Eloquence of the United States

LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF

ELOQUENCE

OF

THE UNITED STATES

COMPILED

BY E. B. WILLISTON.

IN FIVE VOLUMES,
VOL. I.

MIDDLETOWN, CONN,
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY F.. & H. CLARK

1827.
LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR3MIA
DAVIS

\

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, SS.

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the seventeenth day of
July, in the fifty-se ond year of the Independence of the
United States of America, E. B. WILLISTOK, of the said
District, hath deposited in this Office, the title of a Book, the right whereof
he claims as Author and Proprietor, in the words following — to wit:

" Eloquence of the United States : compiled by E. B. Willision, in Jive
volumes."

In conformity to the Act of Congress of the United States, entitled, " An Act
for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and
Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned." — And also to the Act, entitled, " An Act supplementary to an Act,
entitled 4 An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of
Maps, Charts and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during
the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of
designing, engraving and etching historical and other prints."

CHA'S A. INGERSOLL,

Clerk of the District of Connecticut.
A true copy of Record, examined and sealed by me,

CHA'S A. INGERSOLL,

Clerk of the District of Connecticut.

PREFACE.

THE Compiler of these volumes was induced to
engage in the undertaking, from the conviction that a
collection of the kind would be of great public utili
ty and meet with liberal encouragement. He now
offers them to the public with much diffidence, aris
ing from an apprehension that he may have been in
judicious in his choice of materials, and that the ex
pectations of his patrons will be disappointed.

The work consists of selections from the Delibe
rative, Forensic and Miscellaneous Eloquence of the
United States.

A copious selection has been made from the de
bates in the several State Conventions on the expe
diency of adopting the Federal Constitution, which, it
is believed, will be found highly interesting at the pre
sent time, when so much difference of opinion exists
relative to the true meaning and intent of some parts
of that instrument.

The Congressional Eloquence of the most inter
esting period of our history, (during the Revolution,)
is irrevocably lost; and such was the condition of the

PREFACE.

art of reporting for several years subsequent, that
sketches only of the debates were preserved by the
reporters.

In the selection of the Speeches -in Congress, two
objects have directed the Compiler in his choice — the
eloquence of the productions, and the importance
of the subjects of discussion ; and as far as practica
ble, he has given preference to those which unite
both these qualities. He has endeavored, without
regard to the political parties which have existed, to
make the selection in such manner as to furnish a
view of the most important subjects which have
engaged the deliberations of Congress. Several
speeches, originally reported in the third person,
have been changed to the first with as little altera
tion in the phraseology as possible.

In Forensic Eloquence, great excellence has been
attained in this country; but most of the efforts in
this department have passed away with the occasions
which gave them birth, or exist only in the recollec
tions of those who heard them.

In the prosecution of his undertaking, the Compi
ler has applied to every source from which he could
expect to derive aid ; and takes this opportunity to
acknowledge his great obligations to numerous gen
tlemen, from whom he has received valuable assist
ance. He still is sensible that, notwithstanding his
exertions to render the collection as perfect as possi-

PREFACE.

ble, it is not improbable that the * sin of omission'
may be justly laid to his charge.

But when it is considered how various and exten
sive are the materials from which the compilation
has been made, he feels confident that due allowance
will be made for any errors of this kind into which
he may have fallen.

MlDDLETOWN, CONNECTICUT, )

Nov. 13, 1827. S

I

CONTENTS OF VOLUME FIRST.

Mr. WILSON'S Speech on the expediency of adopting
the Federal Constitution, in the Convention of
Pennsylvania, November 26, 1787, 1

Mr. HAMILTON'S Speech on the same subject, in the

Convention of New York, June 20, 1788, ... 22

Mr. HAMILTON'S second Speech on the same subject,

in the Convention of New York, June 24, 1788, . 45

Mr. HAMILTON'S third Speech on the same subject,

in the Convention of New York, June 27, 1788, . 61

Mr. HENRY'S Speech on the same subject, in the Con
vention of Virginia, June 4, 1788, 73

Mr. RANDOLPH'S Speech on the same subject, in the /^

Convention of Virginia, June 6, 1788, .... 102

Mr. MADISON'S Speech on the same subject, in the Con
vention of Virginia, June, 1788, 128

Mr. HENRY'S second Speech on the same subject, in the

Convention of Virginia, June 7, 1788, .... 178

Mr. MARSHALL'S Speech on the same subject, in the

Convention of Virginia, June 20, 1788, .... 226

Mr. HENRY'S third Speech on the same subject, in the

( Convention of Virginia, June, 24, 1788, .... 240
President WASHINGTON'S Inaugural Address, April 30,
1789, 252
Mr. SMITH'S Speech on Mr. Madison's Resolutions, in
the House of Representatives of the United States,

January 13, 1794, 257

Mr. NICHOLAS' Speech on the same subject, in the
House of Representatives of the United States,

January 16, 1794, 286

Mr. AMES' Speech on the same subject, in the House of
Representatives of the United States, January 27,

1794, 29S

Mr. MADISON'S Speech on the British Treaty, in the

Vlll CONTENTS.

House of Representatives of the United States,

April 15, 1796, 332

Mr. GILES' Speech on the same subject, in the House of
Representatives of the United States, April 18,
1796, 352

Mr. GALLATIN'S Speech on the same subject, in the
House of Representatives of the United States,
April 26, 1796, 396

Mr. AMES' Speech on the same subject, in the House
of Representatives of the United States, April 28,
1796, 425

President J. ADAMS' Inaugural Address, March 4, 1797, 464

Mr. HARPER'S Speech on the necessity of resisting the
Aggressions and Encroachments of France ; in the
House of Representatives of the United States,
May 29,- 1797, 471

SPEECH OF JAMES WILSON.

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA,
NOVEMBER 26lh, 1787.*

THE system proposed, by the late convention, for
the government of the United States, is now before
you. Of that convention I had the honor to be a
member. As I am the only member of that body, who
has the honor to be also a member of this, it may be

* Soon after the termination of the war of the revolution, it be
came apparent that the powers vested in the General Government*
by the articles of Confederation, were inadequate, and that the unity
which had existed among the states during the war, had resulted
rather from the pressure of circumstances, than from any authority
of the General Government.

So universal was the conviction that the public welfare required
a Government of more extensive powers, that in May, 1787, a con
vention, composed of delegates from all the states in the union, with
the exception of Rhode Island, assembled at Philadelphia, to take
the subject into consideration. It continued its deliberations with
closed doors until the 17th of the following September, when thf
Federal Constitution was promulgated. The convention resolved.
" That the constitution be laid before the United States, in Con
gress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this convention that
it should afterwards be submitted to a convention of delegates, cho
sen in each state by the people thereof, for their assent and ratifica
tion."

In conformity to the recommendation of the convention, Con
gress, on the 28th of the same month, passed a resolution directing
that the constitution be submitted to conventions to be assembled
in the several states.

In the conventions subsequently assembled, the expediency of adopt
ing the constitution was discussed wfth great ability and eloquence.
The wisdom, genius and patriotism of the nation, were here called into
action, and their concentrated rays threw over the subject a flood of
light which left none of its intricacies unrevealed. — COMPILED.
VOL. T. I

2 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON"

expected that I should prepare the way for the delibe
rations of this assembly, by unfolding the difficulties
which the late convention were obliged to encounter ;
by pointing out the end which they proposed to ac
complish ; and by tracing the general principles which
they have adopted for the accomplishment of that end.

To form a good system of government for a single
city or state, however limited as to territory, or incon
siderable as to numbers, has been thought to require
the strongest efforts of human genius. With what
conscious diffidence, then, must the members of the
convention have revolved in their minds the immense
undertaking which was before them. Their views
could not be confined to a small or a single community,
but were expanded to a great number of states ; seve
ral of which contain an extent of territory, and re
sources of population, equal to those of some of the
most respectable kingdoms on the other side of the
Atlantic. Nor were even these the only objects to
be comprehended within their deliberations. Numer
ous states yet unformed, myriads of the human race,
who will inhabit regions hitherto uncultivated, were
to be affected by the result of their proceedings. It
Avas necessary, therefore, to form their calculations on
a scale commensurate to a large portion of the globe.

For my own part, I have been often lost in astonish
ment at the vastness of the prospect before us. To
open the navigation of a single river was lately thought,
in Europe, an enterprise adequate to imperial glory.
But could the commercial scenes of the Scheldt be
compared with those that, under a good government,
will be exhibited on the Hudson, the Delaware, the
Potomac, and the numerous other rivers, that water
and are intended to enrich the dominions of the United
States?

The difficulty of the business was equal to its mag
nitude. No small share of wisdom and address is re
quisite to combine and reconcile the jarring interests,
that prevail, or seem to prevail, in a single community.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ;{

The United States contain already thirteen govern
ments mutually independent. Those governments
present to the Atlantic a front of fifteen hundred miles
in extent. Their soil, their climates, their produc
tions, their dimensions, their numbers, are different.
In many instances, a difference and even an opposi
tion subsists among their interests ; and a difference
and even an opposition is imagined to subsist in many
more. An apparent interest produces the same attach
ment as a real one ; and is often pursued with no less
perseverance and vigor. When all these circumstances
are seen and attentively considered, will any mem
ber of this honorable body be surprised, that such a
diversity of things produced a proportioned diversity
of sentiment ? Will he be surprised that such a diversi
ty of sentiment rendered a spirit of mutual forbearance
and conciliation indispensably necessary to the success
of the great work ? And will he be surprised that mu
tual concessions and sacrifices were the consequences
of mutual forbearance and conciliation ? When the
springs of opposition were so numerous and strong,
and poured forth their waters in courses so varying,
need we be surprised that the stream formed by then-
conjunction was impelled in a direction somewhat
different from that, which each of them would have
taken separately ?

I have reason to think that a difficulty arose in the
minds of some members of the convention from another
consideration — their ideas of the temper and disposi
tion of the people, for whom the constitution is propos
ed. The citizens of the United States, however differ^
ent in some other respects, are well known to agree in
one strongly marked feature of their character — a
warm and keen sense of freedom and independence.
This sense has been heightened by the glorious result
of their late struggle against all the efforts of one of
the most powerful nations of Europe. It was appre
hended, I believe, by some, that a people so high spirit
ed would ill brook the restraints of an efficient govern-

i MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON

rnent. I confess that this consideration did not influ
ence my conduct. I knew my constituents to be high
spirited; but I knew them also to possess sound
sense. I knew that, in the event, they would be best
pleased with that system of government, which would
best promote their freedom and happiness. I have
often revolved this subject in my mind. I have sup
posed one of my constituents to ask me, why I gave
such a vote on a particular question ? I have always
thought it would be a satisfactory answer to say —
because I judged, upon the best consideration I could
give, that such a vote was right. I have thought that
it would be but a very poor compliment to my con
stituents to say, that in my opinion, such a vote would
have been proper, but that I supposed a contrary one
would be more agreeable to those who sent me to the
convention. I could not, even in idea, expose myself
to such a retort as, upon the last answer, might have
been justly made to me. Pray, sir, what reasons have
you for supposing that a right vote would displease
your constituents ? Is this the proper return for the
high confidence they have placed in you? If they have
given cause for such a surmise, it was by choosing a
representative, who could entertain such an opinion of
them. I was under no apprehension, that the good
people of this state would behold with displeasure the
brightness of the rays of delegated power, when it only
proved the superior splendor of the luminary, of
which those rays were only the reflection.

A very important difficulty arose from comparing
the extent of the country to be governed, with the kind
of government which it would be proper to establish
in it. It has been an opinion, countenanced by high
authority, " that the natural property of small states is
to be governed as a republic ; of middling ones, to be
subject to a monarch; and of large empires, to be
swayed by a despotic prince; and that the conse
quence is, that, in order to preserve the principles of
the established government, the state must be support-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 0

ed in the extent it has acquired ; and that the spirit of
the state will alter in proportion as it extends ^or con
tracts its limits."* This opinion seems to be support
ed, rather than contradicted, by the history of the gov
ernments in the old world. Here then the difficulty
appeared in full view. On one hand, the United States
contain an immense extent of territory, and, according
to the foregoing opinion, a despotic government is best
adapted to that extent. On the other hand, it was
well known, that, however the citizens of the United
States might, with pleasure, submit to the legitimate
restraints of a republican constitution, they would
reject, with indignation, the fetters of despotism.
What then was to be done ? The idea of a confede
rate republic presented itself. This kind of constitu
tion has been thought to have " all the internal ad
vantages of a republican, together with the external
force of a monarchical government."! Its description
is, " a convention, by which several states agree to be
come members of a larger one, which they intend to
establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that
constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means
of farther association."! The expanding quality of I
such a government is peculiarly fitted for the United
States, the greatest part of whose territory is yet un- f
cultivated.

But while this form of government enabled us to
surmount the difficulty last mentioned, it conducted
us to another, of which I am now to take notice. It
left us almost without precedent or guide ; and, con
sequently, without the benefit of that instruction,
which, in many cases, may be derived from the con
stitution, and history, and experience of other nations.
Several associations have frequently been called by
the name of confederate states, which have not, in

* Mont. Sp. L. b. 8. c. 20.

t Id. b. 9. c. 1. 1 Paley, 199—202.

1 Mont. Sp. L. b. 9. c. 1.

() MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON

propriety of language, deserved it. The Swiss Can
tons are connected only by alliances. The United
Netherlands are indeed an assemblage of societies •
but this assemblage constitutes no new one ; and, there
fore, it does not correspond with the full definition of
a confederate republic. The Germanic body is com
posed of such disproportioned and discordant mate
rials, and its structure is so intricate and complex,
that little useful knowledge can be drawn from it.
Ancient history discloses, and barely discloses to our
view, some confederate republics — the Achgean league,
the Lycian confederacy, and the Amphictyonic coun
cil. But the facts recorded concerning their consti
tutions are so few and general, and their histories are
so unmarked and defective, that no satisfactory infor
mation can be collected from them concerning many
particular circumstances, from an accurate discern
ment and comparison of which alone, legitimate and
practical inferences can be made from one constitu
tion to another. Besides, the situation and dimensions
of those confederacies, and the state of society, man
ners, and habits in them, were so different from those
of the United States, that the most correct descrip
tions could have supplied but a very small fund of ap
plicable remark. Thus, in forming this system, we
were deprived of many advantages, which the history
and experience of other ages and other countries
would, in other cases, have afforded us.

Permit me to add, in this place, that the science
even of government itself, seems yet to be almost in
its state of infancy. Governments, in general, have
been the result of force, of fraud, and of accident.
After a period of six thousand years has elapsed since
the creation, the United States exhibit to the world
the first instance, as far as we can learn, of a nation,
unattacked by external force, unconvulsed by domes
tic insurrections, assembling voluntarily, deliberating
fully, and deciding calmly, concerning that system of
government under which they would wish that they

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 7

and their posterity should live. The ancients, so en
lightened on other subjects, were very uninformed with
regard to this. They seem scarcely to have had any
idea of any other kinds of government, than the three
simple forms designated by the epithets, monarchical,
aristocratical, and democratical. I know that much
and pleasing ingenuity has been exerted, in modem
times, in drawing entertaining parallels between some
of the ancient constitutions, and some of the mixed
governments that have since existed in Europe. But I
much suspect that, on strict examination, the instances
of resemblance will be found to be few and weak ; to
be suggested by the improvements, which, in subse
quent ages, have been made in government, and not
to be drawn immediately from the ancient constitu
tions themselves, as they were intended and under
stood by those who framed them. To illustrate this,
a similar observation may be made on another subject.
Admiring critics have fancied, that they have discover
ed in their favorite Homer the seeds of all the improve
ments in philosophy, and in the sciences, made since
his time. What induces me to be of this opinion, is,
that Tacitus, the profound politician Tacitus, who
lived towards the latter end of those ages which are
now denominated ancient, who undoubtedly had stu
died the constitutions of all the states and kingdoms
known before and in his time, and who certainly was
qualified, in an uncommon degree, for understanding
the full force and operation of each of them, considers,
after all he had known and read, a mixed government,
composed of the three simple forms, as a thing rather
to be wished than expected : and he thinks, that if
such a government could even be instituted, its dura
tion could not be long. One thing is very certain, that,
the doctrine of representation in government was al
together unknown to the ancients. Now the know
ledge and practice of this doctrine is, in my opinion,
essential to every system, that can possess the quali
ties of freedom, wisdom, and energy.

tf MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON

It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps,
excite some surprise, that representation of the people
is not, even at this day, the sole principle of any gov
ernment in Europe. Great Britain boasts, and she
may well boast, of the improvement she has made in
politics, by the admission of representation: for the
improvement is important as far as it goes ; but it by
no means goes far enough. Is the executive power of
Great Britain founded on representation? This is
not pretended. Before the revolution, many of the
kings claimed to reign by divine right, and others by
hereditary right ; and even at the revolution, nothing
farther was effected or attempted, than the recogni
tion of certain parts of an original contract,* supposed
at some remote period to have been made between
the king and the people. A contract seems to ex
clude, rather than to imply, delegated power. The
judges of Great Britain are appointed by the crown.
The judicial authority, therefore, does not depend upon
representation, even in its most remote degree. Does
representation prevail in the legislative department of
the British government ? Even here it does not pre
dominate ; though it may serve as a check. The le
gislature consists of three branches, the king, the
lords, and the commons. Of these, only the latter are
supposed by the constitution to represent the authority
of the people. This short analysis clearly shows, to
what a narrow corner of the British constitution the
principle of representation is confined. I believe it
does not extend farther, if so far, in any other govern
ment in Europe. For the American States were re
served the glory and the happiness of diffusing this
vital principle through all the constituent parts of gov
ernment. Representation is the chain of communi
cation between the people, and those to whom they
have committed the exercise of the powers of govern
ment. This chain may consist of one or more links ;

* I Bl. Com. 233.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 9

but in all cases it should be sufficiently strong and
discernible.

To be left without guide or precedent was not the
only difficulty, in which the convention were involved,
by proposing to their constituents a plan of a confede
rate republic. They found themselves embarrassed
with another of peculiar delicacy and importance ; I
mean that of drawing a proper line between the nation
al government and the governments of the several
states. It was easy to discover a proper and satisfac
tory principle on the subject. Whatever object of gov
ernment is confined in its operation and effects within
the bounds of a particular state, should be con
sidered as belonging to the government of that
state ; whatever object of government extends in its
operation or effects beyond the bounds of a particular
state, should be considered as belonging to the govern
ment of the United States. But though this principle
be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular
cases would be accompanied with much difficulty;
because, in its application, room must be allowed for
great discretionary latitude of construction of the
principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty
arising from discretionary construction on this subject,
an enumeration of particular instances, in which the
application of the principle ought to take place, has
been attempted with much industry and care. It is
only in mathematical science, that aline can be describ
ed with mathematical precision. But I flatter myself
that, upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration
will be found to be safe and unexceptionable ; and ac
curate too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be
expected in a subject of this nature. Particulars
under this head will be more properly explained, when
we descend to the minute view of the enumeration
which is made in the proposed constitution.

After all, it will be necessary, that, on a subject so
peculiarly delicate as this, much prudence, much can
dor, much moderation, and much liberality should be

10 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH O>s

exercised and displayed, both by the federal govern
ment and by the governments of the several states.
It is to be hoped, that those virtues in government will
be exercised and displayed, when we consider, that the
powers of the federal government, and those of the
state governments, are drawn from sources equally
pure. If a difference can be discovered between them,
it is in favor of the federal government; because that
government is founded on a representation of the whole
union ; whereas the government of any particular state
is founded only on the representation of a part, incon
siderable when compared with the whole. It is not
more reasonable to suppose, that the counsels of the
whole will embrace the interest of every part, than that
the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of
the whole.

I intend not, sir, by this description of the difficulties
with which the convention were surrounded, to magnify
their skill or their merit in surmounting them, or to
insinuate that any predicament, in which the conven
tion stood, should prevent the closest and most cautious
scrutiny into the performance, which they have exhibit
ed to their constituents and to the world. My inten
tion is of far other and higher aim — to evince by the
conflicts and difficulties which must arise from the
many and powerful causes which I have enumerated,
that it is hopeless and impracticable to form a constitu
tion, which will, in every part, be acceptable to every
citizen, or even to every government in the United
States ; and that all which can be expected is, to form
such a constitution as, upon the whole, is the best that
can possibly be obtained. Man and perfection ! — a
state and perfection ! — -an assemblage of states and
perfection ! Can we reasonably expect, however
ardently we may wish, to behold the glorious union ?

I can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey
to others, the impression, which, on many occasions,
was made by the difficulties which surrounded and
pressed the convention. The great undertaking, at

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. H

some times, seemed to be at a stand ; at other times,
its motions seemed to be retrograde. At the conclu
sion, however, of our work, many of the members ex
pressed their astonishment at the success with which
it terminated.

Having enumerated some of the difficulties which
the convention were obliged to encounter in the course
of their proceedings, I shall next point out the end
which they proposed to accomplish. Our wants, our
talents, our affections, our passions, all tell us that we
were made for a state of society. But a state of so
ciety could not be supported long or happily without
some civil restraint. It is true that, in a state of na
ture, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others;
but it is equally true, that, in such a state, every other
individual may act uncontrolled by him. Amidst this
universal independence, the dissensions and animosi
ties between interfering members of the society would
be numerous and ungovernable. The consequence
would be, that each member, in such a natural state,
would enjoy less liberty, and suffer more interruption,
than he would in a regulated society. Hence the uni
versal introduction of governments of some kind or
other into the social state. The liberty of every
member is increased by this introduction ; for each
gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every
other member, than he loses by the limitation of his
own. The result is, that civil government is ne
cessary to the perfection and happiness of man. In
forming this government, and carrying it into execution,
it is essential that the interest and authority of the
whole community should be binding on every part of it.

The foregoing principles and conclusions are gene
rally admitted to be just and sound with regard to the
nature and formation of single governments, and the
duty of submission to them. In some cases they will
apply, with much propriety and force, to states already
formed. The advantages and necessity of civil gov
ernment among individuals in society are not greater

jo ;MJ{. WILSON'S SPEECH o\

or stronger than, in some situations and circumstances,
are the advantages and necessity of a federal
government among states. A natural and a very
important question now presents itself. Is such the
situation — are such the circumstances of the United
States ? A proper answer to this question will unfold
some very interesting truths.

The United States may adopt any one of four differ
ent systems. They may become consolidated into
one government, in which the separate existence of
the states shall be entirely absorbed. They may re
ject any plan of union or association, and act as
separate and unconnected states. They may form
two or more confederacies. They may unite in one
federal republic. Which of these systems ought to
have been proposed by the convention ? To support
with vigor, a single government over the whole ex
tent of the United States, would demand a system of
the most unqualified and the most unremitted despot
ism. Such a number of separate states, contiguous in
situation, unconnected and disunited in government,
would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign
influence, and foreign intrigue ; at another, the victim
of mutual rage, rancor, and revenge. Neither of
these systems found advocates in the late convention :
I presume they will not find advocates in this. Would
it be proper to divide the United States into two or
more confederacies ? It will not be unadvisable to
take a more minute survey of this subject. Some
aspects, under which it may be viewed, are far from
being, at first sight, uninviting. Two or more confede
racies would be each more compact and more
manageable, than a single one extending over the
same territory. By dividing the United States into
two or more confederacies, ithe great collision of in
terests, apparently or really different and contrary, in
the whole extent of their dominion, would be broken,
and in a great measure disappear in the several parts.
But these advantages, which are discovered from

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 13

certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by
inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate
examination. Animosities, and perhaps wars, would
arise from assigning the extent, the limits, and the
rights of the different confederacies. The expenses
of governing would be multiplied by the number of
federal governments. The danger resulting from for
eign influence and mutual dissensions would not, per
haps, be less great and alarming in the instance of
different confederacies, than in .the instance of dif
ferent, though more numerous unassociated states.
These observations, and many others that might be
made on the subject, will be sufficient to evince, that
a division of the United States into a number of sepa
rate confederacies, would probably be an unsatis
factory and an unsuccessful experiment. The re
maining system, which the American States may
adopt, is a union of them under one confederate
republic. It will not be necessary to employ much
time or many arguments to show, that this is the
most eligible system that can be proposed. By
adopting this system, the vigor and decision of a
wide spreading monarchy may be joined to the free
dom and beneficence of a contracted republic. The
extent of territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the
number, and greatness, and connexion of lakes and
rivers, with which the United States are intersected
and almost surrounded, all indicate an enlarged gov
ernment to be fit and advantageous for them. The
principles and dispositions of their citizens indicate,
that. in this government liberty shall reign triumphant.
Such indeed have been the general opinions and wishes
entertained since the era of our independence. If
those opinions and wishes are as well founded as they
have been general, the late convention were justified
in proposing to their constituents one confederate re
public, as the best system of a national government for
the United States.

In forming this system, it was proper to give minute

14 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH O\

attention to the interests of all the parts ; but there
was a duty of still higher import — to feel and to show
a predominating regard to the superior interests of
the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed,
the plan before us would never have made its ap
pearance. The same principle that was so necessary
in forming it, is equally necessary in our deliberations,
whether we should reject or ratify it.

I make these observations with a design to prove
and illustrate this gr.eat and important truth — that in
our decisions on the work of the late convention, we
should not limit our views and regards to the state of
Pennsylvania. The aim of the convention was, to
form a system of good and efficient government on the
more extensive scale of the United States. In this, as
in every other instance, the work should be judged
with the same spirit with which it was performed.
A principle of duty as well as of candor demands
this.

We have remarked, that civil government is neces
sary to the perfection of society : we now remark, that
civil liberty is necessary to the perfection of civil gov
ernment. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divest
ed only of that part, which, placed in the government,
produces more good and happiness to the community,
than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it
follows, that civil liberty, while it resigns a part of
natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise
of all the human faculties, so far as it is compatible
with the public welfare.

In considering and . developing the nature and end
of the system before us, it is necessary to mention
another kind of liberty, which has not yet, as far as I
know, received a name. I shall distinguish it by the
appellation of federal liberty. When a single govern
ment is instituted, the individuals, of which it is com
posed, surrender to it a part of their natural independ
ence, which they before enjoyed as men. When a
confederate republic is instituted, the communities, of

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 15

which it is composed, surrender to it a part of their
political independence, which they before enjoyed as
states. The principles which directed, in the former
case, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought
to be given up, and what part ought to be retained,
will give similar directions in the latter case. The
states should resign to the national government that
part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which,
placed in that government, will produce more good to
the whole, than if it had remained in the several states.
While they resign this part of their political liberty,
they retain the free and generous exercise of all their
other faculties as states, so far as it is compatible
with the welfare of the general and superintending
confederacy.

Since states as well as citizens are represented in
the constitution before us, and form the objects on
which that constitution is proposed to operate, it was
necessary to notice and define federal as well as civil
liberty.

These general reflections have been made in order
to introduce? with more propriety and advantage, a
practical illustration of the end proposed to be accom
plished by the late convention.

It has been too well known — it has been too severely
felt — that the present confederation is inadequate to
the government and to the exigencies of the United
States. The great struggle for liberty in this country,
should it be unsuccessful, will probably be the last one
which she will have for her existence and prosperity,
in any part of the globe. And it must be confessed,
that this struggle has, in some of the stages of its pro
gress, been attended with symptoms that foreboded
no fortunate issue. To the iron hand of tyranny,
which was lifted up against her, she manifested, indeed,
an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the fet
ters which were forged for her, and showed that she
was unassailable by force. But she was environed by
dangers of another kind, and springing from a very

16 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON

different source. While she kept her eye steadily
fixed on the efforts of oppression, licentiousness was
secretly undermining the rock on which she stood.

Need I call to your remembrance the contrasted
scenes, of which we have been witnesses ? On the
glorious conclusion of our conflict with Britain, what
high expectations were formed concerning us by
others ! What high expectations did we form con
cerning ourselves! Have those expectations been
realized ? No. What has been the cause? Did our
citizens lose their perseverance and magnanimity ?
No. Did they become insensible of resentment and
indignation at any high handed attempt, that might
have been made to injure or enslave them? No.
What then has been the cause ? The truth is, we
dreaded danger only on one side : this we manfully
repelled. But on another side, danger, not less formi
dable, but more insidious, stole in upon us ; and our
unsuspicious tempers were not sufficiently attentive,
either to its approach or to its operations. Those,
whom foreign strength could not overpower, have
well nigh become the victims of internal anarchy.

If we become a little more particular, we shall find
that the foregoing representation is by no means exag
gerated. When we had baffled all the menaces of
foreign power, we neglected to establish among our
selves a government, that would ensure domestic vigor
and stability. What was the consequence? The
commencement of peace was the commencement of
every disgrace and distress, that could befall a people
in a peaceful state. Devoid of national power, we
could not prohibit the extravagance of our importa
tions, nor could we derive a revenue from their excess.
Devoid of national importance, we could not procure
for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign markets.
Devoid of national credit, we saw our public securities
melt in the hands of the holders, like snow before the
sun. Devoid of national dignity, we could not, in
some instances, perform our treaties on our part :

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 17

<•>

and, in other instances, we could neither obtain nor
compel the performance of them on the part of others.
Devoid of national energy, we could not carry into
execution our own resolutions, decisions, or laws.

Shall I become more particular still ? The tedious
detail would disgust me: nor is it now necessary.
The years of languor are past. We have felt the dis
honor, with which we have been covered : we have
seen the destruction with which we have been threat
ened. We have penetrated to the causes of both, and
when we have once discovered them, we have begun
to search for the means of removing them. For the
confirmation of these remarks, I need not appeal to an
enumeration of facts. The proceedings of Congress,
and of the several states, are replete with them. They
all point out the weakness and insufficiency of the
present confederation as the cause, and an efficient
general government as the only cure of our political
distempers.

Under these impressions, and with these views, was
the late convention appointed; and under these im
pressions, and with these views, the late convention
met.

We now see the great end which they proposed to
accomplish. It was to frame, for the consideration of
their constituents, one federal and national constitu
tion — a constitution that would produce the advan
tages of good, and prevent the inconveniences of bad
government — a constitution, whose beneficence and
energy would pervade the whole union, and bind and
embrace the interests of every part — a constitution
that would ensure peace, freedom, and happiness, to
the states and people of America.

We are now naturally led to examine the means, by
which they proposed to accomplish this end. This
opens more particularly to our view the important dis
cussion before us. But previously to our entering upon
it, it will not be improper to state some general and
leading principles of government, which will receive

VOL. i. 3

18 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON

particular applications in the course of our investi
gations.

There necessarily exists in every government a
power, from which there is no appeal; and which, for
that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable. Where does this power reside ? To
this question, writers on different governments will
give different answers. Sir William Blackstone will
tell you, that in Britain, the power is lodged in the
British parliament ; that the parliament may alter the
form of the government ; and that its power is abso
lute and without control. The idea of a constitution,
limiting and superintending the operations of legisla
tive authority, seems not to have been accurately un
derstood in Britain. There are, at least, no traces of
practice, conformable to such a principle. The British
constitution is just what the British parliament pleases.
When the parliament transferred legislative authority
to Henry the eighth, the act transferring it could not,
in the strict acceptation of the term, be called uncon
stitutional.

To control the power and conduct of the legisla
ture by an overruling constitution, was an improve
ment in the science and practice of government re
served to the American States.

Perhaps some politician, who has not considered,
with sufficient accuracy, our political systems, would
answer, that, in our governments, the supreme power
is vested in the constitutions. This opinion ap
proaches a step nearer to the truth, but doe snot reach
it. The truth is, that, in our governments, the su
preme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains
in the people. As our constitutions are superior to
our legislatures; so the people are superior to our
constitutions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last in
stance, is much greater ; for the people possess, over
our constitutions, control in act, as well as in right.

The consequence is, that the people may change
the constitutions, whenever and however they please-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 19

This is a right, of which no positive institution can
ever deprive them.

These important truths, sir, are far from being
merely speculative : we, at this moment, speak and
deliberate under their immediate and benign influence.
To the operation of these truths, we are to ascribe
the scene, hitherto unparalleled, which America now
exhibits to the world — a gentle, a peaceful, a volunta
ry, and a deliberate transition from one constitution of
government to another. In other parts of the world,
the idea of revolutions in government is, by a mourn
ful and indissoluble association, connected with the
idea of wars, and all the calamities attendant on wars.
But happy experience teaches us to view such revolu
tions in a very different light — to consider them only
as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of
government, and increasing the happiness of society
and mankind.

Oft have I viewed with silent pleasure and admira
tion, the force and prevalence, through the United
States, of this principle — that the supreme power re
sides in the people ; and that they never part with it.
It may be called the panacea in politics. There can
be no disorder in the community but may here receive
a radical cure. If the error be in the legislature, it
may be corrected by the constitution ; if in the con
stitution, it may be corrected by the people. There
is a remedy, therefore, for every distemper in govern
ment, if the people are not wanting to themselves.
For a people wanting to themselves, there is no reme
dy : from their power, as we have seen, there is no ap
peal: to their error, there is no superior principle of
correction.

There are three simple species of government —
monarchy, where the supreme power is in a single
person — aristocracy, where the supreme power is in a
select assembly, the members of which either fill up,
by election, the vacancies in their own body, or suc
ceed to their places in it by inheritance, property, or in

20 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON

respect of some personal right or qualification — a re
public or democracy, where the people at large retain
the supreme power, and act either collectively or by
representation. Each of these species of government
has its advantages and disadvantages.

The advantages of a monarchy are, strength, des
patch, secrecy, unity of counsel. Its disadvantages
are, tyranny, expense, ignorance of the situation and
wants of the people, insecurity, unnecessary wars, evils
attending elections or successions.

The advantage of aristocracy is, wisdom, arising
from experience and education. Its disadvantages are,
dissensions among themselves, oppression to the lower
orders.

The advantages of democracy are, liberty, equal, cau
tious and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace,
opportunities of exciting and producing the abilities
of the best citizens. Its disadvantages are, dissensions,
the delay and disclosure of public counsels, the imbe
cility of public measures retarded by the necessity of a
numerous consent.

A government may be composed of two or more of
the simple forms above mentioned. Such is the British
government. It would be an improper government for
the United States; because it is inadequate to such an
extent of territory ; and because it is suited to an es
tablishment of different orders of men. A more mi
nute comparison between some parts of the British
constitution, and some parts of the plan before us, may,
perhaps, find a proper place in a subsequent period of
our business.

What is the nature and kind of that government,
which has been proposed for the United States, by
the late convention ? In its principle, it is purely de-
mocratical : but that principle is applied in different
forms, in order to obtain the advantages, and exclude
the inconveniences of the simple modes of government.
If we take an extended and accurate view of it, we
shall find the streams of power running in different

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 21

directions, in different dimensions, and at different
heights, watering, adorning, and fertilizing the fields
and meadows, through which their courses are led;
but if we trace them, we shall discover, that they all
originally flow from one abundant fountain. In this
constitution, all authority is derived from THE PEOPLE.
Fit occasions will hereafter offer for particular re
marks on the different parts of the plan. I have now
to ask pardon of the house for detaining them so long.

SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 20, 1788.

The second section of the first article of the constitution having
heen read, the following amendment was proposed :

" Resolved, That it is proper that the number of representatives be
fixed at the rate of one for every twenty thousand inhabitants, to
be ascertained on the principles mentioned in the second section
of the first article of the constitution, until they amount to three
hundred ; after which, they shall be apportioned among the
states, in proportion to the number of inhabitants of the states re
spectively : and that before the first enumeration shall be made,
the several states shall be entitled to choose double the number of
representatives for that purpose, mentioned in the constitution ;"
when Mr. Hamilton addressed the convention as follows. —

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE honorable member, who spoke yesterday,
went into an explanation of a variety of circumstances
to prove the expediency of a change in our national
government, and the necessity of a firm union : at the
same time, he described the great advantages which
this state, in particular, receives frem the confederacy,
and its peculiar weaknesses when abstracted from the
union. In doing this, he advanced a variety of argu
ments, which deserve serious consideration. Gentle
men have this day come forward to answer him. He

MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, &c. 23

has been treated as having wandered in the flowery
fields of fancy ; and attempts have been made, to take
off from the minds of the committee, that sober im
pression, which might be expected from his arguments.
I trust, sir, that observations of this kind are not thrown
out to cast a light air on this important subject; or to
give any personal bias, on the great question before
us. I will not agree with gentlemen, who trifle with
the weaknesses of our country ; and suppose, that they
are enumerated to answer a party purpose, and to
terrify with ideal dangers. No ; I believe these weak
nesses to be real, and pregnant with destruction.
Yet, however weak our country may be, I hope we
shall never sacrifice our liberties. If, therefore, on a
full and candid discussion, the proposed system shall
appear to have that tendency, for God's sake, let us
reject it. But, let us not mistake words for things,
nor accept doubtful surmises as the evidence of truth.
Let us consider the constitution calmly and dispas
sionately, and attend to those things only which merit
consideration.

No arguments drawn from embarrassment or incon
venience ought to prevail upon us to adopt a system
of government radically bad; yet it is proper that
these arguments, among others, should be brought
into view. In doing this, yesterday, it was necessary
to reflect upon our situation ; to dwell upon the imbe
cility of our union ; and to consider whether we, as a
state, could stand alone. Although I am persuaded
this convention will be resolved to adopt nothing that
is bad; yet I think every prudent man will consider
the merits of the plan in connexion with the circum
stances of our country ; and that a rejection of the
constitution may involve most fatal consequences. I
make these remarks to show, that though we ought
not to be actuated by unreasonable fear, yet we ought
to be prudent.

This day, sir, one gentleman has attempted to an
swer the arguments advanced by my honorable friend ;

24 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

another has treated him as having wandered from the
subject : this being the case, I trust I shall be equally
indulged in reviewing the remarks which have been
made.

Sir, it appears to me extraordinary, that while gen
tlemen in one breath acknowledge, that the old con
federation requires many material amendments, they
should in the next deny, that its defects have been the
cause of our political weakness, and the consequent
calamities of our country. I cannot but infer from this,
that there is still some lurking, favorite imagination,
that this system, with corrections, might become a
safe and permanent one. It is proper that we should
examine this matter. We contend that the radical
vice in the old confederation is, that the laws of the
union apply only to states in their corporate capacity.
Has not every man, who has been in our legislature,
experienced the truth of this position ? It is insepara
ble from the disposition of bodies, who have a constitu
tional power of resistance, to examine the merits of a
law. This has ever been the case with the federal re
quisitions. In this examination, not being furnished
with those lights, which directed the deliberations of
the general government, and incapable of embracing
the general interests of the union, the states have al
most uniformly weighed the requisitions by their own
local interests, and have only executed them so far as
answered their particular convenience or advantage.
Hence there have ever been thirteen different bodies
to judge of the measures of Congress — and the opera
tions of government have been distracted by their
taking different courses : those, which were to be
benefitted, have complied with the requisitions ; others
have totally disregarded them. Have not all of us
been witnesses to the unhappy embarrassments which
resulted from these proceedings? Even during the
late war, while the pressure of common danger con
nected strongly the bond of our union, and incited to
vigorous exertions, we have felt many distressing ef-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 25

fects of the impotent system. How have we seen this
state, though most exposed to the calamities of the war,
complying, in an unexampled manner, with the federal
requisitions, and compelled by the delinquency of
others, to bear most unusual burdens. Of this truth,
we have the most solemn proof on our records. In
1779 and 1780, when the state, from the ravages of
war, and from her great exertions to resist them, be
came weak, distressed, and forlorn, every man avowed
the principle which we now contend for ; that our mis
fortunes, in a great degree, proceeded from the want
of vigor in the continental government. These were
our sentiments when we did not speculate, but feel
We saw our weakness, and found ourselves its victims.
Let us reflect that this may again, in all probability,
be our situation. This is a weak state ; and its rela
tive station is dangerous. Your capital is accessible
by land, and by sea is exposed to every daring invader;
and on the north-west, you are open to the inroads of a
powerful foreign nation. Indeed, this state, from its
situation, will, in time of war, probably be the theatre
of its operations.

Gentlemen have said that the non-compliance of
the states has been occasioned by their sufferings.
This may in part be true. But has this state been
delinquent ? Amidst all our distresses, we have fully
complied. If New York could comply wholly with the
requisitions, is it not to be supposed, that the other
states could in part comply ? Certainly every state in
the union might have executed them in some degree.
But New Hampshire, who has not suffered at all, is
totally delinquent: North Carolina is totally delin
quent : many others have contributed in a very small
proportion ; and Pennsylvania and New York are the
only states, which have perfectly discharged their
federal duty.

From the delinquency of those states who have suf
fered little by the war, we naturally conclude, that they
have made no efforts; and a knowledge of human

VOL. i. 4

2$ MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

nature will teach us, that their ease and security have
been a principal cause of their want of exertion.
While danger is distant, its impression is weak, and
while it affects only our neighbors, we have few mo
tives to provide against it. Sir, if we have national
objects to pursue, we must have national revenues.
If you make requisitions arid they are not complied
with, what is to be done ? It has been well observed,
that to coerce the states is one of the maddest pro
jects that was ever devised. A failure of compliance
will never be confined to a single state : this being the
case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war ?
Suppose Massachusetts, or any large state, should re
fuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them;
would they not have influence to procure assistance,
especially from those states who are in the same
situation as themselves ? What picture does this idea
present to our view ? A complying state at war with
a non-complying state : Congress marching the troops
of one state into the bosom of another : this state col
lecting auxiliaries and forming perhaps a majority
against its federal head. Here is a nation at war
with itself. Can any reasonable man be well disposed
towards a government which makes war and carnage
the only means of supporting itself — a government
that can exist only by the sword ? Every such war
must involve the innocent with the guilty. This single
consideration should be sufficient to dispose every
peaceable citizen against such a government.

But can we believe that one state will ever suffer
itself to be used as an instrument of coercion ? The
thing is a dream — it is impossible — then we are
brought to this dilemma: either a federal standing
army is to enforce the requisitions, or the federal trea
sury is left without supplies, and the government with
out support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil ?
Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on
individuals, in the same manner as those of the states
do» This is the true reasoning upon the subject, sir.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 27

The gentlemen appear to acknowledge its force ; and
yet while they yield to the principle, they seem to fear
its application to the government.

What then shall we do ? Shall we take the old con
federation, as the basis of a new system ? Can this
be the object of the gentlemen ? Certainly not. Will
any man who entertains a wish for the safety of his
country, trust the sword and the purse with a single
assembly organized on principles so defective — so
rotten ? Though we might give to such a government
certain powers, with safety, yet to give them the full
and unlimited powers of taxation and the national
forces, would be to establish a despotism ; the defini
tion of which is, a government in which all power
is concentred in a single body. To take the old
confederation, and fashion it upon these principles,
would be establishing a power which would destroy
the liberties of the people. These considerations
show clearly, that a government totally different must
be instituted. They had weight in the convention
which formed the new system. It was seen, that the ne
cessary powers were too great to be trusted to a single
body : they therefore formed two branches, and divided
the powers, that each might be a check upon the other.
This was the result of their wisdom ; and I presume
that every reasonable man will agree to it. The more
this subject is explained, the more clear and convinc
ing it will appear to every member of this body. The
fundamental principle of the old confederation is de
fective — we must totally eradicate and discard this
principle before we can expect an efficient go vernment.
The gentlemen who have spoken to-day, have taken
up the subject of the ancient confederacies : but their
view of them has been extremely partial and erroneous.
The fact is, the same false and impracticable principle
ran through most of the ancient governments. The
first of these governments that we read of, was the
Amphictyonic confederacy. The council which
managed the affairs of this league, possessed powers

28 MR- HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

of a similar complexion to those of our present Con
gress. The same feeble mode of legislation in the
head, and the same power of resistance in the mem
bers, prevailed. When a requisition was made, it
rarely met a compliance ; and a civil war was the con
sequence. Those which were attacked, called in
foreign aid to protect them ; and the ambitious Philip,
under the mask of an ally to one, invaded the liberties
of each, and finally subverted the whole.

The operation of this principle appears in the same
light in the Dutch Republics. They have been oblig
ed to levy taxes by an armed force. In this confedera
cy, one large province, by its superior wealth and in
fluence, is commonly a match for all the rest ; and
when they do not comply, the province of Holland is
obliged to compel them. It is observed, that the
United Provinces have existed a long time ; but they
have been constantly the sport of their neighbors, and
have been supported only by the external pressure of
the surrounding powers. The policy of Europe, not
the policy of their government, has saved them from
dissolution. Besides, the powers of the Stadtholder
have served to give an energy to the operations of
this government, which is not to be found in ours.
This prince has a vast personal influence : he has
independent revenues : he commands an army of forty
thousand men.

The German confederacy has also been a perpetual
source of wars. They have a diet, like our Congress,
who have authority to call for supplies : these calls are
never obeyed; and in time of war, the imperial army
never takes the field till the enemy are returning from
it. The emperor's Austrian dominions, in which he is
an absolute prince, alone enable him to make head
against the common foe. The members of this con
federacy are ever divided and opposed to each other.
The king of Prussia is a member ; yet he has been
constantly in opposition to the emperor. Is this a de
sirable government ?

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 29

i might go more particularly into the discussion of
examples and show, that wherever this fatal principle
has prevailed, even as far back as the Lycian and
Achaean leagues, as well as the Amphictyonic con
federacy; it has proved the destruction of the govern
ment. But I think observations of this kind might
have been spared. Had they not been entered into
by others, I should not have taken up so much of the
time of the committee. No inference can be drawn
from these examples, that republics cannot exist : we
only contend that they have hitherto been founded on
false principles. We have shown how they have been
conducted, and how they have been destroyed.
Weakness in the head has produced resistance in the
members : this has been the immediate parent of civil
war: auxiliary force has been invited; and a foreign
power has annihilated their liberties and their name.
Thus Philip subverted the Amphictyonic, and Rome
the Achaean Republic.

We shall do well, sir, not to deceive ourselves with
the favorable events of the late war. Common danger
prevented the operation of the ruinous principle, in its
full extent : but, since the peace, we have experienced
the evils ; we have felt the poison of the system in its
unmingled purity.

Without dwelling any longer on this subject, I shall
proceed to the question immediately before the com
mittee.

In order that the committee may understand clearly
the principles on which the general convention acted,
I think it necessary to explain some preliminary cir
cumstances.

Sir, the natural situation of this country seems to
divide its interests into different classes. There are
navigating and non-navigating states — the northern
are properly the navigating states : the southern ap
pear to possess neither the means nor the spirit of na
vigation. This difference of situation naturally pro
duces a dissimilarity of interests and views respecting

30 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

foreign commerce. It was the interest of the northern
states, that there should be no restraints on their
navigation, and that they should have full power, by a
majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations
in favor of their own, and in restraint of the navigation
of foreigners. The southern states wished to impose
a restraint on the northern, by requiring that two-thirds
in Congress, should be requisite to pass an act in re
gulation of commerce : they were apprehensive that
the restraints of a navigation law would discourage
foreigners, and by obliging them to employ the ship
ping of the northern states, would probably enhance
their freight. This being the case, they insisted
strenuously on having this provision engrafted in the
constitution ; and the northern states were as anxious
in opposing it. On the other hand, the small states
seeing themselves embraced by the confederation upon
equal terms, wished to retain the advantages which
they already possessed : the large states, on the con
trary, thought it improper that Rhode Island and De
laware should enjoy an equal suffrage with themselves:
from these sources a delicate and difficult contest
arose. It became necessary, therefore, to compro
mise ; or the convention must have dissolved without
effecting any thing. Would it have been wise and
prudent in that body, in this critical situation, to have
deserted their country ? No. Every man who hears
me — every wise man in the United States, would have
condemned them. The convention were obliged to
appoint a committee for accommodation. In this
committee the arrangement was formed as it now
stands ; and their report was accepted. It was a deli
cate point; and it was necessary that all parties
should be indulged. Gentlemen will see, that if there
had not been unanimity, nothing could have been
done : for the convention had no power to establish,
but only to recommend a government. Any other sys
tem would have been impracticable. Let a convention
be called to-morrow — let them meet twenty times;

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 31

nay, twenty thousand times ; they will have the same
difficulties to encounter ; the same clashing interests
to reconcile.

But, dismissing these reflections, let us consider how
far the arrangement is in itself entitled to the approba
tion of this body. We will examine it upon its own
merits.

The first thing objected to, is that clause which al
lows a representation for three-fifths of the negroes.
Much has been said of the impropriety of represent
ing men, who have no will of their own. Whether
this be reasoning or declamation, I will not presume
to say. It is the unfortunate situation of the southern
states, to have a great part of their population, as well
as property, in blacks. The regulation complained of,
was one result of the spirit of accommodation, which
governed the convention ; and without this indulgence,
no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir,
considering some peculiar advantages which we de
rive from them, it is entirely just that they should be
gratified. The southern states possess certain staples,
tobacco, rice, indigo, &c. which must be capital ob
jects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations ;
and the advantage which they necessarily procure in
these treaties, will be felt throughout all the states.
But the justice of this plan will appear in another
view. The best writers on government have held,
that representation should be compounded of persons
and property. This rule has been adopted, as far as
it could be, in the constitution of New York. It will,
however, by no means be admitted, that the slaves
are considered altogether as property. They are
men, though degraded to the condition of slavery.
They are persons known to the municipal laws of the
states which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of
nature. But representation and taxation go together
— and one uniform rule ought to apply to both.
Would it be just to compute these slaves in the as
sessment of taxes* and discard them from the estimate

32 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

in the apportionment of representatives ? Would it be
just to impose a singular burden, without conferring
some adequate advantage ?

Another circumstance ought to be considered.
The rule we have been speaking of, is a general rule,
and applies to all the states. Now, you have a great
number of people in your state, which are not repre
sented at all ; and have no voice in your government :
these will be included in the enumeration — not two-
fifths — nor three-fifths, but the whole. This proves
that the advantages of the plan are not confined to
the southern states, but extend to other parts of the
Union.

I now proceed to consider the objection with regard
to the number of representatives, as it now stands ; I
am persuaded the system, in this respect, stands on a
better footing than the gentlemen imagine.

It has been asserted, that it will be in the power of
Congress to reduce the number. I acknowledge, that
there are no direct words of prohibition. But I con
tend, that the true and genuine construction of the
clause, gives Congress no power whatever to reduce
the representation below the number, as it now stands.
Although they may limit, they can never diminish the
number. One representative for every thirty thousand
inhabitants is fixed as the standard of increase ; till,
by the natural course of population, it shall become
necessary to limit the ratio. Probably, at present,
were this standard to be immediately applied, the rep
resentation would considerably exceed sixty-five. In
three years it would exceed one hundred. If I under
stand the gentlemen, they contend that the number
may be enlarged or may not. I admit that this is in
the discretion of Congress ; and I submit to the com
mittee, whether it be not necessary and proper.
Still, I insist, that an immediate limitation is not proba
ble, nor was it in the contemplation of the convention.
But, sir, who will presume to say, to what precise point
the representation ought to be increased ? This is a

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 33

matter of opinion; and opinions are vastly different
upon the subject. A proof of this is drawn from the
representations in the state legislatures. In Massa
chusetts, the assembly consists of about three hundred
— in South Carolina, of nearly one hundred — in New
York there are sixty-five. It is observed generally,
that the number ought to be large ; let the gentlemen
produce their criterion. I confess it is difficult for me
to say what number may be said to be sufficiently
large. On one hand, it ought to be considered, that
a small number will act with more facility, system and
decision : on the other, that a large one may enhance
the difficulty of corruption. The Congress is to con
sist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a rea
sonable man, may appear to be as near the proper
medium as any number whatever ; at least, for the
present. There is one source of increase, also, which
does not depend upon any constructions of the consti
tution; it is the creation of new states. Vermont,
Kentucky and Franklin, will probably become inde
pendent ; new members of the union will also be form
ed from the unsettled tracts of western territory.
These must be represented, and will all contribute to
swell the federal legislature. If the whole number in
the United States be, at present, three millions, as is
commonly supposed, according to the ratio of one for
thirty thousand, we shall have on the first census, a
hundred representatives. In ten years, thirty more
will be added ; and in twenty-five years, the number
will double : then, sir, we shall have two hundred, if
the increase goes on in the same proportion. The
convention of Massachusetts, who made the same
objection, have fixed upon this number as the point at
which they chose to limit the representation. But can
we pronounce with certainty, that it will not be expe
dient to go beyond this number ? We cannot. Ex
perience alone must determine. This matter may,
with more safety, be left to the discretion of the le
gislature, as it will be the interest of the large and in-
VOL. i. 5

34 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

creasing states, of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsyl
vania, &c. to augment the representation. Only Con
necticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland, can
be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely
calculate upon a growing representation, according to
the advance of population, and the circumstances of
the country.

The state governments possess inherent advantages,
which will ever give them an influence and ascendency
over the national government ; and will for ever pre
clude the possibility of federal encroachments. That
their liberties indeed can be subverted by the federal
head, is repugnant to every rule of political calcula
tion. Is not this arrangement then, sir, a most wise
and prudent one ? Is not the present representation
fully adequate to our present exigencies; and suf
ficient to answer all the purposes of the union ? I
am persuaded that an examination of the objects of
the federal government will afford a conclusive
answer.

Many other observations might be made on this
subject, but I cannot now pursue them ; for I feel my
self not a little exhausted : I beg leave, therefore, to
waive for the present the further discussion of the
question.

On the 21st, Mr. Hamilton continued his remarks as follows :

When I had the honor to address the committee
yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances
which attended the convention, when forming the
plan before you. I endeavored to point out to you
the principles of accommodation, on which this ar
rangement was made, and to show that the contend
ing interests of the states led them to establish the
representation as it now stands. In the second place,
I attempted to prove, that, in point of number, the
representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no
man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main
principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 35

that there should be a broad democratic branch in the
national legislature. But this matter, sir, depends on
circumstances. It is impossible, in the first instance,
to be precise and exact with regard to the number;
and it is equally impossible to determine to what
point it may be proper in future to increase it. On
this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my rea
sonings on the subject of government, I rely more on
the interests and opinions of men, than on any specu
lative parchment provisions whatever. I have found,
that constitutions are more or less excellent, as they
are more or less agreeable to the natural operation
of things. I am therefore disposed not to dwell long
on curious speculations, or pay much attention to
modes and forms ; but to adopt a system, whose prin
ciples have been sanctioned by experience, adapt it
to the real state of our country, and depend on pro
bable reasonings for its operation and result. I con
tend that sixty-five and twenty-six in two bodies, af
ford perfect security, in the present state of things;
and that the regular progressive enlargement, which
was in the contemplation of the general convention,
will not leave an apprehension of danger in the most
timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of
the large states to increase the representation. This
will be the standing instruction to their delegates.
But, say the gentlemen, the members of Congress
will be interested not to increase the number, as it will
diminish their relative influence. In all their reason
ing upon the subject, there seems to be this fallacy :
they suppose that the representative will have no
motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of duty ;
or on the other, but corruption. They do not reflect,
that he is to return to the community ; that he is de
pendent on the will of the people, and that it cannot be
his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general
sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their re
presentatives. I admit that there are exceptions to this
rule — there are certain conjunctures, when it may be

36 MR- HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which
the majority of the people have formed. But in the
general course of things, the popular views, and even
prejudices, will direct the actions of the rulers.

All governments, even the most despotic, depend,
in a great degree, on opinion. In free republics, it
is most peculiarly the case. In these, the will of the
people makes the essential principle of the govern
ment; and the laws which control the community, re
ceive their tone and spirit from the public wishes. It
is the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds
of the people are exceedingly enlightened and refined.
Here then we may expect the laws to be propor-
tionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy;
and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the
most intimate conformity between the views of the re
presentative and his constituent. If the general voice
of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must
take place. They have it in their power to instruct
their representatives ; and the state legislatures, which
appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them.
Sir, if I believed that the number would remain at sixty-
five, I confess I should give my vote for an amend
ment; though in a different form from the one
proposed.

The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twen
ty thousand. I would ask, by what rule or reasoning
it is determined, that one man is a better representa
tive for twenty than thirty thousand ? At present we
have three millions of people ; in twenty-five years,
we shall have six millions; and in forty years, nine
millions : and this is a short period, as it relates to
the existence of states. Here then, according to the
ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have, in
forty years, three hundred representatives. If this be
true, and if this be a safe representation, why be dis
satisfied? Why embarrass the constitution with
amendments, that are merely speculative and useless ?
I affree with the gentleman, that a very small number

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 37

might give some color for suspicion : I acknowledge,
that ten would be unsafe ; on the other hand, a thou
sand would be too numerous. But I ask him, why will
not ninety-one be an adequate and safe representation?
This at present appears to be the proper medium.
Besides, the president of the United States will be him
self the representative of the people. From the com
petition that ever subsists between the branches of gov
ernment, the President will be induced to protect
their rights, whenever they are invaded by either
branch. On whatever side we view this subject, we
discover various and powerful checks to the encroach
ments of Congress. The true and permanent inter
ests of the members are opposed to corruption:
their number is vastly too large for easy combina
tion : the rivalship between the houses will for ever
prove an insuperable obstacle : the people have an
obvious and powerful protection in their state govern
ments. Should any thing dangerous be attempted,
these bodies of perpetual observation, will be capable
of forming and conducting plans of regular opposition.
Can we suppose the people's love of liberty will not,
under the incitement of their legislative leaders, be
roused into resistance, and the madness of tyranny
be extinguished at a blow ? Sir, the danger is too dis
tant ; it is beyond all rational calculation.

It has been observed by an honorable gentleman,
that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would
be the most perfect government. Experience has
proved, that no position in politics is more false than
this. The ancient democracies, in which the people
themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of
good government. Their very character was tyran
ny; their figure deformity. When they assembled,
the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob,
not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for
every enormity. In these assemblies, the enemies of
the people brought forward their plans of ambition sys
tematically. They were opposed by their enemies, of

38 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

another party ; and it became a matter of contingency,
whether the people subjected themselves to be led
blindly by one tyrant or by another.

It was remarked yesterday, that a numerous repre
sentation was necessary to obtain the confidence of
the people. This is not generally true. The confi
dence of the people will easily be gained by a good ad
ministration. This is the true touchstone. I could
illustrate the position, by a variety of historical exam
ples, both ancient and modern. In Sparta, the Ephori
were a body of magistrates, instituted as a check
upon the senate, and representing the people. They
consisted of only five men ; but they were able to pro
tect their rights, and therefore enjoyed their confidence
and attachment. In Rome, the people were repre
sented by three Tribunes, who were afterwards in
creased to ten. Every one acquainted with the histo
ry of that republic, will recollect how powerful a check
to the senatorial encroachments, this small body prov
ed ; how unlimited a confidence was placed in them by
the people whose guardians they were ; and to what a
conspicuous station in the government their influence
at length elevated the plebeians. Massachusetts has
three hundred representatives ; New York has sixty-
five. Have the people in this state less confidence in
their representation than the people of that ? Dela
ware has twenty-one : do the inhabitants of New York
feel a higher confidence than those of Delaware ? I
have stated these examples, to prove that the gentle
man's principle is not just. The popular confidence
depends on circumstances very distinct from conside
rations of number. Probably the public attachment
is more strongly secured by a train of prosperous
events, which are the result of wise deliberation and
vigorous execution, and to which large bodies are
much less competent than small ones. If the repre
sentative conducts with propriety, he will necessarily
enjoy the good will of the constituent. It appears
then, if my reasoning be just, that the clause is perfect-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 39

ly proper, upon the principles of the gentleman who
contends for the amendment ; as there is in it the great
est degree of present security, and a moral certainty
of an increase equal to our utmost wishes.

It has been further, by the gentlemen in opposition,
observed, that a large representation is necessary to
understand the interests of the people. This princi
ple is by no means true, in the extent to which the
gentlemen seem to carry it. I would ask, why may
not a man understand the interests of thirty as well as
of twenty ? The position appears to be made upon
the unfounded presumption, that all the interests of all
parts of the community must be represented. No
idea is more erroneous than this. Only such interests
are proper to be represented, as' are involved in the
powers of the general government. These interests
come completely under the observation of one, or a
few men ; and the requisite information is by no means
augmented in proportion to the increase of number.
What are the objects of the government ? Commerce,
taxation, &c. In order to comprehend the interests of
commerce, is it necessary to know how wheat is rais
ed, and in what proportion it is produced in one dis
trict and in another ? By no means. Neither is this
species of knowledge necessary in general calculations
upon the subject of taxation. The information neces
sary for these purposes, is that which is open to every
intelligent inquirer ; and of which, five men may be as
perfectly possessed as fifty. In royal governments,
there are usually particular men to whom the business
of taxation is committed. These men have the form
ing of systems of finance ; and the regulation of the
revenue. I do not mean to commend this practice.
It proves, however, this point; that a few individuals
may be competent to these objects ; arid that large
numbers are not necessary to perfection in the science
of taxation. But granting for a moment, that this
minute and local knowledge, the gentlemen contend
for, is necessary, let us see, if under the new constitu-

40 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

tion, it will not probably be found in the representa
tion. The natural and proper mode of holding elec
tions, will be to divide the state into districts, in pro
portion to the number to be elected. This state will
consequently be divided, at first, into six. One man
from each district will probably possess all the know
ledge gentlemen can desire. Are the senators of this
state more ignorant of the interests of the people, than
the assembly ? Have they not ever enjoyed their con
fidence as much ? Yet, instead of six districts, they
are elected in four ; and the chance of their being col
lected from the smaller divisions of the state conse
quently diminished. Their number is but twenty-four ;
and their powers are co-extensive with those of the
assembly, and reach objects, which are most dear to
the people — life, liberty and property.

Sir, we hear constantly a great deal, which is rather
calculated to awake our passions, and create preju
dices, than to conduct us to the truth, and teach us
our real interests. I do not suppose this to be the
design of the gentlemen. Why then are we told so
often of an aristocracy ? For my part, I hardly know
the meaning of this word as it is applied. If all we
hear be true, this government is really a very bad one.
But who are the aristocracy among us ? Where do
we find men, elevated to a perpetual rank above their
fellow-citizens ; and possessing powers entirely inde
pendent of them ? The arguments of the gentlemen
only go to prove that there are men who are rich, men
who are poor ; some who are wise, and others who are
not. That indeed every distinguished man is an aris
tocrat. This reminds me of a description of the aris
tocrats, I have seen in a late publication, styled the
Federal Farmer. The author reckons in the aris
tocracy, all governors of states, members of con
gress, chief magistrates, and all officers of the mili
tia. This description, I presume to say, is ridicu
lous. The image is a phantom. Does the new gov
ernment render a rich man more eligible than a poor

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 4!

one ? No. It requires no such qualification. It is
bottomed on the broad and equal principle of your
state constitution.

Sir, if the people have it in their option, to elect
their most meritorious men, is this to be considered as
an objection ? Shall the constitution oppose their
wishes, and abridge their most invaluable privilege ?
While property continues to be pretty equally divided,
and a considerable share of information pervades the
community, the tendency of the people's suffrages, will
be to elevate merit even from obscurity. As riches
increase and accumulate in few hands; as luxury
prevails in society, virtue will be in a greater degree
considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth,
and the tendency of things will be to depart from the
republican standard. This is the real disposition of
human nature : it is what neither the honorable mem
ber nor myself can correct ; it is a common misfortune,
that awaits our state constitution, as well as all
others.

There is an advantage incident to large districts of
election, which perhaps the gentlemen, amidst all
their apprehensions of influence and bribery, have not
adverted to. In large districts, the corruption of the
electors is much more difficult. Combinations for the
purposes of intrigue are less easily formed : factions
and cabals are little known. In a small district,
wealth will have a more complete influence ; because
the people in the vicinity of a great man, are more im
mediately his dependants, and because this influence
has fewer objects to act upon. It has been remarked,
that it would be disagreeable to the middle class of
men to go to the seat of the new government. If this
be so, the difficulty will be enhanced by the gentle
man's proposal. If his argument be true, it proves,
that the larger the representation is, the less will ba
your choice of having it filled. But, it appears to me
frivolous to bring forward such arguments as these.
It has answered no other purpose, than to induce me,

VOT,. f. f>

42 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

by way of reply, to enter into discussions, which I con
sider as useless, and not applicable to our subject.

It is a harsh doctrine, that men grow wicked in
proportion as they improve and enlighten their minds.
Experience has by no means justified us in the suppo
sition, that there is more virtue in one class of men
than in another. Look through the rich and the poor
of the community ; the learned and the ignorant.
Where does virtue predominate ? The difference in
deed consists, not in the quantity but kind of vices,
which are incident to various classes ; and here the
advantage of character belongs to the wealthy.
Their vices are probably more favorable to the pros
perity of the state, than those of the indigent, and
partake less of moral depravity,

After all, sir, we must submit to this idea, that the
true principle of a republic is, that the people should
choose whom they please to govern them. Represen
tation is imperfect, in proportion as the current of po
pular favor is checked. This great source of free
government, popular election, should be perfectly pure,
and the most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this
principle is adhered to ; where, in the organization of
the government, the legislative, executive and judicial
branches are rendered distinct ; where again the le
gislative is divided into separate houses, and the ope
rations of each are controlled by various checks and
balances, and above all, by the vigilance and weight of
the state governments ; to talk of tyranny, and the sub
version of our liberties, is to speak the language of
enthusiasm. This balance between the national and
state governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar
attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms
a double security to the people. If one encroaches on
their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the
other. Indeed, they will both be prevented from over
passing their constitutional limits, by a certain rival-
ship, which will ever subsist between them. I am per
suaded, that a firm union is as necessary to perpetuate

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 43

our liberties, as it is to make us respectable ; and ex
perience will probably prove, that the national govern
ment will be as natural a guardian of our freedom, as
the state legislatures themselves.

Suggestions, sir, of an extraordinary nature, have
been frequently thrown out in the course of the present
political controversy. It gives me pain to dwell ou
topics of this kind; and I wish they might be dismiss
ed. We have been told, that the old confederation
has proved inefficacious, only because intriguing and
powerful men, aiming at a revolution, have been for
ever instigating the people, and rendering them disaf
fected with it. This, sir, is a false insinuation. The
thing is impossible. I will venture to assert, that no
combination of designing men under Heaven, will be
capable of making a government unpopular, which is
in its principles a wise arid good one, and vigorous in
its operations.

The confederation was framed amidst the agitation
and tumult of society. It was composed of unsound
materials put together in haste. Men of intelligence
discovered the feebleness of the structure, in the first
stages of its existence; but the great body of the peo
ple, too much engrossed with their distresses, to con
template any but the immediate causes of them, were
ignorant of the defects of their constitution. But when
the dangers of war were removed, they saw clearly
what they had suffered, and what they had yet to suf
fer, from a feeble form of government. There was no
need of discerning men to convince the people of their
unhappy situation; the complaint was co-extensive
with the evil, and both were common to all classes of
the community. We have been told, that the spirit of
patriotism, and love of liberty, are almost extinguished
among the people; and that it has become a prevail
ing doctrine, that republican principles ought to be
hooted out of the world. Sir, I am confident that such
remarks as these are rather occasioned by the heat of
argument, than by a cool conviction of their truth and

44 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, &c.

justice. As far as my experience has extended, I have
heard no such doctrine, nor have I discovered any di
minution of regard for those rights arid liberties, in de
fence of which, the people have fought and suffered.
There have been, undoubtedly, some men who have
had speculative doubts on the subject of government ;
but the principles of republicanism are founded on too
firm a basis to be shaken by a few speculative and
sceptical reasoners. Our error has been of a very dif
ferent kind. We have erred through excess of caution,
and a zeal false and impracticable. Our counsels
have been destitute of consistency and stability. I
am flattered with a hope, sir, that we have now found
a cure for the evils under which we have so long labor
ed. I trust, that the proposed constitution affords a
genuine specimen of representative and republican
government, and that it will answer, in an eminent de
gree, all the beneficial purposes of society.

SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING TBE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 24th, 1788,

The following speech was made in opposition to a resolution brought
forward by Mr. G. Livingston, as an amendment to the constitution,
which proposed ; That no person should be eligible as a senator for
more than six years, in any term of twelve years, and that the le
gislatures of the several states should have power to recall their
senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, to
serve for the remainder of the time for which such senator, or
senators, so recalled, were appointed.

I AM persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that I in my turn
shall be indulged, in addressing the committee. We
all, in equal sincerity, profess to be anxious for the
establishment of a republican government, on a safe
and solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every
honest man in the United States, and I presume I
shall not be disbelieved, when I declare, that it is an
object of all others, the nearest and most dear to my
own heart. The means of accomplishing this great
purpose, become the most important study which can
interest mankind. It is our duty to examine all those
means with peculiar attention, and to choose the best
and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from

46 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECtf ON

nature, from reason, from examples, the best princi
ples of policy, and to pursue arid apply them in the
formation of our government. We should contem
plate and compare the systems, which, in this examina
tion, come under our view ; distinguish, with a careful
eye, the defects and excellencies of each, and discard
ing the former, incorporate the latter, as far as circum
stances will admit, into our constitution. If we pursue
a different course and neglect this duty, we shall pro
bably disappoint the expectations of our country and
of the world.

In the commencement of a revolution, which receiv
ed its birth from the usurpations of tyranny, nothing
was more natural, than that the public mind should
be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To
resist these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit,
was the great object of all our public and private
institutions. The zeal for liberty became predominant
and excessive. In forming our confederation, this
passion alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to
have had no other view than to secure ourselves from
despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one,
and deserved our utmost attention. But, sir, there is
another object, equally important, and which our
enthusiasm rendered us little capable of regarding : I
mean a principle of strength and stability in the or
ganization of our government, and vigor in its opera
tions. This purpose can never be accomplished
but by the establishment of some select body, formed
peculiarly upon this principle. There are few posi
tions more demonstrable than that there should be in
every republic, some permanent body to correct the pre
judices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate
the fluctuations of a popular assembly. It is evident,
that a body instituted for these purposes, must be so
formed as to exclude as much as possible from its own
character, those infirmities, and that mutability which
it is designed to remedy. It is therefore necessary
that it should be small, that it should hold its autho-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 47

rity during a considerable period, and that it should
have such an independence in the exercise of its pow
ers, as will divest it as much as possible of local preju
dices. It should be so formed as to be the centre of
political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of
conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to
system. Without this establishment, we may make ex
periments without end, but shall never have an efficient
government.

It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the
people in every country desire sincerely its prosperity :
but it is equally unquestionable, that they do not pos
sess the discernment and stability necessary for sys
tematic government. To deny that they are frequently
led into the grossest- errors by misinformation and
passion, would be a flattery which their own good
sense must despise. That branch of administration
especially, which involves our political relations with
foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent
to. These truths are not often held up in public
assemblies ; but they cannot be unknown to any who
hear me. From these principles it follows, that there
ought to be two distinct bodies in our government; one,
which shall be immediately constituted by and pecu
liarly represent the people, and possess all the popular
features ; another, formed upon the principle, and for
the purposes before explained. Such considerations
as these induced the. convention who formed your
state constitution, to institute a senate upon the pre
sent plan. The history of ancient and modern repub
lics had taught them, that many of the evils which
these republics suffered, arose from the want of a cer
tain balance and mutual control indispensable to a
wise administration ; they were convinced that popu
lar assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance,
by sudden impulses and the intrigues of ambitious
men ; and that some firm barrier against these opera
tions was necessary : they, therefore, instituted your

48 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

senate, and the benefits we have experienced, have
fully justified their conceptions.

Now, sir, what is the tendency of the proposed
amendment ? To take away the stability of govern
ment by depriving the senate of its permanency ; to
make this body subject to the same weakness and pre
judices, which are incident to popular assemblies, and
which it was instituted to correct ; and by thus assimi
lating the complexion of the two branches, destroy the
balance between them. The amendment will render
the senator a slave to all the capricious humors among
the people. It will probably be here suggested, that
the legislatures, not the people, are to have the power
of recall. Without attempting to prove that the le
gislatures must be, in a great degree, the image of the
multitude, in respect to federal affairs, and that the
same prejudices and factions will prevail ; I insist, that
in whatever body the power of recall is vested, the se
nator will perpetually feel himself in such a state of
vassalage and dependence, that he never can possess
that firmness which is necessary to the discharge of
his great duty to the union.

Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the inter
ests of the several states, and those of the United
States in contrast ; this is not a fair view of the sub
ject ; they must necessarily be involved in each other.
What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice,
or some prevailing passion, may assume the form of a
genuine interest. The influence of these is as power
ful as the most permanent conviction of the public
good ; and against this influence we ought to provide.
The local interests of a state ought in every case to
give way to the interests of the union : for when a sa
crifice of one or the other is necessary, the former be
comes only an apparent, partial interest, and should
yield, on the principle that the small good ought never
to oppose the great one. When you assemble from
your several counties in the legislature, were every

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 49

member to be guided only by the apparent interest of
his county, government would be impracticable.
There must be a perpetual accommodation and sa
crifice of local advantage to general expediency ; but
the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be
actuated by this important principle. It is therefore
absolutely necessary that the senate should be so form
ed, as to be unbiassed by false conceptions of the real
interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good
of their several states.

Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable appre
hensions of danger to the state governments; they
seem to suppose, that the moment you put men into u
national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical,
and lose all their affection for their fellow-citizens.
But can we imagine that the senators will ever be so
insensible of their own advantage, as to sacrifice the
genuine interest of their constituents ? The state
governments are essentially necessary to the form and
spirit of the general system. As long, therefore, as
Congress have a full conviction of this necessity, they
must, even upon principles purely national, have as
firm an attachment to the one as to the other. This
conviction can never leave them, unless they become
madmen. While the constitution continues to be
read, and its principles known, the states must, by eve
ry rational man, be considered as essential, component
parts of the union; and therefore the idea of sacrific
ing the former to the latter is wholly inadmissible.

The objectors do not advert to the natural strength
and resources of state governments, which will ever
give them an important superiority over the general
government. If we compare the nature of their differ
ent powers, or the means of popular influence which
each possesses, we shall find the advantage entirely
on the side of the states. This consideration, impor
tant as it is, seems to have been little attended to.
The aggregate number of representatives throughout
the states may be two thousand. Their personal in-

VOL. i. 7

£0 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

fluence will, therefore, be proportionably more exten
sive than that of one or two hundred men in Congress.
The state establishments of civil and military officers
of every description, infinitely surpassing in number
any possible correspondent establishments in the ge
neral government, will create such an extent and com
plication of attachments, as will ever secure the predi
lection and support of the people. Whenever, there
fore, Congress shall meditate any infringement of the
state constitutions, the great body of the people will
naturally take part with their domestic representatives.
Can the general government withstand such an united
opposition ? Will the people suffer themselves to be
stripped of their privileges ? Will they suffer their
legislatures^) be reduced to a shadow and a name ?
The idea is shocking to common sense.

From the circumstances already explained, and
many others which might be mentioned, results a
complicated, irresistible check, which must ever sup
port the existence and importance of the state gov
ernments. The danger, if any exists, flows from an
opposite source. The probable evil is, that the ge
neral government will be too dependent on the state
legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices,
and too obsequious to their humors ; that the states,
with every power in their hands, will make encroach
ments on the national authority, till the union is weak
ened and dissolved.

Every member must have been struck with an ob
servation of a gentleman from Albany. Do what you
will, says he, local prejudices and opinions will go
into the government. What ! shall we then form a
constitution to cherish and strengthen these pre
judices ? Shall we confirm the distemper, instead of
remedying it ? It is undeniable that there must be a
control somewhere. Either the general interest is to
control the particular interests, or the contrary. If
the former, then certainly the government ' ought to
be so framed, as to render the power of control effi-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 5]

cient to all intents and purposes ; if the latter, a strik
ing absurdity follows : the controlling powers must be
as numerous as the varying interests, and the opera
tions of government must therefore cease: for the
moment you accommodate these different interests,
which is the only way to set the government in mo
tion, you establish a general controlling power. Thus,
whatever constitutional provisions are made to the
contrary, every government will be at last driven to
the necessity of subjecting the partial to the universal
interest. The gentlemen ought always, in their rea
soning, to distinguish between the real, genuine good
of a state, and the opinions and prejudices which
may prevail respecting it : the latter may be opposed
to the general good, and consequently ought to be
sacrificed ; the former is so involved in it, that it ne
ver can be sacrificed. Sir, the main design of the con
vention, in forming the senate, was to prevent fluc
tuations and cabals. With this view, they made that
body small, and to exist for a considerable period.
Have they executed this design too far ? The sena
tors are to serve six years. This is only two years
longer than the senators of this state hold their places.
One third of the members are to go out every two
years ; and in six, the whole body may be changed.
Prior to the revolution, the representatives in the se
veral colonies were elected for different periods ; for
three years, for seven years, &c. Were those bodies
ever considered as incapable of representing the peo
ple, or as too independent of them ? There is one
circumstance which will have a tendency to increase
the dependence of the senators on the states, in pro
portion to the duration of their appointments. As
the state legislatures are in continual fluctuation, the
senator will have more attachments to form, and con
sequently a greater difficulty of maintaining his place,
than one of shorter duration. He will therefore be
more cautious and industrious to suit his conduct to
the wishes of his constituents.

* p

.r)2 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

Sir, when you take a view of all the circumstances
which have been recited, you will certainly see, that
the senators will constantly look up to the state gov
ernments, with an eye of dependence and affection/
If they are ambitious to continue in office, they will
make every prudent arrangement for this purpose,
and, whatever may be their private sentiments of po
litics, they will be convinced, that the surest means of
obtaining a re-election, will be an uniform attachment
to the interests of their several states.

The gentlemen, to support their amendment, have
observed, that the power of recall, under the old gov
ernment, has never been exercised. There is no rea
soning from this. The experience of a few years,
under peculiar circumstances, can afford no probable
security that it never will be carried into execution
with unhappy effects. A seat in Congress has been
less an object of ambition ; and the arts of intrigue,
consequently, have been less practised. Indeed, it
has been difficult to find men, who were willing to
suffer the mortifications, to which so feeble a govern
ment, and so dependent a station, exposed them.

Sir, if you consider but a moment, the purposes for
which the senate was instituted, and the nature of the
business which they are to transact, you will see the
necessity of giving them duration. They, together
with the president, are to manage all our concerns
with foreign nations ; they must understand all their
interests, and their political systems. This knowledge
is not soon acquired — but a very small part is gained
in the closet. Is it desirable then that new and un
qualified members should be continually thrown into
that body ? When public bodies are engaged in the
exercise of general powers, you cannot judge of the
propriety of their conduct, but from the result of their
systems. They may be forming plans, which require
time and diligence to bring to maturity. It is neces
sary, therefore, that they should have a considerable
and fixed duration, that they may make their calcula-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 53

lions accordingly. If they are to be perpetually fluc
tuating, they can never have that responsibility which
is so important in republican governments. In bodies
subject to frequent changes, great political plans must
be conducted by members in succession : a single as
sembly can have but a partial agency in them, and
consequently cannot properly be answerable for the
final event. Considering the senate, therefore, with a
view to responsibility, duration is a very interesting
and essential quality. There is another view, in which
duration in the senate appears necessary. A gov
ernment, changeable in its policy, must soon lose its
sense of national character, and forfeit the respect of
foreigners. Senators will not be solicitous for the
reputation of public measures, in which they have had
but a temporary concern, and will feel lightly the bur
den of public disapprobation, in proportion to the
number of those who partake of the censure. Our
political rivals will ever consider our mutable counsels
as evidence of deficient wisdom, and will be little ap
prehensive of our arriving at any exalted station in the
scale of power. Such are the internal and external
disadvantages which would result from the principle
contended for. Were it admitted, I am fully persuad
ed, sir, that prejudices would govern the public delibe
rations, and passions rage in the counsels of the union.
If it were necessary, I could illustrate my subject by
historical facts : I could travel through an extensive
field of detail, and demonstrate, that wherever the fa
tal principle of — the head suffering the control of the
members, has operated, it has proved a fruitful source
of commotions and disorder.

This, sir, is the first fair opportunity that has been
offered, of deliberately correcting the errors in gov.-
ernment. Instability has been a prominent and very
defective feature in most republican systems. It is
the first to be seen, and the last to be lamented by a
philosophical inquirer. It has operated most bane-
fully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we

,j4 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poi
sonous principle from our government. If this be not
done, sir, we shall feel, and posterity will be convuls
ed by a painful malady.

On the 25th, Mr. Hamilton continued his remarks upon the same
subject.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

In debates of this kind, it is extremely easy, on either
side, to say a great number of plausible things. It is
to be acknowledged, that there is even a certain degree
of truth in the reasonings on both sides. In this situa
tion, it is the province of judgment and good sense, to
determine their force and application, and how far the
arguments advanced on one side, are balanced by those
on the other. The ingenious dress in which both may
appear, renders it a difficult task to make this decision,
and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe
and solid conclusion. On the present question, some
of the principles on each side are admitted, and the
conclusions drawn from them denied, while other prin
ciples, with their inferences, are rejected altogether.
It is the business of the committee to seek the truth in
this labyrinth of argument.

There are two objects in forming systems of gov
ernment — safety for the people, and energy in the ad
ministration. When these objects are united, the cer
tain tendency of the system will be to the public wel
fare. If the latter object be neglected, the people's
security will be as certainly sacrificed, as by disregard
ing the former. Good constitutions are formed upon
a comparison of the liberty of the individual, with the
strength of government : if the tone of either be too
high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the
happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects,
to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensi
bility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through
the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the
government will reach, in its operations, the perfect

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 55

balance between liberty and power. The arguments
of the gentlemen chiefly apply to the former branch —
the house of representatives. If they will calmly con
sider the different nature of the two branches, they
will see that the reasoning which justly applies to the
representative house, will go to destroy the essential
qualities of the senate. If the former is calculated per
fectly upon the principles of caution, why should you
impose the same principles upon the latter, which is
designed fpr a different operation? Gentlemen, while
they discover a laudable anxiety for the safety of the
people, do not attend to the important distinction I
have drawn. We have it constantly held up to us,
that, as it is our chief duty to guard against tyranny, it
is our policy to form all the branches of government
for this purpose. Sir, it is a truth sufficiently illus
trated by experience, that when the people act by their
representatives, they are commonly irresistible. The
gentleman admits the position, that stability is essen
tial to the government, and yet enforces principles,
which, if true, ought to banish stability from the sys
tem. The gentleman observes, that there is a fallacy
in my reasoning, arid informs us, that the legislatures
of the states — not the people, are to appoint the
senators. Does he reflect, that they are the immedi
ate agents of the people ; that they are so constituted
as to. feel all their prejudices and passions, and to be
governed, in a great degree, by their misapprehen
sions? Experience must have taught him the truth
of this. Look through their history : what factions
have arisen from the most trifling causes — what in
trigues have been practised for the most illiberal pur
poses ! Is not the state of Rhode Island, at this mo
ment, struggling under difficulties and distresses, for
having been led blindly by the spirit of the multitude ?
What is her legislature but the picture of a mob ? In
this state we have a senate, possessed of the proper
qualities of a permanent body : Virginia, Maryland,
and a few other states, are in the same situation : the

56 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

rest are either governed by a single democratic as
sembly, or have a senate constituted entirely upon de
mocratic principles. These have been, more or less,
embroiled in factions, and have generally been the
image and echo of the multitude. It is difficult to
reason on this point, without touching on certain deli
cate chords. I could refer you to periods and con
junctures, when the people have been governed by
improper passions, and led by factious and designing
men. I could show, that the same passions have in
fected their representatives. Let us beware that we
do not make the state legislatures a vehicle, hi which
the evi) humors may be conveyed into the national sys
tem. To prevent this, it is necessary that the senate
should be so formed, as, in some measure, to check the
state governments, and preclude the communication
of the false impressions which they receive from the
people. It has been often repeated, that the legisla
tures of the states can have only a partial and confin
ed view of national affairs ; that they can form no pro
per estimate of great objects which are not in the
sphere of their interests. The observation of the gen
tleman, therefore, cannot take off the force of my ar

gument.

Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a
reflection,* that their future existence is absolutely in
the power of the states. Will not this form a power
ful check ? It is a reflection which applies closely to
their feelings and interests ; and no candid man, who
thinks deliberately, will deny that it would be alone a
sufficient check. The legislatures are to provide the
mode of electing the President, and must have a great
influence over the electors. Indeed, they convey their
influence through a thousand channels, into the gene
ral government. Gentlemen have endeavored to
show that there will be no clashing of local and gene
ra1 interests: they do not seem to have sufficiently
considered the subject. We have in this state a duty
of six pence per pound on salt, and it operates lightly

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 57

and with advantage : but such a duty would be very
burdensome to some of the states. If Congress
should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt
tax, would it not be opposed by the eastern states ?
Being themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of
the measure, they could only feel its apparent injus
tice. Would it be wise to give the New England
states a power to defeat this measure, by recalling
their senators who may be engaged for it ? I beg the
gentlemen once more to attend to the distinction be
tween the real and apparent interests of the states. I
admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the
government ; yet every state is not the government :
every petty district is not the government. Sir, in our
state legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessa
ry between the interests of counties : the same must
happen in the general government between states. In
this, the few must yield to the many: or, in other
words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general
interest. If the members of Congress are too depend
ent on the state legislatures, they will be eternally
forming secret combinations from local views. This
is reasoning from the plainest principles. Their in
terest is interwoven with their dependence, and they
will necessarily yield to the impression of their situa
tion. Those who have been in Congress, have seen
these operations. The first question has been — how
will such a measure affect my constituents, and conse
quently, how will the part I take affect my re-election ?
This consideration may be, in some degree, proper;
but to be dependent from day to day, and to have the
idea perpetually present, would be the source of innu
merable evils. Six years, sir, is a period short enough
for a proper degree of dependence. Let us consider
the peculiar state of this body, and see under what
impressions they will act. One third of them are to
go out at the end of two years ; two thirds in four
years, and the whole in six years. When one year is
elapsed, there will be a number who are to hold their
VOL. i. 8

58 MR- HAMILTON'S SPEECH OK

places for one year, others for three, and others for
five years. Thus, there will not only be a constant
and frequent change of members, but there will be
some whose office is near the point of expiration, and
who, from this circumstance, will have a lively sense
of their dependence. The biennial change of mem
bers is an excellent invention for increasing the diffi
culty of combination. Any scheme of usurpation will
lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advo
cates, and their places will be supplied by an equal
number of new, unaccommodating and virtuous men.
When two principles are equally important, we ought
if possible, to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither.
We think that safety and permanency in this govern
ment are completely reconcileable. The state gov
ernments will have, from the causes I have described,
a sufficient influence over the senate, without the
check for which the gentlemen contend.

It has been remarked, that there is an inconsistency
in our admitting, that the equal votes in the senate
were given to secure the rights of the states ; and, at
the same time, holding up the idea, that their interests
should be sacrificed to those of the union. But the
committee certainly perceive the distinction between
the rights of the state and its interests. The rights
of a state are defined by the constitution, and cannot
be invaded without a violation of it ; but the interests
of a state have no connexion with the constitution,
and may be in a thousand instances constitutionally
sacrificed. An uniform tax is perfectly constitutional ;
and yet it may operate oppressively upon certain
members of the union. The gentlemen are afraid that
the state governments will be abolished. But, sir,
their existence does jiot depend upon the laws of the
United States. Congress can no more abolish the
state governments, than they can dissolve the union.
The whole constitution is repugnant to it, and yet the
gentlemen would introduce an additional, useless pro
vision against it. It is proper that the influence of the

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 59

states should prevail to a certain extent. But shall
the individual states be the judges how far ? Shall an
unlimited power be left them to determine in their
own favor ? The gentlemen go into the extreme : in
stead of a wise government, they would form a fantas
tical Utopia. But, sir, while they give it a plausible,
popular shape, they would render it impracticable.
Much has been said about factions. As far as my ob
servation has extended, factions in Congress have
arisen from attachment to state prejudices. We are
attempting by this constitution to abolish factions, and
to unite all parties for the general welfare. That a
man should have the power in private life, of recalling
his agent, is proper ; because in the business in which
he is engaged, he has no other object but to gain the
approbation of his principal. Is this the case with
the senator ? Is he simply the agent of the state ?
No — he is an agent for the union, and he is bound to
perform services necessary to the good of the whole,
though his state should condemn them.

Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen car
ry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am con
vinced that no government, founded on this feeble
principle, can operate well. I believe also, that we
shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt
the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other
states have; and we hardly know the strength of
their objections to it. There is no probability that
we shall ever persuade a majority of the states to
agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive
themselves. The amendment would defeat their own
design. When a man knows he must quit his station,
let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention
chiefly to his own emolument : nay, he will feel temp
tations, which few other situations furnish, to perpetu
ate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men
will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change hu
man nature, as to oppose the strong current of the sel-

60 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, &c.

fish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the
channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good.

It has been observed, that it is not possible there
should be, in a state, only two men qualified for sena
tors. But, sir, the question is not, whether there may
be no more than two men; but whether, in certain
emergencies, you could find two equal to those whom
the amendment would discard. Important negotia
tions, or other business to which they shall be most
competent, may employ them, at the moment of their
removal. These things often happen. The difficulty
of obtaining men, capable of conducting the affairs of
a nation in dangerous times, is much more serious
than the gentlemen imagine.

As to corruption, sir, admitting in the president a
disposition to corrupt, what are the instruments of
bribery? It is said, he will have in his disposal a
great number of offices. But how many offices are
there, for which a man would relinquish the senato
rial dignity ? There may be some in the judicial, and
some in other principal departments. But there are
few, whose respectability can in any measure balance
that of the office of senator. Men who have been in
the senate once, and who have a reasonable hope of
a re-election, will not be easily bought by offices.
This reasoning shows that a rotation would be pro
ductive of many disadvantages — under particular cir
cumstances, it might be extremely inconvenient, if not
fatal to the prosperity of our country.

SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 27, 1788.

A proposition to amend the constitution was brought before the conven
tion, the object of which was, to materially abridge the power pro
posed to be conferred upon Congress, relative to imposing excise
and laying direct taxes, in opposition to which, Mr. Hamilton de
livered the following speech.

THIS is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on
which objections very naturally arise, and assume the
most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions,
and its first impressions create a prejudice, before cool
examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is
more easy for the human mind to calculate the evils,
than the advantages of a measure ; and vastly more
natural to apprehend the danger, than to see the ne
cessity, of giving powers to our rulers. Hence, I may
justly expect, that those who hear me, will place less
confidence in those arguments which oppose, than in
those which favor, their prepossessions.

After all our doubts, our suspicions and specula
tions, on the subject of government, we must return, at
last, to this important truth — that when we have form
ed a constitution upon free principles ; when we have
given a proper balance to the different branches of ad
ministration, and fixed representation upon pure and
equal principles, we may, with safety, furnish it with

02 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

all the powers necessary to answer, in the most ample
manner, the purposes of government. The great de
siderata are a free representation, and mutual checks.
When these are obtained, all our apprehensions of the
extent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What
then is the structure of this constitution ? One branch
of the legislature is to be elected by the people — by
the same people, who choose your state representa
tives. Its members are to hold their office two years,
and then return to their constituents. Here, sir, the
people govern: here they act by their immediate
representatives. You have also a senate, constituted
by your state legislatures — by men, in whom you place
the highest confidence, and forming another represen
tative branch. Then, again, you have an executive
magistrate, created by a form of election, which me
rits universal admiration. In the form of this govern
ment, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the
checks which the greatest politicians and the best
writers, have ever conceived. What more can rea
sonable men desire? Is there any one branch, in
which the whole legislative and executive powers are
lodged ? No. The legislative authority is lodged in
three distinct branches, properly balanced : the execu
tive authority is divided between two branches ; and
the judicial is still reserved for an independent body,
who hold their offices during good behavior. This
organization is so complex, so skilfully contrived, that
it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked
measure should pass the great scrutiny with success.
Now, what do gentlemen mean, by coming forward
and declaiming against this government ? Why do
they say we ought to limit its powers, to disable it,
and to destroy its capacity of blessing the people ?
Has philosophy suggested — has experience taught,
that such a government ought not to be trusted with
every thing necessary for the good of society ? Sir,
when you have divided and nicely balanced the de
partments of government ; when you have strongly

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. £3

connected the virtue of your rulers with their interest;
when, in short, you have rendered your system as per
fect as human forms can be — you must place con
fidence ; you must give power.

We have heard a great deal of the sword and the
purse: it is said, our liberties are in danger, if both are
possessed by Congress. Let us see what is the true
meaning of this maxim, which has been so much used,
and so little understood. It is, that you shall not
place these powers in either the legislative or execu
tive singly : neither one nor the other shall have both ;
because this would destroy that division of powers, on
which political liberty is founded ; and would furnish
one body with all the means of tyranny. But, where
the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in
another, there can be no danger. All governments
have possessed these powers : they would be monsters
without them, and incapable of exertion. What is
your state government? Does not your legislature
command what money it pleases? Does not your
executive execute the laws without restraint ? These
distinctions between the purse and the sword have no
application to the system, but only to its separate
branches. Sir, when we reason about the great in
terests of a great people, it is high time that we dis
miss our prejudices and banish declamation.

In order to induce us to consider the powers, given
by this constitution, as dangerous— in order to render
plausible an attempt to take away the life and spirit
of the most important power in government, the gen
tleman complains that we shall not have a true and
safe representation* I asked him what a safe repre
sentation was, and he has given no satisfactory aiv
swer. The assembly of New York has been mention
ed as a proper standard ; but, if we apply this stan
dard to the general government, our Congress will be
come a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse,
and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a
system afford security ? Can you have confidence in

64 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

such a body ? The idea of taking the ratio of repre
sentation, in a small society, for the ratio of a great
one, is a fallacy which ought to be exposed. It is im
possible to ascertain to what point our representation
will increase : it may vary from one, to two, three, or
four hundred ,• it depends upon the progress of popu
lation. Suppose it to rest at two hundred ; is not this
number sufficient to secure it against corruption ?
Human nature must be a much more weak and despi
cable thing, than I apprehend it to be, if two hundred
of our fellow-citizens can be corrupted in two years.
But, suppose they are corrupted; can they, in t»vo
years, accomplish their designs ? Can they form a
combination, and even lay a foundation for a system of
tyranny, in so short a period ? It is far from my inten
tion to wound the feelings of any gentleman ; but I
must, in this most interesting discussion, speak of
things as they are ; and hold up opinions in the light
in which they ought to appear : and I maintain, that
all that has been said of corruption, of the purse and
the sword, and of the danger of giving powers, is not
supported by principle or fact : that it is mere verbiage,
and idle declamation. The true principle of govern
ment is this : make the system complete in its struc
ture; give a perfect proportion and balance to its
parts ; and the powers you give it will never affect
your security. The question, then, of the division of
powers between the general and state governments, is
a question of convenience : it becomes a prudential
inquiry, what powers are proper to be reserved to the
latter ; and this immediately involves another inquiry
into the proper objects of the two governments. This
is the criterion by which we shall determine the just
distribution of powers.

The great leading objects of the federal government,
in which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domes
tic peace, and provide for the common defence. In
these are comprehended the regulation of commerce,
that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse ; the

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. (J5

support of armies and navies, and of the civil adminis-*
tration. It is useless to go into detail. Every one
knows that the objects of the general government are
numerous, extensive and important. Every one must
acknowledge the necessity of giving powers, in all re
spects, and in every degree, equal to these objects.
This principle assented to, let us inquire what are the
objects of the state governments. Have they to pro
vide against foreign invasion? Have they to maintain
fleets and armies ? Have they any concern in the re
gulation of commerce, the procuring alliances, or form
ing treaties of peace? No. Their objects are merely
civil and domestic; to support the legislative esta
blishment, and to provide for the administration of the
laws. Let any one compare the expense of support
ing the civil list in a state, with the expense of provid
ing for the defence of the union. The difference is
almost beyond calculation. The experience of Great
Britain will throw some light on this subject. In that
kingdom, the ordinary expenses of peace to those of
war, are as one to fourteen: but there they have a
monarch, with his splendid court, and an enormous ci
vil establishment, with which we have nothing in this
country to compare. If, in Great Britain, the expenses
of war and peace are so disproportioned, how wide
will be their disparity in the United States ; how infi
nitely wider between the general government and
each individual state ! Now, sir, where ought the great
resources to be lodged? Every rational man will
give an immediate answer. To what extent shall
these resources be possessed ? Reason says, as far as
possible exigencies can require ; that is, without limita
tion. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's
wants ; it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its re
sources. Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous
wars, may demand all the possible abilities of the
country. Shall not your government have power to
call these abilities into action ? The contingencies of
society are not reduceable to calculations. They

VOL. r.

