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ENGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
VOL. I.
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
DEAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY; with
a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime
Power. With Portraits, Illustrations and Maps.
2 vols. Crown 8vo. 16s.
THE SUCCESSOES OF DEAKE. With 4
Portraits (2 Photogravures) and 12 Maps and
Plans. 8vo. 21s.
LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO., 39 Paternoster Row
London, New York, and Bombay.
^
ENGLAND
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
A STUDY OF THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF
BRITISH POWER WITHIN THE STRAITS
1603-1713
BY
JULIAN S. CORBETT
AUTHOR OF
'drake and the TUDOR NAVV ' 'THE SUCCESSOR.-; OF DRAKE' ETC.
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I.
fVITH A MAP
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1904
All rig-hts reserved
PREFACE
The substance of the present work has been given during
the past year partly in lectures before the Senior and the
Flag Officers' War Courses at Greenwich, and partly in
the Ford Lectures on English History for 1903 at Oxford.
It is now presented in a complete form on the not
inappropriate occasion of the tercentenary of the capture
of Gibraltar.
In its present shape it is designed in some measure as
a continuation of the volumes in which I endeavoured to
trace the development of the fleet and the naval art, and
the history of naval operations under the Tudors. In
approaching the Stuart period, however, it seemed wiser
to restrict the field. There can be little doubt that much
that is repellent in our naval histories is due to the vast
arena they attempt to fill. In the effort to be complete
they swing us to and fro from end to end of the earth,
till we lose the sense of continuity, fail to seize any
underlying principles, and sink bewildered in a chaos of
facts with no apparent connection and no defined pro-
gression. It is in the seventeenth century that this com-
plexity begins to make itself felt, and discretion therefore
suggested the desirability of seeking a leading line of
development, and following it with as little distraction as
possible.
During the Stuart period two such lines present them-
VI PREFACE
selves — the one our struggle for maritime supremacy with
the Dutch, aud the other the rise of our Mediterranean
power. Both exactly cover the period in question — from
the death of Elizabeth in 1603 to the Peace of Utrecht in
1713 — and both would serve. But there can be little doubt
as to which is the more closely woven into the matter
in hand, and which is of the deeper and more lasting
interest. The struggle with the Dutch, though at the
time it absorbed most of the attention and the heaviest
effort, was, after all, but an episode in our naval history.
It was an episode, it is true, of the gravest import, but
with the wisdom of fuller experience we can now see
that from the essence of things it could only have ended
in one way. In the Mediterranean, on the other hand,
we have to deal with a question that is always open,
with history that we are living to-da}', and with conditions
which continued and remain the most vital preoccupation
of the higher naval strategy.
Once to grasp the Mediterranean point of view is to
be dominated by its fascination. It gives us a light by
which we see the British Empire standing on the same
base as did the greatest empires of the past, and buttressed
by the inviolabilitj' of her oceanic position more stronglj'
than the most enduring of them all. No less inspiring a
thought could embolden a student to relate the history of
the Stuart navj' without touching the Dutch wars or the
foundation of our oversea dominions. For this is what
has been attempted except in so far" as those two
secondary aspects of the time modified or influenced what
I venture to regard as the primar}' and central movement.
The method has at least the advantage of affording us a
fresh point of view. It is from the standpoint of the
struggle with Holland and our colonial expansion that
naval historians, and indeed others, have almost uni-
PREFACE Vll
versally depicted the time, and it should be no matter of
surprise if, viewed from the Mediterranean, it assumes
an aspect in some points so startHng in its novelty as to
arouse a suspicion of mirage. Events which seemed but
the most trifling episodes appear as links in a mighty
chain, reputations that stood high sink low, and others
almost forgotten lift their heads, while judgments that
have long passed into commonplace seem on all sides to
demand revision.
Yet I cannot doubt that any one who can frankly clear
himself of the insular standpoint and view the scene from
the ancient centre of dominion will see it much as I have
endeavoured to paint it, and will feel that, seen from any
other side, its true proportions must be missed and half
its fascination lost. Nor is this all. For I am bold to
hope that by this means he will find in Stuart times a
lamp that will light up much that is dark in later ages,
that will even touch Nelson with a new radiance, and
perhaps reveal more clearly why it is that our Mediter-
ranean Fleet stands to-day in the eyes of Europe as the
symbol and measure of British power.
The attempt to show how largely the position of
England in Europe depended on the possibilities of fleet
action in the Mediterranean necessarily involves the
ca.rrying along of an enormous weight of military and
diplomatic history — history, moreover, that for the most
part is only to be found in its relation to naval pressure in
the correspondence of generals, ministers, and diplomatists.
The majority of historians have ever ignored the naval
influence except where now and then their attention is
aroused by the thunder of a great battle. But, more
often than not, the important fact is that no battle took
place, and again and again the effort to prevent a collision
is the controlling feature of widespread political action.
Vlll PREFACE
As a rule, what did not happen is at least as important as
what did, and it is perhaps mainly due to overlooking
this truth that history has so largely ignored the sweeping-
change in the European system which accompanied the
appearance of Great Britain in the Mediterranean.
So long as we have the sure hand of Dr. Gardiner to
guide us the difficulty is not so great. Indeed I cannot
adequately express my sense of obligation to his great
work. But where it ends the chance of error in the mass
of undigested correspondence that takes its place becomes
almost overwhelming. Much guidance to authoritative
sources is, however, fortunately at hand in the 'Dictionary
of National Biography,' which has infinitely lightened the
labour, and particularly the articles of Professor Laughton,
in which he has practically re-written the whole of our
naval history in a waj^ that few but naval students
can adequately appreciate. My debt is also great to
Mr. Firth, who is carrying on Dr. Gardiner's unfinished
tasli, and who has generously placed at my disposal some
invaluable material he has unearthed. Much too is
owing to the works of Mr. Oppenheim and Mr. Tanner,
whose ' Calendar of the Pepys MSS.' in Magdalene College,
Cambridge, I have been permitted to use in proof by the
kind consent of the Navy Records Society.
Finally my thanks are particularly due to Colonel Sir
George Sydenham Clarke, K.C.M.G., R.E., from whose
inspiring suggestions the idea of this work sprung, and
whom I must gratefully call ' the only begetter of these
ensuing ' pages.
J. S. C.
November 1903
CONTENTS
OK
THE FIRST VOLUME
CHAPTKl:
I. The Mediterranean at the Be«innin'g of the Seven
TEENTH Century .
II. Ward and the Barbaky Pirates
III. The Duke of Osuna
IV. Sir Walter Kalegh and Genoa
V. England and the Venice Conspiracy
VI. The Navy undi;i: James I
VII. The Navy and the Palatinate
VIII. Mansell in the Mediterranean
IX. Richelieu's Invitation
X. Naval Strategy under Charles I
XL Mazarin and the Mediterranean ....
XII. The New Navy
XIII. The Campaign against Kupekt
XIV. The First Mediterranean Squadron ....
XV. The Dutch War within the Straits
XVI. Cromwell and the Mediterranean ....
XVII. Blake and the Turkish Sea Power
XVIII. Cromwell's War with Spain
1
10
21
33
44
66
83
110
134
143
164
178
199
224
238
271
294
318
Map to illustrate British Action in the Mediterranean
FROM 1003 10 1713 Frontispiece
EiNGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
CHAPTEK I
THE MEDITEBRANEAN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
When James I. succeeded Elizabeth, and England was
still but one of the northern sea-powers, there stood at the
extremity of the Gibraltar peninsula a sanctuary dedicated
to Our Lady of Europa. Founded in an unknown past
by the Moors, when Gibraltar Bay was the main inflow of
Moslem invasion, it had grown in wealth and sanctity
till, for those whose business was in the great waters, it
became one of the most revered shrines in Europe. Every
Catholic ship that passed saluted its miracle-working
Madonna, and every heretic captain welcomed the glimmer
of her unfading light that guided him through the Straits.
Her altar glittered with costly gifts from commanders
whom she had saved or helped ; and before it hung great
silver lamps, the offerings of world-renowned admirals,
whose names symbolise for us the old domination of the
Midland Sea. There was one from Giannandrea Doria
himself, who was Don John of Austria's right hand at
Lepanto ; another from Fabrizio Colonna, of the great
family of Papal admirals ; a third from Don Martin de
Padilla, Captain-General of the Galleys of Andalusia, to
whom, in Cadiz Bay, Drake had first taught the bitter
VOL. I. B
2 THE MEDITEREANEAN
lesson of the broadside ship. That lesson was not yet
fully learnt. Its deepest meaning was still dark. The
galley powers continued to dominate the Mediterranean,
and Our Lady of Europa still watched at its gates. But
a day was coming when the thunder of Northern cannon
should proclaim, so that all must hear, the truth of what
Drake and his fellows had taught ; when English seamen
should lay rude hands on the hallowed shrine, and the
lamps of the Dorias and Colonnas should be loot for the
officers of Byng and Kooke. The story of how that came
to pass is the story of the rise of England as a Mediter-
ranean power.'
The establishment of that power is one of the great
facts of the seventeenth century. It was a time when
much was attempted in European politics and almost
everything failed. But England's bid for the domination
of the Mediterranean was never got rid of, and it may
perhaps dispute with the rise of Kussia the claim to be
the greatest and most permanent contribution of that
strenuous epoch to the history of international relations.
It is an abiding fact which, rightly seen, gives a living
glow to a neglected period of naval history — a period
which seems marked with little but confused and half-
seen battles in the Narrow Seas with French and Dutch.
Dazzled with the romantic brilliance with which time and
literature have clothed the age that preceded it, we seek in
the new period for the same attractions, and seek in vain.
The great transition from oars to sails and the launching
of English adventure upon the oceans give the Elizabethan
days a fascination that none can miss. We have come to
regard the time as the heroic age of our navy. It had
indeed something Homeric in its sweep — something that
makes the men and their arms loom large and dominate
' Lopez de Ayala, Historia de Gibraltar, cap. I, sec. 20.
THE NEW ERA 3
the events they shaped. But when their work was done
and they lay at rest amid their trophies, the tale begins
to move upon another plane ; its meaning and its interest
are no less deep ; but they must be sought on other lines.
It is no longer with the great sailors whose romantic
careers had taught them the secret of the sea that we are
so much concerned, nor with the details of build and
armament that went to compose the weapon of their
choice. In type both ships and guns were already what
they remained till steam and iron did for sails what sails
had done for oars. The forging of the weapon and the
making of the men who were its first masters no longer
give the note. A deeper and a louder tone is sounding ;
for before us lie the mighty consequences of what they
had done, the growth of the new naval science, and
above all the undreamed-of change it brought about in
the balance of European power.
It must always be with a sigh of weariness that we
turn our backs on the Tudor days to face the colourless
waste of the early Stuarts. At first sight there is no
period in our naval history which appears so barren of
interest or significance as the reign of James I. We
have come to regard it as a time marked only by the
decay of the national arm under the blight of what we
now call Society, and by occasional commissions for its
reorganisation that were dominated for good and evil by
the party politics of the hour. There is but one expedi-
tion to relieve the dreary story of corrupt and inefficient
administration and the efforts of earnest men to stop the
dov^mward course, and that expedition in its declared
object was a contemptible failure. But this is not the
whole story. There is a natural disposition to measure
the importance of a phase of naval history in terms of
the actions that were fought, and to forget that, besides
b2
4 THE MEDITERRANEAN
being a fighting machine, a powerful navy is also a power-
ful diplomatic asset. The silent pressure of naval power
has been well represented as its most potent line of energy,
and it is in this aspect that the Jacobean period will be
seen to have been dignified with an event of the deepest
importance. For that abortive expedition, besides its de-
clared object, had one which was undeclared and which
gave the keynote of the century. For it was the
occasion on which, with the intention of influencing a
European situation, the navy of England first appeared
in the Mediterranean,
When we consider how often since that day the same
thing has happened, and how often and how profoundly
it has seemed to control the course of history, it is impos-
sible not to be stirred by the significance of the event.
It was the direct and most startling outcome of the
completed transition. For some years men had under-
stood what the new force meant upon the ocean. They
had long seen that the strength which lay in the New World
and in All the Indies must come at last into the hands
of those who could command the oceanic highways ; but
it was a new and bewildering revelation to see what a
change it foreshadowed for the Old World powers that
lay around the Midland Sea.
For centuries the destinies of the civilised world had
seemed to turn about the Mediterranean. Each power
that had in its time dominated the main line of history
had been a maritime power, and its fortunes had climbed
or fallen with its force upon the waters where the three
continents met. It was like the heart of the world ; and
even the barbarians, as they surged forward in their
wandering, seemed ever to be pressing from the ends of
the earth towards the same shining goal, as though their
thirsting hps would find there the fountain of dominion.
THE HEART OF TPIE WORLD 5
So too the media3val emperors, as they sat in the heart
of Germany, knew they were no emperors till their feet
were set on its brink, and one after another they exhausted
their resources in unconscious efforts to reach it. So
strong was its influence that those nations of the North
whose shores were not washed by its waters seemed to
lie out upon the fringe of Christendom — barely within the
pale of European polity. As alhes or subjects they might
modify the action of the central powers by pressure in
rear or flank ; but, so long as the galley remained supreme,
the Midland Sea was closed to them, and they could never
come near enough to the centre of energy to take a com-
manding line of their own. But now all was changed.
So soon as it was apparent that the galley, even in its
ancient home, could not hold its own against the galleon,
the Mediterranean ceased to be purely the centre of the
world. It became also a highwciy into the heart of Europe.
The strategic points upon which the world's history had
pivoted so long were suddenly seen to lie open to the
West, and the outcast fringe of nations, into whose lap
the oceans were beginning to pour an immeasurable
power, were no longer without the pale.
It is significant of how bewildering the revolution was
that the Northern powers were not the first to see what
it gave them. It was rather the old nations, whom it
robbed of their pre-eminence, whose eyes were first
opened. From the outset it became an abiding dread of
Spain that an English or a Dutch saihng fleet would
enter the Mediterranean and discover its power. Yet
characteristically it was not Spain who made the first
steps to meet the new situation. It is true that ever
since the defeat of the Great Armada she had been trying
with changing success to create a sailing navy of her own,
but this was in view of the defence of her Atlantic trade.
6 THE MEDITERRANEAN
In the Mediterranean she still relied mainly upon the
galley fleets of her Italian provinces and the maritime
republics that were her mercenaries. In this way, ever
eince Lepanto, she had been able to dominate her own end
of the sea. The naval power of the Turk was broken, and
the piratical states that lay along the north coast of Africa
had ceased to be a serious danger. Within the Straits
they could not by themselves contend with the Italian
galley admirals, and without in the ocean, where the
richest of the sea-borne trade now passed, they could
not venture till they had learned the mystery of sails.
It was they who first saw the opportunity and went to
school to the English and Dutch.
In order to grasp the complex effects which arose
out of the new conditions of maritime warfare, it is first
necessary to have a clear view of how things stood in the
Mediterranean. A glance at the map will show that
strategically it is divided into two nearly equal areas by
what came to be known as the Two Sicilies — that is, the
island of Sicily itself, and the southern spread of the
Italian peninsula, then occupied by the kingdom of
Naples, In the eastern half and all its ramifications, the
Turks and Venetians still contended for supremacy, and
the contest was steadily going against the Christian power.
Khodes and Cyprus, so long the outposts of western in-
fluence, had never been recovered to Christendom. The
effect of the battle of Lepanto had been merely to confine
the Turkish power to the further half of the sea, and
this it now dominated with its advanced naval station at
Navarino on the western shores of the Morea. All that
remained to check its power were the great island of
Crete and some other scattered stations, where the decay-
ing power of Venice still maintained the Cross with ever-
failing strength. The western half was dominated by
SPAIN AND THE BARBARY STATES 7
Spain mainly through her possession of the Two Sicihes.
Sardinia was also hers. Malta was under her protec-
tion, and there were established the dispossessed knights
of Khodes, still sharing with Venice the honour of hold-
ing the furthest outposts of Christendom against the
Moslem.
The Spanish command of the western half, however,
was not midisputed. The Barbary states, though no
longer the formidable factor which they had been in the
days of Barbarossa, were still active upon the sea, and
from their main strongholds at Tunis and Algiers, both
within the Spanish sphere, they continually disturbed it
with their piracies. Indeed, as the Spanish maritime
strength was slowly exhausted by the struggle with
England, they had been fast recovering the power which
Lepanto had shattered. In vain, during the last few
years of the sixteenth century, the Pope had tried to set
on foot another Holy League against their devastating
activity. Spain would not respond, and without her
nothing effective could be done. In 1601, however, he
had succeeded. A powerful galley fleet, strong enough to
have penetrated to Constantinople, was got together to
surprise Algiers. All the Itahan states except Venice
joined Spain in the effort, and the command was again
given to Giannandrea Doria, the evil genius of Christian
naval power. As he had shown by his advice to Don
John of Austria after Lepanto, and on other occasions
when he was in chief command, he was a past master in
the art of abortive campaigns, and this time he succeeded
in doing absolutely nothing. He led his fleet to Algiers
and brought it back to Messina without having struck a
single blow. Two more attempts were made in the two
following years, but with no more success, and the
Barbary states grew more and more formidable on the
8 THE MEDITERRANEAN
sea till every shore of the Spanish sphere was scarred
with the marks of their raids.
These two main spheres, the Turkish and Spanish,
w^hich relate chiefly to the struggle between East and
West, are not the only points of view from which the
Mediterranean has to be considered. It has a secondary
strategical aspect which bears more directly upon the
European situation. From the middle of the sea two
gulfs run up as it were towards the heart of the Continent,
on either side of Italy. That on the west, where Genoa
gave the only direct access to Savoy and the Spanish
province of Lombardy, was dominated by the ancient
republic which had been the great condottiere of the sea.
With the Riviera and Corsica in her possession she was
master of the situation, for France was as yet too weak
upon the Mediterranean to exercise a counterbalancing
influence from her Proven9al ports. The dominating
position of the place was fullj'^ recognised by the
strategists of the time. For during the interminable
struggle between Francis I. and Charles V. victory had
always seemed to incline to the power that had con-
trol of Genoa. Though nominally independent, it was
now practically a Spanish port — the vital point in the
line of communication which bound Spain to the Austrian
Hapsburgs and the Spanish Netherlands through her
possessions in Northern Italy. Eastward of Italy lies the
Adriatic, or, as it was then generally called, the Gulf of
Venice ; for Venice still claimed the same kind of right
over it as did England in the Narrow Seas, and regarded
it as a mare clausum. Here lay the disturbing factor in
what would otherwise have been a simple problem of
East and West. Venice in her semi-oriental spirit was
usually on fair terms with the Porte. The mainspring
of her policy was her Eastern trade, and this consideration
THE FUNCTION OF VENICE 9
complicated her attitude to the Turks as much as that of
Spain was compHcated by an unwilhngness to entirely
crush a power which, though infidel and hostile, yet served
as a counterpoise to Venice. For Venice in the Mediter-
ranean had been the same obstacle to Spanish dominion
as England had been in the ocean, and, in spite of every
combination to crush her, her territory still spread a
barrier between the two halves of the Hapsburg system
which were now seeking to renew their lost solidarity.
It was the threat of this family dual alliance, which
would go far to re-establish the empire of Charles V.,
that was the dominating fact in European politics, and
it was just when its shadow was beginning to fall upon
the nations that through its weak point in the Mediter-
ranean the new sea power from the North was brought
to bear upon it in a strangely romantic manner.
CHAPTER II
WABD AND THE BAEBAEY PIRATES
Soon after James had come to the throne there was
haunting the alehouses of Plymouth a tattered seafaring
O man, a waif of humanity whose luck had cast him there,
no one knew whence. His name was Ward, and he was
said to be a Faversham man, a fisherman probably, who
had taken to the high seas in the palmy days of privateer-
ing. He was known for a sullen, foul-mouthed, hard-
drinking ruffian, who was seldom sober, and who would
sit at his cups all day long and ' speak doggedly, com-
plaining of his own crosses and cursing other men's luck,'
quarrelsome too at his drink, yet always ready to take a
cudgeUing rather than fight. His occupation was gone,
for the King had grown hard on privateering. In his
eagerness to stand well with Spain and to preserve his
hasty peace James had issued order after order calling in
all letters of marque and bidding his seamen even in
foreign service to return to their country. Deep and
strong was the cursing all along the coast ; but the orders
' were strictly enforced, and times at last grew so bad with
Ward that he was forced to take service in the royal
navy.
He shipped aboard his Majesty's pinnace ' Lion's
Whelp,' then in commission v^th the Channel Guard.
But here he was no better content. He was for ever
grumbling over the hard fare and lack of drink, and
lamenting the good times that were gone, ' when,' as he
1604 MUTINY OF THE ' LION'S WHELPS ' 11
is reported to have said, ' we might sing, swear, drab, and s
kill men as freely as your cakemakers do flies ; when the -
whole sea was our empire where we robbed at will, and
the world was our garden where we walked for sport.'
With talk of this kind he set himself to work upon his
shipmates, till one day, as they lay with the ' Golden
Lion ' at Portsmouth, he hinted to them that he knew a
way to heal their ills. After much pressure he proceeded
to tell them that a small bark which lay near them had
been bought by a Catholic recusant, whose life had grown
unbearable in England, and who, having sold his lands,
was shipping all his worldly goods for France. Here he
showed them their chance. They had but to board her
suddenly at night, seize the treasure she contained, and be
in clover again. The plot was soon hatched, some thirty
of his shipmates agreeing to share the venture. It was
settled that they should all ask leave for a frolic ashore, and
then, such was the naval discipline of the time, when night
came on they could steal off to the bark and help them-
selves to all they wanted, and the officers would never
know they were not safe aboard. In an alehouse ashore
the rascals elected Ward their captain, kneeling round
him, tankards in hand, and all promised well. But, as
ill-luck would have it, a friend of the recusant's had been
struck with the ugly look of the gang, and advised him to
get leave to stow his treasure on board the ' Golden Lion '
till a fair wind came to put him beyond their reach. So
it happened that, when Ward and his band seized the
bark, they found nothing worth having but the dainties
which the gentleman had provided for his voyage. On
these they regaled themselves, cursing their luck and
their captain till Ward saw them in better humour with
their feasting. Then he quietly showed them it was im-
possible to draw back ; there was nothing for it but the
12 WARD AND TflE BARBARY PIRATES 1605
high seas ; and so he induced them to put out. All that
was wanted was a ship to serve their turn, and by a clever
trick he managed to seize one off Scilly. She was a
Frenchman of eighty tons and five guns. Renaming
her appropriately the ' Little John,' after Eobin Hood's
lieutenant, he put back into Plymouth Sound, and there
he quickly found enough men of the old stamp to complete
his crew. Thus equipped, he stood for the coast of Spain.
Off St. Vincent he picked up another prize. In the Straits
/ he got two or three more, and then with his little squadron
/ he held away for Algiers.
To his disappointment, however, the Dey would not
listen to his overtures. A short time before, a certain
Captain Gifford, an Englishman in the service of the
j Grand Duke of Tuscany, resenting the Dey's behaviour
about a prize he had brought in, had recklessly set it on
fire in the midst of the harbour, and had so nearly suc-
ceeded in burning the whole Algerian fleet as to make the
Dey swear vengeance on all Englishmen from that time
forth. Ward, therefore, hastily retired to find a more
cordial reception at Tunis. Though here, as at Algiers,
the Porte was still represented by a Pacha, the practical
dictator of the place at this time was a Turkish adventurer,
called Kara Osman, whom the Janissaries had elected
Bey, and against whom the Pacha was powerless. This
I man Ward was clever enough to gain by promising to
I prey on all Christians except Englishmen and to share
I the profits with him ; and on this basis he received
permission to use the port as his base and commence
operations.
Algiers was not long in following suit. Shortly after-
wards a famous pirate known as Simon Danzer, Dansker,
or le Danseur, and already notorious for his depredations
in all parts of the world, arrived in the Mediterranean
160o THE MUTINEERS AT TUNIS 13
and was invited by the Dey to enter his service, which he
agreed to do with, the formidable squadron under his
command. From these two men thus estabhshed in the
most active centres of "piracy the Barbary corsairs learned
the new art of sailing warships, and under their Dutch
and English masters progressed with a rapidity that could
not long be ignored.^
During the later years of the Elizabethan war the
Mediterranean from the Archipelago to the Straits had
rung with the piracies of English merchantmen. Claims
from all sides, and especially from the Venetians, were still
being pressed upon James, and, though some of them may
have been exaggerated or unfounded, there can be little
doubt that the way roving privateers pressed their rights
over Spanish goods in neutral ships was not always too
regular. To have such a man as Ward, therefore, openly
established at Tunis was an outrage not to be endured,
and he had hardly been at work a year when the King of
France found it necessary to send a special mission to
Tunis to protest against what was going on. His envoj'',
having a firman of the Sultan to back his diplomacy and
' The details of Ward's career are from a work entitled A trice and
certain report of tlie heginning, 'proceedings, overthrows, and now present state
of Captains Ward and Dansker, the tivo late famous pirates ; from their
first setting foorth to this present time, published by Andreiv Barker, Master
of a ship, who tvas taken by the confederates of Ward and by them sometime
detained pi-isoner. London, 1609, 4to. Black Letter (Brit. Mus. C. 27, c. 6).
Barker, who is careful to give the names of his informants for what he did
not himself see, is generally confirmed by Father Pierre Dan in his Histoire
de Barbaric et de ses Corsairs, a w-ork he published in 1637, after returning
from a mission to ransom captives at Algiers. Simon Danzer, he says,
began his Algerian service about 1606. The date of Ward's mutiny is un-
certain, but it is clear from Barker's report he must have been at Algiers at
least four years before 1609. Dan says the Tunisians learnt the art of sails
from an Englishman called Edward, but he was probably subsequent to
Ward. According to Dan, Ward was at Tunis in June 1605 when M. de
Breues was sent there by Henri IV. on the mission referred to below. (Ibid.
pp. 165, 274.) Meteren, in his Histoire des Pays Bas, p. 667a, also says that
Ward was first in the field.
14 WATJD AXD THE P.AT^BATJY PIRATES 1606
secure him the support of the Pacha, was able to exact
from Kara Osman a treaty providing that no Enghsh
corsairs should be suffered to use the harbour.
But Ward was too valuable an ally for the treaty to be
anything but a dead letter. His depredations continued
on an ever increasing scale till finally he dared to invade
the sacred preserve of the Venetians, and crowned his
reputation by capturing, after a desperate fight, one of
their renowned galeazze cli mercantia. For size and
richness these vessels were hardly second to the famous
East Indian carracks of Lisbon. Ward's prize was of
fifteen hundred tons and valued at two millions of ducats.
At the zenith of his fame the English deserter was now
living in all the state of a Bey, surrounded by scores of
obsequious attendants and rolling in riches, so that no
peer in England, as one who saw him said, ' did bear up
his post in more dignity.' He armed his great prize and
sent her out as flagship of his fleet ; but, being overweighted
with ordnance, she was lost in a storm with Captain
Croston, his best man, and a hundred and fifty English
hands. It was the turning point of his fortunes. Ventur-
ing again into the Adriatic to repair the loss, he was met
by the Gulf squadron consisting of a score of galleys with a
gaUeasse at its head, which the Venetians had despatched
against him and which drove him from his station with
the loss of two of his ships and a number more of his
men. So severe was the blow that he had to confine
himself to vessels trading to Cyprus and Alexandria,
with gradually declining fortunes. By 1608 he had but
two ships of his own left, and that year some fifty of his
men deserted in the ' Little John.' Osman smelt
treachery, and it was all Ward could do to save himself
from disgrace. But so great was his reputation, he was
soon able to restore his position. The following year he
1609 DANZER AT ALGIERS 15
was joined by three more English pirate leaders named
James Bishop, Sakell or Sawkeld, and Jennings, and also
about the same time by the famous Sir Francis Verney,
who in the summer of 1608 had sold all that was left
of his ancestral estates and disappeared beyond the seas.
Others probably did the same ; at all events, in the year
after his reverse he was able to equip and man a squadron
of fourteen sail, and seemed as formidable as ever.^
From Algiers Danzer, though not equally fortunate,
had been equally active, and the Spaniards like the Vene-
tians found it necessary to take serious steps to protect
themselves. But, though galleys were well enough to
keep command of the close waters of the Adriatic, they
were useless against sailing ships in the open seas on
either side of the Straits. Danzer, treating the coast-
guard galleys with contempt, had intercepted high officials
returning from Sicily, and venturing outside the Straits,
as was the practice of the Algerines, he appeared off Cape
St. Vincent with a mixed squadron of eighteen vessels.
It was in 1608, just when the negotiations for a truce
with the Dutch gave the Spanish Government breathing
time, and they proceeded at once to reorganise the whole
of their sailing navy. The northern or Biscayan division
was remodelled under the name of the Cantabrian
Squadron and assigned the duty of receiving the West
Indian convoys at the Azores. Thus the galleons of the
main Ocean Squadron were set free, and Don Luis Fa-
jardo, who had recently been appointed to the command,
set to work to form with them a fleet to sweep Danzer and
Ward from the seas. At the time the King of Spain had
on foot a great mobilisation of galleys which all Europe
was watching, and of which no one knew the object, and,
' See Lord Admiral to Salisbury, Aug. 8, 1609, S. P. Domestic, xlvii. 71 ;
Verney Papers {Camden Society), 95.
16 WAED AND THE BARBARY PIRATES 1609
' so long" as Ward and Danzer were active, it could not go
forward. Nothing could be more eloquent of the gravity
with which the work of these two adventurers was
regarded, or of the reality of the revolution they were
working, than that it was found necessary to send against
them the famous galleons of the Indian Guard with the
Captain-General of the Ocean Sea at their head. That
day in June 1609, when Fajardo put out from Cadiz to
5 enter the Mediterranean for the first time with a fleet
of broadside ships, marks a turning-point in naval history,
and it was directly brought about by a Dutch corsair and
a handful of deserters from the British navy.
Fajardo's force consisted of but eight ships of war
and some light craft, but in Sicily he expected to meet
a squadron under another famous English adventurer.
This was Sir Anthony Shirley, the eldest of those three
renowned brothers whose adventures at the Court of
Persia were then in every one's mouth. After his failure
as a privateer in the West Indies in Elizabeth's time he
had gone under the patronage of Essex on a diplomatic
mission to the ' Sophy,' and was now returned with his
visionary brain full of a gigantic European coalition
against the Turks. After visiting the chief Courts con-
J cerned he had reached Madrid, where, through the active
furtherance of the Jesuits, he had been received with great
favour by the weak-minded young King. He even ex-
pected people to believe, as he wrote in his autobiography,
that he had been given for his purpose the supreme
command of the Great Armada that was assembling, and
whose mobilisation he persuaded himself was due to his
own energy and influence. The truth seems to be that
the only commission he ever had from the King was little
more than that of privateer, with the indefinite title of
Admiral of the Levant Seas. Indeed his appointment
1609 Sm ANTHONY SHIRLEY 17
would scarcely deserve notice were it not for its signi-
ficance as a sign of the times. For it was an effort made
by Spain herself to introduce English blood into the
Mediterranean. As it fell out, little came of it. With
his vague authority Shirley had proceeded to Italy early
in 1607, and for two years had been wandering from port
to port trying to get a fleet together and showing a special
anxiety to induce English seamen to desert their ships
and join his flag. By the summer of 1609 he had managed
to form a small squadron, which he boasted to have num-
bered twenty-three sail and seven thousand men, but
as yet he had done nothing ; and in spite of his persuasive
tongue and lavish hand he was beginning to be regarded
as an impostor. His headquarters were at Palermo,
where he was living like a Prince in the * Arabian Nights,'
and it was for this port therefore that Fajardo was bound
in order to effect a junction.^
On his way he looked into Algiers, where apparently
he expected to find Danzer, but he was gone. Weary of
his employment or alarmed at the extensive naval pre-
parations in Spain, the object of which was still a secret,
he had already escaped from the Algerian service and
shortly afterwards appeared with his squadron at
Marseilles to make his peace and seek an asylum
with the French King. Henry IV. was at the time
absorbed with his vast plans for breaking down the
threatening Hapsburg system, and with a watchful eye
' Meteren, Hist, des Pays Bas, 667b. He says Fajaiclo sailed ' en
intention de se joindre a quelques autres navires sous la conduite de
Thomas Shirleye lesquels il pensait rencontrer a Palernio.' The brothers
were often confused, but Thomas is not known to have been out of England
at this time. See The Sherlcy Brothers (Eoxburghe Club). On Sep-
tember 9, 1609, Anthony wrote that he was about to start for an unknown
destination from Palermo with twenty-three ships and seven thousand men.
In November he was said to have seven ships and to have done nothing.
Ibid. p. 71.
VOL. I. C
18 WARD AND THE BARBARY PIRATES 1609
on the Spanish mobiHsation was ready enough to receive
such men with open arms.^ Not finding his man at
Algiers, Fajardo took a cast up to Sardinia, on his way to
effect his junction with Sir Anthony Shirley. There he
fell in with a small squadron, which had been organised
by a Frenchman of the old crusading stamp, and which
deserves remembrance as the first recorded symptom that
France too was stirred by the new movement. It was
the Sieur de Beaulieu, a Poitevin gentleman, who, fired
by the miseries of his fellow-countrymen on the seas, had
fitted out at Havre a galleon and a pinnace as a scourge
for piracy. He, or rather his captain, De Tor, had met
already with considerable success and had apparently been
joined by other vessels from Marseilles. From this man
Fajardo heard that Danzer had been already received into
the French service, and that it was useless to seek him
further. The Frenchman, however, proposed that they
should make a dash upon Tunis, and destroy the squadron
that Ward, Bishop, Verney, and Kara Osman had gathered
there for a cruise against the American treasure fleet.
The proposal somewhat staggered Fajardo, who regarded
the operation as impracticable, at least without the
assistance of Shirley's squadron. On the Frenchman
protesting, however, that he had been about to do it alone,
Fajardo came round. Together they suddenly appeared
in the Goleta, and there they found a squadron of war-
ships almost ready for sea, some of which were of seven
' Meteren (Histoire dcs Pays Bas, 709ii) says he was appointed Con-
voyeur or ' Wafter ' of the French Levant convoj', and that while so serving
he landed near Tunis, where he was captured and murdered in prison.
There was another story, followed by Motley, that he was assassinated in
Paris by a merchant he had robbed ; but Meteren's account is supported by
a letter of July 1011, from the Viceroy of Sicily to Philip III., saying he had
been recently executed by Kara Osman in Tunis — a report which the
Viceroy confirmed in April the following year. See Documentos Indditos,
xliv. 104, 224.
1609 THE EXPULSION OF THE MORISCOS 19
hundred tons, besides unarmed prizes, over thirty sail in
all. They were lying under the guns of the fort, but the
light craft were sent in at once, covered by the fire of the
combined fleet. The result was a complete justification
of the Frenchman's daring. The anchorage lay five
leagues from the city, and, long before succour could arrive,
the French and Spanish boats had fired the whole of the
ships except two that they brought out.^
It was the heaviest blow that the pirates had received
since Lepanto, and all Christendom rang with the exploit.
Indeed, so entire was the satisfaction in Spain that she
did nothing in the Mediterranean to complete the work.
Instead of being allowed to proceed with the powerful
force at his command, Fajardo was recalled to Cartagena,
where the great galley fleet collected from all parts of
the Spanish sphere was now completely mobilised. For
months its gathering had been watched with growing
anxiety from London to Venice, and at last its object
was apparent. It was what has always been regarded
by foreigners as one of the great mistakes of Spanish
history that was on foot — the famous expulsion of the
Moriscos. The descendants of the old Moorish popula-
tion then formed an element that was unrivalled in the
dominions of Spain for wealth, energy, and culture. Yet
they were heretics, and the influence of the Church was
sufficient to brand them as a danger and to force upon
the King the heroic remedy of expelling them in mass.
So instead of crushing the reviving sea power of the
Moslems in the bud, Fajardo was employed in carrying
to Barbary tens of thousands of Spanish subjects, to give
a new impetus to the wealth and activity of the predatory
' This is the account given by Meteren, op. cit. p. 667c, who probably
had it from a French source. See Dan, Hist, de Barbarie, 1637, p. 169 et
seq. Spanish authorities seem, however, to ignore the French squadron and
give the whole credit to Fajardo. See Dure, Arnmda Esjpafiola, iii. 324.
c 2
20 WARD AND THE BARBARY PIRATES 1609
states. It is possible that Shirley too was employed in
the same field ; he certainly struck no blow against the
corsairs to mend his broken reputation. It was not till
the following year that he hazarded an attempt, and then
it was only to make a cruise in Turkish waters with
results so feeble as to bring him into irretrievable con-
tempt. In a vain hope of restoring his position he made
his way back to Madrid, and there gradually sank into
poverty and senility, associating with fugitive English
Catholics, vapouring to the end, with his head as high as
ever, of the vast schemes he had on foot, and teasing the
Spanish Government with fantastic designs to crush the
naval power of his own abandoned country.
The immediate effect of the Moriscos' expulsion was
as disastrous as it was unforeseen. It led at once to the
rise of Salee as a pirate port, and its launch upon its
sinister career. Hitherto the Moslem corsairs had been
practically confined to ports within the Straits, so that
until the coming of Danzer the ocean trade had been
fairly free from danger. But in a few months the
Spaniards found that a number of their wealthy exiles
had established a naval port on the ocean, buying and
hiring ships from the North, till the seas about the mouth
of the Straits began to swarm with corsairs more active,
determined, and well equipped than those of Tunis and
Algiers themselves. In vain they seized El Araish as a
counterstroke ; in vain they tried to block the neighbour-
ing ports ; all was useless. The galleons of the ocean
had more than they could do to keep the Moriscos in
check, and within the Straits the power of the corsairs
was left to grow till, two years after Fajardo's victory, the
seas of the Spanish sphere were almost impassable for
trade, and its shores were being ravaged from end to
end.
CHAPTEE III
THE DUKE OF OSUNA
It is at this moment that a new figure appears upon the
scene, who was destined to save the situation for Christen-
dom and to mark the second step in the Mediterranean
transformation as Ward had marked the first. This man
was Don Pedro Tellez Giron, third Duke of Osuna, a
personality as far' removed from the melodramatic Eng-
lish pirate as could well be conceived. Son of a viceroy
of Naples and a grandee of Spain, he had been carefully
educated at his father's court for a public career. He
was a ripe Latin scholar, was deeply read in history, and,
on leaving the University of Salamanca at the end of
1588, had distinguished himself by composing and re-
citing a funeral ode to the Invincible Armada. Having
succeeded early to his rank and estates, he had gone,
in 1602, as the fashion was, to serve his apprenticeship
10 war at the siege of Ostend. The Homeric contest
between Ambrogio Spinola and Sir Francis Vere had
earned for itself the name of the first school of arms in
Europe, and thither young gentlemen ambitious of a
soldier's reputation flocked, as scholars did to the uni-
versities of Bologna or Padua. So high was his rank
that no post sufficiently exalted for him to accept could
be found vacant in the Spanish army. He therefore had
to content himself with serving as a volunteer, and in this
capacity he attached himself to Spinola's brilliant brother,
38 THE DITCE OF OSUNA lt>03
Frederigo. with whom he had already formed a close
friendship in Madrid.
It was a chance big with consequence. For it must
have been in the strenuous young Admiral's company
that he learnt those ideas on the importance of maritime
power which Frederigo had so lu-gently pressed upon
the Spanish Goyemment, and of which he himself was
destined to be so loud an exponent. And more than
this. His first naval action sufficed to make him a
convert to the new system against which his chief spent
his hfe in vain resistance. For his introduction to
warfare was to be present in that last fight amid the
Zeeland shoals in which Frederigo fell, and in which,
as the Dutch medal boasted, ' the ships made an end of
the galleys.' ' The impression made upon his mind was
one he never forgot. It opened his eyes to the great
secret ; and though in Spain the action was trumpeted as
a victory Osuna read its real meaning. From his chief
hving he had learnt how dominion lay on the sea, and
from his death he had learnt how alone that dominion
coidd be won.
The following year he seized the opportunity of the
peace rejoicings in London to go over and study the
English navy. There he won James's heart by the
beauty and wit of his Latin conversation, for he had
spoken the language fluently since he was nine years
old.- Osuna's opinion of the King was not so flattering.
' If King James,' he said to the Spanish Ambassador,
' were less of a pedant and more of a politician, there
would have been no peace.' Refusing any official posi-
tion he was able to pursue his inquiries in freedom, and
' The Successors of Drake, cap. xvi.
* Gregorio Leti gives an interesting account of how, with a view to
diplomacy, he was taught Latin, between the ages of seven and nine, entirely
from the Colloquies of Erasmus, without grammar or dictionary.
1(510 HLS VIEWS Oy •5EA POWER 23
by hi^ : :: :
no oj.
author
was fu ,
at the reKef of Gr*:
retam - - anms: in
1607. Ir V
ing him, £.__ _;. . - -^j.: :_ :_r
Privy CouDcil and the ' , - _ Fleece.
It was not, however, til- zhxee years later that
the opportunity c- ' . ., . - _^
question of the ap .. --, ..... ._ - .
came before the C sxina seized the occasion to
point out the high stra.: _ : the island for
the command of the Medi: ' ' ^ miQd
upon the shameful condirio- ._: _..„ :: erthe-
less been allowed to fall by the neglect of i:- liorces.
He showed that within the last thirty years the corsairs
had landed and made havoc on its shores over eighty
times, and that under existing conditions there was no
prospect of an improvement. The Moslem forces at
Tunis and Algiers were on the spot, while those of Spain
were far away, and things were going from bad to worse.
As it was, he said, the King was only sovereign of the
territory which the guns of his forts could cover. ' The
new Viceroy you are going to appoint,' he cried, ' will
only go to be a spectator of the same things : he wiU only
go as a Court newsman to record landings, burnings, and
assaults.' Such a condition of affairs, he protested, could
not continue, and there were but two courses by which it
could be stopped — the King must either pay the corsairs
24 THE DUKE OF OSUNA 1611
blackmail to leave the island in peace, or else make it the
centre of such a naval force as v^^ould suffice from the com-
manding position it occupied to sv^^eep them from the seas.
It was seldom a King of Spain heard such home truths at
his council table, and Osuna's prompt reward or punish-
ment was that he received the appointment himself.'
It was in the spring of KUl that he took up his
memorable command. On his arrival he found assem-
bling at Messina the whole available force at the Spanish
disposal in the Italian seas — twelve galleys of the
Neapolitan squadron, ten more from Genoa, five from
Malta, while Sicily itself furnished seven — in all thirty-
four, and others were expected from the Pope. In
command was the Marquis of Santa-Cruz, son of the
original commander-in-chief of the Great Armada, and
almost the only galley admiral in the Spanish service
who had not disgraced himself during the English war.
It was his intention, with the powerful force at his
disposal, to make a raid on the Barbary coast to secure a
supply of galley-slaves. By September he managed to get
ready for sea and make a dash for the Kerkenna Islands in
the Gulf of Gabes, but he got possession of them only with
considerable loss, and returned with five hundred wretched
Arab fishermen and peasants to show for his costl}^ cam-
paign. To such a depth had naval warfare sunk in the
Mediterranean under the influence of Giannandrea Doria.
More deeply confirmed in his ideas than ever by what
he saw, Osuna was already at work. Pending arrange-
' Osuna's career may be followed in Captain Fernandez Duro's Kl gran
Diujue dc Osuna y su marina (Madrid, 1885), and in the third volume of
his Armada Espanola. A long series of documents relating to his Vice-
royalty are in vols. xliv. to xlvii. of the Documentos Licditos. The earliest
authority is an Italian Life of him, by the Milanese historian, Gregorio
Leti, published in 1690, from whom I have taken the details of his youthful
career.
1612 HIS NAVAL EEFORMS 25
ments for beginning a sailing squadron, he laid down two
galleys of his own, which he might use as he liked, to
make a demonstration of his views. One thing he was
bent on improving was the position of seamen. He had
seen in England the effect of what Hawkins had brought
about by persuading the Government to improve the pay
and diet of naval crews, and in health, vigour, and dis-
cipline his vessels quickly became a shameful example
to the King's. So remarkable was the influence of his
reforming energy that he persuaded the Provincial
Parliament to give him an extraordinary subsidy, with
which he fitted out four more of the time-honoured craft.
By the spring of 1612 he thus had six efficient galleys at
his disposal, and with these he proceeded to hit his first
direct blow. It fell on Kabilia, the nearest Tunisian port
to Sicily, which his admiral, Don Otavio de Aragon, took
and burnt. Returning to Sicily with his captured slaves,
Don Otavio joined Santa-Cruz at Trapani at the west
end of the island, and thence made a dash at Tunis itself.
He had learned that the corsairs, having recovered from
Fajardo's punishment, were again fitting out a strong
squadron for a direct attack on the Spanish West Indian
convoy. The surprise was an entire success. Nine or
ten vessels were burnt at their moorings and some brigan-
tines or small galleys captured. The blow was followed
up b}' a productive cruise to the eastward. It was
clear a new spirit was abroad, and the corsairs, stung to
fury, resolved to nip it in the bud by a crushing blow upon
Osuna's headquarters at Messina. With a powerful mixed
fleet of ships and galleys, they too attempted a night
surprise ; but Osuna had already succeeded in bringing
his influence to bear on the rabble of desperadoes and
broken officers who regarded the Sicilian service as their
Alsatia, and the pirates were flung back with the loss
26 THE DUKE OF OSUNA 1613
of two ships, two galleys, three galleots, and some five
hundred men.
The following spring the campaign opened equally
energetically with an attempt to surprise Bizerta, where
the corsairs, taught by bitter experience the vulnera-
bility of Tunis as a naval station, were establishing a
new one, with large docks and magazines, in anticipation
of the latest French ideas. It is interesting to note that
the place was found impregnable, though subsequently
Don Otavio captured and destroyed Cherchel to the west
of Algiers.^ Later in the year, while cruising again to the
eastward for intelligence of a large Turkish fleet reported
to be at sea, he heard that a squadron of ten galleys had
been detached to collect tribute in the Archipelago. These
he sought out and found between Chios and Samos.
Though inferior in numbers he was secure in the superior
efficiency which Osuna's system gave him, and attacked
without hesitation, with the result that he took five
hundred prisoners, freed over a thousand Christian slaves,
and brought back to Messina the Turkish flag-galley and
six others as trophies of his victory.
It was as though Frederigo Spinola's spirit was stir-
ring again, and galvanising the old system into new life.
One exalted Spanish officer wrote enthusiastically to
Philip that such galleys and such organisation had never
been seen, and that Osuna's assiduous study of the art of
war from its grammar upwards showed what a master of
it he had become. This was true enough. His work, so
far, was only preliminary to the main idea which his
mastery of the art of war had taught him. What he
had done with galleys he believed he could do fourfold
' Captain Fernandez Duro says the attack on Bizerta was successful
and puts it in the preceding year (Armada Espafwla, iii. 337). I have,
however, followed Don Otavio de Aragon's own account of bis exploits.
See Docuvicntos Iniditos, xlv, 88,
1614 BEGINS A SAILING FLEET 27
with ships. Still, a sailing fleet was not yet to be had.
Fajardo with his ocean galleons was busy with Salee,
seizing the port of Mehdia close to it, and watching a
Dutch squadron which was hovering on the coast. The
Dutch were already beginning regularly to police the
Straits, and Evertsen their admiral was suspected of
intending a seizure himself. Yet Osuna saw no reason
for delaying a more vigorous offensive, which his master
Spinola and his studies of English methods had taught
him to be the other great secret of naval warfare. He
had already laid down two galleons which he meant to
be the missionaries of his faith, and, taking a leaf out of
the pirates' book, had secured the services of some French
corsairs, the chief of whom was a Norman captain, the
notorious Jacques Pierre. While under their direction
he was bringing his ships to completion, he began urging
on the Government at Madrid that, having seen what a
mere handful of efficient and well-led galleys could do,
the King of Spain should undertake a real campaign to
finally crush the Moslem sea power. In answer to his
appeal the Government sent him a score of galleys under
Prince Philibert of Savoy, who for political reasons had
just been made Captain-General of the Galleys of Spain,
in succession to Doria. With those of Italy he mustered
a fleet of fifty-five at Messina — big enough, as Osuna
thought, to turn the Turks and corsairs out of every nest
they held. But when he saw how Philibert's galleys
contrasted with his own, his hopes fell. The Spanish
taint was upon them all, and little could be expected.
Even as Philibert lay immovable at Messina, the Turkish
fleet made a raid on Malta under his very nose. It was
from Navarino they had come, and a brilliant and suc-
cessful reconnaissance of the port followed, during which
the two Egyptian flag-galleys were captured just outside.
L>8 THE DUKE OF OSUNA 1615
Full information of the Turkish movements was thus
obtained. Philibert followed with his whole force, and
then, quite in the style of Doria, finding no heart to
attack or ability to maintain a blockade, he returned to
Messina without firing a shot.
From that moment Osuna washed his hands of the
King and his galleys, and resolved thenceforth to play his
own game. In Flanders he had seen the little Dutch
ships lying off the Spanish ports week after week and
month after month, and closing them up, and here were
all the King's galleys unable to watch a single harbour.
By every device in his power he tried to get the Govern-
ment to build him a little fleet of sailing vessels that he
migfht show his master how the work should be done.
As yet there was not sufhcient confidence in the Northern
notions, and the scheme fell through. Still, his own two
galleons were ready, one of forty-six guns and the other
of twenty, with a pinnace to attend them, and he sent
them boldly into Egyptian waters. There they immedi-
ately captured a squadron of ten transports on their way
from Alexandria to Constantinople. But so far from
assisting him to get the sailing ships which he was
begging of the King, his success only won him a repri-
mand. There was an old regulation forbidding s^ny royal
officer to fit out saihng ships for privateering. Osuna
had technically broken it, and that was enough for
Madrid. In vain he urged the importance of blockade,
and of being able to keep the sea in winter ; in vain he
reminded his master that, unless he commanded the sea,
he could never command the land. He pointed to the
English ships still at Tunis, against which his galleys
were useless, and argued that the unhappy regulation had
been made before the corsairs had learnt to use broadside
ships. ' When your Majesty,' he wrote, ' issued the order
1616 ADOPTS THE ENGLISH ORGANISATION 29
that " round-ships " were not to be used, they did not
know in Barbary so much as what a tartan was, and now
Tunis alone has sent out more than eight-and-forty great
ships.' All was useless. The Government, suspicious and
conservative as ever, was inexorable.
But Osuna was not to be deterred. In 1616 his
services were recognised by his promotion to the vice-
royalty of Naples, and thence he continued his exertions.
By the spring, besides five new galleons nearly completed
— the ' Five Wounds ' he called them — he had ready for
sea a squadron of five other ships averaging over thirty-
five guns and a large pinnace. All were equipped and
organised on English lines. The sailors were no longer
the mere drudges of the ship's company, but had been
raised more to the standing of the soldiers, in berthing,
food, clothing, and pay. Equally important was his bold
reform in abolishing the dual captaincy, which was the
curse of the Spanish service. Instead of a captain of the
soldiers and a captain of the seamen, he appointed one
officer who, as in England, had command of the whole
ship. At the same time he imitated, and even went
beyond, the English system of concentrating the main
fighting power of the ships in their batteries. They
became like the Northern warships in principle mobile
gun-carriages, instead of relying for their offensive power
chiefly upon marine infantry. In some of his latest
galleons the gunners even outnumbered the ordinary sea-
men, and guns were carried of a heavier calibre than any
admitted in the British navy. Indeed, so heavily were his
vessels armed that it would seem the lower tiers could only
be used in the finest weather ; but this was a defect by no
means unknown in the fleets he had taken as his model. ^
' For details of Osuna's fleet as finally constituted, see Documentos
Ineditos, xlvi. 503. His latest and largest galleon was ' Nuestra Seilora de
30 THE DUKE OF OSUNA 1615
There remained the difficulty of finding an admiral.
In Osuna's service was one Francisco de Eibera, a half-
pay ensign, but what experience of the sea he had had,
if any, we do not know. His seamanship may safely be
set down to Jacques Pierre's tuition. In this man Osuna
was destined to find the hand he wanted, and his was to
be the distinction of being the first sailing admiral in the
Mediterranean.' In the early part of the previous winter
the corsairs' ships had swarmed so thick in the Neapolitan
seas that trade had been brought to a standstill. Osuna
in desperation had sent out Eibera with a galleon of
thirty-six guns. He was at once attacked by two corsairs
of superior force, but after a five hours' fight he beat them
off at nightfall, and they would not await his invitation
la Concepcion,' of 6,000 salvias burden, which was about the same size as
the 'Prince Royal' of 1,200 tons, the latest addition to the British navy
(Guglielmotti, La Marina Pontificia, iv. 313, vii. 293). A comparison of
their armament (by the light of Norton's Usual Tabic for English Ord-
nance, 1628) shows clearly Osuna's exaggeration of the new ideas.
' Concepcion ' ' Prince Royal '
2 50-pounders 2 cannon-perriers, 24-pounders.
14 35 „ 6 demi-cannon, 30 ,,
30 25 „ 12 culverin, 15-20
2 demi-culverin 18 demi-culverin, 9-11 „
2 perriers 13 sakers, 5 ,,
The ' Prince Royal ' also carried four small breech-loading pieces ; the
secondary armament of the ' Concepcion ' is not given. Thus the ' Con-
cepcion ' was a 50-gun ship (counting only the heavy muzzle-loading
pieces, or ' ladle ' pieces, as the Italians called them), and the ' Prince ' was
a 61-gun ship. But it will be seen that the weight of metal in the ' Con-
cepcion ' was far the heavier.
As to crews, the ' Coricepcion's ' complement was 54 officers and gentle-
men, 66 gunners, 60 mariners, and 20 boys, or 200 in all. The normal
complement of such a ship in England would be at least 500 men, of whom
40 would be gunners, 340 mariners, and 120 soldiers. The crew of the
' Concepcion ' would probably be filled up with soldiers, who perhaps
assisted in working the guns in the same way that the mariners did in the
English service.
' Osuna had married Donna Catarina Henriquez de Ribera, daughter of
the Adelantado-Mayor of Andalusia, but Francisco is not stated to have
been her relation.
1616 DEFEATS THE TURKISH GALLEYS 31
to renew the action next day. Passing on to Trapani he
picked up his pinnace and two other vessels, ran across
to Tunis, and cut out two ships from under the guns of
the Goleta f orts. ^ For Osuna this was enough. Ribera was
given the command of the six vessels that were ready
and sent off eastward to watch the Turkish galley fleet.
As he was watering at Cyprus he heard that the Turkish
Admiral was looking for him with forty-five galleys.
Only too ready to be found, Ribera awaited their approach
off Cape Celidon. On July 14 the Turks were seen
approaching, and then was fought the battle which finally
opened men's eyes to what Osuna was doing. For three
days it raged, and every morning the Turks renewed the
attack with increasing desperation. But all in vain.
So crushing was Ribera's fire and so well disposed his
vessels, that the galleys could never board, and during
the third night they retired cut to pieces, leaving Ribera
triumphant on the field he had chosen. Doubtless much
of the success should be put to the credit of Jacques
Pierre, whom Osuna began to treat with a familiar
intimacy that shocked Spanish notions of propriety, but
Ribera was the hero of the hour."
' Documentos Ineclitos, 363.
- How Ribera managed to beat off so overwhelming a force is uncertain.
He certainly divided his squadron into two groups, two vessels in reserve
and the rest as a main body, but the formation of this group is not clear.
Captain Duro says he formed them tmiendo las ciiatro, j^roa con popa,
cinendo el viento con trinqiiete y gavia, as though they were close-hauled
under fore-courses and main top-sails in line ahead. If so, Ribera must
have been quite in the first rank of his art ; for up to this time there is no
perfectly clear account of an action fought line ahead in close order. But,
although Captain Duro's authority is very high, Ribera's despatch seems
hardly capable of bearing the weight he places on it. Ribera says : ' When
I saw them (the enemy) I made signal for the vessels to close {de juniar
bajeles) : having closed, I struck all sail and gave them orders that the vice-
flagship, the " Carretina," and the "Urqueta " should keep together always ;
and if it were a dead calm se dicse cabo por los costados tres,' an expression
which is far from clear. However, it was not calm ; and after detailing his
32 THE UUKE OF OSUNA 1616
The victory made the profouiidest impression from
the first. Irregular as it was, even the Spanish Court
had to recognise it ; and in spite of its having been fought
under Osuna's private flag, contrary to the standing order
against which he had protested in vain, Bibera was given
the rank of Admiral and the coveted Cross of Santiago.
Still it can hardly have been with unmixed satisfaction
that the Spanish ministers contemplated the new force
that Osuna had generated. The skill that gave it life was
from the North, and not their own. If Osuna's success
had been great against the time-honoured weapon of the
Mediterranean, it only emphasised the growing anxiety for
what it would mean should the Northern sea powers choose
to assert themselves within the Straits ; and it was while
the poets were still singing Eibera's victory that the
Spanish Government found itself face to face with the
contingency they had so long dreaded.
other orders, he proceeds : ' These orders given, I made sail towards the
Armada, and coming within cannon shot I furled sails except the foresail
and main top-sail so as not to hinder the vessel being steered.' As there
was wind on each day, the obscure order issued in view of a calm may
be discarded. It seems Kibera kept steerage way the whole time, and in his
advance he says : ' Yo me puse e,n cueriio derecho di mio bajeles y los lleve
juntos como inidieron o si fueron Galeras.'' That is, ' I took my station on
the extreme right of my vessels, and kept them as close as they could go,
or as though they were galleys,' which seems to indicate nothing but the
old line abreast.
CHAPTEE IV
SIR WALTER RALEGH AND GENOA
To grasp the significance of the new situation it is
necessary to turn for a moment to the state of Europe, as
Eibera's shattered ships limped home from their victory.
Ten years had not passed since the truce between Sj)ain
and Holland had ended the old wars in which Elizabeth
and Philip II. had been the dominant figures, and
already the nations were grouping themselves for that
still mightier contest which in the name of religion
was to scourge and rend the face of Europe for thirty
years. On the Catholic side was seen the renewal of
the old relations between the Spanish and Austrian
branches of the Hapsburgs. Spain and the Empire were
again in close alliance, and all there was to prevent their
complete solidarity was on the one side Savoy, pressing
upon the Lombard possessions of Spain and threatening
the security of her submissive servant, Genoa ; on the
other Venice, planted astride the direct line of communi-
cation between the King of Spain and the Emperor, and
entirely dominating the ports at the head of the Adriatic
where the Empire touched the sea. As for the Protes-
tants, a great league seemed to be forming round the
British throne. Since the Princess of England had
married the Elector Palatine, James I. had come to
be recognised as the head of the Keformation, and he,
with a well-meant intention of averting the threatening
outbreak, was endeavouring to make a match between the
VOL. I. D
34 SIR WALTER RALEGH AND GENOA 1616
Prince of Wales and the Spanish Infanta. The negotia-
tions were going far from briskly, and even James could
not conceal from himself that his efforts might fail. Like
Elizabeth, therefore, he was not averse to preparing for a
rainy day by adding to his resources, while at the same
time he spurred the reluctance of the Spanish Court by
letting it feel the sting of his sea power. In English
eyes the tender spot, which had been whipped so sore in
the old days, was still the Indies and the Atlantic
convoys, and Sir Walter Kalegh survived as the personi-
fication of the bygone policy. Ever since the accession
he had been lying in the Tower. He was now released
and was soon busy preparing an expedition which many
believed was intended to revive the wild work of Drake's
young days. It was certainly the hope and intention of
Ralegh's anti-Spanish supporters that it should. The
King, as certainly, was actuated by a desire to fill his
empty coffers by peaceful discoveries and to jog the King
of Spain's memory as to what a hostile England meant.
It was exactly under these conditions that, forty years
before, Drake had been allowed to sail on his famous raid
into the Pacific.
But there were onlookers who saw a little more of the
game. While the heirs of the Elizabethans were living
.still on the oceanic tradition, others had been watching
what Ward and his like had been able to achieve for the
corsairs in the Mediterranean, and the power they had
driven Osuna to develop in self-defence. These men,
the arch-intriguers of Europe, weary of the eternal repe-
tition of the old moves, were hugging themselves with
delight at the sight of a new piece on the board that bid
fair to change the whole game. It was no longer only
for the extremities of his vast empire that the King of
Spain need tremble. Deep in the vitals of his system
1616 THE SITUATION IN NORTH ITALY 35
they saw two points that were as much exposed to the
action of the new power as his wide-spreading hmbs. It
was no longer a question of Cadiz and the Spanish
Main, but of those old focal points of European polity,
Genoa and Venice.
At both points the inward pressure of the two halves
of the Hapsburg dominion had caused an eruption of
hostilities. It was in the ever active crater of Savoy that
the first explosion had occurred, and although in 1615 the
Spanish Governor of Milan had found it necessary to
come to an accommodation with his insignificant enemy,
his chiefs at Madrid could not sit quiet under the humilia-
tion of the peace to which he had committed them. He
was recalled, and a hard-bitten veteran, Don Pedro de
Toledo, Marquis of Villafranca, sent out in his place with
a barely concealed intention that he should pick a new
quarrel.^ The turbulent Duke of Savoy, with his eyes
always fixed on Genoa, was ready enough with French
and English encouragement to begin again ; and thus a
kind of semi-official war was raging between him and the
Spanish Governor of the Milanese. At the same time
Venice was fighting Ferdinand of Styria, the heir-pre-
sumptive of the Austrian house of Hapsburg and the
actual ruler of that portion of its dominions which
stretched down to the Venetian frontier, feeling for the
sea at Trieste and the other little ports of Carniola,
Thus Savoy and Venice were engaged in what was in
fact a joint struggle against the new Hapsburg alliance,
and the two wars had fused into one. So galling, indeed,
• Don Pedro was at this time in his sixtieth year. He had served
under Don John of Austria and Parma in the Netherlands, under the
elder Santa-Cruz at Terceras in 1582, and had filled successively all the
high naval offices in Spain, as Captain-General of the galleys of Naples,
of the galleys of Spain, and of the Ocean Sea. To him also had been con-
fided the chief direction of the expulsion of the Moriscos. See Documentos
InMitos, xcvi. p. 4, note,
D 2
36 Sill WALTER RALEGH AND GENOA 1616
became the action of the Venetians on the eastern
frontier of Milan that Don Pedro de Toledo, when
Osuna's fleet was about to sail against the Turks, had
begged him to employ it m making a diversion against
the Venetians instead. Osuna, bent on first forcing back
the Moslems, had refused ; but since Ribera's brilliant
victory his hands were free, and moreover there were new
and urgent reasons for compliance.
John of Barneveld, who was now the virtual dictator
of Holland, with his usual broad perception, saw clearly
where the keys of the great Catholic combination lay,
and towards the end of the year 1616 news had reached
Madrid that a powerful Dutch squadron with four thousand
troops on board, under Count Ernest of Nassau, was about
to sail for the Mediterranean, intended for the service of
either Savoy or Venice. During the summer the Count
had offered his services to the Signory of the Republic, and
they had obtained permission from the States for him to
levy three thousand men and sufficient transport to carry
them to Venice. By the end of November they were all
embarked and were waiting for a wind in the Texel and
Brill. ^ The dreaded hour had come and the anxiety at
Madrid was profound. During December despatch on
despatch in duplicate and triplicate was sent to the Italian
viceroys, telling them that at all costs the Dutch must
not be allowed to enter the Adriatic, while Santa-Cruz
was ordered to Gibraltar to stop them there. But Osuna
could do little or nothing. His old ships were not yet
recovered from the mauling of their three days' fight at
Cyprus, and the new galleons were not yet ready for sea.
As for doing anything with the galleys, he protested
it was impossible to stop sailing ships with oared craft
in winter, and presently came fresh orders that he
' Carlcton Letters, pp. 54, 96, 101.
1616 INTERVENTION OF THE DUTCH 37
was not to try. Osuna was to direct all his efforts to
reinforcing his colleague at Milan with troops, and to
confine his naval action to closing all the South Italian
ports so soon as the Dutch had passed, in order to cut off
the Venetian food supplies. All Naples and Sicily were
resounding with preparations for the rescue of Milan and
the relief of Gradisca, Ferdinand's frontier fortress at the
head of the Adriatic, which the Venetians were besieging,
and Osuna urged more strenuously than ever the necessity
of sailing ships for the work he had been set to do. Face
to face with its helplessness the Spanish Government
was at last convinced. The Council of State sat solemnly
on Osuna's despatches and resolved that he was right.
* Finally,' so their resolution ran, ' we are of opinion that
it will be well to write to the Duke in appreciation of his
zeal, and that it will be of more use and pertinence to
spend money in fitting out broadside ships as being the
best to resist the enemy, seeing that they themselves
employ that kind of vessel ; because galleys are of small
service except in anticipation of a large galley Armada,
of which there is now no question.' Thus at last did the
inert Spanish Government declare its first official recogni-
tion of the naval revolution to which for years it had so
obstinately shut its eyes.^
But the danger did not end with Holland. There
was more and worse behind. Ealegh's expedition was
slowly approaching completion. In vain Gondomar, the
Spanish Ambassador in London, had exhausted his almost
hypnotic influence over the King in trying to stop it, and
no one could tell what it was really intended to do. James
was chafing more than ever over the cool reception his
marriage overtures had met with in Spain ; Winwood,
' See ' Consulta cle officio del Consejo de Estado,' Madrid, January ]7,
1617. Documentos Ineditos, xlv. No. 423.
38 SIR WALTER RALEGH AND GENOA 1617
his anti-Spanish foreign secretary, was forcing him further
and further into the attitude of a Protestant hero ; and
whispers were afloat that not the Indies but Genoa was
in jeopardy from Ralegh's fleet.
While Nassau lay in the Texel, Lionello, the Vene-
tian Ambassador in London, noticed that Scarnafissi, his
colleague from Savoy, was continually in mysterious
communication with the King and Winwood. Some-
thing of deep importance was clearly in the wind, and
Lionello pressed Scarnafissi to take him into his confi-
dence. Under the most solemn promises of secrecy,
which Lionello promptly broke, the Savoyard revealed
that he was proposing to the King, with Winwood's
support, that Ralegh, instead of being sent to the Indies,
should be reinforced with some of the King's ships, and
then, in concert with some Dutch and French vessels,
should enter the Mediterranean and surprise Genoa.
Already Lord Rich had been permitted to fit out two
privateers under the flag of Savoy ; at this time, moreover,
James was taking active diplomatic action in the Duke's
favour ; and during January 1617 he continued, so
Scarnafissi said, to regard the scheme with favour.
Ralegh too, the Venetian Ambassador was assured, was
quite ready to change his voyage of discovery into a raid
on Genoa, and he was keeping his eye on him and his
fleet, ready to act the moment that Venice decided to
hoist her flag in the Mediterranean. So Lionello wrote
to his Government on January 19, 1617. A week later
he wrote again to say that Scarnafissi had seen the King
on Sunday and had been referred to Winwood to discuss
the details. Winwood had informed him that what the
King wanted to be assured of was first the facility of the
operation, and secondly what share of the plunder was
to be his. Scarnafissi replied that success was assured,
1617 SCARNAFISSI TEMPTS THE KING 39
and that, as to the booty, the Duke of Savoy only wished
to satisfy the King, and all he had to do to enjoy the
lion's share was to send a large enough force to secure it.
Winwood then talked of mobiHsing sixteen sail of the
royal navy besides Ralegh's eight, but that the envoy
thought was too good to be true. Still he was hopeful.
The next week, however, Lionello wrote that the scheme,
so far at least as Ralegh was concerned, had fallen through.
Without giving up his intention of sending naval assist-
ance to Savoy, the King was resolved not to trust it to
Ralegh's hands, mainly because his name would arouse
too much opposition from Spain, but also because he
could not be trusted with the plunder. So at least the
ministers had told Scarnafissi. Lionello was not con-
vinced. He believed that, once at sea, Ralegh would be
found, after all, making for the Mediterranean.^
Gondomar, too, was of the same opinion, and was still
unsatisfied. At the end of March, when Ralegh's fleet
was practically ready for sea, he was still pressing for
some definite assurance from the King.^ To quiet him,
James promised to procure from Ralegh an exact state-
ment of his force and his destination, and to take security
from him before he sailed that he would not change it.
