England; its political organization and development and the war against Germany

ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
and DEVELOPMENT ci/2f?

THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

EDUARD MEYER

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ENGLAND

ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
and DEVELOPMENT and

THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

ENGLAND

ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

and DEVELOPMENT and

THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

BY

EDUARD MEYER, Ph.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN
EXCHANGE PROFESSOR TO HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1909-10

TRANSLATED BY

HELENE S. WHITE

JOINT TRANSLATOR OF VON SYBEL'S FOUNDING
OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

BOSTON

RITTER & COMPANY
1916

Copyright 1916, by
Ritter & Company

All rights reserved

Copyright of the German edition by
I. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Stuttgart.

PRINTED BY
VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY
■ INOHAMTON AND NEW YORK

INTRODUCTION

In offering this book to an English speaking
public we feel assured that its contents will prove of
value to the open-minded reader who desires an all
round knowledge of the absorbing topic of the day,
— the great war and the causes that led up to it.
The author is a highly distinguished historian who,
in undertaking this work, departs from his previous
and chosen field of ancient history to discuss his
present subject with engaging frankness. Concisely
and clearly he places before the reader the part that
England has played in history, especially in regard
to the relations that the English have borne to the
other nations of the world. The ripe judgment and
keen insight of the thorough student of history and
of world politics gives the book the claim to be the
most reasonable, accurate and far seeing work that
has as yet been offered to the public with regard to
the development and character of the English people,
as viewed from the German standpoint.

In the concluding chapter the newly created con-
ditions and problems of world-wide concern are pre-
sented with prophetic insight and eloquent earnest-
ness, and this in itself should make the book worth
while, even if that which precedes it were of less
high merit than it is.

vi Introduction

While we fully realize that English history is a
familiar subject to most American readers, we are
equally convinced that there are many among them
who will follow with interest a portrayal of Eng-
land's development as a state, as it appears to a Ger-
man historian, an outsider of marked ability, who
judges it from the German standpoint, whereas the
Americans, who, as a whole, are readers of English
literature only, have practically received their im-
pressions of England and the English people ex-
clusively from English sources — the insider's fav-
orable view of his own state and his own people.

Although the subject is treated with critical keen-
ness in this volume, and the opinions expressed in it
are based on professional knowledge of the highest
order, and although the conclusions reached are a
stern arraignment of the course pursued by modem
England, nevertheless the restraint of the profes-
sional judgment, and the conclusions at which the
searching analysis of the historian arrives, appear all
too mild to the average German who, in defending
his fatherland and its traditions, is fighting for his
most sacred possessions, and to whom England's part
in the present war seems to be that of the unrighteous
money changers whom Christ cast out of the temple.

In placing this translation of Professor Meyer's
" England " at this time before the American people,
who are neither English nor German, we believe that
it is the only book which sets forth clearly the funda-
mental differences between the English and German
state organizations, as well as between the aspira-
tions and views of life entertained by the two nations

Introduction vii

as a whole. In no sense is it to be classed with the
propaganda literature of the day, as it was written
by the ablest living German historian, for perusal by
his own people, in exposition of English conditions,
past and present, and of the English national char-
acter.

The Publishers.

September, 19 16.

FOREWORD

This work was finished about the middle of Jan-
uary of the present year; the comments on subse-
quent events were added while the book was in the
printer's hands. Now, however, still further com-
ments seem absolutely necessary with regard to the
events of the past few days.

That I did not make a mistake in my judgment
of the American attitude has been clearly shown by
the contrast between the two notes just sent by the
American government, one to Germany and one to
England, — the occasion for the former being the an-
nouncement of Germany's policy of attack by under-
sea craft upon the English coast and commerce ; the
latter, called forth by the consequent misuse of neu-
tral flags by English ships.

The note to England is expressed in most friendly
terms, and asks that some regard be shown for the
welfare of American commerce, saying that although
" the occasional use of a neutral flag under stress of
immediate pursuit " may seem justifiable, neverthe-
less the systematic misuse of the American flag
should be discontinued, since " such a policy of gen-
eral misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels
of the neutral visiting British waters," and " would
even seem to impose on Great Britain a measure of
responsibility for the loss of American lives and

X Foreword

vessels in case of an attack by hostile naval vessels."
The note to Germany, on the other hand, utters a
distinct threat in spite of the courteous terms in
which it is expressed. It flatly denies that the
American attitude has been anything but one of sin-
cere neutrality, and then, with regard to Germany's
announced policy, it goes on to say that, if in pur-
suance of it, " an American vessel should be de-
stroyed or the life of an American citizen be lost, the
government of the United States would be con-
strained to regard it as an indefensible violation of
neutral rights, which would be very hard to reconcile
with the friendly relations existing between the two
countries " ; should such a regrettable event really
result " the government of the United States would
be constrained to hold the German government to a
strict accountability for such acts of their naval
authority, and to take any steps which might be
necessary to secure to American citizens the full
enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high
seas."

To England and her allies all things are to be
permitted, — by them international law may be tram-
pled under foot with impunity; but, when Germany
will not meekly suffer this, and, in self-defense, re-
taliates by measures made necessary by the policy of
her enemy, these are at once decried as inexcusable
violations of international law, with entire forget-
fulness of the fact that England had been the first
to repudiate it.

The proud reply which the German government
made to this note received hearty endorsement

Foreword xi

throughout the country. In calm and dignified
terms it sets forth that Germany is justified in
adopting the proposed measures, and then, in
friendly terms but very pointedly, it calls the atten-
tion of the Americans to their own shortcomings.
If they would have their ships out of peril, they must
be kept out of the danger zone, or else England must
be induced to change her methods ; not Germany, but
England is at fault.

We are not to be intimidated by America, but on
the contrary, we will persist in the measures which
this struggle for existence, together with England's
policy, has forced us to adopt. If America is
offended at this, it can be of no great moment to us,
since the attitude of the United States has been such
that in the future it can hardly do us greater injury
than it has in the past.

Meanwhile Japan also has laid aside the mask, and
is openly stretching out a greedy hand toward China,
while neither the nominal allies of the one country
or the other can do aught to interfere. The Japa-
nese policy is well defined and purposeful, and quite
as unscrupulous as that of England. Japan found
England useful to aid her in driving the Germans
out of China and the islands of the Pacific; now it
is England's turn to be dispossessed. But she is reap-
ing only what she has sowed, and it remains now to
be seen what Australia and America will say to it.
But the great question confronting the future is not
only whether at the end of another century there will
still be any European possessions in eastern China,
in the islands of the Pacific, or even in Australia, but

xii Foreword

whether one person of European extraction may
then be found within these regions.

There is yet one last comment necessary. On
page 302 I had said that " EngHsh gentlemen do not
shrink from any crime, not even from that of assas-
sination, if only appearances can be preserved."
When I wrote this, I was fully informed with regard
to a plot made to assassinate the Irish patriot. Sir
Roger Casement, a plot devised by Findlay, the Brit-
ish Minister at Christiania, and to be carried out by a
young Norwegian, Adler Christensen, then in the
service of Sir Roger. However, since at that time
I lacked documentary evidence, it seemed advisable
not to refer to the matter prematurely, and so the
words " not even from that of assassination " were
erased in the proof. Since then the whole affair has
been made public through the note addressed by Sir
Roger Casement to Sir Edward Grey, the instigator
of the plot, and at whose behest Findlay devised it.

On the voyage from America to Norway, Sir
Roger fortunately eluded his English pursuers;
hardly, however, had he arrived in Christiania, on
October 29, 19 14, when Christensen was summoned
to the British legation and questioned with regard
to his employer. On the following day Christensen
was closeted for two hours with the British Minister,
Findlay, himself, a man who had gained an unenvi-
able notoriety through the brutality of his conduct
in Egypt. Christensen was given to understand that
it would be an easy matter for him to secure for
himself a comfortable and care-free future if he
would undertake to make Sir Roger "disappear."

Foreword xiii

" The man who would deal him a mortal blow would
never have to work again." Findlay promised " on
his word of honor " to pay Christensen five thousand
pounds sterling for the delivery of Sir Roger Case-
ment alive into the hands of the English.

But Christensen remained loyal. He made a pre-
tence of accepting the proposition, whereupon he
was given a secret address, together with a code to
be used in future correspondence. From Berlin,
whither he accompanied Sir Roger, he forwarded to
the British Minister a number of letters that he was
supposed to have filched from his employer, but
which in reality Sir Roger had written for this ex-
press purpose. Later, Christensen returned to Chris-
tiania where he carried out this game of deception
with great skill. On December 7th he was given
the key to a rear door of the British legation, and
on the 3rd of January he induced Findlay, after
considerable urging, to give him the following docu-
ment in Findlay's own handwriting, a facsimile of
which has been made public, and which must be
quoted here as indisputable proof of English cor-
ruption.

" British Legation,

" Christiania, Norway.

" On behalf of the British Government I promise
that if, through information given by Adler Chris-
tensen, Sir Roger Casement be captured either with
or without his companions, the said Adler Christen-
sen is to receive from the British Government the
sum of £5000 to be paid as he may desire.

Adler Christensen is also to enjoy personal im-

xiv Foreword

munity and to be given a passage to the United
States should he desire it.

" M. DE C. FiNDLAY,

" H. B. M. Minister."

To the Norwegian newspapers Findlay declared
that he could make no statement with regard to the
matter; perhaps Sir Edward Grey would explain.
If ever Sir Edward does so, it will be interesting to
learn to what subterfuges he will resort to clear
himself.

This incident shows conclusively how great are
the anxieties that Ireland is causing the British gov-
ernment, despite all the official assurances of the
island's loyalty. Moreover, six Nationalist Irish
newspapers have been suppressed, no Irish-American
papers are permitted, and the importation and sale
of arms has been forbidden by proclamation; but
recruiting is as unpopular in Ireland now as hereto-
fore, and the opposition of the political parties is
as violent as ever.

At the same time the incident serves to illustrate
in a most startling manner the moral depth to which
the ruling classes in England have fallen. If the
evidence were not indisputable, we would not be-
lieve it possible, even after all we have recently ex-
perienced at the hands of England.

Because of the loyalty of a young Norwegian
sailor, Sir Roger Casement escaped the fate that was
intended for him, but the Boer, General Delareij,
was not so fortunate. While riding through the
streets in an automobile with General Beyers, in
September 1914, he was shot and killed by an Eng-

Foreword xv

lish policeman. It was, of course, an " unfortunate
accident/' Surely, in this " war of humanitarian
culture against German barbarism," the English are
not unworthily associated with the Serb assassins
and with the Russians whose diplomacy has ever
resorted to means such as these.

" 'Tis evident, the ' gentleman ' is no Sumarai "
are the words with which the Japanese admiral closes
his report of the naval battle among the Falkland
Islands.

Eduard Meyer.
Berlin-Lichterfelde,

February i8, 191 5.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Introduction v

Foreword ix

PART I — THE CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH
STATE

I The Development and Fundamental
Features of the English Consti-
tution 3

II The English Idea of the State and

OF Freedom 29

III Some Effects of the English Consti-

tution — The Army — The Re-
forms 42

IV England as a " Nightwatchman

State " — Education and Science —
Social Reform Legislation ... 53

V Ireland 73

VI The Scottish Highlands .... loi

VII Free Trade and the Doctrines of the
Manchester School — The Agri-
cultural Pursuits 108

VIII The English Attitude Toward

Other Nations 117

xvii

xviii CONTENTS

PART II — ENGLAND'S POLICY AND ENGLAND
AS A WORLD POWER

CHAPTER PAGE

IX The Beginning of England's Power
AT Sea — Wars with Spain and
Holland 127

X England's Wars with France — The
Beginning of English Supremacy
at Sea 134

XI English World Supremacy, 1814-1863 151

XII New Dangers — France — Russia —

America and Germany .... 166

XIII The Crisis and English Retrogres-

sion 1862-1864 173

XIV Suspension of Colonial Aggression

— Tension Between England and
Russia, i 865-1 881 184

XV The Period from 1881-1901 — Rela-
tions with France — America —
Russia and Turkey 189

XVI Germany's Prosperity and Her Co-
lonial Policy — The English in
Africa — Japan and China . . . 203

XVII Edward VII and the Hatred of Ger-
many 214

XVIII The Triple Entente and the Alli-
ance WITH Japan — Morocco . . 242

XIX The Encircling of Germany — Bel-
gium — Agadir — The Balkan War 251

CHAPTER

XX

XXI

CONTENTS

XIX

PAGE

Preliminary Arrangements for War
— The Beginning of the World
War 270

England's Conduct of the War —
The Moral Decadence of the Eng-
lish 296

PART III — THE NEW WORLD CONDITIONS
AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

XXII Problems of the Future

309

PART I

THE CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH
STATE

CHAPTER I

The Development and Fundamental Features
OF THE English Constitution

It is impossible to form a correct estimate of Eng-
land's part in the history of the world, or of the
motives that led her into the present war, unless
we call to mind the fact that English political
development has proceeded in an exactly contrary
course to that followed by the continental coun-
tries.

The common foundation upon which the political
structure of all modern states rests is the dual organi-
zation of the Middle Ages, in which the overlord
and the Estates sought their own ends along diver-
gent paths which frequently led to bitter antagonism.
Rarely indeed were they brought into harmonious
co-operation through the pursuit of a common ad-
vantage, and then only after long and wearisome
negotiations and intricate compromises.

Such a political organization is as far removed
from the idea of centralized government as the an-
cients knew it, as it is from that which is find-
ing ever-increasing development in modern times.
When it could no longer adequately meet the grow-
ing demands of more highly civilized conditions,

3

4 Features of the English Constitution

it gradually disappeared from the continent, while
the functions of government were more and more
combined in the hand of the overlord. In France
and Spain, as well as in the Scandinavian countries,
this process brought about the monarchy, under the
influence of which the national state was achieved
and the foundation for the development of the mod-
ern national spirit laid. In Germany and Italy a
like course of development was rendered impossible
by the dominance and invulnerability of the Empire,
— within its sphere of influence only local and ter-
ritorial sovereignties could exist.

But everywhere the process was the same, —
through a firm and enduring hold upon the finances,
through the control of the administration and of the
men-at-arms, the Kingship grew more and more in-
dependent of the co-operation of the Estates, which
was always difficult to obtain and never to be relied
upon. And so the Estates gradually lost every ves-
tige of their former power, either as the result of
defeat in a bitter struggle for supremacy,^ or else
through neglect; their consent being no longer
needed, they were no longer summoned, and in
time came to be a forgotten institution. Thus state
sovereignty was evolved, and with it the conception
of the modern monarchical form of government.
Its claim and justification are based upon the fact
that it not only gave the people a single centralized

^ Only in one instance did the reverse of this process take
place, and that is in the Netherlands where the Estates
triumphed over the monarchical tendencies of the Spanish
dominion. The dualistic organization of the Middle Ages
is still to be found in the Duchy of Mecklenburg.

English State in Sixteenth Century 5

administration at the head of affairs, but out of the
chaos of mediaeval anarchy it brought law and order
together with prosperity and a sence of security. As
opposed to the particular interests of the Estates,
the monarchy advanced and shielded the interests
that promoted the common welfare of all the differ-
ent classes of the population, and it is because of
this, the beneficent exercise of its authority in the
interest of all as against class interest, that the
monarchy derived its high claim to authority by
right divine. That it may be free ever to uphold
the right, its power must be unlimited, and it can-
not therefore be responsible to man, but to God
alone.

In England also the political development seemed
at first to be following the common course when
the power of the feudal lords was broken in the Wars
of the Roses, and the Tudor, Henry VII, seized
the crown by the victor's right of battle, and set up
a vigorous regime. Apparently England under the
Tudors made as close an approach to the ideal of
an absolute monarchy as did France under the later
kings of the house of Valois (with the exception of
the time of greatest disruption during the religious
wars), or as did Spain under the Hapsburgs.
There was, however, always this marked difference,
that the English Estates in the Parliament had
gained for themselves a position of greater authority
than had the Estates in any of the continental coun-
tries. Although the higher nobles, together with
the magnates of the Church, had isolated themselves
in the exclusive Upper House, they had found an

6 Features of the English Constitution

active ally in the Lower House in a popular element
that had derived its privileges from the Crown, and
therefore was always eager to uphold the monar-
chical order of things, but nevertheless, and indeed
for that very reason, strongly upheld the principle
that taxes could not be levied without the consent of
the taxed. Under these circumstances a standing
army under the control of the Crown was not pos-
sible in England, and, because of the sense of se-
curity from foreign attack that the insular position
of the kingdom afforded, the need of an army of
defence was less imperatively felt there than in the
states of the continent. Even the despotic Tudors
could not ride rough shod over the inalienable rights
of the English people, although they summoned Par-
liament as seldom as possible, and made more than
a few of its recalcitrant members feel the heavy
hand of their royal displeasure. Moreover, parlia-
mentary authority made a great stride forward
when Henry VIH undertook to free his country
from the yoke of Rome; it made another when,
after a first and abortive attempt on the part of
Edward VI, — which was followed by the temporary
triumph of Spanish Catholicism under Queen Mary,
— Elizabeth, constrained by the exigencies of her
position, established the xA.nglican Church as the na-
tional church polity, and compelled all resisting ele-
ments to yield to its authority ; it made yet another
when, in the bitter struggle with Spain, she appealed
to the national spirit and rallied the nation to her
side.

Indeed it was by these highly autocratic acts

Beginning of Parliamentary Control 7

themselves, carried out, as they were, with utmost
relentlessness, that the authority of ParHament and
the rights of the people it represented were strength-
ened. Without the firm hold upon the nation which
the monarchy had obtained for itself, the English
Reformation could hardly have been achieved, nor
England's independence maintained against the at-
tacks of Spain.

How the Stuarts attempted to force upon the
United Kingdom of Great Britain (united under
their dynasty) a despotic government patterned after
the monarchies of the continent, and so provoked
the people to civil war, — how this war resulted in
the defeat of the Crown because the King did not
have a military force under his control strong enough
to defeat the national army organized by the radical
elements of the country, — how the fall of the mili-
tary despotism that followed, together with the dis-
persion of the Puritan army, was followed in turn
by the restoration of the monarchy, which could
not, however, shake itself free of the restraining
hand of Parliament, — how, on the contrary, the at-
tempt of Charles 11 to regain independence for the
Crown by a closer approach between the two king-
doms of Great Britain and France brought about
the very reverse of the desired object in that the
dependence upon Parliament grew greater instead of
less, — how James II, by his endeavor to wreck the
Anglican Church, precipitated a crisis that resulted
in the invasion of England by the army of William
of Orange, and this gave the Opposition its oppor-
tunity to break the power of James, whose army,

8 Features of the English Constitution

on which he had rehed, forsook him and went over
to the enemy, — all these are familiar facts of his-
tory and need no enlargement here.

Although the crown could be conferred upon Wil-
liam and Mary, as it was upon their sister, Anne,
also, only by overriding the rights of their father
and brother, it was nevertheless formally conferred
upon them by Act of Parliament, and was accepted
by these sovereigns, together with stated conditions
(the Bill of Rights), to which they pledged them-
selves in solemn ceremony. They therefore became
the legally acknowledged rulers of the English peo-
ple, whose loyalty they consequently had a right
to claim. That these sovereigns left no heir to
the throne was the final disaster in the struggle to
maintain the supremacy of the Crown, for it now
passed to a foreign prince. The first two sovereigns
of the house of Hanover remained strangers in the
land they ruled, for they had little or no understand-
ing of its people, or of the political conditions which
prevailed, and found it possible to maintain them-
selves upon the throne only because their presence
there was a distinct advantage to certain interests
for which the men at the head of affairs, and who
had derived their power from Parliament, were con-
tending.

Thus it was that in England, in contrast to politi-
cal development on the continent, the sovereignty in
the later political structure devolved not upon the
Crown, but upon the organized Estates as repre-
sented in Parliament. Since George I understood
no English and had to resort to the Latin language

Parliamentary Control in Eighteenth Century g

when in consultation with his ministers, it was not
possible for him to take part in the deliberations
of the Cabinet, a circumstance through which this
body grew more and more independent, until finally
it emancipated itself entirely from royal control.
Whereas in the reign of William III, and in that
of Queen Anne also, the Cabinet had been the King's
Council, it now became the executive committee of
the Parliament. To be sure in all important mat-
ters, especially in those that concerned England's
foreign policy, the first two Georges, who were men
of energy and by no means lacking in ability, en-
deavored to make the royal will felt, in which they
were oftentimes successful, or at least partially so.

But, in strong contrast to the policy followed by
both William III and Queen Anne, the two succeed-
ing sovereigns added to the dependence of their
position by refusing every concession to the Tories,
and by surrendering themselves entirely into the
hands of the Whigs, the party that had set them
on the throne. When at last, with the accession
of George III, a king with truly national sympathies
came to the throne, it was too late to stem the tide.
It is true, he brought the Tories back into power,
yet his attempt to realize Bolingbroke's ideal of a
" Patriot King " failed utterly in spite of the honest
efforts of the King, and served only to increase the
confusion and add to the entanglements of odious
personal intrigue by which English politics were con-
trolled throughout the eighteenth century.

For this is what parliamentary government de-
generated into from the outset. In theory, no doubt.

lO Features of the English Constitution

it fulfills the ideal of a perfect form of government,
and has been lauded as such ever since the days of
Montesquieu. Even yet the glamour which sur-
rounds it dazzles not only the masses of European
populations, but also those many well-intentioned
men who believe that in it they behold the realization
of their ideal, — the government of the people by
representatives that are chosen by a majority to give
expression to the public mind, — yet fail to look be-
yond the mere form, and so recognize the true
conditions. But it has ever been thus ; mere form,
well-phrased, convinces the majority of men every-
where, and they are ready to swear by it.

The fact is that the English Parliament in its
formative period and up to the enactment of the
reforms of 1832 never was representative of the
people, but was rather the organization by which
a powerful aristocracy ruled. To be sure, by the en-
actment of the Bill of Rights parliamentary ascend-
ency was swung round to the Lower House, since
this body was thereby invested with the sole right to
levy taxes; no money bills. could even be amended
in the Upper House, which was limited to either ac-
cepting or rejecting them. But the right to elect
the members of the Lower House rested upon priv-
ileges granted by the Crown, by virtue of which cer-
tain villages, towns and counties received represen-
tation, while many others were either not represented
at all, or were inadequately represented. Moreover,
the right of suffrage was exercised by free land-
holders only, and was therefore restricted to a small
minority of the population. By such means as

Control by the Upper House II

these it was possible for the higher nobles, of whom,
together with the Episcopal prelacy, the House of
Lords was constituted, to control the Lower House,
not legally but effectually; and in the widest range
of its activities, and so to maintain their ascendency,
both social and political. Many of the seats in the
Lower House were in the direct gift of the titled
members of the Upper House, since these had entire
control of the rotten boroughs — those small repre-
sented districts in which there were only very few
voters, in some cases not half a dozen. It has been
estimated that at one time not less than 306 mem-
bers of the Lower House owed their election to the
votes of only 160 persons. Moreover, the nobles
knew full well how to use this privilege to bring
into the Lower House able men, to attach these to
themselves and their class interests, and finally, by
elevation to the peerage, to draw them within their
own circle.