66 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

cannot be fixed or bounded, even in imagination.
Will you limit the means of your defence, when you
cannot ascertain the force or extent of the invasion ?
Even in ordinary wars, a government is frequently
obliged to call for supplies, to the temporary oppres
sion of the people.

Sir, if we adopt the idea of exclusive revenues, we
shall be obliged to fix some distinguished line, which
neither government shall overpass. The inconven
iences of this measure must appear evident, on the
slightest examination.' The resources appropriated to
one, may diminish or fail, while those of the other may
increase, beyond the wants of government. One may
be destitute of revenues, while the other shall possess
an unnecessary abundance, and the constitution will
be an eternal barrier to a mutual intercourse and re
lief. In this case, will the individual states stand on
so good a ground, as if the objects of taxation were
left free and open to the embrace of both the govern
ments ? Possibly, in the advancement of commerce,
the imposts may increase to such a degree, as to ren
der direct taxes unnecessary. These resources, then,
as the constitution stands, may be occasionally relin
quished to the states ; but on the gentleman's idea of
prescribing exclusive limits, and precluding all recip
rocal communication, this would be entirely improper.
The laws of the states must not touch the appropriat
ed resources of the United States, whatever may be
their wants. Would it not be of more advantage to
the states, to have a concurrent jurisdiction extending
to all the sources of revenue, than to be confined to
such a small resource, as, on calculation of the objects
of the two governments, should appear to be their
due proportion? Certainly you cannot hesitate on
this question. The gentleman's plan would have a
further ill effect; it would tend to dissolve the con
nexion and correspondence of the two governments,
to estrange them from each other, and to destroy that
mutual dependence, which forms the essence of union.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. <J7

Sir, a number of arguments have been advanced by
an honorable member from New York, which, to every
unclouded mind, must carry conviction. He has stat
ed, that in sudden emergencies, it may be necessary
to borrow; and that it is impossible to borrow, unless
you have funds to pledge for the payment of your debts.
Limiting the powers of government to certain re
sources, is rendering the fund precarious ; and oblig
ing the government to ask, instead of empowering it
to command, is to destroy all confidence and credit.
If the power of taxing is restricted, the consequence is,
that on the breaking out of a war, you must divert the
funds, appropriated to the payment of debts, to an
swer immediate exigencies. Thus you violate your
engagements, at the very time you increase the bur
den of them. Besides, sound policy condemns the
practice of accumulating debts. A government, to
act with energy, should have the possession of all its
revenues to answer present purposes. The principle,
for which I contend, is recognized, in all its extent, by
our old constitution. Congress is authorized to raise
troops, to call for supplies without limitation, and to
borrow money to any amount. It is true, they must
use the form of recommendations and requisitions :
but the states are bound by the solemn ties of honor,
of justice, of religion, to comply without reserve.

Mr. Chairman, it has been advanced as a principle,
that no government but a despotism, can exist in a
very extensive country. This is a melancholy consi
deration indeed. If it were founded on truth, we
ought to dismiss the idea of a republican government,
even for the state of New York. This idea has been
taken from a celebrated writer, who, by being misun
derstood, has been the occasion of frequent fallacies
in our reasoning on political subjects. But the posi
tion has been misapprehended; and its application is
entirely false and unwarrantable: it relates only to
democracies, where the whole body of the people
meet to transact business : arid where representation

tf8 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

is unknown. Such were a number of ancient, and
some modern independent cities. Men who read
without attention, have taken these maxims respect
ing the extent of country ; and,, contrary to their pro
per meaning, have applied them to 'republics in gene
ral. This application is wrong in respect to all rep
resentative governments ; but especially in re]ation to
a confederacy of states, in which the supreme legis
lature has only general powers, and the civil and do
mestic concerns of the people are regulated by the
laws of the several states. This distinction being kept
in view, all the difficulty will vanish, and we may ea
sily conceive, that the people of a large country may
be represented, as truly as those of a small one. An
assembly constituted for general purposes, may be
fully competent to every federal regulation, without be
ing too numerous for deliberate conduct. If the state
governments were to be abolished, the question would
wear a different face : but this idea is inadmissible.
They are absolutely necessary to the system. Their
existence must form a leading principle in the most
perfect constitution we could form. I insist, that it
never can be the interest or desire of the national le
gislature, to destroy the state governments. It can
derive no advantage from such an event ; but, on the
contrary, would lose an indispensable support, a neces
sary aid in executing the laws, and conveying the in
fluence of government to the doors of the people.
The union is dependent on the will of the state gov
ernments for its chief magistrate, and for its senate.
The blow aimed at the members, must give a fatal
wound to the head ; and the destruction of the states
must be at once a political suicide. Can the national
government be guilty of this madness ? What induce
ments, what temptations can they have ? Will they
attach new honors to their station ; will they increase
the national strength ; will they multiply the national
resources ; will they make themselves more respecta
ble in the view of foreign nations, or of their fellow-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. (J9

citizens, by robbing the states of their constitutional
privileges ? But imagine, for a moment, that a politi
cal frenzy should seize the government ; suppose they
should make the attempt — certainly, sir, it would be
for ever impracticable. This has been sufficiently de
monstrated by reason and experience. It has been
proved, that the members of republics have been, and
ever will be, stronger than the head. Let us attend to
one general historical example. In the ancient feudal
governments of Europe, there were, in the first place,
a monarch ; subordinate to him, a body of nobles ; and
subject to these, the vassals, or the whole body of the
people. The authority of the kings was limited, and
that of the barons considerably independent. A great
part of the early wars in Europe were contests between
the king and his nobility. In these contests, the lat
ter possessed many advantages derived from their in
fluence, and the immediate command they had over
the people ; and they generally prevailed. The histo
ry of the feudal wars exhibits little more than a series
of successful encroachments on the prerogatives of
monarchy. Here, sir, is one great proof of the supe- .
riority, which the members in limited governments
possess over their head. As long as the barons en
joyed the confidence and attachment of the people,
they had the strength of the country on their side, and
were irresistible. I may be told, that in some instances
the barons were overcome : but how did this hap
pen ? Sir, they took advantage of the depression of
the royal authority, and the establishment of their own
power, to oppress and tyrannize over their vassals. As
commerce enlarged, and as wealth and civilization in
creased, the people began to feel their own weight and
consequence : they grew tired of their oppressions ;
united their strength with that of the prince, and
threw off the yoke of aristocracy. These very in
stances prove what I contend for. They prove, that in
whatever direction the popular weight leans, the cur
rent of power will flow : wherever the popular attach-

70 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON

ments lie, there will rest the political superiority. Sir,
can it be supposed that the state governments will be
come the oppressors of the people ? Will they forfeit
their affections ? Will they combine to destroy the
liberties and happiness of their fellow-citizens, for the
sole purpose of involving themselves in ruin? God
forbid ! The idea, sir, is shocking ! It outrages every
feeling of humanity, and every dictate of common

sense !

There are certain social principles in human nature,
from which we may draw the most solid conclusions,
with respect to the conduct of individuals and of com
munities. We love our families more than our neigh
bors : we love our neighbors more than our coun
trymen in general. The human affections, like the
solar heat, lose their intensity, as they depart from the
centre, and become languid, in proportion to the ex
pansion of the circle, on which they act. On these
principles, the attachment of the individual will be first
and for ever secured by the state governments : they
will be a mutual protection and support. Another
, source of influence, which has already been pointed
out, is the various official connexions in the states.
Gentlemen endeavor to evade the force of this, by
saying that these offices will be insignificant. This is
by no means true. The state officers will ever be im
portant, because they are necessary and useful.
Their powers are such as are extremely interesting to
the people ; such as affect their property, their liberty
and life. What is more important than the administra
tion of justice, and the execution of the civil and cri
minal laws ? Can the state governments become in
significant, while they have the power of raising money
independently, and without control ? If they are real
ly useful ; if they are calculated to promote the essen
tial interests of the people ; they must have their con
fidence and support. The states can never lose their
powers, till the whole people of America are robbed
of their liberties. These must go together ; they must

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 7j

support each other, or meet one common fate. On
the gentlemen's principle, we may safely trust the state
governments, though we have no means of resisting
them : but we cannot confide in the national govern
ment, though we have an effectual constitutional guard
against every encroachment. This is the essence of
their argument, and it is false and fallacious beyond
conception.

With regard to the jurisdiction of the two govern
ments, I shall certainly admit that the constitution
ought to be so formed, as not to prevent the states
from providing for their own existence ; and I main
tain that it is so formed ; and that their power of pro
viding for themselves is sufficiently established. This
is conceded by one gentleman, and in the next breath,
the concession is retracted. He says, Congress have
but one exclusive right in taxation ; that of duties on
imports : certainly, then, their other powers are only
concurrent. But to take off the force of this obvious
conclusion, he immediately says, that the laws of the
United States are supreme ; and that where there is
one supreme, there cannot be a concurrent authority ;
and further, that where the laws of the union are su
preme, those of the states must be subordinate ; be
cause, there cannot be two supremes. This is curi
ous sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act
together, is false. They are inconsistent only when
they are aimed at each other, or at one indivisible ob
ject. The laws of the United States are supreme, as
to all their proper, constitutional objects : the laws of
the states are supreme in the same way. These su
preme laws may act on different objects, without clash
ing; or they may operate on different parts of the
same common object, with perfect harmony. Suppose
both governments should lay a tax, of a penny, on a
certain article : has not each an independent and un
controllable power to collect its own tax? The
meaning of the maxim, there cannot be two supremes^
is simply this — two powers cannot be supreme over

72 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, to*.

each other. This meaning is entirely perverted by
the gentlemen. But, it is said, disputes between col
lectors are to be referred to the federal courts. This
is again wandering in the field of conjecture. But
suppose the fact certain : is it not to be presumed, that
they will express the true meaning of the constitution
and the laws ? Will they not be bound to consider the
concurrent jurisdiction ; to declare that both the taxes
shall have equal operation ; that both the powers, in
that respect, are sovereign and co-extensive ? If they
transgress their duty, we are to hope that they will be
punished. Sir, we can reason from probabilities
alone. When we leave common sense, and give our
selves up to conjecture, there can be no certainty, no
security in our reasonings.

I imagine I have stated to the committee, abundant
reasons to prove the entire safety of the state gdvern-
rnents, and of the people. I would go into a more mi
nute consideration of the nature of the concurrent
jurisdiction, and the operation of the laws, in relation
to revenue ; but at present, I feel too much indisposed
to proceed. I shall, with the leave of the committee,
improve another opportunity of expressing to them
more fully my ideas on this point. I wish the com
mittee to remember, that the constitution under exa
mination, is framed upon truly republican principles ;
and that, as it is expressly designed to provide for the
common protection and the general welfare of the
United States, it must be utterly repugnant to this
constitution, to subvert the state governments, or op
press the people.

SPEECH OF PATRICK HENRY.

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 4th, 178S.

The preamble and the two first sections of the first article of the
constitution being under consideration, Mr. Henry thus addressed
the convention.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE public mind, as well as my own, is extremely
uneasy at the proposed change of government. Give
me leave to form one of the number of those, who wish
to be thoroughly acquainted with the reasons of this
perilous and uneasy situation, and why we are brought
hither to decide on this great national question. I
consider myself as the servant of the people of this
commonwealth, as a centinel over their rights, liberty
and happiness. I represent their feelings when I say.
that they are exceedingly uneasy, being brought from
that state of full security, which they enjoy, to the pre
sent delusive appearance of things. Before the meet
ing of the late federal convention at Philadelphia, a
general peace, and an universal tranquillity prevailed in
this country, and the minds of our citizens were at
perfect repose ; but since that period, they are exceed
ingly uneasy and disquieted. When I wished for an
appointment to this convention; my mind was extremely
agitated for the situation of public affairs. I conceive

VOL. i 10

74 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH OK

the republic to be in extreme danger. If our situation
be thus uneasy, whence has arisen this fearful jeopardy ?
It arises from this fatal system ; it arises from a propo
sal to change our government — a proposal that goes
to the utter annihilation of the most solemn engage
ments of the states — a proposal of establishing nine
states into a confederacy, to the eventual exclusion of
four states. It goes to the annihilation of those solemn
treaties we have formed with foreign nations. The
present circumstances of France, the good offices ren
dered us by that kingdom, require our most faithful and
most punctual adherence to our treaty with her. We
are in alliance with the Spaniards, the Dutch, the
Prussians : those treaties bound us as thirteen states,
confederated together. Yet here is a proposal to sever
that confederacy. Is it possible that we shall abandon
all our treaties and national engagements ? And for
what ? I expected to have heard the reasons of an
event so unexpected to my mind, and many others.
Was our civil polity, or public justice, endangered or
sapped ? Was the real existence of the country threat
ened, or was this preceded by a mournful progression
of events ? This proposal of altering our federal gov
ernment is of a most alarming nature : make the best
of this new government — say it is composed by any
thing but inspiration — you ought to be extremely cau
tious, watchful, jealous of your liberty ; for instead of
securing your rights, you may lose them forever. If a
wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost for
ever. If this new government will not come up to the
expectation of the people, and they should be disap
pointed, their liberty will be lost, and tyranny must and
will arise. I repeat it again, and I beg gentlemen to
consider, that a wrong step, made now, will plunge us
into misery, and our republic will be lost. It will be
necessary for this convention to have a faithful histori
cal detail of the facts, that preceded the session of the
federal convention, and the reasons that actuated its
members in proposing an entire alteration of govern-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 7;,

inent — and to demonstrate the dangers that awaited
us. If they were of such awful magnitude, as to war
rant a proposal so extremely perilous as this, I must
assert, that this convention has an absolute right to a
thorough discovery of every circumstance relative
to this great event. And here I would make this inqui
ry of those worthy characters who composed a part of
the late federal convention. I am sure they were fully
impressed with the necessity of forming a great con
solidated government, instead of a confederation.
That this is a consolidated government is demonstra-
bly clear; and the danger of such a government is, to
my mind, very striking. I have the highest veneration
for those gentlemen ; but, sir, give me leave to demand,
what right had they to say, "We, the People ?" My po
litical curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the
public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized them
to speak the language of, " We, the People," instead
of We, the States? States are the characteristics, and
the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the
agents of this compact, it must be one great consoli
dated national government of the people of all the
states. I have the highest respect for those gentle
men who formed the convention ; and were some of
them not here, I would express some testimonial of
esteem for them. America had on a former occasion
put the utmost confidence in them ; a confidence which
was well placed ; and I am sure, sir, I would give up
any thing to them ; I would cheerfully confide in them
as my representatives. But, sir, on this great occasion,
I would demand the cause of their conduct. Even
from that illustrious man, who saved us by his valor,
I would have a reason for his conduct ; that liberty
which he has given us by his valor, tells me to ask this
reason, and sure I am, were he here, he would give us
that reason : but there are other gentlemen here, who
can give us this information. The people gave them
no power to use their name. That they exceeded their
power is perfectly clear. It is not mere curiosity that

76 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

actuates me ; I wish to hear the real, actual, existing
danger, which should lead us to take those steps so
dangerous in my conception. Disorders have arisen
in other parts of America, but here, sir, no dangers, no
insurrection or tumult, has happened ; every thing has
been calm and tranquil. But notwithstanding this,
we are wandering on the great ocean of human affairs.
I see no land mark to guide us. We are running
we know not whither. Difference in opinion has
gone to a degree of inflammatory resentment, in
(different parts of the country, which has been occa
sioned by this perilous innovation. The federal con
vention ought to have amended the old system ; for
this purpose, they were solely delegated: the object of
their mission extended to no other consideration.
You must therefore forgive the solicitation of one un
worthy member, to know what danger could have
arisen under the present confederation, and what are
the causes of this proposal to change our government

Some of the advocates of the proposed constitution, having replied
to the preceding remarks of Mr. Henry, on the 5th, he continued
his speech as follows.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

1 am much obliged to the very worthy gentleman*
for his encomium. I wish I were possessed of talents,
or possessed of any thing, that might enable me to
elucidate this great subject. I am not free from sus
picion : I am apt to entertain doubts : I rose yesterday
to ask a question, which arose in my awn mind. When
I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my in
terrogation was obvious : the fate of this question and
of America, may depend on this. Have they said, we,
the states ? Have they made a proposal of a compact
between states ? If they had, this would be a con
federation : it is otherwise most clearly a consoli
dated government. The question turns, sir, on that
poor little thing — the expression, We, the people, in-

* Mr. Lee. of Westmoreland,

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 77

stead of the states of America. I need not take much
pains to show, that the principles of this system, are
extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous. Is
this a monarchy, like England — a compact between
prince and people ; with checks on the former to se
cure the liberty of the latter ? Is this a confederacy,
like Holland — an association of a number of inde
pendent states, each of which retains its individual
sovereignty ? It is not a democracy, wherein the
people retain all their rights securely. Had these
principles been adhered to, we should not have been
brought to this alarming transition, from a confederacy
to a consolidated government. We have no detail of
those great considerations which, in my opinion, ought
to have abounded before we should recur to a govern
ment of this kind. Here is a revolution as radical as
that, which separated us from Great Britain. It is as
radical, if in this transition, our rights and privileges
are endangered, and the sovereignty of the states re
linquished! And cannot we plainly see, that this is
actually the case ? The rights of conscience, trial by
jury, liberty of the press, all your immunities and fran
chises, all pretensions to human rights and privileges,
are rendered insecure, if not lost, by this change so
loudly talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others.
Is this tarne relinquishment of rights worthy of free
men ? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude that ought
to characterize republicans ? It is said eight states
have adopted this plan. I declare that if twelve states
and an half had adopted it, I would, with manly firm
ness, and in spite of an erring world, reject it. You are
not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor
how you are to become a great and powerful people,
but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty
ought to be the direct end of your government. Hav
ing premised these things, I shall, with the aid of my
judgment and information, which I confess are not ex
tensive, go into the discussion of this system more mi
nutely. Is it necessary for your liberty, that you should

78 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH OlNi

abandon those great rights by the adoption of this
system ? Is the relinquishment of the trial by jury, and
the liberty of the press, necessary for your liberty ?
Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights, tend
to the security of your liberty ? Liberty, the greatest
of all earthly blessings — give us that precious jewel,
and you may take every thing else. But I am fearful I
have lived long enough to become an old-fashioned
fellow. Perhaps an invincible attachment to the
dearest rights of man, may, in these refined, enlighten
ed days, be deemed old-fashioned : if so, I am con
tented to be so. I say, the time has been when every
pulse of my heart beat for American liberty, and which,
I believe, had a counterpart in the breast of every true
American. But suspicions have gone forth — sus
picions of my integrity. It has been publicly re
ported that my professions are not real. Twenty
three years ago was I supposed a traitor to my
country : I was then said to be a bane of sedition,
because I supported the rights of my country : I may
be thought suspicious, when I say our privileges and
rights are in danger : but, sir, a number of the people
of this country are weak enough to think these things
are too true. I am happy to find that the gentlemen
on the other side, declare they are groundless : but,
sir, suspicion is a virtue, as long as its object is the
preservation of the public good, and as long as it stays
within proper bounds : should it fall on me, I am con
tented : conscious rectitude is a powerful consolation :
I trust there are many who think my professions for
the public good to be real. Let your suspicion look to
both sides : there are many on the other side, who,
possibly may have been persuaded of the necessity of
these measures, which I conceive to be dangerous to
your liberty. Guard with jealous attention the public
liberty. Suspect every one who approaches that jewel.
Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it, but downright
force. Whenever you give up that force, you are in
evitably ruined. I am answered by gentlemen, that

1

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 79

Though I may speak of terrors, yet the fact isrthat we
fire surrounded by none of the dangers I apprehend.
I conceive this new government to be one of those
dangers : it has produced those horrors, which distress
many of our best citizens. We are come hither to
preserve the poor commonwealth of Virginia, if it
can be possibly done : something must be done to pre
serve your liberty and mine. The confederation, this
same despised government, merits, in my opinion, the
highest encomium : it carried us through a long and
dangerous war : it rendered us victorious in that bloody
conflict with a powerful nation : it has secured us a
territory greater than any European monarch pos
sesses : and shall a government which has been thus
strong and vigorous, be accused of imbecility, and
abandoned for want of energy ? Consider what you
are about to do, before you part with this government.
Take longer time in reckoning things : revolutions
like this have happened in almost every country in
Europe : similar examples are to be found in ancient
Greece and ancient Rome : instances of the people
losing their liberty by their own carelessness and the
ambition of a few. We are cautioned by the honora
ble gentleman who presides, against faction and turbu
lence. I acknowledge that licentiousness is danger
ous, and that it ought to be provided against : I ac
knowledge also the new form of government may
effectually prevent it : yet, there is another thing it
will as effectually do : it will oppress and ruin the peo
ple. There are sufficient guards placed against sedi
tion and licentiousness : for when power is given to
this government to suppress these, or, for any other
purpose, the language it assumes is clear, express,
and unequivocal ; but when this constitution speaks of
privileges, there is an ambiguity, sir, a fatal ambigu
ity — an ambiguity which is very astonishing. In the
clause under consideration, there is the strangest lan
guage that I can conceive. I mean, when it says, that
there shall not be more representatives, than one for

80 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

every 30,000. Now, sir, how easy is it to evade this
privilege ? " The number shall not exceed one for every
30,000." This may be satisfied by one representative
from each state. Let our numbers be ever so great,
this immense continent, may, by this artful expression,
be reduced to have but thirteen representatives. I con
fess this construction is not natural ; but the ambiguity of
the expression lays a good ground for a quarrel. Why
was it not clearly and unequivocally expressed, that
they should be entitled to have one for every 30,000 ?
This would have obviated all disputes; and was
this difficult to be done ? What is the inference ?
When population increases, and a state shall send
representatives in this proportion, Congress may re
mand them, because the right of having one for every
30,000 is not clearly expressed. This possibility of
reducing the number to one for each state, approxi
mates to probability by that other expression, " but
each state shall at least have one representative."
Now is it not clear that, from the first expression, the
number might be reduced so much, that some states
should have no representative at all, were it not for
the insertion of this last expression ? And as this is
the only restriction upon them, we may fairly conclude
that they may restrain the number to one from each
state. Perhaps the same horrors may hang over my
mind again. I shall be told I am continually afraid :
but, sir, I have strong cause of apprehension. In
some parts of the plan before you, the great rights of
freemen are endangered, in other parts absolutely
taken away. How does your trial by jury stand ? In
civil cases gone — not sufficiently secured in crimi
nal — this best privilege is gone. But we are told, that
we need not fear, because those in power being our
representatives, will not abuse the powers we put in
their hands. I am not well versed in history, but I will
submit to your recollection, whether liberty has been de
stroyed most often by the licentiousness of the people,
or by the tyranny of rulers. I imagine, sir, you will

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. tfl

find the balance on the side of tyranny. Happy will
you be, if you miss the fate of those nations, who,
omitting to resist their oppressors, or negligently suf
fering their liberty to be wrested from them, have
groaned under intolerable despotism ! Most of the
human race are now in this deplorable condition.
And those nations who have gone in search of gran
deur, power and splendor, have also fallen a sacrifice,
and been the victims of their own folly. While they
acquired those visionary blessings, they lost their free
dom. My great objection to this government is, that
it does not leave us the means of defending our rights ;
or, of waging war against tyrants. It is urged by
some gentlemen, that this new plan will bring us an
acquisition of strength ; an army, and the militia of the
states. This is an idea extremely ridiculous : gentle
men cannot be in earnest. This acquisition will tram
ple on your fallen liberty. Let my beloved Americans
guard against that fatal lethargy that has pervaded the
universe. Have we the means of resisting disciplined
armies, when our only defence, the militia, is put into
the hands of Congress ?

The honorable gentleman said, that great danger
would ensue, if the convention rose without adopting
this system. I ask, where is that danger? I see
none. Other gentlemen have told us, within these
walls, that the union is gone— or, that the union will
be gone. Is not this trifling with the judgment of their
fellow-citizens ? Till they tell us the ground of their
fears, I will consider them as imaginary. I rose to
make inquiry where those dangers were ; they could
make no answer : I believe I never shall have that an
swer. Is there a disposition in the people of this coun
try to revolt against the dominion of laws? Has
there been a single tumult in Virginia ? Have not
the people of Virginia, when laboring under the se
verest pressure of accumulated distresses, manifested
the most cordial acquiescence in the execution of the,
laws ? What could be more awful, than their unani*

VOL. i. 11

82 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH Oi\

mous acquiescence under general distresses ? Is
there any revolution in Virginia? Whither is the
spirit of America gone? Whither is the genius of
America fled ? It was but yesterday, when our ene
mies marched in triumph through our country. Yet
the people of this country could not be appalled by
their pompous armaments : they stopped their careen
and victoriously captured them : where is the peril
now, compared to that ?

Some minds are agitated by foreign alarms. Hap
pily for us, there is no real danger from Europe ; that
country is engaged in more arduous business ; from
that quarter, there is no cause of fear : you may sleep
in safety forever for them. Where is the danger?
If, sir, there was any, I would recur to the American
spirit to defend us — that spirit which has enabled us
to surmount the greatest difficulties : to that illustrious
spirit, I address my most fervent prayer, to prevent
our adopting a system destructive to liberty. Let not
gentlemen be told, that it is not safe to reject this gov
ernment. Wherefore is it not safe? We are told
there are dangers ; but those dangers are ideal ; they
cannot be demonstrated. To encourage us to adopt
it, they tell us, that there is a plain, easy way of getting
amendments. When I come to contemplate this part.
I suppose that I am mad, or, that my countrymen are
so. The way to amendment is, in my conception,
shut. Let us consider this plain, easy way. " The
Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this
constitution ; or, on the application of the legislatures
of two thirds of the several states, shall call a conven
tion for proposing amendments, which, in either case,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of
this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of
three fourths of the several states, or by conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one, or the other mode
of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
Provided, that no amendment which may be made

.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ft,3

prior to the year 1808, shall, in any manner, affect the
first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article ; and that no state, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate." Hence
it appears, that three fourths of the states must ulti
mately agree to any amendments that may be neces
sary. Let us consider the consequences of this. How
ever uncharitable it may appear, yet I must express
my opinion, that the most unworthy characters may
get into power and prevent the introduction of amend
ments. Let us suppose, (for the case is supposable,
possible and probable,) that you happen to deal these
powers to unworthy hands ; will they relinquish pow
ers already in their possession, or agree to amend
ments ? Two thirds of the Congress, or of the state
legislatures, are necessary even to propose amend
ments. If one third of these be unworthy men, they
may prevent the application for amendments; but
a destructive and mischievous feature is, that three
fourths of the state legislatures, or of the state conven
tions, must concur in the amendments when proposed.
In such numerous bodies, there must necessarily be
some designing, bad men. To suppose that so large
a number as three fourths of the states will concur, is
to suppose that they will possess genius, intelligence
and integrity, approaching to miraculous. It would,
indeed, be miraculous, that they should concur in the
same amendments, or, even in such as would bear
some likeness to one another. For four of the small
est states, that do not collectively contain one tenth
part of the population of the United States, may ob
struct the most salutary and necessary amendments.
Nay, in these four states, six tenths of the people may
reject these amendments ; and suppose, that amend
ments shall be opposed to amendments, (which is
highly probable,) is it possible, that three fourths can
ever agree to the same amendments ? A bare majo
rity in these four small states, may hinder the adop
tion of amendments ; so that we may fairly and justly

84 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

conclude, that one twentieth part of the American
people, may prevent the removal of the most grievous
inconveniences and oppression, by refusing to accede
to amendments. A trifling minority may reject the
most salutary amendments. Is this' an easy mode of
securing the public liberty ? It is, sir, a most fearful
situation, when the most contemptible minority can
prevent the alteration of the most oppressive govern
ment ; for it may, in many respects, prove to be such.
Is this the spirit of republicanism ? What, sir, is the
genius of democracy ? Let me read that clause of
the Bill of Rights of Virginia which relates to this :
3d clause ; " That, government is, or ought to be, in
stituted for the common benefit, protection and secu
rity of the people, nation, or community. Of all the va
rious modes and forms of government, that is best,
which is capable of producing the greatest degree of
happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured
against the danger of mal-administration, and that
whenever any government shall be found inadequate,
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the com
munity hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasi
ble right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as
shall be judged most conducive to the public weal."
This, sir, is the language of democracy — that a ma
jority of the community have a right to alter their gov
ernment when found to be oppressive : but how differ
ent is the genius of your new constitution from this !
How different from the sentiments of freemen, that a
contemptible minority can prevent the good of the ma
jority ! If then, gentlemen, standing on this ground,
are come to that point, that they are willing to bind
themselves and their posterity to be oppressed, I am
amazed and inexpressibly astonished. If this be the
opinion of the majority, I must submit; but to me,
sir, it appears perilous and destructive ; I cannot help
thinking so : perhaps it may be the result of my age ;
these may be feelings natural to a man of my years,
when the American spirit has left him, and his mental

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 85

powers, like the members of the body, are decayed.
If, sir, amendments are left to the twentieth, or to the
tenth part of the people of America, your liberty is
gone forever. We have heard that there is a great
deal of bribery practised in the house of commons in
England ; and that many of the members raise them
selves to preferments, by selling the rights of the peo
ple. But, Sir, the tenth part of that body cannot con
tinue oppressions on the rest of the people. English
liberty is, in this case, on a firmer foundation than Ame
rican liberty. It will be easily contrived to procure
the opposition of one tenth of the people to any altera
tion, however judicious.

The honorable gentleman who presides, told us,
that to prevent abuses in our government, we will as
semble in convention, recall our delegated powers,
and punish our servants for abusing the trust reposed
in them. Oh, sir, we should have fine times indeed,
if to punish tyrants, it were only sufficient to assemble
the people. Your arms, wherewith you could defend
yourselves, are gone ; and you have no longer an aris-
tocratical, no longer a democratical spirit. Did you
ever read of any revolution in any nation, brought
about by the punishment of those in power, inflicted
by those who had no power at all ? You read of a
riot act in a country which is called one of the freest
in the world, where a few neighbours cannot assem
ble without the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery,
the engines of despotism. We may see such an act
in America. A standing army we shall have also, to
execute the execrable commands of tyranny : and how
are you to punish them ? Will you order them to be
punished ? Who shall obey these orders ? Will your
mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment ?
In what situation are we to be ?

The clause before you gives a power of direct taxa
tion, unbounded and unlimited ; exclusive power of le
gislation in all cases whatsoever, for ten miles square,
and over all places purchased for the erection of forts.

I

86 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, &c. What resist
ance could be made ? The attempt would be mad
ness. You will find all the strength of this country in
the hands of your enemies : those garrisons will natu
rally be the strongest places in the country. Your
militia is given up to Congress also, in another part
of this plan : they will therefore act as they think pro
per : all power will be in their own possession : you
cannot force them to receive their punishment. Of
what service would militia be to you, when most
probably you will not have a single musket in the
state ? For, as arms are to be provided by Congress,
they may, or may not, furnish them.

Let us here call your attention to that part which
gives the Congress power " To provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing
such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States, reserving to the states respec
tively, the appointment of the officers, and the authori
ty of training the militia, according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." By this, sir, you see that
their control over our last and best defence, is unlimit
ed. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our
militia, they will be useless : the states can do neither,
this power being exclusively given to Congress. The
power of appointing officers over men not disciplined
or armed, is ridiculous : so that this pretended, little
remnant of power, left to the states, may, at the plea
sure of Congress, be rendered nugatory. Our situa
tion will be deplorable indeed : nor can we ever expect
to get this government amended ; since I have already
shown, that a very small minority may prevent it, and
that small minority interested in the continuance of
the oppression. Will the oppressor let go the oppress
ed ? Was there ever an instance ? Can the annals
of mankind exhibit one single example, where rulers,
overcharged with power, willingly let go the oppress
ed, though solicited and requested most earnestly?
The application for amendments will therefore be

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 37

fruitless. Sometimes the oppressed have got loose by
one of those bloody struggles that desolate a country.
But a willing relinquishment of power is one of those
tilings, which human nature never was, nor ever will
he, capable of.

The honorable gentleman's observations, respecting
the people's right of being the agents in the formation
of this government, arc not accurate, in my humble
conception. The distinction between a national gov
ernment and a confederacy, is not sufficiently discern
ed. Had the delegates, who were sent to Philadel
phia, a power to propose a consolidated government
instead of a confederacy ? Were they not deputed by
states, and not by the people? The assent of the
people, in their collective capacity, is not necessary to
the formation of a federal government. The people
have no right to enter into leagues, alliances, or con
federations : they are not the proper agents for this
purpose: states and sovereign powers are the only
proper agents for this kind of government. Show
me an instance where the people have exercised this
business : has it not always gone through the legisla
tures ? I refer you to the treaties with France, Hol
land, and other nations : how were they made ?
Were they not made by the states ? Are the people,
therefore, in their aggregate capacity, the proper per
sons to form a confederacy ? This, therefore, ought
to depend on the consent of the legislatures ; the peo
ple having never sent delegates to make any proposi
tion of changing the government. Yet I must say, at
the same time, that it was made on grounds the most
pure, and perhaps I might have been brought to con
sent to it, so far as to the change of government ; but
there is one thing in it, which I never would acquiesce
in. I mean, the changing it into a consolidated gov
ernment, wrhich is so abhorrent to my mind.

The honorable gentleman then went on to the figure
we make with foreign nations ; the contemptible one
we make in France and Holland, which, according to

88 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

the substance of my notes, he attributes to the present
feeble government. An opinion has gone forth, we find,
that we are a contemptible people : the time has been
when we were thought otherwise. Under this same
despised government, we commanded the respect of all
Europe : wherefore are we now reckoned otherwise ?
The American spirit has fled from hence : it has gone
to regions, where it has never been expected : it has
gone to the people of France, in search of a splendid
government — a strong, energetic government. Shall
we imitate the example of those nations, who have
gone from a simple to a splendid •government ? Are
those nations more worthy of our imitation ? What
can make an adequate satisfaction to them for the loss
they have suffered in attaining such a government —
for the loss of their liberty ? If we admit this consoli
dated government, it will be because we like a great
and splendid one. Some way or other we must be a
great and mighty empire ; we must have an army, and
a navy, and a number of things. When the American
spirit was in its youth, the language of America was
different: liberty, sir, was then the primary object.
We are descended from a people whose government
was founded on liberty: our glorious forefathers, of
Great Britain, made liberty the foundation of every
thing. That country is become a great, mighty and
splendid nation; not because their government is
strong and energetic : but, sir, because liberty is its
direct end and foundation. We drew the spirit of li
berty from our British ancestors ; by that spirit we
have triumphed over every difficulty. But now, sir,
the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains
of consolidation, is about to convert this country into
a powerful and mighty empire. If you make the citi
zens of this country agree to become the subjects of
one great consolidated empire of America, your gov
ernment will not have sufficient energy to keep them
together : such a government is incompatible with the
genius of republicanism. There will be no checks, no

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 8$

real balances, in this government. What can avail
your specious, imaginary balances ; your rope-dancing,
chain-rattling, ridiculous, ideal checks and contri
vances ? But, sir, we are not feared by foreigners ;
we do not make nations tremble. Would this consti
tute happiness, or secure liberty ? I trust, sir, our poli
tical hemisphere will ever direct its operations to the
security of those objects. Consider our situation, sir ;

to to the poor man, ask him what he does ; he will in-
>rm you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his
own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him, in
peace and security. Go to every other member of the
society, you will find the same tranquil ease and con
tent ; you will find no alarms or disturbances ! Why then
tell us of dangers, to terrify us into an adoption of this
new form of government ? And yet who knows the
dangers that this new system may produce ? They
are out of the sight of the common people : they cannot
foresee latent consequences. I dread the operation of
it on the middling and lower classes of people : it
is for them I fear the adoption of this system. I fear I
tire the patience of the committee, but I beg to be in
dulged with a few more observations.

When I thus profess myself an advocate for the
liberty of the people, I shall be told, I am a designing
man, that I am to be a great man, that I am to be a
demagogue; and many similar illiberal insinuations
will be thrown out ; but, sir, conscious rectitude out
weighs these things with me. I see great jeopardy in
this new government: I see none from our present
one. I hope some gentleman or other will bring forth,
in full array, those dangers, if there be any, that we
may see and touch them ; I have said that I thought
this a consolidated government : I will now prove it.
Will the great rights of the people be secured by this
government? Suppose it should prove oppressive,
how can it be altered ? Our bill of rights declares,
" That a majority of the community hath an indubita
ble, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter.
VOL. i. 12

90 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal." I have just proved,
that one tenth, or less, of the people of America — a
most despicable minority, may prevent this reform, or
alteration. Suppose the people of Virginia should
wish to alter their government, can a majority of them
do it ? No, because they are connected with other
men; or, in other words, consolidated with other
states. When the people of Virginia, at a future day,
shall wish to alter their government, though they should
be unanimous in this desire, yet they may be prevented
therefrom by a despicable minority at the extremity of
the United States. The founders of your own constitu
tion made your government changeable : but the power
of changing it is gone from you ! Whither is it gone ? It
is placed in the same hands that hold the rights of
twelve other states ; and those, who hold those rights,
have right and power to keep them. It is not the par
ticular government of Virginia : one of the leading
features of that government is, that a majority can
alter it, when necessary for the public good. This
government is not a Virginian, but an American gov
ernment. Is it not therefore a consolidated govern
ment ? The sixth clause of your bill of rights tells you,
" That elections of members to serve as representa
tives of the people in assembly, ought to be free, and
that all men, having sufficient evidence of perma
nent, common interest with, and attachment to the com
munity, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or
deprived of their property, for public uses, without then-
own consent, or that of their representatives so elected,
nor bound by any law to which they have not in like
manner assented for the public good." But what does
this constitution say ? The clause under considera
tion gives an unlimited and unbounded power of taxa
tion. Suppose every delegate from Virginia opposes
a law laying a tax, what will it avail ? They are op
posed by a majority ; 'eleven members can destroy their
efforts : those feeble ten cannot prevent the passing the

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 91

most oppressive tax-law. So that in direct opposition to
the spirit and express language of your declaration of
rights, you are taxed, not by your own consent, but
by people who have no connexion with you.

The next clause of the bill of rights tells you, "That
all power of suspending law, or the execution of laws,
by any authority, without the consent of the representa
tives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and
ought not to be exercised." This tells us that there
can be no suspension of government, or laws, without
our own consent ; yet this constitution can counteract
and suspend any of our laws, that contravene its op
pressive operation ; for they have the power of direct
taxation, which suspends our bill of rights ; and it is
expressly provided, that they can make all laws neces
sary for carrying their powers into execution ; and it is
declared paramount to the laws and constitutions of
the states. Consider how the only remaining defence,
we have left, is destroyed in this manner. Besides the
expenses of maintaining the senate and other house in
as much splendor as they please, there is to be a great
and mighty president, with very extensive powers —
the powers of a king. He is to be supported in extra
vagant magnificence : so that the whole of our proper
ty may be taken by this American government, by lay
ing what taxes they please, giving themselves what
salaries they please, and suspending our laws at their
pleasure. I might be thought too inquisitive, but I
believe I should take up but very little of your time in
enumerating the little power that is left to the govern
ment of Virginia; for this power is reduced to little or
nothing. Their garrisons, magazines, arsenals, and
forts, which will be situated in the strongest places
within the states — their ten miles square, with all the
fine ornaments of human life, added to their powers,
and taken from the states, will reduce the power of the
latter to nothing. The voice of tradition, I trust, will
inform posterity of our struggles for freedom. If our
descendants be worthy the name of Americans, they

<);> mi. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

will preserve, and hand down to their latest posterity,
the transactions of the present times ; and though, I
confess, my exclamations are not worthy the hearing,
they will see that I have done my utmost to preserve
their liberty : for I never will give up the power of di
rect taxation, but for a scourge. I am. willing to give
it conditionally; that is, after non-compliance with
requisitions : I will do more, sir, and what I hope will
convince the most sceptical man, that I am a lover of
the American union ; that in case Virginia shall not
make punctual payment, the control of our custom
houses, and the whole regulation of trade, shall be
given to Congress ; and that Virginia shall depend on
Congress even for passports, till Virginia shall have
paid the last farthing, and furnished the last soldier.
Nay, sir, there is another alternative to which I
would consent ; even that they should strike us out of
the union, and take away from us all federal privileges,
till we comply with federal requisitions ; but let it de
pend upon our own pleasure to pay our money in the
most easy manner for our people. Were all the states,
more terrible than the mother country, to join against
us, I hope Virginia could defend herself; but, sir, the
dissolution of the union is most abhorrent to my mind.
The first thing I have at heart is American liberty ; the
second thing is American union ; and I hope the peo
ple of Virginia will endeavor to preserve that union.
The increasing population of the southern states, is far
greater than that of New England; consequently, in a
short time, they will be far more numerous than the peo
ple of that country. Consider this, and you will find
this state more particularly interested to support
American liberty, and not bind our posterity by
an improvident relinquishment of our rights. I
would give the best security for a punctual compli
ance with requisitions ; but I beseech gentlemen, at
all hazards, not to grant this unlimited power of
taxation.

The honorable gentleman has told us that these

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 93

powers given to Congress, are accompanied by a judi
ciary which will correct all. On examination, you
will find this very judiciary oppressively constructed,
your jury-trial destroyed, and the judges dependent on
Congress. In this scheme of energetic government,
the people will find two sets of tax gatherers — the
state and the federal sheriffs. This, it seems to me,
will produce such dreadful oppression, as the people
cannot possibly bear. The federal sheriff may com
mit what oppression, make what distresses, he pleases,
and ruin you with impunity : for how are you to tie his
hands ? Have you any sufficient, decided means of
preventing him from sucking your blood by specula
tions, commissions and fees? Thus thousands of
your people will be most shamefully robbed. Our
state sheriffs, those unfeeling blood-suckers, have, un
der the watchful eye of our legislature, committed the
most horrid and barbarous ravages on our people.
It has required the most constant vigilance of the le
gislature to keep them from totally ruining the people.
A repeated succession of laws has been made, to sup
press their iniquitous speculations and cruel extor
tions ; and as often has their nefarious ingenuity de
vised methods of evading the force of those laws : in
the struggle, they have generally triumphed over* the
legislature. It is a fact, that lands have sold for five
shillings, which were worth one hundred pounds. If
sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye of our state
legislature and judiciary, have dared to commit these
outrages, what would they not have done if their mas
ters had been at Philadelphia or New York ? If they
perpetrate the most unwarrantable outrage, on your
persons or property, you cannot get redress on this
side of Philadelphia or New York: and how can you
get it there ? If your domestic avocations could per
mit you to go thither, there you must appeal to judges
sworn to support this Constitution in opposition to
that of any state, and who may also be inclined to fa
vor their own officers. When these harpies are aid-

94 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

ed by excisemen, who may search, at any time, your
houses and most secret recesses, will the people bear
it ? If you think so, you differ from me. Where I
thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I
would grant power with a niggardly hand ; and here
there is a strong probability that these oppressions
shall actually happen. I may be told, that it is safe
to err on that side ; because such regulations may be
made by Congress, as shall restrain these officers, and
because laws are made by our representatives, and
judged by righteous judges : but, sir, as these regula
tions may be made, so they may not ; and many rea
sons there are to induce a belief, that they will not : I
shall therefore be an infidel on that point till the day
of my death.

This constitution is said to have beautiful features ;
but when I come to examine these features, sir, they
appear to me horribly frightful. Among other defor
mities, it has an awful squinting; it squints towards
monarchy : and does not this raise indignation in the
breast of every true American ? Your president may
easily become king. Your senate is so imperfectly
constructed, that your dearest rights may be sacrificed
by what may be a small minority : and a very small
minority may continue forever unchangeably this gov
ernment, although horridly defective. Where are
your checks in this government ? Your strong holds
will be in the hands of your enemies. It is on a sup
position that your American governors shall be ho
nest, that all the good qualities of this government are
founded ; but its defective and imperfect construction,
puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mis
chiefs, should they be bad men. And, sir, would not
all the world, from the eastern to the western hemis
phere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights
upon the contingency of our rulers being good or bad ?
Show me that age and country where the rights and
liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance
of their rulers being good men, without a consequent

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 95

loss of liberty. I say that the loss of that dearest
privilege has ever followed, with absolute certainty,
every such mad attempt. If your American chief be
a man of ambition and abilities, how easy will it be
for him to render himself absolute ! The army is in
his hands, and, if he be a man of address, it will be at
tached to him ; and it will be the subject of long me
ditation with him to seize the first auspicious mo
ment to accomplish his design. And, sir, will the
American spirit solely relieve you when this happens ?
I would rather infinitely, and I am sure most of this
convention are of the same opinion, have a king, lords
and commons, than a government, so replete with
such insupportable evils. If we make a king, we may
prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people,
and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from
infringing them : but the president in the field, at the
head of his army, can prescribe the terms on which he
shall reign master, so far that it will puzzle any Ame
rican ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke.
I cannot, with patience, think of this idea. If ever he
violates the laws, one of two things will happen : he
will come at the head of his army to carry every thing
before him; or, he will give bail, or do what Mr.
Chief Justice will order him. If he be guilty, will not
the recollection of his crimes teach him to make one
bold push for the American throne ? Will not the im
mense difference between being master of every thing,
and being ignominiously tried and punished, power
fully excite him to make this bold push ? But, sir,
where is the existing force to punish him ? Can he
not, at the head of his army, beat down every opposi
tion? Away with your president, we shall have a
king : the army will salute him monarch ; your militia
will leave you, and assist in making him king, and
fight against you : and what have you to oppose this
force? What will then become of you and your
rights ? Will not absolute despotism ensue ? [Here
Mr. Henry strongly and pathetically expatiated on the

96 MR- HENRI'S SPEECH OK

probability of the president's enslaving America, and
the horrid consequences that must result.]

What can be more defective than the clause con
cerning the elections ? The control given to Con
gress, over the time, place and manner of holding
elections, will totally destroy the end of suffrage.
The elections may be held at one place, and the most
inconvenient in the state ; or they may be at remote
distances from those who have a right of suffrage :
hence, nine out of ten must either not vote at all, or
vote for strangers : for the most influential characters
will be applied to, to know who are the most proper to
be chosen. I repeat, that the control of Congress
over the manner, &c. of electing, well warrants this
idea. The natural consequence will be, that this de
mocratic branch will possess none of the public con
fidence : the people will be prejudiced against repre
sentatives chosen in such an injudicious manner.
The proceedings in the northern conclave, will be hid
den from the yeomanry of this country. We are told,
that the yeas and nays shall be taken and entered on
the journals : this, sir, will avail nothing : it may be
locked up in their chests, and concealed forever from
the people ; for they are not to publish what parts they
think require secrecy ; they may think, and will think,
the whole requires it.

Another beautiful feature of this constitution, is the
publication, from time to time, of the receipts and ex
penditures of the public money. This expression, from
time to time, is very indefinite and indeterminate : it
may extend to a century. Grant that any of them are
wicked, they may squander the public money so as to
ruin you, and yet this expression will give you no re
dress. I say, they may ruin you ; for where, sir, is the
responsibility ? The yeas and nays will show you
nothing, unless they be fools as well as knaves : for,
after having wickedly trampled on the rights of the
people, they would act like fools indeed, were they to
publish and divulge their iniquity, when they have it

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. q~t

equally in their power to suppress and conceal it.
Where is the responsibility — that leading principle in
the British government? In that government, a pun
ishment, certain and inevitable, is provided: but in
this, there is no real, actual punishment for the gross
est mal-administration. They may go without pun
ishment, though they commit the most outrageous
violation on our immunities. That paper may tell
me they will be punished. I ask, by what law ? They
must make the laAV, for there is no existing law to do
it. What — will they make a law to punish them
selves ? This, sir> is my great objection to the con
stitution, that there is no true responsibility, and that
the preservation of our liberty depends on the single
chance of men being virtuous enough to make laws to
punish themselves. In the country from which we
are descended, they have real, and not imaginary re
sponsibility ; for there, mal-administration has cost
their heads to some of the most saucy geniuses that
ever were. The senate, by making treaties, may de
stroy your liberty and laws, for want of responsibility.
Two thirds of those that shall happen to be present,
can, with the president, make treaties, that shall be
the supreme law of the land : they may make the most
ruinous treaties, and yet there is no punishment for
them. Whoever shows me a punishment provided for
them, will oblige me. So, sir, notwithstanding there
are eight pillars, they want another. Where will they
make another ? I trust, sir, the exclusion of the evils
wherewith this system is replete, in its present form,
will be made a condition precedent to its adoption, by
this or any other state. The transition from a general,
unqualified admission to offices, to a consolidation of
government, seems easy; for, though the American
states are dissimilar in their structure, this will assimi
late them: this, sir, is itself a strong consolidating
feature, and is not one of the least dangerous in that
system. Nine states are sufficient to establish this
government over those nine. Imagine that nine have

VOL. I. 13

$tt MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

come into it. Virginia has certain scruples. Suppose
she will consequently refuse to join with those states :
may not they still continue in friendship and union
with her? If she sends her annual requisitions in
dollars, do you think their stomachs will be so squeam
ish as to refuse her dollars ? Will they not accept her
regiments ? They would intimidate you into an in
considerate adoption, and frighten you with ideal evils,
and that the union shall be dissolved. 'Tis a bugbear,
sir : the fact is, sir, that the eight adopting states can
hardly stand on their own legs. Public fame tells us,
that the adopting states have already heart-burnings
and animosity, and repent their precipitate hurry : this,
sir, may occasion exceeding great mischief. When I
reflect on these, and many other circumstances, 1 must
think those states will be fond to be in confederacy
with us. If we pay our quota of money annually, and
furnish our rateable number of men, when necessary, I
can see no danger from a rejection. The history of
Switzerland clearly proves, that w^e might be in amica
ble alliance \vith those states, without adopting this
constitution. Switzerland is a confederacy, consisting
of dissimilar governments. This is an example, which
proves that governments, of dissimilar structures, may
be confederated. That confederate republic has
stood upwards of four hundred years ; and, although
several of the individual republics are democratic, and
the rest aristocratic, no evil has resulted from this dis
similarity, for they have braved all the power of France
and Germany, during that long period. The Swiss
spirit, sir, has kept them together : they have encoun
tered and overcome immense difficulties, with patience
and fortitude. In the vicinity of powerful and ambi
tious monarchs, they have retained their independence,
republican simplicity and valor. [Here Mr. Henry
drew a comparison between the people of that country
and those of France, and made a quotation from Ad-
dison, illustrating the subject.] Look at the peasants
of that country, and of France, and mark the dif-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 99

ference. You will find the condition of the former far
more desirable and comfortable. No matter whether
a people be great, splendid and powerful, if they enjoy
freedom. The Turkish Grand Seignior, along side of
our president, would put us to disgrace : but we should
be abundantly consoled for this disgrace, should our
citizen be put in contrast with the Turkish slave.

The most valuable end of government, is the liber
ty of the inhabitants. No possible advantages can
compensate for the loss of this privilege. Show me
the reason why the American union is to be dissolved.
Who are those eight adopting states? Are they
averse to give us a little time to consider, before we
conclude ? Would such a disposition render a junc
tion with them eligible : or, is it the genius of that kind
of government, to precipitate people hastily into mea
sures of the utmost importance, and grant no indul
gence ? If it be, sir, is it for us to accede to such a
government ? We have a right to have time to con
sider — we shall therefore insist upon it. Unless the
government be amended, we can never accept it.
The adopting states will doubtless accept our money
and our regiments ; and what is to be the consequence*
if we are disunited ? I believe that it is yet doubtful,
whether it is not proper to stand by a while, and sec
the effect of its adoption in other states. In forming
a government, the utmost care should be taken, to
prevent its becoming oppressive ; and this government
is of such an intricate and complicated nature, that
no man on this earth, can know its real operation.
The other states have no reason to think, from the
antecedent conduct of Virginia, that she has any in
tention of seceding from the union, or of being less
active to support the general welfare. Would they
not, therefore, acquiesce in our taking time to delibe
rate — deliberate whether the measure be not peri
lous, not only for us, but the adopting states. Permit
me, sir, to say, that 'a great majority of the people, even
in the adopting states, arc averse to this government,

100 iMR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

I believe I would be right to say, that they have been
egregiously misled. Pennsylvania has, perhaps, been
tricked into it. If the other states, who have adopted
it, have not been tricked, still they were too much hur
ried into its adoption. There were very respectable
minorities in several of them ; and, if reports be true, a
clear majority of the people are averse to it. If we
also accede, and it should prove grievous, the peace
and prosperity of our country, which we all love, will
be destroyed. This government has not the affection
of the people, at present. Should it be oppressive,
their affection will be totally estranged from it — and,
sir, you know, that a government without their affec
tions, can neither be durable nor happy. I speak as
one poor individual — but, when I speak, I speak the
language of thousands. But, sir, I mean not to breathe
the spirit, nor utter the language of secession.

I have trespassed so long on your patience, I am
really concerned that I have something yet to say.
The honorable member has said that we shall be
properly represented : remember, sir, that the num
ber of our representatives is but ten, whereof six are a
majority. Will those men be possessed of sufficient
information? A particular knowledge of particular
districts, will not suffice. They must be well acquaint
ed with agriculture, commerce, and a great variety of
other matters throughout the continent; they must
know not only the actual state of nations in Europe
and America, the situation of their farmers, cottagers
and mechanics, but also the relative situation and in
tercourse of those nations. Virginia is as large as
England. Our proportion of representatives is but
ten men. In England they have five hundred and
thirty. The house of commons in England, numerous
as they are, we are told, is bribed, and have bartered
away the rights of their constituents : what then shall
become of us ? Will these few protect our rights ?
Will they be incorruptible ? You say they will be bet
ter men than the English commoners. I say they

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

will be infinitely worse men, because they are to be
chosen blindfolded : their election, (the term, as ap
plied to their appointment, is inaccurate,) will be an.
involuntary nomination, and not a choice. I have, I
fear, fatigued the committee, yet I have not said the
one hundred thousandth part of what I have on my
mind, and wish to impart. On this occasion, I con
ceived myself bound to attend strictly to the interest of
the state ; and I thought her dearest rights at stake :
having lived so long — been so much honored — my ef
forts, though small, are due to my country. I have
found my mind hurried on from subject to subject, on
this very great occasion. We have all been out of or
der, from the gentleman who opened to day, to myself.
I did not come prepared to speak on so multifarious a
subject, in so general a manner. I trust you will in
dulge me another time. Before you abandon the pre
sent system, I hope you will consider not only its de
fects, most maturely, but likewise those of that which
you are to substitute for it. May you be fully appris
ed of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience,
but by some abler advocate than I.

SPEECH OF EDMUND RANDOLPH,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OP ADOPTING THK

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 6th, 1788.

1 '

The first and second sections of the first article of the constitution
being under consideration, Mr. Randolph addressed the con
vention as follows : —

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I AM a child of the revolution. My country, very early
indeed, took me under her protection, at a time when I
most wanted it; and by a succession of favors and
honors, prevented even my most ardent wishes. I feel
the highest gratitude and attachment to my country ;
her felicity is the most fervent prayer of my heart.
Conscious of having exerted my faculties to the ut
most in her behalf, if I have not succeeded in securing
the esteem of my countrymen, I shall reap abundant
consolation from the rectitude of my intentions : ho
nors, when compared to the satisfaction accruing from
a conscious independence and rectitude of ccfhduct,
are no equivalent. The unwearied study of nty life,
shall be to promote her happiness. As a citizen, ambi
tion and popularity are no objects with me. I expect,
in the course of a year, to retire to that private station
which I most sincerely and cordially prefer to all
others.* The security of public justice, sir, is what I

Mr. Randolph was at this time Governor of Virginia.

MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH, &c. ]Q3

most fervently wish — as I consider that object to be the
primary step to the attainment of public happiness. I
can declare to the whole world, that in the part I take
in this very important question, I am actuated by a re
gard for what 1 conceive to be our true interest. I can
also, with equal sincerity, declare that I would join
heart and hand in rejecting this system, did I conceive
it would promote our happiness : but having a strong
conviction on my mind, at this time, that, by a disunion,
we shall throw away all those blessings we have so
earnestly fought for, and that a rejection of the consti
tution will operate disunion — pardon me if 1 discharge
the obligation I owe to my country by voting for its
adoption. We are told that the report of dangers is
false. The cry of peace, sir, is false: say peace,
when there is peace : it is but a sudden calm. The
tempest growls over you — look around — wheresoever
you look, you see danger. When there are so many
witnesses, in many parts of America, that justice is suf
focated, shall peace and happiness still be said to
reign? Candor, sir, requires an undisguised repre
sentation of our situation. Candor, sir, demands a
faithful exposition of facts. Many citizens have found
justice strangled and trampled under foot, through the
course of jurisprudence in this country. Are those,
who have debts due them, satisfied with your govern
ment? Are not creditors wearied with the tedious
procrastination of your legal process — a process ob
scured by legislative mists ? Cast your eyes to your
sea-ports, see how commerce languishes : this country,
so blessed by nature, with every advantage that can
render commerce profitable, through defective legisla
tion, is deprived of all the benefits and emoluments she
might otherwise reap from it. We hear many com
plaints on the subject of located lands — a variety of
competitors claiming the same lands under legislative
acts — public faith prostrated, and private confidence
destroyed. I ask you if your laws are reverenced?
In every well regulated community, the laws command

104 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

respect. Are yours entitled to reverence ? We not
only see violations of the constitution, but of national
principles in repeated instances. How is the fact ? The
history of the violations of the constitution, extends
from the year 1776, to this present time — violations
made by formal acts of the legislature; every thing
has been drawn within the legislative vortex. There
is one example of this violation in Virginia, of a most
striking and shocking nature ; an example, so horrid,
that if I conceived my country would passively permit
a repetition of it, dear as it is to me, I would seek
means of expatriating myself from it. A man, who
was then a citizen, was deprived of his life, thus : from
a mere reliance on general reports, a gentleman in the
house of delegates informed the house, that a certain
man (Josiah Phillips) had committed several crimes,
and was running at large, perpetrating other crimes ;
he therefore moved for leave to attaint him. He ob
tained that leave instantly. No sooner did he obtain
it, than he drew from his pocket a bill already written for
that effect ; it was read three times in one day, and carri
ed to the senate : I will not say that it passed the same
day through the senate ; but he was attainted very
speedily and precipitately, without any proof better than
vague reports ! Without being confronted with his
accusers and witnesses ; without the privilege of call
ing for evidence in his behalf, he was sentenced to
death, and was afterwards actually executed. Was
this arbitrary deprivation of life, the dearest gift of God
to man, consistent with the genius of a republican gov
ernment ? Is this compatible with the spirit of free
dom ? This, sir, has made the deepest impression
on my heart, and I cannot contemplate it without
horror.

There are still a multiplicity of complaints of the
debility of the laws. Justice, in jpany instances, is so
unattainable, that commerce may pin fact, be said to be
stopped entirely. There is no peace, sir, in this land :
can peace exist with injustice, licentiousness, insecu-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

rity and oppression ? These considerations, indepen
dent of many others which I have not yet enumerated,
would be a sufficient reason for the adoption of this
constitution, because it secures the liberty of the citi
zen, his person and property, and will invigorate and
restore commerce and industry.

An additional reason to induce us to adopt it, is that
excessive licentiousness which has resulted from the
relaxation of our laws, and which will be checked by
this government. Let us judge from the fate of more
ancient nations. Licentiousness has produced tyran
ny among many of them : it has contributed as much,
(if not more,) as any other cause whatsoever, to the
loss of their liberties. I have respect for the integrity
of our legislators ; I believe them to be virtuous: but
as long as the defects of the constitution exist, so long
will laws be imperfect. The honorable gentleman
went on further, and said, that the accession of eight
states is not a reason for our adoption. Many other
things have been alledged out of order — instead of
discussing the system regularly, a variety of points are
promiscuously debated, in order to make temporary
impressions on the members. Sir, were I convinced
of the validity of their arguments, I would join them
heart and hand. Were I convinced that the accesions
of eight states, did not render our accession also ne
cessary to preserve the union, I would not accede to it
till it should be previously amended: but, sir, I am
convinced that the union will be lost by our rejection.
Massachusetts has adopted it ; she has recommended
subsequent amendments ; her influence must be very
considerable to obtain them: I trust my countrymen
have sufficient wisdom and virtue to entitle them to
equal respect.

Is it urged, that being wiser, we ought to prescribe
amendments to the other states ? I have considered
this subject deliberately ; wearied myself in endeavor
ing to find a possibility of preserving the union, with
out our unconditional ratification : but. sir, in vain ; I

VOL. i. 14

J06 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

find no other means. I ask myself a variety of ques
tions applicable to the adopting states, and I conclude,
will they repent of whaj; they have done ? Will they
acknowledge themselves in an error ? Or, will they
recede to gratify Virginia? My prediction is, that
they will not. Shall we stand by ourselves, and be se
vered from the union if amendments cannot be had ?
I have every reason for determining within myself, that
our rejection must dissolve the union ; and that that
dissolution will destroy our political happiness. The
honorable gentleman was pleased to draw out several
other arguments, out of order : that this government
would destroy the state governments, the trial by jury,
&c. &c. and concluded, by an illustration of his opinion,
by a reference to the confederacy of the Swiss. Let
us argue with unprejudiced minds : he says, that the
trial by jury is gone — is this so ? Although I have de
clared my determination to give my vote for it, yet I
shall freely censure those parts which appear to me
reprehensible. The trial by jury, in criminal cases, is
secured ; in civil cases, it is not so expressly secured,
as I could wish it ; but it does not follow, that Con
gress has the power of taking away this privilege,
which is secured by the constitution of each state, and
not given away by this constitution. I have no fear on
this subject — Congress must regulate it so as to suit
every state. I will risk my property on the certainty,
that they will institute the trial by jury in such manner
as shall accommodate the conveniences of the inhabi
tants in every state : the difficulty of ascertaining this
accommodation, was the principal cause of its not
being provided for. It will be the interest of the indi
viduals composing Congress, to put it on this conven
ient footing. Shall we not choose men respectable
for their good qualities ? Or can we suppose that
men, tainted with the worst vices, will get into Con
gress ? I beg leave to differ from the honorable gen
tleman, in another point. He dreads that great in
conveniences will ensue from the federal court ; that

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 1Q7

our citizens will be harrassed by being carried thither.
I cannot think that this power of the federal judiciary,
will necessarily be abused. The inconvenience here
suggested, being of a general nature, affecting most
of the states, will, by general consent of the states, be
removed ; and, I trust, such regulations shall be made,
in this case, as will accommodate the people in eve
ry state. The honorable gentleman instanced the
Swiss cantons, as an example, to show us the possibili
ty, if not expediency, of being in amicable alliance
with the other states, without adopting this system.
Sir, references to history will be fatal in political rea
soning, unless well guarded. Our mental ability is often
eo contracted, and powers of investigation so limited,
that sometimes we adduce as an example in our fa
vor, what in fact militates against us. Examine the
situation of that country comparatively to us. Its ex
tent and situation are totally different from ours ; it
is surrounded by powerful, ambitious, and reciprocally
jealous nations : its territory small and the soil not
very fertile. The peculiarity, sir, of their situation, has
kept these cantons together, and not that system of
alliance, to which the gentleman seems to attribute the
durability, and felicity of their connexion.

[Here- Mr. Randolph quoted some passages from
Stanyard, illustrating his argument, and largely com
mented upon them. The effect of- which was, that
the narrow confines of that country rendered it very
possible for a system of confederacy to accommo
date those cantons, that would not suit the United
States : that it was the fear of the ambitious and war
like nations that surrounded them, and the reciprocal
jealousy of the other European powers that rendered
their union so durable; and that notwithstanding
these circumstances, and their being a hardy race of
people, yet such was the injudicious construction of
their confederacy, that very considerable broils some
times interrupted their harmony.]

He then continued — I have produced this example

108 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

to show, that we ought not to be amused with histori
cal references, which have no kind of analogy to the
points under our consideration. We ought to confine
ourselves to those points solely, which have an imme
diate and strict similitude, to the subject of our dis
cussion. The reference made by the honorable
gentleman over the way, is extremely inapplicable to
us. Are the Swiss cantons circumstanced as we are ?
Are we surrounded by formidable nations — or are
we situated in any manner like them ? We are not,
sir. Then it naturally results, that no such friendly
intercourse as he flattered himself with, could take
place, in case of a dissolution of our union. We are
remotely situated from powerful nations, the dread of
whose attack might impel us to unite firmly with one
another ; we are not situated in an inaccessible, strong
position : we have to fear much from one another :
we must soon feel the fatal eifects of an imperfect sys
tem of union.

The honorable gentleman attacks the constitution,
as he thinks it contrary to our bill of rights. Do we
not appeal to the people, by whose authority all gov
ernment is made ? That bill of rights is of no validity,
because, I conceive, it is not formed on due authority.
It is not a part of our constitution : it has never se
cured us against any danger : it has been repeatedly
disregarded and ' violated. But we must not discard
the confederation, for the remembrance of its past
services. I am attached to old servants. I have re
gard and tenderness for this old servant : but when
reason tells us, that it can no longer be retained with
out throwing away all it has gained us, and running
the risk of losing every thing dear to us, must we still
continue our attachment ? Reason and my duty tell
me not. Other gentlemen may think otherwise. But,
sir, is it not possible that men may differ in sentiments,
and still be honest ? We have an inquisition within
ourselves, that leads us not to offend so much against
charity. The gentleman expresses a necessity of be-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 1Q9

ing suspicious of those who govern. I will agree with
him in the necessity of political jealousy to a certain
extent : but we ought to examine, how far this political
jealousy ought to be carried. I confess that a certain
degree of it, is highly necessary to the preservation of
liberty ; but it ought not to be extended to a degree
which is degrading and humiliating to human nature ;
to a degree of restlessness and active disquietude, suf
ficient to disturb a community, or preclude the possi
bility of political happiness and contentment. Confi
dence ought also to be equally limited. Wisdom
shrinks from extremes, and fixes on a medium as her
choice. Experience and history, the least fallible
judges, teach us that in forming a government, the
powers to be given must be commensurate to the ob
ject. A less degree will defeat the intention, and a
greater will subject the people to the depravity of
rulers, who, though they are but the agents of the
people, pervert their powers to their own emolument,
and ambitious views.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to be obliged to detain
the house, but the relation of a variety of matters,
renders it now unavoidable. I informed the house
yesterday, before rising, that I intended to show the
necessity of having a national government, in prefer
ence to the confederation ; also, to show the necessi
ty of conceding the power of taxation, and of distin
guishing between its objects ; and I am the more hap
py, that I possess materials of information for that
purpose. My intention then is, to satisfy the gentle
men of this committee, that a national government is
absolutely indispensable, and that a confederacy is not
eligible, in our present situation. The introductory
step to this will be, to endeavor to convince the house
of the necessity of the union, and that the present con
federation is actually inadequate and unamendable.
The extent of the country is objected to, by the gentle
man over the way, as an insurmountable obstacle to
the establishing a national government in the United

110 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

States. It is a very strange and inconsistent doctrine,
to admit the necessity of the union, and yet urge this
last objection, which I think goes radically to the exis
tence of the union itself. If the extent of the country
be a conclusive argument against a national govern
ment, it is equally so, against an union with the other
states. Instead of entering largely into a discussion of
the nature and effect of the different kinds of govern
ment, or into an inquiry into the particular extent of
country, that may suit the genius of this or that gov
ernment, I ask this question — is this government ne
cessary for the safety of Virginia ? Is the union indis
pensable for our happiness ? I confess it is impru
dent for any nation to form alliance with another,
whose situation and construction of government are
dissimilar with its own. It is impolitic and improper
for men of opulence to join their interest with men of
indigence and chance. But we are now inquiring,
particularly, whether Virginia, as contradistinguished
from the other states, can exist without the union — a
hard question, perhaps, after what has been said. I
will venture, however, to say, she cannot. I shall not
rest contented with asserting, I shall endeavor to
prove. Look at the most powerful nations on earth.
England and France have had recourse to this expe
dient. Those countries found it necessary to unite
with their immediate neighbors, and this union has
prevented the most lamentable mischiefs. What di
vine pre-eminence is Virginia possessed of, above
other states ? Can Virginia send her navy and thun
der, to bid defiance to foreign nations ? And can she
exist without an union with her neighbors, when the
most potent nations have found such an union neces
sary, not only to their political felicity, but their nation
al existence ? Let us examine her ability. Although
it be impossible to determine, with accuracy, what de
gree of internal strength a nation ought to possess, to
enable it to stand by itself; yet there are certain sure
facts and circumstances, which demonstrate, that a

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

particular nation cannot stand singly. I have spoken
with freedom, and, I trust, I have done it with decency ;
but I must also speak with truth. If Virginia can exist
without the union, she must derive that ability from
one or other of these sources, viz : from her natural
situation, or because she has no reason to fear from
other nations. What is her situation ? She is not in
accessible. She is not a petty republic, like that of St,
Marino, surrounded with rocks and mountains, with a
soil not very fertile, nor worthy the envy of surrounding
nations. Were this, sir, her situation, she might, like
that petty state, subsist, separated from all the world.
On the contrary, she is very accessible : the large, ca
pacious bay of Chesapeake, which is but too excel
lently adapted for the admission of enemies, renders
her very vulnerable. I am informed, and I believe
rightly, because I derive my information from those
whose knowledge is most respectable, that Virginia is
in a very unhappy position, with respect to the access
of foes by sea, though happily situated for commerce.
This being her situation by sea, let us look at land.
She has frontiers adjoining the states of Pennsylvania,
Maryland and North Carolina. Two of those states
have declared themselves members of the union. Will
she be inaccessible to the inhabitants of those states ?
Cast your eyes to the western country, that is inhabit
ed by cruel savages, your natural enemies. Besides
their natural propensity to barbarity, they may be ex
cited, by the gold of foreign enemies, to commit the
most horrid ravages on your people. Our great, in
creasing population, is one remedy to this evil ; but.
being scattered thinly over so extensive a country, how
difficult it is to collect their strength, or defend the
country. This is one point of weakness. I wish, for
the honor of my countrymen, that it was the only one.
There is another circumstance which renders us more
vulnerable. Are we not weakened by the population
of those whom we hold in slavery ? The day may come,
when they may make an impression upon us. Gentle-

112 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

men, who have been long accustomed to the contem
plation of the subject, think there is a cause of alarm
in this case. The number of those people, compared
to that of the whites, is in an immense proportion :
their number amounts to two hundred and thirty-six
thousand, that of the whites only to three hundred and
fifty-two thousand. Will the American spirit, so much
spoken of, repel an invading enemy, or enable you to
obtain an advantageous peace? Manufactures and
military stores, may afford relief to a country exposed :
have we these at present ? Attempts have been made
to have these here. If we shall be separated from the
union, shall our chance of having these be greater ?
Or, will not the want of these be more deplorable ?
We shall be told of the exertions of Virginia, under the
confederation — her achievements, when she had no
commerce. These, sir, were necessary for her imme
diate safety, nor would these have availed, without the
aid of the other states. Those states, then our friends,
brothers and supporters, will, if disunited from us, be
our bitterest ^enemies.

If then, sir, Virginia, from her situation, is not inac
cessible, or invulnerable ; let us consider if she be pro
tected, by having no cause to fear from other nations :
has she no cause to fear ? You will have cause to
fear, as a nation, if disunited ; you will not only have
this cause to fear from yourselves, from that species of
population I before mentioned, and your once sister
states, but from the arms of other nations. Have you
no cause of fear from Spain, whose dominions border
on your country ? Every nation, every people, in our
circumstances, have always had abundant cause to
fear. Let us see the danger to be apprehended from
France : let us suppose Virginia separated from the
other states: as part of the former confederated states,
she will owe France a very considerable sum — France
will be as magnanimous as ever. France, by the law
of nations, will have a right to demand the whole of
her, or of the others. If France were to demand it, what

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. U$

would become of the property of America? Could
she not destroy what little commerce we have ?
Could she not seize our ships, and carry havoc and
destruction before her on our shores ? The most la
mentable desolation would take place. We owe a
debt to Spain also ; do we expect indulgence from that
quarter ? That nation has a right to demand the debt
due to it, and power to enforce that right. Will the
Dutch be silent about the debt due to them ? Is there
any one pretension, that any of these nations will be
patient ? The debts due the British are also very con
siderable : these debts have been withheld contrary to
treaty : if Great Britain will demand the payment of
these debts, peremptorily, what will be the conse
quence ? Can we pay them if demanded ? Will
no danger result from a refusal ? Will the British na
tion suffer their subjects to be stripped of their proper
ty ? Is not that nation amply able to do its subjects
justice ? Will the resentment of that powerful and
supercilious nation sleep forever ? If we become one*
sole nation, uniting with our sister states, our means of
defence will be greater ; the indulgence, for the payment
of those debts, will be greater, and the danger of an
attack less probable. Moreover, vast quantities of
lands have been sold, by citizens of this country, to
Europeans, and these lands cannot be found. Will
this fraud be countenanced or endured ? Among so
many causes of danger, shall we be secure, separated
from our sister states ? Weakness itself, sir, will in
vite some attack upon your country. Contemplate
our situation deliberately, and consult history : it will
inform you, that people, in our circumstances, have
ever been attacked, and successfully : open any page,
and you will there find our danger truly depicted. If
such a people had any thing, was it not taken ? The
fate which will befall us, I fear, sir, will be, that we
shall be made a partition of. How will these, our
troubles, be removed ? Can we have any dependence
on commerce ? Can we make any computation on
VOL. i. 1/5

, 114 Mil. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

this subject ? Where will our flag appear ? So high
is the spirit of commercial nations, that they will spend
five times the value of the object, to exclude their ri
vals from a participation in commercial profits: they
seldom regard any expenses. If we should be divided
from the rest of the states, upon what footing would
our navigation in the Mississippi be ? What would be
the probable conduct of France and Spain? Every
gentleman may imagine, in his own mind, the natural
consequences. To these considerations, I might add
many others of a similar nature. Were I to say, that
the boundary, between us and North Carolina, is not yet
settled, I should be told, that Virginia and that state
go together. But what, sir, will be the consequence of
the dispute that may arise between us and Mary
land, on the subject of Potomac river ? It is thought,
Virginia has a right to an equal navigation with them
in that river. If ever it should be decided on grounds
of prior right, their charter will inevitably determine it
in their favor. The country called the Northern Neck,
will probably be severed from Virginia. There is not
a doubt, but the inhabitants of that part will annex
themselves to Maryland, if Virginia refuse to accede to
the union. The recent example of those regulations,
lately made respecting that territory, will illustrate
that probability. Virginia will also be in danger of a
conflict with Pennsylvania, on the subject of bounda
ries. I know that some gentlemen are thoroughly per
suaded, that we have a right to those disputed boun
daries : if we have such a right, I know not where it is
to be found.

Are we not borderers on states that will be separat
ed from us ? Call to mind the history of every part of
the world, where nations have bordered on one another,
and consider the consequences of our separation from
the union. Peruse those histories, and you find such
countries to have ever been almost a perpetual scene
of bloodshed and slaughter. The inhabitants of one,
escaping from punishment into the other — protection

*

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 115

given them — consequent pursuit, robbery, cruelty and
murder. A numerous standing army, that dangerous
expedient, would be necessary, but not sufficient,
for the defence of such borders. Every gentleman
will amplify the scene in his own mind. If you wish
to know the extent of such a scene, look at the histo
ry of England and Scotland before- the union; you
will see their borderers continually committing depre
dations and cruelties, of the most calamitous and de
plorable nature, on one another.

Mr. Chairman, were we struck off from the union,
and disputes of the back lands should be renewed,
which are of the most alarming nature, and which
must produce uncommon mischiefs, can you inform
me how this great subject would be settled ? Vir
ginia has a large unsettled country : she has, at last,
quieted it : but there are great doubts whether she has
taken the best way to effect it. If she has not, disa
greeable consequences may ensue. I have before
hinted at some other causes of quarrel between the
other states and us : particularly the hatred that would
be generated by commercial competition. I will
only add, on that subject, that controversies may arise
concerning the fisheries, which must terminate in
wars. Paper money may also be an additional source
of disputes. Rhode Island has been in one continued
train of opposition to national duties and integrity :
they have defrauded their creditors by their paper mo
ney. Other states have also had emissions of paper
money, to the ruin of credit and commerce. May
not Virginia, at a future day, also recur to the same
expedient ? Has Virginia no affection for paper mo
ney, or disposition to violate contracts ? I fear she is
as fond of these measures as most other states in the
union. The inhabitants of the adjacent states, would
be affected by the depreciation of paper money, which
would assuredly produce a dispute with those states.
This danger is taken away by the present constitu
tion, as it provides, " That no state shall emit bills of

1T6 MR. KANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

credit" Maryland has counteracted the policy of
this state frequently, and may be meditating examples
of this kind again. Before the revolution, there was a
contest about those back lands, in which even gov
ernment was a party : it was put an end to by the war.
Pennsylvania was ready to enter into a war with us
for the disputed lands near the boundaries, and no
thing but the superior prudence of the man, who was at
the head of affairs in Virginia, could have prevent
ed it.

I beg leave to remind you of the strength of Massa
chusetts, and other states to the north, and what would
their conduct be to us if disunited from them. In
case of a conflict between us and Maryland or Penn
sylvania, they would be aided by the whole strength of
the more northern states ; in short, by that of all the
adopting states. For these reasons, I conceive, that
if Virginia supposes she has no cause of apprehen
sion, she will find herself in a fatal error. Suppose
the American spirit in the fullest vigor in Virginia,
what military preparations and exertions is she capa
ble of making? The other states have upwards of
three hundred and thirty thousand men capable of
bearing arms : this will be a good army, or they can
very easily raise a good army out of so great a num
ber. Our militia amounts to fifty thousand; even
stretching it to the improbable amount (urged by
some,) of sixty thousand — in case of an attack, what
defence can we make ? Who are militia ? Can we
depend solely upon these? I will pay the last tribute
of gratitude to the militia of my country : they per
formed some of the most gallant feats during the last
war, and acted as nobly as men, inured to other avo
cations, could be expected to do : but, sir, it is danger
ous to look to them as our sole protectors. Did ever
militia defend a country? Those of Pennsylvania
were said to differ very little from regulars, yet these,
sir, were insufficient for the defence of that state.
The militia of our country will be wanted for agricul-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. H7

ture : on this noblest of arts, depends the virtue and
the very existence of a country : if it be neglected,
every thing else must be in a state of ruin and decay.
It must be neglected if those hands, which ought to
attend to it, are occasionally called forth on military
expeditions. Some, also, will be necessary for manu
factures, and those mechanic arts which are necessa
ry for the aid of the farmer and planter. If we had
men, sufficient in number to defend ourselves, it could
not avail without other requisites. We must have a
navy, to be supported in time of peace as well as war,
to guard our coasts and defend us against invasions.
The impossibility of building and equipping a fleet, in
a short time, constitutes the necessity of having a cer
tain number of ships of war always ready in time of
peace. The maintaining a navy will require money —
and where, sir, can we get money for this and other
purposes ? How shall we raise it ? Review the enor
mity of the debts due by this country : the amount of
the debt we owe to the continent, for bills of credit,
rating at forty for one, will amount to between six and
seven hundred thousand pounds. There is also due
the continent, the balance of requisitions due by us,
and, in addition to this proportion of the old conti
nental debt, there are the foreign, domestic, state mili
tary, and loan-office debts, to which, when you add the
British debt, where is the possibility of finding money
to raise an army or navy ? Review then your real abili
ty. Shall we recur to loans ? Nothing can be more
impolitic : they impoverish a nation : we, sir, have
nothing to repay them ; nor, sir, can we procure them.
Our numbers are daily increasing by emigration ; but
this, sir, will not relieve us, when our credit is gone,
and it is impossible to borrow money. If the imposts
and duties in Virginia, even on the present footing, be
very unproductive, and not equal to our necessities,
what would they be if we were separated from the
union? From the first of September, to the first of
June, the amount, put into the treasury, is only fifty nine

118 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

thousand pounds, or a little more. But, sir, if smug
gling be introduced in consequence of high duties, or
otherwise, and the Potomac should be lost> what hope
is there of getting money from these ?

Shall we be asked if the impost would be bettered by
the union ? I answer that it will, sir. Credit being
restored and confidence diffused in the country, mer
chants and men of wealth will be induced to come
among us ; emigration will increase, and commerce
will flourish : the impost will therefore be more sure
and productive. Under these circumstances, can you
find men to defend you ? If not men, where can you
have a navy ? It is an old observation, that he, who
commands at sea, will command the land ; and it is
justified by modern experience in war. The sea can
only be commanded by commercial nations. The
United States have every means, by nature, to enable
them to distribute supplies mutually among one an
other, to supply other nations with many articles, and
to carry for other nations. Our commerce would not be
kindly received by foreigners, if transacted solely by our
selves ; as it is the spirit of commercial nations to en
gross as much as possible, the carrying trade : this
makes it necessary to defend our commerce : but
how shall we encompass this end? England has
arisen to the greatest height, in modern times, by her
navigation act and other excellent regulations. The
same means would produce the same effects. We
have inland navigation. Our last exports did not
exceed one million of pounds. Our export trade is en
tirely in the hands of foreigners. We have no manufac
tures — depend for supplies on other nations, and so
far are we from having any carrying trade, that, as I
have already said, our exports are in the hands of
foreigners. Besides the profit that might be made by
our natural materials, much greater gains would ac
crue from their being first wrought before they were
exported. England has reaped immense profits by
this, nay, even by purchasing and working up those

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 119

materials which their country did not afford : her suc
cess in commerce is generally ascribed to her naviga
tion act. Virginia would not, incumbered as she is,
agree to have such an act. Thus, for the want of a
navy, are we deprived of the multifarious advantages
of our natural situation ; nor is it possible, that if the
union is dissolved, we ever should have a navy suffi
cient either for our defence or the extension of our
trade. I beg gentlemen to consider these two things
— our inability to raise and man a navy, and the dread
ful consequences of the dissolution of the union.

I will close this catalogue of the evils of the dissolu
tion of the union, by recalling to your mind what pass
ed in the year 1781. Such was the situation of our af
fairs then, that the powers of a dictator were given to
the commander in chief to save us from destruction.
This shows the situation of the country to have been
such, as made it ready to embrace an actual dictator.
At some future period, will not our distresses impel us
to do what the Dutch have done — throw all power
into the hands of a stadtholder ? How infinitely more
wise and eligible, than this desperate alternative, is an
union with our American brethren ? I feel myself so
abhorrent to any thing that will dissolve our union, that
I cannot prevail with myself to assent to it directly or
indirectly. If the union is to be dissolved, what step is
to be taken ? Shall we form a partial confederacy ;
or, is it expected that we shall successfully apply to
foreign alliance for military aid ? This last measure,
sir, has ruined almost every nation that has used it ; so
dreadful an example ought to be most cautiously avoid
ed ; for seldom has a nation recurred to the expedient
of foreign succor, without being ultimately crushed
by that succor. We may lose our liberty and inde
pendence by this injudicious scheme of policy. Admit
ting it to be a scheme replete with safety, what nation
shall we solicit — France ? She will disdain a connex
ion with a people in our predicament. I would trust
every thing to the magnanimity of that nation, but she

120 MR. RANDOLPH'S' SPEECH OK

would despise a people who had, like us, so imprudently
separated from their brethren ; and, sir, were she to
accede to our proposal, with what facility could she be
come mistress of our country. To what nation then,
shall we apply — to Great Britain ? Nobody has as
yet trusted that idea. An application to any othery
must be either fruitless or dangerous ; to those who
advocate local confederacies, and at the same time
preach up for republican liberty, I answer, that their
conduct is inconsistent ; the defence of such partial
confederacies will require such a degree of force arid
expense, as will destroy every feature of republicanism.
Give me leave to say, that 1 see nought but destruc
tion in a local confederacy. With what state can we
confederate but North Carolina — North Carolina, situ
ated worse than ourselves ? Consult your own rea
son : I beseech gentlemen most seriously to reflect on
the consequences of such a confederacy : I beseech
them to consider, whether Virginia and North Caroli
na, both oppressed with debts and slaves, can defend
themselves externally, or make their people happy in
ternally. North Carolina having no strength but mili
tia, and Virginia in the same situation, will make, I
fear, but a despicable figure in history. Thus, sir, I
hope that I have satisfied you, that we are unsafe with
out an union, and that in union alone safety con
sists.

I come now, sir, to the great inquiry, whether the
confederation be such a government as we ought to
continue under ; whether it be such a government, as
can secure the felicity of any free people. Did I be
lieve the confederation was a good thread, which
might be broken without destroying its utility entirely,
I might be induced to concur in putting it together ;
but I am so thoroughly convinced of its incapacity to
be mended or spliced, that I would sooner recur to any
other expedient.

When I spoke last, I endeavored to express my
sentiments concerning that system, and to apologize

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. J21

(if an apology was necessary,) for the conduct of its
trainers — that it was hastily devised, to enable us to
repel a powerful enemy — that the subject was novel
and that its inefficacy was not discovered, till requisi
tions came to be made by Congress. In the then situa
tion of America, a speedy remedy was necessary to
ward off the danger, and this sufficiently answered that
purpose : but so universally is its imbecility now
known, that it is almost useless for me to exhibit it at
this time. Has not Virginia, as well .as every other
state, acknowledged its debility, by sending delegates
to the general convention ? The confederation is, of
all things, the most unsafe, not only to trust to, in its
present form, but even to amend. The object of a
federal government, is to remedy and strengthen the
weakness of its individual branches; whether that
weakness arises from situation, or any other external
cause. With respect to the first, is it not a miracle
that the confederation carried us through the last
war ? It was our unanimity, sir, that carried us through
it. That system was not ultimately concluded till the
year 1781— although the greatest exertions were made
before that time. Then came requisitions of men and
money : its defects then were immediately discovered :
the quotas of men were readily sent — not so those of
money. One state feigned inability, another would not
comply till the rest did ; and various excuses were of
fered ; so that no money was sent into the treasury —
not a requisition was fully complied with. Loans were
the next measure fallen upon : upwards of eighty millions
of dollars were wanting, beside the emissions of dol
lars, forty for one. These things show the impossibili
ty of relying on requisitions. [Here Mr. Randolph
enumerated the different delinquencies of different
states, and the consequent distresses of Congress.] If
the American spirit is to be depended upon, I call
him to awake, to see how his Americans have been
disgraced: but I have no hopes that things will be

VOT,. F 1(>

1-22 MK. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH OX

•better hereafter. I fully expect things will be as they
have been, and that the same derangements will pro
duce similar miscarriages. Will the American spirit
produce money or credit, unless we alter our system?
Are we not in a contemptible situation — are we not the
jest of other nations ?

But it is insinuated, by the honorable gentleman,
that we want to be a grand, splendid and magnificent
people : we wish not to become so : the magnificence
of a royal court is not our object. We want govern
ment, sir — a government that will have stability, and
give us security : for our present government is desti
tute of the one, and incapable of producing the other.
It cannot perhaps, with propriety, be denominated a
government — being void of that energy requisite to
enforce its sanctions. I wish my country not to be
contemptible in the eye's of foreign nations. A well
regulated community is always respected. It is the
internal situation, the defects of government, that at
tract foreign contempt — that contempt, sir, is too
often followed by subjugation. Advert to the con
temptuous manner, in which a shrewd politician speaks
of our government. [Here Mr. Randolph quoted a
passage from Lord Sheffield, the purport of which was,
that Great Britain might engross our trade on her own
terms : that the imbecility and inefficacy of our gene
ral government were such, that it was impossible we
could counteract her policy, however rigid or illiberal
towards us, her commercial regulations might be.] Re
flect but a moment on our situation. Does it not in
vite real hostility ? The conduct of the British minis
try to us, is the natural effect of our unnerved govern
ment. Consider the commercial regulations between
us and Maryland. Is it not known to gentlemen, that
this state and that have been making reprisals 'on
each other, to obviate a repetition of which, in some
degree, these regulations have been made ? Can we
not see from this circumstance, the jealousy, rivalship
and hatred, that would subsist between them, in case

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ]23

this state was out of the union ? They are importing
states, arid importing states will ever be competitors
and rivals. Rhode Island and Connecticut have been
on the point of war, on the subject of their paper mo
ney — Congress did not attempt to interpose. When
Massachusetts was distressed by the late insurrection,
Congress could not relieve her. Who headed that
insurrection ? Recollect the facility with which it was
raised, and the very little ability of the ring-leader, and
you cannot but deplore the extreme debility of our
merely nominal government; we are too despicable to
be regarded by foreign nations. The defects of the
confederation consisted principally in the want of pow
er. It had nominally powers — powers on paper, which
it could not use. The power of making peace and
war is expressly delegated to Congress ; yet the power
of granting passports, though within that of making
peace and war, was considered by Virginia as belong
ing to herself. Without adequate powers, vested in
Congress, America cannot be respectable in the eyes
of other nations. Congress, sir, ought to be fully vest
ed with power to support the union, protect the inter
est of the United States, maintain their commerce, and
defend them from external invasions arid insults, and
internal insurrections ; to maintain justice, and pro
mote harmony and public tranquillity among the states.
A government, not vested with these powers, will ever
be found unable to make us happy or respectable :
how far the confederation is different from such a gov
ernment, is known to all America. Instead of being
able to cherish and protect the states, it has been
unable to defend itself against the encroachments made
upon it by the states : everyone of them has conspired
against it — Virginia as much as any. This fact could
be proved by reference to actual history. I might
quote the observations of an able modern author, (not
because he is decorated with the name of author, but
because his sentiments are drawn from human nature,)
to prove the dangerous impolicy of withholding neces-

124 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

sary powers from Congress; but I shall at this
time, fatigue the house, as little as possible. What
are the powers of Congress ? They have full authori
ty to recommend what they please : this recommenda
tory power reduces them to the condition of poor
supplicants. Consider the dignified language of the
members of the American Congress — May it please
your high mightinesses, of Virginia, to pay your just,
proportionate quota of our national debt : we humbly
supplicate, that it may please you to comply with your
federal duties ! We implore, we beg your obedience !
Js not this, sir, a fair representation of the powers of
Congress ? Their operations are of no validity, when
counteracted by the states. Their authority to re
commend is a mere mockery of government.

But the amendability of the confederation seems to
have great weight on the minds of some gentlemen.
To what point will the amendments go ? What part
makes the most important figure? What part de
serves to be retained ? In it, one body has the legisla
tive, executive and judicial powers : but the want of
efficient powers has prevented the dangers naturally
consequent on the union of these. Is this union con
sistent with an augmentation of their power ? Will
you then amend it, by taking away one of these three
powers? Suppose, for instance, you only vested it
with the legislative and executive powers, without any
control on the judiciary, what must be the result ?
Are we not taught by reason, experience and govern
mental history, that tyranny is the natural and certain
consequence of uniting these two powers, or the le
gislative and judicial powers, exclusively, in the same
body ? If any one denies it, I shall pass by him, as an
infidel not to be reclaimed. Wherever any two of
these three powers, are vested in one single body, they
must, at one time or other, terminate in the destruc
tion of liberty. In the most important cases, the as
sent of nine states is necessary to pass a law : this is
too great a restriction, and whatever good conse-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

quences it may, in some cases, produce, yet it will
prevent energy in many other cases ; it will prevent
energy, which is most necessary on some emergencies,
even in cases wherein the existence of the community
depends on vigor and expedition. It is incompatible
with that secrecy, which is the life of execution and
dispatch. Did ever thirty or forty men retain a se
cret? Without secrecy, no government can carry on
its operations, on great occasions : this is what gives
that superiority in action to the government of one.
If any thing were wanting to complete this farce, it
would be, that a resolution of the assembly of Vir
ginia, and the other legislatures, should be necessary
to confirm and render of any validity, the congression
al acts : this would openly discover the debility of the
general government to all the world. But, in fact, its
imbecility is now nearly the same, as if such acts were
formally requisite. An act of the assembly of Vir
ginia, controverting a resolution of Congress, would
certainly prevail. 1 therefore conclude, that the con
federation is too defective to deserve correction. Let
us take farewell of it, with reverential respect, as an
old benefactor. It is gone, whether this house says
so, or not. It is gone, sir, by its own weakness.

I am afraid I have tired the patience of this house ;
but I trust you will pardon me, as I was urged by the
importunity of the gentleman, in calling for the reasons
of laying the ground work of this plan. It is objected
by the honorable gentleman over the way, (Mr.
George Mason,) that a republican government is im
practicable in an extensive territory, and the extent of
the United States is urged, as a reason, for the rejec
tion of this constitution. Let us consider the defini
tion of a republican government, as laid down by a
man who is highly esteemed. Montesquieu, so cele
brated among politicians, says, " that a republican
government is that, in which the body, or only a part
of the people, is possessed of the supreme power ; a
monarchical, that in which a single person governs,

126 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON

by fixed and established laws ; a despotic government,
that in which a single person, without law, and with
out rule, directs every thing, by his own will arid ca
price." This author has not distinguished a republi
can government from a monarchy, by the extent of its
boundaries, but by the nature of its principles. He, in
another place, contradistinguishes it, as a government
of laws, in opposition to others, which he denominates
a government of men. The empire, or government of
laws, according to that phrase, is that, in which the
laws are made with the free will of the people; hence
then, if laws be made by the assent of the people, the
government may be deemed free. When laws are
made with integrity, and executed with wisdom, the
question is, whether a great extent of country will tend
to abridge the liberty of the people. If defensive force
be necessary, in proportion to the extent of country, I
conceive that, in a judiciously constructed government,
be the country ever so extensive, its inhabitants will be
proportionably numerous, and able to defend it. Ex
tent of country, in my conception, ought to be no bar
to the adoption of a good government. No extent on
earth seems to me too great, provided the laws be
wisely made and executed. The principles of repre
sentation and responsibility, may pervade a large, as
well as a small territory : and tyranny is as easily in
troduced into a small, as into a large district. If it
be answered, that some of the most illustrious and dis
tinguished authors, are of a contrary opinion, I reply,
that authority has no weight with me, till I am con
vinced — that not the dignity of names, but the force
of reasoning, gains my assent.

I intended to have shown the nature of the powers
which ought to have been given to the general gov
ernment, and the reason of investing it with the pow
er of taxation, but this would require more time than
my strength, or the patience of the committee, would
now admit of. I shall conclude with a few observa
tions, which come from my heart. I have labored for

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. J27

the continuance of the union — the rock of our salva
tion. I believe, that as sure as there is a God in
Heaven, our safety, our political happiness and ex
istence, depend on the union of the states ; and, that
without this union, the people of this and the other
states, will undergo the unspeakable calamities, which
discord, faction, turbulence, war and bloodshed, have
produced in other countries. The American spirit
ought to be mixed with American pride — pride to see
the union magnificently triumph. Let that glorious
pride, which once defied the British thunder, reani
mate you again. Let it not be recorded of Ameri
cans, that, after having performed the most gallant ex
ploits, after having overcome the most astonishing dif
ficulties, and after having gained the admiration of
the world by their incomparable valor and policy,
they lost their acquired reputation, their national con
sequence and happiness, by their own indiscretion.
Let no future historian inform posterity, that they
wanted wisdom and virtue, to concur in any regular,
efficient government. Should any writer, doomed to
so disagreeable a task, feel the indignation of an honest
historian, he would reprehend and recriminate our fol
ly, with equal severity and justice. Catch the pre
sent moment, seize it with avidity and eagerness, for
it may be lost, never to be regained. If the union be
n ow lost. I fear it will remain so forever. I believe gen
tlemen are sine ere in their opposition, and actuated by
pure motives : but when I maturely weigh the advan
tages of theun'on, and dreadful consequences of its
dissolution ; when I see safety on my right, and de
struction on my left ; when I behold respectability and
happiness acquired by the one, but annihilated by the
other, I cannot hesitate to decide in favor of the for
mer. I hope my weakness, from speaking .so long,
will. apologize for my leaving this subject in so mutilat
ed a condition. If a further explanation be desired, I
shall take the liberty to enter into it more fully another
time.

