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THE ENEMY WITHIN

By CAPTAIN HENRY LANDAU

all's fair

SECRETS OF THE WHITE LADY
THE ENEMY WITHIN

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2006 with funding from

Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/enemywithininsidOOIandrich

THE ENEMY
WITHIN

The Inside Story of German
Sabotage in America

By CAPTAIN HENRY LANDAU

Profusely Illustrated with Photographs and
Photostatic Copies of Original Documents

G • P • PUTNAM'S SONS
1937

Copyright, igs7> ^V Henry Landau

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, must
not be reproduced in any form without permission.

First Impression

LIBRARY

FEB 2 01967

UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC J

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VAN REES PRESS • NEW YORK

Contents

PAGE

INTRODUCTION ix

Part I
BOMBS, GERMS, AND GERMANS

CHAPTER

I. THE AMERICAN FRONT 3

II. THE PASSPORT FRAUDS 10

ni. THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 1 8

IV. "buy up or blow up" 36

V. THE RECALL OF VON PAPEN AND BOY-ED 52

VI. PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 60

Vn. SECTION IIIB CARRIES ON 72

Vni. BLACK TOM BLOV^S UP 77

IX. THE FREE-LANCE AGENTS 85

X. THE KINGSLAND FIRE 92

XI. DEEPENING SHADOWS 97

XIL A SENTENCE OF DEATH 112

Part II
THE FIVE AGAINST GERMANY

XIII. THE AMERICAN CLAIMANTS TAKE THE FIELD I3I

XIV. RELUCTANT WITNESSES . . I38

XV. "the EASTMAN GIRl" COMES FORWARD I46

XVI. THE SECRETS OF "40 O.B." I50

XVII. THE TRAIL GROWS WARM 166

V

vi CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

XVIII. A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA l8l

XIX. THE STORY OF WOZNIAK — THE FIRE BUG I95

XX. THE BLOODLESS BATTLE OF TUPPER LAKE 202

XXI. THE BURDEN OF PROOF 209

XXII. FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 225

XXIII. THE "qUALTERS HOAX" . 247

XXIV. THE COMMISSION RULES 258

XXV. THE BATTLE CONTINUES 273

XXVI. THE FIRST AMERICAN VICTORY 284

XXVII. THE WILES OF DIPLOMACY 29O

XXVIII. THE ENEMY WITHIN 299

APPENDIX 305

INDEX 311

List of Illustrations

The Fire Raging in the Black Tom Terminal . . . Frontispiece

FACING PAGE

Count Johann von Bernstorfl 22

Dr. Heinrich F. Albert 22

Captain Franz von Papen 23

Captain Karl Boy-Ed 23

Consul General Franz von Bopp 70

Vice Consul Wilhelm von Brincken 70

Wolf von Igel 70

Paul Koenig 70

Captain Franz von Rintelen 71

Robert Fay 71

Inspector Thomas J. Tunney 71

The Ship Bombers on Their Way to Jail 71

LotharWitzke 102

Kurt Jahnke 102

Colonel Walter Nicolai 103

Captain Rudolf Nadolny 103

"Wanted" Poster for Kristoil 134

Charles Wunnenberg 135

German Bombs Seized in Hoboken 135

Fire at Kingsland 166

Sketch of Incendiary Pencil 167

Fiodore Wozniak 167

Paul Hilken 198

Captain Frederick Hinsch 198

via LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FACING PAGE

Dr. Paul Altcndorf 199

Fred Herrmann and Adam Siegel 199

Admiral Sir Reginald Hall 230

Amos J. Peaslee 230

Robert W. Bonynge 230

The Famous Sabotage Cable of January 26, 1 915 231

The Vital Evidence in the $50,000,000 Claims 262

Facsimile of the Table of Contents of the Herrmann Message

Magazine 262-263

Frederick Hinsch and His Wife 263

Raoul Gerdts 263

Introduction

In this book I have endeavored to present the true facts, as far as they
are know^n, concerning German sabotage in the United States during
the period between the outbreak of the World War and the entrance
of the United States into the war. I have concentrated principally on
the Black Tom and Kingsland cases, as they were the most devastating
acts committed and the only ones, with the exception of an explosion
in Tacoma Harbor, in which any attempt has been made to prove
German complicity and to collect damages.

Having assisted the American claimants in their investigations in
connection with the Black Tom and Kingsland cases, I have known
intimately many of the principal characters involved and have obtained
from them their personal stories. Because of this connection, too, the
voluminous records of these cases, consisting chiefly of exhibits, briefs,
oral arguments before the Mixed Claims Commission, and reports of
the various American investigators have been at my disposal.

This book has been written entirely at my own volition and has been
inspired neither by the American claimants nor by their German op-
ponents; nor is it my object to try the case in public before a final
decision has been reached by the Mixed Claims Commission. I have
been prompted solely by a desire to tell the general story of German
sabotage here and in particular to cover the amazing fight which the
American claimants have put up during the last fifteen years in their
efforts to prove Germany's guilt in the destruction of Black Tom and
Kingsland. The story of these cases, probably the most intricate and
bitterly contested ones ever argued before an international court of
law, has never been told before. In view, too, of the present war clouds
gathering in Europe and the Orient and in view of the fact that the
United States is still as vulnerable as ever to the saboteur, it is high
time that the lessons of Black Tom and Kingsland be revealed.

Far be it from me to indict Germany. Many arguments can be ad-

X INTRODUCTION

vanced in support of her contention that, while the United States was
technically neutral during the neutrality period, actually she was
affording material and financial aid to Germany's enemies and that
Germany was justified, therefore, in the use of sabotage to impede
the flow of munitions and supplies to the Allies. In wartime every
nation adopts the most expedient methods to guard its vital interests,
and American unpreparedness in the field of counter-espionage was an
open invitation to Germany to conduct a campaign of sabotage in the
United States.

In depicting the background of the fight which the American in-
vestigators have waged against the German Secret Service and in
analyzing the evidence, I have drawn on my own war experience
in the British Secret Service. During that period I had unique oppor-
tunities to learn the methods and psychology of the German Secret
Service.

A final word must be added concerning the German wireless and
cable messages which the British intercepted and decoded during the
war. Although an explanation of how Amos Peaslee came into pos-
session of them is not given until Part II, they have been inserted
throughout the text of the book wherever they apply. Their authenticity
has been admitted by the German Government.

August 23, 1937. H. L.

PART I
BOMBS, GERMS, AND GERMANS

Chapter I
THE AMERICAN FRONT

Before the World War Germany had made all her war calculations
on the basis of a short but decisive campaign through Belgium and
northern France. When this failed, she realized that she was in for a
long war in which economic strength would be the decisive factor. On
account of her miscalculation on winning the war in a few months she
had not given much attention to the United States. All her energies
had been devoted to preparing against Russia, France, and, to a lesser
extent, England.

But the heads of the government and the army soon came to realize
that America's resources might well be the key to victory for whichever
side could obtain access to them. British sea power precluded Ger-
many's having any chance of drawing on the American market, her-
self; but at least she could and must try to keep her enemies from
exploiting their advantage. There were only two means of doing this
which held out any hope of success, the submarine and sabotage. But
Germany had too few underseas craft in the first year of the war to
enable her seriously to cripple shipping. She therefore felt obliged to
direct the German Military and Naval Intelligence Services to under-
take a sabotage offensive.

Before the World War Gerniany possessed the largest and most effi-
cient secret service organization in Europe. Most of her espionage
activities, however, had been directed against likely enemies on the
continent. She had thought it worth while to plant only one part-time
spy in the United States and had limited his activities to reporting on
new industrial and chemical developments.

As Germany was automatically cut off from the world across the sea
on the outbreak of hostilities, it was then too late to send any great
number of trained spy and sabotage agents to the United States. She

4 THE ENEMY WITHIN

had to rely, therefore, on her diplomatic representatives here to build
up the necessary organization during the early stages of the war. These
were few in number and had been chosen for their posts with no
thought that they would ever be called upon to carry on more than
normal consular and diplomatic business. The Embassy was staffed
by four executives: an Ambassador, a Commercial Attache, a Military
Attache, and a Naval Attache.

The Ambassador, Count Johann von Bernstorff, was a career diplo-
mat who had had many years training in the diplomatic service. His
deep, dome-shaped head and furrowed face revealed the thinker — a
man endowed with great power of concentration. A firm mouth and
chin, and a Kaiser mustache lent him a certain air of fierceness in
contrast to his otherwise delicately molded features. Cold eyes, peering
at times through half -closed lids, gave an impression of cunning, which
was immediately dispelled by his ingratiating smile. Tall, slender, al-
ways immaculately groomed, he had a distinguished appearance. He
Was an aristocrat, a member of an old Saxon family which had sup-
plied Saxony with many of her statesmen.

As an ambassador he had the entree to the White House, a seat in the
diplomatic galleries of the Senate and House of Representatives, and
was in close contact with those Senators, Congressmen, and appointees
who hailed from the sections of the country which had an influential
German-American vote. He had his finger on the pulse of official
Washington and was easily able to keep his government closely in-
formed on all important issues and political events in the capital.

Socially he was much sought after, not only by those to whom spon-
sorship by an ambassador is always an attraction but also by many
Americans of German extraction who were anxious to be useful. He
was a keen judge of character, and many of these men and women he
astutely used on any occasion they could be of service to him.

Germany's Commercial Attache was Privy Councilor Dr. Heinrich
Albert. Not only was he the paymaster of all Germany's diplomatic
and consular representatives in the United States, but he also dis-
bursed funds for supplies purchased by his government, and finally
also paid out money — at least $30,000,000 that we know of — for propa-
ganda, sabotage, and secret service purposes. He had a joint account

THE AMERICAN FRONT 5

with von Bernstorff in the Chase National Bank, which often amounted
to several million dollars. As American treasurer for the Imperial Ger-
man Government, he had great influence with bankers, manufacturers,
and others with whom he did business. His office during the war was
in the Hamburg-American Building at 45 Broadway, New York City.

He was tall and slim. His countenance was open; and in spite of
several saber scars on his cheeks, his fair hair and mild blue eyes gave
him a friendly appearance. He was always well dressed, extremely
polite, and punctilious. He was liked and held in high esteem by his
colleagues, who credited him with expert knowledge of economic con-
ditions in the United States. His methods were quiet and successful;
his participation in secret service and other clandestine activities v/as
carefully camouflaged and but for an accident might even have passed
entirely unnoticed.

Long afterwards, when Congress got down to investigating his ac-
tivities, he was characterized by Senator Nelson as the "Machiavelli of
the whole thing ... the mildest mannered man that ever scuttled ship
or cut a throat."

Captain Franz von Papen held the post of Military Attache. At the
time of his appointment, in 191 3, there was no thought that any big
task might devolve on him. From the viewpoint of the large standing
armies of Europe, Washington was a minor post; and for that reason
the Military Attache occupied a dual position: he was attached both
to the German Embassy in Washington and the German Legation in
Mexico City. To assist him in covering this wide field of activity, he
had only a secretary. Wolf von Igel.

At the time, von Papen was a young cavalry officer in a regiment of
Uhlans. He had married a Miss Boche, the daughter of an immensely
wealthy Alsatian pottery manufacturer; and his new wealth, added to
his social and military standing, had won for him the Washington
appointment. His appearance reflected energy: he was tall, broad-
shouldered, and erect; his face was clean-cut, with large bones, a large
nose, prominent ears, keen eyes, a military mustache, and a strong jaw.
He was vigorous in speech, and quick and daring in action. Intoler-
ance, arrogance, and bluntness in criticizing his associates also were
prominent among his characteristics. Coupled with all these was a

0 THE ENEMY WITHIN

capacity for cunning, intrigue, and hard work. He liked women and
used them whenever he could.

The Kaiser's Naval Attache was Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the son of a
German mother and a Turkish father. So brilliantly had he acquitted
himself at the outset of his naval career that he had been one of six
young officers chosen by the German Naval Command for training
for high executive posts. Attached to the staff of Admiral von Tirpitz,
he had successfully directed a press campaign in 1910 to influence the
public on the eve of requests for heavy naval appropriations, which
amounted in that year to 400,000,000 marks. Later his duties had
taken him to various parts of the world as Naval Attache, and 1914
found him at the Washington post.

In appearance he was heavy-set, bull-necked, with a massive jaw.
He was polished and had considerable charm. He was less impulsive
than von Papen and exercised much more care in covering up his
tracks. He was often at loggerheads with the Military Attache. On one
occasion von Papen telegraphed him to be more careful. To this he
replied in a letter:

Dear Papen:

A secret agent who returned from Washington this evening made the
following statement: "The Washington people are very much excited about
von Papen and are having a constant watch kept on him. They are in
possession of a whole heap of incriminating evidence against him. They
have no evidence against Count B. and Captain B-E (!)." In this connection

1 would suggest with due diffidence that perhaps the first part of your
telegram is worded rather too emphatically.

These then were the men entrusted with the launching of Germany's
campaign of sabotage and obstruction in the United States. It must
be borne in mind, however, that as the war progressed both German
secret services sent free-lance agents to the United States, many of
whom operated independently of Germany's diplomatic represen-
tatives.

When the news was flashed to the United States that the Austrian
Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife had been assassinated in

THE AMERICAN FRONT 7

Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, Count von Bernstorff v^as having dinner
w^ith the Spanish Ambassador at the MetropoHtan Club in Washington.
Von Bernstorff fully comprehended that this might be the spark that
w^ould touch off the general European v^ar v^hich the v^^hole world
knev^ was impending. He at once arranged for his summer leave and
on July 7 sped to Berlin. In the light of his subsequent activities, we
can take it for granted that, in addition to receiving his instructions
from the German Foreign Office, he was also interviewed by the es-
pionage bureaus.

The first of these, commonly known as the German Secret Service,
comprised Section III B of the Great General Staff and was under the
able direction of Colonel Nicolai. In addition to this organization there
also was a Naval Intelligence Service, which, although a much smaller
unit, also operated on a secret service basis. As was the case with the
Allies, both German secret service bodies established spy bases in the
principal neutral countries and from these directed spy activities against
the enemy. Belligerents on both sides tied in their secret service organ-
izations with their naval and military attaches. But if this was common
to both sides, the attaches and secret services of the Allies were at least
wise enough not to engage in any activities which could be construed
as at all detrimental to the neutral countries in which they were located.
Although the attaches acted in an advisory capacity concerning the
objectives to aim at in enemy territory and also telegraphed the spy
reports to headquarters, they never came into contact with the actual
agents. Their dealings were exclusively with the chiefs of the spy bases,
who recruited and directed the individual agents.

However, since Germany had no organized espionage base in the
United States before the war, she had perforce to instruct the Military
and Naval Attaches to undertake personally the task of forming one.

On August 5, 1 91 4, when England declared war, von Bernstorff was
already on his way back to the United States, having sailed three days
previously. Accompanying him were Dr. Albert and Dr. Dernburg,
former Secretary of State for Colonies, whose chief duty was to be
the spreading of German propaganda.

In the Ambassador's possession was $150,000,000 in German treasury
notes, which, according to Dr. Albert's later admissions, was to serve

8 THE ENEMY WITHIN

for "buying munitions for Germany, stopping munitions for the Allies,
necessary propaganda, forwarding reservists — and other things." In
order to guard against this treasure's falling into the hands of patrolling
British warships, it was always kept close at hand so that, in the event
of the ship's being stopped and searched by a boarding party, it could
be thrown overboard at a moment's notice.

If the German Secret Service lacked a prewar organization in the
United States, here were the funds to create one immediately. An
ample surplus would remain after attending to the objectives out-
lined by Dr. Albert. There remained only the handing over of the
instructions from Berlin to von Papen and Boy-Ed before the ma-
chinery would be set in motion.

Captain von Papen was in Mexico City at the outbreak of hos-
tilities. He hurried north immediately to meet von Bernstorff in Wash-
ington and after a conference with him established headquarters in
New York City at 60 Wall Street, where he took a suite of offices which
was known as the Bureau of the Military Attache, or the War Intelli-
gence Center. Meanwhile Captain Boy-Ed had also had an interview
with his Ambassador; and he too located himself in New York with
an office at 11 Broadway, close to the New York Custom House. As
has already been mentioned. Dr. Albert's headquarters were a stone's
throw away, at 45 Broadway.

If there are any doubts as to the nature of the orders von Bernstorff
passed on to his Attaches, we need only turn to the very definite instruc-
tions which were later issued by the authorities in Germany. On
January 26, 1915, the General Staff telegraphed the Embassy in Wash-
ington via the Foreign Office a message the meaning of which is unmis-
takable:

For Military Attache. You can obtain particulars as to persons suitable
for carrying on sabotage in the U. S. and Canada from the following persons :
one, Joseph MacGarrity, Philadelphia, Pa.; two, John P. Keating, Michigan
Avenue, Chicago; three, Jeremiah O'Leary, 16 Park Row, New York.

One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. Number three is reliable
but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Case-
ment. In the U.S. sabotage can be carried out in every kind of factory for
supplying munitions of war. Railway embankments and bridges must not

THE AMERICAN FRONT 9

be touched. Embassy must in no circumstances be compromised. Similar
precautions must be taken in regard to Irish pro-German propaganda.

Zimmermann *

The abrupt opening of the above cable indicates that there must
have been instructions issued relative to sabotage in the United States
prior to the sending of this message. By these orders Germany's diplo-
matic representatives in the United States were compelled to play a
dual role. On the surface they were to carry out their diplomatic func-
tions and preserve friendly relations with the United States; surrepti-
tiously they were to direct Germany's sabotage activities. And above
all Dr. Jekyll was always to deny and repudiate what Mr. Hyde was
doing.

Count von Bernstorff as the commander in chief was to keep in the
background as much as possible, his principal duty being to watch
Congress and the President in order to prevent any political action
unfavorable to Germany. Dr. Albert was to handle the funds, also to
act as the director of activities to tie up Allied munitions orders. Cap-
tain von Papen was to supervise an active army of spies and sabotage
agents both in the United States and in Canada. Captain Boy-Ed was
to direct sabotage on ships transporting munitions to the Allies, to
arrange for coal and supplies for German warships and commerce
raiders, and also to recruit spies to send to enemy countries in Europe,
chiefly England. In this work these four chiefs were to be actively
assisted by the various German Consuls and consular representatives
scattered throughout the United States.

But, before these plans could be put into operation, von Papen and
Boy-Ed were swamped by another and more pressing task. Immedi-
ately war was declared the thousands of reservists resident in Amer-
ica were required to go home and rejoin the colors. The burden of
figuring out ways and means of getting them through the blockade
fell on the two Attaches, and for some time this chore absorbed the
major part of their energies.

* Throughout most of the war Zimmermann was a prominent official of the
Foreign Office, holding successively the posts of Undersecretary and Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

Chapter II
THE PASSPORT FRAUDS

Passport control is an outgrowth of the World War. Before the war,
it was possible to travel all over the world without a passport; it was
only the careful traveler who availed himself of this means of personal
identification. He carried it for his own convenience, and foreign gov-
ernments rarely used it to check up on him. Consequently, in the
United States obtaining a passport was a simple matter which resolved
itself into filling out an application form signed by two witnesses of
American nationality who certified that they knew the applicant to
be an American citizen. The passport carried a rough general descrip-
tion of the bearer but no photograph. To prevent the return of reserv-
ists to the Central Powers the Allies insisted on every traveler's carry-
ing a passport. Passports were examined at all Allied ports; and, as the
cordon tightened, every merchant vessel was stopped at sea by patrols
and searched for suspects.

Von Papen and Boy-Ed were therefore immediately faced with the
problem of securing neutral passports for the thousands of reservists
who were pouring in on them. Since the peacetime passport regula-
tions remained in force for some time, the task was at first a simple
one; but soon the Government tightened its rules; the applications
were closely scrutinized and checked; and more and more informa-
tion was required on the instrument, such as the names of the coun-
tries the holder intended visiting. A photograph was also added to the
requirements. It became necessary, therefore, for the two Attaches to
set up a special organization for supplying passports. They realized,
too, that the difficulties were now such that they would have to aban-
don sending back reservists on a wholesale scale, and instead would
have to concentrate on the officers, of whom there were from 800 to
1,000 scattered through North and South America and who, as they

THE PASSPORT FRAUDS II

were sent on by the various German Consulates, were flowing into
New York in a steady stream.

Hans von Wedell, a reserve officer who had many connections in
New York and who knew the city well, having both practiced law
there and served as a newspaper reporter, was designated to head the
organization. Furthermore, he had already made a trip to Germany
as a courier for von Bernstorff, and while there had discussed the
reservist question with his uncle, Count Botho von Wedell, a Foreign
Office official in Berlin.

When approached by von Papen, von Wedell eagerly undertook the
task. He opened up an office in Bridge Street and then set about acquir-
ing neutral passports. German-Americans in Yorkville and Hoboken,
bums on the East Side, and longshoremen and sailors of Spanish, Scan-
dinavian, or other neutral nationality, who frequented the water front,
were his prey. For the $io to $25 he offered them they delivered to him
the passports he had persuaded them to apply for in their own names.

For a time von Wedell got along famously. The two Attaches sent a
steady stream of reserve officers to him, and with the false neutral pass-
ports furnished by him they were successfully sent on their way to
Scandinavian, Dutch, and Italian ports. His bills were paid by Captain
von Papen. Proof of this was revealed later when the Attache's check
books were seized by the British at Falmouth while he was en route
home after being recalled.

Soon, however, von Wedell was in difficulties; some of his men
started blackmailing him. This was followed up by the disturbing news
that the Department of Justice was on his trail. He was an American
citizen, and as a lawyer he knew the penalties ahead of him. Hence,
deciding that discretion was the better part of valor, he fled to Cuba;
but not, however, before sending von Bernstorff the following letter,
dated December 26, 1914, from the Hotel St. George, Nyack-on-
Hudson, which clearly implicated von Papen and his assistant, von
Igel:

12 THE ENEMY WITHIN

His Excellency

The Imperial German Ambassador

Count von Bernstorff

Washington, D.C.

Your Excellency:

Allow me most obediently to put before you the following facts: It seems
that an attempt has been made to produce the impression upon you that I
prematurely abandoned my post, in New York. That is not true.

I — My work was done. At my departure I left the service, well organized
and worked out to its minutest details, in the hands of my successor, Mr.
Carl Ruroede, picked out by myself, and, despite many warnings, still tarried
for several days in New York in order to give him the necessary final direc-
tions and in order to hold in check the blackmailers thrown on my hands
by the German officers until after the passage of my travelers through
Gibraltar; in which I succeeded. Mr. Ruroede will testify to you that without
my suitable preliminary labors, in which I left no conceivable means untried
and in which I took not the slightest consideration of my personal weal or
woe, it would be impossible for him, as well as for Mr. von Papen, to for-
ward officers and "aspirants" in any number whatever, to Europe. This
merit I lay claim to and the occurrences of the last days have unfortunately
compelled me, out of sheer self-respect, to emphasize this to your Excellency.

II — The motives which induced me to leave New York and which, to
my astonishment, were not communicated to you, are the following:

1. I knew that the State Department had, for three weeks, withheld a
passport application forged by me. Why?

2. Ten days before my departure I learnt from a telegram sent me by
Mr. von Papen, which stirred me up very much, and further through the
omission of a cable, that Dr. Stark had fallen into the hands of the English.
That gentleman's forged papers were liable to come back any day and could,
owing chiefly to his lack of caution, easily be traced back to me.

3. Officers and aspirants of the class which I had to forward over, namely
the people, saddled me with a lot of criminals and Jjlackmailers, whose
eventual revelations were liable to bring about any day the explosion of the
bomb.

4. Mr. von Papen had repeatedly urgently ordered me to hide myself.

5. Mr. Igel had told me I was taking the matter altogether too lightly and
ought to — for God's sake — disappear.

6. My counsel . . . had advised me to hastily quit New York, inasmuch as
a local detective agency was ordered to go after the passport forgeries.

THE PASSPORT FRAUDS I3

7. It had become clear to me that eventual arrest might yet injure the
worthy undertaking and that my disappearance would probably put a stop
to all investigation in this direction.

How urgent it was for me to go away is shown by the fact that, two
days after my departure, detectives, who had followed up my telephone
calls, hunted up my wife's harmless and unsuspecting cousin in Brooklyn,
and subjected her to an interrogatory.

Mr. von Papen and Mr. Albert have told my wife that I forced myself
forward to do this work. That is not true. When I, in Berlin, for the first
time heard of this commission, I objected to going and represented to the
gentleman that my entire livelihood which I had created for myself in
America by six years of labor was at stake therein. I have no other means,
and although Mr. Albert told my wife my practice was not worth talking
about, it sufficed, nevertheless, to decently support myself and wife and to
build my future on. I have finally, at the suasion of Count Wedell, under-
taken it, ready to sacrifice my future and that of my wife. I have, in order
to reach my goal, despite infinite difficulties, destroyed everything that I
built up here for myself and my wife. I have perhaps sometimes been
awkward, but always full of good will, and I now travel back to Germany
with the consciousness of having done my duty as well as I understood it,
and of having accomplished my task.

With expressions of the most exquisite consideration, I am your Excellency,

Very respectfully,

Hans Adam von Wedell

Carl Ruroede, a former senior clerk in Oelrichs and Company, re-
ferred to in the above letter, whom von Wedell had carefully
groomed to take his place, was not long left in peace. Albert G. Adams,
an agent of the Department of Justice, cleverly disguised as a pro-
German Bowery tough, managed to enroll himself as one of Ruroede's
agents in obtaining fake passports. They bargained over the price and
finally agreed on $20 each for passports of native-born Americans and
$30 each for passports of naturalized citizens — the higher price was
fixed for the latter as the application requirements were more severe.

A few days later Adams dashed into Ruroede's office brandishing
four passports. Ruroede expressed satisfaction, as indeed he should
have; for they were perfect, having been made out by the State Depart-
ment at the special request of the Department of Justice.

14 THE ENEMY WITHIN

"But what about the photographs ?" said Adams with a worried look,
after Ruroede had got through examining them.

"Oh! That's simple," replied Ruroede; "watch me."

At this, Ruroede took one of the passports, examined it carefully,
then from a stack of passport photographs picked out one of a reservist
officer whose description fitted the one shown on the instrument. Next
he moistened this photograph, applied some mucilage, and then stuck
it over the photograph on the passport, which had been similarly
dampened. He then turned the paper over, laid it on a cloth, and with
a dull-pointed bone knitting needle traced out the lettering on the seal.

"When this dries," said Ruroede with a triumphant smile, "the new
photograph will bear the imprint of the United States seal and Arthur
Sachse, Reserve Lieutenant in the German Army, will have become
Howard Paul Wright, bearer of passport Number 45573."

The unfortunate Ruroede little knew that Howard Paul Wright
happened to be a Department of Justice agent.

It was not difficult for Adams to discover that the reservists who had
received the four passports furnished by him, under the names of
Howard Paul Wright, Peter Hansen, Stanley F. Martin, and Herbert
S. Wilson, were to sail on the S.S. Bergensfjord, a Norwegian liner,
bound for Bergen, Norway.

On January 2, 191 5, as soon as they received word that Ruroede had
been arrested, four agents of the Department of Justice hurried to the
Barge Office and boarded a revenue cutter, on which they overtook
the Bergensfjord a few minutes after it had sailed. The ship was or-
dered to heave to. All the male passengers on board were lined up,
and the four bearers of the passports were picked out. After a short
interrogation they realized that they had been trapped, and identified
themselves as Sachse, Meyer, Wegener, and MuUer, reservists home-
ward bound to the Fatherland.

On the same day, while Department of Justice agents were gathering
up the papers in Ruroede's office at 11 Bridge Street, a German walked
in bearing a letter of introduction from von Papen and introduced
himself as Wolfram von Knorr, Captain of Cruiser, who up to the out-
break of war had been Naval Attache in Tokio. Cleverly drawn out
in conversation by Joseph A. Baker, Assistant Agent in Charge of the

THE PASSPORT FRAUDS I5

Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York, von Knorr guilelessly
admitted that von Papen had sent him over to get a passport. He v^as
allow^ed to depart; and it was only the next day, vv^hen he read the
morning paper, that he realized he had been questioned by a Depart-
ment of Justice agent.

Von Knorr also unw^ittingly supplied additional proof of von Papen's
complicity in Ruroede's activities. Expert examination showed that the
typewriter used in writing the letter of introduction was the same one
employed in typing the lists of names and descriptions of reservists
which were found in Ruroede's office.

Faced with the facts, Ruroede confessed. He was sentenced to three
years in Atlanta prison. The four reservists, advancing the plea that
they had accepted the passports out of patriotism, were fined $200 each.

There was still, however, one more act to the drama. The luckless
von Wedell had returned from Cuba and was on the Bergensfjord at
the time of the search. This came out in Ruroede's confession. The
Department of Justice had missed him in the line-up; but there was
still the wireless.

On January 11, 191 5, the boarding officer of a British patrol boat
took Rosato Sprio, a Mexican, off the Bergensfjord, Sprio admitted
after close interrogation that he was Hans von Wedell, an American
citizen.

The British patrol boat never made port. She struck a German mine,
and von Wedell went to the bottom with her.

The attitude of official Germany to these passport frauds can be
gauged from coded telegram Number 39 which passed between Wash-
ington and Berlin, on January 7, 1915 :

In consequence of the instructions sent to me by private letter from the
[ ? ] and officially to Herr Papen to send home the largest possible number
of German officers, it was necessary to furnish the latter with false passports,
in regard to which I had, in the circumstances above referred to, no thought
of objection. Details have unfortunately become known to public opinion and
the American Government started an investigation, in the course of which
there is no reason to fear that the Embassy will be compromised. State De-
partment informed me definitely that this Government attached no impor-
tance to the rumors that the Embassy had been concerned. But in regard to

l6 THE ENEMY WITHIN

this question, a strong difference of opinion has arisen between Consul
General Falcke and me. The Consul General considered himself bound to
raise pedantic objections, while I only wanted to give weight to the point
of view that it was incumbent on Hcrr Papen to see that as many officers
as possible were provided. I have already submitted to your Excellency part
of the correspondence with the Consul General. The rest of the papers are
to follow as soon as the matter has been settled.

Bernstorff

Fully agreeing with von Bernstorff in his estimate of Consul General
Falcke, Zimmermann replied on January ii, 1915:

Intelligence has reached us from private sources which raises doubts as
to whether the Consulate General at New York is at present in competent
hands. Please acquaint me with your views by telegraph.

Von Bernstorff then promptly replied on January 12, 1915, suggest-
ing the transfer of Falcke:

Unfortunately I have to confirm the news which has reached Your Ex-
cellency. As I have informed Your Excellency in my dispatches . . . various
differences of opinion have arisen between Falcke and me. He always ended
by yielding to my direct orders, and I have exerted myself to the utmost to
avoid a conflict at this juncture. All the time I took into account the fact that
it was all but impossible for Falcke to travel from here to Europe. Perhaps

he could be transferred to a South American post Albert already sees to

many matters which ordinarily the Consul General would have dealt with
because we had to take Falcke's passive resistance into account.

The arrest of Ruroede did not put an end to the passport frauds,
though their execution became much more difficult. Von Papen and
Boy-Ed continued to hire men to secure passports for them. One of
the latter's men, Richard Peter Stegler, a reservist, was arrested in Feb-
ruary 1915. He admitted that on instructions from Boy-Ed he had
obtained the birth certificate of Richard Madden, of Hoboken, and
had used it to obtain an American passport for which he paid Madden
$100. Both of them were sentenced to a term in prison.

Not only reservists but also spies were sent over to Europe with these

THE PASSPORT FRAUDS I7

false passports. Several of those recruited and sent over by Boy-Ed were
caught by the British. Of them, Karl Lody, was shot in the Tower of
London, and Kuepferle committed suicide in Brixton Prison.

When such of the reservists as managed to get across the Atlantic
reached Germany, their passports were carefully collected by the Ger-
man Secret Service and were again used to send spies from Germany
into England, France, and Russia — fully 90 per cent of the spies who
were sent out from the various German spy bases were equipped with
neutral passports. As the war progressed, the German Secret Service
became more scientific; they copied minutely the texture of the paper,
the seals, and even the watermark, and made up passports in Germany
which would have defied expert examination. Such, however, were not
available to von Papen and Boy-Ed, who had to continue to rely on the
ones obtained by von Wedell and Ruroede.

But the Department of Justice steadily increased its vigilance, and
the State Department changed the form of the passport and made the
application requirements more severe. These measures rapidly reduced
the number of passport frauds. The passport control of the Allies, too,
became more efficient. But during the first few months of the war only
von Papen and Boy-Ed can tell how many hundreds of false passports
they made use of.

Chapter III
THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS

But Germany was far from content with confining the activities of her
representatives to such relatively innocuous enterprises as smuggling
reservists home with forged passports. She was determined to block
the flow of munitions and supplies from Canada and the United States
to the Allies. In spite of her original error in not building up an
espionage service here, she made desperate efTorts to remedy the
situation as rapidly as possible. All available agents in the Western
Hemisphere and the Orient were mobilized and ordered to the United
States.

Prominent among these professional German agents was Horst von
der Goltz. At the outbreak of the war he was combining the trades of
spy and soldier of fortune in the Mexican Army. When the European
crisis took a critical turn, he was ordered to hold himself in readiness,
and as he subsequently stated:

A few days later, the 3rd of August, 1914, license was given by my com-
manding officer to separate myself from the service of my brigade for the
term of six months. I left directly for El Paso, Texas, where I was told by
Mr. Kueck, German Consul at Chihuahua, Mexico, who stayed there, to put
myself at the disposition of Captain von Papen.

This was the day before the declaration of war.

Von der Goltz lost no time in reporting to von Papen. He traveled

to Washington, and from there the German Embassy sent him on to

New York. The Attache was immensely relieved at his arrival. Berlin

had demanded action, and here was a daring and experienced secret

service agent ready to do his bidding. Von der Goltz himself was full of

grandiose schemes to pour into von Papen's willing ears. One was no

less than an invasion of Canada through British Columbia with the aid

z8

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS I9

of German warships in the Pacific and reservists then in the United
States. This foolhardy plan was submitted to von BernstorH, who,
fully realizing its impracticability, promptly squashed it.

The idea of an attack on Canada, however, appealed especially to von
Papen, as it would have the desirable effect of holding back Canadian
supplies, foodstuffs, and troops destined for France. Furthermore, once
a foothold had been estabHshed in Canada, an attempt could be made
to purchase American arms and supplies. Such an embarrassment
might force the American Government to refuse to supply either side,
and thus the flow of munitions and other supplies to the Allies in
Europe would be effectively stopped. Absurd as it was from any prac-
tical standpoint, the idea lingered on in von Papen's mind ; and we find
that on at least two future occasions he seriously entertained it.

But von der Goltz had his eyes too firmly riveted on Canada to be
diverted; in September 1914 he was back with another scheme. This
time it was to blow up the Welland Canal. Von Papen readily fell in
with his plans. The scheme had to be abandoned, however, because
the Canal was too well guarded.

Not long afterwards von der Goltz returned to Berlin for further
orders. The British caught him on his way back to the United States
with sabotage instructions which, as he described them, "left nothing
to be desired . . . seditions, strikes in munition plants, attacks upon
ships carrying supplies to the Allies, bomb outrages." Later he was
extradited to the United States and turned State's evidence against his
accomplices in the Welland Canal attempt. But all this has been told
in many other places — in fact it is one of the few well-known stories of
German activity here — and we will confine ourselves to this passing
mention.

The Germans were not, however, to be discouraged by the failure
of von der Goltz's plans. On December 12, 1914, the following cipher
telegram. Number 357, was sent from Berlin to von Bernstorfl:

Secret: — The transportation of Japanese troops through Canada must be
prevented at all costs if necessary by blowing up Canadian railways. It would
probably be advisable to employ Irish for this purpose in the first instance
as it is almost impossible for Germans to enter Canada. You should discuss
the matter with the Military Attache. The strictest secrecy is indispensable.

20 THE ENEMY WITHIN

This was followed up on January 3, 191 5, by a second cipher tele-
gram, Number 386, to the Ambassador:

From Berlin

To Washington

With reference to my telegram No. 357.

Secret. The General Staff is anxious that vigorous measures should be
taken to destroy the Canadian Pacific in several places for the purpose of
causing a lengthy interruption of traffic. Captain Boehm who is well known
in America and who will shortly return to that country is furnished with
expert information on that subject. Acquaint the Military Attache with the
above and furnish the sums required for the enterprise.

Zimmermann

Spurred on by the telegrams, von Papen looked around for recruits.
His choice fell on Werner Horn, a reserve officer who had come up
from Guatemala to New York to seek means of reaching Germany.
Horn traveled to Vanceboro, Maine, and blew up the international
bridge there. But so amateurish was his technique that he was quickly
arrested. He then confessed but loyally refused to implicate von Papen.

When the news of his confession reached the Canadian authorities,
they promptly applied for his extradition. At this the worried von
Bernstorfl immediately telegraphed Zimmermann:

Most Secret, nth of February, 1915.

The carrying out of your telegram, No. 386, for Military Attache was en-
trusted to a former officer, who has been arrested after [causing] an explosion
on the Canadian Pacific Railway. Canada demands his extradition. I request
authority to protect him; according to the laws of war, the decision ought
presumably to be: Non-extradition, provided that an act of war is proved.

I intend to argue that, although the German Government has given no
orders, the Government regarded the causing of explosions on an enemy
railway as being, since it furthered military interests, an act of war.

Zimmermann fell in with this proposal, for on February 19 he gave
von Bernstorff instructions to protest against Horn's extradition and
also ordered that he "should at the same time see that the extradition
proceedings are carried to the Supreme Court. Adequate legal assistance

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 21

should be provided and the cost will be borne by the Imperial Ex-
chequer."

Horn was indicted on a charge of having transported explosives
from New York City to Vanceboro. He pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced to the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. This, too, is one
of the better-known sabotage incidents.

In 1915 there was yet another bomb plot prepared against Canada
on American soil at the instigation of the Attache. Among check books
and other documents which were later seized by the British and by
the Department of Justice, there appear the following records of pay-
ments:

Paid to Albert Kaltschmidt either by Capt. von Papen or by W. von Igel,
his assistant —

$2,000 on January 27, 1915,
$1,000 on March 27, 1915,
$1,800 on July 12, 1915,
$1400 on September 29, 1915,
$4,000 on December 6, 1915.

In addition, these documents show that on October 5, 1915, $25,000
was paid to Kaltschmidt out of an account of Dr. Albert's in the Chase
National Bank, and was later refunded to Dr. Albert out of one of
Count von BernstorfJ's accounts.

Albert Carl Kaltschmidt had emigrated from Germany a number
of years before the war, had settled in Detroit, and had prospered.
Among other things, he was the owner of a small machine shop. While
he did business with Americans, his moments of leisure were spent
among the German colony in Detroit. He was the Secretary of the
Deutscherbund, and as such felt the urge to strike a blow for the
Fatherland.

Early in May 1915, he called a meeting in his office in the Kresge
Building. Among those present were Walter Scholz, Charles Francis
Respa and his brother-in-law Carl Schmidt. Appealing to them as
German patriots, Kaltschmidt passionately addressed them: "We must
do something for our dear Fatherland. You should not care anything

22 THE ENEMY WITHIN

for America or Americans because America will throw you out from
your work, but we will give you good jobs after the war is over, and
Americans will trample you with their feet." He stressed the immense
aid the United States was giving the Allies in supplying munitions and
supplies to them and outlined a plan for the destruction of some of the
munitions factories.

' After the group had promised to stand loyally by him, plans were
discussed, and it was decided to make a start by blowing up the Detroit
Screw Works. But after reconnoitering it, Kaltschmidt decided it was
too well guarded. He then turned his eyes across the border to the
Peabody Overall Company's factory in Walkerville, where he hap-
pened to know William Lefler, one of the night watchmen.

On June 21 he called Respa to his office, and there introduced him to
William Lefler as "Roberts." He handed them two time-clock devices,
and then took them over to his garage at 84 East Hancock Avenue,
where he showed them about one hundred and fifty-six sticks of 40
per cent dynamite which he had in a packing case. He ordered them to
carry the clocks and dynamite across the Detroit River to Windsor,
Ontario, and offered to pay them $200 each to blow up the Peabody
factory, and the Windsor armory.

As soon as darkness had set in, Respa and his sister, Mrs. Schmidt,
crossed the border carrying the explosives in two suitcases. At the
Peabody factory Respa handed Lefler half the dynamite and attached
one of the clocks. The other charge was set in the rear of the Windsor
armory, in which Canadian troops were billeted. Then he and Mrs.
Schmidt hurried to the ferry and crossed back to Detroit. At 3 o'clock
in the morning the factory bomb exploded. The one at the armory,
however, failed to go off.

The Canadian authorities were immediately suspicious of Lefler, and
on June 26, 1915, he was arrested. He confessed and involved Respa,
who was warned in time, however, by Kaltschmidt's sister Ida. She
gave him $40 and advised him to slip away to New York. Running
out of funds, he soon returned to Detroit, where his arrest immediately
followed. Information given by him and Lefler led quickly to the
arrest of Kaltschmidt and the rest of his associates.

Brown Brothers

Count Johann von Bernstorff, Imper-
ial German Ambassador to the United
States. His Machinations Continued
until the Severance of Diplomatic Re-
lations in 191 7.

Keystone Studios

Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, Imperial

German Commercial Attache. "The

Mildest-Mannered Man That Ever

Scuttled Ship or Cut a Throat."

Brown Brothers

Captain Franz von Papen, Imi>erial
Germa?t Military Attache.

Harris and Euing

Captain Karl Boy-Ed, Imperial Ger-
man Naval Attache.

Saboteurs Extraordinary

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 23

Thanks to the efforts of Horn and Kaltschmidt, the Germans had
succeeded in carrying out two minor acts of sabotage in Canada; but
their main objective, the blowing up of the Canadian Pacific Railway,
had not been attained. Believing that they would have a better chance
of success in the West, they now switched to the Pacific Coast in an
attempt to find an unguarded area in Canada.

In this territory the German sabotage campaign was being conducted
by Franz von Bopp, the German Consul General in San Francisco.
Von Bopp was on vacation in Germany when the war broke out, and
it was not until March 1915 that he succeeded in getting back to San
Francisco. He later admitted that he returned amply provided with
funds, and he undoubtedly had also received specific secret service in-
structions in Germany. As a consular officer, von Bopp was under the
direct orders of von Bernstorff. We also know that both von Papen
and Dr. Albert traveled out to San Francisco to see him, and no doubt
there was a close connection between them. In his sabotage work von
Bopp was aided by his two Vice Consuls, Wilhelm von Brincken and
E. H. von Schack.

In April 1915 a gentleman named van Koolbergen, a Dutchman by
birth and a British subject by naturalization, met von Brincken in the
Heidelberg Cafe in San Francisco. According to van Koolbergen von
Brincken "was very pleasant and told me that he was an officer in the
German Army, and at present working in the Secret Service of the
German Empire and worked here under Mr. Franz von Bopp, the
Imperial German Consul."

Von Brincken had evidently previously checked up on van Kool-
bergen and had satisfied himself that he was reliable, for he offered
him $100 for the use of his passport for a trip to Canada. Sensing that
there was money to be made, van Koolbergen drew the German out,
and at the end of a long conversation in which various plans were dis-
cussed, he agreed for a fee of $3,000 to blow up the tunnel on the
Canadian Pacific between Revelstoke and Vancouver.

Whether van Koolbergen from the outset had no intention of be-
traying the country of his adoption or whether he grew afraid is not
known, but the next day he betrayed the whole deal to A. Carnegie
Ross, the British Consul General in San Francisco, and to T. K. Cornac,

24 THE ENEMY WITHIN

the Consulate's legal adviser. The Canadian authorities were advised,
and in consultation with the Canadian Pacific Railway in Vancouver,
a scheme was devised to enable van Koolbergen to collect his money
and at the same time furnish incriminating evidence against von
Brincken.

A few days after the departure of van Koolbergen, the Vancouver
newspapers carried a prepared story that the railway tunnel in the
Selkirk Mountains had caved in. Armed with the newspapers as evi-
dence that he had successfully accomplished his mission, van Kool-
bergen returned to San Francisco.

However, he had no intention of being involved in any court action
against the Germans. His chief interest now was to collect the money;
and so, keeping both the American and Canadian authorities unin-
formed of his plans, he reported the success of his mission to von
Brincken. The Vice Consul was delighted, paid him $200, and asked
him to come to the Consulate the next day for the balance of his fee.
"An arrangement was made that all I had to do to get access to the
private office of the German Consul was to knock as follows — ^two
long and two short knocks."

At the agreed signal, von Brincken opened the door and introduced
him to the Consul General and to von Schack, both of whom were in
the room. In spite of von Brincken's elation at what his minion had to
tell, von Bopp was skeptical, and van Koolbergen only received $300.
A heated argument ensued in which the double-dealing Dutchman
alternately threatened blackmail and wheedled for the money. He
eventually agreed to cut his fee to $2,250 and was then promised that
the balance would be paid the next day.

At the scheduled time von Brincken met him in the lobby of the
Palace Hotel, and pulled out of his pocket a roll of $1,750 in bills.
Of this he paid van Koolbergen $1,500, and retained $250 as a com-
mission for himself.

The crafty van Koolbergen thus obtained his money without in-
volving himself. But the Canadian authorities were without their
evidence, and von Bopp and von Brincken were free to continue their
activities.

Von Bopp next turned his attention to sabotage objectives in the

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 25

United States. He found the recruiting of suitable agents the most
difficult part of the job. It was not rendered easier, either, by the fact
that his official position made it imperative for him to avoid being
compromised if possible. He therefore detailed von Brincken to enroll
the operatives.

One of the new agents thus enlisted was C. C. Crowley, who for a
number of years had been head detective in San Francisco for the
Southern Pacific Railroad but had lately been discharged. Crowley
heard that the Germans were paying good money and volunteered
his services to von Brincken. The detective evidently made a good
impression, for we soon find him installed in an office of his own
boasting a private secretary.

His first duty was to act as an intermediary in recruiting other agents.
Through a mutual acquaintance, a German who owned a small cigar
store opposite the Gartland Hotel, where he was staying, Crowley be-
came acquainted with Lewis J. Smith, an American of German descent.
Crowley learned that Smith had been employed in the Hercules Powder
Mills at Pinole across the bay but had lately been fired. As these
mills were on his list of factories in the San Francisco area which had
to be watched to check on shipments to the Allies, Smith was promptly
hired. Smith soon found out that the powder at the mills was to be
shipped to Russia and that it was to be taken to Tacoma on a large
scow for transshipment to Vladivostok.

On receiving the report von Brincken dispatched Crowley and Smith
to Tacoma to put time bombs on the S.S. Hazel Dollar and three other
ships which were to load the powder. Smith was a zealous recruit and
lost no time in buying dynamite and fuse from the Du Pont Powder
Works at Seattle under the name of Walter Weaver, on the pretense
that he wanted to clear his farm of tree stumps.

On May 30, 1915, Tacoma and Seattle were jarred by a mighty ex-
plosion. The barge load of powder from the Hercules Powder Com-
pany had disappeared in a blinding flash.

There was an immediate investigation. Smith's purchase of dynamite
and 450 feet of fuse came to light, and he was promptly arrested. But
he had a pat story; and, aided by a skillful lawyer, he managed to get
an acquittal. Smith returned to San Francisco to collect his reward and

26 THE ENEMY WITHIN

to join Crowley, who had not lost any time in getting out of Tacoma.

Von Bopp and von Brincken were in a panic. Their one thought was
to get Smith and Crowley out of San Francisco as quickly as possible.
They hustled them oiff, therefore, to Detroit, once more on a Canadian
mission. This time it was to destroy some of the freight trains routed
through the Province of Ontario and, if possible, the Port Huron Tun-
nel. Smith and Crowley, however, had a healthy respect for the Ca-
nadian police and found it simpler to draw their pay and not risk
their necks.

A few weeks later, in July 1915, they returned to San Francisco with
a fabricated report that they had blown up a horse train at St. Thomas,
Ontario. For this they demanded a bonus of $300, and in addition pre-
sented an expense account of $845.80. These sums von Bopp paid with-
out demur.

Smith, however, was the last person whom the Consul General
wished to have around his bailiwick; consequently he packed him off
again, this time to blow up the powder works at Gary, Indiana, and at
Ishpeming, Michigan. On his arrival in Detroit, the unsuspecting
Smith got a telegram from San Francisco announcing that the scheme
was off. To his appeals for money the Germans turned a deaf ear. They
had gotten him out of the way and intended to keep him at a distance.

As Smith and his wife, whom he had brought along with him, were
left stranded, there was nothing left for him to do but to search for a
job. He managed to secure work in a Detroit automobile factory.

As the weeks went by, however, his conscience began to worry him,
and he started seeing things. On several occasions he thought he saw
Crowley shadowing him. One day his wife pointed out from behind
the curtains an individual across the street who she claimed had been
following her all morning. Fearing alternately that the Germans were
trying to get him out of way because he knew too much and that the
Department of Justice would find out about his activities, he finally
decided to turn State's evidence. In October 1915 he appeared in the
office of the United States Attorney in Detroit and told his story.

The Department of Justice had gradually been piling up evidence
and building a case against von Bopp and his associates on the score
of "violations of the Federal Criminal Statutes in connection with

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS T]

conspiracies to interfere with the transportation of munitions of war
and supplies needed for the AlUed Governments, by dynamiting and
blowing up factories, railroad bridges and tunnels, trains, docks and
steamships." The investigators had not succeeded, however, in definitely
connecting the Consulate with sabotage acts until Smith's evidence
gave them a positive link. Even then the supplementary investigation
took so long that it was not until late in 191 6 that the case was ready
for prosecution.

All telegrams which had passed between Smith and Crowley, and
between them and von Bopp, von Brincken, and von Schack were
uncovered by the Department of Justice and were later admitted in
evidence at the trial. The telephone records of the Gartland Hotel,
where Crowley stayed when in San Francisco, and of the Hotel Beres-
ford, the Piccadilly Apartments, and the Palace Hotel, where von
Brincken resided in succession, showed that Crowley had been in con-
stant touch with the German consular ofl&cials in San Francisco. The
books of the Du Pont Powder Company in Seattle revealed a purchase
of 190 sticks of 100 per cent nitroglycerine by "Walter Weaver," alias
Smith, for which he paid I6.50 and was given an order calling for its
delivery from the launch Du Pont at the Harrison Street dock, where
the powder was delivered to him. Witnesses from the Hercules Powder
Mills testified that nothing unusual was noticed about Smith during
the time of his employment at the mills, but after the explosion of the
powder barge various workmen came to the officers of the company
and stated that the explosion recalled to their minds a number of
suspicious circumstances regarding Smith. A report drawn up by the
Hercules Powder Mills was revealing:

Some of the workmen had observed Smith copying Russian characters
from the powder boxes. . . . He had so little money that it was necessary for
him to borrow money to pay his carfare to San Francisco. Sunday evening
(two days after powder was shipped from the factory) he returned to the
Powder Works in an automobile and exhibited a roll of bills which some of
the men estimated as containing about $400. A day or two later, some of
the men around the plant saw him on the observation car of one of the
trains going north. In connection with the suspicious actions of Smith it has
been learned by the investigations of the powder company that, while the

28 THE ENEMY WITHIN

barge loaded with powder was in San Francisco Bay, Smith called at the
office of the Crowley Laurel Co. (no connection with C. C. Crowley)
and asked permission to go on board the barge, stating that he had been
engaged in loading the powder and that he had broken his watch chain and
lost therefrom his wife's wedding ring, which he wished to search for.

Von Bopp and his associates were arrested late in 1916 and, as we
shall see later, were brought to trial. Smith and his wife were given im-
munity for turning State's evidence. Smith steadfastly denied, how-
ever, that he had blown up the barge in Seattle harbor, and there
was no direct evidence to disprove him. (A watchman had been blown
up with the barge and a murder charge would have been involved.)
He claimed that the dynamite which he had bought under the name
of "Weaver" had been obtained to show Crowley, who had commis-
sioned him to place dynamite bombs on the Hazel Dollar and on the
three other ships which were to load the powder for Vladivostok. But
he had hoodwinked Crowley, he maintained, and, instead, had thrown
the dynamite into a creek. After the war, however, the Germans,
although they denied liability, paid a $500 claim for damages in con-
nection with the explosion.

While the Department of Justice had been preparing its case, how-
ever, von Bopp and von Brincken had had their fingers in other
activities as well. In its inception, they were involved in a Hindu-
German plot to promote sedition in India.

Among the Indian students entered at various American universities
before the war, there soon arose a strong nationalist movement for
home rule in India. Funds were freely provided by certain misguided
Americans, many of whom in good faith thought they were furthering
enlightenment in India, others of whom sincerely believed British rule
in India was tyrannical, and, finally, some of whom were willing to
support anything that was anti-British.

Branches of this Indian nationalist organization were established in
various parts of the United States, but it was among the Indian
students at the University of California in Berkeley that the movement
reached its peak. There, in November 1913, Har Dyal, a postgraduate
student, founded a paper called Ghadr, which being translated means
"revolution." Published in Urdu and other Indian dialects, it freely

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 29

preached an uprising in India and for its fulfillment urged resort to
anarchist methods of assassination and bombing.

On the outbreak of war the attention of Germany's representatives
in the United States was immediately focussed on Har Dyal and his
activities. An uprising in India would serve a double purpose : it would
not only keep Indian native regiments from joining the British Ex-
peditionary Force in France, but it would also divert British troops to
India. It was also an opportune moment to approach Har Dyal, for
his bloodthirsty crusade had displeased the American authorities, and
he was being held for deportation as an undesirable alien. Thus, with-
out difficulty he was persuaded to proceed to Berlin; and another
Hindu, Ram Chandra, was left as his successor to edit Ghadr.

In Germany Har Dyal was taken in hand by von Wesendonck, sec-
retary in charge of the Indian Section of the Foreign Office; and to-
gether they organized the "Indian Independence Committee." At their
rallying call numerous Indian nationalists, chiefly students in various
European universities, flocked to Berlin. Regular meetings were held,
attended by German officials who knew India well; a special fund
amounting to several million marks was provided by the Imperial
Government; and a campaign was outlined to promote sedition in
British India. Emissaries were sent there through Turkey and
Afghanistan, and the organization in the United States was brought
under the direction of the Central Committee in Berlin. Finally,
Germany's diplomatic representatives throughout the world were in-
structed by the German Foreign Office to render material aid and
assistance.

On December 27, 1914, the following coded cable. Number 449, was
sent by Zimmermann to von Bernstorff :

A confidential agent of the Berlin Committee, Heramba Lai Gupta, is
shortly leaving for America in order to organize the importation of arms
and the conveyance of Indians [plotters] now resident in the United States
to India. He is provided with definite instructions. You should place at his
disposal the sum which he requires for this purpose in America, at Shanghai
and Batavia, viz., 150,000 marks. Sanction should be requested by telegraph
for any additional expenditure under this head. Sarkar must postpone further

30 THE ENEMY WITHIN

action until the confidential agent joins him but he should not for the time
being be told the name of the latter.

This was followed up on December 31, 1914, by a further coded
cable from Zimmermann to Washington:

In continuation of No. 449. You should in conjunction with Gupta — ^but
without attracting attention — take steps to have such Indians as are suitable
for this purpose instructed in the use of explosives by some reliable person.

Von Bernstorfl took immediate steps on receipt of these cables. Cap-
tain Hans Tauscher, the New York agent for Krupp's, who also pro-
cured for von der Goltz the dynamite in the Welland afjfair, was called
into action. Through various channels, on instructions from von Papen,
he bought up rifles and cartridges, and in January 1915 shipped 10 car-
loads of freight containing 8,000 rifles and 4,000,000 cartridges to one
"Juan Bernardo Bowen," care of M. Martinez and Company, ship
brokers, San Diego.

In the meantime, Ram Chandra had been in active contact in San
Francisco with the Consulate General. Von Bopp, therefore, was not
surprised when the German Embassy in Washington apprised him
of plans to ship arms to India and instructed him to provide ships for
the purpose. To conceal the German source of the money funds were
transferred by wire through several intermediaries from San Francisco
to Martinez and Company in San Diego, and a small vessel, the Annie
Larsen, was chartered. At the same time, through Fred Jebsen, a former
lieutenant in the German Navy, the Maveric\, an oil tanker, was pur-
chased in San Francisco from one of the Standard Oil Companies.

The arms were secretly loaded aboard the Annie Larsen, and on
March 8, 191 5, she sailed with clearance papers made out for a Mexican
port. Her real destination was the Island of Socorro in the South Seas,
where she was to meet the Maveric\. Here the Maveric\ was to trans-
ship the arms, hide them in her oil tanks, against the possibility of her
being searched, and proceed to the coast of India near Karachi. There
she was to be met by fishing craft which would land the arms and
several bales of seditious pamphlets which had been put on board by
Ram Chandra. On shore the rifles, cartridges, and literature were to be

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 3I

handed over to Indian plotters who had been sent from BerUn to
India to organize a rebellion in the Punjab.

This well-thought-out plan missed fire. After waiting around for a
whole month at Socorro Island, the Annie Larsen ran short of water.
An attempt was made to sink a well; but, when at twenty-two feet
hard rock was struck without a sign of water, the captain of the ship
sailed away for the Mexican coast. A few days later the MavericJ^
arrived at the island; unfortunately, however, there was no trace of
the Annie Larsen, and a British warship appeared on the scene. What
the Mavei'ic\ would have done with the rifles is not known, but on the
approach of a boarding party the captain lost no time in getting rid
of the bales of compromising pamphlets — they were hurriedly thrown
into the fire box.

After wandering around for several months in the Pacific, the Annie
Larsen put in at Hoquiam, Washington, on July i, 1915, where the
cargo was immediately seized by the authorities. The Maveric\ even-
tually reached Batavia, Java, where she was finally sold at a loss. The
filibuster thus ended in costly failure involving a loss of several hun-
dred thousand dollars; and, what was a far greater disappointment to
Germany, her plans for an armed revolt in India had for the time
being vanished in smoke.

As usual, von BernstorfiF issued a denial. On October 5, 1915, he
officially stated that the German Government knew nothing about
the shipment; consequently, for the time being the matter was
dropped. The American Secret Service was not surprised, however,
when among the documents it seized in von Igel's office during a
raid on April 18, 1916, it discovered entries in his notebook defi-
nitely linking up both the Annie Larsen and the Maveric\ to the Ger-
man Consulate in San Francisco.

While the Germans were anxiously waiting for news that the
Maveric\ had kept its rendezvous with the Annie Larsen and that the
arms had been landed in India, von Papen started a Hindu adventure
of his own in the Northwest.

In May 1915 he toured the United States, visiting German Consuls
and discussing plans with them. On May 11 he was in Seattle and there
met Franz Schulenberg, a German agent who had been associated with

32 THE ENEMY WITHIN

von Brincken in San Francisco. Schulenberg had been in contact with
Ram Chandra; and when on his arrival in Seattle he learned that
there was a large population of Hindu coolies in Vancouver, he was
quick to suggest to von Papen that they should be used. This fitted in
well with von Papen's plans, as he was still trying to follow the in-
structions contained in Zimmermann's telegram of January 3, 1915,
stating that the "General Staff is anxious that vigorous measures should
be taken to destroy the Canadian Pacific in several places." Therefore,
a scheme was devised to employ Hindu coolies in the Canadian North-
west to dynamite railway bridges and tunnels, and von Papen per-
sonally paid Schulenberg $4,000 to buy a ton of dynamite and 50 rifles
fitted with Maxim silencers to shoot any guards in the way.

Schulenberg had actually bought the dynamite and had arranged for
it to be delivered to one Singh, near the Canadian border, when von
Brincken learned that the Annie Larsen had put into Hoquiam, Wash-
ington. Fearing that Schulenberg's plan would be uncovered and not
wishing to have further complications on his hands, he instructed him
to break off relations with the Hindus and flee to New York. Von
Papen himself was in a nervous condition at the time; and, therefore,
on Schulenberg's arrival he instructed Koenig, one of his sabotage
directors, to give him a railroad ticket to Mexico City with orders to
get across the border as soon as possible.

Nothing further would have been heard about this abortive
Canadian-Hindu scheme had not Schulenberg returned to the United
States. Stranded and without funds, he was picked up as a vagrant by
the police in San Jose, California, in December 191 7. There, completely
broken down in health, he confessed the details of the plot.

In the meantime Heramba Lai Gupta, the Indian student whose de-
parture for the United States had been announced in Zimmermann's
two cables to von Bernstorff, had arrived in New York. Working to-
gether Gupta and Dr. Chakravarti, a graduate of the University of
Calcutta who had fled from India to avoid arrest, took over, under the
guidance of von Bernstorff, von Papen, and later von Igel, the direction
of the Hindu plots, with which von Bopp and von Brincken now had
nothing further to do. Although the Hindu agents had been success-
ful in running a certain amount of arms into India under false

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 33

manifests, the British were on the alert. On information supplied by
the British Intelligence Service, Chakravarti and Gupta were arrested
in New York in March 1917, and this led to the apprehension of the
whole Hindu-German organization in the United States.

As von Bopp and his associates were intimately mixed up in the plot,
they were tried together with the Hindus involved. The trial began
on November 19, 1917, in San Francisco, with Judge van Fleet on
the bench. Nearly one hundred defendants were assembled, including
the personnel of the San Francisco German Consulate, the German
Consul at Honolulu, a large number of Hindu students, and a
"shipping group" who had acted as intermediaries in the chartering
and purchase of the Annie Larsen and Maveric\.

The trial of these men was one of the most picturesque ever con-
ducted in an American court. The turbaned Hindus lent an Oriental
atmosphere. Among the evidence were publications in six Indian
dialects, also coded messages, all of which called for constant trans-
lation by interpreters and cryptographers. Witness after witness recited
his amazing story of adventure. The action shifted quickly between the
three focal points, Berlin, the United States, and India, with" inter-
mediate scenes laid in Japan, China, Afghanistan, and the South Seas.
The climax occurred on the afternoon of April 23, 1918, the last day
of the trial, when, in the crowded court room, Ram Singh shot and
killed Ram Chandra, whom he suspected of betraying the organiza-
tion. A moment later. United States Marshal James Holohan shot
the murderer dead in his tracks.

A verdict of guilty was returned against twenty-nine of the de-
fendants. The officials of the San Francisco German Consulate were
sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from i year to 2 years,
plus in some cases fines of from $2,000 to $10,000. The Hindus, chiefly
students, received lighter sentences, running from 2 months up to 18
months in the penitentiary. Chakravarti, because of assistance he finally
gave the prosecution, escaped with a sentence of 60 days.

The Department of Justice congratulated itself on its success in
clearing up the von Bopp organization; but, without any of its mem-
bers even being aware of their existence, two of the convicted Consul's

34 THE ENEMY WITHIN

principal agents, Kurt Jahnke and Lothar Witzke, had slipped through
the net.

Jahnke was born in Germany in 1882. We owe a description of him
to an American Intelligence report, obtained by an agent in Mexico
after we entered the war. He was five feet eleven inches tall, about
one hundred and sixty pounds in weight, swarthy, pimply faced, with
blond hair and small weasel eyes. We know little about his ante-
cedents except that he came to the United States several years before
the war, became a naturalized American citizen, and served some time
in the United States Marines.

In June 19 15, we find him one of von Bopp's principal sabotage
agents. Following out the usual practice of secret service agents every-
where, he established a cover for himself by joining the Morse Patrol,
a night watchman agency, in San Francisco. Whether he actually did
the work himself or obtained a substitute is not known, but he achieved
his object by having his name on the daily work sheets — a convenient
alibi if suspected of sabotage in other parts of the country.

In order further to divert suspicion from himself and to display
his patriotism as a naturalized American citizen, he boldly walked
into the office of the Secret Service in San Francisco on February 10,
191 6, and reported to the agent in charge that he had discovered a plot
to blow up the navy yard at Mare Island. However, as the source of
his information was an overheard conversation between alleged Ger-
man agents whose whereabouts were unknown to him, the authorities
paid little attention to his warning. From this inactivity they were to be
rudely awakened shortly afterwards, when with startling suddenness
a magazine blew up at the navy yard. There seemed to be no explana-
tion of the explosion, and the authorities began to ponder over the
warning.

By May 1916 Jahnke had become the director of von Bopp's sabotage
activities. Just at this juncture he met Lothar Witzke; and thus was
formed one of the most deadly teams of saboteurs in history, a team
whose activities we shall frequently encounter as we unravel the web
of German intrigues in this country.

Witzke was born in Posen, East Prussia, in 1895. After attending
grammar and high school, he spent a year at Posen Academy. At the

THE COMING OF THE SABOTEURS 35

age of seventeen he entered the German Naval Academy as a cadet.

By the beginning of the war he v^as a well-built, athletic young fel-
low, good looking, with keen blue eyes, fair hair, and ruddy com-
plexion, serving aboard the cruiser Dresden in South American waters.
He also had the usual sailor's fondness for wine, women, and song.
After many months of excitement, during which the Dresden was alter-
nately playing havoc with Allied shipping and hiding from British
warships, she was eventually caught and sunk. Witzke's leg was broken
in the action, and together with other survivors of the crew he was
interned in Valparaiso.

Early in 1916 he escaped; and as a seaman, under an assumed name,
he succeeded in reaching San Francisco in May 1916 on board the
S.S. Caltisa, There he reported to Consul General von Bopp, who put
him in touch with Jahnke.

At this time the American authorities knew nothing of Jahnke's and
Witzke's surreptitious activities. Both showed special aptitude for secret
service work and were of a caliber far superior to the rest of von Bopp's
agents. So cleverly did they cover their tracks that they were never even
suspected during the neutrality period.

In addition to their work on the West Coast, they made frequent
trips east on sabotage missions. After von Bopp's arrest they gradually
shifted the theater of their operations to the industrial areas of the
Eastern Seaboard.

Chapter IV
"BUY UP OR BLOW UP*

It was not until the early part of 191 5 that American munitions
plants really became adjusted to large-scale production. But in the
meantime the Germans had thrown together a sabotage organization
and were prepared to launch a major offensive. Soon the papers were
filled with accounts of mysterious fires and explosions in ships and
factories. Scarcely a week went by during the last months of 1915
without such a happening, many of them resulting in millions of
dollars' worth of damage, and not a few in loss of life. During 191 6
the rate and amount of destruction increased to even more alarming
proportions. A few of the disasters can be written down to accidents
or carelessness due to the sudden increase in the manufacture of
munitions, but German sabotage agents were undoubtedly responsible
for the bulk of them.

A cursory glance at the partial list incorporated in the Appendix
will reveal the almost incredible toll levied on neutral America.
This chronological table shows that the destructions started on January
I, 1915, with a mysterious incendiary fire at the John A. Roebling
Company plant at Trenton. It further lists, between this date and
America's entry into the war, the names of forty-seven ships on which
bombs or other incendiary devices were found while en route to Allied
countries from American ports and also forty-three American factories
and a few freight yards where arson or explosions caused either partial
or complete destruction. It will be shown later that most of the
German agents fled to Mexico on America's entry into the war; and
it is significant, as is shown by the Appendix, that the incendiary
fires and explosions in American factories and on ships sailing from
American ports also ceased abruptly on this date.

Towards the end of April 1915 the S.S. Cressington Court caught

36

'*BUY UP OR BLOW UP" 37

fire at sea, two bombs were found in the cargo of the S.S. Lord Erne,
and a bomb was found in the hold of the S.S. Devon City. On May
8, 1915, two bombs were discovered in the cargo of the S.S. Ban\dale,
On May 13, 1915, the S.S. Samland mysteriously caught fire at sea.
On May 21, 1915, a bomb was found on board the S.S. Anglo-Saxon.
All these ships had sailed from American ports. The shipowners, the
public, and the press clamored that action should be taken by the
proper authorities to discover those responsible for these outrages. The
result was that in New York Harbor the special job of tracking down
the saboteurs was assigned to Inspector Thomas J. Tunney, head of the
Bomb Squad of the New York Police Department.

It did not take Tunney long to realize that he was up against one
of the hardest assignments of his career. Anyone familiar with the
water front of a great port can appreciate the difficulties. Miles of
shore line and docks, extremely busy during the day but dark and
deserted at night; also in many sections a maze of narrow streets and
dark alleys backing the docks.

Ninety-odd ships of the German merchant marine, ranging from
small tugs to the giant Vaterland, at that time the largest vessel in the
world, were confined in American ports by the vigilance of the British
fleet. The several hundred men composing the crews were free to cir-
culate, and each was a potential agent who could be employed for
sabotage purposes. Added to them were the thousands of stevedores of
all nationalities who frequented the crowded wharves. They worked
by the day or by the job. They were hired on the spot as they gath-
ered round. The shipping companies did not know and did not care
where they lived. All they demanded was an able-bodied man; and
with the tremendous volume of cargoes to be shipped, they had no
time to keep superfluous records or to be particular about whom they
employed. In addition no information had been obtained from the
bombs; for, if they did not explode and were discovered at sea, the
crew lost no time in hastily dumping them overboard.

However some information was gleaned at the end of May 1915.
The S.S. KirJ{^ Oswald, out of New York, docked at Marseilles. In
four sugar bags in her hold bombs were found. On urgent cable de-
mand, the bombs were sent back by the French Government. They

38 THE ENEMY WITHIN

were found to consist of lead pipes, each divided by a copper disc into
two compartments, one of which held potassium chlorate, the other
sulphuric acid. The action of the acid on the copper took place at a
uniform rate and thus determined the time at which the two chemicals
would unite to produce the explosion. In this case the copper disc had
been too thick.

Tunney and his agents followed every possible lead, but they led
nowhere. Sugar shipments were traced from factory to vessel, pur-
chases of potassium chlorate and sulphuric acid in New York City
were investigated — all to no avail.

The first break came at the end of October 1915. Captain Martin,
the French Military Attache, who was stationed in New York, tele-
phoned Police Headquarters that an exporter of war supplies, Carl
Wettig by name, Managing Director of the Whitehall Trading Com-
pany, had given information that a man called Paul Siebs, who resided
at the Hotel Breslin and who had rented desk space from him, had
asked him to purchase a supply of T.N.T., and to deliver it to a garage
in Weehawken.

Tunney was immediately on the alert; he called on Paul Siebs and
demanded to know what he intended to do with the purchase. Siebs,
who Tunney found out later also used the name of Karl Oppegaarde,
was able to furnish no other information than that he had been re-
quested to make the purchase by Dr. Herbert Kienzle, a German clock
maker who had been referred to him by Max Breitung, a mutual ac-
quaintance, and that Kienzle had told him that the T.N.T. was to be
delivered to a man called Fay at a garage on Main Street, Weehawken.

Not wishing to make a premature arrest, Tunney laid a trap for Fay.
A package containing twenty-five pounds of trinitrotoluol was handed
to Wettig; and on Tunney's instructions, accompanied by two of his
agents, Wettig set out for the garage to deliver the explosive to Fay.
He was absent, but they were directed to his boarding house at 28
Fifth Street by a workman. On inquiry from the landlady they found
that he was not at home, and so with her permission they mounted
to his bedroom and left the package on the dresser, together with a
note from Wettig informing him that he had failed to find him
at the garage.

*'buyuporblowup" 39

For the next few days close watch was kept on Dr. Kienzle and Fay,
also on Walter Scholz and Paul Daeche, two men who were constantly
seen with Fay.

Fortune now again favored Tunney. Wanting to test the T.N.T., Fay
asked Wettig to accompany him during the trials. Warned in time by
Wettig, a swarm of detectives were posted in the woods at Grantwood,
New Jersey, where the tests were to be made; and after one or two
experiments with the explosives had been carried out, they stepped in
and arrested Fay together with Scholz, his brother-in-law, who had
accompanied him. The detectives making the arrests were assigned by
Chief William J. Flynn of the Secret Service, as the New York police
did not have the power of arrest in New Jersey.

A quick search of the boarding house and of the garage resulted
in the discovery of a number of ingenious mechanical contrivances
which were immediately recognized as parts of bombs. In the garage
25 sticks of dynamite, 450 pounds of potassium chlorate, 400 detonating
caps, and 200 bomb cylinders were found; and in a packing case they
uncovered 4 finished bombs. In his rooms a chart of New York Harbor
was found, also information which led to the discovery that he was the
owner of a powerful motor boat, moored at the docks opposite West
42nd Street.

Even more interesting than the discovery of the bombs was the story
which Fay had to tell. He was in Germany when the war broke
out, and was immediately called to the colors. He was posted as a
lieutenant to an infantry battalion in line successively in the Vosges
Mountains and in Champagne, where he saw some of the bitterest
fighting of the war. An examination of Allied shells revealed that
much of their superiority was due to the munitions that were being
sent over from the United States. Fay's ingenious mind evolved a
scheme to stop this supply, and he lost no time in putting the plan
before his commanding officer. In due course. Section III B of the Ger-
man General Staff equipped him with a neutral passport, handed him
$4,000 in American currency, and sent him off to report to von Papen.
He reached New York on the S.S. Rotterdam on April 23, 1915.

Fay was well qualified for the task. He was thirty-four years of age,
and an engineer; he also spoke English fluently. The first man he

40 THE ENEMY WITHIN

looked up was Walter Scholz, a former engineer of the Lackawanna
Railroad, who, as we have already mentioned, was employed by
Kaltschmidt in his abortive attempt to blow up the Detroit Screw
Works. Scholz readily fell in with his plans and recruited as an
assistant Paul Daeche, who belonged to the Schlarafia organization, a
fraternal society composed of German-speaking people, of which Scholz
was also a member.

Although at the time of his arrest Fay refused to implicate von Papen,
he revealed his connection with him in a confession which he made
three years later:

My first arrival in New York City was in May [?] 1915, having been
ordered there by the Intelligence Department o£ the German War Office for
the express purpose of sabotage activities in connection with the shipments
of munitions to the Allies, as well as factories manufacturing said munitions.
As directed I reported to Captain von Papen

After meeting Captain von Papen at the Deutscher Verein in New York
City and discussing the matter with him, I went to work on the manufacture
of bombs to be attached to cargo ships sailing with supplies for the Allies. . . .
In most of my subsequent transactions with Captain von Papen, Dr. Kienzle
acted as intermediary . . . Captain von Papen not wishing to have me seen
about the office.

The bombs manufactured by Fay were studied independently by two
sets of military experts of the United States Government, who re-
ported that they were mechanically perfect. The bombs were so de-
signed that they could be fitted to a ship's rudder. By means of a rod
attached to the rudder each swing of the blade wound up a mechanism
which eventually struck down on a cap which fired the T.N.T. in the
container. There was sufficient explosive in it to have sunk the most
heavily armored dreadnought if exploded under the stern. It was Fay's
intention to use his motor boat at night to attach his diabolical devices,
all his plans for the planting of which had been perfected at the time
of his arrest.

Fay and all his confederates were tried together and convicted.
Fay was sentenced to Atlanta, Georgia, for eight years; Scholz, for six;
and Daeche, for four. Kienzle and Breitung were not brought to trial
and were later interned.

*'buy up or blow up" 41

In August 1916, a month after his arrival at the Atlanta Penitentiary,
Fay escaped by means of a forged pass. At various German Consulates
about the country he w^as given money, by means of which he was
enabled to flee to Mexico. From there as a stowaway he succeeded in
reaching Spain. After trying in vain to go on to Germany, he appar-
ently lost heart, and finally surrendered to the American Consul in
Malaga. From there he was returned to the United States to serve out
the rest of his term.

Fay was arrested and convicted for what he had intended to do. His
plans had been nipped in the bud before he could put them into
effect. His arrest had not solved the mystery of a single one of the
bomb outrages on any of the ships we have mentioned, and there was
ample proof that the sabotage agents responsible were still at large:
On October 26, 1915, two days after Fay was arrested, the S.S. Rio
Lages mysteriously took fire at sea; on November 3, 1915, a fire sud-
denly broke out in the hold of the S.S. Euterpe; on November 6, 191 5,
a similar fire occurred on the S.S. Rochamheau, en route to Europe;
and on the next day an explosion took place on the S.S. Ancona while
at sea.