Li the other boroughs the election contests were
a wild farce in which any means of corruption,
bribery, deception, and even open violence were re-
sorted to without scruple, — scenes which have often
been pictured in drastic colors by English writers,
conspicuously so by the brilliant pen of Charles
Dickens.

Li the Lower House itself, ever since the days of
William HI, the most shameful corruption flour-
ished,— an indirect barter of votes for the nu-
merous government offices and for the very lucrative
sinecures in the gift of the government was carried
on side by side with open bribery on a vast scale.

12 Features of the English Constitution

On the other hand the sovereignty that the revo-
lution of 1688 had transferred to the Lower House
was exercised in a manner that would have done
credit to the most vigorous of absolute monarchies.
Leze majesty was in England made to apply to the
Parliament, whereas it is notoriously the privilege
of every Englishman to speak as slightingly or as
offensively as he pleases about the nominal bearer
of the sovereignty — the King. Every offender
against the " privileges " of Parliament, every per-
son who dared attack the Parliament itself or its
Acts, was and is still rigorously prosecuted, and
is liable to severe and humiliating penalties. A free
criticism of all action by the legislative body, such
as is taken for granted in the countries of the con-
tinent, is not allowed even yet in England, and it
behooves him who ventures to step on this forbid-
den ground to choose his words carefully and to
weigh them well before he does so.

That its sittings were held in secret insured Parlia-
ment against control by public opinion. It is a
well known fact that even to-day visitors and re-
porters are admitted by courtesy only, the legal re-
strictions being officially ignored, and that all such
persons can be ejected at any moment if a member
announces that he sees " a stranger " present.
Moreover, to make a report of the proceedings of
Parliament was not only forbidden, but was a pun-
ishable offense.

Under conditions such as these the irresponsi-
bility of the Crown was assured; while, since the
days of William III, Parliament itself has shown

Struggle for Supremacy Among Leaders 13

so little sense of responsibility, and, by its erratic
enactments, its subservience to momentary currents
of opinion, as well as to caprice and personal in-
fluence, has so often embarrassed a capable adminis-
tration, and prevented it from carrying out its well-
planned policies, that we can but wonder that Eng-
land has come forth so successfully from the foreign
conflicts in which she has been obliged to engage.
And, indeed, this would hardly have been possible
except for her insular position, which shielded Eng-
land against many a vital danger and prevented the
states of the continent, with the means then at their
command, from endangering her existence by at-
tacks such as they themselves had frequently to face.
It is in these conditions that we find a reason for the
dangerous vacillations that mark England's policy
during the reign of William III, in the war of the
Spanish Succession, in the Seven Years' war, and in
the Napoleonic wars, as well as for the serious
blunders that were made in the early conduct of the
Seven Years' war, the revolutionary wars, and at
other times. Certainly in the American war of
independence England suffered the full consequences
of these internal conditions.

The natural accompaniment of a parliamentary
form of government is the wide opportunities it
offers to men of ambition and to intriguing schemers.
During the reigns of George I and George II, Wal-
pole established his party, the Whigs, on a firm
foundation, and then, by a resort to any means of
bribery and intrigue, maintained himself in office for
two decades. Many ambitious and more or less

14 Features of the English Constitution

gifted men found it to their advantage to join his
following and so to secure for themselves a share
of the flesh pots ; to the man who felt himself ca-
pable of higher things, there was no course open ex-
cept to join the Opposition. But gradually the
Opposition grew in strength, probably for the sim-
ple reason that the men in power had been at the
head of affairs for so long a time; at last, foreign
complications gave the opportunity to accomplish
Walpole's downfall (January, 1742). And so mat-
ters went on until the close of the eighteenth century.

Most party leaders and other men of ambition
either belonged to the aristocracy by birth, or were
affiliated with them through close personal or family
relations, and, if they followed the usual course,
closed their careers as members of the Upper House.
What motto they emblazoned on their banners, what
measures of government they denounced with fa-
natical zeal as utter failures, or as schemes of ill
will or of treason mattered little. The fine-sound-
ing phrases and deep chest-tones of profound moral
conviction have always been the ready resort of the
orator, and the layman finds them very convincing.
At the psychological moment, at an election for in-
stance, they may turn the scales in the desired direc-
tion. If they do, they have served their purpose;
indeed, nothing more is expected of them, and it is
a great mistake to take them seriously.

No English statesman, when he attained to power,
has ever hesitated to support the very measures
which he had previously bitterly denounced, pro-
vided that they now served his purpose, whereas the

Reforms 1 5

principles which he had advocated as leader of the
Opposition were allowed to fall into neglect as soon
as he undertook the leadership for the Government.
It all resolves itself into a struggle for power, and
has never been a battle for principle. I have asked
a number of educated and well-informed English-
men whether in their opinion a single one of the
English statesmen of the eighteenth century, with
the exception of Burke (an Irishman), really be-
lieved in the principles he advocated, except in so far
as they stood for the power and renown of his
country, of course, but have never received a con-
fident affirmative in reply.

The nineteenth century, however, has seen great
changes in England's political life. The reforms
of 1832 did away altogether with the " rotten
boroughs," and in their stead all the many towns
that had grown into great centers of population in
recent years were given adequate representation, and
the franchise was greatly widened in other ways.
Through later reform bills the franchise became
more and more democratic, until, since 1885, about
two-thirds of all male inhabitants of the kingdom
over twenty-one years of age have the right to vote ;
but from a universal right of suffrage such as is in
force in Germany and in other continental states,
England is still far removed.

By this redistribution of the franchise the way
was opened for an enormous development of the
commercial and industrial interests of the coun-
try, for they gained a wide political influence by
means of it. The great centers of commerce and

1 6 Features of the English Constitution

of industry in the North, which had hitherto suffered
poHtical neglect, now became a highly influential, at
times even a deciding factor in the political life of
the country. The introduction of free trade and the
check this gave to the agrarian interests, that until
then had been paramount in the country, were the
next links in the chain of consequences. Unre-
strained capitalization, commerce and manufacture,
that as early as the eighteenth century had become
the economic foundations of England's greatness,
and had exerted a deciding influence upon the
political action of the state, now received official
recognition in its constitutional structure, and be-
came the dominating factors in its political life, be-
fore which all else had to give way.

Meanwhile the people were emancipated from the
restraining shackles of a narrow creed, by means
of which the masses had been controlled by the Eng-
lish State Church, than which there has been no less
edifying offspring of the Christian religion, — a sort
of bastard product compounded of politics and the-
ology, organized with great but cynical refinement
for the special purpose of keeping the people in
spiritual subjection to the ruling classes, to whom
it afforded the opportunity of exploiting the bene-
fices, while the spiritual welfare of the people was
all but neglected. Even at the present time the
State Church in England has in no way relinquished
its political rights, its dominant social position, nor
its revenues, and its benefices are still subjects of
presentation, as in the past ; their advowson belongs
in part to the Crown, to Church dignitaries, and to

The English State Church 1 7

colleges and universities; but the larger half belongs
to persons in private life, whereby the presentation
of the benefices is in the hands of laymen of almost
any confession of faith.

In Ireland the Disestablishment Act of 1868 de-
prived the English Church of its position there as
the only recognized state church, but at the same
time it received so great a compensation for the
revenues it had to relinquish that it still controls
funds and holds a position of eminence quite out
of proportion to the small number of its communi-
cants. The same is true of Wales, where the people
are largely Methodists, and where the services of the
English Church are as little attended as they are in
the larger part of Ireland. An Act to disestablish
the State Church here also twice passed the Lower
House in 19 13, but was lost in the Upper House.
In Scotland, of course, the Presbyterian Church is
the recognized church of the state; but here the laws
by which other Protestant denominations, " the dis-
senters," suffered constraint are no longer in force
anywhere, and the Catholics and Jews are as emanci-
pated now as are any other religious sects. The
Catholics of Ireland have sent so large a represen-
tation to Parliament that they have compelled con-
sideration there, and in the great political crises the
deciding vote has often been theirs.

The reforms of recent years have broken the in-
fluence which the great families and the ministry
formerly exerted upon the elections, and the cor-
ruption in Parliament, the barter of votes, has
ceased. But in spite of all preventive measures il-

1 8 Features of the English Constitution

legal influences, such as direct or indirect bribery,
must still be reckoned with at the elections, and in
a much greater extent than such things occur, for
instance, with us. And there is little hope that in
England this practice will be entirely uprooted, for
the Englishman seems to have no scruples in this
respect, — corrupt practices do not seem to disturb
the English conscience, if only outward appearances
are preserved. Nevertheless acts of bare-faced cor-
ruption such as used to take place at the polls are
now no longer possible, and, generally speaking, the
will of the majority finds expression in the elections
of to-day. But the most important step forward
lies in the fact that the proceedings of Parliament
are now fully reported in spite of the prohibitory
law, and consequently the attitude and vote of its
members are under the control of their constitu-
encies. The result is that the Parliament, that once
was in no way responsible, is now subject to the
scrutiny of the public and the electorate, and so
has become responsible to the people. This has put
an end to open corruption, i. e., the exploitation of
a seat in Parliament for the purpose of personal ag-
grandizement.

By this process of development an entirely new
element has been introduced into the political life
of England. In the Parliaments of the eighteenth
century small parties were frequently formed within
the two principal parties, .or else were associated
with them. These then unfurled their banner in
support of some principle involved in some one of
the political questions of the day, and made use

Political Parties 1 9

of it to vanquish the men in power, hoping in this
way to secure the flesh pots for themselves, or,
faihng of this, at least to compel consideration of
themselves by a coalition.. In the place of these
smaller groups there now exist two well-defined
parties, the Irish Party and the Labor Party, with
which every Government must reckon. In the main,
however, the old conditions still persist, because,
through the concessions that are made to these
smaller political elements by one or the other of the
principal parties for the purpose of gaining their sup-
port, the condition arises that a majority and a mi-
nority stand opposed to each other, who, however,
when it comes to a vote, always hold together until
some vital question brings about a crisis and the de-
feat of the Government. This sometimes leads to
the formation of a new party, as it did in connec-
tion with Gladstone's Home Rule Bill for Ireland,
when a large number of the Liberals deserted him to
combine with the Conservatives and form a new
party, the Unionists. Generally speaking, however,
in England as in America, the conviction is abroad
that in parliamentary contests it is not so much the
principle of the party program that must be victo-
rious, be it ever so enthusiastically advocated, but the
party itself that must triumph in order to gain and
hold a political power that is only attainable when,
forgetful of all minor interests, two great parties
stand opposed to each other. This tendency may
be ascribed to a common trait of the political char-
acter of the two nations, and one in which they dif-
fer from the nations of the European continent,

20 Features of the English Constitution

especially from the Germans; their idea of political
freedom is not liberty to realize their own political
ideals, but submission to the will of a majority.
What is determined by the majority must receive
the support of the individual, whether it coincides
with his convictions or not. We will consider this
subject more fully later.

This procedure finds especial favor in these two
countries because there the elections are decided by
a relative and not by an absolute majority as is the
case with us, and therefore the deplorable final elec-
tions which so embitter our political life are dis-
pensed with. It also makes it next to impossible
for more than two candidates to be nominated in
an electoral district; the campaign is planned from
the outset to be a contest between two great political
parties, and not, as with us, for a struggle between
a dozen or more smaller groups.^

^ In America candidates must be residents of the district
in which they are nominated, a restriction which, though
not obHgatory by law, is nevertheless maintained by un-
broken precedent. This greatly diminishes the opportunity
for men of distinguished ability to find their way into the
House of Representatives of the Congress, and by far the
larger number of its members arrive there through the
machinations of the " wire-pullers." The election cam-
paigns are managed for each party organization by means
of its " machine," with a resort to any questionable
measures, and an unscrupulous, systematically planned
corruption. In the United States it is therefore the Senate,
the members of which are elected by the states (two from
each state and for a term of six years), that holds first rank
in the estimation of the people, and is of chief importance,
just the reverse of what it is with us. But in America, as

Parliament in Nineteenth Century 21

In earlier times the elections by which the Gov-
ernment appealed to the people for support and upon
the outcome of which their continuance in office de-
pended were comparatively rare in England; mem-
bers of Parliament were free to vote upon many
questions, even on questions of great moment, ac-
cording to their personal convictions and without
regard to party lines. But during the course of the
nineteenth century this freedom has grown steadily

every one knows, no attempt is made to maintain a truly
parliamentary system. The President of the United States
is quite independent of Congress, although his nomina-
tions require confirmation by the Senate, and his financial
policy is dependent upon the appropriations made by Con-
gress. He is free to select the members of his Cabinet ac-
cording to his own judgment, and it is their duty to carry
out his wishes, and they are responsible to no one but him ;
whether or not they belong to the party which has a ma-
jority in one or both Houses is of no importance. More-
over, the President, — and in the individual states, the gov-
ernors,— exercises the right of veto to a degree of which
we in Europe have scarce an idea. The fact that he is
elected by the whole people gives him an authority far
greater than that held by any constitutional monarch.
Generally speaking, the legislative bodies are regarded in
America as necessary evils that must be endured, but whose
power, at least in the individual states, must be limited as
much as possible that they may do a minimum of mischief.
This is accomplished in part by fixing a time limit for the
sessions of the legislatures, which in most of the newer
states are not allowed to be called for more than sixty
days in two years (in Alabama it is only for forty-five
days in four years), and further, by submitting a large
number of questions to the direct vote of the people, and
so making it possible to incorporate new laws into the
state constitutions without the action of the legislatures.

2.2 Features of the English Constitution

less until at the present time the vote on every ques-
tion of importance is strictly a party matter, con-
trolled by the " whips," who see to it that rigid party
discipline is maintained.

Although the bills brought in by the Government
are modified and frequently much amended in conse-
quence of their discussion in Parliament, still, on all
fundamental questions the decision rests with the
Cabinet, and not with Parliament, although the Cabi-
net finds itself compelled to show a due regard for
the drift of opinions within its own party, and to
make frequent compromise where they differ. As
a consequence, the prestige of Parliament has waned
in a measure, and that of its members, very ma-
terially. The representative in Parliament is not a
free agent, but is bound to follow the instructions
of the party that elected him. His constituents keep
him under constant surveillance, and if he should
disappoint them, he would not only have to lay down
his office, but he would be a dead man politically.^
The Parliament, therefore, is now actually in a sim-
ilar position to that once held by the former bearer
of the sovereignty, the King. Just as the latter, ac-
cording to the official and jealously guarded interpre-
tation of the constitution, is not allowed to hold, or

^ This is, of course, not the case when a politician goes
over permanently to the other party and begins his political
career anew, it may be with pre-eminent success, as was
the case with Gladstone, and before him with Sir Robert
Peel, in both cases because of an honest change in convic-
tions ; and of Lord Palmerston because he followed his
instinct for power. Disraeli, too, was a Liberal before he
began his parliamentary career.

Supremacy of the Cabinet 23

at least to express an opinion, but must blindly fol-
low the advice of his ministers,^ so now the ordi-
nary member of parliament can not have an opinion
of his own, but must render unquestioning obedience
to his party leaders.

This development found its culmination when re-
cently (1911) the House of Lords was deprived of
the right of veto, a right which enabled the Upper
House to take a hand in the party struggles, and
to bring to nought the measures forwarded by the
party in power, an interference which of course was
always in favor of the Conservatives and Unionists,
and against the Liberals and Radicals. With this
right fell the last bulwark that stood against the
achievement of absolute party domination and the
nominal sovereignty of the Lower House, which, in
fact, however, is the rule of a Cabinet brought into
office by the vote of the people. Officially the pres-
ent form of government in England is a democracy,
i. e., a government by a majority of the people, or
rather, by a nominal majority as shown by the re-
turns of the elections. It is, of course, not so radi-
cal a democracy as is to be found in many of the
states of the continent, or in America or Australia,
since England has not as yet granted universal man-
hood suffrage. Moreover it must not be overlooked

^ The exceptional position in this respect which Edward
VII created for himself will receive attention later in this
volume. On the other hand, his successor, George V, met
with reproach during the past year because, instead of
taking the initiative himself in the effort to prevent civil
war in Ireland, he left it to a conference of party leaders
with instructions to seek a compromise.

24 Features of the English Constitution

that although the political organization of the Eng-
lish state is that of a democracy, and in spite of the
important political role that the citizen element now
plays in the political life of the nation, and the
great influence which capital and the commercial
and industrial interests exert, the English social
structure is nevertheless now, as it always has been,
an out-and-out aristocracy, more so, indeed, than
that of any other country in the world. This may
be attributed to the fact that the old families have
been wise enough to adapt themselves to the new
conditions, to preserve to themselves the dominat-
ing influence, and to draw to themselves new ele-
ments from out the opposing circles, and thoroughly
to assimilate these. Therefore it is that, in a meas-
ure, they still hold the reins by which the country's
course is guided, and even the most radical statesmen
must, in spite of themselves, conform to their de-
mands and seek their co-operation. As yet it would
be quite impossible to form a Government in which
the aristocracy and the Upper House are not ade-
quately represented by some shining titles, just as
no private undertaking of a scientific or of a social
nature can hope for success without such support.
As in other matters, so also does the superficial
observer, and with him the general public, base his
judgment of the English Constitution on its official
form. Such forms, however, never represent the
true character of existing institutions, but contain
many antiquated clauses, the original meaning of
which has been modified by a more modern inter-
pretation, or else they have lost their meaning alto-

Parliament's Dependence Upon Cabinet 25

gether. In England, which has no constitution and
where countless institutions now regarded as in-
violable rest entirely upon tradition, on precedent,
or on a re-construction of old statutes, this condition
is in especial evidence, as it also was in ancient
Rome. Meanings almost diametrically opposed to
each other may be read into almost any clause of the
Common Law, according to the predilections of the
interpreter, i. e., according to the opinion for which
the commentator desires legal support. By the pro-
visions of the constitution the King is entitled to
numerous rights and privileges, — but he is not al-
lowed to make use of them; they have in fact, and
in so far as they are not obsolete, been transferred
to the Cabinet, and the sovereignty of the Crown
plays no greater role in England than it did in the
Roman Empire; or as, in the Common Law of the
Middle Ages, did the sovereignty of the people, who
were recognized as the official bearer of all political
authority for the sole purpose of transferring that
authority to the Emperor, as the representative of
the people. In our times the English Parliament
has had the selfsame experience, except that the
process of development has as yet not reached its
completion. The actual ruling body of the English
state, the Cabinet, is unknown to the constitution,
and, in so far as any foundation can be found for it,
it rests on the provision made for the Privy Coun-
cil, which still has an official existence, but has lost
all significance, and is never summoned.

Practically, the feature of the English constitu-
tional organization of to-day is that two groups of

26 Features of the English Constitution

Statesmen stand opposed to each other and ready at
any moment to assume the government. How these
groups are formed, and who belongs to them is no
one's concern but their own, and is regulated by the
party leaders, who keep in touch with the currents
of party opinion. The one indispensable condition
is that aspirants for places in the ministry must be
entitled to a seat in Parliament, some in the Lower
House, and some in the Upper House, since a minis-
ter can only address the House of which he is a
member. The party leader is chosen by his party,
or rather by the most important group of its mem-
bers, according to their own judgment, and he is
the man who, when a cabinet crisis arises, is sum-
moned by the King and charged with the formation
of a new ministry. The decision as to which of the
two political parties shall be entrusted with the gov-
ernment is given by the people in an election for
the Lower House. The successful party then has
the right to govern England for seven years, the
length of life of a Parliament. The Parliament can
be dissolved at any time, however, and a new de-
cision at the polls called for. Such a course may
be desirable for several reasons. It may be that the
men in power regard the time as favorable to an
increase of their majority in Parliament by means
of a new election, and a consequent extension of
their term in office; or, on the other hand, they may
have seen their majority there gradually dwindling
in consequence of subsequent by-elections in which
the returns were unfavorable to their party; or their
coalition with some of the smaller, more or less

Practical Working of English Constitution 27

independent groups, such as the Irish Party, or the
Labor Party, or other extremists, is in danger of
being ended; or else the current of pubHc opinion
may be setting strong against them. For the last,
however, the evidence must be strong indeed, if it
is to have the desired effect, for cabinets have been
know^n to remain calmly in office even after they
were fully aware that they could no longer count
upon the support of a majority of their constituents,
and that at the next election they would surely be
defeated, — if only they retained their majority in
Parliament. It has moreover become traditional to
dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people when,
during the rule of one party, new problems of funda-
mental importance arise, such as the home rule and
tariff questions, and the Lords' right of veto.

Plainly then, the decision as to which of the two
groups of statesmen shall direct the government for
a term of years rests with the voters of the country.
The majority as it is rendered at the polls makes the
decision, — the subsequent nomination by the Crown
and the confirmatory vote of the Parliament are
merely necessary formalities. Nominally, one or
the other of the two well defined parties that have
faced each other for centuries must bear off the vic-
tory. In fact, however, the scales are turned by
those political elements of the population that are
not permanently associated with either party. Al-
though, because of tradition, personal interests, and
the viewpoint from which they regard life, the great
majority of the population hold unwaveringly either
to the one or the other of the two great parties, and

28 Features of the English Constitution

can see nothing but evil in the other, the two parties
are yet so evenly balanced that neither can depend
wholly upon its own adherents for a decision and an
assured majority.^ Between the two parties stand
many men who take a broader view and do not
cling unquestioningly to any one group, either be-
cause they are truly above party domination, and
so judge events and conditions for themselves, or
else because the course taken by the ruling party
does not satisfy them, and their expectations have
not been fulfilled, and consequently they want to
give the other side a trial ; or simply because in their
opinion a change of party is beneficial and promotes
the general good. Indeed these new elections have
almost without fail resulted in shifting the responsi-
bility of government to the shoulders of the former
minority.

It is the minor elements therefore upon which the
change of party depends. It is they who decide the
election and in reality determine who is to be at
the head of the English government, and so control
the " play of English institutions."

^ The same is true of the United States. During a po-
litical campaign little or no effort is spent on those states in
which one or the other of the two principal parties feels
assured of a majority; nor do these states receive consider-
ation when a candidate for the presidency is to be selected,
while every effort is made to win the doubtful states in
which either party may hope for victory, and it is largely
with this in view that the presidential candidates are
chosen.

