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ELEMENTS

ministration

JAMES W. FESLER FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX

GEORGE A. GRAHAM DON K. PRICE

V. O. KEY, JR. HENRY REINING, JR.

AVERY LEISERSON WALLACE S. SAYRE

MILTON M. MANDELL DONALD C. STONE

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD JOHN A. VIEG

JOHN D. MILLETT DWIGHT WALDO

Edited By

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX

NEW YORK
PRENTICE - HALL - INC.

PRENTICE-HALL, INC.

70 Fifth Avenue, New Yor/<

reprinted in any form, by mimeograph or any

other means, without permission in writing from

the publishers.

First printing November, 1946
Siioml punting .. Fcbnun, l(H7
Third printing NoM-rnher, 1^48
Fourth printing November, 1949

PRINTED IN* THK UNITFD STATFS OF AMERICA

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Preface

THIS book is a testimonial to its publisher's persistence. Idle minds
have always liked to toy with ideas for books that "ought to be written."
However alluring any such plan, its author is apt to consider it highly
unfair to be burdened with its execution. The editor could have done
wonders with his lawn had he managed to cling to the role of the
gratuitous book-planner. For better or for worse, the publisher prodded
him into a more exacting job.

This book is also a demonstration of teamwork. The fourteen men
who came together to form the team discovered that they thought very
much alike about the field of interest they had in common. When they
joined forces, all of them were engaged in the practical business of public
administration; all of them were under the influence of fresh experience;
and all of them were stimulated by new insights that open up to those
placed strategically within the administrative structure.

These exceptional circumstances held forth the promise of a unified
and systematic treatment of the subject rather than a symposium made up
of unconnected essays. In the exchange of views among the members of
the team, the preliminary plan grew into an integrated enterprise to
which each member contributed his carefully defined share. Throughout
the writing of the book, its character as a combined operation was sus-
tained by the team spirit of each participant.

The principal aim of the book is to deepen the reader's understand-
ing of the administrative process as an integral phase of contemporary
civilization. In a sense, therefore, this is a broadly political rather than
merely technical study. Its focus is on the fundamental problems of
public administration — the problems that assert themselves at countless
points within the framework of governmental effort. The analysis here
presented attempts to explore both the range of controlling institutional
factors and the variables of administrative behavior.

The aim of the book compelled an approach appropriate to it. A
glance at the table of contents will show that the customary division of
the subject matter has been modified in several important respects. There
is also a deliberate recurrence of basic themes, each being developed in
progressive specificity as the discussion moves forward. One of these
basic themes inevitably runs through the entire volume — that of the im-

viii PREFACE

plications of democratic governance for public management in all of its
ramifications.

Many good friends have been generous enough to support the team
at various junctures with sound counsel and welcome assistance. To name
them all would make a long list. The editor is particularly grateful for
the unfailing help rendered him by his secretary, Raye R. Schwciger.
Mary Friedrich and Betty I. Bleichncr of the reference staff of the Library
of the United States Bureau of the Budget have given liberally of their
bibliographical knowledge. The distinguished record officer of the same
agency, Helen L. Chatficld, as an act of supererogation turned herself
into a painstaking proofreader. All these expressions of sympathetic
interest are sincerely appreciated.

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX
Washington, D. C.

Introducing the Team

James W. Fcsler, a former research fellow of the Brookings Institution and
the Rockefeller Foundation, is protessor of political science at the University
of North Carolina. In the federal government he has served on the staffs of
the National Resources Committee, the President's Committee on Administrative
Management, the Office of Production Management, the War Production Board,
and the Civilian Production Administration. From 1941 to 1943 he was
special assistant to the executive secretary of OPM and WPB; from 1943 to
1946 he headed the Policy Analysis and Records Branch of WPB and later of
CPA, combining with his duties during the last two years those of the War
Production Board's historian. His main writings are Executive Management
and the Federal Field Service (1937), one of the special studies sponsored by
the President's Committee on Administrative Management; and The Independ-
ence of State Regulatory Agencies (1942).

George A. Graham, professor of politics at Princeton University, has also
taught at the University of Illinois and at Monmouth College. He has been
associated with the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research and the Princeton
Local Government Survey. In 1942 he joined the Administrative Management
Division of the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President. In
1943 he was made chief of the War Supply Section, and subsequently also served
as head of the War Records Section. In 1945 he was placed in charge of the
Government Organization Branch. His publications include Special Assess-
ments in Detroit (1931); Pe sonnel Practices in Business and Governmental
Organization (1935), one of the monographs of the Commission of Inquiry on
Public Service Personnel; Education for Public Administration (1941); and Reg-
ulatory Administration (1943), of which he was co-editor.

V. O. Key, Jr., professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, has
been a staff member of the National Resources Planning Board and a con-
sultant to the Social Security Board. In the immediate prewar period he also
served as a member of the Baltimore Commission on Governmental Efficiency
and Economy. During World War II he was associated with the Adminis-
trative Management Division of the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office
of the President. I le is the author of The Administration of Federal Grants
to States (1937) and Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (1942); and co-author
of The Initiative and the Referendum in California (1939). One of his more
recent contributions to the periodicals of politics and public administration is
"The Reconversion Pha^e of Demobilization," American Political Science Review,
December, 1944.

Avery Leiserson, of the political science faculty at the University of Chicago,
has been a stafT member of the Labor Advisory Board of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Admininration in the early New Deal period, and later a field
examiner for the National Labor Relations Board. Subsequently he served as
conference director of the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton

X INTRODUCING THE TEAM

University, and as panel secretary to the National Defense Mediation Board.
During World War II he was associated with the Administrative Management
and Estimates divisions of the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Oifice of the
President. His chief work is Administrative Regulation (1942), a study of the
methods by which interest groups participate in the administrative process.

Milton M. Mandcll is at present in charge of testing for administrative and
managerial positions, a significant phase of the program of the United States
Civil Service Commission. He was formerly lecturer in personnel administra-
tion at New York University and the College of the City of New York. He
has been a staff member of the municipal civil service commission in Los Angeles
and the Tennessee Valley Authority; classification consultant to the State of
Connecticut; personnel officer of the Materials Division of the War Production
Board; and chief analyst with the President's Committee for Congested Produc-
tion Areas. He is the co-author of Education and the Civil Service in New
Yor^ City (1938), product of a study of public personnel administration which
he supervised under auspices of New York University; and author of other
contributions to public personnel administration.

Harvey C. Mansfield currently serves as the historian of the Office of Price
Administration. He was formerly assistant professor of government at Yale
University, and has also taught at Stanford University. He was a member of
the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. In 1942
he joined OPA as a principal administrative officer, and subsequently became asso-
ciate price executive and price executive of the Consumer Durable Goods Branch.
In 1945 he was appointed assistant director of the Consumer Goods Division of
OPA. His principal publications are The La^e Cargo Coal Rate Controversy
(1932); The General Accounting Office (1937), one of the special studies spon-
sored by the President's Committee on Administrative Management; and The
Comptroller General (1939).

John D. Millett, associate professor of public administration at Columbia
University, has also taught at Rutgers University. He has been a staff member of
the President's Committee on Administrative Management; assistant secretary
to the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Coun-
cil; and special assistant to the Director of the National Resources Planning Board.
In World War II he was commissioned a major in the United States Army, as-
signed to the Control Division at headquarters of the Army Service Forces; he
left the Army as a colonel. He is the author of The Worlds Progress Adminis-
tration in New Yor^ City (1938) and The British Unemployment Assistance
Board (1939); co-author of Federal Administrators (1939) and The Adminis-
tration of Federal Wor\ Relief (1941). One of his latest contributions to pro-
fessional journals is a study of the direction of supply activities in the War
Department, published in the American Political Science Review, April and
June, 1944.

Fritz Morstein Marx, a research fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation in
1930-1931, has taught at the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, Princeton
University, New York University, Harvard University, Columbia University,
Queens College, Yale University, and American University. Prior to his enlist-
ment in the Army in 1942, he served as consultant to various local, state, and
federal agencies. He has been engaged in research work for the Commission
of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, and was the first chairman of the Special
Committee on Comparative Administration, sponsored by the Committee on

INTRODUCING THE TEAM xi

Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council. Since his return
from the Army, he has worked in the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office
of the President, where he is currently employed as staff assistant in the Office
of the Director. His writings include a study of judicial review under the
Weimar Constitution (1927); Government in the Third Reich (rev. ed., 1937);
and a series of papers on comparative administrative law. He is the editor of
Public Management in the New Democracy (1940).

Don K. Price, a Rhodes scholar in 1932, is associate director of the Public
Administration Clearing House and lecturer in political science at the University
of Chicago. He has served as a staff member of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Central Housing Committee. More recently he has been attached
to the Administrative Management Division of the Bureau of the Budget, Execu-
tive Office of the President. During World War II he was a lieutenant in the
United States Coast Guard Reserve, assigned to headquarters in Washington.
He is co-author of City Manager Government in the United States (1939), a
study undertaken for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social
Science Research Council. He was the first managing editor of Public Admin-
istration Review, to which he contributed a spirited exchange with Professor
Harold J. Laski on the respective merits of presidential and cabinet government.

Henry Reining, Jr., assistant to the executive director of the Port of New
York Authority, previously was management consultant with Rogers & Slade in
New York City, where he specialized in programs for the selection of prospec-
tive executives. Before 1945 he served for ten years as the first educational
director of the National Institute of Public Affairs in Washington, D. C., which
has been singularly successful in sponsoring governmental internship programs
for college graduates of high promise, and more recently for able federal em-
ployees on an in-service basis; the latter program is now being conducted by the
United States Civil Service Commission. Before assuming this position, he
was a faculty member of Princeton University and research associate of the
Princeton Local Government Survey. He has also taught at George Washington
University, American University, and the University of Southern California, an
institution that has pioneered in the field of government-employee training. He
has been consultant to several federal agencies, and also to the National De-
partment of Administration of the Public Service (DASP) in Brazil. He is
the co-editor of Regulatory Administration (1943) and author of a number of
articles in academic reviews.

Wallace S. Sayre, personnel director of the Office of Price Administration,
has recently been appointed professor of administration at the School of Business
and Public Administration of Cornell University. He was formerly a member
of the political science faculty of New York University. In 1937 he was ap-
pointed secretary of the municipal civil service commission in New York City,
and a year later became a member of the commission. Early in 1942 he entered
the service of the Office of Price Administration as principal consultant to the
Personnel Branch. Soon afterwards he was made assistant director of the Fuel
Rationing Division; he assumed direction of OPA's personnel functions in
1944. He is a consulting editor of the New York Legislative Service, and was
a member of the group that drafted the Model Civil Service Law. His writings
have been devoted to various aspects of American government and politics, in-
cluding political biography and the role of the public service. He is co-author
of Charter Revision for the City of New Yor^ (1934) and Education and the
Civil Service in New Yor% City (1938).

Xll INTRODUCING THE TEAM

Donald C. Stone is assistant director in charge of administrative management
in the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President — a position he has
occupied since 1939. He has played a prominent role in the field of govern-
mental research, serving successively as a staff member of the Cincinnati Bureau
of Governmental Research; assistant director for the Committee on Uniform
Crime Records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; staff member
of the Institute of Public Administration in New York City; director of research
of the International City Managers Association; and executive director of the
Public Administration Service in Chicago. During these years he has also
worked as a consultant to many federal agencies, including the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the Social Security Board. As an officer of the Federal Gov-
ernment, he has attended numerous international conferences, both as a member
of the United States delegation and in an advisory capacity. Formerly asso-
ciated with the University of Chicago and Syracuse University, he is now adjunct
professor of public administration at American University. He is the author of
The Management of Municipal Public Worths (1939) and other studies, most
of which have appeared in professional periodicals.

John A. Vieg, professor of government and chairman of his department at
Pomona College, has taught at various institutions, including Iowa State College.
He was research associate at the University of Chicago from 1934 to 1937. In
1943 he became a staff member of the Administrative Management Division of
the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, where he dealt
principally with matters of international administration. While on the faculty
of Iowa State College, he also served as vice chairman of the city plan commission
of Ames, and as vice chairman of the Story County Civilian Defense Council. He
has written The Government of Education in Metropolitan Chicago (1939),
and is co-author of City Manager Government in Seven Cities (1940), The
Future of Government in America (1942), and Wartime Government in Opera-
tion (1943).

Dwight Waldo, formerly of Yale University, is a member of the political
science department at the University of California in Berkeley. In 1942 he
became a staff member of the Office of Price Administration, serving successively
as an administrative assistant, assistant economist, anu price analyst. In 1945
he transferred to the Administrative Management Division of the Bureau of
the Budget, Executive Office of the President, where he devoted his time prin-
cipally to organizational studies. His published writings, thus far confined to
the learned reviews, have dealt with such seemingly disparate matters as social
thought and public-service recruitment. His first book, an analysis of the theory
of American public administration, is scheduled for early release.

Contents

CHAPTER PACK

PREFACE vii

INTRODUCING THE TEAM ix

PARTI
The Role of Public Administration

1. THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, John A. Vieg 3

1. ADMINISTRATION — PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 3

Administration as Part of All Planned Effort, 3; Unity of Scientific Knowledge
of Administration, 4; Scope of Pub'ic Admmistr tion, 5; Elements of Public
Administration, 6; Administration as Servant of Policy, 7.

2. THE AMERICAN BACKGROUND 9

Heritage from Britain, 9; Influence of the Frontier, 11; Hamiltoman and JefTer-
soman Traditions, 12; Public Administration and the National Economy, 13;
Assertion of the Public Interest, 14.

3. THE EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 14

American Pragmatism, 14; Limits to Government Nonintervention, 15; Estab-
lishment of Clientele Departments, 16; Rise of Governmental Corporations, 17;
Growth of Administrative Activities, 18.

4. INCREASING COMPETENCE FOR INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES 20

Professional Versus Amateur, 20; Patronage and Economy, 22; Advances in
Structure and Procedure, 23; Impact of Emergencies, 25; Tasks of Admin-
istration in Mid-Century, 25.

2. THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Avcry Leiserson 27

£T"V-N

1 . THE WORK OF THE PIONEERS >. . .\ 27

Beginnings of Administrative Research, 27; Wives of Governmental Reform,
28; Organized Dissemination of Knowledge, 25; Role of Progressivism, 29; Con-
tribution of the Universities, 30.

2. THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 31

Relativity of Efficiency, 31; Use of Outside Experts, 32; Challenge to Traditional
Approach, 33; Rise of Administrative Self-Analysis, 34; Reaffirmation of the
Political Context, 36.

xiii

XIV CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

3. TRAINING FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ....................... 37

Educational Aspects, 37; Contrast with Great Britain, 39; Post-Entry Training,
40; Group Structure of the Public Service, 41; Higher Career Opportunities, 41.

4. THE FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH ................................ 42

Function Versus Structure, 42; Man in Organization, 43; Theory of Relation-
ships, 44; Progressive Management, 46; Horizons of Administrative Research, 47.

5. ADMINISTRATION — ART OR SCIENCE? ......................... 48

Aims of Scientific Approach, 48; Concerns of the Technician, 49; Science and
Social Dynamics, 49; Evaluated Experimentation, 49; Alliance of Theory and
Practice, 50.

2* UREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION, John A. Vteg ......... 51

1. SEMANTICS AND REALITIES ................................... 51

The Language of Contempt, 51; Officiousness and Frailty, 52; Administrative
Self-Promotion, 52; Procedural Rigmarole, 54; Subjectivity and Objectivity, 55.

2. THE SOURCES OF RED TAPE ................................. 55

Red Tape and Green Tape, 56; Requirements of Efficiency, 56; Predictability
of Performance, 57; Government of Laws, 57; Accountability to the Public, 57.

3. THE CHARGE OF DESPOTISM ................................. 58

Effects of the Industrial Age, 58; Charge of Usurpation, 59; Legislative Dele-
gation, 60; Flexibility of Statutory Standards, 61; Quasi-Judicial Agencies, 61.

4. THE BATTLE AGAINST REGIMENTATION ....................... 63

Experience Abroad, 63, Parliamentary Review ot Delegated Legislation, 64;
Ignoble Partisanship, 65, Matrix of a Mixed Economy, 65, Experimental Ac-
commodation, 66.

5. THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING ............................. 66

Psychology of Public Emplo\nunt, 67, VYi! of Oliicial Anonymity, 68; Teams
and Cogs, 69; Ethics of Political Counsel, 70; Fact Over Fiction, 70.

4. DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION, Don K. Price ........... 72

1 . LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIPS ....................... ?2

Prophets of 111, 72, Dangers of Oversimplification, 74; Control by Delegation,
75, Democracy and Legislative Supremacy, 76; Legislators Vc^us Legisla-
tures, 77.

2. THE PUBLIC AS STAR CUSTOMER ............................. 78

Methods of Opinion Analysis, 78; Advisory Committees, 79; Day-by-Day
Administrative Relationships, 79; Reporting to the Public, 80; Commissions of
Inquiry, 80.

3. PUBLIC ^PARTICIPATION ......................................

Cooperative Government, 81; Combined Operations Among Levels of Gov-
ernment, 82; Benefits of Intergovernmental Collaboration, 84; Inclusion of
Business and Labor, 85; Group Initiative Under National Standards, 86.

CONTENTS XV

CHAPTER PAGE

4. REPRESENTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 87

Interdependence of Public and Private Interests, 87; Threefold Collaboration in
Policy -Making, 88; Informality of Policy-Making/ Process, 89; Experimental
Approach, 90; General Interest Over Special Interest, 90.

5. DEPARTMENTAL DEMOCRACY 91

Individual Freedom Versus Institutional Restraint, 97; Sense of General Pur-
pose, 93; Vice of Departmentalism, 94; Inroads of Perfectionism, 95; Demo-
cratic Self- Education, 96.

5. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,

Fritz Morstein Marx 98

1. THE "AMERICAN SYSTEM" AND THE SERVICE STATE 98

Wartime Rccurd, 98; Peacetime Relevance of Wartime Achievement, 98; Long-
Range Trend Toward the Service State, 99; Assurance Versus Fear, 100; Test
of the Service State, 100.

2. THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICE STATE 101

Making Democracy Succeed, 101; Continuity of Progress, 102; Surviving Con-
tradictions, 103; Requirements of Public Management, 104; Requirements of
Policy Planning, 105.

3. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION — INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT 106

Prominence of Public Administration, 106; Demands on Legislative Leadership,
106; Role of the Judicial Power, 107; Resources of Administration, 108; Admin-
istration as a Fitting Process, 108.

4. THE ENLISTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT 108

Legislative Marching Orders, 108; Political Feasibility of Policy, 709, Admin-
istrative Feasibility of Policy, 110. Blending of Judgments, 110; Administra-
tive Freedom of Expression, 111.

5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SERVICE Ill

Popular Basis of Administrative Services, 111; Habit of Self-Restraint, 112;
Governmental Reinforcement of the Enterprise Economy, 113, Benefits of Regu-
lation, 113; Popular Accountability of Administration, 114.

6. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION — SOCIAL BUFFER 114

Fountains of Administrative Knowledge, 114, Government's Intelligence Func-
tion, 114; Public Research and Analysis, 115; Getting at the Facts, 116; Con-
cern for the Underdog, 776.

PART II
Organization and Management

6. PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION, John D. Milieu 121

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING 121

Essence of Planning, 727; Contribution of Administrative Planning, 123; Plan-
ning and Legislation, 124; Planning and Administration, 124; Interrelation of
Planning Activities, 124.

XVi CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

2. THE MACHINERY FOR PLANNING 126

Federal Improvisation, 126; Natural Resources Planning Board, 727; Office of
War Mobilization and Reconversion, 128; New York City Planning Commis-
sion, 128; Departmental Planning Units, 130.

3. PLANNING VERSUS OPERATIONS 130

Opportunities for Conflict, 1 30; Task of Progressive Management, 131; Plan-
ners as Administrators, 131, Practical Test of Planning, 132; Planning Through
Action Agencies, 133.

4. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PLANNING 133

Long-Range Versus Short-Range Planning, 133; Planning Personnel, 134; Plan-
ning Techniques, 136, Public Relations of Planning, 138; Summary, 138.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION, John D. Milieu. . 140

1. THE ARCHITECTURE OF ORGANIZATION 140 -

Terminology, 140. Bases of Organization, HI; Choice of Basis, H2; Dynamics
and Rigidities, H3; Political Factors in Organization, 144.

2. LINE AND STAFF (1 4y

''Meaning of Line, H5; Meaning of Staff, 146; Staff Activities Inherent in Ad-
ministration, 147; Ceritral Service Activities, 147; Functional and Operating
Staff, 147.

3. QUEST OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY 148

Hierarchy and Span of Control, 148; Decentralization, 149; Unity of Com-
mand, 150; Coordination, 752; Integration, 752.

4. GUIDING RULES OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 153

Need for Standards of Organization, 153; Insuring Sound Organization, 154;
Summary, 756.

fi. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, John A. Vieg 158

1. DUAL FUNCTION: POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

Means and Ends, 158; Separation of Political Leadership and Administration,
759; Combination of Political Leadership and Administration, 767.

r2. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY 162

Cloak of Legal Power, 762; Personal Qual fications, 762; Mark of Leadership,
164; Political and Administrative Talent, 765; American Presidents, l£6; Crea-
tive Policy Versus Sound Administration, 767; Business Leaders,
ernors and Mayors, 168.

3. EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS 169

Relations with the Judiciary, 769; Relations with the Legislature, 170; Agency
Contacts with Legislators, 777; Relations with Other Chief Executives, 777;
Relations with Political Parties, 772; Puolic Opinion and Interest Groups, 772.

4. INTERNAL DIRECTION AND CONTROL 174

Administrative Planning and Direction, 774; Executive Coordination and Ad-
ministrative Reporting, 174; Constitutional Supports, 775; Statutory Implemen-
tation, 777.

CONTENTS XVii

CHAPTER PACE

5. ARMS OF MODERN MANAGEMENT 178

Need for Assistance to the President, 178; Realigning the Executive Branch,
779; Central Staff Facilities, 180; Executive Office of the President, 181; Policy
Coordination, 182; Potentialities of the Cabinet, 182.

9. THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM, Fritz Morstein Marx 184

1. GENERAL FEATURES 184

Purpose of Departmentalization, 184; Structure of Departmental System, 185;
Factors in Departmentalization, 187; Undirected Growth, 189; Quasi-Depart-
mcnts, 190.

2. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION 191

Staff Establishments, 792; Coordinating Agencies, 193; Role of the Cabinet,
195; Use of Interdepartmental Committees, 196; Avenues of Progress, 797.

3. THE SECRETARY'S BUSINESS 198

External Affairs, 198; Living in a Goldfish Bowl, 799; Character of Execu-
tive Function, 200; Classes of Executive Aides, 201; Attaining an Institutional
Product, 201.

4. THE BUREAU PATTERN 202

Special Concerns Versus General Purpose, 202; Centrifugal Pull, 203; Bureau
Intransigence, 204, Weight of Professionalization on Bureau Level, 204; Re-
affirming Unity of Purpose, 205.

10. INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS, James W.

Fesler 207

1. TYPES OF INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS 207

Meaning of Independence, 207; Institutional Safeguards of Independence, 209;
Appointment and Removal of Members, 210; Financial Support and Basic Au-
thority, 277; Political Factors, 271.

2. NATURE AND CONDUCT OF REGULATORY BUSINESS 212

Rule-Making and Case -by-Case Decision, 2/2; Administrative Approach, 274;
Mixture of Approaches, 275; Judicial Control, 277; Proposals of Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 279.

3. THE RECORD OF INDEPENDENCE 221

Regulation by Independent Commissions and by Executive Departments, 227;
Clifcntcle Departments and Directive Power, 222; Struggle for Control Over
Independent Commissions, 22.?; Humphrey Case, 224; Experience in the States,
226.

4. THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE 227

Popular Illusions, 227; Need for Policy Coordination, 228; Lethargy of Inde-
pendence, 228; Pressure for Reform, 229; Lack of Stimulation, 229.

5. ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES 230

Executive Control, 231; Legislative Control, 231; Judicial Control, 232; Segre-
gation of Powers of Independent Commissions, 233; Proposals of President's
Committee on Administrative Management, 234.

XVlii CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

11. GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, V. O. Key, Jr 236

1. CENTRAL CONTROLS AND MANAGERIAL FREEDOM 236

Direction by the Chief Executive, 236; Overhead Control of Departmental
Methods, 236, Control Machinery in Action, 237; Central Control and De-
partmental Resourcefulness, 238; Changing Role of Government Corporations,
238.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE SYSTEM IN GOVERNMENT. . 240

Variety of Government Corporations, 240; Government Corporations as Product
of Emergencies, 241; Great Depression and World War II, 241, Government
Corporations m the Field of Farm Credit, 243, Scope of Corporate System, 244.

3. OVERHEAD CONTROL OF CORPORATE OPERATIONS 244

Immunit) from the Power of the Purst, 244; Restrictions on Corporate Auton-
omy, 246, Emerging State of Budgetary Control, 250, Powers of Comptroller
General, 257; Central Control of Personnel, 255.

4. CORPORATE AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 256

Legislative Bewilderment, 256, Political A iMgomsms, 258, Providing Informa-
tion for the Legislature, 259, Enforcing Political Responsibility of Government
Corporations, 260, Contribution of the Corporate Device, 262.

12. FIELD ORGANIZATION, James W. Fesler 264

1. THE GROWTH OF FIELD ORGANIZATION 264

Continental Prototypes, 264; British Development, 266; Expansion of Federal
Functions, 266, Technological Progress, 267; Scope of Field Organization,
265.

»2J CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION 269

Approach to Decentralization, 269; Factor of Responsibility, 270; Administra-
tive Factors, 270; Functional Factors, 273, hxternal Factors, 274.
/

3. FIELD-HEADQUARTERS RELAT IONS 276

Rivalry of Functional Experts and General Administrators, 276; Lines of Com-
mand, 277; Personnel Policies, 279, Headquarters Office of Field Operations,
280, Problems of Communication, 280; Controls Over Field Organization, 281;
Problems of Multilevel Field Organization, 283.

4. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN THE FIELD 284

Divergencies in Field Organization, 284; Emerging Uniformities, 285; Pooling
of Field Resources, 286; Regional Coordinators, 287; Special Coordinative Ma-
chinery, 288.

5. THE PROSPECTS OF JOINT FIELD PLANNING 289

Regional Planning Commissions, 259, Regional Development Authorities, 290;
Function Versus Area, 297; Remaining Issues, 297; Community-Level Analysis,
292.

13. INFORMAL ORGANIZATION, Harvey C. Mansfield and Fritz

Morstein Marx 294

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

[My FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 294

Organic Growth of Informal Organization, 294; Charts and Realities, 294; "
Attitudes and Motivations, 295; Basis of Personal Organization, 296; Growing
and Shrinking Organizations, 297.

2. ELEMENTS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 297

Characteristic Factors, 297; Self -Expression of Influence, 297; Variables Affecting
Authority, 299; Forms of Personal Organization, 300; Ties of Allegiance, 303.

3. NONHIERARCHICAL SOURCES OF POWER 306

Men Behind the Throne, 307; The Personal Secretary, 309; The Invincible
Constellation, 311; Clubs and Clusters, 312; Voice of the Union, 313.

14. INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION, Avcry Leiscrson. .. 314

1. THE MEANING OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION 314

Types of Interest Groups, 314; Interest Orientation of Public Administration,
315; Governmentahzation of Interest Groups, 316; Interest Groups and Class
Theory, 317 ; Demands for Interest Representation, 317.

2. CLIENTELE ORGANIZATION 318

Growth of Clientele Agencies, 318, Disadvantages of Clientele Organization,
318, Attempts at Internal Balance of Interests, 319; Functions of Clientele
Agencies, 320; Experiences of the Great Depression and World War II, 321.

3. STAFFING FOR POINT OF VIEW 322

Grounds for Interest Representation, 322; Administrative Appointment of Inter-
est Representatives, 323; Problems of Dual Allegiance, 324; Group Representa-
tion Through Special Staff Units, 326, Balance Sheet of Experience, 329.

4. INTEREST REPRESENTATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS 330

Membership Requirements, 330; Nomination by Interest Groups, 331; Bipar-
tisan and Tripartite Boards, 332, Record of Wartime Labor Boards, 333; Test
of Interest Compromise, 334.

5. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSULTATION 334

General Theory of Interest Representation, 334; Basic Distinctions in Group
Representation, 335; Organization of Interest Participation, 336; Three War-
time Examples, 336; Foundations of Interest Consultation, 338.

15. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL, V. O. Key, Jr 339

0 1. MEANS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTROL 339

Central Issue of Governance, 339; Formal Means of Legislative Control, 340;
Looking Into Particulars, 341; Atomization of Control, 342; Weakness of Leg-
islative Discipline, 343.

2. CONTRADICTION OF INTEGRATION 344

Absence of Collective Administrative Responsibility, 344; Splintering Effects of
Legislative-Executive Relations, 345; Legislative Dealings with Subordinate
Personnel, 346; Subtler Legislative Influences, 347; Grants of Organizational
Independence, 348.

XX * CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

3. DIFFUSION OF INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 349

Executive Share in Policy-Making, 349; Desertions from the President's Pro-
gram, 350; Inadequate Legislation, 351; Incongruity Between Power and Re-
sponsibility, 352; Legislators and Administrators, 352.

4. QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 354

Selecting Department Heads, 354; Lower-Level Appointments, 355; Attempted
Extension of Senatorial Confirmation, 356; Removal Power, 357; Legislative
Pressure for Resignation, 358.

5. DRIVES TOWARD REFORM 358

Case for Cabinet Government, 359, Merits of a Question Period, 359; Legis-
lative Committee Meetings with Administrators, 360; Legislative Staffs, 360;
Making Legislative Work Manageable, 361.

PART III
Working Methods

16. THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, Avery

Leiserson 365

1. POLICY FORMATION AND POLICY SANCTION 365

Realm of Administrative Policy, 365; Breadth of Policy-Making Process, 365;
Prompting Role of Management, 366; Legislative Basis of Administrative Policy,
366, Main Division of Responsibility, 367; Coordinate Tasks of Legist a tuic
and Chief Executive, 368.

2. FACT-FINDING AND DISCRETION IN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 368

Delegation of Policy Determination, 368; Administrative Contacts with Pri-
vate Fact-Finding Groups, 369; Interagency Use of Staff Resources, 370; Govern-
ment-wide Clearance of Policy Proposals, 370; Insuring Objectivity in Staff
Recommendations, 371.

3. IDEOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 373

Sources of Ideology, 373; Ideology of Political Office, 373; Administrative
Ideology, 374; Intellectual Flexibility and Emotional Stability, 374; Effects
of Ideological Orientation, 375.

4. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 375

Impact of Interest Groups, 375; Public Relations, 376; Issues of Legality, 376;
Task of the Agency Lawyer, 377; Dynamics of Administrative Policy-Makmg,
377.

17. GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE, Dwight Waldo 381

1. THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF PROCEDURE , 381

Meaning of Procedure, 381; Role of Procedure, 381; Procedures as Laws of
Activity, 382; Procedure as Physiology of Organization, 383; Procedure as In-
stitutional Habit, 383.

CONTENTS XXI

CHAPTER pAGE

2. PROCEDURES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 385

Rule of Law, 385; Safeguarding Liberty and Equality, 386; Legislative Prescrip-
tion of Procedure, 386; Protecting Administrative Morality, 387; Aims of Pro-
cedure, 388.

3. TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 388

Classes of Procedures, 388; Institutional Procedures, 389; Working Procedures,
389; Diversity of Procedures, 391; Two Illustrations, 39 L

4. CREATION AND CRITERIA 392

Procedure-Making Compared with Pohcy-Making, 392; Procedure-Making Units,
394; Art of Making Procedures, 394; Work Simplification and Procedural Stand-
ardization, 395; Problems of Procedure-Making, 396.

5. How TO LIVE AMONG PROCEDURES 398

Law Versus Dispatch, 398, Deficient Procedures, 399; Assessing Red Tape, 399.

18. THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT, Fritz Morstein Marx

and Henry Reining, Jr 400

1. THE DUAL FUNCTION OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 400

Importance of Intermediate Points of Control, 400; Middle Management — Step-
child of Administrative Research, 401; Recognition of a Higher Line Career,
402; Middle Management and Top Direction, 404; Middle Management and
Control of Operations, 406.

2. SUPPORTING TOP DIRECTION 408

Effectiveness of Downward Communication, 408', Two-Way Traffic of Thought,
411; Taking Orders, 413; Tabulations of the Operator, 414; Thinking in Larger
Terms, 415.

3. RUNNING THE SHOW 416

Problems of Delegation, 416; Reinforcing the Line Sector, 417; Organizing for
Work, 418; Reporting Schemes, 419; Keeping Record, 420.

19. THE ART OF SUPERVISION, Henry Reining. Jr 421

1. WHAT is SUPERVISION ? 42P

Direction With Authority, 421; Concept of Functional Foreman, 421; Phases of
Supervision, 422; Scope of Supervision, 422; Institutional Aspects, 42 3.

2: THE SUPERVISORY SKILLS 424

Wartime Innovations, 424; Job Instruction, 426; Improving Methods, 428;
Working With People, 430; Work Simplification, 432.

' 3. PROBLEMS OF SUPERVISION 434

Variations in Supervisory Situation, 434; Requirements of Good Supervision,
435; Democracy of Work, 437; Selecting Supervisors, 439; Supervision and Pol-
icy, 441; Span of Supervision, 442; Employee Organization and Supervision,
442; Short-Run Versus Long-Run Point of View, 443.

4. SUPERVISION AND EMPLOYEE INITIATIVE 444

Institutional Climate, 444; Top Management Support, 445; Channeling Em-
ployee Initiative, 445; Suggestion Systems, 445; Rating Employees, 446.

XX11 CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

20. ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT, Donald C. Stone... 448

1. EVOLUTIONARY CURRENTS 448

Beginnings ot the Analytical Approach, 448; Growth of Systematic Inquiry,
449; Academic and Professional Support, 449; Stimulus from Private Manage-
ment, 450; Government Response, 452.

2. ORGANIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS 452

Conceivable Alternatives, 452; Improvement Through the Administrator's Per-
sonal Action, 453; Use of Outside Consultants, 453; Use ot Committees, 454;
Staff Meetings, 455; Role of an Administrative General Staff, 456; Types of Ad-
ministrative Planning Offices, 459; Tasks of Line Operators and Supervisors,
461; Role of the Rank and File, 462.

3. TECHNIQUES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT / . . . 462

Mission of the Administrator, 462; Types of Administrative Surveys, 464;
Reconnaissance, 466; Planning the Survey, 466; Review of Written Materials,
467; Questionnaires and Check Lists, 468; Interviews, 469; Observation of Opera-
tions, 470; Review of Communications, 471; Work-Load and Work-Measure-
ment Data, 471; Charting Devices, 472; Reports, 472.

4. BASIC RESOURCES IN MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT 473

Qualifications for Analysis, 473; Skill in Human Relations, 474; Training Sur-
veys, 475; Employee-Initiated Action, 476; Summary, 476.

21. MORALE AND DISCIPLINE, Wallace S. Sayre 479

1. THE MEANING OF MORALE 479

Components of Morale, 479; True Com and Counterfeit, 480; Democratic Im-
plications of Morale, 481; Doctrinal Counterinfluences, 481; Impact of Military
and Business Prototypes, 483.

2. BUILDING GROUP MORALE 483 ]

Basic Premises, 483; New Methodology, 484; Teamwork, 485; Leadership,

485; Group Development, 486; Working Together, 487; Union Attitudes,
488; Incentives, 490 \ Performance Standards, 490; Essentiality of Purpose, 491.

3. THE MODES OF DISCIPLINE 491

Aims of Discipline, 491; Disciplinary Restraints, 492; Political Aspects, 493;
Service Ethics, 493; Evocation of Self-Discipline, 494.

4. MORALE AND INSTITUTIONAL PATTERN 495

Organizational Structure and Concerted Action, 495; Balance of Structure and
Morale, 495; Organization in Action, 495; Effects of Specialization, 496; Dis-
cipline as Affirmative Pressure, 496.

PART IV
Responsibility and Accountability

22, ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY, George A. Graham 501

1. MEN AND INSTITUTIONS 501

Responsible Men, 501; Responsible Institutions, 503; Interdependence of Men
and Institutions, 503; The Political Implications of Business Practice, 504;
Automatism? 506*

CONTENTS XXiii

CHAPTER PAGE

2. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY 507

Responsible Legislators, 507; Realism in Responsibility of Legislators, 507; Leg-
islative Irresponsibility? 508; Suicidal Tendencies, 509; Responsibility and Lead-
ership, 509; Responsibility of the Legislative Body, 510.

3. EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 512

Elected Chief Executives, 512; Responsibility of the Chief Executive, 51 3\ Ex-
ecutive Restraint, 514; Executive Emphasis on Teamwork, 514; High Officials —
Political Leadership, 515.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS 516

Politician and Civil Servant, 576; General Interest Versus Special Interest, 576;
Integrity and Good Faith, 577; Civil Service — But Not Servility, 577.

23. THE JUDICIAL TEST, Don K. Price 519

1. THE RULE OF PRACTICALITY 519

Propriety of Administrative Rule-Making and Adjudication, 579; Test of Social
Utility, 520; Two Illustrations, 527; Extending the Rule of Law, 522; Admin-
istrative Regulation as Alternative to Public Ownership, 522.

2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE LAWYERS 523

Prevention Over Punishment, 523; Regulation as Partnership in Management,
524; Informal Settlement Versus Formal Adjudication, 525; Balance of Public
Interests, 526; "Snuffing the Approach of Tyranny," 527; Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 529.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE FAIRNESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 531

Rules of Evidence, 531; Spot-Check of Judicial Review, 532; Scope of Judicial
Review, 533; Legitimate Judicial Concerns, 534; Legislative and Judicial Stand-
ards of Review, 535.

4. THE ORGANIZATION OF ADJUDICATION 537

Prosecutor-and-Judge Agencies, 537; Continental Administrative Courts, 538;
American Alternatives, 539; Executive Integration of Regulatory Bodies, 540;
Political Factors, 542.

5. CONCLUSION 543

Benefits of Administrative Specialization, 543; Combining Flexibility and Prin-
ciple, 543.

24. PERSONNEL STANDARDS, Milton M. Manddl 544

1. RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPETENCE 544

Ensuring Responsive and Resourceful Administration, 544; Management and
the Personnel Function, 544; Reformist Background and Legislative Aspirations,
545; New Outlook, 5-46; Diversity ot Government Employment, 546.

2. THE PERSONNEL OFFICE IN GOVERNMENT 547

Central Personnel Agencies, 548; Working Relationships, 549; Departmental
Personnel Offices, 550; Relations With Operating Officials, 551; Qualifications
for Personnel Work, 552.

XXIV CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

3. CLASSIFICATION AND COMPENSATION 553

Characteristics of Classification, 553 \ Keeping Classification Up-To-Date, 554;
General Overview Versus Special Considerations, 554; Classification and the
Career Service, 555; Compensation, 556.

4. EMPLOYMENT 557

Implications of the Career Idea, 557; Recruitment, 559; Examinations, 560;
Written Tests, 562; Oral Tests, 56J; Evaluation of Education and Experience,
564; Performance Tests, 565; Placement, 566,

5. TRAINING 567

Types of Training, 567; Prc-Entry Training, 568; Orientation, 570; In-Scrvicc
Training, 57f , Post-Entry Training, 57 3.

6. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 574

Place of the Union, 574; Stress and Strain, 574; Unionism and Service Neu-
trality, 575; Value of Unions to Management, 575; Grievance Procedure, 576.

25. FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, Harvey C. Mansfield 577

1. FUEL FOR THE ENGINES OF ADMINISTRATION 577

Administrative Responsibility and Fiscal Accountability, 577; Multitude of
Voices 578; Pressures and Restraints, 579; Pattern of Legislative Money Grants,
580; Forms of Accountability, 58 L

2. JUSTIFICATION 582

Call for Estimates, 582; Departmental Consideration, 583; Formulation of the
Executive Budget, 586; Legislative Action, 557; Congressional Reform Pro-
posals, 590.

3. BUDGETARY COORDINATION 593

Essence of Coordination, 593; Stimulation of Program Thinking, 594; Coordi-
nation by Consultation, 595; Departmental Synthesis, 596; Top-Level Coordi-
nation, 597.

4. BUDGET EXECUTION 598

Budget Principles and the Test of Practice, 598; Divergence Over Ultimate Ends,
602; Fund Control, 603; Allotments, 60 3; Apportionments, 604; Financial
Reporting, 605; Personnel Ceilings, 605.

5. AUDIT 606

Public Finance and Representative Government, 606; Expenditure Control in
England, 606; Beginnings of Expenditure Control in the United States, 607;
Specificity of Appropriations, 608; Administrative Checks, 609; Delay and Lax-
ity, 610; Path of Reform, 672; Formation of the General Accounting Office,
613; Control Versus Audit, 614; Safeguarding Operational Responsibility, 6/5;
Balance Sheet of Audit and Settlement of Accounts, 6/7.

INDEX 623

Parti
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER

The Growth of Public Administration

1. ADMINISTRATION — PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Administration as Part of All Planned Effort. Save for those who drift
through life and care not where the current takes them, all men know
something from their own experience about the importance and the ways
of administering their affairs. For to refuse to let circumstances run some
wayward course and to work instead within the limits they impose to
attain a more acceptable end — this, at heart, is the idea of administration.

In simplest terms, administration is determined action taken in pursuit
of conscious purpose. It is the systematic ordering of affairs and the calcu-
lated use of resources, aimed at making those things happen which we
want to happen and simultaneously preventing developments that fail to
square with our intentions, (it is the marshaling of available labor and
materials in order to gain that which is desired at the lowest cost in energy,
time, and money.) No man, therefore, who singly or in company with
others has ever laid out — or had laid out for him — a course of action and
proceeded on it can be without some intimation of the nature of adminis-
tration. Motivated by their desires and interests, individuals and groups of
individuals set themselves their main goals; what they do thereafter to
translate these goals into positive achievement is essentially administration.

Regardless of the field of human endeavor, there is thus an adminis-
trative side to all planned effort. In simple situations where the things
that need to be done are obvious, and it is fairly plain who can best do
what, it is possible for people sharing an objective to work as a team and
never grow aware of the fact that their teamwork for the common purpose
spells administration. But when conditions become complex or difficult,
when it is no longer easy to know how to proceed or whether the resources
available will be adequate for gaining the common end, the administrative
aspect emerges as a matter of special attention.

This conscious concern with administration arises first, and principally,
among the comparative few to whom it falls to outline programs, devise

4 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

procedures, and direct or supervise operations. In a more general way, the
importance of administration also comes tcy be recognized by the many —
those through whom the process of cooperative effort operates, so to speak—
and how they "see" it will usually make a considerable difference in the
success or failure of the enterprise. Where they share in its purpose and
can look forward to sharing in some way in its fruits, administration is
accepted as the means whereby they are enabled to be successful in their
jobs, and they work accordingly. Where they reject the purpose and see
no prospect of a fair participation in its results, administration is regarded
as a means of exploiting them against their will — and under such circum-
stances even a genius in management will be unable to achieve more than
poor results.

Although the purpose-minded individual has administrative problems
in his own life, whether he lives in the modern metropolis or on a farm
in Kansas, we usually speak of administration and management in con-
nection with the organization and direction of cooperative or collective
activity. The two terms — administration and management — are sometimes
used interchangeably. In general, administration is the broader term, em-
bracing such factors as establishing priority of specific goals, devising the
most appropriate structural form for the cooperative enterprise, and harness-
ing the total effort toward attainment of the defined ends. Management,
in its distinctive sense, relates primarily to those activities which are designed
to make the enterprise succeed within the framework of policy, structure,
and resources.

Unity of Scientific Knowledge of Administration. It is in the sphere
of cooperative or collective effort that administration has its primary signifi-
cance. Whether social, religious, economic, or political in character, every
organization depends on administration for accomplishing its aims. And
the larger the organization, other things being equal, the greater the need
for administration to be formally and extensively developed. On the ques-
tion of whether administration is chiefly art or science^ we can here confine
ourselves to the observation that, while it is and must be both; it is steadily
coming to be more than an art. From either angle, however, it is equally
obvious that the precepts and standards of administration comprise a single
discipline. Its rules and insights are utilized in numerous and widely
different fields; they nevertheless constitute but one body of theory and
practice.

Like other sciences, the developing science of administration has many
branches. All of them, however, stem from the same trunk. Not a few
people have deluded themselves by assuming — to take the most serious
misconception — that business administration and government administration
are entirely separate spheres, completely distinct from each other. The
fact is that they have more in common than not. Neither stands alone;
both are parts of a larger whole. As disciplines they differ not so much

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 5

in theory and practice as in the uses to which they are put. Yet even in
their particular objectives the gap between them is not as wide as some
seem to suppose. Government and business profit alike by contributions
made by either to the advancement of administration. As one example, the
growing membership and influence of the Society for the Advancement of
Management, supported by both groups, prove that these truths are being
appreciated on both sides. Both are realizing how much theirs is a common
goal and a common interest.

Business affords the most obvious illustration of private administration.
But we find highly developed administration of a nongovernmental char-
acter in other institutional realms also. Mooney and Reiley have under-
scored the importance, especially for the study of organization, of the largely
unexplored riches in the field of ecclesiastic administration.1 The Roman
Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church come to mind as two
conspicuous examples. These and other religious bodies throughout the
world have maintained themselves continuously through many centuries.
Such a record implies remarkable administrative as well as spiritual achieve-
ment. It merits more attention by students of administration than it has
thus far received.

Colleges and universities comprise another institutional sphere which
has contributed much to the development of tested administrative knowl-
edge. The universities of Paris, Oxford, Palermo, Cairo, Salamanca, Kiev,
and Harvard are but a few of many outstanding institutions of learning
which have survived through hundreds of eventful years into our own
time. In order to accomplish their intellectual mission they had to give
much thought to the administration of their institutional affairs. Even
today few problems are more complex than those of giving common focus
to the interests of professors, students, parents, alumni, trustees, and donors
or taxpayers — especially when we consider the fact that most of these
individuals are free agents, not subject to compulsion.

Scope of Public Administration. At its fullest range, public adminis-
tration embraces every area and activity under the jurisdiction of public
policy. We might even include the processes and operations through which
the legislative branch is enabled to exercise its law-making power; there
is much adroit management in the enactment of legislation. In the literal
sense of the term, public administration also includes the functions of the
courts — in the administration of justice — and the work of all the agencies,
military as well as civilian, in the executive branch of government. An
exhaustive treatise on public administration would, therefore, have to give
consideration to judicial structure and procedure and likewise to the special
machinery and methods employed by the armed forces, in addition to

1 Mooney, James D. and Reiley, Alan C., The Principles of Organization, New York:
Harper, 1939, especially the discussion of hierarchy in the Roman Catholic Church in the chapter
on "Theories of Organization."

6 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

legislative management. By established usage, however, the term "public
administration" has come to signify primarily the organization, personnel,
practices, and procedures essential to effective performance of the civilian
functions entrusted to the executive branch of government. We shall use
the term in this customary sense, (p

While not disregarding judicial or military functions, public administra-
tion in our meaning denotes mainly the work of civilian agencies charged
by statutory mandate with carrying on the public business assigned to them.
Broadly speaking, it covers everything they do, or could do, to help the
body politic attain its purposes| More specifically, though not ignoring con-
siderations or activities peculiar to particular governmental levels, types of
program, or geographic areas, I public administration centers its concern in
those matters of organization, procedure, and method common to all or
most administrative agencies. It pertains first and foremost to those factors
of basic importance found throughout the whole range of executive respon-
sibility, j

Application of the body of knowledge called public administration to
any particular function like welfare may carry us from the level of the
town hall to that of the statehouse, from there to the national stage, and
on beyond to international affairs. It may span, on a single plane, from
the bogs and bayous of a Louisiana parish to the desert lands of a county
in Nevada or the wooded hillsides of a New England town. It may impress
identical features on such different functions as health, education, conserva-
tion, transportation, telecommunication. Or it may weave back and forth
from a patently "governmental" function like the arrest and detention of a
thief, to a quasi-governmental, quasi-commercial one like the operation of
an electrical utility, and again to what the cynic would regard as a public
function par excellence, the collection of taxes. Despite the shifting scenes,
certain problems will recur and certain precepts will be uniformly applicable
in every field. Generic administrative theory is everywhere the same; its
major parts comprise the "elements" of public administration.

Elements of Public Administration. The fundamentals of organization,
procedure, and method essential to efficient service in all fields alike, irre-
spective of level, area, function, or purpose, fall into three principal groups.
Success in administration is a composite product made up for the most
part of: (a) effective relations in policy-making between the chief executive
and the legislature or, in the case of a private enterprise, the board of direc-
tors governing the organization; (b) ability of the chief executive and his
principal aides and key subordinates to incorporate the policies adopted
by the legislature or board of directors into workable plans of operation,
sustained by appropriate grouping of component activities; and (c) skill
of those in charge of operations in so directing, coordinating, instructing,
and winning the collaboration of the rank and file of employees that the
objectives embodied in policies and plans will be efficiently accomplished.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 7

Thus it follows that the elements of public administration consist of three
sets of considerations or hypotheses: the first pertaining to the role of the
executive head in policy-making, the second to relations between that official
and his immediate associates in the top structure of the administrative
hierarchy, and the third to relations between the higher operating chiefs
and all employees of progressively lower rank.2

Every science has its problems of nomenclature. One of the problems
of nomenclature in public administration has been to develop agreement
on terms that would clearly denote the three major aspects or phases of
this science. While usage has not become firmly settled, the highest respon-
sibilities— those involving relations with the legislative body — are generally
classified as being executive in character. Those primarily oriented toward
the general scheme of operations are usually referred to as administrative.
Those relating to the actual direction and supervision of the whole force of
employees arc in the main labeled managerial. Managers supervise the fulfill-
ment of work programs under the general direction of administrators, who
in turn carry responsibility for broad assignments given them by the chief
executive, whose policies are formulated in collaboration with the legislative
body. It should be noted, however, that each main phase of responsibility
carries its emphasis into the body of aides attached to it; thus the chief of a
departmental planning staff is an administrative aide.

Administration as Servant of Policy. Whether the sphere of interest be
public or private, administration is always the servant of policy. Manage-
ment— the largest part of administration — denotes means, and means have
no significance except in terms of ends. The dichotomy of ends and means
forms the basis of and supplies the justification for studying public adminis-
tration as an identifiable aspect of government. We usually think of govern-
ment as being divided naturally into three coordinate parts — legislative,
executive, and judicial. It is desirable to recognize the utility of conceiving
of government as a going concern having but two main phases — making
public policy an^ administering the public business in accordance with
that policy.

When the legislative and judicial branches of our national and state
governments confine themselves to their proper functions, the former con-
cerns itself mainly with problems of policy and the latter works entirely
in the field of administration — administering justice. In contrast with these
branches, the executive department is obliged to a certain extent to carry a
double load; top executives have to labor in both vineyards. Presidents,
governors, and mayors (save when relieved of administrative duties by a
city manager) are required to serve both as political leaders and adminis-

3 See Pearson, Norman M., "Fayolism As the Necessary Complement of Taylorism,"
American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39, pp. 68-80. For further elaboration, see Urwick,
Lyndall, The Elements of Administration, London: Pitman, 1943.

8 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

trative chiefs. Except for such administrators-in-chief and their principal
subordinates, however, those engaged in administration do not make or
necessarily participate in making the basic policies they execute. Their
prime job is to give effect to policy. Their main function is the execution
of programs. The sponsorship or authorization of programs is the task of
policy-makers— the elected members of the legislative body and the chief
executive with his associates.

Translated into governmental terms, the ends-means scheme becomes
the dichotomy of politics and administration.3 Admitting its relativities,
this is a useful distinction. It is of practical value also in helping free
citizens understand what they can most wisely do in making democracy
work. The political tests of policy are mainly two: enlightenment and
representativeness. The citizen can force his government to meet these
tests by the proper use of his vote. In contrast there is only one main test
of public administration, and one difficult or impossible for the citizen to
apply: Are the means used effective in terms of their cost in achieving
the end sought? The best way for the citizen to ensure that his government
meets this test is not by trying to measure administrative efficiency himself
but by making his elected representatives insist on the use of objective
measurement of performance within the administrative system.

As a general proposition, policy and politics in the sense of the political
process of policy determination are primary to administration both logically
and chronologically. Policy defines the aims and ends of governmental
action. The ideal of government by consent of the governed would be
empty unless the common man had his say in the matter. In a democracy
of large-scale governmental operations like ours the citizen plainly cannot
have his say directly, except within narrow limits. Through voting, how-
ever, and through other kinds of political activity he can indirectly express
his preference in policy. The people choose their representatives in the
legislature and at the helm of the executive branch; these persons proceed
with the making of public policy. Though they may receive advice and
information from various quarters — officials as well as interested groups —
they alone are called upon to determine and declare policy.

On the highest level, \therefore, public policy is what politically chosen
representatives make it. It is after they have set the goals and laid out the
main lines of action for attaining these goals that the basic role of public

8 For two classic statements of this distinction, see Wilson, Woodrow, "The Study of
Administration," Political Science Quarterly, 1887, Vol. 2, pp. 197-222, and Goodnow, Frank J.,
Politics and Administration, New York: Macmillan, 1900. For an indication of current views,
see Haines, Charles G. and Dimock, Marshall £., eds., Essays on the Law and Practice of
Governmental Administration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 9

administration begins.4 Administrators have the task of enforcing or imple-
menting policy J It is the essence of their craft to handle the public's business
with the greatest efficiency possible, limited only by the resources available
to them and the conditions under whhh they are required to work. In
their capacity as citizens, the men and \\omen who serve in public admin-
istration may not always share the views of those who make official policy
or agree with its wisdom. Unless they resign their posts, however, it is
their solemn duty to bend every effort to accomplish the purpose or the
program set. It is not their business to try to substitute any greater wisdom
they may think they have for any lesser wisdom of the people's chosen
representatives. The time for administrators to record their doubts is at
the stage of policy consideration or reconsideration. Here they will usually
be heard with full appreciation of their judgment.

The public service has much to gain and nothing to lose from observing
the implications of the dichotomy of politics and administration. To the
degree that administrative officials make clear by word and deed that they
regard themselves principally as agents of policy, the public will be likelier
to confine itself to the control of policy in the legislative arena, leaving
administration free to do its work without direct political interference.

2. THE AMERICAN BACKGROUND

Heritage from Britain. Five European nations participated in the ex-
ploration and early settlement of what is now the continental United States.
Only one of them, Britain, left a deep imprint upon our administrative
institutions. British antecedents furnished the models for the towns which
still are the fundamental political units in New England and for the
counties which form the basis of local government in the agrarian South.
The mixed pattern of towns, townships, cities, and counties which has
developed in other regions of the country also arose from these beginnings.
The combinations and modifications which took place have been due mainly
to the influence of geographic and economic factors, and also to the fact
that those who migrated from one section to another simply carried some
of their customs with them.

The ad hoc or special-purpose governmental districts — for schools, water,
drainage, health, recreation — so ubiquitous in American local administra-
tion, are likewise to a degree of English origin. Gcnerically, they may be
traced back to the concept of the limited or single-purpose local public cor-

4 The sequence of politics and administration is perhaps most easily visualized with refer-
ence to a particular statute or program. There are at least five stages in the process, the first
three chiefly political, and the latter two mainly administrative: (a) development of a favorable
public opinion; (b) electioneering; (c) formal legislative adoption or enactment; (d) normal
executive administration, continuing as long as the policy remains unchanged; and (c) judicial
administration for interpretation and application of the policy whenever the citizen claims
thit enforcement would invade his legal rights. Cf. Anderson, William, American City Govern-
mcnt, pp. 188-1<>2. New York: Henry Holt, 1925.

10 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

poration as developed in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. This is not to suggest,
however, that the explanation for our extensive — not to say, excessive — use
of these units is bad British precedent. The historic reason for our having
today some 127,000 school districts is not that our ancestors blindly followed
the example of seventeenth-century English administrative organization. It
was partly the need for a convenient governmental unit through which early
Americans, especially in the northern colonies, could realize their ambition
of providing free common schooling for all children; and partly, once the
pattern of reserving sections of the public domain for the support of educa-
tion had beeji established, the necessity for a device whereby the people of
the Northwest Territory (1787), and also of all other areas subsequently
opened for settlement, could organize to take advantage of their educational
opportunities. Whether the district system should be retained unchanged
or whether it should be modified and simplified are questions to which
students of public administration in the twentieth century must find answers.

Until the first gains, during World War I, of the movement for
state administrative reorganization, perhaps the best way to describe the
impact of the British example on state government would have been in
terms of "reverse English." American experience with royal colonial admin-
istration had been such that, when the people themselves came into control
after 1776, they reversed the model of the powerful chief executive. In
organizing their new state governments they vested preponderant power in
the legislative assembly. Aside from the presidency, it took the nation
approximately a century to overcome its fears and suspicions of centralized
authority, even under popular and legislative control. The movement for
administrative integration under a strengthened executive which has been
the key to much of the progress made in state government during the past
generation is a relatively recent development.

Insofar as the form and character of American national government is
concerned, the Constitution on which it is based comprises a bundle of com-
promises. One of the reasons why compromise was so essential in the his-
toric summer of 1787 was the insistence of many of the Founding Fathers
that the document incorporate numerous features of the British system of
government. They aimed at framing a polity combining both aristocratic
and democratic characteristics, but in such a way that over the years the
popular features could gradually be expanded. Every mature citizen may
judge for himself how well they succeeded.

Finally, there is the matter of English ideals of liberty, equality, and
justice. Our British heritage has not consisted merely of mechanics related
to administrative areas and structures. In some ways the most significant
elements have been those conceptions of individual freedom, due process,
and equal justice which, adding up to the "rule of law," are perhaps the
richest political treasure of American as well as of Anglo-Saxon civilization.
Americans have introduced many modifications in their administrative as in

GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 11

their linguistic heritage. Yet these have not replaced the foundations.
British influence lives in American administration today not only in its struc-
tural forms and operating procedures but still more in the spirit by which
the whole system is animated.

Influence of the Frontier. As part of the "cutting edge of civilization,"
public administration is always affected at any given time by what civiliza-
tion is trying to cut. When it is the wilderness of untamed forests, prairies,
swamps, and deserts with which American government had to contend for
three hundred years as the pioneers made their way westward across the
continent, the effects are of one kind. When civilization is cutting economic
or social barriers in a highly industrialized and urbanized society, the effects
are of a different nature.

The physical frontiers against which American civilization was pushing
from the days of the landings at St. Augustine, Jamestown, and Plymouth
until the last of the good "free land" was staked and claimed around 1890
had several major influences upon the emerging administrative system.
Sparsity of population and the simple life which the pioneers and first set-
tlers led, together witl\ their fierce spirit of self-reliance, caused the activity
of government to be restricted at the outset to little more than the main-
tenance of the peace, the recording of land titles and the administration of
justice. As a result, the ideal of limited government became deeply ingrained
in American political thought. This in turn encouraged the view, asserted
on a national scale by Andrew Jackson, that the duties of public employees
were, or admitted of being made, so simple that as a general rule they could
be performed in a reasonably satisfactory manner by the ordinary citizen,
irrespective of the character of his previous private pursuits. Honesty and
normal intelligence were thought to be the only essential qualifications.

These influences have expressed themselves chiefly in two ways. One
has been the constant disposition of the public to be suspicious of all pro-
posals to extend the range of administrative activity. Millions of Americans
still hold the conviction that government should both stay out of business
and keep away from it — the late nineteenth-century version of Jefferson's
preference for that government which governed least. The other influence
has been a somewhat naive faith in mechanically simple and direct relation-
ships between the citizen and his public servants, coupled with a stubborn
refusal to combine defectively small governmental units into larger and
more resourceful entities. Until near the _ close of the nineteenth century,
virtually every important administrative office— wHetrier IrTtown, city, school
district, county, or state — was on an elective basis. Many still are, particu-
larly in the counties. Moreover, terms of elective office are invariably short3
seldom running over two years.

As for appointive positions, the presumption prevailed from the early
days that there should be frequent rotation in office and that every newly
elected official had the right to dismiss incumbents inherited from his pre-

12 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

decessor and fill their posts with appointees of his own choosing. Con-
siderable success has been achieved on the national level and in the more
progressive states and cities in replacing this tradition by the sounder one
of career service based on merit. However, the old way remains dominant
over a considerable area of public administration even to this day.

Hamiltonian and feffersonian Traditions. Another historic influence upon
modern American administration has been the unceasing contest between
two different governmental theories espoused by the two opposing titans
of Washington's original cabinet.5

Hamilton, brilliant, logical, and conservative, believed that commercial
strength constituted the only sure foundation for national welfare and
favored bold use of federal authority to advance that end. His program
for building up a business class through tariff protection and other aids to
industry inevitably entailed a considerable exercise of centralized power.
This caused opposition at a time when previous experience led most people
to cavil at every debatable employment of public authority as a danger to
individual liberty. Hamilton, however, had no fear of power in government
provided that those who wielded it could be held responsible for their acts.
This philosophy has been a significant factor in American government.
Disillusionment with the consequences of his economic approach has weak-
ened the appeal of Hamilton's program at various times. It is hardly too
much to say, however, that his philosophy of administration — readiness to
use governmental power wherever there is assurance of public control over
its use — is stronger today than ever before.

Jefferson, his great antagonist, disagreed with these ideas — though not
with a policy of fostering the development of commerce or of using such
power as was indispensable to the attainment of some end that would greatly
enhance the public welfare. Visualizing the country as destined under the
right leadership to develop into a glorious agrarian democracy in which
every man could find security for his family in the cultivation of his own
acreage or in independent work as artisan, Jefferson saw little need for
national administration other than that required for the conduct of foreign
relations.

Beneath this belief, however, lay a more fundamental conviction. Jef-
ferson was of the opinion that power always tends to corrupt the man in
whom it is vested. He considered the difficulties of preventing its abuse so
formidable as to make imperative its limitation to the barest minimum.
Jefferson's agrarian ideal has long since lost all chance of translation into
actuality. However, no one needs to be told that because of the continued
and gradually increasing expansion of central government, this philosophy
of limited and decentralized administration is one of the most effective rally-
ing cries for many who are earnestly concerned over the future of American

5 Cf. Caldwell, Lynton K., The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and Jefferson,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 13

federalism. There are simultaneously groups within the body politic who
are exploiting the fear of power for selfish purposes.

Clearly, neither the Hamiltonian nor the Jeffersonian tradition embraces
the whole truth. Public administration has profited by accepting parts of
both. The problem has been — and will continue to be — how much em-
phasis at a given time to accord to each.

Public Administration and the National Economy. Adam Smith's The
Wealth of Nations, published in the year of the American declaration of
political independence, served in a sense as a declaration of economic inde-
pendence on behalf of the rising business or middle class. As such its basic
ideas came to have an enormous vogue throughout the whole Western world.
It is no exaggeration to say that during the nineteenth century they sup-
plied the dominant coloration in popular thought on the relations between
government and business. Nor have they ceased to exert their influence.
The philosophy of classical economics which took its rise from this epic
volume was far more than a reasoned protest against the theory and practice
of mercantilism. It had a positive character of its own, the implications of
which were of cardinal importance for public administration.

Politics and economics, according to Adam Smith, were largely separate
spheres. The less they had to do with each other, the better. Every man
had his own property or skill and the impulse of self-interest to lead him
to put them to the best employment. The wisest thing government could
do, therefore, to help men solve their economic problems was to leave the
business world strictly alone. Admittedly it was necessary for government
to prevent or suppress civil disturbances, punish crime, and build and main-
tain basic public works. In the domestic realm at least, however, this was
as far as it should go.

With a virgin continent opening up in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, great numbers of the people of the United States had property of
their own — land being naturally the main type; or, lacking property, they
could acquire some. Land enabled a family to be relatively self-sufficient.
Consequently, the philosophy of governmental nonintervention did no such
violence to the economic facts of life as it would in our day. Widespread
ownership of land, actual and potential, provided at least some justification
for laissez jaire government. Another factor was the neat complementation
of legal theory: it was, and is, one of the basic tenets of the "rule of law"
here as in England that the citizen is at liberty to do whatever has not been
prohibited, provided only that he recognize the equal right of everyone else
to act in the same way.

It required, therefore, a long and slow development, through decades
blotted with innumerable instances of helpless poverty and social injustice,
to raise political thinking above the standard of freedom from regulation of
any kind to a higher standard. This higher standard of the present age is
freedom under regulation designed to safeguard the general welfare. Until

14 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

the new development was well under way, public administration had only
halting and tentative relationships with the national economy. Today gov-
ernmental activities in countless ways sustain our economic life.

Assertion of the Public Interest. Charles E. Merriam has pointed out
in a recent study of public planning that in the early decades of the last
century the federal government showed some concern over abuses inherent
in uncontrolled private exploitation of the nation's natural resources. Yet
it was not until the eighties that practical action was initiated to safeguard
the public interest.6 Following the panic of 1837, Massachusetts established
a state bank commission to make sure thereafter of the observance of it?
banking regulations. Still, even though there was similar provocation ir
other states, few followed suit.7 Jurisdiction over such matters lay generall)
with the states; their inaction often resulted in hardship and injustice foi
numerous individuals. Nevertheless, it was only after the Middle Westerr
states had enacted the Granger laws in the seventies that government begar
to intervene more extensively in the economic sphere.

Conceivably, the executive arm of the national government might hav<
been employed to prevent the occurrence of abuses as the economy of th<
country expanded. However, any effort toward effective use of publi<
authority for such purposes would have met the strongest kind of opposition
From the history of governmental regulation during the late nineteend
century it is evident that the new public administration was in a sense th<
unwanted child of a nation bent on the wild pursuit of material gain. Gros
rapacity and prodigal wastage had to demonstrate the error in the belie
that competition invariably worked like an invisible hand to ensure the prc
tection and promotion of the common welfare. Only then did the represen
tative bodies begin to emphasize the positive note in the American phi!
osophy of government — the idea that government exists to safeguard th
general welfare. Only then did they enact the statutes and create the agencie
which account for the contemporary range of public administration.

3. THE EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

American Pragmatism. With some measure of justification, it has bee
said of the people of the United States that as a nation they are not muc
given to systematic political speculation. Throughout our history it has ger
erally been assumed without benefit of particulars that the sphere of goverr
mental activity should be sharply limited and that government should "sta
out of business." No one, however, has succeeded in making a list of propc
and improper functions of government that has won public approval an
held it over an extended period. William Graham Sumner's What Do Socit

6 Merriam, Charles E., "The National Resources Planning Board: A Chapter in America
Planning Experience," American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 1075 ff.

7 Cf. White, Leonard D., Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, pp. 26-2
New York: Macmillan, rev ed., 1939.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 15

Classes Owe Each Other? (1883) and Herbert Spencer's Man Versus the
State (1884) both endeavored to demonstrate analytically why it was unwise
to enlarge the range of governmental action. Yet the functions of govfern-
ment were increased even during the decades in which these books were
enjoying their greatest popularity. Though their theoretical inclination has
consistently been to keep the scope of government restricted, the American
people have shown equal consistency in basing their action on "practical
considerations" whenever these have pointed strongly in the opposite direc-
tion.

The line of argument implied in Cleveland's famous sentence, "It is a
condition and not a theory which confronts us," is one that has always made
sense to most Americans. They tend to believe that the presumption should
never be in favor of adding to the powers or responsibilities of government;
but they also insist that in the last analysis "government has to do what it
has to do."8 They have never been prepared to adhere blindly to mere theory
when the price of such adherence would have been acute social injustice or
failure to reach some objective to which they were strongly attached. It
remains to be seen how far attitudes will change in the face of the new con-
cern for high-level employment. Up to now, however, Americans have
tended to support the broad principle that government should not meddle
in the domain of economic affairs and at the same time they have wanted it
to be prepared to help them meet whatever economic difficulties might prove
to be beyond the capacity of business.

Limits to Governmental Nonintervention. American administrative his-
tory abounds in illustrations of governmental extensions to meet current
needs. Consider, for instance, the compromise of laissez faire involved in
the erection of national tariff walls, in the establishment of the three "clien-
tele" departments in Washington — Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor — and
in the creation of certain of our governmental corporations. Each of these
developments represents something of a variation on the theme of the pure
theory of the American politico-economic system, yet each is accepted as a
part of the system in operation. Curiously enough, those who show the
greatest interest in urging government to pursue or persist in a positive course
of action are often quite unconscious of what they do in terms of this theory.
The reason is simple. If a particular group can manage to persuade govern-
ment to intervene in the economic sphere on behalf of its own special
interest, that naturally seems to it all to the good; it is "interference" only
in the eyes of those who are interfered with — to them it is all wrong.

Few groups in the body politic have given more lip service to the prin-
ciple of the separation of government and business than the leaders of
industry. They have always held it high as a general idea. Yet from the
time of Alexander Hamilton to the present they have generally favored

8 For the nature of the people's power over public administration, see Appleby, Paul H.,
Big Democracy, p. 135 ff., New York: Knopf, 1945.

16 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

tariff protection — a clear illustration of> artificial interference with the dis-
pensations of the "invisible hand" of foft and "natural" competition. Nor is
it relevant that many believers in laissez jaire have fought for tariffs with-
out being aware of their inconsistency. Their leaders have usually known
what they were doing. As practical men they have merely refused to allow
intangible principles to stand in the way of tangible results.

Establishment of Clientele Departments. Governmental intervention in
the field of agriculture began nationally in an almost unnoticed activity of
the Patent Office — the distribution of seeds and cuttings received from
American consuls abroad. After performing this humble service for a
number of years, the Patent Office in 1839 was given its first agricultural
appropriation of $1,000. This was to be used for continued collection and
distribution of seeds, for making several investigations of interest to farmers,
and for the collection of agricultural statistics. Succeeding years brought
increased appropriations without additional functions. Then, in 1862, under
the urging of the United States Agricultural Society whose members wanted
additional "service" from the government, Congress took the decisive step
of passing the "organic act" which created "at the seat of government of the
United States a Department of Agriculture/*9

It is a far cry from these modest beginnings to the gigantic operations of
the department today. But two strong threads have provided connecting
ties throughout every stage of the development. One is the continuous desire
of organized farmers for governmental aid to agriculture. What the United
States Agricultural Society did in persuading Congress to establish a new
department in the midst of the Civil War typifies what organized agriculture
has tried to do ever since — gain for itself in the solution of its problems the
friendly assistance of government. The other thread is the willingness of
the public to "go along." Occasionally it does so for the positive reason that
it thinks the general welfare would be served by providing the help sought.
The usual explanation is much simpler, however. Unless the opponents of
a proposal can convince the public that its passage would open the door to
a raid on the treasury, it is almost impossible to rally a majority to block its
enactment.

The Department of Commerce and Labor, created in 1903, was the sec-
ond major clientele agency established within the structure of national
administration. In terms of its germinal bureaus, it rose from such practical
considerations as the necessity for proper patent registration (Superintendent
of Patents, 1802), the need for inspection of steamboats to ensure their sea-
worthy condition (Steamboat Inspection Service, 1838), and the demand on
government for maintaining a testing laboratory of its own in order to assure
itself of getting full and precise value in the purchase of supplies (National
Bureau of Standards, 1901). In terms of its creation as a combined entity,

®Gaus, John M. and Wolcott, Leon O., Public Administration and the United States
Department of Agriculture, pp. 3-5, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 17

the Department of Commerce and Labor owed its origin to the fact that
around the turn of the century the President and Congress alike were con-
vinced that administrative needs would better be served by bringing togethei
twelve existing bureaus doing broadly related work in a single, fairly unified
agency.

The unit within the Department of Commerce and Labor which has
aided the American business community most directly came into being as
the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Established in 1912 by an
act of Congress, it was charged specifically with the "the promotion and
development of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States."
Organized business worked actively for the passage of the measure setting
up the new bureau and has since then looked upon the department, not
unreasonably, as its special source of sympathetic governmental assistance.

Like the Department of Commerce (from which in 1913 it was formed
by separation), the Department of Labor was composed initially of two
bureaus which had been created in preceding years. The older of these was
the Bureau of Labor, established by Congress in 1884 for the purpose of
collecting and analyzing information on labor conditions and located in the
Department of the Interior. Named the Department of Labor a few years
later and given independent status though not cabinet rank, it was in 1903
again designated as a bureau and grouped with a number of other agencies
to form the Department of Commerce and Labor. The other original ele-
ment of the newly formed Department of Labor was the Children's Bureau,
which had been in existence for less than a year. As its name implies, the
Children's Bureau was created for the purpose of gathering information
and preparing reports, nationwide in scope, on problems of child care and
child welfare. The considerations leading the President and Congress to
combine the two bureaus into a department of cabinet rank were political
and administrative. With organized labor's increasing success in making
the public aware of the problems of the working class, it appeared to be
both "good politics" and sound administrative grouping to accord labor the
same kind of recognition which had already been given to agriculture and
business.

Rise of Governmental Corporations. As American pragmatism is evi-
dent in the creation of these three great clientele departments, so it can be
seen just as plainly in the circumstances under which some of our govern-
mental proprietary undertakings were launched. With popular opinion
generally adverse to government's "going into business," most proposals to
set up a publicly owned or publicly operated business enterprise have a strike
or two against them before they get under way. Yet government corpora-
tions are by no means uncommon on the American administrative scene.
Many urban communities throughout the country have established their
own corporate enterprises in the field of municipal utilities. When the citi-
zens found themselves unable to obtain satisfactory water, electric, gas, or

18 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

transit service at reasonable rates through private firms, they took what
seemed to them the logical second course of using their local government to
set up and operate its own facilities.

As a rule the states have had little need for such corporate enterprises
of their own. For a variety of reasons, however, the national government has
made increasing use of corporate organization during the past thirty years.
During World War I, for instance, a governmental corporation was formed
for so vital a purpose as the expediting of an emergency shipbuilding pro-
gram. Several such corporations were formed during the years of the Great
Depression to aid economic interests, and especially to make and administer
loans to business firms in need of credit and unable to obtain it from private
sources. The Tennessee Valley Authority, created in 1933, was given cor-
porate status so that it might enjoy the greatest possible measure of adminis-
trative freedom and flexibility in developing its unique program of regional
rehabilitation, including cooperation toward that goal with the people of
the region through their local organizations, both governmental and private.
In World War II, to take but one of many examples, the national govern-
ment organized the United States Commercial Corporation because of the
need for an agency through which it could act with convenience and dis-
patch and with a minimum of publicity in waging certain forms of economic
warfare. It is clear, therefore, that the serious public reservations against
proliferation of governmental activities have not barred the use of govern-
ment corporations when the people have been unable to satisfy their needs
through the services of private enterprise.

Growth of Administrative Activities. The response of government in
this country to what the late Justice Holmes called "the felt necessities of the
time," has meant that the United States, like other modern nations, has
experienced during the last century a great transition. Before the steam
engine, the locomotive, the automobile, the telephone, the radio, the airplane,
and other marvels of science and technology made our civilization what it is,
the responsibilities of government were not only quite limited but on the
whole largely negative in character. So great, however, and so unsettling
has been the impact of scientific inventions upon the conditions under which
the vast majority of people live and work that the police activities of govern-
ment have long come to be overshadowed by others of a more positive
character. The police state of former times has retreated to make room for
the service or welfare state; yet in a sense the two still exist side by side.

The nature of this transformation may be seen very plainly in the tre-
mendous expansion of municipal administration. Cincinnati and Detroit,
during the period from the early 1800's down to the 1930's grew from com-
munities whose municipal services could be numbered on the fingers of one's
hands to metropolitan regions whose services totaled between three and
four hundred. And the end is not yet. The log of administrative develop-
ment of both these cities makes it clear that protection of life and property

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 19

continues to be an important municipal responsibility. It demonstrates even
more conspicuously, however, that it is activities in the fields of health, utili-
ties, education, recreation, and social welfare which mainly absorb the
energies of urban government in the present age.10

Comparative studies of state and county governments likewise show up-
ward trends in the number and variety of their administrative activities.11
The rate of increase, however, is here markedly lower than in the case of
municipalities, owing to the fact that the main currents of modern life —
the trends toward national economic organization and urban residence —
have affected states and counties to a lesser degree. In the case of the national
government the trend line rises steeply. Comprehensive statistical indices
are available only for selected periods; but the crude data themselves give
eloquent testimony of the steadily increasing use the American people have
made of their central government.12 Annual budget expenditures and
civilian personnel figures have both risen at rates far in advance of the rate
of population growth. While the following table does not suggest the nature
of the new responsibilities the national government has acquired in recent
decades, it does afford some indication of the extent to which the volume of
governmental activities has grown.

INCREASE IN NATIONAL POPUIAIION, ANNUAL EXPENDITURES AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PERSONNEL BY Di CADES DURING THE CENTURY 1840-1940

Annual Expenditures

Vear

1840

1850

1860 ... ...

1870
1880 .
1890

1900 .

1910 ...

1920

1930
1940

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: Population,
Vol. 1, p. 6, Washington, 1942.

**U. S. Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report, 1943, pp. 466-471, Washington, 1944.

***U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1943, p. 165,
Washington, 1944. The figures given are for the years 1841, 1851, 1861, etc.

ipulation of

of the National

Civilian Employees

'ontinental

Government, excluding

in the Federal

Mted States*

debt retirement**

Executive

n millions)

(in dollars)

Service***

17.0

24,317,579

23,700

23.2

39,543,492

33,300

31.4

63,130,598

49,200

38.6

309,653,561

53,900

50.2

267,642,958

107,000

63.0

318,040,711

166,000

76.0

520,860,847

256,000

92.0

693,617,065

391,350

105.7

6,403,343,841

562,252

122.8

3,440,268,884

588,206

131.7

8,998,189,706

1,370,110

10 Cf. Upson, Lent D., The Growth of a City Government, Detroit: Bureau of Municipal
Research, 1931; Cincinnati Municipal Reference Bureau, Cincinnati (1802-1936): The March
of City Government, Cincinnati, 1937.

11 For a charting of the administrative growth of state government, see Hurt, Elsey,
California State Government: An Outline of its Administrative Organization from 1850 to
1936. 2 vols., Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1937-1939.

12 See Wooddy, Carroll H., The Growth of the Federal Government, 1915-1932, New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1934. This study was published as one of the monographs supporting
the report of President Hoover's Commission on Recent Social Trends.

20 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The salient fact about the character of the newer activities of the federal
government — namely, that they are designed to cope with the impact of
technology on American society — is patent from the names of some of the
principal agencies which have been created since the turn of the century. A
partial list would include: Department of Commerce (and Labor), 1903;
Department of Labor, 1913; Federal Reserve System, 1913; Federal Trade
Commission, 1914; United States Tariff Commission, 1916; Federal Power
Commission, 1920; Federal Communications Commission, 1934; Securities
and Exchange Commission, 1934; National Labor Relations Board, 1935.
Each of these agencies was established to deal with specific problems, and
each has in some measure accomplished the purpose for which it was created.
Obviously, however, we have not reached the end of the road. New prob-
lems have arisen since the youngest of these agencies was brought into being.
Others will arise in the future.

In organizing an agency to deal with a particular issue, the President and
Congress — or a governor and a state legislature, a mayor and a city council
— may dispose of that immediate issue, but often at the price of various
procedural irritations within the administrative system as a whole. It is
invariably something of a problem to coordinate the work of a new agency
with that of older units doing related work. Especially where there is no
attempt to weigh the advantages of alternative methods of organization and
operation, the problem of coordination can become quite troublesome.

4. INCREASING COMPETENCE FOR INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES

Even a brief survey of the growth of public administration would not be
complete without some mention of the advances and adjustments which
have been made within the system to enable it to handle the increasing load
it has had to carry. Nor can we leave the subject without some appraisal of
government's administrative capacity for sustaining the burdens likely to
be thrust upon it in the future. Let us, therefore, now take note of the peren-
nial struggle that has been waged in American administration for competent
personnel; of the major gains registered in the fields of administrative struc-
ture and procedure; of the effects produced and problems generated by
national emergencies; and of the implications for public administration aris-
ing from the expectations of the American people themselves.

Professional Versus Amateur. Concerned as it is with means rather than
ends, administration is a phase of government in which accomplishment can
be measured with a degree of objectivity. It is, moreover, a phase in which
it is possible to describe with relative precision the particular qualities or
abilities which individuals ought to have for the positions to which they may
be assigned. It might, therefore, be supposed that a system could have been
established early in our history whereby appointments to positions in the
public service would have been conditioned upon demonstration of the skills
or talents required for the proper performance of official duties.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 21

The facts do not bear out this supposition. Whether, as some say, because
we are democratically inclined, or because of other reasons, the great ma-
jority of the American people have always had a pronounced preference for
amateur government. Wanting in general only so much governance as
seemed absolutely necessary to take care of recognized public interests and
concerns, and eager to keep that bare minimum securely under their own
control, they have experimented with a variety of arrangements for organiz-
ing the public service. One device, still widely used in state and local govern-
ment, is that of placing so many offices on an elective basis that the electorate
is compelled — or, according to the logic of this philosophy, privileged — to
choose not only its political representatives but a considerable body of admin-
istrative officials as well. A second formula, now for the most part happily
abandoned, was that of annual elections, based on the theory that where
short terms end, tyranny may begin. Rotation in office comprised a third
approach, which has been fraught with so much peril to efficiency in admin-
istration that it warrants speciaK^ittention.

Washington and Adams, the\ first two presidents of the United States,
prided themselves on being goocf^ republicans but neither claimed to be a
democrat in the Jeffersonian sense. Believing that politics and administra-
tion were for the established social elite of their day — "the rich, the well-
born, and the able" — they pursued personnel policies similar to those of the
more enlightened prime ministers of Britain during the late eighteenth
century. They took it ,for granted — as did also John Quincy Adams later —
that the best families bf the country should and would inspire their ablest
sons to seek careers in the government service. In consequence, they had
little doubt that a president determined — as both of them were — to draw
into the public service men of talent would not encounter any difficulty in
recruiting and retaining an able and devoted staff.

AHoVving for Jefferson's deep distrust of social station, his inherent inclina-
tions wye also toward "talent and virtue" seeking public office; so were
those of Madison and Monroe, his successors in the White House. How-
ever, following his election in 1800, Jefferson discovered that two practical
considerations obliged him to dismiss a number of Federalist appointees and
replace them with Republicans. One was the inability of some of the Fed-
eralist holdovers to convince Jefferson that they could be depended upon
to show no less zeal in carrying out Republican policies than they had in the
service of Washington and Adams. The other was the pressure for posi-
tions put upon the new President by members of his own party.

Originally, the principle of rotation in office was virtually limited in
practice to legislative offices, but agitation arose early in the history of the
Union for its application to administrative offices as well. Congress adopted
in 1820 the famous Four Years Law. This act provided that federal district
attorneys, collectors of customs, naval officers, money agents, registrars of
land offices, paymasters in the army, and several other classes of officials

22 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

should serve four-year terms rather than at the pleasure of the President,
as they had formerly.13 Even without this law, it is more than likely that
Andrew Jackson during his administration (1829-1837) would have man-
aged to dismiss a considerable number of the Whigs he found in the executive
branch at his inauguration. There can be little doubt, however, that the law
helped him to effect those changes in public personnel he thought necessary
to place the government under the control of "the people" — that is, those
who had voted him into office. The four-year rule was later modified; but
it contributed materially to the establishment of the spoils system in the
United States. For half a century, from the 1830's to the 1880's, the over-
whelming majority of appointments in American administration — national,
state, and local — were made on the basis of party patronage.

Patronage and Economy. During the early decades of the middle 1800's,
the functions of government continued to be limited in volume and relatively
simple in character. American genius for muddling along being not inferior
to that of the British, it was possible even later on for the public business
to be transacted tolerably well by politically selected amateur employees
working under loose organization and utilizing casual procedures. But that
age came to an end. After the Civil War, the new materialism of indus-
trialization, economic instability and insecurity, the loosening of personal
ties as a result of increasing urbanization, the opportunities for graft on a
grand scale latent in municipal construction and utilities, and the mounting
necessity for professionally trained personnel to handle the new technical
functions and services of government — all these led to conditions which
made reform imperative.

Disclosures of inefficiency and corruption touching every level of admin-
istration aroused cities and states and the nation itself to a reexami nation of
democracy long overdue. Gradually a demand emerged for the establish-
ment and enforcement of higher standards of official competence and for
tighter procedures wherever public moneys or properties were involved.14
However, indignation over ineptitude or wrongdoing was not the prime
factor in the imposition of new controls. Rather, as the cost of government
increased with additional functions of a technical nature, inefficient adminis-
tration led to disproportionately heavier taxation which the public could less
well afford to ignore.

In national administration, the milestones marking the progress of reform
were the Pendleton Act inaugurating the rule of merit in the recruitment of
public personnel (1883); the expansion of the new civil service by executive

13 Sec Fish, Carl Russell, The Civil Service and the Patronage, p. 66, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1920. This is the leading study of the history of national personnel policies
and practices during the nineteenth century.

14 Cf. StefTens, Lincoln, The Struggle for Seif -Government, New York: Doubleday, 1906,
being an attempt to trace American political corruption to its sources in six states of the United
States; Foulke, William D., Fighting the Spoilsmen, New York: Putnam, 1919; Lynch,
Dennis T., Boss Tweed, New York: Boni & Liveright, 1927.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 23

orders under Presidents Cleveland and Wilson; the Classification Act initiat-
ing a more uniform position structure in federal employment (1923); the
report of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel (1935);
and the report of the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement
chaired by Justice Reed (1941). Corresponding improvements in personnel
administration were accomplished within their own jurisdictions by the
more progressive states and cities.

Advances in Structure and Procedure. In line with these efforts toward
building a professionally competent and politically nonpartisan civil service
have been equally important improvements in administrative structure and
procedure. Congress on several occasions took action in the interest of better
administration. It gave support to the Commission on Economy and Effici-
ency under President Taft by creation of a Bureau of Efficiency (1913-1933).
It greatly enhanced executive control over the departmental system and
strengthened fiscal accountability by passing the Budget and Accounting
Act (1921). By giving President Roosevelt a measure of discretion in the
Reorganization Act of 1939, Congress enabled him, just before the outbreak
of World War II, to simplify the structure of the executive branch and
organize his own office in line with the recommendations of the President's
Committee on Administrative Management.15 Similar powers were granted
in the Reorganization Act of 1945 in order to adjust the wartime develop-
ment to peacetime needs.

Under the Reorganization Act of 1939, the more than one hundred agen-
cies of the federal "administrative branch" were for the most part — excepting
especially the so-called independent boards and commissions — regrouped
into the ten departments and three new combined agencies for social wel-
fare, public works, and public lending. Still more important, the President
as administrator-in-chief was buttressed by provision for several administra-
tive assistants and by the establishment of his own executive office in which
he found his "arms of management" for budgeting, planning, and per-
sonnel. The need for subsequent innovations was recognized in the creation
of an Office for Emergency Management as a division of the Executive
Office of the President. Most of the great control agencies of World War II
were nominally placed within the Office for Emergency Management.

Three main developments symbolize the progress made in raising the

15 No official publication contains more valuable material on American public administra-
tion, whether from the standpoint of analysis or information, than the report of the President's
Committee on Administrative Management and its supporting documents, Washington, Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1937. Louis Brownlow served as chairman of the President's Committee,
and Charles E. Merriam and Luther Gulick were its other two members. Although Congress
eventually authorized the President to proceed with many of the committee recommendations,
the Reorganization Act of 1939 at the same time imposed considerable restrictions. Because
of the "great debate" among the experts over the auditing function, one should read, along
with the Brownlow Report, the report of the Brookings Institution to the Senate Committee
(Senator Byrd, chairman) set up to investigate the executive agencies of the federal government,
Senate Report No. 1275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1937,

24 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

level of efficiency in state administration. Beginning with Illinois under the
leadership of Governor Frank O. Lowden in 1917, approximately half the
states in the Union have taken action to unify their administrative organi-
zation under the governor. Most of the states have also been obliged to give
special consideration to the caliber of management attained by particular
state departments in order to qualify for the increasing number of grants-m-
aid available from the national government. Lastly, the states have begun
to make it a practice, chiefly through the Council of State Governments,16
to exchange information and experience on all kinds of administrative prob-
lems.

The principal improvements in local administration relate, on the whole,
either to various phases of municipal affairs or to public education. In the
field of urban government, they include the formation in 1894 of the National
Municipal League; the strengthening in many mayor-council cities of the
appointive and directive powers of the mayor; the impulse given to better
municipal management, chiefly during the decade from 1905 to 1915, by the
novel commission form of city government; the movement for organized
municipal research which started with the establishment of the New York
Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906; the widespread drive, commencing
more than a generation ago, for the introduction of systematic methods of
municipal budgeting and purchasing; the growth of the council-manager
plan of city government in the wake of agitation for the commission plan;
and the formation over the past three or four decades of national profes-
sional associations of all major groups of local administrative officials, culmi-
nating in the establishment in 1931 of the Public Administration Clearing
House, which at 1313 East 60th Street in Chicago has become an unofficial
capitol for state and local administration throughout the country.17

Three lines of advance, again, describe the progress in educational admin-
istration. These are the well-nigh universal development of the superin-
tendent of schools into the chief administrative officer of the local school
system; the formation of the National Education Association and other
professional organizations; and, finally, the movement for school districts
both large enough in pupil population and strong enough in financial re-
sources to operate programs conforming to acceptable minimum instruc-
tion standards. No substantial improvement can thus far be registered for
rural administration in general. This is probably due to the fact that, as
some of the more important rural functions were partially shouldered by the
state, the county continued to give reasonably satisfactory service.

16 The publication program of the Council of State Governments includes the magazine
State Government and a periodically issued handbook entitled The Boo% of the States.

17 Aside from such sources of current information about local administration as the
National Municipal Review (published by the National Municipal League), the monthly Public
Management, and The Municipal Yearbook (both put out by the International City Managers
Association), mention should be made of the official organs of thr various functional asso-
ciations within and without the "1313" group.

THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 25

Impact of Emergencies. As tragedy is the test of character in personal
life, so crisis is the test of capacity iri administration. Accumulation of
abuses in both public and private areas threatened to produce a partial gov-
ernmental crisis in the United States during the decade preceding the open-
ing of World War I. It was largely forestalled by a series of reforms
embodied in what Theodore Roosevelt liked to call his Square Deal, by
Taft's adherence to "T. R.'s" trust-busting program, and more fully by the
measures adopted as a result of Woodrow Wilson's campaign for the New
Freedom. However, the coming of World War I, particularly America's
entrance into the conflict, put the nation's resources in public administra-
tion to a substantial test. The country was required on short notice to draft
and train a vast army, produce enormous quantities of food and war ma-
terials, and raise billions of dollars in loans and taxes. The measure of suc-
cess achieved may be taken from the subsequent appraisal by the vanquished
enemy, "They knew how to wage war." Yet World War I had only one
significant permanent effect on public administration: the executive branch
never returned to its prewar dimensions either from the standpoint of the
number of agencies and government employees or that of its over-all size.

The impact upon public administration of the Great Depression was
more momentous because many of the measures taken to cope with it were
looked upon as presaging profound changes in the "American system" or
the national "way of life." Moreover, the economic crisis affected every level
of government and nearly every community, urban and rural, throughout
the country. The emergency called for a vast enlargement of the nation's
administrative machine and for the exercise of new powers pointing in the
direction of greater governmental responsibility for the maintenance of the
social and economic structure. Demanding closer collaboration between
Washington and the states, between the states and the localities, and between
the localities and Washington, the emergency also forced something of a
transformation within the American governmental system. Competitive
federalism began to yield by degrees to cooperative federalism.

How far these changes went and what their permanent effects were
destined to be are questions to which there are no precise answers. World
War II overtook the United States before the nation had pulled itself com-
pletely out of the pit. Instead of shrinking in size or authority, govern-
ment was vested with greater powers and obliged to expand its activities
and personnel beyond any precedent. The end of the war allowed consid-
erable reductions, but under the auspices of a policy of high-level employ-
ment we may expect the role of government to remain an extremely impor-
tant factor in support of national prosperity and well-being.

Tas{s of Administration in Mid-Century. America in the middle twen-
tieth century will not and can not return to the old order, be it that of
1929 or 1939. No nation can safely go back; ours does not want to go back.
The memory of insecurity and unemployment lingering on from the late

26 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1930's and the knowledge of greatly increased productive capacity developed
during World War II have combined to make Americans reject a mere
"return to normalcy." They want a world in which a strong international
organization can and will prevent war. And such international organization
has implications for American public administration. The people also want
"full employment." Their determination to attain stable employment means
that in the period ahead public administration may be asked to carry bur-
dens harder and heavier than those it has ever carried during the past.

The American economy is today a mixed economy — a blending of pri-
vate and public undertakings. This interlocking calls for wise public policy
and sensitive administration. The public is looking to government for
assurance that the national economy will be kept operating at high levels
of production and employment. This requires governmental guidance in
fiscal policy and carefully planned adjustments at many points of the
economy.18 Here is a challenging mandate for responsible administration,
but one that can be met as unparalleled war needs have been met.

As the nation approaches mid-century, the crucial question is not whether
its public administration will be adequate and efficient, but whether its
governmental policies will be sound and enlightened. The danger is not
that we might adopt plans and programs so ambitious that government
would be unable to find administrators capable of their execution. Rather
it is that cleavage and confusion among the people, fostered by selfish
groups bent only on their special interest, might destroy the common basis
on which elected representatives could agree on a constructive policy for the
promotion of the general welfare.

18 Cf. Morstun Marx, Fritz, eel., "Maintaining High-Level Production and Employment:
A Symposium," American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39, pp. 1119-1179.

X X X X- X ********************* ************** **************

CHAPTER

The Study of Public Administration

1. THE WORK OF THE PIONEERS

Beginnings of Administrative Research. Public administration empha-
sizes the value of the contributions in executing public policy of men and
women who, through experience or study, have developed a considerable
degree of skill in the administrative process. This process includes: the
designing of appropriate administrative structures and the organizing of
their component units; the formulating of work programs, standards of
performance, and ways of measuring results; the budgeting of public rev-
enue and expenditures and the accounting for funds; the recruiting, train-
ing, and directing of a suitable staff; the assumption of responsibility for the
conduct of operations on the one hand and for planning proposed policy
changes on the other; and the making of proper arrangements for the con-
duct of relations with other administrative agencies, the legislature, private
individuals, organized groups, and the general public.1

Consideration of these various elements may suggest the existence of an
extensive body of cumulative experience, study, and analysis. However,
as an organized field of knowledge, public administration in the United
States is only forty years old, if its birth date is accepted as 1906, the year
the New York Bureau of Municipal Research was established.2 Creation of
the New York Bureau symbolized the beginning of a profession and a
science of administration in three essential respects: accumulation of
descriptive materials about the purposes, powers, structure, and functioning
of governmental agencies; application of analytical techniques and techni-
cal standards; and employment of a full-time expert staff, prepared to accept

1 For a full discussion of the range and the elements of the administrative process in this
sense, see Gaus, John M. and Others, The Frontiers of Public Administration, ch. 1, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1936; Gulick, Luther and Urwick, Lyndall, cds., Papers on the
Science of Administration, New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937.

2 See Weber, G. A., Organized Efforts for the Improvement of Methods in Administration,
Introduction (by W. F. Willoughby) and ch. 1, Washington: Institute for Government
Research, 1919.

28 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

responsibility for recommending specific measures for the improvement of
administrative organization and management. For more than ten years
the New York Bureau made studies and reports covering almost all the
municipal activities of the city. Its methods of establishing working rela-
tionships with the city government, of developing productive opportunities
for investigation, and of getting its recommendations adopted not only
constituted the earliest American experience in continuing administrative
research but also set a prototype for use throughout the country.3

Waves of Government Reform. The research-bureau movement, of
course, did not materialize suddenly out of thin air. It developed after a
period of more than twenty years of political agitation and experimentation
with political "reform." Most of the reformers were people who, though
unwilling or unable to go into politics themselves, thought that the political
life of the nation should be purified and that "better" men should enter
public service. The reformers included such advocates of the merit system
in government employment as Carl Schurz and Dorman B. Eaton; jour
nalists and publicists like E. L. Godkin, Henry Adams, and Henry Dem-
arest Lloyd; and practical businessmen, lawyers, clergymen, teachers, and
other citizens who organized city clubs to promote "good government."
These individuals and civic-minded groups left a lasting legacy in the
formation and the working approach of our civil service commissions, and
other devices of reform. Their political activities were less successful. Al-
though they helped to elect "good" candidates to office in many cities,
usually these men were voted out soon and the party bosses came back into
power. Lacking broad sympathetic support, the independent civil service
commissions were in such instances often controlled or isolated by partisan
forces.

Thoughtful analysis of these experiences resulted, around the turn of
the century, in several more or less systematic inquiries into the facts of
governmental life. One form of governmental research was represented by
the brilliant newspaper and magazine reports of the "muckrakers," whose
exposure of the deeper economic roots of political corruption had a wide if
short-lived influence.4 Characteristic realism and a propensity for quick
generalization led these writers to take the simple position that the economic
system controlled the politicians; that the politicians controlled civil service
commissions and operating officials; and that the remainder of public
administration, insofar as it was not dishonest or corrupt, was simply the
unimportant routine execution of public business.

Organized Dissemination of Knowledge. Another type of research ex-
pressed itself in the collection and dissemination of information on munici-

3 See Gill, Norman N., Municipal Research Bureaus, Washington: American Council on
Public Affairs, 1942.

4Stefrens, Lincoln, Autobiography, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931; Whitlock, Brand,
Forty Years of It, New York: Appleton, new ed., 1925; and the autobiographies of Robert M.
LaFollcttc, Sr., and Theodore Roosevelt.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 29

pal facts and events by the National Municipal League, founded in 1894,
and the formulation by chat body after 1900 of its standard "model laws"
for the organization and powers of local and state governments. The
research activities of the League and the more active promotional tactics
of its offshoot, the National Short Ballot Organization, were of great assist-
ance to the developing profession of public administration. On the whole,
however, these and similar private organizations concentrated on reporting
developments in better government structure and the framing of charters,
ordinances, and constitutions. They tended to leave the study and im-
provement of administrative management, processes, and standards to
"technicians."5

Role of Progressivism. A third type of governmental research was asso-
ciated between 1S% and 1912 with the political movement called Progres-
sivism. Progressivism has often been identified with the personalities of
its leaders.0 One common bond between them was the conviction that if
new policies of economic regulation were to be made to stick, those policies
must be removed from the hands of legislative bodies and administered by
expert boards on the basis of technical investigation and nonpolitical deter-
mination of the facts. Early systematic thinking about the independent
regulatory commission was linked with Progressivism in the states, and in
at least one state, Wisconsin, it was based on close collaboration between
the state capitol and the state university. This collaboration made pos-
sible in 1901 the establishment of one of the first legislative reference libraries
in the United States. It also paved the way for considerable research and
participation by university professors in the drafting of state legislation.
The ensuing period witnessed the initial establishment in many states of
effective legislation regulating public utilities, workmen's compensation,
conservation of natural resources, and conditions of employment.

If the trends inherent in the progressive movement prior to 1912 had
continued, perhaps the study of public administration would have developed
on a subject-matter basis, as separate scries of professional or expert tech-
niques, each peculiar to a distinct area of economic policy. What actually
happened, however, was something different. Development of the theory
of the administrative process exemplified by the independent regulatory
commission was largely taken over by the economists and lawyers, while
the political scientists divided themselves into two groups. One group busied
itself with structural problems in the relations between the federal govern-

5 For a valuable survey, see the Fiftieth Anniversary Issue of the National Municipal
Review, November 1944.

<* Cf. Croly, Herbert, Progressive Democracy, New York: Macmillan, 1915, which is perhaps
the best statement of i's political program. See also Chamberlain, John, Farewell to Reform,
New York: Viking, 1933; Bowers, C. G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, Boston: Hough ton
Mifflin, 1932. Progressivism was really faith in a method, rather than a coherent philosophy
or economic program, coupled with an abiding belief that the people would support expert
administration if properly led and given the facts by responsible political leaders.

30 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ment and the states, state control over local government, political executives
and the legislative body, and the proper organization of the executive
branch. The other joined forces with the municipal research-bureau move-
ment in the conviction that progress toward good government would follow
only from full-time detailed study and technical analysis of the methods of
conducting the government's business.

Contribution of the Universities. The contribution of the universities to
the rise of public administration was rather indirect, with the exception of a
few outstanding individuals. Woodrow Wilson contributed his pioneer
paper entitled "The Study of Administration" to the infant Political Science
Quarterly in 1887. James Bryce is said to have drawn heavily upon the
series of Johns Hopkins studies in historical and political science (beginning
in 1882), as well as upon the services of Professor Frank J. Goodnow, in
preparing his influential American Commonwealth (1888). Many students
of Simon Patten at the University of Pennsylvania, Richard T. Ely and
John R. Commons at Johns Hopkins and Wisconsin, A. L. Lowell at
Harvard, and of the faculty of History, Government, and Public Law at
Columbia University, later distinguished themselves in the practice and
literature of public administration. However, during the earlier period the
study of government and politics was just disentangling itself in the college
curriculum from philosophy, political economy, and a jurisprudence domi-
nated by the private law of property.7

The academic progenitors of public administration in the eighties and
nineties were economists, political scientists, and sociologists who taught
their students how to analyze the economic and political processes through
which public authority is exercised, without much speculating about the
concepts of political philosophers and supreme court judges. Even so,
legal materials constituted so much of the subject matter with which stu-
dents of government dealt in those days that Goodnow, who is generally
considered the father of American public administration, wrote most of his
books in the fields of administrative and constitutional law.8 If it is con-
ceded that a true profession of public administration could not have arisen
until after trained men began to study at first hand the working processes
of government, then contemporary students surely owe to their academic
forefathers a large debt for their critical and realistic temper, their aware-

7 See Beard, Charles A., Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, Introduction, New
York: Macmillan, rev. ed., 1932; Dorfman, Joseph, Thorstein Veblen and His America, esp.
chs. 3-6, New York: Viking, 1934; Merriam, Charles E., American Political Ideas 1865-1917,
New York: Macmillan, 1920.

8 See Fairlie, John A., "Public Administration and Administrative Law," ch. 1, in Haines,
Charles G. and Dimock, Marshall E., cds., Essays on the Law and Practice of Governmental
Administration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 31

ness of the institutional determinants of public policy, and their distrust of
the legalistic approach.9

2. THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE

Relativity of Efficiency. Full-time research bureaus were established
in twelve large cities between 1906 and 1915. Their slogan was efficiency
and economy. The experience of their staffs in administrative research
soon revealed the fugitive nature of this objective, when conceived as
a source of immediate reduction in governmental expenditure. It was dis-
covered that efficiency and economy had to be achieved primarily as a
by-product of getting at the basic facts of administrative purpose, structure,
and procedure. Leaving out instances of outright venality and political
privilege, it was found that there was always a certain degree of efficiency
in existing methods and routines. Apart from the question of whether a
given function should or should not be performed, the goal of efficiency
and economy raised the question of purpose — that is, whether procedures
were to be considered from the limited standpoint of particular operators
and particular interests or from that of the public purpose the individual
agency was supposed to achieve. Thus research-bureau workers were led to
a search for principles of management in order to secure acceptance for
those practices which advanced the purpose of the organization as a whole,
as compared with procedures and habits which had grown up for historic
reasons or had been established by operators with narrower objectives in
view.

For example, from the angle of a municipal department head, it might
be preferable to go directly to the city council for funds. Broader perspec-
tive would be necessary for him to envision the advantages of budgetary
coordination at a central point. Yet only thus could a balanced consideration
of the work plan of the city government as a whole be attained before
submitting the estimates of expenditure to the council. In the same way,
individual officials did not mind the scattering of similar functions among
several agencies and the existence of varying methods of performing similar
operations by different organizations. Yet there was obvious merit in the
principle that functional consolidation and establishment of uniform stand-
ards be secured in the larger interest, even at the expense of particular offi-

9 Organizations of public officials such as state and local health officers, police chiefs,
superintendents of insurance, and tax and educational administrators existed before 1906.
These early organizations were in many cases more social groups than promoters of research
in the standards of their profession, however; and they were separatist and vocational in
interest. See White, Leonard D., Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, ch. 27,
New York: Macmillan, rev. ed., 1939, and Trends in Public Administration, chs. 20, 22,
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933. Earlier events and personalities in the literature of public
administration are discussed in Gaus, John M., A Memorandum on Research in Public Ad-
ministration, Social Science Research Council, 1930, unpublished; Short, Lloyd M., The
Development of National Administrative Organization in the United States, Washington:
Institute of Government Research, 1923.

32 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

cials who might have achieved considerable efficiency within their own
operations. Economy was not simply a matter of eliminating functions
or services, most of which were ardently supported by citizen groups, but
one of giving proper consideration to the specific question of whether
particular expenditures were or were not justified.

Use of Outside Experts. Thus administrative research tried to develop
principles and techniques . of public management. The executive budget,
personnel classification and salary standardization, and centralized pur-
chasing all found systematic application and expansion in local governments
in the decade following 1906.10 It was wholly natural that Dr. Frederick
A. Cleveland of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research was ap-
pointed by President Taft in 1910 to direct the work of the United States
Commission on Economy and Efficiency. The Commission and its staff
for the first time applied to the entire executive branch of the federal govern-
ment the full measure of painstaking research into administrative duties, or-
ganization, procedure, and housekeeping methods, exhibiting in a long series
of factual monographs the results of detailed legislative control over the de-
partments. In his final report, Dr. Cleveland formulated what is perhaps
the classic statement of the purpose of the executive budget as a scientific tool
of administration,11 a contribution which laid an early foundation for the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Similarly, the Congressional Joint
Commission on Reclassification of Salaries drew heavily upon the experience
of the local research bureaus in their work of job description and classifica-
tion; on that foundation was built the scheme embodied in the Classification
Act of 1923 — a guidepost for federal personnel administration.1"

The drive for administrative reorganization of state governments began
in 1909. Staff work and reports in preparation for the New York and Illi-
nois Constitutional Conventions of 1915 and 1917 were notable especially
for the quality and method of research.13 These reports documented three
early premises of organizational thinking: (1) concentration of responsibility
by consolidating functions into a small number of departments, each headed
by a single official appointed by and responsible solely to the chief executive;
(2) functional integration by grouping similar or related activities into the
same department; and (3) centralized controls over finance, government
purchasing, and personnel. Executive responsibility for administration was
the dominating theme. Coupled with the short ballot, the executive budget,

i« Cf. White, Trends (cit. in note 9), pp. 218-223, 255-257.

11 "The Need for a National Budget," 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., House Doc. No. 854,
Washington, 1912. Cf. also his Organized Democracy, New York: Macmillan, 1913.

12 Sec 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Doc. No. 686, Washington, 1920. Cf. also Per-
sonnel Classification Board, Closing Report of Wage and Personnel Survey, Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1931.

13 Cf. Buck, A. E., The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1938; Holcombe, Arthur N., State Government, New York:
Macmillan, 3d ed., 1931; New York Bureau of Municipal Research, New Yor% State Constitution
wd Government: An Appraisal, New York, 1915.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 33

and application of the merit system to all but politically appointed depart-
ment heads, these main propositions conceived as principles were applied
with variations in about half the states between 1917 and 1932. Many of
the changes were based upon recommendations derived from surveys by
three private organizations staffed with specialists in administrative analysis:
the Institute of Government Research of the Brookings Institution (Wash-
ington), the National Institute of Public Administration (successor to the
New York Bureau of Municipal Research), and Griffenhagen and Associ-
ates (Chicago). Their surveys usually resulted in thorough, factual reports,
with recommendations based on intensive analyses and classifications of
activities into major functions. Such reports were filed with the governors
or legislative bodies for appropriate action.14

Entirely aside from the general rule that the professional staffs of investi-
gators were to take no active part in getting their recommendations adopted,
the principles recommended in most of the state surveys came in for quite a
bit of criticism. It was questioned whether the political executive would
have the time or inclination to become a general manager for administra-
tion. The notion that the voters would ever choose their mayors, governors,
or presidents on the basis of administrative competence was ridiculed. Doubts
were raised as to whether the political head should be entrusted with author-
ity over all finance and personnel matters. Finally, instances were pointed
out in which there were persuasive reasons for preferring administrative
boards over single-headed agencies.17' This debate revealed the confusion
and ambiguity of concepts and of scientific methods that had crept into the
thinking of students of public administration.16

Challenge to Traditional Approach. By assuming a separation of policy-
making from administrative efficiency, the investigators had tried to arrive
at valid principles, at least on the technical level of operations. However,
validity of principles depends upon agreement: (1) on the diagnosis of the
problem; and (2) on the objective sought by the investigators. The argu-

14 The capstone of this kind of outside survey work, in method and result, was the
monumental study of the entire area of federal administration by the Brookings Institution for
the Senate (Byrd) Committee Investigating Executive Agencies, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate
Report No. 1275, Washington, 1937.

15 See Hyncman, Charles S., "Administrative Reorganization: An Adventure into Science
and Theology," Journal of Politics, 1939, Vol. 1, p. 62 ff.\ Walker, Harvey, "Theory and
Practice in State Administrative Reorganization," National Municipal Review, 1930, Vol. 19,
p. 249 jf.', Coker, Francis W., "Dogmas of Administrative Reform," American Political Science
Review, 1922, Vol. 16, p. 399 ff.

10 See Beard, Charles A., "Administration: A Test of Ideal and Power," ch. 10, in his
Public Policy and General Weljarc, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941. The best survey
and analysis of the literature of public administration from a methodological standpoint is
Waldo, C. Dwight, Theoretical Aspects of the American Literature of Public Administration, un-
published Ph.D. thcsii at Yale University, 1942, esp. pp. 82-92 (scheduled for early publication).
Cf. also Wallace, Scnuyler C., Federal Departmentalization , New York: Columbia University
Press, 1941; Simon, Herbert A.. "The Proverbs of Administration," Public Administration
Review, 1946, Vol. 6, p. 53 ff.

34 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ments over state reorganization in the 1920's foreshadowed the famous
conflict in 1937 and 1938 between the President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management and the Brookings Institution. Both situations illus-
trate the degree to which broad agreement upon a great many concrete
propositions for administrative improvement can be distorted by differences
over the priority of problems and by the intrusion of political issues and value
judgments which may or may not be relevant to specific proposals. The Pres-
ident's Committee eschewed the survey method of functional analysis and
classification which the Brookings Institution had utilized; it selected its ob-
jectives in terms of the problems conceived by its sponsor and his advisers
to be of compelling importance. Both its investigations and its recom-
mendations sought to develop answers to these problems.

The 1937-1938 debates have caused most students of administration to
recast their notions of public management as a science of "principles."
The conception of the scientific investigator — one standing apart from his
material of human beings while making his inquiries; collecting, sifting,
testing, and weighing his facts and ultimately arriving at the most reliable
conclusions — has somehow been found problematical in governmental re-
search. It was based in part upon Frederick W. Taylor's ideas of scientific
management,17 which called for the study and formulation of the proper
methods of job performance in advance, followed by adjustment of the
human factor to those methods. This approach or technique was de-
veloped and applied to the details of specific job operations at the
shop level by a trained engineer or superintendent within the factory
hierarchy with authority over the workers. It lacks applicability to man-
agement research into program questions. Conditions are different when the
research staff is wholly outside the hierarchy of responsibility and has
no powers or sanctions over the human element other than publicity and
persuasion. The same is true when the purpose of analysis is not to improve
job performance, but to achieve proper structural relationships. A different
condition also prevails when the objective of study is not to help the operat-
ing official do a better job, but rather is to change his job. Moreover, al-
though being outside the government has certain advantages of freedom
and public pressure, it presents extremely difficult problems in developing
and maintaining working contacts with operating officials. Publicity is a
one-shot weapon which, when improperly used, may result in the destruction
of working relationships.

Rise of Administrative Self -Analysis. Two main developments have

17 Taylor's main work is The Principles of Scientific Management, New York: Harper,
1919. See also Cookc, Morris L., "Influence of Scientific Management Upon Government,"
Bulletin of the Taylor Society, 1921, Vol. 9, pp. 31-38; Pearson, Norman M., "Fayolism As the
Necessary Complement of Taylorism," American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39, p.
68 ff.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 35

arisen to modify the methods of citizen research agencies.18 One was sig-
nified by the creation at Chicago in 1933 of the Public Administration
Service. PAS emphasized the importance of work planning and scheduling
in administrative operations. It also specialized in the development of units
of work measurement and systems of administrative reporting which its staff
stood ready not only to recommend but to install.19 This approach was
based on a conviction of the higher value of helping the administrator to
meet his needs, rather than redrawing organization charts and reshuffling
functions.

The other source of competition with traditional administrative research
is the development during the twenties and thirties at all levels of govern-
ment of specialized staff facilities as official agencies of management research.
The work of continuous study of governmental organization and operations
as a basis for the annual scrutiny of departmental budget estimates; the
supervision of the methods of approving and recording obligations and
expenditures; the application of the personnel classification plan to the
recruitment, selection, promotion and transfer of employees — these and
similar central staff activities are in sum a continuous process of research
into the programs and methods of the various agencies. Perhaps the out-
standing contribution of the President's Committee on Administrative
Management was the way in which it highlighted the value of staff and
control agencies as tools of coordination for the chief executive. Its report
reviewed the federal experience of twenty years with the Bureau of Effi-
ciency (1913-33) and laid the foundation for the program of the Budget
Bureau's Division of Administrative Management after 1939.

Consolidation of central responsibility for general efficiency in the agency
of budgetary coordination symbolizes another aspect of strengthened gov-
ernmental management. Staffs engaged in recurrent processes of agency
coordination are stimulated by an energetic group of management-minded
colleagues who are freed from day-by-day responsibilities to make intensive
analyses of specific problems, supplementing the knowledge gained in or-
dinary budgetary relationships with the operating departments. This
catalytic function of a management staff, coordinated with the units of
budgetary, statistical, and other government-wide controls in the Executive
Office of the President, represents the latest development of federal ad-

18 Cf. the discussion presented in "Better City Government," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1938, Vol. 199, pp. 171-189; Proceedings of the
Governmental Research Association, Governmental Research and Citizen Control of Gov-
ernment, Detroit, 1940.

19 Ridley, Clarence E. and Simon, Herbert A., Measuring Municipal Activities, 2d. cd.,
Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1943; National Committee on Municipal
Reporting, Public Reporting, New York: Municipal Administration Service, 1931; Public
Administration Service, The Work Unit in Federal Administration, Chicago, 1937; Stone,
Donald C., The Management of Municipal Public Works, Chicago: Public Administration
Service, 1939.

36 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ministrative planning.20 It affords the President the benefit of a general-
staff approach in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities.

The decade of the thirties thus witnessed a shift of the center of gravity
in governmental research from private citizen-supported agencies outside
the government to central staff agencies within the government itself.
At the same time, there rose a trend away from the idea of central agencies
as direct controllers of line officials toward the concept of central assistance
in line operations by clarification of administrative objectives, stimulation
of work planning and scheduling, and cooperation with departmental
managers in establishing units of measurement and standards of perform-
ance. The information about agency activities derived from these processes
makes available to the chief executive an invaluable flow of ideas divorced
as nearly as may be from vested departmental interests. However, thus
far the potentialities of executive staff planning as a focal point of leader-
ship and direction in formulating substantive policy have not yet crystal-
lized beyond stimulation, advice, and raising of issues.21

Reaffirmation of the Political Context. After forty years of research,
development of tools of administrative analysis and control, and evolution
of a professional spirit among students and practitioners of administration
as such, it .is not surprising that speculation has arisen about the fitness of
persons experienced and trained in the administrative arts to contribute to
the formulation of policy. This is one of the great unsettled issues of ad-
ministrative theory. General discussions about the "managerial revolution"
have drawn attention to it, but have imputed a greater assurance and
solidarity among the elements comprising the managerial groups than
actually exists. The issue is bound up with other complex problems. These
include: (1) the appropriate code of behavior in the area intermediate
between the setting of administrative policy under law and legislative
policy-making; (2) the proper balance between the judgments of subject-
matter experts and line operators on the one hand and those of manage-
ment planners and staff experts on the other; (3) the claims of the lawyers
in the entire realm of law-making and rule-making; and (4) the nature of
"bureaucratic ideology." On this last point, some feel that administrative
agencies are responsible for achieving desirable social purposes and may

20 Cf. Willoughby, W. F., Principles of Public Administration, ch. 5, Washington: Insti-
tute of Government Research, 1929; Jump, W. A., "Budgetary and Financial Administration
in an Operating Department of the Federal Government," Proceedings cit. in note 18, p. 78 ff.\
Stone, Donald C., "Federal Administrative Management, 1932-42," Transactions of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1943, Vol. 65, p. 242 ff.; Macmahon, Arthur W., 'The Future
Organizational Pattern of the Executive Branch," American Political Science Review, 1944,
Vol.38, p. 11791?.

21 For a discussion of policy planning as distinct from administrative planning, cf. Key,
V. O., "Politics and Administration," in White, Leonard D., cd., The Future of Government
in the United States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. The wartime development
of the Office of Economic Stabilization and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
is significant in the functional differentiation between the two forms of planning.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 37

have to fight for them. Others think administrative agencies should con-
fine themselves to getting their assignments done within the policies
established by the legislative body.

Discussion over the past fifteen years of such questions as those of ad-
ministrative finality, administrative discretion, and administrative respon-
sibility22 reveals a shift in administrative research. Concern with technical
expertness and specialized experience has yielded to study of the factors
involved in the management of an organization and the objectives or values
toward which governmental organizations should strive. The assumption
of thirty years ago about the role of public administration in a democratic
society is no longer controlling. Then the whole argument rested on the
thesis that democracy and efficiency in administration were not incompatible.
The question was how to make democratic administration efficient and
effective in the face of arbitrary political interference in administrative
matters. Today it is assumed that the criteria of efficiency in democratic
administration are broader than and superior to technically sound procedure
and financial economy in the execution of established policies.

The importance of technical competence and professional standards is
not underestimated. However, the tests of adequate administration are
thought to go beyond the accomplishment of statutory purposes. It is
argued that administrative activities should be studied with a view to de-
fining emerging problems and developing policy recommendations to meet
demands for new services or types of regulation. It was not a bureaucrat
but a farsighted and successful businessman who pointed out that adminis-
trative ability of the highest order is required for attainment of greater
social unity — the unity that comes from general understanding and satis-
faction on the part of all groups with respect to the constructive planning
and coordination of public services by their government.23

3. TRAINING FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Educational Aspects. The advancement and maturity of public ad-
ministration as a profession may be appraised, apart from its assumptions
and its techniques, by the types of training provided and the standards of
admission required of aspirants for entrance. Of course, there is no
single vocational group of administrators in the public service. This

22 See Gaus and Others, op. cit. in note 1, chs. 6 and 7; Landis, James M., The Adminis*
trative Process, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938; Friedrich, Carl J., "Public Policy
and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,'* in Friedrich, C. J. and Mason, Edward S.,
eds., Public Policy, pp. 3-24, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940; Finer, Herman,
"Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," Public Administration Review,
1940, Vol. 1, pp. 335-49.

23 Dennison, Henry S., "The Need for the Development of Political Science Engineering,"
American Political Science Review, 1932, Vol. 26, p. 241 ff. See aho Merriam, Charles E.,
'The New Management," in his The New Democracy and the New Despotism, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1939.

38 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

service includes every profession and every skill within the range of func-
tions and activities performed for the community. Yet proper training
for government work has been a matter of deep interest among the organi-
zations of public officials and the political science departments in colleges
and universities all over the country. In the course of the last twenty-five
years there has been an increasing crystallization of ideas and methods of
approach.

However diverse the forms of government action may be, the manage-
ment of public business is recognized as a field of career activity for which
it is possible to provide training and incentives to attract the highest
ability in the population. In an authoritative survey,24 Professor George A.
Graham takes the position that training for public administration is not a
special professional apprenticeship but part of the broad problem of edu-
cational policy. Its ideal is continuous growth and widening experience
for the able individual as he prepares himself to meet successive tests of
competence for tasks of greater responsibility. To attract ability and talent
into the public service, government, recruitment should be coordinated with
graduation from the several levels of school and college. Public personnel
agencies should encourage efforts on the part of government workers to
advance themselves by providing training facilities both for appropriate
specialization and for widening their intellectual horizons.

Such a policy would not favor the establishment of a separate program
in educational institutions emphasizing preparation for the public service
exclusively. It would, on the contrary, foster efforts to establish a university-
wide program of guidance, information, and flexible interdepartmental
arrangements for selection of courses, standards of examination, and re-
quirements of evidence of creative ability.25 Similarly, after entrance into
the public service, there would not be a special staff college for prospective
government managers only. Rather, there would be a process of sifting,
competition for opportunities, forward-looking supervision, and promotion
across divisional or departmental lines, based upon a service-wide policy
under the direction of the central personnel agency.

Public administration is not identified by a distinctive technique of its
own, a single type of activity, or a unified subject matter upon which
agreement can be reached for purposes of establishing a special curriculum.
On the contrary, at the undergraduate level, substantial agreement exists
that a broad liberal education is the best prescription. It should include a
realistic awareness of the operation of economic institutions and the role
of government in modern society, supplemented if possible by some work
in statistics or accounting. It should stress the ability to speak and write

3* Graham, George A., Education for Public Administration, Chicago: Public Adminis-
tration Service, 1941.

25 Cf. Lambie, Morris B., cd., Training for the Public Service, Chicago: Public Adminis-
tration Service, 1935.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 39

the English language effectively. This would be a better preparation than
training for a specific job.26 In postgraduate work, all types of pro-
fessional schools are potential sources of recruits for government work.
Professional training in the natural sciences, engineering, education, medi-
cine, social work, law, economics, and governmental research, culminating
in professional degrees, is increasingly accepted as experience which civil
service commissions will consider as qualification for intermediate positions
in the classified service. In pre-entry training for public service, therefore,
we find little disposition to provide a specific occupational preparation.

Contrast with Great Britain. Since the University of Minnesota Con-
ference in 1931, much attention has been devoted to the question of whether
the elements of management constitute a subject matter that can be taught
apart from application to technical fields of administrative activity such as
public health, public works, public welfare; and, if so, whether it would
qualify the student for administrative work.27 Actually, no program of
training for public service has attempted to teach the knowledge and art of
management in a vacuum. Syracuse University, perhaps the outstanding
example of a special program of graduate training aimed at government
service, uses the block or "end-on-end" method of instruction to impart
both the techniques of management and understanding of special areas of
subject matter. Its graduates have found ready markets for their services,
particularly in budget and personnel agencies.

Recruitment for the civil service in the United States has never followed
the lines recommended by the Northcote-Trevelyan and Macaulay reports
for Great Britain in 1853-54.28 These reports advocated the recruitment of
the top men in the graduating classes of the British universities, regardless
of the subject of specialization, for the highest administrative positions in
the civil service, coupled with a suitable period of post-entry training and
qualification. In this country, at least up to 1934, the policy of civil service
recruitment has been based upon the assumption that government work
can be classified into occupational groupings within vertical services. After the
amount of training and experience required for the job classification within
each such service has been determined, qualified applicants are recruited
by competitive examination as positions become vacant. This policy places
a premium upon professional or vocational experience. A good deal of

20 Sec White, Introduction (cit. in note 9), pp. 356-360; Sims, Lewis B., "The Social
Science Analyst Examinations," American Political Science Review, 1939, Vol. 33, pp. 441-450.

27 Cf. Meriam, Lewis, Public Service and Special Training. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1936; Upson, Lent D., Ptactice of Municipal Administration, New York: Century, 1926;
Walker, Harvey, Public Administration in the United States, pt. Ill, New York: Farrar & Rine-
hart, 1937.

28 See Eaton, Dorman B., Civil Service in Great ^Britain, New York: National Civil
Service Reform League, 1881; White, Leonard D. and Others, Civil Service Abroad, New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1935; Stout, Hiram M., Public Service in Great Britain, New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1938; Kingslcy, Donald, Representative Bureaucracy. Yellow Springs: Antioch
Press, 1944.

40 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

criticism has been leveled against it on the ground that in the absence of
clear career lines able young men and women of general competence, lack-
ing specific experience, are likely to look elsewhere for their life work.

The decade from 1934 to 1944 was notable for the efforts made to im-
prove the quality of intake in the lower grades of the public service. In
1934, largely at the instigation of Commissioner Leonard D. White, the
United States Civil Service Commission conducted an examination for
junior civil service examiner, for which post academic training constituted
the principal requirement. In 1936, a broader category of social science
analysts was established as a register from which appointments might be
made by departments seeking general ability rather than specific experience.
From January, 1935, through March, 1939, more than 5,000 such junior
professional appointments were made by federal agencies. L>t) In 1934, the
National Institute of Public Affairs was established in Washington; an-
nually it offered about fifty men and women just out of college the oppor-
tunity to study at first hand the operations of federal agencies in the capacity
of learners, or interns. Programs of municipal internship also received
impetus and encouragement at such institutions as Syracuse University,
Wayne University, and the University of Cincinnati. Apprenticeship pro-
grams were experimentally developed by several of the national organiza-
tions of public officials associated with the Public Administration Clearing
House at Chicago, the Michigan Municipal League, and Los Angeles
County.

Post-Entry Training. Most of the present activity and support of pre-
entry preparation for public service is aimed at the college population.
Post-entry or in-service training remains the main opportunity of advance-
ment for the lower-paid ranks in public employment, particularly in the
clerical and manual occupations. Universities, where located in proximity
to large groups of government workers, such as Southern California, have
established courses for public employees, particularly in the fields of budget-
ing and accounting, police and fire administration, tax assessment and
sanitary inspection. A source of financial aid is available to states and
municipalities under the George-Deen Act of 1936 for vocational training
in public-service occupations.30

In the national capital the outstanding program of in-service training
is that of the Department of Agriculture's Graduate School, whose cur-
riculum and faculty provide some of the best technical courses in public
administration in the country. American University and George Washing-
ton University, also at the seat of the federal government, offer evening

^Report of President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
House Doc. No. 118, p. 25, Washington, 1941. Less than half (2,421) of these appointments
were made from other lists built up from the usual kind of competitive examination.

30 See United States Office of Education, Digest of Annual Reports of State Boards for
Vocational Education, pp. 61-62, Washington, 1942-1943.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 41

courses in practically all the social sciences. With the several law schools,
they have trained many men and women who started as clerks and mes-
sengers for higher administrative and professional positions. In the federal
service, post-entry training is not highly formalized.31 It consists, for the
most part, in encouraging enterprising individuals to seek additional educa-
tion outside their jobs rather than establishing in-service programs directly
related to the official machinery for promotion.

Group Structure of the Public Service. Perhaps the main reason why
post-entry training has not been more closely coordinated with official chan-
nels of advancement lies in the American distaste for formal division of the
public service into relatively closed classes around which real career incen-
tives might develop. The Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Per-
sonnel proposed separate careers for administrative, professional, clerical,
skilled-trade, and unskilled employees. These proposals have never received
the serious public attention they deserve.32 In spite of careful explanations
that an administrative class would serve as a vertical ladder leading from
junior staff positions or below to administrative assistants and on to the
top, the impression continues to prevail that such an arrangement would
reserve the top positions under the political secretaries and assistant secre-
taries for a special group who would be favored at the expense of able per-
sons in the clerical, technical, or professional services.

Regardless of the merits of this objection, it is clear that a systematic
solution could be worked out if law and personnel policy permitted training
for admin:strative work as distinguishable from professional, technical, or
scientific duties. Until such differentiation is adopted in American per-
sonnel practice, however, top administrative positions will be filled both
by appointment from outside the service and by promotion from the ranks
of professional and technical employees. Under these conditions, pre-entry
programs of training for public administration will have to rely more upon
general motives of public service and increasing job opportunities in gov-
ernment than upon the specific attractions of a career in management.

Higher Career Opportunities. Even without legislative sanction of an
administrative class, much could be done by a central personnel agency to
maintain such an ideal as a long-range objective. Constructive suggestions
looking forward to the establishment of an "administrative corps" were
made by the Reed Committee on Civil Service Improvement in 1941. 33
These included: identification of positions in specified grades as a group;

31 For a recent development, sec Reining, Henry, Jr., "The First Federal In-Service Intern-
ship Program," Personnel Administration, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 8 ff.

32 Better Government Personnel, pp. 5-6, 37-47, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935.
3377th Cong., 1st Scss., House Doc. No. 118, p. 3, 56-62, 86-97, Washington, 1941.

Sec also White, Leonard D., Government Career Service, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1935. The Council of Personnel Administration and the Advisorv Committee to the Civil Service
Commission on Administrative Personnel have attempted to follow through on the Reed Com-
mittee's proposals on a higher administrative service.

42 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

maintenance of an inventory of personnel in these positions for use in making
appointments to higher administrative posts; reporting of vacancies in
higher positions; recommending candidates with tested qualifications to
appointing officers; and follow-up on action. -It was asserted that tapping
and training personnel for positions in the lowest grade of the administra-
tive group should be a continuing objective of agency personnel officers
at all times, while a liberal policy permitting transfer of such personnel
between agencies would widen their experience and develop general
administrative skill. The major obstacle to adoption of these suggestions is
the difficulty of finding enough departmental personnel officers willing and
able to cooperate on an informal basis, particularly in the face of strong
pressure upon each to place his own agency's needs above the requirements
of the service as a whole.

One way of raising the question of whether the federal service needs
an administrative corps would be to ask if such a pool of talent could have
produced adequate competence to plan and direct the civilian side of opera-
tions during World War II. War experience is not wholly conclusive be-
cause of the vast expansion of government. Yet it is worth noting that, with
but rather few exceptions, the higher administrators in the war agencies
came from the other branches of government or from the outside. In
civilian recruitment, the Civil Service Commission at an early stage sus-
pended its usual procedures. It authorized the war agencies to appoint per-
sonnel subject only to investigation and certification as to general qualifica-
tions. Moreover, in their procurement and supply operations, the War
and Navy Departments commissioned thousands of civilians to perform
administrative tasks. We reached everywhere for administrative talent.

In establishing its wartime organization the federal government implicitly
admitted that peacetime agencies and their personnel could not primarily be
relied upon to plan and direct the civilian phase of warfare. While a fully
developed administrative service would not by itself have made unnecessary
the creation of emergency agencies, it might well have prevented or sub-
stantially minimized the administrative crises and continuous improvisation
that characterized the first two years after Pearl Harbor. The essential
lesson of American wartime personnel experience was that we were short of
men and women who possessed the ability to envisage the problems ahead
and formulate decisions in advance of crisis situations.

Perhaps the most compelling peacetime consideration in favor of a higher
administrative career is the continuous loss to government of able younger
employees who, having developed their talent within the public service, leave
for more responsible and more challenging work in private enterprise.

4. THE FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH

Function Versus Structure. The accumulation of research materials and
the maturation of administrative research during the thirties produced

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 43

both a textbook systematization of knowledge and considerable philosophic
inquiry into the nature, purpose, and scope of public administration. The
textbooks revealed preoccupation with such matters as the symmetry of
administrative structure and the procedures of good administrative house-
keeping. They also raised the question of whether public administration
consisted of nothing more than an exposition of abstract principles of organi-
zation and a body of experience aimed at training budget and personnel
officers. Was this the whole meaning of public service, and the basis for
attracting ability into government employment?

The experience of management research in private industry ha'd revealed
the error of stating principles of organization as ends, or even as major
purposes. Industrial management now starts from an assumption about the
basic purpose of the organization as a whole. It encourages research to
develop the best ways and means of achieving that purpose. Paralleling this
approach, government research turned to the public purpose sought to be
achieved. In it was seen the rationale for organization, the planning of
operations, the creation of staff units to facilitate operations, and the estab-
lishment of goals and standards as well as methods of measuring results
in relation to the standards selected.

This analysis of management shifts the emphasis from structure to
function. It also defines the key problem as the establishment of effective
working relations between the component parts of the organization."34 The
emphasis upon planning and coordination as essential elements of manage-
ment helped to reorient the thinking of public administration toward the
functions of top direction. Thus the budgeting and personnel functions pre-
sented themselves as techniques of work planning and coordination, and
as training areas for potential managerial talent, rather than as central
concerns of the public administrator.

Man in Organization. Discussion of the elements of organization, how-
ever realistic, aims at some invariant ideas on basic points for thinking,
and hence tends to depersonalize the problems of management. Arthur W,
Macmahon and John D. Millett developed a more productive approach
through an analysis of the role of personalities in the major departments in
the federal government.3'1 Their idea was that a description of background,
training, and career experience of administrators at the levels of bureau chief
and assistant secretary should adduce useful evidence of managerial traits.
The result was an extremely valuable interpretation of varying types of
administrative supervision and departmental coordination arising from the
diversity of personal development and the adjustments made by key officers.

34 Cf. Person, H. S., cd., Scientific Management in American Industry, New York:
Harper, 1929; Mooncy, James D. and Rcilcy, Alan C, Onward Industry, New York: Harper,
1931, and The Principles of Organization, New York: Harper, 1939; Dennison, Henry,
Organisation Engineering, New York: Dutton, 1931.

35 Macmahon, A. W. and Millett, J. D. Federal Administrators, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1939.

44 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The new approach illustrated the impact of personality upon organization.
It extracted the common elements of managerial experience gained in
attempting to create departmental unity out of separate bureau operations.

Biographical research was also utilized by Gaus and Wolcott in their
monumental study of the United States Department of Agriculture.36
Instead of drawing wider inferences from personal data, however, Gaus
and Wolcott used such material as one among several colors with which they
painted the panorama of administrative evolution through seventy years of
political response to powerful economic and technological pressures. Their
study opened broad vistas of research opportunities in administrative history,
focused on the positive role of a public agency in bringing professional and
scientific tools to bear upon the economic problems of a large segment of
the population. It offered chapter-and-verse illustrations of the way a public
agency formulates broader programs and policy, leading onward toward
constructive public service through the educational character of its own
experience. The authors did not close their eyes to the barriers interposed
by strong influences in favor of retaining the earlier concepts of protective,
group-centered regulation. The literature contains no finer treatment of
public administration as the crucible of collective experience for clarifying
legislative goals and for developing the techniques of translating objectives
into administrative instruments for constructive action.

Theory of Relationships. The lifting of the sights of administrative
research to focus upon the social and economic environment has been
largely due to the penetrating writings of Mary Parker Follett and the more
systematic work at the Harvard Business School under the leadership of
Elton D. Mayo. Miss Follett's earlier work in political and social theory had
led her to a keen appreciation of the influence of organization in modern
society. At the same time she had reacted strongly against the ideologies
of group and class conflict which constituted both factual explanation and
political hope for many intellectuals who were aware of antisocial policies
and controls over modern large-scale production. During the last fifteen
years before her death in 1933 she became interested in business management
and organization as a field for application of the principles of unity and
organized cooperation that she had developed in her political studies.

In this new field of interest she was impressed much more with the
conditions tending toward cooperation in the behavior of men working in
groups than with assumptions about inevitable conflicts of interest. In a
series of provocative papers and lectures she showed how management, by
acting on the premise of unity in organized effort instead of merely paying
lip service to it, could gain tremendous strength in mobilizing individual

36 Gaus, John M. and Wolcott, Leon OM Public Administration and the United States
Department of Agriculture, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 45

energies for a common purpose.87 Pervading all her thinking was the idea
that individuals at each level of authority in an organization can be condi-
tioned to think in terms of unity. However, management would have to
make the effort to enable them to sense and understand their contribution to
the common enterprise. It was Mary Follett's abiding faith that the factors
tending toward disunity and internal conflict can be faced frankly; that to
this end enlightened management will open up channels for collective
consideration of the conditions in which frictions arise; and that such fric-
tions stem for the most part from the frustrations and disappointments of in-
dividuals working under conditions out of which they derive no sense of
personal creativeness or contribution.

The research of the Harvard Business School into the springs of human
motivation in business organizations has given us the benefit of a scientific
documentation of Miss Follett's insights.38 These studies applied to indus-
trial research both anthropological findings and sociological concepts, and
added much sophistication as to the meaning of scientific methods of inves-
tigating social relations. The record of the Harvard team's association with
the Western Electric experiments in personnel relations constitutes perhaps
the high-water mark of intensive research into group behavior under con-
trolled conditions. It is impossible to summarize this work adequately, but a
few outstanding findings may be mentioned:

First, there is in each organization a system of informal personal rela-
tionships which condition work habits and attitudes more effectively
than the official hierarchy of authority. The student must develop tech-
niques of observation and interview to enable him to grasp the essential
quality of the organization under attention. A measure of his own
effectiveness is the degree to which he is accepted within the system and
is able to enlist the collaboration of those whose organizational behavior
he is studying.

Second, large organizations consist of many working groups, each
small enough to effect cohesion. Morale centers around such groups,
where direct personal relationships function in relation to a set of non-
logical or emotional incentives and standards. These group standards
must be integrated with the purpose of the organization as a whole
and not permitted to develop intergroup conflicts. Effective management
must not only recognize and give status to each rank in its own social
structure, but also be sure to establish channels of communication be-
tween each group and the center of direction in the organization.

Third, the function of attaining a sense of interrelatedness between
the working groups composing the organization as a whole is a full-time

37 Her collected papers are reprinted in Metcalf, H. C. and Urwick, L., eds., Dynamic
Administration, New York: Harper, 1941.

S8 Cf. Mavo, Elton D., The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, New York.
Macmillan, 1933; Whitehead, T. N., Leadership in a Free Society, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1936; Roethlisbcrger, Fritz, J. and Dickson, W. J., Management and the Worker,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943, and Roethlisberger, Management and Morale,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.

46 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

job which top management cannot leave to chance or to the part-time
attention of supervisory personnel. Explicit attention must be given
to locating and reporting human dissatisfactions at the working levels,
maintaining harmony among the groups in the organization, and study-
ing methods of introducing changes in technical processes or formal
modifications in the structure itself.

Progressive Management. The importance of the personnel function
in organization can hardly be overstressed, but its relation to the central
task of top management remains to be stated. In response to the Harvard
group, an outstanding business executive, Chester I. Barnard, developed
perhaps the most systematic analysis of the executive function since Henri
Fayol. Barnard defined organization as an "impersonal system of coordi-
nated human efforts." He identified the executive's job as: (1) providing
the system of communication; (2) securing essential services from indi-
viduals; and (3) establishing the purposes and objectives of organiza-
tion.39 In his formulation, technical efficiency and morale are not the pri-
mary ends of organized effort. They are limiting factors bearing upon the
permanence or duration of an organization, whose existence through time
depends upon its effectiveness in attaining both the concrete ends of con-
certed activity and essential human satisfactions. Every one of the elements
of management depends upon personnel. While the selection of top per-
sonnel cannot be delegated, the task of functional coordination of those at
the lower levels must be related to the purposes of the organization rathef
than to the managerial function.

All of these propositions show how far modern personnel research has
gone beyond the concept of management as the application of fixed rules
of organization and the installation of technical procedures of selection,
training, and placement. Public administration has been especially receptive
to these ideas. The growing rapprochement among students of administra-
tion in public and private enterprise is demonstrated by various develop-
ments. Two illustrations are the widespread recognition of the work of
Lyndall Urwick40 and the collection of writings in both fields for the
staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management.41 The
emphasis on matters of structure among private management consultants
reflects their greater confidence in the validity of organizational theory.
Government administrators and their planning staffs are more acutely
conscious of the impact of political influences upon public organizations and
have come to accept these pressures as a normal aspect of their work.

The most noteworthy American experiment in modern managerial free-
dom to accomplish broad objectives of public policy — the Tennessee Valley
Authority — has been analyzed in a brilliant piece of administrative reporting

39 Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive, csp. chs. 7 and 15, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1938.

40 Urwick, L., The Elements of Administration, New York: Harper, 1943.

41 Gulick and Urwick, op. cit. in note 1 .

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 47

by its chairman, David E. Lilicnthal.42 The author, convinced that democ-
racy can plan and determine the course of its political evolution, demon-
strates the results that public management can achieve in the utilization
and development of natural resources. Lilienthal feels deeply that TVA
exemplifies sound democratic administration — decentralized operations,
voluntary citizen cooperation and local community participation with gov-
ernment officials in achieving the purpose of the organization, fixing of
responsibility for both planning and execution of administrative policy upon
a single agency, a personnel policy based strictly upon merit but allowing
for constructive flexibility, and an enforcement policy of education and
persuasion that relies for coercive sanction only upon the power of eminent
domain in the public interest.

The essence of democratic administration, Lilienthal says, is doing things
with people, not to them, and placing the responsible administrators close
to the people where they must share the people's problems. Method, he
asserts, is all-important; "it is as inseparable from purpose and ends as our
flesh is from our blood." Give to management powers of affirming and
initiating what shall be done; fix upon it responsibility for results; see that
the experts take action with people instead of simply applying legal coercion
— if we do so, we may be sure that management will work as well for the
public interest as for any incentive of private profit. The TVA demonstra-
tion is a revelation of the enormous potential of moral power available to
a democratic people if they possess the courage to exploit their natural
resources for the common benefit; if they exercise the self-restraint to fix
upon the administration the responsibility and freedom to decide how this
should best be done; and if they find institutional ways of holding the
managers to account for final results.

Horizons of Administrative Research. Research in public administra-
tion thus has pushed steadily backward the barriers of technical separatism
and lack of communication between the various specialists in the adminis-
trative arts. Scientific methods have been applied to the study of the human
factor in organization. The inner secrets of the priesthood of management
have been proved to be susceptible of analysis. Great strides have been made
in clarifying the relationship of budgetary and personnel Coordination to
general management.

Above all, research in public management has struggled free from the
notions of public business as routine, as primarily negative and restrictive
upon personal or private initiative, and as an unnatural but necessary evil.
Study of the modes of policy formation and the relationships in organiza-
tion has brought about an understanding of the psychological processes
of personal identification with the individuality and achievements of the
organization as a whole. Thus public administration has advanced to a

*~TVA: Democracy on the March, esp. pp. 159-161, 199-202, New York: Harper,

48 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

realization of the strong sense of individual release and satisfaction in
cooperating with others.

Because of the great desirability of arriving at common agreement on
public needs and public objectives, increasing research in the borderline
problems lying between political theory and public administration seems
inevitable.4'1 Can greater consensus be reached upon the creative and forma-
tive roles of administrators in advising on the best means of defining particu-
lar objectives and establishing the administrative machinery for achieving
them? How should administrative agencies attempt to integrate their activi-
ties with private group demands and drives for power? How can political
leadership be brought to utilize properly the concepts and techniques of
administrative planning in the formulation of public policies and programs?
Can new forms of administrative accountability to legislatures and to the
public be devised which will increase mutual respect and lessen suspicion
and distrust? Can the educational system be used with greater effective-
ness to arouse both a sympathetic appreciation of the problems of public
management and a desire to enter the public service in the minds of promis-
ing individuals representing all sections of the population?

These are problems of the highest order. They demand unflagging inter-
est and research. For satisfactory progress, we need to establish much better
contacts with foreign administrative experience. Comparative study, of
which thus far we have had too little, is of obvious value.

5. ADMINISTRATION — ART OR SCIENCE?

Aims of Scientific Approach. The term "science" is an honorific word.
Considerable effort has been made to justify its use in identifying the
knowledge and skills that are applied in administrative practice. A science
of administration in the sense of a body of formal statements describing
invariant relationships between measurable objects, units, or elements does
not seem very useful to most students and practitioners. Unquestionably,
administrative research has produced a sizable body of definite precepts and
hypotheses that are applicable to concrete situations.44 But what adminis-
trators visualize as particularly valuable goes beyond that. They are inter-
ested in the techniques of systematizing the process of securing and sifting
relevant information so that the factors involved in arriving at a policy
decision can be stated and the consequences of alternatives can be analyzed
and balanced.

The objective of public or private management is to create conditions
under which a determination of appropriate action can be made in terms
of a plan and an understanding of how that particular decision will fit into

43 See Merriam, Charles E., "Public Administration and Political Theory," Journal o)
Social Philosophy, 1940, Vol. 5. p. 293 #.; Political Power, pp. 285-296, New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1934.

44 C/. Beard, op. cit. in note 16, pp. 163-J70; Urwick, op. cit. in note 40, pp. 17-19.

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 49

the plan. From this angle, administrative research does not seek its goal in
the formulation of mechanical rules or equations, into which human be-
havior must be molded. Rather, it looks toward the systematic ordering of
functions and human relationships so that organizational decisions can and
will be based upon the certainty that each step taken will actually serve the
purpose of the organization as a whole.

Concerns of the Technicians. Naturally, there are levels of routine and
technical proficiency on which greater degrees of uniform mechanical opera-
tion are possible and desirable than at others. Research should continually
seek to simplify and standardize work methods, ranging from the relatively
simple operation of sorting incoming mail for distribution to the complex
process of formulating a work plan for an entire organization in the annual
budget. However,, the establishment of standardized processes and mechani-
cal efficiency docs not penetrate to the central function of management.
Absorption into this more limited aspect of the science of administration
differentiates the operational expert and technician from the manager-
administrator.

Techniques of budgeting, accounting, personnel management, purchase,
storage and handling of materials, and reporting operations are indispensable
tools whereby the facts involved in recurring problem-situations are brought
into focus for the administrator. Yet they are significant to him only as
they raise issues requiring his determination, or call for changes in the
policy of the organization. Administrative progress, in this sense, consists
in the reduction of problems to routines which can be disposed of satis-
factorily at the lower levels.

Science and Social Dynamics. Focusing upon the problem areas of social
organization, the question becomes a different one. How far is it a matter of
science to exercise judgment in selection among alternatives of policy, in
the determination of specific action in pursuit of the purpose of the organi-
zation, or in the interpretation of the requirements of the public interest
in particular cases? If this question were to be answered in scientific terms,
the answer would have to be stated, as in all matters of social relations, in
categories upon which general agreement could be obtained. We have
not yet reached complete agreement on the purpores and powers of public
officials, or on a formula for human behavior whereby conflicts of interest
and will can be predicted and determined in advance. In the philosophy and
practice of democracy, however, it has been learned that men can agree
upon constitutional procedures through wh'ch personal and intergroup
conflicts can be resolved in terms of general policy, basic objectives, and
social priorities.

Evaluated Experimentation. Through the joint action of public officials,
public policy can be tested, tried out, and changed as the result of administra-
tive experience and alert leadership. The science of administration in a de-
mocracy will never be simply a matter of definition; it will always be a mat-

50 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ter of living and striving. Its content will be reflected in the methods by
which administrative experience is applied to the formulation of changing
ideas of public goals. It will gain more specific meaning in continuous re-
search into the problems of communication, incentive, and morale within
both public and private organizations. It will grow through the insight and
ability of administrators as they devise ways of adjusting their programs to
the conflicting demands and ideals of their consumer publics and their
political overseers.

Alliance of Theory and Practice. This view of a democratic science of
administration assumes a unity of theory and practice, and at the same time
envisages a general — but not closed — functional differentiation between its
students and its practitioners. That is to say, administrative research must be
oriented toward actual behavior and the working problems of administrators;
continuous efforts must be made to encourage such research and to bring its
results to the attention of busy administrators.* The suggestion of a National
Research Library for this purpose has been made on several occasions by
Professor Charles A. Beard. Furthermore, administrative research must not
be turned into the handmaiden of officialdom to justify the preferences of
policy-makers at any given moment.

The profession of administration should include both the research worker
and the executive. They should collaborate in selecting problems for study
and making data and experience available. In the formulation and interpre-
tation of findings, however, there will always be room for initiative and
responsibility outside the official sphere. It is to be hoped that students of
administration in universities, business organizations, privately supported
research institutions and public agencies will all seek to break down the
invisible barriers of distance, suspicion, and difference in technique and
objective. Through professional association and the written and printed
word, it should be possible to broaden the channels of communication and
understanding between public and private organizations for mutually helpful
analysis of administrative problems.

CHAPTER

Bureaucracy— Fact and Fiction

1. SEMANTICS AND REALITIES

The tyranny of words is nowhere better exhibited than in the use of the
word "bureaucracy." Governments do their work as much through admin-
istration as through politics. It might therefore be supposed that in a dem-
ocracy where administrators are subject to direction by politicians and where
politicians derive their power from the people, popular allusions to those
who manage the public business would have pleasing connotations. Perhaps
that is the way it ought to be. For the present, however, the opposite is
true, and will be for some time to come.

The Language of Contempt. One of the most common collective desig-
nations for those who man the services of government is "bureaucracy."
The name is one of derision and contempt, harsher, to be sure, in some
contexts than in others but even at its mildest a word inviting one to sneer
or scorn.1 The prevalence of this designation may be regrettable; yet it is a
fact, and as such something not simply to be decried but to be acknowledged
and understood. There are several different explanations for it. Each
warrants brief examination.

As is evident in a thousand ways, the human animal is fearfully and
wonderfully made. Man knows he needs the discipline of authority. Wher-
ever he has come far enough in his evolution to enter the political stage of
development, he has taken steps to establish such authority. But even as he
maintains it, he still resents it and chafes under it. Rationally he realizes
that freedom is unworkable without responsibility. Emotionally his desire
is for liberty without restraint. In this sense "cussin' the bureaucrats" con-
stitutes one expression of human nature, destined to continue as long as
man remains on the earth.

Habit and memory furnish another explanation. In America, popular

1This discussion draws on Morstcin Marx, Fritz, "Bureaucracy," in Peel, Roy V. and
Roucek, Joseph S., cds., Introduction to Politics, p. 410 //., New York: Crowcll, 1941. Cf. also
Finer, Herman, "Critics of 'Bureaucracy'," Political Science Quarterly, 1945, Vol. 60, p. 100 ff.

52 BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION

government, as most people think of it today, was born hardly a hundred
years ago. Only in Britain has it existed for anything like as long a period.
Elsewhere in what are now free countries — with the notable exception of
Switzerland, the Scandinavian nations, the Low Countries and the British
Dominions — monarchy and aristocracy continued to rule not only in form
but in fact until the late nineteenth and — in some cases — the early twentieth
century. Both in America, therefore, and in those lands across the sea
whence so many of our forbears came, government of the people, by the
people, and for the people triumphed only after centuries of autocratic or
aristocratic rule during which administration was frequently overbearing
if not inconsiderate and cruel. Consequently, it was in some measure out
of their own mean experience that the common people came to damn their
public "servants." The evil being long-continuing and the people remem-
bering it full well both as groups and as individuals, the habit has persisted.

Officiousness and Frailty. Officiousness is a third factor accounting for
the unflattering character of many of the popular references to the adminis-
trative profession. Civil servants are ordinary mortals; they have the defects
and weaknesses typical of human nature. Each man loves, as Shakespeare
said, "his own brief moment of authority." However, some seem unable to
avoid showing their glee, and of these the public service probably has a
normal ratio. It is so in all countries} Every government has a proportion
of otherwise satisfactory employees who do their work in a fashion that
rubs the public the wrong way. (This "insolence of office" naturally comes
in for greater criticism in democratic lands like America, Britain, France
and the Scandinavian countries.) Yet even the Germans found ways of
scoffing at Brownshirt "bureaucrats" while Hitler was in power. Nor have
the people of the Soviet Union hesitated to lampoon their own overreaching
"functionaries." The combat troops of all armies illustrate in their scorn
for martinets and for big-talking paper-soldiers berthed at headquarters
the military equivalent of these civilian attitudes.

'Further probing leads to a more serious fact. Occasionally bureaucrats
do abuse their position and authority. By and large, the governmental
processes of modern democracy constitute adequate protection against official
jpiscoaduct. However, these procedures are not always fully used nor are
they always faithfully observed. Here and there a public servant attempts
to make his public office yield a private gain or buckles under pressure and
uses his power to confer illicit advantage on some special group. Il should
be added that this happens more often among bureaucrats in elective than
in appointive posts. Although the guilty are not always caught and forced
to make amends, the gross volume of such abuse has long been on the
decline.

Administrative Self -Promotion. More common and harder to cope with
is a wholly different kind of fault which often arises from excess of zeal in
the promotion of what is honestly believed to be the public interest. That

BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION 53

is the inclination of some public administrators to take too expansive a view
of their functions. In_ order tojacrnmplLsh a public good that might other-
wise be deferred nr Insr^ they ypay push the range of their discretion beyond
the limits Amended by thg legislature. It was a mistake, Woodrow Wilson
argued, to relegate administration to the category of things "which clerks
could arrange after doctors had agreed upon principles." But it is equally a
mistake — and in a democracy a dangerous one — to conceive of administra-
tion ao the heroic center of government. Such a conception might encourage
the view that an independent executive, beyond carrying out the policies
formulated by the legislature, is free to compensate, ^through administrative
orders, for legislative errors of omission or commission!

Administration has been called the core_of modern- government. This
is true in the sense that it is today essential in all states, popular and despotic
alike, Even in a democracy, it is the branch through which government acts
as an evercontinuing process, and- in which the overwhelming majority
of public employees work and the vast bulk of public funds 15 jjpent. Yet
policy-making through. representative assemblies remains primary. To allow
administrators to make the policies they arc to execute, as was the case in
Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, is the definition of despotism. To
organize government so that controlling authority is always vested in those
whom the people desire to exercise political power, as is the case in demo-
cratic Britain, under a cabinet backed by a majority in the House of Com-
mons — this, many believe, is one of the best formulas for freedom yet
devised.

Where, as in the United States, the executive branch with its mix-
ture of political influence and administrative authority is largely independent
of the legislature, and where men without political status may suddenly be
appointed to important administrative posts, ^ special obligations rest on
administrators — as on legislators — to maintain a sense of proportion about
their functions. Public executive^ are obliged to engage in the formulation of
adminhtratiy£.^poUcy, and the necessity for this should be. freefy-jconceded.
Except as the chief executive may direct, however, their participation in the
making of political policy should be confined to advising him and the legis-
lature on policy matters in their own field of operation and offering recom-
mendations or technical assistance to be used for legislative action. Here
the administrator may argue with foresight, with ingenuity, and with a
sense of urgency. Having presented his views, however, he has done every
thing he may properly do.

Thus th|gi^at^afl^-^--p^^V--has its

It is up to the administrator to abide by them no less than the politiciar
and the citizen. No bureaucrat has been prevented from resigning his office
and agitating as a citizen for the policies he thinks indispensable to th<
common welfare. Nor, indeed, is there any law to keep him from running
for Congress or the state assembly or the city council and, as a politician

54 BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION

advocating what the legislature should do. That is the democratic way to
secure the enactment of a particular public policy— by winning a triumph
for it in the political arena. That is the reason why the public takes offense
at men who, as administrators, would try to "decree" policies they had been
unable to "put across" as politicians.

v Procedural Rigmarole. Red tape — or what the average citizen has in
mind when he uses that phrase — also supplies part of the explanation for the
stereotyped conception of bureaucracy. The point should be granted without
argument. To thr ninety per cent of the public who want to do "the right
hing" and generally know how to do it, many government procedures
nust seem unnecessarily complicated. This is true especially of those to
whom it fails to occur that most of the detailed requirements relating to such
matters as permits, licenses, and contracts are to save the majority from the
ignorance, selfishness, or carelessness of the other ten per cent. Hard and
costly social experience accounts in the main for specificities of bureaucratic
procedure.

When at the threshold of World War II motormaker William Knudsen
assumed a post of great importance in the defense effort of the nation, he
said of Washington red tape, "In Detroit we call it system." Thus he not
only gave it a fair and simple characterization but he also furnished a clue
to the reason why it is productive of irritation. After all, it is tape, it is
system. Being inanimate, it is incapable of perfect and instantaneous adapta-
tion to every individual's personal interest or situation — let alone his whims
and fancies. Resenting authority to begin with, man resents it even more
when, no matter what the reason, it seems to blind itself to the scene of its
^operation. Yet in countless instances this appearance can hardly be avoided.
There are numerous types of situations in which the power to fix general
rules must necessarily be centered, while information relevant to their just
and proper utilization lies largely at the point of application. Delegation
of discretion may not always be a feasible answer. When public administra-
tion has to rely on absentee authority, it must accept the consequences in
popular resentment and dissatisfaction as a "risk of operation" — just as, in
similar circumstances, they are accepted in private business.

The assembly lines in the great automobile plants are designed to move
at the speed and in the order that will enable the workers to produce the
maximum number of cars per day. This does not mean that a customer will
always be able to get the car he wants when he wants it and at the price
he thinks right — or that individual workers will not find the pace incon-
veniently fast or slow. So with the red tape of a government agency.
Though designed to enable its employees, working at an established rate, to
provide the public with service conforming to acceptable standards, it will
fail to meet precisely the needs of every single citizen. Methods and proce-

BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION 55

dures calculated to yield the greatest good for the greatest number patently
cannot fit the details of each and every case.2

Subjectivity and Objectivity. "Bureaucracy" would not signify to the
common people the evils it does in America today were it not that various
interests, unwilling to accept public control, have been resolved to discredit
if possible, the very idea and institution of governmental administration.
The economic stakes involved in such efforts are great, and the financial
resources available to support them are frequently on the same scale. Much
of the mspiraTipn fo^ the battle against "bureaucratic regimentation" is
generated by nothing nobler than the desire tojuake jt clifHcult Or impossible
for democracy jx)jyiact or enforce^ regulations needed Jo protect the public
interest. Bureaucracy is besmirched because this seems to offer an effective
way of winning the battle.

Through distortion and caricature, the term "bureaucracy" has come to
imply bungling, arbitrariness, wastefulness, officiousness, and regimentation.
What is its technical meaning? In free translation, it means simply "desk
government" — management by bureaus. It denotes tKe sum Jotal^of the
personnel^ apparatus^ang~prbceHuFes by which anjpjganizat^n_manages its
work and achieves its purposes. The orgamzatipnjnay_bejg»ublic^»r private,
governmental, commercial, educational, ecclesiastical — but if it is of any
size it must be a bureaucracy.

In this sense, bureaucracy is a feature of all large-scale undertakings,
being simply the means, human and physical, through which they strive to
attain their objectives. From this standpoint, the General Motors Corporation
is no less bureaucratic than the United States Government — and General
Motors employees are quite as well aware of the fact as are federal workers.
There is, however, a more restricted meaning of the term. Without implica-
tion of invidious distinctions, it is confined in some contexts solely to gov-
ernment. When so used it normally refers to the entire executive establish-
ment, especially the permanent or career personnel and their operating facili-
ties and procedures. On its administrative side, then, the whole problem
of government consists — as Carl J. Friedrich has properly emphasized — in
the development and maintenance of a bureaucracy that is competent, re-
sponsive, and responsible.3

2. THE SOURCES OF RED TAPE

Efficiency in administration depends at bottom upon devising and direct-
ing a routine, a regimen, a system. We may grant that it is never possible

2 For a provocative study through a management-engineering approach to the problem of
red tape, see Juran, J. M., Bureaucracy — A Challenge to Better Management, New York: Harper,
1944.

8 See his Constitutional Government and Democracy, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1941;
also Friedrich, C. J. and Cole, Taylor, Responsible Bureaucracy: A Study of the Swiss CM
Service, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932.

56 BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION

to reduce all components of a process to the point where they can be so
handled. It is nevertheless the aimJn all managenrient tojliscoyer and intro-
duce that division of spccializcdJ.abQr_.which will enable the total job to be
performed mo§tliti^ctprily and at the lowest possible cost.

Red Tape and Green Tape. From the standpoint of efficiency, public
.ind private administration are basically alike. They operate under similar
types of managerial motivation and compulsion. Many of the sources of
red tape in governmental bureaucracy are no different from those which
account for the^ "green tape" — if we may call it that — in business bureauc-
racy.4 But the: paralleljjojds true for only part ofjhcjvay. Administrators
in government arc obliged jo^c_j^gardfuL of_some considerations beyond
those to" which business^an_lim]tjt:s_. concern. These make the government
tape jcdJjHstf M\ .oL^grecn, . Typically they are social — Aristotle would have
called them political — considerations as distinguished from economic, and
they certainly should figure in public administration.

Perhaps in some fields the ultimate objectives of public management
are identical with those of commercial undertakings, but this is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Government generallyjiims at ends more complex
and more iioy^n£ible_ th^^busi^ess. Men look to government for justice,
law, peace, and order; for the maintenance cf liberty, equality, and oppor-
tunity; for impartiality in the enforcement of economic regulations and
for even-handed ness in the administration of economic assistance — not so
much for service that is swift and cheap as for service that is safe and sure.
They want such service to be economically efficient. They also want it to
satisfy these other and more basic expectations. They do not run their gov-
ernment to make money. They run it in order to establish and preserve
an environment in which they themselves can make a decent living. The
ct-nnjnj-^ nf gtirw»<;g in fondness js ; tjicj^rcatest^conomic gnjjTjr> the individual
entrepreneur or firm at the lowect cconomjc art. The standard for govern-
mejit is Jthe greatest ^nri^^nd^conomic gam for the public jat the lowest
social-and-economic or t to all.

Requirements of Efficiency. To avail itself of the economies latent in
specialization and large-scale organization, government no less than busi-
ness must subnrt to the compulsion of working out a detailed requence
of steps in which the various jobs on each unit of production can best be
done. Assembly-line techniques offer marked advantages over those of
custom craftsmanship. JHey also have their price. They entail the imposi-
tion of an order of progression, the fixing of a rate or rhythm of operation,
and the discipline of a regular routine. Set order, fixed pace, and adherence
to routine — these are the very stuff of which red tape is made. Yet they arc
of the essence of system, too.

4 For an amusing and withal an instructive account of what can happen when a customer
gets entangled in the green tape of private business, see Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, pp.
58-59, New York: Knopf, 1945.

BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION 57

Predictability of Performance. Also common to both government and
business is the desire for predictability of performance. Both for his own
peace of mind and in the interests of maximum productivity, an adminis-
trator wants and needs to know how many units of goods or services his
staff or plant can produce per week or per month and at what cost. Whether
in government or business, his only hope for such predictability lies in the
possibility of maintaining sufficient regularity of operations, both qualita-
tively and quantitatively, to permit the calculation of results in advance of
their occurrence. Yet the very regularity for which he strives and on which
he depends for his success may prove detrimentally monotonous to the
workers under him and may not be appreciated by his customers.

These two, however, are not the only common sources of red or green
tape. Both kinds of tape are nourished by institutional inertia and indiffer-
ence wherever either is allowed to gain a foothold. Both flourish wherever
the lure of order, once established, invests every precedent with the sanctity
of final authority. Both positively luxuriate wherever management becomes
so attached to the comfort of accustomed routine that it avoids at all costs
even the momentarily disruptive effects of a slight change in procedure.

Government of Laws. What of the red tape peculiar to public adminis-
tration? We may first note the administrative counterpart of that key
principle in democratic politics which insists that freedom means a govern-
ment J>f_Jaws rather than of men. Public administration wears red tape
because it is expected to proceed according to objective rules rather than
the subjective intuition of government officials. Who would have it other-
wise? Red tape is perhaps the best insurance the public has that all citizens
will receive equal treatment at the hands of their civil servants.

Accountability to the PMblfc. Another closely related source of red tape is
the ins.sTenceToFthe public on full accountability in governmental manage-
menfTnot "alone Tor final results but also for each and every step by which
they are attained. This means that bureaucrats arc required lo-daAcir work
in such ^\vay that, actually_orjxinLngeJitly^ their every move is open to public
scrutiny._Thcy must perform their task in a fashion that can^b£_defended
and justified even if brought under the most minute and critical review. The
result is what might be expected — almost as much concern at times over
not doing anything wrong as over trying to do something right. To make
matters worse, the tangible rewards for creative imagination are likely to
be meager. Business management prides itself on paying handsomely for
initiative and invention. In public administration, the premium on con-
structive innovation is hardly ever of comparable magnitude. Nor is this
for the reason that governmental management does not appreciate the
value of such incentives. The trouble lies in its being hedged about by re-
strictions that practically preclude it from using them.

58 BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION

3. THE CHARGE OF DESPOTISM

Having essayed an explanation and evaluation of the red tape and inef-
ficiency ascribed to bureaucracy, let us now examine the merits of two
graver indictments— those of despotism and regimentation. Both relate to
supposed abuses of trust or power by the executive branch of government.
For the sake of convenience we shall confine ourselves in the present section
mainly to the charge that bureaucracy seeks to usurp the judicial function,
and endeavor thereafter to investigate the claim that it is contriving to usurp
the legislative function as well.5

Effects of the Industrial Age. The separation of powers has never meant
the same thing in Britain as in America, particularly with regard to rela-
tions between the executive and legislative branches. However, with respect
to relations between the executive and judicial branches it has had approxi-
mately the same significance. One of the common assumptions in both
countries has been that the rights and liberties of the citizen would not be
secure unless all men, public officials and private persons alike, were under
the "rule of law" guaranteed by a hierarchy of independent courts of law.
So long as government could operate on the scale of policing activity, the
judicial tribunals were able to dispose of nearly all types of questions calling
for adjudication — whether arising out of criminal offenses in the usual
sense, civil-law transactions, or noncompliance with administrative regula-
tions. As the impact of technology upon society became more pervasive,
every government has been obliged steadily to extend the range of its con-
cerns. For the proper handling of various types of technical controversies,
this has carried with it the creation outside the judicial branch of novel
administrative agencies or tribunals staffed with specialized personnel and
authorized to employ such procedures as might be most effective in the
light of the subject matter involved.

Because they were in the vanguard of industrialization, America and
Britain have had to make changes in administrative structure and procedure
comparable to those undertaken by other nations which were less deeply
attached to the ideal of the rule of law. As in the case of most departures
from old ways, the new administrative tribunals did not always function
perfectly, particularly in their early years. Occasionally they made errors
of procedural propriety which but for subsequent review by courts of law
might have led to miscarriage of justice. From the beginning, however,
certain groups within the body politic have been unwilling even to acknowl-
edge the necessity for new instrumentalities of this kind. By insisting that
the rule of law was being vitiated rather than aided by constructive adjust-

5 For a fuller treatment, sec below Part IV, "Responsibility and Accountability."

BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION 59

ments in the manner of its application, they condemned these instrumentali-
ties as agencies of a new despotism.6

Charge of Usurpation. Lord Hewart, a British jurist, articulated the
opposition in his volume entitled The New Despotism. His book has had
so great a vogue on both sides of the Atlantic that it may well be taken
as the definitive indictment. "A little inquiry," he wrote, "will serve to show
that there is now, and for some years past has been, a persistent influence
at work which, whatever the motives or the intentions that support it may
be thought to be, undoubtedly has the effect of placing a large and increasing
field of departmental authority and activity beyond the reach of the ordi-
nary law."7 Taking for granted the adequacy of "the ordinary law"— per-
haps more accurately, "the ordinary courts" — and thus in a way begging the
whole question, the author averred that the people of Britain were in
danger of losing their liberties through the growth of administrative
absolutism.

Hewart ignored the inconvenient question of the competence of the ordi-
nary judges to ascertain the facts, let alone their significance, over a wide
range of technical matters. He simply argued that individual rights and
liberties were now in jeopardy because the "ardent bureaucrat" had lately
come to operate under "some such faith" as this:8

1. The business of the Executive is to govern.

2. The only persons fit to govern are experts.

3. The experts in the art of government are the permanent officials,
who, exhibiting an ancient and too much neglected virtue, "think them-
selves worthy of great things, being worthy."

4. But the expert must deal with things as they are. The "four-
square man" makes the best of the circumstances in which he finds
himself.

5. Two main obstacles hamper the beneficent work of the expert.
One is the sovereignty of Parliament, and the other is the rule of law.

6. A kind of fetish-worship, prevalent among an ignorant public,
prevents the destruction of these obstacles. The expert, therefore, must
make use of the first in order to frustrate the second.

7. To this end let him, under Parliamentary forms, clothe himself
with despotic power, and then, because the forms are Parliamentary,
defy the Law Courts.

8. This course will prove tolerably simple if he. can (a) get legisla
don passed in skeleton form, (b) fill up the gaps with his own rules,
orders, and regulations, (c) make it difficult or impossible for Parliament
to check the said rules, orders, and regulations, (d) secure for them the

6 For a fair sample of the literature in which this view is presented, sec Hewart of Bury,
The New Despotism, New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1929 (reissued London: Benn,
1945); Allen, C. K., Bureaucracy Triumphant, London: Oxford University Press, 1931; Amer-
ican Bar Association, "Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law," Reports of the
American Bar Association, 1936, Vol. 61, pp. 720-794; McGuire, O. R., "Administrative Law
and American Democracy," American Bar Association Journal, 1939, Vol. 25, p. 393 ff.

1 Hewart of Bury, op. cit., p. 5.

id., pp. 13-14 (by permission of the publisher, Farrar & Rinchart, New York).

60 BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION

force of statute, (e) make his own decision final, (f) arrange that the
fact of his decision shall be conclusive proof of its legality, (g) take
power to modify the provisions of statutes, (h) prevent and avoid any
sort of appeal to a Court of Law.

9. If the expert can get rid of the Lord Chancellor, reduce the
Judges to a branch of the Civil Service, compel them to give opinions
beforehand on hypothetical rases, and appoint tbem himself through a
businessman to be called "Minister of Justice," the copingstone will be
laid and the music will be the fuller.

If all this, or even the main part of it, were generally true of democracy's
bureaucrats and their intentions, it would be a devastating indictment.
America and Britain would assuredly be en the road to despotism. But
the charge is not true; and for the most part it 13 wholly without warrant.9
Had Hewart and our American critics of like mind been content to specify
some of the cautions which ought to be observed in adapting the rule of
law to the conditions of a technological civilization, they could have per-
formed a valuable service.10 Lacking both such interest and moderation,
what they have done is to prove too much.

Legislative Delegation. As Pennock observes in opening his study of
Administration and the Rule of Law?1 "Before the days of the automobile
there was no need for policemen to direct traffic. Before our population
had multiplied and become concentrated in congested urban areas, sanitary
inspectors were not so necessary as they are now. Before the development
of large-scale business enterprise, the sale of securities required no super-
vision by the government." These changes illustrate some of the technical
problems with which public administration has been confronted through the
progress of applied science. It is almost axiomatic that no invention is
ever quite an unmixed blessing. New mechanisms or processes often
bring new dangers as well as new utilities. They pose for government the
question of how best to secure public advantages without at the same time
disturbing or endangering the social order out of proportion to actual
gains.

Ordinarily, as might be expected, the legislative body was the first to
take positive action in dealing with new situations of this kind. Generally
it has waited, sometimes procrastinated, until sufficient evidence had ac-
cumulated to demonstrate clearly that existing prescriptions and procedures

9 For a point-by-point rebuttal of Hewart's charges in terms of British bureaucracy, sec
Finer, Herman, The British Civil Service, ch. 7, London: Fabian Society and Allen & Unwin,
1937.

10 For tempered studies of the problem of administrative adjudication, see Pennock,
J. Roland, Administration and the Rule of Law, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941; Blachly,
F. F. and Oatman, Miriam E., Administrative Legislation and Adjudication, Washington: Brook-
ings Institution, 1934; Dickinson, John, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in
the United States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927; Landis, James M., The Adminis-
trative Process, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938; Cushman, Robert E., The Inde-
pendent Regulatory Commissions, New York: Oxford University Press, 1941.

H See note 10.

BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION 61

were inadequate to protect the public interest or safeguard individual
welfare. However, f^JpS!^aflirp did «*f forth ** hrst it could the criteria
of the common^good, and thenjvested the power to apply those criteria
either in sojme^administrative agency within the executive bran^.o£mZnew
agency independent of iF^an^norMally independent of the judicial branch
as well. Far from forsaking the ideal of justice, however, what the legis-
lature had in mind in assigning such tasks was to bring novel responsibilities
of government within a more resilient rule of law, one ensuring more sub-
stantive knowledge for judgment, simpler and swifter in procedure, and
less expensive to the litigant,12 yet withal equally just. In brief, legislators
only sought to cope with the practical problem of devising ways and means
for the equitable and expeditious settlement of a mounting mass of tech-
nical cases and controversies.

Flexibility of Statutory Standards. It is difficult to devise criteria and
standards for new fields that will be acceptable as squaring fully with those
to which in familiar situations men have grown accustomed. Instead of
pretending to a knowledge they have lacked — and could not have — legis-
lative bodies have had the wisdom to vest in specialized tribunals and
comparable agencies the general responsibility for deciding what specific
requirements would be right or reasonable in their particular fields. vJR>cc:
ognizing jthat_a^dcgrcc..oL.discretion- hadlo hf .rIgrsH sorn*MirVwfl in ruling
witlTnew issues, legislatures have conferred ..it. .at kast for rhr ..purpose of
establishing the^ relevant facts, upon officials possessed of technical knowl-
edge."OFcourseT such officials were required to observe fundamental rules
of evidence in their work. Thus, statutes defining standards have used such
phrases as "reasonable rates," "public convenience and necessity," "un-
reasonable discrimination," "action necessary or desirable in the public
interest," "adequate facilities and services," "maintenance of a fair and orderly
market," and the like.13 Interpretation of these phrases has been left largely
to the regulatory agencies, and as a last resort to the courts.

Quasi-judicial Agencies. By 1946, Congress had established six major
quasi-judicial agencies outside the executive branch: Interstate Commerce
Commission, 1887; Federal Trade Commission, 1914; Tax Court of the
United States, 1924; Federal Communications Commission, 1934; Securities
and Exchange Commission, 1934; and National Labor Relations Board,
1935. The national legislature had also enacted scores of regulatory measures
calling for the exercise, under appropriate rules of procedure, of consider-
able discretion by administrative officials within the executive branch.
State legislatures have found it advisable to follow a similar course within

12 In their concern for the preservation of the rule of law, bench and bar have tended
to ignore the matter of the costs of justice to the litigant in terms of both time and money,
especially the latter. Its importance as a factor in the creation of administrative tribunals has
been considerable, in America and abroad.

!8 Sec Pennock, op. cit.t p. 31.

62 BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION

their jurisdiction; so have the municipal councils in every large city through-
out the land. And the end is not yet. Although the question of whether to
vest such discretion in agencies within or outside the executive branch is
still a moot one, American experience witb^administrativc tribunals is by
now sufficiently broad and vaiiedLfor some generaLconcIusions. Those
who have studied- it . jnost carefully are generally agreed that both the
graduaMos^by^the^ courts of their former uncontested control over public
administration and the par tial^rcjglacemeat. . of ) udicial guarantees by ad-
ministrative guarantees ot "liberty under law" have jiot ^brought the citizen
un"der a new"3espotism. Oh the contrary, without the aid of such agencies
he might 'Have been unable to maintain his liberties against the powerful,
though impersonal, forces which have been rising about him.14

Administrative tribunals are here to stay; the problem is how to perfect
them. This comes down largely to the question of how to improve their
personnel. Ideally, perhaps, most of the professional staff of a regulatory
agency should have a mastery of both the technical subject matter with
which it deals and the legal principles and procedures that govern such
matters as the conduct of hearings and the taking of evidence. However,
these are two distinct specializations, and few would be specialists in both.
The legal profession, as it becomes reconciled to the need for administra-
tive adjudication, naturally believes that the best way to secure a proper
balance between private rights and public interests in the regulatory proc-
ess would be through stress on legal training.15 Yet lawyers should not
be allowed to substitute their judgment on technical matters for that of
subject-matter experts. Obviously, the practical course for every agency
of administrative justice to take is to staff itself with personnel of both
types and make sure that consideration is given to both sets of factors.

14 For a more specific discussion, sec below Ch. 10, "Independent Regulatory Establish-
ments."

15 Much pertinent information is to be found in the reports of the United States Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Washington: 1940-1941; the report on
Administrative Adjudication in the State of New Yor^, submitted to Governor Herbert H.
Lehman by Robert M. Benjamin and staff, 1942; and the Tenth Biennial Report of the Judicial
Council of California to the Governor and the Legislature, 1944. Some indication of the num-
ber and variety of state administrative agencies engaged at least partially in adjudicatory work
may be gained from the following list of agencies described by the California Judicial Council
as conducting "formal, adjudicatory licensing and disciplinary proceedings": Board of Dental
Examiners, Board of Medical Examiners, Board of Os»teopathic Examiners, Board of Nurse
Examiners, Board of Optometry, Board of Pharmacy, Board of Public Health, Department of
Public Health, Board of Examiners in Veterinary Medicine, Board of Accountancy, Board of
Architectural Examiners, Board of Barber Examiners, Board of Registration for Civil Engineers,
Registrar of Contractors, Board of Cosmetology, Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers,
Structural Pest Control Board, Yacht and Ship Brokers Commissioner, Secretary of State, State
Fire Marshal, State Mineralogist, Director of Agriculture, Labor Commissioner, Real Estate
Commissioner, Commissioner of Corporations, Department of Social Welfare, Department of
Institutions, Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and
Suisun, Board of Pilot Commissioners for Humboldt Bay, Board of Pilot Commissioners for the
Harbor of Saij Diego, Fish and Game Commission, Board of Education, Board of Equalization,
Insurance Commissioner, Building and Loan Commission.

BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION 63

In taking leave of the alleged decline of freedom in the New Levia-
than, we can perhaps do no better than record the considered opinion of
Blachly and Oatman of the legislative proposals advanced by the American
Bar Association in the late 1930's for additional judicial safeguards against
abuses of discretion by administrative agencies. "It appears," they ob-
served, "that the 'tendencies toward administrative absolutism' so feared
by certain promoters of the American Bar Association bill are largely
nonexistent."16

4. THE BATTLE AGAINST REGIMENTATION

Parallel to the accusation that bureaucracy has been usurping the func-
tion of the courts runs the charge that it has also encroached upon the
legislature.17 Administrative adjudication does indeed have a counterpart
in administrative rule-making. Most of those who dam'n the new despotism
are therefore also prone to denounce bureaucratic "regimentation."

Experience Abroad. It may conduce to a sounder analysis of American
developments18 to look first at Britain and France, democratic countries both.
As to the latter, the essence of the matter can be stated readily. The French
are logical and practical about the need for administrative rule-making,
as they are about many other things. Under the Republic, every statute
of consequence enacted by the national parliament included a section
to the effect that "an ordinance of public administration shall deter-
mine the measures proper for securing the execution of the present law."19
The French legislature had no qualms about conferring upon adminis-
trators the task of settling points of detail in public policy.

The British attitude toward what they call "delegated legislation" is not
described as easily. Although there is in England greater readiness to
accept the necessity of administrative regulations than in the United States,
the House of Commons has concerned itself with this matter no less than
three or four times in the past generation. On the first occasion, with

1<J Blachly, F. F. and Oatman, Miriam E., Federal Regulatory Action and Control, p. 277,
Washington: Brookinps Institution, 1940. This matter is taken up more fully below in Ch.
23, "The Judicial Test."