Frantic attempts were made to make Fay talk. He freely admitted
and took the responsibility for all that Tunney had uncovered about
him, but professed complete ignorance as to who was making the
bombs of the Kir\ Oswald type and as to who was placing them on
the ships. Later, in 1918, when he surrendered and was returned to
Atlanta, he revealed in an affidavit that he had known right along all
the principals who were involved.

As the arrests which had been made so far in connection with
land sabotage cases had shown that the agents involved were mostly
of German nationality or of German descent. Inspector Tunney de-
cided to concentrate on the restaurants, hotels, and beer gardens fre-
quented by Germans along the Hoboken water front. He picked out
three of his ablest men, good Americans of Teutonic parentage, who
spoke German perfectly, and assigned them separately to the job,
instructing them to pass themselves off as Germans among the habitues
of these establishments.

42 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Several weeks went by; and then, finally in April 191 6, a break came
to Henry Earth, one of the three. By dint of patience and much boast-
ing of his loyalty to the Fatherland and by occasionally hinting that
he was in German Secret Service employ, he won the confidence of a
German with whom he had struck up an acquaintance. One day his
confidant disclosed to him that a certain Captain von Kleist had a
grievance against a Dr. Scheele for nonpayment of two notes for $117
each, owed to him for secret service work. Earth's informant also added
that von Kleist had written that day to von Igel, head of the German
Secret Service in America, asking for an interview.

The detective was quick to seize his opportunity. Having obtained
from his German friend von Kleist's telephone number and address
in Hoboken, he called him up, posed as one of von Igel's assistants,
referred to von Kleist's letter to von Igel, and stated that he was com-
ing over to Hoboken to see him.

Von Kleist fell completely into the trap. In his eagerness to get pay-
ment of the two notes, he not only revealed that Dr. Scheele was
making bombs to place on ships but also took Earth over to his own
home at 121 Garden Street, Hoboken, and there showed him several
bombs which Earth immediately recognized as identical with the ones
which had been found on the S.S. Kir\ Oswald. Von Kleist's lack of
caution may seem incredible; but secret service records show that even
secret agents cannot resist the innate human urge to air their grievances,
though jail or the firing squad is likely to be the penalty for indis-
cretion.

The saboteur's fate was sealed; and after long questioning sufficient
information was extracted from him to effect the arrests of Dr. Scheele
and others, which eventually led to the rounding up of all who were
involved in this particular ring. It was not, however, until March 1918
that the final arrest was made. From the evidence uncovered by
Tunney and revealed at the trial it has been possible to reconstruct this
ship-bombing organization. It was established that the originator of
this organization, and director of it during the initial stages, was Franz
von Rintelen.

Von Rintelen was a Captain-lieutenant in the German Naval Re-
serve. After serving his time in the Navy, he spent several years abroad

**BUYUPORBLOWUP" 43

acquiring international banking experience. For a time he was em-
ployed in a London banking house and then went to New York, where
he was associated with Ladenburg, Thalmann and Company. During
his stay in America he had the entree wherever he went. He was
a member of the New York Yacht Club, the only other German mem-
bers of which were the Kaiser and his brother Prince Heinrich; he
was a familiar figure also at Newport and on Park Avenue.

Even in these circles he attracted attention. He came of an aristo-
cratic family. Both his features and his easy carriage reflected breeding.
There was little of the Teuton in his appearance — he could easily have
passed for an Italian. In build he was trimly athletic. His quick nervous
movements, his sharp intelligent eyes, and the broad sweep of his fore-^
head revealed a man of action and of intellectual brilliance.

His banking connections enabled him to acquire a first-hand knowl-
edge of American principles and methods of finance and industry.
From New York he went to open branches of a German bank in
Mexico and South America, and shortly after his return to Berlin
was appointed a director of the Deutscher Bank.

The onset of the war brought him an important post on the stafiF
of Admiral von Tirpitz, where on account of his banking knowledge
his first assignment was to make transfers of money abroad for the
use of the raiding German warships then still at large in the Pacific
and in South American waters.

As we already know, the question of America's munitions supplies
to the Allies came to occupy more and more the minds of the General
Staffs of the Army and Navy the longer the struggle continued. Ac-
cording to von Rintelen's own statement, made after the war, he had
plans to meet this problem:

It was accepted in all quarters in Berlin that something of a more forceful
nature must be done than hitherto. Indeed conferences took place in the War
Ministry, the Foreign Office, and the Finance Ministry, in each of which I
outlined my plans, insofar as I could gauge the situation from my post in
Berlin. The impression of energy and determination which I contrived to
make gave considerable satisfaction. Men of action, particularly men like
Hel£ferich and Zimmermann, could not help smiling when I concluded one

44 THE ENEMY WITHIN

speech with: "I'll buy up what I can, and blow up what I can't." One and
all they all resolutely agreed with me that sabotage was the only alternative.

And so von Rintelen v^as duly commissioned by the War Minister,
General von Wandel, to carry out his plan in the United States. On
March 22, 1915, armed v^ith a munificent credit of $500,000 he set out
from Berlin for Christiania aboard the S.S. Kristianiafjord. As Emile V.
Cache, a Swiss citizen and bearer of a Swiss passport (manufactured
in Germany), he brazenly visited the British and American Consulates
in Christiania, obtained their vises and proceeded unmolested to New
York, where he arrived safely on April 3, 1915.

He immediately discovered that the first part of his plan — ^to corner
the American munitions market — was impossible. The supplies were so
large that even the thought of it was ridiculous. He therefore decided
to carry out at once the second alternative — to blow up as much as he
could.

When his plans were communicated to von Papen and Boy-Ed, both
gave their willing support. Explosives were nothing new to them, as
for several months already they had been making considerable use of
them, especially in their Canadian ventures.

For the manufacture of bombs, von Papen offered the services of an
expert. Dr. Walter T. Scheele. In his youth Scheele had served as a lieu-
tenant in Field Artillery Regiment Number 8, and after a few years'
service had applied for leave to go to the United States for the purpose
of chemical research. His leave had been granted, but at the same time
he had been ordered to put himself at the disposal of the Military
Attache in Washington. There he had received the assignment of keep-
ing track of, and reporting on, explosives, and new chemical discoveries
as related to warfare. So valuable had been his information that he
had never been recalled in twenty-one years and without any extra
military service had been advanced from the rank of lieutenant to
major in the reserves. In addition to having the distinction of being
Germany's only prewar spy in the United States, he was also paid an
annual retainer of $1,500 a year.

Scheele had ideal cover. His work as a commercial investigator in
German pay was only a part-time job. He was also engaged in private

< < 5 >

BUYUPORBLOWUP 45

enterprise and was the president of the New Jersey Agricultural Chem-
ical Company. He was just the man von Rintelen was looking for,
and he did not hesitate a moment in sending for him and setting him
to work.

By means of a few experiments, Dr. Scheele quickly evolved the
bomb which has already been described: a lead tube with a metal disc,
either copper or aluminum, separating sulphuric acid from either
potassium chlorate, picric acid, or a mixture of urotropin and sodium
peroxide. For incendiary purposes picric acid was usually used, and the
ends of the tube were sealed with wax instead of with solid plugs.
The mingling of the sulphuric acid with the picric acid caused the
emission of a white hot flame.

At this stage Carl von Kleist appeared on the scene. In some re-
spects he was the Count von Luckner of an earlier generation. As he
was the scion of one of the oldest aristocratic families of Germany,
a career had been open to him in a regiment of the Guards. Instead
he had run away to sea as a boy, and after serving his time on a wind-
jammer had transferred to steamships, obtained his master's certificate,
and eventually the command of an Atlantic liner. He was now an old
man, living in retirement in Hoboken. Von Rintelen was acquainted
with his family and in this way came into contact with him.

Von Kleist knew all the interned German sailors and numbered
among his personal friends most of the captains and officers of the
German vessels laid up in New York Harbor. Von Rintelen found him
a ready tool. Here was adventure after the old man's heart, and he
jumped at the opportunity to serve his country. Together the two of
them worked out a scheme to make use of the interned S.S. Friedrich
der Grosse as a workshop; and Carl Schmidt, the chief engineer, Ernest
Becker, an electrician, and George Praedel, WiUiam Paradies, and
Friedrich Garbade, members of the crew, were enrolled in the or-
ganization.

Soon the workshop in the Friedrich der Grosse was humming with
activity. Von Rintelen purchased large quantities of lead tubing and
copper rods of the right dimensions through the firm of E. V. Gibbons,
Incorporated, with offices in Cedar Street, which he had specially set
up as a blind. Through the same firm he bought the machinery to

46 THE ENEMY WITHIN

cut the lead piping and the copper discs to the proper dimensions.
Under cover of darkness the prepared tubes were taken over to Dr.
Scheele's laboratory at 1133 Clinton Street, Hoboken, w^here they w^ere
filled. Eventually these bombs, or "cigars" as they v^ere called, were
being manufactured at the rate of fifty a day.

For the distribution of the bombs to suitable stevedores who had
access to the ships. Captain Carl Wolpert, an officer of the German
Naval Reserve, Superintendent of the Atlas Line, a subsidiary of the
Hamburg-American Steamship Company, and Eno Bode, a captain
in the service of the North German Lloyd Steamship Company,
were enlisted. A glance at the records of marine disasters for 1915
and 1916 is sufficient to show the zeal and efficiency with which they
carried out their mission.

But von Rintelen was not content to confine his activities to New
York Harbor. Large shipments were being made to the Allies from the
port of Baltimore, and to this center he now turned his attention.
In moving about among the leaders of the German colony there, he
soon made the acquaintance of the Hilken family. They were of
superior social status and unswervingly loyal to the Fatherland.
Henry G. Hilken, the father, had emigrated from Germany to Amer-
ica in 1866, and after he had been settled here some time had married
an American girl. Later a son, Paul Hilken, had been born. At the
outbreak of the war both father and son were partners in the firm of
A. Schumacher & Company, tobacco exporters, and at the same time
Baltimore representatives of the North German Lloyd Steamship Com-
pany.

In the spring of 1915, shortly after young Hilken had returned from
a South American trip, von Rintelen came down to Baltimore to discuss
with him the ship-sabotage campaign. Hilken readily fell in with von
Rintelen's plans and consented to act as paymaster. He also proposed
employing Frederick Hinsch to distribute the bombs.

They could not have hit on a better person. Hinsch, then in his early
forties, was a huge, burly individual with typical German features:
fair hair, blue eyes, ruddy complexion, round full face. At the time
he was captain of the S.S. Nec\ar, a. North German Lloyd ship. At the
commencement of the war he had remained in the South Adantic,

c c > >

BUYUPORBLOWUP 47

dodging British cruisers and attempting to use his ship as a collier and
supply base for German warships still at large. Late in 1914 he had
finally been forced to put into Baltimore, where his ship was interned.
Hinsch was fearless. He knew how to handle the men on the
docks and commanded their respect by his shrewd intelligence, his
flow of seafaring language, and the ready use of his fists when neces-
sary. He accepted von Rintelen's proposal eagerly and soon had a band
of trusty dock workers planting the bombs.

With the Baltimore organization completed, von Rintelen turned
his attention to New Orleans. It is here that a mysterious Erich von
Steinmetz, alias "Captain Steinmetz," comes on the scene. Although
a captain in the German Navy, he managed to reach the United States
via Vladivostok, disguised as a woman. On arrival here he reported to
von Rintelen and became one of his chief assistants. Von Steinmetz
brought with him cultures of glanders for the purpose of inoculating
horses and mules intended for shipment to the Allies. For a time his
activities were confined to trying out his cultures in the field. He
soon found, however, that they were not taking effect. Under the pre-
tense that they were intended for experimental purposes, he boldly
took them to the Rockefeller Institute for testing. Pronouncement that
the cultures were all dead liberated him for action in other fields.
Von Rintelen promptly sent him to New Orleans to take charge of
a ship sabotage campaign there. Through E. J. Conners, an American
citizen who as a gun runner had been mixed up in several Mexican
revolutions, the Captain was able to build up an effective and well
concealed organization.

As soon as Von Rintelen had completed his ship-bombing organi-
zations and they were operating smoothly under the direction of von
Kleist, Wolpert, Bode, Scheele, Hinsch, and Steinmetz, he himself
turned to other activities. Of these, the creation of "Labor's National
Peace Council" was the most spectacular.

The ostensible object of the Council was to promote world peace,
but its real objective was to procure an embargo upon the shipment
of munitions abroad. Von Rintelen remained behind the scenes, sup-
plied the money, and left the promotion to David Lamar, a brilliant,
though crooked, operator in Wall Street, who had been indicted for

48 THE ENEMY WITHIN

attempting to defraud J. P. Morgan and Company. A number of well
meaning enthusiasts joined the Council, several strikes were fostered
among stevedores loading munitions on the docks, considerable lobby-
ing was done in Washington, and the movement gained some mo-
mentum; but, when it was realized that Germany was backing it, or-
ganized labor refused to join in, and it died a natural death. Von
Rintelen sadly admitted that his transactions with Lamar had cost him
several hundred thousand dollars.

He made other attempts at fostering German propaganda through
Walter Schimmel, at founding an illegal and fictitious trade union
among dock workers to promote strikes, and at plotting with the Irish
leaders in the United States. But these v/ere neither more successful
nor less costly.

His most expensive adventure, however, was his attempt to foment
a revolution in Mexico. Huerta, the former President, was in exile in
the United States; and, since he ascribed his fall to American support
of his enemies, he had no special love for this country. Von Rintelen
believed that by restoring him to power he could force the United
States into intervening, and thus divert large quantities of munitions
to the American forces fighting in Mexico. Consequently, he met
Huerta secretly at the latter's hotel in New York, and there arranged
with him German financial support for the plots which the ex-
President was hatching in Mexico.

During the month of May 1915 Huerta had several conferences with
a member of the German embassy who was acting in consort with von
Rintelen. Carranzista agents, however, had been keeping a watchful eye
on him; and one of them succeeded in attending a meeting of Huerta*
adherents on June i, 1915, in the Holland House, when plans for the
plot were discussed. The American authorities were promptly advised.

Shortly afterward Huerta slipped away from New York, ostensibly
to visit the San Francisco Exposition. But Government agents were
shadowing him and were ready at hand when he reached the Mexican
border. He was arrested on a technical charge and jailed. Already
advanced in years and broken down by the failure of his plans, he
died in January 191 6. Thus another wild dream of von Rintelen's was
ended.

< c > >

BUYUPORBLOWUP 49

Because of these extraneous activities and his prodigal spending,
von Rintelen became embroiled v^ith von Papen and Boy-Ed, v^ho v^^ere
jealous of the extensive free-lance authority v^^hich had been given
him in Berlin. The result v^as that strings v^ere pulled, and he found
himself suddenly recalled to Germany.

There was nothing left for him to do but to obey; and, after trying
in vain to procure an American passport under the name of Edward V.
Gates, he sailed for a Dutch port on the SS. Noordam, once again as
R V. Gache. The British, however, had been intercepting and decoding
wireless telegrams for him from Berlin, among which was his recall
order. A cable to British Intelligence Officers in New York brought
them into action, and it was no trick for them to determine that he
was sailing under the name of Gache and to pass this information and
an accurate description of him on to London. This time his neutral
passport was of no avail, and on August 13, 1915, when the Noordam
put in at Falmouth on her way to Holland, he was taken off the ship
and interned at Donnington Hall as a prisoner of war.

In the meantime his ship bombing organizations in the United States
continued to flourish with ever increasing activity until the New York
one suddenly came to an end with the arrest of Captain von Kleist on
April 10, 19 1 6.

The organizations in Baltimore and New Orleans, however, had been
kept as separate and independent nests and therefore were not involved.
But von Steinmetz was thoroughly frightened and, once again dis-
guised as a woman, fled to Germany. Hinsch also disbanded his water-
front organization and turned his attention to other sabotage fields.

Von Rintelen himself was extradited as soon as America entered the
war. Eventually brought to trial, along with his New York subor-
dinates in May 1917, he was sentenced to four years' penal servitude
in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta. His associates received lesser
terms of imprisonment. At that time the Espionage Act had not yet
been passed, and the group had to be tried on a charge of conspiracy
to violate the Sherman Act. This accounts for the mildness of the
sentences.

Dr. Scheele was the last to be caught. The moment von Kleist was
arrested, von Igel, who knew he was the missing link connecting up

50 THE ENEMY WITHIN

the German Government with the conspiracy, gave him $i,8oo in cash
and ordered him out of the country to Cuba as fast as he could go.

In Havana Scheele reported to the German Minister, v^ho passed
him on under the name of James G. Williams, an American citizen, to
one Juan Pozas, who outwardly posed as a wealthy and respectable
merchant but actually was the secret owner of hundreds of small smug-
gling craft operating off the coast of Cuba. Scheele soon found himself
a virtual prisoner in various country homes of the smuggler king and
other German adherents. He was allowed to go nowhere without an
escort.

The arrest in Havana of Richard Guttman, a German agent and
intermediary of the German Legation, which had been paying for
Scheele's keep, led the Cuban police to the fugitive's retreat. He was
arrested in March 1918 and was extradited without delay to the United
States.

The Germans had every reason to be afraid of Scheele, for in his
eager attempts to secure immunity he freely betrayed to the American
authorities German secret formulas for poison gas, incendiary bombs,
liquid-air bombs, high explosives, and dye stuffs.

Anxious to get an expert opinion on the value of this information,
he was examined, at the request of the Government, both by Thomas
A. Edison and his chief chemical assistant, who reported that "he was
an eminent German chemist with unquestioned knowledge of the
most important phases of contemporary chemical warfare methods and
German commercial practice."

Although Scheele efficiently carried out the ruthless demands of his
country, his motives were largely mercenary. He did not hesitate to
extract both from von Papen and von Rintelen large sums of money
for his services. On one of the von Papen check stubs seized at Fal-
mouth was an item: "$10,000 paid Scheele (Rintelen affair)."

In addition to the manufacture of bombs, he figured in several other
of von Rintelen's activities. He was paid lavishly by him to devise a
method of smuggling oil out of the United States. This he did by
solidifying the oil with magnesium carbonate. The oil was then
shipped to Denmark under false manifests by cleverly impregnating
fertilizer with it. On its arrival on the other side the valuable lubricant

**BUY UP OR BLOW UP" 5I

could be easily extracted by putting the fertilizer in water and adding
a benzine salt, which caused the oil to float to the surface. It was also
he who thought up the plan of dropping methylene blue capsules into
shipments of corn, causing the flour milled from the corn to turn a
deep blue. The capsules were made up to appear as grains of corn.
Money was handed him so freely that later he could not resist the
temptation to accept $20,000 from von Rintelen for munitions to be
shipped as agricultural implements; this time, however, he kept the
$20,000 and actually shipped a cargo of farm machinery.

According to Scheele's own estimate, the bombs he had manufac-
tured had been instrumental in destroying cargoes to the value of
$10,000,000 in 36 different ships. He added, however, that only about
25 per cent of the bombs handed out by Wolpert and his associates had
actually been placed on ships. The remainder were thrown overboard
after the money had been pocketed by the dock hands employed to
plant them.

Chapter V
THE RECALL OF VON PAPEN AND BOY-ED

Until the middle of 1915 the diplomatic representatives of the Central
Powers seemed to be succeeding admirably in their efforts to promote
sabotage and other activities violating American neutrality and at the
same time to avoid any unpleasantness v^ith the State Department.
Of course, the v^idespread destruction of ships and factories, the pass-
port frauds, and Horn's melodramatic escapade had led to a certain
amount of newspaper talk about spy plots and sinister activities on the
part of the Teutonic diplomats. The sensational Providence Journal,
especially, had been filled with stories of wildly improbable Germ.an
schemes directed against the United States. But the Government
seemed as trustful as ever, and the self-confidence of the diplomats and
their contempt for American gullibility grew steadily.

This idyllic condition was short-lived, however. On September i the
British staged a coup. They removed Mr. James J. Archibald from a
ship being searched at Falmouth and seized his papers. Archibald was
an American newspaper correspondent who had been covering Ger-
many for some time. Gradually he had drifted into acting as a German
propagandist and bearer of dispatches to and fro through the blockade.
Among the seized papers the British found several communications
from Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to his Foreign
Office. One of these outlined a program for fomenting strikes in the
Bethlehem Steel Company plants and requested permission to put it
into effect; another reflected on the disinterestedness of American
foreign policy and even made disparaging remarks about the President.
Motivated by a fine unselfishness, the British released the text of these
to the press and furnished the American Embassy with photostatic
copies of the originals.

This was too much for the President, and a week later the State Dc-

52

THE RECALL OF VON PAPEN AND BOY-ED 53

partment demanded Dumba's recall. The Dual Monarchy had no re-
course except to swallow this bitter pill with the best grace it could
muster.

But the Dumba documents did not exhaust the treasures among
Archibald's papers. There was a letter from von Papen to his wife, in
the course of which he remarked: "...How splendid on the Eastern
Front ! I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they should shut their
mouths and better still be full of admiration for all that heroism."

When these remarks of the Attache's were published along with the
Dumba material, there was immediately unloosed a storm of public
indignation. The State Department held its hand for the time being,
but von Papen was a marked man. Behind the scenes the Government
began quietly collecting a dossier on his activities and those of Captain
Boy-Ed, both of whom had been under surveillance since early in the
year. There was ample evidence that they had strayed far from the
paths of diplomatic rectitude.

No sooner had this excitement begun to die away than the arrest of
Fay revived it in full force. There were strong indications that von
Papen was involved. (These were later confirmed by Fay's confession
on his return from Spain.) At the same time a renewed wave of factory
bombings added fresh fuel to the fires of popular hysteria. At last, en
December 8, the Government bowed to popular opinion and asked for
the recall of the two attaches as personce non gratce.

The situation was well summed up by President Wilson in his ad-
dress to Congress regarding their recall:

A little while ago such a thing would have seemed incredible. Because it
was incredible, we made no preparation for it. We would have been almost
ashamed to prepare for it as if we were suspicious of ourselves and our
comrades and neighbors.

But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come to pass and we are
without adequate Federal Laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such
laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging
you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the Nation

They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into con-
spiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry
into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve in-
terests alien to our own.

54 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Serious as had been the blunders of the Attaches, these had been
mosdy mistakes caused by their lack of previous experience in secret
service v^ork at the start of their campaign. As time v^ent on their
technique improved. It would be doing scant justice to their cunning
and training to assume that more than a small percentage of their vs^ork
ever w^as discovered.

Commenting on the incendiary fire v^hich had occurred on the previ-
ous day in the Roebling Plant at Trenton, Nev^ Jersey, v^here wire
cables v^ere being made for the Allies, the Literary Digest for Novem-
ber 27, 1915, estimated that "already according to a list published in
the New^ York Journal of Commerce there have been about forty of
these fires involving more than a score of lives." It then went on to add
that the Attorney General of the United States had appealed to the
State authorities to aid him "in prosecuting the plotters everywhere."

Had the two Attaches committed similar acts in any neutral country
in Europe, their recall would have been insisted upon within a month
after the outbreak of hostilities. But von Bernstorfl's skill in denial and
the amazing credulity of the State Department in believing him per-
mitted von Papen and Boy-Ed to continue their ruthless destruction
unmolested for a year and a half.

Four days before Christmas, 191 5, von Papen sailed for England and
Holland, and on New Year's Day was followed by Boy-Ed. Both had
been granted a "safe conduct" by the British, a privilege accorded to
all diplomatic representatives recalled to their countries during the war.
On January 2 and 3, 1916, von Papen's baggage was searched by the
British at Falmouth, and a mass of documents and records that he was
foolishly carrying with him were seized. To the explosive and protest-
ing von Papen the British authorities explained, not without some
humor, that the "safe conduct" referred to his person and not to his
effects.

The most important of these records were the check books to which
we have already referred on numerous occasions. He had received from
Dr. Albert over $3,102,000 * for the carrying on of his work, and we

* Taken from a report of Dr. Albert's to the State Secretary of the Imperial
Treasury. This along with many of his other papers eventually fell into the
hands of the United States Government.

THE RECALL OF VON PAPEN AND BOY-ED 55

do not know how much additional money came to him direct through
mihtary channels. Here in the stubs of his check books was absolute
proof of his connection with Werner Horn, von der Goltz, and other
of the German sabotage agents who had been caught and convicted.
The British again showed their exquisite regard for the welfare of the
United States by passing on the evidence to the United States Gov-
ernment.

Both von Papen and Boy-Ed were awarded decorations on reaching
Germany, and both of them were promoted: Boy-Ed to an important
post on the Admiral Staff of the Navy, and von Papen to the rank of
major. The latter was transferred to the staff of General Liman von
Sanders in Palestine, and a few months later barely escaped capture
by the British cavalry at Nazareth. So precipitate was his flight that
once again he left several compromising documents in the hands of the
British. One was a note from Boy-Ed in Berlin enclosing a letter
which had somehow come into his hands and which he asked von
Papen "to destroy immediately in the interests of safety." The letter,
apparently addressed to a high official in Germany, was written by
"His Excellency von Igel Schwerin," an acquaintance of von Papen's
and Boy-Ed's who had been in intimate contact with them during
their many months' stay at the German Club in New York City. As
von Igel Schwerin gives an accurate account of the acts of the two
Attaches immediately preceding and following their recall, and adds a
frank appraisal of their effect on the American Public, the Press, and
the Government, his letter is quoted here at some length:

. . . Then Herr Boy-Ed made a fresh mistake wiien he addressed a com-
munication to the American people before his departure, in which he affirmed

that he was being sent home guiltless Then, however, he enters on a

boundless lack of circumspection, attacking in this communication the
American press in general, and the celebrated Providence Journal

As could have been seen, the paper on the following day fell all over him
and sent him a series of vulgarities on board by wireless. Others called him
a liar, and such are the parting words which have hung on in the public

mind, and not the words of his communication Herr von Papen's career

closed with quite a disaster. He was charged with being concerned in the
many explosions in the munition factories, in so far as he had given the

56 THE ENEMY WITHIN

money for the procuring of materials and had instructed the people. It
appears, too, that some really childish arrangements were made. . . .

. . . All that could have been forgiven, since failures in such things cannot
alvs^ays be avoided, also much has been performed by Herr von Papen ad-
vantageous to us, if still the prime stupidity had not followed when Herr
von Papen had to leave the country. One could have assumed that he would
have previously destroyed the critical documents left here, or at any rate have
safely disposed of them somewhere or other, so that they could not fall into
the possession of outsiders. But Herr von P. left his bureau, with all these
unfortunate documents, to his young and harmless secretary, Herr von

Igel He himself had obtained a pass through the EngHsh lines, in which

it was expressly noted that only his person would be let through, and that
he must not take with him either letters or anything else. Moreover, he had
instructions from Count von B. to take nothing with him, and all his friends
had warned him urgently "for God's sake, don't take any compromising
papers with you! . . ." Above everything else [he had with him] the rest
of the cheque books, in which he had quite naively noted in plain language
all receivers who had received money from him. He had besides a whole
series of compromising private letters with him.

The excitement here was immense as these facts became known. . . .

. . . Worse still was it that these letters . . . opened the eyes of the Americans
to what was going on, and called forth a storm of indignation. It was fully
justified, since Herr von P. had also on his departure left behind an open

communication in which he protested his innocence After both men,

however, had publicly declared that they were innocent and were unjustly
banished, one could not expect anything else than that the Government
should now show evidence that it had acted with perfect justness

All that we have heard is the bestowal of orders to Herr Boy-Ed and von
Papen, as well as the promotion of Herr von Igel to Vice-Sergt.-Major. You
can judge, too, how extraordinarily fitting it is to publish these distinctions

throughout the whole world Thereby all these things appear not to have

detracted from the self-conceit of these men in the very slightest, on the
contrary they hold themselves, as before, for geniuses. I learn through a good
source, which stands in direct connection with Washington, how this self-
sufficient manner damages. The officials here complain bitterly about the
haughty demeanor of our people, who think by means of a stiff bearing to
compensate for their lack of knowledge of the conditions of the place. Count
von B. and Privy Councillor A. are looked upon in Washington in the light
of emetics. . . .

THE RECALL OF VON PAPEN AND BOY-ED 57

After the publication of the Papen letter, in which Herr von P. spoke
of the idiotic Yankees, the general feeling here was so uncomfortable that
Herr von P. thought it well to disappear for some weeks* He went with
Prince Hatzfeld to the West, and I met the gentlemen at Mammoth Springs
in the Yellowstone Park. I at once understood the object of their journey
and avoided addressing them by name or title, in the supposition that they
were travelling under assumed names. That, however, was a mistake, they
had registered themselves with full title, their arrival was announced in all
the papers, and on their further journey an army of reporters and photogra-
phers followed them. They were pestered at every step they took with the
request to give an explanation about the "Idiotic Yankees." Their reply "we
have nothing to say" was pubUshed with the photographs in all the papers.
I met the gentlemen later in Denver, where the business was at its maddest.
The reporters from San Francisco instructed to do so, had sworn to compel
Papen to an utterance, and followed the two gentlemen everywhere. Both
held newspapers in front of their faces in order not to be snapshotted, and
a whole series of laughable photographs resulted, which circulated through-
out the States. On the papers held up in front of them appeared printed in
German "Wir haben nichts zu sagen" [we have nothing to say]. A mad
comedy at our expense! It is unpleasant to the writer to have to say all this.
With the exception of Bernstorfl and Dernburg, I know all the gentlemen
personally, have lived in the German Club with most of them, and have
always been nicely received by them. ...

However, these final acts of von Papen's and Boy-Ed's must not be
taken as a gauge of their caliber. What seems to be the quintessence of
stupidity was simply another manifestation of the same brazen ef-
frontery which had hitherto crowned their efforts with success. Thus
far the "idiotic Yankees" had believed their denials; von Papen and
Boy-Ed did not realize that they were now being seen in their true
light.

Whatever criticism may be leveled at the two Attaches, they had
carried out implicitly the instructions issued to them by the German
High Command, and apparently Berlin was satisfied with the cam-
paign of sabotage which they had directed on such a vast scale. Proof
of the capacity of von Papen is that he subsequently became Chancellor
of Germany; and at present, as Ambassador in Vienna, he is conduct-
ing the Nazi campaign in Austria.

58 THE ENEMY WITHIN

In spite of the storm which had been raised, the acts of violence con-
tinued. There was a worthy successor to take over the work of von
Papen, and the cogs at the War IntelUgence Center at 60 Wall Street
kept turning without missing a beat. Immediately upon the recall of
Captain von Papen, the German Ambassador addressed the following
communication to the American Secretary of State:

Mr. Wolf von Igel, a German citizen, Secretary of von Papen, will continue
the current business of the Military Attache until the Emperor should name
a successor to the Military Attache.

No other successor was appointed. Von Igel was still at his post when
diplomatic relations were severed just prior to the entry of the United
States into the war.

On the one hand, Germany continued on the same scale her cam-
paign of sabotage; on the other hand, she never ceased to protest her
innocence. On November 25, 1916, von Papen sent to von Bernstorff,
through von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a complete
denial of any connection with the ship bombing:

The War Ministry advises as follows:

The former Military Attache in Washington, Captain von Papen, has
been required to answer to the charge made against him in New York and
reports as follows:

"... The incredible part 6f the matter is that the charge could in the first
place be construed from the documents and accounts that were illegally taken
from Mr. von Igel *

"As appears from American papers, Dr. Scheele is charged with the manu-
facture of incendiary bombs, with what right is past my knowledge.

"It is, however, published at the same time that Dr. Scheele had received
large amounts through me or my office [Mr. von Igel], whereby it is also
indubitably shown that I was the instigator of these plots. I must naturally
lay the greatest value on establishing beyond question that my relations with
Dr. Scheele were exclusively of a business nature and I am in a position to
corroborate this by the documents that account for every amount."

In the opinion of the War Ministry it would be desirable to request of

* As is related in the next chapter, these papers were seized during a raid on
von Igel's office.

THE RECALL OF VON PAPEN AND BOY-ED 59

the Government there an official denial that official persons of the Imperial
German Government were implicated in the so-called "Ship-Complots" or
similar instances.

Please test the matter there and as far as there are no objections make
further arrangements. Report requested.

(Signed) von Jagow

This denial of the Captain's speaks well for his persistence, but in
considering the facts revealed in the preceding chapters he must blush
if he ever thinks back on it now.

Chapter VI
PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR

Brilliant as had been the success of Tunney and his bomb squad in
running to earth those German agents engaged in ship sabotage in
New York Harbor, and granting the Government full credit for tardily
obtaining enough evidence on- the Attaches to effect their recall, still
the efforts of the various American authorities to put a stop to the land
sabotage proved an utter failure. And yet in American factories, freight
yards — ^in fact, everyv^here on American soil where supplies for the
Allies were being transported or assembled — this sabotage was being
carried out on a scale which made the ship bombings appear almost
insignificant.

The preponderating reason for this failure was the lack of coordina-
tion among the various police authorities and between them and the
Department of Justice. This in turn was largely due to the fact that
until the Espionage Act was passed the Department of Justice was
never quite sure whether an individual case of land sabotage was an in-
fraction of a Federal law; consequently there was a disposition to allow
the local authorities to handle the matter. The result was that, since the
sabotage agents were constantly on the move from State to State, the
individual threads of evidence uncovered by the local police were in-
sufficient to disclose the identity of the agents; but in the aggregate
these could have been so tightly knit together by a central organization
covering the whole country as to make rapid solutions of the cases
nearly inevitable.

The main reasons for Tunney's success were that the ring he was
fighting was located largely in his own area and that he was allowed
to concentrate on this one assignment. Had there been coordination
between New York and Baltimore, Hinsch, the organizer of the Balti-
more group, would not have escaped detection.

60

PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 6l

Compelling evidence that a central counter-espionage service could
have enormously diminished the acts of sabotage in the United States
during the neutrality period is that in the neutral belligerent countries
in Europe, all of which possessed an efficient central organization to
combat the spy and saboteur, such sabotage was negligible during the
war.

We might also note that as soon as the United States entered the
war and organized an effective Military Intelligence Service, sabotage
dwindled to the vanishing point; that when kidnaping was attacked
by a centralized and nation-wide police organization, the percentage
of solved cases leaped up almost astronomically.

A cardinal error was also committed in delaying the demand for
the recall of von Papen and Boy-Ed. By the time the recall finally
came, they had already delegated the direction of spy and sabotage
activities to others who remained behind. The German Secret Service
and the German Naval Intelligence Service were also given time and
opportunity during this early period to send free-lance agents out
from Germany equipped with independent funds. Once in the coun-
try, many of them operated as centers of separate and independent
nests.

Except for those agents who were employed in sabotage on ships or
were operating in Canada, the American authorities had only the
most meager information at the time of the saboteurs and spies abroad
in the land.

Of the spy directors whom von Papen left behind him, Paul Koenig
was one of the most important. The Department of Justice and the
detectives of the New York Police Department often crossed his path;
but, in spite of leaving a volume of mystifying records in their hands,
he escaped with no other penalty than confinement in a civilian in-
ternment camp when America entered the war.

Koenig had been head detective of the Atlas Line, a subsidiary of
the Hamburg-American, for a number of years preceding the war. In
this capacity he had come into close contact with sailors, tug skippers,
and dock hands, and knew intimately both the topography and life of
the water front.

He was massively built and was endowed with great bodily strength.

62 THE ENEMY WITHIN

The set of his mouth and eyes suggested craft and brutality. He was
extremely alert mentally and was gifted with supreme self-confidence.
Distrustful of those who worked for him, he earned their hearty dis-
like; but through fear he commanded their respect.

Von Papen saw in Koenig's small detective force the nucleus of
just the organization he required, and so we see in Koenig's memo-
randum book the following entry, under date of August 22, 1914:

German Government, with consent of Dr. Buenz,* entrusted me with
the handling of a certain investigation. Military Attache von Papen called
at my office later and explained the nature of the work expected. (Beginning
of Bureau's service for Imperial Government.)

Koenig's duties were varied and many. As cover, he provided guards
and confidential messengers for von Bernstorff , Dr. Albert, Dr. Dumba,
and for von Papen and Boy-Ed; secretly he was engaged in spy and
sabotage activities, the scope of which can be roughly gauged from the
entries in his memorandum book. We know from this book that as
far back as September 1914, he sent into Canada two spies, one, an
Irishman named Edmond Justice, the other, Frederick Metzler, of
Jersey City, and that he received from them a report on the fortifi-
cations at Quebec and on the number of soldiers who were training
in the camps in that area.

From Koenig's prewar detective activities, Tunney and the New
York police knew him well: they had often cooperated with him on
cases of petty theft and other crimes affecting the Hamburg-Ameri-
can Line. Now, however, they were suspicious of him. In spite of the
fact that all the ships were laid up, Koenig was busier than ever. There-
fore, they decided to watch him.

Koenig, however, was a slippery fish — he was constantly on the alert
and knew all the arts of sleuthing. When shadowing proved useless,

* Managing Director of the Hamburg-American Line. During the early stages
of the war, on instructions from Captain Boy-Ed, he sent out from American
ports, under false manifests, several of the Hamburg-American ships with sup-
plies for German warships then still at large. He was subsequently arrested for
these activities and sentenced to eighteen months in Atlanta, but owing to
various appeals did not commence to serve his term until April 19 18.

PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 6^

they tried tapping the telephone line which led to his office at 45
Broadway. Here again for a time he outwitted them; for both the in-
coming and outgoing conversation was always in guarded language;
and it was soon found that when, for example, he said he was going
out to meet some one at the Staten Island Ferry he meant the Unter
den Linden Bar, and so on: in other words, he had a prearranged
code both as to time and place. But eventually their patience was re-
warded. After listening in for several weeks, a voice came over the
phone which upbraided Koenig in no uncertain language and, finally,
bitterly accused him of being a double-crosser.

The detective listening in acted promptly. He traced the call and
found out that it had been made by a George Fuchs. Discreet inquiry
disclosed that George Fuchs was unemployed and was looking for
work. An offer of a job and an opportunity to pay off his score against
Koenig soon brought Fuchs to heel. He stated that Koenig was a
distant relative of his and that in September 1915 Koenig and his wife
had visited in Niagara Falls, New York, where Fuchs lived at that
time with his mother in the Lochiel Apartments. It was not long be-
fore Koenig proposed to Fuchs that he should undertake some spying
for him in Canada. Fuchs accepted, crossed the border, and returned
a couple of days later with a detailed report on the disposition of
the guards around the Welland Canal.

On the invitation of Koenig, Fuchs moved to New York and
there was enrolled as an agent at $18 a week. In New York a plan
to blow up the Welland Canal was discussed between Koenig,
Richard Emil Leyendecker, and Fred Metzler, Koenig's secretary. It
was arranged that Fuchs should row a boat load of dynamite across
the upper Niagara River to the Canadian side of the border and there
deliver it to Leyendecker and Metzler.

Fuchs, however, fell to drinking in New York. And it was here that
Koenig committed a cardinal error. Judging Fuchs unfit for the serious
job on hand, he discharged him and, what was still more unwise,
quarreled with him over the payment of the paltry sum of $2.57 for
time which Fuchs claimed he had put in. This rankled in Fuchs's mind
with the result that the New York police scarcely needed to urge him
to tell his story. His story, as we can well see, was ample evidence

64 THE ENEMY WITHIN

to justify an arrest. A raid on Koenig's office and on his home also fol-
lowed. In the process of searching his house, a little black book was
brought to light, the memorandum book which we have already men-
tioned. It was loose-leaf, carefully typewritten, and had been kept up
to the day of the raid. It told the story of Koenig s "Bureau of Investi-
gation." Although the most interesting part of it was in code, still a
study of it gave the police not only a close insight into Koenig's
methods but also some indication of what those activities were which
had so baffled them.

The central office was in Rooms 82 and 83 at 45 Broadway, New
York City. Here were established two of the three divisions of
Koenig's organization: the Pier Division, and the Division for Special
Detail. These two divisions apparently occupied themselves with
routine investigations and commissions assigned either by the Gei-
man Embassy or by the German Consulate in New York City.

The third division, the Secret Service Division {Geheimdienst),
performed the real work of the organization; the other two divisions
acted chiefly as a blind.

Agents of the Secret Service Division never came to the Central
Office — Koenig always met them outside. In his notebook is an out-
line of a special "Safety Block System," which was devised for the
purpose:

A street number in Manhattan named over the telephone means that the
meeting will take place five blocks further uptown than the street mentioned.
Pennsylvania Railroad Station means Grand Central Depot. Kaiserhof means
General Post Office in front of P. O. Box 840. Hotel Ansonia means cafe in
Hotel Manhattan [basement]. Hotel Belmont means at the bar in Pabst's,
Columbus Circle.

Not satisfied with these precautions, he continually changed the
code; for two weeks later, under date of December 12, it appeared that
a street number in Manhattan named over the telephone now meant
five blocks further downtown instead of uptown; and that Pabst's bar
was indicated by the Borough Hall, Brooklyn, instead of the Hotel
Belmont,

PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 65

Under date November 23, 1915, was a note:

Beginning with November 28, 1915, all operations designated as D-cases
will be handled exclusively by the Secret Service Division . . . great care is to
be taken that operatives and agents of the Secret Service Division remain
entirely unknown to members of the Central Office and other divisions.

On December i, 1915, further precautions were adopted:

Operatives of this Division will be requested to desist from sending reports
to P. O. 840 as heretofore. Instead, these reports will be handed to me per-
sonally or to the Division's Secretary.

A later entry reads:

In order to safeguard the secrets and affairs of the Department, prior to
receiving a caller, my desk must be entirely cleared of all papers except those
pertaining to the business at hand.

And then another change of meeting place:

Volk's Cafe, 658 Third Avenue, one of the meeting places of the Secret
Service Division, must not be frequented after today until January i, 1916,
for safety's sake.

It was, however, the page in Koenig's notebook marked, "Secret
Service Division, list of aliases used by X.X.X.* D-Cases," which fur-
nished definite evidence that these "D-Cases" referred to destruction or
sabotage cases; for among the thirty-four Secret Service Agents listed
with their aliases we have already mentioned the following three as
being known to the police: Werner Horn, who was indicted for dyna-
miting the Vanceboro Bridge, labelled "D-Case 277" ; Dr. Kienzlc, who
was associated with Robert Fay in the work of making bombs for the
rudders of ships, "D-Case 316"; and Leyendecker, "D-Case 344."

For his own person, Koenig was particularly liberal with aliases.
He had painstakingly listed thirty-seven of them, such as: "Blohm,"
"Bode," "Brandt," "Burg," and so on alphabetically down to "Z."

* Paul Koenig.

66 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Further evidence that the "D-Cases" were sabotage cases is the fol-
lowing entry:

[Newspaper] clippings that refer to D-Cases of this Bureau will continue
to be placed in the private files together with their respective reports. An
exception to this particular rule may be had in the event that there are too
many clippings to be had in which case they may be bound together and
kept separate.

All acts of sabotage were newspaper copy. The newspaper stories not
only furnished proof to Koenig that the particular jobs had been car-
ried out, but in their aggregate were a gauge of the work accomplished
by his organization.

His notebook also betrayed his connection with the official German
representatives in the United States, for we find the following:

Secret Service Division Key to Bureau's Connections

(In use since Oct. 20, 1915)
M.A.C.— I. G. Embassy
H.M.G.— I. G. MiUtary Attache
W.N.N.— I. G. Naval Attache
B.C.D. — I. G. Commercial Attache

There was also an alternative key:

5000 — I. G. Embassy
7000—" " Military Attache
8000—" " Naval Attache
9000—" " Commercial Attache

In addition to the evidence of the notebook we now have access to
other documents which throw light on Koenig's activities. Among
them are partial records of the money paid him by these officials of the
Imperial German Government. They alone show 30 payments, aggre-
gating $159,073.38.

Busy as he was directing the campaign of sabotage covered by the
D-Cases, he was invariably called in as an intermediary when either
the German Embassy or its Attaches wished to avoid being com-

PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 67

promised. Thus it was Koenig who, at Boy-Ed's instigation, paid a
German, Gustave Stahl, to swear to an affidavit that he had seen guns
on the Lusitania. And when, after investigating this affidavit, the De-
partment of Justice found it to be a perjury, it was Koenig again who
hid Stahl and then later produced him at the command of the Federal
authorities. Likewise many a material witness or fugitive German
agent was hidden by him or supplied with funds to escape from the
country. In his second affidavit, given after his escape from the Atlanta
Penitentiary and after his subsequent extradition from Spain, Robert
Fay stated that it was Koenig who met him and gave him the money
with which he reached Mexico. When von Papen was recalled, it was
also to Koenig that he left the task of transferring from New York
to the Embassy those compromising papers he was not taking with
him.

In connection with these and other services, Koenig proudly re-
corded in his notebook, under date December 13, 1915:

At 6.30 P.M., Captain von Papen, German Military Attache, received me
at the German Club to express his thanks for the services which this Bureau
have rendered to him. At the same time he bade me good-bye.

It was, however, the list in the little black book giving the names of
secret agents engaged in D-Cases which riveted the attention of the
New York poUce. The fact that the three who had been identified were
known sabotage agents convinced the police that the remaining thirty-
one were equally dangerous. A study of the names and their aHases
revealed only one clue. The name of Schleindl was familiar. A de-
tective who had trailed Koenig had reported that a man whom Koenig
had met at the Eastern Hotel had been followed and his identity had
been established as Frederick Schleindl, a clerk in the employ of the
National City Bank.

Opposite the name Schleindl appeared the notation: "D-Case 343."
And it was obvious from the entries in Koenig's notebook that it was
an unusually important case. We read that

Beginning with November 6th [1915] no blue copies are to be made of
reports submitted in connection with D-Case 343, and the original reports
will be sent to H. M. G. [von Papen] instead of the duplicates.

68 THE ENEMY WITHIN

A further entry continues:

In order to accomplish better results in connection with D-Case 343, and
to shorten the stay of the informing agent at the place of meeting, it has
been decided to discontinue the form of practice of dining with this agent
prior to receiving his report. It will also be a rule to refrain from working
on other matters until the informant in this case has been fully heard, and
all data taken down in shorthand.

An examination of the entries reveals that Schleindl, who was first
known as operative Number 51, and later as agent CO., from October
21, was designated as agent B.I. This enables us to interpret the next
entry:

Supplementing rule 2, it has been decided that I refrain from drinking
beer or liquor with my supper prior to receiving agent B. I. for the reason
that I wish to be perfectly fresh and well prepared to receive his reports.

Schleindrs arrest promptly followed on the same day as that of his
mentor, December 18, 191 5. In his pocket were two cablegrams ad-
dressed to the National City Bank: one from the Banque Beige pour
Etrangers relating to a shipment of 2,000,000 rifles, the other from the
Russian Government authorizing the bank to accord certain large
credits to the Russian Naval Attache and Purchasing Agent.

Under interrogation the young and emotional Schleindl freely con-
fessed. Being a German reservist, he had reported on the outbreak of
the war to the German Consul in New York. Months had gone by
without his receiving any word, until one day in May 1915, he re-
ceived mysterious instructions from the Consul to report that night to
a German named "Werner," who would be waiting for him in the bar
of the Hotel Manhattan. "Werner" turned out to be Koenig. Playing
on his patriotism and greed, Koenig had no difficulty in enrolling him
as an agent.

Through Schleindl's hands passed not only telegrams from the Al-
lied countries transmitting money for the purchase of war material but
also the orders for them and letters of advice from the manufacturers,
which frequently named the railway by which the munitions were to
be transported and the vessels to which they were consigned. For men

PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 69

who were endeavoring to burn or blow up supplies intended for the
Allies in the factories or during transport, here was invaluable infor-
mation ; and Koenig made full use of it. Every evening over a period of
eight months either he or his secretary, Metzler, spent hours copying
the cables, letters, and papers supplied to them by Schleindl. In the
morning Schleindl made a point of arriving in sufficient time at the
bank to restore the documents to their proper place before the business
day commenced, and in the meantime the information was being
passed on to those engaged in ship sabotage or in the destruction of
factories or supplies on land.

Schleindl further confessed that he had also been approached by an-
other sabotage group, which was working independently of Koenig.
In 1915 Alexander Dietrichens, who had been a classmate of his in
Germany, arrived in the United States on a sabotage mission. Die-
trichens lost no time in looking him up and outlined to him a plan to
blow up the Aetna, Du Pont, and Hercules Powder Companies; a
factory in Eddystone, Pa.; the Savage Arms Co. in Utica; the Poole
Engineering Corporation in Baltimore; the Roebling Works in Tren-
ton, N. J.; the Kastner Chemical Company in Niagara Falls; and an-
other chemical company in West Virginia. Subsequently he met
Dietrichens again at the Cafe Bismarck, and at Schumann's Cafe at
47 West 125th Street. On this latter occasion, Dietrichens, who was
then passing under the name of "Willisch," had three friends with him,
who joined him in attempting to persuade Schleindl to assist them;
and to show that they were in earnest they took him out to a shack
near Tenafly, New Jersey, and showed him a cache of dynamite.
Schleindl confessed, however, that he was more interested in the $25
per week retainer that he was getting from Koenig over and above his
regular pay as a clerk, that he thought there was little risk of discovery
at the bank, and that he did not have the stomach to take a hand per-
sonally in an explosion where there would be loss of life. Therefore he
turned down Dietrichens' proposition.

Explosions and incendiary fires did subsequently break out at some
of the factories cited above, but their origin remained a mystery. It is
highly probable, however, that either Dietrichens or one of his agents
had a hand in them.

70 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Schleindl was tried, convicted, and sentenced to an indefinite prison
term for the theft of documents. Koenig pleaded guilty to the same
charge but was given a suspended sentence.

Thus Koenig was released to continue his sabotage activities. But he
had been caught once, and from now on he was more wary. If he kept
notebooks or records, he saw to it that they never again fell into the
hands of the police. His name is to appear again later in the Black Tom
case, and it was only his internment at the time of America s entry
into the war that put an end to his plotting.

The office of the Military Intelligence Center at 60 Wall Street, under
the direction of von Papen's successor, Wolf von Igel, also continued
its work unabated. Here we have some measure of the extent of the
activities; for on April 18, 1916, acting on information supplied by
von der Goltz to the British concerning the first Welland Canal plot,
the office was raided by agents of the American Secret Service. Von
Igel, who happened to be near the safe, made a frantic effort to close
it, but was knocked over by one of the agents, who had a warrant for
his arrest. Though von Igel claimed that the office was part of the Ger-
man Embassy, none the less a rich haul was made of compromising
documents, many of which will be referred to later. Among the papers
were some of von Igel's account books. They were in a simple alpha-
betical code which was quickly broken by an expert cryptographer.
Payments to "Zkjaara" (Scheele), "Cranzd" (Kleist), "Pyta" (Bode),
"Vyrbald" (Wolpert), and "Zkjunnar" (Schimmel) estabhshed a clear
connection between von Igel and the ship-sabotage group.

Among many other payments the account showed that four sums,
aggregating $4,000, were paid to Pyajn (Boehm) between March 20,
1916, and June 10, 1916. This is of special interest as we have already
seen that in Zimmermann's coded telegram of April 3, 1915, ordering
the destruction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, it was mentioned that
"Captain Boehm who is well known in America and who will shortly
return to that country is furnished with expert information on that
subject." Boehm was only one of the numerous secret agents who were
sent direct to the United States by the German Government with
specific instructions to bring about explosions or in other ways cause
the destruction of munitions of war intended for the Allies.

International A'rui Photos

Consul General Franz von Bopp.

Brown Brothers

Von Papen's Assistant, Wolf von Igel.

Intt, "ational News Photos

Spy Director Paul Koenig.

International News Photos

Captain Franz von Rintelen,
as He Appears Today

International Xews Photos Courtesy of Inspector Tunney

Robert Fay. Inspector Thomas J. Tunney,
of the Bomb Squad.

International News Photos

Ship Bofnbers — Von Kleist, Schmidt, Becker, Paradies,
Praedel, Karbade, Fritzen — on Their Way to Jail.

Leading Figures in thi Ship-Bomb Complots

PAUL KOENIG MAKES AN ERROR 7I

Although the German sabotage agents involved in the Welland
Canal affair were tried and convicted and von Igel W2is indicted, yet
through the intervention of Count von Bernstorff he v^^as able to fur-
nish bail and was never brought to trial. Hov^ lightly the Germans
took von Igel's arrest can be gathered from the foUov^ing passage in a
letter from Dr. Albert to von Papen which was subsequently captured
by the British in Palestine:

New York,
November 16, 1916.

Your name has already been mentioned several times because your friend,
Igel, after a number of official papers had been taken from him by force,
has been working in my offices, which also afford asylum to the remainder
of the staff of the office of our former Naval Attache. The Consulate Gen-
eral having dismissed these gentlemen to avoid the risk of being com-
promised... how slight is the attention we pay to the alleged fact of his
having been compromised — which to one acquainted with the local condi-
tions does not appear bad and has in the meantime been almost forgotten — is
shown by the fact that I have not hesitated to take a step further and grant
power of attorney to him. . . .

Chapter VII
SECTION IIIB CARRIES ON

But von Igel and Dr. Albert were not the only spy paymasters in the
United States; therefore, their records revealed nothing of another
group of sabotage agents v^ho v^ere functioning entirely independently
of them, and of v^hom the American authorities only learned long
after the v^ar.

On von Rintelen's departure from the United States he had left cer-
tain funds v^ith Paul Hilken to finance Hinsch and his group of agents
in Baltimore. Hinsch did not confine his activities to ship sabotage,
but turned his attention to land operations as weW. In addition to blow-
ing up factories and starting incendiary fires, he organized a band of
agents to inoculate with anthrax and glanders germs mules, horses, and
cattle which were awaiting shipment to the Allies. His germ supply
was received from Anton Dilger, a special agent who was sent out
from Germany.

The Dilger family had emigrated from Germany in the 1870's, and
after remaining for some time in Chicago had finally settled in Vir-
ginia. There were now four daughters and two sons, Anton and Carl.

Anton, a medical graduate from Johns Hopkins University, was in
Germany when the war broke out. Having previously obtained con-
siderable experience with a hospital unit during the Serbo-Bulgarian
War, he offered his services to Germany. Shortly thereafter Germany
detailed him to secret service work, and he was sent back to the United
States with a supply of cultures of glanders and anthrax germs, and
instructions to work with Hilken and Hinsch. In Chevy Chase, near
Washington, he installed a laboratory; and, assisted by his brother
Carl, he started in on his work of propagating germs.

The actual inoculating was carried out by J. Edward Felton, a col-
ored foreman of the Negro stevedore crews who worked for Hinsch in

72

SECTION IIIB CARRIES ON 73

Baltimore. In the fall of 1915, on Hinsch's instructions, Felton organ-
ized a band of a dozen Negro assistants to travel round the country.
They carried the germs in glass bottles. Each of these was about an
inch and a half long and three-quarters of an inch in diameter and
stoppered by a cork through which was stuck a long needle extending
into the liquid culture.

Felton and his band did their work by walking along the fences
which enclosed the horses and mules and jabbing the animals with
the needles as they came alongside. The germs were also spread on the
food and in the water they drank.

This new campaign, as well as the ship sabotage, was in full swing
when in January 1916 Anton Dilger was ordered to report to Berlin.
He took ship immediately for Norway, intending to reach Germany
via this neutral country. Passing through Denmark on his way south,
he stopped in at the office of the German Naval Intelligence Service in
Copenhagen. There, to his surprise, he met Fred Herrmann, a young
fellow passenger with whom he had struck up an acquaintanceship on
his way over. Neither had confided in the other, and they now had a
hearty laugh over their mutual deception.

On the next day they boarded a train for Berlin. Herrmann at this
period of his life was a tall, slender, blond youth, described by one
who knew him in 1916 as being very similar in appearance to Colonel
Lindbergh. Dilger found him not without charm as a traveling
companion. As they watched the snow-covered fields flash by their
compartment window, Herrmann's reserve melted; and he was soon
telling his life story.

He was born in Brooklyn on September 10, 1895. His father had
come from Germany and was a naturalized American citizen. His
mother was born in the United States. Some time before the war the
family moved to Roselle Park, New Jersey, which is not far from
Kingsland. There were three other brothers, Edwin, Carl, and John.

In 19 14, shortly after the outbreak of the war, Fred Herrmann sailed
for Rotterdam, Holland, on the Ryndam on a visit to his grandmother
in Germany. On board ship he met a German agent named von Dalen,

74 THE ENEMY WITHIN

who was voyaging under the name William Kottkamp as a traveling
salesman for the European Textile Company.

Von Dalen saw enough of young Herrmann on the steamer to de-
cide that he would make an ideal spy, and on their arrival in Holland
the subject was broached. The adventure appealed to Herrmann, and
he arranged to meet von Dalen in Berlin. There he was introduced to
Captain F. Prieger of the German Naval Intelligence Service. The out-
come was that Herrmann was sent with von Dalen to England, and
cover addresses were furnished them in neutral countries to which they
could send their reports.

Herrmann had several close shaves in the course of these spy activi-
ties. But, as he told Dilger of his adventures, it was the humorous
incidents which he chiefly recalled. On his arrival in England, in order
to have an excuse for traveUng around the country, he decided to pose
as the representative of an American firm selling church vestments.
The acquisition of an American catalogue furnished him both with the
name of an employer and also a talking knowledge of the articles.
Herrmann, of course, was unable to effect delivery, but by quoting
exorbitant prices he succeeded in avoiding an actual sale. One day,
however, overcome by the tyro's salesmanship, a parson, evidently
in charge of a wealthy parish, insisted on placing an order. Herrmann
had to undo the effects of his eloquence, and in doing so suddenly
became an ardent Catholic. He quoted the name of a Catholic bishop
in London as being that of one of his best customers, and for good
measure told of a sale he had made to the Pope himself. The Church
of England parson became quite irascible and, to Herrmann's relief,
showed him the door.

After remaining in England for several months, reporting on the
movements of warships and other naval activities, Herrmann returned
to the United States.

On instructions from Boy-Ed, he sailed for Norway in the fall of
1915, and from there crossed over to Scotland, where he enrolled him-
self in the University of Edinburgh, ostensibly as a student of forestry
but actually to watch the British naval bases on the East Coast of
Scotland. In spite of this cover, however, he aroused the suspicions of
the British; and after an examination at Scotland Yard he was told to

SECTION IIIB CARRIES ON 75

leave the country, and was put on board a ship saiHng for the United
States.

In the meantime Paul Hilken had received a cable from Herr Stape-
feldt, a high official of the North German Lloyd, requesting him to
come to Bremen at once. On his arrival there he found that he had
been called over to make arrangements in connection v^ith the con-
templated U-boat commercial service with the United States which
was to be inaugurated by the submarine Deutschland,

From Bremen Hilken went on to Berlin to arrange for credits for
the purchase of such raw materials in the United States as were to be
shipped to Germany in the Deutschland. While there he met von
Papen, who had lately been recalled to Germany, also several other
German officials; and it occurred to one of them that Hilken could ex-
tend his role of paymaster to additional sabotage agents in the United
States beyond those connected with Hinsch.

In Berlin Anton Dilger introduced Herrmann to Paul Hilken; and
the two of them persuaded Herrmann to transfer his services to Sec-
tion III B, the German Secret Service. Early in February 1916 a con-
ference took place at which Captains Nadolny and Marguerre of
Section III B, and Herrmann, Dilger, and Hilken were present. It is
important to note that Nadolny was one of the heads of Section III B.
One of his major duties was to act as liaison officer with the Foreign
Office in order to harmonize secret service work with Germany's
foreign policy.

At this conference, Nadolny and Marguerre immediately brought up
the subject of the destruction of munitions plants in the United States.
Herrmann volunteered that it would be a difficult job, but Hilken
claimed that it would be easy and outlined how already the work was
being done by introducing sabotage agents as workmen into the fac-
tories. Herrmann eventually fell into line; and, in addition to promis-
ing to assist in the sabotage campaign in the United States, he took on
as a special objective the firing of the Tampico oil fields.

Marguerre and Nadolny then showed them a new incendiary device.
This consisted of a slender glass tube drawn to capillary dimensions in
the center. The top part of the tube contained sulphuric acid; the bot-
tom half a mixture of chlorate of potash and sugar in the proportion of

j6 THE ENEMY WITHIN

3 to I. They demonstrated the method of making the two halves of an
ordinary pencil come apart by soaking it in water; also how, after the
lead had been removed, the glass tube could be slipped into its place and
the two halves of the pencil glued together. The incendiary pencil could
then be brought into action by breaking off the tip. This forced the
sulphuric acid down onto the mixture of sugar and chlorate of potash
and caused the emission of a white-hot flame.

After a supply of these incendiary pencils had been handed to them
and after the necessary credits had been established for Hilken to act
as paymaster, the three German-Americans were sent on their way.

On his return to the United States Hilken made the required ar-
rangements in connection with the Deutschland; and, mindful of
Hinsch*s shipping experience, as well as of the fact that it would pro-
vide excellent cover for Hinsch, he enrolled him as an assistant in the
commercial U-boat service. It was Hinsch who went down Chesapeake
Bay on a tug and guided the submarine to its berth; it was also he who
superintended the loading and unloading. Hilken, on the other hand,
organized the Eastern Forwarding Company, which handled the
dyestufis and other cargo brought in by the submarine and purchased
the nickel, tin, rubber, and other raw materials it took on board. The
Deutschland, however, only succeeded in making two trips to America ;
Germany's Commercial U-boat service proved only an empty dream.

Herrmann traveled back to the United States via Copenhagen, and
shortly after his arrival he met Dilger and Hilken, who had returned
on another boat. In Baltimore Hilken introduced Herrmann to Hinsch.
Hinsch was immensely impressed with the pencils and was emphatic
in claiming that they would be a vast improvement over the "dump-
lings," as he called them, that he had been using hitherto.

From Baltimore Herrmann went to Washington and stayed at Dil-
ger's home. At his laboratory they filled the tubes with the necessary
chemicals and fitted them into pencils. Herrmann then took back a
supply to give Hinsch in Baltimore. In subsequent conferences with the
Captain a plan of campaign was mapped out, a number of factories
were marked for destruction, and each of them chose the ones they
would attend to. According to a statement made by Herrmann after
the war. Kingsland was on his list, and Black Tom on Hinsch's.

Chapter VIII
BLACK TOM BLOWS UP

At 2:08 A.M. on the night of July 30, 1916, New York City was rocked
by the greatest explosion in her history. Over two million pounds of
munitions stored on Black Tom Island in New York Harbor blew up
in a series of explosions. Two of the blasts were distinctly heard in
Camden and Philadelphia, nearly a hundred miles away. The tre-
mendous concussion shattered practically every window in Jersey City,
and in Manhattan and Brooklyn thousands of heavy plate-glass win-
dows fell from office buildings and skyscrapers into the streets. Build-
ings trembled; some of the inhabitants were thrown from their beds;
and the population, panic-stricken, emptied itself out into the streets.

For hours the sky was lit up by the fierce fire which raged on Black
Tom Island; and for three hours a steady stream of high explosives
and shrapnel shells were hurled from the conflagration as they ex-
ploded, some of them landing as far off as Governors Island. Buildings
on Ellis Island were wrecked, and all immigrants there had to be
evacuated. During these terrifying hours. Black Tom and its vicinity
might well have been part of the western front during a gigantic battle.
The residents of Greater New York and northern New Jersey were
shaken badly by the blast, but fortunately the Terminal was just far
enough away to prevent the metropolitan area's being razed.

To follow intelligently the tragic events which happened on that
night, it is necessary to understand the layout of the terminal and also
the conditions which prevailed there at the time of the explosion.

Black Tom is a promontory, nearly one mile long, which juts out
into the Upper Bay from the New Jersey shore, about opposite the
Statue of Liberty. It was originally an island but at the time of the ex-
plosion was joined to the shore by a fill about one hundred and fifty
feet wide.

77

yS THE ENEMY WITHIN

On Black Tom the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company had built
large warehouses, numerous piers, and a network of tracks. Within
a short time after the commencement of the war, Black Tom became
the most important point in America for the transfer of munitions and
supplies to Allied vessels. Loaded freight cars were run into the north-
ern part of the terminal, and from there the munitions were loaded
into barges hired by the consignees and tied up at the adjoining piers.

As it was not always possible for the representatives of the Allied
Governments to determine beforehand the exact time steamers would
be ready to receive the loads of munitions, it was quite usual for the
munitions cars to be kept there for several days, sometimes a week,
waiting to be unloaded. Thus, on the night of the explosion there
were 34 carloads of munitions on Black Tom, consisting of 11 cars of
high explosives, 17 of shells, 3 of nitro-cellulose, i of T.N.T., and 2 of
combination fuses; in all a total of approximately 2,132,000 pounds of
explosives.

At the north pier, bordering on the tracks, ten barges were tied up,
most of them loaded with explosives which they had taken on at other
terminals and piers in New York Harbor. They had tied up at Black
Tom, some to take on additional explosives, others to stay there during
the night and over the following Sunday until their loads could be
shifted to steamers. One of these barges, the Johnson ly, was loaded
with 100,000 pounds of T.N.T. and 417 cases of detonating fuses— a
veritable floating bomb.

During July 1916 Black Tom Terminal was guarded at night by
watchmen (Ley den, Kane, Groat, Kelly, Sloane, and Garrity) provided
by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, and by private detectives
(Burns, Scott, Bryan, and Gibson) furnished by the Dougherty Detec-
tive Agency and paid for by the Allied Governments, owners of the
munitions. These men went on duty at 5 p.m. and remained until

6 A.M.

There was no gate on the tongue of land connecting Black Tom to
the mainland; consequently it was an easy matter for a person to reach
the Terminal; and, unless of a suspicious appearance, he would not
have been stopped by the guards as this passageway was also com-
monly used by the barge men whose boats were tied up at the pier.

BLACK TOM BLOWS UP 79

Furthermore, the Terminal was in an isolated spot and unlighted, thus
making it difficult to sec a person prowling about. In addition anyone
could reach it at night in a boat with little danger of being observed.

On Saturday evening, July 29, at 5 o'clock, all work stopped on
Black Tom; the workmen departed for their usual Sunday holiday;
and all locomotive engines were sent to the mainland. The Terminal
was a dead yard.

A gentle wind was blowing from the southwest. The night was
quiet, and the guards placidly made their periodical rounds.

At 12:45 A.M. a fire was suddenly noticed in one of the munitions
cars. At the first sight of it the guards turned in a fire alarm and fled
in a panic.

Five independent witnesses on Black Tom Island at the time gave
affidavits that the fire started inside the car and that the fire burned
for about twenty minutes before the first explosion. A witness on Bed-
loe's Island, who had a view of the pier as well, later stated that an-
other fire appeared almost simultaneously in a barge about three hun-
dred yards away, presumably the Johnson 17.

At 2:08 A.M. the first explosion occurred, and this was followed by a
second terrific blast at 2:40. In the confusion no one was able to tell
whether the barge or the munitions near the car blew up first. How-
ever this fact is established: the Johnson ly was 325 feet away from the
pier when it exploded. This was determined by the crater which sound-
ings of the river bed disclosed. The depth of the river at that point was
found to be twenty-one feet; whereas a geodetic survey made a few
days before the explosion had established a depth of seven feet at the
same spot. How the barge drifted so far away from the pier is not
known. Only Johnson, the captain of the barge and the only man on
board at the time, could tell whether its moorings had been burned
away, or whether he had cast it loose. Both he and his barge had dis-
appeared, however. Three months later his body drifted up on Bedloe's
Island.

Another huge crater was found at a spot near where the burning
car had stood. Thus it appeared that the two major explosions had
been caused by the detonation of the munitions near the car and on the
barge, the two places where the fires had been observed.

8o THE ENEMY WITHIN

The two explosions and the conflagration which broke loose de-
stroyed the entire Black Tom Terminal together with all the munitions
and rolling stock which happened to be there that night. The damage
was estimated at $14,000,000, and 3 men and a child were killed. These
included Leyden, one of the night watchmen, and a policeman named
James Doherty.

The immediate outcome of the Black Tom disaster was that several
suits were filed against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company by the
Russian Government, which owned most of the munitions that had
exploded, and by the property owners in the neighborhood. The
plaintiffs maintained that the Railroad had been negligent in not
providing better protection for the property in view of the fact that
it was known that German sabotage agents were at work in this
country.

The Lehigh Valley based its defense on the theory that the ex-
plosions had been caused by spontaneous combustion, a defense which
seemed the most expedient at the time, but one which rose to plague
it later; for this was the very defense which the Germans raised
when, after the war, the Railroad and other American claimants in
the Black Tom case filed their claims against Germany for damages
with the Mixed Claims Commission. At these early trials, however, ex-
perts proved to the satisfaction of the jury that spontaneous com-
bustion was impossible. It was established that the smokeless powder
contained in the shells was manufactured in accordance with the
specifications of the United States Army and Navy; that it was all new
powder, treated with a stabilizer known as diphenylamine which pre-
vented spontaneous combustion. Dr. Free, United States Government
expert, testified that he had examined nearly two billion pounds of
powder manufactured in this way and that it was inconceivable that
spontaneous combustion could have occurred. It was further shown
that even untreated smokeless powder would require a temperature
of 356° Fahrenheit before it would ignite.

As regards T.N.T., experts testified that it was impossible for it to
ignite spontaneously. Finally, it was pointed out that if the shells had
gone off by spontaneous combustion, the guards would not have seen
flames destroying the freight car for eighteen minutes before the first

BLACK TOM BLOWS UP 8l

explosion at 2:08 a.m. Besides all this there was evidence to show that
before either of the explosions occurred another fire had broken out
almost simultaneously with the first at a point nearly three hundred
yards away from the car— the distance between it and the barge John-
son ly. This fact alone indicated that the origin of the explosions was
incendiary. In most of these cases the jury found that the Lehigh Valley
Railroad Company had been negligent in not having sufficient guards
to protect the property.

But there were other developments. The local police were busily
searching for leads. A Mrs. Chapman, a resident of Bayonne, New
Jersey, who since her childhood had known Captain John J. Rigney,
of the Bayonne Police Department, reported to him her suspicions
that a cousin, Michael Kristoff, was responsible for the destruction of
Black Tom. She related that Kristoff, who had formerly lodged with
her and at the time lodged with her mother, Mrs. Anna Rushnak, at
76 East 25th Street, Bayonne, did not return home until 4 o'clock in
the morning on the night of the explosion. Hearing him pace the floor,
her mother went to his room. She found him in a state of great excite-
ment and near nervous prostration. To her anxious query as to what
had happened, the only reply she could get out of him was "What
I do! What I do!" This he kept repeating over and over again as he
ran his hands through his hair.

According to Captain Rigney, Mrs. Chapman also told him that
"Kristoff had been in the habit of going away from time to time and
that everywhere he went there was an explosion." She referred to some
place in Columbus, Ohio, where he had gone and said that whenever
he came back from any of these trips he always had plenty of money.
She also said that she had seen maps and charts in Kristoff's possession
while he had been staying with her at her house at 114 Neptune Ave-
nue, Jersey City, New Jersey.

The result was that after shadowing KristofT for some time. Captain
Rigney arrested him near Mrs. Rushnak's home on August 31, 1916,
and turned him over to Lieutenant Peter Green of the Jersey City
Police Department.

All that was known about Kristoff was that he was born in 1893, in

82 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Presov, then in the Slovak region of Hungary, now a part of Czecho-
slovakia, and had been given the surname Michael. When he v^as six
years old, his parents emigrated to the United States, where his mother
had several members of her family living. By 1916 he had grown into
a tall, slimly built young man, with light reddish hair, pale blue eyes,
fair complexion, and a weak receding chin. For some months prior to
July he had been working for the Tidewater Oil Company at Bayonne,
New Jersey, close to Black Tom.

When examined by the Bayonne Police authorities, his story ran
substantially as follows: On January 3, 19 16, he was sitting in the wait-
ing room of the Pennsylvania Railroad Station, 33rd Street, New York
City, when he was accosted by a man who asked him the time and then
inquired where he was going. Kristoff informed him that he was wait-
ing for a train to go to Cambridge, Ohio, where he intended to visit
his sister. This man, who then gave his name as Graentnor, offered him
a job at $20 per week, which he accepted. He went with Graentnor to
the Hotel York, and on the next day they started off on a series of
travels which took them in turn to Philadelphia, Bridgeport, Cleve-
land, Akron, Columbus, Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, and finally
back to New York. After arranging to meet him in the lobby of the
Hotel McAlpin Graentnor disappeared, and he never saw him again.
Kristoff stated that during these journeys his job was to carry Graent-
nor's two suitcases, which contained blueprints of bridges and fac-
tories, also money and books. He had no idea whom Graentnor saw
in these towns, but ventured an opinion that the plans were "to show
people how to build bridges and houses and factories."

His whole story sounded so unintelligible to the police authorities
that they got the impression Kristoff was half demented; and, there-
fore, they called in an alienist to examine him. It was finally decided
that he was not altogether sane, but not dangerously insane. Where-
upon, in spite of the fact he had furnished several false alibis as to
where he had been on the night of the explosion and had admitted
working for the Eagle Oil Works, adjacent to Black Tom, and not
returning for his pay after the explosion, he was released on September
25, 1916, after promising to look for Graentnor.

But the Lehigh Valley Railroad officials were not convinced. To

BLACK TOM BLOWS UP 83

them the strange story of Kristoff was not that of a crazy man but that
of a man attempting to cover up his tracks. They felt that in his clumsy
evasions he had admitted some truths. Factories w^ere being blown up
all over the country, and Graentnor and his two suitcases filled with
blueprints sounded real.

From the payroll records of the Tidewater Oil Company in Bayonne,
where Kristoff had been employed prior to his work at the Eagle Oil
Works, they discovered that he had been absent for five work days in
January 19 16. Subsequently he had left the employ of the Company
on February 29, 1916, and had not returned to work until June 19.
After working there for a month he had transferred his services to the
Eagle Oil Works. In addition, Mrs. Chapman later gave them an
affidavit to the effect that while cleaning Kristoff's room one day
shortly before the Black Tom explosion she had found an unmailed
letter to a man named "Grandson" or "Graentnor," in which he had
demanded a large sum of money. The Lehigh Valley Railroad, there-
fore, hired Alexander Kassman, an employee of the W. J. Burns De-
tective Agency, to shadow him.

For almost a year Kassman lived in close contact with Kristoff; they
worked at the same chocolate factory and met nightly. Kassman posed
as an Austrian anarchist, took Kristoff to anarchists' meetings, and
thus won his confidence. At regular intervals Kassman reported to the
Burns Agency. A perusal of these reports shows that Kristoff on
numerous occasions admitted to Kassman that he had assisted in blow-
ing up Black Tom.

In May 1917 Kassman lost track of Kristoff. Records discovered long
afterwards revealed, however, that he employed a well-known ruse to
divert attention from himself: On May 22, 1917, he enlisted in the
United States Army. A later entry in his Army records shows that he
was discharged on September 12, 1917, because of tuberculosis and for
having enlisted under false enlistment papers.

Kristoff now vanished completely until the spring of 1921, when he
was located in prison at Albany, New York, where he had been com-
mitted for larceny under the name of "John Christie."

Once again the Lehigh Valley attempted to get from him further
information about Black Tom. Through the cooperation of the county

84 THE ENEMY WITHIN

officials of Albany County, a detective of the Washington Detective
Bureau v^as placed in a cell next to KristofF, and together v^ith him v^as
assigned to v^ork in the prison bake shop. The detective remained
there nineteen days, but Kristoff was on the defensive when approached
about Black Tom. He was well aware that a murder charge was in-
volved. He repeated the same story about Graentnor and the blue-
prints which he had told to the Bayonne police five years previously;
and, although he refused to make any admission that he had blown up
Black Tom, he did admit that he had been working with a German
group for several weeks and that they had promised him a large sum of
money.

Shortly after this he was released from prison and for the time being
disappeared. But eventually he reappeared, as we shall see later on.