CHAPTER II

The English Idea of the State and of
Freedom

Of all these many changes in the mode of govern-
ing only a small part found formal expression in
decisions and Acts of Parliament, while in reality
they influenced the deeper meaning and structure of
the constitution and its practical interpretation to a
much greater degree than is apparent on the sur-
face. Nevertheless the political life of the England
of to-day still rests on the old basis and fundamental
opinions that were evolved in the constitutional
struggles of the seventeenth century, and which have
shaped political thought in England ever since.

The political life of England, — and that of Amer-
ica also in so far as this is built upon foundations
inherited from England, — must be gauged by an
entirely different standard from that by which we
judge the continental states, and especially is this
true in so far as the most vital issues in both the
home and the foreign policy are concerned, since
the political organization on the continent is the
exact opposite of that in the insular kingdom. The
most important and most deeply rooted difference
lies in the continental idea of the state as it has
been developed in its relation to the central author-

29

30 English Idea: State and Freedom

ity, the sovereign; of this the English, or we will
say, the people of Great Britain have no concep-
tion. To us the state is the most indispensable as
well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence,
not with regard to our political welfare alone, but to
the daily life and activity of the individual as well,
uniting, as it does, the entire population dwelling
within the utmost limits of its jurisdiction in whole-
some activity for the general good ; we therefore be-
lieve it to be worthy of, as well as entitled to the
entire devotion of every citizen, in honorable effort
to further its purposes. All individualistic en-
deavor, of which there is no lack with us too, as
well as the aspirations of those shattered foreign
nationalities that are included within the boundaries
of our state, must be unreservedly subordinated to
this lofty claim. On the other hand, the state,
through its organ, the government, also has its high
obligation to fulfill, i. e., to hold itself free and un-
prejudiced, above the influence of the individualistic
aspirations of persons and classes, of industrial com-
binations and political parties, and, unaffected by
these, to promote the interests and solve the prob-
lems that concern the entire nation, and to carry
them to a successful issue in spite of the antagonism
of all opposing elements. The state is of much
higher importance than any one of these individ-
ualistic groups, and eventually is of infinitely more
value than the sum of all the individuals within its
jurisdiction. For it has a life apart; its mission
is unending, and, in theory at least, unless it is
wrecked by a force from without, its existence is

Contrast: English and Continental Idea 31

endless, encompassing, as it does, all the generations
yet to come, and weldjng them into a great unit, —
the mighty life of a nation acting its part in the
history of the world.

This conception of the state, which is as much a
part of our life as is the blood in our veins, is no-
where to be found in the English Constitution, and
is quite foreign to English thought, and to that of
America as well. To be sure, in contradistinction
to the dualism of the mediaeval state, the union of
the will to do and the power to act for the state has
been achieved in the Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and in the American Republic also, where
this idea, in opposition to that of the sovereignty
of each individual state, came ofif victorious in the
bloody struggle of the war of secession from which
the American people emerged as a nation.^ To
the potency of this centralization of power may be
ascribed the vigorous conduct of Britain's more re-
cent foreign wars, and the pursuit of a well-defined
national policy abroad. As a consequence, a strong
national feeling has developed in England. In this
the people of Scotland and of Wales share, at least
in times of important crises, whereas in Ireland,
whose official status is one of equality with the other

^ The idea of this new oneness of the country finds char-
acteristic proof in the use of its name as a singular sub-
stantive — " The United States has done something," —
whereas formerly it was customary to speak of " These
United States " with the use of the plural form of the verb,
a peculiarity of speech which is no longer used except by
the fast disappearing remnant of the advocates of partic-
ularism.

32 English Idea: State and Freedom

members of the Kingdom, but whose real position
is that of a subject kingdom exploited for the bene-
fit of English interests, the sentiments that prevail
stand in harshest contrast to this feeling.

In England it is the Parliament to which the state
delegates the centralized authority, or, more accu-
rately speaking, to a ministry that has the support
of a majority in the House of Commons. This
circumstance in itself precludes the possibility of a
governing institution of the state that shall be su-
perior to party bias, and representative of the people
as a whole, uniting them in a common purpose.
Here, as in all countries ruled by a parliament, it is
ever a question of majorities and minorities with
which the people concern themselves, and never one
of a truly centralized authority of the state.

This explains why the English have no concep-
tion whatever of our idea of a centralized state.
The German word Staat is untranslatable into Eng-
lish. There is absolutely no English equivalent to
express the idea which this word conveys to us.
The Britain speaks of " the Empire," which is a
much more comprehensive term, for it brings to
mind all the British possessions in the five continents,
and therefore expresses England's position as a
world power; or he speaks of "the Government,"
and this implies much less, for it designates only the
representatives of the party then at the helm of
state, while it excludes the smaller half of the popu-
lation standing in marked opposition to them and
antagonizing their every measure. Instead of being
ruled by a centralized authority representing the

England's Sudden Changes of Policy 33

state, and superior to all party bias, England is gov-
erned by representatives of a political party. To se-
cure a majority for his party, and so to gain for
it the control of the government, is the first duty
of every English statesman, and of every American
statesman as well. This is the viewpoint from
which all his plans are made, however dear to his
heart may be his country's position as a world power,
or the promotion of its interests abroad, for even
the foreign policy of the country is shaded accord-
ing to this consideration, and in the end is but a
move in the game of politics. It is here that we
find the reason for the sudden changes in England's
foreign policy that have so often accompanied a
change of Government; for the party in opposition,
when it takes the helm, can naturally feel no com-
pulsion whatever to carry to completion the meas-
ures of its predecessors in office, since up to this
time they have been its special objects of attack.
In so far as they may be considered obligations of
the state, this too can have but little weight, since the
state has no existence as an independent authority.
Of a continuously homogeneous foreign policy there
can therefore be no thought in England, except in
so far as there are certain views and plans of action
that are entertained by both parties alike, and which
both are eager to see carried out. To these belongs
the continued and complete supremacy at sea, to-
gether with the consequences which it may entail,
because this is of vital importance to the entire popu-
lation of Great Britain.

Just as the English have no conception of what

34 English Idea: State and Freedom

the word " Stoat " conveys to the German mind,
nor a word to express it, so neither do they under-
stand, nor have they a word for our " Vaterland."
They have become famiHar with its use through
contact with the Germans, and to convey the Ger-
man meaning have translated it by the word father-
land. But for them this word designates the Ger-
man's fatherland, and it is spoken most often in a
tone slightly ironic, or with a pitying sneer in de-
rision of German sentimentality. The Britain has
a " home," but no fatherland. He has no compre-
hension of what the German embodies in the word
fatherland, which is his highest and most sacred pos-
session, calling forth his noblest sentiments and as-
pirations. To this the Britain is a stranger, and
therefore it is absolutely impossible for him to un-
derstand the German national song " Deutschland,
Deutschland iiber alles, iiber alles in der Welt."
With childish naivete he misconstrues it into an ex-
pression of the German nation's aspiration for world
dominion, a thought which certainly was never en-
tertained by the poet, Hoffmann von Fallersleben,
himself, nor by the unnumbered millions of Germans
who have sung it, nor by those who still sing it with
enthusiastic abandon, and to whom the English in-
terpretation of it seems incomprehensible. The
British look upon it as a match for their national
song " Britannia, Rule the Waves," and, with
further childish naivete, take it for granted that
Britain's right to rule the sea is the most natural
thing in the world, and must be conceded by every
one as a matter of course, while the aspiration of

England's Leadership Overtaken 35

any other nation to a position of independence in
the world, and one of importance as a national unit,
is not only regarded as prejudicial to English in-
terests, but is loudly decried as a crime against all
mankind.

In its practical operation the English Constitution
influences every phase of public life. It is the popu-
lar belief that it secures to Great Britain the most
highly developed form of government, far in ad-
vance of all others; and this was true of it at the
time of its conception and of its development during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The espe-
cial feature which justified this high claim is that
it protected every citizen's right of personal liberty,
and bestowed upon a fractional part of the popula-
tion — by no means upon all the people, as is gen-
erally believed — the right to participate in the life
of the state, and so strengthened the foundations
upon which the efficiency of state authority is based.
To these advantages must be added the far greater
degree of freedom which it secured to the industrial
interests of the country, and the consequent in-
crease in material and resources which were placed
at the disposal of state and nation alike. But the
English advance in state organization has long since
been overtaken, and since the beginning of the nine-
teenth century England has fallen more and more
to the rear, while it has tardily and grudgingly, and
therefore ineffectually introduced the institutions
which in other countries have been developed to a
much higher degree.

We may find the reason for this reluctance in the

^6 English Idea: State and Freedom

English idea of freedom that was developed in the
conflict between the Parliament and the Crown, and
which was begun by the higher nobles, and was then
continued to its conclusion by some of these in com-
bination with the House of Commons. In this con-
flict the primary issue was parliamentary privilege,
but in its wider and national issues it laid the foun-
dation for the Englishman's right to personal lib-
erty. The Habeas Corpus Act, by which in 1678
he was protected against imprisonment without a
fair trial, is the great bulwark of personal freedom,
while the provisions of the Declaration of Rights,
by which the supremacy of Parliament was estab-
lished in 1689, gave the nation's aspirations for free-
dom legal form. In this struggle both parties took
part, Whig and Tory alike; for the Tories are by
no means wholly committed to the support of roy-
alty, but, on the contrary, they have been known
to oppose the Crown more vigorously than ever did
the Whigs. If on the other hand they have fre-
quently defended the rights of the Crown, this was
at times but the winning card in the game of politics
by which they hoped to promote the interests of the
proprietary and agrarian elements of the popula-
tion, and so to add to their own power, and by no
means a disinterested desire on their part to add to
the lustre of a self-sufficient monarchy. Their dis-
affection in 1688 decided the outcome of the Revo-
lution and defeated James II.

The English idea of freedom is of a peculiarly
negative character; it expresses itself in effort to
dispense as much as possible with state authority.

English Idea of Freedom 37

Accordingly, the English seek to reduce to a mini-
mum the claims of the state upon the citizen, as
well as the interference of state authority in the life
of the individual citizen, to whom they would se-
cure the utmost liberty of action, and entire free-
dom to pursue his own interests in private life and
in the realm of industry, an object which has been
realized in a high degree and with stupendous re-
sults.

But, after all, man is a social being and cannot
exist in isolation, dependent upon himself alone, but
finds life possible only in well organized and united
communities regulated by inviolable laws. There-
fore, what the state cannot and, according to the
English idea, should not do to accomplish this end
must be provided for by other means. In England,
and in America also, it would seem that the rights
and the functions of the state have been reduced to
their smallest limit, and here the abrogated state
authority has been replaced by a subtle something
styled " public opinion " — custom, tradition, prec-
edent — together with an unquestioning subordi-
nation of the individual to the will of the majority.

The English and American idea of freedom dif-
fers totally from ours.^ If on the one hand the

^ From the moment that a well educated German steps
foot upon the pier in New York until the time that he
leaves from it, he feels himself under a restraint that is
foreign to his nature and is irksome to him, but which he
cannot escape. At every turn he comes upon established
customs and dominating opinions that demand his implicit
submission, and so encroach upon his sense of personal
freedom in matters which he feels he should be allowed to

38 English Idea: State and Freedom

control of the citizen by the state has been reduced
to its lowest quantity, and which according to our
views is far too low, on the other hand the indi-
vidual Englishman or American lives under a con-
stant social constraint which is unknown to us, and
which we would resent as absolute tyranny, and as
a lack of personal freedom. To our mind the essen-
tial condition of freedom is the liberty of the in-

decide for himself. Of all the problems that America
offers for solution to one who becomes thoroughly ac-
quainted with this " land of contrasts," the strangest and
most difficult for him to understand is how the people can
believe themselves to be a free nation, the free nation in
fact, while in reality they live under hourly restraint or
compulsion of which, however, they are not aware, because
they have been accustomed to it from youth up, and there-
fore accept it as a matter-of-course. There is the con-
straint of numberless convictions hallowed by tradition, the
influence of which is felt in all daily intercourse, but above
all in the sphere of religion, and which acts as a check
on the free expression of opinion, and stifles independent
thought. There is the constraint exercised by public
opinion, or what passes for such, and which makes pos-
sible the insufferable intrusion of impertinent interviewers
who daily drag before the public all the private affairs of
the individual citizen and his family, — no one is secure
against the possibility of finding himself at any time
charged in the newspapers with the most serious offenses,
pure inventions of the reporters, for which, however, there
is no redress. And lastly, there is the dreadful tyranny
of organized labor, and of the unscrupulous host of poli-
ticians who control state and municipality alike, and whom
the average American looks upon as a necessary evil that
must be endured, and so does nothing to break their power.
"Politicians are despised in this country" — but they are
allowed to have their way.

English and German Ideas 39

dividual to develop his intellectual and spiritual
personality according to his own ideas, — the right
to shape his views of life independently of the opin-
ions of others, and, from the standpoint thus gained,
to determine his attitude toward the events of life,
and to be allowed unhindered to take an honest stand
for his convictions among his fellow-men. This
tendency, which is paramount in every German and
in which he will not allow himself to be thwarted,
and which therefore is the fundamental characteris-
tic of the political as well as of the spiritual and in-
tellectual life of the German people, is foreign to the
Englishman and to the American as well, or, to say
the least, is but meagerly developed in them. To
them freedom means the right of the majority to
have their way, and there is nothing left to those
who think otherwise but unqualified submission.
Therefore " public opinion " is the highest authority
for the Englishman and the American, whereas for
the German it seems to be almost the reverse, for
when an argument is upheld by the statement that
it is in accord with " public opinion," or that it is
" generally accepted," he is repelled rather than per-
suaded, by it, and often almost unconsciously ranges
himself on the opposing side. This constraining
influence of public opinion is most potently felt in
the spiritual and intellectual sphere, especially in
that of religion, where freedom and recognition of
personal convictions means practically freedom for
the majority only, or for those who have succeeded
in getting the upper hand, and so are accepted
as being the majority, while for all others it

40 English Idea: State and Freedom

means intolerance of their views, and an uncondi-
tional surrender to the mind of the majority. Very
slowly, and only after long continued struggle and
when the futility of trying to force every one to
subscribe to the same views was beyond controversy,
did the idea of tolerance in matters religious gain
ground in England and America, and even yet it
is not as general there as in the foremost countries
of the continent. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge how largely individual freedom of conscience
is still restrained by the English law, and even to a
much greater degree by long established custom and
by public opinion, which makes itself felt in an op-
pressive spiritual constraint, or at least in a demand
for outward conformity to prevailing custom.

It will be profitable in this connection to relate an
incident in my own early life, which confirms my
opinion and by which my eyes were first opened to
existing conditions in England, as well as to the Eng-
lish idea of freedom. Just after I was graduated,
I held the position of tutor during the years 1875
and 1876 in the family of the English consul-general
at Constantinople, Sir Philip Francis, a highly edu-
cated man who had studied in Germany and was a
member of the radical reform party, and with whom
I came into close personal relations. One day I
said to him that I would like to read the " Essay
on Liberty," by John Stuart Mills, to which he re-
plied, " It isn't at all necessary that you should read
it ; for England that essay was of great importance,
for it advances ideas that must be realized there.
But for you it has little that is new; what it advo-

Narrowness in Religious Thought 41

cates for England has been accomplished in Ger-
many for over a century." And this is quite true.
The essay discusses ideas of religious liberty and
freedom of thought that have been in practice w^ith
us ever since the era of our emancipation of thought
and of our classic literature, whereas in England
they are not generally accepted even yet. Until
very recently any one in England who openly
acknowledged himself to be an atheist stood with-
out the pale of the law, and we all know with what
rigid narrowness the " keeping of the Sabbath " is
still construed and enforced there.

CHAPTER III

Some Effects of the English Constitution —
THE Army — the Reforms

Whereas the English submit to social compulsion
without protest, and, in striking contrast to the Ger-
mans, actually accept it as a matter of course, and
hardly realize its existence, on the other hand they
are distrustful of all and every assumption of au-
thority on the part of the state, and oppose them-
selves to it. This want of confidence in the state,
nay, it may even be said this antagonistic attitude
toward it, is but the natural consequence of the con-
stitutional struggles between Parliament and Crown.
The spirit of this long continued struggle still sur-
vives, although when it ended, a victorious Parlia-
ment had appropriated the authority of the Crown,
which now serves merely to give expression to the
unrestricted authority of the Parliament and of
the Cabinet that is dependent upon the latter for its
tenure of office. This want of confidence finds pe-
culiar expression in the provision which makes it
impossible to raise taxes in England, either direct
or indirect, without the consent of Parliament ; and
further, in that the taxes may be levied only for a
stated period of time, in part, for no longer than a
year. Moreover, in contrast to our law, they can-

42

The English Army 43

not continue to be collected after the expiration of
this prescribed time limit except by the sanction
of Parliament, a circumstance by which this body,
in theory at least, is given the power to bring the
entire machinery of government to a standstill.

The like is true of the army, in connection with
which the distrust of the Crown, which showed itself
in the constitutional struggles that occurred during
the reigns of Charles II and William III, brought
about some unique and bizarre situations that were
not only detrimental to England's status as a world
power, but to her political activity as well. This,
too, is but a survival of the ancient antagonism. In
theory, England is provided with an army only when
outer conditions make it a necessity, viz. : when the
country is at war, or on the eve of war. A standing
army has ever been regarded by the English as the
implement with which kings impose their tyranny
upon the people, and therefore it has been but slowly
and deficiently developed. Until far into the last
century the army was dependent for its pay and
disciplinary powers upon an annual grant by the
Mutiny Act. The provision for the purchase of
commissions and all advancement in the army was
intended as a further check upon its control by the
Crown, since this made it impossible for any but
men of means to become officers. Their financial
independence was supposed to insure independence
of their sovereign also, because it enabled them to
lay down their commissions at any time, if called
upon to render a service contrary to conscience or
to the constitution. This provision for the sale of

44 Effects of English Constitution

commissions was abrogated in 1871; but the spirit
of independence still prevails in the army, as does
also the absence of any strong sense of obligation on
the part of the officers to carry out their orders with
unquestioning obedience. Instead, they reserve to
themselves the right to decide according to their
political convictions what their military duty is. Of
this we had a drastic example during the past year
in Ireland when the army refused to act against
the openly organized rebellion of the Orangemen of
Ulster, an act of insubordination which the govern-
ment had to accept, since it had no remedy at its
command.

The sovereign has been deprived of every in-
fluence over the army; since the time of George II
no English king has taken the field at the head
of his forces, and although Queen Victoria with ad-
mirable persistence long refused to relinquish her
right to appoint the commander-in-chief of the
army, and to select him from among the members
of her family, she was after all compelled in 1871
to acquiesce in his subordination to the Secretary
of State for War. In 1904 the office of command-
er-in-chief of the army was abolished, and the Eng-
lish army and navy are now under the exclusive
control of the Cabinet.

Although the ranks of the officers of the army
and of the navy are largely filled by men from the
moneyed classes, or else by younger sons of the
nobility, and therefore command the respect of the
community, it is notorious that the rank and file
of the army is recruited from the lowest strata of

English Army and Navy 45

the population. This is but the natural and un-
avoidable result of the enlistment system; military
service as private or non-commissioned officer is
only sought either by brav^^ling adventurers, or by
men who have suffered shipwreck in life, or are un-
fitted by nature to earn a livelihood in other ways;
or else by young men who have been overpersuaded
or have been lured on by deceptive promises, and
who all too often sign their contract while under
the influence of liquor. All attempts to better the
situation by an increase in the pay of the soldiers,
and by the promise of a well-paying position in the
civil service upon conclusion of their military serv-
ice have proved fruitless. And this is unavoidable,
because it lies in the very nature of things that where
the enlistment system is in force and a man holds his
life at a price, the soldier's vocation should be re-
garded with contempt. In England private soldiers
and non-commissioned officers are excluded from
society and are refused at all the better class of pub-
lic houses, and it is a well known fact that army
officers when off duty do not wear the uniform, and
are rather ashamed of it.

An army of mercenaries can be kept together only
by the most rigid discipline, and therefore it was
not until well in the seventies of the nineteenth cen-
tury that whipping was abolished as a punishment
in the English army and navy, whereas in Germany
it had been out of use for the past two generations.
To supply the navy, England's main ann of defence,
with a sufficient number of seamen, impressment
was resorted to up to the close of the Napoleonic

46 Effects of English Constitution

wars. A commission appointed for the purpose
seized such young men as seemed fitted for the serv-
ice, and compelled them to become seamen, — a
proceeding which was an offense to the nation's
sense of personal freedom, and aroused the amazed
wonder of Voltaire when he was a witness to it on
his first visit to this remarkable country, but which,
for instance, the author of the Junius letters re-
garded not only as a necessity, but as justifiable both
morally and politically.

Ever since these measures have been discontinued,
it has been most dif^cult to secure a suf^cient num-
ber of men for the British army and navy. The
brilliantly illustrated recruiting placards that are dis-
played in most public places, and that picture in
glowing colors the special arm of the service that
they advertise as desirable above all other employ-
ments and as an especially easy and attractive way
of earning a livelihood, are viewed by the stranger
in England with an amused contempt. But they are
displayed to little purpose. Discipline in the service
is relaxed more and more; unruliness and revolts,
demands for better pay, better rations and better
treatment generally, have become the order of the
day, but nothing can be done to put an end to it.
When the troops are to embark for over-sea serv-
ice, they are not infrequently driven aboard half-
seas-over and strongly guarded. That such an army
cannot be fitted to meet the demands of modern war-
fare, which depends so largely upon every soldier's
patriotic devotion to duty as well as upon a sense of
moral obligation on the part of the troops to hold

Aversion to Military Service 47

together in scattered engagements, needs not to be
argued.^ Moreover, the officers generally, al-
though not without conspicuous exceptions, are de-
ficient both in that preparatory intellectual develop-
ment and military education which would fit them
to meet the problems of modern military tactics.
And as for the volunteers and the militia, they are
entirely lacking in this education, for their espe-
cial preparation has been merely in the nature of a
popular sport in which the real military problems
and demands can hardly receive any consideration.
In battle, to be sure, the British troops are no
cowards; but this is largely to be attributed to the
self-respect and stubborn tenacity inherent in the
English national character, as well as to the Britain's
love of a fight of which he gives ample evidence in
his every-day life, and w^hich is no insignificant ele-
ment in the national love of sport. To how great
a degree not only the land forces, but the navy as
well, are insufficiently fitted to meet the exigencies of
modern warfare, how lacking in preparedness, and
how incomplete their equipment is in spite of official
assurances to the contrary, has been amply shown in
all the wars that Great Britain has waged in recent
years, for they have invariably begun with defeat

1 This is well illustrated by a story told by Prince Kraft
zu Hohenlohe. ("Aus Meinem Leben " III, 328 f.)
During the war of 1866 an English major went about look-
ing for the Prussian encampment, but in vain, until finally
he exclaimed that he could not understand how the troops
could be kept together without an encampment, or how
without it they could be got together to start on their on-
ward march.