SPEECH OF JAMES MADISON,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OP ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE,

MR. CHAIRMAN,

IN what I am about to otter to this assembly, 1 shall
not attempt to make impressions by any ardent pro
fessions of zeal for the public welfare : we know that
the principles of every man will be, and ought to be
judged, not by his professions and declarations, but by
his conduct. By that criterion, I wish, in common
with every other member, to be judged; and even
though it should prove unfavorable to my reputation,
yet it is a criterion from which I by no means would
depart, nor could if I would. Comparisons have been
made between the friends of this constitution, and
those who oppose it. Although I disapprove of such
comparisons, I trust, that in every thing that regards
truth, honor, candor and rectitude of motives, the
friends of this system, here, and in other states, are
not inferior to its opponents. But professions of at
tachment to the public good, and comparisons of par
ties, at all times invidious, ought not to govern or in
fluence us now. We ought, sir, to examine the con
stitution exclusively on its own merits. We ought to
inquire whether it will promote the public happiness :
and its aptitude to produce that desirable object,
ought to be the exclusive subject of our researches.

MR. MADISON'S SPEECH, &c.

In this pursuit, we ought to address our arguments not
to the feelings and passions, but to those understand
ings and judgments which have been selected, by the
people of this country, to decide that great question,
by a calm and rational investigation. I hope that
gentlemen, in displaying their abilities on this occa
sion, will, instead of giving opinions and making as
sertions, condescend to prove and demonstrate, by
fair and regular discussion. It gives me pain to hear
gentlemen continually distorting the natural construc
tion of language. Assuredly, it is sufficient if any hu
man production can stand a fair discussion. Before I
proceed to make some additions to the reasons which
have been adduced by my honorable friend over the
way, I must take the liberty to make some observa
tions on what was said by another gentleman, (Mr.
Henry.) He told us, that this constitution ought to
be rejected, because, in his opinion, it endangered the
public liberty, in many instances. Give me leave to
make one answer to that observation — let the dangers
with which this system is supposed to be replete, be
clearly pointed out. If any dangerous and unnecessa
ry powers be given to the general legislature, let them
be plainly demonstrated, and let us not rest satisfied
with general assertions of dangers, without proof —
without examination. If powers be necessary, appa
rent danger is not a sufficient reason against conced
ing them. He has suggested, that licentiousness has
seldom produced the loss of liberty ; but that the ty
ranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since
the general civilization of mankind, I believe there
are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom
of the people, by gradual and silent encroachments of
those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpa
tions : but on a candid examination of history, we shall
find that turbulence, violence and abuse of power, by
the majority trampling on the rights of the minority,
have produced factions and commotions, which, in
republics, have more frequently than any other cause.
VOL. i. 17

130 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

produced despotism. If we go over the whole history
of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their
destruction to have generally resulted from those
causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the
United States, and go to the sources of that diversity
of sentiment which pervades its inhabitants, we shall
find great danger to fear, that the same causes may
terminate here, in the same fatal effects, which they
produced in those republics. This danger ought to
be wisely guarded against. In the progress of this
discussion, it will perhaps appear, ihat the only pos
sible remedy for those evils, and the only certain
means of preserving and protecting the principles of
republicanism, will be found in that very system which
is now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression.
I must confess, that I have not been able to find his
usual consistency, in the gentleman's arguments on
this occasion. He informs us that the people of this
country are at perfect repose ; that every man enjoys
the fruits of his labor, peaceably and securely, and
that every thing is in perfect tranquillity and safety. I
wish sincerely, sir, this were true. But if this be real
ly their situation, why has every state acknowledged
the contrary? Why were deputies from all the states
sent to the general convention? Why have com
plaints of national and individual distresses been e.cho-
ed and re-echoed throughout the continent ? Why
has our general government been so shamefully dis
graced, and our constitution violated? Wherefore
have laws been made to authorize a change, and
wherefore are we now assembled here ? A federal
government is formed for the protection of its indivi
dual members. Ours was itself attacked with impu
nity. Its authority has been boldly disobeyed and
openly despised. I think I perceive a glaring incon
sistency in another of his arguments. He complains
of this constitution, because it requires the con
sent of at least three fourths of the states to intro
duce amendments, which shall be necessarv for the

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

happiness of the people. The assent of so many, he
considers as too great an obstacle to the admission of
salutary amendments, which he strongly insists, ought
to be at the will of a bare majority, and we hear
this argument, at the very moment we are called upon
to assign reasons for proposing a constitution, which
puts it in the power of nine states to abolish the pre
sent inadequate, unsafe and pernicious confederation !
In the first case, he asserts, that a majority ought to
have the power of altering the government, when found
to be inadequate to the security of public happiness.
In the last case, he affirms, that even three fourths of
the community have not a right to alter a government,
which experience has proved to be subversive of na
tional felicity ; nay, that the most necessary and ur
gent alterations cannot be made without the absolute
unanimity of all the states. Does not the thirteenth
article of the confederation expressly require, that no
alteration shall be made without the unanimous con
sent of all the states ? Can any thing in theory be more
perniciously improvident and injudicious than this sub
mission of the will of the majority to the most trifling
minority ? Have not experience and practice actual
ly manifested this theoretical inconvenience to be ex
tremely impolitic ? Let me mention one fact, which I
conceive must carry conviction to the mind of any
one — the smallest state in the union has obstructed
every attempt to reform the government; that little
member has repeatedly disobeyed and counteracted
the general authority ; nay, has even supplied the ene
mies of its country with provisions. Twelve states had
agreed to certain improvements which were proposed,
being thought absolutely necessary to preserve the
existence of the general government ; but as these im
provements, though really indispensable, could not, by
the confederation, be introduced into it without the con
sent of every state, the refractory dissent of that little
state prevented their adoption. The inconveniences
resulting from this requisition, of unanimous concur-

J32 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

rence in alterations of the confederation, must be
known to every member in this convention ; it is
therefore needless to remind them of them. Is it not
self-evident, that a trifling minority ought riot to bind
the majority ? Would not foreign influence be exert
ed with facility over a small minority ? Would the ho
norable gentleman agree to continue the most radi
cal defects in the old system, because the petty state
of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them ?

He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the
district where the seat of the government may be fixed.
Would he submit that the representatives of this state
should carry on their deliberations under the control
of any one member of the union ? If any state had the
power of legislation over the place where Congress
should fix the general government, it would impair the
dignity, and hazard the safety of Congress. If the safe
ty of the union were under the control of any particu
lar state, would not foreign corruption probably prevail
in such a state, to induce it to exert its controlling in
fluence over the members of the general government ?
Gentlemen cannot have forgotten the disgraceful insult
which Congress received some years ago. And, sir,
when we also reflect, that the previous cession of par
ticular states is necessary, before Congress can legis
late exclusively any where, we must, instead of being
alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it.

But the honorable member sees great danger in
the provision concerning the militia. Now, sir, this I
conceive to be an additional security to our liberties,
without diminishing the power of the states, in any
considerable degree ; it appears to me so highly ex
pedient, that I should imagine it would have found ad
vocates even in the warmest friends of the present
system. The authority of training the militia, and
appointing the officers, is reserved to the states. But
Congress ought to have the power of establishing a
uniform system of discipline throughout the states;
and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 133

insurrections, and repel invasions. These are the only
cases wherein they can interfere with the militia ; and
the obvious necessity of their having power over them
in these cases, must flash conviction on any reflecting
mind. Without uniformity of discipline, military bodies
would be incapable of action : without a general con
trolling power to call forth the strength of the union,
for the purpose of repelling invasions, the country
might be overrun, and conquered by foreign ene
mies. Without such a power to suppress insurrec
tions, our liberties might be destroyed by intestine
faction, and domestic tyranny be established.

The honorable member then told us, that there
was no instance of power once transferred, being
voluntarily renounced. Not to produce European ex
amples, which may probably be done before the rising
of this convention, have we not seen already, in seven
states, (and probably in an eighth state,) legislatures
surrendering some of the most important powers they
possessed ? But, sir, by this government, powers are
not given to any particular set of men — they are in
the hands of the people — delegated to their representa
tives chosen for short terms ; — to representatives at
all times responsible to the people, and whose situa
tion is perfectly similar to their own : — as long as this
is the case, we have no danger to apprehend. WThen
the gentleman called to our recollection the usual
effects of the concession of powers, and imputed the
loss of liberty generally to open tyranny, I wish he had
gone something further. Upon a review of history, he
would have found, that the loss of liberty very often
resulted from factions and divisions ; from local consi
derations, which eternally lead to quarrels : he would
have found internal dissensions to have more frequently
demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious disposition in
rulers to retain any stipulated powers.

[Here Mr. Madison enumerated the various means
whereby nations had lost their liberties.]

The power of raising and supporting armies is ex-

134 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

claimed against, as dangerous and unnecessary. I
sincerely wish, sir, that there were no necessity for
vesting this power in the general government. But
suppose a foreign nation should declare war against
the United States, must not the general legislature
have the power of defending the United States ?
Ought it to be known to foreign nations, that the general
government of the United States of America has no pow
er to raise or support an army, even in the utmost dan
ger, when attacked by external enemies? Would
not their knowledge of such a circumstance stimulate
them to fall upon us ? If, sir, Congress be not invested
with this power, any great nation, prompted by ambi
tion or avarice, will be invited by our weakness to at
tack us ; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans,
would certainly be attended with success, when only
opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia. Whoever
considers the peculiar situation of this country, the
multiplicity of its excellent inlets and harbors, and the
uncommon facility of attacking it, however much
he may regret the necessity of such a power, cannot
hesitate a moment in granting it. One fact may eluci
date this argument. In the course of the late war,
when the weak parts of the union were exposed, and
many states were placed in the most deplorable situa
tion by the enemy's ravages, the assistance of foreign
nations was thought so urgently necessary for our
protection, that the relinquishment of territorial advan
tages was not deemed too great a sacrifice for the
acquisition of one ally. This expedient was admitted
with great reluctance even by those states who ex
pected most advantages from it. The crisis, how
ever, at length arrived, when it was judged necessary
for the salvation of this country, to make certain ces
sions to Spain ; whether wisely, or otherwise, is not
for me to say ; but the fact was, that instructions were
sent to our representative at the court of Spain, to em-

Swer him to enter into negotiations for that purpose.
>w it terminated is well known. This fact shows

';• ;

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 135

the extremities to which nations will recur in cases of
imminent danger, and demonstrates the necessity of
making ourselves more respectable. The necessity
of making dangerous cessions, and of applying to for
eign aid, ought to be provided against.

The honorable member then told us, that there are
heart-burnings in the states that have assented to the
new constitution, and that Virginia may, if she does
not come into the measure, continue in amicable con
federacy with those adopting states. I wish, as seldom
as possible, to contradict the assertions of gentlemen ;
but I can venture to affirm, without danger of being
detected in an error, that there is the most conclusive
evidence of the satisfaction of those states being every
day augmented, and that, in that state where it was
adopted only by a majority of nineteen, there is not,
at this time, one fifth of the people dissatisfied. There
are some reasons which induce us to conclude, that
the grounds of proselytism extend every where ; its
principles begin to be better understood ; and the in
flammatory violence wherewith it was opposed by de
signing, illiberal and unthinking minds, begins to sub
side. I will not enumerate the causes from which, in
my conception, the heart-burnings of a majority of its
opposers have originated. Suffice it to say, that in all
cases, they were founded on a misconception of the
nature and tendency of the new government. Had it
been candidly examined and fairly discussed, I believe,
sir, that but a very inconsiderable minority of the peo
ple of the United States would at any time have op
posed it. With respect to the Swiss confederacy,
which the honorable gentleman has proposed for our
example, as far as historical authority may be relied
upon, we shall find their government quite unworthy
of our imitation. I am sure if the honorable member
had sufficiently considered their history and govern
ment, he never would have quoted their example in
this place. He would have found, that instead of re
specting the rights of mankind, their government, (at

136 MR. MADISON- S SPEECH ON

^
least that of several of their cantons,) is one of the

vilest aristocracies that ever was instituted. The
peasants of some of their cantons are more oppressed
and degraded than the subjects of any monarch of
Europe ; nay, almost as much so, as those of any
eastern despot. It is a novelty in politics, that from
the worst of systems, the happiest consequences should
arise. For it is their aristocratical rigor, and the pe
culiarity of their situation, that have so long supported
their union. Without the closest compressment, dis
memberment would unquestionably ensue, arid their
powerful, ambitious neighbors, would immediately
avail themselves of their least jarrings. As we are
not circumstanced like them, however, no conclusive
precedent can be drawn from their situation. I trust,
the gentleman does not carry his idea so far as to re
commend a separation from the adopting states. This
government may secure our happiness ; this is at least
as probable as that it shall be oppressive. If eight
states have, from a persuasion of its policy and utility,
adopted it, shall Virginia shrink from it, without a full
conviction of its danger and inutility ? I hope she
will never shrink from any duty : I trust she will not
determine without the most serious reflection and de
liberation.

I confess to you, sir, that were uniformity of religion
to be introduced by this system, it would, in my opin
ion, be ineligible ; but I have no reason to conclude,
that uniformity of government will produce that of re
ligion. To the great honor of America, that right is
perfectly free and unshackled among us. The gov
ernment has no jurisdiction over it ; the least reflec
tion will convince us, there is no danger to be feared
on that ground.

But we are flattered with the probability of obtain
ing previous amendments. This point calls for the
most serious care of the convention. If amendments
are to be proposed by one state, other states have the
same right, and will also propose alterations* These

v -I'

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

cannot but be dissimilar, and opposite in their nature.
I beg leave to remark, that the governments of the
different states are in many respects dissimilar in their
structure ; their legislative bodies are not similar ;
their executives are still more different. In several of
the states, the first magistrate is elected by the people
at large ; in others, by joint ballot of the members of
both branches of the legislature ; and in others again,
in other different manners. This dissimilarity has oc
casioned a diversity of opinion on the theory of gov
ernment, which will, without many reciprocal conces
sions, render a concurrence impossible. Although
the appointment of an executive magistrate has not
been thought destructive to the principles of democra
cy, in any of the states, yet, in the course of the de
bate, we find objections made to the federal execu
tive : it is urged that the president will degenerate into
a tyrant. I intended, in compliance with the call of
the honorable member, to explain the reasons of pro
posing this constitution, and develope its principles ;
but I shall postpone my remarks, till we hear the sup
plement which he has informed us, he means to add to
what he has already offered.

Give me leave to say something of the nature of the
government, and to show that it is perfectly safe and
just, to vest it with the power of taxation. There are
a number of opinions ; but the principal question is,
whether it be a federal or a consolidated government.
In order to judge properly of the question before us,
we must consider it minutely, in its principal parts. I
myself conceive, that it is of a mixed nature: it is, in
a manner, unprecedented. We cannot find one ex
press prototype in the experience of the world: it
stands by itself. In some respects, it is a government
of a federal nature : in others, it is of a consolidated
nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which
the constitution is investigated, ratified and made the
act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstand
ing what the honorable gentleman has alledged, that

VOL. i. 18

.J38 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

-

this government is not completely consolidated ; nor
is it entirely federal. Who are the parties to it ? The
people — not the people as composing one great
body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereign
ties. Were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consoli
dated government, the assent of a majority of the peo
ple would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a
majority have adopted it already, the remaining states
would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they
unanimously reprobated it. Were it such a govern
ment as is suggested, it would be now binding on the
people of this state, without having had the privilege
of deliberating upon it ; but, sir, no state is bound by
it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the
states adopt it, it will be then a government establish
ed by the thirteen states of America, not through the
intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at
large. In this particular respect, the distinction between
the existing and proposed governments, is very mate
rial. The existing system has been derived from the
dependant, derivative authority of the legislatures of
the states ; whereas this is derived from the superior
power of the people. If we look at the manner in
which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea
is in some degree attended to. By the new system, a
majority of the states cannot introduce amendments ;
nor are all the states required for that purpose ; three
fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this
there is a departure from the federal idea. The mem
bers to the national house of representatives are to be
chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the
numbers in the respective districts. When we come
to the senate, its members are elected by the states in
their equal and political capacity ; but had the gov
ernment been completely consolidated, the senate
would have been chosen by the people, in their indi
vidual capacity, in the same manner as the members
of the other house. Thus it is of a complicated na
ture, and this complication, I trust, will be found to

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS . j 39

exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as
of a mere confederacy. If Virginia were separated
from all the states, her power and authority would
extend to all cases ; in like manner, were all powers
vested in the general government, it would be a con
solidated government : but the powers of the federal
government are enumerated ; it can only operate iu
certain cases : it has legislative powers on defined and
limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its ju
risdiction.

But the honorable member has satirized, with pe
culiar acrimony, the powers given to the general gov
ernment by this constitution. I conceive that the first
question on this subject is, whether these powers be
necessary ; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma
of either submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the
union. Let us consider the most important of these
reprobated powers ; that of direct taxation is most
generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies
of government, there is no question but the most easy
mode of. providing for them will be adopted. When,
therefore, direct taxes are not necessary, they will not
be recurred to. It can be of little advantage to those
in power, to raise money in a manner oppressive to
the people. To consult the conveniences of the peo
ple, will cost them nothing, and in many respects will
be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be
recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on
other nations those immense debts, under the pressure
of which many of them labor ? Not the expenses of
their governments, but war. If this country should be
engaged in war, (and I conceive we ought to provide
for the possibility of such a case,) how would it be
carried on ? By the usual means provided from year
to year ? As our imports will be necessary for the ex
penses of government, and other common exigencies,
how are we to carry on the means of defence ? How
is it possible a war could be supported without money
or credit ? And would, it be possible for government

|

140 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

to have credit, without having the power of raising
money ? No, it would be impossible for any govern
ment, in such a case, to defend itself. Then, I say,
sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordi
nary exigencies, and give this power to the general
government ; for the utter inutility of previous requisi
tions on the states is too well known. Would it be
possible for those countries, whose finances and reve
nues are carried to the highest perfection, to carry on
the operations of government on great emergencies,
such as the maintenance of a war, without an uncon
trolled power of raising money ? Has it not been ne
cessary for Great Britain, notwithstanding the facility
of the collection of her taxes, to have recourse very
often to this and other extraordinary methods of pro
curing money? Would not her public credit have
been ruined, if it was known that her power to raise
money was limited ? Has not France been obliged,
on great occasions, to recur to unusual means, in or
der to raise funds ? It has been the case in many
countries, and no government can exist, unless its
powers extend to make provisions for every contingen
cy. If we were actually attacked by a powerful na
tion, and our general government had not the power
of raising money, but depended solely on requisitions,
our condition would be truly deplorable : if the reve
nues of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty
distinct authorities, it would be impossible for it to
carry on its operations. This must be obvious to
every member here : I think, therefore, that it is ne
cessary for the preservation of the union, that this
power should be given to the general government.

But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined
to the power of direct taxation, will give it a tendency
to destroy all subordinate authority ; that its increas
ing influence will speedily enable it to absorb the state
governments. I cannot bring myself to think that this
will be the case. If the general government were
wholly independent of the governments of the particu-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

lar states, then indeed, usurpation might be expected
to the fullest extent : but. sir, on whom does this gene
ral government depend ? It derives its authority from
these governments, and from the same sources from
which their authority is derived. The members of the
federal government are taken from the same men
from whom those of the state legislatures are taken.
If we consider the mode in which the federal represen
tatives will be chosen, we shall be convinced, that the
general will never destroy the individual governments ;
and this conviction must be strengthened by an atten
tion to the construction of the senate. The represen
tatives will be chosen, probably under the influence of
the members of the state legislatures : but there is not
the least probability that the election of the latter will
be influenced by the former. One hundred and sixty
members representing this commonwealth in one branch
of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large,
and must ever possess more influence than the few men
who will be elected to the general legislature. Those
who wish to become federal representatives, must de
pend on their credit with that class of men who will be
the most popular in their counties, who generally rep
resent the people in the state governments : they can,
therefore, never succeed in any measure contrary to
the wishes of those on whom they depend. So that
on the whole, it is almost certain, that the deliberations
of the members of the federal house of representatives,
will be directed to the interests of the people of Ame
rica. As to the other branch, the senators will be ap
pointed by the legislatures, and though elected for six
years, I do not conceive they will so soon forget the
source from whence they derive their political exist
ence. This election of one branch of the federal, by
the state legislatures, secures an absolute dependence
of the former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of
one third, will lessen the facility of a combination, and
preclude all likelihood of intrigues. I appeal to our
past experience, whether they will attend to the inter-

142 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

csts of their constituent states. Have not those gen
tlemen who have been honored with seats in Con
gress, often signalized themselves by their attachment
to their states ? Sir, I pledge myself that this gov
ernment will answer the expectations of its friends, and
foil the apprehensions of its enemies. I am persuaded
that the patriotism of the people will continue, and be
a sufficient guard to their liberties, and that the ten
dency of the constitution will be, that the state gov
ernments will counteract the general interest, and ul
timately prevail. The number of the representatives
is yet sufficient for our safety, and will gradually in
crease ; and if we consider their different sources of
information, the number will not appear too small.

Sir, that part of the proposed constitution, which
gives the general government the power of laying and
collecting taxes, is indispensable and essential to the
existence of any efficient, or well organized system of
government : if we consult reason, and be ruled by its
dictates, we shall find its justification there : if we re
view the experience we have had, or contemplate the
history of nations, there too we shall find ample rea
sons to prove its expediency. It would be preposterous
to depend for necessary supplies on a body which is
fully possessed of the power of withholding them. If
a government depends on other governments for its
revenues ; if it must depend on the voluntary contribu
tions of its members, its existence must be precarious.
A government that relies on thirteen independent
sovereignties, for the means of its existence, is a solecism
in theory, and a mere nullity in practice. Is it con
sistent with reason, that such a government can pro
mote the happiness of any people ? It is subversive of
every principle of sound policy, to trust the safety of a
community with a government, totally destitute of the
means of protecting itself or its members. Can Con
gress, after the repeated, unequivocal proofs it has ex
perienced of the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisi
tions, reasonably expect, that they would be hereafter

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 143

effectual or productive ? Will not the same local in
terests, and other causes, militate against a compli
ance ? Whoever hopes the contrary must forever be
disappointed. The effect, sir, cannot be changed
without a removal of the cause. Let each county in
this commonwealth be supposed free and independent :
let your revenues depend on requisitions of propor
tionate quotas from them : let application be made
to them repeatedly, and then ask yourself, is it to be
presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate
collection could be made from partial compliances ?
It is now difficult to collect the taxes from them : how
much would that difficulty be enhanced, were you to
depend solely on their generosity ? I appeal to the
reason of every gentleman here, and to his candor to
say whether he is not persuaded, that the present con
federation is as feeble as the government of Virginia
would be in that case : to the same reason I appeal,
whether it be compatible with prudence to continue a
government of such manifest and palpable weakness
and inefficiency.

If we recur to history, and review the annals of man
kind, I undertake to say, that no instance can be pro
duced by the most learned man, of any confederate
government, that will justify a continuation of the pre
sent system ; or that will not, on the contrary, demon
strate the necessity of this change, and of substituting
to the present pernicious and fatal plan, the system
now under consideration, or one equally energetic.
The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of an
cient and modern confederacies, is, that instead of pro
moting the public happiness, or securing public tran
quillity, they have, in every instance, been productive
of anarchy and confusion — ineffectual for the preserva
tion of harmony, and a prey to their own dissensions
and foreign invasions.

The Amphictyonic league resembled our confedera
tion in its nominal powers : it was possessed of rather
more efficiency. The component states retained their

144 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

sovereignty, arid enjoyed an equality of suffrage in the
federal council. But though its powers were more
considerable in many respects than those of our pre
sent system, yet it had the same radical defect. Its
powers were exercised over its individual members in
their political capacities. To this capital defect it
owed its disorders, and final destruction. It was com
pelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to
enforce its decrees. The struggles consequent on a
refusal to obey a decree, and an attempt to enforce it,
produced the necessity of applying to foreign assist
ance : by complying with that application, and employ
ing his wiles and intrigues, Philip of Macedon acquired
sufficient influence to become a member of the league;
and that artful and insidious prince soon after became
master of their liberties.

The Achaean league, though better constructed than
the Amphictyonic, in material respects, was continu
ally agitated with domestic dissensions, and driven to
the necessity of calling in foreign aid ; this also event
uated in the demolition of their confederacy. Had
they been more closely united, their people would
have been happier; and their united wisdom and
strength would not only have rendered unnecessary all
foreign interpositions in their affairs, but would have
enabled them to repel the attack of any enemy. If
we descend to more modern examples, we shall find
the same evils resulting from the same sources.

The Germanic system is neither adequate to the
external defence, or internal felicity of the people ;
the doctrine of quotas and requisitions flourishes here.
Without energy — without stability — the empire is a
nerveless body. The most furious conflicts, and the
most implacable animosities between its members,
strikingly distinguish its history. Concert and co-ope
ration are incompatible with such an injudiciously
constructed system.

The republic of the Swiss is sometimes instanced
for its stability ; but even there, dissensions and wars of

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 14;,

a bloody nature, have been frequently seen between
the cantons. A peculiar coincidence of circumstances
contributes to the continuance of their political con*
nexion. Their feeble association owes its existence to
their singular situation. There is a schism this mo
ment in their confederacy, which, without the necessity
of uniting for their external defence, would immediately
produce its dissolution.

The confederate government of Holland is a further
confirmation of the characteristic imbecility of such
governments. From the history of this government
we might derive lessons of the most important utility.

[Here Mr. Madison quoted sundry passages from
De Witt, respecting the people of Holland, and the war
which they had so long supported against the Spanish
monarch ; showing the impolitic and injudicious struc
ture of their confederacy; that it was entirely desti
tute of energy, because their revenues depended chief
ly on requisitions ; that during that long war, the pro
vinces of Guelderland and Overyssel had not paid their
respective quotas, but had evaded altogether their
payments ; in consequence of which, two sevenths of
the resources of the community had never been
brought into action; nor contributed in the least to
wards the prosecution of the war : that the fear of
pressing danger stimulated Holland and the other pro
vinces to pay all the charges of the war : that those
two provinces had continued their delinquencies ; that
the province of Holland alone paid more than all the
rest; still those provinces which paid up their propor
tional shares, claimed from the failing states the
amounts of their arrearages ; that the most fatal con
sequences had nearly resulted from the difficulty of
adjusting those claims, and from the extreme aver
sion of the delinquent states to discharge even their
most solemn engagements: that there are existing
controversies between the provinces on this account
at present ; and to add to the evils consequent upon
requisitions, that unanimity and the revision and sane-

VOL. i. 19

31 It. MADISON'S SPEECH O,\

tion of their constituents, were necessary to give va
lidity to the decisions of the states general. He then
proceeded,] — Sir, these radical defects in their confe
deracy must have dissolved their association long ago,
were it not for their peculiar position — circumscribed
in a narrow territory ; surrounded by the most power
ful nations in the world ; possessing peculiar advan
tages from their situation; an extensive navigation
and a powerful navy — advantages which it was clear
ly the interest of those nations to diminish or deprive
them of. Their late unhappy dissensions were mani
festly produced by the vices of their system. We
may derive much benefit from the experience of that
unhappy country. Governments, destitute of energy,
will always produce anarchy. These facts are worthy
the most serious consideration of every gentleman
here. ^Poes not the history of these confederacies
coincide with the lessons drawn from our own expe
rience ? I most earnestly pray that America may
have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the instruc
tive information she may derive from a contemplation
of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may
escape a similar fate, by avoiding the causes from
which their infelicity sprung. If the general govern
ment is to depend on the voluntary contributions of
the states for its support, dismemberment of the Unit
ed States may be the consequence. In cases of immi
nent danger, those states alone, more immediately ex
posed to it, would exert themselves ; those remote
from it, would be too supine to interest themselves
warmly in the fate of those whose distresses they did
not immediately perceive. The general government
ought therefore to be armed with power to defend the
whole union.

Must we not suppose, that those parts of America
which are most exposed, will first be the scenes of
war ? Those nations, whose interest is incompatible
with an extension of our power, and who are jealous
of our resources to become powerful and wealthy.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 147

must naturally be inclined to exert every means to
prevent our becoming formidable. Will they not be
impelled to attack the most exposed parts of the un
ion ? Will not their knowledge of the weakness of our
government stimulate them the more readily to such
an attack ? Those parts to which relief can be afford
ed with most difficulty, are the extremities of the coun
try, and will be the first objects of our enemies. The
general government, having no resources beyond what,
are adequate to its existing necessities, will not be
able to afford any effectual succor to those parts
which may be invaded.

In such a case, America must perceive the danger
and folly of withholding from the union, a power suf
ficient to protect the whole territory of the United
States. Such an attack is far from improbable, and if
it be actually made, it is difficult to conceive a possi
bility of escaping the catastrophe of a dismember
ment. On this subject we may receive an estimable
and instructive lesson, from an American confedera
cy; from an example which has happened in our
country, and which applies to us with peculiar force,
being most analogous to our situation. I mean that
species of association or union which subsisted in
New England. The colonies of Massachusetts, Bris
tol, Connecticut and New Hampshire, were confede
rated together.

The object of that confederacy was primarily to de*
fend themselves against the inroads and depredation?
of the Indians. They had a common council, consist
ing of deputies from each party, with an equality of
suffrage in their deliberations. The general expendi
tures and charges were to be adequately defrayed.
Its powers were very similar to those of the confedera
tion. Its history proves clearly, that a government,
founded on such principles, must ever disappoint the
hopes of those who expect its operations to be condu
cive to public happiness.

There are facts on record to prove, that instead of

148 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

answering the end of its institution, or the expectation
of its framers, it was violated with impunity ; and only
regarded when it coincided perfectly with the views
and immediate interests of the respective parties.

The strongest member of the union availed itself of
its circumstances to infringe their confederacy. Mas
sachusetts refused to pay its quotas. In the war be
tween England and Holland, it was found particularly
necessary to make more exertions for the protection
of that country.

Massachusetts being then more powerful and less
exposed than the other colonies, refused its contribu
tions to the general defence. In consequence of this,
the common council remonstrated against the council of
Massachusetts. This altercation terminated in the
dissolution of their union. From this brief account
of a system perfectly resembling our present one, we
may easily divine the inevitable consequences of a
longer adherence to the latter.

[Mr. Madison then recapitulated many instances of
the prevalent persuasion of the wisest patriots of the
states, that the safety of all America depended on
union ; and that the government of the United States
must be possessed of an adequate degree of energy,
or that otherwise their connexion could not be justly
denominated an union. He likewise enumerated the
expedients that had been attempted by the people of
America to form an intimate association, from the
meeting at New York in the year 1754, downwards :
that their sentiments on this subject had been uniform,
both in their colonial and independent conditions ;
and that a variety of causes had hitherto prevented the
adoption of an adequate system. He then continued
thus,]

If we take experience for our guide, we shall find still
more instructive direction on this subject. The weak
ness of the existing articles of the union, showed itself
during the war. It has manifested itself since the peace,
f o such a degree as can leave no doubt in any rational.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 149

intelligent and unbiassed mind, of the necessity of an
alteration : nay, this necessity is obvious to all America ;
it has forced itself on the minds of the people. The com
mittee has been informed, that the confederation was
not completed till the year 1781, when a great portion
of the war was ended ; consequently no part of the
merit of the antecedent operations of the war could
justly be attributed to that system. Its debility was
perceived almost as soon as it was put in operation.
A recapitulation of the proofs which have been expe
rienced of its inefficacy, is unnecessary. It is most
notorious, that feebleness universally marked its cha
racter. Shall we be safe in another war in the same
situation? That instrument required the voluntary
contributions of the states, and thereby sacrificed some
of our best privileges. The most intolerable and un
warrantable oppressions were committed on the people
during the late war. The gross enormity of those
oppressions might have produced the most serious
consequences, were it not for the spirit of liberty,
which preponderated against every consideration.

A scene of injustice, partiality and oppression, may
bring heavenly vengeance on any people. We are
now by our sufferings, expiating the crimes of the
otherwise glorious revolution. Is it not known to
every member of this committee, that the great princi
ples of a free government were reversed through the
whole progress of that scene? Was not every
state harassed ? Was not every individual oppressed
and subjected to repeated distresses ? Was this right ?
Was it a proper form of government, that warranted,
authorized, or overlooked, the most wanton violations
of property ? Had the government been vested with
complete power to procure a regular and adequate
supply of revenue, those oppressive measures would
have been unnecessary. But, sir, can it be supposed
that a repetition of such measures would ever be ac
quiesced in ? Can a government, that stands in need of
such measures, secure the liberty, or promote the happi-

J50 MK. MADISON'S SPEECH OK

ness or glory of any country ? If we do not change
this system, consequences must ensue that gentlemen
do not now apprehend. If other testimony were neces
sary, I might appeal to that which I am sure is very
weighty, but which I mention with reluctance. At the
conclusion of the war, that man who had the most ex
tensive acquaintance with the nature of the country,
who well understood its interests, and who had given
the most unequivocal and most brilliant proofs of his
attachment to its welfare — when he laid down his
arms, wherewith he had so nobly and successfully de
fended his country, publicly testified his disapprobation
of the present system, and suggested that some altera
tion was necessary to render it adequate to the securi
ty of our happiness. I did not introduce that great
name to bias any gentleman here. Much as I admire
and revere the man, I consider these members as not
to be actuated by the influence of any man ; but I in
troduced him as a respectable witness to prove that the
articles of the confederation were inadequate, and that
we must resort to something else. His modesty did
not point out what ought to be done, but said, that
some great change was necessary. But, sir, testimony,
if wished for, may be found in abundance, and numer
ous conclusive reasons may be urged for this change.
Experience daily produced such irresistible proofs of
the defects of that system, that this commonwealth
was induced to exert her influence to meliorate it : she
began that noble work, in which I hope she will per
sist : she proposed to revise it ; her proposition met
with the concurrence, which that of a respectable party
will always meet. I am sure if demonstration were ne
cessary on the part of this commonwealth, reasons have
been abundantly heard in the course of this debate,
manifold and cogent enough, not only to operate con
viction, but to disgust an attentive hearer. Recollect
the resolution of the year 1784. It was then found
that the whole burden of the union was sustained by
a few states. This state was likely to be saddled with

I'HK FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

a very disproportionate share. That expedient was
proposed to ohviate this inconvenience, which has
been placed in its true light. It has been painted in
sufficient horrors by the honorable gentleman who
spoke last.

I agree with the honorable gentleman, (Mr. Henry,)
that national splendor and glory are not our objects :
but does he distinguish between what will render us
secure and happy at home, and what will render us re
spectable abroad ? If we be free and happy at home,
we cannot fail to be respectable abroad.

The confederation is so notoriously feeble, that for
eign nations are unwilling to form any treaties with
us ; they are apprized that our general government
cannot perform any of its engagements : but, that they
may be violated, at pleasure, by any of the states. Our
violation of treaties already entered into, proves this
truth unequivocally. No nation will therefore make
any stipulations with Congress, conceding any advan
tages of importance to us ; they will be the more
averse to entering into engagements with us, as the im
becility of our government enables them to derive
many advantages from our trade, without granting us
any return. Were this country united by proper bands,
in addition to other great advantages, we could form
very beneficial treaties with foreign states. But this
can never happen without a change in our system.
Were we not laughed at by the minister of that nation,
from which we may be able yet to extort some of the
most salutary measures for this country ? Were we
not told that it was necessary to temporize till our
government acquired consistency ? Will any nation
relinquish national advantages to us ? You will be
greatly disappointed, if you expect any such good
effects from this contemptible system. Let us recollect
our conduct to that country from which we have re
ceived the most friendly aid. How have we dealt with
that benevolent ally — France ? Have we complied with
our most sacred obligations to that nation ? Have we

152 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

paid the interest punctually from year to year ? Is not
the interest accumulating, while not a shilling is dis
charged of the principal ? The magnanimity and
forbearance of that friendly monarch are so great, that
he has called upon us for his claims, even in his own
distress and necessity. This, sir, is an additional mo
tive to increase our exertions. At this moment of time,
a very considerable amount is due from us to that
country and to others. [Here Mr. Madison mentioned
the amount of the debts due to different foreign na
tions.] We have been obliged to borrow money, even
to pay the interest of our debts. This is a ruinous and
most disgraceful expedient. Is this a situation on which
America can rely for security and happiness? How
are we to extricate ourselves? The honorable mem
ber tells us, we might rely on the punctuality and friend
ship of the states, and that they will discharge their
quotas for the future ; but, sir, the contributions of the
states have been found inadequate from the beginning,
and are every day diminishing instead of increasing.
From the month of June, 1787, till June, 1788, they
have only paid two hundred seventy six thousand six
hundred and forty one dollars into the federal treasury
for the purposes of supporting the national government,
and discharging the interest of the national debts : a
sum so very insufficient, that it must greatly alarm the
friends of their country. Suggestions and strong as
sertions dissipate before these facts.

Sir, the subject of direct taxation is perhaps one of
the most important that can engage our attention, or
that can be involved in the discussion of this great and
momentous question. If it be to be judged by the
comments made upon it, by the opposers and favorers
of the proposed system, it requires a most clear and
critical investigation. The objections against the ex
ercise of this power by the general government, as far
as I am able to comprehend them, are founded upon
the supposition of its being unnecessary, impracticable,
unsafe and accumulative of expense. I shall therefore

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 153

consider, first, how far it may be necessary ; secondly,
how far it may be practicable ; thirdly, how far it may
be safe, as well with respect to the public liberty at
large, as to the state legislatures ; and fourthly, with
respect to economy.

First then, is it necessary ? I must acknowledge
that 1 concur in opinion with those gentlemen who
told you, that this branch of revenue was essential to
the salvation of the union. It appears to me necessa
ry, in order to secure that punctuality which is requi
site in revenue matters. Without punctuality indi
viduals will refuse it that confidence, without which it
cannot get resources. I beg gentlemen to consider
the situation of this country, if unhappily the govern
ment were to be deprived of this power. Let us sup
pose for a moment that one of those great nations
that may be unfriendly to us, should take advantage
of our weakness, which they will be more ready to do
when they know the want of this resource in our gov
ernment, and should attack us, what forces could we
oppose tcT.it ? Could we find safety in such forces as
we could call out ? Could we call forth a sufficient
number, either by drafts, or in any other way, to
repel a powerful enemy ? The inability of the gov
ernment to raise and support regular troops, would
compel us to depend on militia. It would then be ne
cessary to give this power to the government, or run
the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm belief,
that if a hostile attack were made this moment on the
United States, it would at once flash conviction
on the minds of the citizens, and show them, to their
deep regret, the necessity of vesting the govern
ment with this power, which alone can enable it
to protect the community. I do not wish to frighten
the members of this convention into a concession of
this power, but to bring to their minds those conside
rations which demonstrate its necessity. If we were
secured from the possibility, or the probability of dan
ger, it might be unnecessary. I shall not review that

VOL. i 20

154 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

concourse of dangers which may probably arise at re
mote periods of futurity, nor all those which we have
immediately to apprehend ; for this would lead me be
yond the bounds which I have prescribed to myself,
feut I will mention one single consideration, drawn
from fact itself. I hope to have your attention.

By the treaty between the United States and his
most Christian majesty, among other things it is stipu
lated, that the great principle on which the armed
neutrality in Europe was founded, should prevail in
case of future wars. The principle is this, that free
ships shall make free goods, and that vessels and
goods shall be both free from condemnation. Great
Britain did not recognize it. While all Europe was
against her, she held out without acceding to it. It
has been considered for some time past, that the
flames of war, already kindled, would spread, and that
France and England were likely to draw those swords
which were so recently put up. This is judged
probable. We should not be surprised, in a short
time, if we found ourselves as a neutral nation — France
being on one side, and Great Britain on the other.
Then, what would be the situation of America ? She
is remote from Europe, and ought not to engage in her
politics or wars. The American vessels, if they can
do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of
the contending nations. It is a source of wealth which
we ought not to deny to our citizens. But, sir, is there
not infinite danger, that in despite of all our caution,
we shall be drawn into the war ? If American vessels
have French property on board, Great Britain will
seize them. By this means, we shall be obliged to re
linquish the advantage of a neutral nation, or be en
gaged in a war. A neutral nation ought to be respec
table, or else it will be insulted and attacked. Ame
rica, in her present impotent situation, would run the
risk of being drawn in, as a party in the war, and lose
the advantage of being neutral. Should it happen,
that the British fleet should be superior, have we not

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 155

reason to conclude, from the spirit displayed by that
nation to us and to all the world, that we should be in
sulted in our own ports, and our vessels seized ? But
if we be in a respectable situation ; if it be known that
our government can command the whole resources of
the union, we shall be suffered to enjoy the great ad
vantages of carrying on the commerce of the nations
at war ; for none of them would be willing to add us
to the number of their enemies. I shall say no more
on this point, there being others which merit your con
sideration.

The expedient, proposed by the gentlemen opposed
to this clause, is, that requisitions shall be made, and
if not complied with, in a certain time, that then taxa
tion shall be recurred to. I am clearly convinced,
that whenever requisitions shall be made, they will
disappoint those who put their trust in them. One
reason to prevent the concurrent exertions of all the
states, will arise from the suspicion, in some states, of
delinquency in others. States will be governed by the
motives that actuate individuals.

When a tax law is in operation, in a particular state,
every citizen, if he knows of the energy of the laws to
enforce payment, and that every other citizen is per
forming his duty, will cheerfully discharge his duty;
but were it known, that the citizens of one district
were not performing their duty, and that it was left to
the policy of the government to make them come up
with it, the citizens of the other districts would be
very supine and careless in making provisions for pay
ment. Our own experience makes the illustration
more natural. If requisitions be made on thirteen dif
ferent states, when one deliberates on the subject, she
will know that all the rest will deliberate upon it also.
This, sir, has been a principal cause of the inefficacy
of requisitions heretofore, and will hereafter produce
the same evil. If the legislatures are to deliberate on this
subject, (and the honorable gentleman opposed to this
clause, thinks their deliberation necessary,) is it not

J56 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

presumable, that they will consider peculiar local cir
cumstances ? In the general council, on the contrary,
the sense of all America will be drawn to a single
point. The collective interest of the union at large,
will be known and pursued. No local views will be
permitted to operate against the general welfare.
But when propositions should come before a particu
lar state, there is every reason to believe, that qualifica
tions of the requisitions would be proposed; compli
ance might be promised, and some instant remittances
might be made. This will cause delays, which, in the
first instance, will produce disappointment, and pro
duce failures every where else. This, I hope, will be
considered with the attention it deserves. The
public creditors will be disappointed, and of course,
become more pressing. Requisitions will be made for
purposes equally pervading all America ; but the ex
ertions to make compliances, will probably not be uni
form in the states. If requisitions be made for future
occasions for putting the states in a condition of military
defence, or to repel an invasion, will the exertions be
uniform and equal in all the states ? Some parts of
the United States are more exposed than others. Will
the least exposed states exert themselves equally?
We know that the most exposed will be more immedi
ately interested, and will incur less sacrifices in making
exertions. I beg gentlemen to consider, that this ar
gument will apply with most effect to the states which
are most defenceless and exposed. The southern
states are most exposed, whether we consider their
situation, or the smallness of their population. And
there are other circumstances which render them still
more vulnerable, which do not apply to the northern
states. They are therefore more interested in giving
the government a power to command the whole
strength of the union in cases of emergency. Do not
gentlemen conceive that this mode of obtaining sup
plies from the states, will keep alive animosities be
tween the general government and particular states ?

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 157

Where the chances of failures are so numerous as
thirteen, by the thirteen states, disappointment, in the
first place, and consequent animosity, must inevitably
take place.

Let us consider the alternatives, proposed by gen
tlemen, instead of the power of laying direct taxes.
After the states shall have refused to comply, weigh
the consequences of the exercise of this power by Con
gress. When it comes in the form of a punishment,
great clamors will be raised among the people against
the government ; hatred will be excited against it. It
will be regarded as an ignominious stigma on the
state. It will be considered at least in this light by
the state where the failure is made, and these senti
ments will, no doubt, be diffused through the other
states. Now let us consider the effect, if collectors
are sent where the state governments refuse to com
ply with requisitions. It is too much the disposition
of mankind not to stop at one violation of duty. I
conceive that every requisition that will be made on
any part of America, will kindle a contention between
the delinquent member, and the general government.
Is there no reason to suppose divisions in the govern
ment (for seldom does any thing pass with unanimity,)
on the subject of requisitions ? The parts least ex
posed will oppose those measures which may be
adopted for the defence of the weakest parts. Is there
no reason to presume, that the representatives from
the delinquent states will be more likely to foster diso
bedience to the requisitions of the government, than to
endeavor to recommend a compliance with them to
the public ?

There is, in my opinion, another point of view in
which this alternative will produce great evil. I will
suppose a case that is very probable, namely, that par
tial compliances will be made. A difficulty here
arises, which fully demonstrates its impolicy. If a
part be paid, and the rest be withheld, how is the ge
neral government to proceed ? They are to impose a

158 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

tax, but how shall it be done in this case ? Are they
to impose it by way of punishment, on those who have
paid, as well as those who have not ? All these con
siderations taken into view, (for they are not visionary
or fanciful speculations,) will certainly produce this
consequence. The general government, to avoid
those disappointments first described, and to avoid
the contentions and embarrassments which I have last
described, will, in all probability, throw the public
burdens on those branches of revenue that will be
more in their power. They will be continually ne
cessitated to augment the imposts. If we throw a dis
proportion of the burdens on that side, shall we not
discourage commerce, and suffer many political evils ?
Shall we not increase that disproportion on the south
ern states, which for some time will operate against
us ? The southern states, from having fewer manu
factures, will import and consume more. They will
therefore pay more of the imposts. The more com
merce is burdened, the more the disproportion will
operate against them. If direct taxation be mixed
with other taxes, it will be in the power of the general
government to lessen that inequality. But this in
equality will be increased to the utmost extent, if the
general government have not this power. There is
another point of view in which this subject affords us
instruction. The imports will decrease in time of
war. An honorable gentleman has said, that the im
posts would be so productive that there would be no
occasion for laying taxes. I will submit two observa
tions to him and to the committee. First, in time of
war the imposts will be less ; and, as I hope we are
considering a government for a perpetual duration,
we ought to provide for every future contingency. At
present, our importations bear a full proportion to the
full amount of our sales, and to the number of our in
habitants ; but when we have inhabitants enough, our
imports will decrease ; and as the national demands
will increase with our population, our resources will

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 159

increase as our wants increase. The other conside
ration, which I will submit on this part of the subject,
is this. I believe it will be found in practice, that
those who fix the public burdens, will feel a greater
degree of responsibility when they are to impose them
on the citizens immediately, than if "they were to say
what sum should be paid by the states. If they ex
ceed the limits of propriety, universal discontent and
clamor will arise. Let us suppose they were to col
lect the taxes from the citizens of America ; would
they not consider their circumstances ? Would they
not attentively weigh what could be done by the citi
zens at large ? Were they to exceed in their demands,
what were reasonable burdens, the people would im
pute it to the right source, and look on the imposefs
as odious.

When I consider the nature of the various objections
brought against this clause, I should be led to think,
that the difficulties were such that gentlemen would
not be able to get over them, and that the power, as
defined in the plan of the convention, was impractica
ble. I shall trouble them with a few observations on
that point.

It has been said, that ten men deputed from this
state, and others in proportion from other states, will
not be able to adjust direct taxes so as to accommo
date the various citizens in thirteen states.

I confess I do not see the force of this observation.
Could not ten intelligent men, chosen from ten districts
from this state, lay direct taxes on a few objects in
the most judicious manner ? It is easily to be con
ceived, that they would be acquainted with the situa
tion of the different citizens of this country. Can any
one divide this state into any ten districts so as not to
contain men of sufficient information ? Could not one
man of knowledge be found in a district ? When thus
selected, will they not be able to carry their know
ledge into the general council ? I may say with great
propriety, that the experience of our own legislature

160 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

demonstrates the competency of Congress to lay taxes
wisely. Our assembly consists of considerably more
than a hundred, yet from the nature of the business, it
devolves on a much smaller number. It is through
their sanction, approved of by all the others. It will
be found that there are seldom more than ten men
who rise to high information on this subject. Our fe
deral representatives, as has been said by an honora
ble member, who has entered into the subject with a
great deal of ability, will get information from the
state governments. They will be perfectly well in
formed of the circumstances of the people of the dif
ferent states, and the mode of taxation that would be
most convenient for them, from the laws of the states.
In laying taxes, they may even refer to the state sys
tems of taxation. Let it not be forgotten, that there
is a probability, that that ignorance, which is com
plained of in some parts of America, will be continu
ally diminishing. Let us compare the degree of
knowledge which the people had in time past, to their
present information. Does not our own experience
teach us, that the people are better informed than they
were a few years ago? The citizen of Georgia
knows more now of the affairs of New Hampshire,
than he did, before the revolution, of those of South
Carolina. When the representatives from the differ
ent states are collected together, to consider this sub
ject, they will interchange their knowledge with one
another, and will have the laws of each state on the
table. Besides this, the intercourse of the states will
be continually increasing. It is now much greater
than before the revolution. An honorable friend of
mine seems to conceive, as an insuperable objection,
that if land' were made the particular object of taxa
tion, it would be unjust, as it would exonerate the
commercial part of the community ; that if it were
laid on trade, it would be unjust in discharging the
landholders ; and that any exclusive selection would
be unequal and unfair. If the general government.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

were tied down to one object, I confess the objection
would have some force in it. But if this be not the
case, it can have no weight. If it should have a gene
ral power of taxation, they could select the most pro
per objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner,
as that they should fall in a due degree on every mem
ber of the community. They will be limited to fix the
proportion of each state, and they must raise it in the
most convenient and satisfactory manner to the
public.

The honorable member considered it as another
insuperable objection, that uniform laws could not be
made for thirteen states, and that dissonance would
produce inconvenience and oppression. Perhaps it
may not be found on due inquiry, to be so impractica
ble as he supposes. But were it so, where is the evil
of different laws operating in different states, to raise
money for the general government ? Where is the
evil of such laws ? There are instances in other coun
tries, of different laws operating in different parts of
the country, without producing any kind of oppres
sion. The revenue laws are different in England and
Scotland in several respects. Their laws relating to
custom, excises and trade, are similar ; but those re
specting direct taxation are dissimilar. There is a
land tax in England, and a land tax in Scotland, but
the laws concerning them are not the same. It is
much heavier in proportion in the former than in the
latter. The mode of collection is different ; yet this
is not productive of any national inconvenience. Were
we to argue from the objections against the proposed
plan, we must conclude that this dissimilarity would,
in that point alone, have involved those kingdoms in
difficulties. In England itself, there is a variety
of different laws operating differently in different
places.

I will make another observation on the objection of
my honorable friend. He seemed to conclude, that
concurrent collections under different authorities, were

VOL. r. 21

162 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

not reducible to practice. I agree that were they in
dependent of the people, the argument would be good.
But they must serve one common master. They must
act in concert, or the defaulting party must bring on
itself the resentment of the people. If the general
government be so constructed, that it will not
dare to impose such burdens as will distress the
people, where is the evil of its having a power of taxa
tion concurrent with the states ? The people would
not support it, were it to impose oppressive burdens.
Let me make one more comparison of the state gov
ernments to this plan. Do not the states impose taxes
for local purposes ? Does the concurrent collection
of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for general pur
poses, and of levies laid by the counties for parochial
and county purposes, produce any inconvenience or
oppression ? The collection of these taxes is perfect
ly practicable, and consistent with the views of both
parties. The people at large are the common superior
of the state governments, and the general government.
It is reasonable to conclude, that they will avoid
interferences for two causes — to avoid public oppres
sion, and to render the collections more productive. I
conceive they will be more likely to produce disputes,
in rendering it convenient for the people, than to run
into interfering regulations.

In the third place, I shall consider, whether the pow
er of taxation to be given to the general government be
safe : and first, whether it be safe as to the public liber
ty in general. It would be sufficient to remark, that it is,
because, I conceive, the point has been clearly estab
lished by more than one gentleman who have 'already
spoken on the same side with me. In the decision
of this question, it is of importance to examine,
whether elections of representatives by great dis
tricts of freeholders, be favorable to the fidelity of
representatives. The greatest degree of treachery in
representatives, is to be apprehended where they are
chosen by the least number of electors : because there

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 163

is a greater facility of using undue influence, and be
cause the electors must be less independent. This
position is verified in the most unanswerable manner,
in that country to which appeals are so often made,
and sometimes instructively. Who are the most cor
rupt members of Parliament ? Are they not the in
habitants of small towns and districts ? The sup
porters of liberty are from the great counties. Have we
not seen that the representatives of the city of Lon
don, who are chosen by such thousands of voters, have
continually studied and supported the liberties of the
people, and opposed the corruption of the crown ?
We have seen continually, that most of the members
in the ministerial majority are drawn from small cir
cumscribed districts. We may therefore conclude,
that our representatives being chosen by such ex
tensive districts, will be upright and independent.
In proportion as we have security against corrup
tion in representatives, we have security against cor
ruption from every other quarter whatsoever.

I shall take a view of certain subjects which will lead
to some reflections, to quiet the minds of those gen
tlemen who think that the individual governments will
be swallowed up by the general government. In order
to effect this, it is proper to compare the state govern
ments to the general government with respect to re
ciprocal dependence, and with respect to the means
they have of supporting themselves, or of encroaching
upon one another. At the first comparison, we must
be struck with these remarkable facts. The general
government has not the appointment of a single branch
of the individual governments, or of any officers within
the states, to execute their laws. Are not the states
integral parts of the general government ? Is not the
president chosen under the influence of the state legis
latures? May we not suppose that he will be com
plaisant to those from whom he has his appointment,
and from whom he must have his reappointment ?
The senators are appointed altogether by the legisla
tures.

164 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

The honorable gentleman apprehends a coalition
between the president, senate and house of represen
tatives, against the states. This could be supposed
only from a similarity of the component parts.

A coalition is not likely to take place, because its
component parts are heterogeneous in their nature.
The house of representatives is not chosen by the
state governments, but under the influence of those,
who compose the state legislature. Let us suppose
ten men appointed to carry the government into ef
fect ; there is every degree of certainty, that they would
be indebted, for their re-election, to the members of the
legislatures. If they derive their appointment from
them, will they not execute their duty to them ? Be
sides this, will not the people, (whose predominant
interest will ultimately prevail,) feel great attachment
to the state legislatures? They have the care of
all local interests— those familiar, domestic objects,
for which men have the strongest predilection. The
general government, on the contrary, has the preser
vation of the aggregate interests of the union; ob
jects, which being less familiar, and more remote from
men's notice, have a less powerful influence on their
minds. Do we not see great and natural attachments
arising from local considerations ? This will be the
case, in a much stronger degree, in the state govern
ments, than in the general government. The people
will be attached to their state legislatures from a thou
sand causes : and into whatever scale the people at
large will throw themselves, that scale will prepon
derate. Did we not perceive, in the early stages of
the war, when Congress was the idol of America, and
when in pursuit of the object most dear to America,
that they were attached to their states ? Afterwards,
the whole current of their affection was to the states,
and it would be still the case, were it not for the alarm
ing situation of America.

At one period of the congressional history, they had
power to trample on the states. When they had that

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

fund of paper money in their hands, and could carry
on all their measures without any dependence on the
states, was there any disposition to debase the state
governments ? All that municipal authority which
was necessary to carry on the administration of the
government, they still retained unimpaired. There
was no attempt to diminish it.

I am led, by what has fallen from gentlemen, to take
this supposed combination in another view. Is it sup
posed, that the influence of the general government
will facilitate a combination between the members ?
Is it supposed, that it will preponderate against that
of the state governments ? The means of influence
consist in having the disposal of gifts and emoluments,
and in the number of persons employed by, and depen
dent upon a government. Will any gentleman com
pare the number of persons who will be employed in
the general government, with the number of those that
will be in the state governments? The number of
dependants upon the state governments will be in
finitely greater than those on the general government.
I may say with truth, that there never was a more eco
nomical government in any age or country ; nor which
will require fewer agents, or give less influence.

Let us compare the members composing the legis
lative, executive and judicial powers in the general
government, with those in the states, and let us take
into view the vast number of persons employed in the
states ; from the chief officers to the lowest, we shall
find the scale preponderating so much in favor of the
states, that while so many persons are attached to
them, it will be impossible to turn the balance against
them. There will be an irresistible bias towards the
state governments. Consider the number of militia
officers, the number of justices of the peace, the num
ber of the members of the legislatures, and all the va
rious officers for districts, towns and corporations, all
intermixing with, and residing among the people at
large. While this part of the community retaias its

166 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

affection to the state governments, I conceive the fact
to be, that the state governments, and not the general
government, will preponderate. It cannot be contra
dicted, that they have more extensive means of influ
ence. I have my fears, as well as the honorable gen
tleman ; but my fears are on the other side. Expe
rience, I think, wjdl prove, (though there be no infalli
ble proof of it here,) that the powerful and prevailing
influence of the states, will produce such attention to
local considerations, as will be inconsistent with the
advancement of the interests of the union. But I
choose rather to indulge my hopes than fears, because
I flatter myself, if inconveniences should result from it,
that the clause which provides amendments will re
medy them. The combination of powers vested in
those persons, would seem conclusive in favor of the
states.

The powers of the general government relate to ex
ternal objects, and are but few. But the powers in the
states relate to those great objects which immediate
ly concern the prosperity of the people. Let us ob
serve also, that the powers in the general government
are those which will be exercised mostly in time of
war, while those of the state governments will be ex
ercised in time of peace. But I hope the time of war
will be little, compared to that of peace. I could not
complete the view which ought to be taken of this sub
ject, without making this additional remark, that the
powers vested in the proposed government, are not so
much an augmentation of authority in the general gov
ernment, as a change rendered necessary, for the pur
pose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it
before. It cannot escape any gentleman, that this
power in theory, exists in the confederation as fully as
in this constitution. The only difference is this, that v
now they tax states, and by this plan, they will tax in
dividuals. There is no theoretic difference between
the two. But in practice there will be an infinite dif
ference between them. The one is an ineffectual

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 167

power : the other is adequate to the purpose for which
it is given. This change was necessary for the pub-
Jic safety.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that the acts of Con
gress, requiring money from the states, had been as ef
fectual as the paper on the table : suppose all the laws
of Congress had had complete compliance, will any
gentleman say, that as far as we can judge from past
experience, the state governments would have been
debased, and all consolidated and incorporated in one
system? My imagination cannot reach it. I con
ceive, that had those acts the effect which all laws
ought to have, the states would have retained their
sovereignty.

It seems to be supposed, that it will introduce new
expenses and burdens on the people. I believe it is
not necessary here to make a comparison between
the expenses of the present and of the proposed gov
ernment. All agree that the general government
ought to have power for the regulation of commerce.
I will venture to say, that very great improvements,
and very economical regulations will be made. It will
be a principal object to guard against smuggling, and
such other attacks on the revenue as other nations are
subject to. We are now obliged to defend against
those lawless attempts ; but from the interfering regu
lations of different states, with very little success.
There are regulations in different states which are un
favorable to the inhabitants of other states, and which
militate against the revenue. New York levies mo
ney from New Jersey by her imposts. In New Jersey,
instead of co-operating with New York, the legisla
ture favors encroachments on her regulations. This
will not be the case when uniform arrangements shall
be made.

Requisitions, though ineffectual, are unfriendly to
economy. When requisitions are submitted to the
states, there are near two thousand five hundred per
sons deliberating on the mode of payment. All these,

168 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

during their deliberation, receive public pay. A great
proportion of every session, in every state, is employ
ed to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what
mode. Let us suppose fifteen hundred persons de
liberating on this subject. Let any one make a calcu
lation ; and it will be found that a very few days of
their deliberation will consume more of the public
money, than one year of that of the general legisla
ture. This is not all, Mr. Chairman. When general
powers shall be vested in the general government,
there will be less of that mutability which is seen in
the legislation of the states. The consequence will
be a great saving of expense and time. There is an
other great advantage which I will but barely mention.
The greatest calamity to which the United States can
be subject, is a vicissitude of laws, and a continual
shifting and changing from one object to another, that
must expose the people to various inconveniences.
This has a certain effect, of which sagacious men al
ways have, and always will make an advantage. From
whom is advantage made ? From the industrious far
mers and tradesmen, who are ignorant of the means of
making such advantages. The people will not be ex
posed to these inconveniences under a uniform and
steady course of legislation. But they have been so
heretofore.

Sir, it has been said, that by giving up the power of
taxation, we should give up every thing ; that requisi
tions ought to be made on the states, and that then, if
they be not complied with, Congress should lay direct
taxes by way of penalty. Let us consider the dilemma
which arises from this doctrine. Either requisitions
will be efficacious or they will not. If they be effica
cious, then I say, sir, we give up every thing as much
as by direct taxation. The same amount will be paid
by the people as by direct taxes. If they be not effica
cious, where is the advantage of this plan ? In what
respect will it relieve us from the inconveniences which
we have experienced from requisitions ? The power

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 169

of laying direct taxes by the general government, is
supposed by the honorable gentleman, to be chimeri
cal and impracticable. What is the consequence of
the alternative he proposes ? We are to rely upon
this power to be ultimately used, as a penalty to com
pel the states to comply. If it be chimerical and im
practicable in the first instance, it will be equally so*
when it will be exercised as a penalty. A reference
has been made to concurrent executions, as an instance
of the possibility of interference between the two gov
ernments. But it may be answered, that under the
state governments, concurrent executions cannot pro
duce the inconvenience here dreaded, because they are
executed by the same officer. Is it not in the power
of the general government to employ the state officers ?
Is nothing to be left to future legislation, or must every
thing be immutably fixed in the constitution ? Where
exclusive power is given to the union, there can be no
interference. Where the general and state legislatures
have concurrent power, such regulations will be made,
as may be found necessary to exclude interferences
and other inconveniences. It will be their interest to
make such regulations.

It has been said, that there is no similarity between
petty corporations and independent states. I admit
that, in many points of view, there is a great dissimilari
ty, but in others, there is a striking similarity between
them, which illustrates what is before us. Have we
not seen in our own country (as has been already sug
gested in the course of the debates,) concurrent collec
tions of taxes going on at once, without producing any
inconvenience ? We have seen three distinct collec
tions of taxes for three distinct purposes. Has it not
been found practicable and easy for collections of taxes,
for parochial, county and state purposes, to go on at the
same time ? Every gentleman must know, that this
is now the case, and though there be a subordination
in these cases which will not be in the general govern
ment, yet in practice it has been found, that these differ-

VOL. i. 22

170 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

ent collections have been concurrently carried on, with
convenience to the people, without clashing with one
another, and without deriving their harmony from the
circumstance of being subordinate to one legislative
body. The taxes will be laid for different purposes.
The members of the one government, as well as of the
other, are the agents of, and subordinate to, the people.
I conceive that the collections of the taxes of the one
will not impede those of the other, and that there can
be no interference. This concurrent collection ap
pears to me neither chimerical nor impracticable.

Gentlemen compare resistance of the people to col
lectors, to refusal of requisitions. This goes against
all government. It is as much as to urge that there
should be no legislature. The gentlemen who favored
us with their observations on this subject, seemed to
have reasoned on a supposition, that the general gov
ernment was confined, by the paper on your table, to lay
general uniform taxes. Is it necessary that there
should be a tax on any given article throughout the
United States ? It is represented to be oppressive, that
the states who have slaves and make tobacco, should
pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states,
who have them not, would escape. But does the con
stitution on the table admit of this ? On the contrary,
there is a proportion to be laid on each state, accord
ing to its population. The most proper articles will
be selected in each state. If one article in any state
should be deficient, it will be laid on another article.
Our state is secured on this foundation. Its proportion
will be commensurate to its population. This is a con
stitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against
disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds.
If the taxes be not uniform, and the representatives of
some states contribute to lay a tax of which they bear
no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal ? Does
not the same principle hold in our state government in
some degree ? It has been found inconvenient to fix on
uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

parts are not circumstanced like the lower parts of the
country. In both cases, the reciprocity of the prin
ciple will prevent a disposition in one part to oppress
the other. An honorable gentleman seems to suppose
that Congress, by the possession of this ultimate power
as a penalty, will have as much credit, and will be as
able to procure any sums, on any emergency, as if they
were possessed of it in the first instance ; and that the
votes of Congress will be as competent to procure
loans, as the votes of the British commons. Would the
votes of the British house of commons have that credit,
which they now have, if they were liable to be retarded
in their operation, and perhaps rendered ultimately nu
gatory as those of Congress must be by the proposed
alternative ? When their vote passes, it usually re
ceives the concurrence of the other branch, and it is
known that there is sufficient energy in the government*
to carry it into effect. But here,.the votes of Congress
are, in the first place, dependent on the compliance of
thirteen different bodies, and after non-compliance,
are liable to be opposed and defeated, by the jealousy
of the states against the exercise of this power, and
by the opposition of the people, which may be expected,
if this power be exercised by Congress after partial
compliances. These circumstances being known.
Congress could not command one shilling. He seems
to think that we ought to spare the present generation,
and throw our burdens upon posterity. I will not
contest the equity of this reasoning, but 1 must say that
good policy, as well as views of economy, strongly urge
us even to distress ourselves to comply with our most
solemn engagements. Wre must make effectual pro
vision for the payment of the interest of our public
debts. In order to do justice to our creditors, and sup
port our credit and reputation, we must lodge power
somewhere or other for this purpose. As yet the United
States have not been able, by any energy contained in
the old system, to accomplish this end. Our creditors
have a right to demand the principal, but would be
satisfied with a punctual payment of the interest If

172 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

we have been unable to pay the interest, much less
shall we be able to discharge the principal. It ap
pears to me, that the whole reasoning used on this occa
sion shows, that we ought to adopt this system, in order
to enable us to throw our burdens on posterity. The
honorable member spoke of the decemviri at Rome,
as having some similitude to the ten representatives
who are to be appointed by this state. I can see
no point of similitude here, to enable us to draw any
conclusion. For what purpose were the decem
viri appointed ? They were invested with a plenary
commission to make a code of laws. By whom were
they appointed — by the people at large ? No ; my
memory is not infallible, but it tells me they were ap
pointed by the senate and composed of the most influ
ential characters among the nobles. Can any thing be
inferred from that against our federal representatives ?
Who made a discrimination between the nobles and
the people ? — the senate. Those men totally pervert
ed the powers, which were given them for the purpose
above specified, to the subversion of the public liberty.
Can we suppose that a similar usurpation might be
made, by men appointed in a totally different manner ?
As their circumstances were totally dissimilar, I con
ceive that no arguments drawn from that source, can
apply to this government. I do not thoroughly com
prehend the reasoning of the honorable gentleman,
when he tells us, that the federal government will predo
minate, and that the state interests will be lost ; when,
at the same time, he tells us, that it will be a faction of
seven states. If seven states will prevail as states, I
conceive that state influence will prevail. If state in
fluence under the present feeble government has pre
vailed, I think that a remedy ought to be introduced
by giving the general government power to sup
press it.

He supposes that any argument with respect to a
future war between Great Britain and France is falla
cious. The other nations of Europe have acceded to
that neutrality, while Great Britain opposed it. We

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 173

need not expect, in case of such a war, that we should
be suffered to participate of the profitable emoluments
of the carrying trade, unless we were in a respectable
situation. Recollect the last war. Was there ever a
war in which the British nation stood opposed to so
many nations ? All the belligerent powers in Europe,
with nearly one half of the British empire, were united
against it. Yet that nation, though defeated, and
humbled beyond any previous example, stood out
against this. From her firmness and spirit in such des
perate circumstances, we may divine what her future
conduct may be. I did not contend, that it was neces
sary for the United States to establish a navy for that
sole purpose, but instanced it as one reason out of se
veral, for rendering ourselves respectable. I am no
friend to naval or land armaments in time of peace, but
if they be necessary, the calamity must be submitted to.
Weakness will invite insults. A respectable govern
ment will not only entitle us to a participation of the ad
vantages which are enjoyed by other nations, but will
be a security against attacks and insults. It is to
avoid the calamity of being obliged to have large ar
maments, that we should establish this government.
The best way to avoid danger, is to be in a capacity to
withstand it.

The imposts, we are told, will not diminish, because
the emigrations to the westward will prevent the in
crease of population. Gentlemen have reasoned on
this subject justly, to a certain degree. I admit, that
the imposts will increase till population becomes so
great as to compel us to recur to manufactures. The
period cannot be very far distant, when the unsettled
parts of America will be inhabited. At the expiration
of twenty-five years hence, I conceive, that in every
part of the United States, there will be as great a popu
lation as there is now in the settled parts. We see al
ready, that in the most populous parts of the union,
and where there is but a medium, manufactures are
beginning to be established. Where this is the case.

174 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

the amount of importations will begin to diminish.
Although the imposts may even increase during the
term of twenty-five years, yet when we are preparing
a government for perpetuity, we ought to found it on
permanent principles, and not on those of a temporary
nature.

Holland is a favorite quotation with honorable mem
bers on the other side of the question. Had not their
sentiments been discovered by other circumstances, I
should have concluded from their reasonings on this
occasion, that they were friends to the constitution. I
should suppose, that they had forgotten which side of
the question they were defending. Holland has been
called a republic, and a government friendly to liberty.
Though it may be greatly superior to some other gov
ernments in Europe, still it is not a republic, nor a de
mocracy. Their legislature consists, in some degree,
of men who legislate for life. Their councils consist
of men who hold their offices for life, and who fill up
offices and appoint their salaries themselves. The
people have no agency, mediate or immediate, in the
government. If we look at their history, we shall find,
that every mischief which has befallen them, has re
sulted from the existing confederacy. If the stadthold-
er has been productive of mischief — if we ought to
guard against such a magistrate more than any evil,
let me beseech the honorable gentleman to take no
tice of what produced that, and of those troubles which
interrupted their tranquillity from time to time. The
weakness of their confederacy produced both. When
the French arms were ready to overpower their repub
lic, and the Hollanders were feeble in the means of de
fence, which was principally owing to the violence of
parties, they then appointed a stadtholder, who sus
tained them. If we look at more recent events, we
shall have a more pointed demonstration, that their po
litical infelicity arose from the imbecility of their gov
ernment. In the late disorders, the states were almost
equally divided, three provinces on one side, three on

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 175

the other , and the other divided: one party inclined to
the Prussians, and the other to the French. The
situation of France did not admit of their interposing
immediately in their disputes by an army ; that of the
Prussians did. A powerful and large army marched
into Holland and compelled the other party to surren
der. We know the distressing consequences to the
people. What produced those disputes and the ne
cessity of foreign interference but the debility of their
confederacy ? We may be warned by their example,
and shun their fate, by removing the causes which pro
duced their misfortunes.

My honorable friend has referred to the transactions
of the federal council with respect to the navigation of
the Mississippi. I wish it was consistent with delica
cy and prudence to lay a complete view of the whole
matter before this committee. The history of it is
singular and curious, and perhaps its origin ought to
be taken into consideration. I will touch on some
circumstances, and introduce nearly the substance of
most of the facts relative to it, that I may not seem to
shrink from explanation. It was soon perceived, sir,
after the commencement of the war with Britain, that
among the various objects that would aifect the happi
ness of the people of America, the navigation of the
Mississippi was one. Throughout the whole history
of foreign negotiation, great stress was laid on its pre
servation. In the time of our greatest distresses, and
particularly when the southern states were the scene
of war, the southern states cast their eyes around to be
relieved from their misfortunes. It was supposed that
assistance might be obtained for the relinquishment
of that navigation. It was thought that for so sub
stantial a consideration, Spain might be induced to af
ford decisive succor. It was opposed by the northern
and eastern states. They were sensible that it might
be dangerous to surrender this important right, parti
cularly to the inhabitants of the western country. But
so it was, that the southern states were for it. and the

176 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

eastern states opposed it. Since obtaining that happy
peace, which secures to us all our claims, this subject
has been taken again into consideration, and delibe
rated upon in the federal government. A temporary
relinquishment has been agitated. Several members
from the different states, but particularly from the
northern, were for a temporary surrender, because it
would terminate disputes, and at the end of the short
period for which it was to be given, the right would re
vert, of course, to those who had given it up. And
for this temporary surrender some commercial advan
tages were offered. For my part, I considered that
this measure, though founded on considerations plau
sible and honorable, was yet not justifiable but on
grounds of inevitable necessity. I must declare, in jus
tice to many characters who were in Congress, that
they declared they never would agree to the measure,
unless the situation of the United States was such as
could not prevent it.

On the whole, I am persuaded that the adoption of
this government will be favorable to the preservation
of the right to that navigation. Emigrations will be
made from those parts of the United States which are
settled, to those which are unsettled. If we afford pro
tection to the western country, we shall see it rapidly
peopled. Emigrations from some of the northern
states have lately increased. We may conclude, that
those who emigrate to that country, will leave behind
them all their friends and connexions as advocates for
this right.

What was the cause of those states being the cham
pions of this right, when the southern states were dis
posed to surrender it ? The preservation of this right
will be for the general interest of the union. The
western country will be settled from the north as well
as from the south, and its prosperity will add to the
strength and security of the nation. I am not able to
recollect all those circumstances which would be ne
cessary to give gentlemen a full view of the subject. I

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION'. 177

can only add, that I consider the establishment of the
new government to be the best possible means of se
curing our rights as well in the western parts as else
where.

I will not sit down till I make one more observation
on what fell from an honorable member. He said,
that the true difference between the states, lies in this
circumstance — that some are carrying states, and others
productive, and that the operation of the new gov
ernment will be, that there will be a plurality of the
former to combine against the interest of the latter*
and that consequently it will be dangerous to put it in
their power to do so. I would join with him in senti
ment, if this were the case. Were this within the
bounds of probability, I should be equally alarmed ;
but I think that those states which are contradistin
guished as carrying states, from the non-importing
states, will be but few. I suppose the southern states
will be considered by all, as under the latter descrip
tion. Some other states have been mentioned by an
honorable member on the same side, which are not
considered as carrying states. New Jersey and Con
necticut can by no means be enumerated among the
carrying states. They receive their supplies through
New York. Here then is a plurality of non-importing
states. I could add another, if necessary. Delaware,
though situated upon the water, is upon the list of
non-carrying states. I might say that a great part of
New Hampshire is so. I believe a majority of the
people of that state receive their supplies from Massa
chusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Might I not
add all those states which will be admitted hereafter
into the union ? These will be non-carrying states,
and will support Virginia in case the carrying states
should attempt to combine against the rest. This
objection must therefore fall to the ground.*

: The preceding speech is composed of several delivered by
Mr. Madison during the session of the convention.

COMPILER.
VOL. I. 23

SPEECH OF PATRICK HENRY,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 7, 1788.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I HAVE thought, and still think, that a full investiga
tion of the actual situation of America, ought to pre
cede any decision on this great and important ques
tion. That government is no more than a choice
among evils, is acknowledged by the most intelligent
among mankind, and has been a standing maxim for
ages. If it be demonstrated, that the adoption of the
new plan is a little or a trifling evil, then, sir, I acknow
ledge that adoption ought to follow : but, sir, if this
be a truth, that its adoption may entail misery on the
free people of this country, I then insist, that rejection
ought to follow. Gentlemen strongly urge that its
adoption will be a mighty benefit to us : but, sir, I am
made of such incredulous materials, that assertions
and declarations do not satisfy me. I must be con
vinced, sir. I shall retain my infidelity on that subject
till I see our liberties secured in a manner perfectly
satisfactory to my understanding.

There are certain maxims, by which every wise and
enlightened people will regulate their conduct. There
are certain political maxims, which no free people
ought ever to abandon : maxims, of which the observ
ance is essential to the security of happiness. It is

Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH, &< ,-. 179

impiously irritating the avenging hand of heaven, when
a people, who are in the full enjoyment of freedom,
launch out into the wide ocean of human affairs, and
desert those maxims which alone can preserve liberty.
Such maxims, humble as they are, are those only which
can render a nation safe or formidable. Poor little
humble republican maxims have attracted the admi
ration and engaged the attention of the virtuous and
wise in all nations, and have stood the shock of ages.
We do not now admit the validity of maxims, which
we once delighted in. We have since adopted maxims
of a different, but more refined nature ; new maxims,
which tend to the prostration of republicanism.

We have one, sir, that all men are by nature free
and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of
which, when they enter into society, they cannot, by
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity. We
have a set of maxims of the same spirit, which must
be beloved by every friend to liberty, to virtue, to man
kind — our bill of rights contains those admirable
maxims.

Now, sir, I say, let us consider, whether the picture
given of American affairs ought to drive us from those
beloved maxims.

The honorable gentleman, (Mr. Randolph,) has said,
that it is too late in the day for us to reject this new
plan. That system which was once execrated by the
honorable member, must now be adopted, let its defects
be ever so glaring. That honorable member will not
accuse me of want of candor, when I cast in my mind
what he has given the public,* and compare it to what
has happened since. It seems to me very strange and
unaccountable, that what was the object of his exe
cration should now receive his encomiums. Some
thing extraordinary must have operated so great a
change in his opinion. It is too late in the day ! Gen-

* Alluding to Mr. Randolph's letter on that subject, to the speaker
of the house of delegate?.

I BO MK. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

tlemen must excuse me, if they should declare again
and again, that it is too late, and I should think dif
ferently. I never can believe, sir, that it is too late to
save all that is precious. If it be proper, and, indepen
dently of every external consideration, wisely construct
ed, let us receive it : but, sir, shall its adoption, by
eight states, induce us to receive it, if it be replete
with the most dangerous defects ? They urge, that
subsequent amendments are safer than previous
amendments, and that they will answer the same ends.
At present, we have our liberties and privileges in our
awn hands. Let us not relinquish them. Let us not
adopt this system till we see them secured. There is
some small possibility, that should we follow the con
duct of Massachusetts, amendments might be obtain
ed. There is a small possibility of amending any
government ; but, sir, shall we abandon our inesti
mable rights, and rest their security on a mere possi
bility ? The gentleman fears the loss of the union.
If eight states have ratified it unamended, and we
should rashly imitate their precipitate example, do we
not thereby disunite from several other states ? Shall
those who have risked their lives for the sake of
union, be at once thrown out of it? If it be amended,
every state will accede to it ; but by an imprudent
adoption in its defective and dangerous state, a schism
must inevitably be the consequence; I can never,
therefore, consent to hazard our unalienable rights
on an absolute uncertainty. You are told there
is no peace, although you fondly flatter yourselves that
all is peace — no peace ; a general cry and alarm in
the country ; commerce, riches and wealth vanished ;
citizens going to seek comforts in other parts of the
world; laws insulted; many instances of tyrannical
legislation. These things, sir, are new to me. He has
made the discovery. As to the administration of jus
tice, I believe that failures in commerce, &c. cannot be
attributed to it. My age enables me to recollect its
progress under the old government. I can justify it by

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

saying, that it continues in the same manner in this
state, as it did under the former government. As to
other parts of the continent, I refer that to other gen
tlemen. As to the ability of those who administer it,
I believe they would not suffer by a comparison with
those who administered it under the royal authority.
Where is the cause of complaint if the wealthy go
away ? Is this, added to the other circumstances, of
such enormity, and does it bring such danger over this
commonwealth, as to warrant so important, and so
awful a change, in so precipitate a manner ? As to
insults offered to the laws, I know of none. In this re
spect, I believe this commonwealth would not suffer
by a comparison with the former government. The
laws are as well executed, and as patiently acquiesced
in, as they were under the royal administration. Com
pare the situation of the country; compare that of our
citizens to what they were then, and decide whether
persons and property are not as safe and secure as
they were at that time. Is there a man in this com
monwealth, whose person can be insulted with impuni
ty ? Cannot redress be had here for personal insults
or injuries, as well as in any part of the world; as well
as in those countries where aristocrats and monarchs
triumph and reign ? Is not the protection of property
in full operation here ? The contrary cannot, with
truth, be charged on this commonwealth. Those se
vere charges which are exhibited against it, appear to
me totally groundless. On a fair investigation, we
shall be found to be surrounded by no real dangers.
We have the animating fortitude and persevering
alacrity of republican men, to carry us through misfor
tunes and calamities. 'Tis the fortune of a republic to
be able to withstand the stormy ocean of human vicis
situdes. I know of no danger awaiting us. Public
and private security are to be found here in the highest
degree. Sir, it is the fortune of a free people, not to
be intimidated by imaginary dangers. Fear is the
passion of slaves. Our political and natural hemis-

182 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

pheres are now equally tranquil. Let us recollect the
awful magnitude of the subject of our deliberation.
Let us consider the latent consequences of an errone
ous decision, and let not our minds be led away by
unfair misrepresentations and uncandid suggestions.
There have been many instances of uncommon lenity
and temperance used in the exercise of power in this
commonwealth. I could call your recollection to
many that happened during the war and since, but
every gentleman here must be apprised of them.

The honorable member has given you an elaborate
account of what he judges tyrannical legislation, and
an ex post facto law in the case of Josiah Phillips.
He has misrepresented the facts. That man was not
executed by a tyrannical stroke of power; nor was
he a Socrates. He was a fugitive murderer and an
outlaw ; a man who commanded an infamous bandit
ti, at a time when the war was at the most perilous
stage. He committed the most cruel and shocking
barbarities. He was an enemy to the human name.
Those, who declare war against the human race, may
be struck out of existence as soon as they are appre
hended. He was not executed according to those
beautiful legal ceremonies which are pointed out by
the laws, in criminal cases. The enormity of his
crimes did not entitle him to it. I am truly a friend to
legal forms and methods ; but, sir, the occasion war
ranted the measure. A pirate, an outlaw, or a com
mon enemy to all mankind, may be put to death at
any time. It is justified by the laws of nature and
nations.

The honorable member tells us then, that there are
burnings and discontents in the hearts of our citizens
in general, and that they are dissatisfied with their
government. I have no doubt the honorable member
believes this to be the case, because he says so. But
I have the comfortable assurance, that it is a certain
fact, that it is not so. The middle and lower ranks of
people have not those illumined ideas, which the well-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 133

born are so happily possessed of; they cannot so rea
dily perceive latent objects. The microscopic eyes of
modern statesmen, can see abundance of defects in old
systems; and their illumined imaginations discover
the necessity of a change. They are captivated by
the parade of the number ten ; the charms of the ten
miles square. Sir, I fear this change will ultimately
lead to our ruin. My fears are not the force of ima
gination ; they are but too well founded. I tremble
for my country : but, sir, I trust, I rely, and I am confi
dent, that this political speculation has not taken so
strong a hold of men's minds, as some would make
us believe.

The dangers which may arise from our geographi
cal situation, will be more properly considered a while
hence. At present, what may be surmised on the
subject, with respect to the adjacent states, is merely
visionary. Strength, sir, is a relative term. When I
reflect on the natural force of those nations that might
be induced to attack us, and consider the difficulty of
the attempt and uncertainty of the success, and com
pare thereto the relative strength of our country, I say
that we are strong. We have no cause to fear from
that quarter; we have nothing to dread from our
neighboring states. The superiority of our cause
would give us an advantage over them, were they so
unfriendly or rash as to attack us. As to that part of
the community, which the honorable gentleman spoke
of as in danger of being separated from us, what in
citement or inducement could its inhabitants have to
wish such an event ? It is a matter of doubt whether
they would derive any advantage to themselves, or be
any loss to us by such a separation. Time has been,
and may yet come, when they will find it their advan
tage and true interest to be united with us. There is
no danger of a dismemberment of our country, unless
a constitution be adopted which will enable the gov
ernment to plant enemies on our backs. By the con
federation, the rights of territory are secured. No

184 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH OX

treaty can be made without the consent of nine states
While the consent of nine states is necessary to the
cession of territory, you are safe. If it be put in the
power of a less number, you will most infallibly lose the
Mississippi. As long as we can preserve our unaliena-
ble rights, we are in safety. This new constitution
will involve in its operation the loss of the navigation
of that valuable river. The honorable gentleman can
not be ignorant of the Spanish transactions. A treaty
had been nearly entered into with Spain, to relinquish
that navigation, and that relinquishment would abso
lutely have taken place, had the consent of seven
states been sufficient. The honorable gentleman told
us then, that eight states having adopted this system,
we cannot suppose they will recede on our account. 1
know not what they may do ; but this I know, that a
people of infinitely less importance than those of Vir
ginia, stood the terror of war. Vermont, sir,' withstood
the terror of thirteen states. Maryland did not accede
to the confederation till the year 1781. These two
states, feeble as they are, comparatively to us, were
not afraid of the whole union. Did either of these
states perish ? No, sir, they were admitted freely into
the union. Will not Virginia then be admitted ? I
flatter myself that those states who have ratified the
new plan of government will open their arms and
cheerfully receive us, although we should propose
certain amendments as the conditions on which we
would ratify it. During the late war, all the states
were in pursuit of the same object. To obtain that
object, they made the most strenuous exertions. They
did not suffer trivial considerations to impede its ac
quisition. Give me leave to say, that if the smallest
states in the union were admitted into it, after having
unreasonably procrastinated their accession, the
greatest and most mighty state in the union, will be
easily admitted, when her reluctance to an immediate
accession to this system is founded on the most rea
sonable grounds. When I call this the most mighty

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 185

.state in the union, do I not speak the truth ? Does not
Virginia surpass every state in the union, in number of
inhabitants, extent of territory, felicity of position, and
affluence and wealth ? Some infatuation hangs over
men's minds, that they will inconsiderately precipitate
into measures the most important, and give not a mo
ment's deliberation to others, nor pay any respect to
their opinions. Is this federalism ? Are these the be
loved effects of the federal spirit, that its votaries will
never accede to the just propositions of others ? Sir,
were there nothing objectionable in it but that, I would
vote against it. I desire to have nothing to do with
such men as will obstinately refuse to change their
opinions. Are our opinions not to be regarded ? I
hope that you will recollect, that you are going to join
with men who will pay no respect even to this state.

Switzerland consists of thirteen cantons expressly
confederated for national defence. They have stood
the shock of four hundred years : that country has en
joyed internal tranquillity most of that long period.
Their dissensions have been, comparatively to those
of other countries, very few. What has passed in the
neighboring countries? — wars, dissensions and in
trigues — Germany involved in the most deplorable
civil war thirty years successively, continually con
vulsed with intestine divisions, and harassed by for
eign wars — France with her mighty monarchy per
petually at war. Compare the peasants of Switzer
land with those of any other mighty nation : you will
find them far more happy ; for one civil war among
them, there have been five or six among other na
tions : their attachment to their country, and to free
dom, their resolute intrepidity in their defence, the
consequent security and happiness which they have
enjoyed, and the respect and awe which these things
produced in their bordering nations, have signalized
those republicans. Their valor, sir, has been active ;
everything that sets in motion the springs of the hu
man heart, engaged them to the protection of their in-

VOL. T. 24

186 MH. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

estimable privileges. They have not only secured
their own liberty, but have been the arbiters of the
fate of other people. Here, sir, contemplate the tri
umph of republican governments over the pride of
monarchy. I acknowledge, sir, that the necessity of
national defence has prevailed in invigorating their
councils and arms, and has been, in a considerable de-
gree,*the means of keeping these honest people to
gether. But, sir, they have had wisdom enough to
keep together and render" themselves formidable.
Their heroism is proverbial. They would heroically
fight for their government, and their laws. One of
the illumined sons of these times would not fight for
those objects. Those virtuous and simple people
have not a mighty and splendid president, nor enor
mously expensive navies and armies to support. No,
sir, those brave republicans have acquired their repu
tation no less by their undaunted intrepidity, than by
the wisdom of their frugal and economical policy?
Let us follow their example, and be equally happy.
The honorable member advises us to adopt a measure
which will 4estroy our bill of rights : for, after hear
ing his picture of nations, and his reasons for aban
doning all the powers retained to the states by the
confederation, I am more firmly persuaded of the im
propriety of adopting this * new plan in its present
shape.

I had doubts of the power of those who went to the
convention ; but now we are possessed of it, let us exa
mine it. When we trusted the great object of revising
the confederation to the greatest, the best and most
enlightened of our citizens, we thought their delibera
tions would have been solely confined to that revision.
Instead of this, a new system, totally different in its
nature, and vesting the most extensive powers in Con
gress, is presented. Will the ten men you are to send
to Congress, be more worthy than those seven were ?
If power grew so rapidly in their hands, what may it
not do in the hands of others ? If those who go from

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 187

this state will find power accompanied with temptation,
our situation must be truly critical. When about form
ing a government, if we mistake the principles, or com
mit any other error, the very circumstance promises
that power will be abused. The greatest caution and
circumspection are therefore necessary : nor does this
proposed system in its investigation here, deserve the
least charity.

The honorable . member says, that the national
government is without energy. I perfectly agree with
him : and when he cried out union, I agreed with him :
but I tell him not to mistake the end for the means.
The end is union ; the most capital means, I suppose,
are an army and navy : on a supposition I will ac
knowledge this ; still the bare act of agreeing to that
paper, though it may have an amazing influence, will
not pay our millions. There must be things to pay
debts. What these things are, or how they are to be
produced, must be determined by our political wisdom
and economy.

The honorable gentleman alledges, that previous
amendments will prevent the junction of our riches
from producing great profits and emoluments, (which
would enable us to pay our public debts,) by exclud
ing us from the union. I believe, sir, that a previous
ratification of a system notoriously and confessedly de
fective, will endanger our riches ; our liberty; our all.
Its defects are acknowledged ; they cannot be denied.
The reason offered' by the honorable gentleman for
adopting this defective system, is the adoption by eight
states. I say, sir, that, if we present nothing but what
is reasonable in the shape of amendments, they will re
ceive us. Union is as necessary for them as for us.
Will they then be so unreasonable as not to join us ?
If such be their disposition, I am happy to know it in
time.

The honorable member then observed, that nations
will expend millions for commercial advantages : that
is, they will deprive you of every advantage if they can.

188 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

Apply this another way. Their cheaper way, instead
of laying out millions in making war upon you. will be
to corrupt your senators. I know that if they be not
above all price, they may make a sacrifice of our
commercial interests. They may advise your president
to make a treaty that will not only sacrifice all your
commercial interests, but throw prostrate your bill of
rights. Does he fear that their ships will outnumber
ours on the ocean, or that nations, whose interests
come in contrast with ours, in the progress of their
guilt, will perpetrate the vilest expedients to exclude
us from a participation in commercial advantages ?
Does he advise us, in order to avoid this evil, to adopt
a constitution, which will enable such nations to obtain
their ends by the more easy mode of contaminating the
principles of our senators ? Sir, if our senators will
not be corrupted, it will be because they will be good
men; and not because the constitution provides
against corruption; for there is no real check secured
in it, and the most abandoned and profligate acts may
with impunity be committed by them.

With respect to Maryland, what danger from
thence ? I know none. I have not heard of any hos
tility premeditated or committed. Nine tenths of the
people have not heard of it. Those who are so happy
as to be illumined, have not informed their fellow-citi
zens of it. I am so valiant as to say, that no danger
can come from that source, sufficient to make me
abandon my republican principles. The honorable
gentleman ought to have recollected, that there were
no tyrants in America, as there are in Europe : the
citizens of republican borders are only terrible to ty
rants : instead of being dangerous to one another,
they mutually support one another's liberties. We
might be confederated with the adopting states, with
out ratifying this system. No form of government
renders a people more formidable. A confederacy of
states joined together, becomes strong as the United
Netherlands. The government of Holland, (execrated

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

as it is,) proves that the present confederation is ade
quate to every purpose of human association. There
are seven provinces confederated together for a long
time, containing numerous opulent cities and many of
the finest ports in the world. The recollection of the
situation of that country, would make me execrate
monarchy. The singular felicity and success of that
people, are unparalleled ; freedom has done miracles
there in reclaiming land from the ocean. It is the
richest spot on the face of the globe. Have they no
men or money ? Have they no fleets or armies ?
Have they no arts or sciences among them ? How
did they repel the attacks of the greatest nations in
the world ? How have they acquired their amazing in
fluence and power ? Did they consolidate govern
ment, to effect these purposes as we do ? No, sir, they
have triumphed over every obstacle and difficulty,
and have arrived at the summit of political felicity,
and of uncommon opulence, by means of a confede
racy ; that very government which gentlemen affect to
despise. They have, sir, avoided a consolidation as
the greatest of evils. They have lately, it is true,
made one advance to that fatal progression. This
misfortune burst on them by iniquity and artifice.
That stadtholder, that executive magistrate, contriv
ed it, in conjunction with other European nations. It
was not the choice of the people. Was it owing to
his energy that this happened ? If two provinces have
paid nothing, what have not the rest done ? And have
not these two provinces made other exertions ? Ought
they to avoid this inconvenience, to have consolidated
their different states, and have a ten miles square ?
Compare that little spot, nurtured by liberty, with the
fairest country in the world. Does not Holland pos-
vsess a powerful navy and army, and a full treasury ?
They did not acquire these by debasing the principles
and trampling on the rights of their citizens. Sir, they
acquired these by their industry, economy, and by the
freedom of their government. Their commerce is the

190 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

most extensive in Europe : their credit is unequalled :
their felicity will be an eternal monument of the bless
ings of liberty ; every nation in Europe is taught by
them what they are, and what they ought to be. The
contrast between those nations and this happy people,
is the most splendid spectacle for republicans: the
greatest cause of exultation and triumph to the sons
of freedom. While other nations, precipitated by the
rage of ambition or folly, have, in the pursuit of the
most magnificent projects, rivetted the fetters of bond
age on themselves and their descendants, these repub
licans have secured their political happiness and free
dom. Where is there a nation to be compared to them ?
Where is there now, or where was there ever a nation,
of so small a territory, and so few in number, so
powerful, so wealthy, so happy ? What is the
cause of this superiority? Liberty, sir, the freedom
of their government. Though they are now unhap
pily in some degree consolidated, yet they have
my acclamations, when put in contrast with those
millions of their fellow-men who lived and died slaves.
The dangers of a consolidation ought to be guarded
against in this country. I shall exert my poor talents
to ward them off. Dangers are to be apprehended in
whatever manner we proceed : but those of a consoli
dation are the most destructive. Let us leave no ex
pedient untried to secure happiness ; but whatever be
our decision, I am consoled, if American liberty will re
main entire, only for half a century ; and I trust that
mankind in general, and our posterity in particular,
will be compensated for every anxiety we now feel.

Another gentleman tells us, that no inconvenience
will result from the exercise of the power of taxation
by the general government ; that two shillings out of
ten may be saved by the impost ; and that four shillings
may be paid to the federal collector, and four to the
state collector. A change of government will not pay
money. If from the probable amount of the impost, you
take the enormous and extravagant expenses, which

TH£ FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 191

will certainly attend the support of this great con
solidated government, I believe you will find no reduc
tion of the public burdens by this new system. The
splendid maintenance of the president and of the
members of both houses ; and the salaries and fees of
the swarm of officers and dependants on the gov
ernment, will cost this continent immense sums. Double
sets of collectors will double the expense. To these
are to be added oppressive excise-men and custom
house officers. Sir, the people have an hereditary ha
tred to custom-house officers. The experience of the
mother country leads me to detest them. They have
introduced their baneful influence into the administra
tion, and destroyed one of the, most beautiful systems
that ever the world saw. Our forefathers enjoyed
liberty there, while that system was in its purity, but
it is now contaminated by influence of every kind.