17 Condemnations of bureaucracy on the ground of regimentation may be found in such
books as Beck, James M., Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy, New York- Macmillan, 1933;
Edmunds, Sterling E., The Federal Octoptis, Charlottes villc: Michic Co., 1932; Hoover, Herbert,
The Challenge to Liberty, New York: Scnbncrs, 1934; Lane, Rose Wilder, The Discovery
of Freedom: Man's Struggle Against Authority, New York: John Day, 1943; Wriston, Henry
M., Challenge to Freedom, New York: Harper, 1943; and Sullivan, Lawrence, Bureaucracy
Runs Amuck, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1944.

18 For objective studies of the need for and the use of delegated legislation, see Andrews,
John B., Administrative Labor Legislation, New York: Harper, 1936; Blachly and Oatman,
op. cit. in note 16; Comer, John P., Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1927; Hart, James, The Ordinance-Making Powers oj
the President of the United States, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925.

10Ogg, Frederic A., European Governments and Politics, p. 451, New York: Macmillan,
1944.

64 BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION

Stanley Baldwin at the helm as Prime Minister, the criticism of the House
was "rejected out of hand," in the words of the London Times. The
Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' Powers recommended in its re-
port20 a closer scrutiny by Parliament of the promulgation of subordinate
legislation by the executive branch; this led to no significant action. Again,
during the early part of World War II, a similar proposal was offered but
was rejected by the government on the ground that its enactment would
becloud ministerial responsibility. In 1944, however, it was acknowledged
by the government that additional safeguards should be adopted. Not least
of the reasons was the belief that in the future, ministers might have to
issue rules and orders in greater volume than ever before. The Commons
took up a motion to create

a Select Committee, . . . whose duty it should be to carry on a continuous
examination of z\\ statutory rules and orders and other instruments of
delegated legislation presented to Parliament; and to report from week
to week whether in the opinion of the committee any such instrument
is obscure or contains matter of a controversial nature or should for any
other reason be brought to the special attention of the House.

This motion was countered by Home Secretary Herbert Morrison with a
generous offer to go even further.

Parliamentary Review of Delegated Legislation. By its terms of refer-
ence the select committee is charged with guarding the powers of Parlia-
ment and the liberties of the citizen by inquiring into the character and
effect of the most important types of delegated legislation. Though lacking
authority to send for ministers, it can ask for the services of departmental
officers in getting answers to technical questions and securing other rele-
vant information. This saves it from having to draw the attention of the
House to a regulation without first consulting with the department con-
cerned. The committee chiefly examines measures which would impose
charges on the public revenues, require payments or services to any national
department or agency of local government, or be immune from challenge
in the courts. Two classes of orders are to come in for special scrutiny.
The first includes all orders and regulations which by law do not become
effective unless approved by affirmative resolution of Parliament. The
second and larger group consists of rules and orders which automatically
go into force unless opposed by a prayer or a negative resolution.21 On
this basis the British are prepared to go ahead and make presumably not less
but more use of delegated legislation than they have in times past.

Like Britain and France, the United States is part and parcel of Western
democratic and capitalistic civilization. Nothing is more essential to the
health of this civilization than the maintenance, by such governmental

20 London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1932, Cd. 4060.

21 Cf. London Times, May 16, 1944, and the article entitled "Delegation" in the Man-
chester Guardian, May 18, 1944.

BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION 65

action as may be necessary, o£ an adequate measure of social and economic
equality among the people and a substantial degree of competition among
business enterprises. The British and the French nations have been obliged
during the past century to enact a vast pile of legislation designed to main-
tain such conditions within their borders; so has America. And the com-
plexities of industrial society being" everywhere much the same, Congress
has had to assign the drafting of the detailed regulations implementing
these statutes to the administrative officials charged with their enforcement —
just as have the House of Commons and the Chamber of Deputies.

Ignoble Partisanship. This is the general setting for bureaucratic "legis-
lating" which has given rise to the charge of regimentation. Congress,
state legislatures, and city councils have placed upon administrative agencies
responsibility for putting the flesh of life and action on the bare bones of
skeleton legislation and for making particular statutes and municipal or-
dinances attain the purposes behind their enactment. The bureaucrats
proceed as best they can with these difficult tasks only to find themselves
accused of all manner of evildoing. Why? Because, as often as not, having
been unable to prevent the passage of the statute itself, those opposed to
its objectives have retreated to their last line of defense and have endeavored
on procedural grounds to win a battle already lost.

Thus the stark facts are frequently simple — and on occasion they may
be sinister. Legislative deliberation may reveal so great a need for regu-
latory action in a given field that the only possible way left by which the
opposition may hope to stave off the imposition of controls is through con-
fusing the issues. This is precisely what is often done. Clearly, the real
parties to the argument over public regulation of economic activity are the
representatives of the people in the legislature and the spokesmen for the
interest groups which desire to avoid the social discipline such regulation
would place upon them. It is in many instances the calculated intention
of those who raise the cry of regimentation to befuddle the general public
into thinking that the issue lies instead between tyrannical bureaucrats on
the one side and well-meaning citizens on the other.

Tactics of this kind have always been used by groups endeavoring to
evade social obligations. There is no reason for expecting that they will not
be used until the end of time. Of all the fictions about bureaucracy, one
of the greatest lies in the contention that it is the bureaucrats who are re-
sponsible for the imposition of governmental controls on economic activity.
Such controls are established by the duly chosen political representatives
of the whole people. The much-maligned bureaucrat is but the instrument
through which they are made effective.

Matrix of a Mixed Economy. The abuses and insecurities which inevi-
tably result when men insist on using liberty as though it were license have
forced an almost continuous retreat from the philosophy of governmental
nonintervention in the economic sphere. The American economy is a

66 BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION

mixed economy. Private and public undertakings intermingle. "Either — or"
studies of the role of government in economic life have value only in point-
ing out the perils of going to extremes.22 Many aspects of production and
distribution can be competently handled by private enterprise under law
and regulation. Others are so basic to the maintenance of public health,
comfort, and decency that their management cannot safely be entrusted to
those who would have to operate under the limitations inherent in the profit
motive. In between lie fields — and the area is rather extensive — which lend
themselves equally well to private, public, cooperative, or combined efforts.

Experimental Accommodation. How far public ownership and opera-
tion need to be carried and how far governmental regulation of private
enterprise will have to go are certainly not questions which bureaucrats will
be allowed to answer. Fundamentally, these are matters of high public pol-
icy. No one can predict with certainty what functions of regulation or
control governmental management will be performing a generation hence.
This does not mean, however, that no clues are available to suggest what the
future will bring. It is quite evident that we arc not following any clear
line of theory that would enable us to anticipate impending development.
We do have the light that comes from the lamp of experience, and for a
people as pragmatic as ours that should be a very good light. The likeli-
hood of socialism is at a minimum. We shall go on in the future as in the
past, doing what viable governments have always done — gradually adapting
forms and processes to changing conditions and circumstances.

In our long record of evolutionary rather than revolutionary adjustment
there should be quite a little reassurance for those inclined to be anxious
about the morrow. It should be sufficient to keep them from rejecting the
universe and the century in which they live. The volume of governmental
regulation of economic activities is doubtless destined to expand further.
Such gradual expansion would spell regimentation only if we allowed our
sense of social responsibility to deteriorate and die.

5. THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING

Democracy, it is agreed, rests on understanding between the citizen and
his government. If this is to have any real meaning it is equally essential
that there be understanding between the citizen and his civil servants,
inasmuch as most of the citizen's contacts with his government are through
administrative personnel rather than through political officials. Obviously
the maxim should work both ways; the bureaucrat's need to understand
the citizen matches the citizen's need to understand the bureaucrat. As a

22 The year 1944 saw the publication of two volumes that illustrate only too well the
limitations of the either — or kind of analysis: Miscs, Ludwig von, Omnipotent Government,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944; and Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1944. For a vigorous rejoinder, see Finer, Herman, The Road to
Reaction, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945. Cf. also Wootton, Barbara, Freedom under
Planning, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945.

BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION 67

practical matter, however, the more urgent necessity in the present age is
for greater public understanding of the administrative process.

Psychology of Public Employment. Consider the ordinary man or
woman "working for the government." The government worker is recruited
from no special rank or class or circle within American society; his back-
ground is the same as that of the average citizen. He is increasingly obliged
to give objective proof of competence — first, to get his job, and thereafter to
gain promotion or advancement. His compensation may be sufficient to
enable him to support his family on an acceptable scale of living but it is
never of large proportions.

He does his work hedged about by a mass of rules and regulations which
have - accumulated over the years as the embodiment of popular attitudes
toward the conditions of public employment. Much of what he does may
be floodlighted at any time by pitiless publicity; all of it is subject to the
most intensive and pervasive scrutiny. His chances of taking advantage of
society in furtherance of his own ends should he be so minded, arc fewer
and more circumscribed than are those of thousands upon thousands of his
fellow citizens who arc privately employed.

Yet why presume that he will be so minded? In the first place, no per-
son desiring to lay his hands on material riches would be attracted to the
public service. The majority of government employees are engaged in such
work because the positions offered them held the promise of being "good
jobs," or at any rate fair ones. It is not only a mistake, but even an injustice,
not to remember that the bulk of them are public servants because that is
what they want to be — because the idea of serving the community through
its government appeals to them as the best of all ways to make their living
and to spend their lives.

For these public servants the taking of an oath of loyalty merely formalizes
a resolution already made. It amounts to an outer expression of an inner
dedication — the legal aspect of a code of ethics by which the public em-
ployee is guided in all his official acts and by which he expects all his fellow
workers to proceed. An administrative official no more seeks his position in
order to be able to sit in arbitrary judgment over the public than does a
judge.

Let the government business be what it may, when it comes before the
administrator for action, his whole disposition is to ask himself a series of
questions on this order: What do the Constitution and the statutes say on
this matter? What was the intent of the makers of policy in passing the
law? What discretion am I obliged or expected or allowed to exercise?
How can I best exercise that discretion to promote and preserve the public
interest? There need be little mystery about the workings of bureaucracy
for anyone honestly interested in finding out the facts. Administrative offi-
cials admittedly make mistakes in judgment just as do other human beings.
However, any intimation that the typical official counts that week lost in

68 BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION

which he has not perpetrated some evil on the public is as base as it is
ludicrous.

Veil of Official Anonymity. One thing that would doubtless make it
easier for the public to overcome its misconceptions about the civil service
would be a better understanding of the reasons for official anonymity. There
are two main aspects of the matter. One is the maintenance of anonymity
,by bureaucrats in their capacity as advisers to their political chiefs. The
other is their avoidance of public self-identification as personalities tied into
the work of governmental administration. Let us examine these two aspects
in reverse order.

Any administrative system operating under a government of laws re-
quires some degree of official anonymity. Without it there would be no
way of honoring the basic principle that administrative agencies are fun-
damentally the impartial and impersonal instruments through which gov-
ernment performs its functions. The officials of such agencies are not
supposed to place upon their actions the stamp of their own individual
personalities. On the contrary, their job is merely to be the efficient device
through which the will of the people finds tangible expression.

Yet various difficulties arise when in his official life the bureaucrat
endeavors not to be John A. Smith, William B. Jones, or Edward C. Brown
and tries instead to be something like a disembodied executor of public
policy. For one thing, he runs up against the fact that though theoretically
the people want him to control his personal views or preferences and func-
tion only as "the Administrator," "the Bureau Chief," "the Clerk," or "the
Licensing Officer," many of those with whom he has to deal want him to
handle their cases on a "What's-the-law-between friends?" basis. Friends?
Yes and no. Certainly it is not an uncommon experience for administrative
officials to have citizens presume upon personal acquaintance with them by
asking for favored treatment. And there are always plenty of others looking
for an opportunity to establish such acquaintance so that they may presume
upon it. The official's reaction is usually what might be expected. Knowing
that even acquiescence in such presumptions could be ruinous, he relies as
much as possible upon official anonymity to discourage them. He can easily
go too far. Often his desire to underscore the impersonal character of his
relationship with his citizen-client may lead him to excessive formality in
address and conduct.

Basically, this is the cause of the development and usage by govern-
mental officials of that wooden diction formerly known as officialese and
now as gobbledygook. Percival Q. Adams of 1456 Jefferson Street, Missouri-
ville, Missouri, probably considers his application for a license or his tax
return a matter quite as intimate as it is momentous. He does not want the
licensing officer or the tax collector to treat him as if he were merely a
number. He does not like to see himself referred to in the third person.
Nor does he appreciate the deliberate way in which administrative officials

BUREAUCRACY— FACT AND FICTION 69

often seem to avoid speaking of themselves in the first person when writing
him about things for which they are supposed to be personally responsible.
At its worst, officialese becomes so inverted and involved as to be little short
of maddening. The bureaucrat may think his formalities nicely calculated
to make the citizen "keep a proper distance." The citizen is more likely
to feel that the bureaucrat has built a wall between them.

Official anonymity also stems from the bureaucrat's wholly understand-
able desire to escape being made the victim of unreasoning and indiscrimi-
nate criticism. The body politic accepts years of competent and faithful
service without comment or commendation. However, let a bureaucrat
make some little slip or merely be charged with making one, and the
chances are that he and his agency will have to pay a price in loss of popu-
lar support and esteem out of all proportion to the error done. Is it any
wonder, therefore, that to the bureaucrat the public sometimes seems to be
a dangerous beast which should be avoided? There are always people
anxious for their own purposes to exploit the faults and shortcomings of
the government employee. What reaction could be more natural for him
than to contrive to reduce his exposure to such people to the absolute
minimum?

Teams and Cogs. Having considered the needs and the uses of official
anonymity in the relation between the official and the citizen, let us look
at the matter now from the internal angle, that is, within the bureaucracy
itself. No administrative agency can succeed in the discharge of its function
unless its staff works as a team or as a related group of teams. Each em-
ployee, of course, will have his individual assignment, and, with regard to
his particular job, he should to a degree be on his own. Yet this consideration
must always be subordinated to cooperative needs so that the net result
becomes an "organized" product embracing the whole work of the agency.23
Every member of the staff must learn that what he does commits the agency
itself to some extent. How to instill this essential discipline among all the
employees under him and yet not kill their spirit of initiative is one of the
toughest problems the head of any agency or the chief of any unit has to
face — and it has to be faced continuously.

Not all of those confronted with this problem manage to solve it satis-
factorily. Some generate in their staffs so great a fear of committing the
agency to someth ng wrong that their employees take refuge in a timidity
that keeps them from being positive or effective about anything. Others may
require their personnel to conform in their mode of work to so narrow
and rigid a group routine that all become in practice little more than
robots, cogs on the wheels of government, slaves of an asrembly-line. For-
tunately, there are others in directive or supervisory positions who exercise
special initiative in highlighting for their subordinates the public purpose

28 For an elaboration of this concept, see Appleby, op. cit. in note 4, p. 78 ff.

70 BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION

which the agency was created to serve and the specific services which it
must render in carrying out its responsibilities. They endeavor to show
each employee precisely how and where his job fits into the whole effort.
Finally, through the practice of office democracy and active concern for the
welfare and self-development of all employees, they prove to each member
of the staff that he is regarded as a fellow worker and that his work plays
a significant part in the group enterprise.

Ethics of Political Counsel. Official anonymity has its most specific use
in concealing the identities of bureaucrats in their capacities as advisers to
political chiefs. It is an obvious obligation of the permanent administrative
staff, especially those near the top of an agency, to give their political chief
the soundest advice of which they are capable, and, under the laws, to
carry out his policies with loyalty and efficiency, irrespective of how much
or little of their counsel he accepts. Not having the authority to make pol-
icy, permanent staff or line officers cannot identify themselves with the
responsibility for making it. Only yesterday the professional bureaucrat
advised the predecessor of his present political chief. On some tomorrow he
will be advising his chief's successor. If today he is to try as hard to help
his present chief succeed as he tried to help others in the past and as he
expects to help still others in the future, it can only be on the basis of ten-
dering his counsel within the four walls of the agency. Under the protec-
tion of anonymity his code of ethics calls for excluding from his mind all
considerations except those related to the policy program of his political
chief, the public interest, and the general welfare.

Fact Over Fiction. Granted that the government bureaucracy contains
its share of drones and dullards, of self-servers and time-servers, of minor
tyrants and soulless automatons, these comprise all told but a fraction of the
total. Man for man and woman for woman, there is not now and there
never has been any reason for believing them to be different from their
fellow Americans who are self -employed or work in private industry. The
American bureaucracy is now so numerous that no citizen can indict it
without indicting the nation itself.

The fictions about bureaucracy will go on circulating, but there is rea-
son to expect that they will do so at a gradually decreasing rate. Year by
year the circle of popular understanding will grow wider. As it does, the
public will more generally come to appreciate the limitations under which it
has made its civil servants work.

American democracy has thousands of exceptionally gifted and devoted
employees who not only make no fuss about being bureaucrats but on the
contrary are proud of the fact and grateful for their tasks. We can see them
as a composite picture when we think of individuals such as these: a con-
fidential adviser to the President destined to die years before his time because
of refusal to reduce his labors in proportion to his waning strength; a
journalist endowed with unusual capacity for management willing to let

BUREAUCRACY — FACT AND FICTION 71

his private fortunes slide in order to aid in the reorientation of a great de-
partment; a lifelong government engineer drafted to run a top war agency
after half a dozen industrialists had managed to get all snarled up in it;
a brilliant former state utility commissioner prepared to undergo periodi-
cally the bitterest vituperation in order to demonstrate democracy's ability
to achieve the creative rehabilitation of a river valley; a genius in the per-
fection of budgetary methods and the direction of fiscal operations who
never had any other professional ambition than to help his government
translate its work program into accomplishment with the greatest possible
economy to the taxpayer; a director of an agricultural experiment station
still going strong after nearly forty years of helping the people of his state
in the wise and responsible use of their human and material resources; a
veteran city manager, demonstrating through his efficiency and his devotion
to his community the promise and potentialities throughout the nation of
a public-spirited profession of municipal management; thousands upon
thousands of clerks, secretaries, and stenographers rendering competent and
faithful service at their jobs year after year.

These are the bureaucrats by whom the people of the United States
are served. It is unthinkable that the day will not dawn when their work
will receive the recognition it deserves.

CHAPTER

Democratic Administration

1. LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIPS

Prophets of III. The men who drafted the Constitution of the United
States had had experience with both hereditary monarchy and a confedera-
tion in which a legislative assembly possessed exclusive power. As they
considered the kind of executive head they wished to create, it seemed that
they must choose between tyranny and anarchy. Being sensible men, they
refused both. Instead, they invented a national chief executive with broad
powers who was to be chosen periodically by majority vote — and, as it
turned out, by popular election.

The adoption of the Constitution, of course, did not end controversy over
the powers and functions of the President. The presidency has been popu-
lar enough to last longer without fundamental change than the office of
any other chief executive in any major nation. But many have disliked it,
feared its influence, and believed that to protect our liberty we should
restrict its initiative and independence.

In recent years, the contest over the powers of the presidency has broad-
ened into a debate over the functions of the executive agencies of govern-
ment and their personnel. In these terms, of course, the issue is more realis-
tic in the light of recent world history. It is no single "man on horseback,"
but a dominant party or class, that can threaten a nation's liberty. The
administrative personnel of all our governmental bodies, therefore, may well
consider what their role should be in a democratic society.

Critics of the part that present-day public administration must play have
given administrators something to think about. Mr. James Burnham, for
example, has cheerfully assured us that public administrators, along with
corporation managers, are going to exploit the rest of us, who will con-
stitute the new proletariat.1 Others, like Hayek and Mises, have warned

1 Burnham, James, The Managerial Revolution, New York: John Day, 1941.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 73

that the modern service state will reduce us all to servility just because we
have asked its administrators to organize our welfare and security.2

Such charges are not new. These scholarly jeremiads, as a matter of
fact, have a familiar and even tiresome ring to those who have heard the
same arguments used, in less academic language, in municipal politics.
When cities, in order to get their streets paved or their milk inspected, hire
city managers or strengthen the powers of their mayors, plenty of out-
raged critics usually protest that the democratic system is being undermined.
These attacks appear to carry weight in proportion to the lack of funda-
mental agreement over the objectives of government. In cities where there
has been little factional dispute over fundamental policy, arguments of this
sort are largely ignored.

Whenever they are taken seriously in municipal, state, or federal affairs,
they lead the public to turn to the stock prescriptions of those who wish to
weaken the executive power — that democracy will be safeguarded only if
the legislature controls the details of administration by statute, only if the
civil service completely shuns questions of policy and leaves all initiative
to the lawmakers, only if the national government stays out of state and
local affairs and government in general stays out of business. Yet no admin-
istrative official can work by these maxims. Like any other citizen, the
administrator in his particular sphere must be concerned about the difficulty
of giving democracy effective control over the powerful forces that have been
set free by science. If he thinks that democracy is defined by the maxims
of antigovcrnmental politics and still tries to do his job, he is likely to decide
that the management of public affairs cannot be democratic and efficient
at the same time.

Some administrators, no doubt, have come to this defeatist way of
thinking. Just as Lord Melbourne thought that religion was a fine thing
so long as it did not interfere with a man's private life, so some govern-
mental managers may think that democracy is a fine thing so long as it
does not meddle with the management of public affairs. Nor is this merely
an error of governmental managers. In advancing the old argument that
government should be run like a private corporation, certain political re-
formers have meant only that government should be efficient, while others
have meant that the way it is run should be none of the public's business.

However, many of the men and women who have distinguished them-
selves both as public servants and as students of politics have shown little
disposition to look on politics as a millstone round the neck of governmental
management. On the contrary, they understand that, in a broader sense,

2 Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944; Miscs,
Ludwig von, Omnipotent Government, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. A sharp
dissent has been voiced by Finer, Herman, The Road to Reaction, Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1945. Sec als-o Wootton, Barbara, Freedom under Planning, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1945.

74 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

efficient administration and democratic administration are one and the

same/*

In spite of the defects of our present system, we ought not to overlook
the ways in which our society has operated with a comparatively high degree
of consent and a low degree of compulsion. These ways may well offer
the public administrator more opportunity for enterprising service, though
considerably less security and immunity from criticism, than any political
Utopia devised by nostalgic critics.

Dangers of Oversimplification. The importance of keeping adminis-
tration accountable to a representative body will never grow less, no matter
how strong a sense of professional responsibility public officials may develop,
no matter how exact may become their standards of service. The funda-
mental powers and prerogatives of the legislature are as essential today
as they were when men first risked life itself to assert them. It is hard to
imagine how a government can be democratic unless its legislature is
elected periodically by a free vote; unless the members of the legislature
and legislative proceedings are free of executive coercion and corruption;
and unless public officials administer their offices according to the statutes
and spend money according to the legislative appropriations — all in an en-
vironment of free thought and free speech.

If we start with such a political assumption, how seriously should the
administrator take the argument that the legislature should frame policy
in complete independence of the executive branch and also assert its control
over the details of public affairs?

It does not make sense to expect the legislative and executive branches
to work in harmony, and then to condemn the legislature for too sym-
pathetic consideration of executive proposals. To some extent the public is
led into such inconsistency by the etiquette of a system of separation of
powers, in which leaders of the legislature are likely to be jealous of the
influence of the chief executive and his agencies. However, some of the
most violent feuds over legislative-executive relations in the United States
have developed in cities with council-manager government, in which the
city manager is the appointee of the council and has no formal independence
of it whatever. Perhaps the basic reason is that the American people, con-
sidering themselves responsible for creating their governmental arrange-
ments by rational acts of will, expect the machinery automatically to conform
to the logic of charters and constitutions. Obviously, the public docs not
police compliance with these documents on its own initiative. However, the
legislator or official who chooses to raise an issue of procedural relationships
between the branches of government can usually count on popular attention.

There are always reasons for raising such issues. The legislative oppo-
sition frequently finds it expedient to argue that the party in power is giving

3 For example, see Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, New York: Knopf, 1945.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 75

up legislative prerogatives, thus calling on the corporate pride of lawmakers
to reinforce an argument of policy. In 1944, for example, Democrats in
Albany were denouncing the Republican majority of the New York State
Assembly for subservience to Governor Dewey while the governor's cam-
paign captains were denouncing the Democrats in Congress for subservience
to President Roosevelt. Then, too, a lobbyist likes to bolster his case with
the phraseology of the classic attacks on tyranny; a press agent for a vested
interest can do no better than sound like Tom Paine. And newspaper
reporters, who seem to specialize in public disagreement, often find proce-
dural issues the best material available, in the absence of consistent
disagreement on policy.

The administrative official himself is hardly likely to be impressed by
these issues. By the very nature of his work, he is or ought to be proof
against the assumption that the legislative and executive branches are fun-
damentally in conflict. He knows that all the major aspects of his program
depend on their general agreement. When he thinks in practical terms, he
has to regard the mayor, for example, as being his boss for some purposes,
the council for others. He is realistic enough to understand also that in a
great many matters of administration or even policy he must make deci-
sions himself without being under the immediate control or guidance of
either the mayor or the council, and that in lesser matters his subordinates
also must be similarly independent of him. Without delegation of this kind,
no governmental organization can operate.

It is important for the administrative official to keep his thinking straight
on the large and rather obvious aspects of his relations with the legislature
and the chief executive. Clearly, the real problem is not legislative-executive
relations as much as the relationship between an operating agency, on the
one hand, and the legislative body and chief executive, on the other.

Control by Delegation. Given sound relationships, many questions sim-
ply solve themselves. What, for instance, of the century-old complaint that
administrative agencies are issuing too many orders, and that the legislature
is giving up its right to settle questions by statute? A federal administrative
official knows that his bureau tfow settles by its own orders many matters
that only a few decades ago were the subject of departmental action, or
even an order by the President. As the volume of work increased, the
numerical quantity of decisions naturally increased in greater proportion
at lower levels. The practice of leaving minor matters to be handled at
lower levels strengthened the control of the higher executive at each level.
Indeed, only a systematic practice of directing the lower official to take
responsibility for details can enable a higher official to control him. The
sheer quantity of work to be done by any large organization makes such
selective delegation essential to administrative control. The same principle
must be applied to legislative control. Just as the President can direct the
executive branch only if he concentrates his personal attention on the most

76 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

important matters and delegates the minor ones to others, so Congress can
determine national policy by legislation only if it focuses on the great issues
and leaves the lesser ones to be handled by the President.

Similarly, an executive is eager to have his subordinates develop and
propose new policy. Administration is quite unlike the writing of poetry or
other forms of personal inspiration; as the old wisecrack has it, an adminis-
trator is one who never writes what he signs or signs what he writes. This
is inevitable because the creation of policy is a collective process — one of
gathering ideas and facts and combining them into a program. When a
city manager finds the proposal of a department head acceptable, it is a
sign of good teamwork; when the council finds the proposal of a city man-
ager acceptable, some faction will surely accuse it of being a "rubber stamp."
It is time that someone asked the obvious question: If a legislature, un-
coerced and unintimidated, agrees after open discussion with the proposals
of its chief executive, is it not a sign of effective democracy rather than of
shameful submission? It is pure romance to consider disapproval of a sub-
ordinate's recommendation a sign of independence. The effective super-
visor— whether legislative or executive — gets his policies carried out by
inducing his subordinates to develop and execute his general program. To
do so, he must reach an understanding with them about his goals at an early
stage in the formulation of policy, so that he rarely needs to reject a specific
proposal and start all over again.

A large legislative body will always find it difficult or impossible, even
through committees, to keep in touch with all the advance planning of
administrative agencies and to control the detailed application of policy.
The legislator is tempted by short-run interest and pressure from his con-
stituents to make up for this limitation by political interference with mat-
ters that for best performance ought to be delegated — the selection of indi-
vidual officials, the location of field offices, the letting or cancellation of
contracts, the modification of administrative orders. This temptation is apt
to defeat the whole purpose of legislative supervision, which is to define the
major lines of policy for the executive branch to follow.

Democracy and Legislative Supremacy. Let us consider the classic exam-
ple of parliamentary government. It is easy to see how a legislature may
keep administration generally responsive to its control by only the broadest
kind of supervision. The British Parliament delegates far more rule-making
power to the executive branch than would be constitutionally possible in
the United States. Among the subjects covered by such rules is the whole
problem of governmental organization. The outlines of departments and
their divisions, and also the membership and structure of the Cabinet itself,
are not fixed by legislation but by Orders in Council, Treasury memoranda,
or even less formal documents. Moreover, while the House of Commons
discusses the main policies proposed by the Prime Minister, it rarely alters
them. In effect, individual members acting for themselves cannot get

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 77

amendments to any important legislation considered by the House, and
the House has not altered the executive budget during this century. Mem-
bers of the House have never been able to interfere with administrative
details; by the time that "His Majesty's Service" became a fiction and both
the Cabinet and the civil service came under the control of the House, the
doctrine of collective responsibility of the ministers as the Cabinet induced
them to keep other members of the House from interfering with the direc-
tion of their departments.

For our purpose, the primary fact is that British administration became
democratic as the legislature restricted itself to a very general kind of super-
vision. Nor can we consider it paradoxical that general legislative control
should be improved by the prevention of legislative actions aimed at details.
It was one of the main purposes of our Constitution to take certain types
of executive actions out of the hands of the legislature, breaking boldly with
a habit that had developed in nearly every early state legislature and in the
Congress of the Confederation. As Thomas Jefferson wrote a friend shortly
before the Constitutional Convention met, "I have ever viewed the executive
details as the greatest cause of evil to us, because they in fact place us as if
we had no federal head, by diverting the attention of that head from great
to small subjects."4

Even after the adoption of the Constitution, it was and is still possible
for Congress, in sharp contrast to the House of Commons, to keep its fingers
on all kinds of executive details through its standing committees. But any-
one who believes this difference an inherently national one should consider
the contrast in local government. General management of British cities
rests with committees of the city councils, council members being elected
by wards. Most large American cities, and nearly all the better governed ones,
are administered either by strong mayors or city managers, while the indi-
vidual members of the comparatively small councils do not participate in
the direction of administrative affairs. The most delightful aspect of the mat-
ter is that Americans are apt to call the parliamentary system undemocratic
whenever they learn how much power it places in the Prime Minister, while
British municipal officials consider the city-manager plan and strong-mayor
plan quite dictatorial and un-British, whatever administrative merits these
plans may possess.

Legislators Versus Legislatures. In general, a legislature does not make
administrators responsive to representative control either by settling details
in statutes or by refusing on principle to support policies proposed by the

4 To Edward Carrington from Paris, August 4, 1787. The Life and Selected Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, p. 428, New York: Modem Library, 1944. However, even Jefferson per-
mitted himself moments of cynicism. At the age of 77, when recalling the Congress of the
Confederation, Jefferson wondered "whether Bonaparte's dumb legislature, which said nothing,
and did much, may not be preferable to one which talks much, and does nothing." And he
added, "That one hundred and fifty lawyers should do business together, ought not to be
expected." Jefferson's Autobiography, in op. cit. p. 61.

78 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

executive branch. This point is often obscured, however, because a legisla-
ture does not speak to the public with a single voice. Being composed of
a majority and a minority, it may in general stand behind the chief execu-
tive, and at the same time — through a vocal minority in control of certain
committees — appear to oppose him vigorously. It is then only natural for
the newspapers to give the public the impression that the executive branch
is carrying out a policy over the opposition of the legislature. What is called
"executive usurpation" often resolves itself into a case in which the majority
of the legislature fails to defend against minority attack the policy that it
is generally supporting.6

If it is entirely democratic for an administrator to carry out the intent
of the legislature in the face of attacks from individual legislators or legis-
lative committees, another point becomes apparent. Representative control
can be fully accomplished only if the chief executive and the legislature
work in harmony — the former to maintain effective control over his depart-
ments and bureaus, the latter to keep its individual members and commit-
tees from using tricks of procedure to block its general program. The real
issue of representation and responsibility is not simply between the chief
executive and the legislature, but between the two, on the one hand, and
each and all of the departments, bureaus, and legislative committees that
seek to go their own ways, on the other. The great advances in attaining
administrative responsibility to the legislative branch which have been
achieved in the United States have been made possible by strengthening
the chief executive, who alone can present to the legislature a coherent pro-
gram over and through which broad and democratic control can be exercised.

In exercising such control, the legislature needs staff assistance in the
review and interpretation of facts, the appraising of programs, the drafting
of bills, and other technical work. It must have committee secretariats, legis-
lative reference aids, and parliamentary counsel to fit itself for its tasks of
general surveillance, just as a chief executive needs the tools of management
that are appropriate to executive control. However, the committee members
must keep decisions in their own collective hands and direct their staff
toward matters of proper legislative concern. Any legislative staff that is
allowed to reach into the particulars of agency operations becomes in effect
a rival administrative department, with all of the power of the executive
officials and none of their responsibility for results.

2. THE PUBLIC AS STAR CUSTOMER

Methods of Opinion Analysis. A legislature, even if bicameral, is essen-
tially a single body. As a body, it can act only on a limited number of
important problems. Its influence, however, extends beyond its formal acts.
An alert administrative agency does not merely comply with statutes; it

6 Leigh, Robert D., "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats," Harper's Magazine, January 1945, Vol.
190, pp. 97-105.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 79

seeks to anticipate the drift of public opinion, to develop policy proposals
today that will meet the legislative demands of tomorrow. For this reason
it wishes to keep in touch as closely as possible with public opinion. It may
do so partly by new and specialized methods of analysis, but it is likely
to depend mainly on compiling and appraising in a systematic way the
information that flows in as a result of its ordinary operations.

One of the new and specialized methods is the opinion survey. What
the marketing survey does for a business organization, the opinion survey
does for administrators eager for the views of the star customers of the
government, the general public. By investigating the techniques of the
American Institute of Public Opinion, Congress has virtually recognized
the national importance of this type of unofficial referenda. As Dr. Gallup
and his competitors keep in touch with broad national issues, so public
agencies use similar polling techniques to keep informed of what the general
public or specific groups think of their programs. The Department of Agri-
culture, for example, has conducted elaborate scientific surveys of public
opinion with its own specialists, not only for its own use but also for other
departments. Many cities — notably Kansas City, Missouri, and Seattle — have
made similar surveys with the help of research institutes or universities, to
say nothing of less professional studies. In addition to these sampling sur-
veys, nearly all government departments study the current trends in public
opinion as reflected in newspaper and trade-journal comment.

Advisory Committees. Most administrative policies, however, do not
touch the public as a whole. Administrative agencies arc, therefore, usually
more interested in the opinion of one or another special group that is prin-
cipally affected by their programs. The formal advisory committee is one
means of keeping in touch with such opinion. The War Production Board,
for instance, developed an extensive system of such committees and a set
of principles to guide their operations. The principles themselves were not
new, for they have been followed in practice by many similar advisory com-
mittees at all levels of government — and ignored by others. In summary,
they established a procedure by which affected private interests may be con-
sulted by the agency, but will not be permitted to block action which is
indicated by the public interest. The relationship between the agency and
the affected interests, however, will not depend primarily on such procedures
or even on the existence of formal machinery for consultation. Far more
important will be the degree of public support for the purposes of the
agency, the effectiveness of its organization and operations, and the cohesive-
ness of the private interests and their willingness to cooperate with the
government. If these conditions are favorable, a governmental agency may
be more intimately in touch with the private interests than any advisory
group itself could be.

Day-by-Day Administrative Relationships. Best of all as a means of
keeping in touch with the special opinion of affected interests are the day-

80 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

by-day administrative relationships. Through consideration of large quanti-
ties of individual cases, officials may judge not only the nature of the opin-
ions of those affected but also their general temper. Of course, the stream of
information between public officials and citizens should flow both ways. One
of the most curious aspects of the attacks on "bureaucracy" in recent years6
has been the opposition to publicity programs or to the spending of money
for reports to the public, as if it were improper or undesirable for a govern-
mental agency to ask for the cooperation of the public, rather than to rely on
sanctions. While some agencies have developed programs of persuasion,
especially in seeking compliance with requirements newly established by
statute, most have stressed straight information.

Reporting to the Public. In general, the quality of purely factual report-
ing has unquestionably improved. Cities have competed with each other
to issue the most informative and interesting annual reports. A few states
have followed their example, and several federal agencies prepare periodic
reports that are encyclopedias of information for whole areas of our social
activities. The Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture has long been
an indispensable reference work in its field.7 Nor is it simply a matter of
providing information on government programs for the voter to weigh and
analyze. Most useful — and most significant of the present role of adminis-
tration— are the periodic and special reports which become the basis for
all sorts of private activity. The weather reports, the census compilations,
the specialized periodicals such as the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the Federal
Home Loan Banf^ Review, Domestic Commerce — publications like these
furnish essential data for many and varied private operations.

The daily work of the governmental press agent, often disguised by
various more dignified terms, has its place in the total democratic process.
He is often the closest and most frequent adviser of administrative officials
on the general aspects of their programs. His bias is all in favor of what
the public will like, for his success is measured by the degree of public
approval he wins for his agency. Too often he thinks of advancing the
personal fortunes of his boss, and too rarely does he take a long and im-
partial view of the administrative program. But his shortcomings are to
some degree corrected by the independence of newspaper reporters and
editors. His general influence on administration is surely on the side of
adjusting it to the taste of the public.

Commissions of Inquiry. Advisory committees and public reporting have
their influence on departmental policies. Even more important is the effect
on national policy of programs developed by special advisory groups, in-

6 Sec above Ch. 3, "Bureaucracy — Fact and Fiction."

7 A reader interested in the general philosophy of an editor of government reports who
combines an understanding of general public affairs with an appreciation of scientific techniques
and — rarest of all — a literary style should read the volume of essays by the editor of the
Agriculture Yearbook: Hambidge, Gove, The Prime of Life, New York: Doublcday Doran,
1942.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 81

eluding both public officials and private citizens. Such programs have no
mandatory effect, but the influence of painstaking research and thoughtful
recommendations may be tremendous in the long run. Anyone who reads
the reports of President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends and
of his Commission on Home Building and Home Ownership will discover
in them the outlines of the subsequent decade's national policy on social
welfare and housing. Our current policies are still being influenced by the
reports of the National Resources Planning Board, which brought together
natural and social scientists and leading administrators from private and
public life to draft national programs. And as World War II came to an
end, we were brought face to face with a new program outlined in
Science: The Endless Frontier, a report prepared by Dr. Vannevar Bush
as director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, who under-
took this task at the direction of the President and with the help of com-
mittees including the leading scientists and educators of the country.

The basic changes in our national policy are rarely the invention of
either legislators or administrators working alone. They reauire the con-
sensus of interested men and women of special knowledge and the sup-
port of private organizations, as well as the agreement of officials, the
promotion of popular understanding through press and radio, and the
sanction of elected representatives.

3. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Cooperative Government. It is hard to talk realistically about govern-
ment as long as we think of it as something apart from ourselves. A govern-
mental program does not exist for its own sake, but as a part of a larger
purpose tied into the social order. This must be remembered when we
hear government described as something equivalent to coercion. As a sam-
ple of this type of thinking, we may recall that the National Association of
Manufacturers proclaimed at its 1944 convention that:

Government, in order to be a government, must, in the final analysis,
depend on the legal use of force, and by its very nature must make this
force the basis of its dealings with the private citizen. Under any form
of government-dictated economy this means the intrusion of the irresist-
ible force of government into the everyday affairs of life. These intru-
sions must be accomplished by those in the employ of the government.
Such is political bureaucracy, and therein lie the seeds of tyranny.8

As a general picture of public administration, this statement needs to
be revised with a touch of realism. Force wielded by government employees,
intruding into the everyday life of the citizen to deliver his mail, to relieve
him of his garbage, to teach his children, to keep him from driving on the
wrong side of the road — are these "intrusions"? And it may also be asked

s As reported in the New York Times. Dec. 8, 1944.

82 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

whether private corporations themselves, and their property, do not need
to be protected and supported by force wielded by government employees.
It is at variance with fact to see public administration as the employment
of force against citizens. Nor does it make sense to think of it as being
controlled solely or even primarily by government employees.

When we judge the political character of public administration — and be-
fore we decide that it is either dictatorially oppressive or enervatingly pater-
nalistic— we should remind ourselves that nearly every main function of
government is now administered by cooperation among levels of govern-
ment or between public and quasi-public or private agencies. Not only has
the public become the star customer of government, but business, labor,
and a host of organized group activities have all been rolled into one com-
plex cooperative system. In this system the traditional values of liberty have
not been lost. Yet a higher degree of teamwork or harmony has been
attained than would ever be achieved through a coercive approach.

In general, the system that for want of a better name has sometimes
been called "cooperative government" is one in which a broad program is
carried out, not by a single national agency such as the Post Office Depart-
ment, but by federal, state and local agencies working in cooperation with
each other, with quasi-governmental or private institutions, with business
and labor. For its greatest efficiency, cooperative government requires a
high degree of mutual trust and common understanding, harmonious action
by several or perhaps even thousands of legislative bodies, and considerable
voluntary support from private individuals or institutions.

Combined Operations Among Levels of Government. One of its aspects
is the cooperation of federal, state, and local agencies in almost all the
important programs of government,9 whether in education, social security,
agriculture, public health, the regulation of commerce,10 housing, highways,
public works, or any other fields. Rather than list the programs in which
intergovernmental cooperation is essential, it would be better to challenge
the reader to name an important one in which it is not. He may start with
the business of the post office, but he will be hard put to it to find another.
He had better not mention national defense, usually considered a predomi-
nantly federal function, until he has studied the influence of the state militia
and the National Guard on our military history, and the way in which the
National Guard is formally a part of the structure of the War Department.
And as national defense becomes more and more a matter of technological
and industrial power, it is significant that the most basic scientific research
for national defense in World War II was conducted by private institutions

9 Bane, Frank, "Cooperative Government in Wartime," Public Administration Review,
1942. Vol. 2, p. 95 ff.

10 The degree of cooperation in this field is rarely appreciated. Cf. Bosworth, Karl A., "Fed-
eral-State Administrative Relations in the Regulation of Public Service Enterprises," American
Political Science Renew, 1942, Vol. 36, p. 21*5 ff.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 85

— academic and industrial research laboratories. These appeared better able
to develop new secret weapons because they had an independent status and
thus greater leeway in approach, even though they were working within
the framework of governmental policy.11

The system of cooperative government was greatly expanded during
World War II. Never before had governmental operations and planning
been so decentralized in the United States as at the time when their pur-
pose became utterly concentrated and their potential authority great beyond
any peacetime precedent. The Selective Service System turned over to local
boards of volunteers, set up by state agencies, the task of manning the armed
forces. Much the same policy was followed by our price and rationing
administration. And there are other examples. If the Office of Civilian
Defense was no conspicuous success at the national level, the civilian de-
fense councils in many states and thousands of communities served as vital
nuclei for tying together at a lower level, and modifying in the light of
local circumstances, the many national programs of civilian war activity.
Anyone who thinks of the war program as something dictated from Wash-
ington may study the war activities of the Council of State Governments,
the American Municipal Association, and the United States Conference of
Mayors. State and local governments not only had to carry out national
programs in many obvious and some unexpected ways,12 but they were often
ahead of federal agencies in realizing and pointing to the need for new
policies.

Although state and local governments still use the jargon of states' rights
and local autonomy, in practice they know that they cannot live in inde-
pendence. They must work with federal agencies and influence federal
activities in order to justify their existence. A system in which local gov-
ernments with their own legislative bodies carry out national programs
under the guidance of federal agencies has one highly important general
advantage — both political and administrative — over a completely national
system. The man doing the job in the service of the locality has reason to
feel a general responsibility to the public, not merely a specialized one for
a particular branch of administration to a distant superior. To be specific,
the city manager whose welfare department is carrying out a function on

11 For an appreciation of the part that state military organizations play in Army affairs,
see Palmer, Brig. Gen. John McAuley, America at Arms, Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
1943. Still more relevant to modern warfare is the story of the development of the atomic
bomb, radar, the proximity fuse, and other new weapons. See Smyth, Henry DeWolf, Atomic
Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb
under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1945. See also two forthcoming books on the Office of Scientific Research and
Development: Baxter, James Phinney, Scientists Against Time, and Stewart, Irvin, Organizing
Scientific Research for War, both to be published by Little, Brown & Co.

12 For example, the provision of emergency war housing required the amendment of city
building codes, and the national fiscal policy depended partly on cooperative state and local
taxing and spending programs.

84 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

behalf of federal and state agencies is freer to have an independent opinion,
and to express it to the head of the national program, than if he were a
local employee of a national agency. To carry out the function he must
keep his legislative body informed, and its members in turn may educate
their constituents. While doing the job he can keep it from colliding with
programs of other federal agencies, or v/ith state or local activities. In brief,
the cooperative system gives the man at the level of local government a
better chance to weave together the many strands of national policy than
does a system in which every function has its own special functionaries
from the top level all down the line.

One particularly good example, though in some ways it is unique, is
the scheme of agricultural administration. It has been influenced by concen-
trated economic forces to a lesser degree than have comparable activities
in the fields of commerce and industry. As a result, the traditional American
individualist, the farmer, has retained wider opportunities for direct par-
ticipation in cooperative government. He has taken part in the develop-
ment of an intricate cooperative system of public subsidy, joint marketing,
production control, soil conservation, public credit, freely available scientific
research, and technical education in state universities, extension courses, and
on the farm. From the administrative point of view, this area is especially
interesting because it illustrates so well how some functions can best be
handled by national agencies, especially if they deal with broad economic
problems like farm credit or aid to underprivileged groups like the program
of the Farm Security Administration; how other functions are best en-
trusted to state agriculture departments; others to land-grant colleges; and
still others to the joint efforts of experiment stations and extension services,
in which the county agent works at one and the same time for all levels of
government and for private associations of farmers — and on the side helps
carry on incidental programs of welfare and education.13

Benefits of Intergovernmental Collaboration. To see the benefits of a
cooperative system it is not necessary to believe that local government is
closer to the people, or more important to the people, or more democratic,
than national government. None of the traditional local functions deals
with as many people every day as does the postal service; none of them
affects the lives of citizens in ways as important as do international diplo-
macy and war. And all functions exercised by state and local governments
are more likely to fall under the control of irresponsible groups, whether
wardheelers or powerful economic interests, than is the case in the federal
government. Moreover, the business of the nation commands the citizen's
first attention. The newspaper editor knows what people are interested in

13 For comments on the type of functions that are administered by one level of govern-
ment alone and those that are managed cooperatively, see Benson, George C. S., The New
Centralization, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941. See also Baker, Gladys, The County
4gent, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 85

when he puts Washington affairs on the front page, and local council news,
if any, inside with the hair-tonic ads.

Yet there is a great deal to be said for arrangements under which public
officials with a national point of view have to deal on a basis of mutual
respect with public officials representing a local point of view. Quite a few
broad governmental programs may well be divided into specific functions,
some under exclusive federal or local control and others under mixed con-
trol, but with representatives of all levels of government in a position to
criticize independently the arrangements, and to speak up if they are dis-
regarded. Even if the federal government is the exclusive source of funds
or has the final word in any dispute, the participation of local agencies may
be a source of initiative, of independent criticism, and of administrative
personnel who have been trained in the exercise of political responsibility
rather than as anonymous components of a larger organization.

Inclusion of Business and Labor. It is interesting to note, moreover,
how the cooperative system has been extending itself, not only to local
governments and public institutions, but to business corporations that are
sometimes thought to be motivated only by their balance sheets. Perhaps
the general drift toward the view that private property, too, is a public trust
is partly responsible. And perhaps the way in which the management of
business has become largely separated from ownership has opened the road
to cooperation with the government.

This is not to suggest that business interests are sacrificing themselves
out of public spirit. It is only to say that they now see their place in a
larger system more clearly than was the case half a century ago. They have
been drawn into the administration of national programs by the legislation
that they have sponsored, by regulations imposed on them, by contractual
arrangements with public authorities, and through the activities of their
trade associations. For example, in World War I, the federal government
took over the railroads. In World War II, the Office of Defense Trans-
portation established general policies, and the Association of American
Railroads served as the go-between with the individual railways both on
the formation of these policies and their execution. That individual rail-
way cars are moved about the country according to orders from a national
center in compliance with general governmental policies is not socialism, but
something that would never have been recognized by Adam Smith.

Property, as the lawyers say, is only a bundle of rights. Legislators and
administrators, unlike doctrinaire socialists, have followed the advice of
Aesop by dealing with each right separately, so that the national interest
in the use of property may find expression while private interest is not
destroyed. There is indeed no general principle about government-business
relations that is uniformly binding. Like state and local governments,
business enterprise has to justify its existence by its usefulness in the public
interest. It would not do to expect too much of such a general responsi-

86 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

bility by itself, but it is probable that government-business relations will
be worked out according to specific and empirical standards, field by field.

As business corporations come into the picture, so do labor unions. In
World War I, the Navy manned merchant vessels that carried supplies and
munitions to France. In World War II, while the ships were being oper-
ated by private companies for the War Shipping Administration under a
variety of contractual arrangements, they were manned by civilians whom
seamen's unions referred to the companies. Much of the function of pro-
tecting seamen that was assigned in the late nineteenth century to a gov-
ernment agency — the Bureau of Navigation — has now been taken over by
union delegates.

Group Initiative Under National Standards. The modern tendency is
for the federal government to see to it that private organizations or state
and local governments do certain things according to certain standards,
instead of doing them itself. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, for
instance, licenses private flying schools and private repair shops to examine
the pilots and inspect the maintenance of aircraft — functions comparable
to those which the early Steamboat Inspection Service assigned to its in-
spectors. Thus an agency empowered to establish its own regulations,
instead of being bound by detailed legislation, is apt to discover that admin-
istrative effectiveness dictates the same policy as does the desire to leave
private enterprise independent of detailed government control, subject to
standards established in the public interest.

In all these cooperative arrangements, private associations play an es-
sential part. De Tocqueville remarked a century ago that the leadership
in public affairs which would be assumed by a public functionary in France
or a grand gentleman in England was taken in America by a private as-
sociation.14 Some of these are organizations of people bound together only
by public spirit and civic interest in a single subject; some, like trade and
professional associations or organizations of public officials, are bound
together by a common occupational interest.

It must not be imagined that such a system always works toward the
public welfare. It has the disadvantage of diffusing responsibility and
encouraging various groups to blame their own shortcomings on each
other. In some cities, for example, the price of decent housing is outrage-
ously high because real estate men, dealers in construction materials, con-
tractors, labor, and local government all work closely together to force the
consumer to pay more than he should.15

To keep the mai^ lines of policy in the hands of responsible public of-

14 Democracy in Amrrica, Vol. 2, p. 106, New York: Knopf, 1945.

18 Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentration of Economic
Power, Monograph No. 8, Toward More Housing, Washington: Government Printing Office,
1940. Other monographs of this committee illustrate the dangers of private exercise of what
amounts to governmental power in other economic fields.

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTOATION 87

facials is essential if a governmental program is to be democratically ad*
ministered. To let local agencies use national funds for purposes other
than those determined by responsible national authorities, or to leave to a
private interest the responsibility of regulating itself, cannot be justified
on any grounds of democratic decentralization. However, the existence of
many organizations which command the loyalties of citizens is the best
guarantee that no single agency can demand and abuse that loyalty. The
people may safely call on their governmental executives for vigorous leader-
ship as long as they have many channels through which to contribute to the
development of policies and to protest those that seem to be determined
by self-interest or professional prejudice.

4. REPRESENTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Interdependence of Public and Private Interests. The system of mixed
governmental and private effort has not solved all our political and ad-
ministrative problems; sometimes it may seem that it has only complicated
them. In politics, it has made the old issues of left wing versus right wing,
government ownership versus private enterprise, appear unrealistic. In
administration, it has added so many dimensions to the functions and re-
sponsibilities of public management that the negative formulas of the nine-
teenth century have been rendered inadequate. The problem is no longer
simply how to prevent special privilege; it is one of organizing the larger
public interest.

The most conspicuous kind of nineteenth-century privilege — party
spoils — is fast becoming obsolete. The new problem is more subtle than
the prevention of patronage in jobs or contracts. It is to keep the system
of cooperative government from freezing into a structure of guilds or com-
peting pressure groups. The distinction is not mainly one of form or
pattern, but of purpose and attitude. We cannot solve the problem by
saying that government must not aid private interests, for the interests of
private organizations and governmental agencies are so thoroughly inter-
twined that many of the distinctions between them have become only
incidental.

World War II extended the interdependence of private and public
interests. Private enterprise was often conducted in plants built by a gov-
ernmental corporation, with raw materials assigned by priorities, with
labor provided by the United States Employment Service, with expenses
covered by cost-plus-fee contracts or profits restricted by renegotiation, and
perhaps in communities built by public housing agencies. But this is
nothing fundamentally new in America. It is as old as the land grants to
railroads and homesteaders, as Henry Clay's "American system" of tariffs
and internal improvements, and as the subsidized and chartered private
companies that established most of the thirteen colonies in the New World

88 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

while the other Americas were being developed by alliances of military and
ecclesiastic hierarchies.

Threefold Collaboration in Policy-Making. Today we see most national
policies — which govern the larger private interests as well as purely govern-
mental business — worked out in three-fold collaboration, with participation
by congressional committees, by administrative officials, and by represen-
tatives of private interest groups.

It is clearly essential to democratic government that the legislature be free
to consider and reject the proposals of administrative officials and of pressure
groups, and that it give no particular official or private interest an exclusive
right to be heard. Yet the "bureaucrats" and the "lobbyists" have a vital
role in the formulation of policy, for they shape up the smaller questions
into large issues capable of legislative consideration. Congress would be
faced with chaotic conditions if, for instance, it insisted on reading petitions
from individual businessmen instead of hearing the testimony of trade-
association executives.

To develop a program in democratic fashion, it is indispensable to ex-
amine present administrative experience, study the probable effect of new
proposals on all interests concerned and on related programs, and then
subject the proposals to legislative hearing and debate. While the repre-
sentative of the special-interest group plays a necessary part in this process,
the public administrator has much the same special knowledge and a
broader kind of responsibility. His role in the formulation of policy — for
final legislative consideration, amendment, and approval or rejection — is
and should be an influential one. It is accepted as such whenever any group,
in or out of the legislature, tries to work out a practical program. Heated
denunciation of the influence of bureaucrats on legislation is usually only
a tactical maneuver in the battle over policy.

The administrative official has several assets that make it in accordance
with the public interest for him to exert great influence in the evolution of
policy. He may develop imoartial scientific and professional standards
for the measurement of the effect of policies. He may judge the working
of those policies by close observation in actual practice. His enthusiasm
for theories is likely to be tempered by a shrewd appreciation of what is
possible and practical and what is not. And yet he can be the spokesman of
interests that are not cohesive or powerful enough to hire press agents or
influence legislators by closely reasoned arguments. This function is espe-
cially important since consumers — being equivalent to the general citizenry
—rely mainly on their government to protect their interests against the
powerful lobbies of producers and salesmen.

AH the advantages that the administrative official possesses in the formu-
lation of policy are reflections of the responsibility of his position. It is his
task to further the purposes defined by law and executive order, which are
a part of a general program supported by the dectorate. He is directly

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 89

accountable to his superiors, and indirectly to the legislature, whost* control
over appropriations is a powerful weapon for the enforcement of responsi-
bility. His professional bias and his governmental responsibility alike impel
him to work for the public interest. In practice, his influence is considerable.
Careful studies of the origins of legislation — of the sources of the drafts of
bills acted on by the legislature — show that in federal and state governments
alike the administrative official is accepted as the ghost writer of the
lawmaker.10

Informality of Policy-Making Process. On the other hand, no matter
how much of scientific methods or objective standards is applied in the
development of a policy, a public official is subject to the error of overempha-
sizing his own specialty. The more zeal he shows for the public welfare,
the greater is the probability of error. This kind of distortion is increased
by the tendency of the official to ally himself with legislators who have
similar preferences and with interest representatives holding a similar
point of view.

Such informal alliances to further the public interest by advancing spe-
cial programs make it impossible to determine exactly who was responsible
for what. The effective responsibility for the content of public policy can-
not be measured simply in the number of bills that are prepared by lobby-
ists, by administrative officials, or by individual legislators. For the more
important decisions in the formulation of policy are usually made in informal
discussions in which those concerned try to work out an agreement before
the proposal is formally prepared for legislative consideration.

Even if no informal discussions are held, a proposal drafted by an ad-
ministrative official will be influenced greatly by his judgment of what the
legislative committee will probably accept and of what will arouse strong
opposition by private interests. It should, therefore, be stressed that the very
fluidity and informality of this process is its most democratic characteristic.
The legislature and the chief executive are enabled, if they consider it in the
general public interest, to refuse to accept the organized point of view of
the interest group or the administrative department, and to try through other
combinations of private interests and public administrators to line up a
workable new program.

For while government departments and organized private interests are
basic machinery in our social system, they can be positive forces in a democ-
racy only if they are kept in line with the general public interest. It is not
enough for them to refrain from encroaching on the rights of others; they
must actively contribute to the general welfare. To enforce this fundamen-
tal responsibility it is necessary to prevent any single collection of interests —
whether a government department, a trade association, a labor union, or

16Witte, Edwin E., "Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking," Public Adminis-
tration Review, 1942, Vol. 2, p. 116 ff.; Scott, Elisabeth M. and Zeller, Belle, "State Agencies
and Lawmaking,** ibid., p. 205 ff.

90 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

what not — from monopolizing an activity so completely that it can deal with
the people and their government on its own terms.

Experimental Approach. For this reason it may sometimes be politi-
cally wise not to consolidate major bureaus or departments even though
they have related functions, especially if they are pursuing different experi-
mental approaches to a problem and if their consolidation would result in
dropping such productive experimentation. Thus a two-party system is bet-
ter than a one-party system, not because the two parties have different
philosophies, but because each helps prevent the other from subordinating
the general welfare to its prejudices and interests. Similarly, at the top level
of administration where broad political considerations are properly involved,
it may sometimes be desirable to avoid a neat pattern which puts all related
functions under the same agency, in order to give the chief executive more
freedom of choice in the future.

For example, in the middle 1930's the field of housing was divided into
sharply defined groups, each with its own solution to the housing problem.
The real-estate boards, the building and loan associations, the commercial
banks, the lumber dealers, the welfare workers, the advocates of decentral-
ized subsistence homesteads, the advocates of slum clearance — each of these
private groups was sure that its solution alone was right, each identified it
with its own philosophy, each lined up in support of an administrative
agency dedicated to something like its approach, each cultivated the Con-
gressmen whose committees were likely sources of support. To amalgamate
the various administrative agencies in the field of housing at that stage
would have been to commit the country to a partial approach. After eight
or ten years of enlightening experimentation, however, all groups were much
better prepared to admit the possibility of making the several programs
operate in harmony rather than in opposition to each other. It was then
feasible to bring the several administrative establishments into a single Na-
tional Housing Agency, each retaining a measure of its independence and
each fitting itself into a comprehensive program.

General Interest Over Special Interest. The program of a government is
never merely the sum of its departmental programs; it may be either much
more or much less. It is much less if the basic purposes of the departments
are inconsistent. It is much more if their operations are linked together, each
furthering the activities of the others and all submerging their jurisdictional
disputes in a general current of agreement.

But the legislature alone cannot accomplish such administrative coordina-
tion. The democratic process of subordinating the special interest to the
general interest depends to a high degree on the leadership of the chief
executive in the sponsorship and application of policy. No one is in a better
position to observe how present developments will require changes in policy.
No one else can as effectively use the agencies of centralized management —
budgeting, planning, personnel— to guide the preparation of policy as well

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 91

as its execution. No one else can equally well back up his formal orders
to the executive establishment with administrative sanctions.

The broader the responsibility of an administrator, the more concerned
he must be with the general aspects of the government's program, and the
less with narrow questions of technical efficiency. The specialist in manage-
ment efficiency or scientific research who resents "political" interference
from above may be properly objecting to partisan exploitation of his job.
It is just as likely, however, that he resents having the technical aspects of
his work adjusted to fit a general program. Similarly, the bureau chief
naturally dislikes having his aims subordinated to those of the department,
and in turn the department head may seek to be as independent as possible
of the chief executive.

It is plain that the adjustment of each level's work to make it fit into a
larger pattern is the essential process in administration. As long as this
process is carried on in an atmosphere of free criticism, and with the chief
executive responsible to the people, it is a truly democratic process. The
higher the level at which an administrative official operates and the broader
his responsibilities, the closer he is to direct accountability to the people.
The formal machinery is not as important as the fact that the chief executive
is held responsible by the public for the whole program of the government.
His direct responsibility to the people is strong in the American democratic
tradition. Let us remember that the Electoral College was reduced to a fic-
tion soon after it had been established, and that in many a city the voters
have chosen council members for their support of the city manager rather
than for their own views or personalities.

The chief executive is most effective in contributing to the democratic
workings of administration if he combines with his machinery of coordi-
nation a policy or a philosophy that will stir the interest and inspire the
support of his departments, the legislative body, and the general public alike.
Without such a common purpose, the cooperation of free institutions is
transformed into the selfish defense of vested interests. With it, such cooper-
ation multiplies the effectiveness of governmental administration, adding to
the efforts of each single public agency the energies that are developed in the
varied organisms of a free people.

5. DEPARTMENTAL DEMOCRACY

Individual Freedom Versus Institutional Restraint. If the purpose of
democracy is to make government serve the highest ends of man, instead
of making man serve the lowest ends of government, we cannot be sure
that public administration will remain democratic in the long run simply
by achieving satisfactory working relations between governmental agencies,
the legislature, and the general public. We must consider the way these
agencies are organized and operated, for it is always possible for an organi-
zation to defeat its own ends by becoming an end in itself.

92 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

Within an organization, democracy is by no means the same thing as
lack of discipline or authority. An army, for example, can be quite demo-
cratic even though an officer has authority to order his men to certain death.
The question is whether the administrative organization permits its mem-
bers to retain their independence as citizens in matters that do not concern
their official duties, and whether it gives them a chance, in performing
those duties, to make full use of their talents to further the general welfare.

Public officials and employees do not need to surrender their personal
rights or liberties as citizens. Perhaps the low point of public confidence in
government, at least in the English-language tradition, was reached for a
few years in the late eighteenth century when the British Parliament denied
civil servants the right to vote. That limitation was soon removed, but Great
Britain continued to restrict the political activities of civil servants more
severely than did the United States. America made the opposite error of
letting political parties use government employees for their own purposes,
until civil service rules established the proposition that a public servant
must not campaign in electoral contests for or against the chief executive
or members of the legislature.

It would probably be an error for this nation to adopt, after the British
fashion, the general principle that civil servants may not take part in or-
ganizing the promotion of public policy. There are features of the British
Constitution that justified that principle, and may still justify it. The per-
manent tenure of the civil servant, and the possibility of change at any time
in the political direction of public administration, might make it inconvenient
to permit him to take a public stand on an issue between his present
superiors and their rivals who could become his superiors tomorrow. Even so,
it is a little hard to see why it is proper for civil servants to organize to get
their salaries raised and improper for them to take part in more inclusive
organizations in support of other policies.

At one extreme there must obviously be some limitation; at the
other extreme there need be none. An officer in a high position should not
publicly oppose his political superior's policy without resigning; and if he
does oppose it in public, he should be discharged. At the other extreme,
an employee with duties totally unrelated to policy ought to be— and gen-
erally is — permitted to take any stand he likes on issues of policy.

The most difficult problems arise between these two extremes. An offi-
cial with a long-range interest in the public service will often find com-
promise necessary. As long as he is conscious of working toward his general
objective as a servant of the public, compromise is simply a function of his
position. Government, of course, needs men whose primary interest and
competence are focused in the administrative process itself, and who can
help conduct administrative affairs regardless of chanees in polirv. How-
ever, in a dynamic democracy there is also room for men who, while
not active in electoral campaigns or party organizations, are primarily inter-

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 93

csted in policies and programs, and are quite willing to work for these
either inside or outside the government.

Now that the number of civil servants is so great, it is especially impor-
tant to safeguard their political rights. As long as we keep our system of
cooperative government, we will never be threatened by a gigantic bu-
reaucracy all of whose members vote for its boss. The cooperation of state
and local governments and private institutions in national administration
helps guarantee the freedom and diversity of political views, just as it
keeps our citizens from being divided sharply into two parties, each differ-
ing from the other in political philosophy and in attitudes on all major
issues.

Sense of General Purpose. At the same time, administrators themselves
ought to be concerned with the political implications of their own depart-
ments and the departmental working processes. The purpose of every
organization is partially defeated whenever it tends to become absorbed in
itself and in the interests of its personnel, rather than in the accomplish-
ment of its general objectives. The administrator ought not to be blind to the
dangers of such introversion, for it is a fault from which none of his man-
agement formulas can save him.

There is, first of all, one obvious danger. Any person may easily slide
into the error of believing that his organization exists primarily for him
and for his particular category of associates. This is a matter of degree.
In general, the more the civic status of public employees is preserved,
the less incentive they have for considering their pay and working condi-
tions their prime objectives. It is quite proper to demand the protection
of employee rights and to organize to that end. It is also quite proper to
take an interest in the development of a career service, based on adequate
personal incentives. At the same time, neither the citizen nor the civil
servant ought to confuse the security or conditions of government employ-
ment with the essential purposes of public administration.

The distinction is not always simple, but there are several approaches
which will help an agency head to make it clearer. One is to see that em-
ployees have full opportunity to use their abilities in the most effective ways.
No single organization can do so completely, for the purpose of the organi-
zation itself is a limitation. A welfare agency, for example, could hardlv
make the best use of a promising physicist. Within reasonable limits, how-
ever, intelligent methods of recruiting and classifying employees and of
assigning them work that will suit and develop their talents are apt to
further at once the efficiency and the democracy of administration. Large
organizations can do even more by adopting programs of in-service training
to encourage the fullest growth and use of all potential abilities. Nothing
weakens an administrative organization or a government as a whole more
seriously than artificial barriers to the advancement of men and women
with capacity and leadership. The traditional practice of American civil

94 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

service commissions of considering only the immediate usefulness of a
recruit, and making little or no effort to discover and develop general admin-
istrative ability at an early stage, cannot be justified on grounds of democ-
racy; it is merely shortsighted. It is possible to develop administrators with-
out having an exclusive and undemocratic administrative class.17

In encouraging employees to put forth their best efforts, a great deal
depends on indefinable matters of personality and atmosphere. It may not
be too fanciful to suggest, however, that the qualities which enable a citi-
zen to assert his political independence while respecting the opinions and
personalities of others are similar to those which aid the administrator to
bring out the best efforts of his subordinates. The dictatorial administrator
who makes personal issues out of differences of judgment is likely to stifle
the advice on which he must rely for guidance. On the other hand, one
unduly preoccupied with the personalities of his subordinates — one who
fails to bring to their attention the points on which they fall below his stand-
ards, and who juggles his organization to suit their peculiarities — may
merely find the more scrupulous to be confused and uncertain, and the
less scrupulous to be either scheming for their own purposes or challenging
his leadership. A good measure of intelligent extroversion, combined with
a sensitivity for the rights and feelings of others, will help the administrator
to keep his agency's attention on the job to be done rather than on its
internal problems.

Vice of Departmentalism. A second danger is the assumption that the
organization exists for its own sake. The logical transition here is easy:
esprit de corps makes for effective work, and esprit de corps is furthered
by expansion of the functions or jurisdiction of the organization. In mild
doses this is good medicine, but as a steady diet it is politically fatal. Undue
concentration of loyalty in the agency is somewhat akin to the specialist's
devotion to his own specialty. The formula of having the expert "on tap
but not on top" is easier to quote than to apply in practice.

Several cures have been tried for this ailment. One is to introduce
countcrinfluences in the form of government-wide concerns — agencies to
aid the chief executive in his widely embracing managerial duties, such as
a planning office or a budget bureau, or special coordinating machinery.
Another is to give multiple functions to a single agency or a single unit
of government. On this principle the Tennessee Valley Authority was
created; much earlier the entire system of British local government was
reorganized on the same principle to substitute a single unit of government
in each area for a number of specialized authorities. Still another cure is
the systematic promotion or transfer of administrative personnel from one
department to another. The British civil service adopted this idea for the
higher levels of the administrative class more than two decades ago. Such

17 Cf. above Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administration," sec. 3, "Training for Public
Administration.*'

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 95

transfers have probably done much to make civil servants think more of
the general welfare and less of jurisdictional disputes.

If transfers of this kind are good between departments, why not apply
them between the various levels of government and between government
and private institutions? Government is only one department in the whole
organization of society, and the changes in its functions during the past
century have made the line between it and private activities far less sharp.
Today, the top governmental administrator cannot adequately judge his
agency's operations merely by the conventional standards of management;
he must consider its effects on society as a whole. To give him the necessary
breadth of view, we may need a wider interchange of top personnel among
levels of government and between public and private life. The specialists
in techniques and in various subject-matter fields are necessary, and will
want to make life careers of their work. However, they are not likely to
develop the breadth of sympathy and imagination that an administrator
of the highest level must have if he is to do his job in the development as
well as in the execution of policy.

The spoils system was little better than looting the public treasury. But
the theory of rotation in office is not the same as that of partisan spoils. In
a general sense it has always applied in American life, private as well as
public. Visitors from more static or more stable societies invariably wonder
at the American's tendency to change from job to job, or to occupy several
jobs at once. Perhaps we should rediscover or bring up to date the theory
that Jefferson and Jackson held about public office. It is not that public ad-
ministration is so simple a matter that anyone can master it in a short time.
On the contrary, it is so complex that few can comprehend the problems
that arise at its higher levels without having had wider experience, and
not in government alone.18

Inroads of Perfectionism. A third trap awaits the administrator who
seeks to do the job assigned to him by law and executive direction. It is
the danger that the administrative process will become an object in itself,
that the very art of generalization will be converted into a specialty. Some
managers allow their personal analytical and critical processes to absorb their
attention. As a result, they fail to let subordinates do their jobs in their
own ways, thus obstructing the development of diverse abilities and the
release of individual energies throughout the organization. Others become
hypnotized by the procedures of management. A manual of procedures has
its uses, but like other written rules it is apt to turn sterile unless it is the
elaboration of a common will, a real agreement of minds within the or^ani-
zation on objectives and on the type of teamwork by which they are to be
effected.

is Of course, this proposition is quite different from the historic use* of rotation in office
for patronage purposes; cf. above Ch. 1, "The Growth of Public Administration," sec. 4, "In-
creasing Competence for Increasing Responsibility."

96 DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION

Delegation depends on the assumption that some other man can do the
job as well as the delegating superior, once the proper general directions
are established. The popular axiom, "If you want a job well done, do it
yourself," is the opposite cf administration. Yet a kind of perfectionism
sometimes creeps into management. It is shown by a preference for making
all decisions at headquarters rather than leaving some of them to the field;
headquarters will make no mistakes, even if a bottleneck develops. It is
shown by a preference for flooding the field with detailed instructions; it is
best to make sure that all is settled in terms of the letter of the directives.
It is shown by a preference for centralized national administration in all
circumstances; it is better to have a uniform policy and no local variations,
even if the program fails to win general understanding and acceptance.

Yet these perfectionist assumptions usually break down because the very
nature of public affairs requires their administration with flexibility and
initiative on lower levels. It is, therefore, just as desirable to get the views
of the men in the field as the views of the department head. In a quite literal
sense, headquarters must serve the field officers and the field officers must
serve the public if the organization is to be democratically efficient in its
administration.

Democratic Self -Education. The purposes of democratic society deserve
the best administration that can be had. No less will do the job. And the
administrator who today is doing his best hardly need worry about the stale
charges of czarism and dictatorship that are now being taken up by scholars,
after decades of careless use by political hacks. On the contrary, he should
be heartened by the way in which the administrative process has broadened
and become more democratic during the past generation, even during the
war years when concentration of authority might have provided an excuse
for more authoritarian policies.

This broadening of participation in our national administration must not
be credited to any single group or party. It is the result of a gradual
strengthening of local and group responsibilities throughout the nation, and
of a freer exchange of ideas and personnel among all levels of government
and private organizations, including business corporations. In its more
successful programs, contemporary government makes it plain to the citi-
zen that while the best administration is certainly democratic, the most
democratic administration is also the most efficient.

In order to provide a cohesive force for this cooperative system, we
should encourage among our administrative officials active and responsible
participation in the development of policy.19 The old proposition that policy

19 To be sure, no one would want to minimize the basic distinction between responsible
and irresponsible participation in policy development. Some of the standards of responsibility
in this sphere have been outlined in the present chapter. Others are suggested above in Ch. 1,
"The Growth of Public Administration," sec 1, "Administration — Public and Private," and
Ch. 3, "Bureaucracy — Fact and Fiction," sec. 1. "Semantics and Realities."

DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 97

and administration are mutually exclusive spheres of activity never fully
applied anywhere. Particularly, it never fitted the United States. And
today, when the political fate of the world depends on our ability to coordi-
nate technologies while encouraging initiative, it is necessary for administra-
tive officials to help in the charting of our social policies, even though they
must remain fully responsible to legislative control and to direction by
democratically chosen executives.

The dynamics of our democracy cannot be a simple process of right
pulling against left; it must rather be a process of organizing both public
opinion to support a policy and machinery to carry it out. Our social fron-
tiers will move forward not according to abstract theories but as fast as we
can educate one another to the possibility of effective cooperation. This
process of democratic self-education is one of the main aspects of public
administration. To it the administrative official must contribute his full
share.

CHAPTER

The Social Function of Public Administration

1. THE "AMERICAN SYSTEM" AND THE SERVICE STATE

Wartime Record. In their official report on war and postwar adjustment
policy released early in 1944, Bernard Baruch and John Hancock cast an
appraising glance at "all of the economic systems of the world" and con-
cluded that "the American system has outproduced the world." But they
added a very significant qualification on the manner in which this "miracle"
— as they put it — had been achieved. "With the coming of wqu\" they
observed, va sort of totalitarianism is asserted . . . planning and execution
rest upon one over-all purpose and a single control."]) This tribute to both
the power of our common determination and the role of government in
directing the mobilization of our resources as a nation appears to suggest
a lesson for peace as well as war.

War is not the only teacher of patriotism and civic solidarity. True
dedication of our individual efforts to the organic development of demo-
cratic society might furnish us on a national scale with the "moral equiva-
lent of war," to use William James' phrase.2 If we can attain greater service
from our economy by effective cooperation under the auspices of "one over-
all purpose and a single control," should we not hasten to seek the better life
by adopting for peacetime use the wartime features of the "American sys-
tem" which proved the key to victory?

Peacetime Relevance of Wartime Achievement. An affirmative answer
could find support in the character of our wartime experience, we reached
not only unprecedented levels of productivity and national income but also
a high mark of direct citizen participation in governmental activities such
as selective service administration, civilian defense, and price and rationing
administration!) Our democratic structure of government remained intact,

. * Senate Doc. No. 154, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3, 7, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1944.

2 James* great essay under this tide has been reprinted in Winslow, Thacher and t)avidson,
Frank P., eds., American Youth, p. 181 ff., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 99

and our fundamental liberties were not undermined. In the spherc^pf busi-
ness, the "American system" retained its identity as an enterprise economy,
in the main individually owned and managed for private gain. By har-
nessing our full productive strength, we succeeded in building a vast war
economy atop our peace economy. At no time in our history had we accom-
plished anything like it.

Yet we are far from assuming that the scheme which served us well in
war would provide us with a sound working formula for peacetime living.
Winning a war is a goal for which we close ranks almost automatically.
Safeguarding prosperity in the context of the democratic way of life is an
equally worthy end, but one for which we have not yet evolved a generally
acceptable organizational pattern. To very articulate groups, in fact, the es-
sence of the "American system" lies precisely in the absence of any "single
control," any "regimentation," any "sort of totalitarianism." Spokesmen of
these groups have always insisted that the "American system" itself demands
that government "stay out of business" and leave the economy to its
"natural laws." " ~~~

Long-Range Trend Toward the Service State. However vigorously this
doctrine has been expounded, it is clear that we have never attempted to
practice it consistently. Suffice it to mention the Articles of Confederation,
formulated in 1777, which authorized government to "go into business" by
establishing its "sole and exclusive right and power" to run the postal serv-
ice. Indeed, (.next to our unparalleled technological advance, perhaps the
most striking thing about the "American system" in the historic perspective
is the steady growth of direct andJndi/^i4UibUc^orUrols---by regulation,,
by taxation, by^enfi^^TTT^ageina^nt and use of j^neyjinSarecTiffty En-
forcement of standards of safety, by governmental insurance of risks, by pre-
serving industrial peace, by social rehabilitation, by providing a host of
specialized services to meet particular group needs.) For better or for worse,
all of this is part of the "American system."

Nor can it be argued that the gradual emergence of such public controls
arose from conspirational scheming or lust for power, or zest for interfer-
ence on the part of government. Traditionally suspicious of authority, we
resorted to new controls only in the face of strong popular pressures or con-
ditions that cried out for remedy. On this score, there is no real difference
in the records of the Republican and Democratic parties. In each instance,
governmental action, preventive or curative, presented itself as the lesser
evil, when compared with an unmeliorated status quo. Sometimes the action
taken was futile; sometimes it was foolish. Sometimes it was clumsily de-
vised and incompetently executed. Even if it met our expectations, our
satisfaction was not unmixed. After all, is not the lesser evil still an evil?

One important fact, however, stood out. As the framework of public
concern and superintendence widened, we managed to narrow the Dan-
gerous chasm between wealth and poverty, increase our economic health,

100 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

and raise the national standard of living. Government, by expanding its
functions in the social and economic realms, simultaneously broadened the
meaning of democracy) This was the "trend toward the service state" which
Leonard D. White had found in evidence in the administrative evolution of
the first three decades of the twentieth century.3 It is still going strong.

Assurance Versus Fear. Up to the day of Pearl Harbor, the implications
of this trend were by no means universally appreciated. Like parents who
do not see their children grow, most of us would not have known a trend
had we met one. Those who became aware of it were more inclined to
decry it than to weigh its deeper consequences. Time and again — and with
increasing frequency during the past generation — we had been chilled by
prophecies of impending doom. How could free enterprise or, for that mat-
ter, any freedom survive if government continued to reach out farther and
farther? How could our economic efficiency — the very basis of our existence
— hold up if government meddling drained all initiative from private man-
agement? Questions such as these inspired gloom rather than assurance.
However, while we tended to default on convincing answers, the trend went
on. Political power changed hands, but no party clothed with governmental
responsibility found it practical to call a halt and defy the "trend toward the
service state." Is it reasonable to assume that we simply did not know what
we were doing ?

It is much easier to accept the propositions that the^ service state isjlem-
ocracjr broughtjipdLD-date; that the extension of direct and indirect public
controls aims at the assertion of democracy in the nerve centers of modern
industrial society; and that modern industrial society can endure in rela-
tive freedom only through such assertion. This is not a new or abrupt
turn. It is our chief means of preserving our political heritage. As one of
the ablest defenders of the "middle way" expressed it more than ten years
ago, "The liberty which our Anglo-Saxon ancestors have fought to maintain
for fifty generations has been liberty underjaw., aru| Inw means regulation."1
Liberty under law is at the same time liberty bolstered by law, enriched and
amplified by law — liberty not only for the economically strong but also for
the economically weaET^ln thiiT sense, the service state is the charter of free-
dom for the commonjrian. Here Jefferson's faith in the rank and file and
Hamilton's vision" of active government promoting the public^ intcrestjink
up with each other in ~

Test of the Service State. World War II was an undoubted test of the
"American system." It was also a test of the service state. In terms of exist-
ing governmental machinery, we were far better equipped at its outset than

3 Trends in Public Administration, p. 341, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933.

4 John Dickinson, in presenting the government side on the constitutionality of the Bitu-
minous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Senate Doc. No. 197, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936. Dickinson's general position is concisely out-
lined in his Hold Fast the Middle Way, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1935. This book has
hardlv found the attention it deserves.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 101

we had been as we stood on the threshhold of World War I. Starting with
that federal machinery, we proceeded to strengthen it by putting ourselves,
for the duration of the national emergency, under "a sort of totalitarianism."
Thus forearmed, with all of our great resources at the nation's command,
we set a world record of production. Could we have forged ahead as we
did had we left private enterprise to its own planning and aspirations? The
question is purly rhetorical. The triumph of the "American system" was a
triumph of creative enterprise backed by the service state.

But a real issue remains. Obviously, no one would contend that what
democracy needs is "a sort of totalitarianism." Wartime demands are extraor-
dinary. Nations cannot afford to be slow in getting into their stride. We
confront an entirely different situation in peacetime. Again we shall be
more circumspect and hesitant about means even when we agree on ulti-
mate ends. Again we shall bicker and quarrel among ourselves for selfish
reasons. Again we shall sneer at authority for the fun of it. And authority,
in turn, will no longer be supported by those standards of exceptional lati-
tude which are the essence of war powers under the Constitution. Granted
all of this, we shall nevertheless have to organize ourselves in order to ensure
our well-being as a nation.

2. THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICE STATE

Making Democracy Succeed. Viewed against peacetime's much-increased
opportunities for disruptive disagreement, our postwar assignment as a na-
tion, at home and abroad, looks formidable, to say the least. Internationally,
enduring peace itself may be lost unless we fully act out our role as a senior
partner of potentially decisive influence in shaping a world organization
that will marshal both strength and wisdom. In the domestic sphere, we
are virtually committed to perpetuation of the wartime "miracle" of pro-
ductive abundance and maximum employment. This is not just a bois-
terous roar of self-confidence. It is a matter of necessity.

All of us know that democracy victorious in battle cannot convert itself
into democracy choked by unemployment without simultaneously forfeiting
its future. Therefore, America as well as Great Britain may well ponder
the significance of Lord Woolton's famous White Paper on Employment
Policy — issued before the climax of the war — which bluntly declared in its
first sentence, vThe Government accept as one of their primary aims and
responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment
after the war.*) If we had not already gone some distance in the direction
of the service state, we would have to start now in a hurry. For it is plain
that the discharge of any such broad governmental responsibility, involving
as it does the corollary of "taking action at the earliest possible stage to
arrest a threatened slump," entails a "new approach"5 and specific machinery
for its application.

5Cd. 6527, pp. 3, 16, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1944.

102 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

This machinery must be both highly sensitive and of great dependability,
even though most of it may not be in the nature of an expansion of regu-
latory power in the usual sense. Proper reliance on devices other than
regulatory ones is a traditional aspect of the service state. Fiscal policy
is a goodjllustration. (As World War II taught us how to direct our enter-
prise economy for national purposes, so we learned in the stress and strain of
economic mobilization the real significance of fiscal policy in its several
components — expenditures, taxes, borrowing, and management of the public
debt. In the postwar period, fiscal policy is likely to emerge as one of
government's main tools for achieving a satisfactory level of employment.

Through fiscal policy we can most effectively influence the volume and
direction of spending, the rate and character of investment, the course of
inflationary or deflationary developments — a wide range of factors that enter
into the business cycled However, determinations in the field of fiscal policy
must rest on a large body of factual knowledge as well as sound theory.
Each determination, moreover, requires some implementation through
appropriate administrative mechanisms. Even indirect controls such as
those of fiscal policy depend for their success on adequately staffed statis-
tical and research services, and a variety of regulatory facilities which ^n
be brought to bear on policy execution. Of course, when government™
effect assumes responsibility for underwriting prosperity, it must be fully
equipped for the task. We would not choose a dentist who prides himself
on doing everything with a single instrument.

Continuity of Progress. It is certainly a great advantage that in setting
our sights for the postwar period we are not embarking upon a wholly
novel venture. We may have to improvise and experiment, but for the
most part such improvisation and experimentation will be guided by prac-
tical experience gained in the past. Hence, the "trend toward the service
state" is in itself a valuable legacy. Fortunately, it is a legacy which bears
the imprint of times of peace, and for this reason lends itself better to peace-
time application than would any innovations springing from wartime neces-
sities. If we had only the wartime record to guide us, we might be very
doubtful about its longer-range relevance. The American people have more
than once startled their enemies by throwing all of their might into un-
wanted war. Yet they have always drawn a sharp line between waging
war with all their power and returning to their peacetime business. If they
have erred in this respect at all, the error has been on the side of being
too rigid in observing the necessary line of demarcation.

Small wonder that the service state, in recapturing for democracy and
for accountability to the public some vital areas of social and economic
life, has met stubborn resistance by those who had previously staked claims
to immunity and exemption for their own ends. Laissez faire had its en-
chantment for the few when the many did not stir. But even in its heyday

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 103

the doctrine of government nonintervention was elastic enough to allow
for tariff protection by government. And the idea of protection carried over
into other fields. Industrial society cannot endure without a considerable
degree of stability, firmly grounded in law and regulation.

As we plunged repeatedly from heights of prosperity into valleys of
depression, we learned to fashion ^safeguards against recurrent calamities.
Eventually, these safeguards extended all the way from government pro-
tection against monopolistic exploitation and cutthroat .competition for the
sake of free and fair competition to government protection against the
hazards of old age and unemployment. Nor must we forget the remark-
able spread of government lending activities, which reached an unprece-
dented expanse in the establishment, at the close of the Hoover Adminis-
tration, of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This agency alone
has probably done more for business than was accomplished for the unem-
ployed by all the public works programs of the Great Depression^

Surviving Contradictions. Have there been planners of the service
state? Not in the sense in which we think today of planning. The service
state was not conceived on any general plan. As we sought remedies against
economic and social ills and ailments over more than half a century, we in-
serted public controls in piecemeal fashion and at a variety of points. If in
the end the cumulative effects of these efforts came to resemble something
like a coherent scheme, it was by accident rather than by prior intent or
design. However, by the eve of World War II the outlines of a reasonably
consistent scheme had become apparent.6

It is true that contradictions in structure still remained visible, but they
were negligible in comparison with the unresolved and more fundamental
contradiction in public attitudes toward the service state.^On the one hand,
no open-minded observer could fail to notice that the \Ajnerican system"
had long ceased to be one of private enterprise exclusively, that it had be-
come in fact a mixed economy in which both the private and the public
sectors fulfilled essential tasks, in many ways complementary in nature.
It was apparent that a decisive weakening of the public sector would merely'
restore earlier conditions of social and economic vulnerability which today
no other democratic nation in the world is willing to tolerate. On the other
hand, all too many of us are still captives of obsolete slogans and stereotypes
which depict the service state as a parasite feasting on the body of the
"American system." This fundamental contradiction, more than anything
else, accounts for the fickle climate of opinion in which the service state
operates. How can we acquire the highest degree of -skill in operating the
governmental machine when we permit ourselves to be obsessed with the
idea that the machine will destroy us?

6 Perhaps the best comprehensive description of the service state before our entry into
World War II is contained in Lyon, Lcverett S. and Associates, Government and Economic Life,
2 vols., Washington: Brookings Institution, 1939-1940.

104 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

It is vital that we take a calmer view of the service state as a set of in-
stitutions that have grown to be indispensable in sustaining our economy.
The question has never been one of liquidating those institutions in the
interest of an entirely unworkable, absolute freedom of enterprise. Abso-
lute freedom would annul all community. More than once in the past,
we have been reminded by the Supreme Court itself that the free society en-
dorsed by the Constitution involves the mutual adjustment of rights, that
all rights are relative, and that each right is conditional on the self-preser-
vation of the public order. The service state, being merely a means to an
end, effects such adjustments both in the relation of right to right and
in the relation of right to obligation.

However, the service state cannot make its full potential contribution if
its principal purpose is misunderstood. It cannot do two things at once —
attain its basic goal within the framework of democracy and at the same time
fight a running battle in defense of its existence. As long as powerful groups
and special interests inveigh against the conception as well as the machinery
of the service state, they have no ground for the complaint that government
offers no full assurance of its competence to cope with complex processes.
For it is precisely the perennial denunciation of the service state that inter-
feres most seriously with the gradual refinement and perfection of respon-
sive and responsible government.

Beyond this question of public confidence — identical in the main with
confidence in democracy and democratic procedure-£stress must be laid on
other elementary needs of the service state. Eitst, there is the need for re-
sourceful public -management. Second, there are the related needs for public
planning and policy continuity. Third, there is the need for continuous
synthesis of fundamental motivations — political, economic, and social. Each
of these needs involves the interplay of all three branches of government,
legislative, executive, and judicial. No one branch — and no one level of
g(>tfernment — can singly undertake the whole assignment. Willing coop-
eration among all three branches and on all three levels is imperative. So
is civic cooperation.^)

As long as its elementary needs are only partly met, the service state
remains little more than an idea. As long as its needs are answered only
in a haphazard way and without sufficient attention to their interrelations,
it will fail to mature. QThere is a vast difference between maintaining large-
scale governmental organization, operating at limited capacity, and actually
securing the greatest benefits from that organization) If in the machine
age it is impossible for democracy to keep itself alive without the reenforce-
ment which the service state provides, it should follow that we ought to
exert ourselves to make the most of our opportunity.

J Requirements of Public Management. This is not the place to unfold
in detail the major themes suggested in any enumeration of basic require-
ments. That will be done in subsequent chapters. Here, passing reference

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 105

to only the most obvious implications must be sufficient. Resourceful man-
agement in government presupposes several things. In the first place, the
public sector of the "American system" must be nourished with adminis-
trative and professional talent at least in the same degree to which that
talent has been drawn into the private sector since the advent of industriali-
zation. This is not simply a matter of appropriate standards for entrance
into public service. It also raises the problem of making public employ-
ment attractive in terms of both general prestige and career opportunities/
And, sgcondj we cannot delay for long a practical reconciliation of the
increasing demands for administrative self-reliance, initiative, and inventive-
ness with more concise elaboration of effective forms of general control and
administrative responsibility. Thus far, legislative control has succeeded
neither in securing true accountability nor^in showing itself capable of
promoting vigorous management.8 On this score, the record of private
business is more satisfactory than that of government As we know also
from our experience with judicial control over administration, responsibility
is weakened rather than strengthened if it is exacted primarily TnTTegative

forms of invalidation. • — -

"Requirements of Policy Planning. Equally important is the need for
adequate organization for public planning and policy continuity. A people
united in the pursuit of its main national objectives can well be presumed
to give unified direction to public undertakings. When unity of purpose is
impaired, distortion of general policy through minority pressures and vested
interests is not checked readily.9 However, the impact of these forces of
distortion may be lessened in large measure by governmental arrangements
designed to bring forth something like a rationally conceived national
agenda. Planning is an inseparable aspect of our civilization. It is recog-
nized by industry as a source of profit and an insurance agaiftst loss. We
cannot do without it in carrying on our business as a nation.10 While today
this assertion is perhaps uncontroversial, it cannot be said that we are unani-
mous on such questions as the proper location of the planning function
and the scope of its mandate. Acknowledgment of the importance of plan-
ning does not carry with it any commitment on the questionable alternative
between economic freedom and a planned society. The degree of planning,
realistically speaking, will with us always depend on practical needs, not

7 The outstanding American report in this area is now more than ten years old: Com-
mission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, Better Government Personnel, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1935.

8 Reference may here be made ag*»in tp one of the most incisive public documents bearing
directly on this question: President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with
Special Studies, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937.

9 A sharp picture of the inroads of special interests into the general welfare is presented
in Chase, Stuart, Democracy under Pressure, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945.

10 For an authoritative account of a significant "chapter in American planning experience,*'
see Merriam, Charles E., "The National Resources Planning Board," American Political Science
Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 1075 ff.

106 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

on abstract preferences expressed in oversimplifications. Looking toward
its postwar responsibilities, government cannot be indifferent to the waste
and peril of contradictions in policy. Consistency of policy, on the other
hand, calls for combined legislative and administrative operations.

We can best hope to attain synthesis of fundamental motivations on the
basis of a national agenda. Above all, such an agenda would define and
clarify the tasks of government in relation to our economic and social life.
As one result, the respective functions of the private and public sectors of
our mixed economy could be circumscribed more explicitly. Once these
respective functions stood out in greater clarity, we could hope to reduce
substantially the dangers of friction and disruption. To the same extent
we would win a precious chance of increasing the general efficiency of the
"American system." If we seize upon this chance, we are bound to gain
more than mere material advantages. By developing our confidence in the
soundness of our approach and in our capacity for operating effectively as
a nation, we can make it plain to everyone — including ourselves — that
democracy is not something nice to talk about but that it can work,

3. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION — INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT

Prominence of Public Administration. The most distinctive character-
istic of the service state is the prominence of public administration. As
government shifts from a relatively passive to an increasingly active role,
it inevitably expands its machinery of action. This machinery assumes the
character of a permanent establishment because government is compelled
to take on continuing responsibilities which can be fulfilled only through
continuity of operations.

Typically, continuing administrative operations fall within the province
of the executive branch. Typically also, their conduct requires the dele-
gation of administrative power to each individual agency. While it is
true that even the weakest administrative system must have at its disposal
some degree of administrative power, in our day such power has acquired
an importance in the life of the citizen equal to that of legislative power
and in certain ways much greater than that of judicial power. This devel-
opment, being actually a manifestation of the "trend toward the service
state," has been in evidence as long as the trend itself. Several years before
the birth of the New Deal, Ernst Freund, a leading authority on admin-
istrative law, observed that ^"administrative power appears as one of the
established political facts in present-day government.^1 His judgment was
not ahead of the times, even though it was not yet reflected in the editorial
pages of our newspapers.

Demands on Legislative Leadership. The prominence of administration
in our contemporary political system does not imply a corresponding de-

11 Administrative Powers over Persons and Property, n. 584, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1928.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 107

cline of legislative power. On the contrary, as modern government has
progressed to the point of being bigger than big business, the scope and
magnitude of its operations render farsighted direction ever more significant.
If we may speak of any change in the essential nature of legislation, thai
change would lie in mounting demands on legislative leadership. When
administrative agencies touch upon the activities of millions of citizens,
it is a matter of highest concern whether or not the legislative marching
orders for administrative officials are framed in full comprehension and
recognition of the public interest. Ours is still as much a government of
laws as it was designed to be by those who formulated the Constitution.

y Administrative power is not self-generative. No government agency can
take action without a statutory foundation for action. No government
agency is legally free to push action beyond either the bounds of lawful
means or the limitations drawn in the annual budget adopted by the legis-
lative branch. ^ However, statutory definition of administrative marching
orders can draw only major outlines. It would be unable to penetrate into
the mountain of detail that is necessary for effective deployment of govern-
mental forces in pursuit of objectives laid down in law. Thus the legisla-
ture is called upon to meet the complex task of establishing priorities of
goals and giving general direction through statutory policy pronouncements,
while at the same time allowing administrators sufficient leeway to utilize
their agencies to the best possible public advantage. Few would maintain
in the face of this task that the service state is apt to reduce thT legislative
branch to the function of dignified ornament. Active government sorely
needs wise legislative guidance.

*^Role of tfte^Judidd Power. Nor can it be said that the prominence of
administration detracts from the institutional rank of the judicial power.
To be sure, the judicial power may isolate itself. Courts have always tended
to gravitate toward becoming exponents of conservative attitudes. If any
documentation is needed in this respect, it may be found in the history of
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. In fact, in the past
the service state has suffered its most grievous defeats 'from the recalcitrance
of the judiciary. The memory of the bitter conflict between the New Deal
and the Supreme Court is still fresh in our minds. That conflict could
have been predicted, for during the New Deal we tried to make up for lost
time and thus advanced at a more rapid pace. What was new was not the
direction of the advance but its relative speed. As the speed increased, the
courts braced themselves to intensify their traditional braking effect.

Granting that no court is safe when stepping between a determined
people and its needs and aims, there remains the question of applying judi-
cial power with insight. Administrative agencies must be kept within the
scope of their statutory mandate and the range of lawful means, but this
fact should not lead to a crippling of resourceful public management. The
judicial power denies itself opportunities for constructive influence in ad-

108 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ministration if it operates primarily as a restrictive force. Even in protect-
ing the citizens against illicit encroachments, the judiciary can help to build
a positive code of administrative conduct. In the service state, the presence
or absence of a code of this kind is a matter of great consequence. But
courts disqualify themselves from making a decisive contribution to the
development of a positive administrative code when they permit their best
energies to become absorbed in efforts to block the growth of the service
state on principle.

Resources of Administration. As an instrument of government, public
administration occupies a central place because of its capacity for achieving
results by direct operations. It is eminently suited to function as an agent
of policy, to give policy immediate meaning in the matrix of economic and
social interrelations. Not being tied down to the formalized procedures
appropriate for judicial decisions, it is elastic in its approach. It is the gov-
ernment's business establishment par excellence. Whereas policy can only
attempt to establish a general rule, administration carries the application
of the general rule into the boundless diversity of concrete situations. In
giving specific application to the general rule, administration can take into
account the numerous variables of different conditions. Because of this
flexibility, it can obtain compliance in varying situations without either
jeopardizing the consistency of the general rule or making the general rule a
crushing force that strikes everyone and everywhere in one fell swoop.

Administration as a Fitting Process. Administration thus presents itself
as a fitting process — as a means of giving policy concise expression in a
highly diversified society. Owing to this characteristic, administration can-
not live without discretion. A mechanical tool can eat its way through a
sheet of steel, repeating its operation with never-changing precision. Ad-
ministration, by way of contrast, deals with the dynamics of an organic
society made up of human beings. Even in routine transactions, therefore,
administrative procedure must be alert to the dynamic quality of economic
and social life. It must ascertain facts without bias, appraise them astutely,
bring policy to bear upon the emerging picture, and shape its decisions in
wakeful appreciation of the intent of policy and the results to be produced.
..In each of these phases, administration must aim at coherence without be-
coming a helpless victim of precedent and operational convenience. In
each phase it must keep its mentality free enough for innovation and con-
stant improvement of methods and procedures. In each phase it must set
its course in such a way as to prove itself the servant of the people. A
single glance at any of these postulates is all we need in order to understand
the necessity for securing the highest caliber of administrative stewardship.

44. THE ENLISTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT

Legislative Marching Orders. As an instrument of government, public
administration moves on marching orders written into laws and regulations.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 109

Being the agent of policy, it must on principle accept legislative superin-
tendence and executive command. It is not free to exercise a veto power
in the name of greater expertise. This principle is easily stated, but it raises
many subtle points of administrate ethics. Government agencies, respon-
sible for defined areas of public activity, are prone to develop a stake in their
programs. That is not bad in itself, because administrators will on the
whole render better service when they have faith in their missions. But it
is also true that their whole-hearted identification with the task assigned
them may collide with their obligation to bow to direction whenever such
direction reflects changes of policy which rip into established programs. In
situations of this kind, the deeper loyalty of service must triumph over sec-
ondary loyalties to cherished ends and means. Administration as an agent
has no moral right to plot against its legislative principal, however much the
principal may seem to be in error.

This does not mean that administration is free to use its mind only in
performing its duty as an agent of policy. Throughout the business estab-
lishment of government, we find today a rich assortment of staff services
of high quality. No less impressive is the store of sound administrative
judgment derived from cumulative experience. Many of the research teams
which have been built up at various points of the governmental structure
are wholly on a par with those developed in the realm of private enterprise.
In the supply of managerial skill, too, government has ceased to be gener-
ally inferior to business. How obsolete in this respect the beloved catch-
words of bygone days are is attested by the degree of unpublicized informal
cooperation among key specialists from private and public enterprise in a
great many professional associations. Give-and-take in the exchange of
helpful information has become a mutual process from which government
and business profit alike in equal proportions.

Political Feasibility of Policy. With so much pertinent judgment and
experience available on tap, it would be folly to insist in the interest of
abstract purity of functions that legislative direction should never nurture
itself by resort to expert counsel coming from the administrative sphere.
As a matter of fact, such counsel is constantly sought and utilized by both
the legislature and the chief executive. It must be admitted, however, that the
chief executive, being in a strategic position, can more expeditiously equip
himself with facilities designed to make available for his use the whole body
of administrative information. The creation in 1939 of the Executive Office
of the President illustrates the way in which facilities of this character may
be linked with the head of the government's business establishment. Central
staffs attached to the chief executive are in a position to evolve reporting
relationships with the departmental system through which appropriate in-
formation flows up, to be assembled finally into a comprehensive picture.
Much of this information is immediately translated into intelligence to
serve internal control purposes. A considerable volume, however, feeds

110 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

into the policy-making process, either by pointing up issues that require
solution or by providing supporting data for tentatively formulated policy
proposals.

Successful government involves the accomplishment of feasible objectives.
Determination of feasibility depends on a number of factors. Politically,
a feasible, objective is one that is wanted by sufficiently strong groups of the
population or for which popular endorsement may be obtained through
effectively stimulated public debate. Determination of such feasibility is a
question which elected representatives of the people are generally better qual-
ified to decide than administrators. It includes, for example, a weighing
among goals which cannot all be achieved at the same time. Here, again,
political sense is generally more important than administrative experience.
However, once political feasibility has been ascertained, there is still the
problem of the appropriate governmental approach. Big business though
it is, government, like any other business, has to think in terms of available
resources, organizational and operational as well as financial.

Administrative Feasibility of Policy. A politically feasible objective may
not be attained at all if the administrative system is too feeble for the task.
Even stronger administrative machinery may be dangerously overworked
if a politically feasible objective of considerable magnitude is tackled in
one reckless effort. It may be necessary to progress step by step, and to
time the steps at wider intervals. On each of these points, administrative
judgment is able to contribute substantially to the determination of sound
policy. The same is true of defining the administrative pattern that will
offer the greatest insurance of straightforward advance toward the estab-
lished goal. Practical alternatives can be analyzed before action is taken.
Such planning cuts the chance of breakdown to a minimum. It also pro-
vides protection against costly organizational and technical errors. In short,
it is a valuable aid in achieving economy of effort.

Blending of Judgments. While it is thus clear that administrative ad-
vice is an important ingredient in the making of policy, we must not assume
that there is a precise borderline between consideration of political feasibility
and examination of administrative feasibility. The more both merge, the
better will be the end result. Because administrative advice has no direct
representation in the political councils, it must be drawn in systematically.
Moreover, legislative bodies must keep their policy planning open to ad-
ministrative alternatives in order to evolve a statutory formula that will
best lend itself to prompt execution. Conversely, administrative officials, in
advising on policy, reduce the range of their assistance if they fail to give
careful thought to the legislative balance of power, the enunciated or antici-
pated preferences of the chief executive, and the probabilities of public re-
actions. Ideally, political and administrative thinking should blend into
i joint process.

The separation of powers in our governmental system is on the whole

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 111

unfavorable to such blending, especially when legislative and executive
prerogatives are jealously guarded. But we do have avenues through which
we can come near the ideal. The chief executive has many opportunities
for submitting recommendations to the legislative branch; these may be
substantiated by extensive staff work. The legislature, in turn, is adequately
equipped in its committee system to take testimony from administrative
officials closest to the subject matter under discussion. In addition, intimate
though unofficial cooperation between the staff employed by legislative com-
mittees and staffs engaged in broader studies in various agencies is often
fruitful. This checking of notes and interchange of findings is sometimes
more productive than public presentation of testimony before legislative
committees, which shape their basic inferences in closed executive session.
In general, however, we are still far from a rational scheme through which
political reasoning and administrative judgment can be merged in the formu-
lation of policy. Conceding this partial failure, it is well to recall that, in the
direction of government business, the role of administrative judgment as a
source of informed policy decisions has steadily expanded.

Administrative Freedom of Expression. In furnishing counsel-on policy
matters, administrative officials may foster perilous illusions if their en-
vironment encourages servility and spinelessness. They are of no help
whatsoever, and can easily turn into a positive menace, when conditions in-
duce them to echo the voices of the mighty. Administrative judgment
must rest on unquestionable integrity. It cannot be both trustworthy and
pleasing to everyone. It must enjoy freedom of expression. Advice amounts
to nothing when it is fearful of disagreement. The climate of administrative
judgment is not made by administrators alone. It is the product .of many
things: public attitudes toward the government's business establishment;
cartoons and editorials; aggressive and defensive propaganda coming from
particular special interests; legislative resentments; administrative self-
complacency. Sometimes we run into deep-rooted doubts whether our
national ways and habits, especially in the legislative sphere, leave room for
public administrators who pour their hearts into their work, think for
themselves, and make no bones about the state of affairs and what ought to
be done about it. These doubts may merely indicate the obvious — that the
service state is still in its youth. But we cannot escape the conclusion that
when there is competence for counsel on policy in our administrative system,
it is only commonsense to use and strengthen it.

5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SERVICE

Popular Basis of Administrative Services. A fairly detailed listing of all
of the services performed by government— federal, state and local— would
fill many pages. None of these services was forced upon the community by
wild-eyed officialdom. Each came into being in response to public demands

112 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

to which legislative bodies paid deference— a perfectly natural development
in a democracy.

The power of votes and the threat of reprisals in subsequent electoral
campaigns hang like dark clouds over the legislative scene. If every public
demand could be subjected to popular referendum, many loudly advocated
propositions might die a natural death without gaining striking power in
pressure politics. But the vast bulk of legislation is handled by representa-
tive assemblies exposed to minority agitation, while the public at large is
normally amorphous and unorganized. It is divided by conflicting loyalties
that pull simultaneously toward party, class, general inclination of outlook,
real or imagined self-advancement, religious denomination, occupational
organization, and an abundance of other interests, large and small. In this
bewildering and ever-changing pattern the public falls apart into many
publics. And the better organized for political pressure each public is, the
greater is its chance of overriding the public at large. This explains in the
main the failure of straight consumer representation in the political arena.
It also explains why the service state is neither of one cast nor free from
inconsistencies.

Habit of Self-Restraint. Of course, it would be a strange misconception
to contend that the test of democracy is abstract wisdom. As individuals, we
commit sad errors of judgment in matters of great importance, do foolish
things for unaccountable reasons, cling tenaciously to absurd prejudices,
cast prudence to the winds when we feel like it. Can we hope to do much
better collectively? Actually, we do somewhat better in the realm of public
affairs because here reason follows us like a faithful dog. Here there is
considerably more argument and counterargument than we would be
willing to put up with in our private affairs. And here we also have more
free advice from authoritative sources — the League of Women Voters, the
National Association of Manufacturers, the Secretary of State, our Congress-
man, the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to mention but a few.
Sometimes we entirely change our minds on such advice, though even when
we do we usually line up with the side that promises us the largest slice
of cake. Yet we are on the whole rather particular about the price of the
cake and more anxious to restrain our appetites than we are in our private
spending.

This relative eagerness for self-restraint is a wholesome tendency. It
should be no more than that. For a considerable time, especially the closing
decades of the past century when our great economic interests reaped the
harvest of our continent, the masters of new fortunes tried to convince us
that we had to make this tendency toward political self-abnegation into
an axiom of governance. (They argued that the best government would be
one that governs least, one that entrusts control to the natural drift of the
economy and the profit motive. Only when it became apparent that we

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 113

fared none too well under this prescription did we cast about for a better
one.

Governmental Reinforcement of the Enterprise Economy. Thus the
structure of our public services came forth without a supporting ideology,
even running counter to the general undertone of domestic propaganda. We
bought the service state in relatively small pieces, each piece being badly
needed to fill cracks and breaches in the industrial order. The mixed econ-
omy took form, not because we thought it good, but because necessity dic-
tated successive reinforcements of the private sector through governmental
action which added to the public sector. The service contribution of admin-
istrative agencies, viewed as a whole, lies primarily in its functon as a broad
support of the enterprise economy.

It may be presumed that private business would be able to run our
unemployment and old-age insurance schemes as well as does government —
if there were sufficient profit in it. It might be conceivable for business to
service itself on some cooperative basis in about the same way that it is
being serviced at public expense by such agencies as the Department of
Commerce. It is perhaps possible for the several large farmer organizations
to maintain specialized staffs that could jointly undertake the job now done
by such establishments as the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricul-
tural Engineering. However, if we think in the perspective of the total
picture of national efficiency, it is not difficult to spot the comparative weak-
ness of such solutions. Each of these governmental services — and they are
examples chosen at random — benefits not only from direct access to data and
experience accruing in public activities, but also operates under standards
of strict accounting to the public at large. Cost accounting under budgetary
control and expenditure justification to the satisfaction of the legislature are
not in themselves the most important factors. More significant is the gen-
eral atmosphere of public accountability. Government cannot afford to
chisel on its data. It cannot safely underwrite the interests of individual
groups. It must come very close to scientific accuracy and impartial service
to all.

Benefits of Regulation. This is true also of the regulatory process. Regu-
lation has sometimes been slapped down on interests which have outraged
our sense of equity, but punitive regulation has always tended to throw new
burdens of ill-feeling on the community and to overstep its legitimate aims
in the heat of battle. Ordinarily, the punitive impetus does not survive for
any length of t;me, and methods are later adjusted to meet the practical
business at hand. We need only look at the relationships between carriers
and shippers on the one hand and the Interstate Commerce Commission
on the other.12

12 Some very pertinent observations are contained in a recent tribute to a great adminis-
trator who died in hprness: S wisher, Carl B., "Joseph B. Eastman: Public Servant," Public
Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 34 ff.

114 TK£ SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Evidence shows that regulatory bodies, when they have established them-
selves, develop a peculiar predilection for those subject to their powers.
This is hardly surprising. The function of regulation is to police — in the
interest of a healthy state of affairs. The goal is constructive, and the pro-
cedure must correspond to it. Even if regulatory bodies come to see the
public welfare to some extent from the angle of the welfare of those to be
regulated, they nevertheless resist the temptation to give away their birth-
rights* To steady them when they need steadying is the task of the
legislature or, more precisely, of free public criticism.

Popular Accountability of Administration. The service motive is not an
exclusive property of government. No big company today overlooks oppor-
tunities for selling itself on claims of superior service. We hear these claims
everyday in the commercial plugs over the radio; we read them on trolley
and bus posters and in the smooth-voiced advertisements of popular maga-
zines. Business wants to serve — as well as government. However, as cus-
tomers and consumers we have much more direct control over public
business and public services than private enterprise would be willing to
allow. We have a sharp eye on our public servants, and they know it. We
can chastise them with assured effect through public complaint and legis-
lative grilling. We can take business away from them by cutting down
appropriations. We may often censure too rashly, but the irascible temper
which we habitually reserve for governmental errors and failings keeps
administrative officials on their toes. Administration ' cannot withhold its
books from public inspection. We can force responsive service.

6. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION — SOCIAL BUFFER

Fountains of Administrative Knowledge. The broad spread of govern-
mental activities in the service state has had consequences extending beyond
the mere expansion of public services. When government is interposed at
many points in our society, it gains extraordinary opportunities for devel-
oping a system of intelligence whose output becomes public knowledge.
Take something as vital as dependable statistics on unemployment. Before
the more than 400,000 Smiths, together with the Joneses, the Thompsons, and
the rest of us, had been duly entered in the central records of the Social
Security Board, we had to guess at the volume of unemployment. Now, as
an incidental by-product of our social security scheme, we can always know,
with a high degree of exactness. Fortified with up-to-date information,
government is in a position to plan policy with considerable assurance. It
is also able to obtain early warning of impending slumps and take remedial
action before being overtaken by events. It can even put its finger on
specific areas where maladjustments have become acute, and probe into
underlying causes.

Government's Intelligence Function- The intelligence function of mod-
ern government is in many ways crucial to the fate of the economic and

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 115

social order. Jeremy Bentham saw it in this light more than a century ago
It lies at the heart of our attempts at achieving a high level of employment
in the postwar period. The role of the federal government in attaining
maximum employment is predicated on the availability of a large array of
detailed statistical data on such activities as consumer spending; business
expenditures and outlays — including construction, additions to inventories,
and exports; and state and local expenditures — including projected public
works. Moreover, retrospective data alone would not be adequate. They
must be supplemented by date which predict future facts. We would be
stopped in our tracks and left to face complete uncertainty if the entire
body of government intelligence were still in the state which existed only
fifteen years ago. Today we are better prepared, because government, in its
interlocking with the enterprise economy, has multiplied its eyes and added
finer lenses.

Public Research and Analysis. The more it knows, the better govern-
ment can judge. Seeing more, it is no longer so easily eluded by those
whose doings shy from light, nor is it quickly misled and confused by the
assertions of optimists and pessimists alike. Capitalizing on its far-flung
intelligence, government can substantiate its hunches and projections, and
is less helpless in rebuttal. In our civilization, reseanh and analysis of in-
formation, together with scientific fact-gathering and wider dissemination
of knowledge, are national resources of the greatest practical value because
they give our hand a surer touch in shaping our institutional and technolo-
gical environment. Truth is an objectifying influence in the identification
of the public interest and the pursuit of public ends. It takes the wind
out of the sails of partisan clamor and intentional or unintentional mis-
representation.

The acquisition of knowledge is a field of primary concern to demo-
cratic government. Its ascendancy was properly stressed in the epoch-
making report of Great Britain's Machinery of Government Committee
under Haldane's chairmanship at the end of World War I.13 Our experi-
ence in World War II with the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment, established for the purpose of securing adequate provision for research
on scientific and medical problems relating to national defense, represents
a memorable step in the same direction. But research must not be confined
to laboratories alone. The whole business establishment of government,
although it is in business for business' sake, is at the same time a gigantic
test tube with which we gradually expand our social knowledge. In this
way we not only augment the body of information to guide the policy-
making authorities; we also set down increasingly definite terms of refer-
ence for legitimate public discussion. It is harder to fool the people when

18 Cd. 9230, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1918.

116 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

authentic facts and figures make lies and wild statements uncomfortable
for their authors.

Getting ct the facts. Through its administrative system, government
has been able to organize its intelligence function. Without something like
the administrative machinery which we have built up over the years, gov-
ernment intelligence would necessarily be secondhand and thus of dubious
merit. The risk of accepting at its face value the brief of an interest group
or the complaint of a constituent is well known to every seasoned lawmaker.
With literally hundreds of thousands of government employees in daily
touch with countless economic and social activities and various elements of
the population, headquarters offices meet few obstacles in providing for
continuing public reconnaissance, in gauging pressures and tensions in the
industrial order, and in getting at the relevant facts. On the other hand,
general awareness by the public of the intelligence function of government
has a restraining effect on the voraciousness of special interests and the char-
acter of pressure-group rationalizations. To this extent, administration places
itself deliberately between contending forces, each of which could have its
way only at the expense of all of us.

More explicit and more direct is the buffer function of the administrative
system in the immediate exercise of authority, either of a regulatory nature
or as the basis of concrete services. Here government, by being on the
scene, enforces the ground rules of democratic society. This task includes
not only the job of safeguarding defined standards of human conduct and
decent living but also that of preserving the essential framework of indi-
vidual initiative and accomplishment. ^Administrative power is brought to
bear upon the economic power wielded by giant organizations which, if
left unchecked, would play havoc with the basic interests of the individual
as well as with those of the community at large^It is true, of course, that
administrative agencies are not always strong enough to muster unyielding
resistance under the impact of determined pressures.14 But we should not
lose sight of the fact that in the struggle of organized forces for superiority,
government has gone far toward running interference for the underdog.

Concern for the Underdog. Concern for the underdog is deeply in-
grained in our American mores. It gives our political thinking a distinctive
flavor. Yet, in the day-by-day operation of our economy we are inclined
to a startling degree to condone ruthless prosecution of selfish ends. A broad
strand of our social philosophy supports the fears which Louis Brandeis
aptly expressed in speaking of the curse of bigness. It is equally American,
however, to write bigness in big letters—to take pride in the colossal and
still greater pride in the super-colossal. The native soil has favored the
growth of economic empires in our midst, and the captains of these empires
have ranked above our politicians. When we enshrine bigness as we did

14 The best study of this problem is Herring, E. Pendleton, Public Administration and the
Public Interest. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 117

in the days of laissez faire, we cancel the buffer function of the administra-
tive system. Public officials, however firmly established their service ideology
may be, cannot withdraw into the ivory tower. They cannot defy public
opinion or what successfully poses for it. How well administration per-
forms its buffer functions is, therefore, mainly up to all of us.

Our conflicting reactions toward bigness have never quite permitted us
to seek the ultimate criterion of effective organization in its contribution
to the life of the common man. There have been times when shrewd play
on our emotions made us more fearful of big government than of big
business. One thing is clear, however. If ours is to be a common man's
democracy, government must be big enough to measure up to the order
of magnitude prevailing in the economic sphere.

Pan H

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER

Planning and Administration

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING

Essence of Planning. Planning is preparation for action. It is the vital
step in any great enterprise, for many subsequent decisions about organiza-
tion, procedure, personnel, and policies must flow from an original concep-
tion of purpose. All administrative agencies are set up to accomplish some
desired goal. In a sense, all the problems of administration are problems
of translating purpose into action. The first concern of administrators at
all times is raising and answering the question, "What am I expected to
accomplish?" The second concern is, "How shall I accomplish it?"

Planning gives meaning to action. The work done by an administrative
agency will achieve its goals only if careful plans have been prepared which
show what is to be accomplished. Otherwise, there may be much action
of all kinds, but few results. Or the many activities undertaken may lead
to contradictory results.

Planning is a technique or process. In itself, the word "planning" sug-
gests no goals. It merely means that some method is followed which re-
sults in determining what is wanted and in a plan of action for reaching
that desired goal. Planning is a method of approaching problems — a
method which says, "Let us define clearly what it is we wish to do," and
then asks, "What steps shall we take in order to accomplish our purpose?"

Planning is continuous. Just as life is dynamic and everchanging, so
must planning by individuals and by organized groups be dynamic. Early
plans may become inadequate as new factors in any situation are discovered,
as changing circumstances occur, as we grow and learn more about the
environment in which we live. Plans must accordingly be modified from
time to time. Periodic or even continuous review of fundamental purposes
is desirable for any institution or any group in order to ensure that the
work done will meet present conditions and needs.

Planning embraces all aspects of human life. It concerns every phase
of activity in which we participate, both individually and as organized

121

122 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

groups. The subjects of concern in the planning work of the federal gov-
ernment before World War II are well illustrated in a symposium on the
topic published in 194L1 The chapter titles included land planning, water
resources, energy resources, industrial policies, savings and capital forma-
tion, income distribution, employment planning, public works, transporta-
tion needs, agricultural adjustment, population, nutrition, housing, educa-
tion, health, recreation, social security, international economic relations, war
planning, and industrial mobilization for defense. These were all subjects
of some degree of planning in the federal government. State and local
governments had many of the same concerns and others as well. Private
groups, from the great corporations to fraternal societies, had and have
their plans. An account of the steps taken by one large corporation, the
General Electric Company, in reviewing its plans and in formulating new
ones on the eve of World War II well illustrates planning by private
enterprise.2

Since those who direct organized efforts must begin by planning them,
planning is the first responsibility of management. The continuing concern
with planning which every alert and efficient agency must manifest is well
recognized today in every discussion dealing with the subject of manage-
ment. For example, a recent survey of the organization and direction of
some twenty business corporations declares it to be the primary responsi-
bility of top management to provide:

. . . far-sighted planning and clarification of objectives, visualizing the
needs of the business and determining its most advantageous future
course. . . . There is nothing about an organization more important than
its future. Owners, management, employees, and society in general are,
or should be, more concerned about where a company is going than
where it has been. . . .3

Similarly, a searching discussion of administration in the field of munici-
pal public works makes this generalization:

The successful management and control of any large enterprise re-
quires carefully prepared plans which seek to forecast its future opera-
tions as accurately as possible.4

These elementary propositions may be illustrated by a simple and famil-
iar analogy. The construction of a house is first of all a matter of planning.
There are such fundamental questions to answer as how many and what
types of rooms, what kind of exterior, what kind of surroundings, the
special features desired, and the amount which can be spent out of available

* Galloway, George B. and Associates, Planning for America, New York: Henry Holt, 1941.

2 See Prince, David E., "Planning for the Future While Producing for Victory," in National
Conference on Planning, 1942, p. 48 ff.t Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1942.

3 Holden, Paul E., Fish, Lounsbury S. and Smith, Hubert L., Top Management Organization
and Control t p. 3, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941.

4 Stone, Donald C., The Management of Municipal Public Works, p. 63, Chicago: Public
Administration Service, 1939.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 123

resources. The location is then selected, and detailed plans are prepared
to fit the wants of the owner and the peculiar requirements of the site.
The architect's blueprints are the starting point for the contractor who
actually builds the house, who translates purpose into action. Later, the
house may be outmoded, or may lack the latest developments in heating and
lighting. It may not be large enough. The income status of the owner
may change. Then it must be remodeled, or a new house designed and built.
In all of these phases of providing ourselves with shelter, we practice the
fundamentals of planning.

Contribution of Administrative Planning. No informed discussion of
public administration can fail to give specific attention to the problems of
planning. In many respects these problems are common to all phases of
administrative activity — they involve organizational structure, personnel,
personalities and relationships between units of an organization. The rea-
sons for isolating the subject of planning for special mention as the opening
chapter of this part on organization and management should therefore
be obvious. When we talk about the problems of public administration
we look toward the techniques and processes involved in carrying out the
programs of government. But we must never lose sight of the fact that
we begin with the program, with the work our government desires to accom-
plish. Our primary interest may be confined to the process of performance,
yet that process is important only if it attains the purpose or end of admin-
istrative activity. Sometimes students of administration become so pre-
occupied with procedures and processes that they foget what is of first
importance — the results of these processes.

By beginning our treatment of organization and management with the
subject of planning, we are acknowledging that our first concern is with
results. For, as we said earlier, planning is preparation for action. It is a
particular phase of management, which must continuously deal with defin-
ing end and purpose, with setting the goals to be realized. Administrative
performance can be measured only in terms of the extent to which these
goals have been achieved. As one of the processes of administration, plan-
ning deserves emphasis because of its tremendous influence upon all admin-
istrative activity. The more carefully the plans are prepared, the less waste
will appear in accomplishment. The more comprehensive the plans, the
less day-to-day improvisation will be necessary and the fewer crises will
occur. The more adequate our plans, the surer we will be of accom-
plishing our purpose.

In reviewing the quality of any administrative agency, the analyst today
usually begins with these questions: "What steps are taken to define the
purpose and objectives of the agency? Is there a plan of action? How
comprehensive is the plan? Is the program reviewed from time to time?"
These and similar questions are vital because all other problems— including
problems in structural arrangement, budgeting, personnel, reporting, and

124 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

worMhig relationships— must be examined in the light of their influence
upon realizing the plans of the agency.

Planning and Legislation. Just what kind of planning does an admin-
istrative agency do? What about the role of the legislature in our scheme
of government? For one thing, in recent years the advance planning of the
broad objectives of national action has become more and more a function
of the executive branch of our government. To such planning all adminis-
trative agencies contribute. The same tendency has developed in state
and local governments.5 The legislature today reviews, criticizes, and modi-
fies the plans prepared by administrative agencies under the coordinative
responsibility of the chief executive. The greater prominence of this pro-
cedure since 1933 has not resulted from any peculiarities of the New Deal,
but from the conditions of dynamic government confronted with more and
more problems requiring national action — problems ranging from unem-
ployment to war.

Increasingly the role of the legislature is one of criticism rather than of
formulation. For many reasons, we have found that legislatures by them-
selves are not in a position to formulate broad programs of action. This,
of course, does not mean the inevitable destruction of democratic govern-
ment. Even when administrative agencies do the planning, the final author-
ity to approve or disapprove each proposal remains a legislative function.
This is a very real and essential authority, not to be disparaged.

Planning and Administration. In addition to the need for administrative
agencies to plan broad objectives for legislative consideration and sanction,
there is the need for planning the details within the legislative framework.
Frequently legislatures set forth their will in very general terms. The dif-
ferences of opinion among lawmakers and the pressures of various groups
converging on a legislature often prevent agreement except upon certain
main purposes. The details, or the refinements, are left to be worked out.
Such wartime problems, for example, as the size of Army and Navy, the
composition of the military forces, and the type of weapons and equipment
needed were left for administrative determination. They required careful
planning.

Then, in the third place, there are the administrative plans in a more
specific sense, the programs of work laid out to achieve the objectives finally
agreed upon. These administrative plans may include th»e budget, the
organization structure, and a time schedule of work accomplishment. This
is preeminently a job of administration. It should never be attempted on
the legislative level.

Interrelation of Planning Activities. All these types of planning are
closely related. The interplay of administrative planning, review of present
programs, and formulation of new objectives goes on all the time. Often

5 Sec, for example, the experience in New York State as set forth by Scott, Elisabeth M.
and Zellcr, Belle, "State Agencies and Lawmaking," Public Administration Review, 1942, Vol.
2, p. 205 ff.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 125

a sense of the desired goals of administrative action is developed ouf$f the
work of an agency. We have on occasion established agencies with the
expectation that they will develop plans for action and obtain legislation
for a desired program. This was true, for instance, in the field of price
control during World War II.

It must be repeated — planning presupposes no particular set of objectives,
nor any one conception of political values. Just as budgeting in and of
itself does not mean large outlay or small outlay, revenues balanced with
expenditures, or deficit spending, so planning does not necessarily mean
either a collectivist or a laisscz faire economy. There has been much con-
fusion on this score in recent years. The attention given the succession of
Five-Year Plans in the Soviet Union seems to have suggested to many that
planning and communism are synonymous. The discovery that Hitler's
Germany also planned in a similar way merely broadened the association
to include all totalitarian forms of government.

Those who would insist that planning is incompatible with our form
of government not only appear to contend that democracy is planlessness
but also show themselves little versed in American history. It has often
been pointed out that Alexander Hamilton's First Report on Public Credit
in 1790, two other public reports presented in that year, and his great Report
on Manufactures in 1791 were all planning documents of the first impor-
tance. These were just the beginning of planning by the new American
government — planning that has been continuing ever since.

The furor about planning is caused by disagreement over objectives
and methods. Debate is desirable in a democracy. But it should not suggest
that planning in itself is undesirable. We may weigh specific plans; but
we should be agreed that planning is necessary and vital in public admin-
istration.8 As a problem in administration, distinguished from the man)

8 As long as we have government and administrative agencies, we must have planning.
This planning may be of two types: it may be concerned with new programs and new
activities to meet particular problems demanding governmental a»tcnuon; or it may be concerned
with the progrrms for carrying out broad objectives already set forth in legislation. The second
type of planning in particular is absolutely indispensable to efficient administration. The first
type is closely related to fundamental issues of public policy, and the eventual decision must
be made by the chief executive and the legislative body. This type of planning is intended
to facilitate the selection of choices by those responsible for public policy.

There have been recently several vigorous denunciations of "planners." See particularly
Mises, Ludwig von, Bureaucracy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, and Hayek,
Friedrich A., The Road to Serfdom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. The real
object of attack in these volumes is a government policy which seeks positively to influence
the operation of our economic system. Such policy is identified as government economic
planning, and immediately suggests to the authors that all planners are engaged in promoting
government control of prices, production, service industries, and capital formation. Actually,
the authors are attacking certain governmental policies. The debate accordingly should be
confined to these policies, and should not degenerate into name-calling directed against ill-
dentificd "planners.1*

It should perhaps be repeated that no existing duties assigned to the executive branch of
the government can be carried out efficiently without planning. The discussion here does not
concern one set of policies versus another set; it is concerned with the common problems
involved in any type of planning by administrative agencies.

126 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

problems in the various substantive fields of planning, there are several
aspects of planning as a process which deserve consideration. Let us take
these up in their proper order.

2. THE MACHINERY FOR PLANNING

The organizational means for performing the planning task are not
easily devised. (Since preparation for action is the very essence of adminis-
tration, it is scarcely possible to segregate planning as a single act, different
from all other work. In dividing responsibilities, an administrator cannot
say, "Planning is assigned to this particular branch." Planning in one form
or another goes on at all levels of an administrative organization. Almost
the entire personnel contributes in some way to the preparation of objectives
and programs.)

(Yet, considering the task of planning as a phase of management, admin-
istrators have often found it convenient and desirable to establish some unit
to which they may look principally as their adviser on planning.) As enter-
prises get larger, a need is felt for some place where various plans can be
assembled, reviewed, fitted together, and adjusted to one another. There
is also a need for some particular officer or unit to lay out the common
procedures—and the common assumptions— upon which planning is to
be based.

Federal Improvisation. Until 1934, no planning agency as such was
attached directly to the President. Planning carried on within the govern-
ment was parceled out among the various agencies. In general, each agency
was responsible for preparing plans related to its work. Sometimes a single
department was given broad planning responsibilities. Thus, the National
Defense Act as amended on June 4, 1920, provided that the Assistant Sec-
retary of War should assure "adequate provision for the mobilization of
material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs" (Sec. 5a).
This served as the basis for building up what amounted to a national plan-
ning staff on economic mobilization within the War Department.

In theory, the Cabinet was supposed to be an agency for debating and
advising the President on major questions of policy. From such evidence
as is available we know that it seldom reached such lofty stature. It was
not equipped to do so. Presidents had their confidential advisers, who were
in effect their planners. Occasionally, too, special committees and agencies
were created to propose specific programs. One of these was the Committee
on Economic Security, set up in June, 1934, whose report early in 1935 pre-
ceded the enactment of our social security legislation. The Federal Em-
ployment Stabilization Board was created by act of Congress in 1931 to
plan governmental programs for promoting employment during the down-
swing of the business cycle. This board was abolished in 1933. The Na-
tional Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement was another
agency specifically created by act of Congress. It was entrusted in 1930

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 127

with the task of reviewing the whole system of federal justice and planning
improvements, embodied in a series of 14 reports. However, no continuing
organization was provided until 1934 to meet the need for a central plan-
ning agency under the chief executive.

National Resources Planning Board. On June 30, 1934, by Executive
Order No. 6777, President Roosevelt established the National Resources
Board composed of five members of his Cabinet, the Federal Emergency
Relief Administrator, and three prominent citizens. A small staff was pro-
vided. This new agency was in a sense a continuation of a planning board
created by the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Administration for
Public Works. The new board's report of December 1, 1934, stated that for
the "first time in our history" exhaustive studies on land use, water use,
minerals, and related public works had been brought together. The basis
was laid for a "comprehensive long-range national policy for the conserva-
tion and development of our fabulous natural resources." In 1935, the
National Resources Board was reconstituted as the National Resources Com-
mittee with virtually the same membership.

In its report of January 8, 1937, the President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management declared:

The President must be given direct control over and be charged with
immediate responsibility for the great managerial functions of the gov-
ernment which affect all of the administrative departments. . . . These
functions are personnel management, fiscal and organizational manage-
ment, and planning management. Within these three groups may be
comprehended all of the essential elements of business management.

The President's Committee recommended that a National Resources Board,
composed of five members without salary and with indefinite terms, be
created to serve as a central planning agency under the chief executive.
After the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1939, the President in Reor-
ganization Plan No. 1 of April 25, 1939, provided for a National Resources
Planning Board. The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1939 specified
that the board should be composed of three persons "from widely separated
sections of the United States," appointed by the President with the approval
of the Senate. The National Resources Planning Board came to an end when
Congress, in passing the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1944,
refused to include any funds for its operations, and specifically directed that
no other funds were to be made available for its continuance by the
President.

This experience with a central planning agency in the federal govern-
ment underscored the difficulties which are likely to beset such a unit. One
essential condition for the successful operation of a planning agency is
close and personal relationship with the chief executive. The planners must
have his full confidence and must intimately know his mind. It is doubt-
ful whether any board can ever develop such relationships. Especially

128 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

would this be impossible when a board is torn by internal persona]
jealousies or disagreements. Moreover, the planning agency must also be
linked to operations if its proposals are to be more than long-distance
platitudes, and if its usefulness is to be apparent to legislators. Then, too
the planning agency must be used. For example, although the National
Resources Board was set up by the President as early as June, 1934, it
played no part in planning the most important single program of the federa
government from 1933 to 1940— the emergency work program begun b)
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of April 8, 1935. Indeed, the stor)
of planning this great program is a fascinating example of how a govern
ment undertaking is prepared and put into operation. It has been told ir
full elsewhere.7

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Before the Nationa
Resources Planning Board was abolished, a new type of planning agenq
was already in process of development. This was the Office of War Mobili
zation, which was created by Executive Order No. 9347 of May 27, 1943
Ostensibly a coordinating device for the many wartime programs such aj
those of the War Production Board, Office of Price Administration, Wai
Food Administration, National War Labor Board, and the War and Nav)
Departments, the new office also became implicitly a central planning
agency. It was under its auspices that Bernard Baruch and John Hancock
submitted their Report on War and Postwar Adjustment Policies. The
preparation of legislation on disposal of surplus property and on the settle
ment of terminated contracts was sponsored by this office. The War Mobili
zation and Reconversion Act of October 3, 1944, placed the Office of Wai
Mobilization and Reconversion on a statutory — though temporary — basi:
and entrusted to it important planning responsibilities.

In several respects the Office of War Mobilization, especially in it
original form, suggested a device superior to the National Resources Plan
ning Board. It was headed by a single individual with close relationshif
to the President. It was concerned with immediate programs and policie:
as well as with the preparation of future programs. There was little doub
about its contribution to war and postwar administration, even thougl:
not all of its potentialities were realized.

New Yorl( City Planning Commission. A different kind of planning
organization was set up in New York City by the charter adopted ir
1936. Effective on January 1, 1928, this charter provided for a City Planning
Commission of seven members, one of whom ex officio was the chief engi
neer of the Board of Estimate. The other six members were to be appointee
by the mayor for terms of eight years. Members could be removed by th<
mayor only on proof of official misconduct, negligence, conduct discrediting
the office, or mental or physical inability; a formal hearing was requirec

7 Sec Macmahon, Arthur W., Millett, John D. and Ogdcn, G., The Administration o.
Federal Wor\ Relief, csp. chs. 1-3, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 129

before removal. Salaries o£ the members were not to be reduced during
their tenure. The recommendations of the City Planning Commission on
zoning regulations, the city map, and land subdivisions became effective
unless set aside by a three-fourths majority of the Board of Estimate.
Finally, the commission prepared the capital expenditure budget of the city
for adoption by the Board of Estimate and the municipal council. The
Board of Estimate might include a project in the capital budget to which
the City Planning Commission was opposed only by a three-fourths majority.
The municipal council could strike out a capital item but could not increase
one or add new ones.

Thus in several ways the charter-makers sought to provide an independ-
ent type of planning agency for city affairs. The reasons are best
summarized in the words of the framers of the charter themselves:8

The primary purpose of such a commission is to guide and to influence
the city in its development and future growth. The growth and devel-
opment of a modern city depend upon the wisdom and foresight with
which capital improvements are undertaken and the extent to which the
integrity of zoning regulations and of the city map is maintained. Unfor-
tunately, such expenditures too often have been undertaken because ot
local and special pressures and without relation to the interests of the
city as a whole. Great waste has resulted and a species of logrolling has
developed in connection with measures affecting local or special inter-
ests. Such evils inevitably occur in representative government when sev-
eral representatives of separate constituencies may join in supporting
measures of local or special interest affecting their several constituencies
or followings. But such evils are not to be cured by abolishing repre-
sentative government, or by substituting one representative body for
another. They should be controlled by publicly confronting the repre-
sentatives with the interests of the public at large. Too often such inter-
est finds no advocacy because the local political or special interest is
organized and the general interest is not.

It is therefore proposed to create a responsible, independent commis-
sion concerned with the welfare of the whole city, to advise and report
upon all questions affecting the growth of the city, including the expen-
diture of capital funds, changes in zoning, and changes in the city
map. . . . The commission will report its conclusions for the considera-
tion and action of the Board of Estimate. All proposals for improve-
ments or for changes in the city map or zoning regulations must first
be referred to the Planning Commission. If approved, the Board of
Estimate may adopt them by majority vote; if not approved, twelve
affirmative votes [three-fourths] are required. Thus the Board of Esti-
mate, consisting of the elected representatives of the people, is given the
final decision as to the projects to be adopted, but the function of plan-
ning and recommendation is given to a nonpolitical, full-time body
whose decisions cannot be lightly overriden.

Here was an attempt to create a rather independent planning commis-

8 Preliminary Report and Draft of Proposed Charter for the City of New Yor%, pp. 8-9,
New York: New York City Charter Revision Commission, 1936.

130 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

sion. Undoubtedly this effort was prompted in large part by the nature of
the responsibility entrusted to the commission — planning and control of
land use. The drafters of the city charter sought a means to prevent the
many abuses in land use which had previously occurred. But the approach
proved to be a negative one. When the commission sought to lay out a
comprehensive zoning regulation, the political authorities of the city were
not prepared to accept the program and fundamental modifications were
necessary.9 Thus need for political leadership in planning was well demon-
strated. The independent commission was not as independent in accom-
plishing its mission as might have been expected.

Departmental Planning Units. Within the main agencies of the federal
government, several department heads have found a need for at least an
individual adviser to help in the preparation of departmental plans.10 In
some departments yet another step has been taken — the establishment of a
planning office. If a department is to play its role as an integrating force
for the operating establishments composing it, strong central planning
machinery is necessary. Secretary Elihu Root perceived this need for the
War Department after the Spanish-American War. His efforts led to the
creation of the position of Chief of Staff and the establishment of the Gen-
eral Staff in 1903. More recently the Department of Agriculture took a
similar step by making its Bureau of Agricultural Economics a central
planning unit.11

There are a number of organizational problems connected with plan-
ning. Shall the planning agency be headed by a single individual or a
board? Shall the planning agency be a single adviser or a fairly sizable
office? Shall it be closely tied to the chief executive or department head,
or shall it be given some kind of protected status to encourage what has
been called an independent point of view? The answers which modern
proponents of administrative management would give are clear. Leader-
ship in planning is a responsibility of the chief executive or department
head. The administrator needs planning assistance which can best be af-
forded by a single individual as head of an adequate planning unit. Only
in this way can planning contribute its full potentialities to efficient
administration.

3. PLANNING VERSUS OPERATIONS

' Opportunities for Conflict. Forty years ago, Elihu Root spoke of the
"eternal issue of planning versus administration." The question is indeed

9 Sec Tugwell, R. G., "Implementing the General Interest," Public Administration Review,
1940, Vol. 1, p. 32 ff.

^See Macmahon, Arthur W. and Millctt, John D., Federal Administrators, ch. 4, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

^Gaus, John M. and Wolcott, Leon O., Public Administration and the Department of
Agriculture, p. 311, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940. The most comprehensive
study of the military prototype is Nelson, Otto L., National Security and the General Staff,
Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 131

eternal; no ready solution is available today any more than four decades
ago. In its essence, the problem has two phases. One is the relationship
of planning to operations, or of planners to administrators. The other is
the relationship of plans to action.

There is apt to develop in any agency the attitude among subordinate
operating units that the staff personnel at superior levels spends its time
developing programs which prove impractical in execution. The complaint
may in reality be based on failure of consultation and explanation. Of one
thing there is little doubt; all plans must be closely geared to operations.
They must be realizable; and that means capable of execution by the oper-
ating units. It is a matter of personal relations as well as of effective
management for planning staffs to maintain continuing contact with
operating personnel — to know their problems, seek their advice, and review
proposed programs prior to action.

Tasf( of Progressive Management. It is a fairly good rule, and one that
should be generally observed in administrative practice, for a central plan-
ning agency in municipal, state, or federal government, or even in a large
department, to do as little direct planning as possible. The central unit
should stimulate and review; it should experiment with new techniques
and devices; it should cover subjects not within the scope of subordinate
units. For other activities, there are reasons of expediency and efficiency
which urge that subordinate operating agencies or units be encouraged tc
do the bulk of necessary planning. It is an indication of poor management
when cleavages develop between planning staffs and operating officials.

To be sure, planners are expected to be imaginative, to project bold
courses of action, to weigh all possible alternatives. Operating officials may
have their horizons more narrowly limited to their immediate concerns
Frequently they may let reasons of convenience sway them against a pro-
posed line of action because it may mean more work for them. These
are dangers that must be guarded against. On the other hand, it is vitall)
important that all operating obstacles be clearly understood before a parti
cular policy or program is adopted. Such difficulties can be most readilj
forecast by those having operating responsibilities. Thus a balance musi
always be sought between broadly conceived goals and the practical limita
tions of ways and means. This is just another way of saying that th(
gulf between planning and operations must be bridged by progressiv<
management.

Planners as Administrators. The other phase of the issue between plan
ning and performance concerns the execution of well-laid plans. Specifi
cally, should planners become the administrators of their plans whei
adopted? Here again no categorical answer is possible. If there is such ;
thing as an identifiable planning mentality, it may well be that its necessar
characteristics are different from those required to make a successfu
administrator. On the other hand, we do observe in certain agencies th<

132 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

practice of assigning to a group of men the developing task of long-range
plans for certain operations. Later, as the time approaches for action, the
same people are assigned to supervise execution. Under appropriate condi-
tions, the practice may work satisfactorily. The planners thus become
the administrative supervisors.

Yet, when supervisory authority is lodged in the same staff agency that
exercises planning responsibilities, the planning function may suffer. In
1942, before he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mc-
Narney told a Senate committee that the General Staff of the War De-
partment had taken on so many administrative duties that its planning
work had suffered in consequence.12 The answer in this case was to set
up three great commands to exercise virtually all War Department functions
i in the United States and so free the General Staff of its burdensome coor-
dinating job. There is always a danger that a planning unit may find ad-
Ipnistrative supervision of day-to-day work more tangible and more inter-
esting than planning. This is especially apt to happen if there is no other
agency for exercising the necessary measure of supervision. Certain it is
that ability as a planner is not sure proof of administrative capacity. The
combination of the two tasks in the same individual or agency is not a
foolproof method of uniting planning and operations.

Practical Test of Planning. Plans should be intended for action. When
approved, and when the necessary funds are made available, a set of plans
must next be carried out. Action accordingly follows after the planning.
Much of the success in operation depends upon the thoroughness of the
plans. And purposeful administrative activity depends upon advance prep-
aration. There is no inherent conflict between planning and operations.
The two are inexorably entwined.

David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, men-
tions with some pride that nowhere on its organization chart will the
student find a Department of Social Planning, and that there is no TVA
"plan."13 Yet he admits that TVA is a planning agency. "The TVA idea
of planning sees action and planning not as things separate and apart but
as one single and continuous process."14 Mr. Lilienthal goes on to argue
that the development of a region is a course of action. He acknowledges
that TVA has made many plans, but he also emphasizes the authority's
responsibility for action in the following words:

In the TVA the merging of planning and responsibility for the carry-
ing out of those plans forces our technicians to make them a part of the
main stream of living in the region or community; this it is that breathes
into plans the breath of life. For in the Tennessee Valley the expert
cannot escape from the consequences of his planning, as he can and

12 Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on a Bill to Establish a Department of
Defense Coordination and Control, p. 13, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 6, 1942.

*3 Lilienthal, David E., TV A— Democracy on the March, p. 192, New York: Harper, 1944.
U MM/., p. 199.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 133

usually does where it is divorced from execution. This has a profound
effect on the experts themselves. Where planning is conceived of in
this way, the necessity that experts should be close to the problems with
which they are dealing is evident.115

Planning Through Action Agencies. Mr. Lilienthal is not arguing
against planning. Rather, he is emphasizing that planning should be done
by action agencies or action units. His position is a strong one. His
case can be applied to a large department as well as to TVA in its rela-
tions to the government as a whole. There is good reason indeed why the
primary responsibility for the preparation of plans should be placed upon
operating officials. But usually they will need to have specially designated
personnel to develop the plans. And all the plans must be put together as
a whole.

Although Mr. Lilienthal does not say so, we may presume that the TVA
board and its general manager found that they themselves could put the
plans of operating officials together. Hence there was no need for central
staff planners in TVA. Nor does Mr. Lilienthal deny that TVA plans
must in the long run be made to harmonize with the plans of the federal
government as a whole. However, it is advantageous and desirable to
leave a maximum measure of planning responsibility to operating agencies
or units, and to encourage close relationships between planning specialists
and those who will direct the execution of plans.

4. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PLANNING

Long-Range Versus Short-Range Planning. The question of whether to
place emphasis upon long-range or short-range planning is very similar to
the issue of the relation of planning to operations. Students of administra-
tion have noticed a tendency in many agencies to concentrate attention
upon matters of short-range concern, to the exclusion of any interest in
longer-range goals. No doubt this practice reflects in part the interest of
administrative officials in action; they want to see something happen — and
soon. It also discloses a natural responsiveness to legislative attitudes;
lawmakers do not look with fond eyes on long-range planning by the
executive branch. Furthermore, it reveals that the postponement of thought
about long-range goals may often result from the pressures of the current
job.

This kind of tendency can arise even in a planning agency. For exam-
ple, the New York City Planning Commission had a Division of Master
Plan with two main duties: first, long-range concern with the future physi-
cal improvement of the city; second, the current job of preparing reports
on proposed building sites for immediate construction, reviewing assessable
improvements, and commenting on the proposed sale of city properties.
The staff of the division was not large enough to permit adequate efforts

15 /£«/., p. 201 (by permission of the publisher).

134 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

on both jobs. As a result, the current work was done, and the long-range
planning neglected. The eventual solution in this case was to take on one
additional engineer to routinize the current work by devising "stock" com-
ments and forms, and to set up a separate section to concentrate upon the
long-range master plan. Isolation of the long-range planners was avoided
by short, informal staff conferences held each day within the division. This
change evidently achieved the desired results.16

Ideally, there should be no conflict between short-run and long-run
planning. The two again are interrelated. Short-run plans must be part
of a long-range objective, if the work when accomplished is to have any
meaning. A new, wide street laid out to the edge of a city, built to haul
much traffic, will be of little use unless it is connected with main roads and
unless the city grows in that direction. A plan for the expansion of a
manufacturing plant will be of little value unless there is a sustained
market demand for the product when made. There is no point in develop-
ing harbor facilities unless there is also a longer-range plan for moving
increased tonnage through the port.

At the same time, the determination of short-run programs is the
occasion for reviewing the adequacy of long-range plans and for modify-
ing them to meet current conditions. The desirable connection is exempli-
fied in current capital-budgeting practices in our more advanced cities.
The usual practice is to adopt each year an annual program of capital im-
provements, but simultaneously to furnish a plan for desirable improve-
ments over the next five years. Each year a current program is presented,
and another year added to the long-run plan. The National Resources
Planning Board followed the same practice from 1940 to 1942 in presenting
a six-year program of construction to be undertaken or financed by the
federal government. Generally speaking, it is the task of competent manage-
ment to make certain that a proper balance is maintained between short-run
and long-run planning.

Planning Personnel. The president of a large company once remarked
that there are only a few men in any organization to whom planning re-
sponsibilities can be entrusted. Most people, he observed, are frightened
when asked to look ahead and prepare for future activities. In other words,
this executive was convinced that there was a special type of personnel best
suited for planning.

Unquestionably, there are certain attributes which are desirable in a
planner. He must be imaginative, broad-visioned, willing to explore new
and unusual conceptions, free from prejudice about basic goals. He must
be objective, thorough, flexible. He should be willing to canvass alterna-
tives and forecast probable results without extravagant optimism or pessim-

16 See Boemi, A. Andrew, "Organization o£ a City Planning Department for Current and
Long-Term Activities," Report No. 21, Case Reports in Public Administration, Vol. I, Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1940.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 135

ism. He must have technical competence in his field of work. He must
not be afraid of details. He must have a mind which quickly perceives
interrelationships between various programs of action, and fits pieces to-
gether into a harmonious whole. He must be able to get along well with
others throughout the organization. In other words, he must be a good
staff officer. All these characteristics are desirable in planning personnel.

To be sure, it is easier to state these general qualifications than it is to
measure them. In large part, the personality traits just described can only
be judged subjectively. A chief executive or administrator will have to
decide which prospective candidates possess the desired combination of
characteristics for staff leadership in planning. This is merely a way of
saying that few selections by an administrator are more important to the
success of his enterprise than the designation of his chief planner. It is a
vital choice, and not one to be made hastily or casually.

Because planning is so intimately allied with questions of major policy
and decision, it is frequently believed that the planners must necessarily
be political officers. Presidents and department heads are usually expected
to draw their close advisers from among their personal confidants or politi-
cal associates. This practice has its advantages. It brings new backgrounds
and points of view into the public service. It often helps to ensure loyalty
and full trust between the administrator and his advisers.

The defects in this practice, however, are equally obvious. The new-
comer must take a long period to become fully acquainted with the agency
where he is assigned. He must learn the full impact of present programs
and the probable repercussions of change. More than this, he must be able
to command positive reactions all the way down the administrative hier-
archy. He has to be very sure of himself and well versed in administrative
practices to achieve so much.

If the administrator seeks his planning advisers from within the ranks
of the permanent civil service, he will gain the advantage of having indi-
viduals with a full knowledge of personalities, programs, and problems
peculiar to the particular department. Today, in the federal government
and in most states, our departments are so large that many different points
of view and types of individuals are to be found within them. It is likely
that an agency head can find, without too much difficulty, the civil servant
upon whom he will be willing to rely heavily as a planning adviser.

Yet if a civil servant is to fill such a position, he must inevitably associate
himself with the policies of his chief. When those policies are changed
by a successor, the planner is likely to go too. Must the price for direction
of planning activities be eventual severance from the public service? It
would seem desirable to develop some arrangement whereby civil servants
might hold higher posts like this under one political leadership and in case
of change be returned to their earlier duties or other responsibilities. For
instance, it was found a few years ago that the Post Office Department was

136 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

largely managed by the deputy assistant postmasters general and the chief
inspectors, who were drawn from the ranks of the department but who
tended to shift with changes in departmental leadership.17 When replaced,
a deputy assistant postmaster general went back to his previous position.
While this arrangement had its defects, it might serve as a precedent for
application to planning personnel.

Another question is whether special efforts should be made through
civil service procedures to recruit specialized personnel specifically for staff
work in planning agencies. The answer would appear to depend upon the
characteristics of individual agencies. If the tendency for public agencies
to seek young technicians in many different fields for operating and man-
agement jobs should continue, there would be no reason to advocate any
special approach for the recruitment of planning personnel. The scope of
the professions now recognized in the merit system should be sufficient to
meet planning needs. We must remember that planning is a management
function; it is a technique, a method, an attitude. It is not some special
body of knowledge. Planning is performed as a phase of operations in
various fields. We should continue to seek general professional competence
first, and then look for the individual with the peculiar personal qualifi-
cations and inclinations which make him suitable for the planning staff
of an agency.

Planning Techniques. Research and planning are not synonymous;
rather, the two are complementary. Careful collection of all available in-
formation and analysis of past trends usually precedes the formulation of
future action. Planning is this second step — the formulation of future
action to attain desirable ends.

One method of procedure in planning is to begin with certain standards
of attainment in a particular field. If a standard is available, it may be used
as a measuring rod in determining what we have as contrasted with what
is desirable. The difference, or "gap," is an indication of what we have to
do. The final step is to lay out a program for achieving the desired stand-
ard. Another way of stating the same procedure is: (1) to determine the
objectives; (2) to measure the distance between the present status and the
objectives; (3) to determine the program for realizing the objectives.

In its last year, the National Resources Planning Board experimented
with the latter approach in several different fields. For instance, the stand-
ard of nutritional need was used as a guide to land-use planning in agri-
culture. The objective was an American population provided with an
adequate and properly balanced diet. The science of nutrition had reached
a point where it could say with precision what an adequate and balanced
diet is. Diet needs per individual for different types of food, multiplied
by total population, gave the objective in quantitative terms. This objec-

17 See Macmahon and Millctt, op. cit. in note 10, p. 36.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 137

tive in turn was translated into acreage requirements. Required acreage
compared with existing acreage indicated broadly the "gap" to be bridged
in obtaining agricultural production for an adequate food consumption.

The same approach was used for public libraries. With the assistance
of the National Resources Planning Board, the American Library Associa-
tion undertook to formulate standards for public libraries.18 Comparison
of existing library service with these standards supplied a basis for prepara-
tion of a program to realize the standards.

The principal mechanism of urban land-use planning has long been
the master plan, which is designed to present the current conception of
long-run city development. More specifically, it presents an estimate of
needed capital improvements. This means, of course, laying out the ex-
pected population growth and shifts within a city, and then providing the
facilities to meet the anticipated needs. It implies some standard for in-
dicating needs in schools, parks, fire houses, streets, sewers, water mains,
and all other municipal facilities.19 The master plan also shows all existing
public structures. In short, it is expected to provide the basic data for a
capital-improvement budget for a city. Unfortunately, few cities in the
United States have ever developed even a good approximation of a master
plan. Much improvisation still passes as city planning.

For many years the United States Forest Service has used a forest man-
agement plan as its basic planning program. Under this program, each
supervisor of a forest keeps an up-to-date local forest-management plan for
his area. This plan divides a forest into working circles. For each circle
there are data about topography, number of trees, and rate of growth.
The plan then indicates the silvicultural system or the genetics and ecology
of tree growth, the timber yield, the policy on timber sales, the selection
of areas to be cut, and the annual permissible cut. The forest management
plan became the basis in turn for a regional management plan, which was
incorporated into a national management plan. Thus the Forest Service de-
veloped a program for its work in forestry operation.

There are various techniques for planning, but they have in common
the collection of relevant data on which to build a program for realizing
specified objectives. Whatever techniques are employed, planning must
look forward; it must propose desirable action. The more concrete and
detailed the program, the better has been the planning. And this means
inevitably more efficient administration. Studies in themselves are not
plans. The planning job is not done until specific and detailed programs
have been worked out. The plans should be in such condition that operat-
ing officials could begin immediately to carry them out.

18 Sec Postwar Standards for Public Libraries, Chicago: American Library Association, 1943.

10 See, for example, "Preliminary Report of the Committee on Park and Recreation
Standards," in Planning, 1943, p. 106 ff.t Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials,
1943.

138 PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

Public Relations of Planning. The final problem of planning is getting
the program across. As we saw, planning is a responsibility of the top
administrator. It is his duty to present the program to the chief executive
and to the legislature. He is the advocate. The technicians who may have
prepared the data are only members of his staff.

Yet the administrator must naturally be concerned about the public re-
percussions of a program he accepts. This has led many planners to feel
that they must themselves cultivate outside sources of support. Certainly
it may be contended that planners should consult many different groups
in framing proposals. A sense of participation may encourage some in-
dividuals and groups to endorse later plans. There is much room in the
planning process for advisory committees as well as for extensive consul-
tation with citizen and interest groups.

Some chief planners have found it desirable that they themselves serve
as intermediaries between their technical staffs and the public. They have
feared that their "experts" might frighten or upset the average citizen or
legislator. So they have been the filters for presentation of data and pro-
posals to the outside. There is much to say for this practice. Chief planners
must also supply the links between their technicians and the political head
of the agency — a task requiring considerable skill in communication and
interpretation.

Planning, viewed from the angle of its concrete end-product, leads to
a selling job. The planning personnel must be prepared to help in the
process of sale. The burden of getting programs accepted cannot be left
solely to the responsible political chief. While the planner must make it
clear that he is not the official responsible for determining policy, he must
assist in showing the grounds which make a program desirable. It follows
that for many reasons planners, because they are planners, cannot afford
to ignore the public-relations problems inherent in their job.

Summary. Preparation for action is a vital — indeed an indispensable —
part of administration. It is the first responsibility of management. Many
other phases of management must flow in turn from planning. Particu-
larly, budgeting is very closely tied to planning, for the budget is merely the
fiscal expression of work plans.20 Organizational planning follows the
tasks laid out for an agency. Planning covers many fields — conservation of
natural resources, land use, public works, economic development. An ad-
ministrator, to perform his planning responsibility, must have the necessary
staff whose head works in close personal relationship with him. Planners at
the higher levels in the administrative hierarchy have a management job
to do. They have to stimulate planning by other staff and operating agen-
cies or units, in order to ensure that plans are in balance, that synthesis has
been achieved, and that all aspects have been fully considered. Planners

20 See Walker, Robert A., "The Relation of Budgeting to Program Planning," Public
Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p. 97 ff.

PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 139

must prepare plans themselves in those fields where there is no operating
agency. Planning and operations should not be regarded as being antag-
onistic. Rather, they should be considered as interlocking and as repre-
senting succeeding phases of administrative activity. So also short-range
plans should be carefully geared to long-range objectives. Planning tech-
niques should be designed to lay out work programs for meeting deter-
mined goals. Capital budgets and current operating budgets should be
phases of these techniques.

Personnel engaged in planning should be carefully selected for technical
competence and ability to think ahead in original projections. Planning
requires careful definition of objectives, wherever possible in quantitative
terms, on the basis of an inventory of present status and resources and aim-
ing at a program for realizing these objectives. Consultation with various
interested groups is an essential part of this process. Well-defined object-
ives—a clear comprehension of goals— means purposeful administration
accompanied by the least possible loss in wasted effort.

CHAPTER

Working Concepts of Organization

1. THE ARCHITECTURE OF ORGANIZATION

Terminology. Organization is the method of dividing up work. It
rests upon two basic conditions. First, organization implies that there is
a job to be done. Second, division of work becomes necessary only when
a number of individuals are involved in accomplishing a particular job.
In a relatively simple situation, organization may be informal and even
implicit. It may depend upon tradition or habit. As the job becomes larger,
as the purpose becomes more complex, as the number of people performing
the job increases, organization tends to be more exactly defined.

When we use the word "organization," we shall have in mind a rather
restricted and particular meaning. We are not concerned with the organi-
zation of government as a federal republic, or with its legislative, executive
and judicial branches; here we are not dealing with basic theories about
political structure. Nor are we touching upon the organization of society
into family units, social groups, or economic associations. Our concern
now is with specific work undertaken by government, whether federal, state,
or local. Many of the considerations to which we have to pay attention
hence are also applicable to business enterprise, and likewise to undertakings
such as hospitals and schools. Organization, for our present purposes,
refers to the structure developed for carrying out the tasks entrusted
to the chief executive and his administrative subordinates in government.

It is customary to point out that organization has grown in importance
with the increasing specialization of individuals. Division of labor, for
example, was a basic factor in industrialization. We found that productive
output increased with specialization. But specialization required organi-
zation, since all effort must add up to the desired output. We do not get
a suit of clothes unless the cutters use a suit pattern in cutting the cloth
and the sewers know the particular parts to sew and in what order. If all
the workers sewed sleeves, there would be no suit. So we must have
workers who sew sleeves, and others who sew coat seams, and still others

140

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 141

who sew the trousers. The work of each must be thus systematically al-
located in order to achieve the desired product.

Over the years we have developed a number of definite conceptions
of the ways in which work can and should be divided. To be sure, we are
a long way yet from final and conclusive answers to all organizational
questions. There are differences of opinion about many particular phases
of organization. There is ample room for experimentation in organizational
relations. Administrative structure is not static. New ideas bring new
trends in organization. | Yet there remain certain fundamental concepts in
organization which all should understand. Phrases like "bases of organiza-
tion," "unity of command," "hierarchy," "decentralization," "staff and
line," and "span of control" have rather definite meanings, j It will prove
useful in the present chapter to review briefly these workmg concepts of
organization.

Bases of Organization. Students of organization usually recognize four
different bases for organizations, in the sense of different methods of dividing
up a job. These are: function or purpose, process or profession, clientele or
commodity, and area.

Function or purpose is fairly easy to define. Education of children
through a public school system is a particular function or purpose which
an agency may be established to perform. The conduct of foreign relations,
the collection of taxes, the operation of a navy, the provision of public
assistance to the destitute, the disposal of garbage and refuse— all of these
are functional definitions of administrative jobs. Within a particular
field, too, such as public welfare or social security, the component parts of
governmental activity may be divided functionally, as between unem-
ployment insurance and what we used to call relief. On an assembly line,
in much the same way, the job of putting together an automobile is broken
up into various functions. The wheels and then the engine are attached to
the chassis, the body and fenders are added later, and finally the completed
automobile rolls from the assembly line. Each man along the line has
performed a particular function, such as fastening on a wheel or connecting
a driveshaft.

Functional division of duties or division by purpose is perhaps the most
common of all methods of promoting specialization. There are many who
maintain that it is the only efficient method, since it alone prevents dupli-
cation and conflicts between the work of various individuals. Whether
this be true or not, functionalization is readily apparent in most large
organizations.

Process as a basis of organization is somewhat more difficult to define.
Often it is identified with a profession such as engineering, or with a tech-
nique such as accounting. Medical care wherever provided — whether
in schools, in health centers, or in hospitals— may be regarded as a process
rather than as a function. Legal departments in government-— federal, state,

142 WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

and local— are of a similar character, although they are closely related to the
function of law enforcement.

Process or profession is likely to be found more commonly as a basis
of staff organization than as one of line organization. This is a distinction
to which we shall return later. It is sufficient here to note that some con-
fusion results when we try to define process as a basis for allocating work.
It is not always easy to draw a line between function and process. If a
distinction does not readily appear, it may be just as well to consider the
two as one.

Clientele is much more easily identified as a way of dividing up work.
The Office of Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior is a good
example. This office must provide education, welfare, and other services
for a particular group — the American Indian. The Department of Labor
also is supposed to recognize a very important clientele, the labor element
of our population as contrasted with professional and managerial personnel.
The Children's Bureau is yet another illustration of clientele as the basis of
establishing a particular organization. A hospital for the mentally ill looks
toward a particular clientele, as does a school for the blind or deaf. The
Veterans Administration is a further example. Any analysis of administra-
tive structure will quickly reveal many instances where clientele has been
the basis for determining institutional responsibilities.

Commodity differentiations used for organization are similar to those of
clientele. In any procurement operation some breakdown by commodity
may be expected. In the War and Navy Departments, supply activities are
divided along commodity lines, guns and ammunition being purchased and
stored separately from construction equipment, aircraft, medical supplies,
communications equipment, and general supplies.

Finally, the place where a job is done — that is, the area — may be a primary
basis for organizing activities. The geographic factor is very important in
administration; it will be separately discussed in connection with decentrali-
zation. By their very title, district offices suggest the geographic definition
of duties. The Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Depart-
ment of the Interior is an establishment that deals with the problems of
particular areas. Within the War Department structure, the military post
in the field has long been the center for a number of different activities, all
tied together by the geographic fact of their location. The Tennessee Valley
Authority is an outstanding example of an organization established to
perform several different functions in a designated area.

Choice of Basis. Enough has been said to afford some general under-
standing of the different alternatives available for designing organization.
Each has its advantages, but each presents particular problems.1 It is
i For a good summary of the advantages and disadvantages of these bases of organization
see Gulick, Luther, "The Theory of Organization," in Gulick, L. and Urwick, L., eds., Papers
on the Science of Administration, pp. 21-30, New York: Institute of Public Administration,
1937.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 143

not necessary to debate relative merits in order to gain a fundamental appre-
ciation of organizational problems. No one has yet given us conclusive
evidence that would enable us to say that there is but one best way to
organize for action. There are— as we have seen— four different ways, and
one may present compelling arguments in a given situation. The key lies
often in the situation, or rather in a thoughtful appreciation of the total
line-up of relevant factors.

It is not always recognized that all of these methods of organizing work
may be employed in one agency, at succeeding levels in the division of
work. One example may be cited. Under the work relief program of the
federal government from 1935 to 1942, the first breakdown below the level
of the national office was geographic — by state boundary lines. Status as
an organizationally separate state was granted to New York City. Within
this quasi-state office at one time were four so-called operating divisions:
Operations, Women's and Professional Projects, Employment, and
Finance. Operations referred to construction projects; in essence this
entailed a process. Women's and Professional Projects, on the other hand,
was a division based on clientele, on the type of person employed. Employ-
ment involved the function of determining who was eligible for work and
assigning those eligible to various projects. Finally, Finance was largely the
internal job of keeping project accounts and preparing payrolls for the
workers. This too could be called a process, or, if we choose, a function.
Thus a whole criss-cross of organizational patterns was to be found in this
one agency.

Nor is such a situation unique. Indeed, we may expect to find it in
any large-scale enterprise. A combination of organizational patterns does
not in itself suggest an undesirable or inefficient structure. It may rightfully
demand careful scrutiny with a view to simplification. However, we can-
not automatically say that an organization which employs more than one
basis for its division of duties is a faulty organization. Our analysis must
be more penetrating and conclusive than that.

Dynamics and Rigidities. As the United States expanded from east to
west, and as its population increased sevenfold in one hundred years, the
work of its administrative agencies likewise expanded. The changing na-
ture of governmental activities — particularly in depression and in war —
brought about a further increase in administrative work. Some work begun
many years ago has become less important, if not completely obsolete. Both
aspects of the development entail alterations in organizational structure
to meet new conditions. Shifts in emphasis usually mean shifts in
organization.

Yet there are certain important elements of rigidity in administrative
structure that should never be overlooked. The history of attempts at gen-
eral administrative reorganization of the federal government from 1909 to
date reveals this fact only too clearly. Many agencies have cultivated very

144 WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

close relations with particular interest groups. These groups in turn have
opposed any move which could be interpreted as tending to diminish the
importance of their favored agency— or impairing their own influence upon
its policy. Interagency jealousies also played their part in preventing
organizational change. For example, the rivalry and even hostility between
the National Park Service and the United States Forest Service were
notorious in Washington ever since the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy
of 1909. This feud may have been one of the obstructions in the path of
reorganization proposals in 1923 and in 1937, because forestry enthusiasts
feared that the Forest Service might be transferred to the Department of
the Interior and merged with the Park Service.

Moreover, few administrators face the problem, or the opportunity, of
organizing their agency from scratch. Only when a new agency is set up
to undertake a new job does the head and his assistants have to decide what
factors shall govern the division of labor. Most administrators inherit an
agency, complete with its existing structure, history, and traditions.
Organizational change then becomes difficult to achieve. Frequently it may
take a long time and a gradual program in order to realize the desired
organizational pattern. It makes little difference that the nature of an
agency's work may have greatly changed over a period of years. Corre-
sponding alterations in structure which emphasize the new jobs and
consolidate the less important ones are not easy of accomplishment.

Political Factors in Organization. The relative immobility of many so-
called old-line agencies is one reason why chief executives often prefer the
creation of new agencies to carry out new tasks rather than to entrust the
additional programs to an existing agency with its settled way of thinking,
its already solidified clientele, and its fixed organizational traditions. Rea-
sons of general administrative logic may suggest that related duties should
be assigned to an agency possessing some "know-how." Reasons of high
policy may dictate the exact reverse. There is, in fact, no purely adminis-
trative or organizational answer to this situation.

Unfortunately, organizational theory does not ordinarily recognize the
personality factor. In reality, this is apt to be an important if not a con-
trolling consideration in determining the organizational structure of any
agency. The desire or need to accommodate a certain individual may lead
to modification in structure simply for the benefit of that individual, or
because consideration accorded him may secure more important advantages,
It has happened, for instance, that the entire field organization of a great
agency was adjusted to one top man who insisted that he could "work" only
in a direct command relationship to field installations. Many a reorganiza-
tion has been wrecked on the reef of personality. The student in the class-
room or the writer on organization may pretend that personality factors are
unimportant; the administrator, in determining organizational structure,
may ignore them only at his own peril.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 145

We may hear someone say, upon looking at an organization chart, "It
may work; it all depends upon the individuals who are assigned to run it."
In the present state of our knowledge about public administration, it is
probably as sound to pick key individuals and build the organization
around them as it is to establish the administrative structure and then seek
the individuals to fill the key posts. Of course, the first alternative would
not commend itself when there is likelihood of continued turnover in the
key positions.

To repeat, there are at least four different ways to divide up any major
job, and all four may be used at various levels in the same agency. No one
way is necessarily the best. It is vital, however, that the organizational
pattern be clearly explained to all who are expected to help make it work.
The personnel must understand how the job is divided and how the parts
fit together. Without this, no structure can accomplish its purpose
successfully.

2, LINE AND STAFF

In 1927, William F. Willoughby of the Institute for Government Re-
search pointed out a "fundamental distinction" between the functional and
the institutional activities of governmental services.2 Functional activities,
he said, are those an agency is expected to perform — in other words, the
objectives of the agency. Institutional activities are the work that must be
done in order to keep the agency in operation.

This distinction is similar to another one often made by writers on
organization; it is the distinction between line and staff. Both words have
a military origin, although they are now employed generally in civilian
as well as military administration.

v Meaning of Line. The word "line" is fairly simple to define. It refers
to what in military practice is termed the "chain of command." Line means
,the subordinate division of operating responsibility. Thus, in the federal
government, we say that the line runs from the President to department
heads to bureau chiefs, and so on downward. Or when the Federal Security
Agency was set up, the line included the administrator of the agency, the
Social Security Board as a directing unit, its executive director, the chiefs
of the Bureaus of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Employment Security,
and Public Assistance, and their operating subordinates. Or in a tactical
military organization, the line is made up of the army commander, corps
commander, division commander, regimental commander, battalion com-
mander, company commander, and platoon leader.

Concepts about the bases of organization would be more clearly under-
stood if it were emphasized that they concern the division of duties in
the line. Operating responsibilities may be arranged functionally or by
purpose, by process or profession, by clientele or commodity, or geographi-

2 Willoughby, W. F., Principles of Public Administration, p. 105, Washington: Brookings
Institution. 1927.

146 WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

cally. The line is simply the array of the various succeeding specializations
necessary in accomplishing the task an agency exists to perform, v/

Meaning of Staff. Staff, on the other hand, is a more complicated con-
ception. Many different definitions have been attempted.8 The customary
starting point is to say that the staff is merely an extension of the personality
of the administrator. The job of management — that is, of the administrator
—has been set forth in the specially contrived word POSDCORB.4 These
are the initial letters for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinat-
ing, reporting, and budgeting. Here, it is said, are the essentials with which
the administrator must work. The units which are set up to assist him in
that work are staff agencies. J

It is customary in all writing about staff to point out that the operator
at or near the base of the organizational pyramid needs no or little staff
assistance. The foreman is his own staff. The superintendent of a depart-
ment in a plant may have only an assistant or two. The plant manager,
on the other hand, may have a number of persons organized in various
units to help him. Those familiar with tactical military organization know
that as the progression climbs upward from platoon leader to company
commander, to battalion commander, to regimental commander, and to
division commander, the staff organization becomes larger and more fully
developed. Thus in all administration it is apparent that the greater the
organization and the more jobs it has to do, the more staff assistance the
administrator must have.

Since staffagencies^exist to help the administrator, it is frequently
said that they perform their work inrhiniame dlrtyancT have no command
authority of their own. All power to issue orders rests with the admin-
istrator. The staff simply prepares matters for his action; it does not issue
commands of its own. This is supposed to be basic. It is also pointed out
that the staff does not operate; it only plaAs, advises, suggests, and assists.
Execution is left to others; that is, the line. -J

These qualifications of staff have their importance, but they are unduly
simplified as just stated. Staff activity is not so easy to define or to limit.
Staff agencies or units often do issue orders which the administrator never
sees, even though they will reflect his interests. Sometimes relations between
staff units at various levels of the organizational hierarchy are very close,
and it would be presumptuous to say that the higher units in actuality are
not "operating." Sometimes the mass of recurrent work done by staff units
is hard to differentiate from "operations." ^

Moreover, there are at least three different types of staff work. Perhaps
we ought to say that there are four, and call planning a separate category of
staff activity. When there is a central planning agency in which is concen-

* Sec Urwick, Lyndall, "Organization as a Technical Problem," in Gulick and Urwick,
of. cit. in note 1, p. 49 ff.

4 See Gulick, ibid., p. 12 ff.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 147

trated most of the long-range and short-range preparation for action, then
we may rightly refer to planning as a major — and separate — staff activity.
The previous discussion of planning has emphasized the crucial importance
of this phase of administration. Accordingly, planning should be under*
stood as one part of the staff job.

Staff Activities Inherent in Administration. Apart from centralized
planning, there remain three other kinds of work which often are called
staff. Clear distinction between them will prevent much confusion. One
kind is inherent in all administration. The most outstanding examples are
budgeting and personnel activities. Every manager in public and private
enterprise usually must prepare in some form an estimate of the financial
cost of his work. This becomes a highly specialized job at the higher levels
of administration. So also with personnel management. No work can be
done without the people to perform it. Finding, obtaining, placing, and
keeping the people needed on a job is a continuing concern. No staff work
is more perennially a problem for the administrator than budgeting and
personnel. This work weaves back and forth through all administration,
at almost any level.

Other activities may be placed in the same category. Public reporting
and public relations surely belong here, but they are less well recognized
as such and much less formalized in procedure than budgeting and per-
sonnel. Nonetheless, external relations with the public are implicit in much,
perhaps all administration. Sometimes the top administrator handles this
business directly, while his subordinates play only supporting roles.

Central Service Activities. Another type of staff work is a central service
job for the benefit of all parts of an organization, or those carried on in the
same vicinity. Thus there may be a central reproducing plant for photostat-
ing or otherwise duplicating materials. There may be a central garage
or warehouse. There may be centralized procurement of the supplies
needed in running the agency, such as desks, paper, and typewriters. There
may be mail and messenger services to provide. These are the so-called
institutional activities of an administrative agency in the proper sense. The
degree to which such work should be centralized is an important question
of management which we need not debate here. The point is that exten-
sive services are involved in running an organization; they may be central-
ized in order to make the fullest possible use of specialized facilities and
personnel. When such services are centralized and performed under the
supervision of the top administrator, the combined unit is often called a
staff facility. It is sometimes also described as an "auxiliary" establishment.

Functional and Operating Staff. Finally, there are staff units created
to guide or coordinate activities performed by operating units. This work
depends entirely upon the tasks of an administrative agency and its primary
basis of organization. Thus, in the Washington office of the Forest Service
we encounter divisions of timber management, range management, wild

148 WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

life management, and fire control.5 The divisional designations refer to
functional specialties in the Forest Service whose operating responsibility
is organized geographically. Similar staff units are not likely to be found
in many other agencies. In the Work Projects Administration, however,
which was also organized geographically, there were functional specialists
for educational projects, engineering projects, recreational projects, and other
types of activity. In the Army Service Forces of the War Department,
where procurement operations were divided basically by commodities, func-
tional specialists dealt with purchasing policies, expediting of production
and storage.

Such supervisory or coordinating staff activities in an agency are deter-
mined by the common threads which run through the operating units and
by the decision to recognize some of these threads for uniform management.
In the main, the specialists in particular elements of administration are
likely to be the staff personnel with vital coordinating work to be done in
major operating fields. They are concerned with the substantive work to
be accomplished, and hence have assignments that vary with the agency.
They are nonetheless staff, even when called the "functional" or "operat-
ing" staff in order to differentiate them from those who perform central
services or budget and personnel work.

One other point needs to be made about staff activities. Some agencies
permit cleavage or hostility to develop between staff and operating units. It
must always be remembered that subordinate managers who direct the
work are also advisers to the administrator. The latter does not look to
his staff alone for counsel; he should and does look also to his subordinate
managers or operators, since they too are expected to see the work not
merely in its component parts but as a whole. Staff specialists and operators
both make up an organization. They must work together.6

3. THE QUEST OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY

Hierarchy and Span of Control. Sometimes administrative structure is
| described as pyramidal. This is merely another way of expressing the con-
.ception of hierarchy. As already indicated, organization begins with some
broad purpose to be accomplished, and proceeds by dividing the job into
^various component parts. As each new subdivision is created, the number
of parts multiplies. From one person at the top, the organizational struc-
ture breaks down into various superintendents, then to foremen or super-
visors, and finally to workers—the base of the triangle. This has been called
the "scalar" process or principle in organization.

5 Sec Loveridge, Earl W. and Keplinger, Peter, "Washington-Field Relationships in the
Forest Service," in Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service, p. 23 ff., Washington:
Graduate School of the United States Depirtment of Agriculture, 1942.

* Staff officers need a clear understanding, of the personal and psychological demands
inherent in their role. For an excellent statement of how a staff officer should act, see Bellah,
Lt. Coi. James W., "Staff Officer," Infantry Journal, 1944, Vol. 55 (No. 2), p. 43 ff.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 149

The Catholic Church has long afforded an excellent illustration of
hierarchy. At the base of the structure is the parish priest. Above the priest
is the bishop of the diocese; in turn a number of bishops are grouped under
an archbishop; and finally over the archbishop is the Pope in Rome.
The triangular infantry division used as the basic tactical organization
by the United States in World War II is another example of hierarchy.
Four companies made a battalion, three battalions a regiment, and three
regiments a division.

Hierarchy means the grouping of units into a larger unit for direc-
tion and control of activities. It is the method whereby the efforts of many
different individuals are geared together. Hierarchy is another indispensable
feature of large-scale enterprise. Only through hierarchical relationships
can unified direction be achieved from one central point, and broad purposes
be translated into action. This should not suggest, of course, that hierarchy
may be relied upon as a substitute for cooperation.

The importance of hierarchy is underlined by another organizational
concept — span of control. Any one individual can effectively supervise only
a limited number of persons. Certain administrators and students have
made this limitation specific — no more than seven, nine, or twelve indi-
viduals should report to the same superior. Today it is generally agreed
that the number of individuals a person can direct depends upon several
factors, especially the routine nature of the work, the place where the job
is done, and the energy of the supervisor. It is easier to supervise many
individuals when each is doing the same work, when that work is of a
repetitive nature, and when it is performed close together. A limited num-
ber of contacts for any one superior is nonetheless essential in order to
ensure adequate supervision and coordinated action.

Decentralization. Closely allied to the concepts of hierarchy and span of
control is the concept of decentralization. This is another word with at
least two administrative meanings— quite aside from the political one in
the sense of states' rights and institutions of local self-government.7 In one
administrative sense, decentralization — as deconcentration — is synonymous
with delegation of authority. It refers to the assignment of responsibilities
in such a way that substantial areas of discretion are entrusted to subordi-
nate officers, thus preventing dangerous bottlenecks and overwork for the
administrator at the apex of the hierarchy. We often speak of highly cen-

7 The word "decentralization" has been used by some to refer exclusively to the federal
system, whereby governmental authority is divided between national and state executives and
legislatures. The grant-in-aid system — described in Key, V. O., The Administration of Federal
Grants to States, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1937, and Clark, Jane P., The Rist
of a New Federalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1938 — is a means of promoting
national programs through state administrative agencies. Because of the use of the wore
"decentralization'* to describe federal -state relationships, some have suggested the word "decon-
centration" to describe interlevel or headquarters -field relationships in a particular agency. Foi
a more detailed discussion see the symposium entitled Washington-Field Relationships in tht
Federal Service cited in note 5. This matter is taken up below in Ch. 12, "Field Organization/

150 WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

tralized administration when we really mean that many actions require
prior approval from the chief or one of his assistants. Conversely, we may
think of a highly decentralized administration as one that is characterized
by broad grants of power to individual component parts of the organiza-
tion, with the retention of only certain essential controls in the head office.

Decentralization, however, has yet another meaning, perhaps growing
out of the one just circumscribed. It may refer to field organization, to the
number of units operating away from the central office. The problems of
field organization are discussed later in this book, and it is necessary to
note here only that decentralization has also a geographic aspect, involving
the type of field structure and the authority granted to field units. Much
emphasis has been given to decentralization — as deconcentration — in recent
years, because it has been discovered that rapid action in any large effort
depends in considerable measure upon the extensive delegation of authority
to subordinate officers or field establishments. '

Unity of Command. Still another concept often mentioned in discus-
sions of organization is unity of command. This expression may refer to
the desirability of having each subordinate in the chain of command report
to a single individual. Or it may refer to an arrangement whereby all ad-
ministrative authority flows from one responsible head, be he President of
the United States, governor of a state, or president of a great corporation.
And finally, the concept may refer to the question of the relative mer-
its of a single-headed agency as compared with those of a board or
commission.