The King's engaging frankness as to Ralegh's objective
could only suggest that he was intended to do something
quite different, and the threat hung heavily over Spanish
counsels. All December and January Count Ernest of
Nassau's troops had been lying wind-bound in the Dutch
ports, and the Ocean galleons had been hanging" in the
Straits looking for his sails to appear every hour. Then,
in consequence, it was believed, of a sudden failure of
' Lionello's despatches are printed in Edwards's Life of Raleigh, i. 579.
^ Buckingham to Winwood, March 28, 1617. Buccleuch MSS. {Hist.
MSS. Com.) vol. i. p. 189.
40 SIR WALTER RALEGH AND GENOA 1617
heart at Count Ernest's strength, they had been recalled
to Cadiz, but only to be ordered out again on news that
the Hollanders on February 11 had actually sailed. The
Ocean squadron was this time reinforced from the China
and West Indian fleets. ' So much,' wrote the British
agent at Madrid, ' do they take to heart the going of
those forces out of Holland into Italy.' Two days later
it was known that the Straits had been left open precisely
at the wrong time, and that the whole of the Dutch fleet
had passed in one by one.^ Still the Spanish galleons
were kept where they were in spite of urgent calls on
them elsewhere. No reason appears. All we know is
that Gondomar had not yet got the details of Ralegh's
project from the King, and that it was not till a month
later that it was thought safe to leave the Straits
unguarded. -
There need scarcely have been so much anxiety.
Ealegh had certainly abandoned the idea before he sailed.
Perhaps he had never seriously entertained it. Lionello's
despatches leave it uncertain whether the proposal came
originally from Balegh or Scarnafissi, but it is extremely
improbable that the idea can have commended itself to
the Elizabethan. There is no indication as yet that the
leaders of English naval thought divined the great future
that lay before them in the Mediterranean, and Ralegh
himself, as we know from his own pen, did not believe
that anything could be gained by supporting so insigni-
ficant a prince as the Duke of Savoy. For once his
prophetic insight was at fault. He believed Savoy could
never be more than a vassal to either France or Spain,
' Carleton Letters, pp. 96, 101. Cottington to Winwood, March 23, 1(517,
Bucclcuch MSS. i. 187. According to De Jonghe, Nassau sailed on March
2, 1617 (n.s.), and arrived on April 4 {Nederlmid in Venetie, p. 69).
■- ' lielacion de los navios de la Armada del Mar Oceano, etc' in Duro's
Armada Esiicinola, iii. 365.
1617 VIEWS OF ENGLISH STRATEGISTS 41
and failing to appreciate the peculiar strategic and diplo-
matic strength of its position, he could not dream that it
was to her that the most coveted prize of Christendom
was to fall, and that one day a son of her house would
sit on the throne of the Csesars, with the Pope himself
between his knees. It is therefore unlikely he ever enter-
tained the idea favourably, and even if he did he probably
rejected it on strategic grounds. Since his failures as an
admiral he had devoted much time to the study of naval
science, and he can hardly have missed detecting the weak
point of the design. Sir William Monson, the last of the
true Elizabethan admirals, shortly afterwards laid it down
that the capture of Genoa was impossible without the
previous acquisition of an advanced naval base in the
Mediterranean, and there is no reason to believe that
Ralegh was not sagacious enough to share this view.
Further, it is now practically certain that if Ealegh was
really bent on striking Spain a blow, it was in the way
that naturally commended itself to a man of the Eliza-
bethan school. During his last months in England he
was undoubtedly considering an attack on the Spanish
treasure fleet in concert with French privateers, and one
of his chief captains was the notorious Sir John Fearne,
who only five years before had been cruising off Cape St.
Vincent at the head of a pirate squadron and consorting
with the most active corsairs of the time.^
To be sure Ralegh's admirers will still dispute his
piratical intentions, mainly, as it seems, because such
things are now regarded as discreditable. But it was not
so then. Such moves were at that time the stock-in-trade
of foreign politics — no more to be reprehended than is a
secret treaty now. We have seen how King James him-
self, merely to add weight to his diplomacy, could calmly
' S. P. Dovi. Ixv. 16, i. Examination of John CoUever, July 5, 1611.
42 SIR WALTER RALEGH AKD GENOA 1617
consider the seizure and plunder of a friendly European
port. It is even possible he was privy to Ealegh's com-
munications with France. Ealegh, even in his last solenni
declaration at the gate of death, did not deny that some such
communication had been made. All he said was, ' I never
had any plot or practice with the French directly or in-
directly, nor with any other prince or state, unknown to
the King.' Barneveld was pressing James to do some-
thing, as the Dutch themselves had done, to check the
development of the great Catholic combination ; and if
the worried King gave Ralegh orders not to annoy the
Spaniards, it was only because Gondomar's overbearing
personality wrung them from him. If Ralegh refused to
treat the diplomatic prohibition as Drake used to do, it
was rather because age, sorrow, and imprisonment had
broken his spirit and destroyed his power of command,
than because he did not think it right. There was excuse
enough and to spare. Spain had been persistently violat-
ing the peace by treating every Englishman who appeared
in American waters as an enemy. If he had made bold
reprisal as Drake had done, no one would have blamed
him, and least of all his own conscience. In any case it
is certain that many of the men of most sound and sober
judgment in England regarded it as an almost sacred
duty to break James's faint-hearted peace and force on a
renewal of the war before Spain had time to recover her
strength. The old dog in the manger was showing her-
self incorrigible, and we must not forget it was the
Reformation and the freedom of the New World that
were at stake.
Still opinions will continue to differ on the ethics of
these abortive projects. Yet, whatever we may think of
them, they were innocence itself compared with the cup
which the Spanish governors in Italy were even then
1617 SPAIN DRAWS BACK 43
brewing for Venice. In her Mediterranean policy Spain
for the time seemed cowed by her inabiHty to prevent the
long-feared blow from the North. For all she could do
it might be doubled and redoubled. No sooner indeed
had Nassau's fleet sailed than the Venetian Ambassador
at the Hague was applying to the States for another to
transport three thousand more troops that Count Leven-
stein had raised in Germany for the Venetian service,
and the British Ambassador by the King's orders was
supporting his request.^ It was clear that, with Venice
thus free to renew her strength from the sea, Gradisca
must fall. It was only a question of time and a long
purse ; and there was every prospect of the loss of the
frontier fortress being followed by an expansion of the
maritime republic, which would not only force back the
Austrian Hapsburgs permanently from the Adriatic,
but would end perhaps in the partition of the Spanish
province of Milan between Venice and Savoy. The
Hapsburg system would thus be sundered by an impass-
able gulf. Before such an outlook the heart of Spain
misgave her. Eecoiling before the rising storm upon the
policy of her superseded Viceroy, she began to devote
all her energies to restoring the ignominious peace which,
before her eyes were opened, she had been so eager to
break. At all hazards the door must be closed against the
unwelcome intrusion of the Northern sea powers, and the
opportune mediation of the Pope gave her the chance of
saving her face. The mediation was accepted. Plenipo-
tentiaries from the four contending parties assembled at
Madrid in the spring of 1618, and it was thus faintly that
the new force first made itself felt in the Mediterranean.
' Carleton Letters, pp. 96, 104, 145, 151, 162.
CHAPTEK V
ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY
For Spain to cry peace was one thing. For her viceroys
to hsten was another. Of all the mysteries of Italian
history there is none more dramatic or more difficult
to probe in all its dark recesses than what is known in
Venice as the Spanish Conspiracy. Yet there is one
broad feature in it that stands out clearly enough.
Although it is one that in the fascination of more melo-
dramatic details has been generally overlooked, it is
nevertheless the only point in the strange incredible story
which had a lasting significance. From out of the crowd
of cloaked conspirators, the fevered riding to and fro,
and the cries of tortured men, rises again the hand that
beckoned England to her destinies in the Midland Sea.
In her jeopardy Venice cried to England for her ships,
and this time England heard.
The famous conspiracy is now recognised to have had
two main aspects — the one, within Venice itself, akin to our
own Gunpowder Plot, with mysterious strangers crowding
che low taverns, whispers of secret stores of explosives, and
sudden, silent executions — the other out in the Adriatic,
where Osuna's new fleet was boldly challenging the
ancient claims of the island city, preying on her commerce,
and attacking her fleets. It was Osuna who lived in
Venetian story as the ringleader of the whole plot, and
his piratical familiar, Jacques Pierre, who was believed to
have been its instigator. It was natural enough. For it
1617 OSUNA'S GREAT DESIGN 45
was in Osuna's declared policy of winning the sea, and in
the fleet which, with the Norman corsair's help, he had
at length created that the real danger lay, and not in the
brainless bravos who, as thej'' found to their cost, were but
cliildren in the hands of the Venetian police.
Early in the year 1617, when Ralegh's destination
was still uncertain and Osuna had heard of Nassau's
Dutch squadron that was on the point of sailing, no one
knew whither, he had written to the King at Madrid
saying that he would send the few ships he could get
ready into the Adriatic to be on the look out ; but, so as
not to compromise the home Government, they should sail
under his own private flag on pretence of cruising for pirates.
On the same pretext he said he was seeking permission to
buy some ships in France. At the same time he pointed
out the importance of the rule of concentration, which
Drake had forced on the English Government in 1588, and
begged that Santa-Cruz's squadron, which was then lying
at Gibraltar, might be ordered to join Ribera at Brindisi.
It is possible that it was at this time that his ambitious
mind conceived the idea of making his master supreme in
the Western Mediterranean by the seizure of Venice. At
all events it is certain that on April 1 some such scheme
was occupying his mind. He had heard the Venetians
had sent out a squadron to meet their Dutch auxiliaries,
of whom as yet he had no certain news, and he was
writing to the King to explain how he was concentrating
all the galleys and ships he could lay hands on to prevent
the junction. He did not doubt the Gibraltar galleons
would follow the Dutch if they passed, so as to join hands
with his own admiral Ribera, and then all would be well.
If the King would only place the matter in his hands
with supreme command, he would undertake, he said, to
make him master of the state and seas of Venice. All
46 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1617
he asked was ten of the seventeen galleons which Santa-
Cruz had at Gibraltar, if no more could be spared, and
a free hand, and then with the Itahan galleys and his
own galleons he would undertake that "Venice should
trouble Spain no more.
Meanwhile he ordered Kibera to Brindisi with eleven
galleons, and directed the galleys to join him there. But
long before they were ready the Venetian Gulf squadron
appeared off the port and blockaded Kibera while the
Dutch transports and their attendant warships passed in.
Nothing daunted, however, Osuna pursued his purpose.
Ribera was ordered back to Messina to effect a concentra-
tion with the Italian galleys and the Spanish galleons he
expected from Gibraltar. But instead of the galleons
came a despatch from the King in disapproval of his
proposals. The design on Venice, he was assured, was
an excellent idea, but unfortunately the Ocean galleons
could not be spared. The Spanish seas were so thick
with pirates of all nations that every available ship was
needed to protect the coasts and the ocean trade. No
other answer was possible. For, to add to all the other
anxieties, it was just when Ralegh was on the point of
leaving England, and every Spaniard believed he was
o'oing to turn pirate too. But this was not the worst that
Osuna had to bear. He had also to learn that, in the face
of her helplessness to resist the new naval pressure,
Spain could no longer support the wars of her viceroys
and had accepted the Pope's mediation. Peace negotia-
tions, as we have seen, were about to open at Madrid, and,
for fear of impeding them, there came an order to Osuna
that he was not on any account to allow his fleet to enter
the Adriatic. Here was a heavy check to all his dreams.
His ships and galleys were at last ready to sail, the troops
were on board, and there was the King's order undoing all
1617 THE USCOCCHI 47
he had done. But Osuna was not yet beaten. He had
not been humbled as yet, like Ralegh, with years of sorrow
and imprisonment. Success and popularity had fixed his
confidence. He knew what the naval situation demanded,
and his masterful nature was not so easily thwarted by
the wretched crew of politicians who surrounded his
almost imbecile sovereign. He vowed, so the Venetian
agent reported, that he would send his fleet into the Gulf
in despite of the world, in despite of the King, and in
despite of God. In such a temper an excuse for dis-
obedience is seldom far to seek. It happened that the
objectionable order was not in cypher as usual, and there
he saw his way. So he calmly sat down and wrote to
his master to inform him of the prohibition he had re-
ceived, saying that as it Vv^as not in cypher he had no
doubt it was a forgery, and therefore he was sending his
whole force into the Gulf of Venice as originally ordered.
Meanwhile Nassau's troops had landed in Venice, and
the combined Venetian and Dutch fleet had returned and
struck an offensive blow before Osuna could move. The
only weak point in the Venetian command of the Adriatic
was at this time the sea power of the ancient city of
Ragusa and the other Dalmatian ports, where the old
nobility of Albania and the neighbouring countries, flying
before the Turkish conquests, had established themselves
in a kind of piratical independence and were known as
the Uscocchi. It was in these men and in the Republic
of Ragusa that the house of Austria sought an instru-
ment to sap the Venetian dominion on the sea. Indeed
it was to the Archduke Ferdinand's encouragement of the
Uscocchi that the existing war was mainly due, and in
concert with Osuna he was credited with an intention of
bringing them into line for the threatened blow at Venice.
As an answer to the move the Venetian admiral, Veniero,
48 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1617
had seized a small port close to Kagusa, and there the
Gulf squadron had taken up its station as though with
the intention of establishing a base from which the
obnoxious neutral port could be seized, or at least
rendered impotent. Thither, therefore, Osuna ordered
his fleet so soon as the bulk of it was ready. The move-
ment resulted in a mere reconnaissance. The Gulf
squadron being inferior refused an action, and Osuna's
admirals, findmg it was expecting reinforcements, fell
back to Brindisi to pick up the remainder of their force.
In July they returned, but again the Venetians refused
an action in the open and retired to Lessina. Here an
engagement took place. It was quite indecisive, an
artillery duel at long range ; but, while Kibera blockaded
the Venetians with his galleons, his galleys were able to
intercept two of the famous galeazze di mercantia with
their priceless cargoes. Though Eibera could not retain
his station and was compelled to return to Brindisi, the
affair was heralded as a victory, and Osuna claimed to
have a set-off against Veniero's blockade of his own fleet
at Brindisi, and to have successfully challenged the
Venetian claim to the mare clausum. As a matter of
fact the campaign had been a strategical success for the
Venetians. They had covered the siege of Gradisca, re-
tained their position against Kagusa, and were still in
practical command of the Gulf, in so far as it was closed
as a channel for reinforcements for the Archduke, and
open for the support of their own operations in Carniola.
Still Osuna could be well content. Even the Spanish
Court were coming round to his views. In answer to the
objectionable order, he had presented them with an
accomplished fact, and instead of a reprimand he had
received directions, quite in the elastic modern style, to
protect Spanish interests in the Adriatic. It was an
1617 THE PLOT RIPENS 49
authority wide enough to excuse any violent measures
that might prove successful, and he prepared for a new
effort. The darkest part of the work was already well in
hand. After mysterious overtures to the Venetian Ambas-
sador at Naples, Jacques Pierre with a few kindred spirits
had pretended to desert Osuna's service and had escaped
to Venice. The Frenchman's unnatural eagerness to
transfer his talents to the flag of St. Mark aroused some
suspicion. He was not at once employed, but by pretend-
ing to betray Osuna's designs he retained his liberty,
and was able to tamper with the adventurous rascality
that was found in abundance among the Venetian hired
troops and seamen. His idea appears to have been to
raise at the favourable moment a military and perhaps
a naval revolt ; and so, as soon as the Neapolitan fleet
was signalled, to turn against the Venetians the foreign
mercenaries on whom they were relying. Though silently
watched, he was meeting with no small success, and all
was going well when Osuna was staggered by a peremp-
tory order from Madrid to remove the whole of his ships
instantly from the Adriatic. Instead of attacking Venice
he was to pick up the stores and provisions he had gathered
at Messina for the grand design, and to send them on to
the Marquis of Santa-Cruz at Genoa. To add to his
disgust he found at the same moment that his galley
admiral had left Eibera in the lurch and brought all his
vessels round to Messina without orders, unless they
were some he had received direct from the Court. Osuna
was furious. He wrote in hot protest to the King, not
sparing to demonstrate the madness of the move to
Genoa, which would leave the Venetians free to use their
fleet against the Archduke and the Uscocchi, and expose
the whole of the Neapolitan and Sicilian waters to the
mercy of the Turks and corsairs. Still he would obey if
VOL. I. E
oO ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1617
he could, but he feared it was quite possible that, as
Bibera had now no galleys to tow his ships, the weather
might prevent them getting out of the Adriatic in time
to be of use. But his protests and his cunning were
alike useless. Spain had no choice. The horizon beyond
the Pyrenees had grown so threatening that at any
moment it seemed that the whole weight of France
might be thrown into the scale of Savoy ; and to Genoa,
threatened as she already was from the North Sea, must
go all the strength Philip could scrape together. It was
a situation which Spain had never had to face before.
She was wholly unprepared to meet the double danger.
There was but one way of escape. The Plenipotentiaries
at Madrid hastily completed their work, and in September
peace was signed between Spain, the Empire, Venice, and
Savoy.
It was a peace no one believed in ; Europe was too
obviously on the eve of a universal conflagration. Fer-
dinand, whose savage persecution of his subjects had
more than justified his education as the nurtured cham-
pion of the Jesuits, had been elected King of Protestant
Bohemia. It was the throne to which the Elector
Palatine, the most fiery representative of the Beformation
militant, had always aspired with James's support to lift
his English bride, and Ferdinand, as heir to all the
Austrian dominions and practically Emperor elect, was
as much by his position as his fanatic character the real
head of the Catholic combination. So the glove was
already thrown down. Every one was arming and every
one scheming to secure a better position before the
trumpets sounded.
To Spain the peace brought no relief from the special
anxiety that was breathing upon her out of the Northern
seas. Indeed it was taking a new form that the peace
1617 JAMES PLAYS HIS CARD 61
was likely to aggravate rather than assuage. She had
shown herself wholly unable to police effectively the
great commercial routes that lay within her particular
sphere of action, and both England and Holland, into
whose hands was falling a continually increasing share of
both the Levant and the Indian trade, were evincing an
ominous disposition to do the work themselves. A Dutch
squadron under Evertsen, we have seen, had already been
causing anxiety as to its intentions on the Atlantic coast
of Morocco, and more drastic and extensive measures were
on foot in Holland. In England the King, under pressure
from the Levant and East Indian merchants, had ap-
pointed a royal Commission to inquire into the best
method of breaking the power of the Barbary corsairs,
and out of it came the first faint germ of the British
Mediterranean Squadron. At the end of April 1617,
when the Spanish Council was first considering Osuna's
startling proposal, the Commission, after taking the
evidence of the most experienced merchants and sea-
captains available, had made its report. The main ques-
tions were whether or not the work should be under-
taken in concert with Spain, and whether it were better
to attempt the seizure of Algiers by a coup de main or to
maintain a permanent squadron in the Mediterranean
until the corsairs were hounded from the sea. The
captains were unanimous in declaring Algiers impregnable
to surprise, and in recommending a permanent squadron.
They were equally unanimous in declining to act with
Spaniards, or indeed with any nation except the Dutch,
and they strongly advised that the assistance of the King
of Spain should be confined to a contribution of money
and the use of his ports, which they declared essential to
the scheme as advanced bases. The Commission endorsed
their ideas, and when a month later Sir John Digby went
E 2
52 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1617
as special ambassador to Spain with the marriage treaty
in one hand, this was the peppery dish he carried in the
other.
Nothing could well have been more repellent to the
Spanish palate. An expedition against the Barbary
corsairs had become the stock diplomatic formula for
covering some ulterior and sinister design. Osuna had
been and was still using it without so much as a smile,
and to the Court of Spain Digby's proposals can have
been read as nothing less than the threat of a naval
demonstration to quicken its interest in James's marriage
proposals. But in fact they had the appearance of some-
thing worse. The man who was at the back of the
merchants in their pressure upon the English Government
was Essex's old companion in arms, the Earl of South-
ampton. For us he lives as Shakespeare's far-sighted
patron ; but then he stood for that irresponsible and
romantic policy of hot aggression against Spain which
Essex had personified, and which we should now perhaps
call ' jingoism.' To Gondomar there was no doubt of
what such a leader meant. He wrote to his Government
that the adventurous noble was bent, by means of war
with Spain, on dethroning the Earl of Nottingham
from where he sat as King Log of the navy, in order
that he might reign in his stead, and that under the
cloak of Algiers he was bent on a new attempt upon
Genoa.
For Spain there was nothing to do but make the best
of the situation, and, with as good a face as she could
assume, she entered into negotiations for an international
effort against the corsairs. But it is not surprising to
find that, so soon as the negotiations were on foot, the
Spanish Government, v» hich, as we know, had been hanging
back from Osuna's adventure, was once more encouraging
1617 OSUNA AUTHORISED TO PROCEED 53
its intractable viceroy. Disgusted with the peace which
frustrated his half-finished designs against Venice, and
distracted with contradictory orders, Osuna had begged
for leave of absence for himself, and for definite instruc-
tions for his fleet.' His ships were again in the Adriatic ;
for, on report that Levenstein and his three thousand
Germans were on the point of sailing, he had promptly
orderel it back to Brindisi. Meanwhile the Government
at Madrid had received definite information that, in spite
of the peace, Levenstein had sailed with eleven powerful
ships, under the command of the Dutch admiral, Hilde-
brant Quast. As a matter of fact, an effort had been
made by the Venetian agent at the Hague to stop him as he
passed down Channel, but the order came just two days
too late.^ Of this the Spaniards were probably ignorant,
and it was resolved that Osuna should be told to maintain
the attitude he had taken up. He was, however, to use
the greatest discretion, so as not to endanger the peace ;
while as for leave of absence the King himself wrote in
flattering terms approving his zeal and saying that he
could not be spared from his post.^ A fortnight later he
was definitely informed that he might prevent the
Venetians permanently establishing themselves in their
new station near Ragusa, but it must be done under his
own flag and not the King's.
Before this despatch was received Ribera had been
in collision with the Venetians. By Osuna's orders he
had already taken his fifteen galleons up to Ragusa to
watch their fleet. Whereupon, according to Ribera, the
Venetian admiral had put to sea with eighteen galleons,
twenty-eight galleys, and six galleasses, and attacked him
' October 13, 1017, Doc. Inicl. xlvi. 130.
- Carleton Letters, pp. 163, 195.
" November 20, 1617. Duro, Osuna c su vinrina : Appendix.
54 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIKACY 1617
without any provocation. The weather was fine enough,
says Ribera, for both tiers of guns to be used, and a sharp
action ensued. He was to leeward, and awaited the
Venetian attack, which was made in their old crescent
formation. Of his own tactics he says nothing except
that he soon forced the oared ships to back hurriedly out
of action, and that, on his concentrating his fire upon the
enemy's flag galleon, the whole Venetian force retired.
The Venetians denied that the provocation came from
them, nor did they admit the victory which Ribera reported.
He again claimed to have established command of the
Gulf, but the admitted fact is that a storm prevented the
renewal of the action and that Ribera was forced to run
for shelter back to Brindisi, where before long he found
himself once more blockaded by what he described as a
mixed fleet of Venetian, Dutch, and English vessels
under the flag of St. Mark. It is quite possible, as we
shall see, that some English Levant merchantmen did
actually form part of the Venetian admiral's force, and
these vessels, owing to the dangerous condition of the
seas through which they had to pass, were armed and
equipped in all respects like men-of-war. Indeed, by
both Spaniards and Italians, they were usually spoken of
as galleons.
From this ignominious position it was necessary for
Osuna to extricate his admiral with all speed. Definite
though exaggerated news had just reached him that
Levenstein with fifteen galleons had left Holland for
Venice at the end of October, besides four transports that
were to follow, and there was every prospect of his being
as powerless to prevent their entering the Adriatic as he
had been before. For this time the enemy was armed to
the teeth, and, instead of stealing by as Nassau's ships
had done, Levenstein was ready to fight his way through
1617 VENICE SEEKS ENGLISH HELP 55
in a compact fleet.^ Again, therefore, Osuna cried to the
King for help — for the return of the four galleons he had
been compelled to detach as transports to fetch his troops
back from Lombardy — for seven or eight of the galleons
of the Ocean Guard — for the squadron of the galleys of
Spain. With these he was certain he could deal a blow
to Venice and its fleet which would give his master rest
for many a day to come. But instead of help came fresh
causes of anxiety. His plot against Venice was fast
ripening. Jacques Pierre was making good progress. In
August he had obtained an engagement to serve the
Venetian State. Though he received no definite com-
mission it was a great step forward, and Osuna was
growing desperate. He wanted to have everything ready
by April 1618, yet he could not get so much as a
definite order from Spain, and his colleague in Sicily
refused to co-operate with either ships or galleys. Appeal
after appeal went off to Madrid as his difficulties increased,
till, in the closing days of the year 1617, the last blow
came and he heard that the Venetians had not only ap-
plied for leave to charter a squadron of twelve warships
in Holland, but had sent a similar application to England.
So long as he had only the Dutch to deal with he might
hope to be strong enough still to carry out his project ;
but with both the new sea powers combining to save the
old one, his grand scheme began to look almost hopeless.
Weary of warning his Government, he lost all patience
and took the bit between his teeth. Without so much as
seeking the consent of the ministers he so deeply despised
he took his own line, and began to act with all the airs of
an independent prince. To the Archduke and to Spinola
in Flanders he wrote off to urge them to charter for him
in Holland a squadron of twelve of the largest and most
' Carleton Letters, p. 163.
o6 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1618
heavily armed ships they could get ; to Gondomar in
London, to charter him eight of the renowned English
merchantmen ; and finally to King James himself, begging
him not to refuse to the King of Spain what he had
granted to the Venetians.^
There was need enough for haste. The Venetians
were indeed at work in England, and with so much
vigour that by January 20, 1618, they had received the
necessary permission. In Holland they had had equal
success. They had hoped, it is true, to get eight of the
Dutch navy ships, but this the Government had refused
on the ground that they were themselves fitting out a
fleet of twenty sail against the pirates ; but they allowed
them to hire twelve merchant ships fitted for war, with
the option of purchase.^ By February people were ready
to name the man who was to command the British
contingent. Ostensibly an Italian was to be at its head,
but this was only to save appearances. The real com-
mander was to be an Englishman ; some said Sir Henry
Peyton, a favourite officer of Sir Horace Vere,^ and some
Captain Henry Mainwaring, a famous gentleman pirate,
who had recently come in on a promise of pardon from
the King.
He was a man entirely representative of his class — the
well-born adventurers whose restless spirits or broken
fortunes had driven them, upon the cessation of the war
with Spain, to find employment upon the high seas or in
the service of the Barbary states. A member of one of
the oldest families in England — the Mainwarings of
Peover, in Cheshire — he had taken to piracy — so he
' An Italian version of this letter is among Lord Calthorpe's MSS.
{Hist. MSS. Com. ii. 456) vol. cxlvi. f. 312 ; a Spanish version in
Documentos InMitos, xlvi. 271, dated Naples, Jan. 1, 1618.
^ Carlcton Letters, pp. 232, 235, 245.
' Domestic Calendar, 1613, p. 212.
1618 THE ENGLISH CONDOTTIERI 67
assured the King — more by accident than design.
Details of his piratical career are wanting, but it was cer-
tainly during the period when the English pirate leaders,
under treaty with the Sultan of Morocco, had established
a kind of base at Mamora or Mehdia, at the mouth of the
Sebu river, just north of Salee. Ever since Fajardo's
successful attack on the Goleta at Tunis, it had become
their principal haunt. ^ In less than two years, according
to a report made in 1611 by Sir Ferdinand Gorges,
Governor of Plymouth, there were some forty sail of
English pirates, with two thousand men, using the port
and cruising in two main squadrons, under Sir John
Fearne and a Captain Peter Croston or Kaston.^ Main-
waring's name does not appear among the captains.
Indeed, he had probably not yet taken to the trade ; for,
from a farewell ode written in his honour, it would appear
that he did not sail from England till January 1613, when
he set out with the intention of accompanying Sir Robert
Shirley on his last embassy to Persia.^ What the acci-
dent was that made him change diplomacy for piracy we
do not know ; but if we may believe his own report, he
took so kindly to the new profession that he must soon
have risen to a position which made him supreme at
Mehdia. While he was there, he said, there were thirty
sail of corsairs frequenting the place, and he would not
allow one of them to go either in or out without their
giving an engagement not to touch English vessels.
Furthermore, he made a treaty with the Salee Moriscos,
by which all their Christian prisoners were released, and
he made it his business to rescue all English vessels he
' See Osuna's report, June 2, 1618, Doc. hu^d. xlvi. 411.
' S. P. Domestic, Ixv. 16, July 4, 1611.
* See the Muses'' Sacrifice, by John Davies of Hereford, 1612. It would
appear that, in 1614, Mainwaring's name was famous as a pirate as far as
Caithness. See Sir W. Monson's Voyage in that year ; Churchill, iii. 246.
58 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIEACY 1618
found in ' Turkish ' hands and protect them from moles-
tation. Several ' Turkish ' corsairs he actually captured,
he says, one of which had been as high up the Thames as
the Lea. He also claims to have made an arrangement
with Tunis, by which British ships were to be exempt from
its depredations, and he says the Bey had eaten bread
and salt with him, and offered him half shares of all prizes
and the freedom of his religion if he would enter his ser-
vice. So great was his reputation that he claimed to
have received similar invitations from the Dukes of Savoy
and Guise and from the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Spain,
too, he tells us, finding herself unable to deal otherwise
with the situation, approached him through the Duke of
Medina-Sidonia with the offer of a pardon and a high
command if he would betray Mehdia into Spanish hands.
One midsummer day in the last year of his service, he
tells us that with only two ships he fought five Spaniards
all day and then beat them oif, and thereupon received
from Spain an offer of twenty thousand ducats a year to
take command of the Andalusian squadron. But he was
not to be tempted, and his depredations continued ; nor
was it till the Spaniards began to suspect that the Dutch
had designs on Mehdia that they found energy to destroy
his nest. Then, as we have seen, Fajardo with an over-
powering force captured the place and made it a Spanish
port. Whether Main waring was present at the time is
not known, but as the place made practically no resistance
it is probable that most of the leading corsairs were away
cruising. It is even possible that, after all, Mainwaring
arranged with Fajardo that they should be. At all
events it was the end of his career as a Barbary corsair.
The following year he was hovering in the North Sea
while his friends negotiated his pardon, and early in
1616 they had succeeded in so far assuring it that he
1618 SPAIN AGAIN DEAWS BACK 59
was back in England settling claims with men he had
robbed.^
If half he tells of himself is true, the reappearance of
such a man in the Mediterranean with the official sanction
of the British Government could only be viewed with the
liveliest apprehension in Spain. It is no wonder then
that the news of what was going on in England caused a
profound sensation at Madrid. The Council of State was
at its wit's end. It took them a week of anxious delibera-
tion and prolonged debates before they could make up
their minds what to reply to Osuna. Their last order to
him had been to maintain his position ; but in the face of
the new difficulty their hearts once more began to fail
them, and though at first some members were inchned to
support his action they eventually changed their minds.
The resolution they finally came to was that Osuna must
be told it was useless to pursue his project against Venice.
It was certain that in case of need the princes of
Germany, the King of England, and the Dutch would
come to her assistance ; and as for disputing her claim to
the Adriatic, Spain was not in a position to make war for
such an object. True, Osuna had said he could maintain
such a war for six months from his own resources ; but it
was now clear that, long before six months expired, the
Venetians would have obtained assistance which would
enable them to prolong hostilities for years. He must
therefore give up all idea of coercing the Eepublic and
remove his ships from Brindisi. They assured him that
' Domestic Calendar, 1611-18, pp. 298, 342, 353, 359. See also his
Discourse cm Pirates (signed 'Henry Maynnaringe '), Brit. Mus. Reg. 17, A.
xlvii. Another copy is among the MSS. of Sir P. T. Mainwaring at
Peover, Hist. MSS. Com. x. iv. 202. The copy in the Royal MSS. is
probably that presented to the King. It is a very beautiful piece of cali-
graphy, elaborately illuminated, and it is interesting to note that it may
be the work of the converted pirate's own hand, since John Davies, who
addressed him as his favourite pupil, was a writing-master.
60 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1618
the object for which he had sent them there was no
longer possible, for they had certain news that Levenstein
had already passed in. To keep his ships where they
were could do nothing but excite suspicion and foster that
interference of the Northern powers which Spain wished
particularly to avoid. To add to his vexation these orders
were followed by a reprimand for his having presumed
to correspond directly with a foreign prince, and by a
pious rebuke for seeking help of heretics. Such paltriness
brought the King the rough answer it deserved. ' They
are not going to preach but to fight for you,' he said, and
hotly justified all he had done. His anger availed him
nothing. He was bluntly told to refit ten of his ships
and send them to Gibraltar as a guard for the Straits.'
It was not likely that the Viceroy's ambition would
allow him tamely to submit to such orders which at a
blow would wreck all his schemes. They were fast
coming to a head. Those mysterious strangers were
already swarming in the Venetian taverns ; Jacques
Pierre was darkly at work among Levenstein's troops ;
and the hour of the Kepublic was at hand. In des-
peration Osuna pointed out to the King the madness of
abandoning the Adriatic to his arch-enemy at such a
moment, when so much had been done. He was sure the
King could not have heard the news from England and
Holland when his last orders were penned, and he had
therefore taken on himself to delay their execution till he
heard again. The orders were repeated, and so was his
protest. So sure was he that they must be mistaken in
Madrid about the fleets that w^ere coming from the North
that he had ventured still to delay the recall of his fleet
from ]-)rindisi, and even to reinforce it with four more
' Documcntos Imklitos, Feb. 10, 14, 1618, vol. xlvi. 277 et seq. Duro,
Osuna e su Marina: Appendix, Feb. 17. April 14.
1618 OSUNA EEFUSES TO DESIST 61
ships he had been hastily equipping at Naples. This was
on May 8. In three weeks' time would be the great gala
day at Venice, when her dominion over the Adriatic was
celebrated by the annual ceremony in which the Doge
went out in the great ' Bucentoro ' to wed the Sea.
Strangers from all lands were flocking then as now to see
the pageant. The installation of a new and wealthy
Doge happened to coincide with the world-famed festival.
Venice had never been gayer and more crowded, and yet
in the throngs of tourists and revellers there was a sinis-
ter element so numerous that it could not be entirely
concealed. It was no wonder that Osuna was anxious
and excited as the long prepared moment approached, and
that he tore more fiercely than ever at the reins that were
checking his restiveness from Madrid.
There they knew well enough all that Osuna knew,
but for them it was a reason for drawing back and not for
pressing on. As long before as March 21, Gondomar had
sent them full particulars of the danger that was threaten-
ing. In Holland twelve ships of war under Admiral
Melchior van den Kerkhoven with two thousand men
were almost ready for sea, and in a month seven of the
finest English merchantmen would sail to join them at
Plymouth.^ Besides these there were at least two other
English ships which the Venetian Ambassador had
chartered, and which were already in the Mediterranean.
Gondomar was using his utmost efforts to thwart the
Venetian action, but he knew he would not be able to
stop the squadron sailing any more than he had been able
to stop Ealegh. The Venetian Ambassador had been
ordered to get the vessels off' with the greatest possible
speed, regardless of cost, and he had nearly half a million
' De Jonghe, Nederland in Venetie, p. 86. They sailed from the Texel
May 18, 1618.
62 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1618
ducats at his disposal. Every English ship would carry
besides its seamen seventy soldiers, and it was said the
Low Country officer, Sir Henry Peyton, would command
them. Gondomar could not get at the King. Bucking-
ham, who was then all-powerful and violently anti-
Spanish, would not let him. So there was no hope and
they must prepare for the worst. ^
That King James, for all his nervous caution, could
permit such an expedition to be organised in his territory
was scarcely less significant than if he had fitted out a
squadron from the royal navy. It was impossible to read
it otherwise than as a demonstration of where he meant
to draw the line between peace and war. The Spanish
Government were face to face at last with the prospect of
an English fleet in the Mediterranean, acting in concert
with the Dutch, the Venetians, and probably, as they
thought, the Barbary corsairs ; and whatever may have
been their complicity in Osuna's schemes they knew it was
time to drop them. It was this that had brought to the
chafing Viceroy order after order to quit the Adriatic, and
to remove his fleet from his own port at Brindisi, and it
was this that had earned him the reprimand for writing
directly to the English Court. Nothing could have been
more ill-timed than his application to James for permission
' The schedule of ships -which Gondomar sent included details of their
crews, tonnage, armament, and rate of hiring. They were as follows : —
In England : Tons. Guns.
' The Centurion ' 250 26
The Dragon' 270 26
'The Abigail' 250 26
' The Devil of Dunkirk ' .... 250 26
' The Hercules ' 300 28
' The Mathew ' 330 28
' The Royal Exchange ' .... 400 32
At Leghorn :
' The Southampton ' 230 30
The Merchant lloyal ' .... 450 32
Documentos Iniditos, xlvi. 374.
1618 THE HOUE OF ACTION 63
to hire ships. It had served no purpose but to give the
shifty King a complete answer to Gondomar's protests.
In reply to his importunity the baffled Ambassador could
get nothing better than an assurance that he too might hire
ships if his master wanted them. To this the Spaniards
had no retort, and the only hope of stopping the unwelcome
intrusion was to persuade the Venetians, by a complete
evacuation of the Adriatic, that it was unnecessary for
them to seek English assistance.
But, severely as his Government was pressing him,
Osuna could not bring himself to abandon the fruit of so
much labour, as it hung almost within his reach. His
reinforced fleet was at Brindisi ready to sail, the taverns
of Venice were swollen with his agents. Apparently un-
suspicious of her impending doom, her revels grew higher
and higher, and every day Osuna expected from Madrid
the word that would free his hand. Nearly a month
before, Jacques Pierre had warned him that his pro-
crastination was ruining their chances, and two days later
the Frenchman's activity was stopped by his being ordered
aboard the fleet ' with his most dangerous confederate.
Still no word came from Madrid. On May 18 Osuna
wrote again more urgently than ever. He had heard
directly from Gondomar, and from the Governor of the
Spanish Netherlands, that the English and Dutch ships
were on the point of sailing, and waited in confidence
for the answer.
But already it was too late. The very day he penned
the letter, as Venice awoke for another day's festivity, there
was a sight in the Piazzetta that sent a shiver through every
heart. On the gibbet between the famous columns were
two corpses, and each hung by the leg in token that their
crime was treason. While the horror was still fresh
another body was added, this time awry with the marks
64 ENGLAND AND THE VENICE CONSPIRACY 1618
of torture. No one could tell what it meant. They onlj^
knew that suddenly all those sinister strangers had dis-
appeared as mysteriously as they had assembled, and no
one knew how. There were whispers of boats full of
bodies, and dull splashes in the canals in the dead of
night, and in the fleet Jacques Pierre and his confederate
were swiftly put to death. The day for the fantastic
marriage came, and the people assembled to celebrate it,
but gloomily with anxious murmurs of some horrible
danger narrowly escaped. Yet it had been escaped, and
the wedding took place in all its splendour. The Doge
was still lord of his bride, Osuna's fleet remained motion-
less at Brindisi, and a week later he was writing to say
he had ordered Eibera to withdraw.^
To this hour the ' Spanish Conspiracy ' remains a
mystery. Its ramifications have baflled the historians of
all countries. The parts of France, of Spain, of Osuna,
and of Don Pedro de Toledo at Milan, are all uncertain.
Yet all seemed to have a part. We know the ringleaders
of the bravos in Venice were French, that some of them
had been in Osuna's service, and their chief his most
familiar instrument ; we know that they were in com-
munication with him and the Spanish Ambassador at
Venice, that they expected an attack from Osuna's fleet,
and that Osuna intended to make one at the moment they
were prepared to act. But what the connection was no
man can say. Probabihty would seem to suggest that the
plot in Venice itself was some wild scheme concocted
by mere desperadoes with a vague idea of mending their
fortunes ; that Osuna knew of it and fostered it through
Don Pedro and Jacques Pierre so far as he saw in it an
opportunity of coming in like a deus ex macliina with his
' Duro, Osuna e su Marina : Appendix, May .^0. For the l)est English
account of the ' Spanish Conspiracy,' see Horatio Brown, Venetian Studies.
1618 CAUSE OF OSUNA'S FAILURE 65
fleet, and making himself master of the situation ; and that
the Spanish Government were prepared to shut their eyes
to what he was doing so long as it did not involve them in
too great a danger. And herein lies the abiding interest
of the melodramatic story. Until the Venetian Ambas-
sador with King James's assent began hiring ships on
the London Exchange, the Spanish Government had let
Osuna go on. Then it became clear, not only that the
English King would not permit the old strategic centre
to pass under Spanish control, but that he knew he had
the means to protect it in a way there was no resenting.
Then it was that Spain drew back and was able to hold
her turbulent officer long enough for Venice not only to
crush treachery in her bosom but to provide herself with
a force upon the sea against which Osuna was powerless.
So to all the strange aspects of that famous plot we mui^t
add one more, and see in it the first occasion on which
England by her new sea power laid a mastering hand
upon the old centres of dominion and had dimly revealed
to her her most potent line of political action.
VOL. I.
CHAPTER VI
THE NAVY UNDEE JAMES I.
At first sight it may appear that too much importance
has been attached to the apparently insignificant aid
which James permitted the Venetians to obtain from his
marine. To modern eyes the little squadron of merchant
vesssel, which came at the call of Venice in her hour of
trial, must appear scarcely worth lifting from the oblivion
into which it has fallen. Yet a clear apprehension of the
idea of naval power which then prevailed will show that
to the men of that time the sailing of those forgotten
ships must have had a very deep significance. To begin
with, it must be borne in mind that first-class merchant-
men still formed an integral and recognised part of the
national navy. Sailing war-fleets in all countries were
usually more than half made up of armed merchant ships.
It had even been the policy of the British Government, as
well as of others, to foster the production of such vessels
as composed the little squadron by a tonnage bounty,
with the express intention that they should constitute an
auxiliary fleet. For centuries such vessels had occupied
in the scheme of national defence a similar place to that
which was held by county militia ashore. As yet the
system had shown no signs of falling into disfavour, but
rather the reverse. In the last year of Elizabeth a scheme
had been worked out under which the defence of the
home waters was to be left almost entirely to squadrons
of private men-of-war, in order that the whole royal
DECLINE OF THE NAVY 67
navy might be set free for an untrammelled and far-
reaching offensive, and, as the young Osuna had seen, the
war would have gained a new and irresistible impetus
had not James brought it to so abrupt and premature a
conclusion. It was therefore no mere filibustering ex-
pedition that had been on foot. In sanctioning the
employment of first-class merchantmen by the Venetian
Government, the King was deliberately parting with a
section of his maritime force in order to protect an ally,
and thereby preserve the balance of power in the
Mediterranean.
Nor was this all. It might be said that, so far as the
check to Spain was due to naval pressure, it was due to
the action of the Dutch rather than to that of England.
Indeed, they were rapidly outstripping their mistress in
the naval art, and it is possible that at that moment their
naval power was as great as hers. Ever since the last
years of Elizabeth the royal navy had been declining in
strength and temper ; but it is by no means clear that this
was generally known, England's prestige, as far as we
can judge, stood as high as ever, and upon this she had
been living. The fleet was one of the great sights of the
country. Every foreign tourist of distinction went down
to Rochester to see the royal ships, and wrote home
glowing accounts of their numbers, strength, and splen-
dour. The King held naval reviews in the sight of
shouting thousands, and none but the keenest eye could
tell that all was not as well as ever. But even if the real
state of things was not fully known abroad, it mattered
little, for by this time it was fully known at home, and
the most threatening aspect of the little squadron that
James had sanctioned was that its organisation coincided
with a serious revival in England. It is therefore pro-
w 2
68 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES 1.
bable that the moral effect of the English demonstration
had at least as much weight with the Mediterranean
powers as the actual force exhibited by the Dutch.
If we were to seek for the point at which the. navy
began definitely to decline, we should probably find it about
the time when death withdrew from it the influence of
Hawkins and the old seamen admirals. It was then that,
under men like Essex and Southampton, the navy became
the fashion and fell into the hands of ' Society.' With
a mere fine gentleman like Fulke Greville succeeding
Hawkins, it was not likely that, however good and up-
right the new Treasurer's intentions might be, the seeds of
corruption, which the old Plymouth captain had fought
so long and astutely, should not begin to sprout anew.
Nor from the Earl of Nottingham, the old Lord Admiral,
was any assistance to be expected. With advancing
years lethargy had crept fast upon him. When the peace
was signed he was nearly seventy — a ripe old age as men
went then — and his portrait shows senility stamped on
every feature. In his best days as Lord Howard of
Effingham his lofty personality and unblemished devotion
had given the country the power of welding into an
irresistible weapon all the fierce and unruly elements of
her sea power. As the nominal head of her sea-bred
captains his services were priceless. But neither as a
seaman nor as an administrator was there anything very
definite to his record. In the Great Armada year, on
which his reputation mainly rests, his plan of campaign
had been superseded by that of Drake, and he had been
practically ordered to place his main fleet at his Vice-
Admiral's disposal. In the actual fighting he had been
chiefly distinguished by blundering unsupported into the
middle of the Spanish fleet, and by his inexcusable
turning aside from the crucial attack at Gravelines.
NOTTINGHAM'S EVIL INFLUENCE 69
During the greater part of his administration, moreover,
the navy had been practically managed by Lord Burghley
and Hawkins, and so soon as their hands were removed
it began to go down hill. As early as 1596 the expedition
to Cadiz had demonstrated that the decay of his mental
and physical qualities rendered Nottingham unfit for
active command, and the condition of the fleet in the fol-
lowing year said as little for his powers of administration.
A man always susceptible of being dominated by any
strong personality with which he came in contact, he soon
became but a child in the hands of the worthless men
who succeeded in winning his confidence. The result was
a rapid deterioration of the navy in every aspect, and all
attempts to check it he querulously opposed. Convinced
of the purity and loftiness of his own conduct, he would
not believe that any man whose fortunes he had pushed
could be less devoted than himself. To make matters
more difficult, the worst offenders were connections of
his own, and his behef in his order and in his family,
in which the command of the navy had become almost
hereditary, was sacred and inflexible. The result was an
inevitable nepotism, but a nepotism so honest that he
took any reflection on the general administration of the
service as a personal attack. To remove him was the
only hope for reform, and his position was practically
unassailable. A great nobleman of lofty descent and
venerable fignre, he stood like a personification of Eliza-
bethan glory, a last and cherished link with the heroic
age ; and it was not till Buckingham rose to his almost
unprecedented position as a favourite that a force was
found strong enough to drag the old Lord Admiral from
his seat. For fifteen years after Elizabeth's death he
remained an unwitting cloak to every disease that can
infect a navy.
70 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES I.
His evil genius and the main cause of all the trouble
was Sir Robert Mansell, who stands without a rival in
our naval history for malversation in his office. An officer
of the new school, he was a gentleman of good family who
had chosen the navy as a career from his youth, and the
record of his service afloat was at least respectable.
Though distantly connected with the Lord Admiral, he
was one of Essex's men and had been knighted at Cadiz
in 1596, though in what capacity he served is unknown.
The following year he was captain of Essex's flag-ship
during the Azores expedition, and afterwards was serving
as his admiral on the Irish station. An accomplished
courtier, he managed to survive the fall of his patron, and
Nottingham's influence and devotion to the interests of
his kinsmen was enough to keep him employed. When
Nottingham's son-in-law, Leveson, was serving as Admiral
of the Narrow Seas, Mansell was appointed his vice-
admiral, and when Leveson in 1602 was given the com-
mand of the main fleet, Mansell succeeded him in the
Channel. While he was so serving it had fallen to his
lot to concert with the Dutch admiral a combined
attempt to prevent Frederigo Spinola's second attempt
to pass the Straits of Dover with a galley squadron,
and the success of the operation had brought him some
distinction. It was at all events enough for the Lord
Admiral's influence and his own good looks to secure him
the treasurership of the navy when Sir Fulke Greville
retired in the first year of the new King's reign. The
energy and power with which John Hawkins had filled
the office, no less than the easy-going temper of the old
Lord Admiral, had combined to make the Treasurer the
practical head of the navy, and Mansell found himself
free to play havoc with the service. The disease, which
had been poisoning the whole system since Hawkins's
1608 SIR ROBERT MANSELL 71
incorruptible and able hand had been withdrawn by
death, soon began to appear like health beside the lament-
able prostration into which Mansell rapidly reduced it.
Money was squandered right and left while the efficiency
of the fleet was as recklessly diminished. Promotion by
purchase was established almost without disguise, and
highly-paid officers multiplied beyond anything that had
been known in the hottest days of the war. In one year,
when only seven ships were in commission, there was a
roster of three admirals and four vice-admirals, ' so that
the navy was like an army of generals and colonels.' '
From the top of the tree to the bottom peculation and
embezzlement ran riot, and the swindling in the store-
houses and dockyards was only equalled by the shameless
claims which were made and allowed by the higher
officers. No check was attempted, the Admiralty officers
ceased to meet, Nottingham kept his eyes resolutely
shut, and in four years Mansell had succeeded in wreck-
ing the navy to such an extent that serious alarm was
taken.
The first effort to check his career was in 1608. It
was in this year, it will be remembered, that the Spanish
navy was being reorganised in order to set free the
galleons of the Ocean Guard for operations in the Medi-
terranean against the growing power of Ward and
Danzer — operations which were intended to clear the
ground for the vast naval mobilisation for the expulsion
of the Moriscos. No one, however, at that time could
guess the real object of the activity in the Spanish ports,
and relations between the Courts of London and Madrid
were so severely strained that the worst was feared.
Under the pressure of the new alarm, which induced
James to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with
' Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 190.
72 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES I. 1608
the Dutch, he was also brought to grant a commission
to inquire into the state of the navy, in spite of the
powerful influence of the Howards.
The prime mover in the affair appears to have been
8ir Robert Cotton, the famous antiquary and founder of
the Cottonian Library. He was regarded as the most
learned historical scholar of his time, but what his special
interest in the navy was is not clear. It is interesting,
however, to note that it may have been to some extent
hereditary. The first Navy Commission of which we
have any record owed its existence in a great measure
to the fearless and incessant criticism of the administra-
tion made by a certain Sir Thomas Cotton, who served
as Wafter of the Wool Fleet under Henry VIII., and
as a flag officer in succeeding reigns. When in the
year 1583, on the eve of war with Spain, his prolonged
agitation bore fruit in the great Commission which the
Queen ordered to inquire into the state of the navy, it
was he who with Sir Francis Drake and three others were
appointed sub-commissioners to do all the work. Whether
or not this Sir Thomas was related to Sir Eobert, it was
by him again the bulk of the work was done, for it fell
to his part to draw up the report. The duty was dis-
charged with his customary thoroughness, and the picture
of corruption and incapacity it presented is amazing.
Still more astonishing is the evidence on which it was
based, and which still exists among Cotton's manu-
scripts in the British Museum. Yet less than nothing
came of it. The Lord Admiral, who was nominally at
che head of the Commission, had testified the importance
he attached to it by never attending the sittings. Secure
in the power of his family and the growing dulness of
his conscience, he treated the whole proceeding with con-
tempt, as he well knew he could. The damning report
1612 COTTON'S ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 73
was duly presented to the King, but the culprits suffered
nothing worse than an oration from the royal lips. They
were left free to continue on their evil path, and things
went rapidly from bad to worse.
Four years later, when Spain and the Empire had
definitely joined hands and the Protestant powers were
drawing together in a still closer union, the indefatigable
Cotton tried once more. The prospect of a great European
war was again at its blackest. So strained indeed were
the relations of James with Spain, that Digby, the British
Ambassador at Madrid, had to report that the Council
was actually debating a sudden attack upon the new
Dutch colony in Virginia. Moreover, as politics then
stood at the English Court, Cotton was able to secure the
support of both Northampton and Rochester, the most
powerful of the King's sycophants and the most deter-
mined opponents of the Howards. The result was that
a new Commission was issued. This time the offenders
took a still bolder line. The Commission contained a
clause authorising the Commissioners ' to give orders for
the due punishment of the offenders,' and they determined
to dispute the King's authority to issue such a charge.
To this end Mansell procured from Whitelocke, the latest
authority on the prerogative, an opinion that the ob-
jectionable clause was ultra vires. By chance it reached
the King's hands. His tenderness on such high matters
was acute, and it stung him more sharply than the active
decay of his navy. Both Mansell and Whitelocke were
arrested and brought before the Council, and only escaped
the Tower by a humble submission and apology. There
unfortunately the matter ended. As far as is known the
Commission never reported, and the Lord Admiral and
his Treasurer continued their disastrous career unchecked.
Nor was it till the action of the Duke of Osuna against
74 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES T. 1615
Venice and the utter collapse of the royal finances gave
James a thorough fright that he was brought to his
senses.
It was no sailor or pohtician who finally brought about
the regeneration of the navy, but one of those plain men
of business for whom England is always wont to cry out
in her need. For some years past a new class of officials
had been gathering round the King, taken no longer from
the ranks of the nobility and gentry, but from the middle
class that was daily growing in wealth and importance.
Foremost among them was Sir Lionel Cranfield. He had
begun life like a story-book, as the clever and diligent
apprentice whose handsome face won him the hand of
his master's daughter. With this early start he rapidly
became a marked man in the City, and after distinguish-
ing himself several times in the conduct of semi-official
business with the Government he was introduced to the
King by Northampton as a promising man of affairs.
The promise was abundantly fulfilled. In 1615 he was
knighted and made Master of the Requests. Now" that
Robert Cecil was dead he was without a rival as a finan-
cier. So honest and capable were his methods that he
rapidly obtained a position that was unassailable, and
shone like an angel sent from Heaven to drag both King
and courtiers from the financial slough into which they
had brought themselves. One after another he took the
state departments in hand, searched them to the bottom,
swept them clean, reorganised them on the soundest busi-
ness principles, and started them afresh on healthy lines
to which no one dared to take exception. Perhaps his
most remarkable gift, seeing that he made no pretension
to be a politician, was his power of getting rid of the men
who had caused the mischief. It was a gjift that was
1618 CEANFIELD'S COMMThSION 75
likely to be tried to its utmost when it came to the
Admiralty's turn to feel his hand.
The mere fact that a Commission had been issued was
of course a severe blow to Howard's position. On the
other hand it was likely to arouse the same determined
opposition from his party which had already defeated two
similar attempts. It was clear nothing would come of
Cranfield's efforts unless the most powerful Court influ-
ence could be brought to back them. To this end
Buckingham was approached. He had already reached
a position in the King's favour which no intrigue could
shake ; he had just been created a marquis ; nothing stood
between him and complete domination but the serried
ranks of the Howards, and on them he had declared open
war. The suggestion that he was the proper person to
take the Lord Admiral's place can hardly have been un-
welcome, but he modestly declined it on the ground of
his youth and inexperience. But the seed was sown and
for the present that was enough. Cranfield had in his
mind not merely reform, but such a revolution as would
render the navy practically independent of the Lord
Admiral's incapacity, and the Commission got to work
with a light heart. Cranfield was of course a member,
but he was far too deeply occupied with other depart-
ments to take an active part in its proceedings. The bulk
of the work fell on John Coke, who had been Deputy-
Treasurer and Paymaster of the Navy in Sir Fulke
Greville's time, and had been his right hand in trying to
curb the abuses which had crept into the service in
Elizabeth's last days. Even then a navy captain could
write to him, ' To say truth, the whole body is so cor-
rupted as there is no sound part almost from the head to
the foot ; the great ones feed on the less, and enforce
76 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES I. 1618
them to steal both for themselves and their commanders.'
Coke appears to have lost his post when by the Howard
influence Greville was induced to resign in favour of Sir
Eobert Mansell, and he was no doubt ripe for an attack
on the faction that had displaced him. He was supported
by a most powerful Commission, composed of leading City
merchants and shipowners, like Sir Thomas Smythe,
Governor of the East India and Virginia companies,
financiers like Sir John Wolstenholme, a farmer of the
Customs, with a seasoning of experts from the Exchequer
and practical shipbuilders. From a Commission so con-
structed there was no hope of escape. Mansell beat a
hasty retreat. Before it could meet he obtained a promise
of the Vice-Admiralship of England in place of Sir
Bichard Leveson, who had recently died, and sold the
treasurership to a man after Cranfield's own heart, Sir
William Russell, a leading Muscovy merchant.
By September the Commission had completed its
report. It was of a most businesslike character, dis-
playing no tendency to dwell upon the iniquities of the
past, or to bring home to the old offenders what they so
richly deserved. It was to the future it looked, and it ex-
posed the lamentable condition into which the old system
had fallen merely to emphasise the need of reform. In
an interim report Coke had been able to show that of the
forty-three vessels borne on the Navy List, fourteen, or
one third, were unserviceable ; three apparently did not
even exist, though their upkeep was regularly paid for ;
while three others were useless till repaired. The navy
was in fact weaker by six good ships than in the last year
of Elizabeth. Yet the ordinary charge had risen to over
50,000/. a year, or more than it had been in some of the
last years of the war. During this time nineteen new
vessels had been ostensibly added to the navy, but of
1618 EEPORT OF THE COMMISSION 77
these two had been begun under Fulke Greville, two had
been bought, two were pinnaces, and most of the rest
were reconstructions carried out in the most wasteful and
inefdcient manner. The only substantial addition had
been the famous ' Prince Koyal,' the largest ship ever de-
signed for the navy. In their final report the Commis-
sioners dealt with thirty-five vessels only. Of these, four
were the useless galleys which had been built during
Spinola's scare ; nine, including four large galleons, were
decayed beyond repair, leaving fifteen great ships and
eleven smaller vessels which they considered might be
made serviceable. It was an overwhelming exposure, but
no worse than every one must have expected.
Of far greater interest were the proposals for the
future. They were of the most drastic kind. First was
laid down a minimum establishment of which the navy
should consist. Thirty efficient vessels, the Commissioners
considered, was all that could be hoped for at present,
owing mainly to the heavy calls upon material and seamen
by the increasing number of powerful merchantmen which
were being built, and the ever widening area of British
commerce. The thirty vessels they proposed to class as
follows : Four ' ships royal ' of over 800 tons, all of which
already existed ; fourteen ' great ships ' between 600 and
800 tons, of which eight already existed, and six must be
built to replace five decayed vessels and the four galleys ;
six ' middling ships ' of 450 tons, of which three must be
built to replace five decayed smaller ones ; two * small
ships ' of 350 tons, of which one must be built ; and four
pinnaces under 300 tons. This establishment, they pointed
out, though numerically smaller than that of Elizabeth,
yet exceeded it in total burden by over 3,000 tons. True,
it left ten ships to be provided ; but by building two a
year they considered the standard might be reached in
78 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES I. 1618
five years, at a total cost of 80,000/. a year. In other
words, they reported that the effective strength of the
navy might be nearly doubled for little more than half
what it had been costing.
The policy on which this programme was based was
perfectly clear and well reasoned. It was no new thing ;
it merely carried to its logical conclusion the immemorial
tradition which regarded the merchant marine as an
integral part of the naval force of the kingdom. In those
da.ys sea-borne commerce was not regarded as a source of
weakness, but of strength. The idea of commerce pro-
tection, as we understand it, was unborn. Beyond the
limits of the Four Seas it was not held to be the province
of the royal navy. Ocean-going merchantmen expected
to protect themselves. Not only did they make no demand
upon the royal ships, but, as a matter of course, accepted
the position of an auxiliary navy. All therefore that was
new in the Commissioners' project was the breadth of
vision with which they conceived the whole as one great
national force, and assigned to each branch of it its
special functions. Small ships in the royal navy, they
declared — beyond three or four for special service — were
a mere waste, since whenever they were wanted they could
be had from the merchants in any number. It was
clearly their idea that the true function of the royal
navy was to provide a squadron of powerful ships to form
the backbone of the fighting fleet, and that the merchant
marine should be looked to for the rest. Or, as we should
put it now, the royal navy ought to be confined, or
nearly so, to battleships, and the merchant marine should
be relied on for cruisers and minor types when occasion
arose for a larger number than were sufficient for the
ordinary service of the Narrow Seas. There is in this
policy a comprehensive grasp of the whole problem of
1618 A BUSINJESSLIKE REOUGANISATION 79
naval defence, such as had never yet been so clearly
enunciated, or perhaps even so clearly conceived by any
professional seaman. We see stamped upon the whole
document the influence of men educated to statesmanship
in the management of the great trading companies, of
men accustomed to look their resources fairly in the face,
to measure them without self-deception, and to husband
and distribute them with a single eye to achieving the
utmost return for the capital and energy invested. Small
as was the force they proposed, judged by modern
standards, they knew it was all the existing resources of
the country could keep in a state of high efficiency, such
as they were accustomed to in their own business, and
they knew that if it was so kept it was enough ; ' enough,'
as they said, * with private ships without foreign aid to
encounter any Prince's sea forces.'
But they did not stop here. Merely to point out
what should be done they knew was useless. To leave
the old system intact was only to have their report
shelved, and no sooner was it presented and well received
than they prepared their final blow. The first sign of
what was coming was a whisper that Buckingham had
abandoned his modest attitude and was prepared to accept
the office of Lord High Admiral jointly with the old Earl
of Nottingham, and that the Prince of Wales had sur-
rendered in Buckingham's favour the reversion of the
office which had been granted him as Duke of York
before his elder brother's death. Every one seemed to
regard this as a preliminary to the graceful supersession
of the unhappy old Admiral. But there was more behind.
The news was followed immediately by an announcement
that the Commissioners had offered the King to undertake
the whole management of the Admiralty for 30,000Z. a
year, and to carry out the programme they had laid down,
80 THE NAVY UNDER JAMES I. 1618
if he would appoint them as a permanent Board. So
revohitionary a proposal, which would reduce the Lord
Admiral to the position of chairman of a board of directors,
was more than Nottingham with his old-world aristocratic
ideas could tolerate. He opposed it with his whole weight,
and as it meant a clean sweep of all the old officers they
too supported him fiercely. All was of no avail, for
Buckingham was on the side of the reform. Coke had
written him an ingenious letter explaining on behalf of
the Commissioners that their proposals, so far from
decreasing his power and dignity, would really enhance it,
since under the new system the heads of departments,
instead of being officially appointed by the King and for
life, would now be but members of the Commission holding
their appointments directly from the Lord Admiral and
during his pleasure. Even the Commission itself depended
for its existence solely on his protection and influence.
' Be pleased, my good Lord,' he urged, ' to consider that
the Lord Admiral's greatness is not to have a market
under him of base and unworthy people that betray the
King's honour and his by the sale of places, havoc of
provisions and ruins of ships, but his true and real
greatness is the power and greatness of the King, the
confidence of his favour, the trust of his service, and the
reputation and flourishing state of the navy.' With
these considerations Buckingham, whose zeal for a
powerful navy was thoroughly genuine, was satisfied, and
perhaps even relieved ; and with his support it was an
understood thing that the Commissioners' proposal would
be accepted. It v^as the last blow to the old Lord
Admiral. To be openly recognised as the mere figure-
head that he had been for a quarter of a century was more
than he could bear, and he readily availed himself of
Buckingham's offer to buy him out.
1618 THE END OF THE ELIZABETHANS 81
So amidst the downfall of the Howard family fell the
impressive figure which for years had been honoured as
the personification of the naval glories of Elizabeth.
When we remember what the Howard position had been,
it is no less than astonishing to see how it crumbled at
the touch of the modern commercial spirit. With a
cynical directness Cranfield had gone on the principle
that it is cheaper to buy out obstruction <fchan to waste
time and energy in getting it removed by force, and his
policy proved a complete success. For so businesslike
an attack the men of the Court were wholly unprepared,
and the whole system went down before it smoothly like
a pack of cards.
Nor was this the only sign of the times. As Eliza-
beth's old Lord Admiral was thus deferentially handed
from his seat, there was played out the tragedy of the last
of the Elizabethans. The Commissioners had hardly got
to work when Sir Walter Ealegh returned from his
melancholy failure in Guiana, and while Cranfield and his
men laboured to disentangle the web of corruption,
Gondomar was pressing for Ealegh's blood, as years
before Mendoza had growled for Drake's. Every one
knows how differently the two demands were met.
Though Spain, through her viceroy at Naples, had been
playing a game beside which Ealegh's was almost inno-
cence, James had neither the art nor the courage to
resist. Within a week of Nottingham's fall the successor
of Elizabeth drank the last dregs of his long truckling to
Spain, and Ealegh's body was lying headless on Tower
Hill.
So the old era came to a close. Ealegh had rejected
the principle of action in the Mediterranean in favour of
a revival of the old ideas under which he had lived. He
could not see that they were out of date, and martyrdom
VOL. I. G
82 THE NAVY UNDKL' JAMES T. 1618
with a kind of strange canonisation was his reward. At the
same moment the new men were raising the navy from
its ashes ready for the new career that was rapidly open-
ing before it, and dimly grasping at the main line of its
future energy. With Ealegh's death the oceanic era of
Elizabeth passed away, and in its place the era of the
Mediterranean was dawning.
I
CHAPTEE VII
THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE
With Gondomar's tragic success Spanish diplomacy
appeared triumphant. It seemed for the moment as
though British pohcy was to be brought into complete
subserviency to that of Spain. But, in truth, it was the
turning of the leaf. Events were rapidly shaping them-
selves for the teaching of the new page, and public
opinion, no less than statesmen's judgment, was ripening
to give it life. The sacrifice of the last of the Eliza-
bethans was more than Englishmen could endure. Un-
popular as Ralegh had been all his life, in his dignified
martyrdom he became the patron saint of the British
creed — of the faith which combined in one dogma the
spirit of the Beformation and the spirit of imperial
expansion. The ring of the axe that had laid the old
adventurer low re-awakened the old aggressive passion.
The smouldering hatred of Spain blazed out again ; the
London mob vented its fury by an attack on the Spanish
Embassy ; and when Gondomar left the country —
though he had ridden to the coast in a kind of triumph
like a conqueror — it was to advise his master that on
no account must he break with England.
It was wise counsel. The Bohemian revolution had
already lit the spark of the Thirty Years' War. It was
to James's son-in-law, the Prince Palatine, that the
Bohemians were looking for support against the House of
Austria, and in view of the new alliance between Philip
84 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1619
and the Emperor, and the suspicious naval activity in the
Spanish ports, even James could not sit quiet. Mindful
of Osuna's recent attempt, which might well be renewed,
he had sent to inquire what were the intentions of Spain
in regard to his son-in-law's dominions. The great fear of
the Court of Madrid was that in the coming contest James
would be pushed into the arms of the war party and
finally declare himself the head of the Protestant Church
militant. As things stood the dual alliance had little to
fear, but with the English fleet thrown into the scale
there was small doubt which way it would turn. As
Gondomar pointed out, re-echoing Osuna's incessant cry,
whoever was master at sea would soon be master ashore.
The halting mobilisation which was then in progress had
revealed that the Spanish navy, as he said, had never
been so unready for war, while in a few weeks England
could mobilise a powerful fleet, besides the swarm of
privateers that would immediately cover the sea. The
only policy for Spain was to keep James in a good humour,
and to this end they should revive the negotiations for the
marriage between the Prince of "Wales and the Infanta.
Nor was there any time to lose. Eival proposals were
being made to James from Germany, Savoy, and France ;
and Dutch envoys were actually in London settling the
strained relations which had arisen between the two
countries in the East Indies, and urging the King to
declare war on Spain.