The style of the government, (we the people,) was
introduced, perhaps, to recommend it to the people at
large ; to those citizens who are to be levelled and de
graded to the lowest degree, who are likened to a
herd, and who, by the operation of this blessed sys
tem, are to be transformed from respectable, indepen
dent citizens, to abject, dependent subjects or slaves.
The honorable gentleman has anticipated what we arc
to be reduced to, by degradingly assimilating our citi
zens to a herd.

[Here Mr. Randolph rose, and declared that he did
not use that word to excite any odium, but merely to
convey the idea of a multitude.]

Mr. Henry replied, that it made a deep impression
on his mind, and that he verily believed, that system
would operate as he had said. [He then continued] —
I will exchange that abominable word for requisitions ;
requisitions which gentlemen affect to despise, have
nothing degrading in them. On this depends our po
litical prosperity. I never will give up that darling
word, requisitions ; my country may give it up ; a ma
jority may wrest it from me, but I will never give it up

192 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

till my grave. Requisitions are attended with one sin
gular advantage. They are attended by deliberation.
They secure to the states the benefit of correcting op
pressive errors. If our assembly thought requisitions
erroneous, if they thought the demand was too
great, they might at least supplicate Congress to re
consider, that it was a little too much. The power of
direct taxation was called by the honorable gentleman
the soul of the government : another gentleman called
it the lungs of the government. We all agree, that it
is the most important part of the body politic. If the
power of raising money be necessary for the general
government, it is no less so for the states. If money
be the vitals of Congress, is it not precious for those
individuals from whom it is to be taken ? Must I give
my soul, my lungs, to Congress ? Congress must have
our souls ; the state must have our souls. This is dis
honorable and disgraceful. These two co-ordinate,
interfering, unlimited powers of harassing the com
munity, are unexampled — unprecedented in history:
they are the visionary projects of modern politicians :
tell me not of imaginary means, but of reality : this po
litical solecism will never tend to the benefit of the
community. It will be as oppressive in practice as it
is absurd in theory. If you part from this, which the
honorable gentleman tells you is the soul of Congress,
you will be inevitably ruined. I tell you, they shall not
have the soul of Virginia. They tell us, that one col
lector may collect the federal and state taxes. The
general government being paramount to the state le
gislatures, if the sheriff is to collect for both — his right
hand for the Congress, his left for the state — his right
hand being paramount over the left, his collections will
go to Congress. We will have the rest. Deficiences
in collections will always operate against the states.
Congress being the paramount, supreme power, must
not be disappointed. Thus Congress will have an un
limited, unbounded command over the soul of this
commonwealth. After satisfying their uncontrolled

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 193

demands, what can be left for the states ? Not a suf
ficiency even to defray the expense of their internal
administration. They must therefore glide impercep
tibly and gradually out of existence. This, sir, must
naturally terminate in a consolidation. If this will do
for other people, it never will do for me.

If we are to have one representative for every thirty
thousand souls, it must be by implication. The con
stitution does not positively secure it. Even say it is
a natural implication, why not give us a right to that,
proportion in express terms, in language that could
not admit of evasions or subterfuges ? If they can use
implication for us, they can also use implication against
us. We are giving power ; they are getting power :
judge then, on which side the implication will be used.
When we once put it in their option to assume con
structive power, danger will follow. Trial by jury, and
liberty of the press, are also on this foundation of im
plication. If they encroach on these rights, and you
give your implication for a plea, you are cast ; for they
will be justified by the last part of it, which gives them
full power " To make all laws which shall be necessa
ry and proper to carry their powers into execution."
Implication is dangerous, because it is unbounded : it'
it be admitted at all, and no limits be prescribed, it
admits of the utmost extension. They say, that every
thing that is not given is retained. The reverse of the
proposition is true by implication. They do not carry
their implication so far when they speak of the gene
ral welfare. No implication when the sweeping clause
comes. Implication is only necessary when the ex
istence of privileges is in dispute. The existence of
powers is sufficiently established. If we trust our dear
est rights to implication, we shall be in a very unhap
py situation.

Implication in England has been a source of dissen
sion. There has been a war of implication between
the king and people. For one hundred years did the
mother country struggle under the uncertainty of im-

VOL, i 25

194 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

plication. The people insisted that their rights were
implied: the monarch denied the doctrine. Their
bill of rights in some degree terminated the dispute.
By a bold implication, they said they had a right to
bind us in all cases whatsoever. This constructive
power we opposed, and successfully. Thirteen or
fourteen years ago, the most important thing that
eould be thought of, was to exclude the possibility of
construction and implication. These, sir, were then
deemed perilous. The first thing that was thought of,
was a bill of rights. We were not satisfied with your
constructive argumentative rights.

Mr. Henry then declared, a bill of rights indispensa
bly necessary ; that a general positive provision should
be inserted in the new system, securing to the states
and the people, every right which was not conceded
to the general government ; and that every implica
tion should be done away. It being now late, he con
cluded by observing, that he would resume the sub
ject another time.

On the 9th, Mr. Henry continued his remarks as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I find myself again constrained to trespass on the
patience of this committee. I wish there was a pros
pect of union in our sentiments ; so much time would
not then be taken up. But when I review the magni
tude of the subject under consideration, and of the
dangers which appear to me in this new plan of gov
ernment, and compare thereto my poor abilities to
secure our rights, it will take much more time, in my
poor unconnected way, to traverse the objectionable
parts of it ; there are friends here who will be abler
than myself, to make good these objections which to
us appear well founded. If we recollect, on last Sa
turday, I made some observations on some of those
dangers, which these gentlemen would fain persuade
us hang over the citizens of this commonwealth, to
induce us to change the government, and adopt the

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 195

new plan. Unless there be great and awful dangers,
the change is dangerous, and the experiment ought
not to be made. In estimating the magnitude of these
dangers, we are obliged to take a most serious view
of them, to feel them, to handle them, and to be fami
liar with them. It is not sufficient to feign mere ima
ginary dangers: there must be a dreadful reality.
The great question between us is, does that reality
exist ? These dangers are partially attributed to bad
laws, execrated by the community at large. It is said
the people wish to change the government. I should
be happy to meet them on that ground. Should the
people wish to change it, we should be innocent of the
dangers. It is a fact, that the people do not wish to
change their government. How am I to prove it?
It will rest on my bare assertion, unless supported by
an internal conviction in men's breasts. My poor say-
so is a mere non-entity. But, sir. I am persuaded that
four fifths of the people of Virginia must have amend
ments to the new plan, to reconcile them to a change
of their government. Our assertions form but a slip
pery foundation for the people to rest their political
salvation on. No government can flourish unless it be
founded on the affection of the people. Unless gentle
men can be sure, that this new system is founded on
that ground, they ought to stop their career.

I will not repeat what the gentlemen say, but will
mention one thing. There is a dispute between us
and the Spaniards, about the right of navigating the
Mississippi. This dispute has sprung from the fede
ral government. I wish a great deal to be said on thi?
subject. I wish to know the origin and progress of
the business, as it would probably unfold great dan
gers. In my opinion, the preservation of that river
calls for our most serious consideration. It has been
agitated in Congress. Seven states have voted so as
that it is known to the Spaniards, that under our ex
isting system, the Mississippi shall be taken from them.
Seven states wished to relinquish this river to then*

J96 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

The six southern states opposed it. Seven states not
being sufficient to convey it away, it remains now
ours. If I am wrong, there are a number on this floor,
who can contradict the facts ; I will readily retract.
This new government, I conceive, will enable those
states, who have already discovered their inclination
that way, to give away this river. Will the honorable
gentleman advise us to relinquish this inestimable na
vigation, and place formidable enemies to our backs ?
This weak, this poor confederation cannot secure us.
We are resolved to take shelter under the shield of
federal authority in America. The southern parts of
America have been protected by that weakness so
much execrated. I hope this will be explained. I was
not in Congress when these transactions took place,
I may not have stated every fact. I may have mis
represented matters. I hope to be fully acquainted
with every thing relative to the subject. Let us hear
how the great and important right of navigating that
river has been attended to ; and whether I am mistak
en in my opinion, that federal measures will lose it to
us forever. If a bare majority of Congress can make
laws, the situation of our western citizens is dreadful.
We are threatened with danger for the non-pay
ment of the debt due to France. We have informa
tion from an illustrious citizen of Virginia, who is now
in Paris, which disproves the suggestions of such dan
ger. This citizen has not been in the airy regions of
theoretic speculation ; our ambassador is this worthy
citizen. The ambassador of the United States of
America, is not so despised as the honorable gentle
man would make us believe. A servant of a republic
is as much respected as that of a monarch. The ho
norable gentleman tells us, that hostile fleets are to be
sent to make reprisals upon us ; our ambassador tells
you, that the king of France has taken into considera
tion, to enter into commercial regulations on recipro
cal terms with us, which will be of peculiar advantage
to ns. Does this look like hostility ? I might go fur-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 197

fher; I might say, not from public authority, but good
information, that his opinion is, that you reject this
government. His character and abilities are in the
highest estimation ; he is well acquainted, in every re
spect, with this country ; equally so with the policy of
the European nations. This illustrious citizen advises
you to reject this government, till it be amended. His
sentiments coincide entirely with ours. His attach
ment to, and services done for this country, are well
known. At a great distance from us, he remembers
and studies our happiness. Living amidst splendor
and dissipation, he thinks yet of bills of rights — thinks
of those little despised things called maxims. Let us
follow the sage advice of this common friend of our
happiness. It is little usual for nations to send armies
to collect debts. The house of Bourbon, that great
friend of America, will never attack her for the unwilling
delay of payment. Give me leave to say, that Europe
is too much engaged about objects of greater impor
tance to attend to us. On that great theatre of the
world, the little American matters vanish. Do you
believe, that the mighty monarch of France, beholding
the greatest scenes that ever engaged the attention of
a prince of that country, will divert himself from those
important objects, and now call for a settlement of ac
counts with America ? This proceeding is not war
ranted by good sense. The friendly disposition to us,
and the actual situation of France, render the idea of
danger from that quarter absurd. Would this coun
tryman of ours be fond of advising us to a measure
which he knew to be dangerous — and can it be rea
sonably supposed, that he can be ignorant of any pre
meditated hostility against this country ? The honor
able gentleman may suspect the account, but I will do
our friend the justice to say that he would warn us of
any danger from France.

Do you suppose the Spanish monarch will risk a
contest with the United States, when his feeble colo
nies are exposed to them ? Every advance the people

I

J98 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

here make to the westward, makes him tremble for
Mexico and Peru. Despised as we are among our
selves under our present government, we are terrible
to that monarchy. If this be not a fact, it is general
ly said so.

We are in the next place frightened by dangers from
Holland. We must change our government to escape
the wrath of that republic. Holland groans under a
government like this new one. A stadtholder, sir, a
Dutch president has brought on that country, miseries
which will not permit them to collect debts with fleets
or armies. The wife of a Dutch stadtholder brought
one hundred thousand men against that republic, and
prostrated all opposition. This president will bring
miseries on us like those of Holland. Such is the con
dition of European affairs, that it would be unsafe for
them to send fleets or armies to collect debts. But
here, sir, they make a transition to objects of another
kind. We are presented with dangers of a very un
common nature. I am not acquainted with the arts of
painting. Some gentlemen have a peculiar talent for
them. They are practised with great ingenuity on
this occasion. As a counterpart to what we have
already been intimidated with, we are told, that some
lands have been sold which cannot be found ; and that
this will bring war on this country. Here the picture
will not stand examination. Can it be supposed, that
if a few land speculators and jobbers have violated the
principles of probity, that it will involve this country in
war ? Is there no redress to be otherwise obtained,
even admitting the delinquents and sufferers to be nu
merous ? When gentlemen are thus driven to produce
imaginary dangers, to induce this convention to assent
to this change, I am sure it will not be uncandid to say,
that the change itself is really dangerous. Then the
Maryland compact is broken, and will produce peril
ous consequences. I see nothing very terrible in this.
The adoption of the new system will not remove the
evil Will they forfeit good neighborhood with us, be-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 199

cause the compact is broken ? Then the disputes con
cerning the Carolina line are to involve us in dangers.
A strip of land running from the westward of the
Allegany to the Mississippi, is the subject of this
pretended dispute. I do not know the length or breadth
of this disputed spot. Have they not regularly con
firmed our right to it and relinquished all claims to it ?
I can venture to pledge, that the people of Carolina
will never disturb us. The strength of this despised
country has settled an immense tract of country to
the westward. Give me leave to remark, that the
honorable gentleman's observations on our frontiers,
north and south, east and west, are all inaccurate.

Will Maryland fight against this country for seeking
amendments ? Were there not sixty members in that
state who went in quest of amendments ? Sixty against
eight or ten were in favor of pursuing amendments.
Shall they fight us for doing what they themselves
have done ? They have sought amendments, but dif
ferently from the manner in which I wish amendments
to be got. The honorable gentleman may plume him
self on this difference. Will they fight us for this dis
similarity ? Will they fight us for seeking the object
they seek themselves ? When they do, it will be time
for me to hold my peace. Then, sir, comes Pennsylva
nia, in terrible array. Pennsylvania is to go in conflict
with Virginia. Pennsylvania has been a good neigh
bor heretofore. She is federal — something terrible :
Virginia cannot look her in the face. If we sufficiently
attend to the actual situation of things, we will con
clude, that Pennsylvania will do what we do. A num
ber of that country are strongly opposed to it. Many
of them have lately been convinced of its fatal ten
dency. They are disgorged of their federalism. I
beseech you to bring this matter home to yourselves.
Was there a possibility for the people of that state to
know the reasons of adopting that system or under
stand its principles, in so very short a period after its
formation? This is the middle of June. Those

200 M&. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

transactions happened last August. The matter was
circulated by every effort of industry, and the most
precipitate measures taken to hurry the people into an
adoption. Yet now, after having had several months
since to investigate it, a very large part of this commu
nity — -a very great majority of this community, do
not understand it. I have heard gentlemen of re
spectable abilities declare they did not understand
it. If after great pains, men of high learning, who
have received the aid of a regular education, do not
understand it ; if the people of Pennsylvania under
stood it in so short a time, it must have been from in
tuitive understandings, and uncommon acuteness of
perception. Place yourselves in their situation ; would
you fight your neighbors for considering this great
and awful matter ? If you wish for real amendments,
such as the security of the trial by jury, it will reach
the hearts of the people of that state. Whatever may
be the disposition of the aristocratical politicians of
that country, I know there are friends of human na
ture in that state. If so, they will never make war on
those who make professions of what they are attached
to themselves.

As to the danger arising from borderers, it is mutual
and reciprocal. If it be dangerous for Virginia, it is
equally so for them. It will be their true interest to
be united with us. The danger of our being their ene
mies, will be a prevailing argument in our favor. It
will be as powerful to admit us into the union, as a vote
of adoption without previous amendments could pos
sibly be.

Then the savage Indians are to destroy us. We
cannot look them in the face. The danger is here di
vided ; they are as terrible to the other states as to
us : but, sir, it is well known that we have nothing to
fear from them. Our back settlers are considerably
stronger than they, and their superiority increases
daily. Suppose the states to be confederated all
around us, what we want in number, we shall make up

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 201

otherwise. Our compact situation and natural strength
will secure us. But to avoid all dangers, we must take
shelter under the federal government. Nothing gives
a decided importance but this federal government.
You will sip sorrow, according to the vulgar phrase, if
you want any other security than the laws of Virginia.
• A number of characters of the greatest eminence in
this country, object to this government, for its conso
lidating tendency. This is not imaginary. It is a
formidable reality. If consolidation proves to be as
mischievous to this country, as it has been to other
countries, what will the poor inhabitants of this country
do ? This government will operate like an ambus-
ca.de. It will destroy the state governments, and swal
low up the liberties of the people, without giving them
previous notice. If gentlemen are willing to run the
hazard, let them run it ; but I shall exculpate myself
by my opposition, and monitory warnings within these
walls. But then comes paper money. We are at
peace on this subject. Though this is a thing which
that mighty federal convention had no business with,
yet I acknowledge that paper money would be the bane
of this country. I detest it. Nothing can justify a
people in resorting to it, but extreme necessity. It is
at rest, however, in this commonwealth. It is no longer
solicited or advocated.

Sir, I ask you, and every other gentleman who hears
me, if he can restrain his indignation at a system,
which takes from the state legislatures the care and
preservation of the interests of the people ; one hun
dred and eighty representatives^ the choice of the peo
ple of Virginia, cannot be trusted with their interests.
They are a mobbish, suspected herd. This country
has not virtue enough to manage its own internal inter
ests. These must be referred to the chosen ten. If
we cannot be trusted with the private contracts of the
citizens, we* must be depraved indeed. If he can
prove, that, by one uniform system of abandoned princi
ples, the legislature has betrayed the rights of the peo

VOL. i. 26

202 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH Oft

pie, then let us seek another shelter. So degrading
an indignity — so flagrant an outrage on the states — so
vile a suspicion is humiliating to my mind, and many
others.

Will the adoption of this new plan pay our debts ?
This, sir, is a plain question. It is inferred, that our
grievances are to be redressed, and the evils of the
existing system to be removed by the new constitution.
Let me inform the honorable gentleman, that no nation
ever paid its debts by a change of government, with
out the aid of industry. You never will pay your debts
but by a radical change of domestic economy. At
present, you buy too much, and make too little to pay.
Will this new system promote manufactures, industry
and frugality ? If, instead of this, your hopes and de
signs will be disappointed, you relinquish a great
deal, and hazard infinitely more for nothing. Will it
enhance the value of your lands ? Will it lessen your
burdens ? Will your looms and wheels go to work
by the act of adoption ? If it will in its consequences
produce these things, it will consequently produce a
reform, and enable you to pay your debts. Gentlemen
must prove it. I am a sceptic — an infidel on this
point. I cannot conceive that it will have these happy
consequences. I cannot confide in assertions and al
legations. The evils that attend us, lie in extrava
gance and want of industry, and can only be removed
by assiduity and economy. Perhaps we shall be told
by gentlemen, that these things will happen, because
the administration is to be taken from us, and placed
in the hands of the luminous few, who will pay differ
ent attention, and be more studiously careful than we
can be supposed to be.

With respect to the economical operation of the
new government, I will only remark, that the national
expenses will be increased — if not doubled, it will ap
proach it very near. I might, without incurring the
imputation of illiberality or extravagance, say, that the
expense will be multiplied tenfold. I might tell you

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 203

of a numerous standing army; a great, powerful
navy ; a long and rapacious train of officers and de
pendents, independent of the president, senators and
representatives, whose compensations are without
limitation. How are our debts to be discharged un
less the taxes are increased, when the expenses of
government are so greatly augmented ? The defects
of this system are so numerous and palpable, and so
many states object to it, that no union can be expected,
unless it be amended. Let us take a review of the
facts. New Hampshire and Rhode Island have re
jected it. They have refused to become federal.
New York and North Carolina are reported to be
strongly against it. From high authority, give me
leave to tell, that New York is in high opposition.
Will any gentleman say that North Carolina is not
against it ? They may say so, but I say that the adop
tion of it, in those two states, amounts to entire un
certainty. The system must be amended before these
four states will accede to it. Besides, there are seve
ral other states who are dissatisfied, and wish altera
tions. Massachusetts has, in decided terms, proposed
amendments ; but by her previous ratification, has put
the cart before the horse. Maryland instituted a com
mittee to propose amendments. It then appears, that
two states have actually refused to adopt — two of
those who have adopted, have a desire of amending.
And there is a probability of its being rejected by
New York and North Carolina. The other states have
acceded without proposing amendments. With re
spect to them, local circumstances have, in my judg
ment, operated to produce its unconditional, instantane
ous adoption. The locality of the seat of government,
ten miles square, and the seat of justice, with all their
concomitant emoluments, operated so powerfully with
the first adopting state, that it was adopted without
taking time to reflect. We are told that numerous ad
vantages will result from the concentration of the
wealth and grandeur of the United States in one happy

204 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH OK

spot, to those who will reside in or near it. Prospects
of profit and emoluments have a powerful influence on
the human mind. We, sir, have no such projects as
that of a grand seat of government for thirteen states,
and perhaps for one hundred states hereafter. Con
necticut and New Jersey have their localities also.
New York lies between them. They have no ports,
and are not importing states. New York is an im
porting state, and taking advantage of its situation,
makes them pay duties for all the articles of their con
sumption : thus, these two states being obliged to im
port all they want, through the medium of New York,
pay the particular taxes of that state. 1 know the force
and effect of reasoning- of this sort, by experience.
When the impost was proposed some years ago, those
states which were not importing states, readily agreed
to concede to Congress, the power of laying an impost
on all goods imported for the use of the continental
treasury. Connecticut and New Jersey therefore, are
influenced by advantages of trade in their adoption.
The amounts of all imposts are to go into one common
treasury. This favors adoption by the non-importing
states ; as they participate in the profits which were
before exclusively enjoyed by the importing states.
Notwithstanding this obvious advantage to Connecti
cut, there is a formidable minority there against it.
After taking this general review of American affairs,
as respecting federalism, will the honorable gentleman
tell me, that he can expect union in America ? When
so many states are pointedly against it; when two
adopting states have pointed out, in express terms,
their dissatisfaction as it stands ; and when there is so
respectable a body of men discontented in every state,
can the honorable gentleman promise himself harmony,
of which he is so fond ? If he can, I cannot. To me
it appears unequivocally clear, that we shall not have
that harmony. If it appears to the other states, that
our aversion is founded on just grounds, will they not
be willing to indulge us ? If disunion will really result

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 205

from Virginia's proposing amendments, will they not
wish the re-establishment of the union, and admit us.
if not on such terms as we prescribe, yet on advanta
geous terms ? Is not union as essential to their
happiness, as to ours ? Sir, without a radical altera
tion, the states will never be embraced in one fe
deral pale. If you attempt to force it down men's
throats and call it union, dreadful consequences must
follow.

He has said a great deal about disunion and the
dangers that are to arise from it. When we are on the
subject of union and dangers, let me ask, how will his
present doctrine hold with what has happened ? Is it
consistent with that noble and disinterested conduct,
which he displayed on a former occasion ? Did he not
tell us that he withheld his signature ? Where then
were the dangers which now appear to him so formi
dable ? He saw all America eagerly confiding that
the result of their deliberations would remove their
distresses. He saw all America acting under the im
pulses of hope, expectation and anxiety, arising from
their situation and their partiality for the members of
that convention: yet his enlightened mind, knowing
that system to be defective, magnanimously and nobly
refused its approbation. He was not led by the il
lumined — the illustrious few. He was actuated by the
dictates of his own judgment ; and a better judgment
than I can form. He did not stand out of the way of
information. He must have been possessed of every
intelligence. What alteration have a few months
brought about ? The internal difference between
right and wrong does not fluctuate. It is immutable.
I ask this question as a public man, and out of no par
ticular view. I wish, as such, to consult every source
of information, to form my judgment on so awful a
question. I had the highest respect for the honorable
gentleman's abilities. I considered his opinion as a
great authority. He taught me, sir, in despite of the
approbation of that great federal convention, to doubt

206 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

of the propriety of that system. When I found my
honorable friend in the number of those who doubted,
I began to doubt also. I coincided with him in opinion.
I shall be a staunch and faithful disciple of his. I ap
plaud that magnanimity which led him to withhold his
signature. If he thinks now differently, he is as free
as I am. Such is my situation, that as a poor individu
al, I look for information every where.

This government is so new, it wants a name. I wish
its other novelties were as harmless as this. He told
us, we had an American dictator in the year 1781.
We never had an American President. In making a dic
tator, we follow the example of the most glorious, mag
nanimous and skilful nations. In great dangers this
power has been given. Rome had furnished us with
an illustrious example. America found a person wor
thy of that trust : she looked to Virginia for him.
We gave a dictatorial power to hands that used it
gloriously ; and which were rendered more glorious
by surrendering it up. Where is there a breed of such
dictators ? Shall we find a set of American presidents
of such a breed ? Will the American President come
and lay prostrate at the feet of Congress his laurels ?
I fear there are few men who can be trusted on that
head. The glorious republic of Holland has erected
monuments to her warlike intrepidity and valor : yet
she is now totally ruined by a stadtholder ; a Dutch
president. The destructive wars into which that na
tion has been plunged, has since involved her in ambi
tion. The glorious triumphs of Blenheim and Ra-
millies were not so conformable to the genius, nor so
much to the true interest of the republic, as those nu
merous and useful canals and dykes, and other objects
at which ambition spurns. That republic has, however,
by the industry of its inhabitants, and policy of its ma
gistrates, suppressed the ill effects of ambition. Not
withstanding two of their provinces have paid nothing,
yet I hope the example of Holland will tell us, that we
can live happily without changing our present despis-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 207

ed government. Cannot people be as happy under a
mild, as under an energetic government ? Cannot
content and felicity be enjoyed in a republic, as well
as in a monarchy, because there are whips, chains and
scourges used in the latter ? If I am not as rich as my
neighbor, if I give my mite, my all, republican forbear
ance will say, that it is sufficient. So said the honest
confederates of Holland : " You are poor ; we are
rich. We will go on and do better, far better, than be
under an oppressive government." Far better will it
be for us to continue as we are, than go under that
tight, energetic government. I am persuaded of what
the honorable gentleman says, that separate confede
racies will ruin us. In my judgment, they are evils
never to be thought of till a people are driven by neces
sity. When he asks my opinion of consolidation, of
one power to reign over America, with a strong hand,
I will tell him, I am persuaded of the rectitude of my
honorable friend's opinion, (Mr. Mason,) that one gov
ernment cannot reign over so extensive a country as
this is, without absolute despotism. Compared to
such a consolidation, small confederacies are little
evils, though they ought to be rucurred to, but in case
of necessity. Virginia and North Carolina are despis
ed. They could exist separated from the rest of Ame
rica. Maryland and Vermont were not overrun when
out of the confederacy. Though it is not a desirable
object, yet, I trust, that on examination it will be found,
that Virginia and North Carolina would not be swal
lowed up in case it was necessary for them to be join
ed together.

When we come to the spirit of domestic peace, the
humble genius of Virginia has formed a government,
suitable to the genius of her people. I believe the
hands, that formed the American constitution, triumph
in the experiment. It proves, that the man who form
ed it, and perhaps by accident, did what design could not
do in other parts of the world. After all your reforms
in government, unless you consult the genius of the

208 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

inhabitants, you will never succeed ; your system can
have no duration. Let me appeal to the candor of
the committee, if the want of money be not the source
of all our misfortunes. We cannot be blamed for not
making dollars. This want of money cannot be sup
plied by changes in government. The only possible
remedy, as I have before asserted, is industry aided by
economy. Compare the genius of the people with the
government of this country. Let me remark, that it
stood the severest conflict, during the war, to which
human virtue has ever been called. I call upon every
gentleman here to declare, whether the king of England
had any subjects so attached to his family and gov
ernment — so loyal as we were. But the genius of
Virginia called us for liberty ; called us from those
beloved endearments, which, from long habits, we
were taught to love and revere. We entertained from
our earliest infancy, the most sincere regard and reve
rence for the mother country. Our partiality extend
ed to a predilection for her customs, habits, manners
and laws. Thus inclined, when the deprivation of our
liberty was attempted, what did we do ? What did the
genius of Virginia tell us ? " Sell all and purchase li
berty." This was a severe conflict. Republican
maxims were then esteemed. Those maxims, and
the genius of Virginia, landed you safe on the shore of
freedom. On this awful occasion, did you want a fe
deral government? Did federal ideas possess your
minds ? Did federal ideas lead you to the most splen
did victories ? I must again repeat the favorite idea,
that the genius of Virginia did, and will again lead us
to happiness. To obtain the most splendid prize, you
did not consolidate. You accomplished the most glo
rious ends, by the assistance of the genius of your coun
try. Men were then taught by that genius, that they
were fighting for what was most dear to them. View
the most affectionate father, the most tender mother,
operated on by liberty, nobly stimulating their sons,
their dearest sons, sometimes their only son, to ad-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 209

vunce to the defence of his country. We have seen
sons of Cincinnatus, without splendid magnificence or
parade, going, with the genius of their great progeni
tor Cincinnatus, to the plough — men who served their
country without ruining it ; men who had served it to
the destruction of their private patrimonies ; their
country owing them amazing amounts, for the pay
ment of which no adequate provision was then made.
We have seen such men throw prostrate their arms at
your feet. They did not call for those emoluments,
which ambition presents to some imaginations. The
soldiers, who were able to command every thing, in
stead of trampling on those laws, which they were in
stituted to defend, most strictly obeyed them. The
hands of justice have not been laid on a single Ameri
can soldier. Bring them into contrast with European
veterans — you will see an astonishing superiority over
the latter. There has been a strict subordination to
the laws. The honorable gentleman's office gave him
an opportunity of viewing if the laws were administer
ed so as to prevent riots, routs and unlawful assemblies.
From his then situation, he could have furnished UF
with the instances in which licentiousness trampled on
the laws. Among all our troubles, we have paid almost
to the last shilling, for the sake of justice : we have paid
as well as any state ; I will not say better. To sup
port the general government and our own legislature ;
to pay the interest of the public debts, and defray con
tingencies, we have been heavily taxed. To add to
these things, the distresses produced by paper money,
and by tobacco contracts, were sufficient to render
any people discontented. These, sir, were great
temptations ; but in the most severe conflict of misfor
tunes, this code of laws — this genius of Virginia, call
it what you will, triumphed over every thing.

Why did it please the gentleman, (Mr. Corbin,) to
bestow such epithets on our country ? Have the
worms taken possession of the wood, that our strong
vessel — our political vessel, has sprung a leak ? He

VOL. i. 27

Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

may know better than I, but I consider such epithets
to be the most illiberal and unwarrantable aspersions
on our laws. The system of laws under which we
have lived, has been tried and found to suit our genius.
I trust we shall not change this happy system. I can
not so easily take leave of an old friend. Till I see
him following after and pursuing other objects, which
can pervert the great objects of human legislation,
pardon me if I withhold my assent.

Some here speak of the difficulty in forming a new
code of laws. Young as we were, it was not wonder
ful if there was a difficulty in forming and assimilating
one system of laws. I shall be obliged to the gentle
man, if he would point out those glaring, those great
faults. The efforts of assimilating our laws to our
genius have not been found altogether vain. I shall
pass over some other circumstances which I intended
to mention, and endeavor to come to the capital objec
tion, which my honorable friend made. My worthy
friend said, that a republican form of government
would not suit a very extensive country ; but that if a
government were judiciously organized and limits pre
scribed to it; an attention to these principles might
render it possible for it to exist in an extensive territo
ry. Whoever will be bold to say, that a continent can
be governed by that system, contradicts all the expe
rience of the world. It is a work too great for human
wisdom. Let me call for an example. Experience
has been called the best teacher. I call for an exam
ple of a great extent of country, governed by one gov
ernment, or Congress, call it what you will. I tell him
that a government may be trimmed up according to
gentlemen's fancy, but it never can operate ; it will be
but very short-lived. However disagreeable it may be
to lengthen my objections, I cannot help taking no
tice of what the honorable gentleman said. To me
it appears that there is no check in that government.
The president, senators and representatives all imme
diately, or mediately, are the choice of the people.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Tell me not of checks on paper ; but tell me of checks
founded on self-love. The English government is
founded on self-love. This powerful, irresistible stimu
lus of self-love has saved that government. It has
interposed that hereditary nobility between the king
and commons. If the house of lords assists or per
mits the king to overturn the liberties of the people,
the same tyranny will destroy them ; they will there
fore keep the balance in the democratic branch. Sup
pose they see the commons encroach upon the king ;
self-love, that great, energetic check, will call upon
them to interpose ; for, if the king be destroyed, their
destruction must speedily follow. Here is a conside
ration which prevails in my mind, to pronounce the
British government superior, in this respect, to any
government that ever was in any country. Compare
this with your congressional checks. I beseech gen
tlemen to consider whether they can say, when trust
ing power, that a mere patriotic profession will be
equally operative and efficacious, as the check of self-
love. In considering the experience of ages, is it not
seen that fair, disinterested patriotism and professions
of attachment to rectitude, have never been solely
trusted to by an enlightened, free people. If you de
pend on your president's and senators' patriotism, you
are gone. Have you a resting place like the British
government ? Where is the rock of your salvation ?
The real rock of political salvation is self-love, per
petuated from age to age in every human breast, and
manifested in every action. If they can stand the
temptations of human nature, you are safe. If you
have a good president, senators and representatives,
there is no danger. But can this be expected from
human nature ? Without real checks, it will not suf
fice that some of them are good. A good president,
or senator, or representative will have a natural weak
ness. Virtue will slumber : the wicked will be con
tinually watching : consequently you will be undone.
Where are your checks ? You have no hereditary no-

•212 MR- HENRY'S SPEECH ON

bility — an order of men, to whom human eyes can be
cast up for relief: for, says the constitution, there is no
title of nobility to be granted ; which, by the by, would
not have been so dangerous, as the perilous cession of
powers contained in that paper : because, as Montes
quieu says, when you give titles of nobility, you know
what you give ; but when you give power, you know
not what you give. If you say, that out of this deprav
ed mass, you can collect luminous characters, it will
not avail, unless this luminous breed will be propagat
ed from generation to generation ; and even then, if the
number of vicious characters will preponderate, you
are undone. And that this will certainly be the case,
is, to my mind, perfectly clear. In the British gov
ernment, there are real balances and checks ; in this
system, there are only ideal balances. Till I am con
vinced that there are actual, efficient checks, I will not
give my assent to its establishment. The president
and senators have nothing to lose. They have not
that interest in the preservation of the government,
that the king and lords have in England. They will
therefore be regardless of the interests of the people.
The constitution will be as safe with one body, as with
two. It will answer every purpose of human legisla
tion. How was the constitution of England when only
the commons had the power ? I need only remark,
that it was the most unfortunate era when the country
returned to king, lords and commons, without sufficient
responsibility in the king. When the commons of
England, in the manly language which became free
men, said to their king, you are our servant, then the
temple of liberty was complete. From that noble
source have we derived our liberty : that spirit of pa
triotic attachment to one's country, that zeal for liber
ty, and that enmity to tyranny, which signalized the
then champions of liberty, we inherit from our British
ancestors. And I am free to own, that if you cannot
love a republican government, you may love the Bri
tish monarchy : for, although the king is not sufficient-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 213

ly responsible, the responsibility of his agents, and the
efficient checks interposed by the British constitution,
render it less dangerous than other monarchies, or op
pressive tyrannical aristocracies. What are their
checks of exposing accounts? Their checks upon
paper are inefficient and nugatory. Can you search
your president's closet ? Is this a real check ? We
ought to be exceedingly cautious in giving up this
life, this soul — our money — this power of taxation to
Congress. What powerful check is there here to prevent
the most extravagant and profligate squandering of the
public money? What security have .we in money
matters? Inquiry is precluded by this constitution.
I never wish to see Congress supplicate the states.
But it is more abhorrent to my mind to give them an
unlimited and unbounded command over our souls,
our lives, our purses, without any check or restraint.
How are you to keep inquiry alive ? How discover
their conduct ? We are told by that paper, that a re
gular statement and account of the receipts and ex
penditures of all public money, shall be published from
time to time. Here is a beautiful check ! What
time ? Here is the utmost latitude left. If those who
are in Congress please to put that construction upon
it, the words of the constitution will be satisfied by pub
lishing those accounts once in one hundred years.
They may publish or not, as they please. Is this like
the present despised system, whereby the accounts
are to be published monthly ?

I come now to speak something of requisitions,
which the honorable gentleman thought so truly con
temptible and disgraceful. That honorable gentleman
being a child of the revolution, must recollect with gra
titude the glorious effects of requisitions. It is an
idea that must be grateful to every American. An
English army was sent to compel us to pay money
contrary to our consent. To force us by arbitrary
and tyrannical coercion to satisfy their unbounded de
mands. We wished to pay with our own consent.

1>14 MR. HENRVS SPEECH ON

Rather than pay against our consent, we engaged in
that bloody contest, which terminated so gloriously.
By requisitions we pay with our own consent ; by their
means we have triumphed in the most arduous strug
gle that ever tried the virtue of man. We fought then,
for what we are contending now — to prevent an ar
bitrary deprivation of our property, contrary to our
consent and inclination. I shall be told in this place,
that those who are to tax us are our representatives.
To this I answer, that there is no real check to prevent
their ruining us. There is no actual responsibility.
The only semblance of a check is the negative power
of not re-electing them. This, sir, is but a feeble bar
rier, when their personal interest, their ambition and
avarice come to be put in contrast with the happiness
of the people. All checks founded on any thing but
self-love, will not avail. This constitution reflects, in
the most degrading and mortifying manner, on the vir
tue, integrity and wisdom of the state legislatures : it
presupposes that the chosen few who go to Congress,
will have more upright hearts, and more enlightened
minds, than those who are members of the individual
legislatures. To suppose that ten gentlemen shall
have more real substantial merit, than one hundred
and seventy, is humiliating to the last degree. If, sir,
the diminution of numbers be an augmentation of me
rit, perfection must centre in one. If you have the fa
culty of discerning spirits, it is better to point out at
once the man who has the most illumined qualities.
If ten men be better than one hundred and seventy, it
follows of necessity that one is better than ten — the
choice is more refined.

Such is the danger of the abuse of implied power,
that it would be safer at once to have seven representa
tives, the number to which we are now entitled, than
depend on the uncertain and ambiguous language of
that paper. The number may be lessened instead of
being increased ; and yet by argumentative, construc
tive, implied power, the proportion of taxes may con-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 215

tinue the same or be increased. Nothing is more
perilous than constructive power, which gentlemen
are so willing to trust their happiness to.

If sheriffs prove now an over-match for our legisla
ture ; if their ingenuity has eluded the vigilance of our
laws, how will the matter be amended when they
come clothed with federal authority? A strenu
ous argument offered by gentlemen is, that the same
sheriffs may collect for the continental and state treasu
ries. I have before shown, that this must have an
inevitable tendency to give a decided preference to the
federal treasury in the actual collections, and to throw
all deficiencies on the state. This imaginary remedy
for the evil of congressional taxation, will have another
oppressive operation. The sheriff comes to-day as a
state collector — next day he is federal — how are you to
fix him? How will it be possible to discriminate op
pressions committed in one capacity, from those per
petrated in the other ? Will not his ingenuity perplex
the simple, honest planter ? This will at least involve
in difficulties, those who are unacquainted with legal
ingenuity. When you fix him, where are you to punish
him ? For, I suppose, they will not stay in our courts :
they must go to the federal court ; for, if I understand
that paper right, all controversies arising under that
constitution, or under the laws made in pursuance
thereof, are to be tried in that court. When gentle
men told us, that this part deserved the least excep
tion, I was in hopes, they would prove that there
was plausibility in their suggestions, and that oppres
sion would probably not follow. Are we not told,
that it shall be treason to levy war against the United
States ? Suppose an insult offered to the federal laws
at an immense distance from Philadelphia, will this be
deemed treason ? And shall a man be dragged many
hundred miles to be tried as a criminal, for hav
ing, perhaps justifiably, resisted an unwarrantable
attack upon his person or property? I am not
well acquainted with federal jurisprudence ; but it ap-

216 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

pears to me that these oppressions must result from
this part of the plan. It is at least doubtful, and where
there is even a possibility of such evils, they ought to
be guarded against.

There are to be a number of places fitted out for
arsenals and dock-yards in the different states. Unless
you sell to Congress such places as are proper for these,
within your state, you will not be consistent after adop
tion; it results therefore clearly that you are to give
into their hands, all such places as are fit for strong
holds. When you have these fortifications and garri
sons within your state, your legislature will have no
power over them, though they see the most dangerous
insults offered to the people daily. They are also to
have magazines in each state ; these depositories for
arms, though within the state, will be free from the con
trol of its legislature. Are we at last brought to such
a humiliating and debasing degradation, that we can
not be trusted with arms for our own defence ? There is
a wide difference between having our arms in our own
possession and under our own direction, and having
them under the management of Congress ? If our de
fence be the real object of having those arms, in whose
hands can they be trusted with more propriety, or
equal safety to us, as in our own ? If our legis
lature be unworthy of legislating for every foot in
this state, they are unworthy of saying another word.

The clause which says that Congress shall " pro
vide for arming, organizing arid disciplining the mili
tia, and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the service of the United States, reserv
ing to the states respectively, the appointment of the
officers," seemed to put the states in the power of
Congress. I wished to be informed, if Congress neg
lected to discipline them, whether the states were not
precluded from doing it. Not being favored with a
particular answer, I am confirmed in my opinion, that
the states have not the power of disciplining them,
without recurring to the doctrine of constructive, im-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 217

plied powers. If by implication the states may disci
pline them, by implication also Congress may officer
them ; because, in a partition of power, each has a
right to come in for part; and because implication is
to operate in favor of Congress on all occasions, where
their object is the extension of power, as well as in fa
vor of the states. We have not one fourth of the arms
that would be sufficient to defend ourselves. The
power of arming the militia, and the means of pur
chasing arms, are taken from the states by the para- "
mount powers of Congress. If Congress will not arm
them, they will not be armed at all.

There have been no instances shown of a voluntary
cession of power, sufficient to induce me to grant the
most dangerous powers : a possibility of their future
relinquishment will not persuade me to yield such
powers.

Congress, by the power of taxation, by that of rais
ing an army, and by their control over the militia, have
the sword in one hand and the purse in the other.
Shall we be safe without either ? Congress have an
unlimited power over both : they are entirely given up
by us. Let him candidly tell me, where and when did
freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up
by the people ? Unless a miracle in human affairs
interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the
loss of the sword and purse. Can you prove by any
argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe
without retaining one of these ? If you give them up, you
are gone. Give us at least a plausible apology why Con
gress should keep their proceedings in secret. They
have the power of keeping them secret as long as they
please ; for the provision for a periodical publication is
too inexplicit and ambiguous to avail any thing. The
expression, from time to time, as I have more than once
observed, admits of any extension. They may carry
on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under
the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people
never were nor ever will be secure, when the transoc-

VOL. i. 28

218 Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

tions of their rulers may be concealed from them. The
most iniquitous plots may be carried on against their
liberty and happiness. 1 am not an advocate for di
vulging indiscriminately all the operations of govern
ment, though the practice of our ancestors in some de
gree justifies it. Such transactions as relate to milita
ry operations, or affairs of great consequence, the im
mediate promulgation of which might defeat the inter
ests of the community, I would not wish to be published,
till the end which required their secrecy should have
been effected. But to cover, with the veil of secrecy,
the common routine of business, is an abomination in
the eyes of every intelligent man, and every friend to
his country.

[Mr. Henry then, in a very animated manner, expati
ated on the evil and pernicious tendency of keeping
secret the common proceedings of government, and
said, that it was contrary to the practice of other free
nations. The people of England, he asserted, had
gained immortal honor, by the manly boldness where
with they divulged to all the world their political dis
quisitions and operations ; and that such a conduct
inspired other nations with respect. He illustrated
his arguments by several quotations.] He then con
tinued : —

I appeal to this convention, if it would not be better
for America to take off the veil of secrecy. Look at
us — hear our transactions. If this had been the lan
guage of the federal convention, what would have been
the result ? Such a constitution would not have come
out to your utter astonishment, conceding such dan
gerous powers, and recommending secrecy in the fu
ture transactions of government. I believe it would
have given more general satisfaction, if the proceed
ings of that convention had not been concealed from
the public eye. This constitution authorizes the same
conduct. There is not an English feature in it. The
transactions of Congress may be concealed a century
from the public consistently with the constitution.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

This, sir, is a laudable imitation of the transactions of
the Spanish treaty. We have not forgotten with what
a thick veil of secrecy those transactions were co
vered.

We are told that this government, collectively taken,
is without an example ; that it is national in this part,
and federal in that part, &c. We may be amused, if
we please, by a treatise of political anatomy. In the
brain it is national: the stamina are federal — some
limbs are federal, others national. The senators are
voted for by the state legislatures ; so far it is federal.
Individuals choose the members of the first branch ;
here it is national. It is federal in conferring general
powers, but national in retaining them. It is not to
be supported by the states — the pockets of individuals
are to be searched for its maintenance. What signi
fies it to me, that you have the most curious anatomi
cal description of it in its creation ? To all the com
mon purposes of legislation it is a great consolidation of
government. You are not to have the right to legislate
in any but trivial cases : you are not to touch private
contracts : you are not to have the right of having
arms in your own defence: you cannot be trusted
with dealing out justice between man and man.
What shall the states have to do ? — Take care of the
poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so
on and so on. Abolish the state legislatures at once.
What purposes should they be continued for ? Our
legislature will indeed be a ludicrous spectacle — one
hundred and eighty men marching in solemn, farcical
procession, exhibiting a mournful proof of the lost li
berty of their country, without the power of restoring
it. But, sir, we have the consolation, that it is a mixed
government ; that is, it may work sorely on your neck,
but you will have some comfort by saying, that it was
a federal government in its origin.

I beg gentlemen to consider; lay aside your preju
dices — is this a federal government ? Is it not a con
solidated government for every purpose almost ? Is

•2'2(1 31K. IIKNKY'S SPEECH ON

the government of Virginia a state government, alter
this government is adopted ? I grant that it is a repub
lican government ; but for what purposes ? For such
trivial, domestic considerations, as render it unworthy
the name of a legislature. I shall take leave of this
political anatomy by observing, that it is the most ex
traordinary that ever entered into the imagination of
man. If our political diseases demand a cure, this is
an unheard of medicine. The honorable member, I
am convinced, wanted a name for it. Were your
health in danger, would you take new medicine ? I
need not make use of these exclamations ; for every
member in this committee must be alarmed at making
new and unusual experiments in government. Let us
have national credit and a national treasury in case of
war. You never can want national resources in time
of war, if the war be a national one, if it be necessary,
and this necessity be obvious to the meanest capacity.
The utmost exertions will be used by the people of
America in that case. A republic has this advantage
over a monarchy, that its wars are generally founded
on more just grounds. A republic can never enter into
a war, unless it be a national war, unless it be approv
ed of, or desired by the whole community. Did ever
a republic fail to use the utmost resources of the com
munity when a war was necessary ? I call for an ex
ample. I call also for an example, when a republic has
been engaged in a war contrary to the wishes of its
people. There are thousands of examples where the
ambition of its prince has precipitated a nation into
the most destructive war. No nation ever withheld
power when its object was just and right. I will ha
zard an observation ; I find fault with the paper before
you, because the same power that declares war, has
the ability to carry it on. Is it so in England ? The
king declares war : the house of commons gives the
means of carrying it on. This is a strong check on
the king. He will enter into no war that is unnecessa
ry ; for the commons, having the power of withholding

THK FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 221

the moans, will exercise that power, unless the object
of the war be for the interest of the nation. How is it
here ? The Congress can both declare war and carry
it on, and levy your money as long as you have a
shilling to pay.

I shall now speak a little of the colonial confedera
cy which was proposed at Albany. Massachusetts
did not give her consent to the project at Albany so
as to consolidate with the other colonies. Had there
been a consolidation at Albany, where would have
been their charter ? Would that confederacy have
preserved their charter from Britain ? The strength
and energy of the then designed government would
have crushed American opposition.

The American revolution took its origin from the
comparative weakness of the British government
not being concentred in one point. A concentration
of the strength and interest of the British government
in one point, would have rendered opposition to its ty
rannies fruitless. For want of that consolidation do
we now enjoy liberty, and the privilege of debating at
this moment. I am pleased with the colonial establish
ment. The example, which the honorable member
has produced to persuade us to depart from our pre
sent confederacy, rivets me to my former opinion, and
convinces me that consolidation must end in the de
struction of our liberties.

The honorable gentleman has told us of our ingrati
tude to France. She does not intend to take payment
by force. Ingratitude shall not be laid to my charge.
I wish to see the friendship between this country and
that magnanimous ally perpetuated. Requisitions will
enable us to pay the debts we owe to France and other
countries. She does not desire us to go from our be
loved republican government. The change is incon
sistent with our engagements with those nations. It
is cried out, that those in opposition wish disunion.
This is not true. They are the most strenuous friends
to it. This government will clearly operate disunion.

222 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

If it be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, that
you are going to disunite and dissolve the confederacy,
what says France ? Will she be indifferent to an event
that will so radically affect her treaties with us ? Our
treaty with her is founded on the confederation — we
are bound to her as thirteen states confederated.
What will become of the treaty? It is said that trea
ties will be on a better footing. How so ? Will the
president, senate and house of representatives be par
ties to them ? I cannot conceive how the treaties can
be as binding, if the confederacy is dissolved, as they
are now. Those nations will not continue their friend
ship then ; they will become our enemies. I look on
the treaties as the greatest pillars of safety. If the
house of Bourbon keeps us, we are safe. Dissolve
that confederacy — who has you ? — The British.
Federalism will not protect you from the British. Is
a connexion with that country more desirable ? I was
amazed when gentlemen forgot the friends of America.
I hope that this dangerous change will not be effected.
It is safe for the French and Spaniards, that we should
continue to be thirteen states ; but it is not so, that we
should be consolidated into one government. They
have settlements in America ; will they like schemes
of popular ambition ? Will they not have some seri
ous reflections ? You may tell them you have not
changed your situation ; but they will not believe you.
If there be a real check intended to be left on Con
gress, it must be left in the state governments. There
will be some check, as long as the judges are incor
rupt. As long as they are upright, you may preserve
your liberty. But what will the judges determine
when the state and federal authority come to be con
trasted ? Will your liberty then be secure, when the
congressional laws are declared paramount to the
laws of your state, and the judges are sworn to support
them ?

I am constrained to make a few remarks on the ab
surdity of adopting this system, and relying on the

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. £23

chance of getting it amended afterwards. When it is
confessed to be replete with defects, is it not offering
to insult your understandings, to attempt to reason you
out of the propriety of rejecting it, till it be amended ?
Does it not insult your judgments to tell you — adopt
first, and then amend ? Is your rage for novelty so
great, that you are first to sign and seal, and then to
retract ? Is it possible to conceive a greater solecism ?
I am at a loss what to say. You agree to bind your
selves hand and foot — for the sake of what ? Of being
unbound. You go into a dungeon — for what ? To
get out. Is there no danger when you go in, that
the bolts of federal authority shall shut you in ? Human
nature never will part from power. Look for an exam
ple of a voluntary relinquishment of power, from one
end of the globe to another — you will find none. Nine
tenths of our fellow-men have been, and are now, de
pressed by the most intolerable slavery, in the different
parts of the world ; because the strong hand of power
has bolted them in the dungeon of despotism. Review
the present situation of the nations of Europe, which
is pre.tended to be the freest quarter of the globe. Cast
your eyes on the countries called free there. Look at
the country from which we are descended, I beseech
you ; and although we are separated by everlasting,
insuperable partitions, yet there are some virtuous
people there who are friends to human nature and
liberty. Look at Britain ; see there the bolts and bars
of power; see bribery and corruption defiling the
fairest fabric that ever human nature reared. Can a
gentleman, who is an Englishman, or who is acquaint
ed with the English history, desire to prove these evils ?
See the efforts of a man descended from a friend of
America ; see the efforts of that man, assisted even by
the king, to make reforms. But you find the faults too
strong to be amended. Nothing but bloody war can
alter them. See Ireland : that country groaned from
century to century, without getting their government
amended. Previous adoption was the fashion there.
They sent for amendments from time to time, but

224 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

never obtained them, though pressed by the severest
oppression, till eighty thousand volunteers demanded
them sword in hand — till the power of Britain was
prostrate ; when the American resistance was crowned
with success. Shall we do so ? If you judge by the
experience of Ireland, you must obtain the amendments
as early as possible. But, I ask you again, where is the
example that a government was amended by those
who instituted it ? Where is the instance of the
errors of a government rectified by those who adopted
them ?

I shall make a few observations to prove, that
the power over elections, which is given to Congress,
is contrived by the federal government; that the
people may be deprived of their proper influence in
the government, by destroying the force and effect of
their suffrages. Congress is to have a discretiona
ry control over the time, place and manner of
elections. The representatives are to be elected con
sequently when and where they please. As to the
time and place gentlemen have attempted to obvi
ate the objection by saying, that the time js to
happen once in two years, and that the place is
to be within a particular district, or in the respect-
tive counties. But how will they obviate the
danger of referring the manner of election to Con
gress ? Those illumined genii may see that this may not
endanger the rights of the people ; but to my un
enlightened understanding, it appears plain and clear,
that it will impair the popular weight in the gov
ernment. Look at the Roman history. They had
two ways of voting: the one by tribes, and the
other by centuries. By the former, numbers prevailed :
in the latter, riches preponderated. According to
the mode prescribed, Congress may tell you, that they
have a right to make the vote of one gentleman go
as far as the votes of one hundred poor men. The

Eower over the manner admits of the most dangerous
ititude. They may modify it as they please. They
may regulate the number of votes by the quantity of

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 225

property, without involving any repugnancy to
the constitution. I should not have thought of
this trick or contrivance, had I not seen how the
public liberty of Rome was trifled with by the
mode of voting by centuries, whereby one rich man
had as many votes as a multitude of poor men. The
plebeians were trampled on till they resisted. The
patricians trampled on the liberties of the plebeians,
till the latter had spirit to assert their right to
freedom and equality. The result of the American
mode of election may be similar. Perhaps I shall
be told, that I have gone through the regions of fancy;
that I deal in noisy exclamations, and mighty pro
fessions of patriotism. Gentlemen may retain their
opinions; but I look on that paper as the most
fatal plan, that could possibly be conceived to en
slave a free people. If such be your rage for novelty,
take it and welcome, but you never shall have my
consent. My sentiments may appear extravagant^
but 1 can tell you, that a number of my fellow-citizens
have kindred sentiments ; arid I am anxious, if my
country should come into the hands of tyranny, to ex
culpate myself from being in any degree the cause ;
and to exert my faculties to the utmost to extricate
her. Whether I am gratified or not in my beloved
form of government, I consider that the more she
is plunged into distress, the more it is my duty
to relieve her. Whatever may be the result, I shall
wait with patience till the day may come, when
an opportunity shall offer to exert myself in her cause.
But I should be led to take that man for a lunatic,
who should tell me to run into the adoption of a gov
ernment avowedly defective, in hopes of having it
amended afterwards. Were I about to give away
the meanest particle of my own property, I should
act with more prudence and discretion. My anxiety
and fears are great, lest America, by the adoption
of this system, should be cast into a fathomless abyss.

29

SPEECH OF JOHN MARSHALL.

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 20th, 178C

The first and Second sections of the third article of the constitution
being under consideration, Mr. Marshall addressed the conven
tion as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THIS part of the plan before us, is a great improve
ment on that system from which we are now departing.
Here are tribunals appointed for the decision of con
troversies, which were before, either not at all, or im
properly provided for. That many benefits will result
from this to the members of the collective society,
every one confesses. Unless its organization be de
fective, and so constructed as to injure, instead of ac
commodating the convenience of the people, it merits
our approbation. After such a candid and fair dis
cussion by those gentlemen who support it, after the
very able manner in which they have investigated and
examined it, I conceived it would be no longer consi
dered as so very defective, and that those, who oppos
ed it, would be convinced of the impropriety of some
of their objections. But I perceive they still continue
the same opposition. Gentlemen have gone on an idea,
that the federal courts will not determine the causes,
which may come before them, with the same fairness
and impartiality, with which other courts decide.

MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH, &c. 227

What are the reasons of this supposition ? Do they
draw them from the manner in which the judges are
chosen, or the tenure of their office ? What is it that
makes us trust our judges ? — Their independence in
office and manner of appointment. Are not the
judges of the federal court chosen with as much wis
dom, as the judges of the state governments ? Are
they not equally, if not more independent ? If so, shall
we not conclude that they will decide with equal im
partiality and candor ? If there be as much wisdom
and knowledge in the United States, as in a particular
state, shall we conclude that that wisdom and know
ledge will not be equally exercised in the selection of
the judges ?

The principle on which they object to the federal
jurisdiction, seems to me to be founded on a belief,
that a fair trial will not be had in those courts. If
this committee will consider it fully, they will find it
has no foundation, and that we are as secure there as
any where else. What mischief results from some
causes being tried there ? Is there not the utmost
reason to conclude, that judges wisely appointed, and
independent in their office, will never countenance any
unfair trial ? What are the subjects of its jurisdiction ?
Let us examine them with an expectation that causes
will be as candidly tried there, as elsewhere, and then
determine. The objection, which was made by the
honorable member who was first up yesterday, (Mr.
Mason,) has been so fully refuted, that it is not worth
while to notice it. He objected to Congress having
power to create a number of inferior courts according
to the necessity of public circumstances. I had an
apprehension that those gentlemen, who placed no
confidence in Congress, would object that there might
be no inferior courts. I own that I thought, that those
gentlemen would think there would be no inferior
courts, as it depended on the will of Congress, but that
we should be dragged to the centre of the union. But
I did not conceive, that the power of increasing the

228 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON

number of courts could be objected to by any gentle
man, as it would remove the inconvenience of being
dragged to the centre of the United States. I own
that the power of creating a number of courts is, in
my estimation, so far from being a defect, that it
seems necessary to the perfection of this system. Af
ter having objected to the number and mode, he ob
jected to the subject matter of their cognizance.
[Here Mr. Marshall read the 2d section.] These, sir,
are the points of federal jurisdiction to which he ob
jects, with a few exceptions. Let us examine each
of them with a supposition that the same impartiality
will be observed there, as in other courts, and then
see if any mischief will result from them. With re
spect to its cognizance in all cases arising under the
constitution and the laws of the United States, he says,
that the laws of the United States being paramount to
the laws of the particular states, there is no case but
what this will extend to. Has the government of the
United States power to make laws on every subject ?
Does he understand it so ? Can they make laws af
fecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts,
or claims between citizens of the same state ? Can
they go beyond the delegated powers ? If they were
to make a law not warranted by any of the powers
enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as
an infringement of the constitution which they are to
guard. They would not consider such a law as com
ing under their jurisdiction. They would declare it
void. It will annihilate the state courts, says the ho
norable gentleman. Does not every gentleman here
know, that the causes in our courts are more numer
ous than they can decide, according to their present
construction? Look at the dockets; you will find
them crowded with suits, which the life of man will not
see determined. If some of these suits be carried to
other courts, will it be wrong ? They will still have
business enough. Then there is no danger that par
ticular subjects, small in proportion, being taken out

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 229

of the jurisdiction of the state judiciaries, will render
them useless and of no effect. Does the gentleman
think that the state courts will have no cognizance of
cases not mentioned here ? Are there any words in
this constitution, which exclude the courts of the
states from those cases which they now possess?
Does the gentleman imagine this to be the case?
Will any gentleman believe it ? Are not controver
sies respecting lands, claimed under the grants of dif
ferent states, the only controversies between citizens
of the same state, which the federal judiciary can take
cognizance of? The case is so clear, that to prove it
would be an useless waste of time. The state courts
will not lose the jurisdiction of the causes they now de
cide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction with
the federal courts in those cases, in which the latter
have cognizance.

How disgraceful is it that the state courts cannot
be trusted, says the honorable gentleman. What is
the language of the constitution ? Does it take away
their jurisdiction ? Is it not necessary that -the federal
courts should have cognizance of cases arising under
the constitution and the laws of the United States ?
What is the service or purpose of a judiciary, but to
execute the laws in a peaceable, orderly manner,
without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or avail
ing yourselves of force ? If this be the case, where
can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here ?
To what quarter will you look for protection from an
infringement on the constitution, if you will not give
the power to the judiciary ? There is no other body
that can afford such a protection. But the honora
ble member objects to it, because, says he, the of
ficers of the government will be screened from merited
punishment by the federal judiciary. The federal she
riff, says he, will go into a poor man's house and beat
him, or abuse his family, and the federal court will pro
tect him. Does any gentleman believe this ? Is it
necessary that the officers shall commit a trespass on

230 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON

the property or persons of those with whom they are
to transact business ? Will such great insults on the
people of this country be allowable? Were a law
made to authorize them, it would be void. The injur
ed man would trust to a tribunal in his neighborhood.
To such a tribunal he would apply for redress, and get
it. There is no reason to fear that he would not meet
that justice there, which his country will be ever will
ing to maintain. But on appeal, says the honorable
gentleman, what chance is there to obtain justice ?
This is founded on an idea', that they will not be im
partial. There is no clause in the constitution, which
bars the individual member injured, from applying to
the state courts to give him redress. He says, that
there is no instance of appeals as to fact in common
law cases. The contrary is well known to you, Mr.
Chairman, to be the case in this commonwealth.
With respect to mills, roads and other cases, appeals
lie from the inferior to the superior court, as to fact
as well as law. Is it clear, that there can be no
case in common law, in which an appeal as to fact
might be proper and necessary ? Can you not con
ceive a case where it would be productive of advan
tages to the people at large, to submit to that tribunal
the final determination, involving facts as well as law?
Suppose it should be deemed for the convenience of
the citizens, that those things which concerned foreign
ministers, should be tried in the inferior courts : if jus
tice should be done, the decision would satisfy all.
But if an appeal in matters of fact could not be carried
to the superior court, then it would result, that such
cases could not be tried before the inferior courts, for
fear of injurious and partial decisions.

But, sir, where is the necessity of discriminating be
tween the three cases of chancery, admiralty and com
mon law ? Why not leave it to Congress ? Will it
enlarge their powers ? Is it necessary for them wan
tonly to infringe your rights ? Have you any thing to
apprehend, when they can, in no case, abuse their

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 231

power without rendering themselves hateful to the peo
ple at large ? When this is the case, something may
be left to the legislature, freely chosen by ourselves^
from among ourselves, who are to share the burdens
imposed upon the community, and who can be chang
ed at our pleasure. Where power may be trusted, and
there is no motive to abuse it, it seems to me to be as
well to leave it undetermined, as to fix it in the con
stitution.

With respect to disputes between a state and the
citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has been de
cried with unusual vehemence. I hope no gentleman
will think that a state will be called at the bar of the
federal court. Is there no such case at present ? Are
there not many cases in which the legislature of Vir
ginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued ? It is
not rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall
be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable
states to recover claims of individuals residing in other
states. I contend this construction is warranted by
the words. But, say they, there will be partiality in it,
if a state cannot be defendant — if an individual cannot
proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he
may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and
cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state
defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.
If this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to
the system on that account ? If an individual has a
just claim against any particular state, is it to be pre
sumed, that on application to its legislature, he will not
obtain satisfaction ? But how could a state recover
any claim from a citizen of another state, without the
establishment of these tribunals ?

The honorable member objects to suits being insti
tuted in the federal courts by the citizens of one state
against the citizens of another state. Were I to con
tend, that this was necessary in all cases, and that the
government without it would be defective, I should not
use my own judgment. But are not the objections to

232 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON

it carried too far ? Though it may not, in general, be
absolutely necessary, a case may happen, as has been
observed, in which a citizen of one state ought to be
able to recur to this tribunal, to recover a claim from
the citizen of another state. What is the evil which
this can produce? Will he get more than justice
there ? — The independence of the judges forbids it.
What has he to get? — Justice. Shall we object to
this, because the citizen of another state can obtain
justice without applying to our state courts ? It may
be necessary with respect to the laws and regulations
of commerce, which Congress may make. It may be ne
cessary in cases of debt, and some other controversies.
In claims for land it is not necessary, but it is not danger
ous. In the court of which state will it be instituted — said
the honorable gentleman. It will be instituted in the
court of the state where the defendant resides, where
the law can come at him, and nowhere else. By the
laws of which state will it be determined — said he. By
the laws of the state where the contract was made.
According to those laws, and those only, can it be de
cided. Is this a novelty ? — No, it is a principle in the
jurisprudence of this commonwealth. If a man con
tracted a debt in the East Indies, and it was sued for
here, the decision must be consonant to the laws of that
country. Suppose a contract made in Maryland,
where the annual interest is at six per centum, and a
suit instituted for it in Virginia, what interest would
be given now, without any federal aid ? The interest
of Maryland most certainly, and if the contract had
been made in Virginia, and suit brought in Maryland,
the interest of Virginia must be given without doubt.
It is now to be governed by the laws of that state
where the contract was made. The laws which gov
erned the contract at its formation, govern it in its
decision. To preserve the peace of the union only, its
jurisdiction in this case ought to be recurred to. Let us
consider, that when citizens of one state carry on trade
in another state, much must be due to the one from

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 233

the other, as the case between North Carolina and
Virginia. Would not the refusal of justice to our citi
zens, from the courts of North Carolina, produce dis
putes between the states ? Would the federal judicia
ry swerve from their duty, in order to give partial and
unjust decisions ?

The objection respecting the assignment of a bond
to a citizen of another state, has been fully answered.
But suppose it were to be tried as he says, what would
be given more than was actually due in the case he
mentioned ? It is possible, in our courts as they now
stand, to obtain a judgment for more than justice.
But the court of chancery grants relief. Would it not
be so in the federal court ? Would not depositions
be taken to prove the payments, and if proved, would
not the decision of the court be accordingly ?

He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in
controversies between a state and a foreign state.
Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast,
will she be bound by the decision ? If a foreign state
brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia,
would she not be barred from the claim if the federal
judiciary thought it unjust ? The previous consent of
the parties is necessary ; and, as the federal judiciary
will decide, each party will acquiesce. It will be the
means of preventing disputes with foreign nations.
On an attentive consideration of these courts, I trust
every part will appear satisfactory to the committee.

The exclusion of trial by jury in this case, he urged,
would prostrate our rights. Does the word court only
mean the judges ? Does not the determination of a
jury, necessarily lead to the judgment of the court ?
Is there any thing here which gives the judges exclu
sive jurisdiction of matters of fact ? What is the ob
ject of a jury trial ? — To inform the court of the facts.
When a court has cognizance of facts, does it not fol
low, that they can make inquiry by a jury ? It is im
possible to be otherwise. I hope that in this country,
where impartiality is so much admired, the laws will di-

VOL. r. 30

234 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON

rect facts to be ascertained by a jury. But, says the
honorable gentleman, the juries in the ten miles square
will be mere tools of parties, with which he would not
trust his person or property ; which, he says, he would
rather leave to the court. Because the government
may have a district ten miles square, will no man stay
there but the tools and officers of the government ?
Will nobody else be found there ? Is it so in any
other part of the world, where a government has legis
lative power ? Are there none but officers and tools
of the government of Virginia in Richmond ? Will
there not be independent merchants, and respectable
gentlemen of fortune, within the ten miles square ?
Will there not be worthy farmers and mechanics ?
Will not a good jury be found there as well as any
where else ? Will the officers of the government be
come improper to be on a jury ? What is it to the
government, whether this man or that man succeeds ?
— It is all one thing. Does the constitution say,
that juries shall consist of officers, or that the su
preme court shall be held in the ten miles square ?
It was acknowledged by the honorable member, that
it was secure in England. What makes it secure
there ? Is it their constitution ? What part of their
constitution is there, that the parliament cannot
change ? As the preservation of this right is in the
hands of parliament, and it has ever been held sacred
by them, will the government of America be less honest
than that of Great Britain ? Here a restriction is to
be found. The jury is not to be brought out of the
state. There is no such restriction in that govern
ment ; for the laws of parliament decide every thing
respecting it. Yet gentlemen tell us, that there is
safety there, and nothing here but danger. It seems
to me, that the laws of the United States will general
ly secure trials by a jury of the vicinage, or in such
manner as will be most safe and convenient for the
people.

But it seems that the right of challenging the jurors.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 235

is not secured in this constitution. Is this done by
our own constitution, or by any provision of the English
government ? Is it done by their magna charta, or
bill of rights ? This privilege is founded on their
laws. If so, why should it be objected to the Ameri
can constitution, that it is not inserted in it ? If we
are secure in Virginia, without mentioning it in our
constitution, why should not this security be found in
the federal court ?

The honorable gentleman said much about the
quit rents in the Northern Neck. I will refer it to the
honorable gentleman himself. Has he not acknow
ledged that there was no complete title ? Was he not
satisfied, that the right of the legal representative of
the proprietor did not exist at the time he mentioned ?
If so, it cannot exist now. I will leave it to those
gentlemen who come from that quarter. I trust they
will not be intimidated on this account, in voting on
this question. A law passed in 1782, which secures
this. He says that many poor men may be harassed
and injured by the representative of lord Fairfax. If
he has no right, this cannot be done. If he has this
right and comes to Virginia, what laws will his claims
be determined by ? — By those of this state. By what
tribunals will they be determined? — By our state courts.
Would not the poor man, who was oppressed by an
unjust prosecution, be abundantly protected and satis
fied by the temper of his neighbors, and would he not
find ample justice ? \Vhat reason has the honorable
member to apprehend partiality or injustice? He
supposes, that if the judges be judges of both the fede
ral and state courts, they will incline in favor of one
government. If such contests should arise, who could
more properly decide them, than those who are to
swear to do justice ? If we can expect a fair decision
any where, may we not expect justice to be done by
the judges of both the federal and state governments?
But, says the honorable member, laws mav be executed

•236 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON

tyrannically. Where is the independency of your
judges ? If a law be executed tyrannically in Virginia,
to what can you trust ? — To your judiciary. What
security have you for justice ? — Their independence.
Will it not be so in the federal court?

Gentlemen ask what is meant by law cases, and if
they be not distinct from facts. Is there no law aris
ing on cases in equity and admiralty ? Look at the
acts of assembly ; have you not many cases, where
law and fact are blended ? Does not the jurisdiction
in point of law as well as fact, find itself completely
satisfied in law and fact ? The honorable gentleman
says, that no law of Congress can make any exception
to the federal, appellate jurisdiction of fact as well as
law. He has frequently spoken of technical terms,
and the meaning of them. What is the meaning of the
term exception ? Does it not mean an alteration and
diminution? Congress is empowered to make ex
ceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and
fact, of the supreme court. These exceptions certain
ly go as far as the legislature may think proper, for the
interest and liberty of the people. Who can under
stand this word, exception, to extend to one case as
well as the other ? I am persuaded, that a reconsidera
tion of this case will convince the gentleman, that
he was mistaken. This may go to the cure of the
mischief apprehended. Gentlemen must be satisfied,
that this power will not be so much abused as they
have said.

The honorable member says, that he derives no
consolation from the wisdom and integrity of the le
gislature, because we call them to rectify defects
which it is our duty to remove. We ought well to
weigh the good and evil before we determine. We
ought to be well convinced, that the evil will be really
produced before we decide against it. If we be con
vinced that the good greatly preponderates, though
there be small defects in it, shall we give up that which

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 237

is really good, when we can remove the little mischief
it may contain, in the plain, easy method pointed out in
the system itself?

I was astonished when I heard the honorable gentle
man say, that he wished the trial by jury to be struck
out entirely. Is there no justice to be expected by a
jury of our fellow-citizens ? Will any man prefer to be
tried by a court, when the jury is to be of his country
men, and probably of his vicinage ? We have reason
to believe the regulations with respect to juries will be
such as shall be satisfactory. Because it does not con
tain all, does it contain nothing ? But I conceive
that this committee will see there is safety in the
case, and that there is no mischief to be apprehended.

He states a case, that a man may be carried from a
federal to an anti-federal corner, (and vice versa) where
men are ready to destroy him. Is this probable ? Is it
presumable that they will make a law to punish men
who are of different opinions in politics from them
selves ? Is it presumable, that they will do it in
one single case, unless it be such a case as must
satisfy the people at large ? The good opinion
of the people at large must be consulted by their repre
sentatives; otherwise mischiefs would be produced,
which would shake the government to its foundation.
As it is late, I shall not mention all the gentleman's
argument ; but some parts of it are so glaring, that I
cannot pass them over in silence, He says that the
establishment of these tribunals, and more particularly
in their jurisdiction of controversies between citizens
of these states and foreign citizens and subjects, is like
a retrospective law. Is there no difference between a
tribunal which shall give justice and effect to an exist
ing right, and creating a right that did not exist before ?
The debt or claim is created by the individual; he
has bound himself to comply with it; does the crea
tion of a new court amount to a retrospective law ?

We are satisfied with the provision made in this
country on the subject of trial by jury. Does our con-

.
238 MK. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON

stitution direct trials to be by jury ? It is required in
our bill of rights, which is not a part of the constitution.
Does any security arise from hence ? Have you a
jury when a judgment is obtained on a replevin bond,
or by default ? Have you a jury when a motion is made
for the commonwealth against an individual ; or when
a motion is made by one joint obligor against another,
to recover sums paid as security ? Our courts decide
in all these cases, without the intervention of a jury ;
yet they are all civil cases. The bill of rights is merely
recommendatory. Were it otherwise, the consequence
would be, that many laws which are found convenient,
would be unconstitutional. What does the govern
ment before you say ? Does it exclude the legislature
from giving a trial by jury in civil cases ? If it does not
forbid its exclusion, it is on the same footing on which
your state government stands now. The legislature
of Virginia does not give a trial by jury where it is not
necessary. But gives it wherever it is thought expedi
ent. The federal legislature will do so too, as it is
formed on the same principles.

The honorable gentleman says, that unjust claims
will be made, and the defendant had better pay them
than go to the supreme court. Can you suppose such
a disposition in one of your citizens, as that to op
press another man, he will incur great expenses ?
What will he gain by an unjust demand ? Does a
claim establish a right ? He must bring his witnesses
to prove his claim. If he does not bring his witnesses,
the expenses must fall upon him. Will he go on a cal
culation that the defendant will not defend it, or can
not produce a witness ? Will he incur a great deal of
expense, from a dependence on such a chance ? Those
who know human nature, black as it is, must know
that mankind are too well attached to their interest to
run such a risk. I conceive that this power is abso
lutely necessary, and not dangerous ; that should it be
attended by little inconveniences, they will be altered,
and that they can have no interest in not altering them.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 239

Is there any real danger ? When I compare it to the
exercise of the same power in the government of
Virginia, I am persuaded there is not. The fede
ral government has no other motive, and has every
reason of doing right, which the members of our state
legislature have. Will a man on the Eastern Shore, be
sent to be tried in Kentucky ; or a man from Kentucky
be brought to the Eastern Shore to have his trial ? A
government by doing this would destroy itself. I am
convinced, the trial by jury will be regulated in the man
ner most advantageous to the community.

SPEECH OF PATRICK HENRY,

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 24th, 1788.

The resolution of Mr. Wythe being under consideration, which
proposed, " That the committee should ratify the constitution, and
that whatsoever amendments might be deemed necessary should be
recommended to the consideration of the Congress, which should
first assemble under the constitution, to be acted upon according to
the mode prescribed therein ;" Mr. Henry thus addressed the
convention.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE proposal of ratification is premature. The im
portance of the subject requires the most mature de
liberation. The honorable member must forgive me
for declaring my dissent from it, because, if I understand
it rightly, it admits that the new system is defective arid
most capitally: for immediately after the proposed
ratification, there comes a declaration, that the paper
before you is not intended to violate any of these three
great rights — the liberty of religion, liberty of the
press, and the trial by jury. What is the inference,
when you enumerate the rights which you are to en
joy? That those not enumerated are relinquished.
There are only three things to be retained : religion,
freedom of the press, and jury trial. Will not the ratifi
cation carry every thing, without excepting these three
things ? Will not all the world pronounce, that we

3111. HENRY'S SPEECH, &c. 241

intended to give up all the rest? Every thing it
speaks of, by way of rights, is comprised in these three
things. Your subsequent amendments, only go to
these three amendments. I feel myself distressed, be
cause the necessity of securing our personal rights,
seems not to have pervaded the minds of men : for
many other valuable things are omitted. For in
stance: general warrants, by which an officer may
search suspected places, without evidence of the com
mission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence
of his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are ad
mitted, any man may be seized ; any property may be
taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evi
dence or reason. Every thing the most sacred, may
be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of
power. We have infinitely more reason to dread ge
neral warrants here, than they have in England ; be
cause there, if a person be confined, liberty may be
quickly obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But
here, a man living many hundred miles from the judges,
may rot in prison before he can get that writ.

Another most fatal omission is, with respect to
standing armies. In your bill of rights of Virginia,
they are said to be dangerous to liberty, and it tells
you, that the proper defence of a free state consists in
militia; and so I might go on to ten or eleven things
of immense consequence secured in your bill of rights,
concerning which that proposal is silent. Is that the
language of the bill of rights in England ? Is it the
language of the American bill of rights, that these
three rights, and these only, are valuable ? Is it the
language of men going into a new government ? Is it
not necessary to speak of those things before you go
into a compact ? How do these three things stand ?
As one of the parties, we declare we do not mean to
give them up. This is very dictatorial ; much more
so, than the conduct which proposes alterations as the
condition of adoption. In a compact, there are two
parties— one accepting, and another proposing. As

VOL. i. 31

242 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

a party, we propose that we shall secure these three
things ; and before we have the assent of the other
contracting party, we go into the compact, and leave
these things at their mercy. What will be the conse
quence ? Suppose the other states will call this dic
tatorial : they will say, Virginia has gone into the
government, and carried with her certain propositions,
which she says, ought to be concurred in by the other
states. They will declare, that she has no right to
dictate to other states the conditions on which they
shall come into the union. According to the honora
ble member's proposal, the ratification will cease to be
obligatory unless they accede to these amendments.
We have ratified it. You have committed a violation,
they will say. They have not violated it. We say we
will go out of it. You are then reduced to a sad di
lemma ; to give up these three rights, or leave the
government. This is worse than our present confede
ration, to which we have hitherto adhered honestly
and faithfully. We shall be told we have violated it,
because we have left it for the infringement and vio
lation of conditions, which they never agreed to be a
part of the ratification. The ratification will be com
plete. The proposal is made by one party. We, as
the other, accede to it, and propose the security of
these three great rights ; for it is only a proposal. In
order to secure them, you are left in that state of fatal
hostility, which I shall as much deplore as the honora
ble gentleman. I exhort gentlemen to think seriously,
before they ratify this constitution, and persuade them
selves that they will succeed in making a feeble effort
to get amendments after adoption. With respect to
that part of the proposal, which says, that every power
not granted, remains with the people ; it must be pre
vious to adoption, or it will involve this country in in
evitable destruction. To talk of it, as a thing subse
quent, not as one of your unalienable rights, is leaving
it to the casual opinion of the Congress who shall take
up the consideration of that matter. They will not

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. i>43

reason with you about the effect of this constitution.
They will not take the opinion of this committee con
cerning its operation. They will construe it as they
please. If you place it subsequently, let me ask the
consequences ? Among ten thousand implied powers
which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged
in war, liberate every one of your slaves, if they please.
And this must and will be done by men, a majority of
whom have not a common interest with you. They
will, therefore, have no feeling for your interests.

It has been repeatedly said here, that the great ob
ject of a national government, is national defence.
That power, which is said to be intended for security
and safety, may be rendered detestable and oppressive.
If you give power to the general government to pro
vide for the general defence, the means must be com
mensurate to the end. All the means in the possession
of the people, must be given to the government which
is entrusted with the public defence. In this state there
are two hundred and thirty six thousand blacks, and
there are many in several other states : but there are
few or none in the northern states, and yet, if the north
ern states shall be of opinion that our numbers are
numberless, they may call forth every national re
source. May Congress not say, that every black man
must fight ? Did we not see a little of this in the last
war? We were not so hard pushed, as to make
emancipation general : but acts of assembly passed,
that every slave who would go to the army should be
free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event
about ; slavery is detested ; we feel its fatal effects ;
we deplore it with all the pity of humanity. Let all
these considerations, at some future period, press
with full force on the minds of Congress. Let that
urbanity, which I trust will distinguish America, and
the necessity of national defence — let all these things
operate on their minds, and they will search that pa
per, and see if they have power of manumission. And
have they not, sir ? Have they not power to provide

244 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

for the general defence and welfare ? May they not
think that these call for the abolition of slavery ? May
they not pronounce all slaves free, and will they not be
warranted by that power ? There is no ambiguous
implication, or logical deduction. The paper speaks
to the point. They have the power in clear unequivo
cal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it.
As much as I deplore slavery, I see that prudence for
bids its abolition. I deny that the general govern
ment ought to set them free, because a decided majo
rity of the states have not the ties of sympathy and
fellow-feeling for those whose interest would be affect
ed by their emancipation. The majority of Congress
is to the north, and the slaves are to the south. In
this situation, I see a great deal of the property of the
people of Virginia in jeopardy, and their peace and
tranquillity gone away. I repeat it again, that it would
rejoice my very soul, that every one of my fellow-be
ings was emancipated. As we ought with gratitude
to admire that decree of heaven, which has numbered
us among the free, we ought to lament and deplore
the necessity of holding our fellow-men in bondage.
But is it practicable, by any human means, to liberate
them, without producing the most dreadful and ruinous
consequences? We ought to possess them in the
manner we have inherited them from our ancestors,
as their manumission is incompatible with the felicity
of the country. But we ought to soften, as much as
possible, the rigor of their unhappy fate. I know that
in a variety of particular instances, the legislature, lis
tening to complaints, have admitted their emancipa
tion. Let me not dwell on this subject. I will only
add, that this, as well as every other property of the
people of Virginia, is in jeopardy, and put in the hands
of those who have no similarity of situation with us.
This is a local matter, and I can see no propriety in
subjecting it to Congress.

With respect to subsequent amendments, proposed
by the worthy member. I am distressed when I hear

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 24/>

the expression. It is a new one altogether, and such
an one as stands against every idea of fortitude and
manliness, in the states, or any one else. Evils admit
ted, in order to be removed subsequently, and tyranny
submitted to, in order to be excluded by a subsequent
alteration, are things totally new to me. But I am sure
he meant nothing but to amuse the committee. I
know his candor. His proposal is an idea dreadful to
me. I ask — does experience warrant such a thing
from the beginning of the world to this day ? Do you
enter into a compact of government first, and after
wards settle the terms of the government ? It is ad
mitted by every one, that this is a compact. Although
the confederation be lost, it is a compact constitution,
or something of that nature. I confess I never heard
of such an idea before. It is most abhorrent to my
mind. You endanger the tranquillity of your country,
you stab its repose, if you accept this government un
altered. How are you to allay animosities ? — For
such there are, great and fatal. He flatters me and
tells me, that I could influence the people, and re
concile them to it. Sir, their sentiments are as firm
and steady, as they are patriotic. Were I to ask them
to apostatize from their native religion, they would
despise me. They are not to be shaken in their
opinions with respect to the propriety of preserving
their rights. You never can persuade them, that it is
necessary to relinquish them. Were I to attempt to
persuade them to abandon their patriotic sentiments,
I should look on myself as the most infamous of men.
I believe it to be a fact, that the great body of yeo
manry are in decided opposition to it. I may say
with confidence, that for nineteen counties adjacent
to each other, nine tenths of the people are consci
entiously opposed to it. I may be mistaken, but I give
you it as my opinion, and my opinion is founded on
personal knowledge in some measure, and other good
authority. I have not hunted popularity by declaim
ing to injure this government. Though public fame

246 MK. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

might say so, it was not owing to me that this flame of
opposition has been kindled and spread. These men
never will part with their political opinions. If they
should see their political happiness secured to the
latest posterity, then indeed they might agree to it.
Subsequent amendments will not do for men of this
cast. Do you consult the union in proposing them ?
You may amuse them as long as you please, but they
will never like it. You have not solid reality — the
hearts and hands of the men who are to be governed.
Have gentlemen no respect to the actual dispositions
of the people in the adopting states ? Look at Penn
sylvania and Massachusetts. These two great states
have raised as great objections to that government as
we do. There was a majority of only nineteen in
Massachusetts. We are told, that only ten thousand
were represented in Pennsylvania, although seventy
thousand had a right to be represented. Is not this a
serious thing ? Is it not worth while to turn your eyes
for a moment from subsequent amendments, to the
situation of your country ? Can you have a lasting
union in these circumstances ? It will be in vain to
expect it. But if you agree to previous amendments,
you shall have union, firm and solid. I cannot con
clude without saying, that I shall have nothing to do
with it, if subsequent amendments be determined upon.
Oppressions will be carried on as radically by the ma
jority, when adjustments and accommodations will be
held up. I say, I conceive it my duty, if this govern
ment is adopted before it is amended, to go home. I
shall act as I think my duty requires. Every other gen
tleman will do the same. Previous amendments, in
my opinion, are necessary to procure peace and tran
quillity. I fear, if they be not agreed to, every move
ment and operation of government will cease, and how
long that baneful thing, civil discord, will stay from this
country, God only knows. When men are free from
restraint, how long will you suspend their fury ? The
interval between this and bloodshed, is but a moment.

'

.:->:

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 247

The licentious and wicked of the community, will
seize with avidity every thing you hold. In this un
happy situation, what is to be done ? It surpasses my
stock of wisdom. If you will, in the language of free
men, stipulate that there are rights which no -man un
der heaven can take from you, you shall have me going
along with you, and not otherwise. — [Here Mr. Henry
informed the committee, that he had a resolution pre
pared, to refer a declaration of rights, with certain
amendments to the most exceptionable parts of the
constitution, to the other states in the confederacy, for
their consideration, previous to its ratification. The
clerk then read the resolution, the declaration of rights,
and amendments, which were nearly the same as those
ultimately proposed by the convention, for the consi
deration of Congress. He then resumed the subject]
I have thus candidly submitted to you, Mr. Chairman,
and this committee, what occurred to me as proper
amendments to the constitution, and a declaration of
rights containing those fundamental, unalienable pri
vileges, which I conceive to be essential to liberty and
happiness. I believe, that on a review of these amend
ments it will still be found, that the arm of power will
be sufficiently strong for national purposes, when these
restrictions shall be a part of the government. I be
lieve no gentleman, who opposes me in sentiments,
will be able to discover that any one feature of a
strong government is altered; and at the same time
your unalienable rights are secured by them. The
government unaltered may be terrible to America,
but can never be loved, till it be amended. You find
all the resources of the continent may be drawn to
a point. In danger, the president may concentre to
a point every effort of the continent. If the govern
ment be constructed to satisfy the people and remove
their apprehensions, the wealth and strength of the
continent will go where public utility shall direct,
This government, with these restrictions, will be a
strong government united with the privileges of the

248 Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH OX

people. In my weak judgment, a government i^
strong, when it applies to the most important end of
all governments — the rights and privileges of the peo
ple. In the honorable member's proposal, jury trial,
the press, and religion, and other essential rights, are
not to be given up. Other essential rights — what are
they ? The world will say, that you intended to give
them up. When you go into an enumeration of your
rights, and stop that enumeration, the inevitable con
clusion is, that what is omitted is intended to be sur
rendered.

Anxious as I am to be as little troublesome as pos
sible, I cannot leave this part of the subject, without
adverting to one remark of the honorable gentle
man. He says, that rather than bring the union into
danger, he will adopt it with its imperfections. A
great deal is said about disunion, and consequent dan
gers. I have no claim to a greater share of fortitude
than others, but I can see no kind of danger. I form my
judgment on a single fact alone, that we are at peace
with all the world, nor is there any apparent cause of
a rupture with any nation in the world. Is it among
the American states that the cause of disunion is to be
feared ? Are not the states using all their efforts for the
promotion of union ? New England sacrifices local
prejudices for the purposes of union. We hear the
necessity of the union, and predilection for the union,
re-echoed from all parts of the continent : and all at
once disunion is to follow ! If gentlemen dread dis
union, the very thing they advocate will inevitably
produce it. A previous ratification will raise insur
mountable obstacles to union. New York is an insur
mountable obstacle to it, and North Carolina also.
They will never accede to it, till it be amended. A great
part of Virginia is opposed most decidedly to it, as it
stands. This very spirit which will govern us in these
three states, will find a kindred spirit in the adopting
states. Give me leave to say, that it is very problema
tical whether the adopting states can stand on their

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 240

own legs. I hear only on one side, but as far as my
information goes, there are heart-burnings and animosi
ties among them. Will these animosities be cured by
subsequent amendments ?

Turn away from America, and consider European
politics. The nations there, which can trouble us are
France, England and Spain. But at present we know
for a certainty, that those nations are engaged in very
different pursuits from American conquests. We are
told by our intelligent ambassador, that there is no such
danger as has been apprehended. Give me leave then to
say, that dangers from beyond the Atlantic are imagina
ry. From these premises then, it may be concluded,
that from the creation of the world, to this time, there
never was a more fair and proper opportunity than we
have at this day to establish such a government as will
permanently establish the most transcendent political fe
licity. Since the revolution there has not been so much
experience. Since then, the general inte rests of A meri-
ca have not been better understood, nor the union
more ardently loved, than at this present moment. 1
acknowledge the weakness of the old confederation.
Every man says, that something must be done, Where
is the moment more favorable than this ? During the
war, when ten thousand dangers surrounded us, Ameri
ca was magnanimous. What was the language of the
little state of Maryland ? " I will have time to consi
der. I will hold out three years. Let what may come,
I will have time to reflect." Magnanimity appeared
every where. What was the upshot ? — America tri
umphed. Is there any thing to forbid us to offer these
amendments to the other states ? If this moment goes
away unimproved, we shall never see its return. We
now act under a happy system, which says, that a ma
jority may alter the government when necessary. But
by the paper proposed, a majority will forever endea
vor in vain to alter it. Three fourths may. Is not this
the most promising time for securing the necessary al-
L 32

250 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON

terations ? Will you go into that government, where
it is a principle, that a contemptible minority may pre
vent an alteration? What will be the language
of the majority ? — Change the government. — Nay,
seven eighths of the people of America may wish
the change; but the minority may come with a
Roman Veto, and object to the alteration. The lan
guage of a magnanimous country and of freemen is.
till you remove the defects we will not accede. It
would be in vain for me to show, that there is no dan
ger to prevent our obtaining those amendments, if you
are not convinced already. If the other states will not
agree to them, it is not an inducement to union. The
language of this paper is not dictatorial, but merely a
proposition for amendments. The proposition of
Virginia met with a favorable reception before. We
proposed that convention which met at Annapolis. It
was not called dictatorial. We proposed that at
Philadelphia. Was Virginia thought dictatorial ?
But Virginia is now to lose her pre-eminence.
Those rights of equality, to which the meanest in
dividual in the community is entitled, are to bring us
down infinitely below the Delaware people. Have
we not a right to say, hear our propositions?
Why, sir, your slaves have a right to make their
humble requests. Those, who are in the meanest
occupations of human life, have a right to com
plain. What do we require ? Not pre-eminence,
but safety ; that our citizens may be able to sit down in
peace and security under their own fig-trees. I am
confident that sentiments like these will meet with
unison in every state ; for they will wish to banish
discord from the American soil. I am certain
that the warmest friend of the constitution, wishes
to have fewer enemies — fewer of those who pester
and plague him with opposition. I could not with
hold from my fellow-citizens any thing so reason
able. I fear you will have no union, unless you re-

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 251

move the cause of opposition. Will you sit down
contented with the name of union without any solid
foundation ?

Mr. Henry then concluded, by expressing his hope,
that his resolution would be adopted, and added,
that if the committee should disapprove of any of
his amendments, others might be substituted.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

DELIVERED APRIL 30th, 1789.

Fellow-citizens of the Senate, and
of the House of Representatives,

AMONG the vicissitudes incident to life, no event
could have filled me with greater anxieties, than that
of which the notification was transmitted by your or
der, and received on the fourteenth day of the present
month. On the one hand, I was summoned by my
country, whose voice I can never hear but with vene
ration and love, from a retreat which I had chosen
with the fondest predilection, and in my flattering
hopes with an immutable decision as the asylum of
my declining years ; a retreat which was rendered eve
ry day more necessary, as well as more dear to me,
by the addition of habit to inclination, and of frequent
interruptions in my health to the gradual waste com
mitted on it by time. On the other hand, the magni
tude and difficulty of the trust, to which the voice of
my country called me, being sufficient to awaken in the
wisest and most experienced of her citizens a distrust
ful scrutiny into his qualifications, could not but over
whelm with despondence one, who inheriting inferior
endowments from nature, and unpractised in the du
ties of civil administration, ought to be peculiarly con*
scious of his own deficiencies. In this conflict of emo
tions, all I dare aver, is, that it has been my faithful

INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 253

study to collect my duty from a just appreciation of
every circumstance by which it might be affected.
All I dare hope is, that if in executing this task, I have
been too much swayed by a grateful remembrance of
former instances, or by an affectionate sensibility to
this transcendent proof of the confidence of my fellow-
citizens, and have thence too little consulted my inca
pacity as well as disinclination for the weighty and un
tried cares before me, my error will be palliated by
the motives which misled me, and its consequences be
judged by my country, with some share of the partiali
ty in which they originated.

Such being the impressions under which I have, in
obedience to the public summons, repaired to the pre
sent station, it would be peculiarly improper to omit
in this first official act, my fervent supplications to that
Almighty Being who rules over the universe — who
presides in the councils of nations — and whose provi
dential aids can supply every human defect, that his
benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happi
ness of the people of the United States, a government
instituted by themselves for these essential purposes ;
and may enable every instrument, employed in its ad
ministration, to execute with success, the functions al
lotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to the
great author of every public and private good, I assure
myself that it expresses your sentiments not less than
my own, nor those of my fellow-citizens at large, less
than either. No people can be bound to acknowledge
and adore the invisible hand, which conducts the af
fairs of men, more than the people of the United States.
Every step, by which they have advanced to the cha
racter of an independent nation, seems to have been
distinguished by some token of providential agency :
and in the important revolution just accomplished in
the system of their united government, the tranquil de
liberations and voluntary consent of so many distinct
communities, from which the event has resulted, can
not be compared with the means, by which most gov-

254 PRESIDENT WASHINGTON'S

ernments have been established, without some return
of pious gratitude along with a humble anticipation
of the future blessings which the past seem to presage.
These reflections, arising out of the present crisis, have
forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be sup
pressed. You will join with me, I trust, in thinking
that there are none under the influence of which, the
proceedings of a new and free government can more
auspiciously commence.

By the article establishing the executive depart
ment, it is made the duty of the President, " to recom
mend to your consideration, such measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient." The circum
stances under which I now meet you, will acquit me
from entering into that subject, farther than to refer to
the great constitutional charter under which you are
assembled ; and which, in defining your powers, desig
nates the objects to which your attention is to be given.
It will be more consistent with those circumstances,
and far more congenial with the feelings which actu
ate me, to substitute, in place of a recommendation of
particular measures, the tribute that is due to the ta
lents, the rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the
characters selected to devise and adopt them. In these
honorable qualifications, I behold the surest pledges,
that as, on one side, no local prejudices or attach
ments, no separate views, nor party animosities, will
misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which
ought to watch over this great assemblage of commu
nities and interests ; so on another, that the founda
tions of our national policy will be laid in the pure and
immutable principles of private morality ; and the pre
eminence of free government, be exemplified by all the
attributes which can win the affections of its citizens,
and command the respect of the world. I dwell on
this prospect with every satisfaction which an ardent
love for my country can inspire: since there is no
truth more thoroughly established, than that there ex
ists in the economy and course of nature, an indissolu-

INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 255

ble union between virtue and happiness, between duty
and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an
honest and magnanimous policy and the solid rewards
of public prosperity and felicity : since we ought to be
no less persuaded, that the propitious smiles of heaven
can never be expected on a nation that disregards the
eternal rules of order and right, which heaven itself
has ordained : and since the preservation of the sacred
fire of liberty, and the destiny of the republican model
of government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps
as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to the
hands of the American people.

Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care,
it will remain with your judgment to decide, how far
an exercise of the occasional power delegated by the
fifth article of the constitution is rendered expedient
at the present juncture by the nature of objections
which have been urged against the system, or by the
degree of inquietude which has given birth to them.
Instead of undertaking particular recommendations
on this subject, in which I could be guided by no lights
derived from official opportunities, I shall again give
way to my entire confidence in your discernment and
pursuit of the public good ; for I assure myself that
whilst you carefully avoid every alteration which
might endanger the benefits of an united and effective
government, or which ought to await the future les
sons of experience; a reverence for the characteristic
rights of freemen, and a regard for the public harmo
ny, will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the
question how far the former can be more impregna-
bly fortified, or the latter be safely and advantageously
promoted.

To the preceding observations I have one to add,
which will be most properly addressed to the House of
Representatives. It concerns myself, and will there
fore be as brief as possible. When I was first honor
ed with a call into the service of my country, then on
the eve of an arduous struggle for its liberties, the

256 PRESIDENT WASHINGTON'S, &c.

light in which I contemplated my duty required that
1 should renounce every pecuniary compensation.
From this resolution I have in no instance departed.
And being still under the impressions which produced
it, I must decline, as inapplicable to myself, any share
in the personal emoluments, which may be indispensa
bly included in a permanent provision for the execu
tive department; and must accordingly pray that the
pecuniary estimates for the station in which I am plac
ed, may, during my continuance in it, be limited to
such actual expenditures as the public good may be
thought to require.

Having thus imparted to you my sentiments, as they
have been awakened by the occasion which brings us
together, I shall take my present leave ; but not with
out resorting once more to the benign Parent of the
human race, in humble supplication, that since he has
been pleased to favor the American people, with op
portunities for deliberating in perfect tranquillity, and
dispositions for deciding with unparalleled unanimity
on a form of government, for the security of their un
ion, and the advancement of their happiness ; so his
divine blessing may be equally conspicuous in the en
larged views, the temperate consultations, and the
wise measures on which the success of this govern
ment must depend.

SPEECH OF WILLIAM L. SMITH.

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED

STATES.

Oil the 3d of January, 1794, the house of representatives resolved
itself into a committee of the whole, on the report of Mr. Jeffer
son, Secretary of State, " On the nature and extent of the privileges
and restrictions of the commercial intercourse of the United States
with foreign nations, and the measures which he thought proper
to be adopted for the improvement of the commerce and naviga
tion of the same," when Mr. Madison introduced a series of reso
lutions, proposing to impose " further restrictions and higher
duties, in certain cases, on the manufactures and navigation of
foreign nations, employed in the commerce of the United States,
than those now imposed." On the 13th, Mr. Smith addressed
the committee as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AMONG the various duties which are assigned by the
constitution to the legislature of the United States,
there is perhaps none of a more important nature than
the regulation of commerce, none more generally in
teresting to our fellow-citizens, none which more seri
ously claims our diligent and accurate investigation.

It so essentially involves our navigating, agricultu
ral, commercial and manufacturing interests, that an
apology for the prolixity of the observations which I
am about to submit to the committee, will scarcely be
requisite.

VOL. i. 33,

258 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

In the view which I shall take of the question, dis
engaging the inquiry from all topics of a political na
ture, I shall strictly confine myself to those which are
commercial, and which alone are, in my judgment, pro
perly connected with the subject.

Called upon to decide on propositions, merely com
mercial, and springing from a report, in its nature
limited to commercial regulations, it would be as ill-
timed, as it would be irregular, to mingle with the dis
cussion considerations of a political nature. I shall
accordingly reject from the inquiry every idea which
has reference to the Indians, the Algerines, or the
Western Posts. Whenever those subjects require our
deliberations, I shall not yield to any member in
readiness to vindicate the honor of our country and
to concur in such measures as our best interests may
demand.

This line of procedure will, I trust, be deemed by
those gentlemen who follow me the only proper one,
and that the debate will be altogether confined to
commercial views ; these will of themselves open a
field of discussion sufficiently spacious, without the
intervention of arguments derived from other sources.
It would indeed argue a weakness of ground in the
friends of the propositions, and imply a distrust of the
merits of their cause, were they compelled to bolster
it up with such auxiliaries, and to resort for support
to arguments, not resulting from the nature of the
subject, but from irrelative and extraneous conside
rations.

The propositions, as well as the report, being pre
dicated upon facts and principles having relation to
our commerce and navigation with foreign countries,
by those facts and principles, and those alone, ought
the propositions to stand or fall.

It will not be denied, that this country is at present
in a very delicate crisis, and one requiring dispassion
ate reflection, cool and mature deliberation. It will
be much to be regretted then, if passion should usurp

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 259

the place of reason; if superficial, narrow and preju
diced views should mislead the public councils from
the true path of national interest.

The report of the secretary of state, on the privi
leges and restrictions on the commerce of the United
States in foreign countries, is now before the commit
tee. The tendency of that report, (whatever may
have been the design of the reporter,) appears to be, to
induce a false estimate of the comparative condition
of our commerce with certain foreign nations, and to
urge the legislature to adopt a scheme of retaliating
regulations, restrictions and exclusions.

The most striking contrast, which the performance
evidently aims at, is between Great Britain and France.
For this reason, and as these are the two powers with
whom we have the most extensive relations in trade, I
shall, by a particular investigation of the subject, en
deavor to lay before the committee an accurate and
an impartial comparison of the commercial systems of
the two countries in reference to the United States, as
a test of the solidity of the inferences which are at
tempted to be established by the report. A fair com
parison can only be made with an eye to what may be
deemed the permanent system of the countries in ques
tion. The proper epoch for it, therefore, will precede
the commencement of the pending French revolution.

The commercial regulations of France, during the
period of the revolution, have been too fluctuating, too
much influenced by momentary impulses, and, as tar as
they have looked towards this country with a favora
ble eye, too much manifesting an object of the mo
ment, which cannot be mistaken, to consider them as
a part of a system. But though the comparison will
be made with principal reference to the condition of
our trade with France and Great Britain antecedent
to the existing revolution, the regulations of the sub
sequent period will perhaps not be passed over alto
gether unnoticed.

The table which I have before me, comprises the

2150 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH CIS

principal features of the subject within a short com
pass. It is the work of a gentleman of considerable
commercial knowledge, and I believe may be relied on
for its correctness. An attentive reference to it will,
with some supplementary remarks, convey a just con
ception of the object. A view to conciseness and sim
plicity has excluded from it all articles (the produc
tion and manufactures of the United States,) which
are not of considerable importance.

Accustomed as our ears have been to a constant
panegyric on the generous policy of France towards
this country in commercial relations, and to as con
stant a philippic on the unfriendly, illiberal and perse
cuting policy of Great Britain towards us in the same
relations, we naturally expect to find, in a table which
exhibits their respective systems, numerous discrimina
tions in that of France in our favor, and many valuable
privileges granted to us, which are refused to other
foreign countries ; in that of Great Britain, frequent
discriminations to our prejudice, and a variety of pri
vileges refused to us, which are granted to other foreign
nations. But an inspection of the table will satisfy
every candid mind that the reverse of what has been
supposed is truly the case ; that neither in France nor
the French West Indies is there more than one solitary
and unimportant distinction in our favor, (I mean the
article of fish oil,) either with regard to our exports
thither, our imports from thence, or our shipping ; that
both in Great Britain and the British West Indies,
there are several material distinctions in our favor,
with regard both to our exports thither and to our im
ports from thence, and, as it respects Great Britain,
with regard also to our shipping ; that in the market
of Great Britain a preference is secured to six of our
most valuable staples, by considerably higher duties on
the rival articles of other foreign countries ; that our
navigation thither is favored by our ships, when carry
ing our own productions, being put upon as good a
footing as their own ships, and by the exemption of se-

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 261

veral of our productions, when carried in our ships,
from duties which are paid on the like articles of other
foreign countries carried in the ships of those coun
tries; that several of our productions may be car
ried from the United States to the British West Indies,
while the like productions cannot be carried thither
from any other foreign country ; and that several of
the productions of those countries may be brought
from thence to the United States, which cannot be car
ried from thence to any other foreign country.

These important differences in the systems of the
two countries will appear more fully by passing in re
view each article, and presenting, at the same time,
the remarks which it will suggest.

[Here Mr. Smith entered into a critical examina
tion of our export trade with France and Great Bri
tain, from which he drew an inference, that Great Bri
tain and her dominions consumed annually a much
greater amount of our commodities than France and
her dominions, and consequently, that Great Britain
was a much better customer, as a consumer, than
France. He then proceeded to take a view of our
import trade with those countries, from which he drew
the conclusion, that Great Britain was our best furnish
er as well as our best customer. Mr. Smith next advert
ed to our navigation with France and England. After
going into a detail of facts upon this subject, he pro
ceeded thus] —

We find then, upon a comprehensive and particular
investigation of the system of Great Britain, that in
stead of its wearing an aspect particularly unfriendly
towards us, it has in fact a contrary aspect ; that com
pared with other foreign nations, it makes numerous
and substantial discriminations in our favor ; that it
secures by means, which operate as bounties upon
our commodities, a preference in her markets to the
greatest number of our principal productions, and
thereby materially promotes our agriculture and com
merce ; that in the system of France there is but a

262 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

single and not very important instance of a similar
kind ; that if France allows us some advantages of
navigation in her islands, she allows the same advan
tages to all other foreign nations, while Great Britain
allows advantages to our navigation with herself di
rectly which she does not allow to other foreign na
tions ; that if France admits our salted fish into her
West India islands, she does it under such duties upon
ours and such premiums upon her own as would ex
clude us from them, if she had capacity to supply
herself, while she formally prohibits our flour ; that if
Great Britain excludes our fish from her islands, she
freely admits our flour ; that while France, as far as
we are permitted to trade with her islands, lets in
other foreign nations to a competition with us on equal
terms, Great Britain excludes from a competition with
most of the articles of the United States, which she
admits into the islands, the like articles of other for
eign countries ; that while France permits us to be
supplied directly from her islands with nothing more
than she permits to other nations, and with only the
two articles of molasses and rum, Great Britain allows
us to be supplied directly from her islands with a con
siderable number of essential articles, and refuses a
direct supply of those articles to other foreign coun
tries ; that if the system of France is somewhat more
favorable to our navigation, that of Great Britain is far
more favorable to our agriculture, our commerce, and
to the due and comfortable supply of our wants ; that
Great Britain is a better furnisher than France of the
articles we want, from other foreign countries, and a
better customer for what we have to sell ; and that
the actual relations of commerce between the United
States and Great Britain are more extensive and im
portant than between the United States and France,
and it may be added, or any other country in the world,
for our trade with France is no doubt second in impor
tance.
Where then is the ground for extolling the liberal

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 263

policy of France, the superior importance of our com
mercial connexion with her, and for exclaiming against
the illiberal and oppressive policy of Great Britain,
and for representing our intercourse with her as secon
dary in consequence and utility? There is none.
'Tis altogether a deception which has been long
successfully practised upon the people of the Unit
ed States, and which it is high time we should
unmask.

If we pass from the fact of the footing of our com
merce with France and Great Britain to the principles
and motives of . their respective systems, we shall find
as little room for eulogium on the one as censure on
the other. Candor will assign to both the same station
in our good or bad opinion.

Both (like other nations) have aimed at securing
the greatest possible portion of benefit to themselves,
with no greater concession to our interests than was
supposed to coincide with their own.

The colonial system of France is the great theme
of the plaudits of her partizans.. The detail, already
entered into respecting it, will now be further elucidat
ed by a concise view of its general principles and pro
gress.

An ordinance of the year 1 727, like the British navi
gation act, had given to the mother country a monopo
ly of the trade of the colonies, and had entirely exclud
ed foreigners from it.

Experience having shown, as we learn from an ordi
nance of 30th August, 1784, that it was necessary to
moderate the rigor of that system, small relaxations
from time to time accordingly took place, and by the
ordinance just mentioned, more important alterations
were made.

That ordinance establishes several free ports in the
French islands, one at St. Lucie, one at Martinique,
one at Guadaloupe, one at Tobago, and three at St.
Domingo, and grants permission, " till the king should
please otherwise to ordain," to foreign vessels of at

•264 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

least sixty tons burthen to carry to those free ports
wood of all kinds, pit coal, live animals, salted beef,
but not pork, salted cod and fish, rice, Indian corn, ve
getables, green hides in the hair or tanned, peltry, tur
pentine and tar, and to take from the same ports, mo
lasses, rum and merchandizes which had been imported
from France, charging the articles which are per
mitted to be imported, with the duties stated in the
table.

The steps which succeeded that ordinance, calculat
ed to narrow its operation in regard to the article of
fish, have been already noted so particularly as to
render a recapitulation unnecessary.

It is sufficient to repeat that they manifested on this
point a decided disposition to exclude as far as pos
sible foreign fish, from a competition with their own.

It appears then that the general principle of the co
lony system of France, like that of Great Britain, was
a system of monopoly, and that some temporary devia
tions from it were, from time to time, made from ne
cessity or the force of .circumstances.

In like manner, the navigation act of Great Britain
gives the mother country a monopoly of the trade of
her colonies, not only as to navigation, but as to sup
ply ; but the force of circumstances has led to some de
viations.

The deviations of France have extended partially to
navigation, as well as to supply. Those of Great
Britain have extended further than those of France,
as to supply, but have been narrower as to navigation.
Neither however has deviated further than particular
situation dictated. Great Britain has been less re
laxed on the article of navigation than France, be
cause the means of navigation possessed by the for
mer were more adequate than those possessed by the
latter. France has been more restrictive on the article
of exports than Great Britain, because her home mar
ket was more adequate to the consumption of the pro
ductions of her islands than that of Great Britain to

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

those of her islands, and because the latter found ad
vantages in allowing a freer export to the United
States as an article of exchange. France permitted
the introduction of salted beef and fish into her islands,
because she could not sufficiently furnish those arti
cles herself: she prohibited flour and pork, because
she thought herself competent to the supply of them :
Great Britain prohibited fish, because she knew her
self able to furnish it, and like France, was jealous of
an interference with her fisheries, as a main support of
her navigation. She permitted flour, because she
knew herself unable to supply it. As far as the mea
sures of France may have had a conciliatory aspect
towards this country, she was influenced by the desire
of sharing more largely in our trade, and diverting it
more from her ancient rival. As far as the measures
of Great Britain may have made any concession to us,
they have proceeded from a sense of our importance
to her as a customer, from the utility of our supplies
to her, from a conviction that it was necessary to fa
cilitate to us the means of re-exchange, that it was
better to take our commodities, which were paid for
in commodities, than those of other countries, which
she might have to pay for in specie, that it was good
policy to give us some douceur^ as well to hinder our
commerce from running into another channel, as to
prevent collisions which might be mutually injurious.

These are the true features of the systems of both
countries, as to motives. If we are unprejudiced, we
shall see in neither of them either enmity or particular
friendship; but we shall see* in both a predominant
principle of self-interest, the universal rule of national
conduct.

Having completed my comparison of the two sys
tems of France and Great Britain towards this coun
try, I shall now extend it to those of other countries, in
order to mark the principal differences.

[Here Mr. Smith described the situation of our com
mercial relations with the United Netherlands. Sweden.

VOL. i. 31

266 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

Spain, Portugal and Denmark, and drew the conclu
sion that the system of Great Britain, not only as
compared with that of France, was entitled to our
preference, but that it was also greatly to be prefer
red to that of all the beforementioned nations, except
perhaps the United Netherlands. He then continued
his speech as follows :]

From the view which has been taken, this general
reflection results, that the system of every country is
selfish according to its circumstances, and contains all
those restrictions and exclusions which it deems useful
to its own interests. Besides this, a desire to secure
to the mother country a monopoly of the trade of its
colonies, is a predominant feature in the system of al
most every country in Europe. Nor is it without
foundation in reason. Colonies, especially small isl
ands, are usually maintained and defended at the
expense of the mother country, and it seems a natural
recompense for that service, that the mother country
should enjoy, exclusively of other nations, the benefit
of trade with its colonies. This was thought reasona
ble by the United States, while colonies, even after
their disputes on the point of taxation had begun :
and however the question may stand between the
mother country and its colonies, between the former
and foreign nations, it is not easy to see how the equity
of the exclusion can be contested. At any rate, its be
ing the most prevailing system of nations having colo
nies, there is 110 room for acrimony against a particu
lar one that pursues it. This ought not to dissuade
the United States from availing itself of every just and
proper influence to gain admission into the colony
trade of the nations concerned ; but this object ought
to be pursued with moderation, not under the instiga
tion of a sense of injury, but on the ground of temperate
negotiation and reasonable equivalent.

These observations ought to produce two effects, to
moderate our resentments against particular nations
and our partialities for others, and to evince the im-

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 2t)7

practicability and Quixotism of an attempt by violence,
on the part of this young country, to break through the
fetters which the universal policy of nations imposes
on their intercourse with each other.

Our moderation in this respect ought to be excited
by another reflection — does not our own system pre
sent a number of exclusions and restrictions similar to
those of which we complain ? Let us look into our
impost and tonnage acts ; do they not exhibit a num
ber of instances of duties prohibitory in their principle
and extent? Do they not by additional duties on
foreign vessels and on goods brought in foreign ves
sels, secure a decided superiority to our ships in the
navigation between this country and all those to which
they are permitted to go ? If duties on goods of one
country, imported into another, are oppressions and
grievances, (as the Secretary of State seems frequent
ly to suppose,) how few are the foreign articles brought
into the United States, on which considerable duties
are not laid.

The Secretary of State, after pointing out the exclu
sions, restrictions and burdens which prevent our en
joying all the advantages which we could desire in the
trade with foreign countries, proceeds to indicate the
remedies ; these are counter-exclusions, restrictions
and burdens.

The reason of the thing and the general observa
tions of the Secretary of State', would extend the regu
lations to be adopted to all the nations with whom we
have connexions in trade ; but his conclusion would
seem to confine them to Great Britain, on the sugges
tion that she alone has declined friendly arrangements
by treaty, and that there is no reason to conclude,
that friendly arrangements would be declined by other
nations.

The suggestion with regard to Great Britain, ap
pears not to be well founded, if we are to judge from
the correspondence with the British minister, Mr.
Hammond, communicated by the president to tht>

31K. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

house. Mr. Jefferson asks him, if he is empowered to
treat on the subject of commerce j he replies, that he
is fully authorized to enter into a negotiation for that
purpose, though not as yet empowered to conclude.
Upon further difficulty and objection on the part of
Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Hammond renews his assurance of
his competency to enter on a negotiation, which he
rests on his commission, as minister plenipotentiary,
and his instructions ; Mr. Jefferson requires a commu
nication of his full powers for that purpose, and de
clines the negotiation. This was by no construction
a declining on the part of the British minister. Forms
were the obstacle with the Secretary of State, whose
zeal, at best, was not greater than Mr. Hammond's.

But with regard to Spain, these observations occur.
A secret article with France, stipulated for Spain a
right to become a party to our commercial treaty with
France, on the same terms. She has never availed
herself of the right. Do we not know, that measures
have been since pursued towards forming a treaty of
commerce with her ? Do we not know that none has
been formed ? Have we not reason to suspect, that
such a treaty, on eligible terms, could not be obtained
but at a price which we should be unwilling to pay for
it ? Have no measures been pursued towards effect
ing a commercial treaty with a power so interesting to
us as Portugal ? What was the object of sending a
minister there ? How happens it, that there is no re
turn ? Is not there reason to conclude, from the long
delay, that there are serious obstacles to the forming
a proper treaty of commerce with that nation ?

Why then is Great Britain selected, but that it is
most in unison with our passions to enter into collisions
with her ?

If retaliations for restrictions, exclusions and bur
dens, are to take place, they ought to be dealt out, with
a proportional hand, to all those from whom they are
experienced. This, justice and an inoffensive conduct
require. If, suffering equal impediments to our trade

31K. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 269

from one power as another, we retaliate on one and
not on another, we manifest that we are governed by a
spirit of hostility towards the power against whom our
retaliation is directed, and we ought to count upon a
reciprocation of that spirit. If, suffering fewer from
one than from another, we retaliate only on that party
from whom we suffer least, the spirit of enmity, by
which we were actuated, becomes more unequivocal.
If, receiving a positively better treatment from one
than another, we deal most harshly towards that pow
er which treats us best, will it be an evidence either
of justice or moderation? Will it not be a proof
either of caprice, or of a hatred and aversion, of a na
ture to overrule the considerations both of equity and
prudence.

Whatever questions may be raised about the pre
ference due to the British commercial system, as com
pared with that of France, there can be none, compar
ing it either with that of Spain or Portugal.

Where then is the justification of the attempt to

S'oduce a war of commercial regulations with Great
ritain, passing over greater objections to the policy
observed toward us by other nations ?

Commercial regulations ought to be bottomed on
commercial motives : but if political grievances are to
be implicated, is there no power proposed to be ex
empted, of whom we have cause to complain?

The propositions, (which may be considered as a
commentary on the report,) do every thing but name
Great Britain. Professedly confined to the powers
with whom we have no treaties of commerce, the ar
ticles selected, as the objects of regulation, have
scarcely any application but to Great Britain. This
is but a flimsy cover ; the design will be mistaken by
no one, and there would have been much more dignity
in naming the party with whom it was meant to con
tend.

The idea of an apportionment of retaliation to
grievance is rendered impossible by our treaties.

270 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

These contain precise stipulations of mutual privileges,
and in each case the general principle of the party
being on the footing of the most favored nation.

But at least it might be done with regard to the pow
ers with whom we have no treaties, and the not propo
sing it will be considered as a clear proof that the
ostensible object is one thing, the real object another.

Will it be believed out of doors, that all this pro
ceeds from a pure zeal for the advancement of com
merce and navigation ? Have the views of our public
councils been uniform on this point ? Have they never
contributed to lose favorable opportunities for making
such a treaty, by recalling powers for that purpose once
given, by defeating efforts made to send them when
they might have been useful ?

Whatever may be the motive, the operation may
clearly be pronounced to be a phenomenon in political
history — a government, attempting to aid commerce
by throwing it into confusion ; by obstructing the most
precious channels in which it flows, under the pretence
of making it flow more freely ; by damming up the
best outlet for the surplus commodities of the country,
and the best inlet for the supplies, of which it stands in
need ; by disturbing without temptation, a beneficial
course of things, in an experiment precarious, if not
desperate ; by arresting the current of a prosperous
and progressive navigation, to transfer it to other coun
tries, and by making all this wild work in the blamea-
ble, but feeble attempt to build up the manufactures
and trade of another country at the expense of the
United States.

Let us take a closer view of the project. It has
been proved that it does not rest on a basis of distribu
tive justice, and observations have been made to evince
its impolicy. But this demands a more critical exa
mination.

Let it be premised, that it is a project calculated to
disturb the existing course of three fourths of our im
port trade, two fifths of our export trade, and the

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 271

means on which depend two thirds, at least, of our
revenues.

To be politic, therefore, it ought to unite these dif
ferent ingredients :

1. An object of adequate utility to the country.

2. A moral certainty at least of success.

3. An assurance that the advantage likely to be ob
tained, is not overbalanced by the inconveniences likely
to be incurred, and as an equivalent for the jeopardy
to which advantages in our possession are exposed.

1. The direct object professed to be aimed at, is a
freer trade with Great Britain, and access to her West
India islands, in our own ships. A collateral one, the
success of which seems most relied on, is to transfer a
part of our too great trade with Great Britain to
other nations, particularly France.

The first is no doubt an object of real magnitude,
worthy of every reasonable and promising exertion.
The second, in the single light of obviating a too great
dependence for supply on one nation, is not unworthy of
attention, but, as before observed, it ought only to be
aimed at by expedients neither embarrassing nor ex
pensive ; it is a very insufficient object to be pursued
either at hazard or expense to the people of the United
States. It has been already shown, that to pursue it,
either by prohibitions or partial increase of duties,
would be a costly undertaking to this country.

2. The second ingredient is, " a moral certainty of
success." The argument used to prove the proba
bility, nay, the certainty of success, is this ; the United
States are a most important customer to Great Bri
tain ; they now take off near three millions in her
manufactures, and by the progress of their population,
which is likely to exceed that of their manufactures, the
probability is, that their importance as a customer
will increase every year ; their importance to Great
Britain, as a source of supply, is not less than as a
customer for her manufactures; the articles with
which they furnish her, are those of prime necessity,

272 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

consisting of the means of subsistence, and the mate
rials for ship-building and manufactures, while the
articles we derive from her, are mostly those of con
venience and luxury ; her supplies to us are therefore
less useful than ours to her ; that it would be contrary
to all good policy in Great Britain, to hazard the turn
ing of a commerce so beneficial, into other channels ;
beside all this, Great Britain is immersed in debt,
and in a state of decripitude ; the derangement of our
commerce with her, would endanger a shock to the
whole fabric of her credit, and by affecting injuriously
the interests of a great portion of her mercantile body,
and by throwing out of employ a large number of her
manufacturers, would raise a clamor against the mi
nistry too loud and too extensive to be resisted ; and
that they would consequently be compelled by the
weight of these considerations to yield to our wishes.

It is as great an error in the councils of a country
to over-rate as to under-rate its importance. The
foregoing argument does this, and it does it in defiance
of experience. Similar arguments were formerly used
in favor of a non-importation scheme ; the same conse
quences now foretold, were then predicted in the most
sanguine manner ; but the prediction was not fulfilled.
This it would seem, ought to be a caution to us now.
and ought to warn us against relying upon the like ef
fects, promised from a measure of much less force,
namely, an increase of duties.

If our calculations are made on the ordinary course
of the human passions, or on a just estimate of relative
advantages for the contest proposed, we shall not be
sanguine in expecting that the victory will be readily
yielded to us, or that it will be easily obtained.

The navigation act of Great Britain, the principles of
which exclude us from the advantages we wish to en
joy, is deemed by English politicians, as the palladium
of her riches, greatness and security.

After having cherished it for such a long succession
of years, after having repeatedly hazarded much for

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 273

the maintenance of it, with so strong a conviction
of its immense importance, is it at all probable that
she would surrender it to us without a struggle — that
she would permit us to extort the abandonment of it
from her without a serious trial of strength ?

Prejudices riveted by time and habit, opinions fixed
by long experience of advantages, a sense of interest,
irritated pride, a spirit of resentment at the attempt, all
these strong circumstances would undoubtedly prompt
to resistance. It would be felt, that if a concession
were made to us upon the strength of endeavors to ex
tort it, the whole system must be renounced ; it would
be perceived, that the way having been once successful
ly pointed out to other nations, would not fail to be fol
lowed, and that a surrender to one would be a surren
der to all.

Resistance therefore would certainly follow in one
or other mode, a war of arms or of commercial re
gulations.

If the first should be determined upon, it would not
be difficult for Great Britain to persuade the other pow
ers, with whom she is united, that they ought to make
common cause with her. She would represent that
our regulations were in fact only a covert method of
taking part in the war by embarrassing her, and that
it was the interest of the cause, in which they were
combined, to frustrate our attempts.

If war could be foreseen as the certain conse
quence of the experiment proposed to be made, no
arguments would be necessary to dissuade from it.
Every body would be sensible that more was to be
lost than gained, and that so great a hazard ought not
to be run.

But we are assured that there is no danger of this con
sequence, that no nation would have a right to take
umbrage at any regulations we should adopt with re
gard to our own trade, and that Great Britain would
take care how she put to risk so much as she would
hazard by a quarrel with us.

VOL* i- 35

274 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH Oi\

All this is far more plausible than solid. Experience
has proved to us that the councils of that country are
influenced by passion as well as our own. If we should
seize the present moment to attack her in a point where
she is peculiarly susceptible, she would be apt to re
gard it as a mark of determined hostility. This would
naturally tend to kindle those sparks of enmity
which are alledged to exist on her side. War is as
often the result of resentment as of calculation. A
direct and immediate war between us would not be
surprising ; but if this should not take place, mutual
ill offices and irritations, which naturally grow out of
such a state of things, would be apt quickly to lead to it.
Insults and aggressions might become so multiplied
and open as riot to permit forbearance on either side.

It would be a calculation with Great Britain whether
she could best oppose us by retaliating regulations, or
by arms.

As circumstances at the moment of deliberation
should point, according to the then view of probabilities,
would be the result. The decision may be in favor of
war, under the idea that its distresses might induce us
to enter into a commercial treaty upon her own terms ;
who can pronounce that this would not be the result,
when it is considered that she is likely to be aided by so
many other maritime powers now in her connexion ?

Let us however take it for granted that she would
prefer the other course, that of retaliating regulations ;
how will the contest stand ? The proportion of the
whole exports of Great Britain, which comes to the
United States, is about one fifth ; the proportion of our
exports, which goes to Great Britain, is about one
eighth of the whole amount of her imports. Taking
the mean of these proportions of imports and ex
ports, the proportion which our trade with Great Bri
tain bears to the totality of her trade is about one sixth.

The proportion of imports from the dominions of
Great Britain into the United States, may be stated at
three fourths of our whole importation ; the proportion

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 275

which our exports to the same dominions bears to our
total exportation may be stated at two fifths ; taking
the mean of these two, the proportion which our trade
with Great Britain bears to our whole trade is some
thing more than one half.

It follows then, that while a commercial warfare with
Great Britain would disturb the course of about one
sixth of her trade, it would disturb the course of more
than one half of ours.

This much greater proportional derangement of our
trade than of hers by a contest, is a mathematical
demonstration that the contest would be unequal on
our part, that we should put more to hazard than Great
Britain would do, should be likely to suffer greater in
convenience than her, and consequently, (the resolu
tion and perseverance of the two parties being sup
posed equal,) would be soonest induced to abandon the
contest.

The inequality of the contest is evinced by these fur
ther considerations. The capital of Great Britain is
greater in proportion to numbers than ours. A manu
facturing as well as an agricultural nation, the objects
of her industry and the materials of her trade are as
much diversified as can well be conceived, while ours
are few and simple. The habits of her people admit
of her bringing into action every source of revenue
which she possesses, while those of ours embarrass the
government at every step, and would render substitutes
for the existing ones extremely difficult. The govern
ment of Great Britain has all the energy, which can
be derived either from the nature of a government, or
from long habits of obedience in the people, while
ours is in its infancy, neither confirmed by age nor
habit, and with many circumstances to lessen its force.
No one can but be sensible, that in proportion to the
capital of a merchant or a nation, is the faculty to en
dure partial derangements to the trade carried on by
the one or the other ; that in proportion to the diversi
ty of objects which a merchant or a nation can bring

276 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

to market, is the faculty to find new resources of trade,
and to bear the temporary suspension of existing ones ;
that in proportion to the habitude of a nation to en
dure taxation, is the facility of a government to find
substitutes for revenues lost ; that in proportion to the
energy of a government and the habits of obedience of
a people, is the chance of perseverance on the part of
such government, in measures producing inconven
iences to the community.

Great Britain then would have less to resist and
more means of resistance than the United States;
the United States more to resist and less means of re
sistance than Great Britain. Which party are the
chances against in such a contest ? Can any one
say that the United States ought, in such a compara
tive situation, to count on success in an experiment
like that proposed, with sufficient assurance to be jus
tified in hazarding upon it so great a derangement of
its affairs, as may result from the measure ?

The main argument for the chance of success, is,
that our supplies to Great Britain are more necessary
to her than hers to us. But this is a position which
our self-love gives more credit to than facts will alto
gether authorize. Well informed men in other coun
tries, (whose opportunities of information are at least
as good as ours,) affirm, that great Britain can obtain
a supply of most of the articles she obtains from us, as
cheap and of as good .a quality elsewhere, with only
two exceptions, namely, tobacco and grain, and the
latter is only occasionally wanted : a considerable sub
stitute for our tobacco, though not of equal quality,
may be had elsewhere : and even admitting this posi
tion to be too strongly stated, yet there is no good
reason to doubt that it is in a great degree true. The
colonies of the different European powers on this con
tinent, some countries on the Mediterranean, and the
northern countries of Europe, are in situations adapted
to becoming our competitors.

On the other hand, the manufactured articles which

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 277

we do npt make ourselves, (the greatest part of which
are, in civilized countries, necessaries,) are as impor
tant to us, as our materials for manufacture (the only
articles for which her demand is constant,) are to
Great Britain. The position is as true, that no other
nation can supply us as well as that country, with seve
ral essential articles which we want, as that no nation
can supply her equally well with certain articles which
she takes from us ; and as to other articles of subsis
tence, it is certain that our demand for manufactured
supplies is more constantly urgent than her demand
for those articles. Where indeed shall we find a sub
stitute for the vast supply of manufactures which we
get from that country ? No gentleman will say that
we can suddenly replace them by our manufactures, or
that this, if practicable, could be done without a vio
lent distortion of the natural course of our industry.
A substitute of our own , being out of the question,
where else shall we find one ?

France was the power which could best have filled
any chasm that might have been created. But this is
no longer the case. 'Tis undeniable that the money
capitals of that country have been essentially destroy
ed ; that manufacturing establishments, except those
for war, have been essentially deranged. The destruc
tion to which Lyons appears to be doomed, is a severe
blow to the manufactures of France ; that city, se
cond in importance in all respects, was perhaps the
first in manufacturing importance. It is more than
probable that France, for years to come, will herself
want a foreign supply of manufactured articles.

At a moment then, when the manufactures of Great
Britain have become more necessary than ever to us,
can we expect to succeed in a contest, which supposes
that we can dispense with them ?

It may be said that the resolutions proposed do not
suppose this ; but they do suppose it, for they ought to
proceed upon the possibility, nay, probability, that a
system of commercial retaliation will be adopted by

278 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

Great Britain, in which case we must inevitably sus
tain a defeat, if we cannot dispense both with her sup
plies and with her market for our supplies.

Will it be answered that her manufactures will find
their way to us circuitously, and our supplies to her in
like manner ? If so, what are our regulations to pro
duce but distress and loss to us ? The manufactures
of Great Britain will still be consumed, and our ma
terials will still nourish those manufactures.

The manufactures we take from her being less
bulky than the supplies we send her, the charges of a
circuitous transportation would be less than those of
a like transportation of our commodities. In all the
cases therefore, in which those charges fall upon her,
they would be lighter than in the cases in which the
latter charges fell upon us. Moreover, as the articles
of Great Britain would meet less competition in our
markets than ours in hers, the increased charges on
her manufactures would much oftener fall upon us than
those upon our materials would fall upon her. So
that both ways we should sustain loss.

But, it may be asked, what are the regulations
Great Britain could adopt to counteract ours ?

I answer, she could, (among other conceivable
things,) prohibit or lay prohibitory duties on her com
modities to this country, and on ours to her, in our
bottoms ; and she might in addition, temporarily grant
the same privileges to Dutch or other friendly bottoms
which are now granted to those of the United States
in the trade between us and herself; or she might go
no further in this particular than to permit the impor
tation of our commodities in some of those bottoms.
This, it is true, would be a departure from the system
of her navigation act; but when the question was,
whether she should surrender it permanently to us by
extortion, or temporarily to a power more friendly to
her, till the issue of the experiment could be decided,
who can doubt what would be the course which in
terest and resentment would dictate ?

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 276

But there are numerous other regulations which
could be adopted, and which equally with the forego
ing would have the effect of transferring the trade be
tween the two countries to the management of some
third party ; for after all, it is not improbable this will
be the result of the contest, that instead of the United
States and Great Britain carrying on jointly as they
now do the trade between the two countries, it will be
carried on either directly or circuitously by some third
power, more to our detriment than to that of Great
Britain.

The manufactures of that country will get to us
nearly in the same quantities they now do, with the
disadvantage of additional charges ; such of our com
modities, as she cannot have of equal quality elsewhere,
will get to her also : the rest will be supplanted by the
like commodities of other nations, and we shall lose
the best market we have for them.

Those who advocate the system of contention,
should tell us where a substitute will be found. The
merchants, who know that it is now difficult enough to
find markets for our surplus commodities — that France,
in ordinary times, affords a very contracted one, and
that the French West Indies are not likely, in settled
times, to be as good customers as they have been for
some time past, cannot desire to see the sphere abridg
ed, and our landholders will quickly reprobate the plan.

Thus it appears, that the contest would be likely to
issue against us, and to end in defeat and disgrace.

What would be our situation if we should make an
attempt of the kind and fail in it ? Our trade would
then truly be in the power and at the disposal of Great
Britain.

3. The third ingredient stated, as necessary to justi
fy the proposed attempt, is this ; that the prospect of
advantages should be at least an equivalent for those
in possession, which would be put in jeopardy by the
experiment.

ft has been shown, that in fact there is no real pros-

280 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

pect of advantage, but a considerable one of incon
venience and loss. This puts an end to comparison.
But it may be added, that our situation is precisely
such an one as to forbid experiments. It is so, from
the stage at which we are, as a people, too little ad
vanced, too little matured for hazardous experiments
of any sort.

This is not all : our general situation at this time is
an eligible one ; we are making as rapid a progress in
most of the great branches of political prosperity as we
can reasonably desire, and it would be imprudent to
hazard such a situation, upon precarious speculations
of greater advantage. The prosperity of a nation is
not a plant to thrive in a hotbed ; moderation in this
respect is the truest wisdom ; it is so plain a path, that
it requires a peculiar sublimation of ideas to deviate
from it.

It is agreed on all hands, that all our great national
interests, our population, agriculture, manufactures,
commerce and our navigation, are in a thriving and
progressive state, advancing, faster than was to have
been expected, and as fast as can reasonably be de
sired.

Our navigation, in the short space of three years,
ending the 31st of December, 179°., has increased in
the ratio of nearly one fifth.

The proportions of our tonnage have been as fol
lows : —

In 1790 tons 479091 )

1791 - - 501790 ) showing an increase of 89192 tons.

1792 - 568283)

The proportion of foreign tonnage during the same
years, has been —

In 1790 tons 258919)

1791 - - 240799 > showing a decrease of 14656 tons.

1792 - - 244263)

This proves that our present system is highly fa
vorable to the increase of our navigation, and that we
are gradually supplanting foreigners.

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 281

The truth is, that the difference in the tonnage duty,
and the addition of one tenth upon the duties on goods
imported in foreign bottoms, is a powerful encourage
ment to our shipping, and as it has not been of a mag
nitude to excite retaliation, it is much more likely to
promote the interests of. our navigation, than violent
measures, v/hich would compel to retaliation; pru
dence admonishes us to stop where we are, for the pre
sent, rather than risk the advantages we possess, in
trials of strength, that never fail to injure more or less
both parties.

If we turn from our shipping to our agriculture, we
shall find no reason to be dissatisfied.

The amount of our exports for the year, ending 30th
September, 1792, as appears by the last return of ex
ports to this house, exceeded the two preceding years
by five hundred eighty-nine thousand, six hundred
and one dollars and sixteen cents. It exceeded the
mean of the two preceding years, by one million, five
hundred ninety-seven thousand, nine hundred and
eighty-three dollars and thirty-six cents. Our reve
nues are unquestionably more productive than was
looked for. Those from imports have exceeded, in a
year, four millions, six hundred thousand dollars. Of
the increase of our manufactures we have no precise
standard, but those, who attend most to the subject, en
tertain no doubt that they are progressive.

This certainly is not a state of things that invites to
hazardous experiments. These are perhaps never
justifiable, but when the affairs of a nation are in an
unprosperous train.

We experience, indeed, some embarrassments from
the effects of the European war, but these are tempo
rary, and will cease with that war, which of itself of-
iers us some indemnifications, I mean a freer trade to
the West Indies.

I am greatly mistaken if the considerations, which
have been suggested, do not conclusively prove the
impolicy of the plan which is now recommended for

VOL. i. 36

282 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

our adoption. So strong and decided is my own con
viction, that I cannot but persuade myself, that of the
committee will lead to its rejection.

A few miscellaneous observations will conclude
what I have to offer on this very interesting subject.

1. It has been made an objection to the present foot
ing on which our trade is with Great Britain, that it is
regulated by annual proclamation of the executive, in
stead of a permanent law. This was at first laid down
by the secretary of state in terms so general as to in
clude the West Indies ; but he has since corrected the
error, and told us that our trade with the British West
Indies is regulated by a standing law. The fact itself,
nevertheless, is of no real importance. The actual
footing, on which we are placed, is the only material
point; the mode of doing it is of little consequence.
The annual proclamation of the British executive is
equivalent to the decree, revocable at pleasure, of any
single legislator, of the monarch of Spain or Portugal,
and it may be added, of the French convention, which,
though a numerous body, yet forming only one assem
bly, without checks, is as liable to fluctuation as a sin
gle legislator ; and in fact, its resolutions have been
tound as fickle and variable, as it was possible for the
resolutions of any single person to be. To prove this,
if proof were required, it would be only necessary to
refer to the frequent changes in the regulations they
have made with regard to the trade of this country —
to-day one thing, to-morrow another. Instability is
more applicable to no political institution than to a
legislature, consisting of a single popular assembly.

2. The additional duties proposed, are objectiona
ble, because the existing duties are already, generally
speaking, high enough for the state of our mercantile
capital and the safety of collection. They are near
twenty per centum on an average, upon the value of the
objects on which they are laid ; higher than the du
ties of several countries, and high enough for our pre
sent condition. To augment the rates materially will

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 283

be in the abstract to oppress trade ; for we must have
for our consumption the manufactures of the country
on which they are proposed to be laid.

3. To serve as a contrast to the conduct of Great
Britain, we are told of the liberal overtures for a com
mercial treaty lately made by France.

It has been already remarked, that the conduct of
France towards us since the commencement of the re
volution, is no basis of reasoning : it has undergone as
many revolutions as their political systems : their mea
sures at one period, with respect to our tobacco, were
of a complexion peculiarly hostile to us. The duty of
twenty-five livres per kentle on that article, carried in
our bottoms to France, and of only eighteen livres
fifteen sous on the same article, carried in French bot
toms, amounted to a complete prohibition to carry our
tobacco in our own bottoms.

The duty of twenty livres per kentle on foreign fish
is another important instance of severity of regulations,
a duty admitted by the secretary of state to be pro
hibitory.

If there have been regulations and propositions of a
more favorable nature, they are to be ascribed to
causes of the moment. During the continuance of
the revolution, it is of necessity that we have carte
blanche in the French West Indies. We know that we
are getting admission into the British and Spanish
Islands also.

And as to the overtures for a permanent system, Mr.
Genet's instructions published by him explain the
object. Privileges of trade in the West India Islands
are to be the price of our becoming a party in the war.
The declamations against the liberticide maxims of the
ancient government and in favor of free principles of
commerce, resolve themselves into this. This is a bar
gain which I trust a majority of this house will not be
willing to make ; I am sure our constituents would not
thank us for it.

But it may be asked, are we to sit with folded arms
and tamely submit to all the oppressions, restrictions

2#4 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON

and exclusions to which our trade is subject — if not,
what are we to do ? I answer, nothing certainly at
the present juncture. If the foundation of the question
were more solid than I believe it to be, candidly and
dispassionately considered, this is of all moments
the most unfavorable for an experiment. Any move
ment of the kind would, as before observed, be constru
ed into a political manoeuvre and an attempt to embar
rass one of the belligerent powers, and would interest
the feelings of all those united with her, producing
consequently either war or additional trammels in
every quarter upon our trade ; besides the weighty
argument, that the great source of subsidiary supply
to which we might have heretofore looked has been
obstructed.

But I answer further, that we ought with great cau
tion to attempt any thing at a future day, till we have
acquired a maturity which will enable us to act with
greater effect, and to brave the consequences, even if
they should amount to war, and till we have secured
more adequate means of internal supply ; to which point
we should bend our efforts, as the only rational and safe
expedient, in our present circumstances, for counteract
ing the effects of the spirit of monopoly, which more or
less tinctures not the system of Great Britain merely,
but that of all Europe. But this it seems is not the favor
ite course, it is not high seasoned enough for our politi
cal palate ; we not only turn aside from it with neglect,
but we object away the plainest provisions of the con
stitution to disable ourselves from pursuing it.

Every year, for years to come, will make us a more
important customer to Great Britain, and a more im
portant furnisher of what she wants. If this does not
lead to such a treaty of commerce as we desire, the
period is not very distant when we may insist with
much better effect on what we desire, without any
thing like the same degree of hazard. This last ob
servation is not meant to be confined to Great Britain,
but to extend to any other power, as far as the stipula
tions of treaty may permit.

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 285

Wisdom admonishes us to be patient, "to make
haste slowly." Our progress is and will be rapid
enough, if we do not throw away our advantages.
Why should we be more susceptible than all the world ?
Why should this young country throw down the gaunt
let in favor of free trade against the world ? There may
be spirit in it, but there will certainly not be prudence.

But again it may be asked, shall we put nations, dis
posed to a more liberal system, upon the same footing
with those differently disposed ? Will not this tend
to produce an unfriendly treatment from all ?

I answer first, that I think it has been proved, that
the nation against which we have been invited prin
cipally to aim our artillery, treats us with at least as
much liberality as other nations, I mean in a commer
cial sense.

I answer secondly, that if there be nations, who
are seriously disposed to establish with us more free
and beneficial principles of trade, the path is plain ;
let treaties be formed, fixing upon a solid basis the
privileges which we are to enjoy, and the equivalent.
I have no objection to granting greater privileges to
one power than to another, if it can be put on the stable
foundation of contract, ascertaining the boon and the
equivalent. But I think it folly to be granting volun
tarily boons at the expense of the United States with
out equivalent. The mode of treaty secures the
ground ; it is inoffensive to any third power. Our re
ply to objections would in that case be, " here is the
price to us clearly defined and fixed by treaty, for
which we grant the greater advantages of which you
complain : give us the price, and the like advantages
are yours." But capriciously to grant greater privi
leges by law to one nation than to another, when, upon
a fair comparison, we are not better treated by one
than by another, is neither equitable, politic, nor safe.

Let us then leave changes for the present to the
course of national treaties, and continue to proceed in
the path in which we have hitherto found prosperity
and safetv.

SPEECH OF JOHN NICHOLAS,

ON

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, JANUARY 16, 1794.

In the committee of the whole, Mr. Nicholas spoke as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I FEEL a great embarrassment, in speaking on this
subject, from a distrust of my ability to treat properly
its acknowledged importance, and from the apparent
expectation of the audience. I feel too, as the mem
ber from Maryland who spoke yesterday did, from the
imputation of motives, well knowing that the Repre
sentatives of my country are industriously reported
to be enemies of the government, and promoters of
anarchy, and that the present measure is imputed to
these principles. It is somewhat remarkable, that
farther North we are charged with selfishness and want
of attachment to the general welfare, for a supposed
opposition to measures of the import of the present.
I mention this contradictory inference, to show that
the shameful designs, charged upon us, are not proved
by the fact, and to place the guilt where it only exists,
in the malignity of the accuser.

It is a commonly received opinion, that trade should
be entrusted to the direction of those immediately in
terested in it, and that the actual course of it, is the
best which it could take ; this principle is by no means

MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH, &c. 287

a safe one, and as applied to the trade of America, is
extremely fallacious. It can never be just, where the
beginning and growth of commerce have not been
free from all possible constraint as to its direction, as
that can never be called a business of election, which
has been created under foreign influence. The man
ner in which America was first peopled, and the nurture
she received from Great Britain, afford the most strik
ing contrast to the requisite beforementioned. The
first inhabitants of America were educated in Great
Britain, and brought with them all the wants of their
own country ; to be gratified chiefly by the productions
of that country, aided by British capital in the settle
ment of the wilderness ; and depending on the same
means for the conveyance of its produce to a place
of consumption, it was inevitable that the demand for
British commodities should keep pace with the im
provement of the country. In the commencement of
American population and during its early stages, there
does not appear to have been a chance of comparing the
advantages of commercial connexion with different
countries, and it will be found, that in its progress it
was still more restrained. In the last years of the de
pendence of America on Great Britain, the principal
part of America was occupied by large trading com
panies, composed of people in Great Britain, and con
ducted by factors, who sunk large sums in the hands
of the farmers to attach them to their respective stores,
by which means, competition was precluded, and a
dependence on the supplies of those stores completely
established. Since the revolution, the business has been
conducted by persons in the habit of dependence on
Great Britain, and who had no other capital than the
manufactures of that country, furnished on credit.
The business is still almost wholly conducted by the
same means. In no stage of its growth then, does
there appear to have been a power in the consumer
to have compared the productions of Great Britain,
with those of any other country, as to their quality or

288 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON

price, and therefore there is no propriety in calling the
course of trade, the course of its choice.

The subject before the committee, naturally divides
itself into navigation and manufactures, in speaking of
which^ I shall offer some other considerations, to show
that the same effects are by no means to be expected
from the greatest commercial wisdom in individuals,
which are in the power of the general concert of the
community; the one having in view profit on each sepa
rate transaction, the other promoting an advantageous
result to the whole commerce of the country.

In considering the importance of navigation to all
countries, but especially to such as have so extensive
a production of bulky articles, as America, I think I
shall show that the last observation is accurately
right, and that the interest of the whole community,
not those only who are the carriers, but those also who
furnish the object of carriage, positively demands a
domestic marine, equal to its whole business, and that,
even if it is to exist under rates higher than those of
foreign navigation, it is to be preferred. In circum
stances of tolerable equality, that can never however
entirely be the case ; for in the carriage of the produce
of one country, by the shipping of another, to any other
place than the country to which the shipping belongs,
there is considerably more labor employed, than would
have been by domestic shipping, as the return to their
own country, is to be included. On this ground, it
may be confidently asserted, that where the materials
of navigation are equally attainable, they will always
be more advantageously employed by the country for
whose use they are intended, and that if under such
circumstances, another country is employed as the
carrier, it must be under the influence of some other
cause than interest, as it respects that particular busi
ness. A dependence on the shipping of another coun
try, tends to establish a place of deposit in that coun
try, of those exports which are for the use of others, if
it is at a convenient distance from them. The super-

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 289

intendence of property, makes short voyages desirable
for the owner, and the connexion, that soon takes place,
between the money capital of a country and its ship
ping interests, greatly strengthens the vortex. The
attainment of wealth beyond the demands of naviga
tion, leads to an interest in the cargo itself, and then
the agency in selling to the consumer, becomes im
portant. It is apparent, that as the final sale depends
on the wants of the purchaser, all intermediate expenses
of care and agency, must be taken from the price to
which the maker would be entitled. Our own com
merce has involved this loss in a remarkable degree,
and it has gone to an enormous extent, from a necessi
ty of submitting to the perfidy of agents, arising from
a dependence established by means of the so much
boasted credit.

That there is this tendency in the employment of
foreign shipping, is not only proved by the commercial
importance of Holland, which became thus from her
naval resources, the store-house of Europe, without
furnishing any thing from her own productions, but
also from the varied experience of America. Before
the revolution, every thing for European consumption
was carried to Great Britain ; but since America has
possessed shipping of her own, and in the northern
states, there has been an accession of capital, the ex
port to England is reduced one half. It is true indeed,
that there is still nearly one half of what she receives,
that is re-exported ; but it will be found, that she still
retains a proportionate share of those influences, which
formerly carried the whole. Great Britain, under all
the discouragements of our laws, which we are told by
the mercantile members of the committee, amount to
a prohibition where they have any rivals, did, until
the European war, possess one third of the foreign
tonnage employed in America. This has been sup
ported by the dependence into which the southern
states were placed by credit, and here, as in every
other step of the connexion, this engine extorts ad-

VOL. T. 37

•290 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON

vantages from us, beyond the compensation which is
always secured in the first advance. If there is wanted
other proof of the British interest in the American
navigation, being supported in direct opposition to
our interests, it may be found in the comparative
state of the tonnage employed, where it appears that,
after the protecting duties once had their effect, the
additional tonnage, to a considerable amount, has
been entirely American, and that the British tonnage
has remained very nearly stationary, and in proportion
to their undue influence.

In time of war, in addition to the inconveniences
before stated, which are enhanced by throwing the
trade from its accustomed channel, there are great
and important losses brought on a country by this
kind of dependence. If your carriers are parties to
the war, you are subjected to war freight and war in
surance on your cargo, and you are cut off from all
the markets to which they are hostile ; and indeed,
from our experience in the present war, I may say you
are cut off from the market of your carriers them
selves, as it would have been impossible for British
vessels to have escaped in our seas last summer. To
what extent this loss goes, may be seen from a calcula
tion in the secretary of state's report on the fisheries,
making the proportion of war to that of peace in the
last one hundred years, as forty-two to one hundred ;
and on that calculation there can be no hesitation in
determining that the interest of the farmers requires
that this foreign dependence should end here. But
the European war, by making a temporary exclusion of
British shipping, has already brought on us the great
est mischief of such a regulation, and by the encour
agement it has afforded to our shipping, almost com
pleted the remedy ; so that we have reason to consi
der this as a fortunate period. But it is not merely
the advancement of our marine that is contemplated
by the present resolutions ; the security of that which
we have, is also dependent on them. The danger

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 291

from the Algerines has been estimated in this house at
five per centum on the vessel and cargo, but the whole
encouragement to our own shipping in our existing
laws, consists in the one tenth additional duty on goods
imported in foreign vessels. Whenever there shall be
an European peace, which cannot be far distant, the
whole difference between the two sums will be a direct
encouragement on British ships, and will probably be
equal to two freights. Do gentlemen rely on the pre
carious prospect of building frigates, and the more
precarious service to be rendered by them when built,
so much as to neglect any other regulations for the
safety of our shipping, when they are so much in their
power ?

Having shown, that the actual state of our com
merce is by no means the most beneficial, as far as
navigation is concerned, I will proceed to consider the
benefits derived from the consumption of those Euro
pean manufactures, which form the principal part of
the stores of America: and here it may safely be
said, that national policy by no means justifies the
almost exclusive preference, given to those of Great
Britain. It is not always true, that the commodity
which is bought for least money is the best bargain ;
for the means of payment form an important considera
tion in all traffic, and accommodations in it, may more
than counterbalance an inequality of price. If one
man will receive an article in exchange, which you can
sell to no other, it will certainly be a saving to deal
with him, at a high advance on his property. If there
are countries which would become great consumers of
American produce, on the terms of reciprocal con
sumption, arid we find a difficulty, as is often the case,
in vending that produce, is it not of great national
importance to excite those acts, which are to become
the foundation of the connexion, even if in the first
instance, it is to be attended with inconvenience and
loss ? France may be made a connexion of this sort ;
she is at this time, almost, if not quite on a footing

292 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON

with Great Britain in the consumption of American
products, and every hand which shall receive employ
ment from us, will add to her wants. We are told, that
it is of no less importance to us to find a country
which can supply us advantageously, than one which
will consume our productions, and that, as commerce
is no longer carried on by barter, it is no less beneficial
to sell in one country and buy in another, than if we
could complete the exchange in the same country.
This might be true, if your production was limited,
and the demand for it certain ; but with a greatly im
proving agriculture, and some risk in our markets,
the object is important. Great Britain being the fac
tory of those things, which would make her most de
pendent on the agricultural interest, and her national
wealth being probably at the greatest height, there is
no expectation that her consumption will increase.
On the other hand, as labor is now to receive its direc
tion in France to the manufacturing arts, so far as con
cerns America you will take from the agricultural
strength a large class of people, and by that means
create a dependence on you, at least to the amount of
their own consumption, and the wealth you will diffuse,
will give ability to thousands who are now too poor to
bid for your commodities. Nor is it probable that you
will purchase this important benefit, on very disadvan
tageous terms ; for it is agreed on all hands, that many
important arts are well understood there, and that
labor, which forms the principal part of the cost of
most articles, is considerably cheaper in France, than
in England.

Another very important operation of a discrimina
tion in favor of France, will be, that by encouraging
liberal industry, you may put an end to some practices,
which, in the existing state of consumption, greatly de
preciate our commodities; I mean the public provi
sion made in granaries, and the supply from them in
times of scarcity, which destroy the competition that
raises every thing to its just value. Different conse-

MR, MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

quences have been foretold, as likely to result from
those measures, to which I shall give a short examina
tion. We are told, that the preference, long since given
by our laws, has been equal to a prohibition of British
vessels, and that to the extent to which it has gone,
the best effects have been produced. To secure this
operation from a recent attack, and at the same time to
extend it to some branches of trade, to which its prin
ciple would equally extend, is the object of the marine
resolutions. We have no reason to apprehend bad
effects from an action, which has hitherto had good
consequences. As to the increased duties on manu
factures, I think the prospect in no way threatening,
for if there should be found no country to supply our
wants on better terms, the diminution of consumption
will be only in proportion to the duty. This can be by
no means alarming, considered as the worst conse
quence of the measure to men, with whom the impost
is the favorite mode of collecting the revenue, at a
time when the public wants are equal to any possible
produce. If there shall be found a competitor with
Great Britain for our consumption, the great object
will be attained, as it must be accompanied by a cor
responding consumption of American productions.
But we are told, that there will be a conflict of commer
cial regulations between this country and Great Bri
tain, and that the consequence will be the loss of the
market she affords us. The probable consequences
of such a conflict, will best determine whether it is to
be expected ; as it will commence on her part as well as
ours, with a view to consequences. The danger, which
she can alone apprehend, is the loss of the market for
her manufactures, and to obviate this, it would be ab
surd to widen the breach between us, as that would
tend, in a direct proportion, to the establishment of un
friendly habits, and manufactures, either here or in other
countries, which would rival her own. If, however,
the ultimate advantage would justify such measures,
the immediate distress of her people would forbid it

294 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON

The American trade must be the means of distributing
bread to several hundred thousand persons, whose oc
cupation would be wholly ended with the trade, and the
government is by no means in a situation to bear their
discontent.

Their navigation and manufactures draw many im
portant ingredients from America, which would be lost
to them. The creditors of the people of America to
an immense amount, would be deprived of the remit
tances which depend on a friendly intercourse. On
the whole, it would add to the disorders of the govern
ment among those, who perhaps have heretofore contri
buted to its support, without gratifying any thing but
an arrogant resentment. But we are told, that our own
citizens would be equal sufferers, and are more to be
injured by being stopped in a career of rapid improve
ment : it will be hard to anticipate any real misfortune
to America, in such a contest, unless the temporary
loss of indulgences, which are by no means necessary,
can be so called. The consumption of Great Britain
is, according to the most friendly calculation, not more
than one third of our purchases from her, and therefore
the national wealth, independent of the gratification of
our appetites, will receive an immense addition, and a
vast fund will be procured to make lasting and valua
ble improvements, which would be degraded by com
parison with the gewgaws of a day. It is to be remark
ed, that the diminution of our exports would be divided
among large classes of people, and in all cases rather
form a deduction from the annual income, than a total
loss : this will result from the various objects of American
industry and the division of the markets of its produce.
This forms an important difference between America
and Great Britain, in an estimate of the effects of a
rupture between the two countries. In my opinion,
the habits of the southern states are such as to require
the control, which is said to be the consequence of these
measures. Under the facility offered by the modes of
trade before spoken of, and the credit which is said to

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 295

be so beneficial, they have not only involved them
selves in debt, but have contracted habits, which, with
the power of gratification, must always keep them so.
We did hope that the administration of justice would
have corrected the evil, but we now find that it cannot
be corrected but by entire changes. It is founded in
the policy of the merchant himself, and this circum
stance is enough to present to the minds of the com
mittee a long train of dependent mischiefs ; it is a fact,
supported by the best evidence, that our merchants
who get their goods from the manufacturer, pay as
much for them as the shopkeeper, who buys at Balti
more or Philadelphia. This is one of the conse
quences of the want of credit, which always will fol
low a reliance on collection from farmers ; and there
can be no doubt, that the merchant is indemnified for
his disgrace, as well as his advance. The result of the
whole train of indulgence is, that our goods are
bought at an advance from a half to one fourth of
what they could be afforded for in cash sales ; nor
does the mischief stop here ; it brings a subjection
which materially affects the sale of our produce. I
believe myself, that the war with Great Britain did not
bring half the mischief on us that their credit has, and
I very much suspect that a credit for consumption will
always be found equally mischievous. It by no means
resembles money loans, as is insinuated by the gentle
man from South Carolina, by freeing a man's own re
sources for any other use. It is certain, that there is
no other safe regulation of a farmer's expenses, than
his income and experience every day proves — that when
so regulated they always fall short of the income, and
that when they depend on credit they always exceed it,
and thereby subject future revenue. Lessening the
importation of foreign manufactures will increase our
household fabrics, which experience has proved to be
highly profitable, as the labor is done by a part of the
community of little power in any other application.
Regular efforts in this way have been, in my country,
certainly productive of independence.

296 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON

It is acknowledged, that we may derive great advan*
tages from France in our commerce ; but it is said they
should be secured by treaty, and we should not pay
beforehand for them. If advantages are to be drawn
by treaty from foreign nations, to enable the executive
to procure them we must advance the impost beyond
the revenue standard, or they will have nothing to give
in exchange. Will gentlemen agree to involve France
in this measure indiscriminately, when we have al
ready a commercial treaty with her, which was con
comitant with that treaty which gave us independence?
Will they, under such proofs of friendliness, and while
they are laboring under a revolution that must strength
en our connexion, show distrust of their justice, when
the distinction now proposed may give them a know
ledge of those advantages they may derive from our
trade, and thereby make them more eager for a per
manent contract ? It will be always in our power,
when we find ourselves deceived, to restore the equali
ty with Great Britain. We are asked, what will be
come of our revenue under such an establishment ?
The answer is obvious from my former observations.
If the consumption is reduced only by means of reve
nue, the revenue will increase ; if it is lessened by com
petition, it will not be diminished, for the present rates
will continue on all foreign goods, and we shall be bet
ter able to pay from the improvement of our foreign
markets. But if there should be a diminution without
lessening the power of the people to pay, what mis
chief will there be ? Every body understands that the
people pay the revenue, although it is collected by
custom-house officers ; and there is reason to believe,
that the expense of collection is greater in that way
than any other, as there is not only the apparent ex
pense, but a secret compensation to the merchants for
advancing it.

But we are told, that we are including countries, in
the general description, which are our best customers —
Spain, Portugal, the Hanse Towns and Denmark. It

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 297

will be found, that they are little within the reach of
the propositions, not being carriers and in a small de
gree manufacturers of the articles to be taxed. It will
be in the power of the legislature to save them, in filling
up the blanks ; but this is not intended to shut out any
nation, which chooses to trade with us on liberal terms,
and if we are satisfied with our footing in their trade,
there is no doubt but we can secure it by treaty : they
will not complain of our taking away benefits, which
they may resume at any time. We are told, that this
business is merely commercial, and that we should not
think of our political relations to Great Britain ; hut
in my opinion, most of our grievances have commer
cial objects, and therefore are to be remedied by com
mercial resistance ; if you take away what is contended
for, contest must end. The Indian war and the Alge-
rine attack, have both commercial views, or Great Bri
tain must stand without excuse for instigating the
most horrid cruelties. I consider, however, the pro
positions before you, as the strongest weapon America
possesses, and the most likely to restore her to all her
rights, political and commercial and I trust I have
shown, that the means will have a beneficial effect, if
they should fail as a remedy with respect to Great
Britain.

VOL. i. 38

SPEECH OF FISHER AMES,

ON

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES, JANUARY 27, 1794.

In the committee oi'the whole, Mr. Ames spoke as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE question lies within this compass : is there any
measure proper to be adopted by Congress, which
will have the effect to put our trade and navigation on
a better footing ? If there is, it is our undoubted
right to adopt it, (if by right is understood the power
of self-government, which every independent nation
possesses,) and our own as completely as any other ; it
is our duty also, for we are the depositaries and the
guardians of the interests of our constituents, which,
on every consideration, ought to be dear to us. I
make no doubt they are so, and that there is a dispo
sition sufficiently ardent existing in this body, to co
operate in any measures for the advancement of the
common good. Indeed, so far as I can judge from
any knowledge I have of human nature, or of the pre
vailing spirit of public transactions, that sort of patri
otism, which makes us wish the general prosperity,
when our private interest does not happen to stand in
the way, is no uncommon sentiment. In truth, it
is very like self-love, and not much less prevalent.
There is little occasion to excite and inflame it. It is,
like self-love, more apt to want intelligence than zeal.

MR. AMES' SPEECH, &c. 29U

The danger is always, that it will rush blindly into em
barrassments, which a prudent spirit of inquiry might
have prevented, but from which it will scarcely find
means to extricate us. While therefore the right, the
duty, and the inclination to advance the trade and na
vigation of the United States, are acknowledged and
felt by us all, the choice of the proper means to that
end is a matter requiring the most circumspect inqui
ry, and the most dispassionate judgment.

After a debate has continued a long time, the sub
ject very frequently becomes tiresome before it is ex
hausted. Arguments, however solid, urged by differ
ent speakers, can scarcely fail to render the discussion
both complex and diffusive. Without pretending to
give to my arguments any other merit, I shall aim at
simplicity.

We hear it declared, that the design of the resolu
tions, is to place our trade and navigation on a better
footing. By better footing, we are to understand a
more profitable one. Profit is a plain word, that can
not be misunderstood.

We have, to speak in round numbers, twenty mil
lion dollars of exports annually. To have the trade of
exports on a good footing, means nothing more than
to sell them dear ; and consequently, the trade of import
on a good footing, is to buy cheap. To put them both
on a better footing, is to sell dearer and to buy cheap
er than we do at present. If the effect of the resolu
tions will be, to cause our exports to be sold cheaper,
and our imports to be bought dearer, our trade will
suffer an injury.

It is hard to compute how great the injury would
prove ; for the first loss of value in the buying dear,
and selling cheap, is only the symptom and beginning
of the evil, but by no means the measure of it; it will
withdraw a great part of the nourishment, that now
supplies the wonderful growth of our industry and
opulence. The difference may not amount to a great
proportion of the price of the articles, but it may reach

300 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

the greater part of the profit of the producer ; it may
have effects in this way which will be of the worst
kind, by discouraging the products of our land and in
dustry. It is to this test I propose to bring the reso
lutions on the table ; and if it shall clearly appear, that
they tend to cause our exports to be sold cheaper, and
our imports to be bought dearer, they cannot escape
condemnation. Whatever specious show of advan
tage may be given them, they deserve to be called ag
gravations of any real or supposed evils in our com
mercial system, and not remedies.

I have framed this statement of the question so as to
comprehend the whole subject of debate, and at the
same time, I confess it was my design to exclude from
consideration a number of topics, which appear to me
totally irrelative to it.

The best answer to many assertions we have heard
is, to admit them without proof. We are exhorted to
assert our natural rights ; to put trade on a respecta
ble footing ; to dictate terms of trade to other nations ;
to engage in a contest of self-denial, and by that, and by
shifting our commerce from one country to another, to
make our enemies feel the extent of our power. This
language, as it respects the proper subject of discus
sion, means nothing, or what is worse. If our trade is
already on a profitable footing, it is on a respectable
one. Unless war be our object, it is useless to inquire,
what are the dispositions of any government, with
whose subjects our merchants deal to the best advan
tage. While they will smoke our tobacco, and eat
our provisions, it is very immaterial, both to the con
sumer and the producer, what are the politics of the
two countries, excepting so far as their quarrels may
disturb the benefits of their mutual intercourse.

So far, therefore, as commerce is concerned, the in
quiry is, have we a good market ?

The good or bad state of our actual market is the
question. The actual market is every where more or
less a restricted one, and the natural order of things is

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 301

displaced by the artificial. Most nations, for reasons
of which they alone are the rightful judges, have regu
lated and restricted their intercourse, according to
their views of safety and profit. We claim for our
selves the same right, as the acts in our statute book,
and the resolutions on the table evince, without hold
ing ourselves accountable to any other nation what
ever. The right, which we properly claim, and which
we properly exercise, when we do it prudently and
usefully for our nation, is as well established, and has
been longer in use in the countries of which we com
plain, than in our own. If their right is as good as
that of Congress, to regulate and restrict, why do we
talk of a strenuous exertion of our force, and by dic
tating terms to nations, who are fancied to be physi
cally dependent on America, to change the policy of
nations ? It may be very true, that their policy is very
wise and good for themselves, but not as favorable for
us as we could make it, if we could legislate for both
sides of the Atlantic.

The extravagant despotism of this language accords
very ill with our power to give it effect, or with the af
fectation of zeal for an unlimited freedom of com
merce. Such a state of absolute freedom of com
merce never did exist, and it is very much to be doubt
ed whether it ever will. Were 1 invested with the
trust to legislate for mankind, it is very probable the
first act of my authority would be to throw all the re
strictive and prohibitory laws of trade into the fire :
the resolutions on the table would not be spared.
But if 1 were to do so, it is probable I should have a
quarrel on my hands with every civilized nation. The
Dutch would claim the monopoly of the spice trade,
for which their ancestors passed their whole lives in
warfare. The Spaniards and Portuguese would be no
less obstinate. If we calculate what colony monopo
lies have cost in wealth, in suffering, and in crimes,
we shall say they were dearly purchased. The Eng
lish would plead for their navigation act, not as a

303 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

source of gain, but as an essential means of securing
their independence. So many interests would be dis
turbed, and so many lost, by a violent change from the
existing to an unknown order of things ; and the mutu
al relations of nations, in respect to their power and
wealth, would suffer such a shock, that the idea must
be allowed to be perfectly Utopian and wild. But for
this country to form the project of changing the policy
of nations, and to begin the abolition of restrictions by
restrictions of its own, is equally ridiculous and incon
sistent.

Let every nation that is really disposed to extend the
liberty of commerce, beware of rash and hasty schemes
of prohibition. In the affairs of trade, as in most
others, we make too many laws. We follow experi
ence too little, and the visions of theorists a great deal
too much. Instead of listening to discourses on what
the market ought to be, and what the schemes, which
always promise much on paper, pretend to make it, let
us see what is the actual market for our exports and
imports. This will bring vague assertions and san
guine opinions to the test of experience. That rage
for theory and system, . which would entangle even
practical truth in the web of the brain, is the poison of
public discussion. One fact is better than two systems.

The terms, on which our exports are received in the
British market, have been accurately examined by a
gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Wm. L. Smith.)
Before his statement of facts was made to the com
mittee, it was urged, and with no little warmth, that
the system of England indicated her inveteracy to
wards this country, while that of France, springing
from disinterested affection, constituted a claim for
gratitude and self-denying measures of retribution.

Since that statement, however, that romantic style,
which is so ill adapted to the subject, has been chang
ed. We hear it insinuated, that the comparison of
the footing of our exports, in the markets of France
and England, is of no importance ; that it is chiefly

Mil. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 393

our object to see how we may assist and extend our
commerce. This evasion of the force of the state
ment, or rather this indirect admission of its authori
ty, establishes it. It will not be pretended, that it has
been shaken during the debate.

It has been made to appear, beyond contradiction,
that the British market for our exports, taken in the
aggregate, is a good one ; that it is better than the
French, and better than any we have, and for many of
our products the only one.

The whole amount of our exports to the British do
minions, in the year ending the 30th September, 1790,
was nine million, two hundred and forty-six thousand,
six hundred and six dollars.

But it will be more simple and satisfactory to
confine the inquiry to the articles following : bread
stuff, tobacco, rice, wood, the produce of the fisheries,
fish oil, pot and pearl ash, salted meats, indigo, live
animals, flax seed, naval stores and iron.

The amount of the beforementioned articles, export
ed in that same year to the British dominions, was
eight million, four hundred and fifty-seven thousand,
one hundred and seventy-three dollars.

We have heard so much of restriction of inimical
and jealous prohibitions to cramp our trade, it is na
tural to scrutinize the British system, with the expecta
tion of finding little besides the effects of her selfish
and angry policy.

Yet of the great sum of nearly eight millions and a
half, the amount of the products beforementioned sold
in her markets, two articles only are dutied by way of
restriction. Bread stuff is dutied so high in the mar
ket of Great Britain as, in times of plenty, to exclude
it, and this is done from the desire to favor her own
farmers. The mover of the resolutions justified the
exclusion of our bread stuff from the French West In
dies by their permanent regulations, because, he said,
they were bound to prefer their own products to those
even of the United States. It would seem that the

304 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

same apology would do for England, in her home mar
ket. But what will do for the vindication of one na
tion becomes invective against another. The criminal
nation, however, receives our bread stuff in the West
Indies free, and excludes other foreign, so as to give
our producers the monopoly of the supply. This is
no merit in the judgment of the mover of the resolu
tions, because it is a fragment of her old colony system.
Notwithstanding the nature of the duties on bread stuff
in Great Britain, it has been clearly shown, that she is
a better customer for that article, in Europe, than her
neighbor, France. The latter, in ordinary times, is a
poor customer for bread stuff, for the same reason
that our own country is, because she produces it her
self, and therefore France permits it to be imported,
and the United States do the like. Great Britain of
ten wants the article, and then she receives it; no
country can be expected to buy what it does not want.
The bread stuff sold in the European dominions of
Britain, in the year 1790, amounted to one million,
eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred and forty dollars.

Whale oil pays the heavy duty of eighteen pounds
three shillings sterling per ton; yet spermaceti oil
found a market there to the value of eighty-one thou
sand and forty-eight dollars.

Thus it appears, that of eight millions and a half,
sold to Great Britain and her dominions, only the
value of one million, one hundred and sixty-eight thou
sand dollars was under duty of a restrictive nature.
The bread stuff is hardly to be considered as within
the description ; yet, to give the argument its full
force, what is it ? about one eighth part is restricted,
To proceed with the residue :

Indigo to the amount of $473,830

Live animals to the West Indies - 62,415

Flax-seed to Great Britain 219,924

Total, $756,169

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 305

These articles are received, duty free, which is a
good foot to the trade. Yet we find, good as it is, the
bulk of our exports is received on even better terms :

Flour to the British West Indies $858,00<i

Grain 273,505

Free — while other foreign flour and grain are prohibited.

Tobacco to Great Britain 2,754,493

Ditto to the West Indies 22,816

One shilling and three pence sterling, duty ; three shil
lings and six pence on other foreign tobacco.

In the West Indies, other foreign tobacco is prohibited.

Rice to Great Britain 773,852

Seven shillings and four pence per cwt. duty ; eight
shillings and ten pence on other foreign rice.

To West Indies - - - 180,077

Other foreign rice prohibited.

Wood to Great Britain 240,174

Free — higher duties on other foreign.

To West Indies - 382,481

Free — other foreign prohibited.

Pot and pearl ashes 747,075

Free — two shillings and three pence on other foreign,
equal to ten dollars per ton.

Naval stores to Great Britain - 1 90,670

Higher duties on other foreign.

To West Indies 6,162

Free — other foreign prohibited.

Iron to Great Britain 8 1 .6 1 x!

Free — duties on other foreign.

g6,510,92i»

Thus it appears, that nearly seven eighths of the ex
ports to the British dominions are received on terms
of positive favor. Foreigners, our rivals in the sale
of these articles, are either absolutely shut out of their
market by prohibitions, or discouraged in their compe
tition with us by higher duties. There is some re
striction, it is admitted, but there is, to balance it, a
large amount received duty free; and a half goes to
the account of privilege and favor. This is better
than she treats any other foreign nation. It is better,
indeed, than she treats her own subjects, because they

vot. i. 39

306 MR. AMES' SPEECH Oft

are by this means deprived of a free and open market.
It is better than our footing with any nation, with whom
we have treaties. It has been demonstratively shown,
that it is better than the footing on which 'France re
ceives either the like articles, or the aggregate of our
products. The best proof in the world is, that they
are not sent to France. The merchants will find out
the best market sooner than we shall.

The footing of our exports, under the British system,
is better than that of their exports to the United States,
under our system. Nay, it is better than the freedom
of commerce, which is one of the visions for which our
solid prosperity is to be hazarded ; for, suppose we
could batter down her system of prohibitions and re
strictions, it would be gaining a loss ; one eighth is re
stricted, and more than six eighths have restrictions in
their favor. It is as plain as figures can make it, that, if
a state of freedom for our exports is at par, the pre
sent system raises them, in point of privilege, above
par. To suppose that we can terrify them by these
resolutions, to abolish their restrictions, and at the
same time to maintain in our favor their duties, to ex
clude other foreigners from their market, is too absurd
to be refuted.

We have heard, that the market of France is the
great centre of our interests ; we are to look to her,
and not to England, for advantages, being, as the style
of theory is, our best customer and best friend, show
ing to our trade particular favor and privilege ; while
England manifests in her system such narrow and sel
fish views. It is strange to remark such a pointed re
futation of assertions and opinions by facts. The
amount sent to France herself is very trivial. Ei
ther our merchants are ignorant of the best markets,
or those which they prefer are the best ; and if the
English markets, in spite of the alleged ill usage, are
still preferred to the French, it is a proof of the supe
rior advantages of the former over the latter. The
arguments I have adverted to, oblige those who urge

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 307

them to make a greater difference in favor of the Eng
lish than the true state of facts will warrant. Indeed,
if they persist in their arguments, they are bound to
deny their own conclusions. They are bound to ad
mit this position : if France receives little of such of
our products as Great Britain takes on terms of privi
lege and favor, because of that favor, it allows the
value of that favored footing. If France takes little
of our articles, because she does not want them, it
shows the absurdity of looking to her as the best
customer.

It may be said, and truly, that Great Britain regards
only her own interest in these arguments ; so much
the better. If it is her interest to afford to our com
merce more encouragement than France gives: if
she does this, when she is inveterate against us, as it
is alleged, and when we are indulging an avowed ha
tred towards her, and partiality towards France, it
shows that we have very solid ground to rely on. Her
interest is, according to this statement, stronger than
our passions, stronger than her own, and is the more
to be depended on, as it cannot be put to any more
trying experiment in future. The good will and friend
ship of nations are hollow foundations to build our
systems upon. Mutual interest is a bottom of rock :
the fervor of transient sentiments is not better than
straw or stubble. Some gentlemen have lamented this
distrust of any relation between nations, except an in
terested one ; but the substitution of any other princi
ple could produce little else than the hypocrisy of sen
timent, and an instability of affairs. It would be rely
ing on what is not stable, instead of what is : it would
introduce into politics the jargon of romance. It is in
this sense, and this only, that the word favor is used : a
state of things, so arranged as to produce our profit
and advantage, though intended by Great Britain
merely for her own. The disposition of a nation is im
material ; the fact, that we profit by their system, can
not be so to this discussion.

308 MR. AMES' SPEECH OxN

The next point is, to consider whether our imports
are on a good footing, or, in other words, whether we
are in a situation to buy what we have occasion for at
a cheap rate. In this view, the systems of the com
mercial nations are not to be complained of, as all are
desirous of selling the products of their labor. Great
Britain is not censured in this respect. The objection
is rather of the opposite kind, that we buy too cheap,
and therefore consume too much ; and that we take
not only as much as we can pay for, but to the extent
of our credit also. There is less freedom of importa
tion, however, from the West Indies. In this respect,
France is more restrictive than England ; for the for
mer allows the exportation to us of only rum and mo
lasses, while England admits that of sugar, coffee and
other principal West India products. Yet, even here,
when the preference seems to be decidedly due to the
British system, occasion is taken to extol that of the
French. We are told, that they sell us the chief part
of the molasses, which is consumed or manufactured
into rum ; and that a great and truly important branch,
the distillery, is kept up by their liberality in furnishing
the raw material. There is at every step, matter to
confirm the remark, that nations have framed their re
gulations to suit their own interests, not ours. France
is a great brandy manufacturer ; she will not admit
rum, therefore, even from her own islands, because it
would supplant the consumption of brandy. The mo
lasses was for that reason, some years ago, of no value
in her islands, and was not even saved in casks. But
the demand from our country soon raised its value.
The policy of England has been equally selfish. The
molasses is distilled in her islands, because she has no
manufacture of brandy to suffer by its sale.

A question remains respecting the state of our navi
gation. If we pay no regard to the regulations of
foreign nations, and ask, whether this valuable branch
of our industry and capital is in a distressed and sickly
state, we shall find it is in a strong and flourishing

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 399

condition. If the quantity of shipping was declining,
if it was unemployed, even at low freight, I should say,
it must be sustained and encouraged. No such thing
is asserted. Seamen's wages are high, freights are
high, and American bottoms in full employment. But
the complaint is, our vessels are not permitted to go to
the British West Indies. It is even affirmed, that no
civilized country treats us so ill in that respect. Spain
and Portugal prohibit the traffic to their possessions,
not only in our vessels, but in their own, which, accord
ing to the style of the resolutions, is worse treatment
than we meet with from the British. It is also assert
ed, and on as bad ground, that our vessels are exclud
ed from most of the British markets.

This is not true in any sense. We are admitted
into the greater number of her ports, in our own ves
sels ; and by far the greater value of our exports is sold
in British ports, into which our vessels are received,
not only on a good footing, compared with other for
eigners, but on terms of positive favor, on better terms
than British vessels are admitted into our own ports.
We are not subject to the alien duties ; and the light
money, &c. of one shilling nine pence sterling per ton
is less than our foreign tonnage duty, riot to mention
the ten per centum, on the duties on goods in foreign
bottoms.

But in the port of London our vessels are received
free. It is for the unprejudiced mind to compare these
facts with the assertions we have heard so confidently
and so feelingly made by the mover of the resolutions,
that we are excluded from most of their ports, and
that no civilized nation treats our vessels so ill as the
British.

The tonnage of the vessels, employed between Great
Britain and her dependences and the United States, is
called two hundred and twenty thousand; and the
whole of this is represented as our just right. The
same gentleman speaks of our natural right to the car
riage of our own articles, and that we may and ought

310 MR. AMES' SPEECH OK

to insist upon our equitable share. Yet, soon after, he
uses the language of monopoly, and represents the
whole carriage of imports and exports as the proper
object of our efforts, and all that others carry as a
clear loss to us. If an equitable share of the carriage
means half, we have it already, and more, and our
proportion is rapidly increasing. If any thing is meant
by the natural right of carriage, one would imagine
that it belongs to him, whoever he may be, who, hav
ing bought our produce, and made himself the owner,
thinks proper to take it with him to his own country.
It is neither our policy nor our design to check the sale
of our produce. We invite every description of pur
chasers, because we expect to sell dearest, when the
number and competition of the buyers is the greatest.
For this reason, the total exclusion of foreigners and
their vessels from the purchase and carriage of our
exports, is an advantage, in respect to navigation, which
has a disadvantage to balance it, in respect to the price
of produce. It is with this reserve we ought to receive
the remark, that the carriage of our exports should be
our object, rather than that of our imports. By going
with our vessels into foreign ports we buy our imports
in the best market. By giving a steady and moderate
encouragement to our own shipping, without pretend
ing violently to interrupt the course of business, expe
rience will soon establish that order of things, which
is most beneficial to the exporter, the importer, and
the ship owner. The best interest of agriculture is
the true interest of trade.

In a trade, mutually beneficial, it is strangely absurd
to consider the gain of others as our loss. Admitting
it, however, for argument sake, yet it should be noticed,
that the loss of two hundred and twenty thousand tons
of shipping, is computed according to the apparent ton
nage. Our vessels not being .allowed to go to the Bri
tish West Indies, their vessels, making frequent voy
ages, appear in the entries over and over again. In the
trade to the European dominions of Great Britain, the

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 3H

distance being greater, our vessels are not so often
entered. Both these circumstances give a false
show to the amount of British tonnage, compared with
the American. It is, however, very pleasing to the
mind, to see that our tonnage exceeds the British in
the European trade. For various reasons, some of
which will be mentioned hereafter, the tonnage in the
West India trade, is not the proper subject of calcula
tion. In the European comparison, we have more ton
nage in the British than in the French commerce ; it is
indeed more than four to one.

The great quantity of British tonnage employed in
our trade is also, in a great measure, owing to the
large capitals of their merchants, employed in buy
ing and exporting our productions. If we would ban
ish the ships, we must strike at the root, and banish
the capital. And this, before we have capital of our
own grown up to replace it, would be an operation of
no little violence and injury, to our southern brethren
especially.

Independently of this circumstance, Great Britain
is an active and intelligent rival in the navigation line.
Her ships are dearer, and the provisioning of her sea
men is perhaps rather dearer than ours : on the other
hand, the rate of interest is lower in England, and so are
seamen's wages.lt would be improper, therefore, to
consider the amount of British tonnage in our trade, as a
proof of a bad state of things, arising either from the
restrictions of that government, or the negligence or
timidity of this. We are to charge it to causes, which
are more connected with the natural competition of
capital and industry ; causes, which in fact retarded
the growth of our shipping more, when we were colo
nies and our ships were free, than since the adoption
of the present government.

It has been said with emphasis, that the constitution
grew out of the complaints of the nation respecting
commerce, especially that with the British dominions.
What was then lamented by our patriots ? Feebleness

312 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

of the public councils ; the shadow of union, and
scarcely the shadow of public credit ; every where des
pondence, the pressure of evils, not only great but
portentous of civil distractions. These were the
grievances ; and what more was then desired than
their remedies ? Is it possible to survey this prosper
ous country and to assert that they have been delayed ?
Trade flourishes on our wharves, although it droops
in speeches. Manufactures have risen under the shade
of protecting duties, from almost nothing, to such a
state, that we are even told we can depend on the do
mestic supply, if the foreign should cease. The fishe
ries, which we found in decline, are in the most vigor
ous growth : the whale fishery, which our allies would
have transferred to Dunkirk, now extends over the
whole ocean. To that hardy race of men, the sea is
but a park for hunting its monsters ; such is their acti
vity, the deepest abysses scarcely afford to their prey
a hiding place. Look around, and see how the frontier
circle widens, how the interior improves, and let it be
repeated that the hopes of the people, when they form
ed this constitution, have been frustrated.

But if it should happen, that our prejudices prove
stronger than our senses ; if it should be believed, that
our farmers and merchants see their products and
ships and wharves going to decay together, and they
are ignorant or silent on their own ruin ; still the public
documents would not disclose so alarming a state of our
affairs. Our imports are obtained so plentifully and
cheaply, that one of the avowed objects of the resolu
tions is, to make them scarcer and dearer. Our ex
ports, so far from languishing, have increased two mil
lions of dollars in a year. Our navigation is found to
be augmented beyond the most sanguine expectation.
We hear of the vast advantage the English derived
from the navigation act : and we are asked in a tone
of accusation, shall we sit still and do nothing? Who
is bold enough to say, Congress has done nothing for
the encouragement of American navigation? To

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 313

counteract the navigation act, we have laid on British,
a higher tonnage than our own vessels pay in their
ports ; and what is much more effectual, we have im
posed tender centum on the duties, when the dutied ar
ticles are borne in foreign bottoms. We have also made
the coasting trade a monopoly to our own vessels.
Let those, who have asserted that this is nothing, com
pare facts with the regulations which produced them.

Tonnage. Tons.

American, 1789, 297,468 Excess of American tonnage.

Foreign 265,116

32,352

American, 1790, 347,663

Foreign 258,916

88,747

American, 1791 363,810

Foreign 240,799

123,011

American, 1792, 415,330

Foreign 244,263

171,067

Is not this increase of American shipping rapid
enough ? Many persons say it is too rapid, and attracts
too much capital for the circumstances of the country.
I cannot readily persuade myself to think so valuable
a branch of employment thrives too fast. But a steady
and sure encouragement is more to be relied on than
violent methods of forcing its growth. It is not clear,
that the quantity of our navigation, including our
coasting and fishing vessels, is less in proportion to
those of that nation : in that computation we shall
probably find, that we are already more a navigating
people than the English.

As this is a growing country, we have the most sta
ble ground of dependence on the corresponding growth
of our navigation : and that the increasing demand
for shipping will rather fall to the share of Americans
than foreigners, is not to be denied.* We did expect
this from the nature of our own laws ; we have been con
firmed in it by experience ; and we know that an Ame
rican bottom is actually preferred to a foreign one*

VOL. L 40

.ill MR. AUKS' SPEECH Oft

In cases where one partner is an American, and an
other a foreigner, the ship is made an American bot
tom. A fact of this kind overthrows a whole theory
of reasoning on the necessity of further restrictions.
It shows, that the work of restriction is already done.

If we take the aggregate view of our commercial
interests, we shall find much more occasion for satis
faction, and even exultation, than complaint, and none
for despondence. It would be too bold to say, that our
condition is so eligible there is nothing to be wished.
Neither the order of nature, nor the allotments of pro
vidence, afford perfect content ; and it would be absurd
to expect in our politics what is denied in the laws of
our being. The nations, with whom we have inter
course, have, without exception, more or less restricted
their commerce. They have framed their regulations
to suit their real or fancied interests. The code of
France is as full of restrictions as that of England.
We have regulations of our own ; and they are unlike
those of any other country. Inasmuch as the interest
and circumstances of nations vary so essentially, the
project of an exact reciprocity on our part is a vision.
What we desire is, to have, not an exact reciprocity,
but an intercourse of mutual benefit and convenience.

It has scarcely been so much as insinuated, that the
change contemplated will be a profitable one ; that it
will enable us to sell dearer and to buy cheaper : on
the contrary, we are invited to submit to the hazards
and losses of a conflict with our customers ; to engage
:in a contest of self-denial. For what — to obtain better
markets ? No such thing ; but to shut up forever, if
possible, the best market we have for our exports, and
to confine ourselves to the dearest and scarcest mar
kets for our imports. And this is to be done for the
benefit of trade; or, as it is sometimes more correctly
said, for the benefit of France. This language is not a
little inconsistent and strange from those, who recom
mend a non-importation agreement, and who think we
.should even renounce the sea and devote ourselves to
agriculture. Thus, to make our trade more free, it is to

MR. MADISON \S RESOLUTIONS. 31 o

be embarrassed, and violently shifted from one country
to another, not according to the interest of the mer
chants, but the visionary theories and capricious rash
ness of the legislators. To make trade better, it is to be
made nothing.

So far as commerce and navigation are regarded,
the pretences for this contest are confined to two. We
are not allowed to carry manufactured articles to
Great Britain, nor any products, except of our own
growth ; and we are not permitted to go, with our own
vessels, to the West Indies. The former, which is a
provision of the navigation act, is of little importance
to our interests, as our trade is chiefly a direct one, our
shipping not being equal to the carrying for other na
tions ; and our manufactured articles are not furnished
in quantities for exportation, and if they were, Great
Britain would not be a customer. So far, therefore,
the restriction is rather nominal than real.

The exclusion of our vessels from the West Indies
is of more importance. When we propose to make an
effort to force a privilege from Great Britain, which
she is loath to yield to us, it is necessary to compare the
value of the object with the effort, and above all, to
calculate very warily the probability of success. A
trivial thing deserves not a great exertion ; much less
ought we to stake a very great good in possession, for
a slight chance of a less good. The carriage of one
half the exports and imports to and from the British
Wrest Indies, is the object to be contended for. Our
whole exports to Great Britain are to be hazarded.
We sell on terms of privilege, and positive favor, as it;
has been abundantly shown, near seven millions to the
dominions of Great Britain. We are to risk the privi
lege in this great amount — for what ? For the freight;
only of one half the British West India trade with the
United States. It belongs to commercial men to cal
culate the entire value of the freight alluded to. But
it cannot bear much proportion to the amount of seven
millions. Besides, if we are denied the privilege of

316 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

carrying our articles in our vessels to the islands, we
are on a footing of privilege in the sale of them. We
have one privilege, if not two. It is readily admitted,
that it is a desirable thing, to have our vessels allowed
to go to the English islands ; but the value of the ob
ject has its limits, and we go unquestionably beyond
them, when we throw our whole exports into confusion,
and run the risk of losing our best markets, for the sake
of forcing a permission to carry our own products to
one of those markets ; in which too, it should be notic
ed, we sell much less than we do to Great Britain
herself. If to this we add, that the success of the con
test is grounded on the sanguine and passionate hy
pothesis of our being able to starve the islanders,
which, on trial, may prove false, and which our being
involved in the war would overthrow at once, we may
conclude, without going further into the discussion,
that prudence forbids our engaging in the hazards of
a commercial war ; that great things should not be
staked against such as are of much less value ; that
what we possess should not be risked for what we de
sire, without great odds in our favor ; still less, if the
chance is infinitely against us.

If these considerations should fail of their effect, it
will be necessary to go into an examination of the
tendency of the system of discrimination, to redress and
avenge all our wrongs, and to realize all our hopes.

It has been avowed, that we are to look to France,
not to England, for advantages in trade ; we are to
show our spirit, and to manifest towards those, who are
called enemies, the spirit of enmity, and towards those,
we call friends, something more than passive good will.
We are to take active measures to force trade out of
its accustomed channels, and to shift it by such means
from England to France. The care of the concerns
of the French manufacturers may be, perhaps, as
well left in the hands of the convention, as usurped
into our own. However our zeal might engage us to
interpose, our duty to our own immediate constituents

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 317

demands all our attention. To volunteer it, in order
to excite competition in one foreign nation to supplant
another, is a very strange business ; and to do it, as it
has been irresistibly proved it will happen, at the
charge and cost of our own citizens, is a thing equally
beyond all justification and all example. What is it
but to tax our own people for a time, perhaps for a
long time, in order that the French may at last sell
as cheap as the English ? — cheaper they cannot, nor is
it so much as pretended. The tax will be a loss to us,
and the fancied tendency of it not a gain to this coun
try in the event, but to France. We shall pay more
for a time, and in the end pay no less ; for no object
but that one nation may receive our money, instead of
the other. If this is generous towards France, it is
not just to America. It is sacrificing what we owe to
our constituents, to what we pretend to feel towards
strangers. We have indeed heard a very ardent pro
fession of gratitude to that nation, and infinite reliance
seems to be placed on her readiness to sacrifice her
interest to ours. The story of this generous strife
should be left to ornament fiction. This is not the
form nor the occasion to discharge our obligations of
any sort to any foreign nation : it concerns not our
feelings but our interests; yet the debate has often
soared high above the smoke of business into the epic
region. The market for tobacco, tar, turpentine and
pitch, has become matter of sentiment ; and given oc
casion alternately to rouse our courage and our gra
titude.

If, instead of hexameters, we prefer discussing our
relation to foreign nations in the common language,
we shall not find, that we are bound by treaty to esta
blish a preference in favor of the French. The treaty
is founded on a professed reciprocity, favor for favor.
Why is the principle of treaty or no treaty made so es
sential, when the favor, we are going to give, is an act
of supererogation ? It is not expected by one of the
nations in treaty : for Holland has declared in her trea-

318 AIR. AMES- SPEECH ON

ty with us, that such preferences are the fruitful source
of animosity, embarrassment and war. The French
have set no such example. They discriminate, in their
late navigation act, not as we are exhorted to do, be
tween nations in treaty and not in treaty, but between
nations at war and not at war with them ; so that,
when peace takes place, England will stand, by that
act, on the same ground with ourselves. If we expect
by giving favor to get favor in return, it is improper
to make a law. The business belongs to the execu
tive, in whose hands the constitution has placed the
power of dealing with foreign nations. It is singular
to negotiate legislatively ; to make by a law half a bar
gain, expecting a French law would make the other.
The footing of treaty or no treaty is different from the
ground taken by the mover himself in supporting his
system. He has said, favor for favor is principle :
nations not in treaty grant favors, those in treaty re
strict our trade. Yet the principle of discriminating
in favor of nations in treaty, is not only inconsistent
with the declared doctrine of the mover and with facts,
but it is inconsistent with itself. Nations not in trea
ty, are so very unequally operated upon by the resolu
tions, it is absurd to refer them to one principle. Spain
and Portugal have no treaties with us, and are not
disposed to have : Spain would not accede to the trea
ty of commerce between us and France, though she
was invited : Portugal would not sign a treaty after it
had been discussed and signed on our part. They
have few ships or manufactures, and do not feed their
colonies from us : of course there is little for the discri
mination to operate upon. The operation on nations
in treaty is equally a satire on the principle of discri
mination. In Sweden, with whom we have a treaty,
duties rise higher if borne in our bottoms, than in her
own. France does the like, in respect to tobacco,
two and a half livres the kentle, which in effect prohi
bits our vessels to freight tobacco. The mover has,
somewhat unluckily, proposed to except from this sys-

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 319

tern nations having no navigation acts ; in which case.
France would become the subject of unfriendly discri
mination, as the house have been informed since the
debate began, that she has passed such acts.