Of the various investigations which were conducted at the time by
the Department of Justice, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
local authorities, and the owners, none was successful. It was not
until after 1922, when the Mixed Claims Commission was established,
that the American lawyers employed by the owners gradually began
by exhaustive investigations to lift the curtain of mystery which sur-
rounded the destruction of Black Tom, and by piecing the intricate
clues together began to build up their case against Germany. The story
of their dogged fight against the German Secret Service and their im-
mense difficulties in collecting the evidence is told in Part II. Here we
will only indicate that the evidence they collected led the American
investigators to the conviction that Graentnor was Hinsch or at least
that Hinsch knew a Graentnor whose name he borrowed as an alias;
that Jahnke and Witzke rowed across to Black Tom from the New
York side to assist Kristoff in blowing up the Terminal; and that two
of the Dougherty guards, Burns and Scott, were paid agents of
Koenig's. Whether they were justified in reaching this conclusion the
reader will be able to judge for himself when he has read the evidence.

Chapter IX
THE FREE-LANCE AGENTS

After the Black Tom explosion the work of HInsch, Herrmann, Fel-
ton, Koenig, Jahnke, and Dilger went on unabated. At this time also
they received two new recruits: Wilhelm Woehst, a lieutenant in the
German Army and Raoul Gerdts Pochet.

In December 1916 Woehst was sent out from Germany by Section
III B with a fresh supply of incendiary pencils and with raw cultures
of germs. On arriving in New York he associated himself with
Herrmann.

Raoul Gerdts Pochet, or Gerdts, as he was known among the other
German agents, was born in Bogota, Colombia, of a German father
and a Colombian mother. In July 191 6 he met Herrmann in New
York; a friendship developed between them, and soon he was enrolled
as an agent. His chief duty was to act as Herrmann's chaufFeur and, as
such, accompany him on his many reconnoitering trips in search of
new objectives and assist him in making the necessary plans to carry
out the various acts of destruction.

The dispatch of new agents to the United States was indicative of
continuing German determination to intensify the land sabotage cam-
paign and to revive the marine one. On August 18, 1916, two attempts
were made to blow up the piers of the Pacific Coast Steamship Com-
pany. In October 1916 mysterious fires broke out in the holds of the
S.S. Philadelphia, S.S. Antilla, and S.S. Chicago. On November 21 a
sudden explosion took place on the American S.S. Sarnia. After she
had been beached on the French coast near Cherbourg, twenty unex-
ploded bombs were found in her sugar cargo. On November 27 the
cargo of the S.S. Regina dltalia suddenly took fire. On December 9,
1916, the Midvale Chemical Company building at Bayonne was de-

85

86 THE ENEMY WITHIN

stroyed by a fire and explosion, and in the same month the Bethlehem
Steel Company gas plant was blown up.

The previously mentioned agents were not alone responsible for all
these acts of sabotage. There were other German agents abroad
in the land, notable among whom was Charles N. Wunnenberg.'* When
we first encounter him he was about thirty-six years old, of a stocky
build and of typically Teutonic appearance. While of German descent,
he was a naturalized American citizen. He was an engineer by profes-
sion, according to his own statements, and had also been a mariner. In
the spring of 1915 he made a visit to Germany, in the course of which
his uncle introduced him to Dr. Posse, editor of the Cologne Gazette,
Posse was in close contact with the German Secret Service and lost no
time in discussing with Wunnenberg the possibility of recruiting
American newspaper men as spies. As Wunnenberg thought the plan
was feasible. Posse took him to see Eugene Wilhelm, Chief of the Naval
Intelligence Bureau at Antwerp. Under Wilhelm's tutelage he was in-
structed in the use of secret inks; and, after having been given cover
addresses in Copenhagen to which to send his reports, he was handed
the sum of $2,000 and ordered to return to the United States.

On his return to New York City Wunnenberg joined forces with
Albert A. Sanders, another German agent. As cover the two were given
jobs with the Central Powers Film Company, which was subsidized to
circulate German propaganda pictures in the United States. Wunnen-
berg and Sanders recruited Rutledge Rutherford, an American news-
paper correspondent whom Wunnenberg had met at the office of the
German Literary Defense Committee. Rutherford was given $1,200 to
defray his expenses to England and was instructed to report to the
Chief of the German Naval Intelligence Bureau in Scheveningen, Hol-
land, for further instructions.

Rutherford was completely successful. He succeeded in enrolling
himself as a member of the London Press Club; and he often traveled
between London and Holland, ostensibly as a reporter for his news-
paper but actually to transmit to the Germans his spy reports on the
British Army and Navy.

After successfully enlisting several other newspaper correspondents

* His name is also spelled Wunenberg in some of the reports and affidavits.

THE FREE-LANCE AGENTS 87

as spies, Wunnenberg was ordered to return to Germany. On his arrival
there he was sent to Wilhelmshaven, where under the direction of Dr.
Jansen of the Naval Laboratories, he was instructed in the use of
bombs and in handling a new high explosive called "Tetra."

Next he was sent as a spy to England via Copenhagen. While on
one of his several trips, his steamer, the Leelanaw, was torpedoed
by a German submarine. Together with several other survivors he
was rescued by the submarine, and towed for some time in one of the
Leelanaw s lifeboats. Eventually the lifeboat was picked up by a pass-
ing steamer, and the survivors were landed at Kirkwall. When inter-
viewed by the British authorities, he was able to establish his identity
as an American citizen and was allowed to land.

Shortly after this he was once again sent back to the United States.
Wilhelm furnished him with a letter to Gustav Kremer, vice presi-
dent of the Pass-Kremer Hat Band Manufacturing Company, of Pat-
erson, New Jersey, instructing Kremer to honor Wunnenberg s drafts
up to $10,000. He was also furnished with an additional $12,000, part
of which was transferred to a New York bank in the name of Robert
Davis.

On his return to New York Wunnenberg quickly won for himself
among the German sabotage agents the title of "Charles the Dyna-
miter." One of his letters which fell into the hands of the American
authorities was boastfully signed "The Dynamiter." "Son Charles" was
the code name used in his communications with Wilhelm.

Among the Dynamiter's best work was his recruiting of many Ger-
man sabotage agents in the United States. He also was closely associated
with Kurt Jahnke. The following intercepted coded telegram which
was dispatched from Berlin to Washington on January 10, 1917, links
their names together under ominous circumstances — it was sent the
day before the Kingsland fire: "Intelligence Office is not to be in com-
munication with Igel, Jahnke, Wunnenberg."

Furthermore, at the time of the Armistice some of Wilhelm's papers
were seized by the Belgians at the headquarters of the German Naval
Intelligence Service in Antwerp. In a list of German Secret Service
agents, the following entry was found, as of date October 8, 1916:

88 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Number Name Remarks, etc.
A.13 Wunnenberg German-American, confidential agent in New York
for engaging agents, etc. Very reliable and intelligent.
Some time ago was in Europe, but has returned to
New York, provided with fresh instructions.

Evidence that he was in contact with both von Igel and Paul Koenig
was furnished by von Igel's account book. In it an entry was found:
"1916, Nov. 2 P. K. Vimmanpalf." Deciphered from the alphabetical
code in which von Igel kept his accounts "Vimmanpalf" was found to
stand for Wunnenberg, and opposite many payments made through
Paul Koenig the initials P. K. were prefixed.

In February 1917 Wunnenberg and Sanders were both arrested by
agents of the Department of Justice on information furnished by the
British Intelligence Service. Another of the newspaper correspondents,
George Vaux Bacon, sent over by Wunnenberg to England, had been
given enough rope by the British to hang himself. He had been fol-
lov/ed on his trips to Holland and during a tour of the British Isles
which he had made, supposedly to gather material for a series of
articles describing wartime conditions in Scotland, Ireland, and Eng-
land, but actually as a cover for espionage. When arrested by the
British, Bacon admitted that the secret ink which was found on him
had been furnished by Wunnenberg.

This crafty spy, however, was not entirely unknown to the Depart-
ment of Justice. As early as September 28, 191 6, Mrs. Robert Davis of
Brooklyn, the wife of the man to whom part of the $12,000 mentioned
above was sent, had furnished it with the following information:

...Wuncnberg brought Freda Auerbacker from Germany on a bogus
marriage certificate as his wife. (She told me that she had a husband at the
front in the trenches.) And she told me that he performed a criminal opera-
tion on her on the boat coming over [Oscar the Second] they arrived on
August the ninth of this year. Sanders is supposed to work with Wunenberg
in the Film business, at his office in the White Hall bldg. close to Park
Place. Sanders is the man who got Wunenberg next to Rutlidge. Wunenberg
came from Frisco in March, 1915. I think Wunenberg passport called for
Freda Prestine. . . . Wunenberg ofEered Davis one thousand dollars for every

THE FREE-LANCE AGENTS 89

bomb that he [Davis] would install in the coal bunkers of every ship that
was carrying supplies for the Allies.

...I cannot say to my knowledge that Wunenberg had anything to do
with the Black Tom Island explosion or not, the man who owned one of
the barges that went up in the explosion lived just across the street from
me, Olaf Olsan was boarding with me at that time and working on this
barge, and we supposed he went up in the explosion as we never heard
anything from him any more, in speaking of this disaster Wunenberg said
those barges were loaded for the Allies but that is some of the stuff that
"the God Dam Lime Juice Sons of Bitches will never get." Freda said that
Mrs. Sanders told her while she was over to her house that Wunenberg has
a wife and child living in New York. Wunenberg always treated me as a
lady. I was like a mother to him, he did the last night I staid in my house,
after Freda and I had gone to bed, come into my room but I told him to
get out and he did so. In order for Wunenberg to go to Germany and
back he had to have a wife and he offered me one thousand dollars if I
would go over and come back with him and pass off as his wife. I told him
nothing doing.

Wunnenberg and Sanders were sentenced on March 31, 191 7, to
serve two years in Atlanta Penitentiary. Subsequently, in prison, he
made a confession to a Department of Justice agent whose report, dated
June 8, 1917, reads in part as follows:

...Agent interviewed Wunenberg who stated that he wished a pardon
and that he was in possession of information that might help this Govern-
ment. That this information was mostly confined to a knowledge of chem-
icals and instruments used by the Germans for destructive purposes. For
instance, there is what they call a pencil, it looks Hke a pencil, has no metal
except the tip that holds the eraser. This instrument is capable of being set
so as to go off at a given time, and when set off causes a very intense flame
which will last several minutes setting on fire anything within a radius of
several feet. This is used in attempting arsons on ships, in munition plants
and wherever an opportunity presents itself. The usual way this is used is
to have an agent place one in his coat pocket, set it and leave his coat on a
hook in whatever place he desires to set fire to. Then it is left on desks, etc.

There is another preparation called thermit. It is composed of 6.45 parts
to 1.55 parts of oxide of iron and aluminum filings pressed into the shape
of bricks or circles [spheres] with small hollowed centers. Two of these

go THE ENEMY WITHIN

thermits are used placing one on the other so that the hollowed out places
would be above each other. Into this hollowed out place is placed what is
called a dynometer, which is set to go off at a given time. The dynometer
acts upon the thermit making a molten mass that will burn its way through
steel plates or any substances with which it may come into contact.

Wunenberg said that these instruments were given him by the German
Admiralty.

On another occasion he gave a more precise description of the lead
pencil device which clearly identified it as the same one which Nadolny
and Marguerre handed to Hilken, Dilger, and Herrmann.

Another German agent was Maria de Victorica. She is of interest not
only because she was one of the few female spies employed by the Ger-
mans in the United States but because when arrested in 191 8 she stated
on two separate occasions that she had been informed by other German
agents that an Austrian had blown up Black Tom. This pointed a
finger at Michael Kristoflf; for, as we already know, he was an Austrian
subject.

Maria de Victorica was a glamorous figure. She was the youngest
daughter of Baron Hans von Kretschmann, a general in the German
Army. Her mother was Countess Jennie von Gustedt, daughter of a
Prussian diplomat. She had traveled extensively in various parts of the
world, spoke many languages, and had several university degrees.
Shortly before the war, being of an adventuresome spirit, she used her
high connections to secure an introduction to Colonel Nicolai, the Chief
of the German Secret Service; and because of her special qualifications,
he eagerly enrolled her in his service. One of the few spies who came
up to Hollywood standards, she actually was a beautiful blonde who
employed all the prescribed paraphernalia of her profession: secret
inks, a dozen aliases and disguises, and above all the multiple wiles of
her sex in enslaving men.

Her first assignment took her to Chile, where she married a native
by the name of de Victorica. In 191 4 she returned to Berlin with her
husband, whom she had by then enlisted in the service of Germany.
She was transferred to the Naval Intelligence Service and sent on a
mission to Russia. So successful was she in this work that in December

THE FREE-LANCE AGENTS 9I

1916 she was sent to the United States to ally herself with those groups
who were plotting rebellion in Ireland, to assist in the general sabotage
scheme, and, finally, to report on the work of certain of the German
agents who had preceded her.

But in November 1917 the British Secret Service put the American
authorities on her trail. They had discovered her contact address in
Hoboken. An intercepted letter sent to this address revealed a message
written in secret ink which, after a long hunt — chiefly trailing her from
one fashionable hotel to another — eventually led to her arrest on April
27, 1918. Jeremiah O'Leary, whom we have already mentioned, was
arrested at the same time.

In the meantime her husband had also met with misfortune. On a
mission for the German Secret Service, he was captured in France on
his way to Buenos Aires and sentenced on April 25, 1918, by the
Council of War at Besangon to life imprisonment.

Mme. de Victorica met with a worse fate. On June 7, 19 18, she was
indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for conspiracy to commit espionage
in wartime but was never brought to trial. Although she received every
consideration from the American authorities, years of drug addiction
and the long months of imprisonment broke her spirit. She died on
August 12, 1920, a few months after her release, and was buried at
Kensico, New York, in the Gates of Heaven Cemetery.

Her statements with regard to Black Tom are of value; for, although
she only arrived in the United States in December 1916, she was asso-
ciated with spies such as Wunnenberg who were here at the time of
the explosion.

Chapter X
THE KINGSLAND FIRE

On the afternoon of January ii, 1917, New York City once again
heard the thunderous roar of exploding munitions. For four hours
northern New Jersey, New York City, Westchester, and the western
end of Long Island listened to a bombardment in which probably half
a million three-inch, high explosive shells were discharged. This explo-
sion took place in the shell assembling plant of the Agency of the
Canadian Car and Foundry Company, near Kingsland, New Jersey,
about ten miles from the docks in New York Harbor. A fire originated
suddenly and inexplicably in one of the assembling sheds, Building 30,
to be exact; and within a few minutes the whole plant was ablaze. As
the flames reached each case of shells and exploded the projection
charges, the missiles shot high up in the air and then rained down
in the vicinity of the factory.

Luckily, the shells were not equipped with detonating fuses; there-
fore they fell as so much metal without exploding. Kingsland and
Rutherford were soon filled with hundreds of refugees who had fled
from their homes. Fortunately there were no casualties. The 1,400
workers in the plant and all others nearby, mindful of the danger, fled
in a mad rush at the first peal of the fire alarm, escaping only just in
the nick of time. The entire plant was destroyed. Here the material
damage amounted to $17,000,000.

To understand events it ijs necessary to know something about the
plant at Kingsland and the history of the Company.

The war had been in progress but a few months when enormous

munitions orders started pouring in to the Canadian Car and Foundry

Company, Limited, in Montreal. Large contracts were signed both

with England and Russia for the delivery of shells. The Canadian

factory was working to capacity when, in the spring of 1915, the

92

THE KINGSLAND FIRE 93

Company secured an $83,000,000 contract from the Russian Govern-
ment for 5,000,000 shells. In order to fulfill this contract the parent
company in Canada formed a separate agency and incorporated it
under the laws of New York. In March 1916 the huge plant of the
agency was erected close to Kingsland, in Bergen County, New Jersey.
Shells, shell cases, shrapnel, and powder were shipped to Kingsland
from over one hundred different factories and there assembled for
shipment to Russia. At the time of the fire the plant was turning out
3,000,000 shells per month — ^it was a worthy objective for the German
saboteur. The company was well aware of this, and as a safeguard had
erected around the plant a six-foot fence which was patrolled night
and day by guards. None of the 1,400 workers were allowed to enter
without a preparatory search, and it was strictly forbidden for any
of them to carry matches on his person.

Building 30, where the fire originated, was entirely devoted to clean-
ing out shells. The building was furnished with forty-eight work
benches, along which stood the workers. On the bench in front of
each worker was a pan of gasoline and a small rotating machine oper-
ated by a belt. The cleaning process consisted, first, in dusting out the
shell with a brush; then, in order to clean out the thin coating of
grease with which the shell had been covered on shipment from the
factory, a cloth, moistened in the pan of gasoline, was wrapped around
a piece of wood about a foot long and, after the shell had been fitted
onto the rotating machine, inserted into the shell as it slowly turned;
finally, a dry cloth was wrapped around the stick, and the shell was
dried in a similar manner. It was in the vicinity of one of these ma-
chines that the fire was first noticed.

So rapidly did it spread from building to building that within a
few minutes the whole mammoth plant was ablaze. Four hours later
all that was left of it was a smoldering mass of ruins. 275,000 loaded
shells, 300,000 cartridge cases, 100,086 detonators, 439,920 time fuses,
large stores of T.N.T., and more than one million unloaded shells
that were either in the shops, or waiting shipment to Russia, were com-
pletely destroyed.

Immediately after the fire, the officers of the Company commenced
an investigation to determine the cause of the blaze. Various workmen

94 THE ENEMY WITHIN

were called in and examined by Mr. Cahan, one of the directors of the
Company. It was quickly established that the fire had broken out at
the bench of Fiodore Wozniak, one of the workers. A gang foreman,
Morris Chester Musson, who was at the end of the building when
the fire originated, described what he saw as follows in an affidavit:

...One of the men at the place where the fire originated was Fiodore
Wozniak, whose photograph I recognize and which appears below as
follows :

[A photograph of Wozniak appeared here in the original affidavit.]

I noticed that this man Wozniak had quite a large collection of rags and
that the blaze started in these rags. I also noticed that he had spilled his
pan of alcohol all over the table just preceding that time. The fire immedi-
ately spread very rapidly in the alcohol saturated table. I also noticed that
someone threw a pail of liquid on the rags or the table almost immediately
in the confusion. I am not able to state whether this was water or one of
the pails of refuse alcohol under the tables. My recollection, however, is that
there were no pails of water in the building, the fire buckets being filled
with sand. Whatever the liquid was it caused the fire to spread very rapidly
and the flames dropped down on the floor and in a few minutes the entire
place was in a blaze.

It was my firm conviction from what I saw, and I so stated at the time,
that the place was set on fire purposely, and that has always been and is
my firm belief.

Thomas Steele, another workman, described his observations as fol-
lows:

I was working in No. 30, No. 2265. The fire broke out in the liquid
pan in front of an Austrian workman just after three o'clock. This Austrian
had been there working for at least three weeks.

I saw the fire burning up in his pan about four or five inches high. The
Austrian said nothing but ran for his coat and taking it, ran through the
freight car opening out into the back yard. I was the third man from the
Austrian.

Mr. Cahan also gave his impressions of an interview he had with
Wozniak.

THE KINGSLAND FIRE 95

I told him [Wozniak] that most of his fellow workmen agreed that the
flames had first been seen at or near his table. He admitted to me that the
flames had originated there and he said that they had started in some cloths
which he was using to clean one of the shells.

Wozniak told me that several days before the fire occurred he had found
matches deposited in one of the shells, among the cloths, "rags" he called
them, which he used for cleaning shells. He seemed to lay singular stress
on this fact which at the time, created suspicion in my mind that he was

developing a story to throw suspicion on one of his fellow workers He

said that he was taking the third step in the process of cleaning a shell, that
is, drying the inside with a clean cloth, when a flame burst from the opening
of the shell. . . .

I questioned Wozniak about the man who had worked at the bench
next to him and he said that the man working next to him, on the day of
the fire, was a new man who came on that bench that day for the first
time He said that he did not know his name

I found the man who usually worked at the second table next to that of
Wozniak. He was No. 1208, named Rodriguez, who claimed to have been
originally from Porto Rico. He gave his residence No. 105 West 64th Street,
New York City; and when I had him brought to the office of the company
he declared that he had been absent from the Works on the day of the fire
and that he had been home all day with his family. . . .

Other workmen in Building 30 alleged that the fire started in the pan
of gasoline mixture, which was fixed in front of Wozniak's wooden roller . . .
others who were farther away only saw the flames shooting from the pan
of gasoline mixture high towards the ceiling.

... I had the impression from his [Wozniak's] nervous behavior, from
his demeanor when led into apparent contradictions, and from other inci-
dents in our interviews which were significant to me but difiicult to describe,
that he knew that the fire was no accident and that he personally was
implicated in its origin.

G. W. A. Woodhouse, who acted as interpreter for Mr. Cahan at
some of his interviews with Wozniak and who also interviewed
Wozniak separately stated:

I obtained the same impression from the interviews which are recorded

by Mr. Cahan I also know that the Company made great efforts later

to try to shadow Wozniak and to locate the other workman who was said

96 THE ENEMY WITHIN

to have been employed that day for the first time at the adjoining bench,
but Wozniak disappeared entirely shortly after the detectives were put on
his trail, and we never v^^ere able to locate either him or the v^^orkman v^ho
had been at the adjoining table.

Wozniak said that, though he had entered the Company's employ
as a Russian, he was actually an "Austrian Galician" ; he admitted that
he had served his time in the Austrian Army and that he had at one
time been an Austrian gendarme.

Wozniak was told by Mr. Cahan that he would be needed in New
York in connection with further investigations regarding the fire
and that he would be kept on the Company's payroll during that
period. Detectives were then employed to watch Wozniak. He went to
live at the Russian Immigrant Home on Third Street, New York;
but shortly thereafter he eluded the detectives and disappeared.

Other investigations by the owners and the police proved abortive;
the disaster was left unexplained as yet another mystery of the war.
The insurance companies paid out several million dollars in claims,
and the owners had to bear the rest of the loss.

The years rolled by, and it was not until after 1922, when the Mixed
Claims Commission was formed and the owners of Kingsland filed
a claim against Germany for recovery, that the mystery of the fire
was largely dispelled. The American investigators finally produced
the evidence which they believe proves conclusively that Hinsch pro-
cured the services of Wozniak, and that Wozniak, acting under in-
structions of Herrmann, fired Kingsland, either by the use of in-
cendiary pencils or rags saturated with phosphorus dissolved in some
solvent. On the other hand, the Germans claim it was an industrial
accident.

Chapter XI
DEEPENING SHADOWS

Entering on the last phase of the neutrality period, we must turn once
again to Count von Bernstorff and his Commercial Attache, Dr. Albert.

While the agents directed by Boy-Ed and von Papen, along v^ith
their free-lance colleagues, were destroying ships, dynamiting rail-
ways, burning and blowing up factories, Dr. Albert was careful to
keep his hands clean of blood and powder. However, his accounts bear
absolute proof that he was involved in this campaign of destruction.
Not only did he act as paymaster to the two Attaches and insist on
their getting his authorization for all expenditures in excess of $10,000
from the funds supplied by him, but he also paid large sums to such
known sabotage agents as Albert Kaltschmidt. Furthermore, there is
the evidence contained in his correspondence and in his reports.

On April 20, 1915, he addressed the following communication to
the German State Secretary of the Interior, Berlin:

As is known to your Excellency, I have been supporting the authorized
military agent, Herr von Papen, in his work on the question of munitions.
In reply to our last proposal sent by telegraph (Cable No. 479) authorization
came to proceed along the line of a prevention or restriction of the export
of munitions from the United States to our enemies. The authorization is
worded: "Fully agree with your proposal," and was interpreted by us to the
effect that not only contracts for the purpose of tying up [munitions] in the
narrower sense were to be concluded, but that all other measures necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose aimed at were to be taken. In regard
to the latter I have . . . undertaken a number of steps, an account of which
in writing I must decline [to give] for obvious reasons.

Ten months later he wrote to the State Secretary of the Interior
as follows:

97

98 THE ENEMY WITHIN

... In the question of the exportation of war materials, efforts at enlighten-
ment were introduced in organized fashion under my direction, the effects
of which are still felt, and which have contributed not unessentially to the
feeling in Congress favorable to our interpretation —

...Alongside of that the cooperation in the work of preventing and
delaying the deliveries of munitions and explosive materials was from the
outset an especial role. I was also expressly requested to cooperate in this
because the Consulate General in default of diplomatic prerogative [did not
dare to]

... In any case I undertook and attempted to accomplish all these tasks . . .
as I beg to be permitted to state once more, only at the express request of
the Ambassador or his Attaches and fellow laborers . . . although I was natu-
rally restricted in the employment of assistance by the confidential nature
of the business, and at times my health and strength seemed to be paralyzed.

... I devoted myself to the accomplishment of the tasks for which I was,
in consequence of this, besought — I have never intruded myself into a single
one — with the feeling that in war times every official must hold himself
ready for every necessary work.

In a letter dated July 21, 1915, from Dr. Albert to his wife, he said:
"On the other hand Ruge and Lubbert probably underestimate what
I am doing here, for merely the results of my collaboration with
Herr v. P. in the field known to you, are hard to value."

And then in a letter to his wife dated October 3, 1915, he further
added: "I prefer not to say anything in detail about what I am doing
here. Mr. v. P.'s experience is a warning against carelessness."

Finally, in an undated letter from the Hotel St. Francis, San Fran-
cisco, he wrote to von Papen, just before the Captain's departure in
December, 1915: "Give my best wishes to Mr. Scheuch and tell him
that the struggle on the American front is sometimes very hard. . . .
I shall feel your departure most keenly! Our work together was ex-
cellent, and was always a great pleasure to me."

Not satisfied with this carefully hidden support of Boy-Ed, von
Papen, and von Igel in their campaign of destruction, Dr. Albert also
engaged in direct activities of his own to prevent American munitions
and supplies reaching the Allies. But in this the smooth and shrewd
financial expert took care to confine himself to business ventures.

Well informed by trade investigators, by secret agents, and by the

DEEPENINGSHADOWS 99

various financial and trade reports issued by American institutions, he
had expert information on the rates of production and on the stocks
on hand of those products that were urgently required by the Allies.
He was not one to be caught in any wild and impossible scheme
such as an attempt to buy up the entire munitions supply in the
country; instead, he concentrated on every known device to tie up
Allied contracts, and also on the purchase of vital products, the
supply of which was limited. Thus we find him buying up fifty tons
of liquid chlorine monthly, an amount sufficient seriously to embarrass
the Allies, who had only one small chlorine factory in France and an
even smaller one in England. Carbolic acid was another much needed
product, stocks of which he diverted away from the Allies by the out-
lay of a relatively small sum. But it was in tying up Allied contracts
that he showed his greatest ingenuity. And the creation of the Bridge-
port Projectile Company was perhaps the most ambitious of all his
various schemes.

On March 31, 1915, the Company was incorporated with funds
secretly supplied by Albert. So well, however, was the German con-
nection concealed that for a long time there was an impression in
industrial circles that the British were backing the corporation. Build-
ings and workshops were quickly erected, the necessary plant and
machinery for the production of munitions on a large scale were
ordered, and everything was set for deliveries to commence on Sep-
tember I, 1915.

The objects of the company were: (i) to tie up the output of
machinery and tool manufacturers for several months to come with
contracts, and yet word the cancellation clauses in such a way that
acceptance could be delayed; (2) to hold up supplies for the Allies
by accepting munitions contracts with such provisions in the agree-
ments that no penalty would ensue if the contracts could not be ful-
filled; (3) to pay abnormally high wages and thus unsettle labor,
especially at the neighboring Union Metallic Cartridge Company in
Bridgeport, which had large Allied contracts; and (4) to tie up pow-
der supplies at certain factories by forward purchases over a long
period of time, the orders ultimately to be cancelled or the powder
to be sold to neutral countries.

100 THE ENEMY WITHIN

But the whole plan was wrecked when the United States Govern-
ment became suspicious of Dr. Albert's activities and assigned Secret
Service operatives to watch him. On the afternoon of July 24, as he
was riding uptown on the Sixth Avenue Elevated from the Hamburg-
American Line offices, he fell asleep. He suddenly awoke to find his
train stopped in the Fiftieth Street Station, his destination. In his
hurry to get off he forgot his brief case and was on the platform be-
fore he noticed his loss. He rushed back into the train, only to be told
that a young man had picked it up and left the car. He then hurried
down from the station just in time to see the thief and the bag dis-
appearing rapidly on an open street car. Because of this little episode
Dr. Albert was known for many years as the "Minister without
Portfolio."

At the time it was thought that an Allied agent had taken the bag,
but in reality Mr. Frank Burke of the United States Secret Service was
the culprit. The papers were turned over to Secretary of the Treasury
McAdoo, who discovered that contained in them were data on many
of Germany's secret activities relating to propaganda and the tying
up of key munitions materials. To Mr. McAdoo's regret they dis-
closed nothing criminal in the Doctor's activities.

The Government could not, of course, admit that one of its agents
had stolen them; but Mr. McAdoo was anxious to expose the secret
work of the Germans. He therefore turned the documents over to the
New York World under a pledge of secrecy as to their origin.

To the Doctor's mortification he soon began to see many of his
cleverest schemes plastered over the front page — among them the
whole story of the Bridgeport Projectile Company. The publicity was
naturally fatal. (At a later date when the British seized von Papen's
papers at Falmouth, they found further evidence relating to the
Bridgeport Projectile Company which fully supported this exposure
by the World.)

In the face of all this evidence. Dr. Albert brazenly published the
usual denial. His opinion of the American public and how it should
be handled can be judged from an extract from a letter to his wife
which was intercepted by the British:

DEEPENING SHADOWS lOI

. . . Uncle Sam, a great, strong lout suffering from shrivelling of the brain,
to whom you ought to talk in high language about fine principles and
then deny everything, especially if you are in the wrong.

In another letter, on September 25, 1915, he is no less frank when
v^riting to his wife relative to one of von Papen's letters which the
British had seized and transmitted to Washington:

The effect after his letter had been intercepted has been quite devastat-
ing. Still, I do not believe they will demand his recall, as in the case of
Dumba, although the idiotic Yankees are not particularly friendly.

In the field of propaganda Dr. Albert's role was no less active.
This work he carried out on a big scale, not only through inspired
articles in certain sections of the Press and through subsidized news-
papers such as the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung and The Fatherland,
but also through lecturers and even specially created film companies,
such as the "Central Powers Film Company."

The chief effect of this propaganda was to inflame the minds of
German-Americans, and some of them attempted acts of violence
without any direction from the German sabotage directors. A tragic
example was the case of Eric Meunta, a professor of German at
Columbia University. He decided on his own initiative to strike a
blow for the Fatherland. On July 2, 1915, he planted a bomb in the
Capitol Building in Washington and escaped without detection. The
bomb exploded without doing any damage beyond breaking a few
windows and tearing down some plaster. The next day he invaded
the summer home of J. P. Morgan at Glen Cove, Long Island, and
announced that he intended to hold his family as hostages until
Morgan pledged that he would stop, or help stop, the shipment of
supplies and munitions to the Allied Governments. In the scuffle that
ensued, Meunta drew a pistol and fired, inflicting a slight flesh wound
on Morgan.

When arrested Meunta gave his name as Jack Holt, but soon ad-
mitted his real identity. He declared that he had attempted to blow
up the Capitol because he wanted to show the American people how
dangerous dynamite is. He also maintained that if the United States

102 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Stopped sending munitions to the Allies, Germany would win the
war and peace would be restored.

But the expenditure of sums for propaganda, commercial ventures,
and sabotage, vast as these enterprises were, was only a fraction of Dr.
Albert's huge financial transactions. There must be added the German
loans he floated, and the $500,000,000 worth of German securities he
sold.

How at least part of the money raised in America was spent on
sabotage can be gathered from the random records which came into
the hands of the American authorities. One of these, a letter on the
letterhead of the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, D. C.,
dated May 5, 1915, and signed by Count von Bernstorff, addressed to
"His Excellency High Privy Councilor Albert," reads in part as
follows:

I beg to place at the disposal of Captain von Papen out of the loan funds
three credits, to wit:

1. One in the amount up to $300,000

2. One in the amount up to $60,000

3. One in the approximate amount of $600 monthly

This and many other of the Albert records were obtained after the
entry of the United States into the war. Von Bernstorff and the other
members of his staff destroyed all incriminating documents before they
sailed, but Dr. Albert handed his files over to a neutral consulate in
New York for safe keeping. Department of Justice agents learned,
however, of their existence; and the information that they were stored
in a wall closet proved too great a temptation. Renting an adjoining
office, they broke through the rear wall of the closet, removed the
documents, and restored the plaster. It was not until months after, when
the consular seal on the closet door was broken, that the amazed neutral
consul discovered an empty closet. The Government, of course, had no
legal right to indulge in this polite filching. It has become a convention
in referring to any of Dr. Albert's documents to imply that they came
from the stolen brief case. A glance at the thousands of these docu-
ments in the files of the Department of Justice would convince even the
Doctor's bitterest detractor that he must have been a veritable Hercules

Bro'iin Brothers

Lothar Witzke

Kurt Jahnke

The Most Deadly Sabotage Team in History

Colonel Walter Nicolai, Head of the
German Secret Service.

Keystone Studios

Captain Rudolf Nadolny, of the
German Secret Service.

The Master Minds of the Sabotage Campaign

DEEPENING SHADOWS IO3

to have carried around a brief case of a capacity adequate to contain
them all.

Behind the activities of the Attaches stood hidden their commander
in chief, Count von Bernstorff. All the coded telegrams that passed
between Berlin and its agents in the United States v^ent through his
hands. The follow^ing report of von Bernstorffs, v^ritten on official
Embassy stationery and addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von
Bethmann-HolWeg, over a year and a half after Captain von Papen left
and less than six months before the severance of diplomatic relations,
bears witness to how little went on that he did not know: (The
reason for this letter was that the unpleasant publicity occasioned by
Wolf von Igel's arrest in connection with certain sabotage work had
evidently led to criticism from Berlin and some suggested shifts in
organization.)

Rye, New York,
26th August, 1916.

I have already notified your Excellency that the War Intelligence Center,
New York, has, by the direction of the Deputy General Staff, been immedi-
ately dissolved. Thereupon doubts arose as to whether the Bureau of the
Military Attaches should continue to be carried on by Herr von Igel and
Herr von Skal, as arranged on the part of Herr von Papen at his departure.
As you are aware, the lawsuit is still pending against Herr von Igel, on
account of his participation in the expedition against the Welland Canal.
Since the Imperial Government has taken up in regard to this the position
that the person of Herr von Igel, as a member of the Embassy, and papers
found in his possession, are inviolable, it is out of the question, according to
my respectful opinion, to announce to the American authorities his dismissal
from the service of the Embassy. Such a step would undoubtedly very much
weaken the point of principle on which we stand. The Government here has
not yet answered me upon my last note on the matter. The courts are waiting
for the decision of the State Department before they pursue the matter
further. To all appearance the intention exists to let the case rest for the time
being. I think it lies in our interest also not to stir the matter up again till
further notice.

Herr von Igel and Herr von Skal have, apart from the service for the
Military Intelligence Service Center, carried on the various commercial
measures introduced and partly concluded by Herr von Papen. These have

104 THE ENEMY WITHIN

to do, among other things, with the orders placed by the Bridgeport Pro-
jectile Company, the Aetna Powder Company, the purchase of chlorine and
of earthenware, with the sale of arms — stored to our account in New York
and the State of Washington — which were intended for India, the setting up
the Benzol, Phenol and Toluol arrangements, the discharge of various law-
suits such as those against Koenig, Schleindl, Kienzle, Breitung, Wolpert
and Bode, as well as the arranging of assistance for various persons and their
famiHes involved in these lawsuits.

In all these measures, Privy Councillor Albert has been consulted by Herr
von Igel, as directed at the time by Herr von Papen. On important questions
my decision was called upon also.* The carrying on of these tasks by another
man presents particular difficulties, since, to make oneself acquainted with
the matters, very intricate in part, consequent on the destruction of all
compromising documents ordered by Your Excellency, is almost out of the
question. In the event of Privy Councilor Albert's returning to Germany
within a measurable time, there is absolutely no one else at my disposal who
is to be trusted with the materials referred to. The various parties concerned
would soon notice this, and come forward with claims which it would be
impossible to check. The resultant disadvantages for the finances of the
Empire by the sums, some of them very considerable, which would thus
have to be taken into consideration, may easily be foreseen.

The Labor Reference Bureau, too, for German and Austrian and Hun-
garian subjects, who have left the present munition or other factories, has,
up to the present, been supervised by Herr von Igel.

The connection, moreover, in New York with the India-Irish revolution-
aries has been maintained, since the departure of Herr von Papen, either by
Herr von Igel or Herr von Skal. Herr von Skal keeps in touch with the
Irish, for which, owing to his wide acquaintance in these circles, he is par-
ticularly fitted, and he also, as before, enjoys their confidence.

I permit myself again to remark that the authorities here have since his
release laid no difficulties whatever in the way against his security. Even with
the present general feeling against us prevailing in Government circles, I still
take it as out of the question that any fresh unpleasantness will arise for the
Imperial Embassy from the further employment of Herr von Igel, provided,
of course, that no fresh political tension arises.

BernstorflF
To His Excellency, the Imperial Chancellor Herr von Bedimann-HoUweg.

* Italics are the author's.

DEEPENING SHADOWS IO5

Among the significant points to be noted in this letter are: The
evidence that the work of the Bureau of the MiHtary Attaches was
carried on in full swing under von Igel and von Skal after Captain von
Papen's departure; the reference to the assistance given by the Imperial
German Government to the defense of the lawsuits against Koenig,
Schleindl, Kienzle, Breitung, Wolpert, and Bode, every one of whom
was proved beyond question to be a German sabotage agent; the ref-
erence to consultations between Dr. Albert and von Igel; the admission
by Count von Bernstorff of his own intimate connection with their
work, on which he comments in the italicized sentence above; the
protest against interruption or change in personnel for this special
work; the reference to the "destruction of all compromising documents
ordered by your Excellency"; and the reference to "sale of arms — stored
to our account in New York and the State of Washington — which were
intended for India . . ."

In spite of all this evidence, von Bernstorff claimed after the war in
his book My Three Years in America, pages 108 and 109, that

Whether the illegal acts of the secret agents sent to the United States by the
Military authorities were committed in accordance with their orders or on
their own initiative, I had no means of knowing at the time, nor have I
been able to discover since my return home . . . Military cipher telegrams
formerly addressed to the Military Attache were frequently received at the
Embassy, but were always sent forward at once by the registry to Captain
von Papen's office in New York, as a matter of routine, and without being
referred to me in any way.*

If further evidence is needed to discount the above assertion, the
following telegram which von Bernstorff personally sent to von Papen
in New York and which was intercepted by the American authorities
is proof that he did read instructions sent from Berlin to the Military
Attache:

Washington, D. C, March 24, 1915.

Captain von Papen, 112 Central Park South, New York City. Berlin wire-
less arrived today colon fully agreeing with your proposition.

Bernstorff

* By courtesy of Charles Scribner*s Sons.

I06 THE ENEMY WITHIN

The meaning of this telegram is disclosed by the following extract
from a report by Dr. Albert to the State Secretary of the Interior in
Berlin, dated April 20, 1915, which has already been quoted more
extensively:

. . . Fully agree with your proposal and was interpreted by us to the effect
that not only contracts for the purpose of tying up munitions in the narrower
sense were to be concluded, but that all other measures necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose aimed at were to be taken.

Reference to the second report of Dr. Albert's to the State Secretary
of the Interior, written ten months after this one, and also previously
quoted, will show that he assisted in carrying out the above program
"only at express request of the Ambassador or his Attaches and fellow
laborers."

If von Bernstorff was careful to delegate to his Attaches actual contact
with sabotage agents, and thus avoid compromising himself, he himself
took direct charge in the political field and in propaganda.

In Washington his efforts to promote a legislative embargo on the
shipment of arms and munitions to the Allies was ceaseless. When
argument failed, he used more direct methods, as is evidenced by the
following telegram to Berlin:

15th Dec, 1914. From Washington to Berlin.

In the Congress and House of Representatives the Hitchcock and Volmer
resolutions respecting the export prohibition of arms, ammunition, etc., are
under consideration. A strong agitation is being developed by the Germans
and Irish with a view to carrying these resolutions. In view of the great
importance of the matter, I considered myself authorized to assist the agita-
tion financially and so I gave as a provisional measure the five thousand
dollars for which I was asked by a trustworthy quarter.

(signed) Bernstorfl

He particularly brought pressure to bear on those Senators and
Congressmen who represented sections of the country where there was
a large German-American vote, and in this he was specially aided by
the National German-American Alliance, an organization which com-
prised some 3,000,000 members and constituted a great majority of the

DEEPENING SHADOWS IO7

adult German-American population. Apart from its influence as a
solid voting block, it had a powerful lobby in Washington. It was also
amply supplied with funds by Dr. Albert, besides having approximately
$800,000 which it had collected for the German Red Cross but spent
mostly on propaganda. How much von Bernstorff relied on the Alliance
can be gathered from the following cable which he sent to Berlin on
January 22, 1917:

I request authority to pay up to fifty thousand dollars in order, as on
former occasions, to influence Congress through the organization you know
of, which perhaps can prevent war. I am beginning in the meantime to act
accordingly. In the above circumstance a public official German declaration
in favor of Ireland is highly desirable in order to gain the support of Irish
influence here.

In addition to his illicit activities in the United States, von Bernstorff
also acted as a clearing house for German agents in South America and
the Orient. Once again it was the cables between Berlin and Washing-
ton, intercepted and decoded by the British, which betrayed him. Of
these cables the following are chosen at random.

On September 6, 1914, Zimmermann sent the following message to
von Bernstorff for transmission to Military Attache Maltzan in Peking:

The destruction of a suitable section of Siberian Railway to interfere with
Russian and Japanese communications is extremely desirable. The destruction
of the line could most easily be carried out from China.

On December 11, 1914, von Bernstorff cabled Berlin:

Almost fifty million dollars of war material bought by Russia on way to
Vladivostok. I have notified Peking in order that the destruction of the
railway may be attempted immediately.

We have already described how Boy-Ed recruited many spies in the
United States and sent them over to Europe to work against the Allies.
At least on one occasion von Bernstorff also took an active hand in the
European field. The occasion for this was the visit to the United States
in 191 6 of Paul Bolo, the French defeatist agitator. The Ambassador

I08 THE ENEMY WITHIN

advanced him $1,700,000, which enabled him to buy a string of news-
papers on his return home and to carry on his treasonable propaganda
for a French surrender. Bolo was caught and shot, but his plans nearly
succeeded. Several prominent French Cabinet Ministers also were
involved in this attempt to induce France to make a separate peace.

The following two coded telegrams which passed between von Bern-
storff and von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, reveal the part the
former played:

Number 679, February 26th, 1916.

I have received direct information from an entirely trustworthy source
concerning a political action in one of the enemy countries which would
bring about peace. One of the leading political personalities of the country
in question is seeking a loan of $1,700,000 in New York, for which security
will be given. I was forbidden to give his name in writing. The affair seems
to me to be of the greatest possible importance. Can the money be provided
at once in New York? That the intermediary will keep the matter secret is
entirely certain. Request answer by telegram. A verbal report will follow
as soon as a trustworthy person can be found to bring it to Germany.

Bernstorfl

On February 29, 1916, von Jagow replied to von Bernstorfl:

Answer to Telegram No. 679:

Agree to the loan but only if peace action seems to you a really serious
project, as the provision of money in New York is for us at present extraor-
dinarily difficult. If the enemy country is Russia have nothing to do with
the business, and the sum of money is too small to have any serious effect
in that country. So too in the case of Italy, for it would not be worth while
to spend so much.

Jagow

If we add to these foreign activities the events we have already de-
scribed in previous chapters — Germany's vast sabotage and propaganda
campaign in the United States; her attempts to foment rebellion in
India, the West Indies, Mexico, and Ireland; her endeavors to stir up
strikes among the ranks of American labor; and the attempts to in-
fluence legislation in Washington — we will realize the magnitude and
intricacy of the machine which von Bernstorff directed.

DEEPENING SHADOWS IO9

But the cumulative effect of the whole German policy, whether
justified or not, could only be fatal to relations between the two gov-
ernments. Under the suasion of an innate pro-British and pro-French
bias and the subtle pressure of Allied propaganda, the President and the
people had been growing steadily more antagonistic to German conduct
of the war. The unrestricted submarine warfare in particular had led
to the strongest kind of diplomatic protest. This protest had led to the
temporary cancellation of the campaign. But the President had warned
Germany that any renewal of it would lead to rupture. When the Ger-
mans announced their determination to resume it on February i, 1917,
von Bernstorff and his staff were handed their passports.

The actual declaration of war was held back pending the commission
of an overt act by a submarine, but even the most optimistic knew the
sands were running out.

The sinking of American ships and the loss of American lives were
not long in coming. Finally, on April 2, the President went before
Congress and asked that a state of war be declared to exist between
the Imperial German Government and that of the United States. Just
four days later the die was cast.

While sabotage was not the main issue, we need only refer to Presi-
dent Wilson's War Message to Congress to prove it was a factor. In the
course of it he said:

. . . One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian
autocracy was not and could never be our friend, is that from the very
outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and
even our offices of Government with spies and set criminal intrigues every-
where afoot against our national unity and counsel, our peace within and
without, our industries and our commerce.

Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began;
and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts
of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near
to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have
been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the
personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited
to the Government of the United States

no THE ENEMY WITHIN

Again in his Flag Day address on June 14, 1917, he repeated this
charge:

The extraordinary insults and aggressions o£ the Imperial German Govern-
ment left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms

The military masters of Germany . . . filled our unsuspecting communities
with vicious spies and conspirators . . . and some of these agents were con-
nected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself here in
our own capital.

They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our com-
merce. . . .

The Government of the United States had kept vi^ithin the letter of
international law even if it had favored the Allies and had been an
invaluable adjunct in supplying them with the sinews of war. Even
Count von Bernstorff admits this, for on pages 71 and 72 of his book,
My Three Years in America, he states:

Our position with regard to this question was very unfavorable as we had
no legal basis for complaint. The clause of the Hague Convention which
permitted such traffic had been included in the second Hague Convention

at our own suggestion The President's administration . . . took up the

strict legal standpoint that the traffic in munitions was permissible and that
it would therefore be a breach of neutrality in our favor if such traffic were
forbidden after the outbreak of hostiHties. President Wilson himself even
had an idea of nationalizing the munition factories which would have ren-
dered traffic with the combatant powers a breach of international law. When,
however, he sounded Congress on this matter it became evident that a
majority could not be obtained for such a step.*

The vi^isdom of allowing ourselves to become the supply base for one
side and of financing the munitions purchases of that side to an extent
which would render its victory almost an economic necessity, may well
be questioned. Indeed, the neutrality legislation of the last several years
would seem to indicate a growing realization of the dangers of such
a shortsighted grasping for immediate profits at the risk of ultimate
military involvement.

* By courtesy of Charles Scribner's Sons.

DEEPENING SHADOWS III

But in all fairness to von Bernstorff we must give him credit for
exercising diplomatic skill and discernment of a high order. In spite of
the compromising of several members of his diplomatic staff and the
arrest of several of his sabotage agents, he had alv^ays managed to avoid
an open breach with our government. If it had not been for the un-
restricted submarine campaign, it seems highly probable that he could
have walked the diplomatic tightrope indefinitely and prevented Amer-
ican sympathy for the Allies from ever finding an incident sufficiently
inflammatory to bring about our military intervention.

It must also be said that von Bernstorff appreciated fully the Amer-
ican predisposition to judge the German policies more harshly than
those of the Allies and to accept the Allied view of things. Nor was he
deluded, as were the military leaders of his government, concerning
the overwhelming forces the country would throw into the struggle
if once she came in. Repeatedly he warned the Foreign Office that the
submarine campaign meant war and that war meant defeat, in spite
of the optimism of the naval command over the decisive role they
believed the submarine would play. All Chancellor von Bethmann-
HoUweg and he could do, however, was not enough. The admirals
convinced the generals, and both together convinced the Kaiser. The
fatal decision was made on January 9, and just under three months later
we were in the war.

The homeward trip of von Bernstorff and his staff must have been a
time of sad reflection for the Ambassador. As he stared out over the
endless North Atlantic rollers, bitter realizations must have compan-
ioned him, realizations of how pitifully small a percentage of the muni-
tions output all the sabotage had diverted from its destination and how
infinitesimal it would appear in contrast to the vast stream of men and
supplies he knew would soon be pouring over that same ocean.

Chapter XII
A SENTENCE OF DEATH

No sooner did it become known that diplomatic relations had been
broken off between the United States and Germany than there was a
rapid exodus of German agents across the border into Mexico. Among
these were Witzke, Jahnke, Dilger, Herrmann, Gerdts, and later
Hinsch. So general and so immediate was this flight that it was evident
it was carried out according to a preconceived plan. This shift to Mexico
was not prompted out of concern for the safety of the German agents,
for some of them returned. The sabotage objectives in the United States
remained the same, and there was now the added necessity of securing
information about the United States Army and Navy. The flight was
dictated purely by the necessity of establishing fresh contact machinery
with headquarters in Germany. With the departure of von Bernstorff,
the duty of acting as clearing house for German agents throughout the
North American continent was transferred to von Eckhardt, the
German Minister to Mexico. Not only did he have means of receiving
and transmitting coded messages by wireless, but he also had ample
funds at his disposal to finance espionage.

If the declaration of war between the United States and Germany
had wrought a sudden change in the German spy and sabotage or-
ganization, it caused an even greater change on the American side. It
brought to life the American Military Intelligence Service under the
direction of Colonel Ralph H. van Deman, and with it an effective
counter-espionage organization.

Colonel van Deman was not new to Intelligence work. He had ac-
quired considerable experience in this branch of the service during the
Spanish-American War, and in 1901 had organized in the Philippines
the Military Information Division, which had covered the Islands with

a network of secret agents. He was also a General Staff expert on the

112

A SENTENCE OF DEATH II3

Far East, and probably knew more than any American officer of
Japanese activities throughout the world, especially in the Philippines,
Hawaii, and Samoa. The year 1915 found him in Washington, D. C, as
a major in charge of the Intelligence Service of the United States Army.
He, together with Major Alexander B. Coxe, and a clerk, made up the
entire personnel. Appropriations voted in 1916 for Military Intelligence
in the United States Army totaled only $11,000, and they included all
expenses incurred by military attaches as well.

All this was changed as soon as America came into the war. The
need of a large and efficient Military Intelligence Service was imme-
diately recognized. Colonel Dansey, in charge of the Military Section of
the British Secret Service, was sent over to the United States by the
British War Office; and all the secret service experience of the British
was placed at Colonel van Deman's disposal. To this were added large
funds and carte blanche in selecting an extensive personnel.

In addition, almost over night, the American Protective League was
created and placed under the direction of the Department of Justice.
Under the able leadership of Mr. A. M. Briggs, of Chicago, a volunteer
body of 250,000 patriotic Americans was enrolled throughout the United
States, each member of which kept watch in his particular area. The
duties of these volunteers were varied, ranging from keeping watch on
I.W.W. agitators to running down draft evaders; but their chief duty
was to guard against German spies and sabotage agents. The United
States was now doing what it should have done in 1914.

As a final act German agents are presumed to have blown up the
munitions plant at Eddystone, Pennsylvania, on April 10, 1917, killing
112 workers, most of whom were women and girls. There was also an
attempt to dynamite the Elephant-Butte Dam on the Rio Grande, but
the agent. Dr. Louis Kopf, was caught. After this the Germans turned
their attention chiefly to spy activities directed against the American
Army and Navy, and to fomenting strikes.

Later we shall tell how the German spy and sabotage machine was
reorganized in Mexico; we shall then meet again many of those agents
who had carried out Germany's vast destruction campaign in the
United States, and who had succeeded so effectively in evading the
American law enforcement agencies during the neutrality period. Here,

114 ^^^ ENEMY WITHIN

for the time being, we shall confine ourselves largely to one of them,
Lothar Witzke,* who attempted to cross back into the United States
and was caught. He is worthy of our attention not only because he was
the only German spy who was condemned to death in the United
States during the war, but also because he played a very important part
in the destruction of both Black Tom and Kingsland.

To understand the events which led up to Witzke's arrest, it is nec-
essary to introduce three secret agents who are intimately connected
with the story.

The first of these, Paul Bernardo Altendorf, was an Austrian Pole
born in Cracow on June i, 1875. In this city he studied medicine and
surgery at the University of Cracow. Of a roving disposition, he traveled
extensively in South America and throughout several of the British
colonies, and finally settled in Mexico. There he secured an appointment
on the staff of General Calles, Military Governor of Sonora, with the
rank of Colonel in the Mexican Army. He was an accomplished
linguist, speaking English, Spanish, German, and Polish fluently. In
addition to this he was a soldier of fortune; and, like those of many
non-German subjects of the Dual Monarchy, his sympathies were not
with Germany. It is not surprising, therefore, that in October 191 7 we
find him enrolled as an American Intelligence Agent by Byron S.
Butcher, Special Agent of the United States Military Intelligence Divi-
sion at Nogales, Arizona. The Intelligence Division quickly realized
his special qualifications and sent him to Mexico City to report on
German spy activities. Having already previously made contacts with
several German agents in Mexico, Altendorf skillfully used these con-
nections and got himself enrolled in the German Secret Service.

Cooperating with him was the British Negro agent, William Gleaves.
Though born a British subject in Montreal, Canada, in 1870, he had
spent his boyhood in Pennsylvania as a laborer and in 1893 ^^^ gone to
live in Mexico City. During the war he was first employed by Mr.
Cummings, British Charge d' Affaires in Mexico, and later by Major

* Lothar Witzke was a man of many aliases. In addition sometimes to spelling
his name as Witke or Witcke he also passed under the names of Harry Waber-
ski, Wabrechty, Cape witcke, Hugo Olson, Pablo Davis, Otto, Robert, Nachel A.,
and finally Pablo Waberski.

A SENTENCE OF DEATH II5

Alfred Mason of the British Naval Intelligence Service for the purpose
of obtaining information regarding German activities in Mexico. He,
too, w^as successful in getting himself taken into the German Secret
Service.

The last one, William Neunhofifcr, was born in Texas of German
parentage. He studied hw, and in May 1916 wt find him, tv^enty-eight
years of age, practicing as a lav^^yer in San Antonio, Texas. At this
time the National Guard was mobilized; and, being a member, he was
sent to the Mexican border. Here his command of the German and
Spanish languages attracted the attention of R. L. Barnes, Agent in
Charge of the Department of Justice Investigation Unit in Texas; and he
was enrolled as an agent. In June 1917, he was instructed to proceed to
Mexico City to investigate the activities of German agents in Mexico.
Posing as a "slacker" who had evaded the draft and frequenting the
better-known places of rendezvous for German agents in Mexico City,
he soon won their confidence. So loud-mouthed was he in defaming
everything American that he was constantly denounced to Major
Campbell, the American Military Attache in Mexico City. Reports that
Neunhoffer had been seen in contact with von Eckhardt, the German
Minister, and Kurt Jahnke, then one of the chiefs of Germany's spy
organization in Mexico, caused the Military Attache immense satis-
faction, for that was exactly what he wanted. After the war, to their
great discomfiture and surprise, Neunhoffer also appeared as a Federal
witness against many a draft evader who had fled to Mexico and there
had made him a confidant.

In Mexico City the three ostensible German agents constantly met
each other in the company of other German agents, and it was not
until the final denouement that they learned to their amazement that
each of them had been playing the same game.

One of the first German agents Altendorf, Gleaves, and Neunhoffer
encountered was Jahnke. He was introduced to them by Otto Paglash,
a trusted German agent, and proprietor of the Hotel Juarez in Mexico
City.

On Jahnke's instructions, Gleaves enrolled himself as a member of
the I.W.W., which at that time was working in close cooperation with
the Germans. So ardent a disciple did he show himself that soon he

Il6 THE ENEMY WITHIN

was admitted to the inner councils. When he had thus firmly estab-
lished himself with the I.W.W. the Germans quickly put him to work.
To quote Gleaves:

I was assigned first to the duty of going up to the border where the
American troops were stationed and I was to try to work up a revolt among
some of the American soldiers. For this purpose I was supplied with money
by the German Consul whose office was at Calle Lopez. He gave me about
$1500 which I was to use for expenses and also among the American troops.
I went from Mexico City to Juarez and crossed the border at El Paso and
and stayed in El Paso a week or two. Before going, I reported to Mr. Cum-
mings all about what I had been assigned to do. I was reporting regularly to
Mr. Cummings and Major Mason.

After I returned to Mexico City, I reported to the German Consul that I
had made some progress and thought that I would accomplish something
through some of the American soldiers and sergeants that I had been in
touch with, but I said that I would need some help on another trip. I stayed
around Mexico City quite a long time after that. The German authorities
told me that I had better wait awhile and that they would send somebody
else with me who was familiar with things in the United States.

In the meanwhile Witzke had been active and had made several trips
across the border into the United States. Early in January 1918 he was
ready to depart again on a special mission. Here was Jahnke's oppor-
tunity to provide the help Gleaves had asked for; therefore Gleaves was
instructed to accompany him. And since Altendorf was now well in
the confidence of Jahnke, and the latter wanted him to introduce
Witzke to General Calles in Sonora, he too was ordered to join the
party.

On January 16, 191 8, Witzke (traveling under the name of Pablo
Waberski), Altendorf, and Gleaves left Mexico City for Manzanilla to
catch the S.S. Josefina for Mazatlan, thence to proceed by rail to
Nogales, Sonora. At Colima they discovered that they had missed their
train connection. Fortunately, Witzke was well enough provided with
money to hire an engine and tender; otherwise they would have missed
their boat. Boarding the engine a few miles out of Colima to avoid
being seen, they arrived in time at Manzanilla to catch the steamer.
During this part of the trip Witzke started drinking, and growing

A SENTENCE OF DEATH II7

confidential, boasted to Altendorf both of past exploits and of his pres-
ent secret mission. These admissions have such an important bearing
on the Black Tom case that it is as well to quote Byron S. Butcher, to
whom Altendorf (American Operative A-i) subsequently made his
report:

"There is something terrible going to happen on the other side of the bor-
der when I get there and I can't tell you what it is," Waberski advised A-i. "If
I get the job done well, I will have saved Germany and after I return from
the United States you will see it in the papers, but you must never mention
it to anyone. You will know that it was my work."

He also advised A-i to tell any inquirers that they were only train acquaint-
ances.

Earlier at Guadalajara, Waberski had informed A-i that he was going to
Nogales to kill someone and "blow up things in the United States." Efforts
to secure more definite data failed except that A-i was led to believe that it
was an American officer at Nogales, Arizona, booked to be assassinated,
because the German said that this American through influence with Mexican
officials had seriously injured German plans in Mexico.

Waberski also informed A-i over a bottle of wine that he had blown up a
black powder magazine of 250,000 pounds near San Francisco [Mare Island]
one morning about five o'clock. Waberski bragged that sixteen lives had been
lost including six children. He asserted he was working for the American
Government as a mechanic on the Island at the time of the explosion and
laid wires to accomplish his designs. . . .

At A-i's exclamation that he had a lot of nerve, Waberski replied that he
was a sworn member of the German Secret Service and that he must do the
work "life or death "

"I do not know whether I am coming back alive from this trip or not, as
I may be killed," the German asserted.

"... I also did the work in New Jersey with Yenky [ Jahnke], when the
munition barges were blown up and piers wrecked," asserted Waberski to
A-I. "We were out in a small boat and the waves nearly swamped us and we
came near drowning. The hardships on this piece of work were many but
it was all for 'The Fatherland.' The German Ambassador and Yenky
think very highly of me for my work and I am very proud to have done it.
I am a man they know they can depend upon," said Waberski.

"I have many lives on my conscience and I have killed many people and
will now kill more," added the German to A-i.

Il8 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Waberski also claimed to have caused the fires in the Oregon logging
camps last Fall. His Alien head tax receipt shows that his destination on
arrival at Laredo, June 5th, 1917, was Portland, Oregon.

The Josefina docked at Mazatlan on January 24. There Witzke called
briefly on the German Consul and then retired to a bav^dy house. This
gave Altendorf an opportunity secretly to visit Mr. Chapman, the Amer-
ican Consul, identify himself, and hand him a message for coding and
telegraphic dispatch to Byron S. Butcher, at Nogales, Arizona. As sent
by Chapman it read:

Quote:

January 26th, 10 a.m. to Butcher from A-i: I arrived from Mexico City
last Thursday, leaving for Hermosillo on Saturday 26th with two German
spies, one A. Nuding.*

Both are plotting assassination some officials in Nogales, where they are to
arrive next Monday, catch Nuding if possible. Use care as he is dangerous. I
will be in Hermosillo one day. Would you not have Joe Bru meet me at
Cohen Hotel there at once. Got news for you. Unquote. I have corroborated
evidence as to danger of Nuding.

Chapman

From Mazatlan Witzke, Cleaves, and Altendorf took a train to
Hermosillo via Guaymas. After the train left Guaymas, Witzke v^alked
through the coaches and on his return told Altendorf, "I have gotten
rid of over one hundred dollars. I have six men going north with me.
The v7ork is moving splendidly." One of these men v^as later identi-
fied by Cleaves as Dietz, a German agent, w^ho intended crossing
the border to the Nev^ Mexico coal fields, v^here the Germans had a
large follov^ing among miners who belonged to the I.W.W.

On their arrival in Hermosillo, Altendorf accompanied Witzke to
call on General Calles. Witzke instructed Altendorf just to introduce
him, as Calles would know who he was. According to Altendorf, it
was evident from the conversation which took place between Witzke
and Calles that the General had been informed in some manner of

* The name "Nuding" in this message was garbled, and was probably in-
tended for some other name.

A SENTENCE OF DEATH II9

Witzke's proposed trip to Sonora. Witzke asked Calles to protect him
against American agents in Sonora and requested him to forward to
the German Legation in Mexico City, over his private telegraph line,
any coded telegrams he sent to him from the United States or else-
v^here. Calles, like President Carranza and the whole Mexican Govern-
ment, was pro-German and agreed to do this. At Witzke's request,
Calles further supplied him with a revolver and a permit to carry it in
Mexico.

Having introduced him to Calles, Altendorf s mission was com-
pleted in the eyes of Witzke, and therefore Altendorf took leave of
him. Here we must allow Byron S. Butcher, to take up the story:

Waberski and Cleaves left Hermosillo, January 30th, on the regular
passenger train for the border, while A-i remained behind in order not to
arouse suspicion. A-i left Hermosillo the same night, however, by freight
arriving at Nogales, Sonora, the following night.

In the meantime, an informant, who will be called M-2, was located in
the Central Hotel, Nogales, Sonora, as the most likely place where the Ger-
man would stop. M-2 located Waberski the night of his arrival and remained
with him until his arrest.

I found Waberski at the American Consulate, Nogales, Sonora, the follow-
ing morning. He told a story of having to come to the border to answer his
questionnaire and probably to go to San Francisco. Even though his story
was unlikely, his passport was worse, being the Russian type, always re-
garded with suspicion. Consul Lawton and I agreed to cross the German
across the border. Waberski had his passport "passed" at the U. S. Immigra-
tion Office without question He returned to Mexico and made two trips

across the border during the day. In view of the fact that he left his baggage
on the Mexican side, I did not molest him, awaiting the opportunity to
secure his baggage and him together.

After two days on the road from Hermosillo, by freight, A-i presented
himself at the American Consulate on the night of January 31st, was crossed
to the American side of the border and quartered with me.

He then oudined his trip to Sonora with Waberski as set forth in the
foregoing. He added that the German always carried his papers on his person.

As M-2 had reported that Waberski expected to cross over to the American
side the following morning to do some banking business, S-2 was properly
instructed, an auto was secured and after an hour's wait Waberski appeared.

120 THE ENEMY WITHIN

He had two revolvers shoved against him by S-2 and the writer, was hand-
cuffed and taken to camp and searched.

On his person was found approximately $i,ooo in American cur-
rency and Mexican gold. The gold was in a money belt, and the
currency was tied in handkerchiefs bound around the calves of his
legs.

He had a Russian passport, Number 435, issued in Mexico City to
"Paul Waberski, 22 years of age, mechanic and automobile engineer,
resident of New York City and San Francisco for the last seventeen
years, returning to the United States." The passport was "seen,"
Number 630, by the American Vice Consul in Mexico City and
stamped December 10, 1917. It was "passed" by the U. S. Immigration
Office, Nogales, Arizona, January 31, 1918.

In the "Declaration of Alien about to Depart for the United States"
Waberski declared he was born in Winski, Dziatozin, Russia, May 5,
1895, and had lived in San Francisco from January 1905 to November
1917, and in Mexico City from November 1917 to the date of the
passport. References given included the name of Wladimir Wend-
hausen, Russian Consul General at Mexico City.

Witzke also had a Mexican passport. Number 396, issued at Laredo,
Texas, on November 15, 1917, in the name of Pablo Waberski, Rus-
sian, age 22, en route to Mexico. Opposite the heading, "Estado," he
was described as a bachelor; and opposite "persons who accompany
him," there appeared the notation: "He is accompanied by his wife."
This certainly speaks highly for the efficiency, or perhaps the sense
of humor, of the Mexican passport officials.

He also had in his possession a "Selective Draft" registration cer-
tificate No. C. H. 171, issued at Precinct 1/21, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, June 9, 1917; a "Certificate of Service to Able Seaman" issued
in San Francisco, June 27, 19 17, to Pablo Waberski, for service on the
high seas and inland waters; a motor-car operator's license Number
332987, San Francisco, issued to Paul Waberski, on October 17, 1917;
and an official permission from the Presidente Municipal of Hermo-
sillo, Sonora, dated January 29, 1918, authorizing Pablo Waberski to
carry a pistol.

A SENTENCE OF DEATH 121

There was also a memorandum book showing traveHng expenses
from Mexico City to Nogales, the names and addresses of several girls
in towns along the way, an amorous letter addressed to one of his
conquests in Berkeley, California, and several snapshots of other mem-
bers of his harem.

The biggest find, however, was still to come. That afternoon. Cap-
tain Joel A. Lipscomb, Army Intelligence Officer, and his assistant,
Byron S. Butcher, crossed the border into Nogales, Sonora. They pro-
ceeded to the Central Hotel where by a little bluffing and greasing of
palms they managed to take possession of Witzke's baggage. In it,
along with his personal effects, was found a letter in code, and a cipher
table of words and phrases for sending telegrams.

Captain Lipscomb's satisfaction at finding this cipher table was
short-lived. A comparison of it with the coded letter revealed, to his
disappointment, that there was no connection. The coded letter, there-
fore, was sent to Colonel van Deman in Washington, D. C, for expert
examination by the Cryptographic Bureau, then directed by Captain
Yardley.

In the meantime Cleaves was completely at sea. He had lost track
of Altendorf (A-i) at Hermosillo, Witzke had mysteriously disap-
peared at Nogales, and he had no way in which to communicate with
Jahnke in Mexico City to ask for instructions. His plans were com-
pletely disrupted; for his mission was to contact the American
authorities in Nogales, Arizona, and hand over not only Witzke but
Altendorf as well. To facilitate this, he had arranged a means of
identification with the British Consul in Mazatlan: A piece of paper
on which the word "NOVIA" was written was torn jaggedly in half.
Cleaves retained the portion with the letters "NO" on it, and the
other half with "VIA" on it was sent to Mr. Lawton, the American
Consul in Nogales, Sonora.

After wandering around for a couple of days, Cleaves eventually
decided to call on Mr. Lawton, and it was there that he met Byron S.
Butcher and told him his story.

Butcher's report of the conversation stated:

Cleaves' account of the journey of Waberski, the Doctor [Altendorf], and
himself from Mexico City to Sonora checks in almost every detail with the

122 THE ENEMY WITHIN

statement of A-i [Altendorf], both of whom were unaware of each other's
identity.

Gleaves further informed Butcher that he was retained by the
Germans to accompany Waberski to Nogales, Sonora, to meet dele-
gates of the I.W.W. from New Mexico, Arizona, and California to
arrange with them the plans whereby "Hell would break loose in the
United States" some time in April or May. Of the four or five I.W.W.
delegates who were to meet Waberski at Nogales, two were to have
been Negroes; and Gleaves was to have given them their instructions.
Gleaves stated that Waberski explained to him, in part, his plan to
cause disorder in the United States. This scheme embraced the organ-
ization of the I.W.W. "to carry out a resolution calling for an uprising
of the Negroes, strikes, the blowing up of mines, industrial plants,
railroads, bridges, and telegraph and telephone systems."

Gleaves further informed Butcher that Dietz and the five other
German agents who had boarded the train at Guaymas had gone off
in the direction of Naco, Sonora, with the intention of crossing into
the United States at some point on the Arizona line. Whether or not
they were successful is not known — Captain Lipscomb and his agents
lost track of them completely.

Several months were to intervene before Witzke was brought to
trial. In his prison at Fort Sam Houston he was continuously ques-
tioned by Intelligence Officers, who in the meantime had received
back, decoded, the letter he had carried and thus knew he was a
German agent. They were able to show him that they had strong
evidence against him, but he adamantly refused to give any informa-
tion. The following stenographic notes of a conversation during this
period between him and Byron S. Butcher reflect his attitude; but
they are also important because they contain an admission by Witzke
that he had confided in Altendorf.

W. Well, I am in a pretty hard position. What do you think they will do

with me?

B. Pablo, I tried to tell you the other day that the best thing for you would

be to tell the whole thing. If you keep on the way you are now and do

not tell the truth and all you know, you have no chance at all. As you

A SENTENCE OF DEATH I23

have already guessed, we know nearly all about you. We are in war now,

and also as you know spies are hung. Americans are sometimes strange

in their actions, and I would tell you again the only possible chance you

have is after a week or ten days in San Antonio, and after you have

thought it over, tell them all you know.
W. No, I can't do that. I am very young to die, 22 years. But I have done

my duty. If I told you I would be a traitor and that I will never be.
B. Pablo, that is the chance we all take who do this work. It is legitimate as

long as you do not get caught, but when caught you have to pay the

penalty.
W. Yes, I know it. I will probably be the first man to die in the United

States for my country, won't I ?
B. Yes, probably the first, though I hear that one or two more have been

caught since you were. You think it over, for the way I see it, your

only chance now is to tell all.
W. No, I think I will go through with it. I had planned to live in Mexico

after the War, but now I can never do that Will it [the trial] be

published in the papers ?
B. I don't know, probably not.
W. You know all the details all right, and I think it was that Dr. Altendorf

who told you, as I told him a lot of things in conversation.

Witzke was a gallant patriot, and to the end he refused to betray
anyone vv^ho was connected with him.

On Friday, August 16, 1918, Lothar Witzke, handcuffed and under
military escort, was brought to Military Headquarters, Fort Sam
Houston, San Antonio, Texas, to face a Military Commission.

Seated behind a long board table in a large, severe room were
two brigadier generals and three colonels, the Court which was to
decide the young German's fate. Major A. P. Burgwin, Judge Advo-
cate, and Captain T. A. Brown, his assistant, conducted the prosecu-
tion, and Colonel W. J. Glasgow of the Fourteenth Cavalry was
assigned to defend Witzke.

The order appointing the Commission was read to the accused, and
on his signifying that he did not object to any of the members named
therein, the members of the Court were sworn, and the accused was
arraigned on the following Charge and Specification:

124 ^^^ ENEMY WITHIN

Violation of the eighty-second Article o£ War. In that Lather Witckc, alias
Pablo Waberski, did, at or near Nogales, Arizona, United States of America,
on or about the 31st day of January, 191 8, act as a spy in and about an
encampment there situated, of the Army of the United States, and did, then
and there attempt to collect material information in regard to the numbers,
resources, and operations of the military forces of the United States, with
intent to communicate the same to the enemy.

Witzke pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the first witness was
called by Major Burgwin. The list of witnesses was formidable, in-
cluding as it did Dr. Paul B. Altendorf ; William Cleaves; Major R. R.
Campbell, American Military Attache in Mexico City; Charles L.
Beatty, Immigration Inspection at Nogales; Byron S. Butcher; E. M.
Lawton, American Consul at Nogales, Sonora; Captain Joel A. Lips-
comb; Major Robert L. Barnes, U. S. Military Intelligence Service,
Fort Sam Houston; William Neunhoifer; and, finally. Captain John
M. Manley of the U. S. Cryptographic Bureau, Washington, D. C. The
evidence of all of these witnesses, with the exception of the last one,
has already been outlined.

As Captain Manley was sworn, a hush fell over the court room, for
it was known that he had testimony of the most vital import to give.
He started out by narrating that he had been head of the English
Department of the University of Chicago from July 1898 to October
1917, when he was appointed as an assistant to Captain Yardley, Chief
of the Cryptographic Bureau, Sub-section M.I.8 of the Military Intelli-
gence Division of the General Staff in Washington, D. C. He went on
to explain how he had been interested in codes and ciphers since boy-
hood and had studied them for thirty-five years as a hobby. He also
stated that he was a fluent German scholar and had been exchange
professor at the University of Gottingen in 1909.

In the spring of 191 8, Manley continued, the coded letter carried
by Witzke came into the Cryptographic Bureau. After several others
had tried to decipher it without success, he eventually took it up, and
after spending a great deal of time on it, succeeded in deciphering it.
He explained that it was a transposition cipher. The text was first writ-
ten in German and then by a prearranged diagram the letters were
mixed up. The problem which he had had to solve was to discover

A SENTENCE OF DEATH I25

the formula by which the letters were disarranged. On the instructions
of the Court he now read aloud the decoded message:

15-1-18. To the Imperial Consular Authorities in the Republic of Mexico.
Strictly Secret! The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a
Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent.
Please furnish him on request protection and assistance, also advance him on
demand up to one thousand pesos Mexican gold, and send his code telegrams
to this Embassy as official Consular dispatches.

Von Eckhardt

The effect on the court room was electric. Everyone realized that it
would require extraordinary evidence on the part of Witzke to dis-
credit the quiet but convincing testimony of the Professor of English
and his damning message.

Witzke followed next as the only witness for the defense. After
being duly sworn, he launched out on an amazing story which only
a desperate man could have thought up — it was so fantastic that even
a child would have recognized it as a tissue of invention. Later, as we
shall see, he was to admit this himself.

He testified that his parents were of Russian nationality and that
they had immigrated to the United States when he was five years old.
His father died a few years later; thereupon, at the age of ten, he went
to sea and continued working as a seaman on various coastal steamers
until, at the age of nineteen, he landed in Peru and took up mining
there. Later he went to Mexico. There he became acquainted with a
young Mexican by the name of Ramirez, a member of a group of ban-
dits who were robbing the gold and silver mines in the mountains
some thirty miles out of Mexico City. Ramirez hired him to bring the
bullion into the city.

After he had done this for three or four months, Ramirez had to
go into hiding. Thereupon, in July 1917, Witzke took $1,000 he had
saved, entrusted the remainder to Otto Paglash, the proprietor of the
Juarez Hotel, and fled to San Francisco, where he registered for the
draft. After staying there some time, he was robbed of his money
while on a drunken bout and so returned to Mexico City, where once
again he lodged at the Juarez Hotel. Here he was constantly annoyed

126 THE ENEMY WITHIN

by German agents who tried to enlist his services, but he refused, as
he did not wish to do anything against the United States.

One day, however, a Mexican, Ramon Alderate, solicited him to
go to Sonora to spy on some Mexican rebels there. On his agreeing
to do this, Alderate gave him a cipher group of words to enable him
to send him messages and a coded letter as a means of identification
which he was to present to the owner of a big merchandise house,
La Voista de Puebla, in Mazatlan, whenever he needed money.