Gondomar, in his eagerness to secure the neutrality of
England, probably exaggerated the readiness of the royal
navy. Still, he was not far wrong. In the six months
that had elapsed since he left London, things had changed
greatly for the better. Though Buckingham and the
Commission were not officially appointed till February
1619, they had been diligently at work. The worst of the
1619 THE NEW SHIPS 85
abuses had been already cleaned up. Two new ships had
been laid down in accordance with their programme, and
they were making rapid progress. The King was giving his
new servants a loyal, even enthusiastic support. When
the new ships were complete, he went down to Deptford
in state to see them lamiched. He performed the chris-
tening ceremony in person. Draining a bumper to the
new Commissioners' health, he congratulated Bucking-
ham on his choice of officers, and the officers on the
beauty of the new vessels, on the rapidity of their build-
ing, and no less on the economical accounts they had
offered for his inspection.' In his high satisfaction he
broke quite away from the traditional nomenclature of
the royal navy. The larger of the two vessels, ' a great
ship ' of the second rank, he named, in honour of the
reforming Commissioners, ' The Reformation,' a name
which was changed, perhaps in view of its doubtful
meaning, to ' Constant Reformation.' The other, a ship
of the third rank, he called in honour of the new Lord
Admiral's debut, ' Buckingham's Entrance,' a name which
was afterwards changed, possibly as being too great a
departure from custom, to ' Happy Entrance.' Two more
ships of the same ratings were immediately laid down in
their places, and everything promised that Buckingham's
entrance was really happy, and the reformation likely to
be constant.^
But this was not all to which Gondomar could point
in support of his view that at all costs England and her
' Salvetti, Nov. 22, 1619. Chamberlain to Carleton, Nov. 13, S.P.
Dom.
- In view of tlie difficult question of comparing English and foreign ship
measurements, it is interesting to note that Salvetti says the two vessels
were of 800 and 500 tons respectively, and ' we,' he adds, ' calculate the ton
at 5 sahne each.' The English official measurement was : ' Constant Be-
formation,' burden 564, ton or tonnage 752 ; ' Happy Entrance,' 4i37 and 582
They vvere usually rated at 750 and 580.
86 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE lbl8
sea forces must be kept neutral. During the time the
naval reorganisation had been going on much had occurred
to give his opinion emphasis. Even before he left the
kingdom in the summer of 1618, he had received an
object lesson of how men of the new Commissioner's
stamp could prepare a fleet. It must be remembered
that this was the time when Osuna's contemplated design
on Venice was ripening, and the encouragement which
the Spanish Government had been secretly giving was
suddenly changed to opposition by the news of what the
Eepublic was doing in Holland and England. It was
about the middle of January 1618 that the Venetian
Ambassador in London got leave to charter eight men-
of-war. On April 8, within three months, he went down
to Deptford to see them off. He was received with a
rousing salute and a grand luncheon, as the importance
of the occasion demanded, and his smart little fleet
dropped down the river to be ready for the first fair wind.
On the 23rd they were well away and were expected to
reach Gibraltar by May 1. It was under Sir John
Peyton that they eventually sailed. Who the seaman
commander was is not known, but it was not Main-
waring. At the last moment the Government felt that
the reformed pirate, for all his repentance, was not to be
trusted on the high seas, and he had to go to Venice
overland. On the same day that the ships left Deptford
the contingent of twelve sail, which the Venetian Am-
bassador had equipped in Holland, put to sea, and with it
sailed a regular Dutch squadron of fourteen sail. It was
intended, as was announced, to police the Straits against
the Barbary corsairs, but there was small doubt its objec-
tive would be changed if occasion arose, and for Spain
it was no less a cause for anxiety than the two hired
1618 VlDAZABAL BARS THE STRAITS 87
squadrons which were sailing openly under the flag of
St. Mark.i
It was no wonder, then, that the Spanish Government
was at its wit's end. During the whole time that the
English squadron had been preparing, they had been
bombarding Osuna with orders to quit the Adriatic, and
as yet had received from him nothing but excuses for
disobedience. Don Miguel de Vidazabal, one of the
finest seamen in their service, who had recently been
made vice-admiral of the Cantabrian Squadron, was
watching the Straits with seven ships and two caravels.
Whether to reinforce him or not with such vessels as
the groaning mobilisation would allow became a subject
of anxious debate in the Council. Three new galleons
were sent him ; but on June 18, before they had made up
their minds to do more, the two Dutch squadrons were
sighted from the top of the Eock. What had become of
the English squadron, or why the Dutch had been so
long on the way, is difficult to ascertain. The two con-
tingents had certainly not joined hands, and Vidazabal
felt justified in attacking, since the States admiral drew
off and left the Venetian squadron to take its own course.
The action lasted four hours, and when darkness sepa-
rated the fleets Vidazabal had to report forty killed and
thirty wounded, with the usual rider that the Dutch were
believed to have suffered much more heavily. During
the night he prepared to renew the action, but to his
chagrin received an order from Santa-Cruz to the effect
that his Majesty had resolved not to oppose the passage
of the Venetian squadron. A week before, peremptory
' Salvetti's News Letters, April 18 to May .31, 1618, Add. MSS. 27962,
vol. i. Salvetti was the London agent of the Grand Duke of Tuscany.
68 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1618
orders to the same effect had been sent to Osuna, and at
last he had obeyed.^
So far, then, the naval intervention of England and
her ally in the Mediterranean had been a complete success.
Venice was safe, and Spain's hand was forced. The exten-
sive naval mobilisation for what was officially styled ' the
Secret Expedition ' had now to take definite shape.
Whether or not it had been intended to back up Osuna's
blow, if it had succeeded, is unknown. At any rate, it was
no longer possible to cover such a design under the cloak of
operations against the pirates. It was a game two could
play, and the Northern powers had won the first point.
There was every prospect of their continuing the match
with ever increasing boldness and all the leading cards in
their hand. In fact, the pirates whom Spain had nursed
so long could no more serve as a mask for her ambition.
They had become, by her own supineness, a handle for
her enemies — a handle by which at any moment they
could open wide the gate of the Mediterranean. It was
clear that if Spain hoped to preserve the domination of
her sphere, she must set herself with a single eye to
removing the cause of offence. Within a week of Vida-
zabal's action an Algerian fleet was reported returning
from a raid at Lanzerote in the Canaries. Vidazabal at
once agreed with the admiral of the States squadron that
w^as still lying in the Straits to join hands. Together they
fell upon the corsairs, and in a few hours completely
' Duro, Armada E.sjmfiola, iii. '657, 498. It is probable that the English
squadron had already passed the Straits, perhaps about June 10, as Salvetti
expected ; for on the 13th an urgent order was sent to Osuna to withdraw
his fleet from Brindisi and send it to reinforce the fleet that was being
mobilised against Algiers. This was the oi'der he finally obeyed. On the
other hand, there is a despatch of Osuna's dated July 24, saying that the
English and Dutch have begun to enter the Adriatic (Doc. Inid.). Possibly
therefore, both the fleets had been detained by a long spell of foul weather
and passed the Straits about the same time.
1619 DOUBLE DEALING OF SPAIN 89
destroyed them. About the same time 'Osuna, who, since
his designs on Venice were defeated, was throwing himself
heart and soul into the destruction of the Mussulman
sea power, sent his admiral, Don Otavio de Aragon,
into Turkish waters, where he entered and played havoc
in the Dardanelles. Another squadron made a successful
raid on Bizerta, while similar activity was displayed by
the King's gallej's on the coast of Valencia. At length
Spain seemed in earnest, and it was known she was mus-
tering a great galley fleet from all parts of her dominions
for the spring of 1619.
Still, in view of the war clouds that overhmig Europe,
no one could believe she had not some ulterior design,
and least of all England. Under Gondomar's advice a
special envoy had been sent to James to revive the mar-
riage negotiations, and to get him to offer his mediation
between Bohemia and the Empire. His vanity, which
was always picturing him as the peacemaker of Europe,
quickly swallowed the bait, and Spain thought herself
safe. Philip immediately announced to the Archduke
Albert, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, that he had
decided to give active support to his Austrian ally, and
informed the Emperor himself, that he was ready to give
him a large sum of money, and, if that did not suffice,
troops should follow. This was at the opening of the
year 1 619. The news of the activity in the Spanish ports
was becoming daily more ominous, and by the end of
January every one had taken the alarm. Sir Dudley
Carleton, the British Minister in Holland, sent over word
that the rendezvous for the galley fleet had been dis-
covered to be Messina. This place, from its remarkable
strategical position, was the traditional point of concen-
tration for the combined Christian fleets which had so
often assembled to crush the Moslem sea power. Still
90 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1619
suspicion was in no way disanned. Indeed, so central and
well placed is the port for operations in any part of the
Mediterranean, that nobody could be at ease. The Dutch
were certain it portended what every one feared. ' It makes
them judge,' wrote Carleton, ' that the storm will first fall
on the Venetians by forcing a passage through the Gulf
to Trieste in Istria, and after upon the Bohemians.' ^
The real intention of the Spanish Council cannot be
determined, even if they had definitely decided on any
particular line of action. Ever since the death of the
inflexible Philip II. they had pursued a policy of drift and
vacillation, and were probably doing the same thing now.
For James, in any case, it was unnecessary to come to a
conclusion. He still had ready to his hand the weapon
which would cut either way. It will be remembered that
when Digby, in May 1617, had returned to Madrid to press
the King's marriage proposals more firmly on Philip III.,
the goad he carried was a proposal for joint action by the
leading sea powers — all of them hostile to Spain — against
the Barbary pirates. His suggestion was that each of
them should provide a squadron of twenty sail to act
together for three years from April 1619. Little is known
of the course of the negotiation.- France apparently was
favourable, but the Dutch were not so sure. They had
recently established diplomatic relations with the corsairs,
and their consul at Algiers had succeeded in negotiating
a treaty whereby their ships were to be free from moles-
tation, and they were able to do a remunerative trade at
the pirate ports in nninitions of war. However, the
treaty had not been actually ratified, and they expressed
S.P. Holland, Jan. 25, 1G19.
- Dr. Gardiner found that the bundle of papers rehiting to this affair is
missing from the bimancas archives. I take the terms from Duro, op. cit.
iii. iiiJO.
1619 JAMES PLAYS THE PIRATE CARD 91
in general terms a desire to further James's scheme.^ The
King of Spain was naturally suspicious, but the negotia-
tions continued fitfully and with some ill humour. James
at any rate had his heart in the project. If he had no
higher motive he was certainly anxious to enjoy posing
as the leader of Christendom, and in any case the
weapon was too nicely adjusted to meet the equivocal
attitude of Spain to be abandoned.
Thus the first duty that fell upon Buckingham and
the new Commissioners on formally taking up their duties
was to mobilise six vessels of the royal navy, to which were
to be added five from the Cinque Ports and fourteen from
the merchants, making in all a fleet of twenty-five sail.
At the same time the Dutch were definitely invited to
co-operate with a similar force, with the idea that the two
squadrons should enter the Mediterranean together, and
offer their assistance to the Spanish admiral in his opera-
tion against Algiers — a course which put them in a position
to see that his Armada was not used against Venice or for
any other undesirable object.- The Grand Duke of Tus-
cany, who was to provide a contingent for the Spanish
fleet, was immediately informed by Salvetti, his agent in
London, of what was going on in the English dockyards.
The King, he wrote, had ordered a fleet to be equipped
as soon as possible, so as to sail at any moment. It was
to join with twenty-four Dutchmen and enter the Mediter-
ranean on pretence of operating against the pirates, but
really to keep an eye on Spain. Everything indeed assures
us that this was the main object of the armament. In a
minute which Coke wrote at this time, recommending
greater secrecy in Admiralty business, the trend of oflicial
' CarUton Letters, 136, 143, June 4; 324, July 7, 1617, and cf. ib.
p. 491.
^ Gardiner, iii. 289.
92 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1619
opinion is quite clear. ' In this preparation against
pirates,' he says, ' it may be conceived the State hath some
further design, and if it be governed by general vi^arrants
it will go slowly on. The gazetteers of Venice will take
notice of it, as they have done of our former propositions.
But if it be thought fit to carry it by the trust of a few
and by degrees, by this unexpected preparation his
Majesty's sea forces shall be redeemed from contempt ;
his present treaties with our neighbours shall have more
reputation ; foreign princes will with more respect proceed
in their attempts ; and if they find any interruptions in
their principal designs they shall not have the advantage
of our security and nakedness to redeem their honours by
falling on us.'
As we have seen, the preparation was already not an
entire secret, and unfortunately it was no more sudden
than secret. Cranfield's reform had not had time to show
effect, and mainly for want of money the mobilisation
proceeded very heavily. Contributions had been demanded
from the seaports, but they came in slowly. The fact
was, the English merchants, like the Dutch, had come to
some kind of arrangement with the pirates, and so deep
was their mistrust of the navy that they feared an attack
on Algiers would only end in failure and exasperate
the pirates without reducing their power. Moreover, the
general opinion was that the Spanish armament was really
intended to take advantage of the condition to which our
national defences had been reduced by the shortcomings
of the late administration, and from all the ports local
governors were crying for means to prepare the coast
defences against an invasion, while all over the country
the county forces were being specially mustered to prepare
them for mobilisation.
So great indeed was the financial difficulty that it pro-
1619 MAIN WAKING'S PEOPOSAL FROM VENICE 93
duced a most remarkable proposition to the Lord Admiral.
It came from Sir Henry Mainwaring, who had recently
returned from Venice, disgusted probably, like most other
people, with land service under the Kepublic, and sighing
for the excitement of his old life at sea. The Venetian
Ambassador, it appears, had been instructed by his Govern-
ment, who must have either mistrusted or been unaware
of James's secret intention, to apply to him for the loan
of some of the royal ships, and the Ambassador had asked
Mainwaring to feel the ground for him. Upon this he
applied to Buckingham. ' The Venetians' request to his
Majesty,' he wrote, ' is only for the loan of some of his
Majesty's ships, and they to bear the charge of waging
and victualling the men, giving security to restore and
repair them.' The Venetians had taken the most serious
alarm at the fleet that was gathering in the Spanish ports ;
and Mainwaring, whom the Venetians wished to com-
mand the proposed contingent, saw his way to turning
it to advantage. ' His Majesty,' he continued, ' may pre-
tend to lay down any suspicion of this [that is, the
Spanish] fleet in regard to himself, and therefore that he
will desist from fitting his own ships. But if the Vene-
tians will be at the charge, they may have orders to go
forth — with this commission, that if the Spanish fleet
bear in with the Straits they may follow them, and so
stand for the Gulf [of Venice], whither they will arrive
first, because the Spanish fleet must stop at Messina. If
the Spanish fleet go not to the southward, then the
Venetians have no need of a supply, and the ships are
ready to proceed on his Majesty's own designs. But if
the Spanish fleet should dissolve, the ships being forth
might be employed against the Turkish pirates.' ^
' S.P. Dam. 1619, cv. 148,
94 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1619
From this it is clear and worthy of note that what the
Venetians feared was not the galleys but the galleons
that were being fitted out in the Atlantic ports. Main-
waring's suggestion for meeting the whole situation was
as ingenious as his strategy was sound. It was practi-
cally the line the Dutch meant to take as preferable to
that approved by James. Indeed, their answer to the
English proposal was so unsatisfactory as to amount to a
virtual refusal. They objected with some force that
they had already twenty-five sail at sea, of which twenty-
one were employed against the pirates. As for attacking
Algiers, that would mean an act of war against ' the Sultan
of Constantinople,' with whom they were at peace, while
as for protecting Venice, that would amount to a breach
of their truce with Spain ; and, further, as they naively
explained, they were allowing the Venetians to fit out
four large men-of-war in Holland, although they had not
asked so much, and had agreed that they should keep
the eleven already in their service besides eight merchant-
men that were also in their pay. Such an answer of
course entirely upset James's great design, and notwith-
standing the temptation of the scheme which Mainwaring
had to offer in its place, it could not be thought of.
Buckingham's dignity, if not the King's, could not submit
to the hiring out of navy ships to a foreign power ; nor
could the Commissioners consent to a project which would
at the outset seriously disturb the programme they had
taken office to carry through.
To confirm the impossibility of proceeding with the
King's original scheme, no satisfactory answer had yet
been received from Spain with regard to the proposed
joint operations, and, even if it came, such was the
feeling at the time, both in Court and the country, that
it became clearer every day that it was out of the ques-
1619 SPAIN GIVES WAY 95
tion to expect Englishmen to act harmoniously with
Spaniards. Fortunately, the deadlock mattered little.
The King's astute design appears already to have done its
work, and just about the time that the final answer of
the Dutch was received, news arrived from Cottington,
the British envoy in Madrid, that the Spanish prepara-
tions were at an end. The tidings have a special interest
of their own. The formation of a galley fleet was cer-
tainly not suspended, and here, therefore, we have another
proof of how obsolete galleys had become in the eyes of
the Northern powers. They were clearly regarded as a
negligible quantity. The whole apprehension had been
for the sailing vessels which had been getting ready in
the oceanic ports. Still the English preparations were
not immediately relaxed. It was given out that Lord
Southampton, the arch-enemy of Spain, was to be offered
the command of the proposed fleet. It was not till April
that the work on the ships was finally suspended, the col-
lection stopped, and the money returned to the merchants
on the understanding it was to be ready at short notice,
in case the mobilisation had to be revived.
The news that Cottington had sent was true. The
Spanish Government, whatever their original intentions
may have been, were now devoting their whole energy to
removing the great flaw in their position by crushing the
pirates. A fleet of sixty galleys assembled at Messina
under the incompetent Prince Philibert of Savoy, on
whose employment Philip relied for checking the designs
of his turbulent father.' The objective was Navarino,
the most westerly naval station of the Turks ; but, accord-
ing to Italian historians, the Duke of Osuna, in his
jealousy of doing anything that would strengthen the
' Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy was the son of Charles Emmanuel, the
reigning Duke, by the Infanta Catherine, sister of Philip III. of Spain,
96 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1619
position of the Venetians, succeeded in diverting the
expedition into attempting a surprise of the port of
Susa below Tunis. The attack failed ignominiously, and
Philibert was driven off with severe loss. Nor did the
ofalleons effect much more in the ocean. The annual
convoys were safely brought in, but only two pirate
vessels were taken, and so ended the campaign, leaving
the corsairs as powerful as before, and even more confi-
dent. James's stalking-horse was as good as ever, and
there was every sign of its shelter being shortly required.
The Emperor Mathias was dead, and Ferdinand of
Styria claimed to succeed him as King of Bohemia, in virtue
of his previous election. In August he was also elected
Emperor, and the revolutionary Government in Bohemia,
seeing the mistake they had made in choosing a Catholic
King, determined not to receive him. By a solemn vote
of the Estates he was deposed, and Frederick, the Prince
Palatine, elected in his place. For a while James's
feather-headed son-in-law hesitated. Almost every one
advised him to refuse so thorny and dangerous a seat ;
but his fair and high-spirited English wife urged him to
accept, being sure of her father's support ; and finally he
took the rash step that was his downfall. For long the
elements that went to make up the Thirty Years' War
had been smouldering hotter and hotter. This last touch
set all in a glow, and at any moment men looked to see
the flames burst out in uncontrollable fury. For all her
long intriguing Spain was unready for the moment. Her
one idea still was to keep the Enghsh sea power neutral.
The mediation into which to this end she had tempted
James had failed, and there was nothing left but to let
herself be drawn into the net which he had so cleverly
spread in her path. She could resist the pressure no
longer, and a few days before the Prince Palatine's elec-
1619 THE OLD GAME REVIVED 9?
tion preliminaries had been signed which accepted in
principle the idea of joint action with England against
the pirates. Instead of neutralising the dreaded force,
she had opened the gate to admit it into the last place
where she would like to have seen it. That arch-in-
triguer and opportunist, the Duke of Savoy, with his
eyes always on Genoa and Milan, was encouraging the
Prince Palatine in his wildest dreams, and just when the
two places were most vital to Spain for her communi-
cations with the Emperor, she saw them once more
threatened with a storm out of the North Sea.
At the close of the year news reached England that
Frederick had actually been crowned King of Bohemia.
The people were wild with delight, and James, torn
between anxiety and indignation, allowed the collections
for a fleet against the Barbary pirates, which had been
stopped in April, to be re-opened. At the end of October
he had received from Holland the long-deferred answer to
his original proposals for a league against the corsairs.
With many excuses for the delay, the States informed him
they had decided not to ratify the treaty which their
consul had made at Algiers. They had now ready for
sea a squadron of fourteen sail under Moy Lambert, of
Kotterdam, that was about to cruise against the common
enemy, and they intended to relieve him in the spring
with an equal force. So long as their resources lasted,
they meant to continue the efforts against the Moslem
pest, but without his Majesty's powerful hand they saw
small appearance of utterly suppressing it. 'Wherefore
they humbly besought him to show himself therein, as
well by good effects in arming against the pirates as he
had done by his advice and counsel to their own State.' ^
' Carleton Letters, p. 397, October 22, 1619.
VOL. I. H
98 THE XAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1620
Of this appeal little notice appears to have been taken.
Although the maintenance of a permanent Mediterranean
squadron which the Dutch proposed was exactly what
all the English experts advised, James was too much
incensed with the cold reception with which the Dutch
had greeted the proposal, when he himself was hot about
it, to treat them with much respect. Now, however, that
the war fever about him was growing so high, he appears
to have thought it best, as they said, ' to show himself
therein,' and he began in royal style. In January 1620
it was announced that Sir Robert Mansell, Vice- Admiral
of the Kingdom and Lieutenant of the Royal Navy, was
to command the fleet, and for his second he was to have
the famous Sir Richard Hawkins, Vice-Admiral of Devon,
the personification of all the finest traditions of the Eliza-
bethan service. For moral effect no better choice could
have been made. The official rank of Mansell would give
the necessary dignity, while for Spanish seamen there lay
in the name Hawkins terrors which made it second only
to that of Drake.
As for the fleet itself, it was serious enough to justify the
anxiety that was felt in Spain. It was to consist of six
of the best ships in the royal navy, ten powerful merchant-
men, and two pinnaces, or eighteen sail in all.^ It was
months, however, before the Navy Commissioners were
allowed to get to work. The winter passed away and they
were still without definite orders to proceed. For James,
as for Elizabeth, it was one thing to decide on mobilising
a fleet, and another to let it sail. Through the early part
of 1620 he continued to sit in a fever of irresolution as to
what attitude he should take to his son-in-law's position.
As the opposing parties and opposing anxieties pushed
' See post, p. 114.
1620 JAMES'S lERESOLUTION 99
him this way and that, he was worried beyond bearing
and strove pitiably to put off a decision like a Penelope by
sitting down to an exhaustive study of Bohemian con-
stitutional law from the earliest times. By the end of
January Philip, who feared war as much as James himself,
had finally given in to the Duke of Bavaria's proposals
for the partition of the Palatinate. This was followed
in February by the arrival in London of Ambassadors
from the German Protestant Union to claim James's
assistance in defending the threatened State. At first he
was furious at being called upon to help the reckless son-
in-law who had refused to listen to his advice, but gradually
he began to give way. There was also in London a
certain Scottish soldier of fortune, a Colonel Gray, who
had come from Bohemia in search of troops, and had
brought with him not only letters from Frederick and the
King's daughter, but also one written in pleading terms
by his little grandson.^ It seems greatly to have affected
the old King, and Gray soon obtained permission to raise
two regiments — one in England and one in Scotland.
The war party was triumphant. At last it seemed
they had the upper hand, when in the midst of their
rejoicing Gondomar once more landed at Dover. Having
been dragged into the struggle himself Philip was more
than ever resolved that James and his navy must be
kept out of it, and Gondomar's influence was his last
hope. Every one knew what he had come for. He was
met by Sir Henry Mainwaring, who not long after his
return from Venice had been made Lieutenant of Dover
Castle, probably to keep him quiet, and there he was
sitting like a watchdog at the gate of the kingdom, allow-
ing nothing to escape his keen eye. The Ambassador's
Mar. 6.
Salvetti, ^^
H 2
100 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1620
reception was of the coldest. There was no salute and
no banquet, but Mainwanng went down to the beach to
receive him, ' for which courtesy,' as the reformed pirate
wrote, ' he said in jest he would excuse me twelve crowns
out of the million I owed to Spaniards if I would pay the
rest.' A courtly jest enough, but one that showed the
fangs, and so the two dogs growled and bristled, and
Gondomar passed on. Colonel Gray's drums were beating
merrily for the new regiments when he reached London,
re-echoing those in the Spanish Netherlands, where
Spinola was mobilising the Archduke's forces for what
every one felt was an invasion of the Palatinate. Gray
even halted insolently under the Ambassador's very
window, and, amid the jeers of a sympathetic crowd,
cried for all true men who would serve the King's son-in-
law to come to the place appointed. In the night his
broadside was even fixed to the Embassy door. But all
was of small avail. In a week the King was again in the
hollow of Gondomar 's hand, and the prospect of the fleet
sailing for the Mediterranean seemed as far off as ever.
If James wished to be a peacemaker he was letting
his great opportunity slip. As the long truce between
Spain and the Dutch was drawing to an end, Philip was
no less disturbed than James at the prospect of war. He
was wholly unprepared, and during the previous summer
had had the most serious cause for anxiety about his
position in the Mediterranean. The Duke of Osuna was
still in power at Naples, and he was known to be chafing
dangerously at the way the Government had treated his
brilliant efforts to restore Spanish prestige upon the sea.
The enforced failure of his grand scheme had been fol-
lowed by orders to send troops by way of Trieste to rein-
force the Emperor for his operations against Bohemia,
and to get them there quietly he had been told that the
1620 WAR IMMINENT 101
permission of the Venetians was to be asked. He was
also ordered to replace the troops in the Milanese, which
were going by land to the Netherlands under the Duke of
Savoy's sanction, with the best of his own, and, worst of
all, there was fresh talk of breaking up his fleet. His
term of office was coming to an end, but there was grave
anxiety whether he would lay it down quietly. In July a
report had reached London that he had actually revolted
and set up an independent kingdom at Naples in alliance
with France and Venice. For some weeks this news,
which, if true, would have entirely changed the balance
of power in the Mediterranean, was the talk of the town.^
Nothing, however, came of the alarm, but it was quickly
followed by the discovery of a league between Venice
and Holland which was almost as bad. Every week the
atmosphere grew more warlike, and James, beside himself
with irresolution, was blubbering to Gondomar over his
hard fate to be king in such a world. Philip, as anxious
as himself, was writing in the most serious terms to the
Archduke in Brussels to warn him against the danger he
was running in meddling with the Bohemian quarrel. If
his general, Spinola, were permitted to attack the Pala-
tinate, it would mean certain war with England, and
that, as Philip urged, had always been considered the
most impolitic thing a Spanish king could take in hand.
Still of this James knew nothing. At Deptford and
Chatham little or nothing was being done to prepare the
fleet till suddenly in the first week in April, just a month
after Gondomar's landing, the Navy Commissioners re-
ceived orders to push on the work with all speed.^ The
reason of the sudden change is not quite clear. Salvetti
believed that it was because Osuna, whose fleet, to prevent
' Salvetti, July 4-9. - Coke MSS., p. 107.
102 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1620
a recurrence of the late alarm, had been broken up, had
been ordered to send some of his galleons to Cadiz. ^ It
is also worthy of note that, a few days later, Mainwaring
at Dover sent up word that transports carrying some
two thousand Spanish troops had touched there, bound
for the Archduke's port of Dunkirk. But, whatever the
cause, from that time the dockyards were in full swing.
The King might be a baby in Gondomar's hands, but it
was another task to control the powerful war party at
Court. Alread}^ Gondomar had had a rebuff to warn him.
Captain Eoger North, one of Ealegh's old companions,
had fitted out a small expedition for South America
in which several influential persons were interested.
The Amazons was said to be its destination, and the
Ambassador had demanded its arrest. North had already
left the Thames ; but about the same time that the Navy
Commissioners received their instructions to proceed with
the fleet, Gondomar received an order under the Great
Seal that North was to be stayed at Plymouth. A
month later, news came that North had sailed before the
order reached him. Gondomar was naturally incensed.
To appease him a proclamation against the offender was
issued and a royal pinnace sent in pursuit of him. Of
course it never found him. It was like the old times of
Hawkins and Drake over again, when such escapades
were of yearly occurrence, and the prospects of the war
party grew brighter than ever.
When in April Salvetti announced to his Government
that the fleet was to be mobilised, he had said he was
sure it could not be ready for sea under two or three
months. It really took longer, partly for lack of money,
' News Letter, April 21 to May 1. Three of Osuna's galleons left Naples
on April R 18 and reached Gibraltar May 20-30. Documentos Iniditos,
xlvii. 41H-19.
1620 GONDOIMAR ORSTEUCTS 103
and partly perhaps because it was not intended that it
should sail before August. The fact was that Gondomar,
to whom the unwelcome negotiations for the combined
operations against the corsairs had been confided, was
doing everything in his power to render them abortive.
The principle of the arrangement was that each countrj^
was to provide a fleet of twenty sail which were to keep
the seas from May till October for three years, and
Gondomar was stipulating for a system of co-operation
which he must have known would never be accepted by
the English seamen. The fleets were to act in two sepa-
rate squadrons, one within and one without the Straits ;
and as James insisted on his own fleet taking the Medi-
terranean station, Gondomar was proposing, with the
obvious intention of keeping a watch on it and neu-
tralising its initiative, that six vessels from the Spanish
squadron should be attached to it, and that their place
should be filled by six British ships being placed under
the Spanish admiral for service with him outside the
Straits. He further desired, with an equally obvious in-
tention of gaining time, that the British fleet, instead of
going straight to its allotted station, should begin opera-
tions with a cruise on the north coast of Spain. ^
To all appearance Spain was perfectly ready to abide
by her promise. Osuna's galleons had come round to
Cadiz, and a fleet was out ostensibly awaiting the arrival
of the English squadron. But it was understood in Spain
that Mansell would not move till every detail w^as settled ;
and secure in Gondomar' s skill the Spanish Government
was easy that nothing could be done for that season at
least. Towards the end of May, however, they were sur-
' Aston MSS. vol. ii. (i3.il/. Add. 36445) fol. 11. Copy of Articles for
joint action dr. These articles recite the original negotiations of Digby in
1617.
104 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1620
prised by a sudden announcement from Sir Walter Aston,
James's new Ambassador at Madrid, that Sir Eobert
Mansell would sail about the end of July, and that in the
meanwhile he had instructions to settle with them the
small points of detail which were still outstanding. The
King his master hoped, in spite of the differences that
had arisen, co-operation could be arranged, but in any case
he meant to carry the pirate business through. The
ministers were aghast. They protested it was never in-
tended that the English fleet should move till everything
had been settled. They even accused the Ambassador of
having sent for the ships, and on the plea that the matter
was in Gondomar's hands they flatly refused to negotiate.
All was in vain. Their sullen resistance only brought
them a still severer shock. About a month later, after
having reported their attitude home, Aston received
instructions to inform the Spanish Government that
James had made up his mind to undertake the pirates
single-handed. Their position was completely turned, and
ten days afterwards Buckingham notified to Gondomar
officially that Mansell would sail between August 5 and 10,
and go straight to the Mediterranean.^ The following
day, July 20, Mansell's commission as Admiral and Cap-
tain-General was signed, and though the dockyards were
already working at high pressure, the King sent down
to urge still greater efforts, since he particularly wanted
the fleet to be at Plymouth by August 10.^
' Aston MSS. vol. i. (Add. 36444) Digby to Aston, May 19. Aston to
Digby in reply, fol. 156, and Aston's Letter Book, ibid. vol. vi. July 9.
Buckingham to Gondomar (copy), ibid. vol. i. July 19.
^ Salvetti (News Letter, July 20-30 and July 27 to Aug. 6-7) says the
rendezvous of the fleet was ' a distant port about eighty miles from here,'
i.e. London. His distances are so vague that this is no guide. He calls
Windsor a town sixteen or eighteen miles from London. Plymouth was
always the final rendezvous of south-going fleets. In a later letter of
Aug. 2-12 he calls the port ' Beroclia in the province of Hamptonia.'
1620 MANSELL LEAVES THE THAMES 105
The only explanation of this date to be found is that
two Dutch squadrons were on the point of saiHng for
their usual station off the Straits. There was no actual
arrangement for joint operations, nor much prospect of
the seamen of the two nations acting cordially together,
owing to the outrageous way in which, in spite of the late
treaties, the Dutch continued to behave to English ships in
the Far East. Yet experts agreed that the best way to
deal with the corsairs was to have two squadrons cruising
outside the Straits and two within, and further that
August or September was the best time for them to reach
the station so as to allow the pirate fleet to leave the
Mediterranean for its usual cruise for the Spanish autumn
convoys and to prevent its ever getting back.^ It may, how-
ever, be also noticed that at the same time Digby received
orders to hold himself in readiness to receive his final
instructions as Ambassador Extraordinary to Spain, and at
such a moment even the apparent co-operation of the two
powers in Spanish waters would not be without its value.^
Finally, it was not till September 7 that the fleet got
clear of the Thames and came to anchor in the Downs —
behind time it is true, but not more so than was usual even
in the best days of Elizabeth. The Dutch were as much
behindhand as the English. On August 8 Carleton at the
Hague had sent over wdrd that a deputation of the States
had waited on him to say that they were going to send a
fleet of twenty sail against the Algerines under Haultain,
Admiral of Zeeland, which was to sail early in October.
As the King was doing the same, they hoped the two
fleets might act as one, and if he consented they were
' See Monson's advice to the Council, 1617, Tracts, p. 251. And cf.
' Advice of a Seaman (Math. Knott, gent.), touching the expedition intended
against the Turkish Pirates, 1634,' Harl. MSS. 6893.
2 Salvetti, July 20-30. Digby did not in fact leave England till the
following year, and then not for Spain.
106 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 1620
ready to instruct their officers accordingly. To this
humble proposal the King returned an equally conde-
scending answer. He reminded them of the coldness
with which they had received a similar proposal when he
was graciously pleased to make it, and of their outrageous
behaviour to his subjects in the East Indies. Still, if
they really were in earnest, in the cause of Christendom
he was ready to forget and forgive. Only they had to
some extent lost their chance. He was now sending his
fleet into the Mediterranean under a definite agreement
with the King of Spain. He was no longer free to make
engagements with other states for assistance. Still, if the
two fleets did happen to meet, he for his part would not
refuse their help in so good a cause. ^
The two fleets did happen to meet, and that very
quickly. In the Downs Mansell found a squadron of six-
teen Zeeland ships under Haultain. Twenty more from
Holland were daily expected, but they intended to sail
independently because, although they were commanded
by a vice-admiral only, they would not sail under a
Zeeland admiral, nor would the Zeeland admiral give up
the prerogative of his superior rank. The wind was foul
and Mansell seized the opportunity to come up to London
with all liis captains to bid the King farewell and also to
seek final instructions as to how he was to act. This was
probably the main reason. Mansell's commission con-
templated, as the central operation, a demand of satisfac-
tion, supported by a demonstration before Algiers, and
to be followed in certain eventualities by an attempt to
destroy their ships within the mole. The Dutch, on the
other hand, like all the English experts, condemned the
attempt, and were unanimously in favour of achieving
' Carlctoii Letters, pp. 48.5, 4'Jl.
1620 A CRITICAL DELAY 107
their end by systematic cruising in the open sea. Thus
the two admirals must have found themselves from the
outset faced with a difficulty which, unless removed,
would render concerted action almost impossible. There
was, moreover, the further uncertainty that Gondomar
was still holding back, and no definite agreement had been
come to with Spain. The King was at Windsor, and it
was a week or more before Mansell and his troop of
captains regained the fleet. They brought with them full
and detailed instructions for the conduct of the expedition,
but in the interval they had missed a wind, and the Dutch
had apparently passed on.^
Then followed weeks of waiting. No news came up
from Plymouth that the fleet had finally sailed. It was
a critical delay. The splendid equipment of the ships,
wherein, as Salvetti wrote, not even music for dancing
was omitted, and the glittering appearance of Mansell
and his cavalcade of captains had set every one whisper-
ing that something more than pirates was in the wind.
Some believed the Court was waiting for news from
Germany which might change the fleet's destination.
Others scented the influence of the Spanish Ambassador.
Neither opinion was perhaps groundless. A different
destination for the two fleets had actually been suggested
from Holland — not officially, but privately by a member
of the Government — probably with the intention of feeling
the ground. The King, ' according to his wonted sin-
cerity,' chose to appear highly displeased at the proposal,
and Carleton had orders to express ' his Majesty's dishke
and detestation thereof.' What the obnoxious design
was we do not know, but the Spanish Governor of Milan
' Salvetti, Letters of September. The Journal of the Algiers Voyage,
S.P. Dam. ccxxii. 70. Mansell's instructions are dated Sept. 10. See iwst
pp. 115-6.
108 THE NAVY AND THE PALATINATE 16i^0
was already stirring about the head of Lake Como with
the obvious intention of securing, by the seizure of the
Valtelline, an all-Spanish hne of communication with
Vienna by way of the Tyrol, and the way by which his
move could best be parried was a blow at Genoa, the key
of the whole route.
As for the part Gondomar was playing, he had suc-
ceeded in confirming the King in his faint-hearted ideas.
He had persuaded him that his duty to his daughter and
his son-in-law extended only to preserving the Palatinate,
and not to supporting their usurpation of Bohemia ; and
further that Spinola's army, which was already in motion,
was only intended to support the Emperor's just claims
to the disputed kingdom. James indeed was getting
more dangerously irresolute than ever. Then, in spite of
Gondomar's shameless assurances, came the news that
Spinola had actually entered the Palatinate. James was
naturally beside himself at the way he had been gulled,
and the guilty Ambassador was at his wit's end. From
Madrid he had been receiving more urgent orders than
ever that Mansell's fleet must on no account be allowed
to sail, and here was his royal dupe quite out of hand.
The infuriated old King was openly declaring he was going
to send an army to his son-in-law's rescue, and the Court
was exulting at the prospect of war in the spring.
Gondomar's last hope lay in Digby. Among all the
diverse hands that wore stirring the seething caldron there
was none so masterly as his. No man had kept his head
so level or seen his way so clearly how to preserve the
peace of Europe with honour and distinction. If any
hope in that wave of war fever were to be found, it was
in him, and to him Gondomar played his last card. In
pursuance of the King of Spain's agreement for joint
action against the pirates, it had been settled that Man-
1620 GONDOMAE'S LAST CAKD 109
sell's fleet was to be allowed the free use of Spanish ports.
Gondomar now explained that, in view of the King's
hostile attitude, this could not be permitted. An English
fleet could no longer be regarded as friendly. It was a
clever move, but Digby was equal to it. He pointed out
that in the excited state of public opinion the King could
not possibly have said less than he had. If Gondomar
chose to regard the royal declaration otherwise than as
a friendly effort to amuse his anti- Spanish councillors
and to preserve peace, it could not be helped, and if he
had authority to break with England he had better say
so at once. For whatever the King of Spain thought of
the fleet, it would certainly sail. It was impossible for
the baffled Ambassador to say another word. With Digby
in this frame of mind he knew it was useless to protest
further. On October 3 Sir Eichard Hawkins received his
commission as vice-admiral, and a week later, just when
the Spaniards were comfortably assuring themselves the
danger was over for the season, and had recalled their
fleet into Cadiz for the winter, with no prospect of being
able to get to sea again before the spring, Mansell cleared
the Lizard.*
' Aston to Digby, Oct. 13. For the other authorities on these nego-
tiations, see Gardiner, History of England, iii. 374-5, note. Add. MSS.
3G444.
CHAPTER VIII
MANSELL IN THE MEDITEREANEAN
' In James's unhappy reign,' the highest authority on the
period has written, ' the true poHcy of England is to be
found, not in the manifestoes of its sovereign or in the
despatches of its ministers, but in the memorials in which
Spanish statesmen expressed their apprehension.' As we
watch Europe drifting like an ill-steered ship into the
whirlpool of the Thirty Years' "War, our attention is again
and again arrested at points where it seems that a little
vigorous and intelligent action on the part of England
might have arrested its fatal course. At no point is this
consideration so striking as when Mansell put to sea,
bound for the Mediterranean. It was the eleventh hour,
it is true. Long before the fleet reached its destination
the battle of Prague had been fought and the Prince Pala-
tine was a fugitive from his new Bohemian dominions.
Still there was time. Winter was at hand to stop further
military action ; it lay in Spain's power to say that the
quarrel must go no further, and Spain, helpless and
unprepared, was staring at what it would mean for her
upon the sea if she withheld the word to halt.
It is not by its fighting power that the importance of
Mansell's little fleet must be measured. For Spain, and
indeed for the Empire, it meant something more than
j the number of its crews and the power of its guns. For
Spain it raised the spectre with which she had been
haunted ever since Drake had first appeared upon her
1620 THE SPANISH DILEMMA 111
coasts — the spectre of an alliance between the infidel
corsairs and the heretic powers of the North. It was a
coalition she knew she dared not face ; it was a fear that
was not entirely without foundation. It may even be that
the suggestion, which on the eve of Mansell's departure
reached James from some exalted personage in Holland
and which he so deeply ' disliked and detested,' was some-
thing of this nature — something which would at least
have rendered the allied fleets independent of Spanish
ports. Every one knew of the as yet unratified conven-
tion which the Dutch had negotiated with the Barbary
states, and Englishmen who were scarcely less well treated
by them might easily do the same. Nor must it be for-
gotten that, when Drake and Norreys were aiming at an
occupation of Portugal, and again when Essex had posses-
sion of Cadiz, some steps had certainly been taken for using
Morocco as a base of supply, and the Christians' overtures
had been well received. It was these memories perhaps
that forced Philip into agreeing to allow his ports to be
used by Mansell's fleet. It would be like a thorn in his
side ; but better so than to see it acting from Africa. As
he well knew, his banished Moriscos were ready to
welcome with open arms any one that would help them to
their revenge on Spain, and the older race of corsairs were
scarcely less ready to avert the anger of the men who had
taught them their art and were all they feared upon the
sea. This was what the little fleet meant for Spain at a
moment when the battle of Prague had raised the war
fever in England to boiling point, and when the twelve
years' truce with the Dutch had not six months to live.
Nor does this aspect of the expedition represent for us
all its importance. Were it only for the poor results it
achieved, its fortunes would scarcely be worth following.
The dawn of England's career as a Mediterranean power
112 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1620
was as unpromising as her first attempts at colonisation.
There was no trace discernible of how it was destined to
press upon the world and force history into the channels
in which it flows to-day. Yet Mansell's fleet was the
beginning, and we must see in it the pale dawn of all
that it heralded. England was about to step into the
primeval arena upon which the greatest dramas of
dominion had found their catastrophe. It was here
upon the sea which the three continents embraced that
empire had broken empire since the ages began in un-
ending strife, and for the first time the British navy was
entering its bloodstained waters. For Englishmen at
least it proved to be one of the most momentous de-
partures in history, redeeming a contemptible reign from
much of its insignificance; and as we see the little
squadron thus trailing, as it were, a fiery wake behind it
across the Bay, it glows with an attraction too real and
too romantic for us not to linger a while over its fortunes.
The men to whom fell the unrealised distinction of
inaugurating the new era were probably the best at the
King's disposal. "With the two chief flag-officers the only
fault to be found was that neither of them had been
employed at sea for many years, Mansell not since 1604,
when he began his disastrous career as Treasurer of the
Navy, and Hawkins not since 1594, when he was taken
prisoner during his raid into the South Sea after fighting
for three days an overwhelmingly superior force. Since
then a quarter of a century had passed. In the interval he
had suffered in breach of the laws of war a long and harsh
imprisonment in Spain which had severely impaired his
health, and he was now nearly sixty years of age. His
appointment was no doubt partly due to the influence of
the merchants, a committee of whom, in accordance with
the precedent of Elizabeth's last years, was acting jointly
1620 THE ENGLISH FLAG-OFFICERS 113
with the Navy Commissioners in superintending the
expedition. He appears to have been highly esteemed
in the City, and in these cases the London merchants
usually expected to have the naming of the vice or rear
admiral in order to insure that their own ships at least
should not be entirely at the mercy of courtier officers.^
Possibly, too, he had the powerful support of the Prince
of Wales. Hawkins had just completed his ' Observa-
tions ' on his voyage into the South Sea, the most valu-
able work that had yet been written on the naval art,
and at his death in 1622 a dedication to Prince Charles
was found among his papers.^
The rear-admiral was Sir Thomas Button, who had
first brought himself into notice when in 1600 the
Spaniards occupied Kinsale. He then succeeded in boldly
holding the harbour with a single pinnace till reinforce-
ments arrived, and since then he had been almost con-
tinually employed against pirates in the Narrow Seas.
About 1612 he had been sent under the auspices of Prince
Henry on an expedition to explore the North-west pas-
sage, and had been so far successful as to establish the fact
that there was no western outlet from Hudson's Bay,
Latterly he had been serving as admiral on the Irish
station, and had thrown up his appointment at Mansell's
request, expecting to be made his vice-admiral — a claim
which after some demur he had handsomely surrendered
in Hawkins's favour. Among the ship commanders,
though several, like Sir Arthur Mainwaring, appear to
have been gentlemen of more spirit and influence than
knowledge or experience of their duties, there was a
leaven of the best type of Ealegh's men, like Samuel
' See Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. 13, 69, note. The Haivkins
Voyages (Hakluyt Society, 1878), Introd. p. xxxviii.
2 Ibid., pp. 85, 87.
VOL. I. I
114
MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
1620
Argall, just home from Virginia, and others hke Sir
John Fearne and Christopher Harris, who had recently
served a valuable apprenticeship as pirate captains them-
selves.^
For his conduct of the expedition Mansell's critics
have always treated him with merciless contempt. Their
cue is taken from Monson, who, with his usual haste and
lack of information, "acrimoniously condemned the cam-
paign from beginning to end. It may be doubted, how-
ever, whether the blame lay with the admirals. When
they returned home they excused their failure on the
ground * that the want of authority and their limited
commission was the cause of their ill success.' This, as
Monson allows, ' was afterwards admitted by all men ' ;
' The full list of the fleet as given in the Joiirnnl of the Algiers Voyage,
S.P. Dovi. ccxxii. 106, is as under : —
Guns
Tons
Men
Commanders
EoYAL Na%t:
' Lion ' . . . .
40
600
250
Sir R. Mansell.
' Vanguard ' . .
40
660
250
Sir R. Hawkins.
' Rainbow ' . . .
40
660
250
Sir T. Button.
' Constant lleforniation ' .
40
660
250
[Sir] Arth. Mainwaring.
' Antelope "...
34
400
160
Sir Hy. Palmer.
' Convertine ' .
36
500
220
Thos. Love.
Merchantmen :
' Golden Phcenix ' .
24
300
—
Sam. Argall.
' Samuel '
21
300
' '
Chris. Harris.
' Marygold '
21
260
Sir J. Fearne.
'Zoucli Pha-nix '•
26
280
—
John Penington.
' Barbary '.
18
200
—
Thos. Porter.
' Centurion ' .
22
200
—
Sir Fr. Tanfield.
' Primrose '
18
180
—
Sir John Hampden.
' Hercules '
24
300
—
Eusabey Cave.
' Neptune '
21
280
—
Robt. Haughton.
' Merchant Bonaventura '
23
260
—
John Chidley or Chud-
leigh.
' Restore ' (pinnace)
12
130
50
George Raymond.
' Marmaduke ' (pinnace) .
12
100
50
1
Thos. Hughes.
AU the merchantmen had iron guns, the R.N. brass,
was Ralegh's ' Destiny,' confiscated.
The ' Convertine '
1620 MANSELL'S INSTRUCTIONS 115
but he himself, in his ignorance of the dual object of the
expedition, treated the plea as absurd. Fortunately, after
nearly three centuries of oblivion, a copy of Mansell's in-
structions has come to light to secure him a fair hearing,
and to emphasise the injustice of condemning an admiral's
strategy without a full knowledge of the political con-
siderations that deflected it.^
Though in form they of course disclose nothing but
an intended campaign against the Barbary corsairs, they
are framed in such a way as to secure a diversion of the
expedition on the shortest possible notice. The admiral
is informed that his object is to extirpate pirates, especi-
ally in the Mediterranean, whither he is to go direct,
taking care to keep as close inshore down the coast of the
Peninsula as possible on the look-out for any communica-
tion the Ambassador at Madrid may send him. Though
no definite arrangement had been come to, he is to hold
good correspondence with the Spanish and Dutch fleets,
but on no account is he to intervene in their quarrels.
In complete disregard of Gondomar's proposals, he was
given Gibraltar for his rendezvous, whither he was to
proceed as quickly as possible and inquire for orders from
Aston. The plan of action enjoined also ignored the
suggestions for the fusion of the two fleets, for he
was told to leave the Atlantic station entirely to the
Spaniards, and take the whole of his force into the
Straits. Then we have the important caution that on
no account was he to attempt any hostile act against
the town or castles of Algiers * for fear of its strength
and the Grand Signior's amity.' He was to proceed
by diplomacy, presenting a letter from the King and
demanding the surrender of captured ships, the resti-
• Astmi Papers, vol. ii. f. 15 (Add. MSS. 36445). The instructions
were signed on Sept. 10, 1620, during Mansell's farewell visit to Windsor.
I 2
116 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1620
tution of prize goods, and the release of captives. If he
obtained this he might endeavour by force or stratagem
to burn the pirate fleet within the mole, but only with
great caution, so as not to hazard his Majesty's ships.
In cruising he was further cautioned that he was not to
go east of Cape Spartivento, at the southern end of
Sardinia, unless the weather or a chase compelled him.
It will be seen that this prohibition insured as far as
possible that his operations should not draw him out
of that part of the Mediterranean which lay between
Spain and her North Italian possessions, so that his
fleet might remain a constant menace if any attempt
were contemplated to send assistance to the Emperor
by sea. It is equally significant that he was not to risk
the fighting efficiency of his fleet by hazardous attacks
on pirate ports, and that he was, if possible, to obtain satis-
faction without fighting at all. Negotiations would not
only serve to keep up the pretence of stopping piracy,
but would tend to securing an African base should war
break out with Spain. Considering the state of affairs
abroad and of public opinion in England v/hen Mansell
sailed, nothing was more likely, and we may well be-
lieve that the English Government at such a time had
no intention of throwing away a fleet in rashly attack-
ing the most ruthless enemy of Spain. With these
considerations in mind we may follow the expedition
with more sympathy than its commanders have usually
received.
On October 29 the fleet made Cape St. Vincent,
where Mansell sent ashore for the ' letters of advice ' he
had been told to expect. He was burning for news. From
a ship that followed him he had learnt that, the very day
after he sailed, letters in hot haste had come into Plymouth
for him from the Court, and they were known to be of the
1620 MANSELL KEACHES THE STEAITS 117
utmost importance, for the messenger rode with a halter
round his neck.^ But there were no letters awaiting him,
and he passed at once to his rendezvous and anchored at
Gibraltar. Here he found the Spanish vice-admiral with
two galleons, and from him learnt that the pirates had
been particularly active, having recently sacked a small
Spanish port and threatened Gibraltar itself. But from
Aston there was not a word. He resolved to carry on,
and, in accordance with his instructions, arranged with
the Spanish officer to cruise within the Straits between
Gibraltar and Minorca, ' being ' as he says, ' the limits
of my charge,' while the Spaniards cruised outside.^
This was agreed to, and further that Mansell should be
allowed to land his sick men at Gibraltar and lodge them
in quarters specially prepared for them.
These arrangements completed, Mansell passed on to
Malaga, where he met with a most flattering reception
froih the authorities. Still it was the worst port in the
south-east of Spain, and it says little for the good faith of
the Spaniards, or their confidence in their allies, that it
had been fixed as the headquarters of the English fleet
while it was upon the coast. Here the Admiral hoped
for his final orders without fail, but not a line had come
for him nor a word of the Spanish contingent of oared
craft which he had been led to expect. After waiting a
day he decided to despatch an officer immediately to the
Ambassador at Madrid, and without further loss of time
to take a cast up the coast as far as Alicante in search of
the pirates who had been so active, and in hopes of finding
his instructions there. ^
On November 7 he sailed with the three squadrons of
' Mansell to Aston, Nov. 5. Aston Pai:iers, vol. i.
2 Mansell to Calvert, March 15, 1621. S.P., Spain.
' Mansell to Aston, Nov. 5. Aston Papers, i.
118 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1620
his fleet disposed in echelon and his starboard and sea-
ward squadron advanced, while the few light craft he had
kept close inshore to probe the bays and inlets. Baffling
winds were encountered, and it was not till the 19th
that he made Alicante without having seen a single
pirate sail. It was clear his presence must have frightened
them from the coast. At Alicante there was still not a
line to guide him, and he despatched yet another officer
to Cartagena. Nothing is more eloquent of the uncertain
object of the expedition than this incessant anxiety for
orders. There was still no news of the Spanish con-
tingent, and the Dutch fleet, he heard, having reached
Gibraltar after he had left and learned his arrangement
with the Spanish admiral, had passed on to Tunis and the
Levant. He was thus at a loss what to do ; but rather
than be idle it was resolved, perhaps not too wisely, to
sail at once for Algiers in order to present the King's
demands, and in doing so to make a full reconnaissance
of the whole position.
There they anchored on November 27 with ' white
ensigns flying from the poops of the Admiral and Kear-
Admiral,' but without showing other colours or firing
any salute. In reply to a flag of truce they were informed
that the Pasha had orders from Constantinople to treat
with them and furnish supplies. With that negotiations
began, and the King's letter was presented. It demanded
the immediate surrender of all British prisoners, ships,
and goods then in the port, and satisfaction for the
hundred and fifty vessels the corsairs had taken or de-
stroyed during the past six years. The answer was that
no reply could be given till the Divan had been sum-
moned, and that would take a week. Mansell decided to
wait, and so far was he from intending any hostilities that,
in view of the dangerous nature of the Koad, he struck his
1620 SPANISH SUSPICION OF MANSELL 119
topmasts and yards, and made all snug to ride out the
negotiations, which threatened to be not a little tedious.
No sooner was he thus helpless than vessels began to
pass in and out continuously. Having lost all his ' long-
boats ' in a gale, and being without regular pinnaces, he
was powerless to interfere, and he soon ascertained that
the Algerines were busy forcing all their best English
prisoners aboard and sending them out to sea. Mansell
protested, and the corsairs promised to desist, but with
no intention of doing so.
Meanwhile six Spanish men-of-war appeared. They
excused their intrusion into the English sphere of opera-
tions by alleging that they were in chase of some pirates
who had recently taken a large ship off Cartagena ; but
Mansell was well aware this was not their real object.
Six vessels, it will be remembered, was the contingent
which Gondomar had demanded should be attached to
the British squadron, and there can be no doubt that they
had been sent to see what Mansell was doing. Finding
him quietly anchored in the road and in constant com-
munication with the shore, their worst suspicions were
aroused. The haunting fear that England meant to
ally herself with the corsairs hurried them to the convic-
tion that they had caught Mansell in the act of hatching
the dreaded plot. In hope apparently of provoking
hostilities they opened fire on the batteries of Algiers,
but finding this without effect they retired, and without
further inquiry held away for Spain to report Mansell's
treachery.'
Meanwhile, without suspicion of what were the
Spaniards' unhandsome intentions, Mansell loyally pro-
ceeded with his negotiation. The following day the answer
1 Mansell to Aston, .Jan. 13, 1621. Aston Papers, vol. ii.
120 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1620
to the King's demands was received. It promised to de-
liver up the prisoners and begged for the appointment of
a consul to settle the other demands. On the morrow
forty miserable wretches were sent off, and the admirals
saw clearly they were being played with. They resolved,
therefore, in order to secure the return of their hostages,
and perhaps lull the Algerines into security, to send off
a common man who was willing to play the part of
Consul. They had ascertained that the English prizes,
instead of being prepared for delivery, were being un-
rigged and unloaded, and that, in spite of the engage-
ment, English prisoners had been continually forced to
sea. Clearly more drastic measures would be needed, and
after a vigorous protest to the Pasha they held away for
Cagliari in Sardinia. Their object was probably merely
to get wood and water, for on the wind coming easterly
they put about for Minorca, and on December 14 anchored
there in Alcudia Bay, fuming at the instructions which
forced them to play so tame a part.
It was indeed a lame beginning, and it is impossible
not to believe their angry protestation that they would
never have been contented to be so baffled had their in-
structions permitted a rougher answer. They were men,
we must remember, who had given plenty of hard blows
before, who had come out in the pride and prestige
of the new sea power, and surrounded by all the splen-
dour and dignity of the King's service, to show Dutch-
men and Spaniards once for all how the vermin of the
sea were to be stamped out. They had been insulted
and abused, so they said, as never were the bearers of
a royal message before. They thirsted for revenge, and,
had the least discretion been allowed them, they would
certainly have done something to take it there and
then. As it was, all they could do was to send home for
1620 NEW PLANS 121
authority to act with vigour and leave to remain out for
another period of six months.^
Meanwhile they had no intention of remaining idle.
Since they entered the Mediterranean they had learned
enough to know how to occupy themselves profitably
in the interval. The idea was for the main fleet, as
soon as it had revictualled and watered and picked up the
supplies and pinnaces which had been promised from
England, to return to cruise off Algiers. There it would
lie in wait while the pinnaces and promised Spanish
oared craft beat up the coast and drove the corsairs into
its clutches. They had learned already it was only in the
open sea and stormy w^eather — when they had a whole
day to chase, ' and so much wind as to overbear them
with sail ' — that they could hope to catch the nimble
pirates. On Christmas night, as they passed from Alcudia
to Alicante, still hoping for orders, they had actually
fallen into the middle of a corsair squadron. It was a
squally night, and Button had caught one of them within
musket shot. Several times he raked her through and
through. The crash of her timbers and the screams of
the wounded could be heard in the darkness again and
again, yet she and all her consorts escaped. In those
confined seas, as Mansell complained, the corsairs could
sail the royal ships out of sight in four hours.
The plan proposed might possibly have overcome the
difficulty, but it was not destined to be tried. At Alicante
there was still no news, and while they lay there at a loss
how to act they had to witness the Spaniards boisterously
celebrating the battle of Prague and the dethronement
' Mansell to Buckingham, Alicante, January 18, 1621, Harleian MSS.
1581, f. 70. See also a memorandum concerning proposals for giving him
a freer hand, especially ' for his night attempts and for his day battery,'
and extending his cruising ground as far east as Cephalonia, in S.P. Dom.
cxix. 144.
122 MANSELL IX TJIE MEDITERRANEAN 1620
of their own Princess Eoyal. It was a poor substitute
for the galleys they expected, and relations between the
shore and the ships were far from pleasant. Their
annoyance was further aggravated by finding the pre-
viousl}^ cordial demeanour of the Spaniards had changed
to a barely disguised insolence. The ugly report of the
Spanish admiral had done its work, and Mansell saw no
chance of getting the assistance he required for chastising
the arrogance of Algiers. He wrote a strong protest to
Aston explaining the whole affair, and begging him to put
things right. He assured the Ambassador that, ' contrary
to ill-informed opinion of its strength,' Algiers might easily
be destroyed by bombardment. He had written to the
Lord Admiral to sanction the attempt. All he required
was a contingent of galleys and smaller oared craft.
' If,' he said, ' the Spaniards will give us the means as by
the capitulations agreed, we will give a greater blow in a
day this next spring than all Christendom has done with
all their endeavours since the pirates first began to make
head.' '
Meanwhile, in spite of the ill-behaviour of the
Spaniards, he resolved to do his best to protect their
commerce ; but, though detachments of the fleet were
continually putting to sea on tidings of pirates being
about, not a single vessel was seen, much less captured.
It was not till the second week in January 1621 that the
longed-for despatches arrived, just as Mansell was writing
off again pleading more earnestly than ever for an enlarge-
ment of his powers, so as to cover his intended attack
on Algiers harbour. They were dated from England on
' Mansell to Aston, Jan. 13, 1621, and unolher later unilated, Aston
Papers, vol. ii. Mansell seems to have thought that a ' capitulation ' had been
signed, but the paper he inclosed is only a copy of Gondoniar's draft pro-
posals with the English counter-proposals in the margin. Aston's report
on thr" Spanish admirars accaisation, ibid. IHG.
ltJ21 HIS INSTRUCTIONS ENLARGED 123
November 23, and informed him that he was to continue
in the Mediterranean for another six months, and that his
pinnaces and victuals were coming to Malaga. Hawkins
and his squadron were immediately sent thither to receive
them and cover that coast till they arrived, while Mansell
and Button between them watched Cartagena and Alicante.
Still no prizes were met with, and at the end of the month
Mansell gave orders for the whole fleet to concentrate on
Hawkins at Malaga. On the way thither he fell in with
Haultain, the Zeeland Admiral, with seven sail in com-
pany. The truce between Spain and Holland was on the
point of expiring, and nothing definite had yet been done
to secure its prolongation. A renewal of the war was looked
for in a few weeks, and Haultain said he had twenty-two
vessels in all cruising within and without the Straits.
Eager to deal the pirates a blow while the truce lasted,
he proposed a joint attack upon Algiers, but this Mansell
says he refused ; and yet so suspicious were the Spaniards
that he was immediately accused of conspiring some
new perfidy with the Dutch. ^ Next day he and Button
were driven back to Alicante and did not sail again for
a week. In the interval Button, active as ever, got in
another week's cruise, but still without result. When
finally they made Malaga, it was only to be driven to lee-
ward of it and to be compelled to bear up for Gibraltar, and
there Hawkins joined in the middle of February with the
long expected victuallers and two royal pinnaces. Still
Mansell found it impossible to carry out the design as he
wished. Without more pinnaces or the Spanish oared
contingent, of which nothing had been heard, it would
not work, and he resolved to stay cruising where he was,
between Gibraltar and Ceuta, till he heard again from
' Mansell to Aston. Aston Papers, ii. 1-52.
124 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1621
England. For nearly a month he held the station with
squadrons on either side of the Straits while he himself
visited Tetuan and endeavoured to wring some satisfac-
tion from the authorities there ; but they were as obdu-
rate as at Algiers, and two prizes were all that fell to his
captains' luck.
Meanwhile Aston had succeeded in demonstrating to
the Government at Madrid the falsity of the charges
against Mansell, and had been able to assure him that
the promised squadron of galleys was to meet him at
Alicante, as well as three brigantines or light galleys
from Valencia. To Alicante therefore he hurried, staying
on his way to victual at Malaga. It was not till the
end of March that he reached his destination, and no
galleys were there. It was hardly likely they would be.
Spanish business was at a standstill, for Philip III. was
just dead and Philip IV. reigned in his stead. Still, the
three brigantines were at his service, and there was a
fast polacca for sale. The one he bought and the others
he chartered, determined, it would seem, to carry out his
design on Algiers with or without the galleys. It was
at least a bold resolve. The port which had baffled the
whole might of the great Emperor Charles V. had come
to be let alone. Not even Osuna had dared to touch it,
and by all Mediterranean authority it was regarded as a
place impregnable to any kind of attack. English mer-
chants who knew it were of the same opinion, but the
navy men had looked into it for themselves, and took a
hardier view\ They had come to teach and not to learn,
and they were convinced there was a way of at least
drawing its teeth. It is easy to laugh at their insular
confidence, but their resolution cannot be dismissed so
lightly. Before judging them we should remember the
ugly reputation which Algiers had enjoyed, reign after
1621 EETURNS TO ALGIERS ]25
reign, as it sat secure and defiant in the very jaws of the
Spanish sea power, and then perhaps we may give
Man sell and his officers due credit, not only for their
breezy contempt of precedent, but for the care and
forethought with which they prepared to prove their
case.
The first weeks of April were spent in organising the
fleet for the intended operation. The brigantines and
the polacca were armed and manned so as to form with
the boats of the galleons the oared squadron which the
attempt demanded.^ The two prizes were prepared as
fire-ships, and a quantity of incendiary projectiles, or
' fireworks ' as they were then called, manufactured, and
the men constantly exercised at the work that lay before
them. When all was nearly complete, further letters
arrived from England, by way of Malaga, saying that
a new consignment of stores had reached that port, and
probably authorising Mansell to proceed with his enter-
prise. At any rate, a week later he sailed for Minorca to
take in wood and water, and May 1 was holding away for
Algiers. On the 20th they were before the port, and
came to anchor in a way which, like everything else in
this expedition, points to a growing spirit of order and
discipline in the royal service at least equal to anything
in the time of Elizabeth. Exact directions had been
prepared for every state of the wind, and the evolution
was executed with a quite modern exactitude, the King's
ships bringing up first to mark the line, and the merchant-
' At this time the Polacre or Polacca, Hke the brigantine, was an oared
vessel, not manned by slaves, but rowed by the crew that worked the sails
when the wind was fair. The Journal says that this one was of 120 tons, and
in his orders to Penington to send a contingent to man it, Mansell calls it
the Satia or Polakra (S. P. Dom. ccxx. 81). The Saettia was the smallest
and swiftest form of such craft. See Drake aiul the Tudor Navy, i. H,
The brigantines had nine oars a side.
126 MANSELL IN THE MEDITEEEANEAN 1621
men taking up their stations astern of them in the
squadron intervals they had left. The line was roughly
parallel with the shore, and centred on the Mole, while
six merchantmen were told off to ply between the rear-
most ship and the shore to prevent any vessel either
entering or leaving the harbour.
The harbour itself appears to have been crowded with
shipping that had taken refuge there from the operations
of the various squadrons that were at work against them,
and having thus completely closed the port so that none
could escape, Mansell prepared for an immediate attack
with his oared squadron. It was organised in two
divisions : first the ' boats of execution,' in which were
included the fire-ships, the brigantines, and the polacca ;
and secondly seven ' boats of rescue,' which were to
support the ' boats of execution ' and protect them from an
attack by galleys. But towards evening the wind, which
had been fair all day, died away, and the attempt had to
be deferred. The same thing happened the next night,
but on the third day the fair wind held, and the ' boats of
execution ' advanced. All went well, and the fire-ships
were already off the head of the Mole when the wind
chopped round and they could advance no further. But
the assailants were not yet beaten. Under a heavy fire the
oared craft made an attempt to tow the fire-ships forward.
It was slow work ; the fire grew hotter and hotter, and
the men began to hesitate. To tow in the fire-ships in
face of such a fire was clearly impossible. For a moment
there was thought of a retreat ; but Captain Hughes, who
had command of one of the brigantines, shouted out to
cast off the fire-ships and go in with the boats alone.
The advance was immediately resumed, while Hawkins
and Button in person went boldly in and brought off the
derelict fire-ships. In dashing style the whole of the
1621 FAILURE OF THE ATTACK 127
boats rowed for the fleet, shouting ' King James ! King
James ! God bless King James ! ' Once alongside the
pirate vessels they were masked from the enemy's fire,
and they proceeded to bring their ' fireworks ' into play.
With little loss they succeeded in getting the fleet well
alight in seven difl^erent places, and then, still shouting
triumphantly for King James, they drew ofi^. But, as ill
luck would have it, by this time the wind had again com-
pletely died away. There was no breeze to nourish the
flames, and the fire spread very slowly. As the boats
retired the Algerines found heart to come out from their
shelter, and poured in so heavy a fire that to return to
the smouldering fleet was impossible. Worse still, it
began to rain, and the end of it was that the pirates
were able to extinguish the flames before much damage
had been done. It was a bitter disappointment. The
attempt had been well conceived, and carried out with
boldness and precision. No blame seems to have attached
to any one, nor is it easy to see what more could have been
done. It was sheer ill luck, but the fact remained that
the attempt had failed.'
Still Mansell did not despair. His fire-ships, by the
gallantry of Hawkins and Button, were still intact, his
boats were safe, his loss small, and his men still full of
spirit. Though he drew off, it was not with the inten-
tion of retiring, but apparently because the weather com-
pelled him. Four days after the attempt he issued orders
that the fleet was still to keep together in one body, that
' The names of the officers who conducted the attack are on record. The
fire-ships were commanded by Captains Walsingham and Stokes, the brigan-
tines by Hughes, Tall, and Pepwell, the seven ' boats of rescue ' by Captain
Frampton (Lieutenant to Hawkins, 'Vanguard'), Captain Winker (Lieutenant
to Palmer, 'Reformation'), Captain Turner (Lieutenant to Mansell, 'Lion'),
Captain Dodge (Lieutenant to Tanfield, ' Centurion '), Frewen (Lieutenant to
Haughton, ' Neptune '), Button (nephew and Lieutenant to Sir Thomas Button,
' Eainbow '), and Captain Boyes.
128 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1621
no wide chasing was to be permitted, and that he was
going back to Algiers Eoad, which was to be the rendez-
vous so long as they were on the coast, for he intended to
pursue the attempt he had begun.'