1 might remark on the disposition of England to
settle a commercial treaty, and the known desire of
the marquis of Lansdown, fthen prime minister,) in
1783, to form such an one on the most liberal principles.
The history of that business, and the causes which
prevented its conclusion, ought to be made known to
the public. The powers given to our ministers were
revoked, and yet we hear, that no such disposition on
the part of Great Britain has existed. The declara
tion of Mr. Pitt in parliament, in June, 1792, as well as
the correspondence with Mr. Hammond, shows a desire
to enter upon a negotiation. The statement of the
report of the secretary of state, on.the privileges and
restrictions of our commerce, that Great Britain has
.?hown no inclination to meddle with the subject, seems
to be incorrect.

The expected operation of the resolutions on differ
ent nations, is obvious, and I need not examine their
supposed tendency to dispose Great Britain to settle
an equitable treaty with this country; but I ask,
whether those who hold such language towards that
nation as I have heard, can be supposed to desire a
treaty and friendly connexion. It seems to be thought
a merit to express hatred : it is common and natural to
desire to annoy and to crush those whom we hate, but
it is somewhat singular to pretend, that the design of
our anger is to embrace them.

The tendency of angry measures to friendly dispo
sitions and arrangements, is not obvious. We affect
to believe, that we shall quarrel ourselves into their
good will : that we shall beat a new path to peace and
friendship with Great Britain — one that is grown up
with thorns, and lined with men-traps and spring-guns.
It should be called the war path.

To do justice to the subject, its promised advan-

320 MR- AMES' SPEECH ON

tages should be examined. Exciting the competition
of the French, is to prove an advantage to this country,
by opening a new market with that nation. This is
scarcely intelligible. If it means any thing, it is an
admission, that their market is not a good one, or that
they have not taken measures to favor our traffic with
them. In either case, our system is absurd. The
balance of trade is against us, and in favor of England.
But the resolutions can only aggravate that evil, for,
by compelling us to buy dearer and sell cheaper, the
balance will be turned still more against our country.
Neither is the supply from France less the aliment of
luxury, than that from England. Their excess of
credit is an evil, which we pretend to cure by checking
the natural growth of our own capital, which is the un
doubted tendency of restraining trade ; the progress
of the remedy is thus delayed. If we will trade, there
must be capital. It is best to have it of our own ; if
we have it not, we must depend on credit. Wealth
springs from the profits of employment, and the best
writers on the subject establish it, that employment is
in proportion to the capital that is to excite and re
ward it. To strike off credit, which is the substitute
for capital, if it were possible to do it, would so far
stop employment. Fortunately, it is not possible ; the
activity of individual industry eludes the misjudging
power of governments. The resolutions would, in e£
feet, increase the demand for credit, as our products
selling for less in a new market, and our imports be
ing bought dearer, there would be less money and
more need of it. Necessity would produce credit.
Where the laws are strict, it will soon find its proper
level ; the uses of credit will remain, and the evil will
disappear.

But the whole theory of balances of trade, of help
ing it by restraint, and protecting it by systems of pro
hibition and restriction against foreign nations, as well
as the remedy for credit, are among the exploded dog
mas, which are equally refuted by the maxims of

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

science and the authority of time. Many such topics
have been advanced, which were known to exist as pre
judices, but were not expected as arguments. It seems
to be believed, that the liberty of commerce is of some
value. Although there are restrictions on one side,
there will be some liberty left : counter restrictions, by
diminishing that liberty, are in their nature aggrava
tions and not remedies. We complain of the British
restrictions as of a millstone : our own system will be
another ; so that our trade may hope to be situated
between the upper and the nether millstone.

On the whole, the resolutions contain two great
principles — to control trade by law, instead of leaving
it to the better management of the merchants ; and
the principle of a sumptuary law. To play the tyrant
in the counting-house, and in directing the private ex
penses of our citizens, are employments equally un*
worthy of discussion.

Besides the advantages of the system, we have been
called to another view of it, which seems to have
less connexion with the merits of the discussion. The
acts of states, and the votes of public bodies, before
the constitution was adopted, and the votes of the
house since, have been stated as grounds for our as
sent to this measure at this time. To help our own
trade, to repel any real or supposed attack upon it,
cannot fail to prepossess the mind : accordingly, the
first feelings of every man yield to this proposition,
But the sober judgment, on the tendency and reasona
bleness of the intermeddling of government, often does,
and probably ought still oftener to change our impres
sions. On a second view of the question, the man,
who voted formerly for restrictions, may say, much has
been done under the new constitution, and the good
effects are yet making progress. The necessity of
measures of counter restriction will appear to him
much less urgent, and their efficacy, in the present tur
bulent state of Europe, infinitely less to be relied on.
Far from being inconsistent in his conduct, consisten-
VOT,. r. 41

322 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

cy will forbid his pressing the experiment of his prin
ciple under circumstances which baffle the hopes of its
success. But if so much stress is laid on former
opinions, in favor of this measure, how happens it that
there is so little on that which now appears against it ?
Not one merchant has spoken in favor of it in this
body; not one navigating or commercial state has
patronized it.

It is necessary to consider the dependence of the
British West India islands on our supplies. I admit,
that they cannot draw them so well, and so cheap,
from any other quarter ; but this is not the point. Are
they physically dependent? Can we starve them —
and may we reasonably expect, thus to dictate to
Great Britain a free admission of our vessels into her
islands ? A few details will prove the negative. — Beef
and pork sent from the now United States to the Bri
tish West Indies, 1773, fourteen thousand, nine hun
dred and ninety-three barrels. In the war time, 1780,
ditto from England, seventeen thousand, seven hundred
and ninety-five: at the end of the war, 1783, sixteen
thousand, five hundred and twenty-six. Ireland export
ed, on an average of seven years prior to 1777, two
hundred and fifty thousand barrels. Salted fish the
English take in abundance, and prohibit its importation
from us. Butter and cheese from England and Ire
land are but lately banished even from our markets.
Exports from the now United States, 1773 ; horses, two
thousand, seven hundred and sixty-eight ; cattle, one
thousand, two hundred and three ; sheep and hogs, five
thousand, three hundred and twenty. Twenty-two
years prior to 1791, were exported from England to
all ports, twenty-nine thousand, one hundred and thirty-
one horses. Ireland, on an average of seven years to
1777, exported four thousand and forty live stock, ex
clusive of hogs. The coast of Barbary, the Cape de
Verds, &c. supply sheep and cattle. The islands,
since the war, have increased their domestic supplies
to a great degree.

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 323

The now United States exported about one hundred
and thirty thousand barrels of flour, in 1773, to the
West Indies. Ireland, by grazing less, could supply
wheat ; England herself usually exports it ; she also
imports from Archangel. Sicily and the Barbary
states furnish wheat in abundance. We are deceived,
when we fancy we can starve foreign countries.
France is reckoned to consume grain at the rate of
seven bushels to each soul. Twenty-six millions of
souls, the quantity one hundred and eighty-two millions
of bushels. We export, to speak in round numbers,
five or six millions of bushels to all the different coun
tries, which we supply; a trifle this to their wants.
Frugality is a greater resource. Instead of seven
bushels, perhaps two could be saved by stinting the
consumption of the food of cattje, or by the use of other
food. Two bushels saved to each soul is fifty-two
millions of bushels, a quantity which the whole trading
world, perhaps, could not furnish. Rice is said to be
prohibited by Spain and Portugal to favor their own.
Brazil could supply their rice instead of ours.

I must warn you of the danger of despising Canada
and Nova Scotia too much as rivals in the West India
supply of lumber, especially the former. The de
pendence, the English had placed on them some years
ago, failed, partly because we entered into competi
tion with them on very superior terms, and partly be
cause they were then in an infant state. They are
now supposed to have considerably more than doubled
their numbers since the peace ; and if, instead of hav
ing us for competitors for the supply as before, we
should shut ourselves out by refusing our supplies, or
being refused entry for them, those two colonies would
rise from the ground ; at least we should do more to
bring it about than the English ministry have been able
to do. In 1772, six hundred and seventy-nine vessels,
the actual tonnage of which was one hundred and
twenty-eight thousand, were employed in the West
India trade from Great Britain. They were supposed,

324 MR- AMES' SPEECH ON

on good ground, to be but half freighted to the islands ;
they might carry lumber, and the freight supposed to
be deficient would be, at forty shillings sterling the
tori, one hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds
sterling. This sum would diminish the extra charge
of carrying lumber to the islands. But is lumber to be
had? — Yes, in Germany, and from the Baltic. It is
even cheaper in Europe than our own: besides
which, the hard woods, used in mills, are abundant in
the islands.

We are told they can sell their rum only to the
United States. This concerns not their subsistence,
but their profit. Examine it, however. In 1773, the
now United States took near three million gallons
of rum. The remaining British colonies, Newfound
land, and the African coast, have a considerable
demand for this article. The demand of Ireland is
very much on the increase. It was, in 1763, five hun
dred and thirty thousand gallons; 1770, one million,
five hundred and fifty-eight thousand gallons; 1778,
one million, seven hundred and twenty-nine thousand
gallons.

Thus we see, a total stoppage of the West India
trade would not starve the islanders. It would affect
us deeply ; we should lose the sale of our products, and,
of course, not gain the carriage in our own vessels ;
the object of the contest would be no nearer our reach
than before. Instead, however, of a total stoppage of
the intercourse, it might happen, that each nation
prohibiting the vessels of the other, some third nation
would carry on the traffic in its own bottoms. While
this measure would disarm our system, it would make
it recoil upon ourselves. It would, in effect, operate
chiefly to obstruct the sale of our products. If they
should remain unsold, it would be so much dead loss ;
or if the effect should be to raise the price on the con
sumers, it would either lessen the consumption, or
raise up rivals in the supply. The contest, as it re
spects the West India trade, is in every respect against

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 325

us. To embarrass the supply from the United States,
supposing the worst as it regards the planters, can do
no more than enhance the price of sugar, coffee and
other products. The French islands are now in ruins,
and the English planters have an increased price and
double demand in consequence. While Great Britain
confined the colony trade to herself, she gave to the
colonists in return a monopoly in her consumption of
West India articles. The extra expense, arising from
the severest operation of our system, is already provid
ed against, two fold ; like other charges on the products
of labor and capital, the burden will fall on the con
sumer. The luxurious and opulent consumer in Eu
rope will not regard, and perhaps will not know, the
increase of price nor the cause of it. The new settler,
who clears his land and sells the lumber, will feel any
convulsion in the market more sensibly, without being
able to sustain it at all. It is a contest of wealth
against want of self-denial, between luxury and daily
subsistence, that we provoke with so much confidence
of success. A man of experience in the West India
trade will see this contrast more strongly than it is
possible to represent it.

One of the excellences, for which the measure is re
commended, is, that it will affect our imports. What
is offered as an argument, is really an objection. Who
will supply our wants ? Our own manufactures are
growing, and it is a subject of great satisfaction that
they are. But it would be wrong to overrate their
capacity to clothe us. The same number of inhabi
tants require more and more, because wealth increases.
Add to this the rapid growth of our numbers, and per
haps it will be correct to estimate the progress of
manufactures as only keeping pace with that of our
increasing consumption and population. It follows,
that we shall continue to demand, in future, to the
amount of our present importation. It is not intended
by the resolutions, that we shall import from England.
Holland and the north of Europe do not furnish a suffi-

326 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

cient variety, or sufficient quantity for our consump
tion. It is in vain to look to Spain, Portugal, and the
Italian States. We are expected to depend principally
upon France : it is impossible to examine the ground
of this dependence without adverting to the present
situation of that country. It is a subject, upon which
I practise no disguise ; but I do not think it proper to
introduce the politics of France into this discussion.
If others can find in the scenes that pass there, or in
the principles and agents that direct them, proper sub
jects for amiable names, and sources of joy and hope
in the prospect, I have nothing to say to it : it is an
amusement, which it is not my intention either to
disturb or to partake of. I turn from these horrors .to
examine the condition of France in respect to manu
facturing capital and industry. In this point of view,
whatever political improvements may be hoped for, it
cannot escape observation, that it presents only a wide
field of waste and desolation. Capital, which used to
be food for manufactures, is become their fuel. What
once nourished industry, now lights the fires of civil
war, and quickens the progress of destruction. France
is like a ship, with a fine cargo, burning to the water's
edge ; she may be built upon anew, and freighted with
another cargo, and it will be time enough, when that
shall be, to depend on a part of it for our supply : at
present, and for many years, she will not be so much
a furnisher as a consumer. It is therefore obvious,
that we shall import our supplies either directly or
indirectly from Great Britain. Any obstruction to the
importation will raise the price which we, who con
sume, must bear.

That part of the argument, which rests on the sup
posed distress of the British manufacturers, in conse
quence of the loss of our market, is in every view un
founded. They would not lose the market in fact, and
if they did, we prodigiously exaggerate the importance
of our consumption to the British workmen. Impor
tant it doubtless is, but a little attention will expose the

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 327

extreme folly of the opinion, that they would be brought
to our feet by a trial of our self-denying spirit. Eng
land now supplants France in the important Levant
trade, in the supply of manufactured goods to the East,
and, in a great measure, to the West Indies, to Spain,
Portugal, and their dependencies. Her trade with
Russia has, of late, vastly increased ; and she is treat
ing for a trade with China : so that the new demands
of English manufactures, consequent upon the depres
sion of France as a rival, has amounted to much more
than the whole American importation, which is not
three millions.

The ill effect of a system of restriction and prohibi
tion in the West Indies, has been noticed already.
The privileges allowed to our exports to England may
be withdrawn, and prohibitory or high duties imposed.

The system before us is a mischief, that goes to the
root of our prosperity. The merchants will suffer by
the schemes and projects of a new theory. Great
numbers were ruined by the convulsions of 1775.
They are an order of citizens deserving better of gov
ernment, than to be involved in new confusions. It is
wrong to make our trade wage war for our politics. It is
now scarcely said, that it is a thing to be sought for,
but a weapon to fight with. To gain our approbation
to the system, we are told, it is to be gradually esta
blished. In that case, it will be unavailing. It should
be begun with in all its strength, if we think of starv
ing the islands. Drive them suddenly and by surprise
to extremity, if you would dictate terms ; but they will
prepare against a long expected failure of our supplies.

Our nation will be tired of suffering loss and embar
rassment for the French. The struggle, so painful to
ourselves, so ineffectual against England, will be re
nounced, and we shall sit down with shame and loss,
with disappointed passions and aggravated com
plaints. War, which would then suit our feelings,
would not suit our weakness. We might, perhaps, find

328 MR. AMES' SPEECH Otf

some European power willing to make war on Eng
land, and we might be permitted by a strict alliance,
to partake the misery and the dependence of being a
subaltern in the quarrel. The happiness of this situa
tion seems to be in view, when the system before us is
avowed to be the instrument of avenging our political
resentments. Those, who affect to dread foreign in
fluence, will do well to avoid a partnership in Europe
an jealousies and rivalships. Courting the friendship
of the one, and provoking the hatred of the other, is
dangerous to our real independence ; for it would com
pel America to throw herself into the arms of the one
for protection against the other. Then foreign influ
ence, pernicious as it is, would be sought for; and
though it should be shunned, it could not be resisted.
The connexions of trade form ties between individuals,
and produce little control over government. They
are the ties of peace, and are neither corrupt nor cor
rupting.

We have happily escaped from a state of the most
imminent danger to our peace : a false step would lose
all the security for its continuance, which we owe at
this moment to the conduct of the president. What
is to save us from war ? Not our own power which
inspires no terror ; not the gentle and forbearing spi
rit of the powers of Europe at this crisis ; not the weak
ness of England ; not her affection for this country, if
we believe the assurances of gentlemen on the other
side. What is it then ? It is the interest of Great
Britain to have America for a customer, rather than an
enemy : and it is precisely that interest, which gentle
men are so eager to take away, and to transfer to
France. And what is stranger still, they say, they
rely on that operation as a means of producing peace
with the Indians and Algerines, The wounds, inflict
ed on Great Britain by our enmity, are expected to ex
cite her to supplicate our friendship, and to appease
us by soothing tjie animosity of our enemies. What is

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 329

to produce effects so mystical, so opposite to nature,
so much exceeding the efficacy of their pretended
causes ? This wonder-working paper on the table is
the weapon of terror and destruction : like the writing
on Belshazzer's wall, it is to strike parliaments and na
tions with dismay : it is to be stronger than fleets
against pirates, or than armies against Indians. After
the examination it has undergone, credulity itself will
laugh at these pretensions.

We pretend to expect, not by the force of our re
strictions, but by the mere show of our spirit, to level
all the fences, that have guarded for ages the monopo
ly of the colony trade. The repeal of the navigation
act of England, which is cherished as the palladium
of her safety, which time has rendered venerable, and
prosperity endeared to her people, is to be extorted,
from her fears of a weaker nation. It is not to be
yielded freely, but violently torn from her ; and yet the
idea of a struggle to prevent indignity and loss, is con
sidered as a chimera too ridiculous for sober refuta
tion. She will not dare, say they, to resent it; and
gentlemen have pledged themselves for the success of
the attempt : what is treated as a phantom, is vouched
by fact. Her navigation act is known to have caused
an immediate contest with the Dutch, and four despe
rate seafights ensued, in consequence, the very year of
its passage.

How far it is an act of aggression, for a neutral na
tion to assist the supplies of one neighbor, and to an
noy and distress another, at the crisis of a contest be
tween the two, which strains their strength to the ut
most, is a question, which we might not agree in decid
ing ; but the tendency of such unseasonable partiality,
to exasperate the spirit of hostility against the intru
der, cannot be doubted. The language of the French
government would not sooth this spirit. It proposes,
on the sole condition of a political connexion, to ex
tend to us a part of their West India commerce. The

VOL. i. 42

330 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

coincidence of our. measures with their invitation,
however singular, needs no comment. Of all men,
those are least consistent, who believe in the efficacy
of the regulations, and yet affect to ridicule their hos
tile tendency. In the commercial conflict, say they,
we shall surely prevail and effectually humble Great
Britain.

In open war, we are the weaker, and shall be
brought into danger, if not to ruin. It depends, there
fore, according to their own reasoning, on Great Bri
tain herself, whether she will persist in a struggle,
which will disgrace and weaken her, or turn it into a
war, which will throw the shame and ruin upon her
antagonist. The topics, which furnish arguments to
show the danger to our peace from the resolutions,
are too fruitful to be exhausted. But without pur
suing them further, the experience of mankind has
shown, that commercial rivalships, which spring from
mutual efforts for monopoly, have kindled more
wars, and wasted the earth more, than the spirit
of conquest.

I hope we shall show by our vote, that we deem it
better policy to feed nations than to starve them, and
that we shall never be so unwise, as to put our good
customers into a situation to be for.ced to make every
exertion to do without us. By cherishing the arts of
peace, we shall acquire, and we are actually acquiring,
the strength and resources for a war. Instead of seek
ing treaties, we ought to shun them ; for the later they
shall be formed, the better will be the terms : we shall
have more to give, and more to withhold. We have
not yet taken our proper rank, nor acquired that con
sideration, which will not be refused us, if we persist
in prudent and pacific counsels ; if we give time for
our strength to mature itself. Though America is
rising with a giant's strength, its bones are yet but car
tilages. By delaying the beginning of a conflict, we
insure the victorv.

MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 331

By voting out the resolutions, we shall show to our
own* citizens, and foreign nations, that our prudence
has prevailed over our prejudices, that we prefer our
interests to our resentments. Let us assert a genuine
independence of spirit : we shall be false to our duty
and feelings as Americans, if we basely descend to a
servile dependence on France or Great Britain.

SPEECH OF JAMES MADISON,

ON

THE BRITISH TREATY,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, APRIL 15, 1796.

On the 28th of October, 1794, a treaty between the United States
and Great Britain was concluded, and was subsequently ratified by
the President. On the 1st of March, 1796, the President promul
gated the treaty by proclamation, declaring it obligatory, and on
the same day communicated it to the house of representatives, in
order that the necessary appropriations might be made to carry it
into effect. In committee of the whole, on the following resolu
tion : " Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that it is expe
dient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty
with Great Britain ;" Mr. Madison spoke as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE subject now under the consideration of the
committee, is of such vast extent, of such vital im
portance to this country, and involves so many topics,
which demand minute investigation, that I wish, at
setting out, to be understood as not pretending to go
through all the observations that may be applicable to
its circumstances, but as endeavoring to present it in
a mere general view, persuaded that the omissions I
shall make, will be amply supplied by other gentlemen
who are to follow me in the discussion.

The proposition, sir, immediately before the com
mittee, amounts to this, that the treaty lately made
with Great Britain ought to be directly carried into

MR. MADISON'S SPEECH, &c. 333

effect by all such means and provisions, as are pecu
liarly within the province and the competency of the
house of representatives to supply. This, sir, is the sub
stance of the point immediately in question : but it
will, in examining it, be proper to keep constantly in
view another proposition which was made yester
day, by the gentleman from Pennsylvania,* and refer
red to the committee, and which will be taken up of
course, if the immediate question shall be decided in
the negative.

Sir, if the proposition for carrying the treaty into
effect be agreed to by the house, it must necessarily be
upon some one or other of the three following consi
derations : that the legislature is bound by a constitu
tional necessity to pass the requisite laws, without exa
mining the treaty or considering its merits — or, that
on due examination, the treaty is deemed to be in itself
a good one — or that, apart from these considerations,
there shall appear extraneous reasons of sufficient
weight to induce the house to carry the treaty into ef
fect, even though it be in itself a bad treaty. The
first of these considerations, however, is now complete
ly excluded by the late decision of the house, that they
have a right to judge of the expediency or inexpedien
cy of passing laws relative to treaties ; the question
then first to be examined by the committee, is that
which relates to the merits of the present treaty. I
will now, therefore, proceed to discuss those merits,
and to present them to the committee under three dif
ferent aspects. The first, as it relates to the execu
tion of the treaty of peace, made in the year 1783.
The second, as it bears upon and determines the seve
ral points in the law of nations connected with it.
And the third, as it infringes upon, and may be sup
posed to affect the commercial intercourse of the two
nations.

* Mr. Maclay, who moved a resolution " that it is not expedient
at this time to concur in passing the laws necessary for carrying the
said treaty into effect."

334 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

Sir, in animadverting upon the first of these, I will
not take upon me the invidious office of inquiring,
which party it is to whom the censure may justly be
ascribed of having more than the other contributed to
the delay of its execution, though I am far from enter
taining any desire to shrink from the task, under an
apprehension that the result might be disadvantageous
to this country. The present treaty has itself, in ex
press terms, waved this inquiry, and professes, that its
purpose is to adjust all controversies on the subjects of
which it is conversant, without regard to the mutual
complaints or pretensions of the parties. Naturally,
therefore, and most justly it was to be expected, that the
arrangements for carrying that treaty into effect, would
have been founded on the most exact, scrupulous arid
equitable reciprocity. But has this been the case,
sir ? I venture to say that it has not, and it grieves me
to add, what nevertheless truth and justice compel me
to declare, that, on the contrary, the arrangements were
founded on the grossest violation of this principle.
This, sir, is undoubtedly strong language, and as such
I should be one of the last men living to give it utter
ance, if I were not supported in it by facts no less strong
and unequivocal. There are two articles in the old
treaty, for the execution of which, no provision whatso
ever is made in the new one. The first is that which
relates to the restitution of, or compensation for, the
negroes and other property carried away by the British.
The second, that which provides for the surrender to
the United States of the posts, so long withheld by them,
on our territory. The article that remains unexe
cuted on the part of the United States, is that which
stipulates for the payment of all bonafide debts owing
to British creditors ; and the present treaty guarantees
the carrying of this article into the most complete ef
fect by the United States, together with all damages
sustained by the delay, even to the most rigid extent
of exaction, while it contains no stipulation whatever,
on the part of Great Britain, for the faithful performance

THE BRITISH TREATY. 335

of the articles left unexecuted by her. Look to the
treaty, sir, and you will find nothing like it, nothing al
lusive to it. No, on the contrary, she is entirely and
formally absolved from her obligation to fulfil that arti
cle, which relates to the negroes, and is discharged
from making any compensation whatsoever for her
having delayed to fulfil that, which provides for the sur
render of the posts.

I am aware, sir, of its being urged in apology, or by
way of extenuation for these very unequal stipulations,
that the injury which may possibly be sustained by us
in consequence of the detention of the posts by the
British government, is not susceptible of an accurate
valuation; that between such an injury and money
there is no common measure, and that therefore, the
wrong is incapable of liquidation, and affords no
fair basis for a calculation of pecuniary damages.
This apology, sir, may appear plausible, but it is by no
means satisfactory. Commissioners might easily have
been appointed, (as they are, vested too with full discre
tion, for other purposes,) to take charge of this sub
ject, with instructions to do what they could, if unable
to do what they ought, and if incapable of effecting
positive justice, at least to mitigate the injustice of
doing nothing.

For the very extraordinary abandonment of the com
pensation due for the negroes and other property car
ried off by the British, apologies have also been lamely
attempted; and these apologies demand considera
tion. It is said to be at least doubtful whether this
claim is authorized by the seventh article of the
treaty of peace, and that Great Britain has uniform
ly denied the meaning put by the United States on
that article. In reply to these assertions, it is sufficient
for me to remark, that so far from its being true, that
Great Britain has uniformly denied the American con
struction of this article, it is susceptible of positive
proof, that till very lately, Great Britain has uniformly

336 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

admitted our construction of it, and that she has rejected
the claim on no other ground than the alleged violation
of the fourth article on the part of the United States.
But on the supposition that it had been true, that
Great Britain had uniformly asserted a different con
struction of the article, and refused to accede to ours,
I beg leave to ask the house what ought to have been
done ? Ought we to have acceded at once to her con
struction ? You will anticipate me, sir, in saying, assur
edly not. Each party had an equal right to interpret the
compact ; and if they could not agree, they ought to
have done in this, what they did in other cases, where
they could not agree ; that is, have referred the settle
ment of the meaning of the compact to arbitration :
but, for us to give up the claim altogether because the
other party to the compact thought proper to disallow
our construction of it, was in effect to admit nothing
less than that Great Britain had a better right than the
United States to explain the point in controversy, or
that the United States had done something which in
justice called for a sacrifice of one of their essential
rights.

From this view of the subject, sir, I consider it to be
evident, that the arrangements in this treaty which re
late to the treaty of peace of 1783, are in several in
stances deficient both in justice and reciprocity. And
here a circumstance occurs, that in my opinion
deserves the very particular attention of the com
mittee. From the face of the treaty generally,
and particularly from the order of the articles, it
would seem that the compensation for the spolia
tions on our trade have been combined with the
execution of the treaty of peace, and may therefore
have been viewed as a substitute for the equivalent
stipulated for the negroes. If this be really the mean
ing of the instrument, it cannot be the less obnoxious
to reasonable and fair judges. No man can be more
firmly convinced than I myself am, of the perfect jus-

THE BRITISH TREATY. 33*7

tice on which the claims of the merchants on Great
Britain are founded, nor can any one be more desirous
to see them fully indemnified. But surely, sir, it will
not be asserted that compensation to them is a just
substitute for the compensation due to others. It is
impossible that any claims can be better founded than
those of the sufferers under the seventh article of the
treaty of peace ; because they are supported by posi
tive and acknowledged stipulation, as well as by equity
and right. Just and undeniable as the claims of the
merchants may be, and certainly are, the United States
cannot be obliged to take more care of them than of
the claims equally just and unquestionable of other
citizens ; much less to sacrifice the latter to the for
mer. To set this matter in a light, that will exhibit it
in the clearest and most familiar way possible to the
understanding and the bosom of every member in this
house, I will invert the case. Let us suppose for a mo
ment, that instead of relinquishing the claims for pro
perty wrongfully carried off at the close of the war,
and obtaining stipulations in favor of the mercantile-
claims, the mercantile claims had been relinquished,
and the other claims provided for — I ask, would not
the complaints of the merchants have been as univer
sal and as loud as they would have been just ?

Sir, besides the omissions in favor of Great Britain,
which I have already pointed out, as particularly con
nected with the execution of the treaty of peace, the
committee will perceive, that there are conditions an
nexed to the partial execution of it in the surrender of
the western posts, which increase the general inequali
ty of this part of the treaty, and essentially affect the
value of those objects. I beseech the committee to
examine the point with the attention, a subject of so
very important a character demands.

The value of the posts to the United States is to be
estimated by the influence of those posts : first, on
the trade with the Indians, and secondly, on the temper
and conduct of the Indians to the United States.

VOL. i.. 43

338 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

Their influence on the Indian trade depends principal
ly on the exclusive command they give to the several
carrying places connected with the posts. These
places are understood to be of such importance in this
respect, that those, who possess them exclusively, will
have a monopoly of that lucrative intercourse with a
great part of the savage nations. Great Britain hav
ing exclusively possessed those places, has possessed
all those advantages without a rival; and it was
reasonably enough expected, that with the exclusive
possession of the posts, the exclusive benefits of that
trade and intercourse would be transferred also : but
by the treaty now under consideration, the carrying
places are to be enjoyed in common, arid it will be
determined by the respective advantages under which
British and American traders will engage in the trade,
which of them is to have the larger share in it. In
this point of view, even if in no other, I view this regu
lation in the treaty as highly impolitic and injurious to
the interests of this country. I need not dwell upon
the signal advantages the British will have in their
superior capital, which we shall have to encounter in
all our commercial rivalships : but there is another
consideration which ought to have, and no doubt will
have great weight with the committee on this subject.
The goods imported for the Indian trade through Cana
da, pay no duties — whilst those imported through the
United States for that trade, will have paid duties
from seven to ten per centum. At the same time, every
man must see that a drawback is impracticable, or
would be attended with an expense, which the business
would not bear. Whatever the value or the impor
tance, therefore, which the posts may be supposed to
derive from those considerations, they are in a great
measure stripped of them by the condition, annexed by
this treaty to the surrender of the posts. Instead of
securing, as it ought to have done, a monopoly in our
favor, the carrying places are made common to both
countries under circumstances, which will in all proba-

THE BRITISH TREATY.

339

bility throw a monopoly into the hands of Great Britain.
Nor is this a transient or a temporary evil, for that arti
cle of the treaty is to last forever. As to the influence
of the posts on the conduct of the Indians, it is well
known to depend chiefly upon their influence on the
Indian trade. In proportion, therefore, as the condition
annexed to the surrender of the posts affects the one, it
must affect the other. So long and in such degree, as
the British continue to enjoy the Indian trade, they
will continue to influence the Indian conduct ; and,
though that should not be in the same degree as here
tofore, it will be at least in a degree sufficiently great
to pass sentence of condemnation on the article in ques
tion.

Another very extraordinary feature in this part of
the treaty, sir, is the permission that it grants to aliens
to hold lands in perpetuity. I will not inquire how far
this may be authorized by constitutional principles, but
I will always maintain that there cannot be found, in
any treaty that ever was made, either where territory
was ceded, or where it was acknowledged by one na
tion to another, one other such stipulation. Although
I admit, that in such cases it has been common, and
may be right, to make regulations for the conservation
of the property of the inhabitants, yet 1 believe it will ap
pear, that, in every case of the kind that has occurred,
the owners of landed property, when they were so
favored, were either called upon to swear allegiance
to the new sovereign, or compelled to dispose of their
landed property within a reasonable time.

Sir, the stipulation, by which all the ports of the
United States are to open to Great Britain, as a valua
ble consideration for, or condition upon which those of
one of her unimportant provinces are to be opened to
us in return, is marked with such signal inequality,
that it ought not only to be rejected, but marked with
censure. Nor is the clause respecting the Mississippi
less censurable. To me, indeed, it appears singularly
reprehensible. Happy is it for the United States,

340 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

that the adjustment of our claims with Spain has been
brought about, before any evil operation of the clause has
been experienced. But of the tendency of the thing, I
am persuaded, there can be no doubt. It is the more
remarkable that this extension of the privileges of
Great Britain on the Mississippi, beyond those con
tained in the treaty of peace, should have been admit
ted into the new treaty, because, by the latter itself, the
supposition is suggested that Great Britain may be
deprived, by her real boundary, of all pretensions to
a share in the waters and the banks of the Missis
sippi.

And now, sir, to turn to the second aspect, in which
I have undertaken to examine the question ; namely,
as it determines the several points in the law of nations
connected with it. And here, I must say, that the same
want of real reciprocity, and the same sacrifice of the
interests of the United States, are conspicuous. Sir,
it is well known that the principle that " FREE SHIPS
MAKE FREE GOODS," has ever been a great and favorite
object with the United States ; they have established this
principle in all their treaties ; they have witnessed with
anxiety the general effort and the successful advances
towards incorporating this principle in the law of na
tions — a principle friendly to all neutral nations, and
particularly interesting to the United States. I know,
sir, that it has before now been conceded, on the part
of the United States, that the law of nations stands as
the present treaty regulates it ; but it does not follow
that more than acquiescence in this doctrine, is
proper. There is an evident and a material distinction
between silently acquiescing in it, and giving it the ad
ditional force and support of a formal and positive
stipulation. The former is all that could have
been required, and the latter is more than ought to
have been unnecessarily yielded. The treaty is liable
to similar objections in respect to the enumeration it
contains of contraband articles, in which, sir, I am
sorry to be obliged to remark, that the circumstances

THE BRITISH TREATY. 341

and interests of the United States, have been made to
give way to the particular views of the other party, while
the examples held out in our other treaties have been
disregarded. Hemp, tar, pitch, turpentine, &c., in>
portant staples of this country, have, without even a
pretext of reciprocity, been subjected to confiscation*
No nation, which produces these articles, has, I believe,
any treaties at present, making the same sacrifice,
with the exception of Denmark, who, in the year 1780,
by what means I know not, was induced to agree to
an explanation of the treaty of 1670, by which these
articles are declared to be contraband. Now, sir, it
appears to me, that this same supplementary and ex
planatory agreement between Great Britain and Den
mark, has been the model selected for the contraband
list of the treaty, at present in question ; the enumera
tion in the latter being transcribed, word for word, from
the former, with a single exception, which, not only is
in itself, but renders the whole transaction extremely
remarkable. The article " HORSES," which stands as
one part of the original, is entirely omitted in the copy;
and what renders the omission more worthy of scruti
ny, is, that though the treaty, in general, seems to have
availed itself, wherever it readily could, of the authori
ty of Vattel, the omission of horses is no less a
departure from him, than from the original, from
which that part of the treaty was copied. Indeed, the
whole of this particular transaction seems fraught with
singularity and just liability to suspicion ; for, strange
as it may appear, it is certainly true, that the copy
proceeded exactly from the original, till it got as far as
the purposes of Great Britain required, and at that
point stopped short. I entreat the committee to pay
attention to this fact. After enumerating the articles
that are to be deemed contraband, the Danish article
goes on in the words following, viz. " But it is ex
pressly declared, that among contraband merchandizes,
shall not be comprehended, fish and meats, whether
fresh or salted; wheat, flour, corn, or other grain;

342 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

beans, oil, wines, and generally whatever serves for
the nourishment and support of life ; all of which may
at all times be sold and transported, like any other mer
chandizes, even to places held by an enemy of the two
crowns, provided they be not besieged or blockaded."

This view of the subject naturally leads me to make
some observations on that clause of the treaty which
relates to provisions, and which, to say the least of it,
wears a very ambiguous and disagreeable counte
nance ; or, to speak more precisely, seems to carry
with it a necessary implication that provisions, though
not bound to besieged or blockaded places, may ac
cording to the law of nations, as it now exists, be re
garded and treated as contraband. According to the
genuine law of nations, no articles, which are not ex
pressly and generally contraband, are so, in any particu
lar instance, except in the single case of their going to
a place besieged; yet it is recognized by this treaty,
that there are other cases in which provisions may be
deemed contraband, from which recognition, implica
tion fairly results, that one of those cases may be that
which has been assumed and put in force by Great
Britain, in relation to the United States. Such trivial
cases, as might be devised by way of appurtenances to
the law, that condemns what is bound to blockaded
places, can by no means satisfy the import of the stipu
lation ; because such cases cannot be presumed to
have been in contemplation of the parties. And if the
particular case, of provisions bound to a country at war,
although not to a besieged place, was not meant to be
one of the cases of contraband according to the exist
ing law of nations, how necessary was it to have said
so ; and how easy and natural would that course have
been, with the Danish example on the subject before
their eyes.

On the supposition that provisions, in our own ves
sels, bound to* countries at war with Great Britain,
can be now seized by her for her own use, on the con
dition stipulated, this feature of the treaty, sir, pre-

THE BRITISH TREATY. 343

seats itself in a very serious light indeed ; especially if
the doctrine be resorted to, that has been laid down by
the executive in the letter of Mr. Jefferson, then se
cretary of state, to Mr. Pinckney, on the 7th of Sep
tember, 1793. This letter is a comment on the Bri
tish instructions of June the 8th, 1793, for seizing neu
tral provisions. After stating the measure as a fla
grant breach of the law of nations, and as ruinous to
our commerce and agriculture, it has the following
paragraph. " This act too, tends to draw us from
that state of peace in which we are willing to remain.
It is an essential character of neutrality to furnish no
aids not stipulated by treaty" — that is, sir, by a trea
ty made prior to the war — " to one party, which we
are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we
permit corn to be sent to Great Britain and her friends,
we are equally bound to permit it to be sent to France.
To restrain it would be a partiality that must lead to
war ; and between restraining it ourselves, and permit-
ing her enemies to restrain it unrightfully, there is no
difference. She would consider it as a mere pretext,
of which she certainly would not agree to be the dupe ;
and on what honorable ground could we otherwise
explain it ? Thus we should see ourselves plunged, by
this unauthorized act of Great Britain into a war, with
which we meddle not. and which we wish to avoid, if
justice to all parties, and from all parties, will enable
us to avoid it." Sir, I entreat the committee to give
this very interesting executive document all the atten
tion which it demands, and which they have in their
power to bestow.

I am now, sir, come to that article of the treaty by
which the sequestration of British property is prohi
bited ; upon which I must say, that though I should, in
all probability, be one of the last men existing, to have
recourse to such an expedient for redress, I cannot ap
prove of a perpetual and irrevocable abandonment of
a defensive weapon, the existence of which may ren
der t^ie use of it unnecessary. Sir, there is an extra-

344 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

ordinary peculiarity in the situation of this country, as
it stands in its relations to Great Britain. As we have
no fleets or armies, to command a respect for our
rights, we ought to keep in our own hands all such
means as our situation gives us. This article, sir, is
another instance of the very little regard that has been
paid to reciprocity. It is well known, that British sub
jects now have, and are likely always to have in this
country, a vast quantity of property of the kind made
sacred. American citizens, it is known, have little,
and are likely to have little of the kind in Great Bri
tain. If a real reciprocity was intended, why ara
not other kinds of private property, such as ves
sels and their cargoes, equally protected against vio
lation? These, even within the jurisdiction of Great
Britain, are left open to seizure and sequestration, if
Great Britain shall find it expedient ; and why is not
property on the high seas, under the protection of the
law of nations, which is said to be a part of the law of
the land, made secure by a like stipulation? This
would have given a face of equality and reciprocity to
the bargain. But nothing of the sort makes a part of
it. Where Great Britain has a particular interest at
stake, the treaty watchfully provides for it; when the
United States have an equal interest at stake, and
equally entitled to protection, it is abandoned to all
the dangers which it has experienced.

Having taken this brief review of the positive evils
in this part of the treaty, I might add the various omis
sions, which are chargeable upon it : but, as I shall not
pretend to exhaust the subject, I will mention only one,
and that is, the utterly neglecting to provide for the ex
hibition of sea papers ; and, I cannot help regarding
this omission as truly extraordinary, when I observe
that in almost every modern treaty, and particularly in
all our other treaties, an article on this subject has
been regularly inserted. Indeed it has become almost
an article of course in the treaties of the present
centurv.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 345

I shall now, sir, consider the aspect in which the
commercial articles of this treaty present themselves
for consideration. In the free intercourse stipulated
between the United States and Great Britain, it can
not be pretended that any advantage is gained by the
former. A treaty is surely not necessary to induce
Great Britain to receive our raw materials and to sell
us her manufactures. Let us, on the other hand, con
sider what is given up by the United States.

It is well known that when our government came
into operation, the tonnage of America, employed in
the British trade, bore a very inconsiderable proportion
to the British tonnage. There being nothing on our
side to counteract the influence of capital and other
circumstances on the British side, that disproportion
was the natural state of things. As some small ba
lance to the British advantages, and particularly that
of her capital, our laws have made several regulations
in favor of our shipping, among which is the impor
tant encouragement resulting from the difference of
ten per centum in the duties paid by American and for
eign vessels. Under this encouragement, the Ameri
can tonnage has increased in a very respectable degree
of proportion to the British tonnage. Great Britain
has never deemed it prudent to frustrate or diminish
the effects of this, by attempting any countervailing
measures for her shipping ; being aware, no doubt, that
we could easily preserve the difference by further
measures on our side : but by this treaty, she has re
served to herself the right to take such countervailing
measures against our existing regulations, arid we
have surrendered our right to pursue further defensive
measures against the influence of her capital. It is
justly to be apprehended, therefore, that under such
a restoration of things to their former state, the Ame
rican tonnage will relapse into its former disproportion
to the British tonnage.

Sir, when I turn my attention to that branch of the
subject which relates to the West Indies, I see still
VOL. i. 44

346 MR, MADISON'S SPEECH ON

greater cause for astonishment and dissatisfaction.
As the treaty now stands, Great Britain is left as free,
as she ever has been, to continue to herself and her
shipping, the entire monopoly of the intercourse. Re
collecting, as I do, and as every member of the com
mittee must do, the whole history of this subject, from
the peace of 1783, through every subsequent stage of
our independence, down to the mission of the late envoy,
I find it impossible, adequately to express my astonish
ment, that any treaty of commerce should ever have
been acceded to, that so entirely abandoned the very
object for which alone such a treaty could have been
contemplated; I never could have believed that the
time was so near, when all the principles, claims and
calculations, which have heretofore prevailed among
all classes of people, in every part of the union, on
this interesting point, were to be so completely re
nounced. A treaty of commerce with Great Britain,
excluding a reciprocity for our vessels in the West In
dia trade, is a phenomenon which fills me with more
surprise than I know how to express.

I may be told, perhaps, that in the first place,
Great Britain grants to no other nation the privilege
granted to the United States of trading at all with her
West Indies, and that, in the second place, this is an
important relaxation of the colonial system establish
ed among the nations of Europe. To the first of
these observations, I reply, that no other nation bears
the same relation to the West Indies as the United
States ; that the supplies of the United States are es
sential to those islands ; and that the trade with them
has been permitted purely on that account, and not as
a beneficial privilege to the United States.

To the second, I reply, that it is not true, that the
colony system requires an exclusion of foreign vessels
from the carrying trade between the colonies and
foreign countries. On the contrary, the principle and
practice of the colony system are, to prohibit, as much
as may be convenient, all trade between the colonies

THE BRITISH TREATY. 347

and foreign countries ; but when such a trade is per
mitted at all, as necessary for the colonies, then to al
low the vessels of such foreign countries a reciprocal
right of being employed in the trade. Great Britain
has accordingly restrained the trade of her islands with
this country, as far as her interest in them will permit.
But, has she allowed our vessels the reciprocal right
to carry on the trade so far as it is not restrained ?
— No such thing. Here she enforces a monopoly in her
own favor, contrary to justice, and contrary to the colo
nial system of every European nation that possesses any
colonies ; none of whom, without a single exception,
ever open a trade between their colonies and other
countries, without opening it equally to vessels on both
sides. This is evidently nothing more than strict jus
tice. A colony is a part of an empire. If a nation
choose, she may prohibit all trade between a colony
and a foreign country, as she may between any other
part of her dominions and a foreign country ; but if she
permit such a trade at all, it must be free to vessels on
both sides, as well in the case of colonies as of any
other part of her dominions. Great Britain has the
same right to prohibit foreign trade between London
and the United States, as between Jamaica and the
United States ; but if no such prohibition be made
with respect to either, she is equally bound to allow
foreign vessels a common right with her own in both.
If Great Britain were to say, that . no trade whatever
should be carried on between London and the United
States, she would exercise a right of which we could
not reasonably complain. If she were to say, that no
American vessels should be employed in the trade, it
would produce just complaints, and justify a recipro
cal regulation as to her vessels. The case of the trade
from a port in the West Indies is precisely similar.

In order that the omission of the treaty to provide a
reciprocity for our vessels in the West India trade,
may be placed in its true light, it will be proper to at
tend to another part of the treaty, which ties up the

MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON

hands of this country against every effort for making
it the interest of Great Britain to yield to our reasona
ble claims. For this end I beg leave to point out to
the committee the clause, which restrains the United
States from imposing prohibitions or duties on Great
Britain, in any case, which shall not extend to all other
nations, and to observe, that the clause makes it impos
sible to operate on the unreasonable policy of that
nation, without suspending our commerce at the same
time with all other nations, whose regulations, with re
spect to us, may be ever so favorable and satisfactory.

The fifteenth article, Mr. Chairman, has another
extraordinary feature, which I should imagine must
strike every observer. In other treaties, which profess
to put the parties on the footing of the most favored
nation, it is stipulated that where new favors are grant
ed to a particular nation in return for favors received,
the party claiming the new favor shall pay the price of
it. This is just and proper where the footing of the
most favored nation is established at all. But this ar
ticle gives to Great Britain the full benefit of all privi
leges that may be granted to any other nation, without
requiring from her the same or equivalent privileges,
with those granted by such nation. Hence it will
happen, that if Spain, Portugal or France shall open
their colonial ports to the United States, in considera
tion of certain privileges in our trade, the same privi
leges will result gratis and ipso facto to Great Bri
tain. This stipulation, sir, I consider as peculiarly im
politic, and such an one as cannot fail to form, in the
view of the committee, a very solid and weighty ob
jection to the treaty.

I dare say, sir, that by the advocates of the treaty
great stress will be laid on the article relating to the
East Indies. To those who are better acquainted
with the subject than I can pretend to be, I shall resign
the task of examining and explaining that part of the
subject. With two observations, however, I must
trouble the committee, before I drop the subject of this

THE BRITISH TREATY. 349

article ; one is, that some gentlemen, as judicious and
well informed, as any, who can be consulted, declare
that they consider this article as affording not a sha
dow of advantage to the United States. The other
is, that no privilege is stipulated in it, which has not
heretofore been uniformly granted without stipulation ;
and as the grant can have proceeded from no motive
but a pure regard to the British interest in that coun
try, there was every reasonable security that the trade
would continue open as it had been, under the same
consideration.

Such, Mr. Chairman, being the character of this
treaty, with respect to the execution of the treaty of
peace, the great principles of the law of nations, and
the regulations of commerce, it never can be viewed as
having any claim to be carried into effect on its own
account. Is there then any consideration, extraneous
to the treaty, that can furnish the requisite motives ?
On this part of the subject the house is wholly without
information. For myself, I am ready to declare, that
I have neither seen, nor known, nor heard, of any cir
cumstances in the general posture of affairs, or in the
particular relations of this country to them, that can
account for the unequal and injurious arrangements,
which we are now called upon for laws to execute.
But there is something further to be taken into ac
count. The continuance of the spoliations on our
trade, and the impressment of our seamen, whether
to be understood as practical comments on the treaty,
or as infractions of it, cannot but enforce on the minds
of the committee the most serious reflections. And
here, sir, I beg leave to refer once more to the passage
I have already read, extracted from the letter of Mr.
Jefferson to Mr. Pinckney, and to ask if, as there stat
ed by the executive, our neutrality and peace are to
be exposed, by permitting practices of that kind, what
must be thought of our giving effect, in the midst of
such practices, to a treaty from which a countenance
may be derived by that nation for going on further
with them?

350 MR, MADISON'S SPEECH OK

I am aware that the executive, notwithstanding the
doctrine and policy laid down as above, has finally con
curred in the treaty under all these circumstances.
But I do not consider that as invalidating the reason
ing drawn from the present state of things. I may be
treading on delicate ground, but I cannot think it im
proper to remark, because it is a known fact, that the
executive paused for some weeks after the concur
rence of the senate, before he ratified the treaty with
his signature ; and I think it may fairly be presumed,
that the true grounds of that pause were the renewal
of spoliation, and a recollection of the light in which
they had been represented ; that, on that supposition,
he was probably influenced in signing the treaty when
he did, by an expectation that such a mark of confi
dence in the British government would produce an
abolition of the unlawful proceeding, and consequent
ly, if it were foreseen that the spoliations would have
been continued, as we find them to be, the treaty would
not have been then signed, or if it had not been then
signed, it would not be signed under the circum
stances of the moment, when it falls under our con
sideration.

I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman, with taking notice
of two considerations, which have been made great use
of by way of inducing Congress to carry the treaty into
effect. In the first place, it has been said, that the
greater part of the treaty is to continue in force for no
longer time than two years after the termination of
the present war in Europe ; arid that no very great
evils can grow out of it in that short period. To this
I reply, that ten of the articles, containing very objec
tionable stipulations, are perpetual ; and that, in the
next place, it will be in the power of Great Britain, at
the expiration of the other articles, to produce the
same causes for the renewal of them, as are now urg
ed in their support. If we are now to enforce the
treaty, lest Great Britain should stir up the Indians, and
refuse to pay our merchants for the property of which
she has plundered them, can she not, at the end of two

THE BRITISH TREATY. 351

or three years, plunder them again, to the same or a
greater amount ? Cannot the same apprehensions be
revived with respect to the Indians, and will not the ar
guments then be as strong as they are now, for renew
ing the same treaty, or for making any other equal
sacrifices that her purposes may dictate ?

It has been asked — what will be the consequences
of refusing to carry the treaty into effect ? I answer,
that the only supposable consequence is, that the ex
ecutive, if governed by the prudence and patriotism,
which I do not doubt will govern that department, will
of course pursue the measures most likely to obtain
a reconsideration and remodification of the offensive
parts of the treaty. The idea of war as a consequence
of refusing to give effect to the treaty, is too visionary
and incredible to be admitted into the question. No
man will say that the United States, if they be really
an independent people, have not a right to judge of their
own interests, and to decline any treaty that does riot
duly provide for them. A refusal, therefore, in such
cases, can afford no cause, nor pretext, nor provoca
tion for war, or for any just resentment. But, apart
from this, is it conceivable that Great Britain, with all
the dangers and embarrassments that are thickening
on her, will wantonly make war on a country, which is
the best market she has in the world for her manufac
tures, which pays her an annual balance, in specie, of
ten or twelve millions of dollars, and whose supplies,
moreover, are essential to an important part of her
dominions ? Such a degree of infatuation ought not
to be ascribed to any country. And, at the present
crisis, for reasons well known, an unprovoked war from
Great Britain, on this country, would argue a degree
of madness, greater than any other circumstances that
can well be imagined.

With all the objections, therefore, to the treaty,
which I have stated, I hope it will not now be carried
into effect, and that an opportunity will take place for
reconsidering the subject, on principles more just and
favorable to the United States.

•'-

:

SPEECH OF WILLIAM B. GILES.

ON

THE BRITISH TREATY,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES OP THE UNITED
STATES, APRIL 18, 1796.

In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved,
as the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the
laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great
Britain : Mr. Giles spoke as follows : —

MR. CHAIRMAN,

IT is much to be regretted that all the information
xvhich could throw light upon the subject of discussion,
should not be before the committee. A sense of re
sponsibility arising from the peculiarly delicate nature
of the question, has induced the House to take every
step with more than a common degree of caution.
Before we proceeded to deliberate upon the expedi
ency or inexpediency of providing for carrying the
treaty into effect, we made a request to the Presi
dent for the papers which attended the negociation.
This request has been refused ; not because the call
itself contained any thing unconstitutional; not be
cause the contents of the papers called for are of
such a nature as to render the disclosure thereof at
this time improper — neither of these causes being inti
mated in the message — but because, principles were
advocated by individual gentlemen in the course of

THE BRITISH TREATY.

the argument inducing the call, which the President
thought not warranted by the constitution. I do not
propose to animadvert upon the conduct of the Execu
tive, in departing from the resolution itself, and in notic
ing the arguments of individual members ; nor upon
any other part of the proceedings of the Executive rela
tive to the call of the House and his refusal. I only
mean to remark, that being perfectly convinced of the
propriety of the call itself, of the utility of the informa
tion embraced by it ; and not being satisfied, by the
arguments of the President, of the propriety of with
holding the papers called for, I should myself have been
willing to have suspended all further proceedings re
specting the provision for the treaty, until the papers
should be laid before the House. I would have firmly
placed myself on that ground ; and in that position
hazarded my responsibility. The extreme sensibility
excited on the public mind by the agitation of the
treaty question, I had supposed, would have furnished
an irresistible argument in favor of complying with the
request of the House; provided no inconvenience
would have attended the disclosure ; and in my opin
ion, under all the circumstances of the case, the House
would have been completely justified in suspending all
further proceedings upon the question of providing for
the treaty, until they received that information which
they deemed necessary, to guide their deliberations.
But as the House has thought proper to take a differ
ent course, and has proceeded to the consideration of
the question, with such lights as they possess, I will
explain the motives which will probably finally influence
my vote.

I shall discuss the subject in two points of view.
I will first examine the contents of the treaty itself, and
then the probable consequences of refusing, or of giv
ing it efficacy.

In examining the contents of the instrument itself,
I propose to go through it, article by article, unless the
task prescribed to myself should exceed the bounds

VOL. i. 45

354 MR- GILES' SPEECH ON

usually allowed to members for the delivery of their
sentiments. 1 shall do this, because I wish to treat
the subject with the utmost candor, and to avoid any
possible imputation of intending to exhibit the bad,
and avoid the good parts of the treaty, if any such
there are. I mean, however, to state merely the pur
port of many of the articles, without any animadver
sion, and to dwell only upon such as appear to me to
be the most material.

The first object of the negociation respects the in-
cxecution of the treaty of peace.

The preamble professes to wave the respective com
plaints and pretensions of the parties, as to the inexe-
cution of the former treaty, and of course establishes
a principle, as the basis of the present treaty, that
either both parties Avere equally culpable or equally
blameless, in respect to the inexecution of the treaty
of peace. I do not mean to remark upon the propriety
or impropriety of this admission on the part of the United
States. I will observe, however, and I think with great
force, that the stipulations in the present treaty do not
correspond with the principle professed as its basis.

On the part of Great Britain, two articles have been
unexecuted — the restoration of certain property in pos
session of the British at the close of the war, and the
surrender of the Western posts. On the part of the
United States, one article is said to remain unfulfilled ;
it respects the promise, that no legal impediments
should be thrown in the way of the recovery of debts
due to British subjects.

The claim of compensation for the property carried
away in contravention of the treaty of peace, is wholly
abandoned, and the value of the surrender of the
posts very much lessened, by the annexation of condi
tions which made no part of the stipulations of surren
der in the treaty of peace. The United States are
more than bound to fulfil the article heretofore unfulfill
ed by them; for, instead of continuing the courts open
for the recoverv of debts in the usual wav. as was the

THE BRITISH TKEATV.

promise in the treaty of peace, they are made to as
sume the payment of all debts, interests and damages
in cases of insolvencies, and a mode of adjustment is
proposed for ascertaining the amount, which furnishes
the greatest latitude for frauds against the United
States which could be devised. This will appear in
the further examination of the subject. Hence it is
obvious, that the stipulations of the treaty abandon
the very principle of adjustment assumed by a gentle
man from Connecticut, (Mr. Swift,) in replying to a.
remark to this effect, made by a gentleman from Vir
ginia : he observed, that he believed if an inquiry
were to be made into the first breach of the treaty of
peace, it would not issue favorably to the United
States ; and he proceeded to argue upon the presump
tion, that the first breach was properly imputable to
the United States. I think it requires very strong as
surances to justify an imputation of this sort against the
United States, such as I believe the present occasion
does not afford. In the first place, the treaty itself
disavows the imputation ; all claims and pretensions
arising from the first breach are disclaimed ; of course
it is unnecessary, if not improper, to defend the treaty
on a ground disclaimed by itself.

But upon what ground does the gentleman place
his admission of the first breach of the treaty of peace
upon the United States ? The gentleman denies the
uniform construction, put upon the article for the re
storation of certain property which was carried away
from the United States at the close of the war, and
asserts, that the article never was intended to bear
that construction. If the gentleman can establish his
assertion, and extend it to the other article, unfulfilled
by Great Britain, he may probably establish his po
sition.

I will first premise, that if the article does not in
tend the restoration of property mentioned in it, the
insertion of it in the treaty is not only unnecessary,

356 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

but mischievous ; as it will necessarily produce em
barrassment to the parties to the instrument.

The British army, at the termination of the war,
was at New- York ; the negroes, which constitute the
species of property in question, are in the southern
states, so that if the article does not include that spe
cies of property taken in the course of the war, and in
the possession of the British at the close of it, it is
worse than nonsense. It never could have been sup
posed, that upon the first dawn of peace, the British
would have left New York and invaded the southern
country, for the purpose of plundering the inhabitants
of their negroes. The peace article itself was a suffi
cient security against this conduct, and of course no
specific provision could have been necessary for that
purpose. This is not only the uniform construction of
the article by the United States, but, as I always have
understood and believed, Great Britain has acquiesced
in the construction, until the negociation of the pre
sent treaty. As an evidence of these facts, I will ob
serve, that American commissioners were permitted
to make a list of the negroes in the possession of the
British at the close of the war, by the British com
mander ; that the list was entered upon the files of
Congress; that there are resolutions of Congress
claiming compensation for the property carried away
in contravention of that article in the treaty of peace,
perhaps without even the intimation of a doubt as to
the construction: that during the administration of
lord Carmarthen, I have always understood, that the
claim of compensation for property carried away, was
admitted, whenever British subjects were indemni
fied for the debts due to them from citizens of the
United States. But here I have to regret the want of
the papers called for by this House, as they contain all
the evidence upon which this important fact depends.
Hence it appears that Great Britain herself yield
ed her assent to this construction, and ought not to

THE BRITISH TREATY. 357

have been permitted to withdraw it afterwards. These
circumstances seem to me to be conclusive, and
ingenuity itself would pause for arguments against
facts so stubborn and irresistible.

The gentleman from Connecticut, has said, that he
thinks the present treaty as good an one, as the United
States had any right to expect. If the United States
were as flagitious with respect to the inexecution of
the treaty of peace, as the gentleman supposes, and
Great Britain as blameless, I would acknowledge that
the mode of adjustment has inflicted upon them a just
punishment for their criminal conduct. This, howev
er, is but a negative compliment to the treaty, and can
be gratifying only to those who concur with the gen
tleman in the imputation thrown upon the United
States. But it can afford no consolation to those,
who contend, that Great Britain has been at least as
culpable as the United States, and particularly when
they reflect that the present treaty itself professes to
disavow the imputation.

But even if the imputation is conceded, it would
have been but reasonable, to have confined the pun
ishment to the new adjustment of the articles unfulfill
ed, without extending it to a train of humiliating and
imperious commercial concessions, which are alto
gether unconnected with the subject, and not war
ranted by necessity.

The first article of the treaty, is declaratory of peace,
&c. between the two countries, which is a very desira
ble thing, provided it can be established upon princi
ples compatible with the national honor and the na
tional interests. The second and third articles con
tain the stipulations for the surrender of the western
posts, and the conditions accompanying the surrender.

The surrender of the western posts, would be an
extremely desirable object, if conformably with the
treaty of peace, it were unattended with any conditions.

I am desirous of giving credit to every part of the
instrument which will admit of it, and am not dispos-

358 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

ed to exaggerate its imperfections. I am willing to
admit, that the surrender of the posts, even with the
conditions annexed, is of some importance ; but I will
assert, that the surrender loses a great portion of its
value to the United States, in consequence of the con
ditions attached to it. Two objects of primary impor
tance were to be effected by the unqualified surrender
of the posts. The one was to obtain the influence
over the Indians in their neighborhood, which the Bri
tish now possess. The other, the participation, at
least, in the fur trade carried on with those Indians.
The conditions accompanying the surrender, will, in
my opinion, very much impede the one, and complete
ly defeat the other object.

The stipulation in the second article, which autho
rizes British subjects, now living within the precincts
or jurisdiction of the posts, still to continue to reside
there, with the free use of their property, and to elect
either to remain British subjects, or become American
citizens at pleasure, will, in my opinion, very much im
pede, if not wholly obstruct, the salutary influence of
the United States, over the numerous tribes of Indians
in that quarter ; which is one great object hoped for
from the possession of those posts. The effects of this
stipulation will appear more obvious, when it is com
pared with the stipulations in the next article, by which
the trade with the Indians is regulated. The second
object, to wit, the participation in the fur trade, I be
lieve will be completely defeated by the regulation of
that trade in the third article. That article stipulates
an equality of duties between American citizens and
British subjects, a free communication through that
country, upon an equality of portages and ferriages.
These conditions, in my opinion, will secure a com
plete monopoly of the fur trade to Great Britain ; be
cause the superiority of the British capital employed
in that trade, and the inferiority of duties, paid upon
goods imported for that trade into Canada, will, in my
judgment, wholly exclude American citizens from a

THE BRITISH TREAT!', 359

participation in that trade through any channel in the
United States. The United States have no mode left
to counteract this monopoly, but by a system of draw
backs, which appear to me, from the nature of the
trade and country, to be almost impracticable ; or if
not absolutely impracticable, it will compel us to pur
chase the trade at a price greater than it is worth. It
appears to me, that Great Britain foresaw these con
sequences, and that these articles are as well calculat
ed to produce them, and to obstruct the views of the
United States, as sagacity itself could have devised.
Hence it appears to me, that the value of an unquali
fied surrender of the posts, is very much lessened by
the accompanying conditions. The gentleman from
Connecticut, observed, that tho surrender of the posts
was absolute, and that no conditions were annexed to
it. It is a sufficient answer to say, that his observa
tion is a mere criticism upon terms. If they be not
conditions of the surrender, they are accompanying
engagements, and are to be executed, with good faith,
by the United States.

The fourth and fifth articles relate merely to the as
certainment of the boundary line, and therefore I shall
pass over them without comment.

The sixth article is, in my judgment, highly objec
tionable. This article assumes the payment of all
debts, interests and damages, due from American citi
zens to British subjects, previous to the revolution, in
all cases where insolvencies have ensued, and where
legal impediments to the recovery of the debts have
existed. I will remark, that this is an assumption of
debt by the public, which they do not owe, and never
promised to pay, and that it is bettering the condition
of the British creditor under the treaty of peace, with
out any obligation on the United States to do so. As
amongst the fashionable calumnies of the day, this
article has been a fertile source of misrepresenta
tion against the state I have the honor to represent,
J am anxious to place this subject in its true light :

360 MR. GILES* SPEECH ON

and as I profess to be well acquainted with it, I hope
to be indulged with some minutice of explanation.
This subject presents two aspects to the public ; the
one, as it respects states, the other, as it respects the
individuals of the United States. As to the first, 1 ad
mit, that if a greater proportion of debts of this de
scription are due from Virginia than from other states,
(which has not, however, been ascertained, and which,
I doubt,) in the same proportion as a state, Virginia
would receive an advantage over the rest of the states,
by a common assumption of the debts ; but as it re
spects the individuals of that state, who are not debt
ors, they stand precisely upon the same footing with
individuals in the other states, because they are, in
common with others, to contribute to the payment of
debts which they never owed. It is of very little con
solation to them, that they live in the neighborhood of
those, whose debts they are to contribute to pay ; for
propinquity or distance can make no difference in the
state of interest between the individuals, who do not
owe, but who are to contribute to pay. As a very
small proportion of the inhabitants of Virginia come
under this description of debtors, the phenomenon of
an opposition of that state to this particular article, is
thus explained.

It is to be remarked, that this article contains no
limits as to the amount of debts assumed by it, nor
are there any precise data furnished for calculation.
But it has been said, that if the debts be due, they
ought to be paid, be the amount what it may. Gen
tlemen should reflect, that the amount will depend
very much upon the mode of adjustment, and that the
mode adopted by the treaty, is the most objectionable
that can be devised.

The principle established for the adjustment of the
debts, instead of preserving the conflicting interests of
debtor and creditor, will produce a complete union of
interests; and of course, will furnish the greatest
temptations to frauds against the United States from

THE BRITISH TREATY. 361

both debtor and creditor. Hence the amount of debts
assumed by the United States, will probably be great
ly increased beyond what would be the amount, if the
debtor and creditor were left to the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings to adjust their own differences
under the principle of opposing interests. To entitle
the creditor to a claim upon the United States, it is ne
cessary for him first to establish his demand against
his debtor, and then to show that his debtor was sol
vent at the commencement of the late war, has since
become insolvent, and that some legal impediment has
intervened to prevent the recovery of the debt. Hence
it becomes the interest of both debtor and creditor, to
establish these facts ; because the debtor will be reliev
ed from his debt, by the assumption of the United
States, and the claim of the creditor will be transferred
from the individual to the United States, which he
will in all cases prefer, particularly as the assistance
of the debtor will often become necessary to facilitate
the establishment of the debt. This is the natural
operation of the union of interest, produced by the as
sumption of the debts by the United States, and there
is more danger to be apprehended from it, from the
impossibility of checking it by any vigilance on the
part of the United States, and from the peculiar cir
cumstances attending these debts.

The greatest proportion of debts remaining unpaid*
I believe, stand upon open accounts. In many cases,
when the debts were evidenced by specialties, pay
ments have been obtained, either by the usual course
of judicial process, or by compromise between the par
ties. There are two circumstances, attending the
open accounts, which will give great scope to frau
dulent combinations between the debtor and creditor.
The one respects the evidence, the other the substan
tial causes of difference in the accounts of the creditor
and debtor. In the reign of George the II., an act
was passed for the more easy recovery of debts due to
his majesty's subjects, from his majesty's plantations

VOL. i, 46

362 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

in America. This act authorized the merchant, resid
ing in Great Britain, to establish his debt against a co
lonist, by affidavits, taken before the commencement
of the suit, and authenticated in the usual mode. This
deprived the defendant of all opportunity of cross exa
mination, so essential to the discovery of truth, and
the jury of all knowledge of the character and credibili
ty of the deponent.

In Virginia, the affidavits, taken in pursuance of this
act, have been deemed incompetent to the establish
ment of the debt, because the act itself destroys the
very nature and properties of evidence. Hence, in all
disputed claims, founded upon this act, judgments
have been rendered for the defendants. If this should
be deemed a legal impediment to the recovery, this
whole description of debts will probably come under
the description of debts assumed. The words used in
the treaty were calculated, in my opinion, with a view
to this construction, and must have been dictated by
persons, better informed of the nature of this business
than I presume the envoy extraordinary of the United
States could have been. The words alluded to are the
following : " The said commissioners, in examining
the complaints and applications so preferred to them,
are empowered and required, in pursuance of the true
intent and meaning of this article, to take into their
consideration all claims, whether of principal or in
terest, or balance of principal and interest, and
to determine the same respectively, according to
the merits of the several cases, due regard being
had to all the circumstances thereof, and as equity
and justice shall appear to them to require. And the
said commissioners shall have power to examine all
such persons, as shall come before them, on oath or af
firmation, touching the premises ; and also to receive
in evidence, according as they may think most consis
tent with equity and justice, all written depositions, or
books, or papers, or copies, or extracts thereof, every
such deposition, book, or paper, or copy, or extract.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 3(33

being duly authenticated, either according to the legal
forms now respectively existing in the two countries,
or in such other manner as the said commissioners
shall see cause to require or allow."

The other circumstances arise from the nature of
the remittances. These are generally made in tobac
co. The sales of this article are entrusted solely to
the merchant, residing in Great Britain ; and the Ame
rican shipper has no check whatever upon the mer
chant, making the sale. Upon rendering these ac
counts, the tobacco is often set down at a price very
inferior to the average price of that article in Europe,
at the time of making the sale. A great number of con
troversies have taken place upon this ground, which
remain unsettled ; but, if the United States shall as
sume the debts of the individuals thus circumstanced,
they will have no inducement to contest these ac
counts in a course of judicial proceedings, and the pro
mise of exoneration from the creditor, will often in
duce the debtor to facilitate the establishment of the
claims against the United States. I have not overlook
ed the clause in this article of the treaty, which compels
an assignment of the claim from the creditor to the
United States ; but that will have little or no operation
to check the practice invited by this article, because,
the debtor is presumed to be insolvent before the as
signment is to be made, and I believe the United
States will be but unsuccessful collectors from insol
vent debtors.

From these circumstances I conclude, that this as
sumption of debt, without any obligation for so doing,
is extremely improper, particularly when it is recol
lected, that this article sweeps away all acts of limita
tion, and relates to the whole extensive scene of busi
ness, carried on in the United States, from the ex
tremes of New Hampshire to the extremes of Georgia,
for an unlimited time before the revolution. If I were
to make a conjecture as to the amount, it would be a
loose one, but if I were to choose between indemnifica-

364 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

tion to the American merchants for recent spoliations,
committed upon their commerce, or the payment of
these debts, I should not hesitate to prefer the first
alternative ; because, to that there are known limits ;
to the other, there are not, nor any data for calculation
under the mode of adjustment prescribed by the treaty.
I therefore caution gentlemen against the assumption
of this unascertained debt ; for I believe it will be at
tended with a responsibility, which they cannot answer
to their constituents, nor will the responsibility be al
leviated by the recollection of the merits of the indi
viduals for whose benefit it is made. The increase of
the debt of the United States, by these artificial means,
without any obligation to do so, I think highly ob
jectionable.

The seventh article of the treaty promises compen
sation for the spoliations, committed upon American
commerce, in the course of the present war. This
would be a very desirable object, if it could be obtain
ed ; but, when I observe, that before compensation is
to be obtained, a process is to be had in the admiralty
courts of Great Britain, and that the amount will de
pend very much upon the temper of those courts, I
doubt whether this boasted article will not dwindle
down into very little importance. I shall only observe
further, that the merchants, for whose benefit this ar
ticle was more immediately intended, and who have
petitioned Congress to make provision for carrying
the treaty into effect, seem not to rely implicitly upon
the provision upon this subject ; because, in every me
morial, they have held up the expectation of ultimate
indemnification from the United States.

The eighth article points out the mode of paying the
commissioners, to be appointed under the treaty — to
which I have no objection.

The phraseology of the ninth article is somewhat
curious, and the object I cannot perfectly understand.
It is in the following words :

" It is agreed, that British subjects, who now hold

;

THE BRITISH TREATY. 365

lands in the territories of the United States, and Ameri
can citizens, who now hold lands in the dominions of his
majesty, shall continue to hold them according to the
nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles
therein ; and may grant, sell, or devise the same to
whom they please, in like manner as if they were na
tives ; and that neither they nor their heirs or assigns
shall, so far as may respect the said lands and the legal
remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens."

If it be the object of this article to vary the existing
laws upon the subject of landed estates, it is wholly
improper. If not, it is wholly unnecessary. I do not
know how far this article may affect the proprietory
estates. If it be intended to give any new impulse to
those estates, it may be attended with serious effects.
Pennsylvania is the only state which has regularly ex
tinguished the proprietory claim. If a latitude of con
struction should be given to this article, it might ma
terially affect the states of Delaware, North Carolina
and Virginia. I will not pretend to say, that it will
bear the interpretation I have hinted at, but, as an in
dividual,! would rather it had been omitted. There is
a semblance of reciprocity assumed by this article ;
but no reciprocity in fact.

The tenth article is of a very extraordinary complex
ion. It is remarkable, both as to the matter it con
tains, and the manner in which it is expressed. It is
in the following words :

" Neither the debts, due from individuals of the one
nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor
monies, which they may have in the public funds, or in
the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of
war or national differences, be sequestered or confiscat
ed, it being unjust and impolitic, that debts and engage
ments, contracted and made by individuals having con
fidence in each other, and in their respective govern
ments, should ever be destroyed or impaired by na
tional authority, on account of national differences and
discontents."

366 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

This article also assumes the semblance of recipro
city ; but no reciprocity in fact.

British subjects have great sums, both in public and

Erivate funds, in the United States ; American citizens
ave little or no property in public or private funds in
Great Britain. Hence the evident and substantial
inequality of this reciprocal stipulation. On the other
hand, American citizens have a great share of proper
ty on the water, with very little naval protection, and
of course subject to the naval superiority of Great
Britain.

If, therefore, Great Britain had stipulated, in case of
war, that in consideration of a refusal, on the part of
the United States, to sequestrate property of British sub
jects upon land, she would not molest the property of
American citizens upon water, there would then have
been a substantial, instead of a nominal reciprocity :
as the article now stands, there is an important right
conceded, and no compensation obtained.

This article, however, has been highly applauded,
by a particular description of persons interested in it,
in consequence of the affectation of morality professed
by it.

It has been said to be dishonest and immoral, to take
the property of individuals for the purpose of compen
sating national wrongs. I can see no difference be
tween the morality of taking the property of individuals
upon water, and the property of individuals upon land.
The difference of the element can make no difference
in the morality of the act. However strongly, there
fore, this moral impulse was operating upon the Ame
rican envoy, whilst engaged in the construction of this
article, it had entirely dissipated before he arrived at
the twenty-fifth article : for, in that article, the princi
ple of privateering is not only admitted, but its opera
tion facilitated ; so that, unless the interest of Great
Britain is to be the criterion of the envoy's morality,
what he has gained by the morality of the tenth ar-

THE BRITISH TREATY. 367

ticle, must be at least balanced by the immorality of
the twenty-fifth. Sequestration is always admitted as
part of the law of nations, and hence I presume it is
not immoral, under certain circumstances. It appears
to be the opinion of some, that where the property of
an individual has been sequestered on account of the act
of his nation, the individual is to sustain the loss ;
but this is not the case. The sequestration itself im
poses upon the government, to which the individual
belongs, an obligation of reimbursement. Hence the
sequestration does not ultimately rest upon the indi
vidual, but upon the government for whose wrong the
property was taken. This is also conformable to the
laws of nations. It is the course pursued by Great
Britain for all sequestrations made during the Ameri
can war, and is the course which will be pursued by
all nations.

War itself is immoral in most cases ; and justifiable,
in my opinion, only in the case of self-defence ; but, if
a stipulation had been inserted in this treaty which
prohibited the United States from declaring war, it
would have been justly and universally reprobated.
The present article prohibits the United States from
resorting to the best means, not only of preventing wary
but the most efficacious means of supporting it. Hence
the surrender of the right is a most impolitic con
cession, and is infinitely aggravated by its being a
voluntary concession ; no equivalent being received in
return. It is dishonorable to the United States, be
cause it evidences a want of confidence in the discretion
of the constituted authorities. The right of sequestra
tion is admitted to be essential to national sovereign
ty; but lest it should be indiscreetly used by the
United States, its guardianship is transferred to Great
Britain. I view sequestration as an extraordinary re
medy, to be resorted to only on extraordinary occa
sions. And although I admit that but few cases will
justify a resort to it, yet it is one of our best instru
ments of defence, considering our relationship to

I

368 MR. GILES* SPEECH ON

Great Britain, and ought not, therefore, to have been
surrendered. This restraint is imposed upon the
United States for an unlimited time, and is the more
objectionable, as it is a species of legislation against
the discretion of legislation.

But, whatever may be the difference of opinion as to
the matter of this article, the most partial admirer of
this treaty must be unwilling to defend the very extra
ordinary envoy of the United States for the manner
of expression. This measure was proposed in the
House of Representatives, as one of the means of self-
protection against British depredations. This cir
cumstance was known to the envoy, yet he not only bar
tered away the measure, but, in doing so, branded the
proposition, then depending before the House of Re
presentatives, with the terms "impolitic and unjust."
This was an unnecessary imputation, which no minis
ter could have been justifiable in applying to his gov
ernment. Suppose our envoy had insisted, and the
British minister had agreed, that the order of the 6th of
November, for taking neutral vessels for adjudication,
was piratical, and ought not to be renewed : I will not
pretend to say how far the order would justify the epi
thet ; but what would have been the fate of a British
minister under such circumstances ? Utter disgrace
would have been one inevitable consequence ; but, an
American minister is not only tolerated for a similar
conduct, but by some, who even affect to be Ameri
cans, applauded. In the present agitation of the pub
lic mind, truth seems to be obscured by party irrita
tions, and personal partialities ; but I am convinced,
that whenever it may be so far collected as to take a
calm review of this transaction, there will exist one
universal voice of condemnation.

The eleventh article contains a general stipulation
for the liberty of navigation and commerce between the
two countries.

The twelfth article is the first of the commercial
articles. This article is suspended ; but the want of

THE BRITISH TREATY. ;j(jij

a substitute will justify a few remarks. 1 am not
practically acquainted with commercial detail, and of
course shall not go much into detail upon the com
mercial articles ; there are, however, some grand
principles which apply to commerce, as well as to
every other business or science, which will guide me
in a few remarks upon this subject. The twelfth arti
cle is intended to regulate the trade between the
United States and the British West India Islands; so
far, therefore, as it permits that trade to be carried on.
it is intended as a concession to the United States ;
the rigid restrictions accompanying the concession,
however, render it so paltry, that the Senate rejected
the concession, although the envoy had accepted it.
But, in what situation has the rejection left the United
States ? They are now engaged in a commercial
treaty with Great Britain, in which they have surren
dered almost every commercial advantage they had to
bestow, and are still wholly excluded from the West
India trade. I have always understood that the West
India trade was the great object of commercial nego-
ciation with Great Britain, but now that is formally relin
quished. It may be said, that further negociations upon
this subject are promised ; but what inducement will
Great Britain have to relax her colonial regulations,
provided this treaty should be carried into effect?
She has already, without this relaxation, placed the
commerce between the two countries precisely upon
the footing she wished; and the United States have
yielded every commercial advantage which might
nave been exchanged for that relaxation ; of course.
Great Britain will have no inducement to make, as
the United States have nothing to offer for, the re
laxation.

The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Swift,) justi
fied the conduct of Great Britain with respect to the
West Indies, upon the ground of her colonial rights.
He observed that Great Britain had a right to prevent,
the trade to the West Indies altogether. This is true :

VOL. i. 4.7

370 -MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

and she has a right to prevent the trade to London, and
the United States have a right to interdict her trade
to this country. But I would ask, if there be no relaxa
tion of these rights, of what advantage is the treaty ?
The very object of a commercial treaty is a reciprocal
indulgence in the exercise of these rights ; and the pecu
liar dependence of those islands upon the United States
for their very subsistence, would command a participa
tion in that trade, if properly used.

The resort to the United States for supplies to facili
tate the present operations in the West Indies, is a
striking evidence of the importance of the United
States to their existence.

It has been observed, that the Spanish treaty has
not opened the Spanish islands to the United States.
This is true, and it would have been a desirable thing
if it had effected this object. But it should be recol
lected, that the United States have made no commer
cial concessions to Spain, and that the treaty does
not profess to contain any material commercial regula
tions.

The thirteenth article contains regulations for the
East India trade. This article has been held up as an
apology for all the commercial defects of the treaty.
I do not pretend to be perfectly acquainted with the
nature of this trade ; but as far as I understand the ex
planation of the advantages of this article, I cannot
concur in the result. The common remark is, that this
article secures to the United States a right which be
fore was a courtesy. This remark possesses some
plausibility, but no substance ; what is called courtesy,
is a trade founded upon the interest of the parties. I
believe that a courtesy in trade, the basis of which is
the interest of the party granting it, is a better securi
ty than forced regulations by treaty, without the basis
of interest for their support. It is admitted, that the
trade to the East Indies, before this treaty, was ex
tremely lucrative, and of course cannot be the effect
of the treaty. But the restrictive and monopolizing

THE BRITISH TKEATV. 371

hand of Great Britain, is seen to extend itself even to
this branch of commerce, in the prohibition of the ex
portation of East India articles to an European market
in American bottoms ; which is a restriction that
does not now exist, and is another restriction upon the
citizens of the United States trading thence, which, in
my opinion, will lessen very much the boasted security
of right under this article, whenever the interest of the
East India company will justify the prohibition of
that trade. The restrictions alluded to are in the fol
lowing words. " Neither is this article to be construed
to allow the citizens of the said States to settle or re
side within the said territories, or to go into the interi
or parts thereof, without the permission of the British
government established there ; and if any transgression
should be attempted against the regulations of the
British government in this respect, the observance of
the same shall and may be enforced against the citi
zens of America in the same manner as against British
subjects or others transgressing the same rule. And
the citizens of the United States, whenever they arrive
in any port or harbor in the said territories, or if they
should be permitted in manner aforesaid, to go to any
other place therein, shall always be subject to the laws,
government and jurisdiction, of whatever nature estab
lished, in such harbor, port or place, according as the
same may be. The citizens of the United States, may
also touch for refreshment at the island of St. Helena,
but subject in all respects to such regulations, as the
British government may from time to time establish
there."

The fourteenth article relates to the commerce and
navigation of the two countries generally, and will be
passed over without remark.

The fifteenth article is, in my judgment, highly ob
jectionable.

This article restrains the United States from impos
ing upon British goods higher duties, &c. than upon
those of other foreign nations. It authorizes Great

3*72 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

Britain to equalize the existing unequal duties, between
the American and British bottoms, and restrains the
United States from reviving the existing inequality.
One objection to this article is, that it abandons,
without an equivalent, the advantages resulting from
the peculiar nature of the trade carried on between the
United States and Great Britain. This trade consists,
on the part of the United States, mostly of raw mate
rials, which employ the artizans of Britain, and on the
part of Great Britain, of the manufactures of artizans
in the most finished state ; and in addition, there is
always a large specie balance against the United
States and in favor of Great Britain. It is calculated,
that the United States furnish a market for at least one
third of the whole surplus manufactures of Great
Britain, and for this the most suitable returns for the
British market are made. The loss of so valuable a
market could not be supplied in any part of the world.
It would naturally be supposed, that a trade so favora
ble would be entitled to some indulgence on the part
of the nation receiving the favor, and would command
some respect to the nation affording it ; provided it had
energy enough to avail itself of the advantage ; but by
this article it is abandoned with a nominal, but no real
equivalent. This consideration is greatly strengthened
by extending it to the peculiar nature of the trade be
tween the United States and the West Indies, which
has been already remarked upon.

Upon this ground the discrimination in favor of
American over British bottoms, has been built ; and
the growth of American shipping has very considera
bly increased, in consequence of this policy. Our ex
perience, therefore, is bartered away without even the
probable calculation of a countervailing advantage.

The apology, made for this article, that the United
States have granted no right to Britain, which she did
not possess before, is entirely delusive. It may be true,
that no new right of sovereignty is granted to Great
Britain ; but she is now left at liberty to exercise a

THE BRITISH TREATY. 373

right, without hazard, by a restriction imposed upon the
United States ; and which she had failed to exercise
until this restriction was imposed. It is remarkable,
from the whole complexion of the treaty, that the ad
vantages, gained by Great Britain, consist in restric
tions imposed upon the United States, as if her object
was to restrain the United States in the exercise of
their rights of sovereignty.

The sixteenth article relates only to the appointment
of consuls, and does not require notice.

The seventeenth article is, in my opinion, objec
tionable in many respects. It yields a formal assent
to the seizure and condemnation of an enemy's property
on board of American vessels. I expected to have
heard this article apologized for and not justified. But
I was surprised to hear it asserted, that it was pro
blematical, whether the admission of this principle
would be for the advantage or disadvantage of the
United States. This is throwing the article into a
problem, without attempting to solve it. It is discard
ing the exercise of the reasoning faculty. From the
peculiar situation of the United States in their rela
tions to the rest of the world, the establishment of the
principle, that neutral vessels shall give freedom to
their cargoes, is to them of primary importance ; of
course the United States have sedulously exerted
themselves, in all their foreign negociations, to have that
principle formally admitted as the law of nations. In
every other treaty, entered into by the United States,
this principle has been carefully inserted. A formal
assent to the contrary doctrine, will probably produce
a retrograde effort upon all former exertions, which
will require a great length of time to counteract. In
the relations between the United States and Great
Britain, the principle is peculiarly important. Great
Britain possesses the most formidable fleet in exist
ence, and is at least one half her time at war. The
United States have an extended commerce without
the protection of a fleet, and from her remote situa-

374 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

tion from Europe, the great scene of war, as well as
from the genius of the American people, are not like
ly to be involved in European contests. Hence the
disadvantage to the United States from this stipula
tion, will be in proportion to the greater probability of
their remaining free from war, than Great Britain, and
in proportion to their more defenceless state of com
merce. There exists another forcible reason, which
ought to have prevented this stipulation — its necessa
ry operation upon the present belligerent powers.

Under this article, French goods, in American bot
toms, are made subject to British seizure and con
demnation ; but British goods, in American bottoms,
are free from French seizure and condemnation.
This is an evident partiality in favor of Britain against
France, which, in my opinion, can hardly be warrant
ed by the species of neutrality, proclaimed by the Ex
ecutive as the existing state of the nation. It is not
only a neutrality, but an impartial neutrality. If a de
viation from the strict line of impartial neutrality can
be in one case justifiable, I think every American feel
ing will incline to favor the cause of liberty, and not
the cause of despotism.

It is no apology for this article, to say that an arti
cle upon the opposite principle could not be obtained :
then let none be obtained. It is the assent to the prin
ciple, which constitutes the disgrace and the injury to
the United States. If other terms could not have been
procured, French property, in American bottoms,
might have been left to the ordinary operation of the
laws of nations, without an explicit and invidious stipu
lation for its seizure and condemnation.

The eighteenth article defines contraband goods :
there is a common, but just objection, made to this
article, to wit, that the contraband list is extended,
and that several articles are added, which were never
before admitted to be contraband. It is to be observ
ed, that all these additional articles are amongst the
exports of the United States, whilst most, or perhaps

THE BRITISH TREATY. 375

all of them, are amongst the imports of Great Britain.
This circumstance proves, that the reciprocity, assum
ed by this article, is delusive, and that the advantage
is wholly in favor of Great Britain. This article con
tains also some regulations, respecting the seizure of
provisions in American vessels under certain circum
stances, which are extremely equivocal and suspicious.
I presume this article furnished the pretext to Great
Britain, for issuing the late order for seizing American
vessels, bound with provisions to France. I will not
pretend to say. that the article justifies a construction
which might give rise to the order ; but the existence
of such an order since the signing of the treaty, is
universally admitted : but I will assert, that whether
the order is to be considered as the practical construc
tion of this article, or an infraction of it, or an infrac
tion of the neutrality of the United States in any re
spect, it may be attended with the most serious con
sequences. If this invasion of neutral rights is to be
the first fruits of the treaty, the most alarming results
may be expected from its further operation. The ex
ecutive of the United States has declared, that even
the permission of this conduct, by one of the bellige
rent powers, is a breach of neutrality against the other ;
and, of course, a just cause of war from the injur
ed nation. This doctrine is so clearly established in a
letter from Mr. Jefferson, written by order of the Pre
sident to Mr. Pinckney, dated 7th September, 1793,
that I beg the indulgence of the committee in reading
two or three paragraphs from the letter : it is in the fol
lowing words :

" This act, too, tends directly to draw us from that
state of peace in which we are wishing to remain. It
is an essential character of neutrality, to furnish no
aids, (not stipulated by treaty,) to one party, which we
are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we
permit corn to be sent to Great Britain and her
friends, we are equally bound to permit it to France.
To restrain it would be a partiality, which might lead

376 MR. GILES* SPEECH ON

to war with France ; and, between restraining it our
selves, and permitting her enemies to restrain it un
rightfully, there is no difference. She would consider this
as a mere pretext, of which she would not be the dupe,
and on what honorable ground could we otherwise ex
plain it ? Thus we should see ourselves plunged, by
this unauthorized act of Great Britain, into a war,
with which we meddle not, and which we wish to
avoid, if justice to all parties, and from all parties will
enable us to avoid it. In the case, where we found
ourselves obliged by treaty, to withhold from the ene
mies of France, the right of arming in our ports, we
thought ourselves in justice bound to withhold the
same right from France also ; and we did it. Were
we to withhold from her supplies of provisions, we
should, in like manner, be bound to withhold them
from her enemies also ; and thus shut against ourselves
all the ports of Europe, where corn is in demand, or make
ourselves parties in the war. This is a dilemma,
which Great Britain has no right to force upon us, and
for which no pretext can be found in any part of our
conduct. She may, indeed, feel the desire of starving
an enemy nation ; but she can give no right of doing it
at our loss, nor of making us the instrument of it."

After this unequivocal declaration, made by the Ex
ecutive of the United States, what plea can be made
to the French government, to justify an acquiescence
in this conduct of Great Britain ? Whether it be the
result of the construction of the treaty, or an infraction
of it, what apology can this house make for giving ef
ficacy to the treaty before some satisfactory explana
tion is made upon this subject ? Suppose the republic
of France were to approach the Executive of the Unit
ed States with this letter in their hand, and sav, " Here

is your own declaration of your own principles of neu
trality ! You have unkindly departed from the princi
ples avowed by yourself, in favor of my enemy. You
seem to have concurred in a scheme of distressing a
whole nation by withholding supplies of provisions,

I
THE BRITISH TREATY. 377

when a better office might have been expected from
the United States." Suppose a similar appeal were to
be made to this House, whilst deliberating upon the
expediency or inexpediency of giving efficacy to the
very treaty which is used by Great Britain to sanctify
her conduct ; what reply could be made in either case ?
Is any gentleman, who is disposed to carry the treaty
into effect, prepared to give a satisfactory answer to
so just and so interesting a complaint ? According
to the very principles avowed by the Executive, rather
than give no cause of umbrage to Great Britain, we
give just cause of war to France. Yet it has been
said, that it would be disgraceful to the nation not to
give efficacy to an instrument containing this disgrace
ful concession. It is not sufficient to say, that the re
public of France will not avail herself of this breach of
neutrality, and enter into hostilities against the United
States. It is sufficient to show that the United States,
by the execution of this treaty, under this construc
tion, will furnish just cause for such a conduct ; and.
if this be not the just interpretation of the instrument,
no disgrace can be greater than to execute a treaty
with a nation at the very moment she is engaged in
its infraction.

The nineteenth article contains some regulations
respecting privateers, which require no comment.

The twentieth article respects the punishment of
pirates, which is not material.

The twenty-first article prohibits American citizens
from entering into any foreign service against Great
Britain, and defines piracies. There is an existing
law in the United States upon this subject, which ope
rates equally towards all the belligerent powers. This
act extends no farther than to prohibit American citi
zens from entering into foreign service within the Unit
ed States, and applies equally to all foreign powers.
But Great Britain, not content with this fair and just
regulation, has extended this provision, so far as re
gards herself, beyond the limits or jurisdiction of tin*

VOL, i. 48

378 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

United States, and entirely destroys the impartiality
and neutrality of the existing legal provision. What
is the operation of this article upon the belligerent
powers ? It is this. An American citizen entering
into the French service against Great Britain, out
of the limits or jurisdiction of the United States is
punishable. An American citizen entering into the
British service under the same circumstances, is not
punishable. Besides, it is a prohibition upon Ameri
can citizens, which has never been imposed upon the
subjects or citizens of any nation, as far as I can recol
lect. But the practice of entering into foreign service
has, at all times, been resorted to as affording the best
military education. When it is recollected, that this
article is to continue in force for only two years after
the termination of the present European war ; that
there is no probability of the United States being, dur
ing that time, engaged in an European war ; and that
this article is, in no respect, connected with the pro
fessed objects of negociation — has not the stipulation
too much the appearance, as well as the effect, of in
terfering in the present European quarrel, and evincing
a partiality for the interests of Great Britain, in viola
tion of our professions of an impartial neutrality?
And can this conduct be justified, either from the na
ture of the cause in which France is engaged, or from
the good offices rendered by that great nation to the
United States?

The twenty-second article stipulates, that notice
shall be given before acts of reprisal, &c. shall be au
thorized by either of the contracting parties, which is
very proper.

The twenty-third article is that, in which I expected
to have found some provisions for the protection of
American seamen against British impressments: in
stead of this humane and salutary provision, I found
that the officers and crews of those very ships of war,
&c. engaged in the unauthorized impressments, are to
J>e hospitably received in the ports of the United States,

I

THE BRITISH TREATY. 3f 9

and a proper respect to be paid to those officers, ac
cording to their respective ranks. Strange substitute
this for the protection of American seamen ! This ar
ticle is rendered more aggravating by the practice of
the British in impressing American seamen since the
signing this very treaty. Whilst the table of the House
is almost laboring with evidence of this fact — whilst the
fact is riot denied by any gentleman on this floor — in
the very same breath in which a bill has been passed
for the protection and relief of this valuable class of
citizens, is the House called upon to make provision
for effectuating a treaty of amity, &c. with a nation
committing these wrongs — with a nation refusing to
respect any evidence of protection which can be af
forded to this description of citizens by the govern
ment of the United States ; and an alarm and wonder
is excited, because the House, under these circum
stances, should deliberate upon making the provision.

The twenty-fourth article prohibits the arming of
ships, by other foreign nations, in the ports of the
United States, and selling their prizes ; and restrains
the United States from selling them more provisions
than may be necessary to carry them to the next port
of the nation to which they belong. Although I can
see no propriety in these stipulations, particularly at
this time, I will pass them over without remark.

The twenty-fifth article deserves two remarks — the
first is, that it accommodates Great Britain in her
scheme of privateering against France, and evidences
the same temper with several other articles towards
the belligerent powers, which has been remarked upon.
The other grows out of the general clause of reserva
tion which it contains. The clause I allude to is in
the following words :

" Nothing in this treaty contained, shall, however,
be construed or operate contrary to former and exist
ing public treaties with other sovereigns or states.
But the two parties agree, that while they continue i»
amity, neither of them will in future make any treaty

380 3111. GILES' SPEECH ON

that shall be inconsistent with this or the preceding
article."

From this reservation it is evident, that all the arti
cles, which affect the present belligerent powers, are
intended as constructive of the treaty between the
United States and France ; and the construction is
so made, as to operate most injuriously to France,
and most advantageously to Great Britain. Indeed,
this construction seems to have bound so hard upon
the French treaty, in the opinion of both negociators,
that they, probably apprehending that it might, in some
respect, be deemed by the United States a positive in
fraction of that treaty, thought it necessary to insert
this sovereign clause. The whole of the stipulations,
which affect the present belligerent powers, are the
most reprehensible interferences in the European quar
rel, for the following reasons : first, they are wholly
unnecessary, because they are totally disconnected
with the objects of negociation between the two coun
tries, and with the usual and natural order of com
merce ; and of course, must be deemed voluntary on
the part of the United States. Second, the interest of
the United States could not have been contemplated,
because, there is no probability of their being engaged
in a naval war in two years after the termination of the
present war ; at which time these stipulations are to
cease; of course the accommodation was intended for
the present war, in which the United States are not en
gaged, and not for a future war, in which they may be
engaged. Third, because it is a dishonorable devia
tion from that impartial neutrality, professed by the
United States in favor of a nation the least of all others
entitled to the accommodations of the United States,
and against a nation the most of all others entitled to
them. Fourth, it voluntarily hazards the resentment
and hostility of a nation, which, if exerted, might pro
duce to the United States the most serious calamities.

The twenty-sixth article provides, that in case of war
between the two countries, the merchants and others

THE BRITISH TREATY. 381

of each of the two countries, residing in the other,
shall have time to remove with their effects, &c. which
is in every respect proper.

The twenty-seventh article provides for reciprocal
ly giving up certain fugitives from justice, which is not
objectionable.

The twenty-eighth article respects the time of the
duration of the treaty.