48 Effects of English Constitution

for the British. The fact is that the EngHsh are in-
capable of methodic and exhaustive organization,
for they are not only wanting in the education that
fits for it, but their political and social conditions
are opposed to the close organization that is insep-
arable from successful warfare.

In view of the glaring discrepancy between this
inefficient military organization and the constantly
increasing demands made upon it for the mainte-
nance and expansion of Britain's world empire, there
has been during the last decade an ever growing de-
mand on the part of the wise for the introduction of
universal military service. But for the average
Englishman this is an abomination; unlike the Ger-
man, he looks upon universal military service with
its demand for the entire devotion of the individual
to the state for the time being, as ignominious slav-
ery, and the end of all his much lauded Hberty. If
necessary, he is quite ready to pay for the demands
of the state, and therefore is willing enough that
soldiers shall be bought in whatever market they
may be found ; but to offer himself, even to the ex-
tent of his life, for the highest duty that his country
and its people ask of him appears to him to be
an unendurable compulsion. Even while his coun-
try is at war, he desires not to be disturbed in the
ordinary routine of his life, nor in the pursuit of his
own interests, and he considers it to be the business
of the state to make this possible for him. Both in
England and in America this deep-seated aversion
to universal military service is at the bottom of all
the hatred of Germany, and of the outcry against

Reform Legislation 49

German " militarism," and it is therefore indirectly
the cause of the present war. The war between
England and Germany is in fact merely a repetition
of the historic struggle of a backward and outgrown
form of political and national organization against
one that is far in advance of it, and by which it has
been overtaken and distanced, and which is both eth-
ically and politically of a much higher order.

This condition of backwardness as compared with
the states of the continent, and especially with the
German form of state organization, is apparent in
every department of public life. Nevertheless, even
the United Kingdom could not withdraw itself en-
tirely from the influence of the constantly advancing
development of the nineteenth century and the new
and far-reaching demands made by it. The parlia-
mentary reforms of 1832, immediately preceded by
the emancipation of the Cathohcs (1829), made an
end of the brutal and irresponsible rule of the reac-
tionaries, and opened the way for a long series of
changes by which England instituted reforms that
had long been in effective operation on the continent.
The barbaric law by which any form of theft was
made punishable by death, or at least by deportation
to Australia, was modified ; imprisonment for debt,
so drastically pictured by Dickens and so frightful
in its consequences, was abolished, and the deplorable
Poor Laws, according to which, for instance, or-
phans or the children of paupers could actually be
sold as apprentices for the sake of ridding the com-
munity of the expense of maintaining them, were
materially improved. All ardent admirers of Eng-

50 Effects of English Constitution

land and her free institutions should reflect upon the
opposition that all these reforms encountered, as well
as upon the tardiness with which these humanitarian
principles were put into practice.

The local government also underwent a complete
re-organization. The ancient " self-government "
system, by which the great landed proprietor in the
capacity of justice became the legal administrator
of the county, as church warden controlled the par-
ish, and, most important of all, was also charged
with the care of the poor, proved itself more and
more unsatisfactory, — and the like may be said of
the municipal corporations. Although in the ad-
ministration of both municipal and county boroughs,
the newly organized system of self-government re-
tained the old historic foundations in their place of
honor, yet it now rests on as democratic a basis as
does the Parliament. The administration is in the
hands of an elected Council, the ordinary members
of which, the councillors, hold office for a term of
three years; to these are added one-half as many
aldermen, elected for a term of six years. Subordi-
nate to the Council are the numerous permanently
appointed and salaried officials, such as there are in
the ministerial departments, and it is they who really
transact the great bulk of official business. This
form of local government has born the test of time,
although it suffers under the disadvantage that im-
portant and responsible positions are often held by
men little versed in the matters entrusted to them,
whereas the men best fitted for these positions of re-
sponsibility hesitate to undertake them, because they

English Local Government 51

shrink from the excitement and bitterness that are
inseparable from the election campaigns. This is a
disadvantage from which the German municipal ad-
ministration suffers less ; for not only does a differ-
ently constituted election system make for better
conditions with us, but the longer term of office, and
the institution of a city magistracy of technically
educated councillors and mayor, who are fitted for
the special positions which they hold, are absolutely
necessary conditions to continuity of purpose in ad-
ministration and to the efficient discharge of munici-
pal business. In the elections for our parliament,
however, we too are experiencing in an ever-increas-
ing degree the great disadvantage to which the dem-
ocratic system is subject, viz., that men of a more
sensitive nature are deterred from accepting political
nominations because of the distasteful experiences
that are inseparable from the campaign for election,
while the uncertainty of the outcome makes it im-
possible for many men especially well qualified for
the positions to decide upon a political career.

English local government suffers under still an-
other drawback in that the numerous transactions
which with us are entrusted to the local administra-
tion are dependent in the United Kingdom upon
special Act of Parliament, even to so small a matter
as the franchise of a street railway. But to get such
measures through Parliament (by way of private
bills) is not only a tedious and expensive process, but
is always accompanied by a degree of uncertainty
as to the outcome. Moreover, in England there is
no provision made for the combination of small po-

CO Effects of English Constitution

litical districts into a larger political unit which
would then have charge of the affairs and special
interests of an entire section of country, as is the
case with us in our government districts and prov-
inces. The Home Rule movement in Ireland and
Wales has for its object precisely such a political
organization, an arrangement by which the people
could manage their own affairs within limits pre-
scribed by law, and independently of Parliament.

CHAPTER IV

England as a " Nightwatchman State " —
Education and Science — Social Reform
Legislation

If aspirations for reform fail of consistent real-
ization in the United Kingdom, this must be ascribed
in a large measure to the English idea of personal
freedom by which these aspirations are thwarted at
every turn, as well as to the native opposition to any
increase of state authority. This condition of af-
fairs has found characteristic expression in the term
" Nightwatchman State," which means neither more
nor less than that the state's sole business is to pro-
vide conditions whereby those who live within its
jurisdiction may lead an existence secure against vio-
lence and illegal interference, and by which it will be
made possible for them, unhindered except by such
legal restrictions as are necessary to community life,
to pursue their own interests with perfect freedom,
so that every man may gain for himself the greatest
degree of prosperity that opportunity and his own
ability place within his reach.

Such a conception of the state refutes the idea that
it has an existence apart, and one of much greater
value in itself than that of the individual citizens,
since it unites into a civic organism the atoms of

53

54 As o^ " ^ightwatchman State "

3. society that otherwise would fall apart, and lends
to their existence its highest value by making it pos-
sible for them to realize ideal conditions which as
individuals they could never realize. According to
the English idea, the state dwindles into a sort of
higher police force. To fulfill the duties that have
been left to it, it must have a financial foundation,
and a body of officials ; it must be allowed occa-
sionally to interfere with the absolute freedom of
action desired by its citizens, since it is obliged to
make some demands upon them which, though nec-
essary, are much to be deplored. Its functions and
authority are therefore to be limited as much as pos-
sible; every movement and every effort that tend
toward clothing the state with wider powers are
looked upon as destructive of personal freedom, and
are therefore to be opposed in every conceivable
way, and, if possible, thwarted. Toward foreign
influences the attitude is the same, for, should a new
form of state organization be established abroad and
found to be good, England also might feel con-
strained to adopt it.

The conception of the state as it exists at present
became general in England during the middle of the
nineteenth century in close connection with the free
trade movement and the teachings of Cobden and
the Manchester School. Even so able an historian
as Macaulay approved of it in all its essentials, al-
though, while his great historical work was in prog-
ress, he evidently realized more and more the fun-
damental value of wider state authority, as well as
the desirability of a continuity of purpose in state

Limitation of State's Authority 55

policy, and that this should therefore not be sub-
jected to the fluctuating influences of party bias.
This change in the historian's views is apparent to
any reader who compares his later with his earlier
writings. It is due to this limitation of the state's
authority that many institutions and undertakings,
the organization and administration of which consti-
tute some of the most important duties of the state
in other countries, are either entirely withdrawn
from government control in England, or, through
pressure of circumstances, have only lately been re-
luctantly assumed in part by the state, and so are
largely left to private enterprise.

Conspicuous among the public interests from
which the English state has kept aloof is the great
sphere of intellectual life, — education, science and
art. Of the popular education the state was com-
pelled to take charge if England was not to be out-
distanced in this field by all the more advanced coun-
tries of the continent. When compulsory education
was proposed, it met with the most violent opposition
from the proprietary classes, and more especially
from the capitalists, who argued that the working
classes were much more useful, as well as much more
contented, without the ability to read or write, an
accomplishment which could only serve to awaken
within them aspirations that after all could not be
satisfied. This argument was accompanied by the
fine-sounding phrase that compulsory education is in
itself an infringement upon the personal freedom of
the individual and of his right to be the master of
his fate. Finally, however, although not without

56 As a " Nightwatchman State "

vigorous agitation and violent opposition, education
was made obligatory by the state in 1870 ( !), and
since that time numerous bills have been enacted
by which the elementary schools have been systema-
tized, state support has been provided for them, and
their control placed in the hands of officials ap-
pointed by the state. Thus an end has been made of
the appalling conditions to which the writings of
Dickens called attention.

For the higher education however there is still a
deplorable lack of systematized provision. On the
one hand there are the " day schools," in charge of
the parish or the county, together with the somewhat
similar private schools that are patronized by the
children of the lower middle class, who, while con-
tinuing to live in the homes of their parents, receive
in these schools a practical technical education in-
tended to fit them for their calling in life. On the
other hand are the great public schools, conspicuous
among which are the famous old foundations of
Eton, Harrow and Rugby, where the sons of the
aristocracy are educated to be " gentlemen," and are
also fitted to enter Oxford and Cambridge. The
sharp class distinctions which characterize English
social life are especially marked in the sphere of edu-
cation ; it is still felt to be a sort of social stigma if a
boy cannot afford to go to one of these public
schools, but must content himself to remain at the
home of his parents and attend the day school.

As for the English universities, they are, as every
one knows, all private institutions either of old
foundations or, as is the case with the newer col-

English Universities 57

leges and universities, endowed with funds contrib-
uted by men of means. The state has nothing to do
with them except to grant them a charter by virtue
of which they become incorporated institutions with
the right to confer degrees; in addition, the newer
universities receive from the state a small — ab-
surdly small — financial aid. Among the universi-
ties class distinction reigns supreme. The newer
ones (Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham,
Wales and London University, which has been in the
throes of birth for decades) are patronized by the
sons of the middle class, who here receive an educa-
tion which in its essentials is much like that which
the upper classes in our high schools offer, together
with a purely practical technical training. Oxford
and Cambridge, on the other hand, are attended by
the rising generations of gentlemen that are here
fitted for the higher spheres of life, i. e., they receive
that general intellectual education that is traditional
in England, while they perfect themselves in the
sports and in the art of parliamentary debate, as well
as in that of spending money with elegant ease.
Really scholarly interests and pursuits are quite out-
side the ordinary student's sphere, nor are they ex-
pected of him.

The endeavor to re-construct the old English uni-
versities along lines followed by the universities of
the continent and of America, and to transform them
into truly scientific institutions for higher learning
has proved futile because the necessary material is
lacking both in the teaching force and in the student
body. The learned celebrities who figure as mem-

58 ^s a " Nightwatchman State "

bers of the faculties do not as a rule give class in-
struction ; two or three lectures a year are all that is
required of them. Indeed, there are those among
them who boast that they have never lectured at all.
It is therefore outside of the universities that most of
the scientific and other intellectual work in England
is accomplished, and by scholars who stand in no
official relation to any institution of learning. That
every man's knowledge and capability are not merely
his personal possession, but that they impose upon
him a duty toward his fellow men, and that especially
those scholars who are scientific experts should pass
their knowledge on to the next generation as teach-
ers of its youth is the high idea by which all intel-
lectual workers in Germany are inspired, and to this
the English are strangers.

The natural inference would be that under such
conditions England would fail to hold her own in the
world of science; and this is the case. During the
last few generations she has lost her leadership in
the lines in which so many of her scientists have
been pre-eminent in the past. The places which these
leaders in science left vacant have not been filled by
men of later generations; most English scholars of
to-day lack a broad education, and so are content to
be specialists, and fail to get the wider outlook be-
yond the narrow limits of their special branch into
the domain of universal science.

It is not the part of wisdom therefore to induce
young men from Germany or America to avail them-
selves of the Rhodes' scholarship to become students
at Oxford or Cambridge, where they can doubtless

Science and Art 59

get an insight into the English manner of life, but
can never obtain the scholarly education that the uni-
versities of their home land can offer them. Habits
of luxury they do contract, however, and learn to
spend money with a lavishness that is amazing to us.
The least that a student in these universities can get
along on with utmost, nay, with painful economy, is
£200 (4000 marks) a year; students who would live
in easy circumstances must expect to spend twice or
three times that amount. This is the danger by
which the young men who take advantage of the of-
fered scholarship are beset, and there are many in-
stances in which it has worked them harm.

That in England the state does practically nothing
to promote the interests of science and of art no one
will deny; in these spheres everything is left to
chance and private initiative, and, with the abundant
means at hand, some wonderful results have doubt-
less been achieved in this way. But what the state
itself does to further these interests is far outdone by
all other countries that lay claim to national culture
of the highest rank, and not only by the powerful
nations of ancient civilization and by America, but
by so small and poor a people as the Greeks, who
have done and are still doing marvelous things in
science and art, and in the realm of intellect gener-
ally, and this not alone through the activity of the
state, but by private enterprise and through associa-
tions for the advancement of culture. There is no
other body of men in the world, having a just claim
to be representative of the best there is in the way of
culture in their own land, who have so little appre-

6o ^s a " Nightwatchman State "

ciation of all matters of science and of art, and as
little interest in them, as have the members of the
British Parliament and Ministry.

The English are talking a good deal just now
about their own deficiency and backwardness in sci-
ence and the arts; for these shortcomings are not
only making themselves felt in the intellectual life of
the nation, but in the practical enterprises of life as
well, and England is falling more and more to the
rear in the struggle for industrial supremacy. Of
well-intentioned resolutions and newly-organized so-
cieties to further these interests there are many, and
funds are collected and an occasional new profes-
sorship is made possible by endowment ; all with the
wish to better these conditions, but to little purpose.
What is accomplished usually depends wholly upon
circumstances, and upon the inclination of the donor,
' who may be interested in Egyptology, or Chinese, or
biology, and who looks upon himself as a benefactor
of the community if he endows a chair in some uni-
versity for instruction in the subject which is of
special interest to him, with little thought as to
whether or not there are students who desire this
instruction, which is usually imparted by men of
mediocre ability, and in the form of popular lectures.
The fault that lies at the root of these unprom-
ising conditions is the total absence of all organized
direction in such matters; this is however the only
way in which something really worth while can be
accomplished. Nor is there any provision made by
which the young people can be led into the newer
paths of instruction ; for this also requires organized

Social Reforms 6 1

direction under the control of the state, a method of
procedure which the EngHsh reject with righteous
indignation. How often has the advisabiHty of ac-
quiring a foreign language, especially German, been
preached in England as absolutely indispensable, if
the country would maintain its old-time pre-eminence
in the industrial world. But with what result?
The German language has been studied less and less
in the English secondary schools and universities
during the last decades, until at present it is hardly
studied at all, while in America just the reverse has
taken place.

The fact is that England is beginning to show the
effects of her tenacious adherence to the rigid forms
of an old and decrepit cultural system from which
she finds it impossible to extricate herself. The
familiar " Don't move from the beaten track " has
been her watchword in this sphere of activity as it
has been in others, and therefore all the well-meant
discussions and resolutions amount to nothing. A
real improvement can be accomplished only by means
of a radical reform and a new structure from the
ground up. Whether England can bring herself to
adopt such drastic measures, time alone can reveal.

Social conditions are not much better. To be
sure, much was accomplished by the reforms that
were inaugurated during the third decade of the
nineteenth century, and by which the appalling state
of affairs in the factories and in the relief of the poor
was improved ; child labor was restricted, and a pro-
vision for government inspection of factories was
made. In 1842 a law was passed prohibiting the

62 ^s a " Nightwatchman State "

employment of women in the mines, and in 1847 the
working day for women and children was limited to
ten hours. In 1848 the extreme tendencies of the
chartist movement were suppressed, but were imme-
diately followed by the organization of labor in
trades unions, whereby the material condition of the
laboring classes was greatly ibettered. When in
1868 Disraeli's reform bill greatly widened the fran-
chise, the political status of the working classes ex-
perienced a decided uplift through the influence they
had thus obtained upon the elections for the Parlia-
ment. In 1893 the Labor Party was organized as
an independent political group, standing between the
two great parties, and since then it has been the de-
ciding element in many a hard fought battle in
Parliament, and it has had the satisfaction of seeing
its leaders take their places in a Liberal Government.
But never has there been an effort to improve the
condition of the working classes by legislative act
that has not met with violent protest from the mon-
eyed classes and the interests of capital ; for these
look upon any such legislation as an interference
with the natural course of things in general and
with the Englishman's right to personal freedom in
particular. I have a vivid recollection, for instance,
of the vigorous opposition which Plimsoll's bill for
" the sailer's load line " met before it became a law
in 1875. The phrase refers to the line which marks
the limit up to which the law allows a vessel to be
laden,; for it had been a common trick of the trade
to load an old and unseaworthy vessel far beyond its
capacity, and then send it to sea and to certain de-

Opposition to Social Reform 63,

i
struction, so that the insurance money, which more
than covered the loss, might be collected. That this
meant the sacrifice of many lives was a matter of
little consideration to the shipowners ; theirs was the
right to do as they pleased with their ship, and the
sailors were free to exercise their own discretion
when they undertook the risk of sailing a vessel. It
is an amazing fact that a reputable economic publi-
cation at the time argued in opposition to the bill,
saying that British trade necessarily involved the
annual sacrifice of a certain number of lives; that
this was but the course of nature with which man
could not hope to interfere ; and it then went on to
compute the exact money value of each life — "the
commercial value of human life."

All effort to improve social conditions has met
with like opposition, for England is by no means the
leader in this field either, but follows far behind
some of the states of the continent. Germany was
the pioneer; the stupendous transformation which
has been accomplished there was made possible only
by the idealistic attitude of the nation toward the
realization of the ideas for which Bismarck pointed
the way. Germany's lead in social re-organization
was followed by the other states of the continent,
one after another, although not always without re-
luctance. Belgium, once the idealist's embodiment
of all things liberal, now lags behind in the very
last rank of this forward movement ; and France,
where capital reigns supreme, has as yet not even
found it possible to enact any just tariff and personal
tax legislation, while England has finally felt com-

64 ^s a " Nightwatchman State "

pelled to take the first steps in this onward march.

When in 1906 a Liberal Radical Government with
Lloyd George and the Labor leader, Burns, came
into office, an energetic program of social reform
legislation was undertaken. In 19 13 there was even
an attempt made to render it impossible for unrea-
sonably large areas of land in England to be held
by one landowner, and the proposed preventive leg-
islation was along lines such as had been success-
fully carried out during the last decades against the
same evil in Ireland, under the pressure of the Irish
movement and the boycott (p. 93). Should the
party really succeed in putting through a social-
agrarian reform measure, and so break the dominat-
ing influence of the large landowners, this would
greatly strengthen the position of the Liberals, and
perhaps give them enduring political control of Eng-
land.

How far England is behind Germany in the solu-
tion of the ever-present social problems is evident to
every one who has traveled extensively in the two
countries. The abject poverty that may be seen on
every hand in the larger cities of England, the
wretched way in which the poor are housed, the
ragged garments in which men and women alike are
seen in the streets, dirty and unkempt, — such things
are unknown to us in Germany, where the poorest
person would be ashamed to appear in clothing that
is full of holes, out at the elbows, and with sleeves
and trousers fringed with rags, German mothers
or wives would patch the garments and make them
presentable, if the wearer himself failed to do so,

Condition of the Working Classes 65

and no woman would go about in the ragged cloth-
ing in which women may daily be seen in England.
This sense of decency is but one of the many testi-
monials to the educational value of universal mili-
tary service. Aside from this, however, there is the
love of surroundings that are not only comfortable,
but pleasing as well, which is inborn in the Germans
and prompts them to keep their houses tidy, be they
ever so humble, to make them cheery with flowering
plants, to love and cherish every green bush and tree,
and to plant a little garden, if this is at all possible.
In the rural districts of England the people show a
like appreciation of pleasing surroundings in the
care they take of their homes; but the poorer ele-
ments of the city populations lack this sense alto-
gether; their every effort is given to securing the nee- '
essaries of life, and nothing is left with which to '
provide anything more. Any one who has visited \
the ugly industrial centers of England, — Birming-
ham, Wolverhampton, Sheffield, and similar manu-
facturing districts of other large cities, — where
everything is black, not a spear of grass in sight, and
has seen the monotonously similar houses with their
many chimneys, all covered with dirt and grime,
will think himself in a workingman's paradise when
he sees manufacturing districts such as those of
Westphalia, where every workingman has a neat
little cottage with a garden.

How dissatisfied the English working classes
really are, and how serious is the danger which
threatens from this quarter, has been unmistakably
indicated by the great strikes of the last few years,

66 ^s a " Nightwatchman State "

by which traffic was brought to a standstill, the
receipt and distribution of food-stuffs prevented, and
the whole country brought to the verge of a tempo-
rary food famine. It would seem therefore that
England may be seriously menaced from within, if
the war should continue much longer, the wheels of
industry be stopped, and thousands of men be out of
employment. With us the state has made provision
for such an emergency, and comes to the relief of
all who would otherwise be in distress, as it is doing
most wonderfully at present, and as it will continue
to do. But of forethought such as this there is no
trace in England, where the people will soon learn
that if they would maintain their position of emi-
nence among the nations, they will have to desert
their old time ideals, and entirely change their atti-
tude toward the social and labor problems that con-
front them.

For the idea of unrestricted freedom of action for
every one, which has so long shaped all English life
and has inspired the Liberals of every country with
so much enthusiasm for English institutions, means
virtually the dominance of capital, and the advance-
ment of the material interests of the moneyed
; classes. To this idea, too, may be traced the Eng-
Uish aversion to any form of government provision
for social welfare, as well as to the assumption of
any degree of responsibility on the part of the pros-
perous for the well-being of the community and of
the poorer and more dependent elements of the popu-
lation. This is the reason also why the system of
old age and invalid pensions provided for by compul-

English Egoism 67

sory insurance, and patterned after the one operative
in Germany, met with so much opposition a few
years ago (1908). According to the English view
all these matters should be left to the care of private
philanthropy, which, every one will concede, has
certainly rendered great and praiseworthy service in
these lines. But after all, this would leave it en-
tirely to personal inclination whether these important
interests were to be looked after or not. That the
state should step in and equalize the burden of re-
sponsibility so that it may be shared by all is an idea
that is repugnant to the Englishman, and one which
is irreconcilably opposed to his conception of the
state and of his own personal freedom.