During his absence four pirate vessels had managed to
slip in, but two others had been destroyed and another cap-
tured, and the Algerine galleys which tried to rescue her
beaten off. Mansell's idea was to continue the blockade
and watch for another opportunity of sending in his fire-
ships. Unhappily the time was past. Some escaped
prisoners informed him that the harbour had been securely
boomed, and that, as for any hope of more prizes, precau-
tions had been taken all along the coast to warn approach-
ing vessels of their danger. It was not till then that the
admirals owned themselves beaten. Disease was daily
sapping their strength ; it seemed useless to remain, and
on June 1 they were heading back for Alicante, where
they hoped to hear of reinforcements from home.^
As things stood when they had left England, the idea
had certainly been that the fleet was to be continually
nourished with fresh ships and supplies in order that it
might remain in the Mediterranean for at least three years,
till the pirate power was broken, or so long as it seemed
desirable to threaten Spain. During the spring of 1621 two
' Order to Penington, May 29, 1G21, S. P. Doin. cxxi. 56.
^ The main authority for the above is the Joiirnal or log ah'eady referred
to. A printed copy with sarcastic but not too well-informed notes in John
Coke's hand is in S. P. Dom. ccxxii. 106. His comments must be received
with caution, for during all the last half of 1620 he was on leave attending
to his private affairs in the country, and was apparently ignorant of the
restrictions under which Mansell had sailed (see Coke MSS., Hist. MSS.
Cam. XII. i. 208-9). The author of the Journal is unknown, but internal
evidence shows that he was in Hawkins's sc^uadron aboard Arthur Main-
waring's ship, the ' Constant Eeformation,' until early in April that officer
died of disease at Malaga. Palmer succeeded Mainwaring, and requested
the author to remain with him, but he preferred to go to Sir Francis Tan-
field in the ' Centurion,' a merchantman. Monson's criticism (Tracts, p. 256),
1621 GONDOMAR MAKES DIFFICULTIES 129
fine galleons, the 'Victory ' and 'Dreadnought,' had actually-
been put in commission for the purpose. In May the mer-
chants were called upon to maintain their ships on the
station for six months longer, and at the end of the month
the captains of the two King's ships received their orders
to join. Then suddenly a change came over the situation.
Gondomar had never ceased to protest and cajole until
finally he had succeeded in winning over Buckingham
as securely as he had gained the King. In this difiicult
task the Spaniard's persuasive personality was assisted
by the folly of the Dutch. Their behaviour in the East
Indies was growing daily more intolerable. In spite of
treaties and promises, they continued impudently to assert
their right to exclude English vessels from the most
profitable trading areas, and to assert it with every kind
of outrage. This was England's reward for having kept
the seas for them through the long years of their struggle
for independence ; this was her reward for having supported
the first halting steps of their sea power, and suffered it
to grow up under the shelter of her own. England had
stood loyally beside her, pouring out blood and treasure
for the freedom of the high seas, and the first use the
Dutch sought to make of their success was to force
from which later writers have usually taken their cue, appears no less
unfair and ill-informed than Coke's when compared with the Journal and
the despatches. The principal ones are as follows : — Three from Mansell to
Buckingham, dated January 13, June 9, and July 10, in Harleian MSS.
1581 ; another in S.P. Foreign, Barhary States (dated July 17) ; two
others to the Lords Commissioners (ibid.), one dated conjecturally ' Decem-
ber 1620,' but probably about January 12, 1621, since in his despatch of
January 1.S Mansell says he had just finished it, and the other dated July 16 ;
one to Calvert, Secretary of State in S.P. Spain dated March 15. Two others
to Cranfield, dated January 22 and March 15, are among the De la Warr
Papers {Hist. MSS. Com. iv. 282 i). Three orders issued to Penington,
giving further details of the movements of the fleet, are in S.P. Dom.
exx. 81 (April 12) and 112 (April 25) ; cxxi. 56 (May 29). The Aston Papers
contain many documents besides those already quoted which throw much
new light on the whole affair.
VOL. I. K
130 MANSELL IN THE MEDITEEEANEAN 1621
themselves into the exclusive position from which Spain
had been dragged. There was an old superstition, well
known to seamen, that if you save a man from drowning
he will one day do you some fatal injury. The adage
seemed coming true for England and Holland, and already
the winds were whispering that before England could be
a power in the Mediterranean she must establish her
dominion of the North Sea. The struggle was to be long
and bloody, and its first mutterings were in the air.
Gondomar was not a man to miss his hour. Bucking-
ham's pride as Lord High Admiral was such that he was
coming to regard every injury to a British ship as a
personal affront. It was easy for the skilled Ambassador
to foster his annoyance till he persuaded him that it was
far better to use the royal ships in chastising the insolent
Burghers than in keeping them out on a service which
his master could only view with distrust and dislike. The
result was that when Mansell reached Alicante he found
neither ' Victory ' nor ' Dreadnought.' In their place were
orders to send home at once four of the King's ships.
With the whole fleet he went round to Cadiz, whence, the
second week in July, he despatched Hawkins and Button
homewards. With them went the 'Lion,' 'Eainbow,'
' Eeformation ' and ' Antelope,' and some of the less
seaworthy merchantmen, while with the rest Mansell
remained where he was to await stores and orders.
Having thus reduced his force to a point at which
they had nothing to fear from it the Spaniards became all
politeness. Eager to see him spend his strength on the
common enemy, they offered him everything he wanted,
and a whole squadron of galleys if he would again attack
Algiers. Mansell was nothing loath. An officer was
sent to Madrid to arrange the affair, orders were issued
for a galley squadron to mobilise at Malaga in accordance
1621 MANSELL RECALLED jT 131
with Mansell's desire, and so well was he supplied from
the Cadiz stores that on the last day of July he was able
to sail for Gibraltar to join hands with the galleys.^
Meanwhile relations with the Dutch were going from
bad to worse. Their truce with Spain had come to an
end ; the old war was raging again, and ever since its
renewal they had been seeking to establish a commercial
blockade of the Spanish Netherlands. International law on
the subject was not so clear then as it is now, and James,
hurt in his dignity as Lord of the Narrow Seas, would not
admit their right to stay anything but enemy's goods
and contraband of war. It was a disagreement for which
there was no solution but force, and the result was that
Hawkins and Button, on their way home, received orders
to intercept the homeward-bound Dutch East India fleet
by way of reprisal. Nor was this all. James's genius
for putting himself in the wrong, and playing false cards,
prompted him to send orders to Mansell to bring home
the rest of his fleet to guard the Narrow Seas. Nothing
could have been more ill-timed. In Vienna was Digby
on his hopeless mission for the restoration of the Pala-
tinate to the King's son-in-law, and for the removal
of the Imperial ban. Having succeeded in getting a
partial suspension of hostilities from the Emperor, he was
about to proceed to Madrid in pursuance of the King's
orders, and, feeling acutely the weakness of his hand, was
imploring James to keep Mansell where he was. Even
as the admiral's recall was being penned he was writing
his urgent appeal: 'I must earnestly,' he said, 'recom-
mend the continuing abroad yet for some small time of
Sir Robert Mansell's fleet upon the coast of Spain, which,
in case his Majesty should be ill-used, will prove the best
* Mansell to Aston, July 4 and 31 ; Aston to Buckingham, July 26 ; Sir
John Fearne's instructions for Madrid ; Aston Papers, ii.
132 MANSELL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1621
argument he can use for the restitution of the Palatinate.'
The King, it would seem, repented of his haste and made
an effort to recall the false step he had taken. But even
so it was only in a way that added degradation to his
fatuity. Gondomar was consulted as to whether his
master would take it ill if Mansell remained on the
station. Seeing what was going on in Spain, the Ambas-
sador had naturally no objection to offer. Indeed he
wished for nothing better. His only aim had been to
reduce Mansell to impotence, not to remove him alto-
gether, and he had overshot the mark. He hastened
therefore to explain that his master had no objection
whatever to the operations against the pirates being
continued. Indeed he begged that the two royal gal-
leons and the ten merchantmen that had remained with
Mansell might keep the seas. His master, he said,
had already provided the admiral with fire-ships and
combustibles to renew his attempt, and he was ready to
see him furnished with provisions till tl:tey could be
supplied from home. James replied that his reason for
recalling Mansell was merely that his brother of Spain
seemed jealous of the enterprise, and agreed to send orders
for him to continue his operations.' Whether or not
this apparent complacency on James's part was to cover
a resolution to support Digby at Madrid with a fresh
naval demonstration, it was already too late to recover the
lost ground. On September 15 the Order in Council
was passed, calling on the merchants to provide their ships
for a further period of service, and a week later Mansell,
in answer to his original recall, appeared in the Downs
with all his following.
So ended the first attempt of a British Government to
' Calvert to Cranfield, Do la Warr Papers ; Hist. MSS. Com. iv. 305a,
September 12, 1G21 ; und Gardiner, iv. 227.
1621 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXPEDITION 133
influence the European situation by the presence of a
royal fleet in the Mediterranean. It is remembered now
only for its failure at Algiers, a failure that a little luck
would have turned to a memorable success, and perhaps
reacted on the policy of Spain in a way that cannot now
be measured. At the time the true significance of
Mansell's fleet was recognised in all the cabinets con-
cerned. The Spanish Ambassador indeed seemed to
measure his success by his power of controlling its action
and its energy, and, little as it accomplished, the lesson
was never forgotten, either at home or abroad ; nor from
that time forth did the potentiality of English action in
the Mediterranean ever cease to be a factor in European
diplomacy.
CHAPTEE IX
Richelieu's invitation
For the time Gondomar's dexterity had removed the fear
of English action in the Mediterranean from the counsels
of the Hapsburg alliance, but from the day Mansell passed
the Straits it was never lost sight of. For two years
more James and his Government continued to be amused
with the prospect of a Spanish marriage that was to give
peace to Europe, and the British navy danced attend-
ance ; but no sooner did the return of Prince Charles and
Buckingham from Spain, empty-handed, make war in-
evitable than the idea immediately recurred. Still it was
not in England that the situation was first appreciated.
Elizabethan traditions were still vigorous, and Mansell's
venture had done little to break them. For the most part
English naval strategists were still where Drake had left
them, and the idea of war with Spain was still war as
Drake had made it. It was abroad, where the Hapsburg
alliance was pressing most severely, that the changed con-
ditions were best understood.
In the two years of James's inaction the alliance had
made formidable strides. Heidelberg had fallen and the
Palatinate was completely lost, and even in the far North
the Scandinavian powers were beginning' to see their
neighbour's wall was on fire. From Antwerp to Seville
the Hapsburg territory was now a continuous whole.
The Valtelline, which formed the connecting link by way
of the Tyrol, had been seized, and though there had been
1624 EUROPE AND THE HAPSBURGS 135
a pretence of surrendering it to the custody of the Pope,
it was still occupied by Spanish troops. There was thus
a channel through which, by way of Genoa and Milan,
the wealth of the Indies and all that it meant could freely
pass to nourish the resources of the Empire and feed the
war in Central Europe. If the Scandinavian powers
began to take alarm, no less so did France, as the revived
Hapsburg system embraced her in an ever tightening grip,
and her fears were shared by the other two Catholic
opponents of Spain, Venice and Savoy.
The success of the Hapsburg alliance had placed it at
last in antagonism to all the rest of Europe. But it was
not a solid opposition, and there was the weak point. It
was broadly divided into two great camps, the Protestants
to the North and the Catholics to the South, and each group
had naturally a different view of the way in which the great
alliance was to be fought. The Protestant group inclined
to what might be called a frontal attack on the Empire,
which, by military operations from the northward, would
force Austria to recoil within its old lines. The Catholic
powers, on the contrary, saw the vital point in the centre,
as was natural from their position, and they would have
sought to break the alliance at the joint. The weak
points in the Hapsburg chain were the Valtelline, as it lay
threatened by all three powers of the Catholic group, and
the Western Mediterranean, where at Genoa the link
between Madrid and Milan lay open to naval attack.
The eyes of France were fixed upon the Valtelline ; those
of Savoy, as always, upon Genoa ; but in neither case
exclusively, for an attack on either point would so
materially assist the other that they formed practically
one operation. Each group was naturally anxious to
see the weight of England thrown upon its own
chosen objective, and James was soon besieged with
136 RICHELIEU'S INVITATION 1624
contradictory proposals for a common effort against the
common foe.
At first the line of action most favom^ed by the British
Government was that of the Northern Protestants ; but
this did not exchide the possibiHty of persuading Savoy
and Venice to reopen their old harassing at the centre,
and thither, as early as 1624, was sent Sir Isaac Wake
' to encourage ' them to play their part. His first
point was Turin, the Duke of Savoy's capital, and there
the timid diplomat found himself handling thunderbolts
before he had time to turn round. No sooner did he
arrive than the Duke began pressing on him the old
Genoa scheme of Kalegh's time. ' There is no need to
encourage him,' groaned the overweighted envoy ; ' his
pulse doth beat so strong of itself.' In vain he tried to
get on to Venice. The Duke would not let him go. He
was entirely confident of success. He had charts, plans,
and models of the city, and would not part with the
Englishman till he had laid the complete scheme before
him. It was some time before he could do this, for France
was equally hot for her own design, and each state was
trying to see how deeply she could get the other com-
mitted before she showed her own hand. At last, in
August, Wake was able to send home the complete
i)roposal. Fifty thousand foot were to be raised and paid,
half by England and half by Savoy ; three thousand cavalry
were to be provided by Savoy, and, as their equivalent,
England was to equip a fleet of twenty sail. James's name
need not appear unless he liked. All he provided could
be under his son-in-law's flag ; and as for Venice, he need
have no anxiety, for she too would have to play her part.
Genoa at this time was for all purposes of foreign policy
a mere protectorate of Spain. Therefore, although an
attack on her by Savoy would not be technically a breach
1624 ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND SAVOY 137
with the Hapsburgs, it would be so in effect. It would
be like thrusting a firebrand into the centre of the in-
flammable heap, and would serve to set on fire the whole
of Europe that was not already blazing. Venice must
come in with the rest ; and as for France, she was only
waiting for Savoy to begin the dance. Such was the
incendiary proposal which Wake had to send home,
begging that, if it were accepted, some one more capable
and with stronger nerves might be sent to take his
place. ^
The scheme, however, was not immediately accepted.
To gain time for reflection Wake was instructed to apply
for further details, especially in regard to its financial
aspects. The fact was that the British Government had
another iron in the fire, which promised to burn deeper
than Savoy. No sooner had the failure of Charles and
Buckingham at Madrid given the death-blow to the
weary Spanish marriage than negotiations were reopened
for finding the Prince a bride in France. In November
the preliminary treaty was signed, and by its terms
England and France were allies for the subversion of the
Hapsburgs. In the meantime France had formed a
definite league with Savoy and Venice for wresting the
Valtelline from Spanish hands, and the first advantage
she meant to draw from the proposed marriage was to
add England to the party. This was Eichelieu's idea of
meeting the threatened domination of the House of
Austria — undoubtedly more sound and comprehensive
than James's narrow aim at the recovery of the Palatinate
and the restoration of the status quo in Germany. If the
Hapsburg structure could be severed at the centre, the
rest would easily follow. All that seemed necessary to
' S.P. Foreign, Savoy, Aug. 9, 1624.
138 RICHELIEU'S INVITATION 1624
insure success was to prevent Spain using the advantage
of her command of the Western Mediterranean to paralyse
the action of Savoy. The fitful maritime power which
France from time to time had painfully created on her
Southern coast had sunk again to its lowest ebb. With-
out the aid of the Northern sea powers it was clear Spain
must retain her command and the freedom of her com-
munication with Italy ; and so it came about that of all
the far-reaching consequences that were to flow from the
mating of the sparkling little French princess with
James's solemn son, none were of deeper significance
than the first. For it was nothing else than an invi-
tation from France to England that she should assert
her yet unmeasured influence on continental policy by
naval operations in the Mediterranean.
If ever a great minister's dreams are haunted with
dim visions of what his policy may breed far beyond the
limits of his furthest sight, surely Kichelieu must have
lain uneasy the night he let the proposal go. He might
have seen that sea, which seemed made as a bridge for
France to march to empire, disturbed with the passage
of mighty fleets that were to change its nature —
turning it to a fosse which barred her progress and
thrust her back to wither upon the exhausted soil of her
birthright.
As it was, the proposal came humbly enough to give
no hint of all it might mean. It was in the form of a
suggestion from Marshal Lesdignieres, the officer in
command of the French army which was assembling
to support the Duke of Savoy in his projected attack
on Genoa. The suggestion was addressed to the Nether-
lands as well as England, and was purely naval in
character. England was to incur no expense and no
responsibility. All that was asked was that the King
1624 ENGLAND ARMS 139
of France should be allowed to hire twenty ships of war
in each country. They were to sail under the French
flag, and to be in all respects a French force. The
Dutch at once consented. Buckingham, whose imagi-
native mind was filled with the most grandiose ideas for
the coming war, easily persuaded James to do the same.
It was therefore understood that the French marshal, in
his forthcoming filibustering attack on Genoa, was to
have twenty English men-of-war at his disposal.
This was in the winter of 1624. In spite of the
despairing efforts of Spain to avert the threatened con-
flagration, every one believed it would break out in the
ensuing spring. In England a great fleet was to be
mobilised for immediate action, but at present no one
knew what its destination would be. Following Eliza-
bethan precedent, the direction of all operations for the
recovery of the Palatinate had been placed in the hands
of a supreme Council of War. It numbered among its
members the best of the later Elizabethans : St. John,
Lord Deputy of Ireland ; George Carew, who had saved
Munster from Spain in 1600 ; Fulke Greville, Sidney's
old companion, together with the most accomplished and
experienced soldiers of the new school that had grown up
in the Low Countries under the Fighting Veres. The
naval members were Mansell and Button, the best that
were to be had since Eichard Hawkins was dead. Their
influence upon England's attitude was something more
than consultative, for in effect they were trustees of the
funds which the Commons had voted for the war.
In a bold effort to grasp a part of the executive power,
which had always been the King's, the House had sought
to lay down the broad lines on which the war was to be
conducted. This was the famous resolution of ' the Four
Points.' James, fixed to his narrow view of recovering
140 RICHELIEU'S INVITATION 1624
the Palatinate, was obstinately bent on confining the war
to military operations in Germany, and on offending
Spain as little as possible. Parliament, believing Spain
was still the all-powerful instrument of all the trouble,
and instinctively feeling the strength of England was
on the sea, was as earnestly opposed to distant military
adventures and as obstinately bent on reviving the old
war which James had so prematurely closed. The four
points for which they stipulated were the setting in
order of the coast defences, making provision for the
security of Ireland, assisting the Dutch with troops, and
mobilising the navy. In short, they were set upon a
war conducted exactly on the old Elizabethan lines — that
is, in effect, a defensive war tempered by remunerative
operations against Spanish trade and colonies. Of the
changed situation which had been brought about by the
increased power of the Empire and her chief allies they
were in apparent ignorance. The King of course would
not accept the position they arrogated. He told them
it was enough that the money they voted could not be
touched without the consent of the Treasurers whom they
were to appoint ; but as for the conduct of the war, that
must depend on the advice of the Council of War.
* Whether,' said he, ' I shall send twenty thousand or
ten thousand, whether by land or sea, east or west, by
diversion or otherwise, by invasion upon the Bavarian
or the Emperor, you must leave that to the King.' And
so indeed it was left, the arrangement being that the
Parliamentary Treasurers were to issue money on the
warrant of the Council of War, and not otherwise.
The French proposal, therefore, was outside the view
of either party, and yet it fell in with both. For James
it would be a valuable diversion in favour of the land
operations for the recovery of the Palatinate ; for the
1625 NAVAL RESULTS OF JAMES'S REIGN 141
popular view it was naval, productive, and valuable as
a preoccupation for the Spanish fleet. For the King it
had the special recommendation of enabling him in some
small degree to do his duty to his son-in-law without
openly breaking with Spain. No step could be more
characteristic, and it was practically the last he took.
It was the end of March 1625, and already as the sound
of war grew loud in his ears he lay upon his death-bed
tormented with the din he could not hush. The southern
counties were swarming with unruly recruits who were
to serve abroad under Count Mansfeldt. The ports were
crowded with clamouring skippers whose vessels had
been requisitioned as transports. Twelve ships of the
royal navy were being equipped for their escort and
some further great adventure, and the squadron that was
to pass into the French service was being pushed on.
And so at last, amid the noisd and disturbance of vast
preparations for the war, which he had disgraced himself
to prevent, the fever-stricken King passed away.
Every scheme to which he had set his hand most
devoutly had failed — everything, perhaps, except the re-
generation of the navy. The five years which the Com-
mission had given itself to do the work were past, and
the programme had been carried out to the letter. In
spite of the extraordinary calls that had been made upon
them by Mansell's expedition and Charles's escapade to
Spain, the fleet had been kept in good order ; ten new ships
had been added to it, and the expense reduced by about
a half. However barren of purpose James's reign may
appear, this must never be forgotten. The navy had
been placed on a businesslike footing, and had been
confirmed as the pride and mainstay of the country.
Of his position as Lord of the Narrow Seas James was
at least as proud as of his pose as head of the reformed
142 RICHELIEU'S INVITATION 1625
religion. His interest in the navy had never flagged.
He sat in person to decide disputes on the most technical
questions ; he never missed a launch ; he made his
second son Lord High Admiral, and only displaced him
when he became Prince of Wales to make room for his
chosen favourite. Less consciously, but still as the direct
result of his trust in the navy, he inaugurated a new-
field for its action. Feebly as the new policy had been
started, it was a precedent that had been set. The door
was opened never to be entirely shut. In spite of failure
and disappointment, one of the last acts of his well-
meaning reign had been to push his sea power forward
on its new career, and on his troubled death-bed he had
once more stretched out his shaking hand in answer to
the calling of the Mediterranean.
CHAPTEE X
NAVAL STEATEGY UNDEE CHAELES I.
No king perhaps ever succeeded quietly to a throne with
such a sea of troubles boiling round him as did Charles,
and the first to scald him was the question of the squadron
with which England was to make herself felt in the
Mediterranean.
When the idea was first mooted, there can be no
doubt that there was a real intention to use the force
for breaking into the centre of the Hapsburg position
through Genoa, But, before the agreement had been
signed, France had had forced upon her a wholly different
use for it. In January 1625 the Duke of Soubise, the
great Huguenot chief, exasperated with the King's failure
to carry out the terms of the late pacification, had
suddenly thrown himself upon Blavet, the new head-
quarters of the French navy, and had carried off into
Kochelle all the six royal vessels he found there. By
April the Huguenots were once more in open rebellion ;
and all hope of reducing Eochelle to obedience was gone un-
less a fleet could be procured. There could be no doubt,
therefore, how Louis would use the borrowed ships if
he got them. Still, for the Dutch it was too late to draw
back. In the throes of their new contest with Spain,
which so far had not gone too well with them, they dared
not offend France, and Louis had the prospects of a fresh
pacification with his Protestant rebels to make their
144 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES L 1625
consent easy. So the Dutch contingent sailed, and at
its head was Haultain, Vice- Admiral of Zeeland.
For England, in the toils of her new alliance with the
French Crown, there was scarcely less difficulty ; and when,
on the eve of the old King's death, Buckingham agreed
to lend the ' Vanguard ' of the royal navy and seven
merchantmen, he must have known their destination. If
at the time his airy assurance and indifference to public
opinion had seen no difficulties in the path, they began
quickly to spring into view. In April Sir John Penington,
who was to command, was ready for sea ; but Sir Ferdi-
nand© Gorges, his vice-admiral, could not be got to join.
He had been Elizabeth's Governor of Plymouth, and was
a personification of all the Protestantism militant of her
reign. It was not till the admirals had been assured that
they would not have to fight Huguenots that they could
be got to take the squadron across to Dieppe. Still, both
officers and men were far from easy, and, as the day
approached for Parliament to meet, Buckingham himself
became nervous. He tried to gain time by informing
the admiral he was not to give up the squadron till he
had escorted the new Queen to England. On June 9
Penington at last sailed ; but no sooner was he in contact
with French conversation than his eyes were opened.
Till he had further orders he refused to have any dealings
with the French officers who were commissioned to take
over the ships, and, finally winding a design to seize his
squadron, he quietly put to sea and returned to the English
coast.
Meanwhile Parliament had met and had received the
statement of the Government. There had been a
suggestion of further subsidies, but it had fallen flat, and
there was clearly trouble ahead. Before a new money
grant could be considered, there were inquiries to be made.
1625 IREITATION OF PARLIAMENT 145
The war policy, which the Commons had so clearly defined
in the resolution of the Four Points, had practically been
set at nought. Their Council of War had been induced
to grant subsidies and raise an army for operations in
Germany, which was what they particularly intended to
forbid. The naval forces had been mobilised, but not in
the way they had plainly indicated. They had intended
the mobilisation as a precautionary measure in view of
the powerful fleet that had then been assembling in Spain ;
but it was now known that that fleet had sailed to dis-
possess the Dutch from the lodgment they had made in
Brazil, and all fear of an invasion was at an end. Still
an enormous fleet was being prepared clearly for some
offensive operations, for ten thousand troops were being
pressed, and transports taken up wholesale. Who had
sanctioned it '? What was the enemy ? No war had
been declared, and part at least of the naval forces were
going to assist a Catholic king who was at war with his
Protestant subjects. Vast sums had been spent for the
recovery of the Palatinate, and less than no good done.
The army that had been raised for • Mansfeldt had rotted
away from neglect and disease, and, in spite of the crowd
of ships that had been so long in commission, the Salee
pirates were syvarming in the Narrow Seas and insulting
the very coasts.
It was clear something must be done to mend matters.
The plague was raging in London, and the occasion was
seized to adjourn Parliament to meet at Oxford on August 1.
Still it was by no means easy to know what to do in the
meantime with Penington. He had to be ordered back
to Dieppe, and yet could not be allowed to give up his
ships. The only solution that occurred to the Govern-
ment was to instruct him to get his men to mutiny. This
he did with no little success as soon as he reached Dieppe,
VOL. I. L
146 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1625
and on July 25 his crew carried their officers back again
to England. Meanwhile, however, peace had been signed
with Eochelle. Lesdignieres had rapidly driven the
Spanish garrisons from the Valtelline, and with his
colleague of Savoy had overrun the Genoese territory
almost to the gates of the capital. But there he was
checked. He knew it was madness to attempt the city
itself without support from the sea, and with all the weight
of his name he had been pressing for an accommodation
with the Huguenots in order that the borrowed fleet might
still be placed at his disposal. Now, therefore, that peace
was made, Richelieu was able to assure the English
Government that their ships would certainly be used in
the Mediterranean according to the original plan, and
Penington received final orders to deliver them up. The
transfer actually took place on August 3, but the crews
absolutely refused to serve, and the French got only the
bare ships, nor indeed all of them, for Sir Ferdinando
Gorges, staunch to his faith, was not to be persuaded, and
deserted ship and all.
Thus the most pressing cause of offence was removed ;
but no sooner had Parliament reassembled than it was
clear the way was barely smoothed. The great expedi-
tion with its hundred sail and ten thousand troops had
still to be explained. It had certainly been Buckingham's
intention that it should sail and win him glory before Par-
liament could meet, and to this end the Houses had been
twice prorogued. He mtended to take the command him-
self, under a commission from the Prince Palatine, so as
to avoid as long as possible a formal rupture of the peace
between England and Spain. The original idea had been
apparently something in Drake's manner on the Spanish
coast. Then he had tried to persuade the Prince of
Orange into a joint attack on the Spanish Netherlands.
1625 MENACE OF DUNKIRK 147
The main inducement to the latter line of action
was the growing menace of Dunkirk. During the
peace, Spain had been making serious efforts to in-
crease her sea power, and among other means had
instituted a system of almirantazgos, whereby chartered
trading companies in return for their privileges were
called upon to maintain a war-fleet. One of these, to
the number of twenty-four sail, was now established at
Dunkirk, where naval architecture and seamanship had
reached a point unsurpassed in Europe.' The Dutch
were blockading it with fair success, but, so long as the
Dunkirk squadron existed, the command of the Narrow
Seas was not secure. The destruction of the port was in
fact an operation of the first importance. Sound strategy
demanded it as a necessary preliminary to the effective
conduct of the war on whatever lines it was eventually
to be waged, and so keen was Buckingham on the new
project that he actually went over to Paris to induce
Louis to co-operate. The mission was a complete failure.
So far from succeeding in dragging France into a war
with Spain, he entirely alienated the French King by
making love to his wife. So, before Parhament met, the
new project had been abandoned and he had gone back
to the vague intentions of a campaign to the southward.^
It was to provide against inexperienced levity of this
kind that Parliament had sought to tie the all-powerful
Lord Admiral's hands with a board of experts ; and no
sooner did the question of supply come up again than it
was roundly suggested that the expedition had never been
sanctioned or even considered by the Council of War,
The only member of it sitting in the House was Sir
' Duro, iv. 11.
- Gardiner, v. 325 et seq. ' Buckingham's Instructions,' May 1625^
Coke MSS. p. 201.
L 2
148 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES T. 1625
Robert Mansell. It was a direct challenge to him to
speak, but he held his peace while the debate waxed
hotter and hotter. At length he could contain himself no
longer. It was to Buckingham he owed his fall from
power, and he rose to deal his supplanter a blow from
which he never really recovered. There had, he said,
been some meetings of the Council, but he had not been
present at any since February last. At that time the
question of levying an army to accompany the fleet had
been raised, and he had refused to vote upon it, because
Sir John Coke, a minister and partisan of Buckingham's,
was present, and he was not a member of the Council.
He appears, however, to have intimated that he regarded
the force proposed to be too small to effect anything,
and a useless expense. He had an alternative project of
his own which he was certain would do more for the
Palatinate than anything that could be hoped from the
plan before them. Conway, however, who, though also a
Secretary of State, was on the Council of War, had cut
him short by saying that the question before the Council
had been merely what arms they were to sanction for
the force. Whether it was to be raised or not was not
for them to discuss, and thereupon Mansell appears to
have retired. This was probably just the kind of thing
the House had suspected, and so deep was the sensation
made by Mansell's speech that they immediately adjourned
the debate. On the morrow, to make matters worse,
there came up lamentable reports of the havoc the Salee
pirates and Dunkirkers had been committing on British
subjects. The navy ships had done next to nothing, and
Mansell protested it was their orders that were at fault,
and again the Council of War had not been consulted.
Everywhere upon the high seas and even in their own
waters Englishmen had been treated with contempt, and
1625 MANSELL'S ATTACK ON THE GOVERNMENT 149
not a single insult had been resented. Fuel was added to
the fire till it blazed out in Sir Francis Seymour's cry,
* Let us lay the fault where it is. The Duke of Bucking-
ham is trusted. It must needs be him or his agents.'
The crisis was fast growing in intensity, and the next
day the Solicitor-General was put up to answer Mansell's
accusation. But though he made it appear that the only
reason why Mansell had not been further consulted was
that he had absented himself from the sittings out of
pique, he could not show the design in hand had ever
been sanctioned by the Council of "War. Mansell's reply
was that of a man broken and crushed by a grievance.
He was obliged to admit he had a private quarrel with the
Duke ; he whined querulously of his ancestors, of their
devotion to the Crown, and his own ; he cried for an
inquiry into his conduct at Algiers ; he vowed that he
would make it good with his life that Buckingham's
expedition, manned and victualled as it was, was doomed
to failure ; and w^ound up protesting he neither desired the
good will nor feared the hatred of the great Duke, but,
sailor-like, only wished to do his duty. The impression he
made was not good. Yet it was none the less clear that
the Government had refused to listen to the scheme of the
Vice-Admiral of England, who was also the only man on
the Council of War with any long naval experience ; that
they had pursued a plan which he pronounced ridiculous ;
that they had concealed from him the design which was
finally adopted ; and that, in answer to his protest, he had
been told the plan of campaign lay with Buckingham,
not with the board of experts to whom Parliament had
specially confided the direction of the war. If Mansell's
position had been shaken, that of the King and Bucking-
ham was made no firmer, and the broken admiral sat
down among whispers that Charles had already made
150 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1626
out a commission for a dissolution. It was true enough.
Buckingham could face no more, and, before anything could
be done, Charles's first Parliament had ceased to exist.'
So without money, counsel, or settled purpose the ex-
pedition went forward. September came, and the fleet still
lay huddled in Plymouth, unable to sail. The season
had passed, according to all Elizabethan precedent, for
such an expedition : the soldiers were dying in hundreds
of the plague, and yet Buckingham clung obstinately to
his idea. What it was nobody knew, if indeed he knew
clearly himself. The West Indies, the Azores, the
Canaries, the ports of the Spanish Atlantic seaboard — all
were discussed and their chances reckoned. Some even
still believed that something in the Mediterranean was the
object. The best naval opinion knew that an attack
upon Genoa from the sea was impracticable unless an
adequate base for the fleet could be first established in the
vicinity. Such a base either Corsica or Sardinia would
furnish, and the occupation of either of those islands was
well within the capacity of the expedition.^ Yet there
can be no doubt that such an objective had never been
seriously contemplated, and the fact that it was mentioned
is therefore the more interesting as showing how small
was the importance as yet attached to the strategical
possibilities of the Mediterranean by English experts.
It is of course possible that this or something like it was
Mansell's alternative proposal, but of this we know
nothing. Monson, who by this time had developed into a
very advanced theorist, certainly rejected the notion. But
it must be said for him that he rejected it in favour of a
proposal still more sound.
The eyes of the old Elizabethan admiral were
' Gardiner, Debates in the House of Commons, 1625, C.S. 1873, pp. 115,
123, 147, 1(31. "•- Monson, Tracts, p. 2(;2.
1625 MONSON'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 151
fixed on the Spanish navy, and he saw it at the mercy
of the Enghsh fleet. During the recent reorganisa-
tion of the Spanish maritime forces, they had been
greatly strengthened, and, at least on paper, Spain had
never been so powerful at sea. Besides the three local
squadrons of the North, provided similarly to those of our
own Cinque Ports by the provinces of Guipuscoa, Biscay,
and Galicia, three royal squadrons were established —
one for the Crown of Castile of forty-six sail, another for
Portugal of ten sail, and the third for Flanders of twenty
sail. From these a permanent fleet of twenty sail was
established for the Straits, and the rest formed the Ocean
Guard. Besides these there was also the formidable
Neapolitan squadron, which was composed of Osuna's
old fleet under his Admiral Kibera. The system was so
far complete that when, in May 1624, the Dutch East
India Company seized San Salvador in Brazil, a fleet of
fifty-two sail with twelve thousand men had been sent to
recover it before the year was out. Still it was not till the
end of April 1625 that the invading force, which consisted
of Dutch, English, and Germans, was forced to capitulate,
and the victorious fleet, exhausted or unseaworthy with
its prolonged effort, was coming home. This was known
in England during the summer, and in Monson's eyes the
obvious thing to do was to dismiss the troops and trans-
ports, as Essex had done in 1597, and despatch a purely
naval force to surprise and crush the homeward bound
Spanish fleet at the Azores. Such a blow would have
been the most severe that Spain could receive. Theoreti-
cally Monson's idea was obviously right, but there were
reasons why, even if it had been adopted, success was far
from assured.
Strange as it may seem, although the fleet at Ply-
mouth was one of the most powerful that had ever been
152 NAVAL STnATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1625
fitted out for such a service in England, it had not a
single admiral on its staff. Mansell and Button were both
more or less in disgrace, Sir Eichard Hawkins was dead,
Monson was not even consulted, while Palmer and
Penington were employed in the Narrow Seas. Bucking-
ham himself was to command, with Sir Edward Cecil, a
Low Country soldier, for his Marshal or chief of the staff.
His vice-admiral was the Earl of Essex, his rear-admiral
the Earl of Denbigh, neither of whom had ever held a
command at sea, and the flag officers of the three squad-
rons were mostly noblemen of as little experience. The
captain of Buckingham's ship, an officer who in those
days corresponded in some degree to a modern captain of
the fleet, was Thomas Love. Beyond the fact that he had
been on the Council of War and had commanded a King's
ship in Mansell's expedition, nothing is known of his
previous service ; and yet this man was relied on through-
out as the chief naval adviser. The only other seamen
on the Council of "War of the expedition were Argall and
Chudleigh, both of whom had commanded merchantmen
against Algiers, and possibly Sir John Watts, who appears
to have been grandson of the great London privateer
owner of Elizabeth's time. Monson, who, in spite of
the contempt with which his long experience had been
treated, took the keenest interest in the expedition, could
not contain his disgust, and laid the failure of the
campaign mainly to the ' want of expert men to advise
what had been practised in fleets. For every man,' said
he, ' that can manage a small l)ark is not capable to direct
a fleet. You should not have relied on sailors put into the
habit of gentlemen and made knights before they knew
what belonged to gentility, nor were ever expert but in
poor petty barks.' ^ With a staff so constituted it is
' Trncf!^. p. 273.
1625 THE CADIZ EXPEDITION 163
scarcely possible that any naval enterprise could have
been successful, in spite of the magnificent chance that
offered of destroying the flower of the new Spanish navy
at a blow.
But worse was still to come. Before the expedition
could sail, it was known that the peace with the
Huguenots had been broken. The English ships were to
be used to re'luce Rochelle, and France had clearly
intimated her intention of not risking war with Spain.
If there had ever been any idea of acting in concert with
the French in the Mediterranean, this put an end to it,
and Buckingham was thrown back on the policy of a
frontal attack by a great Protestant alliance. In Sep-
tember Dutch plenipotentiaries arrived at Plymouth to
negotiate a fresh offensive and defensive S'eaty, and
Buckingham, undeterred by his monstrous diplomatic
failures, decided to throw up the command of the fleet
and go over to the Hague to form a grand Protestant
League. Thus the one man whose personal ascendency
and breezy confidence might have given the expedition
some energy and cohesion was removed, and the command
fell to Sir Edward Cecil, a mere infantry colonel of no ex-
ceptional ability and little if any experience of an inde-
pendent command. All that could be done to supply his
lack of influence and knowledge was to create him
Viscount Wimbledon and surround him with a Council
of War, which, besides the noblemen and the few sea
captains already mentioned, consisted mainly of colonels
like himself.
There is no doubt that, owing to the failure of the
Tudor admirals to replace the tactical system they had
destroyed with anything really definite and comprehen-
sive, the influence of professional soldiers versed in the
fundamental principles of the art of war was what the
151 NAVAL STRATEGY UNUER CHARLES I. 1625
nav}'^ most required. Under the great soldiers of the
coming age, Cromwell, William III., and Marlborough,
the navy, as we shall see, learnt much ; but it was
because they and the men of their choice went about
their work in the right way, because they could dis-
tinguish technical detail from basic essentials, and knew
where their own science began and that of the seamen
ended. But with Cecil it was not so. Seeing only the
chaos which the Elizabethans had left behind them, he
tried with the best intentions in the world to force
on the seamen a tactical system which was quite
regardless of the limitations of their art. To dwell on its
precise nature is needless. For our purpose we need
only mark it, like so much else in Stuart times, as an
effort to do the right thing in the wrong way. An official
comment upon it fairly sums it up. ' It was observed,'
the Report runs, ' that it intended to enjoin our fleet to
advance and fight at sea much after the manner of an
army at land, assigning every ship to a particular division,
rank, file, and station, which order and regularity was
not only improbable but almost impossible to be observed
by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place as the sea.'
Owing to the fact that no hostile fleet was met with, no
attempt was made to put it in practice, and it survives for
us only as a vivid glimpse of the condition of tactical
opinion when, during the time of transition to the single
line-ahead, it was hovering between squadronal lines and
what we should now call a group-formation.'
It is from strategical and not from the tactical point of
view that Lord Wimbledon's expedition retains its living
interest. Here the soldiers were thoroughly at home, and
in the domain that was really theirs they struck a note
' See Appendix, vol. ii. ' Origin of the Line of Battle.'
1626 SOLDIERS AND THE NAVAL ART 155
which, though barely audible at first, had the true ring
and is still sounding.
Cecil, it would appear, left the Channel with no very-
definite idea of what his objective was to be. On
October 20, having reached the neighbourhood of St.
Vincent, he thought well to call a council to settle what
they were going to do. So soon as it had assembled he
informed his officers that his general instructions were :
first, to destroy the King of Spain's shipping ; secondly,
to possess some place of importance in his country ; and,
thirdly, as * the principal point,' to intercept the arrival
of the Plate fleet. The question therefore was what
place they should seize. He further told them that at a
council of war held before the King at Plymouth, San
Lucar, the port of Seville, had been the objective most
favoured, but the final decision had been left to them on
the spot. Then it was that the debate arose in which, so
far as is known, was made the first suggestion of an
exploit destined eventually to lay the foundation of
British power in the Mediterranean. A simple officer in
an inglorious expedition, the man who made it has long
been forgotten. His very name barely escaped oblivion,
and his identity has survived by the merest accident. Yet
surely he deserves a shrine in naval annals, and for-
tunately it is still possible to lift him from his obscurity,
and to treasure every shred of his memory that can be
recovered.
When we see what he was, it is to be again struck
with how little the men of the English navy understood
whither their destiny was to lead them. We see that
destiny germinating, as it were, by its own vitality out of
that obscure mutiny which sent Ward to teach the
Barbary pirates the English art, and so forced the Duke
of Osuna to try with a new sea power to dominate
156 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1617
the Mediterranean from Sicily and Naples. It will be
remembered that when the great Spanish Viceroy was
pressing Venice with his new fleet and Venice was crying
to England for help, the focus of her war with the Haps-
burgs was at Gradisca, which was closely besieged by
a Venetian army. It was Ferdinand's frontier fortress
which commanded the coast road round the head of the
Adriatic, and so gave access into his ducal dominions
about Trieste, where alone he touched the sea. On
its fate therefore the war seemed to turn. In com-
mand of the sea, the Venetians were free to nourish
their besieging army by an easy and rapid line of com-
munication, and so long as this condition existed its
fate was recognised to be only a matter of time.
Every one saw that all depended on the dominion of
the Adriatic. Hence Osuna's eagerness to control it, and
Ferdinand's encouragement of the Illyrian pirates and
the lavish expenditure of Venice in English and Dutch
ports. Every one engaged in the defence of the place was
feeling acutely the silent pressure of the sea, and among
them was a certain Scottish soldier of fortune in the
Austrian service, one Captain Henry Bruce.
Like most others of his type he had begun his career
in the Low Country wars, and, after serving the Dutch
with distinction, had passed on at the conclusion of the war
into the service of the Emperor with the reputation of
an accomplished officer with a strongly scientific turn of
mind.^ After the peace of Madrid put an end to the
' He was serving the Dutch as early as 1604, when he got into trouble
by killing in a duel a certain Captain Hamilton, Captain-Lieutenant of
Buccleucli's regiment. In 1608 he submitted to the States certain military
inventions, which were accepted and for which he was well paid. On
August 10, 1608, he received a very flattering recommendation from the
Dutch Government to the Margrave of Anspach. See Ferguson's Scots
Brigade m Holland {Scottish Hist. Soc), vol. i.
1619 COLONEL HENRY BRUCE 167
Venetian war he contniued to serve his ducal master,
and when Ferdinand became Emperor he followed him
to Vienna. There his services were rewarded with the
governorship of Nikolburg on the Moravian frontier,
where, at the outbreak of the Bohemian war, he allowed
himself to be surprised and was obliged to capitulate.
He now left the Emperor's service, as some said, in
disgrace ; but, according to his own story, he retired with
his master's good leave because he could not consent
to bear arms against his own king's son-in-law. On his
way back to Scotland he reported himself at the Hague to
the British Ambassador, Sir Dudley Carleton. Carleton
had his suspicions. The man, he wrote home, though of
good place and reputation in the Emperor's wars, was a
hot papist and perhaps a Jesuit agent. In any case he was
a person of consideration, and it was worth while keeping
an eye on him. This was in May 1620, when the war
fever in England was running high and the drums were
beating for the Prince Palatine's recruits under the
Spanish Ambassador's window. In hope of a command,
probably, Bruce proceeded direct to England. Whether
or not he found employment at that time is uncertain,
but in 1621 he is described as * the servitor of the Prince
his Highness ' ; and at any rate by 1625 he had so far esta-
blished his reputation as to be given the command of the
tenth or junior regiment in Buckingham's expeditionary
force, which entitled him to a place in the Council of War,
and won him a knighthood with the rest.^
It was this man who made the memorable proposal.
The masters of the fleet had declared in council that San
Lucar was impossible. It was a barred harbour, and they
refused to be responsible for taking in the King's ships
without pilots. The old game of an attack on Cadiz was
' Carletoti's Letters, pp. 456, 460. Ferguson, op, cit.
158 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1625
then put forward, whereupon Sir Henry Bruce got up and
boldly proposed Gibraltar, The idea was entirely new
and seems to have come upon the greater number of
officers present as a surprise. But Bruce proceeded to
point out how admirably the place fitted their strength
and their objects. The road was a very strong one for
the fleet to ride in, the shore afforded a good landing for
troops, and, being small, the town could be easily garrisoned
and victualled, and so permanently held if once taken.
As for its advantages, though Gibraltar was poor compared
with Cadiz or San Lucar, yet as a naval station it was un-
rivalled. The possession of it would place the whole
Levant trade at their command and serve as a point of
departure for future operations within the Straits. Far
better, he urged, to look to the moral effect and future
benefits than to be tempted by present pillage.
The reception that Bruce's speech met with is a little
doubtful. Afterwards, when Essex and nine of the other
colonels formulated an indictment against Cecil for his
mismanagement of the campaign, one of their principal
charges was that he had not allowed Bruce's suggestion to
be properly discussed. They accused him of having slighted
both the proposal and its proposer by abruptly putting the
question whether it was to be Cadiz or Gibraltar, adding
that Gibraltar was Sir Henry Bruce's suggestion and that
he seemed to stand alone. This Cecil characterised as a
slander, saying that he had known Bruce longer in the
wars than any other colonel, and that he was a gentle-
man he most particularly honoured. Yet the contra-
dictory reasons which he gave for not having treated the
proposal more seriously leave us with an impression that
it was to his lack of understanding and dread of re-
sponsibility that the summary rejection of the idea was
due. Tn one place he pleaded that Gibraltar was too
1625 BRUCE SUGGESTS GIBRALTAR 159
strong and not adapted to the objects of the expedition ;
in another that he did not know it was Brace's proposal,
but thought it came from the master of his ship ; and in
a third that he had no authority to go anywhere but to
Cadiz or San Lucar. In short his whole defence is that
of a man who knew he had made a grave mistake and
thrown away the only chance he had had of a triumphant
return.^
The opportunity that was missed is the more to be
regretted since we know the place was in no condition to
offer a serious resistance. In response to the changed
situation a deep-water harbour had recently been made
by the construction of what was so long famous as the
' New Mole ' ; so that it could now receive broadside ships
as well as galleys ; but the works were barely finished and
little or nothing had been done to defend them. The
Spaniards themselves were in grave apprehension for the
place, and in the previous winter the King in person had
visited it and ordered its fortifications to be modernised.
The conversion was actually in progress, and it was owing
to a similar state of things at Cadiz in 1596 that Essex
had taken the town so easily. Gibraltar would certainly
have been a still lighter task.-
Bruce's proposition being suppressed, the Council
decided to attack St. Mary Port, in Cadiz Bay ; but this
proved as impracticable as San Lucar. It was then de-
cided to land on the Cadiz island and seize Fort Puntal,
which guarded the passage into the inner harbour. Here
lay a portion of the fleet that had returned from Brazil,
' The Voyage to Cadiz (Camden Society), p. 33. Two Original Journals
of Sir Richard Grenville, London, 1724, pp. 5, 33.
- Lopez de Ayala, Hist, of Gibraltar (Trans. James Bell), ISO. See
also the original report on the progress of the work at the end of 1626 by
Luis Bravo, Add. MSS. 15152 • and Aston's report, March 25, 1622, in his
' Letter Book,' Add. MSS. 36449.
160 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1626
and some other vessels, and these they proposed to
capture or destroy. But so much time had ah*eady been
wasted in councils that, long before an attack could be
delivered, the Spanish ships had made themselves abso-
lutely secure. The v^hole design w^as a poor imitation of
what Howard and Essex had attempted in 1596. Every
mistake they had then committed was repeated and
exaggerated, there was no brilliant genius to repair
errors, and in a week the fleet put to sea again, having
suffered no little loss and accomplished nothing.
Still, they had gathered intelligence which might have
directed them to repairing their fortunes. In Malaga,
within the Straits, they learned there was lying the bulk
of the Brazil fleet, stricken with disease, wholly unfit for
sea and thoroughly demoralised. It was at the mercy of
a bold attack, and some of the council of war were in
favour of immediately undertaking its destruction. But
Cecil could not bring himself to depart from his instruc-
tions or even to interpret them broadly. He felt bound
to attempt the capture of the Plate fleet. To this end
he decided to cruise off Cape St. Vincent, nor could the
advocates of action in the Mediterranean wring any better
comfort from him than a rendezvous near Malaga if they
were forced from their station by westerly winds ; other-
wise the rendezvous was to be the Bayona Islands off
Galicia. But no westerly gales came to blow them to
fortune, and while they cruised fifty leagues to seaward on
no definite system and without observation vessels, the
Plate fleet slipped into Cadiz behind them unsighted.
Towards the end of November they were driven home
in scattered groups, with no semblance of discipline or
cohesion left, and Cecil had nothing to show for his
pains but a swollen death roll, a shattered fleet no longer
fit for sea, and for his reward the nickname of ' General
162-5 PEESISTENCE OF ELIZABETHAN IDEAS 161
Sit-still.' On the ocean and the Spanish coast they had
accomplished nothing, and in the Mediterranean the
Marquis of Santa-Cruz had been left free to fly to the
rescue of Genoa with a fleet of galleys. The French
were forced to retire, and, along the Kiviera, place after
place was reoccupied by the Spanish admiral. In spite
of the great effort that had been made, the Hapsburg
position was stronger than ever. England had put forth
her dreaded sea power and had failed. The link between
Spain and Austria had renewed its strength. Charles's
chance of breaking it had passed away, and the Thirty
Years' War was left to run its appalling course with no
interference from the British navy.
The truth is that England was still under the Eliza-
bethan spell. It was not seen that the centre of power
had passed from Spain to the Empire. Spain in English
eyes was still the womb of all disturbance. Could she be
brought low, all would be well. If war were to be made, it
must be waged as Elizabeth had waged it— in the Atlan-
tic and against Spanish trade. It was at this time that
the full accounts of Drake's exploits were being published
by his family, and it was with Drake's spirit, as Essex and
Kalegh had transfigured it, that Buckingham was in-
spired.^ No one could see that the heart of the situation
had changed its place since his strategy had passed into
legend, and that it was only in the Mediterranean that
England would come within striking distance of the new
vital points.
In 1626 an effort was made to get a new fleet to sea
under Lord Willoughby, another professional soldier, but
it was again directed against the Plate fleet, and started
' Sir Francis Drake Revived was published in 1626, and dedicated by
Sir Francis Drake, Bart., to Charles I. TJie World Encompassed he pub-
lished in 1628, and dedicated it to Robert Earl of Warwick, afterwards Lord
High Admiral.
VOL. I. M.
162 NAVAL STRATEGY UNDER CHARLES I. 1627-30
SO late in the year that it was driven back by gales in the
Bay before ever it reached its station. In the following
year Buckingham's wild diplomacy had driven us into war
with France, and the navy was employed in disastrous
efforts to assist the Huguenots at Kochelle. England was
drifting further and further from the Mediterranean.
Even when Venice, alarmed at the turn things were
taking, decided to mediate between France and England
and endeavour to stop the insane war, it was understood
that, if peace came about, the British fleet was to be used
in the Baltic to support the frontal attack from Scandi-
navia. It was on the eve of Buckingham's assassination,
as he was about to lead in person a fresh attempt to
relieve Rochelle, that Venice offered her mediation and
nothing came of it. In the autumn Rochelle capitulated,
and peace with France followed in the spring. But still
no fleet went to the Baltic, though Gustavus Adolphus,
about to launch on his meteoric career, was crying loudly
for its help. In despair the King of Denmark made his
peace with the Empire and withdrew from the Protestant
alliance. In the following year came peace with Spain,
patched up on the lines of that of 1604, which gave to
England practically nothing of all she had fought for so
long and arduously ; and from that time she finally stood
aside from the mighty struggle while Gustavus Adolphus
did her work by hurling the Hapsburg back from the
Baltic. From either of the two seas which gave her a
pathway into the heart of Europe she might have deeply
influenced the result ; but Charles never understood the
power he could have put forth. Again, in 1632, when
Gustavus was at the zenith of his reputation, and there
seemed nothing to stop his sweeping the Hapsburgs
from the face of Europe, if only his rear were secured,
he pleaded for the British fleet in the Baltic, and again.
1632 GUSTAVUS AND THE BALTIC 163
in spite of wise counsel from his ministers, Charles stub-
bornly refused to listen. His whole naval policy was
sinking further into reaction, and for the rest of his reign it
was devoted, with the aid of the famous ship-money fleets,
to enforcing his claim to the sovereignty of the Narrow
Seas and to preventing their being disturbed by opera-
tions of the belligerents.
M 2
CHAPTER XI
MAZAEIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
It was many a long day before England was again in
a position to assert herself in the Mediterranean, and
before her hour came the situation that had existed when
she first entered the Straits had wholly changed. In the
interval, during which the British navy was occupied
in the great constitutional struggle between King and
Parhament, a new sea power had arisen. France, with
whom the epic contest was to be fought out, had
definitely taken her place upon the waters of the Medi-
terranean.
In the last revolt of the Huguenots, Richelieu had
seen his vast work of building up the modern French
kingdom almost brought to ruin for want of a fleet,
and it was in 1626, when he saw the English sea power
about to be thrown into the rebels' scale, that he began
to lay his foundations. It was in England he found
his model. Up to this time the French navy had
dragged on a moribund existence under its old mediaeval
organisation, and was still administered on almost feudal
lines by four independent Admiralties, His first move
was to sweep them away and centralise the whole
organisation as it was centralised in England. He did
in fact in one stroke what in England had been done
in three main strides of development extending over
a whole century. When Henry VIII. in his last years
had created his central office of the navy, he had
1626 RICHELIEU'S NAVAL REFORMS 165
left the service with much of its mediaeval colouring by
retaining the great office of Lord High Admiral un-
impaired. Under Elizabeth, hovi^ever, it had been largely
modernised, not by any definite reform, but in the
characteristic English way of unrecognised change that
was found practically convenient. Lord Howard of
Effingham remained to all appearance head of the navy,
but the bulk of the work was done by Lord Burleigh and
his chosen right hand. Sir John Hawkins, so that the
Admiralty tended to become more and more an ordinary
State department under the direct control of the chief
minister of the Crown. By Cranfield's reform the
work was practically completed. The last touch was
given by Buckingham when he succeeded in getting for
himself the office of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports
concurrently with that of Lord High Admiral. Thence-
forward, like other departments, the navy was ad-
ministered mainly by civilian public servants, while pro-
fessional officers contented themselves with handling
the material that was provided for them. All this
Eichelieu accomplished, or seemed to have accomplished,
in one act, by abolishing the four Admiralties and
substituting in their place a central State department,
with himself at its head as Grand Master of Navigation,
Immediately beneath him were two Secretaries of State,
one for the West and one for the Levant — that is, one
for the Ocean and one for the Mediterranean. These
officers with two others formed a naval council, whose
orders were executed in each of six maritime provinces
by a civilian officer styled Lieutenant-General of the
Grand Master. The fleet itself was organised in four
squadrons — those of Normandy, Brittany, and Guienne
for the Ocean, and that of Provence for the Mediterranean.
The system of allocation marks clearly the trend of ,
166 MAZARIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1631
naval thought at the time. Every eye was turned to
the great w^aters. The momentous revolution that was
working itself out upon the ocean and Far Eastern seas
absorbed attention. It was there the great struggle for
dominion must be settled, and until some one of the
oceanic powers had established some kind of preponder-
ance, it was impossible for any of them to make itself
felt with a mastering hand upon the Mediterranean.
So far indeed did the old arena appear to have lost its
importance, that for a time the Proven9al or Medi-
terranean squadron remained what it had always been,
and was represented practically by the Marseilles galleys
and nothing more. It was not till France found herself
drawn openly into the Thirty Years' War in a life
and death struggle with the Hapsburg alliance, that
the importance of the Mediterranean reasserted itself,
and it was once more perceived to be what it always
had been and always must be. In 1631 Eichelieu
entered into alliance with Gustavus Adolphus ; in the
two following years he was considering the project of a
great ship canal from Marseilles to the ocean, and the
famous naval port of Toulon was begun. His next step
was to purchase from the young Duke of Retz, then only
fifteen years old, the office of Captain-General of the
Galleys, which carried with it the Lieutenancy of the
Levant, the one mediaeval office that had survived his
reforms of 1626. Thus his administrative revolution
was completed, and the French navy could begin its
career as an homogeneous entity.
But for all he could do, when war with the Haps-
burgs was declared in 1635, he was powerless to take
the offensive in the Mediterranean, and had to rely on
coast defence, while Santa-Cruz threatened the shores
of Provence and finally seized the Lerins islands.
1635 RICHELIEU S NAVAL STRATEGY 167
Situated as they were, they formed a standing menace
to the new naval base at Toulon, and the Spaniards
were occupying them in force and rapidly throwing up
fortifications of great strength, as though the occupation
were intended to be permanent. Richelieu at once
recognised the error in his naval strategy, and issued
orders for practically the whole force of the oceanic
squadrons to concentrate at Belle Isle and thence to
enter the Mediterranean.
The fleet he was able to collect was a testimony to
the success of his reforms. It consisted of some forty
ships of war, including the great ' St. Louis ' of 1,000
tons, and nine other vessels of 500 tons, the bulk of
which belonged to Brittany, where Brest was fast
assuming the place in the west that Toulon was to
achieve in the south. There were, besides, fourteen
transport and store ships and six fire-ships, which were
beginning to be regarded as a necessary factor in
every thoroughly equipped fleet, and were yearly grow-
ing in tactical importance. The effort practically ex-
hausted the whole capacity of the oceanic squadrons,
and, compared with the force England could display, the
result was not very imposing. Yet it was a respectable
force enough, and about Midsummer 1636 it passed the
Straits without finding anything to oppose it, and effected
a junction at Hyeres with the galleys and a small
sailing squadron from Toulon. But there for the time
its energy ended. During the rest of the year the
mutual jealousy of the various commanders prevented
anything being done, and so low was the fleet reduced
that it was actually in contemplation for half of it to
return to the western ports to refit. At the same
moment, however, the Spaniards prematurely reduced
their garrison in the Lerins islands. The French seized
168 MAZAIIIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 163?
the occasion, attacked with their whole force, and by the
middle of May 1637 the Lerins were once more in
French hands. For the remainder of the year they were
able to secure a working command of the sea and greatly
assist military operations on the Spanish frontier. As
winter came on, however, it was found impossible to
keep the fleet at sea any longer, and the bulk of it had to
be sent back to the western ports for an overhaul. Still,
a contingent from each division remained to be dealt with
in the Proven9al ports, and thus was set on a permanent
footing the famous Toulon squadron. In the spring of
1638 it consisted of eighteen ships of war, six of which
were of 400 tons and upwards, and three fire-ships — a small
beginning, it is true, but, taken with the formidable and
increasing force that was being developed in the ocean
ports, it was enough to give France a definite status as
a first-rate sea power in the Mediterranean.'
During the remainder of the war the Toulon squadron,
supported from time to time by a division from the
Atlantic, continued to have a marked influence on its
progress. Its strategical value was mainly displayed in
the security enjoyed by the shore of Provence and the
coastwise traflic, and by the support it was able to give
to the French oifensive operations, both in Italy on the
one side and Catalonia on the other. So convincing was
Eichelieu's naval poHcy that his death brought no inter-
ruption of the course upon which he had launched the
new monarchy. He was succeeded as Grand Master by
his nephew, the young Due de Breze, and the growing
importance of the Mediterranean in French eyes was em-
phasised by his taking command of the Toulon fleet in
' For tlie French navy at this time see Jal, Abraham diL Qitesne et la
Marine de son temps. Gu6rin (Histoire Maritime) is now regarded in
France as untrustworthy. See De la llonciere, Hist, de la Marine, vol. i.
Introduction.
1643 THE DUG DE BREZE 169
person. Though this was a departure from KicheHeu's
idea of naval adruimstration, it worked well. The youth-
ful chief showed himself both capable and active, and his
first campaign was the most vigorous that had yet been
fought. Early in August 1643 he was able to put to sea
with twenty-four ships of war, a squadron of galleys, and
thirteen fire-ships, and he had ordered seven more ships to
join him from the Atlantic. Eunning down the coast of
Catalonia he captured, off Barcelona, five fine Spanish
men-of-war, and added them subsequently to his fleet.
Continuing his way, he ascertained off Cartagena that
there was an armada in Cadiz preparing to oppose him,
and he boldly held on to meet it. So serious was the
disturbance of the Spaniards' plans, which the French
action in the Mediterranean had produced, that they had
been compelled to order the Dunkirk squadron, the flower
of their navy, to enter the Straits. Off Cape Gata the
two fleets met. All day they fought, and so much did the
advantage lie with the young French admiral that he not
only destroyed three of the finest of the Spanish vessels,
but was able to continue his way towards Gibraltar to
join hands with his Atlantic division. Still not content,
he made a demonstration off Algiers to endeavour to effect
an exchange of prisoners, and, after capturing a corsair or
two, returned in triumph to Toulon. With pardonable
pride he ordered a medal to be struck to commemorate
the campaign, and it bore the legend, Presage de Vempire
de la mer.
It was scarcely too much to boast, seeing what the
command of the Mediterranean meant for France, and it
would seem that Mazarin's cool head saw Breze's cam-
paign in scarcely less glittering colours than did the
young commander himself. He began to perceive there
were possibilities in the new weapon beyond anything
170 MAZARIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1644
it had yet achieved. So long as his alliance with the
Dutch remained firm he could trust to them the care of
the ocean and the support of his army operating in the
Spanish Netherlands, while, with the exception of a
sufficient force for coast defence, he could concentrate
practically the whole of the French naval strength in the
Mediterranean. Mazarin is usually blamed for having
neglected the navy, and having failed to maintain the
vigorous growth Eichelieu had inaugurated. But seeing
the vast drain which the military exigencies of the situa-
tion were making upon the resources of the country, and
the practical security which the Dutch alliance gave him
in the Atlantic, the censure is probably unjust. Eegard-
ing his war policy from a purely strategical point of view,
it would be a fairer judgment to praise him unreservedly
for the bold and clear view which recognised the limited
naval capacity of his country, and decided to concentrate
the whole of it at the most vital point. That point he
recognised in the western half of the Mediterranean.
With the Spaniards in command of it, it was a path for
invasion into Southern France. In French hands it was
a gulf driven through the centre of the Hapsburg system
and exposing it to incalculable attacks in every direc-
tion. On this principle Mazarin appears to have acted.
Whether or not he fully appreciated what he was doing
is a personal question that does not concern us. We have
but to observe the fact and mark the result.
During the two years that followed the campaign of
1643 the Due de Breze with his able lieutenant, the
Chevalier Paul, was occupied in supporting the invasion
of Catalonia ; but already Mazarin was contemplating
for him a more telling stroke. For some time past his
far-seeing eye had been fixed upon the old centres
of Mediterranean power, and both in Naples and Sicily
1645 DESIGNS ON THE TWO SICILIES 171
he had been busily fomenting the discontent which the
maladministration of the Spaniards engendered. All that
the possession of the Two Sicilies meant for his enemy
was clear to him, and he was Hent on wresting them from
her grasp. ' It is no less a matter,' he wrote, in telling
his agent to spare no expense, ' than the loss of two
kingdoms, which would be the death-blow to Spain.'
His accurate measurement of the power at his disposal
did not permit him to think of a direct conquest. The
end was to be gained in another way by the hand of
Prince Thomas of Savoy. As a first step a military
expedition under his command, supported by Breze's
fleet, was directed against the ports which the Spaniards
held in the south of Tuscany, in order to secure for
France a fresh opening into the Spanish Italian posses-
sions, and at the same time to warn the Pope of the
danger of leaning too markedly to Spain. This done, if
affairs in Naples were ripe for the reception of a liberator,
the Prince was to be established there as king of an
independent state, on condition that he would cede to
France the port of Gaeta on the southern frontier of the
Papal territory, and another in the Adriatic. It was
further stipulated that, should he or his heirs ever succeed
to the throne of Savoy, he was to cede to France so much of
his territory as lay to the west of the Alps — that is to say,
the province of Nice. Thus Mazarin, anticipating history
by two centuries, sought to complete the Mediterranean
coast-line of France, while at the same time he held the
Pope gripped between two naval ports, secured a new
point from which to strike at the Hapsburg's communi-
cations, established himself in the heart of the Mediter-
ranean, and saw the key of it in the hands of a prince
who must be dependent upon his master.^
' Lcttres du Cardinal Mazarin {Docinnents Inddits), ii. b04.
172 MAZA.RIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1646
It was a conception worthy of a great minister, and
the Due de Breze was a commander well suited to
his hand. In May 1646 he sailed from Toulon at the
head of a fleet of tw^enty-six ships, twenty galleys, and
eighteen fire-ships, together with a number of transports
carrying six thousand troops under Prince Thomas of
Savoy. Without difficulty they were suddenly thrown
ashore in Tuscany, and, having established himself there,
the Prince, with the assistance of Breze's fleet, laid siege
to Orbitello, the most important of the Spanish ports.
To take the place by assault was impossible, and before
the siege was four days old the Spanish fleet, which had
rendezvoused at Naples, appeared to relieve it. The two
fleets were fairly equal, except that the Spaniards were
considerably stronger in galleys. In the action that
ensued both sides claimed the victory, but in effect it was
the Spaniards who reaped all the advantage. The Due de
Breze, still only in his thirtieth year, was killed by a
round shot, and his vice-admiral decided to take the
fleet Back into port to repair damages. It is true the
Spaniards did the same, but their object was accom-
plished. The Prince of Savoy found it impossible to
continue the siege, and, so far from being able to proceed,
crowned with victory, to Naples, it was only with the
greatest difliculty he effected his retreat to Turin.
Mazarin's first offensive stroke was parried, but his
purpose held firm. The failure of the campaign had but
served to emphasise the importance of the navy, and all
the most exalted and ambitious spirits in France were
eager to secure its command. The great Conde himself,
who, since his late victory at Rocroy, was adored as
the national hero, was the most pressing claimant to the
vacant office of Grand Master, and Mazarin saw the very
keenness of the new weapon threatening his policy with
1646 OEBITELLO AND ELP.A 173
failure. Other great nobles were as covetons of the place
as Conde, but Mazarin at all costs was resolved to hold
true to his master's idea. The navy was far too powerful
a factor in the new kingdom to be allowed to pass out of
the control of the central Government. Henceforth it
must lie in his own hands, as it had been in Richelieu's,
and with one of his masterly strokes he baffled all the
claimants by getting the Queen Eegent herself to accept
the exalted post. So Anne of Austria became Grand
Master of Navigation, and whatever was the Queen
Regent's was Mazarin's. Unshaken by the late failure,
the first use he made of his new power was to order a
division of the Toulon fleet to sea with fresh troops, and
before the autumn was out he was in possession of Piom-
bino, another Tuscan port which the Spaniards occupied
to the north of Orbitello, and firmly established in Porto
Longone in the adjacent Isle of Elba. Thus his position
was completely recovered. In Piombino he had a gate-
way into Tuscany ; and in Elba, immediately opposite to
it, an advanced naval base, which gave him a still greater
advantage than that which the Spaniards enjoyed in
Corsica and Sardinia. Nor did he sleep on his advantage
or for one moment turn his eye from the great project he
had conceived. In the following year the bulk of the
Toulon fleet was occupied in supporting Conde, who had
been induced to accept the command in Catalonia ; but
a division of it was sent, under the Chevalier Paul, to
Piombino and Elba to keep an eye on Naples. There at
last Mazarin's machinations were bearing visible fruit.