Having examined the treaty at large, with candor,
and with the best judgment I possess, I find in it so
much to condemn, and so little to applaud, and some
of the objectionable parts are so formidable in them
selves, that it is wonderful to me, that the treaty
should have found an advocate upon its merits, in the
United States. Viewing the subject as I do, and be
lieving it my duty to exercise my discretion upon it,
nothing, contained in it, can justify me in giving my
vote for the necessary provisions to give it efficacy.

[Mr. Giles, after apologizing for the time he had al
ready consumed, proceeded to consider the probable
consequences of refusing, or giving efficacy to the
treaty.]

Gentlemen in favor of making the provision have sug
gested two consequences resulting from a refusal, of a
very serious nature. The one, what is termed by them
the hostility of departments of government, which
would necessarily eventuate in a total dissolution of
the government itself. The other, a war with Great
Britain. If either of these consequences would result,
I would vote for the necessary provisions, although
the vote would be more against my feelings than any
vote I ever before gave. Whether either of these
consequences will result, cannot be positively ascer
tained, but by experiment. The subject, however,
like all others, is susceptible of a certain degree of
reasoning and calculation.

It should be recollected, that the House is now en
gaged in the exercise of its constitutional rights. It
is called upon to make provision for carrying into ef-

382 MR. GILES' SPEECH ' ON

feet the British treaty. Two things naturally present
themselves to its consideration. The one, the expe
diency of the object of expenditure itself, for which the
appropriation is required ; the second, the ways and
means of raising the money. It has been settled by
the House, that both are within the constitutional dis
cretion of the House. The President would deprive
the House of the right of judging of the expediency of
the expenditure, and limit its discretion to the ways
and means of furnishing the supplies. This point be
ing previously settled, I shall not enlarge upon it. I pro
pose to give the history of the rise and progress of the
treaty. I will be correct as to facts, and precise as to
dates. Very shortly after Great Britain became a
party to the war against France, the President pro
claimed the United States to be in a state of impartial
neutrality. The proclamation was dated 22d of April,
1793. An attempt had been made, and was at that
time continued, to terminate the differences, which
subsisted between the United States and Great Bri
tain, growing out of the inexecution of the treaty of
peace. This attempt proved unsuccessful. On the
1 6th of June, 1793, Great Britain issued an order,
which affected the rights of neutral vessels. This or
der, and the acts committed under it, served to in
crease the causes of dispute between the two countries.
On the meeting of Congress, in the succeeding fall,
the President communicated to them all the negocia-
tions which had taken place between the two coun
tries, intimated, that negociation did not promise a
favorable issue, and that it was left with Congress to
say, what further was to be done. In this critical situa
tion of affairs, Congress took the subject into conside
ration. Great Britain was, at that time at least, consi
dered as the aggressing nation. The first measure of
self-protection proposed, was a restriction of the com
merce of Great Britain with the United States : this
measure was objected to, as being too strong as a
commercial measure, and too weak as a political one.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 3g3

As far, however, as a vote was taken upon it, a majori
ty of the house appeared in favor of that proceeding.
On the 6th of November, 1793, an additional order
was issued, the purport of which was, to take and
bring to legal adjudication all neutral vessels bound to
French ports. This additional evidence of hostility
gave rise to three other measures ; the one was an
embargo for a limited time, which was effected; the
second was the suspension of commercial intercourse
between the United States and Great Britain; the
third, a sequestration, or rather the arrestation of debts
due to British subjects. The proposition for the ar
restation of debts, was moved the 27th of March :
the proposition for the suspension of intercourse, 7th
of April, 1794. On the 4th of April, 1794, the Presi
dent laid before the House a communication from Mr.
Pinckney, minister from the United States to Great
Britain, containing a conversation between Mr. Pinck
ney and Lord Grenville, of a very extraordinary nature,
which always appeared to me to be the ground work
of the change, which shortly afterwards took place in
the conduct of the Executive of the United States to
wards the House of Representatives.

The part of the communication alluded to, is in the
following words. — Extract of a letter from Mr. Pinck
ney to the secretary of state, dated 9th of January, 1794.

" Lord Grenville answered, that the only reason for
renewing them was, lest the present instruction, being
a revocation of that of the 6th of November, might
also be deemed to revoke the articles which were
connected with it. His lordship then explained the
motives which had induced this government to issue
the present instruction. The first, he said was the
sincere desire of administration to maintain the best
understanding and harmony with the United States.
The second was, what he could not mention to me
officially, but what he still thought it right, I should be
apprized of, that no misconception of their motives
might be entertained: that he was aware of the delica-

384 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

cy of speaking to a foreign minister concerning the in
ternal state of his country, neither could he expect an
answer from me on the subject ; but that their second
reason was, by this conduct, to take away every pre
text, from evil disposed persons among us, who accord
ing to the intelligence he had received, were endeavor
ing to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well
as to oppose the measures of our own government,
and, in short, to reduce us to the present situation of
France ; a misfortune, which they deprecated, as well
for our sakes, as for the common welfare and tranquilli
ty of mankind. He further took occasion to observe,
with respect to the conduct of our government, in
maintaining our neutrality, that although there were
some matters, with which this government was not
perfectly satisfied, (and to which, for the same reason,
they refrained from giving that opposition they thought
they would be justified in doing,) yet, from the general
tenor of the conduct of our government, they were con
vinced, it was their desire to maintain a full neutrality,
which was an additional motive for their present con
duct."

It is to be remarked, that on the 8th of January,
the revocation of the hostile order of the 6th of No
vember took place, and on the next day, after an apolo
gy for the acknowledged indelicacy of interfering in
the internal affairs of a foreign government, Lord
Grenville modestly undertakes to intermeddle with the
affairs of the United States. It has always been mat
ter of surprise to me, that the American minister should
have listened to such a communication, and still more
surprising, that it should have met with a favorable re
ception in the United States. But the fact is, that on
the 19th of April, 1794, the chief justice was taken
from the exercise of his judicial duties, and nominated
envoy extraordinary to Great Britain, during the pen
dency of two of the beforementioned propositions in
the House of Representatives. The House of Repre
sentatives proceeded to pass the bill for the suspension

THE BRITISH TKEATV. 385

of commercial intercourse on the 25th of April, by an
uncommonly large majority, and on the 27th of April, the
bill was negatived by the senate%upon the casting vote
of the vice-president. The effect of this vote was a
discontinuance of the embargo, and an abandonment
of all the other measures proposed for self-protectioo.
In these acts will be seen, the commencement of what
gentlemen call the hostility of departments ; but what
I shall term the due exercise of the checks, provided by
the constitution. And, if it is to be traced to this source,
the House of Representatives will evidently appear not
to be the aggressor. The House, viewing their mea
sures defeated by the constitutional check, acquiesced
in the decision without a murmur. Now we are told*
if the House should exercise its constitutional check, a
dissolution of the government would necessarily ensue.
This conclusion seems to me without foundation, and
ought not to be brought into calculation, in estimating
the present question.

The treaty itself was concluded on the 28th of Octo
ber, 1794. It was communicated to this House, the
1st of March, 1796, having on the same day been pro
mulgated by proclamation declaring it to be obligatory.

The treaty originated from an intimation of
lord Grenville, which has always excited my appre
hension ; it was commenced against the known sense of
the House of Representatives, and every step of its
progression seems to have been marked with peculiar
coercion.

When a British minister undertakes to declare, that
the motive for the revocation of a hostile order was,
to take away every pretext from evil disposed persons
among us, who, according to the intelligence he had re
ceived, were endeavoring to irritate our own people
against Griat Britain, as well as to oppose the measures
of our own government, &c., and to assign the same
reason, for refraining from giving that opposition to
some exceptionable measures of our government,
which he otherwise might have done; and when the

VOL, i. 49

386 MK. GILES' SPEECH ON

United States so far listen to this language, as
immediately to enter into negociation upon the sub
ject, my apprehensions of British interference, of
British influence, are strongly excited, particularly
when the British minister seems to make a common
cause between the two governments against what he
is pleased to call evil disposed persons. I will here
incidentally remark, that as far as these " evil disposed
persons" have produced the revocation of the hostile
order of November, and a relaxation of British hostili
ty in other respects, they are certainly entitled to ap
plause from the United States, whatever epithets may
have been bestowed upon them by a British minister.

The contents of the treaty have very much confirm
ed my original apprehensions. Gentlemen have often
said, show us the danger of British interference, of
British influence. To my mind, the treaty itself con
tains the evidence. The treaty itself corresponds
with what I consider as the object of the British mi
nister in giving the invitation to it.

I find it in the following particular instances. Be
fore the treaty, the right of laying a special, as well as
a general embargo existed in the United States : the
right of laying a special embargo upon British vessels,
is surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of seques
tration existed, and the exercise of it was proposed.
This right, so far as it respects Great Britain, is for
ever surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of dis
criminating against British goods, in favor of those of
other nations, existed, and the exercise of it was pro
posed. This right is surrendered. Before the treaty,
the right of suspending commercial intercourse with
Great Britain existed, and was proposed to be exer
cised ; the exercise of that right is stipulated against
for a limited time, &c. All these are restrictions of
the exercise of the rights of national sovereignty, and
seem to me complete evidence of British interference.

These circumstances furnish two reflections. The
one is. that the British cabinet deem the measures

THE BRITISH TREATY. 387

proposed, to be more efficacious, than they have ge
nerally been represented to be in the United States ; and
hence, the extreme caution to stipulate against the
future exercise of them. The other is, that party sen
sations must have had great influence upon the extra
ordinary envoy of the United States, to induce his
consent to these great abridgments of the rights of
national sovereignty. The treaty not only contains
abridgments of the national rights, but changes the
municipal regulations of the United States : and how
have these things been effected ? — By the substi
tution of a foreign power in the place of the House
of Representatives. If the treaty-making power be
thus extensive, and if it be so absolutely obligatory,
as. to deprive the House of Representatives of the
right of judging as to the expediency of making the
provisions for its complete effectuation, of what use is
the House of Representatives as a distinct branch of
the government ? Will it not be a mere formal, and
not an efficient branch of the government ? An entire
new system of jurisprudence may thus be introduced
by treaty, and become obligatory upon the House
of Representatives — obligatory upon the nation.

Whenever the question, which necessarily results
from the unlimited scope given to the treaty-making
power, shall be presented to the people of the United
States, to wit : — Shall the House of Representatives
become a formal, or remain an efficient, branch of the
government; they will pause, before they will decide
upon its annihilation. Their love of liberty, their love
of their own interests, will check, for a moment, per
sonal affections, or antipathies : party sensations, state
jealousies will be disarmed, and the people will be
found right in their decision.

Even in the midst of the clamor of war and disunion,
which has been momentarily excited for a particular
object, the people cannot be led to such fatal extremi
ties, as the doctrine contended for would necessarily
produce. Much less will this be the case after they

M*R. GILES' SPEECH ON7

shall have been relieved from these causeless appre
hensions.

If therefore, the House should exercise a constitu
tional right of judging of the propriety of the object of
expenditure, and a refusal should be the result of their
judgment, I do not believe that it will produce that
fatal hostility of departments which would eventuate in
a total dissolution of the government ; but will be an
exercise of one of the salutary checks, provided in the
constitution, which, in my opinion, constitute its
merit, and not its reproach.

I shall now proceed to consider, whether a war with
Great Britain will be the probable consequence of a
refusal to make the necessary provision for carrying
the British treaty into effect. To my mind, there does
not appear to be the least ground for the clamor, which
has been excited from this suggestion. I believe that
Great Britain will make war upon the United States
whenever she deems it her interest to do so ; and that
the treaty would impose no restraint upon her, if she
thought her interest would justify the conduct. I also
believe, that if there should be no treaty with Great
Britain, she would not go to war with the United
States, unless her interest should dictate the measure.
In short, I believe, that Great Britain, like all other
nations, will make her interest the criterion of her
conduct in every question of peace or war.

If this opinion be well formed, the probability of
war may be tested by this question. Is it the interest
of Great Britain to make war upon the United States
in the relative situation of the two countries ? Great
Britain is now engaged in a war in which the govern
ment hazards every thing. She is at this moment en
gaged in an important enterprize against the French
West Indies. She is under the necessity of resorting
to the United States for sundry supplies for facilitating
the enterprize. The United States are the best com
mercial customer she has in the world. Under these
circumstances, what would be her inducement for

THE BRITISH TREATY, 3(J9

war ? What would be her inducements to avoid it ?
These questions furnish their own answers. The argu
ment of war is an argument of dependence. It is also
an argument which will last forever. If the fear of war
is now to influence our conduct against our judgments,
will not the same argument apply with double force
two years after the expiration of the present war, to in
duce a continuance of the treaty upon its present inju
rious conditions ?

As the argument of war is the chief instrument, by
which the treaty is pressed upon the people of the
United States, 1 beg the indulgence of the committee
in taking a retrospective view of this subject, and in
examining it with some minuteness. Whatever may
have been my opinion at the time of receiving the in
formation of the hostile order of the 6th of November,
I am now of opinion, that at that time, Great Britain
did meditate war against the United States, although
I believe there is no danger of it at present.

I believe too, that the neutrality, proclaimed by the
United States, does not in the smallest degree, influ
ence the conduct or disposition of Great Britain to
wards the United States in regard to war or peace,
but that the true explanation of her disposition will be
found in the course of events in Europe. On the
1st of February, 1793, France declared war against
the king of England, and the stadtholder of Holland,
and on the 7th of the same month against Spain.
France was then at war with the emperor of Germany,
and the king of Prussia, &c. A combination of most
of the despots of Europe had previously been formed,
(it is generally believed on the 21st July, 1791, at
Pilnitz,) for the purpose of crushing the revolutionary
spirit, which had appeared in France. The accession
of Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Portugal and some
of the Italian States to the combination already form
ed, made it the most formidable which has ever ap
peared in the history of modern times. The most
desperate and bloody war. of course, ensued, and im-

390 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

mediately succeeded the declaration of war against
Great Britain ; a series of successes took place, which
threatened the absolute subjugation of France.

On the 1st of March, the French sustained a consi
derable loss by the surprise of the vanguard of their
army, on the river Roer ; on the 13th, the rebellion of
La Vendee commenced; on the 18th, Dumourier was
defeated ; on the 20th, he abandoned his army ; on the
3d of April, his army retreated into France ; on the 4th,
Dumourier himself was outlawed; on the 13th, France
made a declaration against all interference with for
eign governments ; on the 22d of April, the President
issued the proclamation of neutrality; on the 3d of
May, the rebellion of Corsica commenced ; 29th, the
rebellion of the department of Loire ; 30th, the rebel
lion of the city of Lyons ; June 2d, thirty-two deputies
of the convention, generally called the Brissotines,
were arrested. About the same time, a rebellion com
menced in the departments ofBouches du Rhone, Cal
vados and Eure ; June the 8th, the first order by Great
Britain for seizure of neutral vessels bound to France,
with provisions, was issued. It is here to be remark
ed, that the impartial state of neutrality proclaimed by
the President of the United States, on the 22d of the
preceding April, was probably known to the British
cabinet; but, whilst flushed with these successes
in her crusade against liberty, the neutrality of the
United States could not protect them from the inva
sion of their neutral rights. On the 10th of July, Con-
de surrendered to the Combined Armies ; on the 27th,
Mayence, &c. ; on the 28th, Valenciennes ; at the end
of July, the Spaniards were in possession of Bellegrade,
Collioure, St. Elme, &c. and of the whole department
of the eastern Pyrenees, and part of the lower Pyre
nees. The Prussians and Austrians were possessed
of the lines of Weisemburg, Fort Vauban, £c. and
had blockaded Landau. The Piedmontese and Ha
noverians had made successful inroads into other
parts of France ; the royalists of La Vendee were in
possession of four departments.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 391

The royalists of the fourth were in possession of
Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and the departments of
Vaucluse and Rhone. On the 28th of August, all
Frenchmen were put in requisition ; on the 28th, Tou
lon surrendered to lord Hood, by the royalists ; on the
9th of September, the duke of York was defeated ; on
the llth, Lyons was subdued; on the 30th of October,
the Brissotines were executed. This was nearly the
state of the war upon the European continent, at the
time of issuing the hostile order of the 6th of November.
In this chronological statement of facts, may be found
the hostile disposition of Great Britain, widened by
that order against the United States. France, convuls
ed with intestine divisions, which extended to the very
heart of the convention, laboring under the most for
midable external pressure, was supposed to be an easy
prey to this terrible combination of despots : the com
bination having in view, as I believe, the total de
struction of liberty. Great Britain, possessed of the
most triumphant and formidable fleet, and guiding al
most implicitly the movements of this great combina-
nation, already anticipated the destruction of liberty in
France, and began to turn her attention towards the
same object in the United States. Hence, the order of
the 6th of November ; hence, the truce between Portu
gal and Algiers ; hence, the talk between lord Dor
chester and the Indians. These were all acts of hos
tility, and evidently produced by the state of things be
fore described. But what events followed these acts
of hostility ?

A complete reverse of fortune immediately succeed
ed. The duke of York had been already defeated.
On the 17th of December, Toulon was retaken by the
French ; on the 22d, the Austrian fortified camp near
Werth, was attacked and carried ; on the 24th and
25th, the army under the command of the duke of
Brunswick was defeated at Kellsburg, and the Austrian
army at Geisberg ; on the 26th, the lines of Weisem-
burg were forced, and the Austrian army defeated,

392 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON

On the 8th of January, the hostile order for seizing
neutral vessels was revoked, and on the 9th, lord
Grenville informed the American minister, that the
revocation of the order was to take away all pretext
from evil disposed persons amongst us, for indulging
their resentment against Great Britain. But, however
strongly this motive may have operated on the British
cabinet, it certainly was very strongly enforced by the
state of things upon the European continent, which
was not only changed, but completely reversed be
tween the 6th of November, 1793, and the 8th of Janua
ry, 1794. It is remarkable, that notwithstanding the
several changes in the conduct of Great Britain, to
wards the United States, they have been uniform in
their impartial neutrality towards Great Britain; of
course, the uniform disposition of the United States
towards Great Britain, could not have produced the
fluctuating disposition of Great Britain towards the
United States. Great Britain, in all probability,
supposed, that, in the intoxication of the combined
powers, from their early successes, her influence
might unite them in a war against the United States,
and perhaps, in the height of her presumption, she
might even have indulged the impious hope of regain
ing her dominion over them : but this sudden reverse
of fortune checked her ambitious enterprize. Proba
bly anticipating a speedy dissolution of the combina
tion, and having abandoned all prospects of engaging
them in her iniquitous project, and being unwilling to
add a new and formidable enemy to the one she al
ready had encountered, and even fearing the effects of
her previous hostilities, a sudden revolution is produc
ed in her conduct towards the United States: it is
then she is desirous of taking away all pretext from
" evil disposed persons," to indulge their resentment
against her: it is then the order of revocation is seen.
If, then, Great Britain was unwilling to encounter a
new enemy, in her then situation, will any change of
circumstances justify, at this time, the supposition of a

THE BRITISH TREATY. 393

change of disposition in Great Britain, respecting war
with the United States ? I believe not. Peace seems
to be more important to Great Britain, at this moment,
than at any time previously, during the whole period
of the war. The nation is desirous of peace, and dis
tressed for provisions. The combination, which in
dulged her presumptuous hopes, crumbled into dust.

Prussia is at peace with France, and almost at war
with Great Britain. Spain is at peace with France,
and hardly at peace with Great Britain. Holland is
at peace and in alliance with France, and at war with
Great Britain. Austria herself is almost exhausted,
and desirous of peace ; and the continuation of
French exertions and successes has excited the admi
ration and astonishment of the world. Are these the
circumstances which would justify apprehensions of
war from Great Britain ? And are the United States
to tremble at the sound of war from a nation thus cir
cumstanced ? I trust not. And for what cause is this
war to be produced ? Because the House of Repre
sentatives may deem it inexpedient to become the in
strument of giving efficacy to a bad bargain.

I verily believe, that the alarm of war is not serious.
I verily believe it is resorted to as an artificial instru
ment to effect a favorite object. For my part, I be
lieve the hazard so small, as not to constitute an item
in estimating the present question.

I believe, that Great Britain considers the United
States as a more important commercial connexion,
(particularly as it respects her views in the West In-
aies,) than some gentlemen seem to admit ; and I be
lieve also, that she views the United States more for
midable as an enemy. I infer these opinions from
the avidity with which this treaty seems to have been
received in that country, and particularly from an ex
pression in the speech of the king at the late meeting
of parliament. Two reflections were strongly im
pressed upon my mind from that speech. The one,
that the treaty is deemed a very advantageous one to
1. 50

394 MR, GILES' SPEECH ON

Great Britain, the other, that Great Britain has no ap
petite for war against the United States, in her present
situation.

Hence, I cannot believe, that there is the least pos
sible foundation for the suggestion of the fatal hostili
ty of departments of government, or of war with Great
Britain, as amongst the consequences resulting from a
refusal to make the necessary provisions for giving ef
ficacy to the treaty.

As the present treaty is incomplete, and as further
negociations are stipulated in the treaty itself, and in
the event of a decision either way, are expected ; I
think the most important consequences of the vote
will be these. If the House should refuse to make the
provisions for carrying the treaty into effect, the new
negociations will commence without the concessions
contained in the present treaty. If the provisions are
made, the further negociations will proceed under the
weight of the concessions already made, arid very little
melioration of the present conditions can be expect
ed, as the United States will have very little left to in
duce the melioration. And if no final adjustment of
differences ensues, the United States will at least con
tinue to possess all the rights attached to national
sovereignty.

Much has been said, and much unnecessarily said,
about intemperance and heats. I will appeal to the
recollection of the committee, whether there ever was
a more harmonious session than the present, until this
treaty was introduced into the House ; and, then,
whether its opponents have not discovered at least as
much coolness and deliberation as its advocates.

The treaty itself is the torch of discord, which has
been unfortunately thrown into the United States, and
it is extraordinary to observe, that those who have been
most instrumental in introducing it, impute intemper
ance to others for a firm and decisive opposition to it.
It is too much to suppose that the absolute sacrifice of
opinion is an obligation due to the embarrassments,
into which this treaty has thrown the United States.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 395

Upon the whole, I conscientiously believe the treaty
to be a bad one. I believe it contains the completes!
evidence of British interference in our internal affairs,
and has laid the foundation for the further extension of
British influence. It has restricted the exercise of
some of the important rights of national sovereignty.
It has voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United
States in the present European war, and destroyed all
pretensions to its character of impartiality. It has
not afforded protection to our neutral rights, which is
amongst its great objects ; and, in the adjustment of
the differences resulting from the inexecution of the
treaty of peace, it is unequal and unjust. All these im
portant circumstances considered, and when it is also
considered, that the British persevere in impressing
our seamen and seizing our vessels in violation of the
clearest rights of neutral nations, even since the signing
'of the treaty, I cannot consent to be the instrument of
giving it efficacy. I believe, that it is one of those ex
traordinary cases, which justify strong and extraordina
ry resistance.

SPEECH OF ALBERT GALLATIN,

ON

THE BRITISH TREATY,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, APRIL 26, 1796.

In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved)
as the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the
laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great
Britain : Mr. Gallatin spoke as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I WILL not follow some of the gentlemen, who have
preceded me, by dwelling upon the discretion of the
legislature; a question which has already been the
subject of our deliberations, and been decided by a so
lemn vote. Gentlemen, who were in the minority on
that question, may give any construction they please
to the declaratory resolution of the House ; they may
again repeat, that to refuse to carry the treaty into ef
fect, is a breach of the public faith, which they con
ceive as being pledged by the President and senate.
This has been the ground on which a difference of
opinion has existed since the beginning of the discus
sion. It is because the House thinks that the faith of
the nation cannot, on those subjects submitted to the
power of Congress, be pledged by any constituted au
thority other than the legislature, that they resolved,
that, in all such cases, it is their right and duty to con-

MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH, &c. 397

aider the expediency of carrying a treaty into effect.
If the House think the faith of the nation already pledg
ed, they cannot claim any discretion ; there is no
room left to deliberate upon the expediency of the
thing. The resolution now under consideration, is
merely " that it is expedient to carry the British treaty
into effect," and not whether we are bound by nation-
al faith to do it. I will, therefore, consider the question
of expediency alone ; and thinking, as I do, that the
House has full discretion on this subject, I conceive
that there is as much responsibility in deciding in the
affirmative, as in rejecting the resolution, and that we
shall be equally answerable for the consequences that
may follow from either.

It is, however, true, that there was a great differ
ence between the situation of this country, in the year
1794, when a negociator was appointed, and that ia
which we are at present ; and that consequences will
follow the refusal to carry into effect the treaty in its
present stage, which would not have attended a refu
sal to negociate, and to enter - into such a treaty.
The question of expediency, therefore, assumes before
us a different and more complex shape, than when be
fore the negociator,«tfre senate, or the President. The
treaty, in itself and abstractedly considered, may be
injurious; it may be such an instrument as, in the
opinion of the House, ought not to have been adopted
by the Executive ; and yet, such as it is, we may think
it expedient, under the present circumstances, to car
ry it into effect. I will, therefore, first take a view of
the provisions of the treaty itself, and in the next place,
supposing it is injurious, consider, in case it is not car^
ried into effect, what will be the natural consequence
of such refusal.

The provisions of the treaty relate either to the ad
justment of past differences, or to the future inter
course of the two nations. The differences, now ex
isting between Great Britain and this country, arose
either from non-execution of some articles qf the tyea-

398 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

ty of peace, or from the effects of the present Europe
an war. The complaints of Great Britain, in relation
to the treaty of 1783, were confined to the legal impe
diments, thrown by the several states in the way of the
recovery of British debts. The late treaty provides
adequate remedy on that subject ; the United States
are bound to make full and complete compensation
for any losses arising from that source, and every
ground of complaint on the part of Great Britain is
removed.

Having thus done full justice to the other nation,
America has a right to expect that equal attention
shall be paid to her claims arising from infractions of
the treaty of peace, viz. compensation for the negroes
carried away by the British ; restoration of the western
posts, and indemnification for their detention.

On the subject of the first claim which has been ob
jected to as groundless, I will observe, that I am not satis
fied that the construction given by the British govern
ment to that article of the treaty, is justified even by
the letter of the article. That construction rests on
the supposition that slaves come under the general
denomination of booty, and are alienated the moment
they fall into the possession of ah. enemy, so that all
those who were in the hands of the British when the
treaty of peace was signed, must be considered as
British, and not as American property, and are not in
cluded in the article. It will, however, appear, by re
curring to Vattel when speaking of the right of Postli-
minium, that slaves cannot be considered as part of
the booty which is alienated by the act of capture,
and that they are to be ranked rather with real pro
perty, to the profits of which only the captors are en
titled. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the
construction given by America, is that which was un
derstood by the parties at the time of making the trea
ty. The journals of Mr. Adams, quoted by a gentle
man from Connecticut, (Mr. Coit,) prove this fully ;
for when he says, that the insertion of this article was

THE BRITISH TREATY. 399

alone worth the journey of Mr. Laurens from London,
can it be supposed that he would have laid so much
stress on a clause, which, according to the new con
struction, now attempted to be given, means only that
the British would commit no new act of hostility —
would not carry away slaves, at that time in posses
sion of Americans ? Congress recognized that con
struction by adopting the resolution which has been
already quoted, and which was introduced upon the
motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and it has not
been denied that the British ministry, during Mr.
Adams' embassy, also agreed to it.

But when our negociator had, for the sake of peace,
waved that claim ; when he had also abandoned the
right which America had to demand an indemnifica
tion for the detention of the posts, although he had
conceded the right of a similar nature, which Great
Britain had for the detention of debts ; when he had
thus given up every thing which might be supposed to
be of a doubtful nature, it might have been hoped that
our last claim — a claim on which there was not, and
there never had been any dispute — the western posts
should have been restored according to the terms of
the treaty of peace. Upon what ground the British
insisted, and our negociator conceded, that this
late restitution should be saddled with new conditions,
which made no part of the original contract, 1 am at
a loss to know. British traders are allowed, by the
new treaty, to remain within the posts, without becom
ing citizens of the United States; and to carry on
trade and commerce with the Indians living within our
boundaries, without being subject to any control from
our government. In vain is it said, that if that clause
had not been inserted, we would have found it our in
terest to effect it by our own laws. Of this we are
alone competent judges ; if that condition is harmless
at present, it is not possible to foresee whether, under
future circumstances, it will not prove highly injurious ;
and whether harmless or not, it is not less a perma-

400 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

nent and new condition imposed upon us. But the
fact is, that by the introduction of that clause, by
obliging us to keep within our jurisdiction, as British
subjects, the very men, who have been the instruments
used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our
frontiers ; by obliging us to suffer those men to con
tinue their commerce with the Indians living in our
territory, uncontrolled by those regulations, which we
have thought necessary in order to restrain our own
citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great
Britain has preserved her full influence with the Indian
nations. By a restoration of the posts under that con
dition, we have lost the greatest advantage that was
expected from their possession, viz. future security
against the Indians. In the same manner have the
British preserved the commercial advantages, which
result from the occupancy of those posts, by stipulat
ing as a permanent condition, a free passage for their
goods across our portages, without paying any duty.
Another article of the new treaty, which is connect
ed with the provisions of the treaty of 1783, deserves
consideration ; I mean what relates to the Mississippi,
At the time when the navigation of that river to its
mouth, was, by the treaty of peace, declared to be
common to both nations, Great Britain communicated
to America a right, which she held by virtue of the
treaty of 1763, and as owner of the Floridas ; but since
that cession to the United States, England has ceded to
Spain her claim on the Floridas, and does not own, at
the present time, an inch of ground, either on the
mouth or on any part of that river. Spain now stands
in the place of Great Britain, and by virtue of the
treaty of 1783, it is to Spain and America, and not to
England and America that the navigation of the Mis
sissippi is at present to be common. Yet, notwith
standing this change of circumstances, we have re
peated that article of the former treaty in the late one,
and have granted to Great Britain the additional privi
lege of using our ports on the eastern side of the river.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 40i

without which, as they own no land thereon, they
could not have navigated it. Nor is this all. Upon a
supposition that the Mississippi does not extend so
far northward as to be intersected by a line drawn due
west from the Lake of the Wood, or, in other words,
upon a supposition that Great Britain has not a claim
even to touch the Mississippi, we have agreed, not
upon what will be the boundary line, but that we will
hereafter negociate to settle that line. Thus leaving
to future negociation what should have been finally
settled by the treaty itself, in the same manner as all
other differences were, is calculated for the sole pur
pose, either of laying the foundation of future disputes,
or of recognizing a claim in Great Britain on the waters
of the Mississippi, even if their boundary line leaves to
the southward the sources of that river. Had not that
been the intention of Great Britain, the line would have
been settled at once by the treaty, according to either
of the two only rational ways of doing it in conformity to
the treaty of 1783, that is to say, by agreeing that the
line should run from the northernmost sources of the
Mississippi, either directly to the western extremity of
the Lake of the Wood, or northwardly till it intersect
ed the line to be drawn due west from that lake. But, by
repeating the article of the treaty of 1783 ; by conced
ing the free use of our ports on the river, and by the
insertion of the fourth article, we have admitted, that
Great Britain, in all possible events, has still a right
to navigate that river from its source to its mouth.
What may be the future effects of these provisions,
especially as they regard our intercourse with Spain, it
is impossible at present to say ; but although they can
bring us no advantage, they may embroil us with that
nation ; and we have already felt the effect of it in our
late treaty with Spain, since we were obliged, on ac
count of that clause of the British treaty, to accept as
a gift and a favor the navigation of that river whieh we
had till then claimed as a right.

The seventh article of the treaty is intended to ad-

VOL. i. 51

402 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

just those differences which arose from the effects of
the present European war. On that article it may also
be observed, that whilst it provides a full compensation
for the claims of the British, it is worded in such a
manner, when speaking of the indemnification for
spoliations committed on .the American commerce, as
will render it liable to a construction very unfavorable
to our just claims on that ground. The commissioners,
to be appointed by virtue of that article, are to take
cognizance and to grant redress only in those cases
where, by reason of irregular or illegal captures or con
demnations, made under color of authority or commis
sions from the king of Great Britain, losses have been
incurred, and where adequate compensation cannot
now be actually obtained by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings. If Great Britain should insist
that, since the signing of the treaty, they had, by ad
mitting appeals to their superior courts, afforded a
redress by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings;
if those courts were to declare, that the captures,
complained of, were neither illegal, nor made under
color, but by virtue of authority or commissions from
the king, and if that construction should prevail with
the commissioners ; the indemnification which our
plundered merchants would actually receive, in conse
quence of the provisions of this article, wrould fall very
short of their expectations and of their just claims.
Yet this article, considering the relative situation of
the two countries, at the time when the negociation
took place, is as much as could reasonably have
been expected by America. When a weak nation has
to contend with a powerful one, it is gaining a great
deal, if the national honor is saved even by the shadow
of an indemnification, and by an apparent concession
on the part of the aggressor ; and however objectiona
ble the article might appear at first view, I am, on the
whole, satisfied with it.

The remaining provisions of the treaty have no con
nexion with past differences ; they make no part of

THE BRITISH TREATY.

the convention which was the avowed object of Mr.
Jay's mission: they apply solely to the future inter
course of the two nations as relating to commerce and
navigation ; and had they been entirely omitted, our
differences would have been nevertheless adjusted.
It is agreed on all hands, that, so far as relates to our
commerce with Great Britain, we want no treaty. The
intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties,
is more immediately necessary to England, and her
own interest is a sufficient pledge of her granting us at
all times a perfect liberty of commerce to her Europe
an ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in
order to obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and
some general security in our navigation.

The twelfth and thirteenth articles were obtained
by our negociator with a view to the first object. The
twelfth article, however, which relates to our inter
course with the West Indies, is found, upon examina
tion, to be accompanied by a restriction of such na
ture, that what was granted by Great Britain as a fa
vor, has been rejected by the senate as highly injuri
ous. The thirteenth article, which relates to the East
Indies, and remains a part of the treaty, is, like the
twelfth, conferring a favor limited by restrictions, and
so far as I can depend on the opinion of the best inform
ed judges on this subject, these restrictions put the
trade in a more disadvantageous situation than it was
before the treaty. As the West India article declares,
that wre shall not re-export any produce of those isl
ands to Europe, so the East India article, at the same
time that it grants us the privilege, which we enjoyed
before, and which we enjoyed because it was the in
terest of the East India company to grant it to us — that
of being admitted into the British sea-ports there —
prohibits our carrying any articles from thence to any
place except to America ; which regulation amounts
to a total prohibition to export East India articles to
China, or to obtain freights back to Europe ; and upon
the whole, I cannot help thinking, from what has fallen

404 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

on this floor, and what I have heard elsewhere, from
gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the
East India commerce had been as generally understood
in America as the West India trade, that so much
boasted of article would have met the same fate in
the senate with the twelfth article.

But if, leaving commercial regulations, we shall seek
in the treaty for some provisions securing to us the
free navigation of the ocean against any future ag-

fressions on our trade, where are they to be found ?
can add nothing to what has been said on the sub
ject of contraband articles : it is, indeed, self-evident,
that, connecting our treaty with England on that sub
ject with those we have made with other nations, it
amounts to a positive compact to supply that nation,
exclusively, with naval stores, whenever they may be
at war. Had the list of contraband articles been re
duced — had naval stores and provisions, our two
great staple commodities, been declared not to be
contraband, security would have been given to the
free exportation of our produce ; but instead of any
provision being made on that head, an article of a
most doubtful nature, and on which I will remark here
after, has been introduced. But I mean, for the pre
sent, to confine my observations to the important ques
tion of free bottoms making free goods. It was with
the utmost astonishment that I heard the doctrine ad
vanced on this floor, that such a provision, if admitted,
would prove injurious to America, inasmuch as, in
case of war between this country and any other na
tion, the goods of that nation might be protected by the
English flag. It is not to a state of war that the bene
fits of this provision would extend ; but it is the only
security which neutral nations can have against the
legal plundering on the high seas, so often committed
by belligerent powers. It is not for the sake of pro
tecting an enemy's property; it is not for the sake of
securing an advantageous carrying trade ; but it is in
order effectually to secure ourselves against sea ag-

THE BRITISH TREATY.

gressions, that this provision is necessary. Spolia
tions may arise from unjust orders, given by the gov
ernment of a belligerent nation to their officers and
cruizers, and these may be redressed by application
to, and negociation with, that order. But no com
plaints, no negociations, no orders of government it
self, can give redress, when those spoliations are
grounded on a supposition, that the vessels of the
neutral nation have an enemy's property on board, as
long as such property is not protected by the flag of
the neutral nation ; as long as it is liable to be cap
tured, it is not sufficient, in order to avoid detention
and capture, to have no such property on board.
Every privateer, under pretence that he suspects an
enemy's goods to be part of a cargo, may search, vex
arid capture a vessel ; and if in any corner of the do
minions of the belligerent power, a single judge can
be found inclined, if riot determined, to condemn, at
all events, before his tribunal ; all vessels so captured
will be brought there, arid the same pretence which
caused the capture will justify a condemnation. The
only nation who persists in the support of this doctrine,
as making part of the law of nations, is the first mari
time power of Europe, whom their interest, as they are
the strongest, and as there is hardly a maritime war
in which they are not involved, leads to wish for a con
tinuation of a custom, which gives additional strength
to their overbearing dominion over the seas. All the
other nations have different sentiments and a different
interest. During the American war, in the year 1780,
so fully convinced were the neutral nations, of the ne
cessity of introducing that doctrine of free bottoms
making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portu
gal, who was in a state of vassallage to, and a mere
appendage of Great Britain, united in order to es
tablish the principle, and formed for that purpose the
alliance known by the name of the armed neutrality.
All the belligerent powers, except England, recognized
and agreed to the doctrine. England itselfl was

406 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH OK

obliged, in some measure, to give for a while, a tacit
acquiescence. America, at the time, fully admitted
the principle, although then at war. (Mr. Gallatin
quoted, on this subject, the journals of Congress of the
year 1780, page 210, and of the year 1781, page 80,)
It has been introduced into every other treaty we
have concluded since our existence as a nation. Since
the year 1780, every nation, so far as my knowledge
goes, has refused to enter into a treaty of commerce
with England, unless that provision was inserted.
Russia, for that reason, would not renew their treaty,
which had expired in 1786 ; although I believe, that
during the present war, and in order to answer the ends
of the war, they formed a temporary convention, which
I have not seen, but which, perhaps, does not include
that provision. England consented to it, in her trea
ty with France, in 1788, and we are the first neutral
nation who has abandoned the common cause, given
up the claim, and by a positive declaration, inserted in
our treaty, recognized the contrary doctrine. It has
been said, that under the present circumstances, it
could not be expected that Great Britain would give
up the point; perhaps so ; but the objection is not, that
our negociator has not been able to obtain that prin
ciple, but that he has consented to enter into a treaty
of commerce, (which we do not want, and which has
no connexion with an adjustment of our differences
with Great Britain,) without the principle contended
for, making part of that treaty. Unless we can obtain
security for our navigation, we want no treaty ; and
the only provision which can give us that security,
should have been the sine qua non of a treaty. On the
contrary, we have disgusted all the other neutral na
tions of Europe, without whose concert arid assistance
there is but little hope that we shall ever obtain that
point ; and we have taught Great Britain, that we are
disposed to form the most intimate connexions with
her, even at the expense of recognizing a principle the
most fatal to the liberty of commerce, and to the secu
rity of our navigation.

THE BRITISH TREATY, 407

But, if we could not obtain any thing which might
secure us against future aggressions, should we have
parted, without receiving any equivalent, with those
weapons of self-defence, which, although they could
not repel, might, in some degree, prevent any gross at
tacks upon our trade — any gross violation of our rights
as a neutral nation? We have no fleet to oppose or
to punish the insults of Great Britain ; but, from our
commercial relative situation, we have it in our power
to restrain her aggressions, by restrictions on her
trade, by a total prohibition of her manufactures, or by
a sequestration of the debts due to her. By the
treaty, not satisfied with receiving nothing, not satis
fied with obtaining no security for the future, we have,
of our own accord, surrendered those defensive arms,
for fear they might be abused by ourselves. We have
given up the two first, for the whole time during which
we might want them most, the period of the present
war; and the last, the power of sequestration, we have
abandoned forever : every other article of the treaty of
commerce is temporary ; this perpetual.

I shall not enter into a discussion of the immorality
of sequestering private property. What can be more
immoral than war ; or plundering on the high seas,
legalized under the name of privateering ? Yet self-
defence justifies the first, and the necessity of the case
may, at least, in some instances, and where it is the
only practicable mode of warfare left to a nation, apo
logize even for the last. In the same manner, the
power of sequestration may be resorted to, as the last
weapon of self-defence, rather than to seek redress by
an appeal to arms. It is the last peace measure that
can be taken by a nation ; but the treaty, by declaring,
that in case of national differences it shall not be re
sorted to, has deprived us of the power of judging of
its propriety, has rendered it an act of hostility, and
has effectually taken off that restraint, which a fear of
its exercise laid upon Great Britain.

Thus it appears, that, by the treaty, we have promis-

408 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

ed full compensation to England for every possible
claim they may have against us, that we have aban
doned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we
have consented to receive the posts, our claim to
which was not disputed, under new conditions and re
strictions never before contemplated — that after
having obtained, by those concessions, an adjustment
of past differences, we have entered into a new agree
ment, unconnected with those objects, which have
heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two
nations ; and that, by this treaty of commerce and na
vigation, we have obtained no commercial advantage,
which we did not enjoy before, we have obtained
no security against future aggressions, no security in
favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we have
parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with
every power of restriction, with every weapon of self-
defence which is calculated to give us any security.

There is yet another article which stands by itself,
unconnected either with adjustment of past disputes,
or with commercial regulations ; I mean the ninth ar
ticle, which provides that British subjects now holding
lands in the United States, shall continue to hold them,
and may sell or devise the same ; and that neither they,
nor their heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect
the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto,
be regarded as aliens. I am not a lawyer, and, in
expressing an opinion, I mean nothing more than to
communicate my doubts, and ask for an explanation.
There would be no difficulty in finding the meaning of
the article, did it apply only to those British subjects,
who have acquired lands under the laws of the states ;
but the former connexion of this country with England,
renders the subject difficult to be explained, even by
men of legal abilities ; for its explanation must depend
on the consequences of a principle unknown to the
laws of England. The principle of the English law is,
that no subject can shake his allegiance, that is to
say, that no man who was once a citizen, can become

THE BRITISH TREATY. 409

an alien. Yet, by the effect of the revolution, British
subjects, who, before 1776, had a right to hold lands in
America, as part of the British empire, have become
aliens in the United States, and the effect of that alien
age upon their titles to such lands, and how far that,
effect is changed by the operation of the treaty, seem
to me to be questions of a very nice nature. I will,
however, beg leave to suggest what to me appears to
be the effect of the treaty. So far as lands have been
confiscated by the laws of any state, and those laws
carried into effect, and so far as such lands having
been considered as escheated, an office has been
found, and the escheat been completed, I conceive
the treaty will create no alteration; but where the
lands have not been confiscated, either because no
laws had been passed for that purpose, or because
they had not been carried into effect before the trea
ty of 1783, and where the legal formalities of finding
an office, &c. necessary to complete an escheat have
been neglected, it seems to me the treaty may operate
in three ways. Firstly, it will prevent any state from
completing an escheat by finding an office, &c. when
they have neglected doing it. Secondly, it will ena
ble the British subjects to sell or devise, and therefore
to convert their life estate into a fee-simple for ever.
And thirdly, it will enable those subjects to institute
suits in courts for the recovery of those lands, provid
ing them with a legal remedy, they had not before,
since their alienage would have been a sufficient bar
against bringing real actions. If the treaty may be
supposed to have that effect, its tendency so far as re
lates, not to private estates, but to the former pro
prietary estates, may prove vexatious and injurious to
several of the states. It will strengthen the proprie
tary claims of the Penn family, not in Pennsylvania,
but in the state of Delaware. It may have some ef
fect on the decision of the Fairfax claim in Virginia,
and even on such parts of the lands of Maryland,
VOL. i. 52

410 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

which have been sold, although formerly the property
of the Baltimore family, as vacant lands and not as
confiscated lands. In North Carolina, the proprieta
ry claim of the Grandville family, which includes the
best half of that state and of the southwestern territo
ry, may be revived by the treaty ; for although a law
has passed in that state to confiscate the lands of all
the British subjects who should be absent on a certain
day, yet the proprietary lands were not meant to be
comprehended within that provision ; the commission
ers, who were to sell the confiscated property, never
disposed of a single acre of the lands, which were
granted by another law of the state as vacant and not
as confiscated lands, without having been actually es
cheated to the state by an office being found or any
other formality whatever ; and they are even express
ly distinguished from land to be confiscated by the
very act passed for the purpose of confiscating. (Mr.
Gallatin here read the clause of the act he alluded
to.) Supposing, however, every thing I have said on
this subject as very doubtful, it is not less true that
this article, under an appearance of reciprocity, grants
a positive advantage to Great Britain without any
equivalent being given — is, if not an infraction, at least
a restriction over the legislative powers, and an excep
tion to the laws of the different states on a subject of
a delicate nature — may involve not only some of our
citizens, but even several of the states in complex law
suits and serious embarrassment, and although it may
thus create much mischief, can give us no possible
benefit.

From the review I have taken of the treaty, and the
opinions I have expressed, it is hardly necessary for
me to add, that I look upon the instrument as highly
injurious to the interests of the United States, and that
I earnestly wish it never had been made ; but whether
in its present stage, the House ought to refuse to car
ry it into effect, and what will be the probable conse-

THE BRITISH TREATY. 411

quences of a refusal, is a question which requires the
most serious attention, and which I will now attempt
to investigate.

Should the treaty be finally defeated, either new ne-
gociations will be more successful, or Great Britain
will refuse to make a new arrangement, and leave
things in the situation in which they now are, or war
will be the consequence. I will, in the course of my
observations, make some remarks on the last suppo
sition. I do not think that the first will be very pro
bable at present, and I am of opinion, that under the
present circumstances, and until some change takes
place in our own or in the relative political situation
of the European nations, it is to be apprehended, that,
in such a case, new negociations will either be reject
ed, or prove unsuccessful. Such an event might have
perhaps followed a rejection of the treaty even by the
senate or by the President. After the negociator, em
ployed by the United States, had once affixed his sig
nature, it must have become very problematical, un
less he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal
to sanction the contract he had made, would not
eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a
new treaty. I conceive that the hopes of obtaining
better conditions, by a new negociation, are much
less in the present stage of the business than they
were, when the treaty was in its inchoate form before
the Executive ; and in order to form a just idea of the
consequences of a rejection at present, I will contem
plate them upon this supposition, which appears to me
most probable, to wit, that no new treaty will take
place for a certain period of time.

In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, I
have already stated the advantages which, in my opin
ion, would result to the United States from the non-
existence of that instrument ; I will not repeat ; but
proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue,
that can be set off against those advantages.

As I am not sensible that a single commercial ad-

412 MR. GALLATiiVS SPEECH ON

vantage has been obtained by the treaty, I cannot
mention the loss of any, as a mischief that may at
tend its rejection. If, however, the East India article
is supposed to be beneficial, it must, on the other
hand, be conceded, that we have enjoyed every bene
fit arising from it for a number of years, without trea
ty, and consequently because it was the interest of the
East India company that we should enjoy them, and
that it is not probable, that circumstances will so far
change there, during the short period to which this ar
ticle is limited, as to induce that company to adopt a
different policy towards us.

The indemnification, to be obtained from Great Bri
tain for spoliations on our trade, if considered as a
national reparation for a national aggression, is cer
tainly, as I have already stated it, an important object
gained by the treaty. But, if it is to be viewed as a
money transaction, and its loss as a national loss of
money, it will be well to examine, whether in this point
of view, viz. of money, we should not be gainers, on
the whole, by not carrying the treaty into effect. I
have made no objections to that article of the treaty
which relates to British debts. Whatever the amount
may be, if it is just that we should pay them, it must
be just to pay that amount ; but when we are examin
ing the situation in which we should be, if we had no
treaty, when we are calculating the losses we are to
experience by obtaining no compensation for our
claims, it is right to consider the amount of those
claims, and to compare it with the probable amount
of the claims of the other party, and of the sums of
money which a non-execution of the treaty, and a re
fusal on the part of Great Britain to do us justice, to
indemnify us for our own losses and to enter into new
negociations, would justify us in withholding. That
subject has already undergone a full discussion, and I
will recall the attention of the committee only to the
demand of Great Britain for interest on the British
debts. It is well known that our courts have uniformly

THE BRITISH TREATY. 413

refused to allow to the British creditors the interest
which has accrued on their demands during the late
war, that is to say, during eight years. Although we
have contended that those decisions cannot be con
sidered as legal impediments, yet it has been insisted
by Great Britain that they are. The two govern
ments have come to issue on this point, as may be
seen by recurring to the printed correspondence of Mr.
Jefferson. It is one of the points to which the juris
diction of the commissioners must extend, since, on ac
count of the decisions of our courts, it is one of the
cases where compensation could not be obtained, and
has been refused by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings ; and for greater security, the commission
ers are, by the treaty, empowered to take into their
consideration all claims, whether of principal or inter
est, or balances of principal or interest. These com
missioners must be considered less as judges, than as
political agents, who will come with a determination to
support the claims, contended for by their respective
nations. They will, therefore, disagree on the subject
of war interest, and it will be left solely to the fifth
commissioner, that is to say, to lot, to decide whether
that interest shall be paid by the United States, or not.
Eight years interest amounts to one half of the whole
amount of debts due by America to Great Britain at
the beginning of the war ; for it must be remarked,
that this claim extends to all debts whether good or
bad, because it has been refused on all, and can be
recovered, by the ordinary course of judicial proceed
ings, on none. What those debts amount to, is very
uncertain. I have seen a variety of calculations on
this subject. If they are estimated, as they have been
by some, at five millions sterling, one half of them will
amount to more than twelve millions of dollars ; and
when we take into consideration the amount of princi
pal we shall have to pay, on the principles stated by a
gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,) his calcula
tion of near fifteen millions of dollars in the whole.

-

1J4 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

will not seem exaggerated. But even taking the
amount of those debts at the lowest estimate, the
amount of war interest, and of the principal we shall
have to pay, far exceeds the amount, which the most
sanguine among us expected to recover from the gov
ernment of Great Britain, by virtue of the treaty, on
account of the spoliations committed on our trade.

The only positive loss, therefore, which, in my opin
ion, will arise from our having no treaty, is that of the
western posts. I have already stated, that, surrendered
in the manner settled by the treaty, I conceive them to
be of very insignificant value in a commercial point of
view, and of very little use, if any, as a security against
the Indians ; for it must be remembered, that our own
laws, for the purpose of preserving peace with those
tribes, have enacted, under severe penalties, that our
own citizens shall, on no account whatever, cross over
the boundary line between them and ourselves, although
within the territory ceded to us by Great Britain, unless
they have special licenses from our government. It is,
therefore, our own opinion, that peace cannot be pre
served with the Indians, if ever our own citizens have
a free and uncontrolled intercourse with them. And
yet it is a positive condition of the treaty, that the
British traders, settled at Detroit and in the other
posts — men, who from habit, are attached to Great Bri
tain, and inimical to the United States ; who have given
repeated proofs of that enmity ; who possess an un
bounded influence amongst the Indians, and have been
the chief promoters of the Indian war — that these men
may remain there as British subjects, and that they and
all other British subjects may have the privilege for
ever to pass over that line, which we have forbidden
our citizens to cross, and may continue to carry on with
the Indians living within our territory, a free trade and
commerce uncontrolled by our laws and by those re
gulations, which we have imposed, or may impose on
our citizens ; in other words, we have agreed that these
men may preserve their baneful influence over the Indi-

THE BRITISH TREATY,

ans, and their allegiance to Great Britain; and we
may, therefore, expect that influence to be exerted
which suits the interest, and will be in conformity to
the directions of their sovereign. I must, therefore,
repeat, that as I think that at any time since 1789, we
might have had the posts without these conditions,
provided we had then agreed, as we have by the late
treaty, to make a compensation for the British debts,
I had much rather that we could again be placed in the
situation in which we were two years ago ; and I will
not hesitate to declare that, in my opinion, our claim
to the posts, and the chance we had to obtain them, by
negociation, in the year 1793, was better than their
possession upon the terms of the treaty. But as the
question now is not what would be best to be done, if
no treaty had been made ; as the negociator has put us
in a worse situation than we were before that treaty ;
as the subject of the present examination is the con
sequences that will follow, if no treaty at all* is made ;
and as one of those consequences will undoubtedly be
a further detention of the posts, and less hope to obtain
them in future, I will certainly agree that it is better
to have them, even encumbered with these conditions,
than not to have them at all. For although they may
not be of an immediate advantage, either as a com
mercial object or as giving security against the Indi
ans, their possession will enable us to prevent a further
extension of the British settlements within our terri
tory, and by forming settlements of our own, to acquire
by degrees sufficient strength in that quarter, to have
nothing to fear either from the British or from the
Indians.

The further detention of the posts, the national
stain that will result from receiving no reparation for
the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a
final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain,
are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a
rejection of the treaty ; and when to those considera
tions I add that of the present situation of this country.

416 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

of the agitation of the public mind, and of the advan
tages that will arise from union of sentiments, however
injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, how
ever repugnant it may be to my feelings, and perhaps
to my prejudices, I feel induced to vote for it, and will
not give my assent to any proposition which will imply
its rejection. But the conduct of Great Britain, since
the treaty was signed, the impressment of our seamen,
and their uninterrupted spoliations on our trade, espe
cially by seizing our vessels laden with provisions, a
proceeding which they may, perhaps, justify by one of
the articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as
may induce us to pause a while, in order to examine
whether it is proper, immediately and without having
obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolu
tion on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws
necessary to carry the treaty into effect.

The eighteenth article of the treaty, the provision
article, as it is called, has already been fully investi
gated by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,)
and I have been astonished, that those gentlemen who
have spoken in favor of the treaty, have given no di
rect answer to his remarks on that point. The second
clause of that article declares, that, " whenever pro
visions, becoming contraband according to the exist
ing laws of nations, shall for that reason be seized ;
the same shall not be confiscated, but the owners in
demnified." This clause of the article does not con
template provisions, or other articles not generally
contraband, when attempted to be carried to a besieg
ed place ; for the third clause of the same article pro
vides for the last mentioned case, and declares, " that a
vessel thus laden and sailing for a besieged place shall
not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, con
fiscated, unless after notice she shall again attempt to
enter;" which implies, that, in case of notice thus
given, provisions may be confiscated, whilst the pro
visions contemplated in the second clause are not to
be confiscated. It is, therefore, admitted by that arti-

THE BRITISH TREAT k". JIT

cle, that there are cases, other than that of provisions
and other articles not generally contraband, carried
to a besieged place, in which those provisions and ar
ticles may be regarded as contraband. It is admitting
a principle unknown to the laws of nations, infringing
our neutrality, destructive of our trade, and liable to
every misconstruction. The British have shown, what
they meant by provisions becoming contraband ac
cording to the existing laws of nations, when they have
taken our vessels laden with provisions, and given us
an indemnification of tender centum. So immediately
connected is that proceeding of the British, with this
article, that even the gentleman from, Connecticut,
(Mr. Hillhouse,) could not separate them in his own
mind ; and wherl speaking of the indemnification, we
are to obtain in such cases, as are contemplated by
the article, he repeatedly called it " ten per centum ;"
thinking only of the compensation, given by the British
in the case beforementioned, as one contemplated in
the article, since the words ten per centum are not to
be found in the clause itself. It is not, however, mate
rial at present to decide, whether a fair construction
of the article justifies the conduct of the British or not.
The fact is uncontroverted ; they still continue to im
press our seamen and to capture our vessels. If they
pretend to justify this conduct by the treaty, it becomes
necessary to obtain an explanation of the doubtful ar
ticles ; if there is nothing in the treaty to justify it,
their acts are acts of hostility, and an infraction of the
treaty ; and, even according to the doctrine of those
gentlemen, who think, that, in common cases, the
House has no discretion, the treaty once broken by
one party, is no longer binding on the other ; and it is
the right as well as the duty of this House, not to pro
ceed to pass the laws necessary to carry it into effect,
until satisfactory assurances are obtained, that these
acts shall cease, arid until Great Britain has evinced a
friendly disposition towards us.

Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty,

VOL. r. 53

418 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

they will not attend a postponement. To suspend our
proceedings, will not throw us into a situation, which
will require new negociations, new arrangements on the
points already settled and well understood by both par
ties. It will be merely a delay, until an explanation of
the late conduct of the British towards us may be ob
tained, or until that conduct may be altered. If, on the
contrary, we consent to carry the treaty into effect, under
the present circumstances, what will be our situation in
future ? It is by committing the most wanton and the
most unprovoked aggressions on our trade ; it is, by sei
zing a large amount of our property as a pledge for our
good behaviour, that Great Britain has forced the nation
into the present treaty. If by threatening new hostili
ties, or rather by continuing her aggressions, even
after the treaty is made, she can force us also, to carry
it into effect, our acquiescence will be tantamount to a
declaration, that we mean to submit in proportion to
the insults that are offered to us ; and this disposition
being once known, what security have we against
new insults, new aggressions, new spoliations, which
probably will lay the foundation of some additional de
mands on the part of the aggressor, and of some ad
ditional sacrifices on ours? It has been said, and
said with truth, that to put up with the indignities we
have received, without obtaining any reparation,
which will probably be the effect of defeating the trea
ty, is highly dishonorable to the nation. In my opin
ion, it is still more so, not only tamely to submit to a
continuation of these national insults, but while they
thus continue uninterrupted, to carry into effect the
instrument we have consented to accept as a repara
tion for former ones. When the general conduct of
Great Britain towards us, from the beginning of the
present war, is considered; when the means, by which
she has produced the treaty, are reflected on ; a final
compliance on our part, while she still persists in that
conduct, whilst the chastening rod of that nation is
still held over us, is. in my opinion, a dereliction of na-

THE BRITISH TREATY. 419

lional interest, of national honor, of national inde
pendence.

But it is said, that war must be the consequence of
our delaying to carry the treaty into effect. Do the
gentlemen mean, that if we reject the treaty, if we do
not accept the reparation there given to us, in order
to obtain redress, we have no alternative left but war ?
If we must go to war in order to obtain reparation for
insults and spoliations on our trade, we must do it,
even if we carry the present treaty into effect; for this
treaty gives us no reparation for the aggressions com
mitted since it was ratified, has not produced a dis
continuance of those acts of hostility, and gives us no
security that they shall be discontinued. But the ar
guments of those gentlemen, who suppose that America
must go to war, apply to a final rejection of the treaty,
and not to a delay. I do not propose to refuse the re
paration offered by the treaty, and to put up with the
aggressions committed; I have agreed, that that repa
ration, such as it is, is a valuable article of the treaty ;
I have agreed, that, under the present circumstances, a
greater evil will follow a total rejection of, than an ac
quiescence in the treaty. The only measure, which
has been mentioned, in preference of the one now un
der discussion, is a suspension, a postponement whilst
the present spoliations continue, in hopes to obtain
for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they
shall cease.

But is it meant to insinuate that it is the final inten
tion of those, who pretend to wish only for a postpone
ment, to involve this country in a war ? There has been
no period during the present European war, at which it
would not have been equally weak and wicked to adopt
such measures, as must involve America in the contest,
unless forced into it for the sake of self-defence ; but, at
this time, to think of it would fall but little short of
madness. The whole American nation would rise in
opposition to the idea ; and it might, at least have
been recollected, that war cannot be declared, except

120 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH OS

by Congress, and that two of the branches of govern
ment are sufficient to check the other in any supposed
attempt of this kind.

If there is no necessity imposed upon America to go
to war, if there is no apprehension she will, by her own
conduct, involve herself in one, the danger must arise
from Great Britain, and the threat is, that she will make
war against us if we do not comply. Gentlemen first
tell us that we have made the best possible bargain
with that nation ; that she has conceded every thing,
without receiving a single iota in return, and yet they
would persuade us, that she will make war against us
in order to force us to accept that contract so advanta
geous to us, and so injurious to herself. It will not be
contended, that a delay, until an amicable explanation
is obtained, could afford even a pretence to Great Bri
tain for going to war ; and we all know that her own
interest would prevent her. If another campaign takes
place, it is acknowledged, that all her efforts are to be
exerted against the West Indies. She has proclaimed
her own scarcity of provisions at home, and she must
depend on our supplies to support her armament. It
depends upon us to defeat her whole scheme, and this
is a sufficient pledge against open hostility, if the Eu
ropean war continues. If peace takes place, there
will not be even the appearance of danger ; the mo
ment, when a nation is happy enough to emerge from
one of the most expensive, bloody and dangerous wars,
in which she ever has been involved, will be the
last, she would choose to plunge afresh into a similar
calamity.

But to the cry of war, the alarmists do not fail to
add that of confusion ; and they have declared, even
on this floor, that if the resolution is not adopted, gov
ernment will be dissolved. Government dissolved in
case a postponement takes place ! The idea is too
absurd to deserve a direct answer. But I will ask
those gentlemen, by whom government is to be dis
solved ? Certainly not by those who may vote against

THE BRITISH TREATY, 421

the resolution; for although they are not perhaps for
tunate enough to have obtained the confidence of the
gentlemen who voted against them, still it must be
agreed, that those who succeed in their wishes, who
defeat a measure they dislike, will not wish to destroy
that government, which they hold so far in their hands,
as to be able to carry their own measures. For them
to dissolve government, would be to dissolve their own
power. By whom, then, I again ask, is the govern
ment to be dissolved ? The gentlemen must answer —
by themselves — or they must declare, that they mean
nothing but to alarm. Is it really the language of
those men, who profess to be, who distinguish them
selves by the self-assumed appellation of friends to
order, that if they do not succeed in all their mea
sures, they will overset government — and have all their
professions been only a veil to hide their love of pow
er, a pretence to cover their ambition? Do they
mean, that the first event, which shall put an end to
their own authority, shall be the last act of govern
ment ? As to myself, I do not believe that they have
such intentions; I have too good an opinion of their
patriotism to allow myself to admit such an idea a
single moment ; but I think myself justifiable in enter
taining a belief, that some amongst them, in order to
carry a favorite, and what they think to be an advan
tageous measure, mean to spread an alarm which they
do not feel; and I have no doubt, that many have con
tracted such a habit of carrying every measure of gov
ernment as they please, that they really think that eve
ry thing must be thrown into confusion, the moment
they are thwarted in a matter of importance. I hope,
that experience will in future cure their fears. But, at
all events, be the wishes and intentions of the members
of this House what they may, it is not in their power
to dissolve the government. The people of the -United
States, from one end of the continent to the other, are
strongly attached to their constitution; they would
restrain and punish the excesses of any party, of any

422 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON

set of men in government, who would be guilty of the
attempt; and on them I will rest as a full security
against every endeavor to destroy our union, our con
stitution, or our government.

But although I am not afraid of a dissolution, I feel
how highly desirable is a more general union of senti
ment ; I feel the importance of an agreement of opin
ion between the different branches of government, and
even between the members of the same branch. I
would sacrifice much to obtain that object ; it has
been one of the most urging motives with me to be in
favor, not of a rejection, but only of a suspension, of a
delay. But even, as a matter of opinion, it is difficult
to say, which mode of proceeding in this House, will
best accord with the general sentiments of the people.
So far as relates to the petitions before us, the number
of signatures against the treaty, exceeds, at the mo
ment I am speaking, the number of those in favor of
the treaty. Amongst the last, some have come from
one part of the union, where, it seems, both from the
expressions in the petition itself, and from the proceed
ings there, that a great inducement in the petitioners
to sign, was a wish to carry the treaty with Spain into ef
fect, as they appear to suppose that its fate depends
upon that of the British treaty. How they would act
upon the British treaty alone, and unconnected with
the other, I do not know, nor have I any evidence
which enables me to form an opinion thereon. All I
know is, that, until the Spanish treaty was made, they
were perfectly silent on the subject of the other treaty,
and never expressed an opinion upon it alone.

True it is, that an alarm, which has produced a com
bination, has lately taken place amongst the merchants
of this and some other sea-ports. What effect it will
have, and how successful they will eventually be, in
spreading this alarm amongst the people at large, I
cannot tell ; but there are circumstances accompany
ing their petition, which, in my opinion, much diminish
the weight they otherwise might have had. They

THE BRITISH TREATY. 423

have undoubtedly a right to petition upon every public
measure, where they think themselves interested, and
their petitions deserve equal regard with those of their
fellow-citizens, throughout the United States. But,
on this occasion, in order to create an alarm, in order
to induce the people to join them, in order to force
the House to pass the laws relative to the treaty, they
have formed a dangerous combination, and affected
to cease insuring vessels, purchasing produce, and
transacting any business. A gentleman from New
York, (Mr. Williams,) has been so much alarmed
himself, that he has predicted a fall in the price of eve
ry kind of produce, and seems indeed to have supposed
that the clamors of a few individuals here, would ei
ther put an end to, or satisfy the wants of those na
tions, which depend on us for supplies of provisions.
Yet, it has so happened, and it is a complete proof
that the whole is only an alarm, that whilst we have
been debating, the price of flour, which was of very
dull sale two weeks ago, has risen in equal proportion
with the supposed fears of the purchasers. I cannot
help considering the cry of war, the threats of a disso
lution of government, and the present alarm, as design
ed for the same purpose, that of making an impression
on the fears of this House. It was through the fear of
being involved in a war, that the negociation with
Great Britain originated; under the impression of
fear, the treaty has been negociated and signed ; a
fear of the same danger, that of war, has promoted its
ratification ; and now, every imaginary mischief, which
can alarm our fears, is conjured up, in order to de
prive us of that discretion, which this House thinks
they have a right to exercise, and in order to force us
to carry the treaty into effect.

If the people of the United States wish this House to
carry the treaty into effect immediately, and notwith
standing the continued aggressions of the British, if
their will was fairly and fully expressed, I would imme
diately acquiesce; but since an appeal has been made

424 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH, &c.

to them, it is reasonable to suspend a decision until
their sentiments are known. Till then I must follow
my own judgment ; and as I cannot see that any pos
sible evils will follow a delay, I shall vote against the
resolution before the committee, in order to make
room, either for that proposed by my colleague, (Mr.
M'Clay,) or for any other, expressed in any manner
whatever, provided it embraces the object I have in
view, to wit, the suspension of the final vote — a post
ponement of the laws necessary to carry the treaty
into effect, until satisfactory assurances are obtained,
that Great Britain means, in future, to show us that
friendly disposition, which it is my earnest wish, may
at all times, be cultivated by America towards all
other nations.

SPEECH OF FISHER AMES,

ON

THE BRITISH TREATY,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, APRIL 28, 1796.

In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved, as
the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the laws
necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great Britain ;
Mr. Ames spoke as follows :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I ENTERTAIN the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my
strength will hold me out to speak a few minutes.

In my judgment, a right decision will depend more
on the temper and manner, with which we may prevail
upon ourselves to contemplate the subject, than upon
the developement of any profound political principles,
or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If
we could succeed to neutralize our inclinations, we
should find less difficulty than we have to apprehend in
surmounting all our objections.

The suggestion, a few days ago, that the House
manifested symptoms of heat and irritation, was made
and retorted as if the charge ought to create surprise,
and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to
ourselves, and to the occasion. Let us not affect to
deny the existence and the intrusion of some portion
of prejudice and feeling into the debate, when, from the
very structure of our nature, we ought to anticipate the

VOL, i. 54

,>

426 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

circumstance as a probability, and when we are ad
monished by the evidence of our senses that it is the
fact.

How can we make professions for ourselves, and
offer exhortations to the House, that no influence
should be felt but that of duty, and no guide respected
but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally
every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears.

Our understandings have been addressed, it is true,
and with ability and effect ; but, I demand, has any
corner of the heart been left unexplored ? It has been
ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and, when that
attempt failed, to awaken the sensibilities that would
require none. Every prejudice and feeling has been
summoned to listen to some peculiar style of address :
and yet we seem to believe, and to consider a doubt
as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence
but that of unbiassed reason.

It would be strange, that a subject, which has roused
in turn all the passions of the country, should be dis
cussed without the interference of any of our own.
We are men, and therefore not exempt from those
passions : as citizens and representatives, we feel the
interests that must excite them. The hazard of great
interests cannot fail to agitate strong passions. We
are not disinterested; it is impossible we should be
dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may be
cloud the judgment, and, for a time, pervert the under
standing. But the public sensibility, and our own, has
sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation
to the debate. The public attention has been quick
ened to mark the progress of the discussion, and its
judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impres
sions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our
result will, I hope, on that account, be the safer and
more mature, as well as more accordant with that of
the nation. The only constant agents in political af
fairs are the passions of men. Shall we complain of
our nature — shall we say that man ought to have been

•

I

THE BRITISH TREATY. 427

made otherwise ? It is right already, because HE, from
whom we derive our nature, ordained it so ; and be
cause thus made and thus acting, the cause of truth
and the public good is the more surely promoted.

But an attempt has been made to produce an influ
ence of a nature more stubborn, and more unfriendly
to truth. It is very unfairly pretended, that the con
stitutional right of this House is at stake, and to be
asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative.
We hear it said, that this is a struggle for liberty, a
manly resistance against the design to nullify this as
sembly, and to make it a cypher in the government :
that the President and senate, the numerous meet
ings in the cities, and the influence of the general
alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of
a scheme of coercion and terror, to force the treaty
down our throats, though we loathe it, and in spite of
the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.

It is necessary to pause here and inquire, whether
suggestions of this kind be not unfair in their very
texture and fabric, and pernicious in all their in
fluences. They oppose an obstacle in the path of in
quiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely insur
mountable. They will not yield to argument ; for as
they were not reasoned up, they cannot be reasoned
down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in
truth's way, and built of materials that are indestruc
tible. While this remains, it is vain to argue ; it is
vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into the sea.
For, I ask of the men of knowledge of the world,
whether they would not hold him for a blockhead, that
should hope to prevail in an argument, whose scope and
object is to mortify the self-love of the expected prose
lyte ? I ask further, when such attempts have been
made, have they not failed of success ? The indig
nant heart repels a conviction that is believed to de
base it.

The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its
sense, nor more constant in its action, than what is

420 3IR. AMES' SPEECH ON

called in French, V esprit du corps, or the self-love
of an assembly ; that jealous affection which a body
of men is always found to bear towards its own pre
rogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion.
Why should we urge an unmeaning censure, or yield
to groundless fears that truth and duty will be aban
doned, because men in a public assembly are still
men, and feel that esprit du corps which is one of the
laws of their nature ? Still less should we despond or
complain, if we reflect, that this very spirit is a guar
dian instinct, that watches over the life of this assem
bly. It cherishes the principle of self-preservation,
and without its existence, and its existence with all
the strength we see it possess, the privileges of the
representatives of the people, and mediately the liber
ties of the people, would not be guarded, as they are,
with a vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing
constancy and courage.

If the consequences, most unfairly attributed to the
vote in the affirmative, were not chimerical, and
worse, for they are deceptive, I should think it a re
proach to be found even moderate in my zeal, to as
sert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and
whenever they shall be in real danger, the present oc
casion affords proof, that there will be no want of ad
vocates and champions.

Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and when
once roused, so difficult to pacify, that if we could
prove the alarm was groundless, the prejudice against
the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it
may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to
negative a measure, which was lately believed by our
selves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others,
to encroach upon the powers of the House. Princi
ples that bear a remote affinity with usurpation on
those powers will be rejected, not merely as errors,
but as wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a
post, where it is possible they may be wounded, and be
inflamed by the slightest suspicion of an assault.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 429

While these prepossessions remain, all argument is
useless. It may be heard with the ceremony of at
tention, and lavish its own resources, and the patience
it wearies to no manner of purpose. The ears may
be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and eve
ry pass to the understanding guarded.

Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear
for the rights of the House can be allayed, I will not
ask a hearing.

I cannot press this topic too far ; I cannot address
myself with too much emphasis to the magnanimity
and candor of those who sit here, to suspect their own
feelings, and, while they do, to examine the grounds
of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our per
suasion, that this body has an interest in one side of
the question more than the other, before we attempt
to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and
solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all,
we form our creed more from inclination than evi
dence.

Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it
be only by way of supposition, and for a moment, that
it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to
their alarms for the powers of this House ; that the
addresses, which have been made with such variety of
forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to
all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either
the effects or the instruments of artifice and decep
tion, and then let them see the subject once more in its
singleness and simplicity.

It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the
subject, to justify the passionate appeals that have
been made to us to struggle for our liberties and rights,
and the solemn exhortations to reject the proposition,
said to be concealed in that on your table, to surren
der them forever. In spite of this mock solemnity,
I demand, if the House will not concur in the measure
to execute the treaty, what other course shall we take ?
How many ways of proceeding lie open before us ?

130 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

In the nature of things there are but three ; we are
either to make the treaty, to observe it, or break it.
It would be absurd to say we will do neither. If I may
repeat a phrase already so much abused, we are under
coercion to do one of them, and we have no power, by
the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the conse
quences of a choice.

By refusing to act, we choose. The treaty will be
broken and fall to the ground. Where is the fitness
then, of replying to those who urge upon the House the
topics of duty and policy, that they attempt to force
the treaty down, and to compel this assembly to re
nounce its discretion and to degrade itself to the rank
of a blind and passive instrument in the hands of the
treaty-making power ? In case we reject the appropria
tion, we do not secure any greater liberty of action,
we gain no safer shelter than before from the conse
quences of the decision. Indeed they are not to be
evaded. It is neither just nor manly to complain that
the treaty-making power has produced this coercion
to act. It is not the art or the despotism of that pow
er, it is the nature of things that compels. Shall
we, dreading to become the blind instruments of pow
er, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere sounds
of imposture ? Yet that word, that empty word, coer
cion, has given scope to an eloquence, that, one would
imagine, could not be tired, and did not choose to be
quieted.

Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives
that are before us, and we shall scarcely fail to see, in
still stronger lights, the futility of our apprehensions
for the power and liberty of the House.

If, as some have suggested, the thing called a treaty,
is incomplete, if it has no binding force or obliga
tion, the first question is, will this House complete the
instrument, and, by concurring, impart to it that force
which it wants.

The doctrine has been avowed, that the treaty,
though formally ratified by the executive power of both

THE BRITISH TREATY. 431

nations, though published as a law for our own by the
President's proclamation, is still a mere proposition
submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable in
point of authority or obligation, from a motion for leave
to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary
legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so
dear to many, precisely for the reason, that in the con
tention for power, victory is always dear, is obviously
repugnant to the very terms as well as the fair interpre
tation of our own resolutions — (Mr. Blount's.) We
declare, that the treaty-making power is exclusively
vested in the President and senate, and not in this
House. Need I say, that we fly in the face of that
resolution, when we pretend, that the acts of that power
are not valid until we have concurred in them? It
would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the
most glaring contradiction, and to claim a share in a
power, which we at the same time disclaim as exclusive
ly vested in other departments.

What can be more strange than to say, that the
compacts of the President and senate with foreign
nations are treaties, without our agency, and yet those
compacts want all power and obligation, until they are
sanctioned by our concurrence ? It is not my design
in this place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this
part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take
it for granted, that this monstrous opinion stands in
little need of remark, and if it does, lies almost out of
the reach of refutation.

But, say those, who hide the absurdity under the
cover of ambiguous phrases ; have we no discretion?
and if we have, are we not to make use of it in judg
ing of the expediency or inexpediency of the treaty ?
Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot
surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of
duty.

If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not
in making the appropriations for the treaty, but in the
resolution itself — (Mr. Blount's.) Let us examine it

432 MH. AMES' SPEECH ON

more nearly. A treaty is a bargain between nations,
binding in good faith ; and what makes a bargain ?
The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that
the treaty power is not in this House; this House has
no share in contracting, and is not a party : of con
sequence, the President and senate alone, may make
a treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, how
ever, say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expedi
ency of treaties ; that is the constitutional province of
our discretion. Be it so. What follows ? Treaties,
when adjudged by us to be inexpedient, fall to the
ground, and the public faith is not hurt. This, incredi
ble and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The
amount of it, in plainer language, is this — the Presi
dent and senate are to make national bargains, and
this House has nothing to do in making them. But bad
bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable
consequence, do not bind the nation. When a national
bargain, called a treaty, is made, its binding force does
not depend upon the making, but upon our opinion
that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be
known and declared only by ourselves, when sitting in
our legislative capacity, the treaty, though ratified,
and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung up in sus
pense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the
bargain, and it falls, though, as we say, our faith does
not. We approve a bargain as expedient, and it stands
firm, and binds the nation. Yet, even in this latter
case, its force is plainly not derived from the ratifica
tion by the treaty-making power, but from our appro
bation. Who will trace these inferences, and pretend
that we have no share, according to the argument, in
the. treaty-making power ? These opinions, neverthe
less, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perse
verance. Is it possible that any man can be hardy
enough to avow them, and their ridiculous conse
quences ?

Let me hasten to suppose the treaty is considered
as already made, and then the alternative is fairly pre-

THE BRITISH TREATY, 433

settled to the mind, whether we will observe the treaty
or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question.

If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course
is obvious. Whatever is stipulated to be done by the
nation, must be complied with. Our agency, if it
should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And
I do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of con
duct for the legislative as for the courts of law.

I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the
coercion, so much dreaded and declaimed against, ap
pears at length to be no more than the authority of
principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen com
plain we are forced to act in this way, we are forced
to swallow the treaty. It is very true, unless we claim
the liberty of abuse, the right to act as we ought not.
There is but one right way open for us, the laws of
morality and good faith have fenced up every other.
What sort of liberty is that, which we presume to exer
cise against the authority of those laws ? It is for
tyrants to complain, that principles are restraints, and
that they have no liberty, so long as their despotism
has limits. These principles will be unfolded by
examining the remaining question :

SHALL WE BREAK THE TREATY?

The treaty is bad, fatally bad, is the cry. It sacri
fices the interest, the honor, the independence of the
United States, and the faith of our engagements to
France. If we listen to the clamor of party intemper
ance, the evils are of a number not to be counted, and
of a nature not to be borne, even in idea. The lan
guage of passion and exaggeration may silence that
of sober reason in other places, it has not done it
here. The question here is, whether the treaty be re
ally so very fatal as to oblige the nation to break its
faith. I admit that such a treaty ought not to be exe
cuted. I admit that self-preservation is the first law of
society, as well as of individuals. It would, perhaps,
be deemed an abuse of terms to call that a treaty,
which violates such a principle. I wave also, for the

VOL. i. 55

434 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

present, any inquiry, what departments shall represent
the nation, and annul the stipulations of a treaty. I
content myself with pursuing the inquiry, whether the
nature of this compact be such as to justify our refusal
to carry it into effect. A treaty is the promise of a
nation. Now, promises do not always bind him that
makes them.

But I lay down two rules, which ought to guide us in
this case. The treaty must appear to be bad, not
merely in the petty details, but in its character, princi
ple and mass. And in the next place, this ought to be
ascertained by the decided and general concurrence
of the enlightened public. I confess there seems to
me something very like ridicule thrown over the debate
by the discussion of the articles in detail.

The undecided point is, shall we break our faith ?
And while our country and enlightened Europe, await
the issue with more than curiosity, we are employed
to gather piecemeal, and article by article, from the
instrument, a justification for the deed by trivial calcu
lations of commercial profit and loss. This is little
worthy of the subject, of this body, or of the nation. If
the treaty is bad, it will appear to be so in its mass.
Evil to a fatal extreme, if that be its tendency, requires
no proof; it brings it. Extremes speak for themselves
arid make their own law. What if the direct voyage
of American ships to Jamaica with horses or lumber,
might net one or two per centum more than the present
trade to Surinam ; would the proof of the fact avail any
thing in so grave a question as the violation of the
public engagements?

It is in vain to allege, that our faith, plighted to
France, is violated by this new treaty. Our prior trea
ties are expressly saved from the operation of the Bri
tish treaty. And what do those mean who say, that
our honor was forfeited by treating at all, and especial
ly by such a treaty ? Justice, the laws and practice
of nations, a just regard for peace as a duty to man
kind, and the known wish of our citizens, as well as that

THE BRITISH TREATY. 435

self-respect which required it of the nation to act with
dignity and moderation, all these forbade an appeal to
arms, before we had tried the effect of negociation.
The honor of the United States was saved, not forfeit
ed, by treating. The treaty itself, by its stipulations
for the posts, for indemnity, and for a due observation
of our neutral rights, has justly raised the character of
the nation. Never did the name of America appear in
Europe with more lustre than upon the event of ratify
ing this instrument. The fact is of a nature to over
come all contradiction.

But the independence of the country — we are co
lonists again. This is the cry of the very men who tell
us, that France will resent our exercise of the rights of
an independent nation to adjust our wrongs with an
aggressor, without giving her the opportunity to say,
those wrongs shall subsist and shall not be adjusted.
This is an admirable specimen of the spirit of inde
pendence. The treaty with Great Britain, it cannoi
be denied, is unfavorable to this strange sort of in
dependence.

Few men of any reputation for sense, among those
who say the treaty is bad, will put that reputation so
much at hazard as to pretend that it is so extremely bad
as to warrant and require a violation of the public
faith. The proper ground of the controversy, there
fore, is really unoccupied by the opposers of the trea
ty ; as the very hinge of the debate is on the point, not
of its being good or otherwise, but whether it is intole
rably and fatally pernicious. If loose and ignorant
declaimers have any where asserted the latter idea, it
is too extravagant, and too solidly refuted, to be re
peated here. Instead of any attempt to expose it still
further, I will say, and I appeal with confidence to the
candor of many opposers of the treaty to acknow
ledge, that if it had been permitted to go into opera
tion silently, like our other treaties, so little alteration
of any sort would be made by it in the great mass of
our commercial and agricultural concerns, that it

436 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

would not be generally discovered by its effects to be
in force, during the term for which it was contracted.
I place considerable reliance on the weight men of
candor will give to this remark, because I believe it to
be true, and little short of undeniable. When the
panic dread of the treaty shall cease, as it certainly
must, it will be seen through another medium. Those,
who shall make search into the articles for the cause
of their alarms, will be so far from finding stipulations
that will operate fatally, they will discover few of them
that will have- any lasting operation at all. Those,
which relate to the disputes between the two coun
tries, will spend their force upon the subjects in dispute,
and extinguish them. The commercial articles are
more of a nature to confirm the existing state of
things, than to change it. The treaty alarm was
purely an address to the imagination and prejudices of
the citizens, and not on that account the less formida
ble. Objections that proceed upon error, in fact or
calculation, may be traced arid exposed ; but such as
are drawn from the imagination or addressed to it,
elude definition, and return to domineer over the mind,
after having been banished from it by truth.

I will not so far abuse the momentary strength that
is lent to me by the zeal of the occasion, as to enlarge
upon the commercial operation of the treaty. I pro
ceed to the second proposition, which I have stated as
indispensably requisite to a refusal of the performance
of a treaty — will the state of public opinion justify the
deed ?

No government, not even a despotism, will break its
faith without some pretext, and it must be plausible, it
must be such as will carry the public opinion along
with it. Reasons of policy, if not of morality, dissuade
even Turkey and Algiers from breaches of treaty in
mere wantonness of perfidy, in open contempt of the
reproaches of their subjects. Surely, a popular gov
ernment will not proceed more arbitrarily, as it is more
free ; nor with less shame or scruple in proportion as it

THE BRITISH TREATY. 437

has better morals. It will not proceed against the
faith of treaties at all, unless the strong and decided
sense of the nation shall pronounce, not simply that the
treaty is not advantageous, but that it ought to be broken
and annulled. Such a plain manifestation of the sense
of the citizens is indispensably requisite ; first, because
if the popular apprehensions be not an infallible crite
rion of the disadvantages of the instrument, their ac
quiescence in the operation of it is an irrefragable
proof, that the extreme case does not exist, which alone
could justify our setting it aside.

In the next place, this approving opinion of the citi
zens is requisite, as the best preventive of the ill conse
quences of a measure always so delicate, and often so
hazardous. Individuals would, in that case at least,
attempt to repel the opprobrium that would be thrown
upon Congress by those who will charge it with per
fidy. They would give weight to the testimony of
facts, and the authority of principles, on which the
government would rest its vindication. And if war
should ensue upon the violation, our citizens would
not be divided from their government, nor the ardor of
their courage be chilled by the consciousness of injus
tice, and the sense of humiliation, that sense which
makes those despicable who know they are despised.

I add a third reason, and with me it has a force that
no words of mine can augment, that a government,
wantonly refusing to fulfil its engagements, is the cor-
rupter of its citizens. Will the laws continue to pre
vail in the hearts of the people, when the respect that
gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators ?
How shall we punish vice while we practise it ? We
have not force, and vain will be our reliance, when we
have forfeited the resources of opinion. To weaken
government and to corrupt morals are effects of a
breach of faith not to be prevented ; and from effects
they become causes, producing, with augmented ac
tivity, more disorder and more corruption ; order will
be disturbed and the life of the public liberty shortened.

438 MR. AMES* SPEECH ON

And who, I would inquire, is hardy enough to pre
tend, that the public voice demands the violation of
the treaty ? The evidence of the sense of the great
mass of the nation is often equivocal ; but when was
it ever manifested with more energy and precision
than at the present moment ? The voice of the peo
ple is raised against the measure of refusing the ap
propriations. If gentlemen should urge, nevertheless,
that all this sound of alarm is a counterfeit expression
of the sense of the public, I will proceed to other proofs.
If the treaty is ruinous to our commerce, what has
blinded the eyes of the merchants and traders ?
Surely they are not enemies to trade, or ignorant of
their own interests. Their sense is not so liable to be
mistaken as .that of a nation, and they are almost
unanimous. The articles, stipulating the redress of
our injuries by captures on the sea, are said to be de
lusive. By whom is this said ? The very men, whose
fortunes are staked upon the competency of that redress,
say no such thing. They wait with anxious fear lest
you should annul that compact on which all their
hopes are rested.

Thus we offer proof, little short of absolute demon
stration, that the voice of our country is raised not to
sanction, but to deprecate the non-performance of our
engagements. It is not the nation, it is one, and but
one branch of the government that proposes to reject
them. With this aspect of things, to reject is an act
of desperation.

I shall be asked, why a treaty so good in some ar
ticles, and so harmless in others, has met with such
unrelenting opposition ; and how the clamors against
it from New Hampshire to Georgia, can be accounted
for ? The apprehensions so extensively diffused, on
its first publication, will be vouched as proof, that the
treaty is bad, and that the people hold it in abhorrence.

I am not embarrassed to find the answer to this in
sinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious ope
ration? could not have created all the fears that were

THE BRITISH TREATY. 439

felt or affected. The alarm spread faster than the
publication of the treaty. There were more critics
than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined,
those fears have subsided.

The movements of passion are quicker than those
of the understanding. We are to search for the
causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this
obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the
state of the public feeling.

The fervor of the revolution war had not entirely
cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensi
bilities of our citizens were quickened with a tenfold
vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irrita
tion. One of the two great nations of Europe under
went a change which has attracted all our wonder,
and interested all our sympathies. Whatever they
did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went
to excess. These impressions met with much to in
flame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspa
pers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusi
asm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism, and
that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we
could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of
all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant
in both. It is my right to avow that passions so impe
tuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without
disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting
at risk the peace and precious interests of our coun
try. They were hazarded. I will not exhaust the
little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by
whom, or by what means they were rescued from the
sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs ?
They are here, they are every where. No one has
forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has for
gotten the captures of our vessels, and the imminent
danger of war. The nation thirsted not merely for
reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs,
and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power
of any words of compact, or could any parchment with

440 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

its seals prevail at once to tranquillize the people ? It
was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom
popular, and least of all when the stipulations of amity
succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best
treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke re
sentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure
to disappoint extravagant expectations as to disarm
extravagant passions. Of the latter, hatred is one
that takes no bribes. They, who are animated by the
spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility
of profit.

Why do they complain, that the West Indies are not
laid open ? Why do they lament, that any restriction
is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies ?
Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist
upon more, more will be accomplished ? Let us be
explicit — more would not satisfy. If all was granted,
would riot a treaty of amity with Great Britain, still be
obnoxious ? Have we not this instant heard it urged
against our envoy, that he was not ardent enough in
his hatred of Great Britain ? A treaty of amity is con
demned because it was not made by a foe, and in the
spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant,
repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should
be made with the enemy of France. No treaty, ex
claim others, should be made with a monarch or a
despot : there will be no naval security while those
sea-robbers domineer on the ocean : their den must
be destroyed : that nation must be extirpated.

I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings
such as these, we do not pant for treaties. Such pas
sions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing,
but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left
king George his island, it would not answer ; not if he
stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the
world ought to rejoice if Britain was sunk in the sea ;
if where there are now men and wealth and laws and
liberty, there was no more than a sand bank for the
sea-monsters to fatten on ; a space for the storms of
the ocean to mingle in conflict.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 441

1 object nothing to the good sense or humanity of all
this. I yield the point, that this is a proof that the age
of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let
it be patriotism, if you will, but it is no indication that
any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not
to overcome the objections to the terms ; it is to re-
strain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with
the party.

Having alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am,
not unwilling to explain myself; I affect no conceal
ment, and I have practised none. While those two
great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels,
they will both equally desire, arid with any chance of
success, equally endeavor to create an influence in
America. Each will exert all its arts to range our
strength on its own side. How is this to be effected ?
Our government is a democratical republic. It will
not be disposed to pursue a system of politics, in sub
servience to either France or England, in opposition
to the general wishes of the citizens : and, if Congress
should adopt such measures, they would not be pur
sued long, nor with much success. From the nature
of our government, popularity is the instrument of for
eign influence. Without it, all is labor and disap
pointment. With that mighty auxiliary, foreign in
trigue finds agents, not only volunteers, but competi
tors for employment, and any thing like reluctance is
understood to be a crime. Has Britain this means of
influence ? Certainly not. If her gold could buy ad
herents, their becoming such would deprive them of
all political power and importance. They would not
wield popularity as a 'weapon, but would fall under it.
Britain has no influence, and for the reasons just given
can have none. She has enough ; and God forbid she
ever should have more. France, possessed of popular
enthusiasm, of party attachments, has had, and still
has too much influence on our politics — any foreign
influence is too much, and ought to be destroyed. I
detest the man and disdain the spirit, that can bend to

VOL. i. 56

442 MK. AMES' SPEECH O!s

a mean subserviency to the views of any nation. It is
enough to be Americans. That character compre
hends our duties, and ought to engross our attach
ments.

But I would not be misunderstood. I would not
break the alliance with France ; I would not have
the connexion between the two countries even a cold
one. It should be cordial and sincere ; but I would
banish that influence, which, by acting on the passions
of the citizens, may acquire a power over the govern
ment.

It is no bad proof of the merit of the treaty, that, un
der all these unfavorable circumstances, it should be
so well approved. In spite of first impressions, in spite
of misrepresentation and party clamor, inquiry has
multiplied its advocates ; and at last the public senti
ment appears to me clearly preponderating to its side.

On the most careful review of the several branches
of the treaty, those which respect political arrange
ments, the spoliations on our trade, and the regula
tion of commerce, there is little to be apprehended.
The evil, aggravated as it is by party, is little in de
gree, and short in duration ; two years from the end
of the European war. I ask, and I would ask the
question significantly, what are the inducements to
reject the treaty ? What great object is to be gained,
and fairly gained by it ? If, however, as to the merits
of the treaty, candor should suspend its approbation,
what is there to hold patriotism a moment in balance,
as to the violation of it ? Nothing ; I repeat confident
ly, nothing. There is nothing before us in that event
but confusion and dishonor.

But before I attempt to develope those conse
quences, I must put myself at ease by some explanation.

Nothing is worse received among men than the
confutation of their opinions ; and, of these, none are
more dear or more vulnerable than their political opin
ions. To say that a proposition leads to shame and
ruin, is almost equivalent to a charge that the support-

THE BRITISH TREAT*. U'J

ers of it intend to produce them. I throw myself upon
the -magnanimity and candor of those who hear me.
I cannot do justice to my subject without exposing, as
forcibly as I can, all the evils in prospect. I readily
admit, that in every science, and most of all in politics,
error springs from other sources than the want of sense
or integrity. I despise indiscriminate professions of
candor and respect. There are individuals opposed to
me of whom I am not bound to say any thing. But of
many, perhaps of a majority of the opposers of the appro
priations, it gives me pleasure to declare, they possess
my confidence and regard. There are among them
individuals for whom I entertain a cordial affection.

The consequences of refusing to make provision for
the treaty are not all to be foreseen. By rejecting, vast
interests are committed to the sport of the winds.
Chance becomes the arbiter of events, and it is forbidden
to human foresight to count their number, or measure
their extent. Before we resolve to leap into this abyss,
so dark and so profound, it becomes us to pause and re
flect upon such of the dangers as are obvious and inevi
table. If this assembly should be wrought into a tem
per to defy these consequences, it is vain, it is decep
tive, to pretend that we can escape them. It is worse
than weakness to say, that as to public faith our vote
has already settled the question. Another tribunal
than our own is already erected. The public opinion,
not merely of our own country, but of the enlightened
world, will pronounce a judgment that we cannot resist,
that we dare not even affect to despise.

Well may I urge it to men, who know the worth of
character, that it is no trivial calamity to have it con
tested. Refusing to do what the treaty stipulates shall
be done, opens the controversy. Even if we should
stand justified at last, a character, that is vindicated, is
something worse than it stood before, unquestioned
and unquestionable. Like the plaintiff in an action of
slander, we recover a reputation disfigured by invective,
and even tarnished by too much handling. In the

J4i JJR. AMES' SPEECH O\

combat tor the honor of the nation, it may receive some
wounds, which, though they should heal, will leave scars.
I need not say, for surely the feelings of every bosom
have anticipated, that we cannot guard this sense of
national honor, this everlasting fire which alone keeps
patriotism warm in the heart, with a sensibility too
vigilant and jealous.

If, by executing the treaty, there is no possibility of
dishonor, and if, by rejecting, there is some foundation
for doubt, and for reproach, it is not for me to measure,
it is for your own feelings to estimate the vast distance,
that divides the one side of the alternative from the
other.

If therefore, we should enter on the examination
of the question of duty and obligation with some
feelings of prepossession, 1 do not hesitate to say, they
are such as we ought to have : it is an after inquiry to
determine whether they are such as ought finally to be
resisted.

The resolution (Mr. Blount's) is less explicit than
(he constitution. Its patrons should have made it
more so, if possible, if they had any doubts, or meant
the public should entertain none. Is it the sense of
that vote, as some have insinuated, that we claim a
right, for any cause or no cause at all but our own
•sovereign will and pleasure, to refuse to execute, and
thereby to annul the stipulations of a treaty — that
we have nothing to regard but the expediency or inex
pediency of the measure, being absolutely free from
all obligation by compact to give it our sanction ? A
doctrine so monstrous, so shameless, is refuted by
being avowed. There are no words, you could express
it in, that would not convey both confutation and re
proach. It would outrage the ignorance of the tenth
century to believe, it would baffle the casuistry of a
papal council to vindicate. I venture to say it is im
possible : no less impossible than that we should desire
to assert the scandalous privilege of being free after
we have pledged our honor.

THE BRITISH TREATY. .j 1;,

It is doing injustice to the resolution of the House,
(which I dislike on many accounts) to strain the in
terpretation of it to this extravagance. The treaty-
making power is declared by it to be vested exclusive
ly in the President and senate. Will any man in his
senses affirm, that it can be a treaty before it has any
binding force or obligation ? If it has no binding force
upon us, it has none upon Great Britain. Let candor
answer, is Great Britain free from any obligation to de
liver the posts in June, and are we willing to signify to
her that we think so ? Is it with that nation a question
of mere expediency or inexpediency to do it, and that
too, even after we have done all that depends upon us
to give the treaty effect ? No sober man believes this.
No one, who would not join in condemning the faithless
proceedings of that nation, if such a doctrine should
be avowed and carried into practice — and why com
plain, if Great Britain is not bound? There can
be no breach of faith where none is plighted. I shall
be told that she is bound. Surely it follows, that if she is
bound to performance, our nation is under a similar
obligation ; if both parties be not obliged, neither is
obliged, it is no compact, no treaty. This is a dictate
of law and common sense, and every jury in the coun
try has sanctioned it on oath.