Much importance is usually placed upon the construction of an adminis-
trative arrangement wherein each person has only one superior to whom
he looks for direction. In such a setup an individual cannot receive con-
flicting instructions, or play one superior off against another and thus
escape effective supervision. On the other hand, when the subordinate is
subject to multiple sources of command, confusion may arise and respon-
sibility for action may be difficult to fix. Administrative expedience has
shown this to be a cardinal factor in connection with general efficiency.
Yet there are practical conditions which on occasion may dictate the crea-
tion or continuance of a situation where one has two superiors. The con-
cept of unity of command therefore needs to be reconciled with a recogni-
tion that supervision of any activity may be dual — technical and also admin-
istrative.8 The two types of supervision may be exercised by different
individuals. The one type may be concerned with professional competence
in the performance of a job, while the other is chiefly interested in the effi-
cient utilization of the resources— men and materials— available for the job.

Administrative responsibility is of especial concern in a democracy. Our
great governmental machinery must be kept responsive to changes in politi-

8 Sec Macmahon, Arthur W., Millett, John D. and Ogdcn, G., The Administration of
Federal Wor\ Relief, ch. 11, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 151

cal opinion. When party control in the presidency changes, for example,
we expect the new incumbent to be able to make his policies effective
throughout the administrative agencies of government. Yet an unequivocal
adoption of this policy has never occurred either in our national government
or in most of our states and cities. Instead, we have used in many instances
a different kind of arrangement, which has led to another concept — that of
administrative autonomy.

Our great regulatory commissions, exercising so-called quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial authority, are often referred to as independent agencies.
Their peculiar status is embodied in the law, and the Supreme Court has
held that a member of such a commission may not be removed at will by
the President.9 Government corporations have also been viewed as inde-
pendent, particularly when they were free to handle their funds under their
own procedure and to appoint personnel regardless of civil service provisions.
There is no "unity of command" over these agencies. Responsible direction
is confused, to say the least.

The practice of creating boards and commissions to exercise administra-
tive authority is fairly extensive throughout federal, state, and local govern-
ment. Many students will readily accept the famous dictum that boards
are "long, narrow, and wooden." There is undoubtedly a place for boards
in administration, as deliberative or consultative devices. However, it is
quite widely recognized now that any activity requiring positive action and
leadership can best be directed by a single individual. Boards violate the
concept of "unity of command." They make rapid action difficult. We may
admit that unity of command is an organizational objective, but it can
scarcely be called an adequate description of actual administrative practice
in our government today.10

9 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).

10 On the whole problem of the organizational position of the regulatory commissions,
see Cushman, Robert E., The Independent Regulatory Commissions, esp. chs. 10-13, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1941. For a study of state regulatory agencies, see Fcsler, James W.,
The Independence of State Regulatory Agencies, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1942,
For fuller discussion, see below Ch. 10, "Independent Regulatory Establishments."

There is extensive writing on the subject of government corporations. See particularly,
Van Dorn, Harold A., Government-Owned Corporations, New York: Knopf, 1926; Dimock,
Marshall E., Government-Owned Enterprises in the Panama Canal Zone, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1934, and Developing America's Waterways, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1935; Emmerich, Herbert, "Government Corporations and Independent Supervisory
Agencies," in President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special
Studies, p. 299 ff., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937; Thurston, John, Government
Proprietary Corporations in the English-Speaking Countries, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1937; McDiarmid, John, Government Corporations and Federal Funds, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1938; and Pritchett, C. Herman, "The Paradox of the Government
Corporation," Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 381 ff. For fuller discussion,
see below Ch. 11, "Government Corporations."

The best statement on the use and limitations of boards is to be found in a small
pamphlet by Urwick, L., Committees in Organization, London, 1935 (reprinted from the
British Management Review).

152 WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

Coordination. There are yet two other terms frequently encountered in
discussions of organization. These are "coordination" and "integration."
Often they appear coupled together as if complementary. Actually, the
two words describe very different structural arrangements. Indeed, coordi-
nation does not refer to organization except indirectly. Rather it is a phase
of management, a part of the job of supervision. Coordination is achieved
when harmonious action prevails between the operating parts of an agency.
The techniques of coordination run through the whole range of supervisory
tools: careful planning of the job, clear definition of responsibility, establish-
ment of reporting obligations, inspection of work, conferences of key per-
sonnel, proper and convenient channels of communication, higher approval
of action proposed by subordinates. And the list could be extended.

Organizationally, the first problem of coordination is to ensure that there
are adequate staff facilities to help exercise the necessary authority. Coordi-
nation must be achieved by providing the administrator with competent
assistance. Wherever there are important subjects of common interest to
different operating agencies or units; wherever their fields of activities tend
to duplicate or overlap; wherever it is necessary to have common problems
of operating units handled on a common basis — in all such situations a
coordinating staff is needed.

On the other hand, staff coordination may develop difficulties. Staff
works in the name of the administrator, but the operating official may still
go to the boss and protest what may look to him like direct staff instruc-
tions. A large organization may have many staff facilities, thus increasing
the number of subordinates reporting to the administrator. As operating
agencies multiply and perform increased work, there is often a tendency
to enlarge the staff of the administrator at the same time. The result may
be confusion arising from a desire by the staff to assume more and more
operating authority; another result may be congestion or overcrowding
at the top.

Integration. Integration offers a possible solution for situations like
these. Integration means the combination of operating units under an addi-
tional administrative official interposed between them and the top adminis-
trator. The interposed individual is not a staff officer but a line adminis-
trator. He commands the group of combined units, and thereby reduces the
number of operating officials reporting to the top man.

An example of coordination proceeding toward integration is afforded
by housing experience during World War II. Prior to the war, there were
a Federal Housing Administration and a Federal Home Loan Bank Board
in the Federal Loan Agency, and a United States Housing Authority in the
Federal Works Agency. The need for handling the urban housing problem
on a uniform basis during the defense period led the President to create,
by Executive Order No. 8632 of January 11, 1941, a Division of Defense
Housing Coordination in the Office for Emergency Management, part of

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 153

his Executive Office. This was a move in the direction of coordinating
housing programs by setting up a staff officer in the housing field, with the
President as the direct head over the Federal Loan Agency and the
Federal Works Agency. When, for various reasons, this effort did not
succeed, the President, by Executive Order No. 9070 of February 24, 1942,
established under his war powers the National Housing Agency. Into
the new agency went as its three component parts a Federal Public Hous-
ing Authority (formerly the USHA), the Federal Housing Administration,
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The President now had one
man to look to in the housing field — the administrator of the National
Housing Agency. Previously he had had to deal with three — his staff
officer on housing and the heads of the Federal Works and Loan Agencies.11
Coordination can be achieved through staff planning and supervision.
Integration is the means for reducing the structural diversity of too elabo-
rate an organization, or for lightening the burden on a central staff. In
effect, integration introduces a new level in the organizational hierarchy —
a new level of coordinating authority. The added line administrator will be
able directly to iron out difficulties between subordinate units. Fewer issues
will then require coordination at the next higher level. Integration is the
organizational device which will cut down a top administrator's load. Co-
ordination simply sees to it that he performs his role and carries his load.

4. GUIDING RULES OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

"Need for Standards of Organization. There have been attempts from
time to time to formulate guides or standards of organization. While our dis-
cussion has briefly outlined the major problems in organization, it has pro-
vided no answers for those with organizing responsibility. The need for
some positive guidance to administrators in fixing organizational structure
has often been felt. This in turn has led various students to set up standards
of what is assumed to be good organization.

11 There is a great deal of literature about general problems of organization. The follow-
ing are listed as a few of the major contributions to the subject: Gulick and Urwick, op. cit.
in note 1; Gaus, John M. and Others, The Frontiers of Public Administration, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1936; Willoughby, op. cit. in note 2; Snrth, Edgar W., "Relation
of Organization to Management," in the symposium entitled Administrative Management,
p. 53 ff., Washington: United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School, 1938; and
Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government, Preliminary
Report, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1937. Cf. also Hopf, Harry A., "Administrative
Coordination," in Morstcin Marx, Fritz, cd., Public Management in the N'tv Democracy,
p. 83 ff., New York: Harper, 1940; Urwick, L., The Elements of Administration, New York:
Harper, 1943; Dimock, Marshall E., The Executive in Action, New York: Harper, 1945; and
Hopf, Harry A., "Soundings in the Literature of Management," Advanced Management, 1945,
Vol. 10, p. 93 ff.

Among the many books about organization of private enterprise, see Mooney, James D.
and Reiley, Alan C., The Principles of Organization, New York: Harper, 1939, and Holden,
Paul E., Fish, Lounsbury S. and Smith, Hubert L., Top Management Organization and Con-
trol, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941.

154

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

Necessarily these standards have been general in terms; they have sug-
gested pitfalls to avoid as much as positive action to take. Three of these
efforts at stating enduring guideposts of organization are summarized in
comparative tabular form below. The selection may be regarded as repre-
sentative of all efforts to formulate organizational standards.

ENSURING SOUND ORGANIZATION

1. Definite and clean-cut
responsibilities should
be assigned to each
executive.

2. Responsibility should
always be coupled with
corresponding author-
ity.

3. No change should be
made in the scope or
responsibilities of a
position without a
definite understanding
to that effect on the
part of all concerned.

4. No executive or em-
ployee, occupying a
single position in the
organization, should
be subject to definite
orders from more than
one source.

5. , Orders should never
be given to subordi-
nates over the head of
a responsible executive.
Rather than do this
the officer in question
should be supplanted.

II**

1. Definite responsibil-
ity and authority
should be estab-
lished for all posi-
tions.

(a) Authority must be
commensurate with
responsibility.

2. Organization of the
department should
be clearly defined.
. . . Organization is
an ever - changing
vehicle of manage-
ment and thus
must be molded
through the use of
executive orders,
bulletins, office
memoranda, and
. . . frequent staff
and individual con-
ferences.

3. The leadership of
the department as a
whole and of each
of its line subdivi-
sions should be sin-
gle and direct.

Ill***

1. Definite and clean-
cut responsibilities
should be assigned
to each employee,
particularly the key
employees.

2. Responsibility must
be accompanied by
reasonably complete
authority.

3. No employee, oc-
cupying a single
position in an or-
ganization, should
be subject to defi-
nite orders from
more than one per-
son.

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION

155

ENSURING SOUND ORGANIZATION — Continued

II** III***

6. Criticisms of subordi-
nates should, whenever
possible, be made pri-
vately, and in no case
should a subordinate
be criticized in the
presence of executives
or employees of equal
or lower rank.

7. No dispute or differ-
ence between execu-
tives or employees as
to authority or respon-
sibilities should be
considered too trivial
for prompt and careful
adjudication.

8. Promotions, wage
changes, and discipli-
nary action should al-
ways be approved by
the executive immedi-
ately superior to the
one directly responsi-
ble.

9. No executive or em-
ployee should ever be
required, or expected',
to be at the same time
an assistant to, and
critic of, another.

10. Any executive whose
work is subject to reg-
ular inspection should',
whenever practicable,
be given the assistance
and facilities necessary
to enable him to main-
tain an independent
check of the quality of
his work.

4. The director of the
department and
each division chief
should be assisted
in their administra-
tive responsibilities
by the management
and staff activities
under their author-
ity.

5. No administrator of
a department or di-
vision should have
reporting to him
more persons than
he can adequately
supervise.

Wherever possible,
an independent
check of an em-
ployee's work
should be made
and the results of
the check should be
made available to
the employee in as
helpful a manner
as possible.
Not more than
three to six em-
ployees who are
charged with im-
portant and varied
responsibilities
should be subject
to the direct orders
of the same man.

156

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION
ENSURING SOUND ORGANIZATION — Continued

I* II** III***

6. Veto power must
be given only to
persons who are
charged with re-
sponsibility for the
results of their
vetoes.

6. The main subdivi-
sions of the depart-
ment should be
based upon an
analysis of the ac-
tivities carried on,
with all activities
which are alike in
scope or technique,
or which require a
similar type of su-
pervision, grouped
together.

7. Positions should be
determined insofar
as possible irrespec-
tive of individuals,
on the basis of the
various classes of
work to be per-
formed.

8. Coordination of the
work and personnel
of the several ma-
jor divisions of the
department should
be the primary con-
cern of the depart-
ment director.

*"Tcn Commandments of Good Organization," prepared by the American Management
Association and quoted in Public Administration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, p. 80, note 1.

**From Stone, Donald C., The Management of Municipal Public Worths, pp. 7-8, Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1939 (by permission of the publisher).

*** Principles developed by the Surplus Marketing Administration and reported by
Allsetter, W. R., in Public Administration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, p. 80 ff. (by permission
of the editor).

Summary. Our working concepts of organization are founded on gen-
eral observations which have crystallized from experience. Four primary
bases are in common use for dividing up operating responsibilities. It is of
practical value to recognize the differences between line and staff, between

WORKING CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATION 157

the operating work which accomplishes the end-purpose of administrative
effort and the work that is done to keep the organization fit for effective
action. The operating job is broken down into various levels of supervision.
This is the foundation of hierarchy. Ideally, we want a single line of author-
ity throughout the hierarchy; that is, we want unity of command. How-
ever, the concept of unity of command must allow for a distinction between
technical supervision and administrative supervision since the one is con-
cerned with specialized professional work and the other with general
efficiency and performance. Coordination is necessary among operating
units, but when the coordinating burden becomes large, a new level of
supervision may be introduced through integration.

Generalizations about organization must be modified because of per-
sonality factors and because of peculiar circumstances of time and place.
There are no final answers to all organizational problems, even though we
do have signposts for our guidance in applying the working concepts of
organization.

Management is common to all public enterprise, whether the ultimate
product is flood control, military defense, or collection of taxes. That is
why the general body of public administration as a field of knowledge
deals with common problems. These make up the realm of interchangeable
experience in public administration. At the same time, we should never
forget that we are talking only about ways and means, about techniques
and processes. It is the administrative end-product that is of first impor-
tance. Our deeper concern is with organizing to achieve that end-product
for the benefit of the community, with the least depletion of available
resources.

CHAPTER

The Chief Executive

1. DUAL FUNCTION: POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

Means and Ends.CAt its highest reach, administrative management is
so closely intertwined with leadership in policy development that in most
governmental jurisdictions and in nearly all private organizations both
functions are intentionally lodged in the same top man. This is the central
fact setting off the position of the chief executive from those of all lesser
administrative officers, whether they be called executives, administrators,
managers, or by some other title. It is our purpose in the present chapter
to describe and analyze this most important of all offices in public adminis-
tration by focusing on five basic aspects: the duality of the executive's
functions; leadership and authority; external relationships; the tools needed
for effective control; and the arms of modern management.

The justification for studying administration apart from other phases of
government rests, as we saw earlier, on the possibility and the utility of
distinguishing between political ends and administrative means. Of course,
acceptance of the validity of this distinction in no way denies the fact that
there are higher and lower levels of administration and of policy. Nor does
it place in doubt the necessity for differing degrees of initiative and discre-
tion to be exercised throughout the entire range of political power and
administrative authority.

Lesser ends are themselves means toward greater ends, and higher
means are intermediate ends reached by lower means. The need for deci-
sion is everywhere the same, and, wherever a decision must be made, there
in one sense both a question of policy and a question of administration
have to be decided. If for intellectual convenience we abstract from the
general context sometimes the one, sometimes the other, life remains none
the less tangled and connected. Yet schemes and symbols of analysis have
great value if their limitations are borne in mind.

(j[f the accent be on policy — that is, on ends — we may, for instance, observe
that even where major policy decisions are made by individuals holding

158

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 159

political responsibility, minor policy decisions will still be left to administra-
tive officers. Does this mean that the distinction between politics and
administration is faulty? Not at all. It merely recognizes that below the
plane of political policy-determination lie other planes — planes of adminis-
trative policy—on which also questions of alternative courses of action have
to be decided. Conversely, if the accent be on means — that is, on alterna-
tives of administration— we should acknowledge that above the issues of
administrative machinery and procedure lie issues of political ways and
means. Administrative preferences therefore may have to yield to neces-
sities of politics. <^Political politics" and "administrative administration"
give only the broad outlines of the picture of government; the full portrait
calls for the lights and shadings of administrative politics and political
management.)

In the whole realm of government perhaps no one appreciates the
truth — or the importance — of this proposition so much as the chief execu-
tive. The President of the United States, the governors of New York,
Pennsylvania, and California, and the mayors of New York City, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Detroit, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Boston, as responsible
heads of the executive branch in our largest governmental jurisdictions, fur-
nish outstanding illustrations of the range and complexity of the responsi-
bilities inherent in this office. Yet abilities of the same kind if not of the
same order are needed at the helm of every sizable administrative establish-
ment whatever the governmental level — in the governorship of each state,
in the mayoralty of every urban community, in the top office of scores of
thousands of other units of local government, and also in the direction of
all large administrative departments.

Separation of Political Leadership and Administration. Before proceed-
ing into an analysis of the chief executive in his typical role, let us examine
briefly several types of situations in which the responsibilities of policy devel-
opment and administrative direction are assigned to different officials rather
than concentrated in a single individual. Turning first to instances of such
separation outside government, we may note the common practice among
business corporations of vesting responsibility for corporate policy in a board
of directors headed by a chairman and delegating corporate management to
a president or general manager.

Election as chairman of the board expresses recognition of demonstrated
initiative and intelligence in policy leadership. Elevation to this position
signifies above everything else the primacy of company policy. While the
president or general manager may also be a director, his first duty is the
effective execution of whatever policies the board may adopt. Nor are busi-
ness corporations the only organizations employing such a division of basic
responsibilities. The way the presidents of many private colleges and uni-
versities, and other nongovernmental institutions and associations as well,

160 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

stand inflation, to the chairmen of their boards of trustees or regents fol-
lows the same pattern.

There are fewer clear examples of such separation within govern-
ment. Perhaps the most striking illustration is furnished by municipal
organization under what ought to be called for the sake of completeness the
mayor-council-manager plan. The theory behind this soundest of all forms
of municipal government is perfectly plain. Policy leadership is the respon-
sibility of the council, and particularly of its chairman, the mayor — whether
he be chosen by the council or elected by the voters. The city manager's job
is confined to advising with the mayor and council on matters requiring
their decision, and administering the work program which they adopt.

Other examples may be found in the field of public education. Insofar
as underlying theory is concerned — and the facts themselves are more or
less in line with it — the relations between local boards of education and
their superintendents of schools are like those prevailing under the council-
manager plan. The same applies to the relations between state boards of
education and the presidents, chancellors, and provosts of state colleges
and universities.

One other situation remains to be mentioned in the same context. In
the more recent past not a few governmental agencies — national, state, and
local — have found it productive of good administration within their own
organizations to distinguish consciously between policy concerns and man-
agement responsibilities. Commenting on the general necessity for "a com-
mon focus for management facilities either in an administratively minded
department head or in a general administrator working in close association
with the policy leadership of the agency," Donald C. Stone in 1943 of-
fered this brief summary of specific though tentative develoments in the
federal government:1

A few years ago observers thought they saw in a few departments
the beginnings of general managership positions which could meet this
need, but the development has not continued. Recently there has been
some experience with trying to solve the management problem by ap-
pointing career administrators to assistant secretaryships or undersecre-
taryships of departments, positions traditionally occupied by political
appointees. There is not yet a consensus on the best solution.

(^Separation of responsibilities for policy initiative and general manage-
ment presents obvious practical advantages on appropriate levels of action.
There is something to be said for the view that further advancement in
public administration depends in some measure on the possibility of a more
extensive employment of the formula behind it. Yet in all the cases here

1 See his report entitled "Federal Administrative Management, 1932-1942," Transactions
of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1943, Vol. 65, p. 242 ff. The question of
providing for a general manager or business manager in the departmental framework has
nothing to do, of course, with the distinction between staff and line. See above Ch. 7, "Work-
ing Concepts of Organization," sec. 2, "Line and Staff."

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 16 1

cited the distinction between political head and administrative manager
is sharper in name than it is in fact.(jThe separation of these roles is suc-
cessful only where the relationships between the officials are characterized
by mutual confidence— confidence sustained through frequent conference
and counsel. V The practical working arrangements between the two will
vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.LTheir net result in every
case should be such a modification of the functional separation as to pro-
duce, in Bagehot's phrase, an "intimate detachment" between the two officers'
— like that between the British minister and his permanent undersecretary/

Combination of Political Leadership and Administration. Having
acknowledged the fact of instances of bifurcation even in government, we
may return to the general rule: combination of policy initiative and top
management in a single official known as the chief executive, who is sub-
ject to legislative control. This is the principal clue to the nature of the
office of President — and, on their own planes, the offices of governor and
mayor. Each serves simultaneously as political leader and administrative
chief. The powers and prerogatives of their offices may be inadequate to
the double task; yet they are supposed to be effective in both capacities. As
for the handicaps under which they may have to labor, they are expected
to surmount them or contrive to reduce their ill effects.

Every one of our presidents since John Adams has realized that no one
could hope to be a successful leader of national policy if he did not first
succeed in being the effective leader of his own political party. On the
administrative side, nearly every president — at least since Theodore Roose-
velt—has shown himself aware of the need for better managerial arrange-
ments to facilitate executive leadership and has tried to obtain such
arrangements.

In the states and cities, developments have been been roughly parallel.
Governors and mayors have long recognized the indispensability of organ-
ized support among the voters in order to be influential in making or
changing public policy. Generally speaking, however, it has only been
since the first practical tests in 1917 of state administrative reorganiza-
tion that governors have begun to be comparably effective as administrative
chiefs. Even now, nearly half of the states are still substantially untouched
by this movement.2 As for mayoral chief executives, in most cases they
are unable to measure up to the expectations held for them as adminis-
trators until the municipality has revised its charter with the intent of
adopting the so-called strong-mayor form of city government. Many Ameri-
can cities, particularly those with larger populations, have effected such re-
visions. However, there remain hundreds upon hundreds of communities

2 Lipson, Leslie M., The American State Governor: From Figurehead to Leader, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1939, probably provides the best summary and analysis of the
position of the governor as chief executive currently available.

L62 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

where the lot of the municipal executive as administrative head is not a

lappy one.3

2. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY

Cloa\ of Legal Power. Patently, the position of chief executive em-
)odies tremendous responsibility and authority. (However, no man who
jains this high place is likely to achieve more than indifferent success unless
ic conceives his job first of all in terms of opportunity for lasting accomplish-
nent.y That is the mark of the great chief executive in democratic gov-
ernment: he looks upon his office as giving him for his term the noblest
assignment within the power of the people — the privilege of making his
e^ership effective in action designed to promote the general welfare.
/vThe greatest of American presidents and governors and mayors have
lever been content to do only what they had to dpjjNor have they relied
jpon their legal authority alone to win their ends/ Although not unwilling
:o use authority when obliged to do so, they Have always had clear ideas
about the uses to which the power of government should be put, and have
^referred to gain their ends through leadership rather than through im-
)osition of constitutional sanctions.

( Every public office requires a legal definition of its competence. Such
definitions have their merits. They are valuable for establishing fields of
recognized jurisdiction among various officers. They are also indispensable
n enabling the courts to decide cases involving on the one hand the duty
:>r discretion of an administrative official and on the other the right of a
>rivate citizen. Yet it is clear that at the top of the administrative hier-
irchy such legal delineations, though not unnecessary, are in themselves
nsufficient to raise an official to the stature of a chief executive. Clothes
do not make the man; neither do the vestments of power make a president.
Legal authority a chief executive must have. However, unless it is in
effect a confirmation of leadership accepted or emerging, the chances are
:hat it will profit him very little.^

Constitutions and charters invest a chief executive with the legal com-
setence to recommend and veto legislation, appoint and dismiss subor-
dinate officials, orepare and — upon legislative approval — execute budgets,
represent the government at all manner of official functions, and direct
:he entire executive establishment. The placement of these several powers
in his hands is obviously essential to the performance of his main duties,
but it is far from being all that is essential. Legal powers are, so to speak,
the executive's bones. Flesh and blood, mind and spirit, he must supply
bimself.

Personal Qualifications. One of the things of mind and spirit the execu-

3 For sound treatments of the executive function in city government, see Story, Russell M.,
The American Municipal Executive, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1918, and Reed, Thomas H.,
Municipal Management, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 163

tive must bring to his job is strength and balance of personality. ^Without
the deeper authority latent in this resource the prospect of his developing
vital relationships will be almost nil, in administration as well as in politics.
For an administrative head, it is one thing to have the legal right to com-
mand; it is something quite different to have effective direction over an
executive organization. The former is a matter of formal power. The
latter is largely a matter of appeal and influence. It requires, first of all,
evidence ofjnterest, intelligence, and energy. Unless there be about the
executive a single-minde'dness which will enable him to generate and sus-
:ain a general concern for the fulfillment of the goals of his program, he
cannot hope to assert the authority that signifies the true leader. If he
does not care, no one will care; there will be no program. / Let him beware
at all times of being content merely to sit in the executive's chair; his job
consists not of being but of doing.* Only if he demonstrates by continuous
interest that he has made the aims of the total enterprise his very own
concern will he stand out as head of the organization.

Basic intelligence — as contrasted with great learning — is so indispen-
sable that nothing more is needed here than the merest mention of it
No man willingly takes suggestions — much less orders — from someone
who is plainly "hard of thinking," regardless of how eminent or exalted
his position. (The hardness may stem from deficiency of brain power or
From set bias or from infirmity of age; it makes no difference) There is
no substitute for the ability to think.\x

Energy is another prime necessity. He could never be more than a
lominal executive who, though showing steady interest and intelligence,
kvas devoid of physical and nervous vigor. It is not surprising that presi-
dents, premiers, and other top executives find their tasks a heavy drain
upon their energies. .-'That is an inescapable aspect of their work. There is
a point to the argument that a man's age and vigor have a direct bearing
on his fitness for high executive office. Exceptions can be justified by ex-
:eptional facts, but, as a general rule, no one should be asked or expected to
undertake arduous executive responsibilities in his declining years. Especi-
illy in the American presidency, the risks to the public welfare are too
great in an era when government must play so positive^a role in support
Df the social order.%>)

These qualities are fundamental to strength of personality. (JBut they
must also be in balance. )Unless the individual's traits are so combined
that they will enable him to win and hold the devotion of other men, he
has little chance of meeting the demands made on the executive office.
Others must be able to feel that they know him and can trust him, be-
cause he is regarded as the captain of their team. (President Franklin D.
Roosevelt epitomized the right point of view at his first inaugural: "For
the trust reposed in me I will return the courage and the devotion that
befit the time. I can do no less. . . . The people of the United States . . .

164 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

have made me the present instrument of their wishes. In the spirit of the
gift I take it/0

Marf( of Leadership. More specifically, an executive must have that
quality about his whole personality which enables him, without sacrificing
integrity of purpose, to lubricate human relationships* \It is this influence
that prompts men to prefer action based on their big agreements to endless
argument over their little differences.) It is this influence that induces them
to retain their enthusiasm for a general program even after it has become
clear that they are not going to be able to "have things exactly their own
way.'* | The chief executive can have high self-confidence, but only if his
identification with the entire administrative undertaking is so complete
that those around him will take his sureness as proof of a conviction that
"Together we can and will do it!" Probably General Eisenhower rose to
as nearly perfect an identity of individuality and program during the war in
Europe as has been reached by any great executive in recent years. The
seal of that perfection lay in his being even more ready to take the blame
when things went wrong than to accept the glory when victory crowned
the efforts of his soldiers and his staff. To be truly effective, says Urwick
in his Elements of Administration,4 "command must represent a common
objective." Whether or not it achieves this depends primarily upon the
spirit that emanates from the commander's personality.

Someone has defined leadership as the ability to make other men "feel
two inches higher." The observation applies to administrative leadership
as much as to any other kind. The greatest executives are always marked
by a generosity of attitude toward those under them, by a willingness to
overstate rather than understate their subordinates' accomplishments, par-
ticularly when it comes to the assessment of credits and honors. The toast
which Joseph Stalin offered at the victory celebration in the Kremlin on
June 25, 1945, for example, affords some insight into the executive qualities
of this leader:5

(Do not expect me to say anything extraordinary. I have a most simple
and ordinary toast to propose.

I should like to drink the health of the people of whom few hold ranks
and whose titles are not envied, people who are considered to be cogs
in the wheels of the great State apparatus, but without whom all of us
— marshals, front and army commanders — are, to put it crudely, not
worth a tinker's damn. One of the cogs goes out of commission — and
the whole thing is done for.

I propose a toast for simple, ordinary, modest people, for those cogs
who keep our great State machine going in all the branches of science,
national economy and military affairs. There are very many of them,
their name is legion — they are tens of millions of people.

They are modest people. Nobody writes anything about them. They

4 Urwick, Lyndall, The Elements of Administration, p. 80, New York: Harper, 1943.

5 Information Bulletin, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington,
July 12, 1945.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 165

have no titles and few of them hold ranks. But they are the people who
support us, as the base supports the summit.

I drink to the health of these people— our respected comrades.

One other basic element iri administrative leadership remains to be
mentioned. It is the most important of all.) That is the talent for ideas,
the ability to conceive solutions to current political, economic, and social
problems which the public will approve, or, at the least, can be persuaded
to accept. In the final analysis, a chief executive succeeds or fails in terms
of the substantive policies he espouses — and if he espouses none he is not a
chief executive. No matter what other qualifications a man may possess,
if he lacks the capacity for initiating concrete proposals to meet the urgent
issues of his day, he has no warrant for seeking or accepting executive
office. Nor is he likely to gain such office if he has to win his way in an
election against someone who does have positive ideas to offer.

Political and Administrative Talent. Anybody can rant about the need
for efficiency and economy in government. Every normally articulate ad-
ministrator inveighs against unnecessary overlapping and duplication. No
ordinarily alert official has yet been found who has denied the need for
coordination and cooperation among governmental agencies. But these are
not policy issues.^ They are standards, and they are universally accepted.
Up to now no Democrat has been caught alive who would admit that a
Republican could be more firmly attached to such standards than he —
or vice versa. And none ever will.

With respect to public policies, however, the situation is wholly different.
Whether a chief executive is concerned about social issues and willing to
take a stand on proposals for their solution is something the electorate can
easily find out. It is impossible for him to get by with pretense or evasion,
except temporarily. A man aspiring to elective executive office must be
•prepared to disparage the claims of the opposition candidate — and there may
be times when this alone will "put him in." However, the fundamental
thing the people want to know is not what the incumbent has done wrong
but how the contender would do things differently.

In a purely administrative or managerial position, commitment to such
goals as "economy and efficiency" is all that can be expected. Such rather
mechanical or mathematical virtues plus platform technique do not suffice
to make a president or a governor. Nor can a chief executive worthy of
the name be produced by synthetic composition—so much political leader-
ship and so much executive ability. The assumption may have done him
an injustice, but Thomas Dewey was handicapped in the 1944 presidential
race by the suspicion, widely entertained, that he was not a "natural." Few
of his critics could deny that he appeared to have made a good record "as
an administrator," yet they were able to persuade many voters that, even
though he was efficient, at any rate he was "nothing more." Be this as it
mavJ the fact remains: over and above administrative capacity a chief

166 1KB CHIEF EXECUTIVE

executive must possess talent for political leadership. If he has the latter
in abundance it may compensate for deficiencies in the former because
soundness of policy generally eases administrative tasks. ff*he rule does
not apply with equal force in reverse, however, because there is no substi-
tute for enlightened vision.)

American Presidents. From Washington to Truman, the American
presidency illustrates considerably varying types of executive leadership.
Among the thirty-two men who have occupied the position, several stand
out as administrative heads of extraordinary talent. Washington's signal
success in launching the new government is traceable to his ability to take
ideas from both Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian sources, weld them into a
single program, and then enlist the aid of both factions in its execution
The inferior of both Hamilton and Jefferson in originating plans and pro-
posals, he was their superior in devising combinations of policy on which
it was possible to reach agreement for action. What made Washington's
leadership acceptable and effective, however, was not simply his intelli-
gence at finding high common denominators. There were also his known
competence in management and his proven personal disinterestedness. The
secret of his achievement as President did not lie, of course, in the legal
authority with which he was endowed by virtue of Article II of the Con-
stitution. It lay in the confidence the public had learned to put in him be-
cause of the character of his leadership— displayed first in the crisis of the
Revolution and later in the Critical Period.

In analyzing the reasons for Jefferson's high stature as President, we are
tempted to wonder what kind of record his rival Hamilton would have
made had he been elected. The answer is suggested by saying that Hamil-
ton could hardly have been elected: with all his brilliance he had too little
gift for compromise. An executive he could have been — and indeed a very
great executive he was — but not a chief executive, sensitive to working re-
lationships. Jefferson did not begin to equal Hamilton in sheer admin-
istrative skill, but in the realm of political thinking he had a clear advantage
over the scintillating New Yorker, especially when we consider the nascent
democracy in which they were mutual contenders for popular support. The
fact is that among all our chief executives probably none accomplished so
much with such slight administrative wherewithal as Jefferson. His presi-
dency proves as does no other the truth that insofar as the highest office
in American government is concerned, political ingenuity carries greater
weight than administrative talent.

President Jackson exhibited a type of executive personality profoundly
different from that of any of his predecessors, and quite at variance, too,
with that of any occupant of the White House since. Considering himself
the spokesman of the hitherto more or less unenfranchised common man,
and particularly of the rising West, he took office with the conviction that
he had a mandate from the electorate to restore the government to the

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 167

people. To him, this entailed beating back the growing concentration of
financial power in private hands, and preserving and strengthening the
Union against all hazards. In his view, a president would be guilty of
dereliction of duty if he held himself under no higher obligation than to
furnish Congress with information on the state of the Union and admin-
ister such laws as the legislature might adopt. He saw with exceptional
clarity that under the American Constitution effective government de-
pends mainly upon the chief executive. If he failed to offer positive
leadership, no one else could substitute for him.

Lincoln's genius, like Jefferson's, lay far more in the political than in
the administrative realm. Where other men, abler and more experienced
in governmental management, lost their heads and embraced proposals
which could not possibly have united the nation, he devised a policy at
once moderate, positive, and capable of evoking enthusiastic popular sup-
port: the limitation of slavery to those areas where it already existed and
the preservation of the Union. His championship of these policies, attended
as it was by unfailing steadiness, humility, and magnanimity, earned for him
his preeminent rank among the men who have occupied the presidency.

Creative Policy Versus Sound Administration. Time lends a perspective
to our comments on the administrations of Washington, Jefferson, Jackson,
and Lincoln which we shall lack for years to come in the case of those
who have lived in the White House more recently. It is impossible to ap-
praise with equal accuracy the capacities and accomplishments of Cleveland,
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Yet there is
one thing that can be said of these later presidents quite as safely as of the
earlier ones. They were distinguished far more for socially creative policy
than for economically efficient administration.6

Nor does the rule work only one way. The national chief executives
who are least well remembered are precisely those who lacked the impulse
or the capacity to be imagiaative about their office. They tended to look
upon their powers in narrowly legal terms or seemed unable to conceive
of any higher public service than that of reducing the tax rate. Buchanan,
Grant, McKinley, Harding, and Coolidge rank among the lesser lights of
the White House for one and the same reason. Since they pursued no dis-

6 For broad verification of the theses presented in the text, see Corwin, Edward S., The
President: Office and Powers, New York: New York University Press, 1940; Laski, Harold J.,
The American Presidency. New York: Harper, 1940; Milton, George Fort, The Use of Presi-
dential Power, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1944.

The literature of business administration is voluminous. For an analysis of the more
important qualifications and functions of top corporation executives, see Clccton, Glenn W.
and Mason, Charles W., Executive Ability: Its Discovery and Development, Yellow Springs:
Antioch Press, 1934; Tead, Ordway, Human Nature and Management, New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1938; Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1938; Mooney, James D. and Rciley, Alan C., The Principles of Organization
New York: Harper, 1939.

168 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

tinctive public policies, the nation has not been much interested in the
economy or efficiency they achieved in their administrations.

Business Leaders. What has been said about the test of success for the
chief executives of our national government is also borne out in the records
of American business leadership. These leaders, too, must rely on their
influence upon others rather than on formal authority if they are to rise
to the heights. By the nature of things, to a greater degree than in gov-
ernment, the policies of commercial enterprise, in the sense of final or basic
goals, are set forth in advance. The objective of business executives is to
make money through well-planned and efficient production and sale of
goods or services. The more money they can make for their company,
the greater their reward. The policy problem does not assume for them the
proportions it necessarily does in the case of governmental chief executives.
With this significant qualification, the conditions for executive success in
both government and business are much the same.

John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, James J. Hill, Owen D. Young,
Walter S. Gifford, and Alfred P. Sloan became great business executives
because they were first leaders of men. The secret of their authority among
their associates and subordinates lay in the continuous demonstration of
their superiority in intelligence, in imagination, in shrewdness, in daring,
and in personal magnetism — the very qualities recognized by their col-
laborators as most essential at the highest rung of the executive ladder.
True enough, volume of stock ownership, family relationship, and per-
sonal friendship all have a bearing on the selection of top officials in business
corporations. However, at least among the larger firms, the basic criterion
is usually capacity for leadership. Responsibility is likely to come to those
who are most ready and anxious to accept it.

Governors and Mayors. It is to be expected that the relationship be-
tween authority and leadership in the case of state and municipal chief
executives corresponds very closely with our findings about the presidency.
The great governors have been the champions of the general welfare in
response to the vital issues of their day; they have earned less acclaim as
efficient administrators of established programs. It does not alter the gen-
eral fact to acknowledge that in some cases their most singular achievement
has been to raise the whole tone and level of public administration for the
promotion of particular policies. This has often been the necessary pre-
requisite to an attack upon emerging problems of substantive policy.

LaFollette of Wisconsin, Smith, Roosevelt, and Lehman of New York,
Olson and Stassen of Minnesota, Winant of New Hampshire, Murphy of
Michigan, Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Arnall of Georgia, Warren of Cali-
fornia— these may or may not be the greatest governors to have held office
in our day. But they are among the elect. And in every instance, their

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 169

reputation has turned on political leadership rather than on administrative

attainment.7

Generally speaking, policy issues on the municipal level hold rela-
tively less importance than on the state level — and considerably less
.han on the national plane. Despite this fact, the prestige of a municipal
^hief executive still depends mainly on the kind of program he sponsors
and the dynamic qualities of his personality.8 LaGuardia in New York
City, Hoan in Milwaukee, Seasongood in Cincinnati, Maverick in San
Antonio, Wyatt in Louisville, and Lausche in Cleveland — none of these
distinguished mayors has contented himself with being merely a faithful
steward of "things as he found them." On the contrary, all have carried
forward new programs supplementing or supplanting the old — programs
that held the promise of making for better community life rather than
merely more efficient administration.9

3. EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

The chief executive's relations with individuals and groups outside the
executive branch are bound to absorb much of his time and energy regard-
less of whether the form of government be presidential or parliamentary.
However, given the separation of powers and the traditions attendant upon
it in the United States, such external relations can hardly fail to be of
the keenest and most continupys concern to the head of the administrative
machinery of government. Within the governmental framework itself his
responsibilities are three. He must establish and maintain good relations
with the legislature, with the judiciary, and — depending upon the circum-
stances— with other chief executives. It will be useful to look at each ot
these separately.

Relations with the Judiciary. Ordinarily, executive-judicial relationships
are not especially problematical. Assuming that the measures a chief execu-
tive has in mind to propose for legislative action do not raise issues of
constitutionality in terms of court precedents and general judicial disposi-
tion, he should have little difficulty in living in peace with the judiciary.
Prudent use of his power of appointment will pay dividends, even though

7 See the pointed exchange of views "On Governors" between Leonard D. White and
Frank Bane in Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p. 68 ff.f 153 ff.

8 There are those who argue that the policy element in city — and even in state — govern-
ment is not large enough to sustain by itself partisan elections. Suffice it to observe that, even
after allowing for some diminution on the local level as compared with the two higher levels,
there is enough policy substance remaining to make the reputation of municipal chief executives
turn chiefly upon what they stand for in politics.

9 We can gain a good understanding of the qualities needed in the mayoralty from such
volumes as these: Rankin, Rebecca, ed., New Yor% Advancing, New York: Municipal Refer-
ence Library, 1945; Hoan, Daniel W., City Government, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1936; Merriam, Charles E., Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics, New York:
Macmillan, 1929; Whitlock. Brand, Forty Years of It, New York: Appleton, rev. cd., 1925.

170 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

in the federal government opportunity for nomination? is controlled by
death, retirement, or resignation from the bench.

However, as the epic battle in 1937 between the Supreme Court and
Franklin D. Roosevelt demonstrated, a "strong man" in the presidency
is apt not only to bring forward new ideas and programs but also for this
very reason to run up against the latent conservatism of the judiciary. In
such a situation, matters do not simply resolve themselves through the
President's appointive power, because vacancies on the bench may be slow
to occur. There is, in fact, no readily available constitutional mechanism
for attaining constructive adjustment under these conditions. The only
remedy lies in the President's hold on popular support. Not even the
Supreme Court can afford to stand between a resourceful national leader
and the majority of the people.

Relations with the Legislature. In his relations with the legislature, the
chief executive faces a different situation. Both the legislative and executive
branches have political functions to perform. Unless they see generally
eye to eye with each other on the need for public action, government may
simply have to mark time. And not merely that. Through its power of
sanction over policy proposals requiring statutory enactment, its control over
liie public purse, and its confirmation of major appointments by the upper
chamber, the legislature can do much to facilitate or obstruct day-by-day
administration. What this adds up to is that presidents, governors, and
mayors must get along with their legislative assemblies not just occasionally
but continuously. This is true despite the fact that, by proclaiming the
separation and independence of powers, the Constitution, together with the
general tradition born of it, encourages each branch of government to be
constantly sensitive about the recognition of its prerogatives and its
coordinate position.

The prospect of effective government under these circumstances depends
upon several considerations, each of which the chief executive must exploit
to full advantage. In the first place, he can capitalize on the fact that in the
United States, notwithstanding the forces of pressure politics, there is a
wide consensus on the principle of the priority of the publig_jKelfare over
private interests. Thus he is able to frame and present his proposals for
national measures in terms of that consensus. Secondly, by virtue of his
role as the leader of his party, he can appeal in the name of the party and
its platform for support of his program from all members of the party in
the legislative branch. In the third place, he has opportunities to demon-
strate the depth and sincerity of his desire for cooperation with the legislature
by showing at all times a generous respect for its high place in the grand
scheme of democracy, and by collaborating with its leaders to create chan-
nels and arrangements for full and frequent consultation on matters of
mutual concern. Lastly, he can try, in a manner designed to avoid the
appearance of organizing pressure, to use the public interest attaching to

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 171

his office for generating among the people a climate of opinion that will
dispose both branches of government toward a common approach to the
solution of the problems of the day. We may think of "fireside chats"
broadcast nationally, press conferences, and the like. We should think also
of much hard bargaining behind the scenes.

Agency Contacts with Legislators. It may be noted in this connection
that every major administrative agency has its own contacts with the legis-
lature. These relations, typically with a legislative committee or individual
members, inevitably have a bearing on the way in which the chief execu-
tive gets along with the legislative assembly as a whole. Indeed, in the
national government the impact of agency-congressional relationships upon
the President's success in redeeming his campaign pledges and giving effect
to his program is considerable. Alert courtesies extended by administrative
agencies to Senators and Representatives, including prompt supply of tech-
nical information and special attention to the needs of particular con-
stituents, can do much to create a general good will on the part of the
Congress toward "the Administration."

On the other hand, these relations may have another aspect, and one
grimly detrimental from the President's standpoint. Agency officials have
sometimes been known to form understandings with members of Congress
that almost amount to defensive alliances against the fulfillment of certain
portions of the chief executive's program. Obviously no president can be
indifferent to the evils of such a situation. Yet he may not be in a position
to correct it with ease. For if the uncooperative agency official has strong
backing "on the Hill" or from organized groups having the ear of influential
elements in the legislature, he becomes virtually untouchable. The chief
executive's only recourse is to try to outmaneuver or isolate the insubordi-
nate subordinate. To this extent, administrative hierarchy may break down.
Nor is the legislative majority better able to check its own entrenched
minorities in such dealings.

Relations with Other Chief Executives. When it comes to his relations
with other men of his own official status, the chief executive will find them
light or burdensome depending largely on the governmental level of his
job. In our time, the President has few responsibilities more engrossing than
those involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. Increasingly, foreign policy
points toward his own working relations with the heads of other national
governments, particularly those with basic international interests akin to
ours. Even when his foreign policy steers through clear waters, these
relations are apt to absorb more of his time and thought than those with
all the state governors and municipal executives put together. Nor are
they likely to require less attention in the foreseeable future. In the after-
math of World War II we know that the victory we have won at such
great cost can be made secure only through a cooperative peace. There is
probably no standard by which presidents and contenders for the presidency

172 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

will be measured more sharply than that of their standing and their influ-
ence, actual or potential, in the international sphere.

Governors and mayors, in dealing with the chief executives of other
governmental jurisdictions, rarely confront issues as important as those
faced by the President. In the nature of our governmental tradition, there
are not as many working contacts between governors and mayors as might
benefit their public business. On the whole, a mayor's relations with other
chief executives are likely to be confined to conferences on mutual problems
with the mayors of neighboring cities, and to his participation with other
mayors in the activities of his state's league of municipalities and either the
American Municipal Association or— in the case of our metropolitan cities—
the United States Conference of Mayors. As for the governor, he will have
his main dealings with the governors of adjoining states and with the may-
ors of his state's largest cities. On other than matters of party politics his
contacts with the mayors of other cities or with the governors of more dis-
tant states will be normally quite infrequent, except for those related to
the Governors' Conference or the Council of State Governments.

Relations with Political Parties. We may turn now to the chief execu-
tive's external relations outside the structure of government proper. Here
his problems fall again into several classes. In point of importance, party
relationships probably rank first. For it is a plain fact that his strength
within his party, and in turn the party's strength within the electorate, are
at the very core of his effectiveness as chief executive. Both aspects he must
cultivate steadily. It therefore behooves him to counsel frequently with the
leaders of his party, to keep the party united and aggressive, and so to guide
its fortunes that it may win and hold the favor of the voters.

He may count himself fortunate if without inordinate anguish of soul
he can handle the distribution of public honors and political appointments
in a way that serves his ends. The management of these matters makes
up a large segment of what may be called party business. Despite the help
furnished traditionally by the Postmaster General and the regular party
machinery, "the Chief" must give his own time to many— sometimes trivial-
seeming — items. He must also be available for advice on questions of party
finance or even on the times and places of major party rallies and radio pro-
grams, to say nothing of party conventions and their agenda. Nor should
we overlook the demands on him for securing as much cooperation as is
attainable from the opposition party— or from disaffected elements within
his own party.

Public Opinion and Interest Groups. Because of the cardinal role of
free means of mass communication in democratic government, the Presi-
dent's relations with the press— as likewise those of a governor or a mayor-
are of peculiar significance. Nothing is more essential to his success than
that he keep in touch with the people. Newspapers, magazines, the radio,
and the moving pictures are the main two-way facilities which make close

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 173

contact possible. An efficient and tactful press secretary will rank among
his most indispensable personal aides.

Even with the ablest assistance, however, the President will be obliged
to give personal attention to what publicity he wants and what political in-
telligence services he needs. It goes without saying that insofar as his
direct use of the various media is concerned, he is wise to make the most
of his particular gifts of expression and make the least of his shortcomings.
If the press and radio and Hollywood take a friendly line and he learns
how to cooperate with them, they can do a great deal to build him up and
keep him before the eye of the public. For, regardless of what history may
later say of him, here and now he will be what they say he is— unless the
next election shows them to have been quite wrong.

Interest groups pose a tough problem for every politician who dedicates
his efforts to the common good, whether he be in the executive or legisla-
tive branch. The special interest tends to assume something no chief execu-
tive mindful of his trust would grant— that what is good for it will auto-
matically be good for all the people. It is clear, however, that he cannot
ignore interest groups in the political arena. * In the first place, it is of the
essence of democracy that men should be free to associate their efforts in
promoting interests and enterprises in which they share. -Secondly, it is
equally essential that government subject the struggle for power among
interest groups to such regulation and control as is needed to safeguard the
public welfare. A potent factor in the situation is, of course, the powerful
influence interest groups often exert over the way in which their members
vote. Consequently each party is perpetually anxious to win as much of
their support as possible, or at least to avoid drawing upon itself the antag-
onism of those groups which cannot be considered as potential supporters.

Business, labor, agriculture, veterans, civic organizations, and professional
patriots probably constitute the principal interest groups that presidents and
governors confront. Municipal chief executives see less of organized agri-
culture and more of neighborhood councils, social welfare organizations,
and taxpayers associations. Each of these groups makes up a part of the
body politic which it is the chief executive's business to serve. The great
public which he likes to regard as his principal too often turns out to be
nothing more than a loose composite of little or lesser publics — somehow
bound together by a not always very sharp sense of larger unity. If he
can consolidate the sense of community — a critical part of his job — the
various groups may be induced to keep their selfish impulses under reason-
able restraint and so be able to make positive contributions to the proper
functioning of government. If he fails in this greatest assignment as a result
of personal weakness or of circumstances beyond the power even of a true
leader, he will learn at first hand what havoc pressure politics may cause.

174 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

4. INTERNAL DIRECTION AND CONTROL

The preceding section, treating as it did of external relationships, dealt
principally with the political aspects of the role of the chief executive. In
this and the succeeding section, an effort will be made to describe the func-
tions he performs and the facilities he uses within the executive branch
itself, the presidency being taken as prototype.

Administrative Planning and Direction. As administrator-in-chief, the
President's first task is to decide what kind of general framework of con-
sensus he may assume or evolve between himself and the legislature, what
are to be the main aims of his administration, and by what basic policies he
will work for their attainment. Such anticipations are subject to change;
yet he needs some point of departure. Next, he must arrange for plans to
be developed analyzing specific problem areas and outlining alternative
methods of solution. He must also give thought to an organizational struc-
ture fitting the logic of his aims, policies, and plans. All of this requires a
reliable supporting cast.

One of the President's principal responsibilities is to select the men and
women who as agency heads will fill the major executive positions within
his organization. They in turn will have to be depended upon to nominate
subordinate political officials. Selection and appointment of key officers
are, however, still in the category of mere preliminaries. All of the subordi-
nate heads have to be directed to their tasks; it falls to the chief executive
to convey to them a clear conception of their missions in the government-
wide context.

He must require annually of each agency a systematic work program
supported by estimates~-of expenditures. In order to develop a balanced and
administratively feasible program for the executive branch as a whole,
he needs to integrate the agency programs into a single comprehensive
plan. This is known as the annual budget. No recurrent document he
submits to the legislature is of greater importance. Upon its presentation
to Congress in justification of requests for funds it is scrutinized by the
Appropriations Committee of each chamber. Its subsequent adoption by
the legislature, usually with considerable modifications, translates the
budget into the means whereby the President can assure himself systemati-
cally that the approved work plan of the government is being accomplished.

Executive Coordination and Administrative Reporting. Even with rea-
sonably clear policies and plans, a satisfactory scheme of organization, able
top personnel, foresighted direction in individual agencies, and careful
programming and scheduling of administrative activities, there is no fool-
proof guarantee that everything and everybody will mesh nicely so that
each agency can be left to run by itself. One of the President's most com-
plicated functions is that of coordinating the efforts and operations of the
entire executive branch. Of course, the budget itself is an instrument of

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 175

coordination. Through it the President may even attain a degree of con-
certed action on the part of the great regulatory boards and commissions
that in all other respects, except for his power of appointment, are not under
his command. Considering the national proclivity for agencies which are in-
dependent of the chief executive, and a tradition of rugged administrative
individualism even within the executive branch proper, it should be easy
to understand that coordination of governmental activities, week in and
week out, is a heavy responsibility and a never-ending one.

Finally, the President must constantly keep his eyes on the total admin-
istrative picture. He must make himself a central point of reporting. The
budget provides the basis for a systematic gathering and analysis "of informa-
tion. However, the President needs additional channels of intelligence about
the status of administrative progress. He must be able to find out what
he should know in order to report effectively to Congress, the press, or
the public. This calls for special arrangements to provide him with the kind
and quantity of information he wants, when he wants it.

Constitutional Supports. These being the President's main administra-
tive functions, what specific powers and devices does he rely upon to exe-
cute them ? His prerogative in the field of policy initiative derives from that
clause in Article II of the Constitution which provides that he "shall from
time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the Union,
and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient." In proposing public policy, no chief executive
would want to act on the spur of the moment. He naturally welcomes
ideas and suggestions, formal and informal, from a wide variety of sources
inside and outside government. These, however, have to be sifted and
evaluated; and a final selection has to be made. Most of the sifting and
appraising can be entrusted to his permanent staff establishments. Often,
however, even after they have done their best, he will still need help in
"making up his mind." He may put the matter to the Cabinet or consult
with individual members. He may call in the leaders of Congress. Or he
may seek the confidential counsel of a Colonel House or a Harry Hopkins.
There is perhaps undue fluidity in this pattern, but without a more highly
developed presidential secretariat we can hardly expect a material change.

No provision in the Constitution specifically requires or authorizes the
President in so many words to "plan" his general program. Yet his need
and right to do so would appear to be implied in the constitutional provi-
sion that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and in
another clause appearing earlier in Article II that "he may require the
opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive depart-
ments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,"
Even without these clauses, however, the necessity for him to anticipate the
future would remain. He would have to prepare for it even though his

176 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

authority might be derived from "the law of the situation"10 rather than the
law of the Constitution.

With respect to administrative organization, the President's powers are
limited. Permanent administrative agencies no less than the so-called inde-
pendent establishments are the creations of Congress. None of them can
be broken up or recombined in different ways or merged with other agen-
cies except by statute. There is a strong case to be made for investing the
President with permanent authority to adapt administrative structure to
governmental needs, but so far no such continuing authority has ever been
granted. Temporary grants of specifically circumscribed power to work out
structural adjustments have been made in the Reorganization Acts of 1939
and 1945. In times of war the President is likely to obtain special authority
of this kind, such as the two War Powers Acts of World War II and the
Overman Act of World War I— aside from his automatically operative
war powers, which are of considerable scope.

The power of appointment and — by implication — of removal is one of
the most telling the chief executive possesses. Article II of the Constitution
provides that he

. . . shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appoint-
ment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments."

The removal power, held by the Supreme Court corollary to the appoint-
ing power j11 continues to be extensive but was definitely qualified in the
Humphrey case.12 Corwin summarizes the present situation in this way:18

As to agents of his own powers, the President's removal power is
illimitable; as to agents of Congress* constitutional powers, Congress
may confine it to removal for cause, which implies the further right to
require a hearing as a part of the procedure of removal.

In the exercise of his directive function over the various administrative
agencies — but not the independent regulatory boards and commissions —
the chief executive is supported by several provisions of the Constitution,
chiefly by the very first sentence of Article II: "The executive power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America." That broad
grant would perhaps have sufficed of itself to empower the President to

10 For the insight embodied in this phrase, students of administration are indebted to a
brilliant — and practical — woman, Mary Parker Follett. Sec her "Individualism in a Planned
Society" in Mctcalf, Henry C. and Urwick, L., cds. Dynamic Administration, New York:
Harper, 1942.

U Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, lia (1926).

12 295 U. S. 602 (1935).

13 Op. cit. above in note 6, p. 96.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 177

issue such orders as he might find necessary or expedient in directing the
administrative operations of the executive branch. In addition, however,
certain other provisions are relevant. Among them are the express stipula-
tion in Section 2 of the same article that he "shall be commander in chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
states, when called into the actual service of the United States," and the
more general clause, already cited, that he "shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed."

However, uncontested authority to direct the executive branch proper
does not ensure informed and competent direction. The problem is how to
make it effective. One of the first needs is a system of administrative com-
munication that will flash up to the chief executive the institutional intelli-
gence he requires from all sectors of his entire organization, and simul-
taneously will guarantee that his orders and his general line, of approach
will get through without distortion or delay to those on the lower levels of
command.

Statutory Implementation. Work programming and budgeting are basic
to sound administration, but the President has had the machinery to per-
form these functions systematically only for a bare quarter-century. The
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 furnished him specialized staff assistance
in a Bureau of the Budget operating primarily by reliance on his own direc-
tive power.14 The administrative histories of the states suggest the same
lesson: that until a government adopts the idea of the executive budget —
and preferably with the item veto that is lacking in the federal government
— it is futile to expect effective and economical administration. Of course,
adoption of such a system will not automatically bring anything like the
administrative millenium. Without it, however, the gates to progress will
open only halfway.

Like the directive power, of which it may be said to be a derivative, the
power to coordinate is general in the character of its application. It rests
fundamentally upon the same clauses in the Constitution listed as the sources
of the directive power. Beyond that it has been made explicit in the Budget
and Accounting Act and other statutes in which Congress has reaffirmed the
President's obligation to unify the operations of the various administrative
agencies it has created. One notable recent example is the Employment Act
of 1946, under which the President is to avail himself of a new Council of
Economic Advisers to convey to the legislature ways and means of attaining
maximum employment throughout the nation by concerted governmental
action.

As a source of central information about the national administrative
system, the chief executive is the logical agent reporting on progress of
operations and policy problems to Congress or the public. The legislature

14 Sec Morstcin Marx, Fritz, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its Evolution and Present Role,"
American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39, p. 653 ff., 869 ff.

178 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

usually requires such reports in statutory language written directly into
acts enabling or directing him to launch new undertakings. A good example
is the reporting on the progress of the lend-lease program during World
War II. We may also think of the annual message on the State of the Union
and the annual budget message. In 1946, both were combined for the first
time in a single document because the two messages increasingly tended to
deal with the same fundamental issues of healthy economic, social, and fiscal
development of our national order. Most other messages address themselves
to particular matters.

By far the larger body of data and proposals, however, emerges in
administrative self-reporting within the executive branch. This is the
method — and the only one — by which the President can hope to keep him-
self abreast of what is going on at the administrative front-lines and what is
being done in his name by the army of federal employees deployed all over
the country and our outposts abroad. Without staff work to harness this vast
flow of information, it could easily turn into a destructive torrent. Facts,
figures, and suggestions must be transformed continuously into information
serviceable to the chief executive f on control purposes.

5. ARMS OF MODERN MANAGEMENT

Need for Assistance to the President* "The President needs help." So
wrote the President's Committee on Administrative Management headed by
Louis Brownlow in its report submitted January 8, 1937. In assigning
functions and responsibilities to the executive branch the Constitution and
the statutes simply ordain that "the President" shall do thus and so.
Obviously no man, whatever his genius, could personally perform the many
and heavy tasks which the chief executive thus is obliged to take on. It
is to him in his institutional capacity — to his office — that the assignments
are made; and, except where Congress has itself fixed the means, he is
expected, within the bounds of statutory authority and funds appropriated,
to recruit, organize, and direct whatever personnel may be required for the
work to be accomplished.

Here, with the sole exception of the chairmanship of the Council of
Ministers of the Soviet Union, is clearly the biggest management job
in the world. How does the President handle it? What aides and facilities
does he need to help him get his work done? True, the great line depart-
ments are the instruments through which ultimately the purposes of the
federal government are carried into effect. But what are the means by
which the President makes sure that they know of his intentions and
expectations and that he knows how well they are succeeding in their
tasks?

It was the general conclusion of the President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management that: (1) the President needed, in addition to his per-
sonal secretaries, as many as six administrative assistants on his immediate

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 179

White House staff; (2) in the tasks of executive management he should
have the assistance of three main "arms," one for planning, one for budget-
ing, and one for personnel; (3) with such internal arrangements as would
meet the special problems presented by regulatory commissions and govern-
mental corporations, all line agencies should be consolidated into twelve
departments, each headed by a secretary of Cabinet rank; and (4) there
should be a reordering of the functions of the General Accounting Office to
ensure two things — that, on the one hand, auditing prior to spending should
no longer keep the wheels of administration from moving; and that, on the
other, the executive branch should be made more effectively accountable to
Congress by more searching and more constructive post-auditing.

How fully House and Senate would have accepted these recommenda-
tions if President Roosevelt had not followed their submission with his
provocative message on Supreme Court reform, no one can say. In any
event, the Reorganization Act of 1939 incorporated only part of the pro-
posed measures. Above all, the President was granted six administrative
assistants, and a legal foundation was laid for the establishment of the
Executive Office of the President— perhaps the most significant step .forward
since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The Executive Office was
made up of the National Resources Planning Board,15 the Bureau of the
Budget, the Liaison Office for Personnel Management, the Office of Gov-
ernment Reports, and the Office for Emergency Management.18 This last
division of the Executive Office subsequently allowed the President desirable
leeway for locating in it — even if by legal fiction — many of the great war-
time control agencies.

Notwithstanding the later abolition by act of Congress of the National
Resources Planning Board and the administrative elimination of the Office
of Government Reports, the Executive Office of the President has continued
to serve essential purposes. Its principal remaining element, the Bureau of
the Budget, has gone far to give the President highly diversified staff assist-
ance. Under the Employment Act of 1946, its services have been amplified
by a Council of Economic Advisers, placed by law in the Executive Office.
Technically outside the Executive Office but in fact linked to it have been two
other important presidential agencies: the Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion17 and the Office of Economic Stabilization, both devoted more
to policy development than to administration.

Realigning the Executive Branch. As to changes in the departmental
structure, those authorized under the Reorganization Act of 1939 and subse-
quently adopted in the form of presidential "plans" were not insignificant.

18 Sec above Ch. 6, "Planning and Administration," sec. 2, "The Machinery for Plan-
ning."

16 See Brownlow, Louis and Others, "The Executive Office of the President: A Sym-
posium," Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 101 ff.

17 See above Ch. 6, "Planning and Administration," sec. 2, "The Machinery for Plan-
ning."

180 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Yet the executive branch emerged from World War II in need not only of
reconversion to a peacetime basis but of further reorganization for the
general purpose of increasing its effectiveness. Authorization to propose
such modifications — not extending to certain exempted establishments — was
conferred upon the President in the Reorganization Act of 1945.18 Leaving
aside the point that authority to reorganize administrative structure is in
the nature of a continuing necessity and should therefore not be granted only
for a limited time, how can the chief executive best use such power as is now
vested in him? If he wants to make it serve general needs, he will try to
accomplish five main goals.

First, he will weigh opportunities for regrouping and consolidation
among and within line or operating agencies to effect better service, check
duplication, and reduce the span of control for himself and the departmental
leadership. Of course, this does not apply to those establishments which are
set apart by reorganization statute. We may expect an integration of the
War and Navy Departments into a single Department of Defense. In
addition, the President may find it possible to consolidate various agencies
with othjer main departments. It has even been argued that the number of
departments can and should be reduced to seven. Experience suggests,
however, that no change quite so drastic could win acceptance. Moreover,
too heavy concentration along this line might in turn overtax departmental
leadership.

Central Staff Facilities. Second, the President may want to reexamine
arrangements for the conduct of central staff and auxiliary services
such as budgeting, recruitment and examination of personnel, in-service
training, purchasing, accounting, printing, safety facilities, and the like.
Here the aim would be to gain for the federal government whatever
advantages can be derived from centralized staff and housekeeping activities,
while yet leaving in each department adequate means as well as full
authority and responsibility for getting its job done. This might also entail
the removal or mitigation of the hazards and impediments to sound manage-
ment within the executive branch which are latent in the opportunities the
General Accounting Office has of intervening in an unproductive manner
in administrative operations. There is every reason for insisting on a
careful audit of all records after an individual administrative transaction
has been completed. But there is no good reason for the kind of supervision
by the Comptroller General as head of the General Accounting Office that
has developed in federal administration. Ideally, as the President's Com-
mittee on Administrative Management proposed, Congress should not only
retain an auditor general for the final examination and certification of
accounts, but it should also demand of him a truly comprehensive annual

18 Again, as under the Reorganization Act of 1939, the "hard core" of independent regula-
tory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission was exempted, including the civil functions of the Army Corps of Engineers.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 181

report on the character of fiscal operations and the general performance of
the executive branch.

Executive Office of the President. Third, the President must consider
again the adequacy of his own staff establishments. The theoretical premises
of the Executive Office of the President have proved sound; and the Presi-
dent needs all the help he can get from that office.19 Increasingly since
1939, the Bureau of the Budget has grown into that great arm of overhead
management which is the intent of the Budget and Accounting Act. In
Arthur Macmahon's descriptive phrase, the bureau has become the "em-
bodiment of the presidency" in federal administration.20 Through its
several divisions — Estimates, Fiscal, Legislative Reference, Administrative
Management, Statistical Standards — the chief executive obtains continuing
assistance in the preparation and execution of the annual budget; in the
clearance and coordination of agency proposals for legislation or views on
pending bills; in the achievement of better organization and management
throughout the executive branch; in the coordination of federal statistical
services; and in the analysis of government-wide or departmental programs,
of issues or implications of fiscal policy, and of the progress of administrative
operations.21

The situation is different with regard to forward-looking policy plan-
ning. Harried as the President tends to be by immediate concerns, he re-
quires first-rate advice if he is to think wisely — or think at all — about the
state of the Union a decade or generation hence instead of a year or two.
There was provision for that kind of help as long as the National Resources
Planning Board was still in existence. Since 1943, when Congress cut off its
appropriations, it has been necessary for the President to rely on catch-as-
catch-can planning services wherever he could get them, even if only in bits.
Criticisms of the reconversion program have time and again shown up the
unwisdom of abolishing the National Resources Planning Board. Sooner
or later, its equivalent will have to be reestablished. Perhaps the new statu-
tory Council of Economic Advisers, set up in the Executive Office of the
President by the Employment Act of 1946, will eventually develop into
such an equivalent.

The case for a director of personnel to give the President expert counsel
and, as civil service administrator, to direct the operations of the present Civil
Service Commission, is almost equally persuasive. True, the present arrange-
ment of a Liaison Office for Personnel Management within the Executive

19 This does not mean, of course, that there should be maintained in the Office for
Emergency Management skeleton agencies or technical staffs actually not needed. As its name
suggests but docs not fully explain, this office serves its purpose in the main by providing
an ever-ready legal and administrative framework within which temporary emergency agencies
can be created when required, provided that funds are made available for such agencies by
Congress.

^Macmahon, Arthur W., "The Future Organizational Pattern of the Executive Branch,"
American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 1182.

21 See Morstcin Marx, he. cit. above in note 14, p. 869 ft.

182 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Office, clearing on matters of presidential interest with the Civil Service
Commission, has not been unworkable. Yet it remains essentially a make-
shift that should be superseded. The President is as much in need of having
his own director of personnel as are other chief executives. Few problems
lie closer to the heart of administration than that of staffing— of discovering,
recruiting, placing, and developing competent employees so that they can
produce at top capacity. Solution of this problem should grow out of con-
scious design and not have to depend upon favorable circumstances in the
relations between the President and a so-called independent establishment,
the Civil Service Commission.

Policy Coordination. The fourth goal of administrative reorganization
relates to the equivalent of that office whose head used to be spoken of as
"Assistant President," "Coordinator of Domestic Affairs," or "Secretary of
Domestic Policy" more often than as Director of War Mobilization and
Reconversion.22 By statute, this office is both temporary and outside the
Executive Office of the President. If the President needs a special staff officer
to coordinate domestic policy, much as the Secretary of State oversees
foreign affairs, he would be well advised to place such an aide and his staff
in the Executive Office— as exponent of directive coordination, in com-
parison with the functions of managerial coordination that are being dis-
charged by the budget director.23 If this were done, it would be possible at
the same time to carry further the institutionalization of the Executive Office.
It still needs better inner balance of policy development and administrative
concerns; better integration of its working processes, including the White
House staff in the technical sense; and better facilities for checking back and
forth on all matters that come to the President's desk.

Potentialities of the Cabinet. The fifth and final goal for which the
President should strive as part of any reorganization is to make greater use
of his underdeveloped Cabinet. Ample delegation of authority and respon-
sibility by the President to the heads of his line establishments and consolida-
tion of his own staff contribute greatly to success in administration. How-
ever, the problems and concerns of the departmental system ramify so
widely and intertwine so perplexingly that the chief executive must seek to
arrange for the main agencies to share them with him through discussion
and decision in the Cabinet. As a collegial body, the Cabinet could serve as
a forum for debating general policy recommendations, and aid the President
in formulating such proposals in true teamwork.24 Cabinet committees, with
the participation of specialized top personnel, could set themselves the task
of finding a common approach to major policy issues and of devising a
pattern of combined operations for giving effect to considered solutions.

22 See above Ch. 6, "Planning and Administration/' sec. 2, 'The Machinery for Plan-
ning."

23 See Morstein Marx, he. cit. above in note 14, p. 898.

24 Cf. Macmahon, loc. cit. above in note 20, p. 1 187.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 183

Cabinet meetings might well include the key men of the President's Execu-
tive Office. This is but hopeful speculation, for it is one of the distinctive
facts about our federal government that the Cabinet lives in a kind of
dormant state as a device for making policy. However, one thing is certain.
That President who first exploits the collective potentialities of the Cabinet
as a regular and systematic practice will make a signal contribution to Amer-
ican public administration.

CHAPTER

The Departmental System

1. GENERAL FEATURES

Purpose of Departmentalization. We speak of departments when dealing
with parts of a whole. The whole may be a unified territory; thus, the French
departements are areas into which the country is divided for governmental
purposes. Or the whole may be the total structure of political organization;
thus, we often refer to the three main powers of government, set apart from
one another under our Constitution, as the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments. Or the whole may be the machinery of administration com-
bined in the executive branch; thus, [we have long recognized the need for
some division of labor in the administrative system by grouping more or less
related functions under formally designated departments^ It is with depart-
mentalization in this last sense that we shall here be concerned.
^Departmentalization, being in essence a division of labor, is intended to
make more effective rather than split up the whole within which it is
applied.1 When organizations grow to the point where direction and control
can ndlonger be exercised in face-to-face contact between the leader and the
rank and file, intermediate stages of leadership must be supplied. Such
arrangements — though marking out the component parts within the whole —
make it possible to keep the organization in formation and to attain efficient
use of specialized skills. In determining the scope of responsibility on each
of these intermediate stages or at each point of subdivision, consideration
must be given to two elementary propositions. First, it is essential to achieve
the greatest measure of operational unity within every subdivision. Second,
it is necessary to establish sound working relationships among all sub-
divisions.

This is in the main a matter of economy of control. Subleadership is
hopelessly overburdened when compelled to putf together scattered frag-
ments of different activities. It is also easy to/see that the demands on sub-
leadership are not always of the same chararewv In large-scale organizations,
public and private, the higher intermpdlatfe itages usually require special

184

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 185

capacity for ranging over broader fields and for marshaling sizable forces
in close relationship to the aims of the organization as a whole. On the
other hand, subleadership on the lower intermediate stages down to the
first-line supervisor increasingly calls for technical competence with respect
to specific operations. Even the first-line supervisor, however, is in a very
practical sense an agent of the leader of the entire organization, assisting
him in attaining the ends of the organization at large.

The way in which the whole is reenforced through identification of its
parts and their interrelations provides the general framework of adminis-
trative organization. Hierarchy, lines of command, levels of responsibility
and channels of administrative communication find their proper place within
this framework. Departmentalization represents the highest intermediate
stage of leadership in relation to the chief executive, but it is only one stage.
Layer after layer, division of labor and delegation of authority progress
downward throughout the departmental system. Nevertheless, the first
order of division, on the departmental plane, is of decisive importance in
giving shape to the bulk of the lower structure. That is why departmentali-
zation, however academic much of the discussion about it may be, is any-
thing but an academic matter.

Structure of the Departmental System. In one form or another, and
under varying labels, departmentalization occurs in all organized enterprise
except the smallest kind. The Phillips Petroleum Company, for instance,
maintains no less than twenty-one departments, such as production, refining,
traffic, and sales on the one hand; and engineering, research, economics, and
public relations on the other. The Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation,
another illustration chosen at random, operates through about eighteen de-
partments, some of which are in the nature of subdivisions of the main de-
partments.1 To mention a few examples in the field of government, Ten-
nessee, under the reorganization acts of 1923 and 1937, placed the following
departments under its governor: administration, finance and taxation, high-
ways and public works, conservation, agriculture, insurance and banking,
labor, education, public health, and institutions and public welfare.2 The
mayor of Boston exercises authority, wholly or in part, over a much larger
number of departments, including fire, health, hospital, public welfare,
institutions, building, city planning, street laying-out, public buildings,
school buildings, public works, transit, park, market, weights and measures,
and library and art.8 The village manager of Winnetka, Illinois, has only
five full-fledged departments to be concerned with— police, fire, health, pub-

1Scc Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Policyholders Service Bureau, Business Organi-
zation, supplemental exhibits A and C, New York, 1944. This is one of a series of helpful
reports on business management.

2 See Buck, A. E., The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States, p. 229,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.

3 See Boston Municipal Research Bureau, Report, p. 4, Boston, Oct. 1937.

186 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

lie works, and water and electric.4 The number of federal executive depart-
ments has been kept to ten; listed on the basis of seniority, they are: State,
War, Treasury (the original trio since 1789), Navy (1798), Interior (1849),
Agriculture (1862) Justice (1870), Post Office (1872), Commerce (1903),
and Labor (1913).5

Considering the actual scope of federal activities, it may at first glance
look like a marvelous accomplishment that the chief executive of the nation
can direct these activities through so few departments—less than a third of
the number of departments that cluster about the Prime Minister in Eng-
land. But the first glance is sadly deceptive. Historically, we started out
well enough. The Founding Fathers, with a remarkably acute sense of
administration, took great care in drawing the outlines of a unified executive
branch. However, significant departures occurred with the creation of
establishments independent of the President save for his appointing power.

The principal landmarks in this new development were the Civil Service
Commission (1883) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887),
both regulatory bodies— the former vested with virtual autonomy in recruit-
ment for federal service and the latter well-nigh uncontrolled in its control
over the national transportation system. Through the years, a baker's dozen
of similar agencies came forth on the precedent of these two. Add to this
the proliferation of governmental corporations and separate authorities,
and we have a picture of the diversity and diffusion which confronts the
chief executive. How can he perform his constitutional duties as head of the
administrative organization, asked the President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management in 1937, when he must deal directly with one hundred
federal agencies of one kind or another?6 The Reorganization Act of 1939
authorized some integration subject to statutory limitations, but fell short of
achieving anything like a final solution. How far the Reorganization Act
of 1945 will carry us in this respect, remains to be seen.

Much the same situation prevails in state and local governments. Inde-
pendent boards and commissions, together with other unattached authorities
of comparable status, in many jurisdictions compete with the departmental
machinery controlled by the governor or mayor. The chairman of a munici-
pal police commission, for example, may exercise greater power than the
nominal principal executive of the city. Moreover, most state and local
governments are still paying heavy tribute to the long ballot of old, which

4 See Village of Winnctka, III., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1943
p. 2.

6 General reference may be made in this context to the United States Government Manual,
the official handbook of the federal government, which appears in up-to-date editions at short
intervals and which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

6 See President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. The findings and recommendations of this
committee have exerted considerable influence on subsequent developments and still represent
an important source of pertinent information.

1KB DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 187

was based on the philosophy that most, if not ail, offices should be filled by
election. Elective officials such as recorder, treasurer, and comptroller, hold-
ing office by statutory or even constitutional provision, may be thorns in the
flesh of the state or local chief executive. Since the beginning of this century,
measurable progress has been made toward raising governors and mayors
to true responsibility for the executive branch, and the continuous spread of
the council-manager plan of municipal government has worked in the same
direction. However, an integrated system of administration is even now the
exception rather than the rule, despite many notable instances of state and
local reorganization.

Factors in Departmentalization. Lest our failure to evolve a fully satis-
factory executive structure be seized upon as evidence of governmental
floundering, it must be stressed that departmentalization is fraught with
complexities.7 These are in part technical, in part political. From a technical
point of view, it is difficult to determine with assurance the proper basis of
departmental organization. Should it be identity of major purpose to be
served or function to be exercised, such as national defense, social welfare,
and urban development? Or should it be the nature of the process or the
primary skill involved in it, such as engineering, licensing, and mimeo-
graphing? Or should it be the group of people to be serviced, such as
farmers, veterans, and small businessmen? Or, finally, should it be the
territory or area on which activities should be focused, such as New England,
the Missouri valley, and downstate Illinois? Speculating on the feasibility
of each such basis, we are bound to discover soon that its strict and exclu-
sive application leads simultaneously to two undesirable consequences. First,
activities that belong together as components of a concrete administrative
end-product are torn apart at various points and in varying ways. Second,
if reasonable concessions are made to a combination of activities in what
might be termed an organic manner and with an eye to the end-product,
activities of the same kind appear in conjunction with others at many
different places in the executive branch.

Classification of conceivable bases of departmental organization, being
"one of convenience alone,"8 is therefore merely a useful starting point for
trying to piece together the jigsaw puzzle. How to manipulate the classi-
fication for practical ends is quite another matter. Admitting its inability
to lay down a few simple rules of the game, the Brookings Institution,

7 See Gulick, Luther, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Gulick, Luther and
Urwick, L., eds., Papers on the Science of Administration, p. 3 ff., New York: Institute of
Public Administration, 1937; Brookings Institution, Report to the Byrd Committee on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of the National Government, Senate Report No. 1275, 75th
Cong., 1st Scss., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937; Wallace, Schuyier C., Federal
Departmentalization: A Critique of Theories of Organization, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1941. See also above Ch. 7, "Working Concepts of Organization."

8 Benson, George C. S., "Internal Administrative Organization," Public Administration
Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 473.

188 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

advising a congressional committee several years ago, suggested a cautious!)
eclectic approach:9

No single factor can be decisive throughout the entire organization.
One factor may help us to decide at one point; elsewhere, another factor
may be more helpful. At every point one determinant must be balanced
against another. For some functions and some agencies there may be
no one best course of action. A choice may be presented between alterna-
tives, one as desirable as the other.

This does not sound very encouraging, but it contains more than a grain
of truth. Study of departmentalization, like all administrative analysis, re-
quires careful penetration into the total situation in which the problem to
be solved is lodged. Technical knowledge, even when tested in the hard
school of practical experience, is of little avail unless its application is pre-
ceded by painstaking and skillful diagnosis, not only of the ill to be reme-
died, but also of all the factors that bear upon both the ill and the possible
remedies.

Aside from its technical compexities, departmentalization is also beset
with political issues. No sooner has a department been established than it
will become enamoured with itself. However extraordinary the conglomera-
tion of activities packed into it by way of compromise, it will presently
associate itself with each of them in unfaltering fondness. Talk about
shifting any of these activities to some other department — as subsequent
events may indicate to be the better logic — and argument breaks loose. Then
also, departmental officialdom naturally inclines toward taking an expansive
view of the department's mandate. As the department grows bigger and
better (which to its leadership may be one and the same thing), it inevitably
begins to impinge upon related activities carried on by other departments.
Again, there will be a lot of fussing and fuming when lines of demarcation
must be redrawn. Each time the department will muster persuasive reasons
for keeping what it has "always" had, or what "belongs to it"— at least by
implication; and its arguments are likely to evoke a vigorous echo among
the loyal clientele of special interests and pressure groups that have lined
up within its ramparts. Usually the noise alone is enough to intimidate
reform.

Moreover, executive reorganization is a somewhat obscure art and
more than a little suspect among the entrenched interests inside and outside
the departmental system. Suspicion begets hostility and resistance. Institu-
tional resistance may be deliberate, but it may arise also from the inertia
of settled form. The cumulative effect has been one of inordinate immobility.
Looking at the departmental structure, we may be reminded of "monsters
with great defensive power developed at the expense of movement and
intellect," as Pendleton Herring has so aptly put it.10

9 Op. fit. in note 7, p. 43.

10 "Executive-Legislative Responsibilities," American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol.
38, p. 1161.

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 189

In the face of such "monsters," the feeble voice of organizational com-
monsense is none too effective. Exceptional circumstances must come to the
fore in order to provide the psychological moment for thoroughgoing
realignment. Circumstances of this kind are relatively rare. But they are
frequent enough to warrant continuous structural planning by a central
staff agency such as the Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office of the
President. Continuous planning is necessary because changing national
needs and emerging reorientation of policy usually affect the departmental
system to a greater or lesser extent. Here, as elsewhere, preparedness pays.
When the day for constructive action arrives, the whole opportunity may
hinge on the immediate availability of fully considered proposals for
reorganization.

Undirected Growth. The technical and political difficulties which sur-
round departmentalization account in large measure for the fact that the
structure of the executive branch has been traditionally the product of
"undirected growth," in Leonard D. White's descriptive phrase. To put
it differently, rarely if ever have we tried to project existing and emerging
governmental activities in terms of a comprehensive organizational plan.
On the other han|J, judging by our experience with state and local reorgani-
zation, we must admit that a neatly conceived general formula yields only
limited results unless its application is accompanied by a change of insti-
tutional atmosphere. This would have to include a corresponding strength-
ening of enlightened management, a better personnel system, and greater
legislative self-restraint in tampering with the departmental scheme on
partisan impulse. Reorganization has been abused as a political football
more often than we might think. Nor has the game lost its attraction to
those who know how to play. A notable recent instance occurred in 1945 when
the Senate was asked to confirm former Vice President Henry A. Wallace
as Secretary of Commerce. He had proved himself earlier an able Secretary
of Agriculture. Yet confirmation was attainable only after responsibility
for extensive governmental credit activities had been severed from the
Department of Commerce and made the concern of a separate agency.

The alliance between institutional inertia, vested interests, and political
partisanship throws an enormous weight of support behind the departmental
status quo. Stability of organization is in itself an asset, because for greatest
efficiency everyone must know his way within the organization as a matter
of habit. Indeed, habit born of repetition or indoctrination minimizes the
effects even of grossly deformed organization. However, stability becomes
a vice when it is maintained at the price of structural simplicity and balance.
It shows itself as a particularly serious vice when we consider the usual time
lag between established governmental form ajid the evermoving substance
of social and economic life. On practical grounds, therefore, we should
strive for a permanent legislative-executive arrangement under which appro-
priate organizational adjustments and modifications in the executive branch

190 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

can be made in harmony with changing needs. The legislature would pro-
vide the frame of reference, and the chief executive would take action
within the scope of his authorization. This is what Herbert Hoover, then
Secretary of Commerce, proposed in 1924 before the Joint Congressional
Committee on the Reorganization of the Administrative Branch. The
Reorganization Act of 1939 — though conceding only temporary authority —
followed the line of Hoover's reasoning. It called for reorganization plans
formulated by the President to be submitted to Congress, which reserved
to itself the right of disapproval.11 Under the Reorganization Act of 1945,
the same general prescription has been used for the postwar period, because
the two War Powers Acts of World War II— temporary grants of merely
temporary effect modeled on the Overman Act of World War I — were
designed specifically for only war-emergency duration.12

Because departmentalization aims to increase the effectiveness of the
whole rather than partition it, the number of main divisions is important
from the angle of direction by the chief executive. His physical span of
control is naturally limited. Reasonably exact measurement would differ
with different personalities. But for each personality the limit is easily
reached, especially if we keep in mind that a smaller numfcer of departments
in turn may involve too wide a span of control for the department heads,
thus shifting the problem to the next lower level. Inflexible restriction of
the number of departments is therefore no adequate answer, whether such
restriction be imposed constitutionally, as it has been in several states, or by
statute, as it was in the Reorganization Act of 1939, here primarily as a check
on the President's range of structural choice.

Quasi-Departments. Although no new "departments" were to be created
under the Reorganization Act of 1939, three quasi-departments came into
being: the Federal Security Agency, the Federal Works Agency, and the
Federal Loan Agency. Each absorbed into itself a multitude of adminis-
trative establishments, many of which had formerly not known a common
denominator. We may doubt very much whether the grouping of quite
diversified lending activities under a quasi-department— and hence without
close relationship to broader substantive programs — was a sound move. The
fact remains, however, that the three new agencies brought measurable
relief to the overburdened chief executive. As for internal integration within
each new agency, it is hardly surprising that initially there was more
similarity to a holding company than to a department.

11 For greater detail see Millett, John D. and Rogers, Lindsay, "The Legislative Veto
and the Reorganization Act of 1939," Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 176 ff. A
brief history of federal reorganization efforts may be found in Meriam, Lewis and Schmccke-
bier, Laurence F., Reorganization of the National Government, p. 181 ff., Washington: Brook-
ings Institution, 1939.

12 For an illuminating and authoritative preview, see Brownlow, Louis, "Reconversion of
the Federal Administrative Machinery from War to Peace," Public Administration Review, 1944,
Vol. 4, p. 309 ff. The author served as the chairman of the President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management; see above note 6.

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 191

The common denominator does not spring from mere pronouncement.
It must be fostered systematically over a longer period before it translates
itself into a point of view commonly shared throughout the agency. In
general, formation of quasi-departments is an ingenious device for provid-
ing the executive branch with an experimental fringe. Activity groupings
may thus be tried out in practice, and legislative assent to full departmental
status may be bought by demonstration of performance. This applies also
to such essentially permanent establishments as the National Housing
Agency, a merger of several no longer novel federal programs which might
have come about under the Reorganization Act of 1939 but actually took
place under the First War Powers Act of 1941 and thus required further
legislation for its continued effectiveness.

2. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION

Before the consolidations made possible by the Reorganization Act of
1939 had reached the point of full returns, the gradual transformation from
peace to war expressed itself in the creation of many new agencies. Coordi-
nation became a burning issue. The way this issue was met is likely to have
wider significance. In the first place a considerable degree of coordination
was achieved through the Executive Office of the President, doubtless the
outstanding product brought forth under the Reorganization Act of 1939.13
One of its divisions, the Office for Emergency Management, furnished the
nominal link between the chief executive and most — though not all — of the
new machinery. In the initial period, it also exerted some real coordinative
and prompting influence. More important in the whole development was
the role of another division of the Executive Office, the Bureau of the Budget.
The latter, established in 1921 as the President's first staff agency, came
to reflect him in administration, in Arthur Macmahon's appraisal.14 Sec-
ondly, as the pressures and frictions within the quickly expanding executive
branch increased and as action programs acquired red-hot priority, officials
in charge of such programs were authorized to assume directive powers in
broad fields, binding upon all operating agencies active in these fields. This
was true of the heads of the War Production Board and the War Manpower
Commission. Later, successively wider coordinative mandates were en-
trusted to the director of the Office of Economic Stabilization (1942) and the
director of the Office of War Mobilization (1943), afterwards the statutory
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

13 A highly informative symposium on the Executive Office of the President in its original
form by Louis Brownlow and Others was published in Public Administration Review, 1941,
Vol. 1, p. 101 ff. The reader should bear in mind that subsequently two divisions of the
Executive Office disappeared. The Office of Government Reports was disbanded as such, and
the National Resources Planning Board died of legislative antagonism.

14 "The Future Organizational Pattern of the Executive Branch," American Political Scienct
Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 1182. A helpful review of war developments is offered by Gulick>
Luther, "War Organization of the Federal Government," ibid., p. 1166 ff.

192 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

Staff Establishments. To place reliance for interdepartmental coordina-
tion on officers or offices that serve the chief executive in a staff capacity
and exercise authority essentially in his name and by his direction is not a
novel tendency. Provision for such assistance has been a typical concern
of state and local reorganization for several decades. It was expressed most
frequendy in the centralization of expenditure control under a budget
agency attached to the office of the governor, mayor, or city manager. A
milestone was set in 1917 when Illinois introduced such a budget system
into its state administration. Municipalities followed the same path. The
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 carried the much-publicized prescrip-
tion into the federal government. By equipping the President with a special
agency, the Bureau of the Budget, to aid him in shaping up, year after year,
the annual work plan of the government for consideration and adoption by
Congress, this act reversed the former trend toward departmental self-deter-
mination and independence. In constructing the general program of agency
estimates of appropriations, the Bureau of the Budget could correlate the
activities undertaken throughout the executive branch, and thus give a
substantial impetus to interdepartmental coordination as well as to the
improvement of administrative management.

With the establishment in 1939 of the President's Executive Office, the
Bureau of the Budget, as an integral part of the new nucleus, underwent a
conspicuous expansion in order to become one of the "principal management
arms of the Government."15 Through its growing professional staff, it was
able to furnish practical help at numerous points in the conversion of the
administrative system from peacetime needs to wartime demands, and in
spreading knowledge of tested methods and practices. The broad range of
this kind of combined consulting and installation service supplied the bureau
with unusual opportunities for spotting undetected weaknesses of organi-
zation and management in the unfolding war administration. Depending
on the character of the problems and obstacles which it encountered in its
remedial efforts, the bureau on many occasions placed issues before the
President which would ordinarily not have come to his early attention. In
numerous instances, these issues involved clarification of jurisdictional boun-
daries and adjustment of programs for better coordination of different
agencies that somehow had got in one another's way.

Simultaneously, the bureau kept its eyes on the attainment of dominant
wartime objectives through concerted action by several federal agencies,
from the point of view of both adequate administrative planning and syn-
chronized execution. This entailed working contacts with planning staffs
and operating officials in various parts of the executive branch, and also the
combined boards and similar devices by which the United States secured
cooperation with Great Britain, Canada, and other members of the United

15 This is the language of Executive Order No. 8248 of September 8, 1939, which may
be called the original charter of the President's Executive Office. See also above note 13.

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 193

Nations.16 Aside from such working contacts, the bureau exercised its
budgetary authority for coordinative purposes. The same end was furthered
in connection with the bureau's review for conformity with the President's
program of agency proposals for legislation or executive orders, and agency
reports to congressional committees on pending bills. Another avenue of
coordination presented itself in the bureau's responsibility, under the Reports
Act of 1942, for approving agency plans for statistical inquiries addressed to
the public. Additional pertinent authorities were included in the war over-
time pay legislation and its successor, the Federal Employees Pay Act of
1945, under which the budget director determines periodically the personnel
requirements of federal agencies.

Coordinating Agencies. Compared with the implicit and broadly inclu-
sive coordinating mandate of the Bureau of the Budget, the wartime inno-
vations for pulling together governmental activities in order to "hold the
line" against inflation and to organize all of the productive resources of the
country for greatest striking power appear as explicit and specific grants of
authority. The evolving pattern became clear with the formation of the
Office of Economic Stabilization; it later found its sharpest expression in
the tasks assigned to the new Office of War Mobilization. The director of
the Office of War Mobilization was charged with the duty "to unify the
activities of the federal agencies . . . engaged in or concerned with produc-
tion, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian
supplies, materials, or products." He was also to "resolve or determine
controversies between such agencies," except those falling into the jurisdic-
tion of the Office of Economic Stabilization. In exercising these functions,
he was entitled to "issue such directives on policy or operations to the federal
agencies ... as may be necessary to carry out the programs developed, the
policies established, and the decisions made" under his authority, and to
call for progress reports from any of the agencies subject to his directives.
In basic conception, the pattern fashioned by executive orders issued in
1942 and 1943 under the President's wartime powers was reaffirmed in the
War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944. In this law the renamed
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion emerged as a statutory estab'
lishment," incorporating within itself three equally temporary demobilization
agencies having kindred supervisory concerns: the Office of Contract Settle-
ment, the Surplus War Property Administration, and the Retraining and
Reemployment Administration.17

Thus there had arisen, side by side with more traditional coordinating

m Operation of the combined machinery has been looked upon by many as a rehearsal
for peacetime international organization; see, for instance, Salter, Arthur, "From Combined War
Agencies to International Administration," Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p. 1 ff.
The author is an old hand at combined business; his study of Allied shipping control during
World War I, published in 1921, is still of great value.

17 The progress of demobilization planning has been traced by Key, V. O., "The Recon-
version Phase of Demobilization,*' American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 1137 ff.

194 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

machinery as exemplified by the Bureau of the Budget, an impressive
hierarchy of coordinators, with the War Mobilization, and Reconversion
director closest to the apex. He was not exactly at the apex because he had
to share the loftly heights with others, primarily representatives of the
military services, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and spokesmen of
foreign policy, especially the Secretary of State. Although in large part a
makeshift arrangement, the new hierarchy of wartime coordinators was
instrumental in settling countless questions which normally would have
plagued the chief executive without really requiring his consideration.
Delegation of some of his authority proved to be the answer to the riddle
of unified administrative operation.

This sounds quite simple. But the specific character of such delegation
had to be worked out experimentally. Men had to be found to try their
hand at tentative assignments, never knowing at the start whether they
would fit into the personal working habits of an executive head who at the
very beginning of the defense organization for war needs had proclaimed
himself emphatically "the boss." And prestige had to be built up for these
men so that operating officials would actually take orders without thoughts
of appeal or evasion. All of this called for more than mouth-filling clauses
written into executive orders.

Although interdepartmental coordination had gained the upper hand
over departmental friction during the closing years of World War II, it
did not exactly leave us an accepted prototype for peacetime use. In the
first place, the somewhat haphazard stratification of coordinative layers
wedged between the chief executive and the departmental system in its
wartime enlargement in itself resulted in a good deal of uncertainty. A
simpler postwar setup appears highly desirable, with fewer layers and
still greater precision in responsibilities. Second, the hierarchy of coordi-
nators with their own special staffs seemed to pose a contradiction to the
fundamental idea embodied in the Executive Office of the President.

Each coordinator reflected an element of power derived directly from
the basic function of the chief executive as the constitutional overseer of the
departmental scheme. To differentiate between the "arms of management"
supplied in the Executive Office and special arms of coordination might be
a strenuous exercise in semantics. Some of the special arms of coordination,
it is true, were nominally part of the Executive Office, through the fiction
of an integrated Office for Emergency Management; this applied, for in-
stance, to the chairmen of the War Production Board and the War Man-
power Commission. However, in both fact and physical location, these first-
line coordinators were none too close to the White House. Closest to it, and
actually in it most of the time, was the head of the Office of War Mobiliza-
tion and Reconversion; but he, interestingly, was never organizationally
included in the Executive Office. The institutional gap between him and the
Bureau of the Budget would probably have caused difficulties save for

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 195

generally satisfactory working relationships, insisted upon by President
Roosevelt himself.

A third factor is perhaps still more important. Under the War Mobiliza-
tion and Reconversion Act of 1944, the top coordinator of the home front
assumed a statutory office under specifications that tended to pull him
toward congressional rather than presidential superintendence. To that ex-
tent the law impinged visibly on "the orthodox administrative doctrine that
organs of direction should occupy a staff relation to the chief executive."18
Here, again, we perceive possibilities of dissonances.

A statutory "Assistant President," gravitating toward Congress because
of special reporting obligations, may severely limit the President's directive
power. His presence also may cause strain in the President's use of the "arms
of management" provided in the Executive Office. Or, if there is instead of
an "Assistant President" the head of a superdepartment in charge of pro-
gram formulation and program coordination over wider areas of the
departmental system, might not such statutory relationship with the legis-
lature narrow unduly the President's control over the line-up of operating
agencies? Coordination above the departmental level is part and parcel
of the President's executive function. Such coordination can only be
achieved by his direction, based on the same principle on which rests the
exercise of authority by his "arms of management." It appears to follow
that for best results coordinative assistance should be rendered to the Presi-
dent within the framework of his appropriately regrouped Executive Office.
Managerial coordination by the Bureau of the Budget and directive co-
ordination by a special officer cannot be separated organizationally.

Role of the Cabinet. Nothing has been said thus far about the Cabinet
as a coordinating mechanism, and for good reasons. It is customary to point
out that in contrast with Great Britain the American assembly of depart-
ment heads as a consultative body is devoid of constitutional standing, in
the states as well as in the federal government. Nor is the matter different
in our municipalities. Where governor's or mayor's councils exist, they are
generally special advisory establishments for particular purposes. Whereas
the British War Cabinet, in both World War I and World War II, served
as one of the foremost devices for tightening up the departmental system,
in the United States the accelerated pace of critical times seems to bring
about almost the opposite result. Woodrow Wilson did find it convenient
to meet regularly with the key figures of his war administration, but work-
ing relations among various agencies rarely dominated the agenda. Franklin
D. Roosevelt took no inspiration from Wilson's example and managed to
keep the circle of his close advisers for the most part in fairly constant
motion. The parallel with the "brain trust" of the thirties suggests itself,
including the rate of turnover. In this picture the Cabinet's contribution was

18 Key, he. cit. in note 17, p. 1152.

196 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

reduced to the fact that it continued to meet without ever becoming a
central cog.

One explanation of the difference between British and American prac-
tice in this respect is usually left unmentioned. In England, the Cabinet
puts heavy responsibility for the effective conduct of its business on a com-
petently staffed secretariat. This secretariat, in its developed form the
institutional offspring of World War I, sees to it that all matters on the
docket, except last-minute propositions of great urgency, are checked and
cleared to the point where the issue can be disposed of by a decision offer-
ing promise of finality. With us, notwithstanding the existence of the
Executive Office, comparable facilities for continuous cross-referencing
are still lacking. Small wonder that Cabinet meetings tend to revolve
around summaries of developments presented by the President himself,
and items of departmental concern brought up by individual secretaries but
rarely of true interest to the Cabinet as a whole. Although sound sugges-
tions have occasionally been advanced for a vitalization of the Cabinet,10
decisive change is hardly in the offing as long as we do not build up an
adequate secretariat.

Use of Interdepartmental Committees. Before we leave the subject of
interdepartmental coordination, a word on the use of special committees
is in order. Such committees combining representatives of several agencies
for joint deliberation of matters of common interest or wider ramification
are nothing new. We find illustrations on all three levels of government —
federal, state, and local. Shortly after its inception, the Bureau of the
Budget began to surround itself with a growing array of interdepartmental
committees which, under varying names, attended to the inauguration of
better management. Collectively, they came to be known as the Coordinat-
ing Service, steered by a chief coordinator who in turn reported to the
director of the bureau. The Coordinating Service was supported by a
regional organization of its own, which linked itself to the more than three
hundred federal business associations composed of ranking federal field
officials in as many cities throughout the land. In the early twenties, these
interdepartmental arrangements gave considerable drive to the improvement
of governmental business practices. But in the course of time the effort
spent itself, and the Coordinating Service died of stagnation. It was form-
ally abolished in 1933. Atrophy had also weakened the remaining federal
business associations.

Many other interdepartmental committees, however, continued to pursue
their missions in the executive branch. One notable example was the Cen-
tral Statistical Board, later transferred to the President's Executive Office
and perpetuated as the Division of Statistical Standards in the Bureau of
the Budget. Throughout the lifetime of this board, coordinating functions

19 See, for instance, Macmahon, loc. cit. in note 14, p. 1187. See also above Ch. 8, "The
Chief Executive," sec. 5, "Arms of Management"

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 197

were in the foreground of its program. The same can be said of the Com-
mittee on Trade Agreements brought together under auspices of the State
Department. A more recent instance was the creation in the State Depart-
ment of an Executive Committee for Economic Foreign Policy, which may
prove itself a very important interdepartmental arrangement.20

With all that, we are far from possessing on any of the three levels of
government a comprehensively interlocking committee system. Nor should
we expect too much from it if we had one. For, in the nature of things,
interdepartmental committees seldom feel the directive push from above.
They function on condition of agreement, and may deteriorate into trading
posts where stubborn parties bicker for their own advantages. Apparently,
such committees work best on the basis of specific terms of reference, with
a membership picked for sufficient authority or technical knowledge to
facilitate mutual commitment, and under alert and vigorous leadership.
When these conditions prevail, interdepartmental committees may repay
many times the administrative effort invested in them.

Avenues of Progress. In the perspective of interdepartmental coordi-
nation, the departmental system shows itself as a massive conglomeration
which does not readily respond to the reins held by the chief executive. Ad-
ministrative agencies are apt to become personifications of a purpose en-
dowed by legislative action and guarded by interest assortments that regard
themselves as the lawful beneficiaries of the endowment. The result is
reluctance toward whole-hearted acceptance of executive control. Centrifugal
tendencies are therefore innate in the departmental structure. A concert
of forces is attainable only through continuous assertion of direction from
the top.

Realistically speaking, this means that coordinative effort plays the
role of a counterpressure. It is never supreme, but it may go far toward
accomplishing a relatively high degree of homogeneity of general orienta-
tion. Organization charts of the executive branch tend to display reas-
suringly straight lines of command and responsibility. In certain ways,
however, a more appropriate comparison might be that with a feudal
pattern of higher and lower fiefs in which the vassals are sometimes torn
between conflicting loyalties, and where designation of rank is often a very
misleading index of actual power and influence.

Looking ahead with our eyes on the national goal of high-level employ-
ment, we can discern some of the problems that closely bear upon the

20 For an informative appraisal of federal experience in this field, see Reynolds, Mary T.,
Interdepartmental Committees in the National Administration, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1939. The role of interdepartmental machinery within the State Department is indicated
in Laves, Walter H. C. and Wilcox, Francis O., "Organizing the Government for Participation
in World Affairs," American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 913 ff. Sec also two
related papers by the same authors under the tides "The Reorganization of the Department of
State," ibid., p. 289 ff., and "The State Department Continues Its Reorganization," ibid., 1945,
Vol. 39, p. 309 ff.

198 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

general organization of the executive branch. When integrated economic
policy and coordinated application of regulatory and stimulative mechan-
isms are at a premium, we must aim at three cardinal things. First, while
adding to the strength of top coordination in planning as well as in execu-
tion, we must decrease the exorbitant strain on the chief executive by
providing supplementary opportunities for synthesis through broader re-
grouping of departmental spheres or stronger machinery for interdepart-
mental cooperation. This need is particularly acute in such fields as
provision for unified national defense, conduct of postwar foreign affairs,
maintenance of industrial peace, and integration of authority over trans-
portation, including aviation. Second, as soon as we think of the impli-
cations of departmental regrouping to further these ends, the question of
the independent regulatory boards and commissions comes to mind.
Independence from the chief executive in combination with segmentation
of regulatory assignments between a variety of such agencies spells serious
inadequacy. The postwar need for dealing with the economy in terms of
widely inclusive consistency does not accord with multiplicity of inde-
pendent regulatory bodies. Much of this is also pertinent to the future
role of governmental corporations. And third, sound staff work within
a more comprehensive Executive Office of the President, with full partici-
pation of agency staffs, will be an indispensable requirement. Invigoration of
the staff function cannot be long delayed lest government itself be chal-
lenged in its role of protecting the enterprise economy against fateful shocks.

3, THE SECRETARY'S BUSINESS

In federal administration, the title of secretary is confined to the heads
of eight of the ten executive departments; the remaining two department
heads are designated as Attorney General and as Postmaster General.
However, in this discussion of the secretary's business we shall apply the
term generically. That is to say, we shall deal with the tasks of the gov-
ernmental executive on the agency level, whatever the name of the agency.
Names differ widely today. Aside from the regular departments — federal,
state and local — we find agencies labeled as offices (such as the Office of
Price Administration), administrations (such as the Veterans Administra-
tion), authorities (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority), and so on.
Quite a few of these are permanent establishments; many others are of an
emergency character. However they may differ in durability, most of them
are generically very much like the regular departments. Their heads face
about the same working conditions and tribulations.

External Affairs. Like the chief executive himself, the governmental
executive on the agency level must cope with two main categories of busi-
ness: external matters and internal matters. Both categories compete for
his attention. He cannot safely neglect the one for the other. In this re-
spect, again, the governmental executive finds himself in a position not

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 199

basically different from that occupied by the executive in private enterprise.
It is sometimes suggested that the governmental executive, being a public
figure distinctly visible to the public, is more heavily burdened with ex-
ternal matters. However, private management has recently become very
much aware of the necessity for dividing its energy to satisfy the general
public as well as its customers, stockholders, and employees.

An angry general public can stir up a lot of trouble even for the biggest
corporations. Thus it is sound protection of investment for private man-
agement to put its best foot forward in its relations with the general public.
Ever since the late Ivy Lee made himself the father of a new profession
by "humanizing" the Pennsylvania Railroad and the senior Rockefeller,
the art of public relations has enjoyed top rating among the external con-
cerns of business executives. The emergence of such figures as Archibald
MacLeish, a ranking man of letters, and William Benton, a publicity
specialist, as Assistant Secretaries of State in charge of informational services
is symptomatic of the same development in public administration.

Roughly speaking, the weight of the executive function in the technical
sense rests in the internal realm, in the direction of an administrative or-
ganization toward accomplishment of its purposes. By comparison, ex-
ternal business gives the impression of being auxiliary to the executive
function, providing for the surrounding conditions under which this func-
tion— and the total task of the organization — can best be carried out. Such
a distinction, however, should not lead us to assume that we may draw a
precise borderline between external and internal aspects. Quite apart from
questions of administrative policy where public repercussions are often a
crucial factor, even seemingly innocent details of management have an
alarming capacity for catching unexpected attention outside the agency's
four walls. Most problems which come before the governmental execu-
tive carry with them potentialities of public debate, and require at least
a second thought from this angle.

Living in a Goldfish Bowl. Fortunately, the large majority of items
passing across the desk of the governmental executive fail to attract outside
notice. But he can never be sure in advance. Newsmen have their peculiar
pipelines. Congressmen fish up a great many interesting things about regu-
lations, instructions, and orders which agency field officials bring to bear
upon constituents "back home." Grilling may be merciless when the time
comes around for legislative committee hearings on the agency's budgetary
estimates, to say nothing about investigating committees.

Of course, public wakefulness is not only necessary in a democracy but
also a most desirable stimulant. Yet the governmental executive frequently
has a tough time trying to do anything without offending some organized
group or running up against the highly personal views of a powerful fig-
ure in the legislature. On the legitimate doctrine that public business is
everybody's business, we are as a nation predisposed toward criticizing pub-

200 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

lie officials more liberally and spontaneously than we do executives in
private enterprise. That in itself has done much to retard the demise of the
myth that business management is more efficient than government, and to
keep alive the dangerous notion that the price of democracy is inefficiency.

Because of the pressure of external matters, the governmental executive
must be something of a politician, at least in an extracurricular way. If
he was recruited from the arena of politics, he may not find it difficult
to retain his former alignments and friends. These are valuable sources of
counsel on matters of agency strategy and tactics. They can be instrumental
in promoting the public reputation of the governmental executive as a
"crack administrator," even if his management staffs will never cease to
shake their heads in privacy. Friends good and true, in the legislature and
in interest organizations, are also able to carry the ball for him when the
game becomes fast. A different situation usually presents itself to the gov-
ernmental executive whose rise to office stems from eligibility acquired
outside politics in the customary meaning. He needs the same kind of
external support, but he seldom gets it without extensive effort. He may
also learn that it is not a simple thing to be a politician in an extracurricular
fashion without making it a curriculum.

Whatever the background of the governmental executive, he cannot for
any length of time relax his vigilance over his agency's public relations.
This requires special internal organization, technical assistance within his
own office, and much hard labor on his part in mingling socially with the
right crowd, in building good will at his press conferences, and in cultivating
his legislative contacts. Nor should we forget his equally exacting chore of
maintaining himself close to the chief executive and those who have his
ear — officials or members of the "kitchen cabinet," which may also include
elements of the distaff side.

Finally, there are his colleagues at the helm of various other agencies.
Some of them may have sharply competitive instincts. Others may demon-
strate personal antagonism. But rare is the agency which can live by itself,
without dependence on sympathetic cooperation from other agencies. It
would be very bold to presuppose the existence of whole-hearted cooper-
ation among all members of the executive family. In the development of
cooperation, the way in which the governmental executive personally gets
along with his brethren is a matter of great importance. One of his most
obvious tasks as the responsible head of his organization is to exert himself
continually toward driving into every part of it a thorough appreciation
of the need, not only for good public relations, but also for effective work-
ing relationships with other elements of the executive branch.

Character of Executive Function. Turning to the executive function itself,
we may describe its core in brevity as direction and control— the former in the
sense of providing for the right kind of action, and the latter looking toward
ttie attainment of accountability for and in the execution of policy. These

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 201

two central terms embrace a variety of integral and interrelated functions.
Direction entails planning, coordination, and programming— even research.
Control involves organization, supervision, documentation, and reporting.
Other subsidiary functions play in equal proportions in both spheres.
Budgeting, for instance, is simultaneously a tool of planning and a method
of accountability. Personnel administration also serves both direction and
control.

While there are different ways of grouping the ingredients of the execu-
tive function, no grouping can dispose of the plain fact that the governmental
executive himself operates in a relatively small circle concentric with that
of the total executive function. In other words, in exercising the executive
function he is at the pole from which his actions radiate into his agency.
However, in shaping his actions and in securing compliance throughout the
agency he must necessarily rely on many aides who thus act as extensions
of the executive function. Because human beings are anything but robots,
these aides perform their tasks not as inanimate cogs but as individuals
who exert measurable influences upon one another, and also upon the gov-
ernmental executive himself. This makes the latter a more resourceful and
better informed chief. But it is at the same time a control and a limitation
placed upon him.

Classes of Executive Aides. The aides who share in the exercise of the
executive function fall into fairly distinct classes. They may be divided
broadly into political and professional officers. Typically, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries and special assistants are political appointees, though
their claim to recognition is based in an increasing number of cases on
evidence of special competence rather than on obligations of patronage.
One or the other may even have come from the ranks of the department.
The professional element is mostly supplied through career service. In
federal administration, the majority of bureau chiefs or heads of special
services like budgeting have reached their level from below; this would
not be true of many state and local governments.

Most of the federal bureaus are in charge of defined departmental ac-
tivities of a line character. But you can never trust official nomenclature.
Outstanding examples of bureaus serving in a staff capacity are the Bureau
of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Labor Department. Many other staff
units are known as offices, divisions, or branches. Such staff and auxiliary
facilities — planning, management, budget, statistics, personnel — add to the
infusion of professional thinking into the institutional environment in which
the agency head spends his days.

Attaining an Institutional Product. The governmental executive thus
enjoys the advantage of having at his call not only various types of advisers
but also a profitable blend of judgments — political and professional, staff
and line, general and special. If he is alert in securing the proper mixture

202 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

for each different occasion, he will rarely make a fool of himself. However,
the proper mixture cannot be found in any book of recipes. The crux of
the executive function lies therefore in the teamplaj of all the aides who
enter into the exercise of direction and control.

In an agency that has settled down to its business and has become a
going concern, teamplay will arise without requiring constant prodding
from the head of the agency. Notwithstanding personal incompatibilities
of one kind or another, the individual members of the team will come to
adjust themselves to a pattern familiar to all. Each will learn the modes of
thought of the others, including their idiosyncrasies and their blow-up
points. As this process continues, the governmental executive will be able
increasingly to restrict himself to feeding fresh ideas into the team and to
getting conclusions into concrete form for practical application. It is in this
sense that some students of management have spoken of the executive as
the catalyst or as the ratifier of staff judgment. This is quite different from
the nai've conception of the titan who roars orders.

Departmental leadership, then, calls for much more than a chief who
thinks of himself as a ruler and "gets things going." He cannot whip sub-
ordinates into doing well. He cannot overrule them blindly. He has no
way of preventing his orders from being bent and twisted at will in the
process of execution by operating officials who say they "didn't understand
them." The governmental executive — in widening the horizon of his or-
ganization, in holding it to its main goals, in welding its resources together,
in straightening out internal and external difficulties — shows himself a true
leader by being ever mindful of the human factor.21 The more he suc-
ceeds in persuading, the less will he be driven to empty gestures of authority.
In the long run, his accomplishments will not stand up if they fail to live
in the minds and attitudes of his subordinates. This means that he may
have to accept, at least temporarily, the veto of his key officials. Nor can
he push ahead in too many directions at once. He must have considerable
patience in making his influence felt. Only thus can he educate his or-
ganization to think and act on his terms. Only thus can he give real force
to his leadership.

4. THE BUREAU PATTERN

Special Concerns Versus General Purposes. Exercise of the executive
function employs many more individuals than the agency head himself.
Despite such relief as may be achieved through distribution of responsibili-
ties among officials sharing in the application of directive power or im-
plementing the directive power by staff work, the governmental executive

21 For a more extensive discussion of the working approach of agency heads, see Stone,
Donald C., "Notes on the Governmental Executive: His Role and His Methods," Public
Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 210 ff.; Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, ch. 7,
"Operating on One's Proper Level," New York: Knopf, 1945.

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 203

is still heavily burdened. He alone is able to attend to the necessary con-
tacts with the chief executive, legislative leaders, and his colleagues in the
departmental system. He alone is in a position to reconcile in binding
terms political answerability for the actions of his agency with vigorous
pursuit of agency programs. He alone can shoulder the task of keeping
fresh in all minds a unified conception of purpose and approach.

Faced with these prime duties, he would invite failure and defeat if he
allowed his energies to be dissipated in details and trivialities. Of course,
small things are often more important than they seem to be at first glance,
especially if they have a political twist. In trying to shun small things, the
governmental executive therefore cannot afford to dispose of sage discrimi-
nation. He must develop an eye for the significant detail. Yet he should
normally stick to his proper level. If he does not, he is likely not only
to give inadequate time to his main role but also to befuddle his supporting
cast and throw working relationships on lower levels out of gear.

In confining himself generally to his own level, the governmental execu-
tive would have little ease of mind if he could not be reasonably sure of
the caliber, loyalty, and thought processes of his key subordinates. This
again underscores one of his principal obligations — that of establishing close
rapport with the subleadership of his organization so that his attitude can
become active on a broad scale. Subordinates can directly handle many
issues when they know of his general attitude. They can evolve a pretty
dependable sense of differentiation in determining what matters should go
up to him and what matters they can settle in their spheres.

It is difficult to spell out such differentiation in writing, but in the work-
ing style of a well-directed agency the differentiation is usually quite pre-
cise to all concerned. Equally important is the willingness of the govern
mental executive to make the most of his associates by handing them things
that are too tough for him to accomplish without assistance. He is the con-
ductor in the concert of specialists; as such he needs only his score, a baton,
and the eyes of his orchestra. When technicalities come up, he should
promptly turn them over to his technicians. When operational questions
arise, he should first put them up to his operators. In either case, he has
to be familiar with the structure of his resources.

Centrifugal Pull. Most of the staff and auxiliary services aiding the
governmental executive are appendages to his own office, though the organi-
zation chart will show them as separate boxes. But the operating branches,
traditionally organized as bureaus or their equivalent, are one further step
removed. Each — in its divisions, sections, units, and field establishments —
may control many hundreds and even thousands of employees. And the
number of such bureaus within one agency may run to a score. The
sheer bulk of these operating branches absorbed in their particular business
means for the agency's center— the secretary's level— an enormous centrifu-
gal pull, a constant "downward drag." As one able former undersecretary

204 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

has remarked, "throughout my stay in Washington I have been impressed
with the fact of too great separation on the part of the bureaus from
the departments."22

This separation is not simply overcome by placing groups of bureaus in
charge of assistant secretaries or coordinating directors. However, we can
see the obvious need for "some collateral or parallel lines of control to push
against the whole vertical structures of the bureaus in moving the bureaus
into closer association and harmony." In addition, "immediately around the
secretary there must be a special means for converting matters that come
from the special bureau pyramids into the general."23 During World War
II as well as earlier, the Department of Agriculture experimented with ar-
rangements of this kind, if only in a tentative fashion. Such arrangements,
however, do not yield results automatically. They are stepping stones that
lead to varying degrees of functional integration when and insofar as the
departmental officialdom can be induced to use them as the customary and
the safest thing to do.

Bureau Intransigence. As departments are prone to struggle for their
operational prerogatives and find inconspicuous ways of defying or evading
central control, so bureaus within departments prefer to be "left alone" by
the departmental high command. Some of this tendency is everpresent. It
is frequently reenforced by bureau self-sufficiency, both in squarely sitting
on a special function and in holding hands with a specific clientele. The
result may be a high degree of institutional intransigence paired with sub-
servience to interest demands coming from the outside. The one is as em-
barrassing to the governmental executive as the other.

Here, as in the area of the chief executive, we can notice distinctly the
unintended consequences of the historic growth of our administrative organ-
ization. The body administrative first developed its extremities, then its
head. In their relative proportions, hands and feet — the operating extremi-
ties— are oversized and the control center of the nervous system is still too
weak. To change the metaphor, the relationship between the bureaus and
the secretary's setup resembles, more often than it should, the proverbial
tail wagging the dog.

Weight of Professionalization on Bureau Level. The genesis of our
administrative system is also reflected in a related fact. Not only are the
staff facilities available to the governmental executive younger and weaker
than most of the operating bureaus; they are also less representative of the
career element!24 Thus general management and control, in terms of the

22Appleby, Paul H., in an interesting exchange of letters with Professor Arnold Brecht
published in Public Administration Review, 1942, Vol. 2, p. 63.

23 fad., p. 66.

24 A most valuable source of information on this and related subjects is Macmahon, Arthur
W. and Millett, John D., federal Administrators, New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
See also the first author's earlier studies of selection and tenure of federal bureau chiefs pub-
lished in American Political Science Review, 1926, Vol. 20, p. 548 ff.t 770 if.

THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM 205

entire department, have to contend with a greater measure of professionali-
zation on the lower levels. The answer, of course, is fuller recognition of
the career idea near the apex of the administrative hierarchy, including a
differentiation between political and permanent members of the secretary's
entourage.

It is interesting that the central departments in Germany, where the
career principle for the higher service emerged more than two centuries ago,
have traditionally operated as very small establishments, with the operating
branches organized as autonomous though subordinate entities. The depart-
ment head exercised his authority primarily through, or with the constant
counsel of, his permanent undersecretary. The permanent undersecretary
in turn relied on the directors of some three to five divisions, each of which
was composed of less than a dozen officers, not counting clerical personnel.
These officers — principals, as their counterpart is called in British minis-
terial parlance — looked after their special fields, in which each was "ex-
pected to be the foremost expert of the country, at least so far as it relates to
government."25 The principals were the links between the department and
its autonomous though subordinate bureaus headed by presidents. The
individual principal kept the bureaus under his jurisdiction in touch with
departmental policy and conversely received all necessary information from
them. This may appear to us as a still more marked separation of the bu-
reaus from the departments. Actually, conversion of business from the
special bureau context to the general departmental context was more easily
attained through a small but high-powered top organization composed of
career men.

Reaffirming Unity of Purpose. However, although his bureaus may
have assertive individualities of their own, it should not be inferred that the
governmental executive is helpless in the face of subtle obstinacy. His staff
and auxiliary services, if alive to their opportunities, are capable of acting
for him at many points of the departmental organization in the combined
roles of mediators, missionaries, and watchdogs. The departmental budget
officer, for example, can be extremely useful in keeping operating bureaus
in line by screening their requests for appropriations with a view to con-
formity with the general program of the agency head. Nor need the pres-
sure for synthesis come exclusively from the top. Interbureau committees
may be utilized to provide gentle compulsion for the operating services to
take account of a broader conception than that of their own cherished

25Brecht, Arnold and Glascr, Comstock, The Art and Technique of Administration in
German Ministries, p. 25, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Professor Brecht, a
former ministerial director in the German career service, has argued the case for arrangements
described in the text in a number of thoughtful statements, most extensively in his article on
"Smaller Departments," Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 363 ff., and in some
subsequent correspondence with Mr. Appleby, then undersecretary in the Department of Agri-
culture, he. cit. above in note 22, p. 61 ff. It is pertinent to observe that federal departments
have as a rule met suspicion on the part of the Appropriations Committees of Congress when
proposing reinforcement of the immediate organization at the disposal of the department head.

206 THE DEPARTMENTAL SYSTEM

microcosm.26 Consultative methods, systematically applied, can contribute
substantially to the formation of what may justly be called the depart-
mental mind. Regular staff conferences, bringing together responsible offi-
cials on various levels of the departmental pyramid, offer another device
that has yielded tangible benefits where it has found thoughtful sponsorship
and intelligent support.

To be sure, forms of administrative structure and management, though
experience may favor one over another, are never better than the living sub-
stance for which they are to serve as receptacles. This living substance is
made up of men and women who at best represent humanity in all of its
embodiments. That they have passed entrance examinations is perhaps the
least significant thing about them. Much more important, beyond their
quest of decent living, is their pride of service and the nature of their adjust-
ment to the discipline of working together for an end above personal gain.
In both their pride and their adjustment, they are subject to influences —
good and bad — that spring from the dynamics of our political order. Depart-
mental leadership is only one of these influences, but its effects should not
be underestimated. The more we succeed through proper staffing in making
departmental leadership an institutional product, the less need we fear the
bungling or bullying of uninspired mediocrity.

2<JFor the experience of the Department of Agriculture, which, has extensively relied on
this medium, see Glaser, Comstock, "Managing Committee Work in a Large Organization,"
Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 249 ff. See also in general Morstein Marx, Fritz,
"Bureaucracy and Consultation," Review of Politics, 1939, Vol. 1, p. 84 ff., and "Policy Formu-
lation and the Administrative Process," American Political Science Review, 1939, Vol. 33, p.

CHAPTER

Independent Regulatory Establishments

The administrative structure of government is often pictured as a neatly
symmetrical pyramid in which each stone is a unit of the executive branch
and the capstone is the chief executive. Tidy instincts make us expect that
no stray stones will be scattered about on the ground surrounding the pyra-
mid. In practice, government is not organized that way, and there is a
considerable body of opinion that it should not be so organized. We need
only glance at any government in this country or abroad to see that while
many public agencies are subject to immediate control by the chief execu-
tive, there are a number of agencies having some degree of independence
from him and even, in certain cases, from the legislature. It is these so-
called independent establishments that will receive particular attention in
the present chapter.

1. TYPES OF INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS

Meaning of Independence. "Independence," as a word, has acquired a
confusing variety of meanings in the governmental setting. Usually the
word refers to freedom of an agency from immediate control by the chief
executive and, in some cases, by the legislature. In certain uses, however,
"independence" in government refers to integrity and devotion to the public
interest — & natural derivative from the first meaning if legislatures and chief
executives are thought of as "political" in the opprobrious sense of that term.
By natural progression, this emphasis on integrity and the public interest as
the very substance of independence leads to giving "independence" the
meaning of freedom from control by special interest groups. Sometimes
even, by independence is meant an agency's freedom to act without fear
of highly restrictive legal barriers erected by courts of law. Finally, those who
use independence in the sense of freedom from executive and legislative con-
trol may wind up, through a different chain of reasoning, with an "inde-
pendence" that means direct responsibility to the electorate.

These confusions of meaning are not so great as to create insuperable

207

208 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

obstacles to consideration of the status of so-called independent establish-
ments. Actually, they arise simply from applying the same term to two
things. The first is the end sought— the formulation and administration of
public policies without undue pressure from political and economic inter-
ests. The second is the supposed means to that end — the organizational
status of "independence" or isolation from political and economic centers
of power.

There are five main types of agencies for which independent status is
often urged and obtained. First are the regulatory agencies, charged with
exercising broad governmental powers in connection with electric power,
transportation, insurance, banking, liquor control, securities issuance, fair
trade practices, labor relations, radio, and other important economic areas.
The second type is the government-in-business enterprise, usually organized
as the government corporation, to which the next chapter is specifically
addressed. Third are certain service agencies. Some of these, like educa-
tional institutions and welfare departments, may claim the right to inde-
pendence largely because of the professionalization of their staffs. Others,
like highway commissions and — to some extent — social agencies, claim
independence because of the possibility of the governor's making political
capital of their large staffs and expenditures. The fourth group consists at
the state level of such officials as the state treasurer, secretary of state, and
attorney general, who largely for traditional and political reasons may be
directly responsible to the electorate. Finally, there are the auditors who,
because they are expected to report independently on the legality of expendi-
tures by executive officials, are wisely made independent of control by the
chief executive.1

Surprisingly, it is genuinely difficult to determine when an agency is
independent. In fact, both complete independence from, and complete
subordination to, the chief executive and the legislature are myths. All
governmental institutions draw too much from the same wellspring of ideas
and are too exposed to the same "climate of opinion" to be thought of as
truly independent for long. Independent establishments, like courts, follow
the election returns, though sometimes with considerable reluctance and
delay. On the other hand, it is a familiar feature of bureaucracy that even
in the more highly integrated executive branch, individual departments,
bureaus, and sections can muster a considerable resistance to direction by
superior authority; this can be remedied only by firm and decisive action
by the higher executives. We are, therefore, dealing with a matter of
degree — greater or lesser — of independence, not with complete independ-
ence or complete dependence.

1In the federal government the term "independent establishments" frequently refers to
all agencies neither in the legislative nor the judicial branch that are outside the ten so-called
executive departments. Such agencies, including, for instance, the National Archives and the
Smithsonian Institution, have very little in common except this one negative characteristic, and
are not as a group the subject of this chapter.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 209

Institutional Safeguards of Independence. Ingenious designers have by
now developed most of the institutional arrangements that promise to in-
crease an agency's degree of independence. The most common device is that
of the commission or board form of organization. It is supposed that a
group of three, five, or seven men is less susceptible of subservience to the
chief executive than a single department head. If decisions must be made
by such a multiple-member commission, there is likely to be emphasis upon
discussion, deliberation, consideration of all relevant opinions, and com-
promise. The very delay involved in calling a formal meeting of the com-
mission before a decision is made is an influence against precipitate com-
pliance with the chief executive's orders.

Conceivably, of course, even a commission could be made subservient if
its members were party loyalists all allied with the chief executive, or if
they were beholden to him for their tenure and could be removed at any
time he thought appropriate. In fact, some commissions and boards are cre-
ated as agents of the chief executive, with no thought that they will be or
should be independent. Advocates of independence must therefore go be-
yond mere creation of commissions.

Many commissions must be bipartisan; that is, each must be composed of
members of both major political parties and in approximately equal num-
bers. However, political scientists are agreed that the requirement of bipar-
tisanship puts a premium on extensive political activity as a qualification
for membership, and therefore fails to lift commissions out of politics into
an atmosphere of true independence.2 Furthermore, with each major party
at present such a congeries of discordant factions, a bipartisanship require-
ment alone cannot prevent a shrewd chief executive from picking a majority
of members who share his views on public policy in the area of the com-
mission's responsibility. While party labels still mean different orientations
as to public policy when applied to each party as a whole, such labels may
be quite meaningless when attached to individuals.

Another supposed assurance of independence is the staggered-term
arrangement. Terms of members of each commission are scheduled on an
overlapping basis so that no individual chief executive during his term of
office has an opportunity to appoint a majority of members of any commis-
sion. Thus it is assured that no commission will be subservient to him.
This safeguard breaks down if the same chief executive is elected for
more than one term or if the same political party or faction captures
the post of chief executive for several terms in succession. Furthermore,
it is to be noted that not only newly appointed commissioners but also hold-

2 One distinguished public servant, Joseph B. Eastman, nearly missed appointment to the
Interstate Commerce Commission because he was an independent in politics and hence could
not qualify clearly as a member of either political party. For convenience, he was classified as
a Republican since there was no Democratic vacancy. See Swisher, Carl B., "Joseph B» East-
man— Public Servant," Public Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 37 ft.

210 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

overs whose terms will expire during the chief executive's term are likely
to be hospitable to his views on policy.

Appointment and Removal of Members. Statutory or constitutional
restriction on the exercise of the executive's appointive power in connection
with commissions is another device resorted to in the name of independence.
Many such restrictions are scarcely worth notice, for they are almost mean-
ingless— statutory insistence that an appointee be of good moral character,
or have professional or business experience, or be free of a criminal record!
A requirement of senatorial confirmation of appointments is difficult to
appraise. Possibly it deters the chief executive from making outrageous
appointments, though public opinion alone should suffice as a check. On
the other hand, a requirement of senatorial confirmation may actually
inject so much politics into appointments as to discourage able citizens from
allowing themselves to be put forward as candidates for public positions.
Sometimes the chief executive's freedom of choice is considerably restricted
by the requirement that he select appointees from a limited panel of names
prepared by some presumably nonpolitical group. Thus, neutral citizens —
for example, presidents of the principal universities in the state — may be
authorized by law to nominate to the governor candidates from whom he
shall select members of an important regulatory commission.

In other instances, the legislature may actually force the governor to
select all commission members from a panel of names submitted by a single
special-interest group. This, of course, reflects considerable distrust of the
governor and relatively greater confidence in the interest group's sympa-
thetic regard for the public interest. Often such a provision betokens abdi-
cation by the legislature in favor of self-regulation by an industry, profes-
sion, or other economic group. Sometimes several competing interest groups
are brought into the nomination process, and the chief executive is required
to select a certain number of his appointees from nominees of each of the
Interest groups. Through such a balancing of special interests in its mem-
bership it is supposed that the commission's decisions will come close to
representing the public interest — a supposition, it may be added, that
students should regard with some skepticism.

More importance is attached to the removal power than to any other
criterion of independence. Unless a commissioner or head of an agency has
security of tenure, he is in no position to challenge the policy instructions
of the chief executive. Actually, few statutes place commissioners entirely
beyond the executive's removal power. It is recognized that legislative im-
peachment is too cumbersome a process to be the sole recourse against
dishonest or inefficient public officials. In the case of independent commis-
sions, however, the executive is generally restricted to certain specific reasons
for removal. "Inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" are
fairly customary grounds for removal in federal statutes creating independ-
ent commissions. These restrictions are enforced by the courts, as President

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 211

Franklin D. Roosevelt found to his sorrow when, early in the New Deal,
he attempted to remove Commissioner William E. Humphrey from the
Federal Trade Commission. However, the chief executive is allowed con-
siderable discretion in deciding what actions do fall within the grounds for
removal specified by statute. Removal is, of course, an extreme step that is
rarely taken. Yet its existence or nonexistence as an ultimate sanction of the
President's authority conditions the atmosphere in which commissioners
consider his views on commission policy.

Financial Support and Basic Authority. Freedom from reliance upon the
chief executive and the legislature for financial support is an important
criterion of independence. We should not underestimate the importance
of executive budgets and legislative appropriations as annual or biennial
power-bestowing and power-withdrawing instruments — and, by natural
deduction, instruments giving the chief executive and even individual
legislators an influence upon the commission that they might not have
otherwise. Commissions that finance themselves are generally free of this
executive-legislative type of control. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System is supported directly by assessment upon the reserve banks.
And many state commissions on banking, insurance, public utilities, agricul-
tural marketing, and professional licensing support themselves in whole or in
part through assessment of fees on the companies and individuals subject to
their regulatory authority. As a means to independence, financial support
is an excellent instrument; but it runs counter to the whole emphasis in
democratic history upon legislative possession of the power of the purse.

As yet, the architects of independent establishments have failed to free
such agencies from dependence on the legislative body for grants of regu-
latory authority. Congress and the state legislatures create and abolish the
powers of independent agencies. Every so often, therefore, an agency, how-
ever independent by all the criteria just reviewed, must ask the legislative
body for extensions of its jurisdiction and for more effective sanctions with
which to enforce its decisions. It must also enter the legislative arena when-
ever a bill is proposed to abolish or weaken the agency.3

Political Factors. Two final factors are important in freeing agencies
from dependence on the chief executive, even though they are unrecognized
by the statute books. One is the alliance of agencies with pressure groups
whose economic and political power is sufficient to protect their wards
against even such controls as are authorized by law. If a utilities commis-
sion wins the favor of the utility companies, the banking commission comes
to be regarded as the banks' creature, the fish and game commission is
strongly backed by the well-organized sportsmen's associations, the labor

3 A few state agencies are established and granted their powers by constitutional provision;
dependence on the legislature is therefore lessened, but on occasion such agencies may have to
participate actively in a campaign to influence an election on proposed constitutional amend-
ments.

212 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

department can run for support to the great labor organizations, and
the medical licensing board can turn to the influential medical association—
in such situations a chief executive and a legislature may readily be balked
in their attempts to control these public agencies.

The second factor is not unrelated to pressure-group alliances. It con-
cerns the ability of the agency to develop political power sufficient to resist
the chief executive's encroachments upon its independence. The courting
of pressure groups is, of course, a major step in this direction. In addition,
if an agency head controls a major faction in the chief executive's political
party as some agency heads are appointed in recognition of such control,
or if the agency has assiduously cultivated the good will of legislators and
local party leaders, or if the agency head has established a public prestige
that would cause the newspapers, educational leaders, civic organizations,
and women's clubs to protest vigorously any executive trespassing on his
authority — in cases like these the chief executive will not "cross" the agency
head without gauging accurately the political liabilities he might thereby
assume.

In part, of course, we are saying that regulation is essentially political,
that it is concerned with the formulation of public policies. Over the years,
the people have established legislative and executive instruments for policy-
making and have placed emphasis on responsiveness of those instruments
to public opinion. This responsiveness is periodically enforced at the polls
and is less formally emphasized between elections in newspapers, corre-
spondence, speeches, hearings, and through other channels. The people's
legislative and executive instruments must, in turn, control the regulatory
agencies, unless we err in speaking of the work of these agencies as policy
formation. The problem may therefore in part be reduced to the questions:
What is the nature of regulatory business? How should it be conducted?

2. NATURE AND CONDUCT OF REGULATORY BUSINESS

Regulation is governmental circumscribing of the range of permissible
conduct of individuals and groups. The simplest regulations require that
stop lights be observed, that houses not be robbed, that children attend
school. In this type of regulation, characteristically the legislative body
adopts a clear-cut rule defining public policy. It is a simple task then for
policemen and truant officers to arrest apparent violators; and the courts
have no serious problem, assuming sufficient evidence is presented, in de-
ciding finally whether or not the law has actually been violated.

Rule-Making and Case-by-Case Decision. However, regulation by mod-
ern government goes far beyond the simple examples cited. In the less
simple types of regulation the most dramatic feature is the extent to which
legislative bodies delegate broad discretionary power to administrative
igcncies. The legislatures despair of defining in crystal-clear terms the
norms of conduct to govern economic or social life. Instead, they pass

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 213

laws requiring that railroad and power rates be "just and reasonable," that
restaurants and dairies be "sanitary," that employers provide "reasonable
protection to the lives, health, and safety" of their employees, that commer-
cial practices not be "unfair or deceptive" or include "unfair methods of
competition." The volume of legislative business, the lack of expertness
on the part of the average legislator, and, perhaps, a disposition of the
lawmaking body in some instances to "pass the buck," have all contributed
to the trend toward vague statutes whose only precision is acquired by
administrative and judicial action long after the legislature has completed
its work. Whatever the cause, the administrative and judicial areas of
discretion have been vastly increased by legislative inability to define pre-
cisely what acts government regards as unlawful.

Once the legislature has decided to delegate broad discretionary authority,
the question of whether such authority should be exercised through tech-
niques of a legislative, judicial, executive, or other character is posed. Most
regulatory agencies use a combination of these approaches, but it is im-
portant to note the practical significance of the several approaches because
the emphasis given each differs. If emphasis is placed on a legislative
technique, the agency will set about doing what the legislature failed to do
— define with some exactness the types of acts that will be treated as unlaw-
ful. This it will do through the issuance of rules and regulations. For ex-
ample, in most states there are industrial safety codes, issued by the state
labor department, which describe specifically the types of safety precautions
employers must take if they are to conform to the legislature's demand that
employers provide safe conditions of employment.

On the other hand, if the discretionary authority is to be exercised along
judicial lines, the agency very probably will depend upon private individuals
to bring cases formally to its attention, or it will on its own initiative hail
suspected violators before its bar for an investigation, or it will require
that individuals and companies proposing to take a particular line of action
— such as open a liquor store, extend a railroad's tracks, or practice medi-
cine— apply to the agency for a license or "certificate of convenience and
necessity" before going ahead with the proposed action. Whichever of these
approaches is followed, the agency will be deciding each case as it comes
along, without paying too much attention to the need of industry and
citizens for more reliable guidance as to permissible conduct than either
the vague statute or the spotty pattern of past case decisions affords.

The rule-making approach does have the advantage that the public learns
relatively more promptly the standards by which it must abide. Further-
more, in formulating such general rules, the regulatory agency can engage
in thorough research and consult with representatives of all groups likely to
be affected by the regulation. Thereby the agency frankly acknowledges that
it is making public policy, that it needs to inform itself of all relevant eco-
nomic facts, and that it desires the advice of all affected interests.

214 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

The case-by-case approach, on the other hand, leaves the public in the
dark for years, in some instances, as to what the vague statute means. It
often narrows the evidence to that presented in formal court-like hearings.
It tends to ignore affected interests not represented by the two contending
parties to each dispute. And it permits the introduction of considerations
of public policy and public interest only as rather regrettable departures
from "sound" procedure.

The case-by-case approach reaches its greatest usefulness when the func-
tion is genuinely one of settlement of disputes between two parties; as, for
example, when an injured workman seeks compensation from an employer.
Especially is this true where the statute, or a set of regulations having
the force of law, fairly clearly establishes the standards to control the adjudi-
cative work. What is needed then is simply a process that will: (1) let
the two parties tell their stories and argue whether the facts fall within or
without the area defined by the legislative standards; and (2) ensure that
the decision is made by a man who will honestly weigh the evidence and
arguments presented by the two sides and exercise wise judgment in ruling
which contender should prevail. This clearly is a different situation from
one where public policy needs to be defined, where the public interest needs
to be vigorously advanced in an industrial area in which that interest has
previously been subordinated to private interests, and where an important
segment of the economy needs to know the "rules of the game."

Administrative Approach. A third approach to regulation is usually
thought of as executive or administrative in character. Most clearly con-
nected with this approach is the regulatory function of inspection. It is the
inspector who checks fire precautions in theaters and office buildings; visits
factories to determine observance of industrial safety codes and laws govern-
ing the employment of women and children; looks over barber shops,
dairies, and restaurants to ensure sanitary conditions; stops cars on the high-
way to prevent spread of the Japanese beetle; examines bank records to
protect depositors against loss of their savings; surveys factory payrolls to
enforce wage and hour legislation; and goes through railway trains to assure
that their equipment complies with all necessary safety devices. Sometimes
the inspector is a laboratory technician testing the quality of food and drugs.
Sometimes, indeed, if the term has a reasonable degree of elasticity, he is an
administrator and grader of examinations taken by candidates for licenses
such as doctors, pharmacists, and barbers.

The inspector is naturally more circumscribed in his function than an
agency head promulgating rules and regulations affecting great industries;
the inspector is often the implementer of such rules and regulations. Never-
theless, he is no mere automaton answering "yes" or "no" to a form ques-
tion as to whether his inspection reveals a violation. The modern inspector
is often a missionary, charged with spreading awareness and understanding

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 215

of the law and the administrative regulations under the law. He is expected
to tell people subject to his jurisdiction not only what the regulations are
and the penalties for their violation, but also why the regulation is necessary
and deserves voluntary compliance. Inspection and enforcement, in other
words, thrive best when those subject to them are so educated and per-
suaded that actual violations are few.

This very emphasis on the inspector's educational function lends breadth
to his discretionary powers. For discovery of a first violation is often used
as an opportunity for an educational interview with the violator, rather than
for punishing him. Whether this educational approach is followed twice
or thrice with the same violator, or on the other hand is rejected even for
a first violation in favor of prompt punishment, is largely a matter for the
inspector's judgment as to which course will best serve the public interest.
It is noteworthy that for laxity in enforcement by the inspector there is
generally no judicial remedy. The public interest, in other words, is pro-
tected only by the administrative means of the inspector's removal or repri-
mand by his administrative supervisors.

Regulatory officials and scholars alike have often questioned the attempts
to define regulatory approaches as either legislative, judicial, or executive.
One basis of their questioning is the frequency with which two or three of
these approaches are combined in the same agency. In practice the rules-and-
regulations approach, which is of a legislative character, and the case-by-case
approach, which is more judicial in orientation, are often found together.
For instance, in some states the so-called workmen's compensation board
both formulates industrial safety codes and hears individual cases of work-
men claiming compensation for injuries sustained in industrial accidents.
The War Production Board promulgated orders applicable to whole indus-
tries, heard appeals from individuals seeking exemption from those industry-
wide orders, and also heard violation cases. In addition, naturally, regulatory
agencies have executive or administrative responsibilities. A notable case
among the independent agencies is the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which enforces a variety of statutes designed to ensure safe operation of
the railroads; under one of these statutes its inspectors examine over one
hundred thousand locomotives each year.

Mixture of Approaches. In fact, the mixture of legislative, executive,
and judicial approaches has been one of the principal arguments for estab-
lishment of the independent commissions. The reasoning runs that, under
the doctrine of the separation of powers, none of the three great branches
of government may exercise powers constitutionally belonging to either of
the other two branches. Consequently, a regulatory agency exercising a
combination of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot constitu-
tionally belong to any one of the three branches. Hence, the regulatory
commissions must be independent. This reasoning overlooks the fact that

216 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

a number of the executive departments and agencies perform all three types
of function.4

The second basis for questioning the attempt to categorize different types
of regulatory action as legislative, executive, and judicial arises from a
belief that this classification loses sight of the real heart of regulation, which
is fact-finding. It is stressed that every major determination by government
in the regulatory sphere should be preceded by an earnest effort to find the
facts. This may involve broad research in the economics, history, and ad-
ministrative phases of the general problem, investigation of the records of
companies most affected by the proposed decision, collection of statistics
from the industry on a periodic basis to provide factual background for
all of the agency's decisions, and consultation with experts and interests
likely to be directly or indirectly affected by the proposed decision. Con-
sultation might be secured by formal hearing, by interviews through mem-
bers of the agency's staff, or by correspondence. It should be directed to
getting both facts and opinions or arguments.

This is a more comprehensive approach than any attempt to put regu-
latory activities into neat packets labeled "legislative," "executive," and
"judicial" for the purpose of using distinctive procedures for each. Since it
is convenient to argue by analogy, those who take this fact-finding approach
say that its nearest kin is the approach of legislative committees.5 The
distinguishing features of the legislative committee are these: (1) it takes
the initiative in seeking economic and social facts and opinions as a basis
for guiding the judgment of the legislative body; (2) it recognizes that in
pursuing facts to guide public policy, the cumbersome procedure of law
courts would both consume undue time and obstruct the assembling of rele-
vant evidence; (3) it works on the assumption that its members are the
seekers of the truth and may take an active part in the questioning of wit-
nesses, without impairing each member's ability to arrive at unbiased judg-
ments on the basis of the facts and the policy issues involved; (4) it is a
testimonial to the principle of delegation, for although the legislature itself

4 Federal administrative agencies exercising rule-making and adjudicative powers over
private individuals arc listed in Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, p. 261 ff.t 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate
Doc. No. 8, 1941.

5 An interesting feature in the evolution of the independent commission is that the earliest
important commissions — those concerned with railroad regulation — were regarded as arms of
the legislative body to investigate and recommend rate-fixing measures. Part of the reason for
the adoption of procedures more like those of courts than like those of legislative committees
was probably the early domination of the Interstate Commerce Commission by Judge Thomas
M. Coolcy, and the initial appointment of no one but lawyers to that commission. Board of
Investigation and Research, Report on Practices and Procedures of Governmental Control, p.
59 ff., 78th Cong., 2d. Sess., House Doc. No. 678. 1944.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 217

makes the ultimate decision, it cannot as such take all the evidence neces-
sary for a sound decision, and instead relies on the legislative committee as
its agent, to assemble the data and recommend appropriate legislation; and
(5) it has an awareness that at public hearings everyone may be represented
except the public, and that in order to guard resulting legislation from
being swayed too much by the particular witnesses and the most vociferous
special interests, the committee members must themselves keep the
public interest constantly in mind in thinking through their policy
recommendations.

In legislative committees— as in courts, executive agencies, and independ-
ent commissions— the extent to which particular methods serve as media
for arriving at sound decisions depends more upon the men seeking the
facts and making the decisions than upon mechanical rules of procedure.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that a regulatory agency that followed the model
of tjie legislative committee would conduct itself differently from one that
thought of itself as an expert court for the impartial adjudication of contro-
versies brought before it by aggrieved parties.

Judicial Control. This brings us to the vital problem of procedures. One
startling aspect of the problem deserves special emphasis. Although the
courts have been very much concerned about the procedures followed in
reaching administrative decisions bearing on specific individuals or cor-
porations— that is, court-like decisions — they have shown little interest in
the question of safeguarding procedures in the formation of general regu-
latory policy through rules and regulations. True, the courts insist that legis-
lative bodies must not completely abdicate. They must canalize and set
bounds to the discretionary powers delegated to each regulatory agency.
But that hurdle past, the agency has been left relatively free by the
courts to arrive at its general rules and regulations by any procedure it
deems wise.

Considerations of sound public policy often dictate a democratic con-
sultation of affected interests before a general regulation is issued. State
labor departments usually establish panels or committees drawn from labor
unions and management to help in drafting industrial safety codes. The
United States Department of Agriculture has developed an elaborate system
of county committees of farmers with whom questions of departmental
policy can be discussed. Wartime agencies, particularly the War Production
Board and the Office of Price Administration, used both industry advisory
committees and labor advisory committees, which were consulted in connec-
tion with the drafting of hundreds of industry-regulating orders. Although
in practice the formulation of rules and regulations is no haphazard dicta-

218 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

tion by uninformed bureaucrats, the courts cannot claim credit for this fact.6
Their control over the rule-making power stems from the same roots as
their control over the power of legislatures. That is to say, the courts have
reviewed the substance of rules and regulations as they have that of laws,
while largely leaving the procedures involved in rule-making to the discre-
tion of the administrative agency. Rules and regulations have been held
invalid when their provisions appeared to the courts either to exceed the
grant of power made by the legislature or to be unreasonable in terms of a
departure from accepted canons of fairness.

We have been talking about rules and regulations of rather broad cover-
age— usually a whole industry or a large segment of an industry. The courts
have whittled down procedural freedom in rule-making, however, by insist-
ing that where a rule, a regulation, or an order was to be quite specific
in its application— where it would, for example, fix rates to be charged by
individual utilities — something like court procedures would be necessary.
Here, curiously, the courts admit that rate-fixing is a legislative, not a
judicial function; but nonetheless they insist that the procedures in rate-
fixing be of a judicial character.7

Basically this means that such rate-determination must be preceded by
notice to the affected parties and opportunities for them to be heard. With
this principle established, the main dispute has been over the character of
the hearing that is required. The courts, while always granting that their
own rigid procedures need not be followed, have at times imposed proce-
dural straitjackets on regulatory departments and commissions. As a result
these had to abandon many practices that seemed perfectly legitimate
by analogy with administrative agencies and legislative committees, espe-
cially if we recall that legislatures may directly fix rates without court-like
procedures. According to one decision,8 a full hearing involves the right to
introduce evidence, to know all the evidence that is to be considered by
the regulatory officials in fixing the rates, to have opportunity to refute that
evidence—including the right to cross-examine witnesses— and to have the
final decision supported by substantial evidence.

6 Some statutes required notice and hearing prior to issuance of general rules and regula-
tions, but generally this was not the case. The Walter-Logan bill, which on the eve of our
entry into World War II nearly became law, included a provision that "all administrative rules
. . . shall be issued by the head of the agency . . . and by each independent agency . . . after
publication of notice and public hearings." Only rules governing hearing procedure itself were
to be exempted from this blanket requirement. The proposal was not favored by the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. See Duane, Morris, "Mandatory Hearings in
the Rule-Making Process," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
1942, Vol. 221, pp. 115-122. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 represents another
attempt at defining general requirements. For a discussion of the main features of this law,
sec below Ch. 23, "The Judicial Test."

7 See Hart, James, An Introduction to Administrative Law, p. 265, New York: Crofts,
1940.

8 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 227 U. S.
88 (1913).

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 219

Even where a hearing is initiated with the declared purpose of inquiring
into a particular company's rates, it has been held inadequate unless the
agency provides notice of the specific rates it proposes to promulgate, and
enables rebuttal of its proposal.9 Fortunately, the courts have not insisted
that commissions and executive departments take over wholesale the elabo-
rate rules of evidence that are the lawyer's stock in trade. We can say "for-
tunately," having noted the Interstate Commerce Commission's statement
forty years ago that probably "not a single case arising before the Commis-
sion could be properly decided if the complainant, the railroad, or the Com-
mission were bound by the rules of evidence applying to the introduction of
testimony in courts."10

Of course, there are cases of regulation where the objective is similar to
that of the courts — a specific decision in a case between two private parties,
such as a worker and his employer, or between a government agency and
a private party. In such cases, the general principles of procedure applicable
to conduct of court business are pertinent, though softened by noninsistence
upon rigorous observance of the rules of evidence. Again, notice and
hearing are the basic requirements.

Courts can only set the formal outer bounds of regulatory procedure.
Eclipsing the importance of any such judicial strictures upon regulatory
agencies are the caliber of men given regulatory responsibility and the
depth of their understanding of the relation of government to individual
citizens and enterprises in a democracy. What is required is a positive de-
sire for achievement of the public interest. However, this desire must have
much more balance than the witch-hunting mood of aggressive public
prosecutors. Coincident with a positive desire for achieving the public
interest must be an understanding of the need for avoiding government
by decree without advance consultation with affected interests and oppor-
tunity for all relevant facts to be considered. Yet such understanding must
not lull the regulatory official into an overemphasis on individual rights
to the point where the rights and interests of the general public are over-
looked. The task of devising regulatory procedures that satisfy both public
and private interests and are well adapted to particular functions is a
challenge to legislatures, courts, and, above all, the regulatory agencies
themselves. This was clearly recognized by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure.

Proposals of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.
The most important inquiry into regulatory procedures in recent years was
that of the Attorney General's Committee, which submitted its report early
in 1941. The committee's more significant recommendations were embodied

9 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938). See also Morgan v. United States, 298
U. S. 468 (1936), where the Supreme Court insisted that the Secretary of Agriculture per-
sonally had to consider and appraise the voluminous evidence in a case under the Packers and
Stockyards Act before fixing rates, since the act vested the rate-fixing authority in him.

10 Interstate Commerce Commission, Annual Report for 1908, p. 10.

220 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

in a bill, proposed for consideration by Congress. We may group them
under four headings. First with respect to rule-making, the bill would
require extensive publication of policies, interpretations, rules, regulations,
and procedures; annual reporting to Congress on rules issued by the agency
and rules proposed by private citizens; and designation by each agency of
some unit or official to be responsible for keeping rules up-to-date and for
receiving suggestions from the public. The bill would also stipulate a delay
of forty-five days between the promulgation of an order and the date it be-
comes effective, subject to waiver by the order-issuing agency. Second, with
respect to centralized governmental responsibility for regulatory procedures,
the bill would create an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure, the di-
rector of which would investigate any and all aspects of regulatory procedure,
submit his recommendations to Congress and the individual agencies, and
appoint hearing commissioners to serve in most regulatory agencies. Third,
the bill's major provision for administrative adjudication calls for the hold-
ing of all initial hearings by these hearings commissioners, except where
agency heads themselves can hold all hearings. Decisions of the hearing
commissioners in the cases they heard would be final, unless appealed to the
agency heads. And fourth, to reduce uncertainty as to whether proposed
private actions would be permitted by a regulatory agency, the bill would
authorize the issuance of declaratory rulings. Although issued before alleged
violation has occurred, these rulings would have the same binding effect as
an agency decision in an ordinary case. It is not too much to say that the
work of the Attorney General's Committee has had a very beneficial effect
on the character and the tenor of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946.11

Worth noting is the committee's sympathetic understanding and encour-
agement of informal methods of adjudication. The committee observes,
". . . even where formal proceedings are fully available, informal procedures
constitute the vast bulk of administrative adjudication and are truly the
lifeblood of the administrative process."12 However, without detracting from
the utility of extensive reliance on informal procedure in appropriate cases,
two facts should be underscored. In the first place, adoption of informal
procedures, involving bargaining with private interests in order to arrive
at a mutually acceptable course of action, is often resorted to by regulatory
agencies to avoid the cumbersome quasi-judicial procedure imposed on them
by courts, to get prompter compliance by the regulated interests instead of
the delays entailed in a judicial review of a formal regulatory decision, and
to by-pass the danger of having the decision overturned by the courts. In
the second place, cases settled by informal procedure, because of their infi-
nitely greater volume than that of formal cases, may sacrifice the public

the committee's bill, see op. cit. above in note 4, pp. 191-202. On the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of 1946, sec below Ch. 23, "The Judicial Test."
12 Op. cit. above in note 4, p. 35.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 221

interest and private rights, while on the other hand lawyers and courts are
insisting that formal cases be settled with the elaborate paraphernalia of
the courtroom. This, of course, is not to condemn informal procedure.
It does, however, suggest the perils in treating regulatory procedure as
something concerned with cases of the type that appear on a law court's
docket, rather than as something concerned with, for example, the hundreds
of thousands of items of business that are handled annually by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, mainly through its subordinate officials.

The problem of regulatory procedures will never cease to be perplexing,
for it consists essentially of the delicate task of achieving a balance between
public policy and private rights, between form and substance, and between
men and procedures. The problem is complicated by the fact that this bal-
ance is not the same for each regulatory function. Procedures must be
adapted to the particular tasks assigned to regulatory agencies by the
legislative body,

3. THE RECORD OF INDEPENDENCE

Regulation by Independent Commissions and Executive Departments.
In the federal government the number of independent regulatory establish-
ments has never been large. Their significance results rather from the im-
portance of the economic areas over which they have jurisdiction than from
their number. There are only nine so-called independent regulatory com-
missions or boards: the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National
Labor Relations Board, the United States Maritime Commission, and the
Civil Aeronautics Board. These bodies in the aggregate have vast powers
over transportation by rail, bus, pipeline, ocean, and air; communication
by telephone, telegraph, and radio; the "rules of the game" by which trade
and commerce are kept fair and competitive; the supply of electric power
across state lines at reasonable rates; the supply of money and credit, the
issuance of stocks and bonds, and the operations of stock exchanges; and the
maintenance of collective bargaining unfettered by unfair practices on the
part of employers.

These boards and commissions have five members each, with the excep-
tions of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Communications Com-
mission, each of which has seven members, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, with the unwieldy number of eleven. Through staggered
terms of five, six, or seven years—excepting the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, whose members serve for 14 years — and bipartisan
membership — not required for this board or the National Labor Relations
Board — these establishments are intended to be independent of any partic-
ular chief executive. Although the President may remove members of

222 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

most of them only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,
he presumably has a free hand on removals of members of the Pfcderal
Power Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Com-
munications Commission, for the statutes set up no bars to his freedom of
action in these cases. In most instances the President designates the commis-
sion chairman. However, in the important cases of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Federal Power Commission
the membership itself selects one of its number as chairman.13

It is important to note that regular executive departments exercise regu-
latory powers of a character not unlike that entrusted to the independent
commissions. As Professor Robert E. Cushman points out, "Congress has
followed no consistent principle in assigning regulatory functions to inde-
pendent agencies rather than to other units in the national government.
There seems to be nothing about the regulatory job which makes it impera-
tive that it be handled by the same kind of administrative body."14 The
Department of Agriculture with its regulation of packers and stockyards
as well as commodity exchanges, and in all some forty regulatory statutes, is
an outstanding example in this respect. The Departments of Commerce,
Interior, Labor, and the Federal Security Agency with its Food and Drug
Administration also control important economic activities.15

During World War II, vast regulatory authority was entrusted to single-
headed agencies such as the Office of Price Administration, War Production
Board, War Manpower Commission, Petroleum Administration for War,
Solid Fuels Administration, War Food Administration, and Office of
Defense Transportation. It may be added that in performance, both the
independent commissions and the single-headed agencies have shown suc-
cesses and failures.

Clientele Departments and Directive Power. Among the single-headed
departments, two problems have been paramount. One has been the special-
interest taint of the three departments that would be the most likely
single-headed agencies for exercise of regulatory powers: the Department
of Commerce, the businessman's friend; the Department of Labor, the

13 Sec Cushman, Robert E., The Independent Regulatory Commissions, p. 760 ff., New
York: Oxford University Press, 1941.

Ulbid.,?. 10.

15 The Brookings Institution has suggested that the executive departments regulate and
control business through an exercise of what is virtually the "police power," in the interests of
public health, safety, and the prevention of fraud. Here the only factors involved arc a fixed
rule of law, a charge that the law has been broken, and a decision. The work of independent
commissions, on the other hand, is distinguishable because it involves questions of public
policy on large economic problems, questions of complicated economic relationships, and prob-
lems of public management. For this point, see Senate Select Committee to Investigate
the Executive Agencies of the Government, Report No. 10 of the Brookings Institution,
Government Activities in the Regulation of Private Business Enterprise t p. 61 ff., 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1937. See also Benson, George C. S., "Administrative Regulation within Federal
Departments," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1942, Vol.
221, pp. 64-71.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 223

worker's— especially the union's— friend; and the Department of Agricul-
ture, the farmer's friend. Thus a problem arises whenever, for example,
there is need for regulation of both employers and workers to assure col-
lective bargaining, prevent unfair labor practices, facilitate the settlement of
labor disputes, or control wages and hours. Should such functions be as-
signed to the Department of Labor, or would that interfere — or, what is
equally important, give grounds for suspicion of interference — with fair
treatment of the employers' interests?

The second problem about single-headed departments has been the ex-
tent to which particular kinds of regulatory work may be slighted because
of the influence of the department head or the President. The Justice
Department, for instance, having limited funds and staff like any other
agency, must choose where it wishes to concentrate these resources. Some-
times, especially under a conservative administration, prosecutions for viola-
tion of antitrust laws may be relatively infrequent. Under a different kind
of administration, and without any change in the law, the Justice Department
may launch a full-scale crusade against monopolies. One of the principal
justifications for the independent commissions is the argument that, because
of their staggered-term arrangement and relative freedom from execu-
tive domination, they have greater continuity of policy than executive
departments.

Struggle for Control Over Independent Commissions. In the federal
government there has been a continuing struggle for power over the in-
dependent commissions and boards. The protagonists have been the
President, Congress, the courts, the regulated interests, and the regulatory
agencies themselves. Congress is most powerful when a commission is
being created or when bills are before Congress for increasing or decreasing
the responsibilities of particular commissions. Congress may see a need
under various conditions for assigning functions to an independent com-
mission having theoretically closer ties to the legislature than to the Presi-
dent. Such conditions are given when: (a) Congress wants to set up a
function on an experimental basis, with the intention of passing a more
precisely worded statute after the commission has felt its way into the prob-
lem and developed the experience out of which such a statute can be
drafted; (b) Congress intends to organize a function that is largely
investigational and designed to lead to recommendations for legislation
remedying the economic maladjustments the agency uncovers — much as a
legislative investigating committee might work; (c) Congress is defining
a function so vaguely and mixing various kinds of responsibilities in such
a way that the agency will exercise powers of legislative and judicial char-
acter as well as of an executive character; it is, therefore concluded that
under the doctrine of the separation of powers, the function should not be
vested in any of the three branches of the government; (d) Congress is
disinclined to enhance the power of the executive branch simply because

224 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

this detracts from the prestige and strength of Congress; (e) Congress is
distrustful of the particular President or department heads in office because
the administration is guided by a political party, faction, or philosophy
different from that of Congress; (f) Congress cannot find an executive
department in which the new function would readily fit; and (g) Congress
is under considerable pressure to afford representation in the administra-
tion of a regulatory statute to more than one region, industry, or party.

On occasion, when Congress and the executive branch are under the
same political control, they may jointly advocate creating an independent
commission to handle a new and important regulatory power. The reason
might simply be that under such an arrangement the President can name
all the members of the new commission. Because of the long, though
staggered terms of commissioners, he can thus perpetuate his party's control
of the particular function into and possibly through the next presidential
term. *-

The President is, of course, the protagonist most frustrated by his lack
of control over the execution of some of the most important statutes that
Congress ever passed. Every president for about the past forty years has
sought to control one or more of the independent commissions.10 By his
appointments and removals; his close relations with the chairmen of some
of the commissions; his ability to mobilize public opinion; his budgeting
authority; and much of the time his standing with Congress— by all these
means the President, whoever he may be, has been able repeatedly either
to influence commissions directly or to put them on the defensive in a
public battle in which he has certain advantages. Nevertheless, the com-
missions retain imposing powers of resistance to presidential direction.

Humphrey Case. The most conspicuous instance of a presidential at-
tempt to control an important commission resulted in judicial support
for the congressional doctrine of independence of regulatory commissions.
The Federal Trade Commission, created in 1914 under the Wilson Ad-
ministration, had been given important powers to attack unfair methods of
competition and unlawful trade practices and to investigate business mis-
conduct. Before it was four years old this commission had shown that it
interpreted its mandate literally, and intended to carry it out in a vigorous
manner. Its attitude, particularly evidenced by the commission's blistering
attack on the monopolistic practices of the meat-packing industry, aroused
the bitter resentment of much of the business world.17 It is not surprising
that under the more conservative administrations of Presidents Harding,

16 Cushman, op. cit. above in note 13, p. 681 ff.

17 As a result of the packing industry's hostility to the Federal Trade Commission, adminis-
tration of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 was assigned by Congress to the Secretary of
Agriculture, an action that met with the packing industry's favor because it preferred even a
farmer's and rancher's friend to the shrewd, aggressive commission that had so effectively
exposed the practices of the industry.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 225

Coolidge, and Hoover, a conscious effort was made to put men on the
Federal Trade Commission who would have less crusading zeal and who,
to a considerable extent, would exercise the commission's powers at sonw
thing less than their maximum extent.18 William E. Humphrey, appointed
to the commission by President Coolidge in 1925, dominated it between
1925 and 1933 because on most important issues he could count on the
votes of the other two Republican commissioners. Now collusion with,
rather than control of, trusts and monopolies by the Federal Trade Com-
mission was talked about on the floor of the House of Representatives.

Shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated, he asked Com-
missioner Humphrey to resign, pointing out that Humphrey's policy was
not in harmony with the President's policy on the work of the Federal
Trade Commission. On the Commissioner's refusal, the President re-
moved him. Eventually, the Humphrey case reached the Supreme Court.
Humphrey's position had rested on the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which provided for presidential removal of commissioners "for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The chief executive, the argu-
ment went, had violated this act in removing Humphrey not for any of
these reasons, but for incompatibility with the President's views on policy
matters. The President, on the other hand, relied on the Supreme Court's
earlier decision and opinion in Myers v. United States,19 in which it was
held that Congress could not constitutionally restrict the power to remove
any executive official — in this case, a postmaster — whom the President had
appointed either alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate.20

This was declared to follow logically from a consideration of the Presi-
dent's constitutional possession of the executive power, the power of ap-
pointment, and the responsibility for taking care that the laws be faithfully
executed. And in a dictum the majority of the Supreme Court, led by
Chief Justice Taft, clearly indicated that the President has an unfettered
right under the Constitution to remove members of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial bodies. However, in the Humphrey case the Supreme Court
abandoned this dictum. It held instead that where there is a body exer-
cising primarily quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties and only inci-
dentally administrative or executive functions, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, Congress may by statute specify the causes for which members
can be removed by the President. In a case like this, the statute is binding

18 It is notable that in this same period the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice showed none of the enthusiasm for its work apparent in the Wilson and Franklin D.
Roosevelt Administrations, and that the Supreme Court, dominated by conservative justices,
subjected the Federal Trade Commission to a rigorous doctrine of judicial review of com-
mission decisions.

10 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

20 The specific attempt to restrict the President's removal power consisted of congres-
sional insistence that the President obtain the consent of the Senate before removing incumbents
of certain executive offices, such as postmastcrships, to which the appointment had been by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

226 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

on the President, and he cannot remove for causes not specified in the
statute. The Humphrey case in effect recognized a fourth branch of gov-
ernment, consisting of the independent commissions. A commission such
as the Federal Trade Commission is "wholly disconnected from the execu-
tive department" and is instead "an agency of the legislative and judicial
departments."21

Experience in the States. In the states certain factors have given the
problem of independent commissions a different setting than in the federal
government.21* Generally the legislature meets more infrequently — for in-
stance, meeting only once every two years. Thus it is more difficult for the
apologist for independent commissions to argue that, though independent
of the executive, they are given effective supervision and coordination by the
legislative branch. In the second place, the general atmosphere of many state
governments is more definitely political, with emphasis on patronage,
favoritism, and subservience to pressure groups. In states where this atmos-
phere exists — and it does not exist in all — the departments responsible to the
governor, those responsible directly to the people, and the independent
commissions are all affected. The agencies that come nearest to escaping
this atmosphere are those with professionalized staffs, such as the state
health department, the state v. elfare department, and the state university.

Such service agencies with professional staffs are likely to have a tradi-
tion of both integrity and skill. They also are backed by public opinion
or organized blocs of opinion in resistance to political pressures. In addi-
tion, they have largely administrative rather than policy decisions to make.
In contrast, the heart of economic regulation is policy, and the people are
ill-served if they have no effective way to bring sanctions against the regu-
latory commissions, which seem to float in mid-air, unanswerable directly
to either of the two political branches of government, executive and legis-
lative. These factors suggest that the people would be better advised to let
service agencies, rather than regulatory bodies, have a high degree of
independence.

Both the degree of political favoritism running through the conduct of
public affairs in some states and a general fear of strengthening the office
of governor when experience reveals the possibility that a charlatan may
be elected to the post, result often in a general desire for the independence of
all agencies — service and regulatory — that have important work to do. While
this has an appealing appearance of "facing the realities," it leaves the
governor with little responsibility, removes administration of a large num-
ber of governmental policies from effective public control, and in some
cases causes a relative increase in the control of agencies by special-interest
groups. No one is left to call regulatory officials on the carpet promptly

21 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).

22 See Fesler, James W., The Independence of State Regulatory Agencies, Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1942.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 227

if they are neglecting the public interest. The spur to action is gone, for
the public itself is not overly vigilant about the day-to-day acts of regulatory
agencies. On the other hand, the special interest groups are likely to be
well organized in their efforts to soften the rigors of regulation.

In the experience of the states there is no ready-made solution to the
problem of the independent regulatory bodies. The nearest to a solution
we can come is to adopt the firm position that policy-making agencies
must be controlled by the people through their political instruments, the
legislature and governor. Since the legislature meets infrequently, and
is in any event ill-equipped to provide real supervision and coordination of
the regulatory agencies, the governor must be the principal instrument of
popular control. That he is a politician, sometimes even a demagogue or
a tool of special interests, cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that regu-
latory officials may have the same defects, for politicians are often elected or
appointed to these positions. Certainly, however, if "democratic govern-
ment" has any meaning at all, it is that policy must be decided or con-
trolled by the people. To set the regulatory agencies free of this control
is to insulate important areas of economic policy against effective popular
governance.

Much more important than any mechanical changes, though, would be
a general improvement of the "tone" of state government. This would
bring better men to the legislature and to the governor's office. Such a
change in turn would bring good men to the regulatory agencies.

4. THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE

Popular Illusions. The idea of independent regulatory agencies has an
appeal to citizens who think of politics as something unclean, of legislators
as controlled puppets, and of chief executives and their department heads as
spoilsmen intent primarily on perpetuating themselves in power. On the
other hand, the same citizens are likely to respect the courts and to regard
judges as wise and well-balanced men with an unusual capacity for dis-
covering the "right" solution to any problem of law, fact, or policy. How-
ever, even a casual look at legislatures, courts, and executive departments
should reveal the extent to which men and women in the course of their
public careers serve in two and often three of the branches of government.
It should also make evident the injustice of characterizing in blanket fashion
as incompetent and corrupt the officials in any of the three branches of
government.

The relevance of this consideration to our topic lies in the tendency of
many citizens to support independent commissions as a means of bringing
judge-like wisdom, balance, and insight into the process of regulation of
business and industry. Such an approach ignores two basic facts. One
is that those appointed or elected to the independent commissions are often
the same men who before or after their term on the commission have served

228 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

or will serve as state legislators, governors, members of Congress, or execu-
tive officials. Some may also be defeated candidates for political office, or
men thought of primarily for past or potential favors to the political party.
The second fact ignored by commission enthusiasts is the very great dan-
ger in any doctrine that pretends that we can preserve democracy and still
vest economic powers in a governmental agency that is not clearly subject
to officials who in turn are responsible to the people. The proposition is
simply that policy is the very thing to be kept under effective popular con-
trol if democracy is to survive. And many regulatory commissions make
more important policies, by both action and inaction, than do ordinary
departments. Almost by definition, a regulatory commission is set up to
establish policies that the legislative body has not been able to determine
in any specific way.

Need for Policy Coordination. This emphasis on policy as the focal
problem of popular control of governmental regulation leads to another
main consideration. It is the need for coordination of the policies that are
being adopted and executed by the scores of agencies — executive and inde-
pendent— in any government, on the state or federal level. Clearly, the
citizenry has a right to demand that someone prevent its government's
right hand from undoing what its left hand has been trying to do. The
very size of federal and state administration makes perfect coordination im-
possible. However, the existence of commissions with great regulatory
powers claiming virtual independence of the chief executive seriously
handicaps attempts to approximate even a rough-hewn sort of coordination.

Let us suppose a railroad situation in which the problem involves rates,
a violation of the antitrust laws, a labor dispute, competition by river boats
and barges, an anti-inflation policy, and a loan from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. The railroad would be at the mercy of almost as
many agencies as there are specific parts to the problem. If the problem had
sufficient importance to rise to the President's level, he could himself or
through an aide get the executive agencies together and insist upon a sen-
sibly articulated set of policies for meeting the situation. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, however, with its control over rates as part of our
hypothetical puzzle, could stay away from the conference. Or, if in attend-
ance, it could decline to "go along" with the other agencies on a solution.

Lethargy of Independence. Problems of this character are not fanciful.
An illustration is the President's inability to stir the Interstate Commerce
Commission out of apparent lethargy on the vital policy problem of south-
ern and western freight rates. He deliberately appointed a southern
expert on the subject as a commissioner. He underlined the importance of
Tennessee Valley Authority freight-rate studies by special messages to Con-
gress on the subject, with a sidelong glance at the commission. And his
Attorney General sued the western railroads for violation of the antitrust
laws. All that did not move the mountain. Finally the state of Georgia

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 229

brought the issue to the Supreme Court on the charge that the railroads had
conspired to discriminate in their rates against the South. By implication,
the Interstate Commerce Commission was accused as an accessory to the
alleged crime. In May, 1944, shortly after the Supreme Court took jurisdic-
tion of the case, the commission roused itself to issue a decision favoring
both the South and the West, but still not meeting the full issue head-on.

Here was an instance where a great policy issue fell within the juris-
diction of an independent commission. The President was apparently
powerless to prod the commission to action. The Supreme Court finally
assumed jurisdiction over this policy issue on the basis of an antitrust suit
brought by a state. Only then did the commission announce a decision,
the timing of which suggested an attempt to beat the Supreme Court to the
draw.

Pressure for Reform. Such intransigence or even the clashing of gov-
ernment agencies without ready means of settling their disputes may be
charitably tolerated during periods when government is relatively inac-
tive and disposed to let business enterprises "have their head." However,
when government's function is conceived as positive in character, as a
conscious guidance of economic forces to achieve maximum production
for wartime needs or full employment in times of peace, the people and
the business community itself insist that there be a consistency among gov-
ernmental policies and among the actions of governmental agencies in
executing those policies.

This does not mean dictatorship; far from it. It does mean an organi-
zation such as any well-run business enterprise would insist on — subordina-
tion to a president or general manager of virtually all functions that the
board of directors does not itself perform. The president-manager can then
be held responsible for seeing that the gears of the enterprise mesh rather
than clash. Only thus will all parts of the company pull together instead
of pulling in opposite directions, with the company remaining on "dead
center."

Over the long run of the years ahead it seems very doubtful that the
people will return to a negative concept of government's role in the economy.
It is therefore hardly conceivable that they will long tolerate an arrange-
ment whereby the most important instruments for guidance of the economy
are independent commissions without close ties linking them to one another
and to either the legislature or the executive.

Lac\ of Stimulation. For independent commissions, whatever their
advantages, the people pay a dear price in a number of ways. Many a
regulatory commission is notably lacking in the vigor essential to advancing
toward the goals the legislative and executive branches had in mind in
adopting the basic statutes. As a recent federal board investigating the com-
mission method of regulation observed, "A regulatory statute may be both
wise and practicable, and yet be totally ineffective for the simple reason

230 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

that the agency takes no decisive action under it. ... An agency, in fact,
possesses through this means a not inconsiderable power to thwart the legis-
lative purpose. . . . An inactive agency will not lack apologists in any
event; the difficulty is to find persons or groups able and in a position to
apply a spur."23

In the states as well, many a utility commission, workmen's compensa-
tion and industrial safety board, banking and insurance board, and profes-
sional licensing board shows little evidence of a determined effort to define
and achieve the public interest. Public utilities commissions, for example,
most of them created because the people wanted forceful regulation of the
intrenched railroad and electric power companies, have all too generally
taken a negative attitude toward exercise of their power.

The causes of such reluctance to act vigorously on behalf of the public
are several. The most important are three: (a) general inertia, which
can be indulged when there are no incentives to action and when action is
bound to make enemies; (b) overemphasis on the judicial approach, spring-
ing in part from the belief that commissions were made independent so
that they could have much the same character and procedure as courts,
and in part from the insistence of courts that due process of law requires
court-like procedures in regulation; and (c) excessive exposure to the
views and influence of the regulated interests, without compensating ex-
posure to governmental and private views expressive of the public interest.
While these features of unaggressive regulation are most common at the
state level, they are discernible as well in such respected federal agencies
as the Interstate Commerce Commission,24

5. ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

To fit the independent regulatory commissions into the broad pattern
of American government, several alternatives have been advanced. These
alternatives are: (a) to integrate the commissions into the executive branch
by clearly subordinating them to the chief executive; (b) to strengthen
legislative control of the commissions; (c) to strengthen judicial review of
the activities of independent commissions; and (d) to segregate the legis-
lative, administrative, and judicial phases of each commission's work, so
that each phase of work can be appropriately performed. The first three
alternatives assume that commissions should be assigned to one of the main
branches of government instead of remaining an unrecognized and headless
fourth branch of government. The last alternative assumes that since

23 Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit. above in note 5, pp. 16-17.

24 For example, proposals to give the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over
all forms of transportation, including air transport, have been rejected on the ground that the
commission is too "railroad-minded," and could not take a broad enough view of the public
interest in development of competitive methods of transportation. Congress did write the
fundamentals of a general transportation policy into the Transportation Act of 1940, but it
is an entirely different matter to expect an effective application of these fundamentals.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 231

commissions perform a mixture of powers it would be unsound to sub-
ordinate the commissions to any one branch of government; however,
individual powers might be so subordinated or at least be exercised by
distinct units of each commission.

Executive Control. Integration under the chief executive's firm con-
trol would facilitate coordination of policy and administration both among
the commissions themselves and with the executive agencies. However, it
would place the commissions in danger of more frequent shifts of policy
resulting in proportionate instability for the business world. It would also
clearly associate the commissions with whatever standards of political
morality were observed by the chief executive — necessarily a political man.
Most important, it would place quasi-judicial functions requiring impar-
tiality under the influence of the policy-minded chief executive.

To some students, on the other hand, it is a fundamental error to re-
gard the chief executive as a key formulator of policy, since constitutional
emphasis is upon his executive functions — that is, the execution of policies
which are laid down by the policy-formulating branch of government, the
legislative body. Under this view, the only advantage in integrating the
commissions under the chief executive would be coordination of administra-
tion; the disadvantage would be exposure of commission policy to execu<
tive pressure.

Legislative Control. If emphasis is placed upon the need for keeping
the regulatory commissions from exercising a free and unguided hand on
policy matters, and if the executive is ruled out as a key formulator of
policy, the clear remedy is a strengthening of legislative oversight of the
work of the commissions. Many advocates of integration under the chief
executive would warmly embrace this legislative alternative if it offered
any possibility of success. However, experience to date has not revealed
that our legislative bodies are equipped to give the commissions the re-
quired degree of supervision.

Clearly, state legislatures meeting for a few months each year or bi-
ennium are not organized for continuing superintendence of regulatory
work. Congress is in a more favorable position. Nonetheless, after the
most careful appraisal of past experience and future prospects for congres-
sional control, Professor Cushman concludes that "Congress is likely to
content itself with doing nothing for the most part in its dealings with the
commissions, and with resorting to some form of drastic action when some-
thing approaching a scandal crops up in connection with a commission."26

Recently we have seen evidence of a serious intention to strengthen the
organization and procedure of Congress. Success of these efforts is to be
hoped for, but it is unlikely that even after such improvement Congress
will supervise the independent regulatory commissions with any greater

2fi Cushman, of. at. nbovc in no^ 13, p 678.

232 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

effectiveness than it has shown in its relations with executive agencies
having regulatory functions.

Judicial Control. Increased judicial control of regulatory commissions
would contribute little or nothing to the coordination of policy and ad-
ministration. It could both assure faithful observance of judicial pro-
cedure by the commissions and subject their decisions to the risk of being
overruled if they failed to coincide with the legal and value judgments of
the courts. On the procedural side, extension of judicial restrictions would
mean a further formalization of commission procedure. On the substantive
side, more thorough judicial review would call in each case for independent
judicial reappraisal of the facts upon which the commission had based its
decision.

Although in some states there is still need for a tightening up of regu-
latory procedures to make sure that private rights receive due consideration,
in the federal government the need is much less obvious. While the Ameri-
can Bar Association has pressed for severe legislative restrictions on regu-
latory methods, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure has looked in both directions at once. On the one hand, it has
urged a centrally appointed group of impartial hearing commissioners;
on the other, it has rejected more extreme measures, such as a uniform
code of regulatory procedure and the abandonment of the informality of
procedure now followed in the great majority of cases. In 1944, a report on
the practices and procedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission cau-
tioned that "the ways of the courts, if emulated too faithfully, can inhibit the
Commission in the effective performance of its duties. The judicial influ-
ence is by no means an unmixed blessing."26 There is a measure of caution
in this respect in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.