A revolution had broken out, and the famous Masaniello,
at the head of a popular outbreak, had proclaimed a re-
public. The news caused a profound sensation in Europe.
The principal cities of Sicily had responded to the revolu-
tionary movement, and men saw a possibility of the Two
174 MAZAEIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1647
Sicilies becoming for Spain another Holland. All that
seemed to be required was a leader of dignity and ex-
perience, and the same kind of support from outside with
which England under Elizabeth had enabled the Dutch
to gain their feet.
Still Mazarin held his hand. Prince Thomas received
no call and the fleet remained at Elba. The fact was
Mazarin had learned the great lesson. The late campaign
had taught him that nothing really effective could be
achieved without first gaining a real command of the sea.
He was therefore resolved not to risk another step until
he had concentrated every available ship in the Mediter-
ranean. His success on the Tuscan coast had decided
the Grand Duke to secretly throw in his lot with France,
and he had sold all his galleys to Louis in the name of
the Prince of Monaco. The new King of Portugal too
had been engaged to send a squadron of his best ships
to Toulon, and Du Quesne was on his way to enter
the Straits with a squadron he had raised in Sweden.
Mazarin knew besides that a premature intervention
might nip the Neapolitan revolution in the bud, and to his
agents' urgent calls from Italy he replied that they must
not try to eat the fruit until it was ripe. With these
considerations he also sought to quiet Prince Thomas's
impatience ; for the truth was he meant to throw him
over. His great scheme had taken a further development.
Conde was the greatest leader in Europe ; Conde was the
great stumblingblock to Mazarin's internal policy ; and
the astute minister saw that, if Conde could only be
induced to accept the enterprise of the Two Sicilies, he
would achieve a double stroke of incalculable advantage
to his country. Not only would the chief disturbing
factor be removed from France, but, with a prince of the
blood at the head of a new Mediterranean state, the Two
1647 GUISE AND NAPLES 17r>
Sicilies would become for France all that the Catholic
Netherlands had been for Spain.
So full of brilliant promise was Mazarin's idea that
it is difficult not to pause a moment and wonder how the
course of European policy might have been changed
could Conde have been induced to spend his ambition and
unrivalled genius in building up at Naples or Palermo a
naval state in sympathy with France. But it was not to
be. Conde apparently could only see in the proposal a
crafty design to ruin him, and he refused. So Mazarin
was forced back on Prince Thomas and his policy of
waiting till the fruit was ripe. Still hoping Conde might
change his mind, he resolved to let things stay as they
were till he could no longer hold back. But, just when all
was settled, his hand was forced by a wholly unlooked-for
incident.
In Kome was the young Duke of Guise, trying to get a
divorce, and longing to drown his private cares in any wild
sea of public adventure. No more romantic or fascinating
figure gilds the annals of his time. In person, character,
and temper, Heaven seemed to have designed him for a
popular hero. The blood of the old Angevins who had
once ruled in the Sicilies tingled in his veins and fired him
to seek in the stormy outburst at Naples a way to his
highest aspirations. More astute even than Mazarin, he
industriously fomented republican opinions in Naples
till one day he received from the popular leaders an
invitation to come and be to them what the princes of the
House of Orange had been to the Dutch. He asked Louis's
consent to accept, and Mazarin hardly knew what to
answer. There was still time to consider, however, and
Mazarin felt he might safely risk a vague consent. He
was sure at any rate that for the present Guise could not
act upon it ; for the Spanish fleet held the sea, and the land
176 j\[AZAEIN AND THE MEDITEREANEAN 1647
route to Naples was impossible. But suddenly came the
news that the daring young prince had gone aboard a
felucca almost alone, and, passing through the centre of
the blockading Spanish force, had landed at Naples. A
feather-headed young gallant, no matter how brilliant
his personality, was the last instrument Mazarin would
have chosen to work his Mediterranean policy. But
he had to act. The Toulon squadron had retired into
port for the winter. Nevertheless, so much of it as could
get to sea was immediately ordered out, and after serious
delay from the wintry weather it appeared off Naples.
But there was now no Due de Breze to give it life. The
Due de Kichelieu was in command, and though he had
under him such officers as the Chevalier Paul and Abraham
Du Quesne, he practically did nothing. After blockading
the enemy's fleet under the guns of the batteries that were
still in Spanish hands for two months, and fighting a half-
hearted action, he returned in disorder to Toulon.
The enterprise of Naples had failed a second time, but
Guise was still there, and Mazarin was too firmly set on
his great idea not to persist. He kept repeating to all
concerned that the loss of Naples meant the death-blow to
Spain, and stirred every nerve to prepare a still stronger
expedition for the spring of 1648. But long before it
could sail came the news that Guise's reckless behaviour
had succeeded in disgusting the Neapolitans. The
Spaniards had been treacherously readmitted and the
Duke was a prisoner. The event was not entirely un-
welcome. Neither Louis nor Mazarin had ever approved
Guise's adventures, and now falling back on the original
idea they oifered the command of the new expedition
they were preparing to Prince Thomas. He accepted,
but it was not till August that he was able to get to sea.
The force at his command was the most powerful France
1648 HIS FAILURE 177
had yet developed upon the Mediterranean. It consisted
of some seventy sail of warships and transports, and
Mazarin had reason to hope that its appearance in the
Bay of Naples would be the signal for a new revolution,
or at least that it would be able to seize one of the
Neapolitan islands and estabhsh there a base for further
operations. In both expectations he was disappointed.
So strongly had the Spaniards re-estabhshed themselves,
and so ill were the operations conducted, that it was
found impossible to accomplish anything.
Mazarin 's far-sighted design had finally failed, but it
had left its mark. So near had it been to success, so
dangerously had the balance of Mediterranean power
been swaying for a change, that a new condition had been
definitely introduced into European politics. The sailing
of that formidable fleet from Toulon marks the definite
appearance of France as a Mediterranean power, and the
abortive attempt on the Two Sicilies was to be remem-
bered less as a failure than as an indication of the possi-
bilities that lay open to the new sea power. Though for
a time the outbreak of Conde paralysed the action of
France with civil war, every one felt the attempt was
likely to be renewed so soon as she was herself again, and
nowhere was the new situation more keenly watched than
in England.
CHAPTEK XII
THE NEW NAVY
) At the moment when the preoccupation of civil strife
« brought to a halt the development of the French navy,
that of England was set free, and she found herself at
liberty to reappear in the Mediterranean just when France
was forced to abandon her attempt to dominate it. It was
a memorable hour, big with transition. There are few
points in European history where a period is s"o'strongly
marked as at this halting place — midway in the seventeenth
I century. As we listen to the great psean there comes
a pause in its throb, and when the sound flows on again
it is in a rhythm entirely changed. In the history of
the British navy it is no less marked than in that of
European polity. When England awoke to take her place
once more among the powers, it was to face a new
situation with a new weapon and a new method of wield-
ing it.
The situation must be clearly apprehended. The
main reason which had made Mazarin so eager to deal
Spain a death-blow in the Mediterranean was that, in
January 1648, she had induced his Dutch allies to make a
separate peace with her, and thus the struggle between
Spaniards and Dutch which had lasted eighty years was
brought definitely to an end. Maz-arin's idea had been to
force Spain into a peace with France by creating in the
Mediterranean a situation which she dared not face. In
this, as wu have seen, he failed ; but before the year was
1648 THE PARIAH STATE / 179
out he had come to terms with the Em^^ire and thus broken
up the Hapsburg alHance. At the same time the Empire
too made peace with Sweden, and the Thirty Years' War
was at an end. Spain and France were left facing each
other single-handed, each crippled by inherent troubles,
but fairly matched and neutralising one another on the
European board. The other prime factors in the situa-
tion were that the United Provinces were starting finally on
their brief career aS'one'^of the great powers ; Portugal was
again an independent kingdom ; and, lastly, there had
arisen on the ruins of the decrepit Stuart monarchy a
milifary state whose power of disturbance it was impos-
sible to calculate^^ ~^
IF was a phenomenon unknown to modern Europe,
and no one could tell how to deal with it. Diplomacy
was in those days almost entirely a matter of dynastic
connections, and here was a state without a dynasty.
The extraordinary military ability it had developed
made it a desirable ally, but in every Court of Europe
it was regarded with repulsion, which the execution of
the King increased to loathing. It was natural then
that the only method of handling the situation that
suggested itself to the old monarchies was to keep well
with the exiled dynasty till an opportunity arose for
restoring it and so securing its alliance. Till that time
came the new Bepublic could be ignored as a pariah
among nations. For, powerful as was its military strength,
its navy~as'yet had made no appearance, and there was no
indication that it could stretch its arm beyond the sea.
The position indeed in which the Commonwealth
found itself at the outset of its career upon the sea was
almost ignominious, and gave no sign of the impressive
future that lay before it. It was not that the navy had
been neglected. From the King the Parliamentary
N 2
180 THE NEW NAVY 1630-8
Government had inherited a force that was not below the
traditional standard. No one can deny to Charles his devo-
tion to the navy. It was the immediate cause of his ruin
and the outcome of it one of the mainstays of his opponents.
So soon as Kichelieu's energy began to threaten a serious
rivalry upon the seas, a new era of naval activity had set
in and the English dockyards were busy, as they were to
be so often again, in a building match with the French.
In 1631 Charles had procured a detailed return of
Eichelieu's navy, showing some forty vessels ranging from
200 to 900 tons, more than half of them being 34 to 40-gun
ships of 400 to 500 tons. Such a navy, atleast on paper,
was a serious rival, and in the next three years the English
dockyards turned out four vessels of about 800 tons and
two of 500, so that in the ensuing year the ' ship money '
fleets could ride the Narrow Seas in undisputed fiiastery.
But the contest did not end here. The French had laid
down a vessel of 1400 tons, and Charles called for designs
for a three-decker of 1500. Such a ship had never been
heard of. It was some years under consideration, but in
spite of tlie protests of the experts that a warship with
three gun decks was ' beyond the art or wit of man to con-
struct,' the King persisted. In January 1086 the keel was
laid, and in October 1638 was launched the famous
' Sovereign of the Seas ' of 102 guns, the pride and glory of
the Caroline navy, and the first three-decker ever built.
Yet the French were not altogether beaten. In the
same year they were able to commission the ' Couronne '
of 2000 tons ; but, though she was 28 ft. longer than
the ' Sovereign,' she was not a three-decker and only
carried 72 guns. Still Charles was not satisfied. He
began at once to contemplate another ' Sovereign,' but
before her keel could be laid his troubles were upon him
and she was still-born.
1630-8 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION UNDER CHARLES I. 181
It is not onl}' in this early contest \\ith France that
the interest of the Caroline programme lies. It was an
age of invention and experiment : the new scientific spirit
was astir, and naval architecture, like everything else, felt
its quickening. Engines for moving ships against wind
and tide were constantly being designed, paddle vessels
were regularly employed for towing the navy ships in and
out of the Med way, and even submarines were not beyond
the daring of inventors.' Such aspirations were of course
premature ; but a distinct advance in naval architecture did
take place, and its most prominent result was the appear-
ance of the modern ' frigate.' In 1627, during the height
of his war with France and Spain, Charles had sought to
supply his lack of cruisers by building ten ' whelps ' of
about 200 tons. They were still on Elizabethan lines,
designed like the larger pinnaces to use oars, but were
otherwise small replicas of ' great ships.' In 1640
Richelieu replied with ten ' dragones,' apparently on the
same lines. So far there seems little sign of change in
the typical cruiser, from either England or France. The
truth is that neither country can claim the credit of the
* frigate.' It was in the piratical port of Dunkirk, where
constructors were freed from Government control, that the
real step was taken. We have seen how the place had
been earning itself the reputation of the smartest dock-
yard in Europe, and turning out privateers which no one
could touch. In the year 1635, when the Conde de
Fuentes took over the command of the Spanish squadron
of Dunkirk, he found in it a division of twelve ' fregatas '
which Spaniards regarded as a wholly new type and
claim as the model that all nations followed. The ocean
powers had all of course long ago left behind the original
' An interesting account of these inventions is among Lord Dartmouth's
MSS. ,.«^---
182 THE NEW NAVY 1630-8
Mediterranean form of 'frigate,' which was only a small
and modified galley, and were applying the word to
small fast-sailing vessels such as the gaUizahras, which
carried the Spanish treasure trade. But the Dunkirk ships
were a still further advance. For the most part they were
vessels of from 200 to 300 tons, with 20 to 30 guns, and their
marked characteristic was that they had no poop or fore-
castle of any kind, but an upper deck that ran flush from
stem to stern, a modification which was found to give
them extraordinary speed and handiness.'
During the year 1635 the Dunkirkers, with their hand
against every man's, made a remarkable number of
prizes ; but in 1636 two of them, the ' Swan ' and the
' Nicodemus,' were captured by the ' ship money ' fleet
under Northumberland, and were added to the navy as
the fastest vessels afloat. Sir John Penington, his vice-
admiral and one of the most experienced officers in the
service, was so much struck with them that he advised
the ' Swan ' being taken as a model in the English dock-
yards, and the ' Nicodemus ' was said to run away from
everything ' as a greyhound does from a little dog.' The
dimensions of the ' Swan ' are unknown, for before Pen-
ington's advice could be acted on she was wrecked off
Guernsey ; but the ' Nicodemus ' we know to have been of
105 tons with a length of nearly 3^ times her beam. This
was a distinct advance on the old galleon proportion, on
which Charles's construction had been going in all his
latest ships, and it may be that this increased length was
El further characteristic of the new Dunkirk frigates, and
that this is the real explanation of the same characteristic
appearing in the first frigates of the Long Parliament.
The point is difficult to determine, for, owing to the
troubles that supervened, the English dockyards, so far as
' Duro Armada Espnfwla, iv. 407.
1640-8 INFLUENCE OF THE ' NEW MODEL ' 183
new work was concerned, were silent for nearly ten years.
Though the navy had not particularly distinguished itself
during the first civil war, it had remained staunch to its
paymasters and had sufficed to give the Parliament the
command of the sea against the King. It was not till
the last great effort was being made to bring the protracted
strife to a conclusion that any serious measures were taken
to increase the naval energy of the Parliament.
It is in the year 1645 that we may place the concep-
tion of the true moderrTnavy — the year that by a strange
chance was the centenary of the fleet which marked the
culmination of the naval reforms of Henry VIII., and
which finally established the English domination of the
Narrow Seas. The movement out of which the change
came was the same that produced the New Model
army, so that in that year we see our modern army and
our modern navy lying as it were side by side in one
cradle. By virtue of the Self-Denying Ordinance both
services passed together out of the hands of the politicians
to be refashioned by professional men. The Earl of
Warwick resigned his office of Lord High Admiral, and
its duties were vested in a commission of six peers and
twelve commoners. The influence of the experts was at
once visible in a programme embodying the ideas which
had been in the air for the past ten years. During 1646
and 1647, the first years of the new administration, at least
nine vessels of the new long frigate type were launched.
They varied from a little over '200 tons up to nearly 500,
and carried from 26 to 38 guns. Most famous of them
all was the ' Constant Warwick,' built in 1646 as a
privateer by a syndicate in which Warwick was the chief
partner. From her birth she was regularly chartered by
the Parliament, and finally purchased into the navy in 1649,
Pepys believed her to have been the first true frigate
184 THE NEW NAVY 1645-8
ever laid down in an English dockyard, and to have been
copied from a French vessel that had been lying in the
Thames. This may have been the fact, but she can hardlj^
claim to be the first of her class, since in the same year
she was built the Government launched four others of
their own which were on lines even more advanced than
the ' Warwick.' Even therefore if she was actually
copied from a French ship, the others were not, and the
oft-repeated assertion that we owed the type to France
cannot be supported. The fact probably is that both
nations learnt in the same school — the school of Dunkirk,
which at that time, if it was anything, was Spanish,
although it did actually surrender to the French in this
very year, 1646.
So far then all was going well with the navy of the
Parliament. The men, better paid and treated than they
had ever been before, and commanded by seamen after
their own heart, responded with ungrudging obedience, and
it was not till the triumph of the constitutional party
split it into two factions that the trouble began. So little
interest had the sailors displayed in the merits of the
struggle, that a revolt was hardly to be looked for, and
indeed it may be doubted whether any would have
occurred, had it not been for the lines on which the split
declared itself. The question of the future settlement of
the Government rapidly resolved itself into a quarrel
between the older constitutionalists and the new mihtary
party. The jealousy which to some extent is inevitable
between the two services naturally inclined the sailors to
be restless under the threatened domination of military
officers, especially as it seemed to them to involve a return
to the detested landsmen officers of Charles's time. The
anxiety of the military party to secure the fleet brought
about the crisis. In October 3 647 Captain William
1648 THE ML'TJNY OF 1648 185
Batten, a popular seaman who had been appointed Vice-
Admn^al of England and Commander-in-Chief when
Warwick had been obliged to resign, was summoned some-
what peremptorily to explain certain matters to the
Government, and, being uneasy at the turn things were
taking, seized the opportunity to tender his resignation.
It was accepted with alacrity, and an active member of the
Navy Board, Colonel Thomas Eainsborough, appointed
Commander-in-CEieFm his place. He was a typical man
of the New Model, a strong Independent, and apparently
filled with an overweening sense of what was due to the
men of the army that had delivered the country. To the
sailors he was detestable, for, although he had formerly
commanded afloat, he was essentially the soldier. For
six months they endured what they called his ' insuffer-
able pride, ignorance, and insolency,' and then they mu-
tinied and refused to allow him aboard his ship. The
other vessels of the fleet followed the example of the flag-
ship and similarly got rid of their objectionable officers.
May 1648, when the mutiny occurred, was one of the
darkest hours for the revolution. The second civil war
was breaking out. The Scots were preparing to cross the
border to the King's rescue, and Koyalist risings had taken
place in Wales, the Eastern Counties, and Kent. The
Presbyterians in London could barely be controlled ; there
was every sign of the insurrection spreading to Surrey and
Essex ; the Kentish Eoyalists were threatening the capital
from Kochester and Deptford ; and under the guns of the
revolted ships the castles of Deal, Sandown, and Walmer
were forced to surrender, and Dover was besieged. There
was not a moment to lose. The seamen demanded that
Warwick should come back to command them, and the
Government had no choice but to reappoint him Lord
High Admiral and send him off at once. He was so far
186 THE NEW NAVY 1648
successful that of the twenty-seven vessels that composed
the fleet in the Downs he was able to secure eighteen ; but
the other nine, including the ' Constant Reformation ' and
one of the new frigates, declared openly for the King and
stood over to Goree in Holland.
Thither the Prince of Wales hastened to meet them,
and so large was the demand which the new civil war
made upon the Parliamentary fleet that he found himself
actually in superior force to anything that could be brought
to meet him. The way was open for a sudden descent
on the capital or the revolted counties, and in July he
stood over to the English coast. There, to make matters
worse. Batten, who managed to escape from custody
in London, joined him in the 'Constant Warwick.'
The Prince had now eleven vessels and the most popular
and experienced officers in the service at his command,
and AVarwick had not yet succeeded in weeding his fleet
of sedition. For a month the Prince was able to blockade
the Thames, intercepting a number of valuable homeward-
bound vessels, and to keep himself interposed between the
Chatham and Portsmouth divisions of the Parliamentary
fleet. It was a most promising situation in view of the
unrest of the Presbyterian City and the Scottish inva-
sion. Unfortunately the Prince had insisted on com-
manding the fleet himself, and neither he nor his Presby-
terian vice-admiral. Lord Willoughby of Parham, knew
anything of their business ; and as for Batten, who had
been knighted and made rear-admiral, he was too un-
easy in his conscience to be capable of vigorous action.
Thus nothing was made of the opportunity. Every
attempt to assist the movement in the home counties
failed ignominiously. For fear of offending the City, the
prizes were given up for next to nothing, and neither
division of the Parliamentary fleet was brought to action.
1648 RUPERT AND THE REVOLTED SHIPS 187
Then came CromweH's crushing defeat of the Scots at
Preston to shatter all the'Iiopes on which the Prince's
action was based ; and though the seamen forced him
to make one desperate attempt to bring Warwick to
action in the Thames, it failed, and the revolted ships
had to return to Helvoetsluys, where Warwick blockaded
them till the advancing season compelled him to with-
draw.
Thus the naval position of the Commonwealth at the
outset of its career was by no means imposing. It had
displayed an inability to use the force at its command
with vigour and promptitude, and the Prince of Wales had
the nucleus of a fleet, officered by some of the best men
in the service, to increase the demands that the mari-
time force of the Parliament had proved inadequate to
meet. Save for the evil star of the Stuarts the situa-
tion might have been still worse, but, as usual, they played
into their enemies' hands. Already mutinous for want of
paj^ and mistrustful of their Presbyterian officers, the
sailors were disgusted with the intrigues of the Prince's
followers for the command. They themselves, uneasy at
having been carried back to a foreign port, and clinging
fanatically to the idea that they had not deserted their
country, clamoured for the Duke of York, their legitimate
Lord High Admiral, and at such a moment to place over
them a foreigner was the most ill-advised step that could
be taken. Yet this was what was done. Prince Bupert
and his brother Maurice, who, though theylmd been at
sea with the Prince of Wales, had made no progress in
the seamen's affection, were nominated admiral and vice-
admiral. The result was that Batten, Jordan (afterwards
the~Tamous admiral of the Dutch war), and two or three
other captains withdrew from the service, the sailors
deserted wholesale, and, the ' Constant Warwick ' having
188 THE NEW NAVY 1649
already set the example, several of the other ships returned
to England and surrendered.
Still the position was awkward enough. The Koj^alists
retained the nucleus of a fleet, around which privateers of
all nations would be willing enough to gather in order to
prey on English commerce. The Queen of Bohemia
pawned her jewels to assist her adventurous sons, and they
justified their appointment by such a display of energy
that in January 1649, a fortnight before the King's
execution, they were able to put to sea with eight vessels,
and under the wing of three Dutch East Indiamen to
pass down the Channel defying the winter guard to stop
them.
Hitherto the civil war had been confined to the land ;
but now, with Scotland and Ireland on their hands, and
every foreign nation in a condition of barely concealed
hostility, the revolutionary Government saw it spreading
to the sea. But for the new men danger was only a spur
to effort. Energy, thoroughness, and a practical and
scientific directness of method were their note, and the King
was barely in his grave before they set on foot those
far-reaching measures, that finally transformed the navy
to its modern shape, and established England as the great
naval power of the world.
The promptitude with which they acted reveals the
importance they attached to their maritime position, and
the boldness and sagacity with which the}^ grasped the
task that lay before them. It was on January 30, 1649,
that the King's head fell. On February 2 they voted
that no fewer than thirty armed merchantmen should
1)6 added to the fleet ; ten days later they placed the
office of naval Commander-in-Chief in the hands of a
commission consisting of three of their most trusted
colonels; ten days later, again, Warwick's appointment
1649 THE DEAGOONING OF THE NAVY 189
as Lord High Admiral was terminated, and the powers ^
and duties of the office vested in the Council of State ;
and even before they had formally abolished the kingly
office they had passed two ordinances for the en-
couragement of seamen and increasing the attractions of
the naval service. The main feature of these measures
was a large increase and clear definition of the share of
prize money which they intended to allow, and in view
of the pohcy they were contemplating and the recent
exhibition of the seamen's opinion some substantia]
gratification was imperative. For the navy was about to i
be brought definitely under the military domination, which
had been threatening and exasperating it ever since the
fall of Howard, and herein lies the absorbing interest of
the new administration.
In a sense the reform was a reaction — a reaction to !
the system which Drake and his school had broken down
— a reaction to the ideas of the Mediterranean which t
regarded the naval and military arts as one. In the south
the two arts were but two branches of the great art of
war, governed by the same essential principles and to be
worked out on the same essential lines. It was this
influence which, stiffened into pedantry, had choked the
development of naval science till the Elizabethans
delivered it. But great advance as was the reform of
Wynter, Hawkins, and Drake, it must not be forgotten
that it was mainly destructive. They broke down the old
tradition, but created little to take its place. True, there
are signs that Drake saw dimly the disease which his
work was likely to engender, and in the year after the
Armada he experimented for a remedy ; but time and op-
portunity were wanting for fruition. In Buckingham's
time, as we have seen, an attempt was made to restore the
good that had perished with the evil, but it was attempted
190 THE NEW NAVY 1649
on vicious lines and the remedy proved worse than the
disease. Then the Long ParHament went back frankly
to the ideas of the Elizabethan seamen, and they too
missed success — even came close to disaster. It is but
natural then that the new military government should
see in that lack of success a lesson that was perfectly clear
to their eyes. It was the military element that was
wanting — not as Buckingham understood it — not the
chivalry and the feathers, but the element of the pro-
fessional soldier with his matter-of-fact appreciation of
the fundamental principles of his art. It was this element
to which the Parliament had surrendered itself in its most
hopeless hour, and it had given them the New Model
(army. Now that the New Model was in power it was
inevitable that it should see salvation for the navy in the
same element by which it had triumphed.
Nowhere exists any definite enunciation of these
views. The work shows itself to us as an assertion of
that instinct for administration which is the remarkable
feature of the Commonwealth, and we have to gather it
from what was done and not from what was said. In
what was done the trend of thought is unmistakable.
We see it clearly in the choice of their three ' Generals
at Sea,' as they came to be called. Colonel Edward
J Popham, it is true, had served afloat, but it was many
yearsHback, when he was quite a young man, and he was
now forty. In the ship-money fleet of 1686 he had been
lieutenant in the ' Plenrietta Maria,' and the following
i y year commanded the 'Fifth Whelp' and lost her. It
was no fault of his, and he again had a ship in 1689.
But the fact that a man commanded afloat in those days
of landsmen captains is no proof that he was a sailor,
and certainly at the outbreak of the civil war Popham
served ashore, raising men for the Parliament and
1649
THE COLONEL ADMIRALS
191
receiving the rank of colonel almost from the outset.
In any case the sailors' view of him admits of no dispute ;
for he was one of the three colonels whose presence as
captains in the fleet had led to the recent mutiny, and
his ship, the ' Swallow,' like Kainsborough's own, had
remained with the Prince of Wales and, was now with
Rupert. Again, in the case of Colonel Richard Deane,
although, being the nephew of a city merchant,Tie is said
to have made trading voyages as a young man, through- -
out the civil wars he had served as a soldier, and had
acquired the highest reputation as an artillery officer.
At Preston too he had shown real tactical ability when in
command of the right wing of Cromwell's victorious army.
The third case is the most remarkable of all, and
it brings us to the name which was to the navy of the
seventeenth century what"X)ra,ke's had been to that of the
sixteenth, and with which the reappearance of England
in the Mediterranean is indissolubly associated. It is
Robert Blake that tradition has always acclaimed as the
masfer~'spirit of the Cromwellian navy, and modern
research has only confirmed his place. Many achieve-
ments with which he was credited have, it is true, been
found to be exaggerated, and some even without founda-
tion. But this only serves to reveal how profound was
the impression of his work. Legends grew up about his
name as they grew up about Drake's ; but, shatter them
as we will, they still serve the more strongly to reveal
to us how great was the place each held for the men
of his age. Though Blake was no professional soldier
like Skippon and Leslie and Monk, there was nothing
in his career to make him a seaman, except possibly, as
in Deane's case, a few trading voyages in his youth.
Till the age of twenty-six he had been a scholar at
Oxford, and then, having failed to obtain a fellowship.
192
THE NEW NAVY
1649
-/"
he returned to Bridgewater, his native town, where his
family were merchants. For five or six years ' in his
youth ' he Hved at Schiedam in Holland, and while there
seems to have become acquainted with Tromp. It may
well have been that he went there as agent for the family
business.^ At the outbreak of the war he appears to
have attached himself to Popham, and when Bristol
surrendered to Eupert in 1643 he was already lieutehant-
colonel of Popham's regiment. Here it was he first
became prominent by refusing for twenty-four hours to
give up the outwork he commanded, vowing it was not
included in the capitulation, and that he could still hold
it. The following year he was the moving spirit of the
defence of Lyme in Dorsetshire, when for a month, with
a garrison" of five hundred men, it held out against all
Prince Maurice's army till the place was relieved, and so
frustrated the Royalist strategy in the west. Then he
held Taunton, a barely defensible place, for a whole year,
and agam paralysed the Eoyalist action in Devon and
Cornwall. In the second civil war his name appears in
no prominent position, and be was mentioned in cavalier
circles as a man who had not received his due reward,
and therefore was worth watching. The reason of his
sudden elevation to the head of the navy is still a
mystery, unless during the recent time of acute anxiety
he had done something, of which nothing is known,
to prevent a Royalist outbreak in the west. The credit
of his selection is probably due to the man who first
recognised his talents. Popham, by reason of his
previous experience, was, of all the men whom the new
Government could trust, the one most confidently looked
to in naval affairs, and his request to have his old lieu-
Gardiner, Dutch War, pp. 217, 402.
^
vfW
^f
1649 COLONEL ROBERT BLAKE 193
tenant-colonel for a colleague would probably have been
enough to secure Blake's appointment.
Still, no one was more surprised at his sudden eleva-
tion than Blake himself, and one man at least thought
his talents were thrown away at sea. Barely six months
after he had entered on his new duties, a"n3"while he
was actually blockading Eupert on the Munster coast,
Cromwell, who had just landed in Ireland and was face
to face with the enormous difficulties of his task, applied
for him to be his major-general.^ No higher compliment |
could have been paid to his soldiership. It was an office
which, as corresponding to a modern chief of the staff,
was usually reserved for professional soldiers of the ripest
experience. But Blake was already wedded to his new
career, and in his bulldog way had no mind to loosen
his teeth on the prey he was watching. So soon as he
heard of it he wrote off to Popham begging him to get
the application withdrawn. ' It was a strange surprise,'
he said, ' greater even than that of my present employment,
which, although it was extremely beyond my expectations
as well as merits, I was soon able to resolve upon by
your counsel and friendship.' He even intimated that,
anxious as he was to serve the Parliament, he would
retire into private life rather than submit to be taken
from the sea. ' I desire,' he concluded, ' to serve the
Parliament in anything I can, so I shall account it an \
especial happiness to be able to serve them in that con-
junction [in] which they have already placed me. If they
please otherwise to resolve I shall be content with a
great deal more cheerfulness to lay down the command
than I took it up, and in private to contribute the I
' Cromwell landed August 15. The application was known to Deane in
Dublin on August 23. See Deane to Popham, Leybouf-ne-Pojiham MSS.
(Hist. MSS. Com.) p. 34.
VOL. I. 0
194 THE NEW NAVY 1649
devoutest performances of my soul for their honour and
prosperity.' ^ After this letter no more was heard of
Cromwell's application. The place was given to Ireton,
and the three colonels remained to bend the navy'in
shape with their own ideas.
It must not of course be concluded that the installa-
tion of these men was not mainly for a political end.
The desire to secure the navy undoubtedly came before
the intention of reforming it. But the one was so in-
evitably the outcome of the other that the Government
of the Commonwealth must be taken to have intended
what the new appointments achieved. Their primary
intention was to see the navy in hands they could trust ;
but it is no less certain that they intended that these
same hands should infuse into the sea service the same
spirit and the same science which had secured them the
devotion and the triumphs of the army. Time and
reflection only deepened the lines they had begun to
trace. In March the following year the Council of State
delegated their Admiralty work to a committee of seven of
their number. Continuity was secured in the presidency of
Sir Henry Vane, who had been the Parliamentary Treasurer
oFthe Navy ; but of the other six~merhbers four, including
Popham, were colonels, and thus the soldiers were in a
majority. At the same time, while the seamen were
conciliated by an increase of pay, more military officers
were given ships for the summer fleet.
In the following month we get a further insight into
the feeling that prevailed, in the announcement that ' on
April 9 the Lord General (Fairfax), Lord President
(Bradshaw), and Mr. Speaker, with many members of
Parliament and officers of the army, went to Deptford to
' Col. liobert Blake to Col. Edward rophain, September IG, 1649.
Leybourne-Popham MSS. {Hist. MSS. Com.) p. 38.
/
1650 CHANGED CONCEPTION OF A FLEET 195
see the launching of the two frigates.' These were the
latest vessels of the new type, the one of 60 guns named
the ' Fairfax,' and the other of 42 called the ' President.' A
third frigate of 64 guns was launched the same year and
named the ' Speaker.' Besides these vessels two other
large ones, the ' Constant Warwick ' and the ' Guinea,'
had been bought into the fleet. Substantial as this increase
of force was, it was but the firstfruits of the new policy.
During this and the following year no fewer than twenty-
one new vessels were built or bought, besides thirteen
prizes that were added to the Navy List. Such wholesale
addition to the permanent force of the nation was without
precedent and marks the beginning of a momentous
change which is attributed mainly to Blake, but of which
Popham was perhaps the true father.
It was an age of standing armies, and the new conti-
nental idea of military organisation which Charles had tried
to graft upon the navy was now established by the men who
had opposed him. In his ship-money fleets Charles had en-
deavoured to create a real standing navy. Up to this time,
as we know, the naval defence of the kingdom had largely
rested on what was really a naval militia centred on a
small permanent nucleus. The navy of England was the
whole of its shipping, the royal navy only that part of
it which belonged to the King. In the Armada campaign
the Elizabethans had seen well enough the weakness of
the system, and as the war continued year after year
it was seen to hamper trade for no adequate return in
fighting strength. Its inexpediency was as clearly
marked as its impotence, but the country was not then
ripe or rich enough for a change. It was the great
work of Blake and his colleagues that they succeeded in
effecting what Elizabeth had not ventured to attempt,
and Charles had ruined himself to achieve. In these
o 2
196 THE NEW NAVY 1650
unprecedented increases to the fleet we have the begin-
ning of the modern standing navy, the expression of the
id^ that the bulk of the national force upon the sea must
be^ permanent force. It was the natural outcome of the
sol&iers' administration. To them the laxity and disorder
of the bastard fleets of the old days were unendurable.
Again and again they had tried to introduce some kind of
organisation which would enable a fleet to be handled
with something like the precision of an army, but they
had always failed, partly because they tried too much,
but mainly because the merchantmen could not be got to
obey or even see the sense of the new orders that were
issued. As armies became, as they had done in recent
years, more mobile and precise in their movements, the
condition of things at sea became more and more unendur-
able to soldiers who had to do with fleets. To the men of
the New Model — at that hour undoubtedly the last expres-
sion of the military art in Europe — it was impossible, and
it was only by creating a naval force akin to that which
they had perfected ashore that they could hope to teach
the seamen the lesson they were so slow to learn and so
sorely needed.
' Thus it was that the definite and final appearance of
England as a naval power in the Mediterranean coincided
exactly with the final change lii' her naval system ; and
thus too it was that w^hen the nations of Europe were
looking askance, but as yet with no great anxiety, at the
new military state, they were suddenly awakened to the
disturbing fact that it had a navy no less formidable than
the army at which every one was gaping.
Along with the larger movement of the transition
went certain minor changes that left their mark. With
the first attempts to create a real standing navy a new
system for the classification of ships was introduced, and
1651 RATING OF SHIPS 197
with the ship-money fleets appears the germ of the
modern system of rating. A Navy List showing the fleet
divided into six rates exists as early as 1641 ; but, from
a list ten years later, it does not appear that the classi-
fication was made on any very definite principle. The most
constant factor is the number of the crew required to
work the ship, and this was no doubt a good rough and
ready measure of her relative importance, especially as
crews were supposed to bear a general relation to tonnage.
There were then only three first rates of from 60 to 100
guns. The second rates had crews of from 280 to 360
men and about 50 guns. Third rates had about 180 men
and 40 to 50 guns. The fourth rates, a very large class,
ran mostly from 120 to 150 men and 30 to 40 guns. In
the fifth class no vessel had 100 men or over 24 guns.
The sixth class included small fry of the old pinnace type,
ketches, shallops and the like. Their complement was
usually from 30 to 50 men. ' Frigates ' appear in all the
classes except the first.
Four years later — in 1655 — afresh classification was
attempted, in which, owing to the increased scale of build-
ing, several of the old ships were degraded a rate. At the
same time the first step was taken to give the rates a
definite relation to guns, and a regular ' establishment ' was
laid dowTi, though not very strictly adhered to. Thus
first rates were assigned 91 guns, second rates 64, third
rates 50, fourth rates 38, fifth rates 22, and sixth rates 8.
Another noticeable change was the entire disappearance
of the secondary armament of small quick-firing, breech-
loading guns, which had held their place throughout the
Tudor period. No clear explanation of their obsolescence
is to be found, but there is little doubt that it was the
natural outcome of the revolution in naval tactics esta-
blished by the Elizabethans. They had lifted gun-fire to
198 ■ THE NEW NAVY 1651
the first place, and, as boarding grew less and less in
favour, the secondary armament, which was designed to
clear for boarding or to repel boarders, fell with it. The
same views led to the gradual diminution of superstruc-
tures, and in frigates to their entire disappearance in order
to attain handiness in manoeuvring for fire advantage ; and
with the disappearance of superstructures the secondary
armament, which was mainly designed to defend them
when a ship was entered, must also have inclined to
disappear. The danger attending their use in the heat of
action and the introduction of hand grenades may also
have had something to do with it, no less than the increas-
ing handiness and rapidity of fire of muzzle-loading guns.
The English founders devised means of casting pieces
lighter than had been the custom without decreasing their
power. Indeed English ordnance and gunnery continued
to hold their pre-eminence. The Dutch admiral De With,
after his first action with Blake in 1652, could write, ' We
found that the guns on their smallest frigates carry further
than our heaviest cannons ; and the English, I am sure,
fired smarter and quicker than did many of ours.' ^ Such
a startling statement must of course be discounted by
remembering that De With was trying to get the States
to improve his fleet ; but there can be little doubt, after
all allowances are made, that the navy of the Common-
wealth was launched upon the Mediterranean in a state
of general smartness and efficiency that had never been
equalled.
• Gardiner, First Dutch War {Navy Records Society), ii. 300.
CHAPTEE XIII
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPEET
The impulse which finally guided England back into the
Mediterranean was very remarkable. It was like the
finger of destiny — the outcome of hostile machinations for
which no such end could have been foreseen. It was a
pious belief of the old herbalists that beside every poison-
ous weed there might be found growing a balm that was
its antidote, and so it was that nature now seemed to
deal with England.
From the same point — midway in the seventeenth
century — which saw the transformation of the English
navy, dates also a transformation in her foreign relations.
The execution of the King may be said to have given a
new colour to continental politics, at least so far as Great
Britain was concerned. Their mainspring thenceforth
for a century to come was the fortunes of the Stuart
family. Great Britain appeared in the eyes of continental
statesmen to be open to the same kind of action that they
had been using so freely everywhere else, the same to
which the Dutch were exposed by the differences between
the Orange and the Eepublican parties, the same which
France had been using against the Spanish Empire in
Catalonia, Portugal, and the Two Sicilies, and the same
which Spain was now paying back to France by her en-
couragement of the Fronde. It was a source of weakness
to which the English Government had been a stranger
200 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 1649
since the execution of Mary Stuart, and its reappearance
at this moment was the most serious menace to the posi-
tion of the new miHtary state. It was new poison, and its
effects might have been extremely grave had not the anti-
dote been found springing up beside it. As it was, the
very first effort to use the new form of attack was the
means of bringing the threatened power immediately to
the true method of meeting it. It was the fitting out of
Rupert's squadron at Helvoetsluys and the encouragement
which the new maritime war received from foreign powers
that directly led to the reappearance of England in the
Mediterranean.
After escaping the winter guard, Eupert and his
brother proceeded direct to the coast of Munster, which
from the days when Drake lay hid there, and long before,
had been a kind of sanctuary for sea rovers like themselves.
They were seriously under-manned ; but there, if any-
where, they could hope to fill up with men of the right
stamp, and with this object the Princes established them-
selves at Kinsale. At first the English Government did
not take the matter very seriously. It was left to
Ayscue and Penn, the admirals on the Irish station, to
deal with. But their force soon proved inadequate. In
February the Prince was reported at Bristol to have
twenty-eight sail and to be rendering the adjacent seas
wholly unsafe for commerce. It is true Ayscue's captains
made several captures, including two of Rupert's smartest
frigates. But Ireland was almost lost to the Common-
wealth. Here and there her officers, like Coote, Jones,
and Monk, were clinging to seaports till Cromwell could
come to the rescue, and the Irish squadron could not watch
the Princes and at the same time afford the desperate
garrisons the relief they wanted. Moreover, Cromwell
intended to land his army in Munster, and for that the
1649 THE PROPHECY OF GREBNERUS 201
command of the seas must be recovered. The serious
news of Kupert's growing strength, which had come in
from Bristol, was followed in a week by the appointment
of Popham, Blake, and Deane to command the fleet, and
their first service was that all three of them were ordered
to sea to deal with the pirate Princes.
It was no more than the situation seemed to demand.
Mazarin, with his eye set on the establishment of absolute
monarchy in France, dreaded the infection of Republican-
ism as much as in Elizabethan times Philip II. had dreaded
the infection of heresy. The Cardinal declared that the
cause of the Stuarts was the cause of all kings ; he was
hoping for a coalition to restore the exiled dynasty, and,
so far as his own necessities would permit, was furthering
the growth of the Stuart cause at sea. With the EngHsh
Government the sense of danger was emphasised by a
curious warning which seems to have had its weight. An
old prophecy which was said to have been deposited in
Trinity College, Cambridge, during Ehzabeth's reign was
brought to light. After foretelling the leading events of
European history during the Thirty Years' War and down
to the fall of the Stuarts, it declared that another Charles
would arise, who would appear with a mighty navy on
the shores of his father's kingdom and recover it by the
aid of Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and France. Now it
happened that these were the very powers of which
Mazarin hoped to compose his coalition so soon as his hands
were free from the Spanish war ; and though the coinci-
dence throws doubt on the genuineness of the prophecy, it
must have added to its moral effect.' It is not surprising
therefore to find the Council of State addressing to their
' ' The prophecy of Pauhis Grebnerus,' Domestic Calendar, May 1649.
Mazarin'' s Letters {Documents iMdits), iii. '225, 339 ; and cf. Deane to
Popham, Leyboimie- Popham MSS. Aug. 23, 1649.
202 THE CAMPAIGN AGAIJS^ST EUPERT 1649
Generals, on the eve of sailing, a serious exhortation tluit
Eupert's fleet must be destroyed. It would avail little,
they said, that they kept the seas clear during the
summer with the large force which had been placed at
their command. The prestige of the republic depended
on the Prince's force being utterly shattered so that he
could not boast he had maintained himself in the face of
the whole navy of the Commonwealth.^
Having caught Rupert in Kinsale, the Generals
blockaded him there and resolved to order Popham home
at once, as they were strong enough without him. There
during the whole summer Blake and Deane kept the re-
volted ships, and snapped up a number of others which
they caught cruising with a Stuart commission. No at-
tempt, however, was made to destroy Eupert's fleet in the
harbour, as Leveson had destroyed the Spaniards in Castle-
haven fifty years before ; but this was probably due to the
powerful works with which the harbour had been fortified
since that time, and in any case the sound strategy of the
moment was to preserve the fleet in being, and so prevent
t any communication between Munster and the continent
i till Cromwell's work in Ireland was done. The last con-
. sideration is probably the explanation of the Generals'
apparent lack of enterprise, for Blake at least was ere
long to show how little he feared harbour defences. As
all the ports of Munster had to be watched as well as
Kinsale, there was work enough for the fleet without
risking anything, and it is significant that it was the
Generals at Sea who most strongly urged that Cromwell
should strike south first, in order to reduce the ports and
so relieve the almost intolerable pressure on the fleet.
So convincing indeed were their arguments that it was
' Council of state to the Generals at Sea, May 19, KJiO, Domestic
Calendar, p. loO.
y*
1649 ESCAPE OF RUPERT 203
only through a series of accidents that Ireton was not
detached to Munster from Milford Haven with a wing
of the Lord General's army/
By midsummer the blockading fleet was in so serious
a condition that Deane had to be sent away with part of it
to recruit, and Blake was left alone. For three months
more he hung on/fefiismg, as we have seen, every induce-
ment to let go his prey, till with the approach of the
equinox he found it necessary to send home his largest
vessels. Shifting his flag to a third-rate, he still held his
ground, watching anxiously for Cromwell, whose victorious
army was already pressing southward. His task was now
doubly difficult. As the pressure from the north made
Rupert's position every day less secure, so the boisterous
weather rendered the blockade more difficult, till some
time about the last week in October a gale forced the
blockading squadron to stand off to sea, and by the time
it could gather again Rupert had flown. ^
Seven vessels were all he could carry out. The rest he
was unable either to man or to equip, and he had to leave
them laid up to fall into Cromwell's hands. But his little
fleet still included the revolted navy ships that were left
to him, and, with Scilly for a base, he was still dangerous.
He had told the royal exiles some months before that,
even if he were forced from Kinsale, he doubted not, as he
wrote, ' ere long to see Scilly a second Venice . . . where
after a little we'may^et the King a good subsistence,
and I believe we shall make shift to live in spite of all
' Deane to Popham, July 3, 1649, Leyhourne-Popham MSS. {Hist.
MSS. Coon.) p. 19 ; same to same, Sept. 22, ibid. p. 40 ; cf. Ormonde MSS.
uly 10, ii. 99-102.
- The exact date of bis escape is not certain. Heath's C7jro;iic^t' (p. 254)
gives it as October 24, but the Council of State in London knew of it
on October 27, Domestic Calendar, p. 366. On October 2 they had heard
that three of his vessels had escaped in a storm, but it was not certain that
Bupert was with them, Lcybourne-Popham MSS. p. 43,
204 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 1649
factions.' ^ The Council of State were not a little anxious.
The Canary merchantmen were nearly due in the Channel,
and if Eupert caught them he would have a new fleet at
a stroke, besides the rich spoil. He was actually reported
to be lying off the Land's End waiting for them, but as a
matter of fact he knew the activity of the Generals had
made the Narrow Seas too hot to hold him, and he had
borne away out into the ocean. For a month he was lost
sight of, but on December 1 came news that he was
capturing English merchantmen off the coast of Spain,
and the Generals at Sea immediately received an order to
fit out a squadron of ten sail to hunt him away. And so
was set on foot the fleet that was once more to carry the
English flag into the Mediterranean.
The commander that would naturally have been chosen
was ' Black ' Deane, as he was called, the junior of the
three Generals^. The outlook at the time was so serious
that it was natural to wish to keep the senior ones at
home. The news was that Eupert was off Cadiz, negoti-
ating for permission to sell his prizes in Spanish ports and
use them as he wished. Both in the Spanish Netherlands
and in France similar permission had been granted to
Stuart privateers, and there was every chance that Eupert
would succeed in his desire. As no foreign Government
had yet recognised the Eepublic, negotiations were im-
possible. France was even claiming to treat British
commerce as pirate goods, that were fair game for
every man, and relations in consequence had grown so
severely strained that war was looked for at any moment.
As it happened, Deane was ill. But there was no time to
be lost. Blake was in the west, on his way from Ireland,
and the Council of State, without consulting any one,
ordered him to proceed straight to Portsmouth and take
' Warburton, iii. 220.
/
1650 DANGER OF A NAVAL COALITION 205
up the command without coming to London. At the
same time the Trinity House was ordered to furnish sail-
ing directions for the Mediterranean, and bills were to be
prepared on Leghorn and other places to provide the fleet
with money. ^ .
Clearly a demonstration in the Mediterranean was
intended if the chase should lead thither. The prepara-
tions were pushed on with unprecedented vigour, and
grew as they proceeded. On January 10, 1650, a captain
who had been watching the French coast reported to
Popham a great naval activity. Every one said it was to
feinfofce Rupert, and the anxious officer begged his chief
not to let the fleet that was ordered ' for the Straits ' to
go forth ill-manned. The Secretary of the Admiralty at
the same time assured Popham that his only fear was
that the fleet was too weak to enter the Straits, and that
it was to be doubled. The fact was that Mazarin had
taken alarm. Bordeaux was in rebellion ; he was
blockading it from the sea ; and he had been informed
that the English preparations against Rupert were really
intended for its relief. -
It was but natural that Mazarin should expect from
the men he so deeply despised a repetition of the idle
strategy of Buckingham's war. So obvious was the move
that we can only wonder at the brilliance of the new
spirit that was infusing English policy. In spite of news
of further naval preparations in Ostend and elsewhere,
which might seem to be the beginning of the prophesied
coalition, neither the Government nor the Generals were
to be turned from the true objective. First and foremost
it was Rupert's fleet, and then the Mediterranean, Since
' Domestic Calendar, 424-425, 4«9.
- Captain Keyser to Popham, January 10, 1650 ; Coytmor to Popham
and Blake, January 12, Leybotcrne-Popluivi MSS. 54. Mazarin to the
Due d'Epernon, Lettres, iii. 432. ,„.^^
206 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 16-50
it had become known that it was in a I'ortugiiesc and not
a Spanish port that Rupert had been received, the latter
object became even more remote. Blake was to be hurried
to Lisbon immediately with such ships as could be got
ready, and Popham was to follow in the spring with a
reserve and the bills on Leghorn. There was a possi-
bility that the demonstration in the Mediterranean would
not be necessary, for Spain was already opening her eyes
to the value of an alliance with the Republic as an enemy
of France and Portugal, and Blake was to carry out an
envoy to Madrid. When in February he got to sea his
instructions were mainly concerned with directions to deal
with the Princes and their ' revolted ships,' and with those
of any commander, no matter what his commission, who
attempted to join them.
Meanwhile Kupert at Lisbon had been as active.
With the produce of his captured cargoes he had managed
to thoroughly equip not only his old fleet but also his
three prizes, and he had already dropped down the Tagus
as far as Belem Castle to start on a fresh cruise when
Blake's fleet was seen anchoring just outside in Cascaes
Bay. At the last moment the younger Vane had joined
the fleet as envoy to the King of Portugal, and he was
immediately landed with the Parliament's letter explain-
ing that Blake had been sent out to recover their revolted
warships and punish the pirates who had taken them.
He was followed by the lieutenant of Blake's flagship
with a friendly message pointing out that it was clearly
a special providence that the two arch-pirates had been
detained at Lisbon till his squadron had arrived, and he
trusted, therefore, the King would excuse any hostile
attempt that might be made upon tliem in the harbour,
as there was no other way of making it. It would seem
that in this spirit Blake actually made an attempt to
1650 BLAKE AT LISBON 207
enter the river. But as the finger of Providence was not
so clear to the King of Portugal as it was to the Common-
wealth admiral, warning guns from the batteries forced
him to return to his anchorage and proceed with the
negotiations.
On March 18, about a week after Blake's arrival, Vane
succeeded in making a preliminary agreement, by which,
in case of bad weather, Blake was to be permitted to enter
the river and anchor in Oeiras Bay — the road which lies
between the outer defences of St. Julian's Castle and the
inner at Belem, But no hostilities were to take place,
and he was to retire outside again so soon as the weather
permitted. This of course would never do, and a few
days later Blake sent in his vice-admiral to demand either
the restitution of the revolted ships or permission to seize
them by force where they lay, or in the alternative a
peremptory order for both fleets to leave the harbour at
the same time. If all these proposals were refused he was
to demand liberty of the port in accordance with subsisting
treaties.
Meanwhile, however, an accredited envoy had arrived
from Charles IL, and, in pursuance of the same treaties,
was making demands in the opposite sense, and requesting
the King to refuse all recognition of the Commonwealth.'
For all parties it was a situation of extreme difdculty.
The King could not make up his mind, and Blake
had no real authority, even if he had the power to force
his hand. It looked like another long summer blockade
with the additional danger that any day a French or
some other foreign squadron might appear to join hands
with Kupert. This was what the English Government
chiefly feared, and they were stirring every nerve to get
' Thomas Elyott to John IV. of Portugal, March 19 (n.s.), 1«50, Hodgkiu
MSS. {Hist. MSS. Com. xv. ii.) p. 120.
208 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 1650
the second division out, with Popham in person at its head,
and with such instructions as would leave no room for
hesitation. Still it was not till the middle of April that
he could hoist his flag, and a month more before he finally
cleared the Channel with the ' Kesolution,' a first rate, one
second rate, two fourth rates, and four powerful armed
merchantmen.^
The result of these provoking delays was that what
was feared had happened. Two French men-of-war, of
50 and 28 guns, had appeared off Lisbon to join the
Princes, but their captains mistook the English fleet for
Eupert's, and Blake was able quietly to take possession
of them. Still as yet he had no authority to make
reprisals on the French, and when the King demanded
the release of the vessels he felt bound to let them go
free. It was not till they had joined Rupert that
Blake heard that the Portuguese Court had finally
made up its mind to stand with the Eoyalists. Then
he did not hesitate to act. On May 16, as Popham was
clearing the Channel on his way south, the annual Brazil
fleet, consisting of eighteen sail, came out of the Tagus.
He had no definite instruction to seize Portuguese ships ;
but nine of them were English chartered for the voyage,
and as a British admiral he had the usual authority to
compel the services of all English ships he met. The
nine vessels were therefore stayed, and with the ready
consent of the crews he added them to his force.
Ten days later Popham stood into Cascaes Bay and
showed Blake the additional instructions he had brought.
By these the admirals were authorised to attack the
Princes wherever they found them. If the King of
Portugal offered any objection, they were to make reprisals
- ' Popham's Journal of the voyage is in the Leybourne-PoplMm MSS
p. 61 ct acq.
IG.-iO POPHAM JOINS BLAKE! 209
on all Portuguese ships, and they were further expressly
directed to make general reprisals on the subjects and
ships of the French King. This was tantamount to the
declaration of a naval war with both Portugal and France,
and as the force at the Generals' disposal now consisted
of about twenty navy ships and over a dozen armed
merchantmen, they were quite in a position to make them-
selves felt.
To the King of Spain the situation was eminently
satisfactory. The whole of his naval force that could be
spared from its ordinary duties was being concentrated
at Palermo under Don John of Austria for the recovery
of the places which the French had seized in Tuscany,
and nothing could suit him better than to see England
drawn into a naval war with his two hereditary enemies.
Though he still delayed his recognition of the Common-
wealth, Ascham, its diplomatic agent, had been received
at Cadiz with marked respect, and the Eoyalist envoys
with coldness. This clearing of the diplomatic air was,
however, suddenly checked. Ascham reached Madrid the
very day Popham cast anchor in Cascaes Bay, and on the
morrow he was brutally murdered at his inn by some
cavalier swashbucklers. This outrage was of course un-
known to the Generals ; but before taking any hostile
step against the Portuguese they decided it was better
to send for Vane and provide for his safety. He came
to the fleet, and as soon as he saw what the Parliament's
new instructions were, he determined not to return.
Thereupon a formal demand for the revolted ships was
sent in by Blake's lieutenant, and four days were given
for an answer, so imperious had the note of the Eepublic
become. The time passed without any reply, and when
at last it came it was so unsatisfactory that the Generals
resolved to begiji operations.
VOL. I. P
210
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT
1650
Blake's original division by this time was very short
of water and beverage, and a small French squadron was
reported to be hovering about Cadiz, seeking for an oppor-
tunity of joining Kupert. As a first step, therefore, he
transferred his flag to Popham's ship and sent his own,
the ' George,' with seven more of his squadron to the
southward. They were placed under the command of his
rear-admiral, Kichard Badiley, a seaman officer of whom
a great deal more was to be heard, with instructions to
cruise for the Frenchmen and, after dealing with them,
to procure from Cadiz all that was wanted.' Another
frigate was detached to watch to the northward and
water at the Burlings, while the ' Constant Warwick '
was sent home with Vane to report to the Government.
At the same time reprisals were commenced by seizing
all the fishing boats within reach, and some of these
were armed for inshore work. The main squadron that
was left off Lisbon, thus reduced, consisted chiefly of
merchantmen, and with it the Generals settled down to
the blockade.
Though a few small vessels got through, it proved
very effective, and the only warship that attempted to run
in was captured. Still all June passed away, Badiley's
squadron did not return, and drink got lower and lower.
Inf ormaliion too w'as received that the King of Portugal
was making extensive naval preparations in order to
join Rupert in driving the English off. The rest of
Blake's old division had to be sent north for water, and
the situation was growing critical. It was not till the
middle of July that one of the frigates rejoined from
Cadiz. She had to report that they had found three
ships of the French navy at anchor in Lagos Bay. By
' Gardiner's First Dutch War, i. 2, and Lcyhonrnc-ropham MSS.
p. 67. ,— — -
1650 DIFFICULTIES OF THE BLOCKADE 211
promptly cutting their cables and being clean, two had
escaped, but the third of 36 guns was brought to
action by the 'Adventure,' a ship of equal force, and after
a long engagement forced to surrender. So hard was the
fight, and so heavy the English fire, that she went down
two hours after striking.^ As for the rest of Badiley's
squadron, the Generals were assured they would speedily
rejoin with all that was wanted. It was none too soon.
Four more days passed, and still the wind hung in the
north and kept the longed-for vessels away. To make
matters worse a number of ships were seen dropping down
from Lisbon, till, by the 22nd, more than a score were lying
at anchor in Oeiras Bay, and still there was no sign of the
missing squadron. Truly might the Generals say, as they
wrote home to the Council of State, ' It hath pleased God
in this place to exercise us with various and mixed provi-
dences.'" Four more days passed without any news of
Badiley's ships, nor had any sign of them appeared when
the morning of the 26th broke with a fair wind off the
shore and Kupert was seen coming out. Twenty-six
ships and eighteen caravels could be counted, and against
these the Generals had only ten sail to show besides the
requisitioned Brazil vessels. But they did not hesitate a
moment. The largest of the French ships was leading
with four fire-ships, and about a mile astern of them came
the ' Constant Keformation,' the Prince's flagship. To
' An account of the action is in Gibson's 'Reminiscences' (Gardiner's
First Dutch War, i. 2). As an indicatiou of the English methods of
relying on gun fire, it may be noted that ' the " Adventure " men called on
their captain to board the French ship, which he denied until he could see
the blood run out of their scuppers.' Gibson says there were four ships,
and he is borne out by Gentillot's ' Draft Instructions ' (Guizot, Hist, de la
Ripublig^iie Anglaise, I. app. xvii.). It is there stated that the captain of
the captured ship was the Chevalier de Fonteny, and that he was ' tu^
reellement aprSs la prise.' Possibly, however, this refers to another case.
See a similar story, idost, p. 217, note.
p 2
212 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 1650
avoid the fire-ships the Generals weighed immediately and
stood off to sea, but as soon as a reasonable offing was
obtained they lay to and waited. Still the enemy had
the wind and held on ; but presently it shifted a bit to
the southward. The blockading fleet immediately filled
away, and, having with a short tack secured the weather
gage, made a dash in to cut off the leading ships. But
the moment the enemy saw they had lost the windward
position they drew back, and were soon standing in again
on their course with the Generals in full chase. A few
shots were exchanged, but that was all, and as night fell
the Princes were safe again under the Portuguese guns.
For both sides it was a disappointment. Eupert had
failed to get out and the Generals had failed to bring him
to action. The blockaders had been perhaps too eager,
and next morning, when the attempt was renewed in a
dense fog, the Generals stood off as soon as they discovered
the Prince's purpose. In vain they lay to, and let him
get dead to weather of them, hoping thus to induce him
to attack ; but again the day passed away without result.
The Generals were now getting desperate. They had
but four days' drink left, and could not hold on much
longer. But, as the evening closed in, the situation
changed. Seven sail were seen in the offing, and, in grave
anxiety lest they meant the long-feared relief from France,
the Generals stood out to meet them. They proved to be
Badiley's missing division from Cadiz, and at daylight they
joined. During the morning every captain had all he
needed in abundance, and the whole fleet stood in to
attack. But the wind held stubbornly to the eastward
and every effort was unavailing. That night, however,
they anchored close in with cables short-hauled, hoping
to surprise their enemy in the morning ; but when day
broke there was not a sail to be seen. Rupert had aban-
ItioO BLAKE ENGAGES RUPEET 213
doned his attempt to escape, and the weary blockade had
to begin again.
Not for another month were the Princes able to re-
new their attempt. It was in the first week of Septem-
ber. Blake was alone plying off the Eock of Lisbon
with only ten sail. The Brazil merchantmen had been
sent home as no longer able to keep the sea. Most of
the other ships had just gone with Popham to refit at
Cadiz. ^ The morning of the 7th was again foggy, but
about eleven o'clock Blake was aware that the Portuguese
fleet and part of Bupert's were putting to sea. Then it
would seem he lost them again ; but about four in the
afternoon the fog cleared, and he found himself, with only
two frigates in company, close to the whole of the hostile
fleet, numbering thirty-six sail, with Eupert leading. It
was a perilous position, but ' by God's good providence,'
as Blake wTote, the enemy were to leeward of him.
Without any hesitation at the overwhelming disparity of
numbers, the General bore down to engage the Prince's
ship. Eupert was nothing loath, and, having given orders
to reserve his fire, held on to close in silence. So at last
the two antagonists were at arm's length. Neither would
give way ; but Blake's master pointed out that, holding
as they were, it was very doubtful if they could weather
the Prince. ' Can you stem him ? ' — that is ' ram ' him —
asked the General. ' Yes,' said the master, ' but then we
shall hazard both ships.' ' I'll run that hazard,' Blake
answered, ' rather than bear up for the enemy ; ' and they
held on.2 Seeing a collision was inevitable, Eupert gave
way, and as he bore up Blake, who could trust his gunners
' The absence of Popham is to be inferred from the fact that his flag-
ship was one of the vessels detached, and that Blake alone signed the
despatch relating to the incident. Hist. MSS. Com. xvii. i. 536.
- Gibson's ' Eeminiscences ' in Gardiner's Z)2(^c/i IFa?-, i. 18. Blake to the
Council of State, October 14, 1650, Hist. MSS. Com. xii. i. 536.
214 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT I60O
better than the Prince, let fly. So just was his aim that
Bupert's fore-topmast came crashing down at the cap.
Hopelessly disabled for the moment, the Prince was forced
to bear up into the shelter of the Portuguese fleet, and as
he did so the fog closed down again, and Blake very
wisely bore away to get touch with the rest of his ships.
It was not till next morning that he found them, and
then it was known that once more the Princes had been
forced to withdraw into the Tagus. It was practically
the end of the blockade, and that rift in the mist was
the only chance the two opposing admirals ever had of
looking into the muzzles of each other's guns.
At so late a period of the year it was hopeless to think
of destroying Eupert as he was. But a more effective
method of dealing with the situation was at hand. The
homeward bound fleet from Brazil was daily expected,
and in its capture Blake saw a means of making the
King of Portugal weary of his guest. A month before
the home Government had suggested to the Generals the
advisability of sending a squadron to intercept it at the
Azores, but they had wisely declined to divide their force.
Their wisdom was now to be rewarded. A week after
the encounter with Kupert the Brazil fleet, to the number
of twenty-three sail, was sighted making for the Tagus.
Blake gave chase, and after a three-hours' fight succeeded
in destroying the vice-flagship' ahd^cliptufihg the rear-
admiral and six other vessels, with four thousand chests
of sugar and four hundred prisoners. Having administered
this sharp chastisement to the Portuguese Government,
he carried his prizes into Cadiz and left the Tagus open.
The reason of this move is nowhere given. Blake has
been blamed for its consequences, but there was certainly
much to be said for the course he took. The situation
which the Commonwealth had to face when Blake began
1650 BLAKE TAKES A NEW LINE 215
his campaign had entirely changed. Ireland had been
reduced to submission ; Scotland had been paralysed by
Cromwell's victory at Dunbar ; and tlie^great Koyalist
reactioiTj'whicE Eupert's fleet had been designed to sup-
port from the 'sea,~was wellin hand without his having
been able to give it any real assistance. Between them
the Generals at Sea had been able to prevent any danger-
ous concentration round his flag, and he was reduced to the
position of a mere buccaneer. Whatever Blake's infor-
mation may havTlbeEliTTIe' might justly have concluded
that the King of Portugal would now be only too glad to
get rid of so costly and discredited a guest, and that the
best chance of finally destroying him was to see him a
friendless wanderer on the high seas. In British waters
he could do no harm, for Popham was back there with
his division ; and if he attempted to find refuge in the
Mediterranean, Blake at Cadiz was in a position to
chase with a practical certainty of success. Short there-
fore of forcing the King of Portugal to deliver up his
supplicant, a course he was most unlikely to take, Blake
could not have done better than give him a chance of
honourably getting rid of the Prince's presence.
How lightly Blake regarded Eupert's force is clear from
the dispositions he now made. Popham, as has been
said, had already gone home to resume TTTs duties in the
Channel. Five more vessels, including his flagship, were
now detached under Captain Badiley to escort home the
Brazil prizes and a convoy of Levant merchantmen that
had rendezvoused within the Straits at Malaga. Blake
himself, with the seven ships that remained, resolved to
stay out a month or more longer, contrary to all pre-
cedent, ' to do the Commonwealth ' — so he wrote — ' all
the service I can hereabout or elsewhere, as the providence
of God shall direct me.' There can be no doubt he was
216 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 1650
thoroaghly prepared for what followed. Shortly after
the capture of the Brazil ships some kind of unofficial
negotiations seem to have been commenced with the
Court of Lisbon for a preliminary arrangement bj^ which
reprisals were to cease on condition that Rupert's fleet
should no longer receive protection in Portuguese har-
bours. The result of these overtures, according to
Royalist authority, was that some time in September
the Princes were formally requested to leave. ^
It was on October 12 that they put to sea with six
sail, and for some days, as it would appear, they hung
about off the Tagus looking for a Frenchman who was
expected to join them. Blake at all events got no news
of the movement. Not expecting his recent feat to have
so immediate an effect, he was still in Cadiz busil}'
cleaning his ships for the winter cruise. It was not till
two days after Rupert had put to sea that Badilcy's
squadron started for home, and on the morrow a despatch
vessel arrived from England which put Blake into im-
mediate activity. What the message was that it brought
is not certain, but there can be little doubt that it ordered
him to turn his attention to active reprisals upon the
French. Under cover of the exiled'^King's flag they had
continued to prey on the commerce of the Commonwealth
in a manner that was scarcely removed from piracy. They
had imprisoned her merchants and confiscated their goods.
In vain the English Government had protested, and at
last its patience was exhausted. It was not till the
day the de-;patch vessel reached Blake that the Judges of
the Admiralty reported, apparently in answer to French
protests, that justice had been demanded in the French
courts and had been refused, and that therefore general
reprisals were perfectly lawful. Their decision was a
' Wiuburton, iii. 31o.
/
1650 BLAKE'S CHIVALRY 217
foregone conclusion, and the Council of State could hardly
have waited for it before letting Blake know what was
coming. At all events, the moment he received the
despatches he hoisted his flag in the ' Phoenix,' a fourth
rate, and with three other frigates, which were all he had
ready for sea, hurried out to take up a station in the
Straits' mouth. Here, after a four days' cruise, he fell in
with a French navy ship of 36 guns, under the com-
mand of a certain Chevalier de la Lande. Deceived
by seeing the Admiral's flag flying on the ' Phcenix ' into
believing himself overmatched, the Chevalier came aboard
to surrender ; but, on seeing how weak the ship was, }
instead of delivering his sword he began to insinuate he
had been trepanned into coming aboard. Therefore
Blake, in a spirit of almost Quixotic chivalry more charac- '
teristic of an Elizabethan than a hard-headed Parlia-
mentary officer, told the Frenchman to return to his ship
and fight it out. He did so, but nothing could induce
his crew to handle a gun, and finally he had to come ]
aboard again and surrender his ship — ' of such dread,' writes
a seaman of the time, ' was the English courage and sea '
conduct then.' ^ »
' This story, which was told shortly by Whitelocke, has been of late
years dismissed by naval historians as utterly incredible, mainly because
neither Blake nor his captain, Saltonstall, mentions it {Hist. MSS. Cutn.
xiii. i. 538, -543). Blake merely says, ' After some dispute he yielded upon
quarter.' But Whitelocke's story is confirmed and explained by the
recently discovered ' Reminiscences ' of Gibson {Dutch War, i. 7). The
prize, which was brought into the navy as the ' Success,' was the ' Jules,' a
vessel that had been serving before Bordeaux under the command of M. le
Chevalier de la Lande (Jal, Du Qiiesnc, i. 182, and Gentillot's draft instruc-
tions, Guizot, Hist, dc la Republiquc Anglaise, i. Ji'^J. xvii. 465). Blake
says he was ' brother to him that was sunk by the "Adventure" frigate.'