On his way north he decided to continue to San Francisco to
arrange about the draft. He did not want to be posted as a deserter,
and he wanted to explain to the American authorities in San Francisco,
where he had registered, that he was a Russian and not an American.
He stopped off at Mazatlan and there met the beautiful daughter of a
rich Mexican mining man, the owner of two mines. He became en-
gaged to the girl and promised to marry her immediately on his re-
turn from San Francisco.

While en route he met Altendorf, who was down and out and for
whom he felt sorry, and took Altendorf along with him. He regretted
this now, for several people had warned him that his companion was a
German agent and that he would get himself into trouble in the United
States if any American agent saw him in his company.

After cross-examination by the Judge Advocate, Witzke further
added that he had left $2,000 in gold in the safe of Otto Paglash's; and
that, because he knew of Otto Paglash's association with German spies,
he figured that Paglash had framed him with the American authorities.

The Judge Advocate reviewed the evidence as covered by the wit-
nesses and by the exhibits. Colonel Glasgow's reply was brief. He called
the attention of the Court to the difficulty of the defense in that it had
been impossible to bring any witnesses from Mexico. He argued that it
was up to the Court to decide whether it would believe Witzke or
Altendorf and Gleaves, who, he tried to maintain, had taken money
from both sides. Needless to say, this line of defense made no impression
on the Court.

The Court then adjourned for its deliberations. When it resumed, it
found that the accused, Lather Witcke (Lothar Witzke), alias Waber-

A SENTENCE OF DEATH \TJ

ski, was guilty, and sentenced him to be hanged by the neck until dead,
"two-thirds of the members concurring in the finding."

Witzke was returned to his cell in Fort Sam Houston and was kept
there awaiting a review of his case. While confined there he made two
attempts at escape, and in one of them actually succeeded in getting
out of the prison. He was arrested, however, the same day, as he was
emerging from a Mexican shack. On his return to the cell. Private
Henry Brackett, one of the guards, noticed that he glanced up at a
corner. The place was searched, and behind the steel sheeting they
found a razor blade and a small ball of brown paper. On opening it up,
it was found to be a cigarette paper on which was written in German
in Witzke's handwriting a message, which translated into English
read as follows:

My right name is Latar Witzke. Born in Poznen and for that reason I only
understand Polish and not Russian. I was lieutenant on Cruiser Dresden that
was sunk near Valparaiso, Chile. I lay two months in the hospital, which
is the reason I escaped internment. The rest of the crew is interned.

After this, his guard was doubled, his top clothes were removed, and
he was kept confined in his underwear.

On November 2, 191 8, nine days before the Armistice, Witzke's
sentence was approved by Major General de R. C. Cabell, Commanding
Officer at Fort Houston.

On May 27, 1920, President Wilson confirmed Witzke's sentence
but commuted it to "Confinement at hard labor for the rest of his
natural life." He was then transferred to Leavenworth Prison.

Immediately after the war, Germany started exerting every possible
pressure to secure his release. Finally, on April 30, 1923, the German
Ambassador, Dr. Wiedfeldt, called personally on General Bethel, Judge
Advocate General of the Army, urging the release of Witzke. On the
following day the German Ambassador wrote him again and we quote
the following section from that letter:

Other countries, including Germany, have since released all their prisoners
of war and among them those who were sentenced for offenses of espionage.
It would, therefore, do much to pacify public opinion in my country and

128 THE ENEMY WITHIN

would be considered a special act of grace by my Government, if the United
States of America, as France did a few months ago, were now also to set
free their last prisoner of war. I know this would be much appreciated in my
country, for the case of Lothar Witcke . . . has not only attracted the attention
of public opinion but has also frequently been discussed in the German
Reichstag.

A report was also before the Judge Advocate General from the
warden of the prison at Leavenworth, showing that Witzke in July
192 1 had performed an act of heroism and had prevented a disaster by
entering a prison boiler room after an explosion.

On the basis of the above facts — and not because of any doubt as to
the evidence — the Judge Advocate General recommended Witzke's re-
lease on September 26, 1923, in a letter to the Adjutant General reading
in part as follows:

The sentence of death was the proper, and has been in all countries the
customary, sentence for the offense. . . . The question as I see it is one of

policy France released her last enemy prisoner in January, 1923, and

England is said to have done likewise

Witzke was released, but in the subsequent chapters we shall hear
a great deal more about him.

PART II
THE FIVE AGAINST GERMANY

Chapter XIII
THE AMERICAN CLAIMANTS TAKE THE FIELD

The war was over, but its heritage had still to be liquidated. The re-
turn to normalcy was a slow process: Millions of combatants had to be
demobilized, and means provided to enable them to return to normal
life; arrangements had to be made for the return of prisoners of war;
armies of occupation had to be organized; the disarmament of Germany
had to be supervised; treaties of peace had to be negotiated; the map of
Europe had to be remade; Germany's colonies had to be divided up;
pensions had to be provided for disabled soldiers and for the dependents
of those who had been killed; devastated areas had to be rebuilt;
machinery had to be set up for the collection of reparations; and not
least the dead had to be identified and tombstones erected over their
graves.

The Treaty of Versailles attempted to provide a world-wide and de-
finitive settlement between Germany and all the Allied and Associated
Powers. In spite of the prominent part played by President Wilson in
the framing of the treaty, it was rejected by the United States Senate on
November 19, 1919. An entire new agreement had to be negotiated
between Germany and the United States minus the unacceptable sec-
tions of the former one; and this instrument, known as the Treaty of
Berlin, was not ratified by the Senate until October 18, 1921.

Among its terms was a provision for setting up a Mixed Claims Com-
mission to adjudicate all claims for damages growing out of the war
presented by the nationals of either country through their respective
governments.

According to the terms of the treaty, each country was to appoint
one Commissioner, and these two were to select a neutral Umpire.
These three officers constituted the Commission.

Germany named Dr. Wilhelm Kiesselbach as her Commissioner; the

131

132 THE ENEMY WITHIN

United States chose Chandler P. Anderson. Either because she wished
to make a gesture, or because she was being shrewd, Germany asked
that the Umpire be an American citizen. The American Commissioner
unwisely acceded to this request. The reason for the unwisdom of this
decision lay in the fact that an American of high impartiality could
hardly avoid leaning over backward to avoid any appearance of favor-
ing his own country in any question in which he had to render the
final judgment. But, in any event, the two Commissioners agreed upon
former Supreme Court Justice Day for the post.

Also contained in the section of the treaty dealing with the Commis-
sion was a clause stipulating that each government would present the
cases of its nationals through its own officially appointed representative
to be known as the American Agent and the German Agent. Robert
W. Bonynge was selected as the American Agent to represent the
United States Government in pleading those cases in which he had
satisfied himself as to Germany's guilt and the valuation of the claims.
Dr. Karl von Lewinski was appointed German Agent to combat
American claims. H. H. Martin was chosen as Counsel to Bonynge,
and Dr. Wilhelm Tannenberg was designated as Counsel to the Ger-
man Agent.

In case of a disagreement between the two Commissioners, the Um-
pire was to cast the deciding vote. The decisions of the Commission
were to be final in every instance. As the hearings proceeded, three
Umpires in succession died : Justice Day, Edwin B. Parker, and Roland
Boyden. Today, Supreme Court Justice Roberts is filling the position.
Recently, too. Chandler P. Anderson died, and his place as Commis-
sioner has been taken by Christopher B. Garnett. On the German side
there have also been changes. Dr. Paulig is the German Agent today,
and Commissioner Kiesselbach recently resigned and Dr. Victor
Huecking has taken his place.

During the last fifteen years over twenty thousand separate claims,
ranging from the illegal use of German patents to the confiscation of
American deposits in German banks, have been heard and disposed of
by the Commission; and, when a verdict on the Black Tom and Kings-
land cases is handed down, its work will be practically completed.

Since a sovereign government is the only party recognized before an

AMERICAN CLAIMANTS TAKE THE FIELD I33

international tribunal such as the Mixed Claims Commission, the
American Agent is the only American who can appear before the Com-
mission. But it is the practice in all such international cases for the
private counsel of the claimants on whose behalf the claims are filed
to prepare the cases for trial, assemble the evidence, write the briefs,
and otherwise assist the official government Agent.

Accordingly, the firm of Peaslee and Brigham was chosen as special
counsel for the Lehigh Valley Railroad, the owners of Black Tom;
H. N. Arnold, of the firm of Rumsey and Morgan, for the Black Tom
underwriters. Coudert Brothers, the well-known international lawyers,
represented both the underwriters and the Agency of the Canadian Car
and Foundry Company, Limited, the owners of Kingsland; Cravath,
de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood acted for the Bethlehem Steel Com-
pany, which had suffered a loss of approximately $2,000,000 at Black
Tom by the destruction of shells belonging to it and awaiting shipment
there. Lansing and Woolsey were retained in an advisory capacity by
all the corporations involved. Since Mr. Lansing had been Secretary of
State in President Wilson's Cabinet, it was thought that he would be
specially useful for his knowledge of wartime records on file in Wash-
ington. Of these law firms, Coudert Brothers were not active after
1924; whereas Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood did not come
in until 1929; and Lansing and Woolsey were not retained until 1927,
and are now no longer associated.

According to the spirit of the agreement between the United States
and Germany which led to the creation of the Mixed Claims Com-
mission, both governments were to cooperate in a friendly way and
make available to each other all records and sources of information. All
the evidence was to be laid before the Commission in an open and
impartial way, both governments being supposedly more interested
in seeing justice done than in winning legal victories by suppressing or
distorting the true facts.

But if this was the wish and the spirit of the United States Govern-
ment, it was quickly discovered that in the Black Tom and Kingsland
cases the Germans did not intend to abide by this unwritten under-
standing. They immediately made the issue one of national honor and
prestige. As soon as the American plaintiffs began probing into things,

134 THE ENEMY WITHIN

they found that the policy of denial, so ably followed out by von
Bernstorff and his Attaches during the war, was to be continued.
Furthermore, no German record pertinent to the two cases and
detrimental to the German defense was to be made available, even
when the particular document was specified and described by the
American lawyers. Nor were the Americans to be allowed to examine
any witnesses in Germany. Soon the Germans went beyond this and
made it plain to all former German agents resident in any part of the
world that they would be traitors to their country if they disclosed any
information relative to German sabotage or spy activities in the United
States. The American Agent found himself up against a stone wall
erected by the German Government and its secret service.

So colossal was the task involved that the owners of Black Tom
and Kingsland, together with certain claimants affected by the blowing
up of the powder barge in Tacoma harbor in 1915, were the only ones
who had both the courage and the financial resources to file sabotage
claims with the Mixed Claims Commission. The hundreds of other
owners and insurance companies who suffered losses, many of them
amounting to millions of dollars, from acts of German sabotage were
appalled at the magnitude of the task and the enormous expense of
fighting the entire forces of a powerful nation. Since the powder barge
claim only amounted to $500 for windows broken in the vicinity of the
explosion, Germany immediately paid it. But in the Black Tom and
Kingsland cases, she was determined from the beginning to make a
fight to the finish.

Perhaps she thought it incumbent on her to support von Bernstorff
and other wartime German officials in their denials, or perhaps she was
following the age-old principle that a country always disavows the acts
of its secret service. On the other hand, she may have been afraid that
the admission of guilt in a few cases at the outset would let loose a flood
of sabotage claims. It is not inconceivable that, before the American
lawyers began to produce masses of evidence, she may have been ig-
norant of the acts of some of her agents and have sincerely believed she
was not responsible for the destruction of Black Tom and Kingsland.
In any event, for fifteen years she has never admitted her guilt and has

LIBERAL REWARD
iformation as to the whereabouts of
MICHAEL KRrSTOF

«KE CRl&TOFf . MIKK CKtSllK, sm) FKIJX KRihlY

REMARKS

TS.» m»n „ ,lU.gfd w h«»c hv

m^H!H A\f SI f

'^^m

flS

f- fi^ ^ M

Charles Wunnenberg, alias "Charles the Dynamiter"

German Bombs Seized in Hoboken.

AMERICAN CLAIMANTS TAKE THE FIELD I35

fought the cases by every means the greatest minds of her legal,
diplomatic, and espionage services could devise.

The different lav7 firms representing the several companies having
interests in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases were inexperienced in
secret service work and consequently began by wasting much time and
money and at the end of several years had but little in the way of
results to show for it. Eventually the claimants began to reaUze that
without cooperation they would never get anywhere and that it was to
the best interests of all concerned to join forces. Therefore, in 1924, on
the recommendation of Judge Barrett of the Lehigh Valley Railroad
Company, who was on friendly terms with Senator Curry, then Chair-
man of the Board of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Amos
J. Peaslee, of the law firm of Peaslee and Brigham, was selected to lead
the American interests in their fight.

Peaslee was extraordinarily fitted to carry on this battle and to
organize and search for clues. For fifteen years he has labored tirelessly
and patiently to amass the overwhelming evidence which today sheds
light on the mysteries of Black Tom and Kingsland. He had had con-
siderable wartime experience as a major in the American Expeditionary
Force, both as Judge Advocate of the General Court-Martial at the
headquarters of General Harbord and in organizing a trusted band
of officers to act as confidential couriers at General Pershing's head-
quarters. After the Armistice he had been attached to the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace and had proposed several important
amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations. For a number
of years he had specialized in cases involving quertions of international
law, and was Honorary Secretary of the International Law Association
in America. Above all, however, he had had considerable experience
in handling cases involving German interests. He is short, slight of
build, mild-mannered, and a Quaker to boot; but behind all these dis-
arming appearances is the shrewd lawyer and skilled negotiator with
an iron determination. Tireless and patient, he has refused to be dis-
couraged by Germany's campaign of delay and obstruction. Ever ready
at a moment's notice to travel to the most distant countries to collect
evidence and follow up clues, he has crossed the ocean more than
thirty times in this contest of endurance and wits.

136 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Indefatigable in his efforts has been }. J. McCloy, of Cravath, de
Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood. McCloy, heavy-set, large of head, de-
liberate of movement, and usually with a pipe in his mouth, has been
working on the cases steadily since 1930 and has kept the records which
today amount to thousands of exhibits running to over 10,000,000
words. He has coordinated the evidence and has tirelessly fitted the vast
mosaic together. During the latter part of the investigation the prepara-
tion of the briefs has largely devolved on his shoulders. Skilled in in-
terviewing witnesses, he has adroitly and patiently sat hours with them,
slowly leading them back over the years to lift the veil here and there
from events which happened twenty years ago. He, too, is a skilled
international lawyer, having had several years' experience in the Paris
office of his law firm.

But perhaps the fiercest and most determined of all Peaslee's col-
laborators has been Leonard A. Peto, vice president of the Canadian
Car and Foundry Company, who might be called the bulldog of the
investigation. An American by birth and a Canadian by natural-
ization, he is sandy-haired, ruddy, athletic in build, dynamic in char-
acter. A fighter by nature and ever ready to take a risk, he has led the
way where sometimes his lawyer associates have hesitated to tread.
He was one of the first to realize that the German Secret Service and
the government controlling it were determined to conceal the facts in
every possible way and that only by outwitting them at their own game
could the evidence be unearthed. In an investigation which has already
cost the American interests over $1,000,000, his company has often
supplied the funds without which the Germans might easily have won
the war of financial attrition they have been waging in an attempt to
exhaust the resources of the claimants.

Peaslee, Peto and McCloy for the claimants; Bonynge and Martin
for the United States Government — these then are the five against
Germany.

Peaslee and his associates, as they surveyed the situation, grasped at
the outset that their task was one where it would be necessary to re-
construct the whole German sabotage organization, a task all the more
formidable because no evidence was of value to them unless they could

AMERICAN CLAIMANTS TAKE THE FIELD I37

prove it in a court of law. The only way they could hope to do this was
by employing a corps of investigators who could comb the world seek-
ing former German agents and searching for evidence.

Their first step, naturally, was to turn to the wartime records of the
Department of Justice, of the Military Intelligence Service, and of the
various law enforcement agencies throughout the country to familiarize
themselves with the German activities that had come to light before we
entered the war. In this they were greatly aided by Peaslee because of
his friendly relations with A. Bruce Bielaski and General van Deman,
heads of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and of the Military In-
telligence Service, respectively, at the time of the war.

This search was extremely difficult, because most of the records had
never been coordinated. Many of them were scattered and often hidden
away and long forgotten in some file in a tiny precinct poUce station;
and sometimes the most vital information they wanted had been passed
up as unimportant at the time of the police investigation. And yet, as
we shall see, they picked up a thread here and a thread there, and with
this as a basis they and their operatives launched their campaign.

That part of the general German Secret Service sabotage organization
which Peaslee and his associates reconstructed from the above records
has been covered for the most part in the preceding chapters. Those
cogs in Germany's sabotage machine which escaped detection during
the war will be filled in as we proceed; but from now on our attention
will be focused chiefly on Black Tom and Kingsland.

Chapter XIV
RELUCTANT WITNESSES

The investigation of the police records and especially a study of the
Lehigh Valley Company's dossier on Kristoff immediately set Peaslee
and his investigators on his trail. He had disappeared. He had not been
heard of since his release from the Albany prison in 1921. The in-
vestigators v^ere anxious to interrogate him. The country v^as combed
from coast to coast. His knov^n relations and former hang-outs v^ere
visited, but there was no trace of him. Finally, how^ever, he was located
in 1927, once again in jail. He had been committed to the Welfare
Island prison on a charge of larceny.

When he was released in the same summer, Albert M. Dickman,
an investigator for the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, met him
outside the prison gates. Dickman tried to persuade him then and
there to accompany him to Peaslee's office, but Kristoff was unwilling.
He first wanted to visit his uncle in Yonkers, and promised to call on
Peaslee the next afternoon. Dickman immediately got on the telephone
to Peaslee and informed him of the arrangement.

Peaslee went down to the country that night, and on the next day,
a sweltering hot Saturday, returned specially to New York for the in-
terview. Throughout the afternoon Peaslee sat in his office waiting in
vain. Kristoff never showed up, and from then on was never heard of
again until in 1928 the Germans informed the Commission that
he had died of tuberculosis on Staten Island, on April 3, 1928,
and had been buried in the potter's field there. The fact that the Ger-
mans were the ones to report this would seem to indicate that they
had been keeping in close contact with him.

An immediate investigation was made. According to the identifica-
tion papers found on him, the man who had died was indeed Michael
Kristoff. The teeth, however, differed from the teeth records shown in

138

RELUCTANT WITNESSES I39

Kristoff's Army file. The American claimants have accepted this ac-
count of Kristoif's death, but there are some of the investigators who
firmly believe that he is still alive.

After his failure to meet Peaslee and his subsequent disappearance,
all that the American investigators had left were the Bayonne police
reports and those of Kassman, and the statement of Maria de Victorica
that an Austrian had blown up Black Tom. This evidence indicated
that Kristoff had taken part in the destruction of Black Tom; but,
even if this were proved, he still had to be linked up to a recognized
German agent before the blame could be pinned on Germany. The
problem was to find or identify Graentnor, and none of the records
revealed any clues. The investigators therefore turned to Witzke, who,
as we have already shown, had boasted to Altendorf that he and
Jahnke had blown up Black Tom, adding, "We were out in a small
boat and the waves nearly swamped us and we came near drowning."

Witzke's court-martial record was gone through with a fine-tooth
comb, but with no success. The Judge Advocate had had sufficient evi-
dence to secure a conviction on the coded message found on Witzke
and on the testimony furnished by the witnesses. In consequence no
particular attention had been given to his reported statements about
Black Tom.

It was from an entirely different source that corroborative evidence
came. Hidden in a stack of dusty files, a series of reports from Fort
Sam Houston were found; and among them was an affidavit dated
September 19, 1919, from Corporal John Shores, a guard at the prison,
in which he testified to Captain A. H. J. Voelker, Adjutant:

John Shores, age 22 years, Corporal, Company F, 3rd Infantry United
States Army; home address, Benton, Ky., being duly sworn deposes and says:

That about two months ago he heard Lothar Witzke, alias Pablo Waberski,
say, while in the guardhouse at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, that he and
another fellow blew up Black Tom Island in New York.

(signed) John Shores

When interviewed by the American investigators on December 11,
1926, Captain Voelker stated that he had taken the affidavit from
Corporal Shores as a matter of record, but that no action had been

140 THE ENEMY WITHIN

taken on it as Witzke had already been tried and convicted as a spy.

Peaslee and his associates had, however, been set on a new track;
and in 1926 they located another guard, Sergeant Haslam, who had
been at Fort Sam Houston during Witzke's detention there and to
whom Witzke had also confessed that he had participated in the
destruction of Black Tom. Corporal Shores was then reexamined; and
he furnished an additional affidavit to the effect that Witzke had not
only told him that he and a companion had blown up Black Tom
but also had said that they were in a rowboat which was overturned by
the explosion of a drifting ammunition barge.

The intercepted coded telegram of January 10, 1917, which we have
already quoted in connection with Wunnenberg, placed Jahnke defi-
nitely in New York on this date. Peaslee and his investigators, how-
ever, found proof that both he and Witzke were there prior to this
date.

In 1919 Witzke had been examined by Captain''^ Tunney, then of
the Military Intelligence, in connection with an application made
by him for commutation of his court-martial sentence. Scrutiny of the
transcript of this examination revealed that Witzke had been careful
to deny that he had told anyone that he had blown up Black Tom or
that he had been in New York at the time of the explosion. He had ad-
mitted, however, that he and Jahnke had been in New York during the
fall of 1916, and had roomed together at 100 West 56th Street.

Witzke further went on to admit at this examination that, from
this period up to the time of the entry of the United States into the
war, he was carrying "secret messages" between the German Consuls
in New York, San Francisco, and Chicago. It was an admission that
he was being employed all over the United States; and in the light
of his admissions to Altendorf and his known record in Mexico it is
reasonable to assume that a German agent of his importance would
not be employed as a simple messenger but that his travels were in
connection with sabotage activities.

As for Jahnke, apart from the proof furnished by intercepted cables
which will be quoted later, the following report, dated January 25,
191 8, submitted by H. M. Moffett, a Secret Service operative, who

* Inspector was his police rank.

RELUCTANT WITNESSES I4I

interviewed Von Brincken in prison, clearly shows that Jahnke was
engaged in sabotage activities in the United States:

Von Brincken then states that on or about November 15, 1915, which is
supposed to be the birthday of Consul Bopp, the latter had Jahnke blow up a
concern which was supposed to be secretly making munidons for the AlUes.
It later developed that this place, which is located at Twelfth and Howard
Streets, this city [San Francisco], was engaged in casting window weights.
The press published an interview with the proprietor in which he states that
he thought it was an accident, as he could see no reason why the place should
be dynamited inasmuch as they had no known enemies. Bopp was supposed
to pay Jahnke a thousand dollars for this job, and had paid him $500.00 in
advance. He refused, however, to pay him the balance of $500.00, as he
claimed the place was not manufacturing munitions and also in view of the
statement of the proprietor, as published in the papers. Bopp then sent C. C.
Crowley, now doing time at McNeil Island, to investigate the concern before
he would pay the balance. Crowley has since verified von Brincken's state-
ment regarding the blowing up of this concern

A further report, written early in 1918 by an American agent sta-
tioned in Mexico City, reveals the importance of Jahnke as a German
agent:

Intelligence Officers will be interested to know that the present task of
promoting a mutiny in the U. S. Army has been entrusted by BerUn to one
of their star agents, one K. A. Jahnke of Mexico City. This event is scheduled
for the Autumn. Jahnke also has taken under his wing the general super-
vision of sabotage in the U. S., the Panama Canal, and American possessions
generally, including especially sabotage of ships transporting War material
and material for ship construction. His program covering the foregoing am-
bitions has been approved by the German Government, with an available
credit of 100,000 marks per month, and an additional large commission on
results accomplished. . . . He has already had some experience in the control
of German agitators, defeatists and I.W.W. agitators in this country, and is
regarded as an ideal man for the job.

Jahnke's official appointment seems to be that of sole naval confidential

agent in Mexico Intelligence Officers will probably never have the pleasure

of meeting Mr. Jahnke personally, but it is not at all unHkely that he will give
them something to think about. Hence this note in advance.

142 THE ENEMY WITHIN

From these records Peaslee turned to Koenig's notebook. In looking
through the thirty-four secret service agents listed under the heading
"D-Cases," his attention was arrested by two names: Scott and Burns
(spelled Berns once and Burns twice in other sections of the notebook).
Scott and Burns were the names of two of the Dougherty guards who
were on duty at Black Tom on the night of the explosion.

Both Scott and Burns were located by W. H. Russel, a member of
the Greeley Detective Bureau. Scott was then on the New York police
force and Burns was living in Huntington, L. I. Under date of March
30, 1929, Russel in an affidavit covered the statements which Burns and
Scott made to him separately in interviews at which Peaslee was also
present. According to this affidavit both Scott and Burns denied that
they knew Paul Koenig. Burns stated that he was the "Captain" in
charge of the Dougherty detectives at Black Tom and that he took over
his duties on June i, 1916. After he had been on duty for about two or
three weeks, Burns said, he was approached one night in the Jersey
Central Station at Communipaw Avenue by a man whom he did not
know and who gave him some money and asked him to relax the
guard of the detectives working under him. He admitted that from
time to time this man gave him similar sums but added "I didn't see
no particular harm in taking some money which was being handed
about and I think I would have been a fool if I hadn't. It wasn't much
of anything — only small pieces of change from time to time."

Scott admitted that Burns had given him small amounts of money
now and again but claimed that he did not know for what purpose.
He further stated that Burns sometimes gave him money to buy liquor
for the guards. He also added that Burns disappeared from New York
shortly after the Black Tom explosion and was later located at Oak-
land, California. On further interrogation, Scott admitted that he knew
Kristoff, as he had often seen him hanging around the White House
saloon at Communipaw Avenue.

Both Burns and Scott declined, in the course of the interview, to
sign any written statements in support of what they had said as
described above. Later, when Grover Whalen was Commissioner of
Police in New York City, Peaslee appealed to him for help in getting
a written statement from Scott. Scott first agreed to write out a state-

RELUCTANT WITNESSES I43

ment; but, after he had done this, he wished to make so many changes
that the attempt was given up.

Having been unable to get any aid from Scott and Burns, an appeal
was made to von Lewinski, the German Agent, either to produce
Koenig as a witness, or failing this, to produce or indicate who the
Scott and Burns were who were mentioned in his notebook. Germany
refused to produce Koenig. But later he was discovered in the United
States. He had been in Jersey City all the time. However, when ap-
proached by the American claimants, he refused to give any informa-
tion, and when later examined under subpoena in 1933, he successfully
resisted the cross-examination of Mr. Bonynge.

An interesting note from Koenig, found among papers seized by the
American authorities during the raid on von Igel's office reads as
follows:

W. von Igel, Esq., New York City,

New York, August 10, 1916.
Dear Sir:

I am forwarding under separate cover a certain part of a shell which was
found on Governor's Island shortly after the recent explosion which took
place on Black Tom Island.
If you find it to be of any interest to you or others, you may retain same.

Faithfully yours,

Paul Koenig

Koenig claimed in the course of this examination that the sending of
the shell fragment had no special significance.

The possibility that two common names such as Burns and Scott
could have appeared purely by chance in Koenig's list of thirty-four
secret agents was also investigated. On the basis of scrambling up all
the names in the Manhattan telephone book, and then choosing 34 of
them at random, it was found by actuarial computation that the
chance of Burns's and Scott's being drawn in succession (the two
names followed each other in Koenig's list) was i in 2,000,000.

That the Germans did make a practice of bribing guards is proved
by an admission to this effect made by Wilhelm Woehst, a confessed
German agent, of whom we shall hear more later. Von Rintelen also

144 THE ENEMY WITHIN

confessed to the same practice and further confirmed that Black Tom
was a German sabotage objective by admitting that as far back as
1915 he visited it secretly one night v^ith a viev^ to mapping plans for
its destruction.

KristofI, Witzke, Jahnke, Koenig, Scott and Burns, — w^hat, if any,
was the connecting link between them as related to Black Tom, and
who and where was Graentnor?

Chapter XV
THE EASTMAN GIRL" COMES FORWARD

A REVIEW of the evidence furnished by Horst von der Goltz and by
the German agents who were convicted in the Welland Canal case
revealed that they had stored the dynamite in a house in New York
at 123 West 15th Street. The owner of this house, Martha Held, was a
buxom, handsome woman whose dark blue eyes and black glossy hair
were usually set off by sparkling earrings. She was a prewar German
Secret Service recruit but never did any actual spying. Instead, she
ran a rendezvous house for German spies, a safe retreat for their secret
meetings. She was a German baroness by marriage (what happened
to the baron we do not know) a genial, middle-aged woman at the
time she was in New York. She was accustomed to entertaining men
from every walk of life.

As far back as 1912 she rented the house at 123 West 15th Street,
New York City, from J. Irving Walsh, former president of the New
York City Real Estate Board, to whom she confided that she had
chosen the number specially as an easy aid to memory.

It is from Mrs. Mena Edwards Reiss, who was brought forward
early in 1925 by her husband, a Lehigh Valley employee, that we have
a detailed account of Martha Held and the clandestine activities which
took place in her establishment. For a fee she gladly set down her
experiences in an affidavit.

During the years 1914, 1915, and 1916, Mena Edwards, then un-
married, was employed by the Eastman Kodak Company and was
known as "The Eastman Girl." She posed for photographs for use in
advertisements and displays on magazine covers. A pretty, vivacious,
athletic girl, pleasure-loving and fond of sports, she was well liked
and had a wide circle of friends. For a time during this period she
lived at a hotel at 86th Street and Broadway with a motion picture

145

146 THE ENEMY WITHIN

actress named Marie Wells; later she shared an apartment on West
87th Street with Lucille Rogers, an actress.

Late in 1914, or early in 1915, she became acquainted with a French
girl named "Vera," whose last name she had forgotten, who lived in
the Pasadena Apartments at 61 st Street and Broadway.

Vera, who spoke German fluently, later confided to her that she
was a German agent, and as such had made several trips to Europe.
Through this French girl Miss Edwards met a German named Eugene
Schwerdt, an immensely wealthy broker, who at one time had cor-
nered the South American wool market. One evening at the Plaza
Hotel, Schwerdt introduced her to Captain von Papen.

Thereafter Vera and Miss Edwards were frequently the guests of
Schwerdt and von Papen, often dining together at the Plaza, the
Ritz, or at Delmonico's, and frequently going for horseback rides in
Central Park.

At one of these dinners von Papen introduced her to Captain Boy-Ed.
After they had dined, they took her to 123 West 15th Street and pre-
sented her to Martha Held, who. Miss Edwards later discovered, also
used the name, "Martha Gordon."

During the rest of the neutrality period Miss Edwards was a fre-
quent guest in that house. It was an old-fashioned dwelling with a
brown-stone stoop. There was a well-equipped kitchen and a wine
cellar in the basement, and on the first floor a large dining room whose
walls were lined with photographs of Martha Held and other stars in
opera costumes. Mme. Held occupied the whole four floors of the
dwelling. There were two servants: Janushka, a Hungarian maid, and
Rose, a colored woman.

Miss Edwards and Vera dined in the house about once a week either
with von Papen or Boy-Ed or other of the Germans whom they
met through the two Attaches. Miss Edv^rds soon discovered that it
was a meeting place for German agents, captains and officers from
the interned German ships, reservists, and spies who had been sent
over from Germany. Many of them came disguised in all sorts of
garb. All of them entered through the basement. Among the many
she met she recalls the names of von Rintelen, Horst von der Goltz,
Hans Tauscher, Ludwig Meyer, J. von Bruck, Martin Lange of the

**THE EASTMAN GIRL" COMES FORWARD I47

Cafe Bismarck, and a curious character, known to her only as "Mox,"
who was said to be a printer by day and a saboteur by night.

The destruction of munitions and factories and other equipment
which was of service to the AlUed Governments was a constant topic
of conversation. Sometimes English was spoken; but even when Ger-
man was used, which was generally the case. Miss Edwards, although
she could not talk the language fluently, understood enough German to
follow what was said. Black Tom and the Welland Canal were often
mentioned, as well as factories in various parts of the United States.

At these conferences bombs were often carefully handed around.
Men brought them in satchels from Hoboken, and Mme. Held stored
them in a cupboard in readiness to be given later to others who carried
them away. Often, too, great rolls of blue prints were spread on the
table; and photographs were closely examined.

After von Papen and Boy-Ed were sent out of the country, she met
Wolf von Igel several times. She remembered that on two occasions
Count von Bernstorff also came to the house.

On several occasions, just prior to the Black Tom explosion, she
overheard plans for the destruction of the Terminal. For the coup the
night of Saturday to Sunday, just after midnight, was considered to
be the most propitious moment. The printer, "Mox," was chosen to
carry the bombs over to the Jersey side; and, according to the con-
versation, she gathered that they had several inside men actually in
the employ of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company to assist them.

Alarmed at what she had heard, she decided to spend the next week-
end out of the city and therefore went down to stay with a friend at
Atlantic Highlands on the New Jersey coast. She and her hostess
were asleep when they were awakened by what sounded at first like
a clap of thunder. As their bedroom led onto a verandah, they
rushed out to bring in their bathing suits, which had been hung out
there to dry. Against the sky they could see the ruddy glare of a great
conflagration; and from time to time they heard popping sounds,
which they later learned were made by exploding shells.

Miss Edwards returned to New York Monday, July 31, and on
Tuesday morning Martha Held telephoned her inviting her to dinner
that night. There was a large crowd at Number 123 when she arrived.

148 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Everyone was talking about the success of the Black Tom explosion.
Toasts were drunk to the Kaiser and the Fatherland, and there was
also a good deal of handshaking.

After this Miss Edwards began to get more frightened about the
activities of the group; and, as at the same time, one of the employees
of the Eastman Kodak Company informed her that the company was
getting suspicious of her and was inclined to believe that she was too
pro-German, she decided to return to her mother's home at Walling-
ton, about thirty miles from Rochester. There she remained for sev-
eral months without returning to New York City.

In defending Germany before the Mixed Claims Commission, von
Lewinski, the German Agent, denounced Mena Edwards Reiss's affi-
davit on the grounds that the American lawyers had paid her $2,500
for her statement and had promised her a further $5,000 if the Com-
mission handed down a favorable decision.

But this payment was no discovery on the part of the Germans; the
American lawyers at the time of the filing of the affidavit had loyally
notified the Commission of the fact. Miss Edwards had insisted on a
fee; and, although Peaslee was loathe to pay it, realizing that it would
detract from the value of her statement, yet there was no alternative as
she obviously had information to impart. Her affidavit was not worth
the money he paid for it, as he afterwards saw.

It seems likely that she drew somewhat on her imagination. In any
case her affidavit was merely filed as supporting evidence, though later
it proved more of a handicap than a help. From other sources it had
been established beyond the shadow of a doubt that Martha Held did
conduct a spy rendezvous at 123 West 15th Street, that explosives
were stored there, and that Mena Edwards had frequented the estab-
lishment.

J. Irving Walsh gave an affidavit that he rented 123 West 15th Street
to a German woman, Martha Held, in 1912; that he visited the house
from time to time and "had noticed that there was a great deal of wine
and liquor about, and that it always had quite a German atmosphere";
that Martha Held further told him that "on several occasions the sea
captains on the German boats were accustomed to coming there and
she said that she would give them little dinners at night." He further

<< _. . _ )5

THE EASTMAN GIRL COMES FORWARD I49

added that there was something strange in connection with the dis-
continuance of the tenancy, on June 6, 1918:

My recollection is that I received a telephone call stating that the house
was vacant and that Martha Held and everybody had disappeared, and that
we sent down there and found that the keys had been left next door, and
that no one knew where Martha Held had gone.

Apart from the names of known German agents mentioned by Miss
Edwards, the names of von Bruck and Ludwig Meyer appeared in Dr.
Albert's private book of addresses, and that of Martin Lange, the pro-
prietor of the Cafe Bismarck, in Koenig's notebook.

Investigation of some of the neighbors in the same block corroborated
the fact that Martha Held sometimes used the name of "Martha
Gordon." One of them recalled that because of the number of men who
frequented the establishment, the neighbors whispered that it was a
bawdy house. Martha Held probably encouraged this belief to cloak
her real activities. But all this brought Peaslee and his investigators no
nearer to the solution of their problem. They therefore turned to new
fields.

Chapter XVI
THE SECRETS OF "40 O.B."

Having searched the American records, Peaslee and his associates
naturally directed their attention to those of the Allies. There had been
two independent British Intelligence sections operating in the United
States during the war: one a unit of the British Secret Service under the
direction of Sir William Wiseman, who moved about New York as
Walter Wisdom, director of W. Wisdom Films, Incorporated; the
other, a section of the British Military Intelligence Service commanded
by Colonel Thwaites. Both services had kept a watchful eye on the
activities of Boy-Ed, von Papen, and their successors in the recruiting
of spies of neutral nationality in the United States for dispatch to the
Allied countries. Several of these spies, such as George Vaux Bacon, had
been caught in England as a result of this alertness. Some attention had
also been given to German sabotage activities in the United States, since
the British had an obvious and vital interest in the munitions shipments
which were being made to Europe. And, although it was impossible for
the British to interfere in the United States during the neutrality period,
they were able, on occasions, to pass on information to the American
authorities. When this failed to bring action, they communicated it to
the press. Some of the sensational disclosures made by the Providence
Journal during the war were of British origin.

Peaslee was well aware of these facts, and consequently he sailed for
Europe in 1925. But secret service records are what their name implies.
Because of his appearing as a private citizen without any official back-
ing, he was courteously received by Sir Basil Thompson, head of
Scotland Yard, and just as politely informed that the British had no
information to impart. In any case, he applied to the wrong depart-
ment; for, although Scotland Yard effected spy arrests in England

during the war, it relied on the British Secret Service and on the In-

150

THE SECRETS OF 40 O.B. I5I

telligence Services of the Army and Navy for its espionage information.

Peaslee vi^as quick to realize the cause of his failure; and, as soon as
he returned to the United States, he got in touch with former Secretary
Robert Lansing, v^ith whom he was well acquainted.

Peaslee met him at Watertown, New York, on August 5, 1925, and
there explained to him his needs. It was natural that Lansing, who
knew the inside story of the Zimmermann telegram * should have fired
Peaslee with enthusiasm for Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, the man who,
as Director of Naval Intelligence Service of the British Admiralty, had
been responsible for the interception and decoding of this telegram.
Lansing gave Peaslee a letter of introduction to Admiral William E.
Sims, former commander of the American naval forces in Europe. "Hall
and Sims are great personal friends," said Lansing. "Get Sims to give
you a letter of introduction to him. Hall intercepted and decoded every
German cable and wireless message that passed between von Bernstorff
and Berlin. Get a copy of these messages, and I am sure you will find
all the information you want."

Peaslee wrote posthaste to Admiral Sims at Newport, and also to a
cousin of the Admiral's, Joseph P. Sims, with whom Peaslee had been
associated in France during the war.

On August 18, 1925, Peaslee sailed once more for England, armed
this time with a precious letter of introduction from Sims to Hall. The
information which Peaslee obtained from Sir Reginald Hall immedi-
ately set the American investigators on the right track and supplied
such valuable clues that even at the risk of digressing we must describe
at some length how the British Cryptographic Service intercepted and
decoded German cables and telegrams.

War had been declared between Germany and England but a few
hours when a group of trawlers sailed from the east coast of England in
the direction of Emden, the German port at the mouth of the Ems
River where the Dutch coast joins that of Germany. To any German
coastal patrol boat which might have spotted them, they were just some

* Sent in January, 1917, by Zimmermann, German Foreign Minister, to von
Eckhardt, German Minister to Mexico, instructing him to promise Mexico Ger-
man aid in securing a return of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, in the event
that the United States should enter the war on the side of the Allies and Mexico
should ally herself with Germany.

152 THE ENEMY WITHIN

of the many fishing boats operating in the area. A boarding party would
have revealed that they were manned chiefly by cable experts. Under
the cover of darkness and mist, slipping silently between the Dutch
islands in the vicinity, they grappled for the German deep-sea cables.
Covered with mud and seaweed, these cables were eventually hauled up
on deck; and one after another they were cut and allowed to sink back
into the depths. It was a brilliant coup, conceived and executed by a
young naval officer who, disguised as a fisherman, had mapped out the
area several months before the war and had planned every step which
had now been so successfully carried out.

After fruitlessly trying to get through on their cables, the Germans
at length realized what had happened. To communicate with the out-
side world only two channels were now left open to them : cables owned
by neutral countries, and wireless communication through the air. The
ether soon buzzed with German coded wireless messages, not only to
their diplomatic representatives in neutral countries but also to those
of their warships cut off in distant parts of the globe by the outbreak of
hostilities.

The French immediately suggested jamming the German wireless,
but the British had a craftier plan. They decided instead to intercept the
messages and to use them to their own advantage. The idea was excel-
lent. But how was this to be done? It was obvious that somehow or
other the German codes had to be stolen or acquired, or some master
mind had to be found who, by methods of cryptography, could break the
multiple and intricate ciphers which were being used. The Director of
Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, to whom the task was assigned,
quickly realized that both methods had to be used.

It is true that the art of cryptography can be developed by constant
practice, but it also requires a special flair. Whence, at short notice, was
the British Admiralty going to recruit the necessary personnel, and
above all where was the man to be found who had sufficient experi-
ence to direct such a service ? Chance favored the British. In the Ad-
miralty itself was a man who, as a hobby, had made a life study of
cryptography. This man was Sir Alfred Ewing, Director of Naval
Education, a noted scientist; and it was to him that Admiral Sir Henry

c c

THE SECRETS OF 4O O.B. I53

Oliver, Director of Naval Intelligence at the outbreak of the war,
turned.

Sir Alfred eagerly accepted the assignment. Starting v^ith a staff of
Rwc men, he patiently trained them and then added to their number
until eventually he had a band of fifty assistants — mathematicians,
linguists, and, later, secret ink chemists. Space for Sir Alfred and his
staff was found in the Old Admiralty Building in Room 40, and to
keep the nature of the organization secret it was always referred to as
"40 O.B." (Old Building).

Ewing's appointment was one of the most judicious ever made at the
Admiralty. While battles raged at the front and at sea, this frail,
slightly-built man, with his enormous head, bushy eyebrows, and dark
piercing eyes, tranquilly seated in his peaceful office at the Admiralty
listening attentively, learned through intercepted and decoded messages
what the next moves of the enemy would be. Even though the Germans
constantly invented new codes or scrambled up and combined existing
ones, he and the men working under him were always able to solve their
mystery.

The existence of the British Cryptographic Service was one of the
most jealously guarded secrets of the war. Even some of the British
Cabinet Ministers did not know of its existence, and many a member
of the Admiralty never heard of it until long afterwards. But those who
were in the know realized that it contributed largely to the ultimate
victory of the Allies. The public for the first time heard of it in 1925
when Sir Alfred Ewing caused a sensation by referring to it in an
address which he gave at the University of Edinburgh. Shortly after-
wards. Lord Balfour made the following declaration: "The country
owes *40 O.B.' an immense debt of gratitude, a debt which, for the
moment at least, cannot be paid. Secrecy was an essential part of the
work, and never was a secret better guarded."

There are hundreds of code and cipher systems, some of which arc
simple, others so complex as to tax the uttermost ingenuity of the
cryptographer. Some are based on a verse or prose passage, or on an
intricate combination of numbers, others are as elementary as the
prearranged interchange of the letters of the alphabet. Some require the
use of ponderous code books; others, in order to prevent their falling

154 THE ENEMY WITHIN

into the hands of the enemy, can be committed to memory. The skilled
cryptographer must take most of these in his stride.

Cryptography alone, however, could not possibly unravel the secrets
of all the German coded messages w^hich crov^ded both the air and
other channels of communication. The larger codes are in the form of a
dictionary, with a group of five or six numbers to represent each word
or phrase. As each group of figures is chosen arbitrarily, there is no
means of deciphering such a code unless the actual code book or a copy
of it is used. As many of the German coded messages were based on the
larger codes, "40 O.B.'* could therefore never have achieved its bril-
liant success had not many of these codes, by some means or other,
fallen into the hands of the British. The difficult task of acquiring them
devolved on the British Naval Intelligence Service.

In October 1914 Captain W. R. Hall, who later was knighted and
promoted to the rank of admiral, took over from Admiral Sir Henry
Oliver the direction of the Naval Intelligence Service. Sir Reginald, or
"Blinker" Hall, as he was affectionately known to his intimates, was
splendidly endowed for this work. The following estimate of him
made by Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in London, in
a confidential letter to President Wilson in 1917, was no exaggeration:

Hall is one genius that the War has developed. Neither in fiction nor in
fact can you find any such man to match him. Of the wonderful things that
I know he has done there are several that it would take an exciting volume
to tell. The man is a genius — a clear case of genius. All other Secret Service

men are amateurs by comparison 1 shall never meet another man like

him : that were too much to expect.

Apart from Hall's intimate experience and knowledge of everything
pertaining to secret service, he was an uncanny judge of character. One
glance was sufficient for him to sum a man up. It was thus that he
immediately gauged the qualities of Ewing, chosen by his predecessor,
and promptly gave him carte blanche in the running of "40 O.B." The
rest of his staff was chosen and handled with equal perception. He
also had a remarkable ability in cross-examination, which proved the
downfall of many a suspected German spy who was snared in the net
he laid for him. However watertight their story, as Horst von der Goltz

THE SECRETS OF 4O O.B. I55

and von Rintelen found when they had to face him in 191 5, he in-
tuitively picked out the flaws in their aHbis or defenses. "He can see
through your very immortal soul. What eyes the man has got!" was
the despairing remark of one of his victims. But it was the acquiring
of German codes which was Sir Reginald's special vocation. Under his
expert guidance and planning some were stolen by his daring agents;
some were recovered from sunken German submarines and warships;
others were captured by the British forces in various parts of the world.
Although the British diplomatic and fighting services knew nothing
about "40 O.B.," yet, as if attracted by a magnet, all information ac-
quired by them pertaining to German codes found its way to Hall.
His net was spun so finely that nothing missed him. To illustrate his
methods we will tell how three of the many codes which fell into his
hands were obtained.

A few hours after the German occupation of Brussels, the powerful
wireless station at the Belgian capital had been converted to German
use. As the intercepted messages started coming in to "40 O.B.," it be-
came immediately evident to Sir Alfred Ewing that the Germans at the
Brussels station were making extensive use of one of their large diplo-
matic codes. Many of the messages defied the efforts of some of his best
cryptographers.

British agents, recruited from amongst the Belgians who remained
behind in the occupied territory, were sending a steady stream of spy
reports through to Holland. Here, then, was as good a field as any in
which to attempt to secure possession of one of the larger German
codes. H.523, one of the best of the British agents, was charged with the
mission. Careful observation and inquiry by him yielded results. He
discovered that the German coding staff was located in the Kom-
mandantur in Brussels and that it was composed of four coding clerks,
one of whom was an Austrian, Alexander Szek, a brilliant young en-
gineer, born in Croydon, a suburb of London, whose father had moved
with him to Brussels several years before the war. Immediately after
the occupation of Belgium, the German and Austrian authorities had
called to the colors all their nationals of military age residing in the
territory, and young Szek had been one of them. His knowledge of
the French language and of Brussels had won for him an assignment

156 THE ENEMY WITHIN

in the German counter-espionage service, and from there, in the course
of time, he had been transferred as a coding clerk to the Komman-
dantur.

On receipt of agent H.523's report, the British Secret Service was
quick to seize on the point that Szek was born in London. A check-up
of aHens registered in Croydon revealed that Szek had a sister still
living there, that she was employed as a governess in an English family,
and that, as in the case of so many Austrians, she was violently anti-
German. It was not difficult, therefore, to persuade her to write a letter
to her brother on fine tissue paper urging him to aid the British by
securing for them the code. Her letter was handed to H.523 on one of
his periodical trips across the frontier into Holland.

To approach Szek directly was a dangerous and delicate undertak-
ing, but H.523 was skilled in the right methods of approach. After
winning Szek's confidence by giving him news of his sister, H.523
finally handed him her letter. At first Szek was afraid, but after
considerable persuasion he eventually fell in with H.523's plans. Szek's
first thought was to steal the code, but H.523 quickly pointed out to
him that this would defeat their object, as the Germans would im-
mediately change it. And so Szek set about the laborious task of secretly
copying the code during his hours of service. This took him several
months, since he could only do the copying during the odd moments
he was left alone in the coding room during the luncheon hour. Finally,
however, in April 1915 the task was completed. But to H.523's dismay
Szek refused to give him the code. He insisted instead on escaping
across the frontier with it to Holland. In vain H.523 pleaded with him
that his flight would arouse the suspicion of the Germans that the code
had been copied. But Szek was adamant; he had just received confi-
dential information that he was about to be transferred to the front;
and from the firing line, above all, he wished to escape. Therefore,
early in April 1915 on a moonless night, the two of them set out for the
Belgian-Dutch, frontier.

It was the period just after the Germans had completed their for-
midable barrier along the Belgian-Dutch border to prevent the pas-
sage of spy reports and to put a stop to the flow of refugees escaping
across the border to join the Belgian Army. A high-voltage electric

> >

THE SECRETS OF 4O O.B. I57

fence, eight feet high, sentries every hundred yards, searchlights, police
dogs, a horde of secret service police, and mounted patrols covered the
length of the frontier. Arriving near the border, Szek began to regret
his decision. The danger v^as as real as being in the trenches. He was
now glad to get rid of the compromising copy of the code by handing
it to H.523.

Equipped with India rubber gloves and socks to enable them to cross
the high-tension electric fence, the two men, crouched in the long
grass, awaiting the moment when the sentry near them would reach
the point on his beat farthest away from them. But their wait was cut
short, a police dog started barking, the alarm was given, the search-
lights were switched on, and the sentry started shooting. H.523, ex-
perienced in crossing the high-voltage electric fence, made a dash for
the border and succeeded in getting across, but Szek turned back and
tried to escape. H.523 brought the code to Colonel Oppenheim, the
British Military Attache at The Hague; and in due course it was for-
warded to Sir Reginald Hall. What happened to Szek will ever remain
one of the mysteries of the war.

Szek's father, who lived with him in the rue du Lombard, in Brus-
sels, never heard of his son again. He was convinced that his son got
across the frontier; and when after the Armistice he failed to return
home, he accused the British of making away with him to prevent the
Germans' finding out that the British had a copy of the code.

After the war the author of this book was in charge of the British
Intelligence Commission, whose function it was to liquidate all the
British spy services which had operated behind the German western
front in occupied Belgium and northeastern France. In the course of
his investigation he came across some evidence to show that Alexander
Szek had been kept in solitary confinement in the Namur prison, that
he v/as tried by court-martial, found guilty of being a deserter from
military service, and shot. The author's informant was a former Ger-
man soldier who had served during the war as a warder at the prison.
This man, born in Silesia, acquired Polish nationality by the Peace
Treaty, and remained in Belgium after the Armistice. The author is
inclined to believe the warder's story — he had no reason to invent it —
but Szek's father refused to accept it. To him it was just another ruse

158 THE ENEMY WITHIN

of the British to keep the truth away from him. On the other hand, if
the Germans did shoot Alexander Szek, why did they not notify his
father? And why after the war, when the father made inquiry in
BerUn, did the German authorities inform him that they had no record
of his son's execution ?

Whatever the solution to the mystery, and whatever suspicions the
Germans may have had, it is evident that they were not aware that the
British had secured a copy of the code, for, except for a few minor
variations, it remained unchanged and in active use until the end of
the war.

For the story of the second code we must now switch to another part
of the world. One of the principal sources of oil supply for the British
fleet was the oil wells of the Anglo-Persian Company in Persia. These
oil wells, situated several hundred miles inland, were connected to the
Persian Gulf by a pipeline. The protection of this vital artery of supply
became a supreme necessity. The task was a difficult one, owing to the
length of the pipeline and the barren nature of the country through
which it ran. The whole length of it could not be guarded at the same
time, and the surveillance had to be entrusted to mounted patrols. Not
only had these patrols to watch out for marauding bands of Turks
and Kurds, who knew the terrain much better than the British, but
Persia itself was a hotbed of German intrigue; and, as was the case in
other neutral countries, it was overrun by German agents, who, in most
cases, were directed by some German official enjoying diplomatic im-
munity.

Wasmuss, the German Consul at Shiraz, was specially active, and
of this fact the British Intelligence Service was fully aware. In fact, so
well were they posted as to his activities, and so closely was he watched,
that the British knew several days ahead of time of a raid on the pipe-
line he planned to carry out with the help of Kurdish irregulars.

The date and the locality of the raid being known, an ambush was
laid for Wasmuss and his band of Kurds. It was a surprised German
Consul who found himself surrounded and forced to surrender before
more than a shot or two had been fired. Pleased as the British were
with their haul, they were even more delighted and surprised when
they discovered an important German code in the possession of Was-

THE SECRETS OF 40 O.B. I59

muss. So sure had he been of success that, with characteristic German
thoroughness, he had brought the code along with him. He had wished
to lose no time in sending through to the Turkish lines, for wireless
transmission to Berlin, a coded message announcing the details of his
coup.

The code was promptly forwarded to Sir Reginald Hall. It was the
German code number 13040. It proved later to be one of the biggest
scoops of the war, for it was possession of it which enabled "40 O.B."
to decipher the Zimmermann telegram.

Even though the Germans heard of the capture of Wasmuss, it never
dawned on them that he could have been so foolish and indiscreet as
to have permitted the code to fall into the hands of the British. Today
the code is still in the possession of Sir Reginald and is one of his most
prized souvenirs.

Several codes were also recovered from German warships sunk by
the British Navy. Of these the code from the cruiser Magdeburg was
one of the most important. Within a few minutes after a British tor-
pedo struck her, she went to the bottom, and only a handful of the
crew were saved. Days afterwards a British torpedo boat patrolling the
area sighted a floating body. It turned out to be the commander of
the Magdeburg. Buttoned securely in his tunic was the code book.
Some of the survivors later testified that when last they saw their
commander, he was standing on deck with the code book clasped in
his hands.

Such, then, was the organization which he had brought to per-
fection. Not only was there "40 O.B.," which was capable of mastering
every German cipher, but also Sir Reginald's network spread through-
out the world, which was able to acquire by theft or capture every
important German code. This combination of skilled cryptographers
and the actual possession of the large German codes enabled Sir
Reginald and his organization to decipher every German coded message
which came into their possession.

To pick up the German wireless messages, receiving stations were
erected at Lowestoft, Lerwick, Murcar, and York. These stations not
only sufficed to intercept the messages for dispatch to "40 O.B.," but
they served also as radio goniometric stations to furnish bearings

l6o THE ENEMY WITHIN

for triangulating the position of any German vessel using its wireless.

Not satisfied with intercepting every German wireless message which
flashed through the air, agents were actively employed in all neutral
countries to secure copies of coded telegrams and cables sent out by
German diplomatic representatives over neutral telegraph and cable
lines. This was specially necessary in the case of the messages which
passed back and forth between von Bernstorff and Berlin; for, as we
shall see, not all of them by any means were sent through radio stations.

Long before the war Germany had seen the necessity of establishing
a complete wireless system throughout the world. In accordance with
this plan she had in 1911 erected a wireless station at Sayville, Long
Island. This foresight had permitted her throughout the first two
months of the war to have untrammeled wireless communication with
her representatives in the United States. But in September 1914 the
United States Government seized the station, realizing that it was be-
ing used to direct movements of German commerce raiders still at sea
and was thereby infringing American neutrality. At the same time a
censorship was enforced and the sending of coded messages was pro-
hibited.

German ingenuity, hov/ever, soon found a means of evasion. Receiv-
ing the incoming messages sent out every morning at 3 a.m. from the
powerful German station at Nauen, near Berlin, was simple. Many of
the interned German ships, although forced to take down their regular
antennae, rerigged them in funnels or other places of concealment.
Several secret receiving stations were also erected in private homes.
The sending of messages, however, was more difficult. One method was
to use prearranged key phrases embedded in apparently innocent com-
mercial telegrams; but for messages important enough to demand the
use of one of their large codes they availed themselves chiefly of neutral
channels, especially those provided by Sweden. The Sv/edish Foreign
Office was notoriously pro-German, and German messages were fre-
quently put in Swedish cipher and sent to Swedish Ministers in other
countries for delivery to their German colleagues. Incredible though it
may seem, Germany also occasionally beguiled the State Department
on one pretext or another into forwarding her messages.

The British network of agents in the neutral countries picked up

THE SECRETS OF '*40 O.B." l6l

most of these cables, however; and even those forv^arded through the
State Department w^ere intercepted in London, as the cable lines from
the United States to Europe passed through the British Isles. In Hol-
land where the author was in charge of the Military Section of the
British Secret Service during the war, one of the British agents was
specially assigned to procure, through secret connections of his in the
Dutch telegraph office, copies of all telegrams sent to Berlin by the
German Minister at The Hague. Such a telegram, intercepted by a
British agent in neutral Chile and decoded by "40 O.B.," gave the
British Admiralty the information that Admiral von Spee and his
squadron were about to sail from Valparaiso for the Falkland Islands.
This permitted the Admiralty to draft the plan which led to the sink-
ing of von Spec's ships by Admiral Sturdee. Proof of the efficiency of
the British network was that the Zimmermann telegram was sent
through four different routes to von Eckhardt, the German Minister
to Mexico, and that the British picked it up in each case.

One of the routes was via the State Department and von Bernstorfl.
It happened that at this time the Germans were discussing with Presi-
dent Wilson the possibility of ending the war by a negotiated peace. As
these conversations were initiated by the President, he was anxious to
provide every facility for communications to pass to and fro between
Berlin and von Bernstorff. Therefore, he had instructed Ambassador
Gerard to forward German diplomatic cipher cables through the
American Embassy instead of insisting on their being presented in
clear for transmission in the American code. The Germans had taken
advantage of this situation and had merely tacked the Zimmermann
telegram onto the end of one dealing with the peace negotiations.

By 1916 over 2,000 coded messages were coming into "40 O.B." daily,
and not one failed to be decoded. Relying upon the secrecy of their
codes, the Germans were amazingly loquacious. They filled the air
with the most secret information concerning their army, navy and
diplomatic service, and all this "40 O.B." grasped out of the ether.
In addition most of the German messages sent over neutral cables were
also intercepted. The result was that the British had as accurate in-
formation about German affairs as the Germans themselves. To cite a
few instances: The movements of German warships were known in

l62 THE ENEMY WITHIN

the cases of each of the principal naval engagements; and in the case
of the Battle of the Dogger Bank, the British knew twenty-four hours
ahead of time which German warships had left port and the times of
their departures ; track was kept of all German submarines, and a map
was kept on the wall in "40 O.B." showing the position of each one as
revealed by its wireless messages; the Admiralty was warned well in
advance about each Zeppelin raid; the activities of Sir Roger Casement
in Germany were flashed freely back and forth between Berlin and
von Bernstorff in Washington, and the British knew the exact day he
embarked by submarine for the west coast of Ireland, and thus were
able to lie in wait for him. The German confidence in their codes also
cost their Intelligence Services dear: the names and activities of dozens
of their spies were revealed in their messages, and this was the cause
of many a sensational arrest.

Not until after the war did the Germans realize that all their coded
messages had been an open book to the British and consequently to all
the Allies. They continued to use most of their larger codes throughout
the war, and even when changes were made, these were transmitted by
wireless in the old code; consequently "40 O.B." was able to listen in
and make note of these changes. Even the precautionary measures they
adopted were exploited by "40 O.B." For example, whenever a Zeppelin
started out on a raid over England, it left the regular naval code behind,
and instead took along with it a special code, prefixed "H.V.B." This
was in case it was shot down. Preliminary to a raid, each Zeppelin tak-
ing part in it radioed "H.V.B. alone on board"; this was sufficient in-
dication to "40 O.B." that a raid was about to take place.

But it would be unfair to Sir Reginald Hall if we blamed the Ger-
mans entirely for their blind confidence in their codes. Great credit is
due him for the tricks he invented to keep the Germans in the dark.
Again and again during the war he was puzzled how to make use of
his information without betraying the existence of "40 O.B." His in-
genuity in this was almost as great as the skill of his organization in
intercepting and decoding the messages. Even in communicating in-
formation to British staff oflScers of the Army and Navy, the source
was always carefully camouflaged.

The publication of the Zimmermann telegram by President Wilson

THE SECRETS OF 40 O.B. 163

gave Sir Reginald many anxious moments. The danger of publication
was foreseen; and strange as it may seem, the British kept the telegram
almost a month before they could bring themselves to communicate it.
Hall was prepared, however, when publication took place. He called
in a representative of the London Daily Mail, and when the interview
was well started asked, "Don't you think we have been slow to let the
Americans get a jump on us?"

"What do you mean?" the journalist queried.

"Why, the Zimmermann telegram," Hall replied. "Here we have
been trying in vain since the commencement of the war to secure de-
coded copies of German wireless messages, and apparently the Ameri-
cans have had no difficulty in procuring them."

The journalist looked at Sir Reginald with surprise, and demanded,
"What do you want me to do about it?"

"Publish it."

Still more dumbfounded, the representative of the Daily Mail
pointed out the impossibility of doing this because of the censor.

"Leave the censor to me," Hall replied.

It was only then that the journalist grasped Sir Reginald's strategy
and what was expected of him.

On the following day, under large headlines, a sensational article
appeared in the Daily Mail praising the ingenuity of the Americans in
securing a copy of the decoded telegram and criticizing the British
Intelligence Services for failing to do so.

At the same time. Sir Reginald's agents in New York skillfully cir-
culated a rumor that American agents had succeeded in securing a
copy of the telegram in Mexico City.

The German reaction was immediate. Hall was able to smile with
satisfaction when "40 O.B." brought him the following decoded mes-
sages addressed to von Eckhardt, the German Minister in Mexico City:

To: Mexico No. 20 21st March, 1917

Most Secret. Decipher personally.
Please cable in same cipher who deciphered Cable Dispatches I and II,
how the originals and decodes were kept, and, in particular, whether both
dispatches were kept in the same place.

Stumm

164 THE ENEMY WITHIN

From: Berlin No. 22 27th March, 1917

To: Mexico

Various indications suggest that the treachery was committed in Mexico.

The greatest caution is indicated.

Burn all compromising material.

These messages evidently greatly disturbed von Eckhardt, for he re-
plied in great detail and furnished evidence that von Bernstorff's office
in Washington was to blame:

From: Mexico No. 14 30/3/17

To: Berlin

Reply to telegram No. 22. Greater caution than is always exercised here
would be impossible. The text of telegrams which have arrived is read to
me at night in my dwelling house by Magnus, in a low voice. My servant,
who does not understand German, sleeps' in an annex. Apart from this,
the text is never anywhere but in Magnus' hand or in the steel safe, the
method of opening which is only known to him and myself.

According to Kinkel, in Washington even secret telegrams were known
to the whole chancery. Two copies were regularly made for the Embassy
records. Here there can be no question of carbon copies or waste paper.

Having set von Eckhardt and von Bernstorff about each other's ears,
Hall was satisfied. The more so since Zimmermann supinely continued
to use the same code. From the contents of the above cables it is clear
that the Germans had swallowed Hall's insinuated explanation that it
was a copy of the telegram in clear which had been stolen and that the
code itself was not compromised.

Many other ingenious ruses were employed by Sir Reginald to mis-
lead the Germans. From action taken by the British on information
contained in the German coded messages, it eventually became obvious
to the Germans that there was a serious leak somewhere. At all costs
Hall had to dispel any suspicion among the Germans that their codes
were compromised, or could be deciphered by an organization such as
"40 O.B." Two of his agents, both of French nationality, played an
important role in this work of deception. One of them was an Attache
at the French Embassy in a neutral country, the other was a member
of the French Secret Service. Both of them posed as traitors and sue-

THE SECRETS OF ''4O O.B. ' 165

ceeded in winning the confidence of the Germans. Apart from giving
the Germans information which the AHies could afford to let them
know, they would occasionally startle the Germans by giving them in-
formation about the most secret German plans gleaned by Hall either
through "40 O.B." or from one of his spies in Germany. On one oc-
casion the bogus traitors informed the Germans that Sir Roger Case-
ment had embarked on a German submarine and was on his way to
the West Coast of Ireland. (Hall knew that the submarine was at sea
and could not be stopped.) In reply to the frantic demands of the Ger-
mans as to the source of the information, all the two informants could
offer was that it was a most jealously guarded secret but that they had
been able to discover that the information came from a high official
in Germany who was in the pay of one of the Allies. Since HalFs two
agents were located in two different neutral countries and played their
parts with infinite astuteness, the Germans considered the information
supplied by the one as a a corroboration of that of the other. Des-
perately the German counter-espionage service attempted to locate the
arch-traitor, and as time went on offered a fabulous reward for infor-
mation which would lead to his arrest. In the meantime. Hall and
"40 O.B." calmly continued to extract Germany's most intimate and
vital secrets from her coded messages which flowed back and forth
between Berlin and the outside world.

No wonder Peaslee was speeding across the ocean to meet Admiral
Hall.

Chapter XVII
THE TRAIL GROWS WARM

After exchanging several telegrams with Admiral Hall, Peaslee even-
tually met him on August 27, 1925, at his London residence at 53
Cadogan Gardens. Sir Reginald had arranged to leave that night for
some grouse shooting in Scotland, and Peaslee therefore lost no time
in plunging into the object of his mission. He found Hall in full
sympathy vv^ith the American claimants, and so commendatory v^as
Admiral Sims's letter that he ended up their conference by saying:
"Copies of the decoded German cables are stored avi^ay in several tin
boxes in the basement. I sealed up these boxes w^ith instructions that
they w^ere not to be opened up for twenty years. You have caused me
to change my mind, however. I will open up the boxes for you. Copy
such of the cables as you think will be useful to you. Make yourself at
home. The servants will look after you." His rapid and sweeping de-
cision was typical of the man. Fortunately he was retired from the
Navy and was, therefore, his own master.

Hall took Peaslee down to the basement, spread the cables before
him, and took his leave to catch the train for Scotland. Peaslee found
over 10,000 cables, radio messages, and letters which Hall had inter-
cepted and decoded. Twenty-six different codes had been used in
sending these messages. Attached to the originals was a translation
in clear, also the "recognition group," or number of the code used.

Some of these cables have already been incorporated throughout this
book; and as Peaslee read them here for the first time he saw proof of
the existence in the United States of that vast sabotage organization
described in the preceding chapters and also irrefutable evidence con-
necting von BernstorfiF and his staff with these activities.

In addition it became clear to him that even if the sabotage cam-

166

A sketch by Fred Herrmann, a former
German sabotage agent, of the design
used in the German incendiary pen-
cils. The black section at the top
represents the lead at the point. When
this is broken the tip of the glass
tube is shattered and sulphuric acid
is allowed to mix with chlorate of
potash and sugar in the lower con^
tainer through a capillary tube. This
results in a white-hot flame's being re-
leased through the top. A pencil like
this may have been used in firing the
plant at Kingsland, New Jersey

Fiodore Wozniak—the Fire Bug

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM 167

paign had reached its peak in the United States, it had been directed
against every neutral country in the world — a campaign the magni-
tude of which was beyond anything ever before recorded in the annals
of international relations.

The following telegram, dated December 22, 1914, from the German
Charge d'Afifaires in Peking, and relayed by von Bernstorff to Berlin,
is indicative of activities in China:

Military Attache is leaving the day after tomorrow to undertake operations
against the [Siberian] Railway in person. He has furnished me with the
following report:

I. Traffic having been interrupted for fourteen days at the end of Sep-
tember and for eighteen days at the end of October by explosions on certain
sections of the railway, it is now necessary to have recourse to force, as the
line is closely guarded. I am proceeding with eight hundred [Chungchueses?]
through Eastern Mongolia in order to operate against the Nonni section
and the Hailar Tunnel, which will be destroyed about the middle of
January. . . .

2

3. I have entered into relations with the representative of the Russian
Revolutionary Committee for the Maritime Province, who states that all
preparations have been made for an insurrection, and that the prospects of
success are excellent....

Argentina, like the United States, was an important source of supply
for the Allies, and here German agents were especially active. On April
24, 1915, Zimmermann cabled Buenos Aires:

It would be desirable to render useless certain particular cargoes of
corn, an operation which can be effected, without danger to human beings,
by means of doses of Kokodyl, or Merkaptan contained in Gelodorat cap-
sules. Experiments made here have demonstrated that the capsules can be
made to look like grains of corn. They should for this purpose be mixed up
with the corn when the latter is being shipped from the silos. Two or three
capsules would suffice to render a hundred kilograms of corn offensive to
the smell. There is no result until the corn is ground in a mill. You should
report whether it is possible to get supplies of the above and to carry out
the project.

l68 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Not satisfied with destroying corn, German agents, under the direc-
tion of an agent known as Arnold, also inoculated mules and cattle
with disease germs. On January 19, 1918, the following telegram was
sent to Berlin via the Military Attache in Madrid: "Most Secret:
Arnold reports a constant transport of mules to Mesopotamia some of
which have been treated by him "

Then apparently the germ campaign was halted for a time, for on
February 2, 1918, Arnold telegraphed to Berlin, through the Military
Attache in Madrid, asking for permission to recommence operations:

For the Supreme Command.

Berlin Tel. 19177 of September 12: Decision for Arnold as to cattle and corn.

As this decision was not made, and a female agent of the Naval Attache,
who had brought the cultures to Buenos Aires had fallen under suspicion
in the meantime, I instructed the person in question to abandon this line
of work, which has hitherto been very successful, and which he regards as
relatively free from risk.

I request a decision.

He asks for the Iron Cross for his most valuable collaborator, Dr.
Herman Fischer.

Military Attache

To this there was a reply from Berlin on February 11, 1918:

Please instruct Arnold to continue his successful activity against cattle.

His work directed against grain is to be suppressed as it promises little
success.

If it is possible to do so without attracting attention, please send personal
details as to Fischer.

General Staff

On February 14, 1918, the Military Attache in Madrid telegraphed
Berlin:

Instructions in accordance with Tel. 23357 of February loth were sent
telegraphically. The person in question reports that owing to his work
the export of horses to France and Italy has for the time being completely
ceased. Since September four ships with 5,400 mules started for Meso-
potamia; all were thoroughly treated

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM 169

Towards the end of February 1918, Arnold, as is evidenced by the
following telegram, sent one of his agents to the United States:

From: Madrid

To: Berlin February 28, 1918

Arnold has dispatched a confidential agent Julio Rico * to the States and
requests that the Military Attache at Stockholm should be informed that
this confidential agent will perhaps announce himself as dispatched by
Miller of Buenos Aires.

This was six weeks before the mysterious influenza epidemic which
carried off thousands of American soldiers broke out in the military
camps in the United States. Although there is no evidence that Ger-
many was responsible, yet in view of the above telegram and the one
which follows there is room for conjecture:

Most Secret

From: Madrid

To: Berlin August 22, 1918

Donhoff has sent some remarks of the Director of the Bacteriological
Institute at Buenos Aires, Dr. Kraus, concerning the prevention of serum
diseases by the substitution or admixture of horse serum with bovine serum.

Kraus comes to the following conclusions which have been tested in
practice :

1. If bovine serum is heated twice 56° (half an hour) it causes hardly
any serum disease even if administered in very large quantities (300 cases
of anthrax, 40 of typhus).

2. The diphtheria and tetanus serum obtained from cattle causes hardly
any serum disease in cases of diphtheria and tetanus in man.

3. If a preliminary injection of diphtheria bovine serum is made, a sub-
cutaneous injection without running any risk of producing serum disease.
If the procedure is reversed serum disease occurs.

The names of the other agents who carried on in the United States
an extensive campaign of inoculating livestock with glanders and
anthrax have already been revealed. Although these particular agents
confined their activities to animals, there is a cryptic entry in von

* Julio Rico was subsequendy arrested in the United States for poisoning
mules.

170 THE ENEMY WITHIN

IgePs account book which needs explaining — it showed an expenditure
up to November 30, 1915, of $82,109.08 for a consignment of tetanus
germs. No explanation has ever been forthcoming.

Other neutral South American nations were not exempted from Ger-
many's activities. On January 27, 1918, Madrid telegraphed Berlin:

I have received a cipher message dated December 17th [1917] from the
Legation, Caracas [Venezuela], with contents as follows:

The agent at Curasao resigned his appointment in April, 1917, on account
of the sharp watch kept on his activities . . . could not be made use of. As
it was impossible to replace him by a suitable person, the secret material
including that which has lately arrived will be kept here.

Two other points of interest were brought to light : There were sev-
eral telegrams to show that during the neutrality period the Germans
had shipped bomb and incendiary devices to their agents in the United
States in consignments of Swiss toys. There was also the following tele-
gram to show that the Military Intelligence Center in New York was
moved to Havana, Cuba, shortly before the United States entered the
war:

From: Havana

To: Rio de Janeiro 31st [ ?] February, 1917.

...New York Intelligence Center has been transferred to Havana. Send
next telegram via Buenos Aires.

Naval Representative

As interesting as these telegrams were to Peaslee, there were others
that riveted his attention even more closely. They contained not only the
names of German sabotage agents already known to him; but what
was still more important those of dozens hitherto unmentioned, who
had operated with impunity in the United States during the neutrality
period, and had later escaped to Mexico. He also noted innumerable
clues which, he realized, would solve the mysteries of Black Tom and
Kingsland if followed up. These radiograms and cables he copied care-
fully.

By August 31, 1925, he had completed his work. It had taken him 5
days to read through the deciphered messages and copy nearly 300 of

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM I7I

the more revealing ones. Worn out, he returned to his hotel. He then
wrote a letter to Hall expressing his heartfelt thanks and sent him a
copy of the cables and radiograms he had copied. A few days later he
was on his way back to the United States on the Leviathan,

Jahnke's was one of the first names which had caught Peaslee's eye
in reading through the cables.

The following cable, dated November 12, 1917, sent from Mexico to
Berlin via Madrid and marked "For Antwerp," establishes Jahnke's
connection with Wunnenberg, and through him with Wilhelm, the
director of the Antwerp branch of the German Naval Intelligence
Service:

Kurt Jahnke, who states that he has been appointed by Wunnenberg,
alias Son Charles,* for secret service in U.S.A., reports as follows from
Mexico. Charles and Sanders are in prison in New York. With the re-
mainder of the money Kurt has established S. Service in accordance with
instructions which were brought by a drunken Danish Captain from
Switzerland. He cannot be responsible for the service in Mexico because he
cannot receive money from U.SA. Kurt asks for further instructions in
order to have a basis for Mexico, and asks to be informed in what manner
he is to expect his instructions. He proposes that a naval expert should be
sent to Mexico, as hitherto nothing has been done there in the naval line.

Von Eckhardt

Berlin was apparently waiting for the departure of a confidential
messenger from Spain for Mexico, for on December 8, 1917, Berlin
telegraphed Madrid:

If your messenger of December 21st is trustworthy please give him the
following instructions for Jahnke and the Legation. Jahnke is to get into
communication with the Military Representative at the Legation in Mexico
in order to operate principally against ships with S. undertakings. He is to
try and send an agent from Mexico to U.S.A. The messenger must if possible
take the [?W/T] Code as well as the Spanish covering addresses for letters
and telegraphic communication with Jahnke. As soon as a messenger arrives
in Mexico he should discuss the Mexican matter with the M.A. there.

* The code name of Wunnenberg.

172 THE ENEMY WITHIN

This telegram is of special interest, for it was on receipt of these in-
structions that Jahnke sent Witzke off on the mission which cul-
minated in his arrest.
A new leader then turned up on the Mexican scene, for on December

27, 1917, Madrid radioed Berlin:

From a conversation Delmar has received the impression that not alone
Jahnke is not self-reliant but that he is not entirely reUable. Therefore ... I
have handed the contents of No. 196 to the messenger for Captain Hinsch
especially as he is a German and also because he enjoys the confidence of
the Minister. I have also given him the new method of ciphering. A safe
opportunity of sending by post to Mexico only occurs once a month by a
Spanish steamer, leaving Coruna every 21st either by a special messenger
or a man belonging to the crew.