For the courts to review not only the legal questions in a regulatory
decision but also the weight of the evidence would reduce the prestige of
regulatory bodies. It would supplant their presumably expert judgment of
the facts of a case with the inexpert judgment of members of the judiciary.
In practice the doctrines of court review have a certain flexibility. This the
judges take advantage of in order to review more fully decisions of regu-
latory bodies in which they lack confidence, while letting decisions of those
having been found to possess integrity, expertness, and formal court-like pro-
cedures escape severe judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, court attitude toward
judicial review of decisions of regulatory agencies fluctuates to some extent
with the variations in dominance of the courts by conservative and progres-
sive judges. The former extend judicial review to both quasi-legislative and

26 Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit. above in note 5, p. 68. The Board devoted
a special section to the problem of reluctance of Interstate Commerce Commission personnel
to take official notice of even noncontroversial legal and economic facts not put in the record
by the parties to a hearing; it noted that in some instances Commission personnel even hold it
improper to rely on earlier Commission decisions unless they arc introduced as evidence at
the hearing — a view that is contrary even to court practice.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 233

administrative actions. The latter tend to contract the extent of judicial
review on the grounds that the courts should not substitute their judgment
for that of coordinate branches of government, save on clearly legal
questions.27

Segregation of Powers of Independent Commissions. In effect, regu-
latory commissions have lines of responsibility running to all three branches
of government, as indeed have executive departments as well. The commis-
sions are responsible to the courts for staying within their statutory powers,
for following the lead of the courts in ruling on questions of law, and for
applying a fair procedure in activities of a judicial character. The commis-
sions are responsible to the legislative body for broad policies — responsibility
enforced through its power to amend the basic statutes and to determine
how much money each agency may spend. The responsibility of the com-
missions to the chief executive is the vaguest of the three and a matter of
considerable dispute between him and the commissions. In two capacities
the President appears to need greater control — in administrative manage-
ment and in policy coordination. It can be seen easily that the independent
commissions and the executive departments are scarcely distinguishable in
the matter of judicial and legislative lines of responsibility. The principal
distinction is in the clarity of executive supervision of executive departments,
as contrasted with the fuzziness of the chief executive's relations to inde-
pendent commissions.28

In view of the difficulty of clearly placing independent commissions
under one of the three branches of government, and also because of cer-
tain sound objections to merging quasi-legislative, administrative, and quasi-
judicial activities even within a commission, it has been proposed that some-
how the several powers of each commission be segregated. The most fun-
damental complaint is that prosecuting and judging should not be in the
same hands. Yet a commission may decide what the statute means, investi-
gate and formally charge a person with an alleged violation, and make
up its mind whether the evidence presented by itself and the charged per-
son calls for a decision that there was or was not a violation. Actually, each
major commission is as an institution composed of hundreds of officials
and employees. It is therefore possible to argue either that segregation
should be absolute in the sense that the commission should not be respon-
sible for both prosecuting and adjudicative functions; or that the usua)
segregation of personnel into several units within the commission should
suffice to keep the prosecutors distinct from those who do the judging,
while at the same time common direction of both groups by the commis-

27 For an excellent brief review of this general problem, see Pennock, Roland J., "Judicial
Control of Administrative Decisions," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 1942, Vol. 221, pp. 183-191.

28 See Cushman, op. cit. above in note 13, p. 697 ff.

234 INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS

sion would provide a reasonably consistent pattern of regulation.29
In addition to the attempt to ensure impartiality in adjudication by
commissions, there is another motive for segregation. This is the desire
clearly to subordinate to the chief executive's control at least part of the
work now done by the independent commissions. Of course, the primary
argument against executive control of the commissions is that such control
might destroy impartiality in the performance of judicial functions. The
advocates of executive control therefore have hit upon the expedient of
setting up, for each area now regulated by commissions, one body to hear
and decide impartially disputes of a judicial character, and another to per-
form all responsibilities of a policy-formulating and administrative charac-
ter— including the prosecution function — now vested in the commissions.
This proposal gained particular prominence when advanced by the Presi-
dent's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937.

Proposals of President's Committee on Administrative Management.
The President's Committee suggested experimentation with a segregation
along specific lines. Each commission would retain its judicial functions
under the present guarantees of independence. For purely administrative
purposes, however, it would be attached to one of the executive departments.
All of its functions not of a judicial character would be placed under the
control of the department head. The arrangement would safeguard impar-
tiality in the exercise of functions of a judicial nature. At the same time,
it would bring under executive control those policy-formulating functions
and management functions that properly fall within the President's area
of responsibility. Moreover, by placing the prosecuting function under
executive control, it would be separated clearly from the judicial function.30
This solution has not appealed to Congress31 nor to the commissions
themselves. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure opposed such complete segregation on three grounds. One was that
the consequence of multiplication of governmental units in identical fields
was objectionable. The second was that two agency units in the same field
would lead to friction, inconsistency of action, and a breakdown of respon-
sibility. The third asserted that since such biases as do exist on the part
of regulatory agencies "are mainly the product of many factors of mind
and experience, and have comparatively little relation to the administrative
machinery," complete severance of the judicial phases of regulatory work

29 On this issue of total vs. internal segregation, see the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, op. at. above note 4, pp. 55-60, and 203-209.

80 President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies, pp.
39-42, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937.

81 In delegating to the President authority to reorganize the executive branch, Congress
in the Reorganization Act of 1939 specifically excepted the independent commissions from his
authority. The Reorganization Act of 1945 generally followed this precedent.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY ESTABLISHMENTS 235

from its other phases would not be warranted.82 Consequently the Attorney
General's Committee recommended internal segregation among each com-
mission's personnel to keep distinct the judicial activity from the prosecuting,
policy-formulating, and administrative work, primarily through centrally
appointed hearing officers to perform most of the judicial tasks. This is
the general line taken by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.

Arrangements like these fail, of course, to give the chief executive the de-
sired control over nonjudicial activities of the commissions. Moreover, in the
field of public utilities there has been a general feeling that legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial functions of each commission "are so intertwined . . . that
attempts to separate and segregate them will be in all probability considerably
more destructive than constructive."33 At the state level the additional
point is made that many state regulatory commissions have such small staffs
— sometimes less than five or ten employees — that segregation is beyond
practical consideration.

It is not likely that any mass reorganization of federal and state regu-
latory commissions will occur in the near future. However, though there
is disagreement on the remedy, it is an important advance if the commis-
sions have come under sufficiently close examination for citizens to recognize
several fundamental factors. First, the quality of men and women appointed
to the commissions is more important than the details of organization.
Second, judicial work should be carried on in an impartial manner, free
of the bias characteristic of the prosecution function. Third, coordination
of policy formulation and administrative management among government
agencies is essential, especially during periods when government plays a
positive role in the economy. The chief executive appears to be the only
responsible and effective focus for such coordination. And fourth, independ-
ent commissions should be subject to the same control by the legislative
and judicial branches that applies to all other regulatory and service agencies
of government.

^Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit. above in note 4,
pp. 55-60. Three members of the committee argued that internal segregation was not suffi-
cient. ,md in effect endorsed the President's Committee's proposal. Ibid., pp. 203-209.

83 Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit. above in note 5, 124 ff., referring
specifically to the Interstate Commerce Commission. See also National Association of Railroad
and Utilities Commissioners, Report of the Committee on Progress in Public Utility Regulation,
1938.

CHAPTER

Government Corporations

1. CENTRAL CONTROLS AND MANAGERIAL FREEDOM

Direction by the Chief Executive. A persistent, if not the predominant,
problem in the design of governmental structure is the determination of the
relationship of the agencies of administration to the organs of popular con-
trol—the elected chief executives and legislatures. The general trend in
recent decades has been to restrict the independence of administrative de-
partments by subjecting them to the direction of the chief executive. How-
ever, for the functions performed by independent regulatory boards and
commissions the achievement of public purpose has been thought to require
immunity from his control. The government corporation, in its status in the
general institutional framework, represents still another type of organiza-
tion. While it is usually subject to much more control by the chief execu-
tive and the legislature over its general policy than the independent com-
mission, it enjoys far greater freedom than the ordinary department in the
choice of means to achieve its objectives.

In the process of making administrative agencies accountable to the
chief executive, ordinary departments have come to be hedged about by
many limitations on their freedom of action. Some of these limitations
on departmental autonomy concern the substance of what is being done.
The chief executive wants to move in one direction rather than another.
He desires to wait for a more propitious time before a department inaugu-
rates a program. He prefers this program emphasis or that. Such controls
of policy are essential to direction. They are the means by which the chief
executive fulfills his broad political responsibility.

Overhead Control of Departmental Methods. The process of administra-
tive consolidation has brought still another type of overhead control, which
is directed primarily toward the means or methods of achieving substantive
objectives. The department is not only told by higher authority what to do,
but it is also bound by more or less detailed instructions on how to do the
job. Budget, personnel, accounting, and legal officials on the government-

236

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 237

wide level make it their business to see that these instructions are formu-
lated and followed.

Integration of the administrative structure makes possible more detailed
and more effective control by the legislature. In the federal government, for
instance, a well-prepared executive budget which presents information on
which Congress can act is a foundation for congressional control. An effec-
tive central personnel agency strengthens Congress. For example, Congress
can fix salary scales and the Civil Service Commission will see that they
are followed. The Comptroller General, legally an agent of Congress, will
see that legislation prescribing the manner of expenditure of funds is
carried out to the letter.

Control Machinery in Action. The thoroughness with which legislative
enactments can be applied throughout the vast administrative structure is
marvelous and awesome. In a more primitive administrative era the rule
books might be filled with regulations, but they would hamper no one as
long as they could be ignored or not as the official saw fit. Modern admin-
istrative techniques alter the situation If Congress should abruptly decide
that, beginning with the next fiscal year, no red-haired person was to be
employed in the federal service, a complex and far-flung administrative
process would be set in motion.

The Civil Service Commission would assemble the experts to advise it
in the promulgation of regulations defining "red" hair. It would exclude
all people within the definition from its future examinations. It would
lay down rules for the departments. To make certain that the act of Con-
gress was carried out, it might prescribe that no color-blind person could
be a personnel officer. The Bureau of the Budget would inquire of the
departments what steps were being taken to avoid the expenditure of funds
for the prohibited purpose.

Each department head would issue stern orders to his personnel offices.
Instructions including detailed procedures for the application of the law
would flow to the bureau chiefs, the division chiefs, and the section chiefs.
From Washington, these orders would go to the federal field establishments
— the regional, state, and local offices. The regulation would find its way
to outposts of the national government in Alaska, India, and Afghanistan.
It would filter down the administrative hierarchy to the lowliest and most
remote office. The Comptroller General would require an affidavit from
each employee that he or she did not have red hair — probably accompanied
by a photograph in color, attested to be a true likeness of the affiant by two
disinterested persons! The Attorney General would be asked to rule on the
applicability of the law to a completely bald person who once had red hair;
and the holding of the Attorney General might be contrary to that of the
Comptroller General.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation would put samples of hair through
the laboratory to detect evidences of dye. The courts would be called upon

238 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

to decide whether the law applied to employees of state governments paid
in part from federal grants. The Department of State, for the good of the
service, would seek from Congress an exception from the law for its locally
hired employees in Eire. Congressional committees would be petitioned by
discharged persons insisting that their hair was titian and not red as the
Comptroller General had held and demanding special legislation author-
izing their employment.

The example is fanciful but its essence could be duplicated a hundred
times. Derived from such controls over methods are- the cherished maxims
of our political folklore to the etffect that government departments are stifled
by red tape, paralyzed by intricate procedures, hindered by adherence to
precedent, and bound by absurd rules and regulations. Corollary beliefs
are that departments are ill fitted to undertake functions requiring speedy
action, rapid adaptation to new conditions, inventiveness, and the exercise
of judgment unfettered by petty rules. These notions abound most luxu-
riantly in newspaper editorials, campaign speeches, and kindred sources, and
in some degree they possess an undeniable validity.

Central Control and Departmental Resourcefulness. A government de-
partment must follow elaborate procedures in estimating its future financial
needs and in obtaining appropriations from Congress. It enjoys no assur-
ance of continuity in its programs, for once a year it must seek funds from
a Congress that is sometimes friendly and sometimes inexplicably capri-
cious. It must hire its employees subject to intricate procedures and regu-
lations fixed by the Civil Service Commission. In spending money it must
take care lest it violate the voluminous jurisprudence on the subject as inter-
preted by the Comptroller General. All these controls arise to* meet demon-
strated needs. If some such controls were not in existence, they would have
U> be invented. Yet there is a continuing necessity for adjusting their form
to reconcile the demands of administrative integration with the conditions
requisite for creative management.

In part because of the controls applicable to the operations of ordinary
departments and in part because of other reasons, the government corpora-
tion is commonly regarded as a means by which the body politic can
conduct commercial activities under administrative arrangements approxi-
mating those of private enterprise. In a frequently quoted passage, British
Laborite Herbert Morrison has argued for the use of the corporation in the
management of publicly-owned commercial enterprise because such an un-
dertaking "should be able with speed and decision to adapt itself to the
changing needs of the modern world." Such characteristics are not with-
out merit in the ordinary department, but they are indispensable in a com-
mercial enterprise if it is to survive.

Changing Role of Government Corporations. A "pure" form of gov-
ernment corporation would be one in which government owned all or the
majority of the stock of an incorporated enterprise. Government, like a

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 239

private stockholder, would look to the managers for the efficient conduct
of the enterprise and would measure performance by the volume of divi-
dends and the state of the balance sheet. It would leave to the officers of
the corporation the tasks of management: the methods of personnel selec-
tion; the rules for purchasing supplies; the terms on which sales would be
made; the disposition of revenues and profits; and so forth. For example,
if the federal government should purchase fifty-one per cent of the stock
of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, it could receive its
dividends, observe the general results of operation, and, if dissatisfied, use
its majority stock control to replace the management. In practice, however,
governmental use of the corporate device for the conduct of pure commer-
cial enterprise is exceptional. It is used largely for functions in the no
man's land between ordinary governmental functions and commercial
activities.1

Although the federal government has owned and operated corporations
which approximated the "pure" type in their autonomy and in their form,
government corporations have gradually lost most of the characteristics of
the private corporation and have become more and more like ordinary
administrative departments. This trend toward the assimilation of corpora-
tions into the regular governmental pattern moved a step further with the
passage of the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945. Even under
that act, corporations retained a degree of autonomy not uniformly enjoyed
by departments. The discussion which follows must of necessity be in con-
siderable measure an historical analysis indicating the process by which
government corporations reached the stage of development marked by
this federal statute.

1 Of some importance is the means of formation of government corporations. In some
instances they are formed by federal officials proceeding under state laws in the same manner
as private incorporators. Such action is, of course, taken in pursuance of some sort of authori-
zation by federal law. In other instances government corporations are created specifically by
.icts of Congress. In a third type of situation the corporation may be formed by federal officials
— acting as "incorporators" — under general or specific authorization by Congress. In a few
instances private corporations have become "government" corporations by public acquisition of
their capital stock.

As to the federal government, there has been considerable discussion looking toward the
enactment of a statute providing a uniform method for the formation of corporations together
with a degree of uniformity of corporate rights and responsibilities. The lack of such a statute
has made difficult congressional control over the creation of corporations; some existing cor-
porations were originally pegged on statutory clauses which doubdess were enacted without
expectation that they would be so used. Past practice in chartering corporations also created
some difficulty in controlling the scope of corporate activity. The Government Corporation
Control Act (Public Law No. 248, 79th Cong., approved Dec. 6, 1945) prohibits the organiza-
tion or acquisition of any government corporation "for the purpose of acting as an agency or
instrumentality of the United States, except by Act of Congress or pursuant to an Act of
Congress specifically authorizing such action." The same act requires the liquidation by June
30, 1948, of all wholly government-owned corporations formed under laws of the states or
the District of Columbia, unless reincorporated by act of Congress prior to that date.

240 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE SYSTEM IN GOVERNMENT

Variety of Government Corporations. Rationalizations for the use of the
government corporation have been erected on the assumption that it should
be resorted to primarily for the administration of self-sustaining commercial
undertakings. Only when such a function is performed can there be a
source of funds for operation other than appropriations. Only with such
non-tax revenues is it feasible for long to grant autonomy in internal man-
agement of the affairs of the undertaking, since nearly all the controls
applicable to the ordinary department stem from the fact of expenditure
from the public treasury. However, in many instances government corpora-
tions have been charged with functions of a noncommercial or quasi-
commercial character more akin to those of an old-line department than to
those of a business enterprise.

Consequently, in the United States government corporations are of
"somewhat limited value" in illustrating their use as a means of managing
publicly owned commercial enterprises.2 Partly because of the nature of
the functions imposed upon them, government corporations have also ac-
quired, through congressional and executive action, a great diversity of
form. It is thus misleading to speak of "the" government corporation. No
uniformity of powers or of form is apparent; about all that government
corporations have in common is the name. This diversification has been
carried so far that a leading student of the subject has concluded that "the
government corporation as a concept — as a definite and specialized form of
administrative organization — is rapidly ceasing to exist."3 Nevertheless,
the agencies that masquerade under the title of corporation differ in many
respects from the ordinary departments.

The nature and form of individual corporations have been determined
by a variety of factors. The ideas prevailing at the time are reflected in
corporations formed in different periods. The kind of function performed
has been of some importance, for those corporations that conduct more
truly commercial activities seem to have maintained a higher degree of
corporate autonomy. The political strength of their constituencies has a
bearing on the form of many corporations. Thus, by virtue of its popular
support, the Tennessee Valley Authority has been able to resist proposals
to convert it into something more nearly approximating a regular depart-
ment. A considerable number of corporations, usually some time after
their establishment, have felt the pressure of Congress to force them into
the mold of an ordinary department.

2 Thurston, John, Government Proprietary Corporations in the English-Speaking Countries,
p. 6, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937.

3Pritchctt, C. H., "The Paradox of the Government Corporation," Public Administration
Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 381.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 24l

Government Corporations as Products of Emergencies. Most govern-
ment corporations have been products of emergency conditions, although
their life does not always end with the emergency which gave them birth.
In war and depression the federal government has been compelled to under-
take activities of an extraordinary character. Pressure for speedy action
made the corporate form with its freedom from cumbersome procedures
attractive. However, the oldest existing government corporation—the Pan-
ama Railroad Company — came into government ownership under different
circumstances. In 1903, the United States acquired the French interest in
the canal and in the railroad company which had been incorporated under
the laws of New York in 1849. The federal government has continued to
operate the company under its original charter. In addition to tht railroad,
the company operates hotels, commissaries, steamships, dairies, laundries, and
other enterprises. It is administered under the War Department in close
affiliation with the Canal Zone. Partially because of its monopolistic posi-
tion, it has been a profitable enterprise.4 The Inland Waterways Corpora-
tion, formed in 1924, is another instance in which emergency conditions did
not govern the choice of administrative form.5 The corporate arrangement
was deliberately chosen because of its advantages over the then existing
departmental structure. The corporation operates the Federal Barge Lines
which in 1943 had a gross operating revenue of $8.3 millions.

With these exceptions, and the further exception of the Federal Land
Banks which were authorized in 1916 after long inquiry into the problem
of agricultural credit, the federal corporate system has been a creature of
war and depression. The first large-scale use of corporations occurred in
World War I, when such bodies included the United States Housing Cor-
poration, the United States Grain Corporation, the War Finance Corpora-
tion, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the United States Spruce Pro-
duction Corporation. Experience gained at that time brought a recogni-
tion of the potentialities of the corporation and furnished precedents for
subsequent action.6

Great Depression and World War II. The Great Depression was a
second occasion for the creation of a considerable number of corporations.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was formed in 1932 in an attempt
to stave off economic disaster by loans to business — banks, insurance com-

4 See Dimock, Marshall £., Government-Operated Enterprises in the Panama Canal Zone,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. Much of our knowledge of the government corpor-
ation has been made available by Professor Dimock through his own writings and studies by his
students.

5 See Dimock, Marshall E., Developing America's Waterways, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1935.

6 See Van Dorn. Harold, Government-Owned Corporations, New York: Knopf, 1926.

242 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

panics, railroads, and other types of enterprise.7 The functions of the cor-
poration were broadened after its establishment, and through the spawning
of subsidiaries it eventually became a huge holding company. The Home
Owners Loan Corporation was another type of emergency credit agency.
Created in 1933, it had the function of refinancing home mortgages threat-
ened with foreclosure. By the end of its lending operations in 1936 it had
refinanced over $3 billions in home mortgages. It continues to exist, ful-
filling the functions of collecting its mortgages and managing the prop-
erties acquired in its operations. Another variety of emergency corporation
was the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation, which was chartered in
1933 for the purpose of buying agricultural surpluses and of distributing
them to relief agencies — hardly a profit-making enterprise but one involving
large purchasing operations which could be carried on more handily under
corporate arrangements.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, though a permanent institution, was
also of depression origin. It was created in 1933 with functions of a mixed
governmental and commercial nature, and it is notable both for its cor-
porate form and as an experiment in multiple-purpose regional administra-
tion. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, another permanent
agency of emergency origin, was charged with the insurance of bank depos-
its of less than $5,000, a risk too great to be carried by private enterprise
and difficult of assumption save through compulsory coverage on a large
scale. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (1934) had a
similar objective in the protection of investments in savings and loan insti-
tutions. Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (1934) involved the incorporation of
an existing activity, a move perhaps influenced by the frequent resort to use
of the corporate device in other activities at the time. The corporation sells
to government departments, which are obliged to buy from it, and employs
workers who have no alternative market for their labor. It makes money.
Other corporations created in the early 1930's included the Commodity
Credit Corporation (1933), the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (1934),
the Mortgage Corporation (1935) under the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration, and the Federal Home Loan Banks (1932).

World War II brought another spurt in corporate activity with the
creation of a number of corporations, principally as subsidiaries of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to carry on war activities which are
notoriously of a risky character. The Defense Homes Corporation (1940)

7 See Senate Doc. No. 172, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Pt. 1, pp. 50-52, 1940. This document
Consists of a report prepared by the Treasury Department in response to a Senate request; it
contains detailed information on each of the corporations in existence at the time. For a
more recent and much briefer description, see Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential
Expenditures, Government Corporations, Senate Doc. No. 227, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. A more
comprehensive description of each corporation is to be found in Reference Manual of Govern-
went Corporations, prepared by the General Accounting Office and printed as Senate Doc. No.
*6, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 243

was organized to construct homes in areas congested by defense activity.
The Defense Plant Corporation (1940) was created to finance and construct
plants for war production; it became the owner of billions in plants and
machinery. The Defense Supplies Corporation (1940) and the Metals
Reserve Company (1940) were established to buy and sell strategic and
critical materials. The Rubber Development Corporation (1940) was given
the job of developing and procuring natural rubber abroad, principally in
Latin America, while the Rubber Reserve Company (1940) was formed to
construct synthetic rubber plants. The United States Commercial Company
(1942), another Reconstruction Finance Corporation subsidiary, was char-
tered to engage chiefly in preclusive buying abroad— that is, buying critical
materials regardless of price to prevent their falling into the hands of the
enemy.8

In 1945, several of the defense subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation were merged with the parent company and lost their separate
identity. Those affected by Public Law No. 109, approved June 30, 1945,
were: Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Rubber Reserve
Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Disaster Loan Corporation.
The Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs formed several corporations to be
used as instrumentalities in the promotion of the Good Neighbor Policy.
They were the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the Institute of Inter-
American Transportation, the Inter-American Educational Foundation, Inc.,
the Inter-American Navigation Corporation, and Prencinradio, Inc.

Government Corporations in the Field of Farm Credit. The corporation
has been the characteristic administrative form in the elaborate governmental
system for farm credit which has grown steadily since 1916. The twelve
Federal Land Banks, organized in 1917 under the Federal Farm Loan Act
of 1916, are mixed in ownership, with part of the stock being owned by
the federal government and part by national farm loan associations— that
is, borrowers' cooperatives. The Federal Land Banks have revolutionized
long-term farm mortgage lending practices; their outstanding loans at the
end of 1943 totalled $13 billions.

The credit system was broadened in 1923 with the creation of twelve Fed-
eral Intermediate Credit Banks which make loans and discounts for lending
institutions engaged in short-term financing of farm production; their loans
and discounts in 1943 were about $1 billion. The twelve Production Credit
Corporations, set up in 1933, organize and finance local production credit
associations which in turn make short-term loans to farmers. In theory,
these local associations are credit cooperatives with some of their capital
subscribed by the Production Credit Corporations. All these financing

*See Gordon, David, "How We Blockaded Germany," Harper's Magaxine, December,
1944, Vol. 190, pp. 14-22.

244 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

institutions and certain others have been under the supervision of the Farm
Credit Administration.

Scope of Corporate System. The net effect of the development of the
corporate system was that by 1944 there were in existence in the neighbor-
hood of one hundred government corporations, the precise number varying
with idiosyncracies in definition. In the aggregate the corporations in the
fiscal year of 1944 spent $58.8 millions for administrative expense and $303.3
millions for nonadministrative expense. They used $8.68 billions for the
purchase and improvement of property, principally war plants and supplies,
and loaned $1.02 billions. These same agencies, from their inception to the
end of 1944, had spent $18.9 billions for the purchase and improvement of
property and had loaned $202 billions.9

3. OVERHEAD CONTROL OF CORPORATE OPERATIONS

Immunity from the Power of the Purse. The ordinary government
department is subject to overhead controls applied by the Bureau of the
Budget, the Department of Justice, the Comptroller General, and the Civil
Service Commission. Through decades of evolution these controls and
procedures have become, as David E. Lilienthal has said, "stupefying" in
their complexity.10 Although such limitations on departmental action are by
no means without utility, they often delay operation: they limit departments
in the choice of means to achieve ends; they sometimes smother initiative;
and too often they become pointless ritual. Long experience has demon-
strated the need for limits on officials who spend other people's money.
However, in some types of governmental undertakings, reliance on the
traditional prescriptions rather than on alternative methods of measuring
performance makes it difficult to accomplish the job assigned to an agency;

Administratively, the most significant privilege enjoyed by a full-fledged
government corporation is its freedom from the customary rules about
finance. These rules stem from the great constitutional principle that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in pursuance of law. The
principle lays the basis for control by the executive and legislative branches
over the administrative agencies. The power of the purse is used to deter-
mine the amounts to be spent for each of the purposes of government. It
is also used to prescribe in greater or lesser detail precisely how the money
shall be spent.

Another principle — a necessary corollary of the first — is that public
revenues shall be deposited in the Treasury. Without adherence to this
maxim, public moneys might be spent directly from revenue without specific
appropriation by the legislature. A third fundamental principle is that of
annual appropriations. Invariable adherence to it has not been achieved. A

9 Treasury Department, Bulletin, pp. 66-68, Sept., 1944. The figures are from tables under
the heading, "Certain Government Corporations and Credit Agencies."

10 TVA— Democracy on the March, p. 168, New York: Harper, 1944.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 245

few permanent appropriations — that is, standing authorizations for the ex-
penditure of specified amounts each year — remain on the books. Yet annual
appropriation is the general practice in the federal government. This is of
profound importance. It means that the power of the purse is exerted at
annual intervals. The burden of proof and pressure is annually placed upon
those who desire money.

The government corporation furnishes a method of modifying these
principles. A subscription by government to the capital stock of a corpora-
tion or an allocation of funds to the corporation removes the money from
the Treasury and from annual appropriation control. The funds may be
utilized until exhausted whether it takes one year or ten. Earnings of the
corporation, since they may be corporate funds rather than public revenues,
need not be covered into the Treasury but may be retained in the custody
of the corporation. They may then be spent at the discretion of the officers
of the corporation, though only within the limits of corporate purposes
fixed by the charter. If the corporation is engaged in a self-sustaining func-
tion, its revenues would enable it to operate on its own resources more or
less indefinitely without annual subjection to the presidential and congres-
sional power of the purse.

It is usually pointed out that in the avoidance of customary regulations
about expenditure a superior type of control becomes possible. If a revenue-
producing function is involved, analysis of the financial operations by ordi-
nary methods applied by private corporations will furnish a means of
evaluating performance. Is the enterprise coming out even or is it yielding
a return on the government's investment? Thus the Tennessee Valley
Authority attempts to indicate in its financial reports the degree to which
its power operations are paying their way. This can be contrasted with the
Post Office accounting in which a profit may be claimed while no charges
are made for capital, depreciation, or other factors which are weighed in
business accounting.

Fiscal freedom makes the measurement of performance feasible. How-
ever, probably of greater importance in the case made for corporate
autonomy are certain characteristics of the appropriation procedure for
ordinary departments. It is very difficult to forecast specifically the financial
requirements of a commercial enterprise. If business is unexpectedly good,
the increased revenues must be available to meet the increased operating
charges. Moreover, application of the usual appropriation procedures to
commercial enterprises is made less practicable by the length of the appro-
priation cycle. An ordinary department must anticipate its financial needs
long in advance of actual expenditure. Thus each summer a department
must begin the preparation of its expenditure estimates to cover the fiscal
year that will end on June 30 two years later. It must ordinarily present
its estimates for review by the Bureau of the Budget about September of
the year preceding the beginning of the fiscal year covered by the estimates

246 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

It will subsequently justify the estimates as approved by the President to
congressional committees, and final action will be taken by Congress shortly
before the beginning of the fiscal year.

The difficulties of forecasting revenues and expenditures of commercial
enterprise are illustrated by an experience of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority. Estimates of power revenues and expenses of power production
prepared in the summer of 1939 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941,
were: revenues, $14.7 millions; direct power expenses, $5.6 millions. In
fact, however, revenues turned out to be $21 millions and expenses about
$9 millions.11 Under ordinary budget procedure, TVA would have had to
go back to Congress for additional appropriations to meet the unforeseen
conditions. Under corporate practice, the increased revenues were avail-
able without congressional action to meet the increased expenses.

Another example is furnished by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration. Its revenues consist of assessments on the deposits of insured banks,
together with the earnings of investments of the capital and surplus of
the corporation. The losses paid to depositors in closed banks have fluctu-
ated violently over the years. Deposit insurance losses and expenses have
ranged from a low of $1.3 millions in 1942 to a high of $14.0 millions in
1939. The corporation attempts to pay depositors as soon as possible after
a bank is closed — the next day if practicable. Any attempt to estimate
losses and provide for them by appropriations would be doomed to failure
unless the appropriations were coupled with authority virtually approxi-
mating the present range of discretion of the corporation.

Freedom to plan and make expenditures within the limits of funds
available is important because of the difficulties of forecasting. Equally
important is the fact that such freedom gives the corporate officials greater
discretion in determining how the corporation is to be managed. If the
expenditure program must go through the Bureau of the Budget and the
Appropriations Committees of Congress, the corporate determinations of
how the funds are best to be expended will almost certainly be questioned.
The judgment of the Bureau of the Budget, acting for the President, and
the opinion of the congressional committees may be substituted for con-
clusions of those responsible for the management of the corporation. By
this limitation of their discretion, corporate managers assert, their power
ceases to be commensurate with their responsibility for the management
of the affairs of the corporation.

Restrictions on Corporate Autonomy. Such are the considerations urged
in support of fiscal autonomy for government corporations. In practice,
corporate autonomy in the disposition of revenues has been sharply re-
duced. The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 subjected all
corporations wholly owned by the federal government to a uniform type

11 Finer, Herman, The TVA: Lessons for International Application, p. 189, Montreal:
International Labour Office, 1944.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 24?

of budgetary control, which we shall describe shortly. Even before the
adoption of this law, successive actions by the President and Congress had
narrowed corporate autonomy in the determination of expenditure pro-
grams. These actions left only the Inland Waterways Corporation, the
Panama Railroad Company, and certain agricultural credit corporations
of mixed ownership in full enjoyment of the power to adopt operating
programs for the expenditure of their revenues.

From its establishment in 1924, the Inland Waterways Corporation had
not had to seek annual appropriations for operating expenses. Revenues
from the operation of the Federal Barge Line and other sources were spent
for the conduct of the business in the discretion of the corporate manage-
ment. The corporation did not have to estimate long in advance how many
workers it would need to man its transport facilities, justify these estimates
to the Bureau of the Budget and to congressional committees, and operate
within the limits of a congressional appropriation. Rather, it paid its
expenses of operation from its revenues after the fashion of a private cor-
poration. Similarly, and for a much longer period of time, the Panama
Railroad enjoyed the privilege of managing its affairs within the limits
of its resources.

Prior to 1945, the general tendency had been toward greater control by
overhead executive agencies and by Congress over the financial program-
ming of corporations. In some instances this trend was attributable to
the fact that the corporation did not possess funds, either from its own
earnings or from other sources, adequate to meet its needs; it thus had
to seek appropriations to finance its operations. In these situations the
theory of corporate freedom was never completely applied. It was perhaps
equally important in the extension of budgetary and appropriation control
that central budget officials and the Appropriations Committees were on the
whole ill disposed toward arrangements diverging from those applicable
to government operations generally.

In the development of appropriation control, the first step was the in-
troduction of the requirement that corporations with funds available
for expenditure without annual appropriation, obtain approval by the
Bureau of the Budget of expenditures for "administrative expenses," a
category of expenditure somewhat difficult to define. On August 5, 1935,
the President directed that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Federal Farm
Mortgage Corporation submit annually to the Bureau of the Budget esti-
mates of funds needed for administrative expenses, and that they incur
obligations only within the limits approved by the budget director.12
Shortly afterwards, the same rule was applied to the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, the Reconstruction Finance

12 Executive Order No. 7126 of August 5, 1935. This order also applied to several non-
corporate federal agencies which were at the time outside the usual appropriation procedure.

248 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

Corporation, and the Electric Home and Farm Authority.13 Next, the
Tennessee Valley Authority was added to the list. In 1942, the require-
ments were extended to all major corporations until then outside the rule.14

The next step in the evolution of overhead control of government cor-
porations was the introduction of congressional review of administrative
expenses. The First Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1936 listed nine
larger corporations which, beginning with the next fiscal year, were pro-
hibited from incurring any administrative expenses "except pursuant to
an annual appropriation specifically therefor . . . ,"15 This provision would
have resulted in expenditures being made from the Treasury rather than
from corporate funds. That in turn would have brought such adminis-
trative expenditures within the purview of the Comptroller General and
would have made them subject to all the general rules and regulations
applicable to departments. However, the law of 1936 was modified in
subsequent appropriation acts. Congressional action took the form of a
limitation on the amount of corporate funds which might be spent for
administrative purposes, rather than of an appropriation from the Treas-
ury. Thus the language of one pertinent appropriation act for 1945 reads:
"Not to exceed $11,500,000 of the funds of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, established by the Act of January 22, 1932 (47 Stat. 5), shall
be available during the fiscal year 1945 for its administrative expenses . . . ."
By this means, Congress limited the amount which might be spent for
administrative purposes but did not bring the expenditure under the control
of legislation and regulations governing ordinary departments.

Whether or not the original laws governing a corporation should be
changed to bring administrative expenses under annual congressional re-
view seems to have been determined largely by chance rather than by prin-
ciple. In some instances, the action taken resulted clearly from the lack
of legislative confidence in a particular individual. In other instances, the
initiative came from the corporation, motivated by the consideration that
it might be better off under a limitation suggested by itself than it would
be under more drastic action initiated by Congress.16

Subjection of "administrative expenses" to congressional limitation was
not necessarily onerous. It left the corporation autonomous in the greater
part of its fiscal operations. A lending corporation, for example, might
loan, collect, and reloan its funds without congressional limitation on the

13 Executive Order No. 7150 of August 19, 1935.

** Executive Order No. 9159 of May 11, 1942.

M 49 Stat. 1648.

16 The 1946 budget contemplated that congressional limitation would be placed on addi-
tional corporations. The Chairman of the Board of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
said to the House Appropriations Committee: "This year, to comply with the growing senti-
ment among congressional leaders that Congress should pass upon administrative expenses of
Government corporations, we voluntarily submitted our annual budget for such expenses for
congressional approval."

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 249

total scale of lending operations— save such limitation as was imposed by
the amount of capital available to the corporation. Congress limited only
the "administrative" expenses. Moreover, the ingenious concept of "non-
administrative expenses" and their exclusion from congressional control
permitted corporate flexibility in the determination of the amounts spent
for certain purposes which in lay language might be called administrative.
The differentiation between administrative and nonadministrative expense
was not sharp. Generally, continuing overhead costs were included in the
administrative category while expenses arising directly in the management,
protection, and care of property by the corporation were nonadministrative.

The distinction was laid down in the appropriation act relating to each
corporation. Thus, the 1945 appropriation limitation for the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation stated: "Provided, That all necessary expenses
in connection with the acquisition, operation, maintenance, improvement,
or disposition of any real or personal property belonging to the Corpora-
tion or the RFC Mortgage Company, or in which they have an interest,
including expenses of collections of pledged collateral, shall be considered
as nonadministrative expenses for the purposes hereof." The foregoing
formula is typical, but variations in language have prevailed for each cor-
poration or cluster of corporations to which the nonadministrative expense
proviso applies. The significance of the exception of nonadministrative
expense may be deduced from the fact that in 1944 these expenditures for
corporations and credit agencies reporting them were in the aggregate more
than five times as great as administrative expenses.

Administrative and nonadministrative expenses may be very small in
comparison with program expenditures. Before 1945, program expenditures
of most corporations were excluded from annual appropriation control.
However, if new capital or additional authority to borrow was necessary
to carry out a program, a corporation had to obtain legislative authority and
appropriations to enlarge its program.17 Thus, when the Tennessee Valley
Authority needs new capital to construct additional works, its request is
scrutinized by Congress just as thoroughly as a similar request by the
Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation of the Depart-
ment of the Interior. If program expenditures, however, are made from
funds already available to the corporation, the more general practice has

17 Some government corporations have power to borrow from the investing public. Such
corporations may enlarge their sphere of activity within the limits of their borrowing authority
without seeking an appropriation. Thus the Federal Land Banks finance a large proportion
of their mortgage loans from funds obtained by the sale of securities. Operating costs are
met and profits result from the spread between the rate of interest the banks pay and the
rate they receive. The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 required that corpora-
tions obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury before selling or buying obligations
of the United States or obligations guaranteed by the United States in amounts over $100,000.
Federal Land Banks and certain other agricultural credit corporations, however, were merely
required to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury.

250 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

been that no annually fixed congressional limitation applied.18 Thus de-
posit losses by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have not been
subject to appropriation limitation. The Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion has been able to loan, collect, and reloan its funds as circumstances
warranted without annual permissive action by Congress. The Smaller
War Plants Corporation, during its existence in World War II, was lim-
ited by Congress in its administrative expenditures, but its capital con-
stituted a revolving fund for making loans.

Emerging State of Budgetary Control. Our discussion of the state of
budgetary control over government corporations must necessarily be ten-
tative, for the ultimate developments under the Government Corporation
Control Act of 1945 are unpredictable. That act, in its provisions regard-
ing the submission of budget requests, represented another step in the
evolution of the types of control already described. It differentiated between
wholly owned and mixed-ownership government corporations. Insofar
as the mixed-ownership corporations were concerned — the Central Bank
for Cooperatives and the Regional Banks for Cooperatives, Federal Land
Banks, Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration— the status quo was maintained. No annual budget presentation
was required of these corporations by the act.

Wholly owned government corporations — that is, corporations other
than those of mixed ownership listed above— were required to submit
annually a "budget program" through the usual budgetary channels. The
act specified: "The budget program shall be a business-type budget, or plan
of operations, with due allowance given to the need for flexibility, includ-
ing provision for emergencies and contingencies, in order that the cor-
poration may properly carry out its activities as authorized by law." The
statute also specified that the budget program contain a statement of the
financial condition of the corporation and other information calculated
to enable Congress to evaluate its past performance and its future program.

The degree to which the legislation of 1945 will actually limit corporate
autonomy can be determined only as procedure under the act develops.
The act did not contemplate the financing of corporate activities by appro-
priation from the Treasury. Rather, its objective was to furnish opportunity
for congressional review of planned expenditures from corporate funds.
Thus the act merely applied to all kinds of corporate expenditures the
type of control that had already developed with regard to administrative
expenses of many corporations. Incidentally, it was assumed that corpora-
tions which had been operating under congressional limitation of admin-
istrative expenses would continue to do so.

The degree of congressional limitation will depend in large measure on

. 18The President's budget for the fiscal year of 1946 included estimates of nonadminis-
trative expenses and program expenditures by corporations, but these figures were informational
rather than in request of congressional authorization.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 251

what type of action Congress develops the habit of taking after it receives
corporate budget programs. Congress could write into the appropriation
language detailed directions, or it could simply do nothing. The act spe-
cifically states that congressional action is not necessary to authorize
expenditure from corporate funds. Congress could, if it wished, examine
the programs of the corporation. If the plans raised no issue, inaction
by Congress would erect no bar to corporate execution of programs. How-
ever, corporations were instructed to include in their 1947 budget programs
the following authorizing language to be transmitted to Congress: "Ap-
proval is hereby given to the . . . Corporation, within the funds available
to it, to undertake the types of programs set forth in its 1947 Budget."

The problem remained of how corporations would deal with unfore-
seeable emergencies requiring rapid change of plans. It was proposed to
include in their first budget program presented for congressional approval
the following general language applicable to all corporations: "In order to
meet emergencies or contingencies arising subsequent to approval of the
Budget and not provided for in the budget program, a corporation covered
by the provisions of this Act may adjust, with the approval of the President,
its budget program to provide for the immediate initiation of programs
authorized by law and not specifically set forth in the approved Budget;
Provided, That the new program shall be immediately transmitted to the
Congress as an amendment to the Budget; Provided further, That under
no circumstances shall a corporation prior to approval by the Congress
undertake a program which would necessitate an increase in its authorized
borrowing authority."19 Reference to the President implied prior review by
the Budget Bureau.

Powers of the Comptroller General. The aspect of financial control
which has received most attention is that of the audit and settlement of
accounts by the Comptroller General. In much of the discussion of this
subject two phases of the matter as applied to corporations are not clearly
differentiated. The first is the body of laws and regulations applied by
the Comptroller General; the second is their mode of application. When
expenditures are made from the Treasury—as contrasted with corporate
funds — and are reviewed by the Comptroller General, they become subject
to all the legal prescriptions of government-wide applicability in the ab-
sence of positive legislative exception. These rules are frequently in them-
selves not conducive to efficiency in commercial enterprise. The manner
in which they are interpreted and the methods by which the Comptroller
General applies them are a still different matter. Highly formalistic pro-

10 Such a proviso was reflective of the spirit in which the House Committeee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Departments expected the legislation to be carried out. See House Report
No. 856, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., July 5, 1945. A similar provision had been included in an
earlier bill proposed by Senator Byrd (S. 469, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., February 5, 1945). The
hearings on this bill before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency constitute a valuable source of information on government corporations.

252 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

cedures to prove compliance place a great burden of paperwork on govern-
ment agencies. Moreover, the discretion which rests in the Comptroller
General in the interpretation of legislation sometimes makes it possible for
him to exert great influence on the nature of an agency's program.

A weakness of the Comptroller General's audit as it applies to cor-
porate enterprise is that it is concerned solely with legality of expenditure
rather than with efficiency of operation. These two qualities are by no
means identical. A government agency may make its expenditures in a
perfectly legal manner and yet be inefficient. Thus, to spend legally, an
agency must comply with an act requiring competitive bidding in the
making of public purchases. If all bids are alike, the accepted etiquette is
to advertise again or to draw lots to determine the successful bidder. David
Lilienthal points out that if this procedure had been required of the Tenn-
essee Valley Authority when it received identical bids for cement, it would
have had to pay excessive prices. Instead it negotiated lower prices. It
was able to bargain with the intimation that it could construct its own
cement plant.20 Such a tactic would have been illegal under ordinary
procedures, and the Comptroller General would have blocked payment on
a purchase so made. The General Accounting Office under him is not
concerned with the operating efficiency of a purchasing system; it seeks
merely to see that particular payments have been made in accordance with
law. Naturally, in commercial enterprise freedom in purchases from ham-
pering routines bulks much larger in importance than in the ordinary depart-
ment which usually has to make only small purchases for its office needs.

The statute on purchasing procedures is only one of hundreds of stat-
utes and many more decisions of the Comptroller General which the Gen-
eral Accounting Office applies in reviewing the expenditures of government
departments. A few additional illustrations may be cited of such general pro-
hibitions which can be waived in particular instances only by congressional
dispensation, which, needless to say, has been often granted. Land to be
used for public buildings may not be bought until the Attorney General
clears the title. All printing must be done by the Government Printing
Office. Law books and periodicals may not be purchased except by specific
appropriation. All contracts must be placed in the custody of the General
Accounting Office. Plans for public buildings must be approved by the
Public Buildings Administration. In addition to general laws of un-
equivocal meaning, government departments are subject to a large body
of rulings produced by the General Accounting Office in the interpretation
of statutory language.21

20 Lilienthal, David E. and Marquis, R. H., "The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the
Federal Government," Harvard Law Review, 1941, Vol. 54, p. 567.

21 The above examples are from McDiarmid, John, Government Corporations and Federal
Funds, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. This able treatment covers thoroughly the
general problems of financial control sketched here only briefly. For fuller discussion, see
below Ch. 25, "Fiscal Accountability."

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 253

The relationship of corporations to the Comptroller General has under-
gone a process of evolution similar to that of their relation to the budget
process and appropriation procedure. A state of complete freedom from
review by the Comptroller General was gradually modified by changes
affecting particular corporations. Finally, in 1945, all corporations became
subject to inspection of their accounts by the Comptroller General in a
manner somewhat different from that applicable to ordinary departments.
Whether a corporation came within the jurisdiction of the Comptroller
General, thus being subject to the regulations applied by his office, was
determined before 1945 by the basic legislation and appropriation language
relating to each corporation. By an executive order of 1934, the President
directed that corporations created after March 3, 1933, "the accounting pro-
cedure for which is not otherwise provided by law" should render accounts
to the General Accounting Office for settlement as prescribed by the Comp-
troller General.22 In actual fact, the procedure was generally "otherwise
provided by law" for each corporation.23

Nor was the practice by any means uniform. At one extreme, corpora-
tions such as the Panama Railroad Company and the Inland Waterways
Corporation, both created before the date fixed by the executive order of
1934, retained complete freedom from the Comptroller General. Even
when Congress limited total administrative expenses for particular corpo-
rations, it sometimes made it clear that this action did not bring the manner
of making such expenditures within the regulations applied by the Comp-
troller General. Thus the 1945 Reconstruction Finance Corporation limita-
tion indicated that "except for the limitations in amounts hereinbefore, and
the restrictions in respect to travel expenses, the administrative expenses
and other obligations of the corporation shall be incurred, allowed, and
paid" in accordance with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act. In
other instances, administrative expenses alone were made subject to review
by the Comptroller General. Thus the 1945 limitation on administrative
expenses of the Smaller War Plants Corporation provided that no part of
the administrative expense allowance might "be obligated or expended
unless and until an appropriate appropriation account shall have been
established therefor pursuant to an appropriation warrant or a covering
warrant, and all such expenses shall be accounted for and audited in ac-
cordance with the Budget and Accounting Act."

All types of expenditures by Federal Prison Industries, Inc. were placed
under review by the Comptroller General and had to be made "in accord-
ance with the laws generally applicable to the expenditures of the several
departments and establishments of the government." The Tennessee

22 Executive Order No. 6549 of January 3, 1934.

23 A table showing the relationship of government corporations to the Bureau of the
Budget and the General Accounting Office in 1944 is printed in the Hearings of the Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation
Bill for 1945, pp. 807-808.

254 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

Valley Authority occupied and still enjoys a peculiar position in relation
to the Comptroller General. Almost continuously since its establishment,
TVA has been in controversy with the Comptroller General, who has had
as allies various groups hostile to its program. The upshot has been that
TVA is liable to audit by the Comptroller General but that Congress has
made modifications of general statutes for its benefit. Moreover, TVA
enjoys by statute the unique right to overrule a disallowance by the Comp-
troller General under certain circumstances.24

Perhaps good and sufficient reasons have existed for excepting the ex-
penditures of many government corporations from general laws and regu-
lations. However, one of the consequences has been an unsatisfactory
system for the inspection of corporate accounts. Not a few corporations
have employed private accounting firms to examine their accounts. This
practice is of dubious efficacy for public enterprise. To fill the void, Con-
gress in its legislation of 1945 directed the Comptroller General to audit the
financial transactions of all government corporations, but the intent was
to require a type of audit different from that applicable to ordinary depart-
ments. When the Comptroller General "audits" and "settles" accounts
of government departments, he determines whether particular expendi-
tures have been made in accordance with law and regulation as inter-
preted by himself. The Government Corporation Control Act calls for
an annual audit in accordance "with the principles and procedures ap-
plicable to commercial corporate transactions."

Thus the act does not operate to bring corporate expenditures under
the laws and regulations applicable to government departments generally.
The status quo that existed before the passage of the act is preserved. If
a corporation was authorized by previous legislation to determine the man-
ner of making expenditures, that right would live on. Or if a corporation
was bound by the ordinary rules and regulations, as in the example cited
above of Federal Prison Industries, that arrangement would also continue.
The Comptroller General was directed to report to Congress on the find-
ings of the audit, including ua statement of assets and liabilities, capital
and surplus, or deficit; a statement of surplus or deficit analysis; a state-
ment of income and expense; a statement of sources and application of
funds; and such comments and information as may be deemed necessary
to keep Congress informed of the operations and financial condition of the
several corporations."25 The statute laid the basis for a more satisfactory

24 An act of 1941 provides that the General Accounting Office "shall not disallow credit
for nor withhold funds because of any expenditures which the Board shall determine to have
been necessary" to carry out the provisions of TVA's basic statute. 55 Stat. 775.

25 The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 reenacted in substance the relevant
sections of Public Law No. 4, 79th Cong., approved February 24, ^945, which divorced the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation from the Department of Commerce and also dealt with the
audit of government corporations. Separation of the RFC from the Commerce Department
became an issue in connection with the nomination of Henry A. Wallace as Secretary of Com-
merce.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 255

financial inspection of corporations than had generally prevailed. At the
same time, the General Accounting Office was faced with the necessity of
radically altering its approach to auditing problems in order to achieve
the needed results.26

Central Control of Personnel. A federal department is bound by
general legislation, administered by the Civil Service Commission, which
fixes the manner of recruitment of employees, classification and pay
scales, and other aspects of personnel administration. As a consequence,
departmental discretion is limited in the selection of staff and in the
determination of compensation by both legislation and the tradition and
customs of civil service. Government corporations have placed a high value
on freedom from civil service rules and procedures, but their special priv-
ileges in personnel matters are rapidly disappearing.

The President, by Executive Order No. 7915 of June 24, 1938, provided
for bringing into the competitive civil service all positions, "including
positions in corporations wholly owned or controlled by the United States,"
except those exempted by statute. The general terms of the order applied
to the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Electric Home and Farm
Authority, the Export-Import Bank, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.27 The Ramspeck Act of 1940 authorized the President to
place in the competitive classified service the employees of all government-
owned corporations except the Tennessee Valley Authority.28 The Presi-
dent exercised this power by Executive Order No. 8743 of April 23, 1941,
which put under the provisions of the Civil Service Act the great
majority of positions to which the act of 1940 authorized civil service
extension.

In the legislation creating the Tennessee Valley Authority, special at-
tention was given to the personnel question. Congress concluded that the
undertaking might have a smaller chance of success if it had to operate
under civil service rules, yet it laid down the following merit-system in-
junction: "In the appointment of officials and the selection of employees
for said Corporation, and in the promotion of any such employees or
officials, no political test or qualification should be permitted or given
consideration, but all such appointments and promotions shall be given
and made on the basis of merit and efficiency . . . ." TVA has won an
impressive reputation for its personnel policies and practices. Its reputa-
tion has spread so far, wide, and handsome that in recent years few new fed-

26 For a discussion of the operations of the Comptroller General, see below Ch. 25, "Fiscal
Accountability," sec. 5, "Audit."

27 See Pritchctt, he. cit. above in note 3, p. 384.

2854 Stat. 1211. The statute recognized that there might be legal limits to the extension
of the civil service laws to corporations of the federal government formed under state laws.
On the problems of federal corporations and state legislative control, see the excellent mono-
graph by Weintraub, Ruth G., Government Corporations and State Law, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1939.

256 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

cral agencies felt respectable unless they had at least one TVA alumnus
in their personnel division. A thorough student of TVA concludes that
its record in personnel "has been in considerable measure attributable to
its freedom from time-worn Civil Service procedures and regulations."29
He points out, however, that the Civil Service Commission of today is not
the routine-ridden organization that it was in the early 1930's.

Freedom from the "time-worn" procedures of the Civil Service Com-
mission does not ensure by itself better-than-average personnel practices.
It merely leaves the way open for innovation and managerial responsibility
in personnel administration. In some instances — notably the Home Own-
ers Loan Corporation in its earlier days — the freedom from civil service
legislation has provided merely an opening for spoils practices. No cor-
poration other than TVA has gained an outstanding reputation for its
personnel policies, although some may have done a good job without
much advertising.

4. CORPORATE AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

Legislative Bewilderment. The highly formalized overhead controls
that have been described here constitute methods by which agencies may
be brought within the orbit of general governmental policy. When these
methods do not apply and when other controls are absent, presumably
a government-owned corporation would possess more or less complete
autonomy within the limits of the resources and authority granted to it
at the time of its creation. The theory of corporate autonomy may thus
conflict with the necessity that public activities be in accord with the
policies and wishes of those who carry political responsibility for the actions
of government. Or, to put the proposition in another way, it is funda-
mental that means exist by which administrative officers and governmental
agencies may be held accountable for their acts to those who bear political
responsibility — the chief executive and the legislature. In terms of manage-
ment, means must exist by which the operations of the corporation may
be brought into harmony with related actions of government.

Of course, the establishment of a corporation with the concomitant
definition of its functions — the instruction about what it is to do — is in
itself an act of direction. It is impracticable, however, for Congress and
the President, or an agency head acting pursuant to law, to create a cor-
poration, tell it what to do, and then forget about it. As a matter of
political necessity, there must be a continuing general surveillance of its
operations. The government corporation, if it enjoys financial autonomy,
is removed from the annual executive and legislative review of requests for

^Pritchctt, C. H., The Tennessee Valley Authority, p. 306, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1943.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 257

appropriations. If it is removed from general administrative supervision, it is
apt— as is frequently charged— to consider itself not a part of government.

Congress is somewhat baffled in its dealings with government corpo-
rations. They do not yield very well to the types of control exercised over
government departments. In dealing with the ordinary agency, a con-
gressional committee can tell it how many employees of particular grades
it can employ during the next fiscal year, can reduce the amount available
for the salary of an official it dislikes, can periodically put the key officers
on the carpet, and can enter into a very searching review of the agency's
plans and proposals. In general, Congress is thus able actually to exercise
control — although interference with the minutiae of administration is not
a genuine control of broad policy. On the other hand, when Congress
comes up against a corporation operating a commercial enterprise, differ-
ent types of evaluation of performance are essential. To criticize and to
demand more effective management of such an enterprise would not lead
very far if the usual types of analysis of government operations were fol-
lowed.

A sense of frustration seems to arise among Congressmen when they
are concerned with government corporations. The following exchange
before a congressional committee between Senator Byrd as its chairman,
and Jesse Jones, then Secretary of Commerce and boss of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, is a good illustration:

The Chairman. Will you point out to me now exactly what con-
gressional authority Congress has over these corporations after the
first authorization to operate is given to you? . . . We authorize you to
borrow $5,000,000,000. After that is done, what authority has Con-
gress over the RFC and how can they exercise it if it has got it?

Secretary Jones. I suppose if we misuse the funds, you would have
a good deal of authority?

The Chairman. How?

Secretary Jones. I do not know about that. . . .

• • • •

The Chairman. ... I am asking you what authority Congress has over
the RFC after they make their initial authorization.

Secretary Jones. I have always thought they had all of the authority.

The Chairman. Tell me how they can exercise the authority. You
know vastly more about it than I do. They haven't even a report from
the RFC in detail.

Secretary Jones. We make monthly reports to Congress.

The Chairman. You do not make them in detail?

Secretary Jones. Pretty well in detail.

The Chairman. You do not give the names of the borrowers?

Secretary Jones. I think we do

258 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

The Chairman. Where does that report go?

Mr. Mulligan. To the Vice-President and the Speaker.

The Chairman. Is it a public report?

Mr. Mulligan. Yes, except since the war I do not know whether
they have been issued to the general public or not.

The Chairman. Do you make an annual report to Congress?

Mr. Mulligan. In addition to the monthly report a quarterly report
to Congress is also required by law.

Secretary Jones. A monthly report and a quarterly report. . . .

The Chairman. ... I have never seen a report on the itemized loans
of the RFC.

Secretary Jones. If you will refer to the act, Senator, you will find it
requires these things, and these reports are sent in here, and you can go
to the Vice-President's office and get them.

The Chairman. I am glad to hear you say that.

Secretary Jones. We will be delighted to send them to the individual
members that want them. . . .

The Chairman. I am talking about the itemized statements.

Secretary Jones. I am talking about the itemized statement. I am
talking about the loan to John Smith for X dollars, and the rate of
interest. . . .

The Chairman. You haven't told me yet what control Congress can
exercise over the RFC.

Secretary Jones. I will leave that to Congress.30

Political Antagonisms. Congress is not, of course, as helpless as the
Senator would have us believe in the foregoing passage. However, it is
certainly true that the legislature has not developed satisfactory ways and
means for a recurring review of the operations of corporations. The normal
courses of discussion and criticism are open; when a Senator thunders,
government officials quake in their boots, whether they be on corporate
or on noncorporate payrolls. Congress has at its disposal the investigative
power which has been used effectively in relation to the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and other corporations.

At times, the intervention of Congress is not calculated to guide gen-
eral policy but to gain partisan, personal, or local advantage. Thus, over
several congressional sessions Senator McKellar of Tennessee has con-
ducted warfare against TV A, attempting to bring its employees under
Senate confirmation, to deprive it of the use of its receipts, and in general
to limit the authority of the corporation. The Senator was said to be intent
upon patronage and to cloak a personal grudge against the chairman of
TV A, a man not disposed to be pliable when he felt that the interests of

3° Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, Hearings, pp.
2295-2297, 78th Cong., 1st Scss., pt. 7, 1943.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 259

the corporation were threatened.31 This sort of congressional intervention
is probably the very thing which advocates of the corporate method desire
to avoid by autonomy. Yet the most liberal corporate freedom will not
serve to stave off congressional attack on either partisan or policy grounds.
The political battle has to be won for any activity, whether or not it is
conducted through corporate form.

It should be well noted also that most of the corporations have been at
fault at various times in their relationships with Congress. They have
partaken in a special degree of the administrative attitude that "what Con-
gress does not know will not get one into trouble." If corporations expect
to enjoy a status different from that of a usual department, they must
furnish information by which Congress can evaluate their operations by
means different from those applied to the ordinary department. The chair-
man of TVA has recognized this need and has proposed that special
arrangements be made by which at appropriate intervals Congress could
review the work of corporations.32

Providing Information for the Legislature. A better flow of informa-
tion has been reaching Congress since the middle thirties. Principally
through the stimulus of the Joint Committee on Non-Essential Expendi-
tures, comprehensive quarterly financial reports are made by the corpora-
tions to the Treasury and to the Bureau of the Budget.33 Such reports are
intelligible to technically competent persons, but they are not a very effec-
tive method of informing Congress or the public. The President's budget
annually contains a statement for each corporation showing expenditures
and receipts, actual and anticipated, just as for ordinary departments.34
Some of the corporations publish annual reports. Among the more illumi-
nating reports are those of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Generally, however, the work of the corporations has been a closed
book to Congress. Take the annual report of the Inland Waterways Cor-
poration as an example. It is prepared along traditional lines of corporate
reporting; but even private corporations have discovered that they must
call in their public-relations advisers as well as their accountants to try to
make their reports intelligible to their stockholders. The average Con-
gressman— or the average citizen — can sweat over the report of the Inland
Waterways Corporation for 1943 and find that it had a small deficit in its
transport operations which was offset by profits realized from the sale of
securities of the federal government. However, from the report it is difficult
to evaluate the efficiency of the management. Was it more or less effective

51 See Reynolds, J. L., "McKellar on the Rampage," New Republic, March 27 \ 1944, Vol.
110, pp. 400-402.

32 Lilienthal and Marquis, he. cit. above in note 20.

33 For the present form of these reports, see Budget-Treasury Regulation No. 3 of Sep-
tember 1, 1944, adopted under Executive Order No. 8512 of August 13, 1940.

3* Accompanying the fiscal statements are brief statements of the functions and authority
of the corporations. This is a convenient source of data on the current status of the corporations.

260 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

than in the preceding year? Was the corporation gradually going bank-
rupt through the impairment of its capital?85 What could be done to im-
prove the income-expense ratio?

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issues an excellent annual
report. Still, nowhere does it show how much this corporation is costing
the government in terms of the annual interest charge on capital stock,
subscribed by the Treasury, which yields no return to the federal govern-
ment. In most instances it requires prolonged special study to dig up the
really pertinent facts for the evaluation of corporate operations. Thus, by
enough research to produce a book, a private scholar might conclude that
without the subsidy from the Production Credit Corporations, the production
credit associations would have had to charge farmers about one per
cent more on loans in 1943 in order to maintain the same services and
accumulate the same reserves as in 1942.36 Such data are not ordinarily
produced by corporate reporting.

Congress should become better informed on the workings of govern-
ment corporations by the procedures provided under the Government Coi-
poration Control Act of 1945. It will receive and review the annual budget
programs of wholly owned government corporations. It will also be pre-
sented with reports of annual audits by the Comptroller General of the
affairs of both wholly owned and mixed-ownership corporations. These
arrangements will bring the business of each corporation before Congress
as a matter of routine. They will furnish corporate officials with the
opportunity to explain their operations, without waiting until a hostile in-
vestigation arises — caused perhaps in part because of lack of better channels
of communication between the corporation and Congress. In February,
1946, the House Committee on Appropriations created a new subcommit-
tee to deal with corporate budget programs and reports — a recognition of
the necessity for specialization within the committee on the problems of
corporations.

Enforcing Political Responsibility of Government Corporations. The
broader question of responsibility has not been realistically faced by gov-
ernment-corporation enthusiasts.37 The analogy with the private corpora-

35 Inadequate information on the state of the assets of a corporation may conceal losses or
it may result in continued overcapitalization which is, of course, costly to government. A
statute of 1938 provided for an annual appraisal of the net worth of the Commodity Credit
Corporation. Impairment of capital would be restored by appropriation, thus bringing losses to
the attention of Congress. Increment of assets above the authorized capital would be covered
into the Treasury, thus cutting off the cost of excess capital in the hands of the corporation.
The President in 1939, in his budget for the fiscal year of 1940 (p. ix), recommended that the
practice be extended to other corporations. The Government Corporation Control Act requires
that corporate budget programs include estimates of capital to be returned to the Treasury or
of appropriations required to restore capital impairments.

86 Butz, E. L., The Production Credit System for Farmers, Washington: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1944.

87 The questions that need to be answered have been posed. See Committee on Public
Administration, Research in the Use of the Government Corporation, New York, 1940.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 261

tion is not perfect. Although a degree of autonomy is enjoyed by a private
corporation, a variety of forces operates to enforce responsibility. The
financial journals, bankers, investment advisers, and such government
agencies as the Securities and Exchange Commission seek and obtain con-
siderable information about the operation of a business concern. Larger
stockholders are certainly not without influence. The need to retain the
confidence of the financial community operates as a spur to management.
The mores and habits of a business civilization likewise have their effects.

These influences are normally not present in the case of a government
corporation. No very satisfactory substitutes have been evolved save for
those corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, which have
been centers of controversy and have thus been compelled to exert their best
efforts both to manage their affairs and to inform the public of the results.
Had the practice of relying on private capital as a partial method of
financing become more general, government corporations would have had
to go into the market and sell their securities like private concerns. Under
such conditions, they might have become subject to the discipline of the
financial market. This has been true of the Federal Land Banks and
certain other lending corporations. But the more general practice has been
to finance government corporate operations solely with public funds.

The theory of corporate autonomy has been more badly mangled by the
integration of corporations into the departmental system than through con-
trol by Congress. This integration comes about partially through neces-
sity. It is impracticable to permit scores of corporations to drift about the
administrative cosmos accountable to no one in particular. From an operat-
ing standpoint, it is also essential that corporate policies be geared into
related policies executed by ordinary departments. The simplest way to
accomplish such reconciliation is by bringing the corporation within the
appropriate department. Thus, Federal Prison Industries, Inc. is within
the Department of Justice and is managed by those responsible for the
federal prisons. The Farm Credit Administration has been within the De-
partment of Agriculture and has functioned primarily as something ap-
proximating a holding company. Its supervision of the farm credit corpora-
tions has represented, in part, a specialized substitute for other overhead
controls.

Most of the housing corporations are within the structure of the Na-
tional Housing Agency. The integration of the Defense Plant Corpora-
tion, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Metals Reserve Company and
other defense subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has
been accomplished by means other than assignment to the appropriate de-
partment. In the exercise of its general powers over procurement, the War
Production Board certified plants to be constructed, supplies to be pur-
chased, and, in some instances, subsidies to be paid. These corporations
acted as bankers and managers to carry out decisions made elsewhere. In

262 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

their cases, the concept of a corporate board of directors fixing the policy
of the corporation and exercising an autonomous prudence was thus far
removed from the actual administrative situation.

The integration of corporations into the general administrative struc-
ture has been carried far. It may even be concluded that, by and large,
a government corporation, insofar as its autonomy in policy is concerned,
is little different from a bureau or other subdivision of a department. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Tennessee Valley Authority
retain their independent identity, but they are exceptional. The corpora-
tion today usually enjoys certain special privileges that a departmental
bureau does not have. However, in the exercise of these privileges it must
in most instances be guided by departmental policy and direction.

The Contribution of the Corporate Device. In reality there are few, if
any, corporate operations which could not be accomplished by an ordinary
department if the usual financial procedures were modified.38 Corpora-
tions have tended to acquire some of the characteristics of the ordinary
department, thereby narrowing the differences between the two. Never-
theless, most corporations do retain certain distinguishing features. Be-
fore the passage of the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, prob-
ably the most important privileges accorded to many corporations were
freedom from the annual appropriating process for the major part of their
outlays, and the right to retain receipts for corporate use. The extent to
which procedures under this act will modify the autonomy of corporations
remains to be seen, but the legislation contemplates different arrangements
for corporations than for ordinary departments. Of comparable import-
ance is freedom from review by the Comptroller General, which is of very
great significance in the negotiation and settlement of contracts and other
business transactions. If the Government Corporation Control Act really
results in a "commercial" type of audit, it will not narrow corporate priv-
ileges in this regard.

Almost all the supposedly desirable features of corporations can be, and
from time to time have been, given to ordinary departments. It is possible
in this manner to establish a revolving fund into which receipts are paid
and from which expenditures are made; to exempt employees from civil
service regulations; to deprive the Comptroller General of his powers with
respect to certain types of transactions; and to make exceptions from other
types of legislative and executive controls. Nevertheless, it has been much
easier to accomplish these things by creating a corporation than by making
an open and frontal assault on generally accepted working rules governing
the entire administrative establishment.

Perhaps the chief justification of the corporate device is that in times

38 For a careful comparative analysis of corporations and their equivalents in ordinary
departments, see White, Leonard D., Introduction to the Study of Public Admin ttration, ch. 9,
New York: Macmillan, rev. cd., 1939.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 263

of emergency it has been possible to achieve with it urgent objectives which
might have been more difficult or impossible of attainment by other means.
By a single action — establishment of the corporation — men have been put
to work on a job unhampered by the necessity of conducting a running
fight with the Bureau of the Budget, the Appropriations Committees, the
Comptroller General, and the Civil Service Commission. Once the emer-
gency is over and the operation is proceeding smoothly, the corporation
can be brought into more orthodox governmental patterns, or it can be
liquidated.

The wide use of the corporation and the considerable literature on the
subject throw into bold relief the general problem of administrative decon-
centration. The pressure toward uniformity of operating method and
toward coordination of policy throughout the huge federal machinery
brings with it formidable issues in the maintenance of initiative and in
the preservation of conditions favorable to self-reliant management and
innovation. Unification and uniformity carry with them an inevitable
degree of congestion at the center, and also delay and hamper action. In
devising mechanisms for central control we must guard against the ten-
dency to exert great effort in the achievement of integration and uniformity
with respect to matters that really are not of sufficient significance to justify
he trouble.

The rise of the government corporation reflects the difficulties that sur-
round responsive administration in the settled forms of the departmental
system and in higher central controls. Escape from traditional ways of
doing things through corporate autonomy is not the answer. The solution
lies in better appreciation of the need for creative freedom of public manage-
ment buttressed by full responsibility — and for forms of control appropriate
to this fundamental purpose.

CHAPTER

Field Organization

Capitals of nations and states are popularly regarded as the places where
the business of government is carried on. Actually this business brings
national and state government into hundreds and thousands of communi-
ties distant from the capital — that is, into "the field." For it is in the field
that taxes are collected, regulatory laws enforced, and governmental serv-
ices rendered. This being true, effective administration at the capital is
not enough. Equally important is the condition of the field service. It
must be competently staffed. It must contribute to the planning and execu-
tion of the programs of the various departments and bureaus centered at
the capital. It must bring these more or less specialized programs into
coordinated focus for each geographic area cf the country. It must be
responsive to local as well as national needs,

1. THE GROWTH OF FIELD ORGANIZATION

Continental Prototypes. Historically, field organization has been a tool
used for both the centralization and decentralization of government. The
centralist emphasis dominated field organization during the centuries when
Western civilization was emerging from the Middle Ages. The evolution
of the nation-state was a reaction against the feudal organization of society
— under which state taxes had long ceased to be collected, justice was meted
out by local authorities, the right to travel highways depended on payment
of tolls to local lords, the coinage of money was far from a state monopoly,
and national armies were mere assemblages of groups of vassals of allied
lords. Naturally, the extent of reversal of these centrifugal tendencies has
depended upon the king's capacity for reducing his dependence upon
the feudal lords. This required, among other things, the development of
a truly national bureaucracy that would carry the king's law and collect
the king's taxes throughout the realm.

Accordingly, in France for instance, the king appointed so-called in-
tendants to represent him in the provinces, with authority over both local

264

FIELD ORGANIZATION 263

governments and subordinate field officials of the different departments
of the national government.1 The precedent thus set by the ancien regime
was not neglected after the Revolution of 1789. Indeed, Napoleon later
improved upon this centralizing device. The king's intendants, serving
for twenty or thirty years in their particular provinces, had often asserted
a measure of independence from the Paris government by encouraging and
defending local interests. Napoleon, noting these difficulties, deliberately
ignored the provinces, superimposing on the country's map an entirely
artificial set of boundaries outlining areal "departments," each of which
was headed by a prefect representing the central government. This scheme
of territorial administration has continued since Napoleon's time as a
major instrument of centralization. Its distinctive feature is that the pre-
fect represents practically all of the national government's functional de-
partments. Consequently, most of the functional threads of national gov-
ernment are pulled together at his level before they are stretched on to
individual communities and citizens.

In Prussia, too, and its precursor, the Electorate of Brandenburg, field
officers were used to weld local feudatories into a centralized nation. Fred-
erick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, in 1657 divided his
Privy Council into a larger number of specialized departments, and des-
ignated certain members of the council as local regents. Characteristically,
the regents were not natives of the areas to which they were assigned.
Being tied both to the Privy Council and to local areas, the regents were
effective instruments for insuring local observance of national economic,
social, and fiscal policies. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
regents had associated with them administrative councils for their areas,
composed of national field agents.

< Simultaneously with the development of the local regents and their
administrative councils, there developed war commissariats scattered
throughout the country, whose concern for financing, feeding, billeting,
and clothing the armed forces of the military-minded Prussian state made
them strong rivals of the regents and councils. As friction between the
rival establishments increased, the successive kings issued ineffectual man-
dates directing the commissariats and councils to confer with each other
in order to avoid wasteful competition, and even introduced royal arbitra-
tion of individual jurisdictional conflicts. Despairing of these measures, the
king ultimately merged the councils and the commissariats. As a result,
the more aggressive war commissariats gained dominance over the coun-
cils, and the Prussian field service became even more of a centralizing
force.2

1 Cf. Bloch, Marc, "Feudalism: European," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 6,
pp. 203-210; Shepard, W. J., "Centralization," ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 308-312; Finer, Herman,
Theory and Practice of Modern Government, pp. 1223 ff., London: Methucn, 1932.

»C/. Finer, ibid., pp. 1190-1195, 1202.

266 FIELD ORGANIZATION

British Development. Considerably before the European continent
emerged from feudalism, England had established the ultimate dependence
of all lords and lords' vassals upon the king. Accordingly, she never was
driven to provide the continental type of counterpoise to the decentralized
structure of feudalism— an army of intendants or regents administering
local areas on behalf of the king. Instead centralist tendencies took the
form of local sheriffs designed both to represent the king and to protect
the rights of local self-government against encroachment by feudal lords;
or of justices of the peace appointed by the king from among local land-
owners. However, popular prejudice against the sheriffs as local representa-
tives of the king resulted in decay of the sheriff's office. Subsequently, the
attempt to use local justices of the peace as royal administrative agents came
to an end with the civil wars of the seventeenth century. Thenceforth the
justices were virtually uncontrolled by London.

Throughout British development, emphasis was placed on struggles
over policy formation and therefore over the role of Parliament. The rela-
tively lighter stress placed upon the machinery through which policies
would be administered may account for the British failure to follow the
continental pattern of field integration. In recent times, extension of the
national government to the field has been through the individual functional
departments, not through agents representing the whole national adminis-
tration in particular areas.3

Expansion of Federal Functions. In modern times particularly, it is diffi-
cult to disentangle the motives, or for that matter the results, of the growth
of field services. To some degree the centralizing factor — so conspicuous in
the modern origins of field organization— persists, often with emphasis
upon supervision of local governments. At the other extreme is a conscious
effort by national governments to permit adaptation of administration to
the needs and aspirations of particular regions— in other words, to decen-
tralize the execution of policies that must be formulated nationally. A third,
and perhaps most important factor in the growth of field organization,
is^ simply the need to get particular functions performed, with all conscious
theorizing about centralization and decentralization pushed aside.

This third factor has dominated the development of the field service of
our federal government. In the United States, the centralization-decentrali-
zation dispute has centered on the respective powers of the Union and the
states. The federal field service has been generally accepted as a necessary
and unobjectionable complement to those powers that are in fact exercised
by the national government. That explains, from the historical standpoint,

9Cf. Bloch, he. cit. above in note 1; Dhonau, May L, Decentralisation in Government
Departments, p. 5 ff., London: Institute of Public Administration, 1938; Finer, op. at. above
in note 1, pp. 1281-1291. For German, French, and British experience, see also Special Com-
mittee on Comparative Administration, Committee on Public Administration, Social Science
Research Council, Memorandum on Regional Codrdination, pp. 13-19, 26-43, Washington,
March, 1943.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 267

why the bulk of these field services evolved for such functions as carrying
the mail, collecting federal taxes, prosecuting and trying legal cases under
federal law, protecting the frontiers, and building and repairing the ships
of the Navy. In fact, the story of the growth of the federal field services
in this country parallels almost directly that of the expansion of functions
of the national government. In many ways the most interesting phases of
field administration developed only after the federal government under-
took important and varied regulatory responsibilities and adopted spending
programs designed to equalize and support with national resources the
social and economic opportunities of the citizens of the several states.

A case in point is the United States Department of Agriculture. Al-
though established in 1862, the early concentration of this department
upon research and reporting meant that for many years there was no need
for a large staff, either in Washington or in the field. Even in 1905, all
functions could be performed by about 5,000 employees, 70 per cent of
whom were stationed in the field. Only two of the department's bureaus
had extensive field services. Yet, in 1939, the demands of regulatory, pro-
motional, and research functions had so multiplied that the employees
of the department numbered 82,000 — sixteen times the figure for 1905 —
while 85 per cent of this total number were in the field service. In the
period since 1905, field employment had increased both absolutely and rela-
tively, reflecting the growth and changing nature of the department's
responsibilities.4

Thus expansion of the service and regulatory functions of government
underlies much of the expansion of field services. Indeed, the very fact that
national policy could be administered in the field—away from Washington
— undoubtedly made more palatable the idea of federal assumption of much
policy-making that earlier had been thought to belong to state and local
governments. Similarly, state assumption of local functions has often been
followed by arrangements for having these functions administered either
through field agents of the state government or through local governments
themselves serving in effect as arms of state administration.

Technological Progress. Particularly in the fields of transportation and
communication, technological progress has played an important role in the
expansion of field services. Technology converts local commerce into na-
tional commerce, and so both furthers the shifting of regulatory and pn>
motional functions to the national government and necessitates expansion
of the government's field services. It also affects directly the ease of contact
between citizens and the national capital and between field agents and the
central government. In fact, the facility with which Washington officials

4 Truman, David B., Admini$trative Decentralization, pp. 36-41, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1940. For an account of the growth of the functions of the Department of
Agriculture, see Gaus, John M. and Wolcott, Leon C., Public Administration and the United
States Department of Agriculture, pp. 3-90, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940.

268 FIELD ORGANIZATION

and citizens in all parts of the country can directly communicate with one
another even relieves some of the pressure for establishment and expansion
of field services. Some federal agencies either rely entirely on their func-
tional divisions at Washington for operating their programs or merely
establish regional divisions within their Washington headquarters.

Paralleling this easing of central headquarters-citizen contact, however,
is the strengthening of bonds connecting departmental officials with their
field personnel. Through telephone, telegraph, and teletype, through air mail
and regular mail, and through air and train travel, field agents and central
headquarters are in daily contact. In practice, this encourages the expansion
of field services, for central officials need have no fear of losing control
by setting up field offices.5 By the very fact that advances in communication
and transportation remove distance as a barrier to central control, they are
centralizing influences. Yet, at the same time, they permit creation of a
field structure within which decentralization of authority can go forward
without impairing the ultimate responsibility of departmental headquarters
for the agency's total program and operations.

Scope of Field Organization. The most perplexing and important prob-
lems of field organization in this country arise naturally in the federal gov-
ernment, since its functions extend over greater territory than do those of
the states. Nonetheless, the states are also faced by the necessity for field
organization. In general, the states have lagged considerably behind the
federal government in the development of extensive field services. This has
been attributable to several factors: (1) the relatively short distances between
the state capital and the other communities in the state, with the result
that administration directly from the capital was in most cases reasonably
satisfactory; (2) the extent to which governmental functions were per-
formed by counties, towns, and special districts; and (3) the less satisfactory
state personnel situation, where in many departments employees could not
be spared for the staffing of field offices.6

For all the obviousness of the need for extending administration through
field services, it is generally startling to look at the statistics that demon-
strate governmental response to this need. In the federal government, for
instance, nine employees are stationed in the field for every employee sta-
tioned in Washington. Of the total of almost 2.4 million federal em-

5 Nonetheless, there is some indication that field officials in the Far West, being visited
less frequently by Washington officials and themselves appearing at Washington less fre-
quently than eastern field officials, have a greater independence of central direction.

6 On state field services and the related problem of administrative areas, see Hansen,
G. H., A Regional Redistrictlng Plan for the State of Utah, Provo: Brigham Young University
Press, 1937; Menefee, Selden C., A Plan for Regional Administrative Districts in the State of
Washington, Seattle: University of Washington, 1935; Uhl, Raymond, "Administrative Regions
in Virginia," Public Administration Review, 1942, Vol. 2, pp. 50-63; Hinderaker, Ivan, The
Administrative Districts and Field Offices of the Minnesota State Government t Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minneapolis Press, 1943.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 269

ployccs in April, 1946, about 237,000 were stationed in Washington and
2,163,000 in the field. The agencies with the largest number of field em-
ployees were, in the order of size of field personnel, the War, Post Office and
Navy Departments, all with fields staffs of several hundred thousand;
and, with less than 150,000 employees in the field, the Veterans Administra-
tion, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Interior
Department, the Office of Price Administration, and the War Assets
Administration.7

2. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

Approach to Decentralization. Since field organization has developed
in the United States not through any master plan but in response to the
needs of individual departments and bureaus, naturally there is diversity
among the methods of field administration. Yet, within virtually every
agency will be found such basic problems as these: thejaropcr degree of
decentralization. of authorit^^the conflict 9f interests between functional
experts _at headquarters and general administrators injhe field; the basic
need for intelligent and sympathetic handling of relations between head-
quarters and the field; and the complexities of managing a field structure
having two or even three successive levels. Each of these intra-agency
problems will be considered in turn.

The question of the degree to which authority should be delegated to
field agents requires an appreciation of the character of field organization as
a facility susceptible of different uses. It is an efficient tool for either centrali-
zation or decentralization of authority. Whether or not decentralization —
or deconcentration — actually characterizes a given field service may be
discerned from observation of the frequency with which field offices must
refer matters to central headquarters for decision; the number and specificity
of central regulations and orders governing field work; the provision for
citizen appeal to headquarters for overruling of field decisions; the degree
to which all of the agency's field activities within each geographic area are
directed by a single field official; the volume of decisions and variety of
functions of the agency; and the caliber of field officials.8 Since authority
stems initially from the center, decentralization requires positive actionJ
Lack dTfKis sort of actionjresults in centralization. For such representative
functionTas" tEosc In volvinglKe^gi-anNin^id anchhc agricultural programs,

7 United States Civil Service Commission, Monthly Report of Employment: Executive
Branch oj the Federal Government, April, 1946. It should be noted that during World War II
several central services were removed from the congested national capital.

$See Truman, op. cit. above in note 4, pp. 56-58, 189; Dhonau, op. cit. in note 3, p.
16; Ulienthal, David E., TVA: Democracy on the Marih, p. 161, New York: Harper, 1944.

270 FIELD ORGANIZATION

the federal government has generally failed to delegate broad authority to
its field agents.9

The factors that usually control the degree to which an agency cen-
tralizes or decentralizes its authority fall under four broad headings:
(1) the factor of responsibility; (2) administrative factors; (3) functional
factors; and (4) external factors.10

Factor of Responsibility. The principle of administrative responsibility
acts as a general deterrent to the decentralization of administrative author-
ity. The principle itself is familiar. Every agency head in the federal gov-
ernment is answerable for his general administrative program to the Presi-
dent, Congress, and the people. He is responsible to central budgetary,
accounting, auditing, and personnel agencies and to the courts for the
integrity and legality of his agency's operations. He can also be pilloried
at any time by the press, committees of Congress, and political enemies
for right or wrong decisions made by him or his subordinates, however
picayune the matter.

As a result, agencies hesitate to delegate broad discretionary authority
to field officials, who are thought to be less readily controlled than officials
regularly stationed at the capital. The effects of this system of responsibility,
though well-nigh universal, are more acute in some agencies than in
others. An instance is the Public Works Administration, which, because it
performed an activity traditionally open to the dangers of corruption and
graft, set up a highly centralized organization.11

Administrative Factors. \The second main cluster of factors influencing
decentralization is administrative in character, specifically: age of the
agency, stability of its policies and methods, competence of its field person-
nel, pressure for speed and economy, and administrative sophistication. The
age of the agency is basic to several of the other administrative factors
mentioned. Time is required for a new agency to get well staffed and
organized at headquarters, for key officials to get used to working together,
and for an esprit de corps to develop that will support high morale in the

0 See Key, V. O., The Administration of Federal Grants to the States, p. 222, Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1937; Truman, op. at. above in note 4, p. 195; Vieg, John A.,
"Working Relationships in Governmental Agricultural Programs," Public Administration Review,
1941, Vol. 1, p. 146. Cf. also Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, p. 100, New York: Knopf,
1945. A rough grouping of centralized and decentralized agencies is suggested in Fesler,
James W., "Federal Use of Administrative Areas," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1940, Vol. 207, p. 114.

10 The itemization and discussion of individual factors here presented are based in part
upon Gulick, Luther, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Gulick, L. and Urwick, L.,
eds., Papers on the Science of Administration, p. 29 ff.t New York: Institute of Public Ad-
ministration, 1937; Truman, op. cit. above in note 4, p. 17 ff.\ Wallace, Schuyler, Federal
Departmentalization, pp. 133-144, New York: Columbia University Press, 1941; Dhonau, op.
cit. above in note 3, p. 13 ff., 135; and Fesler, he. cit. above in note 9, p. 114.

11 Sec Williams, J. Kcrwin, Grants-in-Aid Under the Public Works Administration, p. 99,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 271

field. Organization and staffing of a field service, and delegation of author-
ity to it, must generally await the clarification of organization and author-
ity at the center.12 And even after a field service is organized and staffed,
time must often be allowed for the field service to prove itself worthy of
the confidence of headquarters officials — a confidence that is a prerequisite
of willingness to decentralize.

Stability of policies and methods is fundamental. As long as headquar-
ters itself is in a ferment over the policies to b^pursued by the agency, it
is idle to talk of decentralization. In some instances, furthermore, it is
only by temporary centralization of all decisions that headquarters can
reach the point of establishing a pattern of policies on the basis of which
decentralization can then go forward.13 | ^

'Agencies differ in the degree to which they can crystallize and stabilize
policies and methods. May L. Dhonau has suggested that the judicial type
of administrative work can be decentralized more extensively than other
types of activity.14 J Examples would be the settlement of claims to unem-
ployment insurance benefits and veterans' pensions. For the great mass of
such cases that are filed by citizens, the answer is provided either in the
statutes and regulations or in precedents established at headquarters early
in the agency's life. Only the unusual cases need be referred to head-
quarters for central decision.

^The competence of field personnel is a third administrative factor gov-
erning readiness to decentralize. At the heart of the disinclination to dele-
gate substantial authority lies the conviction of many officials that only they
themselves have the ability tcTdo the job as well as it should be done. To
dissuade them from this point of view requires, among other things, a
demonstration that others, both at headquarters and in the field, can do
important parts of the job competently. The field officials must have the
confidence, not only of the top executives of the agency, but also of the
functional specialists down the line. The fact that a field office can rarely

12 In the Works Progress Administration, however, the internal organization of state
offices was crystallized well ahead of clarification of Washington organization. Sec Macmahon,
Arthur W., Millett, John D. and Ogden, Gladys, The Administration of Federal Work Relief,
p. 208 ff., Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941.

13 An instance is provided by the Forest Service's centralization of certain phases of
recreational use of national forests until new policies and standards could be developed. See
Loveridgc, Earl W. and Keplingcr, Peter, "Washington-Field Relationships in the Forest Serv-
ice," in the symposium entitled Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service, p. 33,
Washington: United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School, 1942.

14 Op. cit. above in note 3, p. 135. If central instructions are too precise, of course, no true
decentralization could ensue, since there would be no significant discretion to be exercised in
the field despite the volume of transactions conducted there. For the contrast presented in
the inability of the Office of Production Management to decentralize, see Carey, William D.,
"Central -Field Relationships in the War Production Board," Public Administration Review,
1944, Vol. 4, p. 35. On all the administrative factors of decentralization this article offers a
valuable case study.

272 FIELD ORGANIZATION

demonstrate as much technical competence as the specialized divisions at the
agency's headquarters is a chief deterrent to decentralization.15 '

An illustration of the interrelationships of such factors as responsibility,
age of agency, stability of policies and methods, and competence of field
personnel is afforded by the Public Works Administration. After two years
of centralized administration — imposed in part, as we noted, because of
fear of graft and consequent exposure to political repercussions — the agency
decentralized the settlement of many problems. This was practicable, in the
opinion of top Washington officials, because legal, engineering, and financial
examiners with experience in the central office could be stationed in the
field offices, where their analyses and action on project applications would be
both competent and in conformity with uniform national standards.16

I/Problems of decentralization are complicated by a fourth administrative
factor, the need for speed and economy in administrative operations, both
to satisfy citizens as clients of the agency and to meet budgetary and effi-
ciency goals of the agency itself. \ The Disbursement Division of the Treas-
ury Department, for example, decentralized its certification and payment of
field payrolls of most federal agencies and, during the depression of the
1930's, its payment of relief checks. This was done in order to relieve the
Washington office of the heavy administrative burden and accelerate the
discharge of the government's financial obligations, thus providing speedier
service for those to whom the federal government owed money.17

\Many other agencies have realized that officials stationed permanently
in particular regions with authority to take action on behalf of the agency
will generally have lower travel and communication costs than headquarters
officials in a highly centralized organization. Their space costs may be lower
than those in the crowded capital. Citizens will generally appreciate the
opportunity to deal with a near-by official rather than with a central bureau
that can be visited only at considerable personal expense. <J-

Administrative sophistication, particularly with regard to management
of a field service, is a final factor influencing decentralization. Age is, of
course, a contributing element, for — as has been pointed out — an agency
must often develop its principles of field administration in an experimental
fashion and then wait for their crystallization as a condition to sound
understanding of both subject matter and administrative problems by cen-
tral and field personnel. This requires time, but it also requires a highly
intelligent and constructive approach by all key officials. A professional
approach is needed to such questions as the relative values of centralization
and decentralization, the respective roles of functional experts and general
administrators, the techniques for breaking down barriers to mutual col-
laboration between central headquarters and the field service, and the appro-

15 Sec Carey, loc. cit. above in note 14, p. 35.

wSee Williams, op. cit. above in note 11, p. 93; Key, op. cit. above in note 9, p. 226.

1* Sec Truman, op. cit. above in note 4, p. 29 ff.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 273

priate distribution of functions and authority in a two-tier or three-tier
field organization. Given a mature approach, an agency may overcome
many of the apparent obstacles to decentralization. I

Functional Factors. While factors of responsibility and administration
set limits to the feasibility of centralization and decentralization for indi-
vidual departments, the most marked variations among governmental agen-
cies result from the third major group of factors — those concerned with
functions. Here the factors involve answers to such questions as these:
How great a variety of distinct functions does the agency have? How
essential is technical specialization in the agency's work ? Does the function
require national uniformity or diversity among regions and localities?

The variety of functions an agency performs may affect its readiness to
decentralize operations. (\n agency with a single function has a relatively '
simple problem of analysis and decision in order to determine the appro-
priate degree of decentralization. But if an agency performs a variety of
functions, each of its central divisions may insist on a separate set of field
offices and districts, may have quite contradictory views on the urgency
or the extent of decentralization, and may violently oppose control of its
field agents by a field official representing the department head or his chief
of field operations.!

/ Reconciliation of these different viewpoints may be impossible, with the
result that either no decentralization occurs or each division decentralizes
as it chooses. In the latter event, the very failure to get agreement on an
integrated field service for the whole department may retard the process
of decentralization^ The department head, with full coordinative author-
ity over officials in Washington but no coordinative machinery in the field,
may very well fear the possibility of inefficiency, duplication, or direct
conflict if division heads delegate a large degree of authority to their field
representatives. It is also true that in cases where two or three divisions
need to reach joint decisions, the level in the hierarchy of all three where
the decisions will be ma'de will be dictated by the structure of the least
decentralized division. \ Consequently, one or more divisions will always
act as "drags" on the decentralization of other divisions in a department
performing a variety of functions.|

fin some agencies there is a pressing need for technical specialization.
This, particularly in a small agency, usually handicaps attempts to decen-
tralize the work, as a simple comparison will make clearf If for a certain
purpose an agency is allowed to have a payroll of fifty employees, it is able
to concentrate the fifty positions in a central staff within which there can
be both general administrators and groups of specialists such as engineers,
chemists, and budget and personnel experts. Or it may want to open per-
haps forty district offices in the field and assign to each office one employee
representing the whole agency in all of its specialized aspects, leaving only
ten at headquarters. This means that both at headquarters and in the

274 FIELD ORGANIZATION

field practically all positions will have to be filled by employees who are
not trained for any of the specialities that could contribute materially to
an intelligent job of administration.

Ready examples from recent experience are afforded by the Office of
Price Administration and the War Production Board. At Washington,
each agency had an expert on almost every industry and commodity in the
United States. But to duplicate this range of expertness in field offices was
out of the question. It is a general rule that no agency has in each of its
field offices as great a range of specialization as is represented in its head-
quarters staff. This necessarily acts as a bar to decentralization by agencies
requiring the services of technical personnel in reaching most of their
decisions.

Variety of functions and need for technical specialization are comple-
mented by a third functional factor — the degree of need for national uni-
formity as contrasted with the need for regional and local variation. This
factor goes to the heart of differing philosophies of government. It also
raises the difficult problem of how to measure the relative efficiency of dif-
fering administrative techniques. Thus it is perhaps both the most basic
and the least tangible of all the factors bearing on decentralization. The
fact that a function is within the legal jurisdiction of a central government
does not mean that its administration cannot be decentralized. Often func-
tions are shifted to the central government because financial or personnel
resources are greater there than at lower governmental levels; because policy
formulation needs to be centralized; or because the central government
must be looked to for assumption of ultimate administrative responsibility
on the highest level. However, unless there are affirmative reasons for
absolute uniformity in detailed operations as well as in general decisions
of the agency, authority can generally be decentralized to field agents.

The most obvious need for diversity in administration of a function
arises in agencies affected by differences in the physical characteristics of
the various parts of the country. Agricultural, forest, and water-resource
activities are examples. On the other hand, (the principal drive toward
centralization comes from insistence that when privileges and penalties are
being dispensed or rights determined, equity requires an identical adminis-
trative decision in every identical set of circumstances, whether the case
arises in Oregon, Louisiana, or Maine. Since administrative decisions often
involve general elements of judgment, this degree of uniformity cannot be
assured under a decentralized system permitting each field igent to reach
independent conclusions on the cases arising in his district? Examples of
functions demanding uniformity on a national basis are the administrative
adjudication of veterans' claims for compensation, the review of tax returns,
and the determination of the relative importance of various products in the
war procurement program. ^s

Externtd Factors. A final group of factors bearing on the centralization-

FIELD ORGANIZATION 275

decentralization controversy still calls for discussion. It concerns the need
for an agency to look beyond its own internal operations to external prob-
lems. The most important are the necessities for bringing the citizen into
the administrative process, collaborating with other federal, state, and local
agencies, and adapting field activities to political pressures.

The first of these factors may be referred to as the degree of need for^
support, participation, and representation at the "grass roots" of democracy ,x
If support of a large number of citizens is requisite to successful admin-
istration— as was true of the farm production program and wartime ra-
tioning and conscription; or if their participation is needed to impart
wisdom to the local decisions mad^-again a factor in these three programs;
or if national policy-makers at Washington need vigorous representation
of regional points of view so as to avoid development of unrealistic and
extravagantly uniform national plans, then under such conditions a de-
centralized organization is likely to develop.18

The degree of need for collaboration with other federal, state, and local
agencies is a second external factor in decentralization decisions. Other
things being equal, an agency's decisions should be made at the level of
authority that is most convenient for other agencies participating in the
decision-making process. This mean's that if federal agencies A and B
have a number of joint activities, their regional officials must have reason^-
ably similar grants of discretionary authority. It means further that if
the program is one of federal aid to the states, the federal agency admin-
istering the program will probably need to establish regional or state offices
that have the staff and authority to consult with the state governments
and * give them final answers on many important questions. Similarly,
pressure for a degree of decentralization develops when an agency's field
officials are invited to participate in a regional planning commission or to
collaborate with an establishment promoting regional development, like the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Nonetheless, it is probably true that the need
for collaboration with other agencies and groups exerts only a secondary
influence on a department's determination of the desirable degree of de-
centralization.

Finally, among external / factors, political aspects must be considered.
Since the strength of our political parties lies in their state and local or-
ganizations, there is some danger that field officials of the federal govern-
ment will come under heavy local pressures from the powers that be. This
is the case especially if the field officials have a large degree of discretion
in such matters as the appointing of employees, awarding of contracts, and
making of money grants or loans of one kind or another to individuals.
The problem is particularly acute if patronage governs the selection of key
field officials such as state administrators of federal agencies. Indeed, it

18 See Lilicnthal, op. tit. above in note 8, pp. 156-161, and, regarding agricultural land-use
planning programs, Vieg, he. «V.,above in note 9, p. 146.

276 FIELD ORGANIZATION

has been pointed out that in the Works Progress Administration "there
were occasions when state and district administrators took the attitude that
their primary allegiance was to the local political interest that had obtained
their appointments rather than to WPA headquarters in Washington."19

Generally, field work is more susceptible to political inroads than de-
partmental work in Washington. Able agency heads consequently may
shy away from extensive decentralization, lest they be forced to appoint a
large number of politically sponsored employees. By the same token, an
able Washington staff saddled with a political field staff may be anxious to
withhold grants of real power to the field.

In sum, then, central administrators confronted with the problem of
how far to go in decentralizing individual activities are likely to be influ-
enced by some or all of the factors here reviewed.

3. FIELD-HEADQUARTERS RELATIONS

The preceding discussion has suggested certain fundamental requisites
for the maturing of field-headquarters relations in an agency. It may be
well to restate them. They are: the adjustment of the conflicting interests
of functional experts and general administrators^ the development of
methods for improving mutual field-headquarters understanding and re-
spect;*and discovery of a firm formula to govern relations within a com-
plex, multilevel field organization. These are all problems that arise in
every field service, whether authority be centralized or decentralized.

Rivalry of Functional Experts and General Administrators. The most
fundamental of the three problems is the rivalry of functional experts and
general administrators. Each agency's headquarters office is subdivided
into specialized units dealing with different programs, techniques, controls,
and services. Some of them are so-called line or operating divisions, re-
sponsible for important segments of the agency's program. Some contribute
special skills, such as engineering and statistics. Others exercise manage-
ment control or perform managerial services, such as budgeting, personnel,
and space allocation. But each of the main divisions is responsible to the
agency head or to one of his chief deputies. Each has an institutional pride
and enthusiasm for its own part of the total program. Each — as can be
understood — would dislike to see important phases of its work performed
or directed by other divisions and officials. In fact, to such extent as a
division cannot actually perform or direct the work falling within its sub-
ject-matter specialty, a modification, if not a breakdown, occurs in the
system of responsibility.

When an agency's program is projected into the field there arise two
basic alternatives. Each division may be allowed to set up its own field
service and directly control the performance of the division's functions in

wMacmahon, Millctt and Ogden, op. tit. above in note 12, p. 279; see also pp. 269-291.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 277

the field. On the other hand, the whole agency may organize an integrated
field service, with each regional, state, and district director held responsible
for all agency functions performed in his assigned territory. The first
alternative has the defect that execution of the agency program is not in-
tegrated in each field area. The second alternative has the defect that
functional divisions at headquarters have no direct control over execution
of their subject-matter programs in the field. A major problem of ad-
ministration is to avoid the impasse between the apparently irreconcilable
positions of function and area, of functional experts and general admin-
istrators.

The solutions found to this dilemma stem in considerable measure from
the character of headquarters organization. If the agency head is weak,
or if the agency is a mere confederation of unrelated functional divisions
with no really joint objective or program, the functional point of view
is likely to prevail over the agency-wide point of view in field organiza-
tion. Many a federal department embraces so wide a range of function*
and includes such powerful and tradition-encrusted bureaus that any single
department-wide field structure seems out of the question. Difficult aj
has been the establishment of agency-wide areal coordination by the Socia!
Security Board,20 the task of overcoming functional pulls in such quasi
departments as the Federal Security Agency, of which the Social Securitj
Board has been but one of a number of constituent parts, is clearly almos
impossible.21

Sheer size of the administrative task, often but not always a companioi
of multiplicity of autonomous bureaus and distantly related functions, ma]
also be a deterrent to real agency-wide field coordination. The volume o
orders and informational paper that would have to flow to field coordinator
if functional lines of authority were suppressed in such an agency as th<
United States Department of Agriculture is fearful to contemplate.

In general, though, it may be concluded that the ability of a depart
ment's field coordinators to integrate its functions for given areas of th<
country will depend heavily on the strength of the department head vis-b-vi
his bureau heads, and on the inherent need for integration of departmenta
functions because of their subservience to a single purpose.

Lines of Command. Establishment of an integrated field service b
no means ends the problems of function versus area. For there remains
never-ending tussle over the extent to which the agency's regional dlrecto
must take orders from functional divisions at headquarters. This applie
also to the amount of direct contact that will be permitted between region*
functional divisions and their central prototypes. There are really onl

20 See Mitchell, W. L., "Washijigton-Field Relations in the Society Security Board," i
op. ciV.aJjove in note 13, p. 44.

^fSee, however, Roseman, Alvin, "The Regional Coordination of Defense Health an
Welfare Services," Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, pp. 432-440.

278 FIELD ORGANIZATION

two choices, because complete autonomy for the regional director is
unattainable.

One choice is to require that all programs and major orders dear
through the administrative hierarchy, while technical advice is handled
directly between central functional divisions and their regional counter-
parts. On main instructions to the field, the central functional divisions
would make recommendations to the agency head or his deputy. The
latter, on the basis of these recommendations, would transmit to his re-
gional directors such orders as he, a general administrator like the regional
directors, deemed desirable. The regional director in turn would see that
the orders were executed by his regional functional divisions. In this
pattern, the functional officials are subordinated at each step to the general
administrators.

The alternative method, called "dual command," appears at first glance
to be almost indistinguishable from the relationship just described. How-
ever, the difference is that between subordinating functional specialties to
general administration and recognizing "a double line of control."22 Under
such dual command, regional functional experts must look for orders both
to the regional director and to the functional divisions at headquarters.

Again, as in the question of the feasibility of decentralization, no single
formula will fit all agencies. Too much depends on the unity of purpose
of the particular agency and the consequent need for integrating all of its
functions.23 A great deal depends also on the effectiveness with which the
needed integration is actually achieved by a strong agency head. If head-
quarters is simply a tent under which autonomous bureaus are gathered
for mere appearance's sake, there is no possibility of a strong regional
director being able to challenge the flow of "technical" — as distinguished
from "administrative" — commands.

C If the agency really has a single purpose, requiring that its functions be
geared together, the need for a strong hierarchy of general administrators
built into both the headquarters and field organizations is great. A single-
purpose agency has, in addition, the incidental advantage that its regional
directors can be men and women with some specialized training, able to
command respect from the functional divisions?/ On the other hand, a
wide-ranging agency like the Social Security Board must choose "gencral-
ists" whose contributions to administration the functional experts tend to
underrate.24

In practice, the dynamism of functional divisions and the professional
bond between the staff of each such central division and its regional coun-
terpart weight the scales against the general administrators. This combina-
tion of influences tends to reduce regional directors to mere providers of

^Macmahon, Millett and Ogden, op. cit. above in note 12, pp. 265-267.

23 See Stone, Donald C., "Washington-Field Relationships," in op. cit. in note 13, p. 16.

24 See Mitchell, he. cit. above in note 20, p. 43.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 279

common facilities such as space, stenographic pools, and mail routing;
freely available speech-makers; and recorders of what goes on— the field
"eyes and ears" of headquarters. [The centrifugal force of the functional
divisions has been so strong that* the administrative problem has nearly
always been how to strengthen the regional director, and seldom how to
increase the role of the functional divisions.25)

Whatever the basic formula hammered out between i

generalists and functionalists may be, an agency has day-to-day problems
of headquarters-field relations, most of which revolve about four issues:
personnel policies; the headquarters office of field operations; communica-
tions; and control. In the case of personnel policies, field relations are
often muddied by jealousy over relative salaries.. In the Work Projects
Administration in March, 1937, for example, the average annual salary for
Washington was $2,251, but the average salaries for the state and district
offices were respectively $1,633 and $1,401.26

A regrettable lack of mutual understanding also develops when there
is no exchange of personnel between headquarters and field stations. The
Bridgeman Committee on reform of the British postal service put both of
these problems bluntly when it recommended, "As a rule no officer should
be appointed to an administrative position of importance at Headquarters
without a thorough training in, and experience of, work in the Provinces.
There should be no difference in status between the administrative Staff
at Headquarters and in the Provinces.'*27 The free movement of personnel,
both vertically and horizontally, is necessary not only to increase awareness
of field problems at headquarters and to open opportunities of promotion
for field staff members, but also to counteract provincialism within field
districts.28

Transfer of field personnel among districts can both widen opportunities^
for promotion and overcome provincialism. However, in the Social Se-
curity Board, each regional office having a vacancy tended to resent the
passing over of its own staff members in favor of some one from another
region.29 The national movement of personnel is also handicapped by the
need for placating sectional prejudices by the appointment of ^natiyes^ Jo
rcgionalofficcs, and by the value to an agency of regional representatives
wno^riTtlioroughly acquainted with the agency's clients in the region and

25 See Great Britain, Citrine Committee on Regional Boards, Report, p. 7 ff., Cmd. 6360,
London 1942; Dhonau, op. cit. above in note 3, p. 95 ff., 153; Key, op. cit. above in note 9,
p. 219 ff.; Williams, op. cif. above in note 11, p. 94; Fesler, James W., "Areas for Industrial
Mobilization, 1917-1941," Public Administration Review, 1941, Vol. V, pp. 149-166.

26 See Macmahon, Millett and Ogden, op. cit. above in note 12, p. 229.

2T Quoted in Dhonau, op. cit. above in note 3, p. 97; for Miss Dhonau's concurrence, see
p. 154. For United States Department of Agriculture experience, see Truman, op. cit. above
in note 4, p. 194.

28 Such provincialism "is one of the most frequent causes of misunderstanding or friction
in central-field relationships." Loveridge and Keplinger, he. cit. above in note 13, p. 32.

29 Sec Mitchell, loc. cit. above in note 20, p. 48.

280 FIELD ORGANIZATION

sensitive to the more subtle regional trends.80 A fortunate countervailing
tendency is the fear of an agency, such as the Public Works Administration,
that a field administrator might favor, or be accused of favoring, his own
state or region. The solution hit upon in this agency was "for the ad-
ministrator to be chosen from outside the district in which he was to
serve, despite the danger that he might be unfamiliar with local conditions
and unacceptable to the local officials with whom he should work haiy
moniously."31

Headquarters Office of Field Operations. A second major issue of
headquarters-field relations is the role and status of the headquarters office
of field operations. In theory, as we have seen, the principle of the single
chain of command requires that regional directors receive all important
orders from the agency head, not from the functional divisions. Yet the
agency head rarely can give personal attention to each of these orders.
Hence he often establishes an office of field operations through which all
functional and other orders proposed for issuance to the field must be
cleared, the field viewpoint may be reflected to headquarters for staff
discussions, and the agency head can maintain administrative supervision
of field operations.

The dangers inherent in this solution are several. The office of field
operations may become procedure-minded and fail to develop a broad
appreciation of the total agency program. It may lack the prestige and
broad-gauged personnel needed for effective participation in policy coun-
cils at headquarters. It may overstep its authority by captiously revising
programs that have been developed by functional divisions. And, by
barring direct contact between regional directors and headquarters officials,
it may depress field morale and undermine central-field understanding.

As the Work Projects Administration discovered, there is in a sense
no distinguishable division of activity to justify the label of field relations.
Instead, jevery division at headquarters is concerned with field relations
and must somehow be linked with the other divisions in a collaborative
endeavor to get the agency's objectives realized through the field serviofc
One of the most promising wartime experiments of this character was the
Operations Council of the War Production Board. It brought together
regularly the operations vice-chairman of WPB, the regional directors, the
heads of functional divisions, and the head of the office of field operations.
In addition, the regional directors caucused separately, with a view to
pointing up issues that should be brought to the attention of the chairman
of WPB.

.Problems of Communication. This suggests the third problem of cen-
tral-field relations — that of communication. The formal pattern for com-
munication from headquarters to the field is established by such rules as

30 See Key, op. at. above in note 9, p. 92, 106 ff.
81 Williams, op. cit. above in note 11, p. 72.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 281

"orders must flow through the office of field operations," and "advice may
flow directly from functional divisions at headquarters to their counter-
parts in the field." But this formalization of channels by no means meets
fully all problems. How are regional administrators to keep informed of
the flow of technical advice to their subordinates? How can field officials
be given adequate understanding of the total program of the agency?
How can functional divisions be prevented from dropping "paratroops"
into regions to perform special brief assignments — or how can this practice
at least be kept from undermining the regional director's responsibility for
all agency activities in the region? How can field officials be apprised of
central decisions in advance of their appearance under headquarters date-
lines in the region's newspapers? How can headquarters answers given
directly to officials of state and local governments, business corporations,
and private citizens, be kept consistent with the answers of regional offices
to the same people? And how can headquarters be kept' informed of -com-
munications among regional offices ? In addition, there is tKe important and
puzzling question of the volume and type of reports that field officials
must file centrally to keep headquarters informed of developments all over
the country and to facilitate effective supervision over the field services.

Despite the variety and difficulty of these communication problems, the
most fundamental question is probably that of how field officials can be
brought to play a constructive 'part in the formulation of agency policies
and procedures. Few able officials are content to be mere executors of
central instructions, or mere pedestrian writers of weekly reports "to keep
headquarters informed." As Donald C. Stone says, "Policy, programs,
and procedures must be developed and constantly revalued in terms of
operating and administrative experience, and, with a few exceptions, this
experience is taking place in the field."^/Two things are called for: the
consultation of field officials by headquarters in the development of national
policies; and the devolution of planning authority/so that, as in the Forest
Service, officials at each administrative level — national, regional, and sub-
regional — will have planning tasks appropriate to their assigned areas and
interlocked with the plans of the other levels.33

Controls Over Field Organization. The need for rigid headquarters
controls may be in roughly inverse ratio to the success with which com-
munication problems are solved and real understanding is developed be-
tween headquarters and the field.34 Nevertheless, ^communication is never
so perfect as to obviate the need for all controls. (

The three principal methods of headquarters control are advance review,

^2 Lor. tit. above in note 23, p. 18.

88 Sec Loveridge and Keplinger, loc. at. above in note 13, p. 31.

84 See Truman, David B., "Headquarters and the Field/' Public Administration Review
1942, Vol. 2, p. 359. C/. also Carey, William D., "Control and Supervision of Field Offices,'
jfttt, 1946, Vol. 6, pp. 20-24.

282 FIELD ORGANIZATION

g, and inspection. Advance review interferes to some degree with

ll-nedged decentralization, for it means the referral of matters to headj
quarters for decision. An example would be the requirement that eacl
field office do all the investigation of a case arising in its area, but refe
the case, with its recommendation and supporting data, to headquarter
for the actual decision. Differing only in degree is the initial decisioi
of a case in the field, with the citizen having a ready course of appeal t<
headquarters. On the management side, advance review can mean control
of budgets, personnel transactions, space allocation, and other managerial
facilities.

Reporting, which has aptly been termed a device of "remote control,"
places reliance on statistical and narrative accounts submitted by field
officials to headquarters. Through these reports, comparisons can be made
among field offices to check on efficiency and to spot successful experi-
ments deserving of application by all field offices. Headquarters can also
set field offices straight on any problems raised in their reports, and direct
them to change unsatisfactory practices.

A chief problem in reporting as a tool of control is that its utility
depends so much on the very officials over whom control is being attempted.
Few of them will consciously report adversely on their own operations.
Consequently, the device of "remote control" is most appropriate for those
agencies whose field work can be meaningfully measured in quantitative
terms35 and for whom, therefore, the form and content of reports can be
prescribed beyond any ability of the field official to escape self-revelation
of his errors. Even in such agencies there are instances, like the Work
Projects Administration, where politically appointed field administrators
are so distrusted that statistical reporting is set up outside their control,
pending at least the maturing of reporting methods to the foolproof stage.36

Inspection is essential to effective central control, yet it is a constant
irritant to field officials. Unless they are unusually skillful, inspectors must
either be superficial and ineffective or be "snoopers" trying to get under
surface appearances and consequently undermining the field staff's feeling
that their office chief has the full confidence of headquarters. A field
administrator tolerates with some distaste the brief visits of central agents
who subsequently write reports and recommendations on matters he feels
would require them months or years to master.

One device for preserving the field official's dignity is to let him see the
central inspector's report and submit his own comments to accompany it.
Another, and perhaps the most important, is for the inspector to be more
a counselor and less a reporter or examiner of formal obedience to pro-
cedural instructions. As a counselor he may ingratiate himself with the
field officials and help them with ideas on how to do a better job, prefer-

85 See Dhonau, op. cit. above in note 3, p. 153.

86 See Macmahon, Millett and Ogdcn, op. cit. above in note 12, pp. 238-240.

FIElJD ORGANIZATION 283

ably letting the ideas appear to originate with the field men themselves.
The spirit animating inspection work will necessarily depend on the level
of competence in the field service. Unless the field employees are reason-
ably able, control, rather than stimulation and encouragement, will be the
motif of inspection.

Problems of Multilevel Field Organization. Somewhat distinctive
problems of central-field relations arise in the multilevel field organiza-
tion. In many agencies, the typical field structure involves regional offices
and state or district offices, and, in some instances, a still lower level. Such
a pattern develops especially among agencies having a large clientele and a
large volume of field work, with the consequent necessity for local offices
within easy travel distance of their clients. This may mean up to hundreds
of local offices. Yet, considering the span of control, it is impossible for
a headquarters director of field operations to supervise directly so many
chiefs of local offices. He may meet the problem by providing himself
with a large staff of assistants in his central office. Or, as is more customary,
he may establish, say, a dozen regional offices as an intermediate level
between himself and the local offices.

The problems coming up in such a multilevel field structure are not
easily solved. If the regional office is powerful and if devolution of au-
thority to it is the rule, headquarters will be in inadequate contact with
the "firing line" of local offices. As a result, headquarters will tend to
"that remoteness in high places and divorce between theory and practice
which it is the very aim of decentralization to avoid."37 Similarly, strict
hierarchical principles would demand that the regional office have exclu-
sive inspectional authority over local offices. The consequence would be
that the central inspectional control — save over regional offices — would
tend to atrophy. Of course, it would be dangerous to separate what a
French scholar, Hauriou, has called the "noncombatants" at headquarters
from the "combatants" in the local offices. Despite theory, this threat has
led to frequent deliberate by-passing of the regional offices. If, on the
other hand, regional offices are not powerful and are inadequately staffed|
with experts, they become merely delay points in the transmission of
ters from the local offices to headquarters, which alone has functional
pertness.

There is often dispute as to whether headquarters or the regional office
should determine the location and jurisdiction of local offices and appoint
their chiefs. It is certainly true that regional offices, in working out their
supervisory relations to local offices, confront many of the problems of
internal organization that are prevalent at headquarters, such as the con-
flict of interest between functional experts and general administrators, and

87 Dhonau, op. «>. above in note 3, p. 134.

284 FIELD ORGANIZATION

the question of the desirability of a regional division of field relations.38

4. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN THE FIELD

Divergencies in Field Organization. In the United States, as we have
observed earlier, each bureau and agency having field functions has de-
veloped its own field service. As a result, the federal government has no
integrated field organization such as those established by governments of
continental Europe. Instead, it has well over a hundred separate field serv-
ices. For each of these, the sponsoring agency locates field offices, delineates
regional boundaries, and determines the desirable degree of decentralization
with primary reference to the administrative and functional requirements of
its own operations, but with slight reference to the broader interests of the
whole government.

To some extent, the diversity in field organization is due to minor con-
siderations of administrative or personal convenience; to political pressures
affecting the selection of field centers; and to lack of imagination in appre-
ciating the need for decentralization and the desirability of interagency
collaboration.

The importance of these influences can be exaggerated, however. There
are sound grounds for handling field operations in connection with agri-
cultural production differently from field operations in taking the census,
inspecting steamboats, rationing food, settling labor disputes, or supervising
Indian reservations. Since the clustering and the nature of the phenomena
with which government is concerned vary, diversity among the field or-
ganizations for dealing with these phenomena is natural. The factors to
be considered in laying out regional boundaries, locating field offices, and
decentralizing authority can be enumerated without too much difficulty.
Yet the relative weight of each factor will vary agency by agency and
function by function, with the result that even a consciously logical
approach to field organization will lead to differing arrangements.30

38 Cf. Macmahon, Millett and Ogdcn, op. cit. above in note 12, pp. 200-207, 233-236;
Hedge, A. M. and Benson, George C. S., "Supervision and Inspection of Local Projects by
Regional Offices," No. 43 in Committee on Public Administration, Social Science Research
Council, Case Reports in Public Administration, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941;
Click, Philip M. and Barrows, Leland, "Administrative Reorganization of a Federal Agency-.
Elimination of Regional Offices," No. 87 in ibid., 1944; Goodnck, M. George, "WPB De-
centralization Within the Chicago Region," Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp.
208-219.

"For descriptive lists, maps, and analyses of federal administrative regions and head-
quarters, see National Resources Committee, Regional Factors in National Planning and De-
velopment, pp. 71-82, 203-233, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935; Fcslcr, James
W., "Federal Administrative Regions," American Political Science Review, 1936, Vol. 30,
pp. 257-268; Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Federal Field Offices, pp.
55-58, Senate Doc. No. 22, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943; Division of Public Inquiries, Office
of War Information, Regional Offices of Federal Departments and Agencies, Washington, 1945.

For factors relevant to agency choice of regional boundaries and headquarters, see Legis-
lative Reference Service, Library of Congress, op. cit.\ Fesler, James W., "Criteria for Ad-
ministrative Regions," Social Forces, 1943, Vol. 22, pp. 26-32.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 285

Granting the need for diversity among field organizations, it can be
pressed too far. In its extreme version, it would call for a distinctive field
service for every function and subfunction of every agency, thus destroy-
ing the idea of an integrated field service, even for an agency with a single
major purpose. And in cases where the need for diversity is genuine, we
must still accommodate in some fashion the necessity for interagency co-
ordination in the field. Attempts to meet this necessity have revolved
about four problems: increased uniformity in the location of regional
boundaries and field offices; joint action to effect economies in institutional
services; coordination in the execution of programs; and coordination in
the planning of programs.

Emerging Uniformities. One of the ideas most appealing to the lay-
man is that of bringing order out of the supposed chaos of regional boun-
daries and field offices. Its popularity can be constructively used to bring
field-service geography into greater similarity of pattern in the absence of
compelling functional or administrative grounds for diversity. On the
other hand, little likelihood exists of any agreement upon a single master
scheme of regional boundaries to which all agencies would have to con-
form.40

Identity of regional office locations is an ideal that can be more closely
approximated than identity of regional boundaries. We observe a definite
preference among the thirty-three largest federal agencies for certain
strategically located cities. Leading in preference are Chicago, New York,
San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Kansas City, Dallas, Cleveland, Philadel-
phia, and Denver.41 A report of the National Resources Committee
arrived at the following list of cities as the ideal centers for regional plan-
ning: Boston, New York, Knoxville, Atlanta, New Orleans, Portland, San
Francisco, and Denver.42 Some large departments, even though they are
not planning an early establishment of integrated field services of a de-
partment-wide character, are making conscious efforts to get bureau field
offices located in common cities, and, if possible, in common buildings.

The United States Department of Agriculture, for instance, has made
some progress in this direction, even looking beyond field centers to the
establishment of common regional boundaries for its bureaus. However,
political considerations have retarded the program.43 Apparently the early
efforts have been directed toward building up strong nuclei at Philadelphia,

40 C/. Fesler, James W., "Standardization of Federal Administrative Regions," Social
Forces, 1936, Vol. 15, pp. 76-81.

41 See Latham, Earl, "Executive Management and the Federal Field Service," Public Ad-
ministration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 16. For a slightly different list of frequently chosen
field centers, based on all regionalizing agencies for 1934-35, see Fesler, "Federal Adminis-
trative Regions," he. cit. above in note 39, p. 265 ff., and National Resources Committee, op. cit.
in note 39, p. 30, 72 ff.

42 See op. cit. above in note 39, p. 195.

48 See Appleby, op. cit. above in note 9, p. 99.

286 FIELD ORGANIZATION

Milwaukee, Lincoln, Neb., and San Francisco. A final indication of cities
likely to emerge as regional centers is the Bureau of the Budget's selection of
Dallas, San Francisco, Chicago and Denver, as the location of its new field
offices.44

Pooling of Field Resources. Whatever the ultimate compromise be-
tween uniformity and diversity in regional boundaries and headquarters
will be, there will continue, as in the past, to be need for interagency co-
ordination in the field. Historically, such coordination was earliest devel-
oped in attempts at economies in such common institutional services as
office and storage space, trucking facilities, equipment, personnel, and purJ
chasing. This was the working focus of the area coordinators of the
Federal Coordinating Service and the federal business associations from 1921
to 1933 45

The most promising recent developments in federal administration
toward interagency pooling of institutional resources in each major area and
city are two. One is the decentralization effected within certain institutional
service agencies, such as the Civil Service Commission and the Disburse-
ment Division of the Treasury Department. The other is the establish-
ment of field offices of the Bureau of the Budget. The Budget Bureau,
through its field offices, is uniquely equipped to draw together in each
area the institutional service agencies; to link these in turn closely to the
operating agencies; and to bring pressure for economies that can result
from effective handling of institutional services.

We do not minimize institutional services if we hold that if interagency
coordination in the field focuses on the above objectives alone — which was
largely true throughout the 1920's — vastly more important problems of
administration will be overlooked. One of these is how to coordinate the
execution of the programs of all federal agencies in any particular region.
The elements basic to interagency cooperation in the field have been iden-
tified as: familiarity with other agencies' work; informal acquaintance;
physical proximity; a specific objective; a limited number of participants;
and approximately equal status of the participants.40

The first two elements — awareness of what other agencies are doing
and an informal acquaintance with their officials in the area — can find
recognition in part through luncheon clubs, such as the surviving federal
business associations, the USDA Clubs of the United States Department

44 See the testimony of Budget Director Harold D. Smith, Senate Committee on Appro-
priations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1945, p. 231, 78th Cong., 2d
Scss., Washington, 1944.

48 The field work of the Federal Coordinating Service is critically reviewed in Fesler,
James W., "Executive Management and the Federal Field Service," in President's Committee on
Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies t pp. 279-282, Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1937.

43 £/. Fesler, James W., "Interdepartmental Relations in the Field Service of the Federal
Government," op. fit. above in note 13, pp. 52-55.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 287

of Agriculture, and the war agencies' informal gatherings in Boston and
other cities.47 Field training programs, wide distribution of annual reports
of all agencies and the United States Government Manual, and possibly
the preparation of a consolidated federal annual report for each region
or state, are additional ways of spreading awareness of other agencies'
activities. The element of physical proximity of cooperating officials de-
pends necessarily upon the success of the movement for greater uniformity
in choice of field offices, and upon greater emphasis toward getting most
federal offices in the same city into a single building.

A specific objective and a limited number of participants are essential
to effective coordination. "Coordination in general" is an illusion. The
greatest results come when a few officials having vital interest in some par-
ticular joint problem meet for the purpose of finding a specific answer to
it.48 Otherwise, there is no focal point for discussion and no interest
capable of sustaining the coordinative effort. Approximately equal status
of the participants is also important, for two reasons. Each cooperating
official should be able to speak with a degree of authority for his agency
equivalent to that of the representatives of the other agencies. This ability
depends on the extent to which authority within each agency has beer
decentralized. Each participant should also speak with reference to ap-
proximately the same area as the other officials. This in turn depends
on the degree of identity of regional boundaries marking out the juris-
dictions of the cooperating officials.

Regional Coordtnafors.\^Aost coordination is at present effected througt
direct contact between field officials of the agencies which need to geai
their activities together. The fact that this method appears not wholl)
adequate underlies the suggestions which constantly recur for establish
ment of some sort of a presidential agent in each region to coordinate al
federal field officials in that a^eaT^The area coordinators of the formei
Federal Coordinating Service, subsequently the state directors of the Na
tional Emergency Council, and more recently the field office heads of th<
Bureau of the Budget have been the principal responses to this need. On<
of the main problems is to isolate the functions that such a presidentia
agent should perform, assuming that he cannot match the French prefec
in diversity of powers.

Each state director of the National Emergency Council was instructed
"(a) to operate a bureau of information concerning the federal agencie!
and their activities; (b) to promote cooperation among federal agencies
(c) to act as a liaison officer between the federal agencies and the stat<
administration; and (d) to report biweekly to Washington on the progres

47 See Dobbs, John M., "Interagency Communication at the Regional Level ," Public Ad
ministration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp. 64-67.

48 See Gant, George F., "Bureaucracy in the Field," Public Administration Review, 1943
Vol. 3, pp. 364-369, esp. p. 368.

288 FIELD ORGANIZATION

of each federal agency in the state, critically appraising the effectiveness
of its work and analyzing the adequacy of the federal program to meet the
needs."49 His jxjcin gromqting interagency cooperation anriripgrpH very
largely a Migg^Hnn^ far "regggf] ^gnygngfg." Each of these

would convene and preside at meetings of representatives of various
agencies; use his persuasive powers to stimulate cooperation; keep himself
informed on all questions of common concern; and report to some central
agency, preferably attached to the Executive Office of the President, "on
the region as a whole, unsolved problems, regional cooperation or its ab-
sence, the need for central decision with respect to particular controversies,

and the like." In addition, h£ might h*" "gfj a? g-rpyrinna^rKifrafnr wk*»n

the conflicting agencies agreed on his assuming such a role. He might also
directly supervise all central institutional services.50

A monograph of the President's Committee on Administrative Manage-
ment proposed regional representatives of the President or of a central
staff agency who would act in three capacities. They would serve as
neutral conciliators of interagency conflicts in the field and report irrecon-
cilable disputes to Washington, where a solution could be found more
effectively. They would foster mutual acquaintance and familiarity with
all agencies' field programs among field officials, through sponsorship of
local federal business associations and statewide meetings of ranking fed-
eral officials in each state. And they would make special administrative
studies constituting audits of the effectiveness of field programs of particular
agencies and of the total pattern of federal field activities in a given area.51

Special Coordinative Machinery. All of these experiments and proposals
indicate a need for affirmative steps directed toward interagency coordina-
tion in the field. Concern with this need is a responsibility of the Bureau
of the Budget. In 1943 it described the functions of its field offices as fol-
lows: "to counsel and advise with federal officials in the field for the pur-
pose of getting better coordination of federal programs and better rela-
tions among the federal agencies in the field; to consult with officials of
state and local government on the operation of federal programs of con-
cern to them and to report to bureau headquarters problems arising in these
relationships, with recommendations for their solution; to examine and
recommend improvements in the utilization of supplies and equipment in
the field; and to make administrative studies on the initiative of the field
offices or at the request of other bureau staffs, to make recommendations
for more efficient operations and to report to bureau headquarters those

49 Cf. Feslcr, he. cit. above in note 45, p. 282; sec also pp. 283-287 for a critical ap-
praisal of the National Emergency Council's field service. For a concurring view, see Mac-
mahon, Millett and Ogden, op. cit. above in note 12, p. 241 ff.

00 Special Copimittee on Comparative Administration, Committee on Public Adminis-
tration, Social Science Research Council, op. cit. above in note 3, pp. 12, 21-23.

51 Fcslcr, loc. cit. above in note 45, p. 292 ff.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 289

problems requiring special study or action or a policy statement or guide
from headquarters."82

In addition, passing note should be taken of regional committees and
boards, especially during World War II, organized by functional agencies
having coordinative responsibilities affecting a number of agencies. Ex-
amples are the regional advisory councils of the Office of Defense Health
and Welfare Services;53 the local work of the Committee for Congested
Areas;54 the manpower priorities committees of the War Manpower Com-
mission; and the area production urgency committees of the War Pro-
duction Board. One of the fundamental advantages of such committees is
that each has a specific objective, in contrast to regional coordinators, whose
very universality of interest may dull their effectiveness.

5. THE PROSPECTS OF JOINT FIELD PLANNING

Much of the interagency coordination discussed above assumes tha
policy is formulated at headquarters and that the function of field official;
is primarily to carry central programs into execution. A radical departure
from such a premise is the view that policy itself should be formulated a
the regional level. Two principal instruments have been evolved for thi
purpose: the regional planning commission; and the regional developmen
authority.

Regional Planning Commissions. J&egional planning— commissions, as
they have evolved in the United States, haye_ been^ primarily de$ignedLto
qomplcmgnt the work of state planning boards. Their membership has
generally stemmecTTiroirr these statef boards." Still, field representatives of
federal agencies have actively collaborated in important staff studies that
have strongly influenced the work of the commissions. The noteworthy
1942 report of the Southeastern Regional Planning Commission, for example,
was prepared with the aid of the National Resources Planning Board, Tenn-
essee Valley Authority, Forest Service, Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
National Park Service, Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Power Com-
mission, United States Housing Authority, and Work Projects Adminis-
tration.55 The National Resources Planning Board, which provided vigor-
ous federal sponsorship of both regional planning commissions and state
planning boards, has been abolished. However, continuance of planning
activities at regional and state levels is to be expected.56

52 Latham, he. cit. above in note 41, p. 19.

M A penetrating analysis of this experience, which has general as well as specific value,
is provided by Roseman, he. cit. above in note 21.

64 See Gill, Corrington, "Federal-State-City Cooperation in Congested Production Areas,"
Public Administration Review. 1945, Vol. 5, pp. 28-33.

55 National Resources Planning Board, Regional Planning: Part XI — The Southeast, Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1942.

56 See Mcrriam, Charles £., "The National Resources Planning Board: A Chapter in
American Planning Experience," American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol. 38, pp. 1075-
1088.

290 FIELD ORGANIZATION

Regional planning commissions prepare very valuable reports that serve
to crystallize desiraBle^policics for long-rang£jTgional development. But
"sHcIT reports lack any reliable implementing mechanism. Planning and
execution are treated as two distinct fields, and the integration of planning
through regional commissions is not matched by a similar integration of
execution. Instead, dozens of federal, state, and local agencies are free
to accept or reject the proposals of the planners' reports. The reports,
therefore, are primarily educational in purpose. They fall short of the
conception in many minds of the need for capitalizing on the vitality
of regional consciousness and for translating regional planning into con-
crete results.

Regional Development Authorities. These reactions to the approach of
regional planning commissions result in a hospitable reception for the
idea of regional development authorities modeled on the Tennessee Valley
Authority. Such authorities provide a focus both for_planning and for
action. They themselves possess corriprehefldve authority, granted by~Con-
gress, to perform any functions necessary to the development of the re-
sources of the region. Yet, if animated by the spirit of TV A, authorities
of this kind may also endeavor to bring other federal agencies, as well
as state and local agencies, into cooperative planning and administration.
Such efforts are facilitated by the financial aid the regional authority can
offer the functional agencies, and by the reluctance of functional agencies
to be "frozen out" of any region by the former.57

The case for integrated resources development on a regional basis has
been stated enthusiastically and persuasively in recent years.58 The success
of the Tennessee Valley Authority has provided seemingly incontrovertible
proof of the wisdom of this approach. The President and many members
of Congress have reacted favorably to the numerous bills for a Missouri
Valley Authority, a Columbia Valley Authority, and similar new agencies
focusing on water and related resources. The difficulty of a region's water-
resource development has always lain in the fact that such development is
subject to the mercies of the Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Federal Power Commission, Department of Agriculture, Public Health
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and other func-
tional agencies. This difficulty could presumably be met by giving each
region of the country a single development authority. Decisions for the
region would be made in the region, close to the people. They would fit
together into a consistent pattern for the region, and not clash as is the
case when each of a dozen federal agencies pursues its own independent
path. Planning and execution would be tied together and not be isolated

^ See Pritchett, C. Herman, The Tennessee Valley Authority, pp. 116-140, Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1943; Fesler, he. cit. above in note 45, pp. 288-290.
** Notably by Lilienthal, op. cit. above in note 8.

FIELD ORGANIZATION 291

from each other, as occurs under the approach of the regional planning com-
missions.

Function Versus Area. The issue is not new. It is the ancient conflict
between function and area. Both are necessary, yet one must have primacy
The issue is also a reflection in the field of a problem of the center: Ho\v
to group functions and bureaus into a logical departmental structure at
headquarters; how to strengthen the department head's authority to inte-
grate the work of bureaus that have established a tradition of autonomy;
and how to provide effective interdepartmental collaboration in planning
and execution of programs involving the interests of more than one agency.
In other words, the question of regional development authorities arises in
part because at headquarters there has been no effective coordination of
agencies dealing with water and other natural resources.

The most notable lack of coordination is the long-standing rivalry be-
tween the Army Corps of Engineers, with its primary interest in naviga-
tion and flood control, and the Bureau of Reclamation of the Interior
Department, with its emphasis on irrigation and reclamation. These two
agencies are the principal dam builders of the federal government. Neither
has heretofore had a fundamental interest in the generation of electric
power. In the Pacific Northwest, the Bonneville project was built by the
Engineers, Grand Coulee by the Bureau of Reclamation, while distribution
of the power was made a responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior.

Remaining Issues. If the shortcut solution of such problems is the
establishment of regional development authorities, certain remaining issues
need clarification. First, the key problems of the Tennessee valley are not
identical with the key problems of other regions. As between the Tennessee
valley and the Columbia valley, for instance, entirely different emphases
must be placed on soil erosion, flood control, irrigation, domestic water
supplies, fishing, lumbering, and land ownership.59

Second, j:he functional jurisdictions of_rcgigjialNdcvclopmcnt authorities
will have to bp precisely defined. The warmest advocates ot development
autKorities make no pretense that their technique is applicable to any gov-
ernmental problems other than unified development of natural resources-
water, land, minerals, forests.60 The regional authorities, therefore, are not
a transplantation from abroad of the prefectural system. Many regula-
tory and service functions must continue to be performed by field agents
of central agencies.

iThird, the fate of Washington bureaus concerned with resources must
be 'determined. If ten or twelve development authorities blanket the coun-
try, will there be any need for well-staffed central agencies such as the
Forest Service, National Park Service, Federal Power Commission, Depart-

59 See McWilliams, Carey, "Columbia River Bureaucrats," Nation, June 23, 1945, Vol. 160,
p. 694.

®° Cf. Lilienthal, op. cit. above in note 8, p. 168.

292 FIELD ORGANIZATION

ment of Agriculture, and Bureau of Reclamation? If not, will the public
lose some governmental efficiency through the breaking up of these special-
ized staffs? And will the public suffer increased taxes to support ten or
twelve specialized staffs for each resources function?

Fourth, the areas of regional development authorities must be care-
fully defined if they are not to overlap and so lead to confused responsibility
qnd "border fighting." Contrary to general impressions, the Tennessee
Valley Authority has no precise boundaries for its marketing of electric
power. It markets its power well beyond the valley where the power is
generated.

Finally, there has to be some machinery for general supervision of the
authorities by the federal government. The concept of autonomous au-
thorities clearly responsible neither to the people's representatives at Wash-
ington nor directly to regional constituencies is opposed to the democratic
tradition. There are three possible answers: to make the authorities re-
sponsible directly to the President; to make them responsible to some
supervisory unit located in the Executive Office of the President; or to make
them responsible to the Secretary of the Interior.61

Community-Level Analysis. We have noticed that the regional plan-
ning commissions take a very broad viewpoint and provide no effective
link between planning and execution. The regional development authori-
ties in their more ambitious form are a revolutionary abandonment of
functional administration of resources by the federal government. In addi-
tion, they leave unanswered the question of joint field planning of non-
resource activities. More modest and more short-range in objective than
either of these proposals is a third approach to program planning: com-
munity-level analysis of the impact of federal programs.

This approach emphasizes that federal administration, however greatly
it be functionally segmented, must make sense at the level where its mul-
tiple activities come in direct contact with citizens and the communities in
which they live. It is at this administrative "firing line," therefore, that the
actual interaction of federal operations can best be observed. The symptoms
of confusion, overlapping of authority, or neglect of citizens' needs can be
isolated and reported to headquarters and to that regional agent of the
chief executive who may have the task of interagency coordination. It
should not be forgotten that a majority of interagency difficulties in the
field are caused — and can only be remedied — by action at the central level.62

The best solution would seem to be for the Bureau of the Budget's field

01 See Hansen, Alvin H. and PcrlofT, Harvey S., Regional Resource Development, p. 30
ff., National Planning Association Planning Pamphlet No. 16, Washington, 1942; Cooke,
Morris L., "Who Shall Boss the MVA?" New Republic, April 16, 1945, Vol. 112, p. 499;
Pincus, William, "Shall We Have More TVA's?" Public Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5,
pp. 148-152.

42 See Feslcr, loc. cit. above in note 45, p. 292. See also White, Leonard D., "Field
Coordination in Liberated Areas/' Public Administration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, p. 189 £

FIELD ORGANIZATION 293

offices to make studies in sample communities or counties covering the total
impact of Federal programs,63 report the results to Budget Bureau head-
quarters, and thereby stimulate remedial action at the center and in the
field. Corrective action could be backed by the authority of the Executive
Office of the President and the controls available through budgetary review
and quarterly apportionment of appropriated funds. Such a method of
assuring that federal programs fit together is no substitute, of course, for the
broad-gauged work of regional planning commissions and regional develop-
ment authorities. However, it does afford a constant test of the short-range
effectiveness of federal programs and provides machinery for correcting
such defects as are discovered.

63 Even more useful would be sample area surveys of the impact of federal, state, and
local programs, the reports to be a basis for action by all three governmental levels. Some
experimental studies of this character have already been undertaken; to some extent the
reports of regional planning commissions are examples of this approach. Mention may also be
made of the sample studies carried on under auspices of the Council on Intergovernmental
Relations.

CHAPTER

Informal Organization

1. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

Organic Growth of Informal Organization. This chapter is to deal
with some of the organizational and operational implications of the difference
between authority and influence, between the legal power of command
to direct the behavior of others and the human capacity for getting others
to see things your way so that they will act and even want to act accord-
ingly. How this difference affects the role of the chief executive we have
noticed earlier,1 but the matter has wider significance. It can hardly
escape the sharp-eyefl /observer that administrative bodies — and indeed all
organizations, whether legislatures, political parties, labor unions, business
enterprises, universities, churches, armies, or professional associations —
respond in fact to a variety of informal patterns of influence among their
membership.2 These are more or less at variance with the acknowledged
structure of formal authority on which the organization rests.

It is therefore easy to understand that an essential object of successful
administrative leadership must be to provide the integrating forces that
will draw all eyes toward common goals. In small groups where authority
is mainly the product of conceded superiority rather than of legal designa-
tion, the distinctive effect of influence may blend completely with this kind
of nonlegal authority. As soon as the group grows larger, however, formal
authority may set itself apart from leadership. While the boss naturally
will want to run the show, every one else in the group, no less naturally,
will want to be as independent as possible, and will have his own notions
of how the show ought to be run. Such individualistic impulses never fully
subside in any organization. They give rise to the cell formation typical of
informal organization.

Charts and Realities. The organization chart — which most modern organ-

1 See above Ch. 8, "The Chief Executive," sec. 2, "Leadership and Authority."

2 For the increasing interest of students of management in this area of behavior, see above
Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administration," sec. 4, "The Frontiers of Research,"

294

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 295

izations require as a source of self-respect—shows the formal structure, labels
the jurisdiction assigned to each component unit, and indicates the lines
of hierarchical authority established to regulate the conduct of business.
If the chart is carefully and candidly drawn, the very act of preparing it is
almost sure to disclose internal ambiguities calling for resolution. If a clari-
fication of these is a by-product of completing the chart, the labor of the
chartmaker is already repaid in the smoother operations that can be ex-
pected to result from a better understanding of working relationships among
the various groups of employees. At best, however, the organization chart
is ordinarily and necessarily an idealized picture of the intents of top man-
agement, a reflection of hopes and aims rather than a photograph of the
operating facts within the organization. To the sophisticated reader, the
chart is a useful guide to further questions.

To begin with, the chart, while locating present personnel, speaks rather
in terms of positions than of live employees. In such an inevitably com-
posite abstraction of, say, all possible P-5 economists, we have no clue about
the kind of man who might be heading the Analysis Section in the Import
Division, about the standing he has in his section or in the division, or
about the load of work he carries or has failed to carry. Is he the faithful
technician who as a lowly and anenymous assistant to the previous section
head used to get up the figures to support the division's policy and who as
the "logical" successor now fondles the same series of figures even though
changing conditions call for an imaginative and fresh analysis of foreign
trade? Or is he the man who was borrowed from the Research Division on
a temporary detail to work out a particular problem before the Import
Division had an Analysis Section of its own, and who impressed the division
chief so much that the section was created to keep him around?

Again, was he perhaps the only promising reinforcement the division chief
could think of in order to bolster an ailing operation, with the position
of section head happening to be the handiest vacancy to bring him into the
picture? Or, to suggest only one more line of possibilities, is the position
again vacant today as we look at the organization chart? If so, is a replace-
ment in sight and the section's work still definitely part of the whole pro-
gram? Or is the place not to be filled and the section to be disbanded, so
that its box in the chart has already turned into an anachronism? Plainly,
we would need answers not only to these and many more questions about
our P-5 economist, but also to similar questions about the division chief
one step above and others in adjoining positions, before attempting to draw
from the chart an appraisal of his role as the head of the Analysis Section.

Attitudes and Motivations. However he appears on the chart, this P-5
stands in a different light to his own subordinates in the section. Here he is
the boss, clothed with authority to summon and direct, and all his qualities
of leadership are at stake in the assessment of what that authority is worth.
To the oldtimer in the section— say, with a standing assignment to tabulate

296 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

the weekly figures of customs receipts — he may be only another boss, more
or less like those that have come and gone, to be viewed with indifference
unless it should occur to the section head that the customs figures ought
to be compiled differently, or possibly are no longer needed at all. If he
lets people alone who know their tasks and do them without prodding, he
is a safe boss; and a safe boss is a good boss in the oldtimer's way of
thinking.

To one of the junior economists, however, the boss may be the author
of that series of articles which broke new ground in the analysis of the
balance of international payments. This junior may have studied the same
field, and is cherishing a hope that the boss will develop it within the
section — a prospect rich in possibilities of new assignments and recogni-
tion for the alert youngster. Another junior of the same rank, though, who
because of his addiction to doctrinal heresies was passed over whenever
the previous section head had an especially interesting project to assign, is
thoroughly alarmed to find that the new head also has a blind spot regarding
these doctrines. Convinced that he is facing a hopeless situation, he has
already begun to make discreet inquiries about possible openings in other
parts of the agency. In a sense, his mind is no longer on the job.

All of these variables must be accounted for in the staff pattern before
we can have much of an idea of the concrete work situation. And so with
the girls in the section. One or two of them can be counted on to stay
overtime if needed, to get out the materials the boss has to have for his
conference the first thing in the morning. The others feel that if he cannot
arrange to get his work done during office hours, they are under no duty to
bail him out.

Basis of Personal Organization. Given the crew our section head has
to work with — and allowing for such additions and eliminations as he can
manage from time to time — he develops a team for his purposes. He leans
on the strengths he finds, and by-passes the weaknesses. He looks to a
smaller nucleus of people for the crucial work, and he meets with them
more often. Together they look ahead and lay plans, assemble the strategic
information and put it into persuasive form, carry the argument when the
occasion for it arises, and consolidate the advance when their program has
won endorsement. This is the section head's personal organization — perhaps
no more than a thought-man, an action-man, and a personal secretary.
Organization charts are silent on the relationships that constitute such
personal organizations.

The factors here considered center around the measure of influence that
our hypothetical subordinate— the section head— may exert on his imme-
diate superior and on his own section. The example is taken from the
middle ranks in the scale of positions, and from a staff or auxiliary function
in the organization's work— for the Analysis Section presumably does not
actually issue the licenses that are, let us say, the end product of the divi-

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 297

sion's operation. If we shift our example upward or downward in the
hierarchy, or from a staff or auxiliary section to an operating section, some
of the situations indicated are no longer so plausible, while other new possi-
bilities open up. In particular, the higher we go up the line, the more
complex the relationships become.

Growing and Shrinking Organizations. Again, we have assumed an
example from a stable organization. But organization charts are drawn
also for rapidy expanding agencies. In 1942, for instance, the war agencies
were recruiting personnel at an almost overwhelming rate as they struggled
to cope with the new tasks that had brought them into being. As their
functions grew, their internal structure and external relationships altered.
Successive newcomers in these agencies caught hold and came to exert
decisive influence, or failed to catch hold and dropped out of sight. From
month to month, under the impact of these changes, organization charts
.became obsolete more rapidly than maps of Europe.** In the same way,
during the months that followed the close of hostilities in 1945, contraction
or liquidation and atrophy of functions were the order of the day for most
of these agencies. Once more, the patterns of influence within the organi-
zation in many cases changed abruptly.

In short, the chart portrays the norms of anatomy. We must look to
the informal organization to understand the physiology — perhaps the path-
ology—of the organism, and the dynamics of its behavior.

2. ELEMENTS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

Characteristic Factors. The network of influence does not extend from
any single center — even, it may be suspected, under such a well-consoli-
dated regime as the prewar Soviet system, which did not mind the burden
on military discipline arising from the institution of political commissars
in the Red Army. Certainly in the more familiar field of our own federal
administration, relationships based on influence result rather from the inter-
play of a combination of factors. Some are unique to the particular scene.
Others are recurringly characteristic of many agencies and situations.

Among the latter we may discern: (1) the relation of the actual leader-
ship sensed within the organization to the formal location of authority;
(2) the personal organizations installed or recognized by the leaders within
the framework of the formal structure, to transmit direction and keep the
leaders posted on internal conditions; and (3) the ties of allegiances, external
and internal, that cut across hierarchical levels and bind together groups of
officials and employees on some other basis than that of loyalty to their
formal superiors. It is useful also to distinguish the role of these informal
groupings as supplementary channels of communication and intelligence
from their potentialities for furthering or hindering the acknowledged aims
of the organization. These points call for some elaboration.

Self-Expression of Influence. The magnetism of personal leadership is

298 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

an irrepressible and often an unpredictable force. Responsibility will fre-
quently evoke it unexpectedly in the head of an organization that is sud-
denly subjected to new conditions and pressing problems. However, leader-
ship may fail to appear at the point where there was every reason to count
on it, and instead turn up elsewhere in the organization. It may indeed be
ordinarily denied to the titular head of the organization by the very process
of his selection.

Nomination for the presidency, to take a conspicuous case, usually does
not go to a man showing exceptional personal qualities of independent
leadership if the party chieftains who control the convention can feel confi-
dent of winning with a more manageable Jand dependable candidate. The
chairmanship of a congressional committee, where seniority commonly gov-
erns, will only by accident fall to the dominant personality of the commit-
tee. Cabinet officers must often be chosen in recognition of claims other
than the leadership they can promise in running their departments. And
so with administrative appointments. The conditions of selection too seldom
permit native qualities of personal leadership to be the decisive criterion.
Except for a new agency with an active head who is also its actual leader,
or for a crisis in the life of an older agency that gives a new head an un-
usually free hand for reorganization, the typical situation therefore shows a
distribution of leadership through the organization that does not coincide
with formal authority. All such leadership begets loyalty, and loyalty
commands influence.

Obviously, nominal authority does not work in a vacuum; the leadership
is somewhere. A capable department head may be given jurisdiction over
an unrelated operation, because the operators must report to some one, and
no better place for allocation of the function has appeared. If the jurisdic-
tion is already in satisfactory hands, it may be left alone. Authority to this
extent tends to follow the pull of leadership. Much the same is true within
the departmental organization itself and within each of its component
parts.

Because one of the chief staff officers serving as immediate advisers to
the department head may have demonstrated special capacity for achieving
internal agreements or for sound political judgment or simply for getting
work done more promptly than others, he is used more and more as a
privileged source of counsel and assistance. Difficult problems — including
those outside his formal jurisdiction — drift to him automatically from the
desk of the top executive. Other staff officers, and line officials as well, dis-
cover that it is wise for them to check with this colleague in advance on all
problematical matters handed up to the department head. In the end, the
staff officer may be doing the job of a permanent undersecretary, while the
nominal undersecretary shifts his attention to matters of special interest to
him. Or, in a given bureau, division, or section, the employee who estab-
lishes himself as a key man will grow in stature as his responsibilities
expand de facto by spontaneous accrual

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 299

No doubt, such developments introduce into the hierarchical structure
much-needed flexibility. They allow an organization to make the most of its
strength wherever such strength resides. On the other hand, it is also
evident that as a consequence the organization may develop all kinds of
unorthodox bulges. From time to time these bulges will be legalized, so to
speak, as factual influence is given formal status through the redefinition
of authority and through adjustments in the channels of command. How-
ever, such formalization may merely aggravate defects in internal balance,
structural deformities, and lopsided arrangements. With all that, the sur-
veyor of organizational structure should always bear in mind the need for
reserving judgment until all compensating advantages of a seemingly bizarre
pattern have been ascertained. ' A department is not likely to be impressed
with the criticism that its organization chart looks screwy when the existing
working mechanisms accord with the operating preferences of its strongest
personalities and are adequately understood by its personnel.

Variables Affecting Authority. A complicating factor arises from the
dynamics of leadership. Authority as expressed in legal terms is essentially
static. Influence is susceptible of continuous change. Leadership may wane
as an official commanding deference shows himself unable to stand the
tough grind of responsibility, or as his health and his nerves begin to falter,
or as he fails to withstand the jolts and shocks of temporary defeats. In-
fluence is competitive. When leaders stumble and fall by the wayside,
rivals will meet their opportunity. As these individuals begin to inject their
personalities into the stream of operations, new bulges may evolve while
earlier ones wither away.

The actual substance of authority is therefore affected by a wide range
of factors. To support itself, authority cannot merely point to its insignia.
It must seek to effect constancy of deference. -Thus it requires a basis in
persuasion. It must nurture itself in consent. It must bargain for endorse-
ment and negotiate workable covenants with internal forces of opposition.
Administrative orders, while traveling downward from level of authority
to level of authority, may completely change their meaning when they
encounter passive resistance or open antagonism.8 Authority cannot assert
itself when its claims fail to rest on plausible reason or commonly shared
attitudes. To a large extent, therefore, authority must be buttressed by
rational considerations and appeals. That is why some students regard the
top executive primarily as a ratifying agent-^one who sanctions the common
thinking of his organization.4 In aiming at such sanction, he must prepare
the ground by shaping common thought.

8 For a report on general limitations of institutional knowledge about policies and in-
structions, see Corson, John J., "Weak Links in the Chain of Command," Public Opinion
Quarterly, 1945, Vol. 9, p. 346 ff.

4 See, for instance, Coutrot, Jean, "Note sur la Technique du Travail en Commission,'
Administrative Papers, p. 46 ff., and Morstem Marx, Fritz, discussion remarks, Proceedings, pp
99-100, Seventh International Management Congress, Washington, 1938. The same basic pom:
is implicit in McCormick, Charles P., Multiple Management. New York, Harper, 1938.

300 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

Moreover, the exercise of authority is affected by the nature of its man-
date, which in a real sense is always in flux. The statutory formulation
of the mission of an administrative organization may remain the same, and
yet the scope of actual authority reposing in the top executive is bound to
change with changing circumstances. Most of these circumstances are be-
yond his own control. We may think of shifting legislative alignments,
the rise and fall of popular causes, reorientations in general policy, and
even deteriorating public relations that arrest the individual agency in many
ways. These variables account for the fact that there are always matters
of great administrative significance within the reach of the legislative man-
date of an agency which its top executive would never dare to touch at
certain times. Particular issues grow too hot to handle while others cool
off in the battles of public opinion and the contests of political forces. The
time-bound cycles of popular elections also play their role in determining
the actual scope of legal authority.

Even in the most limited sense — solely in reference to the specific incum-
bent— the place of formal authority is one of relative importance only. The
official vested with authority may be personally weak or strong, timid or
aggressive, unimaginative or intellectually alert, phlegmatic or choleric.
The same span of legal authority will furnish different individualities with
different opportunities for initiative and leadership. Even in reasonably
stable organizations, changes in personnel at the points of control are fre-
quent enough to cause conspicuous modifications in the interplay of dif-
ferent personalities. All this does not suggest that formally allocated author-
ity amounts to little. It does suggest that it is never quite the same as
circumstances alter.

Forms of Personal Organization. We have earlier alluded to the phe-
nomenon of personal organization — special structures of relationships built
freely for the convenience of individual leaders within the formal framework
of the organization. The members of a personal organization may not
always be identified as such except to the inner circle they represent. Their
individual roles will vary, too. On the level of the top executive, for in-
stance, some members will be primarily sources of confidential information.
Others may be placed strategically for the stimulation of prompt response
to administrative directives from above; these members of the top executive's
personal organization are to "carry the ball" for him in the sphere of opera-,
tions. While functioning for the most part independently and at different
points of the hierarchical structure, all members will maintain contact with
one another as well as with "the chief." They will act in concert, though
for best effect their synchronized action usually retains the appearance of
coincidence and spontaneity.

The existence of such personal organizations formed around individual
exponents of control — the department head, chiefs of larger staff or auxiliary
services, line officers on various levels of command, and even unit supervi-

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 301

sors at the base of operations—in itself attests to the limitations of formal
authority. Power of direction may be commensurate with personal respon-
sibility at each control point of the administrative hierarchy, yet direction
does not automatically elicit positive response. All large-scale organization,
because of both its size and its specialization, is highly vulnerable to internal
indifference, intransigence, and obstruction. Left to himself, even the top
executive, in the imposing plenitude of his directive power, may have the
ugly feeling of perching atop an angry elephant firmly set to have things
his own way. True enough, the executive has his "arms of management" —
administrative planning, budgeting, personnel — and his line subleadership
to rely upon. But how much of this supporting cast can be trusted actually
to support him?

How real this question is can perhaps be seen most readily when we
think of a new appointee taking over a government department. This may
be an entirely novel experience for him, as it usually is. There is no one
to brief him on his first day of office. He is lucky if he knows one or two
key people in the department sufficiently well to be sure of their sym-
pathetic help right at the start, and some others against whom he should
be on guard. He may be free to bring along a small number of personal
assistants — each probably as green at the start on departmental business
as he himself. Replacements in the top range of command will have to
wait until the new head has had time to reach more or less final judg-
ments on the internal situation he is facing.

His first thought in testing personalities he has to depend upon will be
to have assurance of their complete loyalty so that he in turn can have full
confidence in them and talk to them without mental reservations. Because
too many new appointments would mean a heavy mortgage of inexperience,
he is never free to fire and hire at will, quite aside from the limitations
placed upon him by the civil service system. In the main, he must learn
to work with the department as he finds it, and teafh his immediate sub-
ordinates to take to him and work with him. In some instances he will be
able to shift individual officers he spots as congenial into positions in his
proximity. As a general rule, however, he has only a restricted opportunity
for rearranging the human pattern around him. ^

In the experience of his first few months, he will therefore attempt to
create his own unofficial peerage from within the department. He will turn
repeatedly to those who win his confidence first. These will become con-
scious of their task as intermediaries, and in due course will be treated and
used as such by their colleagues. Unofficial peers can be made and unmade
by the department head; readjustments in the structure of his peerage may
happen rather frequently at the beginning, and will continue to occur at
later periods. Slowly, however, a degree of constancy will evolve in his
personal organization. At best, its constancy will allow for a recognition
of those special talents which are at a premium in this kind of grouping.

302 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

One of those rare individuals who have a good grasp of the department
as a whole— perhaps the budget officer, perhaps a bureau chief with many
years of service and a sufficient variety of successive responsibilities behind
him— is likely to be drawn into the personal organization of the top execu-
tive. His personal assistants brought by him into the department become
"charter members," though not necessarily for all time to come. It would
be erroneous to assume that every one of the political officeholders of the
department is simultaneously a member of the peerage in our sense. One
of them may be too intimately tied into a powerful interest group that eyes
the department head with misapprehension. Another may remain too much
adrift in the affairs of the department to win standing within it. On the
other hand, some of the permanent officials will be included in the top
executive's personal organization because of their strength as leaders, be-
cause of the multiplicity of their working contacts with others, or because
of their range of practical experience. In addition, his personal organization
is apt to reach into such highly sensitive functions as public relations^
legislative liaison, and field direction.

Objective qualifications alone are never enough for membership; above
such qualifications, the decisive factor is a substantial degree of personal
compatibility with the intellectual approach and the outlook of the depart-
ment head. His personal organization is basically made up of "king's men,"
whether as a tight group or as a loose affiliation. Within it, stars may rise
and fall. There may also be occasional cases of desertion. Moreover, his
personal organization is never the only one. For greatest utility it must link
itself to the personal organizations developed by ranking subordinate lead-
ers. Where a subordinate leader differentiates himself from the fortunes of
the department head, the latter's personal organization must attempt to
outmaneuver or to checkmate in one or another form the "king's men" of
the uncooperative subordinate. Prolonged battles may rage between dif-
ferent personal organizations. Formal agreements in open conference may
in many cases be merely the product of informal bargains for support. The
price exacted for such support may be an important promotion, an enlarge-
ment of functions, or a greater degree of independence in specified areas.
Such concessions may interfere with general expectancies based on official
rules and customs, causing losses in morale throughout the department.
There is hence always a point of declining returns.

Yet it is clear that without this type of personal organization, individual
leaders in the department cannot hope to know what is really going on,
what the attitudes of the working force are, and how to generate momen-
tum for cooperative action in the sphere of their own concerns. Teamwork
is not achieved by mere pronouncement of hierarchical superiors. It re-
quires recognition of the most accomplished players on each team. Indeed,
one or two of these may monopolize the actual leadership in the team,
leaving the nominal leader in the role of a figurehead. At the same time,

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 303

it is obvious that effective personal organization calls for much adroit han-
dling, and much mature appreciation of relationships, coupled with a sense
of reality. As with organization in the formal sense, personal organization
may easily militate against itself. It may become a burden on the individual
leader, setting him off from his wider institutional environment. It may
inject elements of arbitrariness or favoritism into general working processes.
It may substitute subjective considerations for objective evaluations, dis-
rupting the regularity of operations and destroying the promise of
planned advancement toward acknowledged aims.

The balance sheet of personal organization has its debit as well as its
credit side. On the debit side we would have to enter the possibility of
doubts seeping through the department about the integrity of management,
soundness of decisions, and justice in internal allocation of rewards. Per-
sonal organization can be a great convenience in attaining impersonal
objectives — policy goals. It can also acquire the characteristics of personal
government and thus corrupt impersonal objectives. An able department
head will periodically examine the balance sheet— and draw his own prac-
tical conclusions.

Ties of Allegiance. Formal organization suggests a monolithic structure
in which all wills are bent toward a defined set of institutional goals. Ac-
ceptance of these goals is at least implicit throughout the entire structure.
An outstanding leader at the helm of the organization may not only be-
come a symbolic expression of the validity and continuity of acknowledged
objectives but he may also draw forth the allegiance of his subleadership
and with it that of the large body of personnel. I Even then, however, there
remain in each individual certain residual allegiances of varying strength
that exert their pulls in different directions.5 Man is only in part organize
able. He lives only in part in his occupation. The fanatic alone is able to
pour all of his capacity for allegiance into a single cause.

Normally, every individual responds to a wide range of loyalties — some
embedded in his background, some foisted upon him in the school of living,
some freely accepted as a matter of deliberate choice. In this agglomeration
no single loyalty will dominate all others. For satisfying human experience,
however, all such loyalties should admit of harmonious blending without
contradiction or conflict. The same applies to man as part of an organiza-
tion in which he spends his occupational life. No more can be expected
of him than that the total fabric of his loyalties keep him receptive to the
goals of the organization he is serving. Yet, notwithstanding a general
accord of loyalties, each loyalty separately continues to have some influence
upon him. Each loyalty, depending on the circumstances, may place him
in part or for a time in juxtaposition to the organization for which he
works.

5 For an illuminating discussion of the complex pattern of civic allegiances, see Merriam,
Charles £., The Making of Citizens, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.

304 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

This is the basic reason why institutional leadership must constantly
attempt to magnify individual loyalty toward the institution. Such effort
cannot be confined to a single approach — a single "morale program." It
must come to the fore in everything the organization undertakes to ac-
complish. To foster what military language calls "pride of outfit," institu-
tional leadership must be articulate and persuasive on its objectives and poli-
cies, adept in developing a general system of internal incentives, resourceful
in broadening the base for individual participation in determining the ends
and means of the organization, and inventive in distributing credit for
collective accomplishment.

While formal authority rests axiomatically on universal recognition of
deference owed it, no assurance exists that loyalty will conform to institut-
tional assumptions. Even in reasonably homogeneous organizations capable
of producing a common feeling of institutional individuality and identity,
each member may stand in a different relationship to the organization as
a whole. Some members may completely give themselves to the organiza-
tion, regarding it as their better" part. Others may accept institutional
authority as a pragmatic compromise essential to their cooperative role in the
organization. Still others may be satisfied with a more passive attitude —
"live and let live"— while reserving their deeper attachments for private
pursuits outside the organization. Finally, there will be those who, though
not necessarily antagonistic to the organization itself, will strive to super-
impose on the "powers to be" values derived from loyalties other than that
demanded by the organization.

Such competing loyalties may have external or internal focus; often both
types are intermingled imperceptibly. Under the external rubric, for exam-
ple, we may think of a bureau chief who has driven such firm roots into
the function entrusted to his bureau that he consciously or unconsciously
reflects in all his thinking the preferences of the outside interest group which
looks upon this function with proprietary eyes. He has wholly equated
his responsibility with the ends pursued by the interest group. If anywhere
challenged by his official superiors, he does not hesitate to plot his defense
in closed session with the chieftains of the interest group. These may make
him feel like a central figure in their councils, run personal publicity for him,
and build him up as a great public servant or a national expert. Blind to
more general objectives, he comes to consider his superiors as evil forces
against which he must battle tenaciously in order to guard the function of
his bureau — and the outside interest that supports it and him alike.

Or we may think of an assistant secretary in a department whose creden-
tials for public service stem from earlier political affiliation with a legislative
bloc that because of its aims inevitably impinges upon the department. His
official chief may deal with him as if he were— as he essentially is— a hostile
observer posted for sniping, missing no chance of capitalizing on his legisla-
tive support in order to further the purposes of the legislative bloc. Every

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 305

Ties of Allegiance. Formal organization suggests a monolithic structure
in which all wills are bent toward a defined set of institutional goals. Ac-
ceptance of these goals is at least implicit throughout the entire structure.
An outstanding leader at the helm of the organization may not only be-
come a symbolic expression of the validity and continuity of acknowledged
objectives but he may also draw forth the allegiance of his subleadership
and with it that of the large body of personnel. J Even then, however, there
remain in each individual certain residual allegiances of varying strength
that exert their pulls in different directions.5 Man is only in part organize
able. He lives only in part in his occupation. The fanatic alone is able to
pour all of his capacity for allegiance into a single cause.

5 For an illuminating discussion of the complex pattern of civic allegiances, see Merriam,
Charles £., The Making of Citizens, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.

306 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

other lawyers; an engineer dealing with lawyers may gravitate instinctively
toward support of the views of other engineers. Or, in questions of func-
tional grouping and allocation of responsibilities, individual categories of
specialists may predicate their opinions primarily on their conception of the
stake of their specialty in the proposed arrangement.

In addition, personal association of a comparable character — with cor-
responding investment of loyalty — may spring from common backgrounds.
Graduation from the same college or professional school is one illustration;
earlier staff experience in the same scientific foundation or research institu-
tion or consulting firm is another. Like any other type of large-scale organi-
zation, moreover, government departments have their ideological factions —
here the "liberals," there the "conservatives." Eager stalwarts of each fac-
tion are likely to look at the department as a potential area of conquest, or
at least an object of proportionate influence. Factional struggles may not
always be conspicuous, but the sense of loyalty produced in their heat may
leave little loyalty to the department itself. Finally, we should mention the
ties of allegiance among the organized rank and file of employees. The
locals of government-employee unions may attract to themselves a substan-
tial share of loyalty, especially in the face of an unsympathetic or laggard
departmental leadership.

Thus the actual pattern of human relationships and allegiances within
the formal organization is distinguished by obvious complexity. Reference
to "channels of command" may becloud the real picture. Uncrowned lead-
ers compete with crowned ones. Informal and often unaccountable group-
ings brought to life for various purposes press against one another. Nor are
the underlying motivations always either clear or durable. Human beings
freely exercise their privilege to change their minds on what seems worth
their effort. So does man in organization. This explains in part why any
given organization may demonstrate great vigor at certain times and may
virtually fall apart or drop into a coma at certain other times, even though
its general mandate or its formal structure remain unchanged. It also casts
a sharp light on the folly of considering a department a mighty steamroller
pursuing its aims with mechanical precision. Last but not least, it shows
how much we borrow from imagination when we talk about the sinister
designs of a single-minded bureaucracy.

3. NONHIERARCHICAL SOURCES OF POWER

Democratic theory stresses the unregimented evolution of free associa-
tions of citizens who can raise their voices politically and speak for them-
selves. The very diversity of these associations is justly considered an asset
to democratic governance. Public preferences can be tested in open argu-
ment. Fresh ideas can find direct and immediate expression. Workable
compromises can be forged in the adjustment of group aims to one an-
other. This, we feel, is the soundest way of tapping and mobilizing the

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 307

political resources of the whole nation. Even those who occasionally doubt
the productivity of too much diffusion and too much milling movement
on the political scene would be very reluctant to sacrifice the values of un-
impaired self-expression to a superimposed "order" that would choke group
autonomy under a gigantic blanket of directed uniformity. But free politi-
cal competition is not without pitfalls. It may operate to the detriment of
the public interest. There is a great difference between the National League
of Women Voters and an economic pressure group whose voting strength
or financial support may in effect corner much of the political mar-
ket.7 It is all too evident that pressure politics may degenerate into brash
hijacking.

Informal organization offers some close parallels. Unless confined in
both scope and form, it may turn into a disorganizing force, undoing at
least in part what formal organization is intended to achieve. It may dan-
gerously widen the cracks and crannies which division of labor and segre-
gation of functions inevitably tears into the structure of all formal organi-
zatioijA It may in certain areas actually nullify official responsibility. With
all that, informal organization does meet practical needs. Like the free in-
terplay of democratic groups in the civic realm, it is in many respects a
source of administrative vitality. It provides additional outlets for group
opinion, thus extending and broadening the avenues of institutional plan-
ning and thought. Informal leadership, moreover, is in a sense as much
a school of responsibility as the exercise of official authority. In short, in-
formal organization, aside from being a perfectly natural growth, not only
to some extent eases the rigidities of hierarchy but also can work as a desir-
able stimulant to a timid or uninspired top command.Y How far it does
the latter will depend mainly on the public spirit of its leaders. ^

This may become clearer through a more specific review of some com-
posite pictures of fairly typical manifestations of informal organization.
Each manifestation is selected at random, without any attempt at complete-
ness of display. But all have one feature in common: they demonstrate
nonhierarchical sources of power. That is to say, they show concrete points
. of influence that are separate from the structure of hierarchical power, even
though in some instances they are related to the location of formal authority.

Men Behind the Throne. As no ruler— be he an omnipotent dictator
or a constitutional president — thinks and acts in splendid isolation, as there
are always men and women in his entourage who intentionally or uninten-
tionally help him to make up his mind,8 so the head of a government de-
partment, however retiring and introvert by nature, is surrounded by his
"inner circle." He may have a regular "cabinet" of his own, made up pcr-

7 Sec below Ch. 14, "Interest Groups in Administration," sec. 1, "The Meaning of Interest
Representation."

8 For a penetrating discussion, long overlooked, see Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of
Government, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908; republished Bloomington: Principia
Press, 1935.

308 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

haps of his principal staff and line officers, with whom he discusses matters
of general importance at a set hour each week or oftener. On special issues
he may confer with smaller or larger groups of officials, excluding those
members of his cabinet not directly concerned, and drawing in other officers
who do not ordinarily attend the cabinet meetings. Consultative organs of
some kind are an administrative necessity; whether they are always intel-
ligently utilized is still another question.9 However, the existence of such
machinery seldom gives a hint about the way in which the top executive
frames his judgments. He may be merely a polite listener. He may simply
believe such formally organized consultation to be a proper democratic
gesture. Or he may use his cabinet meetings primarily as a method of
communicating his decisions to the first level of his subleadership. How,
then, does he reach his decisions?

It is at this point only that we turn from formal organization to in-
formal one. The insider may tell us that the cabinet is just a ritual; that
there is in fact something like an "inner cabinet" of only three members;
and that one of these is not even included in the official cabinet. Those in
the inner cabinet are the "men behind the throne." The one who does not
belong to the official cabinet is the senior personal assistant to the depart-
ment head. For many years he has been the political shadow of the man
who now directs the affairs of the department — a relationship that developed
long ago in local politics and has been reinforced in the test of changing
fortunes as both made their way within the currently dominant major
party. This personal assistant has no clearly defined functions. He is r
Colonel House or a Harry Hopkins to the department head. Moreover, he
is the department's most important liaison to the party leadership and tht
legislative body as well. He and "the chief" have come to think as one
nind. The other two members of the inner cabinet are one of the assist-
ant secretaries and a bureau chief. The assistant secretary is the youngest
man on the top level, but he has proved himself an invaluable fountain
of fertile ideas. That is the reason why he overshadows the undersecretary,
who is weighted down by a heavy burden of operating responsibilities. The
bureau chief is known neither for imaginative thinking nor for good
political judgment. However, he has been with the department for nearly
two decades and he knows its practical business inside out.

It is with these three men that the department head arrives at his deci-
sions, sometimes at a tray luncheon in his office, sometimes during a brief
session preceding a meeting of his cabinet. Because all four know each
other very closely, they are able to express themselves in some kind of short-
hand language, coming to the point in a few words. There is not only
extraordinary economy in their method of oral communication, but each
is also fully aware of every one else's general bias, including his own. This

9 Cf. Morstein Marx, Fritz, "Bureaucracy and Consultation," Review of Politics, 1939, Vol.
1, p. 84 ff.

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 309

introduces desirable checks. On the other hand, their joint consultations
often end merely in preliminary determinations— what sort of study to call
for by the administrative-management unit; whom to ask for further in-
formation; what kind of fact-finding to set in motion. Thus this group of
four is linked to the hierarchy to the extent that it jointly exercises the ex-
ecutive function. However, the status of the three members of the inner
cabinet is as unofficial and informal as the department head's personal or-
ganization, which may be much larger in size and may overlap his official
cabinet only in small part.

The type of consultative grouping here portrayed resembles a regency,
with the king withdrawing, for all practical purposes, into the role of one
member. In other comparable institutional situations, the "men behind the
throne" may be an equally small body of departmental elder statesmen with
or without actual veto power; or a more fluid group of little collective
strength, throwing the greatest influence in the direction of the subordi-
nate with whom the department head happened to talk last. It must be
doubted whether there is a single "best way" of organizing and using the
"men behind the throne." The decisive factor will often be the working
habits of the top executive. In such small groups, of course, it is highly
advantageous that each individual member consciously complement the
abilities and inclinations of the other members. The greatest peril lies
in the possibility that the convenience of harmony reduces the group's ca-
pacity for criticism; after all, life is much more agreeable when one can
roll along under the momentum supplied by the strongest personality. It
is also obvious that much tact and ingenuity is required of each member
of the group in minimizing the importance of his informal function in
his dealings with the hierarchy itself, and in respecting openly all the
proprieties of internal authority.

The Personal Secretary. Throughout the administrative hierarchy, indi-
vidual key men would in most instances cut sorry figures were it not for
the untiring assistance they receive from their personal secretaries. As the
housekeeper of the administrative estate of her boss, the personal secretary
may feel herself to be part of the structure of authority. Outside the insti-
tutional province of her boss, her importance is frequently underrated;
inside she may be treated like a queen. Her responsibilities reflect those of
the boss; and within certain limitations she may even act as his alter ego.
As the stenographic manual of one federal agency explains:

To be a real help to the executive, she must know how he would like
to have a task performed and do it that way. She must be alert to grasp
situations and draw sound conclusions, to take into consideration more
than meets the eye or the ear. She must be able to follow the wishes of
her chief, even to anticipate them.

. . . The "thinking secretary" proves her ability to take responsibility;
to express initiative, originality, and resourcefulness. This thoughtful

310 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

attitude is the basis for judgment, which is essential in tempering all
other traits.

An extremely important point for the secretary to remember is that
she represents both her chief and the agency to callers, in person and over
the telephone. She must put herself in her chief's place and convey the
impression and the information as he would have her do it. ... Besides
a thorough knowledge of the facts in the case, this often requires cour-
tesy and tact. Since the executive and his secretary function interde-
pendently, it is particularly important that they have a complete
understanding about telephone practices so that all calls will be taken
care of adequately in a manner appropriate to the agency. The secretary
must see that all calls are followed through to completion or returned
promptly, as dictated by courtesy.

The secretary must become skillful in taking interruptions herself and
in interrupting others. She must determine when something is suf-
ficiently important or urgent to justify interrupting her chief at a con-
ference and the method by which she will convey the message to him,
remembering that she interrupts not only her chief but others as well.

Because the boss himself generally occupies a dual position as an ex-
ponent of the official hierarchy and as a member of one or more informal
organizations, his personal secretary must extend her activities in these same
different directions. Her main stock in trade is knowledge of things that
only her boss knows. Only she can tell where he is at the moment, whether
he may be accessible "for a few minutes" during the next few hours,
where the memorandum now is that was sent up to him day before yester-
day, what matters are still on his desk, what disposition he is likely to make
of each matter. In giving information of this kind, in arranging the list of
callers and conferences, in adjusting priority among appointments as
urgencies change, in drawing the attention of her boss to items that have
passed from his mind — in all of her activities she must be thoroughly cog-
nizant of the specific character of the relationship between him and others.

She must have a sure sense of differentiation; some demands on the time
of her boss need to be rebuffed, while on others she will yield with ease.
Members of his own personal organization may share with her confidential
information that she would never think of disclosing to any one except
other members of the personal organization. Indeed, she may become the
manager of the agenda for this personal organization. She must make it her
business to hear and to see — drawing even from the gossip of the office
and the cafeteria hints and suggestions of profit to her boss. Through her
contacts with other secretaries, she may become a special channel of intelli-
gence to other kinds of informal organization.

Small wonder that the personal secretary will often know her boss better
than docs his wife. He may find it of benefit to pose to her administrative
problems to which he has no ready answer. He may leave her a great deal
of discretion in handling particular matters with his subordinates. He will
feel hopelessly stranded when a cold keeps her from the office. Others

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 311

working for him will soon learn the importance of approaching him
through her. They will also respect her as an astute judge of their stake
in any given matter. They will try to gain her favor, but she would not be
able to conduct her business with full efficiency if she proved an easy
victim of flattery.

The Invincible Constellation. In our discussion of informal groupings
we have noticed time and again the extent to which in administrative insti-
tutions— as in all large-scale enterprise10 — the hierarchical order of authority
is modified by the factor of personal standing within the organization. This
is true also within the hierarchy itself. There are everywhere individuals on
a relatively lower level of authority who "count" and thus overshadow
others on a higher level of authority. For example, a ranking staff officer
may belong to the department head's official cabinet, and yet he may not
"count." Or a line executive may be entitled to all the vestments of
seniority, and yet he knows that his opinions and proposals find no takers
unless they are endorsed by some one who does "count." Conversely, those
within a department who are familiar with the structure of informal organi-
zation will be able to point to four or five unadvertised officials whose
agreement on any matter is tantamount to a departmental decision.
Those are the few one has to see in order to get action — the "invincible
constellation."

The informal status of the members of this cardinal group may have
quite different foundations. One may be a central figure in the top execu-
tive's personal organization. Another may be the action-man among those
"behind the throne." No less often will membership in the "invincible
constellation" rest on a firmly established reputation for soundness in judging
the feasibility and efficacy of proposed action. This is sometimes a matter
of breadth of appreciation of all the factors that may affect specific meas-
ures— an attribute of precise thinking and rich experience. Equally often
such reputation may simply stem from the fact that luckily previous judg-
ments have usually proved right rather than wrong. Whatever the source
of the glory of infallibility, the fact remains that the initials of these four

10 Study of informal organization is still in its infancy. Valuable insights were furnished
indirectly by Bentley, op. cit. above in note 8. More specific materials can be found in
Mayo, Elton, Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, New York: Macmillan, 1933;
Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1938, rcpublished 1945; Tead, Ordway, Human Nature and Management, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1933, and Democratic Administration, New York: Association Press, 1945.
O£ particular value is Rocthlisbergcr and Dickson, op. cit. above in note 6. See also Mayo,
Elton and Others, Teamwork^ and Labor Turnover in the Aircraft Industry of Southern Cali-
fornia, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1944; Rocthlisbergcr, Fritz J., Management and
Morale, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941; Gardner, Burlcigh B., Human Relations
in Industry, Chicago: Irvin, 1945. Relationships between informal organization and super-
vision are suggested by Bradford, L. P. and Lippitt, Ronald, "Building a Democratic Work
Group," Personnel, 1945, Vol. 22, p. 142 ff. The implications of unionization for informal
organization arc touched upon by Bakke, E. Wight, "Why Workers Join Unions,*' ibid., p.
37 ff.

312 INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

or five officials at the bottom of action papers seem to have a magic effect.

Of course, the "invincible constellation" may conceivably meet defeat at
any time. However, the prestige of its members will survive occasional de-
feat if the decision they supported continues to look like the best solution
in the light of all known circumstances, and if no evidence turns up to
demonstrate either obvious errors of judgment or inadequate consideration
of all the factors that should have been taken into account. Their craft
demands of the members of the "invincible constellation" that they be
masters in digesting all the necessary basic information. They are bound
to be men who not only have intimate knowledge of the department and
its facilities for analysis but also of the outside interests which the decision
will affect.

Clubs and Clusters. As in ordinary ward politics, so in the office it often
pays to be known as a good fellow, and to be active in good fellowship.
Assume that an important man in the organization loves a weekly night of
poker and virile conversation, would it not be both a distinction and a
privilege to be asked to share in the fun? An inexhaustible supply of jokes
may buy the important man's jovial interest in one's career. "An entertain-
ing chap," the important man may think; "I ought to see more of him in
the office." And during poker there are always precious opportunities for
posting the important man on this or that. Or consider the Indiana Club
and all its jolly Hoosiers; they have a hard-working program committee,
but no one minds a discreet business conversation in the corner. Or think
of the wartime car pool, and how gratifying it was to come to know the
section chief so intimately. The car pool is no longer, yet its off-the-record
conversations may remain a regular feature.

Innocuous — and desirable — as these groupings are, they are also sources
of nonhierarchical influence. Illustrations of a somewhat different charac-
ter may be taken from the annals of quite a few of the quickly recruited
emergency agencies, especially those of World War II. Intensive solidari-
ties developed among occupational groups — businessmen, professors, lawyers,
civil servants. Each group tended to see a challenge in the other. Informal
leadership, if only for purposes of vigilance, found ready support within
the individual group. In fact, spokesmen discovered it to be to their ad-
vantage not to be caught in the neutralizing sphere of the official hierarchy,
where extremist views could not be expressed in freedom. Similar forma-
tions, based on general outlook rather than on occupation, are by no means
exceptional in old-line establishments. At times the reformist "Young
Turks" may have the upper hand, reducing those who are other-minded to
the role of the "loyal opposition" — loyal or not so loyal. No matter how
frequently the factional position will be reversed, the existence of a "loyal
opposition" in each case heightens the collective sense of public purpose and
helps to defeat institutional self-complacency.

Nor should we forget the "old school tie" in its American version, which

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 313

is considerably less obnoxious than the British prototype. Still, in the ad-
ministrative staff and auxiliary services we may run into a significant scatter-
ing of Minnesota men or Chicago men or Syracuse men.11 Quite naturally,
they maintain their own system of intercommunication, develop their own
sign language, and generally look upon one another with fraternal eyes.
This may even be a necessity when they confront the most honorable federa-
tion of departmental oldtimers.

Voice of the Union. The picture would hardly be complete without
some indication of the place occupied in a department by the local or locals
of government-employee unions.12 Unionization has received new impetus
in recent years, especially among the rank and file. It should be admitted
at the outset that collective bargaining in the public service must take dif-
ferent forms as compared with industry, particularly because compensation
and other phases of the work relationship are ordinarily the subject of gov-
ernment-wide and even statutory regulation. Nonetheless, a considerable
field remains for constructive participation of chosen employee representa-
tives in various aspects of the managerial process. This is true not only of
grievance procedure and the promotion of employee health, welfare, and
safety but also of departmental employee relations in general.

By and large, the working contacts of employee locals have been con-
fined to the personnel office, instead of fanning out over the organization.
By and large, too, the nature of these contacts has held the local too much
to a negative role — raising remonstrances in the face of departmental inten-
tions or actions. That this need not be the case has been demonstrated by
the more positive approach pursued by such agencies as the Tennessee
Valley Authority. The ultimate administrative producers are the ordinary
employees. Work-simplification programs aimed at mass processes, for
instance, cannot be carried along by first-line supervisors single-handedly.
Programs of this kind, involving a higher level of general efficiency and
large potential economies, must enlist every employee. It will not always
be easy to win the rank and file, but without first settling all conceivable
questions with their legitimate representatives no appeal for whole-hearted
cooperation is likely to be successful.