Surely no one will claim that the English are
wanting in devotion to their ideals any more than
are other nations, and England can point with pride
to many of her sons who, with entire self-devotion
and a persistence characteristic of the English, have
striven to further the idealistic tendencies and hu-
manitarian efforts of their generation. That they
have accomplished much in spite of every endeavor
to thwart them, and, in bitter and prolonged strug-
gle with the opposing tendencies, have come off vic-
torious in the end, has already been shown, and it
would be but a foolish misrepresentation of facts
to deny this. Nevertheless, of the average English-
man, the characteristically national type, it may be
said that his chief trait is the unbridled selfishness
which, sustained by the English idea of personal
freedom, leads him to seek his own interests regard-
less of all else, and with ruthless indifference to the

68 As a " Nightwatchman State "

rights of others to trample them underfoot, as he
proceeds on his self seeking way. And this crass
egoism is transferred from private and business in-
terests to the political struggles within the country,
as well as to its relations to foreign nations and
states. Another characteristic of the English, still
less attractive and more dangerous, is that they do
not take this stand openly and frankly, but under-
stand excellently well how to disguise their real mo-
tives by high sounding phrases that claim for them
idealistic and humanitarian intentions, and so give
the impression that England and the English are
ever seeking to advance the best interests of all man-
kind, or at least are contending for no more than
their legitimate rights, while in reality the matter
at stake is simply their own advantage and the power
to exploit others.

The opium war with China in 1842, the bombard-
ment of Alexandria and the occupation of Egypt,
Jameson's invasion of the Transvaal, and lastly, the
Boer war, are all especially drastic instances of Eng-
land's humanitarian activity during the last few
decades. Indeed, for three hundred years English
history has been marked by the same characteristic ;
all the wars that were waged, all the numberless ac-
quisitions of territory that were made, and which in
part were wrested from European countries, from
the civilized peoples of Asia, and from the " bar-
barian " races, bear witness to this. When the more
conscientious men of England would not counte-
nance these proceedings and raised a voice in pro-
test, as, for instance, did the large minority that dis-

English as Humanitarians 69

approved of the Boer war, it availed them nothing,
and eventually they had to accept what the Govern-
ment proposed to do.

This national tendency is furthered by another
characteristic trait. The English mind has a natu-
ral bent toward the apprehension of the practical side
of things and the immediate advantages to be de-
rived from them ; with rare and conspicuous excep-
tions, pure speculation and theory have little attrac-
tion for the English. The intuitive craving of the
German to arrive at a consistent apprehension of the
universal plan of things is quite foreign to the Eng-
lishman, as is also our propensity to meditate on the
problems of life, which gives rise to so much pon-
dering thought even among our people in the lower
walks of life, and often develops in men of very
ordinary ability a tendency to critical examina-
tion, together with an astonishing ability for logical
reasoning, although within limitations, of course.

These national traits incline the Englishman to
accept authoritative statements and whatever has the
support of public opinion without question, espe-
cially if they are well phrased,^ Now it never is

^ This is especially noticeable in the way in which the
great mass of the English people, and a goodly number of
Americans also, blindly accept the statements of the Bible
in their literal sense, and in which they far exceed in
credulity the most orthodox Germans. This is not seldom
true even of men who in other matters have a very clear
and unprejudiced judgment. In their opinion, however,
religion and creed are matters apart, and are not subject to
the ordinary methods of reasoning. Accordingly it is an
easy matter to reverse this argument and find a convenient

yo As a " Nightwatchman State "

difficult to find some wise sounding sentence or
maxim from which a reason or excuse may be de-
ducted for almost any course of reasoning or of ac-
tion, and make it appear to be almost an ethical ne-
cessity. And so it comes about that the Englishman
has two sets of principles to draw upon, one of
which is certain to serve him as a justification for
any course of action which he proposes to pursue.
That the two do not harmonize does not seem to
disturb the average Englishman in the least.^ It
would be a mistake however to call this peculiarity
of character plain hypocrisy; the average English-
man simply accepts what is told him, and, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, carefully avoids a closer
scrutiny of it for fear that his eyes may be opened
to something that may disturb him, and perhaps
shake his faith in his comfortable double system of
justification. This way of dealing with the prob-

excuse for temporarily ignoring the dictates of religion and
ethics when these conflict with special interests, either per-
sonal or national.

^ This remarkable process of reasoning was laughably
illustrated during the present war when, on December i6,
1914, Scarborough and Westhartlepool were fired upon by
German war vessels. This occurrence roused the English
to an indignant protest in which they declared it to be
a flagrant violation of international law, since these places
were open ports and therefore unfortified. (We have yet
to learn of an instance when England refrained from an
attack upon such ports if it was to her advantage.) At the
same time, however, they announced that the forts of
Westhartlepool had returned the fire. But I question
whether the average Englishman so much as noticed this
glaring discrepancy.

English Cant yi

lems of life has one great advantage, — it banishes
all qualms of conscience, a very troublesome weak-
ness for those who would win success on the prac-
tical side of life, and one from which the English
seem to be peculiarly free.

What has been said of English credulity does not,
of course, apply to the most intelligent people, and
especially not to the " smart " business men and the
political wirepullers; these are very well aware of
how little there is back of all their loudly proclaimed
adherence to principle. The English have a particu-
lar word for this assumed attitude of virtue, this
unctuously expressed devotion to high standards of ,
morality; they call it " cant," and they are quick to
look through it, too. But foreigners, and especially
the Germans, are deceived by it again and again, ,
because they cannot understand how a man of
honor can resort to means so unscrupulous. This
was once more the experience of our diplomats in \
their negotiations with Great Britain just before the |
beginning of the present war. But to a certain /
class of English diplomatists it matters little what/
they do, if only an appearance of virtue and decorum
is preserved, and when one of their especially per-
fidious tricks has proved successful, the English pub-
lic not only accepts it, but gives them hearty ap-
plause.^

^ At the time when Edward VII, then Prince of Wales,
was implicated with others in dishonesty at cards while
playing bakkarat, his most eminent associate in this deplor-
able incident was awaited on his return to his home by an
enthusiastic crowd of admirers, who detached the horses

72 As a " Nightwatchman State "

The present war must have opened the eyes of
even the dullest observers to what may be expected
of the English gentleman and of his love of fair play
and regard for moral principles and justice, unless,
indeed, they are keeping them shut intentionally be-
cause, like many of the neutrals, they do not want
to see things as they are.

from his carriage, and themselves dragged it to its destina-
tion. They evidently believed that he had acquitted him-
self as an English gentleman should, in know^ing how to
come off victor in the game, honestly or dishonestly ; after
all, vi^hy were people so stupid as to allow themselves to be
cheated !

CHAPTER V
Ireland

One member of the United British Kingdom has
ever been the object of ruthless exploitation for the
benefit of specifically English interests, and, while
nominally recognized as a member on equal terms
with the others, has in reality received the treatment
of a mercilessly subjugated province, and been de-
prived of every vestige of its much-desired inde-
pendence ; — it is needless to mention the name of
Ireland. In the treatment accorded the " emerald
isle " the true nature of English humanitarism is
glaringly revealed, together with the hollo wness of
all the loudly proclaimed liberal intentions with
which the English deceive themselves, and have too
long duped all credulous foreigners.

Although Ireland first came under English domi-
nation during the reign of Henry II, it was not until
the close of the sanguinary warfare waged against
it with utmost cruelty by Henry VIII, and especially
by Elizabeth, that the island lay prostrate at the
feet of its conqueror. The English Revolution was
the signal for an equally bloody uprising of the Irish,
which was suppressed with terrible thoroughness
by Cromwell. This conquest of the island that pro-

73

74 Ireland

tects the west coast of England was by no means
confined to its political subjection and the union of
the two islands in one kingdom, for its first and fore-
most purpose was to gain possession of the land it-
self and to distribute this among the foreign invad-
ers,— a sort of colonization by violence. For this
reason the war against Ireland was in its widest ef-
fect one of extermination, just as were the wars
against the Indians of North America, waged first by
England, and later by the United States. A large
part of the population was put to the sword, while
thousands of children were sent to America, there
to be sold as slaves.

In the provinces of Ulster, Munster and Leinster
all lands were confiscated, and then parceled out
among the soldiers and the immigrants that followed
them ; the native population was transferred to the
northwestern and least fertile part of the island,
and crowded together in the province of Connaught
where land was assigned to the ** innocent Papists,"
— those of the Irish who could prove that they had
taken no part in the rebellion. In the other three
provinces only the laboring classes were allowed to
remain, since these could not be spared.

This war of races was also a religious war; the
conquerors were Protestants, and the vanquished
were Catholics, whose zeal for their church was
strengthened by the relentlessness of their persecu-
tion. It is a well established fact that during the
two hundred years in which Catholicism was sup-
pressed in Ireland and its adherents persecuted with
utmost cruelty, the Protestant religion made prac-

Subjugation of Ireland 75

tically no converts among the natives of the island.
Conversion was not the object of the invaders, but
quite the contrary, since every conversion would
have been a distinct disadvantage to themselves, for
they would have had to make concessions to these
newly made fellow Protestants.

Cromwell's terrible method of settlement was but
little modified at the time of the Restoration by the
Bill of Settlement in 1660; but even the slight ameli-
orations it provided were not carried out in full, for
the Protestant settlers looked upon every concession
made to the Catholics and Irish as an infringement
of their own rights, and as detrimental to English
interests, and therefore protested against them, both
vigorously and successfully. And so only a small
number of those who had been dispossessed of their
land received it back again ; about four-fifths of the
island remained in the hands of Protestants,
while large domains were conferred upon English
magnates and favorites of the Crown.

Later, James II made Ireland the mainstay of his
endeavor to Catholicize his realm, and after the revo-
lution of 1688, used the island as a base of opera-
tions in his attempt to regain his crown with the aid
of France. The national uprising of the Irish under
the flag of the legitimate King, and with the hope of
winning their independence, led to the notorious Bill
of Attainder, enacted by the Irish Parliament in
1689. By it the Irish paid back the English invad-
ers in their own coin, by confiscating their lately ac-
quired land as having never been rightfully theirs,
and moreover, as having been forfeited by their par-

76 Ireland

ticipation in the rebellion, and then restored these
lands to the original owners, but with a provision
to indemnify the recent English owners for their
loss.^ These measures were never carried out, how-
ever; with the victory that William III won in the
battle of the Boyne (July i, 1690), and the subse-
quent conquest of the entire island, the fate of Ire-
land was sealed. The Act of Settlement was re-
stored, the English settlers received back the lands
of which they had been dispossessed, and the provi-
sions for toleration guaranteed to the Catholic
Church and its adherents by the terms of surrender
when Limerick capitulated were evaded as much as
possible. The Irish received the treatment of an
enslaved race having no rights whatever; but since
their physical fitness made them very desirable as
soldiers, they were urgently induced to recruit in
England's army, — of Englishmen there always have
been comparatively few in the British army aside
from the corps of officers, and of this, too, Irish-
men have always formed a considerable part.

The English High Church became the established
church of Ireland ; for its support the Roman Catho-
lics were forced to pay the customary tithe, \vhich
was collected by brutal middlemen with a resort to
any form of violence, and they were also compelled

^ Macaulay, in his interesting rehearsal of these events,
gives a very one-sided picture of the conditions that pre-
vailed in Ireland at this time. A much less partisan and
very detailed account of them may be found in the second
volume of Lecky's " History of England in the Eighteenth
Century." The German historian Ranke also gives a brief
and striking portrayal of them in his history of England.

The Oppression of Ireland yy

to build the churches; numerous profitable benefices
were established for dioceses in which, aside from
the fatly endowed clergy, there was hardly a com-
municant. Catholics were debarred from teaching;
if any dared undertake it, they did so at the risk of
incurring the heavy penalties provided for such a
breach of the law. In the disposition and inherit-
ance of property the Catholics were subject to man-
ifold restrictions, while the statutes abounded in va-
rious cunningly devised clauses that made it possible
to deprive them of the little that was left them.
How every effort was made to ruin Irish agriculture,
industry and trade we will see later. The govern-
ment of the country was left to the Irish Parliament
under strictest supervision by the Parliament at Lon-
don ; the Dublin Parliament was elected exclusively
by the Protestant settlers, and far exceeded both in
corruption and impotence the English Parliament,
until, in 1801, when the two Parliaments were
merged into one, the political union of the two is-
lands was consummated, and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland established.

Under this terrible oppression large numbers of
the Irish died every year from hunger and from
sheer misery, while their masters looked on utterly
devoid of pity; it was intended that they should
perish in ignorance and privation. How absolutely
appalling the conditions really were is revealed by
Dean Swift in the biting satire of his pamphlets,
and which culminates in the tragic advice, grounded
in deepest pity but carried out in his inimically de-
tailed and absurdly realistic style, to butcher the

yS Ireland

children and to breed them systematically for this
purpose, since thus they would be of use to hu-
manity, and at the same time an end would be made
of all their misery, as well as of the crowds of beg-
gars who were allowed to grow up only to fulfill a
useless and hopeless existence. What Swift says
is the more effective since, although Dean of St.
Patrick's in Dublin, he was by no means in sympathy
with the Irish people, and his religious views were
biased by his sincere adherence to the narrow stand-
ards of the English High Church.

The marks which this horrible state of affairs left
upon the national character of this gifted, good-na-
tured, and highly imaginative race are familiar to
every one. If the Irish were originally inclined to
take life easy and to give little thought to the mor-
row, these traits could but be deepened by the long
years of oppression during which they were denied
every prospect of providing an independent or defi-
nite future for themselves. The rags, the dirt and
the beggary that may be seen in Ireland and in such
English cities as Liverpool, where there is a large
Irish laboring population, can only be equaled in
southern Italy and Spain. Doubtless there are
Irish traits of character that afford a partial expla-
nation of this deplorable condition, but by far the
greater blame lies at the door of England, the pow-
erful state that should have educated this subject
people to a realization of better things, but instead,
actually fostered these conditions because they con-
stitute no insignificant factor in the impotence of the
race. All the more should we be inclined to appre-

The Irish Exodus 79

ciate the humor, the light heartedness and mental
elasticity that have not deserted the Irish despite
the sense of oppression from which they cannot es-
cape. They still are inclined to make the best of
things, and although much given to noisy discus-
sion and long rhetorical outbursts, not seldom of a
distinctly poetical character, as well as to quarrel-
some and often offensive haranguing, they are
neither vindictive nor fanatical. Religious perse-
cution also is quite foreign to their nature in spite
of all their Church has suffered at the hands of the
English, who resemble the Irish in this respect as
little as they do in most others.

During this period of Ireland's deep distress be-
gan the exodus of her sons, which has continued un-
broken for many years ; some emigrated to the col-
onies, others to England, and still others chose to
become mercenaries in the armies of a foreign
prince. Many, as has already been said, accepted
the terms of the English recruiting officers and
fought England's battles on many a field, not sel-
dom against their own kinsmen serving as merce-
naries under the banners of France, just as did the
Greeks in ancient times, and in more modern days,
the Swiss. The English policemen, too, those big,
sturdy, and very sensible and helpful officers of the
law with whom every visitor in England is familiar,
are usually sons of Erin.

Intellectually gifted Irishmen most frequently
turned to journalism, and they now form a large
proportion, perhaps the majority of the great edi-
torial staff of the English newspapers. And so it

8o Ireland

comes about that often an Irish editor, in obedience
to orders from his chief, writes fuhninating articles
in support of a poHcy that is diametrically opposed
to his own convictions, and which personally he de-
tests and antagonizes. The curse of modern jour-
nalism is this insincerity of its latest form of develop-
ment,— the anonymous editorial, that only too often
expresses in strongest terms convictions that are not
those of the writer at all, — mere exercises in style,
written in support of interests, personal or political,
that the paper represents. It is needless to say that
fortunately there are many happy exceptions to this
general rule.

Under the foreign yoke the native speech of Ire-
land has all but disappeared from the island; only
in the northwestern part, in the county of Con-
naught, may it still be heard as the language of the

^ people.^ But this has by no means made English-
men of the Irish; on the contrary, the difference
between them is as great as ever. A bitter hatred
of the English oppressor and a longing to regain his
lost right to have a voice in shaping the destiny of
his race fills the heart of every true Irishman.

! These emotions are stimulated by the love that the
Irish have for their emerald isle, their romantically
deep devotion to their homeland; for the Irishman,
unlike the Englishman, has a fatherland.

1 The reverse of this is true of the Celtic language in
Wales and among the Gaelic populations of the Scottish
Highlands. The people of these regions could not be
crushed as were the Irish, and moreover, being Protestants
(though in Wales not of the established church), their
church services were conducted in their native tongue.

Suppression of Irish Industries 8 1

Whenever opportunity offered, the hatred of
England found expression in rebellion, especially
when made more hopeful by promised aid from
France ; at other times it found vent in insurrections
that during the last few centuries became a habit
with the Irish. As questionable as are the means
that are resorted to at such times, we must never
forget that the men who in their dire need have had
recourse to them in Ireland were and are idealists
and patriots inspired by high motives, and often men
of charming personality. The English fiction that
the Irish are subjects of the United Kingdom, and
that their civic duty as such is loyalty to the Brit-
ish government is not accepted by the subjugated
race, and never can be.

In this connection the incredible short-sightedness
of England's self seeking policy toward Ireland is
fully revealed. It has achieved what one would be
inclined to believe impossible in that the foreign in-
vaders, the Protestant settlers themselves have been
forced into the ranks of the insurgents by the ruth-
lessness of English oppression. Ireland has been
well endowed by nature ; in spite of the excess of
moisture, the great stretches of moorland, the rocky
areas and the scarcity of mineral and other natural
wealth (there are no coal deposits and few min-
erals), the country could be a prosperous one because
of its advantages for agriculture and stockraising,
and its industrial and commercial possibilities. But
that is just what the people of the English mother-
land wished to prevent, for they feared Irish indus-
trial competition, and saw in it a serious menace

82 Ireland

to their own profits. Ireland was not to be allowed
to achieve prosperity or industrial independence; it
was intended that it should remain a subjugated
province to be drained of everything for the benefit
of England.

A like policy was adopted by England in her rela-
tions to her colonies across the sea, but without suc-
cess, because of the distance which separated them
from the motherland and because of the greater in-
dependence of their attitude; it therefore resulted in
the loss to England of the greater part of North
America. Scotland, too, was to receive similar
treatment, and under William III various measures
were adopted with this end in view. But Scotland
was an unsubjected kingdom, strong in its sense of
independence, and was not to be trodden under foot.
In the union consummated in 1707 it secured for
itself valuable concessions, and, above all, was placed
on an equal footing with England in industrial mat-
ters. The result was that before long England was
over-run with keen and closely calculating Scotch
business men, who for years were a cause for bitter
but useless complaint on the part o.f their English
competitors.

Ireland on the contrary lay helpless at the feet of
England, and so here the full intent of the English
policy could be freely worked out. Whenever it ap-
peared probable that Ireland was about to realize a
degree of prosperity through success in some one
particular field of industry, England at once stepped
in and crushed the prospect. The Navigation Acts
of 1663, which were but those of 165 1 in a some-

Ireland Enslaved and Desolate 83

what altered form, were made more stringent in
1693, and deprived Irish commerce of its former
terms of equaHty with that of England, decreeing
that the export and import trade with the colonies
should henceforth be carried on only through Eng-
lish ports and in English vessels. In 1665 and 1680
all exportation of cattle, meats, butter and cheese
from Ireland to England was forbidden. When the
Irish landowners then turned to sheep raising, to
which the rich meadow lands of the island were well
adapted, and the woolen manufacturers of Ireland
soon afterward appeared to be in a fair way toward
active competition with the manufacturers of Eng-
land, all exportation of woolen goods from Ireland
was prohibited, not only to England and her col-
onies, but to any part of the world. The raw prod-
uct however was admitted into England since in
this way the English woolen factories could be sup-
plied with the cheapest wool. Ireland's next move
— • to foster the flax growing industry and the manu-
facture of linen — was checkmated with an import
tax, so high that it was prohibitive, on all hemp and
linen goods entering British ports.

The English kings, who were also the sovereigns
of the nominally independent kingdom of Ireland,
were obliged in spite of any attempted remonstrance
to conform their action to the English demands.
And although the impotent Irish Parliament roused
itself to occasional demonstrations of resistance, it
could, of course, accomplish nothing. Ireland has
more and better harbors than has any other country
of its size in the world, and its position should make

84 Ireland

it the natural outlet of a large export trade to west-
ern Europe and America ; but the harbors lie unused
and neglected, for an Irish mercantile marine does
not exist, and would not be tolerated by England.
In addition, and for the purpose of still greater
discouragement of native industries, Ireland was
flooded with manufactured wares from England of
a kind such as the Irish people themselves were pro-
ducing. Yet England annually drew, and continues
to do so, large sums of money out of this handi-
capped island for the benefit of the Crown and nu-
merous magnates and prelates, and which eventually
redounded to the benefit of England, since these
officials are notoriously distinguished for their ab-
sence from the country in which they hold office, and
rarely set foot upon their possessions there, but
spend their incomes in England.

By these combined means Ireland was systemat-
ically consigned to pauperism and desolation; and
with it all, its unhappy people have to endure the
open scorn and derision of their subjugators, who
themselves have brought about the degradation they
despise.

Now all these destructive measures not only af-
fected the people at whom they were aimed, but,
equally with the Irish, the English settlers in the
land also suffered the consequences. They, too, felt
their every industrial effort to be intentionally handi-
capped, and their indignation against the mother
country was the greater because they belonged to the
superior race, and by means of their possessions and
their greater alertness could have pursued lucra-

Dean Sivift's Picture of Ireland 85

tive occupations to their advantage and the better-
ment of their fortunes, if the law had allowed them
a free hand. But considerations for a community
of blood and of religion, as well as for the dictates
of a wholesome policy of provident care for the na-
tion's future, were of as little importance to Eng-
land as were the dictates of humanity and decency
when these came in conflict with the desire to keep
the neighboring island in slavish subjection, whereby
every possibility of an inconvenient competition and
consequent division of profits was avoided.