It cannot be a treaty and yet no treaty, a bargain
yet no promise ; if it is a promise, I am not to read a
lecture to show why an honest man will keep his pro
mise.

The reason of the thing, and the words of the reso
lution of the House, imply, that the United States en
gage their good faith in a treaty. We disclaim, say
the majority, the treaty-making power ; we of course
disclaim (they ought to say,) every doctrine, that would
put a negative upon the doings of that power. It is the
prerogative of folly alone to maintain both sides of a
proposition.

Will any man affirm, the American nation is engag
ed by good faith to the British nation ; but that en-

MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

gagement is nothing to this House ? Such a man is
not to be reasoned with. Such a doctrine is a coat of
mail, that would turn the edge of all the weapons of
argument, if they were sharper than a sword. Will it
be imagined, the king of Great Britain and the Presi
dent are mutually bound by the treaty, but the two na
tions are free ?

It is one thing for this House to stand in a position
that presents an opportunity to break the faith of
America, and another to establish a principle that will
justify the deed.

We feel less repugnance to believe that any other
body is bound by obligation than our own. There is
not a man here who does riot say that Great Britain
is bound by treaty. Bring it nearer home. Is the se
nate bound ? Just as much as the House and no more.
Suppose the senate, as part of the treaty power, by
ratifying a treaty on Monday, pledges the public faith
to do a certain act. Then, in their ordinary capacity
as a branch of the legislature, the senate is called
upon on Tuesday to perform that act, for example, an
appropriation of money — is the senate, (so lately un
der obligation,) now free to agree or disagree to the
act ? If the twenty ratifying senators should rise up
and avow this principle, saying, we struggle for liberty,
we will not be cyphers, mere puppets, and give their
votes accordingly, would not shame blister their
tongues, would not infamy tingle in their ears — would
not their country, which they had insulted and dis
honored, though it should be silent and forgiving, be a
revolutionary tribunal, a rack on which their own re
flections would stretch them ?

This, sir, is a cause that would be dishonored and
betrayed, if I contented myself with appealing only to
the understanding. It is too cold, and its processes are
too slow for the occasion. I desire to thank God,
that since he has given me an intellect so fallible, he
has impressed upon me an instinct that is sure. On a
question of shame and honor, reasoning is sometimes

THE BRITISH TREATY, 447

useless, and worse. I feel the decision in my pulse — if
it throws no light upon the brain, it kindles a fire at the
heart.

It is not easy to deny, it is impossible to doubt, that
a treaty imposes an obligation on the American na
tion. It would be childish to consider the President
and senate obliged, and the nation and the House free.
What is the obligation—perfect or imperfect ? If
perfect, the debate is brought to a conclusion. If im
perfect, how large a part of our faith is pawned ? Is
half our honor put at risk, and is that half too cheap
to be redeemed? How long has this hair-splitting
subdivision of good faith been discovered, and why
has it escaped the researches of the writers on the law
of nations ? Shall we add a new chapter to that law,
or insert this doctrine as a supplement to, or more pro
perly a repeal of the ten commandments ?

The principles and the example of the British par
liament have been alleged to coincide with the doc
trine of those who deny the obligation of the treaty.
1 have not had the health to make very laborious re
searches into this subject. I will, however, sketch my
view of it. Several instances have been noticed, but
the treaty of Utrecht is the only one that seems to be
at all applicable. It has been answered, that the con
duct of parliament in that celebrated example, affords
no sanction to our refusal to carry the treaty into ef
fect. The obligation of the treaty of Utrecht has been
understood to depend on the concurrence of parlia
ment, as a condition to its becoming of force. If that
opinion should, however, appear incorrect, still the
precedent proves, not that the treaty of Utrecht want
ed obligation, but that parliament disregarded it ; a
proof, not of the construction of the treaty-making
power, but of the violation of a national engagement.
Admitting still further, that the parliament claimed and
exercised its power, not as a breach of faith, but as a
matter of constitutional right, I reply, that the analogy
between parliament and Congress totally fails. The

448 MR. AMESJ SPEECH ON

nature of the British government may require and
justify a course of proceeding in respect to treaties, that
is unwarrantable here.

The British government is a mixed one. The king,
at the head of the army, of the hierarchy, with an am
ple civil list, hereditary, unresponsible, and possessing
the prerogative of peace and war, may be properly ob
served with some jealousy in respect to the exercise of
the treaty-making power. It seems, and perhaps from
a spirit of caution on this account, to be their doctrine,
that treaties bind the nation, but are not to be regard
ed by the courts of law, until laws have been passed
conformably to them. Our concurrence has expressly
regulated the matter differently. The concurrence of
parliament is necessary to treaties becoming laws in
England, gentlemen say ; and here the senate, repre
senting the states, must concur in treaties. The con
stitution and the reason of the case, make the concur
rence of the senate as effectual as the sanction of par
liament, and why not? The senate is an elective
body, and the approbation of a majority of the states
affords the nation as ample security against the abuse
of the treaty-making power, as the British nation can
enjoy in the control of parliament.

Whatever doubt there may be as to the parliamenta
ry doctrine of the obligation of treaties in Great Bri
tain, (and perhaps there is some,) there is none in
their books, or their modern practice. Blackstone
represents treaties as of the highest obligation, when
ratified by the king ; and for almost a century, there
has been no instance of opposition by parliament to
this doctrine. Their treaties have been uniformly
carried into effect, although many have been ratified,
of a nature most obnoxious to party, and have produc
ed louder clamor than we have lately witnessed. The
example of England, therefore, fairly examined, does
not warrant, it dissuades us from a negative vote.

Gentlemen have said, with spirit, whatever the true
doctrine of our constitution may be. Great Britain has no

THE BRITISH TREATY. 449

right to complain or to dictate an interpretation. The
sense of the American nation as to the treaty power,
is to be received by all foreign nations. This is very
true as a maxim ; but the fact is against those who
vouch it. The sense of the American nation is not as
the vote of the House has declared it. Our claim to
some agency in giving force and obligation to treaties,
is beyond all kind of controversy novel. The sense of
the nation is probably against it. The sense of the
government certainly is. The President denies it on
constitutional grounds, and therefore cannot ever
accede to our interpretation. The senate ratified the
treaty, and cannot without dishonor adopt it, as I have
attempted to show. Where then do they find the proof,
that this is the American sense of the treaty-making
power, which is to silence the murmurs of Great Bri
tain ? Is it because a majority of two or three, or at
most of four or five of this House, will reject the treaty ?
Is it thus, the sense of our nation is to be recognized ?
Our government may thus be stopped in its move
ments — a struggle for power may thus commence, and
the event of the conflict may decide who is the victor,
and the quiet possessor of the treaty power. But,
at present, it is beyond all credibility, that our vote, by
a bare majority, should be believed to do any thing
better than to embitter our divisions, and to tear up the
settled foundations of our departments.

If the obligation of a treaty be complete, I am aware
that cases sometimes exist which will justify a nation
in refusing a compliance. Are our liberties, gentle
men demand, to be bartered away by a treaty, — and
is there no remedy ? There is. Extremes are not to be
supposed, but when they happen, they make the law
for themselves. No such extreme can be pretended
in this instance, and if it existed, the authority it
would confer to throw off the obligation, would rest
where the obligation itself resides — in the nation. This
House is not the nation — it is not the whole delegated
authority of the nation. Being only a part of that au-

VOL. i. 57

450 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

thority, its right to act for the whole society obviously
depends on the concurrence of the other two branches.
If they refuse to concur, a treaty, once made, remains in
full force, although a breach on the part of a foreign
nation would confer upon our own, a right to forbear
the execution. I repeat it, even in that case the act of
this House cannot be admitted as the act of the nation,
and if the President and senate should not concur,
the treaty would be obligatory.

I put a case that will not fail to produce conviction.
Our treaty with France engages that free bottoms
shall make free goods, and how has it been kept ? As
such engagements will ever be in time of war. France
has set it aside, and pleads imperious necessity. We
have no navy to enforce the observance of such arti
cles, and paper barriers are weak against the violence
of those, who are on the scramble for enemies' goods
on the high seas. The breach of any article of a treaty
by one nation gives an undoubted right to the other to
renounce the whole treaty. But has one branch of the
government that right, or must it reside with the whole
authority of the nation ? What if the senate should
resolve, that the French treaty is broken, and there
fore null and of no effect. The answer is obvious, you
would deny their sole authority. That branch of the
legislature has equal power in this regard with the
House of Representatives. One branch alone cannot
express the will of the nation.

A right to annul a treaty, because a foreign nation
has broken its articles, is only like the case of a suffi
cient cause to repeal a law. In both cases the branches
of our government must concur in the orderly way, or
the law and the treaty will remain.

The very cases, supposed by my adversaries in this
argument, conclude against themselves. They will
persist in confounding ideas that should be kept dis
tinct, they will suppose that the House of Representa
tives has no power unless it has all power. The House
is nothing if it be not the whole government — the na
tion,

THE BRITISH TREATY. 451

On every hypothesis, therefore, the conclusion is not
to be resisted ; we are either to execute this treaty, or
break our faith.

To expatiate on the value of public faith may pass
with some men for declamation — to such men I have
nothing to say. To others I will urge — can any cir
cumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and
debasement ? Can any thing tend more to make men
think themselves mean, or degrade to a lower point
their estimation of virtue, and their standard of action ?

It would not merely demoralize mankind, it tends to
break all the ligaments of society, to dissolve that mys
terious charm which attracts individuals to the nation,
and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense of shame
and disgust.

What is patriotism ? Is it a narrow affection for
the spot where a man was born ? Are the very clods
where we tread entitled to this ardent preference be
cause they are greener ? No, sir, this is not the cha
racter of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object.
It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoy
ments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest fila
ments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of so
ciety, because they are the laws of virtue. In their
authority we see, not the array of force and terror,
but the venerable image of our country's honor. Every
good citizen makes that honor his own, and cherishes
it not only as precious, but as sacred. He is willing to
risk his life in its defence, and is conscious that he
gains protection while he gives it. For, what rights of
a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a state re
nounces the principles that constitute their security ?
Or if his life should not be invaded, what would its
enjoyments be in a country odious in the eyes of stran
gers and dishonored in his own ? Could he look with
affection and veneration to such a country as his
parent ? The sense of having one would die within
him ; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained
any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He would be a
banished man in his native land.

452 3IR. AMES" SPEECH ON

I see ncTexception to the respect, that is paid among
nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases
in this enlightened period, when it is violated, there
are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of
politics, the religion of governments. It is observed
by barbarians — a whiff of tobacco smoke, or a string
of beads, gives not merely binding force, but sanctity
to treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought
for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise,
or too just, to disown and annul its obligation. Thus
we see, neither the ignorance of savages, nor the prin
ciples of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a
nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could
be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows, if the vic
tims of justice could live again, collect together and
form a society, they would, however loath, soon find
themselves obliged to make justice, that justice under
which they fell, the fundamental law of their state.
They would perceive, it was their interest to make
others respect, and they would therefore soon pay
some respect themselves to the obligations of good
faith.

It is painful, I hope it is superfluous, to make even
the supposition, that America should furnish the occa
sion of this opprobrium. No, let me not even ima
gine, that a republican government, sprung, as our own
is, from a people enlightened and uncorrupted, a gov
ernment whose origin is right, and whose daily disci
pline is duty, can, upon solemn debate, make its option
to be faithless — can dare to act what despots dare not
avow, what our own example evinces, the states of Bar-
bary are unsuspected of. No, let me rather make
the supposition, that Great Britain refuses to execute
the treaty, after we have done every thing to carry it
into effect. Is there any language of reproach pun
gent enough to express your commentary on the fact ?
What would you say, or rather what would you not
say ? Would you not tell them, wherever an English
man might travel, shame would stick to him — he would

THE BRITISH TREATY. 453

disown his country. You would exclaim, England,
proud of your wealth, and arrogant in the possession
of power — blush for these distinctions, which become
the vehicles of your dishonor. Such a nation might
truly say to corruption, thou art my father, and to the
worm, thou art my mother and my sister. We should
say of such a race of men, their name is a heavier bur
den than their debt.

I can scarcely persuade myself to believe, that the
consideration I have suggested requires the aid of any
auxiliary. But, unfortunately, auxiliary arguments
are at hand. Five millions of dollars, and probably
more, on the score of spoliations committed on our
commerce, depend upon the treaty. The treaty offers
the only prospect of indemnity. Such redress is pro
mised as the merchants place some confidence in.
Will you interpose and frustrate that hope ; leaving to
many families nothing but beggary and despair ? It
is a smooth proceeding to take a vote in this body :
it takes less than half an hour to call the yeas and
nays and reject the treaty. But what is the effect of
it ? What, but this ; the very men, formerly so loud
for redress ; such fierce champions, that even to ask
for justice was too mean and too slow, now turn their
capricious fury upon the sufferers, and say, by their
vote, to them and their families, no longer eat bread ;
petitioners go home and starve, we cannot satisfy your
wrongs and our resentments.

Will you pay the sufferers out of the treasury ? No.
The answer was given two years ago, and appears on
our journals. Will you give them letters of marque
and reprisal to pay themselves by force ? No, that is
war. Besides, it would be an opportunity for those
who have already lost much to lose more. Will you
go to war to avenge their injury ? If you do, the war
will leave you no money to indemnify them. If it
should be unsuccessful, you will aggravate existing
evils ; if successful, your enemy will have no treasure
left to give our merchants ; the first losses -will be con-

454 MK. AMES' SPEECH ON

founded with much greater and be forgotten. At
the end of a war there must be a negociation, which
is the very point we have already gained ; and why
relinquish it ? And who will be confident that the
terms of the negociation, after a desolating war, would
be more acceptable to another House of Representa
tives, than the treaty before us. Members and opin
ions may be so changed, that the treaty would then be
rejected for being what the present majority say it
should be. Whether we shall go on making treaties
and refusing to execute them, I know not. Of this I
am certain, it will be very difficult to exercise the
treaty-making power on the new principles, with much
reputation or advantage to the country.

The refusal of the posts, (inevitable if we reject the
treaty,) is a measure too decisive in its nature to be
neutral in its consequences. From great causes we
are to look for great effects. A plain arid obvious one
will be, the price of the western lands will fall. Set
tlers will not choose to fix their habitation on a field of
battle. Those who talk so much of the interest of the
United States, should calculate how deeply it will be
affected by rejecting the treaty ; how vast a tract of
wild land will almost cease to be property. This loss,
let it be observed, will fall upon a fund expressly de
voted to sink the national debt. What then are we
called upon to do ? However the form of the vote
and the protestations of many may disguise the pro
ceeding, our resolution is in substance, and it deserves
to wear the title of a resolution to prevent the sale of
the western lands and the discharge of the public debt.

Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contested
by any one ? Experience gives the answer. The
frontiers were scourged with war till the negociation
with great Britain was far advanced, and then the state
of hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both
nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and
perhaps they are not. We ought not, however, to ex
pect that neighboring nations, highly irritated against

THE BRITISH TREATY. 455

each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages ;
the traders will gain an influence and will abuse it ;
and who is ignorant that their passions are easily
raised, and hardly restrained from violence ? Their
situation will oblige them to choose between this
country and Great Britain, in case the treaty should be
rejected. They will not be pur friends, and at the
same time the friends of our enemies.

But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this
point ? Certainly the very men who charged the In
dian war on the detention of the posts, will call for no
other proof than the recital of their own speeches. It
is remembered with what emphasis, with what acrimo
ny, they expatiated on the burden of taxes, and the
drain of blood and treasure into the western country, in
consequence of Britain's holding the posts. Until the
posts are restored, they exclaimed, the treasury and
the frontiers must bleed.

If any, against all these proofs, should maintain that
the peace with the Indians will be stable without the
posts, to them I will urge another reply. From argu
ments calculated to produce conviction, I will appeal
directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask,
whether it is not already planted there ? I resort especial
ly to the convictions of the western gentlemen, whether,
supposing no posts and no treaty, the settlers will remain
in security ? Can they take it upon them to say, that
an Indian peace, under these circumstances, will prove
firm ? No, sir, it will not be peace, but a sword : it
will be no better than a lure to draw victims within the
reach of the tomahawk.

On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I
could find words for them, if my powers bore any pro
portion to my zeal, I would swell my voice to such a
note of remonstrance, it should reach every log-house
beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants,
wake from your false security : your cruel dangers,
your more cruel apprehensions are soon to be renew
ed: the wounds, yet. unhealed, are to be torn open

456 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

again : in the day time, your path through the woods
will be ambushed : the darkness of midnight will
glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a
father — the blood of your sons shall fatten your corn
field : you are a mother — the war-whoop shall wake
the sleep of the cradle.

On this subject you need not suspect any deception
on your feelings. It is a spectacle of horror, which
cannot be overdrawn. If you have nature in your
hearts, it will speak a language, compared with which
all I have said or can say will be poor and frigid.

Will it be whispered that the treaty has made me a
new champion for the protection of the frontiers ? It
is known that my voice as well as vote have been uni
formly given in conformity with the ideas I have ex
pressed. Protection is the right of the frontiers ; it is
our duty to give it.

Who will accuse me of wandering out of the sub
ject ? Who will say that I exaggerate the tendencies
of our measures ? Will any one answer by a sneer,
that all this is idle preaching ? Will any one deny, that
we are bound, and I would hope to good purpose, by
the most solemn sanctions of duty for the vote we
give ? Are despots alone to be reproached for un
feeling indifference to the tears and blood of their
subjects ? Are republicans unresponsible ? Have the
principles, on which you ground the reproach upon
cabinets and kings, no practical influence, no binding
force ? Are they merely themes of idle declamation,
introduced to decorate the morality of & newspaper
essay, or to furnish pretty topics of harangue from the
windows of that state-house ? I trust it is neither too
presumptuous nor too late to ask ; can you put the
dearest interest of society at risk without guilt, and
without remorse ?

It is vain to offer as an excuse, that public men are
not to be reproached for the evils that may happen to
ensue from their measures. This is very true, where
they are unforeseen or inevitable. Those I have de-

jj THE BRITISH TREATY. 457

picted are not unforeseen ; they are so far from inevi
table, we are going to bring them into being by our
vote. We choose the consequences, and become as
justly answerable for them as for the measure that we
know will produce them.

By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires, we
bind the victims. This day we undertake to render
account to the widows and orphans whom our deci
sion will make, to the wretches that will be roasted at
the stake, to our country, and I do not deem it too se
rious to say, to conscience and to God. We are an
swerable, and if duty be any thing more than a word of
imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are pre
paring to make ourselves as wretched as our country.

There is no mistake in this case, there can be none.
Experience has already been the prophet of events, and
the cries of our future victims have already reached
us. The western inhabitants are not a silent and un
complaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues
from the shade of their wilderness. It exclaims, that
while one hand is held up to reject this treaty, the
other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination
to the scenes that will open. It is no great effort of
the imagination to conceive, that events so near are
already begun. I can fancy that I listen to the yells of
savage vengeance, and the shrieks. of torture. Alrea
dy they seem to sigh in the west wind — already they
mingle with every echo from the mountains.

It is not the part of prudence to be inattentive to
the tendencies of measures. Where there is any
ground to fear that these will be pernicious, wisdom
and duty forbid that we should underrate them. If
we reject the treaty, will our peace be as safe as if we
executed it with good faith ? I do honor to the intre
pid spirit of those who say it will. It was formerly un
derstood to constitute the excellence of a man's faith
to believe without evidence and against it.

But as opinions on this article are changed, and
We are called to act for our country, it becomes us to

VOL. i. 58

458 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON

explore the dangers that will attend its peace, and to
avoid them if we can.

Few of us here, and fewer still in proportion of our
constituents, will doubt, that, by rejecting, all those
dangers will be aggravated.

The idea of war is treated as a bugbear. This
levity is at least unseasonable, and most of all unbe
coming some who resort to it.

Who has forgotten the philippics of 1794? The
cry then was reparation — no envoy — no treaty — no te
dious delays. Now, it seems, the passion subsides, or
at least the hurry to satisfy it. Great Britain, say
they, will not wage war upon us.

In 1794, it was urged by those, who now say, no war,
that if we built frigates, or resisted the piracies of Al
giers, we could not expect peace. Now they give ex
cellent comfort truly. Great Britain has seized our ves
sels and cargoes to the amount of millions ; she holds the
posts ; she interrupts our trade, say they, as a neutral
nation ; and these gentlemen, formerly so fierce for
redress, assure us, in terms of the sweetest consola
tion, Great Britain will bear all this patiently. But let
me ask the late champions of our rights, will our nation
bear it ? Let others exult because the aggressor will
let our wrongs sleep forever. Will it add, it is my
duty to ask, to the patience and quiet of our citizens
to see their rights abandoned ? Will not the disap
pointment of their hopes, so long patronized by the
government, now in the crisis of their being realized,
convert all their passions into fury and despair ?

Are the posts to remain forever in the possession of
Great Britain ? Let those who reject them, when the
treaty offers them to our hands, say, if they choose,
they are of no importance. If they are, will they take
them by force ? The argument I am urging, would
then come to a point. To use force is war. To talk
of treaty again is too absurd. Posts and redress must
come from voluntary good will, treaty or war.

The conclusion is plain, if the state of peace shall
continue, so will the British possession of the posts.

THE BRITISH TREATY. 459

Look again at this state of things. On the sea-
coast, vast losses uncompensated : on the frontier,
Indian war, actual encroachment on our territory:
every where discontent — resentments tenfold more
fierce because they will be impotent and humbled :
national scorn and abasement.

The disputes of the old treaty of 1783, being left to
rankle, will revive the almost extinguished animosi
ties of that period. Wars, in all countries, and most
of all in such as are free, arise from the impetuosity of
the public feelings. The despotism of Turkey is of
ten obliged by clamor, to unsheath the sword. War
might perhaps be delayed, but could not be prevented.
The causes of it would remain, would be aggravated,
would be multiplied, and soon become intolerable.
More captures, more impressments would swell the
list of our wrongs, and the current of our rage. I make
no calculation of the arts of those, whose employment
it has been, on former occasions, to fan the fire. I
say nothing of the foreign money and emissaries that
might foment the spirit of hostility, because the state
of things will naturally run to violence. With less
than their former exertion, they would be successful.

Will our government be able to temper and restrain
the turbulence of such a crisis ? The government,
alas, will be in no capacity to govern. A divided peo
ple — and divided councils ! Shall we cherish the
spirit of peace or show the energies of war ? Shall
we make our adversary afraid of our strength, or dis
pose him, by the measures of resentment and broken
faith, to respect our rights ? Do gentlemen rely on the
state of peace because both nations will be worse dis
posed to keep it; because injuries, and insults still
harder to endure, will be mutually offered ?

Such a state of things will exist, if we should long
avoid war, as will be worse than war. Peace without
security, accumulation of injury without redress, or
the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, con
tempt for ourselves, intestine discord and anarchy.

460 MK. AIDES' SPEECH ON

Worse than this need not be apprehended, for if worse
could happen, anarchy would bring it. Is this the
peace, gentlemen undertake with such fearless confi
dence to maintain ? Is this the station of American
dignity, which the high-spirited champions of our na
tional independence and honor could endure — nay,
which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for
the country ? What is there in the treaty, that could
humble us so low? Are they the men to swallow
their resentments, who so lately were choaking with
them. If in the case contemplated by them, it should
be peace, I do not hesitate to declare it ought not M
be peace.

Is there any thing in the prospect of the interior
state of the country, to encourage us to aggravate the
dangers of a war ? Would not the shock of that evil
produce another, and shake down the feeble and then
unbraced structure of our government? Is this a
chimera ? Is it going off the ground of matter of fact
to say, the rejection of the appropriation proceeds
upon the doctrine of a civil war of the departments ?
Two branches have ratified a treaty, and we are going
to set it aside. How is this disorder in the machine
to be rectified ? While it exists, its movements must
stop, and when we talk of a remedy, is that any other
than the formidable one of a revolutionary interposi
tion of the people ? And is this, in the judgment even
of my opposers, to execute, to preserve the constitu
tion and the public order ? Is this the state of ha
zard, if not of convulsion, which they can have the
courage to contemplate and to brave, or beyond which
their penetration can reach and see the issue ? They
seem to believe, arid they act as if they believed, that
our union, our peace, our liberty are invulnerable and
immortal — as if our happy state was not to be disturb
ed by our dissensions, and that we are not capable of
falling from it by our unworthiness. Some of them
have no doubt better nerves and better discernment
than mine. They can see the bright aspects and hap-

THE BRITISH TREATY. 461

py consequences of all this array of horrors. They
can see intestine discords, our government disorganiz
ed, our wrongs aggravated, multiplied and unredress-
ed, peace with dishonor, or war without justice, union
or resources, in " the calm lights of mild philosophy."

But whatever they may anticipate as the next mea
sure of prudence and safety, they have explained no
thing to the House. After rejecting the treaty, what
is to be the next step ? They must have foreseen what
ought to be done, they have doubtless resolved what
to propose. Why then are they silent ? Dare they
not avow their plan of conduct, or do they wait till our
progress towards confusion shall guide them in form
ing it ?

Let me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready
to despond on this prospect, by presenting another,
which it is yet in our power to realize. Is it possible
for a real American to look at the prosperity of this
country without some desire for its continuance, with
out some respect for the measures which, many will
say, produced, and all will confess, have preserved it ?
Will he not feel some dread, that a change of system
will reverse the scene ? The well grounded fears of
our citizens in 1794, were removed by the treaty, but
are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly in
evitable, and would not this adjustment have been con
sidered, at that day, as a happy escape from the cala
mity ? The great interest and the general desire of
our people, was to enjoy the advantages of neutrali
ty. This instrument, however misrepresented, af
fords America that inestimable security. The causes
of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or re
ferred to a new negociation after the end of the Euro
pean war. This was gaining every thing, because it
confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are
gaining every thing. This alone would justify the en
gagements of the government. For, when the fiery
vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our hori
zon, all our wishes were concentred in this one, that

462 fift. AMES' SPEECH ON

we might escape the desolation of the storm. This
treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, mark
ed to our eyes the space where it was raging, and af
forded, at the same time, the sure prognostic of fair
weather. If we reject it, the vivid colors will grow
pale, it will be a baleful meteor portending tempest
and war.

Let us not hesitate then, to agree to the appropria
tion to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall
save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and dif
fuse the spirit of confidence and enterprize, that will
augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and
improvement is wonderful, and some will think, too
rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast, and
if peace and good government should be preserved,
the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as
the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their
future success. The rewards of exertion go to aug
ment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital.
The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed-wheat, and is
sown again to swell, almost beyond calculation, the
future harvest of prosperity. And in this progress,
what seems to be fiction is found to fall short of ex
perience.

I rose to speak under impressions, that I would have
resisted if I could. Those who see me will believe,
that the reduced state of my health has unfitted me.
almost equally, for much exertion of body or mind.
Unprepared for debate, by careful reflection in my re
tirement, or by long attention here, I thought the reso
lution I had taken to sit silent, was imposed by necessi
ty, and would cost me no effort to maintain. With a
mind thus vacant of ideas, and sinking, as I really am,
under a sense of weakness, I imagined the very desire
of speaking was extinguished by the persuasion that I
had nothing to say. Yet when I come to the moment
of deciding the vote, I start back with dread from the
edge of the pit into which we are plunging. In my
view, even the minutes I have spent in expostulation,

THE BRITISH TREATY. 463

have their value, because they protract the crisis, and
the short period in which alone we may resolve to
escape it.

I have thus been led, by my feelings, to speak more
at length than I had intended. Yet I have, perhaps, as
little personal interest in the event as anyone here.
There is, I believe, no member who will not think his
chance to be a witness of the consequences greater
than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject,
and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the public dis
orders, to make confusion worse 'confounded, even I?
slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may
autlive the government and constitution of my country.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

OF

JOHN ADAMS,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

DELIVERED MARCH 4, J 797.

WHEN it was first- perceived, in early times, that no
middle course for America remained, between unlimit
ed submission to a foreign legislature and a total in
dependence of its claims ; men of reflection were less
apprehensive of danger from the formidable power of
fleets and armies they must determine to resist,
than from those contests and dissensions, which would
certainly arise, concerning the forms of government to
be instituted over the whole, and over the parts of this
extensive country. Relying, however, on the purity of
their intentions, the justice of their cause, and the in
tegrity and intelligence of the people, under an over
ruling Providence, which had so signally protected
this country from the first ; the representatives of this
nation, then consisting of little more than half its pre
sent numbers, not only broke to pieces the chains
which were forging, and the rod of iron that was lifted
up, and frankly cut asunder the ties which had bound
them, and launched into an ocean of uncertainty.

The zeal and ardor of the people during the revolution
ary war, supplying the place of government, command
ed a degree of order, sufficient at least for the tempo
rary preservation of society. The confederation,
which was early felt to be necessary, was prepared
from the models of the Batavian and Helvetic confede
racies, the only examples which remain, with any de
tail and precision, in history, and certainly the only
ones, which the people at large had ever considered.
But, reflecting on the striking difference, in so many
particulars, between this country and those, where a

TNAUGURAL ADDRESS. 465

courier may go from the seat of government to the
frontier in a single day, it was then certainly foreseen
by some, who assisted in Congress at the formation of
it, that it could not be durable.

Negligence of its regulations, inattention to its re
commendations, if not disobedience to its authority,
not only in individuals, but in states, soon appeared
with their melancholy consequences; universal lan
guor, jealousies, rivalries of states ; decline of navi
gation and commerce ; discouragement of necessary
manufactures ; universal fall in the value of lands and
their produce ; contempt of public and private faith :
loss of consideration and credit with foreign nations ;
and, at length, in discontents, animosities, combina
tions, partial conventions, and insurrection, threat
ening some great national calamity.

In this dangerous crisis, the people of America were
not abandoned by their usual good sense, presence of
mind, resolution, or integrity. Measures were pursu
ed to concert a plan, to form a more perfect union, es
tablish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide
for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty. The public dis
quisition, discussions, and deliberations issued in the
present happy constitution of government.

Employed in the service of my country abroad dur
ing the whole course of these transactions, I first saw
the constitution of the United States in a foreign
country. Irritated by no literary altercation, animated
by no public debate, heated by no party animosity, I
read it with great satisfaction, as the result of good
heads, prompted by good hearts ; as an experiment,
better adapted to the genius, character, situation, and
relations of this nation and country, than any, which
had ever been proposed or suggested. In its general
principles and great outlines, it was conformable to
such a system of government as I had ever most es
teemed ; and in some states, my own native state in
particular, had contributed to establish^ Claiming a
right of suffrage in common with my fellow-citizens
VOL. i. 59

466 PRESIDENT J. ADAMSr

in the adoption or rejection of a constitution, which
was to rule me and my posterity, as well as them and
theirs, I did not hesitate to express my approbation of
it on all occasions, in public and in private. It was
not then nor has been since any objection to it, in my
mind, that the executive and senate were not more
permanent. Nor have I entertained a thought of pro
moting any alteration in it, but such as the people
themselves, in the course of their experience, should
see and feel to be necessary or expedient, and by their
representatives in Congress and the state legislatures,
according to the constitution itself, adopt and ordain.

Returning to the bosom of my country, after a pain
ful separation from it for ten years, I had the honor to
be elected to a station under the new order of things,
and I have repeatedly laid myself under the most seri
ous obligations to support the constitution. The ope
ration of it has equalled the most sanguine expecta
tions of its friends ; and from an habitual attention to
it, satisfaction in its administration, and delight in its
effects upon the peace, order, prosperity and happi
ness of the nation, I have acquired an habitual attach
ment to it, and veneration for it.

What other form of government, indeed, can so well
deserve our esteem and love ?

There may be little solidity in an ancient idea, that
congregations of men into cities and nations are the
most pleasing objects in the sight of superior intelli-
gencies : but this is very certain, that to a benevolent
human mind there can be no spectacle presented by
any nation, more pleasing, more noble, majestic, or
august, than an assembly like that, which has so often
been seen in this and the other chamber of Congress—
of a government, in which the executive authority, as
well as that of all the branches of the legislature, are
exercised by citizens selected at regular periods by
their neighbors, to make and execute laws for the
general good. Can any thing essential, any thing more
than mere ornament and decoration, be added to
fhis by robes or diamonds ? Can authority be more

.

.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 467

amiable or respectable, when it descends from acci
dents or institutions established in remote antiquity,
than when it springs fresh from the hearts and judg
ments of an honest and enlightened people ? For, it
is the people only that are represented : it is their pow
er and majesty that is reflected, and only for their
good, in every legitimate government, under whatever
form it may appear. The existence of such a govern
ment as ours for any length of time, is a full proof
of a general dissemination of knowledge and virtue
throughout the whole body of the people. And
what object of consideration, more pleasing than this,
can be presented to the human mind ? If national
pride is ever justifiable or excusable, it is when it
springs, not from power or riches, grandeur or glory,
but from conviction of national innocence, information
and benevolence.

In the midst of these pleasing ideas, we should be
unfaithful to ourselves, if we should ever lose sight of
the danger to our liberties, if any thing partial or ex
traneous should infect the purity of our free, fair, virtu
ous and independent elections. If an election is to be
determined by a majority of a single vote, and that can
be procured by a party through artifice, or corruption,
the government may be the choice of a party, for its
own ends, not of the nation for the national good. If
that solitary suffrage can be obtained by foreign na
tions, by flattery or menaces, by fraud or violence, by
terror, intrigue, or venality ; the government may not
be the choice of the American people, but of foreign
nations. It may be foreign nations who govern us,
and not we, the people, who govern ourselves : and
candid men will acknowledge, that in such cases
choice would have little advantage to boast of, over lot
or chance.

Such is the amiable and interesting system of gov
ernment, (and such are some of the abuses to which it
may be exposed,) which the people of America have
exhibited to the admiration and anxiety of the wise
and virtuous of all nations for eight years 5 under the

468 PRESIDENT J. ADAMS'

administration of a citizen, who, by a long course of
great actions, regulated by prudence, justice, temper
ance, and fortitude, conducting a people, inspired with
the same virtues, and animated with the same ardent
patriotism and love of liberty, to independence and
peace, to increasing wealth and unexampled prosperi
ty, has merited the gratitude of his fellow-citizens,
commanded the highest praises of foreign nations, and
secured immortal glory with posterity.

In that retirement, which is his voluntary choice, may
he long live to enjoy the delicious recollection of his
services, the gratitude of mankind; the happy fruits of
them to himself and the world, which are daily increas
ing, and that splendid prospect of the future fortunes of
his country, which is opening from year to year. His
name may be still a rampart, and the knowledge that
he lives, a bulwark against all open or secret enemies
of his country's peace.

This example has been recommended to the imita
tion of his successors, by both Houses of Congress,
and by the voice of the legislatures and the people,
throughout the nation.

On this subject it might become me better to be
silent, or to speak with diffidence; but, as something
may be expected, the occasion, I hope, will be admit
ted as an apology, if I venture to say, that — if a pre
ference, upon principle, of a free republican govern
ment, formed upon long and serious reflection, after a
diligent and impartial inquiry after truth ; if an attach
ment to the constitution of the United States, and a
conscientious determination to support it, until it shall
be altered by the judgments and wishes of the people,
expressed in the mode prescribed in it ; if a respectful
attention to the constitutions of the individual states,
and a constant caution and delicacy towards the state
governments ; if an equal and impartial regard to the
rights, interests, honor, and happiness of all the states
in the union, without preference or regard to a nor
thern or southern, eastern or western position, their
various political opinions on essential points, or their

INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 469

personal attachments ; if a love of virtuous men of all
parties and denominations ; if a love of science and
letters, and a wish to patronize every rational effort to
encourage schools, colleges, universities, academies,
and every institution for propagating knowledge, vir
tue and religion among all classes of the people, not
only for their benign influence on the happiness of life,
in all its stages and classes, and of society in all its
forms, but, as the only means of preserving our consti
tution from its natural enemies, the spirit of sophistry,
the spirit of party, the spirit of intrigue, profligacy,
and corruption, and the pestilence of foreign influence,
which is the angel of destruction to elective govern
ments ; if a love of equal laws, of justice and humani
ty, in the interior administration ; if an inclination to
improve agriculture, commerce, and manufactures for
necessity, convenience, and defence ; if a spirit of equi
ty and humanity towards the aboriginal nations of
America, and a disposition to meliorate their condi
tion, by inclining them to be more friendly to us, and
our citizens to be more friendly to them : if an inflexi
ble determination to maintain peace and inviolable
faith with all nations, and that system of neutrality and
impartiality among the belligerent powers of Europe,
which has been adopted by the government, and so
solemnly sanctioned by both Houses of Congress, and
applauded by the legislatures of the states and the
public opinion, until it shall be otherwise ordained by
Congress; if a personal esteem for the French nation,
formed in a residence of seven years chiefly among
them, and a sincere desire to preserve the friendship,
which has been so much for the honor and interest of
both nations; if, while the conscious honor and integrity
of the people of America, and the internal sentiment of
their own power and energies must be preserved, an
earnest endeavor to investigate every just cause, and
remove every colorable pretence, of complaint ; if an
intention to pursue, by amicable negociation, a repara
tion for the injuries, that have been committed on

W I

470 ^PRESIDENT J. ADAMS', &c7

the commerce of our fellow-citizens by whatever na
tion ; arid if success cannot be obtained, to lay the
facts before the legislature, that they may consider,
what further measures the honor and interest of the
government and its constituents demand; if a resolu
tion to do justice, as far as may depend upon me, at
all times, and to all nations, and maintain peace,
friendship and benevolence with all the world ; if an
unshaken confidence in the honor, spirit, and resources
of the American people, on which I have so often ha
zarded my all, and never been deceived ; if elevated
ideas of the high destinies of this country, and of my own
duties towards it, founded on a knowledge of the moral
principles and intellectual improvements of the people,
deeply engraven on my mind in early life, and not ob
scured but exalted by experience and age, and with
humble reverence I feel it my duty to add — if a venera
tion for the religion of a people, who profess and call
themselves Christians, and a fixed resolution to consi
der a decent respect for Christianity among the best
recommendations for the public service, can enable me,
in any degree, to comply with your wishes, it shall be
my strenuous endeavor, that this sagacious injunction
of the two Houses shall not be without effect.

With this great example before me ; with the sense
and spirit, the faith and honor, the duty and interest of
the same American people, pledged to support the
constitution of the United States, I entertain no doubt
of its continuance in all its energy ; and my mind is
prepared without hesitation, to lay myself under the
most solemn obligations to support it, to the utmost of
my power.

And may that Being, who is supreme over all, the
patron of order, the fountain of justice, and the protec
tor, in all ages of the world, of virtuous liberty, con
tinue his blessing upon this nation and its government,
and give it all possible success and duration, consistent
with the ends of his providence.

SPEECH OF ROBERT G. HARPER,

*>

ON THE

NECESSITY OF RESISTING THE AGGRESSIONS AND
ENCROACHMENTS OF FRANCE,

t

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OP THE
UNITED STATES, MAY 29, 1797.

In 1797, the French Directory refused to receive Mr. Pinckney,
the minister of the United States, under such circumstances that
the President deemed it advisable to call a special session of Con
gress to take the subject into consideration. He accordingly issu
ed a proclamation convoking Congress ; and in his message, com
municated at the opening of the session, he expressed, in strong
terms of disapprobation, his sense of the indignity offered to the
United States by the Directory. An address was moved in
the House of Representatives, responding the sentiments of the
President. An amendment, however, was proposed, expressive
of an opinion that the House viewed the conduct of the Directory
as less reprehensible than it had been represented by the Presi
dent, and recommending conciliatory measures as the basis of the
negociations about to be entered into with France.

The amendment being under consideration in committee of the
whole, Mr. Harper delivered the following speech :

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AT the time the interruption took place on Satur
day, by the unfortunate indisposition of the speaker, I
had drawn near to the close of those observations,
with which at that time, I intended to trouble the com
mittee. I shall now resume, as nearly as possible, the
same train of remarks, and bring them to a conclusion
as speedily as possible. As more time, however, is
now afforded to me, I will take a range somewhat
more extensive than I had prescribed to myself on the

472 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

former day, endeavoring, at the same time, to avoid
every thing, not strictly relative to the question on the
amendment, now under consideration.

[Mr. Harper here observed, that he should go a lit
tle out of his way, in order to notice and refute some
positions laid down by gentlemen in favor of the
amendment, which, though wholly irrelevant to the
present question, would have a tendency, if allowed to
pass uncontradicted, to render the people discontent
ed with the government. Having concluded his re
marks upon this subject, he proceeded thus :]

The scope and object of this amendment is to re
commend it to the President, to offer certain conces
sions to France, in the negociations which he has de
clared it his intention to commence. These conces
sions, are understood to relate to the list of contra
band, which is more extensive, as stated by the British
treaty, than in that with France ; and to the right of
taking enemies' goods out of neutral ships, which Bri
tain enjoys, and France by her treaty with us has given
up. In these two points it is the scope and object of
the amendment to recommend, that the two nations
should be placed on the same footing. Hence the
amendment is to be considered under two points of
view ; first, the recommendation itself; and secondly,
the thing recommended.

As to the recommendation itself, I ask, is it consti
tutional — is it useful — is it politic ?

With respect to its constitutionality, every body
knows, that the power of negociation is given wholly
to the President by the constitution, and that of mak
ing treaties to the President and senate. Can the
House of Representatives control or direct that pow
er ? Can it instruct the President in matters, which
the constitution has entrusted solely and exclusively
to his judgment ? Shall it undertake to instruct him —
will he be bound to obey those instructions ? Should
he think fit to pursue a different course, will the House
be justified by the constitution and their duty in with-

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 473

holding supplies, and in leaving the country without
defence ? Do gentlemen foresee the dilemma, which
they are preparing for themselves and for the House ;
a dilemma in which they must choose between pride
and duty, between supporting the executive in mea
sures adopted against their advice, and leaving the
country defenceless, at the mercy of all who may
choose to assail it? What possible effect can this
interference have, but to lay the foundations of a schism
between the different departments of government ?

But admitting such a recommendation to be con
formable to the constitution, in what is it useful ? Is
it to dispose the executive to treat ? If so, it is use
less, for he already has that disposition, and has strong
ly declared it in his speech to both Houses. He has
declared it as his resolution " to institute a fresh at
tempt at negociatiori, and to promote and accelerate
an accommodation, provided one can be made on
terms compatible with the rights, duties, interests and
honor of the nation." He has declared, that if we
have committed " errors, and these can be demonstrat
ed, we shall be willing to correct them. If we have
done injuries, we shall be willing, on conviction, to re
dress them." Can there be a spirit more conciliato
ry — or would gentlemen wish to see the negociations
conducted on other principles ?

Is it to give information to the executive, to point
out the course which the public good requires to be
taken? But do gentlemen imagine that the executive
is ignorant of the public interest, or less acquainted
with it than the House? Is it not notorious that
bodies of this kind are always unfit for negociation ?
Have not the people declared it, by placing that pow
er in the hands of the President ? Can gentlemen
suppose, that the House possesses, or can possess, all
the information necessary, in forming an opinion about
what ought to be given, and what ought to be requir
ed, in a negociation with another nation ? Can the
house foresee all that may happen, to render this of-

VOL. i. 60

474 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

fer inexpedient, or useless, or unnecessary — to justify
other offers, or to make demands necessary, instead
of offers of any kind ? What will become of the power
of negociation in the executive, if the House is first to
instruct him, and afterwards to censure him ?

Some gentlemen have seemed to think, that this
amendment would give weight to the negociation
abroad ; would strengthen the hands of the executive,
and place him on higher ground. But how is this ef
fect to be produced ? By showing, it is answered,
that, in making this offer, all the branches of govern
ment are united, and that the ground thus taken will
be firmly supported. But must it not be perfectly
evident, that the best way of giving this impression is,
to pursue a conduct and hold a language, which will
evince a perfect confidence in the executive, and a
determination to support him with the whole force and
resources of the country ? Then it is, that the offers
of the executive will come with weight, when they come
with evidence of union in the government, and of
mutual confidence among the various departments.

Some gentlemen have supported this amendment on
the ground, that it will give confidence to the people of
this country in the executive; arid one gentleman
from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,) has gone so far as to
say, that the people of this country will not support the
government, unless its measures are right. Admitting
this opinion to be true, (and I am inclined to think it
may be,) still it will remain to be inquired, by what
means and on what standard the people would form
their opinion of the propriety and wisdom of the mea
sures, pursued by their government. Not certainly
from the declarations of that gentleman or his friends;
because there has not been one measure adopted by
the government, since its formation, which they have
not opposed in the House and out of it, on which they
have not set the stamp of their most decided censure ;
and yet, sir, we have seen all these measures support
ed and approved of by the people. We have seen the

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 475

late President, who was in a peculiar manner the au
thor of them, under whose auspices they were adopt
ed and established, in spite of the most violent and
persevering opposition from these very gentlemen —
we have seen him surrounded with applauses, with
gratitude and with thanks, from every quarter of the
union ; we have seen the wisdom and firmness of his
administration made one very principal ground of
these thanks arid applauses ; and even in a former
House of Representatives, where the principles of
these gentlemen did so greatly preponderate, when
they moved to strike out of an address to this great
man a clause expressly approving his administration,
as wise, firm and greatly beneficial to his country, the
motion was overruled by a very large majority ; and
when the address itself, containing this obnoxious
clause, was put to the vote, it passed with only twelve
nays. Yet gentlemen talk to us, as if they were the
standard, by which the people would measure the con
duct of government ! Sir, the people are not truly es
timated by those gentlemen. They are not the blind,
ignorant herd which those gentlemen take them to be.
They will do in future what they have always done
heretofore — they will judge of the measures of govern
ment by the measures themselves, and by the just con
fidence which they have long placed in those whom
they have appointed to administer it ; not by the opin
ions or invectives of this or that set of men, either on
this floor or out of doors. Gentlemen ought to be ad
monished, by the frequent and always unsuccessful ap
peals, which they have made to the people, to give up
at length this vain chimera of being able to rule public
opinion, with which they have so long suffered them
selves to be deluded.

I hold, sir, in my hand a paper, from that very quar
ter where gentlemen probably suppose, and not with
out appearance of reason, that their labors in the vine
yard of opposition have been crowned with most suc
cess. It is an add*9ss from Mecklenburg county, in

476 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

Virginia, to their representative on this floor, and con
tains sentiments so just, so truly patriotic, and so ap
plicable to the point of confidence in government, that
I cannot help reading it to the committee, though I am
sensible it must have already attracted the notice of
every individual. [Mr. Harper then read the address.]

This paper, sir, affords a most consoling and hon
orable contrast to the speeches, which have lately
been heard on this floor. It contains sentiments,
which I have no doubt are reverberated from the hearts
of every American in every part of the union, and
which prove how far the people, even that part of
them on which these gentlemen have most particular
ly relied, are from sharing with them in their want of
affection for the government, and of confidence in its
measures. There is nothing in this address to prove,
that the people in that part of the union will refuse to
support the government, unless those gentlemen should
inform them that its measures were right.

I also consider the recommendation, contained in
this amendment, as extremely impolitic. Is it good
policy to show the enemy your eagerness to treat,
your eagerness to make concessions ? Is it good po
licy to show to France, that you have no confidence in
the executive, in his wisdom, his information, his pa
triotic intentions ; that you think it necessary to in
struct and direct him ? Is it good policy to send
the executive trammelled to France ; to send him in a
situation, where he must either yield to a part of her
demands, or go against the recommendations of this
House ? Is this the way to give weight to his nego-
ciations, or to lessen her demands ? Is it true, thai
there is in this House a majority, who do not confide
in the executive ? I repeat the question, and I ad
dress it not to those gentlemen whose constant em
ployment it has been, for eight years past, in the
House and out of it, to oppose the executive and every
measure which he was understood to favor, to declare
their distrust of him. and endeavpr to weaken thai

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 477

confidence so justly reposed in him by the people. I
address not myself to these : I address myself to those
gentlemen, and some such there no doubt are, who,
entertaining just ideas of the constitution, and repos
ing full confidence in the executive, may nevertheless
be inclined to favor this recommendation, because
they think it a harmless thing. I could ask these gen
tlemen, whether there is a majority in this House, who
do not think the executive worthy of confidence in the
performance of his constitutional functions ? I could
ask them whether they are willing to make this decla
ration, if they do not believe it ? I could ask them
whether, admitting it to be true, it would be prudent
to tell France so ? I would ask them what, beside
such a declaration, France can see in this amend
ment ? I answer, and they must, I think, join me in
the answer, that she can see nothing else. She will
see in it a proof and confirmation of her present opin
ion, that we are a divided people; that the people are
divided from the government, and the government di
vided within itself This will encourage her to press
and heighten her demands ; for, seeing us. as she will
think, divided, she will remember one part of the
scripture, while she forgets all the rest, that " a house
divided against itself cannot stand."

As I believe this recommendation to be unconstitu
tional, useless and highly impolitic, I can never give
my vote in its favor.

I will now ask gentlemen, who may think the recom
mendation not improper, whether the measure recom
mended is entitled to their support ? Why should it
be entitled to support ? Either because it is necessa
ry, or because it is useful ; because it is demanded by
justice, or recommended by good policy.

If the measure were really necessary, or useful, sure
ly the executive is as well apprized of that necessity
and utility, as well qualified to judge about it, as the
House of Representatives : and the thing will be as
well done by him alone, and will have as much effect,

478 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

as if the House were to join in it : the claims of justice
can be as completely satisfied in one case as in the
other; the ends of policy as completely attained.
Though I myself have very little reliance on the use
fulness of the measure, and no conviction of its neces
sity, still I, for one, am perfectly willing that it should
be tried by the executive, and perfectly willing that it
should be effected, if the executive think fit. Neither
have I any doubt that it will be tried. The very de
bate in this House will inform the executive of the pro
priety of trying it; and I have no doubt, moreover,
that the executive is disposed to make the attempt, to
offer these advantages to France. I know nothing di
rectly of the opinion of the executive, but I know, that
those who are about the executive have this opinion,
and are disposed to make this offer to France, not per
haps in the unqualified and unconditional manner re
commended by some gentlemen, but on terms con
sistent with the honor and interests of this country,
and with which the public, when it comes to be informed
of them, will be satisfied. I, therefore, even if I thought
this measure not only useful but necessary, should
still leave it most willingly to the President. But as
there are gentlemen in the House, who may be inclin
ed to favor the recommendation from an opinion, that
the measure recommended is necessary or useful, F
will address some considerations to them, by which
they may, perhaps, be induced to doubt whether it is
either the one or the other.

First, I ask them, how this measure, this concession
to France, can be necessary ? Do gentlemen contend.
that this country is too weak to defend her rights ;
that it must yield to the demands of a foreign power,
merely because those demands are made ? I have
not so understood them. Supple as their language
has been, and submissive as their course of policy
seems calculated to become, they have not yet bent
thus low. But they have contended, that this conces
sion is necessary, because it is right ; because justice

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 479

requires it. And how does justice require it ? Be
cause, according to them, having yielded these rights
to England by our treaty with her, impartial justice re
quires, that we should yield them also to France.

This argument rests^on the ground that Britain does
not possess these rights by the law of nations, which
point gentlemen have taken much pains, and made
many elaborate dissertations, to establish. I shall not
follow them through this long diplomatic discussion,
which is much better suited to the department of
state, and has there been handled in a very mas
terly and satisfactory manner. I believe, that when
the official paper on this subject, lately published
from the department of state, shall be read and
compared with the speeches of gentlemen, very
little doubt will remain on the point. I have an
other reason too for avoiding a dispute on the law
of nations. Gentlemen seem disposed to treat the
law, and the writers on it, with as little respect as the
one and the other have received from the nation
whose cause they advocate. One minister of that na
tion, in this country, has declared those writers to be
no better than worm-eaten volumes, whose contents he
was happy to have forgotten. Another, at Genoa,
declared, that the French had taken up arms for the
express purpose of subverting the law of nations.
After this I should be almost afraid to cite writers on
the law of nations, lest I should be told, " that they are
worm-eaten volumes." There is, however, one au
thority on this point, which perhaps may be acknow
ledged, and which I will therefore adduce. It is the
marine code of France herself; from which it ap
pears, that by the law of nations, and her own laws
founded upon it, enemies' goods are liable to capture,
in neutral ships.

Sir, it appears from Valin, vol. ii. page 250, that, on
the 21st of October, 1744, the king of France published
& regulation, " concerning prizes made at sea, and the
navigation of- neutral vessels in time of war."

480 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

first, second, third and fourth articles specify all the
cases in which neutral ships in time of war may sail, free
from molestation. Then comes the fifth article, which
is in these words : " If in any of the cases specified in
the first, second, third and fourth articles of this regu
lation, there shall be found on board of the said neutral
ships, to whatsoever nation they may belong, merchan
dizes or effects, the property of his majesty's enemies,
such merchandize or effects shall be good prize, even
though they be not the production of the enemies'
country: but the ships shall be released." This
regulation continued in force till the 26th of July, 1778,
when the king of France, having engaged in the Ameri
can war, (for the treaty of alliance was early in Februa
ry, 1778,) found it his interest to relax from the princi
ple in hopes of prevailing on England to do so too.
Accordingly on that day he published a regulation, by
the first article of which, enemies' property, on board of
neutral ships, is declared to be safe from capture by
French armed vessels. The article, however, contains
the following clause : " But his majesty retains to him
self a right to revoke the permission contained in the
present article, should the enemy powers fail to grant a
similar permission within six months from the date
hereof."

Hence it is clear, that France not only has asserted
and long exercised this right, which she charges us
with having conceded to England, but even possesses
it at the present moment, and may exercise it, if she
thinks fit, without violating the law of nations; she
being only restrained in those cases, in which, as in
ours, she has renounced it by treaties. All this ap
pears from her own laws and public acts; for her re-
linquishment of this right in July, 1778, having been
merely conditional and dependent on a similar relin-
quishment by England, which has never taken place,
may be at any moment revoked, and indeed has been;
for, notwithstanding all her clamors against the Eng
lish for exercising this right, it is very well known, that

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE.

she has constantly exercised it herself from the begin
ning of the present war.

It may therefore be expected, that we shall not here
after be told by either France or her advocates, that
the right to take enemies' goods in neutral vessels, is
not a right given by the law of nations.

It has, however, been contended, that the law of na
tions in this respect has been altered by the conven
tion of the armed neutrality. I will not stop to refute
this position, which has been so often and so complete
ly exposed ; still less will I undertake to prove what is
in itself so perfectly obvious, that the convention of
the armed neutrality, being no more than a treaty, is
confined, like all other treaties, to the parties who
agree to it, and can in no manner affect the general
rights of other states, under the general law of nations :
but I will remark, that this objection about the armed
neutrality, comes with a very bad grace from France ;
because France, when requested to accede to this con
vention of the armed neutrality, expressly declined it.
She declined it indeed under pretence, that its principles
were already established by her regulation of July,
1778. This regulation, however, as has been seen,
was temporary and conditional, and left France at full
liberty to adhere to the law of nations, or adopt the
principles of the armed neutrality, as she might after
wards find convenient. She afterwards did refuse to
accede, as appears by the authority of Mr. Gibbon ;
in one of whose letters to lord Sheffield, dated Sep
tember llth, 1785, and published in the first volume of
his miscellaneous works, page 06, there is found this
passage : " The other day the French ambassador
mentioned, that the empress of Russia had proposed to
ratify the principles of the armed neutrality by a defini
tive treaty ; but that the French had declared, that
they would neither propose nor accept an article, so
disagreeable to England."

This, sir, is a good comment on their former pro
ceedings with respect to this right ; and proves, that

VOL. i; 61

482 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

they never meant to renounce it, though they were
willing, for a short time and for a particular purpose,
to suspend its exercise. It is true that France after
wards, in the years 1786 and 1787, made a treaty with
Russia, in which this right was finally relinquished.
The same thing is done in her treaty with England
in 1786. But her having so long retained it, and her
very agreement at last to give it up, proves most incon-
testably that she believes herself to possess it, under
the general law of nations.

A dispute has arisen, whether the convention of the
armed neutrality is permanent in its nature, or merely
confined to the duration of the American war. I have
been of the latter opinion myself, on the construction
of the instrument itself, and of the acts which have
grown out of it ; and I shall not enter again into the
discussion, which I believe to be wholly immaterial.
Because, whether this convention be permanent or
temporary, still it is no more than a treaty, and can
have no effect on the general law of nations. I will,
however, correct a mistake into which a gentleman
from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) has fallen on this
subject. In order to prove that the convention of the
armed neutrality was permanent in its nature, that gen
tleman has asserted that Portugal acceded to it after
the war. But the gentleman has forgot the dates.
The accession of Portugal was signed at Petersburg.
July, 1782, and ratified at Lisbon, September, 1782.
The ratifications were exchanged on the 21st of
January, 1783. Whereas the provisional articles of
peace were not signed till November 30th, 1782.
The armistice for suspending hostilities took place on
the 20th of January, 1783, and the definitive treaty, by
which the war was really ended, was not signed till
September, 1783, many months after the accession of
Portugal. That accession even preceded the provi
sional articles by some months ; and yet the gentle
man from Pennsylvania has told the committee that
Portugal acceded after the war.

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 483

The gentleman, however, has given up the point, so
strongly contended for by others on the same side of
the House. He has admitted that we did not, by the
treaty with England, concede to her the right respect
ing neutral bottoms ; but he contends that we should
have made no commercial treaty with her, till she had
relinquished that right. I will, however, ask that gen
tleman and the committee, whether it is not wise to
obtain the modification of a right which operates un
favorably to us, when we cannot obtain its relinquish-
ment? Is it not wise and lawful, since we cannot
prevent this operation, to render it as little injurious
as possible — to lessen its inconveniencies when we
cannot quite remove them ? This is what the treaty
has done ; and surely we may do this without asking
the permission of France, or giving her cause of offence.

From all this it must evidently appear, that we have
not conceded this right to England, since she possess
ed it by the law of nations ; and that we have done
France no injury. Consequently, justice does not re
quire us to concede it to her. The argument of ne
cessity, of course, falls to the ground.

Will the argument of utility avail gentlemen any bet
ter ? They contend, that if not necessary, it would at;
least be useful to make this concession to France :
that if not demanded by justice, it is at least recom
mended by policy. If so, it may be done by the Pre
sident without our assistance or advice, and the same
good effects will still result from it. But why will it be
useful ? Will it be valuable to France ? Does she
want it ? Will this concession satisfy her ? These
are questions which, in my opinion, deserve particular
and serious consideration.

In the first place, I would ask how this right can be
valuable to France ? We are not carriers for Britain.
For many nations, indeed, we are carriers, but not for
Britain ; which, on the contrary, is very considerably a
carrier for us. Our produce is often found in her
ships — her goods very seldom in ours. Consequently.

484 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

the right to take British property on board of our
ships, is a right of no value to France. Her interest,
and a very powerful one it is, consists not in using the
right herself, but in taking it away from England. It
is not to seize English property in our ships that she is
so anxious, but to make French property safe from
being seized in them by the English. Could she once
accomplish this point, her commerce would float safe
ly in our ships, and England, being prohibited to touch
it, would become infinitely less formidable to her.
The navy of England would, in fact, become in a great
degree useless to her, in a war against France ; since
it could not touch her commerce secured under our
neutral flag, while France, having her commerce thus
carried on for her, would be able to employ every
ship and every sailor she possessed, in attacking and
destroying the commerce and the navy of England.
Thus that naval superiority which she so much dreads,
and which enables England to counterbalance her
power in Europe, would be stripped of all its effects and
all its terrors. It is not, therefore, wonderful, that
France should be so extremely anxious to deprive Eng
land of this right, or so ready to renounce it herself.
It is of no use to her, and of infinite use, perhaps ne
cessity, to England.

Accordingly it has been seen, that France, while
perpetually urging us to resist the exercise of this right
by England, and even quarrelling with us for not doing
so, has never hinted the least desire to have it herself.
She has not been slow or diffident, every body knows,
in demanding what she thinks useful to herself; and it
may, therefore, be most safely concluded, that since
she has not demanded this, she thinks it of no use to
her, and does not want it. To show us, indeed, how
little she cares about it, she has taken it lately by a for
mal decree, and yet still continues to quarrel with us,
and plunder us.

What reason, then, I would ask, is there for suppos
ing, that France will be satisfied by this concession ?

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 485

Does she limit her claims to this ? Some gentlemen,
particularly one from Maryland, (Mr. S. Smith,) has
said so : but does she say so ? Is that gentleman in
the secret of her councils, or authorized to explain her
pretensions ? If so, let him show his credentials. If
not, the House must take the liberty of judging, not
from his assertions, but from the acts of France her
self; from the official papers presented by her minis
ters. Let the gentleman from Maryland read these
papers. He will find in them a great many preten
sions to which he will never submit, but not one word
of this. That gentleman has said, that her decree of
March 2d, wherein she takes these rights, which gen
tlemen are so anxious to have conceded to her, ought
to overrule all her former acts, to be considered as her
ultimatum, as the final declaration of her wishes, her
claims, and her pretensions. If so, why continue to
plunder and maltreat us since that decree? Why
send away our minister ? Why refuse to receive an
other, unless all the grievances of which she has com
plained, and to the redress of which she thinks herself
entitled, shall first be removed ? Gentlemen have
found in that phrase, " to the redress of which she is
entitled," a wonderful restriction of all her demands,
and a very conciliatory disposition. But who is to de
clare which are the complaints, to the redress of which
she is entitled ? Certainly she herself. And where is
this country to look for the declaration ? Certainly in
the official acts of her government directed to ours,
and not in decrees passed long after, nor in the
speeches of members on this floor. The first of these
acts is M. de la Croix's summary, delivered to our
ministers at Paris, March 9th, 1796, and containing
complaints against the whole British treaty, against
the interference of our courts with French prizes, and
against the construction, put by our government on
the laws of neutrality, and on some articles of the trea
ty with France. Next comes the decree of July 4th,
1796. for enforcing these complaints. After that is

486 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESIST!^,

M. Adet's fifth note of October 27th, 1796, communi
cating this decree ; and last of all comes his manifesto,
November 15th, 1796, in which all the former com
plaints made by himself, his predecessors and M. de la
Croix, are enlarged upon and enforced. On the 12th
of December following, the directory refused to re
ceive our minister, and declared that they would in fu
ture, receive no minister plenipotentiary from us, till
all the injuries, of which they had complained, were
redressed. What are the complaints here referred to ?
Certainly those contained in the manifesto of M. Adet :
for as the directory had no doubt given him instruc
tions, as to the manifesto and the time of publishing
it, they must have known that it had been published,
when they gave this answer to Gen. Pinckney ; and to
that manifesto, and the complaints contained in it, the
answer no doubt refers. As to the decree of March
2d, which gentlemen say, ought to be considered as
the ultimatum of France, it did not take place till two
months afterwards : and to suppose that the directory,
in refusing to receive a minister on account of griev
ances complained of, had reference to a complaint
made two months after, would certainly be to charge
them with a very singular absurdity.

I cannot, therefore, be persuaded that these conces
sions, so much relied on by gentlemen, will satisfy
France, since it is certain that they form no part of
her present demands, that she never has asked for
them, and that they would be of little value to her, if
she had them. This conclusion is greatly strengthen
ed by the consideration, that although she had pos
sessed herself of these rights by the decree of July 4th,
1796, and still more formally and expressly by that of
March 2d, 1797, she still continued to pillage and mal
treat this country, under the pretext of other com
plaints ; whereas, had these rights now proposed to be
ceded to her, been the sole or chief object of her de
sires, she would have ceased to complain and plunder,
as soon as she had seized themt

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 487

I should be glad to hear what use is to be made of
this conclusion. Is it to dissuade our government
from making the offer to France ? No ; I, for one,
wish the offer to be made, and I have no doubt, that
it will be made, whether recommended by the House
or not : but to dissuade the House from relying too
much on the efficacy of this offer ; to dissuade them
from regarding this offer as in any degree an effectual
mean of satisfying the demands of France, of checking
her insolence, or of restraining her aggressions. To
prevent them, if possible, from being led, by confidence
so false, into a neglect of these decided and energetic
measures of defence, on which the success of the ne-
gociation must entirely depend. This idea, I believe,
cannot be too much pressed upon the House. I con
ceive it to be of infinite importance in the present situa
tion of our affairs. I am persuaded, that our only
hope of avoiding war or disgrace, lies in a strict and
practical attention to it. In order to enforce the more
effectually its importance, I conceive, that it will be
highly useful to inquire what the real wishes and ob
jects of France are, as well as what they are not. In
order to find out this, it will be proper to ask, what has
been the scope of her policy in this country ? And
what is the ground of her anger at the British treaty ?
For my part, I have no doubt that the whole scope of
the French policy towards this country, has been to
draw it into the war against England, and the tenden
cy of the British treaty to defeat this project, the whole
ground of their animosity against that instrument. It
is, in my opinion, a vain delusion, to suppose that
France has conceived this mighty resentment, and is
committing these unheard of outrages, on account of
this or that article of a treaty, this or that advantage
given to another nation, and withheld from her. It is
the treaty itself, which has given her offence ; and its
tendency to preserve peace between this country and
Britain, is the ground of that offence. If it should be
asked, how this appears to have been the drift of

488 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

France ? I answer, that it appears, in the first place,
by the instructions to Genet. These instructions have
been given to the public by M. Genet himself, in order
to justify his conduct in this country. They must still
be fresh in the recollection of most persons ; but as
there may be some, who have not particularly attend
ed to them, or have forgotten their tenor, it will not be
improper to cite some of the most remarkable pas
sages. " The executive council, (says M. Genet,) are
disposed to set on foot a negociation on these founda
tions, (the overtures made by general Washington and
Mr. Jefferson for a new treaty,) and they do not know
but that such a treaty admits a latitude still more ex
tensive, in becoming a national agreement, in which
two great nations shall suspend" (this, sir, should have
been translated unite,) " their commercial and political
interests, and establish a mutual understanding, to be
friend the empire of liberty wherever it can be embrac
ed, and punish those powers who still keep up an ex
clusive colonial and commercial system, by declaring,
that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of
the contracting parties." Thus it appears, that this
treaty is not only to be a commercial, but also a politi
cal union : that we are to assist in extending French
principles and French influence, under the name of
guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people, and be
friending the empire of liberty ; and that, in order to
accomplish this end, we are to shut our ports against
all the powers who maintain an exclusive commercial
and colonial system; that is, against the English,
Spaniards, Danes and Dutch. This amounts in sub
stance, and almost in name, to an alliance offensive
and defensive with France.

Lest, however, her views should be misunderstood,
she has gone on, in the instructions, to explain them in
a manner still more clear and explicit. " As it is pos
sible, however, (continues M. Genet,) that the false
representations, which have been made to Congress
of the state of our internal affairs, of the situation of

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE, 489

our maritime force, of our finances, and especially of
the storms with which we are threatened, may make
her ministers, in the negociations which citizen Genet
is instructed to open, adopt a timid and wavering con
duct, the executive council charges him, in expecta
tion that the American government will finally deter
mine to make a common cause with us, to take such
steps as it will appear to him exigencies may require*
to serve the cause of liberty and the freedom of the,
people." This passage, sir, assuredly can require no
comment. In the supplementary instructions, the sys
tem is more fully developed. And indeed, the passage
relative to the point under consideration is so conclu
sive, that I will cite it entire. These are the words :
" The reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the
two nations, stipulated in the eleventh article of the
treaty of 1778, can be established upon generous prin
ciples, which have been already pointed out, and shall
equally be an essential clause in the new treaty, which
is to be proposed." In order to understand this, it will
be necessary to recollect, that the treaty of 1778, was
purely defensive ; so that France could not claim the
guarantee in a war, in which she should be the aggres
sor. As she was then preparing to attack England,
against which she declared war within less than a
month after these instructions were signed, this defen
sive guarantee would not answer her purpose. She
therefore evidently wished to make it offensive and de
fensive. For had she meant to remain on the defen
sive herself, the defensive guarantee would have been
sufficient, and she would have wanted no other. The
instructions then proceed thus : " The executive coun
cil, in consequence, recommend it especially to citi
zen Genet, to sound early the disposition of the Ame
rican government, and to make it, (the guarantee,) a
condition sine qua non of their commerce with the West
Indies, so essential to the United States. It nearly con
cerns the peace and prosperity of the French nation,
that a people, whose resources increase beyond all
VOL. i. 62

490 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

calculation, and whom nature has placed so near our
rich colonies, should become interested by their own
engagements, in the preservation of these islands.
Citizen Genet will find the less difficulty in making the
proposition relished in the United States, as the great
trade which will be the reward of it will indemnify
them in the end for the sacrifices which they may
make in the outset ; and the Americans cannot be ig
norant of the great disproportion between their re
sources and those of the French republic, and that for
a long period the guarantee asked from them will be
little more than nominal for them, while on our part
it will be real, and we shall immediately put ourselves
in a condition to fulfil it, by sending to the American
ports a sufficient force to put them beyond insult, and
to facilitate their communication with the islands and
with France." Thus it manifestly appears, that an
alliance, offensive and defensive in the war, which she
meditated against England, was to be formed with
France ; that the object of this alliance was to be the
preservation of her islands, and commercial privileges
its reward ; that we were to make sacrifices in the
outset, and be reimbursed by these privileges ; and
that a French fleet was to be sent to our coast, for our
protection. In other words, we were to become the
carriers and servants of France, and she was to defend
us against England.

This point indeed is so clear, that it has been ad
mitted by the greater part of those, who possess any
information on the subject. Many gentlemen, how
ever, are of opinion, that when Genet was recalled, this
system was given up by France. But I ask these gen
tlemen, what was the real motive of Genet's recal ?
Was it to disavow his plans, or to satisfy our com
plaints ? Certainly not. His violent and foolish pro
ceedings, which counteracted the plan instead of pro
moting it, were no doubt intended to be censured, and
there probably was a disposition to coax and flatter
oiil government* by the recal of this minister, in order

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE.

to prepare it better for that insidious policy, which was
to be adopted by his successors. The true cause,
however, of Genet's removal was the fall of the Brisso-
tine party, to which he had belonged; and every person
connected with or employed by which, Robespierre
had removed. Hence the consuls in America, against
whom we never had complained, were removed, as
well as the minister. But did the French government
disavow the instructions or the proceedings of M. Genet ?
Did his successors relinquish his claims and preten
sions ? Certainly not. On the contrary, they were
all renewed and perpetually urged by those gentlemen,
who never ceased to talk to us about efficacious
measures against England, about a vigorous reaction.
And in the manifesto published by one of them (M.
Adet,) the whole of Genet's measures were expressly
revived, and all his complaints renewed and enforced.
Even that appeal to the people, which he was dis
graced for threatening, was actually made by this
manifesto.

The policy of France to draw this country into the
war, appears also, from the clamor, raised by her and
her partizans against the proclamation of neutrality.
This clamor is fresh in the recollection of us all. Genet
cried out against this proclamation ; Fouchet indirect
ly complained of it, and Adet stigmatized it as insidi
ous, perfidious and " a cloak under which this country
presented England with a poniard, to cut the throat
of our ally." Societies passed resolutions against it ;
orators declaimed, and newspapers teemed with abuse.
Whence all this, if the object had not been to engage
us in the war ? Had France, as she pretended, been de
sirous of our remaining in peace, whence all this rage
at the measure, the only possible object of which was to
preserve peace ? That such was her object is more
over manifest from the measures themselves which she
wished us to adopt; for it is impossible to suppose her
government ignorant of the direct and necessary ten
dency of these measures to bring us into a quarrel
with England.

.192 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

Tn the first place, she wished us to resist and repel
the right, .claimed and exercised by the British govern
ment under the law of nations, of taking the property
of their enemies, on board of our ships. She constant
ly urged us, not only to deny this right, but to resist its
exercise in an efficacious manner. But could she
have imagined that England would yield this right to
us ? She knew that the English, when France, Spain,
Holland and the United States, were in arms against
them alone, had refused to yield it, though pressed by
the formidable combination of all the neutral powers,
with the empress of Russia at their head: a combina
tion, supported too by the united maritime strength of
Prussia, Sweden and Denmark. She knew that after
the American war, Russia, whose treaty with England
expired in 1786, and who, as a power desirous of ex
tending its navigation, was extremely desirous of this
concession, had never been able to obtain it from Eng
land.

Sir, England has constantly refused it to the formida
ble fleet, the immense strength, the overbearing influ
ence, and the wise and vigorous government of the
empress of Russia. She has constantly refused it to
the united solicitations of Sweden and Denmark and
the Hanse towns ; though she has carried on a very
extensive and important commerce with all these na
tions. She has constantly refused it, in time of peace,
to all of them. To France, indeed, she conceded it in
1780, because she gained great equivalents, and
had no interest in withholding it from her ; as she
could never expect to be engaged in a war without
having France for her enemy ; and in that case the
stipulation could not operate. But what did she say
to those nations who might remain at peace, while she
and France should be at war — such as the Russians,
Swedes, Danes, and Hanse towns ? She said, " I will
never J relinquish this right to you ; because it would
enable you to become the carriers of France, whenever
is at war with me; and she will thereby be ena-

J HE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 493

bled, in her turn, to employ all her ships and sailors in
attacking my commerce, while hers will be safe under
a neutral flag." In the year 1793, indeed, when Rus
sia entered into the coalition against France, Britain
made a temporary cession to her of this right, because
the reason, for which it had been withheld, could not
operate, while Russia as well as England was at war
with France : but even then she would not entirely re
linquish it. All this France perfectly well knew ; and
knowing it, could she suppose, that England, would
relinquish this right to us, who had not a single ship of
war, when she had refused it to the vast force of the
armed neutrality — that what she had refused to so
many powerful nations she would yield to a people,
who, though possessing vast resources, could not call
them into action without great injury to themselves, and
much delay — that what she had refused in time of peace,
she wouLd surrender in a war, where not only her suc
cess, but her very existence, depended on the support
of her naval power ; and surrender it too to that very na
tion, which possessing the greatest number of ships and
sailors, was most capable of exercising the right to
her injury and destruction ? No, France expected no
such thing. She knew, that England would not sur
render the right ; and when she so warmly and pertina
ciously urged us to resist the exercise of it, she could
have had no other view than to set the two countries to
quarrelling. England, she well knew, would not yield,
Should we persist, a war must immediately take place.
The same, sir, will apply to the measures she wished
us to adopt, respecting the impressment of seamen in
our ships. It is well known, that England insists on a
principle, by which all persons once her subjects al
ways remain so, unless the right to their allegiance
has been given up by the government itself. This is
the case with all persons born in the United States, or
settled in them at the treaty of peace. From these she
claims no allegiance. But such as have come here
tsince the treaty, she still considers as her subjects, and

494 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

claims the right of treating them as such, whenever she
finds them on her own territory, or on the high seas, the
common territory of nations. Of this description there
are numbers of sailors on board of our ships, and she
claims a right to impress them. This right I do not
mean to defend ; I know that in its exercise it is liable
to great abuse, and is particularly inconvenient to this
country ; but it is claimed and exercised by France
herself, and by every other nation, as well as England.
Yet France has constantly urged us to resist the exer
cise of it by England. We have done every thing
in our power to induce England to renounce it, and
not succeeding in that, we have taken all proper steps
to remedy and prevent its abuse. But this does not
satisfy France ; she urges us to resist the right itself.
Why ? — Because she supposes that England will yield
it? No, sir, no such thing. She well knows that
England will not arid cannot yield it with any regard
to her own safety: it being of the last importance
to her in a war like the present, where she has every
thing staked on her maritime exertions, to prevent her
seamen from passing from hers into neutral ships,
where they get better wages, lighter duty, and are free
from danger. France well knows, therefore, that
England will not yield this right, and this is precisely
the reason why she urges us to resist it : because such
a resistance must immediately produce a quarrel be
tween Great Britain and the United States.

The same spirit is visible in her other demands ; all
of which tend to the same point. She wished us to
adopt a construction of the treaty, that would have
given her complete possession of our ports, and shut
them to England. She would have armed vessels, and
enlisted crews, in our country ; she would have sold
her prizes here ; she would have taken the merchant
ships of England on our shores, and in our very rivers ;
arid our courts must not have interfered. No English
ship of war could have entered our harbors, which she
would not have expelled, by simply affirming, that it

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 495

had made prize on her citizens, no matter whether
lately or four years ago, whether in the East Indies,
the West Indies, Africa or Europe. Could she have
imagined, that England would see all this partiality, all
these favors to its enemy, without anger and jealousy ?
Could she have imagined, that bitter complaints or ir
ritating remonstrances on the part of that country,
would not take place ? Certainly she could not. She
knew, that anger, jealousy and irritation would ne
cessarily be excited : she knew, that a system, which,
under the name of neutrality, would have all the effect
of an alliance with her, must produce resentment and
remonstrance on the part of England, and that these,
added to the ancient animosities not yet extinguished,
but heightened on the contrary by recent injuries, must
speedily end in hostility.

Sir, the plan of ambition and aggrandizement, pur
sued by France in Europe, affords additional proofs of
her policy respecting this country. I have no doubt,
that any gentleman, who will carefully examine the
subject, will be convinced, that France deliberately at
tacked Austria as well as England, and of her own
accord, and, in pursuance of a regular system of poli
cy, lighted up the flames of the present war. I shall
not, however, stop to examine that question, which
would require a minute and tedious detail of facts,
and is by no means, essentially necessary in the pre
sent deliberation. Whether France began the war
from projects of dominion, or was driven into it for
the defence of her independence, is, in some degree,
unimportant at present ; since it is perfectly evident,
and has indeed been admitted on all sides, that with
whatever motives the war began, it has long since
been a mere contest for power. In this contest,
France, having detached Prussia from the alliance,
enslaved Belgium, subjugated Holland, and obtained
an absolute control over the government and forces
of Spain, found her progress resisted by nothing but
the firm persevering courage of Austria on one side,

496 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

and the vast maritime power of England on the other.
Accordingly, she bent all her efforts to weaken and
destroy these two powers, and left nothing un attempt
ed to divide them* She made continual efforts to in
duce the Turks to fall on the house of Austria on one
side, and to arm Prussia against it on the other. She
offered to divide its spoils with Prussia, in order to
engage the avarice and ambition of that rival power,
by whose assistance she might break the strength of
Austria, arid then rule both, with the rest of Germany.
As the fear of Russia has kept the king of Prussia in
awe, and restrained his enterprises, she has left no
stone unturned, to lull the new emperor of Russia into
security, and obtain his acquiescence. By thus rais
ing up enemies against Austria on every side, and
pressing upon it at the same time with her whole mili
tary force, she is attempting to compel it to relinquish
a large part of its territories, and make a peace sepa
rate from England. But she constantly refuses either
to give up her own conquests, or to make a peace in
which both England and Austria should be included.
The policy of this is obvious and important. Could
she, after having stripped and weakened Austria, suc
ceed in detaching it from England, she would be left
free to turn her whole undivided force against that ri
val nation, so long the great object of her jealousy and
hatred, and whose maritime superiority, it has been
her policy, for a century, to reduce. In the meantime,
she leaves nothing unattempted to accomplish this
purpose ; and knowing that the naval strength and pe
cuniary resources of the English depend on their trade,
she resolves to assail their trade in all possible ways.
Hence her former and recent attempts to exclude
English vessels from every port. Hence her instruc
tions to Genet to draw us into an alliance, one condi
tion of which is to be the exclusion of English vessels
from our ports. Hence her threats to Portugal of an
invasion by Spain, unless English vessels are excluded
from the Portuguese ports. Hence her recent at-

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 497

tempts of the same kind on Denmark and the Hanse
towns.

To the success of this project against the com
merce and navy of England, the aid of the United
States is of the highest importance,* and is so consi
dered by France. I have it from the highest authori
ty, that the plan of a maritime coalition against Eng
land, was early formed by France ; that to the comple
tion of it the accession of the United States was alone
wanting ; and that that accession was requested and
refused. The pretence of this coalition, was to reduce
the exorbitant maritime power of England, and pre
vent her tyranny over the other commercial states.
The object of it was, and the certain effect of it if suc
cessful would have been, to break down England ; by
which means France, who came next to her in naval
power, would have been left to reign unrivalled and
uncontrolled in her stead. The United States would
have been the most important member of this coali
tion. The great number of their ships and sailors
would have enabled them to become the carriers of
France, while she should employ all her maritime re
sources in attacking England. Their privateers also
would have struck a deadly blow at the English com
merce ; and the use of their resources and their ports
to France would have given her a decided superiority
in the West Indies, and obliged the English to send
so great a force there, as greatly to weaken their ope
rations every where else. Hence it is evident that
France could have no ally so important to her, in the
naval war against England, as the United States. In
deed, without their assistance, she could have no hopes
of success in the West Indies. Accordingly she took
steps to secure this assistance, as soon as she be
gan to form her project against England, and has pur
sued them ever since with the most unwearied perse
verance, and by every expedient of threats, promise?,
flatteries, fraud and intrigue.

VOL. i. 63

49,8 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

It being, as I conceive, perfectly manifest from all
these considerations, that the plan of France has al
ways been to draw us into the war ; the house is fur
nished with a ready solution of her anger against the
British treaty, and a clue to all her present measures.
It is evident, that her anger at the treaty has arisen
entirely, from its having defeated her plan of drawing
us into the war ; and it will readily appear, that the
whole aim and object of her present measures are to
compel us to renounce it ; to drive us into that quarrel
with England, into which she has failed in her attempts
to entice us. She must either mean this, or she must
mean seriously to attack us, and drive us into a war
against herself. To discover which of these is her
real object, what is the true motive of her present
measures, is of the utmost importance ; because till
that is done, it will be difficult to determine, in what
manner those measures ought to be counteracted,
which is the point immediately under consideration.
I can never believe, that it is the intention of France
seriously to attack this country, or to drive it into a
war against herself. She has too much to lose and
too little to gain by such a contest, to have seriously
resolved on it, or even to wish it. In her counsels, I
have observed great wickedness, but no folly ; and it
would be the extreme of folly in her to compel this
country to become her enemy; especially in the pre
sent war, when we can throw so formidable a weight
into the opposite scale. France well knows our pow
er in that respect, and will not compel us to exert it.
She well knows, that we possess more ships and more
seamen than any country upon earth except England
alone. She well knows, that our sailors are the most
brave, skilful and enterprizing in the world, and, that by
arming our vessels, our commerce would soon be made
to float safe from privateers; while her fleets and
large ships would be kept in awe by those of England.
She knows that in the late war, the state of Massa
chusetts alone, with its privateers, took one third of all

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 499

the merchant ships of Great Britain ; and that, though
she had no commerce to be attacked, these maritime
materials, greatly increased since that time, would ena
ble us, if driven to the necessity, to create speedily a
formidable marine, with which we could, not only de
fend ourselves, but attack her possessions. She knows,
that we have a population not far short of six millions,
and that the martial spirit, which conducted us glori
ously through the trying scenes of the late war, though
dormant indeed, could not have been extinguished.
She knows, that by co-operating with the English, (a
co-operation which must result naturally from our be
ing driven into the war.) by opening our harbors to
their ships, permitting them to arm, refit and victual in
our ports, to recruit among our seamen, and to em
ploy our vessels as transports, we could give them a
most decided preponderance in the American seas,
under which her own colonies, and those of Spain arid
Holland, which she most justly considers as her own,
must speedily fall.

She knows, that in case of a war with us, Spain and
Holland, who must be her allies, would be within our
grasp. She knows that the Americans could and
would lay hold of New Orleans and the Floridas, and
that they are well acquainted with the road to Mexico ;
and she would dread that enterprizing valor, which
formerly led them through barren wilds and frozen
mountains, to the walls of Quebec. She knows, in fine,
that to drive this country into a war with her at the
present juncture, would bring about that co-operation
of means, and that union of interests and views be
tween us and the English, which it has been the great
object of her policy to prevent, and which she had un
dertaken two wars, in the course of half a century, for
the sole and express purpose of breaking. It is, there
fore, I think, impossible to conceive, that France
means to drive or provoke us into war. Her object,
in my opinion, must be altogether different. It must

500 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

be to compel us to renounce the British treaty, and
renew all our differences with that nation, under cir
cumstances of irritation which must speedily end in a
rupture. What has led her to form this project?
From whence could she derive hopes of success ?
She has been led to form it, in my opinion, from a per
suasion, erroneous indeed, but favored by many ap
pearances, that we are a weak, pusillanimous people,
too much devoted to gain to regard our honor, too
careful about our property to risk it in support of our
rights, too much divided to exert our strength, too dis
trustful of our own government to defend it, too much
devoted to her to repel her aggressions at the risk of
a quarrel, too much exasperated against England to
consent to that co-operation, which must of necessity
grow out of resistance to France. Various occur
rences have combined to produce and confirm this
persuasion, and the forbearance, which our govern
ment has exercised towards herself, is not the least of
them. She has seen us submit, with patience, to the
insults and outrages of three successive ministers, for
the very least of which, she would have sent the minis
ter of any nation out of her country, if not to the guil
lotine. The minister of the grand duke of Tuscany,
with whom France had recently concluded a treaty,
learning that the daughter of Louis the Sixteenth was
to be sent out of the country, requested permission
to pay her a visit. This request to visit an unfortu
nate young lady, the near relation of his sovereign,
and whose tender age no less than her sex, her vir
tues and her calamities, entitled her to respect, was
answered by an order from the directory, to quit the
territories of the republic. His expression of a wish
to show one mark of regard to virtuous misfortune
and suffering innocence, was considered as an affront
by the government of France, and punished by the in
stant dismissal of the minister. Accustomed to act
thus herself, how can she impute our long suffering and

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 501

forbearance, under the perpetual insolence and insults
of her ministers, to any thing but weakness, pusilla
nimity, or a blind devotedness to herself? The con
duct of gentlemen on this floor too has more and more
confirmed her in this injurious opinion of us ; has
confirmed her in the erroneous persuasion, that there
is a party in the very bosom of the government, devot
ed to her interests. I do not mean to charge gentle
men with acting under French influence. I am per
suaded that, in the course they have taken, they be
lieved themselves to be aiming at the good of their
country, which they supposed might best be promoted
in the manner recommended by them. But I would
ask those gentlemen, and I solemnly call on them to
lay their hands on their hearts and answer me — I
would ask them whether the course of conduct, which
they have pursued, is not calculated to impress France
with a belief, that they are devoted to her interests and
not to those of their own country ? Whether the man
ner, in which they have always connected the interests
and wishes of France with their opposition to the
measures of this government, does not necessarily
tend to create and confirm this belief? When she
saw them constantly making it a ground of opposi
tion to measures, that they would be hurtful or dis
pleasing to her; constantly supporting those plans
which she was desirous of seeing adopted; constantly
opposing all that she opposed ; what could she infer,
but that they were a party devoted to her views ? As
she knows their numbers and importance, and has
these apparently strong reasons for relying on their
attachment, what can she conclude, but that however
unable they may be to direct the government accord
ing to her wishes, they will be ready and able so to
clog its operations, as to prevent it from adopting or
pursuing vigorous measures against her? She no
doubt does believe, and there is evidence of the fact
from the most respectable quarter, our minister in

o02 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

that country, that she has nothing to do but press
hard on the government, in order to lay it, bound hand
and foot, at the feet of this party, by means of which,
she might then govern the country. She is further
confirmed in this belief by the conduct of the people
of this country, by their warm partiality for her cause
and her nation, by their enthusiastic exultation in her
victories, and the fond, sympathizing sorrow with
which they mourn her disasters. Mistaking the source
of these generous emotions, she has seen in them no
thing but the proof of a slavish devotedness to herself,
which would render this people incapable of asserting
their own rights, when it must be done at the risk of
her displeasure. She does not know, nor can she be
made to understand, that it is the cause of liberty in
which she is thought to be struggling, that inspires this
enthusiasm, and that, should she change her conduct,
and abandon the principles which she professes, these
generous well-wishers would be found among the firm
est of her opposers. A similar mistake she commit
ted with respect to England, and that mistake further
confirmed her original error. She saw much resent
ment excited by the attacks and outrages of England,
and she supposed that resentment to be deep-rooted
and durable. She did not know, and could not con
ceive, that, when England had given up her injurious
pretensions for the future, and agreed to make a fair
and just compensation for the past, we should forget
our resentments, and cherish sentiments of mutual
and friendly intercourse. She supposed these resent
ments to be far more deeply rooted, more universal,
and more permanent, than they really are, and relies
on them as a certain means of preventing any union
of interests and operations between us and England,
however recommended by policy or even required by
necessity.

In all these delusions she is confirmed by the con
duct* the speeches, and the writings, of persons in this

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 503

country, both our own citizens and hers ; by the infor
mation and opinions of some of her citizens, who, hav
ing resided here, have carried home with them those
erroneous opinions, which foreigners generally form
about countries they visit ; and it is to be feared by
the behaviour too of some of our citizens in her own
country, who, forgetting the trust reposed in them, and
the situations in which they were placed, allowed them
selves to pursue a course of conduct and conversation,
calculated to confirm France in all her unfounded and
injurious opinions, respecting this country. Suppos
ing, therefore, that the people of this country are un
willing to oppose her, arid the government unable;
that we should prefer peace with submission, to the
risk of war ; that a strong party devoted to her will
hang on the government, and impede all its measures
of reaction ; and that, if she should place us by her
aggressions in a situation, where the choice should
seem to lie between a war with England and a war
with her, our hatred to England, joined to those other
causes, would force us to take the former part of the
alternative; she has resolved on the measures which
she is now pursuing, and the object of which is to
make us renounce the treaty with England, and enter
into a quarrel with that nation : in fine, to effect by
force and aggressions, that which she had attempted
in vain by four years of intriguing and insidious policy.
If such are her objects, how was she to be induced
to renounce them? By trifling concessions of this,
that, or the other article of a treaty ; this, that or the
other advantage in trade ? — No. It seems to me a de
lusion equally fatal and unaccountable, to suppose
that she is to be thus satisfied : to suppose that, by
these inconsiderable favors which she has not even
asked for, she is to be bought off from a plan so
great and important. It seems to me the most fatal
and unaccountable delusion, that can make gentlemen
shut their eyes to this testimony of every nation, to

504 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

this glare of light bursting in from every side ; that
can render them blind to the projects of France, to the
Herculean strides of her overtowering ambition, which
so evidently aims at nothing less than the establish
ment of universal empire, or universal influence, and
has fixed on this country as one of the instruments for
accomplishing her plan.

It is against this dangerous delusion that I wish to
warn the House and the country. I wish to warn
them not to deceive themselves with the vain and fal
lacious expectation, that the concessions proposed by
this amendment will satisfy the wishes or arrest the
measures of France. Do I dissuade you from these
concessions ? Far from it, I wish them to be offered,
and in the way the most likely to give weight to the
offer. It is a bridge which I am willing to build, for
the pride of France to retreat over ; but what I wish to
warn the House against, is the resting satisfied with
building the bridge, to the neglect of those measures
by which France may be induced to march over it,
after it shall be built. I wish to negociate, and I even
rely much on success ; but the success of the negocia-
tion must be secured on this floor. It must be secur
ed by adopting firm language and energetic measures ;
measures which will convince France, that those opin
ions respecting this country, on which her system is
founded, are wholly erroneous ; that we are neither a
weak, a pusillanimous or a divided people ; that we
are not disposed to barter honor for quiet, nor to save
our money at the expense of our rights : which will
convince her, that we understood her projects, and are
determined to oppose them, with all our resources, and
at the hazard of all our possessions. This, I believe,
is the way to insure success to the negociation ; and
without this I shall consider it as a measure equally
vain, weak and delusive.

When France shall at length be convinced, that we
are firmly resolved to call forth all our resources, and

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 505

exert all our strength to resist her encroachments and
aggressions, she will soon desist from them. She
need not be told what these resources are; she
well knows their greatness and extent ; she well
knows that this country, if driven into a war,
could soon become invulnerable to her attacks, and
could throw a most formidable and preponderating
weight into the scale of her adversary. She will not,
therefore, drive us to this extremity, but will desist as
soon as she finds us determined. I have already touch
ed on our means of injuring France, and of repelling
her attacks; and if those means were less than they
are, still they might be rendered all-sufficient, by resolu
tion and courage. It is in these that the strength of
nations consists, and not in fleets, nor armies, nor popu
lation, nor money: in the "unconquerable will — the
courage never to submit or yield." These are the true
sources of national greatness ; aud to use the words of
a celebrated writer,— " where these means are not
wanting, all others will be found or created." It was
by these means that Holland, in the days of her glory,
triumphed over the mighty power of Spain. It is by
these, that in latter times, and in the course of the
present war, the Swiss, a people, not half so numerous
as we, and possessing few of our advantages, have
honorably maintained their neutrality amid the shock
of surrounding states, and against the haughty ag
gressions of France herself. The Swiss have not been
without their trials. They had given refuge to many
French emigrants, whom their vengeful and implacable
country had driven and pursued from state to state, and
whom it wished to deprive of their last asylum in the
mountains of Switzerland. The Swiss were required
to drive them away, under the pretence that to afford
them a retreat was contrary to the laws of neutrality.
They at first temporized and evaded the demand:
France insisted ; and finding at length that evasion was
useless, they assumed a firm attitude, and declared that
VOL. i. 64

506 Mfc. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING

having afforded an asylum to those unfortunate exiles,
which no law of neutrality forbade, they would protect
them in it at every hazard. France, finding them thus re
solved, gave up the attempt. This was effected by
that determined courage, which alone can make a na
tion great or respectable : and this effect has invariably
been produced by the same cause, in every age and
every clime. It was this that made Rome the mistress
of the world, and Athens the protectress of Greece.
When was it that Rome attracted most strongly the
admiration of mankind, and impressed the deepest
sentiment of fear on the hearts of her enemies ? It
was when seventy thousand of her sons lay bleeding at
Cannae, and Hannibal, victorious over three Roman
armies and twenty nations, was thundering at her
gates. It was then that the young and heroic Scipio,
having sworn on his sword in the presence of the fathers
of the country, not to despair of the republic, marched
forth at the head of a people, firmly resolved to con
quer or die : and that resolution insured them the victo
ry. When did Athens appear the greatest and the
most formidable ? It was when giving up their houses
and possessions to the flames of the enemy, and having
transferred their wives, their children, their aged pa
rents, and the symbols of their religion on board of
their fleet, they resolved to consider themselves as the
republic, and their ships as their country. It was then
they struck that terrible blow, under which the great
ness of Persia sunk and expired.

These means, sir, and many others are in our power.
Let us resolve to use them, and act so as to convince
France that we have taken the resolution, and there
is nothing to fear. This conviction will be to us in
stead of fleets and armies, and even more effectual.
Seeing us thus prepared she will not attack us. Then
will she listen to our peaceable proposals ; then will
she accept the concessions we mean to offer. But
should this offer not be thus supported, should it be at-

THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 507

tended by any circumstances from which she can dis
cover weakness, distrust or division, then will she re
ject it with derision and scorn. I view in the proposed
amendment circumstances of this kind; and for that,
among other reasons shall vote against it. I shall vote
against it not because I am for war, but because I am
for peace ; and because I see in this amendment itself,
and more especially in the course to which it points,
the means of impeding, instead of promoting our pacific
endeavors. And let it be remembered, that when we
give this vote, we vote not only on the peace of our
country, but on what is far more important, its rights
and its honor.

END OF VOL. I.

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