The leadership of an agency local is an example of nonhierarchicai
power par excellence. It may be a nightmare to the exponents of the official
hierarchy. When met with good will and understanding, however, the
union can be a source of real support. To fight a running battle with the
local entails grave risks to morale. It also may set off sparks on the legisla-
tive side, and embarrass the chief executive himself. These considerations
invite an attitude of give-and-take, even though negotiating the basic terms
of such give-and-take may be tough business.

11 Cf. above Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administration," sec. 3, "Training for Public
Administration."

12 Cf. below Ch. 24, "Personnel Standards," sec. 6, "Employee Relations."

CHAPTER

Interest Groups in Administration

1. THE MEANING OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION

Types of Interest Groups. Public administration operates in an environ-
ment of interest-group activity. Most of the agencies of government are
the product of intergroup pressure or conflict, the outcome of which was
establishment of a governmental body to perform a service or function that
had been carried out unsatisfactorily or not at all under conditions of private
initiative. Some of the duties of the oldest federal departments — Foreign
Affairs, Treasury, War— included the protection, promotion, or regulation,
in iMadison's phrase, of "various and interfering interests . . . [which]
involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary opera-
tions of the government." Even when a public agency secures a legislative
mandate to perform a given task without formal relationship to the group
or class structure of society, citizens affected by that task watch it constantly^
and make their views known through some collective organization or agenu

The variety and scope of interest-group activity defy efforts toward
simplification. Students of interest-group activity have concentrated on
describing the organization and activities of specific organizations, and on
making case studies of agencies and situations in which group pressures
have molded or modified legislative and administrative policy.1 The latter
method succeeds in capturing the richness and vitality of governmental
experience. Yet it fails to yield satisfactory tools of interpretation and un-
derstanding. We need more descriptive studies and reports, but we also
need to develop concepts and methods of understanding the fundamental

1 Cf. Herring, Pcndleton, Group Representation Before Congress, Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1929, and Public Administration and the Public Interest, New York: McGraw-Hill,
1936; Childs, H. L., Labor and Capital in National Politics, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930;
Crawford, K., The Pressure Boys, New York: Messncr, 1939; Blaisdell, D. C., Economic
Power end Political Pressures, Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 26,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941.

314

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

315

motivation and distinctive behavior patterns of interest groups.2 A slightly
revised version of a classification suggested by Charles A. Beard is pre-
sented below to give some idea of the variety of interest groups, and to
emphasize the rise of professional and skill groups to challenge the category
of economic interests that until recently had been presumed to bt
predominant.

Major Category of Interest and Basis of
Organization

I. ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

A. Industry^ commodity, or service

B. Federation of particular interests

Group Organization

A. Trade associations and indus-
trial institutes, • trade unions,
producer cooperatives

B. Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation,
National Farmers Union, Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations

C. Consumers' associations, taxpay-
ers' leagues

A. Bar and medical associations,
public relations counselors, so-
cial workers, educators

B. Scientific societies, organizations
of public officials

National Catholic Welfare Con-
ference, Federal Council of
Churches of Christ in America

A. Anti-Saloon League, Women's
Christian Temperance Union

B. Relief recipients, veterans' or-
ganizations

C. Negro, nationality and women's
organizations

Interest Orientation of Public Administration. Pressure groups have in
common a self-regarding singleness of aim which places priority of impor-
tance upon the immediate purpose or welfare of the group organization as
such. But administrative agencies are also characterized by a focus of aim

2C/. Bentley, A. F., The Process of Government, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1908; Perlman, S., Theory of the Labor Movement, New York: Macmillan, 1928; Jordan, E.,
The Theory of Legislation, Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1930; Macmahon, A. W.,
'The Mexican Railways under Workers' Administration," Public Administration Review.
1941, Vol. 1, p. 458 ff.i Chase, S., Democracy Under Pressure. New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1945.

C. Federation of general interests

II. SKILL

A. Profession

B. Research and communication of

experience
III. RELIGION

IV. REFORM

A. Moral causes

B. Improvement of group status

C. Equalization of opportunity

316 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

and effort, coupled with a highly developed sense of organizational im-
portance. A bureaucracy transcends the particularism of pressure groups
only by the oath of public office and its commitment to the execution of a
program delegated to it by the political agencies of policy formulation.
Bureaucratic theory attempts to avoid group pressures by referring them to
the predetermined legislative policy or to the necessity for rules and regifr
lations applying generally to all groups and situations. The weakness of
this formal position is that a bureaucracy is itself part of the structure of
the community, and the achievement of its specific aim is in large measure
dependent upon its ability to secure the cooperation and support of other
group organizations.^

If it fails to do so, it loses a valuable opportunity to influence the course
of policy. And unless it does so, its own powers and organization may be
modified or abolished by legislation induced by pressure from dissatisfied
groups or by the legislature's own dissatisfaction with the inability of the
bureaucracy to transform the relationships between conflicting groups from
controversy to routine. Administrative agencies must keep foremost loyalty
to the public purpose entrusted to them. Still, they cannot forget that
other social groups share in that purpose and have their own notions as
to how it may best be achieved. The public official may be primarily re-
sponsible for the formulation of administrative policy, but under demo-
cratic conditions his responsibility does not make him the sole judge of
the ends of policy. The wise administrator, therefore, keeps open the
channels of information and advice between his agency and the private
organizations concerned with its operation) Indeed, the only question is
whether these channels should be established on a formal basis or main-
tained as a matter of informal personal contact.

Governmentalization of Interest Groups. In countries where the scope
of governmental responsibility for economic enterprise is much wider than
has been recognized in the United States, this interdependence of govern-
mental and economic organization becomes an integral part of the political
structure. The Russian trade unions and cooperatives, the German chambers
of industry, and the Italian corporations became in effect decentralized
operating divisions of the central policy-making agency controlling the
national economy.8 In that role, industrial bodies and groups participated
in the formulation of policy in an administrative rather than a political
capacity, losing their independence and their opportunity to criticize openly
and to press for changes in the direction of policy.

8C/. Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization? New York:
Longmans, 1936; Bicnstock, Gregory and Others, Management in Russian Industry and Agri-
culture, London: Oxford University Press, 1944; Sweezy, Maxinc, The Structure of the Nazi
Economy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941; International Labor Office, Methods of
Collaboration Between Public Authorities, Workers' and Employers' Organizations, pt. I,
Geneva, 1940; Brady, Robert A., Business as a System of Power, New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1943.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 317

Interest Groups and Class Theory. Returning to a context in which a
distinction is maintained between private initiative and governmental con-
trol in economic affairs, we may observe that interest-group activitity in
general accepts the prevailing structure and process of policy formation.
It is reformist rather than revolutionary in orientation. Interest groups
attempt to make public policy the instrument of their aims. Their tech-
niques include the methods and channels of publicity; withholding or
offering financial or voting support; sanctions of cooperation or non-
cooperation; and personal contacts with public officials through innumerable
channels of social, professional, and official association.

(Jnterest-group activity is in a category of thought different from the
Marxist concept of class interest, which presumes an irrepressible conflict
between the capitalists and the workers. This ideology looks forward to
the unification of political and economic activity in the name of an authori-
tative program identified with the interest of the whole people — or the
"classless society.^ Less inclusive group interests are labeled as collabora-
tionist, diversionist, or reactionary. Believers in the class-interest doctrine
may engage in pressure-group tactics pending the realization of the classless
society. However, they do so without a sense of responsibility for the
immediate effects of policy, for their deeper moral responsibility is for the
achievement of a different social structure and a new political order of
ideas, rulers, and institutions.

Demands for Interest Representation. 'Historically, the class interests of
property were reflected for hundreds of years in the governmental structure
and theory of representation underlying policy formation.4 Since the
nineteenth century, however, property representation as such has almost
completely been abolished as a qualification for public office. A partial
recrudescence of class representation has appeared in recent years. Certain
group interests, particularly labor organizations, have raised the demand for
specific representation or participation in the formulation of public policy.
J As we know, there are always either formal or informal relationships
between group organizations and official bureaucracies. Furthermore, it
is perfectly cle^r that in the sense of the right to be heard, to be consulted,
and to be informed in advance of the tentative basis of emerging policy
determination, group participation is a fundamental feature of democratic
legislation and administration. When, therefore, group organizations press
for representation in the official structure of administration, their desire
reflects some deeper motivation, whether it be redress of grievances, <fe-
sire for power, resentment over too limited participation, or fears of insecurity.

What are the forms and types of interest representation, and the ways
in which it works? In the following sections three forms will be analyzed,
and in the final section some suggestions will be presented as to the appro-
priate conditions and basic assumptions of such interest representation.

*Cf. Beard, Charles A., The Economic Basis of Politics. New York: Knopf, 1945.

318 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

2. CLIENTELE ORGANIZATION

Growth of Clientele Agencies. Interest representation finds expression
indirectly in the structure of government when an agency is created to
benefit a special category of citizens, or to promote the welfare of a group
having some specified interest or attribute in common. The best known
examples are perhaps the services and financial aids to cxservicemen by
the Veterans Administration; the research, promotional, and advisory func-
tions of the Women's Bureau in furthering equal opportunities and non-
discrimination between wage earners of both sexes; the comparable
activities and grant-in-aid responsibilities of the Children's Bureau for im-
proving the health, education, and welfare of mothers and children; the
regulation and constructive development of Indian life by the Office of
Indian Affairs. Clientele organization may be contrasted with the more
common organization by function, in which the agency is established to
perform a function or service for all categories of citizens, such as a public
library or a fire department.

A function may be so defined that, in effect, it is restricted to a major
industrial or economic group. The Federal Reserve System operates through
reserve banks whose operations in turn are restricted to banks. The
Securities and Exchange Commission's jurisdiction is restricted to security
issuers, traders, and organized exchanges engaged in security transactions.
The Interstate Commerce Commission dealt for many years solely with the
railroads and their customers. However, when the administrative function
is of a regulatory rather than a service or promotional character, the im-
plication is that two or more adversary interests are involved, one of which
— having by law been accorded priority — is represented by the public agency.
In such cases, the clientele principle is transvalued by clothing the group
objective wholly or in part with the public interest. This objectification of
the group interest in public policy characterizes a great deal of modern
labor and agricultural legislation.

Disadvantages of Clientele Organization. From the standpoint of
economy and efficiency, the clientele principle is defective because it allows
many agencies to perform essentially the same basic function for different
classes of people. In practice, of course, the principle is not carried to its
logical extreme. Under modern conditions, the justification for clientele
agencies is usually based on special circumstances, coupled with a welfare
motive that assumes the desirability of governmental ministration to the
needs of an unprotected or underprivileged or unrepresented group. The
most familiar arguments are that clientele organizatioa is required either
to redress existing inequalities or inequities in economic and social life, or
to handle technical problems peculiar to an economic process or to a spe-
cific class of citizens. In the latter case, the distinction between function
and clientele loses its meaning, because every functional agency has to

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 319

define its jurisdiction to include certain classes of people or cases and to ex-
clude others. However, although clientele agencies may be formally es-
tablished to perform specified functions, this does not make them functional
in purpose or scope.

The crux of the problem of administrative organization turns upon
the extent to which the agency becomes exclusive, competitive, or self-
centered in spirit. An agency whose activities are focused and directed
toward a particular group is likely to be more narrowly centered than one
established to perform its function impartially for all citizens. Analysis of
governmental structures will usually reveal, however, some functional agen-
cies which have a focus of purpose so narrow that they become more ex-
clusive and self-centered than a clientele agency whose interests range over
a broader segment of the population or national economy. Form of
organization, whether functional or clientele, is therefore relative to the
public purpose rather than to the particular end in itself. No governmental
agency should be so constituted as to enable a single group to prevent the
agency from taking the most inclusive view of the public interest in any
given situation.5

Attempts at Internal Balance of Interests. One way of implementing
such a standard would be to create agencies with so broad a jurisdiction,
covering so many organized groups, that the interest of no one group could
be controlling. At first glance this idea would seem to have been followed
in the creation of such federal departments as Agriculture, Commerce, and
Labor. The functions of the Department of Agriculture include research,
information, service, and regulation of processors, distributors, and financiers
as well as a great variety of commodity producers. The Department of
Commerce deals with interests represented by hundreds of industrial prod-
uct and service classifications and associational groupings. The Department
of Labor's statistical and regulatory functions affect manufacturers as well
as scores of industrial and craft unions. All this splintering of "interests"
fails, however, to take account of the pressure influences behind the his-
torical development of the three departments and of the psychological
factor that the great federations of agricultural, business, and labor groups
look upon each department as their spokesman in the highest councils of
the executive branch.6

As long as the large interest groups retain any degree of virility and
unity, they will expect great weight to be given their views on the appoint-
ment of top personnel and general policy matters. No government can
neglect this factor. Indeed, provided the operating and technical levels of
administration are protected from political interference in appointment or

6C/. Brookings Institution, Investigation of Executive Agencies, ch. 2, Senate Doc. No.
1275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1937; May, Geoffrey, "Day Dreams of A Bureau-
crat," Public Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 154.

6 For a general discussion, see Short, L. M., The Development of National Administrative
Orfanization, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1923.

320 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

removal of personnel and in the handling of business, it seems at least
arguable whether the political heads of these departments could not be ap-
pointed as representatives of farmers, businessmen, or wage earners. Aside
from a broader public interest, the problem at this level raises another
issue, namely, the need of the chief executive for a department head and
adviser in whom he has complete confidence, while a group representative
by definition has another primary loyalty. The dilemma is not insurmount-
able, but it requires a rare combination of ability, integrity, and flexibility
to serve in something like a dual capacity.

Functions of Clientele Agencies. The functions most often delegated
to a clientele agency7 are of a service character: research and exchange of
information. The systematic reports and studies of the agency are used by
the clientele group or by other groups to press for desired legislation or
changes in administrative policy. Another function is the formulation of
standards, whether of equity and health — as in the employment of women
and children — or for the protection of criteria of competence and training
to be applied by state professional and trade examining boards. In the
latter case, the standards are authoritative rather than advisory. They
raise the question of formal delegation of rule-making power to private
groups, since such boards are usually composed of representatives of the
professional or trade groups that are seeking state regulation of admission
to the profession or trade.8 Inevitably, the standards established have an
economic effect in limiting the number of those admitted to the profession
or trade. However, delegation of this power to private associations has
been justified by courts and legislatures because technical and specialized
training cannot be maintained without rigorous tests of proficiency.

Generally speaking, the endowment of clientele agencies with regulatory
responsibilities runs counter to deeply felt ideas of equity and fairness. The
assumption prevails that an agency responsible for promoting the welfare
of a particular group or class of citizens cannot be expected to maintain
judicial attitudes of impartiality in a dispute involving an interest adversary
to that which the agency is supposed to protect or promote. This is one of
the outstanding reasons for the creation of independent regulatory commis-
sions outside the structure of the executive departments. The objection
can be disposed of technically by protecting the regulatory tribunal, wher-
ever it be located, from political or other interference in the handling of
its cases. The Department of Agriculture, for instance, has many regula-
tory duties which are administered by single-headed bureaus fairly and

7 The Office of Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior presents a special case
because it performs practically all governmental functions in the areas placed under its juris-
diction. Cf. Meriam, Lewis, The Administration of Indian Affairs, Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1928.

8 The legal questions are discussed by Jaffe, L. L., "Law Making by Private Groups,"
Harvard Law Review, 1937, Vol. 51, p. 201 ff. See generally Carr Saunders, A. M. and
Wilson, P. A., The Professions, London: Oxford University Press, 1933.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 321

equitably enough to pass the test of judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court.9
Organizational independence has retained its strength as a symbol of
fairness in most areas of federal regulatory administration.

Experiences of the Great Depression and World War II. Emergency
legislation to meet conditions of economic depression, such as the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the mobilization of industry and agri-
culture in World War II, resulted in a mushroom growth of clientele
agencies. The hundreds of NRA code authorities, hailed at the beginning
of the New Deal as experiments in industrial self-government, were later
vilified as promoting monopolies and enabling minority groups to legislate
for their private ends.10 But the mood was passing. Faced with the exi-
gencies of defense and war production programs, the Office of Production
Management — and subsequently the War Production Board, the Office of
Price Administration, the War Food Administration, the Office of Defense
Transportation and the Petroleum Administration for War — all developed
an organization based upon industrial processes or commodity groupings,
and in many cases staffed by men drawn from the ranks of the industries
concerned.

With the exception of the ODT and PAW, the main pattern of organi-
zation was one of function and process — for example, production and
materials controls, price and rationing controls, food production and dis-
tribution. However, the industry and commodity divisions played a prom-
inent role in formulating limitation and allocation orders or price and
marketing regulations, in handling priority applications, and in collecting
and analyzing statistical information. In the fields of petroleum production
and distribution and of railroad transportation, the agencies were frankly
constituted and staffed on an industry basis. Although headed in each
instance by a public official responsible to the President, they relied pri-
marily upon industry initiative and cooperation in developing and carrying
out the changes in business practices necessary to meet wartime require-
ments.

In short, it was recognized that our normal governmental machinery
and personnel had to be supplemented to meet the demands of war; that
over-all policies and controls should not be delegated in toto to the broadest
industrial groupings; and that a basis of organization had to be evolved
that would conduce to maintaining contacts with the regulated groups,
securing their advice and active cooperation, giving them prominence in
announcing and promulgating administrative policies and regulations, and
enlisting them for much of the routine work of administration. The con-
flicts of policy between the agencies built on industry or clientele and the
9C/. Kitchen, C. W., "Regulatory Procedures in Agricultural Marketing and Food Dis-
tribution," in the symposium entitled Lectures on Administrative Regulation, Washington:
Department of Agriculture Graduate School, 1945.

10 C/. Lyon, L. S. and Others, The National Recovery Administration, Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1935.

322 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

functional agencies of control above them, like the Office of War Mobili-
zation, yield some classic case studies in administration. It is probable,
however, that these conflicts reflected bottlenecks or divergencies in pro-
duction programs that would have plagued the war effort in any event
regardless of organizational forms.

Two general observations stand out. First, any agency which seeks
special treatment, privilege, or protection for particular groups deprives
itself of a justifiable claim to the administrative responsibility for executing
more inclusive general policies of government. Second, while in special
cases a group purpose may be identified with the general welfare and with
statutory policy, the primary concern of any organized group is with the
naming of administrative top personnel and the content of policy,

3. STAFFING FOR POINT OF VIEW

Grounds for Interest Representation. The question may be asked
whether it is possible to distinguish between the content or substance of ad-
ministrative policies and the officers who are responsible for policy making.
In the process of policy formulation, the substance of decisions reached
is extremely difficult to dissociate from the personalities and social attitudes
of those participating. The "organization product" is rarely an individual
idea. It is usually the fruit of a great deal of preliminary discussion and
informal memoranda. Ultimately it turns out in the form of a letter, state-
ment, message, or order which has been reviewed and initialed by repre-
sentatives of many different parts of the organization.11 Realizing the
relatively indeterminate character of administrative policy-making and the
importance of participation in the developmental stages, some interest groups
— particularly labor organizations— have requested representation in admin-
istration on three grounds: first, that such group representation is desirable
to equalize opportunities for protecting and safeguarding respective inter-
ests; second, that organized groups can make contributions of special
knowledge and experience which would not otherwise be available to public
agencies; and third, that group participation in policy formulation makes
possible the avoidance of mistakes and the integration of diverse viewpoints
in advance of formal action on policy proposals.

Before discussing the different forms that group representation may take,
we should say that there is a practical difference between demands for
representation that arise from distrust of the administrative top personnel
and demands for changes in agency rules or policies. Administrators may
isolate themselves from leaders and currents of group opinion. But by
doing so, they lose a valuable opportunity for developing mutual respect
and confidence that may be gained through continued formal or informal
contacts with outside interests. Self-isolation interferes with the all-im-

11 Cf. Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, ch. 8: "Wanted: An Organization Product,'* New
York: Knopf, 1945.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 323

portant impression of fairness — the public conviction that decisions are
made only after full investigation and consideration of the facts, which in-
cludes taking into account the positions and viewpoints of group spokesmen.
Such institutionalized contacts and the application of elementary principles
of judicious procedure can go far to protect administrators from charges
of bias, unfamiliarity with their job, inside manipulation, and "politics"
in making decisons.

Demands for group representation that are motivated by a desire to in-
fluence policy can be met in a variety of ways. Members of regulatory
boards and commissions are usually prohibited from having any financial
interest in concerns to be regulated and from engaging in any other voca-
tion, trade, or employment. In such agencies, the demands and views of
affected groups are expected to be considered through legal procedures of
investigation and notice and through opportunity for hearing prior to a
formal decision, regulation, or order. A more direct device — which will be
considered in the next section — is the appointment of a representative ad-
ministrative board whose members are nominated by interest groups. A
third technique is the appointment of administrative personnel on grounds
of special vocational experience or affiliation. One form of this device is the
creation of a special staff unit to maintain contacts with outside groups and
to present their grievances, claims, or suggestions to the appropriate officials.

Administrative Appointment of Interest Representatives. The appoint-
ment of individuals to public office because of group affiliation squarely
conflicts with the civil service concept of appointment by virtue of merit
established by competitive examination. Fortunately, the two principles
are not incompatible. Group affiliation or vocational experience may go
hand in hand with merit and qualification. The question of propriety in
appointing group representatives who retain connections of personal loyalty
or financial interest in private organizations rests upon other grounds.

During World War II, one type of such representation was the practice
of appointing $l-a-year men by agencies like the War Production Board.
The Office of Defense Transportation in certain cases employed its top
personnel on a "without compensation" basis, the private employer— a rail-
road— paying the executives their regular salaries. The Petroleum Admin-
istration for War adopted the practice of paying regular government salaries,
but many of its executives received the difference between their public pay
and their private salaries from their previous employer. Representatives of
labor organizations appointed to top administrative posts usually fol-
lowed the principle of accepting government positions but served only part
time. They and their labor alternates received compensation on a when-
actually-employed basis. At lower levels, public employees appointed as

324 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

labor representatives accepted government salaries and devoted full time
to their responsibilities.12

The practice of dual compensation, or recognition of dual allegiance to
public and private organizations, arose in part from the lack of men and
women in government service trained in industry operations, familiar with
the influential industry leaders, and capable of swiftly grasping the peculiar
wartime problems in developing programs of economic mobilization and
control. With such outstanding exceptions as Ickes, Eastman, and Hender-
son, the slower-moving governmental processes of professional research and
regulation were for the most part by-passed for the presumed advantages of
business experience in initiating and administering the war programs. The
policy of appointing outsiders who retained their financial or business con-
nections had definite drawbacks. It gave countenance to charges by other
businessmen of special privilege and big-business domination, and lent
support to demands for representation of other groups.

Problems of Dual Allegiance. Julius A. Krug, then director of the
War Production Board's Office of War Utilities, and Ralph Davies, deputy
of the Petroleum Administrator for War, attempted to meet these charges
by a so-called "melting-pot" policy. It consisted of recruiting men from
all branches and interests in the electric power and petroleum industries —
publicly and privately owned enterprises, integrated and independent com-
panies, state regulatory commissions, and so on. The first two adminis-
trators of the Office of Price Administration, who maintained a policy of
personal disinterestedness of top price executives, were pilloried before
Congress and the public for relying in too great measure upon economics
professors in administering price control and rationing. The melting-pot
policy, if it did not eliminate charges of special-interest domination, was
rationalized by the respective administrators on the ground that it gave them
the benefit of variety of training, experience, and ability in policy formu-
lation and execution.

12 Apparently there is no legal barrier to the receipt of private payment for services ren-
dered exclusively to private persons or organizations when such services have no connection
with the services rendered to the government. Civil Service Act, Rules, and Regulations (an-
notated), p. 442. A federal statute of 1917 provided that after July 1, 1919, "no government
official or employee shall receive any salary in connection with his services as such an official
or employee from any source other than the government of the United States, except as may
be contributed out of the Treasury of any State, county or municipality, and no person, asso-
ciation or corporation shall make any contribution to, or in any way supplement the salary
of, any government official or employee for the services performed by him for the government
of the United Statacs" (violations are misdemeanors punishable by fine of not less than
$1,000 or imprisonment for not less than six months, or both); 5 U. S. C. 66. This provision
applies to salaries received from a private person or source as compensation or part compen-
sation for the services rendered to the government, and to compensation received if the
officer or employee renders the same or similar services to both the government and a private
person. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 273 (1922); 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 294 (1935); 39 pp. Atty. Gen.
501 (1940). See also Kirchheimcr, Otto, "The Historical and Comparative Background of the
Hatch Law," in Friedrich, Carl J. and Mason, Edward S., eds., Public Policy, Vol. 2, p. 341 ff.,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 325

The concept of coordination as maintaining a variety and balance of
diverse personalities and viewpoints within organizations is a familiar one
in administrative theory.13 Conceived in terms of competition in ideas and
incentive for keeping the top administrator informed as to what is going
on in his organization, such a policy encourages vigor and initiative all
down the line. The condition of its effectiveness in a cooperative system is,
however, that the participants accept as preeminent the common purpose
of the organization, and that the divergences in understanding and inter-
pretation of that purpose do not undermine belief in its reality as the or-
ganization objective. While functional specialization is certainly compatible
with organizational unity, it is also well recognized that the widest dis-
parity of individual motives may still contribute to cooperative effort. A
general statement of objectives permits wide differences in interpretation
as to the best means for accomplishing the organizational purpose. However,
neither particular individuals nor units of the staff should be given reason
to conclude that other individuals or staff sectors holding conflicting views
on policy have a truer grasp of the general purpose or an inside track in
policy councils. Systematic encouragement of conflicting views tends to
undermine the necessary will-to-cooperate on the lower levels of organiza-
tional life. It comes dangerously close to creating internal ideological con-
troversies which few administrators can afford to tolerate.

A sound recruitment policy in any line organization consciously aim!
at securing a representative distribution or cross section of social experience
in its staff. Such differences, so far as possible, should be kept on an indi-
Ividual basis, with a view to appealing to individual incentives and desire
for rewards which will contribute toward attainment of the general goal.
Introduction of conflicting goals imperils the realization of the highest
value within the organization. From the standpoint of an individual who
thinks of himself as representing an outside group and conscientiously strives
to maintain two loyalties, the experience is apt to be an extremely frustrating
and unhappy one, unless he happens to be an aggressive personality who
finds self-expression in conflict regardless of outcome.

Acceptance of a job without acceptance of the authoritatively expressed
major purpose of the undertaking is a self-defeating act unless the individual
adopts a pressure-group attitude which detracts from his usefulness at
operating levels. The outside group which favors "representation" but
claims that agreement can be reached on methods of administration will
soon be faced with two lessons of experience: First, the outside group is
bound to lose confidence in its representative when he is identified with the
bureaucracy as a jobholder; second, the public employee who thinks of

13 Cf. Dennison, Henry S., Organization Engineering, New York: Button, 1931; Barnard,
Chester I., The Functions of the Executive, pp. 86-94, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1938; Follett, Mary P., Dynamic Administration, pp. 96-116, New York: Harper, 1941.

326 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

himself as a group representative will have the greatest difficulty in accept-
ing the channels and levels of authority required by the organization.

Group Representation Through Special Staff Units. Some agencies have
deliberately incorporated the formal principle of interest representation by
creating staff units on policy, linked to outside groups and maintaining
liaison relationships with operating divisions. Examples are the labor, busi-
ness, and consumer advisory boards of the National Recovery Administra-
tion, and the Offices of Labor Production, Manpower Requirements and
Civilian Requirements in the War Production Board. The NRA advisory
boards were given a formal power of withholding their assent to a code
of fair competition to be approved by the NRA administrator, later the
National Industrial Recovery Board. The labor and consumer boards
naturally used this power to delay the promulgation of codes until the
labor and price provisions were satisfactory to them.

The process of negotiating codes took on bargaining aspects which had
both good and bad results. The boards established some standards of phrase-
ology and policy which were accepted by the administrator and his deputies.
These standards improved the administrative feasibility of the codes and
helped to raise the level of competitive practices in industry. At the same
time, the boards and their staffs psychologically separated themselves from
the code administrators and developed a corporate unity and loyalty of
their own. This resulted in a lack of consensus on the purpose of NRA and
an attitude of irresponsibility toward the administrator's problems. The veto
power had to be used too often and came to be overridden by the adminis-
trator as a matter of form, accentuating the lack of sympathy and mutual
deference.

At the top level the boards met separately and moved progressively away
from close touch with the administrator, while their staff members were
inhibited from assuming the role of technical advisers to the code adminis-
trators. It was only for a brief period of six months prior to the judicial
burial of NRA that a smooth-working device of policy coordination was
developed from the boards. This was an advisory council composed of two
top staff members from each board, created to review policy questions aris-
ing under any code of fair competition. The council acted as a group of
technical experts, who secured full reports and investigations from their
own staffs as well as the code administrators. It thus carved out a role of
authoritative advice to the National Industrial Recovery Board. It is note-
worthy that the council developed into an effective tool in supervising the
actual administration of the codes after they had been negotiated and
promulgated. It therefore conflicted squarely with the principle of industrial
self-government by code authorities in the initiation of changes in general
NRA policy.

When the Office of Production Management was created soon after the
inception of the defense program, a novel form of interest representation

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 327

was adopted. Administrative authority was divided between Director Gen-
eral William S. Knudsen and Associate Director General Sidney Hillman.
The latter was responsible for a Labor Division, headed by a Princeton
economist, J. Douglas Brown. The Labor Division was plagued by the
distrust of trade union leaders toward the "technicians" on Brown's staff
when the chips were down on issues of industrial reconversion for war.
There was no such thing as preparing for war by writing codes of regula-
tion. With little time to bargain about methods, the question was how to
get out war production. The story of labor representation in the period
of reconversion to war remains to be written, but its main elements are
likely to be: (1) industrial and military insistence upon the policy initiative;
(2) distrust of labor participation on issues of military or management prerog-
ative; (3) labor's attempt to influence policy by securing separate representa-
tion and by making demands in policy conferences on a bargaining basis;
and (4) labor's refusal to permit bureaucrats, even those selected by its
own leaders, to make by themselves final commitments or binding decisions
as a matter of administrative policy.

After Hillman's undermined health had forced him to leave his post
and a more unitary top control over war production had been installed
under Donald Nelson, the Labor Division was replaced at presidential direc-
tion by an Office of Labor Production, reporting to the chairman of the
War Production Board. The first director of the new agency, a former
Michigan Commissioner of Labor, was replaced early in 1943 by Joseph B.
Keenan of the American Federation of Labor. At the same time, a new
Office of Manpower Requirements was created under Clinton S. Golden
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The representative character of
these men could not be questioned by the unions. As the pattern of WPB
limitation and allocation orders, priority administration, and budgeting of
controlled materials had by this time been established, Keenan and Golden
turned their attention to the problems of developing channels of communi-
cation, information, and influence within the complex WPB organization.

In this effort, they relied largely upon their deputies, George Brooks and
Ralph Hetzel, who were experienced in the intricacies of administration and
appreciated the necessity of conforming to the conditions of bureaucratic
cooperation. With few exceptions, they succeeded in settling their internal
problems, and worked out procedures for placing a labor representative in
each industry division or bureau to advise on labor matters arising under
the WPB programs. Their major problem became in fact that of staking
claim to functions which other labor agencies— the Department of Labor
in labor disputes and the War Manpower Commission in securing adequate
sources of labor supply — would recognize as falling within the province
of WPB.

As long as the chairman of WPB considered the participation of labor
valuable in the stimulation of production and the administration of mate-

328 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

rials allocation or limitation orders, labor's advisory position within WPB
was protected. Toward the end in the area production-committee approach
and in the termination of war contracts, the labor units shifted their pro-
grams from an emphasis on influencing top policy to one on cooperating
with other units in the organization in coordinating administrative policy,
on the whole with somewhat less effectiveness than had the staff of the labor
advisory board in the NRA advisory council. Again, as in NRA, it was in the
declining rather than the formative period that labor representation through
special staff units really tackled the problems of organizing for effectual
work in a complex hierarchical organization. Only then was definite prog-
ress made toward gaining matter-of-course recognition by officials at all
policy levels in the agency for the labor staff members' contribution in in-
formation, ideas, and ingenuity.

We may question, however, whether labor organizations generally have
grasped the significance of this lesson. Or, if they have, whether they look
upon their experience as a failure in labor representation, with the inference
that they should press for more influential jobs next time rather than search
for an effective device to influence policy from the labor point of view.

Consumer representation in the war effort was divided at a very early
stage. In 1941, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply was
reduced in jurisdiction and title to OP A. The function of securing an ade-
quate production of materials and goods for nonmilitary uses was placed
in the Office of Production Management, where the consumer interest was
very largely considered in terms of the problems of the manufacturers of
civilian-type goods and materials. Originally staffed mainly by economists
under Leon Henderson, the OPM Office of Civilian Supply eventually be-
came the Office of Civilian Requirements. It was gradually transformed
into a group of broadminded businessmen with the functions of advising
the industry divisions on production and materials problems from an over-
all standpoint, and of acting as a claimant agency for the controlled mate-
rials left over after the military and strategic civilian claimants had justified
their requirements to the program vice-chairman and the requirements com-
mittee of WPB. During a limited period in 1942, the office did in effect
make strategic determinations as to materials allocation. However, this was
terminated when the program vice-chairman became responsible for allo-
cating materials among competing military and civilian uses.

The general consumer interest was therefore split up, in terms of the
functional division of labor, between production control in WPB and price
control in OPA. The latter inevitably pushed for precedence over produc-
tion urgencies and was usually in opposition to WPB requests for higher
prices to elicit increases in production. The domestic consumer interest
became identified with a total agency function. At no time was specific
representation demanded by consumers as a group. Industrial consumers
or producers, however, secured a congressional proviso on OPA's funds

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 329

requiring that no official receiving more than $4,500 a year should have had
less than five years' responsible "business" experience. Here again, Leon
Henderson's professional economist-administrators were gradually replaced
by men of business training and background. Whether the later appointees
were better administrators than their predecessors remains to be proved.
In any event, the supporters of price control did not renounce their faith in
OPA because of this development, nor did the record of price control there-
after show any trend unfavorable to price stabilization until several months
after V-J Day.

Balance Sheet of Experience. Objectively, the policy of staffing adminis-
trative agencies for "point of view" involves two logically contradictory cri-
teria of selection and training. The responsibility of the administrator for
achieving results under the policy of the law called for authority to appoint
subordinates upon whose ability and judgment he could rely. At the same
time, responsibility and loyalty of his administrative subordinates were to
symbols or organizations outside the agency by which they were employed.

It may readily be admitted that administrative ingenuity should not be
stultified by logical dilemmas. In the first place, when the factors of time
and place are taken into account, it is conceivable that nine-tenths of the
employee's job will never raise a conflict between his two loyalties. Sec-
ondly, the administrator may find ways of canalizing or utilizing the
energies of interest representatives so as not to interfere with vital parts
of his program. Thirdly, in many cases, the interests of outside groups may
be complementary to his own, and mutual exploration of policy alternatives
may remove barriers raised by institutional distance, misunderstanding, and
errors in judgment. Considerations such as these, however, can be met by
arrangements which do not impose equal strains on lines of administrative
responsibility and individual personalities.

The legitimate aspirations of labor, consumer, or citizen groups for more
effective participation in administrative policy-making should not be di-
rected toward securing positions as group representatives at operating or
technical levels. Creation of representative staff units at the top-policy level,
reporting directly to the administrator, may have some public-relations value
to both the outside groups and the public agency. However, the advantages
of inside information and symbolic cooperation with government that
accrue to the outside group are probably outweighed by the implicit limi-
tations upon freedom to criticize; the emotional and physical strains upon
the group representative; and the unpleasantness of being open to charges
from the group itself of bureaucratic sympathy by virtue of holding a
government job. If the administrative job is worth being done, it would
be best to place responsibility upon the administrator for making appoint-
ments on the basis of individual qualifications in relation to the job to be
done; urge him to seek as varied as possible a basis of social experience,
training, and personality in recruiting his staff; permit him to create the

330 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

healthy and necessary unity of effort that arises from willing cooperation
in an organization with high morale; expose him to outside policy pressures1,
and compel him to inform his public as to what he is doing. It will pay,
however, to protect him from ideological conflict within his own staff.

4. INTEREST REPRESENTATION ON ADMINIS NATIVE BOARDS

Membership Requirements. Practical politicians and political scientists
are well aware of the opportunity for representation of group interests when
public agencies are headed by boards instead of by single administrators.
Specifically, economic group representation may here be concealed by the
qualification of appointees as party members — usually stated in terms of a
limitation upon the appointing authority that no more than two members
of a three-man board or three of a five-man board shall belong to the same
political party. This leaves the chief executive ample discretion to nominate
candidates acceptable to him, subject to the advice and approval of party
organizations expressed informally as well as through one or both houses
of the legislature.14 Painstaking analysis of the biographical history and
administrative record of such appointees will show how many of them tend
to favor particular group demands, but it may also reveal considerable inde-
pendence of thought and refusal to follow lines of group cleavage under
conditions of relative permanence of tenure.15

Specific representation for economic groups has been tried spasmodically
in the establishment of regulatory tribunals. Demands for it are associated
with the idea that those responsible for wielding powers of such vital con-
cern should have practical knowledge of the problems of the regulated
groups. The legislative method is to insert a statutory provision that mem-
bers of the board or commission shall be appointed as bankers, workers,
businessmen, and farmers, or with experience in defined occupations. These
provisions are found more frequently in state laws than in federal legisla-
tion, and there has been no general federal tendency toward adopting such
requirements, for several reasons.

The appointing chief executive can take the element of vocational ex-
perience into account without formal limitation in the law. Moreover, legis-
lators wish geographic and political affiliations to be considered as well.
If the chief executive has a particular candidate in mind, he can usually find
technical ways to meet the legal qualification. The legislature or the group
interests therefore cannot ensure, as a matter of law, that their candidates

14 Cf. Herring, Pendleton, Federal Commissioners, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1936; Zeller, Belle, Pressure Politics in New Yor%, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1936; McKean,
D. D., Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.

15 C. H. Pritchctt's studies of the voting record of the Supreme Court led him to conclude
that the major line of division between the justices is *'the allowable extent of public controls
versus private rights." This issue of principle transcends and cuts across lines of group con-
flict except insofar as some groups maintain a consistently antigovernmental or status quo
position. See 'The Divided Supreme Court," Michigan Law Review, 1945. Vol. 44, pp. 434-442.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 331

will be selected. It is constitutionally doubtful, as well as undesirable from
the angle of public policy, for the legislature to exercise the power of nomi-
nating the appointee. Hence, if an organized group cannot succeed in tying
the chief executive's hand by this method, it may prefer not to alienate
him by a halfway step and rather approach him through informal and
political channels. In the case of proposals for bipartisan representative
boards, the group making the demand must anticipate counterdemands from
other groups, with the implicit inference that a balance of power would
be lodged in a public representative uncontrolled by any group. The con-
sequences of permanently implanting such a conflict in administrative
bodies should give pause to outside groups interested in effective and prompt
procedural action.16

Nomination by Interest Groups. A third device, which may be either
formal or informal, is to provide for appointment by the chief executive
upon nomination by interest groups. This is the method by which most
state professional examining boards are appointed. In a nonpolitical con-
text, it amounts to permitting professional groups virtually to appoint their
candidates and fix the technical standards of entrance to their trade or
profession. The line between the political and nonpolitical is easily crossed,
however, and such agencies move carefully to secure legislative authoriza-
tion for their tests and sanctions in granting or revoking certificates to
practice.17

In establishing public corporations the British have used variations of
the device of formal nomination by group organizations to avoid "political"
influences or control by government departments, and to secure the advan-
tages of technical experience on the boards of directors. The governing
board of the Port of London Authority is composed of eighteen members
elected by shipowners, merchants, rivercraft owners and wharfingers, and
ten members appointed by public authorities. Of the public authorities'
appointments, two are generally representatives of union labor. The Central
Electricity Board of seven members is appointed by the Minister of Trans-
port after consultation with such interest representatives as he thinks fit — that
is to say, local government, electricity, commerce, industry, transport, agri-
culture, and labor. The London Passenger Transport Board is appointed
by an ad hoc independent body of appointing trustees, composed of the
chairman of the London County Council, the president of the Law Society,
the president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales, the chairman of the Committee of London Clearing Banks, and a
representative of the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Com-
mittee. There are two common elements in British methods of appoint-
ment through group organizations: (1) creation of a public agency to do

1<J On this whole question, see Leiscrson, A very, Administrative Regulation, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1942.

17 For a general discussion, see below Ch. 15, "Legislative Control."

332 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

a job without "political" interference; and (2) deliberate representation of
many interests in order to prevent any one line of conflict from predominat-
ing, thus creating a situation in which managerial responsibility must be
recognized.

Bipartisan and Tripartite Boards. The outstanding governmental func-
tion in which the representative board has been used time and again is
the settlement of labor disputes. In spite of repeated disappointments, the
demand for a bipartisan or tripartite board directly nominated by employer
groups and unions, with or without participation of "the public," some-
how always recurs. The reasons seem to lie in part in the complexities of
employer-union relations, the facts of which are known better to the parties
than to "outside" mediators or arbitrators; the disinclination to allow govern-
ment agencies to administer any policy — however named — of compulsory
arbitration that might control the terms of the labor bargain; the familiar
custom and pattern in negotiation to be personally represented on the deci-
sion-making body when the policy settlement is unclear; and the desire of
many labor leaders for status and prestige arising from participation in
governmental policy-making.

It is here necessary to introduce distinctions or functional differentiations
which complicate the problem but are essential to full understanding. Bi-
partisan boards, composed of an equal number of employer and union rep-
resentatives, have functioned successfully for many years in the arbitration
of collective bargaining demands. However, they operate quite differently
when the problem is one of working out the details of applying an existing
agreement, or of deciding general policy questions such as those of the
proper level of wages and whether union membership should be a condition
of employment. An analogy might be drawn in distinguishing between the
problem of administering a provision that railroad freight rates shall apply
faiily and equitably to different classes of shippers, and the problem of
raising or lowering the general level of freight rates or changing the dif-
ferentials between classes of shippers.

If the purpose of public policy is to throw primary responsibility for
settling disputes back upon employers and unions, a bipartisan board may
be appropriate. When the parties themselves have failed, as in disputes over
proposed changes in labor agreements or negotiation of new agreements,
another element is injected. It is the requirement that a public agency shall
intervene, either to mediate the dispute by recommending formally to the
parties a basis of settlement, or to decide authoritatively the terms of set-
tlement. In these situations, representation of the disputants upon the pub-
lic body tends to inhibit rather than promote a free formulation of the issues
in terms from which agreement might be developed. Bipartisan or tripartite
boards dealing with problems of changing general policy therefore invite
continuance of settled lines of dispute, and tend to throw the burden of
decision on the public or neutral members of the board. All this is well

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 333

known. Yet because unions do not wish compulsory settlement of labor
disputes, they are recurrently urging bipartisan or tripartite representation
on governmental labor boards.

Record of Wartime Labor Boards. The National Defense Mediation
Board (March-December, 1941) and the National War Labor Board (1942-
1945) are our most recent and dramatic case studies of tripartite representa-
tion. The first had four representatives of labor and employers, and three
public members; the second had four representatives for each of the three
groups. After an excellent record of settling disputes by recommending
wage increases — facilitated by government defense contracts — the Defense
Mediation Board fell apart when the CIO members resigned because the
public members refused to recommend a union shop for the coal mines
operated by the steel companies.

The shock of Pearl Harbor caused a reorientation of the board's thinking.
At the National War Labor Policies Conference in December, 1941, a no-
strike, no-lockout pledge was secured from labor and management. President
Roosevelt added a third condition — that the renamed National War Labor
Board would be empowered to settle all disputes. Thereafter, the board
operated on the theory that some form of security would have to be given
unions in return for renouncing the $trike for the duration of the emergency.
A maintenance-of-membership clause with a 15-day withdrawal period
was the formula finally decided upon. As the employer representatives
did not resign from the board, the public members were entitled to infer
that the difference between industry and labor had been "narrowed" from
an "impassable gulf" to an acceptable solution of the conflict.18

The government's wage stabilization policy, announced in April, 1942,
and the adoption in October of the Economic Stabilization Act, brought
new difficulties upon the board. The "Little Steel" formula was adopted in
July over the dissent of the labor members, but they did not resign. On
the contrary, they found that it was still possible to secure wage increases,
and under the board's wage policies of November 6, 1942, increases were
in some cases agreed upon by the employer and union representatives that
placed the public members in a dissenting minority. The "Hold-the-Line"
executive order of April 8, 1943, stopped this, but the union members re-
mained. Now another element of friction entered. The executive order
had made the director of Economic Stabilization superior to the board in
policy review and coordination, interfering with its freedom to apply the
wage stabilization policy to the decision of disputes in its own discretion.
The necessary relationships between the public members of the board and the
Economic Stabilization director became a serious issue to the labor members,
some of whom openly charged the latter official with "politically" interfering

18 Davis, William H., "Aims and Policies of the National War Labor Board," Annals of
thf American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1942, Vol. 224, p. 145.

334 INTEREST CROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

with board responsibility and with controlling the decisions of the public
members.

Test of Interest Compromise. The real test of the representative adminis-
trative board, however, lies in its success in resolving policy problems by
compromising the differences between the groups represented on it. The
great compromise that the War Labor Board brought about was the ac-
quiescence of employers in the policy of maintenance of union membership
and the cooperation of organized labor with wage stabilization. We must
admire the accomplishment of the public members in holding the board
together, and thereby maintaining an enormously important symbolic unity
between labor and management during the war period. It may safely be
stated, however, that it was only the exigencies of war that induced labor
and industry to accept the wage stabilization program.

Students of the internal procedures within the board will notice the
delays and backlogs of cases due to the refusal of employer and union
members to accept policy decisions of the board as precedents in handling
new cases. Here, once more, the verdict of history will decide whether the
recognition of basic interests and the preservation of external unity were
worth the price of administrative delays and suspension of the processes
of collective bargaining. The contention that the War Labor Board ad-
vanced collective bargaining and developed a legacy of policy which unions
and employers would wish to preserve after the war went up in smoke
within sixty days after Japan surrendered. Both parties seem quite united
on keeping government out of labor disputes. Yet we may question whether
this attitude will be permanent, and whether tripartite representation would
not again be requested if governmental intervention in specifying the terms
of the labor bargain were to become imminent.

5. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSULTATION

General Theory of Interest Representation. At this point, the outlines of
the general theory of interest representation may briefly be sketched. The
underlying idea is .best described by the phrase "economic federalism," in
the sense of a division of authority and function between government and
the broad economic groupings in which men and women spend most of
their working hours and derive their personal appreciation of the political
process. The ethical foundation of the concept is found in the importance
of creating in the community as wide as possible a basis of training and
experience in governmental affairs, and of the deeper unity arising from a
commonly shared sense of contribution in solving social problems. The
theory appeals to social democrats because of its justification of autonomous
group life, and perhaps also because it is ambiguous enough to apply to
three different forms of institutional arrangements, enabling its exponents
to substitute one for another without being politically inconsistent. The

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 335

chree organizational concepts are excellently illustrated in the writings of
Professor Harold J. Laski.

In World War I, during a period in his life of observation and specula-
tion on a relatively abstract plane, Laski was greatly impressed with the
importance of permitting voluntary groups such as unions and churches
a high degree of freedom to select and pursue their objectives under organ-
ized government dominated by private-property attitudes.19 Later, in his
Grammar of Politics?® Laski rejected a constitutional structure based upon
autonomous groups wielding powers of both economic and political de-
cision. He substituted for this form of federalism a concept of group rep-
resentation and consultation at policy levels of public administration, wisely
allowing such details as the degree of policy-making authority and the
selection of representatives to vary with the nature of the administrative
problem. During the ensuing twenty years, Laski reflected on both the
menace of fascism and the internal divisions within the Western democra-
cies that inhibited the formation of an aggressively democratic program.
After entering active politics, he has come to emphasize the importance
of a unifying democratic faith. The contribution of economic groupings to
such a faith cannot be a matter of autonomous choice. It must be made
in cooperation with government through a uniting symbol of the most
inclusive good — namely, the program of a freely elected people's party.21

Basic Distinctions in Group Representation. We can now see that the
concept of economic group representation allows distinctions as to: (1) the
level of policy determination — that is to say, the area and scope of govern-
mental jurisdiction over which general decisions of economic policy should
be made and within which local or functional differentiations should be
permitted;22 (2) the recognition of power groups and other interests in
general policy formation; and (3) the method of organizing the process by
which interest participation should be guaranteed. The problem involved
in the first distinction is clearly one of paramount political and legislative
policy. Any attempt to solve such questions by the exercise of adminis-
trative power simply throws the administrative agency into the middle of
political controversy that a higher political authority should decide, unless
it be assumed that politics and administration are one.

The problem arising from the second distinction refers in part to the
constitutional guarantees and rights of free association, petition, and assem-
bly. However, it blends into the administrative sphere when an agency
is given discretion to select and define the group categories or organizations

19 Foundations of Sovereignty, "Administrative Areas" and "The Pluralistic State," espe-
cially p. 75 #., New York: Harcourt Brace, 1921.

20 Ch. 2, and pp. 282-285, 384-387, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925.

21 Faith, Reason and Civilization, New York: Viking, 1944.

22 Paul Appleby has pointed out that from a management standpoint it is nonsense to
decentralize until central policy integration has been attained. Op. cit. above in note 11,
pp. 100-102.

336 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION

whose interests it desires to take into account. This problem may be
summed up by saying that powerful group organizations can usually get
their views presented. The difficulty of administrators is to maintain a clear
understanding that their public responsibility is broader than their allegiance
to any one group. Their responsibility requires consideration of general
governmental policy and the interests of the community as a whole.

Organization of Interest Participation. The scope of this chapter has
been in general restricted to the third problem, which can be restated as the
question of how to take into account the views of all relevant group inter-
ests in administrative policy-formation. We have analyzed several organiza-
tional devices and found each somehow unsatisfactory. This seems to be
due to two factors. First, while administrative discretion affords an oppor^
tunity for groups to press for favorable determination of policy questions
that are not yet legislatively settled, most groups fail to realize that an ad-
ministrative agency cannot attempt to decide larger controversial issues with-
out risking its own security through political conflict.23 Second, interest
groups often fail to recognize that they may want fairness and impartiality
in administration even more than they want a share of official responsibility
for policy determination.

The vital problem of how to bring interest-group influences to bear upon
the process of administrative policy-formation is not a simple matter of
calling conferences and holding hearings. The sense of participation is es-
sential to social or public morale, but this is not automatically secured by
formal arrangement. It must be developed and learned by creating a set of
understood conditions, special skills, and mutual responsibilities on the part
of the group members, their leaders, the administrator, and his staff. When
these specifications have been met and the participants have learned how
to promote their separate interests by working together, some form of the
advisory committee will be found most acceptable to all. The reason is ob-
vious. If we assume that consent is necessary to the administrator and that
group interests wish to be freely and independently represented, the incen-
tive should be placed upon the administrator to win group assent, and the
group representatives should be free to withdraw and to criticize. Three
wartime examples are pertinent.

Three Wartime Examples. The first example is drawn from the experi-
ence of the Office of Defense Transportation, which set up an advisory com-
mittee composed of representatives of railroad management and labor to
consider wartime measures of conservation and efficiency. Such measures
necessitated revision of treasured union rules embodied in established union
agreements. ODT, for reasons best known to its staff, chose by order to ab-
rogate rules prescribing the length of trains. While, in the light of wartime

28 The proper distinction is that administrators need not be neutral in their recommenda-
tions on forward-looking policy changes and should contribute actively to their decision, but
should not decide themselves.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTRATION 337

conditions, the unions might have delivered up their dearly prized rules,
the ract remains that the abrogation worked to the pecuniary advantage of
the carriers, who sought to escape from the conditions of bargaining agree-
ments under the guise of lofty principle. As a consequence, the union mem-
bers of the ODT advisory committee resigned and sought redress — obtained
subsequently — through direct negotiations with the carriers. And ODT
lost a channel for securing the cooperation of the railroad unions in its
wartime tasks.

The second example is the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the
War Manpower Commission. The committee went through two stages:
(1) 1942-1943, when as a bipartisan labor-management board it practically
ran WMC; (2) 1943-45, when it was reorganized to include representatives
of agriculture and to place highest-ranking officials of the great national
labor, business, and farmer organizations on the committee. The effect of
the shift was that the committee was somewhat less frequently consulted
and had less to do with administrative detail.

Nevertheless, in both stages the committee members agreed and insisted
that voluntary methods should be relied upon to control the flow of man-
power into essential civilian industries and occupations. By and large,
the government followed this policy throughout the war, except for moral
pressure exerted through publicity and advertising and through "paper"
controls such as employment stabilization plans and centralized referrals
to jobs in each community through the employment offices, and the col-
lateral control of wages by the War Labor Board. If any general criticism
of wartime governmental manpower policy may be made, it is that the
War Manpower Commission and its chairman failed to formulate a posi-
tive program, on the one hand permitting the military agencies to fix their
own manpower requirements, on the other following a separate policy with
respect to the requirements of nonmilitary employers of labor.

The third example is the wartime policy of the British Minister of
Labor. Ernest Bevin established a joint consultative committee composed of
representatives selected by the Employers' Confederation and the Trades
Union Congress. This committee did not attempt to assume responsibility
for determining Briush manpower policy. The government initiated and
sponsored the drastic powers assumed by it in the Essential Work Orders-
in-Council, but it took pains to initiate consultations with the joint commit-
tee on every step and change of policy while these were being formulated.24
Apparently the same procedures were not followed in planning for military
demobilization, however.25 Although the Minister in charge of reconver-
sion planning, Lord Woolton, advised the committee that demobilization

24 Sec Radcliffe, J. V., "Trade Unions' Part in Britain's War Effort," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1942, Vol. 224, pp. 117-123.

25 British Trades Union Congress, Report of General Council, pp. 161-162, Blackpool,
1944.

338 INTEREST GROUPS IN ADMINISTOATION

plans were at an advanced stage, he refused to indicate their general outlines
or principles. The Minister of Labor informed the committee that he was
"not in a position" to give any indication of the government's plans. The
General Council of the Trades Union Congress then formally told the
Prime Minister that a violation of the principle of consultation had taken
place. The Prime Minister's reply, made more than two months later,
stated that the demobilization policy should first be announced to Parlia-
ment. The deterioration of consultative relationships reflected in this de-
cision of Winston Churchill may well have had a bearing not only on the
quality of civilian morale but also on the withdrawal of the Labor Party
from the government in less than a year.

(Foundations of Interest Consultation. These three applications of the
principle of consultation do not demonstrate once and for all its superiority
over other forms of "shared participation" in public policy-making. They
illustrate the workings of a cooperative arrangement which places priority
of importance upon: (1) mutual respect for responsibilities of administrat-
ors and group leaders; (2) working with others rather than allowing one
group to put something over on the others that they don't have to take;
(3) fair dealing by making information available on purposes and methods
of administration within the defined scope of the plan; and (4) providing
opportunity for criticisms and suggestions. The principle of consultation
on the administrative level clearly will not appeal to those who assume
that their views must be adopted or they won't play. It will work only
under conditions where the participants assume that a process of expert
investigation and open discussion is the proper way to discover the best
means of realizing an agreed-upon public purpose.

He who is more interested in influencing the formulation of that purpose
is simply expressing his legitimate preference for participation in political
conflict rather than for reducing political decisions from debatable hypotheses
to administrative operations. It is confusion thrice-confounded to carry
such conflict into the administrative process and to make administrative
organization the arena for continuing political battles. Unless we decide
to delegate governmental powers to a single political group which can only
be overthrown by violence, we must assume that tentative solutions to
our social and economic conflicts can from time to time be reached by those
skilled in winning the people's votes, who will turn over to those trained
in administratioiy(he task of seeing to it that the terms of political settlements
are made to work,

CHAPTER

Legislative Control

1. MEANS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTROL

Central Issue of Governance. The distinctive institution of popular gov-
ernment is the representative assembly. But representative assemblies alone
cannot govern. The power to lead in policy-making and to direct adminis-
tration must be vested in a chief executive. Although popular authority
may rest in the representative assembly, an aggregation of five hundred
men and women in a hall does not constitute a government. /

In democracies, one of the fundamental constitutional problems is that
of the relations between the representative body and the executive branch.
Unfettered and uncontrolled power may gravitate to executive agencies if the
popular body is weak. On the other hand, if inadequate power is vested
in the executive branch, government may follow a faltering and hesitant
policy, at times with risk to national survival. If the representative body
attempts to assume the executive function, it tends to become a market place
where individuals and factions bargain away the national welfare for
sectional or parochial gain.

Our scheme of separated powers creates peculiar difficulties in the adjust-
ment of relations between the executive branch and the representative body.
By design, the constitutional system assures rivalry — and therefore friction —
between them; by checks and balances it laces both together in inescapably
close relations. Not only do we have the frictions inevitable between the
legislature and the chief executive, each independent and equal. In addi-
tion, the administrative departments are caught between the rival claims
of both.

Members of Congress often declaim in tones of irritation that the bu-
reaucrats ought to keep in mind their responsibility to the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. Yet the bureaucrat knows that through a definite
hierarchy of control he is accountable to the President, who under the
Constitution is the chief executive vested with powers of direction. More-
over, the President as well as Congress is chosen by the people— a fact often
disregarded in the bickering of lawmaker and executive. Although it rarely

339

340 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

arises in such bald form, the question often distills down in particular cases
to whether the President or Congress shall direct the administrative agencies
in the execution of the laws. The forces polarized around this issue
permeate the e-itire executive structure and account for many of the basic
characteristics of American public administration.

Formal Means of Legislative Control. Although we speak of "legis-
lative control" of administration, our constitutional theory does not con-
template that the chief executive will be subservient to the legislative body.
Legislative supremacy requires that the tenure of the principal executive
officers depend on the will of the representative body. In our system,
both the legislature and the chief executive have ill-defined spheres of dom-
inance. Legislative influence manifests itself in the process of relating the
functions of legislative and executive organs. Denied the formal power to
designate the chief executive and the heads of executive agencies, legislators
seek to influence the direction of administrative policy by other means.

The principal formal means in the hands of Congress for control of
the administration are the powers of enacting, amending, and repealing
legislation, of investigation, and of appropriation. In addition, the Senate
has the right to review presidential appointments, except those to "inferior
offices," which are vested in the President or the heads of departments.
These types of formal authority are not all the means of legislative control;
the fact that formal powers exist and may be used enables Congress and its
members to exert great influence by such methods as criticism from the
floor, or through press statements and by personal contact and individual
pressure. Each administrative agency keeps a sharp eye on congressional
attitudes and often trims its sails accordingly.

The mere mention of these legislative powers indicates their significance
as means of control of administration. Acts of Congress fix the limits of
power which may be exercised by administrative agencies, and often the
manner of its exercise. Moreover, authority which is granted may be with-
drawn. Administrators must proceed on the assumption that the legislation
they administer may be repealed or modified. However, the power of
repeal is difficult to exercise; opportunities for obstruction in the legislative
process are many, and a repealing act must be signed by the President or
passed over his veto.

In recent years, a method has been developed by which Congress can
virtually repeal a law without the possibility of defeat by Presidential veto.
Many emergency acts of World War II were to remain in effect until six
months after the end of the war, until a date specified in the act, or "until
such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution or the President
may designate." Concurrent resolutions are not submitted to the President
for approval. Hence a means has been invented — though of untested
constitutionality— by which Congress can in effect repeal legislation or with-
draw powers from administrative agencies without the danger of a presi-

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 341

dential veto.1 While no case of use of this power has occurred, the very
existence of the power is not without its effect within the executive branch.

Congress exercises even more effective control over administration by
enacting legislation to be effective for only one year or for some other de-
terminate period. Administrative policy and performance may therefore be
reviewed by Congress when an extension of power is sought. For months
preceding the renewal of such an act, its administrators walk warily, per-
haps fearing to take steps of urgent importance lest some group in Congress
be annoyed. The reciprocal trade-agreement program provides an example
of an administrative activity based on limited-term legislation. Many im-
portant war activities — for instance, price control, priorities, selective service —
were based on short-term legislation. Administrators must wage battle
for renewal when the expiration dates of such statutes approach. The
difficulty of obtaining positive action from Congress gives to congressional
opponents of a policy based on short-term legislation certain advantages
which they do not enjoy under ordinary legislative forms.

The appropriating process is the most comprehensive and the most
systematic means by which the legislature reviews administrative activities.
Once a year administrators must appear before the subcommittees of the
two Appropriations Committees and explain and justify in great detail their
requests for money. They must answer questions — some penetrating, some
sympathetic, some unfriendly — about their operations. Once a year they
are on the carpet and must be prepared to defend their work against what-
ever criticism the members of the Appropriations Committees feel disposed
to make. In the course of the hearings, legislative instructions are often
given which, while not written into the appropriation act, are regarded as
binding.2

Looking Into Particulars. The power of investigation is in theory a
method by which Congress obtains information on which to base legislation.
In fact, it tends to be in the main a method by which Congress directs
public attention to particular administrative situations and makes its wishes
known to administrators. Many varieties of investigations are conducted
by congressional committees. In some instances, resolutions grant commit-
tees full power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production
of records and papers. In others, a quorum of a standing committee decides
to conduct an inquiry and requests the appearance of administrators. In
some instances, the inquiry is conducted with the assistance of a competent
staff which does the spadework necessary to prepare for an informative
public hearing. In others, committee members depend on their own per-
sonal knowledge for an offhand interrogation of the witnesses. In motive
the inquiry may be a sincere and responsible effort to promote the public

1 See White, Howard, "Executive Responsibility to Congress via Concurrent Resolution,'1
American Political Science Review, 1942, Vol. 36, pp. 895-900.

2 Consult the excellent analysis by Macmahon, Arthur W., "Congressional Oversight o*
Administration: The Power of the Purse," Political Science Quarterly, 1943, Vol. 58, pp
161-190. 380-414.

342 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

good. Or it may be simply designed to discredit individuals or programs
in an unfair manner.3

From time to time Congress virtually assumes administrative functions
by acting on individual cases rather than in terms of general principles.
Thus an appropriation act of 1944 provided that "prior to the acquisition
or disposal, by lease or otherwise, of any land acquired for naval use under
the authority of this, or any other act, the Secretary of the Navy shall come
into agreement with the Naval Affairs Committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with respect to the terms of such prospective
acquisitions or disposals. . . ."4 Similarly, the Alien Registration Act of
1940 provided that the Attorney General should deport immediately any
alien whose deportation had been suspended more than six months if the
"two Houses pass a concurrent resolution stating in substance that the
Congress does not favor the suspension of such deportation." Congressional
participation in individual administrative actions, however, is more gen-
erally accomplished by less formal methods.

Atomization of Control. The existence of all these powers in the legis-
lative body is elementary. The conditions of their exercise are matters
less well understood. Congress, House of Representatives, and Senate are
terms evoking in the mind the notion of an assembly that debates, delib-
erates, and decides. Such notions must be supplemented by more adequate
conceptions if we are to comprehend the interplay between legislature and
administration. Congress as a whole can really master and decide only
a few main issues. So great is the volume of legislative business and such
are our parliamentary practices that we have in reality not one legislative
body but scores of small legislative bodies. When we seek to understand
the relations of Congress with the executive branch, we must speak, not
of either, but of this Senator, or that Representative, or this committee, or
that bloc and the administrative establishment. The actions of Congress
are in the great majority of instances those of a single member, or two, or
a handful — actions which their colleagues ratify or to which they raise
no objection.

The committee system accords great power to a few individuals in
Congress. Our Congress does not have the great fear of committees that
some representative bodies manifest. Committees are not regarded with
jealousy as groups that grasp and exercise the power of the entire body,
but as the normal media for doing business. Consequently, committee
chairmen in particular are very powerful. Their power is greater for ob-
struction than for initiation; nonetheless it is formidable. If a measure
goes through the committee, its chances of adoption are good. If the com-

8 See Dimock, Marshall E., Congressional Investigating Committees, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1929; McGeary, M. N., The Developments of Congressional Investigative Power,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.

458 Stat. 189.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 343

mittee is hostile, the measure is almost certain to die in spite of the occa-
sional invocation of the discharge rule to compel the committee to report
the bill.

Weakness of Legislative Discipline. Power is not only dispersed within
the representative body; beyond that, the individuals of influence also are
not necessarily in agreement with each other or with the dominant views
of the majority party. The choice of committee chairmen is ordinarily
determined by seniority of service, and the secret of success in Congress
lies in a combination of horse-sense, luck, and longevity. A committee
chairman, though belonging to the party headed by the President, may
therefore be completely at outs with the general policy of the government.
Thus, in a critical period in World War II, the chairman of the Senate
Military Affairs Committee was quite hostile toward the principal phases
of our defense policy.5 The major parties in House and Senate have dis-
covered no way to bring such dissenters into line with the general party
program or prevent their selection for committee posts. Nor has the House
or Senate found a way to discipline the few irresponsible members who
bring the lawmaking body as a whole into disrepute by stupid or dema-
gogic actions. So weak is legislative discipline, yet so strong is the spirit
of fraternity, that a member can scarcely provoke his brethren to raise their
voices in protest and in defense of the good name of Congress.

Legislative usages ensure that divergences of view exist between the
executive branch and at least some of the principal centers of power in
Congress. The rule of seniority tends to give committee chairmanships and
other positions of influence to members from sections most faithful to one
party. Members from such areas, Democratic or Republican, are likely
to have a different outlook on public policy than has the President, who
must orient his policy toward the middle of the road or politically doubtful
areas. But the actual pattern of power in Congress is both complicated
and kaleidoscopic. Only to authors of textbooks on civics are our legis-
latures simple affairs. The student of comparative institutions finds in
them elements of an English municipal council, with its close committee
relations with administrative agencies; the Chamber of Deputies of the
French Republic, with its individualism and shifting majorities; the House
of Commons, with its party solidarity — all interlarded with a liberum veto
of an indigenous variety.6

Because of the internal workings of Congress the actual pattern of re
lations between Congress and the executive branch is incredibly complex
For the purposes of the present analysis, it is essential to note the power
of the individual and of the small group within Congress with respect to

5 See Davis, Burke, "Senator Bob Reynolds: Retrospective View," Harper's, Vol. 186,
March, 1943, pp. 362-369.

6 One of the best single volumes on Congress is Roland Young's This Is Congress, New
York: Knopf, 1943.

344 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

the great mass of congressional business, and the diversity of policy views
among these centers of power.

2. CONTRADICTION OF INTEGRATION

Absence of Collective Administrative Responsibility. A basic concept
of administrative speculation of the past thirty years is that of integration.
The idea has organizational implications but it also includes the notion
that the chief executive must so direct the administrative agencies that
interagency conflict of objectives is minimized. Different agencies should
administer related programs in a complementary fashion and will do so
only by conscious top direction. The administrative structure is unified
under the chief executive. The general concept of integration also carries
with it the notion of unified legislative programs for administrative agencies.
Departments should move forward in the same direction as well as be
managed in their current operations in a coordinated manner. Examples
are legion. One agency should not promote inflationary spending while
another promotes deflationary taxation. Another should not try to drain
land for agricultural use while still another attempts to preserve the same
swamps as game habitats.

Congress, in its relations with the executive branch, tends to atomize
rather than integrate the administrative structure and public policy. A
factor of prime importance in this tendency is the practical absence of any
custom or sense of collective responsibility within the administrative estab-
lishment. Each department head must stand on his own feet. Important
blocs in Congress may conduct guerilla warfare against him. Ordinarily,
he must fight his own battle. His colleagues do not rally to his cause; they
are not endangered. If he is in the good graces of Congress at the moment,
he must shape his policy on the supposition that if he should run counter
to the interests of the legislators most concerned with his program, he would
have to fight for himself. The President will usually stand aloof, for in
the presidential system there is an element reminiscent of the constitu-
tional monarchy — the President must to some extent remain outside the
political fray.

The fact of individual responsibility is of the most profound admin-
istrative significance. It throws the agency head into the arms of the con-
gressional committees and blocs having a particular interest in the activities
of his agency, and puts him at the mercies of whatever groups are involved.
Administrative departments, both because of their internal drives and ex-
ternal affiliations, tend to be particularistic. Integration must proceed from
the President, and, to be effective, it must curb the departments and the
interests allied with them.

Under presidential leadership a great deal of administrative unification
may be accomplished on so-called noncontroversial matters. However, on
questions of basic importance the agency must sooner or later weigh the

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 345

advantages of faithfully going down the line of presidential policy against
the disadvantages of antagonizing a small but powerful group in Congress.
Thus, a Secretary of Agriculture who recognized that the consumer of
food has an interest in its price would probably be reprimanded from the
floor of Congress and be given rough treatment by the producer-minded
committees on agriculture. So he might merely pay lip service to an in-
tegrated economic policy.

Or, let us consider the various efforts by the President to unify operations
in the development and control of water resources. The Bureau of Reclama-
tion of the Interior Department and the Army Corps of Engineers are
great competitors in this field. Each has its allies in Congress. Only so
far and no farther can the President go in coordinating the two agencies,
because the friends of each unite to deny funds to the President to employ
staff for coordinating purposes. Under these conditions, the sense of col-
lective responsibility — the feeling that ours is a government rather than a
fortuitous grouping of departments — does not make itself strongly felt.
Yet such a consciousness is requisite for the development of the most ef-
fective coordination and integration of administrative operations.

Splintering Effects of Legislative-Executive Relations. The strong cen-
trifugal tendencies in an administrative structure organized to a large
extent on a clientele basis are reenforced by the dispersion of congressional
authority among many working centers. The practice of individual re-
sponsibility of department heads is one manifestation of the confluence of
these institutional and social factors. However, the splintering effects of
our system of congressional-executive relationships extend farther down
into the administrative machine. The position of department heads is often
weakened by direct dealings between Congress and the chiefs of depart-
mental subdivisions.

Hierarchical control within the departments is modified by a variety
of practices. Probably one of the most significant is the custom in con-
gressional criticism of placing the finger of responsibility on bureau chiefs
and other subordinates of department heads. Not infrequently speeches
of Congressmen or their press conferences ring with denunciations of
these subordinate departmental officials. Or, such officials receive congres-
sional praise for their wise and statesmanlike management of affairs. The
practice in either instance has the same effect — an erosion of intradepart-
mental controls. The general problem is well illustrated in a negative way
by the reply of the Chief of Naval Operations to a question by the Senate
Naval Affairs Committee on the Greer incident in 1941 :7

Q. Are there any reasons why the commanding officer and other
officers and men of the Greer should not appear before the committee?
If so, what are those reasons?

A. Yes. Testimony of such officers would be almost certain to dis-

7 Congressional Record, Vol. 87, p. 8314.

346 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

close vital military secrets which would endanger other naval vessels.
In addition, to establish a precedent or to have naval officers at sea feel
that whenever they take action they would or might be called before a
congressional investigating committee to explain and justify their action,
would be prejudicial to the conduct of operations on the high seas.

Legislative Dealings with Subordinate Personnel. Direct congressional
dealings with subordinates in the review of appropriation requests have
something of the same effect. The department head may put in a brief
appearance at the beginning of the hearings. However, members of Con-
gress prefer to talk with the men down the line who actually do the work,
and perhaps in the course of the interrogation give them instructions on
how the job ought or ought not to be done in the future.

A bureau chief is "strong" or "weak" in dealing with Congress — "on
the Hill." If "strong," he may be brought into line in an integrated de-
partmental program only with difficulty. Bureau chiefs may become quite
independent of the heads of their agencies insofar as broad policy is con-
cerned. This independence is usually associated with their status "on the
Hill" or with outside interest groups. Likewise, the manner in which
appropriations are sometimes made may have a similar effect. The appro-
priation may be made to a particular bureau rather than to the department.
Under these conditions, departmental — and occasionally presidential — di-
rection may be met by the reply: "But we are responsible to Congress for
the manner in which this program is carried out."8

The close connections between members of Congress and bureau chiefs
frequently promote stability and continuity in policy and are by no means
invariably detrimental to the general welfare. These relations, however,
make it difficult for the President or Congress to hold department heads
accountable for the management of their affairs. Bureau chiefs and senior
legislators are the cream of the career crop in the federal government.
Both groups are likely to regard Presidents and department heads as tran-
sient trespassers. Probably the greatest resistance to direction by depart-
ment heads is to be found in the highly professionalized services — in
particular, the military services. It is indeed an unusual Secretary of the
Navy or Secretary of War who can make much of an impress upon his
department.

Congressional supervision of departments occasionally extends to mass
examination of the qualifications, antecedents, and affiliations of subordin-
ate personnel. Such inquiries may be quite impersonal witch-hunting
expeditions with no specific animosity toward any particular employee. In
some instances congressional reaction reaches the point of formal measures

8 On the general question of congressional control of executive agencies, see Herring,
Pendleton, "Executive-Legislative Responsibilities/' American Political Science Review, 1944,
Vol. 38, pp. 1153-65.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 347

to ensure the discharge of designated individuals.9 These practices have
an insidious effect on the work of subordinate personnel. An employee's
spine may become spaghetti-like when there exists the possibility of his
being, in effect, blacklisted for federal employment through denunciation
by individual lawmakers simply for doing his duty.

Subtler Legislative Influences. All these interferences with hierarchical
control have been described in a manner which colors the exposition to a
degree with exaggeration. In reality, the tendencies are more subtle and
more difficult to identify than our discussion might lead us to believe. The
significance of these practices may be best comprehended by comparison
with the customs of British cabinet government. The responsible minister
is the man who must answer on the floor of Parliament for the misdeeds
of his department. He cannot dodge the brickbats, and, in compensation,
he has a monopoly of the bouquets. He can be held accountable only if
he alone can hold his subordinates accountable. He therefore must make,
or appear to make, the policy decisions. The concentration of criticism
upon the responsible minister has a most pervasive intradepartmental effect
in tightening up the internal lines of control, supervision, and communi-
cation.10 All this, of course, is not the same as saying that the United States

9 See Cushman, Robert E., "The Purge of Federal Employees Accused of Disloyalty,"
Public Administration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, pp. 297-316; Schuman, Frederick L., '"Bill of
Attainder' in the Seventy -Eighth Congress," American Political Science Review, 1943, Vol. 37,
pp. 819-29. Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 provided: "No
part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund (1) which is made available under or pursuant
to this act, or (2) which is now, or which is hereafter made, available under or pursuant to
any other act, to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, shall be
used, after November 15, 1943, to pay any part of the salary, or other compensation for the
personal services, of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr., and Robert Morss Lovett,
unless prior to such date such person has been appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. . . ." With the approval of their respective superiors these
three men continued to perform their duties after November 15, 1943, and sued to collect their
salaries. The Court of Claims upheld their claim for compensation. The opinion of the court,
delivered by the Chief Justice and concurred in by one judge, held that the act did not operate
to remove the plaintiffs from office and that they were entitled to collect. In separate opinions
concurring in the result, the other judges of the court went further and asserted that the
congressional action was unconstitutional. Different judges, however, had different reasons for
considering the provision invalid. The Supreme Court held Sec. 304 void; U. S. v. Lovett,
Watson, and Dodd, June 3, 1946.

10 In 1943 a Canadian labor leader attacked the chairman of the War Prices and Trade
Board, characterizing him as "Canada's No. 1 Nazi." The chairman was a subordinate of the
Minister of Finance and was thus comparable to a bureau chief or other similar subordinate
official in the United States. It is difficult to conceive of an editorial like the following being
published as a consequence of such an incident in the United States:

"This we suggest is a case where a word is needed from some voice in the Government.
This Montreal labor man is more likely than not an irresponsible flannel -mouth; speaking no
more for labor than for the rest of us. The trouble is that thousands of people throughout the
country may not consider him a flannel-mouth, will take what he says seriously. . . .

"Mr. Gordon and the* War Prices Board are merely an administrative agency. They do
not make laws; they administer them. They carry out duties and functions given them by
Parliament and the Government, and for which Parliament and the Government must take full
responsibility.

348 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

should have a cabinet government. It is only a means of illuminating by
contrast the character of the influences at work under a system of separa-
tion of powers.

Grants of Organizational Independence. In some types of situations,
action by Congress has more direct effects in the atomization of adminis-
tration than the more or less subtle influences described. Examples fre-
quently occur in connection with organization. Thus, legislation which
establishes a function independent of the department to which it might
fall in the normal course has long-term administrative consequences. The
new agency, uninfluenced by such forces of integration as flow from in-
corporation into a department, is left free to pursue its own inclinations.
More important, it is likely to be politically weak, especially dependent on
interest-group support, and unable to take a strong stand in its dealings with
legislative blocs. It may become something of an administrative orphan,
buffeted about by the political storms.

In the independent regulatory commission there occurs the most striking
splintering of administration by legislative action. In a deliberate effort to
make them independent of the chief executive, such agencies are declared
to be "responsible" to Congress. The fact of the matter is that they are
responsible to no one. They may keep their ears close to congressional com-
mittees, but Congress is not organized to enforce a continuing responsi-
bility.

The chances are that a regulatory commission dealing with a single
industry will be more nearly responsible to the industry than to the legis-
lature. Deprived of the influences on policy that flow from give-and-take
with other departments and from the directions of the chief executive, the
independent commission gravitates toward an industry point of view. More
or less from necessity it seeks to retain the confidence of the regulated in-
dustry. Indeed, the theory on which the commissions are based makes it
impracticable for them to collaborate with the chief executive or other execu-
tive agencies in the development of a unified policy. Their quasi-judicial
procedure renders it improper for them to commit themselves to a general

"In England there is an old, well-established tradition under which members of the Cabinet
take responsibility for — and defend — the acts of their officials. It is an integral part of the
principle — also observed scrupulously — under which officials themselves make no statements on
policy, and engage in no public controversy.

"That principle should operate in Canada. Our cabinet ministers, and the Government as
a whole, cannot be permitted to take credit to themselves, for the prices ceiling and the War
Prices Board, yet remain silent, let others take the blame, when officials of the War Prices
Board are abused and vilified.

"In the circumstances, we suggest it is up to the appropriate member of the Cabinet to
tell the country that if there is dictatorship under the War Prices Board Administration the
dictatorship belongs to the Government, or to Parliament; that if any charge of 'Nazism* be
made it should be made against the Government and Parliament. In other words, whatever
responsibility exists should be fixed properly." Ottawa Morning Journal, September 3, 1943.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 349

policy lest they thereby prejudice themselves in the determination of par-
ticular cases.

All in all, the legislative forces playing on the administrative structure
contribute to disintegration in management. In effect legislators seek to
exercise piecemeal the function of direction over administration. Legis-
lators who are jealous of chief executives, either in particular or in general,
find this a congenial role. In reality, however, legislative control is most
effective when all administration is sufficiently integrated. In appropria-
tions, for example, lawmaking bodies are most effective when the chief
executive presents a well-considered and carefully-pruned budget. Under
such conditions, the estimates become a tool of legislative oversight.11

In other areas, legislative influences on administration are generated in no
slight measure from the weakness of the chief executive. The power of the
chief executive is usually described in awesome terms. In actual fact, the
administrative apparatus at his command to aid him in knowing what is
going on below his level and in guiding operations is quite inadequate.
This is in part the result of legislative jealousy of the executive, but what-
ever the origin, the lawmaking branch moves in to occupy as well as it
may the administrative vacuum.

3. DIFFUSION OF INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Executive Share in Policy-Making. Legislation fixes the scope of ad-
ministrative power and to a large degree the manner of its exercise. Laws
must be constantly adjusted to meet changed conditions and to reflect ex-
perience in their application. The administration in power must inevitably
have an important share in the formulation of legislative measures. In
our executive-legislative relationships we have made little provision for an
honest recognition of this necessity.

Administrators participate in the formulation of legislation, but their
activities are to a degree surreptitious and always subject to the accusation
of constitutional immorality. If the chief executive proposes legislation, he
is charged in many instances with attempting to coerce a coequal govern-
mental organ and of leading the nation along the road to dictatorship. He
may find it advisable to refrain from action when he should exercise strong
leadership. On the other hand, since he will risk little if Congress rejects
his proposal, he may urge legislation which he knows Congress will not
enact. Thereby he gains credit with some sectors of the population. Simi-
larly, he may ease his duty by placing a problem before Congress and
leaving to that body the unhappy choice of means to solve the problem. Or
he may for a long time neglect an urgent problem and present to Congress
no proposed solution. No legislature is able to develop and put into effect

11 See Smith, Harold D., "The Budget as an Instrument of Legislative Control and' Execu-
tive Management," Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp. 181-188.

350 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

a comprehensive legislative program on its own initiative. Nor does it have
any recourse against the chief executive if he fails to exercise leadership.

Desertions From the President's Program. Our unhappy state of execu-
tive-legislative relationships in the formulation and adoption of general pro-
grams results in halting and uneven progress in the adaptation of the legal
framework within which administration must operate. The legislative pro-
gram of the chief executive no less than the administrative structure tends
to be devoid of unity. Administrative drives to unify the legislative program
encounter the obstacle of relatively weak internal direction as well as the
check of strong ties between particular departments, groups, and blocs
within Congress. Each department head prefers to be free to promote his
own legislative objectives in Congress. In turn he is encouraged in this
preference by Congressional protagonists of his agency.

Freedom of departmental initiative in appropriation matters is limited by
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which prohibits federal depart-
ments from seeking funds in sums larger than those recommended by the
President in his annual budget or any supplement. Administrative agencies,
however, can usually manage to get their wishes on record through the in-
terposition of friendly Congressmen. The situation is illustrated by the fol-
lowing interchange in 1945 between Mr. Tarver, a member of the House
Appropriations Committee, and Mr. Jones, the War Food Administrator:

Mr. Tarver: ... I have noted with a great deal of misgiving this pro-
posal of the Budget to cut down A. A. A. funds to $290,000,000 and to
provide for a further cut in the next fiscal year to $200,000,000. . . . Do
you feel that that is a wise course of procedure? If not, what are the
reasons which cause you to arrive at your conclusion?

Mr. Jones: I can only give you my personal opinion on those matters
because we submit our requests to the Bureau of the Budget, and, of
course, the official Budget then comes up to Congress by way of an
estimate. I do not hesitate to give you my personal opinion on these
matters if you wish me to do so. ...

Mr. Tarver: I would be very glad to have you do so.

Mr. Jones: I think it would be very unfortunate if through a reduc-
tion in funds, especially at this critical period of the war, the A. A. A.
is handicapped.

I would like to see, if it were left to me personally, full provision made
by direct appropriation for soil-conservation payments. They have paid
great dividends. There is no question about it.

Mr. Tarver: You mean for $300,000,000?

Mr. Jones: Yes. That is what I personally would prefer. I am giving
you just my personal viewpoint.12

In other instances, the battle to upset the President's budgetary recommenda-
tions may be carried by private organizations which are in very close
contact with the administrative agencies.

12 House Committee on Appropriations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on Agriculture
Department Appropriation Bill for 1946, pt. 2, p. 10, 1945.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL J5l

In matters other than appropriations, federal agencies are subject to the
requirement that they clear with the Bureau of the Budget proposed legisla-
tion and comments on legislative proposals. The clearance process serves the
purpose of determining whether the views of the agency are in accord with
the program of the President. Formal agency statements to Congress are
supposed to include an indication of the relationship of the matter in ques-
tion to the President's program. The procedure results in a modification of
some legislative ambitions of individual agencies and an early death to
many of their proposals.13 Yet the practice of coordination of such legisla-
tive urges into a systematic and consistent program is only in a relatively
embryonic form. Further development will require a much more tightly
knit management of the executive branch than has been the custom. More-
over, there is some doubt whether such a condition can be brought about
until Congress itself ceases to encourage autonomous departmental initiative
in legislation.

Inadequate Legislation. Absence of cohesion in the legislative program
of the chief executive — absence in fact of a program clearly designated as
such — contributes mightily to confusion in the public mind, to submission
of ill-considered legislative proposals, and to poor administration. Legis-
lative schemes emerging from the departments are often ill-conceived and
inadequately thought through. Not infrequently the scheme worked out in
a single department raises a variety of questions about its relationship to
other governmental activities. In fact, Congress has to devote a great deal
of its energies to the settlement of interagency disputes on issues of no over-
whelming public importance which might very well be settled within the
administrative establishment.

Our ineffective linking of the administrative and legislative processes
has important consequences in the operation of the executive branch. Per-
haps one of the most significant is the necessity of operating under inade-
quate or inappropriate legislation which hampers or limits administration
or makes it ineffective or unduly costly. Government agencies hesitate
to seek modifications from Congress. They will rather indulge in im-
provisations and patiently endure the oddest kinds of legal limitation. The
reason is obvious. They never know what will emerge from the legislative
mill once it begins to turn. Except for the most important questions on
which broad public discussion and understanding may be brought to bear,
the administrative tendency is to limp along on the existing legal basis,
no matter how unsatisfactory it may be. It is regarded as better than to
arouse sleeping dogs.

13 See the testimony of F. J. Bailey, Chief of the Division of Legislative Reference, Bureau
of the Budget, in House Committee on the Civil Service, Hearings pursuant to H. Res. 16,
pt. 2, pp. 359-373, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943. See also Witte, E. E., 'The Preparation of
Proposed Legislative Measures by Administrative Departments," in President's Committee on
Administrative Management, Report with Special Sttidies, p. 361 #., Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1937.

352 LEGISLATIVE CONTOOL

Incongruity Between Power and Responsibility. The basic fact is that
we have an institutional system which does not assure that administration
will have power commensurate with its responsibility. Take, for instance,
the following remarks of Senator Connally in 1940 during the considera-
tion of a proposal to establish a joint congressional committee on national
defense, whose consent would have been required before the President
might make expenditures from an emergency fund for national defense:

I want to perform my responsibility in this crisis or emergency. I
want to fill the place in my country that my countrymen think I should
fill, and perform whatever duty is laid upon me; but I do not want to
take over somebody else's function or somebody else's responsibility.
Give the President this $100,000,000. He has the responsibility; but if
we hamper him, if we impede him, if we embarrass him with a smelling
committee, we lessen his responsibilities. He can very easily say, *I
undertook to discharge this function, but every time I sought to dis-
charge it, I had to run up to the Capitol and talk to some Members of
the House and some Senators who could not make up their minds, who
delayed, who hindered, and who undertook to interject into the theories
of the War and Navy Department policies which I did not regard as
wise or sound/14

Questions of like character are implicit in almost every important legis-
lative proposal. Perhaps one of the reasons why we so often have incon-
gruity between power and responsibility is that Congress has no routine
means by which it can hold the executive branch accountable for the exer-
cise of its power. A chief executive cannot say to Congress: "I refuse to
accept responsibility for results on the terms imposed by Congress. I resign
and yield the control of government to the opposition." Actions of Con-
gress— keeping in mind that Congress for all practical purposes means this
bloc, this committee, and even this member — thus are not fraught with the
danger that its chickens will come home to roost.

The legislative bloc from livestock-producing states, for instance, which
succeeds in raising the price of meat, is not likely to be placed in charge of
distribution and have to cope with the complaints of processors and con-
sumers. The Congressman who succeeds in discrediting the Federal Com-
munications Commission is not likely to have an opportunity to demon-
strate that he can do any better in regulating the broadcasting industry.
The congressional group which succeeds in boosting the price of milk will
not in the normal course of events have to listen to disgruntled urban
housewives.

Legislators and Administrators. The administrator and the legislator
move in different environments and are subjected to different influences.
The administrator often derives moral satisfaction from the fact that he
looks at public issues in a context different from that in which they are
viewed by the legislator. He — so the theory runs — considers issues in terms

14 Congressional Record, Vol. 86, p. 6593.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 353

of the national welfare, while the legislator views them as they bear on his
state or district. In this contrast, which contains at least a grain of truth,
the administrator has no cause for self-congratulation. The difference arises
from the institutional structure. The voters elect their representatives to
look out for their interests. A Senator from Nevada cannot very well be a
statesman on the silver issue, just as a Representative from a coal-mining
district cannot for long neglect the interests of his constituents. Moreover,
administrators themselves have their prejudices. The Department of Agri-
culture or the Department of Labor and those who manage them are not
free from bias in the definition of the national interest.

The interaction between legislature and administration, with the accom-
panying division of power, makes it quite difficult to place responsibility
for action or inaction. The legislator can tell his constituents that he does
his best to keep the bureaucrats from doing so many foolish things. The
administrator can assert that he is doing as well as he can with the obstacles
placed in his path by Congress. And both may be right.

From the newspapers we may gain the impression that legislators are
an irresponsible lot, solely concerned with promoting the selfish causes of
their own districts. The picture is far from correct. Every Congress has
many members who labor earnestly, diligently, soberly, and steadily to pro-
mote the general welfare, as they see it. Their activities are far overshad-
owed in the press by the reports of the animadversions of their more pic-
turesque or picaresque colleagues. The heavy routine work of the legislator
does not produce headlines. Wild charges do. Thus, criticism by Congress
of the executive branch takes on a fantastic character. Since such criticism
is not in face-to-face debate, the most fabulous allegations may be made
with no one to question them.

The more incredible a story, the more attention it may receive in the
press; such is often the editorial standard of what constitutes news. Nor
does the public receive informative reporting. Thus, a news lead may read:
" 'The Washington corn policy constitutes a deliberate and calculated effort
by this power-hungry government to drive the farmers into bankruptcy,'
Senator Doakes of Illiana charged today. 'It is another step on the road to
dictatorship along which we are being carried. It is what one can expect
when the Department of Agriculture is staffed with Phi Beta Kappas who
have never slopped a hog.' "

More accurate reporting might make the story read: "The corn policy
was denounced by Senator Doakes of Illiana. The Senator, a member of
the minority party, owns three corn farms, comes from a state in which
corn-growing is the principal industry and will be up for reelection this
fall. He spoke from a manuscript prepared at the national headquarters of
the Corn Growers League of which he is a past president. Seven Senators
were on the floor at the time; they appeared to be unperturbed by his
remarks."

354 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

The continuing and inevitable attempts of Congress to manage the busi-
ness of administration diffuse responsibility and confuse the public. In strict
administrative theory there is usually nothing but condemnation for the
interferences of Congress with administration — interventions which are
usually in terms of particular cases or local interests rather than of general
principle. Congress— the textbooks argue— should limit itself to action on
general rules; then the individual cases would take care of themselves. In
some respects, however, the very fact that lawmakers do criticize and inter-
vene in specific cases and local situations makes their attacks a valuable
corrective to administrative generalization.

It is sometimes forgotten that ours is after all a huge country with citizens
living and working under an almost infinite variety of conditions. There
is in administration an almost inevitable tendency to reduce action to gen-
eral rules and to treat all individual situations as if they were alike. Legis-
lators, in their capacity as ambassadors for their constituents, intercede in
individual situations and demand adaptation of administrative practices to
fit the situation. It is not enough to dismiss this function of legislators by say-
ing that they intervene regardless of the justice of the cause of their con-
stituent. Generally they have a higher sense of responsibility than that;
and since they cannot be ignored they may and often do bring about many
correctives of administrative action. Wisdom in government is not so much
the formulation of just, general rules as the making of judicious exceptions
therefrom.15

4. QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Selecting Department Heads. Legislative supremacy means that the
lawmaking body has power both to choose the principal executive officers
and to terminate their services. The American constitutional system does
not formally provide for legislative supremacy. The selection and tenure of
the President are not determined by legislative action, although by virtue of
their role in party affairs Senators and Representatives may make themselves
felt in the choice of presidential nominees. On the other hand, the Presi-
dent as party leader is not without influence in the selection of members
of the House and Senate.

Nevertheless, once elected, neither the President nor Congress can for-
mally influence the tenure of office of the other. The status of subordinate
executive officers is different from that of the President. There is a con-
tinuing effort by Congress to exert control over their appointment and
tenure. These efforts are based in part on the formal powers of Congress —
such as the power of the Senate to confirm presidential nominations to cer-
tain offices. In most instances, however, the legislature seeks to determine

16 For extended treatment of the problems touched on here, see Herring, Pendleton, Presi-
dential Leadership, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1940; Laski, Harold J., The American
Presidency, New York: Harper, 1940.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 355

the top personnel of the executive branch by indirection. The President
also has to choose. When two governmental organs attempt to select the
holders of the same offices, conflict is inevitable.

The power to designate and discharge the principal executive officers is
probably the most effective means of controlling administration. Both the
chief executive and the legislature have a variety of devices for determining
what is to be done and how it is to be done. However, it is far easier to
guide the general direction of administrative business by the choice of chief
officers whose viewpoints are of the desired type. Congress wants to in-
fluence these choices. Its efforts subside and flare up from time to time as
the general temperature of attitudes toward the chief executive fluctuates.

In a broad sense, our principal executive and administrative officers must
retain the confidence of Congress just as the ministers in a responsible cab-
inet system must have the confidence of Parliament to remain in office.
Ours, of course, is not a responsible cabinet system, nor is it equipped with
the parliamentary procedures for expressing confidence or lack of confi-
dence. Nevertheless, considerations of legislative confidence play a signifi-
cant part in the selection and continuance in office of personnel at the top
levels of the departments.

In the selection of agency heads, a long tradition concedes to the Presi-
dent fairly final discretion in the choice of the members of his Cabinet.
Spectacular instances of senatorial refusal to assent to such presidential
appointments merely confirm the general rule of presidential finality. Yet
in making even these appointments, the President must be mindful of the
probable attitudes of Congress toward prospective appointees.

Lower-Level Appointments. Legislative influence on appointments be-
low the level of the Cabinet is on the whole more potent and more per-
suasive. The interest of Senators in appointments to positions in the "little
cabinet" and to top positions in agencies not of Cabinet status has tradition-
ally been of a patronage character. The desire has been to place in these
positions persons who have rendered service to the party, and the actions of
Presidents are ordinarily colored by the same inclinations. Hence, the
usual problem of reconciling senatorial and presidential preferences has
been simply that of allocating positions among the various factions of the
party in a manner to provoke the minimum dissatisfaction.

When tension over issues is high, however, senatorial influence may be
exerted to prevent the appointment of candidates with policy views con-
trary to those held by the dominant coalition in the Senate. Thus, in 1945,
the nomination of Aubrey Williams — previously an officer of the Works
Progress Administration, former administrator of the National Youth Ad-
ministration, subsequently an employee of the National Farmers Union, and
regarded by many as considerably left of center — to be Rural Electrification
Administrator precipitated a heated senatorial debate. His competence for
the job was certainly as adequate as that of most candidates ordinarily nomi-

356 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

nated to fill such offices. The debate was rather on the policy issues implicit
in the appointment of one of his views. That such debates occur so rarely
is an indication of the effectiveness of senatorial influence in screening out
possibilities unacceptable to the Senate prior to nomination.

Occasionally, control of the top personnel is achieved in effect by deci-
sions that deprive particular individuals of control over particular functions.
Thus, in 1945 when the President nominated Henry Wallace to be Secre-
tary of Commerce, a measure was initiated in the Senate to remove the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and its subsidiaries from the Depart-
ment of Commerce. The southern right wing of the Democratic Party in
coalition with the Republicans succeeded in preventing direction of these
important corporations by Mr. Wallace. Although cleavages within the
Democratic Party were the dominant factor in this situation, the event
was not without its instructive aspects on congressional-executive relations
generally. Senator George, the sponsor of the bill of divorcement, stated:

... I think the vast powers and vast authority given [to the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation] is the strongest possible argument that
anyone can make for the return, or for the hastening of the return, of
these powers to an independent agency of the Government created by
the Congress and responsible to the Congress. . . .

I am firmly of the opinion, myself, that as we follow through the
mobilization period to the end of the war, whenever it may come, and
as we also enter into and follow through the reconversion period, that
this direct responsibility ought to be recognized by the Congress and
ought not to be placed, or continued, in an officer in the executive branch
of the Government who is a part of the official family, so to speak, of the
Chief Executive of the Nation.16

Attempted Extension of Senatorial Confirmation. Control by Senators
and Representatives of appointments further down the administrative
hierarchy has differed from time to time with the waxing and waning of
the spoils system. Our traditions have accorded great influence to Senators
and Representatives in appointments to the public service. During this cen-
tury, however, with the strengthening of the merit system, large blocks of
employees have been removed from the realm of congressional patronage.17

Apart from informal "clearance" of appointments with Representatives
and Senators, Congress on occasion attempts to broaden its formal control
by the extension of senatorial confirmation to large numbers of lower posi-
tions. Thus, under various work relief appropriation acts from 1935 to 1942,
senatorial confirmation was required for federal appointments as state and
regional administrators receiving more than $5,000 annually. Scattered statu-
tory provisions of similar purport were placed in various war agency appro-

16 Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearings on S. 375, p. 10, 79th Cong., 1st Sess..
January 24 and 25, 1945.

17 See the excellent study by Fowler, Dorothy Ganficld, "Congressional Dictation of Local
Appointments," Journal of Politics, 1945, Vol. 7, pp. 25-57.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 357

priation acts. One act applying to the War Manpower Commission stipu-
lated, for example, that no one might be appointed at a salary of over $4,500
save by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The actual
administrative consequences of the requirement of confirmation have never
been carefully analyzed. Certainly in some situations the result is that a
Senator may have at least a veto over important administrative actions
within his state.

The debate in 1943 over a proposal to extend the confirmation require-
ment to all employees receiving in excess of $4,500 a year illuminates the
theoretical problems of administration involved in legislative control of
appointments. Some Senators indicated a desire to prevent abuses such as
the payment of excessive salaries to unqualified individuals. Others thought
that by having a hand in the selection of subordinate personnel, the Senate
might gain a greater voice in the policies of administrative agencies. Sen-
ator Vandenburg asserted that "this is one of the few ways in which Con-
gress can reach back into the implementing of its delegated powers, and
have something to say and do by way of limitation of the sprawling
bureaucracy which is the curse of our present-day democracy." On the
other hand, the President asserted that the bill "presupposes congressional
responsibility for the operations of executive agencies." If the power of
appointment of subordinate personnel were divided between the Senate and
department heads, he saw a dissipation of responsibility for the success of
an agency's program.18

Removal Power. Control of personnel includes the power to remove as
well as to influence selection. Congress has no ready and easy method by
which it can remove officials whose attitudes or policies are not to its liking.
The power of impeachment is a blunderbuss of no utility. The power to
specify that no funds shall be available for the employment of particular
individuals has been used in scattered instances against relatively unimpor-
tant employees of the executive branch. But there is no clean-cut method
by which the legislature can simply say, "We have nothing against you per-
sonally. Nor do we question your competence or your Americanism. Our
views on what the policy of your department should be are not the same
as yours. You are fired." The lack of workable means for the removal by
Congress of executive officers is, of course, merely the corollary of independ-
ence of the chief executive— the glory or the fatal defect of the American
system of government, depending on the point of view.

Nevertheless, a determined legislature can virtually drive a man from
office, although not without considerable vituperation and recrimination.
Exposure of corruption and the consequent forced resignation of an execu.
tive officer occasionally occur. Resignations on account of incompatibility
either of personality or policy between Congress and an individual officer

18 Sec the analysis by Macmahon, Arthur W., "Senatorial Confirmation," Public Adminis-
tration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, pp. 281-296.

358 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

are better indications of the fundamental legislative as well as executive
tendency to seek relationships of confidence. Occasionally congressional in-
vestigations appear to have as their primary objective the removal of an
executive officer. That is, the investigation is certainly not designed to de-
velop legislation; nor is it motivated by a search for corruption. It aims
to oust an individual whose views arouse the animosity of the legislators
spearheading the investigation.

Legislative Pressure for Resignation. By its control over appropriations
the lawmaking body can make an official quite uncomfortable. In some
instances arbitrary cuts in budget estimates are made because of congres-
sional dislike of an individual, disagreement with his policies, or other re-
lated reasons. The pressure is thus on him to resign lest by continuance
in office he will damage the agency which he heads or serves. In other
cases, by persistent criticism from the floor, by frequent adoption of limit-
ing legislation, and by similar means an official may be thoroughly persuaded
that his period of usefulness is ended. Congress is most effective in its
efforts to terminate the services of a particular individual when it has sup-
port in the press and the public generally. A common pattern of behavior
is that the executive branch attempts to weather the congressional storm.
Then, perhaps in the wake of a "moral" victory, a resignation occurs after
things have quieted down. The formality of executive independence is
preserved but the actuality of legislative discharge prevails.19

No matter who is President or what the conditions of the time are,
Congress exerts influence over the selection of the principal administrative
officers. Harmonious relations between the chief executive and the legisla-
ture do not indicate the absence of congressional participation in appoint-
ments. This general condition may only reflect careful consideration of con-
gressional wishes. Legislative attitudes become more apparent when differ-
ences of policy exist between the President and Congress. During Democratic
administrations the conservative wing of the party usually is in a position
to make its divergent views strongly felt because of its strength in the Sen-
ate. Similarly, during Republication administrations the western liberal wing
of the party makes itself felt because of a like advantageous position in the
same body.

5. DRIVES TOWARD REFORM

Of prescriptions to cure the ills of Congress there is no dearth. Hopeful
souls come forward at moments when they can gain a hearing and attempt
to market their cures for Congress. A massive sales resistance usually meets
their offerings, which are often based on faulty diagnoses. The principal
error in diagnosis made by reformers is that they approach Congress in iso-
lation from the rest of the government. The basic issues involve the struc-

19 See the penetrating case study by Leigh, Robert D., "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats," Harper's
Magazine, Vol. 190, January, 1945, pp. 97-105.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 359

ture of the entire government rather than Congress alone. They are almost
invariably associated with the fundamental principle of separation of
powers.

Case for Cabinet Government. Outright adoption of the principle of
cabinet responsibility has been strongly urged by a few students of gov-
ernment,20 but sentiment in support of such a move is not nearly so strong
as it once was. The British system in its current usages has come to be
recognized as something radically different from the older conceptions of
that system. Furthermore, the manner in which it would operate under
American conditions is quite unpredictable.21

The transplantation of the cabinet system would deprive us of the
strength that inheres in the presidency, and might produce the instability as-
sociated with the French parliamentary system rather than arrangements
sifiilar to those of Great Britain and the Dominions. Moreover, it would
necessitate a drastic revision of the working relationships between our two
legislative chambers and the consequent decline of the strength accorded in
our federal system to the states with small populations. Whatever our prog-
nosis of the results of adopting the cabinet system may be, the likelihood of
such action is remote. We must work out our constitutional problems
within the framework of the system of separation of powers. As a measure
of conservative experimentation, we can only suggest that it might be
worthwhile to try out the cabinet arrangement in one or two states to see
how it would operate under American conditions.

The drive for congressional reform has its peaks and its valleys. The
policies of the Roosevelt administrations in depression and war stimulated un-
usual agitation among both members of Congress and citizens for a thorough-
going reconsideration of the function anc1 role of Congress. With proposals
for the purely internal reorganization of the legislative process, we have no
concern here. However, the various suggestions for alteration of the rela-
tionships between the legislative and executive branches are of interest in
throwing light on the general problem dealt with in this chapter.

Merits of a Question Period. Representative Estes Kefauver of Tennessee
attracted considerable attention by his proposal to introduce a "question
period," modeled on British practice, when heads of executive agencies
would appear before the House of Representatives to reply to questions of
which they had received advance notice.22 Such an arrangement would
permit members of the Cabinet and the heads of other agencies to answer
criticisms and explain policies. Appearance of executive officers before the
entire House would limit the monopoly of information which committees

20 See, for example, the persuasive study by Hazlitt, Henry, A New Constitution Now,
New York: Whittlesey, 1942.

21 For critical observations, see Price, Don K., "The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems,"
Public Administration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, pp. 317-334.

^ Sec Kefauver, Estes, "The Need for Better Executive-Legislative Teamwork in the
National Government," American Political Snencr Rrpteu', 1944, Vol. 38, pp. 317-325.

360 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

tend to have of subjects within their jurisdiction. This might somewhat
weaken the committees. It is not without significance that many of the
"older heads" within the House — those who hold committee chairmanships
and other positions of leadership — were strongly opposed to the Kefauver
proposal. Conversely, the chief proponents of such measures tend to be
newer members of Congress who have little opportunity to utilize their
talents because of their lack of seniority.

Legislative Committee Meetings with Administrators. A variety of
other schemes are suggested from time to time to produce a closer liaison
between Congress and the administrative departments. Thus, it is proposed
that individual legislators meet at frequent intervals with their opposite
numbers in the executive branch to consider forthcoming problems, to in-
form Congress, and to bring the views of Congress to the executive officer
concerned. This kind of arrangement is occasionally formalized for a tirfe
by particular committees.

While closer relationships between executive officials and legislative com-
mittees are in some ways advantageous, they also may contribute to the dis-
integration of administration. Congressional committees tend to be en-
thusiasts for the matters with which they deal. The public interest is not
necessarily better promoted by giving, for example, the committees on agri-
culture in either chamber a stronger voice in the management of the
Department of Agriculture than they now have.

Legislative Staffs. Better staffing of Congress is another favorite attack
on the problem.23 This is to serve two purposes: to aid the legislator in
handling his legislative business; and to aid him in handling his constitu-
ents' business. A more or less professionalized class of congressional secreta-
ries has been developed consisting of men and women who "know" Wash-
ington and who run the errands that inevitably are the lot of legislators,
not always unsolicited. More significant issues are raised by the need for
assistance to the legislator in his legislative business.

In the staffing of congressional committees it is sometimes assumed that
by this means the legislature can do directly many things which the execu-
tive branch should do. We can make ourselves felt — so the speculation runs
— if we have staff to help us dig into the bureaucracies. When intelligently
used, expert staff can make Congress much more effective. However, by
overstaffing Congress we run the danger of merely setting up another
bureaucracy "on the Hill" to do a job which, if it is not already being done
elsewhere, ought to be. The contribution of the lawmaker in the govern-
mental process is not in the exercise of professional expertness. If he merely
mouths what his experts tell him, we lose important values of representative
government.

23 Sec, for example, Heller, Robert, Strengthening the Congress, Washington: National
Planning Association, 1944; Hamilton, Walton, "Blueprint for a Virile Congress," New York
Times Magazine, September 10, 1944.

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 361

Making Legislative Wort^ Manageable. These remarks suggest that one
of the most important currents of reform is that of drawing the line between
what the legislative body ought to do and what it ought to demand that the
executive branch do well. No matter how much staff it builds up, Con-
gress cannot make all the decisions of government unless we change radi-
cally the nature of our system. To make its job manageable, Congress
needs to slough off a mass of minutiae which now absorbs its time and
energies. One means by which it might shift a great volume of work to the
executive branch would be through adoption of the British provisional
order system — that is, rules and regulations made by the executive agencies
would become effective within a specified time unless Congress decided to
the contrary.

The most notable example of the use of this technique in the United
States was under the Reorganization Acts of 1939 and 1945, which empow-
ered the President to submit so-called reorganization plans to become ef-
fective unless disapproved by concurrent resolution. Over many subjects,
this arrangement would actually reserve for Congress more substantial control
than it now possesses, especially under legislation empowering an agency to
regulate an industry in "the public interest." In the exercise of such powers,
executive officers would also often be much more comfortable if their actions
were subject to general congressional review. The endless criticism for ex-
ceeding legislative grants of power might be effectively terminated, and
policy questions which probably ought to have congressional approval would
not be settled finally by the executive branch, as they now are.

A recent proposal has been aimed at the establishment of a Joint Execu-
tive-Legislative Cabinet. It would consist of perhaps nine congressional
leaders and nine members of the executive Cabinet. It would be presided
over by the President. This arrangement would undertake to maintain
agreement on the principal lines of policy and legislation. In the event of
a deadlock between himself and Congress, the President could dissolve the
legislature and order a new election.24

Many variations of the foregoing proposals have been made,25 and the
entire range of possibilities was explored by a joint committee set up by
Congress late in 1944.20 There are those who believe that adoption of one
or more of these schemes would ensure peace and harmony in executive-

2* See Finlettcr, Thomas K., Can Representative Government Do the Job?, New York:
Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945.

25 See the useful survey in The Reorganization of Congress, A Report of the Committee
on Congress of the American Political Science Association, Washington: Public Affairs Press,
1945.

26 See Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, First Progress Report, Sen. Doc.
No. 36, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. The hearings before the joint committee constitute a valuable
source of information about the workings of Congress; Hearings before the Joint Committee on
the Organization of Congress pursuant to H. Con. Res. No. 18, 1945, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
The committee's final report appeared as House Report No. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.. March
4, 1946.

362 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

legislative relationships. That celestial state of affairs will probably never
come about because executive-legislative differences often boil down to the
issue of who will rule. That issue cannot be settled without doing violence
to the theory of separation of powers, which presupposes that Congress
and the President share the power to rule. Friction is inevitable and, we
might add, probably desirable within proper bounds. Nevertheless, much
senseless controversy could be eliminated if administrators exerted more
persistent and more intelligent efforts to keep legislators informed of the
affairs of state and, in turn, to inform themselves of the views of legislators.

Part III
WORKING METHODS

CHAPTER

The Formulation of Administrative Policy

1. POLICY FORMATION AND POLICY SANCTION

Realm of Administrative Policy. The primary organ of policy sanction
is the legislature. In the main, it lays down policy in general terms. For
purposes of effective government such general policy, usually expressed in
statutes, must be made more specific. This is done by administrative policy-
formulation as an implementation of statutory directions addressed to the
executive branch.

Policy in the latter sense may consist of the determination of a long-range
work program, such as the number of applications to be processed, surplus
items to be sold, inspections to be made, projects to be completed, during
a given time period. It may mean establishing a criterion or standard for
the guidance of staff thinking in making decisions on recurrent matters
in the course of day-to-day operations. Or it may mean a highly specific
decision — for instance, whether a precedent-setting letter should be sent out
or an important appointment made. In the broadest sense, however, a pol-
icy question is one which requires an authoritative determination as to
whether or not a new program or change in an existing plan of action
should be undertaken.

Breadth of Policy-Making Process. Formal determination — or final ap-
proval— of a proposal setting forth what should be done occupies a very
small segment of time in the process of policy making. This is true es-
pecially in the case of administrative operations, unless the top administrator
undertakes personally to review the basis of all decisions he is called upon
to make, which would create an impossible bottleneck at his desk. On the
other hand, one mark of a good executive is his ability to decide quickly
whether more staff work or more thorough planning needs to be done be-
fore he can intelligently consider a proposed action. Policy questions that
raise issues about his basic program objectives or the kind of structural
arrangements and administrative coordination he wants in his organization

365

366 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

will require more of his time than operating decisions, the bulk of which
he must delegate to his immediate line subordinates.

On either type of policy question, however, regardless of the time ele-
ment involved, the final formal decision is preceded by an evolutionary
stage of formulation. This begins with the spotting of some concrete needs
and identification of the problem, leading to investigation and analysis.
It is carried forward to the point of corrective recommendations, leading
in turn to formal initiation of the proposed action for review and approval
or rejection in terms of its implications for existing practices and relation-
ships. Ultimate determination is succeeded by the stage of execution,
which consists of a decignation of the individual responsible and the proce-
dures to be followed for applying the controlling policy or general plan of
action in particular cases.

Prompting Role of Management. Once the main lines of program ob-
jective, structural grouping, and functional coordination have been laid down,
neither formulation nor execution of policy as a matter of practice is sharply
distinct from the other. Policy issues are continually arising out of
problems of execution, and solutions may be initiated at any phase of exe-
cution. New facts, different situations, and changing pressures are con-
stantly coming up which necessitate decisions by operating officials or else
require requests for policy clearance or approval of proposed action on a
higher level.1 A well-managed agency properly encourages such suggestions
from below. However, they must be analyzed and reviewed in the wider
policy perspective to determine whether the proposed measure falls within
existing policy or whether the policy itself should be modified.

One task of management, therefore, is to establish appropriate methods
for identifying existing or potential problems, and to provide channels for
sifting and expediting consideration of policy issues at the most suitable
agency levels.2 The determination having been made, it is equally important
that its substance and its rationale be quickly disseminated to the whole staff
and to the public affected by it. The ease and effectiveness with which an
agency educates itself and its public as to its own policies and any changes
in them, determines in large measure its ability to dispose of its work with
ease and effectiveness at operating levels.

Legislative Basis of Administrative Policy. On a broader scale, the same

1 As stated by Laves, Walter H. C. and Wilcox, Francis O., "Organizing the Government
for Participation in World Affairs," American Political Science Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 927:
"Foreign policies like other policies are not made at the top. They are an institutional product
rather than orders issued from above. They are submitted in a hundred different ways through
staff decisions and recommendations, to be tacitly or explicitly approved or disapproved."

2 "The whole process is one of varying degrees of importance. . . . Organization consists
of fixing responsibility for decisions at those points where there is appropriate competence to
make them in terms of experience and perspective." Blandford, John B., "Coordinating
Administration/' p. 94, Proceedings, 28th Conference of the Governmental Research Association,
Detroit, 1940. See also Applcby, Paul H., Big Democracy, pp. 88-94, 120-124, New York:
Knopf, 1945.

THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 367

process that goes on in administrative organizations occurs in legislative
policy-making, except that most of the issues do not arise out of daily opera-
tions of the legislature's own staff. In a sense, the legislative body acts as
something like a board of directors for all administrative agencies, but pol-
icy determination is divided between it and another political organ, the
chief executive. Both, separately or jointly, determine policy that is binding
upon administrative agencies.

This division seems to assume two principal channels for policy formu-
lation: one from the people through their elected representatives; the other
from administrative officials to the chief executive. The interaction between
these two processes would be relatively simple if the legislature confined
its role in policy formulation to approving or disapproving policy proposals
submitted to it by the chief executive, whether through statutory enactments
or through the positive or negative exercise of its power to appropriate
the funds estimated to be necessary for the achievement of stated public
purposes. English-speaking countries, however, have rejected such sim-
plicity after an historic struggle for control of the royal or executive pre-
rogative. As a result, the legislature established its constitutional power
not only to decide whether money should be spent for a public purpose,
but also to take the initiative in policy making and extend it to defining
the method, principles, and organization by which that purpose should be
attained.

Main Division of Responsibility. Nevertheless, the scope of governmental
functions under modern industrial and technological conditions is so vast
that legislative bodies from sheer necessity have delegated more and more
responsibility for the content of policy proposals to administrative agencies.
In these agencies, more technically competent, comprehensive, and balanced
consideration of the issues is possible than in the atmosphere and procedures
of large legislative assemblies. The magnitude and pressure of public busi-
ness upon legislatures has forced them to relinquish much of their initiating
and planning function to the chief executive, thereby enhancing the impor-
tance of legislative review and approval of administrative proposals. Such
legislative review and approval are most effectively exercised in the creation
or modification of administrative powers,3 whereby administrative policy is
controlled prospectively — in the first instance by basic legislative authoriza-
tion, in the second by appropriation of funds.

The distinction between legislative and administrative policy does not
turn so much upon an inherent difference in the content of policy as upon
the extent to which the proposed innovation or plan of action involves a
fundamental change in existing public policy. The new program or policy
will require legislative authorisation primarily as it calls for amendment or
revision of established practices or expectancies around which public feelings

8 See Jennings, W. Ivor, Cabinet Government, pp. 177-178, London: Cambridge Uni*
versity Press, 1937.

368 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

or economic interests have become consolidated. No satisfactory substitute
has been found for the educational value of public discussion created by
open investigation and debate, the safeguards implicit in public hearings, and
the stability gained by survival of the legislative crucible and the embodi-
ment of policy in the form of law. The great hazards in the legislative
process are the distorting influences of partisan forces seeking narrow ob-
jectives through piecemeal amendment, regardless — and sometimes at the
price — of the over-all plan.

Coordinate Tas^s of Legislature and Chief Executive. It is often claimed
that the chief executive is in a better position than the lawmaking body to
secure expert consideration of policy questions in the light of the complexi-
ties and conflicts that have to be reconciled. However, he has his own
problems of maintaining personal relationships with the leaders of his party
in the legislature, appraising the popularity of policy proposals in terms of
votes, and ensuring cohesion of his party organization. Given the multi-
plicity of policy initiators in the legislature, it is clear nevertheless that he
has an important and legitimate function on behalf of the whole people
to state authoritatively his opinion on the substance of proposed policy. He
is best placed to answer the question of how far policy should be formu-
lated on the basis of considerations deemed important by the experts in
getting votes — the politicians — and how much weight should be given the
factors deemed important by the experts in getting the job done — the
administrators.

Put in another way, our constitutional system assumes the desirability
of divided responsibility and rivalry between chief executive and legislature.
As a consequence, the chief executive bears a large part of the burden of
formulating and explaining the need for changed public policies and for
focusing the legislators' attention upon the issues which they should decide,
as distinct from those decisions which should be left to administrative
judgment and competence,4

2. FACT-FINDING AND DISCRETION IN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

Delegation of Policy Determination. Much discussion and analysis,
particularly in legal literature, has been devoted to the legislative delegation
of rule-making power to the discretionary judgment of administrative offi-
cials. No analysis of the technical legal arguments need be made here be-
cause we shall examine them in a later chapter. The present discussion starts
from the basic premise that a legislative body cannot administer. The prac-
tical question, therefore, is the extent to which it is desirable for the statute

4 Cf. Goodnow, Frank J., Politics and Administration, New York: Macmillan, 1900;
Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 269-302, New York:
Harper, 1942; Watkins, Frederick W., "Constitutional Dictatorship," in Friedrich, Carl J. and
Mason, Edward S., eds., Public Policy, p. 324 ff.9 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940;
Lindsay, A. D., The Modem Democratic State, pp. 143-146, London: Oxford University Press,
1943; Jordan, Elijah, The Theory of Legislation, Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1930.

THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 369

to prescribe in detail the methods of achieving its purpose. In other words,
how free a choice of means should be given the administrator?

The legal question of delegation really goes to the problem of the desir-
ability of the general policy. The Supreme Court has made it clear that if
the legislature has the authority to adopt a given program of action or plan
of regulation, it may prescribe the method of achieving that program in
either general or specific terms. In doing so, it is subject to only two major
conditions: first, responsibility for achieving the public purpose or program
should be vested in public officials; second, the statutory statement of the
public purpose should be expressed in terms that are sufficiently clear to
afford a criterion by which the courts may judge whether the administrative
policy has a reasonable relationship to the basic statutory purpose.5 Assum-
ing the constitutionality of the legislative purpose, the problem of adminis-
trative policy-makers is to determine whether the conditions exist under
which the adopted policy should be applied and what should be done to
give it effect. In these terms, the proper criterion for appraising administra-
tive discretion is the reliability and accuracy of the information upon which
such determinations are based.

Congress, the statute itself, and functional groups exert pressures which
in their combined effects upon administrators tend to force them to seek as
complete a finding of the facts, as rigorous an analysis of the relevant issues,
and as precise a statement of the assumptions and reasoning upon which
the administrative approach should be based, as can be obtained from their
staffs. In this view, which holds that as a rule the top official of an agency
is intent upon performing his tasks as fairly and effectively as he knows
how, the principal limitation upon the quality of administrative policy is
the scope and reliability of the facilities for analyzing and presenting in-
formation to him. He must rely in large measure upon the statement of
the issues that his staff presents to him. The question, therefore, is how the
administrator can guard himself against the pitfalls of subjective preferences,
based upon superficial or narrow assumptions as to what information is
relevant and what issues are important.

Administrative Contacts with Private Fact-Finding Groups. One thing
the administrator may do is encourage the establishment of contacts with
private fact-finding groups outside of government. Outstanding examples of
these linkages are the informal relationships between the Bureau of Agri-
cultural Economics and the farmer organizations; the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics and the labor organizations; the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Bureau of Railway Economics of the Association of American
Railroads; the Office of Education and the National Education Associa-

te/. U. S. v. Rock Royal Coop, 307 U. S. 533 (1939); Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage and
Hour Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944);
Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers, pp. 111-126, 365-369, New York:
New York University Press, 1940. C/. also below Ch. 23, "The Judicial Test."

370 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

tion; the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and industry trade
associations; the Census Bureau and the American Statistical Association;
the Bureau of the Budget and the Public Administration Clearing House
and its affiliated organizations of public officials; the Children's Bureau and
the local councils of private welfare agencies; the United States Public
Health Service and the American Medical Association.

Collaborative relationships in planning and stimulating research pro-
grams are unquestionably helpful to both private and public agencies, some-
times developing into well-understood divisions of labor. The mutual inter-
est of these different bodies in the problems of the same economic grouping
in the population or the same area of professional concern arises out of
essentially similar general views of public policy. Administrative policy
should therefore be on its guard lest the factors of propinquity bring about
a public distrust of the reliability of the agency's official judgments, decisions,
or publications.

Interagency Use of Staff Resources. A second way of improving staff
sources of information is to further the formation of technical relations and
associations with officials of other agencies engaged in the same type of
work. In the federal government the Council on Personnel Administration
holds monthly meetings of departmental personnel officers. Another illus-
tration is the Division of Statistical Standards in the Bureau of the Budget.
This unit performs a semiofficial service of a similar character for agency
statisticians by establishing interagency coordinating committees to handle
technical problems of program and method. Progress and results of the plan-
ning and coordinating activities it sponsors are described in a monthly
Statistical Reporter?

Arrangements such as these are valuable. They widen technical points
of view. They increase professional experience through exchange of view-
points and information. And they develop support for interdepartmental
programs and techniques having general policy significance as distinct from
purely jurisdictional bureau-centered interest.

Government-Wide Clearance of Policy Proposals. A third way of placing
an agency in official touch with external sources of information is exempli-
fied in the federal government by the procedure of formal consultation and
clearance of legislative matters and proposed executive orders through the
Division of Legislative Reference in the Bureau of the Budget.7 Any recom-
mendation for legislative enactment or report by an agency upon pending
legislation must be put before the bureau before submission to Congress.
The bureau determines what other agencies are affected by the subject mat-
ter, supplies them with a copy of the pertinent materials, and requests a

6 Sec also Bureau of the Budget, Two Years of Progress under the Federal Reports Act,
Senate Report No. 47, pt. 2, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1945.

? See Executive Order No. 8248 of September 8, 1939; Budget Circular A-19 (revised)
of August 1, 1944.

THE FORMuj-AijwjJN <jF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 371

statement of their views on it. Having secured the views of all agencies con-
cerned, the bureau ascertains the relationship of the legislation to the pro*
gram of the President, and communicates its finding to the initiating agency,
which in its report to Congress must include a statement of the advice re-
ceived from the Budget Bureau.

This channel, of course, is not a means of broadening the span of atten*
tion of a very large proportion of the staff of a department. Formal clear-
ance procedure represents a very late stage in the interdepartmental nego-
tiation or exchange of views. "The real consideration of legislative proposals
in administrative circles precedes, rather than follows, compliance with the
formal clearance requirements/*8 Many pieces of forward-looking legislation
in recent years have been the result of a vast measure of informal prelimi-
nary discussion prior to the initiation of final proposals through formal
channels. Yet the existence of clearance requirements is a real incentive
to interdepartmental consultation.

Ensuring Objectivity in Staff Recommendations. Personal and profes-
sional contacts and associations across departmental lines are an important
means of broadening staff outlook on policy questions. Top administrators
also have a strong interest in establishing devices whereby they can be
assured of the accuracy of the facts and the objectivity of statements on
the issues presented to them for decision. This problem is particularly com-
pelling when the administrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, in which
he must find out what questions really are at issue and arrive at judgments
as to what should be done on the facts of specific cases. Such narrowing of
the area of decision in specific cases from general arguments to definable
factors or determinants of judgment is an outstanding feature of the entire
administrative process. It accounts for much of the emphasis on the part
of regulatory tribunals and agencies upon a "fair hearing," "decision on the
record," and "substantiality" of evidence.

The problem is not restricted to quasi-judicial processes in the specific
sense, however. Even ordinary administrative orders and acts must be
based on a careful scrutiny of all the relevant facts. Moreover, all rules and
regulations prescribing rights or obligations of individuals must be drafted
on rigorously analyzed assumptions as to the type of situation that is antici-
pated or planned for. Generalized language is necessary, but trained
analysis in advance of formal promulgation reduces the apparent generality
and ensures application of the rules within concrete and often quite precise
limits.9

In order to create an administrative pattern in which this type of analy-
sis operates continuously and as a matter of course, the administrator must

8Witte, Erwin E., "Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking," Public Adminis-
tration Review, 1942, Vol. 2, p. 119.

°This process appears to conform to the "utilitarian" method and standard of arriving
at ethical judgments, which has been applied to administrative theory by Leys, Wayne A. R.,
"Ethics and Administrative Discretion," Public Administration Review, 1943, Vol. 3, p. 10 ff.

372 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

establish machinery for institutional planning and for review of lower-
level decisions or recommendations.10 This is first of all a problem of key
personnel, which rests upon a relationship of personal understanding and
cooperation between the first echelon of subordinates and the top adminis-
trative authority, whether it be a board or individual. Once the personal
relationships at the top have been established, however, administrative
planning is properly distinguishable from the review process.

In formulating new goals of administrative effort, planning draws upon
all facilities and personal resources in the organization, regardless of lines of
responsibility. The function of review is closely associated with existing
lines of command, and with the responsibilities of supervisors in scrutiniz-
ing the quality and quantity of their subordinates' day-to-day work. In
complex organizations like the Army Service Forces and the War Produc-
tion Board of World War II, the two functions may be brought together
at the top in an over-all review group— the Control Division of ASF and
the Bureau of Planning and Statistics of WPB. This will stimulate self-
analysis and improvement in performance standards as well as reporting
methods on the part of operating divisions. Both such planning and review
presuppose thorough fact-finding as a basis for administrative decision.11
On any problem of policy formulation, they rival and supplement each other
by emphasizing different facts and different approaches to the same prob-
lem for attention at the top. Administrative planning should be closely
tied into budget formulation, from whose planning phases it is indistin-
guishable.12

It should be clear, then, that the administrative approach to the problem
presented by legislative delegation of discretion to achieve a broad objective
of public policy does not assume an unfettered choice of means. For ex-
ample, the annual legislative review of appropriation requests provides a
check. The technical nature of the particular issues imposes certain limita-
tions. The sources of information and devices of coordination available to
top executives through budgetary and management channels, functioning
under government-wide standards, establish another set of brakes. The
promotion of criteria of technical competence through interagency staff
associations, formal and informal, are further important controls of a pro-
fessional character. Finally, the evolution of procedures for ensuring ac-
curate and fair determination of the facts, including specific recognition of
the function of internal administrative planning and control, represents an
advanced form of research-in-action, whose principal defect is the narrow*

10 Cf. Simon, Herbert A., "Decision-Making and Administrative Organization," Public
Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp. 26-29.

11 In the words of Follett, Mary P., Dynamic Administration, p. 305, New York: Harper,
1942: "I have given four principles of organization. The underpinning of these is information,.
based upon research."

& Cf. Walker, Robert A., "The Relation of Budgeting to Program Planning," Public
Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp. 97-107.

THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 375

considerations, tend to dismiss the importance of technical disagreements
between staff on problems which overlap several responsibilities or fall
partially outside the agency's bailiwick. In short, the administrator who
encourages initiative creates conflict in his organization. Under these con-
ditions, to him the paramount desirability often appears to be whatever
policy decision offers the best chance of enabling the organization to stick
together — the "good of the service" doctrine.

Effects of Ideological Orientation. At its lowest extreme, the need for
organizational solidarity may stifle all initiative apart from uniformity with
the "party line" of the group closest to the agency head. In its higher mani-
festations, organizational unity encourages objectivity of judgment and the
raising of policy questions on the assurance that existing policy is fully
carried out. As a corollary, this solidarity proscribes special favors for special
groups or individuals inside and outside the organization. At the same
time, such a drive for unity places a large responsibility for policy coordina-
tion upon the agency head and his immediate associates, because once their
authority has been subdivided, differences over policy questions among them
must be disposed of in terms of the prestige, self-respect, and pride of every
member of the administrative subdivisions involved.

Administrative ideology, therefore, presents a very complex problem in
social psychology. Immediately and concretely, administrative policy is
to a large degree a matter of personality and personal relationships between
the agency head, his own staff, and the first level of operating subordinates.
Ex officio, so to speak, the understandings and commitments of this group
determine much of the course of administrative policy. In personnel
changes at these levels may be sought the significant clues to shifts in the
direction of policy. However, the ability of top management to do its job
in achieving the purpose of the organization as a whole depends in turn
on the sense of contribution, accomplishment, and participation on the part
of the working groups all the way down the hierarchy. In the face of the
explosive problems generated by social idealism, personal will-to-power,
and simple demands for a sense of job satisfaction by men working in
groups, it is not surprising that outsiders get the impression of powerful,
anonymous influences which are feared because they are not understood.

4. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

Impact of Interest Groups. Legislative relationships are, of course, not
the only external influences which administrative policy-making must take
into account. Organized pressure groups are well aware of— and some-
times responsible for— the delegation of discretionary powers to government

376 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

agencies. These groups maintain an ever-watchful eye upon administrative
decisions affecting their own purposes and programs.14

Their influence is exercised through requests for information; demands
to be heard at formal hearings; their ability to create an extremely un-
favorable atmosphere of publicity for the agency; and a negative power of
refusing to cooperate with administrative officials. Over and above pres-
sure tactics, however, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter,15 group or-
ganizations have secured considerable recognition for a valuable consulta-
tive role through which, in various forms, they may participate in the
formulation of administrative policy.

Public Relations. Public relations, not only with legislative bodies and
organized groups but also in terms of informing the press and the general
public of the work and accomplishments of an agency, have been accepted
in recent years as an essential element in administrative policy.16 While the
general function of a public-relations officer is one of public information, his
influence extends to the problem of how a complicated, technical policy-de-
cision can best be explained to the lay public. Sometimes he may have to
propose the modification of a policy in order to secure better understanding
and a more favorable public attitude toward the agency.

Beyond its decisions in particular cases, the long-run task of an admin-
istrative agency is a public-relations problem. The job is to transform a
public policy, which originally is only a string of words in the statute book
or in a directive, from a purely verbal expression into a pattern of public
acceptance. Such acceptance must include an expectancy as to the activities
of officials responsible for putting the policy into effect. In this broadest
sense of public relations, the long-run justification of an administrative
agency — particularly in the regulatory field — will depend in large measure
upon its success in establishing a favorable reaction to its basic policies and
its normal methods of operation.

Issues of Legality. Since government agencies function in pursuance of
law and are controlled through forms of law imposed by the courts, legal
considerations are an important factor in administrative policy-making.
Many agencies have a continuing problem, however, in clarifying for them-
selves the proper role of legal advice. The term "administrative law" may
be said to include the legal rules controlling administration, the written
letter of the policies developed for or by administration, and the procedural
forms through which administrative acts secure legal effect. One or the

14 Cf. Herring, Pendlcton, Public Administration and the Public Interest, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1936; Crawford, K., The Pressure Boys, New York: Viking, 1939; McCunc, W.,
The Farm Bloc, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1943; Blaisdell, D. C., Economic Power and
Political Pressures, Monograph No. 26 of the Temporary National Economic Committee, Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1941.

*8 Cf. Ch. 14, 'Interest Groups in Administration."

** Cf. McCamy, James L.f Governmental Publicity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1939.

THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 377

other of these highly important aspects of the administrative process has upon
occasion been used to justify the notion that legal considerations— that is,
those proposed by lawyers — should dominate in the determination of sub-
stantive policy and likewise in the entire process of administrative investi-
gation and review.

Task of the Agency Lawyer. For example, in the early wartime history
of the Office of Price Administration,17 virtually a dual legal-administrative
structure was established. A legal adviser reporting to the general counsel
of OPA was attached to each important level of authority in the Price
Department. To require legal consultation may not appear to be an onerous
obligation. However, when it is construed by either the operators in the
line of command or the lawyers, or by both, as a division of administrative
responsibility, a truly perplexing situation arises. Similarly, at higher policy
levels operating executives tend to resent the views of the chief legal counsel
on policy proposals unless these center on questions of authority; adequacy
of analysis of the legal issues; accuracy of the facts upon which the proposed
determination is based; and propriety of the form and procedure in which
action is to be taken.

Of these four categories, questions of authority afford perhaps the least
numerous though the most irritating opportunities for participating in policy
discussion. In administration, the most sought-after advice relates to the
questions: "What should be done?" and "How can this be done?" It is a
great temptation for the lawyer, particularly if he is able and aggressive,
to overextend his sphere in initiating policy on administrative matters. In
most situations he will contribute to internal administrative unity and im-
proved public relations if he raises his policy ideas and legal questions
reasonably close to the final point of determination. In so doing, he will
make his influence less questionable and secure more respect for the con-
siderations that fall into his primary responsibility for litigation before the
courts and proper deference to the citizen's procedural interests.

Dynamics of Administrative Policy-Making. All of these external factors
are dependent upon one another. In more than one way they are involved in
most policy determinations, with their importance varying from problem to
problem. Giving each factor its proper weight is the function of adminis-
trative judgment. Policy decision in administration is not an isolated act
of top officials; it is not a legalistic interpretation of an hypothetical legis-i
lative intent; nor is it the exercise of unfettered power to steer a course
according to the administrator's political preferences or social prejudices.
Rather, it is the result of an interplay of many forces and many brains
brought to a focus by the coordinating direction from the administrator.

17 See Pniefer, C. H., "Dual Responsibility under a Single Head," Public Administration
Review, 1943, Vol. 3, pp. 59-60. C/. in general Morstein Marx, Fritz, "The Lawyer's Role in
Public Administration," Y*te Law Journal. 1946, Vol. 55, p. 498 ff.

378 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

His is the responsibility for reconciling political and legal factors with the
factual analyses and technical recommendations of his staff.

The dynamics of administrative policy-making are therefore not readily
captured in any simple pattern of thought. The least realistic view is that
of administrative policy emerging straight from the administrator's autono-
mous decision. The gifted executive, it is true, will be able to sense the
need for policy shifts as well as the weaknesses in existing policy through
his grasp of the work of his organization. Even then, however, he will
combat any tendency on his part to come forth spontaneously with specific
remedies. Instead, he will be guided by personal "hunch" to probe into the
matter in conversations with his immediate associates, and on this basis
determine specific assignments of an exploratory character addressed to ap-
propriate staff units or line officials. Their preliminary work in turn will
furnish the basis upon which the particular problem can be discussed a
second time with better insight on the top level.

Far more often are policy proposals initiated, not by the administrator
himself, but by those much further down the line who see the issues in con-
crete terms in the course of their day-by-day activities. A field office chief,
for instance, may grow aware of the operating inadequacy of a given policy.
He may have informal ways of checking his own reactions with those of
other field officers in his region. He is also in a position to take into ac-
count public attitudes in his area expressed to him in various ways, includ-
ing occasional lunches with local spokesmen of his agency's clientele and
other interested groups. Through his reporting relationships with the
regional director, he has an opportunity for enlisting the latter's interest.
Again, a broadening of relevant considerations is apt to occur when the
emerging proposal and the substantiating facts are mulled over in the re-
gional office, or perhaps placed on the agenda of some periodic meeting of
all field officers held by the regional head. As the matter moves up the
line, it is likely to reach the departmental level in the context of an indi-
vidual bureau responsible for defined aspects of the agency's program.
Ordinarily, the bureau chief will first assure himself of the thoughts of his
own key people. Only thereafter will he draw other bureaus or staff units
into consultation.

Perhaps the bureau chief will have sufficient standing before the legis-
lature to take the initiative in sounding out some of the more important
figures on the legislative committee that is primarily concerned with the
agency's activities. He may thus be able to ascertain in advance the drift
of legislative attitude. He may also seek the views of interest-group head-
quarters, either through formal consultation or in off-the-record conversa-
tions. In all of these stages there occurs an enrichment of thought and a
sounder appreciation of the realities surrounding the policy proposal. Such
realities may well include gradually sharpening disagreements among dif-

THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 379

ferent interest groups, among different bureaus, among different legislators,
and among different staff officers.

Administrative gains to be secured by action on the proposal would
have to be balanced carefully against the potentialities for internal and ex-
ternal conflict. In many instances, no doubt, the proposal is shelved before
it goes any further. In other instances, the sponsoring bureau chief will
grow convinced that a fuller examination of the facts and of possible alter-
natives to the proposal is required. Such examination may involve extensive
study by a particular staff unit in the agency, perhaps in cooperation with ex-
pert staffs in other agencies and on the level of the chief executive, or with
private groups having research facilities or other resources of their own. In
still other cases, the matter will resolve itself in terms of an opinion of the
legal counsel of the agency — negative or positive; and if the latter, with
or without significant qualifications.

All of this is merely the preliminary stage of preparing the ground for
action on the administrator's level. When and if the matter comes up
before him, it will usually be clear whether legislative changes must be
sought or whether the issue can be disposed of through executive order or
by the agency itself under its statutory authorization. The administrator
must assure himself of the comprehensiveness of vision that should support
the proposal. His immediate staff aides will help him to determine whether
the recommendation makes due allowance for an agency-wide or even
government-wide point of view, or whether it tends to overplay the insti-
tutional interest of one particular bureau or one particular function en-
trusted to the agency. He may decide to yield in this individual instance
to what he must recognize to be an act of bureau self-promotion — simply
because he is aware of the political strength of the sponsoring bureau in
terms of its outside support. In any event he will have to alert his public-
relations staff for the impending action.

Then, before he takes action he may want to bring together once more
the leaders of interest groups, perhaps in order to achieve a more satis-
factory compromise among them or to win additional support through
measured concessions to opposing interests. If he does, he may on occasion
find it desirable to drop the proposal because of growing fear of public
controversy. Conversely, it is also conceivable that for reasons of personal
conviction or personal working relationships with individual legislators,
other agency heads, or important interest groups the administrator will veto
the proposal notwithstanding a climate of wider support. Furthermore,
his thinking will be affected by his own anticipation of the reaction or the
needs of the chief executive.

If the policy proposal requires for enactment an executive order, the
administrator must give thought to the kinds of resistance or opposition he
may run into when the drafted order enters the process of top-level clear-
ance. In the face of a serious chance of conflict on this level he would have

380 THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

to raise the question of whether he should first discuss the matter with the
chief executive or present it in a cabinet meeting. Here again, reconcilia-
tion and adjustment will have to be worked out; and the ultimate product
of the long chain of transactions may look quite different from anything
the field office chief had in mind when he made himself the snowball that
set off the avalanche.

This much is clear, however. Administrative policy-making is ordinar-
ily not reduced to any single action either of a homogeneous bureaucracy
or of the responsible administrator. It is more in the nature of a conglom-
eration of agreements among a large variety of groups — agreements suf-
ficiently widespread and substantial to outweigh remaining unresolved
conflicts. It is a process that necessarily in most instances moves slowly,
but proportionately moves more surely. It is also one that operates at a
relatively high rate of mortality of policy proposals. With all that, it is no
less an approximation of community consensus than is the legislative process,
and it is subject to the same irritations and handicaps.

CHAPTER

Government By Procedure

1. THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF PROCEDURE

Meaning of Procedure. In the hectic early days of one of the great war
agencies of World War II, the handling of correspondence was so cumber-
some and slow that often tempers reached the blazing point. A well-known
management analyst, brought in to help treat the agency's growing pains,
made a study of the routine steps in dealing with a simple letter from the
time it reached the office until the equally simple one-paragraph reply was
mailed. A very unusual but dramatic "flow chart" was prepared, using
a thirty-yard strip of wrapping paper and — symbolically — festoons of red
tape to indicate the tortuous movements of the correspondence, step by step.
As a result of the study, replies were speeded and manpower and materials
were saved, chiefly through the introduction of standardized procedures to
deal with routine inquiries.

This incident serves to illustrate some of the matters that are the subject
of our discussion here — such as the relationship of procedures to staff morale
and "public relations," and the value of specialization in the analysis and
creation of procedure.

Administrative procedure, broadly defined, is the prescribed or custom-
ary way of working together in the conduct of an organization's business.
Procedure thus has three distinguishing features. The first is the repetition
of transactions in a prescribed or customary fashion. The second is the
coordination of various efforts into a larger whole. The third is purpose:
to maintain the organization in operation and achieve its goals.

Role of Procedure. The essential role of procedure is well epitomized
in phrases that Walter Bagehot coined for another purpose — "the hyphen
that joins, the buckle that binds." Aside from leadership and cooperation,
it is procedure that knits an organization into a whole and keeps it a going
concern. It is procedure that governs the routine internal and external
relationships — between one individual and another; between one organiza-
tional unit and another; between one process and another; between one

381

382 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

skill or technique and another; between one function and another; between
one place and another; between the organization and the public; and be-
tween all combinations and permutations of these. It is by means of pro-
cedure that the day-to-day work of government is done— mail sorted, routed
and delivered; deeds recorded; accounts audited; cases prosecuted; protests
heard; food inspected; budgets reviewed; tax returns verified; data collected;
supplies purchased; property assessed; inquiries answered; orders issued;
investigations made; and so forth endlessly.

Procedure, properly applied, allows specialization to be carried to its
optimum degree and effects the most efficient division of labor. Procedure
not only divides labor; it also divides — and fixes — responsibility. Procedure
thus is a means of maintaining order and of achieving regularity, continuity,
predictability, control, and accountability. It is a means of maximizing con-
trol of the subjective drives of an organization's members, of assuring that
their official actions contribute — and, if possible, that their private loyalties
conform — to the organization's objectives. From a general political angle,
procedure ensures equality of treatment — a value of great significance to the
citizen.

Procedure is not a unique feature of public administration. It is a con-
comitant of all organized activity, and many procedures are equally usable
by private administration or public administration. Private as well as pub-
lic "red tape" can be time-consuming and annoying to those affected, as
any one can testify who has tried to exchange a purchase without a sales
slip or to cash a check without "proper identification."1

Procedures as Laws of Activity. From one point of view, an organiza-
tion's procedures may be regarded as a body of "law" applying primarily
to its members, but also in varying degree and manner — depending upon
the organization's authority and activities — to persons outside. More than
analogy is involved. - To the extent that procedures are prescribed by con-
stitution, statute, and court decision, they are law in the full legal sense
and they are enforceable as such. "Most procedures, however, are only modes
o^conduct devised by the organization to regulate the working relations
of its members. While these modes of conduct must, of course, be consonant
with law, and while in the case of public agencies their ultimate purpose
may be to give effect to law, they are not generally law in the technical
sense. The sanctions for their enforcement are primarily administrative.

As with law, procedure may be either written or unwritten. Large and
well-developed agencies have specialized procedure-issuing organs and put
forth a large volume of written procedural materials. Small and rudi-
mentary organizations may rely heavily upon unwritten custom. In any
organization, large or small, custom and current conceptions of adminis-
trative right and wrong are very important. Some written procedures, just

*For an interesting comparison of public and private "red tape," see Appleby, Paul H.,
Kg Democracy, Ch. 6, New York: Knopf, 1945.

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 383

as some laws and ordinances, are honored chiefly in the breach, though
they have been prepared in the proper manner and duly signed by the
highest authority. They may be so poorly written that they are not read
or understood; or so unrealistic that they are not taken seriously; or they
may be contrary to prevailing notions of administrative morality and in-
capable of enforcement. Conversely, some procedures may become well-
developed by custom and be followed religiously without being committed
to paper — either through neglect or because to do so would not be politic.
"Standard operating procedure" is not necessarily set forth in a manual.

Again as with law, procedure is laid down at various levels. An organi-
zation may prescribe procedures applying to itself as a whole or to any
or most of its component parts. Conversely, organizational units generally
may adopt any procedures that are reasonable and not in conflict with law
or with procedures set forth by a superior authority. The structure of pro-
cedures in a large organization thus resembles a child's set of nested blocks.
Accordingly, the "man at the bottom" operates under several, perhaps many,
layers of procedure. Lest this be regarded as cruel, let it be said that unless
he is an oversensitive individual he is likely to become accustomed to his
burden, and even to cherish it as something peculiarly his own.

Procedure as Physiology of Organization. From another point of view,
procedure may be looked upon as the "physiology" of organization. As such
it is not separable, even in concept, from considerations of formal organiza-
tional structure. Anatomy and physiology are but different aspects of the
same thing: structure is meaningless without functions, and function is
impossible without structure. Organizational structures are defined ulti-
mately in terms of procedures — "shall be the function of," "shall report to,"
"are responsible for." And in turn, procedures are geared to organizational
structure— "upon receipt from the Administrative Division," "shall forward
to the appropriate district office," and so forth.

Organizations are structures of relationships between skills. Procedure
brings the structures to life. For highly developed professional or scientific
skills, procedure performs the function of uniting them with an organization
and its purposes. It does not, however, substantially affect or reach into the
skills or techniques of professional and scientific personnel. The prepara-
tion of a legal argument, the treatment of a plant disease, or the analysis
of food for selenium traces are governed for the most part by rules outside
the realm of administration. In descending the scale of specialized skills,
however, this tends to be less and less true. Eventually a point is reached
at which administrative procedure merges with whatever specialized func-
tion the individual may perform. Such operations as sorting, packaging, and
loading are subject in their entirety to well-developed techniques of proce-
dure analysis and improvement.

Procedure as Institutional Habit. In still another aspect, the procedures
of an organization may be viewed as its "habits." Habits are the repetitive

384 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

acts that in large measure express and affect the personality and character
of an individual. Procedures are the repetitive acts that in large measure
manifest and shape the personality and character of an organization. Both
habits and procedures routinize and stabilize day-to-day existence, contribute
to the achievement of immediate goals, and release energies to deal with
what is novel or "higher."

As it has its characteristic merits, habit has its characteristic disadvan-
tages, and it is here that the chief limitations of procedure emerge. For
not only are procedures analogous to habits; beyond that, to an individual
participant a procedure becomes largely a habit or series of habits, physiologi-
cally no different from habits developed in private life. Thus a clerk whose
role in a procedure is to sort and route certain documents develops patterns
of mental and muscular coordination that are second nature.

The disadvantages of habit lie in its propensity to engross the whole
individual. The repetitive acts yield psychological and physiological satis-
factions, and the habits become ends in themselves and substitutes for
thought instead of aids to thought. A "cake of custom" develops and
hardens, hindering adaptation to changed circumstances. It is a common
experience to encounter a human being or an organization that is now
only an animated antique because habits or procedures were allowed to
become ends in themselves instead of means to ends.

The manifestations of procedural hardening of the administrative arteries
are undesirable in themselves and dangerous to the life of the organization.
Constant effort is needed to obviate this deterioration. By its very nature,
procedure limits initiative and narrows discretion. Unless the individuals
concerned are more than ordinarily vigorous and resourceful, aware of the
role of procedure and trained in its analysis, procedures— even excellent
ones — exact-sutoll. •

Some victims of procedure, feeling their ambitions unsatisfied and their
egos suppressed, adopt the tactic of passive resistance. They develop a
"waitiogjor. orders" outlook, and pull only enough to keep the traces taut.
Others make a false virtue of what appears a necessity by developing a
Cult of Procedure. Unsure of their position, uninformed about the signifi-
cance of their function in the whole procedural system, they magnify, their
task far beyond its intrinsic importance. Their own procedural role becomes
a Thing-in-Itself, a monstrous defense mechanism. Procedure is turned
into a weapon to ward off the criticism of outsiders— ignorant intruders who
do not recognize the preeminence of Procedure. Woe betide the soul, inside
the organization or out, who slights or fails to live by Procedure!

Still others, at once sophisticated about procedure and indifferent to the
ends it is designed to serve, will use it as an army uses fortifications, either
as a basefor attack or a situs for defense. If action or inaction serves their
interests, mey either will find a way to fit it within the letter of the pro-
cedures or they will circumvent or violate them. But if they are faced with

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 385

an action they personally find disagreeable, even the minutiae of procedure
will be used to strangle and kill.

2. PROCEDURES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Rule of Law. Although procedure has generic qualities that do not differ
whether the organization is public or private, the objectives of public
administration and the conditions under which it is carried on create spe-
cial procedural functions and problems. American public administration
aims at the accomplishment of broad, diverse, and often intangible objec-
tives while working within the framework of one of the most complex
legal systems of any modern state. It does this over great spaces — in the
midst of a large, heterogeneous, and in part unsympathetic population; and
in interrelation with an economic system of unparalleled intricacy.

The broad, diverse, and often intangible objectives of public administra-
tion are in large degree set forth in the statutes creating and instructing
particular agencies. However, in pursuing the objectives laid down in its
basic statute an agency is motivated and guided not only by the statute
itself. As a governmental entity, its actions are conditioned by many other
legal provisions which in one way or another apply to it. These provisions
are many because the constitutional-legal system of America is of great
complexity.

The fundamental significance of our complex legal system for actions
which affect the public lies primarily in the idea of the "rule of law" — the
I idea that governmental actions may not be arbitrary but must proceed from
and be consonant with law. This general idea has been imbedded in the
traditions of Western civilization for many centuries and is by no means
a unique possession of America. However, a number of factors have com-
bined here to give it a full and elaborate institutional and legal embodi-
ment— so full and elaborate that sometimes the ends of justice may seem
obstructed by it. The relationship of public administration to the rule of law
is the subject of many volumes. It is not the present subject of discussion.2
Here, it is sufficient to note some of the chief features in the pattern of
conformity required of public administration, and the role of procedure
in achieving that pattern.

Every administrative act — national, state, or local — must conform to the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the courts, ultimately
the Supreme Court. State and local administrative__acts must, in addition,
accord with the constitution of the state and the organic law of the com-
munity concerned. Not only must administrative acts be in harmony with
constitutional provisions; they must also be in accord with the laws which
have been enacted pursuant to the constitution concerned.

2 For a review of this subject and a guide to the literature of the field, see Pennock, J.
Roland, Administrationand the Rule of Law, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941. Sec also
below Ch. 23, "The Judicial Test."

386 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

Safeguarding Liberty and Equality. The Constitution of the United
States and those of the states individually, and many of the federal and
state laws, contain provisions designed to safeguard citizens from unjust
and arbitrary actions — that is, to assure the "rule of law" in its moral
content, in its substance. What is the moral content, the substantive mean-
ing, of the rule of law? A brief answer may be made: liberty and equality.
Ac to liberty, federal and state constitutions and laws are studded with pro-
visions seeking to guarantee that certain impositions shall not be made
upon individuals by government action, or that if they do happen they
shall happen only in a certain prescribed manner, by "due-process of law."
Examples are the provisions guaranteeing freedom— o£. expression, or the
rules of court procedure designed to safeguard the rights of those accused
of crimes. As to^equajity, constitutions and laws are likewise replete with
provisions seeking to make sure that all persons shall be treated equally
by government; or that if classifications are established these shall be rea-
sonable with treatment equal within classes. Thus there are provisions
securing for every one "equal protection of the laws."

These limitations upon administration are political as well as legal. It
is not only that the ideas_of liberty and equality are anchored in the laws.
They are also deeply ing*amed in our national psychology and are hence
a political force to be reckoned with. Public agencies are often not free to
take expeditious actions or to make distinctions in treatment that are within
the requirements of the law — and that a private concern would take without
hesitation. The reason is that to do so might raise a hue and cry of
"dictatorship" that might imperil the very existence of the agency.

The ways in which procedure serves to ensure that the requirements
of the "rule of law" are met are manifold. Probably most prominent arc
consultation and review in their various forms. Consultation — intra-agency,
interagency, and extragovernmental — in proper procedural form goes far to
make certain that regulations and decisions are both legal and politic. Pro-
cedures for administrative review of protested actions arc constantly being
improved and lessen appeals to the courts. Procedures for internal review
of correspondence, orders, and other official documents ojten take an undue
toll of time and temper of personnel. Yet, adequately safeguarded by limi-
tations on types of review and on time for review, "clearance" performs an
invaluable function in contributing to administrative legality and propriety.

Legislative Prescription of Procedure. In seeking to assure that adminis-
trative procedures are consonant with and adapted to serve the ends of
constitutional government, American legislative bodies often prescribe pro-
cedures in greater or lesser detail, rather than leave the matter to the dis-
cretion of administrators. Legislation may, for example, direct that an
agency issue orders only after consulting with the affected individual or
group, or provide a review only for certain types of contested decisions,
Of necessity, however, such procedural instructions are set forth in phraseol-

GOVERNMENT B¥ PROCEDURE 387

ogy less subtle than the facts that confront the agency. There is a large
area in which the agency is "on its own" in devising procedures for
achieving its particular objectives within legal and political limits. A con-
siderable limitation of this area of option has been attempted by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1946, about which more will be said in a
later chapter.

In the case of regulatory agencies, the creation of procedures is of special
significance because the procedures followed affect the "substance" of law
in spelling out the rights and duties of individuals. Often, in fact, it is
only through procedures that the intent of the basic statute with respect
to particular conditions is manifested. In the statutes governing regulatory
agencies, even when carefully drawn, we find rather broad criteria of action,
such as "public convenience and necessity," "fair and equitable," or "unfair
methods of competition." Criteria like these are translated by administrative
determination into specific substantive rules or decisions— that is to say,
rules or decisions to the effect that certain categories of persons or enter-
prises may or must take or refrain from specified actions.

In translating the general criterion into the particular rule or decision,
procedures must be carefully devised to ensure reasonableness, fairness, and
consistency. Or, from another point of view, they must ensure that all rules
and decisions are within the intent of the legislature and will be upheld if
challenged in the courts. The "meaning" of a regulatory statute as it is
applied depends thoroughly and intimately upon procedural rules relating
to the collection of data or evidence, review of proposed regulations, appeals
from decisions, and so forth.

In addition to laying down procedures designed to maintain the "rule of
law," legislative bodies often prescribe such procedures for somewhat differ-
ent purposes. Conceiving their role as that of a "board of directors" for
the public's business, they attempt to control the management of that busi-
ness by defining the manner in which it shall be carried on, particularly
in matters relating to personnel and expenditure of funds. In part this
may be ascribed to the fact that under our constitutional system, legislative
bodies try to compensate for their very limited ability to choose or remove
a chief executive. They are therefore prone to supervise executive actions
in as great detail as possible. In part, also, it may be ascribed to the special
honesty, publicity, and propriety expected in the conduct of public busi-
ness. As a nation we have a double standard of administrative virtue,
one for private organizations and one for public. As a result, legis-
lators— and sometimes administrators — in a well-meant attempt to "keep
out of trouble" tend to create substantive vices by excesses of procedural
virtue.

Protecting Administrative Morality. Dishonesty in public places is news.
Since the merest peccadillos may come through magnification in the press
to influence policy, public financial and personnel procedures are hedged

388 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

about by a great mass of stipulations designed to attain, not speed and
efficiency in the public's business, but honesty to the letter and accuracyjto
the cent.3 The same is true of procurement of supplies, which is potentially
and sometimes actually subject to serious abuse. To prevent dishonesty,
elaborate safeguards have been erected. Thus government agencies are in-
duced to regard purchasing of supplies as a routine clerical operation that
can be performed by any one who has mastered the many relevant laws,
regulations, and forms, rather than a business calling for skill in the
economics of supply.

The criteria of success under such conditions are apt to relate more to
the correctness of the paperwork or the absence of "exceptions" taken by
the supervisory authority, and less to cost and quality. Of course, honesty
is essential. It is a prime question, however, whether there is not a basic
deficiency in laws and rules that fail to encourage an efficient stewardship
of the public interest and on the contrary lend an aura of respectability to
limited vision and dullness.

As citizens, we demand that propriety as well as honesty in public
business be doubly served by administrative procedures. For example — per-
haps as a survival of the notion that "the king can do no wrong" — letters
from the government are expected to be not only precise and definitive in
substantive commitments but also models of correctness. So the Bureau of
Widgets perforce must maintain a foolproof correspondence-review proce-
dure to ensure neat and grammatical replies even to messy and ungrammati-
cal letters, despite the inevitable delay.

Aims of Procedure. Clearly, the public character of public administra-
tion generates special problems in the creation and revision of procedures.
At the bare minimum, administrative procedures must be above a legiti-
mate charge of unconstitutionally or illegality. If they are good procedures,
they will do much more. "They will aim to conform to the spirit as well as
the letter of our basic guarantees of freedom and equality. They will seek
under unusjaally difficult circumstances to reconcile honesty with speed and
efficiency. They will go beyond the requirements of law in providing for
prompt and courteous treatment of the citizen.

The public official is like the preacher's wife in that higher than usual
standards of morality, propriety, and courtesy are deemed to apply to both.
In an economic sense there may be no distinction between the sources of
public and private salaries, but the Taxpayers' League will never believe it.

3. TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Classes of Procedures. A Linnaeus who will analyze and classify the flora
of the procedural realm has yet to appear. For some reason, formal analysis
in this realm has lagged behind that in the realm of organization. Perhaps

8 A lively discussion of limitations of this type will be found in Juran, J. M., Bureaucracy:
A Challenge to Better Management, ch. 5, New York: Harper, 1944.

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 389

this indicates only that no constructive purpose would be served by classi-
fication. Perhaps it indicates lack of courage and industry, for procedural
issuances exhibit a forbidding tropical exuberance and diversity.

Administrative procedures can obviously be classified upon a purely
formal basis in several ways-— for instance, whether written or unwritten,
whether issued centrally or by field offices, and so on. However, the formal
classification which seems most significant, in terms of the sources and uses
of administrative procedures, is one which distinguishes between procedures
designed to keep the organization operating as an organization, and those
designed to accomplish the particular objectives of the organization. The
former are internal and purely "institutional." They are not issued to the
public. The latter, being concerned with the specific job of the organization,
vary greatly. They are of two main types: those affecting a public and
issued publicly, and those issued and applying internally only.

Institutional Procedures. Institutional administrative procedures in our
sense are those pertaining to a staff, housekeeping, service, or auxiliary
function.4 As noted earlier, such procedures for public agencies are in a
large — and even undesirably large — measure prescribed by statute, though
in practice the procedures of various agencies operating under the same
statutory prescriptions may vary considerably. Some of the institutional
procedures of each agency are also likely to emanate from a central unit
operating upon a government-wide basis — in the federal government the
Civil Service Commission, Bureau of the Budget, Treasury, or General
Accounting Office. Among the matters usually covered by institutional
procedures are: mail and communications; meetings and conferences;
travel; internal reporting; preparation, issuance and distribution of docu-
ments; space; library service; files and records; clerical services; procure-
ment; clearance and review; budgetary and fiscal administration; and per-
sonnel administration in all its aspects — recruitment, classification, leave
and attendance, compensation and promotions, and so forth.

The range and complexity of these procedures may well be illustrated
by the travel regulations. In the federal government the travel regulations
prescribed for all agencies run to many thousands of words. They deal in
great detail with such matters as receiving authority to travel; permissible
accommodations; special conveyances; use of telephone and telegraph; cal-
culation of per diem allowance; and use of various forms, a minimum of
three in any case — travel authorization form, travel request form, expense
voucher form.

Wording Procedures. Procedures designed to accomplish an agency's
particular objectives are divisible into those oublicly and those not publicly

4 In its general meaning, "staff" includes most or all of the other functions enumerated
here; see above Ch. 7, "Working Concepts of Organization," sec. 2, "Line and Staff." If
the meaning of "staff" is more sharply confined to thinking and plan-making, related func-
tions to control or ease operations stand out as separate entities.

390 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

issued. Procedures that are issued publicly constitute a set of "ground ttilcs0
for the agency and any individual affected by the basic statute. They rep-
resent the agency's sense of the procedural requirements of the law, per-
haps after judicial test, and also its conception of what is customary, fair,
and expedient where the law is not explicit. In general, publicly issued
procedural materials. indicate the manner in which agencies may reach and
apply substantive decisions; set forth the part the affected persons may take
or are required to take in connection with substantive determinations; and
stipulate the remedies and appeals, short of the courts, available to affected
persons.

Specifically, such procedural issuances deal with consultations and con-
ferences with interest groups; adversary proceedings; investigations; exami-
nations; petitions; reports and records as a basis for findings; hearings;
official notice; written evidence; oral argument; briefs and pleadings; depo-
sitions; subpoenas; and administrative review. They often contain forms
to be filled out and utilized. Ideally, they should tell all persons affected
by the basic statute "what^ where, when, and how" in simple language.

Mention of "substantive" decisions or determinations requires a word
of explanation. Many of the regulations, orders, and decisions issued by
public agencies are primarily substantive rather than procedural. That is
to say, they purport to state the intent-or substance of the law as applied
to a given set of facts. Such are decisions of public utility commissions or
"cease and desist" orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission. Often
the dividing line between substantive and procedural issuances is not at
all distinct. In some, procedural and substantive provisions are actually
commingled. Thus Treasury regulations under a particular tax law may
contain, without formal distinction between them, procedural instructions
and substantive provisions supplementing specific sections of the law.5

Publicly issued procedures in the nature of "ground rules" give the key
to the most important category of internally issued procedures designed to
achieve an agency's objectives. For each important procedural issuance

5 To obviate another possible source of confusion, it should be noted that "administrative
procedure" is sometimes given a much narrower meaning than that given it in this discussion.
A considerable number of students whose backgrounds and interests are primarily legal use
the term "administrative procedure" to refer only to the procedures of regulatory agencies in
applying their statutes to affected persons. This narrower usage derives from the use of the
word "administrative" to apply only to agencies which have "the power to determine, cither
by rule or decision, private rights and obligations." See Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, p. 7, Senate Doc.
No. 8, 77th Gang., 1st Sess., 1941.

The limitations of this exclusively legal point of view are indicated by a statement a few
pages later (p. 19): "The Gommittee has been impressed by the frequent reluctance of high
officers, charged with serious policy-making functions, to relinquish control over the most
picayune phases of personnel and business management." By definition, high officers should
not concern themselves with "picayune" matters. Or might it seem to a lawyer intent upon
his own specialty that all matters of personnel and management are picayune? In practice, the
legal aspect of administration is important but seldom predominant.

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 391

affecting persons outside an organization, there is likely to be issued another
procedural document to persons within the organization, explaining in
greater detail the part that they must play in the total operation. For exam-
ple, if a statement or affidavit is required of an individual affected by the
enforcement of the law, it is necessary to specify the manner of handling this
document within the organization — the officers or organization units re-
sponsible, time limitations for each decision or process, criteria to be applied,
and methods of disposition. It should be noted, however, that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1946 has considerably extended the range of
federal procedures that must be issued publicly.

The publicly issued procedural regulation and its internal counterpart
may be illustrated by considering the industry advisory committees estab-
lished by some agencies. The publicly issued regulation will deal with such
matters as general functions and powers of the committees; eligibility for
membership and appointment of members; committee officers and finances;
meetings and recommendations. The internal regulation will cover such
matters as purpose of committees; when to establish committees; selection
of committee members; securing official approval of comitiittees; invitations
and declinations; public announcements; resignations and removals; alter-
nates; and so forth.

Diversity of Procedures. Internally issued procedures designed to achieve
an agency's objectives exhibit great diversity. For each agency they are
distinctive because the agency itself is distinctive — in its organizational
structure, its purposes, its location, its legal and administrative tools, its size,
its clientele, its techniques, or its personnel. Every organization is unique
in certain ways if only because its personnel, traditions, and mode of opera-
tions are unique in their combination. Therefore procedure, as the struc-
ture of working relations between all the components of an organization,,
must vary with the individuality of the organization.

As diversity is the distinguishing feature of this category of administra-
tive procedure, it is better to illustrate its manifold nature than to attempt
classification. Let us consider, then, the differences between the procedures
of two federal units — the Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Econom-
ics and the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance.

Two Illustrations. The former is one of several bureaus comprising the
Agricultural Research Administration in the Department of Agriculture.
Its functions are: research in foods and nutrition, textiles and clothing, hous-
ing and household equipment, and family economics; and summarization
and dissemination of information in these fields. In its research work, con-
ducted upon a project basis, it has relationships in the Washington area
with the remainder of the Agricultural Research Administration, and also
with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the Public Health Service, and the Bureau of Standards. In its educational
orogram it has relationships with the Extension Service and the Office of

392 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

Education. It has no field organization, but important research work is
carried on throughout the country on a basis of temporary cooperation with
other interested bodies, such as land-grant colleges and privately endowed
universities. Apart from its institutional procedures — which it has generally
in common with the larger organization of which it is a part — the proce-
dures of this bureau concern such matters as inauguration and approval of
projects; relationships among its five functional divisions; presentation, re-
view, and publication of research findings; and relationships with the
agencies with which it cooperates in research or publicity.

The Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance, operating under the
Social Security Board in the Federal Security Agency, is responsible for
the accomplishment of the old-age and survivors' insurance provisions of
the Social Security Act. The extent of its operations is indicated by the fact
that some 67,000,000 social-security account numbers have been assigned
up to the present time. To perform its functions, a very extensive field
organization is necessary. The bureau operates through the board's regional
offices and nearly 500 field offices administered directly by the bureau under
the general supervision of the regional directors. In addition, there is a
large central establishment for the maintenance of complete and detailed
wage records for each insured person.

The typical procedures of this bureau concern such matters as the assign-
ing of account numbers; investigating and developing accurate wage data
when such information has been incompletely or incorrectly reported by
employers; verifying and posting wage reports; accepting and adjudicating
claims; making insurance payments; and so forth. The performance of
these operations upon so vast a scale necessitates procedures that are not
only elaborate but also meticulous in the extreme, making use of the most
advanced office equipment and recording and sorting devices.

If nothing else, our discussion of types of administrative procedures
will have conveyed the impression that the species of procedure are not
distinct and neatly labeled.6 Perhaps this conclusion need not cause con-
cern, inasmuch as the science of biology is itself without an unexceptionable
concept of species!

4. CREATION AND CRITERIA

Procedure-Making Compared with Policy-Making. In the broad view,
administrative procedures are conceived and developed in a manner similar
to that of administrative policies. This is natural since the two are intimately

* Unfortunately, the nomenclature of printed procedural materials is inconsistent and con-
fusing. Procedural materials are usually issued in serial form, in which case they are known
as "regulations" or "orders"; or in code form, in which case items are designated by volume,
part, chapter, etc. There is no general distinction between categories, such as "regulations,"
"rules," or "orders." Each agency or jurisdiction uses the terms in accordance with its history
and tastes, distinguishing between various types of regulations or orders by adjectives — for
instance, different series of regulations may be designated as "administrative," "general," "divi-
sional," and so on.

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 393

related. Procedures should exist only to give effect to policies; and a wise
policy decision cannot be made without thorough consideration of the pro-
cedural implications of alternatives. As in the case of policy decisions, the
top executive, operating officials, staff personnel, legislative bodies, lawyers
and courts, and outside interest groups all affect the formulation of an
agency's procedures.

Compared with the formulation of administrative policy, however, there
are significant differences in the roles played by the various participants.
The top executive's role is proportionately less. His energies will be largely
absorbed in activities related — if only indirectly — to the formulation of the
agency's policies. Unless the procedure affects all or a substantial element
of the organization, or has important policy or public-relations aspects, no
extensive part is likely to be played by the executive head, except when
formal clearance discloses disagreements. Similarly with line or operating
officials generally. Their day-by-day business will account for most of their
time and thought, and few of them will have interest in the technicalities of
improved procedures — however much they may be irritated by the inade-
quacies of present procedures.

However, seldom will a procedural change be made without consultation
with or even the cooperation and consent of the operating officials whose
work the change affects. The question whether and in what cases they
should be allowed to interpose vetoes to procedural changes is a fertile
source of internal conflict. Operating officials often do veto procedural
changes, by virtue of higher authority or by sub rosa methods. In any
organization there is covert or perhaps open competition for position or
influence, and victory and defeat in this competition are often manifested in
procedural change — or lack of change.

As with the top executive and line officials, so with the legislature and
interest groups — they claim a smaller share in the formation of procedures
than they do in the formation of policies. Legislatures, as we saw, prescribe
a considerable volume of "housekeeping" procedure. Some of the indi-
vidual agency's chief procedures, too, are likely to be laid down in its
main statute — for instance, that a review division shall handle certain types
of cases, or that outside interests shall be consulted upon an organized basis.
However, in any case there is a great bulk of procedural detail to be
filled in.

Interest_gtoups impinge upon the procedure-making process at several
points. They may be consulted formally on proposed procedure or its revision;
or they may exercise some informal influence, by virtue of personal relations
between their members and agency officers or procedure-making personnel.
Interest groups make their interest in procedure felt most effectively, how-
ever, on the relatively rare occasions when they can prevail upon the legisla-
tive body to change an agency's procedures— perhaps over the objections
of the latter.

394 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

The place occupied by the lawyer in procedure-making is of great
importance, particularly in regulatory agencies. Also, his role is often in
dispute. Theoretically, it is advisory only, even in the preparation of proce-
dural materials that affect the rights and duties of individuals. Not legal
learning alone, but knowledge of the facts and simplicity of phrase are of
the essence. Certainly, however, the lawyer has a legitimate advisory func-
tion in laying out procedures that must meet the test of "due process
of law."

Procedure-Making Units. So much for the broad picture, but what of
procedure-making organs, the problems they face, the methods and criteria
they use ? The answers to these questions must, of necessity, touch upon many
important subjects. It should therefore be borne in mind that the special-
ized knowledge and arts of the procedural analyst are not fully encom-
passed in our survey. These will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.

As to procedure-making organs, they are of various kinds and they
exist under a wide variety of designations, depending upon the organization
and customs of the agency of which they are a part. Generally speaking,
procedure-making organs are attached in a staff capacity to the top executive
or a subordinate line official, integrated with a budget office or an adminis-
trative-management division, or associated with or located in a planning
organ. A procedure-making organ may operate on a government-wide
basis in its administrative jurisdiction. Thus the Civil Service Commission
and the Bureau of the Budget, as indicated above, perform some procedure-
making functions for federal administration generally.

In addition to special procedure-making units operating at different
organizational levels of authority, there is frequently, particularly in large
organizations, specialization in types of procedural work. Usually the
unit dealing with institutional procedures is separate from that dealing
with the agency's substantive procedures. Units for work simplification or
standardization of procedures in such fields as personnel may be sepa-
rate from either. Wherever they are located and whatever their functions,
it is important that the procedure-making organs have authority equal to
their tasks — and not only formal authority, but that moral authority that
stems from the interest and support of top management and from adequate
professional skill. These last are two of the three most significant ingredi-
ents of good procedural work; the third is the interest and cooperation of
the personnel affected by the procedures, particularly the line executives.

There are two major emphases in procedural work. One is upon creat-
ing new procedures, the other upon improving existing procedures. In
either case, of course, a new procedure must also be tested and installed.

Art of Making Procedures. He who creates new procedures must first
of all apply himself diligently to six questions: What? Why? Who? How?
When? Where? Incisiveness and imagination are necessary. What does
the statute say? Where the statute is not clear, what is the best interprc-

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 395

tation? What procedural clues are offered by similar organizations doing
similar tasks? Can the job be done effectively with the present organiza-
tion or should change be recommended? If a particular method appears
efficient, can it be reconciled with stautory requirements? Is the job one
that can be done best by using ten skilled or fifteen unskilled employees?
Such are some of the questions for which answers must be found.

Intimate knowledge of the facts is essential, but hardly less important is
"writijig^up" the procedure. For this, some of the art of the playwright is
necessary, for good written procedures are rather like the script of a good
play. The "characters" must be introduced and identified, and they should
have an organic role in the production. Entrances and exits must be
planned with purpose, stage directions must be given, and so forth. Pro-
cedural materials should be brief, clear, and concise. All the tricks in the
writers' and printers' trades should be employed, for to learn their lines
quickly the players must be induced to read them. Unfortunately, proce-
dural manuals are frequently as dry and forbidding as the Sahara.7

Procedures must be installed. Even the best-written materials do not
suffice of themselves. Educational campaigns must be undertaken, incentives
offered, sanctions devised, methods for apprehending violators worked out,
test runs made to discover "bugs," and follow-up inspections planned. All
possible devices for breaking old habits and creating new ones must be
used.

The job of probing and bettering procedures is in part the same as that
of creating new procedures, in part different. It involves preliminary fact-
finding and planning; analysis of existing procedure; development of the
proposed new procedure; and testing, installing, and following up the
changed procedure. Determination must be made, first of all, of areas likely
to be productive of results. Such phenomena as mushroom growth of
activities, inexperienced personnel, or consolidation of units within an organi-
zation indicate areas most likely to need analysis and change. Next comes
reconnaissance into the existing situation, followed by "softening up," by
whatever stratagems and demonstrations of shortcomings that can be em-
ployed. Then corrective action may be initiated.

Worl{ Simplification and Procedural Standardization. There are two
well-recognized types of programs in the field of procedure improvement,
both of which have been speeded in their development by work of the
Army Service Forces during World War II. One of these is work simpli-
fication, which has as its chief tools the work distribution chart, the process
chart and the workload chart. The work distribution chart is prepared from
an inventory of the work of each member of an organization unit or par-

7 On the subject of simplifying "official English" see Flcsch, Rudolph, "More About
^" Public Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, pp. 240-244. Herbert A. Simon's

'The Fine Art of Issuing Orders," Public Management, 1945, Vol. 27, pp. 206-208, contains
much wisdom pertinent to the subject.

396 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

ticipant in a particular procedure. It shows in tabular form the activities
of all employees and the time they spend on their work. The process chart
or flow chart traces step-by-step "what happens" for a given procedure—
what is done, who does it, time consumed, and space and time between
each step. The workload chart or work count aims to answer the ques-
tion of "how much." What is counted and the method of counting depend
upon what is being studied. The chart's uses are in dividing, relating, and
scheduling work; finding bottlenecks; stimulating competitive interests in
performance; assessing personnel needs; and appraising the value of parti-
cular processes. Using these three tools of analysis and sometimes others,
work simplification programs perform the function of modernizing and
streamlining procedures.

Procedure standardization differs from work simplification chiefly in
emphasis, though it may make use of the same tools. It seeks to discover
and install the one most economical and efficient procedure for doing
common or interrelated work of certain kinds. In order to merit a
standardization study, an operation must be a fairly basic one, it must
cut across much or all of the organization, and it must involve a reasonably
large number of persons. The values of procedure standardization lie in
such matters as clarifying policy intent; publicizing and generalizing all
useful information that was formerly the possession of a few employees;
standardizing costs and man-hour requirements; and training new person-
nel by the use of procedural manuals.

Problems of Procedure-Making. The central problem in procedure-
making of any kind is how to combine experience in procedure per se with
[knowledge about and an adequate "feeling" for the operations which par-
ticular procedures govern. To hard-working operating officials, the "proce-
dural analyst" may seem an uninformed busybody — he cannot possibly
know as much about the operation as those-on-the-job, it's none of his
business anyway, and if he really wants to be helpful — as he says he does! —
let him pitch in and help with the work that's piling up. To the inquiring
procedural analyst, in turn, operating officials may seem short-sighted, self-
centered, narrow-minded — each interested only in his task of the moment
and utterly lacking in organizational perspective. Failure to solve satisfac-
torily this central problem of combining diverse outlooks has two results.
Either the procedure-making organ, if bolstered by formal authority,
promulgates procedures that are useless and often disregarded; or no pro-
cedural changes are made except through tedious evolution or violent
revolution.

Let it be admitted that the task of the procedural analyst is frequently
difficult and thankless. Interest in procedures is a rather rare and precious
quality, likely to mark him as suspect at the outset. Interference with
established habits evokes deep and often sharp psychological reactions.
The innate aversion to change is often reinforced by fear of loss of employ-

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 397

ment or of harder work if the status quo is disturbed. By humorous legend,
the "efficiency expert" is peculiarly liable to accidents, such as falling down
an elevator shaft or into an acid vat!

On the other hand, let it also be admitted that the Bright-Eyed Young
Chap from upstairs is frequently a sore trial to any one who has already
missed the deadline on his current assignment. Much is still to be done in
"humanizing" the procedural analyst and in helping him to develop suit-
able protective coloration. And after all, we cannot deny the kernel of
wisdom in the belief that "there is much to be said for a poor procedure
if people are used to it." A change in procedure may or may not pay off
over the long haul, but the immediate results, as the man-on-the-job knows,
are almost certain to be temporary confusion, unhappiness, questioning,
and complaint.

No simple solution exists to this central problem of procedural im-
provement— the proper admixture of diverse interests. Two devices for
helping to solve it are, however, being used with increasing success. One
is the employee-suggestion system, with rewards in honor or money to those
who submit practicable suggestions for administrative improvement. "Sug-
gestion boxes" are venerable institutions, but the potentialities of employee-
suggestion systems for a number of important purposes are receiving grow-
ing recognition. The other device is the work-simplification program, dis-
cussed earlier, which depends for its success upon training supervisory per-
sonnel in the philosophy and basic methods of procedural analysis and
improvement. There is nothing esoteric in such tools as the process chart.
The more widespread how-to-do-it-better thinking becomes, the closer to
solution will be one of the fundamental problems of administration.

Reference has been made in our discussion to "good" procedure as dis-
tinguished from poor. But what is "good" procedure? Again, no simple
answer is possible. Or rather, a simple answer is possible but not very
helpful: good procedure is that which is well adapted to achieve the desired
'ends. The trouble arises both in defining the "desired ends" and in de-
termining whether the procedure really is well adapted to achieving them
once they have been agreed upon.

The ends sought by administration are not easily stated. They are com-
plex and intangible, and it is often difficult to determine which of them is
to be served by a procedure, and in what proportions. After decision upon
ends, the relative "efficiency and economy" of alternative procedures must
be measured. Efficiency and economy are not readily applied criteria; they
vary in their implications according to the goal in view. Much progress
has been made in recent years in achieving objective standards of measure-
ment in some fields of administrative performance. However, the tools are
still relatively crude and inadequate. Thus, a new procedure saves paper and
filing facilities; yet can we be sure that the operating official is not right
when he says that the saving is but a straw in the balance compared to the

398 GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE

objectives served by more complete records? Or a new procedure estab-
lishes the optimum specialization of the functions of three clerks, as de-
termined by work counts and time-and-motion studies; yet can we be sure
that staleness and increased fatigue will not outweigh the gain within a
month? Suppose that under the new arrangement the three clerks are not
as "happy" as before. Is the happiness of employees a legitimate considera-
tion in democratic administration? Even on a practical basis, are we sure
the happiness won't "pay off" over the long run in loyalty and morale?
The "grammar" of procedure — its routine steps and its customary tools —
is easy to learn. But knowledge of grammar is at most a first step in pro-
ducing literature. And the art of procedural analysis still far transcends
the science.8

5. How TO LIVE AMONG PROCEDURES

Law Versus Dispatch. In the stereotypes that the political cartoonist
has created, the public bureaucrat is either a malignant person who spins
"red tape" to accomplish his own wicked designs or a stupid person who
creates red tape in the image of his stupidity.9

Some of the reasons why these stereotypes have found such widespread
acceptance should now be clear. In the management of its internal affairs,
public administration is for political reasons bound by rules designed to

8 Some of the material dealing with procedural analysis has been prepared for agency use
only; some material, though more widely circulated, is not available except in specialized
libraries. Generally, and especially in the area of policy procedures, much remains to be done,
both in exploration and publication for general use. Work simplification and procedure
standardization stem from and are associated with the scientific-management movement. They
arc direct descendants of Frederick Taylor's early searches for the "one best way." The litera-
ture of this field, such as the time and motion studies of the journal Advanced Management,
should be consulted on various aspects of these subjects.