And so it came about that the English settlers
themselves were drawn into opposition to the
motherland, and, despite all differences of race and
creed, made common cause with their Irish depend-
ents against the common oppressor. Thus a com-
munity of interests was established, and a fellow-
feeling for Ireland developed that is vividly apparent
in the fiery pamphlets that came from the pen of
Dean Swift in the early years of the eighteenth cen-
tury. He says: "The conveniency of ports and
havens, which nature has bestowed so liberally on
this kingdom, is of no more use to us than a beau-
tiful prospect to a man shut up in a dungeon.

" As to shipping of its own, Ireland is so utterly
unprovided, that of all the excellent timber cut down
within these fifty or sixty years, it can hardly be
said that the nation has received the benefit of one
valuable house to dwell in, or one ship to trade with.
Ireland is the only kingdom I ever heard or read of,
either in ancient or modern story, which was de-
nied the liberty of exporting their native commodi-

86 Ireland

ties and manufactures wherever they pleased. . . .
We are forced to obey some laws we never con-
sented to. . . . We are so far from having a king
to reside among us, that even the viceroy is generally
absent four-fifths of his time in the government.
. . . One-third part of the rents of Ireland is spent
in England; which, with the profit of employments,
pensions, appeals, journeys of pleasure or health,
education at the Inns of Court and both Universi-
ties, remittances at pleasure, the pay of all superior
officers in the army, and other incidents, will amount
to a full half of the income of the whole kingdom,
all clear profit to England, ... Ye are idle! ye
are idle! answered Pharaoh to the Israelites, when
they complained to his Majesty that they were forced
to make bricks without straw.

" England enjoys every one of those advantages
for enriching a nation which I have above enumer-
ated ; and, into the bargain, a good million returned
to them every year without labour or hazard, or one
farthing value received on our side; but how long
we shall be able to continue the payment, I am not
under the least concern. One thing I know, that,
when the hen is starved to death, there will be no
more golden eggs. " ^

This picture of Ireland as Swift saw it is a true
portrayal of Irish conditions in all their essential
features up to the time of the reform legislation of
the nineteenth century. In spite of the Union con-
summated in 1 80 1, Ireland remained the subjugated
land it had been, languishing in misery, and the scene

^ Swift, A Short View of the State of Ireland, 1727.

Ireland in Nineteenth Century 87

of constant uprisings and conspiracies. Its posses-
sion was, of course, a political necessity to England,
since without it the position of Great Britain as a
world power would be jeopardized, as also would
her maritime ascendency. Ireland as an independ-
ent state or, worse still, as a dependency of some
foreign power, would bar England from immediate
access to the open ocean, and would threaten, or
at least circumscribe her maritime interests, just as
England had herself prevented the full development
of Holland and France as sea-powers, and had de-
stroyed the maritime ascendency of the Netherlands
altogether. Aside from this, Ireland was needed
by England as the chief recruiting ground for her
army; but, at the same time, the willingness of the
Irish to risk their lives for a price in serving as
mercenaries was a proof of their inferiority to the
free Englishman who would not stoop to the
despised military service. Moreover, the revenues
that Ireland yielded under compulsion were a very
welcome addition to the treasury of the realm, and,
above all, provided a care-free existence for many
of England's ruling class and for the higher nobles
who, as legislators by inheritance, composed the
Upper House of the Parliament.

When, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, the
evils of misgovernment became apparent in the
homeland also in an ever increasing degree, and the
country was evidently hastening toward a crisis,
the first decisive blow to the existing system came
from Ireland. The political ferment in the island
under the leadership of the great agitator, O'Con-

88 Ireland

nell, assumed such dimensions that it soon became
evident that another uprising of the Irish people was
at hand. Some of the more discerning of the Tory
leaders realized that England was in no condition
to cope successfully with such a peril; even the Duke
of Wellington himself admitted that it would be
the part of wisdom to make concessions, and him-
self undertook to see them through. It was Ireland
therefore that forced the Catholic emancipation in
1829, and so made the first break in the prevailing
system of control, and this was soon followed by the
parliamentary reforms and further reform legisla-
tion.

In this general movement for reform Ireland was
not wholly neglected. In 1834 the Catholics of Ire-
land were released from compulsion to build the
churches and from payment of the tithe to the Eng-
lish High Church, the tithe being henceforth levied
as a charge upon the land, a sort of income tax
based on landed property values. Next came the
improvement of the school system, and in 1868 the
Anglican Church of Ireland was disestablished, but
received a large indemnity. Ireland was benefited
by some of the parliamentary reforms also.

But all of these, as well as other measures of re-
form, were too tardily undertaken, and did not strike
deep enough to be a real help to Ireland, or to lessen
the bitter feeling of hatred that its people bear their
oppressors. The Irish people realize that these con-
cessions were all grudgingly made, and only because
of the compulsion exercised by irresistible pressure,

Decrease in Ireland's Population 89

and that England's attitude toward them remains
unchanged.

England still draws immense sums out of Ireland
every year; Ireland is still compelled to send most
of her exports by way of English ports and re-laden
into English vessels ; the Irish harbors still are un-
developed as they were in the days of Swift, and
the great international navigation companies, such
as the Hamburg-American Line, are not allowed a
port of entry in Ireland. The total value of Irish
exports for the year 19 10 amounted to nearly 63 5^
million pounds sterling; of this total, a proportion to
the value of S-Y^ millions was sent to England; the
other 1 1 millions worth of goods were shipped to
foreign ports, and of these only 700,000 pounds'
worth were exported direct from Irish ports, and
the remaining amount, valued at 10 millions, had to
be sent via England.

The chief source of Ireland's distress remained, —
the wretched agrarian laws were in no way modi-
fied. By far the larger part of the land was still,
as it had been, in the hands of the English aristoc-
racy and only a small number of these landholders
ever set foot on Irish soil, while by far the greater
part of the Irish people themselves, seven-eighths of
the population, was at the mercy of the English
landlords, and almost without redress. From the
small piece of land which was allotted to an Irish
peasant, and which he preferably planted with po-
tatoes, he could not provide the most meager support
for his family after meeting the heavy tax demands.

90 Ireland

And so Ireland grew more desolate with every year,
while the exodus to America and to the manufactur-
ing cities of England took on ever greater dimen-
sions. In addition, the terrible famine of 1845,
which came as the result of the potato blight, car-
ried away a very large part of the population.
While in 1840 the census showed a population of
8,177,000 inhabitants, in 1850 this number had
been reduced by death and emigration to 6,696,000.
This diminution has continued uninterruptedly, and
Ireland is the only country of Europe where the
population has grown steadily less during the course
of the nineteenth century, and where, in city and
country alike, the visitor may see on every hand de-
.serted and ruinous houses that are uncared for be-
cause the entire families that once lived in them have
either died out or have left home and country. In
1870 the number of inhabitants was 5,408,000, in
1900 it was 4,458,000, and in 191 1 only 4,390,000.
These figures in themselves are a terrible ar-
raignment of English rule in Ireland, and at the
same time are a convincing proof that the Irish
movement could never be abandoned. O'Connell's
attempt in 1843 to force the repeal of the Act of
Union failed, but it was followed by the Fenian
conspiracies, in connection with which so many deeds
of murder were committed, and which the English
government found so difficult to suppress. Then
came the organization of the Irish Party as a po-
litical unit in Parliament, its purpose being to ob-
tain for Ireland an Irish administration, and there-
fore the establishment of an independent national

Revolutionary Tendencies 9 1

parliament at Dublin. It is actually to the advan-
tage of this party — so strange are the results of
circumstances sometimes — that the population of
the island has diminished, since, as a consequence,
the electoral districts in Ireland are much smaller
than those of England, and therefore Ireland has a
much larger representation in the Parliament of the
Kingdom than it is entitled to by the size of its
population.

These Irish aspirations are shared, for reasons al-
ready mentioned, by a large part of Ireland's Prot-
estant population of English descent. The com-
munity of interests that is developed by living to-
gether in the same land and under like conditions
is after all the deciding influence, and outweighs all
other considerations. It is a significant fact that
the foremost political leader that Ireland produced
in the nineteenth century, Parnell, " the uncrowned
king of Ireland," was a Protestant of English ex-
traction. It is only a part of the people of north-
eastern Ireland, the descendants of the English set-
tlers of Ulster, with Londonderry and Belfast as
the central points of their influence, who have taken
a stand in marked contrast to this general attitude.

Those who have these political aspirations of Ire-
land at heart find great encouragement in the sup-
port, chiefly financial, that they receive from the
Irish in America, who hate England bitterly as the
power that drove them from their homes and their
native land. In America the Irish have shown of
what they are capable when given a chance. It must
be admitted that many of them, especially those who

92

Ireland

came from most primitive circumstances and were
without education of any kind, became the ready
tools of agitators and unscrupulous politicians who
had it in their power, through the existing state of
political corruption, to provide these new Ameri-
cans with easy means of earning a livelihood. But,
generally speaking, the Irish have done well in
America, and count among their numbers there some
of the ablest and most respected citizens of the west-
ern republic.

By the English, it is needless to say, these Irish
aspirations were regarded as entirely unjustified, and
as the extravagant pretensions of an inferior and
wholly incorrigible race whose inferiority was never
more apparently evinced than in the ingratitude
shown for all the benefits conferred by England, as
well as in the total lack of a due appreciation of
the great advantages to be derived from association
with so powerful a state as England, and in an in-
satiable desire for ever more privileges. In 1848,
Queen Victoria, who naturally looked at these mat-
ters through colored glasses, wrote to her uncle,
King Leopold of Belgium : " There are ample means
of crushing the rebellion in Ireland, and I think it is
very likely to go off without any contest, which peo-
ple (and I think rightly) rather regret. The Irish
should receive a good lesson or they will begin
again."

It is true that murder and other deeds of violence
of every description were the means to which the
Irish resorted in their extremity, and these were
not to be condoned from a moral point of view, and

The Boycott. Agrarian Reforms 93

could not be tolerated by any government. Never-
theless they achieved results in one field at least
where other means had proved fruitless. The agi-
tation for agrarian reforms, which was strenuously
renewed early in the seventies of the last century,
found its most potent weapon in the newly invented
" boycott," that derived its name from that of the
landlord on whom it was first practiced in 1880, —
viz., no laborers would work for the boycotted land-
lord, and his tenants refused to pay their rents or
any other charges ; and, since there was no money
to be extracted from them, any legal action against
them would have proved futile. To enforce this
new method and make it general, all tenants who
would not conform to this national demand, but pre-
ferred to pay their rents, were terrified into com-
pliance, some even were murdered, others had their
cottages burned down, or their cattle mutilated. By
these brutal means the English were at last compelled
to yield.

In 1 88 1 Mr. Gladstone's Land Reform Bill was
passed. According to it the tenants and peasants
were to pay a fair rent based on legally established
property values, while at the same time fixity of
tenure was secured to them, since the landlord could
no longer evict them at his pleasure. Further modi-
fying measures were enacted, until finally, in 1903,
the tenants received the legal right to acquire prop-
erty rights from the landlord by the payment of an
annual interest at a moderate rate, by which in time
the title to the land passed to them ; for this purpose
the government advanced the purchase price to the

94

Ireland

tenants. The English landowners resisted this en-
croachment upon their unrestricted privileges as
long as they possibly could, but yielded in the end,
as they could get no money out of their tenants in
any other way. Indeed, they had reason to be
thankful to get even so much for property that
had become almost worthless.

In order to hold the Irish Party to the Liberals,
Mr. Gladstone adopted " home rule for Ireland "
as a part of his program in 1886. This meant, of
course, an independent parliament for Ireland, and
since that time this has always been the chief issue
in England's home policy, and between the political
parties. It led, first of all, to the formation of the
Unionist Party, and since then has more than once
contributed to the overwhelming defeat of the Lib-
erals. But the question was not thus disposed of by
any means, for the Irish Party was much too power-
ful and influential a political element to have its de-
mands left without consideration for any length of
time. Joseph Chamberlain, by far the most able of
the Unionist statesmen, attempted to crowd the Irish
question into the background by proposing a gigan-
tic plan of forming a closer political union between
all the integral parts of the British Empire, and
sought to accomplish this end by all the means avail-
able to a demagogue. But the English colonies were
not at all inclined to relinquish either their inde-
pendence or their high protective tariffs, and the
great agitation for tariff protection in England,
especially on food stuffs, which Mr. Chamberlain
conducted on a tremendous scale, failed to accom-

Home Rule 95

plish its purpose. The election in 1906 showed an
overwhelming majority in favor of free trade, and
at the same time for a Liberal ministry.

This decided the Irish question also, and there
was nothing left for the majority of the British
people to do but to accept the inevitable. The op-
position of the Conservatives, who found their main
stay in the Upper House, was broken when, in 191 1,
the Lords' right of veto was restricted by Act of
Parliament. The Orangemen of Ulster raised a
vigorous protest, however, and prepared for armed
resistance, aided and abetted by the Conservatives
and the corps of British army officers who, as has
already been related, refused to act against them.
By these events the country was brought to the
verge of civil war. On July 26, 19 14, two thou-
sand rifles were secretly landed in Ireland, some-
where in the vicinity of Dublin, and distributed
among the Irish volunteers. When the government
authorities made an attempt to deprive them of these
rifles — the Irish nationalists were not to be al-
lowed to have arms, although the Orangemen of
Ulster were being plentifully supplied with them —
a bloody encounter ensued. Most of the volunteers
succeeded in escaping and taking their arms with
them, but in one of the Dublin riots which followed,
a Scotch regiment in garrison there fired two vol-
leys into the mob, killing and wounding several per-
sons, mostly women and children. The inquiry into
this affair, promised by Mr. Asquith, and by which
"the army would doubtless be fully justified and
come off with honor," as he declared in the Parlia-

q6 Ireland

ment, was never undertaken, since immediately after-
ward the war with Germany was begun. For the
same reason all action on the Irish question was
deferred. There were several considerations, how-
ever, that made it very desirable to secure the favor
of Ireland, and specially the good will of the hoped
for Irish recruits. It was therefore deemed expe-
dient to go through with the form of passing the
Home Rule Bill and ceremoniously placing it on the
statute book, but with the proviso that the Act would
be suspended from operation until after the close of
the war, and was not then to be in effect until Par-
liament had had the fullest opportunity to revise
it by amendment.

By this procedure, which seems well fitted for a
place in a comedy, it was supposed that Irish senti-
ment would be changed, and the passions that had
been kindled be appeased. The leaders of the Irish
Party, Mr. Redmond foremost among them, have
indeed declared themselves content with it, and are
now vigorously upholding the Government, espe-
cially in the endeavor to secure recruits. In the
public meetings that have been held for this purpose,
Mr. Redmond has pictured the atrocious conduct
of the Germans in Belgium, and how this was espe-
cially directed against the Catholic Church (Eng-
land being renowned for her love of it!), and how
the priests were murdered and the nuns violated.
The Archbishop of Mechlin, who was brought from
Belgium for the occasion, sat by and wept as he
listened.^ And so England finds herself in a posi-
^ In the severely Protestant province of Ulster no such

Attitude in the Present War 97

tion to announce to the world that all the people of
the United Kingdom are standing as a unit against
the common foe, in brotherly harmony, and for-
getful of all former differences, their only rivalry
being in their devotion to their common country.
" Ireland," declared Sir Edward Grey in his speech
in which he outlined the Government's policy to the
Parliament on August 3, 19 14, " is the only bright
spot in this entire terrible situation."

In reality, however, things look very different.
The Irish would still be offering open resistance to
England if they were not forcibly suppressed. The
country is destitute of arms and is surrounded by
mines; its few ports are closed to all foreign ves-
sels, even to those of neutral countries; the freedom
of the press is restricted, and the least criticism un-
favorable to England, or suspicious behavior of any
kind is considered cause for legal prosecution. The
press justifies this attitude in a characteristically
English fashion by declaring that although freedom
of speech is a fundamental and inalienable right of
every citizen of Great Britain, it is nevertheless not
to be tolerated that the Irish nationalists should be
allowed to frustrate the will of the majority of the
English people by interfering with the recruiting of
soldiers in Ireland.

appeal as this was made, it is needless to say. There the
men were urged to fight for England because that country
had been " the only one that had dared to defy the Pope
and Rome ! " But this is only another evidence of English
efficiency to advocate with an equally honest mien two
doctrines that are diametrically opposed to each other, — a
talent in which no other nation can compete with them.

^8 Ireland

Since there is not the slightest prospect of success
for their cause at this time, the Irish are content-
ing themselves with a passive resistance, which they
manifest by refusing to recruit in spite of all offered
inducements, although doubtless many a man is
driven to it by absolute want. The true Irishman
feels it to be treason to his own land to take up
arms for England's cause, and Mr. Redmond and
his colleagues have lost all their former influence,
and are repudiated by the great mass of the Irish
people, as has been shown in the by-elections which
give great majorities against them. The patriotic
Irish hope for German success in the present war,
since they believe that their cause will benefit by it,
and that perhaps it may even help them to gain their
long desired freedom for Ireland. In what measure
these sentiments may influence the Irish soldiers who
are at the front, it would be difficult at present to
say.

Ireland is evidently still " England's Heel of
Achilles." ^ That England is not blind to the situ-

^ Under this title appeared Schiemann's translation of
the most interesting parts of Sir Roger Casement's
pamphlet entitled " The Crime against Ireland and how the
War may right it," which he wrote before the beginning of
the war, and the whole tenor of which shows a remarkably
clear insight in predicting the future.

The author was at one time British consul in the Congo
Country, and while there was a witness of the evil results
of its misgovernment and of the frightful atrocities prac-
ticed on the natives. Later he saw a repetition of these
brutal scenes in the dreadful abuse of the Putumayo In-
dians in the region around the sources of the Amazon. It
was due to him that public attention was directed to these

England's Present Attitude 99

ation may be inferred from the fact that no sooner
had the Pope, by request of the German govern-
ment, sent two high Irish ecclesiastics to minister to
the spiritual needs of the Irish prisoners in Ger-
many, than England also entered into negotiations
with the Vatican for a similar purpose, although
never before having manifested any such concern.
A delegate to the Pope was appointed, and a fa-
natically devout Roman Catholic at that, in the
person of the Earl of Norfolk, a descendant of the
ancient family of Howards who count among their
number so many martyrs to Catholicism. For Eng-
land this was a most remarkable proceeding, and one
at variance with the entire trend of English tradi-
tion. Since the downfall of James II England has
never entered into any official relations with Rome
until now, and at any other time this step would
have roused a storm of indignant protest and the
cry of "No Popery!" in every part of the land.
But in the present great emergency and in the face
of the danger that threatens from across the Irish
Sea, the English grasp at any means that will serve

frightful atrocities and steps taken against them. He is
an enthusiastic Irishman who is striving for the liberation
of Ireland from the English yoke, and during his present
visit to Germany has been working energetically for that
end. He has clearly revealed the true relation which Ire-
land's cruel subjection by England bears to that country's
greatness as a sea-power, and at the same time expresses
hopes of Ireland's ultimate political separation from Eng-
land, if not as a consequence of this war, still at no far
distant day, whereby true freedom of the sea will be se-
cured, and its domination by England be ended.

lOO Ireland

their purpose. This whole proceeding shows plainly
enough how far different the real attitude in Ire-
land is from that which it is reported to be for the
sake of allaying the anxiety of the public.

CHAPTER VI
The Scottish Highlands

Perhaps the fate of the Scottish Highlands is
even more significant than that of Ireland as indic-
ative of English purpose in the domination of a
conquered country. Of complaints there are none
in these highland regions; their fate has been ac-
complished ; and so the treatment to which they have
succumbed has been little criticized ; indeed, their
peaceful condition has even been cited in praise of
England.

As is vi^ell known, the Highland Scotch, the stock
whose ancestors came from Ireland, were originally
the dominating race in the northern kingdom of
Great Britain. When later their name and au-
thority together passed to the people of the Low-
lands, who were of Anglo-Saxon descent, the dis-
tinguishing name Gael or Gaelic, was commonly ap-
plied to the Highland people of Celtic origin. With
them, as with their Celtic brethren in Ireland, the
ancient clan system was maintained unaltered. The
members of a clan regarded themselves as bound to-
gether by the ties of kinship and the duty of revenge
for an injury done to one of their kind; at the head
of each clan was the chieftain, the hereditary head
of the family, to whom all owed implicit obedience

lOI

102 Scottish Highlands

together with their allegiance. The authority of the
King and government at Edinburgh was therefore
always comparatively slight. Moreover, a bitter
enmity existed between many of these clans, and
they stood opposed to each other in deadly feuds
that were passed from one generation to the next,
and extended through hundreds of years. For these
reasons they were especially prone to be drawn into
the fierce religious and civil conflicts that marked
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whereas
some of these clans held steadfastly to the Parlia-
ment and to the austere Presbyterian Church, chief
among these being the Campbells of Argyle, others
were firm adherents of the Stuart dynasty, and, to
a small extent even attached themselves to the Cath-
olic cause.

Their impetuous manner of attack in battle con-
tinued quite unaltered by any of the more modern
methods of warfare; bare-legged, and throwing off
their outer garments, they made a wild charge on the
foe, wielding their broadswords with deadly effect,
and so, often drove all before them in a complete
rout. Thus they fought under Montrose in 1645,
under Dundee in the Pass of Killiecrankie in 1689,
and in the revolt for the Pretender, James III, in
1 71 5. But because of the total absence of any united
action, as well as on account of their primitive po-
litical organization, they were never enabled to reap
the full benefit of their victories. When the ad-
herents of James II were defeated by William of
Orange in 1690, the government authorities got their
first opportunity to gain a firm foothold in the High-

Subjection of the Highlands IO3

lands by building forts and laying roads. Finally
the ancient enmity of the clans found vent in a
terrible catastrophe when the Campbells, aided by
the government at Edinburgh, treacherously fell
upon the MacDonalds of Glencoe on February 2,
1692, and all but exterminated them in a bloody mas-
sacre. But still the organization of the clans and
the authority of their chiefs continued much as be-
fore. In 1745 the Highlands rose for the last time
in support of a Stuart, Charles Edward, who with
his army of Highlanders penetrated as far into Eng-
land as Derby, setting the whole country into a
panic. But after their terrible defeat in the dis-
astrous battle of Culloden on April 27, 1746, and
the deadly work of the executioner that followed,
the Highlanders were subjected to extreme measures
of repression. They were disarmed and forbidden
to wear the national garb, the tartan, under heavy
penalty; or to assemble for public worship under
any confession of faith other than that of the Estab-
lished Presbyterian Church;^ and, most effective
of all, the hereditary jurisdictions of the chiefs were
bought up and transferred to the Crown, followed
by a general Act of Indemnity. And so the organi-
zation of the clans came to an end.

At the same time the English ideas of property
and property rights were made applicable to the
entirely different conditions that had prevailed in
the clans. The hereditary head of a noble family

^ These restrictions affected the Anglican Church in
Scotland more than any other, since its communicants were
decidedly Jacobite in their tendencies.