In a telegram dated January 4, 1918, Berlin concurred and wirelessed
Delmar via Madrid as follows:

The Admiralty has withdrawn the commission to Jahnke for sabotage
undertakings, and contemplates appointing Hinsch instead. As the latter
is already in service with you, The Admiralty agree that Hinsch shall remain
under your orders and shall be occupied in naval business in January. His
activities, however, must be under your control in agreement with the
Embassy.

Jahnke, however, had no intention of accepting Berlin's decision, for
he promptly took steps to enlist the support of von Eckhardt, the Ger-
man Minister to Mexico. How successful he was in this is evidenced
by the following message dispatched from Madrid to Berlin on March

28, 1918:

A messenger from Mexico has handed in a long report from Jahnke to
the Admiralty Staff, which represents Delmar and Captain Hinsch as [a
word is here apparently omitted] and as actually criminal and claims for
himself sole direction. He demands telegraphic instructions to this effect
from Nauen to the Minister. I leave to the Naval Attache who is at this
moment absent from Madrid the task of sending a more detailed report as
to the dispatch which in my opinion is absolutely shameless both in form
and matter. The dispatch was accompanied by a telegram for the Minister
for Foreign Affairs which the Ambassador will forward and which un-

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM I73

fortunately proves that the Minister who according to Delmar's previous
statements is easily swayed is at present entirely under the influence of
Jahnke.

Military Attache

The announced telegram from von Eckhardt, then followed: *

Cooperation between Jahnke and Hinsch is in consequence of their mutual
distrust impossible.

Jahnke's work must not be interrupted and he is therefore receiving
financial support through me.

In consequence of very grave discoveries I request permission to [dismiss]
Delmar, Hinsch . . . from my [Intelligence Service], approval to be indicated
by telegraphing the word "dismiss."

In addition, on April 3, 191 8, Jahnke cabled via Madrid to Wilhelm,
his chief, in Antwerp; and at the same time he stressed his former
success in the United States:

The instructions given by Lieut. Stephan to Captain Hinsch placing me
under his orders was a painful surprise to me. Acording to my instructions
from Son Charles, I was to work independently in the U.S.A. and Mexico.
I am accustomed to doing this. My successes justify the confidence which
has been placed in me. Dr. Delmar neither knows anything of my activities
nor is he in a position to judge. Hinsch has absolutely no organization; it is
out of the question placing my services at his disposal; and besides, Hinsch
has no experience, is incapable and tactless and works with characteristic
pettiness and personal spite.

The destruction of war factories and provisions in the U. S. A. is working
satisfactorily. Since May 1917 my people report as destroyed, the English
S.S. Clar\, Japanese S.S. Itfh [?].

I am now occupied in causing strikes and mutinies in the Army. Shall
I counter-order the steps proposed against Japanese steamers? Am I to
undertake anything against Japanese Colony in CaHfornia? The American
Pacific [Canadian Pacific] Fleet has now been organized ... and the service
is carried out by cruisers out of commission. They forward by sea thirty
thousand men who proceed to France every third week alternately via
Pensacola and Long Island Bay. I recommend submarine attacks on the

* The latter part of the message is mutilated, but the general sense is clear.

174 THE ENEMY WITHIN

American coast with a possible base in Mexico. In this event may I employ
naval officers in Chile?

Berlin now decided to retain Jahnke's services, and at the same time
corroborated the account of his successes. Accordingly, a fev^ days later,
Berlin informed Madrid:

According to Jahnke, detailed accounts of the successes mentioned appear
credible. His cooperation for the Admiralty Staff must therefore unquestion-
ably remain. A direct telegram from Jahnke has arrived saying that he
cannot work in company but must be independent

...Nothing is to be undertaken in Mexico by us until the arrival of
further instructions, in order to avoid disturbing political relations. Jahnke
should therefore only operate against the U. S. A. and Canada. With refer-
ence to his further questions and proposals, a decision will soon follow.

Jahnke finally v^on a complete victory over Hinsch and Delmar, for
on April 29, 1918, Berlin radioed Madrid:

Please inform Delmar in reply to your telegrams 1073 and 1357 of March
26 and April 13 respectively that Jahnke has been made sole Naval Con-
fidential Agent in Mexico.

General Staff

Although Peaslee had never heard of either Hinsch or Delmar, it was
obvious to him from the context of the preceding messages that they
were sabotage agents who had operated in the United States during the
neutrality period and had performed work of suflEcient importance
there to have warranted disputing with Jahnke the leadership of the
sabotage organization later directed from Mexico. He made a mental
note of the two names and then turned to two radiograms which he
had laid aside at the commencement of his examination of the mes-
sages, in the hopes that he would receive further enlightenment from
those which still remained to be read. In this he had been disappointed,
and therefore he slowly read through these two messages again.

The first one, dated April 12, 1917, from von Eckhardt, marked "For
Captain Marguerre or Nadolny, Great General Staff," read as follows:

Mexico i2th April: Where is Lieut. Wohst stationed? Has he sent about
$25,000 to Paul Hilken.'* He or somebody else is to send me money F...

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM 175

86793 Quartalisen Hermann. ... With reference to the previous paragraph,
Hermann (a smart fair haired German with an Anglo-Saxon accent) professes
to have received from General Staff a year ago, and renewed in January
by Hilken, a commission to set fire to the Tampico Oil Field, and proposes
now to carry it out. He asks me whether he is to do it. Would it not be
well for me to answer that I am not in communication with Berlin ? Verdy
believes him and his companion ..,51158 Gerds to be English or American
spies. Request immediate answer. Most immediate!

To this cable, Berlin replied on May 13, 1917:

Hermann's statements are correct. Nothing is known of Gerds. Wohst
has been retired.

The firing of Tampico would be valuable from a military point of view,
but the General Staff leaves to you to decide.

Please do not sanction anything which would endanger our relations
with Mexico or, if the question arises, give Hermann any open support.

Peaslee was thus faced with the names of six German agents whom
he had never heard of before, at least five of whom had operated in
the United States and were known to the General Staff in Germany.
Who were Hinsch, Delmar, Wohst, or Woehst, Paul Hilken, Her-
mann, or Herrmann, and Gerds, or Gerdts ? The American investiga-
tors were determined to find out. They were on the point of launching
an intensive search for them when Germany made a move which com-
pletely halted their plans.

As far back as April 1924, Dr. von Lewinski, the German Agent,
had indicated to the American claimants that Germany would be
favorably inclined towards a compromise settlement of the claims if
sufficient evidence was produced to indicate that they were well
founded. Thereafter, a considerable amount of evidence in support of
the claims was submitted to the German Agent from time to time, and
in the course of this he also received copies of the Hall cables.

Shortly after receipt of these cables. Dr. von Lewinski suddenly
broached the subject of a settlement; and, although at the time he
would not admit their authenticity, it was apparent that he considered
the cables the prima-facie proof he had demanded. Accordingly, a num-
ber of conferences were held both in Berlin and in the United States

176 THE ENEMY WITHIN

at which active negotiations were carried on between von Lewinski,
Peaslee, and Bonynge, the American Agent. The basis of the settlement
proposed by von Lewinski was $18,000,000 in full payment of the
claims, an amount which at that time represented about 50 per cent
of the Black Tom and Kingsland claims. He also stipulated that such a
settlement was not to be interpreted in any way as an admission of
guilt on the part of Germany.

For no valid reason, other than that von Lewinski was always wait-
ing for instructions from Berlin, the negotiations dragged on through
1926. It finally became apparent to the American claimants that Ger-
many's real purpose was not to settle the sabotage cases but chiefly to
create a favorable atmosphere for the passage of the Settlement of War
Claims Act. The plans for the enactment of this act were launched in
December 1925. The Act was to provide for the release of a certain por-
tion of the German property seized in the United States during the
war and for the creation out of the remainder of a fund for the pay-
ment of American claims against Germany. Germany's interest in the
passage of this Act was borne out by the fact that von Lewinski now
produced a draft agreement for the consideration of the American
Agent, one of the conditions of which was that the compromise settle-
ment should be conditional upon the release by the United States of
German sequestrated property. Needless to say, the United States took
the unequivocal position that it could make no such agreement until
action had been taken by Congress.

In the meantime, considerable pressure was being put on Congress
by those American companies and citizens who had already received
awards on their claims. Decisions had already been handed down on
more than 90 per cent of the claims filed with the Mixed Claims Com-
mission, and no payment could be made on these awards until Con-
gress had agreed on a plan for the establishment of a fund out of the
sequestrated German property. Germany was also exerting every form
of influence, since the value of the seized property was far in excess of
the total amount of the claims. Dr. Kiesselbach, the German Commis-
sioner on the Mixed Claims Commission, even went so far as to appear
in person before the Ways and Means Committee to state his point of
view. How much the passage of the Act meant to Germany can be

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM I77

gauged from the fact that, although Dr. Kiesselbach was careful to ex-
plain to the Committee that he was appearing before it unofficially
and without fee, later certain German private companies which had
benefited by the Act presented him with 500,000 reichsmarks (about
$100,000) after the passage of the Act in March 1928.

By the Settlement of War Claims Act the German Special Deposit
Account of $180,000,000 was created partly out of German funds and
property sequestrated here during the war and partly from a special
appropriation voted by Congress. Of this, all but $20,000,000 has been
paid out in awards. And as the Black Tom and Kingsland claims, prin-
cipal plus interest, calculated to September 17, 1936, amount to $50,-
145,145.55,'^ the balance, in the event of a verdict's being handed down
in favor of the American claimants, will have to be settled out of the
remainder of the Special Deposit Account, and for any deficiency the
American claimants must look to the German bonds, which the United
States Government accepted as a guarantee deposit when 80 per cent
of the confiscated German property was released by the Alien Property
Custodian under the provisions of the above Act. Germany, however,
has defaulted on her payments on these bonds.

When the eventual passage of the Act seemed assured, the German
Agent wrote, on January 19, 1927, to Mr. Bonynge stating that the
German authorities had reached the conclusion that the destruction
of the Black Tom terminal and the Kingsland plant was not caused by
the acts of the German Government or its agents.

The American claimants immediately realized that they had been
tricked. Nearly two valuable years had been lost, and Germany had not
only seen all the evidence which was to be used against her, but she

* SUMMARY STATEMENT

Docket Principal Claim in Full to
Claimant No. o£ Claim Sept. 17, 1936

1. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company . . . 8103 $9,921,730.15 $22,378,157.16

2. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry

Company, Limited 81 17 6,956,865.81 15,465,303.25

3. Bethlehem Steel Company 14901 2,070,764.53 4,670,545.70

4. D. L. & W. R. R. Co 8296 32,678.62 72,645.46

5. Black Tom Underwriters 2,095,903.26 4,663,372.17

6. Kingsland Underwriters 1,311,618.13 2,895,121.81

178 THE ENEMY WITHIN

had also won a breathing spell in which she could prepare her defense.
A lesson had, however, been learned. From now on the American
claimants and their investigators would be on their guard.

Following the receipt of the letter, the American claimants imme-
diately commenced the preparation of the memorials, or formal com-
plaints, against Germany, which they filed with the Mixed Claims
Commission on April 16, 1927, and April 26, 1927, respectively, on
behalf of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and the Agency of
the Canadian Car and Foundry Company. To these Germany filed an
answer shortly after; and, ironical as it may seem, in the answer she
acknowledged the authenticity of the Hall cables.

The American investigators on their part took up the fight with
redoubled vigor. A search was immediately set on foot to locate the
six German agents mentioned in the Hall cables, although not without
the realization that by now they had probably scattered to the four
corners of the earth.

Luck, however, was with the American operatives. One of the six,
Paul Hilken, was still in the United States, and he was not difficult
to locate — his father was the German Consul in Baltimore.

When first approached by Peaslee, Hilken was reluctant to give any
information. But the passage of time had weakened his ties with Ger-
many, and also he now had a son in Princeton and a daughter in
Smith, both of whom were thoroughly Americanized. Peaslee persisted
in his efforts to induce him to talk and eventually succeeded. In a series
of interviews three affidavits were obtained from him which, pieced
together, outlined the role he had played.

Hilken told how first he had been employed by von Rintelen to act
as paymaster in Baltimore for Hinsch and Anton Dilger; he then
graphically went on to describe in detail the interview which he,
Dilger, and Herrmann subsequently had had with Nadolny and Mar-
guerre in Berlin, in February 1916. He stated clearly that instructions
were given to them to start in on their sabotage activities immediately,
and not after America had entered the war, as Germany later was to
maintain in her defense before the Mixed Claims Commission. He
also related how, on his return to the United States, he had acted as
paymaster for this group up to the time the United States entered the

THE TRAIL GROWS WARM I79

war. He revealed also that Anton Dilger and Delmar were one and the
same person, and he gave a clue which enabled the American investi-
gators to locate Edward Felton. He was either unable or unwilling to
furnish any specific information about Kingsland, but he definitely
indicated that Hinsch had directed the plot which had led to the
blowing up of Black Tom.

According to Hilken's own admission, in addition to $10,000 which
he gave Hinsch out of funds provided by von Rintelen he had paid
out to Hinsch and Fred Herrmann for sabotage purposes close to
$60,000 out of the credits which had been arranged for him while he
was in Germany.

There was one payment of $2,000 which he specifically called atten-
tion to. As this payment has an important bearing on the Black Tom
case in that it was paid a few days after the explosion, it is as well to
quote verbatim the questions in connection with it that were put to
Hilken by the American lawyers and the answers he gave:

Q. Do you recall any payment made to Hinsch at about the time of the
Black Tom explosion?

A. Well, shortly after Black Tom explosion we met here in New York
before going to New London.

Q. When you say "we met in New York," who do you mean?

A. Hinsch, Herrmann and myself, and I remember of a dinnei: that we
had at the Astor at that time with Mr. Benjamin Loewenstein of
the Nassau Smelting and Refining Company, and Sir John Hamer,
who lived at the Astor, and through whom I bought much of the
nickel and tin which was shipped on the Deutschland, and I remem-
ber giving Hinsch a payment which I think was two thousand dollars
at that time.

Q. That was about what date?

A. That was early in August, 1916.

Q. What did Hinsch say he wanted the money for?

A. Well, Hinsch told me at that time that he had hired the men that
set fire to Black Tom.

Q. He told you that at that time?

A. He told me that at that time.

Q. Yes?

A. I remember perfectly asking Hinsch about Black Tom and his saying,

l80 THE ENEMY WITHIN

when I wanted the details of how it was done, "Oh, it is better, much

better, for you to know nothing about that." I remember that perfectly.
Q. And that was at this dinner a few days after the Black Tom explosion ?
A. I won't say at this dinner; I don't think it was, but it was right after

the Black Tom, within a few days after the Black Tom disaster.
Q. And that was in connection with a payment that you made of two

thousand dollars to him.?
A. That is my recollection.

Edward Felton was next located still living in Baltimore. Now, 43
years of age, he recalled his adventures clearly and seemed glad to find
attentive listeners. He freely confessed the part he had played in in-
oculating horses and mules under the direction of Hinsch, stating that
most of this work was done near Van Cortlandt Park, New York City,
and at Norfolk and Newport News, Virginia. He went on to say that
in addition to these activities he had also distributed circulars in Norfolk
among the stevedores there urging them to go on strike, that Hinsch
had also empowered him to place bombs on ships loading at Baltimore,
and that he and his men had set fire to pier Number 9 at Baltimore,
and to grain elevators at Canton, Baltimore, and Norfolk. Finally he
added that Hinsch traveled round the country a great deal, and that
he had seen him in New York a good many times. He also put the
American investigators in touch with another colored man named
Young, one of the band who had assisted him in his inoculation activi-
ties. On interrogation, Young corroborated the statement of Felton.

Chapter XVIII
A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA

In the meantime, In November 1928, Peaslee and Peto picked up the
trail of Raoul Gerdts. Hidden away in a long forgotten file in the State
Department, a dispatch was found reporting that on July 29, 19 17,
Gerdts had confessed to S. Le Roy Layton, American Vice Consul, at
Barranquilla, Colombia, full details of his association with Fred
Herrmann and had also furnished a description of the incendiary pen-
cils. The report was annoyingly incomplete, but it was evident that
Gerdts was in possession of valuable information concerning the
Black Tom and Kingsland cases. Peaslee and Peto took immediate
action; within twenty-four hours of receiving information that he was
still in Barranquilla, they were on their way to Colombia; on January
II, 1929, they met Gerdts.

Gerdts refused to give any information unless he was paid a fee of
$10,000, and as Peto and Peaslee knew he had been closely associated
with Herrmann they were in a quandary. Much as they disliked to pay
for a pig in a poke, there was no alternative. They deposited the
amount in escrow, and the bank paid the money over to Gerdts on re-
ceipt of his affidavit. Peto and Peaslee reported the matter to Mr.
Bonynge as soon as the money had been paid.

Gerdts then took up the story of the events that had happened
from the time of his flight from the United States. In February 1917,
when it was obvious that the United States was about to enter the
war, he and Herrmann fled to Mexico via Cuba. Hilken supplied them
with funds, and at the same time reminded Herrmann that he had
promised Nadolny and Marguerre the year before that he would de-
stroy the oil fields at Tampico, Mexico.

In Havana he and Herrmann had some trouble with their false

Mexican passports on which they were traveling, but eventually, with

181

l82 THE ENEMY WITHIN

the aid of a few judicious bribes, they succeeded in entering Mexico
by way of Vera Cruz.

On their arrival in Mexico Herrmann ran short of money; and as
von Eckhardt was incHned to be distrustful of him, he decided to send
Gerdts on a mission across the border to raise funds * The rest of the
information furnished by Gerdts was subsequently to prove of such
importance that it is as well to quote it in the affidavit form in which
he gave it to Peaslee and Peto:

I was ordered by Herrmann to go from Mexico to New York with an
order to collect $25,000 from Hoppenbergt and to bring the money back
personally to him [Herrmann] in Mexico City. I remember that the order
and instructions given to me by Herrmann were written in lemon juice on
a page in a book of poetry. The lemon juice made the writing invisible and
for that reason I did not know the exact contents of the order. The address
of Hoppenberg which Herrmann gave me was "Pearl Street, New York."
When I arrived there I was told that Hoppenberg had died the previous
day. In the same book of poetry there was another order, also written in
lemon juice, to the effect that in the event that I should not find Hoppen-
berg in New York I was to deliver the order to Paul Hilken, in Baltimore,
where I went that day. I remember that when I arrived at Mr. Hilken's
home and asked for him, a woman, probably thinking that I had some
business of interest to Mr. Hilken told me to leave the house immediately
and come back in about a half hour because at that time special investigators
were inspecting the house. I returned some time later and found Mr. Hilken
to whom I gave the page from the book of poetry. He went to the cellar of
the house to decipher the order and then told me that he did not have that
amount of money, but that I should stay at his home while he went to
New York to procure the money. Three days later he returned and told
me that he was going to send the money, but that another friend of his
who he expected in a few months was going to take the money to Mexico.
Shortly afterwards, a man was introduced to me as Captain Hinsch. He
told me that he was a Captain of the North German Lloyd that towed the
Deutschland to the harbor at Baltimore. He told me to go back to Mexico
and gave me a thousand dollars. The balance of $24,000 he told me he was
going to take himself. He asked me to tell Herrmann that he [Hinsch]

♦ See von Eckhardt's cable to Berlin, dated April 12, 19 17, pp. 174-5.
t Employed by Hilken in New York City as manager of the Eastern Forward-
ing Company.

A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA 183

was busily engaged in getting guns of 7.05 millimeters across the border into
Mexico which were to be used to equip a destroyer in Mazatlan, intercepting

ships carrying cargoes from San Francisco This was how I met Captain

Hinsch and this was the nature of my relationship with him. I have not

seen him since On my return on different occasions Herrmann spoke

about the desirability of setting fire to the tanks of petroleum at Tampico. . . .
One day Herrmann said he would give me $25,000 to do it. I refused this
offer and a few days later he discharged me, telling me that I was not the
man they wanted — My relations with Herrmann at the end were very
disagreeable because when I did not have enough money to go back to
Colombia he answered "Go to the devil."

Hilken later verified in full the part of Gerdt's statement which
dealt with himself.

Gerdts then returned to Bogota via Havana and eventually became
agent for the Sun Life Insurance Company, which job he held when
Peaslee and Peto examined him.

Gerdts's statement comprised some 10,000 words; but, as most of it
outlined activities which, with the exception of the above extract, have
already been covered, it is not included here.

As most of the information contained in Gerdts's statement was sub-
sequently obtained from Hilken and Herrmann, for a long time Peto
and Peaslee felt that they had paid dearly for it. Two years later,
however, long after the Mixed Claims Commission had rendered its
first adverse decision in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases, a new
piece of evidence suddenly came to light which, as we shall see later,
gave this extract from Gerdts's statement an entirely new importance.

While Peto and Peaslee were busy interviewing Gerdts at Barran-
quilla, they suddenly heard through Neunhoffer that Witzke was in
the employ of the Lagopetroleum Company in Maracaibo, Venezuela.
Neunhoffer's brother was a member of the Company, and it was
through him that Neunhoffer got the information.

All the evidence that Peto and Peaslee had had about Witzke up to
this point was either that obtained from other witnesses or what they
had been able to glean from the records of his court-martial or from
Captain Tunney's examination of him while in prison. At the interro-

184 THE ENEMY WITHIN

gations on which these records were based, Witzke had only been
superficially examined as to Black Tom. Attention had been focussed
on his general spy and sabotage activities and not specifically on any
one act of destruction. There were a thousand and one questions which
Peaslee and Peto wanted to ask Witzke. So eager were they to meet
him that they left Barranquilla before the examination of Gerdts had
been completed; and promising to return later, they chartered a plane
to take them to Maracaibo.

Fast as they had sped, and as secretively as their operatives had
worked, the news of their intended arrival had traveled ahead of them
— apparently the chartering of the plane was news in itself. To their
surprise, they found on landing that the whole town of Maracaibo had
turned out to meet them.

Witzke was easily found at the oflSces of the Company; and at
the home of J. Oswald Boyd, Director, to which they adjourned for
privacy, the interview was quickly gotten under way. It needed but a
few minutes of conversation, however, for Peto and Peaslee to realize
that Witzke's lips were sealed. He informed them that he had recently
returned from Germany and there had given a sworn statement to
Herr Hossenfelder of the German Foreign Office denying any connec-
tion with the destruction either of Black Tom or Kingsland. He
categorically announced:

That statement stands as far as Fm concerned to the end. Furthermore,
to say anything different would embarrass me in Germany. I have convinced
the Foreign Office that I have told the truth and the whole truth and if I
should swear to anything different they could charge and convict me of
perjury, and they would be only too glad to do so; and bear in mind that
this is a crime for which they could extradite me from any country and
condemn me to jail for five years.

On Peto's and Peaslee's remarking that any cross-examination before
the American Consul would be useless under these circumstances, as
his answers would not necessarily represent the truth, Witzke replied,
"Well, I've told you this much freely, so you can see how futile it
would be." He further added that he believed fully in the code of
honor of the German Army and Navy officers of the old regime and

A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA 185

intended to stick by it. He also spoke in terms of the greatest contempt
of all those witnesses who, as he termed it, had "squealed" on
Germany.

Although he refused to give any information about his sabotage
activities, he was affable and spoke freely about other events not
directly related. He showed Peaslee and Peto two decorations, the
Iron Cross First and Second Class, which he had received personally
from Admiral Behncke on his return to Germany.

With eyes flashing fire, he referred to Altendorf, stating that he had
once had him at the point of a pistol and regretted that he had not put
him out of the way then. In talking alone with Peto and "off the
record" he insisted that he knew nothing of who did the job at Kings-
land or how it was done; but he said Black Tom "was another matter."
He would say no more.

One point of interest, however, came out of the interview: he let
slip that he had handed Herr Hossenfelder, of the German Foreign
OflSce, the diary which he had kept during the war. Realizing at
once that this diary must contain valuable information, Peto and
Peaslee lost no time in reporting its existence to the American Agent.

Mr. Bonynge immediately, through the Mixed Claims Commission,
asked Germany to produce it; but once again he met with a blank
refusal. Germany declined to allow the American Agent to examine
the diary, claiming that Witzke objected to the production of the docu-
ment because it contained information relative to some of his friends
who might get into trouble if the diary were to come into the possession
of the American Government. In order to prove an alibi for Witzke,
Germany nevertheless filed as evidence a photostatic copy of two pages
of the diary bearing entries which showed that he had not been in New
York at the time of the Black Tom explosion. Examination of this
photostatic copy showed conclusively, however, both that the notes
made in the diary were not contemporaneous with the dates in the diary
and that some of the entries differed in respect to the handwriting in
which they were written.

In addition to this refusal to produce important evidence, Germany
also declined to make available for interrogation witnesses whom the
American investigators had now definitely located in Germany.

l86 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Hinsch * was being well looked after in Bremen by the North German
Lloyd. Willie Woehst,* a lieutenant in the German Army, whose name
had figured several times in the intercepted cables, and who was a
free-lance agent sent out by Section III B to assist Herrmann, Hilken,
and Hinsch, was located in Hamburg. Jahnke, then a member of
the Prussian Diet, had apparently come into money and was living
in a villa on the outskirts of Berlin. Von Igel had retired and was
living in an apartment on the Kurfuerstendamn in Berlin. Wunnenberg
was running a milk evaporating plant in Germany; Marguerre, now
residing in Berlin, had secured a divorce from his wife, and either of
them could have furnished valuable information. And finally, Nadolny,
who for some time had been German Minister to Turkey, was at the
beck and call of Germany. But not one of these would she ever ask
to testify or to produce his records.

Furthermore, although the German Agent at any examination con-
ducted by the American Agent had been freely permitted in whatso-
ever way he chose to interview witnesses produced by the American
interests, yet when the American Agent requested that these key wit-
nesses be made accessible for examination either by him or by the
American lawyers, the Germans refused to allow them to be inter-
viewed except before a German court and through either a German
attorney agreeable to Germany or through Mr. Bonynge, who was
unfamiliar with the German language. Germany's attitude in the
matter was summed up by the American Agent in his argument
before the Mixed Claims Commission at The Hague hearing in 1930:

Subsequently I received from the German Agent a notice setting forth the
procedure that would be adopted. Of course, it was apparent that if Captain
Hinsch, Marguerre and Wohst were to be examined in a German court,
the evidence would be taken in the German language. Unfortunately, neither
myself nor my assistant, Mr. Martin, is familiar with the German language;
nor could either of us conduct a cross examination in German. Realizing
that an examination of a witness through an interpreter is always unsatis-
factory, and is always avoided by the court, if it can possibly be avoided,
and especially that the cross examination of a witness through an interpreter
is exceedingly unsatisfactory, I endeavored to secure the services of German

* Both Hinsch and Woehst died recentl)'.

A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA 187

counsel, necessarily one who knew something about the facts in the case,
or otherwise he would be absolutely useless. I found that Mr. Ohse, who
was employed by some of these claimants on a per diem basis, was at liberty.
I first cabled to him to ascertain whether or not he was at liberty to act
for me in this matter. Upon receiving advice from him that he was, I made
arrangements with him to appoint him, as I have authority to do from my
Government, a special counsel for me in these cases for the purpose of con-
ducting that cross examination and solely for that purpose. The German
Government objected to having Mr. Ohse appear because he had represented
some of the claimants. If I thought it material, I think I could satisfy this
Commission beyond any doubt that it is not contrary to any procedure
before International Tribunals, and certainly not contrary to what has been
done in these very cases before this Commission. . . .

The purpose of the cross examination of a witness is simply to extract
from him, if possible, the truth, and I wanted to have the cross examination

made in a very searching and thorough manner That could only be

done, it seems to me, if counsel famiHar with the case and speaking the
language of the witness cross examined the witness. Germany, however,
objected to having the cross examination conducted by Mr. Ohse, and as I
could not, as the American Agent, permit the German Government to
exercise the power of veto over my appointment of a special counsel, I
declined to have anything to do with the examination of Captain Hinsch
or these other witnesses, and the result was that we have here only the
ex parte examination of Captain Hinsch and of Wohst and of Marguerre.

The almost beautiful coordination of the replies of these three wit-
nesses in denial of facts since established by contemporaneous docu-
ments to have been true is an example of the value of such an
examination.

The American lawyers had now located and questioned Paul Hilken,
Edward Felton, Gerdts, and Witzke. They also eventually discovered
Carl Dilger on a cattle ranch in Montana and obtained a confirmatory
affidavit from him concerning his brother's activities.

Their investigators in the meantime had been busy hunting for
Fred Herrmann. Two of his brothers, Edwin and Carl, were finally
found at Roselle Park, New Jersey; and from them it was learned

l88 THE ENEMY WITHIN

that Fred had fled to South America after the war and was now located
at Talcahuana, Chile.

As Hilken had overcome his original reluctance and was now, at
least to a limited extent, cooperating with the American investigators
in their efforts to collect evidence, it was thought advisable to send him
to Chile to persuade Fred Herrmann to return to the United States to
testify. Both Hilken and Herrmann were American citizens, and it was
thought that Hilken would be able to convince Herrmann that there
would be no danger in returning. (The United States Government had
given assurances early in the proceedings that it was not interested in
criminal prosecutions based on any evidence given to the Mixed Claims
Commission or to the American lawyers.)

Hilken accepted the mission and sailed for Valparaiso. His con-
ference with Herrmann is best described in his own words:

My ship arrived in Valparaiso on Thursday, January loth, 1929. At about
eight A.M., a man who gave his name as "Lemberg" came to my stateroom
and said that he had been asked by Fred Herrmann to meet me. [Herrmann
had been advised by Hilken of his arrival.]

Herrmann and "Lemberg" came to my room at the Hotel Astor in
Valparaiso between nine and ten o'clock that morning. Herrmann appeared
to be extremely suspicious and before engaging in any conversation with
me he searched my room, the closet, the bathroom and all possible places
where a dictaphone or where some witness might have been concealed, and
inquired as to who was occupying the room next to us. I assured him that
no effort was being made to trick him and that I merely wanted to discuss
matters with him relative to our previous association in the United States
during 1916 and 1917. Herrmann knew that I was coming and knew
generally the purpose of my visit, and I asked him why he had not met the
steamer. He said substantially the following: "Do you think that I am a
damn fool? That was an American steamer and who knows but that even
without your knowing it, someone may have had some strong arm men
ready to throw me in a cell to take me back to the United States and that
would be the end of it."

During that day, that is Thursday, January 10, 1929, I asked Herrmann
whether he would be prepared to go before the American Consul and make
his statement respecting his operations during the War. That he immediately
refused to do. I told him that I had been advised before leaving New York

A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA 189

that the question of his immunity from criminal prosecution by the United
States had been taken up with the Assistant Attorney General and asked
him whether, if he had full assurance that no such prosecutions were con-
templated, he would make a full confession and statement for use by the
United States Government before the Mixed Claims Commission.

Herrmann's replies to these requests were substantially as follows: "What
possible advantage is it to me to testify? I have only your statement that I
would be given immunity. My wife and I are Chileans and I never intend

to return to the United States "He continued that he had taken up a

thousand acres of land in Chile in connection with applying for Chilean
citizenship and in connection with the birth of his two children

In taking this position Herrmann was heartily seconded by Mr. "Lemberg"
who seemed to a large extent to be spurring Herrmann on to take that
position. . . .

I showed Herrmann the two briefs filed by the United States with the
Mixed Claims Commission in the Black Tom case and in that of Kingsland.
Herrmann read the briefs with apparently a great deal of interest.

After completing the Black Tom brief, he said, "Well, they've got the
right man, Michael Kristoff. Why don't they go after him? Why do they
bother me?" I tried to follow this up and obtain further information from
him about his relations with Kristoif. He declined to give me any further
information as to his own relations, if any, with Kristoff.

Herrmann also stated that he had nothing to do with the destruction of

the Kingsland property Herrmann admitted that he was in the service

of Germany during 1915, 1916, and 1917. He admitted that he had first
met me at the offices of Nadolny and Marguerre in Berlin in February,
1916, as I have testified; he also admitted that Nadolny and Marguerre gave
him instructions at the time of our meeting in Berlin in February, 1916, to
destroy munition plants in the United States, as I have previously testified.
Herrmann said — "Of course, I can always deny that." He also claimed that
he never carried out any of the orders. Herrmann admitted that he had
received various funds from me in the United States after his return to the
United States from BerUn in 1916. . . .

Herrmann later explained why he had both refused to return with
Hilken to the United States and to give him a statement admitting
his sabotage activities. His reason was that at the time he was em-
ployed in Chile by the National City Bank and he was afraid that, if his
participation in German sabotage came out, he would lose his job.

190 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Therefore he consulted the German Consul in Valparaiso and outlined
to him fully his sabotage activities in the United States and later
in Mexico. The German Consul, thereupon, advised him to see the
German Minister in Santiago.

On his arrival at the Legation, von Olshausen, the German Minister,
explained to Herrmann that he had already been in touch with the
Consul and that it w^ould be best to av^^ait developments.

A few days later von Olshausen sent for him and told him that he
had received a cable from Berlin concerning his case. When he was
finally persuaded to tell Peaslee his story, Herrmann claimed that,
after he had fully admitted to the Minister exactly what his sabotage
role had been, von Olshausen drew up for him a statement denying
everything and asked him to sign it. According to his affidavits, he told
the Minister that the statement was not true. To this the Minister re-
plied, "Never mind. Sign it." Herrmann therefore signed the statement,
though not in affidavit form. He also admitted that he later signed
several other statements drawn up at the Legation and that, although
on each occasion he informed the Minister that they did not contain
the truth, he was instructed to sign them. The Minister also promised to
finance him if he lost his job on account of the discovery of his
activities.

Just as he feared, a couple of months later the National City Bank
found out about his past and dismissed him. He then returned to the
Legation and reminded the Minister of his promise. Von Olshausen
lived up to his agreement, promised to try and find him a job and in
the meantime to pay him 1,000 pesos (about $120) per month to cover
his living expenses and those of his family.

But Peaslee and Peto were not to be put off by one refusal. Imme-
diately on Hilken's return, they got in touch with Herrmann's two
brothers, Edwin and Carl, and after a considerable lapse of time were
finally successful in persuading them to go to Chile to advise Fred to
tell the truth and return with them to the United States.

Fred was still afraid, however, but finally compromised by agreeing
to meet Peto and Peaslee in Havana. He sailed with his brother-in-law,
Mr. Aguayo, and arrived in Havana on March 27, 1930.

There Peto and Peaslee were successful in convincing him that he

A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA I9I

would not be molested by the American authorities; and without dis-
cussing his sabotage activities the whole party left for the United
States.

Immediately on reaching Washington, on March 31, 1930, Peaslee
advised Mr. Bonynge of his arrival with Herrmann. Before seeing
either, Mr. Bonynge also notified Dr. Lewinski and suggested a joint
conference of the two Agents with the witness. This the German
Agent said was agreeable to him. The conference was accordingly fixed
for 3:30 P.M., March 31, 1930, in the office of the American Agent;
and Peaslee was so advised.

The first thing that Herrmann said after the American Agent had
asked him if he knew anything about the Kingsland fire was, "May I
first have an interview with the German Agent privately?" To which
Mr. Bonynge replied, "Certainly. Dr. von Lewinski, take him to your
office and examine him if you want to, and let him say what he
pleases." Herrmann was to say later that he asked the German Agent
when alone with him, whether he wished him to tell the truth and
that von Lewinski replied in the affirmative.

The outcome of the conference, which was resumed on Dr. von
Lewinski's and Herrmann's return to the room, was that a direct
examination of Fred Herrmann was arranged for April 30, 1930, in
the presence of the American and German Agents and their counsel.

During the course of the examination Mr. Bonynge's main purpose
was to establish the identity of "Graentnor" or "Grandson," the man
with whom Kristoff had traveled around the country and whose name
Mrs. Rushnak's daughter had seen on an envelope in his room. For the
American Agent realized that finding him would supply a vital
missing link in the chain of evidence connecting Germany with the
Black Tom explosion.

The identity of this man of mystery was dramatically disclosed by
Herrmann in one of his replies. Mindful of the fact that, when Witzke
had been questioned by Captain Tunney of the Military Intelligence
about the German agents whom he knew in Mexico, he had given a
description of a man called Rodriguez which exactly fitted Herrmann,
Mr. Bonynge suddenly shot at him: "Have you not been known under
the name of Rodriguez.?"

192 THE ENEMY WITHIN

To which Herrmann replied: "Afterwards, I think it was three or
four days afterwards, I saw Captain Hinsch. That was up in New
London."

"Up where?" queried Mr. Bonynge.

"At New London," Herrmann answered. "I met him and he said,
*Hello, Rodriguez'; and I said to him, Tou are a fine guy.' What the
hell was it I said to him? I said that because he made a sort of joke
about it; and I said, 'Hello, Grantnor,' because he called himself by
that name; and that is a rather English name, and with the German
face on him, he could not very well get away with it."

To Bonynge's next question, demanding again to know what he had
called Hinsch, Herrmann added the explanation: "I called him
'Graentnor' or 'Grantner' or something like that. I told him he ought
to take some other name instead of an English name."

When cross-examined on this point, Herrmann explained that most
of the German agents had used aliases; that he himself had used the
names of Lewis, March, Larsen, and many others; and that Hinsch
had the peculiar habit of using the names of people he knew. He
recalled that Hinsch had turned up in Mexico under the name of
Harry Imwold and had also called himself Johannsen, both names of
men whom he had known in the United States. Herrmann further
added that on one occasion Hinsch had registered at a hotel with a girl
under the name of Fred L. Herrmann and that he had had a serious
row with Hinsch about it.

In endeavoring to find out whether Hinsch had been following out
the same practice in using the name of "Graentnor," or "Grandson,"
the American investigators discovered that one of the witnesses in the
von Rintelen trial was a man called Grandson, who had been asso-
ciated with the manufacture of bombs on the Friedrich der Grosse.

When Paul Hilken was questioned on the matter, he, too, confirmed
Herrmann's statement that Hinsch had sometimes used the alias of
"Graentnor." A more valuable corroboration was to come, however,
from a former German agent with whom the American lawyers had
no direct contact.

In various talks with Herrmann, Peto asked him whether he knew
any of the other German agents who were still alive. Herrmann men-

A JOURNEY TO SOUTH AMERICA I93

tioned a man named Hadler, who, he thought, was still living in
Mexico. Investigations were made, and it was found that Hadler had
moved to California in 1922. After considerable search Hadler was
eventually located in Los Angeles. Thereupon a message was sent to
him requesting him to come to New York and offering to pay his
expenses.

On his arrival, without having been seen or interrogated by any
of the American lawyers or their operatives, he was interviewed by
Mr. Martin, Mr. Bonynge's counsel. At this interview, Hadler furnished
an affidavit in which, he testified that from February 1917 until the
end of the war he was employed in Mexico as a German agent, and
that on several occasions he had heard Herrmann call Hinsch by a
name that sounded like "Graentnor."

In his own evidence, given during his examination before the Amer-
ican and German Agents of the Mixed Claims Commission, Herrmann
also testified that both in New York and down in Mexico Hinsch had
boasted to him that his agents had been responsible for the blowing
up of Black Tom. Herrmann stated that he believed him because, when
he and Hinsch had mapped out their sabotage campaign. Black Tom
had been on a list of places, the destruction of which Hinsch had re-
served for himself.

This discovery of Hinsch's use of the name Graentnor was the single
greatest step forward the investigation had yet taken in solving the
mystery of Black Tom. Victory seemed within the grasp of the claim-
ants, and they began the old game of counting their chickens before
they were hatched.

But there were still a few available witnesses left for the American
lawyers to interview, and von Rintelen was one of them. Some time
previously they had received a letter from him offering to come to the
United States to testify on condition diat: (i) no charge of any kind
would be brought against him in Canada or the United States; (2) his
expenses would be paid; (3) his life and accident insurance policies
now totaling $300,000, which at that time only provided for emer-
gencies as far as 15° west of Greenwich, would be reinsured: (4)
they would pay $10,000 "as forfeit fund to put me in a positon to wind
up pending matters and provide for some similar requirements." How-

194 THE ENEMY WITHIN

ever, on his being informed that any paymeiits to him would have
to be disclosed to the Commission, he refused to testify. In any case,
it is doubtful v^hether the American interests v^ould have disbursed
the sums he demanded ; for, although he had enrolled Hinsch, it is im-
probable that he could have throv^n much light on Black Tom and
Kingsland, as he left the United States more than a year before the
former v^as blov^^n up.

All of the sabotage funds which von Rintelen had left behind him
in the United States had been seized by the Alien Property Custodian
in 1917. Von Rintelen claimed that several thousand dollars of this
belonged to him personally. For years after the war he tried to recover
this amount from the German Government. It is also of interest to note
that it was only when Germany heard that von Rintelen was in touch
with the American claimants that she suddenly paid him $12,000, a
sum in excess of his original claim. It was Dr. Albert, who, as his at-
torney, secured the payment for him. In pressing his client's claim, the
Doctor made a statement that everything von Rintelen had done in the
United States during the neutrality period had been done with the full
knowledge of the German military authorities. Whatever may be his
reason, von Rintelen has kept away from Germany and has resided in
England during the last few years. And for reasons best known to her-
self Germany has never called on him to testify for her in the Black
Tom and Kingsland cases.

There was one person whom the American investigators would have
liked to examine and that was Anton Dilger. However, he was out of
their reach. He had met a sudden death in Spain during the last
months of the war. A week before he died he sent a message to Berlin
refusing to carry out certain orders issued to him by Germany and
marked "very urgent." Eight days afterwards a telegram was sent from
Spain to Germany:

Delmar [Anton Dilger] died yesterday. The expenses for his hospital treat-
ment and burial are being borne by the Political Section.

Military Attache

It was whispered that he knew too much. It was a deadly poison that
removed him— at least so it was later intimated by a former German
agent.

Chapter XIX

THE STORY OF WOZNIAK—FIRE BUG

We must now revert to the Kingsland case. Peto and Peaslee had
before them the reports of Mr. Cahan, one of the directors of the
Agency of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, who, as the
reader may recall, had conducted an investigation immediately after
the fire. The finger of suspicion pointed to Wozniak, but suspicion was
not enough to collect damages on; his actual commission of the crime
had first to be proved in a court of law, then that he had done it at
the behest of some recognized German agent.

And so, once again, the American lawyers and their operatives
started off by searching the records. In the process of doing this it was
natural that they should turn to the archives of the Russian Supply
Committee, as Kingsland had been working exclusively for the Russian
Government at the time of the explosion. Fortunately these records
were still intact and were stored in Washington, D. C. In this study
they were ably assisted by Boris Brasol, a former Russian lawyer, who
was in charge of confidential investigations for the Supply Committee.
Their search was soon productive of results.

Two letters were found from Wozniak, written in December 1916 to
General Khrabroff, President of the Artillery Commission of the
Russian Supply Committee, warning him that great negligence was
being shown in the manufacture of shells at Kingsland.

Further investigation showed that a few weeks before he wrote
these letters he had made application to the Russian Embassy for Rus-
sian citizenship.

Through Brasol General Khrabroff was located in Vermont; and on
October 17, 1929, he gave Peaslee and Martin a statement of which
the following is an extract:

195

196 THE ENEMY WITHIN

A few days after receiving the letter and before the fire at Kingsland— to
the best of my recollection it was the day before the fire, i.e., on January 10,
1917 — I received a further communication from Fiodore Wozniak in the

form of a postcard An English translation of the postcard, which was

also in Russian, read as I recall its wording, about as follows: "Things are
getting worse and worse with us. There will be a catastrophe."

About two days after the fire ... it was announced that a man wished to
see me. When this man appeared in my office he stated that his name was
Wozniak and that he wished to talk to me about the Kingsland fire. The
photograph attached to this statement, initialed by me, is a photograph of
the same man who called upon me at that time. Wozniak stated that he had
been under surveillance by the Police and that he wished to have the advice
of the Russian officials as to what he should do and say in order not to hurt
the Russian interests. We discussed with Wozniak the circumstances of the
fire and asked him various questions relative to the details of it. Wozniak
admitted at that time to us that he had written to me the letter and postcard
above mentioned. His explanations of the circumstances immediately before
and after the fire were not satisfactory to us and led us to beUeve that
Wozniak caused the fire.

We ascertained that Wozniak had made remittances of some substantial
sums of money amounting to several thousand dollars to his own order in
Russia shortly after the fire occurred. I remember that we questioned him
in our interview as to why he was sending these sums to Russia to his own
order. Wozniak said that he had no relations in Russia and that he was
sending money there to use himself later.

Among the records of the Russian Supply Committee a report was
discovered written by General KhrabrofI to the Russian Government
reporting the Wozniak incident. This report, written shortly after the
Kingsland fire, corroborated in every detail the above statement of the
General's.

Wozniak's application for Russian citizenship and his warnings to
the Russian Supply Committee prior to the fire were exactly like
Witzke's maneuver in applying for American citizenship and like
Jahnke's in warning the American authorities in San Francisco about
the navy yard explosion on Mare Island. In the minds of the American
investigators, it was clear that this was a clumsy attempt on Wozniak's
part at throwing up a smoke screen to conceal his real proclivities.

THE STORY OF WOZNIAK — FIRE BUG I97

A further startling discovery was made in searching through the rec-
ords of the Russian Supply Committee. It was found that Wozniak
got his job at Kingsland through the Russian Vice Consul Florinsky,
who was later dismissed from the Consulate for pro-German activities.
It was also established that Florinsky had been in contact with von
Rintelen and, therefore, presumably with Hinsch. Germany herself
furnished proof of Florinsky's interest in Wozniak by filing as evidence
a permit issued by the Russian Consulate in New York on April 26,
1916, permitting Wozniak to return to his home in Galicia, which at
that time was occupied by the Russians. On the back of this permit
was written in Florinsky's own handwriting:

No. 1719.

The Russian Imperial Consulate at New York hereby certifies over its
official seal, that Mr. Theodore Vozniak is personally known to this Consulate
General. New York — April 26, 191 6.

Imperial Russian Consul General,
By D. Florinsky, Acting Vice Consul.

Florinsky was also one of the many dupes of the Baroness Ida Leonie
von Seidlitz. Before her arrival in New York, on June i, 1915, she had
already had several years of experience in Russia in the employ of the
German Secret Service. Her passport showed that she was fifty-three
years of age, an Austrian by birth, that she had lived in Russia, Bul-
garia, and Germany, and that she was a widow visiting friends in the
United States. A brilliant woman with a flair for intrigue, she readily
fitted into the schemes of the Germans. Her arrival in the United
States was preceded by a warning from the United States Minister
to Denmark, Mr. Egan, to the effect that she would bear watching.
She was accompanied by a musician named Varase, who acted as
intermediary between her and von Bernstorff.

Her duties were to foster Irish plots against England, initiate peace
propaganda, keep Germany informed ahead of time of the plans of
official Washington, and not least to corrupt certain members of the
Russian Supply Committee.

She gained an entree among the Russians through her book, Russia
Yesterday and Tomorrow, the preparation of which brought her de-

igS THE ENEMY WITHIN

signedly into contact with them. Her attention was specially focused
on Florinsky, whose services she cleverly enlisted through one of her
agents, Tamara Swirskaya, a Russian ballet dancer. From Florinsky
she learned the quantity and nature of all munitions purchases made
in the United States by the Russians during the earlier years of the
war. Above all, she made his mind receptive to the plots of other
German agents.

During this period the Baroness was living in luxury at the most
expensive New York hotels, but with the departure of von Bernstorff
she lost her source of financial support and was soon in difficulties. She
was compelled to give up her quarters at the Waldorf-Astoria; various
judgments were obtained against her; and on May ii, 1918, the immi-
gration authorities took a hand and transferred her to Ellis Island.
After being confronted with her, Maria de Victorica later stated that
she had met her in Bulgaria in 1912 and "at that time she asked me
to operate under her for the Bulgarian Government."

The records of the British Secret Service produced further corrobora-
tive evidence of Wozniak's connections both with the Germans and
with Florinsky. A report turned up from one of the British agents,
Pilenas, or Palmer, dated January 9, 191 7, two days he j ore the fire. It is
perhaps worth noting that today Palmer is the director of a detective
agency in New York City and runs advertisements containing the
interesting phrase "the man who *broke' the 17-year-old Kingsland
Mysteries." This report was addressed to Colonel Thwaites of the Brit-
ish Military Intelligence Service and stated:

An informant whose information has heretofore been usually found reliable
states that Wozniak is in the pay of the Austrian or German secret service,
and is acting under orders to make friendly contacts with Russians in New
York, especially among the members of the Russian Commission, with a view
to finding out about munition plants. My informant further tells me that
Wozniak has succeeded in obtaining employment in the Kingsland, N. J.,
plant of the Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry where ammunition for
Russian Government is being made and stored. My informant states that
Wozniak got the job through the Russian Vice Consul, whose name he is
not quite sure of, but thinks it is Floretsky. As a blind, Wozniak has written

Paul Hilken, a Paymaster for Ger-
man Spies in the United States

Captain Frederick Hinsch: Was He
Graentnor, Kristoff's Brains?

Keystone Studios

Dr Paul Altendorf, American Secret
Agent in Mexico

The Spies, Fred Herrmann {at left)

and Adam Siegel {at right) in

Mexico — 1 91 7.

THE STORY OF WOZNIAK FIRE BUG I99

two letters to the President of the Russian Supply Committee in New York
about so-called irregularities at the plant.

We must now, for the time being, turn away from Wozniak to ex-
amine some other evidence which the American investigators again
uncovered among the records of the Department of Justice.

After the Black Tom Terminal had been rebuilt a man named Kolb
was arrested in an attempt to blow it up a second time. It was found
that he had been closely associated with one Charles E. Thorne, an
assistant employment agent at Kingsland at the time of the fire. This
directed the attention of Department of Justice agents to him. But
when they arrived to search his rooms they found that Thorne had
fled. But several letters were uncovered among his belongings. Three of
them were written by an actor friend of his, Carrol Clucas, who was
then playing in The Thoroughbreds, a burlesque musical comedy.

The first of them, dated December 27, 191 6, was addressed to "My
dear Thorne of Thistle Fame," and read as follows:

Thanks so much for yours of recent date. 'Smatter Pop, why the poisoning?
Only the Ententes are to be poisoned. How comes it a Deutscher gets
poisoned on Guinness Stout? Lay off that stufiF. I am a spy too. Now see! . . .
To have made the jamboree a complete success one "C. Williams" should
have been along! ! Mr. Fisher says he never can think of your last name. I
wonder if he suspects anything? Sorry submarine boat went down. I ask you,
where would you expect a submarine boat to go ? Up in the air ? Same thing.
Better luck next time. —

P. S. About what date will you be ready to sail on board the S.S. St. Paul
or other liner ? Important.

The second letter, dated January 8, 1917, written by Clucas from
Canada, contained the following excerpt:

Now I want to caution you about the contents of your letters to me when I
am in Canada. As you are aware, they are all censored, and don*t sign "Kron
Prinz" because I will never get them if you do.

A third letter, written seven days after the Kingsland fire is sig-
nificant:

200 THE ENEMY WITHIN

It was my firm belief that you were a victim of your own hand. Needless
to say I was surprised and deHghted to receive your letter this morning. I
cannot here tell you how concerned I was when the glaring headlines told
of the Kingsland disaster, nor can I tell you what my first impressions were,
but you can surely guess. I will be more anxious than you know to hear full
particulars and just how much your "Father" had to do with it! Seems very
strange to me that perhaps your little red book would impart valuable knowl-
edge! 'No? Oh! and by the way, where is the Deutschland? . . .

In addition to these letters there was also a sealed letter, undated, ad-
dressed to "Sergt. Braum, 59th Street Circle" and signed "Sergt.
Ehrhart." It read: "Bearer is a prospective recruit for regular service,
having served three years (3) in Prussia's (?) service. He is looking for
a special assignment."

Thorne disappeared from circulation. There v^ere conjectures as to
v^hat had happened to him, and for a long time a rumor circulated
that under one of his many aHases he was later shot in England as a
spy.

In April 1930 Carrol Clucas was uncovered in Mount Vernon, Ohio.
When interviewed by Peaslee, he admitted having written the above
letters and also stated that between June 3 and some time in September
1916, he and Thorne, who was then passing under the name of Chester
Williams, made four trips between the United States and Liverpool as
stewards on the St, Paul, On their last trip, Clucas recalled that Thorne
was ill on their arrival in New York and was carried down the ship's
gangway on a stretcher and placed in a conveyance waiting for him
on the wharf.

Clucas further testified that Thorne often intimated to him that he
was a German spy; and that, in a letter written to him about a week
after the Kingsland fire, Thorne claimed that the fire was the work
of German agents.

This statement of Clucas' was important, not only because it revealed
Thorne as a German spy but because it also fitted in perfectly with an
affidavit which had been obtained a short time previously from Edwin
Herrmann, Fred Herrmann's brother. An extract is quoted below:

THE STORY OF WOZNIAK — FIRE BUG 201

I remember very well Thorne and Carrol Clucas. They were friends of
Willie Wohst, and of my brother, Fritz. My brother, Fritz, used to refer to
Clucas as a ham actor. One of them was carried off a steamer when they
arrived on a stretcher feigning illness, and was met by a private ambulance,
the purpose of the plan being to take off the boat a supply of tubes or other
materials that were being used. I personally went to the steamer St. Paul
when Thorne and Clucas arrived, and which came in, as I recall it, at the
slip next to the 23rd Street Ferry on the New York side. . . .

These tubes mentioned by Edwin were incendiary pencils — yet an-
other supply which Germany had sent into the United States.

For some reason or other, at this stage Fred Herrmann concealed the
fact that he himself personally knew Thorne. It was established, how-
ever, through three independent witnesses whom the American inves-
tigators interrogated that Hinsch knew Thorne well and that in 1915
and early 1916 they had lived a few blocks from each other in Balti-
more. It is significant, too, that it was only two months before the
fire that Thorne got his job as employment agent at Kingsland.

Having thus linked up Thorne to Fred Herrmann and Hinsch, we
must now turn back once more to the evidence which Herrmann gave
when examined before the American and German Agents of the
Mixed Claims Commission.

Chapter XX
THE BLOODLESS BATTLE OF TUPPER LAKE

We have already described how after Fred Herrmann met Hinsch
they examined a list of factories which Hinsch had marked for destruc-
tion and that on the list allotted to Herrmann the Kingsland factory
was included.

According to Herrmann, after spending considerable time studying
the layout of the Kingsland plant he came to realize that the factory
was too well guarded and that it would require an inside man to do
the job. He accordingly consulted Hinsch, who had been carrying on
sabotage since 1915 and who had a large number of agents at his
disposal. Hinsch promised to study the situation. Some time later
Hinsch called him up at the Hotel McAlpin, where Herrmann was
staying, and informed him that he had found the right man for him.
They agreed to meet outside the Hotel McAlpin, and there Hinsch
introduced Herrmann to Wozniak, a workman employed at the Kings-
land plant. Herrmann, however, did not like the looks of Wozniak. He
described him later as a man with "a heavy, thick black mustache, and
dark eyes, looking sort of cuckoo — staring eyes." He was not sure
whether he could trust him. Consequently, he asked Hinsch to find
him another man. On the next day Hinsch turned up with a man
called Rodriguez, a Porto Rican, one of his agents in Baltimore. Later
Herrmann introduced Rodriguez to Wozniak and asked Wozniak if
he could get him employment at the Kingsland plant. Wozniak replied
that there would be no difficulty, as he had a pull with the Kingsland
employment agent. He was successful in procuring work for Rodriguez
in the Kingsland plant. Thereafter Herrmann met the two every four
or five days to discuss plans with them; and over a period of two or

three weeks he paid each of them $40 a week. Finally Herrmann

202

BLOODLESS BATTLE OF TUPPER LAKE 203

became convinced that they would be able to do the job and gave
them each four or five incendiary pencils.
During his examination, Herrmann v^ent on to explain:

I showed them how they [the incendiary pencils] worked and told them
to put them in an old working jacket or something like that, and all they
had to do was to cut off the top and put them in their pockets and take their
coats off and hang them up somewhere. I think that it was about two days
after the fire, there, I met Rodriguez, and I asked him where Wozniak was.
He said he had not seen him. I said, "I suppose that I'll have to give you
some money," and I gave him $500.00 — ^I am positive that it was $500.00 — and
told him that he had better beat it, and I gave him an address, which did not
exist, if he wanted to keep in touch with me. I had no idea of seeing him
again.

With this evidence before us we can now hazard a guess as to why
Hinsch greeted Fred Herrmann with, "Hello, Rodriguez." Was it be-
cause Herrmann had hired Rodriguez .f' Or was it because the new
man who took Rodriguez' place on the day of the fire was Herrmann
himself.? The identity of this new man was never established. When
interviewed by the American lawyers, Hadler expressed an opinion that
it was Herrmann. There is no evidence, however, to prove this. Most of
the records of the Kingsland plant were destroyed in the fire and with
them the name or alias of Rodriguez' substitute.

After the fire, according to the evidence filed by the American law-
yers, Wozniak fled to Mexico and there turned up under the name of
"Karowski." Later Wozniak was to furnish the Germans with an
affidavit denying that he had intentionally set fire to Kingsland or that
he knew Hinsch, Herrmann, or any German agent or that he had ever
been in Mexico or had used the name of Karowski.

But against this denial were the affidavits of Altendorf, Hadler, and
others, who not only identified Wozniak's photographs as that of a
German agent whom they met in Mexico in 1917 but also testified
that he was passing under the name of Karowski. Judge Fake, who ex-
amined Altendorf in 1920, produced a yellow slip of paper which was
handed to him by Altendorf at this examination and which has been
in his possession ever since. On that slip of paper, which gave the

204 THE ENEMY WITHIN

names of the various German agents that Altendorf had met in Mex-
ico, was the name of Karowski.

Herrmann testified that, during the time he was with Hinsch in
Mexico, one day towards the end of 1917 Hinsch told him that
Wozniak was in Mexico City and that he was going to send him
around to see him. Herrmann stated that he refused to see Wozniak
and told Hinsch to keep Wozniak away from him since, to his mind,
Wozniak was half crazy and he was afraid of him.

The American investigators had made every effort to locate Wozniak,
when suddenly, in August 1929, the Germans filed affidavits signed by
Wozniak which indicated that he was in the United States. Detectives
were sent to the address shown on the affidavits and were informed
that he had left just a few days before and had disappeared without
leaving a forwarding address.

Mr. Bonynge, thereupon, immediately applied directly to Dr. Tan-
nenberg. Counsel to the German Agent, asking for Wozniak's address.
To this there was no reply, and several weeks later, on January 10,
1930, the American Agent applied to Dr. von Lewinski, the German
Agent, asking for the information.

The Wozniak affidavits contained a lead, however. They estab-
Hshed an alibi showing that Wozniak had been employed by the Santa
Clara Lumber Company, at Tupper Lake, during August and Septem-
ber 1917, the period during which Karowski was in Mexico. It was
evident that both the Germans and Wozniak had spent a considerable
time in Tupper Lake preparing these affidavits. Therefore, the area
was watched. On July 5, 1930, Peto suddenly got word that Wozniak
had again turned up there.

On being advised of this through Peaslee, Mr. Bonynge addressed
a letter to Wozniak requesting him to appear before him for a cross-
examination and handed this letter to Peaslee with instructions that
he should see that Wozniak got it.

Realizing that Wozniak was being concealed from them, a force was
assembled. Peto descended on Tupper Lake from Montreal, and
Peaslee, accompanied by H. H. Martin, the Counsel for the American
Agent, advanced northwards from New York City.

Peaslee reached Tupper Lake at 7:50 a.m. on July 8 and was met

BLOODLESS BATTLE OF TUPPER LAKE 205

at the station by Peto, who reported that Wozniak had been last seen at
Shinnick's Hotel in the company of Mr. Healy, an attorney for the
German Agent.

On their way to Shinnick's hotel, a car suddenly turned into the
road and passed them going in the opposite direction. In it they recog-
nized Healy and Wozniak. Swinging their car around, Peto and Peas-
lee set off in hot pursuit. It was a neck-and-neck race for some time,
until eventually Peto and Peaslee succeeded in getting ahead of the
fleeing machine and blocking the road with their car. Thus was won
the bloodless battle of Tupper Lake, and Bonynge's letter was delivered
to Wozniak.

There are various versions of what actually happened — ^both sides
filed a lengthy report with the Mixed Claims Commission. The Ger-
man version was that they mistook Peaslee and Peto for prohibition
agents, that their unseemly haste was occasioned by fear that a raid
was about to be made on Shinnick's Hotel, and that Wozniak would be
held as a material witness. All of which, said Mr. Bonynge, reminded
him of Bill in Alice in Wonderland: "Something comes at me like a
jack-in-the-box, and up I goes in the air like a sky-rocket."

On his way back from Tupper Lake to New York, Wozniak in an
unguarded moment had a conversation with the brakeman of the
train, in the course of which he made some significant disclosures.
This brakeman, Louis F. Hyatt, subsequently furnished an affidavit to
Peaslee which read as follows:

On the morning of July 10, 1930, 1 was on my regular run on train No. 36,
leaving Albany at 2:45 p-^- The train was composed entirely of pullmans

except one day coach and one smoker A short time after we left Albany

a man in the day coach who had no hat and who had a long mustache
turned up at the ends, and a rather slight build who walked quite erect, mo-
tioned to me to come to him. I recognized the picture [of Wozniak] which
has been shown to me this morning and which is attached to this statement
on which I have put my initials.

The brakeman then got into conversation with Wozniak:

During this conversation he [Wozniak] took three or four newspaper
clippings from an envelope in his pocket, describing about an explosion and

206 THE ENEMY WITHIN

fire, which had his picture on them and I noticed the resemblance and asked
him was it him, and he told me yes that was him, but that he wasn't guilty
of it even though he was being watched and that he was ducking the ones
who were after him for it.

I asked him why he was being watched if he wasn't guilty and he said
that the engineer of the plant was the one that done it. He said that he had
notified the Russian Government that the shells were no good and that some-
thing was going to happen, and shortly after that this happened. He said
that an engineer in the plant had put a sort of mechanical pencil into his coat
pocket over his machine which caused the explosion and fire.

He told me had been up to Tupper Lake for about six weeks to look for
work and that he got wise there that he was being watched and he told me
how he had checked up on a man buying rubbers there; that he was sus-
picious of him and that he left there. . . .

I said to him, "If you're so afraid of these men why don't you get yourself
locked up?" and he said, "Well, they can't do anything to me, they're just
trying to get the claims for the company."

When he was asking about these men and showing me these clippings I
began to get suspicious that he was, in plain words, a nut, that was my saying
to the conductor, so I called the conductor's attention to him and said he
better get a policeman or something the man seemed to me to be a nut or
crazy. He told me, "No, he isn't insane or he isn't a nut, there is a man in the
head sleeper watching him and he isn't a nut."

Later in his argument before the Mixed Claims Commission at The
Hague hearing, Mr. Bonynge, in commenting on this affidavit of
Hyatt, stated:

In this unguarded moment Wozniak stated that an engineer in the plant
had put a sort of mechanical pencil into his coat pocket over his machine,
which caused the explosion and fire. Never before had he made any statement
similar to that, and, of course, that shows perfectly well that he knows that
there was a pencil that caused that fire and the pencil that caused the fire
was the pencil that was given to him by Herrmann, and given also to
Rodriguez.

Shortly after Wozniak's return to New York, Mr. Bonynge received
a letter from the German Agent advising him that Wozniak was ready
to volunteer as a witness and to give his testimony.

BLOODLESS BATTLE OF TUPPER LAKE 207

On cross-examining him, Mr. Bonynge quickly realized that
Wozniak had a prepared story and that in his general denials he was
backing up the affidavits he had already given to the Germans. To
judge Wozniak's reliability as a witness, Mr. Bonynge, therefore,
switched to the divorce proceedings which he had learned Wozniak
had recently undertaken in Chicago against his wife. At this Wozniak
grew very excited and in his replies revealed that two months after
he had given his affidavits to the Germans, he had committed perjury
in Chicago. In the sworn complaint that he had filed in his divorce
suit he stated that he had been living in Chicago for more than a year
preceding. Whereas his examination by Mr. Bonynge showed that he
had never been in Chicago before in his life.

In the meantime the American operatives had been investigating the
alibis that Wozniak had furnished. A man named George Prespare,
a resident of Tupper Lake, had given the Germans an affidavit in
which he had declared that on presentation of Wozniak to him he had
recognized him as one of the men who had worked in Tupper Lake
during August and September 19 17. Prespare now furnished the Amer-
ican investigators with an affidavit in which he stated that it could not
have been in 1917 that he took Wozniak up to the lumber camp of the
Santa Clara Lumber Company because in 1916 he had sold his wagon
and was not driving people up to the particular camp where Wozniak
claimed he was working. Furthermore, when shown six photographs,
two of them of Wozniak, and four of them of workmen who had
worked at Kingsland, he identified Wozniak, whom he had seen only
two months previously; but he also identified two of the other photo-
graphs as those of men who had worked at the Santa Clara Lumber
Company; and yet neither of them had ever set foot in Tupper Lake
in their lives.

Finally, Wozniak claimed in his affidavit that during the summer of
1917 he had quit work at the Preston Pond Camp of the Santa Clara
Lumber Company with one Alex Smith. An examination of the books
of the Lumber Company revealed that the only time Alex Smith
worked at the Preston Pond Camp was from January 18, 1918, to
March 25, 1918.

208 THE ENEMY WITHIN

With the investigation of these alibis, and the examination of
Wozniak completed, the dead line for the filing of evidence for The
Hague hearing had been reached. The voluminous records of exhibits
and briefs were crated up, and the scene of activities was transferred to
The Hague.

Chapter XXI

THE BURDEN OF PROOF

The Mixed Claims Commission met on September i8, 1930, at The
Hague to render a judgment on the evidence presented by Germany
and the United States in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases.

The Umpire was the Honorable Roland W. Boyden; the Honorable
Chandler P. Anderson was the American Commissioner; and the Ger-
man Commissioner was Dr. Wilhelm Kiesselbach. On behalf of the
Government of the United States there appeared: the Honorable Robert
W. Bonynge, American Agent, and Mr. H. H. Martin, Counsel to the
American Agent. On behalf of Germany: Dr. Karl von Lewinski,
German Agent; Dr. Wilhelm Tannenberg, Counsel to the German
Agent; and Mr. T. J. Healy, Assistant Counsel.

After making appropriate reference to the Peace Palace in which
they were assembled, an edifice dedicated by the donor, Andrew Car-
negie, to the cause of peace and the settlement of international con-
troversies by judicial tribunals, Mr. Bonynge outlined the charge:

That during the period of American neutrality, the Imperial German
Government, in accordance with the policy now admitted to have been in-
augurated by the Foreign Office of the Imperial German Government,
authorizing and directing sabotage against munitions and munition plants
in the United States, did employ, through its agents thereunto duly author-
ized, men who actually set fire to the Black Tom Terminal and to the
Kingsland plant of the Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Company.

He then went on to point out the difficulties which Germany had
set up in the way of the American investigators to prevent their ob-
taining information. He quoted the numerous instances of obstruction
and lack of cooperation which we have already mentioned in the pre-
ceding chapters, and finally stressed two specific instances.

209

210 THE ENEMY WITHIN

One of these related to the famous cablegram of January 26, 1915.'*
In his oral argument reviewing the evidence Mr. Bonynge pointed
out that the importance of this cablegram had been fully recognized
by the Umpire at a previous preliminary hearing in Washington. On
that occasion he had indicated by his questions that, in his opinion, this
message could not have been the first message relating to sabotage in
the United States because of the abrupt manner in v^hich the cablegram
starts: "Information regarding persons suitable for carrying out sabo-
tage in the United States and Canada can be obtained from the
following." He went on to state that on the motion of the American
Agent, the Umpire had requested Germany to produce all the other
documents preceding and relating to this cable and had indicated to
Germany, by analyzing the legends upon the cable of January 26, where
they might find these other documents.

Germany had thereupon filed an affidavit signed by Nadolny that
this cablegram was just a passing incident, a blunder of a subordinate,
that as a staff officer in the office of Section III B of the Great General
Staff he had allowed himself to be overpersuaded by a fanatic, Sir
Roger Casement, to issue this cablegram; and that the fact that this
cablegram had been sent through the Foreign Office was of no sig-
nificance, because in this instance the Foreign Office had merely acted
as a forwarding medium.

In response to the order of the Commission a document had then
been produced from the files of the Foreign Office which had been
there all the time but could not be found until the American Agent
had told the Germans where they could find it. This document was a
letter from the Foreign Office to Section III B — to Nadolny and to
Marguerre — directing them to forward the above cable. This proved
that if anyone had been persuaded by Sir Roger Casement it was not
Nadolny, but the Foreign Office.

Germany had then filed another statement from Nadolny in which
he said that after the sending of the cable "the Foreign Office took the
position that even sabotage at that time was not permissible, as Amer-
ica, in spite of its war support, which was contrary to the spirit of
neutrality, was officially a neutral country."

* See page 8. »

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 211

When urged by the Commission to produce the original document
on which the cablegram of January 26 was based, Germany had pro-
duced it. On it were found the signatures of Count Montgelas, one
of the highest officials of the Foreign Office, and of Zimmermann, as
we already know. The Germans next had filed a brief in which they
stated that "the officials of the Foreign Office in charge of this matter
changed their minds and came to the conclusion that they had per-
mitted themselves to be led into a blunder." The brief further stated
that "the cable of January 26, 1915, was not acted upon but was com-
pletely disregarded by the addressee. Neither does it make any differ-
ence in judging the reasons why von Papen disregarded the message
and why he was in position to do so."

Mr. Bonynge continued his argument by pointing out that one year
after Nadolny and Marguerre had sent the cablegram, and more than
a year before America entered the war, these same two men met
Herrmann, Hilken, and Dilger in the office of Section III B, handed
them incendiary pencils, authorized Hilken to pay out any moneys
that might be required, and ordered them to go back to the United
States as quickly as possible.

He then moved on to a discussion of Herrmann's relations with von
Olshausen, emphasizing Germany's failure to produce the documents
demanded by him relative to the interviews between the two.

According to Mr. Bonynge, he had demanded that the German agent
produce the cables between von Olshausen and the German Govern-
ment concerning Herrmann, the existence of which had been brought
out in Herrmann's affidavit. Instead of producing them the Germans
had filed an unsworn statement by von Olshausen, dated June i, 1930,
in which he had denied that Herrmann had confessed to him partici-
pation in the destruction of Kingsland, and had denied that he had
stated to Herrmann that "we have to shut an eye now and then,"
and had denied sending a cable to Berlin about Herrmann, but had
admitted sending a written report.

As Mr. Bonynge was about to continue after this recapitulation of
what had gone on at the previous hearings, the German Agent indig-
nantly intervened, claiming it was unnecessary for a diplomatic repre-
sentative of Germany to swear to a statement and that his word was

212 THE ENEMY WITHIN

sufficient. Then, referring to the cables and von Olshausen's written
report, he dramatically stated that he had them in his pocket but could
not produce them as they were in code — to decipher them would mean
compromising the German code.
To this Mr. Bonynge replied :

Nobody asks anything about the German code. I would not know what
to do with it if I had it. I do not want the German code. I want what was
stated in this message. They can have somebody decode it and have somebody
swear that it is a proper decoding of the message, if they want to be frank
and give all the evidence in their possession bearing upon this matter. The
failure of Germany to produce these documents is certainly to be construed
against Germany, and to be construed as confirming Herrmann's testimony,
rather than the testimony of Minister Olshausen, because as a witness he is no
different from Herrmann, except that we would give more credence to his
testimony if he were not referring to written documents.

I have never yet learned in my practice that when a man takes the witness
stand he is exempt from the rules governing all other witnesses because he
is an official, whether he is Secretary of State or whatever his position is. If
this were an ordinary proceeding in a domestic court in the United States,
and we wanted a document from the Secretary of State we would, either
through a subpoena duces tecum or by a writ of mandamus, compel the
production of the document. The Secretary of State could not protect himself
by simply going on the stand and saying, "I have read the document, and
the document states so and so." He would have to produce the document.

On page 3 of his report of June i, 1930, the Minister refers to telegraphic
instructions of the Foreign Office, dated February 15, 1929, which instructions
the Minister thinks were sent before the Foreign Office had received his
written report with respect to Herrmann's call about the middle of January,
1929.

It certainly would be interesting to see and to learn what the instructions
of the Foreign Office were which were drafted without the knowledge of the
contents of the Minister's report on Herrmann. Who was keeping the Foreign
Office advised with reference to Herrmann at this time in February, 1929, be-
fore the Minister had made any report at all ?

With the receipt of these instructions from the Foreign Office, the German
Minister to Chile first commenced, according to his testimony, to take an
interest in the Herrmann matter.

Why do we not have the instructions he received.? I think he tried to tell

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 213

us what the instructions were, but the instructions came either by a coded
message or came by a letter to him, and that could be produced and set at
naught forever the argument I am now making, if my argument is not
founded upon the facts. Yet Germany stands here before this Commission
and says that it has made an honest and a fair submission of all facts within
its knowledge bearing upon these cases.

Then in an argument which lasted for four days Mr. Bonynge pre-
sented to the Commission all the evidence which has been outlined in
the preceding chapters. In the course of this argument he also analyzed
the evidence which Germany had filed to establish alibis for Witzke
and Jahnke. His attack on these alibis is best given in his own words:

The first attempt to prove an alibi for Witzke was when evidence was
produced that on July 25, 1916,—! think that is the correct date— he made
apphcation for American citizenship. Witzke, on July 25th, four days before
the blowing up of the Black Tom, made an application for American citizen-
ship when he had no intention of ever becoming an American citizen, and
it is so admitted by the German Agent in his briefs. He must have made it
for some ulterior purpose. That fact goes to estabHsh that he was laying the
foundation for establishing an alibi. Then it was demonstrated that even
though he had made his application for American citizenship on July 25,
1916, it was still possible, having made it in San Francisco, for him to be in
New York fifteen hours, I think it was, before the blowing up of the Black
Tom. The attempt to prove an alibi by making application for American
citizenship was thus disposed of. It was a common practice, as shown in this
case, for German agents to apply for American citizenship. Witzke did it.
Wozniak did it just a few weeks before he made his dramatic appearance
at the office of the German Consul General in New York. It is proven in
reference to a number of the other German agents.

Having destroyed the attempt to prove that alibi, they then examined
Witzke over again and sought to estabHsh an alibi on another and a different
basis, although Witzke is supposed to have told his entire story at the time
he was first examined.

He was asked on that examination by Dr. Paulig whether he had any
documentary evidence, any letters or any documents that would establish the
truth of his statement that he was not in New York at the time of the blowing
up of the Black Tom. He assured Dr. Paulig that he had nothing. He only
referred to his notebook, and Dr. Paulig at the conclusion of that examination

214 THE ENEMY WITHIN

assured Witzke, with clasped hands, in a dramatic scene, that under no
circumstances would that notebook ever be disclosed to the American
Government

The only evidence that was introduced that has any bearing at all towards
establishing an alibi . . . was the letter which was addressed by Witzke to his
parents. The post mark on that letter is rather difficult to decipher. It is
deciphered by the German Agent as August 2nd. There may be some ques-
tion, as you examine the original, as to whether it was August 2nd or August
i2th. But assuming that it was August 2nd, what they attempt to prove is
that that letter, post marked in San Francisco on August 2nd, shows that
he could not have gotten back from New York to San Francisco after blow-
ing up the Black Tom, or assisted in blowing it up, on July 29, in time to
mail that letter in San Francisco on August 2nd.

As this Commission well knows the fact that a letter bears the post mark
of a certain date, when a man is attempting to estabUsh an alibi, does not
prove that he actually mailed the letter at that time. Somebody else may have
mailed the letter for him. That is an old trick

The only proof that the letters were actually mailed by Witzke on the dates
which the post marks bear is the evidence of Witzke himself. He does swear
that he mailed them on those particular dates. But I submit to you gentlemen
of the Commission that Witzke is an absolutely unreliable witness. . . .