See also Clascr, Comstock, Administrative Procedure: A Practical Handbook for the Ad-
ministrative Analyst, especially chs. 1, 5, and 11, Washington: American Council on Public
Affairs, 1941; Gottschalk, Col. Oliver A., "Standardization of Procedure," Public Administration
Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp. 287-297; Raising Management's Sights on Office Organization
(pamphlet), New York: American Management Association, 1944; Work Simplification (pam-
phlet), reprinted from Adjutant -General's School Bulletin, June 1943 issue. Excellent tech-
nical material may be found in the following: Manual for Control Officers: Volume HI, Work
Simplification, Washington: Control Division, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1942; Control
Manual (M703-7): Simplification and Standardization of Procedures, Washington: Head-
quarters, Army Service Forces, 1944; Control Manual (M703-4): Work Simplification (Material
Handling), Washington: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1943; Control Manual (M703-6):
Standardization of Forms, Washington: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1944; Work
Simplification, As Exemplified by the Work Simplification Program of the U. S. Bureau of the
Budget, Publication No. 91, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1945.

A very good picture of the procedural problems and apparatus of an important agency
can be gained by studying two essays, written from different points of view, about the War
Production Board: Levinc, David D., "Administrative Control Techniques of the War Pro-
duction Board,'* Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, pp. 89-96; and O'Brian, John
Lord and Flcischmann, Manly, "The War Production Board Administrative Policies and Pro-
cedures," George Washington Law Review, 1944, Vol. 13, pp. 1-60.

* Cf. also above Ch. 3, "Bureaucracy — Fact and Fiction."

GOVERNMENT BY PROCEDURE 399

guarantee complete honesty and accountability,10 not solely efficiency and
economy as these qualities are understood in private affairs. In its regu-
latory activities, public administration is governed by legal rules and insti-
tutions evolved over a long period of time to guarantee the rights of the
citizen against unwarranted governmental interference. Certainly we can-
not expect particular speed and dispatch of public administration when it
is subject to a body of law designed to prevent too great speed and dispatch.
Perhaps speed and dispatch need more emphasis as against guarantees of
rights. Or perhaps under modern conditions rights can be better guaran-
teed with more speed and dispatch in the public's affairs. But let the issues
be clear.

Deficient Procedures. It must be conceded, of course, that some admin-
istrative procedures fall far short of legitimate aspirations. Such instances
usually occur because a procedure, once satisfactory, no longer fits the facts.
Procedures are habits, and habits notoriously persist into senility after the
rational faculties have been blunted. It is seldom, however, that public
procedures reflect mere personal ends; the preventive checks are too certain.
The contrary belief stems rather from the prior and more fundamental
matter of disagreement with an agency's objectives.

Assessing Red Tape. One whose blood-pressure rises dangerously upon
encountering "red tape" in public administration can with therapeutic
benefits pursue several lines of thought. He can reflect upon the wisdom
of General Marshall's dictum that "if you cut red tape you must be damn
sure of what you are doing." After all, one man's red tape is another man's
system. Only when all the facts are known can condemnation be fairly
entered and a change be recommended that is likely to be beneficial. Rarely
does an isolated encounter with a personally irritating procedure yield the
knowledge necessary for a just condemnation. Or he can reflect that red
tape constitutes a protection against precipitate and arbitrary official action
to his detriment, and that this must be weighed against any possible annoy-
ance in dealing with government. Or he may elect to act upon the half-
truth that red tape, like caries or cancer, is an affliction of civilization, and
Thoreau-like retreat to his own Walden Pond.

Those inside the organization will also find these remedies generally
applicable for their own irritations. Indeed, irritation with an agency's
red tape is a chronic and often acute complaint of public employees. Of
course, it is usually the other fellow's red tape that is at fault; and since he
is a member of the same staff he can be hated with the special fierceness
that characterizes fratricidal strife. What is more important, the govern-
ment employee should recognize that he is in no event bound to be a mere
pawn in the game. No matter how lowly his status, he has both a right
and an obligation to seek to improve procedures.

10 Cf. below Part IV, "Responsibility and Accountability."

CHAPTER

The Tasks of Middle Management

1. THE DUAL FUNCTION OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

Importance of Intermediate Points of Control. In order to bring execu-
tive direction to bear upon the general flow of operations in which the end
product of public service takes its shape, administrative agencies — like all
large-scale enterprise — resort to hierarchical organization.1 The essential
function of hierarchy is to provide an integrated scheme of intermediate
control points for the attainment of efficiency, consistency, and continuity of
cooperative effort. In linking these control points in descending order, from
the head of the organization to progressively lower subordinates down to
the first-line supervisor, we arrive at a "chain of command."

Too often we speak of hierarchy as if it were a physical structure sep-
arate from the human element. Actually it is more in the nature of a tex-
ture of relationships — each member of the hierarchy responding to his
superior and in turn influencing his subordinates, with countless variables
of relationship entering into the picture.2 Nor must it be assumed that
hierarchy is principally a device for superimposing top determinations upon
the whole organization. Hierarchy does engender a desirable centripetal
pull, preventing the cooperative undertaking from falling apart. However,
the chief test of its effectiveness lies in appropriate devolution of respon-
sibility so as to allow the organization to work under its own "steam." To
the same degree that hierarchy reinforces accountability and responsiveness
toward the top, it should also relieve those at the top of unnecessary burdens.
This can be done only by adequate delegation of authority. Devolution of
responsibility without commensurate delegation of authority is an empty
gesture, bound to lead nowhere.

Small-scale organization has only two vulnerable areas — the character
of its leadership and the productivity of its immediate operators. In large-

1 Sec above Ch. 7, "Working Concepts of Organization/' sec. 3, "Quest of Organizational
Unity."

2 See above Ch. 13, "Informal Organization.'*

400

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 401

scale organization, the number of vulnerable areas is much greater because
of the multitude of intermediate control points between top management
and the rank and file of employees. iys_therefw^lwj;dy^an ^exaggeration to
sa^jhat^one of the most critical_sectors of management in large-scale or-
ganizations lies in the intermediate ranges of cpmmand. The whole con-
cept of "channels of command" underscores the importance of those points
of internal control and direction which are lodged between the responsible
head of the organization and his working force at the base of operations.
The total distribution of these intermediate points of control and direction
indicates the field of middle management.

Middle Management — Stepchild of Administrative Research. Consider-
ing the significance of middle management for the success of any large-scale
organization, it is surprising to notice how little emphasis it has found in
the literature on administration, both public and private. A good deal of
attention has been devoted to the functions of the chief executive3 and to his
staff facilities.4 Much the same is true of administrative leadership on the
departmental level.5 In large measure the explanation for the relative fail-
ure to deal more explicitly with the particular problems surrounding middle
management must be sought in two historic factors.

In the first place, the movement toward administrative reform since
early in the century logically saw its main goal in the institutional invig-
oration of the chief executive. In stressing his responsibility for the entire
executive branch, the reform movement chose the most promising lever for
achieving better management throughout the administrative structure.
Beginning with the novel concept of a budget office attached to the chief
executive, his "arms of management" were consciously designed to make
responsible direction truly effective. Because of the traditional intransigence-
of the line departments, the new establishments with government-wide con-
cerns were generally entrusted with extensive control functions—quite in
harmony with the precedent of civil service commissions.

Exercise of such technical controls called for personnel of professional
competence to carry out specialized assignments. As a consequence, the
particular knowledge and training required to build and sustain staff or
auxiliary services have been in the forefront of academic and practical in-
terest, deflecting consideration from the no less important needs of middle
management. Judging only by the dominant currents running through
the great bulk of administrative research and writings, we might easily be
led to the inference that middle managers are a mentally inert mass, stung
into action solely by the indefatigable prodding of shock brigades of special-

3 See above Ch. 8, "The Chief Executive."

4 See above Ch. 7, "Working Concepts o£ Organization," sec. 2, "Line and Staff"; Ch. 8,
"The Chief Executive," sec. 5, "Arms of Modern Management"; Ch. 9, "The Departmental
System," sec. 2; "Interdepartmental Coordination."

5 See above Ch. 9, "The Departmental System," sec. 3, "The Secretary's Business."

402 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

ists descending upon them from the higher realm of knowledge— admin-
istrative planning, budgeting, organization and methods analysis, and
personnel work.

The second historic factor that has contributed to the relative neglect of
middle management is related to the first. It is the lack of homogeneity
and cohesiveness of middle management as an occupational grouping. Most
of the staff and auxiliary services have developed into fairly well-defined
careers, each distinguished by marked characteristics. A training specialist,
for instance, is readily identified by his specialization. There is no such
distinct career in middle management. Broadly speaking, middle man-
agers are the natural offspring of a vast variety of functions and subfunc-
tions proliferating all over the administrative scene. These functions and
subfunctions, not the essence of middle management itself, are the areas
of their specialized competence. Ordinarily they are middle managers not
because they have displayed specific managerial talent as such, but because
they have shown ability in the context of a particular function or subfunc-
tion administered by their agency.

Recognition of a Higher Line Career. In 1941, the President's Com-
mittee on Civil Service Improvement, under the chairmanship of Justice
Reed, pointed out that middle management, though identified as such
through the common character of its responsibilities, had no standing as a
specific category within the federal service for purposes of systematic train-
ing and selection. Focusing especially on the higher middle and top grades
of the classified service, the committee observed that these officials "perform
the most difficult and responsible office work along specialized lines re-
quiring extended training and experience."6 As the committee put it,7
those occupying such advanced permanent positions:

. . . perform the function of overhead management, direction, and
supervision in every branch of the Federal Government. This is the
principal duty of bureau chiefs and assistant bureau chiefs, of directors
of divisions and assistant directors, of heads of institutions, of the execu-
tive officers of commissions and their associates, and of a growing num-
ber of administrative assistants and assistants to executives in high posi-
tion. It is also one of the duties of the President and heads of departments
and agencies, secretaries, commissioners, administrators and others; but
these high officials have policy-determining duties and political respon-
sibilities as well, which are absent from the permanent branch of admin-
istration. In its elementary forms the same function may be said to reach
down to the first-line supervisors who must plan, direct, and coordinate
the work of the rank and file.

While the Reed Committee did not differentiate sharply between staff
and line positions, dealing rather with the more advanced classified grades

* President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement, Report, p. 56, House Doc. No. 118,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1941.

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 403

in general, it necessarily included in its inquiry the main body of middle
managers. The committee felt that better awareness of the distinctive re-
quirements of these grades, especially from the point of view of selection and
preparation, would yield measurable profit. Summarizing its recommenda-
tions, it stated:8

In general terms, we think it would be helpful if the positions involv-
ing administrative duties were identified and carefully described in each
department and agency, and if each department and agency made and
kept current a list or inventory of persons who had demonstrated that
they possessed administrative skill, with the personal and official history,
present classification and other relevant data. We also believe that the
continuous search for good prospective material for administration
should be more definitely recognized in some departments and agencies
as a joint responsibility of supervisors and personnel officers. Finally,
we think that the machinery is now for the first time available to permit
a desirable extension of the program of training and testing which is
already in operation in most departments.

No doubt a more methodical approach would go far toward promoting
the characteristic qualifications called for in administrative work, especially
that of middle management. This is not merely a matter of enhanced
competence. It also carries over into the general orientation and the op-
erational outlook of middle managers. Hence the Reed Committee quite
properly concerned itself with the broader question of occupational attitudes.
What it had to say on this point could hardly occasion surprise. In its
own language:9

Government departments and agencies, their divisions and their sub-

• divisions, suffer from an insularity which hampers their effective coordi-

' nation as parts of a single whole. Indifference, jealously, competition,

I and sometimes even sabotage develop in the effort of each small unit to

protect itself and its staff. There is too little recognition of a common

responsibility to a common and single employer, the American people

as represented by the Congress and the President.

Such insularity is in part the result of both the size and the functionali-
zation of large-scale organization. Tied to a particular subdivision in a
complex structure of vast dimensions, the middle manager is apt to identify
himself with the more tangible realities and objectives of his subdivision.
In part, however, his insular point of view derives from the fact that under
existing conditions he has difficulty in seeing himself as part of a profession
different from the particular function within which he rose. Lack of a
uniting bond among the exponents of middle management keeps him en-
slaved to the individual function in which he has his roots. Recognition
of middle management in terms of a career grouping would tend to draw
its mentality from the particular to the general, away from the specialized

p. 57. See also above Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administration," sec. 3,
"Training for Public Administration."
. D. 61.

404 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

functional activities from which it springs. Career integration would
deepen the middle manager's consciousness of his general role, especially
if reinforced by a government-wide scheme of interfunctional and inter-
departmental transfers within the entire administrative group. He thus
would gain wider vision and greater capacity for coordinative adjustments.

For this reason, it may be doubted whether the Reed Committee's re-
luctance to propose a consolidated higher administrative service was really
in line with the general run of its own recommendations. A higher ad-
ministrative career marked out as such would at the same time furnish
much-needed opportunities for a freer interchange of personnel between
staff and line positions. It may still be the most effective device for bridging
the gulf between these two elements— a gulf that interferes seriously
with the intimacy of give-and-take that is required for sound staff-line
relationships.

Middle Management and Top Direction. Good staff work implies not
only mastery of pertinent fields of knowledge but also a high degree of
sensitivity to the needs of the top executive and to the problems that are on
the minds of line officials. In much the same way, effective middle manage-
ment, aside from intellectual command of the functional specialization in
which it operates, requires receptivity to higher executive direction as well
as capacity for team leadership. The outstanding factor about top-level
direction is that it must encompass the organization as a whole and deal
with each issue in terms of the whole. As the principal support of top-level
direction, middle management therefore has to show itself able to infuse
the generality of organization-wide purposes into its individual operations.
On this score it can succeed only insofar as it captures in its own thinking
the broad-range ends of the organization at large. Conversely, it is bound
to fail in exact proportion to the insularity of its outlook.

If the middle manager proves incapable of reenacting in his own prov-
ince the generality of organizational ends, of relating his day-by-day actions
to the total administrative process, he in effect defaults on his basic duty.
More mindful of his immediate sphere, he becomes a counterinfluence to
higher executive direction rather than its elongation. For all practical pur-
poses he partially checkmates top management, denying it full scope over
the organization and making himself a victual -vassal who grants or with-
holds his support as convenience, expediency, or special inducements might
indicate. Under such conditions the middle manager is not far from ar-
rogating to himself all management in his orbit, defying, obstructing, or
yielding to demands from above only as he sees fit, however well he may
choose to disguise his actual autonomy. This may be deliberate in certain in-
stances, especially when a middle manager is at odds with the higher powers
and is also protected by a more or less concealed alliance with political or
economic groups outside the organization.10 As a rule he succumbs to

above Ch. 13, "Informal Organization/' sec. 2, "Elements of Informal Organization.*'

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 405

such autonomistic tendencies unconsciously. Top management is far away.
It is referred to not as "we" but as "they"— "we" do things our own way;
"they" come in to tell us, though having not the faintest idea of "our"
troubles and "our" business.

The strength of middle management rests in the fact that it thoroughly
knows its own "shop." This knowledge is the middle manager's stock-in-
trade and his legitimate pride. Staff specialists are likely to be glared at
with particular fierceness when they are tactless enough to demonstrate
that through their own analysis they have come to know the "shop" as well,
if not better. Operators naturally do not take too well to the idea that any
one might know as much about operations as they do. However, the virtue
of the middle manager's intimate familiarity with his own segment of the
organization has its corresponding vice. The vice of the virtue lies in a
proportionately dimmer perception of what the organization is trying to ac-
complish as a whole. Such dimmed perception inevitably affects the role
of middle management as an elongation of the executive function.

However urgent and continuous its attention to the progress of opera-
tions, middle management must find as much time as it can to face upward,
As an informed student of administration has expressed it, "the drag of
inadequacy is always downward. The need in administration is always
for the reverse: for a secretary to project his thinking to the governmental
level, for a bureau chief to try to see the problems of the department, for
the division chief to comprehend the work of the entire bureau."11 Nc
doubt one of the most pressing needs in administration is that for increas-
ingly more comprehensive consideration as matters move upward from the
bottom to the top. However, such progressive generalization in the pres-
entation of each individual subject that calls for higher action does not
come forth of its own. Top management, expecting support from the
middle manager, must extend its hand to him, so to speak. It must ac-
tively seek to convey to him a sense of organization-wide objectives. Effec-
tive communication of top-level policy is one method of achieving this end.
Another is untiring demonstration of the interest that top management has
in the way operations are going.

The institutional communication system is therefore a matter of crucial
significance for the entire conduct of middle management.12 A top man-
agement that wraps itself in silence resembles a head after decapitation.
Top-level action by itself is an entirely insufficient agent of communication.
In the first place, such action is by no means always conspicuous through-
out the organization. In many instances the determination and adjustment
of policy in the highest councils of the organization aim at longer-range

11 Applcby, Paul H., Big Democracy, p. 45, New York: Knopf, 1945. See also above Ch. 9,
"The Departmental System," sec. 4, "The Bureau Pattern."

12 See also above Ch. 16, "The Formulation of Administrative Policy," sec. 1, "Policy
Formation and Policy Sanction.*'

406 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

effects rather than immediately visible changes. The large body of person-
nel in the organization may live through many a day before the first con-
crete ripples of the change come down to it. Secondly, the bare policy
pronouncement and the letter of administrative orders and instructions are
too frugal a diet to nurture full understanding of institutional goals. For
their own purposes, middle managers need to know the motivations, in-
tentions, and reasons that go into directives handed down to them.

Without being adequately posted on the course steered by top manage-
ment, middle managers are likely to lose themselves in the particular
transactions for which they are responsible. In the absence of an elucida-
tion of general ends, smaller problems assert themselves — magnified to the
point of distortion. The result is functional isolation and separatism — the
occupational diseases of large-scale enterprise. At the same time, ignorance
of top-level objectives encourages middle managers to allow matters that
with better knowledge could be settled by them on the spot to pass on to the
higher superior, causing dangerous congestion in the upper ranges of the
organization. This inclination in turn decreases the middle manager's op-
portunity for creative self-application. It is thus clear that inadequate
downward communication in large part cancels out the fundamental con-
tribution which middle management is designed to make in giving positive
effect to top direction.

Middle Management and Control of Operations. At the base of ad-
ministrative operations, the total managerial effort concentrates itself in the
first-line supervisor. In a sense, he is the lowest extension of middle
management in the hierarchical structure. Working with his small crew
of usually no more than ten employees, he functions very much like the
foreman in industry — organizing his team, maintaining the pace of work,
securing the necessary quality of output, developing the skill of those work-
ing for him, showing them how to do their job and how to do it better.
If we think of middle management as the integrated scheme of intermediate
control points between the top and the bottom of the organization, we may
regard the first-line supervisor as being outside the range of middle man-
agement. Supervision on his level will be treated more specifically in
another chapter.13 However, in a more general sense supervision runs
through the entire organization, each superior supervising his immediate
subordinates.

By and large, supervision becomes more direct as we proceed downward
in the hierarchy. At the top, it tends to be rather general, in part because
of the plausible assumption of higher competence for independent work in
the upper reaches of administrative responsibility, in part because the nature
of directive activity — predominant on these levels — renders specific sur-
veillance unfeasible and ineffectual. Here the record of achievement or
failure must be extensively relied upon as a substitute for the eyes of the

13 See below Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision."

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 407

supervisor. In the lower strata of the organization, supervision is apt to be
closer as it increasingly relates to more repetitive and less complex trans-
actions. The burdens of direct supervision — typical of middle management
in general — therefore increase from level to level as the distance to the base
of operations grows shorter.

Control of operations, even under exceptionally favorable circumstances,
is never a purely mechanical process. Human beings do not function like
machines. Attainment of a reasonably standardized group product hence
requires considerable leeway in direction. A great number of factors enter
into any kind of organized group action. Only when the middle manager
is placed in a position to influence these factors without undue restraint can
he be expected to live up to his task. It follows that appropriate delegation
of authority is a basic condition to successful guidance of operations.

Most middle managers feel that the scope of their authority is inadequate
to their responsibility. How much justification there is for these complaints
we shall examine in a subsequent section. Here it may suffice to observe
that nowhere is the urge to "be left alone" as great as in the line cadres.
This is not surprising. Face to face with the task to "get the job done,"
under continuous pressure from above for speed and action, and hungry
for the emotional thrill of "getting results," the middle manager is prone
to wish for more power to his elbow. His eyes focus only on a defined
sector of operations, only on part of the organization. But within that
sector he is supreme, or has reason to think of himself as supreme. And he
longs for the totality of authority that would make him fully master.

However small, this is his world. To him, it is a complete world, just
as complete in itself as the job to be done. Here he is the boss; it is he
who is answerable for the state of business in his sector; it is he who earns
the credit for accomplishment. The head of his agency and the galaxy of staff
people higher up may fancy themselves to throne above the whole organi-
zation and deal with it in its entirety. However, only the line operator
"hears the thing tick." Only he sees the concrete product of operations.
Only he has the satisfaction of visibly carrying his forces forward — through
his leadership, his grasp of the situation, and what he personally is able
to do about the situation. Looking for drama in administration? You
find it most easily in the line.

A lot has been said about managerial "know how" of late. "Know
how" — as contrasted with the theoretical exposition of the executive func-
tion or an understanding of the techniques of administrative analysis,
budgeting, and personnel administration — is for the most part the property
of middle management. "Know how" arises principally from trying-
shrewd experimentation, ingenious improvisation, swift adjustment, and
that kind of resilient initiative which is always willing to try all over again.
Much of the glory of "know how" is the middle manager's. He is the one
who performs the feat of bringing together the manpower and the tools

408 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

allowed him by his budget so that tangible values of public service come
forth. He consolidates the human relationships into purposeful and pro-
ductive effort. He also feels the first repercussions of lowered morale, and
is the first called into the breach to furnish personal inspiration in order
to raise the spirit of his force. *"'

Control of operations extends all the way from the planning stage to
the completion point. It entails the programming of activities to meet
specified goals; the scheduling of step sequences in order to relate the de-
ployment of personnel to the time factor; the spelling-out of particular
assignments; the definition of standards of performance; the establishment
of recording and reporting requirements; the designation of the most ap-
propriate methods and techniques; the determination of the most expe-
ditious flow of work; the identification of the mechanics used for checking
progress and quality; and the review of the end product. Usually all of
these elements blend into one another. Yet each has its part to play in
middle management, and each may require much thought and great care,
especially when novel functions or undertakings are involved for which
past experience does not provide a dependable guide. In such instances,
the resourcefulness of line officials will often be put to an exacting test.

In its control of operations, middle management — to use a military
simile — is in the main concerned with the tactics of administration, leaving
the final decisions of a strategic character to the top level of the organization.
The middle manager's tactical responsibilities compel him to face downward,
toward the detailed transactions at the base of the hierarchical structure.
At the same time, as we have noted earlier, he must view himself as the
internal agent of top management, as a manifestation of the executive func-
tion. This makes it necessary for him simultaneously to look for the signals
from above. In a very real sense, therefore, his attention is persistently
drawn in two opposite directions. As there are pressures on him from the
top, so there are pressures from the bottom. The impact of these opposite
pressures would tax any man's equanimity. It is thus not startling that
middle managers frequently give the impression of being either hardboiled
or militantly defensive. They can hardly help it. Theirs is a tough job
that favors toughness of fiber.

2. SUPPORTING TOP DIRECTION

Effectiveness of Downward Communication. In order to achieve a
secure alignment with middle management, top direction must "explain
itself" as fully as it can. As has already been suggested, this puts in bold
relief the need for effective downward communication. Communication
has two separable though interrelated aspects— content and form. The for-
mer reaches into such matters as volume and frequency. The latter includes
the entire process of communication.

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 409

On the aspect of content, it would be trite indeed to demand clarity
and conciseness. The trouble is that unprecise, cryptic, or fragmentary com-
munication of top-level objectives and policies in many cases is not simply
the result of casualness, inattention, or sloppy phrasing. The head of an
agency and his intimate associates may be quite clear about particular ends
and yet hesitate greatly to make these ends a subject of organization-wide
pronouncement. The matter may be delicate; it may imply an admission of
partial failure; it may require the equivalent of talking "among ourselves"
in the family circle.

Large-scale organization meets peculiar limitations on this score. Its size
increases the chance of unwelcome leakages. With so many people involved
in the echelons of middle management alone — quite aside from the still
larger body of first-line supervisors — can the executive be sure of confiden-
tial treatment? Can he safely assume a sufficient degree of loyalty every-
where? Is it at least possible to take for granted sympathetic appreciation
of the difficulties he confronts in striving for sensible solutions, especially
when these must reflect a high degree of generality?

Here, then, is one of the fundamental reasons why downward communi-
cation so often seems to withhold as much as it conveys. It throws a sharp
light on the importance of widespread personal identification with the aims
of the organization. No agency can think or talk within its "four walls"
when its personnel lacks what is perhaps best termed "sense of institution."
This is not to minimize the stimulating effect of constructive argument over
differences of opinion.14 However, only high esprit dc corps can provide
the general climate of institutional loyalty that would permit creative dis-
agreement within the frame of common allegiance.15

To that extent, communication is predetermined in its character by a
firmly implanted service ideology — an area thus far largely unexplored
despite its pivotal significance. What little discussion of service ideology
has taken place points for the most part to the possibility of self-protective
solidarities — the perils of "bureaucracy." In all large-scale enterprise, the
first requirement is to raise the individual's mind from his personal predi-
lections and ambitions to the plane of self-identification with the coopera-
tive effort. It is a secondary proposition to guard him against becoming a
mindless serf of his organizatiton.

Downward communication may be a meager trickle from sheer timidity;
if it is, the fault usually lies in limp leadership at the top — leadership that
fails to arouse enthusiasm and devotion in both the officialdom and the
working force at large. Yet downward communication may also suffer from

14 For the special problems that under auspices of interest representation affect the de-
sirable administrative "freedom of thought," see above Ch. 14, "Interest Groups in Administra-
tion," sec. 3, "Staffing for Point of View."

15 On this question, see also above Ch. 13, "Informal Organization," sec. 2, "Elements
of Informal Organization."

410 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

an entirely different ill— namely, torrential abundance. This is also often
a repercussion of weak top leadership. The policy announcement is followed
by an interminable series of policy clarifications. Or the administrative order
carries in its wake a whole string of implementing instructions, one more
detailed than the other. The essential economy of communication is between
these two extremes. But is there enough concentration on atttaining such
economy? Most middle managers consider themselves victims of either
tpp little or too much. They may not always be the best judges of the
%<golden mean," but all too often they can make a good case to demonstrate
that they are "left high and dry" or altogether "snowed under."

Despite some technical advances such as the introduction of teletype
equipment, communication as an art has remained amazingly antiquated.
All one can say is that we are doing about as well as Roman administrators
did, except that departmental officers and provincial governors in the days
of the Empire were not bothered with the obnoxious effects of the type-
writer and modern multicopying devices. For ordinary uses, the "memo"
reigns supreme, and usually in triplicate. Few have stopped to ponder the
incredible investment of time that goes into the manufacture and the
consumption of administrative communications.

^ High-grade staff people processing the raw materials for official "issu-
ances," lawyers scanning "rough copies" with the eagle eye characteristic of
their craft, draftsmen adding their flourishes, busy line-executives adorning
the margin with their "queries," and solemn men bickering at the confer-
ence table over commas and periods — all of this is part of the tortuous
gestation. Then the ditto machines start humming, and the cloudburst
comes down. "Did you read the latest one on paper salvage?" "Heavens,
no I My girl just puts it into the file."

A wide field exists to the imaginative communication-engineer to devise
ways of cutting down the volume of waste motion. Use of short forms is
one approach, but it is more fascinating to think of substituting for the
rolling paragraph such things as flash signals or color patterns or shorthand
symbols or pictorial strips. Short of this, there is the possibility of aiding
the consumer by getting down closer to basic English.16 Establishment
of agency-wide issuance control, though adding a new unit, has paid its
way because of both its braking effect and the great convenience of locat-
ing quickly particular kinds of communications identified by series — direc-
tives, orders, instructions, informational bulletins.

This is clear, however. The mass of written communications now tradi-
tional in large-scale enterprise eats up too many office hours at the receiving
end as well as at the point of origin. Moreover, in the very embarrassment
of riches, most systems of administrative communication fail to provide an

le Mention should be made particularly of the vigorous campaign for increased read-
ability of written communications carried forward by the Social Security Board. See also
above Ch. 17, "Government by Procedure," sec. 4, "Creation and Criteria."

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 411

even coverage of significant information. Priorities are ill-defined, and the
trivialr-tends to drown the essential. With "all the stuff that comes down,"
the middle manager may still know very little about executive thinking at
the top. And though he tries to keep abreast of developments, he may fall
into the defensive habit of reading only when he "has the time for it." Judg-
ing by what evidence we have,17 top-level issuances ordinarily enter the
mind of an organization only slowly, and by no means uniformly.

Two-Way Traffic of Thought. Fortunately, downward communication
to enable middle management to operate as the elongation of top-level di-
rection is today seldom strictly a one-way affair. Effective communication
enunciates thought, and institutional thought travels increasingly on two-
way avenues. Downward communication reaches the ear of the middle man-
ager most clearly when its substance relates to his own thinking— when he
finds his own ideas mirrored in it. Expressed in terms of a general rule,
we may say that communication of policy gains in effectiveness in rough'
proportion to the scope of active participation of middle management in
the policy-making process.

To a certain extent, of course, the middle manager is always a policy-
maker. Not only does he take part in policy formulation by translating
strategy into tactics, by tracing out top determinations into line activities,
by framing operating policies under his own responsibility. He is also a
policy-maker indirectly — by implicit or explicit reference, in his reporting
function, to existing weaknesses in the administrative approach, inadequacies
in current policies, and emerging problems and issues that warrant top-
level consideration.18 However, in these respects his role in policy formula-
tion is intermittent and incidental. For best results, his participation in the
policy-making process should be continuous and take form in an organized
manner.

There are many different ways for achieving continuous participation
in an organized fashion, and most of them admit of application even below
the intermediate stratum of middle management.19 More important than
individual devices such as the staff meeting,20 is the habit of up-and-down
and across-the-board consultation21 that only top management is in a posi-

17 For some valuable insights based on specific inquiry into the percentage-wise distribu-
tion of knowledge about policy pronouncements, administrative orders, and instructions, see
Corson, John J., "Weak Links in the Chain of Command," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1945,
Vol. 9, p. 346 if.

18 For a discussion of the dynamics of administrative policy-making, see above Ch. 16,
"The Formulation of Administrative Policy," sec. 4, "External Influences in Administrative
Policy.'*

10 Sec below Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec. 4, "Supervision and Employee Initia-
tive"; Ch. 24, "Personal Standards," sec. 6, "Employee Relations."

20 For a discussion of the j^taff meeting as a device of organizing administrative analysis,
see below Ch. 20, "Administrative Self-Improvement," sec. 2, "Organization for Administrative
Analysis."

21 Cf. Morstein Marx, Fritz, "Bureaucracy and Consultation," Review of Politics, 1939, Vol.

1, p. 84 ff.

412 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

tion to instill in all parts of the organization. A feeble or small-minded
top management, offended by any "criticism" from within, is obviously
unable to foster such habits of consultation, however much lip service it
may pay the abstract principle of common thought. Helpful suggestions
and new ideas will not come forth when they fail to find eager takers. Yet,
though the habit of sharing policy-thinking should be accorded first
place, particular arrangements commend themselves for their habit-forming
effects.

In the operation of a departmental bureau, for instance, it will be profit-
able— as experience has demonstrated"2 — for the bureau chief to meet every
day for a brief conference with his assistant chiefs; assemble once a week a
somewhat wider circle of key officers; spend at least an hour twice a month
with all his division, branch, and unit chiefs and their right-hand men in
order to focus attention on matters of common significance; and get to-
gether once a year with all his field-office managers, and more often with
smaller groups of them, perhaps region by region, and with the regional
directors as well.23 This would not dispose of the customary media of cir-
culating information — bureau bulletins, periodic program and activity sur-
veys, weekly field letters. Needless to say, observing the proprieties of a
conference schedule is one thing, but knowing how to make a go of it is
still something different. A sour-looking chairman who brightens up only
when he can tightly hold on to his own monologue would wreck any
kind of staff meeting in no time.

It is probably true that the total intellectual resources available within
the structure of large-scale enterprise are today still far from being fully
utilized. The effect is exactly like making a high-priced engineer count
building permits. He gets disgusted and indifferent to the interests of his
employer; and the employer wastes four-fifths of the engineer's salary be-
cause counting building permits, if it has to be done at all, could be done
by the lowest-paid employee. Strangely, the loss in both efficiency and
economy that results from leaving untapped much of the latent ability in
an organization is frequently caused deliberately. Too many top executives
have remained enslaved to the obsolete notion that wide internal participa-
tion in policy thinking undermines their "authority." It is time for them
to see that they are wrong.

If evidence from money-making private business be preferred, they
would find it in the record of "multiple .management" — a catch-phrase
made famous by Baltimore's business-minded Charles P. McCormick.24 In
his company — largest wholesale spice dealers in the United States — McCor-
mick provided for three elective employee bodies: a junior board of direc-

22 Cf. Corson, John J., "The Role of Communication in the Process of Administration,"
Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p. 7 ff.

23 Cf. also above Ch. 12, "Field Organization," sec. 3, "Field-Headquarters Relations.'*

24 See his Multiple Management, New York: Harper, 1938.

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 413

tors, a factory board, and a sales and advertising board. The prime function
of these three organs is to feed ideas into the senior board of stockholders.
Multiple management has done so well that some 500 firms have followed
suit, including Eric Johnston's three Spokane companies. Its success is tes-
timony to a generally sound conception.

Taking Orders. Middle management is in the "chain of command" — in
fact it represents most of the length of this chain. Looking downward, the
middle manager exercises his formal authority in large measure by giving or-
ders. Simultaneously, however, he is subject to the formal authority of his
superiors. If the familiar adage about learning to obey in order to learn
to command settled everything, the middle manager, usually serving his
way up, would be an ideal commander. And the ideal commander would
also excel at taking orders.

Taking orders is in many ways merely the reverse of self-identification
with institutional purposes and objectives. When such self-identification is
complete or nearly complete, the order from higher authority is essentially
an affirmative gesture, a signal to go ahead, more of a timing device than
an indication of aims or direction. No one would see a problem in taking
an order when the order for all practical purposes is his own, or — because
of prior consultation — at least in part his own.

It is a rather different proposition, and one causing varying degrees of
strain, to execute orders that cannot readily be accommodated even within
a reasonably flexible frame of institutional allegiance. When top manage-
ment is overbearing and yet has little standing with the organization; or
has embarked upon a new and dubious course without attempting to take
the middle managers into its confidence; or appears to subordinate acknowl-
edged long-range objectives to opportunistic maneuvering — in such circum-
stances compliance with orders may hurt.

This kind of emotional conflict illuminates again the narrow foundation
on which formal authority rests.25 No order executes itself. It moves down
the chain of command only so far as its motion is sustained by the impetus
furnished on each level of subleadership. To be sure, compliance is bol-
stered up by discipline and by machinery for the enforcement of discipline.26
But disciplinary machinery is a far cry from joyful zest of individual self-
exertion.

In the face of disciplinary threats, all one needs to do is turn on a show
of compliance. "Getting by" is enough not to "get caught." Or one may "lie
low," inching ahead reluctantly only when prodded. Or one may flatly
refuse to budge, though always duly covered. Bureaucratic sabotage is by
no means confined to public administration; it occurs to the same extent in
private management. Orders can be "misunderstood." Excuses can be

25 Sec above Ch. 13, "Informal Organization," sec. 2, "Elements of Informal Organiza-
tion."

26 Sec below Ch. 21, "Morale and Discipline."

414 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

found to explain sluggishness. "Buck-passing" can be practiced with con-
siderable refinement. Conceding that there are practical limits to passive
resistance, we arc once more reminded of the all-pervading influence of
restraints that only a living service-ideology can impose. Once more we
recognize that faithful execution of orders in the last analysis springs from
common agreement on institutional ends.

At the same time, ability to take orders does not imply blind subservience.
The middle manager for whom "orders are orders" always, may get his
organization into serious trouble when he fails to speak up on obstacles which
only he can spot from the vantage point of his line experience. He simply
does not do his job if he dispenses with his personal judgment. Orders
may indeed be susceptible of misunderstanding. They may overshoot the
mark. They may be overtaken by rapidly changing conditions. Then it is
plainly in the interest of the whole organization immediately to check back
with the supreme command.

On the other hand, everything would soon stall if middle management
made it a general practice to attempt a virtual verification of each order
by appealing to the next higher level for elaboration. Here, too, and in
the interpretation of orders for the lower levels, alert judgment is prerequi-
site. It will err rarely when the broad picture of administrative strategy
and the "way we operate" are clearly understood by all concerned.27

Tribulations of the Operator. In the conduct of line business, the mid-
dle manager carries a responsibility that is well-nigh all-inclusive. He has
to "get the work out," and all of it — and fast. Yet, especially in the realm
of public administration, his hands are tied in many ways, though in each
instance in the name of good management.

He does not freely pick his subordinates; they are handed him through
certification from an eligibility register by the central personnel agency, and
his actual choice is generally limited by the "rule of three." He is not
allowed to grade them up or down; that is a matter of a ceremonious jig-_
marolfr known as ^classification, and in this rigmarole his own judgment
may be the least important factor. He is, of course, unable simply to tell
them never again to come before his eyes; he must state a "cause" in writ-
ing, and the matter may not rest at that, for it is not unusual among govern-
mental jurisdictions to allow a dismissed employee to carry his case before
the civil service commission.28 These restrictions are not devoid of reasons
that no one would want to brush aside lightly.29 They are nonetheless very
real impairments of the middle manager's freedom of operational option.

If we turn to government-wide regulations on budgeting, auditing, ao

27 Ability to take orders has been treated as the first requirement of effective middle
management by Frederick J. George, "How To Be a Good Junior Executive," Canadian Bun-
ness, 1941, Vol. 14, p. 88 ff.

28 This is not generally true of the federal government.

29 For a fuller discussion of public personnel administration in the context of adminis-
trative responsibility, fee below Ch. 24, "Personnel Standards.*'

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 413

counting, procurement, and a host of housekeeping functions, the topog*
raphy of management grows increasingly befuddling. Like poison ivy
climbing all over the thicket, the prohibitions seem to outdo the incentives.
In the end, the middle manager's perspective may become badly distorted.
He may feel that a serious backlog in substantive business may not be as
troublesome as an infraction of general housekeeping procedures. If he
falls behind in his operations, he may find charitable judges among his
superiors; if he gets "fouled up" on government- wide prescriptions about
the handling of vouchers, for instance, a central agency may start snarling
at his department.

A pretty persuasive case can be made for the contention that American
public administration has become top-heavy with central controls. Certainly
this is a question to which careful research might be devoted with great
benefit. Meanwhile, the line operator has to "sweat it out." We need
little imagination to visualize the many instances in which he feels arrested
in the application of straight commonsense by hard and fast rules that to
lim have no rhyme or reason whatsoever.

Thinking in Larger Terms. Self -identification with institutional pur-
Doses, as we observed earlier, is a condition vital to productive middle man-
igement. But, as with all good things, there can be too much of it. Ex-
:esses may present themselves on different scales. The most common type
}f excess arises from the imnicdiacy of the operator's concern with the par-
:icular province of his responsibility. His bureau, division, section, or unit,
Deing the foundation of his status within the organization, insidiously ex-
Dands its claim on his mind. Eventually he comes to look upon himself as
he living personification of this one link in the chain of the cooperative
process. He "lives for his work" to the exclusion of outside considerations,
>ven though he knows that theoretically its worth could not be assessed
without regard for the organization as a whole.

This attitude accounts for the peculiar tendency on the part of the aver-
age line official toward functional self-aggrandizement, however innocent
and unconscious. He seeks expansion — bigger and better programs, bigger
and better appropriations, bigger and better staffs — not just for the exhilara-
tion of sheer magnitude, but because to him his segment of the total effort
is the most important one, the hub of the entire enterprise. Top manage-
ment, the budget officer, and the personnel director are all "off the beam"
when they fail to see it that way. Or perhaps they are even jealous and want
to hold him down. So he thinks he has to play his cards astutely and never
put them on the table face up.

In contrast with the tug-of-war between the particular and the general
within the agency, excessive self-identification with institutional purposes
also occurs on a department-wide scale. When it is instinctively assumed,
for example, that the department is always right, its officialdom may be dis-
tinguished by high morale and great elan, but to the same extent the depart-

416 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

ment is severely handicapped for open-minded interdepartmental coopera-
tion. In the modern service state,30 governmental functions intermesh and
intermingle. Few departments have clearly defined monopolies on particular
areas of public service. Far more frequently several departments touch
one and the same area from different angles. When one agency advances
in a given area, other agencies are inevitably affected. In consequence, as
there is intradepartmental competition between bureaus and divisions,
so we encounter rivalry between agencies themselves. Nor is this all. De-
partment heads may also display a keen competitive sense in relation to
the chief executive.

On the levels of middle management, the innate particularism can be
mitigated only by a systematically cultivated inclination to think in larger
terms. Top leadership may do much to widen the horizon of the line
official. But appropriate indoctrination should be government-wide. This is
not impossible of attainment. We could place much more stress on middle
management as a unified profession, and develop arrangements to move
middle managers about within their department and interdepartmentally
to check the danger of introversion. We could thus provide a climate favor-
able to the growth of an administrative doctrine that would assure primacy
to the more comprehensive public interest— in conformity with political
responsibility. Such a doctrine is the logical center-piece of a democratically
conceived service ideology,

3. RUNNING THE SHOW

Problems of Delegation. Top management expects of the line official
that in due time he will be able to report, "Mission accomplished." In
carrying out his mission, he must think and plan for himself. No detailed
instruction coming from above can ever take the place of his own experi-
ence and foresight. In fact, he is the chosen instrument to settle the details,
thus freeing the leadership of his agency for policy consideration. To do his
job he needs a considerable degree of leeway of action. No one would
quarrel with the axiom that the authority delegated to him should meas-
ure up to the breadth of his responsibility for results. However, it is a dif-
ferent matter to transform the axiom into reality.

Generally speaking, delegation of authority has been hesitant and grudg-
ing. This can be explained in part by the rather disorganized and sometimes
erratic manner in which American legislatures have exacted accountability
from politically responsible administrators. When agency heads can be
singed so badly because of relatively minor slips of distant subordinates,
the general inclination will be to hold the reins of top control more tightly
than i$ ideal for good management. Part of the explanation lies also in the
traditions of the "spoils system" of an earlier day when line officials could

80 Cf. above Ch. 5, "The Social Function of Public Administration," sec. 2, "The Needs
of the Service State."

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 417

not be trusted to stand on their own feet administratively. Still another
part of the explanation must be sought in the same tendencies that have
retarded adequate decentralization of activities to the field.31 For greatest
efficiency, delegation of authority to middle management could by and large
go much further than it has so far.

Even where delegation of authority is reasonably adequate, we often
find unnecessarily extensive requirements for higher approval of whole
categories of more important decisions. These requirements throw great
burdens on the administrative process and are hardly conducive to the
formation of a strong sense of responsibility. It is sounder to devise report-
ing relationships through which danger signs become automatically visible,32
both to top management and to the operating officials themselves. Appraisal
of the outcome of administrative action in success or failure is superior to
cumbersome mechanics of higher review of proposed action.

Reinforcing the Line Sector. It is the hallmark of effective middle
management to be able to stand on its own feet, at the same time knowing
where to get help when help is needed. Much help will be secured by the
simple method of checking with the "crowd across the hall" or by pooling
resources with adjacent line sectors. Indeed, large-scale enterprise cannot
achieve unity of purpose without a constant process of cross-referencing —
drawing into both planning and operations all the thought, information,
and experience available within the total organization; enriching each activ-
ity by tying it into the whole program; and amplifying the stream of insti-
tutional intelligence so that line officials and staff officers can maintain
elbow touch with each other and among themselves. As a student of middle
management has said, "The organization of crosswise relationships is one
of the foremost problems of today and tomorrow."33

The wide-awake operator knows many turns for bringing these cross-
wise relationships into play—down to sources of "grapevine" and the un-
hurried conversation in the executive dining room. Line officials see eye to
eye on many things and usually share their worries without reserve. They
feel rather differently toward staff people, especially from the top offices.
Yet prudent use of staff facilities pays the middle manager high dividends,
and he knows it. Growth of at least rudimentary staff organs within the
line organization itself has made him more enthusiastic about assistance
from staff personnel than he used to be. Higher-level staffs, though indis-
pensable to him on major problems,34 are still somewhat suspect for their
uncanny ways of ferreting out hidden issues that call for much explaining
on his part— and occasionally make him look very sheepish.

31 Sec above Ch. 12, "Field Organization," sec. 2, "Centralization and Decentralization/'

32 Cf. Pfirtncr, John M., "How To Delegate Authority," Public Management, 1943, Vol.
25, p. 351tf.

33 Niles, Mary C. H., Middle Management, p. 52, New York: Harper, 1941.

34 See below Ch. 20, "Administrative Self -Improvement."

418 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

In the light of the historic development of staff facilities, it cannot cause
astonishment that as a rule the staff organs lodged down in the line are
the weakest. Departmental top-office staffs rank higher in competence, and
central staff establishments may rate one or two notches above these. Not-
withstanding the greater purchasing power of the higher levels, staff talent
ought to be more evenly distributed. This would also allay the fears of
middle managers that staff personnel called on for help might in effect lay
down the law for the operators to live with, and then nimbly depart from
the scene.35

Organizing for Worl^. Line officials, like every one else, may pride them-
selves on organizing their "shop" without ever stopping to think about
organizing their own job.36 One ailment widespread among operators is a
pernicious preoccupation with lesser details — "the petty done, the undone
vast." In administration, detail is seldom trivial; but it is also true that the
competent middle manager must possess a sure feeling for the significant
detail which alone justifies his personal attention. A kindred ailment is the
abandon with which some line officials throw themselves into the routine
technicalities of operating processes. They keep themselves so busy that
no minute is left for the contemplative pause. In the end they have run so
dry that the thought of thinking drives them frantic; so they have to go
on being busy.

It is generally simply an indication of a bad job of self-organization to
be always pressed for time. This is especially serious in middle manage-
ment because operators stand or fall with their capacity for dealing with
larger groups of human beings who look to them for guidance and stimula-
tion. Time is of the essence in all human relationships — time for confer-
ences, time for complaints, time for advice, time for instruction, time for a
joke or a few friendly words wherever the opportunity presents itself.

A line official must therefore be able not merely to project his influence
upon the entire range of operations in his charge but also to detach himself
mentally from the day-by-day activities, at least at sufficiently frequent inter-
vals. Only with such detachment can he be a reliable overseer of the "whole
show." Only by figuratively stepping back during his quieter hours can
he preserve his perspective.

Even if he holds that thinking is none of his business, the pressures on
him will compel him to pick one or two understudies and to build up his
key men. He will have to learn how to anticipate program changes and
emerging problems. He will have to fit his own way of operating into the
working methods of his immediate superior and the mode of business

35 Theoretically, of course, staff personnel arc outside the chain of command. As a
statement on organization and methods work issued January 8, 1945, by the British Treasury
formulates it, departmental organization and methods branches "will operate by advice ten-
dered and not by instructions issued." Of course, such advice may in concrete circum-
stances be equal to command.

86 Cf. Niles, op. tit. above in note 33, ch. 11.

THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 419

prevalent in those units which with his unit form a tactical entity. If he is
far enough down in the chain of command, he must not only be readily
accessible to all of his first-line supervisors but he must also look over their
shoulders to find out how they are doing.

Whatever his location in the hierarchy, he must be alert to opportunities
for developing talent among his subordinates and be sufficiently unselfish
to let promising men and women go on to higher responsibilities outside
his "shop." One of the greatest qualities of middle management lies in
training employees for advancement all over the organization. This puts
a premium on the point of view of the "generalise—looking at the whole
picture rather than at any particular specialization.

Reporting Schemes. In the two-way traffic of thought, the upward flow
of reports and recommendations is at least as significant to the character
of institutional intelligence as downward communication. Line reporting
brings top management "down to earth." No fine-spun plan is worth a
tinker's dam unless it holds up in the stress of operations. Without realistic
line reporting, top-level direction would grope in darkness. Equally im-
portant is the contribution of operating reports to the maintenance of
internal control.

All programming and scheduling must be buttressed by reporting re-
quirements. But reporting can run wild. In not a few administrative or-
ganizations everybody seems to need to know everything, and in the ensuing
flood of information everybody is drowned alike. In the system of informa-
tional channels the locks perform a function no less urgent than the channels
themselves.

In the first place, in order to be of use for purposes of executive control,
raw information must continually be translated into control information—
by digesting, abstracting, and underscoring of relevant points. Secondly.,
informational priorities must be clearly expressed in designing the report-
ing system. Thirdly, time and again the question must be raised whether
each periodic report actually meets concrete, needs.

By raising this question with commendable stubbornness, the Army
Service Forces during World War II, for instance, manufactured uncounted
workdays of time saved by getting rid of reports of no or marginal utility.
Reporting requirements, once established, have great survival power, not-
withstanding the disappearance of original demand. Moreover, information
serially supplied by operators may to them be "just red tape" because no
one has told them exactly why top management must have the information
and how it might be made to render service to them, too, in appraising line
activities. Finally, in many instances the data dredged up in reports may
only tell half of the story, which is sometimes worse than saying nothing
at all. To illustrate, trying to judge workload by measuring the quantity of
licenses issued or inspections carried out would be foolish if routine cases

420 THE TASKS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

were not segregated from more complex ones, or if the variables of com-
plexity were not objectively identified.

Keeping Records. Administration can mean many things, but it is
always a lot of paperwork. Federal records now in existence are estimated
to amount to some 16,000,000 or 18,000,000 cubic feet, with an annual accu-
mulation of no less than 1,000,000.37 Most of this is made up of operating
records. However, resort to documentation of past undertakings and full-
fledged record reference — like institutional library reference — is becoming
growingly essential to policy determination and top-staff activity.38 Record
management as a specialized service has made marked strides recently. It
may prove to be a highly beneficial influence in strengthening the memory
of an organization; evoke a clearer sense of consistency in its collective
mind; and keep its officials from improvising anew for each day or conduct-
ing the concert "by ear."

Bodies of records may look like so much besmudged and dust-covered
paper. Actually they are "repositories of information,"39 and should be
treated as such. "The objectives of the record function are: (1) the receipt,
custody, and care of the record material belonging to an organization;
(2) its maintenance in such condition that the material and the informa-
tion contained therein may be readily available; and (3) its proper final
disposition."40 In the disposition, archival interests must be safeguarded.
This explains the role the National Archives is playing in superintending
the final disposition of federal records.41

Documentation of transactions is an aid not only in achieving responsi-
bility—the record tells— but also in making "know how" less fugitive and
more of an institutional property. When the working files on each level
of middle management are reasonably complete and in good order, it is
much easier to pull operators out of their "shop" for more important assign-
ments because the successor can find his way without asking innumerable .
questions or figuring out each thing again. Orderliness of control is in
large part dependent on orderliness of documentation. No middle man-
ager is truly up to his job if he fails to assure himself of good record
administration.

37 Wilson, William J., "Analysis of Government Records: An Emerging Profession,'*
Library Quarterly, 1946, Vol. 16. p. 1. This paper opens up many of the aspects of modern
record administration.

38 See Morstein Marx, Fritz and Others, "A Reference Service for the Administrator,"
Interagency Records Administration Conference: Washington, April 27, 1945 (mimeographed).

8ftChatfield, Helen L., "The Role of the Archivist in Public Administration/' p. 5,
National Archives: Washington, May, 1942 (mimeographed).

40 Chatfield, Helen L., 'The Problem of Records from the Standpoint of Management,"
American Archivist, 1940, Vol. 3, p. 97.

41 The National Archives has issued much useful material on record administration,
especially in its series of circulars,

CHAPTER

The Art of Supervision

1. WHAT Is SUPERVISION?

Direction with Authority. Supervision has been defined as the direction,
accompanied by authority, of the work of others. It is this top-to-bottom
chain of supervision which gives coherence to any organization.

Supervision in its purest form occurs at the first or lowest level of organi-
zation— that is, the direction-with-authority over workers who in turn direct
no one else. In government parlance, this lowest level is referred to as that
of the first-line supervisor. In industry it is that of the lead-man, or fore-
man. In an army it is that of the corporal, or perhaps the sergeant/ It is
with the first-line supervisor that most of our discussion here will deal.

It should be borne in mind, however, that supervision occurs wherever
there are groups of workers, high or low in the organization, in or outside
the "chain of command." In true staff units, for instance, one employee may
oversee another, although neither has any power of direction outside his
office. Likewise in a group of specialists, the head specialist may supervise
the work of the others, although his authority does not extend into th<
organization; it is not related to other workers outside .he specialist group.
This argument, of course, spins the thread of command pretty fine if car-
ried too far. Consider that the staff employee or specialist may wield real
influence on the workers in other units even if he does it informally and
outside the hierarchy, by the force of his personality, by the excellence of his
suggestions, or by some other nonauthoritative means.

Concept of Functional Foreman. Frederick W. Taylor, the original ex-
ponent of scientific management, recognized this factor in his case for the
"functional foreman." He felt that the highest production could be achieved
if each special aspect of the worker's task was commanded by a foreman
who was a specialist in it.1 This concept of multiple direction— Taylor broke
it into eight parts — is no longer accepted, at least in theory. Instead, the

1 Taylor's most important work was published in 1911 under the title The Principles of
Scientific Management^ republished New York: Harper, 1934.

421

422 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

modern management conception calls for unity of command. Each worker
is to have only one boss. The specialist has no direct authority. He cannot
give orders to the worker. He may only use indirect influence, set techni-
cal standards, and so on. In fact, usually his influence is indirectly exerted
through the immediate supervisor. The supervisor, then, is the boss who
has immediate and personal direction — with authority — of other workers.

Phases of Supervision. Defined in terms of production, the supervisor
is responsible for getting out the work of his unit — for its quantity and
quality, its timing.VAnd herein lies the rub. All too often in the past, man-
agers and supervisors have had an eye on production rather than on the
basic producers. One symptom of this disease has been the practice of ap-
pointing as foreman or supervisor the best worker in the shop or office.
The typist who wrote the most letters per hour was made head of the
stenographic pool because she was the best worker. As if by her very ex-
ample she would spur the others on! Usually such appointments have
brought poor results because of failure to see the personal side of the job
of the supervisor.

A similar although rarer practice especially in "red tape" organizations
such as large insurance companies and government offices has been to pro-
mote the "old hand" to be supervisor because he "knows the ropes." The
ropes, of course, vary from the literal version aboard a sailing vessel to the
more complicated strands of laws and rules in a federal agency, for example.
The chap who has been around long enough to know office policy and pro-
cedures, whom one sees for this and for that — be it Form 57 or 309 — has
great value. Again, however, supervisory appointments made from among
such people ignore the key to the supervisor's job, namely, ability to work
with others and make them work better, i/

So we touch early on the three phases of the supervisor's job: (1) sub-
ptantive or technical — the work to be done; (2) institutional or adjective —
policies and procedures according to which the work must be done;
id (3) personal— the handling of the workers, though "handling" is not
hie best word for it. It is the last phase which will concern us most. Neither
lie work nor the rules are the key to supervision. The supervisor must
fcnow both, but the critical knowledge and the indispensable skill is nothing
Ijess than personal leadership.2

Scope of Supervision. Since our emphasis quite naturally is on the
human side of the supervisor's responsibilities, we may very quickly glide
'over his technical and institutional responsibilities. The actual content of
his technical responsibilities will vary greatly depending on the product,

2 There is a considerable body of literature on supervision. A helpful guide is furnished
by Cooper, Alfred M., How To Supervise People, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941. Super-
vision is also treated in most of the general works on industrial management, such as Alford,
L. P., Principles of Industrial Management, New York: Ronald Press, 1940. On general
aspects of supervision in government, see especially Cooper, Alfred M., Supervision of Govern-
mental Employees, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943.

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 423

work process, and work situation^ In mass-production industry, the lead-
man may have almost no direct technical responsibility, except for quan-
tity of output. Method is determined higher up. Equipment is provided,
and materials likewise. Quality control is also out of his hands since it is
the immediate concern of an inspector.

In less systematized and routinized operations — in office work, for ex-
ample— any or all of these problems may well remain in the supervisor's
hands and demand therefore that he "know how." jie may have to plan
the work, set standards for quantity and quality of work to be expected,
'and make specific assignments of duties. More will be said in a later section
about his responsibility for work methods. Safety, too, is a responsibility
of_. the supervisor. It is his duty, often with the help of a specialist—
the "safety engineer" — to encourage safe work habits, to enforce safety
rules, and otherwise to prevent accident^ A concomitant charge is to keep
the work place clean and orderly. The supervisor may have to provide
workers with the necessary tools, equipment, and auxiliary services such
as equipment maintenance; or with an adequate quantity of supplies and
materials. Or his responsibility may be partial only, such as the custody
of machines.

It follows that the supervisor must "know the work." It does not neces-
sarily follow, as is sometimes contended, that the supervisor must be an
expert in the field. It is possible for a good supervisor to move over from
another type of work and learn the new work, especially when he is picked
for his potential as a supervisor — "a leader" — rather than for his expertness
in the work. This is not as commonly done as it should be, however. -*

Institutional Aspects. The institutional side of the supervisor's duties
involves the policies, procedures, and practices of his agency or company.
The organization requires certain ways of doing things to which the super-
visor must conform. A big chunk of this institutional responsibility is per-
sonnel policies and procedures. The supervisor may have authority to
select, place, and evaluate employees, but in actual practice any or all of
these functions may be carried on by the personnel specialist. The latter
arrangement is apt to be the case in civil service systems. The choice of a
worker, for example, may only be in terms of refusing to accept the worker
selected by others. In any case, how the supervisor carries on these personnel
operations is usually prescribed for him. He merely needs to know the
forms and procedures, the rules and regulations, in order to get along. This
applies in particular to public administration. ^/

Such regulations may well get in the way of supervision, especially
in discipline cases. Attendance, punctuality, and personal conduct on the
part of the worker in conformity with "company rules" are another branch
of "institutionalism" which the supervisor must heed. The conservation
and salvage of equipment and supplies, too, may be spelled out in regula-

424 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

dons, to give another example. From this brand of supervision stems the
temptation to promote the worker who "knows the ropes."

To sum up, the supervisor must know the kind of work that is done by
his unit and the policies and procedures of his agency. But our interest lies
in the more distinctive phase of supervision, the human side. J

2. THE SUPERVISORY SKILLS

Wartime Innovations. The supervisor's skills have been variously enu-
merated. One such listing runs as long as seventeen essential skills. There
is no magic number. During the great effort of World War II, when there
was heavy pressure on learning fast, the essentials were stripped down to a
minimum of three: JIT, JMT, and JRT. We refer to the Training Within
Industry program of the War Manpower Commission3 whereby not thou-
sands but literally hundreds of thousands of foremen were trained in three
basic supervisory skills: Job Instruction Training; Job Management Train-
ing; and Job Relations Training. In other words, this program was based
on . the -assumption, jhat the irreducible IT minium of supervisory skills is
three: (1) to instruct a worker how to do a job; (2) to lay out methods
and improve work processes; and (3) to deal personally with workers,
especially face-to-face.

The tripartite classification goes back quite some years in history — to
World War I, in fact. At that time the tremendous expansion of industry
forced management to pay attention to training of supervisors. Stimulated
by the critical need for quickly developing competent supervisors for the
mushroom growth of plants, management experts made remarkable prog-
ress in isolating the factors that make for a good supervisor, analyzing these
factors, and formulating practical methods for putting their findings into
practice. The wartime program resulted in continued study and proved
itself so well in the following years that the emergency of World War II
found us in possession of tested methods for training employees in the
skills of supervision.

The Training Within Industry Service of the War Manpower Commis-
sion, headed by industrial experts of long experience, launched a nation-
wide program to assist industry to meet the problems arising from its
enormous demand for supervisory personnel. Thousands of factories and
offices throughout the country installed TWI's short intensive programs
for job instruction, job methods, and job relations, so that in the end well
over a million supervisors in war production had gone through one or
more of these training programs.

Numbers of participants, of course, prove nothing. But startling results
were achieved from this emphasis on the skills of supervision. Two out of

3 An excellent account of this program is offered in War Manpower Commission, Bureau
of Training, Training Within Industry Service, The Training Within Industry Report, 1940-
1945, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 425

every three plants served by TWI reported production increases up to 25
per cent, and the other third found that better supervision raised output
from 25 to 500 per cent. Comparable savings in manpower and time needed
to break in new workers, in scrap and waste cost, and in reduction of acci-
dents were reported. In some plants absenteeism was cut in half. There
was also a constant decrease in the rate of turnover among employees
whose supervisors had had the benefit of the "J" programs.

It was understandable that government agencies, experiencing similar
expansion, should have looked with interest at the successful attack industry
was making on one of its most critical personnel problems. Experiments
were carried out to determine whether TWI's program, designed for in-
dustrial organizations, would be equally effective in government agencies
beset by many of the same manpower difficulties. The answer was quickly
forthcoming. Although the work, the operation, and the environment may
vary widely, the skills involved in supervising jobs are identical in any
supervisor-and-employee situation. Certain adaptations had to be made,
for the terminology and approach required in government offices are dif-
ferent from those encountered in a machine shop. However, the alterations
necessary were limited to details.

In order to make the TWI formula available to federal agencies, the
United States Civil Service Commission established a program of training
and staffed it with men and women who could administer the techniques
that had proved to be so successful in industry. One further step was taken.
Instead of relieving office managers of the responsibility of training their
supervisors by having outsiders do it, the emphasis was squarely placed on
management's concern with the training activity through use of its own
personnel.

The general procedure was for the Civil Service Commission to show
the individual government agency how to train its supervisors and to help
it follow through in order to make sure that the training courses produced
the practical results that were expected. This was done by assuring thai
the agency's top executive fully understood the program and really accepted
the responsibility for its operation, and then by giving selected agency
personnel an intensive training course to prepare them in the techniques
of administration. Three separate programs were offered to the federa
agencies. Each program was drawn up to cover a specific phase of super
vision, and each was presented in five concentrated two-hour sessions. Since
the programs in order to stand up had to appeal to operating people or
all levels and show a direct application to their own jobs, the whole ap
proach was specifically designed to get immediate action and to accomplisl
quick results. Because of the careful trial-and-error development of the pro
grams under actual operating conditions, they soon became streamlined t<
the point where they were easy to understand, easy to present, easy to con
duct and interesting in form and content.

426 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

By examining the essentials of these programs more closely, we can best
identify the basic supervisory skills in a setting both concrete and generally
significant. The point that should be kept in mind is not the particular fea-
tures of each program, but the light it sheds on the role of ^PeTsupervisor
From this angle, the wartime experience is of lasting interest. ^

Job Instruction. The expansion of public administration caused by^the
war dictated the firsf^progrnnrf of thfs series — teaching supervisors how to
teach. With new workers pouring by the thousands into govenrment
offices and with old workers assigned new duties, it was essential to shorten
as much as possible the time necessary for all these employees to learn
their new jobs. Managing an organization under emergency conditions is
a process of constant adjustment to change. Every rhangg_flf

sonnel calls for instructions to get the work-out on time^and,p_laces a heavy
load on the first-line supervisor. He cannot carry it unless he has com-
petent workers under him who understand their jobs, know what to do,

tv to do it, and learn new jobs without time wasted or delay.
Job-instruction training shows the supervisor how to teach those under
him to perform their daily operations./ The supervisor, of course, has always
done this, after a fashion. He usually realizes that the new employee has
to know something about the job before he can go to work. So he may
turn him over to one of the old hands for a while, or he may make an
effort to train the neophyte by such means as he is familiar with, and per-
haps fail because his methods are ineffectual. If he does nothing else, he at
least takes it for granted that his new employees will require a certain
amount of time to take hold of their jobs, and resigns himself to waiting for
the breaking-in period to end. Supervisors who have taken job-instruction
training have learned that a simple four-step teaching method on the job
is far superior to the casual methods of old which wasted so much valuable
time.

^The supervisor is shown how to explain a new job to an employee, how
to demonstrate it so that the employee can follow each step, and how to
coach the employee while he practices the operation until it is mastered. He
is shown how to guard against the mistake of trying to give the employee
more than he can absorb at a time. VHe is also taught to avoid technical
language that the learner cannot comprehend. He is shown how to discover
the parts of the job that the learner needs to know first. The supervisor
knows that merely telling a worker what to do is not enough, nor is it
enough to show him how to do it. He comes to see the truth of the training
slogan: "If the employee hasn't learned, the supervisor hasn't taught." •**
Job-instruction training brings together two phases of the training
process: how to get ready to instruct, and how to instruct. In the first phase,
the supervisor learns to look at the job analytically, to break it down into
units, and to arrange the units into a logical learning order. In the second
phase, he learns exactly how to get his knowledge across to the employee

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 427

so that the latter understands the job and gets his work done quickly,
correctly, and conscientiously.

How to get ready to instruct consists of the following steps: (1) have
a timetable, know how much skill you expect to develop in the worker and
how soon; (2) break down the job, list the principal steps, pick out the key
points; (3) have everything right— tools, equipment, and materials; and
(4) have the work place properly arranged, just as the worker will be
expected to keep it.
/How to instruct is also broken down into four steps:

(1) Prepare the worker by putting him at his ease, finding out what he
knows about the job, getting him interested in learning and placing him
in the correct position;

(2) Present the operation by telling, showing, illustrating, and question-
ing carefully and patiently, stressing key points, and instructing clearly and
completely, taking up one point at a time, but no more than the worker
can master;

(3) Try out his performance by testing him on the job, having him tell
and show you, and having him explain key points while you ask questions
and correct errors until you tyiow he knows; and

(4) Follow up by putting him on his own, checking him frequently,
designating one to whom he goes for help, encouraging him to ask questions,
getting him to look for key points as he progresses, and tapering off
coaching and close follow-up as his work improves.

The basic content of this program is epitomized in simple terms on
a little card furnished every supervisor who goes through it. However,
the method of teaching JIT is as important as the content. Teaching JIT
is made up of five closely packed two-hour sessions, conducted by agency
personnel that has been previously trained by the Civil Service Commis-
sion. It has been found that best njfiults are obtained with groups of ten
or twelve participants. Beyond that\ujnber there is insufficient time for
individual practice, and JIT devotes bVv little time to theory and a great
deal to application. Only the first sessions g^ven over to theoretical study.
The other four two-hour sessions provide\ach member of the group with
at least two opportunities to try his hand at thfc, skill of instruction and
to benefit from the criticism of the instructor and the olSfcr members.

In short, each member of the group takes his turn in presenting an
actual demonstration of the method, using a job operation employed in his
own office. Before he can do this, of course, he must break down the job
into a sequence of steps and decide what key points the learner must know
about. In the demonstration before the group he uses the job breakdown
he himself prepared, and follows the four-step method to instruct another
member who acts as a learner. The group then discusses the demonstration,
criticizes the presentation, and suggests improvements.

In other words, the program applies to the teaching method its own

428 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

principles of telling and showing the learner what he is expected to learn,
giving him a chance of actually trying it, and demonstrating where he suc-
ceeded and where he failed. The final step of following up after the
supervisor has had opportunity to practice takes place later when he has
returned to his unit and has applied the method on the job. Continued
emphasis was maintained in the form of personal calls from representatives
of the Civil Service Commission and agency trainers, presentation of illus-
trative movies through the Office of Education and other devices.4
/ Improving Methods. Perhaps the strongest single impediment to man-
agement progress is the dead weight of tradition — the habit of doing things
the way they have always been done. Habits are powerful and the habitual
method may survive simply because we are used to it, not because it is the
best method. The only way organizations can rid themselves of outmoded
procedures, unnecessary operations, and wasteful duplications of effort is
to subject every activity periodically to searching reexamination. ^

Job Method Training was evolved to meet the need of supervisors for
a simple, practical way of improving jobs — a plan they could apply to their
daily work. Although originally developed by TWI for foremen in indus-
try, its approach to the integration of manpower, materials, and machinery
is common to all supervisory jobs. The program has been found to be
readily adaptable to conditions of government work.

JMT does not make methods engineers, nor is it intended to do so. It
does put into the supervisor's hands a tool that will enable him to examine
operations critically and to work out improvements logically and effectively.
The entire emphasis is on making improvements, not on theory or mere
discussion. (After being given a sound conception of the methods as applied
'(to an actual operation, each supervisor is required to analyze a job in his
jown unit and to make concrete recommendations for changing the job to
bring about more effective use of manpower, materials, and equipment.
Each supervisor demonstrates how he analyzed the present operation and
questioned every detail. He then explains the new method he has developed
in which he eliminates unnecessary operations, and combines, rearranges, and
simplifies the details to make the job easier, faster, and more economical.

As in the case of JIT, job-methods training is given to equally small
groups of supervisors in five two-hour sessions. Again, the program is
conducted by leaders selected from the agency personnel trained by the
Civil Service Commission. The objective is not to get a certain number
of improvements from each supervisor, but to encourage a constant reap-
praisal of existing methods.

JMT can be articulated with employee-suggestion systems, with employee
"councils," and with agency planning and procedure work. It stimulates a
constant flow of ideas for new and better ways of doing old jobs.

4C/. United States Civil Service Commission, Supervision Improvement Program, A Pro*
gram for Supervisors in the Federal Service, Washington, 1943.

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 429

The great virtue of JMT is that it opens up to every supervisor the
opportunity to be creative about his work. The success of this program
affords new evidence that there is in each of us a creative imagination at
work that speculates on the possibility of making changes in the established
scheme of things, even in matters that are not in our own immediate
province. In this natural tendency of human beings we possess an inex-
haustible spring of improvement possibilities that is virtually untapped. Al-
though management recognizes the necessity for revising its procedures to
effect modifications and short-cuts, too often it turns this task over to special-
ized planning staffs or method engineers, without using the potential flow of
ideas that could come from the mass of employees on the job.

First-line supervisors are in a key position to carry out management
policy. They work closely with employees in the details of processes and
projects, and have intimate knowledge of a multitude of operations that in
the aggregate make up the program of the agency. In fact, many times
the supervisor is the only manager and representative of management who
knows enough about the technical aspects of his unit to make intelligent
comments about it. Consequently, management is incapable of streamlining
the totality of jobs in the organization without the vigorous assistance of
the supervisor.

Here is the way the little card that is handed to all supervisors who take
JM3& describes the essence of this approach:

Step 1. Brea^ down the job. (a) List all details of a job exactly
as it is done by the present method, (b) Be sure details include every-
thing you and others do in using (1) manpower, (2) materials, (3)
equipment.

Step 2. Question every detail, (a) Use these types of questions: (1)
Why is it necessary? (2) What is its purpose? (3) Where should it
be done? (4) When should it be done? (5) Who should do it?
(6) How is the best way to do it? (b) Also question the office lay-out,
work places, flow of work, safety, forms, form letters, clearances, review-
ing, and all other procedures.

Step 3. Develop the new method, (a) Eliminate unnecessary detail,
(b) Combine details when practical, (c) Rearrange for better sequence,
(d) Simplify all unnecessary detail. (1) To make the work easier:
(A) Pre-position materials, supplies, and equipment at the best places
in the proper work areas. (B) Let both hands do useful work. (C)
Use devices for materials. (D) Work out your idea with others. (E)
Write up your proposed method.

Step 4. Apply the new method, (a) Sell your proposal to your boss,
(b) Sell the new method to the employees, (c) Get approvals from all
concerned, (d) Put the new method to work, use it until a better is
developed, (e) Give credit where credit is due.

J^b^methods.-training has had such an immediate positive effect on the
attitude of supervisors toward their own jobs that some agencies have tried
to carry the^ idea one step further—to the individual employeie^ The result

430 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

has been gratifying. Besides demonstrating that the program is easily within
the capacity of the average employee, such extension gives recognition to
one factor that is essential to this type of training. Both the employee and
the supervisor must be made to see that suggestions from them are sincerely
desired by those higher up. Although each of us thinks he knows how to
improve on the established way of doing things, we have a natural reluc-
tance about appearing to criticize our superiors. It's different when we are
asked to give constructive criticism.

Wording with People. For many supervisors, the most difficult part of
their job is acquiring the knack of dealing with employees. This ability
is vital to good supervision for every act of the supervisor has a bearing
one way or the other on the attitude and morale of employees. Supervisors
do not need an elaborate course in applied psychology to develop the skill
required to get results through other people, but they do need an under-
standing of the fundamentals which lie behind employee attitudes and a
workable method of applying those fundamentals.

Job-relations training is concerned with two phases of the supervisor's
problem. The first is the general knowledge essential to dealing with all
employees, the "foundation of good relations." The basic principles are
few: tell employees how they are getting along; give credit where it is due;
make the most of each person's ability; and inform employees of changes
that affect them. The second phase deals with the technique of handling
individual problems — the special problems that arise because employees are
not a "great grey mass" but individuals, each with his own reactions,
emotions, backgrounds, and abilities.

The training methods, however, are much the same as with JIT and
JMT — five two-hour sessions, mostly taken up with application to actual
situations, and led by the agency's own personnel who have been trained
by the Civil Service Commission. First, the technique of maintaining good
relations is demonstrated to the group of participants, using actual cases
taken from job situations. Next, each supervisor brings in a case from his
own unit and presents an application of the JRT method. The group helps
him to establish what his real objective is, what facts need to be secured,
what possible actions he could take, and the probable effect of each action.

No final judgment is passed on the supervisor's solution. The purpose
is to give him skill in arriving at decisions, not to hand him a set of canned
decisions. This training supplies the supervisor with an understanding of
job attitudes and the methods of handling employee-relation problems.
With this guidance each supervisor can develop his own skill and feeling
for the human factor.

The core of job-relations training is concisely stated on a small reference
card given to trainees:

Foundations for good relations. (1) Let each worker know how he
is getting along, (a) Figure out what you expect from him. (b) Point

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 431

out to him ways to improve. (2) Give credit when due. (a) Recognize
extra or unusual performance, (b) Tell him when it is fresh; tell him
while it is fresh. (3) Tell an employee in advance about changes that
will affect him. (a) Tell him why, if possible, (b) Get him to accept
the change. (4) Make the best use of each person's ability, (a) Look
for ability not now being used, (b) Never stand in an employee's way.
People must be treated lil(e individuals. How to handle a problem.
(1) Get the facts, (a) Review the record, (b) Find out what rules and
customs apply, (c) Talk with individuals concerned, (d) Get opinions
and feelings, (e) Be sure that you have the whole story. (2) Weigh
and decide, (a) Fit the facts together, (b) Consider their bearing on
each other, (c) Check practices and policies, (d) What possible actions
are there? (e) Consider effect on individual, group, and production.
(f) Don't jump to conclusions. (3) Take action, (a) Can you handle
this yourself? (b) Do you need help in handling it? (c) Should you
refer this to your supervisor? (d) Time your action properly, (e) Don't
pass the buck. (4) Check results, (a) How soon will you follow-up? (b)
How often will you need to check? (c) Watch for changes in output,
attitudes and relationships, (d) Did your action help production?

Of course, no matter how well the supervisor masters these points, he still
has to be JJroficient in the art of leadership. Perhaps an outstanding leader
must be born, but certainly skill in leadership can be improved, as job-
relations training has demonstrated. Application of fundamental proposi-
tions does have an important bearing on human relations on the job.

One fundamental fact is that we are all different. Each one of us brings
to a job his own individual attitudes, his hopes and ambitions, his aptitudes
and his interests. A given situation will affect each individual according
to his own point of view, and it may affect him in an entirely different
way on another occasion. Furthermore, all of us have other things burden-
ing us besides our jobs, which can very well interfere with our state of
mind — our health, our family, our future security, to name but a few.
These factors may exist in many different combinations. Any approach
to the problems arising out of human relationships must inevitably be made
on the basis of the individual case.

It is not necessary to turn supervisors into trained psychologists to help
them deal with their employees as individuals. The average supervisor,
impressed with the policy of treating everybody alike and given a tech-
nique of unearthing the facts underlying employee attitudes, will make
sound or at least sounder decisions. If he uses job-relations techniques, his
decisions will be sounder because he will try to learn all the facts in each
case — not merely those that appear on the surface — and because he will not
consider the case closed until the decision has been proven to be correct.

It is plain that the highly condensed solutions into which JIT, JMT,
and JRT have been put are by themselves mcrcly^ghots in the arm. The
supervisor, to be effectively trained, must be provided with a plan for de-
veloping skill on the job. Therefore follow-up is highly important. Con-

432 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

tinucd use and perfection of the three skills must be the watchword if the
supervisor is to become adept at his trade.

Finally, management must accept the implications of this kind of train-
ing by reexamining its policies and operations to see if they conflict with
the basic propositions which the first-line supervisor is expected to follow.
For example, it is unreasonable to hope that a supervisor will maintain
much enthusiasm for improving job methods in the face of hostility of his
own supervisor every time he makes a suggestion. A supervisor will not be
convinced very long that his superiors sincerely want to treat employees
fairly and intelligently, if he himself is suffering from unfair or unintelli-
gent treatment. He will relax his efforts if his superiors violate principles
of good employee relations in formulating or enforcing personnel policies.
Again, the supervisor may become fully convinced in the JIT program that
part of his job is to improve his employees' efficiency through continued
training on the job, but this conviction will not be sustained if no continued
interest is taken higher up in his own improvement. This is another way
of saying that the new programs, although they are designed primarily for
first-line supervisors, enunciate conceptions that are applicable anywhere in
the organizational hierarchy right up to the head of the agency.

It should be pointed out that all of the three J programs were utilized
not only by the federal government but by states, counties, and cities as well.
Many of these took advantage of the TWI trainers to secure supervisory in-
struction within their own jurisdictions. Others used the materials as devel-
oped by the work-improvement program of the United States Civil Service
Commission.

Worf^ Simplification. Let us now turn to a related effort, the so-called
work-simplification program developed by the United States Bureau of the
Budget.5 As in the case of job-methods training under TWI, this is an
attempt to condense training into a readily understandable form, which can
be easily assimilated by first-line supervisors themselves. It should not be
inferred that the work-simplification program duplicates job-methods train-
ing; it is a more specific though highly simplified program in itself.

It is built around three basic management problems: (1) the distribu-
tion of work; (2) the sequence of work; and (3) the volume of work.
For these three basic problems there are three elementary tools to be used:
(1) the work-distribution chart; (2) the process chart; and (3) the work
count. The supervisor is trained in the use of the three tools in order that
he may be able to solve each respective basic problem.

The method is equally interesting. The first training session is given

5 Cf. United States Bureau of the Budget, Trainer's Guide to the Wor% Simplification
Training Sessions; Specifications for Agency Wor\ Simplification; Supervisor's Guide to the
Work,. Distribution Chart; Supervisor's Guide to the Process Chart; Supervisor's Guide to the
Wor\ Count , Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945. The essence of these materials
is also available in Publication No. 91, Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1945.

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 433

over to introducing the program, setting up the objectives of the sessions,
and getting the group to know each other. About an hour is devoted to
discussing the work-distribution chart. This is the preface, so to speak,
:o two hours of "laboratory" work in which the supervisor himself uses
the work-distribution chart. The second session reviews the work performed
and introduces the process chart. This again is followed by "laboratory"
activity in which the supervisors meet with the instructor to make up their
first process chart. The third training session in a similar fashion deals
with the work count, followed once more by individual application. The
instructor makes an appointment with each supervisor, meets him at his
desk, and helps to determine what work to count in his own unit. Then
there is a final session of three hours in which the total program is reviewed
and supervisors demonstrate their competence in using the three tools. As
in the case of the J programs, follow-up is indispensable.

All of this merely draws additional emphasis to the supervisor's task
of dealing with his people — the crux of the whole supervisory situation.
No supervisor can hope to be successful unless he learns to lead without
bossing. The days of the "straw boss" who shouted his orders and cracked
his whip are over. It never was an effective method, even before the ad-
vent of a more mature appreciation of work democracy and organized
labor. The secret of good supervision is to suggest, to stimulate with a
word of praise, to lead by example.

Much of the supervisor's task is to work with the employees he has.
He might sometimes wish he could fire all of his workers and replace them
with abler ones. This is seldom possible or desirable. Therefore, one of
the tricks in the supervisor's bag must be to know how to develop hidden
ability. Realistically, of course, it is no trick at all; it is a competence
gained only from study and association with the worker, from understand-
ing his whole attitude, and from willingness to help him. As in leading
without bossing, discovering hidden abilities requires going to the worker,
being sympathetic, studying him carefully, and giving him every oppor-
tunity to express himself. This same basic approach will also create a
favorable working climate, in which the worker will have a feeling of re-
lease and not a feeling of repression.

The discussion so far may suggest that the supervisor has a gigantic
job which he does all alone. This, of course, would not be true, particu-
larly in government. In instructional situations — in handling the problems
of teaching workers new tasks, new methods, and new procedures— the
supervisor, in almost all governmental jurisdictions, has the help of a train-
ing officer or a training division.^ This is also true of his general handling
of personnel matters. In fact, most of these things are done for him by a
recruiting officer, an employment officer, and other specialists. Likewise,
when it comes to methods, the planning staff of the agency is generally
at hand, often stimulating the supervisor to develop new work procedures

434 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

and improve old methods. On morale problems and on handling out-of-
the-ordinary cases, the supervisor in many governmental jurisdictions has
the help of an employee counselor or employee-relations officer. However,
the emphasis must be constantly maintained that in the concrete situatior
these functions are all those of the supervisor. Even if he receives help
from above, the burden inevitably continues to be his.

3. PROBLEMS OF SUPERVISION

There is a temptation to capsulate and reduce to catchwords and slogans

the truths that should govern supervision in order that a working tech-
nique may be applied. Slogans can be coined, but they may be misunder-
stood. What is good supervision? What should the qualities of a super-
visor be in order to make him effective?

Variations in Supervisory Situations. In a still-unpublished monograph
entitled Introduction to Supervision? John M. Pfiffner has offered an ex-
cellent analysis to answer these two questions. Any answer must allow for
many variations. In the first place, what makes for effective supervision
in situations dealing with one kind of work may not do so under other
conditions. Supervising miners is a task different from supervising typists
in a stenographic pool, not to mention supervising scientists in a laboratory.
Secondly, and as a corollary, the^ingredients of good supervision will vary
i with the kind of people involved. Highly skilled artisans or highly edu-
cated professional employees may be of prima dbfl/zfl "'temperament and
demand an entirely different kind of attention than less skilled or trained
individuals. Thirdly, the concrete work situation may make a substantial
difference. Work in an office requires one pattern of supervisory knowledge
and skills; work in a factory, in a commercial establishment, or in a school
building requires another.

Fourth, the extent of supervisory responsibility will have a good deal
to do with the demands made on the supervisor. The supervisor whose
range of duties is narrow probably need not be as specifically qualified as
the supervisor whose responsibilities are comprehensive in terms of the
work of his unit. The supervisor who is bolstered by a training assistant,
personnel officer, and employee counselor probably need not be as broadly
trained as one who has to work completely on his own, without staff
services. Or, the supervisor who makes important decisions as to what work
has to be done and how it is to be done will need to be a more highly
competent individual. Fifth, the level of supervision is important? The first-
line supervisor will undoubtedly have less need for intellectual powers than
the supervisor much further up the line. The former will have more need
for detailed knowledge of the work to be done.

« Pfiffner, John M., Introduction to Supervision, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, 1944, mimeographed.

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 435

Requirements of Good Supervision. Pfiffncr7 lists eight requirements
of good supervision and good supervisors: (1) Command of job content;
(2) personal qualifications; (3) teaching ability; (4) general outlook;
(5) courage and fortitude; (6) ethical and moral considerations; (7) admin-
istrative technology; and (8) curiosity and intellectual ability. To elaborate:

(1) Job content. An expert knowledge of the work to be done is per-
haps desirable at the first level of supervision, but it is doubtful if it is
essential. Ability to do the work skillfully is helpful because it enables the
supervisor to answer questions by his example. Furthermore, it enables him
to judge results. It helps him to lay out work in such a way that one worker
is not overburdened and another underemployed. However, too great an
expertness in the work is less desirable, especially if it tends to make the
supervisor the best worker'of the unit, rather than its supervisor.

It is doubtful whether supervisors should be recruited without regard to
their knowledge of the job to be supervised. In many work situations, super-
visors could probably be given quick training in the job content, buttthey
should still be selected because of personal qualification. Seniority alonFlT
one of the worst possible bases for picking supervisors. Some one has very
pointedly remarked that twenty years of experience may be simply one
year's experience repeated twenty times. )

(2) Personal qualifications. These are probably the most important
qualifications for any supervisor. The best supervisory material comes from
among those who like people, who enjoy cooperating with others, who have
the ability to attract others to themselves, who can motivate them positively
and unite them in their work. But we must go beyond this point to con-
siderations of emotional stability and intellectual integrity.

Without emotional stability, the supervisor will not be able to control
himself. If he cannot control himself at all times, if he is apt to speak to an
employee in anger, he is not a good supervisor. Intellectual integrity implies
an objective attitude which grows out of a knowledge of one's strength and
weakness. Such a knowledge permits the supervisor to be objective toward
others, especially in handling grievances.

Along with emotional balance, there should be balance in other traits as
well. It seems fairly well established in psychological testing that good
supervisory material is more dominant than recessive, more extroverted
than introverted, more stable than unstable, more self-sufficient than depend-
ent on others. Any of these traits, however, when carried to an extreme
degree is harmful.

An individual who must dominate in every situation certainly is not
good supervisory material. Neither is the individual who is so completely
extroverted that he is not aware of the reactions of others. He who is so
well integrated and stable that nothing can ruffle him is by that very fact

7 Op. cit. above in note 6.

436 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

often deprived of motivating power and of the drive that may lead him or
others far. Likewise, the supervisor who carries self-sufficiency to the ex-
treme and never seeks advice from others is apt to become an autocrat in
his actions. Finally getting down to physical characteristics, it certainly helps
if the supervisor "cuts a good figure" — if he has the physical presence to
command the attention of others. Of course, that does not compensate for
personal weaknesses within.

(3) Teaching ability. This is one of the three basic skills of supervision.
Supervisory work requires the ability to participate and lead in conferences,
to teach groups of individuals. It requires also the ability to teach oneself,
to keep perpetually at the process of self-education, to remain up-to-date on
changes and new developments.

(4) General outlool^. A supervisor needs to be career-minded if he is to
set an example to his employees. This, after all, is the most effective method
of leadership. The supervisor should love his job and be absorbed in it.
He can then engender enthusiasm in others and stimulate them by his
own example. If he is career-minded, he will foster what has been called
"clan pride" or esprit de corps, thus furnishing a subtle but effective motiva-
tion that is an all-important morale factor.

(5) Courage and fortitude. These make the supervisor fully assume
responsibility in all cases where he should. Without both he will not have
>the stamina to take action decisively. He will not be willing to "walk
toward danger." He may not say "no" when he should, nor frankly con-
fess mistakes. However, boldness must be balanced with caution, bravery
with tact; otherwise the supervisor will "stick his neck out" until someone
hacks it off. ^

(6) Ethical and Moral Considerations. It is difficult to speak of these
without sounding like the "pulpit," yet they are not trivial. Whether it be
petty pilfering of the stamp box, abusing the expense account for personal
purposes, drinking or gambling, being careless about one's credit rating,
piling up traffic offenses, or the wrong kinds of amorous involvements— any
of these reflects on the respect and dignity which must attend the supervisor
if he is to do his best at his job. Default in any of such directions may very
well impair the value of his example. Supervision requires a natural assump-
tion of responsibility and a natural desire to set a good example.

(7) Administrative technology. This refers to the ability of the super-
visor to organize and coordinate. The whole purpose of his job existence is to
get work done. If he cannot organize this work and coordinate the efforts
of those who work with him, he will fail in supervision. It is therefore neces-
sary for him to know something about administration, to have a sense of sys-
tem and method. He has to be able to lay out schedules and assign work,
so as to keep constant the stream of production. He cannot get by with
fragmentary knowledge. Above all, he should know the place of his unit
in the organization as a whole.

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 437

(8) Curiosity and intellectual ability. The inquiring mind with an appe-
tite for unsolved problems is at a real premium in our world. That is why
it is necessary for the supervisor not to be too much submerged in the de-
tails of the work of his unit, why he must be detached enough to see the
problems beneath and to work on them. Furthermore, he needs to be suf-
ficiently superior in intellect to be able to have an effective approach to
problems and to be a good problem-solver. He needs this ability to separate
essentials from nonessentials. Certainly the supervisor should be capable
of making decisions in a deliberate manner, and not "by the seat of his
pants."

Democracy of Wor\. Examination of these eight requirements shows
that the "spirit of supervision" demands leadership rather than driving
force. The aim is to secure a voluntary and spontaneous work response,
with the workers themselves participating as much as is feasible in planning
job strategy and determining production methods. It has logically been
contended that for organic progress the fundamentals of Anglo-Saxon
political democracy and constitutional government should be extended into
the manager-worker relationship.

In a sense, this is the issue of democracy versus hierarchy. In such a dis-
cussion we are inevitably bucking the set ways of thinking about superior-
subordinate relationships, about the "inefficiency" of democracy, and about
the "command functions" in the military sense. However, support is fur-
nished by the writings of Mary Parker Follett,8 Elton Mayo,9 Fritz J. Roeth-
lisberger,10 and others.11

Mary Follett has pointed out that the claims made for final authority
are mostly based on illustion. True authority actually springs only from
the intrinsic competence, worthiness, and strength of one in a place of
authority. To be called authority, it must be spontaneously and tacitly
acquiesced in by the workers. Authority does not leap forth from the com-
mands of those at the top simply because the organization chart or the
manual says so. It arises out of "the law of the situation," which is the anti-
thesis to the "illusion of final authority." In other words, institutional situa-
tions demand certain actions to be taken by those whom commonsense and
general agreement indicate as the ones to take such actions, regardless of
what the hierarchic lines might be.

This kind of thinking means, in terms of effective supervision, that the
supervisor must be in part democratically chosen. He must command the

8 See her Dynamic Administration, New York: Harper, 1942.

9 See his Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, New York: Macmillan, 1933,
and Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.

10 See his Management and Morale, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941; and
Roethlisberger, Fritz J. and Dickson, William J., Management and the Worker. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1943.

I1*:/. Bradford, Leland P. and Lippitt, Ronald, "Building a Democratic Work Group,"
Personnel, 1945, Vol. 22, p. 142 ff.

438 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

respect and the following of his subordinates. Otherwise he will be super-
visor in name only. He may actually give the commands, but another
may do the leading because that other has implicit prestige with his fellows.
The effective supervisor, by superior knowledge and greater skill, "takes
the workers with him." His use of the power of command is secondary at
best.

It is a mistake, however, to think of hierarchy and democracy as being
antithetical. The spirit and practice of supervision can be democratic with-
out infringing upon the essentials of manual-prescribed discipline. Demo-
cratic supervision solicits the worker's interest and participation in the pro-
duction process on a consultative basis. At the same time, there must be a
certain definiteness in the handling of human situations and a consistency
with responsibilities under the laws and regulations.

Fair dealing and justice sometimes require painful measures for the
good of the employees themselves. Likewise democracy in administration, to
be effective, must be able to act expeditiously when necessary. It cannot sur-
vive in the ways of a submissive supervisor who does not dare to take action
for fear of worker resentment. Neither can democratic administration exist
if the employees are dominated by emotional dread of all authority. The
spirit of supervision should be democratic, and the supervisor should seize
every possible opportunity to defer to the essential dignity and the senti-
ments of the worker. However, this can never come about on a lasting
basis unless the worker in turn is mindful of his obligations as well as his
rights.

As Pfiffner puts it:12

Managers and supervisors must come to the realization that discretion
and flexibility are not synonymous with arbitrariness and power. Man-
agement of the future, whether public or private, must learn to work
within the framework of the new personnel jurisprudence, which places
upon the supervisory staff the same type of restriction which constitu-
tional safeguards in the Bill of Rights exercise over the executive officers
of government. It should be remembered that the idea of tying the
hands of kings with constitutional restraint was thought to be a radical
move by the substantial people in the world until more modern times.
In the present century, we have fought two world wars to preserve con-
stitutional government with its legal safeguards against governmental
power over individuals. It seems reasonable to assume that the same
type of arbitrary power of the supervisor over the worker should be
abolished in favor of the wholesome discretion exercised within the limi-
tations of a rapidly developing personnel jurisprudence.

One final note might be added. It is becoming increasingly clear with the
rise of labor unions in industry that the day of democracy has not only
dawned but that the sun is shining near the zenith. \ A highly placed
manager of one of the country's biggest industries recently gave an amusing

12 Op. cit. above in note 6 (by permission of the author) .

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 439

illustration of what this may mean in terms of human relations. After
leaving a dollar-a-year job in Washington, he went back to his plant and
made a personal inspection trip. Several times he was stopped in the corri-
dors by groups of workers lounging and smoking. He could not tell
whether they were on a regular recess or not. Nevertheless, he had to say
"pardon me" and "excuse me" in order to proceed through the corridors,
whereas a few years ago — he said — he would have taken the names and
numbers of each one of them and told them to go to the office and get
thfir last pay.

s Selecting Supervisors. How to find qualified supervisory material is
indeed a critical problem. However, the key to picking good supervisors
is good planning.13 It is necessary to identify those employees who hold
promise of making effective supervisors before the need for them actually
arises. This selection of understudies is frequently made quite unconsciously.
The supervisor will turn to the most dependable worker and ask him to
take his place when he is out of the room or to train a new worker. Or
the supervisor will in some other way indicate his preference among the
workers with whom he has contact.

The trouble with this process is that it is frequently quite unplanned.
Furthermore, it is usually based on the need of the moment. A premium
is thus placed on dependability; or on the ability to teach — as in the case
of training a new worker; or even on such a negative factor as the super-
visor's feeling that the man he has selected is no threat or competition to
him.^The only adequate answer to the problem of picking supervisors is to
have a scheme prepared well in advance. This is a responsibility of top man-
agement. Nevertheless, unless the worker knows the plan that management
follows in choosing supervisors he cannot have much incentive and certainly
he will have very little sense of direction toward achieving advancement.

In most work situations today, the system— if it can be called that— for
picking supervisors is the very informal and almost entirely unplanned
one of observing the workers on the job. When a likely candidate for a
supervisory post is spotted, his name is recorded in the mind or perhaps
in the notebook of the boss, depending on how systematic he is. When an
opportunity comes up, the various candidates the boss has noted are inter-
viewed. Their work records are compared and then one man is madb
supervisor.

This system, informal as it may seem to be, can be a good one if defi-
nite standards are kept in mind. There may be a personal history in writ-
ing of each worker's performance, including his performance under ten-
sion, how he gets along with his fellows, whether he is ambitious, whether
he has made any suggestions for improvement of the work, his conduct

18 A good introduction to supervisory training may be found in Fern, George H., Training
for Supervision in Industry, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945.

440 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

off the job, and so forth. If such a record is not kept as part of each em-
ployee's personnel folder, an ill-considered choice is much more likely.

The personal interview is frequently used, particularly if the superior
making the selection of the new supervisor is two or three levels removed
from the candidate and does not know his work intimately. The interview
is useful to test personal traits. Generally it does not have sufficient validity
to contradict the record of work experience or the recommendations of
former superiors.

Recommendation by former superiors needs to be given some weight,
too, but caution should be exercised. The supervisor's recommendation is
only as good as the supervisor himself. If the supervisor is one who for his
own self-protection will select the worker who is aggressive and pushes him-
self forward, or if he notices only the people who are pleasant and inoccuous,
his recommendation would be misleading to that extent. By and large, how-
ever, it is to be doubted whether the superior, in making a promotion,
should override the supervisor's recommendation.

Written tests are not much in use for the selection of supervisors. Yet
such tests can be helpful indicators. A grave question is whether inventories
of personal traits or basic interests may be used with complete assurance
in a competitive situation. It has been well established that general intelli-
gence and subject-matter knowledge — how to lay out a job, how to issue
instructions, how to teach — can be readily tested, not to mention the funda-
mentals of public administration.

It has also been demonstrated that the intelligence test alone is a fairly
good indicator to identify supervisory talent, provided that complete reliance
is not placed upon it but that further screening takes place. The supervisor
cannot be effective unless he is superior in intelligence, or at a bare mini-
mum as intelligent as the average worker under him. Otherwise he is seri-
ously handicapped in his leadership and in his acceptance bf'fhe, group, v

State and local governments in certain jurisdictions use the competitive
promotional examination. This can be a sound system, but it depends
almost entirely on how it is administered. Mere posting of the opportunity
to take a competitive promotional examination would certainly not be
enough.

Finally, there is still another device— election of supervisors by their fel-
low workers. This has been tried in a number of places and found to be
none too successful. Probably supervisors should conduct themselves in
such a way that they would be the choice of their workers. But it is to be
doubted whether the most popular member of a group is always the best
supervisor.

Even a selection system combining most of the elements here reviewed
would not guarantee a good supervisor. He would still have to be tried
on the job; an understudy system is therefore desirable. Once workers with
supervisory talent are identified, they should be given a chance of showing

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 441

their ability as supervisors. They could act as relief when their supervisor is
on sick leave or vacation, or during shorter periods when he is called away
from his post. During this kind of probationary period when the candi-
date is acting as understudy, he should be given training to qualify him
fully for his job. His performance as acting supervisor and as trainee will
allow a fairly definitive rating of his promise.

Supervision and Policy. The system by which supervisors are picked
depends upon the policy of top management. To what extent are supervis-
ors the victims of top policy? We are tempted to reply: In inverse propor-
tion to the degree of their use in the determination of policy. In turn, their
participation in policy-making is in large part a problem of communication
— getting information about policy and underlying reasons down the hier-
archy and policy suggestions back up again.14 If the agency head sees to it
that managers on the intermediate levels down to the first-line supervisors
meet regularly with their work associates to discuss the objectives of the
organization and how successfully these are being accomplished, supervisors
will have an opportunity of contributing to the making of policy.

When they do, they are likely to press for reasonable flexibility in the
application of general regulations that impinge upon their relationship
with their employees.15 There are still too many rules which require
supervisors to take specified action against the employee irrespective of the
particular circumstances of the individual case, and sometimes over quite
trivial matters. When the supervisor's discretion is so sharply limited, he is
impaired in his opportunity for effective supervision. We are here faced
with an inherent dilemma of large-scale organization. On the one hand is
the demand for uniformity, and on the other a realization that for best
performance the supervisor requires as much latitude as possible.

It is not in policy matters alone that supervisors may be victimized.
They are also exposed to pressures of various sorts from higher levels. These
pressures may come from superiors in the line of command or from officers
in staff services who may interfere in the supervisory situation for one rea-
son or another. Much of the functional specialization of large-scale organi-
zation is in a sense an interference with effective supervision. Examples are
the supervisor's inability freely to reward exceptional service by increased
pay, or to hire and fire employees. In fact, certain state and local jurisdic-
tions give the employees generally the right to appeal to the civil service
commission for reinstatement on its decision.

One of the sharpest pressures which a superior can bring on a supervisor
is pressure for greater production without conceding overtime compensation.
Another example of pressure may arise from employee counseling by special
staff services. During World War II, especially in the federal service, the

14 For a fuller discussion, see above Ch. 16, "The Formulation of Administrative Policy."

15 For further discussion, sec above Ch. 17, "Government by Procedure," especially sec. 4,
"Creation and Criteria."

442 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

supervisor's job of looking after the morale of his employees was almost
completely taken over in some agencies by an employee-relations staff, par-
ticularly by the employee counselor. The more technical specialists there
are in personnel and management-planning offices, the greater is the tempta-
tion to exert various pressures on the supervisor— indeed, to make him abdi-
cate certain of his responsibilities and pass them over to these technicians.
Specialization— notwithstanding its general merits— thus causes another
dilemma in first-line supervision.

Span of Supervision. A specific problem which deserves consideration
might be called that of the span of supervision. How many workers can
one supervisor control effectively? This is not the way the number of work-
ers assigned to the supervisor is usually determined, however. The super-
visor is simply given a block of work to do and the number of workers
deemed adequate to handle it, without much thought of the problem of
span of supervision. Under the pressure of what may be an impossible
assignment, the supervisor can very well break down or resign himself to
doing an inadequate job.

It is not possible to give a definite answer to the question of "the span of
supervision." Graicunas16 tried it by insisting that no superior should super-
vise more than three subordinates, but immediately we would have to make
an exception at the first level of supervision because so many employees
carry on rather mechanical tasks which require a minimum of surveillance.
In other words, the span of supervision depends upon the homogeneity of
the work, its mechanical or nonmechanical nature, the proficiency of
the workers, and so on. In short, it depends upon the amount of attention
the supervisor needs to give to each individual worker. Naturally, the more
time he has to spend with each, the fewer he can supervise.

It is doubtful, however, whether a single supervisor can supervise more
than six or seven workers unless their tasks are almost entirely mechanized
and routinized. True, the supervisor can save himself a lot of time by
organizing his own job. There are many internal controls such as produc-
tion records and quality control records which can save the supervisor
many steps and much personal attention, thereby lengthening his span
of supervision.

Employee Organization and Supervision. Something has been said in
the preceding discussion about the new democratic approach to supervision.
Reference has been made to the employee union. This changed situation
constitutes a novel problem for supervision. In the first place, in a highly
unionized plant or office— and most governmental jurisdictions, especially
the larger ones, are now unionized at least in part— democracy has been

16 "Relationship in Organization," in Gulick, Luther and Urwick, L., eds,, Papers on the
Science of Administration, p. 183 ff.t New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937.
C/. also above Ch. 7, "Working Concepts of Organization," sec. 3, "Quest of Organizational
Unity."

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 443

forced upon the supervisor by the very organization of the employees. He
has to deal with grievances consistently because he is confronted by an
organized group. He has to discuss hours of work, assignment of work, or
whatever the topic of a complaint may be, in terms of the weight of
numbers.

Nor is that all. As factories have their shop stewards who speak for the
union even though they are also employees themselves, so the government-
employee unions have their spokesmen. What happens to the undivided
authority of the supervisor when he is dealing with a shop steward about
one of the supervisor's workers? Certainly the pure concept of hierarchy
is affected. The employee union by its very existence puts a premium upon
intelligence on the part of the supervisor, upon a progressive philosophy in
his dealings with workers, and upon his skill in negotiations not only face
to face with his employees but also with others outside his shop. The prob-
lem of the employee union might well be pondered by those who are
selecting prospective supervisors.

Another entirely different question comes up in connection with unioni-
zation— the question of whether the supervisor himself is to be unionized.17
There is still considerable public controversy about the issue whether
foremen in factories and supervisors in offices may belong to labor unions
or whether they are— as management contends — an integral part of the
executive system. The truth is, of course, that the supervisor in this matter
is on the fence, or in an organizational no man's land. Being raised from
among the workers, being in daily contact with them, the first-line super-
visor, if he has any sympathy at all, very readily identifies himself with
them.

On the other hand, no one can deny that even supervisors in the first
line are the fingers of the hands of management. They are not only first-
line supervisors but first-line executives as well. We could conjecture that
the supervisor would regard himself as a manager and an executive only
when his place as such is clearly indicated to him by top management
and only when management is sympathetic to the individual worker. If
the worker is in fact suppressed or exploited by management, the sympa-
thetic supervisor will be prone to side with the workers in a controversy
between them and management.

Short-Run Versus Long-Run Point of View. Many of the problems of
supervision can be telescoped into one question — that of the short-run versus
the long-run point of view. A management which insists on immediate
top production at any given level of work proficiency without taking time
and money for training in order to up-grade the worker or give him an
opportunity to train and develop himself, pursues a policy which has far-

17 An excellent discussion of the industrial aspect of the matter is contained in Roethlis-
berger, Fritz J., "The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk," Harvard Business Review,
1945, Vol. 23, p. 283 ff.

444 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

reaching implications for the supervisor's role. This kind of attitude on the
part of top management causes a situation in which the job contends against
the individual's personal development.

In the past, government has generally refused to facilitate training
and educational opportunity by placing immediate efficiency ahead of long-
run self-development. The supervisor who tries to "hang on to his good
men" rather than let them go out and get additional experience elsewhere
is doing the same kind of blocking. When supervisors are job-conscious
rather than people-conscious, they are going to make such mistakes. How
long will it take the employee unions to wake up to these considerations?

To be sure, the emphasis in position classification must be on the job
rather than on the individual if the classification system is to be objective.
Nevertheless, any one who has had experience in working with groups
of people knows that the only workable long-run arrangement is to give
every individual an opportunity to find the type of work for which he has
greatest aptitude, and then to help him actively to develop himself to
capacity. In broadest terms, this is a question as to how much of each
day is going to be given to planning for future days, and how much of
the daily production may be sacrificed in order to gain some time for
training to increase efficiency and productivity for the future. The balance
may vary with different situations, but there certainly must be a balance.

Do we make the most of supervision? The answer is: We do not by
any means. Government particularly has sinned in this respect. Govern-
ment, by developing civil service systems and higher staff services such as
personnel, budgeting, and management planning, in a sense has tried to
make up for deficiencies in supervision. It took another world war and
the pressing need for increased work with decreased manpower to drive
us into a sounder consideration of supervision. At the same time, the devel-
opment of labor unions and the extension of the idea of democracy from
the political arena into the economic and the workaday world have under-
scored the importance of supervision. To put it paradoxically, we have
moved away from hierarchical considerations because of better-organized
worker interests, only to be led back to hierarchical considerations demo-
cratically conceived.

4. SUPERVISION AND EMPLOYEE INITIATIVE

Institutional Climate. The character of supervision in any given organi-
zation is neither merely a reflection of a particular function or activity that
is being supervised nor principally the result of the personal qualifications
of the supervisor, important as these are. We must take into account still
another factor— the "institutional climate"; that is, the policies which are
imposed upon the supervisor by top management and the attitudes of execu-
tives and managers on the intermediate levels above the first-line supervisor.

For example, nonrecognition of unions will have a great deal to do with

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 445

the character of supervision in any institution. Usually the good supervisor
is able to make the employee loyal to the organization, but the development
of such loyalty becomes an impossible task when the climate of the insti-
tution is frigid and repulsive to the worker. The good supervisor is worker-
centered, but how can he be worker-centered if no one above him is
interested in the worker?

Top Management Support. It is therefore highly important that top
management identify itself with the supervisor. One way of doing this is
to make sure that the supervisor is properly selected, trained, and paid.

Second, he should be kept constantly informed, not only of company
policy which affects production, but also of policy in every other respect,
so that he will be in effect a part of the stream of consciousness of the or-
ganization as a whole. This applies with special emphasis to government
agencies. If the head of the agency is satisfied to make policy and pass
it down as a court hands out its decisions, he need not be surprised if the
supervisors fail to identify themselves with him. If, however, the super-
visors are constantly consulted and kept informed, if there are frequent
staff conferences at each level of the organization, there will be in effect
only one identity to the organization. We might say that any top manage-
ment which loses its foremen or supervisors to a union deserves to suffer
this loss.

Channeling Employee Initiative. In brief, top management may encour-
age or stifle the supervisor. He may be made a mindless cog of control.
Yet it is obvious that he .should never try to substitute for the initiative
of Uie"employee. The real job of supervision is how to furnish control and
guidance without destroying employee initiative. In terms of production
the very purpose of hierarchy is to free the workers of organizational im-
pediments so that they can spend their full time and full energy on the
task of getting the work done.

The supervisor who has sympathy for the worker, who is interested in
the worker's problems, who lets the worker talk and even "talk back," who
fights the worker's battles with the higher manager, will not be inclined
to stifle the initiative of his employees. This is not chough, however. It
is necessary in addition that workers have a market for their initiative,"!?©
to^ speak. "This may be furnished by an employee-suggestion system~~
~ Suggestion Systems. The suggestion box, periodic awards, and plant
publicity can hope to achieve only partial results at best. Moreover, if the
workers are convinced that the scheme is primarily for the benefit of the
stockholder, the employee-suggestion system is not going to work anyway.
However, many suggestion systems have been effective, and the methods
required for their operation are well established. J. M. Juran, in his Bureau-
cracy—A Challenge to Better Management,1* lists eight essential require-

i* New York: Harper, 1944, p. 117 (by permission of the publisher).

446 THE ART OF SUPERVISION

ments for jjjggffTfrfiil «*mplnyge-aiiggefit inn
preferTto call it, "employee-participation" system:

(1) Announced official support of such a plan; (2) a channel for sug-
gestions separate from normal supervision; (3) prompt acknowledge-
ment of the receipt of suggestions; (4) fair and impartial investigation
of each suggestion; (5) progress reports to the employee where the in-
vestigation takes a long time; (6) final report issued with prior
knowledge, if not concurrence, of the employee; (7) a recording in the
employee's personnel record of (a) his making the suggestion and (b)
results obtained; and (8) a system of reward for valuable suggestions.

Juran goes on to point out that the system can be varied. It may be
merely a record of suggestions for the recognition of the worker's merit.
It may operate on nonfinancial recognition — for example, a letter from top
management. It may establish promotion preference. And it may involve
tangible rewards in the form of a gold medal, a bronze plaque, or a grant
of money. During World War II, several federal departments established
such suggestion systems with considerable benefit to their operations.10
LThe suggestion system is not the orily form of stimulating employee initia-
tive. Under the so-called-ABC conference, various groups throughout the
hierarchy down To^tKe^lowest levSclticet together to give each individual
an opportunity to speaK BTslnmcOfln the absence of such an arrangement,
regular supervisor conferences have proved to be valuable on all levels,
including that of first-line supervision. Employee clubs with ostensibly
recreational purposes may also be effective morale-builders and vehicles for
free discussion of work problems as well. Like the best kind of army
officer, the supervisor in government must be ever alert in his concern for
his men. I£ he shows the same concern for strengthening and equipping
his workers that the company commander does for feeding, clothing, and
sheltering his company, he would come close to the practical ideal of
supervision.

Rating Employees. A good employee-rating system requires definite
standards of performance and thus assists in work programming and work
scheduling.20 It also leads naturally to the improvement of performance —
that is, training. In discussing with the employee the rating given and
the reasons for it, the supervisor has a precious opportunity of winning
:onfidence, correcting weaknesses, and prompting new zest by objective
praise. The supervisor can succeed only in terms of his personal relations
with the worker in giving a complete judgment of the latter's performance.
Without such close contact and conditions of candor, the supervisor's
reports to his superiors are worthless.

10 Cf. Donaho, John A., "Employee Suggestion Systems in the Public Service," Public
Personnel Review, 1945, Vol. 6, p. 230 ff. See also below Ch. 20, "Administrative Self -Im-
provement," sec. 4, "Basic Resources in Management Improvement."

20 Cf. above Ch. 18, "The Tasks of Middle Management," sec. 3, "Running the Show."

THE ART OF SUPERVISION 447

The quest in public administration has been primarily for a foolproof
form of performance rating. The number of revisions of rating forms
in the federal government testifies to this search for a magic tool. However,
many governmental jurisdictions have abandoned the search and have spent
their time more profitably on improving the ability of the wielders of the
tool — the supervisors themselves. The supervisor must be able to sit down
with the worker and go over his whole performance, winding up by recom-
mending to him concretely what he can do to improve his work. Fear of
such a session is perhaps the key to excessively formal supervision and
neglect of real supervisory responsibility, especially in governmental jurisdic-
tions where performance rating has been highly formalized.

CHAPTER

Administrative Self-Improvement

1. EVOLUTIONARY CURRENTS

Beginnings of the Analytical Approach. As we have seen earlier,1 the
analytical approach to American public administration is o£ relatively recent
origin. We may trace it back to the establishment of the New York Bureau
of Municipal Research in 1906. The methodically planned and systemati-
cally executed surveys undertaken by that bureau led to many striking
improvements in Uie government of the city. The success of those surveys
won almost instantaneous recognition for the analytical approach that sup-
ported them. Unscrupulous politicians could not withstand the force of
facts thus brought to light. Indeed, it was this widening exposition of the
darker aspects of city government which ushered in the reform administra-
tion of John Purroy Mitchel from 1914 to 1918.

Other communities, noting these achievements, called on the New York
Bureau for help. Surveys were made of cities, counties, and states through-
out the country, and even abroad. Citizens in these jurisdictions saw that
facts were more powerful than partisan assertions. As a result, bureaus
of governmental research sprang up in many communities, often staffed by
those trained at the New York Bureau.

These governmental research agencies carried forward the basic reforms
initiated in the late nineteenth century — elimination of the spoils system;
municipal home rule; election reform; and direct popular control through
referendum and recall of officials. New programs were added, such as the
short ballot; strengthening the chief executive; elimination of administration
by legislative committees and boards; establishment of budget, accounting,
and audit systems; departmental reorganization; scientific tax assessment;
centralized purchasing; and judicial reform. The National Municipal
League, established in 1894, gained in influence as it incorporated many of
these features in its model city charter and provided a clearing house of best
practices for citizen groups.

1 Sec above Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administration."

448

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 449

Growth of Systematic Inquiry. The Commission on Economy and
Efficiency, appointed in 1910 by President Taft, was in large part an out-
growth of the work of the governmental research bureaus. The commit-
tee presented a series of reports on the necessity for a national budget sys-
tem, better departmental working methods, and other administrative re-
forms in the federal government. While no immediate action was taken
by Congress, the studies paved the way for later improvement, and the
ideas they set forth lived on. Similar work was put under way in New
York State under Governor Charles E. Hughes. Ultimately, a thorough-
going reorganization of the state government grew out of the proposals of
the New York Constitutional Convention of 1915.

Special commissions of inquiry appointed by state and local chief execu-
tives appeared with increasing frequency as the years went by. Likewise,
legislative committees undertook inquiries of their own. One of the most
noteworthy of these was the Special Joint Committee on Taxation and
Retrenchment in New York State, which began its work in 1921 under the
chairmanship of Frederick Davenport. Its reports provided excellent source
material for the student and practitioner of public administration every-
where, as well as many tangible benefits to New York state and local
government.

In more recent years, both congressional committees and presidents have
given increasing attention to organizational and administrative problems.2
In 1937, comprehensive reports on these subjects were submitted by the
President's Committee on Administrative Management3 and by the Brook-
ings Institution,4 the latter employed by the Select Committee to Investigate
the Executive Agencies of the Government, known as the Byrd Committee.
The Brookings study was the last intensive effort in the field of federal
departmental organization made by Congress, although during World War
II the so-called Truman and Ramspeck committees made noteworthy
investigations of specific aspects of administration. While these inquiries
resulted in the tightening of operations and the elimination of instances of
inefficiency, few tangible gains in administrative organization have emerged
from direct congressional action. On the other hand, the work of the Presi-
dent's Committee on Administrative Management has been outstanding.
Its report prepared the way for important organizational improvements that
were effected on the eve of World War II.

Academic and Professional Support. Suchjefforts from an early date
required men and women trained in governmental research and analysis.
The staff of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research had been in great
demand in many places. To meet this demand, the bureau in 1911 set up

2 For a historical survey, see Meriam, Lewis and Schmeckebier, Laurence P., Reorgani-
zation of the National Government, p. 181 #., Washington: Brookings Institution, 1939.
8 See its Report with Special Studies, Washington: Government Printing Office. 1937.
4 Senate Report No. 1275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1937.

450 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

a Training School for Public Service. The program acquired characteristic
features of graduate training under Charles A. Beard in 1915 and later
under William E. Mosher. About the same time, the universities began to
be interested not only in governmental research but also in training students
for research and administrative posts. Many universities — such as Syracuse,
Columbia, Chicago, Minnesota, Harvard, and Alabama, to name only a
few — have formulated specific curricula for this purpose.5

Foundations likewise became interested in better government manage-
ment. They granted funds to universities for research and training pro-
grams. They also gave support to the work of the New York Bureau of
Municipal Research — since 1932 the Institute of Public Administration — and
to basic studies like those carried on by President Hoover's Committee on
Social Trends, the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel
(1934-1935), and the Committee on Public Administration of the Social
Science Research Council.6

Reflecting an increasingly professional attitude toward public adminis-
tration, public officials have grouped together in organizations for the ex-
change of experience' and information. Even before 1900, a number of
such bodies were making contributions to better government — for example,
the American Public Health Association, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, and the American Society for Municipal Improvements.
A related early development was the establishment of state leagues of mu-
nicipalities, which devoted their attention to arousing interest in improv-
ing municipal practices and in presenting the needs of the cities to state
legislatures.

The work of such associations was given great impetus in the early
1930's by the foundation of the Public Administration Clearing House in
Chicago. It became the headquarters of a dozen or more organizations of
public authorities and officials under one roof, commonly known as the
"1313 Group" (1313 East 60th Street). Its members— typified by the Council
of State Governments, the American Municipal Association, the Interna-
tional City Managers Association, the Municipal Finance Officers Associa-
tion, the Civil Service Assembly, the American Public Welfare Association,
and the American Public Works Association — are today enlisting thousands
of officials in the cause of sound administration through conferences, profes-
sional journals, and dissemination of research. Consulting, research, and
publication services are rendered through a joint agency, the Public
Administration Service.

Stimulus from Private Management. Even before the search fo/ new
administrative methods was under way in government, jnoneers in industry

*Cf. Graham, George A., Education for Public Administration, Chicago: Public Admin-
istration Service, 1941.

*Cf. Anderson, William and Gaus, John M., Research in Public Administration, Chicago:
Public Administration Service. 1945.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 451

^ad^dcvcloped a fruitful technique of studying production proDiems, even-
t^aTly fn he knq^m as ''scientihcnmanagcmenr^ Faced with the evTdcntTacr
that employers were unable to adjust themselves to the great industrial ex-
pansion after the Civil War, these pioneers began to study the methods by
which production was controlled.

Historically, the movement began in 1886 when Henry R. Towne read
his paper entitled "The Engineer as Economist," before the American So-
ciety of Mechanical Engineers. Towne proposed that an engineer should
not only be interested in the invention, design, and installation of a machine,
but also in devising means for the most effective operation in the shop.
This idea of bringing the engineer into the problems of production sug-
gested an entirely new relationship between employers and specialists. Its
full implications were not explored by the society that Towne had addressed,
which confined itself to discussing devices and methods of improvement in
industry suggested by the experience of its members. It did not attempt to
develop a body of principles, but dealt with particular problems that were of
general interest, such as piece rates.

Meanwhile, Frederick W. Taylor — as worker and later as foreman —
was observing the causes of waste, breakdown in production, inefficiency in
the use of materials and machines, conflict between workers and employers,
and almost total lack of planning. Taylor began his inquiries by examin-
ing the daily problems of the shop. He experimented with all the variables
connected with a certain operation, machine, or material until he found
the best method of doing the job. He studied, measured, and then set up
specifications.

When the best method was found, Taylor needed to transmit it to the
other foremen. Thus training became an additional aspect of his approach.
He discovered that the study of one phase of operations led to another*—
to the relations of labor and management, and finally to the problems of
over-all organization. Taylor's ideas were presented in his Principles of
Scientific Management, published in 191 1.7 The volume awakened world-
wide interest in management circles. It was translated into more than a
dozen languages and exerted a strong influence in France, Germany, Eng^
land, and Japan.8

*"* FurthentttRtrktion for the study of production costs resulted from
hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1910-1911. In these
hearings the shipper interests, which were opposing a railroad's request
for a rate increase, demanded that the railroad make every effort to de-
crease its operating costs before being granted an increase. As evidence of
the great savings that could be made by careful operating methods, the ship-
per interests cited the economies derived from Taylor's work in several

7 RepubHshcd New York: Harper, 1934.

8 See Person, Harlow S., "The Genius of Frederick W. Taylor," Advanced Management,
1945, Vol. 10, p. 2 ff.

452 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

industrial plants. Some of Taylor's associates, among them Henry L. Gantt
and Frank B. Gilbreth, were called to testify on the new approach to man-
agement. It was at this time that the term "scientific management" was
coined and first used publicly. The publicity growing out of these hearings
contributed to wider acceptance of the movement by industry.9

After World War I, the formation of management societies helped to
raise professional standards and to disseminate information on new tech-
niques to a much broader audience. Among these bodies were two organiza-
tions which later joined forces to form the Society for the Advancement of
Management. In 1919, the National Office Management Association began
to apply to office routine the methods used in shops.

Government Response. Government has increasingly utilized the meth-j
ods of scientific management. Perhaps the relatively slow start was dui
to the inapplicability of many of the early techniques to governmental
functions. In recent years, as scientific management has concerned itseli!
more with problems of planning, organization, personnel, and administra-j
tion, it has had more to offer to governmental staffs. A common element}
in these two noteworthy movements toward administrative progress — thd
one in industry and the other in government — has been the spirit of objecl
tive inquiry and analysis. While techniques have changed, the geneM*
approach has remained the same.

2. ORGANIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS

Conceivable Alternatives. The chief executive of a government or the
head of a department, bureau, or division may approach the task of ad-
ministrative self-improvement from a number of angles. Whatever the
angle, the task breaks down essentially into constant review and effort to
obtain better operations in terms of what is done, who does it, and how it
is done.

Obviously, the governmental executive cannot concern himself with the
details of administrative analysis. He may, by personal action, resolve
some problem or difficulty. Exercising general supervision is itself in large
measure a job of adjusting and resolving organizational and procedural
matters, and of training subordinates to fit into the operation. The govern-
mental executive can, however, do only a small part of the job personally
and will need to supply himself with various types of aids.

He could employ outside consultants to work out proposals for improve-
ment and to assist in their installation. Or committees of key line-subor-
dinates or staff officials within the organization may be appointed as
particular problems arise. Periodic meetings may provide a setting for
throwing administrative problems on the table for discussion and resolu-

9 See also House of Representatives, Committee on Labor, Hearings on the Taylor system,
62d Cong., 1st Sess., 1911.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 453

tion. An administrative "general staff"— budgeting, personnel, admin-
istrative-planning, and programming officers — provides another instrument
for analyzing and disposing of major questions of organization and
management.

In accomplishing the task of raising the general level of management,
the administrator must bring his line operators and supervisors into the
total effort for improvement.,/ On them rests principal responsibility for
initiating or carrying but most of the modifications which will be made
from day to day or week to week. In the process of harnessing the ener-
gies of his operators and supervisors, the administrator must also bring about
participation and support on the part of the rank and file of employees.

All of these are not alternatives limiting the choice of the administrator.
Each supplements the other. Each warrants consideration in the total picture.
Each plays a part in the broader context.

Improvement Through the Administrator's Personal Action. The skilled
administrator in the course of a day's work has many opportunities to
bring about informally adjustments which will remedy existing difficulties
or prevent future trouble and friction. How effective he is at this depends
upon the keenness of his observation of the organization at work and his
sensitivity to the existence of bottlenecks, conflicts in responsibility, personal
maladjustments, and outmoded methods.

Unobstructed flow of information to him from his staff officers and from
operating officials will help. Complaints coming from them will often
lead to the detection of fire under the smoke. If the fire is not big, the
administrator can put it out himself. Usually he is unable to do it alone.
Rather he must rely upon his subordinates. If this is to work out, he
must provide a fertile environment which will stimulate administrative
improvement by those subordinates. Generally, the administrator's principal
contribution will be the giving of considered assent to changes which have
come up to him for approval from his general staff, from his operators,
from consultants, or from meetings of groups within and without the or-
ganization concerned with specific problems.10

Use of Outside Consultants. Government agencies often are confronted
with administrative problems which require intensive study beyond what
can be done by the regular staff. Or, for example, the balance of personal
factors may be such that no one within the agency can deal with such
major problems effectively. In these situations, an outside viewpoint or the
utilization of experts who have been schooled in solving similar problems
in many jurisdictions will be essential.

To meet such special needs, outside consultants have been employed by

10 For a fuller discussion, see Stone, Donald C., "Notes on the Governmental Executive:
His Role and His Methods," Public Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 210 ff. This
paper is also available in "New Horizons in Public Administration, University, Ala.: University
of Alabama Press, 1945.

454 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

government, federal, state, and local, with increasing frequency in recent
years. Well known are the surveys made by the Institute of Public Ad-
ministration, the Public Administration Service, the Brookings Institution,
ind private consulting firms to develop broad plans for governmental re-
organization. Their efforts have been concerned ordinarily with the fun-
damental aspects of better structure and management, and not with the
minutiae of administration.

Less far-reaching in scope, but more important for the development of
jound administrative practices, is the extent to which federal, state, and
local administrators arrange with consultants to work as temporary rein-
forcements of their staffs, without publicity or fanfare. For example, the
War Production Board brought in the director of the Institute of Public
Administration to serve temporarily as head of its Organizational Planning
Division. The Petroleum Administration for War employed the director
of the management department of Standard Oil of California as adviser on
administrative problems. Some of the staff members of the Navy Depart-
ment's Office of the Management Engineer were recruited from industrial
engineering firms that had previously conducted administrative studies for
that department. The Department of Agriculture brought back on a part-
time basis a former official turned college president to head up a reorgani-
zation program. The United States Bureau of the Budget has used the
services of a number of consultants to assist on its own internal problems
as well as its work of aiding other agencies in solving theirs.

At the state and local levels, the Public Administration Service has
applied on a broad scale this idea of quiet assistance to officials in the in-
stallation of new organization and methods. This approach has proved
more effective in most cases than the preparation of lengthy survey reports
which often end up gathering dust in bookcases. In many areas, local and
state official^ secure help in solving their problems from university research
bureaus. The Bureaus of Public Administration of the Universities of
Alabama, California, and Virginia, for instance, have been called on ex-
tensively by public authorities for such assistance.

Use of Committees. The use of committees of subordinates JS_JUIJQ&
device for solving administrative groblems. In New York City, for example,
Mayor LaGuardia appointed a Committee on Simplification of Procedures
:omposed of the budget director as chairman, the comptroller, the Commis-
sioner of Investigation, the Commissioner of Purchase, and the president
of the Civil Service Commission. In the federal government, the War Food
Administrator determined upon a plan of reorganization of his agency,
and appointed a committee consisting of the director of the Office of Budget
and Finance as chairman, the director of personnel, and his general counsel
to put the plan into effect.

Pointing the way toward increased use of the committee device in the
federal government are two other recent examples. At the direction of the

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 455

deputy chief of staff of the War Department, two committees were formed
to propose improved methods for reporting on the strength of the Army.
One of these committees— known as the Steering Committee— furnished
the general leadership and considered the proposals submitted by the second
committee — the Working Committee — which assembled the study data
and prepared alternative suggestions for better strength reporting.

The second example is found in the use of the committee device to
achieve the objectives of three federal agencies — the General Accounting
Office, the Treasury Department, and the Bureau of the Budget — in bring-
ing about a simplification of the governmental payroll system. Repre-
sentatives of each of these agencies collaborated in the study, preparation
of findings, and formulation of recommendations. Following approval by
the three agencies, the necessary regulations were issued by each for its
sphere of government-wide responsibility to make the recommendations
effective.

Special committees are not only a useful means of developing new ideas,
but are often helpful when it comes to putting the ideas into effect. The
United States Department of Agriculture has used such committees ex-
tensively.11 But there are dangers as well as advantages. Committee mem-
bers may already be overburdened to a point that th$ proposed course of
action is apt to be no more well thought out than an off-the-cuff decision
by the administrator. The two-committee system used in the War Depart-
ment provides a method for lessening such a danger.

Sometimes committees are appointed to meet situations in which the
members have vested interests, so that no neutral or over-all viewpoint can
be brought to bear on them. Moreover, the designation of a committee is
often an effort to compensate for the failure of an operating official or for
inadequate staff work. Committees are most fruitful when an admin-
istrative assistant or a member of the administrator's general staff functions
as chairman or services the committee through the collection of information
and the preparation of draft reports.

Staff Meetings. Meetings of the administrator^with bis principal assist-
ants can be of greaF value In administrative self-improvement.1" Such
meetings are in general more productive in providing a forum for the
common recognition of deficiencies and for bringing about general agree-
ment on a course of action than in evolving specific solutions. By careful
planning, the administrator can center attention upon the most important
points and make certain that the discussion does not reduce itself to ir-
relevant issues.

11 C/. Glaser, Comstock, "Managing Committee Work in a Large Organization," Public
Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 249 ff.

12 Cf. Morstein Marx, Fritz, "Policy Formulation and the Administrative Process," Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 1939, Vol. 33, p. 55 ff. Cf. also above Ch. 4, "Democratic
Administration," sec. 5, "Office Democracy."

456 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

Staff meetings are successful only when problems of interest to all are
on the agenda. Accordingly, at a meeting of an agency head with his
bureau or division chiefs, it would be fruitful to discuss means of better
work-programming and budgeting throughout the agency or a new plan
for providing legal services to all the subdivisions. Intensive consideration
of the internal organization of one of the subdivisions or the revision of
technical procedures affecting only two or three would not hold the atten-
tion of the whole group. On the other hand, frcflueaL.|nectings dqjgive
the governmental executive an opportunity to develop team spirit and to
bring about a union of minds among his key men. This is essential to an
institutional environment productive of management improvement.

Role of the Administrative General Staff. The general staff officers or
units inevitably bear the brunt in analyzing complex problems of organi-
zation and procedure and in developing solutions. The term "adminis-
trative general staff" refers only to those staff officers or units that share
with the agency executive his problems of management and deal with
matters which he must resolve as the head of the organization. This would
include those concerned with program planning, budgeting, administrative
planning, and personnel management. It would exclude for the most part
such activities as routine legal service,13 purchasing, accounting, plant main-
tenance, and other general services which, while of great importance to the
effective functioning of the organization, are essentially of an auxiliary or
service character rather than aids in general management.

In small organizations and on the lower operating levels of a large
organization, the directing official can do most of his staff work himself
or with the aid of a deputy or administrative assistant. As the problems
of administration increase in complexity, he will require full-time staff offi-
cers of the type mentioned, and in addition one or more personal assistants.
These general staff units, as the planning, programming, analyzing, deploy-
ing, and coordinating arms of the administrator, have a vital role to play in
bringing about improvement in the agency's internal arrangements.

The budget office, for example, in the formulation of work plans with
the operating bureaus or divisions deals with two general classes of prob-
lems: first, the character and extent of operations that are proposed — that is
to say, the program; second, the organization and methods to carry out
that program. Insofar as the budget staff has true understanding of ad-
ministrative matters, it will be able to raise the general level of manage-
ment. Because of this interrelationship of budgeting and administrative
planning, the two are often combined under the same head. If separate,
the two groups must work together very closely.

The personnel office can be a potent factor in improving administration.

13 For a discussion of the potential contribution of legal officers to the work of the ad-
ministrative general staff, see Morstein Marx, Fritz, "The Lawyer's Role in Public Administra-
tion," Yale Law Journal, 1946, Vol. 55, p. 498 ff. Cf. also below Ch. 23, "The Judicial Test."

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 457

Staffing the organization with qualifkdjDei^jQ^^^

securing efficient operation. More germane, however, to our subject here
isntorrspp'orliunity the personnel office has of uncovering organizational and
operating difficulties in the course of its daily contacts with operating offi-
cials and individual employees. The position-classification analyst is in a
strategic spot to identify administrative problems because he looks into the
content of specific jobs and their place in the organization. Employee-
relations staff can often locate trouble areas in dealing with grievances and
other personal problems. A regular duty, therefore, of the personnel office
is to call to the attention of the budget or administrative-planning office
any internal defects which it discovers in its daily work.

An administrative-planning office providing facilities for the diagnosis
and remedy of major ills of organization and method is an essential part
of the administrative general staff of city, county, state, or nation, or of a
large operating subdivision. The following excerpt from the order estab-
lishing a division of management planning in the Office of Departmental
Administration of the State Department in Washington illustrates the type
of activities which are appropriate for such a unit :

(1) Continuous study of our foreign policies and objectives in the
light of trends in foreign and domestic affairs, and participation in plan-
ning future foreign relations programs, with particular reference to the
administrative implications and feasibility of such programs, and with
a view to developing and executing administrative management policies
fully adjusted to the Department's changing needs.

(2) Furnishing of advisory and consultative services and assistance in
a staff capacity to divisions and offices to facilitate the carrying out of
their assigned functions through the planned improvement of manage-
ment.

(3) Continuous study of improved techniques of management an-
alysis and planning in government and industry with a view to the ap-
plication of such techniques to the improvement of management in the
Department.

(4) Continuous appraisal of the Department's organizational and
functional relations with other governmental and with intergovernmental
agencies, including interdepartmental and intergovernmental commit-
tees or similar organized groups, with particular reference to over-all
administrative implications for the Department, and with a view to the
continuous development of improved working understandings.

(5) Collaboration with the planning staff of the Office of the Foreign
Service in studying problems of mutual interest and concern with a view
to the development of sound over-all administrative policies and prac-
tices and more effective working relations between organizational units
of the Department, other agencies, and the Foreign Service.

(6) Investigation, analysis and appraisal of the effectiveness of the
Department's organization structure, including its component divisions
and offices and intradepartmental committees or similar organized
groups, with a view to the development of new organization units or to
such adjustments of organizational structure as may be required for the
effective implementation of present and future responsibilities.

458 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

(7) Analysis of functions and of work assignments and lines of au-
thority and responsibility among the component offices and divisions of
the Department with a view to clearer definitions as required and maxi-
mum coordination of effort based on exact understanding of working
relations.

(8) Study and analysis of work methods and procedures, with par-
ticular reference to those which cut across organizational lines in the de-
partment, and between the Department and other agencies, such as the
flow of correspondence and other documentation, with a view to work
simplification, standardization of methods and procedures, elimination of
waste time and effort, reduction of costs or delays, and improved utiliza-
tion of employee skills, and review and control of forms with a view to
their standardization and simplification.

(9) Preparation, or assistance in the preparation, and review (a) of
proposed legislation or executive orders concerning the authority, func-
tions or management of the Department and (b) of departmental orders
and regulations, administrative instructions, organizational and admin-
istrative manuals, and other documents concerning organizational struc-
ture, functions, lines of authority and responsibility, work methods and
procedures, and the designation of ranking officers of the Department
and of the Department's representatives on interdepartmental committees
and similar agencies. The Division of Management Planning shall be
responsible for necessary clearances of such documents with interested
divisions and offices, and all such documents, prior to issuance, shall be
cleared with the Division of Management Planning, which shall examine
them from the viewpoint of content and purpose, their over-all adminis-
trative implications and effects, conformity with previously issued docu-
ments of similar character, and conformity with existing regulations on
the subject, such as those set forth in Departmental Order 1269 of May
3, 1944.

(10) Assistance in the development of a system of divisional progress
reports and, through study of such reports, keeping informed on current
accomplishments and trends in program activity as a basis for anticipat-
ing, where possible, need for adjustments in organization, clarification of
functions and of lines of authority and responsibility, and improvement
in work methods and procedures.

(11) Enlisting the active support and assistance of all employees in
the improvement of management in the Department through such
means as the development of employee suggestion and incentive pro-
grams, employee-management conferences and the like.

(12) Participation with the Division of Budget and Finance in the
consideration of such matters as the preparation of budget estimates and
the allotment of positions, with the Division of Departmental Personnel
in the consideration of such matters as job evaluation and classification,
with the Division of Administrative Service in the consideration of such
matters as the allotment and utilization of space and equipment, and
with the Division of Communications and Records in the consideration
of such matters as problems of record administration; keeping those di-
visions currently informed concerning management planning matters
which may affect their work and securing their advice and assistance in
the conduct of management planning projects and in effecting manage-
ment improvements.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT' 459

The role of an administrative-planning or administrative-management
unit is also indicated in the following sentences from a specimen draft of
an order developed by the United States Bureau of the Budget for the
guidance of agencies interested in setting up such an office:

The Administrative Management Office will give continuous and sus-
tained attention to the improvement of organization structure and the
development of sound administrative practices in both the departmental
and regional offices, for the purpose of facilitating and expediting over-
all direction, coordination, and control of the Department's administra-
tive activities.

. . . The Director of the Administrative Management Office will serve
the Administrator in a purely advisory and consultative capacity and will
not have any authority nor responsibility for direct operations.

. . . The Director of the Administrative Management Office will. . .
work closely with the personnel, budget, program planning, research,
and statistical directors in the formulation and revision of organizational
structure, budget estimates, personnel classifications, and related matters
resulting from any important shift in emphasis or direction of the
agency's activities.

Types of Administrative-Planning Offices. The City and County of
Los Angeles long stood at the head of the list of governmental units having
administrative-planning offices. The Bureau of Budget and Efficiency of the
city and the Bureau of Administrative Research — originally Bureau of
Efficiency — of the county were the forerunners of a number of such offices
set up in state and local government. On the whole, however, munici-
palities, counties, and states have lagged behind in incorporating into their
general-staff structure specific facilities for this important work.

The federal government affords scores of examples of organized admin-
istrative-planning work, not only at the top level of agencies but also in
their bureaus and divisions. The Division of Administrative Planning of
the Farm Credit Administration and the Division of Coordination and
Procedures of the Social Security Board were early and noteworthy examples.
The Post Office Department has established a Budget and Administrative
Unit in the immediate office of the Postmaster General. This unit has two
branches: budget work, handled by a Budgeting Commissioner; and admin-
istrative planning, headed by a Commissioner of Administrative Planning.

The Commerce Department has an Office of Budget and Management,
reporting to the executive assistant to the Secretary of Commerce. In a
recent reorganization of the Veterans Administration, provision was made
for an Office of Coordination and Planning, which includes several sub-
divisions known as services — research service, administrative-management
service, inspection and investigation service, budget and planning service,
and employee-suggestion service. Nearly all of the emergency agencies of
World War II found a need for central staff to help the top executive work
out the agency's organization structure, define the functions and respon-

460 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

sibilities of its various subdivisions, establish devices for coordination and
control, and develop general plans of management and operating practices
governing the entire enterprise.

The use of administrative-planning staffs by the Army and Navy has
been particularly significant.14 When General Somervell was appointed
commanding general of the Army Service Forces, he organized a Control
Division as his principal arm to work out solutions to organizational, op-
erating, and procedural problems. The Control Division was subdivided
into three branches: (1) a statistical branch, which supervised the reporting
systems of ASF, analyzing and making special reports on progress and
operations; (2) an administrative-management branch, which investigated
a wide range of administrative problems, conducted surveys, and supervised
work-simplification and work-measurement programs carried on through-
out all subdivisions of ASF; and (3) a procedures branch, which developed
and exercised general control over ASF personnel, procurement, supply, and
fiscal procedures.

A Management Control Directorate, established in 1942 under the re-
organization of the Army Air Forces, carried out many of these same
activities and proved a valuable means of improving and simplifying ad-
ministrative arrangements and of establishing machinery to execute new
programs. While no formal administrative-planning unit has been estab-
lished at the General Staff level of the Army, informal assistance of this
kind has been utilized to some extent. No real provision for it has been
made at the level of the Secretary of War, although some such work has
been done by the Office of Civilian Personnel in the Secretary's office.15

In the Navy, on the other hand, the Secretary in 1942 set up an Office
of the Management Engineer to assist him on problems of organization,
distribution of functions, administrative relationships, procedures, and meth-
ods. This office conducted organizational and procedural studies, developed
standards for measuring administrative activities, and promoted improved
utilization of manpower. Realizing not only that the central office could
handle merely a small part of the agency's work of analysis and adjustment,
but also that it should be placed as close to operations as possible, the office
has encouraged the various bureaus of the Navy to establish staff facilities
of their own. As a result, administrative-planning units have grown up in
many places throughout the organization.

Harold D. Smith, upon taking office in 1939 as director of the United
States Bureau of the Budget, established a Division of Administrative Man-

14 Cf. the symposia on "Administrative Management in the Army Service Forces" by
Somervell, Brehon and Others, and on "Administrative Problems in Naval Procurement and
Logistics" by Forrestal, James and Others, Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p.
255 ff., and 1945, Vol. 5, p. 289 ff.

15 For an excellent general discussion of some of the basic problems, see Nelson, Otto L.,
Jr., "Wartime Developments in War Department Organization and Administration," Public
Administration Review, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 1 ff.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 461

agemcnt to provide central administrative-planning activities as part of
the general staff facilities of the chief executive. One of the first programs
of the newly organized division was designed to bring forth and strengthen
administrative-planning, budgeting, and personnel offices in all government
agencies. All of the bureau's divisions — Estimates, Legislative Reference,
Statistical Standards, and Fiscal, as well as Administrative Management —
have a share in bringing about administrative improvement throughout the
federal government. However, primary responsibility for organizational
matters and for finding answers to administrative problems falls within the
specific sphere of the Administrative Management Division.16 A staff
instruction of this division defines its function as follows :

The Division of Administrative Management is generally responsible,
as a part of the Bureau of the Budget, for assisting the President in
bringing about better organization and management of the Federal
Government. It does this through bringing about a better distribution
of functions within and among Federal agencies, helping with the estab-
lishment of new agencies and liquidating old ones, assisting individual
agencies on administrative problems, strengthening agency staff services,
improving government-wide business practices and procedures, and re-
viewing the administrative aspects of proposed legislation and executive
orders. A major emphasis is the development of programs which are of
help to government departments and agencies in solving their own
problems.

Tasfo of Line Operators and Supervisors. Line operators and super-
visors have the primary responsibility for administrative improvement.17
Preoccupation with the work of management staffs has generally led ob-
servers to overlook this fact. The operator is the one who is apt to know
first that things are not going well, and who must make any new solution
work. Tuning up the organization, making informal adjustments here and
there, and changing methods are all part of the day's management chores.

Whether or not the operator does a good job in organizing the functions
under his supervision and in getting all the pieces to mesh together will
depend upon his interest and knowledge. Many become absorbed in the
substantive or technical phases of their work and are less interested in, or
at least unconscious of, the fact that their job is in large part an administra-
tive one.

The question may well be raised: Where does the role of the operator
break off and that of the general staff begin? Unfortunately, there is no
clear-cut answer. The operator who has many organizational or proce-

16 For a study of the intertwining of budgetary and managerial staff work on the central
level of the federal government, see Morstein Marx, Fritz, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its
Evolution and Present Role," American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39, p. 653 ff.t
869 ff. See also below Ch. 25, "Fiscal Accountability," sec. 3, "Budgetary Coordination."
Harold D. Smith's work philosophy has been set forth in his book The Management of Your
Government. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945.

17 See above Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision."

462 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

dural problems will — or in any event should — have an assistant or a staff
unit of his own to work on them. He may attempt to resolve those questions
which cannot be settled within his own division by raising them with people
in the other divisions, but usually at this point the issue is found to contain
elements which require more intensive study than he can give. Such more
difficult problems will rise up in the organization as a daily occurrence.
Here it is that the higher administrative-planning staff enters the picture.

By providing useful service to the operators, the central staff will create
a good market for its special competence and will not have to rely primarily
upon orders from the top executive. It is best not to look at administrative-
planning units or any of the general-staff offices as control centers or to
require a large mass of detailed matters to be cleared through them. In
fact, a check-and-review approach will defeat general-staff work.

Role of the Ran\ and File. What has been said here about the need of
participation by the operator and supervisor in management improvement
applies also to the body of employees. Employees know when things go
wrong. They are in a position to see how detailed situations can be im-
proved and where new methods will provide more efficient results. Unless
their ideas and suggestions are captured, the organization will lose one of
its major sources of help.

Employee suggestions will not be made, nor will teamwork among
employees in improving operations be secured, unless supervisors furnish
incentive. Formal employee-suggestion systems18 are valuable. However,
they are incidental to the larger problem of good supervision and
foremanship.

Most first-line supervisors do not have time for extensive training or to
explore and experiment in these fields on their own. Yet they need to have
a grasp of some of the elementary aspects of analysis and some of the
specific work-simplification techniques suitable for their own tasks. To
meet this need in the federal government, numerous agencies have devel-
oped special training and improvement programs for particular or con-
tinued use.19

3. TECHNIQUES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

Mission of the Administrator. Experience in government as in industry
has shown clearly that we cannot expect better organization and manage-
ment than is suggested by the quality o^ j^sonncHn.j^dministrative posts.
New constitutions, statutes, anocharters might be adoptecT which provide
for streamlined structure and method, and yet results might be negligible.
There is the famous illustration of one state which adopted a compre-

18 Sec above Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec. 4, "Supervision and Employee
Initiative."

19 For a fuller discussion of some of these, see above Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision,'*
sec. 2, "The Supervisory Skills."

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 463

hensivc reorganization plan, but continued to function as before. Nothing
is accomplished except as ideas or plans are translated into action. Action
requires administration.

One of the mistakes of the early government reformers was the assump-
tion that once a good setup had been established and competent officials
placed in office, all would work smoothly from then on. How different
is the fact! Administration is dynamic; organizational arrangements and
relationships are continually in flux. Structure must be constantly adjusted
to meet changes in program, policy, product, methods, and human beings.
This is why the development of the Public Administration Clearing House
and the large number of professional organizations of public officials as
depositories of work experience is so significant.

Public leadership and the support ol sound policy and program are
essential "a tithe higher administrative posts. It is the organization, however,
which produces public services and carries out public purposes. Conse-
quently, it is imperative to have administrators who will inculcate in their
entire establishment a recognition that continuous readjustment in structure
and method is a task in which all have a common stake.

A general feeling that something is wrong with the operating machinery
of an agency is of no value unless it is translated into specifics of exactly
what is wrong and precisely how it can be remedied. The administrator may
notice that papers reflecting internal conflicts or confusions are crossing his
desk in increasing numbers. He may observe that newspapers blast his
operations because they are bogging down. His political superiors may bring
program failures to his attention. He may grow aware that his staff is
transitory, with an unusually high turnover. He may begin to question
apparent contradictions of reports on financial or program status, or to
note that contradictory regulations have been issued by his staff. These
are only a few of the obvious ways in which the administrator may be
roused into considering remedies. How does he proceed from this point?

It is well to recall that the administrator has several major concerns.20
He must define the objectives of his program. He must determine how
things are to be done — that is, the division of labor and the allocation of
responsibility. He is concerned also with quantity — how much is to be
done; with rate of service — how fast things are to be done; with quality —
how well they are to be done; with staffing — who is to do it; and with cost.
He must communicate his ideas so that all employees will know what is
expected of them, and he must provide for lateral exchange of knowledge
so that each employee will know generally what other employees and units
are doing. He must set up controls to ensure that the program he wants is
being carried out in the manner he wants it carried out and that this is
being done as expeditiously and efficiently as possible.

20 Sec Stone, he. cit. above in note 10. Cf. also above Ch. 9, "The Departmental System,"
sec. 3, "The Secretary's Business."

464 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

The factors which contribute to the smooth running of his organization,
together with that indefinable ability to motivate others which some officials
have, will be of no value if they are neglected or never recognized. The
administrator will, then, find it desirable to look for a continuously opera-
tive indicator — giving warning prior to general complaints — that will let
him know when his organization is not producing. He will want to use
critical, evaluative, and systematic introspection with regard to what his
organization is doing and how it is doing it. He will want to keep the
parts oiled and closely geared together.

Such introspection must rely on what is called the survey method. Put
another way, all administrative review and improvement of operations is
dependent upon some fact-finding method. If the administrator suspects
that the state of morale of his employees is such that operations are im-
paired, he should first ascertain the cause. If he discovers that work is
piling up, he must locate the cause of the backlog.

Whether the fact-finding method is used by the administrator himself,
a committee, the staff meeting, line supervisors, general-staff experts, or out-
side consultants is relatively unimportant. Irrespective of who collects the
facts, the method of assembling them is common to each approach. But
there must be collection of information or data. The process must be
planned. It must be organized and lead to analysis. Conclusions must be
reached, and a new policy or a plan of action for better organization or
method must be developed. The proposals should finally be tested and
installed. Virtually the only preference between the various methods of
fact-finding lies in the intensity with which the analysis can be made.
For all this the basic device is the administrative survey.

Types of Administrative Surveys. The plan for the administrative sur-
vey will depend materially upon the type of fact-finding to be undertaken.
It may require several varieties of special analytical techniques, depending
upon the purpose of the appraisal. Three types merit attention here.

(1) The reconnaissance survey. This is a diagnostic device to identify
administrative difficulties, and is an inevitable preliminary to all other types
of surveys. It may be long or short, depending upon the familiarity of the
analysts with the function or activity being surveyed. The object of the
reconnaissance is to arrive at an early conclusion as to whether additional
fact-finding is necessary, and of what sort; or whether action can be taken
immediately, and of what sort. It requires careful planning, for recon-
naissance generally should be brief and touch upon only the necessary high
spots. It should not be permitted to linger over details.

The interview is the principal method employed. Pertinent workload
and production figures, written statements of functions and operating meth-
ods, organization charts, record forms, and available statistical data may be
compiled during the interview process. Organization and analysis of mate-

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 465

rial must be undertaken with the recognition that basic problems, not details,
are sought to be identified.

(2) The over-all survey. This is analogous to a complete checjs-up jof
i complex machine. It deals with all the elements with which management
is concerned, from policy through organization and staffing ' dbwBMtojdte
tailed procedure. Examples of this sort of project are surveys which were
made by the United States Bureau of the Budget of the Bituminous Coal
Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Administration; by the Public
Administration Service of the states of North Dakota and South Carolina,
Montgomery County, Ohio, and the town of Brookline, Massachusetts; by
the Bureau of Public Administration of the State of Virginia; by the Brook-
ings Institution of the state of North Carolina; and by the Los Angeles
County Bureau of Budget and Efficiency of the county's operations. It may
employ the reconnaissance approach in some areas and detailed analyses
in others.

(3) The special-purpose survey. The scope of this surveyjijay be based
upon the results of a preliminary reconnaissance survey, or it may be de-
cided in advance, prior to any effort at fact-finding. Usually it will involve
either an organizational survey, a survey of some specific function, or a
procedure survey. The organizational survey is limited to structure and
allocation of functions. It usually emphasizes top-organization considera-
tions. The functional survey traces some function through all of its rami-
fications across organizational lines. It may run the gamut from plans and
objectives through organization and method with respect to a particular
function.

The procedure survey picks up at the operating level, and is normally
tied to some function — for instance, personnel, purchasing, accounting, or
public works. It is not aimed at objectives and organization. The Navy
Department, through its Management Engineer's Office, has carried on an
interesting combination of procedural and personnel survey designed to
identify cases of nonutilization of employee skills, correct allocation of posi-
tions, and eliminate unnecessary procedures and positions. These personnel-
utilization surveys were conducted by expert analysts in each bureau on a
sectional basis; that is, each organizational section was surveyed as an entity,
and recommendations were submitted before the team moved on.

Some of the methods of conducting administrative analysis have been
well understood for years by specialists in the field, but very little of this
knowledge has been brought together in organized form. Administrative-
survey reports provide much of the best literature available, but practically
no generalization has been derived from these individual experiences as far
as methods of analysis are concerned. The one comprehensive effort pub-
lished to date is Research Methods in Public Administration by John M.
Pfiffner.21 There have been a few efforts to bring together the story on

21 New York: Ronald, 1940.

466 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

how to carry out special kinds of administrative studies, particularly the
extended discussion of methods of doing classification surveys included in
the 1941 report of the Civil Service Assembly on Position Classification in
the Public Service.22 Much experience has been recorded in scientific-man-
agement literature, going back to Frederick W. Taylor and the Gilbreths,
in the field of time and motion study.23

Reconnaissance. As a preliminary to intensive analysis, reconnaissance
should lead to a detailed plan of action as quickly as possible. This kind
of reconnaissance generally starts with some previous indication of the area
of attention and the reasons prompting the request or recommendation for
a survey. Steps are then taken to obtain a more specific picture of the area
to be covered and the problems to be resolved.

Whether, in all, two hours or two weeks are to be spent on such a pre-
view, the objective is to make a general appraisal of the operation to be
analyzed. This may include any or all of the following: identifying the
nature and extent of activities; noting possible variations of activities from
appropriation purposes; establishing principal manpower demands; making
an estimate of the effectiveness of personnel utilization; sizing up manage-
ment controls — administrative reporting, work measurement, cost account-
ing, inspections, and program-planning facilities; spotting possible organiza-
tional or procedural weaknesses; observing the quality of executive leader-
ship; and taking a look at headquarters-field relationships, the adequacy of
the physical plant, the degree of mechanization of clerical processes, the
extent of the backlog of work, and the state of employee relations.

Before a decision is reached that this preliminary once-over should be
followed by an intensive survey, careful weighing must take place of the
advantages to be derived against the investment involved. The prospective
gain should, of course, warrant the expenditure. The study should be of
greater importance than alternative survey activities that might be under-
taken, and preferably it should be related to a long-range objective.

When reconnaissance is the beginning and the end of an administrative
analysis, more or less the same program is followed, but final judgments
are made and recommendations are developed on the spot. It then becomes
necessary to capitalize on the knowledge immediately available. Because
intensive study is precluded, the recommendations should usually define the
basic requirements, rather than the details, of administrative reorganization
or managerial improvement.

Planning the Survey. In an intensive survey, whatever its type, the
basic elements remain more or less constant. Once the commitment for the
study has been made, the first step is the development of a precise plan of
work, including the organizafion*ahd*scheduling of the study. This faciIT-

22 Chicago: 1941, ch. 7.

28 For a representative work in this field, see Barnes, Ralph M., Motion and Time Study,
2d cdr New York: Wiley, 1940.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 467

tates crystallization of the problems to be resolved. Through the setting up
of an orderly work schedule and out lining of tne steps that must be taken, it
also expedites the conducting of the study. Moreover, the work plan can
be a great aid if a similar study is later undertaken in a different set of cir-
cumstances, and may lead to a standardized approach to recurring types of
studies.

The project outline should include a brief statement of the problem to be
analyzed, the objectives of the study, and the scope of the work to be under-
taken. Issues or problems likely to be encountered should be listed as pre-
cisely as possible. The individual steps to be taken in making the study
should be set out. Sources, documents, and authorities to be consulted
should be enumerated. A detailed schedule of the staff requirements should
be worked out, including the length of time each member will be needed.
The approximate date of completion, not only of each major step in the
project but also of the project as a whole, should be estimated as closely as
possible.

In selecting staff for administrative analysis, it is important that there
be balance among the types of skills drawn upon, and that the entire staff
— including those coopted from outside the surveying agency — be subject
to the controls of the leader of the survey group. Advance arrangements
with those responsible for the operations to be surveyed are also of major
importance to facilitate the work and working relationships of the project
staff. Ready access should exist to the top official who is in a position to
secure acceptance of recommendations in the area to be surveyed. The
project staff, whether outside consultants or administrative-planning per-
sonnel of the agency, will find it desirable to arrange for some degree of
assistance by the budget officer, personnel officer, or other key employees.
It may be necessary for the staff to explain the project to top officials, and to
notify or explain it to all employees in order to ensure their understanding
and participation.

Review of Written Materials. When the fact-gathering stage is readied,
the choice among varying approaches* ahcf'difffcTeht aids an3 devices is al-
most limitless. It is at this point that the analyst must use his skill in. deter-
mining those most appropriate to his_ purposes _and combining or adapting
them In a suitable fashion. Generally the starting point will be a review of
written materials, including statutes and orders, which give the historical
background of the organization. The survey staff must also secure the bene-
fit of any previous studies. The more that can be learned about the business
of the agency or the unit in advance, either through review of materials
or conversations with those familiar with the situation, the more effectively
will the subsequent steps of the survey be carried out.

The study of constitutions, statutes, charters, court decisions, executive
orders, instructions, and other regulations will be of particular significance if
inadequacies or inconsistencies in the basic mandate are the primary concern,

468 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

or if it is known what changes arc to be made and the job is to revise
the legal documents accordingly. Legal materials, however, are more often
than not a scanty resource for getting at the more specific or detailed admin-
istrative problems. In an administrative survey, the objective is more likely
to be a diagnosis of what is, rather than what ought to be under law or
regulation.

Old reports and administrative documents, legislative hearings and de-
bates, minutes of commission or board meetings, newspaper accounts, and
published treatise* and historical records as well, provide useful working
material in acquiring an understanding of what brought about a particular
organizational arrangement or method of operation. Such materials will
usually supply only part of the picture, however, since much of what went
on before may never have been recorded, and available documents not in-
frequently fail to tell the most revealing chapters of the story. Particular
attention should be given to any earlier studies of the survey area and to any
recommendations that may have been developed at previous times.

Materials reflecting the main outlines of the current administrative pic-
ture should always be given a careful review at the outset of a survey. These
include financial and activity reports, budget justifications and hearings,
work programs, and organization charts and manuals. Such records as job-
classification sheets, other personnel data, forms, and administrative pre-
scriptions of one sort or another may also be helpful.

Questionnaires and Chect{ Lists. When secondary sources of information
have been exhausted and the analyst is laying plans for collection of detailed
first-hand data, the questionnaire or check-list approach is likely to come to
mind. This is a useful method of producing information quickly from a
large group of people in a standardized pattern. It also contributes to build-
ing up an accurate and complete picture by providing a ready check of one
answer against another. The framing of significant questions in advance
and in detail, however, requires an appreciable foundation of information on
the agency and on the problems being covered.

The United States Bureau of the Budget has recently made considerable
use of this device as a part of its efforts to stimulate management improve-
ment throughout the federal government. Early in 1944, a pamphlet en-
titled An Agency Management Program: A Guide for Self-Appraisal and
for Planning Economies in Operation was distributed throughout the gov-
ernment as an aid to agencies in sizing up their operations. The pamphlet
raised questions such as these: What is our attitude toward management?
Are all of our activities essential? Are we well organized? What have we
done to conserve men, money, and materials?

A year later, with the close of World War II in sight, more detailed
schedules were developed to help agencies get their records in shape in an-
ticipation of liquidation or reduction of activities. These lists of questions
were directed toward the evaluation and improvement of personnel records

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 469

and controls, fiscal records and controls, property records and controls, and
record management and controls. Recently, a comprehensive questionnaire
on agency practices was prepared and distributed in connection with an
analysis of the administration of the employee-retirement system. Its use
saved untold time in a survey covering the entire federal government.

As an aid in interviews, a questionnaire submitted to officials in advance
will prove helpful in directing their attention to productive topics. It will
also secure greater cooperation by permitting advance consideration of the
questioner's needs.

Interviews. While much has been written about interviewing,24 little
material is available on the use of the interview as a major technique in
administrative analysis.25 Careful scheduling and conduct of interviews can
readily provide information, insight, and ideas that are otherwise unobtain-
able. Through interviews, it is possible to get official interpretation of the
problems under study and ideas on their solution; clarify questions raised
by study of written materials; arrange subsequent contacts with subordi-
nates; and gain understanding of personalities and attitudes of key officials.
When good coverage through interviews has been obtained, the risk of
findings and recommendations being sidetracked on questions of fact is sub-
stantially eliminated, since in the presentation of the facts the operator's point
of view has been taken into account and potential misunderstanding has
been straightened out beforehand. The analyst skilled in interviewing can
also size up psychological factors, break down resistance to change, and
build up potential support for forthcoming proposals.

Various patterns of interviewing may be employed. In reconnaissance
or in the general course of analysis, particularly well-informed and com-
municative individuals can be spotted and listed according to the types of
information in their possession. These sources can then be exhaustively
tapped at a later point.

Another approach is to start at the top of the organization and move
down through the hierarchy as far as is necessary to get an adequate story.
Interviews at the higher levels stress objectives, program, the general organi-
zation and flow of work, external relationships, and supervision. As inter-
viewing proceeds downward through the agency, increasing detail is ob-
tained on the distribution of work, the nature of the activities being carried
on, the sequence of operations, and working facilities and their use. This
system permits working through channels and makes it easy to locate each
successive piece of information in its proper place in the larger administra-
tive setting.

Interviews can also be used to trace through a procedure by asking each

24 C/. Bingham, Walter V. and Moore, Bruce V., How To Interview, 3d ed., New York:
Harper, 1941.

25 See Pfiffncr, Research Methods in Public Administration, cit. above in note 21, p.

470 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

person who successively participates in that procedure what he does and
how, or by retracing a specific completed action by asking each person what
happened at his point of the operation. In the course of interviews, the
skilled analyst looks at working papers, observes the actual operations, and
brings into play other aids to analysis.

Obviously, the interview will not often produce confessions of omission
or error. Also, significant details may be unintentionally overlooked by
those furnishing information. Certain administrative operations represent-
ing the best or the ideal performance may be confused with the more typi-
cal ones. Spot experience may overshadow and distort customary day-to-day
operations. The skilled analyst must undertake to compensate for these
weaknesses in testimony as he recognizes or suspects them.

Interviews need to be carefully scheduled and thought through in
advance if the required information is actually to be secured. A check
list of points on which information is desired must be prepared and a line
of questioning planned which will develop this information. The inter-
viewer should also be forearmed with knowledge about those he is to
question so that he will not be in the dark in devising his approach. The
success with which the interview relationships are started will have an im-
portant bearing on the fruitfulness of subsequent conversations. Close atten-
tion needs to be given to the atmosphere engendered in the first conversation.

Helpful hints to the interviewer would include these: Try to see each
individual privately; encourage him to talk; be sympathetic and a good
listener; don't try to give offhand advice; make an effort to get operators
to define their problems and to state what they think should be done about
them.

If the interview is skillfully handled, it will be possible for the analyst
to win acceptance as one who can help management solve its problems.
He should also succeed in stimulating thinking by the operators. When
pertinent to the interview, illustrations of principal forms and procedures
should be collected and tied into the interview notes. The interview is
more than an assembling of opinions; it is aimed at securing facts through
conversations. Complete notes, including captions or headings to facili-
tate future references, should be made after the interview on the basis of the
project outline.

Observation of Operations. Direct observation of what is happening is
one of the more obvious analysis tools, but unfortunately one that is too
often neglected. Observation enables the analyst to see operations in relation
to each other — a street-paving crew at work, or a group of file clerks classi-
fying, sorting, storing, and pulling papers. A walk through an organization
with a guide can be a big reconnaissance help in judging prima facie the
performance of operations, in acquiring an awareness of employee attitudes
and the cordiality of relationships between supervisors and the rank and
file — in other words, in getting the feel of the place.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 471

In any survey, observation is essential to an appraisal of the physical
layout and the use of working tools. It is a major element in any motion
study in which an individual operation is viewed again and again to break
it down into a phase sequence of action or inaction. Sometimes the motion-
picture camera is used so that the operation can be reviewed repeatedly in
slow motion. Looking at what is done by each employee who partici-
pates in a procedure is one way to trace the flow of work through an organi-
zation. Sitting in on staff conferences or meetings is another type of direct
observation — one in which primary emphasis is upon listening, rather than
upon looking.

Understanding through observation becomes increasingly difficult when
an individual's activities are diversified or variable or when activities are
incompletely reflected in actions or words. Looking or listening will not
help when the object of study is a man sitting at his desk formulating
policy. Even though he sees and hears, the skilled analyst also recognizes
that in many situations he may misunderstand or misinterpret elements
of the transaction unless he uses other analytical tools as well.

Review of Communications. A great many devices have been worked
out and applied successfully on repeated occasions in breaking down die
flow, distribution, and accumulation of work.26 One of the best of these
is the review of working papers, either in storage or as they flow through
a distribution center, usually the mail room. Precise, first-hand information
on the kinds of things handled, what is done with them, and the distribu-
tion and flow of work can facilitate judgments on methods, organization,
and procedure, and can aid in figuring out what changes need to be made.

It can also be of help in identifying the level of difficulty of different
types of work. It can reinforce findings and nail down recommendations.
It can help the analyst to avoid the overgeneralizations, misrepresentations,
or omissions that may come from sole reliance on secondary sources or
personal interviews. Working papers also may be analyzed in order to
simplify communication. Opportunities for form letters, check lists, and
other time-saving devices can be located after such a study.

On the other hand, reading files or correspondence can prove to be an
inordinately time-consuming method of administrative analysis. For many
activities, moreover, working papers provide an inadequate reflection of the
operation— for instance, street cleaning, bridge building, across-the-counter
customer service, packaging, filing operations, conferences, and telephone
conversations. Working papers may contain only the end product or other-
wise fail to reflect fully what is done and why.

Wori^-Load and Wor\-Measurement Data. The gathering and inter-
pretation of statistics play an important part in administrative analysis, par-

26 Reference may be made to Glaser, Comstock, Administrative Procedure, Washington:
American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, offered as a "practical handbook for the adminis-
trative analyst"; and to Barnes, Ralph M., Wor^ Methods Manual, New York: Wiley, 1944.

472 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

ticularly in connection with measuring the work passing through organiza-
tion units, in evaluating the effort required to perform tasks in a certain
way, and in arriving at a conclusion about the efficiency of operations.
Work count, work measurement, and cost-analysis techniques are all part of
analysis. By drawing together significant figures it is possible to isolate
and identify administrative bottlenecks upon which attention should be
concentrated; point up defects in the existing allocation of functions; reveal
periodic peaks and valleys in work load which can be eliminated by re-
scheduling or by rearranging work assignments; disclose unbalance in the
distribution of work; discover unnecessary operations; and frequently sup-
port recommendations by a showing of savings in time, money, or work
requirements.

In addition, administrative results often can be tested against statistically
developed standards of performance and accomplishment. Many functions
of municipal government have been closely related to standards of cost
accounting or work measurement. Less has been done at the federal level
that is worthy of the name of cost accounting or work measurement. Inter-
est is developing, however, particularly in the area of administrative services.

Charting Devices. Much help is available to the analyst in the various
kinds of charts, pictures, and diagrams that have been developed to facilitate
the clear recording of data and to speed up the process of communicating
ideas.27 To show a succession of operations, a wide variety of charting
devices has been evolved.

The organization chart is commonly used to show the basic allocation
of functions, the hierarchy of responsibilities, and at times the number and
classes of employees performing each main function. The work-distribu-
tion chart pictures detailed individual work assignments of the first-line
operating unit. There is the work-flow chart, portraying the general se-
quence of major activities through the organization. The process chart
gives a picture of the detailed, consecutive, individual operations, trans-
portations, storages, delays, and inspections by which a job is done. The
right-and-left-hand chart or the simo-motion chart can be used when a
breakdown of the work movements of one individual is in order.

In analyzing working arrangements and the utility and layout of facili-
ties, pictorial diagrams can vividly present the individual or group operation.
Space analysis becomes much easier with a layout diagram. Lines showing
the flow of work or the number and types of personal contacts in a
given time period can clearly reflect possible defects in existing physical
arrangements.

Reports. Throughout the course of analysis, facts are mentally organized

27 An excellent presentation is to be found in Finley, Harold A., "Principles and Methods
of Work Simplification," in Proceedings of the Life Office Management Association, p. 227 ff.
Neiv York, 1943. See also United States Bureau of the Budget, Management Bulletin on
Process Charting, Nov., 1945.

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 473

and related to one other, to past experience, and to previously accumulated
knowledge. In any substantial fact-gathering, however, some systematic
recording of data is necessary. This is done to facilitate either the develop-
ment of findings and recommendations or the communication of ideas.

Data must be organized to fit the audience if recommendations are to
be accepted or effected^ Will the top executive or line operator absorb and
understand proposals most easily through conversation, charts, pictures,
a brief written summary, or a lengthy report? Does he like to get right
down to proposed changes or does he prefer first to think through the facts
or consider the existing defects? What subjects or ideas attract or repel
those who must decide upon or put into effect survey recommendations?
The answers to these questions should control the organization of report
materials.

In addition, questions of timing will have a bearing on the way in which
the materials are brought together. Should conclusions and recommenda-
tions be presented as they are developed, and agreements be reached stage
by stage, or should the story be presented as a whole at the end of the
project? If the latter, should the report be offered as a finished product
or should there be submission of a tentative report subject to revision after
discussion ? Whatever the decision on tactics, it is highly desirable to obtain
agreement on findings before presenting conclusions, and on premises and
conclusions before presenting recommendations.

In submitting the report, plans need to be thought out for the imple-
mentation of the proposals. This may require establishing a special unit
within the organization surveyed to carry forward the recommendations;
or seeing to it that special staff is employed to do the job; or temporarily
transferring some of the analysts who did the study to the agency or unit
studied. Continued participation by the study group may be required to
install new devices or methods; to work initially with the agency or unit;
to prepare action documents for effecting changes; to revise procedures;
or to take over an operation temporarily as a demonstration. Whenever pos-
sible, it is desirable so to arrange matters that the proposals will be adopted
by the line operator as his own. Maximum effect cannot be derived as long
as the product remains that of an outsider.

4. BASIC RESOURCES IN MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

Qualifications for Analysis. Three types of abilities and backgrounds are
important in the formulation oFsound administrative proposals. The first is
an understanding of administration. The more an individual knows about
public administration and the more experience he has had in dealing with or-
ganization and method problems, the better fitted he is to analyze a new
problem. He knows the kinds of things that give trouble, the points of
friction, the bottlenecks, the telltale evidences of an effectively or ineffectively
operating organization, and the arrangements that generally work out well.

474 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

Skill in the actual process of observation and analysis is the second essen-
tial. "This is partly an innate ability and partly a matter of training and
^experience. If one is schooled to look for possible improvements and is
trained in analytical methods, he can quickly broaden the value of his
observations and expedite his gathering and assimilation of the facts.

THiethird personal characteristic required in the development of more
effective organization and mcthodsis judgment. The individual must be
objective in his view of lif e"around Him or of the particular situation with
which he is dealing. He must have the ability to see both the forest and the
trees. He must also have a flair for developing practical solutions and get-
ting them across. This involves a great deal of human understanding and
instinctive behavior if situations are to be interpreted accurately.

5^/77 in Human Relations. Underlying all such personal requirements
is the need for skill in human relations. The analyst is constantly searching
for operating arrangements in which individuals are able to act more easily
and effectively. It may even be said that administrative analysis is, in large
part, psychological analysis.

Psychological factors enter into the survey process all along the line.
Fact-gathering involves face-to-face contacts. There must be cultivation of
good relations to build up useful sources of information and ideas. The pro-
ductivity of interviews will depend to a degree upon how well one re-
sponds to the reactions and attitudes of the individuals interviewed. Dis-
cussion of ideas or proposals couched in the language in which an individual
thinks and feels may transform his opposition or indifference into coopera-
tion or, at least, receptivity. This is particularly important in dealing with
administrators and supervisors who must pass upon or apply the recom-
mendations developed. Finally, recommendations may have to be made in
the light of major personality factors in the organization.

The competent top administrator, the supervisors at the various levels
in the hierarchy, and the administrative general-staff personnel are all in
need of these abilities. The latter — the administrative assistant, the budget
officer, or the administrative-planning officer — will find competence in ad-
ministrative analysis their principal stock-in-trade. Their whole day is
devoted to observing, diagnosing, evaluating, stimulating, and recommend-
ing. As they become masters of the techniques, they will be able effec-
tively to accomplish in a week — and perhaps in a more thoroughgoing
fashion — what would take the unskilled analyst months.

The top administrator has insufficient time to analyze many problems.
However, he will need to know of the existence of the various methods of
identifying and overcoming difficulties. He will also want to be assured
that the recommendations or the alternative choices submitted to him are
the product of effective analysis. The able executive will bear these findings
in mind in virtually everything he does.

Analysis also occurs as the administrator, with or without special staff

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 475

assistance, reviews the papers that pass over his desk and observes the or-
ganization's end product. The same is true of the rank and file of super-
visors. The lower the level, the more can the supervisor see at first-hand
the detail problems that confront the organization and the better is his posi-
tion to figure out solutions. But human beings function largely by habit;
they get used to their surroundings and their established routine.28 The
supervisor who is constantly challenging his own methods of work and
keeping on the lookout for better ways of doing it will be able to solve a
mass of problems which the dull-eyed supervisor will never see.

Training Surveys. The methods of fact-finding or of surveying are fre-
quently thought to be restricted to so-called experts and top administrative
staffs. However, during World War II, fact-finding techniques were com-
bined with training techniques in developing in first-line supervisors the
skills necessary to carry out their portion of the total management job.
Two outstanding examples specifically fit into our context.

One is the "J" programs discussed in the preceding chapter.20 These
programs were worked out with one primary aim in mind — to supply war
industry rapidly with foremen in sufficient numbers and with sufficient
ability to meet industrial expansion and increased production requirements.
In using the "J" programs for purposes other than those for which they
were designed, careful review should be made of both the individual pro-
gram and the situation to which it is to be applied, so that any necessary
adaptations may be made.

The second illustration is the work-simplification program, also pre-
viously discussed.30 Work simplification has long been practiced by special-
ists. During World War II Lt. Col. John A. Aldridge of the Quartermaster
Corps Control Division, Army Service Forces, developed office-work sim-
plification principally in terms of process charting and layout-flow charting.
He did an outstanding job in introducing the gang-process chart as a device
for analyzing material-handling problems. Basing its efforts on mass em-
ployee participation, the Quartermaster Corps saved 26.4 per cent of all
manpower covered by the program for other assignments in the expanding
war effort. The United States Bureau of the Budget added to the analysis
technique of the process chart the techniques of the work-distribution chart
and the work count, and packaged them in such a manner that busy first-
line supervisors could be instructed in the use of these elementary devices
in a few short sessions. In the Office of Price Administration, savings of
nearly $2 millions were reported after a concentrated effort on the basis of
the bureau's program.

Work simplification requires for its most beneficial use an interested

28 Cf. above Ch. 17, "Government by Procedure," sec. 1, "The Nature and Limitations of
Procedure."

29 See above Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec. 2, "The Supervisory Skills."

bid. and above Ch. 17, "Government by Procedure," sec. 4, "Creadon and Criteria.1

476 ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT

middle management and a competent expert or small staff of experts in
administrative analysis to cope with problems supervisors turn up which
ire beyond the scope of their authority. The bureau's work-simplification
training program, including the visual aids used, has been published by the
Public Administration Service.31

Employee-Initiated Action. Administrative and training surveys are
initiated by top management, and even work-simplification programs focus
only on the first-line supervisor. What of the rank and file? Employee-sug-
gestion systems have been instituted in many governmental units to bring
about management improvements.32 Employees are provided with forms on
which they outline a proposed improvement, such as a simplified proce-
dure, a new piece of equipment, a scheme for saving effort, or some better
type of operation control. Sometimes financial awards are given; in other
cases, reliance has been upon public citation. In the War Department,
10 per cent of the employees have participated each year in this scheme.
From June, 1943, to December, 1944, cash awards of $653,762 were paid;
189,711 suggestions had come forth in this period. Annual savings from
them were estimated at $54,930,931. In the Navy Department, savings
resulting from employee suggestions were estimated at $15 millions a year.

The significance of employee-initiated action is not limited to cash
savings. It rests also in th^ highly intangible but

improved employee morale. As each employee thinks of job processes on
his own initiative, he tends to take greater interest in his job and to become
more closely affiliated with the organization. This feeling is increased
materially as employees are permitted to share in management discussions.
Shop committees and labor-management committees composed of supervis-
ors and employees have brought about better common understanding of
problems arising on either side. Depending upon the underlying interest
of management, they have contributed to effective settlement of many
administrative issues.

Summary. In the last ten years, interest in better administration by
responsible public officials and large numbers of rank-and-file government
employees has multipled. This interest has taken the form of intelligent
analysis of administrative problems, to the end that day-to-day programs
are carried on more effectively and efficiently. Marked increase is noticeable
iiythe development and use of sound techniques of analysis.

/ Programs of administrative improvement have literally spread like
wildfire on the municipal, state, and federal levels of government. There
is danger during an expansion of this scope that techniques may be applied
to situations which actually do not fit the conditions. This is due to an un-
derstandable eagerness to try something that has proved successful else-

»! Publication No. 91, Chicago, 1945.

82 C/. also above Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec. 4, "Supervision and Employee
Initiative."

ADMINISTRATIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT 477

where. Innovation for innovation's sake should be guarded against. Tech-,
niques should be adapted to specific situations. Only through experience
tested inmaaiiqld ways^^-Wc-gauT useful generalizations.

5e~continuing growth of interest in management improvement gener-
ally must be based on a firm foundation of testing results and interchange
of information. However, much remains still to be done in both these areas.
The attempt to make available to first-line supervisors and employees knowl-
edge of the techniques of analysis, and to open further avenues of wider
participation in management should be fostered vigorously in order to se-
cure closer communication of ideas between supervisors and subordinates
throughout the entire administrative structure.

CHAPTER

Morale and Discipline

1. THE MEANING OF MORALE

Components of Morale. Leonard D. White has said : "Morale is both an
index of a sound employment situation and a positive means of building an
efficient organization. It reflects a social-psychological situation, a state of
mind in which men and women voluntarily seek to develop and apply their
full powers to the task upon which they are engaged, by reason of the intel-
lectual or moral satisfaction which they derive from their own self-realiza-
tion, their achievements in their chosen field, and their pride in the service."1

Thus considered, morale is obviously the very essence of successful ad-
ministration. Whether the undertaking administered be an army, a public
agency, or a private enterprise, it is clear that if its leaders aspire to sustained
accomplishment of defined results, they must master the problem of morale
both as a standard of appraising the effectiveness of their organization and
as a technique of maximizing its esprit de corps.

In the past decade, the elements of morale have been the subject of ex-
tensive exploration by both students and practitioners of administration.2

1 White, Leonard D., "Administration, Public," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.
I, p. 446, New York: Macmiilan, 1930.

2 For a cross section of the best scholarship available on the subject of this chapter, see
Tead, Ordway, Human Nature and Management, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933, and The
Art of Leadership, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935; Follett, Mary P., Dynamic Administration,
cd. by Metcalf, Henry C. and Urwick, Lyndall, New York: Harper, 1942; Urwick, Lyndall and
Brech, E. F. L., Thirteen Pioneers, p. 48 ff., London: Management Publications, 1945;
Roethlisberger, Fritz J., Management and Morale, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941;
Roethlisberger, Fritz J. and Dick son, William J., Management and the Worker, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1943; Mayo, Elton, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization,
Boston: Harvard School of Business Administration, 1945; Pearson, John, "Teamwork," in
Morstein Marx, Fritz, ed., Public Management in the New Democracy, ch. 6, New York:
Harper, 1940; Graduate School of the United States Department of Agriculture, Administra-
tive Management: Principles and Techniques, Lancaster: Lancaster Press, 1938; Viteles, Morris
S., Industrial Psychology, New York: Norton, 1932; Niles, Mary C. H., Middle Management,
New York: Harper, 1941; Mosher, William E. and Kingsley, J. Donald, Public Personnel
Administration, rev. ed., New York: Harper, 1941; Tcad, Ordway and Metcalf, Henry C.,
Personnel Administration, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933; Dimock, Marshall E., The Execu-
tive in Action, New York: Harper, 1945.