104 Scottish Highlands

who had been the chief of a clan now became the
owner of all the land that had belonged to his clan,
while his kinsmen, who hitherto, as vassals and
trusted servants, had enjoyed his protection, were
now degraded to the condition of mere tenants with
no assured rights of their own, their existence
henceforth being entirely dependent upon his pleas-
ure.

These measures were devastating in their effect,
especially so since together with them English cap-
ital made its entrance into the Highlands. With
the primitive methods that prevailed in the agri-
cultural industries, the land could yield but little
profit, and yet the new owners cared for it only in
proportion to the money they could get out of it.
Consequently they ejected scores of families from
the homes that had been theirs for generations, and
procured new tenants from whom they hoped to get
better returns on their investments. But if the com-
petition with foreign imports made it impossible for
the agricultural interests in England to maintain
themselves on a profitable basis, and ever since the
repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 these had been
steadily losing ground, to how much greater a de-
gree must this have been true of the mountainous
districts of Scotland. So it finally came about that
the proprietors preferred to use their holdings as
pasture land for sheep raising; or, more preferably
still, to turn them into vast parks and hunting
grounds, not only for their own use (to be the
owner of a great game park is deemed essential to
the dignity of people of rank in England), but as

The Deserted Highlands 1 05

a means of increasing the income of the proprietor
by letting them, as is quite customary/ to rich
EngHshmen who are either really devoted to the
national sport, or think that they ought to be be-
cause it is the fashion.

And so the Highlands became entirely deserted,
although at one time they had been populated by
a numerous and, although very primitive, yet con-
tented people. Instead of promoting the welfare of
these Gaelic natives of the soil by well chosen regu-
lations, and by educating them for a more advanced
stage of civilization, and so protecting them in their
mode of life, the British government allowed these
unfortunates to be driven from their native land,
and their descendants drifted into the great manu-
facturing cities, or emigrated to America, or, as
bandits or thieves, ended their days on the gallows.
Thus the country that under different circumstances
might have been developed similarly to Switzerland
and might now be supporting a large and prosperous
population is practically a deserted land. Quite iso-
lated, and miles apart, lie a few small hamlets of
only a few houses, to which none are ever added,
since the landowners do not allow the erection of
new buildings. So it happens that on the shores of
Lock Awe, a lake in the southern Highlands some-
what resembling the Lake of Ziirich both in shape
and size, and like it surrounded by rolling hills, there

^ Likewise the enormous expense incurred for the main-
tenance of many a one of the country estates belonging to
the English aristocracy is met by letting it to some rich
tenant for a while.

I06 Scottish Highlands

is hardly a house to be seen. All told, there are five
tiny villages in the region that borders on its waters.
Even the roads frequented by tourists are being
closed to them more and more for fear that the
game may be frightened off. Between these villages
stretch wide pasture lands where a few shepherds
find support. Near the shores of the lake a few
summer hotels may be seen and the castles that are
fitted out with every luxury by their titled owners,
who, it needs hardly be said, count a Highland piper
among their retinue, and require their menials to
wear the once despised garb of the Highlander, that
has become popular again since the novels of Sir
Walter Scott have roused new enthusiasm for the
romance of the Highlands.^

Nowhere may the true nature and the devastating
influence of English " personal freedom," and of
the English capitalist be more clearly exhibited.
Only nature lovers who cannot be happy except
where no human being is in sight will be enthusias-
tic admirers of the loneliness and beauty of the Scot-
tish Highlands. To him who regards the earth as
the dwelling place of an active and productive race,
the scene is one that fills him with a deep sadness.
To me it was more depressing than the devastation
of Asia Minor under the Turkish yoke; for I could
but reflect that the Turk knows no better, and is

^ The ancient and bitter antagonism between the Gaelic
and the Anglo-Saxon populations of Scotland is quite for-
gotten; the latter regard the Gaelic Highlanders as their
ancestors, and are proud of the victories that these won
over their own Anglo-Saxon progenitors.

The Deserted Highlands I07

therefore not capable of producing or fostering a
higher state of culture. The desolation of the
Highlands, however, is the work of a cultured na-
tion, of one that claims not only a leading position
among the peoples of the world, but also that its
influence everywhere is favorable to the highest civi-
lization and the best interests of mankind.

CHAPTER VII

Free Trade and the Doctrines of the Man-
chester School — The Agricultural Pur-
suits

With the abrogation of the Corn Laws in 1846
and the adoption of free trade by England, capital
and commerce became the controlling factors in
the national development. As early as 1842 most
of the old tariff regulations had either been dis-
carded altogether, or had at least been greatly modi-
fied, and in 1849 the Navigation Act also was dis-
continued. When these steps had been taken, the
fate of the agricultural pursuits, that had hitherto
been the chief source of the national wealth, was
sealed. They had for years been growing less and
less profitable, and could henceforth be continued as
a practical means of support only through artificial
protective measures, for the industrial and commer-
cial activities had not only come to be the controlling
interests in the life of the nation, but in the political
life also they had gained a deciding influence.

The products of English soil had become quite
insufficient to feed the rapidly growing population,
and therefore the terrible famine of 1845, by which
not only Ireland but England also suffered, turned
the scales in favor of a free entry of food products

108

A gricultural Industries 109

into the country. From that time forth domestic
production could no longer maintain itself on a profit
paying basis in face of the immense imports of cheap
grains from abroad, and with every year grew less
desirable as an occupation from a pecuniary point
of view. The raising of grain is now almost en-
tirely abandoned, and the sojourner in England may
travel a long distance without seeing a single grain
field. Live stock and garden produce can, of course,
be raised to greater advantage, but even in these
pursuits the domestic producers are obliged to meet
an ever increasing competition from abroad.

At the present time about two-thirds (109,836
sq. km.) of the entire area of England and Wales
(150,359 sq. km.) are devoted to agriculture,^ and
of this only a little more than one-fifth (23,194
sq. km.) is planted with grain and potatoes. Of the
total number of industrially employed persons in
England and Wales only 8.5 per cent ^ are engaged

^ Of woodland there is practically none in England.
According to the data in the year book of statistics for
1914 issued by the Imperial German government and a
few other data derived from the handbook of political
economy from which I have taken my figures and made
my computations, the forest lands in England and Wales
amount to 7,626 sq. km. as against 139,959 sq. km. in Ger-
many.

2 Unfortunately in the data of the year book of statistics,
agriculture, fisheries and forestry are all included under
one head, and since the fishing industry employs quite a
large number of men, although those engaged in forestry
are a negligible quantity in England but a considerable
one in Germany, the conclusion is that the percentage of
persons in England that are engaged in tilling the soil is

no Free Trade: Manchester School

in agricultural pursuits, including those employed
in raising live stock and garden produce, as against
35.2 per cent in Germany. Naturally Ireland
makes quite a different showing, with 43 per cent
of all the industrially employed population engaged
in some form of agriculture, largely, however, in the
raising of live stock. Of the entire amount of land
in use for these purposes (69,760 sq. km. out of a
total area of 82,260 sq. km.), approximately one-
ninth only (7,465 sq. km.) is devoted to the produc-
tion of grain and potatoes. In 1913 the yield of
the grain harvest in England and Wales, including
wheat, barley, oats, and a very small quantity of
rye, which the English like so little, amounted to
3,921,800 tons, in Ireland to not more than 1,174,200
tons, a total of 5,096,000 tons; in addition, Eng-
land produced 2,941,000 tons of potatoes, and Ire-
land 3,799,400 tons, amounting to 6,741,300 tons
in all. In the same year 30,265,700 tons of grain
v^ere raised in Germany, and 54,121,100 tons of po-
tatoes, or approximately six times the amount of
grain, and eight times the quantity of potatoes. At
the same time the population of the United King-
dom, according to the census of 19 10, was almost
three-fourths of that of Germany (more exactly,
nine-thirteenths, or 45 >^ millions against 65 millions
in Germany). With regard to live stock the fig-
even smaller than the given 8.5 per cent. With regard
to Scotland, where very little is done in the way of farm-
ing, the year book of statistics gives no data whatever
concerning the raising of agricultural products or live-
stock.

Dependence on Food from Abroad i n

ures show a very much better situation in the United
Kingdom, although the amount raised is quite in-
sufficient for the needs of home consumption. In
the year 19 13 England, Wales and Ireland (un-
fortunately here again the figures for Scotland are
not at hand) raised in round numbers 10,650,000
head of beef cattle as against 20,182,000 in Ger-
many, only 3,160,000 pigs as against 20,182,000 in
Germany, but 20,750,000 sheep as against 5,803,000
in Germany.^

The United Kingdom has therefore arrived at the
stage that in ancient times was first reached by the
Athenian state, soon to be followed, however, by
all the other Grecian states, and in which the Italians
found themselves in the second century before the
Christian era, and from that time forth until the
fall of the Empire,^ — viz., the condition of abso-

^ The number of horses raised in England, Wales and
Ireland is 2,017,000, and in Germany 4,532,000.

^ The following extract is from an address sent by the
Emperor Tiberius to the Senate in the year 22 a. d. : " It
is wonderful that nobody represents, That Italy is in con-
stant want of foreign supplies, that the lives of the Roman
people are daily at the mercy of uncertain seas and tem-
pests: were it not for our supports from the provinces,
supports by which the masters and their slaves, and their
estates, are maintained, would our own groves and villas
maintain us? This care therefore. Conscript Fathers, is
the business of the Prince, and by neglect of this care the
foundations of the state would be dissolved." (Tacitus,
Annals III.) All the many attempts to change the eco-
nomic condition of Italy proved ineffectual ; when in the
year 300 the Empire crumbled as a result of the civil wars,
the complete desolation of the country and of the cities
was inevitable.

112 Free Trade: Manchester School

lute dependence upon the importation of food from
across the seas. The gravity of this situation to-
gether with the necessity of providing for it must
in the end become the controlHng factor in the na-
tional policy, and one before which all else must
give way. Should an enemy succeed in cutting
England off from communication by sea with its
foreign food supply, as happened to the Athenians
in 404 and 388 B. C, and to the Italians again and
again during the period of their factional wars, the
country would be lost, and would have to submit to
the terms of the victor, though not a single soldier
of the enemy had set foot upon English soil.

With every step in the further development of
this situation the results of Great Britain's economic
policy have become more and more apparent, not
to English statesmen only, but to the people gen-
erally, as they realize that this is not only a vital
danger that threatens their position of leadership
among the nations, but that the very existence of
the British Kingdom as an independent state is at
stake. This is the nightmare that awaits the Brit-
ish slumberers at the close of their days of rejoicing
and self -congratulation because of the position of
supremacy they have won for themselves among
the nations of the earth — the anxious thought of
the future and how to provide for it — that will
not let them rest in peace, for, as the danger grows
in magnitude, it threatens to unsettle the very foun-
dations of their political structure and social organi-
zation, and to compel a radical change in their order
of life.

Free Trade and Its Results II3

To be sure, when Sir Robert Peel turned his
country's course into untried paths by the repeal of
the Corn Laws and the introduction of free trade,
the future seemed to hold no such corroding care.
By the Napoleonic wars and the continental blockade
Britain had gained full command of the sea and of
the world's commerce ; there was not a rival to dis-
pute her rule, and the keenest glance into the future
failed to reveal a power that was at all likely to de-
velop the ability successfully to compete w^ith her.
The whole world, so it seemed, had accepted Britain
as the mistress of the sea and had conceded to her
without protest her position of supremacy among
the nations of the world.

Meanwhile the English manufacturing industries
had passed through a stage of enormous develop-
ment, and were in no need of protection, for with
the aid of the British merchant marine they were
flooding the world with their products, and were
finding little or no competition from the backward
industries of the continent and of North America.

Therefore, when Cobden proclaimed his doctrine
of free trade, it was eagerly accepted as the gospel
of a new era that was to bring emancipation to man-
kind, and in which the mists of prejudice and past
error were to vanish in the sunshine of the new day.
For well did the apostles of this latest doctrine know
how to present it as a scientifically established prin-
ciple, good for all people at all times, and they
found ready listeners, and made countless converts
in every quarter of the globe. We in Germany well
remember with what fanatical zeal these doctrinaire

114 /^r^^ Trade: Manchester School

advocates of free trade preached it in our own coun-
try, and tried to impress every one with the truth
of their theory, while they behttled the opinions of
those who differed with them and whom they sought
to suppress as intellectually and morally their in-
feriors. It seemed impossible to them that intelli-
gent beings could fail to be convinced by the rea-
sonableness of their doctrine and so adopt it
themselves, unless, indeed, they were influenced by
sinister motives.

Moreover, these free trade enthusiasts were them-
selves so convinced of the truth of their doctrine
that they rejected all historic evidence to the con-
trary as unscientific, and with extreme ingenuous-
ness simply denied the fact that all political and
economic systems must of necessity be conditional,
and dependent upon the combined influences of all
the many factors that enter into the situation and
give rise to the ever changing and diversified prob-
lems of the times. Any one who entertained such
opinions was regarded by the free trade advocates
as a stubborn reactionary, or as an ignoramus of
limited mentality, or, what is most probable, as a
self seeking egoist who, under cover of belief in
the older theory, was following some reprehensible
object, and was therefore an impediment in the way
of human progress.

The conception of the state as it was developed
in the course of English political life, and which has
already been discussed, was taken up by the Man-
chester School and systematized in a formula some-
what after this fashion: Economic activity is the

Doctrines of Manchester School 115

chief factor in human Hfe, compared with which
all else is insignificant; it is the duty of the state
to remove all obstacles that may impede its prog-
ress, and therefore all interference on the part of
the state itself should be limited to the smallest pos-
sible minimum, so that all may have fair play ; in this
way the ideal formulated by Bentham during the
period of clarified thought will be realized, — " the
greatest happiness of the greatest number." The
English conception of the state is evidently thought
to be the only correct one, and all others to be either
antiquated or fallacious. When these ideas have
been generally accepted and acted upon, so it was
believed, all cause for war, all rivalry of the nations
in a struggle for existence will be eliminated; for
the nations and states will then be dissolved into
loosely united groups of people held together and
protected by police regulations only, all of them
following their own individual interests unhindered
by any restrictions, and given the opportunity to atr
tain the end for which they are striving by free
economic competition.

That the objects so attained and the happiness
realized are on a wholly material basis, ignoring
some of the highest and most influential springs of
hum.an action, which are thereby relegated to the
rubbish heap of outgrown ideas; that there is no
place in this system for the most important duties of
the state, and a total disregard of the individuality
of each of the great states and national entities that
are uninterruptedly striving with one another, dur-
ing the years of peace as well as during the times

Il6 Free Trade: Manchester School

of warfare between them, and who by this mighty
contention are advancing human development, — all
these considerations are entirely disregarded in the
doctrines of the Manchester School.

The English aristocracy adopted this doctrine in
its entirety and conformed their action to it, and so
maintained their ascendency, as has already been
stated. The fact is, however, that when these ideas
together with free trade were put into practice, cap-
ital eventually became supreme, and all other na-
tional considerations had to give way before it ; and
then, unsatiated by the profits at home, it turned
to the nations abroad and ruthlessly exploited them
in the interest of England. If the English had
succeeded in converting the states of the continent
to the doctrine of free trade, their doors would all
have been opened wide to English commerce and to
the output of English factories, and they would then
have grown more and more dependent upon Britain,
until at last they would have lost all hope of ever
extricating themselves from their economic depend-
ence, while every possible danger to British suprem-
acy among the nations of the world would have
vanished.

CHAPTER VIII

The English Attitude Toward Other
Nations

The purpose of this volume requires that one
other EngHsh characteristic should be discussed :
The attitude that the Briton assumes toward the
people of other countries.

In consequence of Britain's isolated position phys-
ically, its development has been along lines peculiarly
its own, and its people therefore differ from the na-
tions of the continent much more than these do
among themselves. Just as the structure of the
state and the organization of its political life are
unlike those on the continent, so there are other
marked differences in the national customs and views
of life — differences that extend down to such small
things as the daily meals and their preparation in
the kitchen — small matters in themselves, but by
no means unimportant in their effect upon the social
life of the nations and their relations to one another.

Although the people of each country and province
of the European continent have their own distinctive
habits and customs, these countries stand in this re-
spect as a single group in contrast with the British
Isles and America. To the average Englishman the
customs and manners to which he has been accus-

117

Il8 Attitude Towards Other Nations

tomed from youth up seem the only proper ones, and
every deviation from them appears to him to be a
social offence of which he disapproves the more be-
cause he himself has been accustomed to bow to
the dictates of public opinion, and to regard tradi-
tion as inviolable.

The Briton therefore expects every foreigner who
sets foot upon his island to conform to English cus-
toms and views of life, and one would therefore sup-
pose that when he himself is abroad, he would adapt
himself to the manners and ways of the land in
which he finds himself. But not so ; he sees in these
but an evidence of the inferiority of all other na-
tions and their degree of culture to that of his own,
and demands as a matter of course that every one
should conform to his ideas of propriety. The Eng-
lish, for instance are shocked when a foreigner vis-
iting England wears a dress coat at some ceremo-
nious or festive occasion that takes place in the day
time, or, what is still more shocking, appears in
anything but a dress coat in the evening, for the
Englishman who lives as etiquette demands wears
evening dress even when dining alone, or only with
the members of his immediate family. But, on the
other hand, at a state occasion such as the break-
fast at Court to which the members of the congress
of historians that met in Berlin in 1908 were invited,
and at which guests are requested to wear full
dress, the Englishmen coolly appear in frock-coats,
and we are good-natured and forbearing enough to
let such a disregard of our social customs pass un-
noticed.

Attitude When Abroad HO

It is to demeanor such as this that the EngHsh-
man owes his reputation abroad of being overbear-
ing and irritating, even though it may be uninten-
tional, and he may be quite unconscious of it. But
although the individual Briton gets himself dis-
liked and into frequent difficulties by this attitude,
the nation as a whole is the gainer by it, for the peo-
ple of the continent, who are much used to inter-
course with foreigners and to their various customs,
have condoned the British lack of courtesy the more
readily because it is accompanied by English gold.
And so it has come about that during the last century
customs as well as etiquette on the continent have
become more and more Anglicised, especially so in
those circles that aspire to recognition as " good
society."

This is peculiarly true of Germany where long
dependence upon foreign countries, and a belated
achievement of political independence has made the
people prone to imitate others, a tendency to which
they yielded the more readily because of their native
repugnance to fixed customs and forms, and their
strong inclination to criticize their own institutions
and to disapprove of them. Aside from all this,
there is among us Germans a good-natured desire
to meet the stranger half way, and to make things
pleasant for him. Indeed this toadying to the for-
eigner, and especially to the foreigner from Eng-
land, has come to be a national ailment with us, and
one that so far has withstood every effort at a cure ;
and it is a question whether after the conclusion of
the present war, we will be able to overcome it, or,

I20 Attitude Towards Other Nations

in spite of our recent bitter experience, will yield
to it again, and the leading social circles will return
to this aping of foreign manners.

It is all of a piece with this tendency of the Brit-
ish to do as they like when abroad, that they make no
attempt to speak the language of the country in
which they happen to be. While at home, most
likely, they did not study it at all, or its rudiments
only, and, as they have little ability in this direction
and are very averse to exposing themselves to pos-
sible ridicule, they make no effort to use a foreign
language. In this reluctance we probably see the
constraining effect of the habit of past generations,
for the Americans, in sharp contrast to the English,
study foreign languages assiduously in their schools,
and are very ready to use them as best they may,
and therefore make extraordinarily rapid progress
in them. The English, on the contrary, always try
to get along with the use of their native tongue only,
and this usually serves their purpose very well.
This is especially the case in Germany where the
acquisition of foreign languages is very general, and
where every one is eager to perfect himself in them,
and the English therefore find the people most ready
to accept their language as the medium of inter-
course. All this has greatly furthered the use of
English as the universal tongue.

But this attitude has its darker side also, for it
makes the Briton incapable of understanding and
appreciating the institutions and view point of other
nationalities, and he considers it quite beneath his
dignity to make any attempt to do so. How greatly

Failure to Understand 121

it handicaps him in his commercial relations with
foreign nations has become glaringly apparent ever
since German industries have reached the point
where they can offer serious competition to the Eng-
lish in this direction.

The English merchants as a rule offer in foreign
markets only such goods as they themselves have
been accustomed to use, and which meet their own
requirements ; they pay no heed to the tastes and
habits of the people among whom they hope to find
customers, but instead, -try to impose their goods
upon them whether they suit or not. The Germans,
on the contrary, consult not only the habits and
needs of their foreign customers, but their tastes
as well, and moreover can carry on all necessary
business transactions with them in their own speech.
This attitude of the English is not simply the re-
sult of self-satisfaction and conceit, but may prob-
ably be traced in a much larger measure to a lack
in their power of adjustment, which is inherent in
the English mentality, and due, no doubt, to the rigid
traditions of English culture and education, and
which has taken on proportions in the national char-
acter that threaten to become fatal. The English
hardly deem it possible that they might act differ-
ently or cultivate other habits, and all the warnings,
speeches, and resolutions advising a change of atti-
tude and a better preparation for commercial enter-
prise, such as the study of foreign languages, etc.,
that have been the order of the day in England dur-
ing the last few decades, have had no results what-
ever. The Briton cannot escape from his habit.

122 Attitude Towards Other Nations

The English show a like inability when confronted
by the problems that arise in connection with the
social or political institutions of foreign lands, and,
failing to arrive at a correct estimate of the ideas
and sentiments that underlie them, can neither in-
augurate nor carry out measures best fitted to solve
them. No one will question that there are many
highly educated Englishmen who have a thorough
knowledge of foreign countries and their affairs;
and, on the other hand, it would be a fatal mistake
on our part to allow ourselves to believe that there
is a correct judgment to any widely extended de-
gree in our own land concerning conditions abroad.
This applies most pertinently to our impressions of
England and America where the views and circum-
stances of life depart so decidedly from our own,
and with regard to which a true appreciation is con-
fined to a very small circle in Germany. Our daily
press is by no means well posted with regard to
these matters, and gives us only meager and inade-
quate reports, while it is not unusual to meet Ger-
mans of otherwise wide attainments who make the
most surprising statements, and entertain quite ab-
surd views in regard to conditions in England or
America.