He made false statements admittedly, under oath, when he was being
examined on his court martial proceedings. He then stated that he was a
Russian. He first said he met Jahnke in New York, and afterwards he
changed it and said he met him in San Francisco. Throughout that entire
testimony he lied from beginning to end

As to the new evidence to establish an alibi for Jahnke, Jahnke has also
been examined a number of times by the German Government, and has given
three or four or five different affidavits. In his first affidavit he stated that

he had told the sheer truth and all of his activities No mention at all was

made by him of the fact that he had ever served as a detective for the Morse
Patrol in San Francisco.

Jahnke was a pretty prominent man. He was the confidential adviser
of Bopp. He was receiving a very comfortable salary from Bopp. There was
no possible reason why he should ever have served as a detective at the rate of
twenty-five cents an hour and put in services during the year 1916, I think,

for some forty-odd days Receiving altogether according to the records of

the Morse Patrol — not the testimony of Jahnke himself— the large sum of
eighty-six dollars and some odd cents.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 215

What is the record they produce? They produce a record o£ the Morse
Patrol which shows that a man by the name of Jahnke was assigned to do
some detective work for them on different dates during the year 1916, in-
cluding a record that a man under the name of Jahnke was working for

the Morse Patrol on July 12, 15, 16, 29 and 30, 1916 That evidence was

introduced some time between August 14, 1929, and January 31, 1930. As
soon as it was introduced, investigations were made of the records of the
Morse Patrol, and it developed . . . that they had a very careless way of
keeping records of who actually served. It developed, however, that Jahnke
was known to the Morse Patrol, that he first went there under the name of
Borden, an alias; that Ruwe of the Morse Patrol knew he was a German
spy; that the Morse Patrol had been doing some work for the German
Consulate General in San Francisco. It developed by the testimony of an
accountant who went over the books of the company itself, and not in con-
nection with these cases at all, that their records did not disclose exactly who
performed services on a certain date; that a substitute might be used for the
man whose name was given, and that there was no way of telling from
those records who actually performed the services on the particular days. . . .

Mr. Bonynge finally summed up the evidence:

I wish now, gentlemen of the Commission, to sum up very briefly what we
contend has been established to show that Germany was responsible for the
blowing up of the Black Tom. I want again to repeat that we are here trying
a civil action; that the burden of proof which rests upon us is to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence in the minds of the members of this
Commission that Germany, as a principal, was responsible for the blowing
up of the Black Tom. Once we establish that fact, all the details as to how it
was done, who did it, which particular agent did this thing, how he accom-
plished it, all the details as to the explosions which occurred, whether one
was on the land and the other was on a boat, all become immaterial, provided
we have convinced this Commission by a preponderance of the evidence that
Germany, as a principal, was responsible for the blowing up of the Black
Tom.

In support of that contention I submit to this Commission that we have
established the following propositions beyond the peradventure of a doubt:

First, that Germany did specifically, by the cablegram of January 26, 1915,
authorize and direct the carrying on of sabotage in the United States against
munitions and munition factories.

2l6 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Second, that in pursuance of that poUcy, Germany did send Agents to the
United States, and employed others in the United States, and armed them
with the incendiary devices to carry into execution the poUcy which the
highest powers of Germany had declared was to be pursued in the United
States.

Third, we have established that one of the Agents thus employed by
Germany, Hinsch, an admitted German agent, traveled about the country
with a suitcase which he had to have carefully guarded by an unknown and
half -demented man. What was the purpose of guarding that suitcase ? Was it
not because it had in it, not the ordinary clothing of a man who is traveUng
about the country, but these very incendiary devices?

Fourth, we have established that Hinsch has admitted that he was traveling
about the country during the very time this man Kristoff was traveling about
the country, and that he visited some of the very places Kristoff visited.

Fifth, we have established, again, that Kristoff himself, on the night of the
explosion, came home declaring that he had been a party to the explosion.
We have connected that testimony with the testimony of Witzke that he and
Jahnke were responsible for the blowing up of the Black Tom, and that he
has denied those admissions, although we have established beyond doubt
that the admissions were made; that he has attempted to prove an alibi, has
made two or three different attempts, when one failed made another; that
Jahnke has never testified that he performed the services he is alleged to have
performed in San Francisco at the time, and that his alibi has likewise failed.

When he had finished with the Black Tom case Mr. Bonynge went
on to the Kingsland case. After declaring that he had established be-
yond reasonable doubt that Germany from the beginning of the war
was engaged in a world-wide campaign of sabotage, and had never
canceled the sabotage order of January 26, 1915, Mr. Bonynge stated
in his summing up of this case:

That immediately following the issuance of this authorization (the cable
of January 26, 1915) Germany sent to, or selected from its sympathizers in,
the United States agents to execute the policy authorized by the Foreign
Office of the German Government, and armed them with the means to carry
that poHcy into execution.

That Messrs. Nadolny and Marguerre of the German Staff specifically
employed Herrmann as a German agent and furnished him with the in-

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 217

cendiary devices to destroy munitions and munition factories in the United
States.

That Herrmann, in pursuance of the authority given to him, came to the
United States; with the assistance of Captain Hinsch and other German
agents, employed Wozniak and Rodriguez to set fire to the Kingsland plant,
and furnished them with the identical incendiary devices given to him by
Nadolny and Marguerre for the very purpose of destroying munition
factories.

That Wozniak and Rodriguez, with the assistance of Hinsch, Herrmann
and other German agents, did actually start the fire that destroyed the
Kingsland plant.

On the cojnclusion of Mr. Bonynge's argument, Dr. Karl von
Lev^inski, the German Agent, took the floor to present Germany's
argument. He prefaced his plea v^ith a caustic attack on the tactics the
American lawyers had used in obtaining their evidence and expressed
regret that these methods had been found necessary in litigation bc-
tv^een tvv^o governments before an international tribunal. He then took
exception to the concluding remarks of Mr. Bonynge's summing up
which had defined his contention that, if once it had been proved
that Germany was responsible for the destruction of Black Tom and
Kingsland, it was immaterial what particular German agents accom-
plished it or how he did it:

What the American Agent treats as mere details, namely, how it was done,
who did it, and whether the person who did it was really a German agent —
these so-called "details" form the actual, and I claim the only, issue in the
present proceedings.

To be specific, if the American Agent proves that Witzke or Jahnke
actually blew up Black Tom, or if he proves that Kristoff blew up Black
Tom, and that he was a German agent, then, but only then, has he dis-
charged the burden of proof incumbent upon him. If he is unable to prove
this, his case must fall, even if it should be considered as estabUshed that there
existed an authorization to commit sabotage against ammunition factories
and plants in the United States during neutrality.

The same is true in the Kingsland case. Assumption, suspicions, even
possibilities are not enough. Actual proof of the actual fact is the only
possible basis of recovery in the instant claims.

2l8 THE ENEMY WITHIN

The ship sabotage and the inoculation of horses, mules, and cattle in
the United States he frankly admitted. Dr. von Lewinski argued, how-
ever, that, although the bombs were placed on ships in American ports,
the active destruction was timed to take place outside of American
waters. Tliat presumably was Germany's defense as regards the germ
inoculation, too, since on the same basis it could be argued that the
germs were only intended to take effect on the livestock after shipment.

As regards the sabotage order of January 26, 191 5, Dr. von Lewinski
claimed that it was never carried out; and as to the instructions issued
by Nadolny and Marguerre to Hilken, Herrmann, and Dilger he
averred that they were only to come into effect in the event of the
United States's entering the war on the side of the Allies.

The German evidence which had been filed was then reviewed at
great length by Dr. von Lewinski and Dr. Tannenberg. Without ex-
ception, every one of those German agents resident in Germany who
had been accused by the American lawyers had issued a lengthy denial.
And it was on these denials, especially on that of Hinsch, that Germany
chiefly based her defense. Hinsch gave an affidavit that at the time of
the Black Tom explosion all of his time was being taken up with the
affairs of the Eastern Forwarding Company and the duties connected
with the loading and unloading of the submarine Deutschland,

The evidence of Herrmann was attacked as that of a man who had
testified for both sides and therefore could not be believed. The testi-
mony of Altendorf was impeached on the grounds that in various
statements in 1918 and in newspaper articles written by him in 1919
and 1920 he had given different versions of how Witzke and Jahnke
had blown up Black Tom. A lengthy exposition was made of the alibis
which had been established for Witzke, Jahnke, and Wozniak.

Finally, in the Kingsland case, a strenuous defense was advanced that
the fire was caused by an industrial accident. In support of this conten-
tion, affidavits from several Italian workmen who worked at Kingsland
at the time of the fire had been produced just before the hearing; also
a report, dated January 18, 1917, from a man named Johnson, who was
in charge of the guards at Kingsland and who reported on the cause
of the fire after interviewing several of the workmen present in Build-
ing 30 at the time of the outbreak of the fire. It was also intimated

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 219

that the American claimants must have known of the existence of this
report and had purposely ignored it. In reviewing this evidence of
Johnson, and also of Lascola, one of the Italian workmen, Dr. Tannen-
berg stated:

Wozniak was working, in the afternoon of January 11, at the last cleaning
machine at the northerly end of the last table at the north end of the building.
There was one table holding about three or four cleaning machines. He was
at the northerly end of that table, and at approximately 3 145 — or 3 143, accord-
ing to the Johnson report — he took an uncleaned shell and put it in place for
cleaning, and as he did so the closed end of the steel shell struck sparks from
the cast iron pulley which was revolving under the traction of the moving
belt.

The shell did not fit into place at once, and Wozniak gave the shell a push
in order to make it fit into place better

The sparks, although unobserved by Wozniak, were seen by other men,
and in this connection it must be remembered that the shell revolved away
from Wozniak, so that if any spark was caused, the spark would not appear
on the side towards Wozniak but on the other side.

According to the Johnson report of January 18, 1917 (Page 3), the streak
of sparks which resulted from that contact of shell and pulley was seen by
George Roberts, Thomas A. Decle, Andrew Roach, Chris Lovett, and
Thomas Steele, as well as other workmen not named.

In the Johnson report Johnson refers to the fact that he examined these
men and that the statements of these men are all substantially in accord
with what Roberts said. Roberts was working on one of these tables at the
northerly end of the building, about ten feet away from Wozniak, facing
Wozniak, as I said before, on one of these tables that were at right angles
to the tables on which the cleaning machines were placed, and according to
what Johnson states in his report Roberts saw suddenly a streak of sparks
coming from the machine, and Johnson states that that observation is sub-
stantially confirmed by the statements of five, six or more witnesses.

If Johnson's report does not set forth correctly what the eye witnesses said
at the time of their examination, why are not those reports produced ? They
are at the disposal of the claimant company. The fact that they are not
produced, although the American Agent certainly had a chance to obtain the
statements, is, in the opinion of the German Agent, conclusive proof that the
original statements are in accord with what Johnson says in his report about
the very beginning of the fire at the cleaning machine, a streak of small

220 THE ENEMY WITHIN

sparks— not a flame one foot long that came with a siss out of the inside
of the shell. Six or seven witnesses say that the very first beginning was a
streak of sparks coming from this place. All saw the sparks coming from
Wozniak's cleaning machine immediately before the fire. That Wozniak did
not see the sparks is not to be wondered at, as an inspection of the drawing
of the cleaning machine shown in German exhibit CXXXI will show that
the sparks must, from the nature of the machine, have landed on the gasoline-
soaked table behind the high part of the cleaning machine on which he was
cleaning the shells.

That the fire started from those sparks which had landed on the table,
away from Wozniak, behind the cleaning machine, is established also by the
evidence of Lascola. I refer to the fact that Lascola had been examined by
Judge Fake and by officials of the Agency of the Canadian Car & Foundry
Company in Rutherford and in New York immediately after the fire.

He testified in the deposition which was taken in August of this year
(Exhibit CXV) that when his attention was called by a sudden squeak and
he looked at Wozniak's machine, he was only ten feet away from Wozniak's
machine. He saw little flames between the end of the shell, the closed end
of the shell against the cast iron pulley, and the pan of gasoline, little flames.

Dr. Tannenberg continued the argument by outlining in vivid detail
the evidence of Urciuoli and Ruggiero, the two other Italian v^ork-
men, and quoted at considerable length from their affidavits. In his
afladavit Urciuoli had stated that he had been employed as a millwright
in Building Number 30 for six or eight months and described his
experiences in the building as foUov^s;

When the machines had been in use a considerable period, they would
get hot and would stick. This would cause a friction between the end of the
steel shaft and the cast iron pulley. On these occasions a very hot spark
would be thrown and could be seen from the center of the building. When-
ever I saw these sparks I would hurry to the machine and throw the belt oflF,
stopping the machine. Again at times the cast iron pulleys would wear in
the bore of the pulley. The wearing of the cast iron pulley against the steel
shaft would cause more sparks that were a source of danger. On one occasion
during the time I was employed in Building Number 30, one of the tables
caught fire from these causes, namely, from the sparking of the cleaning
machine, and I put it out with an overcoat which I took from the wall.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF '221

Ruggiero, who according to Dr. Tannenbcrg, was sub-foreman in
Building 30 for a considerable length of time, had also confirmed this
by the following statement in his affidavit:

In case the pulleys were not kept well oiled, they would begin to squeak
and bind. Occasionally they would stick and fail to rotate, that is, they
would become "frozen" to the steel pin, on which they were supposed to
rotate. When this happened the belt on that machine would begin to slip
over the cast iron pulley, but the pulley would not move. The shell, how-
ever, would continue to revolve as a result of the friction between the shell
and the belt. On the occasions when that happened there would be a very
decided friction between the end of the steel shell (which was moving under
the belt) and the cast iron pulley, which would not move. In such a case
the machine would begin to throw sparks. A squeaking machine was always
considered a danger signal, at which time whoever happened to be in charge
of that particular section of machines would immediately take the shell out
and throw the belt so that the millwright could put that particular machine
in working order.

During the course of my employment in Building 30, I frequently saw
cleaning machines throw sparks as a result of friction developing from
defects in the machine.

In his rebuttal Mr. Bonynge attacked as well as he could with the
material at hand the testimony of these "eyewitnesses," but the picture
of sparking machines and general carelessness in the plant, portrayed
particularly by Ruggiero and Urciuoli, could not be overcome. As to
the Johnson report, Mr. Bonynge replied to the charges of the German
Agent by saying:

I desire now to refer to the Johnson report upon which a great deal of

reliance apparently was placed by the German Agent We have had no

opportunity to make a thorough examination, because it was filed just a few
days before we left the United States, but I think an investigation of the
report itself will show that the report was never made to the Agency of
Canadian Car & Foundry Company. This man was an employee of the Thiel
Detective Agency. His dudes at the plant were not to examine the witnesses
and ascertain how the fire occurred. He had a large number of guards, whose
duty it was to protect the plant. He was desirous of presenting a report to his

222 THE ENEMY WITHIN

principal, the Thiel Detective Agency, to satisfy the Thiel Detective Agency
that he and his guards were in no way responsible for the fire

... A reading of the report — and I don't recall that Counsel for the German
Agent read from the report at all— will demonstrate that there is not any-
where in Johnson's first report or supplemental report any statement by him
that he personally examined any of the workmen in the Kingsland plant;
but, much more important than that, there is not the sHghtest indication that
anyone ever took any written statements from any of the witnesses men-
tioned. On the contrary it appears very clearly from his first report, as well
as from his second report, that his whole report is third or fourth hand
hearsay evidence, and that the real purpose of the report was not to account
for how the fire originated, but to establish that the guards who were under
his supervision had properly performed their duties He goes on to de-
scribe what the various guards did, and, at the end of the general commenda-
tion of his own guards he makes the following statement :

"All of the guards behaved with commendable courage and judgment,
and it is largely due to their efforts that every employee in the plant got
away in safety '*

This charge against the American Agent [of suppressing the Johnson
report] is fully disproved and differs entirely from the statement made by the
American Agent that Germany had suppressed documents which are ad-
mitted to be in existence and actually in the possession of the German
Government at the present time, relating to the interviews had by Herrmann
with the members of the German Legation in Santiago, Chile.

On Tuesday, September 30, 1930, the Commission adjourned to con-
sider the evidence. Two v^^eeks later, at Hamburg, October 16, 1930, it
handed down its unanimous decision dismissing both the Black Tom
and the Kingsland cases. ^ The decisions and opinions of the Commis-
sion covered twenty-seven printed pages, but the following extracts
record in a general sense the findings.

The Commission held that the authority of persons alleged to be re-
sponsible for causing both the destructions and to act for and bind the
German Government was fully established. It ruled on this point that

The Commission has no difficulty with the question of authority in these
cases. The persons alleged to be responsible for causing these two fires to be

* The two terms, The Hague decision and the Hamburg decision, are used
interchangeably by all connected with the litigation.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF 223

set — either by participating in the act themselves or by employing sub-agents
of their own — were in such relation to the German authorities, and some o£
them in such relation to Nadolny and Marguerre, who were in charge of the
political section of the German General Staff, or to Hinsch, that Germany
must be held responsible if they, or some of them, did cause the fires to be set.
The Commission does not need direct proof, but on the evidence as submitted
we could hold Germany responsible if, but only if, we are reasonably con-
vinced that the fires occurred in some way through the acts of certain
German agents.

With regard to Black Tom the Commission stated that it was far
from satisfied that Kristoff had not set fire to the Terminal either alone
or in company with other parties unknown. It went on to say that it
did not believe that Witzke or Jahnke had participated in the firing
of the Terminal. It further stated that Black Tom would have been a
logical target for any German sabotage agent. But while it felt that
there was no assurance that Graentnor was not Hinsch or that Hinsch
did not employ Kristoff it said that it did not feel the Americans, on
whom was the burden of proof, had established beyond a reasonable
doubt either that Kristoff was a German agent or that he had actually
blown up Black Tom.

In the Kingsland case, after reviewing the evidence, the Commission
ruled as follows:

In the Kingsland case we find upon the evidence that the fire was not
caused by any German agent.

This conclusion was of course based upon the evidence then before
the Commission. In reviewing that evidence the Commission said:

... If we were called upon to guess what caused the fire from the evidence
of the circumstances, we should without hesitation turn to the machine which
held the shell which Wozniak was cleaning. There is strongly persuasive
evidence that these machines required constant watching, that when out of
order they squeaked and threw out sparks, and that fires, quickly ex-
tinguished, had previously occurred from this source, and there is some
evidence from a workman close by of squeaking and of sparks from
Wozniak's machine just at the time of the starting of the fire. Wozniak

224 THE ENEMY WITHIN

himself does not mention this in his contemporaneous statements, though he
later mentioned it merely as a possible explanation. In fact he says that his
machine was running well that day, though it had sometimes run very hot.
To Wozniak the fire seemed to originate in the rapidly revolving shell case
itself and to follow the rag wound around a stick with which he was drying
the shell case when he withdrew the rag. It is interesting to find that his own
statement is the only one which bears any resemblance to what would have
happened if he had used one of the inflammatory pencils with which Herr-
mann says he supplied him.

From a reading of the above abstract, it definitely appears that the
Commission in making the remarks contained in this opinion relied
largely upon the Johnson report and even more upon the testimony
of the Italian workmen. Also, the Germans had been aided by the
natural reluctance of the tribunal to disbelieve the word of a great and
sovereign nation unless absolute documentary proof could be produced
showing that a German agent had ordered the firing of the two plants.

Chapter XXII

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES

The Hague decision might have broken the stoutest hearts, but the
Americans had only begun to fight.

The Germans had sprung a tactical surprise on the American Agent
by filing at the last moment a mass of new evidence. At, the time this
was done, the date for The Hague hearing had been fixed; and the
business of packing the voluminous records, arranging sailings, as well
as preparing the cases for argument, had left no time for any more than
cursory investigation of this new evidence, which included not only
the Johnson report and the sworn statements of the Italian workmen
at Kingsland, which we will refer to as the Lyndhurst testimony, but
also the affidavits of Hinsch, Woehst, and Marguerre.''^

As their first move in rebuilding the cases the American lawyers
investigated the Lyndhurst testimony and the Johnson report. They
knew that Mr. Cahan, one of the directors of the Canadian Car and
Foundry Company, had conducted an impartial and exhaustive in-
vestigation immediately after the fire and, after weighing up all the
evidence, had come to the conclusion that the fire was an act of in-
cendiarism. They sensed, therefore, that the affidavits of the Italian
workmen had been falsely inspired.

Their suspicions were quickly confirmed. When interviewed, R. N.
Marrone, a notary public of Lyndhurst, who had acted as the stenog-
rapher in the compilation of the affidavits which had been executed by
Ruggiero and Urciuoli, testified that the affidavits were dictated almost
in their entirety by Counsel for the German Agent.

* The hearing took place at The Hague on September i8, 1930. The Lynd-
hurst testimony was filed August 9, 1930; the Johnson report on August 26, 1930;
translation of the testimony of Woehst and Marguerre was filed August 18 and
25, 1930; and that of Hinsch on August 21, 1930, and September 18, 1930.

225

226 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Furthermore, there was proof that the affidavits had been procured
by the pressure of money, the payment of which had not been disclosed
to the Commission, and in support of this Marrone produced from the
files of his nephew by marriage, a Mr. Carella, a series of letters and
carbon copies of letters exchanged between Carella and Dr. Tannen-
berg. (Carella had been retained by Dr. Tannenberg to obtain the
Lyndhurst affidavits.) A portion of the correspondence between Carella
and Dr. Tannenberg is quoted below:

April loth, 1931.
William Tannenberg, Esq.,
loio Investment Building
15th & K Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Confirming our conversation of March 30th, 193 1, I have informed our
witnesses as to your decision in the matter. I have been expecting that of
which we spoke of and these people are continually calling upon me for
some action.

It is absolutely urgent that this matter be taken care o£ immediately
because the opposition is making strenuous efforts to obtain adverse informa-
tion.

Reports will be forwarded to you within the next few days.

Awaiting an early reply, I beg to remain

Yours very truly,

To which Dr. Tannenberg replied:

April 17, 1931.
Nicholas A. Carella, Esq.
298 Ridge Road,
Lyndhurst, N. J.

Dear Sir:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the loth instant and your
telegram of today. I have to apologize for not answering your letter
promptly; however, I postponed my reply for the reason that the instructions
from Germany for which I had asked had not yet arrived and I was anxious
to advise you that our conversation had been confirmed.

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 227

The unexpected delay was due to the fact that I was requested to supply
our Berlin office with detailed information which was required in order to
enable them to proceed as suggested by me. That does not mean that there
are any obstacles. I have no doubt that the instructions will be here by
Monday of next week [April 20th] at the very latest, and I shall not fail
to inform you immediately as to when you can go to New York.

I sincerely hope that you wall understand the situation and that the
unforeseen delay will not have caused you any inconveniences. I also hope
that I shall have an opportunity to see you again in the near future so that
I can explain to you the circumstances in more detail.

You may rest assured that I greatly appreciate your services and that I
am awaiting your reports with very great interest.

Yours very truly,

Wilhelm Tannenberg

True to his assurance, Dr. Tannenberg encountered no obstacles, for
on April 20, 193 1, he wrote to Mr. Carella as follows:

Dear Sir:

Referring to my telegram of the 17th inst. and to my telegram of the
following day, I wish to advise you that I have received authority to proceed
in the matter as suggested. If you will be kind enough to call at the German
Consulate General in New York, Mr. Loerky, the gentleman whom you
met there on a previous occasion, will give you the necessary information.
Hoping to hear from you very soon, I am,

Very truly yours,

Wilhelm Tannenberg

The American lav^ers would have liked to have seen a copy of the
messages which had passed between Tannenberg and Berlin on the
subject, but once again Germany did not produce them.

In another letter, after reporting vivid tales of attempts on the part of
one of the American investigators to tempt the Lyndhurst witnesses
with money, and after stressing the difficulties which he was expe-
riencing with the witnesses, Lascola and Urciuoli, Carella continued:

I have made every effort to keep these witnesses in line with threats of
criminal prosecution. Their patience has reached its final pitch and I hope
that some money will come forthwith to relieve the present situation.

228 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Apart from the above considerations, Ruggiero, who, prior to The
Hague hearing, had testified in his affidavit to previous fires v^hich he,
himself, had extinguished at Kingsland, and had traced the develop-
ment of the cleaning machines v^^hich, according to him, wtrt continu-
ously unsatisfactory right down to the time he quit wor\ in December
igi6, was found on investigation to have worked in Building Number
30 at Kingsland for a total of three weeks, and to have left the plant in
August igi6, approximately five months before the fire. Investigation
also disclosed that Urciuoli did not work in the plant at all during the
week in which the fire took place.

It was, however, from Lascola that the most convincing evidence of
fraud was obtained. On April 26, 1933, three years after he had given
the affidavit to the Germans, he testified in an aflEdavit written in
Italian that he had received $50 in a surreptitious manner from "the
American" who had come with Ruggiero, to get his affidavit, that later
he had been given an additional $100, but that he had not received the
expense money which had been promised him for an operation. He
then went on to add:

At the time of the fire I was about ten feet away and out of the corner
of my eye I saw a small flame and saw the man with the rag saturated in
benzine try to put out fire with it but instead caused the flame to spread
and increase, and another man threw a pail of water on the flames spreading
them more and then everybody ran, and this is all, and I told others the
same thing, and everybody who asked me.

I was working in Building No. 30 about six months and never saw any
fires.

I was told that the statement I signed three years ago for the American
who came with Guidetti and Ruggiero, that the machine threw sparks, but
I did not make this statement and it is not true that this machine threw
sparks.

It was noted also that the correspondence between the office of the
German Agent and Carella showed that a statement was obtained in
Lyndhurst from one Victor Frangipane. But the statement turned out
to be immaterial when the claimants checked it.

In a statement furnished to the American investigators, Frangipane

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 229

closes his affidavit by saying: "It is my opinion that Wozniak purposely
set this fire."

Turning now to the Johnson reports of January 13 and 18, 1917, it
was found that the German exhibit produced at The Hague hearing
was a carbon copy, that the paper on which the reports were written
was of very recent manufacture, and the copies could not have been
made much before the German Agent procured them in August 1930.

In the opinion of the American lawyers, the introduction of the car-
bons alone without any explanation that they had been recently copied,
was sufficient in itself to mislead the Commission, whether innocently
or not; for a recently written report would not, in the very nature of
things, be given as much weight as would the original carbon copy.

The evidence seems clear that these reports, which contained sec-
ond-hand information, were never submitted to the Agency of the
Canadian Car and Foundry Company and that in 1917 the only interest
that Johnson could have had in drafting them was to satisfy the Thiel
Agency that he and his guards were no way responsible for the fire.

Had these reports been handed to the Company at the time it con-
ducted its investigation immediately after the fire, there would have
been no reason to suppress them as charged by the Germans. As hap-
pens in the case of all such fires, and as was recently evidenced in that
of the Graf Zeppelin, there is always a certain amount of conflicting
evidence from witnesses who sincerely believe that they saw the origin
of the disaster, but actually only witnessed an after-effect. A series of
such statements was actually made at the time, but the bulk of evidence
collected by Mr. Cahan was of such a nature that without hesitation
he ascribed the fire to an act of incendiarism. "^

In his report Johnson mentioned George Roberts (No. 3242) as stat-
ing that a streak of sparks came from the cleaning machine. An ex-
amination of the payroll, which had not been in the plant at the time
of the fire, shows that there was no such person in the Company's
employ. Urciuoli is another person mentioned by Johnson; and he, as
we have already shown, was not at the plant during the week of the
fire.

It is also highly significant that Johnson in neither of his reports

230 THE ENEMY WITHIN

gave any indication of an effort on his part to question Wozniak, the
employee at whose bench the fire admittedly started.

Far from the condition of carelessness and neglect which Ruggiero
and Urciuoli so persuasively sketched, there was produced after The
Hague hearing a mass of evidence to show that every known safety
device was employed at Kingsland, and that the plant was extraor-
dinarily well supervised and eflBciently managed. Mr. George Coe,
the vice president and director of Johnson and Higgins, a very well-
known firm of insurance brokers, testified that the engineers' inspec-
tions were extremely rigid and their reports indicated that the fire pro-
tection conditions in the plant were excellent. Joseph D. Evans, who
has had a wide experience with explosives and the manufacture and
loading of shells, testified that the same type of cleaning machine was
used to clean millions of shells at other plants as well as at Kingsland
without the slightest trouble from sparks or fires. Mr. William Hark-
ness, the works manager at the Kingsland plant, stated that there had
never been any fire, however small, in Building 30, prior to the fire
which destroyed the plant. He also testified that an inspector named
Renz had made an inspection of the motors, wires, and lights in
Building Number 30 about fifteen minutes before the fire occurred and
had reported that everything was in perfect order in the building.
Renz's own affidavit to this effect was filed.

However, in view of die confidence expressed by the Commission
at Hamburg in the testimony of the Lyndhurst witnesses, it was
thought advisable to obtain even further evidence, if possible, to
demonstrate its falsity. By a piece of good fortune, a search of the Army
Ordnance Department files disclosed that at the Picatinny Arsenal at
Dover, N. J., there was found a cleaning machine of the very type
which had been used at Kingsland. Mr. McCormick, of the Picatinny
Arsenal, when asked for his expert opinion, testified:

Throughout the entire period of time during which I had anything to
do with these machines, from 191 5 until about May, 1926, I have never
known any of them to throw out sparks or cause fires. Literally millions
of shells have been cleaned by these machines under my supervision at the
plants and arsenals which I have mentioned

Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (top right)
Director of the British Naval Intelli-
gence Service.

From "The Life and Letters of Walter H.
Page," Courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Company

Courtesy of Amos J. Peaslee

Amos J. Peaslee (above) Legal Fer-
ret. Robert W. Bonynge (at right)
American Agent before the Mixed
Claims Commission.

Keystone Studios

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FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 23I

Exhaustive tests were made on the machine by experts of the United
States Government at the Arsenal and it was found that it was im-
possible for the machine to produce a spark in the manner described
by Urciuoli and Ruggiero.

Having established that fraud had been committed in obtaining the
Lyndhurst testimony, the American lawyers now proceeded to analyze
the rest of the evidence which Germany had filed prior to The Hague
hearing. They turned, therefore, to the evidence of Nadolny, Marguerre,
Hinsch, and Woehst, on which Germany had relied so heavily. It re-
quired no special perception to discern that here, too, false testimony
had been given.

To understand the influence which had been brought to bear on
these key witnesses, it is of paramount importance to realize that, at
the very commencement of her defense, Germany deliberately and
quite brazenly attempted to mislead the Commission as to the sabotage
cable of January 26, 1915, which authorized the carrying out of sabotage
in the United States from that date on.

It was then that Germany instituted her attack on the Black Tom
and Kingsland claims by denying everything which was not over-
whelmingly proven and by suppressing evidence, a policy which it
can now be shown has not been altered throughout the entire history
of the claims. In following out this defense, Germany was being con-
sistent— she was following out the same policy of denial which von
Bernstorff and his aides had so successfully practiced during the
neutrality period.

When Nadolny testified that he had sent the cable of January 26,
1 91 5, to the German Embassy entirely on his own responsibility and
had used the Foreign Office, as he expressed it, as a mere "technical in-
termediary," he simply and plainly misrepresented the facts to the
Commission. Germany admitted this herself when Judge Parker, the
Umpire at the time, compelled, on pain of drawing unfavorable in-
ferences, the production of the earlier documents relative to the cable,
as was described in Mr. Bonynge's argument at The Hague. These
documents showed that the "irresponsible indiscretion" had been com-
mitted not by Nadolny, who the Germans tried to prove was a minor

232 THE ENEMY WITHIN

subordinate, but by the Foreign Office itself, for the cable was sent out
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Nadolny had also misrepresented facts when he had stated that no
further instructions were ever sent out after the cable. This was proven
when the meeting in February 191 6 of Mar guerre and Nadolny
with Hilken, Herrmann, and Dilger was disclosed. Later Marguerre
tried to cover this up by furnishing an affidavit in 1930 that Nadolny
merely introduced Herrmann to him, and left the room before the
sabotage discussion took place and the incendiary pencils were handed
over.

Nadolny was not a minor official. He was attached to Section III B
of the General Staff during the war, where he occupied the important
post of liaison officer v/ith the Foreign Office. In 1928, at the time his
evidence was filed with the Commission, he was Minister to Con-
stantinople, and was subsequently appointed Ambassador to Moscow.
It can be taken, therefore, that he was not testifying as a simple in-
dividual, but that he was doing so in the name of Germany.

Turning now to Marguerre, we find that he had testified : first, that
he had given definite and explicit instructions to Herrmann at the
February 191 6 meeting not to commit sabotage in the United States
during the neutrality period; second, that it was the policy of the Gen-
eral Staff, of which he was a representative, to limit the instruction of
agents sent to neutral countries to the commission of sabotage acts
only after such countries entered the war against Germany; third, that
Lieutenant Woehst, whom Herrmann had accused of sabotage activities
in the United States, had been sent to America by the Section only for
the purpose of obtaining a false passport to proceed to Italy for espi-
onage purposes, and that he, Marguerre, had given no instructions
whatever to Woehst for sabotage in the United States and had fur-
nished him with no incendiary tubes or disease germs.

Regarding the first point of Marguerre's testimony, the Commission
itself stated in its Hague decision that it did not believe his testimony.
As regards the second point, the cables which we have already quoted,
and all of which Germany has admitted to be authentic, are proof that
a sabotage campaign was waged in neutral Argentina and China. If
space permitted, it could also be shown that Germany carried out a

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 233

similar campaign in Roumania, both with germs and explosives, be-
fore Roumania entered the war. Finally, on the third point, there is
absolutely conclusive evidence that Woehst was sent to the United
States as a sabotage agent, in spite of his own denials given in support
of Marguerre's affidavit.

Since Germany relied heavily on the testimony of Woehst to break
down the Herrmann evidence, Woehst having testified that Herrmann
was not engaged in sabotage during the neutrality period and having
claimed that he was positive of this because he roomed continuously
with him until Herrmann's departure for Mexico, it is important to
examine the evidence which the American investigators produced to
prove that Woehst had actually been engaged in the United States in
sabotage activities. On January 11, 1917, Hilken wrote to Arnold^ in
Argentina with regard to Woehst:

Our principals abroad [the term used by Hilken to denote Section III B]
realizing that my other interests require too much of my time and make it
possible for me to devote my energies to their interests, have sent a young
man, who arrived here a month ago and whom I have since initiated into
American trade. He brought with him several new samples which may be
useful in Argentina.

In the stubs of Hilken's check books, which were only discovered
by the American investigators after The Hague hearing, there ap-
peared for the first time a payment to Woehst on December 13, 1916, of
the sum of $500. This, together with the date of Woehst's arrival in
this country and other evidence in the case, conclusively establishes
that Woehst was the young man whom Hilken referred to in his letter
to Arnold.

Apart from Hilken's and Herrmann's affidavits that Woehst was en-
gaged in actual sabotage activities, there is the testimony of Hildegarde
Jacobsen, his cousin, who, as the reports of Federal agents show, was
used both by Woehst and Herrmann as "cover." At a recent exami-
nation she also testified that

On the Sunday night [following the Kingsland fire] we rushed off to
Rochester, N. Y., because spots had appeared on my face and my cousin

*Head of the German Secret Service in Argentina, whose specialty was in-
oculation of mules, horses, and catde with anthrax and glanders germs.

234 "^^^ ENEMY WITHIN

was afraid that I had contracted an infection from him, as he said that he
had been handUng some materials which might give me an infection, and
which might have serious consequences. On this account, my cousin refused
to permit me to go to a doctor in New York, but took me immediately to
Rochester where I was examined by our family doctor. My cousin was tre-
mendously relieved when the doctor diagnosed my complaint as German
measles.

It seems reasonable to assume that Woehst feared that Miss Jacobsen
had contracted either anthrax or glanders, one of the symptoms of
which is a violent skin eruption.

Furthermore, Miss Jacobsen stated that on a recent visit of hers to
Germany, before her cousin died, he told her that he had falsely denied
knowledge of the Kingsland destruction because he had had no other
alternative.

We must now pass to the series of letters which Woehst sent to
Hilken in 1920 and 1921, the writing of which he also admitted to Miss
Jacobsen.

Although Woehst stated in his affidavit that before he left for
America he had no idea that Hilken was working for the General
Staff, yet it is obvious from the context of the following letter both
that Woehst was engaged in sabotage in the United States and that
Hilken was well acquainted with Nadolny and Marguerre:

As I unfortunately have received no answer from you to my last letter, I
was forced to hand in my claim for damages to the proper authorities for
foreign claims, and I have been asked by them to submit a confirmation,
that / was active * in New York and Baltimore from October, 191 6, until
February, 191 7. 1 request you, therefore, to confirm this so that I will be able
to use your statement with the department in question.

I would not like to bring the gentlemen, Marguerre, Capt. von Hulsen and
Mr. Nadolny into difficulties, and, therefore, must ask you for your assistance.

Respectfully,

Willy Wohst,

Altona, Moltkestrasse 22
P.S. In case I do not receive this confirmation from you I am unfortunately
forced to make my demands for payment from the funds. (G.G.St.) of that
period.

* Italics are the author's.

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 235

In another letter, Woehst wrote to Mr. Hilken, Senior:

Now, as at that time your son gave an order on Berlin to send for us
$15,000, and as this remittance arrived too late [after the severance of the
diplomatic relations], this money could not be used and must therefore still
lie to the credit of Mr. Paul Hilken's account. Of course the money cannot
be returned to the former department as the former existence of this depart-
ment naturally is not now to be spoken of.

It is very significant that Woehst w^ls not questioned in any respect
about these letters at the time he v^as examined in Berlin.

With regard to Herrmann we find the same false evidence. In his
testimony Woehst pictured himself as having been in almost daily con-
tact with Herrmann; he states that Herrmann certainly told him
"everything which was on his mind," and as a result he stated that he
was in a position to know that Herrmann never had any designs at
any time on munitions plants, particularly Kingsland:

Q. Did Herrmann, outside of this activity [the Intelligence work referred
to by Marguerre in his affidavit], attend to other matters of the secret service
independently ?

A. No.

Q. Were you with Hermann so frequently that you can say this positively ?

A. Yes, for during the day we were also constantly together.

The proof, however, that Herrmann operated apart from Woehst,
at least on some occasions, is supplied by the letter found by Federal
agents on February 24, 1917, in Woehst's rooms. It read:

Dear Hauten [one of Woehst's admitted aliases] :

If letters come for me from Perth Amboy, open them and heat them. If
there is any news, you can forward it to the right party

At the head of this letter are the names of certain ammunition fac-
tories located in New Jersey.
On being shown this letter, Woehst said:

I cannot say now whether the letter ... is genuine. It is certain that the
statements cannot have had any connection with acts of destruction of any

236 THE ENEMY WITHIN

munition plant since Hermann, as long as I knew him, did not engage in
such activities.

Woehst also testified falsely as to his movements after the Kingsland
fire. In his affidavit he claimed that he had remained continuously in
Nev^ York from December 11, 1916, to January 20, 1917, and yet Miss
Jacobsen, his cousin, later testified:

On the morning following that fire [Kingsland], Woehst called at the
Three Arts Club at about 9 a.m., and told me that it was important for him
to leave town at least for a few days and he wanted me to go with him. He
was very insistent on going somewhere where there were few people, and
where it was quiet. I inquired the reason for this and Woehst referred to
the article in the newspaper about the fire. I asked him if he had anything
to do with it, and he avoided a direct reply shrugging his shoulders and
laughing.

... I went with him to Montclair and stayed at the Hotel Montclair for
three days, over a week-end from Friday morning until Sunday night. The
hotel had a large open fireplace and a skating rink on the pond at the foot
of the hill.

On Sunday night, January 14, 1917, Woehst and Miss Jacobsen went
to Rochester, as has previously been shown, where the family physician
relieved his fears by diagnosing the spots on her face as German
measles.

Hinsch formed the bulwark of Germany's defense at The Hague
hearing. He attempted to support Marguerre in the general German
defense, and in so doing showed his willingness to conform his testi-
mony to Germany's policy, thereby giving proof that he had falsely
testified. But it is his defense on the specific issues with which we are
now concerned.

Hinsch, long before the Black Tom and Kingsland charges were
made against him, had returned to Germany, where he had become
the head of a stevedore business in Bremerhaven. When faced with
the charges, he denied having had any connection with Black Tom or
Kingsland, and in answer to the very specific statements made by
Herrmann in 1930, made two assertions: first, that Herrmann's in-
structions from the General Staff were to proceed against American

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 237

property only if the United States entered the war; and, second, that
during the period of the two destructions he was so exclusively en-
gaged with manifold duties relating to the U-boat Deutschland's visits
to the United States that he could not, and did not, engage in any
sabotage whatever following Hilken's return from the conference
with Nadolny and Marguerre in the spring of 191 6. He supported his
denials by statements that he was in Baltimore and New London
during all periods during which, if he had been guilty, he might have
been expected to be in or around New York. In other words, his de-
fense was essentially an alibi.

The various statements submitted by Germany from Captain Hinsch
furnished an interesting example of the practice of German witnesses
to discuss only matters which were already known and to say nothing
concerning matters which had not been revealed. Hinsch's first affidavit
in 1929 was confined to mere statements of denial and makes no dis-
closure of his sabotage activities which commenced in May 1915. Al-
though Hilken had specifically charged Hinsch with having collected
the sum of $2,000 in connection with the Black Tom explosion, Hinsch
failed to deny or even to mention the allegation.

Hinsch made a further affidavit in March 1930. This likewise con-
tained only further brief denials. It was only after Herrmann had testi-
fied in April 1930 and had been corroborated by Carl Dilger and Felton
that Hinsch finally admitted having conducted sabotage activities from
May 1915, under instructions received by him from von Rintelen, to
whom he was introduced in Baltimore by Hilken. Even at this time
he made no reference to the $2,000 payment.

We know that he did assist Hilken in the work connected with the
visits of the U-boat and that he subsequently had an official position
with the company which was formed to carry on the U-boat business.
On the other hand, he gready exaggerated his work in connection
with it. The importance which Hinsch ascribed to his activities with
the U-boat Deutschland is evidenced by the fact that in his iio-page
deposition of August 1930, over 90 pages are devoted to a description
of his U-boat work. And yet the Deutschland, a boat of most limited
cargo capacity, made just 2 trips, and then over a period of 14 months

238 THE ENEMY WITHIN

between the return of Hilken from the General Stai? and Hinsch's de-
parture for Mexico. It was in American ports just 40 days.

In addition to this, even during the short period of the Deutsch-
land's activity, Hinsch was frequently absent from his U-boat service.
One of the witnesses testified :

He would come down in the morning and in the afternoons and see how
the work was progressing along. . . . What he did at other times, I do not
know. . . . He had a habit of talking to me in the morning . . . saying "good
morning; how is everything going on?" I would say "all right, sir" and he
would walk away.

The whole lengthy examination of Hinsch in Berlin appears to be
mainly an effort to build up the picture of an all-absorbing task with
the commercial submarine, permitting no interruptions whatever. It
was an example of the use to which the familiar "cover" position can
be put to distract attention from an agent's operations.

We have proof that the Deutschland completed her loading by July
20, 1916. (The Black Tom explosion occurred during the early hours
of July 30.) George Dederer, an employee of the Eastern Forwarding
Company, was examined under subpoena at Baltimore on August 7,
1933; and in the course of that examination there was produced a
carbon copy of a letter addressed to Hinsch in New York dictated by
Dederer on July 22. The letter was written on Saturday and would not
have been delivered in ordinary course until the following Monday in
New York. If Hinsch was never away from Baltimore for a single hour,
Dederer would not have sent a letter to him in New York. To explain
the letter, Dederer, who had previously testified for Germany, claimed:
"This must be due to an oversight or an error of the typist." Hinsch on
his part suggested "fabrication." And yet the letter came from the
Eastern Forwarding Company files, and there is not the slightest
question of its authenticity.

The next period of any importance is just after the Black Tom ex-
plosion, at or about the time Hilken claims to have paid Hinsch $2,000
for his work in connection with the explosion.

Before The Hague hearing the only evidence which the American
lawyers had as to this payment was the statement of Hilken. Germany

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 239

denied this payment and stated that Hilken was confusing it with a
payment of $2,000 in January 1916.

In December 1931, however, more than a year after The Hague hear-
ing, Hilken's estranged wife discovered his wartime diary among her
belongings. In it was an entry confirming August 10, 1916, as the date
of the $2,000 payment. Final proof, however, was brought forth in 1932
when the stubs of Hilken's check book came to light. On check stub
Number 115 a payment of $2,000 was shown on the same date, and
marked as paid in cash for "Capt. H., Lewis, etc." ("Capt. H." stands
for Hinsch; and "Lewis" is one of the admitted aliases used by
Herrmann.)

Apart from the fact that the American lawyers had now definitely
established that this payment, which Hilken testified Hinsch told him
was for the Black Tom job, had been made on August 10, 1916, the
check stub also furnished indirect proof that Hinsch was in New York
on this date, since it showed that the money was paid in cash. If there
is any doubt as to this latter point, another entry in the diary puts
Hinsch in New York on a date even closer to the explosion. Under
August 4, 1916, there appears an entry: "Astor Roof with Sir John
[Hamer] and crowd." As we have already shown, Hinsch attended
this dinner.

There is one more important point regarding which it can be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinsch testified falsely, and that
is in regard to his denial that he had ever met Charles Thorne, who
was the assistant employment agent at the Kingsland plant at the time
of the fire.

One of the opinions handed down by the Commission at Hamburg
in 1930 in reference to the evidence respecting Thorne was that "There
is a good deal of evidence that throws suspicion of some sort on Thorne
...but nothing convincing to show Thome's acquaintance with
Hinsch."

The matter might have rested there, but in September 1933 Thorne,
once thought dead, suddenly came to life. After years of search, detec-
tives employed by Peto eventually ran him to earth at the Terminal
Hotel in New York.

When asked to appear voluntarily for examination, Thorne refused,

240 THE ENEMY WITHIN

saying that he did not want to have anything to do with the Kingsland
investigation. He was, therefore, subpoenaed and on September 25 and
26, 1933, was examined before the United States District Court by Mr.
Bonynge.

Thorne admitted that his true name was Curt Thummel, that he
was born in Germany, and that his father had served in the German
Army. About 1903 Thummel emigrated to the United States, and after
spending several years doing odd jobs, changed his name to Thorne,
and in 1913 joined the United States Coast Guard. At the outbreak of
the war he was living in Baltimore; and there, as his natural sympathies
were with Germany, he came in contact with many of the officers on
the German boats. He testified that it was towards the end of 1914
that he was introduced to Hinsch in the bar of the Emerson Hotel in
Baltimore. Thereafter he often met Hinsch both on land and on the
"Neckar. After he had known Hinsch for some time and after he had
resigned from the Coast Guard in May 1916, he was asked by Hinsch
to do courier work involving the carrying of under-cover messages to
Europe. This he performed by traveling to England on the S.S. St.
Paul, having been given detailed instructions in this connection by one
"Anderson" or "Peterson" at the Union Square Hotel. Thorne later
abandoned this work, as he was in fear of apprehension in England.
The man whom we will hereafter call Anderson told him there was
nothing more to do; and so, around the middle of September 1916,
Thorne went up to New London where he says Hinsch and the others
were expecting the submarine Bremen* While in New London, he
met Paul Hilken at the Hotel Griswold. According to Thorne, Hinsch
sent him back to New York the same night to see Anderson, who gave
him instructions to obtain employment in a munitions plant. Thorne
secured a position at Kingsland, and he admitted that Hinsch sent him
men at various times whom he wished him to hire. Thorne could re-
member no names but recalled a man with a German name who was
hired under another name and another "South American, Portuguese,
Spaniard or possibly an Italian," both of whom Hinsch had sent out
for employment at the plant. Thorne also testified that Hinsch and he

* Germany's second commercial submarine. It never did arrive in the United
States. The causes of its loss remain one of the mysteries of the seas.

FALSE EVIDENCE AND NEW WITNESSES 24I

met at Meyer's Hotel in Hoboken at various times and discussed plans
for the destruction of the plant; that he saw Hinsch after the fire; and
that Hinsch had spoken of the good job done in destroying it, men-
tioning Wozniak's name in this connection. After the Kingsland fire,
Thorne set up an agency which supplied munitions workers to many
munitions plants, some of which he mentioned by name; and he stated
that Hinsch continued to send him men to employ and, from time to
time, in this connection he saw Hinsch. Hinsch, he stated, came to
see him finally, telling him he was going to Mexico, and warned him of
possible danger with the United States in the war. Thorne did not say
that he knew or ever met Wozniak. He stated that he knew the name
and who he was and that he had a vague recollection of having seen
Wozniak but could be no more definite than this about him. He men-
tioned a man named Ehrhart, for whom he had gotten employment at
Kingsland at Hinsch's request. Who the "Anderson" or "Peterson"
was, whom Thorne mentions as being at the Union Square Hotel, we
do not know. It was a familiar German alias, — Koenig, when testify-
ing for Germany, stated that he knew Fay under the name of Ander-
son or Peterson.

Thome's entire testimony was given in question and answer form,
and on reading the questionnaire it is difficult to come to any other
conclusion than that Hinsch knew Thorne well. Furthermore, during
the examination Thorne and Fred Herrmann were confronted with
each other. The recognition was mutual, and from the familiar way
they greeted each other, it was evident to all present that it was not
staged.

In addition to Thome's evidence, there was the testimony of three
other men'% who gave aflSdavits that they had seen Thorne in Hinsch's
company.

Faced with this overwhelming evidence, Hinsch then in a further
affidavit admitted acquaintanceship with Thorne, but excused his
former denial by saying that it was only a casual one. He then went on
in an attempt to discredit Thorne by saying:

* Ballard, Fesmire, and Dillon.

242 THE ENEMY WITHIN

A similar clumsy invention is Thome's allegation that I sent him to the
above-mentioned Anderson or Peterson so that he might be employed as a
courier. It is hardly conceivable, I think, that I would have selected for such
an important and confidential position a man like Thorne with whom, ac-
cording to his own presentation, I had comparatively superficial relations
only, and of whom I could not know anything certain.

But Hinsch's contention in this respect was not convincing. Spies
willing to undertake dangerous work were not to be had so easily.
Thorne was a German, the son of a German Army officer; he had
lived in Baltimore, where Hinsch lived, and the letter of Clucas's, found
by the Department of Justice, indicates that he did do some sort of
work as a German agent. Hinsch, in spite of his denial, had known
Thorne for more than a year. Kottkamp had picked Herrmann up on
board a steamer and had utilized his services for espionage work on
much less acquaintance than Hinsch had had with Thorne.

The general testimony of Hinsch was in accordance with the de-
fense which Germany, as we have already shown, fashioned from the
outset. Being resident in Germany and under the eye of the German
Government, Hinsch, Woehst, Nadolny, and Marguerre found them-
selves in precisely the same position in which Herrmann was when
German officials in Chile got him to sign false statements, except that
the German Government could put much more pressure on them than
the German Minister could put on Herrmann.

Chapter XXIII
THE "QUALTERS HOAX"

While the fight went on to prove that incomplete, collusive, and false
evidence had misled the Commission at The Hague hearing and had
unfairly prejudiced the cases of the claimants, the search for new evi-
dence continued.

The American investigators were following up various clues to prove
that Wozniak was in Mexico in 1917 under the name of Karowski,
when suddenly a document was produced which, if proved authentic,
was sufficient to smash the whole German defense.

While searching through a box of old papers in the attic of his
former home in Baltimore, at Christmas time in 1930, Hilken found in
an old Blue Boo\ magazine for January 1917, the message which
Gerdts testified he had brought from Herrmann in Mexico to Hilken
in Baltimore.

Other than the fact that it was a request from Herrmann for $25,000,
Hilken stated that he had long ago forgotten the contents of the mes-
sage. Now, as he read it he realized that he had in his hands the evi-
dence which proved conclusively Germany's guilt in the Black Tom
and Kingsland cases. At this time, however, Hilken was not particu-
larly well disposed toward the American claimants because of pub-
licity which had been given to some of his statements. He had just
learned of the pending appearance of a series of articles in Liberty
relative to German sabotage in the United States; and, fearful that the
production of the message would throw the limelight on him, he hesi-
tated. Gradually, however, another influence exerted itself on him.
The Hague decision of the Commission had discredited the evidence
he had given prior to The Hague hearing, and this had deeply

wounded his feelings.

243

244 ^^^ ENEMY WITHIN

In passing judgment on Hilken for his connection with the German
sabotage campaign one must reaUze that, although he was an Ameri-
can citizen, he had had the closest ties with Germany at the time of the
war, not only on account of his German descent but also because of his
intimate connection with the North German Lloyd and through it
with official Germany. His sympathies had been, therefore, all with the
country of his father, who was later to become the German Consul in
Baltimore. The intervening years had, however, brought about a
change in his outlook; wider associations in this country and less de-
pendence on German interests together with the knowledge that much
was known already of his wartime activities caused him to resist less
than others differently situated the efforts which were constantly made
to get at the truth concerning those activities.

And so, stung by The Hague decision, which had branded his evi-
dence as false, he decided to prove to the Umpire that he had told the
truth. Therefore, on February 26, 1931, Hilken took the magazine to
Boston, and on February 27, went to the office of the Honorable
Roland W. Boyden, the Umpire, to show him the magazine. On his
arrival at Mr. Boyden's office, however, Hilken was told that Mr. Boy-
den had left for New York and could be found at 44 Broad Street. The
next morning he went to see Mr. Boyden there and was told that he
would be in conference for an hour. On his return before the ex-
piration of an hour he was told that Mr. Boyden had left for Boston.
"I concluded," said Hilken, "that Mr. Boyden had intentionally
avoided meeting me, and I made no further efforts to see him."

Hurt at this seeming affront, Hilken returned home, and the
magazine might once again have been consigned to oblivion, had not
Herrmann, who had been absent in Mexico, returned to New York on
April 18, 193 1.

Herrmann called on Hilken, who had moved to New York from
Baltimore. During an evening spent in consuming a demijohn of
home-made wine, Hilken mentioned his discovery to Herrmann. Herr-
mann sent word to Peto, who finally succeeded in getting the maga-
zine from Hilken on April 27, 193 1.

One can imagine Peto's excitement when he read the message:

i i ._ .__»>

THE QUALTERS HOAX 245

Have seen 1755 [Eckhardt] he is suspicious o£ me. Can't convince him I
come from 19 15 [Marguerre] and 1794 [Nadolny]. Have told him all refer-
ence 2584 [Hinsch] and I, 2384 [Deutschland], 7595 [Jersey City Terminal],
3106 [Kingsland], 4526 [Savannah], and 8545 [Tony's Lab.] he doubts me
on account of my bum 7346 [German] confirm to him thru your channels
all OK and my mission here I have no funds 1755 [Eckhardt] claims he is
short of money send [by] bearer U. S. 25000. — Have you heard from Willie
Have wired 2336 [Hildegarde] but no answer. Be careful of her and con-
nections Where are 2584 [Hinsch] and 9107 [Carl Ahrendt] Tell 2584
[Hinsch] to come here I expect to go north but he can locate me thru 1755
[Eckhardt] I dont trust 9107 [Carl Ahrendt], 3994 [Kristoff], 1585
[Wolfgang] and that 4776 [Hoboken] bunch If cornered they might get
us in Dutch with authorities See that 2584 [Hinsch] brings with him all
who might implicate us tell him 7386 [Siegel] is with me. Where is 6394
[Carl D.] he worries me remember past experience Has 2584 [Hinsch] seen
1315 [Wozniak] Tell him to fix that up. If you have any difficulties see
8165 [Phil Wirth Nat. Arts Club] Tell 2584 [Hinsch] his plan O.K. Am
in close touch with major and influential Mexicans can obtain old 3175
[cruiser] for 50000 West Coast What will you do now with America in the
war Are you coming here or going to South America Advise you drop
everything and leave the States. Regards to 2784 [Hoppenberg] Sei nicht
dum mach doch wieder bumm bumm bumm. Most important send funds
Bearer will relate experiences and details Greetings.

This message, written in lemon juice in a Blue Boo\, had been de-
veloped by Hilken in his cellar by passing a hot iron over it. A brov^^n
imprint of the heel of the iron showed up on some of the pages. A
portion of the message was written in a numerical code, which was
decoded by disregarding the first digit and then reading backward the
other numbers. Thus 1755 stood for page 557 of the Blue Boo\, and by
holding this page up to the light a series of pin pricks was seen, which
if taken in order spelled out the word.

If we now analyze this Herrmann message, we find remarkable
confirmation of the evidence we have already discussed.

The opening sentence, that Eckhardt was suspicious of him, is con-
firmed by Eckhardt's own telegram of April 12, 191 7, which we have
already quoted.

"Can't convince him I come from Marguerre and Nadolny." Here

246 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Hermann is alluding to the February 1916 conference with Marguerre
and Nadolny in Berlin.

"Have told him all reference Hinsch and I, Deutschland, Jersey City
Terminal, Kingsland, Savannah and Tony's Lab." Jersey City Ter-
minal is, of course, Black Tom. Savannah w^as where they were destroy-
ing cotton and infecting horses. Tony's Lab. was Dilger's Laboratory,
at Chevy Chase, where disease germs were propagated.

"I have no funds. Eckhardt claims he is short of money. Send by
bearer U. S. 25000." It may be recalled that Gerdts got |i,ooo from
Hilken and brought it back to Herrmann and delivered a message
that Hilken was sending the remainder by Hinsch, and also that
Woehst in his letters to Hilken and Hilken's father had asked what
had become of the $25,000.

"Have you heard from Willie?" — ^Willie is Woehst.

"Have wired Hildegarde but no answer." Hildegarde is Hildegarde
Jacobsen, Woehst's cousin. This telegram which Herrmann refers to
was actually intercepted by the United States authorities at the time,
and Department of Justice records of 1917 show that Miss Jacobsen
was questioned as to the meaning of this telegram. She later testified
that she did send Herrmann a reply to this telegram but that it was
evidently sent to the wrong address.

"I don't trust Carl Ahrendt, KristofiF, Wolfgang and that Hoboken
bunch. If cornered they might get us in Dutch with the authorities.
See that Hinsch brings with him all that might implicate us. Tell him
Siegel is with us." Here is proof that Kristoff was a German agent.
Hilken and Herrmann were American citizens, and, therefore, had
more to fear. Siegel will be dealt with later.

"Where is Carl D.? He worries me. Remember past experience."
This refers to an incident described by Herrmann in his 1930 afi&davit.
According to Herrmann, Carl Dilger, Anton Dilger's brother, was in-
clined to be indiscreet, and so they sent him to Germany with a coded
message asking Section III B to keep him over there until the end of
the war. To their surprise, Carl Dilger returned with incendiary pen-
cils hidden in the false bottom of his trunk. And when asked if he had
delivered the message, he confessed that on the approach of a British
cruiser he had grown afraid, and thrown it overboard.

THE "qUALTERS HOAx" 247

"Has Hinsch seen Wozniak ? Tell him to Rx that up." It will be re*
membered that Herrmann testified when examined by the American
and German Agents in 1930 that he had paid Rodriguez $500 but
that he had not paid Wozniak. This was evidently worrying him;
therefore he told Hilken, the paymaster, "to fix that up." "Tell Hinsch
his plan O.K can obtain old cruiser for 50000 West Coast." This re-
fers to the guns which Hinsch sent across the border to Mexico to
mount on a boat with which he intended to raid American merchant-
men plying on the West Coast.

"Regards to Hoppenberg. Sei nicht dum mach doch wieder bumm,
bumm, bumm." Translated this reads: "Don't be dumb. Make again
boom, boom, boom." Hoppenberg was the manager of the Eastern
Forwarding Company. Herrmann explains this passage by stating that
at the time of the Black Tom explosion, Hoppenberg's windows were
shattered; and that, when he jokingly complained about it to several
German agents who were gathered in his office, they told him that
they would soon again be making "boom, boom, boom."

The obvious object in Herrmann's mentioning so many past events
in his message was to furnish proof that it was genuine and had
actually come from him. Von Eckhardt had doubted his identity, and
he wanted to make doubly sure that Hilken would not do the same
thing.

The filing in evidence of the Herrmann message, which was done
on July I, 1931, before the Boston hearing immediately precipitated a
battle of experts. The Germans claimed that it was a forgery; that the
date of the magazine meant nothing, since a back number could have
been bought in some second-hand bookstore and the message written
and pricked in it. On their side the Americans produced expert testi-
mony to show that the penetration of the lemon juice writing to the
reverse side of the paper was an index that it had been done on the
paper when new, and that the spongy nature of the pin perforations
indicated that they had been made in new paper. The only point the
Germans conceded was that the message was in Herrmann's hand-
writing.

Germany's main expert was Albert S. Osborn, the well-known au-
thority on handwriting and all forms of questioned documents. Such

248 THE ENEMY WITHIN

was Osborn's reputation that, acting upon the suggestion of the Amer-
ican Agent, the Commission had tried to secure him as an independent
expert for itself rather than for either party in the case. Osborn, pre-
ferred, however, to act in a partisan capacity for Germany.

As the American claimants expressed doubts whether Osborn really
had been previously retained by Germany, and also in view of subse-
quent developments, it is as well to take note of the somewhat re-
markable letter which Osborn wrote to Dr. Tannenberg at this period.
The following is an extract:

. . . The condition the matter is in now is simply as to who is to be my
employer and who is to pay me.

This claim represents, I think, a larger amount than any case in which I
have ever appeared, and of course if my services should be valuable the
charge for the services naturally should be consistent with the case and the
work done. My arrangement in cases of this kind is a fixed preliminary
charge for an examination, which determines whether or not I am to be
in the case. Then my charge is not a per diem charge in any way but is a
"fair and reasonable" charge consistent with the circumstances of the case
and the value of the service. I of course cannot take a case on a contingent
fee, like a lawyer, but the matter can be left in this somewhat indefinite way
so that the fee finally will depend upon the importance of the case and the
value of the service.

Commissions, as a rule, have a tendency to cut charges and limit them
unduly, which I suppose is a natural result in order to avoid possible
criticism.

There is, of course, another question here and that is the ethical question
of whether I could appear for the Commission, having been retained by the
German government in this same case at a previous hearing. I would not,
of course, appear for the Commission without your approval and I think I
should require this approval in written form so that I would be relieved of
any possible criticism for appearing in the case for others than those by
whom I was first engaged. I am very particular about these matters, and of
course if you say that you prefer that I should appear before the Commission
for you, I shall feel obliged to do so on account of my previous employment
in the case.

All this, of course, is not presuming that I am appearing in the case for
the German government, for the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, and

THE **QUALTERS HOAx'* 249

for the Commission, but that I am simply at the present time being asked to
appear for the Commission.

Of course it would be perfectly proper, I think, for you, if you see fit to
do so, to say to the Commission that you had already interviewed me on
more than one occasion and that under the circumstances it perhaps would
be better for me to appear for the German government.

Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Bonynge now knew that Osborn
maintained he had been employed earlier by the German Agent, he
wrote to the Commission stating that he was still anxious that Osborn
should appear as an independent expert for it. When approached on
the matter, the German Agent agreed to release Osborn but on certain
conditions, one of them being that under no circumstances was Osborn
to disclose any of the discussions that he, the German Agent, had
previously had either with Osborn or his son. These conditions were
not acceptable to Mr. Bonynge, and consequently the matter was
dropped.

To meet the battery of German experts, the American claimants
assembled an even more formidable array of the leading authorities
here and abroad.

Finally, for an expert opinion on the handwriting, they employed
Elbridge W. Stein on Osborn's recommendation. As later the Ameri-
can Agent submitted a brief accusing Osborn and Stein of collusion,
this fact should be borne in mind.

What impresses the layman chiefly in reading through the volumi-
nous findings of these experts is that the expert opinion of those on
one side could disagree so diametrically with the results of the same
tests as applied by those on the other side. There was disagreement on
the absorbent quality of the paper at the time it was written on, the
nature of the pen cuts and abrasions caused when writing the message,
whether or not the heel marks left by the iron in the margins were
intensification of a yellowing which had already occurred there before
ironing, and finally on the difference between pin pricks in old and
new paper. So bitter was the conflict between them that Osborn did
not hesitate, when criticizing an exhibit produced by the United States
Bureau of Standards, to declare that it was of "a most peculiar char-

250 THE ENEMY WITHIN

acter." He then continued that "it is, of course, charitable to say that
the inaccurate statement is a blunder, but it is difficult to understand
how an error of this kind could be made by an experienced examiner."
This immediately brought back the rejoinder that the test made by
Osborn was "wholly unscientific and unfair."

It was, however, on a point which had nothing to do with the rela-
tive age of the message and the paper on which it was written that the
controversy reached its height, and which in the end once again led
the American claimants to accuse Germany of fraud in what they
termed the "Quakers Hoax."

An examination of the table of contents of the Blue Boo\ in which
the Herrmann message was written shows pencil checks on the margins
of the pages, against eleven of the fifteen titles listed. Of the eleven titles
checked, seven are checked with horizontal dashes resembling minus
signs, and four with cross marks resembling plus signs.

But when the magazine containing the Herrmann message first
came into the hands of Peto and Peaslee, neither they nor any of those
associated with them had noticed these check marks. They were, there-
fore, entirely at a loss to understand Germany's purpose in suddenly
producing 409 assorted copies of Blue Boo\, Red Boo\, and Adventure
magazines of which 154 contained check marks against stories in the
tables of contents, 137 of which were horizontal dashes, and 17 were
crosses in the form of plus signs.

According to an affidavit executed by Meyers of Abraham's Book
Store, which deals in second hand books and magazines, these
magazines came into Germany's possession in the following man-
ner: In October 1931 a man calling himself Osborn telephoned and
asked Meyers if he had a copy of the Blue Boo\ for January 1917
— the same issue in which was written the Herrmann message. Meyers
informed his questioner that he was out of it. A day or two afterwards,
on October 28, 1931, Osborn paid a visit to the store, bought a copy of
the Blue Boo\ for December 1916, and asked Meyers to get him a
copy of the January 1917 issue. Osborn also questioned Meyers about
the sales of the latter issue, and was informed that several months
previously he had sold the only two copies he had had in stock.

On November 5, 1931, Osborn again visited Abraham's Book

THE **QUALTERS HOAx" 25I

Store, this time accompanied by Dr. Tannenberg. Both of them ques-
tioned Meyers closely about the above two sales, and finally Osborn
asked Meyers if he would sign an affidavit outlining the details. Before
leaving the store Dr. Tannenberg purchased all the Blue Books for
19 1 7 which Meyers had in stock.

On the next day Dr. Tannenberg appeared at Abraham's Book Store
alone and secured from Meyers an affidavit to the effect that between
February and April 193 1, one of the two copies of the January 1917
Blue Boo\ which the store then had in stock was sold to a man who
"wore an overcoat" and who he "vaguely remembers" was "tall and
possibly between thirty and forty years old." Later, in commenting on
this description, Mr. Bonynge stated in his brief that "it was implied,
of course, that this must have been Herrmann." It may be remembered
that Herrmann was a man of exceptional height and was at this time
thirty-five years old. It seems curious that Meyers should have been
called upon to describe a customer whom he had seen for a few min-
utes nine months ago. It was also strange that all the corrections in
this affidavit were made in Dr. Tannenberg's handwriting, as were
also the verifications of these corrections; Dr. Tannenberg himself
initialed them with the capital "M." But Meyers later stated that he had
given his consent to Dr. Tannenberg's doing this.

It may be noted that Traynor, an American investigator, had pur-
chased a copy of the January 1917 Blue Boo\ for the claimants' records
at the same store some time after the Herrmann message magazine had
been filed with the Commission. It just so happened that on October
28, the very day Osborn visited Abraham's Book Store, Stein, the
American claimants' expert, was informed of the purchase. This fact
became invested with great importance in the minds of the American
lawyers.

After the purchase of the magazines from the book store, Germany
put forth the ingenious argument that the similarity between the
markings in the magazines Dr. Tannenberg had purchased and those
in the Herrmann message magazine was proof that the latter, like the
former, was obtained from Abraham's Book Store in 193 1, and there-
fore could not have been in Herrmann's hands in 1917.

In support of this theory Germany put in evidence affidavits ob-

252 THE ENEMY WITHIN

tained from the Quakers Brothers, Horace and John, wherein they
told a story substantially to this effect: Horace had been, since 191 1, a
reader of Blue Boo\, Red Book,, and Adventure, and also of the Cos-
mopolitan. It was his invariable custom to check, in the tables of con-
tents of these magazines, the title of every story which he read. He did
this by making horizontal dashes resembling minus signs. Thereafter
John read the magazines, and it was his invariable custom also to
check in the tables of contents the title of every story which he read.
He did this by drawing vertical lines across the horizontal lines previ-
ously made by his brother, Horace, thus producing crosses. Except for
possible very rare instances, John never read a story which Horace had
not previously read.

This sequence of marking was in fact the keynote of the Quakers
story and was urged by Germany as proof of the fact that the Herr-
mann message was written in a Quakers magazine since + marks
appeared on the table-of-contents pages of the magazine containing
that message. The American experts immediately made the conven-
tional tests to determine the sequence of the marks on the Herrmann
message and the actual sequence turned out to be just the reverse.
While this was a vital point, the German experts, although aware of
the test, never made it or, if they did make it, their results were never
filed; and the accuracy of the American experts' findings on this point
were never questioned.

Some time near the end of 1930, Horace Quakers sold to Abraham's
Book Store the magazines which he had been accumulating since 1911.
This sale, according to Horace's affidavit, included complete sets of the
Blue Book for each year from 1911 to 1929, inclusive. If the Quakers'
story were true and if it could be demonstrated that the Hermann
message magazine had been marked in the same manner as their
magazines, the presumption would be nearly irrefutable that Herr-
mann was the tall man mentioned in Meyers' affidavit and that he had
faked the message.

As a result of his examination of the Herrmann message magazine,
Osborn, the expert for Germany, stated that "a different pencil was
used in making the vertical, or nearly vertical stroke than was used to
make the horizontal stroke." In this he was in flat disagreement both

THE **QUALTERS HOAx" 253

with Gurrin and with Heinrich, the American experts, in whose
opinions not only both strokes in each cross mark were made at one
time, by one person, with one pencil or type of pencil, but that there
is a similarity of pencils in all the marks in the Herrmann message
magazine — dashes as well as crosses — with one possible exception.

After the passage of the Act of June 7, 1933, permitting witnesses be-
fore the Commission to be examined under subpoena in open court,
John Quakers was so examined. Testifying with the Herrmann maga-
zine before him, he said:

. . . The marks do not look like my brother's, that is the cross marks are
not mine because I never made a mark like that. These marks are too small.
Q. You never made such a small mark as that?
A. No, I never did.

Q. Now look at the original magazine [the one in which Herrmann wrote
the message] and state again whether those marks, the vertical marks in the
cross marks, were marks made by you?

A. They were not made by me.

On July 18, 1932, Dr. Tannenberg had Horace Quakers go to Wash-
ington to inspect the Herrmann message magazine, and took from him
an affidavit which stated:

The horizontal pencil marks on the table of contents of this January, 1917,
copy of the Blue Boo\ magazine also look exactly like the marks I used to
make. . . . There is no doubt in my mind that these horizontal marks were
made by me in that particular copy . . . and that this is one of the magazines
. . . sold ... to Abraham's Book Store.

Horace had refused to be examined by the American Agent, or on
his behalf, before the hearing, but when subsequently examined under
subpoena he made it clear that some of the horizontal strokes in the
Herrmann message magazine were certainly not his, and gave other
testimony damaging to the good faith of the German Agent in the
taking of his affidavit.

In his testimony under subpoena, Horace stated that the condition

254 THE ENEMY WITHIN

of the Herrmann message magazine was "entirely different than the
magazines I sold to Abraham's," but that Dr. Tannenberg or Dr.
Grossmann explained that the magazine had been much handled and
might have been artificially aged; he also stated that his identification
of the magazine for Dr. Tannenberg was based solely on some of the
horizontal marks, saying, "my affidavit was on the basis of the marks
which I recognized and not those that I did not recognize." Asked if
the horizontal marks were not similar to those anybody might make,
he said, "They naturally are but there is something about them that led
me to believe they are mine, the stories they are opposite and the gen-
eral looks of them." When told that the expert evidence showed that
the horizontal strokes in every one of the four crosses had been made
after the vertical strokes, he said that, if this were so, it would change
his opinion.

Apart from the foregoing, the physical characteristics of the
Herrmann message magazine themselves indicate that the maga-
zine was not a Quakers magazine and that it was not sold from
Abraham's Book Store in 1931. The cover had been separated from it
with no indication that it had been recently removed. The last page of
the last story was at some time carefully torn from the magazine. The
general state of deterioration was far beyond that of any of the maga-
zines identified as Quakers magazines. On the other hand it was in the
condition to be expected of the magazine sent by Herrmann to Hilken
in April 1917.

Finally, when the American claimants introduced Herrmann to
Meyers, the latter stated that he was positive that Herrmann was not
the man whom he described to Dr. Tannenberg as the person who had
bought a Blue Boo\ of the same issue as the one in which the Herr-
mann message was written.

Herrmann testified that the magazine he used for the message was
bought by him in Havana in 1917, when he was on his way from the
United States to Mexico, and that he had taken the magazine along
with him to read on the journey.

In their frantic endeavors to prove the message a forgery, the Ger-
mans pointed to the Gerdts affidavit in which he stated that the
message was written in a book of poetry. They also endeavored to

<< ._ .__>>

THE QUALTERS HOAX 255

show that all the agents in Mexico were furnished with secret ink, and
that, therefore, Herrmann would not have used lemon juice. Finally,
there was the usual affidavit of denial from Hinsch, who stated that
Hilken in 19 17 showed him the message which Gerdts had brought
from Herrmann. He affirmed that this message was a very short one,
written not in a magazine but in a bound volume with heavy covers on
it, 8 X 5 inches in size, and that the message consisted merely of an
identification of Gerdts, with an added request for money, and a re-
mark that Gerdts would report orally.

The American investigators now played a trump card. In the mean-
while, Siegel, the man whom Herrmann mentioned in the message as
being with him in Mexico City, was uncovered by Herrmann in Reval,
Esthonia. Herrmann found among his papers an old address of SiegeFs
in the Baltic Provinces, and by good luck a letter addressed to him
there was forwarded on to the right destination. After a reply had come
back from Siegel, Herrmann was sent to Europe to get a statement
from him. Siegel was delighted to see Herrmann; they chatted about
old times, and, finally, according to Herrmann, he told Siegel about the
Commission and explained to him that both sides had agreed to tell all
they knew in order to arrive at the truth. Siegel agreed to write out a
statement outlining what he knew about the Blue Boo\ message, but
balked at having it notarized, explaining that Reval was a small town
and that he did not want an Esthonian notary to know about his Ger-
man activities during the war. Therefore Herrmann accepted the fol-
lowing signed statement from Siegel, and dispensed with the notarial
seal (translation):

My name is Adam Siegel; I was born on October, 1883, at St. Petersburg;
I am a German National, at present living in Reval, Estonia.

Late in March or early in April, 1917, on board the Spanish steamer
Monserrat, I met Fritz Herrmann accompanied by Raoul Gortz Pochet, en
route from Havana to Vera Cruz.

From Vera Cruz we traveled together by rail to Mexico, D. F., where we
stopped for the time being at the Hotel Cosmos. In the lobby of the Hotel,
on the evening of our arrival, we became acquainted with a Major Schwierz
of the Mexican Army at whose advice we moved soon afterwards to the

256 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Hotel Juarez, belonging to a certain Otto Paglasch. This was a very poor
hotel, but very cheap.

I informed Herrmann of the manner in which I escaped from the Russian
internment and told him also that while I had no money, I had much time,
and also a desire to undertake something in the interests of Germany, par-
ticularly as I had not succeeded in working myself through to Germany.