478

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 479

Identification of the components of morale, however, is still elusive despite
common agreement upon several generalizations. These generalizations are
at least useful terms of exposition. One is that the group climate must pro-
vide opportunity for individual self-expression by the members of the group.
Another is that the cooperative context must furnish outlets for the individ-
ual's pride in his own workmanship. Still another is that members of the
group must accept the purposes and values of the group as their own — that
they have a sense of belonging to the group or of identity with it. These
may be described as the individualistic bases of morale.

Of equal importance are those bases from which the group derives its
own collective individuality and vitality. In many ways, the first among
them is personal opportunity for creative participation in the formulation
and pursuit of widely shared group objectives. Not only is it important
thus to weld the individual member and the group together; it is also im-
perative that the group conceives of itself as serving the ends and goals
of the larger community.

The highest morale has an intellectual as well as an emotional quality.
Its intellectual quality results from emphasis upon information, understand-
ing, and intercommunication, which rest in turn on genuine participation
in institutional thinking, planning, deciding, and evaluating. These are the
dynamics of morale. Some observers have laid great stress on a more static
component — that of the security of the individual within the group. Secur-
ity, however, is more accurately a by-product, not a creator of group morale.
Its overemphasis inevitably adulterates morale.

Not a few students have concluded that there are certain additional re-
quirements for the maintenance of positive morale. They underscore the
need for homogeneity in the purposes of the group. There must be, they
say, at least the absence of inconsistency in group purposes, since contradic-
tions produce stresses and strains destructive of group identity. To be sure,
heterogeneity of purpose which engenders within the group a conscious and
prolonged competition in the pursuit of irreconcilable objectives is hostile to
morale. Yet the limits of tolerance may be fairly generous. The group
thrives upon variety in points of view as well as upon unity. Of course, gen-
eral agreement upon the master objective is necessary. However, construc-
tive competition as to means, particularly as to those means which call for
adaptation to time and circumstance, is a generator of morale — not its

enemy.

Homogeneity in the composition of the group, it is argued, is also es-
sential. Staff homogeneity with respect to age, ability, energy, and perma-
nence is deceptively attractive, but it also may cause undue narrowness. The
search should rather be for that fine balance of staff composition which
gives to the group the efficiency which comes from maturity and the
momentum which comes from youth.

Other writers have suggested that the group must have a conviction ol

480 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

success— that is, accomplishments must stand out in terms of group purposes
and be obvious to outside observers as well as to the group itself. Such con*
ditions are usually beyond the control of the group, however. There is only
a relatively brief time-span during which the group may be sustained by
the near prospect of success or, in some rare instances, by the knowledge
that the goal is distant but worth striving for.

Still other students have contended that morale depends upon the degree
of successful and enduring indoctrination which the group receives. The
validity of this contention is limited by the boundary between education
and demagogy. Indoctrination is an instrument, the utility of which is
linked to its educative quality and the soundness of its premises. Indoctrina-
tion is one thing, the character of the doctrine is another.

True Coin and Counterfeit. Morale is frequently confused with its coun-
terfeits. The crowd has its moments of evanescent enthusiasm. The clan has
its solid, introverted self-sufficiency. The clique has its conspiratorial intoxi-
cation. The caste, conscious of its exclusive membership, has its somber,
pretentious symbols of unity. The gang has its exaggerated forms of self-
importance.

These are not manifestations of morale in any meaningful sense. Morale
is a significant term to those concerned with administration only when the
concept has progressive social utility. To serve a progressive function in
administration, morale must be stripped of its parochial values. It cannot
have emotionally or intellectually neutral tones. In the administrative en-
vironment, the significance of morale lies: first, in its barometric function —
its function as a psychological index of the net quality of management; and,
second, in its instrumental function — its contribution of emphasis and
method to the values of creative group effort.

In this perspective, group morale involves balance, flexibility, maturity,
continuity, persistence against adversity, and capacity for constant renewal.
Balance and maturity are the product of a total perspective of the group —
its raison d'etre, its objectives and goals, its concept of itself. Pursued too
deliberately, balance and maturity become superannuation. The group per-
spective becomes a system of static stereotypes, empty symbols of a dead past.
Continuity in morale is still more fugitive, for morale is always less difficult
to evoke than to sustain. Morale, as the spirit of the group, is a living thing.
To be sustained, it must be constantly renewed by the vitality of day-to-day
relationships and operations.

Persistence against adversity is easily produced upon occasion, but its
continuance is rarely encountered except in the counterfeit form of resist-
ance to change. Nothing is so fatally easy to develop as rigid habit. It
represents ease, familiarity, certainty, "security." These, however, are the
attractive forms of false morale.

Morale is flexible. Flexibility and persistence of morale require the high-
est, level of leadership. Such leadership brings forth constant participation

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 481

in the sharing of aims and plans, in judgment and evaluation, in adapta-
tion to changed circumstances. The group learns much more readily the
opposite habits: smugness, complacency, exclusiveness, attachment to some
plateau of morale, rationalization of limited accomplishment, acceptance of
the present unattainability of some peak that has been reached in its past.
It is always tempted by the familiarity, comfort, and ease of old ways— the
dead level of mediocrity.

Democratic Implications of Morale. These generalizations about the
nature of morale march clearly toward one major conclusion. Morale is
a democratic concept. Fascism, Nazism, and Shintoism may have seemed
very effective "morale" builders. However, theirs was a brittle "morale," an
unyielding spirit which when cracked was shattered. As circumstances
shifted, their rigidity of habit and attitude was unable to adapt.

The product of indoctrination and repetition, this type of "morale"
lacked understanding. A response to authority, it lacked initiative, inven-
tiveness, and imagination. An intelligent and simultaneously persistent
morale in a complex, changing world must be democratic. It must enlist
voluntary and creative participation of each member of the group in the
formation of group purposes and the attainment of group goals.

The essence of democratic morale is to be found in its accent on
common knowledge, initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination throughout
the group. Democratic morale is built upon the free and constructive sharing
by all members of the group in the definition and accomplishment of the
group's purposes. It seeks to evoke this participation through the art of
leadership, not by authority; through the inner unity of the group, not by
its division into hierarchical levels; through the dynamic drive of the whole
group, not by requirements imposed by command. The literature of morale
probes into the wellsprings of human motivation and response. Its findings
are decisive in the endorsement of democratic premises, conclusive in the
indictment o^ the uses of self-centered authority and the ephemeral effects
of involuntary participation.

Doctrinal Counter influences. There is still great need in the public serv-
ice for the development of an understanding of morale in its most positive
forms. We have depended too long upon the lawyer and the engineer tc
provide the master theory of human relations in public administration. As
the main if unacknowledged craftsmen of administrative doctrine, the)
have labored mightily to repair the defaults of others, but they have not beer
equipped to do the complete job. The concepts brought forth in both
quarters have been equally congenial, equally plausible, and equally false
What they have produced is not a democratic theory of administration
however much their literary efforts have been sweetened with the strategic
use of such words as "American" and "democratic." Fundamentally, theii
product has tended toward authoritarian dogma.

The proof is the doxology implicit in contemporary theory of publi<

482 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

administration. Its most ancient and revered precept is that the state is
sovereign. It follows that not only are those who live within the state's
boundaries inhibited by the near-divinity of rigid forms, but also and espe-
cially that those who work for the state are required to respect its sov-
ereignty. The influence of this concept is universal and subtle on all the
premises employed by the architects of administrative doctrine. The con-
cept of internal sovereignty has provided the alchemy by which the author-
ity and the unilateral prestige of the abstract state has been transferred to all
those who command the enterprises of government.

The lawyer is prone to construct an administrative universe out of a
logic concerned with the right ordering of words on paper, a process to
which human behavior and human motivation seem irrelevant. The
engineer looks to the efficient manipulation of materials — blocks of stone,
bars of steel, and the more mysterious action and reaction of molecule and
atom, light and sound. Human behavior may appear to him as an equilib-
rium of forces. He is apt to forget that in administration these forces are
animate and impulsive. To both the lawyer as an artisan of words and the
engineer as a manipulator of materials, authoritarian concepts of administra-
tion have seemed necessary and virtuous. Each has found the tradition and
the myth of the sovereign state convincing as an article of faith and con-
venient as an instrument of command.

No less influential has been their elaboration of hierarchy as indispen-
sable and immutable. Hierarchy is seen by them as the alternative to
disorder. The natural place of hierarchy as one of the methods of group
action has been exalted to a higher status — that of the central instrument of
organization to which all other means are subordinate. This elaboration
has obscured the fact that, whatever its convenient and proper uses, hierarchy
may operate as a negation of democracy and as an adulterant of morale.

In the theory of public administration, the derivatives of hierarchy take
many forms. One of the most universal is the organization chart, used to
produce that illusion of symmetry and finality which seems to give the
lawyer and the engineer great emotional satisfaction. But the organization
chart alone, whether made manifest in visual or verbal form, fails to pro-
vide a sufficient cloak for the needs of authority. Consequently, there is
the enshrinement of the written procedure and the directive. These, how-
ever necessary they may be as pragmatic means, may also be used to spell
out in persuasive and impressive ritual the abstract implications of hier-
archy and the inarticulate lesson of the organization chart.

The language of the chart is usually the language of authority and com-
mand, rarely the language of leadership and collaboration. "Span of control,"
"chain of command," "final authority"—-these are familiar figures of thought.
The political scientist and the student of public administration — not yet
entirely free from intellectual subordination to the lawyer and the engineer
—have added still other verses to the authoritarian doxology. Their devo-

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 483

tion to the concept of hierarchy has been expressed in the creation of
additional pillars of authority— notably the staff office as a device of control
to police the organization and to guard its procedural supports.

Impact of Military and Business Prototypes. Other and powerful in-
fluences have abetted the growth of authoritarian administrative theory.
Prominent among these has been the imitation of military administration,
reflected most clearly in the structure and habits of agencies concerned with
public safety. In these enterprises appear, in most complete form, the
trappings of command represented by the varied insignia of grades of author-
ity. Moreover, the military tradition exerts its influence in many other
administrative areas in more subtle ways.

Even more pervasive and influential in public administration has been
the example of private enterprise. Here the concepts, forms, and usages
of authoritarian management have been less softened by the impact of demo-
cratic pressures. In this area of human effort, authority and hierarchy pay
more immediate dividends. In fact, so conclusive have been the dividends
that few theoretical concessions have been made, and in even fewer in-
stances has practice bowed to democratic premises. The literature of private
management, indeed, shows very few of the doubts of hierarchy and the
marks of democratic aspiration now found in some of the writings on
public administration. Despite this fact, most of the pleas for ratification
of new methods in public administration still seek the endorsement of
private-enterprise analogy. Applied without reference to social values of
public service, the dogmas of efficiency and economy, for example, are un-
democratic. Yet they are consistently invoked by the theorist and prac-
titioner of public administration as the main rationalization, or at least the
protective coloration, for almost every formula of improvement.

These are the principal but not the only barriers to the development of
a fruitful theory and a productive methodology for the stimulation of
morale in the public service. The task is no less than the rediscovery of the
basic assumptions upon which the democratic experiment began, and their
laborious application to the habits of management in all our public enter-
prises. Its difficulty lies not only in the birth-pains of new concepts but
even more in the repudiation of the seductive nostrums of authority. For
the latter have acquired the benediction of "common sense" and common
prejudice.

2. BUILDING GROUP MORALE

Basic Premises. We frequently forget that democracy is a comparatively
new and a still timidly applied concept. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries it meant primarily the rule of the majority. It was associated
with the political and legal forms of the ballot, a representative legislature,
a written constitution, and a bill of rights. These institutional develop-
ments were the more obvious expressions of deeper changes in other aspects

484 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

of life. Among them were the collapse of feudalism, the rise of industry
and trade, and the establishment of a free market. The entire transforma-
tion had the effect of dissolving the bonds of tyranny and opening the
channels of initiation and invention to large groups that were hitherto
bound by authoritarian controls. The enormous growth of America was
due largely to the existence of conditions which released the innovative
spirit in so many of our people.

Yet the ideas, attitudes, and customs of authority persist. Orthodox doc-
trine of military organization and discipline still reflects a command system.
Administration in industry, government, and education continues to lean
heavily upon formal authority. Thus, as our life has become more highly
organized into official and private groups, the dead hand of the past still
lingers. Group life remains encumbered by the theories of organization and
administration which developed in a feudal civilization. We have yet to
win our complete independence from the past.

The more democratic life of America — as well as the psychology and
the methods of the scientist, the artist, and the inventor — has revealed the
deeper resources of responsibility when men and women have an oppor-
tunity to be themselves and join with others in pursuit of common goals.
We still have much to learn of the potentials of human beings and how
to realize those potentials. That is an important part of the future of
democracy. Administration must learn to substitute imagination, inven-
tion, understanding, and persuasion for authority.

New Methodology. A new theory, a new language pattern, a new
intellectual climate, a new methodology will not be the full-blown product
of tomorrow's labors. Instead, its realization will more probably flow from
the slower currents of many partial contributions to a new "common law"
and common practice in administration. This common practice already
has had its promising beginning.

There is cumulative evidence to show that the student and the practi-
tioner of administration are each growing conscious of the roots and the
processes of behavior and motivation. Preliminary borrowings and tentative
applications of the findings of the psychologist and the sociologist are be-
coming more frequent. In some of the literature and in some of the prac-
tice of administration, the shift in emphasis from the language of authority
to the language of democracy is quite pronounced.3 In others, the incon-
sistency between the articulate premises of authority and the inarticulate
premises of democratic management is not yet clearly seen. The forms
and practices of democratic management have, instead, been engrafted with
greater or lesser skill upon the unchanged forms and habits of authority.

Even these latter instances, however, are signs of progress. The dynamics of

8 See especially Lilienthal, David E., TV A: Democracy on the March, New York: Harper,
1944; Clapp, Gordon and Others, Employee Relations in the Public Service, Chicago: Civil
Service Assembly, 1942; Follctt, op. cit. above in note 2.

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 485

morale, once even partially released, tend to exert their own educative force.
In still other situations the new patterns are applied uncritically, and often
for management's transient or self-serving purposes. Although such appli-
cations are in the main unsuccessful and frequently self-defeating, they too
on occasion have a value not without parallel to the process by which, in
private enterprise, the company union sometimes finds its way to inde-
pendence and maturity.

Teamworl^. The methodology of morale now includes a list of tech-
niques of respectable length and depth. Most of these have been tested
in the fires of application. Their worth and uses are consequently known
to sophisticated observers and practitioners. Distinctly prominent are the
several devices by which the concept of "the team" is gradually being sub-
stituted for the unmitigated concept of hierarchy. These devices are the
most promising, although the most difficult to apply. Their great value
lies in the fact that they strike at the basic causes of static morale. Without
them, other devices are restricted to marginal influence upon morale
improvement.

Methods for establishing "the team" as the action group in public ad-
ministration are many and diversified. One complex of methods is designed
to increase the forms and content of communication among all levels of
the organization, emphasizing especially the two-way function of the chan-
nels of communication.4 Staff indoctrination is thus perpetuated and
transformed into group consultation. Lines of command become the ma-
chinery by which preliminary goals are set, revised, agreed upon, and made
into group objectives and standards of accomplishment. Staff meetings —
sterile institutions under the literal premises of hierarchy— become dynamic
centers of high morale as skill and sincerity are nourished through their
successful development.

The written word in the process of communication is no less important.
When the reports of progress and achievement and the assignments of
general and specific tasks are consciously used as instruments of consulta-
tion and participation by and for the whole group, their value to morale
becomes immeasurably positive. In creating and renewing morale, the
need for constant invention is imperative. The task of the leader is the
imaginative search for new forms of communication and the modified use of
old forms. It is equally his assignment to avoid dependence upon once suc-
cessful devices which have lost their sharp edge or have been made inappro-
priate by time or circumstance.

Leadership. Another category of morale methods is the group which

4 For two suggestive expositions of the purposes and the art of communication, see Cor-
son, John J., "The Role of Communication in the Process of Administration," Public Admin-
istration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p. 7 #.; Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Train-
ing Bulletin No. 2, Making Staff Meetings More Useful, Washington, March, 1946 (mimeo-
graphed). Sec also above Ch. 18, "The Tasks of Middle Management," sec. 2, "Supporting.
Top Direction."

486 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

recognizes the differential functions of the several levels of an organization
in the creation and maintenance of morale. These methods identify the
subtle role of leadership in its various forms and grades of responsibility —
in particular : the executive task, the special contribution of middle manage-
ment, and the crucial role of the first-line supervisor. The metamorphosis
from authoritarian to democratic management depends almost exclusively
upon the skill with which the commander transforms himself into the
leader. All the pressures of convention and all the lines of least resistance
move him toward the continued use of formal authority. Nevertheless,
he must want to be the leader rather than the commander.

The role of leader is more difficult than any other. Except by the ob-
sessed or the inspired, it is therefore reluctantly adopted. The leader has
no vacation from his task, no gadgets to manipulate defensively, no alibis
available.5 Despite his greater satisfactions with success, he must constantly
practice the art of anonymity in his methods of leadership. Otherwise he
becomes the "big boss." All this requires a sense of dedication rarely en-
countered in the market place of traditional managers and supervisors.
The finding and training of leaders is, accordingly, one of the main
burdens of those who aspire to promote the growth and universal exten-
sion of democratic management.

The specific elements of leadership appropriate to democratic group-
performance have received little more than peripheral attention in manage-
ment literature. The by-paths of military and other authoritarian traditions
have proved too inviting. Jefferson's precepts, long neglected, are only now
tardily being taken up. The discoveries of the psychologist are only now
verifying democratic premises. Small beginnings are only now spreading
into more confident application on broader scenes. Among these, the ex-
periments undertaken by the Tennessee Valley Authority deserve pioneer
status. Other efforts await only the conclusive evidence of their success
and merit.6

Group Development. The following excerpt from a kit for supervisors
issued by the Office of Price Administration is a good example of docu-
mentation of the emerging tendencies for the promotion of leadership and
self-development :

MARKS OF SUPERIOR GROUP PERFORMANCE

The press of operational responsibilities commonly diverts attention
from our leadership role. Moreover, leadership is such a personal matter
that it is difficult to evaluate objectively. Yet it is leadership that trans-
forms a number of individuals into a team, and it is only as a team that
we and our staff can effectively discharge our responsibilities.

5 See particularly Tead, The Art of Leadership, cit. above in note 2; Stone, Donald C.,
"Notes on the Government Executive: His Role and Methods," Public Administration Review,
1945, Vol. 5, p. 210 ff.'9 Niles, op. cit. above in note 2.

6 Sec, for instance, the ideas developed by Bradford, Leland P. and Lippitt, Ronald,
"Building a Democratic Work Group," Personnel, 1945, Vol. 22, p. 142 ff.

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 487

The best way to study our leadership is to measure it against the per-
formance of our group. Following are some criteria of group perform-
ance. It is not assumed that many groups will rate high on all items.
These items can, however, help us to analyze the performance of our
group and our success as their leaders. Upon the basis of such an an-
alysis, we may discover ways in which our leadership should develop.

A. Employee Performance

1. The members of the staff show initiative, resourcefulness, and im-
agination in dealing with problem situations. They are skillful in an-
alysis of problems and inventive in solutions.

2. They have a whole-hearted interest in their work and a sense of
responsibility, not only for their individual job, but for the programs of
their shop and the agency as a whole.

3. They are eager to learn and grow in their job. They know what
they need and want to learn and why they want to learn it.

4. Employees have confidence in themselves but at the same time are
objective, analytical, and critical about their performance.

B. Supervisory Performance

1. The supervisor encourages employees to make suggestions, develop
ideas, and plan for improving operations. He helps them test out and
evaluate objectively their suggestions and ideas, and where possible ac-
cepts and acts upon them.

2. The supervisor depends more upon the employees' attitudes toward
their work as disciplinary controls and less upon his own authority and
arbitrary "dos" and "don'ts."

C. Relations Within the Group

1. The staff works together cooperatively as a team with a large
measure of common understanding and common purpose. Each member
shares actively in group decision, policy making, and planning. He sees
his individual job in relation to the total program.

2. There is mutual respect and friendliness among supervisors and
subordinates. They are interested in each other as persons. The work
atmosphere is cordial and congenial.

It might be helpful from time to time to rate your group on these
items, using a scale from 1 to 5. In this way you can note improvements
in your leadership.

Wording Together. No less productive of morale than are teamwork,
leadership, and group development are the constructive gropings for collab-
oration between public management and the organized rank and file of
the group. The weight of the old approach here, of course, as in private
management,7 has been toward the antithesis of collaboration. The tradi-
tion of authority and command in management has generated a reciprocal
tradition — the grouping of employees into combative and hostile organi-
zations. The authoritarian attitude has met employee aspirations for active
participation in the whole administrative process by many types of resist-

7 For a significant departure from this tradition, see Walters, J. E., Personnel Relations,
New York: Ronald Press, 1945.

488 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

ance and defense. The sovereignty of the state has been freely invoked,
The techniques of paternalism have been widely used. And when further
ramparts were needed, public management has marked out narrow juris-
dictional areas of employee consultation.

Government-employee organizations have tried to defeat these tactics
with countermeasures of open or concealed waffare. The result has been,
generally, that morale was sacrificed upon the altar of authority. Slowly,
however, the rank and file have pushed forward the boundaries of recog-
nition. As concessions have gradually softened the forms of resistance,
collaboration has brought forth some of the minimum conditions of demo-
cratic management. Particularly in the last decade have the habits of
formal relations and hostility been progressively abandoned.

Substantial headway has thus been made toward the removal of nega-
tive factors, but only fractional advance has occurred in the development of
machinery for fruitful employee partnership in public administration.
Negotiation, rather than participation, is still the order of the day. There is
real promise, nonetheless, that progress may now be by geometrical pro-
gression. Certainly the ferment of increased collaboration in strategic
areas is fully at work. Both management and union now need to give
their energies to the invention of efficient and economical machinery by
which the rank and file may contribute their maximum responsibility to
the attainment of higher group morale.8

Union Attitudes. An illustration of employee thinking about conditions
of good morale is the following statement published by the National Fed-
eration of Federal Employees, a body not affiliated with either the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor or the Congress of Industrial Organizations:9

HINTS FOR GOOD ADMINISTRATORS AND FOR GOOD FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Administrators Employees

Fight for your employees. See that Fight for your supervisor. See that he
they get a square deal. Be loyal to gets a square deal. Be loyal to him.
them.

Promote your employees as rapidly as Boost your employer's stock,
is justified and possible.

Promote one of your own employees, Work hard to improve your efficiency
an insider, to new and available jobs; so as to become qualified for a better
do not bring in outsiders and place position,
them above insiders of equal efficiency.

Promote insiders of greater seniority Be alert to promote objectives of your
over those of lesser seniority, provided service at all times,
the qualifications are equally good.

8 For evidence of this progress in theory and practice, see Clapp, op. cit. above in note
3; National Civil Service League, Employee Organizations in the Public Service, New York,
1946; Golden, Clinton S. and Ruttenberg, Harold J., The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy.
New York: Harper, 1942. See also below Ch. 24, "Personnel Standards," sec. 6, "Employee
Relations."

* Federal Employee, 1945, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 8 (by permission of the editor).

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

489

Administrators

Be economical, but remember the best
economy is a staff of good workers,
well paid, possessed of high morale,
and effecting maximum production.

Know your people personally, as many
of them as possible. Take a personal
interest in their welfare.

Avoid issuance of conflicting instruc-
tions. When new work assignments
are made, check on previous obligations
already assumed by those to whom the
orders are issued.

Insofar as practicable explain the
reasons for things, but do not argue.

Eliminate dead-end jobs. They are a
sign of ineffective organization.

Be prompt to transfer, reclassify, or sep-
arate from the service any unsatisfac-
tory employee. Do not blame anyone
but yourself if you have such employees
in your administrative unit.

Encourage organization and coopera-
tion on the part of your employees in
unions for improvement of working
conditions and social and economic wel-
fare, credit unions, hospital guilds, or
other groups. Go in with them if the
rules permit. Show them your interest
and give them your help.

Take your employees into your confi-
dence. Hold frequent conferences.
Keep in touch with your personnel
office.

Make the most of yourself and your
outfit. Folks like to work for a suc-
cessful administrator, strong enough
to get the job done, protect his em-
ployees, and advance his organization.

Cut out all possible red tape, but retain
control of all operations so the work
will advance effectively and with cer-
tainty.

Employees

Help to get the job done with the great-
est economy of materials, time, and
energy.

While no employer likes an apple poi
isher, the employee should go at least
half way. Supervisors are human.

If impossible assignments are received,
tell the supervisor quickly. Do not
apologize, make excuses, or alibi when
work is not done.

Call possible improvements to the su-
pervisor's attention, but do not argue.
Go ahead and get the job done to the
best of your ability.

Do not be satisfied with any dead-end
job. Build up your qualifications so
that you can advance.

If your record is unsatisfactory, cooper-
ate with the responsible administrator
to secure a transfer, reclassification, or
separation from the service so you can
find your proper place.

Join and promote employee cooper-
atives such as unions for improvement
of working conditions, social and eco-
nomic welfare, credit unions, hospital
guilds and the like.

When you have a grievance take it to
the supervisor first. Give him a chance
to straighten things out.

Give individual loyalty to employer and
organization. Put all you've got into
it, so it can really get the job done and
advance.

Pay meticulous attention to actual
paper requirements. A certain amount
of red tape is essential to the smooth
functioning of a large organization.
After all, your salary check is paper
work! Let the supervisor know when
you discover a valid short cut.

490 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

Incentives. Much attention and experimentation have been given to a
class of morale methods which are concerned with identifying and using
systems of incentives and rewards. Conventionally, two types of incentives
and rewards are identified — the economic and the noneconomic. Exten-
sive analysis, particularly in private management, has tended to establish
the fact that in individual motivation these two are not only inextricably
mixed but that they also have approximately equal significance. In public
employment, it has been assumed that nonfinancial incentives count more
heavily than financial. Security, the prestige of public service, the evolution
of career systems, and the use of objective standards for individual advance-
ment have all been offered as substitutes for higher monetary awards in
private industry, c^

The sharp limits that restrict the validity of this thesis have led to the
introduction, in more recent years, of various additional financial and non-
financial incentives for public employees. Salary increases for meritorious
service and cash awards for outstanding employee-suggestions have become
regular features of administrative practice. Nonfinancial incentives have
also been increasingly emphasized. Official recognition of distinguished
service has been formalized in service awards and other official document*
and insignia. Most incentive systems, whether financial or nonfinancial,
are still in rudimentary form. This is due mainly to awareness of the fact
that they are only supplementary morale devices. As such, however, they
warrant fuller elaboration.

In the absence of more basic morale generators, incentive systems serve
largely to ameliorate the harsher forms of administration and to provide
management with "showcase" demonstrations of democratic intentions.
Under these conditions, they invite and receive the suspicion or indifference
of the group rather than recognition as important parts of the work en-
vironment. In another setting, governed by good will without valor, in-
centive systems may represent superficial comprehension by management
of the basic factors in human motivation. When offered as a deliberately
contrived but measured concession to democratic management, such sys-
tems invariably disappoint their creators. Only as a bona fide expression of
genuine effort toward democratic management are they worth the cost of in-
stallation and administration.10

Performance Standards. Incentive systems point the way toward a more
important method of morale improvement. The work group needs, and
will invariably respond to, objective standards of performance. These must
be standards agreed upon by the group, not simply the ex cathedra standards
of management. Here again, the process of creation has been slow.

Standards have been characteristically established by statistical averages,
by the pace-setter in the group, by "time studies," or by the standard of

10 See Roethlisbergcr, Management and Morale, cit. above in note 2. Sec also above
Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec. 5, "Supervision and Employee Initiative."

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 491

maximum profits. These are not the standards which increase morale.
Standards useful to morale are those whose logic and reasonableness ap-
peal to the group — those which have been set by the process of participation
and agreement within the group. Standards arrived at in any other way
invite sabotage of quality if not of quantity of performance.11

Production standards, though frequently used as the main test of morale,
are in fact deceptive instruments of diagnosis. Production is the resultant of
many variables. Low production is the sign of pathology in collaboration.
But a complete diagnosis may require scrutiny of the total environment
of the group. Effective therapy as a rule involves correction of the modes
of organization and of the exercise of authority by supervisor and manager.
Only such correction may release the creative potential of the group.

Essentiality of Purpose. In public administration, the manager and the
supervisor have at hand a morale potential greater than that tapped by any
of the methods thus far mentioned. Theirs is the rare opportunity to use the
ends and purposes of society in their direct relationships to the objectives of
the groups they lead. Public service can be seen as an indispensable means
by which the community attains its aims.

Participation in an economic stabilization program, for instance, whose
effects reach every American — indeed help determine world prosperity —
has a significance beside which merely private objectives pale into sheer
inconsequence. The same is true of participation in a program of social
security, in the definition of the rights of labor, in a program of service and
information to American business, in the conduct of foreign affairs. All
these undertakings are charged with such implications that when employees
are aroused to the importance of what they do, the effect upon morale is
electrifying.

Unfortunately, too many public employees are helped to see only a
little way beyond their own desks. Their activity becomes a dull routine;
their self-esteem is smothered by hard layers of hierarchy. Thus is lost a
great and everpresent morale potential.

3. THE MODES OF DISCIPLINE

Aims of Discipline. The modes of discipline are best appraised in the
perspective of democratic management. Thus viewed, they obviously rep-
resent techniques for handling the crises flowing from the breakdown of
morale. Too often discipline is relied upon to bolster the edifice of com-
mand, to control the deviations from established authority, and to induce
conformity as a substitute for agreement. When the modes of discipline

11 For the most interesting and promising recent approach, see United States Bureau of
the Budget, Work. Simplification as Exemplified by the Work Simplification Program of the
17. 5. Bureau of the Budget, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1945, Publication No. 91;
Morstein Marx, Fritz, "Looking at Under-all Management," Public Administration Review
1944, Vol. 4, p. 368 ff.

492 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

arc employed for these purposes, the frequency of their use supplies an
index to the state of group morale. Conversely, self-enforcing discipline
is a function of high morale.

However, even within the framework of democratic management, ma-
chinery of discipline has its place. As first aid to treat the failures of
leadership or of individual performance, discipline may provide the starting
point for constructive morale action. This means that the most important
matter about discipline is the purpose and the manner of its use. Purpose
raises the question of the major premise of discipline. Is it to preserve the
structure of command ? Or is it to contribute to the improvement of group
cooperation and morale? These are not so much inconsistent premises as
they are competing emphases. The problem resolves itself into the ques-
tion: Which is major; which is minor?

The fact that the traditional pattern exalts the relation of discipline to
command has compelled the growth of many ameliorative safeguards —
formal statement of "cause" of disciplinary action, right of hearing, right of
appeal. The more conventional literature of discipline puts stress on these
safeguards without giving much consideration to the premise which makes
the safeguards so necessary. The current task is to infuse into the subject
the fresh vitality of the new concept of democratic morale.

A more positive approach to discipline would treat it as the systematic
developmentof the understandings, values, skills, and attitudes involved
in effective participation in institutional processes. Thu*; discipline would
assume an educative rather than a punitive functionVHere we could per-
ceive once more the sharp distinction between the democratic and the
authoritarian versions of administration. We should remind ourselves that
morale entails balance, flexibility, maturity, continuity, persistence against
adversity, and capacity for constant renewal.

Such morale comes only from untiring and positive discipline in the
arts and manners of participation, of teamwork. Discipline in this sense
is a product of democratic leadership that concentrates on education, per-
suasion, and consultation rather than on authority and control. The dis-
ciplinary techniques of the reprimand, the demotion, the dismissal, together
with efficiency rating, assume their proper and relatively minor roles of
complementing the positive appeals of leadership.

Disciplinary Restraints. In the public service, discipline is also repre-
sented in other institutional forms. Traditionally, these take the shape of
more or less restrictive codes of behavior imposed upon the employee by
statute or civil service rule, or by norms of conduct originating in the
atmosphere of popular suspicion and fear which government has inherited
from its authoritarian past. Such codes are dubious instruments of dis-
cipline since their more drastic provisions have no roots in agreement or
acceptance by those whom they are intended to control.

Legal devices to hold in check an imagined menace of bureaucratic

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 493

partisanship in politics or to neutralize the democratic influence of the
government employee in his role of private citizen, may have demoralizing
effects. Significantly, action under these codes tends toward occasional
peaks of excited application and longer valleys of desuetude.12 In the larger
perspective, formal disciplinary clauses often fail in their positive purposes
and simultaneously retard the growth of democratic morale in many areas.
Far more important are the standards of self-restraint and propriety that
emerge naturally in the consciousness of a career service.

Political Aspects. Disciplinary rules usually prohibit public employees
from playing a part in political campaigns and in party management,
aside from defining the scope of their freedom to make political contribu-
tions. To some extent, these rules have a protective intent — to reduce politi-
cal pressure on government personnel. However, injunction and protection
may often overlap in strange ways.

As an example of the dilemmas posed by the traditional codes, the fol-
lowing statement by a member of the United States Civil Service Commis-
sion before a congressional committee on employee activities which "may
in a sense be political" but are not prohibited by either the Hatch Act of
1939 or the civil service rules is instructive:13

The Hatch Act by a direct provision in section 9 (a) fully protects a
Federal employee's right to vote as he may choose and to express his
opinions on all political subjects and candidates. Section 18 of the act
definitely provides that Federal employees may actively participate in
wholly nonpartisan local elections and may work for or against any gen-
eral question that is to be decided at the polls by the voters. In addition
to these, it has been ruled that a Federal employee is permitted to engage
in the following, notwithstanding the provisions of the Hatch Act and
the civil service rules:

Attend open public political meetings as a spectator; make voluntary
contributions to a political party general campaign fund; become a mem-
ber and attend meetings of a political club; wear a campaign badge or
button; display a candidate's campaign photograph in his home or auto-
mobile; sign a political party candidate's nominating petition as an
individual.

Thus are general rights, once restricted, slowly reestablished segment by
segment in a reluctant catalog of interpretation.

Service Ethics. The methods of emancipation from purely negative
institutional restraints imposed on government employees are to some degree
already spelled out. They may be described in different main categories.

12 For an analysis of one significant segment of this problem, see Sayre, Wallace S.,
"Political Neutrality,'* in Morstein Marx, op. cit. above in note 2, p. 202 ff.

13 House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Independent Offices Appropria-
tion Bill for 1947, p. 1111, 79th Con*., 2d Sess., Washington, 1946. Sec also Howard,
L. V., "Federal Restrictions upon the Political Activity of Government Employees," American
Political Science Review, 1941, Vol. 35, p. 470 ff.; Morstein Marx, Fritz, "Comparative Ad-
ministrative Law: Political Activity of Civil Servants," Virginia Law Review, 1942, Vol. 29,
P. 52 ff.

494 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

The common objective— as has already been suggested— is the substitution
of a body of service ethics, providing positive aims and voluntary standards
of behavior, for the restrictive codes of control nearly exclusively relied
upon hitherto. </

One method would be the official publication of basic postulates for
public-service conduct. This method is best illustrated in several of the
provisions of the Weimar Constitution of 1919 and in the more relevant
declaration of the Michigan Civil Service Act of 1937 :14

Every state employee shall fulfill conscientiously, according to the con-
stitution and the laws, the duties of the office conferred upon him and
shall prove himself in his behavior inside and outside the office worthy
of the esteem which his profession requires. In his official activity, the
state employee shall pursue the common good and not only be impartial
but so act as not to endanger his impartiality nor to give occasion for dis-
trust of his impartiality.

Postulates of such breadth and universal validity inspire creative response.
They draw forth implicit sentiments of public service. Their essence is the
establishment of goals and norms whose appropriateness is satisfactorily
self-evident.

There is, however, a corollary essential to the full realization of this
method. The authors of such basic postulates of behavior must refrain
from weakening the principal pronouncements by the inclusion or subse-
quent addition of wholly restrictive lists of imposed conditions. These
serve only to rob the higher postulates of their full meaning and to limit
the aspirations of the public servant.

Evocation of Self-Discipline. Another method is the promotion of
career ethics in the many professional segments of the public service, in-
cluding the administrative personnel in the more specific sense. The evo-
cation of self-discipline in the form of professional codes of ethics is evident
in many contemporary practices. Professional solidarity in its positive
manifestations furnishes guides to willing deference to the public interest.

The International City Managers Association, for instance, has built a
sound and widely applicable tradition in its many years of emphasis upon
the professional standards to govern the official conduct of the city man-
ager. The special significance of its approach as a method of positive dis-
cipline is in the manner of its origin and growth. These are standards of
behavior created by the group, though not without the labor of leadership.
In their final institutional form they represent an agreed-upon declaration
of group aims.15

14 Sec. 23 of the act

15 An example of the "strain of formation" is provided by the strivings of the "atomic"
scientists to find a blueprint for their basic responsibilities as a group.

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 495

4. MORALE AND INSTITUTIONAL PATTERN

Organizational Structure and Concerted Action. We have been critical
of some of the effects of hierarchy and associated forms of authoritarian
administration. This was not to underestimate the needs for organization,
for structure, and for clarity of command. On the contrary, what we seek
is a new perspective on structure and its uses. As Paul Appleby has put it,
"Getting agreement on action has its beginning in structure. Concerted
action becomes possible only by organizing for action. . . . structure comes
first and remains basic."16 Thus the main difficulty lies in the vast exag-
geration given in administrative literature to hierarchy and other embodi-
ments of authority.

In Appleby 's words:17

Administration is somehow a respectable word while "coordination"
seems to be disreputable. Yet administration always proceeds through
coordination. To coordinate is to bring into common action, and this is a
reasonably adequate general definition of administration. Administra-
tion is thought of popularly in much too simple terms — as management
and, increasing the distortion, in the military or authoritarian tradition.
Psychologists and administrators alike have come increasingly to realize
that management consists much less in giving orders than in inducing
or in organizing to secure agreement. When the process is thus under-
stood, orders are seen as the formulation of what has been or will be
agreed to. ... The tendency among the uninitiated is to feel that if
someone would only issue the proper orders or if only someone were
clothed with sufficient authority, there would be no need of coordina-
tion and everything would become a matter of "simple administration."

All organization theory, in a larger sense, aims at the essential recon-
ciliation of the demands of structure and command with the necessities of
group participation and agreement. Structure is basic, but it tends to be
static. Morale is indispensable, but it tends to be fluid. The correct balance
between structure and morale, then, is that which provides form and di-
rection to the dynamics of self-realization and group expression.

Balance of Structure and Morale. The reconciliation or balance between
structure and morale is discovered only by constant recxamination of the
precision with which existing organization reflects the needs of group
purpose and group participation. This perpetual scrutiny of organization
properly begins with a searching question: How effectively does current
structure and hierarchy express the collective objective?

Except perhaps for the very moment of its first creation, organization
always lags behind the expression of evolving group purpose^ Invariably,
therefore, the drag of unexamined structure is backward. Organization
is forever out of date. Its rebuilding or adaptation is a constant necessity.

Organization in Action. From this first inquiry, the continued reconsid-

*6 Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, p. 92, New York: Knopf, 1945.
17 Ibid., p. 78 (by permission of the publisher) .

496 MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

eration of structure proceeds to an appraisal of organization in action. Does
it still truly provide the mechanics of consultation and communication
which are essential to group morale? Have the arteries of participation
hardened? Have the signs and facts of agreement diminished? Have the
goals set become too easy of accomplishment and is their attainment no
longer impressive to the group? Has leadership sunk to the plateau of
amiable ratification of casual group proposals? These are the diagnostic
questions in the reassessment of structure in action. The findings must be
applied ever anew to the redefinition of organization forms.

Structure is progressively reconciled with morale when the process of
reconsideration produces repeated emphasis upon participation. Participa-
tion is the bridge between the structure and the group. Its manifestations
are productive to the degree to which they are at once purposeful and in-
formal. Structure, then, in many ways needs to be consciously subordinated.
It is most efficient when it gives direction unobtrusively, when the group
feels its presence in substance, not in form.

Effects of Specialization. Modern organization suffers from excessive
accommodation to the dogma of specialization. Effective operation, particu-
larly in the complex tasks of modern government, requires the proficiency
and skill which comes from specialization. However, specialization is apt
to be separatist, to be narrowly conceived, to isolate its practitioners from all
others.18

Thus organizational theory is confronted with the additional imperative
to integrate and simultaneously identify the specialized parts with the whole.
The reconciliation of structure with morale therefore imposes a further task
upon the art of leadership. It is the conscious emphasis upon interrelation-
ships, upon the processes of inter communication —particularly the methods
by which the specialized parts participate in the shaping of general objec-
tives, the evaluation of general accomplishments, and the appropriate sub-
ordination of all the structural components to the overriding purpose of the
group.

Discipline as Affirmative Pressure. Structure and command, as we have
seen, lean toward self-preservation and aggrandizement. In this inclination,
discipline in its negative forms is most frequently invoked. Mitigation of
such tendencies by awareness of the necessities of democratic morale is a
further problem in theory and practice.

The regressive uses of discipline are ubiquitous. Administrative archi-
tects who seek the optimum balance between structure and morale must
accordingly look toward the identification and isolation of disciplinary ele-
ments. The whole range of disciplinary sanctions, from the reprimand to the
dismissal, presents opportunities for reciprocity and accommodation of insti-
tutional interests. When rightly seized upon, these opportunities may

18 C/. above Ch. 9, "The Departmental System," sec. 1, "General Features."

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE 497

provide the moment and the means for fruitful exercise of leadership and
collaboration. Such objectives are realized only when discipline is viewed
as one of the affirmative pressures toward collective ends. In the hands of
skillful leadership, the reprimand, for example, is not a coercive weapon
but a tool for the promotion of mutual understanding, objective evaluation,
and new direction.

Morale and structure are the complementary halves of administration.
In the important sphere of modern public administration, their unity can
be as productive as the democratic idea itself, which released the Western
world from its bondage to institutions congealed by time into the tight
shackles of feudalism. Nor is their unity a goal beyond our day if we keep
our eyes firmly on the task.

PartIV
RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

CHAPTER

Essentials of Responsibility

1. MEN AND INSTITUTIONS

Responsibility is at the roots of civilization and government. It is the
derivative of centuries of human experience. It is based on the best in He-
brew-Greek-Christian thought as revived and reinterpreted in our culture
since the beginning of modern times.

Responsibility is a characteristic of both men and institutions. Indeed,
it needs to permeate men and institutions alike if it is to exist at all. Respon-
sible men create responsible institutions, and responsible institutions develop
responsibility in men.

Responsible Men. The concept of responsibility is ubiquitous. It is not
an isolated phenomenon of politics. Responsibility is a determining factor
in the character of property, the nature of the family, and the constitution
of the state. It pervades our systems of ethics, law, politics, and religion. It is
not something to be defined in a neat sentence — it is the horizon of mankind."

In the long journey toward that horizon, however, much ground has
been covered. Some of the landmarks are worth noting. Responsibility, as
we know it today, is a product of Western civilization. It has assumed pro-
gressively clearer meaning since the Renaissance and the Reformation. It is a
matter of ideas, ideals, attitudes, and conscious obligation. It is also a matter
of custom, convention, and law. We note a striking geographical coincidence
between the development of cultural individualism and that of institutions
of political responsibility. Representative assemblies, mayority rule, minority
rights, accountable officials, and government according to law are not to
be found except where a high value is placed upon man's growth for his
own sake and where men generally, more than a mere few, have come to
accept responsibility.

What are the attributes of responsible men? We may name some of
them. First, responsibility cannot exist unless there is capacity — in the
political context, authority— of a discretionary character. Children once
were said, perhaps hopefully, to reach "the age of responsibility." Helpless

501

502 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

infants are not responsible. Not until the child's powers have developed is
he able to be responsible, or irresponsible. Before that time the concept is
inapplicable. We look not to the helpless but to the powerful in society
to play a responsible role.

Discretion is also essential to responsibility, which is something more
than enforceable accountability. A duty that contains no element of initiative,
judgment, or choice for the one obliged to perform it may be a matter
of accountability, but not of responsibility in the wider sense. In the Parable
of the Talents the servant who hid his talent in a napkin chose to meet a
standard of accountability — he produced the talent on demand — when in
fact he knew that he was vested with discretion and that he was expected
to exericse his initiative in pursuing a policy of investment.

A second characteristic of responsible men is recognition of an obliga-
tion to meet a need that exceeds the individual's and to act according to a
standard that is outside himself and beyond his control. Such recognition
must be effective even though it may not necessarily be articulate. A
responsible member of a family recognizes at least some family interests
as superior to his personal interests. A member of a political party recog-
nizes certain party interests as being above his own interests. A responsible'
public official recognizes a public interest as overriding any interest of his
own or the interest of any group or class to which he may belong.

The standard of responsibility is perhaps as important as the interest.
Hitler's action in attempting to destroy Christianity in Germany was not a
simple act of gratuitous malevolence. The action had a certain logic to it.
As long as a standard of conduct existed that was outside his control, he
might be held responsible in terms of that standard in the minds of some.
To escape completely such judgment, he was driven to attempt to destroy
the independent system of values. The existence of a state religion in
authoritarian countries is no mere accident.

A third characteristic of responsible men is regard for consequences. We
say that an automobile driver who recklessly endangers his life and the
lives of others drives irresponsibly. He who has no regard for truth but
makes wild statements is also said to speak irresponsibly. A political
representative who votes in disregard of the effect of his decisions acts
irresponsibly.

^^Responsibility connotes a certain amount of rationalism and an element
or prudence. A responsible leader may endanger his own life or the lives
of his followers, but he will only do it for a considered reason, after some
weighing of the objectives and some calculation of the risks. It is this
element of responsibility in leadership that holds a group together. Men
will not continue to support a program that an irresponsible leader deprives
of promise of success.

-^ Another way of putting it is that responsibility contains a time perspec-
tive of more than the moment. The future is as important as the present.

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 503

A responsible party leader does not jeopardize the welfare of his party. A
responsible official does not endanger the security of the state. A respon-
sible administrator does not imperil the vitality of his organization. V-

Responsible Institutions. When the concept of responsibility is suffi-
ciently strong to be reflected in men's lives, it is also to be found in the
political institutions of representative government. In the United States of
America we take these institutions for granted, and have forgotten their
origin. Their common ancestry is worth noting.

All may be traced to the combined influence of Christian thought and
Greek rationalism reconsidered in the perspective of Reformation and
Renaissance. Majority rule, minority rights, and individual rights rest
squarely upon belief in the value of the individual human being, upon belief
in the equal value of human beings. In the light of reason, justification
of majority rule is a simple mathematical process. The coexistence of major-
ity rule with minority rights and individual rights has in it not a little
gf the Grecian ideal of moderation and restraint. It also assumes sufficient
unity and generosity to permit a reconciliation of majority, minority, and
individual interests.

In the development of discrete institutions, formal procedures, and
known rules of law we recognize the influence of rationalism. Good will
is not enough. The problems to be dealt with are of a nature and volume
to require concrete machinery. To assure responsible results, men steeped in
Western culture have not been content to rely on mysticism, absolutism, or
chance. With the rationalism of the observational-clinical-laboratory ap-
proach, they have preferred mechanics as a means of increasing the
probability that responsible men will govern in a responsible way.

Interdependence of Men and Institutions. Some aspects of the interde-
pendence of responsibility in men and in institutions may be seen in the
family. Marriage is a responsible institution with duties and obligations —
some of them established by laws. But it also gives the parties to the union
wide discretion. Administrative supervision ends with the issuance of the
marriage license. The obligations assumed and the standards accepted by
the contracting parties are stated in very general terms. It is up to each party
jointly to recognize and determine what the needs of the family require
in personal terms and to make his or her contribution accordingly.

Families flourish because men and women do make the contribution
needed. It is frequently much greater than they could be compelled to make,
and it is not always an equal contribution. The interests of the family, future
as well as present, are the governing considerations. Responsible men and
women recognizing such needs, accepting obligations to meet them, and
thinking about the future of the family make the family successful.

The traditions, the conventions, the social sanctions, and the laws which
surround family life stimulate, influence, and restrain action. They outline
the pattern and help to secure conformance to it. Both the pattern and the

504 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

sanctions arc essential. We must add, however, that they are not sufficient
alone. Some families break up even though the institution of marriage in
general does not collapse. Unless there is generally a reasonable development
of the quality of responsibility in the people involved, any institution is
ineffective.

The position of the child in the family also emphasizes the relationship
of institutional management to the personal quality of responsibility. Rear-
ing a child is in part a matter of developing in him an effective sense and
habit of responsibility. A general regime is set up for the child, and he is
instructed about things to be done and things not to be done. Both father
and mother try to hold him to account for his conduct.

But this is an exhausting and time-consuming process. A child's
interests and energy quickly go beyond the limits of any scheme of de-
tailed guidance. The parental council would have to be in continuous
session to prescribe, proscribe, and prohibit; and more supervision than is
feasible would be necessary. Parents cannot stand over the child with a
stick all the time or wash behind his ears all his life. The only real solu-
tion for child as well as parents is for the child to assume increasing re-
sponsibility for his own conduct — responsibility that involves initiative,
judgment, restraint, and recognition of obligations.

The growth of responsibility in the child is by no means spontaneous.
It is in part a product of the efforts of the parents. In fact, it is a principal
function of the institution of family life. The effort required to develop
responsibility in a boy or girl probably varies greatly; but even the mini-
mum effort is colossal. Success is the crowning achievement of the home,
bolstered by school and church. An active system of expressing account-
ability is essential to success, but unless there is success in establishing the
ideals, attitudes, and habits of responsibility, the home has failed.

The Political Implications of Business Practice. Responsibility is taught
explicitly and also by inference. Specific concepts grip men's minds, and
the implications of ways of living are equally influential. How can we ex-
plain the change in political responsibility that took place in the United
States during the nineteenth century? At the beginning of that century, as
we know, the leaders of society — that is, the leaders in business, agriculture,
and the professions — were also the political leaders. They recognized their
problems and stepped forward. Many of them devoted their thought, their
energy, their money, and their lives to resolving public issues.

These leaders were broadly active in public affairs. They took upon
themselves the burden of political discussion and decision. By the end of the
century, the situation had changed. Some businessmen continued to be
publicly active in politics, but they were now a minority. Most business lead-
ers had withdrawn from broad political responsibility. The professional poli-
tician had appeared, recognized as a broker, not to take the place left by the
natural leaders of society, but to substitute for them, to fill the vacuum.

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 505

Why did so many men whose ability, achievements, wealth, and pres-
tige qualified them for leadership choose not to exert such leadership? There
are many explanations, of course. Among them was the important influence
of the pattern of business itself.1 The new business organizations and busi-
ness practices were training men to narrow their responsibility as much as
possible, even to escape responsibility entirely.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, property was private in a
personal sense. Business property was private, business was private. A man
was engaged personally, either alone or with his partners, in a business en-
terprise. He was personally committed, personally accountable, personally
responsible for the business enterprise. Joint stock companies were the
exception.2 In the orthodox view their usefulness was limited. Charters
were a special privilege conferred by special legislative act, and they did
not necessarily grant limited liability to corporate owners. Corporate
purposes were narrowly limited, and corporate powers were narrowly
construed.

By the end of the century the situation in the United States had com-
pletely changed. Businessmen who were fully responsible in their person and
.property for all their actions were a dead or dying species/ Business was
corporate. All corporations carried the privilege of limited liability. More-
over, the requirements of capital investment by the incorporators had been
so far abandoned, and the capital structure had been permitted to become
so complicated, that it was both possible and proper for businessmen to
launch and operate an enterprise without any true personal liability. The
restrictions on corporate purposes had been swept away, and the privilege
of incorporation had become a right.

Business had ceased to be private in any real sense, but it had certainly
not become public. It was characteristically irresponsible. Businessmen
who lived and worked in this system were schooled in the arts, the attitudes,
and the habits of irresponsibility. Through the corporate charter they could
secure capital with a negligible, if any, investment of their own. They could
control a corporation which they did not own. They contracted for land,
materials, and labor; and these contracts could either be lived up to or
repudiated and litigated. The system of minimizing responsibility, coupled
with the vast growth in size of business units, had an inevitably debilitating
effect upon the quality of responsibility in the natural leaders of a society
which was becoming increasingly industrial in character.

1This explanation of certain tendencies toward irresponsibility in American politics b
offered as an hypothesis.

2 Cf. Adam Smith's dictum that "The only trades which it seems possible for a joint
stock company to carry on successfully, without an exclusive privilege, are those of which all
the operations arc capable of being reduced to what is called a routine, or of such a uni-
formity of method as admits of little or no variation.1* Wealth of Nations, bk. V, ch. 1,
pt. 3, art. I, "Of Public Works and Institutions which are Necessary for Facilitating Particu-
lar Branches of Commerce."

506 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Automatism? It was easy to transfer these attitudes and habits of mini-
mizing responsibility from business to politics. In both fields, irresponsi-
bility was doubtless fostered by the prevailing belief in the automatic quali-
ties of the economic and political order. The vulgar version of the doctrines
of the classical economists seemed to encourage each entrepreneur to do the
best he could for himself by whatever means he could find. Although
the competition of numerous small and distinctly private business units had
given way to the strife of corporate combinations, relatively irresponsible
in character and ruthless in methods, it was still argued that the aggregate
of this total effort was the public good. It was still assumed that there was
an economic "system" which could stand any amount of pulling and
hauling.

Similar reliance was placed upon the automatic qualities of the political

order. Representative assemblies were firmly established. Almost universal

manhood suffrage had been achieved, and the franchise was exercised

through a long ballot at frequent elections. It was felt that this kind of

democracy had so much inherent stability that any number of people could

fock the boat with impunity, and that the efforts of special interests to

secure privileges would balance. No one had to assume responsibility

for operating or maintaining the ship of state.

Darwin's theory of evolution and the popular inferences that were made
from it no doubt encouraged the belief in social automatism. In America,
furthermore, the expanding population, the exploitation of rich resources,
and the process of industrial development provided what seemed to be tan-
gible and convincing evidence of the durability of "progress." It was easy
to believe in a scheme which did not require any one in particular to play
a responsible part in public affairs and which made it unnecessary to worry
about the social consequence of individual action.

Two world wars with a world-wide depression between them have been
a tough dish for mankind. Who now really thinks that the world order
or any "system" will unguidedly produce either peace or prosperity? Who
really believes in the automatism of any stereotyped concept of society?

The events of the last half century challenge any superstitious belief
in social automatism. It is now obvious that if the benefits inherent in
world culture and world resources are to be realized, it is necessary to
achieve a higher level of responsibility in men and in institutions than
society has yet attained. The situation demands ability, initiative, and dis-
cretion, exercised to meet the needs of society and not merely the needs
of an individual, a class, or even a single nation. The standards by which
the adequacy of policies must be measured have risen. The consequences
of action or inaction by any substantial group in society must be carefully
considered. Responsibility is at an extraordinary premium for the present
and the future.

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 507

2. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY

In this chapter we are concerned particularly with political responsibility,
even though it is obviously only a part of the wider phenomenon. What is
the responsibility of legislators? Of elected executives? Of administrative
officials? We will forego the pleasure of talking about the responsibility
of judges.

Responsible Legislators. Responsible government is impossible without
responsible legislators and without a realistic system of legislative responsi-
bility. The essential features of a system of responsibility are generally
agreed upon and need only be mentioned here: frequent but not too-
frequent elections, honest elections, an adequate number of representatives
but not too long a ballot, reasonable equality in representation as a basis for
majority rule, and so on. Although the advent of the initiative, referendum,
and recall may seem to complicate the system, it also highlights an important
aspect of all responsible institutions.

Institutions which permit responsible political action necessarily provide
for discretion, and discretion admits of abuse. If the ends of responsible
government are to be achieved, the authorized discretion must be exercised
with due regard for consequences, must be guided by the needs of the com-
munity, and must conform at the very minimum to the ethical and moral
standards of the community. The usefulness of the initiative and referen-
dum depends upon the restraint and the judgment with which they are
exercised.

Persistent and irresponsible special interests could conceivably weaken
the legislative process seriously by excessive use of the initiative. Although
a highly developed sense of responsibility in the electorate would check and
eventually shut off such tactics of pressure groups, the system of direct con-
trol calls for a sense of responsibility among special interests as well as in
the general public. The referendum, too, can be abused by excess. With
reasonable restraint in application, it becomes a valuable procedure for deal-
ing with extraordinary situations. The recall is similarly a welcome addi-
tion to the scheme of responsibility which could be, but generally has not
been, carried to extremes.

Realism in Responsibility of Legislators. The demand for responsibility
in legislators goes much further than is indicated by electoral devices.
It is obvious that representative government is a farce if the elections are
dishonest. Honesty in elections, however, requires a great deal more than
counting the ballots with due regard for mathematical accuracy. An elec-
tion can perform its function only when the campaign itself is reasonably
honest. If the candidates for election disregard the truth and fill the air
with unfounded assertions, fantastic charges, and malicious misrepresenta'
tions, they make it impossible to achieve responsible government through
the electoral process.

508 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

The need for honest discussion is equally great within the legislative
assembly. Lawmaking bodies and the legislative process rest on the founda-
tion of faith in reason. Discussion is an effective means of getting at the
facts and of weighing them when all parties to the discussion act in good
faith. However, unless the preponderant purpose of the legislators is to
make debate a rational process, the issues can be so confused with half-truths
or untruths as to render discussion ridiculous.

<L Majority rule is obviously a cornerstone of responsible government. The
legislative process is intended to be a means of discovering or formulating a
majority view, and a legislative decision should rest upon the support of
the majority. Majority rule may be and frequently is defeated, however, by
irresponsible legislators. Dilatory action may prevent effective discussion
or make a decision impossible. Committees may refuse to report bills upon
which a majority clearly wishes to act.

Although legislative rules generally permit the majority to compel com-
mittees to act, the procedure is so laborious as to be serviceable only in rare
instances. A committee may also handle its hearings and taking of evidence
in such an arbitrary and biased way that the lawmaking body never has
a chance of considering the proposed measure on its merits. Committee
members who are governed more by a special interest than by the general
interest may destroy responsible government. Can a legislative chamber
function effectively as a representative body when the committees are not
fully responsible to the majority of the chamber ?

Legislative Irresponsibility? The British government is sometimes criti-
cized on the grounds that the Cabinet — conceived as a committee — is not the
servant of the House of Commons, but has become its master, and a despotic
master at that. In American legislative assemblies, which typically work
through committees, are the committees fully responsible to the assembly or
have they become arbitrary and irresponsible rulers? In many instances they
fall short of any reasonable standard of responsibility.

Let us consider the evidence, starting with committee hearings. Is the
investigation an impartial and careful inquiry into the facts? Too fre-
quently it is the cross-examination of witnesses by a hostile prosecutor, or
the staging of a dramatic scene with a carefully selected professional cast.
When we consider the methods — not to mention the manners — of many
committees of Congress, we find it not so strange that civil servants cringe
at the thought of "going up on the Hill," and that legislative-executive rela-
tions lack cordiality. The "third degree" is not a good way to find the
truth or to make friends. It may force testimony which is desired; but if
the victim lives and is interrogated again he will be forever after on guard.

The mysteries of a committee's deliberations perhaps defy analysis, but
what about its decisions? One of the committee's functions in American
practice is to "screen" legislation. This is an act of responsible discretion.
But how is the screening done? Is it a rational process of sifting the signifi-

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 509

cant from the trivial? Is it guided by a policy based on views of the major-
ity of the committee? If there is a general policy, does it have the support
of the majority of the legislative chamber or does it represent merely the
views of a vested legislative interest? And if there is no guiding policy,
what governs the screening process? Chance, whim, or the dictates of
the chairman?

How many sessions of Congress pass without arbitrary action by some
standing committee or by the Rules Committee to prevent discussion and
to defeat the determination of a policy by the majority? Not many. It is
no defense against the charge of irresponsibility to argue that not a few
members wish to be relieved of the necessity of confronting embar-
rassing issues. The evasion of responsibility can only weaken responsible
government.

Suicidal Tendencies. The responsibility with which a legislative chamber
acts is the product in part of the way in which it is constituted, in part of
the character of its members, and in part of its rules and organization. The
strength of the seniority principle in controlling committee assignments,
committee chairmanships, and positions of authority in the chamber is a
serious cause of irresponsibility in American government. The methods by
which the whole house can hold the committee to account for its action,
or inaction, are generally inadequate.

Gerrymandering, whether by constitution or statute, is bad enough in
most legislatures. When the lawmaking body by its rules and organization
further skews* the representative process through perpetuating an uncon-
trolled oligarchy of unrepresentative members, it allows a dangerous sap-
4>ing of its own vitality. If the legislative branch is suffering a decline, as
some think, the danger to its survival is not to be sought in an encroach-
ment from outside by the executive branch. It is to be found rather in the
suicidal tendencies within the legislature itself. No lawmaking body that
violates the basic principles of responsible representation can hope to play
anything but a declining role in grappling with the complex issues which
today confront government.

Responsibility and Leadership. Discussions of the responsibility of legis-
lators frequently center about their relations to their constituents. Should
legislators lead or follow? If they lead, how far ahead should they lead?
It is generally agreed that voters have a right to expect their representatives
to be better informed and more farsighted than the general public. Hence
the voter can without embarrassment change his mind about a policy as he
grows wiser through experience. The legislator, however, is supposed to be
sufficiently well informed that he makes fewer errors and foresees develop-
ments the average man could not anticipate. The legislator's foresight
should be at least as good as the voter's hindsight.

The relationship between the representative and his constituents is not
a matter of dealing with a monolithic mass of people. In even the most

510 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

homogeneous district there is a wide variety of people and groups. The
number of purely agricultural districts — which might be presumed to be
most homogeneous— is dropping, and the diversification of agriculture is
creating a variety of agricultural interests. Even in a purely agricultural
district living off a single crop, interests of owners, tenants, laborers, pri-
mary processors of foods, merchants, and bankers have to be considered.
People also vary in race, religion, and general^putlook on life. In urban
districts or in urban-rural districts the variety of interests is, of course, very
great.

The variety of interests which a representative must consider is in
one sense the essence of his problem, but it also provides a solution to the
representative's dilemma. Some interests are avid and well organized. If
he heeds only these, he may become their slave. Here is where his leader-
ship can come to the fore. If he has not sufficient leadership to educate,
organize, and appeal to the broader interests of his district, he is doomed to
be the servant of special interests. But if he exercises real influence he may
greatly broaden his base of support and play the part of a responsible
leader in matters of public policy.

The representative's relationship to the party organization, the political
machine, or the "boss" presents a similar situation. It is sometimes said
that a man has to have money, organization support, or both to be nomi-
nated and elected. It may be readily conceded that some men are completely
dependent upon money or the machine for their political life, but it does
not follow that every one is so dependent.

A political "nobody" naturally cannot become a Washington, a Jeffer-
son, or a Roosevelt by simply announcing his candidacy. If a man has
qualities of leadership, however, if he has the ability to exercise wise judg-
ment in the public interest, if he has demonstrated this ability in previous
activities, he will have a reasonable chance of being elected on his own
merits. When a political "somebody" comes along who has real qualities
of leadership, no machine and no amount of money ordinarily can beat
him. The opposition also has to put up a strong candidate. When a candi-
date says that "no one" can be elected without money or machine support,
look him over.

This is not to say that money and the political machine may not tip
the balance or even defeat the interests of a majority of the people. They
often do. The point is rather that real leadership of a responsible character
is vital, and a man who has it is certain to be able to play a useful part
in politics. He may not always win, but he will always make his leadership
felt and he will frequently represent the public.

Responsibility of the Legislative Body. The question of a representative's
relation to his constituents is no more important than that of his re-
lation to his colleagues, to the legislative body as a whole, and to the
general public. As responsible government requires a man in authority to

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 511

look beyond himself, his group, his class, and his party, so it requires him
to look beyond his constituency in considering public needs. His obliga-
tion to the total public overrides his obligation to any part of it.

Public obligation is not set aside by a federal structure of government.
The right of secession was denied in our constitutional history in a bloody
Civil War. The principle of the higher loyalty to the broader unity is fun-
damental. The obligation is legal as well as ethical. But how can it be
implemented?

Any representative can fulfill the obligation for himself. Many do so.
The name of George W. Morris will long be remembered as that of a
national figure. He was a responsible leader, a representative whose hori-
zons and constituency were as broad as the nation. The Tennessee Valley
Authority was not built in Morris' Nebraska.

If a representative will not meet his broader obligations, what can be
done about it? The remedy lies with his colleagues and in the rules, pro-
cedures, and organization which they establish. How long the more or less
disfranchised rank and file of the House of Representatives will stand
for being pushed around by the venerable oligarchs who rule them without
representing them, no one knows. But they don't have to take it forever.
The rules can be revised, and the committee system can be changed. The
particularism which now makes both House and Senate a playground for
special interests can be controlled.

This control is not an impossible task. It is not inevitable, for example,
that committees on agriculture should be in the hands of the "farm bloc."
If these committees contained a considerable number of members represent-
ing areas which are heavy consumers of agricultural products, would not
the committees do a better job for Congress, for the public, and, in the
long run, for the farmers ? Reconciling the special interest with the general
interest should begin not later than in the committee stage.

In any reconsideration of means of improving the legislative process,
it is essential not to overlook the basic importance of responsibility. Many
things can be done to improve and expedite the work of Congress and state
legislatures. However, unless reforms include steps to strengthen the re-
sponsible qualities of legislative action they will not be very effective. Rep-
resentative committees under responsible, not dictatorial, chairmen, respon-
sible to the entire legislative body under its own responsible leaders, could
effect a revolution in the quality and vitality of American legislatures.

Power to make these changes rests with the lawmaking bodies them-
selves. The present leadership is opposed to change, and the present setup
with the Inertia JD£ many years behind it protects them. But the legislative
rank and file are not helpless. Responsibility carries with it the obligation
to use granted powers only for the public good. There is in the history
jof responsible government a deep-seated "right of revolution." There i§

512 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

also a positive duty to revolt against any abuse of discretion or authority
which obstructs the processes and the ends of responsible government.

The objection may be raised that someone will get hurt in the course
of a revolt against the present scheme of things. To be sure, someone
will get hurt, but responsibility carries with it the obligation to risk some
danger and to make some personal sacrifice if necessary. Responsible gov-
ernment can never continue very long unless the rank and file as well as
the leaders of the moment show qualities of responsibility, and unless the
former establish the most practical means possible of holding the latter
responsible.

3. EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Elected Chief Executives. The responsibility of legislators, who have the
broadest authority and discretion in government, should properly be dis-
cussed first. Next in order comes that of the elected chief executives, such
as the President and the governors.3 They are participants in the legislative
process. They are elected representatives of the public. They are also the
chief channels through which the experience of government in operation
can be brought together, interpreted, and reintroduced in the necessarily
continuous process of policy formulation and administrative improvement.
The elected chief executive is as significant an American contribution to the
art of government as that of judicial review.

A salient feature of the elected chief executive is the breadth of respon-
sibility which attaches to his office.4 There has been public insistence and
expectation that the chief executive take the broad view of public policy;
that he hold the balance even among powerful special interests; and that
he subordinate particular interests to the general interest. Presidents are
looked to for leadership in the entire process of making and administering
a truly national policy; and, similarly, governors and mayors are expected
to rise above any special interest.

The elected chief executive's is a responsible office which has tended

3 It is the purpose of this chapter to call attention to some of the more obvious charac-
teristics of responsibility in American government rather than to treat any one executive or
administrative office in detail. For systematic discussion of the presidency and of the position
of state governor, see such works as Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers.
New York: New York University Press, 1940; Berdahl, Clarence A., War Powers of the Execu-
tive in the United States, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1921; Hart, James and Spicer, George
W., "Executive Leadership in Administration," pt. II, in Essays on the Law and Practice of
Governmental Administration, ed. by Hainfs, Charles G. and Dimock, Marshall E., Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1935; Lipson, Leslie, The American Governor: From Figurehead to
Leader, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1939. Cf. also above Ch. 8, "The Chief Executive."

4 All responsibility of public officials is, of course, responsibility under the law, within
the law, and in accordance with the law. That goes without saying and need not be reit-
erated throughout our discussion. It is, however, the initiative and discretion which the law —
constitutional and statutory, conventional and formal, written and unwritten — gives to the
public official that makes responsibility a subject of intrinsic interest and importance.

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 513

to develop in men holding it a sense of responsibility. It has generally
brought out the best in presidents, governors, and mayors. The tendency
of men elected to it to rise to the high requirements set for them is one of
the most encouraging features of American life. This tendency may also
account in part for the growth in political power and prestige which our
chief executives have experienced. Whatever the degree of change in the
relative standing of legislative bodies and chief executives, it has certainly
been affected by the different ways in which the two have faced up to the
challenge of responsibility.

Responsibility of the Chief Executive. The chief executive's responsibil-
ity to the public and to the legislative body is peculiarly a matter of integra-
tion. He must take the lead in reconciling conflicts and inconsistencies
in policy. He must secure some synthesis of the desires of his total con-
stituency rfnd the total experience of the administrative process. His respon-
sibility to the public and the legislature also largely determines the nature
of his responsibility to his subordinates — his administration.

The latter responsibility has four principal features :

(1) The chief executive must give his subordinates guidance on the
general direction of public policy and the timing of action.

(2) He must see that divergent tendencies within the administrative
organization are reconciled and that an integrated program is developed.
Differences of personality are at times an obvious problem, but much more
fundamental and difficult are the issues of policy.

(3) To meet these needs, he must be in touch with the entire adminis-
tration and he must utilize its experiences and advice. That is to say, he
has an obligation to his subordinates to be familiar with their experience
and points of view bearing on important matters, whether or not he acts
upon advice they give.

(4) He must also see that there is an adequate pool of knowledge and
effective cooperation among the key people of his administration. The
pool of knowledge must be greater and the cooperation more extensive than
the chief executive's own knowledge or capacity for supervision.

The process of exchanging information of mutual interest and of work-
ing together toward an over-all program and its consistent administration
must go on throughout all levels and all parts of the executive branch.
For the chief executive, all of these responsibilities are controls in organiz-
ing and managing his administration, and in shaping his executive office.

The chief executive's responsibility for guidance on broad questions of
policy is obvious. The process of formulating and perfecting public policy
is partly a matter of reducing alternatives and of concentrating upon the
more promising possibilities. However, for the most effective use of the
resources of government the general direction must be determined. There
should not be too much standing around at the crossroads. If these decisions

514 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

are made promptly, public officials and civil servants can make their efforts
count most effectively.

It may at times be desirable to advance along several parallel or even
slightly divergent routes. Such progress requires supervision to make sure
that divergence does not become too great and also that all forces converge
upon the goal at the right time. If a choice between completely incon-
sistent proposals is delayed too long, either much of the subsequent work
is bound to be wasted or all progress is certain to stop. Neither result is
desirable, nor is the accompanying low morale. Of course, not all of the
chief executive's decisions are necessarily difficult. If he is well informed
both politically and administratively, the general course to be taken may
be fairly clear. Even on the most difficult questions, however, he must make
up his mind without unreasonable delay.

Executive Restraint. How much responsibility has a chief executive for
initiating policy himself? Obviously, if there is no other way to get things
started, then he must crank the engine with his own hand. But his prime
responsibility is to see that sufficient initiative is exercised within his ad-
ministration, rather than to generate all the ideas himself. Some elected
chief executives have personally identified themselves with many detailed
policies in the early stages of development. As a general practice, this is
probably inconsistent with the executive function.

In the game of government, the captain of the administrative team is
supposed to play the full sixty minutes. If he runs with the ball on every
play he may find himself completely tuckered out before the end of the
first half, and he cannot be very effective from then on. For example, the
President is not only a legislative leader, and the leader of the administra-
tion, but he is also chief of state.

There is a certain inconsistency between the President's several roles,
though it is not a serious problem as long as he does not overplay any one
part. He is much closer to his essential function when he takes public
responsibility for reviewing and integrating proposals initiated within the
administration than when he himself proposes and promotes. The emphasis
in the chief executive's responsibility is upon integration.

Executive Emphasis on Teamworl^. If the chief executive takes his re-
sponsibility as head of the administration seriously, it may not be necessary
for him to make so many public decisions of a controversial character. The
best time to integrate policies is in their early stages of development, and
Dn the lower echelons of government. As Mary Parker Follett so well
understood, many conflicts — social as well as administrative — are unneces-
sary, and result from overlong delayed collaboration.5 They are also the
consequence of an inadequate pool of knowledge and of too limited
perspective.

5 For a cross-section of her writings, sec Metcalf, Henry C. and Urwick, L,, eds., Dy-
namic Administration, New York: Harper, 1942.

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 513

If the chief executive takes a lively interest in assuring that people
in the government get together at the earliest feasible moment on matters
of common importance, he tends to avoid many of the conflicts which
would otherwise harass his administration. Of course, the policy of hori-
zontal, voluntary coordination should be facilitated by the administrative
structure itself. In this respect, federal administration and most of the
state governments leave much to be desired. No better device has so far
been discovered to secure cooperation within a government than a common
superior officer who insists upon cooperation. There are too many pro-
grams of both federal and state governments which lack any effective
common superior.

High Official*— Political Leadership. The highest category of admin-
istrative officials includes those who also have, by the nature of their office
and duties, political responsibility. A typical example is the head of an
executive department. He stands between the chief executive and the
lesser administrative officials whose positions are or should be nonpolitical
in character. That pivotal position makes his office of peculiar importance
in the total scheme of responsibility. It is the point at which the lay control
of professional administration is to be made effective.

To handle his job, the department head needs to be a good admin-
istrator. But it is «just as important — perhaps even more important — that
he be a good politician, in the broadest sense of the word. The department
head's primary responsibility to the public, to the chief executive, and to
his subordinates is for active political leadership. As we have noted, the
chief executive must limit himself most of the time to general guidance,
review, and integration in the development of policy. The department head,
however, has no obligation to continue in office for a fixed period.6 The
measure of his success is how much he contributes, rather than how long
he lasts. He is politically expendable. It is his function to take risks, to
^expose himself to hostile fire, and to withdraw or be carried off the field
when he has performed his mission. The department head who always
plays it safe, and who lets his chief run interference for him rather than
get into the interference himself, is operating on the wrong level. He
should apply at the nearest post office for an announcement of the next
civil service examinations and get a job that really suits him.

When the chief executive is a strong political figure, there may be a
tendency for his subordinates to let him do all the heavy political work.
This starts a wholly undesirable trend. The chief executive develops more
muscle from constant exercise and his lieutenants get weaker from lack of
it, throwing still more work on their chief. One answer is for the depart-
ment heads to face up to their political responsibilities even if they have

6 The positions of elected department heads, which exist in many state governments,
would be an exception to this rule. On the appointive department head, see also above Ch.
9, "The Departmental System."

516 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

to risk their office by doing so. There ought to be a law against cabinet
members owning real estate in or near the District of Columbia.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Politician and Civil Servant. Another phase of a department head's role
is to take full responsibility for the acts of his subordinates. This does not
apply, of course, to those of his associates who share with him a personal
political function. Above all, he must always protect the civil servants
from political pressures. He is free to disregard the advice of his pro-
fessional staff. He may modify their proposals, or overrule them entirely.
But he should never allow political pressures to get past him to the per-
manent personnel, i/ If a political head of a department cannot or will not
take public responsibility for the work of his organization, he is not big
enough for his job.

General Interest Versus Special Interest. A further aspect of the respon-
sibility of officials who are immediately subordinate to the chief executive
is their common obligation to work together in the development and ad-
ministration of a coordinated program.7 This is reciprocal to the chief
executive's obligation to secure teamwork in his official family. It calls for
a nice balancing of obligations. As the head of a department the adminis-
trator is responsible for the development and management of his depart-
ment's program. He must see that the needs of the program receive ade-
quate attention, and that the full implications of the operating experience
are available in the revision and further development of the program.

This function not infrequently makes the political head of the depart-
mental organization a spokesman for a particular interest of — or in — the
government. He speaks for agriculture, or labor, or the Navy. It is thus
easy for him to forget or minimize his still greater obligation to see that
his particular program is developed and administered in accordance with
the broadest interests of the government, and as a part of its total program.
Balancing the particular and the general requires fine discrimination and a
high sense of responsibility.

Although the chief executive is responsible for making certain that the
essential teamwork occurs among all agencies, he is to some extent at the
mercy of his subordinates, notwithstanding his possession of the ultimate
sanction of removal. He can punish public quarreling, but it is more diffi-
cult to prevent his desk from being loaded with conflicts which need never
have arisen. A*d if subordinates involved in a conflict of policy go through
the motions of collaboration but never progress toward common ground,
how can the chief executive tell whether one of them is recalcitrant or all
of them are simply standing pat ?

T One of the best discussions of the essential role of the key administrator is to be found
in Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy, esp. chs. 4, 7-9, New York: Knopf, 1945.

ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY 517

Among the more painful difficulties of our recent wartime administration
were certain top officials who were uncritical and unrestrained advocates
of the worthiest causes. They were quite unwilling to try to find means of
achieving their ends which would be reconcilable with other equally im-
portant objectives. They meant well but they created more problems than
enemy saboteurs.8

Integrity and Good Faith. Certain responsibilities of political officials
are duplicated at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. Cross co-
ordination is, of course, a responsibility at all echelons. Each key man has
an obligation to keep his group posted on major developments or informa-
tion that will make their work more intelligent. Similarly each has an
obligation to bring to the attention of his superior all the facts or consid-
erations which the latter will need later to make the most intelligent
decisions possible or to take the action that may be required.9

"The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" so long as it is
relevant probably sums up an administrative official's responsibility to his
boss for information and advice. Summarization is necessary, of course,
but it must be accurate condensation. In handling questions of policy an
executive is dependent on his staff for advising him honestly and fully.
The integrity of the entire organization depends upon their good faith in
the discharge of this function. Mistakes and errors can be forgiven, but
lack of good faith is inexcusable. \J

A corollary of integrity and good faith in dealing with the one to whom
an administrative official is responsible is effective supervision in dealing
with those for whom he is responsible. A large element in effective supervi-
sion is real contact. There must be a meeting of minds. There must be
mutual confidence and understanding. When contact is lost either through
infrequent association or loss of confidence and understanding, there is
danger of arbitrary administration.

An official may not always be able to put his mind to the merits of every
issue that comes before him. But he must be sure that someone whom he
has tested and proved to be competent has put his mind to every issue.
This assurance has to be kept current. The head of an office can lose con-
tact at times with some of the business flowing through it, but he dare not
lose contact with the men who handle that business.

Civil Service— But Not Servility. A subordinate's responsibility includes
the obligation to tell his boss things which the latter may not want to hear.
But how far does the obligation go ? You can wear out your welcome, and
"vain repetitions" get you nowhere. Some judgment is required on how
hard to press an unpleasant issue. One guide is the importance of the issue.
If the matter is of some possible consequence, even the most timorous soul
must take himself in hand and make at least one serious effort to see that

8 Cf. also above Ch. 14, "Interest Groups in Administration."

9 See also above Ch. 16, "The Formulation of Administrative Policy/*

518 ESSENTIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

his superior is adequately informed. The fact that his responsibility is ad-
ministrative rather than "political" in character does not give a civil servant
the right to be a Caspar Milquetoast.10 vX

The scope of initiative and discretion, of course, declines as we go down
the administrative ladder. Responsibilities become duties. Accountability,
not responsibility, governs.11 This transition, however, is not uniform. Many
civil servants far below the level of political responsibility have positions in
which they may and must exert considerable influence upon policy and
upon the administration of programs.12 They have positions of a highly
responsible character even though their responsibility is within the admin-
istrative family and not to the public or the legislative body directly. It is
upon their integrity and their devotion to the loftiest traditions of respon-
sible government that much of the success of modern administration must
rest.

10 The literature on administrative responsibility proper is still limited in scope. Ref-
erence may be made to the following writings: Gaus, John M., "The Responsibility of Public
Administration," ch. 3, in Gaus, John M. and Others, The Frontiers of Public Administration,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936; Dykstra, Clarence A., "The Quest for Respon-
sibility," American Political Science Review, 1939, Vol. 33, p. 1 ff.\ White, Leonard D.,
Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, p. 561 #., New York: Macmillan, 2d cd.,
1939; Fricdrich, Carl J., "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," p.
3 ff., in Friedrich, Carl J. and Mason, Edward S., eds., Public Policy, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1940; Morstcin Marx, Fritz, "Administrative Responsibility," p. 218 ff.f in
Morstein Marx, Fritz, cd., Public Management in the New Democracy, New York: Harper,
1940; Finer, Herman, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government,'* Public
Administration Review, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 335 ft.\ Key, V. O., "Politics and Administration,"
p. 159 ft., in, White, Leonard D., ed., The Future of Government in the United States, Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

11 The transitional area is surveyed in greater detail in the succeeding chapters of this
book.

12 This point has been fully developed above in Ch. 4, "Democratic Administration."

CHAPTER

The Judicial Test

1. THE RULE OF PRACTICALITY

Propriety of Administrative Rule-Making and Adjudication. One of
the surest ways to obscure the workings of American government is to
insist on some facile generalization like "the legislature enacts general prin-
ciples, the courts interpret them, and the executive branch administers
them." The theory of the separation of powers was never fully applied to
any government in the United States — federal, state, or local. Yet it has
misled many people into believing that it is somehow improper for an execu-
tive agency to issue regulations or to judge cases affecting private rights.

Before we discuss the way in which public administration enters into the
formulation of general rules and the adjudication of cases, subject in both
respects to review by the courts, one elementary fact about our governmental
system should be noted. On each level of government, the legislature
generally acts only as a single body, the judiciary handles all sorts of cases
without specializing very much on defined categories, but the executive
branch is divided into departments and bureaus each of which does a par-
ticular kind of work.

Specifically, when an issue comes to a legislative decision, every member
of the lawmaking body has an equal vote with every other member on
every type of question, irrespective of his individual range of pertinent
information. Moreover, because of the sheer quantity of business, the legis-
lature cannot undertake to prescribe in detail all the rules and regulations
that need to be issued to give effect to the decision it has reached. Similarly,
the courts hear cases involving all kinds of legal situations arising in all walks
of life. Although the judicial branch may have any number of inferior courts,
it is fundamentally not organized to decide a large volume of particular
categories of specialized cases promptly, cheaply, and uniformly. Only by
appropriate organization and specialization can the bulk and variety of gov-
ernment business be handled effectively.

The legislature decides the most important questions by statutes and by

519

520 THE JUDICIAL TEST

voting appropriations, but beyond the general disposition of the matter it
must rely on executive officials to make the detailed decisions. At this point
there is still a tremendous quantity of rules to be issued to implement the
statutes and interpret their meaning. Similarly, each day in the process
of administration questions come up that involve private rights. Admin-
istrative officers must decide most of these questions; partly because they
can decide them quicker, cheaper, and more generally to the satisfaction of
the public than any one else; and partly because the judiciary is better
equipped for the decision of cases involving broad principles of official
conduct and public-law relations.

In short, the functions of issuing rules and deciding cases are by no
means exclusively legislative and judicial. Executive agencies must dis-
charge them in the normal course of business. By doing so they manage,
in a general sense, wide areas of our social and economic system. Since
this chapter deals particularly with the administrative processes of issuing
regulations and adjudicating cases, and with court review of these processes
as well, it should be remarked at the beginning that it is quite normal for
the quantity of administrative regulations to exceed the quantity of statutes,
and for a great many more cases to be decided by administrative agencies
than by the courts. It has never been the function of the judiciary to pass
automatically on all regulations, or to reconsider all aspects of every ad-
ministrative decision whenever a citizen believes that his interests have been
affected by a government agency.

Test of Social Utility. Then what, in those respects, is the judiciary's
function, and who decides what its function is ? The latter question should
be answered first. The legislature by statute says how much rule-making
power it wants to delegate to executive agencies, and also fixes the boundary
between the process of administrative adjudication and the judicial function.
The courts apply the Constitution and the statutes to these problems, and —
subject to the guidance of law — may have the last word. The executive
branch, whatever its political influence, has no authoritative voice in decid-
ing how far its power runs.

A legislature may require specific types of administrative rules or de-
cisions to be reviewed in every respect by the courts, and it sometimes does.
A court may review a case or a regulation with so little respect for the
original decision of an administrative agency that it usurps the agency's
function, and this it too often does. In either case, the administrative agency
has no protection, except the fact that in the long run the increasing in-
terdependence in society and the resulting expansion of governmental func-
tions in themselves will convince the public of the need for flexible and
specialized management that administrative organization alone can provide.

Only by administrative organization and management can we supply
the initiative, the expertness, and the planned teamwork that are required to
solve modern problems. The way in which executive agencies should or-

THE JUDICIAL TEST 521

ganize their system of issuing regulations and deciding cases, and the line
between their function and that of the judiciary, are matters to be settled
not by automatic formulas or political slogans, but by the practical test of
social utility.

Two Illustrations. Let us consider one or two examples to illustrate the
point. The Post Office Department will carry an ordinary letter if the
sender puts a three-cent stamp on it, and it will carry a periodical at a re-
duced rate if the sender qualifies for second-class mailing privileges. If a
letter has not been properly stamped, it is only sensible to have the postal
clerk return it to the sender for postage, or put a postage-due stamp on it
and collect from the addressee, according to the instructions the clerk gets
from his department. However, the question of second-class mailing privi-
leges, though hardly different in principle, is a question of vital concern
to considerable economic interests, and the statutes say that a publisher
must have a formal hearing before the Post Office Department can take
those privileges away from him.

In both types of transactions the Post Office Department is performing
the same service. In principle, there is no reason why a statute should not
provide for a formal hearing whenever a postal clerk and a private citizen
disagree over the weight of a letter. In practice, there is a perfectly good
reason. People want their mail delivered, and realize that it would not
make sense to encourage contentious proceedings that would hamper the
service. Therefore, the less important question, and the question that can
more easily be answered according to a definite standard, is entrusted to the
discretion of an administrative subordinate, while the more important ques-
tion of second-class mailing privileges is the subject of more formal pro-
cedure at a higher administrative level— and, if necessary, before a court
of law.

For another example we might turn to the creation of an army. In the
eighteenth century, the nation relied to a considerable extent on legislative
and judicial machinery to do this job. The Militia Act of 1792 (1 Stat. 271)
provided that all men be enrolled in the militia, and enjoined them to pro-
vide themselves with muskets and with musket-balls one-eighteenth of a
pound in weight. Citizens who provided themselves with such arms were,
the statute said, to "hold the same exempted from all suits, distresses, exe-
cutions or sales, for debt or for the payment of taxes." The lack of neces-
sary administrative machinery recommended by President Washington but
neglected by Congress made this system a fiasco, as the War of 1812
demonstrated.

The mid-nineteenth century system — during the Civil War— was a
centralized system of conscription administered directly by the Army. The
citizen could appeal only to the ordinary courts. The drafting of men dur-
ing the Civil War was both scandalously arbitrary and inefficient.

522 THE JUDICIAL TEST

In the twentieth century, we have done better by applying two related
concepts: the creation of an organization — the Selective Service system —
by cooperative arrangements among different levels of government, and
the issuance of rules and the adjudication of individual cases by that or-
ganization. It would be hard to imagine how bad a system Selective
Service would be if the functions of administration and adjudication were
separated. If the Army itself drafted men, and the ordinary courts were the
only place in which to get a hearing, the drafted men and their families
would certainly consider themselves less fairly treated.

Extending the Rule of Law. In these two examples — the postal system
and the armed forces — it is especially obvious that the process of adminis-
trative regulation and adjudication is not a perversion of the ordinary
legislative and judicial methods, or a usurpation by executive agencies
of functions ordinarily belonging to the legislature and the courts. On the
contrary, it is simply a means by which an executive agency — either on its
own initiative or in accordance with legislation — takes systematic precau-
tions to safeguard private rights. As one authoritative study put it, the
formal procedure of administrative rule-making and adjudication, "far
from being an encroachment upon the rule of law, is an extension of it."1
Administrative adjudication in agencies like the Federal Security Agency and
the Veterans Administration has a similar purpose—to make sure that gov-
ernmental services or benefits are distributed fairly, which is a matter
somewhat different from the determination of rights.

While administrative rule-making and adjudication are added safeguards
to fair play in the administration of some governmental services, they are
a major part of the business of regulating private interests. Some activities
which need to be controlled in the public interest are operated under systems
of government ownership or management; others are in private ownership
and subject to government regulation. Thus regulation, with its admin-
istrative rule-making and adjudication, is an alternative to public ownership
or direct public control.

Administrative Regulation as Alternative to Public Ownership. The
nation might have considered authorizing the federal government to take
over the railroads, if it could not have regulated them through the Inter-
state Commerce Commission; or the shipping lines, if it were not for the
United States Maritime Commission; or the radio networks, but for the
Federal Communications Commission; or the banking and exchange system,
but for the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Home Loan Bank System,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other agencies. Some of
these are primarily agencies which handle cases by direct executive action-
die Home Owners Loan Corporation did not hold hearings before making a

1 Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report, p. 12, Senate
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st. Sess., Washington, 1941.

THE JUDICIAL TEST 523

loan. Others are primarily regulatory agencies with highly developed
processes of adjudication. In most of them, however, the functions of ad-
ministration and adjudication are inseparable.

It is at least partly an historical accident that in the United States the
federal government operates the postal service but not the telephone and
telegraph systems; or that state governments operate certain hospitals and
sanatoriums and not others; or that municipalities own airports but not
railroad stations, or operate one utility — from abattoirs to waterworks —
and leave another in private ownership. What may start as an historical
accident usually becomes a firmly rooted tradition. Podunk is shocked to
learn that Middletown is socialistic enough to own its electric-power plant,
while Middletown is surprised to discover that Podunk violates American
tradition by getting some of its beef from a municipal slaughterhouse. In
much the same way Americans are generally surprised to learn that the
British Post Office Department handles telegrams, while the British find it
hard to understand that even well-to-do Americans may be educated from
kindergarten to Ph.D. in government institutions.

When government undertakes to regulate great corporations instead
of taking them over, it has two general alternatives, or a mixture of both.
One is to proceed by first laying down statutory definitions of the standards
which the corporations must follow, then by having an executive agency
investigate their operations, and finally by having any violations prosecuted
before the courts. The other alternative is to give an executive agency
authority to issue detailed regulations, to conduct the necessary investiga-
tions, and to hear any cases involving violations.

The latter alternative has been followed, not because government agen-
cies grasped for power, but because the regulated interests greatly preferred
it. A private corporation, like a government department, cannot operate
if many of its decisions are likely to be litigated. If it has to be regulated,
it would rather be regulated by having an administrative agency enter into
a sort of operating partnership with it and take over certain defined con-
trols, instead of having a prosecuting attorney dogging its footsteps.

This preference may be a surprise to the casual observer who takes the
complaints of businessmen about government regulation to mean that they
would rather be prosecuted in a court than regulated under an administra-
tive procedure. As one Senator has put it, "One of the great difficulties of
the Congress in attempting to avoid the detailed regulation of business, with
indefinite power in a federal bureau, is the fact that in many cases the busi-
nessmen themselves seem to want that kind of regulation."2

2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE LAWYERS

Prevention Over Punishment. If we look in some detail at the methods
of government regulation, we may see how much they are like the manage-

2 Congressional Record, Vol. 86, p. 10070 (August 8, 1940).

524 THE JUDICIAL TEST

ment of a broad field of activity by a corporation, and how much they have
in common with those methods that are essential to the conduct of public
administration in general. As with all types of administrative actions,
one main way in which the work of regulatory agencies differs from that
of the judiciary is that in the main they try to prevent mistakes rather than
punish offenders. The courts themselves, of course, by injunctions and man-
damus proceedings may prevent specific injuries and compel specific actions,
and on the other hand administrative agencies may punish individuals or
corporations for offenses. But the basic distinction still holds good.

A municipal building-inspection department does not wait to take steps
against a landlord until the elevator collapses and kills some passengers; it
inspects and certificates elevators to make sure they are safe. The Civil
Aeronautics Authority does not merely wait to prosecute airplane pilots who
through incompetence smash their planes; in a more practical fashion it
examines and licenses those who present themselves as competent. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation does not merely adjust its premiums
to take care of the number of bank failures; it inspects insured banks to
make sure they are not going to fail. It is possible, of course, to study these
administrative processes solely as degenerate offshoots of the judicial system.
It would seem more realistic, however, to observe that each such activity is,
in a broad sense, a part of the management of the real estate business, the
air transport business, or the banking business.

Regulation as Partnership in Management. Likewise, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which has to approve registration statements before
securities are offered on the market, must act more like a partner in the
management of the issuing enterprise than like a court refereeing disputes.
An investment firm must put its securities on the market promptly in order
to make a profit, and any public question about their soundness would
wreck the sale. For this reason it is no wonder that the securities market
in general prefers to have questions about registration statements handled
informally and privately by staff members of the commission, rather than
aired end delayed in an open formal hearing.

Again, as with all administrative activity, the primary purpose of regu-
lation is to protect the public interest. In order to do so, an administrative
agency may make use of specialists who are also valuable to the regulated
industry. The Department of Agriculture grades and inspects grain, and
inspects perishable commodities and imported farm products. The work of
its inspectors, scientists, and technicians— and its associated state and local
institutions— makes up the national research program for agriculture. The
merchant-marine inspectors of the United States Coast Guard inspect the
construction, maintenance, and repair of vessels. An inspector in a ship-
yard who makes sure that work is up to specifications may save the ship-
builder and the ship buyer the cost of hiring men for some of the same

THE JUDICIAL TEST 525

work. And a marine inspector who crawls through the dirty boiler of a
cargo vessel in order to tell the ship's engineers what repairs need to be
made for the next voyage may be engaging in quasi-judicial activity, but
the ship's officers look on him as an expert consultant, and if they think of
any one as "regulating" them they are likely to think of their company
management.

In another way the processes of administrative regulation are more
similar to those of management than to judicial proceedings. The adminis-
trative agency makes a continuous positive effort to prevent adjudicatory
cases from occurring by using its field staff to educate the affected interests.
It may take a positive lead in developing new techniques and new methods
of management for the regulated interests. The United States Public Health
Service, for example, is not merely concerned with the prosecution of
offenders, but also with the development of new methods of sanitation.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board does not merely regulate local mort-
gage-credit institutions; it develops new credit opportunities for them, and
instructs them in the organization of their business and the techniques of
encouraging savings and home financing. Because such agencies specialize
in a single field of activity, and have direct administrative control over their
personnel, they can develop standard national policies for the regulated
interests and help them improve their operations.

Some of the agencies in question have a still more positive function of
over-all management. The United States Maritime Commission, for in-
stance, has relatively few regulatory activities, and is charged with the job
of subsidizing and developing the American merchant marine. The Civil
Aeronautics Administration decides which airlines can operate where, and
sees that they have proper airport facilities, flight services, qualified crews,
and safe equipment. The Federal Reserve System, similarly, has some
functions of adjudication; yet its main function is the general direction of
a crucial field of economic activity.

To be sure, some of the agencies which make rules and hear cases do
not deal with a single type of business, but with a particular aspect of many
types of business. The several regulatory agencies in the field of labor rela-
tions are examples. Other examples are revenue-collection agencies: the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization is the federal administrative agency whose
proceedings most closely resemble those of criminal courts.

Informal Settlement Versus Formal Adjudication. Since most of the
agencies with rule-making and adjudicatory functions are either service
agencies in the main, or have responsibilities for promoting or even man-
aging broad fields of economic interest, they should not be considered pri-
marily as tribunals for handling complaints, prosecuting offenses, or settling
disputes. Such business is generally only a by-product of their work, or

526 THE JUDICIAL TEST

rather it is only the way of disposing of their unsatisfactory commodities.
For their basic product or objective is the cooperative management of a
national activity, and any case in which the private parties concerned cannot
be led to cooperate is a failure, not an accomplishment.

The figures cited by the Attorney General's Committee on Administra-
tive Procedure illustrate this point.3 The Interstate Commerce Commission
arranged voluntary settlements in all but five of 3,500 demurrage complaints.
The Department of Agriculture, administering twenty-odd regulatory stat-
utes, had fewer formal hearings than one per day, and an exception was
taken to an examiner's report less often than once a week. The National
Labor Relations Board, in the first four years of its stormy career, had to
issue formal complaints in only 8 per cent, and to make formal decisions
in only 4 per cent, of its 12,227 unfair labor-practice cases. To look on
regulatory agencies primarily as courts and to make them follow the same
procedure would be to organize them not for their main purpose, but for
the small proportion of cases in which their purpose could not be accom-
plished— as if business were to be organized mainly for the convenience of
referees in bankruptcy, or hospitals for the convenience of undertakers.

Balance of Public Interests. In each field of activity a balance must be
struck between the need for a formalized procedure — somewhat resembling
that of the judicial system — in order to protect people from arbitrary action,
and the need for administrative initiative, discretion, and dispatch, in order
to further the interests of the people concerned and to protect them from
frustrating formalities. The balance may vary from time to time. Since the
Interstate Commerce Commission was too much like a tribunal to manage
the national transportation system in wartime, the Office of Defense Trans-
portation was created. Since the United States Maritime Commission could
not operate our wartime ocean shipping in its existing form, it was trans-
formed for that purpose into the War Shipping Administration, while
retaining its old identity for other operations.

Those who mainly wish to protect private interests against interference
will naturally — at least in the short run — want to tip the balance in favor
of more formalized procedures. Those who mainly wish to accomplish
broad social objectives and to integrate national policy will generally want
to tip it in favor of more administrative discretion. The same issue may
be debated, too, in another aspect: whether a regulatory function, especially
in the federal government, should be lodged in an ordinary executive depart-
ment—as are those in the field of agriculture — or in an independent com-
mission— as are most of those that deal with business. However, our dif-
ferences of opinion are less likely to be irreconcilable if we remember that
the issuing of rules and the hearing of cases may be an essential part of

8 Op. ck. above in note 1, p. 35. Cf. also above Ch. 10, "Independent Regulatory Estab-
lishments," sec. 2, "The Nature and Conduct of Regulatory Business."

THE JUDICIAL TEST 527

an administrative function, and that some types of private interests may
prefer to be regulated by an administrative agency that is also concerned
with promoting their welfare, rather than to run the constant risk of court
action. The modern maxim is to temper justice with subsidy.

"Snuffing the Approach of Tyranny." One of the great debates of
contemporary public affairs is that of the traditional lawyers versus the
administrative lawyers. The legal profession of the United States today —
as Edmund Burke remarked of it in 1775 — is "numerous and powerful"
and its members "augur misgovernment at a distance, and snuff the ap-
proach of tyranny in every tainted breeze."1 The controversial publications
of the various schools of legal thought illuminate the subject of administra-
tive adjudication and "delegated legislation" for the student. However,
they keep the spotlight on the small minority of cases that come up for
formal hearings — on that part of administration that follows, or may per-
haps be made to follow, procedures similar to those of the judiciary. This
preoccupation with the margin of the problem is typified by the terms
"administrative process," "administrative procedure," and "administrative
agency," which in most lawyers' studies of the subject are used to refer only
to the agencies that issue rules and adjudicate private rights, and their
methods of doing sol5

A leader of the attack on administrative adjudication has been Professor
Roscoe Pound, who in addition to his authority as a scholar has been the
spokesman of the Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association. To avoid the impression that any serious writer proposes sim-
ply to abolish administrative adjudication, we should stress perhaps that
even Pound explains the necessity for its development and its existence. He
tells how the United States was "law ridden" in the nineteenth century;
how the demands of an expanding law of public utilities and the require-
ments of social legislation led to the development of administrative proce-
dures and regulatory agencies; how the judiciary reviewed the decisions
of these agencies without giving any weight to their findings of fact, thus
forcing them to follow rules of evidence suitable only for jury trials in
common-law courts; and, in consequence, how the state legislatures and
eventually Congress began to give more and more functions to administra-
tive agencies and comparatively fewer to the courts. He mentions work-
men's compensation, corporate reorganization, the adjustment of private
water rights. Then, too, for the past sixty years "the judiciary has been
falling into line and . . . powers which two generations ago would have

4 "On Conciliation with the Colonies," Speeches and Letters on American Affairs, p. 95,
New York: Dutton (Everyman's Library), 1931.

5 This type of definition led the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure to speculate on how things would be managed "if administrative agencies did not exist
in the Federal Government." Op cit. above in note 1, p. 13. C/. also above Ch. 17, "Govern-
ment by Procedure."

528 THE JUDICIAL TEST

been held purely judicial and jealously guarded from executive exercise . . .
are now cheerfully conceded to boards and commissions."6

On the other hand, Pound charges that the philosophies of Marx, Freud,
and Einstein have led certain people "to believe in supermen administrators
free from the checks of law or rights or judicial review."7 This belief,
he holds, has been responsible for basically unfair procedures in administra-
tive hearings. The courts, he says, are headed by judges who are trained to
conform to known standards and settled ideals; their decisions are exposed
to the criticism of an informed profession; reports of the cases appear in the
public records; and individual judgments are subject to review by a bench
whose attitude is analytical. The administrative agencies, he argues, are
under none of these safeguards. Moreover, they have an "obstinate tendency
to decide without a hearing or without hearing one of the parties"; they
make determinations on the basis of private consultations; they fail to dis-
close to affected parties the evidence on which their orders are based; and
heads of administrative agencies act on abstracts of testimony prepared by
irresponsible subordinates, without studying the original testimony.8 These
evils are all connected with the fact that the same agency is acting as prose-
cutor and judge in the same case.

Pound's general point of view is identical with the basis for the legisla-
tion repeatedly proposed to require all administrative agencies generally to
follow a single pattern of procedure in their rule-making and adjudication.
In Congress, many bills of this type have been introduced in recent years.
The most noted was the Walter-Logan bill (H. R. 6324, 76th Congress,
3d Session), which was passed by Congress but vetoed by the President.
This bill prescribed a single rigid method for the issuing of regulations, no
matter on what subject; it provided for very extensive judicial review of
rules, even if they were not the subject of controversy; it required that all
adjudicatory decisions be reviewed by superior administrative authorities,
whether any one appealed or not; and, while excepting decisions of certain
agencies entirely, it called for much more extensive judicial review than the
courts now are willing or are permitted by statute to exercise. At the same
time that such federal legislation was being widely discussed, the state of
New York considered a constitutional amendment to increase the frequency
and scope of judicial review of administrative actions.

The support of the organized legal profession for such measures made
a thorough study of them essential. The President accordingly asked the
Attorney General in 1939 to appoint a committee to study the possibility of
"procedural reform in the field of Administrative law." At about the same

6 Administrative Law: Its Growth, Procedure, and Significance, p. 31, Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1942. This brief study ably summarizes Dean Pound's views on
the subject.

Tlbid., p. 22.

8/£iW.,pp.60-75.

THE JUDICIAL TEST 529

time the governor of New York appointed Robert M. Benjamin to conduct
a similar study in that state.

This turn of events was similar to that nearly a decade earlier in Great
Britain, where The New Despotism by Lord Hewart,9 a justice of the
King's Bench, impelled the government to appoint a Committee on Minis-
ters' Powers. The reports of this committee,10 of the United States Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,11 and of the Benjamin
inquiry12 in the state of New York give a remarkably authoritative and
detailed analysis of the problem. All of them generally agree that the courts
cannot do the job that administrative agencies are now doing, and that
administrative agencies could not do it themselves if any one made them
imitate the courts.

In addition to these official reports, many lawyers have undertaken to
refute Pound and his school of thought. Several of them — notably Judge
Jerome Frank and Dean James M. Landis, both formerly of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and Professor Walter Gellhorn, director of
research for the Attorney General's Committee and later regional counsel
of the Office of Price Administration — have had experience in federal regu-
latory agencies. Frank's lively book, // Men Were Angels™ takes issue
pointedly with Pound and shows in great detail how the Securities and
Exchange Commission met all the tests of fair procedure which Pound
argued were respected only in the courts. Gellhorn's Federal Administrative
Proceedings^ is a briefer study that draws on the work of the Attorney
General's Committee to give a broad picture of the problem of administra-
tive adjudication.

Federal Administrative Procedure Act. One might have assumed that
the increasingly realistic and mature analysis of the whole problem of ad-
ministrative law would have encouraged a cautious legislative approach
in this important area, and one intent upon preserving the desirable flexi-
bility of administrative practice. Actually, however, those forces which
originally had carried forward the case for the Walter-Logan bill resumed
their campaign at the end of World War II without meeting any resistance
in Congress. Although the findings of the earlier official inquiries com-
pelled these forces to compromise on many details, they succeeded in press-
ing for considerably more extensive judicial review of administrative actions;

9 London: Cosmopolitan, 1929; rcpubhshcd London: Benn, 1945. Cf. also above Ch. 3,
"Bureaucracy — Fact and Fiction," sec. 3, "The Charge of Despotism."
AO Cmd. 4060, London, 1932.

11 Op. cit. above note 1.

12 Benjamin, Robert M., Administrative Adjudication in the State of New Yor^, Albany,
1942.

13 New York: Harper, 1930.

14 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941. Sec also Landis, James M., The Administrative
Process, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. A good general discussion may be found
in Pcnnock, Roland J., Administration and the Rule of Law, New York: Farrar & Rinehart,
1941.

530 THE JUDICIAL TEST

for the imposition of a uniform pattern of administrative regulation and
adjudication; and for more highly formalized procedures that would give
private interests greater opportunity for influencing or escaping government
regulation. The result was the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.

It is not surprising that the act has met a mixed welcome. The Attorney
General has greeted it as "a hopeful prospect of achieving reasonable uni-
formity and fairness in administrative procedures without at the same
time interfering unduly with the efficient and economical operation of the
Government." Others, and especially many close students of the admin-
istrative process, have recorded grave misgivings about the anticipated
impact of the new legislation upon regulatory and adjudicatory methods.

Much, of course, will depend on the construction of the act by the
judiciary. But there is little doubt that the act throws a heavy burden of
court-like formality upon government regulation; creates novel require-
ments to be observed by administrative agencies at the threat of judicial
invalidation of their actions; and, by extending the scope of judicial review,
invites the courts to become virtual partners in the conduct of adminis-
trative business.

The act operates on the basis of sweeping definitions. It lumps the
rich variety of administrative actions and decisions into but two categories:
rules and orders. And it deals with both categories in general language,
leaving few exceptions from the requirements it lays down for either
category.

Save only for matters of legitimate secrecy on the one hand and internal
management on the other, the act stipulates that each agency must publish
in the Federal Register descriptions of its structure, including its field or-
ganization, to indicate the allocation of authority; statements of its decision-
making methods, together with precise information about its formal and in-
formal procedures; and all "substantive rules" as well as pronouncements of
its general policy and interpretations by which it considers itself bound. A
similar obligation exists with respect to final opinions or orders in the ad-
judication of cases.

Under the act, rule-making must proceed by advance notice to the public
and by opportunity for the participation of private interests in the rule-
making process. Formal notice and participation by "all interested parties"
is also required in administrative adjudication. Equally rigid is the statu-
tory prescription that no officer engaged in the fact-finding aspect of the
adjudicatory process may take part in the decision of the case. Conversely,
the same officer having presided over the administrative hearing must make
the initial decision or the recommendation for the final decision of the
case. An initial decision is subject to administrative appeal, compelling
the agency to go once more over the entire matter in the same manner the
initial decision was reached. All agencies must secure an adequate number
of hearing examiners, whose separate status is protected by special guar-

THE JUDICIAL TEST 531

antees and who are not to be drawn into any other phase of administrative
business.

The act is emphatic in referring to the courts of law a private party
"adversely affected or aggrieved" by administrative action. As to the scope
of judicial review, the courts are directed to set aside any administrative
actions deemed void for various reasons, including in certain types of cases
actions "unwarranted by the facts." On the side of questions of law, the
act furnishes a fresh incentive for the courts to reach out into the area of
administrative discretion. However these statutory clauses may eventually
be circumscribed by court precedent, it appears obvious that the new law
is likelier to increase the quantity of litigation than to raise the standards
of administrative justice.

In a striking manner, once again the Administrative Procedure Act turns
the spotlight on the question of the proper general approach to the problem
of administrative rule-making and adjudication. Are the demands of justice
and those of administrative efficiency irreconcilable? Must we concede the
need for reducing the promptness and resourcefulness of public service for
the benefit of the. ordinary citizen because important private interests in
the community have to be specifically safeguarded by elaborate procedures
subject to judicial approbation? As one way of seeking an answer to these
questions, we should find it helpful to consider administrative adjudication
in its full context.

The three main problems of administrative adjudication that are out-
lined by the various recent studies are these: the rules of evidence and other
procedures that govern the conduct of hearings; judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions; and the organization of administrative agencies to prevent
the combination of managerial and adjudicative functions from causing
bias in the trial examiners or hearing officers.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE FAIRNESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Rules of Evidence. An individual whose interests are impaired by ad-
ministrative action can present his case effectively only if he knows the
evidence that is being presented against him and has a fair chance to refute
it. Some of the most serious charges against administrative procedure have
been to the effect that these essentials of fair play were not being followed.

The Attorney General's Committee, after directing its expert staff to
study in detail the procedures of nearly all federal agencies that adjudicate
private rights, found "few instances of indifference on the part of the
agencies to the basic values which underlie a fair hearing," but instead
"a healthy self-criticism and considerable alertness to fulfill not only the
letter of the judicial pronouncements but the basic implications of fairness
in hearing."15

15 Op. cit. above in note 1, p. 62.

532 THE JUDICIAL TEST

The committee's principal criticism, on the other hand, was that the
administrative hearings were not administrative enough. In its own lan-
guage, it blamed "lengthy hearings and incredibly voluminous records"
for burdensome delays, and made several recommendations for shortening
the process. One of them was that administrative agencies borrow an in-
formal and expeditious procedure from the courts— the "pretrial hearing,"
which is a hearing conducted in the manner of a conference between a
judge and the lawyers in the case, using more direct methods of getting at
the facts than formal examination and cross-examination.

Perhaps to the amazement of those who suspected that political trends
under the New Deal had led to unfair administrative practices, the Attorney
General's Committee directed some of its more severe censure on points of
procedure, not against any of the new regulatory agencies, but against two
of the older departments. It criticized the War Department for failing to
inform interested parties— other than the applicants themselves-— of the
reasons justifying a license for the erection of structures in navigable water-
ways. And it rebuked the Post Office Department for neglecting to notify
publishers of their statutory right to a hearing before revoking second-class
mailing privileges, even though they had always been given an opportunity
to state their case in writing.

Neither the Attorney General's Committee nor the Benjamin report to
the governor of New York recommended one single code of administrative
procedure. Only a minority of the Attorney General's Committee did. The
majority held that the advantages of diversity to accommodate particular
types of regulatory authority were considerable, and therefore made nu-
merous minor recommendations on the procedure of individual agencies as
a result of the committee's research.16

Spot Chec\ of Judicial Review. The problem of judicial review has been
magnified out of all importance, for in numerous types of cases that are
handled by administrative agencies the citizen would get little or no tangible
protection from appealing to the courts. Many administrative agencies, in
matters of adjudication, deal with questions that have to be answered imme-
diately in order to prevent hardship, or that individually do not justify the
cost of legal proceedings. Thus an unsuccessful claimant for a small social
security benefit will usually not hire a lawyer to contest a doubtful case,
simply because the odds are not worth the cost. A grower will not t?ke
to court a decision by an examiner of the United States Department of
Agriculture condemning a carload of perishable commodities, for his goods
will decay before they could be introduced as evidence. A securities broker
will find little satisfaction in appealing from an adverse decision of the

16 Sec the scries of monographs on individual agencies issued by the Attorney General's
Committee. Study of almost any two of the monographs will suffice to show the reader how
considerably the subject matter and the procedure of the various agencies differ from one
another.

THE JUDICIAL TEST 533

Securities and Exchange Commission on the listing of a security, for the
opportunity to sell it profitably may have gone.

To depend mainly on judicial review in these cases would be futile.
The chief problem is how to organize on a fair basis the system of rendering
the original decision. The volume of administrative decisions alone would
make it unwise to rely too extensively on review by the courts. It is no
more reasonable to ask the courts to decide anew any considerable portion
of administrative decisions than to ask the Supreme Court to consider again
most of the cases decided by lower courts.

What the courts can do, however, is to protect the fundamental rights
of citizens to fair treatment in the hearing of their cases, and to maintain
the basic political and constitutional relationship between the administrative
agency and other branches of government. If the courts are to do this
effectively, they must restrict themselves to two questions: first, the type of
case which they will review at all; and second, the extent to which they will
give weight to the original decision of the administrative agency.

In four general ways the federal courts have narrowed down the number
of cases they will review, even though they have avoided a statement of
principles and have carefully maintained their discretion to consider each
case as it comes up. One such restriction is that the individual appealing
from the administrative decision must have "legal standing" — that is, in
general, he must be "adversely affected" by the decision. Another is that
the administrative decision must be a final one. No one may come to the
court with a case until he has done all he can to get a favorable decision
from the administrative agency. Third, there is some question of whether
courts will generally review an administrator's refusal to take action — such
as refusal to issue a license — even though the Supreme Court in 1938 with-
drew its earlier doctrine that "negative orders" were not reviewable. Fourth,
courts will not review— sometimes by self-denial, sometimes because of
statutory limitations — some types of decisions that seem particularly suited
to administrative discretion. Examples are a decision that a contractor on a
government project must pay certain wage rates, or decisions of the Veter-
ans Administration with respect to certain classes of benefits to veterans.17

Scope of Judicial Review. Much more important, however, than the
question of whether or not to review a case is the question of how far a
court is to go in its review. For just as the administrative agency has no
more extensive rule-making or quasi-legislative power than the legislature
intended to give it, so it has only as much power to make decisions as the
courts leave in its hands. An illustration of the way in which the judiciary
may take over decisions that are the very heart of administration may be
chosen from the annals of New York state government. In 1903, the Court
of Appeals held that the duty of classification of positions — as competitive,

!7 Cf. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, ofi. cit. above in note 1,
pp. 84-86.

534 THE JUDICIAL TEST

noncompctitivc, or exempt—- under the civil service law was quasi-judicial
in its nature, and could be reviewed by the courts by writ of certiorari,
much like any decision of a lower court. After a few years the Court of
Appeals came to the uncomfortable conclusion that it had — in its own words
—"in effect assumed the functions of the Civil Service Commissioners, for
every challenged decision of these officers was brought to this court as a
question of law."18 Accordingly, it reversed itself; decided that the function
was not judicial or even quasi-judicial; held that such decisions could be
reviewed only by writ of mandamus; and explained that, while clear failure
or refusal of the Civil Service Commission to do its duty could be reviewed,
the court would not reverse any decision, even though it might differ with
its wisdom, if there was "a fair and reasonable ground for difference of
opinion."

In short, since every act of a public official must be based on legal authori-
zation, courts may stretch their logic a bit and make nearly any type of
administrative decision all over again. The stretching would not be too
difficult. It is a settled principle that the courts have the power to review
questions of law, since otherwise the citizen would have no way to appeal
against the actions of an official who plainly acted illegally. It is a com-
monplace among lawyers, however, that no clear distinction exists between
questions of law and questions of fact, since their subject matter is basically
the same. As one frequently quoted passage runs, "the knife of policy
alone effects an artificial cleavage" between the two questions, and fur-
thermore, "at the point where the court chooses to draw the line between
public interest and private right."19

To illustrate this point, we may take the classic case of Miller v. Horton.20
A public health official killed a horse that in his judgment had the glanders.
The jury decided that the horse had not really had the glanders after all;
that the official who thought it had was wrong; and that therefore he had
not had legal authority to kill the horse and must pay for it. The law usually
authorizes an official to act only in certain circumstances and for certain
purposes. If a judge wants to reverse the official's decision on the facts of
the situation, he can often find the facts so thoroughly mixed up with the
legal issues involved that a review ostensibly of the law will take care of
the facts as well.

Legitimate Judicial Concerns. If the courts were generally preoccupied
with private rights and careless of the public interest, logic alone would not
stop them from reducing the original administrative ruling to little more

18 Simons v. McGuire, 204 N. Y. 253, 257-258, 97 N. E. 526, 527 (1912), as quoted
by Hart, James, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A Thesis," George Washington
Law Review, 1941, Vol. 9, p. 501.

19 Dickinson, John, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, p. 55, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1927.

20 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850 (1891).

THE JUDICIAL TEST 535

than a formal preliminary to the judicial decision. Fortunately, the courts
in the main do no such thing. Their prevailing philosophy has followed
the election returns in accepting the idea that considerations of public in-
terest have greatly expanded as our economic system has increased its
interdependences. Accordingly, when a court reviews an administrative ad-
judication, more often than not it adjusts the scope of its review to the
extent to which fundamental principles appear to be involved, much as an
executive gives his attention to the more significant problems of administra-
tion and leaves others to his subordinates.

Above all, a higher court will thoroughly review cases involving con-
stitutional rights. It may consider all the aspects of such a case anew, giv-
ing comparatively little weight even in questions of fact to the original
decision of an administrative agency. The next most intensive review will
be given those cases in which the problem arises of whether an agency
acted outside its statutory authority. Even though such questions of law
are entangled with questions of fact, the courts will certainly not hesitate
to reverse an agency's decision when that decision was clearly beyond its
legal power.

A part of the question of whether the agency acted legally or not is
this: Did it follow a fair procedure? The courts are likely to insist rigor-
ously on the fundamentals of fair play — the right to face and cross-examine
witnesses for the other side, and so on. On the other hand, the courts are
not likely to insist that specialized administrative agencies with expert trial
examiners be bound by the elaborate rules of evidence that were developed
to help a judge keep a jury of laymen from being bamboozled.

American courts, it should be added, are still somewhat more inclined
than English courts to assume that an administrative agency has acted
fairly only if it has acted like a court. The Arlidge case21 in Great Britain
established the principle that administrative agencies might conform to
"methods of natural justice" without following "lawyer-like methods." In
contrast to this, in the equally famous Morgan cases22 in the United States,
the Supreme Court, in regard to certain procedures, considered the function
of the Secretary of Agriculture "a duty akin to that of a judge."

Legislative and Judicial Standards of Review. The courts will rely most
on the administrative agency's decision, and insist least on their own point
of view, in questions that are clearly and solely questions of fact. In re-
viewing such questions, the courts have come more and more to the point of
trying to decide not whether the administrative agency made the correct
decision — which could only mean the same decision the court would have
made if it had been the agency—but whether the decision was made rea-

21 Local Government Board v. Arlidge, L. R. (1915), Appeal Cases, 120.
22 Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936); 304 U. S. 1 (1938): 304 U. S. 23
(1938).

536 THE JUDICIAL TEST

sonably and on the basis of substantial evidence. Language to bring about
this effect has been incorporated in legislation defining the extent of court re-
view of the decisions of certain federal agencies: "findings of fact by the
Commission, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless
it shall clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are arbitrary and

• • »*OQ

capricious. /d

There has been a measure of legislative maneuvering over the exact lan-
guage of this formula. But as long as the general idea is put across that
the courts are not to substitute their judgment for that of administrative
agencies in cases the latter have decided, the exact words of the formula do
not matter much. Congress declared the findings of the National Labor
Relations Board conclusive if "supported by evidence," without using the
term "substantial" or anything like it, but the Supreme Court held that
if the evidence was not substantial it was not evidence, and the omission
of the word made no difference."4

Those who wish to broaden the scope of judicial review have argued
that administrative decisions ought to be supported by the "weight of the
evidence." However, the question cannot be solved by any such juggling
of words. It is simply the issue of whether or not the courts are going to
let the administrative agencies do their jobs. And in recent years the judi-
cial point of view generally has been a more sympathetic one.25

In general, court review of administrative decisions and orders is least
useful on those aspects of a case that require discretion — the selection of one
choice among several with nearly equal advantages — or call for technical or
scientific qualifications. It is most useful, on the other hand, on those as-
pects of a case that involve the protection of definite individual rights or
personal liberties against arbitrary, unreasonable, or careless official action.
However, no line can be drawn in advance between the various aspects of
any single case. Just as the judge may substitute his personal predilections
for the scientific opinion of the expert, so the expert may come to believe
that his science justifies exceeding his authority. In the long run, mutual
respect by judges and administrators will help maintain a sense of jurisdic-
tional differentiation between them, particularly if an aggressive and well-
informed public opinion watches the entire process of adjudication.

23 Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1094, 47 U. S. C. 402e).

^Consolidated Edison Co. v. NX.R.B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938).

25 The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provided that appeals against regulations of
the Office of Price Administration had to be made first to the price administrator, and that
any one denied relief might then ask a special emergency court of appeals to issue an injunc-
tion against a regulation, but only if the regulation was found to be "not in accordance with
law, or ... arbitrary or capricious." In Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1943), the
Supreme Court upheld not only the authority of Congress to delegate "legislative" power —
"Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least pos-
sible delegation of discretion to administrative officers" — but also the unusual provisions for
review of the validity of regulations only in accordance with a single procedurr

THE JUDICIAL TEST 537

4. THE ORGANIZATION OF ADJUDICATION

Prosecutor-and-]udge Agencies. Since practical limitations apply to the
usefulness of judicial review in a dynamic administrative system, it is all
the more important to organize properly the hearing activities of the gov-
ernment agencies concerned. This problem, it is true, has nothing to do
with the great mass of business of most of the agencies, which is handled
by informal settlement. Nor has it anything to do with the business of
some of the agencies, which proceeds by such techniques as scientific inspec-
tion and makes little or no use of formal hearings. However, the agency
that holds formal hearings must take care to organize itself so as to avoid
the charge — and any basis for the suspicion — that its interest in initiating the
case leads it to be unfair in the hearing.

This is the question of whether a single agency should be both prose-
cutor and judge in the same case. The question is partly fallacious, but
nevertheless it has made many people doubt the fairness of administrative
procedure. The element of fallacy in the question is that an agency is not
a single person. The agency may be an extremely large organization —
much larger than the whole government of the United States a century
ago — and it is surely as possible to set up within it a system of checks and
balances as it was to create such a system in our national government.

The agency may well be expected to have a bias in favor of a certain
policy — the policy which it is instructed by statute to enforce. And if cer-
tain groups oppose that policy it is possible for the agency to develop a bias
against those groups. Even judges, however, are not supposed to be com-
pletely neutral toward the laws they are enforcing, or toward those who fail
to obey the laws. They are only supposed to reserve judgment on the
question of whether any given individual has in fact disobeyed the laws.
Still, administrative agencies are particularly likely to be directed to enforce
laws that are vigorously opposed by one or another respectable economic
interest, and their unpopularity may sometimes be a measure of their
effectiveness.

Administrative agencies may be reluctant to create formal hearing units,
and to set off the personnel that hear cases from those who investigate and
initiate them. Their reluctance may come from fear of reducing the scope
of their discretion; fear of tying their hands with their own procedure; or
fear of inviting additional judicial review by appearing to be in effect
subordinate courts. Such fear does not seem unreasonable if we think of
the point of view of the traditional lawyers, who are still likely to hold with
the late A. V. Dicey that administrative law does not exist in English-
speaking countries.

Dicey, in his classic on the law of the British Constitution,26 emphasized

36 Dicey, A. V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th cd., New
York: Macmillan, 1915.

538 THE JUDICIAL TEST

the facts that any citizen could go — as he still can go — to the regular court
if any official damaged him by acting beyond his legal authority; and that
under the Continental system of administrative law the citizen is not always
able to do this. What he failed to see was that the common-law court may
be too slow and expensive to help the citizen or may achieve nothing if the
official act which damaged him was performed within the law, while an
administrative court might give him quick and cheap relief. On points
like these, Dicey's Continental critics scored heavily, especially those who
like Duguit27 emphasized the service functions of public administration
and the role of governmental authority in giving effect to democratic
policies.

Continental Administrative Courts. English-speaking countries were
reluctant to permit executive departments to hear and decide cases after the
manner of a court. They showed even greater reluctance to evolve special-
ized branches of the judiciary to handle the new types of cases that arose
with the extension of government functions. These attitudes kept the
United States and Great Britain, in some types of cases, from developing as
effective machinery for protecting private rights as was brought into being
by the administrative courts of Continental Europe.

The French established a system of administrative courts as a result of
the decision, effected in their revolutionary constitution, to separate the
powers of government with logical thoroughness. They carried their logic
so far as to forbid the judiciary to interfere with administrative acts, and
initially left the citizen with no recourse except appeal to the higher level
of administration. The executive branch subsequently organized a formal
system of inferior and superior councils to hear such appeals. These coun-
cils secured increasing independence as administrative courts, hearing all
kinds of cases arising out of the relationship between public authorities and
the citizens.

The Napoleonic period carried French administrative influences through-
out most of Europe. The system of administrative courts, with national
variations, eventually became Continental in its scope. At the highest stage
of its development, it had several fairly general characteristics.28 It was
a system of judge-made law, in that the administrative judges built up an
expanding body of precedents in the process of interpreting statutes and
deciding cases. There was a hierarchy of courts, with appeal from the lower
to the higher. The procedure made it relatively easy and inexpensive for
the average citizen to get a decision.

Since among the lower courts there was a considerable measure of spe-
cialization like that of executive departments, the judges were closely in

27 Duguit, Leon. Law in the Modem State, New York: Viking, 1919.

28 For a summary description and citations to the literature on this subject, see Morstein
Marx, Fritz, "Comparative Administrative Law: The Continental Alternative," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, 1942, Vol. 91, p. 118 ff.

THE JUDICIAL TEST 539

touch with administrative developments, and in an excellent position to
interpret the motivation and to control the discretion of officials. At the
same time, the judges, being drawn from the ranks of the administrative
career service, were sympathetic toward the public purposes of government
agencies. Career administrators themselves were trained in public law as
well as for management. For this reason, and because administrative actions
did not come before less well-informed ordinary courts, government depart-
ments were not in need of large legal staffs who might — as in the United
States— have carried on feuds with operating officials.

American Alternatives. The possibility of bringing forth a more sys-
tematic body of administrative law in this country has led scholars of sound
reputation to propose a special court of appeals for administrative cases.29
This is no startling proposal in view of the fact that Congress has set up
several constitutional curiosities sometimes called legislative courts, such
as the Tax Court and the Court of Claims, which hear appeals from admin-
istrative agencies. And there is reason for reflecting on the merits of a
structure of administrative courts. Fritz Morstein Marx, whose experience
as a public official in republican Germany reinforces his opinions as a stu-
dent of administration, has argued for a general system of administrative

courts.80

On the other hand, several proposals have been advanced for improving
the institutions of administrative law and adjudication without setting up
new courts. Any proposal for instituting administrative courts in American
government raises the question of whether they would be in the executive
or the judicial branch or, like the Tax Court, in a sort of quasi-legislative
limbo. If they were clearly established in the judicial branch, it might be dif-
ficult to keep their personnel and procedures from taking on the character-
istics of other courts. The principal official committees that have touched
on the subject in recent years have avoided this whole question, perhaps pre-
ferring to leave the process of administrative adjudication in the executive
branch, or in the independent commissions and boards in whatever branch
they may be.

The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure pro-
posed to create a separate corps of hearing commissioners and to establish
a staff agency to keep an eye on regulatory procedures. The committee
suggested the formation of an office of federal administrative procedure,
headed by a three-man board — one judge, the director of the administrative
office of the United States courts, and a director of federal administrative
procedure to be appointed by the President for a seven-year term. This
office would keep in touch with federal procedures of adjudication and regu-

20 Cf. Blachly, Frederick F. and Oatman, Miriam E., "A United States Court of Appeals for
Administration," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1942 Vol
221, p. 170 ff.

80 Sec loc. cit. above note 28.

540 THE JUDICIAL TEST

lation through liaison officers designated by each agency, and would study
and recommend improvements. Each agency would nominate its own
hearing commissioners for seven-year appointments, but the Office of Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure would have to approve the appointments,
and the hearing commissioners could be removed only by this office.

The minority of the Attorney General's Committee wished to go further
than the majority in applying a judicial pattern to the organization and pro-
cedure of administrative adjudication. They urged the enactment of a code
of administrative procedure. It would separate by statutory provision the
functions of prosecuting and judging, define the scope of judicial review,
and establish uniform standards of fair administrative procedure.

The Benjamin report on Administrative Adjudication in the State of
New York recommended a similar central executive agency, a division of
administrative procedure. Perhaps it is significant that Benjamin, although
aided by a competent staff, was solely responsible for his report, instead of
submitting it through a committee. For the Benjamin report recommended
that the division of administrative procedure be headed by a single director
instead of by a board. The director was to serve at the pleasure of the
governor, and the division was to be principally advisory in its function,
having nothing to do with the appointment of trial examiners. The Ben-
jamin report emphasized that administrative adjudication is an essential part
of administration, which must be a function of the executive branch. The
threat to detach it from the executive branch had been more serious in
New York than in the federal government, in view of the constitutional
amendment proposed in New York to provide judicial review of the facts
as well as of the law of virtually all decisions of administrative officers and
agencies.81

Executive Integration of Regulatory Bodies. Even more care to see that
the present administrative responsibility for adjudication should not slip
away into the judicial branch was shown several years earlier by the
President's Committee on Administrative Management. It dealt with
the administration of that function as it discussed the problem of the
organization of the independent regulatory boards and commissions.32 The
President's Committee freely admitted that the same personnel should not
prepare and prosecute cases and then sit in judgment on them. "This not
only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fair-
ness."33 The committee put still more emphasis, however, on the necessity

81 Sec Parratt, Spencer D., "The Benjamin Report," Public Administration Review, 1942,
Vol. 2, p. 348 ff., as well ?s the Benjamin report itself: op. cit. above note 12.

82 See President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. One of the special studies was "The Problem
of the Independent Regulatory Commissions," by Robert E. Cushman, from which the pro-
posal of the committee on the subject was drawn. See also Cushman's more recent book,
The Independent Regulatory Commissions, New York: Oxford University Press, 1941.

88 Report cit. above in note 32, p. 40.

THE JUDICIAL TEST 54l

of unifying the executive branch to keep the federal government from bog-
ging down, like some state governments, by the weight and confusion of
independent and irresponsible units. For, in a supporting staff study, Pro-
fessor Robert E. Cushman pointed out that it was very difficult to disen-
tangle the administrative and judicial phases of regulatory work — a fact
on which all observers of the subject appear to agree — and that some of the
regulatory commissions do not merely regulate in the sense that a police
department or a public health officer regulates. For example, he observed
that the Interstate Commerce Commission "regulates and manages the land
transportation system of the nation." It is, "in short, a little government in
itself set up for the purpose of governing the railroads." And, although its
paths cross that of the President, it has no formal responsibility to him.

The President's Committee proposed, as Cushman suggested, a formula
to provide both judicial fairness and executive integration. It recommended
that the independent commissions and boards be put into the executive
departments as bureaus or divisions, and that each of them be divided into
two sections. One would be an administrative section, organized and staffed
like any other bureau, which would handle the administrative, rule-making,
and investigating phases of the work. If the cases to be handled were nu-
merous and routine, it would also conduct the hearings in the first instance.
The other would be the judicial section, including members appointed by
the President and approved by the Senate for long and staggered terms.
It would be in the department only for housekeeping purposes. It would
hear cases and appeals.

Some of these judicial sections might well develop into administrative
courts, as Cushman pointed out, citing the precedent of the Board of
Tax Appeals, which has since become the Tax Court. In the meantime, he
urged, the division into administrative and judicial sections would be a
flexible matter. This flexibility would have its advantages. It would avoid
the danger that an entirely new set of administrative courts might be staffed
with lawyers alone, who would carry over with them the approach of the
traditional judicial system. By comparison with the regular courts, their
more specialized acquaintance with the subject matter might well lead the
new legal staffs of administrative courts to encroach even more aggressively
on administrative initiative.

This is speculation. But we may recall that the Committee on Adminis-
trative Law of the American fiar Association proposed in 1936 — without get-
ting the support of the Bar Association as a whole— the creation of an ad-
ministrative court, with a trial division of at least four sections, to absorb
several "legislative" courts then in existence and take .over their jurisdiction.
This court would have settled claims and handled the revocation or suspen-
sion of licenses and other regulatory permits. Its appellate division would
have reviewed the decisions of the trial sections on all issues of law and

542 THE JUDICIAL TEST

fact. The ultimate purpose of the proposal was to extend judicial review to
the findings of facts on which regulatory authority is based.

Political Factors. There is no essential reason why a system of administra-
tive courts should be expected to take over the administrative functions of
executive agencies or encroach on them by extending the scope of judicial
review. However, the administrative courts grew up on the Continent in
part because the ordinary judiciary was not permitted to check administra-
tion. To duplicate them here, where the courts have been accustomed to
interfering too much, might give more opportunity for such interference.

The letter of the law and judicial methods have never been the principal
safeguards of individual freedom, even in the courts themselves. The courts
may have been more able to protect liberties in English-speaking countries
than elsewhere because their traditional system gave them more discretion-
ary authority to accomplish the moral objectives of justice than Continental
courts were permitted.34 On the other hand, some of the strongest restraints
on arbitrary administrative action are political.

It has often been remarked that a regulatory agency and the regulated
interest may tend to work together very closely. Pressure of the political
agency heads on their subordinates will often be in the direction of prose-
cuting only clear cases of violation in order to avoid the protests and political
opposition that might be caused by questionable ones. The agency ordinar-
ily has a strong motive for going easy on its "constituents," since it may
need their support in obtaining appropriations or additional legislative
authority. Moreover, agencies may have reason to fear that some of their
regulatory functions will be taken from them and transferred to a com-
petitor. It is possible that this fear adds to their desire to cultivate the
support of the interests they are regulating.

The agency usually issues regulations as well as enforces them, and in
preparing such regulations it generally consults closely with the interests
concerned. Any unreasonable requirement will certainly cause a protest to
Congress, which holds over the agency the threat of reduced appropriations
or withdrawal of statutory authority. Thus we have a degree of respon-
sibility to the legislature in the regulation of economic interests, whether
the regulating agency is an independent commission or an executive depart-
ment, in addition to the latter's responsibility to the President. Neither
house of the lawmaking body as a whole can deal with protests, but com-
mittee hearings give legislators a much more effective opportunity to dig
into the details of administration. The main shortcoming of the existing
system is that — except in the event of disaster or crisis — it puts all the pres-
sure in the direction of relaxing, rather than strengthening, the authority
of the regulatory agency.

84 Sec two articles on this point by Pekelis, Alexander H., "Legal Techniques and Po-
litical Ideologies," Michigan Law "Review , 1943, Vol. 41, p. 4 ff., and "Administrative Dis-
cretion and the Rule of Law," Social Research, 1943, Vol. 10, p. 1 ff.

THE JUDICIAL TEST 543

5. CONCLUSION

Benefits of Administrative Specialization. The essentials of justice in
human relations are eternal. They involve basic questions of ethics and
politics which do not change with scientific or industrial development.
In order to safeguard human rights and human dignity, it is necessary to
have not only an elected legislature with power to establish the basic rules
of society, but also a judiciary whose concern with fundamental values will
not be distorted by specialized interests.

However, just as the legislature will best discharge its general function
if it leaves technical rules to be established by responsible administrators,
so the courts can most effectively protect human rights if the great volume
of specialized cases is handled by administrative adjudication — subject to
the power of the courts to enforce the principles of fair play.

Combining Flexibility and Principle. The role of government in mod-
ern society is too dynamic and too diversified for us to attain justice merely
by conforming to traditional methods. Rigid judicial procedure would be
intolerable in the wide fields of activity in which administrative agencies
are today the copilots with private management.

Here is one of the great challenges to public administration in the
future — to organize a system of administrative adjudication, closely asso-
ciated with the execution of policy, that will combine the virtues of dis-
patch and flexibility with the degree of institutional independence necessary
to safeguard individual rights.

CHAPTER

Personnel Standards

1. RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPETENCE

Ensuring Responsive and Resourceful Administration. Responsible pub-
lic management is not simply attained by subjecting administrative agencies
to axioms of "government of laws." It requires corresponding modes of
administrative behavior — a true service ideology. It also requires institu-
tional expectancies of technical competence. \^Thc demand for a high cali-
ber of public personnel therefore not only aims at a working force of proved
ability but also at general standards of efficiency. Without such standards
no government department could undertake effectively to shoulder its
statutory responsibilities?^

In this sense, personnel administration provides the very foundation of
resourceful and responsive management. The rules and methods which
govern the organization of the working force in public employment occupy
a central place in the system of administrative responsibility. Civil service
commissions and personnel officers concern themselves with a large variety
of highly specialized activities, but all of these activities bear in one way
or another upon the problem of safeguarding the responsible conduct of
governmental business.

Management and the Personnel function. As with comparable func-
tions like budgeting and planning, it is characteristic of personnel admin-
istration that its contribution cannot be measured objectively when it
operates in the sphere of its greatest effectiveness, but its value is relatively
determinable when it neglects its most important function. The paradox
is simple to explain. The personnel director is essentially an adviser to
management — from the top executive down to the first-line supervisor. As
he performs this task, either effectively or poorly, his contribution is com-
mingled with that of general management and therefore it is not senarately
measurable. On the other hand, if the personnel office confines itself to
its own operations, it can boast of the number of applicants recruited, of
training classes held, of jobs classified, and point to similar activities that

544

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 545

are capable of statistical treatment. These are all useful and necessary serv-
ices, but such reporting fails to demonstrate the personnel office's role in
management decisions.

The growing significance of personnel administration results from the
increase in the knowledge required to handle successfully the human prob-
lems of a large organization. While the specific techniques of personnel
administration are highly important, they achieve this importance only to
the extent to which they contribute to sound working relations in an or-
ganization. Personnel administration aids the supervisor in accomplishing
the goal of effective human relations by the assistance it can give him in
meeting his responsibilities, even though he and his line superiors have
to set the substantive objectives.

Reformist Background and Legislative Aspirations. An attempt to de-
scribe the present outlook on public personnel administration should not
conceal its background in earlier reform movements. It is only because
the reformers of a past era were relatively successful that public personnel
administration has been able to advance its position to the point where it
is being accepted as one of the most important units on the level of top
management.

The presence of a merit system is usually indicated by the passage of
legislation providing for appointments based on open competitive examina-
tion. Such legislation was enacted by the federal government and New York
State in 1883 and by Massachusetts in 1884. Other states, cities, and
counties have followed their lead and accepted the merit principle in public
employment.1 The astute observer will note at times, however, that while
the facade furnished by civil service legislation is pleasing, the internal
structure beneath has not always changed.2

Definite progress can be noted, nonetheless. In the federal government
a large area of employment is based on merit. New York City under
Mayor LaGuardia, Los Angeles under Mayor Bowron, and Minnesota
under Governor Stassen are a few of many examples of comparatively ef-
fective adherence to the letter and spirit of the merit principle. In recent
years, one of the greatest advances has resulted from the Social Security
Act, which provides that local and state employees in services subsidized
by the federal government under this law must be selected on the basis of
open competition.

1Thc period of greatest activity in the spread of the merit system was in the 1930's,
when a number of states and cities enacted civil service laws. Various states, including New
York, have a merit system based on provisions of the state constitution. This arrangement is
sometimes preferred since constitutional provisions are not changed as easily as statutory
enactments.

2 Many civil service commissions have funds so inadequate that no good selection program
can be undertaken. The presence of a large proportion of positions exempted from competitive
examinations usually indicates that patronage still plays a strong role in appointments, al-
though there are also other more subtle methods to evade civil service provisions.

546 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

While much of the following discussion will relate to personnel man-
agement and organization, it may be stressed that there is not as yet
sufficient acceptance by the people of the United States of the importance
of good public management to justify relaxation of civic vigilance. Much
still depends on the endeavors of such organizations as the National Civil
Service League and the National League of Women Voters to extend and
strengthen the merit rule.3 So long as some groups favor ineffectual gov-
ernment, the merit system has to be guarded.

New OutlooJ^. The 1930's produced for the first time a widespread
awareness of the fact that many able men and women consider government
employment useful and challenging work. It is obvious that the public
service has always had outstanding employees. But this was a matter
of chance, except in some specialized fields such as forest administration
where government was a major employer. Economic conditions in the
Great Depression and the marked extension of public administration turned
attention to government as an attractive career.

While the movement toward public employment resulted in part from
the lack of opportunities in private enterprise and from the search for
security, it developed into a positive acceptance of the distinct advantages
of government work in terms of its contribution to the general welfare and
its utilization of the individual's abilities.4 The increase in enrollment in
college and university courses in public administration and the higher
quality of personnel who during this period entered the government service
— city, state, and federal — are partial indications of the changed situation.

Diversity of Government Employment. Government employment va-
ries sufficiently with time, place, and occupation to make generalizations
difficult. Yet any one considering a career in government should be familiar
with the conditions which he may find. Public service has been com-
mended for its security and condemned for its low salaries. Both of these
general assertions are definitely false in many specific instances. Private
utilities, banks, insurance companies, and the large mercantile and manu-

3 Civil service reform has been in the mainstream of good-government movements in
the United States. The activity on this front began after the Civil War and is still going
strong. The National Civil Service Reform League only recently dropped the word "Reform"
from its name, possibly as a result of the changed connotation of the term. The student
and the practitioner of public personnel administration should know the history of civil
service reform. Some good sources are: Foulke, William D., Fighting the Spoilsman, New
York: Putnam, 1919; United States Civil Service Commission, A History of the Federal Civil
Service, 1789-1939, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939; and Stewart, Frank M,,
The National Civil Service Reform League, Austin: University of Texas, 1929.

4 The interest of university students in employment opportunities in the public service is
indicated by the Harvard Guardian Conference on the American Public Service which was
organized by a group of undergraduates at Harvard University. The publication resulting
from the conference is a significant addition to the literature of public administration: Mor-
stein Marx, Fritz, ed.. Public Management in the New Democracy, New York: Harper, 1940.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 547

facturing establishments, practically speaking, for many of their employees
offer as much security as does government. Conversely, federal employ-
ment holds forth financial compensation which for all but the two or three
per cent in the higher technical and administrative positions compares fa-
vorably with that of private industry.5

For instance, the top legal position in the federal service carries a salary
of $15,000; incomes are ten or twenty times as large for some lawyers in
private practice. On the other hand, despite the great ability of many
lawyers in the federal service, there is no assurance that most of them
would have higher incomes if they left the government for private practice.
This is not to question the very definite need for higher salaries, especially
in local or state governments, but rather to suggest that those interested in
public service need not be deterred because of considerations of income.

As to the distribution of occupations in the public service, it should not
be assumed that the majority of government employees are office workers.
A government employee is just as likely to be a mechanic in a Navy ship-
yard or an Army arsenal, a letter carrier, a laborer on a highway or a sewer
project, an inspector of elevators or livestock, a hospital attendant, a farmer's
adviser on soil conservation or animal husbandry, or a laboratory assistant.
The supervisors and administrators are not expert paper-shufflers but em-
ployees directing police work, the building of dams, the running of insur-
ance services, or the maintenance of parks or highways. Government has
many clerks, but so does any company in private industry which is interested
in maintaining records on its production, its income, and its expenditures.

2. THE PERSONNEL OFFICE IN GOVERNMENT

The personnel functions of the executive branch of government are
typically divided among a central personnel agency, the personnel specialists
in each agency, and the operating officials and supervisors. This division
of functions has inevitably led to fights for control. The central personnel
agency, usually called the civil service commission, tends to guard its powers
and look with suspicion upon efforts of the operating agencies to assume
greater responsibilities. Agency personnel specialists, while on the one
hand opposing the central personnel agency, on the other hand look askance
at the efforts of line officials to obtain independence from personnel controls.
The supervisors and even the operating executives frequently have not much
use for either of the others. Yet it is a reasonable assumption that each of

15 This statement is not meant to imply that government salaries are as high as those
in private industry on the basis of comparison of duties and responsibilities, especially in the
upper ranges. But there are not so many high-paying jobs in industry, and the underpaid
government employee may not be able to obtain a higher salary in industry because of lack
of opportunity. City and state governments, in general, pay much less than corresponding
positions in private industrv.

548 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

the three elements in the personnel picture has an important role, and that
light shed on their respective responsibilities will help avoid the heat of or-
ganizational friction.

Central Personnel Agencies. No central personnel agency can hope to
be popular always or with every one. Under the laws and constitutional
provisions affecting its work, it must try to meet almost irreconcilable re-
quirements.6 A single agency cannot administer laws relating in general
terms to veterans preference, apportionment, appointment by open com-
petition, pay increases within grade, and classification and compensation
based on evaluation of duties, and at the same time satisfy the specific re-
cruitment, promotion, and classification needs of thousands of supervisors
in individual personnel actions.7 The best central personnel agencies rec-
ognize the duality of responsibilities and evaluate each of their actions in
the light of both responsibilities. The major attacks on central personnel
agencies have arisen when one or the other responsibility has been used as
the sole basis for operation. Attempting rigidly to enforce general rules of
statutory personnel policy has resulted in criticism from the operating
agencies of interference in good management. Meeting fully even the
legitimate desires of top administrators and line executives has resulted in
public condemnations for seeming violations of laws and regulations.

The relationship of the central personnel agency to the chief executive
—whether he be mayor, governor, or President— is a vital factor in its suc-
cess. Close contact is fundamental to the establishment of satisfactory
working connections with line agencies and to obtaining adequate funds
with which to operate. In order to strengthen this relationship, there has
arisen during recent years a movement away from independent civil service
commissions with administrative responsibilities toward single-headed per-
sonnel departments assisted by an advisory committee with rule-making
and review functions but no operating authority. The new general prin-
ciple was strongly advocated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Commit-
tee on Administrative Management which recommended, in addition to

«Mosher, William E. and Kingsley, J. Donald, Public Personnel Administration, chs.
4, 5, and 6, New York: Harper, rev. ed., 1941, contains an excellent discussion of the func-
tions and organizational problems of central personnel agencies. This is the leading textbook
on the subject. Other good introductions are: "Improved Personnel in Government Service,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1937, Vol. 189; Readings in
Public Personnel Administration, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1942; and Reeves, Floyd
W. and David, Paul T., Personnel Administration in the federal Service, Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1937, one of the special studies for the President's Committee on
Administrative Management.

7 Cf. White, Leonard D., ed., Civil Service In Wartime, Chicago: University of Chicago,
J945, which indicates on the whole that civil service commissions can, if necessary, meet the
k-ecruiting needs even of wartime government if they transfer a large part of the initiative
for recruitment to the line agencies. See also above Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administra-
tion," sec. 3, "Training for Public Adminsitration."

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 549

the abolition of the three-member commission, that the central personnel
agency be made part of the new Executive Office of the President.8

Congressional opposition to this principle was based on the role of the
Civil Service Commission as a control agency, as distinguished from the
view of the President's Committee, which stressed the services that a per-
sonnel agency should offer to operating officials. So an intermediary ar-
rangement was made: the commission was maintained, but a Liaison Officer
for Personnel Management was established as part of the President's
immediate staff. Some states, however, such as Michigan, Connecticut, and
Minnesota, have in effect followed the recommendations of the President's
Committee. While this conflict between congressional and presidential
views is symbolic of the dualism of responsibilities of the central personnel
agency, there is thus far no conclusive evidence that the device of the single-
headed personnel department has resulted in a definite shift of emphasis
between control and service responsibilities.

Wording Relationships. There is an unfortunate gap between the central
personnel and budget agencies in most governmental units whereas their
functions reveal the need for effective coordination. In Connecticut, the
budget and personnel functions are more closely linked than in most juris-
dictions, partly as a result of having the heads of both functions report
to the Commissioner of Finance and Control rather than independently to
the governor. This may indicate that the United States Civil Service Com-
mission, if made part of the Executive Office of the President and placed
under a head of that office who would also direct the budget function,
could achieve a closer and more permanent relationship with the Bureau of
the Budget than is possible on the present basis of informal agreements and
mutual interests. Where there is a gap between the two functions, the per-
sonnel agency is prone to accuse the budget office of failing to recognize
the human problems of administration while the budgeteers may decry the
financial cost of proposed personnel policies.

The expansion of the functions of central personnel agencies, especially
during the past twenty-five years, makes it evident that a civil service com-
mission's work can be ruinous to good administration unless its functions
are properly administered.0 When appointments were its main task, good
management could alleviate mistakes made. The entrance of civil service
commissions into such areas as classification, compensation, within-grade
salary increases, service ratings, personnel utilization, and appeals from
discharges has given them an outstanding opportunity to assist in the im-

8 The most extended discussion of this important organizational problem is to be found
in Reeves and David, op. cit. above note 6. The usual civil service commission in the
United States is a three-member, bipartisan board appointed by the chief executive with the
consent of the upper chamber of the legislature, the members serving overlapping terms. Cf.
also above Ch. 8, "The Chief Executive," sec. 5, "Arms of Modern Management."

9 For discussion of what these functions should be, see Hubbard, Henry F., "Elements
of a Comprehensive Personnel Program," Public Personnel Review, 1940, Vol. 1, pp. 1-17.

550 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

provement of public administration and at the same time made inefficiency
on their part a heavy burden which even the most competent administrators
cannot carry. The expansion of personnel activities thus is a great challenge.
Administering its program with full recognition of management problems,
the civil service commission can help raise administration to a high plane;
conversely, its work can lead to the condemnation of all personnel activities,
both good and bad.

Of course, the personnel agency is subject to extraneous influences.
The pressure groups in civil service administration are easily identified.10
There is that part of the public which is interested in government employ-
ment, whose most frequent complaints are directed at the nature of the
examinations used — some favoring one type, some another, based largely
on self-interest. There are those entitled to veterans preference, who are
anxious that this preference be observed faithfully.11 There are the civic
groups, who either as taxpayers or as citizens concerned with the general
welfare are anxious that civil service commissions withstand other pressures,
whether from the chief executive, the legislature, or special-interest groups,
including government employees or prospective employees. There are the
various technical and professional bodies interested in higher qualification
standards and higher classification grades in their special fields. And there
are the legislators, interested in consideration of their constituents' problems
and alert, at times, to correct apparent wrong-doing in the executive branch
of government.

Departmental Personnel Offices. The central personnel agency cannot
and, as a practical matter, should not attempt to carry out all specialized per-
sonnel functions by itself. Such an attempt would lead to self-destruction.
In any large jurisdiction, the central agency is too far removed from im-
mediate operating problems to make this virtual monopoly desirable.

To provide those personnel services which a central personnel agency
cannot perform and to bring personnel operations closer to the operating
officials who need assistance, departmental personnel offices have been estab-
lished.12 In the case of large federal agencies, bureau and regional personnel
offices have also been set up. As was suggested previously, the central
personnel agency can look on these offices either as contenders for power or
as valuable allies in making the personnel function effective.

10 The best discussion of this and related subjects is to be found in Public Relations of
Public Personnel Agencies, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1941.

11 Veterans preference can only be justified by a theory that public employment should
be used for patriotic purposes; it cannot be justified either on the basis of merit-system selec-
tion or the best administration of the public services. Cf. Miller, John F., "Veterans Prefer-
ence in the Public Service," in Friedrich, Carl J. and Others, Problems of the American Public
Service, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935.

12 There is no adequate publication on the functions and administrative problems of a
departmental personnel office. Some discussion of this subject is to be found in Altmcycr,
A. J., "The Scope of Departmental Personnel Activities," Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 1937, Vol. 189, pp. 188-191.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 551

Too often, the situation has degenerated into open conflict, with the
agency personnel office stressing the specific needs of its department, while
the central agency has emphasized the over-all governmental viewpoint and
legislative and procedural limitations. As a result, too much of the time
of the departmental personnel office is sometimes spent in planning hov;
to outmaneuver the central agency. What this differentiation of functions
requires is administrative skill and professional competence on both sides.
Since 1939, the Council of Personnel Administration in the federal govern-
ment has proved to be an excellent device for helping to reconcile the two
conflicting forces by providing a formal method for bringing together de-
partmental personnel officers and Civil Service Commission representatives.

The creation of departmental personnel staffs is mainly a development
of the 1930's, but the personnel office of the United States Department of
Agriculture was set up in the 1920's shortly after the passage of the Classi-
fication Act of 1923. Executive Order No. 7916 of June 24, 1938, required
each federal agency to establish such offices. They grew out of the clerical
functions previously performed by departmental chief clerks in such matters
as payroll preparation and recording of leave.13 By and large, they have
not been extensively developed in local or state governments, although the
Department of Water and Power in the city of Los Angeles has long had
such an office and some steps in this direction have been taken in New
York City and elsewhere. In general, any governmental agency interested
in a full-fledged personnel program can justify having at least one full-time
professional personnel assistant, even when its total roster is as low as two
hundred.

No matter what the type of organization may be, the fundamental per-
sonnel needs remain the same, although emphasis varies with time and
administrative circumstances. Classification of positions according to simi-
larity of duties is basic to good administration and other personnel functions.
The employment process, which encompasses recruitment, examination,
selection, and placement, has long been considered the core of personnel
administration. Equally important is the work involved in individual and
group training and in employee relations. In some organizations, such as
public transportation and utilities systems, safety engineering is a pertinent
activity.

Relations with Operating Officials. The ultimate test of the effectiveness
of any personnel office, whether central or departmental, is the extent to
which it implements the work of the operating official. In other words,
personnel administration is the means whereby the line official obtains
specialized assistance to help him carry out his functions. The first task

13 The existence of a personnel office is not a definite indication that the office is pro-
viding professional rather than clerical personnel services to a department. Too often ex-
pertness in regulations is substituted for skill in recruitment, placement, training, and em-
ployee relations.

552 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

of the personnel specialist is to aid the operating official in identifying and
meeting his employee problems.14 Handling of training and employee re-
lations matters, setting qualification standards, and determining job duties is
the work of the supervisor and not that of the personnel specialist. When
the latter assists on these problems, he can do so only at the request of the
supervisor. To the greatest extent possible, the supervisor should be trained
so that he can perform his own duties efficiently.

It would be easy for the personnel officer merely to exercise control and
not to attempt to enlighten or persuade. It would be simple to dismiss
a personnel request from a supervisor as improper and require him to
justify each action in detail. But it is obvious that this approach would
lead nowhere. The opposite and constructive approach compels the per-
sonnel officer to develop his techniques so that any suggestions made to
the supervisor are based on convincing reasons.

It should not be necessary to belabor this point, but much of the chief
criticism of personnel administration is related to it. Starting out with the
point of view of reformers anxious to defeat the spoilsmen, personnel ad-
ministration has yet to learn that it is now part of management, and not
divorced from it. It has yet to appreciate that its justification lies not in
aloofness but in its contribution to management.15

Qualifications for Personnel Worf(. Personnel administration is one of
the social sciences, and its work therefore requires knowledge of human
behavior and ability in personal relations. Since it is also part of manage-
ment, it calls for a thorough understanding of all management problems,
including organization, public relations, and coordination. In addition, the
personnel specialist, to be able to help the line official, must know the spe-
cific techniques of training, placement, employee relations, classification,
and recruitment.

The production engineer has his knowledge of machines and manufac-
turing methods, the physician his knowledge of human ailments and meth-
ods of treatment. The personnel specialist has to be acquainted with the
body of knowledge that has been developed in his field. Without it he merely
brings to the solution of a problem a vague desire to do well which, at best,
is offensive to the supervisors. In addition to his knowledge of techniques,
however, he has to be skilled in their application. He is not an automobile
mechanic treating an inanimate car but a responsible agent counseling em-
ployees, interviewing applicants for employment, and advising management.

14 The most realistic study of this and related areas of administration is presented in
Meriam, Lewis, Public Personnel Problems from the Standpoint of the Operating Officer,
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1938. Cf. also above Ch. 18, "The Tasks of Middle Man-
agement," and Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision."

15 For a comparison of public and industrial personnel administration, see Graham, George
A., "Personnel Practices in Business and Governmental Organizations," op. cit. above note 11,
pp. 337-427.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 553

3. CLASSIFICATION AND COMPENSATION

Characteristics of Classification. The introduction of classification into
the field of public personnel administration has provided a tool which, while
not yet perfected, is of basic importance to other processes such as employ-
ment, examination, training, service rating, salary determination, budgeting,
and organizational planning.10 The first classification plan in the public
service which approached present-day standards was developed in the city
of Chicago shortly before World War I. The federal government's classi-
fication program was adopted by Congress in 1923. A substantial number
of city and state governments have made progress in these programs since
that time. It is now generally accepted practice for a local or state govern-
ment which enacts a civil service law to begin immediately with the prepa-
ration of a classification plan.

By classification is meant the grouping of positions on the basis of simi-
larity of duties and qualification requirements. Each such group, which may
include from one to a thousand or more positions, is called a "class" and
each class has an appropriate designation. Classes are sometimes arranged
in series — a graded hierarchy of classes in the same occupational field with
the lowest class having the simplest duties and the highest the most complex
tasks.

Grouping positions into classes offers a time-saving device which is of
immeasurable benefit to other administrative processes. A state or city might
have ten thousand positions but only six hundred classes. This means that it
would require only six hundred examination registers to meet all of its em-
ployment needs, not ten thousand. The budget officer would not have to
investigate each position in each department to determine whether compar-
able salaries are involved in budget requests from different departments,
since the titles of the positions would indicate whether the duties are com-
parable. The training specialist would know, without having to make an
independent investigation, which departments have employees who should
be included in a given training program.

Specifications are usually prepared in connection with the development
of classification plans. These specifications furnish for each class a class
title, a statement of duties, and a statement of appropriate qualifications.
The statements provide a guide as to which class each position should be
allocated to, the nature of the examination that should be prepared for re-
cruitment, and the salary that should be paid for employees performing
the duties described in the specification.

While these are some of the major purposes that class specifications are
designed to fulfill, in actual practice they usually fall short of the goal. Too
frequently the specifications are prepared primarily from the point of view

10 The most thorough exposition of this subject is offered in Position-Clasfification in tkc
Public Service, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1941.

554 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

of the classification technician, and do not meet the needs of the examina-
tion and training specialists. As a result, the specialists in examination and
training duplicate the previous investigation of positions by the classification
staff. Extensive participation by examination and training specialists in
the planning and formulation of classification plans helps to reduce such
duplication.

Keeping Classification Up-To-Date. However, positions in any organi-
zation are always in a state of flux. Rapid changes in duties often result
from turnover so that the old specification no longer accurately describes
the new duties. Addition to or subtraction from the functions of an organi-
zation inevitably alters the composition of positions. A new administrator
carries out changes which are sometimes not reflected in the organization
chart but which affect the duties of positions. An increase or decrease in
appropriations brings with it a reallocation of duties among positions. Such
changes, constantly occurring in any organization, make necessary a day-by-
day administration of the classification plan in order to keep it up-to-date.

Failure to recognize this need has been frequent and disastrous. It is
as if the blueprints for a 1938 automobile were used to produce today's
model.

To overcome this condition, a classification staff is needed that can, by
working with the various units of the organization, keep abreast of posi-
tion changes and make the necessary revision. This may be done by chang-
ing positions from one class to another or by establishing new classes. The
necessary information is usually obtained by requiring a new description of
a position whenever an appointment is proposed or a promotion recom-
mended; or by means of periodic surveys of limited numbers of positions,
on either an occupational or an organizational basis.

General Overview Versus Special Considerations. In the federal service
particularly, and to some extent in state and local government, the classi-
fication process has been at times a source of mystery and frustration to op-
erating officials, and at other times a game which one tries to win by evasion
and misrepresentation. The reasons are obvious. The classification specialist
attempts to bring order out of chaos. To emphasize the common character-
istics of positions included in a class, he tends to gloss over those individual
differences in positions which destroy the symmetry of his work. Inevitably,
this means inadequate recognition of the relative uniqueness of some posi-
tions. Furthermore, the classification specialist looks at the total structure of
the government jurisdiction, whereas the operating official is only conscious
of the positions immediately under his supervision or under that of col-
leagues close by. Finally, despite some valiant efforts, operating officials have
not yet been fully informed as to how classification operates.

This educational task is now recognized as essential. By means of confer-
ences and written materials prepared specially for supervisors, some progress
is being made. In the federal service, however, inflexibilities are produced by

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 555

the need for congressional approval of changes in grades in the classification
plan. It is therefore improbable that frustration of management through the
classification plan can soon be completely overcome. Administrative experi-
ence during World War II, fortunately, has shown that full cooperation
between the United States Civil Service Commission and the line agencies
at least can mitigate the more serious rigidities.

In the best administration of a classification plan, full weight is given
to its close relationship with organizational planning. At least partly be-
cause of the necessary tie between these two administrative services, the
Tennessee Valley Authority and the United States Department of Agricul-
ture have the organizational planning unit as part of the personnel office,
while in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration classi-
fication was removed from the personnel division and made part of organi-
zational analysis. In any case, no matter what structural arrangements are
in effect, it is generally considered desirable to associate surveys for organi-
zational planning with those for classification purposes so that duplicate
inquiries can be avoided and the fullest use made by both groups of the
information developed by each. Review by classification staffs of individual
position descriptions often reveals organizational defects which should be
corrected through joint action by management and organizational-planning
specialists.

Classification and the Career Service. The implications of a classification
plan for a career service and for the total personnel program are often over-
looked. A good classification plan can be compared with a tree with a strong
trunk, a few main branches extending from the trunk near the ground, and
with proliferation becoming more evident the higher one goes. Similarly
with a classification plan. The number of classes designed for original re-
cruitment—the trunk and the main branches—should be kept to a minimum
and be related to the educational system so that, for example, entrance classes
arc tied in with high-school graduation, college graduation, and graduate-
and professional-school training. A large number of special classes beyond
these entrance classes would not, therefore, interfere with the recruitment of
the best students because of their lack of experience. Nor would it throw
a heavy burden on the examining process by unduly multiplying the num-
ber of open competitive examinations which would have to be administered.

One of the most significant technical problems in the field of classifica-
tion relates to the need for an understandable presentation of the differences
between classes within the same occupational series and between series. Too
often, class specifications have used vague terminology in attempting to
establish this distinction. In consequence, a position as statistician might be
in one class if the statistician worked in a small agency but in a higher grade
if the agency were larger. It is true that semantic difficulties occur in other
fields besides classification, but much of the mystery of classification to both
management and employees would be eliminated by clearer descriptions of

556 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

class differences. In order to solve this problem, some class specifications
prepared in the last few years have included a section on "distinguishing
features of the work," thus emphasizing the differences between closely
related classes.

The main misunderstandings in the field of classification arise from a
confusion of the position that is to be classified with the employee doing the
job. The classification technician attempts to allocate a position to a class,
whether the position is occupied or vacant. He is concerned with the duties
and responsibilities that have been assigned by management to that position,
and, if the position is occupied, are being performed in it. He is not con-
cerned with the individual employee's qualifications for the purpose of
determining how well the job is done or whether the employee could as-
sume additional responsibilities. In other words, the employee might be a
certified public accountant and yet be performing duties which require only
the knowledge and skill of a graduate of a commercial high-school book-
keeping course. Conversely, if the employee has had only bookkeeping
training but is performing the duties of a highly skilled accountant, the
position would be allocated on the basis of the duties only. Failure to follow
this principle will result in gross inequities, either in favor or to the dis-
advantage of the interests of certain employees.

Compensation. The principal problem in the establishment of a com-
pensation plan is the lack of a well-defined wage theory for the public serv-
ice.17 Lacking such a theory, those responsible for the preparation of a com-
pensation plan have floundered among various improvised conceptions. Not
by the process of clear formulation but by rationalization from practices that
seem prevalent, wage-setting for per-annum employees in the public service
appears to be generally based on the minimum rate necessary to obtain quali-
fied employees. In brief, government has not attempted to set a high rate
for private industry to emulate but has more usually adopted a rate which
is not as low as the lowest-paying rate in industry nor as high as the
highest.

In contrast with the practices controlling salaries of government em-
ployees paid on an annual basis, it is customary in the public service for the
trades, labor, and other per-diem positions to be compensated at rates cor-
responding to the highest in private industry. One factor that accounts for
this difference between per-diem and per-annum employees is that the work
of per-diem public employees tends to be more closely comparable to that
performed in private industry than the duties of the white-collar civil serv-
ant When one union serves workers in both industry and government,
there is obviously pressure toward reducing the differences between the two
sets of pay scales.

17 For a discussion of the problems of compensation in the public service, see Richey, Carl
L., "Determining Pay Policy," pp. 44-48, and Baruch, Ismar, "Surveying Prevailing Salary
Rates," pp. 49-62, Readings, op. cit. above in note 6.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 557

The compensation plan needs to be kept as current as the classification
plan, although classification requires day-by-day review while the influences
affecting the compensation plan tend to change more slowly. Increases and
decreases in costs of living and changes in the demand-and-supply situation
in specific occupations make desirable a periodic review, probably on an
annual basis, of the salary rates which have been established. The city of
St. Paul was the leader in tying the compensation plan into a cost-of-living
index and providing for changes in compensation based on changes in the
index. Other communities have followed this lead. The plan, if adopted
with the full approval of the legislature, the chief executive, and the em-
ployees, is of substantial benefit in reducing wrangling and bitter disputes
over wages. The Tennessee Valley Authority holds an annual joint con-
ference of management and labor to discuss changes needed in the wages'
for trades positions, based on data collected jointly.

The usual compensation plan in the public service for per-annum posi-
tions provides for a minimum and a maximum rate and intermediate rates.
One of the most contentious issues in personnel and budget administration
arises in connection with methods for making increases between the mini-
mum and the maximum — that is, in-grade increases. In the past, and still
current in some places, such increases have been made on an unsystematic
basis, often as a result of chance availability of funds or to reward a par-
ticular individual. To overcome this unsatisfactory condition, some govern-
ment units — such as the city and the state of New York, the city of Los
Angeles, and the federal government — provide automatic in-grade salary
increases. In the federal service, these increases are based on period of
service and efficiency, and provision is made for an extra increase for
superior accomplishment. Formal plans for in-grade increases are appar-
ently far superior to the previous haphazard methods.

By and large, the compensation to be paid for a class of positions is sub-
ject to legislative action. This control of specifics has had a deleterious effect
on public administration. It has resulted in loss of competent personnel in
periods of rising wages because of the rigidity of legislative determination.
It has produced evasions in the administration of classification, such as
reclassification of positions in order to obtain more money for a position,
since the salary could not be changed to meet altered general conditions. It
has also injected political considerations into the administrative process. It
would seem desirable for the legislature to exercise its control by review of
budget estimates rather than by review of the salary ranges for individual
classes or series of positions.

4. EMPLOYMENT

Implications of the Career Idea. Employment practices and standards
establish the "tone" of an organization. We can compare, in private indus-
try, the sophisticated personnel of the advertising agencies and the staid

538 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

staff of financial institutions, the hurry of the newspaper room and the
hushed atmosphere of the corporation lawyer's office. Organizations as old
as most government agencies reflect differences in personnel as a result of
variety in function, in standards used at the time each group was hired, and
in age distribution. The bright young economists engaged in monetary re-
search in the Treasury Department are different in type from the experts
in the same department's Bureau of Accounts. The recently recruited stenog-
rapher fresh from school is different from the secretary who has been in the
organization thirty years. The Ph.D. just hired for biological research is
different from his colleague who started out as a laboratory assistant after
graduation from high school and advanced to the lower grades in the
professional service.

These observations make plain that the setting of employment standards
is part of top-management policy and not to be dissociated from it.
The objectives stated by the chief executive, whether in terms of a "return
to normalcy" or a dynamic program which stresses that "there is nothing
to fear except fear itself," must underlie employment standards. There was
not much point in bringing into the government progressive minds when
government was viewed as a negative, primarily regulating institution. On
the other hand, unimaginative technical competence is not of much help
to a chief executive interested in blazing new trails. It is the function of the
chief executive to seek response from the legislature if his objectives are not
theirs; it is the function of the employees of the executive branch to carry
out the chief executive's goals under the laws. Attacks by Congressmen on
appointments in the executive branch during the presidency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt were therefore in the main aimed at the chief executive, even
though in disguised form.

Viewing this problem from a different angle, we can state that a chief
executive should be able to secure the personnel resources that he needs
to attain his objectives. He may be faced, as was the first Labor government
in Great Britain, with a civil service which on the whole is psychologically
conditioned By sympathies at variance with his own. In such an instance,
a speedy remedy may be repugnant to a merit and career system.18 For-
tunately, American administration has its roots in all strata of society, and
in the wake of the New Deal it shows a beneficial mixture of attitudes.

A career service is the best insurance of good administration. Such a
service is predicated on recruiting young men and women with capacity

18 The possibility of conflict between a chief executive's personnel needs and a solidified
career service is obvious. Periods of rapid social change place the greatest stress on* a career
service. It is also obvious that demands for adjustment can be used as a subterfuge by
those interested in patronage and the destruction of efficient administration. Ideally, a
career service should be distinguished by a true career ideology, assuring whole-hearted sup-
port of administrative competence to any lawful government. This actually coincides with
main tendencies of professional attitude. The question of service ideology is also closely linked
to that of the basic rights of the civil servant. On this point, see above Ch. 21, "Morale and Dis-
cipline,'1 sec. 3, "The Modes of Discipline."

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 559

for learning and growth, training them in order to develop and utilize their
aptitudes, and offering them opportunity for advancement in responsibility
and remuneration. The advantages are teamwork and continuity in ad-
ministration, and an effective way of attracting the ablest candidates to the
public service. However, the administration of a career service depends on
a recognition of its implications. Among these, employment practices are
extremely important. A career service requires positive efforts to induce the
most competent individuals to compete in its examinations. It also requires
that examinations emphasize capacity for growth, with achievement meas-
ured only to the extent that it also indicates ability and promise. Mediocrity
would not be a proper measure since it makes inevitable the need for re-
cruitment at levels higher than the present entrance grades to compensate
for inadequacies in general ability.19

However competently a career system is administered, an occasional in-
jection of employees from outside the service in higher-grade positions can
be justified. New techniques in technical and professional services require
new employees, both on a temporary and on a permanent basis, to provide
leadership in the use of these techniques. Also, the stimulus of competition
from outside an organization, if limited in its application so as to preserve
the career idea, is a useful incentive to employees to keep abreast of devel-
opments in their fields. Of course, any extensive need for outside recruit-
ment at higher grades is a reflection on the ability available within an
organization. On the other hand, complete failure to recruit employees
occasionally at the higher grades is probably also a reflection on the organi-
zation, because it might demonstrate self-complacency.

Recruitment. In general, public personnel agencies have done a poorer
job in recruitment than in classification. While the classification techniques
used in the public service are at least as good as those found in private
;ndustry, public recruitment has been inferior to that in commercial and in-
dustrial enterprise:20 A notable exception occurred during World War II
when the federal government— face to face with a need for more than two
million additional employees while the military services were simulta-
neously withdrawing more than ten million individuals from the labor
force — went out to the sources of manpower and used every known device,
and some new ones, to get help. It should be noted, however, that this
great success was accomplished during a period when competitive examina-
tions were temporarily abandoned. Can the public service in the future

19 The best discussion of the need for a career service is provided in White, Leonard
D., Government Career Service, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935. C/. also above
Ch. 2, "The Study of Public Administration," sec. 3, "Training for Public Administration";
Ch. 18, "The Tasks of Middle Management," sec. 1, "The Dual Function of Middle Manage-
ment"; and Ch. 20, "Administrative Self-Improvement," sec. 1, "Evolutionary Currents."

20 A good summary of recruiting practices in the public service is presented in Recruiting
Applicants for the Public Service, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1942.

560 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

retain competitive examinations and yet meet the aggressive competition
of private industry and the universities for talent?

A number of recruiting techniques have been devised to meet this prob-
lem. Examinations are being coordinated with the school year so that eligi-
bility registers will be ready and appointments available before graduation.
Operating officials with university, professional, and commercial contacts are
playing a positive role in interesting competent individuals in government
employment. But more can be done. Examination registers can be put on
a continuous basis so that applicants for employment will be able to file
at any time rather than during a restricted period. Advantages and oppor-
tunities in the public service could be better publicized through professional
associations, college personnel departments, and pamphlets. Finally, the
examination process can be speeded up so that the gap between the dates of
filing an application and receiving an offer of employment would be greatly
reduced.

In other words, personnel agencies should not be content with post-
office announcements or obscure "help-wanted" advertisements to stimulate
competition for employment. The number of applications received for an
examination is never a sufficient guide to the quality of recruiting work
done; only the quality of applicants indicates success in this field. In the
same manner as advertising agencies test the comparative value of various
media for selling specific commodities, public personnel agencies should
study the results obtained from different recruiting methods for different
occupations and grades of positions.

Examinations. Traditionally, the examining process has occupied the
center of the stage for civil service commissions.21 This situation is his-
torically explained since the prime reason for their establishment has been
the desire for improvement in selection. However, present trends show that
management problems connected with classification, compensation, place-
ment, training and employee relations play an increasingly important role,
even though examinations will probably always continue to be of great
significance.

Examining is one phase of public administration which borrows from
industrial, educational, and military experience. Intelligence, clerical, and
trades testing programs are similar in all these fields. But significant
differences are to be noted. Examination methods in the civil service require
that applicants be ranked in the order of their ability, from the top down,
while military and industrial personnel processes tend to emphasize the
determination of the applicant's minimum ability to do the job for which
he is being examined. The civil service examination generally has to ac-
complish two purposes: first, to determine which applicants meet minimum

21 For a detailed analysis of all types of civil service tests see Sayre, Wallace S. and
Mandell, Milton, Education and the Civil Service in New York CttV» Bulletin No. 20, Wash-
ington: Office of Education, 1938.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 56l

standards; and second, to determine which applicant from among these
is best, next best, and so on. It is obvious that an examination which is
used for both purposes in common must be much better than one used to
determine^only ability to meet minimum standards.

Moreover, examinations in the public service have to be virtually appeal-
proof. THry must be sufficiently objective so that they would produce equiv-
alent results even if different individuals of the same professional compe-
tence were to administer them. This necessity arises out of the right of
appeal, even to the courts, available to candidates who question the fair-
ness of the examination used. Therein lies both a stimulus and a limitation
for the examiner in a central personnel agency. It means that every method
he proposes to use he must first judge by the two criteria of technical value
and objectivity. Furthermore, the examiner in the public service is con-
cerned with a third factor — the outer appearance of a testing technique
in the sense that the examination, from the viewpoint of both legislative
requirements and public pressure, shall look practical in addition to being
technically sound.

In general, we may hazard the opinion that the soundness of examining
methods for the public service has not been substantially reduced as a result
of these three factors.22 While some testing methods which appear to be
sound cannot be used because of the three limitations, others which are
effective have been developed. The examining process in government has
met the basic standards of reliability and validity to approximately the same
extent as the examination methods used by private industry.

The basic types of tests used in public personnel examinations are four:
written examination, oral examination, performance demonstration, and
evaluation of education and experience. These tests are used in varying
combinations, depending on the type of occupation, the grade level of the
job, and the number of applicants anticipated. The general method is to
give greater credit for the written test, and little or no credit for experience
in the lower grades of occupations. This scheme is reversed in the higher
grades, where the oral test is used in examinations for occupations when
skill in dealing with people is important. The performance test, which
requires the applicant to demonstrate how well he can do the work, is used
mainly in examinations for trade, stenographic, and typing positions.

The greatest handicap to the improvement of the examination process
in government has been the failure to evaluate examinations scientifically.
Inadequate use of scientific methods, contrasting sharply with the extensive
research programs of the. military services in World Wars I and II, has kept
examinations at approximately the same stage of development as they were

22 Dr. Uhrbrock, one of the leading testing experts in private industry, has stated: "The
federal service is far ahead of private industry in the use of modern selection methods."
Administrative Management, p. 17, Washington: Graduate School of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture, 1938.

562 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

ten to fifteen years ago. While it is recognized that the number of variables
in many an administrative problem tends to reduce the possibility of
accurate measurement, selection methods can be studied with relative pre-
cision. This is one phase of administration which can be made scientific;
there should be no need for using methods based so largely on mere opinion
as to what is good and appropriate.

Written Tests. The written test23 is most extensively used in public per-
sonnel examinations. When well prepared, it is the best selection method
for many types of positions. When inadequately prepared, it is frequently
criticized as "academic," irrelevant to the job, and measuring factual knowl-
edge only. Written tests can be grouped in the following categories: (a) gen-
eral mental ability or specific mental abilities, such as verbal or quantitative
reasoning; (b) aptitude for a group of occupations, such as mechanical,
engineering, or clerical; (c) achievement in any particular field as a result
of either training or experience; and (d) personality and interests.

In the main, achievement tests are most commonly used in the public
service, with general mental ability tests in second place. The emphasis on
achievement tests arises from the desire of operating officials to select per-
sons who will be able to assume their duties immediately with little or no
training. The situation in this respect is quite different in the military serv-
ices, where mental ability and aptitude are stressed and adequate training
is provided so that the assigned duties can ultimately be satisfactorily
performed.

Emphasis on achievement may seriously restrict recruitment by eliminat-
ing from competition a large number of able beginners. In the federal
service, the examination for junior civil-service examiner was specifically
designed to draw into government outstanding young applicants who
could be trained and placed in positions where their abilities would be best
utilized. This examination and the related junior professional-assistant
examination have been the stepping-stone to appointment for many promis-
ing federal administrative employees. The entire examination for junior
civil-service examiner and part of the examination for junior professional
assistant have been a general mental-ability test which largely measures
potential capacity rather than specific achievement.

Primarily as a result of studies made by universities and the military
services, aptitude tests are now available for trade and clerical positions,
and some central personnel agencies make extensive use of them.

For several reasons, written tests for measuring personality and interests
have not been used often in the public service despite the great importance
of these factors in successful job performance. In the first place, public

23 A forthcoming volume of the Civil Service Assembly will offer the first comprehen-
sive description of this field. For a summary of the material in this volume, see Sublette,
Donald J., "The Preparation of Pencil and Paper Tests," pp. 71-87, Readings, op. cit. above
in note 6.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 563

personnel agencies have done little in determining the value of such tests,
while the data on their usefulness in industry still seem inconclusive. Second-
ly, since only a few tests of this kind are available and extensive preparation
of new types is beyond the resources of most public personnel agencies, the
continued use of the same tests might invite "coaching" which would elimi-
nate any value the tests may have. Thirdly, and perhaps most important,
we have little evidence to indicate that bright candidates, no matter how
unsuitable their personalities, could not "beat" these tests by giving responses
which would add up to a score quite at variance with their actual personali-
ties. The significance of the factor of personality is so great, however, that
continued research in both written and other types of tests is warranted in
order to obtain an adequate measure of human behavior.

Returning to the general subject, we may note that the controversy
between those advocating the essay type of questions and those favoring
short-answer objective questions is practically over. Except where the num-
ber of candidates is relatively small, central personnel agencies are in general
now using objective questions in their written tests. The advocates of the
essay question emphasize its apparent value in measuring written expres-
sion and ability to develop an argument or a subject. However, in attempt-
ing thus to rate written expression, personnel agencies are faced with an
expensive technique. It is also difficult, if not impossible, to get the general
agreement of several raters on the score to be assigned to the response. Poor
preparation of short-answer tests has resulted in the charge that they meas-
ure only factual knowledge. Actually, such tests can measure judgment,
reasoning, and analytical ability much more precisely and inexpensively
than the essay test or any other type of test.