These two brothers seem to have been among the most active French
ofiicers who had been preying on English commerce. The French have an
incredible story that one of them, some time before this, had endeavoured
to force an English squadron to lower their flags to his own, and, being
captured for his temerity, was there and then beheaded for a pirate (Jal,
218 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT 1650
We may assume that this was the vessel that Eupert
was looking for. It was certainly the object of Blake's
move, and he immediately returned to Cadiz to pick up
the rest of his ships and to add the prize to his squadron.
No step could have been more unlucky. It was on
October 20 that the Frenchman was captured, and a week
later intelligence reached Blake at Cadiz that on the
'26th Kupert had appeared at Malaga and attempted to
destroy some English merchantmen in the harbour.
While Blake's back was turned the Princes, having failed
to find their French consort, had entered the Straits
without her. It was their only chance. ' Being destitute
of a port,' wrote one of their followers, ' we take the
confines of the Mediterranean for our harbours, poverty
and despair being companions, and revenge our guide.'
In a moment Blake was on their heels. There was
no time to get the prize ready, and it had to be left
I - behind. With his other seven ships he reached Malaga
on the 30th, and the same day was away again for Alicante.
He had heard that Rupert had lawlessly burnt some
English vessels in Velez Malaga, in spite of the Spanish
il ^ protests, and had passed on.' 'I intend,' he wrote home
under sail, ' God willing, to pursue as far as Providence
shall direct.' He had clean freshly-victualled ships to his
hand and had nothing to stop him. On November 2,
after turning Cape Gata, he captured another Frenchman
of twenty guns, and on the morrow, close to Cape Palos,
he fell in with the ' Eoebuck ' of Rupert's squadron, and
oj). cit. p. 187j. The Chevalier is again mentioned in an unsavoury piece of
intelligence work in Mazarin's Letters, iii. 761.
' The excuse which liupert is said to have given for defying the port
authorities was that he wanted to catch Captain Morley, ' one of the four
and chiefest traitors who had signed the sentence of death of the King of
Great Britain, his uncle ' (//^s^ MSS. Com. xiii. i. 548). No one of that
name signed the death warrant.
1650 BLAKE ENTEKS THE STRAITS
forced her to strike. The next night he chased two more
of the Prince's vessels, with two prizes in company,
into Cartagena. The fact was that Eupert, finding the
Governors"'oT the Spanish ports were determined not to
submit to his lawless depredations, had retired towards the
Balearic islands, with the intention of cruising between
the islands and the Spanish coast. "While thus engaged
he was overtaken by a gale that scattered his force, and
some of them had stood in towards the coast, while he
and his brother in the ' Keformation ' and ' Swallow '
had held on for the rendezvous he had appointed in the
almost deserted island of Formentara. There, under a
stone marked with a white flag, he left directions for his
consorts to find him. The paper still exists.^ It orders
that all prizes shall be carried to Sardinia, and thence,
if he was not found in Cagliari Bay, his captains were to
send to him for further instructions to the port which he
had already fixed for his destination. As Blake suspected,
it was Toulon, and thither the two Princes presently made
their way.
Meanwhile Blake had put into Cartagena, and, having
driven ashore another of Kupert's ships that was en-
deavouring to enter the harbour, was demanding the
surrender of the others in no humble key. ' It is of very
high consequence to the Parliament of England,' he wrote
to the Governor, ' and may be of no small concernment to
his Majesty (the King of Spain) to give this business a
speedy and present despatch, that, being master of these
ships which are come into this harbour, I may be at
liberty to pursue, and by God's blessing to seize upon,
the remainder of their strength before they join them-
selves with the French, which is likely to be their last
refuge.'
' Wclbeck MSS. {Mid. MSS. Com. xiii. i.) 539. It is dated Nov. 5-15.
./
220 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT I60O
It was an argument well calculated to appeal to the
Spanish Government, and Blake's broad appreciation of
the political significance of his fleet is another mark of
his high qualifications as an admiral. It will be remem-
bered that Don John had been gathering at Messina a
fleet to take advantage of the command of the sea which
the troubles in France had left in Spanish hands. The
opportunity had been used with success, and during the
summer he had recovered all that the Spaniards had lost
in Tuscany. On Michaelmas day, however, Mazarin
had succeeded in arranging a pacification by which
Bordeaux had returned to its allegiance. The sore which
the Spaniards had kept open so long was healed, and at
such a moment an addition to the French strength in the
Mediterranean was the last thing they wished to see.
The situation equally emphasised the importance of being
on the best possible terms with the new military republic
which was so viciously showing its teeth within the
Straits. Accordingly, the officials at Cartagena were
extremely polite, but protested they could do nothing
without instructions, and finally induced Blake to consent
to hold his hand till they had communicated with Madrid.
But for this Rupert's men dared not wait. The next
day they made a desperate attempt to get to sea, and, in
endeavouring to weather the blockading force, were all
driven ashore and totally wrecked.
It was enough for Blake. Contenting himself with
writing a letter to the King to demand the guns, cables,
and anchors of the wrecked ships, he left one of his
vessels with the two French prizes to receive them, and
himself sailed in chase of Kupert and Maurice. He had
captured papers which disclosed the rendezvous in the
Balearic islands, and there he sought his quarry. As we
know, the Princes were already flown, but Blake must
1650 ITS POLITICAL RESULTS 221
have discovered Eupert's fresh instructions, and perhaps
proceeded as far as Sardinia in search of him. At all
events, it was not till after a three weeks' cruise that he
was back at Cartagena, where he must have learned that
the Princes had been received in Toulon and were out of
his reach.
But his work was done and he might well rest satis-
fied with its result. ' Indeed,' wrote one of his captains,
' the Lord hath proved us exceedingly, since we have had
little of the arm of the flesh amongst us — I mean, since
our great and powerful fleet of so many ships were
reduced only to a little squadron of ten ships under the
command of Colonel Blake : for since then we have taken
the Brazil fleet, and after that, our squadron being now
but three ships and four frigates, we have taken three
French ships and destroyed and taken all Eupert's
ships, seven in number, only two now remaining. And
thus hath God owned us in the midst of our implacable
enemies, so that the terror of God is amongst them. Five
chaseth a hundred, and ten a thousand, which is marvel-
lous in our eyes. The Spaniards are now exceeding kind
unto us.' It was true enough. If they had been friendly
ever since Popham and Blake took a high hand with
Portugal, they were almost obsequious now. The pariah
state had stretched out its hand into the Mediterranean
and could no longer be ignored. On the very day the
pious captain vinrote his letter, Philip IV. recognised
the Commonwealth by signing letters of credence for an
ambassador who was to proceed to London in order to
apologise for Ascham's murder, and to promise the punish-
ment of the culprils^ and shelter for the English fleets in
Spanish ports. Portugal too was hurrying off an agent to
try to come to terms, and it could not be long before the
rest would have to do the same. Blake's work was indeed
222
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUPERT
1650
done, and shortly afterwards he wont round to Cadiz to
return home.
But of all this nothing was known at home ; even his
exploit on the Brazil fleet had not yet been heard of in
London. All the Government knew was that Kupert
had escaped from Lisbon, and their faith in the soldier
Ithey had trusted was broken. By a strange irony, as
Blake was in the act of destroying Eupert's fleet as an
effective force, they were sending out to supersede him.
The officer selected was William Penn, a seaman born
and bred, who, though not yet thirty years old, had for the
past two or three years been serving the Parliament as a
flag-officer on the Irish station. His instructions were to
go South with such ships as could be spared from the
Winter Guard, take over from Blake any of his squadron
that might still be fit for sea, and order him home.'
The appointment is highly significarifT From his
boyhood Penn had been carefully trained under his father
for the naval service. All his life he had been afloat,
and the selection of such a man, who indeed was des-
tined to live as the typical representative of the old
seaman school, marks in the clearest possible way the
revulsion of feeling that was going on at headquarters.
For the moment it looked as though the Commonwealth
was about to abandon its policy of soldier admirals. But
their distrust of the Coldriel who was to shed so much
lustre on their naval administration did not last long.
Even before Penn had actually left the Channel with
his first division the Council of State had received Blake's
letter from Malaga, announcing that he had entered the
Mediterranean, and meant, God willing, to pursue the
Princes wherever Providence should direct.^
• Council of State to Blake, Nov. 2, 1650. Thurloe, S.P. 1. IGfi.
- Council of State Proceedings, Dec. 13, 1050. Du)u. Cal. p. 468.
y
1650 THE COLONEL'S TEIUMPH 223
It was enough to show them the mistake they were
making. Penn's instructions were modified, and fresh
orders were sent to Blake to stay where he was with the
force he had at his command and finish what he had
begun so well ; and finally, when the second division of
Penn's fleet sailed, it carried orders that he was to place
himself under Blake's command. With Blake in the
Mediterranean, and in such a temper as his letter disclosed,
there was nothing to fear. ' The seven ships left with
Colonel Blake,' wrote Vane to Cromwell, ' are very likely
to be the total ruin of Eupert's fleet and a great terror to
the French. This hath made the Spaniard solemnly
acknowledge us. Portugal likewise stands knocking at
the door. . . .' So they rightly read the effect of their flag
bemg'displayed within the Straits. In the same week
that they sent Blake his new orders and Penn cleared the
Channel, the French agent, who was trying to treat un-
officially, was ordered to quit the kingdom, the Portu-
guese envoy was refused a hearing, and the new Spanish
Ambassador, in solemn act before Parliament, recognised
the pariah state.
As it happened, the new orders for Blake never reached
him, but none the less did he reap the reward of what he
had already achieved. On January 8, 1651, his proceedings
were approved by Parliament, and he was ordered to be
thanked. Early in February he was back in England.
On the 13th he had the honour of making his relation to
the House of ' the wonderful appearance of the powerful
hand of God with him in his service at sea,' and was
thereupon voted a grant of a thousand pounds * for his
great and faithful service.'
,J
CHAPTEE XIV
THE FIRST MEDITEERANEAN SQUADRON
Blake's return in modest triumph at the beginning of
1651, and the sailing of the two squadrons that were to
reHeve him, mark the definite adoption by England of a
polic}^ of activity in the Mediterranean. Through the
half century that had come to an end we have traced
the complex forces that had been drawing her reluctantly
to her destiny. We have seen her appearing in her new
sphere, at first piratically, in spite of herself, much as she
had begun her career upon the ocean. We have watched
the effects of that appearance as it rapidly revolutionised
the old Italian conditions by the dominating power of the
sailing war-vessel and the seamanship of the North. One
by one, every government that had its seat around the
land-girt sea was made to feel the meaning of the change,
and with every shift of European politics we have heard
some fresh voice calling down the Northern powers to
adjust the scale. Every time that call was answered,
however faintly, we have seen the great continental
struggle change its stride as soldiers and diplomatists,
barely conscious of the cause, shifted uneasily at their
work from end to end of Europe. There had been
moments when it seemed that England, by using the
arena that was opened to her, might have interfered
almost like a deus ex machina. Yet still she held back, as
she has done soberly before almost every decisive step
that has led her to greatness.
lCv,\ RECAPITUI.ATrnN 2:'».'5
But now her hour had come, and the new and vigorous
blood that was tinghng in the veins of her Government
set her boldly forward. The revorting~sacrifice with
which she had consecrated her liberties had outraged
all Europe. By general consent she was treated as an
outcast among nations, and scarcely had the new ad-
ministration recognised its ostracism before it saw the
way to bring Europe to reason. Spain was the first to
fall ; for of all the great powers she was the one that lay
most exposed to the new weapon. She had besides an
hereditary dread of English enmity, and her exhausting
struggle witH ' Erahc e had done everything to emphasise
the importance of an English alliance. Still so violent
was her antipathy to the regicide Government, that even
in the depth of her distress she could not bring herself
to hold out a hand. Yet, with the first exhibition of
the new force that the Commonwealth was able to display,
her reserve had broken down. Blake had but to enter
the Mediterranean and deliver his sounding ])low on
RuperV~tof ' all hesitation to vanish, and in a month or
two a special ambassador was in London, and the outcast
Government had been recognised by what was still re-
garded_ as the proudest and most po^^■e^ful Court in
Europe. Small wonder then if the Commonwealth, in
spite of the serious calls upon its navy in the Narrow
Seas, resolved to continue the policy which Blake had so
successfully inaugurated.
It must not be supposed, however, that this policy was
adopted entirely or quite consciously for political reasons.
It was rather a reaction of that great internal change
which, as we have seen,, finally established the navy on its
modern footing. Henceforward the national navy was to
be a regular force of Government ships, built and main-
tained for war alone. In sympathy with the growth of
VOL. I, "" Q
226
THE FIRST MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON 1651
standing armies, merchantmen, however powerful, were
to be relegated to the position they have occupied ever
since. Though still to be used as occasional auxiliaries,
they were no longer to be counted on for the strength of
the navy, but, on the contrary, were to be regarded as one
of its burdens. No change in our naval history is greater
or more far-reachingTKan tliis. It was no mere change
of organisation ; it was a revolution in the fundamental
• , conception of naval defence. For the first time the pro-
tection of the mercantile marine came to be regarded
almost as the chief end for which the regular navy existed,
/ and the whole of naval strategy underwent a profound
modification in English thought.
In Spain this idea of the functions of a navy had
existed from the time when Philip II. had revived his
marine for the protection of his oceanic commerce. In
the Mediterranean it had also existed since the rise of the
Mussulman corsairs ; but France and the Italian states,
no less than Spain, had confined it practically to opera-
tions within the Straits. Similarly, although the germ
of the idea had always existed in England, it had been
confined to the Narrow Seas. For nearly two centuries
it had been the custom for the royal navy to provide a
regular escort, or ' wafters ' as they were called, for the
annual wine and wool fleets in the Bay of Biscay, the
Channel, and the North Sea ; but all ships trading to the
Levant had been expected to take care of themselves.
The other Northern powers had acted on the same
principle. Of late years, it is true, the Dutch had some-
what extended the theory by maintaining a regular squad-
ron about the Straits, and we have seen how James I.
attempted to do the same. The effort came to little, for
it was premature so long as the old theory of a navy
existed. To the Commonwealth it was left to add the
1650 NEW VIEW OF COMMERCE PROTECTION 227
lasting reform to all the others which it attempted with
less success, and it was the consequent revolution in
strategy that perhaps even more than purely political
considerations pushed her into the Mediterranean.
The revolution cannot be too strongly insisted on. It
is the failure to appreciate its importance that has led to
the keynote of the naval policy of the time being so little
noticed. When strategists""^" the~seventeenth century
spealTof the Mediterranean, it is almost always in terms
of commerce protection, and we are thus inclined to miss
the political significance that underlay their utterance.
We forget that so soon as the mercantile marine became
a recognised burden on the navy, the main lines of
commerce became also the main lines of naval strategy,
and the crossing of the trade routes its focal points.
Thus, although strategists, for the purpose of commending
their views to the public and the Treasury, naturally wrote
in terms of commerce, w^e must never forget that what
they were really aiming at was the command of the sea
by the domination of the great ~"ffade" routes "and the
acquisition of focal points as naval stations.
Before ever Blake had entered the Mediterranean we
see the process at work. It will be remembered that
when, in 1650, he was alone before Lisbon, he had requi-
sitioned out of the Portuguese Brazil fleet some English
merchantmen to strengthen his blockading squadron.
These vessels he and Popham subsequently sent home as
being unfit in their opinion for active operations with the
navy ships. This was in September. On the last day of
October Parliament passed an act for adding fifteen per
cent, to the customs, and directing that the money so
raised should be used in defraying the cost of regular men-
of-war to convoy merchantmen, and early in December
Captain Hall was appointed to command a squadron for
Q 2
L>28
THE FIRST MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
l()r,o
convoy duty to the Mediterranean. The immediate cause
of this memorable departure was the reckless way in
which the French were making use of the Stuart flag to
prey on British commerce. At the time the act was
passed it was said that French privateers had captured or
destroyed five thousand tons of English shipping, together
with some four hundred guns and cargoes valued at half
a million. It is true the contra side of the account was
mounting up rapidly since general reprisals had been
authorised, but it was clear the force of private merchant-
men, which had so long sufficed, would no longer serve
against the growing excellence of the French men-of-war.
Thus, when Penn was ordered to supersede Blake,
he was gi^'^n to understand that a second division would
follow him under Hall in a month or two. The under-
standing was apparently that Hall was to regard himself
as under Penn's flag, with the restriction that Penn was
to have no power to divert Hall's ships from their special
convoy duties in the Mediterranean. As we have seen,
the final instructions which Penn received before sailing
had been largely modified. Instead of superseding Blake
he was merely ordered to attempt" the capture of a second
Brazil fleet, which the Government knew was on its way
home. In view of Blake's blockade of Lisbon they ex-
pected that the Portuguese authorities would stop the ships
at the Azores. At the Azores, therefore, Penn was ordered
to take up his station. He was given to understand that
his further instructions would be sent to him at Vigo in
Galicia, and whether or not he was able to intercept his
quarry, he was to be at Vigo without fail In^ the end of
December.'
' Popham and Deane to Penn, November 10, 1650; M'elbcck MS S. ii.
70. In the same volume is a rough extract of his journal, which, with
the fuller extracts in Penn's Life of Penn, i. 317 et seq., is the chief
authority for his long cruise. -
>
1651 PENN'S SQUADRON 229
He had but four frigates with hiin, for these were all
that could be spared from the Irish and Western squadrons
which he had been commanding. Captain Jordan, now
one of the most trusted of the Commonwealth's officers,
was to bring him out for a flagship the recently launched
' Fairfax ' so soon as she was ready for sea. So well timed
was his sailing that, even before he reached his station, he
fell in with and captured a Brazil ship. To his deep chagrin,
however, it proved to be only a straggler from the main
fleet of sixty-three sail, and he knew it must have already
passed the islands. To retrieve his ill-luck he was for
immediately giving chase, but an obstinate easterly wind
held him to the Azores. A fortnight later the ' Fairfax '
and a small frigate found him still windbound. Nor was
it till the first week in February that he was able to stand
over for the Portuguese coast. Not having been able to
reach Vigo by the appointed time, he had not received
any further instructions, but he expected to get them
from Hall's division, which was now due to join. As he
approached the coast he spoke a Dutch convoy homeward
bound from Cadiz, and then, to his great surprise, he learnt
for the first time that neither Blake nor any of his fleet
were on the station. He was believed to have gone home,
leaving four of his fleet to watch the Tagus.
Meanwhile, as we know, Blake had reached England
to report his success. But even before his arrival the
Government had learnt that the Princes had been winter-
ing in Toulon under French protection. Upon this,
Blake's brother Benjamin was hurried out in the ' Assur-
ance,' in company with Captain Ball in the ' Adventure,'
to reinforce Penn and to order him to) immediately carry
his squadron into the Straits anddeal with Kupert.
These urgent instructions the two frigate captains left at
the appointed rendezvous at Vigo, and, not finding Penn
230 THE FIRST MEDTrERRAXEAN SQUADRON 1651
there, they passed down the coast and cruised in company
before Lisbon.^ Here Penn arrived in search of Kobert
Blake and his fleet on February 21, and spoke the ' Assur-
ance,' but Benjamin Blake did not know or did not choose
to tell the purport of the orders he had brought out, and
Penn had to send back to Vigo to fetch them. Two days
later he fell in with the ' Adventure,' and from Captain
Ball he learned for the first time that he was not to super-
sede Blake, but to act under his orders (' for which,' he
said handsomely, ' I am not sorry '). Subject to Blake's
orders, however, he was given liberty to cruise as far as
Gibraltar and Malaga.
It was evident that these instructions must have
been penned before it was known that Blake was return-
ing home. They clearly contemplated the two admirals
acting in concert, which was now impossible. Penn
was consequently in doubt, under the changed conditions,
whether he ought to enter the Straits or to take Blake's
place on the Portuguese coast. His desire was certainly to
remain where he was ; but on the morrow Hall appeared
with his division in charge of the Levant convoy, and the
instructions he brought made it clear to Penn that while
Hall went up the Straits with the convoy, he himself
was also to enter the Mediterranean in search of Bupert.
He could no longer doubt that this was the effect of
the orders that had been left at Vigo, and after a short
consultation he decided to uncover Lisbon, and go down
to Cadiz to revictual and clean for the chase.
' Richaicl Gibson, in his ' Reminiscences ' (Gardiner, Dutch War, p. 17),
Kays he was cruising four months in Benjamin ]>lake's ship before I'enn
appeared. Tliis would make him sail from England in September IGoO, but
we know the order to commission the two frigates was not issued till
November 15 (Dom. Cal. Commnmvealth, ii. TyOO). The two frigates probably
sailed in December, so as to reach Vigo at the end of the month, when
Penn was expected to be there.
1651 PENN DISAPPROVES HIS ORDERS 231
Thus reluctantly he had forced upon him the honour
of conducting the first true Mediterranean squadron.
His disapproval of the move he could not conceal, but
whether his objections were purely strategical may be
doubted. As a sailor admiral his mind worked still in
the old grooves which Drake at his best had vainly tried
to break up. He was wedded to the false but profitable
game of commerce destruction, and he did not scruple to
say so. True, in acknowledging his orders he based his
objections on the fact that Lisbon was almost reduced to
famine by the blockade, and practically at his mercy ; but
it was on prizes that his mind was harping. ' Already,'
he lamented, ' we have seized more vessels than we have
been days before it, and I am confident that in one month
we should have taken as many as we could well have
manned.' Smarting under the disappointment of having
so narrowly missed the Brazil fieet, he seemed incapable
of appreciating the wider strategy of the Council of State
or to see there was higher game stirring. Still, orders
had to be obeyed, and for Penn it must at least be said
that he obeyed them loyally.
By March 1 he was in Cadiz, busy refitting his fleet.
Hall had also put in there with his convoy, and before
such a display of force the Spaniards were more than
ever polite. ' Your fleets meeting here,' wrote Hall in his
despatch, 'so soon after the departure of the other [that
is, Blake's] is of no less admiration to other foreign
kingdoms (into which reports fly to them daily) than to
Spain, who much admire your quickness in such strength
and fresh supplies. So as I believe in a short time the
Spaniards, between fear and love, wiU grow respectful to
us, though hitherto we have had little sign of it, more
than compliments which we fail not to equalise them in.' ^
' Penn, i. 325-330.
./
232 THE FIRST MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON 1651
On March 13 Hall passed on his way up the Straits
with his convoy, but it \^■as not till the end of the month
that Penn had his whole squadron ready, and on the 29th
he entered the Mediterranean with eight sail, ' intending,'
as he wrote, ' (with God's assistance) to find Prince
Eupert out, and endeavour the destroying of him and his
adherents.'
In Toulon the Princes had succeeded in refitting the
' Eeformation ' and ' Swallow ' and two other vessels, and
in persuading another English captain to join their flag.
Mazarin had found it necessary to go back from Riche-
lieu's policy, and the exigencies of his struggle with the
great feudal families had forced him to conciliate one of
them by granting the office of Grand Master of Naviga-
tion to the Due de Vendome. To him Rupert applied
for assistance and received permission freely to use the
port and its stores in return for the money realised by the
sale of his prizes. This permission, however, was accom-
panied by a curious change in Rupert's line of action which
is highly significant. ' His Highness,' says his chronicler,
after relating what had passed at Toalon, ' seeing himself
reduced to three sail, strained the utmost of his treasure
and bought another, which was named the " Honest
Seaman," and being but weak in ships endeavoured to be
strong in men. Before his levy was perfect an English
gentleman called Captain Craven, who had a ship at
Marseilles, took commission under his Highness, and
joined with the fleet, which, being at anchor with the rest
of his fleet, was named the " Loyal Subject." Thus, with
a squadron of five ships, conceiving all disasters past, he
fixed his resolution to take revenge on the Spaniard.' '
Of this determination no explanation is given. Instead
of continuing to strike directly at English commerce, he
' Warburton, iii. 323.
16ol EUPERT AND MAZARIN 233
had apparently resolved to deal with the Spaniards for
giving the regicides liberty of their ports, as Blake had
dealt with the Portuguese for receiving the cavalier fleet.
The seamen seem to have been clearly under the im-
pression that they were to wage war on Spain, and this is
perhaps why he succeeded in filling up his crews so well.
British sailors were always poor politicians. They did
not like~figEting tTi^iF^wn~countrymen, whatever the
cause, but were always ready enough to fight Spaniards,
especially as that way plunder was the easiest come by.
Kupert's aim, however, did not end there. It was far
more ambitious. He had secretly made up his mind that,
after obtaining all he could on the Spanish coast, he would
go out to the West Indies. There he intended to support
the British colonies ffiat still recognised the King, and
so rekindle the war from that distant base. But so soon
as he opened his mind to his companies he found them
strongly opposed to any such course, and bent on remain-
ing in Spanish waters. It is clear, then, that the declared
objective of the little squadron when it sailed was Spanish
commerce, and it is quite possible that it was on this
understanding that Kupert received permission to use the
Toulon dockyard. Mazarin, since the battle of Dunbar,
had nearly lost hope of the royal cause, and though he
could not bring himself to adopt the advice of .hisjagent
in England and recognise the Commoii wealth, he was
doing his best to stop the disastrous reprisals in which
the two countries were engaged at sea. The sailing of
Penn's fleet can only have increased his anxiety to come
to terms. It was followed by the alarming news that
Philip had forestalled him in recognising the Common-
wealth, and he was warned by his agents that England
was on the brink of entering into an offensive alliance
with Spain. At the same time he was still losing ground
234 THE FIRST MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON 1651
to the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, and nothing seems
more Hkely than that the condition of the assistance that
was given to Rupert was that he was to use his force in
weakening Spain, and not in giving further provocation
to the Commonwealth.
Whether or not some such condition had been exacted
from Eupert, it is clear he had little intention of abiding
by it. When he sailed in the spring he steered to the
eastward, giving out that his destination was the Levant.
This was all the information of his movements that Penn
was able to pick up when, after failing to find him among
the Balearic islands and capturing a few French prizes, he
too proceeded to the eastward. On May 1 he had heard
from the Governor of Minorca that Eupert had been
ready for sea some three weeks past. He therefore made
for Sardinia as the best chance of getting in contact with
him, and of falling in with the French privateers who
had taken to lying there for the English Levant traders.
At Cagliari there was still no news of the chase, and all he
could learn was that the King of France had engaged to
lend the Princes three ships. For ten days he cruised
between Sardinia and the Barbary coast, till, having
assured himself his enemy had not passed eastward, he
resolved to bear up along the east side of Sardinia and
Corsica and lie off Toulon. In this way he made sure he
would lay hold of some French man-of-war and get more
certain information of Eupert's course. Subsequently
he decided to put into Leghorn on his way, in order to
communicate with the British Consul there, and the very
day he arrived, May 25, a galley came in from Toulon
bringing the Consul letters to the effect that Eupert with
his five vessels and a fire-ship had sailed on the 7th, the
same day that Penn had reached Sardinia.
So soon therefore as he had watered and sent off his
1651 RUPERT EVADES PENN 235
despatches to the Council of State, he ran back southward,
and after setting apart a Friday ' to seek the Lord in
public,' he took up his station off Trapani at the western
end of Sicily. There for a whole month he cruised in
the narrows of the Mediterranean between Bizerta, Malta,
and the Sicilian coast. Several valuable prizes were his
reward, the richest of which, a 200-ton ship of 18 guns
from Marseilles, full of treasure, he captured in a calm.
The way in which it was done deserves recording as
a testimony to the versatility of Penn and his officers.
There being no wind to overhaul the chase, three of the
frigates were fitted with oar-ports between the guns, and
thus temporarily turned into vessels of free movement.
In this way he was able, with the help of the boats towing,
to overhaul and capture his prize. This feat was all the
more satisfactorj^, for it was afterwards found that in a
good breeze she could outsail any of the English vessels
by a main-top sail.^ But of the Princes he could hear
nothing. Nor was it till the end of July that he knew
his prayers and his activity had been alike unavailing.
Putting into Messina, he found letters awaiting him from
the Consul at Leghorn, saying that the Princes had been
seen off Cadiz. The fact was, Eupert's easterly course had
been a mere ruse, but it had succeeded in outwitting Penn.
Rupert had never passed to the eastward of Corsica at
all, but had run directly down to the African coast just
when the false intelligence he had spread had made Penn
move to Sardinia out of his way. Stealing westward
along the Barbary shore, while Penn was running north
to Leghorn and Hall was far up to the eastward, he had
quietly cleared the Straits without hindrance. Then, after
trying in vain to light on a Spanish prize on the Anda-
lusian coast, he had held off to Madeira out of harm's way.
' Penii, Life ojf Penn, ii. App. M.
236 THE FIRST MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON 1651
Thus, though Penn's chase had failed in its iiiain
object, he had successfully covered the Levant trade and
had driven Rupert out of the Mediterranean. It was all
that"~was needed. Out on the ocean it was impossible for
such a squadron as Eupert's to live long. By shipwreck,
disease, and disaffection his force began inevitably to melt
away, and though he did eventually reach the West Indies
he was never again a real danger. The whole episode, in
fact, was a kind of foretaste of Nelson's duel with Ville-
neuve, and Bupert's move to the West Indies proved as
disastrous to the Eoyalist cause at sea as did A^illcneuve's
to that of Napoleon. Unlike Nelson, Penn did not take
the strong step of leaving his station in pursuit, but like
him he moved to the Straits. On his way he fell in with
part of the Dutch Mediterranean squadron and received
from the ofhcer in command the deliberately false informa-
tion that on June 30 he had seen Rupert's squadron off
the Lizard heading up Channel. The news was not
credited, and as there were rumours that the French New-
foundland fish fleet was coming into the Mediterranean,
Penn decided to hold the Straits to waylay it. A fort-
night later he received news of the ' crowning mercy' at
Worcester by which Cromwell had given the death-blow
to tEeRoyalist cause. Rupert was therefore less than
ev^" a danger, but at home the Princes were still believed
to be on the Spanish coast, and with the good news Penn
received orders from the Council of State that he was to
devote himself to their destruction. A fevv days later
he obtained information that they were at the Azores,
but still he clung to Gibraltar, being sure they must
sooner or later make their w^ay back. Moreover, by hold-
ing the Straits he had the best chance of making prizes.
Throughout the whole campaign this idea of the object of
naval warfare had never ceased to confuse his judgment.
16r,l RESULT OF PENN'S CRUISE 287
But in view of the intelligence he had of the unsea-
worthiness of Kupert's best ships and of the fact that
a squadron under Ayscue had been ordered to the West
Indies, it is difficult to say his decision was not right.
He' must at least be credited with the tenacity of the
convictions which fastened him to the station he had
chosen all through the winter, and the skill with which
he disposed his squadron, both night and day, so that, as
his son wrote, ' few ships went into the Straits but they
were spoken with if friends, or taken if enemies.' ^
At the end of November intelligence reached him that
the * Eeformation,' the best of Rupert's ships, had been
lost at the Azores with all hands. Thereupon, feeling
justified at last in dividing his force, he resolved in council
of war to detach three frigates westward to complete the
Princes' destruction. .With the rest of his force it was
decided he should remain on guard where he was, and
there he remained till the end of January 1652, when
Badiley, in charge of the Levant convoy, arrived with a
fresh squadron to relieve him. 80 the memorable cruise
of the first true Mediterranean squadron came to an end,
and early m February Penn cleared from Cadiz, home-
ward bound, having faithfully guarded the Levant trade,
and with thirty-six prizes to his credit.
' Penn, ii. App. M.
/
CHAPTEE XV
THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STEAITS
Meanwhile the Mediterranean policy of the two
northern repubhcs had been developing. The foregoing
narrative will show that, although Hall's division had
been definitely sent to protect commerce in the Mediter-
ranean, Penn's presence there was to some extent an
accident. "\\^hen he sailed he had no orders for entering
the Straits, and it was not till off Lisbon he met his
fresh instructions to 'enlarge his quarters,' as he said, in
consequence of Kupert's movements, that he thought of
quitting the Atlantic. Since that time events had occurred
which deeply emphasised the expediency of maintaining a
permanent Mediterranean fleet. The heartburnings which
for years had been accumulating between the English
and the Dutch at sea were now increasing in intensity.
In the course of their reprisals on the French the English
officers exerted the undoubted right— as international
law then was — to search Dutch vessels for French goods.
This claim the Dutch, whose most profitable trade had
always been in troubled waters, persistently refused to
admit, and while Penn was lying in the Straits on the
look-out for the French Newfoundland fleet, in which
were many Dutch vessels, it almost came to blows. The
Dutch southern squadron was about the Straits under
Van Galen, one of the toughest and most strong-handed
office?s-iTr~the States' service — a veteran who had spent
a strenuous lifetime in fighting Spaniards and corsairs.
16ol DUTCPI SYSTEM OF COMMERCE PEOTECTION 239
He had his ships dispersed for cruising, and one of them
under Cornelis Tromp, son of the great admiral, fell in
with Penn. Tromp at oncf divined what the English
game was, and promptlj^ passed the word for a concen-
tration. The intention certainly was to force Penn
to leave the Newfoundland fleet alone, and it was only
by the British admiral's tact and diplomacy that a serious
conflict was avoided.
That the Dutch were able to take this high line was
due to a recent and unprecedented development in their
naval policy. When in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia
brought the Thirty Years' War to a conclusion, their
fleet was not reduced as usual to a bare peace footing.
Owing to their strained relations with the Commonwealth
and the increasing display of English power in the
Mediterranean, more serious precautions were thought
necessary. It had been resolved therefore that the
admiralties of the various provinces should keep at sea
a permanent force of forty sail for the protection of Dutch
commerce. But, as the tension increased, even this was
not considered suihcient. In the spring of 1651, after
Penn and Hall had begun their operations, it was decided
to practically ^double the existing establishment. On
May 16 the States General called upon the various
admiralties to furnish their respective quotas of an ad-
ditional force of thirty-five sail, and a complete system of
commerce protection was laid down. Five ships and
fifteen frigates were to cruise from the Skager Rack to
Gibraltar, covering the v,'hole North Sea and Atlantic
coasts ; and the rest, being twelve ships and three frigates,
or half the effective force of the new fleet, were to serve
in the Mediterranean.^
The English Government replied with a corresponding
' Dutch War, i. 57 ; ii. 22, 25,
u
240 THE DUTni WW, WfTIlTN' THE STRAITS ]m\
addition to their own convoy squadrons. Hall had come
home, but he had been replaced by another frigate squadron
under a certain Captain Henry Appleton with Badiley for
his second in command, and acting in two divisions they
had been constantly employed throughout the year in
convoying merchantmen from place to place over the
whole extent of the Mediterranean. To this force at the
end of the year was added the last new ship of the
Commonwealth, which, as a symbol of their increasing
power, had been named the ' Worcester,' after their late
triumph. With a small frigate as a tender she was ordered,
under Captain Charles Thorowgood, on convoy duty, and
to the particular service of redeeming slaves at Algiers.
Not content even with this provision the Navy Committee
reported that twenty-six more vessels should be brought
forward for commerce protection, which would bring up
the total to the number of those specially voted by the
Dutch. On this report Parliament voted on January 14,
1652, that a permanent squadron not exceeding twelve
sail was to be kept continually in the Mediterranean, and
a system of reliefs arranged so that every quarter three
or four ships should be sent home with convoys and be
replaced by a similar number of fresh ones taking out
outward-bound vessels. For this purpose the navy
officers were authorised to commission thirty-eight sail.
The English Mediterranean squadron would thus be in a
numerical inferiority of three to the Dutch, whose squad-
ron was to be fifteen ; but it may be presumed that the
English Government, owing to the general superiority of
their ships, regarded these twelve as equal in force to the
Dutch fifteen.^ With regard to the rest of the Dutch
permanent fleet, they were of course more or less balanced
by the powerful Summer and Winter Guards that were
' Dutch War (NavTj Bcco^'ch Society), I. Gl ct spq.
1651
END OF THE ROYALIST SEA POWER
241
always kept in the Narrow Seas, and charged with the
ordinary convoy service of the Bay of Biscay and the
North Sea and Baltic ports.
The English position had been further secured by the
reduction of the Scilly Islands. There Sir John Gren-
vine7grandson of the famous Sir Eichard of the ' Eevenge,'
had managed to maintain himself under the Stuart flag.
BiifTh'e place had sunk into a mere nest of pirates, and
in the spring of 1651 the Dutch, who had suffered as
much as any one else, threatened to seize it. Tromp
actually declared war on Grenville ; but Blake was
hurried to the scene with Ayscue's squadron, which was
on the point of sailing for the West Indies, and quickly
forced Grenville to surrender. Before the year was out
the"T^"orMan, Jersey, and Guernsey had shared the fate
of Scilly. Thus at a stroke the Dutch were deprived of
any hope they entertained of establishing a naval station
in English waters, and the last blow was given to the
Stuart sea power which at one time had threatened so
seriously the very existence of the Commonwealth.
Another change must be noted. In August, while the
resources and energy of the Commonwealth were strained
to the utmost to meet the new danger caused by
Charles II. 's reception in Scotland, Popham, who with
the Channel Guard was watching to prevent any com-
munication between the continent and the King at
Stirling, suddenly died. In spite of the anxiety of the
time, his body was brought up from Dover and buried at
Westminster with all the pomp and solemnity of which
the Republic was capable. Blake, to give him compara-
tive rest after all his exertions, Ea3 been sent to Plymouth
to watch the West. Deane was tied to Crbmweirs"army,
preparmg the flotilla for the masterly turning movement
across the Forth which finally forced Charles from his
VOL. I. B
'f
K ^.
.■^"/
242 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS 1652
impregnable position at Stirling. So Blake had to be
hastily summoned from his rest and sent to sea again
with the Channel Guard. Thus to all intents, on the eve
of the great struggle with the Dutch, he became virtually
sole naval Commander-in-Chief.
This then was the situation when, in the first days of
^ ' February 1652, news reached Holland that Ayscue had
seized in the West Indies the whole of the Dutch ships
to the number of twenty-seven which he had found there
\ trading in contravention of the English Act of October 3,
1650, forbidding commerce with the Royalist colonies.
The Dutch merchants, seeing their West Indian trade
threatened with destruction, petitioned that Vice- Admiral
Jan Evertsen, who commanded the Northern division of
the permanent squadron cruising from the North Sea
down to Finisterre, should be reinforced and the Mediter-
ranean squadron ordered to join him. He would then be
able to intercept Asycue's home-coming fleet and protect
the outgoing West Indian merchantmen. About a fort-
night later, on February 22, the States General issued
the heroic order that the admiralties were to equip and
arm no fewer than one hundred and fifty ships over
and above those already at sea in order to protect their
commerce. Fifty of these were to be got to sea im-
mediately, and the rest as soon as might be. It was not
in the nature of the Commonwealth to let their enemies
arm in peace. Three days later they confirmed Blake as
sole Commander-in-Chief for a period of nine months.
Th'e~Cbuncil of State duly made out his commission,
deciding at the same time to defer the consideration of a
person to fill Popham's vacant place, and immediately
sent him down to Deptford, Woolwich, and Chatham to
find out why the Summer Guard was not yet ready for
■sea. Reprimands went singing into every one's ears ; the
1652 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 243
' Sovereign of the Seas ' (cut down a deck) and the ' Prince '
(renamed the ' Kesolution '), the two glories of the
Carohne navy, were ordered into commission ; the whole
country was ransacked for guns ; and Penn, who was just
arriving from the Mediterranean with his four best ships,
was ordered to keep them still at sea, and was subse-
quently selected by Blake for his vice-admiral. In April
both Blake and Tromp were out, and on May 19 occurred
the memorable conflict between them over the honour
of tKe'flag. Parliament immediately ordered forty more
ships to be manned and armed, and began still more
drastic reprisals on Dutch commerce. The bitter rivalry
between the seamen of the two countries, which had been
growing in acrimony ever since the English enabled the
Dutch to become a sea power, had come to a head at last.
All negotiations were in vain, and on the last day of June
the Dutch envoys took their leave of Parliament, and the
first of the great Dutch wars had begun.
"TKus at its outset the growth of the English power
in the Mediterranean received a check. The system of
reliefs which had recently been established was thrown out
of gear, and Appleton and Badiley, who were in command
of the two divisions of the Mediterranean squadron under
the new organisation, were left to shift for themselves.
Not that the English Government at first had any idea
of abandoning the position they had taken up. The total
number of ships voted for the year 1652 was two hundred
and fifty besides fire-ships. From this great fleet three
squadrons were to be detached for particular service in
protecting commerce. A squadron of twenty sail was to
proceed to the North ; another, of thirty sail, was to guard
the mouth of the Channel ; while a third, also of thirty
sail, was to go down to the Straits.'
' Penn's Life of Penn, i. 430.
& 2
/
244 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS 1652
For the men to whose arduous lot it fell to keep the
English flag flying in the Mediterranean the situation
happened at the moment to be singularly unfavour-
able. The squadron was not only particularly weak,
but was very unfortunately disposed. Appleton, who
had been busy during the winter and spring "convoying
merchantmen all over the Levant, was in Leghorn
with the ' Leopard ' (48) and the ' Bonaventure^4"4).
The ' Constant "Warwick ' (32), the third vessel of his
division, was in Genoa. Leghorn, the Grand Duke of
Tuscany's principal port, had become the chief trading
centre of those seas, and here the Commonwealth had
practically established the headquarters of the Mediter-
ranean squadron by appointing a navy agent. The man
chosen was Charles Longland, a merchant who had dis-
played much resource and activity in suppl3dng Penn with
stores and intelligence during his late cruise against Buport.
It is a name that deserves remembrance. He was a man
of the type to which England has owed so much. A mere
successful Italian merchant, suddenly called to State affairs,
he immediately developed a courageous energy and diplo-
matic ability that were equalled only by the remarkable
intuition for the broad conditions of naval power which
his despatches exhibit. Appointed in November 1651,
when the Commonwealth had determined on a continuous
Mediterranean policy, he had already succeeded in obtain-
ing from the Grand Duke extraterritorial rights in his
port for English navy ships— a privilege which practically
amounted to the recognition of the Commonwealth, He
also secured their free access to the port for careening
and supply, and thus provided the squadron with a base.'
' Longland to Navy Committee and enclosures, April 10, 1()52 (Doinestic
Calendar, p. 221). The Calendar contains the series of despatches from
Longland and the naval ofliccrs on which the following narrative is mainly
1652 SITUATION IN THP^ STRAITS 245
Badiley had already been able to nse it. In March he had
entered the Straits with the ' Paragon ' (52), the ' Phoenix '
and ' Elizabeth ' (two 36-gun frigates), and a smaller one,
the ' Nightingale ' (24). Passing up the Spanish coast,
he had driven the French war-ships before him into
Toulon and taken his convoy safely to Genoa and Leghorn.
Then, in the usual course, he had passed on to the far
Levant and was now at Smyrna, about to sail on his
return voj^age. Thus it happened that at the critical
moment the two English squadrons were as widely
divided as they could well be.
To make matters worse, the Dutch were unusually
concentrated. Their admiral Katz had assembled a
force of fourteen sail, and was engaged in making a
demonstration before Toulon. Its object is difficult to
determine. Toulon for some time past had been in a
disaffected condition ; but, though Marseilles had thrown
in her lot with the Fronde, the naval port was still
nominally loyal, and Frenchmen on the Italian exchanges
gave out that Katz was come to secure it effectively in
the interests of the French King. The suspicion that
Mazarin's hand was in it was plausible enough. At
the moment his chief need was for naval assistance.
During the years when he had been powerful at sea,
he had wrested from Spain her chief Flemish ports,
Gravelines, Mardyke, and finally Dunkirk. But now the
tables were turned. Gravelines was already recovered.
Dunkirk was closely besieged by a Spanish army, and the
Due de Vendome, the new ' Grand Master,' was straining
every nerv6 to carry relief to' it from BreStr" Barcelona,
which was still in French hands, was in much the same
based. But it must be noted that Longland's are wrongly placed. On com-
paring his despatches with Appleton's and Badiley's, it is clear Longland,
in the Italian manner, used new style dates, and they therefore musf be
taken to have been written ten days earlier than appears in the Calendar.
246 THE DUTCH WAR AVITHIN THE STRAITS 1652
case, and Mazarin was trying to get a squadron equipped
in the Mediterranean to reinforce Vendome at Brest and to
relieve Barcelona on the way.
This service was committed to a certain Chevalier de
la Ferriere, an officer of the port of Toulon, who in 1649
hactused the force then at his command to seize and destroy
the London Levant Company's fleet, and was regarded by
English merchants as the arch-thief of the Mediterranean.
Longland had been urging the Council of State to send a
squadron to reinforce their strength within the Straits,
and suggested that it might begin operations by destroy-
ing La Ferriere's fleet on its way to Barcelona in retribu-
tion for his depredations on English commerce. English
naval officers, as we know, had already extended their re-
prisals against ships belonging to the French Crown, and,
in view of the critical condition of his affairs, Mazarin may
well have welcomed any counterbalancing factor which
might hamper English action on the Proven9al coast.
Nothing came of Longland's bold idea ; but, in view of
what afterwards occurred, it is important to bear in mind
that this method of bringing the French to reason by
a stunning blow had been suggested to the Council of
State from the Mediterranean as early as the spring of
1652.1
There was, however, another explanation of the
Toulon demonstration very different from that given by
the French. Dutchmen affirmed that Katz was there to
demand redress. There can be no doubt the Dutch had
suffered as much from the seizure of Spanish goods in their
vessels by the French as they had done from the seizure
of French and Portuguese goods by the English, and the
Dutch merchants in Italy gave out that, in default of justice
being done, their admiral had commission for reprisals on
' See ])ost, p. 255,
1652 APPLETON BLOCKADED IN LEGHORN y 247
French ships. But, as week after week went by and
nothing definite was done, Longland came to the shrewd
conclusion that Katz's action would depend on the result
of the negotiations which were then in progress between
London and the Hague. Almost from the first he smelt
mischief, and he had never ceased to urge upon the home
Government the need of reinforcing their Mediterranean
squadron. As news of the strained relations with the
Dutch reached him, his anxiety increased, and he decided
with Appleton that he had better not put to sea till Badiley
rejoined. ~"T)n June 18 he heard of Blake's collision
with Tromp, just a month after it occurred, and immedi-
ately sent off to warn Badiley at Smyrna of the coming
storm. Ten days later it burst. On that day Katz, flying
the flag of Vice-Admiral of Holland, appeared with his
whole squadron before Leghorn, and Appleton and his rich
convoy were caught. In serious alarm he began unloading
his more precious goods. Katz threatened to attack if he
did not desist, but the Tuscan Governor held firm and Katz
stayed his hand. As the Dutch were stifl vehemently
striving in London to avert the war their lawlessness had
brought upon them, it is probable that Katz had no
definite orders to use violence, and moreover the redoubt-
able Van Galen was on his way out overland to supersede
him. None knew the ground better than he, and it was
not a year since he had crowned his reputation by forcing
a treaty on Salee.^
Longland was at his wit's end. It was not only Van
Galen, BuTserious reinforcements that the Dutch were
expecting. He feared, too, the French might join them.
As it was, even if Badiley succeeded in rejoining Appleton,
the British force would be far too weak to do anything,
and he redoubled his importunity for more ships. His
' Yie de Corneillc Tromp, 1694.
248 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS I6.-,2
efforts were supported by the powerful Levant Companj'
at home. But the Admiralty was up to its eyes as it
was. Blake, regardless of Tromp, had gone North with
the main fleet to destroy the Dutch fishing flotilla, and
not a ship could be spared. They suggested that the
Levant Company should fit out war ships of their own
mider the letters of marque which had been already
granted them after La Ferriere's destruction of their
fleet. They replied they were too poor after all their
losses from the French depredations in the Mediterranean,
and, insisting on the new conception of commerce protec-
tion, suggested that the State should hire their ships that
were out there, and fit them as men-of-war at the public
expense. And this was all that could be done.
Meanwhile things at Leghorn remained at a deadlock.
The Grand Duke would not allow the Dutch to attack,
and Appleton could not stir. On August '22 Van Galen
arrived ; Badiley was also daily expected. It was well that
the English had such a man to face the Dutch veteran.
Like Longland, he was a man typical of his time. All
through the days of his manhood, when Levant traders
were expected to look after themselves, he had com-
manded a little ship called the 'Advance,' with a crew of
only fifty-four hands, and three times at various points
in the Mediterranean — once in 1637, once in 1040, and
again in 1644 — he had fought single-handed and heavily
beaten powerful Barbary squadrons that had attacked
him.^ When the Parliament was setting out to establish
its sea power he had been given the command of the
' Happy Entrance ' after its return to its allegiance, and
while commanding her had planned and carried through
the destruction of the ' Antelope,' which Eupei't had been
' See his Lieutenant .Tohn Steele's affidavit and Badiley's Ansivcj- lo
A])2)leton's Remonstrance, p. 1)0, Brit. Mas. E. 1952 9).
16o2 MOVEMENTS OF VAN GALEN 249
forced to leave behind m Helvoetsluys. Since then,
as we know, he had had further experience as Blake's
rear-admiral on the coast of Portugal. Still, bold and
resourceful as he was, he was no match for Van Galen in
strategy or fleet tactics. All he could do, and well he did
it, was to uphold the honour of his flag.
The moment Van Galen took over the command, all
was astir. Leaving six vessels to watch Appleton in
Leghorn, he himself immediately put to sea to intercept
Badiley and prevent any co-operation with his colleague.
For two days he kept in sight, and then disappeared to
the west. Cox, who commanded the ' Constant War-
wick ' in Genoa, was promptly ordered to follow and
ascertain his movements, with instruction that, if he found
Van Galen making to the eastward, he was to go with all
speed to Messina and on to Zante to meet Badiley.
Whether Van Galen deceived Cox, or whether the latter
was anxious to get away from Appleton's control, to Zante
he went, and, the day after he had sailed. Van Galen
reappeared before Leghorn.^ Appleton was deeply
aggrieved, but there can be no doubt that Cox's resolve
to get to sea was for the best, though he certainly dis-
obeyed orders. It was a serious misfortune that Apple-
ton, besides being ill, was a thoroughly incompetent and
unenterprising officer ; he was now less inclined than ever
to move ; nor could Longland, having as yet no order to
show, induce the captains of the Levant Company's ships
to put their hand to the work. Thus Van Galen's dispo-
sitions were not so much as disturbed, and Badiley was
left without assistance.
Cox met him at Zante, and informed him that he had
left Van Galen steering westward. Badiley immediately
resolved, instead of taking his convoy by way of Messina
' Api^leton to Navy Committee, S.P. Doui. xxiv. 89, July 23, 1().'32.
250 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS 1652
and Naples, the usual route by which Van Galen would
expect him, to proceed direct to Leghorn. He had, even
with the * Constant Warwick,' but four men-of-war in
company, besides the four Levant merchantmen of his
convoy, against Van Galen's fourteen at the least. The
odds were heavy against him, but he meant to try.
English seamen proverbially underestimated the fighting
powers of the Dutch, and if the merchantmen and Apple-
ton only played their parts there was no reason why he
should not cut his way through, in case, after all, he found
Van Galen still off Leghorn. But from the intelligence
which Cox had given him, Badiley was inclined to believe
that Van Galen's design was to double back to the
eastward, and lie in wait for him about the southern
cape of Sardinia, and not near Leghorn. Thus, by
following the course he had in his mind, and passing-
inside Sardinia and Corsica, he hoped to elude Van
Galen altogether, and join hands with Appleton without
interruption.^
Unfortunately, as we know, his intelligence was incor-
rect, and Van Galen continued to keep up the delusion.
A week or so after he had reappeared at Leghorn he
again put to sea with ten sail as though he were going to
Toulon. Some said it was to fetch four fresh ships that
had been equipped for him there ; others that he was
going to blockade the place, which was now in open
revolt, while the King attacked it from the land side.^
Longland was not deceived, and, in despair of a junction
being effected, was hoping as late as August 22 that
Badiley was waiting at Messina till the fleet that was
expected from England arrived. As a matter of fact Van
Galen was still somewhere off Leghorn, and apparently
' Badiley's despatch, Aug. 31, S.P. Domestic, xxiv. 12.j, i.
- Lonf,'lancl to Council of State, August 9-10, 1G52, ibirl. xxiv. 107.
1652 ACTION OFF MONTE CHRISTO 251
fully aware of Badiley's movements. About the 26th he
moved southward with his ten sail, leaving only four and
an armed merchantman just joined to blockade Appleton,
and it was at this time that Badiley was stealing up
inside the islands. Next day, as he was passing Monte
Christo, the two fleets sighted one another. About four
o'clock they engaged, but a calm and nightfall put an end
to the action before it had grown serious. ' There was
not above four or five hundred pieces of ordnance spent
on both sides,' wrote Badiley, * and we had suffered but
little.' Next morning Ba3iley was discovered to have been
making his way towards Monte Christo, and three' of the
Dutch ships had fallen so far to leeward that Van Galen
did not renew the attack till noon. The Dutch had ap-
parently been reinforced by one ship from before Leghorn,
and, so soon as their rearguard had closed up. Van Galen
bore down with his whole weight.
Then all that long summer day raged a fight which
each side agreed was the hottest within memory. To the
Dutch Badiley appeared to have awaited their attack with
his navy ships disposed in a half-moon, but he himself
says that, according to the usual English practice, he had
ordered his captains to fall astern of him and to engage
at musket range. His order, however, was not properly
obeyed even by the navy ships. Cox in the ' Constant
Warwick ' — an officer whose courage was as fierce and
reckless as his temper — alone took and kept his station,
and on him and Badiley fell the heat of the action. The
Levant ships took hardly any part at all, but made their
way safely and with all speed into Porto Longone in
Elba, while Badiley held Van Galen. Owing to the failure
of his captains to support"~Eim the Dutch were able to
concentrate on the two leading ships, but all day long
they held their own. ' By my gunner's account,' Badiley
252 THE DUTCH WAE WITHIN THE 8T1JAITS 1652
tells, ' we discharged from this ship eight hundred pieces
of great ordnance that day, which must have done no
small execution, having sometimes two of the enemy's best
men-of-war aboard; and their Admiral, Vice-Admiral, and
Rear- Admiral, with all the rest, sometimes wdthin pistol-
and musket-shot of us.' Once he was boarded, and so hot
was the reception that his adversary cried for quarter, but
he was too hard pressed to take possession. Van Galen
himself led the attack, but was soon forced to falT'away
with the loss of seventeen killed and twenty-seven danger-
ously wounded, and seven shot between wind and water.
It was no wonder, for Badiley's method of fighting was
severely English. Such was his fire discipline that he would
not allow a single great gun to be discharged till he rang
' his ship's great bell,' with the result that his shot never
missed, we are told, but tore great holes in the Dutch-
men's sides and wrought havoc on board with the
splinters.^ Two or three ships took Van Galen's place,
and Badiley was as hard put to it as ever. The ' Phoenix,'
instead of keeping her station astern, had forgecTahead,
and when she tried to go about to his relief managed,
though she was one of the smartest and handiest frigates
in the service, to fall foul of a heavy Dutch ship, and
having no forecastle for her men to retire to, was immedi-
ately taken.- ' There must have been great carelessness,'
wrote Badiley, ' to say the least.' But he was so 'badly
shut in that he could not move to her rescue. As even-
ing fell, two of the enemy had lost their mainmasts, they
had nearly two hundred killed, and, as the English Admiral
said, ' they seemed out of breath.' There was cause
enough. Bart and Swart, the two captains who had
' Gibson's ' Keminiscences,' Gardinerls ,Eib:5<_-D2t^c/j War, i. 18. Gibson
confirms Badiley's formation as being in line aheiwT)y giving the order of
the ships.
- See Captain Wadsworth's letter in P.adiley's Answer, p. DO.
1652 RESULT OF THE ACTION 263
grappled Badiley, besides another called Haen, were killed ;
Van Boer, the vice-admiral, who had got across his bows
to rake him, had been very severely handled ; and Cornelis
Tromp, who had followed his old chief to the Mediter-
ranean, had to abandon his ship next day. The Dutch
themselves admit they were forced to let go, and thus
during the night, by the help of his oars and his boats,
Badiley was able to follow his merchantmen.'
There was nothing else to do. The ammunition of all
his captains was almost expended. In his own ship he
had twenty-six killed and fifty-seven wounded, including
all his chief officers. He had received in his hull some
fifty shot, many of them between wind and water, and
his rigging was cut to pieces. Yet he saved his ship
and his convoy, and by daylight next morning all his
squadron, except the ' Phojnix,' was in Porto Longone.
The Dutch made a threat to follow, but a few shots from
the Spanish batteries persuaded them to be content with
the important victory they had won. Moreover, judging
by the state of Badiley's shot lockers, their ammunition
must have been no less exhausted, and, ill-manned as they
were, their crews must have been decimated. Conse-
quently no further attempt was made to molest the
English vessels, At first Badiley did not realise the
meaning of his defeat. He barely regarded it as such,
and believed that, if the Spanish Governor of Porto Lon-
gone only held true to his neutrality, he could soon
achieve some means of joining hands with Appleton.
Longland saw more clearly. He knew the man
Appleton'was, and knew how active Van Galen had been
' The details of the action are taken from Badiley's despatches in S.P.
Dom. xxiv. 125, i., and from various letters and affidavits printed in Apple-
ton's Bemonstrmice, and Badiley's Answer., and in La Vie de Corneille
Tromp. Gibson also gives a picturesque account in his ' Eeminiscences,' iibi
supra.
254 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS 1652
to increase his force by arming merchantmen. When it
was known at Leghorn that Van Galen and Badiley were
in contact, Longland had urged Appleton as strongly as
he could to put out and fight the four ships that were
blockading him. But, although the Dutch crews all told
did not outnumber those of his two navy ships, and though
two of his convoy offered to join him, he would not stir,
because, as he said, he was ill, nor would he suffer his
officers to go without him. Had he tried, a junction
might almost certainly have been effected in Porto
Longone. As it was, all Longland could do was to use
his best diplomatic means to secure the neutrality of
Badiley's port of refuge. But that he knew was little
enough. ' I hope,' he wrote to the Navy Committee,
' God has directed you to a better protection, without
which this will soon vanish, for the enemy is master of
the sea, by which way alone Captain Badiley's wants
must be supplied. . . . Except this fleet of Dutch be
destroyed there will be no trade for our nation in the
Straits.'
As a matter of fact he need have been in no anxiety
about Spanish neutrality ; for already an event had
happened which could only confirm Spain in her friendly
attitude and by which France earned the reward of the
piratical conduct of her officers in the Mediterranean.
The naval situation at the moment was as follows. The
bulk of the Spanish fleet under Don John of Austria was
before Barcelona supporting the efforts of Philip's army
to recover it from the French. The Chevalier de la
Ferriere had got to sea with the Toulon squadron, but
the force he had been able to raise was quite inadequate
for the relief of Barcelona without the assistance of the
Dutch ; and, though there was no chance of this being
given, they were being allowed in Proven9al ports every
1652 BLAKE'S REVENGE 256
facility for furthering their efforts to drive the Enghsh
out of the Mediterranean. The bulk of the French naval
force was w^ith Vendome on the Atlantic seaboard. Having
completed the organisation of his fleet in Brest, he had
swept southward and driven from before Eochelle a com-
bined squadron of Spaniards and French Frondeurs who
were there to give countenance to its rebellion ; and having
thus secured his rear he had gone northward to relieve
Dunkirk. On September 1 the fleet was "driven into
Dieppe by a gale, and three days later Vendome, who had
gone ashore, was roused from his bed with a message
from the besieged port that unless relieved in three days
it must capitulate. His larger ships were still under
refit and unable to move, but he promptly sent to sea
the whole of his transports and store ships mider escort
of eight of his smaller men-of-war. Next day, as they
were passing Calais, they sighted Blake's fleet, sup-
posed to be on the look-out for Tromp ; but to their
intense surprise he bore down on them, captured seven of
the eight men-of-war and most of their convoy, and carried
them to the English coast. Next day Dunkirk capitu-
lated, and Spain had recovered all she had lost in the days
whe*n France had dominated the Mediterranean.
"B^lake's startling action had been suggested by the
Spanish Aihbassador. He had pointed out to the English
Government the opportunity Vendome's attempt would
afford for pressing their reprisals upon the French King's
own ships, since they too had been guilty of attacks upon
Enghsh merchantmen within the Straits. To this day
the French can only speak of it as a felony. But, by all
the laws of war, a state of general reprisal existing, it
was technically lawful, and in view of what was going on
in the Mediterranean it is hard to deny its justice. For
two years or more France had refused to recognise the
256 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS 1652
Commonwealth, and had treated it as a pirate power,
whose commerce was fair game for any one. She had
sheltered Eupert and saved him. At this very hour she
was further tearing her pretended neutrality by allowing
Van Galen openly to use her Proven^-al ports as a base
of attack against the Commonwealth officers. By what
right or reason could she complain ? The blow was hard,
but she brought it on her own head. Nor did it end there.
Vendome's concentration at Brest, which Blake had
robbed of its fruit, had left Don John supreme in the
Mediterranean. La Ferriere could effect nothing, and a
month later Barcelona had shared the fate of Dunkirk.'
' The Council of State expressly defended their attack on French
navy ships on the ground that French '-navy ships had seized English
merchantmen (Guizot, i. App. xx. -5, and Gardiner, CovivwnwealtJi, ii. 131)
Dr. Gardiner at first was inclined to believe there was no evidence of this,
but subsequently called attention to the complaint of the Levant Company
in 1649 (S.P. Dom. p. 11) cf injuries done them by the 'French Fleet
within the Straits,' which he assumes must mean a fleet of the French
royal navy. To this evidence we may add a despatch of Longland's of
May 1-10, 1652, in which, in anticipation of Blake's action, he suggests
attacking a fleet of French navy ships that ' are arming for the relief of
Barcelona, and are commanded in chief by Captain Ferere ' (i.e. La Ferriere),
' a famous thief that has done much mischief to our nation in burning the
" Talent " and taking other ships, and now intends the like ruin to any of
our ships ' (S.P. Dom. xxiv. 11). La Ferriere, according to the editor of
Mazarin's ' Letters,' is often mentioned in them ' conime charge d'un com-
niandement maritime a Toulon ' (Lettres de Mazarin, v. 5'2, ii.). The
' Talent ' and her cargo were valued at 60,260Z., and on proof thereof the
Council of State authorised the Admiralty Judges to issue letters of marque
and reprisal to that amount on January 9, 1650. On the same day
similar letters were authorised to two other firms, members of the Levant
Company, for 9,838L and 32,71521. (Dom. Cal. 554). Following this on
April 25, when Popham was about to sail to join Blake off Lisbon, he was
invested with powers of letters of marque, and instructed to seize ' such
ships and vessels of the French King or any of his subjects as you shall
think fit ' (Thurloe, St. P. i. 144). The Levant Company, it appears, did
not act on their letters of marque. When they complained of the blockade
of their ships at Leghorn, they were asked why they had not done so, and
they replied that they could not afford it ' in respect of our late and many
losses by the French fleet ' (Dom. Cal. 360). In view of the repeated use
of this expression, and the fact that the Levant Company's ships were
more than a match for any ordinary privateers, the conclusion is almost
1652 BADILEY AT ELBA 257
The blow brought Mazarin at last to his senses ;
but while he was hasteniffg his preparations to get an
embassy over to recognise the Commonwealth, the
Spanish Ambassador was doing his best that open war
should come of it. It was no wonder then that all went
well in Porto Longone, and that Badiley remained on
excellent terms with the Spanish Governor. Under his
wing communication between Elba and Leghorn was
easy enough by way of the Spanish ports on the Tuscan
coast. Longland came round to consult with Badiley,
and Cox went to Leghorn to take over the command of
the ' Bonaventure,' whose captain had just died. But
nothing could be got out of Appleton, who remained as
inert as ever. Instead of improving, the situation grew
worse and worse. The Dutch being in command of the
sea were able continually to increase their force by taking
up merchantmen, and by the middle of September they
had twenty sail available. To add insult to injury, they
had brought the captured ' Phcenix ' into Leghorn, and
were busy careenihg and refitting her, under Appleton's
nose, as an addition to their lleet. Longland tried to
persuade Appleton to seize her, but he objected that it
irresistible, apart from the otlier evidence, that tlie damage had been done
by the King's navy. But Colbert, in his minute on the subject drawn up
in 1650, actually admits that this was so (Guizot, Hist, de la Rep. Anglaise,
vol. i. App. XV.), and suggests two different grounds of excuse. The King's
ships, he says, attacked English commerce, either when his officers were
serving under a Stuart commission (and the King could not refuse his
cousin leave to give such commissions) ; or else when serving under his own
flag, but then only because the aggrieved merchantmen refused to submit
to a search for Spanish goods. It is to be observed, however, that when
Gentillot was sent over to negotiate an arrangement, although his instruc-
tions admit the attacks by French navy ships, they do not direct him to
excuse them on the ground of resistance to ' the right of search.' This
would look as though the facts would not bear out the defence Colbert had
suggested (ibid. App. xvii. 465). It is noteworthy, moreover, that it waa
equally absent from Bordeaux's instructions and Louis XIV.'s letter of
December 2, 1652 (ibid. 512-16).
VOL. I. S
f.l
2S8 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STUAITS 1652
would be a violation of the neutrality of the Grand Duke's
port. Efforts were then made to follow the Dutch example
and persuade the English merchant captains to prepare
their vessels as men-of-war, but they still refused to take
the responsibility unless he could show authority from
the Government to take them up. So there was nothing
to do but try to keep the Tuscan Government in a good
temper till a relieving fleet arrived from England.
Owing to an epidemic at Genoa, communication with
the North was very difficult, and it was not apparently till
nearly six weeks after the action at Monte Christo that
the Council of State heard of their Mediterranean otiicers'
distress. They immediately ordered their thanks to be
sent to Spain and to the Governor of Porto Longone, and
Blake was directed to detach twenty ships from his fleet
to rendezvous at Portsmouth and proceed to the Straits
under the command of Captain Peacocke. Blake had just
defeated De With and De Eliyter off the Kentish Knock,
and it was believed the campaign was over for the year.
So far the English had had almost uninterrupted success
against the Dutch, and to all appearance a squadron for
the Mediterranean might easily be spared. Blake by no
means took this view, and kej^t urging the Government to
keep him in fighting trim. So great, however, was their
confidence and financial embarrassment that he pleaded
? in vain. The result was all that Blake feared. In a
couple of months Tromp, who had been recalled to the
command, was out again with the Bordeaux convoy, and
finding Blake, as he passed down Channel, in greatly
inferior strength, inflicted on him a sound defeat. Then at
last the Government awoke to the gravity of the situation.
Clearly every effort must be concentrated on regaining the
command of the Channel, and Peacocke was promptly
or^rcd to rejoin IBlake's flag \vith Ins twenty ships.
/
1652 DEADLOCK AT LEGHORN / 259
Meanwhile Badiley, in ignorance as yet that he had
been abandonedj'Kacf not been idle. At the end of October
he had received an order six weeks old, appointing
him Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and he
acted immediately. Having obtained permission from
the friendly Governor to erect batteries ashore for the
protection of his vessels, he made all snug, and then took
a felucca to Leghorn. He had heard that the bulk of the
Dutch fleet had sailed westward, leaving only six vessels to
blockade the port, and he meant under his new authority
to bring out the ' Leopard ' and ' Bonaventure ' at all costs.
In the blockaded port he found all at a deadlock. The
ships were not provisioned, and the officers were at logger-
heads. Cox's temper could not brook Appleton's refusal
to permit an attempt to recover the ' PhcEnix,' and Appleton
had dismissed him his ship. Longland was no less dis-
gusted with the commodore's inertness, but Badiley soon
made a change. Showing his new commission to Appleton,
he restored Cox to his command, and ordered Longland to
get two months' victuals into the navy ships ; but before
he was ready the Dutch had thirteen ships outside, and
he could not move. So back again he went to Elba,
convinced it was impossible for the two squadrons to
effect a junction till help came from England, or at least
until Longland had succeeded in a negotiation he had
set on foot to get hold of some of the English private
men-of-war that were in the Venetian service.