On the day after our arrival, Herrmann and Pochet went to see the Ger-
man Minister, Mr. von Eckhardt.

. . . Herrmann having received no news, he enlightened me one day about
his activities, and it was decided to send Raoul Pochet to Baltimore to obtain
funds. He was given an American magazine to take along. The necessary
communications were written crosswise to the print in lemon juice on several
pages of this magazine. The information was written down partly in normal
writing and partly in code; the code words consisted of a cipher and were
to be deciphered in a certain way by means of perforations with a needle.

After the report had first been drawn up on a sheet of paper, I dictated it
to Herrmann; he wrote it in the already mentioned magazine.

Raoul Pochet returned from the U. S. A. about the middle of May, but
brought with him much less money than Herrmann expected, or had asked
for. He reported that Captain Hinsch would shortly thereafter come himself
and bring along the needed funds.

Herrmann showed me today a magazine similar to that used at that time
to send to Baltimore, likewise the photographs of the printed pages on which
the report to Baltimore was written in lemon juice at that time. These above
mentioned photographs were signed by me today.

Adam Siegel.

As soon as the Siegel statement was filed with the Commission,
German agents rushed to interview him. What they told Siegel is not
known, but the affidavit signed by him before the German Charge
d' Affaires in Reval is in evidence. In it Siegel charged that Herrmann
represented himself as acting on behalf of Germany, and claimed that
when he handed Herrmann the statement, he thought he was testifying
for Germany. In this affidavit Siegel gave the following version of the
role he played in the writing of the Herrmann message:

The secret message came about in the following way; Herrmann had
drafted it without my having anything to do with it and asked me — since

C i . . „ > >

THE QUALTERS HOAX 257

it is difficult to write with invisible ink — to dictate it to him. This I did. I
also recall that the message was written in a printed volume but — in view
of my secondary role of the one who dictated — I can no longer swear whether
it was a magazine or bound book. It seems to me quite possible that the
printed volume was smaller than the sheets shown to me by Herrmann. The
size may well have been 8x5 or 9x6 inches.

Siege! then said: "Nor do I longer recall today whether the message
. . . was written on printed or unprinted paper." And he went on to add
that he was "present when the writing was done and the printed vol-
ume was handed to Gerdts and know positively that during that time
single sheets of the printed volume were not pricked with a needle
under certain letters." Siegel, finally, stated that most of the names in
the message were unknown to him until read over to him by Herr-
mann at the time of their meeting in Reval.

The American claimants' answer to Siegel's denial was that it was in
keeping with Germany's general policy, and that pressure had been
brought to bear on him to make it. They further added that even if
Herrmann did represent himself to Siegel as an emissary of Germany
— which Herrmann denies — that this was all the more reason why
Siegel told the truth in the statement he gave Herrmann.

Chapter XXIV
THE COMMISSION RULES

We must now turn once again to Wozniak; for, whether intention-
ally or by pure chance, he succeeded in discrediting to some extent the
Herrmann message in the eyes of the Commission.

Six American witnesses had furnished affidavits placing Wozniak in
Mexico in the fall of 191 7 under the name of Karowski, and Germany
had taken such a definite stand that Wozniak was not in Mexico dur-
ing this period and had never used this alias that irrefutable proof cor-
roborating the American affidavits would have constituted evidence of
the highest importance. Accordingly, the American operatives spared
no efforts to uncover the truth, and investigations were set on foot in
Mexico, in the United States, and also in Rawa Russka, the district in
Austrian Galicia from which Wozniak came.

In the last-named area the American investigators sought informa-
tion from the Chief of Police Sochanski, who submitted the following
report (translated from the Polish language) :

In reply to your request which was made in j>erson on March 30, 1932, I
submit the following:

1/ To the north of the village of Wolka Mazowiecka in the district of
Rawa Russka there is a village bearing the name of "Karow." This village
is surrounded by large forests called the "Karowski Forests."

2/ Before his emigration to America in 1912, Teodor Wozniak, who was
born in the village of Wolka Mazowiecka in 1884, worked for some time in
the aforesaid Karowski Forests.

3/ There is a long established custom in Poland that if several persons
bearing the same surname inhabit the same district, in order to distinguish
them from one another, there is added to their surnames the name of the
particular locaUty where they live or with which they are in this or that way
connected.

258

THE COMMISSION RULES 259

4/ The members of the Wozniak family living in the district of Rawa
Russka are very numerous and it is therefore quite probable that a member
of said family living or working in the Karowski Forests vv^ould be called
Karowski Wozniak or Wozniak Karowski and in informal conversation or
communications simply Karowski.

It is therefore quite probable that both before he emigrated to America
and after his emigration Teodor Wozniak used the alias Karowski.

signed: for the Wojewod:

Sochanski

Chief of the Surety Division

On the filing of this report, the Germans also started an investiga-
tion in this remote section of Poland. This resulted in stirring up the
inhabitants of Wozniak's native tov^n to a pitch of excitement which
they had not experienced since Ludendorff was there during the battle
of Rawa Russka.

In the meantime McCloy had unearthed in Cleveland two intimate
friends of Wozniak's who had known him since boyhood, one named
Golka, the other, Panas. Both of these men furnished affidavits testify-
ing that Wozniak had written them letters from Mexico in 1917. The
sworn statement of Panas reads in part as follows:

. . . While we were Hving in Scranton and before the receipt of these letters
from Mexico, Wozniak told us that he might go away, that he was apt to
do some traveUng.

Not a long time after receipt of the letters Wozniak came to see us in
Scranton. I cannot recall the date distinctly but I seem to remember that it was
a holiday, probably Thanksgiving Day of 1917, or St. Demetrius Day [a
November church festival in Ukrainia]. He asked us if we had the letters
he had sent us from Mexico and certain other letters we had received from
him, saying that he needed them. We thought it somewhat strange but
searched for them and found them and returned them to him. He destroyed
the letters in front of us and threw them in the coal pail. I remember this
as it seemed very strange, particularly as he gave us no reason for doing it.

These letters had been destroyed, and so there was no proof other

than the word of Golka and Panas that these letters had been written.

This was the situation when, early in 1931, the American lawyers

26o THE ENEMY WITHIN

received information through the U. S. Postal authorities that Woz-
niak had written several registered letters to a Ukrainian named Baran
in Chicago. Baran turned out to be quite a prominent man among his
fellow^ countrymen. He was not only a minister of the church but chair-
man of the Ukrainian Relief Committee.

Baran was brought to New York late in April 193 1 and, in the course
of an interview with Peto, disclosed that he had several letters of Woz-
niak and was sure that several of them were written from Mexico.
Therefore Baran was sent back to Chicago to fetch them while the
American lawyers waited in suspense.

Before delivering the letters, however, he insisted on guarantees that
Wozniak would not be criminally prosecuted because of any evidence
contained in them. He also demanded a fee of $2,500 for compensation
for his time and traveling expenses. But in due course the American
Agent granted permission for the payment to be made, satisfactory
guarantees for Wozniak's immunity were furnished, and Baran finally
handed over the letters on May 27. According to the evidence of these
three Wozniak letters, one was written from St. Louis on August 10,
1917, the other two were written from Mexico City on August 28 and
September 16, 1917, respectively. One of the letters from Mexico City
reads as follows (translated from the Ukrainian) :

Mexico City, August 28, 1917

To Ivan Baran

Preacher

in Labor Temple

E. 14 Street 2 Ave.

Dear Friend:

I wanted to write to you sooner but could not. Those damn Germans do
not want me to write to anyone. Mexico in itself I do not like. The Mexicans
themselves look like bandits. The houses are not big — but there are also
better palaces, for example, as in the vicinity where the German Ambassador
lives — that is, Dennamaca and Liverpool Street. But nevertheless the
churches here are big and the priests are rich. If you think you will learn
Mexican quickly then come here — and make a living. I think that I did
quite wrong by going with the Germans. I am not entirely well — dreadfully

THE COMMISSION RULES ibl

nervous, and in addition to all this it is dreadfully hot here. There is no
place to go and if there were, why it is dangerous and I must listen to the
Germans. But I think that I shall not be here long, I have a little money
and the Germans promise to give more. Do not tell anybody what I have
told you — or what I have written you. If you want to write, then write to
the address F. W. Karowski, Poste Restante, Mexico M.

I shall try to be back soon.

Hearty regards. T. I. Vozniak

When these letters were filed with the Commission, the experts on
both sides once again had a field day. As in the case of the Herrmann
message, the only point the experts could agree on was that they were
written in Wozniak's handwriting. Germany contended that the paper
on which they were written had been artificially aged. As proof the
German experts claimed that the watermark in one of the letters was
made by a dandy-roll prepared for the Mirkow Paper Mills in 1926 by
a Paris dandy-roll maker.

As opposed to this the American Agent produced the testimony of
the owner of the watermark, a Polish paper merchant named Kiper-
man, who stated:

. . . This drawing was sent by me in 1909 or 1910 to the firm of Wargunin
Brothers in St. Petersburg for the manufacture for me of paper with this
watermark. I do not exactly remember whether, in ordering paper in 1909
or 1 910, from the firm of Wargunin Brothers in St. Petersburg, same was
delivered with this watermark. I ordered paper with this watermark from
the Polish paper mills Mirkow, and Saenger, in 1924 or 1925. Since 1928
I have not manufactured paper with this watermark. From the enclosed
photograph, I cannot state whether the paper was made at [by ? ] Mirkow, by
Saenger or by Wargunin Brothers.

The Germans answered by filing evidence that Kiperman could not
have ordered a dandy-roll in 1909 or 1910, because at that time his sale
of paper products was so small that it was improbable that he owned
a watermark of his own.

And so the ball was bounced back and forth from a dozen contro-
versial points. Germany went so far as to accuse some one on the Amer-
ican side of putting age stains on one of the letters after it had been

262 THE ENEMY WITHIN

filed in evidence. This was indignantly denied. The early photostats
were compared with the more recent ones, and once again the experts
were brought into action. The American experts, however, were not
prepared to state that the Wozniak letters were authentic, although sev-
eral stated that they saw no evidence on the face of the documents to
prove their lack of genuineness.

In the meantime one of the most amazing and dramatic episodes of
the whole struggle took place in New York City — a face to face inter-
view between Peto and Wozniak. On May 12, 1931, entirely unex-
pectedly, Wozniak turned up at the Hotel Roosevelt, where Peto was
staying, and demanded an interview. Being suspicious of Wozniak's
motives, Peto sent him away and asked him to return on the following
day. This he did, but in the interim arrangements were made to secrete
two stenographers in an adjoining room to take down all that Wozniak
wished to say.

At 9 A.M. Wozniak was ushered into room 1209, and there Peto
was ready and waiting for him. The two seated themselves in chairs
placed up against the connecting door leading to room 1207; and on
the other side of the door, a few inches away, sat the two stenogra-
phers, Louis Cahan and Joseph Shaffer, of the Bar Association Steno-
graphic Service. From the transcript of the questions and answers it
is obvious that Wozniak's object in visiting Peto was to obtain
money from him in return for a confession. A direct demand was not
made; for each time Wozniak started leading up to it, Peto cleverly
switched the conversation by plying him with questions about the fire.
These Wozniak answered in the belief that there were no witnesses
to the conversation and that consequently he was not destroying his
chances of being paid for a witnessed statement, which alone, he knew,
would be of any value to Peto. In his answers Wozniak confessed that
he had set fire to Kingsland and admitted his association prior to the
fire with German agents, who he frankly admitted were in the Kings-
land plant plotting its destruction. He refused, however, to give any
names or to admit knowing Herrmann. He insistently denied that at
Kingsland he or anyone else had employed incendiary pencils. Instead,
he intimated that the fire was caused by the use of rags soaked with a

The Yukon Tr«U

THE BLUE

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The Vital Evidence in the $50,000,000 Claims.

HE BLUE BOOK

\<\\ 1 * AO. liUKoi,

COVER DESIGN: Painted by ARCHIE GUNN

The Best Short Stories of the Month

The Society Bee.

Mrs. Tib Tmk<r is MxuViS, liy lis.- -(,<!. t
and Mr$. Krckr to 1^. t'hs^ wit'.- ih*

\W ?v\rT Vk Kvne 481

The New Stories of Tarzan, •BvF(^--R-" n. ,..<..,.!,, 515

•'Tarzan and the Black Boy" i> the titic of thi- ;;.

ing tak?s of the wiid-rno^s-rt'ar./d sun of Loni v,.>., .r

Cupid on the Medway Road.

A iovt>-story of that satisfactory, convincinj.: .-<«rt which tl
"Pembma" stories knows so well how to writr.

B\ Walter Jones 528

«-.;!..ii; ■;■ ■.■■'. the ntenionii)i<-

%

"Art Is Art.

By Ellis Parker Butler 558

JaiH'z the jTuileful turns his attention to a para-sitic artist a:,.i ■
scalp hanging at his belt— and a check folded in his wail, t

Down and Out.

By Charles Wesley Sanders 567

A story of the men who ^o down to the hmd on r!i!ir<.ia<i
made her man win his fight against a dangerou> et;

The White Wolf.

a Woman who

Bv Robert Case\ 573

A vivid and terrible drama of the Biack .Hills country. d>'-.(.-r!li.-^i v. ith notable power
by the author of "The Midas Touch" and "Th.- Pay-Streak."

Hoxley Plays a Queer Hand. By Elliott Flower 582

He was a bit dull, was lloxley, but he was not so obt.ii.-e as to refui-.e a s^'oud tiiir;g
offered him on a silver salver; a. story with an unusuai twist. ♦

Trade at Home.

By George A. Brings 601

A business story, pure and simple- that is, it would be if bu.-iiness were Wi-r either
pure or simple. Anyhow, you'll find it m.o.>t intere,st!ng.

THE STORY-PRESS CORPORATION Pulhsher. North Anseruan Bid. CHICAGO

LOL is ECKSTEIN. Prti.i o . ism i hi. .

it M PWKVKS New t-ngUoJ Kfpteseautsvi", *> ( 0*1. -. t a. ^

Eoatftfil a« •K«3«»4 «.!*«» a»««rr July v4, iWA. jt i- i>^i B» e ..t <.>^ wf i .,<r "^ \ t . . 1 M» '. < is"v

MAGAZINETs^'w

1

f. \sN.K i.-)U' Editor.

hy HKRBKRT MORTON STOOPS

Hie Man with One Kan

By Edwin L, Sabin 608

I!.' h;(.l but .-OH- oar. ami he f.-ar.-d i^he Wouldn't
jt r>ut, iJui iov.' afHi-Mr. P.urr found a way.

f ree Laiues in Diplomacy. By Clarence Herbert New 617

i- ! :.■ tii.u, u.-; i— ••;; a» arm to .i.nvri a ^o.kI writt-r. Mt^ New is back

• :s nwi'Ah With "A ( ount^-r.-^trok.,' m Svv,'(!,.n." one of his best stones.

The (»reat Turn -Outer.

By Raymond S. Spears 629

Ransdin.

wn }>..s- i^ ts Uk- .disor ol'th*' local {.ai^Tby th« throat™ at»d tht- editor
HV t'> tw'jnhuVi m «ptt»> «>i it.

Three Continued Stones

By Arthur Somers Roche 49Sy | ..

rnent of this fa.scinatinK mystery-story by the author of the famous -
»%' nrvad* > the camp of bm enemy; and so he finds sssm the irirl

Vagabonds of Chance. Bv Georire Washington Ogden 536

Thi- n..v..I is big in theme and in treat-
-r typ* s that have made our frontier so

The l^oyal fUue ( rci-sus. By James Francis Dwyer 592

- ^^"^y''^ " .Strang.. ,|ut'st to tropic San
i-\' -Jihair: Laone .strik*-^ down The Red

A Complete Book-Length Novel
The Yukon Trail By Wilh'am Maclxod Raine 636

Afh.. ^n'il,.sh,rvof Ata.lu. r..p»'t*>with.wiftartH.^^

i •; !r,ik-«* 4rt«j- thst ttof !a tfct

Frederick Hinsch and His Wife in
Mexico in 1918.

Raoul Gerdts.

They Know the Story Behind the BLUE BOOK Message

THE COMMISSION RULES 263

liquid in which something, presumably phosphorus,* had been dis-
solved.

The conversation had reached this point v^hen suddenly one of the
stenographers coughed. Wozniak jumped up in a rage, rattled the
locked door, looked through the keyhole, and claimed that it opened
into a closet in w^hich w^itnesses v^^ere hiding. Peto protested that it was
simply the door of the adjoining room. This seemed to enrage Woz-
niak still further. He rushed out of the room and tried to get into the
next room through the door leading into it from the corridor. Peto, now
thoroughly alarmed, called Joseph Farrell, one of the assistant man-
agers of the Roosevelt, who eventually calmed Wozniak and escorted
him out of the hotel.

When the stenographic notes in affidavit form and the Wozniak let-
ters were filed with the Commission, the American Agent moved
to have Wozniak examined before the Commission; but Dr. Tannen-
berg refused his consent, and wrote a letter to Mr. Bonynge, the im-
portant part of which stated:

When I returned to this country at the end of March, 1931, I had several
conversations with Wozniak. In these conversations he indicated very
strongly that he expected payment of a large sum by us. I advised Wozniak
that no such payment could be made. Wozniak repeated his requests at every
conversation I had with him and, finally, advised me that if his request was
not complied with, he would accept an offer which had been made to him
and which would cause me great regret. I, thereupon, broke off my relations
with Wozniak and have not seen him since.

This letter clearly indicated the defense which Germany intended
to adopt.

As a result of the finding of the Herrmann message and the Woz-
niak letters, and also because of other additional evidence which had
been uncovered by the American investigators, a petition for a rehear-

* Feuerwasser (fire water), phosphorus dissolved in carbon disulphide, or other
solvent, was a well-known German incendiary device. The solvent evaporated
rapidly, leaving the finely divided phosphorus to burn spontaneously with a
white hot flame that ignited all inflammable material in reach.

264 THE ENEMY WITHIN

ing of both the Black Tom and Kingsland cases and a reconsideration
of The Hague decision on the basis of this newly discovered evidence
v^as filed by the American Agent with the Mixed Claims Commission
on July I, 1931.
A hearing was held upon this petition at Boston in the summer of

193 1. But before a decision was reached Mr. Boy den, the Umpire, died.
Some time after that, by the agreement of both governments, Mr.

Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of the United States
was appointed to succeed Mr. Boyden, and from November 21 to 25,

1932, the Mixed Claims Commission once again met to consider not
only the new evidence presented at the Boston hearing but also a large
amount of additional evidence which had been filed by both govern-
ments in the interim.

The arguments based on the evidence which has already been fully
covered in the preceding chapters were forcefully presented by the
Agents appearing for their respective governments. So able was the
presentation, and so controversial was the nature of the evidence, that
when it came time for the Commission to render its decision, the Amer-
ican and German Commissioners, the two Judges, were in complete dis-
agreement. Accordingly, on November 28, 1932, they executed and filed
a certificate of disagreement in these cases, and thereby certified to the
Umpire for a decision all the evidence covered at the hearing (except
the question of the jurisdiction of the Commission to reopen a decision
previously rendered by it at The Hague). The Umpire in a decision
handed down on December 3, 1932, (the German Commissioner con-
curring), dismissed the petition for a rehearing. The American Com-
missioner filed a separate opinion on December 2, 1932.

In his opinion, the Umpire adjudged the Wozniak letters to be
fraudulent. With regard to the Herrmann message, the authenticity
of which it was incumbent on the Americans to prove, he was unable
to decide whether it was genuine or not. In analyzing its context, Mr.
Justice Roberts stated in part:

The document comprises 254 words. Those that have to do with the re-
quest for money amount to only twenty. All the remainder are wholly
irrelevant to the purpose in hand But enough has been said to show in

THE COMMISSION RULES 265

how extraordinary a manner this document dovetails with all the important
and disputed points of the claimants' case and how pat all these references
are, not to the request for funds but to the claimants' points of proof

said:

Concerning the testimony of the experts, the Umpire

It remains to consider whether these doubts can be resolved by recourse
to the expert testimony. This consists of about one thousand pages. The
questions submitted to the experts are in my belief novel. They involve at
the foundation certain known qualities of ink and paper. But as one reads
the testimony on both sides one is impressed with the fact that the experts
themselves had to resort to experiment with lemon-juice writing on new and
old paper to reach their conclusions. Many of the opinions of the experts
on the one side are countered by diametrically opposite results stated by those
on the other. I agree with the arguments of both Agents that certain of
the experiments and tests which they criticize are not beyond fair criticism
and fail to carry conviction. I entertain no doubt that all the experts retained
by both litigants were inspired by a desire to do their honest best with a very
difficult problem... on the expert evidence alone my judgment would be
left in balance as to the authenticity of the document ... at best, expert
evidence can usually be only an aid to judgment, and not always in and of
itself so conclusive as to carry conviction.

In summarizing his opinion on the message, the Umpire stated:

As has been indicated, the testimony offered on both sides with respect to
the message, to say the least, raises grave doubts with regard to it. The
sources from which it comes [the evidence of Hilken and Herrmann had
been disbeUeved at The Hague hearing], the circumstances of its production,
the evidence as to the time and circumstances in which it was written, and
the silent but persuasive intrinsic evidence which is drawn from its contents,
makes impossible an affirmative conclusion in favor of the claimants and
against Germany. The claimants have the burden to estabfish, by a fair
preponderance of evidence, that this document was written and sent at the
time claimed. With every disposition to avoid technicality, to be liberal as
to the interpretation and effect of evidence, and to regard the great difficulties
under which the claimants have labored in the production of their proofs,
I yet find myself unable to overcome the natural doubts and misgivings
which cluster about this document. I am not, therefore, prepared to make a

266 THE ENEMY WITHIN

finding that this is the missive which Herrmann dispatched to Hilken in
1917.

Prior to handing down his decision, he went on to add:

It must be borne in mind that whatever may be the belief of any Member
of the Commission with respect to Germany's general attitude and the
motives or purposes of its agents, or with respect to the equities of the
claimants, or that Germany is disentitled to favorable consideration by
reason of her general poUcy as to American-made munitions and supplies
for the Allies, this Tribunal sits as a court with the obligation to ignore
any such considerations and, however liberally construing rules of evidence,
is still bound to act only upon proof which reasonably leads to the con-
clusions upon which liability is consequent.

And finally he concluded his opinion by handing down the follow-
ing decision:

... it is my opinion that if the new evidence were formally placed on file
and considered in connection with the whole body of evidence submitted
prior to the Commission's opinion of October 16, 1930, the findings then
made and the conclusions then reached would not be reversed or materially
modified. . . .

As soon as the findings were handed down by the Commission, the
American Agent referred the matter of the Wozniak letters to the
Department of Justice in order that Wozniak and Baran might be
indicted if it were found that a fraud against the United States had been
committed. After fourteen months the Department of Justice reported
to the State Department that it was not disposed to seek an indictment
as, among other things, it "entertains considerable doubt... as to
whether the letters are in fact spurious."

It must also be stated that the American lawyers themselves enter-
tained some doubt about the authenticity of the letters, chiefly because
they were not entirely satisfied that the watermark was in existence in
19 17. In view of this they suggested to the American Agent that he
withdraw the letters from evidence rather than allow them to remain
subject to doubt as to the date of the watermark. After giving the

THE COMMISSION RULES 267

matter consideration, the American Agent took the responsibiHty of
not withdrawing the letters, mainly for the reason that even if the
letters were false, as neither he nor counsel were convinced was the
case, they would still serve to prove what had been contended from
the start, — that Wozniak was a perjurer and fraud whose statements
and protestations of innocence filed by Germany could not be believed.
There is no doubt, however, in the minds of the American lawyers
that actually the submission of the letters was a tactical error; for, in
their opinion, the Wozniak letters undoubtedly influenced the Com-
mission in its consideration of the Herrmann message.

On June 7, 1933, Congress passed a special act which for the first
time permitted the American Agent to have process issued for the
appearance of witnesses. Making use of this power, Wozniak was sub-
poenaed to appear before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on August 22, 1933. Here once again
he was examined as to his participation in the Kingsland fire.

In the course of this examination he repeated most of the informa-
tion which he had given to Peto at the Roosevelt Hotel. He confessed
that he had been in contact with German agents prior to the fire but
refused to testify as to matters which he believed would involve him
in direct perjury by reason of his former statements on behalf of Ger-
many. With regard to the origin of the fire, he now stated definitely
that it was caused by a rag soaked in phosphorus, which had
been put on his bench by a German agent. He spoke of rewards
which he claimed had been promised him and of the failure of Dr.
Tannenberg to make good such promises. He also produced a letter
he had written to von Papen, then the Chancellor of the German
Reich, complaining of his treatment by the German Agent and asserting
that Germany had been responsible for the destruction of Kingsland.

By this time, however, Wozniak was a completely discredited wit-
ness. But even if his admissions were now of little value, the American
lawyers had gained a point. They had piled up enough evidence to prove
that Wozniak, one of Germany's principal witnesses prior to The
Hague hearing, was not the truthful, frugal, honest type of laboring
man that Germany had then painted him to be.

268 THE ENEMY WITHIN

If the Commission was right in its verdict on the Wozniak letters
and they are fraudulent, immediately a whole host of baffling questions
clamors for an answer. Who inspired the forgeries? Was it a fraud
hatched by Wozniak and Baran? Or did the Germans deliberately
foist them on Peto with a view to discrediting the Herrmann message ?
It must be remembered that Hilken discovered the message in his attic
just before Christmas, 1930. Prior to this the Germans undoubtedly
knew both from Gerdts's affidavit of 1929, and from Hinsch, who was
in Germany, that a message had been written, and that, therefore, there
was always a possibility of its being produced one day. In fact the
Germans never tried to deny the existence of such a message but merely
attempted to prove that the one Hilken produced was not the true
original.

We will leave the reader to his own speculations on these matters
and turn now to what we know was a definite attempt to defraud the
American investigators by means of forged documents. But this time
they were too smart to be caught.

In January 1931 a certain party who had previously been connected
with the Alien Property Custodian's office learned from a Parisian
gentleman by the name of Michel de Taube that certain documents
were available in Europe which would prove Germany's responsibility
beyond doubt for the destruction of Black Tom and Kingsland.

This information was passed on to McCloy, who was stationed in
Paris at the time. He soon found out that de Taube was a professor of
international law and a former member of the faculty of the University
of Petrograd. De Taube had little information to give McCloy beyond
the fact that Count Alexander Nelidoff, a Russian then living in Berlin,
had come to him and said that he had access to vitally important docu-
ments bearing on the case. The Count had further stated that his
interest in the cases had been aroused by what he had heard about The
Hague hearing, then but recently concluded. The Count's reason for
consulting de Taube, or at least so de Taube told McCloy, was to seek
advice on the best way of disposing of them to the Americans. De
Taube had suggested bringing them first to a neutral country before
opening up negotiations.

At McCloy's behest, de Taube promised to communicate immedi-

THE COMMISSION RULES 269

ately with the Count in BerUn. McCloy was anxious to get possession
of the documents as soon as possible, but for some reason or other
their delivery kept being delayed. De Taube alternately assumed an air
of mystery or pleaded that he was a simple intermediary and did not
know what was happening in Berlin. At length, after putting through
several long-distance calls to Berlin, a meeting between Nelidoif and
McCloy was arranged at The Hague. Then, at the last moment, it was
canceled; and the rendezvous was transferred to Spa, Belgium; but
when McCloy arrived there, he found a telegram from Nelidoff which
announced in guarded language that he had suddenly had to change
his plans.

Finally, after a delay of several weeks, McCloy traveled to Berlin
and there had several clandestine meetings with Nelidoff. Nelidoff
appeared constantly on his guard, took the greatest precautions against
being followed, and carried a tear-gas pistol in the shape of a fountain
pen, which to Nelidofl's consternation nearly exploded one night when
in his presence McCloy hastily sought a pen with which to take some
notes. After attempting to get a large sum of money out of McCloy,
eventually, on April 18 Nelidoff handed him the documents on the
understanding that payment would be made only after they had been
examined and found authentic.

On inspection, the documents proved to consist largely of a number
of reports from Nadolny under various dates in 1916 and 1917 relative
to sabotage in the United States. There were also several letters osten-
sibly written by Stresemann concerning the investigation of certain of
the activities of von Papen and von Bernstorff in the United States. The
contents of the documents were such that, if they were proved genuine,
the evidence supplied by them would be conclusive.

Immediately McCloy sent for Gerald Francis Gurrin, the well-known
British handwriting specialist and examiner of questioned documents,
who came to Berlin at his request.

After a cursory examination, Gurrin announced that they had all
the earmarks of being genuine and that, if they were forgeries, they
were remarkably well done. He reserved judgment, however, until he
could make further tests and have a chance to compare the signatures
with genuine specimens, which he was in a position to secure.

270 THE ENEMY WITHIN

These final tests, however, resulted in Gurrin's giving McCloy an
opinion that the documents could not be relied upon as genuine. Mc-
Cloy simultaneously consulted Admiral Hall as to Nelidojfi['s back-
ground and found out through Hall that Nelidoff v^as v^ell-know^n
to the British Secret Service. Shortly afterv^ards McCloy received a
full report from one of its members who seemed to be well informed
about Nelidoff's activities. This report showed that Nelidoff was at
the head of a number of forging experts in Berlin, whose business it
was not only to forge documents of every description but also to de-
liver them with such secrecy and mystery as to make the recipients
believe that they were stolen originals. Their work was almost
perfect, and they were able to get at the material to enable them to
forge any document for which they thought there would be a sale. The
report went on to read that Nelidoff was often employed by the Ger-
man Secret Service to plant so-called official documents on foreign
powers.

It was suggested to McCloy that he lead Nelidoff on to see what he
would produce. At the same time, he was advised to be careful and not
to trust any of Nelidoff's associates, but to play with them with the
knowledge that he was dealing with a shrewd and powerful band of
super-crooks.

McCloy preferred, however, to let well enough alone. After taking
photostats of the documents he returned them to Nelidoff and for the
time being heard no more of him.

On November 13, 193 1, the B, Z. am Mittag, the Berlin midday
newspaper, carried the following story (translated from the German) :

COUNT ALEXANDER NELIDOFF ARRESTED
ACCUSED OF COUNTERFEITING

The erstwhile Russian Guard Officer, Count Alexander Nelidoff, a striking
and elegant figure out of the Czarist Court circles, a near relative of the
Russian Ambassador who died in Paris in 1910, is at present in the Berlin
jail under the serious accusation of counterfeiting.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Count Nelidoff, who has enjoyed
a first-class education, his first teachers being Jesuits of Brussels, put his great
military knowledge at the service of various governments. He left Manchuria

THE COMMISSION RULES 27I

with the remnants o£ the Horvath Army, came to Constantiople by way
of Japan, participated in the Wrangel campaign, and finally stranded again
on the Bosphorus. There the English and French struggled for influence in
Asia Minor. During the Graeco-Turkish War, and during the Revolution
against Kemal, Count Nelidoff had a finger in the game, now on one, then
on the other side. Afterwards, he came to Berlin, where he managed to gain
entrance into political circles.

In January of this year, the former Russian Officer MammonoflF was
arrested in Stockholm, in whose baggage were found bundles of false
EngHsh pound notes. Mammonoff and NeHdoflF are friends from Russian
days, and are said to have been in touch with each other since. MammonofiF
was later extradited to Germany from Stockholm, on account of criminal
acts committed in Germany.

A few months ago, Count NeHdoff had managed to obtain connections
with some German authority, from whom he received large amounts for
necessary traveUng expenses and disbursements, for services which he prom-
ised to render. When Nelidoff found it impossible to carry out the objectives
he had undertaken, he came into conflict with his employer. He offered to
repay the amount advanced to him, — and paid with English pound notes,
which came from MammonoflF 's workroom.

As it was suspected that he was working in collusion with MammonoflF,
he was arrested, but he denied energetically having received the bank notes
from MammonoflF. In regard to his source of income during recent years,
he is very reticent, and seeks to draw in an alleged British journalist, to
whom he claims to have furnished poUtical documents for some large work.

It would be interesting to know who the German authority was
"from whom he received large amounts for necessary traveling
expenses and disbursements for services which he promised to render."
One cannot help speculating on what objectives he had undertaken
and found "impossible to carry out." Of course they may not have had
anything to do with McCloy, but then it is also possible that they may
have.

One piece of information which Nelidoff gave McCloy was gen-
uine. He spoke of a printed report (unpublished) of a commission
headed by a Professor Delbriick which had included references to Ger-
man sabotage activities in the United States. From other sources, it is
known that a few years after the war such a commission was consti-

272 THE ENEMY WITHIN

tuted to inquire into certain phases of the war; but the publication of
its report was later suppressed by the German authorities. This report,
together with the minutes of the Reichstag hearing which took place
in 192 1 respecting von Rintelen's sabotage mission to the United States,
are yet further examples of evidence which Germany failed to produce
before the Mixed Claims Commission.

Chapter XXV

THE BATTLE CONTINUES

It might be well at this point to pause a moment and take stock of the
position of the American claimants' cause. In The Hague decision given
in 1930 the original claims for damages had been tried and the Ameri-
can evidence had been adjudged inconclusive in proving German
responsibility for the explosions. And nov^ for a second time their
hopes had been dashed by the Commission's decision of December 3,
1932, rejecting their plea to reopen the cases on the basis of the nev7
evidence contained in the Wozniak letters and the Herrmann message.
But undaunted they continued the fight, believing firmly that Ger-
many vv^as guilty and that sooner or later they w^ould succeed in con-
vincing the Commission. Soon after the second decision they came
upon important evidence v^hich they felt justified them in petitioning
the Court in May 1933 to reopen the cases on the ground that

. . . Certain important witnesses for Germany, in affidavits filed in evidence
by Germany, furnished incomplete, collusive and false evidence which misled
the Commission and unfairly prejudiced the cases of the claimants.

Witzke v^as again located just at this time in Hankow, China, in the
employ of the Hamburg-American Line. Mindful of the fact that Ger-
many had cited his refusal of permission as an excuse for not filing the
notebook with the Commission, the American Agent, through the
Secretary of State, sent the Consul in Hankow the following telegram:

Dec. 22, 1933, 5 p.m.
Confidential
American Consul
Hankow (China) via V.R.
Your telegram No. 47, Nov. i, noon.

Please interview Lothar Witzke and endeavor obtain authority from him
permitting German Agent Mixed Claims Commission to file with Commis-

273

274 THE ENEMY WITHIN

sion notebook delivered by Witzke to Paulig German Foreign Office Berlin
Summer of 1927 under condition that it is not to be delivered to anyone else
without Witzke's permission. This notebook according to record is now^ in
possession of German Agent who takes the position that in the absence of
authority from Witzke his Government has no right to deal with it contrary
to the will of the owner. Witzke may be advised that United States not
interested in possible criminal prosecution relating to matters before Com-
mission. Telegraph results interview.

Phillips Acting

To this the American Consul at Hankow replied as follows:

Hankow via N.R., dated Dec. 31, 1933

Secretary of State

Washington

Dec. 31, 4pm

Department's Dec. 22, 5pm

Have interviewed Witzke whose attitude in brief is, first, that inasmuch
as he turned over five or six notebooks and many papers to Paulig he would
like to know which notebook is referred to and, second, that he wishes the
Germant Agent or German Government to instruct him that it has no
objection to the suggested procedure.

Adams

Thereafter Mr. Martin addressed a letter to Dr. Lohmann, the then
German Agent, requesting him to instruct Witzke that the German
authorities had no objection.

Thereupon, three days after Mr. Martin communicated with Dr.
Lohmann, Witzke had an interview with the American Consul at
Hankow, who reported as follows:

Hankow, (Via N.R.) Dated Jan. 5, 1934
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Jan. 5, 6pm

Witzke called today and stated that since the interview mentioned in my
unnumbered telegram of Dec. 31, 4 p.m., he has examined his personal
records and finds that the notebook which the Mixed Claims Commission
desires to use is one which he has declined to make available to the Com-

THE BATTLE CONTINUES 275

mission and that, with the exception o£ one page which he has already agreed
to make available, he must again decline to allow the notebook to be used
because it contains the names of casual acquaintances who have no real
knowledge of the matters under investigation and whom he does not wish
to expose to inquiry.

Adams

Although he had received no reply to his first letter, Mr. Martin
then wrote to Dr. Lohmann again and stated on the basis of the Con-
sul's radio that Witzke only objected to the filing of the one notebook,
and therefore he requested Germany to file the other four or five.

To this letter Dr. Lohmann merely sent the following acknowledg-
ment:

Mixed Claims Commission

United States and Germany

German Agency Washington, D.C. Jan. 20, 1934

Mr. H. H. Martin
Counsel to the American Agent
Mixed Claims Commission
State Department Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated January 19, 1934, which
you wrote me subsequent to your communication of January 2nd, concern-
ing the same matter.

Yours very truly,

[Dr.] Job. G. Lohmann
German Agent.

It was thus evident from these telegrams and correspondence that,
first of all some one must have prompted Witzke to change his mind;
and secondly, that it was Germany, and not Witzke, who objected to
the filing of the four or Ewt other notebooks.

In connection with the search by the American investigators for new
evidence, there come once again into the picture the Irish agitators
whom Germany had so consistently tried to exploit during the war.

276 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Of all the Irishmen who could have been of help in sabotage work,
there was no one who had greater potentialities in 19 14 than Jim
Larkin. He was a powerful figure in the Irish movement and in the
radical labor movement. He had the very widest acquaintance among
factory workers and longshoremen, the particular men among whom
German agents admit they were especially active. He was quite above
the level of the ordinary rank and file of those Irishmen who were
working under or with German agents in this country. He was pecul-
iarly talented as a labor orator; and, with his radical social views, he
was in an excellent position to effect strikes amongst the munitions
workers or to encourage sabotage.

O'Leary, MacGarrity, Keating, Maguire, and Devoy, famous Irish
leaders at that time, were working closely in this country with the
Germans; but Larkin had qualities which none of them possessed.

The American investigators judged that Larkin must know some-
thing about the German sabotage campaign, and clues supplied by the
Military InteUigence Division of the War Department bore them out.
In 1933 he was located in Ireland, and McCloy had an interview with
him in Dublin and obtained an affidavit which outlined his connec-
tions with German agents in the United States.

Larkin testified that he himself never took part in the actual sabo-
tage campaign but, rather, confined himself to the organizing of strikes
to secure both higher pay and shorter hours for workmen and to pre-
vent the shipment of munitions to the Allies. But because of these
labor activities, which were highly beneficial to the Germans, they
accepted him as one of themselves; and Boy-Ed and other German
leaders constantly tried to get him to use labor for sabotage purposes.
They also admitted him to their inner councils. He was told of the
sabotage headquarters at Lakewood, New Jersey, and was shown
various incendiary devices, one of which, in the light of Wozniak's
later testimony, is of special interest. This device, as he described it,
consisted of small "scent bottles" filled with phosphorus in solution,
a few drops of which sprinkled on papers or rags would cause them to
burst into flames as soon as the liquid evaporated.

Early in 191 6 Larkin was present at a meeting of German sabotage
agents. Various sabotage objectives were discussed; and the destruction

THE BATTLE CONTINUES 277

of Black Tom among other places was decided upon. A plan was
worked out by means of which a barge laden with explosives at one
of the Black Tom piers was to be detonated.

Larkin was walking along Broadway with friends when Black Tom
blew up. Although he had an airtight alibi, he decided it would be
expedient to disappear for a time. He went, therefore, to Mexico City,
where he stopped at the Juarez Hotel. There he met several of the Ger-
man agents and had several interviews with von Eckhardt.

The Germans were still intent on his participation in their sabotage
schemes. He told of a map they showed him on which munitions
works marked for destruction were shown. Enraged by his continued
refusal, they got Otto Paglash, the proprietor of the Juarez Hotel, to
throv/ him out of the hotel. He was broke and was forced to sleep on
a park bench until he received funds from the United States, when he
moved to a more comfortable lodging. It was the luckiest move he ever
made, for on the very morning after he had left the park the tramp
who had taken the bench he had vacated was found stabbed to death.

Concluding that he knew entirely too much for his own good, he
thereupon decided to return to the United States. On the way to the
border he was attacked on the train by three Mexican desperadoes. He
succeeded in beating off their attack, however, and got across the border
safely.

Shortly afterwards he was arrested as an anarchist, was convicted,
and was sentenced to Sing Sing. After the war he was released by
Governor Alfred E. Smith and deported.

On McCloy's return to the United States, he proceeded to check up
on Larkin's statements. In the files of the Military Intelligence Division
of the War Department a report on Larkin and copies of two tele-
grams sent by him from Mexico were found. One telegram read:

Mexico City, Mex. Oct. 17, 1917

Bankson,

Hotel Fresno Eddy St., San Francisco, Calif.
See Markin Pacific Building cable me money through bank vital need
repay later Hotel Turbide.

James Larkin

278 THE ENEMY WITHIN

The other read: "Answer urgent need derelict forward letters Hotel
Juarez cable reply."
The report stated in part:

There is no information concerning the purpose of James Larkin's presence
in Mexico City. From his past conduct it might be inferred that he was
arranging cooperation between German agents and radicals in this country.
However, if this were the case it would hardly seem that he would be wiring
to Bankson in San Francisco for funds.

When Larkin's affidavit was filed the Germans followed their basic
defense by issuing a denial and branding the statement as a lie. Further-
more, through some channel or other they obtained a copy of a cable
from Larkin to McCloy requesting the latter to pay him ^^50 he
had promised. Germany attempted to prove that McCloy had bought
Larkin's evidence. The explanation of the £^^0 is that when McCloy
met Larkin in Dublin, the latter insisted that his attorney should be
present at the interview, and also stated that it was only fair McCloy
should pay the attorney's fees. This he agreed to do immediately on his
return to London. But in the rush of sailing for the United States the
next day, he forgot to send the promised sum. On his arrival in New
York, he found a cable from Larkin reminding him of the matter.

After all these varied investigations, the possibilities of finding new
sources to search for evidence seemed about exhausted; and the Black
Tom and Kingsland investigation appeared to be entering upon its
final stages. But suddenly, through a former British Secret Service
officer, it was learned that there existed in Austria documents
which proved the responsibility of Germany for the destruction of
both Kingsland and Black Tom. Means were pondered of obtaining
the documents without arousing the suspicion of Germany ; experience
had abundantly proved that nothing could be expected of her except
opposition. Furthermore, as there were many indications that Austria
and Germany had collaborated to some extent in the commission of
sabotage in the United States, it was not thought that Austria would
willingly permit her files to be laid open to the Commission. Any
direct questions would have put Austria on guard, and therefore Peas-

THE BATTLE CONTINUES 279

lee and McCloy, with the help of their secret service adviser, decided
to use a little guile in their Austrian investigations.

It v^as decided that the subtlest plan would be to interest a publisher
in the publication of material from the pertinent files relating to the
diplomatic relations of the Central Powers with the United States dur-
ing the World War. As many years had passed since the war and as
students of history were gaining more and more access to files once
closed, they thought some progress in this direction might be made.
Peaslee and his espionage expert realized that two things were neces-
sary— an author and a publisher. A well-known Hungarian historian.
Dr. Otto Ernst, who had published books and articles on material in
the Austrian archives was offered the job of writing a book along the
lines indicated, and Lovat Dickson & Thompson, Limited, of London,
which had published books dealing with German material of a some-
what similar nature, was engaged as the possible publisher. Mr. Lovat
Dickson expressed a willingness to undertake the publication of any
material which Dr. Ernst could furnish, and so advised him. The pub-
lication would certainly have taken place had the studies not been
interrupted, and the contract with Dr. Ernst was entirely bonafide.

Dr. Ernst commenced his work and started sending material to the
publisher. Gradually he was led to direct his researches more and more
to matters relating to the causes of the United States's entering the war
and to matters shedding light on the existence of a sabotage campaign
there during the period of neutrality. Of course, all this was done with
the hope that Dr. Ernst would get on the right track and produce in
the ordinary course of his permitted studies of the Austrian files the
documents in which the claimants were interested.

In the course of his researches Dr. Ernst had the assistance of two
Austrian official archivists, a Dr. Hausknecht and a Herr Schnagl; but
neither of these men had any contact with Peaslee. They were perfectly
innocent officials of the War Archives, who quite openly and properly
supplied material to Dr. Ernst, who they knew would furnish the
material to a London publisher interested in making public the material
they were supplying.

In this way a number of documents relating to German sabotage in
the United States came to light. One of them, which is in the form of

28o THE ENEMY WITHIN

a resume of information distributed by the Austrian Military Intelli-
gence Service, is particularly significant. This resume was based on
information received from German Army Headquarters, and read as
follows (translation from the German) :

United States of America.

According to the latest news 21 more ammunition factories have been
blown up.

The explosion in Kingsland, New Jersey, is reputed to have caused dam-
ages of $17,000,000, while that in the Du Pont Powder factory $2,000,000.

Still further "surprises" are said to be impending.

Vienna, April 27, 1917.

The distribution list at the foot of this document is as follows:

Military Chancellery of His Majesty in Baden and Vienna i each

Operations Division, Supreme Army Command, War Minister i each

War Minister (MS — Operations Chancellery) 6

Col. Kundmann i

Asst. Chief of the General Staff i

Representative of the Foreign Minister with Supreme Army

Command 2

German Representative O. with Supreme Army Command .... i

Commander of the S W Front i

Army Group EH Josef i

Army Group FM Conrad i

Information Division — Supreme Army Command 3

Group E 4

This document and the evidence relating to it show that in 1917 the
German sabotage organization was sufficiently well established in the
United States for German Army Headquarters to report with confi-
dence to the Austrian General Staff that "still further ^surprises' are
impending." The general wording of the report, taken in conjunction
with the last sentence, indicates that the 21 ammunition factories,
including those of Kingsland and Du Pont, were blown up by the Ger-
man sabotage organization.

In view of Germany's repeated assertion that all documents relative

THE BATTLE CONTINUES 281

to the wartime activities of her agents in the United States had been
destroyed, it is of interest to read the following affidavit of Dr. Ernst's:

At the time that this attached document [the resume quoted above] re-
ferring to destruction of factories in the United States was discovered, which
was early in April, 1935, ^ discussed that aspect of my subject with some
of the employees in the Archives, and was advised that it was quite certain
there were in Berlin many documents on this subject. Herr Schnagl referred
to the fact that there is a current exchange of information between BerUn
and Vienna with respect to official records and that frequently employees
of Archives in BerUn visit Vienna and vice versa, and he told me that he
thought it would be easy to have the subject looked into and verified, and
that he would make an effort to do so before my work was completed. He
suggested that a request could be sent by the Austrian Government to the
German Government in Berlin for such records or that he could have some
of the Austrian Archivists who are from time to time in Berlin make a
personal investigation. Not long after that Herr Schnagl advised me that
he had caused a request to be sent to Berlin for the files of Washington
reports from the German Embassy to the Foreign Office in BerUn during
the period 1914 to 1917 to be sent down on loan to Vienna. Subsequently I
inquired of Herr Schnagl whether the files from Berlin had been requested
and had arrived and I was advised that they had been requested but had
not arrived. Herr Schnagl assured me, however, that he had the matter in
mind and would verify the existence of such records in some way before
I concluded my researches. Later Herr Schnagl told me that while he had
not yet been able to procure from Berlin the file requested he had succeeded
in verifying the existence of such files through one of the officers of the
Kriegarchiv in Vienna, Dr. Albin Hausknecht, who had personally been in
Berlin. Dr. Hausknecht is a Major in the Austrian Army and is also employed
as an official in the Austrian Archives. I asked Dr. Hausknecht to supply
me with a letter to my publishers confirming the results of his investigations
in Berlin. A photostatic copy of that letter dated May 20, 1935, is attached
hereto marked "Annex O." I also saw Dr. Hausknecht again two days later
and discussed with him again his visit to Berlin and asked him to give me
more of the details respecting it. He said that he examined records in
Potsdam, am Branhausberg in charge of Dr. Musebeck, Direktor des
Reichsarchivs in Potsdam and particularly documents under the title "Group
A" in charge of Oberregierungsrat Rupprecht. I discussed with him the
question whether the archives were at present easy of access. He said that

282 THE ENEMY WITHIN

he thought it would be very difficult for anyone not an official to have any
access to them for scientific or literary purposes and he mentioned the fact
that he noted that there vvras a man at the door of the building who took a
very careful record of the times to the minutes when persons entered and
left the building. He said that such a record of his visit should be in
existence.

Dr. Hausknecht, an official of the Austrian Kriegarchiv in a perfectly
open manner, with no effort or apparent purpose to do other than
obtain information contained in the Potsdam Archives, in ordinary
course ran across a file which he described in brief but definite manner
in a letter which he wrote to the London publishers:

In connection with the letter [sic] to you of today, you may be also in-
terested to know, that in the last week (16-19 ^^Y ^935) > while I was on
an official archive mission in BerHn, I examined in the German State
Archives a file of reports from the German Embassy in Washington during
the period while Count Bernstorff was Ambassador there, — which described
numerous destructions accompUshed by Germany of ammunition factories
and stores in the United States during that period.

Unfortunately before the researches of Dr. Ernst were completed the
time schedule fixed by the Mixed Claims Commission compelled the
filing of the results of such researches as had been completed. As soon
as they were filed the German Government, of course, was in a posi-
tion to locate the leak and plug it.

Through von Papen, who was now the German Ambassador to Aus-
tria, pressure was brought to bear to bar Ernst, Schnagl, and Haus-
knecht from further research in Vienna.

The statements of the Austrian Archivists given above are evidence
of the existence of the documents they refer to, and they are statements
of men who were unaware of the significance their statements might
have upon the issues of the Black Tom and Kingsland claims. And
yet as we have already shown, Germany has consistently refused to
produce these documents.

In rebuttal of this testimony, Germany introduced no evidence to
destroy the implications of the above resume, but presented two

THE BATTLE CONTINUES 283

Statements of denial from Dr. Hausknecht and Herr Schnagl. With
regard to the above letter which he wrote to the English publishers,
Dr. Hausknecht claimed that Dr. Ernst wrote the letter for him on
official stationery of the War Archives, and that he signed it without
reading it. Dr. Musebeck, Director of the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam,
testified that his recollection is that Dr. Hausknecht did visit the archives
on May 16, 1935, and that he asked for an inspection of the files of
the Supreme Army Command concerning sabotage activities in the
United States, but that he was advised that he would have to conform
to certain regulations before these files could be opened to him.

Chapter XXVI

THE FIRST AMERICAN VICTORY

It was not until May 1936 that a hearing was held by the Commission
on the United States* petition of May 4, 1933, alleging that the Com-
mission had been misled by Germany in the presentation of her evi-
dence. The three years' lapse of time had been caused by Germany.
She had first attempted to claim that The Hague decision was final and
that the Commission lacked the authority to reopen the cases. When
overruled on this point, she had shifted her efforts to impeding the
taking of testimony by the American Agent in the American courts.
She had also used every type of ingenious pretext for delaying the filing
of her evidence.

But at last the Commission met in Washington in May 1936 — three
years after the petition had been filed. The whole issue of perjury, col-
lusion, and suppression of evidence was argued. But the Commission
limited itself to ruling on one point only: the question of whether the
Commission had been misled at the time of the hearing on the Herr-
mann message and the Wozniak letters by a statement of the German
Commissioner's to the effect that the American claimants had sup-
pressed a report by Elbridge W. Stein adverse to the authenticity of the
documents. In view of this failure to decide the complete issue, we
shall limit ourselves to a summary of the arguments on the Stein re-
port and on the allegations of collusion between Osborn and Stein.

In his brief Mr. Bonynge pointed out that Osborn had been the first
to say anything about a suppressed report of Stein's:

Mr. Osborn prepared the way for the story later conveyed to the Com-
mission that claimants had suppressed a report by one of their own experts
adverse to the authenticity of the document. On August 13, 1932, in one of
his three reports of that date, he wrote (An. 78, pp. 1-2) : "The second sur-

284

THE FIRST AMERICAN VICTORY 285

prising reports are from Mr. Elbridge W. Stein, of New York, which merely
express the opinions that the Herrmann message was written by Herrmann
and that the Wozniak letters were written by Wozniak, regarding which
there is no controversy. Mr. Stein is not merely a handwriting expert but
an expert of national reputation on all classes of problems relating to ques-
tioned and disputed documents including paper and ink problems relating
to age of documents. . . ."

This insinuation of Osborn's had aroused some speculation among
the American lawyers at the time, but no particular importance was
attached to it. But suddenly, on the eve of the hearing, Stein wrote a
letter to counsel on November 4, 1932, alleging suppression of a report
he asserted he had made on June 10, 1931 (nearly a year and a half
previously), adverse to the authenticity of the Wozniak letters and the
Herrmann message. He stated in this letter:

The printed report of the argument at Boston [July 30-August i, 1931] in
the Black Tom case leaves no doubt but that the use of my supplementary
report on the handwriting in the Wozniak letters only is a distinct detriment
to my reputation as a document examiner of ability and integrity.

He further stated in this letter that "if my complete report had been
used as evidence no one could misunderstand what my opinion was
regarding the documents." He also alleged that the failure of the
claimants to file the report of June 10 and the use only of the reports
on handwriting had created the impression that he supported the
genuineness of documents which he believed to be fraudulent. He said
specifically, "This I can never allow ... I have sent a copy of this letter
to Mr. Bonynge so that voluntary action may be taken immediately to
correct the unfairness."

Amazed at this letter Mr. Bonynge sent for Stein and in the presence
of three lawyers for the claimants demanded to know how his hand-
writing report had been improperly used at the Boston hearing. Stein
was unable to give any satisfactory explanation, and on the next day
retracted his letter "in its entirety."

At the interview on November 5, Stein was also asked point-blank
whether or not Mr. Osborn or anyone connected with the Commission

286 THE ENEMY WITHIN

knew of his letter of November 4. In reply Stein gave his absolute assur-
ance that the story of suppression had not been communicated to Osborn
or to the Commission, and thereupon the matter was allowed to drop.

This report of June 10, Stein said, took up the entire question of the
authenticity of the documents. However, the claimants contended that
he had been engaged only to report on the handwriting. He produced
an alleged copy of the suppressed report, the original of which he
maintained he had sent to the claimants.

In his brief Mr. Bonynge attacked the truth of these statements on
the following major grounds: (i) His services had not been engaged
until June 16 — six days after he claimed to have made the report. He
therefore had had no reason to make any report whatsoever on June 10.
Furthermore, he had never been informed that the Wozniak letters
even existed until June 16. Yet his alleged report of June 10 contained
a report on them. (2) His alleged report must have been written with-
out any real study of the Herrmann message. The originals of the
Herrmann message and the Wozniak letters had nevei* been left with
him for more than a few hours, but had been studied from photostats
adequate only for the purpose of passing on the handwriting. (3) The
copy of the alleged report of June 10 was typewritten, but the date was
written in by hand.

In summing up, Mr. Bonynge's brief went on to discuss the relations
between Stein and Osborn:

After the Washington decision of December 3, 1932, the American Agent
and the claimants were shocked to learn that, notwithstanding their interview
with Mr. Stein on November 5 and the assurances then given, the story of
suppression had in fact been conveyed to the Commission before the decision.
The story was false. The reasons which had been given by Mr. Stein as to
why the Commission should be informed of his alleged report were baseless.
The letter of November 4 had been retracted. Mr. Stein in fact had no per-
sonal or professional reason for conveying a false story to the Commission.

The claimants recalled Mr. Osborn's connection with the Quakers hoax,
and his use of Mr. Stein to obtain from them the information with which
that story started. It was Mr. Osborn who would be benefited by the passing
on to the Commission of this story of suppression. It seemed apparent that

THE FIRST AMERICAN VICTORY 287

the only avenue by which this story could have reached the Commission
was from Mr. Stein to Mr. Osborn and through him to the German Agent.
Mr. Osborn has indignantly denied collusion with Mr. Stein, but he has not
specifically denied that he passed this story on to the German Agent.

The facts above reviewed speak for themselves and the American Agent
wishes only to add thereto the facts stated below, which show Mr. Osborn's
attitude from the very beginning, without further comment or characteri-
zation.

. . . Mr. Osborn, when approached by claimants, stated to them that he
would request his release from Germany in order to enable him to act for
them, whereas actually, according to Dr. Tannenberg's letter to the Umpire of
September 8, 1931, he made no attempt whatever to obtain such a release.
Instead, he urged claimants to employ Mr. Stein. Having accompHshed this,
as he thought, he refused to substitute a neutral retainer for a partisan
one, the value of which would depend "on the results" obtained. Mr. Stein
and Mr. Osborn talked together about this case, and Mr. Stein's alleged
report is strikingly like Mr. Osborn's own and contains some of the same
manifest errors made by Mr. Osborn

Further on the brief stated:

These sabotage cases are in point. Mr. Stein was not opposing Mr. Osborn,
he was merely occupying a position in the opposing camp. The only question
on which Mr. Stein testified was the question of handwriting, and in this
Mr. Osborn was in agreement. And if Mr. Stein had been employed to pass
on other questions, his alleged report shows that he would still have been
in agreement with Mr. Osborn. The testimony of those who heard his
alleged report read aloud on November 5, 1932, is that it was strikingly
similar to Mr. Osborn's — even to the making of the same obvious errors,
such as that the writing fluid used was colored; and that in writing the letter
"h" in the word "bunch" the pen cut through the paper and wrote the "h"
on the page below. . . . The absurdity of the first of these errors, and the
manifest impossibility of the second, are discussed under the heading "The
Expert Evidence." But it may here be noted that even if Mr. Stein had not
admitted, as he did, that he and Mr. Osborn talked the sabotage cases over
in general together, this fact would still have appeared from the similarity
existing between Mr. Osborn's report and Mr. Stein's alleged report. It would
seem to be impossible that both men, without conference, could have made
both errors.

288 THE ENEMY WITHIN

In rebuttal to these arguments of Mr. Bonynge's the German Agent
filed only a short affidavit by Osborn in which he denied collusion with
Stein and called the charge "a cruel and unwarranted slander." He also
stated that he considered it "unnecessary to dignify these astonishing
charges by reciting them and answering them in detail." Apart from
this Germany filed no evidence in denial.

The identity of the person who had told the German Commissioner
the suppressed report story was never disclosed. We do know, however,
that the Commission had never questioned the American Agent con-
cerning any unfiled report by Stein. During the course of the argument
the Umpire himself gave an account of what had happened:

I have known Mr. Albert S. Osborn (handwriting and questioned docu-
ment expert who appeared for Germany) for many years. When I was in
practice I retained him in connection with several problems arising with
respect to documents whose authenticity was contested. At some time he
referred me to Mr. Elbridge W. Stein as a competent expert in similar
matters. Mr. Stein, at that time, had an office in the Bulletin Building,
Philadelphia. On one or more occasions I consulted him.

Just before the date set for hearing in the sabotage cases (probably some-
time in November, 1932), Mr. Stein attempted to get into communication
with me by telephone. He wished an interview with me concerning the
sabotage cases in which I knew he was a witness for the claimants. I refused
to allow him to communicate with me.

During the meetings of the Commission preliminary to the hearing. Dr.
Kiesselbach (the German Commissioner) advised Mr. Anderson (American
Commissioner) and me that the claimants had suppressed an expert report
adverse to the authenticity of the Wozniak letters and the Herrmann mes-
sage. I cannot say that Dr. Kiesselbach specifically stated the source of his
information.

The communication naturally disturbed me but I knew of no action that
the Commission or I, as Umpire, could take in the premises and so stated.

My impression that there had been some such suppression was strength-
ened by Mr. Osborn's statement, in one of his affidavits, that it was remark-
able that no opinion by Mr. Stein, a competent expert in such matters, had
been submitted as to the age of the documents but only an opinion as to
handwriting, a matter that was uncontested.

In the oral argument, the German Agent made no reference to this matter
and as the American Agent did not refer to it the impression remained that

THE FIRST AMERICAN VICTORY 289

there had been a withholding of a report which might have shed light on
the question argued before the Commission.

When the Commission had heard the arguments of both Agents on
all phases of the American petition for the rehearing, it adjourned to
consider the evidence. It announced its decision on June 6. In the
decision the Commission limited itself to adjudicating one question
only — the effect of the suppressed report story on its decision concern-
ing the authenticity of the Herrmann message and the Wozniak
letters:

In addition, this Commission states through its members present at the
time that there can be no doubt as to the entire good faith of the then
German Commissioner when he made his communication. The Umpire and
the American Commissioner hold, and claimants have shown, that there
was no sufficient ground for suspicion, and that for this reason claimants are
entitled to a reconsideration. The German Commissioner, whilst doubting
that the claimants were actually wrong (especially as in his view mere
suspicions never can be a basic element of juridical findings) takes the stand,
that in international arbitration it is of equal importance that justice be done
and that appearances show clearly to everybody's conviction that justice was
done. He does not think that the second requirement was satisfactorily com-
plied with in the present case, and for this reason he accedes to the conclusion
of the other members of this Commission. It is therefore decided, that the
decision of this Commission rendered at Washington on the 3rd of Decem-
ber, 1932, be set aside. This decision reinstates the cases into the position
they were before the Washington decision was given. It has no bearing on
the decision rendered at The Hague and does not reopen the cases as far
as that decision is concerned. Before The Hague decision may be set aside
the Commission must act upon the claimants' petition for a rehearing.

The Commission also issued a supplementary order for Germany to
produce at a subsequent hearing, the date of v^hich was to be fixed
later, all the documents which she had hitherto refused to surrender.
It also ordered the American claimants to produce certain records
which were needed to clarify the evidence. And, finally, it decided to
call in Stein and Osborn for a special interrogation. The Commission
then recessed preparatory to holding a meeting on June 17 to fix the
procedure to be followed in view of its decision.

Chapter XXVII
THE WILES OF DIPLOMACY

On May 28, 1936, six days before the Umpire rendered his decision set-
ting aside the Washington decision of December 1932, Germany
sprang a surprise. Hauptmann von Pfeffer, a representative of the
German Government, handed to the American Charge d' Affaires in
BerHn a memorandum for telegraphic dispatch to the Department of
State extending an invitation to the American Government to send
over a representative to BerHn in June to discuss an amicable settlement
of the sabotage cases, and at the same time adding the information
that Germany had instructed her representative before the Commission
to apply for "immediate postponement of the pending process dis-
cussion before the Mixed Claims Commission."

On June 4 this v^as followed up by another memorandum from
Hauptmann von Pfeffer delivered to the American Embassy in Berlin
for transmission to the State Department, and w^hich read as follows:

As has become known the proceedings before the Mixed Claims Commis-
sion, Washington, have just been terminated (with the result that the United
States may reopen the main proceedings) . The last point of the declarations
of the German Government of May 28, 1936, which had to do with the
postponement of the proceedings now terminated has thus been transcended
and settled by the developments.

The German Government believes that hereby no change has occurred in
the other points of its declaration and in the mutually discussed arrange-
ments. Minister President Goering would be pleased to receive the American
representatives in the course of the month of June in Germany.

The result was that when the Commission met on June 17 the Ger-
man Agent asked for a postponement; and the American Agent, in
consenting, explained that it was for the purpose of negotiating a set-
tlement.

290

THE WILES OF DIPLOMACY 29I

The claimants were jubilant over this development, and their hearts
quickened at the thought of the shov^^er of gold that v^as about to end
the twice seven lean years of litigation. Mr. Bonynge and Mr. Martin
lost no time in taking ship for Germany, v^here they wxre soon joined
by Peaslee. There were few in the American camp who let their minds
dwell on the last time their champions had set forth on the same
mission.

On reaching Bremen, Bonynge ana Martm were met by Herr von
Deichmann, who had with him credentials establishing that he was a
representative of the German Government; and they were advised that
the German Government desired the negotiations to be held in Munich
with Hauptmann von Pfeffer. Thereupon, accompanied by von Deich-
mann, they left at once for Munich.

Acting in accordance with his instructions from the State Depart-
ment, the American Agent on the first day of the meeting with Haupt-
mann von Pfeffer stated that "his position and that of his counsel were
those of Agent and Counsel respectively before the Mixed Claims
Commission, United States and Germany, and that they were not
authorized or privileged to discuss any other matter pertaining to the
general relations between the two countries and that settlement of the
sabotage claims must be unconditional and not based upon the con-
sideration of any other matter."^

Von Pfeffer accepted this statement, and the negotiations were
limited to a discussion of the sabotage claims. Throughout the confer-
ence von Pfeffer was in constant communication with the Chancellor
himself. Finally, on July 6, both parties reached an agreement; and von
Pfeffer signed the accord for Germany, presumably with the full au-
thorization of his government. This document is known as the Munich
Agreement. Its terms provided that the Black Tom and Kingsland
claims (153 in all, if we add in those of the insurance companies)
should be paid on the following basis : 50 per cent of each claim was to
be paid immediately in cash out of the Special Deposit Account created
by the Settlement of War Claims Act; on some of the claims additional
amounts were to be paid pro rata out of the German bonds which the

* This quotation is taken from a report which the American agent submitted
to the Mixed Claims Commission on April 15, 1937.

292 THE ENEMY WITHIN

German Government had deposited with the United States Treasury to
secure Germany's obHgations under the Act. The equivalent of 50 per
cent of the principal and interest of the avv^ards as of September 17,
1936 (the date to v^hich the Commission had adjourned), amounted
actually to $25,072,572.77; but only $20,000,000 v^as left in the Special
Deposit Account at the time.

The reason for this was that some 6,900 av^ards had been made by the
Mixed Claims Commission, covering all manner of claims vs^hich could
possibly arise from the disruption of the economic and social relation-
ships betv^een the citizens of tv^o great modern states. For the payment
of these claims the Act had set up some thirteen categories dealing
with the manner and the order of payment of funds from the Special
Deposit Account. The awards to American nationals relating to death
or personal injury were paid first. The small awards of under $100,000
were paid next. Awards of over $100,000 were paid last, and then only
up to 80 per cent of the principal plus interest accruing before January
I, 1928, until 80% of the aggregate of all payments authorized to
American nationals had been paid. Thus the last group of award
holders still have certain payments coming to them.

Since the Black Tom and Kingsland claims alone remained to be
adjudicated, and as there was only $20,000,000 in cash left in the
account, none of this money would be available to the other award
holders if the Black Tom and Kingsland claims were paid. It can be
seen from this that the interest of the other award holders in this
balance ^ was highly contingent. There were still, of course, the German
bonds; but, as Germany had defaulted on their interest payment, they
were eyed askance.

But no sooner did certain award holders learn that Mr. Bonynge and
Mr. Martin had gone to Germany to negotiate a settlement than some
of them set out to wreck the negotiations. In this they were not im-
mediately successful; for, before they could take action, the Munich
Agreement had already been signed. But there were still ways and
means of upsetting the agreement.

A prominent New York attorney was retained by some of these

* Actually the award holders were only interested in this balance to the extent
of $7,000,000.

THE WILES OF DIPLOMACY 293

award holders and immediately sent to Germany. Although armed
with no credentials from the United States Government, he called at
the German Foreign Office and there had an interview with a high
official.

The official later reported that the lawyer had informed him that the
United States Government held that the Munich Agreement was not
binding because Hauptmann von Pfeffer had no official standing, as far
as it was concerned, which would enable him to sign international
agreements regarding the sabotage cases. According to the official's
recollections of the conversation, the attorney said his clients were
afraid that the German Government might file the Munich Agreement
with the Commission and ask for awards to be made in accordance
with its provisions.

According to the official, the award holders were determined to fiight
this move in every way possible: by representations to the United States
Government, by Federal court action, and by a newspaper campaign.
They had already induced the Government to permit them to file a
brief with the Commission. If the Commission should rule against
them they planned to take legal action to prevent the Secretary
of the Treasury's paying out money from the Special Deposit Ac-
count. The official further added that the lawyer had told him that his
clients had wanted to start an immediate publicity campaign, but he
had managed to restrain them long enough to give him this oppor-
tunity of attempting to convince the appropriate German officials of
the soundness of the award holders' position.

Naturally the American claimants were greatly incensed at the
action of the award holders — especially when they stopped to consider
that these fortunate ones had already received on an average 107 per
cent of the face value of their initial claims. Mr. Bonynge, however,
ignored the actions of the lawyer and his clients. On January 5, 1937,
he filed motions with the Commission for the entry of awards in favor
of the sabotage claimants in accordance with the Munich Agreement.
In answer to this the German Agent advised the Commission that he
would forward the motions to the German Foreign Office for con-
sideration and that it was his "intention to submit an answer in writ-
ing.

294 THE ENEMY WITHIN

At the same session of the Commission, on January 6, 1937, certain
award holders filed a petition, as the attorney had told the German
official they would, asking for leave to be heard in support of a petition
requesting that the Munich Agreement be rejected as a basis for the entry
of a decree of award in favor of the sabotage claimants. The award
holders claimed that the Munich Agreement was in the nature of an
assignment of funds and that this was illegal, since these funds could
only be disposed of by the Commission after it had made a formal rul-
ing that Germany was responsible for the destruction of Black Tom
and Kingsland.

The German Government, however, was willing to go through with
the Munich Agreement only if it would open the way for general
diplomatic discussions designed to effect a thoroughgoing improve-
ment in the relations between the two countries. When it saw that the
American Government was unwilling to accept this view, it calmly pre-
sented the State Department on April 5, 1937, with a note repudiating
the Munich Agreement in toto. This communication blandly asserted
that the award holders' intervention had cast doubt on the possibility
of ending the litigation before the Commission by an independent
agreement and also maintained that the German Government had
never looked on the Munich Agreement as other than a preparatory
basis for formulating official steps to be taken before the Commission
by the German Agent, The note then went on to say that the German
Government considered diplomatic negotiations of a general nature
a prerequisite to taking any action before the Commission for putting
the Agreement into force. For these reasons, therefore, the German
Government wished to continue the cases pending before the Com-
mission in the status they were in before the Munich conversations.

During a special hearing before the Commission Mr. Bonynge vigor-
ously attacked these German assumptions concerning the Munich
Agreement, maintaining that Germany may have hoped that the settle-
ment of the sabotage cases would pave the way to other collateral agree-
ments with Germany, but that at Munich it was specifically understood
on both sides that the Agreement was not dependent on the settlement
or discussion of any other matter of difference between the two gov-
ernments. Affirming that the Munich Agreement was a solemn and

THE WILES OF DIPLOMACY 295

binding engagement on the part of Germany, he called on the Com-
mission to make awards in favor of the American sabotage claimants in
accordance with the Agreement.

After listening to the arguments of both Agents, the Umpire handed
down a decision on July 7, 1937, that the Munich Agreement was not
enforceable by the Commission as the interpretation of international
agreements was outside its jurisdiction. The Commission also set
September 15, 1937, ^^ the date of the hearing ordered in the ruling of
June 6, 1936.

Thus once again the American claimants had been deceived by Ger-
many, and once again Germany had gained valuable time in which to
prepare her defense. But the Americans were not discouraged. Since
the Washington decision of 1932, the tide had dejfinitely turned in their
favor, and slowly but surely Germany was being entwined in the coils
of her own deception.

As the position now stands the Black Tom and Kingsland cases
have automatically reverted to the position they were in at the time of
The Hague decision in 1930. The American claimants are pinning
hopes of ultimate victory on the Herrmann message; on the mountain
of proof they have collected that Germany furnished incomplete, col-
lusive, and false evidence which misled the Commission at The Hague
hearing; and, finally, on the suppressed documents which the Com-
mission has ordered Germany to produce. Whether Germany will pro-
duce all these documents, and in their original form, remains to be
seen. During the course of this long investigation, in which both sides
have accused each other of fraud, the production of any vital docu-
ment has immediately raised a cloud of suspicion.

There is Httle more to tell now. Both sides are girding up their
loins in preparation for the coming battle before the Commission and
striving to plug every possible loophole in their arguments. It might
be worth recording, however, that the perennial Wozniak bobbed up
again once more. Without the knowledge of the Commission, he ap-
plied for American citizenship, and on April 26, 1937, was examined
in New York City by Examiner Luther W. Throckmorton of the U. S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service.

296 THE ENEMY WITHIN

At tnis examination Wozniak freely admitted having been in con-
tact with German agents while employed in the Kingsland plant. He
stated that he was first approached by a fellow employee named Nick,
who was either a Russian or a German and who spoke both languages
fluently. Nick subsequently put him in touch with Herrmann, and
several meetings were held at night in the Kingsland Cemetery, a
hundred yards from the plant. At these meetings several German
agents from Hoboken also were present. The destruction of Kingsland
was discussed, and Wozniak admitted that Herrmann gave him an
incendiary pencil. Wozniak claimed, however, that his object in
attending the meetings was to report the plans of the German agents
to the Russian Supply Committee, and that he wrote a letter and a
postcard to warn them. On their paying no attention, he destroyed
the pencil and let the matter drop. He also conceded that the fire
broke out at his bench but disclaimed responsibility for it. He gave it
as his opinion that some one had impregnated with an inflammable
material the dry rags he had used to swab out the shell in the last
process of cleaning.

The most interesting revelations were made, however, when the
examiner came to his relations with Dr. Tannenberg. His story was
to the effect that one day in 1929 he was sitting on a bench in Battery
Park, New York, when a stranger approached him and showed him
a newspaper in which his name was mentioned in connection with
the Kingsland fire. On Wozniak's admitting his identity the man
advised him to get in touch with the German Consul. This he did, and
in due course he was sent to see Dr. Tannenberg. Thereafter he was
employed by the Doctor for about forty days at a salary of $10 per
day looking for witnesses.

When questioned about the three letters he had written to Baran,
Wozniak was evasive. He admitted that he had written several letters
to Baran at the dictation of German agents and that he had given
these letters to them to mail; but he could not or would not give any
explanation of the motive. When the examiner tried to pin him down
as to when he had written these letters he maintained he had done
so in 1917 and that he had probably given them to Nick to mail. (It
must be borne in mind that if Wozniak had admitted these letters

THE WILES OF DIPLOMACY 297

had been written shortly before Baran handed them to the American
claimants he would have made himself liable to prosecution under
a conspiracy charge.) Wozniak definitely stated, however, that he had
never been in Mexico. Although his testimony was evasive in regard
to the letters and the examiner did not press him concerning them,
the deduction is obvious that they contained false statements. It seems
not improbable that he was telling the truth concerning their being
dictated by German agents but was moving the date back to 1917
to avoid incriminating himself.

When questioned about the total amount of money he had received
from Dr. Tannenberg, he stated that he had received in all $2,000,
and had been promised a large sum to be paid later when the cases
were finished.

He produced a copy of his letter to von Papen in which he com-
plained that Dr. Tannenberg had not kept his promise. He admitted
that he had given false evidence in the affidavits he had given Dr.
Tannenberg but claimed that the Doctor had misled him by telling
him that the claims for damages in the Black Tom and Kingsland
cases had been brought by private companies and not by the United
States Government.

Needless to say, when Wozniak's petition came up in the United
States District Court in June it was denied.

A final humorous touch was contributed by Peaslee on the occasion
of his sailing for Europe on business connected with the cases. On
the evening of May 5 he boarded his ship, the S.S. Bremen, about half
an hour before sailing time. By chance he took up the passenger list
and as his eye wandered down the alphabet it was suddenly arrested
by the name of Kurt Jahnke. The thought immediately flashed through
his mind that the Germans had again tricked him and had had
Jahnke over here secretly aiding Dr. Tannenberg in preparing his
defense. The boldness of this did not surprise him — the Germans had
tried many risky maneuvers before. With the forlorn hope that there
was still time to get a subpoena served, he dashed into the North
German Lloyd shed to telephone McCloy. But it was impossible to
get a marshal down to the pier quickly enough.

298 THE ENEMY WITHIN

After his return Peaslee had a hearty laugh at his own expense when
he discovered through the Immigration authorities that this Kurt
Jahnke was only 35 years old. While he had a lively appreciation of
the former secret agent's achievements, he was not quite prepared to
number rejuvenation among them.