It is frequently stated that written tests are not useful in examining older
candidates, since younger applicants, it is claimed, have an advantage on these
tests. It has not yet been demonstrated, however, that candidates in different
age groups but with equal ability get different scores on written tests. Where
the written test attempts to measure extensiveness of experience, as fre
quently happens, it discriminates against the younger rather than the oldei
candidate. Only when the written test attempts to measure knowledge
based on college or high-school curricula does it favor the recent graduate
and it does so quite appropriately if the examination is for an entrance grad<
in an occupation where such schooling is the only qualification.

Oral Tests. The oral test24 is used far beyond the point warranted b]
available data on its value. Its frequent inclusion in examinations seem
to rest on its apparent suitability for measuring personal characteristics

24 A complete discussion of this subject may be found in Oral Tests in Public Pertonnt
Selection, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1943. The oral test, though intended to probe int
personality traits, must not be confused with so-called suitability investigations, which ca
easily deteriorate into political witch-hunting and .encroachments upon fundamental right
Sec above Ch. 15, "Legislative Control," sec. 4, "Quest for Accountability/'

564 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

not on its actual effectiveness. It traditionally is part of examinations for
higher-grade positions and for positions involving extensive contacts with
the public.

The usual method for conducting the oral test is to have the applicants
interviewed by a rating board, which generally has three to five members.
The members of the board ask the candidate questions about his back-
ground or general questions which will indicate his ability in oral expres-
sion. Generally, however, the important facts of human behavior are not
revealed. The candidate is in an artificial situation, and the questions asked
are on the level of a casual conversation rather than on that of a serious
conference. The oral test, in such a situation, merely measures the superficial
aspects of personality, speech, appearance, and general mental ability, as con-
trasted with the specific traits of leadership, tact, and forcefulness required
in many positions.

The past few years have witnessed the development of a number of new
techniques which may do much to enhance the value of the oral test. The
"stress interview" attempts to put the candidate "on the spot." He is rated
on his reactions to the stress situations, which may even attempt to duplicate
actual work problems. The oral testing method devised by former United
States Civil Service Commissioner Samuel H. Ordway, Jr. and James C.
O'Brien requires the candidate to describe from his past experience inci-
dents in which he successfully coped with situations similar to those that
might arise in the position for which he has applied.

The Adjutant General's Office of the War Department has made two
improvements in oral testing methods in connection with the officer selec-
tion program. In the first place, although a standard set of questions for
the interview has been developed, the method of questioning has been kept
flexible. Secondly, the rating method is undoubtedly more reliable than
the rather elementary techniques in general use. One additional and prom-
ising oral testing method, utilized by the British Army and the Office of
Strategic Services during World War II and also tried out by the United
States Civil Service Commission, provides for discussion among several can-
didates of a topic selected either by or for them while the rating board
observes but does not participate. This type of oral test seems to furnish
better evidence on leadership abilities and personality adjustment than the
usual interview.

The improvements here cited offer hope that the oral test may become
a significant factor in civil service examinations on the basis of statistical evi-
dence rather than on mere opinion. Since this test lends itself to the same
scientific evaluation as does the written test, intensive study may result in
substantial progress. The written- test offers little hope of developing into
an adequate measure of personality. Perhaps the oral test will fulfill its
promise.

Evaluation of Education and Experience. The evaluation of education

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 565

and experience25 seems to offer important evidence on which to base a candi-
date's standing on the examination register. It is continuously in use for
this purpose. However, no one has yet demonstrated objectively and pre-
cisely that it has much value for selection when administered in accordance
with the usual practices of civil service commissions. It involves the assump-
tion that personnel technicians or occupational specialists can make a ra-
tional decision that, for example, two years of training in electrical engineer-
ing plus four years of experience as a design engineer of power-transmission
lines is worth 87 per cent in a particular examination, while a degree in
mechanical engineering plus three years of experience in operating a power-
generating plant of a specific size is worth 84 per cent in the same exami-
nation. The process, except in extreme cases of either outstanding or
sharply inferior experience, offers only slight hope of reasonably accurate
measurement.

One recent major advance in this field has been the trend toward empha-
sizing the quality of experience offered by the candidate rather than the
quantity. As a corollary to this improvement, additional credit for experi-
ence may be denied beyond a measure set in advance. Finally, the United
States Civil Service Commission, for the three highest grades in the federal
service, is using the technique of thorough investigation to obtain first-hand
information on the quality of experience offered by applicants. This
method, together with improvements that are needed in rating the evi-
dence after it has been obtained, seems to offer the greatest assurance of prog-
ress in experience evaluation.

Related to the problem of rating experience is that of establishing mini-
mum education and experience requirements for admission to civil service
examinations. In our discussion of classification, it was suggested that one
of the criteria of a good classification plan should be the support it gives
to the career idea; that in each occupational series, entrance classes should
be provided which do not require previous experience but only the com-
pletion of appropriate preparation or training. This is essential, since ex-
perience requirements for the lowest grade would force the best college
and high-school graduates into industry. Conversely, if adequate written
tests were used, experience should be permitted as a substitute for educa-
tional requirements in order to extend still further the area of competition.

Performance Tests. In trade and clerical positions particularly, perform-
ance tests26 have been applied with great success by central personnel agen-
cies. The candidate is asked to do a "sample" of the work that the position
entails, and he is rated on the skill he shows. The typist actually types, the

25 Despite the importance given to this test in many civil service examinations, it has not
been studied with any great care. For a discussion of the subject, sec Pockrass, Jack, "Rating
Training and Experience in Merit System Selection," pp. 97-108, Readings, op. tit. above note 6.

26 This subject is discussed in Cozad, Lyman H., "The Use of Performance Tests by the
Los Angeles City Civil Service Commission," pp. 88-96, Reading, op. cit. above in note 6.

566 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

stenographer takes dictation and transcribes her notes, the electrician repairs
a motor, and so on. Candidates like this type of test. Furthermore, the
results obtained indicate, in general, ability to perform the job successfully.
The performance test tends to be the most expensive type, but its great
value justifies its use in many instances.

Great care is needed in the preparation of the performance test in order
to make certain that the work samples selected are representative, and not
atypical, of the actual duties of the position, since the test cannot duplicate
all the duties. In addition, it is desirable to design the test so that objective
ratings may be given, because subjectivity in the rating process will destroy
the value of even the best examination. For example, the strength of the
welds made in a welding test can be measured by a machine in quantitative
terms; the accuracy of transcription of a stenographer can also be rated
against an objective scale in order to obtain reliability in the scoring process.

Placement. In the main, the function of proper placement of employees
has been grossly neglected. Great care has been exercised in the examining
process for original selection, and then the values to be derived have been
wasted in poor assignments. In addition to the placement of a new em-
ployee in order to give him an opportunity to use his knowledge, skills, and
abilities, the placement process involves a follow-up throughout his working
career to make certain that there is maximum utilization of his capacities.
Relatively little attention has been given to initial placement after recruit-
ment, but even less care has been exercised thereafter.27

Civil service examinations are usually designed for the purpose of filling
a group of vacancies rather than a single position. The candidates certified
from the eligibility register for a specific vacancy are therefore ranked in
the order of their general abilities. The agency making the appointment,
however, has to consider additional information in reaching its decision as
to who, among the candidates certified by the civil service commission,
would be best in terms of experience, training, interests, and personality.
Sometimes the considerations involved in passing over a higher-ranking
candidate are hardly valid, but generally civil service examinations need to
be supplemented by additional inquiry pertinent to the filling of vacancies.

27 The field of service or performance ratings has not yet been fully treated. However, a
well -administered service-rating plan is essential to proper placement, training, and supervision.
It is the device for recording periodically how well each employee is performing and what his
strong points and his weak points arc. This information, if properly prepared, is invaluable for
placement and training purposes. As a development in service rating, the United States Civil
Service Commission has stressed the preparation of standards of performance so that the service
ratings can be based on written standards known to both employee and supervisor. Most of
the discussion of performance ratings has been directed at the design of the rating form, while
experience indicates that the form is of secondary importance to the understanding and accept-
ance by supervisors of what is involved in the rating process. Government and industrial
service ratings are discussed in Halscy, George D., Making and Using Industrial Service Ratings,
New York: Harper, 1944. See also above Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec. 4, "Super-
vision and Employee Initiative.'*

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 567

Shifts in functions within organizations require transfers of personnel
which should be handled on the basis of matching job requirements with
the abilities of the employees affected. Not only experience and training but
also interests and personal factors should be considered in making these
transfers. The personality of the supervisor, the pace of work in the unit,
and the opportunity for displaying initiative are all intangible elements of
a job; they may make the difference between good and bad placement.
The placement specialist should work with operating officials and training
specialists in organizing a program for transferring employees among va-
rious units so that the employees can be prepared for more important posi-
tions. Some intern programs, such as those of the National Institute of
Public Affairs in Washington, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the
United States Civil Service Commission, use this technique with excellent
results.

Promotions can be considered part of the placement program. In many
government jurisdictions, promotions are made as a result of competitive
examinations conducted by the civil service commission. However, operat-
ing officials consider promotion by examination a limitation on their
authority. Employees, on the other hand, tend to favor this device as an
objective method for achieving advancement. When all the employees who
compete in a promotional examination are working under the direction of
the same supervisor, it is doubtful whether the examination is as valid a
measure for selection as choice by the supervisor. When the supervisor who
is to make the selection is not personally acquainted with the work of all
the employees to be considered, an examination can be helpful for promotion
as well as open competition.

No adequate interdepartmental transfer system exists in any large juris-
diction, although some agencies of the federal government have developed,
for their own needs, methods for filling vacancies by transfers within the
organization. The cost of interdepartmental systems, which require a cur-
rent record of the training, skills, performance, and abilities of all em-
ployees, is apt to be high. Departmental systems usually provide for posting
notices of vacancies on bulletin boards in addition to maintaining employee
records in the personnel office. This practice can improve employee morale
and aid in sound placement since, even in the largest organizations, some
employees always find themselves in dead-end jobs without direct oppor-
tunities for advancement.

5. TRAINING

Types of Training. Training is a fundamental problem and responsi-
bility of management in any organization.28 In the Army, the Chief of

28 A brief introduction to this subject is to be found in Employee Training in the Public
Service, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1941.

568 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

Staff has a training specialist as one of his immediate chief staff assistants. In
private industry, progressive companies emphasize training far beyond its
recognition in all but a few governmental units. In its highest development,
the training staff devotes itself to two main objectives: (1) maximizing com-
munication of policies, program objectives, and group ideas through all levels
of the organization; and (2) instilling the habit of training throughout the
managerial and supervisory groups.

Training may be either formal or informal; definite values and advan-
tages are derived from each type. Informal training goes on continuously
in every organization, but it has to be part of an over-all training program
to be most efficient. This comprehensive type of training occurs in the day-
by-day relationships of employee and supervisor, in conferences and staff
meetings, in employee newspapers and organization publications, at meet-
ings of professional associations, and in the reading and study that the
employee undertakes at his own volition or at his supervisor's suggestion.
Because such training is connected with the regular tasks of the employee,
he can best integrate it with his own experience and thereby profit from it.
Since there is no compulsion connected with it, his motivation is positive.
Its influence, whether good or bad, is profound.

No formal type of training can match in importance that received from
the supervisor. His comments on the employee's work, his suggestions for
improvement, and his role in informing the employee on new developments
in the organization, are basic to the employee's progress and happiness on
the job. It is for this reason that the training of supervisors in employee
relations, in the improvement of procedures, and in instructing employees
has undergone such a phenomenal growth, especially during World War II
under the outstanding leadership of the Training Within Industry Service
of the War Manpower Commission.

Formal training can be divided into the following categories: pre-entry
training, which is preparation for entrance into the public service; orienta-
tion, toward both the organization and the specific job; in-service training, for
improvement on the present job and for preparation for advancement as
well; and post-entry training, which is generally related not to the specific
needs of the organization but to the individual's own personal desires and
occupational interests.

Pre-Entry Training. Preparation for public service is usually haphazard.
Despite the great increase in interest in government employment since 1930,
very few public employees have completed a school course designed to pre-
pare them for their careers. This fact has advantages as well as disadvan-
tages. Because today the public service covers wide areas of technological,
economic, and social activities, it can use employees no matter what special
interests and training they may have. The nonspecialized type of recruit-
ment, if it were supplemented by intensive and extensive training after en-
trance into the public service, would furnish an adequate foundation for

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 569

efficient administration. Unfortunately, however, most employees hired
without special preparation for their work have not been given training after
appointment.

In several occupations and professions, government service offers the
principal employment opportunities: forestry, education, public health, and
— since 1930— -social work. In these fields, academic institutions and pub-i
lie officials have worked and are working closely together to make cer|
tain that the training given meets the needs of the public service. The
greatest recent advance in organized university preparation has been in the
broad field of public administration. University after university has fol-
lowed the lead — if not the approach — of Syracuse in preparing special cur-
ricula, principally on the graduate level, for administrative training. Some
of the outstanding expressions of this trend are the academic programs of
Harvard, New York University, Cincinnati, Wayne, Chicago, Northwest-
ern, Minnesota, California, and Southern California; a great many other
universities are undertaking similar training.29 Such training usually at-
tempts to be broadly inclusive, covering the major areas of staff and line
operations in government rather than making the student a specialist in
any one of them.

A fundamental conflict in philosophy exists as to which type of training
for the public service is best. Shall the training specifically attempt to give
the student the rudiments of classification, examining, budgeting, procedure
analysis, public welfare, housing, public health, streets and highways, and
so on? Or shall it approach training for public administration from the point
of view of public law, public finance, political institutions, and history?
This conflict could be expected because of the variety of positions included
in public administration. The staff member of a municipal civil service
commission will probably benefit more from the first type of training, while
the general staff assistant to an important executive can use the second type
more profitably. Obviously, there is need for both kinds of training. Quan-
titatively, in terms of immediate employment opportunities, the first method
is more tempting. However, if aspirants are to become our future top-line
officials rather than auxiliary or staff specialists, the second approach has
greater validity.

Internship is probably the most effective device for bridging the gap
between university training and public employment. A number of universi-
ties use it for their engineering students. It has also become a customary
part of graduate training in public administration. In the federal service,
the National Institute of Public Affairs annually brings to Washington a
group of the most promising recent college graduates who receive learner's

29 This subject is comprehensively dealt with in Graham, George A., Education for Public
Administration, Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941. Cf. also above Ch. 2, "The
Study of Public Administration," sec. 3, "Training for Public Administration," and Ch. 20,
"Administrative Self -Improvement," sec. 1, "Evolutionary Currents."

570 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

assignments in federal agencies which are supplemented by lectures and
attendance at local universities. This program has infused outstanding
talent into government, with subsequent acclimatization to the conditions
and problems of public administration.

Orientation. Orientation programs offer rewards to an organization far
beyond their cost. Their values are both immediate and of long-range
character. Orientation relieves the employee of the "stage fright" associated
with entering a new job, and is a sign to him that the organization is
interested in both his welfare and in helping him adjust to his new sur-
roundings. An orientation course usually includes information about the
administrative structure of the organization, its history, its functions, and
its personnel policies. Frequently an opportunity is provided for meeting
some of the top officials. In addition to orientation to the total organization,
there is an equally urgent need for orientation to the specific job and the
unit in which the employee will be working. All too often, however, the
method still is to show the employee his desk and tell him to go to work.
Many agencies, on the other hand, furnish newcomers with an employee
handbook describing the entire working environment.

Manuals of operating procedures are extremely valuable in orientation
to the job. They set forth the rules, regulations, and processes in which
the employee will be engaged. Employee participation in the preparation
of these manuals is an excellent in-service training technique; it requires the
employee to evaluate his work methods and consider how his activity fits
in with that of others.

Formal training classes are an efficient orientation method when a num-
ber of employees have been recruited about the same time. Orientation to
clerical and stenographic employees can usually be provided on this basis in
larger organizations because of the number coming in approximately simul-
taneously. The training specialist may work with the placement officer in
scheduling the entrance on duty so that new employees start as a group and
thus make the training program more economical.

In both orientation and in-service training, the training specialist acts
as adviser and assistant to top executives and to supervisory officials who
have the responsibility for setting the objectives of training programs. Their
needs have to be met. To put it differently, training is a management tool
in which the trainer assists the supervisor in getting work done. Working
from this concept, then, the training specialist has to know management's
problems as well as training techniques. He is expected to assist the super-
visor in identifying the need for training in the organization as well as
know what techniques would be most efficient in achieving the desired
results.

In-Service Training. If there were no changes in techniques or functions,
there would be little need for in-service training. But statutes and regu-
lations are constantly changing, and new professional and administrative

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 571

techniques are constantly being evolved. Shall the architect use the knowl-
edge he acquired when he went to college in 1928 to meet the problems of
tomorrow? Will the clerical processing techniques of 1930 meet the needs
of today? Shall the physician be left to his own imagination in learning
about penicillin and other more recent medical developments ?

In-service training is only a partial but appropriate answer to these
questions. Certainly each employee has a personal responsibility for keep-
ing himself posted on developments in his field, and his supervisor has the
responsibility for furnishing leadership in this respect. But voluntary effort
should be supplemented because all employees need to use the best tech-
niques in their work, and an organized training plan for a group of
employees is more efficient than individual efforts which will duplicate one
another. Furthermore, the constantly broadening areas of each profession
make in-service training essential. The housing specialist is no longer just
an architect; he is now, in addition, an economist, sociologist, and political
scientist. The public personnel specialist is no longer merely a psychologist
but also a specialist in administration — much in the same manner as an
army officer in command of ground troops has to know about the problems
of air and naval warfare and the use of electronic and other scientific
devices.

In the United States, police and fire departments, municipal and state,
have had the longest and probably the best experience in public-service
training. These departments do not operate on the assumption that they
can send new employees out on a beat or to fight a fire immediately after
appointment. Rather, they have established training schools which use
the classroom for intensive presentation of the knowledge necessary to do
police and fire work, followed by supervised practice in actual duties.
Regular police and fire officers serve as faculty members to teach a formal
curriculum. In addition to such training immediately after appointment,
refresher courses are usually provided to keep the men alert to new tech-
nical developments in their work. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
and state leagues of municipalities have supplemented local training pro-
grams by instruction which is of special help to small police and fire de-
partments with little or no instructional facilities of their own.

The professional associations which have grown from the public service,
primarily centered around the Public Administration Clearing House in
Chicago, have made a significant contribution to training by means of their
publications and conventions. Housing, welfare, police, fire, personnel,
budget, and other public-service groups, organized in associations, have
helped to make true professions of their work. One of their most signifi-
cant contributions, considering the tremendous number of units of govern-
ment in the United States, is to bring to the attention of all of their members
any promising new techniques and practices.

The public service continuously enters new functional fields and con-

572 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

scquently runs into skill shortages which have to be met. For example,
the great expansion of personnel functions in the federal government during
the 1930s and World War II produced a shortage which could not be met
simply by recruitment of qualified personnel. Training was a necessity in
this situation. Employees were recruited from general registers and then
prepared for their work by means of classroom training and supervised
work-experience. The internship program of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity in the fields of personnel and public administration represented another
organized effort in the same direction. Lack of previous experience in
price control and rationing made it necessary for the Office of Price Ad-
ministration during World War II to use training methods extensively to
meet its need for qualified technical and administrative employees.

In addition to their participation in pre-entry training, the universities
can do a great deal in the development of in-service training, although this
frequently requires an adjustment in terms of evening courses, short insti-
tutes, or courses that cut across the usual departmental offerings. Despite
such special problems, the universities have made a telling contribution,
principally by means of evening courses established to meet specific training
goals. Those universities which are located in centers of government em-
ployment such as New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, and
Los Angeles have organized evening courses which are based on close
analysis of the needs of government employees. The entire curriculum of
the Graduate School of the United States Department of Agriculture is, of
course, designed for this purpose. Short institutes, such as those conducted
by the University of Southern California, which meet for a few days of
intensive discussion of some area of administration, constitute a training
device perhaps more acceptable to the older and more advanced employee
than the usual evening classes. As a supplement to its regular class program,
the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture has offered several
series of high-grade lectures on particular subjects which have been helpful
in meeting training demands.

The size and type of staff needed in the central and departmental per-
sonnel offices to make training effective is dependent on the relative em-
phasis between advice to supervisors as compared with formal training
programs. A few training specialists of superior ability can perform the
first function, even in a large organization. A much larger staff at various
grades would be needed to perform the second function extensively. The
training staff's closest relationship within the personnel agency is with the
employment and placement staff because training is the main source of
skilled employees where recruitment falls short of requisitions. In addition,
the placement staff can advise the training specialists on the results achieved
by training; at the same time, it can obtain information on training com-
pleted by employees to use for placement purposes.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 573

Post-Entry Training. Post-entry training, while for the most part not
directly related to the work of the employee, is definitely of help to an
organization. An example would be training in engineering for a person-
nel specialist in a public-works or highway department. Training in per-
sonnel work or public administration in this instance would be considered in-
service training; yet training in engineering in our example might be as
valuable to the employee as the more closely related work in personnel
administration. Hence the border between in-service and post-entry train-
ing is indistinct. Another example of post-entry training is that of an
employee in a professional or administrative position but lacking educa-
tional preparation for it. He might undertake college or university training
to supplement his practical experience.

It is desirable that the training staff assist employees who are interested
in such training by furnishing both information on courses available and
helpful suggestions about curricula. Additional training completed by an
employee should be recorded in his personnel file so that consideration of
his transfer or promotion may include the course work undertaken. In
evaluating this training, the training staff should work with the placement
officers so that the organization's needs and standards may receive appropriate
emphasis.

Training staffs are sometimes accused of promoting training programs
as ends in themselves rather than as a means for better work performance
of employees and better administration. This may merely reflect the broader
viewpoints of training specialists as to the knowledge and skills that are
desirable. Unfortunately, it may also indicate that training has not been
integrated with placement and management objectives. In practice, the
second alternative means that in its educational work the training staff has
gone off on its own path.

For a long period, training staffs have been faced with the difficulty of
evaluating the results of their work. Because the value of training is not
readily recognized in many organizations, it is important that adequate
techniques of appraisal be developed. In general, the method used has been
to obtain the opinion of the supervisors of employees who have participated
in training programs. It is difficult, of course, to summarize such opinions
into a precise report which would be convincing to management.

Where the quantity of daily work done in an organizational unit can
be measured, the problem can be reduced, although not completely elim-
inated, by means of work measurement before and after training. However,
where work-count techniques are not suitable, the apparently objective
methods that have so far been used, such as the reduction of turnover after
supervisory training, are of questionable validity. What is needed are new
criteria which wiU help measure the degree to which the employees possess
competence and esprit de corps and to which supervisors have absorbed the
habit of continuous training of their employees.

574 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

6. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

Place of the Union. Employee relations30 are no longer an academic
topic. While most government employees are not union members, the num-
ber of members is sufficient to make unionism an important facet of public
personnel administration.31 Resort to strike by government-employee unions
is usually prohibited by their constitutions, but strikes have occurred in
government.

Legal provisions would usually prevent a closed shop in government
agencies. The chief issue in union-government relations revolves around
the degree of recognition accorded the union. Some officials meet every
union request with a cry that the closed shop is not legal. The furthest
that union demands in the public service generally go is request for recog-
nition of the union as the bargaining agent for the employees of the ad-
ministrative unit. The relative lack of experience of government officials
in union relations leads them to reject this request with the same vehemence
that was typical of private industry twenty years ago. Industry has shifted
its attention away from union recognition for collective bargaining, which
does not necessarily limit the employer in his hiring freedom or require
the employee to join a union or continue his membership. Private manage-
ment is concentrating now on the closed shop.

Stress and Strain. The history of labor relations in industry explains
why recognition of a union of government employees accords with the ob-
jectives of officials who understand the value of unions, and why it is not
relished by other officials who consciously or unconsciously oppose unions.
The existence of more than one union in an organization permits the anti-
union official to play off one against the other, while the official who wel-
comes union assistance in management is hampered by the multiple
structure.

Antagonism to unions in the public service derives from certain con-
ceptions of government as an employer. It is argued that the importance
of governmental functions makes potential interference with these functions
a scrJQUs-tbrcat tojJis.jw^llbuufi of^frritizens. However, the effects of
strikes of utility^ transportation, ?nH fr^«M^"ct-ry workers in private in-
dtistry may*T>e)ustJlsJaarmf ul to thcjaublitf" welfare.32 It is furthcrjisscrted

30 The best discussion of the subject is to be found in Employee Relations in the Public
Service, Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1942. Cf. also above Ch. 13, "Informal Organiza-
tional," sec. 3, "Nonhierarchical Sources of Power"; Ch. 19, "The Art of Supervision," sec 3,
"Problems of Supervision"; and Ch. 21, "Morale and Discipline."

31 Adequate retirement systems, reasonable hours of work, sick leave and annual leave
are all close to the interest of employee unions and should therefore be of concern to the
personnel agency. In many instances, hours of work and leave regulations vary from depart-
ment to department without justification. It would be desirable for the central personnel agency,
working with the budget office, to take the leadership in standardizing these arrangements, as
has largely been done in the federal government.

32 This is not to say that strikes are desirable in the public service; no government-
federal, state, or local — considers strikes of its employees lawful.

PERSONNEL STANDARDS 575

that the authority of the government official in bargaining with unions is
circmmtribed--byJegid[aiive re^Ulicments and enactments. Yet the limits
of administrative authority are known to unions and are no adequate
justification for an absolute refusal of collective bargaining.

Unionism and Service Neutrality. The possible impairment of the civil
servant's neutrality in political and economic issues is sometimes offered
as a reason for rejecting government unionism involving outside affiliations.
Those directly participating in labor matters in government, such as the
employees of the National Labor Relations Board, recognize the validity
of the argument so far as they are concerned; they abide by the principle
of an independent union. But many government employees are not so close
to the industrial firing line.

In the same manner as advocates of nonpartisan municipal government
point out that there is no Republican or Democratic method for building a
bridge, it may be shown that there is neither an AF of L nor a CIO way
of delivering letters, sweeping a street, or inspecting milk. We may also
speculate, considering the limited area of union demands, on whether the
social basis of the higher civil service in Great Britain, for instance, is not
a greater barrier to actual administrative neutrality than union membership
of the rank and file of employees who are far removed from responsibility
for policy decisions. Perhaps, too, the mores resulting from day-by-day
employment in government are a stronger influence on employee behavior
than dues paying and periodic attendance at union meetings.*3

Value of Unions to Management. Thus far, the negative side of the
union problem has been stressed. The positive values of government-
employee unions should also be identified. Unions keep management
alert since slipshod administrative practices will be exposed quickly. They
offer a more efficient method for bringing some of the ideas of employees to
the attention of the head of the agency than even the best-organized staff
meetings. Finally, the participation of employees in management planning
is desirable for any organization. Its benefits were clearly indicated by
the experience of the labor-management councils sponsored by the War
Production Board in private industry during World War II. Democratic
administration is based on extensive and intensive employee participation,
which in a large organization at least in part means union participation;
autocratic administration knows that unions are anathema to its continued
existence.

Both independent unions and unions affiliated with the AF of L and
CIO are found in the public service, while in the trades area government
workers arc frequently in the same unions with their fellow-craftsmen
working in private industry. The AF of L has a union for federal work-

83 Because of their basic insecurity, unions frequently fight for personnel practices, such
as emphasis on seniority in promotion, which are retrogressive. In other words, management can
derive substantial benefits from recognition of unions but it also will receive requests which
hinder good administration.

576 PERSONNEL STANDARDS

ers— the American Federation of Government Employees— and a separate
union for local and state government workers. The movement to combine
the two comparable unions of the CIO has led in 1946 to the formation of
the United Public Workers of America. The National Federation of Fed-
eral Employees is the ranking independent union which was once affiliated
with the AF of L.

Grievance Procedure. Handling government employee grievances and
appeals can benefit from a few sound rules. Informal settlement is always
to be sought first. The employee should be expected to discuss the griev-
ance with his immediate superior, after receiving a statement of the issue
in writing. The expensive and time-consuming appeal procedure should
not be used for grievances which can be settled in the direct relationship
between the employee and his supervisor. Adherence to this principle also
avoids short-circuiting the supervisor and thus creating management diffi-
culties. Beyond that, the head of the agency needs an appeals board,
preferably composed of employee, management, and personnel-office repre-
sentatives. It hears the appeal if discussion with the immediate supervisor
and the next higher superior has not resolved the problem. The appeals
board should make its recommendation to the head of the agency rather
than issue its own decision since the responsibility for action should remain
with the top executive. Speed is desirable at each stage of the procedure
so that the employee will not distrust its effectiveness.

Employee groups have sometimes recommended that appeals be sub-
mitted to an impartial board established outside of the agency in which
the employee works. In the city of Los Angeles, for example, and in the
federal service so far as veterans are concerned, employees have the right
to appeal to the civil service commission.34 An outside appeals board has the
advantage of impartiality, but its existence results in the formal disposition
of problems which might best be handled closer to management. In small
city or state governments, such an appeals board may be needed to ensure
fair consideration; in the major federal agencies, this procedure may be
unwarranted, especially when employees are represented on the board.

The issues involved in union relations, employee participation in the
formulation of policies, and the handling of grievances are complex and
deserve the close attention of the personnel director and an able employee-
relations staff. This staff may at times assume that successful handling of
individual employee problems is a satisfactory substitute for leadership on
the more general aspects. However, there simply is no alternative to advising
supervisors and management on proper employee-relations policies that will
serve as an adequate framework for skillful handling of employee problems
on the level where they arise.

34 As an interesting parallel, under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (sec. 11)
hearing examiners may be removed "only for good cause . . . determined by the Civil Service
Commission. . . ." On this act, sec above Ch. 23, "The Judicial Test," sec. 2, "The Admin-
istrative Process and the Lawyers."

CHAPTER

Fiscal Accountability

1. FUEL FOR THE ENGINES OF ADMINISTRATION

Administrative Responsibility and Fiscal Accountability. As general
erms, responsibility and accountability may appear to have almost identical
neanings. In the realm of administration both terms imply a relationship of
;ubordination to the intentions of a higher principal. Thus we speak in-
erchangeably of the municipal director of public welfare as being respon-
sible to the city manager, and of the head of the state police as being
uxountable to the governor. However, under the political principle of
'government of laws," the relationship of subordination to the intentions
}f a higher principal is institutional rather than personal; circumscribed by
.egal norms rather than by habits of dependence; sustained by free accept-
mce of its implications rather than by the claims of superior authority.
Effective answerability is therefore less a response to specific demands made
at will by a higher principal than it is the product of awareness of a com-
non purpose embedded in the wider cooperative context. Responsibility
.s likely to suffer when its formalized elements — its "sanctions" — fail to
^ear closely on generally endorsed ends.

This becomes especially evident when we consider the evolution of those
mechanisms by which government officials are made to answer for the use
of public funds placed at their disposal for the accomplishment of defined
abjectives — accountability in its more immediate sense. The need for such
accountability springs from the heart of popular government.1 Legislative
control of public administration would be only intermittent and intolerably
clumsy as well if it were confined to the lawmaking function proper. For
it is clear that sole reliance on the lawmaking function would reduce the
writing of marching orders for the executive branch to statutory grants of
authority or their repeal. Allocation of the fuel supply for the engines of
administration on a year-by-year basis allows for much greater efficacy and

1 Cf. also above Ch. 15, "Legislative Control."

577

578 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

flexibility of legislative determination. This method of control, combined
with adequate examination of the actual use of the funds voted, is focused
on the questions of the desirable — and possible — volume of services within
the framework of an agency's statutory mandate, and of priorities among
alternatives.

The maxim of fiscal accountability on the part of government officials
has never been seriously challenged. Indeed, it could not be challenged
without a simultaneous onslaught on democracy itself. To develop the
most appropriate forms of fiscal accountability has proved to be an entirely
different matter. Here we have be^.n faced with a dual dilemma. In the
first place, both the legislative and the executive branches have found it
difficult to keep at a safe distance from the Scylla of controls so unrefined
as to be practically worthless and the Charybdis of devices so detailed as
to be destructive of broaden perspective. And secondly, we have not yet
achieved the necessary synthesis between suitably precise requirements and
unimpaired pursuit of constructive administrative goals. Ironically, though
not surprisingly, the highest sense of administrative responsibility has col-
lided all too often with formal stipulations of fiscal accountability. Con-
versely, the more distrustful and exacting these stipulations have been, the
less have they attained their aim.

Notwithstanding procedural rigidities of fiscal accountability, it is plain
that of all the great powers of government the most elastic and the most
generally congenial is the spending power. It is adaptable to the widest
variety of objectives — to wage war, to buy peace, to regulate the acreage
of agricultural crops, to build highways, to stabilize the price of peanut
butter. It is susceptible of countless techniques of application — by adding
to the public payroll, by contracts for the services of private enterprise, by
grants-in-aid to states and cities, by outright gifts, by conditional loans. It
is supported by the taxing and borrowing powers of the wealthiest of
nations. It is subject to no constitutional restraints of consequence.2 And
if there are economic limits on its exercise, they have not yet been measured.
The disbursement of government funds is one of the great harmonizers of
divergent interests.

Multitude of Voices. While the American Constitution is explicit that
"no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of ap-
propriations made by law,"3 the practice of conflict, compromise, and
cooperation under the separation of powers divides authority and influence
over the disposition of funds among many hands. Congress receives finan-
cial requests from the President. It obtains assistance on ideas and factual
information from the various federal agencies. And it has the benefit of
the over-all vantage point of the Budget Bureau on the expenditure struc-

2 Among the constitutional literature, reference may be made especially to Corwin, Edward
S., The Twilight of the Supreme Court, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934.
8 Art. I, sec. 9.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 579

turc and the Treasury Department on the revenue picture. Without these
aids the lawmaking body would be helpless to consider most appropriation
bills. Yet it is free to disregard all such advice in any particular case.

Moreover, the legislature is importuned by lobbies, and must choose
what answer to give to their demands. Its own members exhibit a spec-
troscopic array of opinions. Congressional rules of procedure afford few
automatically effective self-disciplinary checks against divisive tendencies
in fiscal policy. Last but not least, the scheme of congressional organization
emphasizes the pluralism of power.4 Separate committees in the House and
Senate are charged with jurisdiction over taxation, appropriations, and
expenditures in the executive branch. Many other legislative committees
concerned with particular subject-matter areas contend for a voice in finan-
cial decisions affecting their clienteles. Over these, in the House, the Rules
Committee and the majority leadership exercise a fitful control.

Within the administrative structure there is equal diversity of purpose.
A bureau chief may have plans for bettering his program by the enlarge-
ment of field-service facilities. A field-office manager may come forth with
different proposals for implementing the program in his area. The depart-
ment head, sympathetic but harassed with alternatives of action, may fail
to grasp the implications completely. A cognate bureau in another de-
partment may keep its jealous eyes on administrative rivals to its own
position. The Budget Bureau watches the scene with a detached view of
operations and under the institutional necessity of trimming most requests
for money. A Treasury spokesman may reflect concern over the market
for government securities if borrowing is to continue.

Pressures and Restraints. Purposes and pressures are dynamic. Congress
does not exhaust its power in a single exercise, although its action tends to
culminate in the passage of legislation. Administrative agencies, on the
other hand, are involved both before and after legislative action. In con-
tinuing cycles they prepare and urge their financial requests for the next
fiscal year while the funds appropriated for the current fiscal year are being
spent and the expenditures of the previous one are being reviewed and
analyzed. Of course, objectives and methods of the spending process alter
with time and circumstance. During the quarter-century since the passage
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,5 however, the mechanisms for
formulating and implementing an integrated financial program for the
executive branch have been steadily elaborated.

The emerging machinery has been slow in taking form, tardy in re-
lation to the need, and feeble for the purpose at important points. Its

*This matter has received renewed attention in the recent report of the Joint Committee
on the Organization of Congress, Senate Report No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington,
1946, and in the final report of the New York State faint Legislative Committee on Legislative
Methods, Practices, Procedures, and Expenditures, Legislative Doc. No. 31, Albany, 1946.

M2Stat.20;31U. S.C.I 1-16.

580 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

results still leave much to be desired. The elements of the system are as
yet only partially understood and utilized by the direct participants in the fis-
cal process — legislative and administrative, staff and line. Congressional par-
ticularism is often hostile to a general approach that puts consistency and
the broader public interest ahead of free barter over special interests.0 On
the administrative side, bureaus and departments have their traditions of
autonomy as well as their own program interests, and cultivate their sep-
arate ties with legislative groups.

Line establishments do not readily defer to the restraints of coordinating
bodies. Staff agencies sometimes need to be reminded of the essential con-
ditions of successful staff work. There was a time, for example, when a
budget director turned down a request for more funds from the head of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice with the remark that
too many antitrust suits were bad for business. Yet, in spite of surviving
shortcomings, the gains of recent years in the techniques of fiscal coordina-
tion are impressive when contrasted with the splintering of responsibility
that characterized nineteenth-century financial administration.

Pattern of Legislative Money Grants. Annually Congress passes a dozen
or more general appropriation acts, each supplying funds for the coming fis-
cal year to one or more of the federal agencies. Ordinarily these acts are
voted during the closing quarter of the expiring fiscal year — prior to June 30.
In addition, several deficiency bills are passed at irregular intervals through-
out the year, disposing of the financial requests arising from needs not antici-
pated or acknowledged when the regular appropriation bills were considered.
Appropriations specify the purposes to be served in all degrees of specificity.
They may be small or large. A lump-sum grant of $8 billions to the Works
Progress Administration established a peacetime high-water mark for both
size and generality in one depression year of the 1930's. In the same year
the Indian Service of the Interior Department was receiving its modest
allowance in several hundred bits and pieces, each separately earmarked
for a particular locality or activity.

Appropriations are grants. They are also statutory limitations. The ap-
propriation acts must be passed in some form each year and are not likely
to be vetoed, whatever their final form. They are therefore handy measures
for the attachment of riders. Some riders grant new authority to relieve past
inconveniences. Most of them embody additional restrictions, expressive
of current legislative sentiment. Like barnacles once attached, such riders
tend to become in effect permanent parts of the vessel, being carried forward
from fiscal vear to fiscal year.

Each government agency has also its organic legislation, authorizing its
existence and definme its powers. These laws establish limitations on the
purposes and methods of expenditures. Another group of statutes lays down
or authorizes uniform regulations of administrative practice covering all

6 Sec above Ch. 15, "Legislative Control," sec. 1, "Means and Conditions of Control."

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 581

agencies unless specifically exempted — the salary limits of the Classification
Act of 1923; government-wide pay-raise legislation; the retirement acts; the
standardized travel regulations; the requirements of publicity and competi-
tive bidding on government contracts in order to eliminate discrimination
or recurrent possibilities of scandal.

A statute of 1893 forbids any agency to hire any member of the Pin-
kerton Detective Agency.7 Since 1917 both the War and Navy Departments
have been under an injunction, imposed in their appropriation acts, not to
engage in any time studies by means of a "time-measuring device" — a
strange idea in the day of work simplification in administrative operations.
A further set of legislative restrictions is meant to protect congressional
prerogatives against executive encroachment. Finally, the Walsh-Healey
Act,8 forbidding the letting of government contracts to firms that do not
meet specified labor standards, is typical of a category of laws which limit
administrative discretion in the interest of promoting an ulterior economic
policy.

From another point of view, the character and impact of these restrictions
varies considerably with the nature of the individual agency and the imme-
diate objects of its expenditures. The overhead of salaries, office space,
supplies, and travel is common to all agencies in some degree and makes up
nearly the whole budget of regulatory agencies. Fiscal procedures and limi-
tations governing these matters are widely standardized and minutely
worked out. Different sets of safeguards are appropriate for payments of
interest on the public debt; for loans to be made to business firms; for agri-
cultural-adjustment and soil-conservation contracts with farmers; for veter-
ans' benefits and pensions; for the construction of public works directly or on
contract; for purchases of land; and for the procurement of industrial mate-
rials and manufactured goods. Superimposed on this class of limitations
are variations in statutory restrictions based on the character of the agency
— civilian or military, temporary or permanent — and on the degree of
legislative confidence in its leadership.

The administrative spenders of public funds must proceed in the context of
all these legislative directives. It is not necessary here to attempt a compre-
hensive appraisal of the immense and detailed content of this body of law.
Suffice it to say that the whole edifice of fiscal law is an outgrowth of
the constitutional separation of powers, and administrative agencies are
accountable for giving the law full effect.

Forms of Accountability. It is time now to raise more specifically the
question of who is accountable to whom and for what. In formulating an
answer, the four focal points of financial control should be borne in mind.
These are: (1) the operating bureau or unit which actually spends the
money; (2) the larger agency of which the unit is a part; (3) the central

*27Stat.591.
«49Stat. 2036.

582 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

offices through which executive control is exercised and over-all staff or
auxiliary services are rendered— the Budget Bureau and the Treasury; and
(4) the congressional committees dealing with revenue and expenditure.

The major mechanisms of control must be separately recognized also. In
broad outline these involve: (1) the justification of estimates; (2) the su-
perintendence of the use of appropriated funds; (3) the devices for timing
the rate of expenditures; and (4) the audit and settlement of accounts.
Finally, we must take into consideration the sequence of successive steps in
the processes of appropriation and expenditure, which ordinarily spread over
a period of two to three years — from the first administrative forethought to
the last spending act. It is perhaps convenient to treat these factors by fol-
lowing the various stages in the life history of appropriations and expendi-
tures as they occur in order to bring out the relevance of each factor.

In doing so, the landmark quality of the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 emerges most visibly. In a very real sense, the act represented the
fruition of years of enlightened agitation and thought. Although marred by
some uncomprehending efforts and actions explainable only in terms of
the immediate political situation, it charted a new course in the progress
of financial administration. Looking back in some respects to the original
conception of Alexander Hamilton, it reversed the drift of events during
an intervening century to the fundamental emphasis on the unifying and
consciously planning potentialities of fiscal processes centered in the con-
stitutional responsibility of the chief executive. The act created one entirely
new agency — the Budget Bureau, as a staff arm of the President — and reor-
ganized an existing group of auditing and accounting offices into another
new establishment, the General Accounting Office under a Comptroller
General.

The subsequent development of these two agencies has had a profound
influence on the further evolution of federal financial management. Let us
begin with the phase of justification of agency estimates of expenditures.
The full cycle begins, with the operating units in the several departments
and establishments and returns to them in the end.

2. JUSTIFICATION

Call for Estimates. Each year in June the budget director issues a call to
all federal agencies for their budget estimates covering the fiscal year to
commence thirteen months thereafter — July 1. The call for estimates is in
effect one method of achieving accountability. It places responsibility on
the operating agencies for planning, formulating, and reviewing the work
they see lying ahead of them, and for presenting justifications for funds
to carry it on. The justifications must prove persuasive enough to induce
the President to request, and Congress to approve, appropriations that will
enable the projected activities to go forward.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 583

The call for estimates itself is a substantial document.9 It gives an
indication in general terms of the President's program for the future and
its fiscal implications. It requires all agencies to submit to the Budget
Bureau their estimates— the so-called language sheets, which set out the
text of what the agency would like Congress to enact. It calls also for
schedules of obligations — the so-called green sheets — showing the break-
down of expenditure, personnel, materials, travel, printing, and the like.
It asks, finally, for justifications of the estimates. These consist of descrip-
tions of the agency's organization and facilities and the nature of its work
program, together with supporting data indicating its financial needs. In
order to assist the operating establishments in presenting their case with
care, the call for estimates is accompanied by a series of instructions. The
usual deadline for the submission of the materials requested is September
15. Only in exceptional circumstances can this deadline be extended without
jeopardizing actions at a later stage which have a fixed calendar.

The call for estimates is properly concerned with the application of
objective criteria in the framing of justifications submitted by the agencies.
Such objective criteria are especially important as a foundation for work-
load forecasts and operating standards of general validity. Usually, there-
fore, the call for estimates contains specific pointers like these:10

Operating standards are essential for the translation of workloads into
costs. In numerous units . . . such standards and ratios have been de-
veloped and applied as effective tools of management and as bases for
estimates of needed funds, personnel, and facilities; e. g., vouchers
audited per examiner; claims adjudicated per examiner; cards tabulated
per hour of machine rental; cards punched or coded or sorted per oper-
ator; documents filed or searched per file clerk; sheets mimeographed
per machine, per operator; lines typed per operator; man-days or crew-
days per acre or per parcel of land surveyed; cost per mile and per hour
of vehicle operation; ratio of employment office personnel to total em-
ployment; ratio of payroll personnel to total personnel; cubic-foot costs
of new construction by types; ratio of annual repair cost to total invest-
ment; and for institutional activities — cost per bed, cost per patient-day,
personnel-to-patient ratios, and utilization rates. As a contributory step
in assembling and making more widely available operating standards
now in use, and in furthering their development and application, it is
desired that to whatever extent such standards have been developed each
justification text . . . present them in concise written or tabular form
following, or as a part of, the presentation of the workload.

Departmental Consideration. Receipt of the call for estimates passes the
ball to the departmental budget officer whom each agency is required by the
Budget and Accounting Act to designate as the locus of its internal financial

9 Cf. Morstein Marx, Fritz, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its Evolution and Present Role,"
American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39, p. 653 ff., 869 ff. This paper contains also
bibliographical references to the extensive literature on the budget process.

10 Quoted from the call for estimates for the fiscal year of 1948; Bureau of the Budget*
Bulletin No. 1945-46:24, sec. 33, Washington, June 24, 1946.

584 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

controls. The development of budget offices proceeded unevenly among the
federal agencies during the early years of experience with the act; the pres-
ent situation still exhibits a wide range of competence and imagination.
The departmental budget officer in some cases is little more than a glorified
bookkeeper attached to the office of the agency head. In other cases, and
particularly where the impact of World War II was felt most strongly, the
budget officer has become an important participant in the management and
planning of the department. For this role he is equipped with his own staff
to keep abreast of the work of his agency.

Many variations from agency to agency prevail in the internal proce-
dures for assembling and reviewing the preliminary estimates secured from
each of the operating units within the department. Then also, some antici-
pated operations lend themselves readily to objective measurement, while
others must rest on little more than informed forecasts and realistic guesses
by those who have been closest to the particular program during* the preced-
ing fiscal year. As we have noted, the call for estimates makes explicit re-
quest for objective data where available or susceptible of development. Com-
parative materials may also be drawn in, as in the case of field offices per-
forming substantially similar functions for the agency within limited
territorial areas.

Patently, it is not enough for the budget officer to add up the sum of the
operating requests thus assembled and report the total. Both before he
relays the call for estimates to the bureaus and divisions and upon scrutiniz-
ing their requests, consultation with directing and planning top officials of
his agency is needed. The several programs of the department must be
correlated. Conflicts over activity priorities among departmental subdivi-
sions must be resolved. Scales of values must be established for choosing
among a multitude of competing alternatives. The estimates of staff, auxili-
ary and technical services — for such functions as personnel management,
travel, printing, law enforcement, and public information — must be analyzed
in terms of their adequacy and necessity in relation to the total scheme of
substantive work programs of the agency.

The terms of the justifications must be reviewed as well as the figures
they accompany. Inconsistencies and ambiguities not only jeopardize favor-
able action at higher levels but also point up weaknesses in the agency's
own managerial arrangements. The function of the budget officer here is
that of probing and questioning — and drawing attention to issues that re-
quire remedial action on the operating or policy-making levels. Except
within the limits of already clearly expressed agency policy, he cannot safely
attempt a resolution of the questions he raises without first assuring himself
of the views and attitudes of the agency head or his deputies.

The measure of influence which this kind of departmental review year
upon year exerts is a test of the strength and caliber of general departmental
management. In American administration, the tradition of bureau or divi-

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 585

sional autonomy is strong. It may be fortified by outside links — personal
relationships between the bureau chief and strategically placed members
of Congress or a tightly organized special-interest clientele. Such relation-
ships may render a particular bureau's estimates well-nigh untouchable.

The first head of the National Park Service in the Interior Department
— himself a commanding figure — kept that bureau in such a position. Occa-
sionally the well-dramatized personality of a bureau chief, particularly one
connected with an activity of such general public interest as crime detection,
may have the same effect. The budget officer single-handedly cannot try
to change the institutional "facts of life." Lack of interest and backing on
the part of his agency head may prevent him altogether from making a
significant contribution in his area. Nevertheless, the trend of recent years
has been to professionalize and invigorate the budget process.

Pressure from the Budget Bureau has helped. Moreover, ordinarily too
much is at stake for the future of the agency to allow the budgetary aspect
to be slighted. When departmental review of internal estimates is under-
taken actively and intelligently, it affords one of the best occasions in the
entire range of administrative management for program planning and
reappraisal. This would be inconceivable without participation of the agency
head, advised by his immediate staff. On him falls the main burden of pub-
lic responsibility for the success of his department's total program.

Departmental consideration of the proposed financial program for the
next fiscal year also supplies opportunity for experimentation with novel
methods of budgetary presentation. Some types of programs lend them-
selves to analysis in project terms as distinguished from organizational units.
The Tennessee Valley Authority and the Uinted States Department of
Agriculture have made notable contributions to budgetary practice in this
direction. One good example — but not the only one — is suggested by con-
struction projects scheduled over a definite period of time; when undertaken
directly by the agency itself, these may involve the activities of several
organizational units such as engineering, personnel, construction, and
finance. Research projects, whether or not they involve more than one or-
ganizational unit, admit of definition in terms of a stated goal and may be
treated in the same way.

Review of estimates within the agency may occur more than once. At a
later stage, it is not infrequently necessary to repeat appraisal and reappraisal
with a still sharper focus. The agency's estimates as initially submitted may be
returned by the Budget Bureau for reconsideration and reduction, perhaps
to a specified lower figure. Then the agency has an opportunity to recom-
mend the manner in which the reduction is to be absorbed. In such a situa-
tion, a high order of critical analysis is required of both the management
staff and the program chiefs, and the claims to priority among individual
programs themselves must be reexamined.

586 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Formulation of the Executive Budget. Up to this point, the process of
justification has served to secure accountability for orderly planning and
correlation of the various programs that each agency proposes to carry
forward. Within the Budget Bureau, all departmental estimates are brought
together and examined in the Estimates Division.11 Its staff members are
assigned on an agency basis so that over a period of years a considerable
degree of specialized knowledge and practical familiarity with the opera-
tions and problems of each agency is developed by individual budget exam-
iners. These may in fact have been informally consulted by the depart-
mental budget officer while the estimates were being prepared under his
guidance. The examiners, in turn, may have already called on the resources
of the Budget Bureau's Administrative Management Division or other staff
units to assist the agency in solving some of its recurrent problems.

Now the process reaches the stage of administrative hearings under the
auspices of the Budget Bureau. These hearings are conducted by commit-
tees, each headed by a senior staff member. The individual department is
represented not only by its top officials and its budget officer but also by
those of its program chiefs whose areas are primarily concerned. Commit-
tee hearings are informal but searching.

They may dwell on policy and program questions as well as operating
problems and cost standards. They may be over in a few hours for a small
establishment or take weeks for a large department. Written justifications
are supplemented by oral discussion. Particular attention is paid to changes
in financial requests over those for the current fiscal year.

In all these matters the members of the hearing committees have the
benefit of specialized counsel from staff in other divisions of the Budget
Bureau. The Fiscal Division, for instance — occupied in the main with
analysis of the broader governmental programs and their economic impli-
cations— is in a position to offer expert advice on such subject-matter fields
as social security, foreign commerce, investment, transportation, consumer
expenditure, and federal-state-local relationships. The Statistical Standards
Division, with its coordinating functions in the wide area of data collection
as an essential aspect of the administrative process, can contribute technical
information and professional judgment on agency plans involving fact-
finding projects. The Legislative Reference Division, as a clearance facility
for the adjustment of departmental intentions to the President's legislative
program and for achieving accord on proposed executive orders, is able to
account for the status of pending measures. The Administrative Manage-
ment Division, through its surveys and studies of organizational matters
and operating methods throughout the government, is likely to possess
first-hand knowledge of the conditions of agency management.

11 For the different phases of the budget process, see Morstein Marx, he. cit. above note
9, p. 870 tf.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 587

This last division, though a product of recent years, has gone far toward
giving full expression to one of the most significant features of the Budget
and Accounting Act — the integration of the budget process with the man-
agerial concerns of the chief executive. The act expressly charged the
Budget Bureau with the task of studying problems of governmental struc-
ture and operations in order to promote "economy and efficiency in the
conduct of public service."12 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of
this assignment. It gave a healthy emphasis to the positive core of budgeting
as a means of developing a unified and comprehensive work plan for the
government.

Such a work plan does not result from a formalized adjudication of
agency requests for funds. It can take shape only when there is mature
appreciation of the living processes of administration as well as firm grasp
of program interrelations. Conversely, the framing of a work plan for the
government as a whole puts the spotlight on hidden managerial weak-
nesses and operating inefficiencies. These are not eliminated by pious ad-
monitions alone. A workmanlike approach is required to show how to
doit.

The business of the hearing committees, though removing the remain-
ing doubts about facts or reasons through joint consideration of the written
justifications presented by each agency, is merely preliminary to another
step. This is the internal examination of the emerging picture, department
by department, by the budget director assisted by an advisory review com-
mitee of annually changing membership. The outcome of this review
determines the array of surviving issues and general problems that can be
settled only in conferences with the President.

The President's decisions give the executive budget its final form. How-
ever, the principle of the executive budget means merely that Congress has
the assurance of receiving a responsible and all-embracing proposal, framed
with an eye to government-wide rather than purely departmental interests.
The last word is the legislature's.

Legislative Action. The executive budget is placed before Congress early
in January, accompanied by the President's budget message. This message
contains the highlights of his financial program for the next fiscal year,
including an informative discussion of its anticipated impact upon the
economy and of the government's principal plans for action. Because
of the increasing difficulty of differentiating the contents of a document
so fundamental for the welfare of the country from the President's annual
message on the State of the Union, both messages have recently been com-
bined. The combined message also concerns itself with the recommenda-
tions for the maintenance of economic stability and high-level employment

12 Sec. 209 of the act.

588 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

made annually by the new Council of Economic Advisers to the President
under the Employment Act of 1946.13

The federal government today represents "the world's largest enter-
prise."14 It is therefore evident that its annual revenue program and the
character of its yearly outlay have profound effects upon the whole economy.
Modern economists such as the late John M. Keynes, William H. Beveridge,
and Alvin H. Hansen have done much to make governments aware of
the opportunities they have at their disposal for influencing the general
level of economic activities through a carefully planned fiscal policy.15 Fis-
cal policy is made up of four basic components — taxation, borrowing,
expenditure, and debt management. Constructive fiscal policy, as an in-
creasingly important tool of public stewardship, must attempt to relate
the government's budget to the nation's budget. The latter is in balance
only when the anticipated receipts of consumers, business, and public author-
ities— federal, state, and local — equal their projected expenditures. These
expenditures are known as the "gross national product."16

Fiscal policy can be effective only when it is bolstered up by more than
coherent revenue and expenditure planning. It may be contradicted by
governmental wage policy. It may be defeated by tax measures that impair
the formation and free play of venture capital. It may collapse when the
goverment fails to take prompt action in order to prevent an inflationary
spiral or an impending slump. In brief, it must have the support of other
public policies, including those controlling the various types of economic
regulation and the scope of spending operations such as social security.
Only when fiscal policy is the reflection of a fully consistent working ap-
proach permeating all activities of government can it achieve its course-
setting ends. For this, a realistically considered budget is a prerequisite.

Although the President's budget message outlines the major considera-
tions that underlie the proposed expenditure structure, it has thus far been
less revealing on the "background of thinking"17 about the budget at large.
Nor is there a routine technique for submitting to the Appropriations Com-
mittees on each main point a "specific memorandum . . . indicating the

13 Public Law No. 304, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., approved February 20, 1946. For a dis-
cussion of the background of this law, see Morstein Marx, Fritz, ed., "Maintaining High-Level
Production and Employment: A Symposium," American Political Science Review, 1945, Vol. 39,
p. 1119tf.

14 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, op. cit. above in note 4, p. 19.

16 Cf. Colm, Gerhard, "Technical Requirements," in the symposium cited above in note
13, p. 1126 ff.\ Wickwar, W. Hardy, "British Plans," ibid., p. 1137 #.; Holcombe, Arthur N.,
"Over-all Financial Planning through the Bureau of the Budget," Public Administration Review,
1941, Vol. 1, p. 225 ff.

M Cf. the President's Budget Message for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1947, p. U,
Washington, 1946.

17 Budget Director Harold D. Smith, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee, Hearings on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1946, p. 307, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess., Washington, 1945.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 589

background of particular proposals."18 The budget director has pointed
out in congressional hearings that current practice leaves him little chance
of laying "our facts" before the committees.19 This is the more serious
since, in departure from the theory of the executive budget, the "defense"
of the President's estimates before the Appropriations Committees has been
traditionally entrusted to the representatives of the individual agencies con-
cerned. The Budget Bureau has no official share in the legislative process,
except in the role of a watchful observer and an occasional source of addi-
tional information in response to committee requests.

Ordinarily the Appropriations Committee in either chamber, without any
penetrating preliminary analysis of the executive budget as a whole, dis-
tributes its various segments among a group of subcommittees, each operat-
ing in virtual independence. The consequences of this procedure, with par-
ticular reference to the House, have recently been placed in bold relief
by the report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress:20

For instance, a bill appropriating funds for the Department of the In-
terior is considered by the Interior Department subcommittee. This sub-
committee holds hearings in executive session from which are excluded
not only the public and the press but all other Members of Congress,
even the other 35 members of the Appropriations Committee who are
not members of this subcommittee. Members of Congress . . . have little
knowledge of what transpires within the subcommittee until the bill is
reported. Opposition to the requested appropriation which, if informed
through open hearings and publicity, might give much beneficial infor-
mation and suggestions to the subcommittee, to the full Appropriations
Committee and to Congress, is thereby stifled or, at best, put at a de-
cided disadvantage.

Moreover, . . . consideration of appropriation bills by the House
Committee on Appropriations is perforce rather perfunctory. The full
committee does not consider it necessary to give bills the same detailed
examination they have already received in subcommittee. Here also all
consideration is in secret session.

... the usual procedure in the House Appropriations Committee,
when a subcommittee reports, is for the subcommittee chairman and the
ranking minority member to present a brief summary of their report
to the full committee. After brief consideration and opportunity for
amendments, the bill is then promptly reported to the House. In prac-
tice, careful consideration of the measure is thus limited to the members
of the subcommittee in charge, upon whose judgment the full committee
generally confidently relies.

Reports of the full committee on major bills customarily reach the
floor soon after committee approval. Under these circumstances, the
findings and printed hearings on appropriation bills are usually not
available for careful and sustained study by the membership at large
before the bills are reported to the House for its action. The hearings
are naturally massive in size and complex in detail. As a result, it is

20 Op. cit. above in note 4, pp. 20-21.

590 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

not easy for Members of the House fully to inform themselves on the
complex contents of appropriation bills before they come up for final
action on the floor.

The virutal autonomy of the subcommittees of the Appropriations Com-
mittee in either chamber and the peculiar safeguards of privacy with which
they have surrounded themselves lead to a destructive fragmentation in the
legislative treatment of the executive budget. Submitted to Congress as
the work plan of the government, it is analyzed principally in terms of the
needs of particular departments. In order to overcome this distortion of
perspective, Congress long ago consolidated the several appropriation com-
mittees in each chamber as a much-needed implementation of the Budget
and Accounting Act. In actual fact, however, the diffusion of responsibility
which the consolidation was intended to remove, has come to life again in
the present scheme of subcommittees.

Fragmentation of point of view toward the executive budget as a whole
encourages an alignment between individual subcommittees on the one
hand and their departmental clients as well as outside pressure groups linked
to the departments on the other. In addition, the degree of power exercised
by the subcommittees plays into the hands of individual lawmakers who
exert personal influence within their particular subcommittees. This often
becomes conspicuous at a later stage when Senate and House conferees meet
in order to iron out disagreements in their votes on appropriation bills.

Congressional Reform Proposals. Equally consequential is the institu-
tional separation between the revenue-raising and the appropriating com-
mittees. In the language of the document previously cited, "Neither, so far
as congressional machinery is concerned, gives any consideration to the rela-
tionship between income and expenditures. The appropriations committees
are not required by statute or rule to keep total outgo within anticipated
income."21 This point, together with related defects in the present system
of fiscal control, figures prominently in the recommendations advanced by
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.

The committee "believes that Congress has not adequately equipped itself
to resist the pressure of departments and agencies in behalf of larger expen-
ditures."22 To provide better "equipment" the committee has recommended
a drastic remedy — adoption each spring of annual budget totals proposed
by joint action of the revenue and expenditure committees. Once these totals
are set by concurrent resolution there would remain two alternatives:23

In the event, after consultation and investigation, that the appropria-
tions committees are unable to bring anticipated expenditures within
estimated receipts, a record vote expressing the policy of the Congress

, pp. 19-20.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 591

to create additional Federal debt in the amount of the excess would be
required. The budget resolution would have to be approved by both
Houses before any appropriation for the next fiscal year would be valid.
Should total appropriations later be found to have exceeded the total
budget figure as set by the Congress, all appropriations except perma-
nent appropriations and those for servicing the public debt, for veterans'
pensions and benefits and trust expenditures, would be automatically
reduced accordingly by a uniform percentage designed to bring total
appropriations within the over-all limit previously fixed.

The difficulties likely to arise from adoption of such a proposal are not
obscure. In the first place, an automatic ceiling is a crude device at best,
allowing for no differentiation among varying levels of priority with re-
spect to individual programs incorporated into the executive budget. Past
experience with over-all ceilings in different governmental jurisdictions and
in different substantive contexts — including general tax and debt limitations
— has demonstrated the irrationalities of their cramping effects. Secondly,
determination of annual totals after submission of the executive budget to
the legislature raises a practical question of appropriate timing. Much of
the effort embodied in the executive budget will come to naught if it i$
necessarily unrelated to ceiling figures adopted only after budget comple-
tion. The internal balance of the plan is in part conditioned on the size of
outlay* On the other hand, it would hardly be a feasible procedure for
Congress to commit itself to budget totals without having taken a good
look at the individual programs to be financed. Thirdly, the self-imposed
deadlines on congressional action envisaged in the scheme can scarcely fail
to invite filibuster.

In a sense, no doubt, the idea of budget ceilings determined after com-
pletion of the government's annual work plan is a partial negation of the
very theory of the executive budget. The President would ordinarily have
reason, of course, to welcome a general expression of sentiment on the part
of Congress before the executive budget is formulated. Yet there will be
occasions when even in full knowledge of such sentiment he would con-
sider it his duty to present facts and figures in justification of higher expen-
diture for vital programs on which he would want to argue his case. The
matter of the best timing of any legislative declaration of intent, however
general in form, would still be perplexing. A definite adoption by concur-
rent resolution of budget ceilings puts additional weight on the time factor.

Lastly, a uniform reduction of all appropriations — with few exceptions —
on a percentage basis destroys the opportunity for administrative recon-
sideration and adjustment in the volume and emphasis of individual pro-
grams and activities. Is it realistic to assume that a research enterprise of
paramount importance for our national defense could be cut back in a
blindfolded manner in exactly the same way in which an appropriation
for the construction of federal office-buildings would be reduced percentage-
wise? Would not the Secretary of the Navy, for instance, feel impelled

592 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

to press earnestly and vigorously for a reconsideration of the effects of such
over-all shrinkage of funds on the security of the country? Automatic re-
duction is certainly no convenient avenue of escape from the "pressure of
departments and agencies in behalf of larger expenditures."

Other committee recommendations rest on sounder grounds. These
include suggestions for fuller scrutiny of appropriation bills by each Appro-
priations Committee itself; establishment of the general rule of open com-
mittee hearings and sessions; earlier submission of appropriation hearings
and reports to the House and Senate; and preparation of a uniform ap-
propriation classification to be utilized in the hearings.24 Each suggestion,
in the light of current practice, is a step in the right direction.

The proposals also place desirable emphasis upon expansion of compe-
tent staff assistance to the appropriation subcommittees, and on provision of
modern accounting machinery and equipment for the commitee staffs.
Inadequate staffing of Congress is an old and legitimate complaint.25 Better
staffed Appropriations Committees would at the same time be able to develop
working contacts with their counterparts in the executive branch, especially
the Budget Bureau. The budget director has spoken of such continuing
staff relations as "most profitable."20 By pooling the resources of oppo-
site staff groups it should be possible to avoid duplication of study and
inquiry for competitive reasons. Cooperative arrangements of this kind
might also temper unfavorable congressional attitudes toward the budget
process. For instance, legislators have repeatedly urged the Budget Bureau
to assume the role of a strong-minded and independent guardian of econ-
omy for economy's sake, while equally often censuring it for reduction of
expenditures proposed by agencies that happened to be in the good graces
of particular groups in Congress.

The committee, finally, concerned itself with the reinforcement of the
budgetary principle of integrity of appropriations,27 whittled down from its
theoretical scope by legislative practices that have grown up in response
to need and convenience. It recommended that:

. . . the practice of reappropriating unexpended balances be discon-
tinued, except in the case of continuing appropriations for public works,
and that unexpended balances revert to the Treasury as provided by law.
The new amounts appropriated each year should indicate the total
money available to each agency.

24 ibid., pp. 20-21.

25 Sec Kogers, Lindsay, "The Staffing of Congress," Political Science Quarterly, 1941, Vol.
S6, p. /I ff.\ Committee on Congress, American Political Science Association, The Reorganization
of Congress, p. 22 ff.t 79, Washington, 1945. For the evolution of the staffing practice of the
.louse Appropriations Committee, see Congressional Record, 1943, Vol. 89, p. 10994 ff.

28 Loc. cit. above in note 17, p. 309.

27 For a discussion of the traditional principles of budgeting in their impact upon creative
iidministrative management, see Smith, Harold D., "The Budget as an Instrument of Legis-
lative Control and Executive Management," Public Administration Review, 1944, Vol. 4, p.
181/7.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 593

We also recommend that the current practice of permitting transfer
of funds between appropriation accounts and organization units be
discontinued.

We further recommend that a uniform system of control be perfected
by the appropriations committees so as to cover into the Treasury all
funds resulting from the sale of Government property or services by all
regular Federal departments and agencies.28

The first of these recommendations is a mild if debatable step. It would
merely exchange the inconveniences of obscurity in the precise amounts
voted each year for some added difficulty in ascertaining the total cost of
particular projects carried over several years, and in estimating far in ad-
vance just how much may be left of an individual appropriation June 30.
The other two proposals are more serious.

Transfers of funds, if deliberately used to defeat a clear expression of
legislative purpose, are objectionable, of course. But safeguards against
such abuse can be introduced, by requiring the Budget Bureau's approval
or even current reporting of the transfers to the Appropriations Committees,
without destroying the plain advantages of flexibility in the adaptation of
administrative programs to changing circumstances which a controllable
authority to transfer funds affords. To prohibit transfers altogether can
only lead to the inflation of estimates for all accounts and units, so as to
make sure that no deficiency will be encountered in any of the estimates.

The covering of all receipts directly into the Treasury — so that they will
require a fresh appropriation by Congress before they are available for
spending — is a salutary general principle where it operates to control the
net governmental outlay. Examples are the miscellaneous receipts from
fees for grazing permits on the public lands, the issuance of passports, court
costs, and the like. But unless such a requirement were accompanied by
objectionable permanent indefinite appropriations, it would hamstring the
prompt and efficient conduct of many business operations the government
is engaged in — the payment of money orders or losses on insured mail by
the Post Office Department, for instance. And if applied to public enter-
prises organized in corporate form, such as the Inland Waterways Corpo-
ration or the Tennessee Valley Authority, the requirement would go to
lengths rejected even by the conservative sponsors of the Government
Corporation Control Act of 1945.

3. BUDGETARY COORDINATION

Essence of Coordination. On the administrative side, the budget process
brings into being a proposed work plan for the government. Preparation
of the executive budget is therefore a demonstration of coordinative proce-

28 Op. cit. above in note 4, p. 23. Mention may be made in this connection of the search-
ing analysis of the review approach of the Appropriations Committees by Macmahon, Arthur W.,
"Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," Political Science
Quarterly, 1943, Vol. 58, p. 161 ff.t 380 ff.

594 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

dure in action. Coordination, as we saw earlier,29 is one of the working
concepts of organization — of all organization. Time and again in previous
chapters we have identified manifestations of this fundamental element in
institutional cooperation. In connection with our discussion of the morale
factor we have noticed especially the democratic implications of effective
coordination.30 Perhaps it is useful at this point to take a closer look at
the coordinative aspects of the budget process.

Much of the literature on management treats of coordination primarily
as an integral part of the executive function. The coordinative needs of
large-scale enterprise are supposed to be met in the main in the sweep of
executive leadership and in the anonymous ministrations of higher staff
agents. No one would want to minimize the contribution that wise top
direction buttressed by astute staff work is able to make to the sense of
unity so essential to any organization. However, it is equally true that
coordinative action springing from the center of formal authority can
attain results only when there is widespread receptivity. Coordination be-
comes a sham when it attempts to operate by fiat. One may order men
to work together, but the order of itself does not generate cooperative
inclinations.

Moreover, in the organizational sense coordination is never consummated
in a single act. To put it differently, it aspires to arrangements that will
endure as long as they serve a given purpose. From this vantage point,
coordination is not so much a function as it is a state of working relation-
ships. The test of effective coordination is the pattern of relationships
achieved rather than the existence of coordinative mechanisms or their
actual utilization by higher authority. It follows that coordination would be
futile if it were confined to "laying down the law." It must seek consensus.
It must convey reasons. It must elicit identification with its objectives.

Stimulation of Program Thinking. The "tone" of administration is in
part the product of the spirit of management that radiates from the top;
in part — and not the smallest part by any means — the reflection of the point
of view that prevails in the operating cadres of the organization. Here, espe-
cially in the crucial ranges of middle management,31 we encounter a deep-
seated tendency toward a microcosmic outlook. Capsular thinking is en-
couraged by the institutional distance between the day-by-day routine in
which the operator is enmeshed and the loftier visions that present them-
selves at the apex of the hierarchy. Even in the highest intermediate strata
of the organization — on the bureau and divisional levels — attention is
usually concentrated on the particplar programs for which bureau and divi-

29 See above Ch. 7, "Working Concepts of Organization," sec. 3, "Quest of Organizational
Unity.*'

80 See above Ch. 21, "Morale and Discipline," sec. 4, "Morale and Institutional Pattern."

81 See above Ch. 18, "The Tasks of Middle Management," sec. 2, "Supporting Top
Direction."

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 595

sion chiefs are specifically responsible.82 To them, the total agency program
is far less tangible and immediate. In fact, they may doubt at times the
existence of such a program.

Although their doubts will usually be without foundation, the self-
assertive qualities of the total program may be obvious only to the head of
the agency and his entourage. Policy pronouncements will speak eloquently
about the comprehensive program. Yet it is more likely than not that the
average line official will scan each such pronouncement with only two ques-
tions in mind: What does it give me? What does it take from me?
Stronger stimulation is required to make the line official aware of the de-
partment-wide perspective. And if he does not share in the department-
wide perspective, if he ignores it in his limited area, how can the entire
agency program ever be a full-bodied reality? How can he be depended
on to fit his actions into the broader framework of close-knit organizational
interrelations ? How can he be expected to serve as an instrument of coordi-
nation? The budget process is peculiarly well-suited to operate as a correc-
tive to such localized introversion and self-sufficiency.

Budgetary justification of proposed expenditures is essentially self -justi-
fication in terms of the larger enterprise. The fundamental point of refer-
ence is the need of the whole. The password of justification is the contribu-
tion that each individual unit within a particular agency is able to make to
the whole agency program, and — on the higher level — each particular de-
partment to the whole governmental program. Indeed, only through an
examination of these specific contributions in their relation to one another
is it possible to spell out the total program in reasonably definite terms.

Coordination by Consultation. A general indication of the main em-
phases that are to run through the work program of an agency for any
given fiscal year rarely derives directly from financial considerations alone*
Such an indication cannot come from the departmental budget officer. It calls
for leads from the policy-makers of the agency. Even these, however, have to
seek an objective basis for the policy guidance they must furnish the budget
officer and the line officials with whom he has to "thrash things out." Before
the agency head is in a position to commit himself in rough outline on the
kind of expenditure structure that would best meet next year's needs, he
must weigh many factors in the light of concrete data, confer with those
on the second level of command, take counsel with his staff officers — and
even check with political associates outside his organization.

Consultative procedure takes on a more specific form as the departmental
budget officer, forearmed by the "general line" indicated at the top, starts
out on his review meetings with the higher operating officials to appraise
the merits of their estimates. Ordinarily, to the operating official this is
merely the terminal phase of a process of joint consideration that may have

32 See above Ch. 9, "The Departmental System," sec. 4, "The Bureau Pattern."

596 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

occupied a good share of his time during the preceding weeks as the various
units in his charge, departmental and in the field, argued their respective
fund requests before him. The budget officer's labor is eased by the thor-
oughness with which conflicting demands and activity maladjustments have
been eliminated during the estimate planning within each bureau and divi-
sion. From the very moment that the first field-office manager of the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, far up in the Pacific North-
west, thoughtfully scratched his chin and began to ponder the prospect of the
coming fiscal year, uncounted operators were prompted by the budget process
not only to account for themselves but also to turn their eyes upon the
organization at large. It thus became a matter of consequence to them to
find out what and how others were doing in their individual provinces.

To this extent coordination by consultation is self-generative. One needs
no orders to achieve a modified arrangement when he discovers that he is
stumbling over the legs of someone else. Such modified arrangements
usually can be worked out on the spot by give-and-take procedure. In
other instances, when the matter is more complex and special assistance
appears necessary, "loose ends" may be marked for a full-fledged survey to
be undertaken by the departmental management staff. In either case, the
foundation for curative action emerges in the meeting of minds across juris-
dictional boundaries. The budget process is a continuing incentive for every
one in every corner to take into account the need for a unified conception
of the entire organization. As this conception grows in strength, operators
are encouraged to develop an instinct for coordination.

Departmental Synthesis. With all the full-throated eulogies of the exec-
utive function and all the enthusiastic dissertations on the role of central
staff offices, large-scale enterprise would screech to an abrupt stop if suddenly
deprived of the self-perpetuating qualities of intelligently steered line opera-
tions. It is not ludicrous to think of the departmental budget officer as a
monitor of efficiency — which is in large part coordination. But no one, not
even the top executive of an agency, is strong enough to swim against the
stream of adverse administrative attitudes and traditions. Coordination, too,
under auspices of the budget process must face the institutional "facts of
life." It cannot maintain itself in its own make-believe. Yet it is capable
of turning into a pervasive influence and of steadily augmenting its
momentum.

Budgetary coordination in the departmental sphere exerts its influence
not so much because of any sanction of superior authority but because of
its capacity for "making sense" to those affected by it. The sense it tries
to transmit to operating officials who are fond of the self-contained life
must attempt to fasten upon their own scale of values. That the "big boss"
wants it thus and so will in itself have little appeal.

Where there is confusion among objectives and conflict among programs,
with resulting antagonisms between individual line chiefs or between them

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 597

md the top level, one cannot simply go in with a whip. However, one
nay fruitfully examine the deeper causes; attain agreement on the basic
:acts controlling the situation; request from each official involved his best
:hinking on a remedy; make each familiar with the other's point of view;
work toward joint appraisal of all forthcoming proposals; attempt accept-
ance of a trial arrangement to be reconsidered at a later date; and cultivate
the conviction that all are likely to gain and no one to lose when irritations
ire removed, working relationships placed above legitimate challenge, and
operations geared to common goals. Departmental synthesis is approxi-
mated most closely when people understand and appreciate its benefits in
terms that strike close to home.

Top-Level Coordination. The most persuasive argument for coordination
that is brought forth in the budget process is the argument from incon-
trovertible evidence. The departmental budget officer may have one gen-
eral view of coordinative necessities and the operator another. Who is to
tell abstractly which is right ? It is quite a different matter when the budget
officer is able to say with his sweetest smile, "See here, Jim, what you want
to take on is already being done by Bob." Or, "You feel it's essential that
you go ahead with all of these new projects; but Bill and Harry are sensible
enough to defer some of theirs, though they feel exactly like you." Or, "If
we don't get more consistency and coherence into our whole program, how
do you expect us to get by the Budget Bureau and the Appropriations
Committees?"

This means, in effect, playing the ball back. Restraints are activated,
but the operator's judgment on the best solution within the frame of gov-
erning circumstances remains controlling. And follow-up, next year at the
latest, is easy. Fundamentally the same approach commends itself for the
final review of the entire body of estimates on the part of the Budget Bureau.
The hearing procedure, it is true, does not allow opportunity for confront-
ing the representatives of one department with those of another. However,
the same result is attained when the bureau's officials have occasion to point
to lack of broader balance, contradictions in policies, or ill-drawn borderlines
between certain programs of one agency and others undertaken elsewhere.

Conferences between the budget director or his deputy and agency heads,
individually or jointly, implement the hearing procedure, within the "budget
season" or without. These conferences would not carry far if the budget
director were unable to speak in the name of the President, thus simultan-
eously reducing the burdens on him. The legislative founders of the na-
tional budget system envisaged close contact between the President and his
budget director83 — a relationship that was strengthened by the Budget
Bureau's transfer, in 1939, from the Treasury to the new Executive Office
of the President.

88 Cf. Morstein Marx, he. at. above in note 9, p. 664 ff.

598 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Congressional voices have sometimes been raised in favor of a Budget
Bureau that would growl always and bite often. More lasting — and more
constructive — effects arise from the less dramatic pursuit of program inte-
gration and management improvement through counsel and recommenda-
tion. Only thus can a demoralization of departmental responsibility be
avoided. Only thus can such responsibility be enlisted positively for the ac-
knowledgment of government-wide ends. Clearly, however, advice and
suggestions from a central staff agency must extend to more than budgetary
figures and fiscal mechanisms. The Budget Bureau's coordinative task
calls for breadth of information, imaginative thinking, competence in anal-
ysis, and toughness of reasoning. These, not formal authority, are the sales-
men of over-all coordination.

4. BUDGET EXECUTION

Budget Principles and the Test of Practice. When the appropriation
acts have finally tjeen passed and become law, another stage in the attain-
ment of accountability in administration begins. This is the expenditure
process — the execution of the budget. As was pointed out earlier, appropri-
ations have the twofold aspect of conveying spending authorization as well
as imposing responsibility.

Since for our discussion the latter object is uppermost in mind, the first
inquiry may be directed to the suitability of the budget as enacted for ac-
countability purposes. From such a point of view a number of qualities are
desirable which in governmental practice — municipal, state, and federal —
are commonly realized, if only to a certain degree. These qualities may
be summarized as budgetary publicity, clarity, comprehensiveness, unity,
specification, prior authorization, periodicity, and accuracy.34 As funda-
mental requirements, they seem obvious enough. Yet none of them has
been consistently satisfied. Although emerging as matters of form, they
reflect among other things how far those framing, adopting, and executing
the budget have an adequate grasp of the total significance of the process
in which they are engaged.

At first glance it may appear axiomatic that funds ought not to be made
available to any government agency without public notice of the fact. In
fascist countries prior to World War II, the availability of funds in amounts
undisclosed to the public provided an indispensable means of preparation
for war. In this country the totals of wartime appropriations and authori-
zations were generally known, and questions of secrecy related rather to
purposes than to sums voted. In time of peace it is doubtful whether any
public purpose whatever can be so cogent as to justify secrecy about the

a4 Cf. Smith, he. cit. above in note 27. A broader treatment may be found in Buck,
A. E., The Budget in Governments of Today, New York: Macmillan, 1934. For a compre-
hensive presentation of fiscal administration in the federal government, see Seiko, Daniel T.,
The Federal Financial System, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 599

amounts of appropriations — even, for example, for making atomic bombs.

It seems equally axiomatic that the budget should be understandable, but
complications and ambiguities are hard to keep out of it. For one thing,
the budget is likely to be at the mercy of the accounting system currently
in existence. For a long time governmental accounting in most jurisdictions
has lagged far behind the development of good practice in some well-
managed private concerns, and inertia is a powerful force. Statutory re-
quirements of itemization in a particular way are frequent obstacles. It
takes not far from a thousand quarto pages to present the federal budget
to Congress, including summary tables for a quicker view in perspective.
The appropriations are contained in perhaps a score of separate acts inter-
larded with much extraneous material, and there are no underscorings in
them for the lay reader.

Much of this is understandable in terms of the variety of sources and
uses of public funds, and the multiplicity of agencies participating in the
spending process. More of it can be explained by the fact that it would be
difficult to make comparisons if the manner of presentation were changed
from one year to the next. Reviewing authorities, both administrative and
legislative, over a period of time develop familiarity with a segment of the
budget and the appropriation language. They have an understandable
suspicion of innovations in the general setup. It is harder to tell what
changes from last year may be hidden in a new version, and direct com-
parisons would be futile.

Unless the budget comprehends all proposed expenditures, its usefulness
for purposes of control and accountability is limited, and appraisals of its
over-all fiscal effect must be qualified. Yet difficult questions arise in the
effort to achieve the ideal of comprehensiveness. One has to do with com-
mercial and business activities of government. The Post Office Department,
for example, is an enterprise with an annual turnover running to billions
of dollars. For many years it showed a chronic deficit in operations, slight in
comparison with turnover, for which an appropriation was required. To
show in the budget all anticipated gross receipts and payments of the Post
Office Department would inflate both federal income and outgo by several
billions representing postal savings accounts and money orders — money to
which the government has only technical title. To show only the net antici-
pated deficit, however, would give a very partial impression of the magni-
tude of postal operations.

The resolution of problems of this sort, in conformity with the principles
of budget clarity and comprehensiveness, is mainly found in the use of an-
nexed or subsidiary budgets, while the main budget carries only the net
deficit or surplus. Another type of difficulty was illustrated, prior to World
War II, in the experiments with double budgets. One provided for what
was thought of as the regular and continuing expenses of government —
the "ordinary budget" — and the other showed separately the extraordinary

600 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

expenses proposed for relief in a depression period and later for the defense
effort.

In justification of this dualism, it was urged that the "extraordinary
budget" was intended to be in the nature of capital outlays to be amortized
over a period of years. In the one case the expected upward swing of the
economic cycle was viewed as the period of amortization; and in the other,
a postwar period of peace of indefinite length. In both cases, the efforts at
distinction proved rather impractical and were abandoned after trial.85
Yet there is a case for separating in the budget matters of longer-range in-
vestment and improvement outlay from current expense, as in the capital-
budget practice of New York City.

A final and continuously troublesome question relates to the treatment
of permanent and indefinite appropriations. A milestone in the efforts to
overcome these difficulties was the Permanent Appropriations Repeal Act of
1934.38 However, instances recur where particular receipts of the govern-
ment are earmarked for special-purpose spending in a manner that defeats
the program-coordinating processes implicit in the regular appropriating
procedure. An example of this is the appropriation of 30 per cent of all
customs receipts to the Department of Agriculture for use in stimulat-
ing export consumption of agricultural commodities.

Although the federal budget is presented to Congress in one complete
annual document, supplemental or deficiency estimates are often inescapable.
While this should not obscure the substantial degree of achievement of the
goal of unity in the presentation of estimates, it is true nevertheless — as has
already been indicated — that the appropriations themselves do not emerge
as one piece. Current practice reflects strong traces of the historical tradi-
tion that for many decades put the congressional jurisdiction over appropria-
tions in the lap of nearly a dozen separate committees.

Now a single Appropriations Committee in each house has jurisdiction
over all expenditure requests, but considers them in subcommittees which
report on them successively. Moreover, the subcommittees have such a
measure of autonomy that in fact there is never an effective legislative op-
portunity for viewing the prospective or actual total outgo until all the
appropriation acts have been passed and the session is closed.37 In the
execution of the budget, in consequence, there is no over-all "master plan"
to serve as a point of departure for governmental accounting.

The degree to which the budget and the individual appropriation
should specify sums and purposes is perhaps the most controversial question

85 For an example of a more consistent practice of dual budgeting, see Morstcin Marx,
Fritz, "Germany," in Anderson, William, ed., Local Government in Europe, p. 260 ff.t 296 ff.,
New York: App'eton, 1939.

»«48Stat. 1224.

87 The annual "budget review," issued by the Budget Bureau upon the beginning of the
new fiscal year, gives the essential data, including up-to-date forecasts revised in the light of
later developments; but this, of course, follows legislative action.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 601

of all. Presumably, while the estimates must present much detail, the ap-
propriation acts ought to allow considerable flexibility for administrativi
discretion in order to meet changes in conditions. As will be demonstrated
later,88 efforts to tie administrative hands by extremes of budgetary speci-
fication have proved unproductive and even onerous. The length of tim^
from the administrative development of estimates until expenditures ant
actually made is a virtual guarantee that alterations in the original planning
will be required. With respect to new programs particularly, a delicate
balance has to be worked out in executive-congressional relationships be-
tween the need for furnishing as much detail as can fairly be foreseen and
the later reappraisal if the estimates prove insufficient or wrongly projected.

Traditionally also there are areas of national-defense activity and diplo-
matic and domestic intelligence where claims of secrecy in the use of funds
have an important bearing on the degree of specification. Emergency ap-
propriations for relief purposes during the depression of the 1930's have
introduced another area where lump-sum appropriations have been justified.
Here the grounds were those of flexibility and urgent need for more speed
and improvisation than the customary estimating procedure accomodates.
In addition, the relative equilibrium of political strength between Congress
and the chief executive has been an important factor in determining the
degree of specification imposed by the legislature.

The requirement of prior authorization is politically central. It can be
disregarded by the executive branch only at its own peril. Still, a century
and a half of our history has shown that occasions present themselves when
the risks have appeared to be warranted. Wilmerding has brought together
many instances to illustrate that our government has not been slow to rec-
ognize the ancient maxim of public safety being the highest law, even when
acted upon by the President on his personal initiative.

To take a notable example, shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War,
at a time when the allegiance of many federal officials was in question,
President Lincoln directed the Secretary of the Treasury to advance two
million dollars to private individuals of known loyalty to pay for such de-
fense steps as might prove necessary. No disclosure of this move was made
to the public or to Congress for over a year.30 Perhaps the closest approach
to a parallel in connection with World War II occurred in 1941 when
fifty overaged destroyers were traded with Great Britain for sea and air
bases without prior congressional authorization.

Discussion of the appropriating process has already made explicit the
continuous nature of executive and congressional consideration of requests
for funds. Nevertheless, any methodical administration of expenditures
must make it possible from time to time to close the books on successive

38 See below sec. 5, "Audit."

89 Cf. Wilmerding, Lucius, Jr., The Spending Power, p. 14, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1943.

602 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

stages of operations. The rule that appropriations are made for a single
fiscal year is generally observed. However, it is subject to two classes of
exceptions— permanent continuing appropriations and appropriations for
specific projects to be completed regardless of time.

The principal example of the former is the permanent indefinite appro-
priation for interest on the public debt. This is thought to be necessary to
give the money markets adequate assurance on the public credit. Instances
of the latter are to be found in appropriations for public works, although
recent legislative usage calls for the appropriation of annual installments
after authorization in fixed sums for such projects has been made.

Mention should also be made of the common habit of reappropriating
unexpended balances — the exact amounts involved not being susceptible of
ascertainment at the time of reappropriation. Coupled with the general
rule that appropriations are available for a year or two after the close of the
fiscal year to cover obligations incurred but not paid for during that year,
this practice serves again to blur the definiteness and periodicity of appro-
priations. Moreover, the general rule of making appropriations and con-
sidering deficits and surpluses annually should not blind us to the essentially
arbitrary nature of using any such fixed period of time.

Particularly when the budget is viewed more broadly as an instrument
of national fiscal policy to be employed with conscious regard to its effects
on the whole economy, the value of appraisals that would more closely re-
late to the span of business cycles of prosperity and depression becomes
apparent. Similar questions arise in the peacetime amortization of the pub-
lic debt accumulated in wartime. Much argument and speculation by
economists and students of public finance has been devoted in recent years
to attempts to work out feasible methods of implementing a more expansive
conception of the budget.

Divergence Over Ultimate Ends. The shortcomings in meeting the
formal requirements of a properly developed budget system, listed at the
outset of this section, point up a more basic lesson than that involved in
the failure of individuals to understand the goals of the system. There is
divergence over the ultimate ends to be served as well. The run of legis-
lative responses to the play of economic and social forces is different, at
least on particulars, from the executive response.

The aims of provincial pressures are apt to find expression in legislative
limitations on appropriations. Lacking a reconciliation of these localized
impulses at the stage of formulation of the budget, the processes of com-
promise implicit in the final passage of appropriation acts and their approval
by the President are piecemeal processes. They override formal require-
ments. So also do the institutional jealousies that lead Congress to prefer
an atomistic organization of the executive branch, and to be unsympathetic
to administrative mechanisms for the integration of policy. In the rudi-
mentary and inconsistent resolution of the conflicting claims of legislative

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 603

control and executive management,40 the basis for orderly fiscal adminis-
tration is the surest victim.

Fund Control. Responsibility for carrying out congressional directives
in the expenditure process is fixed by means of the accounting system. The
federal accounting machinery in the fiscal year of 1945, for example, had
to be geared to keep track of no less than 332,426,649 government checks
paid by the Treasurer of the United States.41 In the maintenance of this
system the Treasury, the Budget Bureau, the spending agencies and the
General Accounting Office all share in important ways — a fact that of itself
underlines the need for effective correlation.

Its first element is fund control. This is the treatment of each item of
appropriation, including many of the appropriation limitations, as a sepa-
rate fund account, to be credited with the amount of the grant and charged
with the expenditures applicable to it. As to limitations, if the Department
of the Interior, for instance, is appropriated a sum with the stipulation
that no more than a stated amount or percentage may be expended within
the District of Columbia, the limitation can readily be set up as another
account. But if the appropriation is to one of the department's bureaus
like the Geological Survey, while the limitation is applicable to the total
amount for the department, control is not so easy. Overlapping provisos and
limitations indefinite in amount, indeed, make it impractical to carry fund
control to its logical conclusion.

Establishment of fund accounts is done on the books of the Treasury for
all appropriations, and in each agency for the appropriations made to it.
On requisition by these agencies, advances chargeable to their appropriations
are made to the chief disbursing officer of the Treasury or one of his agents.
The former maintains a series of checking accounts with the Treasurer of
the United States. The Treasurer in turn acts as a bank for payments and
deposits. The chief disbursing officer and his agents issue checks against
vouchers properly certified by the spending agency so long as there is a
credit balance in the applicable account. In this manner fund control pre-
vents an overdrawing of appropriations.

Allotments. Fund control by itself is a control of the flow at the nozzle.
It does not prevent the creation of obligations that will produce pressures —
overwhelming pressures, as abundant experience testifies — for deficiency
appropriations. To forestall these pressures and assure that administration
will keep within the fiscal bounds originally fixed, control is reinforced by
allotments and apportionments as two supplementary devices of account-
ability. A third device— centrally administered personnel ceilings—has lately
been introduced into federal management as an additional control over a

40 Cf. Smith, loc. cit. above in note 27.

41 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1945,
p. 124, Washington, 1946. This is ten times the annual rate for the years immediately prior to
1933.

604 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

troublesome area. A scheme of financial reporting is the mechanism for
bringing about a correlation of these devices.

Within the range of activities comprehended by a single appropriation
account, the agency's work program is divided up in fiscal terms by means
of allotments. Subdivision can be carried to any desired degree of detail
and agency practice varies considerably. Allotments are ordinarily made
to each of the component organizational units of the agency, down to a
given level. In some circumstances they can also be made for the several
projects to be carried on by such a unit, as for categories of loans or grants-
in-aid, for example. They set the limits within which the unit is author-
ized to proceed in drawing on appropriated funds.

The importance of allotments differs in proportion to the scope of ad-
ministrative discretion vested in the agency; it varies also with the size of
the sum in the appropriation account. Specific appropriations leave less
room for allotments; lump sums are meaningless without them. For pur-
poses of the financial accountability of the agency, allotments are essentially
a safeguard against the overobligation of appropriations that might occur
because a number of hands are reaching into the same pocket at once.

Apportionments. Apportionments are designed to prevent these hands
from reaching too deeply too soon, with the result that all of the year's
funds are gone before all of the year's work is done. In the federal govern-
ment, the control of apportionments — quarterly amounts into which the
annual appropriation must be divided in advance, and which set limits to
the agency's spending during the quarter under each appropriation heading
— is vested in the Budget Bureau. The requirement of apportionments was
orginally imposed under the antideficiency legislation of 1905-1906,42 but
lapsed in innocuous desuetude until the authority was centralized in the
Budget Bureau by Executive Order No. 6166 of June 10, 1933.

A classic example of the evil the act was designed to combat occurred
late in 1879, when the Postmaster General asked Congress for an additional
sum of $2 million to supplement the appropriation of $5,900,000 for inland
mail transportation on the "star routes." There had been no cut in his
original estimate; the deficiency was needed to cover commitments, the
department having let contracts requiring expenditure at a rate that would
exhaust the appropriation by April. When called to explain, the Postmaster
General replied that the department had not overexpended its appropriation
and would not do so. If the deficiency were not forthcoming, the contracts
would be annulled and the carriage of mails stopped. The country might be
inconvenienced, but congressional authorizations would not be exceeded.43

The apportioning process is no mere matter of dividing by four. Areas
of expansion and contraction in the agency's operations must be continu-
ously reviewed. To this extent the justification process must be repeated

4234Stat. 48.

43 Sec Wilmcrding, op. cit. above in note 39, pp. 137-140.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 605

in outline in order to project the agency's needs more realistically and with
closer precision against the current record of performance. Apportionments
may be reconsidered within the quarter as particular needs arise. On the
other hand, the Budget Bureau may go further to protect the government
against overobligation or to keep in the Treasury funds that appear to be
in excess of actual requirements for the developing program of an agency
by establishing reserves against appropriations which are withheld from
apportionment altogether.

This was done on a fairly large scale shortly after V-J Day, before
Congress passed the Appropriation Recision Act44 to recapture unused war
authorizations. Of course, the Budget Bureau's exercise of this power may
raise delicate problems in executive-legislative relationships, especially if the
agency has strong support in Congress. Who is the bureau to say that the
agency may not spend what the agency wants to spend and Congress has
authorized it to spend, just because it takes a different view of the actual
sum required to meet the legislatively approved need? Statutory recogni-
tion of the power to establish reserves has come forth only quite recently.45

Financial Reporting. In connection with control over apportionments,
and in order to provide the Treasury with current information on the
status of obligations as well as expenditures, specific reporting machinery
is needed. To this end the Budget Bureau and the Treasury through joint
action have of late elaborated a financial reporting system, applicable to
all federal agencies and government corporations. Authority for this re-
form was supplied in Executive Order No. 8512 of August 13, 1940.

Perhaps the most important innovation has been the institution of a
monthly report from the operating establishments on the status of each of
their appropriations, showing unobligated balances and unpaid obligations.
The monthly status reports are a substantial help in backing up the appor-
tionment procedure. They sound a warning signal when the rate of spend-
ing and obligating threatens to run away from the assumptions on which
the apportionments are based. Moreover, the monthly status reports afford
another means of comparing actual expenditures with agency estimates
for the next fiscal year up to the very time that the projected executive
budget is placed before the President.

Personnel Ceilings. A final means of control was recently established
when Congress singled out the field of federal personnel for special bud-
getary control. The War Overtime Pay Act of 194346 charged the Budget
Bureau with the duty of determining, from quarter to quarter and agency
by agency, the number of employees necessary "for the proper and efficient
exercise" of the functions of the executive branch. The quarterly determina-

44 Act of February 18, 1946; 60 Stat. 6.

45 Sec. 607 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of June 30, 1945; 59 Stat. 295.
4«57 Stat. 75.

606 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

tions must be reported to Congress. These provisions of the Overtime Pay
Act have been made permanent legislation.47

In order to turn determinations of such character to constructive use,
they must be paralleled by a program of concrete suggestions for manage-
ment improvement. This draws attention once more to the statutory assign-
ment of the Budget Bureau to strengthen the general organization and the
operating methods of the executive branch. Without facilities for the con-
duct of administrative studies as envisaged by the Budget and Accounting
Act, the bureau would be as ill-equipped to set personnel ceilings as to
review estimates of expenditures.

5. AUDIT

Public Finance and Representative Government. Since the seventeenth
century it has been an article of faith among English-speaking peoples that
legislative control of the purse-strings is the best practical guarantee of the
maintenance of representative government. The taming of royal power in
England was an institutional achievement of the legislature. Fiscal suprem-
acy, buttressed by the twin rights to refuse to levy taxes and to refuse to
appropriate their proceeds when levied as approved, was an important in-
strument in the legislature's success. From this example, the American
colonists drew their basic lesson.

Colonial legislatures could not control their appointed governors them-
selves. But the lawmaking bodies used their powers over the sources and
uses of funds to express their dissatisfaction with the agents and policies
of the home government. Frequently they elected their own treasurers in
order to ensure the sympathetic administration of their financial instructions.

The prestige of legislatures was high when the American Constitution
was adopted. The colonists, on the basis of their experience, had reason
to distrust every kind of executive authority. Little wonder, then, that the
framers of the Constitution put the ultimate authority over public finances
squarely in the hands of the lawmakers, and allotted to the more popular
chamber — the House of Representatives — the prerogative of introducing tax
bills. To this day, in no field has Congress made less use of statutory dele-
gation, and kept the detailed exercise of its power more jealously to itself,
than in the field of taxation.

Expenditure Control in England. Legislative control of actual expendi-
tures after appropriations have been voted — keeping the spending of money
within the scope of the grants authorized, checking the observance of limita-
tions, and analyzing and appraising the results obtained— has proved to be
quite another matter. This was true in England also for a long time. There,
however, the unification of the political authority of both the executive and
the legislative branches by means of cabinet government had become so well

47 Sec. 607 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, cit. above in note 45. See also the
Federal Employees Pay Act of 1946, Public Law No. 390, 79th Cong., 2d Scss.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 607

established by the middle of the last century that a mutuality of interest
developed in an external, independent audit of all financial transactions.
This was provided for by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of
1866.48

Under the law the position of Comptroller and Auditor General was
created, an office to be held "during good behavior" — that is, on permanent
tenure. With the help of a modest but expert staff, the incumbent annually
examines the accounts of the Treasury and the other departments. He
goes into such detail as he finds necessary in view of the internal administra-
tive checks in operation. He ascertains whether expenditures have been
kept within parliamentary appropriations, and whether Treasury directions
have been followed.

The Comptroller and Auditor General reports his findings to the Com-
mittee on Public Accounts of the House of Commons, whose chairman is
a member of the legislative opposition. The committee first holds searching
hearings over these reports, attended by the Comptroller and Auditor Gen-
eral and by representatives of the Treasury and the departments affected.
Subsequently the committee reports its appraisal and the supporting data to
the House of Commons. In case of legislative criticism, the Treasury must
alter its practice or defend it publicly. Where expenditures in excess of
appropriations have been made by a department, the Treasury must give its
sanction by authorizing transfers of funds insofar as that is permissible; if it
is not, the Treasury must secure a ratification from the House of Commons
in the form of a supplementary appropriation. If neither course prevails,
the departmental accounting officer is held personally liable.

Under this system there is public assurance that financial policies and
procedures will stand disinterested scrutiny, without calling in question
the major substantive decisions for which the government assumes political
responsibility. A roughly similar result is aimed at under modern practice
by the independent audit of private corporations whose securities are pub-
licly traded, in line with requirements of the stock exchanges and of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. However, the position of minority
investors in relation to corporate management is obviously much weaker
than that of the House of Commons. As a result the degree of disclosure to
them—and the corresponding influence of possible publicity on corporate
practices — is distinctly smaller.

Beginnings of Expenditure Control in the United States. The separation
of powers embodied in American government has so far precluded any such
amicably efficacious arrangement for legislative control of public expendi-
tures as we find in England. Once the appropriation acts have been passed,
the use of funds is in administrative hands. To be sure, the process of ad-
ministrative spending is one in which individual legislators often share as

48 29 & 30 Viet., ch. 39.

608 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

they pursue particular interests such as an allocation for public works or
the location of a field installation.49 Yet no full-fledged audit brings back
to the lawmaking body an independent review of what has transpired.

No specific machinery exists by which the legislature can systematically
hold officials accountable for their expenditures. Beset with divided counsel
and conflicting interests among its own membership, preoccupied most of
the time with other matters, virtually paralyzed by the enormous mass of
its business, and confronted with a chief executive who does not depend
on its pleasure for office, Congress has delegated or left unexercised nearly
all of its authority in expenditure control. For the most part it confines itself
to taking into account in succeeding appropriations what it has learned —
however imperfectly — about the use of the last.

This does not mean, of course, that we lack in the United States a system
of expenditure control and fiscal accountability. Its roots run back through
time to the revolutionary governments preceding the adoption of the Ameri-
can Constitution. From 1789 to 1921 Congress relied on two main devices
of surveillance, supplemented occasionally by committee investigations.
These were: (1) the language of the appropriation acts; and (2) a set of
internal checks within the executive branch. The descriptive language
would set forth with more or less particularity the purposes of the individual
appropriation. The internal administrative checks were designed to ensure
that at each stage in the spending process a separate official was responsible
for attesting the integrity of the transaction — too many officials in all, and
too divergent in interests, to make collusion practicable.

Specificity of Appropriations. Reliance on qualifying language to govern
administrative spending led to the doctrine of specific appropriations. The
act of March 3, 1809, laid down the injunction, still in effect, that "the sums
appropriated by law for each branch of expenditure in the several depart-
ments shall be solely applied to the objects for which they are respectively
appropriated, and to no other."50 This was coupled with a policy and prac-
tice of specifying objects of expenditure minutely. The development of
excessive specificity was an inevitable outgrowth and in the end proved
self-defeating.

The earliest appropriation for the support of the government, in 1789,
was simple enough. In one hundred twenty-three words it disposed of $639,-
000 under four headings. The amounts were derived from estimates fur-
nished by the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. A little expe-
rience in the method of deficiency requests to cover objects thought to have
been already provided for soon showed that there was no necessary restric-
tive connection between prior estimates of expenditure and the actual use
made of available funds.

49 Sec above Ch. 15, "Legislative Control."

00 Rev. Stat., sec. 3678, 31 U. S. C. 628. The history of congressional efforts to control
expenditures has been traced with insight and charm by Wilmcrding, op. cit. above in note 39.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 609

Under the sting of criticism from Gallatin and Jefferson, the Federalists
gradually accepted a greater specification of objects. This was softened, how-
ever, by a delegation of power to the President to authorize certain transfers
between appropriation headings when Congress was not in session. As
party control of the government shifted, so did the points of view. But the
trend toward particularization continued. Nevertheless, within a generation
theory and practice were no longer within speaking distance of each other.

Appropriations were specified in the minutest detail. However, by means
of transfers, the carrying forward of unexpended balances, and the incur-
ring of obligations in anticipation of deficiency appropriations — all in the
teeth of statutes designed to prevent these practices — funds were found for
expenditures the departments wanted to make beyond the original appropria-
tions. John Randolph in 1806 expressed the feeling of congressional helpless-
ness when, though in opposition, he refused to try to reduce the naval ap-
propriation for contingent expenses: "If we cannot restrain the expenditures
of the Navy Department within the sum annually fixed, after giving as
much as is asked for, is it not the idlest thing to attempt to restrain them
by giving less?"51 We may also think of the anecdote related by Henry
Clay in 1819 to show how institutional frustration turned into individual
cynicism:52

Some years ago it had been the custom, now abolished, to use in this
House a beverage in lieu of water for those members who preferred it.
A member of the House said he was not in the habit of using this sort
of substitute for one of nature's greatest and purest bounties, but would
prefer something stronger. The officers of the House said they should be
glad to gratify him, but did not know how they could with propriety pay
for it out of the contingent fund. Why, said the member, under what
head of appropriation do you pay for this syrup for the use of the mem-
bers? Under the head of stationery, the officer said. Well, replied the
member, put down a little grog under the head of fuel, and let me
have it.

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, Congress had come to ap-
preciate fully the realities of the situation. It often appropriated deliberately
less money than was known to be required, with the expectation of provid-
ing the remainder in deficiency bills later. In even-numbered years the
legislature was tempted to take advantage of this technique to make a show
of economy. It was not until the beginning of genuine budgetary practice
under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 that the conduct of federal
administration was freed from the irrationalities of such coercive deficiencies.

Administrative Checks. The internal checks that were devised also
showed themselves unsatisfactory. The Treasury Department Act of 1789
established under the Secretary of the Treasury a comptroller, a treasurer,
an auditor, and a register-keeping officer. According to the underlying theory,

61 Annals of Congress, Vol. 15, p. 1000; Wilmerding, op. cit. above in note 39, p. 66.
52 Annals of Congress, Vol. 33, p. 456; Wilmerding, op. cit. above in note 39, p. 82.

610 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

when Congress had passed an appropriation for the use of a particular
department the Secretary of the Treasury drew a "warrant," and the comp-
troller countersigned it. This established an appropriation credit with the
treasurer, which the register-keeping officer recorded. Thereafter, until the
credit was exhausted, the Secretary of the Treasury, on request of the de-
partment, would issue further warrants in favor of particular payees, which
the treasurer would pay upon countersignature by the comptroller.

The request might take the form of a voucher for materials received or
services performed; if so, it had first to be examined and approved — or
"settled" — by the auditor and the comptroller. Commonly, however, the pay-
ment was an advance of funds to a departmental agent — or disbursing offi-
cer— who then proceeded to pay vouchers approved in the department. Be-
cause of the particularity of appropriations, disbursing officers usually held
advances under several separate appropriation headings. Many of these
officers, especially in the revenue and postal services, were also collectors of
public funds. For both these reasons they were frequently, in a position, if
their advances under a particular heading were exhausted, to borrow tem-
porarily from another to meet the need for an immediate payment.

The disbursing officers were accountable to the auditor, and furnished
him periodic reports listing their collections and advances, and their pay-
ments supported by paid vouchers. If the auditor disallowed a payment as
unauthorized under the appropriation charged and the comptroller sustained
him, the disbursing officer was personally liable. If he could not clear the
disallowance by supplying further information, by charging the expenditure
to another appropriation, by recovering the money from the payee, or by
securing a relief act from Congress, he was bound to pay it himself. If he
defaulted, the comptroller — later the Solicitor, and now the Department of
Justice — was charged with the duty of collecting the debt.

Some experience with the latitude of personal responsibility of disbursing
officers led to the requirement that they be bonded. This requirement has
lately been extended to the certifying officers, who approve vouchers,53 in
view of the mechanized and ministerial nature of the disbursing officers'
duties under modern conditions. Moreover, as a part of their operating
routine the departments and bureaus developed their own internal checks
on the accounts of their disbursing officers before transmittal to the Treas-
ury. The settled accounts went to the Treasury, and remained there. In
theory, an analysis of them, together with the warrants issued directly, would
have made it possible to determine, as of any given date, the status and uses
of an appropriation. In fact, however, such information was never assem-
bled in time to serve any comprehensive budgetary or reporting purpose.

Delay and Laxity. Some frailties of this system are plain, of which the
chief was its delays. As a critic remarked, the system was "the most admir-

M Act of December 29, 1941; 55 Stat. 875.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 611

able contrivance that the mind of man ever conceived to put down the sums
claimed by public creditors to the smallest figures, and then to postpone to the
latest possible moment the payment of what has at last been acknowledged
due."54 However, First Comptroller Elisha Whittlesey, when asked by Sec-
retary of the Treasury Guthrie in 1854 to report improvements, responded
in the sentiment that sustained the system through the nineteenth century:
"The law organizing the Treasury Department . . . was framed by very wise
men, who took a deep interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country.
The system is based on checks to guard against dishonesty and fraud, and
it has worked admirably. The Treasury Department is as pure and free
from the perpetration of fraud as it was the day it went into operation. . . .
The system, in my opinion, cannot be bettered, and operates as harmoniously
and beautifully now, as it did sixty-five years ago."55

In theory, the chain of fiscal accountability began with an appropriation.
But in the old days Congress was not — as it is now — in virtually continuous
session; distances were great, and communications uncertain and slow. Just
as the specification of appropriations annulled its purpose by its rigidity in
the face of unforeseeable changes in conditions and needs, so the administra-
tive checks and balances turned into impediments when they prevented
payments that had to be made within a time limit to serve their end — food
and forage for troops and animals on a western expedition, provisions for
vessels about to sail, payment to France for the Louisiana Purchase, for ex-
ample. The exigencies of government were at the paying, not the appro-
priating, end of the chain.

In an effort to meet the complaints about delays, the duties of the comp-
troller and the auditor were splintered at an early date. By 1836 there were
six auditors and two comptrollers; yet the tempo was not quickened. As an
unavoidable result, the actual sequence of events was as likely as not to
start with a payment by a disbursing officer, leaving the train of authorizing
warrants and appropriations to follow along by way of ratification. When
this was a common occurrence, it is understandable why promptness and
exacting standards in the settlement of accounts were hard to obtain.

Failure to secure dispatch and meticulous procedure, however, was dis-
astrous to the Treasury's own accounting system. It could tell quickly
enough what appropriations had been made, what advances had been issued,
and what receipts had been reported. On the other hand, everything else
was at large— what obligations had been incurred or were in prospect, at
what rate advances would be spent, what payments and receipts were not
yet reported, what reported payments would be disallowed. All of this had
to wait on paperwork that would spread over the ensuing years. On this
footing of sand the Secretary of the Treasury reported annually to Con-

MRenick, Edward I., "Control of National Expenditures," Political Science Quarterly, 1891,
Vol. 6, p. 248.

55 Annual Report of the First Comptroller, 1854, pp. 103-104.

612 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

grass on the state of federal finances. It was an inescapable consequence that
Congress could bring only a dusty vision to the business of taxing, bor-
rowing, and appropriating.

Path of Reform. Modern efforts to reform the system began with the
Dockery Act of 1894,66 the collaborative work of Secretary of the Treasury
Foster and a congressional commission, aided by outside experts. It clarified
the jurisdiction of the auditors, and strengthened their supervision over dis-
bursing officers as well as over the issuance of departmental requisitions for
advances. The law consolidated the comptrollers into one, as in the insti-
tutional beginning, with appellate authority over the auditors. It made it
the comptroller's duty to render advance decisions on request from depart-
ment heads or disbursing officers, and gave him power to prescribe the
forms of keeping and rendering all public accounts. Finally, the new legis-
lation centralized all bookkeeping in the Treasury in a reorganized Divi-
sion of Warrants, Estimates and Appropriations— displacing this kind of
work of the register-keeping officer and the auditors.

Under the dispensation of 1894, the comptroller's main function was to
provide a uniform construction of the appropriation laws, conclusive and
binding upon all the departments. There had been earlier conflict over the
finality of determinations by department heads when challenged by the
comptroller, as happened on occasion. The Dockery Act did not touch this
ambiguity, which entered the picture especially whenever the comptroller
asked the Attorney General to collect by suit a payment disallowed on a
construction of the law by the comptroller that the Attorney General dis-
agreed with.57 As to the comptroller's status, although he and the auditors
arere subordinates of the Secretary of the Treasury, the spoils system — as
a rule with relatively few exceptions — yielded far enough to keep them in
office with successive changes in the political control of the govern-
ment. Of course, like other bureau chiefs, they were ordinarily patronage
appointees in the earlier period.

It was at this stage of development that the movement leading to the
passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 overtook the accounting
system of the government. It was by then a system that imposed on each
individual disbursing officer a tiresomely detailed and long drawn-out ac-
countability to Treasury officials for every payment made, applying the test
of statutory authorization onlv, and seemingly unconcerned with administra-
tive results ach'Vvrrl or operating standards applied. It put almost no organi-
zational resoonsibility on the departments and bureaus for the effective
handling of their fiscal affairs. This was the more serious because, until

MAct of July 31, 1894; 28 Stat 162, 205. For the report of the Dockery Commission
and the debate in the House of Representatives, see Congressional Record, Vol. 26, pp. 4297-
4307, 4335-4354.

W See Mansfield, Harvey C., The Comptroller General, ch. 4, New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1939.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 613

the recent emergence of departmental management in a fairly inclusive
sense, all the bureaus were nearly autonomous operating entities.

Equally important, the accounting system left the Treasury, as the cen-
tral fiscal agency of the government, and a fortiori also Congress, without
any adequate current and comprehensive conception of the over-all finan-
cial situation. Except for occasional and sporadic legislative intervention,
the system reserved for the executive branch all administrative determina-
tions as to how and whether congressional mandates attached to appropria-
tions were observed. While this would have been a proper arrangement if
bolstered by some kind of subsequent review, there was actually no provi-
sion whatever for securing to Congress the benefits of an independent
inquiry and opinion on such matters. True, these are hindsight judgments.
In the light of contemporary opinion, and in the absence of the financial
strains under which European governments operated, the system was not
viewed with any marked dissatisfaction in the country.

Formation of the General Accounting Office. The Budget and Account-
ing Act of 1921 made two important changes in the scheme of financial
accountability, one of them fundamental. First, it rolled together into a
single establishment the combined functions, personnel, and records of the
former comptroller and the six auditors, without modifying substantially the
definitions of basic powers and duties as these had developed over the years.
This new establishment was the General Accounting Office, under a single
head — the Comptroller General. Second, the act described the General Ac-
counting Office as "independent of the executive departments." This theory
was reinforced by the stipulation that the functions of the General Account-
ing Office be performed "without direction from any other officer." As a
tangible institutional guarantee of independence, the act gave the Comp-
troller General a fifteen-year term of office, making him irremovable except
by joint resolution of Congress for cause and after hearing.

Adoption by Congress of Title HI of the Budget and Accounting Act,
containing these changes, was not preceded by any real debate of its provi-
sions, except for the question of the Comptroller General's tenure. The
fifteen-year term was a compromise between the views of the House leader-
ship intent upon an indefinite term— "during good behavior"— and the Sen-
ators who wanted one of seven years. The House also talked of vesting
the appointment in Congress. However, it was deterred by the argument
that, since one Congress could not bind the next, a maximum term of only
two years could be assured that way.

Before the bill finally passed there was an unsuccessful move to hand
the power of appointment to the Supreme Court. Although emphatically
in favor of the reform measure, President Wilson in 1920 vetoed the bill as
originally passed. He protested that the restriction on his removal power
was unconstitutional— a question the legislative arrangement was designed
to avoid. But when the law was repassed the next year with only a slight

614 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

and hardly consequential change, President Harding accepted it. The cpn-
stitutional point is likely to remain moot.58

When voting on the law, few members of Congress realized that the
establishment of an independent General Accounting Office was simply
creating a separation of powers within the administrative structure as com-
plete and thorough as that prevailing in the constitutional system. This took
the place of the former division of labor that afforded internal checks in an
administration ultimately responsible to the President. The proponents of
the new scheme, experts and Congressmen alike, had talked of the need for
an "independent" audit on behalf of Congress— and frequently invoked the
English example in complete misunderstanding of its most basic features.
What the act in fact did was to institute an independent administrative
control over expenditures, exercised from the standpoint of their legality.

Control Versus Audit. The distinction is basic. The important power of
the Comptroller General, as of the comptroller before him, is to "settle"
accounts. Settlement has always meant, as Wilmerding puts it, "the final
administrative determination of the balances due to or from the United
States on accounts between itself and its debtors and creditors."59 An audit,
on the other hand, is "an examination made on behalf of a principal of the
transactions of an agent as recorded in an account."00 The Comptroller Gen-
eral conducts an examination of the payments made by administrative offi-
cers, not on behalf of Congress but as an incident to the exercise of his
power as a principal to settle accounts. He also determines the amounts to
be paid on claims submitted to his office for direct settlement. No one
makes an audit report to Congress of the amounts finally allowed as charges
against appropriations; and the Comptroller General would be the last per-
son suitable to do so, since he himself makes the determinations that would
be reviewed in such an audit.

The effects of this confusion of audit and control are apparent in two
directions — on accountability to the legislature, and on the conduct of ad-
ministration. On the legislative side, the existence of the Comptroller Gen-
eral has given Congress a comforting and illusory sense of security. After
all, somebody is looking after the matter, and nothing more needs to be
done. This conclusion would be warranted only on the supposition that the
Comptroller General is infallible. In fact, after one hundred sixty years,
Congress still has no regular and comprehensive means of knowing how far
its fiscal mandates and limitations are being observed.

By the same token, the legislature has set up no machinery in the nature
of a public-accounts committee to provide an orderly instrument for making
use of pertinent information for control purposes. In 1920 the Senate, and

58 Sec Mansfield, op. cit. above in note 57, ch. 3.

**0p. cit. above in note 39, p. 259. For a convincing development of this point, see
ibid., ch. 12.

. 273.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 615

in 1927 the House, adopted resolutions consolidating their several previous
committees on appropriations in the executive departments into one each.
The evidence is clear, however, that both committees have been generally
inactive in the area of fiscal accountability — rather completely so in the Sen-
ate, and in the House confined to occasional investigations of specific com-
plaints. A lawmaking body needs staff assistance in so intricate a field as
financial control. While this general proposition has been gaining some ac-
ceptance in connection with the legislative consideration of the budget, it
has made little headway as applied to control based on audit.

In the conduct of public management, the strictures imposed by the
separation of powers within the administrative structure have been produc-
tive of much controversy. This was true particularly under the regime of
Comptroller General McCarl that spanned most of the period from 1921
until World War II. The policy of the General Accounting Office dictated
expansion. The scope of its review widened considerably. Increasingly it
substituted its determinations for those of operating officials on questions of
fact as well as of law involved in ruling on the availability of appropriations.01
The adoption of rules and forms was designed to bring to the General
Accounting Office a much greater proportion of the immense mass of under-
lying data on which its determinations are based. Moreover, the depart-
ments were urged— and legislation was unsuccessfully sought to compel
them — to submit their vouchers for preaudit in advance of payment. This
invitation was accepted in only a very small proportion of the total volume
of transactions.

The immediate consequences of all these policies were to draw attention
to arguments over jurisdiction and to paperwork about details handled at a
point too remote from their operating origin, to the detriment of good
management. It soon became apparent also that the Comptroller General's
independence left a good deal of room within the interstices of the law for
the expression of views on public policy in social and economic fields. Such
expressions did not necessarily coincide with prevailing attitudes in either
the executive or the legislative branch. The Comptroller General tangled
early with Congress over veterans' payments, and later with the executive
branch over the Tennessee Valley Authority62 and other New Deal measures.

Safeguarding Operational Responsibility. One by-product was no doubt
a stimulus to the improvement of Treasury accounting63 and the develop-
ment of departmental management in order to meet more effectively the

61 A large body of case law has been built up in this field. Annual increments will be
found in the published volumes of the decisions of the Comptroller General.

**2On the relationship between the Comptroller General and government corporations in
general, sec above Ch. 11, "Government Corporations," sec. 3, "Overhead Control of Cor-
porate Operations." See also McDiarmid, John, Government Corporations and Federal Funds.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

68 See Bartelt, Edward F., Accounting Procedures of the United States Government,
Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940.

6l6 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Comptroller General's encroachments on operating discretion. In addition,
his restrictive approach furnished a marked impetus to both the establish-
ment of agencies and the organization of activities in corporate form out-
side his purview. A further method of mitigating his influence was the
enactment of legislation specifically making the findings of particular agency
heads on particular types of questions conclusive on the Comptroller General.
In this fashion the bulk of payments in World War II was made subject
to his scrutiny only in very limited degrees or not at all. On a direct test
of the central issue he was expressly foreclosed from reviewing war-contract
termination payments, except on the narrowest grounds, by the Contract
Settlement Act of 1944. Here effective use was made in debate of the pros-
pects of delay and of "unemployment by audit," if the Comptroller General
were permitted to question the bases of settlements previously arrived at.84
This prohibition operated to throw out baby and bath together — the scope
of the audit would not reach beyond the settlement which represented the
terminal point of a complex series of prior transactions.

Recognizing the undesirability of the general state of affairs, and recap-
turing some of the ground previously yielded to executive freedom of action,
Congress undertook to push in a different direction in passing the Govern-
ment Corporation Control Act of 1945.05 Statutory precedents for this ven-
ture existed in the instructions given the Comptroller General to audit, but
not to settle, the accounts of the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet
Corporation after World War I, and also of the Tennessee Valley Authority
under its basic statute of 1933.66 But Comptroller General McCarl had
made these instructions instruments of controversy rather than of construc-
ive innovation. In addition to preventing the establishment of new govern-
ment corporations without express statutory sanction in the future, the
Government Corporation Control Act directed the Comptroller General to
conduct a commercial type of audit of each of the existing corporations to
be considered permanent, giving due recognition to their needs for operating
flexibility. The results he is to report to Congress. All corporate transac-
tions were opened to his examination, but he was given no power to settle
the accounts.

It is too soon to appraise this experiment in 'echniques of accountability.
Much will depend on the spirit in which the Comptroller General ap-
proaches his task, and on the degree of cooperation he receives from public
enterprises previously exempt and taught by experience to be suspicious of
his activities. On the first score, the Comptroller General's initial selection
of an informed and outspoken critic of previous procedures to head the new

w See Key,, V. O., 'The Reconversion Phase of Demobilization," American Political Science
Review, 1944, Vol. 38, p. 1146 ff.

'6559 Star. 597. Sec also above Ch. 11, "Government Corporations," sec. 3, "Overhead
Control of Corporate Operations."

««48Stat. 58.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 617

operation is a good omen. If coperation is forthcoming, the next test will
be for Congress to show its statesmanship in the use of a new tool. If
good results are obtained, conceivably a model is indicated for eventual
extension to the regular departments.

Balance Sheet of Audit and Settlement of Accounts. From this review
it is apparent that as matters stand the pattern of accountability for the use
of public funds after they have been spent is exceedingly uneven, depending
in part on the historical position of the individual agency and in part on
its current favor with Congress. If the agency is in the old-line tradition,
it must submit its vouchers for settlement, accompanied by elaborate sup-
porting data from which the Comptroller General will draw his own con-
clusions. Or, if — as in the case of veterans' payments — Congress really wants
its funds to get out to the payees promptly without haggling after the event,
the vouchers will be submitted. However, they will be accompanied by cer-
tificates of findings that shut out review in the absence of evidence of
fraud. If the establishment in question is a corporation, its books must be
open to examination, but no accounts will be submitted for settlement.
In all three situations, accountability is as yet to the General Accounting
Office, not to the legislature.

Appraising the experience from 1921 to 1936, the President's Committee
on Administrative Management in 1937 proposed a reorganization of fiscal
administration, based on the divorce of the Comptroller General's audit and
settlement powers67 and the establishment of accountability to Congress
through a Joint Committee on Public Accounts. Under the House and
Senate bills introduced to give effect to these recommendations, the control
powers proper were variously assigned to the Treasury and the Budget
Bureau. The Senate passed its bill, but the House bill was recommitted
by a narrow vote in the aftermath of the defeat of the President's plan for
reconstructing the Supreme Court. The Reorganization Act of 1939 left
the whole matter untouched. In the Reorganization Act of 1945, Congress
made plain its intent to preclude any changes affecting the status of the
General Accounting Office by means of the reorganization plans it author-
ized the President to submit.

However, the subject was reopened in the hearings held in 1945 by the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. The committee adopted
several proposals specifically intended to strengthen fiscal control on the
part of the legislature itself.68 These proposals deal with both the budget
process and the character of the Comptroller General's audit functions
In certain ways they appear to represent a tour de force that could have
dubious consequences. However, while some of the recommendations may
prove excessively restrictive and to that extent not conducive to responsible

67 See President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies
p. 15 ff., 49 ff., 139 ff., 173 ff., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937.

68 Op. cit. above in note 4, p. 18 ff.

618 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

financial management, others demonstrate a welcome tendency toward
broadening the range of congressional information about the way appro-
priations are being spent. Perhaps the most serious objection that may be
raised to the proposals of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Con-
gress is that they are on the whole rather heavy-handed—explained in part
no doubt by the cumulative effect of legislative frustrations over a long
period. Although some of the proposals have been referred to earlier in
the particular context of our discussion, it may be convenient at this point
to summarize them in the order in which they have been set forth by the
committee.

The first recommendation stipulates that, within the initial sixty days
of each congressional session or by April 15, the revenue and appropriations
committees of both chambers by joint action submit to Congress a concur-
rent resolution — not sent to the President for approval or veto — set-
ting over-all receipts and expenditures for the coming fiscal year. If esti-
mated revenue does not measure up to proposed expenditure, Congress by a
record vote must authorize a corresponding increase in the national debt.
Should actual appropriations exceed the approved budget figure, each ap-
propriation would be reduced by a uniform percentage, except those of a
permanent nature, interest on the national debt, veterans' pensions and
benefits, trust expenditures, and debt retirement.

The second recommendation provides that all appropriation bills be care-
fully considered by the full Appropriations Committees of both chambers.
In general, committee and subcommittee hearings are to be held in public
session. Printed hearings and reports on appropriation bills would have
to be laid before each chamber at least three legislative days before their
consideration on the floor. Hearings should be based on a uniform appro-
priation classification. Each appropriation subcommittee is to have at its
disposal four qualified staff assistants to serve both majority and minority
members, and the committee staff is to be supplied with modern accounting
machinery and equipment.

The third recommendation directs the Comptroller General to submit
annually a "general service audit" of each federal agency. This would apply
also to government corporations. The service audit is to furnish Congress
with information on the general financial operation of the agency or cor-
poration and its care in handling public funds.

The fourth recommendation lays clown the rule that all appropriations be
in definite amounts. The custom of reappropriating unexpended balances is
to be discontinued, except for public works carried out over longer periods.
Transfer of funds between federal agencies is to cease. All "regular" agen-
cies are to follow a uniform practice of returning income from sales or
services to the Treasury Department.

The fifth and last recommendation aims to abolish the usage of attach-
ing substantive legislation to appropriation bills. Congressional rules should

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 619

be tightened to prevent amendments offered as "economy limitations" which
actually propose legislative changes. The Comptroller General is to survey
limitations on appropriation bills to identify those which require more
money to carry out than they save. Both Appropriations Committees are re-
quested to study ways and means of limiting any increase in permanent
appropriations.

The implications of these proposals for the budget process have been
indicated in a preceding section.09 Here we can confine ourselves to sug-
gesting the possibilities of sounder fiscal control that open up in the perspec-
tive of the two recommendations in which the Joint Commitee on the
Organization of Congress has attempted to redefine parts of the Comp-
troller General's mandate. Both proposals are relevant not only from the
angle of their specific content but also as expressions of a desire for a re-
orientation in the outlook of the General Accounting Office.

The committee declared that the General Accounting Office has "un-
doubtedly served a valued purpose in carefully checking all government
expenditures to see that they come within the law and that amounts claimed
are due."70 This work is to go on. In addition, however, the Comptroller
General should present to the legislature "service audits" that would
"include reports on the administrative performance and broad operations
of the agency, together with information that will enable Congress to
determine whether public funds are being carelessly, extravagantly, or
loosely administered and spent."71 This kind of audit — the committee makes
plain — would have to be different from "the present detailed audit of items"
that "does not reveal the general condition of the agency's operation."72

We may conjecture that true service audits adjudging "the administrative
performance and broad operations" of an agency or government corporation
could be attempted only upon substantial increases in the staff of the Comp-
troller General. In fact, staff needs for this purpose are quite different in
character from those hitherto met in his recruitment policy. The kind of
staff that would have to be built up in the General Accounting Office has
in the past rather found its place in high-grade departmental management
offices or in the Administrative Management Division of the Bureau of the
Budget. Much of the work of the Administrative Management Division,
indeed, has tended to come close to the purposes of the service audits en-
visaged by the committee. We could imagine a fruitful collaboration in this
area between the General Accounting Office and the Bureau of the Budget.
Such arrangement would at the same time prevent unnecessary duplication
of effort — a duplication which literal execution of the committee proposal
would make inevitable.

69 See above sec. 2, "Justification."

70 Op. cit. above in note 4, p. 22.

71 Ibid.

620 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Unfortunately, the proposals of the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress stress the Comptroller General's audit functions without simul-
taneously taking him correspondingly out of the administrative process.
His settlement duties, as we noted, are not to be modified or shifted to an-
other place in the pattern of fiscal control. These duties alone represent a
business of enormous proportions. The Comptroller General's annual 'report
for 1945 recorded a backlog of 487,532,636 checks in unreconciled depository
accounts, as against 224,658,308 at the beginning of the fiscal year; accounts
containing 153,286,172 checks were reconciled, while 416,160,500 paid checks
were received.73 When we consider the volume of such transactions^ should
become clear that heavier accent on activities more closely related to auditing
may in the end merely produce intensified conflict of purposes in the
operations of the General Accounting Office. Moreover, the proposals do
not bring significantly nearer any real working integration of the audit
function with the exercise of congressional oversight and control; for this
purpose a mechanism such as a legislative committee on public accounts
to whom the Comptroller General could regularly report is indispensable.

Looking at the "administrative performance" of an agency in its entirety
would be a new experience for the General Accounting Office. Shift of
attention in this direction may be an important step toward effective general
auditing and comprehensive reporting to Congress. The same impulse may
be generated in the other assignment that the committee has in mind for the
Comptroller General. Scrutiny of limitations on appropriation bills to
determine those which appear to entail disproportionate cost is likely to be
an antidote to his traditional preoccupation with the enforcement of limita-
tions. The very admission of the committee that so-called economy limita-
tions may be "extravagant"74 is a highly suggestive gesture. Many of the
economy limitations have accomplished little, but pose exasperating problems
to those responsible for sound administrative management.

The immediate fate of the specific fiscal proposals of the joint committee
is of less importance for our purposes than their significance as indications
of a trend. The necessary compromises with the legislative expediencies
of the moment,, and the uncertainties attending any predictions as to how
a charter of new institutional arrangements will work out in practice, com-
bine to postpone final judgments. It is plain that neither the joint com-
mittee nor its parent Congress was in a mood for revolutionary departures;
and equally plain that the separation of powers sharply limits the range of
available innovations. But the evident concern for practical improvements
in financial accountability is a wholesome sign in a government that has
grown to new stature and assumed a scale of public responsibilities only
dimly foreshadowed when the Budget and Accounting Act was passed

7* Washington, 1946, p. 26.

74 Op. tit. above in note 4, p. 23.

FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 621

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was passed in the shadow
of impending congressional elections and in the rush of adjournment to the
first long vacation the members of Congress have granted themselves for
several years. The act carried through in modified form a good share of
the joint committee's fiscal recommendations. It sanctioned the requirement
that the legislative branch, by concurrent resolution, annually determine an
over-all limit on appropriations for the year, and express the sense of
Congress that the public debt should be increased if this amount exceeds
anticipated receipts. The harsh method of policing legislative budget ceil-
ings— uniform percentage cuts if actual appropriations should run higher
than the fixed total — was eliminated, however, and no substitute for it was
agreed upon. Passage of the concurrent resolution, and its effect if passed,
remained in the discretion of Congress in each succeeding fiscal year.

Practically all features of the second, fourth and fifth recommendations of
the joint committee, outlined above, were adopted. In place of the annual
"general service audit" contemplated in the third proposal, the Comptroller
General was directed from time to time to make an "expenditure analysis"
of each federal agency such as will, in his opinion, "enable Congress to de-
termine whether public funds have been economically and efficiently admin-
istered and expended." Moreover, the reorganized Committee on Expend-
itures in the Executive Departments in each house was specifically assigned
the duty of "receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General"
and of making recommendations on their subject matter. It is easy to sec
that the administration of these provisions leaves wide latitude for energy
and discretion.

The emphasis upon a redirection of the audit function away from the
detail and toward the general may prove a lasting contribution. Full
accountability for the level of efficiency throughout the executive branch is
woven into the tenets of representative government. The more closely we
approximate a satisfactory solution of this problem, the less ground will
there be for the ill-considered contention that inefficiency is the price of
democracy.

• * MM KM K * K X X X X X X X X X ********************************** **

Index

Accountability, administrative, 105, 114, 339
ff.t 512 ff.f 577 ff., fiscal; 23, 339 ff.,
577 ff.; popular, 57, 339 ff.

Accounting, see Accountability, fiscal

Accuracy, of budget, sec Budgeting, prin-
ciples

Adams, Henry, 28

Adams, John, 21, 161

Adams, John Quincy, 21

Adjudication, administrative, 519 ff.; sec also
Independent regulatory agencies; Judicial
review

Adjutant General's Office, 564

Administration, college, 5, 160 ff.; eccles-
iastic, 5; judicial, 5, 7; see also Attorney
General; Justice, Department of; military,
5, 52, 483, 521 ff.; see also War Depart-
ment

Administration, public, administrative sur-
veys, 472 ff.; art or science, 4, 48 ff.;
as fitting process, 108; business manager,
160 ff.; characteristics, 3 ff., 6, 27, 38 ff.,
106 ff.; definition, 3 ff.; elements, 6 ff.; his-
tory, 9 ff.-, improvement, 448 ff., 462 ff.;
nomenclature, 7 ff.; scope, 5 ff.; self -analy-
sis 34 ff.; social function, 98 ff.; spirit, 69
ff.; see also Ideology, administrative; study,
27 ff.; theory and practice, 50; training,
37 ff.t 544 ff.; see also Democratic admin-
istration; Management

Administrative class, see Administration, pub-
lic, training; Democratic administration;
Personnel administration, public; President's
Committee on Civil Service Improvement

Administrative law, see Judicial review

Administrative Procedure Act, 218 n. 6, 220,
232, 235, 387, 391, 529 ff.

Administrative Research, Bureau of, Los An-
geles, 459

Agricultural Economics, Bureau of, 130, 201,
289

Agricultural Society, 16

Agriculture, Department of, 15 ff., 44, 79,
130, 186, 201, 204, 217, 222 ff., 261, 267
ff., 277, 285 ff., 290 ff., 319 ff., 345 ff..
391 ff., 454 ff., 524 ff., 532, 551 ff., 572,
585; Graduate School, 40, 572; Yearbook, 80

Agriculture, organized, see Interest groups,

Agriculture, Department of
Alabama, University of, 450 ff.
Aldndge, John A., 475
Alien Registration Act, 342

Allegiance, administrative, see Ideology, ad-
ministrative; Morale; Organization, informal

Allsetter, W. R., cited, 154 ff.

American, Bar Association, 63, 232, 315,
527 ff., 541 ff.; Federation of Government
Employees, 576; Federation of Labor, 327,
575 ff.; see also Interest groups; Institute
of Public Opinion, 79; Management Asso-
ciation, cited, 154 ff.; Medical Associa-
tion, 370; see also Interest groups; Mu-
nicipal Association, 83, 172, 450; Public
Health Association, 450; Public Welfare
Association, 450; Public Works Associa-
tion 450; Society for Municipal Improve-
ments, 450; Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers, 451; Statistical Association, 370;
Telephone & Telegraph Company, 239;
University, 40 ff.

Analysis, administrative, see Organization;
Administration, public, improvement; Sur-
veys, administrative; Procedure, adminis-
trative

Anonymity, official, 68 ff.

Anti-Saloon League, see Interest groups

Antitrust Division, 580

Appeals board, for grievances, see Personnel
administration, public, gnevances

Appleby, Paul H., cited, 203 ff., 495

Appointment, see Chief executive, legal pow-
ers; Personnel administration, public

Apprenticeship, administrative, 40

Appropriations, see Budgeting; Committees,
see Budgeting

Aristotle, 56

Arlidge case, 535

Army, Corps of Engineers, 249, 289 ff.t 345:
Service Forces, 148, 419, 460

Arnall, Go\crnor, 168

"Assistant President," see Coordination, inter-
departmental

Assistants, administrative, to the President,
23, 178 ff.; departmental, 201 ff.

Association of American Railroads, 85, 369

Atlanta, 285

623

624

INDEX

Attorney General, 189, 228, 252, 342, 530,
612

Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure, 218 ». 6, 232, 390 n. 5,
526, 528 ff.; cited, 234 ff., 522; proposals,
219 ff., 539 ff.

Auditing, 606 ff.i administrative checks, 609
ff.l and operating responsibility, 615 ff.;
and settlement, 614; beginnings, 607 ff.;
in England, 606 ff.; of performance, 618
ff., 621; versus control, 613

Authoritarianism, sec Morale

Authority, and leadership, see Chief execu-
tive, leadership; administrative, see Democ-
racy, office; Judicial review; Morale; Or-
ganization, informal

Automatism, social, and responsibility, 506

Auxiliary services, see Organization, staff;
Staff agencies

Bagchot, Walter, cited, 161, 381

Baldwin, Stanley, 64

Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, 144

Banks, tee Federal Land Banks; Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation

Barnard, Chester I., 46

Baruch, Bernard, cited, 98, 128

Beard, Charles A., 50, 450 ff.; cited 315

Benjamin, Robert M., 529 ff., 540

Bentham, Jeremy, 115

Benton, William, 199

Beveridge, William H., 588

Bevin, Ernest, 337 ff.

Biography, of administrators, see Administra-
tion, public, study

Bipartisan boards, see Independent regulatory
agencies; Interest groups

Bituminous Coal Commission, 465

Blachly, Frederick F., cited, 63

Blandford, John B., cited, 366 n. 2

Board of Investigation and Research, citeo*»
229 ff.t 235

Boards, see Independent regulatory agencies;
administrative, see Interest groups, represen-
tation; * bipartisan, see Interest groups, rep-
resentation; combined, see Combined boards;
tripartite, see Interest groups, representation

Bonneville, 291

Boston, 159, 185, 285 ff.

Bowron, Mayor, 545

"Brain trust," 195

Brandeis, Justice, 116

Brandenburg, 265

Brecht, Arnold, cited, 205

Bridgeman Committee, cited, 279

Brooking* Institution, 33 ff., 449 ff., 465;
cited, 187 ff.

Brookline, Mass., 465

Brooks, George, 327

Brown, J. Douglas, 327

Brownlow, Louis, 23 n. 15, 178

Bryce, James, 30

Buchanan, President, 167

Budget and Accounting Act, 23, 32, 177 ff.,
192, 579 ff.f 583 ff., 606, 609, 612

Budget and Efficiency, Bureau of, Los An-
geles, 459

Budget Bureau, 35, 177 ff., 191 ff., 244 ff.,
286 ff., 370 ff., 432 ff., 454 ff., 578 ff.

Budgeting, 23 ff., 32, 35, 174, 177 ff., 192
ff., 205, 577 ff.-t allotments, 603 ff.; and
personnel administration, 549 ff.; appor-
tionments, 604 ff.; appropriations, 580 ff.,
618; as staff activity, 147; budget ceilings,
618; budget review, 600 n. 37; by projects,
585; capital, see Capital budget; Planning,
techniques; coordination, 593 ff.; deficien-
cies, 580 ff.; departmental, 594 ff.; execu-
tive budget, 586 ff.; execution, 598 ff.; ex-
traordinary budget, 599 ff.; fund control,
603; fund transfers, 592 ff., 618; justifica-
tions, 582 ff., 618; legislative ceilings, 590
ff., 621; legislative procedure, 587 ff.; ordi-
nary budget, 599 ff.; personnel ceilings, 605
ff.; principles, 598 ff., 608 ff.; reporting,
605; see also General staff, administrative;
Government corporations; Staff agencies;
Legislative control

Bureaucracy, 51 ff., 80, 93 ff., 98 ff., 414 ff.;
see also Interest groups; Organization, in-
formal ; Procedure, administrative

Burke, Edmund, cited, 527

Burnham, James, cited, 72

Bush, Vannevar, 81

Business, administration, see Management,
private; and government, 11 ff.; see also
Service state; organized, see Interest groups;
manager, in administration, see Adminis-
tration, public, business manager; practice,
and responsibility, 504 ff.

Byrd, Senator, 449; cited, 257

Cabinet, coordinativc role, 195 ff.; government,
see England; informal, 307 ff.; potentiali-
ties of, 182 ff.; see also Planning

Cairo, University of, 5

California, 159; University of, 454, 569

Call, for estimates, see Budgeting, justifica-
tions

Capital budget, 600; see also Planning, tech-
niques

Car pool, 312

Career service, influence of, 204 ff.; see also
Ideology, administrative; Personnel admin-
istration, public

INDEX

625

Carnegie, Andrew, 168

Catholic, Church, see Administration, eccles-
iastic; Welfare Conference, National, see
Interest groups

Census Bureau, 370

Central, Electricity Board, 331; Statistical
Board, 196

Chambers of Commerce, see Interest groups

Charts, see Organization; Surveys, adminis-
trative; Work simplification

Chatficld, Helen L., cited, 420

Chicago, 159, 285 ff., 553, 572; University
of, 450, 569

On^exscjiiiXS* 10, 36, 53 ff., 72 ff., 158 ff.;
and foreign policy, 171 ff.; and govern-
ment corporations, 236 ff.; and independent
regulatory agencies, 223 ff.; and interest
groups, 172 ff.', and legislative control, 339
ff.; and reorganization, 176 ff.; see also
Reorganization; and teamwork, 514 ff.;
business leaders, 168 ff.; executive direc-
tion, 174 ff.; external relationships, 169
ff.; leadership, 7 ff., 162 ff.; legal powers,
101, 162 ff., 175 ff., 354 ff.; municipal, 158
ff.; personal qualifications, 162 ff.; private
management, 159 ff.; responsibility, 512
ff.; state, 158 ff.; see also Budgeting; Plan-
ning

Children's Bureau, 17, 142, 318 ff., 370

Christian thought, and responsibility, sec Re-
sponsibility, essentials

Churches, Federal Council of, tee Interest
groups

Churchill, Winston, 338

Cincinnati, 18 ff.; University of, 40, 569

City-manager plan, 7, 24, 73 ff., 160, 187

Civil Aeronautics, Administration, 86, 465,
524 ff.; Board, 221

Civil servants, rights, 92, 491 ff.; see also
Personnel administration, public

Civil Service, Assembly, 450, 466; Commis-
sion, see Personnel administration, public

Clarity, of budget, see Budgeting, principles

Class theory, see Interest groups

Classification, tee Personnel administration,
public; Act, 23, 32, 551, 553, 581

Clay, Henry, 86; cited, 609

Clearance, legislative, 586; of appointments,
356 ff.; of policy proposals, 370 ff.; sta-
tistical, 586; tee also Budget Bureau; Co-
ordination

Cleveland, 285

Cleveland, Frederick A., 32

Cleveland, President, 23, 167; cited, 15

Clientele agencies, 15 ff., 222 ff., 304 ff.,
318 ff.

Clubs, employee, 312 ff.; USDA, 286 ff.

Coast Guard, United States, 524 ff.

College administration, tee Administration,

college

Columbia University, 30, 450
Combined boards, wartime, 192 ff.
Command, dual, see Supervision; unity of,

see Organization
Commerce, Department of, 15 ff., 113, 186,

189,222, 319 ff., 356, 459
Commercial Company, United States, 18, 243

Commission, of Inquiry on Public Service
Personnel, 23, 41, 450; on Economy and
Efficiency, 23, 32, 449; on Law Observance
and Enforcement, National, 126 ff.; on
Rectification of Salaries, Congressional, 32;
plan, of city government, 24

Commissions, of inquiry, 80 ff.; see also In-
dependent regulatory agencies

Committee, for Congested Areas, 289; on Eco-
nomic Security, 126; on Machinery of
Government, 115; on Non -Essential Ex-
penditures, Congressional, 259; on the Or-
ganization of Congress, Joint, 589 ff.; pro-
posals, 617 ff.; see also Legislative control,
reform; on Public Administration, 450; on
the Reorganization of the Administrative
Branch, Congressional, 190; on Taxation
and Retrenchment, New York, 449; on
Trade Agreements, 197

Committees, advisory, 79; area production
urgency, 289, 327 ff.; Cabinet, 182 ff.;
hearings, see Budgeting, executive budget;
interbureau, 205 ff.; interdepartmental, 196
ff.; legislative, meeting with administrators,
360; manpower priorities, 289; use of, in
administrative improvement, 454 ff.

Commodity Credit Corporation, 242, 255

Commons, John R., 30

Communication, administrative, see Surveys,
administrative; and field organization, 280
ff.; and middle management, 408 ff.

Community analysis, 292 ff.

Comparative study, administrative, 48

Compensation, tee Personnel administration,
public

Competitive bidding, 252

Comprehensiveness, of budget, see Budgeting,
principles

Comptroller General, 179 ff., 238 ff.t 244
ff.f 389, 455, 582 ff.; see also Auditing;
Government corporations

Confederation, Articles of, 99

Conference of Mayors, United States, 83, 172

Congress of Industrial Organizations, 327 ff.,
575 ff.; tee alto Interest groups

Connally, Senator, cited, 352

Connecticut, 549

Consultants, outside, 453 ff.

626

INDEX

Consultation, administrative, 307 ff.; tec also
Independent regulatory agencies; Interest
groups; and coordination, 595 ff.

Consumers' associations, see Interest groups

Contract Settlement Act, 616

Contracts, government, see Purchasing, gov-
ernmental

Control, agencies, see Staff agencies; of op-
erations, see Management, middle; see also
Chief executive; Legislative control

Cooley, Judge, 216 n. 5

Coolidge, President, 167, 225

Cooperatives, Central Bank for, 250; regional
banks for, 250; see also Interest groups

Coordinating Service, 286 ff.; see also Com-
mittees, interdepartmental

Coordination, and field organization, 284 ff.;
and organization, 152 ff.; budgetary, 593
ff.; effect of reorganizations on, 20; gov-
ernment-wide, 35 ff.; see also Budget Bu-
reau; interdepartmental, 191 ff.; of legis-
lative proposals, 192 ff.; of policy, 182, 228
ff.; of statistical activities, 192 ff.; regional,
287 ff.; resistance to, see Organization, po-
litical factors; see also Budgeting; Budget
Bureau; Chief executive; Clearance

Corporations, governmental, see Government
corporations

Corruption, 31, 448 ff.

Corwin, Edward S., cited, 176

Cost accounting, see Accountability, fiscal;
Work measurement

Cost of living, see Personnel administration,
public, compensation

Council, of Economic Advisers, 177, 179,
181, 588; of Ministers, see Russia; of Per-
sonnel Administration, 41 n. 33, 370, 551;
of State Governments, 24, 83, 172, 450

County government, see Government, county

Court of Claims, 539

Courts, see Judicial review; Supreme Court

Cushman, Robert E., cited, 222, 231, 541

Customs, Bureau of, 525

Dallas, 285 ff.

Darwin, 506

Davenport, Frederick, 449

Davies, Ralph, 324

Debt, public, see Accountability, fiscal

Decentralization, 12 ff., 149 ff.; see also
Field organization

Deconcentration, see Decentralization

Defense, Department of, 180; Homes Cor-
poration, 242 ff.; Housing Coordination,
Division of, 152; Plant Corporation, 243,
261; Supplies Corporation, 243, 261

Deficiencies, see Budgeting, deficiencies

Delegation, 54, 75 ff.; see also Chief execu-
tive; Departmental system; Management,
middle

Democracy, office, 69 ff., 91 ff.

Democratic administration, 69 ff., 72 ff., 437
ff.; and morale, 481 ff.; see also Personnel
administration, public, employee relations

Democratic theory, 306 ff.

Denver, 285 ff.

Departmental system, 184 ff.; bureau pattern,
202 ff., 346 ff.; business examples, 185;
executive function, 200 ff.; growth, 16 ff.;
nomenclature, 198; resistance to direction,
202 ff.; secretarial level, 198 ff.; see also
Administration, public, improvement;
Budgeting; Management, middle; Person-
nel administration, public; Responsibility,
administrative

Despotism, see Bureaucracy

Detroit, 18 ff., 159

Dcwcy, Governor, 75, 165

Dhonau, May L., cited, 271

Dicey, A. V., cited, 537 ff.

Dickinson, John, cited, 100

Dictatorship, see Bureaucracy

Dimock, Marshall E., 241 n. 4

Disaster Loan Corporation, 243

Disbursement Division, 286, 272

Disbursing officer, see Accountability, fiscal

Discipline, administrative, 478 ff.; and civic
rights, 493

Discretion, administrative, see Independent
regulatory agencies; Bureaucracy; Policy,
administrative, formulation; "Rule of Law"

Districts, see Governmental districts

Dockery Act, 612

Domestic Commerce, 80

Donoughmore Committee, 64

Draft, see Selective Service System

Due process of law, 10 ff.; see also Judicial
review

Duguit, Leon, 538

Eastman, Joseph B., 209 n. 2

Eaton, Dot man B., 28

Economic Stabilization Act, 333 ff.

Economic warfare, see Commercial Company,
United States

Economy, in government, see Budgeting;
Procedure, administrative; mixed, 26, 65
ff.f 87 ff., 98 ff.; see also Service state

Education, see Interest groups; School dis-
tricts

Efficiency, Bureau of, 23; see also Procedure,
administrative; Administration, public;
Budget Bureau

Einstein, Albert, 528

Eisenhower, General, 164

INDEX

627

Elective office, 186 ff.; tradition, 11, 20 ff.

Electoral College, 91

Electric Home and Farm Authority, 248, 255

tlite, historic role, 21

Ely, Richard T., 30

Emergencies, impact on administration, 25

Emergency, Council, National, 287 ff.; Fleet
Corporation, 241, 616; Price Control Act,
536 n. 25

Employee, rating, sec Personnel administra-
tion, public, rating; suggestion systems, see
Supervision, administrative, and employee
initiative

Employment, Act, 177, 179, 181, 588; high-
level, 15, 26, 101 ff., 197 ff.; public, tee
Personnel administration, public, employ-
ment; Service, United States, 87

England, 52 ff., 58, 63 ff., 76 ff., 92 ff., 101,
115, 161, 186, 195 ff., 205, 238, 266 ff.,
279, 312 ff., 331 ff., 337 ff., 343 ff., 359,
451, 508, 523, 529, 535 ff.. 558, 564, 575,
601, 606 ff., 614; civil service recruitment,
39 ff.; influence on American administra-
tion, 9 ff.

Equality, 10 ff.; procedural safeguards, 385 ff.

Estimates, see Budgeting, justifications

Ethics, administrative, see Ideology, adminis-
trative; of administrative counsel, 70

Examinations, see Personnel administration,
public

Executive, see Chief executive; budget, see
Budgeting

Executive-legislative relations, see Legislative
control; Policy

Executive Office of the President, 23, 35 ff.f
109, 153, 179 ff., 191 ff.t 288, 292, 549,
597

Expenditures, federal, 19 ff.; see also Budget-
ing; Accountability, fiscal

Experience, evaluation of, see Personnel ad-
ministration, public, tests

Experts, functional, see Field organization,
field-headquarters relations; use of outside,
32 ff., 453 ff.

Export-Import Bank, 247, 255

Extraordinary budget, see Budgeting

Farm, Bureau Federation, see Interest groups;
credit, see Federal Land Banks; Credit
Administration, 243 ff., 261, 459; Loan
Act, 243; Security Administration, 84

Farmers Union, National, 355

Fascism, 481; see also Hidcr; Mussolini

Fayol, Henri, 46

Federal, Barge Lines, 241, 247; Bureau of
Investigation, see Investigations; business
associations, 286; Communications Corn-

Federal — ( Continued)

mission, 20, 61, 221 ff., 522; Deposit In-
surance Corporation, 242, 246, 255, 260
ff.t 524 ff.; Employment Stabilization Board,
126; Farm Mortgage Corporation, 242, 247
ff.; government, see Government, federal;
Home Loan Bank Board, 152 ff., 522 #,/
Home Loan Bank Review, 80; Home Loan
Banks, 242, 250; Housing Administration,
153; Housing Authority, 152; Intermediate
Credit Banks, 243; Land Banks, 241 ff.,
249 n. 17, 250, 261; Loan Agency, 152
ff., 190; Power Commission, 20, 221 ff.,
289 ff.; Prison Industries, 242, 253 ff.t 261;
Public Housing Authority, 153; Reserve
Bulletin, 80; Reserve System, 20, 211, 221,
318 ff., 522 ff.; Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation, 242, 247 ff.; Security
Agency, 145, 190, 222, 277, 391 ff., 522;
Surplus Commodities Corporation, 242;
Trade Commission, 20, 61, 221 ff., 224 ff.t
390; Works Agency, 152 ff.. 190, see also
National

Federalism, 12 ff.; cooperative, 25, 81 ff.

Federalists, 21

Field organization, 144, 264 ff.; centraliza-
tion, 269 ff.; communication, 280 ff.; coor-
dination, 284 ff.; decentralization, 269 ff.;
dual command, 277 ft.', field-headquarters
relationships, 277 ff.; growth, 264 ff.;
joint planning, 289 #.; state, 268 #.; tech-
nological factors, 267 ff.; see also Organiza-
tion

Fiscal, accountability, see Accountability, fiscal;
policy, see Policy, fiscal; programs, formu-
lation, 586; see also Budget Bureau

Fish and Wildlife Service, 290

Fish, Lounsbury S., cited, 122

Flow chart, see Surveys, administrative

Follett, Mary P., 44 ff., 437 ff.; cited, 176,
514

Food and Drug Administration, 222

Foreign, and Domestic Commerce, Bureau
of, 17, 370, 596; policy, and State De-
partment, 194; policy, Executive Com-
mittee for Economic, 197; see also Chief
executive, and foreign policy

Forest Service, United States, 137, 144, 147
ff., 289, 291 ff.

Four Years Law, 21

France, 52, 63 ff.. 184, 264 ff.t 283, 343
359, 451, 538 ff.

Frank, Jerome, cited, 529

Frederick William, Great Elector, 265

Freedom of expression, administrative, 111;
see also Ideology, administrative

Freight rates, southern and western, 228 ff.

Freud, Sigmund, 528

Freund, Ernst, cited, 106

628

INDEX

Friedrich, Carl J., cited, 55

Frontier, influence on administration, II ff.

Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, 609

Gallup polls, 79

Gang-process chart, sec Surveys, training

Gantt, Henry L., 452

Gaus, John M., 44

Gellhorn, Waiter, 529

General Accounting Office, history, 613; see
also Comptroller General

General Electric Company, 122

General Motors Corporation, 55

General staff, administrative, 456 ff.; Army,
see Planning

Geological Survey, 603

George, Senator, cited, 356

Georgc-Decn Act, 40

George Washington University, 40 ff.

Georgia, 228

Germany, 52, 53, 205, 316, 451, 494, 502,
538 ff.

Gifford, Walter S., 168

Gilbreth, Frank B., 452, 466

Gobbledygook, 68 ff.

Godkin, E. L., 28

Golden, Clinton S., 327 ff.

Good Neighbor policy, 243

Goodnow, Frank J., 30

Government corporations, 236 ff.; administra-
tive expenses, 247 ff.; and political responsi-
bility, 256 ff.; budgetary control, 250 ff.;
Control Act, 239 ff., 593, 616 ff.; growth,
17 ff., 240 ff.; information, 259 ff.; munici-
pal utilities, 17 ff.; overhead control, 244 ff.;
personnel control, 255; powers of Comp-
troller General, 251 ff.

Government, county, growth, 19; federal,
growth, 19 ff.; limited, 11 ff., 14 ff.; local,
administrative reforms, 24, beginnings, 9,
English, 77, see also Community analysis,
Intergovernmental relations; Manual, United
States, 287; municipal, administrative im-
provement, 27 ff., 448 ff.; "of laws," 57,
544, 577; personnel, see Personnel admin-
istration, public; Printing Office, 252; state,
administrative improvement, 448 ff., growth,
19; sec also Intergovernmental relations;
Personnel administration, public

Governmental districts, special-purpose, 9 ff.

Governor, see Chief executive

Governors' Conference, 172

Graduate School of the Department of Agri-
culture, 40, 572

Graham, George A., 38

Grain Corporation, United States, 241

Grand Coulee, 291

Granger Laws, 14

Grant, General, 167

Great Britain, see England

Greek Orthodox Church, see Administration,
ecclesiastic

Green sheets, see Budgeting, justifications

Grievances, see Personnel administration, pub-
lic, grievances

GrifTenhagen and associates, 33

Group participation, see Morale

Gulick, Luther, 23 n. 15

Haldanc report, 115

Hamilton, Alexander, 100, 125, 166, 582,
608; influence on administration, 12 ff., 15

Hancock, John, 128; cited, 98

Hanscn, Alvin H., 588

Harding, President, 167, 224, 614

Harvard University, 5, 30, 450, 546 n. 4,
569; School of Business Administration,
441?.

Hatch Act, 493

Hauriou, cited, 283

Hayek, F. A., cited, 72 ff.

Headquarters, see Field organization

Hearing, budget, see Budgeting, justifications;
legislative, budget, 588 ff.t 618; see also
Regulation, governmental Independent reg-
ulatory agencies; Judicial review

Henderson, Leon, 328 ff.

Herring, Pendlcton, cited, 188

Hetzcl, Ralph, 327

Hewart of Bury, 529; cited, 59 ff.

Hierarchy, and middle management, 400 ff.;
see also Legislative control; Organization

Hill, James J., 168

Hillman, Sidney, 327 ff.

Hitler, 52 ff., 125, 502

Hoan, Mayor, 169

Holdcn, Paul E., cited, 122

Holland, 52

Holmes, Justice, cited, 18

Home Owners Loan Corporation, 242, 247
ff.f 256, 258, 522 ff.

Hoover, Herbert, 103, 190, 225

Hopkins, Harry, 175, 308

House, Colonel, 175, 308

Housing, see National Housing Agency; Au-
thority, United States, 152 ff., 289; Cor-
poration, United States, 241

Hughes, Governor, 449

Human factor, see Morale

Human Nutrition and Home Economks,
Bureau of, 391 ff.

Humphrey case, 151, 176, 210 ff., 224 ff.

INDEX

629

Ideology, administrative, 8 ff., 36 ff., 206, 544,
558 0. 18; and administrative policy, 373
ff.; and administrative procedure, 381 ff.;
see also Interest groups; Organization,, in-
formal; Personnel administration, public,
employee relations

Illinois, 192; state reorganization, 24; state
constitutional convention, 32 ff.

Immigration and Naturalization, Bureau of,
525

Incentives, see Morale

Independent regulatory agencies, 23, 29 ff.,
151, 186 ff., 207 ff., 540 ff.; and legis-
lative control, 348 ff.; inertia, 228 ff.; ju-
dicial control, 217 ff., 519 ff.; proposals
of President's Committee on Administrative
Management, 234 ff.; segregation of func-
tions, 233 ff., 537 ff.; state, 62 n. 15, 226
ff.; status guarantees, 207 ff.; types of, 207
ff.; see also Bureaucracy; Regulation, gov-
ernmental

Indoctrination, see Ideology, administrative

Influence, see Organization, informal

Information, administrative, 80, 174 ff.; and
administrative surveys, 467 ff.; and field
organization, 281 ff.; and government cor-
porations, see Government corporattons, in-
formation; and public interest, 114 ff.; re-
porting schemes, 419 ff.; see also Budget-
ing, reporting

Information, public, on legislature, 353 ff.

Inland Waterways Corporation, 241, 247, 253,
259 ff.. 593

In-service training, see Personnel administra-
tion, public, training

Inspection, 523 ff.; field, 281 ff.; see also
Regulation, governmental, administrative ap-
proach

Institute, of Inter-American Affairs, 243; of
Inter- American Transportation, 243; of Pub-
lic Administration, 33, 450 ff.

Institutional administration, see Organization,
staff

Instruction training, see Supervision, adminis-
trative, skills

Integration, and legislative control, 344 ff.;
and organization, 152 ff.; see also Inde-
pendent regulatory agencies

Integrity, administrative, see Ideology, ad-
ministrative; Responsibility, administrative

Inter- American, Educational Foundation, 243;
Navigation Corporation, 243

Interest groups, 304 ff.t 314 ff., 375 ff.; and
bureaucracy, 314 ff.; and independent regu-
latory agencies, see Independent regulatory
agencies; and regulation, see Regulation,

Interest groups — (Continued)
governmental; Bureaucracy; and service
state, 98 ff.; clientele organization, 318 ff.;
see also Clientele agencies; consultation, 334
ff.; governmentalization, 316; 'interest rep-
resentation, 330 ff.; staffing for point of
view, 322 ff.; types, 314 ff.; see also Chief
executive; Information, administrative; In-
tergovernmental relations

Intergovernmental relations, 25, 81 ff.; see
also Service state

Interior, Department of the, 17, 142 ff., 186,
222, 249, 269, 289 ff., 345, 580, 585, 603

Internal Revenue, Bureau of, 525

International, Association of Chiefs of Police,
450; City Managers Association, 24 n. 17,
450, 494

Internship, see Personnel administration, pub-
lic, training

Interstate Commerce Commission, 61, 113,
186, 209 n. 2, 215, 216 n. 5, 219, 221 ff.,
228, 232, 318 ff., 369, 451 ff., 522 ff.t
541

Interviews, see Personnel administration, pub-
lic, tests; Surveys, administrative

Investigation, Federal Bureau of, 571; of facts,
see Budgeting, justifications; Policy, ad-
ministrative, formulation; suitability, 563
n. 24

Italy, 53

"J" programs, 424 ff., 475

Jackson, Andrew, 22, 95, 166 ff.

James, William, cited, 98

Japan, 451

Jefferson, Thomas, 11, 21, 77, 95, 100, 166,
609; cited 77, influence on administration,
12 ff.

Job, instruction training, see Supervision, ad-
ministrative, skills; management training,
see Supervision, administrative, skills; re-
lations training, see Supervision, adminis-
trative, skills

Johns Hopkins University, 30

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 194

Jones, Jesse, cited, 257

Judicial review, administrative courts, 538 ff.;
administrative fairness, 531 ff.; legislative
standards, 535; of administration, 519 ff.;
political factors, 542; scope, 533; see also
Independent regulatory agencies; Regula-
tion, governmental; Supreme Court

Judiciary, and chief executive, 169 ff.

Juran, J. M., cited, 445 ff.

Justice, 10 ff.; Department of, 186, 223, 224,
261. 580. 610

630

INDEX

Kansas City, Mo., 79, 285

Kecnan, Joseph B., 327 ff.

Kefauver, Representative, cited, 359

Keynes, John M., 588

Kiev, University of, 5

Knoxville, Tenn., 285

Knudscn, William S., 327 ff.; cited, 54

Krug, Julius A., 324

Labor, Bureau of, 17; Department of, 15 ff.,
142, 186, 201, 222 ff., 319 ff.. 353; organ-
ized, see Interest groups; Statistics, Bureau
of, 112, 201

LaFollctte, Robert, Sr., 168

LaGuardia, Mayor, 169, 454, 545

Laissez fare, see Nonintervention, govern-
mental

Land-grant colleges, 84

Land-use planning, see Planning, techniques

Landis, James M., 529

Language sheets, see Budgeting, justifications

Laski, Harold J., 335

Latin America, 243

Lausche, Mayor, 169

Laves, Walter H. C., cited, 366 n. 1

Law, administrative, see Judicial review; legal
approach, 30; role of agency lawyer, 376
ff.; schools, and public service training, 41;
see also "Rule of law"; Due process of law

Lawyer, in government, 547

Leadership, administrative, see Morale; po-
litical, sec Chief executive; sec also Or-
ganization, informal

League of Women Voters, 112, 307, 546

Lee, Ivy, 199

Legal profession, 62, 527 ff.

Legality, see Judicial review

Legislation, delegated, see Independent regu-
latory agencies; Judicial review

Legislative control, 77 ff., 339 ff.; and ad-
ministrative accountability, 354 ff.; and ad-
ministrative procedure, 386 ff.; and ap-
pointments, 354 ff.; and executive respon-
sibility, 354 ff.; and independent regu-
latory agencies, 223 ff.; and integration,
344 ff.; and responsibility, 349 ff.; diffu-
sion, 342 ff.; of removals, 357 ff.; over
administration, 189 ff.; reform, 358 ff.; see
also Accountability, fiscal; Auditing; Budget-
ing

Legislative-executive relations, see Executive-
legislative relations

Legislative reference libraries, 29

Legislative Reorganization Act, 621

Lehman, Governor, 168

Liability, see Auditing

Liaison Office for Personnel Management, 179,
181 ff.f 549

Liberty, 10 ff., 98 ff.; procedural safeguards,
385 ff.; .see also Democratic administration

Libraries, public, and planning, 137

Lilienthal, David £., 47, 285 ff.; cited, 132
ff.t 244, 252

Limited government, see Government, lim-
ited

Lincoln, Abraham, 167, 601

Lincoln, Neb., 286

Line, see Organization

Lloyd, Henry Demarest, 28

Lobbyists, 75, 88

Local government, see Government, local

London, 266; County Council, 331; Passen-
ger Transport Board, 331

Lord Chancellor, 60

Los Angeles, city, 159, 459, 551, 557, 572,
576; county, 40, 459, 465

Lowden, Governor, 24

Lowell, A. L., 30

Loyal opposition, administrative, 312 ff.

Loyalty, see Ideology, administrative; investi-
gations, 347 n. 9

Macaulay report, 39

MacLeish, Archibald, 199

Macmahon, Arthur W., 43; cited, 181, 191

Madison, James, 21; cited, 314

Management, and personnel administration,
see Personnel administration, public

Management, "arms" of, 23, 178 ff., 191 ff.,
301, 401 ff.; see also Staff agencies; bulle-
tins, 468 ff.; definition, 4; improvement,
see Administration, public, improvement;
legislative, 5; see also Legislative control

Management, middle, 400 ff.; and operations
control, 406 ff.; and top direction, 404 ff.;
approach, 416 ff.; delegation, 416 ff.; rec-
ords, 420; reporting schemes, 419 ff.; tak-
ing orders, 413 ff.; see also Budgeting;
Personnel administration, public

Management, multiple, see Management,
middle

Management, private, 3 ff., 159 ff.t 483; and
public administration, 450 ff.; and red tape,
55 ff.; and unions, 442 ff.; research, see
Management, scientific

Management, principles of, see Administration,
public, study; public, sec Administration,
public

Management, scientific, 34 ff.f 398 n. 8; and
public administration, 450 ff.; see also
Taylor, Frederick W.

Management-Labor Policy Committee, 337

Manuals of procedure, 570

INDEX

631

Maritime Commission, United States, 221,

522 ff.

Marshall, General, cited, 399
Marx, Karl, 528

Massachusetts, 545; early banking regula-
tions, 14

Master plan, see Planning, techniques; Divi-
sion of, 133 ff.
Maverick, Mayor, 169
Mayo, Elton D., 44 ff.t 437 ff.
Mayor, sec Chief executive
McCarl, Comptroller General, 615 ff.
McCormick, Charles P., 412 ff.
McKellar, Senator, 258 ff.
McKinley, President, 167
McNarney, General, cited, 132
Measurement, of work, see Work measure-
ment

Melbourne, Lord, cited, 73
Mercantilism, 13

Merit system, 32 ff., 544 ff.; growth, 12;
see also Personnel administration, public;
Service state

Mernam, Charles E., 23 n. 15; cited, 14
Message, budget, 587 ff.; combined, State of
the Union and budget, 178, 587 ff.; State
of the Union, 587 ff.
Metals Reserve Company, 243, 261
Methods see Procedure, administrative; Su-
pervision, administrative, skills
Metropolitan administration, 18 ff.
Michigan, 549; Civil Service Act, cited, 494;

Municipal League, 40
Middle Ages, 264 ff.

Middle management, see Management, middle
Militia, Act, 521; state, 82
Miller v. Horton, 534
Milieu, John D., 43
Milwaukee, 286

Ministers' powers, sec Donoughmore Com-
mittee

Minnesota, 549; University of, 450, 569; con-
ference of 1931, 39
Mises, L. von, 72 ff.
Mitchel, Mayor, 448 ff.
Monroe, James, 21
Montgomery County, O., 465
Mooney, James D., cited, 5
Morale, 478 ff.; and discipline, 491 ff.; and
organization, 495 ff.; and specialization,
496; building of, 483 ff.; definition, 478
ff.; factors, 4; see also Democracy, office;
Management, middle; Organization, infor-
mal; Relationships, administrative, theory
Morality, administrative, procedural protection,

387 ff.; see also Ideology, administrative
Morgan cases, 535
Morrison, Herbert, 64; cited, 238
Morstein Marx, Fritz, cited, 539

Mortgage Corporation, 242, 249

Mosher, William E., 450

Motivation, see Organization, informal

Muckrakers, 28 ff.

Multiple management, see Management, middle

Municipal, administration, growth, 18 ff.;
Finance Officers Association, 450; politics,
73 ff.; research, 24, 27 ff., 448 ff.; see also
New York Bureau of Municipal Research;
utilities, 523; see also Government corpo-
rations

Mussolini, 53

Myers case, 225

Napoleon, 265

National, Association of Manufacturers, 112,
315; cited, 81; Civil Service League, 546;
Defense Act, 126; Defense Mediation
Board, 333 ff.; Education Association, 24,
369 ff.; Farmers Union, sec Interest groups;
Federation of Federal Employees, 488 ff.,
576; Guard, 82; Housing Agency, 90, 153,
191, 261; Industrial Recovery Administra-
tion, 321 ff.; Institute of Public Affairs, 40,
567, 569 ff.; Municipal League, 24, 29, 448;
Labor Relations Board, 20, 61, 221, 526,
536, 575; Park Service, 144, 289 ff., 585;
Research Library, proposal for, 50; Re-
sources Committee, see National Resources
Planning Board; Resources Planning Board,
127 ff., 179, 181, 285, 289; reports, 81;
Short Ballot Organization, 29; War Labor
Board, 128, 333 ff.

Nationality organizations, see Interest groups
"Nation's budget," 588
Natural resources, see Resources, natural
Navigation, Bureau of, 86
Navy Department, 42, 128, 142, 180, 186,

269, 346, 454, 460, 476, 581
Nazism, 481; see also Hitler
Negro organizations, see Interest groups
Nelson, Donald, 327 ff.
Neutrality, administrative, see Ideology, ad-
ministrative

New England, town government, 9
New Orleans, 285

New York, Bureau of Municipal Research, 24,
27 ff., 448 ff.; city, 159, 285, 448 ff., 551,
557, 572; charter reform, 129 ff.; Planning
Commission, 128 ff.; constitutional conven-
tion, 32 ff., 449; state, 159, 448 ff.t 533,
545, 557, 600; administrative procedure,
529 ff., 540; University, 569
Nilcs, Mary C. H., cited, 417
Nonintervention, governmental, 11 ff., 98 ff.;
limits, 15 ff.; see also Bureaucracy; Plan-
ning
Norris, Senator, 512

632

INDEX

North Carolina, 465
North Dakota, 465
Northcotc-Trcvelyan report, 39
Northwest Territory, 10
Northwestern University, 569

Oatman, Miriam £., cited, 63

Obligations, financial, see Accountability, fiscal

O'Brien, James C., 564

Office, Management Association, National,
452; for Emergency Management, 23, 152,
179, 191, 194 ff.; of Civilian Defense, 83;
of Contract Settlement, 193; of Defense
Transportation, 85, 222, 289, 321 ff.; 336
ff., 526; of Economic Stabilization, 179,
191, 193 ff., 333 ff.; of Education, 428;
of Government Reports, 179; of Indian
Affairs, 142 ff., 318, 580; of Price Admin-
istration, 128, 217, 222, 269, 321 ff., 377,
475, 486 ff., 529 ff., 572; of Production
Management, 321 ff.; of Scientific Research
and Development, 81, 115; of Strategic
Services, 564; of War Mobilization and
Reconversion, 128, 179, 182, 191, 193 ff.

Officialese, 68 ff.

Officiousness, see Bureaucracy

Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Bureau of,
391 ff.

Olson, Governor, 168

Opinion analysis, see Information

Ordinary budget, see Budgeting

Ordway, Samuel H., Jr., 564

Organization, and change, 297; and coordina-
tion, 152; and procedure, 383 ff.; bases,
141 ff., 187 ff.; bureau, 202 ff.; charts,
294 ff.; definition, HO ff.; departmental,
184 ff.; ecclesiastic, 5; field, see Field or-
ganization; for administrative analysis, 452
ff.; guiding rules, 153 ff.; hierarchy, 148
ff.; human factor, 43 ff.; informal, 294 ff.,
and organized employees, 313, informal
cabinet, 307 ff., relationships, 294 ff, per-
sonal secretary, 309 ff.; integration, 152 ff.;
line, 145 ff.; of departments, 184 ff.; of
personnel administration, 547 ff.; personal,
296 ff., 300 ff.; political factors, 144 ff.,
188 ff., 197 ff.-, span of control, 149, 184
ff.; staff, 145 ff., 200 ff., 298 ff.; theory,
32 ff., 44 ff.i unity of command, 150 ff.;
working concepts, 140 ff.; see also Field
organization; Morale; Personnel adminis-
tration, public, training

Overman Act, 176, 190

Overtime Pay Act, 605 ff.

Oxford University, 5

Paine, Thomas, 75

Palermo, University of, 5

Panama Railroad Company, 241, 247, 253

Paper work, see Auditing; Procedure, ad-
ministrative; Management, middle, records

Paris, University of, 5

Park Service, see National Park Service

Participation, see Morale

Party government, see Chief executive; Legis-
lative control

Patent Office, 16

Patents, Superintendent of, 16

Patronage, see Rotation in office

Patten, Simon, 30

Pendleton Act, 22

Pennock, J. Roland, cited, 60

Pennsylvania, 159; Railroad, 199; University
of, 30

Perfectionism, 95 ff.

Performance, standards, see Administration,
public, improvement; Morale; tests, see
Personnel administration, public, tests

Periodicity, of budget, see Budgeting, prin-
ciples

Permanent Appropriations Repeal Act, 600

Personnel administration, public, 544 ff.; and
budgeting, 549 ff.; as staff activity, 147;
central, 548 ff.; classification, 553 ff.; com-
pensation, 553 ff.; departmental, 550 ff.;
employee rating, 446 ff., 566 n. 27; em-
ployee relations, 574 ff.; employment, 557
ff.; examinations, 560 ff.; grievances, 576;
growth, 20 ff.; internship, 569 ff.; organi-
zation of, 181 ff., 547 ff.; orientation, 570;
personnel ceilings, 193, 605 ff.; placement,
93 ff., 566 ff.; recruitment, 559 ff.; staffing
for point of view, see Interest groups;
suitability test, 347 n. 9; tests, 562 ff.;
training, 567 ff.; see also Administration,
public, improvement; Administration, pub-
lic, training; Discipline; Government corpo-
rations, personnel control; Legislative con-
trol, of removals; Morale; Organization, in-
formal; Planning; President's Committee on
Civil Service Improvement; Supervision, ad-
ministrative, selection for; Supervision, ad-
ministrative, skills

Personnel, federal, growth, 19; policy, public,
see Legislative control, appointments

Petroleum Administration for War, 222, 321
ff» 454

Pfiffncr, John M., cited, 434 ff., 465

Philadelphia, 159, 285

Phillips Petroleum Company, 185

Pinchot, see Ballinger-Pinchot controversy

Pinkerton Detective Agency, 581

Pioneers, see Frontier

INDEX

633

Placement, see Personnel administration, pub-
lic

Planning, administrative) 23, 46 ff., 123 ff.,
174, 192 ff.; and unions, 459 ff.; see also
Policy, administrative, formulation; and ad-
ministration, 121 ff., 181; and management,
131 ff.; and operations, 130 ff.; and to-
talitarianism, 125; as staff activity, 146 ff.;
joint field, 289 ff.; legislative, 124; ma-
chinery, 126 ff.; military, 124; of adminis-
trative surveys, 462 ff.; organizational, see
Organization; personnel, 134 ff.; public
relations, 138 ff.; techniques, 136 ff.; see
also Policy

Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engi-
neering, Bureau of, 113

Police, state, 18

Policy, administrative, 7 ff., 198 ff., 365 ff.t
and supervision, 441 ff., clearance, 370 ff.,
dynamics of, 377 ff., external factors, 375
ff., formulation, 88 ff.f 365 ff., see also
Legislative control, Management, middle;
administrative feasibility, 110; and adminis-
tration, 7 ff., 53 ff., 72 ff., 88 ff., 108 ff.,
158 ff.; and interest groups, 314 ff.; and
legislative control, 339 ff.; contribution of
administrators, 36 ff.; coordination of, 182,
228 ff.; executive, and recruitment, 557 ff.;
executive-legislative relations, 170 ff., 198 ff.;
fiscal, 26, 102, 586 ff.; legislative, 7 ff., 365 ff.;
planning, 46 ff., 105 ff.; political feasibility,
109 ff.; primacy over administration, 7 ff.

Political, leadership, see Chief executive;
rights, of civil servants, 493 ff.

Port of London Authority, 331

Portland, Ore., 385

POSDCORB, 146

Post-entry training, see Personnel administra-
tion, public, training

Post Office Department, 82, 84, 135 ff.f 186,
245, 269, 459, 521, 532, 593, 599

Postal administration, 99

Postmaster General, 172, 198, 604

Pound, Roscoc, cited, 527 ff.

Power, abuse of, see Bureaucracy; Judicial
review; political, as cormptive influence,
12 ff.

Pragmatism, in administration, 14 ff., 90 ff.,
102 ff.

Prc-entry training, see Personnel administra-
tion, public, training

Prencinradio, 243

President, see Chief executive

President's, Commission on Home Building
and Home Ownership, 81; Committee on
Administrative Management, 23, 34, 35,
46, 449, 548 ff.; cited, 127, 178, 186;
proposals, 178 ff., 234 ff., 288, 540 ff.,

President's — (Continued)
617 1 Committee on Civil Service Improve-
ment, 23, 41 ff.; cited, 402 ff.; Committee
on Recent Social Trends, 81, 450
Pressure groups, see Interest groups
Price administration, 83; see also Office of

Price Administration

Prior authorization, of budget, see Budget-
ing, principles

Procedure, administrative, 237 ff., 381 ff.,
414 ff.; analysis, 392 ff.; and legislative
control, 386 ff.; and organization, 383 ff.;
creation, 392 ff.; for grievances, 576; in-
stitutional, 389 ff.; manuals, 570; stand-
ardization, 392 ff.; types, 381 ff.; working,
389 ff.; see also Independent regulator)'
agencies; Administrative Procedure Act;
Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure

Process chart, see Surveys, administrative
Production Credit Corporations, 243 ff., 260
Professional associations, of officials, 24, 31 n.

9, 315, 450
Progrcssivism, 29 ff.
Projects, see Budgeting, by projects; Surveys,

administrative
Property, and interest groups, see Interest

groups; ownership, 13
Protectionism, see Tariff, protective
Prussia, 265
Psychology, public employment, 67 ff.; see

also Bureaucracy

Public administration, see Administration, pub-
lic; Clearing House, 24, 40, 370 ff., 450;
463, 571; Service, 35, 450 ff., 465, 476
Public, assistance, see Work Projects Adminis-
tration, Works Progress Administration;
Buildings Administration, 252; Health
Service, United States, 290, 370, 525 ff.;
information, opinion analysis, 78 ff.; see
also Information

Public relations, and administrative policy,

376; counselors, 315; departmental, 199

ff.; executive, 170 ff.; see also Information;

Planning, public relations

Public reporting, public relations officers, 80;

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