One step, however, he had taken before leaving
Leghorn which was destined to have the gravest results.
When he had first conceived the idea of cutting the
' Antelope ' out of Helvoetsluys, the Earl of Warwick had
assured him that no act of hostility would violate the
neutrality of a foreign port provided no fire-arms were
used to disturb it. There could, of course, be no higher
260 THE DUTCH WAR AVITHIN THE STILMTS W-rJ
authority on such a point than the Lord High Admiral
of England, and Badiley, to whom the sight of the
' Phoenix ' being refitted bj^ his enemies was as torment-
ing^'as' it was to Cox, had given his fiery captain leave to
surprise her if he could do so quietly. Moreover, as he
assured the Council of State, quite in Nelson's vein, he
was sure that when they gave him strict orders to respect
the Grand Duke's port, they could not have contemplated
that the smartest frigate in the service would ever be in
Dutch hands. There were, of course, great difficulties in
the way ; but when one day Cornells Tromp, who had been
given command of the ' Phcenix,' put to sea and returned
with a fat English prize and her national colours trailing
under his stern, Cox could hold his hand no longer. It
happened that the morrow was St. Andrew's day, when it
was the custom for the Dutch skippers to give a feast to
their Italian friends. The drinking was probably un-
usually deep over the new prizes, and in the dead of night
Tromp suddenly found himself boarded on each side by
three fisher boats. He had barely time to discharge his
pistols and leap overboard out of his cabin window before
Cox — for it was he — and the lieutenants of his own and
Appleton's ships were in effective possession. The crew
were forced below ; the moorings were cut ; and she was
soon standing merrily out to sea through the midst of the
blockading squadron. For two hours Dutch and English
fought like fury between decks as she sped away from the
two frigates that vainly gave chase ; but at last all was
quiet. Fresh and clean as she was, she easily outsailed her
pursuers, and nothing more was heard of her till a message
came from Cox to say he was safe in Naples.'
' Gibson, in his account of the exploit, says that Tromp shot Appleton's
lieutenant dead as he was breaking open the cabin door, and that this waa
the only loss.
1652 PtECAPTURE OF THE ' PIKENIX ' 261
It was a smart and well-judged piece of work, with a
smack of the practical joke which appealed to the Floren-
tine sense of humour. At first the Grand Duke seemed
unwilling to take the matter very seriously. The whole
thing had heen done heyond the range of his batteries, and
by the Enghsh not a shot had been fired. ' It seems,'
wrote Badiley, ' the Great Duke, upon first hearing what
was done upon the " Phcenix" frigate, smiled and said the
Turks had taken her out of the midst of the Dutch fleet, and
not the English,' and his Highness was further pleased to
banter the indignant Dutchmen on the excellent watch
they kept. Unfortunately Appleton in a moment of ill-
timed energy spoiled the game.' A Dutch spy had been
discovered in one of the English ships and had leapt over-
board to swim ashore. Appleton followed in a boat, and
just as the man reached the shore he tried to arrest him.
The sentry interfered and called the guard, and in the
altercation that ensued Appleton so far forgot himself as
to strike one of the musketeers. It was more than the
Grand Duke could endure. He sent for Appleton and
had him arrested at Pisa, but finally was induced to hand
him over to Badiley, with whom the Duke was still on
excellent terms, on condition that he would keep him
under arrest. So the affair ended, but its ill-effects
continued, and they were seriously increased when the
news of Blake's defeat came in, and it was known that
Badiley could no longer expect assistance from home.
Moreover, Tromp, after his victory, had proceeded as
far as the Isle of Rhe off Kochelle, and it was be-
lieved he meant to detach a squadron into the Straits.
The Dutch force there had already grown to some
thirty sail ; there was a credible report that Prince
Rupert was coming to command them ; and it became
clear to the Duke that unless he got rid of his un-
262 THE DUTCH WAK WITHIN THE STRAITF^ 1653
welcome guests, his port could not remain much longer
inviolate.
Longland and Badiley redoubled their exertions to
meet the expected crisis. Longland had secured six
ships in Venice and hoped for two more. He had com-
pelled the Levant Company's merchantmen in Leghorn
and Genoa to discharge their cargoes and fit as men-of-
war, and was begging the Council of State to send out
to him men, even if they could not spare ships. Badiley
had got the ' Constant Warwick ' and the ' Elizabeth ' out of
Porto Longone, and they were with Cox at Naples readj^ to
join hands with the Venice ships so soon as the}'' came
round. The rest of his convoy he had moved into Porto
Ferrajo, the Tuscan port of Elba, where he was permitted
to refit them as men-of-war. This change of base had
been forced upon him by his hot-headed captains having
offended the Spaniards at Naples. They had taken a
Dutch prize, and the Viceroy insisted on having the
case brought into his own prize court. The captains
refused, and were consequently arrested and thrown into
prison, ' which,' wrote Longland in despair, ' brings dis-
grace and contempt upon the Parliament's commanders ;
and except the Parliament at home resent it in some high
manner it will grow customary amongst the Italian
Princes.' ' The necessity,' Longland added, setting his
finger on the weak point of "the whole situation, 'our
ships are put to for these Princes' ports makes them
trample upon us.'
Badiley had now twenty ships if he could only get
them together, and twice he flew to Leghorn on hearing
the Dutch had drawn off, but only to find them in force
again off the port. They had been reinforced by three
ships from Tromp's fleet and now numbered over thirty
sail, six of which wore Iving somewhere off BrindisT to
1653 BADILEY DECIDES TO FIGHT i>63
intercept the ships that were to come from Venice.
Badiley's idea, since his captains at Naples had been set
free on his demand, was to concentrate his own squad-
ron at Porto Ferrajo, and endeavour, if it pleased God
to open a way, to release the ships in Leghorn and then
go to meet the Venice ships at Messina. He meant to do
his best, but felt bitterly that he had been neglected.
' Some assistance,' he w^rote to the Navy Committee, ' is
most necessary, not only in respect of the honour of the
nation .... at a place, which may be called the centre of
trade and upon which is the eye of all Europe ; but it is
reported that Prince Rupert may be here every day with
his prizes from the West Indies, and if he comes before
our conjunction the disorders our mariners may be put to
cannot be foreseen.' Such a warning must have sounded
very much like a threat ; but Badiley was true as steel,
though he did not refrain from pointing out that in the
early stages of the war, when General Blake and Sir George
Ayscue's fleets met, they might have sent him aid and
had his squadron back in time for the late battle.
It was in the last days of Febuary 1653, after endless
heartburnings over Cox's exploit, that the end came, and
Badiley received an ultimatum from the Duke that he
must either give up a ship as security for the restoration
of the 'Phoenix' to the Dutch, or else clear his war ships
out of Leghorn within ten days. It was a hard alternative,
but Badilej'' did not flinch. Ill-manned and badly placed
as he was, and smarting as he did at the way he had been
abandoned, he could not bring himself to admit the un-
lawfulness of what he had done, or to lower the lofty
tone he had taken over the honour of his flag. So, coolly
and with a full appreciation of what it meant, he chose
the harder way, and resolved to shake the dust of Leg-
horn from his feet. To this end he immediately repaired
264 THE DUTCH WAR WITHIN THE STRAITS 1653
to his own squadron, which was now again concentrated
at Porto Ferrajo, to mature his plans. He had there his
flagship, the 'Paragon,' his three frigates, and four armed
merchantmen, and in Leghorn were two frigates and
also four merchantmen. The Dutch at the moment had
but sixteen sail in their blockading squadron. ' It had
been better,' wrote Longland, ' if they could have stayed
for the conjunction of the Venice ships, but Providence has
otherwise determined.' In any case the Venice ships had
done their work by drawing off part of the blockading
fleet. 'I hope,' he added, 'all will be for the best, as
a better opportunity than this with less odds we may not
meet with in six months. If God gives us the day, I
hope Captain Badiley will so husband the business as to
keep the mastery of the seas, which will be of very great
import.'
There was indeed ground for hope. Even as the
ultimatum was being penned, England was rejoicing over
the victory which Blake, Deane^and Monk had won in
the Channel over Tromp's fleet on its return from Ehe,
anTtlie Navy Committee was writing out to Longland and
f Badiley that the Lord had been pleased to open a door
for their relief, and that all hands and heads were at work
to that end. But of this they knew nothing, and had to
I play their own hand.
On the last day of February, Badiley put out from
Porto Ferrajo, and from Piombino sent his last instruc-
tions to Appleton. For at Badiley 's request the Grand
Duke had consented to his arrest being removed in order
that he might take out the Leghorn squadron. Badiley 's
final idea provided for two alternative conditions of
weather. If the wind were from the sea, and so in his
favour, he intended to keep to windward of Van Galen,
and, so soon as the wind came strong, to endeavour to
1653 PLAN TO BREAK THE BLOCKADE 26o
break through his squadron and join hands with Appleton,
who was to be ready outside the Mole to meet him. If
on the other hand the wind were off shore, so as to give
the Dutch the weather gage, and Van Galen stood off to
attack the relieving squadron, then Appleton was at once
to give chase. In this case it was, of course, of the ut-
most importance that Appleton should fall on Van
Galen's rear at the earliest possible moment, and Badiley's
last words to him were, ' Haste as for your life to follow
with all sail j'ou can, so that we be not too much op-
pressed before you come.' It was equally important
that Appleton should on no account expose himself by
patting to sea till Badiley and Van Galen were actually
engaged. A council of war had been held at Leghorn,
at which, in accordance with letters received from Badi-
ley, this had been very strictly laid down as a condition
essential to success. But it seems clear that the resolu-
tion was come to on the supposition that Van Galen
would not stand off to fight the relieving squadron. Sub-
sequently it must have occurred to Badiley that possibly
he would, and it was evidently in view of this possibility
that at the last moment he gave Appleton the additional
instruction.^ It does not appear to have struck Badiley
that his last orders were not entirelj' on all fours with
those he had already given, and that they left to Appleton
the final decision as to what was the crucial moment
for him to come out. Here was his mistake. Know-
ing the man Appleton was, it was vital he should leave
nothing to his intelligence. In the event, however, of the
wind being off shore, a most important decision was so
left, and in the result we have one more example of the
absolute necessity of the most exact and unmistakable in-
structions when a combined operation is to be attempted.
' Longlancl to Cromwell, Dom. Cal. Nov. 4-14, p. 243.
266 THE DUTCH WAR WITPTIN THE STRAITS 1653
When Badiley appeared off Leghorn, the wind was
blowing from the sea, and he had to content himself with
keeping the wind of Van Galen. In the afternoon, how-
ever, it began to blow from the land, but still the Dutch
did not stir. At nightfall, therefore, Badiley beat close
in, and unperceived sent orders to Appleton to break out
under cover of the darkness. It was a splendid chance,
but at dawn Appleton was still motionless. Bitterly dis-
appointed, Badiley stood to sea again to try to draw the
Dutch into the open. The wind was still fresh from the
east, and Van Galen, to Badiley's delight, weighed and
gave chase. Thinking his moment had come, Appleton,
in accordance with his instructions, made sail in his wake,
and then happened the thing which — simple as it seems —
was apparently beyond Badiley's tactical foresight. So
soon as Appleton was well under way. Van Galen went
about and stood back for the mouth of the port. The
result was a premature action, in which the Dutch admiral
was able to bring the whole weight of his sixteen vessels
upon Appleton 's six, and Badiley was left hopelessly to
leeward, little more than a spectator of his colleague's
destruction.
Considering how ill-manned were his ships and how
demoralised his men by their long detention in port,
Appleton seems to have made a fairly good fight of it.
It was four hours before all his merchantmen had struck,
and he himself, he says, held out for six. Only one ship,
a merchantman, managed to get clear, and join Badiley
to leeward. The losses on both sides were severe. Those
admitted by the Dutch were 128 killed, and as many
wounded. Among the latter was Van Galen himself.
Early in the action he had been hit in iTie leg by a
round shot. With some demur he was taken below and
had it amputated jast below the knee. Still be could
1653 ENGLISH DRIVEN FROM THE STRAITS 267
not rest. So soon as the operation was over he called for ;
a cup of wine, and, drinking confusion to all regicides,
insisted on being carried on deck again to direct the re-
mainder of the fight. It is with regret that one has to tell
that nine days later he died of his wound, but with a
reputation his countrymen fully and handsomely recog-
nised. We can do no less when we remember that the
crown of his long and brilliant record was that, with
resources at first scarcely superior to his determined
enemy, he drove the English out of the Mediterranean.'
That, and no less, was the result of his clever victory.
In the face of so complete a reverse there was nothing
left for Badiley but to make good his escape before he
himself was overwhelmed like his colleague, and by the
end of March he was clear out of the Mediterranean, with
all his squadron and corivoyaiid a Dutch prize he took at
Minorca. Not that he intended to abandon his station
to the Dutch without a struggle. His own ship was too
foul, shot-torn, and worm-eaten to keep the sea ; but two
of his frigates only required cleaning, and these he in-
tended to send back from Lisbon, ' to amuse the Dutch,'
as he said, and prevent their sending north any consider-
able portion of their ships to reinforce their main fleet.
He himself proposed to go home, change his ship, and beg
for ten fresh ones, and with this force added to his own
he believed he could regain his position. His two frigates
and the ships from Venice would have compelled the
Dutch to split up their fleet for convoy duty, and he
would be able to defeat them in detail.
It was a plausible scheme, but unfortunately his crews
refused to Hsten to his orders. They were resolved to
' For further details of the action: see Mr. Spalding's exhaustive study
of the whole episode in his monograph on The Life and Times of Richard
Badiley.
if..
268 THE DUTCH WAli WITHIN THE STRAITS 1653
come home after their long spell of service. Badiley was
powerless to oppose. He had to give up, and in May with
the whole of his mutinous squadron he was back in the
Downs.
At the Admiralty he found a new spirit in the ascen-
dant. After Blake's defeat and his protest against the
inadequate force with which he had been furnished, the
Government had determined to fill up Popham's vacant
place, and join Deane and the new man with Blake in the
active command in accordance with the original scheme.
The new man was General George Monk, whose recent
brilliant and thorough "work in the pacification of Scot-
land had justified Cromwell's high opinion of his abilities.
The choice is highly significant, for it confirmed absolutely
the military influence. Monk was the typical soldier of his
time. Unlike Blake or Popham or Deane, he had been a
I soldier all his life. Born of a knightly and ancient family in
Devonshire, war was bred in his bone. When still a boy
heliad Served in Cecil's disastrous expedition to Cadiz, and
again in Buckingham's fiasco at Ehe. Since then he
had fought and studied under the Dutch flag in the Low
Countries with ever increasing distinction till he be-
came captain-lieutenant of the crack English regiment in
the service, and so it was under his hard hand that all
the most brilliant of the gilded youth of England were
schooled into soldiership. At the outbreak of the domestic
troubles in his own country, he had come home with an
unrivalled reputation as an expert soldier. Deeply versed
in the science of his profession, and with all the traditions
of the art of war ingrained in him like a second nature,
he brought to bear upon the problem of the hour a broad
conception of the military exigencies of the case un-
clouded by political considerations and undisturbed by un-
essential details. Plis talent for warlike administration
1653 GENEKAL MONK TURNS ADMIRAL 1^69
was no less pronounced. He had learned it in the finest
school in Europe, and the directness and homely shrewd-
ness of his methods carried all before him. Politically
his simple creed was to be true to his commission and
his paymasters. In the civil war he had had to choose
between them. He chose his commission and served the
King, and though he had been taken prisoner in his first
action and lodged in the Tower, no pressure which the
Parliament or his personal friends could bring to bear in
order to secure his services could move him till the war
was over. Then, in accordance with the code of the pro-
fessional soldier, he considered himself free and frankly
took service with the Commonwealth. Such was the
man who from now onward was to dominate the navy
for many a year to come.
His first taste of true naval warfare had been in the
late victory over Tromp, where he had commanded the
junior squadron. He was now with Deane in active
command of the main fleet, since Blake had been wounded
and was still incapacitated. On the Mediterranean pro-
blem his influence is at once visible. After the victory,
which had absorbed the original squadron destined for the
Straits, a fresh one was quickly set on foot at Portsmouth.
Deane and Monk did not approve. In what had happened
in the Mediterranean they read before everything an
emphatic warning of the importance of concentration,
and told the Government so plainly. Though they were
preparing the new squadron according to their orders, they
doubted the wisdom of sending it, and even took upon
themselves to suggest that the whole design should be
reconsidered in view of the fact that Badiley was coming
home. They were of opinion that the squadron could
be employed to greater advantage by cruising in touch
with themselves in the mouth of the Channel to intercept
270 THE DUTCH WAH WITHIN THE STRAITS 1653
the Holland trade. There can be little doubt they were
right. The pressing need of the moment, before any real
use could be made of the Mediterranean, was to crush
the Dutch sea power, and the way to do it was to con-
centrate every available ship upon their main fleet and
the converging points of the commerce on which their
national vitality depended. For a while, however, the
Government insisted on their view ; but after Cromwell's
coiqj d'etat on April 20, by which he practically became
dictator, no more was heard of the new Straits squadron.
It was finally absorbed in the great fleet with which, in
the famous two days' battle off the North Foreland-, Monk,
deprived of his colleague at the outset by a round shot,
but with Penn and Jordan for his flag officers, defeated
Tromp, De Euyter, and De With. The victory was far
from deciding the war. The Dutch were soon ready for
sea again, and, eluding the blockade which Monk had
established, were able to concentrate in the North Sea a
fleet more powerful than ever. The great four days
battle followed, in which Monk was again victorious,
and '"Tfomp*^lost his life. But even then, so desperate
had been the fight, the English admiral was unable to
establish a working command of the sea, and it was
impossible to spare a squadron for the Mediterranean.
There the Dutch had to be left in undisputed control, and
the""waF dragged on till Cromwell became Protector and,
mucTrTc) Monk's disgust, put an end to it in the spring of
l&S^. The Dutch sea power was not entirely crushed.
The general conditions rendered such an end impolitic.
/ So peace was made on terms which, without destroying
■ Holland as a potent Protestant power, insured to England
a real maritime supremacy — a supremacy which, among
all its other advantages, left her free to pursue her inter-
rupted policy within the Straits.
CHAPTEE XVI
CEOMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
With the close of the Dutch war the Protector in
undisputed sway found himself with the destinies of
England in his lap and his hands free to shape a foreign
policy. Having firmly established the new Government
atnome, his remaining task was to make it respected
abroad, and force the powers to abandon the Stuarts.
The policy he pursued to this end is one of the knottiest
points in English history. It has baffled the greatest
historians, as it baffled the most astute of his contem-
poraries, to unravel completely its shifting intricacies, to
reconcile its apparently changing aims. For our present
purpose, however, it is unnecessary to push inquiry very
far. For the student of English action in the Mediter-
ranean it is in this very uncertainty that its main interest
lies'! It was in the Mediterranean that he found the chief
means of executing his bewildering changes of front, aiid
whichever way he faced for the moment he had always
there a point in his position which seemed to outflank
and dominate any force his opponents could bring into
line against him.
When the Protector looked abroad, the chief factor in
the European situation was the struggle between France
and Spain, which was the last relic of the Thirty Years'
War, and which still continued to fill Europe from end
to end with unrest. So deep and viddespread were the
interests'mvolved that every state had to shape its policy
272 CROaiWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1654
more or less closely in relation to the great centre of dis-
turbance, and there was not one that did not see its
future for good or evil to some extent bound up in the
outcome of those interminable campaigns. From year
to year the advantage shifted, and no one could foresee
the end. This alone v^as clear, that, if any pov^er should
arise to sway the balance definitely to the one side or the
other, it would be acclaimed as the controlling force in
Europe.
It is then no matter for wonder if Cromwell's instinct
quickly assured him that in intervention in that great
struggle his foreign policy must speak. Three leading
1 ideas are clearly recognisable in the maze in which he
I seemed to move. They answered exactly to the three
leading motives which had actuated English foreign
policy ever since she had become a great power. First
there was the religious idea — that his mission was to
become the leader of ""a" great Protestant coalition, and
finally stay and stifle the counter-reformation. It was
of this too that James had dreamed in his feckless way
when he first sent a fleet into the Mediterranean. This
idea in its integrity would of course involve not mere
intervention, but war with both the exhausted combatants.
Secondly, there was the commercial idea, which meant
a revival of the Elizabethan war, having for its aim the
opening of the New World to British trade and the with-
drawal of British subjects from the jurisdiction of the
Inquisition in Spanish ports. The adoption of this idea
involved war with Spain and an alliance with France.
Finally there was the national idea — the determination
f to lift England once more^hto the position from which
she had fallen, and to take vengeance for the insult
and contumely which had been heaped upon her ever
since she had been a republic. France in this had been
1(554 CRO.AIWELL'S FOREIGN POLICY 273
the arch-offender by her piratical treatment of English
commerce and her protection of the Koyalist cause.
It was a view consequently that seemed to point to an
alliance with Spain.
The position was one which the two belligerents
were quick to realise. Both France and Spain saw
clearly that the controlling force had arisen, and each
was bidding higher and higher for its good will. In the
Spanish Netherlands the Archduke, in appealing to his
subjects to raise the money which Cromwell was de-
manding as part of the price of his alliance, put it frankly
enough. ' At last,' he proclaimed, ' God, who is accus-
tomed to act by ways inscrutable to men, has raised up
a human power that can make the scales incline to the
side of peace by putting a finger ever so lightly upon
them. ' ' As far as human eyes could see, it was no less
than" this that was at stake : whichever belligerent could
secure the English alliance would be in a position to
dictate terms to the other.
With the game thus completely in his hand it was
natural that Cromwell should be in no hurry to decide
which card to play, until he saw clearly which line would
best achieve his several aims. Moreover, a fresh Boyalist
rising in the Highlands gave a further cause for delibera-
tion. So for the time the diplomatists held the field
and Cromwelh"gpread around him a web of negotiation
which~Tor~mEricacy and instability neither Elizabeth nor
James ever surpassed. Still diplomacy without some
hint of action would not avail. It was this that had
brought James's well-meant efforts into contempt, and
Cromwell was no man to fall into the same error. Yet,
if action must be taken, it must be action that threatened
both France and Spain alike. The solution was simple
' Gardiner, Commomoealth and Protectorate, ii. 4G5, May 1G54.
/VOL. I. T
274 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERDANEAX Kj-W
' and ready to hand. It was clearly a situation that lent
itself to the Mediterranean treatment, and Cromwell's first
step was to set about preparing a fleet for the Straits.
"T!'he importance which he attached to the move is
testified by the fact that Blake was selected for the com-
mand. The cruise that foITo\ved is one of the most
famous in English naval history. Ecgardless of all tliat
[ le3 up to it, many have even come to acclaim it as the
[ beginning of the English action within the Straits.
Legends grew up about it, as they did round Drake ; and
i Blake has been credited with exploits which modern
research has shown to be without foundation. Men
came to believe that there was scarcely a potentate
I within the Straits that did not feel the weight of his arm,
! that the Pope himself cowered in St. Angelo at the
t thunder of his guns. The truth is that what he accom-
plished by force of arms was almost nothing, and the
reaction tends to treat the cruise as of small importance.
Yet the old mythical view is the true one. Those
legendary achievements are but the index of the place
which the cruise held in men's minds at the time, the
echo of its deep moral effect, and they mark for us more
I clearly than the most exact chronicle the opening of inen's
eyes to the true meaning of Mediterranean power to
\ England.
The actual intention of the expedition still remains a
crux for historians. The original idea is clear enough. On
the conclusion of the Dutch war there was a debate in the
Council on the disposal of the magnificent fleet of a hun-
dred and sixty sail that was then in commission. The
project most favoured was the cohqiiestof the Spanish
West Indies. The main objection was that it would involve
the loss of our trade with Spain and endanger that to the
Levant. To this it was answered that hostilities would
1654 BLAKE'S MISSION 27o
necessarily be confined to the West Indies, for the EngHsh
trade was of so much importance to both Spain and
Flanders that Phihp could not allow the war to spread
to Europe. The idea that you might attack the
colonial possessions of a power just as you could make
reprisals on her ships without a general state of war
arising is strange enough to our ears, but it was only
that on which England and Spain had mutually acted
ever since the commencement of what are now usually
called the piratical operations of Drake and his fellows.
The argument was sound enough, but it was met by the
objection that, even if the proposed expedition did not
lead to war, the Mediterranean trade would still lie open
to Spanish reprisals. To this it was replied ' that that
will not prove so ; for, having peace with France (which
must be supposed upon this war), we shall have the
benefit of their friendship and harbours upon the Medi-
terranean Sea, which are much more useful for us than
the Spaniards ' — that is to say, we should be in a position
to protect the Levant trade by a fleet acting from French
ports. Thereupon it was proposed to allot forty sail for the
Channel, eight each for the Scottish, Irish, and Newfound-
land stations, thirty for the West Indies, and sixteen for
the Straits, the rest being paid off. Here then is the
germ of Blake's famous fleet. It was originally designed
to protect English commerce in the Mediterranean while
the Spanish West Indies were attacked.^
Before it sailed, however, its true intentions, as we
shall see, became much more of an enigma. Blake's
final instructions have never been found. They remain
in the obscurity with which they were religiously veiled
at the time. The latest and best authority believes that
the admiral had none at all, except some vague directions
' Clarke Papers, vol. iii. App. B. p. 205.
276 Cr.OMWELL AND THE MEDITErvRANEAN 1654
to act against the Barbary corsairs and generally to pro-
tect the English Levant trade. ^
This is almost certainly the truth. He was sent, as
Mansell was sent a generation before, under the time-
honoured veil that had long ago been worn transparent.
He was to act as Mansell was to act on such instructions
as should subsequently reach him. He was sent as
Mansell was sent and as our Mediterranean squadron is
maintained to-day as the symbol of English power, and to
be ready at the controlling point for any eventuality. Of
all this it is impossible that there should be any direct
evidence ; but everything becomes clear if, in the light
we have of all that had gone before, we trace the
growth of the idea in the minds of Cromwell and his
advisers.
Ever since Badiley's defeat Longland had not ceased
to urge the importance of a '^Mediterranean squadron.
AVhen he heard of Monk's final victory over the Dutch
he redoubled his importunity. It was not merely a
question of protecting commerce, he said, but it meant
' See Gardiner, iii. 373 n. The orders he there refers to are copied into
the Entry Book of Car. II., No. 4, p. 17 under the impossible date of July
1656. It should be, he says, July 22, 1054. There is, however, a difficulty in
assigning this date. The entry runs, ' On receiving these instructions, you
shall with the fleet under your command sail with the first convenient wind
and weather unto Algiers.' Now on July 22, 1654, Blake had no fleet under
his command. He did not hoist his flag till August 10 (Weale's Journal,
Sloane MSS. 1431). The orders further authorise him, in case the
Algerines refuse the demands he is charged to make, ' to assault them by
land or sea, and fight with and slay all persons opposing you.' Now on
March 14, 1655, Blake at Cagliari wrote complaining that he had no such
authority. His general instructions limited him to blockading the corsairs'
ports for a few days, and he asked for express authority to attack their ports
(Thurloe, iii. 232, and see post, p. 310). It is clear therefore that these
instructions must be subsequent to his request of March 24, 1655. In all
probability they were the answer he got, and the true date is the summer of
1655. So far then as the entry is to be trusted, it is evidence that Algiers
was not his original objective, but rather an afterthought, when the suc-
cess of his attack at Tunis was known.
1654 LOJsGLA^^D'S VIEWS / 277
' many other advantages in relation to France, Spain, and
Barbary.' Getting no response, he showed how such a
squadron as he desired might maintain itself without any
expense to the state by reprisals upon the rich Levant
trade of France. Apart from every other consideration,
as he further urged, so contemptuous had the neighbour-
ing Princes grown since the Dutch had been left in
undisputed mastery of those seas, that a fleet was abso-
lutely necessary to bring them to reason.
His well-reasoned importunity, poured into the ears
of Cromwell's ministers with ever increasing vehemence,
cannot have been without its effect, supported as it was
by the lamentations of the powerful Levant Company.
It is even probable that it would have led to action before
the conclusion of the Dutch war but for Monk's opposi-
tion. Cromwell's trust in the wide capacity and judgment
of his new^admiral' was daily increasing, and he, as we
have seen, was opposed on the broad principles of his
art to any weakening of the main fleet till that of the
enemy was completely crushed. Events showed the
justness of his view. For the pressure he brought to bear
at the vital point soon compelled the States to recall their
squadron from the Straits. But even then Longland's
importunity did not cease. Since the Dutch had gone, he
said, the French had become worse than ever. English
commerce seemed to be held fair game for everybody, and
a squadron was more necessary than ever to restore
English prestige.
The despatch in which he insisted on this view reached
London early in April 1654, just after the peace with
Holland was signed, and indications at once appear that at
last he was to be heard. Before the month was out the
Council of State, as we have seen, had practically decided
in principle on a Mediterranean squadron. Mazarin had
278 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1654
taken alarm and was writing to Bordeaux, his Ambassador
in London, that he was to keep him well informed as to
the ships that were to be detached from the main fleet.
In spite of the peace there was no cessation of naval
activity in the English dockyards, and half Europe was
anxiously asking where the blow was to fall. The Grand
Duke of Tuscany promptly trimmed his sails for a storm
in the old quarter. In the last days of the war the Dutch
had sunk a British ship within the limits of his port, and
he now seized two of their vessels as security that repara-
tion should be made to the injured owners. In every
exchange in Italy the coming of the English fleet was
the subject of anxious discussion, and most people saw
in Cromwell a new and more terrible Gustavus Adolphus,
and were sure it was Civita Vecchia, the Pope's own
port, that would first feel lEhe smart.
But of all men Mazarin had the gravest cause for
concern. He had again got a working hold of France ;
but Conde, the leader of the rebellious opposition, was in
communication with the Protector, and an English fleet
at Bordeaux or Bochelle could easily stir the smouldering
embers of insurrection into a new flame. Worse still,
there was the prospect of Blake's being able to deal him
such another blow as had robbed him of Dunkirk. For
Mazarin was once more reviving his old Mediterranean
policy. Since it had broken down four years before,
Spain had been making steady progress in both Italy and
Catalonia. But the Duke of Guise was now free again,
and Mazarin had resolved to use him for a second bold
bid for the domination of the Two Sicilies. In Toulon a
powerful expedition was being prepared, and Monsieur
de Nieuchese, who was in command of the French Ocean
squadron at Brest, was under orders to carry every avail-
able ship to join it at the earliest possible moment. Nor
1654 FRENCH DESIGNS ON NAPLES 279
was this all. This time the attempt was to be supported
by a powerful coalition. Savoy was already engaged.
Genoa, which was in a state of "sullen anger with Spain,
was being pressed to join and accept a French protectorate.
It was also hoped that, as before, the new Portuguese
kingdom, in return for France securing its recognition by
the Pope, would contribute a powerful contingent to the
fleet. Lastly, the Papacy itself was to be persuaded to
seize the opportunity of throwing off the oppression of
Spain. As Longland got wind of the design, he kept
sending home news of its development. He knew by
this time that the fleet he had been praying for was
coming, and he pointed out the splendid opportunity it
afforded for England to exert a mastering influence.
Every one said — so he wrote — that, before such a coalition
as Mazarin was forming, Spain would not survive in Italy
without the Protector's help. So keen was he for action
that he had taken steps to secure an accurate list of the
Toulon fleet, and begged that it might be handed to Blake
or Badiley.^
Meanwhile at home the idea of a Mediterranean fleet
had been growing. Neither France nor Spain would
come to terms, and on June 5, in secret sitting of the
Council of State, it was resolved that a fleet of twenty-
four ships should be prepared ' for the Straits ' and
another of fourteen for the ' Western design.' - Thus
the Mediterranean squadron had risen to the first place
instead of being, as it was originally, inferior to that
which was to operate in the West Indies. No reason
appears for the change. We can only note that it was
contemporaneous with the discovery of a plot against the
Protector, in which the Baron de Baas, who had been
.' Longland's despatches are in Thnrloe, ii.
,/*■ - Dom. Cell. p. 200.
280 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1654
specially sent over by Mazarin to smooth his relations
with Cromwell, was supposed to be implicated ; and,
fm'ther, that the period of active preparation which
immediately followed coincided with the Protector's last
efforts to induce France to join in a Protestant coalition
against Spain and with his ultimate conviction that he
must take his own course.
As Blake's fleet gathered life, Mazarin grew feverishly
anxious. Neither Guise nor Nieuchese was ready to sail,
and he kept petulantly pressing and taunting them to be
gone. At the same time Longland's suggestions grew
more ambitious and strangely tuned to the Protector's
new note. The Toulon fleet, he said, was still in port, not
daring to sail for fear of Blake, and then came a hint that
opens up a startling vista of possibilities. We have seen
already how keenly he felt the weak point of England's
position in the Mediterranean, and how he lamented to
see her dependent on the Italian Princes for abase. Now
he saw Genoa hesitating between the two dominations
that never ceased to threaten her, and the old dream of
Ealegh's time revived in his active mind. Of all states,
he said, Genoa was the least prepared for war. Though
rich, her wealth lay solely in commerce and finance, and she
could not even feed her population from her own territory.
He knew her weakness, he knew her temptations, and he
knew her splendid harbour. From where he was he could
see all, and he looked and longed. * They have the best
port in Italy,' he wrote, when he knew Blake was about
to sail. ' I wish it were in the hands of others that have
more occasion for it.' In Cromwell's tangled negotiations
with France and Spain, while each was threatened by a
gathering fleet, from each was demanded the conquest of a
continental port as the price of his goodwill. From Spain
he would require Calais, from France Dunkirk. Yet of a
16o4 A MISSED OPPORTUNITY :>81
port within the Straits, where, in view of the strained re-
lations with France, it was now far more necessary, not
a word was said. As far as we know, Longland'shint fell
dead. Yet it is strange that, seeing how the navy men
felt the necessity, and how little Cromwell's dreams of
continental action were limited by practical difficulties,
the seed did not ever show some sign of growth. The
actual adverse occupation of Genoa was of course out of
the question, but it is by no means clear that some
arrangement might not have been come to, by which the
desired ends would have been achieved in a more peaceable
way. A naval protectorate, for instance, would have freed
Genoa from the domination of both Spain and France,
and in return she could well have afforded to cede or
lease to England a port in Corsica. Such an arrange-
ment would have secured Cromwell's position in the
Mediterranean better perhaps than any step he could
have taken. Nor could a more favourable moment have
been looked for to open negotiations. It was at this time
that the fear of a league between England and Spain was
holding Genoa back from France, and she was about to
make advances to the Protector for a close commercial
alliance, and that with an eagerness which leaves little
doubt she was prepared to pay a very high price to turn the
stream of English trade from Leghorn to her own quays.
Whatever might have come of it, it is unfortunate that
a suggestion, which seemed so exactly to hit the exigencies
of Cromwell's position, did not reach London in time for
it to be turned to even diplomatic advantage. Before it
was received Blake had started, and the situation appeared
to have taken definite shape. Though the Marquis of
Bordeaux was still in England, the negotiations with
France were practically broken off. In spite of the
' Western ' squadron, which was still being brought
282 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1654
forward at Plymouth, Spain seemed to have it all her
own way, and Mazarin's anxiety redoubled for the
success of his Neapolitan venture. At the end of July
^ Blake's squadron was gathering in the Downs and Guise
had not yet even left Paris. On August 1 Mazarin,
losing all patience, wrote him a sharp letter saying that, if
he did not embark within ten days, the King would divert
the expedition to another object. That very day the
gay young Duke set out, and a week later Mazarin was
assuring him that, if he would only sail immediately, the
reinforcements he required to bring his force up to the
promised strength should follow him at once.' At the
same time he was bringing all his weight to bear upon
Genoa to press her into his design, and assuring her that
as 3'et there was no league between England and Spain.
Nieuchese in Brest was being scolded as roundly as Guise,
and being angrily told that if he did not get to sea at once
he would find his passage into the Mediterranean barred
altogether.- Mazarin at any rate had little doubt that the
first object of Blake's fleet was to frustrate Guise's design.
Though Cromwell's intentions were still uncertain, to
outward appearance he had practically cast in his lot with
Spain. On August 5, only a fortnight after he had finally
made up his mind to prosecute his design against the West
I Indies, he wrote to Philip to say that Blake was about to
I . . .
I sail for the Mediterranean to protect English connnerce
i and begging the hospitality of his ports."'* On August 10
Blake hoisted his flag in the Downs, with Badiley for
; vice-admiral, and Jordan, who was one of the new and
most brilliant reputations of the Dutch war, for the
y
' Lettres de Mazarin, vi. C07, GIO, Gl-3.
- Ibid. 591, 598, 608.
^ Debate in the Protector's Council, July 20, 1654, Clarke Papers,
iii. -207.
v^V
1654
BLAKE SAILS FOE THE STRAITS
283
second flag-officer. By the '25th he was at Plymouth,
and Mazarm was still pressing Guise to get to sea and
reprimanding Nieuchese for his delay more testily than
ever. After one ineffectual attempt to get out of the
Channel, which lost him ten days, Blake finally got away
on October 8, and after looking into Lisbon, presumably
to see'v^hether there was any sign of the Brest division
having put in there or of a move from the Portuguese
fleet, he passed on his way.'
' The dates and main details of Blake's cruise, except where otherwise
stated, are taken from Weale's Journal (Sloane MSS. 1431). Weale was
an officer in the ' Amity ' frigate.
The list of his fleet as given by Penn (vol. ii. 150), and corrected from
Weale's Journal and Blake's despatches, was as follows, besides two or
three auxiliary or store vessels :
Kates
Ships
Guns
Men
350
Commanders
3 second .
' George ' .
60
Eobert Blake, General >i^
John Stokes, Captain
^■■■'''
' Andrew '
54
300
Eich. Badiley, Vice Adm. "
' Unicorn '
54
300
Jos. Jordan, Eear-Adm.
4 third . .
' Langport ' ' ..
50
260
Eoger Cuttance
' Bridgewater ' ' .
50
260
Anth. Earning
,--' Worcester ' ' .
46
240
William Hill
„^'
'.Plymouth '
50
260
Eich. Stayner.
11 fourth *^
' Hampshire ' .
34
160
Benjamin Blake
' Foresight '
36
160
Peter Mootham
'Kent' . . .
40
170
Edw. Witheridge
'Taunton'"^ .
36
160
Thos. Vallis
' Diamond '
36
160
John Harman
' Euby ' .
36
160
Edm. Curtis
' Newcastle '
40
180
Nath. Cobham
' Amity ' .
30
120
Henry Pack
' Maidstone '
32
140
Thos. Adams
' Princess Mary '
34
150
John Lloyd
' Elias '
32
140
John Symonds
3 fifth . .
' Mermaid '
24
90
-
•^'Success'
24
60
Wm. Kendal!
' Sophia '
24
60
Bob. Kirby
3 sixth . .
' Hector ' .
16
35
' Dolphin '
16
45
John Smith
' Nonsuch ' Ketch
10
30
In Penn's list the ' Success ' and ' Sophia ' appear as above, but in the
main fleet list of 1653, under the same commanders, they are given as
284 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1654
Mazarin's anxiety was now extreme. For all his
pressing, Guise had only got to sea a fortnight before
Blake finally cleared the Lizard, and Nieuchese with the
Brest division was still at his moorings. No sooner did
the harassed minister know that Blake had really gone
than he told Bordeaux he must find out what his destina-
tion was. A week later this despatch was followed by
instructions to demand peremptorily from the Protector
what orders Blake had about dealing with French ships,
and to ask for his passports if he did not receive a satis-
factory answer.^ At the same time Louis himself wrote
to Nieuchese at Brest, telling him that Blake had sailed for
the Mediterranean, and that he was to put to sea at once
in order to get ahead of him and join the Chevalier Paul,
who was in command of Guise's fleet, before the English
appeared. ' I am sure,' said the King, ' that if you and
Paul are only together, when they meet you, they will
not dare to attack, and that under commanders so brave
and experienced as you and Paul it will not be easy to win
any advantage over my forces.' There was still more
anxiety in what followed. ' I have written to-day,' he
added, ' to the Sieur de Bordeaux, my Ambassador in
England, to demand of the Protector an explanation in
writing of the manner in which his fleet is to behave
to mine, giving him to understand that I have no fear of
an action if it has to be fought, but that I would gladly
avoid any incident which may prevent the nations enjoy-
ing an assured repose and disturb their commerce. It is
38-gun frigates with crews of 150 and 160 men. In Derrick's list of 1G5'2,
from the Pepys Miscellany, the 'Success' appears as a fourth rate with 150
men. Presumably she was the French prize ' Jules,' which Blake had taken
in 1051. Blake, in his despatch of March 24, 1655, speaks of having with
him the ' Mermaid,' a 24-gun fifth rate with 90 men. It is not in Pcnn's
list.
' Lcttrcs de Mazarin, October 21-26 (o.s.), pp. 373, 378.
1654 MAZAEIN'S ANXIETY 285
your duty to avoid a meeting with the EngHsh fleet, but
if by chance you fall in with it, I doubt not j^ou will
maintain the position {les avantages) that is due to me. .
. . . Perhaps, and I desire it should be so, the Protector
will make such an answer to the Sieur de Bordeaux that
the fears I have suggested will vanish.' ^
So far from Bordeaux receiving the explanation he
was instructed to demand, he could not even obtain an
audience ; and yet, instead of his taking his leave, the
negotiations for an alliance were reopened. The fact is
that, situated as France was, and in spite of Turenne's
recent successes on her northern frontier against Conde
and the Spaniards, she could not face a British fleet in the
Mediterranean ; and white 1&lake'sflag~was flying Mazarin
felt himself compelled, at almost any cost, to keep the
peace with the Protector. Blake's fleet was the trump
card of the game. It was dangled before his eyes like a
bait to lead him on, and whenever he tried to seize it, it
was snatched away, and fresh concessions demanded.
' When I reproach them,' wrote Bordeaux the day after
Blake had joined the fleet, ' that at previous conferences
they have offered, in return for a subsidy of two million
livres, to maintain twenty vessels in the Mediterranean
to support our designs there, they tell me that these were
only conversations, which were not binding.' In vain
Mazarin thus tried again and again to get the card into
his own hand, and again and again was forced to submit
to fresh humiliations for fear of seeing it played against
him.-
' ' Archives de la Maison de Nieuchese,' November 6, 1654 (n.s,), cited by
Jal, Dii Quesne, i. 212.
^ Bordeaux to Brienne, November 13-23, 1654, Thurloe, ii. 724, and same
to same, p. 731. Mazarin to Bordeaux, December 28 (o.s.), Guizot, ii. Api^.
xiii. p. 490. Instructions to Bordeaux, July 6-11, ibid. p. 4G0. Bordeaux
to Brienne, August 11-21, ibid. p. 479,
ij/'
286 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 16.j4
Meanwhile Blake, with his Hag flying in the ' St.
George ' (or * George ' by her puritanical name), a ship of
sixty guns, had appeared before Cadiz and anchored off Eota
at the point of the bay. Besides smaller vessels he had
twenty ships and frigates, the smallest of which carried
twenty-four guns. All had been specially sheathed for a
long cruise in the Mediterranean,^ and Blake had the ball
before him. The Governor sent off to invite him to enter
the harbour, but Blake replied that he was bound with all
speed for the Straits. The fact was that he had found the
English charge d'affaires awaiting him at Cadiz with infor-
mation that four days previously nine French war ships had
passed, making for the Straits. Fearing that he had missed
Nieuchese, he contented himself with handing to the
Governor Cromwell's letter to Philip, and at once carried
on in chase. Of his immediate business he made no
secret, and far and wide through Europe spread the news
how the admiral had openly proclaimed that his mission
was to fight the Duke of Guise wherever he found
him.^
Every one believed the Duke was doomed. Having
finally sailed from Toulon in the last days of September,
he had met with baffling gales, that broke up his fleet and
delayed him so long that sixteen days out he had to water
as best he could at the southern end of Sardinia. Driven
from his anchors by a gale, he was forced almost under
the Spanish guns at Cagliari, and there had to wait a
week, hoping to get touch with his galleys which he had
entirely lost. After all he had to sail without them and
proceed on his way round Sicily in a sadly crippled condi-
' Domestic Calendar, p. 229, June 29, 1G54.
~ ' Lettre du Comte de Molina,' Guizot, i. 488. Mazarin to Bordeaux,
.January 2, 1655 (n.s.), ibid. 490, and Thurloe, iii. 41. Mazarin mentions
Blake's ' boast,' but Molina merely writes that 'people say he is in chase of
the French fleet.'
1654 GUISE REACHES NAPLES 287
tion.^ For his design was not to trust again entirely to
the fickle population of Naples itself, but to land some-
where in Calabria or Apuglia from the Gulf of Taranto or
the Adriatic.^ In this way he hoped to meet the cavalry
which was to join him from the north, raise the country
people against their Spanish masters, and approach the
capital from the rear like a conqueror. So luckless how-
ever was he with the weather that, after vainly trying to
double the southern cape of Sicily for three days, he had
to bear up to Malta for shelter and water. There, how-
ever, to his high indignation, he received a shotted salute
from the Spanish knights, and had to run back in despair
to Favignano, an island at the west end of Sicily. It
was in Spanish hands ; but the garrison abandoned the
forts that protected the anchorage, and he was able to
water in peace. By this time, however, his provisions
were running so short — this at least is the reason he gave
— that he felt it useless to continue his original plan and
resolved to proceed direct to Naples. This he did, and on
November 4 he landed and occupied Castellamare in the
south-east corner of the bay.
At the same time Blake entered the Straits, and
heard at Gibraltar fresh news of the Brest squadron.
It had not yet passed in, and he spread his frigates to
get touch with it. Three days later Stayner, one of the
smartest officers in the fleet, and some other captains
came in to report they could see nothing of Nieuchese,
and Blake, with a sharp reprimand, prompt!}^ sent them
' ' Eelation de tout ee qui s'est pass6 au voyage de Naples, par M. le Due
de Guise,' in Recueil Historique, Cologne, 166G, 12mo. This is a despatch
which Guise wrote from ' Cap de Corse, December 17, 1654,' on his retreat
to Toulon.
^ Longland and other intelhgencers believed him to be going to land in
Apuglia from the Adriatic, but in his ' Eelation ' {itbi supra) he himself only
mentions Calabria.
288 CnOMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1(J.54
out again. • From the manner in which the narrator
insists on Blake's anger with the offending officers we
may detect another indication of his bracing influence on
the navy. Ever since the birth of the new art inefficient
cruising had been its curse, and it would seem that
Blake had determined to turn a new leaf. No doubt,
according to the custom of the sea, his captains thought
they had done their duty, and were surprised at their
reception. But what was good enough for them was not
good enough for a man trained in the art of war on land.
Step by- step the soldiers were lifting naval warfare to
a science, and there is little doubt that from this
momentous sojourn of Blake in Gibraltar Road we may
mark, in addition to its other consequences, another stride
upon the upward way.
But for all his vigilance and discipline the days went
by and not a sign of the enemy appeared. Days grew
to weeks, and the most critical period of Blake's
cruise, when Guise was actually at work in Naples Bay,
was slipping by, while he clung in forced inaction to the
station he had chosen. He could not know the man
Nieuchese was, or the orders Louis had given him.
Nieuchese had interpreted them only too faithfully.
Finding, as it would seem, that Blake was before him,
and mindful of his instructions to keep out of his way,
he had put back into Lisbon, and there was quietly
cleaning his ships. It was nearly three weeks before
Blake knew this, and was convinced it was no use
waiting. On November 21 he at last resolved to pass on,
and after touching at Malaga and Alicante he stood
across for Sardinia. He reached it on December 4, and
at Cagliari heard that Guise had been there.- Whither he
' Weale's Journal.
- Weale in his Journal says thiit on December 4 they heaid Gnise had
been there twenty-nine days before — i.e. November 5. JUit at this time he
1654 BLAKE MISSES GUISE >^ 289
had gone no one could tell, but four days later intelli-
gence came in that he was at Naples. On this hot scent
Blake weighed without a moment's delay, and in three
days was beating into the bay. But, high as had been
his hopes, it was too late. Not a French ship was to be
seen. The prey was already flown, and Blake had to (
fume under the first of those close chances of which l
i
England's record in the Mediterranean is so full.
Having seized Castellamare, Guise had proceeded to
improve his holding. After a stubborn resistance and
considerable loss, Torre Annunciata, a work on the
Naples side, fell ; but there his success ended. In vain he
tried to seize the neighbouring mills, on which depended
his only chance of feeding his men. The Spaniards were
too strong, and the reckless plundering, which he was
unable to control, effectually turned the inhabitants
against him. The intendant of his army reported but a
week's provisions left. There was no help for it — so
Guise thought — but to let go and return to Toulon for
his promised reinforcements and fresh stores. In a week
the whole force was embarked again. For a fortnight •
more, while Blake was still clinging to Gibraltar, the t
weather held the French fleet where it was at the mercy I
of a resolute attack. ' If he (Blake),' lamented Longiand, f
when eight of Guise's retreating ships had put into
Leghorn, ' if he had not stayed at the Straits mouth,
but come directly for Italy, he had found all the French
fleet in a pound in Naples Bay, where he might have
done what he would with 'em ; but all will be for the
best.'i
There was certainly much truth in his godly resig-
was at Castellamare. Guise himself says nothing of having been at Cagliari
a second time. Weale therefore seems to be mistaken in the information
Blake actually received.
' Thurloe, iii. 12.
VOL. I. n
290 CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 1654
nation. Had Blake been in time the real significance of
his cruise would not have fallen into the oblivion which
has so long obscured it. Seeing the condition of
Guise's fleet and the veteran material under Blake's
command, a great victory must have recorded the object
of the campaign indelibly. But as it was the work was
done without shedding of blood. For the second
time the feather-headed Duke had courted disaster, and
shattered Mazarin's dreams of Mediterranean power.
How far Blake's presence had contributed directly to
the miscarriage it is difficult to say. The failure was
mainly due to Guise's irresponsible determination to
abandon his original intention of landing in Calabria.
At a blow it upset Mazarin's elaborately laid plans, and
threw the Duke back on trusting once more to the
disaffection of the Neapolitans. Though Guise himself
says nothing on the point, we know how nervous the
French authorities were about the English Mediterranean
squadron, and we may be sure that Guise's fatal step
was largely due to the fear of being shut into the
Adriatic by Blake. Nieuchese's continued delay in
joining was no doubt the immediate cause, but this delay
was also the result of Blake's action. His interposition
at Gibraltar between the two French squadrons had in
fact rendered both of them impotent. Nor must it be
forgotten how important was the moral support of his
presence to the other side. In every Italian seaport the
rumour was that Cromwell's admiral was coming to
assist the Spaniards. It did everything to restore
their failing prestige, and must have materially assisted
the Viceroy of Naples in securing as he did, by timely
concessions, the loyalty of his restless subjects.
However this may be, Blake's presence put an end to
all hope that the attempt could be renewed. When, on
16.54 MAZAiaX ()UT-MAX(EUVRED
December 7, Guise wrote froiii Cape Corso in Corsica to
announce his retreat, he appears fully to have expected
that he would be sent out again. He was not going to
allow a man to land, he said. He meant to be ready to
act the moment he received his orders. But, however
sanguine the Duke might be, Mazarin was under no
illusions. Though in his letters he tried to make light
of his failure, setting against it Turenne's successes
on the northern frontier, it is clear he felt his prestif^e
had suffered a severe blow, and that his great design
was dead beyond present recovery. Blake himself did
not fail to emphasise the situation. Having ascertained
at Naples, where he w^as accorded a brilliant reception,
all that had taken place, he did not let the grass grow
under his feet. Leaving one or two vessels behind him,
presumably for intelligence purposes, he gave chase to
Guise with the bulk of the fleet. But he was just too
late. On December 20 he looked into Leghorn. Eight
French ships^HaH put in there, hut for fear, as some said,
that Blake would get between them and Toulon, they were
already gone, and he had to learn that the whole force
was safe in its own ports. For Guise to stir out again
with Blake where he was, was not to be thought of.
It was clearer than ever that, before France could make
any real progress in the Mediterranean, she must come
to an understanding with England. So, in spite of all
the provocation Louis had received, Bordeaux was told
to defer his departure and use the delay in^' fresh effort
to bring the Protector to reason. The negotiations
therefore continued as before, but with as little success.
Cromwell could not but feel the enhanced advantage
of his position, and Bordeaux was as little able to
conceal the increased eagerness of his master for a treaty.
Louis conceded everything but the claim of England to
u 2
2f)2
CROMWELL AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
1055
intervene on behalf of French Protestants, and on this
point the Protector was equally determined to insist. So
the condition of reprisal, that was scarcely removed from
war, continued. Blake was not recalled and remained
to carry out the original intentions of his commission.
Though it is on the remaining incidents of the cruise,
real and imaginary, that its fame has rested, they are
insignificant beside that part of his operations which
closed with the dispersal of Guise's force. The story of
his having at Civita Vecchia exacted from the Pope an
indemnity for having allowed Eupert to sell prizes in the
Papal ports is without foundation. A similar tale in
relation to the Grand Duke of Tuscany is traceable to a
Genoese source. Their Ambassador Extraordinary was
at this time in London, pressing the Protector to conclude
a reciprocal commercial treaty by which the subjects of
each state should be on equal footing with those of the
other. Their main object was, as we have seen, to divert
the British trade from Leghorn to their own port. But
the envoy did not fail to point out that while such a treaty
would be of great benefit to the Genoese state and its
independence, England would also gain by it in other
ways. ' It would also,' he wrote to Cromwell, ' be useful
and beneficial to the English nation for the many and
obvious reasons which, without doubt, will be in the mind
of your most serene Highness.' ^
There seems in the words a suggestion such as Longland
had hinted at some months before, that Genoa might
become for the English navy what she had so long been
for that of Spain. But it led to nothing. Though
Cromwell entertained the idea, the merchants were loath
to desert Leghorn ; and though the Genoese never lost
' Thurloe, iii. 118; Gardiner, Historij, iii. STi-G, and see also his note
on ' Blake at Leghorn ' in Eug. Hist. Review, xiv. 109.
1655 BLAKE AT LEGHORN 293
an opportunity of offering their hospitality to the Enghsh
fleet, Enghsh trade remained faithful to the Medici. So
far from quarrelling with the Grand Duke, Blake met
with a cordial welcome, and, in spite of the activity of the
Genoese, his visit served to knit still more closely the
remarkable sympathy that had so long existed between
the English and the Florentines. If any satisfaction
was needed it was amply afforded in the full liberty which
Blake was allowed to refresh his fleet for the completion
of the work which yet lay before him. Still there were
reports that the French fleet at Toulon was coming out
again, and he would not leave his dominating position
until he had learned for certain that Louis had ordered
his ships to be laid up for the winter. Discouraged by
his complete failure, the King was going to content himself
with sending out privateers. ' And so,' wrote Blake
complacently, ' there will be no further stop to our
proceedings from Trapani.' ^
' Despatch, Add. MSS. 9304, f. 99.
CHAPTEE XVII
BLAKE AND THE TUEKISH SEA POWER
The proceedings to which Blake referred were those
which had been made the pretence for sending him to
the Mediterranean. Well had they served Cromwell's
turn, and his Admiral had now" leisure to attend to them.
By a dramatic turn the dutj^ before him carries us back
to our starting point. We have traced step by step how
the germ planted half a century before; b}' Ward, the
English mutineer, had worked with ever widening effect
till it had changed the whole conditions and meaning of
Mediterranean power. With an English fleet dominant
in its waters and no rival navy in a position to dispute its
command we see the revolution consummated, and the
first use England was to make of her new" power was to
strike at the point where the pregnant seed had been
sown. Tunis was Blake's objective, and on January 15,
1G55, he sailed from Leghorn for Trapani to meet the
ships he had left at Naples. With the exception of four
frigates w^hich he had detached to watch the Balearic
islands for French privateers on the trade route, and a
ketch left behind at Leghorn to bring on letters from
home, his whole force was with him.'
It was likely to be wanted, for Blake had before him
an undertaking not unlike that which he had just
abandoned for the time, and which was similarly calculated
' ])Lsp!itcli of Mai ell J 1, Hi-'J^j. Add. MSS. U304.
1655 THE CANDIOTE WAR 295
to mark the new domination. But now it was a still
more momentous struggle in which he was about to
intervene — the ceaseless pressure of the East upon the
West. Concurrefrtly~ivith the contest between France
and Spain for the command of the Western Mediterranean
a still fiercer one had been raging for the command of
the Eastern half. Ten years previously it had commenced
by the sudden descent of an overwhelming Turkish force
upon Crete, which still formed part of the Venetian
empire. The new storm was yet another outcome of
the Thirty Years' War. While Christendom was absorbed
in the internecine strife it was inevitable that the Moslem
should seize the opportunity to push further westward
into the Mediterranean. It was again Venice who was
left to bar the way, and the Sultan had determined to
drive her from her ancient possessions of Crete, as he
had driven her from Cyprus.
The war naturally turned upon the command of the
sea, and Venice had chartered a number of English
ships to reinforce her navy. It was some of these that
Longland had induced her to spare for Badiley's relief.
There were reasons why scarcely any sacrifice could be
too great to win the goodwill of the Commonwealth.
Realising the tremendous issue at stake, she had sought in
every Court in Europe to induce the combatants to aban-
don the fratricidal struggle, but hitherto in vain. From the
small Papal navy and the Knights of Malta alone had
any assistance been forthcoming ; and, seeing herself left
almost alone to fight the battle of Christendom, she rose
to the occasion with all her old heroism and resource.
Though Canea, the westernmost part of the island, fell an
easy prey, Crete was far from conquered. Year after year
the struggle had gone on at the sacrifice of innumerable
lives and treasure untold. In Mocenigo Venice had found
296 BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER 1655
a commander worthy to stand beside the greatest of her
great names, and under his daring and sagacious leader-
ship the Candiote war, as it was called, was made to
glow as one of the brightest chapters in her annals. Still
it was all she could do with her enfeebled resources to
hold her own, and so soon as the Commonwealth was
revealed as a new force in Europe she applied to it for
help.
It was some time, however, before she could wipe
out the ill-effects of her unhappy patronage of the Stuart
Court, and from the Long Parliament she received little
encouragement. With the change of Government, how-
ever, she took fresh hope, and not without reason. It
was a cause which appealed strongly to Cromwell's
crusading spirit, and for a time he seems to have doubted
whether this was not the right way to use the power
which God had given him. He told the Venetian resident,
at his first audience in January 1654, that he had every
desire to assist the Eepublic, which he considered the
buckler of religion against its most powerful foe. Later
in the year, when an Ambassador Extraordinary arrived
on the same mission and diplomatically stirred the
Protector's rehgious zeal, he replied that the generous
defence offered by Venice against the common foe laid
every Christian Prince under obligations to her ; that he
himself had often felt the pricks and goad of zeal for the
service of God, and that, if the embassy had only come
sooner, it might have found the conjuncture more favour-
able to its objects.^
But high as was the obligation under which Venice
had placed the Commonwealth by granting Longland's
request, and strongly as her appeal moved a man of
Cromwell's nature, there were two insuperable difficulties
' n. li. Crown, Venetian Studies, p. 370 et seq.
1655 BLAKE'S TEMPTATION 297
in the way of a war w^ith Turkey — one, the opposition
of the powerful Levant Company, which was alarmed
for its Turkish interests, and the other, the West Indian
adventure, on which Cromwell had already decided to
embark. It is possible of course that, in spite of these
objections, he gave Blake to understand he might do
what he could, but of this there is no trace. It is more
probable that at Leghorn the admiral, with his ardour
only whetted by having missed Guise, found the local
influences irresistible. All Italy was ringing with the
latest exploits of Mocenigo and mourning his death.
Isolated with a few ships m the midst of a great Turkish
fleet off the Dardanelles, he had fought his way clear,
dealing such destruction around him that it took the
Capitan Pasha a month to get his fleet fit for sea again, j
But, in spite of Mocenigo's heroism, a Turkish fleet had
been able to get through to the relief of the army in Crete, i
and he had died, men said, of a broken heart. •
It is easy to understand how Blake's chivalrous spirit,
burning as it was to do some deed that should make the
name of England resound through Europe, longed to take i
up the dead admiral's sword and strike a blow for the hard- t
pressed Republic. At Leghorn, moreover, it could not be J
forgotten how, in spite of her necessities, Venice had con-
sented to release the English ships in her service at
Badiley's call. AVhat half promises Longland may have
m3i^ to secure such a concession we cannot tell ; but, as
Badiley himself was there as vice-admiral of the fleet, the
two 'of them could easily have persuaded Blake that some
return was called for. Authority or no authority, a blow
for the relief of Candia was in the spirit of the high pur-
pose for which he had been sent out, and in the spirit
which inspired Cromwell's foreign policy as he had re-
cently declared it. ' God,' said the Protector in silencing
298 BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER 1655
Lambert's objections to an aggressive line of action, ' God
has not brought us hither where we are, but to considerTKe
worlc that we may do in the world as well as at lipme.'
It Was a sentiment entirely in accord with Blake's nature,
' and, as though from Heaven, a chance was offered him in
a manner and of a nature that he was no man to resist.
His resolution was as sudden as it was heroic. On
January 15, on the eve of sailing from Leghorn, he had
written home to say he was going to Trapani to pick up
his detached frigates, and so to Tunis or Tripoli as seemed
best on the spot. That up to this time he had no very
% definite orders is clear. Feeling the importance of his
presence in the Mediterranean, he begged that victuals
might be sent out to him, so that he might keep his sta-
tion ' so as to be ready,' as he said, ' for any service
which the Providence of God or instructions shall
lead us unto.' ^ He had hardly got to sea when, though
tiie weather had promised thoroughly fair, he encountered
a furious gale which for three days kept his whole fleet in
constant peril of being cast away among the islands off
the Tuscan coast, and finally drove him back to Leghorn.
His faith was sorely tried. ' It hath pleased God,' he
wrote in describing the catastrophe he had escaped, ' to
' exercise us with variety of wind and weather, and with
divers mixed providences and strange dispensations never
to be forgotten by us, especially in regard that He hath
been pleased in them all to rouse His compassion to pre-
^ vail against His threatenings, and His mercy to triumph
over His judgment.' ^ In this frame of mind he received a
piece of information which under the circumstances can
only have seemed to him like the finger of Heaven.
News had just come in that the war-ships of all
the Barbary states from Algiers to TripoH, the flower
' Add. MSS. 9304. i. U'.). - Ibid. i. 101.
1655 HE TURNS CRUSADER 299
of the Moslem marine, were to concentrate at Tunis on
February 12 for the Sultan's service against Crete.
The war had long focussed round the siege of Candia, the
Venetian capital of the island. Mocenigo's line of strategy-
had been a vigorous offensive with the fleet, whereby he had
established a command of the ^gean Sea, and continually
menaced the Turkish possessions that lay upon its waters.
In this way he had rendered their communications with
the besieging force in Crete in the last degree precarious,
and at the same time compelled the Sultan to dissipate
his strength in innumerable garrisons. In the present
campaign the Venetian fleet was to act in two divisions —
one blockading the Dardanelles and the other laying siege
to Malvoisia in the Morea, the Turkish advanced base of
supply for Crete. Under these circumstances it is clear
that, if the Turkish army before Candia could receive relief
from the Barbary side, the task of the Venetians would be
seriously complicated, while, on the other hand, if Blake
could succeed in crushing the combined fleet of the tri-
butary states, he would give the Venetians the practical
ordering of the campaign.^ How could he hesitate ? In
the whole conduct of his life he w^as a zealot of childlike
faith, whose every utterance shows ffiaFan Intimate com-
munion with the Deity was as real a thing to him as it
was to Cromwell. Left practically to his own initiative, he
hacTbeen trusting, as we have seen, that the Providence of
God would lead him on, and he can no longer have doubted
the purpose of the gale which had driven him back to I
Leghorn.
Full of this great intention Blake lay chafing at his
moorings till the end of the month. When at last, on
January 31, the weather permitted him to get clear, he had
' Daru, Hist, de Venise (eel. 1853), vol. v. cap. i. Blake's despatches of
March 14, 1655, in Add. MSS. it:i04 and Thuiloe, iii. '282.
300 BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER 1655
thus less than a fortnight in hand, and, ill-provisioned as
he was, he determined in his impatience to make a dash
straight for his objective without calling at Trapani for
supplies as he had intended. So rapid was his movement
that in a week he was before Tunis, but it was only to
encounter another disappointment. The first thing he
learnt was that his information was false. There was no
concentration, and the chance of the resounding exploit on
which he was bent was gone. Still the simple words of
his despatch which cover his disappointment leave no
doubt of his intention, and he must be given all credit for
the high purpose he had formed. It was the true Nelson
touch, and nothing in Nelson's life marks more indis-
putably the spirit of the great commander. For such
men it is not enough to excuse inertness by resting on
( orders that are indistinct, timid, or lacking in thoroughness.
I He perceives the broad stream of policy on which his
superiors are floating, and dares to show them, even before
they clearly see themselves, the course they should steer.
In this great spirit he came near to hurling the new force
of his country against the East in the old quarrel, and
raising its fallen name higher in the face of Europe than
any other means could have achieved. It was prestige he
was sent forth to seek, and only by some such heroic
stroke could it be truly won. So it was we see him, full
of the love of God and his country, raging round the
Mediterranean to seek a foeman worthy of the weapon he
had tempered, and finding none.
Still, in spite of his disappointment, a crumb of com-
fort remained. In the neighbouring Porto Farina, the new
naval headquarters of the Tunisian state, lay nine war
ships, and Blake despatched a squadron of four frigates,
under Captain Hill of the ' Worcester ' (his usual cruiser
commodore), across the gulf to blockade them. Having
1655 DEMA^'DS REDRESS AT TUNIS 301
thus secured the ground, he proceeded with the prosaic
business on which he had nominally been sent out. His
actual instructions, so far as we know them, were to demand
the restitution of a ship called the 'Princess,' with an
indemnity, and the release of all British captives. It can
hardly be said that justice was entirely on the admiral's
side. In 1646 a man called Edmund Casson had been
sent out b}'^ the Parliamentarj^ Government on a mission
to the Barbary states to negotiate the release of English
prisoners and a treaty to secure the immunity of English
vessels. Such a treaty he successfully concluded with
Algiers, but his negotiations with Tunis appear to have
been spoilt by the conduct of an English captain, who,
having agreed to transport a company of Turkish troops
to Smyrna, took the first opportunity of selling them to
the Malta galleys. Another English envoy had done his
best to secure their release, but the Knights demanded
a price beyond his means, and the Bey remained rather
aggravated than appeased. It was but natural then that,
in answer to the English demands (although he was ready,
as he professed, to negotiate a treaty for the future), he
absolutely refused to give any satisfaction for the past.
Now Blake's instructions further directed him, 'in case
of refusal of right, to seize, surprise, sink, and destroy
all ships and vessels belonging to the kingdom of Tunis
he should meet.' Such was the authority that Eliza-
beth was wont to give Drake and his fellow admirals,
and which James gave Mansell. The same doubts
which had so often troubled them at once arose in
Blake's mind. Was he, or was he not, entitled to sink
the same ships in their own ports ? He could not solve
the doubt ; but, finding negotiation useless, promptly stood
across to Porto Farina. The presence of his blockadin^^
frigates had caused the nine men-of-war to be unrigged
:W2 BLAKE AND THE TUliKISH SKA POWER 1655
and disarmed, and hauled close inshore under the castle,
while other batteries had been erected and armed with
their guns to further protect them. An entrenched camp
had also been formed during the blockade ; and when
Blake moved, the Bey marched down and occupied it
with some thousands of horse and foot. The position
was thus a very dithcult one to deal with — so difhcult
indeed that the Council of War decided that, whatever the
decision might ultimately be as to how far their instruc-
tions entitled them to go, it was impossible to attack with
the fleet in the condition it was. They had but five days'
drink, and very little bread. It was therefore decided
to leave six frigates, under Captain Stayner of the
'Plymouth,' to continue the blockade, and to carry the
rest of the fleet to Cagliari for supplies.^
On February 22, therefore, they sailed, 'meaning to
give them a more sudden and hotter visit,' and four days
later anchored at Cagliari. Here they found the four
frigates that had been sent to cruise round the Balearic
islands. For their pains they had to show a smart
French frigate of fifteen guns, called the ' Fame,' and to
report they had driven ashore and sold to the Governor
of Majorca another of thirty guns, called the ' Percy,' a
well-known English-built ship.-
' Blake's despatches in Thudoe, iii. 232, and Add. MSS. 9304 ; Gardiner,
Common-wealth, iii. 376 et seq. The frigates detailed for the blockade were
'Plymouth,' 'Kent,' 'Newcastle,' 'Foresight,' 'Taunton,' and 'Mermaid.'