Chapter XXVIII
THE ENEMY WITHIN

What the outcome of the Black Tom and Kingsland cases will be, no
one yet knows. It is one thing to feel convinced that Germany is guilty
in both cases; it is another thing to prove it in an international court
of law, which almost inevitably is inclined to believe the word of a
government as against that of individual witnesses. Furthermore, Ger-
man agents did not stand on street corners and advertise what they
were doing. By 1916 Germany's sabotage directors in the United States
had become veterans in the field and were sufficiently well versed in
secret service methods to cover up their tracks. A Hinsch would not
reveal his identity to a Kristoff. He would employ just the methods
that Graentnor used.

Starting out on a cold trail nearly six years after the destruction of
Black Tom and Kingsland, and after most of the German agents and
officials involved had scattered to the four corners of the globe, the
American investigators have had an almost superhuman task. Precious
years had been lost during which many of the contemporary clues had
disappeared. The Germans had also been given a breathing spell; and
by 1924, the period when the investigation really got under way, the
German Secret Service had once again come to life, the backbone of
the German Government had been stiffened, and both were ready to
fight tooth and nail.

Had the American investigators been on the scene in Berlin just
after the Armistice their task would have been simple. They could
have demanded and would have received the sabotage documents which
the German Government has since either destroyed or secreted. Proof
that the German Secret Service files were intact at the period was

furnished by Felstead, a British officer attached to the Inter-Allied

299

300 THE ENEMY WITHIN

Control Commission, who marched into the archives and took the
Edith Cavell file, which he still has in his possession.

It has also been especially difficult for the American lawyers to con-
vince the three judges of the Mixed Claims Commission that a sov-
ereign country such as Germany would resort to fraud and trickery;
yet such artifices are the stock in trade of all secret services; and in the
Black Tom and Kingsland cases, the American claimants have had
to cross swords with the German Secret Service. The German Govern-
ment is the facade; it is her secret service which has supplied the
organization which has kept a close eye, not only on all the German
wartime sabotage agents involved, but also on the movements of the
American investigators. In the opinion of this author, who spent sev-
eral years of his life combating the German Secret Service, the methods
it has employed fighting the American claimants run true to form.

In no large country other than the United States could Germany have
carried out the wholesale sabotage campaign which she conducted here
during the neutrality period. Even a country like Holland, caught
between the Germans and Allies as though in a nut cracker, would
not have tolerated for a moment any spy or sabotage activity con-
ducted against her. The secret services of all the belligerents used
Holland as a spy base during the war, but all of them were extremely
careful to avoid any act which might have been interpreted as directed
against the Dutch. Her police knew the identity and whereabouts of
the directors of the various secret services, and, precarious though Hol-
land's position was, they would quickly have been held responsible for
any hostile acts of their agents.

The weakness of the United States both then and now is that there
was, and still is, no American counter-espionage service. The Depart-
ment of Justice does investigate whatever reports of suspected spy
activities are sent in from time to time by private citizens, but there is
no check-up on spies in any way comparable with that which exists
in other countries. Foreign spies can operate here in comparative
safety.

At least $150,000,000 damage was done in the United States by
sabotage agents during the World War— not to mention the huge
loss in potential profits caused by the destruction of factories holding

THE ENEMY WITHIN 3OI

millions of dollars' worth of contracts. The same objectives exist today
and are just as vulnerable. Twenty men willing to give their lives
could probably put the Panama Canal out of action. Furthermore,
germ warfare was in its infancy twenty years ago. But tremendous
strides have been made since, both in developing more deadly and
concentrated strains of disease bacteria and in perfecting super and
easier methods of disseminating them. It would be too late to start
organizing a counter-espionage defense after the outbreak of hos-
tilities, for in a few days a handful of agents could initiate a nation-wide
epidemic of plague, cholera, or other deadly diseases. A grim portent
of this coming form of attack is the recent news from Spain that
several secret agents have been sentenced to death for spreading sleep-
ing sickness and typhus behind the Insurgent lines.

A counter-espionage service cannot be created overnight. Its effi-
ciency depends on an experienced personnel, on the possession of accu-
rate records of suspects, on watching these suspects, and on piecing
together information obtained from all parts of the country. Twenty-
four hours after the declaration of war in 1914 every suspected German
spy in France either was under lock and key or had been escorted
across the frontier.

Foreign key agents for sabotage and espionage are already here in
waiting; and when needed others will be quickly recruited from
among those Fascist, Communist, or other alien organizations which,
through the chance of war, happen to be lined up on the side of the
enemy. All this was demonstrated during the World War. Foreign
spy activities in Mexico are also of special interest. We have seen how
Mexico was used as a spy base during the war, and it is probable that
today even in time of peace it is still being used as such.

Apart from protecting naval and military secrets from the foreign
spy, and being ready to combat the saboteur in the event of war, a
counter-espionage service would amply justify its existence by keeping
a watchful eye on internal subversive movements. In addition it would
serve to coordinate all pertinent information collected by the various
law enforcement agencies of the Government, by the local police
forces, reserve Army Intelligence officers and the American Legion.
Under present conditions such information tends to be hidden in

302 THE ENEMY WITHIN

watertight compartments. The Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and finally the Secret Service
Division of the Treasury Department could all be used as channels of
information and action w^ithout in any way interfering with their
present functions.

When we turn to the field of secret service, we find the United
States in an even weaker position. She is the only large nation that
does not employ such a service to obtain the war plans of prospec-
tive enemies and learn about their new weapons. The small Intelligence
units maintained by the Army and Navy are the only organizations
of the kind, and their principal object is to serve as a nucleus for
expansion in time of war. The Military Intelligence, a small section
of the General Staff, consists of a few officers and stenographers. When
we consider that its yearly grant is only $30,000, we are not surprised
to learn that its sole function is to act in an advisory capacity to the
Staff and to digest the information from foreign press clippings and
such data as the military attaches are able to gather by keeping their
eyes and ears open. The Cryptographic Fureau, which functioned so
efficiently during the latter part of the war and immediately afterward,
has been discontinued. <

Today, nearly every European country not only has large and active
Military and Naval Intelligence Services, as well as effective counter-
espionage organizations, but also a central secret service operating an
army of spies whose reports are distributed to the Navy, Army, and
Foreign Office.

The combined efforts of American armament manufacturers, re-
search laboratories, and the specialists of the Army and Navy have
probably succeeded in keeping equipment up-to-date and may pos-
sibly have developed some surprise weapons of their own; but in these
times of rapid changes it is truly dangerous for any country not to be
fully posted on the military developments of the rest of the world.
It is futile to think that weapons which are considered inhuman will
not be employed. Military experts and foreign statesmen agree that
all international laws will be broken and the most destructive weapons
that can be devised will be used. Effective defense against new weapons
can be prepared only if they are known in advance.

THE ENEMY WITHIN 303

Before the World War, there was an interchange of information
between the different international armament manufacturers. The re-
sult was that the heavy siege guns used by the Germans in their attacks
on Liege and Antwerp were the only weapons of any importance
which were not common to all armies at the outbreak of hostilities in
1914. Today almost every country has an official secrets act which
prevents the interchange of information.

Spying is undoubtedly on the increase. Hardly a week passes with-
out the European press's reporting some important spy arrest; and yet
those who have secret service experience realize that these newspaper
reports only reflect the bubbling at the surface — that underneath,
secretly and cautiously, extensive spy networks are being established
in every country.

In France alone more spies have been caught since the Armistice
than were arrested throughout the whole of Europe during the twenty-
five years preceding the World War. It is disturbing to discover that
many of the spies arrested in Europe during the last few years have
been Americans in foreign secret service employ.

For an annual expenditure of less than one per cent of what we
lost from German sabotage during the neutrality period we could
maintain a secret service and counter-espionage organization the peer
of any in the world. This indeed seems a low rate of insurance to pay
for rendering the country safe from military surprise and from the
ravages of subversive agents both foreign and domestic.

Appendix

CHRONOLOGY

]uly 7, 1 91 4 — Count von Bernstorff sailed for Germany.

August 2, 1 91 4 — Count von Bernstorff started his return journey to America.

January i, 191 5 — Incendiary fire at the John A. Roebling Company plant at Trenton.*

January 3, 191 5 — Mysterious explosion on the S.S. Orton in Erie Basin.f

January 18, 191 5 — Captain von Papen paid Werner Horn $700 by check Number 87 for his
work in attempting to destroy the Vanceboro Bridge in Maine.

January 26, 191 5 — Radio from the General Staff in Germany, signed Zimmermann, to the
German Embassy, in Washington, for the Military Attache. See page 8.

February 191 5 — Werner Horn attempted to blow up the Vanceboro bridge at Machias, Maine.

February 2, 191 5 — Captain von Papen sent the German Consulate at Seattle a check for $1300.

About February 3, 191 5 — A bomb was found in the cargo of the S.S. Hennington Court.

Toward the end of February, 191 5 — The S.S. Carlton took fire mysteriously.

March 191 5 — Carl Schmidt was first employed by Kaltschmidt in Detroit for sabotage activities.

March 191 5 — Gustave Steven was employed by Kaltschmidt to blow up bridges on the
Canadian Pacific Railway.

March 5, 191 5 — Explosion at Du Pont Plant at Haskell, N. J.

April I, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion of Equitable Powder Plant at Allon, Illinois.

April 4, 1 91 5 — M}'sterious explosion of caps for shells at the New Jersey Freight Depot,
Pompton Lakes.

April 1 91 5 — Lieutenant von Rintelen arrived in the United States.

April 9, 191 5 — Letter from Captain von Papen to General von Falkenhayn regarding Lieuten-
ant von Rintelen, and expressing thanks that "the army administration is prepared to employ
large funds to curtail the supply of war materials for our enemies in every way possible."

April 20, 19 1 5 — ^Dr. Albert in a letter to the State Secretary of the Interior confirmed the
understanding that "all measures necessary for the purpose" were to be taken to prevent the
shipment of munitions to the Allies.

April 23, 191 5 — Robert Fay arrived in the United States from Berlin, with specific orders to
engage in sabotage activities and to report to Captain von Papen.

April 29, 1 91 5 — The S.S. Cressington Court caught fire at sea.

April 1915 — Two bombs were found in the cargo of the S.S. Lord Erne.

April 1 91 5 — A bomb was found in the hold of the S.S. Devon City.

April 1 91 5 — Koolbergen met von Brincken in the Heidelburg Cafe in San Francisco, and
arrangements were made for his employment in sabotage activities by the German Consul and
Vice Consul in San Francisco.

May 3, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion at the Anderson Chemical Company at Wallington, New Jersey,
costing three lives.

May 5, 1 91 5 — Count von Bernstorff wrote to Dr. Albert asking him to place $30,000 out of
the Loan Fund at the disposal of William Wilkie, who had been employed under a formal
contract, to assist the German Government in work "to obstruct and hinder the delivery of
orders and toluol and picric acid which have been contracted for by the Allies."

* This was about the beginning of a long series of mysterious unexplained incendiary fires and
explosions in properties where supplies for the Allies were being manufactured.

t As Captain Tunney says regarding the many similar occurrences which followed, "There
was a maddening certainty about it all that suggested that every ship that left port must have
nothing in her hold except hungry rats, parlor matches, oil waste and free kerosene."

305

3o6

APPENDIX

May 8, 191 5 — ^Two bombs were found in cargo the S.S. Bank.dde.

May 10, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion in Du Pont plant at Carney's Point, N. J.

May II, 1 91 5 — Captain von Papen sent the German Consulate at Seattle $500.

May 13, 19 1 5 — ^The S.S. Samland took fire at sea.

May 15, 1 91 5 — Two explosions occurred at the Du Pont plant, Carney's Point, N. J.

May 21, 1 915 — A bomb was found on board the S.S. Anglo-Saxon.

May 25, 1 91 5 — An explosion occurred at Du Pont plant, Carney's Point, N. J.

May 30, 1915 — ^Explosion in Seatde Harbor of dynamite manufactured at Pinole, California,
which was then located on a barge in Seattle Harbor. The evidence establishes the relations of
the German Consul General at San Francisco and also the fact that Captain von Papen was in
Seattle shortly before this explosion and paid money to the German Consul there apparently for
use in connection with it.*

May 19 1 5 — ^The S.S. Kirl{ Oswald out of New York laden with supplies for France docked at
Marseilles and in four sugar bags in her hold were found bombs.

Early in June 191 5 — Captain Bode went to see Robert Fay "at the Riverside Garage at
Weehawken," which Fay used as a workshop, and asked Fay to produce some bombs for
blowing up ships.

June 2, 1 91 5 — The S.S. Strathway mysteriously took fire at sea.

June 4, 1 915 — A bomb exploded on the S.S. MinneJiaha while she was at sea.

June 26, 1 91 5 — Incendiary fire at the Aetna Powder plant at Pittsburgh.

Summer of 191 5 — Kaltschmidt and his associates were engaged in sabotage activities in
Detroit.

July 2, 1 915 — ^In a corridor of the main floor of the Senate wing of the United States Capitol
at Washington used to stand a telephone switchboard — on the night of Friday, July 2, 191 5,
an explosion near it blew fragments of the board through the walls of the telephone booths
adjoining . . . Plaster was rent from the walls and ceilings, every door near by was blown open
. . . (one was a door into the Vice President's office) . . . The east reception room was wrecked. A
hole was torn in the wall and fragments of windows, mirrors, crystal chandeliers and other
crystal apparatus flew in every direction.

July 3, 191 5 — An attempt was made to assassinate J. Pierpont Morgan at his home on
Long Island by a man named Holt, who was identified as of "German origin" and who also
apparently participated in the placing of dynamite on ships.

In running Holt down the authorities discovered, as part of his property, a trunk filled with
134 sticks of dynamite ... several botdes of sulphuric acid and nitric acid and 197 detonating
caps.

July 7, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion at the Philadelphia Benzol plant at Harrison Brothers.

July 7, 1915 — Incendiary explosion at the Du Pont plant at Pompton Lakes.

July 13, 1 91 5 — The S.S. Touraine took fire mysteriously while at sea.

July 14, 191 5 — ^The S.S. Lord Downshire took fire mysteriously while at sea.

July 15, 19 1 5 — Incendiary fire Central Railroad grain elevator at Weehawken.

July 16, 1 91 5 — Incendiary explosion and fire at the Aetna plant at Sinnemahoning, Pennsyl-
vania, costing five lives.

July 19, 1 91 5 — ^Incendiary explosion at the Du Pont plant at Wilmington.

July 20, 1 91 5 — A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Knutford.

July 20, 1 91 5 — ^Report by Paul Koenig to Captain von Papen with respect to the payment
of $150 secured by cashing check of Captain von Papen's, Number 146, on the Riggs National
Bank, in Washington, dated July 16, 191 5, which funds were paid to a man who had exhibited
a sample bomb, of a kind previously described by Captain von Papen to Paul Koenig, made to
resemble a lump of coal.

July 21, 1 91 5 — Dr. Albert's letter to his wife refers to his collaboration with Herr von
Papen "in the field known to you."

July 24, 1 91 5 — Five mysterious fires started in the hold of the S.S. Craigside.

July 25, 191 5 — ^Munitions train mysteriously wrecked at Metuchen, N. J.

July 27, 1 91 5 — ^Two bombs were found on board the S.S. Arabic.

* The detailed dates in connection with this piece of sabotage work have been omitted from
this chronology. The German Consul and Vice Consuls in San Francisco were indicted and
convicted in connection with this matter.

APPENDIX 307

July 28, 1 91 5 — ^Mysterious explosion at the Du Pont works in Wilmington.

July 29, 1 91 5 — ^Mysterious destruction of a glaze mill in the American Powder Company at
Acton, Massachusetts.

August 1, 191 5 — Wolf von Igel rented offices at 60 Wall Street, New York, under a lease
extending to May i, 191 6, which was later renewed to May i, 191 7.

From these offices much of the sabotage work was directed. They were known as the head-
quarters of the "War Intelligence Center" or "Bureau of the Military Attaches" in German
official circles. The owner of the building was told at the time of the renewal of the lease that
von Igel was engaged in the "advertising business."

August 9, 1915 — The S.S. Asuncion de Lamn^^a mysteriously took fire at sea.

August II, 1 91 5 — Incendiary fire Westinghouse Electric Plant, Turtle Creek, Pennsylvania.

August 13, 1 91 5 — Bombs were found in the cargo of the S.S, Williston.

August 16, 191 5 — The denial of the participation of the German Embassy in the work of
fomenting strikes in munition factories, found in Dr. Albert's files, bears this date.

August 27, 1 91 5 — Johannes Hendrickus Koolbergen, in a sworn statement, confesses to the
sabotage work for which he was employed by Mr. Franz Bopp, the German Consul at San
Francisco.

August 27, 191 5 — ^The lighter Dixie mysteriously took fire while being loaded.

August 29, 1 91 5 — Explosion in Du Pont Plant at Wilmington, Delaware.

August 30, 1 91 5 — Michael Kristoff was convicted at Rye, New York, for carrying a revolver.

August 1 91 5 — Train loaded with 7,000 pounds of dynamite was destroyed at Pinole,
California.

September i, 191 5 — ^The S.S. Rotterdam took fire mysteriously at sea.

September 2, 1915 — ^The S.S. Santa Ana took fire mysteriously at sea.

September 29, 191 5 — Dynamite was found on the pier where the S.S. San Guglielmo was
about to depart.

Early Part of October 191 5 — Captain von Papen's office telephoned Robert Fay to come to 60
Wall Street, and Captain von Papen gave Fay orders regarding the destruction of a "plant
somewhere in the southern part of Kentucky."

October 3, 191 5 — Dr. Albert wrote to his wife saying: "I prefer not to say anything in
detail about what I am doing here. Mr. von P.'s experience is a warning."

October 4, 191 5 — Captain von Papen paid Dr. A. W. Reissling's expenses for a "journey to
Aetna."

October 5, 191 5 — A deposit of $25,000 was made to Kaltschmidt's credit by the Chase
National Bank as directed by Dr. Albert.

October 11, 191 5 — A mysterious fire occurred in the Baldwin Locomotive Works at Eddy-
stone.

October 24, 191 5 — Robert Fay was placed under arrest and examined at Police Head-
quarters, New York City. He testified then that he was told by Captain von Papen not
to make any trouble. Robert Fay's examination at Police Headquarters on Oct 24, 19 15, is in
part as follows:

"A. I had to say something and I made a bluff that I could do these things and they said

it was up to the officials on the other side. I can never go back again. I have been told

strictly not to make any trouble.
"Q. Who told you that?
"A. Von Papen."

October 25, 191 5 — Paul Daeche, a German sabotage agent connected with Robert Fay,
was arrested at Weehawken, N. J.

October 26, 191 5 — Statement of C. L. Wettig regarding the participation of Max Breitung,
Dr. Kienzle and others in the sabotage work under Captain von Papen.

October 26, 191 5 — ^The S.S. Rio Lages mysteriously took fire at sea.

October 28, 1915 — Statement by Louis J. Smith, regarding the orders from the German
Consul General, von Bopp, of San Francisco, to blow up various things.

October, 191 5 — A mysterious fire destroyed shops of the Bethlehem Steel Co.

November 3, 191 5 — A mysterious fire broke out in the hold of the S.S. Euterpe.

November 6, 191 5 — A mysterious fire broke out on the S.S. Rocfiambeau while at sea.

November 7, 191 5 — An explosion occurred on the S.S. Ancona while at sea.

3o8

APPENDIX

November 8, 191 5 — ^The German Government in a note to the United States State Depart-
ment flatly denied that any German officers had been connected with passport frauds.

November 10, 191 5 — ^Mysterious fire at Bethlehem at the Bethlehem Steel Company "of
which all Germany had had warning and on which the German press was forbidden to
comment."

November 12, 191 5 — Theodore Otto reported to Captain von Papen regarding "an incendiary
fire" at Bethlehem, saying "the place of the fire presents a sight which does the eye and
heart good."

November 26, 191 5 — ^Incendiary fire in the Roebling Plant at Trenton, N. J., where wire
cables were being made for the Allies.

December 4, 191 5 — ^The president of the United States requested the recall of Captain Von
Papen and Captain Boy-Ed.

December 4, 1915 — Two mysterious fires occurred on board the S.S. Tynningham while at
sea.

December 7, 191 5 — ^The President of the United States sent a message to Congress regarding
the recall of Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed and officially charged the German Gov-
ernment with conspiracies against our neutrality.

December 8, 1915 — ^The Secretary of State of the United States wrote again to Count von
Bernstorff repeating the request for the immediate recall of Captain von Papen and Captain
Boy-Ed, saying, "The relations of the two attaches with individuals who participated in illegal
and questionable activities are established."

December 10, 1915 — ^The German Ambassador formally notified the Secretary of State
that the Emperor had recalled Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen in accordance with
the vidshes of the United States Government.

December 10, 191 5 — ^Dynamite was found in the coal tender of a munitions train in thr
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Callery Junction, Pa.

December 18, 191 5 — ^Paul Koenig and Richard Leyendecker were arraigned and held in
$15,000 bail for sabotage activities. Fred Schliendl was arrested the same day.

December 18, 191 5 — ^The German Government in an authorized wireless to the New York
Times denied that it ever "accepted the support of any person . . . seeking to promote the cause
of Germany ... by contravention of law or by any means whatever that could offend the
American people . . ." and also "absolutely denies" responsibility in any way for the "attacks
upon property and various of the rights of the American Government."

December 21, 191 5 — Fred Metzler, Paul Koenig's secretary, and Richard Emil Leyendecker
went before a grand jury in New York and confessed to their part in Koenig's trip to Canada
in connection with the second attempt to blow up the Well and Canal.

December 23, 191 5. — Captain Von Papen sailed for Europe, after his recall at the request
of President Wilson and on leaving made a statement saying that he had a "clean record"
and denying all "misrepresentations and calumnies."

December 23, 191 5 — ^Paul Koenig, Richard Leyendecker and a man named "Justice" were
indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for the Southern District of New York for a second attempt
to blow up the Welland Canal.

December 24, 191 5 — ^Dynamite was found in the cargo of the S.S. Alston while at sea.

December 26, 191 5 — ^A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Inchmoor.

December 26, 19 15 — A mysterious fire was found in the hold of the S.S. Manchuria.

December 28, 191 5 — Von Rintelen was indicted for fomenting strikes in munitions fac-
tories.

December 29, 191 5 — Captain Boy -Ed sailed for Europe, after his recall by President Wilson,
saying that he "refrained" from "refuting all the stories which were told about me in the
American newspapers."

December, 191 5 — Schleindl, the German reservist who was employed by Paul Koenig to
work in the National City Bank and procure the reports of movements of munitions, was
arrested.

January 2, 191 6 — Captain von Papen's papers disclosing various details of the sabotage
campaign were seized by the British authorities at Falmouth.

January 191 6 — The German Government placed $3,500,000 at Dr. Albert's disposal.

January 10, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Du Pont powder plant at Carney's Point, N. J.

January 11, 191 6 — Explosion at Du Pont plant in Wilmington, Del.

APPENDIX 309

January 15, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Du Pont plant at Gibbstown, N. J.

January 15, 191 6 — Count von Bernstorff, when the contents of Captain von Papen's papers
seized at Falmouth vv^ere reported to him, said, according to the newspapers — "I don't be-
lieve it."

January 19, 191 6 — A mysterious fire occurred on the S.S. Sygna while at sea.

January 19, 191 6 — A bomb explosion occurred on the S.S. Ryndam.

January 22, 191 6 — ^Two bombs were discovered in the cargo of the S.S. RosebanJi.

February 2, 191 6 — Von der Goltz made a statement to the British Metropolitan Police
at Scoriand Yard, in which he described his relations to Captain von Papen, and told of the
dynamite for sabotage work furnished to him by Captain von Papen and Captain Hans
Tauscher.

February 3, 191 6 — Dr. Albert, in a report "to the State Secretary of the Interior, Berlin,"
pledged the same support to von Igel which he had previously given to Captain von Papen in
the work of preventing the delivery of war materials to the Allies.

February 3, 191 6 — A bomb was discovered in the cargo of the S.S. Hennington Court.

February 12, 191 6 — Bethlehem Projectile Plant destroyed.

February 16, 191 6 — A mysterious fire occurred in the S.S. Dalton while at sea.

February 19, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Union Metallic Cartridge Company plant in Bridgeport,
Conn.

February 20, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Middlesex Analine Co. plant at Bound Brook.

February 21, 191 6 — A bomb explosion occurred on S.S. Tennyson while at sea.

February 26, 191 6 — ^A mysterious fire occurred on the S.S. Livingston Court in Gravesend
Bay.

February 191 6 — An incendiary fire was started in Houses of Parliament in Ottawa.

End of February 191 6 — ^The S.S. Carlton caught fire at sea mysteriously.

April 4, 191 6 — A cargo of supplies for the Allies on the S.S. Marta was damaged.

April 13, 1916 — ^Du Pont plant at Bluefields, W. Va., wrecked by an explosion.

April 18, 1 91 6 — ^Wolf von Igel was arrested for sabotage activities and many incriminating
documents were taken from him.

April 19, 1 91 6 — Eight men were arrested in New Jersey, principally employees of the
North German Lloyd Company in connection with the placing of fire bombs upon cargoes
on ships.

April 19, 191 6 — ^Robert Fay confessed to his employment as a German sabotage agent, his
work with von Papen, and his relations to Paul Koenig.

April 27, 1 91 6 — Fred Schleindl confessed to the United States officers his relations to Paul
Koenig and his sabotage conferences at the Cafe Bismarck.

May 10, 1 91 6 — The Adas Powder mixing plant was destroyed.

May II, 1 91 6 — A plot was discovered to destroy the William Todd Company plant at
Youngstown, Ohio.

May 14, 191 6 — ^The munitions cargo of the S.S. California was mysteriously damaged.

May 14, 1 91 6 — A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Kandahar.

May 16, 1 91 6 — ^The Du Pont Powder Company plant at Gibbstown was mysteriously
destroyed.

May, 191 6 — A large chemical plant in Cadillac, Michigan, was mysteriously destroyed.

June 7, 1 91 6 — ^Du Pont plant at Wayne, N. J., destroyed.

July I, 191 6 — Congress authorized the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice
to investigate matters at the request of the State Department. Prior to that time the Bureau's
power of investigation had been very limited.

July 22, 1 91 6 — ^Explosion in Hercules Powder Works.

July 26, 27, 28, 29, 191 6 — Michael Kristoff. who had been working at the Eagle Oil Works
plant at Bayonne, near Black Tom, was absent from the works.

July 22 to August 4 — It is interesting to note that Dr. Albert's diary, which rarely misses a
day in recording his social and business activities, is a complete blank for the days July 22, 23,
24 and 25, and all of the days from July 28 to August 4 inclusive.

August 18, 191 6 — ^Two attempts were made to blow up the piers of the Pacific Coast
Steamship Company.

August 191 6 — ^Robert Fay, who had been in prison at Atlanta, escaped and was assisted

310 APPENDIX

in reaching Mexico by Paul Koenig and Leyendecker, and various German consuls in
Savannah, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco.

October 2, 191 6 — A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Philadelphia.

October 8, 1916. — A mysterious fire occurred on the S.S. Antilla.

October 28, 191 6 — A mysterious fire broke out in the hold of the S.S. Chicago, and she
was taken Into the Azores.

November 5, 191 6 — A fire broke out in the S.S. Ponus and it was put ashore in Falmouth
bay.

November 21, 191 6 — ^Twenty unexploded bombs were found in the sugar cargo of the
American S.S. Sarnia. She was beached and flooded near Cherbourg.

November 27, 191 6 — Michael KristofT told Alexander Kassman that "in the middle of the
night with two men he went over to Black Tom. One man told Michael Kristoff to watch the
place all round, and he, Michael KristofT, with another man, went to a big steamboat with
ammunition aboard. . . . Around the ship where I put the dynamite were steamboats and on
the boats were cars of ammunition. My friend also put on one boat between the cars, and half
an hour later there was an explosion. . . ."

November 27, 191 6 — ^The cargo of the S.S. Regina d'ltalia was partly destroyed by a mys-
terious fire.

About December i, 191 6, or Earlier — ^Fiodore Wozniak, a Russian workman, was planted
in the munitions assembling plant.

December 9, 191 6 — The Midvale Chemical Co. building at Bayway was destroyed by a fire
and explosion.

December 27, 191 6 — ^The Bethlehem Steel Co. gas plant was destroyed by an explosion.

December 31, 191 6 — ^The New York Times estimates that the "incendiary loss in 191 6 was
easily twenty-five million dollars, or fifteen million dollars above normal."

January 11, 1917 — ^The Kingsland Assembling Plant was destroyed.

January 16, 191 7 — Clarence Tomlinson, one of the workmen in the Kingsland factory,
identified Wozniak as the man at whose machine in the factory the fire started.

January 17, 191 7 — Maurice Chester Musson, another workman at the Kingsland plant,
furnished a statement to Judge Fake confirming the probably incendiary origin of the fire.

March 7, 191 7 — C. J. Scully, a United States officer, reported regarding Fritz Kolb, who
was at the Commercial Hotel, 212 River Street, Hoboken, "directly opposite the piers of the
North German Lloyd Line" and says that "in this man's room were found two bombs, one
loaded, as well as powder and various ingredients used in the manufacture of nitro-
glycerine."

April 2, 191 7 — ^President Wilson, in addressing Congress regarding the declaration of war,
repeated the charge that the German Government has engaged in a sabotage campaign.

April 4, 191 7 — Siegel and Rodriguez [Herrmann] left the United States for Cuba with the
intention of going to Mexico, according to the statement of Witzke. Witzke indicates that
these men participated in the arrangement for the Black Tom explosion.

April 6, 1 91 7 — ^United States declared war on Germany. Nearly all the German agents
fled to Mexico as rapidly as possible. Destruction of factories, etc., ceased very quickly after
this date.

INDEX

Index

Abraham's Book Store, 250-54

Act of June 7, 1933, about Claims Commis-
sion witnesses, 253, 267

Adams, Albert G., 13-14

Adams, consul at Hankow, 273-5

Adventure magazine, 252

Aetna Powder Co., 69, 104

Agent, American, in Black Tom and Kings-
land claims — see Bonynge
German — see German Agent

Aguayo, Mr., 190

Ahrendt, Carl, 245, 246

Albert, Dr. Heinrich, 4-5, 7, 8, 16, 21, 54, 56,
62, 70, 104, 105, 107, 149; his duties, 9;
connection with Wedell, 13; with Bopp,
23; letter about Igel, 71; involved in
sabotage, 97-8; method of blocking sup-
plies, 98-9; creates Bridgeport Projectile
Co., 99; loses his brief case on the El,
100; denies evidence, loo-ioi; his meth-
ods of propaganda, loi; financial trans-
actions, 102; his files taken from closet,
102; reports to Berlin, 106; his claim for
Rintelen, 194

Alderate, Ramon, 126

aliases revealed by Koenig's notebook, 65; by
Herrmann, 191 -2

Alien Property Custodian, 177, 194, 268

Allied propaganda, 109

Allies, munitions for the, 25, 27, 43, 47, 69,
71, 78, 106, 147; passport control by, 17;
secret service of, 7

Altendorf, Paul Bernardo, 114-19, 121, 124,
126, 140, 203, 204, 218

American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 135

American Legion, 301

American Protective League, 113

Ancona, 41

Anderson, Chandler P., 132, 209, 288

Anglo-Persian Co., 158

Anglo-Saxon, 37

Annie Larsen, 30-3

Antilla, 85

Archibald, James J., 52, 53

Argentina, German sabotage activities in, 167,
168, 169, 170, 233

armament manufacturers, 303

Arnold, German agent in Argentina, 168-9,

233
Arnold, H. N., 133
AUanta Penitentiary, 15, 21, 40, 41, 49, 62n.,

67, 89
Adas Line, 46, 61
Auerbacker, Freda, 88, 89
Austria, documents in, 278 seq.
Austrian Military Intelligence, 280
Austrian War Archives, 279, 281-3
Austria-Hungary, 52-3, 114, 155
award holders, 291-4; their N. Y. attorney,

292-4

Bacon, George Vaux, 88, 150

Baker, Joseph A., 14

Balfour, Lord, 153

Baltimore agents, 46, 47, 60, 72-6. See Hilken

Ban/(dale, 37

Bankson, 277, 278

Banque Beige pour fitrangers, 68

Baran, Ivan, 260, 266, 268, 296-7

Barnes, Major R. L., 115, 124

Barranquilla, Colombia, 181, 184

Barrett, Judge, 135

Barth, Henry, 42

Batavia, Java, 29, 31

Bayonne, N. J., 81, 82, 83, 84, 85

Beatty, Charles L., 124

Becker, Ernest, 45

Behncke, Admiral, 185

Belgian-Dutch border, 156

Bergensfjord, 14, 15

Berlin, Treaty of, 131

Bernstorfl, Count Johann von, 11, 16, 19, 21,
23, 29, 54, 56, 57, 58, 134, 160, 161,
162, 164, 167, 197, 198, 231, 269
his functions, 4, 5, 9; goes to Berlin (1914),
7; returns with espionage attaches and
funds, 7-8; forbids attempt to invade
Canada, 19; on Canadian Pacific Sabotage,
20; on Indian sedition plot, 31; inter-
venes for Igel, 71; behind Dr. Albert and
other agents, 102-111; tries to secure em-
bargo on arms, 106; pressure on German-
Americans, 106-107; connections vvdth
agents in S. A. and Orient, 107; with

313

314

INDEX

Bolo, 107-8; with Mena Edwards, 147;
work summarized, 108; returns home,
1 1 1 ; his connection with Sabotage revealed
in decoded German messages, 166
My Three Years in America, 105, no

Bethel, General, 127, 128

Bethlehem Steel Co., 52, 86, 133, I77n.

Bcthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, 103, in

Bielaski, A. Bruce, 137

Black Tom Island explosion, 70, 76, 77-84,
85, 89, 91, 114, 117, 170, 179-80, 184,
185, 193, 194, I99» 277
counsel in case, 133, 135; amount of claim,
I77n.; investigation, 138-49; hearings
and decisions, see Mixed Claims Com-
mission

Black Tom underwriters' claim, 1770.

Blue Boo^ magazines, 243, 245, 250-5

Boche, Miss, 5

Bode, Eno, 46, 47, 70, 104, 105

Boehm, Captain, 20, 71

Bolo, Paul, 107-108

bombs, 37-8, 40, 45-6, 50, 147, 218

Bonynge, Robert W. (American Agent), 132,
i33» 136, 181, 193, 204, 231, 240, 288,
290; handicapped by German tactics, 134,
177-8, 185-6; cross-examines Koenig, 143;
confers with Lewinski, 176, 191; argu-
ment at 1930 hearing, 186-7, 206, 209-21;
letter to Wozniak, 205; cross-examines
him, 207; in matter of lemon-juice mes-
sage, 246-57; of Wozniak letters, 263,
264, 266, 267; argument at 1936 hear-
ing, 284-7; hunts records in Germany,
291-2; dealings with award-holders, 293-5

Bopp, Franz von, 141; in California munitions
plot, 23-8; in promoting Hindu sedition,
28-33; connection with Jahnke, 34, 214;
with Witzke, 35

Boston hearing (1931), 264

"Bowen, Juan Bernardo," 30

Boy-Ed, Captain Karl, 6, 8, 62, 276; his duties,
9; connection with Ruroedc, 16; with
Rintelen, 44, 49; watched by U. S. Govt.,
53; recalled, 54, 61; promoted, 55; effects
of his work in U. S., 55-8; connection
with Koenig, 67; with Herrmann, 74;
with Mena Edwards, 146

Boyd, J. Oswald, 184

Boyden, Roland W., 132, 209, 244, 264

Brackett, Henry, 127

Brasol Boris, 195

Breitung, Max, 38, 40, 104, 105

Bremen, 240

Bremerhaven, 236

Bridge Street, No. 11 (Rurocde's oflScc), 11,

13, 14
Bridgeport Projectile Co., 99, 100, 104

Briggs, A. M., 113

Brincken, Wilhelm von, in Canadian sabotage,

23-4; in California munitions plot, 23-8;

in promoting Hindu sedition, 28-33; con*

nection with Jahnke, 141
British Admiralty, 152, 153, 161
British Cryptographic Service, 151 seq.
British Intelligence Commission, 157
British Intelligence Services, 33, 49, 88, 91,

113, 150-51, 153, 154, 156, 158, 161,

163, 198, 270
British police, 74
British War Office, 113

British wireless stations for picking up Ger-
man messages, 159-60
Broadway, No. 11 (Boy-Ed's office), 8

No. 45 (Hamburg-American Bldg., office of

Koenig and Albert), 5, 8, 6z, 64, 100
Brown, Captain T. A., 123
Bruck, J. von, 146
Brussels Kommandantur coding staff, 155-6;

wireless station, 155
Bryan, 78
Buenz, Dr., 62
Building 30 at Kingsland, 92, 93, 94, 218,

220, 221, 228, 230
Bulgarian Government, 198
"Bureau of Investigation" — see Koenig and

Broadway, No. 45
"Bureau of the Military Attaches" — see Wall

Street, No. 60
Burgwin, Major A. P., Judge Advocate, 123,

124, 126, 139
Burke, Frank, gets Dr. Albert's bag, 100
Burns, 78, 84, 142, 143, 144
Burns (W. J.) Detective Agency, 83
Butcher, Byron S., 114, 117, 118, 119, 121,

122, 124
B. Z. am Mittag, 270-71

Cabell, Major General de R. C, 127

Cables, German, 151-2; neutral, 160-61

Cahan, Louis, 262

Cahan, Mr., 94, 95, 96, 195, 225, 229

California, University of, 28

Calles, General, 114, 116, 118, 119

Calusa, 35

Campbell, Major, R. R., 115, 124

Canada, invasion of, considered, 18-19

Canadian Car and Foundry Co., 92, 134, 136,

178, 195, 220, 221, 225, 229, 248. See

Kingsland works
Canadian Pacific Railway, 20, 23-4, 32, 71
Canadian railways, 19, 23-4, 26, 32
Capitol Building, Washington, loi
Carella, N. A., 226-7
Carnegie, Andrew, 209
Carranza, 119

INDEX

315

Casement, Sir Roger, 8, 162, 165, 210

Catholic, Herrmann's salesmanship as a, 74

Cavell (Edith) file, 300

Central Powers Film Co., 86, loi

Chakravarti, Dr., 32, 33

Chandra, Ram, 29-33

Chapman, consul at Mazatlan, 118

Chapman, Mrs., 81, 83

"Charles the Dynamiter" — see Wunncnberg

Chase National Bank, N. Y. C, 5, 21

Chevy Chase (Md.) laboratory, 72, 245, 246

Chicago, 85

Chile, 190, 242; German Minister to — see
Olshauscn

China, German sabotage activities in, 167

Christiania, 44

"cigars" — see bombs

claimants, 176-7, 273. See award holders

claims against Germany, 176. See also Black
Tom, Kingsland, Mixed Claims Commis-
sion

Clar\, 173

Clucas, Carrol, 199, 200, 201

Codes, 6iy 64-5, 152-9, 161-2, 164-5, 166

Coe, George, 230

Cologne Gazette, 86

Conners, E. J., 47

Copenhagen, 76

corn shipments spoiled, 51, 167

Cornac, T. K., 23

Cosmopolitan magazine, 252

Coudert Brothers, 133

Council of War, 91

Coxe, Major Alexander B., 113

Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, 133,
136

Crcssington Court, 36

Crowley, C. C, 25, 26, 27, 28, 141

Crowley Laurel Co., 28

cryptography, 152-4. See Hall, Admiral Sir
Reginald, and Codes

Cummings, Charge d'Aifaires in Mexico, 114,
116

Curry, Senator, 135

Daeche, Paul, 39-40
Dal en, von, 73-4, 242
dandy-rolls, 261
Dansey, Colonel, 113
Davis, Robert, 87, 88-9

Mrs., 88-9
Day, Justice, 132
"D-Cases," 65-7, 68, 142
Decle, Thomas A., 219
Dederer, George, 238
Deichmann, von, 291
Delbriick, Professor, 271

Dclmar, Dr., 172, 173, 174, 175, 179. See

Dilger
Deman, Col. Ralph H. van, 112-113, 137
Dernburg, Dr., 7, 57
Detroit, 26

Detroit Dcutscherbund, 21
Detroit Screw Works, 22, 40
Deutscher Bank, 43

Deutscher Verein, N. Y. C, 40, 55, 57
Deutschland, 75, 76, 179, 182, 200, 218, 237,

238, 245, 246
Devon City, 37
Dcvoy, 276

Dietrichens, Alexander, 69
Dietz, 118
Dilger, Anton, 72, 73, 75, 76, 85, 90, 112,

178, 179, 194, 211, 218, 232, 246. See

Delmar
Carl, 72, 178, 237, 246
documents, experts on questioned, 247 seq.,

269-70
Dogger Bank, Battle of the, 162
Doherty, James, 80

Dougherty Detective Agency, 78, 84, 142
Dresden, 35, 127

Du Pont Powder Co., 69; in Seattle, 25, 27
Du Pont, 27

Dumba, Dr., 52, 62, loi
Dyal, Har, 28, 29

Eagle Oil Works, 82, 83

Eastern Forwarding Co., 76, i82n., 218, 238,
247

"Eastman Girl" — see Edwards, Mena

Eastman Kodak Co., 145, 148

Eckhardt, von, German Minister to Mexico,
112, 115, 116, 125, i5in., 161, 163-4,
171, 173. 174-5, 182, 246, 247, 256, 277

Eddystone (Pa.) munitions plant, 69, 113

Edison, Thomas A., 50

Edwards, Mena, 145-9

Egan, Maurice Francis, 197

Ehrhart, 241

Elephant-Butte Dam, 113

Ellis Island, 77

Ernst, Dr. Otto, 279-83

Espionage Act, 49, 60

Euterpe, 41

Evans, Joseph D., 230

Ewing, Sir Alfred, 152-3, 154, 155

Fake, Judge, 203, 220

Falcke, Consul General, 16

Falkland, Batde of, 161

Farrell, Joseph, 263

Fatherland, The, loi

Fay, Robert, 38-41, 53, 65, 67, 241

Felstead, 299

3i6

INDEX

Felton, J. Edward, 72-3, 85, 179, 180, 237

fertilizer, oil put into, 50-51

Fischer, Dr. Herman, 168

Fleet, Judge van, 33

Florinsky, Vice-consul, 197, 198

Flynn, Chief William J., 39

forging experts in Berlin, 270

Fort Leavenworth, 127, 128

Fort Sam Houston, 122, 123, 124, 127, 139,

140
"Forty O. B.," 153 seq.
Frangipane, Victor, 228-9
Free, Dr., 80

French defeatist movement, 107-108
French Government, 37
French Secret Service, 164
Friedrich der Grosse, 45, 192
Fuchs, George, betrays Koenig, 63-4

"Gache, Emile V.," 44, 49

Galicia, Austrian (Wozniak's district), 197,
258-9

Garbade, Friedrich, 45

Garnett, Christopher B., 132

Garrity, 78

Gary (Ind.) powder works, 26

"Gates, Edward V.," 49

Gerard, Ambassador James W., 161

Gerdts — see Pochet

German Admiralty, 90, 174

German Agent in claims, 249, 290, 293, 295.
See Lewinski, Lohmann, Paulig

German barrier to prevent spy reports and ref-
ugees' escape, 156-7

German Club, N. Y. C. — see Deutscher Verein

German codes, 63, 64-5, 151, 152-9, 161 -2,
164-5, ^^^i 212, 245; known to British,
156, 158, 162; this not suspected by
Germany, 162-5. ^^^ Zimmermann tele-
gram

German Consuls, consulates, and legations, 18,

29, 33» 50, 158, 167-70, 190

in the U. S., 4, 9, 11, 23, 31, 41, 178
at San Francisco, 23-4, 27, 30, 31, 33
in New York City, 64, 68, 71
German counter-espionage service, 165
German deep-sea cables, 151 -2
German diplomatic staff in U. S. — see Bern-
storff, Papen, Boy-Ed, Albert, Dernburg,
etc.
German Embassy, Washington, 4, 5, 8, 15, 18,

30, 64, 66, 67, 70, 102, 103, 164
German espionage bureaus, 7. See German

Military and Naval Intelligence Services
German Foreign Office, 7, 8, 9n., 11, 29, 43,
III, 184, 185, 210, 211, 212, 231, 232,
274

German funds for sabotage and propaganda,
4, 7-8, 23, 30, 39, 44, 48, 50, 51, 54,
63, 66, 87, 88, 102, 107, 108, 112, 116,
179, 182, 211, 235, 237, 243, 246

German General Staff of the Army, 7, 8, 39,
43, 223, 234; of the Navy, 43

German Government, 31, 50, 66, 103, 187,
290; attitude toward faked passports,
15-16; efforts to block munitions exports,
18; recalls and promotes Papen and Boy-
Ed, 54-5, 57; protests innocence, 58-9;
appoints Koenig, 62; pays Seattle ex-
plosion claims, 28, 134; U. S. declares
war on, 109; sued for Black Tom ex-
plosion, 80; attitude toward this and
Kingsland claims, 134-5; offers settle-
ment, 176; tricks claimants, 177-8; re-
fuses to produce Witzke's diary, 185; or
witnesses, 185-6; general policy during
litigation, 143, 194, 209, 211, 212, 224,
225, 227, 231, 237, 242, 257, 275, 278;
calls lemon-juice message (Herrmann) a
forgery, 247 (see Quakers Hoax)

German Literary Defense Committee, 86

German Military Intelligence Service (Section
III B), 3, 8, 17, 23, 39, 40, 42, 60, 61,
84, 90, 91, 114, 117, 137, 162, 186, 197,
211, 246, 270

German Military Intelligence Service Center —
see Wall Street, No. 60

German Naval Intelligence Service, 7, 61, 74,
90, 162
in Antwerp, 86, 87, 171, 173
in Copenhagen, 73
in Scheveningen, 86

German notes to Wilson about peace, 161

German property in U. S. sequestrated, 176,

177, 194
German Red Cross, 107
German sabotage in neutral countries, 166

seq., 216, 232-3
German Secret Service — see German Military

Intelligence Service
German ships interned, 37, 45, 62
German Special Deposit Account, 177, 291-3
German submarines, 3, 75, 76, 109, 155, 162,

165
German War Archives, 281-3
German "War Intelligence Center" — see Wall

Street, No. 60
German wireless, 152, 154, 155, 159-60. See

German codes
German-Americans, 4, loi, 106-107
Germany — see German Government; claims

against, 176 (see also Black Tom and

Kingsland)
germs, 47, 72-3, 85, 168-70, 218, 232, 246
Ghadr, 28, 29

INDEX

317

Gibbons, E. V., Inc., 45

Gibson, 78

Glasgow, Colonel W. J., 123, 126

Gleaves, William, 114-15, 115-16, 118, 121,

122, 124, 126
Goering, Minister President, 290
Golka, 259
Goltz, Horst von der, 55, 146, 154; his plan

to invade Canada, 18-19; to blow up

Welland Canal, 19, 30, 70
"Gordon, Martha" — see Held, Martha
"Graentnor" (Hinsch), 82, 83, 84, 139, 144,

191, 193, 223
Graf Zeppelin. 229
Grandson, 192. See "Graentnor"
Grantwood, N. J., tests at, 39
Greeley Detective Bureau, 142
Green, Lieut. Peter, 81
Groat, 78

Grossmann, Dr., 254
Guidetti, 228

Gupta, Heramba Lai, 29, 30, 32, 33
Gurrin, Gerald Francis, 253, 269-70
Gustedt, Countess Jennie von, 90
Guttman, Richard, 50

"H. 523," 155-7

Hadler, 193, 203

Hague, The, 157, 161, 209

Hague Convention, no

Hague decision — see Hamburg decision

Hague hearing, 186-7, 208-24, 225

Hall, Admiral Sir Reginald, 151, 154-5, I57>

159, 162-3, 164, 165, 166, 171, 270; his

ruses to prevent Germany's knowing of

"40 O. B.," 162-5
Hamburg-American Building — see Broadway,

No. 45
Line, 46, 61, 62, 273
Hamburg decision, 183, 222-4, 230, 232, 244,

273
Hamer, Sir John, 179, 239
Hansen, Peter, 14
Harbord, General, 135
Harkness, William, 230
Haslam, Sergeant, 140
Hatzfeld, Prince, 57
Hausknecht, Dr. Albin, 279, 281-3
Havana, 51, 170, 190, 254
Hazel Dollar, 25, 28
Healy, T. J., 205, 209
Heinrich, handwriting expert, 253
Heinrich, Prince, 43

Held, Martha (123 W. 15th, N. Y. C), 146-9
Helfferich, 43
Hercules Powder Co., 69; at Pinole, 25, 27;

explosion at Seattle works, 25-6, 134

Herrmann, Carl, 187, 190
Edwin, 187, 190, 200

Fred, 90, 112, 175, 186, 201, 218, 237,
242; appearance, 251; connected widi
Black Tom plot, 73-5, 76, 179, 211, 212,
217, 218, 246; with Kingsland plot, 96,
216-17, 222, 232, 233, 235, 236; with
Gerdts (Pochct), 85, 181-3; sends lemon-
juice message to Hilken, 182 {see Quakers
Hoax); in Chile, 188; story involving
Kristoff, 188-9; immunity promised, 189;
returns to U. S., 190, 254; confers with
Lewinski, 191; is identified as "Rodri-
guez," 191 -2, 202-3; and identifies
Hinsch as "Graentnor," 192; connects
Hinsch with Black Tom plot, 193; de-
scribes Wozniak, 202; gives incendiary
pencils to Hinsch and Wozniak, 203;
knows Thorne, 241

Hermosillo, Sonora, 118, 119, 120, 121

Hilken, Henry G., 46, 235

Paul, 46, 72, 75, 90, 174, 175, 178, 186,
189, 190, 192, 2i8, 232, 233, 235, 268;
arrangements for U-boats, 76; helps Herr-
mann and Pochet to flee, 181; lemon-
juice message from Herrmann, 182, 183
{see Quakers Hoax); goes to Chile to see
him, 188; connection with Black Tom
plot, 179-80, 211, 238-9
Mrs. Paul, 239

Hindus, 28-33

Hinsch, Frederick, 75, 85, 175, 186, 187, 193,
197, 201, 245, 247, 268; character and
record, 46-7; organizes Baltimore group,
47> 49> 60; sabotage with germs, 72-3;
with incendiary pencils {q. v.), 76; con-
nection with Wozniak, 96; flees to
Mexico, 112; connection with Jahnke, 172;,
173, 174; with Hilken, 178-9; with Herr-
mann and Wozniak, 202-3; identity as.
"Graentnor," 84, 191, 192, 193, 223;
meets Thorne, 240-42
connection with Black Tom plot, 179-8(1,
216, 223; his $2000 payment, 237, 239;
with Kingsland plot, 217, 223, 225, 231,
240-42; U-boat service, 237-8; alibi, 218,
236-8; in Germany after war, 236

Hitchcock resolution, 106

Hoboken, N. J., 11, 16, 41, 42, 45, 46, 91,
241, 245, 246

Holland, 155-7, 161

Holohan, U. S. Marshal James, 33

Hoppenberg, 182, 245, 247

Hoquiam, Wash., 31, 32

Horn, Werner, 20-21, 23, 52, 55, 65

horses and mules, inoculation of — see germs

Hossenfelder, German Foreign office, 184, 185

Huecking, Dr. Victor, 132

3i8

INDEX

Hucrta, President, 48
Hull, Secretary Cordell, 273
Hulsen, Captain von, 234
Hyatt, Louis F., 205-6

Igel, Wolf von, 5, 11, 12, 21, 31, 42, 49-50,
56, 58n., 72, 105, 143, 170, 186; takes
over 60 Wall St. office, 58, 70; code and
payments shown in his books, 70-71, 88;
connected with Wunnenbcrg, 87-8; his
position described by Bernstorff, 103-4;
meets Mena Edwards, 147

incendiary pencils, 75-6, 85, 89-90, 201, 203,
206, 211, 246, 262

India, sedition in, 28-33, 104, 105

Indian Independence Committee, 29

Indian regiments, 29

influenza epidemic, 169

ink, secret, 88, 153, 255, 257

inoculation — see germs

Inter-Allied Control Commission, 300

International Law Association, 135

Interstate Commerce Commission, 84

Irish, pro-German propaganda among, 9, 104,
106, 197

Irish-American agitators, 275-6

Irish- Americans, 19

Ishpeming (Mich.) powder works, 26

I. W. W. agitators, 113, 115, 116, 118, 122,
141

Jacobsen, Hildegarde, 233-4, 236, 245, 246

Jagow, von, 58-9, 108

Jahnke, Kurt, 85, 186, 196; connection with
early sabotage, 34; gives warning of Mare
Island explosion, 34, 196; connection with
W'itzke, 35, 84; with Wunnenberg, 87,
171; in Mexico, ii5-i7> 121; with
Brincken, 141; with Mexican Legation,
1 71 -2; made sole Agent in Mexico, 174;
connection with Hinsch, 172, 173; with
Black Tom plot, 84, 139, 140, 141, 144,
213, 214-15, 216, 217, 223; alibi, 213-15,
218

Jahnke, Kurt — another one, 297-8

Jansen, Dr., 87

Jebsen, Fred, 30

Jersey City Police Department, 81

Johnson, Captain, 79

Johnson ly, 78, 79, 81

Johnson & Higgins, 230

Johnson's report on Kingsland explosion, 218,
219, 221, 222, 224, 225n., 229-30

Josefina, 116, 118

Justice, Edmond, 62

Kaltschmidt, Albert Carl, 21-2, 23, 40, 97
Ida, 22

Kane, 78

"Karowski" (Wozniak), 203-4, 243; origin

of name, 258-9
Kassmann, Alexander, 83, 139
Kastner Chemical Co., 69
Keating, John P., 8, 276
Kelly, 78
Kemal Pasha, 271
Khrabroff, General, 195-6
Kienzle, Dr. Herbert, 38, 40, 65, 104, 105
Kiesselbach, Dr. Wilhelm, 131, 132, 176, 177,

288
Kingsland underwriters* claim, i77n.
Kingsland works, explosion at, 76, 87, 92-6,
114, 170, 179-80, 184, 185, 194, 195-9,
208-24, 225-42; safety devices at, 230;
cleaning machines, 230-31
counsel in case, 133, 135; amount of claim,
I77n.; witnesses influenced or bribed,
230-31; hearings and decisions, see
Mixed Claims Commission
Kipcrman, Polish paper merchant, 261
Kirf{ Oswald. 37, 41, 42
Kleist, Captain von, 42, 45, 47, 49, 70
Knorr, Wolf ran von, 14-15
Koenig, Paul, 85, 104, 105, 241; character,
61-2; activities, 62-3; betrayed, 63-4; his
organization, 64; code, etc., revealed by
notebook, 64-8, 142, 149; aliases, 65;
connection with Schleindel, 68-9; trial
and internment, 70; connection with
Wunnenberg, 88; with Black Tom plot,
142, 143, 144, 149; headquarters — see
Broadway, No. 45
Kolb, 199

Koolbergen, van, 23, 24
Kopf, Dr. Louis, 113
"Kottkamp, William" — see Dalcn
Kraus, Dr., 169
Kremer, Gustav, 87
Kretschmann, Baron Hans von, 90
Kristianiafjord , 44

KristofT, Michael, connected with Black Tom
explosion, 81-4, 90, 138, 142, 144, 189,
216, 217, 223, 246; question of death,
138-9
Krupp's, 30
Kueck, Consul, 18
Kuepferle, 17

labor, American, 108

Labor Reference Bureau, T04

"Labor's National Peace Council," 47

Lackawanna Railroad, 40, I77n.

Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., 43

Lagopetroleum Co., 183

Lakewood (N. J.) sabotage headquarters, 276

INDEX

319

Lamar, David, 47-8

Lange, Martin, 146, 149

Lansing, Robert, 133, 151

Lansing & Woolsey, 133

Larkin, James, 276-8; his Black Tom alibi, 277

Lascola's testimony about Kingsland, 219-20,

227, 228

Lawton, E. M., 119, 121, 124

Layton, S. Le Roy, 181

League of Nations Covenant, 135

Leelanau/, 87

Lefler, William, 22

Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 78, 80, 81, 82,

83, 138, 145, 147, 178. See Black Tom

Island explosion
lemon juice for invisible message, 182 (see

Quakers Hoax)
Leviathan, 171
Lewinski, Dr. Karl von (German Agent), 132,

143, 148, 175-6, 186, 191, 204, 206, 225,

228, 229; at 1930 Hague hearing, 209-21
Leyden, 78, 80

Leyendecker, Richard Emil, 63, 65

Liberty magazine, 243

Liman von Sanders, 55

Lipscomb, Captain Joel A., 121, 122, 124

Literary Digest, 54

Lody, Karl, 17

Loerky, of N. Y. German Consulate, 227

Loewenstein, Benjamin, 179

Lohmann, Dr. Johann G. (German Agent),

274-5. See German Agent
London Daily Mail, 163
Lord Erne, 37

Lovat Dickson & Thompson, Ltd., 279, 282
Lovett, Chris, 219
Lusitania, 67
Lubbert, 98
Lyndhurst testimony, 225-31

McAdoo, Secretary, 100

McCloy, J. J., 136, 259, 268-71, 276-7, 279,

297
McCormick, Mr., 230
MacGarrity, Joseph, 8, 276
Madden, Richard, 16
Madrid, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174
Magdeburg, 159
Maguire, 276
Maltzan, Attache, 107
MammonofI, 271
Manley, Captain John M., 124-5
Maracaibo, Venezuela, 183, 184
Mare Island Navy Yard, 34, 117, 196
Marguerre, Captain, 75, 90, 178, 181, 186,

187, 189, 210, 216, 217, 218, 223, 225,

231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 242,

245. See incendiary pencils

Marronc, R. N., 225

Martin, Captain, 38

Martin, H. H., 132, 186, 193, 195, 209

Martin, Stanley F., 14

Martinez & Co., 30

Mason, Major Alfred, 115, 116

Maverick,, 30-31, 33

Mesopotamia, mules for, 168

message in lemon juice, Herrmann to Hilken,

182, 243-57
Metzler, Frederick, 62, 63, 69
Meunta, Eric, 101-102
Mexico, 41, 48, 67, 112-28; flight of German

agents to, 112. See Huerta
Mexico City, 32, 114, 115, 116, 277, 278;
German Legation in, 5, 8, 116, 119,
163-4, 171
Meyer, Ludwig, 14, 146, 149
Meyers, book salesman, 250, 251, 252, 254
Midvale Chemical Co., 85-6
Mirkow Paper Mills, 261

Mixed Claims Commission, 80, 84, 138, 178,
185, 193, 248-9; organized, 131-7; per-
sonnel, 131-2; counsel, 133, 135-6; pro-
cedure, 132-3; difficulties raised by Ger-
many, 134, 177-8, 185-6; search for rec-
ords, 136-7 (jee Peaslee and Bonynge);
claims filed with, 176-7
hearings: The Hague (1930), 186-7, 208-24,
225; Washington (1932), 264-6, 290;
Washington (1936), 284-9, 294-5
decisions: Hamburg (1930), 183, 222-4,
230, 232, 244, 273; Washington (1932),
264-6, 273, 290; Washington (i937)> 295
Moffett, H. M., 1 40-1
Monserrat, 255
Montgelas, Count, 211
Morgan, J. P., loi
Morgan (J. P.) & Co., 48
Morse Patrol, 34, 214, 215
"Mox," 147
Muller, 14

Munich Agreement, 291-5
munitions market, U. S., 44
munitions plants, explosions in, 36, 54, 217,

See Kingsland
munitions shipped as farm machinery, 51
munitions workers, Thome's agency for, 241
Musebeck, Dr., 281, 283
Musson, Morris Chester, 94

Nadolny, Captain, 75, 90, 178, 181, 186, 189,
210, 216, 217, 218, 223, 231, 232, 234,
237, 242, 245, See incendiary pencils

Nassau Smelting and Refining Co., 179

National City Bank, N. Y. C, 67, 68, 189,
190

National German-American Alliance, 106-107

320

INDEX

Nauen wireless station, i6o, 172

Heckar, 46, 240

Nelidoff, Count Alexander, 268, 269, 270-71

Nelson, Senator, 5

Neunhofler, William, 115, 183

neutral telegraph and cable lines, 160-61

New Orleans agents, 47

Nick, 296

Nicolai, Colonel, 7, 90

N, J. Agricultural Chemical Co., 45

Noordam, 49

North German Lloyd Line, 46, 75, 182, 186,

244
Norway, 73, 74
Nuding, A., 118

N. Y. C. Police Department, 37, 61, 62, 67
N. Y. Harbor, 39, 45, 46, 77-9
N. Y. Journal of Commerce, 54
N. Y. Staats-Zeitung, 100
N. Y. World, 100

Oelrichs & Co., 13

Ohse, Mr., 187

oil smuggled out of U. S., 50-51

in Persia, 158
Old Admiralty Building, 153
O'Leary, Jeremiah, 8, 91, 276
Oliver, Admiral Sir Henry, 152-3, 154
Olshausen, von, German Minister to Chile,

190, 211, 212
"Oppegaarde, Karl," 38
Oppenheim, Colonel, 157
Osborn, Albert S., 247-50, 284-9

Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 85

Page, Walter Hines, 154

Paglash, Otto, 115, 125, 126, 256

Palmer (Pilenas), 198

Panas, 259

Papen, Count Franz von, 5, 6, 11, 58, 62, 103,
267, 269; his N. Y. office, 8; duties, 9;
in passport forgeries, 12-17; connection
with Goltz, 18-19; considers plan to in-
vade Canada, 18-19; to blow up Welland
Canal, 19; and Canadian Pacific R. R.,
20; connection with Bopp, 23; with
sedition in India, 30, 31, 32; with Fay,
40; with Rintelen, 44, 49; watched by
U. S. Govt., 53; recalled, 54, 61; records
seized, 53-4; promoted, 55; effects of acts
in U. S., 55-8; connection with Koenig,
67; with Igel, 71; with Hilken, 75; with
Albert, 102; with Mena Edwards, 146

paper, experts on, 247 seq., 261-2

Paradies, William, 45

Parker, Edwin B., 132, 231

Pass-Kremer Hat Band Mfg. Co., 87

passports, faking neutral, 10-17

Paulig, Dr. (German Agent), 132, 213. See
German Agent

Pcabody Overall Company, Walkervillc, Ont.,
22

peace, negotiated, 161

Peaslee, Amos }., 174, 176; on Mixed Claims
Commission, 135, 136, 137; investigates
U. S. suspects, 138, 139, 140, 142; seeks
Allies' records, 150, 151, 165; examines
decoded German messages in England,
166-70; discovers new agents' names,
170; goes to Colombia to see Gerdts
(Pochet), 1 81-3; to Venezuela to see
Witzke, 183-5; meets Herrmann in Ha-
vana, 190-91; gets data on Wozniak,
195-9, 202-8; finds Clucas, 200; to
Tuppcr Lake for Wozniak, 204-6; starts
search for Austrian records, 279; to Ger-
many to negotiate with Pfeffer, 291, 298

Peaslee & Brigham, 133, 135

pencils, experts on, 252-3

incendiary — see incendiary pencils

Pershing, General, 135

Persia, 158

Peto, Leonard A., 136, 181, 182, 183, 184,
185, 190, 192, 195, 204, 205, 239, 260;
gets Blue Book, message that Herrmann
sent Hilken, 245-6; meets Wozniak, 262

Pfeffer, Hauptmann von, 290, 291

Philadelphia, 85

phosphorus-impregnated rags, 262-3, 267, 276,
296

Picatinny Arsenal, 230-31

Pochet, Raoul Gerdts, 85, 112, 175, 184; con-
nection with Herrmann, 85, 181, 183;
story of his flight, 181-3; ordered to get
funds in N. Y. C, with invisible message
for Hilken, 182, 243-57; affidavit about it,
254; described in Siegel's statement, 256

Poland, 259

Poole Engineering Corporation, 69

Port Huron (Ont.) Tunnel, 26

Posse, Dr., 86

Pozas, Juan, 50

Praedel, George, 45

Prespare, George, 207

Prieger, Captain F., 74

Providence Journal, 52, 55, 150

Quakers brothers, 252-4
"Quakers Hoax," 243-57
Quebec fortifications, 62

radio — see German codes, German wireless,
British wireless stations

railway bridges excepted from German sabo-
tage orders, 8-9

Ramirez, 125

INDEX

321

Rawa Russka, 258, 259

Red Boo/{ magazine, 252

Regina d' Italia, 85

Reichstag hearing, 272

Reiss, Mrs. — see Edwards, Mena

Renz, inspector, 230

reservists, 10-17

Respa, Charles Francis, 21, 22

Reval, Esthonia, 255, 256, 257

Rico, Julio, 169

Rigney, Captain John J., 81

Rintelen, Captain Franz von, 143-4, I4^» I55>
193-4. 197, 237, 272; career, 42-51; con-
nections, 43; plans for dealing w^ith prob-
lem of U. S. munitions shipments, 43-4;
engages Dr. Scheele, 44-5; uses Friedrich
der Grosse for making bombs, 45-6; or-
ganizes Baltimore agents, 46, 178, 179;
and New Orleans, 47; connection with
Lamar, 47-8; with Huerta, 48; recalled,
49; extradited, tried, imprisoned, 49;
offers to testify, 193-4; his U. S. funds
seized, 194

Rio Lages, 41

Roach, Andrew, 219

Roberts, George, 219

Roberts, Justice Owen J., 132; Jiis decision as
Umpire at 1932 hearing, 264-6; at 1937
hearing, 295

Rochambeau, 41

Rockefeller Institute, 47

"Rodriguez" (Herrmann?), 95, 191-2, 202-3,
206, 217

Roebling (John A.) Company, Trenton, 36, 54

Rogers, Lucille, 146

Ross, A. Carnegie, 23

Rotterdam, 39

Roumania, 232-3

Ruge, 98

Ruggiero's testimony about Kingsland, 220,
221, 225-31

Rumscy & Morgan, 133

Ruroede, Carl, in passport forgeries, 12-17

Rushnak, Mrs. Anna, 81, 191

Russel, W. H., 142

Russian Consulate, N. Y. C, 197

Russian Embassy, 195

Russian Government, 68, 80, 92, 93, 107,
108, 196

Russian Supply Committee, 195-9

Rutherford, Rudedge, 86, 88

Ruwe of the Morse Patrol, 215

Ryndam, 73

sabotage activities, lessons to be drawn from

history of, 299-303
sabotage order — see Zimmcrmann cablegram
Sachse, Arthur, 14

Saenger paper mills, 261

"Safety Block System," 64

Satnland, 37

San Francisco, 23-8, 30, 33, 34, 277

Sanders, Albert A., 86, 88, 89, 171

Santa Clara Lumber Co., 204, 207

Santiago, Chile, 190, 222. See Olshausen

Sarnia, 85

Savage Arms Co., 69

Sayville (L. L) wireless station, 160

"scent botdes," 276

Schack, E. H. von, 23, 24, 27

Scheuch, 98

Scheele, Dr. Walter T., 42, 44-5, 47, 50-51,
58, 70; Germany's only pre-war spy in
U. S., 44

Schimmel, Walter, 48, 70

Schlarafia, the, 40

Schleindl, Frederick, 67-70, 104, 105

Schmidt, Carl, 21
Mrs., 22

Schnagl, 279, 281-3

Scholz, Walter, 21, 39-40

Schulenberg, Franz, 31, 32

Schumacher (A.) & Co., 46

Schwerdt, Eugene, 146

Schwerin, von Igel, 55

Scotland, 74

Scotland Yard, 150

Scott, 78, 84, 142, 143, 144

Seattle, Wash., 25, 27, 28, 31, 134

"Secret Service Division" of Koenig's organi-
zation, 64-6

Section III B — see German Military Intelligence
Service

Seidlitz, Baroness Ida Leonic von, 197-8
Russia Yesterday and Tomorrow, 197

Selkirk Mountains tunnel, 24

serum, diphtheria, 169

Setdement of War Claims Act, 176, 177, 291

Shaffer, Joseph, 262

Sherman Act, 49

ships, explosions in, 36-51, 218; means used —
see bombs

Shores, Corporal John, 139, 140

Siberian Railway, 107, 167

Siebs, Paul, 38

Sigel, Adam, 245, 246, 255-7

Sims, Joseph P., 151

Sims, Admiral William E., 151, 166

Singh, Ram, 32, 33

Skal, von, 103, 104

Sloane, 78

Smith, Alex, 207

Smith, Governor Alfred E., 277

Smith, Lewis J., 25-8

Sochanski, Chief of Police, 258-9

Socorro Island, 30, 31

322

INDEX

Southern Pacific Railroad, 25
Spanish Civil War, 301
Spec, von, 161

spontaneous combustion of munitions, ques-
tion of, 80-81
Sprio, Rosato, 15
spying, modern, 303
St. Paul, 200, 201, 240
St. Thomas, Ont., 26
Stahl, Gustave, 67
Standard Oil Co., 30

Stapefeldt of the North German Lloyd, 75
Stark, Dr., 12
Steele, Thomas, 94, 219
Stegler, Richard Peter, 16
Stein, Elbridgc W,, 249, 251, 284-9
Steinmetz, Erich von, 47, 49
Stephan, Lieutenant, 173
Stockholm, 169
Stresemann, Gustav, 269
Sturdee, Admiral, 161
Sun Life Insurance Co., 183
Swedish Foreign Office, 160
Swirskaya, Tamara, 198
Szek, Alexander, 155-8

Tacoma, Wash., 25

Tampico oil fields, 75, 175, 181, 183

Tannenberg, Dr. Wilhelm, 132, 204, 209, 218,
219, 220, 221, 287; his "Lyndhurst"
correspondence, 225-7; in dispute over
lemon-juice message, 248, 251, 253, 254;
his implied defense in matter of
Wozniak's confession, 263

Taube, Michel de, 268, 269

Tauscher, Captain Hans, 30, 146

Tenafly, N. J., 69

Tetra, 87

Thiel Detective Agency, 221, 222, 229

Thompson, Sir Basil, 150

Thorne, Charles E., 199, 200, 201, 239-42

Throckmorton, Luther W., 295

Thummel, Curt — see Thorne, Charles E.

Thwaites, Colonel, 150, 198

Tidevv^ater Oil Co., 82, 83

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 6, 43

T. N. T., 38, 40, 78, 80, 93

toys, incendiary devices shipped with, 170

Traynor, 251

Tunney, Inspector Thomas J., 37-9, 41, 42,
60, 62, 140, 191

Tupper Lake, 204-7

Turks, 158

Ukrainian Relief Committee, 260
Umpires in Black Tom and Kingsland claims,
132

Union Metallic Cartridge Co., 99

Urciuoli's testimony about Kingsland, 220,

221, 225-31
U. S. Army Intelligence Service, 113, 276, 277
U. S. Army Ordnance Department, 230
U. S. Bureau of Standards, 249-50
U. S. Coast Guard, 240
U. S. counter-espionage service, 60-61
U. S. Cryptographic Bureau, 302
U. S. Department of Justice, 11, 13-15, 17, 21,

27» 28, 33, 60, 61, 67, 84, 88, 89, 102,

113. 115. 137. 199, 246, 266

U. S. Embassy in London, 52; in Berlin, 161,

290
U. S. Federal Bureau of Invertigation, 15, 137,

302
U. S. Government, 177, 188, 290, 297
U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,

295, 302
U. S. Military Intelligence Service, 61, 113,

114, 137, 140, 191, 302
U. S. postal authorities, 260

U. S. Secret Service, 31, 34, 70, 100, 302
U. S. State Department, 15, 17, 52, 53, 54,

103, 160, 161, 181, 290
U. S. Treasury Department, 302

Valparaiso, Chile, 35, 127, 161, 188

Vanceboro (Maine) bridge, 20-21, 65

Vancouver, B. C, 23, 24

Varase, 197

Vaterland, 37

Venezuela, 170, 183, 184

"Vera," 146

Versailles, Treaty of, 131

Victorica, de, 90, 91

Maria de, 90-91, 139, 198
Vladivostok, 25, 28, 47, 107
Voelker, Captain A. H. J., 139
Volmer resolution, 106

Waberski — see Witzkc

Wall Street, No. 60 (Papcn's "Bureau of the

Military Attaches"), 8, 56, 58, 70, 105,

170
Walsh, J. Irving, 146, 148-9
Wandel, General ron, 44
"War Intelligence Center" — see Wall Street,

No. 60
Wargunin Bros., 261
Washington Detective Bureau, 83-4
Washington hearing (1932), 264-6, (1937)

294-5
Wasmuss, Consul, 158-9
Watermark of Wozniak's letter paper, 261 -2»

266-7
"Weaver, Walter," 25, 27, 28

INDEX

323

Wedell, Count Botho von, 11, 13

Hans von, obtains fake passports, 11-13, 15

Weehawken, N. J., 38

Wegener, 14

Welland Canal, 19, 30, 63, 70, 71, 103, 147

Wells, Marie, 146

Wendhauscn, Wladimir, 120

Wesendonck, von, 29

Wettig, Carl, 38

Whalen, Grover, 142

Whitehall Trading Co., 38

Wiedfeldt, Dr., 127

Wilhelm, Eugene, 86, 87, 171, 173

Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 43

Wilhelmshaven Naval Laboratories, 87

"Williams, James G.," 50

Wilson, Herbert S., 14

Wilson, Wcodrow, 9, 52, 53, 1 09-1 10, 127,
131, I33» 154, 161, 162

Windsor (Ont.) armory, 22

"Wisdom, Walter" — see Wiseman

Wiseman, Sir William, 150

Witzkc, Lothcr, 34-5, 84, 114, 139, 191, 196;
mission to Nogales, 1 16-17; admissions to
Altendorf, 1 17-18; sees Calles, 11 8-1 9;
actions at Sonora, 119; captured, 120;
"Waberski" passport, 120; code, 121;
connection with I. W. W., 122; keeps
silence, 122-3; trial, 123-6; his testimony,
125-6; convicted, 127, 140; imprisoned,
127; appeals, 140; released, 128; connec-
tion with Black Tom explosion, 140, 144,
183-5, 213-14, 216, 217, 223; alibi, 213-
15, 218; in Venezuela, 183-5; diary, 185;
objections to filing notebooks, 274-5

Wochst, Wilhelm, 85, 143, 174, 175, 186, 187,
201, 225, 231, 232-6, 242, 243, 246

Wolfgang, 245, 246

Wolpert, Captain Carl, 46, 47, 51, 70, 104,
105

Woodhousc, G. W. A., 95-6

Wozniak, Fiodore, origin and name
("Karowski"), 258-9; record, 196-9;
meets other agents, 202; identity and
activities, 203 seq.; at Tupper Lake,
204-8; his part in Kingsland explosion,
94-6, 217, 219-20, 228-31, 241, 247, 296;
his explanation, 195-6; alibi, 218; Com-
mission's theory of the accident, 223-4;
evidence in his letters, 258-60, 296-7;
one from Mexico City, 260-61; authen-
ticity challenged, 261-2, 266, 285; meets
Peto and confesses, 262-3; subpoenaed,
267; employed by Dr. Tannenberg, 296;
denies being in Mexico, 297; admits pay-
ment, 297; petition denied, 297

Wozniak family, 258-9

Wright, Howard Paul, 14

Wunnenberg, Charles N., 86-90, 91, 140, i86

Yacht Club, N. Y. C, 43
"Yankees, idiotic," 57, loi
Yardley, Captain, 124
Yorkvillc, N. Y. C, 11
Young, 180

Zeppelin raids over England, 162
Zimmermann, 9, 16, 20, 29, 30, 32, 43, 71,
107, 167
cablegram ordering sabotage (Jan. 26,

1915), 8, 210-11, 215, 216, 218, 231
telegram (to Mexican Legation), 151, 159,
161, 162-4

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