As the ' Plymouth ' was the only third rate, I assume Stayner was in
command.
- This vessel, under the name ' La Persee,' is the subject of one of the
heroic traditions of the French navy. Her captain was a Knight of Malta,
named Valbelle, who had served with distinction in the Candiote war and
had been one of Guise's captains in the late expedition. During the retreat
before Blake he was hailed by an English ship which had — so the story goes
— ' the cool audacity to demand a salute, as a right due to the masters of the
sea,' whereupon Valbelle boarded the Englishman ' with heroic ardour,
trode the insolent aggressors under his feet, carried off their flag, . . .
and after frightful carnage made himself master of the enemy's ship. Un-
1655 FRENCH PRIZES 303
These two captures brought the tale of French prizes
up to seven, and after more than a fortnight spent in
vain efforts to get safticient bread, Blake had to send the
' Hampshire ' and * Maidstone ' frigates to Genoa to get
more and careen. Two other frigates, the ' Langport '
and ' Diamond,' were to return to Majorca on the same
errand, with orders to sweep the trade route as far as
Alicante or Cape Palos, and then proceed also to Genoa.
Thence the ' Langport ' was to bring on what bread had
been obtained, and the other three were to resume the
willing, however, to embitter too far the relations between the two countries,
he abandoned his prize on the demand of the EngUsh commandant.'
This story, incredible as it seems, receives some corroboration from Blake's
remark that she was 'well known,' suggesting she was a marked ship; and
also from Mazarin's instructions to Bordeaux, wherein he told him to insist
on the fact as evidence of his goodwill, that Guise had restored an English
prize he had taken (Mazarin to Bordeaux, January 2, 1655, Thurloe, iii.
41 ; same to same, January 16, Guizot, ii. App. xiv. 510). All the
captains of the English navy — so tlie French story proceeds- were filled with
extreme irritation at Valbelle's exploit and sought to wipe out the disgrace.
On February 13-23, 1655, 'a division of four vessels — one of 60 guns and
the others of 36 to 44 — under the Chevalier Banks, found her between
Majorca and Cabrera.' Then follows the story of another heroic action,
in which Valbelle fought all the four ships and finally ran himself ashore,
and even then so maltreated the nearest Englishman that he forced the
captain to accept an armistice. The following day the English broke their
agreement and attacked again. For three days more Valbelle defended
himself, till finally the Spanish Viceroy, overcome with admiration, allowed
him and his crew to land without being treated as prisoners of war (Guerin,
Hist. Maritime, iii. 10-3-5).
The ' Chevalier Banks ' I cannot account for. The squadron detached
from Leghorn consisted of the ' Langport,' 50 (Capt. Koger Cuttance), the
' Hampshire,' 34 (Capt. Benjamin Blake), the ' Diamond,' 36 (Capt. John
Harman), and the ' Maidstone,' 32 (Capt. Thomas Adams). Blake's report
on the ' Percy ' affair is that, ' not being able to possess themselves of it,
being also extremely battered and spoiled, they took 3,000 dollars of the
Governor of that place, who was likewise upon agreement to be at the charge
of sending home all the French in her, which were 300 in number '
(Thurloe, iii. 232). In another despatch {Add. MSS. 9304) he says his
men were about to burn her when the Governor made this offer. On these
accounts we may safely allow Valbelle the credit of a very fine defence,
after all allowance is made for the obvious and quite unnecessary exaggera-
tions and absurdities of the French story.
:304 BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER 1655
cruising station about the Balearic islands. The final
rendezvous was to be Alcudia Bay, in Majorca, pre-
paratory to a demonstration on the coast of Provence.^
On March 15, with the rest of the fleet, he weighed again
for Tunis ' to put an end to the business there,' as he
wrote, ' which we shall endeavour to do with all the
resolution and circumspection which we can, as God shall
direct us, it being a business of manifold concernments
and interests, and subject to divers consequents and con-
structions.' Seeing the condition of affairs, this was no
more than truth. While at Cagliari he had received by
his ketch a letter in the Protector's own hand, giving him
certain commands. What they were is unknown. The
despatches accompanying it were dated January 15 and
29 — just a month after Penn had sailed for the West
Indies.'^ There may therefore have been a warning of
the coming war with Spain, but the indications are rather
that it referred to the transport of some horses which the
Protector had instructed Longland to purchase for him in
Italy. What Blake had in his mind was almost certainly
the possibility of his action involving England in the
Candiote war, and risking the Levant trade with Turkey.
How grave was his anxiety his action proves. On
' Blake's despatch, March 14, 1G55, Add. MSS. 9.304.
- So the despatch in Add. MSS. 9304. That in Thurloe, iii. 232, only
mentions the receipt of one dated January 25. The letters dealt mainly
with the political crisis at home and Cromwell's summary dissolution of
Parliament on January 22. The Admiral's reception of the news disposes
of the Royalist legend that he was politically opposed to Cromwell's
methods. ' I was not surprised with the intelligence,' he wrote to Thurloe,
' the slow proceedings and awkward motions of that assembly giving great
cause to the fact it would come to some such period ; and I cannot but
exceedingly wonder that there should yet remain so strong a spirit of
prejudice and animosity in the minds of men who profess themselves most
affectionate patriots as to postpone the necessary ways and means for pre-
servation of the Commonwealth. . . . But blessed be the Lord who hath
hitherto delivered and doth still deliver us.'
1665 TUNIS OBDUEATE 305
March 21 he anchored again before the Goleta of Tunis.
Here he received, and, strangely enough, by a French
ship, another ' great packet of letters,' which must have
been written early in February. Again, we do not know
their contents, but on the 'following day another French
ship, which had withdrawn into the Goleta, came boldly
out and anchored in the middle of the English fleet with
impunity, ' from which,' says an officer, ' we judged the
General's letters related to a league with France.' As a
matter of fact, when the despatches were written, Bor-
deaux was very hopeful about a treaty. In view of
Penn's expedition against the Spanish Indies, it was
almost as necessary to Cromwell as to Mazarin. Mazarin
had declared himself eager for it, and had told Bordeaux
to dwell on the recent restitution of English prizes as a
mark of his sincerity. It is very possible, therefore, that
Blake at this time did receive orders to suspend his opera-
tions against French commerce.
He could thus give his undivided energies to the
Barbary states. At Tunis the situation was unchanged,
and he once more sent in the Protector's demands. But
Blake's movements had only served to harden the Bey's
heart. ' We found them,' wrote the admiral, ' more
wilful and untractable than before, adding to their
obstinacy much insolence and contumely, denying us all
commerce of civility.' They had refused him leave to
water, and had fired upon his boats, and at last Blake lost
his patience. ' These barbarous provocations,' says he,
* did so far work on our spirits that we judged it necessary
for the honour of our fleet, our nation, and religion, seeing
they would not deal with us as friends, to make them
feel us as enemies : and it was therefore resolved in
Council of War to endeavour the firing of their ships in
Porto Farina.' The die being cast, he once more retired
VOL. I. X
306 BLAKE AND THE TUIiKISII 8EA POWER 1655
to Trapaiii with the double object of filling up with water
and lulling the Bey into security. There he remained a
week, and on the afternoon of April 3 was back again off
the port. All was as before. The Tunis vessels were
still lying under the batteries, a pistol-shot from shore, the
coast was lined with musketeers, and some sixty guns
frowned from the castle and works. A final council was
called to consider the formidable task ; but first, in the
true Cromwellian spirit, they ' sought the Lord by prayer.'
The answer quickly came. It was to attack and burn the
ships on the morrow where they lay.^
^ At the first glimmer of dawn the ships began to take
up their allotted stations. ' The fourth-rate frigates,' we
are told, * were first under sail, and went near the castle
and works.' Captain Cobham in the ' Newcastle ' led the
way, followed by the rest of the fourth and fifth rates, and
all came to anchor, says another officer, ' near the Turks'
nine ships, who lay close to the castle and the forts by
it.' - Badiley, the vice-admiral, in the ' Andrew,' with
Stayner in the ' Plymouth,' then went in, quickly
followed by the admiral with the rest of the heavier
ships, the 'Worcester,' 'Unicorn,' 'Bridgwater,' and
' Success,' and then six second and third rates. ' All
anchored,' we are told, ' just against the body of the
castle, within musket-shot, and began to play their
broadsides.' The whole evolution was performed with
perfect ease, ' the Lord,' as Blake said, ' being pleased to
' See a letter, Ax)ril 9 and 10, from the fleet in a tract called A Book of
the Continuation of Foreign Passages, 1657, Brit. Mus. E. 195-1 (3) 4to.
The other main authorities are Blake's despatch, April 18, in Thurloe, iii<
390, and Weale's Journal. An excellent chart and note on the alteration of
the coast is in Gardiner, Coinmomvealth dc. iii. 381.
' Continuation of Foreign Passages. It gives the fullest details of the
ships engaged. Seven vessels, it says, followed the 'Newcastle,' viz. ' Kent,'
' Foresight,' ' Amity,' ' Princess Maria,' ' I'earl,' ' Mermaid,' and ' Merlin.''
Weale adds the 'Kuby ' and ' Diamond.'
1655 BOMBARDMENT OF PORTO FARINA 307
favour us with a gentle gale off the sea, which cast all
the smoke upon them and made our work the more easy.'
It will be seen that with the force at his command
Blake must have been able to develop a fire formi-
dable beyond any that Mansell had the power to do in
his similar attempt at Algiers. Still for a time, as they
said, it was very hot work. As the sun rose, Badiley
answered the first gun from the castle and the action
rapidly became general. Soon after the advanced squadron
was anchored, the ' boats of execution ' put off and, under
cover of the storm of shot and the blinding clouds of
smoke, rowed for the dismantled ships. At their approach
the Tunisian crews sprang overboard and swam ashore.
The panic spread to the advanced works, and in a short
time the enemy had all taken refuge in the castle.
Then one by one the ships were boarded, fires were
kindled in each of them, and by eight o'clock the whole
were blazing. By this time the fire of the castle began
to slacken. ' We played very thick,' wrote an officer, ' for
four or five hours.' By eleven o'clock it was completely
mastered, and Blake had marked another point in the pro-
gress of naval science.
It was not the first time, as is often said, that a fleet
had successfully engaged shore batteries. Landings had
often been covered in this way before, and in 1602, when
Sir Eichard Leveson and Sir William Monson had
captured the great carrack in Cezimbra Koad, they had
done much the same thing. But in these cases it was
the landing that had led to Lhe evacuation of the shore
works. The only exception was Cezimbra Road, and
there the fleet had been able to work under sail. This
was the first time that ships had anchored close under
powerful batteries and almost immediately crushed them
by sheer weight of metal. For this is what had been
308 BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER 1655
done. In vain the enemy, as the boats drew off, attempted
to regain their abandoned works. They could scarcely
fire a gun. As the frigates began to warp out they tried
to reach their flaming vessels, but a few shots from the
heavy ships frustrated every attempt. The wind con-
tinued light, and when the work was done the admiral
' put out his flag of defiance and the whole fleet warped
out almost as easily as it had gone in.' The gallant Badiley
as vice-admiral was the first to anchor under the castle
and he was the last to weigh, defiantly keeping his station
till the doomed vessels were beyond saving. In the
English ships scarcely a man was hit, showing that the
enemy's fire must have been mastered from the first. The
loss in the boats was more serious. It is given as from
twenty-five to thirty killed, and forty to eighty wounded ;
but all, or nearly all, was the eflect of musketry from the
shore trenches. All day they watched the holocaust, and
when night fell the flames still lit up the field of victory.
So the work was done, and well might an exultant officer
call it ' a piece of service that has not been paralleled in
these parts of the world.' ^
Blake's own note was much more modest. He could
see little in his exploit but his extraordinary luck. After
commenting on the insignificance of his loss he writes :
' It is also remarkable to us that shortly after our getting
forth, the wind and weather changed, and continued very
stormy for many days, so that we could not have effected
our business had not the Lord afforded that nick of time
in which it was done.' His grateful words might well
make critics pause before they treat with contumely
Mansell's failure at Algiers. Blake's apparently irresolute
movements previous to the attack had been exactly the
same as his ; both were embarrassed by the same indefinite
' Weale's Journal.
/
16o5 BLAKE AND MANSELL C03IPAEED 309
mstrnctions ; and Blake's methods might ahnost have
been founded on Mansell's, so exactly similar were they.
If Mansell had only had Blake's luck with the wind — if,
instead of a calm and rain after the ships were set on fire,
he had had a fresh breeze as Blake had — he must have
succeeded as Blake did, and the Mediterranean would
have rung with an exploit whose consequences for James's
prestige at that critical moment it is impossible to
measure.
A comparison of the two exploits may be insisted on
with profit, and pressed without disparagement to either
officer. It rather serves to bring out the merits of each,
and to give some light on the extent of risk that a naval
commander may legitimately take. The cardinal difference
between the two exploits — and it is that which has ob-
scured their comparative merits — is that Blake entered
the harbour and Mansell did not. Each was right in the
particular case. We do not know the exact strength of
the enemy in either case, but we do know the comparative
value of the two English fleets, and we may safely say that
the defences of Porto Farina were at least as inferior to
those of Algiers as Blake's fleet was superior to Mansell's.
It is clear that if Blake had been unable to come out
when the work was done, it would have mattered little.
So long as his overwhelming force remained in the
harbour not a Tunisian gun could have been manned.
For Mansell the inability to withdraw would have meant
destruction. Had the chances been otherwise, he too
doubtless would have gone in ; but clearly the true risk
for him to take was to attempt the firing of the ships with-
out trying to silence the batteries. This he successfully did,
and his boats retired. When Blake had done so much
he also retired and withdrew to a similar position to that
which Mansell held throughout. In the one case the
81U BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER I600
enemy's ships continued to burn, in the other they did not,
owing mainly at least to an incalculable chance of the
fickle Mediterranean weather. It is not right that this
difference — though it was all the difference between
failure and success — should divide the credit of the two
operations as widely as it has done. In appraising the
judgment of the two admirals it would be difficult to know
where to bestow the prize. Blake used an overwhelming
force with just boldness while Mansell with just reserve
husbanded one that was inadequate. It is needless to
decide ; for this is certain — that there is as much true
instruction for a naval officer in the one exploit as in the
other.
Complete as was Blake's success at Porto Farina, it
earned him nothing tangible. Having given the Bey his
lesson, he at once resumed his blockade of the Goleta and
repeated his demands. The Bey remained absolutely
inflexible. He refused even to treat unless Blake came
ashore. The destroyed ships, he said, were the Sultan's,
and with him the English would have to deal. Blake was
in despair. He had gained no concession, he had not
released a single captive, and yet there was nothing to do
but retire once more to Cagliari. There he wrote an
anxious despatch to excuse his conduct. ' Seeing it has
pleased God,' he said, ' to justify us herein, I hope his
Highness will not be offended at it, nor any who regard
duly the honour of our nation ; altho' I expect to hear of
many complaints and clamours of interested men.' He
meant of course the Levant merchants, and in his anxiety
on their account he hurried off a merchantman, which
happened to be in the Goleta, with letters to the Am-
bassador at Constantinople to explain the provocation
under which he had acted. He had to own how hazardous
his exploit had been. ' I confess,' he says, 'I did awhile
1655 IILAKE'S FUUTIIER INTENTIONS 311
much hesitate myself, and was balanced in my thoughts,
until the barbarous carriage of those pirates did turn the
scale.' Whatever the consequences to himself and British
trade, the work was done, and it was time to turn to other
matters.
His programme was as yet incomplete. Guise's fleet
was still on his mind, and so was Algiers, whither he now
meant to proceed in order to get a conlErmation of Casson's
treaty and fill up with water. The work was not likely
to take him long. His exploit had already told. Within
a week of it, while still before Tunis, he had received a
deferential invitation from the Dey of Algiers to negotiate.'
Thus he saw his way to gathering the first-fruits of his
victory, and then returning without delay to his original
object. ' From Algiers,' he wrote, while putting his fleet
in order at Cagliari, ' we intend, if God enable us, to sail
to Majorca, and from thence to range the coast of Provence
to attend the French fleet in our way home, so long as
our victuals will admit.' From this it is clear that his
orders to deal gently with French commerce were not
long-lived. In the last week in March Longland had sent
him on two packets from London, which he must have
received at Cagliari, to change his note. When these de-
spatches were written the French negotiations had again
hung fire. Cromwell absolutely refused to abandon his f^
claim as the head of the Protestant faith to interfere on ' :
behalf of the Huguenots if he judged fit. It was a claim ' <
Louis could not possibly admit. P)ordeaux was constantly
asking for his passports, and the Protector was to all
appearance quite prepared for a war with both France
and Spain in the cause of the Eeformation. So far then
' Continuation of Foreign Passaf/es. This information is added on
April 10 as a postscript after the description of the action written on the
yth, and dated ' from Tunis Eoad.'
31-' IJLAKE AND THE rURKISII SEA POWER 1655
from being debarred from injuring French commerce,
Blake must have been authorised to proceed on the
original intention, and threaten the ports of Toulon and
Marseilles, where a powerful expedition was being pre-
pared for resuming the offensive in Catalonia. The in-
calculable force that lay in the Mediterranean squadron
was thus again emphasised. Up till the very last moment
it enabled Cromwell to play his double game. On the one
hand it was a lever to force France into peace, and on the
other a spell to lull Spain into security. Even as Blake
acknowledged the subtle orders, Penn's attack on San
Domingo was in full swing, and the final instructions to
the Mediterranean squadron were speeding southward by
sea and land.
It -^as on April 18 that Blake, still believing the
Toulon fleet was his objective, sailed from Cagliari to
Algiers, where he arrived in ten days. His stay lasted
barely a fortnight ; but so great was the effect of his lesson
to Tunis that it was enough to do his work and do it
well. So far from finding any resistance, he was received
with marked respect. Victuals, water, everything he
asked for was readily furnished. Casson's treaty was re-
newed, with additional clauses extending its benefits to
all British subjects, and in pursuance of it all who were
then in captivity were given up on payment of their value.
The men of the fleet were even permitted to ransom out
of their pay a number of Dutchmen who swam off to the
ships. It is part of the legend that Blake did much the
same at Tripoli. It is certain that before receiving
Cromwell's last orders he had intended to do so, but the
call that had reached him at Cagliari left no time to spare
for the work.^ At Algiers he did not delay an hour
' See his despatch of March 14, Add. MSS. 'J304 : ' After Tunis we
intend to !,'o for Tripoli.'
1655 HIS FINAL ORDERS 318
longer than was necessary. So soon as victuals and
captives were on board he swept on to the Balearic
islands, where his three frigates were busy with French
commerce.^ On May 14, four days after he had left
Algiers, he anchored at Formentara and began to take in
wood ; but next day, before he had done, it came on to
blow and he had to make sail. On the morrow, as he
stood off and on, he was joined by the * Elias,' which was
bringing wine and bread from Naples, and with her were
a victualler called the ' Betty ' and his ketch. His plans
immediately changed. After another day spent in taking
in the stores, two small frigates were detached to Alicante
and Cartagena to take in the guns that were there, belong-
ing presumably to Kupert's beaten ships. Their orders
were to follow him, not to Toulon, but to Gibraltar and
Cadiz. This sudden change of move, of which there is
no hint before, admits of but one explanation. He had
heard by despatches, which Longland had forwarded, that
Spain, not France, was to be his enemy, and instead of
operating on the coast of Provence he was under orders
for the coast of Andalasia to intercept the Plate fleet. ^
' Thui-loe, iii. 487.
- On June 13 Cromwell wrote to Blake that he had sent him orders
about the Plate fleet overland via Leghorn, and also by a ketch direct by
sea (Thurloe, iii. 547). The question is whether the orders were sent early
enough to have reached Blake at Formentara by May 16. Cromwell's
words show that they were sent off before April 28, as Dr. Gardiner points
out [Commonwealth dx. iii. 392 n.), but they were probably sent much earlier.
A ketch for the purpose was called for by the Admiralty Committee on
March 26 [Dam. Cal. 452). There was some delay in fitting her out, but
presumably the orders were ready and duplicates were sent off by land very
soon after this call — that is, early in April. Dr. Gardiner, however, believed
they were entrusted to Capt. Nixon of the ' Centurion,' a fourth-rate frigate,
about the end of April, and that he landed the messenger somewhere in the
Mediterranean and sent him to Leghorn overland. If this was so Blake
cannot have received the orders at Formentara on May 17. But the letters
which on May 1 Vice-Admiral Jordan says he had given to Nixon cannot
have been there sent overland. Nixon, with the ' Centurion ' and ' Dragon,'
814 BLAKE AND THE TURKISH SEA POWER 1655
Of Blake's immediate movements there is no record,
but in ten days' time the two frigates which had been
detached to AHcante and Cartagena, having loaded up the
guns, came up with the main body of the fleet as it was
in the act of passing the Straits. The reason Blake had
been so long on the way is not clear, but there is an
explanation worth suggesting, as it involves the possible
truth of one of the most striking episodes of the legend.
Bishop Burnet relates that when ' Blake with the
f fleet happened to be at Malaga, before he made war on
' Spain,' some of his seamen went ashore, and, meeting the
Host, began to jeer at the people for making obeisance. At
* the instigation of the priests, the crowd set upon them and
sent them back to their ships very severely handled. Once
on board the men complained to Blake, and the admiral
promptly sent on shore a trumpet to demand the sur-
render of the ringleader of the priests. The Governor
replied he had no jurisdiction over priests ; whereupon
Blake declared that that was no concern of his, but that
if the offender was not given up within three hours he
would burn the town. The priest was sent. Blake repri-
i
sailed as convoy to the victuallers which Cromwell distinctly says he sent
oft' after the overland orders had gone, and these vessels met Blake at
Cadiz (Thurloe, iii. 547, Dom. Cal. viii. pp. 468, 471). The despatches
Nixon carried must have been those which Blake refers to in his cypher
despatch of June 12 as ' the secret instructions sent by your Highness
referring me to a former instruction touching the Silver fleet ' (Thurloe,
iii. 541).
These ' former instructions ' must have been those sent oft' l)y Longland
from Leghorn on May 1 by the 'Warwick' pinnace to Alcudia Bay
(Thurloe, iii. 422). This is just the time he would have received letters from
London, sent off overland at the end of March, the post time being, as
appears from his correspondence, about four to five weeks. The probability
is that, on his way to Formentara from Algiers, Blake detached his despatch
ketch to Alcudia Bay to bring on anything he found at the rendezvous,
that she found there the ' Warwick ' pinnace, the ' Elias,' and the ' Betty,'
and thus it was that her arrival at Formentara with the ' Warwick's '
despatches was followed by Blake's sudden change of plan.
1655 BLAKE AT MALAGA 315
manded him for not having lodged a formal complaint of
the seamen's conduct. Had he done so they should have
been punished. He would suffer no man of his to insult
the established religion oT a country, but at the same
time he would have all men know that an Englishman
was~orily to be punished by an Englishman. And with
that h(^ let the priest go. 'Cromwell,' Burnet adds,
'was. much delighted with this, and read the letters in
Council with great satisfaction, and said he hoped he
should make the name of an Englishman as great as ever
that of a Roman had been.' ^ The story may be a pure
myth, but Burnet can hardly have invented it, and all we
know of Blake's movements renders it quite possible that
something of the kind really occurred. We know, more-
over, that when he called at Malaga on his way out, one
of his boats for some unexplained reason had been de-
tained and that the fleet sailed without it. It is on the
assumption that the Bishop's story related to this visit that
modern scepticism has rejected it.^ But it is almost cer-
tain that Blake visited Malaga a second time on his way
out of the Straits. He was ten days — that is, from May 17
to May 27 — getting from Formentara to Gibraltar, and,
as we know from the log of the ' Amity,' one of the two
frigates detached for the guns, they met with calms and
baffling airs from the 25th to the morning of the 27th as
they turned westward.-'' The fleet could not have passed
the Straits in such weather, and Malaga was the ordinary
place for vessels to He while waiting for a wind to carry
them out. Hence nothing is more probable than that
Blake lay there three days at this time, and while doing so
he may well have demanded redress either for the previous
' History of his Own Times, i. SO (138).
- GardLmev, Common neaUJt d'c. iii. 373, n,
' Weale's Journal,
316 BLAKE AND THE TUTJKISH SEA POWER 1655
detention of his boat or for some new insult to his flag.
In any case there is nothing in the known facts of the
/f I case to justify an ont-of-hand rejection of the bishop's
story, and Blake may still be credited with his famous
vindication of his country's honour.
It was the last act of that memorable cruise. With
admirable skill, and the shameless craft which was then
the foundation of all foreign politics both at home and
abroad, Cromwell had extracted from it the utmost
,- possible advantage. By permitting Blake's last move on
Toulon he had blinded the Spaniards' eyes till the very last
moment. Blake had scarcely reached Cadiz before it was
known that Penn's fleet was in the West Indies. Yet in
the previous week the Governor of Alicante and Cartagena
had been handing over Rupert's guns to the English
captains with effusive compliments. Even at Cadiz,
when Blake asked leave to careen his ships in the port,
orders came dowm from Madrid that it was to be per-
mitted ; but, having probably in the meanwhile learnt the
news that had come across the Atlantic, he prudently
declined the invitation when it arrived. It was safer to
anchor off Eota, and there in the mouth of the bay he lay
quietly revictualling before the Spaniards' eyes from the
storeships that had arrived from England. No one could
doubt what his business was. He had come there, every
one said, to intercept the treasure fleet if Penn missed it,
and by the King's order incessant prayers were offered
for its safety in the monasteries and convents.'
Such were indeed his orders, and a little later they
were supplemented by instructions to prevent any relief
getting out to the West Indies to interfere with Penn.
1 They were accompanied by the Protector's hearty approval
of what his admiral had done at Tunis. He acknow-
' Sir Percy Wright to Thurloe (Thurloe, iii. 542).
l6oo BLAKE'S 'PARDON' 317
ledged the good hand of God in it, as Blake had pointed
out ; but at the same time he added : ' I think myself
obliged to notice your courage and good conduct therein,
and do esteem that you have done a very considerable
service to this Commonwealth.' ^ For the present he was
deseed to do no more. Though he remained on the
coast all the summer, the treasure fleet did not come,
and no Indian relief put out. It is true a fleet hastily
gathered and equipped in Cadiz did get to sea, but war
had not been declared and it avoided an action. Blake
on his part did not press one, since he had no authority to
attack a fleet not bound for the Indies. By the end of
summer the admiral with his fifty-six years was so broken
by the long strain to which he had been exposed that
he could not conceal his condition from the Protector.
Cromwell at once gave him leave to stay out or come
home as he pleased, and on October 6, with his fleet as
worn and strained as himself, he anchored in the Downs.
' This letter of approval, in answer to Blake's apology for attacking
Porto Farina without orders, is clearly the origin of the widely believed
story that Blake received a pardon from Cromwell. Practically he did, and
the story can hardly be said to be a ' pure fiction ' (Gardiner, First Dutch
War, i. 24, n.).
%/
O
CHAPTER XVIII
CKOMWELL's war with SPAIN
The remarkable success of Blake's memorable demon-
stration gave the course of English Mediterranean power
a new and stronger impulse. Henceforth it moves in a
fuller flood. The main channel becomes clearly recog-
nisable, and the slenderer streams that go to swell its bulk
lose their importance. While we traced the sources, each
rivulet — the small beginnings that make great ends — had
to be examined with patient scrutiny that to each might
be justly apportioned its relative share. But as they
unite in a wider bed the course becomes clearer and we
may travel down it at greater speed. The rivulets that
formerly were parent streams become mere tributaries
that deserve no more than passing notice. It is with the
broad features of our progress that we are now concerned,
and these we may observe as we are carried ever more
rapidly down the increasing current.
Cromwell's Spanish war was little concerned with
action within the Straits. It was conceived in the Eliza-
bethan spirit, and in the Elizabethan spirit it was waged.
It was mainly an Ocean war, and yet the lessons of Blake's
cruise were not wholly forgotten. The great contribution
of that cruise to naval thought has never been sufficiently
recognised. It was not his swoop on Naples, his threat
on Toulon, or even his exploit on the Tunis batteries that
was its most memorable feature. It was those three
impatient weeks — wasted weeks as it seemed — when at the
1654 LESSONS OF BLAKE'S CRUISE j^ 319
outset of his campaign he lay at Gibraltar fuming because
the Brest division did not come. It was in those weeks,
when men said he had thrown away his chance of strik-
ing Guise, that he had really defeated him, and not only
him but Mazarin's whole Mediterranean policy. By
seizing the Straits and holding them as he did, he had
prevented Guise receiving at the essential moment the
powerful addition to his force on which he relied for
success ; the heart was stricken out of the French
commanders, their action was cramped and made ab-
ortive, and finally all hope of renewing the attempt after
the first miscarriage was destroyed. It is true that a
crushing blow at Guise's demoralised fleet would have
made a more brilliant impression for the moment, but
for deep and lasting influence on the balance of sea power
it could not compare with what Blake's timely inaction
achieved. By the still pressure of those lost weeks he
had given to English naval strategy a priceless maxim.
He had demonstrated the surpassing importance of
GiKi'nitar anxl'the inherent weakness of the Freiich
position. His action had brought naked to the surface
the cardinal f acttEat the two seats of her naval energy
were separated widely and by a narrow defile. It was
clear "that the prompt seizure or even the threat to seize
this defile must place in English hands the initiative in
any naval war with her old enemy. This then was the
priceless secret that Blake had laid bare — the true
sigmScance of the Gibraltar defile. Priceless indeed
it "was to those who had eyes to see — for it is not too
much to say that to this enduring geographical condition,
more than to any other single factor, England owed' her
final domination of the sea.
It is not of course pretended that the truth was clearly
recognised at once. The great facts of strategy have
320 CROMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIN 16o5
always grown slowly to axiomatic solidity, rather by
repeated example than sudden precept. It is one of the
most remarkable features of Drake's wide grasp of naval
problems that he was able to formulate his intuitions as
clearly as he did. Blake may have done as much in the
present case, but so little that he wrote has survived that
we cannot tell. All we know is that at the very next
opportunity the idea recurred. Spain was now to find her-
self in the same position as France. In her case also the
two main seats of her naval energy were separated by the
Gibraltar defile. In the days of the old war this had not
been so, and this was no doubt one reason why the
Elizabethan admirals had neglected Gibraltar. At that
time Spain held Portugal and had no sailing navy in the
Mediterranean. Consequently the central point of her
naval power lay not at Gibraltar but at Cape St. Vincent.
To the north of it lay Lisbon and the ports of Galicia,
Biscay, and Flanders ; to the south, Cadiz and Seville, the
great seats of the American marine, and such Italian ports
as could contribute to her oceanic strength. St. Vincent
then, as Drake saw, was the true point of division. Here
it was he performed one of his most daring and
miraculous exploits in seizing the Cape, and throughout
the war his pupils continued to regard St. Vincent as
the key of the Spanish position. But with the loss of
Portugal and Osuna's foundation of a sailing navy in the
Two Sicilies the centre of gravity shifted to Gibraltar.
Thus, so soon as the new war breaks out, we see the
neglected idea of the Scottish soldier of fortune being
forced again to the front, and the Straits assuming an
importance which they had never enjoyed before.
As in the case of Drake's descent on the West Indies
and the Spanish Main in 1585, formal war did not
immediately follow the attack of Penn and Venables on
1655 COLONEL MONTAGUE 321
Hispaniola and Jamaica. Throughout the autumn and
winter of 1655 the Spaniards made earnest efforts to come
to an arrangement ; but on the EngHsh demands for the
rehgious exterritoriahty of their merchantmen in Spanish
ports and for the open door in the Indies neither side
would give way. It was the old quarrel which James's
premature peace had left unsettled, and it had to be fought
out. Though war was not actually proclaimed by Spain
till February 1656, a powerful fleet had been brought
forward in the English ports during the winter months.
Blake was to command it, but as his health was far from
restored he begged for a colleague. To his serious dis-
satisfaction, as it is said, Cromwell appointed his young
friend Edward Montague, better known in Eestorationdays
as the Earl oTl^andwich. This brilliant and attractive
gentleman was one of Cronnvcll's mistakes. A cousin of
the Earl of Manchester, the first Parliamentary Com-
mander-in-Chief, he had thrown in his lot with the
popular cause and been given premature military prefer-
ment. After Manchester's retirement his favour con-
tinued. When barely yet twenty years of age he had
received the command of a regiment in the New Model
army, and had fought at Naseby and the siege of Bristol.
Though, as Clarendon says, he had the reputation of ' a
very stout and sober young man,' there is no sign of his
having particularly distinguished himself, nor indeed of
his having taken any further part in the struggle till Crom-
well's rise to supreme power again attracted him. In
August 1654 he had been appointed one of the Com-
missioners of the Treasury, and thus he was not yet
thirty, with absolutely no experience of the sea and very
little of war at all, when he was suddenly thrust up to
share the position which Blake had so hardly earned. The
explanation of the appointment must be sought in Crom-
voL. I. y
322 CROMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIX 1656
well's personal affection and Montague's own pecuniary
difficulties. Pepys, his most ardent admirer and devoted
client, says he was hea\aly in debt at the time, and the
main object of the coming campaign was the capture of
the Spanish treasure fleet. The result of the appoint-
ment was from our present point of view a very striking
modification of the action which Cromwell had in his mind.
As usual, the admirals' instructions are not extant and
we have again to gather them from their proceedings.
The fleet was a very powerful one. At its head, bearing
the flag of both the admirals, was the ' Naseby,' a new
frigate-built first-rate of over 1600 tons and 80 guns,
just launched at Woolwich and the pride of the Pro-
tectorate navy. Next her was the famous ' Kesolution,'
which was originally intended for Lawson's flag ; but at
the last moment, for political reasons, he was superseded
by Badiley. No list of the fleet exists, but it certainly
consisted of not less than forty-five sail and included at
least eight second-rates and several third-rates.^
Owing to the difliculty of manning so large a force
and other reasons it was not till the end of March that
the admirals cleared from Torbay. The result was that
the treasure fleet got into Cadiz before them, and their
chance of a rich capture was gone till the next one was
due in the summer. They were thus thrown back on
their secondary objects, one of which, it becomes clear, was
to establish a footing on Spanish territory at some point
' Thiuioe, V. 69. Montague, on May 20, says there Avere sixteen frigates
before Cadiz and twenty-seven sail at . Tangier, including fire-ships and
victuallers, besides at least two detached frigates, the ' Phcenix ' and ' Sap-
phire.' From the minute-book of the Navy Commissioners (Add. MSS.
1905, f. ISO) and Stayner's despatch (Thurloe, v. 399), and other scattered
notices we know the fleet included, besides the first-rates ' Naseby ' and
' Resolution,' the 'Andrew ' (52), 'Rainbow ' (54), 'Unicorn' (50), ' Plymouth '
(54), 'Bridgewatcr' (62), ' Speaker ' (64), ' George ' (52)— all second-rates— and
the ' Entrance ' (40), ' Bristol ' (44), ' Taunton ' (40), and ' Jersey ' (40), third-
rates.
1G56 PROPOSAL TO TAKE GIBRALTAR 323
from which they could control the Straits and also pre-
vent an expedition sailing from Cadiz for the recovery of
Jamaica. On April 15, off the south-west of Portugal,
Montague sent to Thnrloe the unwelcome intelligence
they had obtained. Not only the newly arrived treasure
fleet but the galleons of the Indian Guard that had not
already got awa.y with the outward convoy were snug in
the inmost recesses of Cadiz harbour, where it was almost
impossible to attack them, and it was certain that the
Spaniards did not mean, as had been hoped, to put out
and risk an action. Further he says, ' They have sent
two new regiments for Gibraltar, and the Duke of Medina
is as active as he can [be] in securing the coast. You may
well judge upon this intelligence what straights we are
in to resolve our actings : what respect to have to the
Indies, and what to attempt here worth the while.' The
weather was too boisterous to hold a council, and it was
not till five days later, on April 20, he was able to send
the result of their deliberations.
After a long and careful reconnaissance it was decided I
that as things stood it was impossible to do anything at 1
Cadiz. 'We had then,' Montague continues, 'some '
debate of Gibraltar, and there appeared no great mind to
it in regard of hardness and want of land men formed,
and officers and numbers of men too, all of which are real
obstacles, as you may judge upon the description of the
place [and] the number and quality of our men ; and to-
say the truth the seamen are not for land service unless ^.j ^
it be a sudden plunder. They are valiant, but not to be ^^ \/
ruled and kept m any government ashore. Nor have fUi^*-*^
your sea officers much stomach to fight ashore. Yet this
work is not thrown aside on debate.'^ ""'
' Thurloe, v. 67. The word ' stomach ' is there wrongly deciphered
'stoars.' It is written 90, 6, 19, 7, 0, 25, which reads ' stoack,' tlie ' m ' i
being obviously omitted. s
r 2
324 CliOMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIN 1656
From these remarks of Montague's it is clear the
idea of Gibraltar must have been in the admirals' minds
from the first, and it was now to be pressed from home.
A week later, on April 28, when Cromwell had learnt from
independent sources how unfavourably events had fallen,
he sent the admirals a series of suggestions for the future
conduct of the campaign. First he proposed the destruc-
tion of the Spanish fleet where it lay, and, if this were
found impracticable, an attempt on Cadiz itself.^ Failing
this he asks them to consider * whether any other place
be attemptable, especially that of flie town and castle of
Gibraltar, which, if possessed and made tenable l)y us,
would it not be both an advantage to our trade and an
annoyance to the Spaniard, and enable us without keeping
so great a fleet on that coast, with six nimble frigates
lodged there, to do the Spaniard more harm than by a
fleet and ease our own charge ? ' Here we have the first
definite suggestion of the permanent occupation of Gib-
raltar as a naval station, and it comes from Cromwell's pen.
With whom the idea originated we cannot tell. From
Montague's concern for the place it would look as if it had
been mentioned before they sailed. It is probable, as the
custom was, that the designers of the campaign had had
the records of similar expeditions before them and had
noted Colonel Bruce's proposal to Lord Wimbledon in
1625. After the fleet sailed, however, the idea must for
some reason have taken firmer hold of the Protector's
mind and caused him to lay more stress upon it. So
' Carlyle here mistakes Crorawell's meaning. He does not contemplate
the destruction of the Suazo bridge, close by which the whole Spanish
force was concentrated, but suggests it may be neutralised as a line of
relief for Cadiz by throwing entrenchments across the narrowest part of
the island of Leon, and so cutting the road from the bridge to the town. It
was so Essex had intended his attack to be covered in 1590, though by
mistake the covering force went on to the bridge.
1656 CROMWELL AND GIBRALTAR 3L^5
far indeed had the project gone with him that he is said
to have formed a design for cutting through what is now
the neutral ground and turning Gibraltar into an island.'
Meanwhile, in search of water, the admirals had moved
down to Tangier, leaving a division of fourteen frigates
under the rear-admiral to blockade Cadiz. On their way
they fell in with Cromwell's messenger, and ten days
later, on May 13, after they had been lying at Tangier a
week, Montague took two frigates across the Straits and
made a close reconnaissance of the Eock in person. The
result appears to have been that the more he looked at it
the less he liked it. Still it could not be lightly aban-
doned. Cromwell's messenger was a certain Captain
Lloyd, whom the Protector specially recommended as a
person of integrity and in full possession of his ideas. In
virtue of his verbal instructions Lloyd appears to have
laid particular stress on the Gibraltar project. ' I per-
ceive,' Montague wrote a we'elTTater, ' much desire that
Gibraltar should be taken. My thoughts as to that are
in short these : that the likeliest way to get it is by
landing on the sand and quickly cutting it off between
sea and sea, or so to secure our men there as they may
hinder the intercourse of the town with the main, frigates
lying near to assist them : and it is well known that
Spain never victualleth a place for one month. This will
want four or five thousand men, well formed and officered.'
This he said was only his own private opinion, for a
council had not yet been called to reconsider the question.
What Blake thought we cannot tell. We have none
of his letters, and Montague never refers to him, and the
' Sir Henry Sheeres, A Discourse concerning the Aleclitcrraiie/in
Sea dx. {See2}ost, vol. ii. pp. 79, 256.) To the edition of 1705, published
immediately after the place was taken by Eooke, is a plan of it, and beside
the neutral ground it has this note : ' Oliver Cromwell had a design on this
place and would have cut this neck of land to make Gibraltar an island.'
326 CROMWELL'S ^^'AR WITH SPAIN 1666
impression we get is that he was either ill or too discon-
tented for energetic action. Still there is reason to
believe he was of Montague's opinion ; at any rate it was
decided not to make any attempt for the present, and
Lloyd was sent back to report to Cromwell and receive
his decision. It is possible that Montague's keen anxiety
for prize money may have had a good deal to do with its
postponement, but his reasons for not attempting the
enterprise have much weight. There were certainl}^ a
number of soldiers in the fleet who had been shipped
when seamen were found so hard to get and so disaffected ;
but, as Montague said, they were not ' formed ' — that is,
organised in companies and regiments for shore service —
and they had no officers. Moreover, there was for the
moment more pressing business in hand. Portugal was
making difficulties over the ratification of the commercial
treaty that had lately been concluded, and was suspected
of an intention to throw in her lot with Spain. Montague
was eager to seize the occasion as an excuse for capturing
their homeward-bound Brazil convoy, which was just due.
The English envoy at Lisbon had suggested this step, and
it would seem that Lloyd had brought them authority to
take it. By his hands or shortly afterwards they received
definite instructions to make a demonstration before
Lisbon with a peremptory demand for ratification. Much
to Montague's disgust — and he made no secret of it — the
effect was immediate. The Portuguese gave in and the
Brazil fleet had to be left alone.
This business done, the admirals returned to Cadiz
to see once more if Cromwell's suggestions could not
be carried out.^ But all seemed as hopeless as before.
Both admirals were now agreed that ' nothing could be
' Pointer's lettei-s (Dom. Cnl 37;!|. June lf5. lC>r,C>, and Montague's in
Thurloe, v. 170, June 30.
1656 BLAKE STALEMATED 327
done against the Spaniard.' Proposals were made for
attempting Bayona in Galicia, and also for plundering
Majorca, but Blake rejected them all. A hint had been
received from home that if nothing could be done against
the Spanish attitude of passive defence, the bulk of the
fleet should be sent back. So lame a conclusion was
little to Blake's mind. The fact was, his heart was set on
completing the work he had but half done in his previous
campaign, and a new cruise in the Mediterranean was at
this time practically decided on. ' We have in a manner
resolved,' wrote Montague on the last day of June, ' to
appear in the Straits as high as Tripoli, and make a
league with that place if we can, as also Tunis it may be.'
The idea was to leave thirteen sail, including the largest
ships, under Badiley to watch Cadiz and, after detaching
a squadron against Salee, to proceed into the Mediter-
ranean with the rest. It was a programme that promised
far too little remuneration to please Montague. For all
Cromwell's high-handed ways he did not venture to
establish a commercial blockade of Cadiz. That which
they were working was purely military, and practically
unproductive. It broke Montague's heart to see the
flourishing trade neutrals were doing with the enemy,
' which,' he lamented, ' we cannot hinder unless we should
fight all the world.' Contraband they did attempt to stop,
but with small effect and much loss of temper. ' It begets
a deal of ill-will,' he added ; ' in short, is the worst piece of
work we meet with.' He was tired and disgusted with a
service so different from what he had hoped, and he ended
by urging that fifteen sail of nimble frigates kept per-
manently on the station, careening and watering at
Lisbon, could do more than the fleet they had.
There were moral effects, however, of which he took
no note. That powerful fleet and Blake's name produced
328
CROMWELLS WAR WITH SRAIN
1656
^
|//5
f within the Mediterranean an impression which was deep
and lasting, and which is for us the highest interest of the
campaign. From Leghorn Longland was watching its
effect with his cTiaracteristic aciiteness. The possihiHties
the'"fleet possessed of striking in a score of different places
kept every cabinet concerned in a wholesome state of
anxious deference. As early as February Longland had
written that on the first news that Blake was coming to
sea again the Pope had had all the treasure of Loretto
removed inland. Li April he said he had sent down two
thousand masons to fortify his coast towns. Others
believed Blake's objective was Elba, Majorca, or Sicily,
' and generally the Italian Princes dreaded that the French
ambitions were to be supported by the English fleet. The
i alarm moderated when Blake was known to be operating
off Cadiz ; but when, about midsummer, rumours came in
that he was after all coming into the Mediterranean, it
redoubled, and not without cause. At a moment when it
seemed to the admirals they were most impotent, to us,
who can view the whole field, they present a picture of
striking potency, and afford us a notable demonstration
of the power which a Mediterranean fleet can give to
England for playing on the strings of Europe.
"The trouble about ratifjdng the treaty with Portugal
had been raised by the Church. The priests, scandalised
at the article which gave religious exterritoriality to the
English merchants, took up an irreconcilable attitude,
and to the English protests the King replied he was not
king of the Church, and must refer the article for the
Pope's consent. The successful demonstration of the
fleet before Lisbon, which had compelled him to stand
by his word, was thus for Cromwell and his men a direct
l)low at what they regarded as the cloven hoof of
Piomo. Ever since his accession, the new Pope,
1656 ALAPtM OF THE POPE 329
Alexander .VII., had fixed his poHcy on bringing
about peace between France and Spain. The amazing
miHtary successes of the new King of Sweden, Charles
Gustavus, were filling Catholic eyes with amazement.
Another Gustavus Adolphus had arisen, and it was
known that the no less terrible Cromwell was devoting
all his energy to forming with him a great Protestant
alliance against the supposed aggression of Eome.
The Pope's idea was doubtless defensive. For him it
was the Protestants who threatened aggression. His
project of bringing peace to the faithful was, however,
going but badly. The previous year he had seen France
compelled to back CromwelTs'Tntervention on behalf of
the Vaudois Protestants, and now negotiations were
actually on foot between Cromwell and Mazarin for an
offensive alliance against Spain. When, to crown the
danger, he saw Portugal on the brink of placing herself
in the Protector's hands, it was but natural he should
intei'fere, and, having failed and been found out, that he
and every one else should expect retaliation.
When Cromwell as yet did not know what the end
of the Vaudois affair was to be, he had drawn attention
to the fact that at Nice and Villafranca, the territory of
their persecutor, the Duke of Savoy, lay open to his
fleet, and the Pope knew that his own Eomagna was
equally exposed. All kinds of stories went the round of
Europe, pointing to the extreme anxiety that was felt at
Eome. So soon as the new danger was grasped, it was
said the Pope summoned the Ambassadors of Spain,
Venice, Florence, and other great and powerful princes,
and showed them how they were all threatened by the
English fleet, with which that of Turkey was to be
joined" in secret alliance.^ The sound of a couple of
' From Cologne, June 16, 1056 (Thurloe, v. 93).
330 CROMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIN 1656
Dutch ships saluting at Civita Vecchia threw Eome into
a panic. It was said tlTaTlBlake had seized the port.
The Pope ordered his heavy artillery to be drawn out of
the Castle of St. Angelo and planted in the streets, and
the whole city to stand to arms. ' Whereby,' wrote
Longland, in sending the report, ' you may please
observe first, particularly, of whom the Pope is most
afraid, which I cannot but take for a good omen, that
God may please to give deliverance to Christendom by
English arms.' ^
As to the best use to which the idle fleet might be
put, Longland had his own ideas. His eyes were still
set on the heart of the Mediterranean. The Neapolitans,
he said, were again in a state of great unrest, and so
serious was their disaffection that he was certain, if Blake
appeared in the bay and declared he had come to help
the people to throw off the Spanish yoke, they would
rise to a man. The mistake the French had twice made
need not be repeated. He named a native nobleman, of
vast wealth, great popularity, and English connections,
who was ready to place himself at the head of the move-
ment. Thus Naples might become a kingdom under a
sovereign of its own, and be permanently lost to Spain,
and that he declared would be a greater blow to her than
the loss of all her Indies.^
None of these plans were destined to be carried out.
No sooner had Blake resolved to enter the Mediterranean
than strong easterly weather set in that held him at
Cadiz. Instead of abating, it increased to a violent
tempest, and so shattered the fleet that ten of the frigates
had to be sent home. Still, on July 9, leaving Badiley
with twelve sail before Cadiz, the admirals were able' to
weigh f(^r the Straits with about fourteen sail. ' God
' Thurloc, V. 187. - Ibid. v. 93, June G-IG.
/
16.5t) OPERATIONS IN THE STRAITS 331
send us a good voyage,' Montague concluded his despatch, i
'and good news from England at our return.' It was
not, however, for Tunis or Tripoli that they were now
bound. While awaiting Cromwell's decision about
Gibraltar theyhaZ~l?esoTve3~~to"looli out for a place
on the Barbary side of the Straits which might serve
their turn for careening and watering, 'in case,' as
Montague wrote, ' you come to need it on another ;
occasion.' He called the place they had their e3'e on |
Boremo or Buzema, by which he probably meant the
island of Albucemas, on the Eiff coast, about a hundred
miles within the Straits.^ ' Let me add by the way,' he r
further said, 'that if we could find such a place com- ;
modious, it were an unspeakable advantage to England '
to have a fort and possession thereof.' His expression
should be remembered, for in it we seem to have the
germ of the idea which was destined for years to replace
that of Gibraltar. For the present nothing came of it,
for the place was found wholly unsuitable. They did
not, however, return empty-handed. Five frigates and a
fire-ship had been detached to Malaga, under a Captain
Smith, with a view of destroying some shipping which
was known to be lying there. With his fire-ship he
burnt two vessels lying under the mole, a galley, and
half a dozen smaller craft. Then, having driven the
Spaniards from the mole by his fire, he landed upon it,
spiked the guns of the battery, and came off with the loss
of six killed.
Eeturning to Cadiz and finding no orders from home,
the admirals now went down to Salee to force a treaty
and release captives. By September 1 they were
' See 2^ost, ii. 32, note. It is conceivable also that he meant the
bay of Beuzus. an anchor.ige close to Ceuta and inmiediately opposite
Gibraltar.
I
332 CROMWELL'S WAR ^\'IT11 .SPAIN 1656
back again at Cadiz, and still without orders as to
Gibraltar or sending home the larger ships. In a week
they had to go on to Lisbon for water, leaving Stayner
with a frigate squadron to maintain the blockade.
Scarcely were their backs turned when it came on to
blow from the west, and he had to stand out to sea.
The same wind, as luck would have it, was bringing in
the flota of Tierra Firme, which carried the treasure
' of Peru, and while his frigates were scattered he fell in
with it. Thus, without any warning, the great chance
had come. Sadly fallen from its old glories, the fleet
consisted of but seven sail and a Portuguese prize.
There were but two galleons, with two armed ureas or
' hulks ' and three merchantmen. Stayner had only
three of his frigates in a position to engage, the rest
being to leeward ; but they were all three second-rates
of over fifty guns, and more than a match for their prey.
Undeceived by the admiral's flag being flown on one of the
ureas, Stayner let it go and made for the galleons. After
a six hours action, one of them which carried the Marquis
of Baydes, Governor of Chile, was burnt. The other and
• one of the merchantmen were taken, and the remaining
urea was sunk. The pseudo-flagship and the prize were
chased ashore, while the two other merchantmen escaped
into Gibraltar. It was one of tlie sharpest blows that
had ever been dealt by England to the Indian trade. To
\ the Spaniards it meant a loss in modern value of about
ten millions sterling, to Cromwell a gain of three millions.'
So beyond all expectation the main object of the
' In the above account I have mainly followed the Spanish version
(Duro, Armada Espcmola, v. 22), rectifying where possible by Stayner's own
despatch (Thurloe, v. 399). The odds were certainly greatly in favour of
the English, and Stayner in his very modest report did not seek to exag-
gerate his exploit.
lfio6 DUNKIRK V. GIBEALTAIJ 333
campaign was after all accomplished, and Stayner's great
stroke_ of fortune brought it to an end. *""
He had not long joined the main fleet in the Tagus
with his prizes when the long-awaited orders arrived from
the Protector. For more than a month after Lloyd had
arrived with the admirals' reply to his suggestions,
Cromwell had delayed his decision. He was in the
throes of forcing Mazarin into a joint ojDeration against
Dunkirk, and it would seem that he meant to hold Blake
and his fleet in terrorem until he knew what line the
Cardinal meant to take. It was not till August 17 that
Lockhart, his ambassador extraordinary at the French
Court, was able to assure him that Mazarin had given in
and had begun caressing him with an almost suspicious
cordiality. Eleven days later Cromwell's instructions to
his admirals were sent down to Plymouth.^
In despair of orders they had just decided to
winter in the Tagus, to be ready for action at the earliest
moment next year ; but Cromwell's despatch proved a
complete endorsement of the views which Montague had
sent home by Captain Lloyd. He noted that they had
found it impossible to move the Spaniard or to attack
him in his harbom's; ' and as for any design on Gibraltar,'
he adds, ' we see by GeneraT^Montague'S' letter to the
Secretary that nothing therein was feasible without a
good body of landsmen,' and in view of his project against
Dunkirk he had no troops to spare. With Dunkirk sub-
stituted for Gibraltar as the main objective, the whole
fleet was clearly no longer required where it was.
Montague was therefore to bring home the largest ships,
while Blake with twenty frigates, or such other number
as he deemed advisable, was to stay out and hold the
station.
1 Thurloe, v. 517, 363.
/
-?
334 CROMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIN 1657
With this decision of CromweH's his Mediterranean
pohcy sank to a mere accessory to his main hne of energy.
Having decided to concentrate his action on the ports of
the Spanish Netherlands, and estabhsh there a foothold
on the continent, he abandoned the idea of Gibraltar.
Thereafter the war took a different turn. Owing to the
mutual jealousies of the Protestant powers the Baltic for
the moment assumed a more important place" than the
Mediterranean, while Stayner's success and affairs in the
West Indies fixed the maritime war more definitely still
to Elizabethan lines. It was a war policy that _was
crowned by the famous exploit of Blake and Stayner
upon the flota of New Spain at Teneriffe in the following
year — an exploit which was also the crown of Blake's own
y *'% reputation. On his way home in triumph he died, and in a
few weeks Badiley followed him to an honoured grave.
Neither lived to demonstrate the value of the work they
had set on foot, or to complete what they had begun.
'' Still its effects were far from lost, as the remaining events
of the Protectorate administration proved.
The importance that was attached to continuing a
Mediterranean fleet is marked by the fact that, a few
months after Montague's return, it was decided to esta-
blish at Tetuan a purveyor for the navy, and this reso-
lution was carried out early in the year 1657.^ With
Lisbon as a careening port and Tetuan as a victualling
station the squadron was thus fairly well based, even
without Gibraltar, and on this system it continued to
be worked. When Blake went home, Captain John
Stoakes, who had served as his captain throughout his
Mediterranean cruise and had commanded the blockading
division off Cadiz during his chief's absence at Teneriffe,
' Minute-book of the Navy Commissioners, Add, MSS. 1905, ff. '221,
229, January 10 and February 24, 1657.
1657 STOAKES AT TUNIS " 335
was left in command of the station with a squadron of
about twenty frigates. At the end of the year, when
it became apparent that the fleet which had been
laboriously preparing at Cadiz could never get to sea,
he was -ordered to send home all but ten sail, and with
these to enter the Mediterranean and put a stop to the
depredations of the Tunis and Tripoli corsairs. As a first
step he sent forward Captain Whetstone, a nephew of the
Protector, with four frigates to cruise between Malta and
Crete with instructions to use the Venetian island of
Zante as a base and rendezvous. He himself proceeded
to Leghorn, presumably for stores and beverage. His
reception was far from cordial. The Grand Duke's atti-
tude was so unfriendly that Stoakes suspected him of
having been seduced to the Spanish interest, and before
he left relations had grown very strained. Still, in spite
of all difhculties, he was able to appear before Tunis
at the end of January 1658. He at once demanded the
release of all British captives as a preliminary to further
negotiation. The Bey, in a spirit very different from that
which he had previously displayed, replied that he was
ready to ransom them upon the same terms as Blake
had accepted at Algiers. Stoakes was for fighting, but
having ascertained that there were eight men-of-war in
Porto Farina, and that the forts had been greatly
strengthened, and knowing also his own frigates were too
foul to do good work, he decided to offer a ransom.
Ultimately he induced the Bey to give up all the
prisoners for about a tenth of their market value. He
then was admitted into Porto Farina to clean, and
before he had done he successfully negotiated a treaty
which rendered English commerce immune from inter-
ference, and gave the war vessels of each state freedom
of the other's ports. Having thus satisfactorily settled
336 CROMWELL'S WAR ^MTII SPAIN 1658
matters at Tunis, he bad to return to the northward
to recruit before doing anything against Tripoli. At
Leghorn he was bluntly refused pratique and actually
fired upon for taking a prize in alleged breach of the
neutrality of the port. As he said, he had done nothing
but what every Dutch admiral had done before him, and
he himself had seen Blake do far more. But Leghorn
was becoming thoroughly Spanish. Even the provisions
which had been prepared for him he was not permitted
to take on board, and, not wishing to involve the
country in hostilities with Tuscany, he contented himself
with sending a protest to Florence and reporting home,
and betook himself to Marseilles.^
There he had now a certainty of the most cordial
reception. For Mazarin his ally's fleet in the Mediter-
ranean was too tempting a chance to be thrown away.
Ever since the beginning of the year an expedition had
been in preparation at Toulon for some unknown objec-
tive. The Chevalier Paul was in charge of it, and the
English Consul at Marseilles reported to Lockhart in
Paris that it was believed to be for a renewal of the
attempt on Naples.- It is possible a diversion of this
kind may have been contemplated. Mazarin at this
time was being pressed from various quarters to renew
his old attempt on the Two Sicilies, and particularly by
the eccentric Queen of Sweden who was now in Rome, and
in spite of her abdication could not keep her fingers from
' See Stoakes's despatches of January 0 and February 27, 1658, in
Domestic Calendar, ii. 259, 307, and Thurloe, vii. 77 ; of March 29, Carte
MSS. 73 ; of April, Raiulinson MSS. A. 58. For the whole of his com-
mand see the last part of Weale's Journal, uhi supra, which unfor-
tunately comes to an abrupt end on March 9, 1658, at Porto Farina, where it
says Stoakes had just finished careening his frigates ; Whetstone's Letter-
book from January 29 to August 23 in liawlinson MSS. C. 381 ; and the
papers used at Whetstone's court-martial. Add. MSS. 1904, f. 169 ct seq.
■ Aldworth to Lockhart, February 9-19, 1058 (Thurloe, vi. 787)
1658 MAZARIN ASKS FOR HELP 337
politics. Her and her friends he gave to understand that
such an enterprise was out of the question, but others
were allowed to believe that he had it still in his mind
and was only waiting his opportunity.' At the moment
his hands were full with Flanders and with operations
against the Spanish possessions in the north of Italy.
There he was supporting the Duke of Modena, who
was operating against Mantua from the southward.
Early in March a thousand French troops had landed for
his support at Viareggio, the chief port of the Duchy of
Lucca. Leave for the purpose had been granted by the
Duke ; and Longiand, in reporting the affair, appeared to
believe his cofifplacency was in some measure due to the
presence of the English fleet. ' The Italian Princes,' he
wrote, ' do all believe that the Protector's ships of war
in these seas came chiefly to join with the French and
carry on their designs against Spain.' ^ This was not true,
but Mazarin was no man to miss the value of the
impression or a chance of giving it emphasis. So soon,
then, as he had finally fallen in with Cromwell's views as
to the joint operations in Flanders, he ventured just at
this time to request that some of the Mediterranean
squadron might be permitted to act for a few weeks with
the Chevalier Paul.^ The object is nowhere mentioned,
but there can be little doubt that the request related more
or less directly to the operations of the Duke of Modena.
The idea which most strongly recommended itself to
Mazarin at the moment was a fresh attempt to seize
Orbitello and Porto Longone in Elba, and so block the line
' Lettres cle Mazarin, vol. viii. To Pere Dumeau, March 29, p. 689 ; to
the Queen of Sweden, May 9, p. 709 ; to Card. Antonio Barberini, May 15,
p. 714 ; to the Duke of Modena, June 19, p. 738 ; to the Duke of Castelnuovo,
July 3, p. 747; to the Queen of Sweden, July 7, p. 749.
2 Thurloe, vi. 824, 846, February 28, March 5, 1658.
3 Lockhart to Thurloe, ibid. 854, March 7, 1658, and iUd. vii. 70, April ] 1.
VOL. I. Z
388 CROMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIN 1668
by which reinforcements passed from Spain to Milan.'
This was probably the real intention, if indeed he had
any at all, and the whole affair was not an astute piece
of stage play. In any case the precise objective matters
little for our purpose. Mazarin's chief anxiety was to
prevent the Spaniards sending troops to reinforce Dun-
kirk, which they were known to be about to attempt,
and the obvious way to achieve his end, as he well knew,
was to threaten an offensive in the Mediterranean. Crom-
well, on Lockhart's advice, at once granted the request,
and promised him the co-operation of five or six frigates
for six weeks, which was all Mazarin asked. They were
to be at or near Toulon by June 1, but it was not till
May 31 that the orders were sent off to Stoakes.^ The
French King, he was told, was about to undertake a
naval expedition against the common enemy, and he was
to detail five or six frigates to accompany the Toulon
force ' to such place against the Spaniard as the admiral
of the French fleet shall desire,' and to defend it against
attack. These orders he received about the end of the
month, and placed half his fleet under Captain Whet-
stone for the purpose. With the rest he determined to
proceed to Tripoli and complete the work he had left
undone.^
Whetstone at once took his squadron to Toulon ; but
though it was a month behind the time Mazarin had
originally specified, he found the French fleet in no
condition to sail. A demonstration was made before
Marseilles, which was again in a state of revolt, and that
' Mazarin to Card. Barberini, February 5-15, 1658 {Lettres, viii. 679).
Stoakes to , September 28, 1658 {Carte MSS. 73, f. 205 b).
- Thurloe, vii. 70, 155.
" Stoakes to Whetstone, June 29 (Rawlinson MSS. 381 and Add. MSS.
9304, f. 148). Same to Navy Commissioners {Dom. Cal. July 9). Same to
Thurloe, June 21 (Thurloe, vii. 189).
1658 MAZAEIN REPENTS HIS BARGAIN 939
was all; and when August came Whetstone began to
clamour to be liberated from the irksome service.^
As it happened, orders for his release were already on
their way. In the interval the battle of the Dunes had
been fought, the Spanish power in^Ee "Netherlands was
completely broken, and Mazarin was looking awry at the
price he had had to pay for Cromwell's help. To see
Dunkirk in English hands was small incentive to similar
joint operations elsewhere, even if he had ever seriously
intended them ; and when all was over his note to Lock-
hart began to change. He grumbled over everything con-
nected with the situation in Flanders, and informed the
ambassador that he had practically given up his project
in the Mediterranean and that it was not worth while to
detain Whetstone's frigates any longer. He would prefer
a joint expedition to intercept the Spanish treasure fleet
later on. As a matter of fact the threat had served its
purpose and Mazarin found he had been hunting with
the lion. 2
How powerful must have been the moral effect of
Whetstone's junction with the Toulon expedition became
manifest when we see how Stoakes fared at Tripoli. The
bare appearance of his little force before the port was
enough to secure him the same success he had achieved
at Tunis, and a treaty similar to those existing with the
other Barbary states was exacted.^ This was about the
last news which Cromwell lived to receive from the
Me"diterranean, and so he saw his poHcy triumphant.
Still there was no idea of letting go the hold. A week
' Whetstone to the Admu'alty Commissioners, August 3, 1658 (Dom.
Cal. p. 108). A letter-book containing the whole of his correspondence at
this time is in Rawlinson MSS. C. 381.
- Thurloe, vi. 369. Lockhart to Thurloe, July 8 {ibid. vii. 251, 306)
Thurloe to Whetstone, July 27 (Dom. Cal. p. 101).
^ Admiralty Commissioners to Stoakes, September 16 (Dom. Cal. p. 140)
340 CROMWELL'S WAR WITH SPAIN 1658-9
earlier he had ordered the recall of half Stoakes's squadron,
bat not with any intention of abandoning the position he
had taken up. It was rather with the view of increasing
the efficiency of the Mediterranean fleet by substituting
fresh ships for those that were spent. It was a policy
which Montague continued to press, and under Richard
Cromwell steps were taken to keep up Stoakes's strength.^
Tn5roughout the winter, acting from Toulon and Tetuan,
he was able very effectually to police the trade routes and
capture every Spanish war ship that ventured to show
herself. Communications between Italy and Spain were
rendered almost impossible. In the early part of 1659 he
even made an attempt to take his slender force round
to Cadiz with the bold intention of attacking the out-
ward-bound West Indian fleet, but persistent westerly
weather prevented his getting out of the Straits till his
stores were exhausted. He was further much hampered
by the insubordination and discontent of his captains.
The political troubles which were beginning to shake
Cromwell's fabric to pieces spread to the fleet. Whet-
stone had to be arrested and sent home, and another
captain deserted with his ship.'^ But Stoakes by a firm
hand managed to keep his force effective. Still the end
was near. On his return to Toulon in 1659 to refit,
instead of meeting with the usual welcome, he found
himself received with marked coldness and even indignity.
The explanation was not long in declaring itself. The
French no longer required him. They had gained all they
wanted, for the Spaniards were clearly ready to accept
their terms of peace. On May 8 an armistice was signed
between the two powers ; on June 4 a preliminary
' Thui-loe, vii. 306. Dom. Cal. p. 192, November 20-1, 1658.
- Baiulinson MSS- C. 381, and Stoakes's despatch, September 28, 1658
(Carte MSS. 73).
1659 PEACE OF THE PYRENEES 341
treaty was agreed to, and a fortnight later Stoakes was
recalled.^
From the first both Spain and France had each looked
to the English alliance as a means to dictate peace to its
adversary. The fact that Spain was so soon forced to accept
the hard terms which France offered is usually attributed
entirely to her disasters in Flanders. But, as we have seen,
there was another and perhaps a more powerful considera-
tion nearer home. The Spanish Court had always shown
itself as indifferent to pressure in the Low Countries as
it was nervous about the command of the Mediterranean.
The mere fact that five English frigates joined the French
admiral for a few weeks was little in itself, but as a threat
of what might come it was in the last degree alarming.
In the old war no amount of harrying of her oceanic
commerce had served to bring Spain to her knees, but the
same kind of danger in the Mediterranean was another
thing. Longland probably only voiced the general opinion
when he had recommended operations against Naples. ' I
am confident,' said he, ' that the loss of this kingdom would
be a greater blow to the Spaniard than the loss of the
West Indies, for that affords him only money, but this both
money and men.' ^ With the success of the French and
English arms in Flanders, both Cromwell and Mazarin
were free to resume their Mediterranean policy with vigour ;
and, should they choose to follow up the line which
Whetstone's movement had indicated, there could be small
hope of Spam retaining her Italian provinces. Her com-
mand of the connecting seas was wholly lost ; her great
empire lay exposed in disjointed fragments, incapable of
mutual support ; and had she not recognised the hopeless-
ness of the situation by the treaty of the Pyrenees, her
' Dom. Cal. June 17, 1658, p. 377.
- Thurloe, v. 93.
342 CROMWELL S WAR WITH SPAIN 1669
ruin could hardly have been averted. It is impossible
then to believe that, in taking the humiliating step she did,
and making peace on Mazarin's terms, shewaslnot largelj''
influenced by what had been happening within the Straits,
and that Stoakes's forgotten presence at Toulon, which
then caused so much stir in the neighbouring Courts, did
not do much to emphasise the meaning and reach of a
British Mediterranean fleet.
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME
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