This is the fruit we are reaping as the result of
the Prussian government's incredibly narrow and
short-sighted policy of public instruction that, quite
out of touch with the actual demands of life and
its practical requirements, has neglected the study of
the English language in the high schools, and even
in the colleges has ranked it as a secondary require-

Failure to Understand 1 23

ment and virtually as an optional study. On the
other hand English is assiduously studied in the prac-
tical arts and vocational schools, and it follows that
a much greater familiarity with that language is to
be found among the middle and even the lower
classes of our population than in the circles that
claim leadership in our intellectual life. How little
distinguished for a correct appreciation of foreign
conditions the members of our diplomatic corps
as a whole really have been, and how inadequately
their special education and preparation has fitted
them to get into touch with the influential circles
abroad and to get correct impressions from them,
and so be enabled to influence them in turn, has re-
ceived ample and regrettable proof at every step of
our diplomatic activity during the last decades. In
the negotiations that were the forerunners of the
present war, as well as in those that are connected
with its progress, this experience has been repeated.
In England, however, the information and prep-
aration so necessary to diplomatic efficiency is lack-
ing in a still greater degree. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that the foreign policy of England
has been hampered, and at times has entirely mis-
carried, because of a want of sympathetic apprecia-
tion of affairs abroad. The English are totally ig-
norant of conditions in Germany, and are absolutely
unable to grasp our views of life, and are therefore
wholly out of sympathy with the institutions of
state and the military organization that are their
natural outgrowth. That they had entirely failed
to reach a correct estimate of our military strength,

124 Attitude Towards Other Nations

as well as of the efficiency of our organization, and,
above all, of the lofty feeling of patriotism that is
the well-spring of the German nation's strength, this
latest war has amply revealed to the world.

This is not to be wondered at, however, when we
consider that a man like Sir Edward Grey has been
charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, — a
man who, aside from a little French, knows nothing
of any language except his own, and has never been
outside of his native land, except once on a visit to
Paris. But the situation is no better with a large
majority of British statesmen, — Mr. Gladstone's is
a typical case. And this is true also of most of the
eminent men of England who, because of their
social position, their political influence or their lit-
erary activity, have shaped the destiny of their
country.

PART II

ENGLAND'S POLICY AND ENGLAND AS A
WORLD POWER

CHAPTER IX

The Beginning of England's Power at Sea —
Wars with Spain and Holland

We may now turn our attention to an inspec-
tion of the successive steps by which a definite Eng-
lish policy was evolved, and of the course by which
England attained her supremacy at sea.

The foundation for her country's present strength
at sea was laid by Elizabeth in her struggle with
Spain, which was then at the height of its power
as a world empire, and was seeking to extend its
control to the island kingdom also, and to turn it
back to Catholicism; or rather, Spain was trying
to regain the influence over England that it had
once held when Mary, wife of Philip H of Spain,
was on the English throne. The first step in this
conflict was taken when Elizabeth allied herself with
the Netherlands in their revolt against Spanish op-
pression ; another, when she brought Scotland into
complete political subjection to England by her sup-
port of the party that opposed Mary Stuart; and
still another, when Elizabeth sought to attach
France to English interests during the period of that
country's political uncertainty due to religious
dissension and the factional war between the no-
bles.

It was at this time in their history that the Eng-
127

128 England's Power at Sea

lish first ventured upon daring undertakings at sea, —
the half piratical adventures of Drake and Raleigh
in their bold aggressions upon the colonies and com-
merce of Spain, which brought about a declaration
of war, and the dispatch of the Spanish Armada to
British waters. This was the time also when the
first, although fruitless attempt to form a settlement
on the shores of America was made by the English
in 1584; and in the year 1600 the East India Com-
pany was formed.

It is not to our purpose to follow the uncertain
attempts and irresolute course of England's poHcy
during the reigns of the earlier Stuarts, under whom
Scotland had been united with England in a personal
union. The Spanish monarchy, in close connection
with the German House of Hapsburg, was still the
dominating power in Europe. Neither James I nor
Charles I was capable of inaugurating an aggres-
sive English policy, the difficulties of which would
have been greatly increased by the growing antago-
nism between the Parliament and the Crown. On
the other hand, the contemptible peace policy to
which Raleigh was sacrificed when James I sent him
to the scaffold in 16 18 to appease Spain for the at-
tack upon her colonies on the Orinoco River, came
to nought in 1624 through the failure of the King's
plan to arrange a marriage between his son and a
Spanish Infanta. The King's next attempt, as
champion of the Protestant cause in Europe, to
wrest the Palatinate from the grasp of the Haps-
burgs, and so to participate in the German war, also
ended in dismal failure.

The Navigation Acts 1 29

Years of continued peace, however, offered the
opportunity to plant Enghsh colonies in North
America, — the first one in Virginia in 1607, and
another on the New England shore in 1620, which
soon received great additions from the Puritans who
were seeking refuge from persecution at home.

While the Spanish power as a world empire was
fast waning, and could be maintained only with
great difficulty, more especially so since Richelieu
had begun to assail it with all his resourcefulness of
policy, and with the strength of French arms, an-
other sea power was fast claiming the attention of
the world. The Netherlands reached the zenith of
their glory as a maritime power just at the time
when England's weakness at sea compelled her to
withdraw from the carrying trade of the world.
On October 21, 1639, Admiral Van Tromp found
the Spanish fleet off the coast of England in the
vicinity of Dover, and through the connivance of
Charles I, whose habitual weakness allowed him as
usual to be led into a contemptible act of duplicity,
this last expedition that Spain was able to send
against the Netherlands was crushed.

All England felt the pressure of the Dutch as-
cendency at sea very keenly in every branch of com-
merce and trade. In spite of their community of
interests as two Protestant nations, and the analo-
gous situation of the two countries in the antago-
nistic relation in which each stood to one of two
royal houses allied by marriage — the house of
Orange and that of the Stuarts — this commercial
competition engendered in the English a bitter op-

130 England's Power at Sea

position toward the powerful merchants of the
Netherlands.

With the establishment of the Commonwealth
England's vigor was first fully revealed to the world.
At home the newly established government sternly
suppressed every attempt at revolt within the three
kingdoms, by means of the efficient army that out-
matched every opponent, and to which it owed its
victory. Abroad the English fleet under Blake pur-
sued the adherents of their King, who had died on
the scaffold, into every sea, and compelled the lately
rehabilitated Kingdom of Portugal, as well as its
Spanish adversaries, not only to refrain from giving
them aid, but also to surrender the arms and ships
that had found safety under their protection.

On October 9, 1651, the first of the Navigation
Acts was passed that for two centuries were not only
to be the fundamental principle of Britain's commer-
cial policy, but were to shape that country's policy
throughout. It prohibited the importation in for-
eign vessels of any but the products of the countries
to which they belonged, or else these were to be
brought to England in English vessels. This pro-
vision pertained to European products; all others
were to be imported in English vessels only.^ As
Holland was not disposed to accept these terms, the
Dutch vessels then in British ports were seized, and
a piratical warfare was begun against the sea craft
of the Netherlands, which soon led to a declaration

^ After the Restoration, the Navigation Act was made to
apply to Ireland also, by which the ruin of Irish commerce
was accomplished, as has already been told.

Wars Waged 131

of war. Cromwell, who was then Lord Protector
of England, soon brought the war to a close, how-
ever, and compelled Holland to accept his terms of
peace (1654), and submit to the Navigation Act.

Cromwell then renewed the war against Spain.
It was begun while the two countries were still at
peace by the conquest of Jamaica (1655), which
England has retained ever since. The war was then
prosecuted in alliance with the French, to whose aid
the English owed their acquisition of Dunkirk. It
was due to this alliance also that the thirty years'
war between France and Spain was brought to a def-
inite close, and the latter country was forced to con-
clude the Peace of the Pyrenees by which the posi-
tion of dominance in Europe, so long held by Spain,
was lost to her and passed to France,

This fast developing power of France, which soon
received a further and tremendous impetus through
the purposeful and sweeping policy of aggrandize-
ment pursued by Louis XIV, was viewed by Eng-
land with great and growing concern. But the
kings of the dynasty that ruled England just after
the Restoration held persistently to France at every
important turn in the affairs of England, with but
rare exceptions, hoping from that country to draw
the strength that would enable them to hold their
own against the Parliament in their struggle for a
position of independence within their own realm.
One permanent advantage accrued to England as a
result of this policy of the Stuart kings in the pre-
dominating influence that their country gained in
Portugal, whose independence was enforced by Eng-

132 England's Power at Sea

land and France as victorious allies in their war
with Spain.

The people of the Netherlands, however, were
still the real rivals of the English, and in both the
wars that Charles II conducted against Holland
( 1664-1667 and 1672-1674), he could depend upon
the strong approval of his people. It was the Earl
of Shaftesbury, at first the head of the Cabal Min-
istry (1667-1673), and later the leader of the ruth-
less and popular Opposition, who designated Hol-
land as the Carthage that must at all hazards be de-
stroyed. In spite of an immediate and victorious
conflict at sea, the conduct of these wars did not
redound to England's glory; the internal weakness
of the administration, the prevailing resort to in-
trigue at Court, and the repeated quarrels with the
Parliament, the very reverse of Cromwell's master-
ful and relentlessly despotic regime, made an ener-
getic war policy impossible. In the first war, the
government of the Netherlands under the direction
of John De Witt ordered Admiral De Ruyter to sail
with his fleet to the Thames, from where he threat-
ened London and compelled England to conclude a
peace. In the second war, Van Tromp and De Ruy-
ter successfully defended the coast of Holland
against a British attack upon the island of Texel.

Nevertheless the final outcome of these wars was
not without some advantage to England. At the
close of the first one, England held New Amster-
dam, which she retained, renaming it New York,
and so dislodged the wedge which Holland had
driven into the new world between the two English

Wars with Holland 1 33

colonies, New England in the north, and Virginia
to the south of it, in North America. During the
second war, the Netherlands suffered a serious set-
back in the attack which Louis XIV made upon them
at the same time, and so England was enabled to
enforce submission to the Navigation Act, and to
demand a large indemnity from Holland besides.
Moreover, the natural conditions that make for
power among the nations, such as England's pre-
ponderance in population, and the wealth of her re-
sources, began to tell more and more ; gradually the
Netherlands sank into a position of secondary im-
portance, and in time ceased to be a menace to Eng-
land. The former rivalry between the two nations
was then gradually replaced by a constantly increas-
ing relation of friendship.

CHAPTER X

England's Wars with France — The Begin-
ning OF English Supremacy at Sea

The closer relations between England and the
Netherlands were made more desirable, and eventu-
ally became a political necessity to England, by the
great strides that France was making toward a po-
sition of supremacy in the world. By land the
French had already secured for themselves the place
of dominance among the nations of the continent,
and they now were striving to gain a like pre-emi-
nence at sea. The French navy and merchant ma-
rine were greatly enlarged, and the harbors im-
proved; French supremacy in the Mediterranean
was secured beyond dispute; to their colonies in
America they added the new territory of Louisiana,
by which English colonization was hemmed in from
the west ; San Diego and other smaller islands in the
West Indies were occupied, and the settlement of
Pondichery on the eastern coast of India established.
It was this prodigious expansion that soon led the
English people to recognize in France their greatest
rival, with whom they would have to contend if
they were to maintain their ascendency at sea. In
sharp contrast to the policy of the Crown, the popu-
lar tide of anti-French sentiment grew ever stronger

134

European Balance of Power 1^5

in England, and was still further swelled, not only
by the fundamental differences in the political or-
ganization of the two countries, but even more so
by the religious antagonism that was stimulated by
the sharply emphasized Catholic attitude of Louis
XIV, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes
(1685).

All those European powers that looked upon
French preponderance as a menace to their independ-
ent existence now endeavored by all imaginable
measures to enlist England on their side. A deci-
sive step in this direction was taken when the ac-
tion of the Netherlands made it possible for Wil-
liam III to enter England with his army in 1688, by
which the Opposition received their long-desired op-
portunity, the Stuart dynasty was driven from the
throne, and, as a consequence, the great coalition
against France was formed. From this time forth
the policy of England has gone hand in hand with
that of Holland, with the natural result that the
smaller nation has followed more and more sub-
missively in the wake of the greater. The two
countries were henceforth grouped together and
styled " the sea powers " by the nations of the con-
tinent.

In all the great wars that have taken place since
that time one feature of England's policy has clearly
revealed itself, and has remained its leading char-
acteristic up to the present day : England allies
herself with the weaker nations of the continent to
give battle to the strongest. The catch-word that
has been coined to meet this situation is that " the

136 England's Wars

balance of power in Europe must be maintained,"
which is right enough. But the Enghsh interpreta-
tion of it is that the continent is a world by itself,
that England lies outside of it, and therefore is not
a part of Europe at all; no one of the continental
states is to be allowed to become supreme, and so
become a menace to England; while the nations of
the continent are destroying one another in warfare,
England is to be free to follow her own interests
unhindered, and so gain for herself a dominating
position in the world, and then, at the close of the
conflicts, take a hand in the bargaining among the
nations and decide according to her own needs what
the conformation of political Europe shall be.

England has therefore ever sought to combine the
power of the weaker nations in a coalition, and to
make use of this to accomplish her own purpose by
the humiliation of her most troublesome rival.
Meanwhile she has always known well how to se-
cure all the spoils for herself, and to hold on to them,
and has never felt any compunction to withdraw
from a coalition without in any way fulfilling the
promises she had held out to her allies, and when-
ever her own ends had been accomplished, or if the
conquests of the alliance promised to be greater than
had been foreseen, and consequently threatened se-
riously to unsettle existing European conditions.
This rapid change of front that finds an ever ready
excuse in a change of ministry has deservedly given
England a reputation for faithlessness. That no
dependence could be placed upon England, and no
lasting compact made with her was soon discovered

European Balance of Power 137

by the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the pressing
need of the moment frequently compelled the states
of the continent to combine with England, only to
discover to their sorrow what might be expected
from an alliance with " perfidious Albion." By the
pursuit of this unscrupulous policy, and by the abso-
lute selfishness of her attitude, England has carried
off one triumph after another, and so has constantly
added to her power.

In the war that England waged in alliance with
Holland, Austria and Spain from 1689 to 1697, she
triumphantly asserted her independence of action,
and secured recognition of her lately established
form of government, crushed the overweening am-
bition of France, and in the naval battle of La
Hogue (1692), as well as in the later encounters
at sea, and despite the valorous deeds of Jean Barts
and other French privateers, did immense damage
to the French sea power. Then, in the Peace of
Ryswick, after her own purpose had been achieved,
England manifested no concern for the welfare of
her recent allies, but compelled them to accept the
terms of peace that she had arranged in conjunc-
tion with France. It was by the terms of this
treaty that France acquired Strassburg and Alsace.

Later, in the war of the Spanish Succession, a
definite end was made of French domination.
Then, when Queen Anne finally ventured to assert
herself, shook ofT the constraint that the Whigs had
imposed upon her, and brought the Tories back into
power, England under the control of this party not
only immediately concluded a peace — so much was

138 England's Wars

politically justifiable — but played her former allies
false, and secretly connived with France to obtain
advantages for both. But as usual, England did
not fail to secure for herself the lion's share of the
spoils by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). In Amer-
ica she acquired Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova
Scotia) and Hudson Bay from France, while in
Spain she retained Gibraltar and Minorca, which
gave her control of the gateway to the Mediterra-
nean as well as a strong position within its western
extent. By the re-establishment of the Dutch bar-
rier — the right given to Holland to hold certain
forts on the Belgian frontier — a limit was set to
French ambition in the direction of the English
coast, which had been threatened. France was
compelled to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk
which had been purchased from Charles H, and to
fill up the harbor. In consequence of the Methuen
Treaty, December, 1703, Portugal had become an
English satellite even before the beginning of the
war, and had been entirely at the mercy of Eng-
land's commercial methods ever since the agree-
ment to import no woolen cloths except from that
country ; but from this time forth Portugal virtually
sank into a condition of vassalage, and has re-
mained in this state of dependence upon England
up to the present day.

From Spain England secured the right of the As-
siento — the contract for furnishing the colonies
in America with negroes — probably the most lu-
crative trade of the Atlantic. Every one knows
that England understood well how to make the

War of the Spanish Succession 139

most of this privilege, and, not content with this
alone, far exceeded it in the smuggling trade that
the English merchants carried on with the African
coast. In large measure it is to this slave trade
that Liverpool owes its present prosperity, its
streets, as the saying goes, being paved with negro
skulls. The prosperous descendants of these slave
traders have not turned pious only — every correct
Englishman is that — but are filled to overflowing
with benevolence and philanthropic devotion, as be-
fits all beati possidentcs. It is not necessary to re-
view the negotiations that took place during the
next few decades, since the chief events of this
period were the indecisive commercial wars that
England carried on with Spain, and the renewed
hostilities against France in connection with the
war of the Spanish Succession. Although British
trade and British sovereignty at sea grew apace, of
definite results there were none.

So far as the struggle between France and Eng-
land was concerned, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle
in 1748 was no more than an armistice, for the
American problems remained unsettled, and the
Americans themselves, who by this time had de-
veloped a strong feeling of self-reliance, showed
as little consideration for their own rivals as did
their mother country at home for hers, and, quite
untroubled by diplomatic negotiations abroad,
adopted a policy of territorial expansion on their
own account, and by a petty but unremitting war-
fare attempted to break the bounds that the French
possession of Canada and Louisiana set to their ter-

140 England's Wars

ritory. In addition there was the strong position
that the French had gained for themselves in the
Indian Ocean by the acquisition of the islands of
La France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Reunion),
which the valiant deeds of Labourdonnais and Du-
pleix had won for France, and the further French
successes in the eastern part of India, by which the
few positions that England held in this region, such
as Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, were seriously
menaced. Although the two nations were still of-
ficially at peace, the conflicting interests of the sit-
uation soon led to violent armed encounters in
which the native princes of the rival dynasties of
the Deccan took sides, and in which Captain Clive
gained his first brilliant victories.

It was as the result of this conflict of interests in
the East and in the West that England and France
faced each other in the bitter Seven Years' war,
from 1755 to 1763. In this struggle the war
waged by Frederick the Great in alliance with Eng-
land against the greater part of Europe is but an
episode, and constituted the continental war by
which England meant to keep her chief adversary
fully engaged by land so that she herself might be
free to pursue her maritime policy undisturbed.
And her aim was achieved, for it was in this war
that the foundations were laid for the world empire
of Great Britain, for the dominance of the English
nation, and for the world-wide use of the English
tongue.

The war began in the usual English way, with
severe reverses, chief among them being the loss of

Pitt and Seven Years' War 141

Minorca; and it ended in the usual English way
also, — with desertion of the ally that had won
England's battles for her on the continent, and so
had made possible her victories beyond the seas.
But between the beginning and the end of this
war lies the vigorous administration of Pitt, the
great English war minister. Pitt is perhaps the
most typical representative of England during this
epoch of her aspiration to pre-eminence among the
nations of the world. His was a masterful spirit
that felt within itself the capability for great
achievement, and with proud self-consciousness
looked with disdain upon all rivals, who on every
occasion were made to realize his superiority to
themselves. In the struggles between the contend-
ing political parties, or rather between the men who
were hungry for power, and in which his own
power was developed, he showed himself to be quite
as unscrupulous and vindictive in the means he em-
ployed to make his way upward, by a coalition first
with one rival and then with another, as have most
great English personalities. And he, too, as head
of the administration, devoted all his energy to put-
ting through the very measures, such as the occu-
pation and defence of Hanover, which previously,
as member of the Opposition, he had fiercely de-
nounced. But he was above striving for personal
advantage, and proof against all the temptations of
sordid gain, which in the lives of so many men of
renown shows itself at the decisive moment to be
the mainspring of their actions. The lofty patri-
otism in which the measures he advocated with

142 England's Wars

glowing eloquence had their origin was not, as in
the case of so many others, the result of a carefully
prepared and well studied rhetorical effort —
though that, too, was not wanting — but was in
reality the deepest well-spring of his action, and
the inspiration of his life, revealed with impulsive
and therefore convincing eloquence. By the fulmi-
nating oratory with which he mercilessly beat to
earth every opposition, he controlled the Parlia-
ment entirely, and won for himself the idolizing
admiration of the people; with a vigorous and re-
lentless assertion of this power he now procured
the means for the conduct of the war on a grand
scale. To him, therefore, England owes the crea-
tion of her world dominion.

It was during the Seven Years' war that Give
established English supremacy in India by the cap-
ture of Bengal. Together with these victories in the
East, Canada also was won for England, for in the
Peace of Versailles France definitely relinquished
all her possessions in North America. Canada was
ceded to England, and Louisiana to Spain, which
in its advanced state of decadence knew not what
to do with it. Thus fate decided that the North
American continent was to be dominated by the
Anglo Saxon race, and, as an inevitable conse-
quence, that the French tongue should eventually
cease to be the language of international intercourse
in spite of the tenacity with which it clung to its
place in the traditions of diplomacy, and despite the
pre-eminent position that French literature held in

American Independence 143

the world of letters; gradually it was replaced by
the English language.^

Getting rid of French rivalry in North America
was not an unqualified advantage to England how-
ever, for it brought with it a new danger to the
fulfillment of her desire for world dominion, and it
was not long before this made itself known, and in
a most vigorous manner. The Americans in Vir-
ginia, New England, and in the other English colo-
nies held to the motherland and fought for it with
apparent enthusiasm so long as they felt the pres-
sure of French domination just beyond their own
boundaries, and therefore were in need of protection.
But these agricultural colonies had long since be-
come so strong and self-sustaining that they had de-
veloped a national individuality with well defined
interests of their own, together with a strong liking
for independence, which they had inherited from
their English forefathers. They were little in-
clined therefore to allow the motherland to shape
their destiny, or to control their local government
and commercial interests. England's narrow com-
mercial policy, and the endeavor of the English Par-
liament and the English government to assert their
authority, at least in form, — for the import tax on
tea and other commodities amounted to little else,

^ That the meridian of Paris (of which the meridian of
Ferro is but another form) has been replaced on our maps
by that of Greenwich is a parallel instance, and one equally
indicative of this progressive pro-English development
in international intercourse.

144 England's Wars

— had exactly the opposite effect of that which was
desired, and only served to precipitate the crisis.

It was hardly a decade after the Peace of Ver-
sailles that the rupture between England and her
American colonies was brought about by the fa-
mous Boston Tea Party, when the tea was thrown
overboard into the harbor, and in the following year
the first American Congress met in Philadelphia;
in 1775 the first armed encounter took place, and
in 1776 came the declaration of independence. But
all the loudly decried grievances were after all but
pretexts, and there can be no doubt that the Ameri-
can colonies would have revolted even had the Eng-
lish government followed an entirely different
course, for the deciding influence was the American
desire for absolute independence, which no form of
federation in connection with the motherland would
have satisfied.^ In its widest aspect the American
Revolution was a civil war, for a considerable part
of the proprietary and aristocratically inclined ele-

^ This view of the great revolutionary movement is re-
ceiving increasing recognition in America also in oppo-
sition to the usual representation, which is due not so much
to the opinion of the Americans themselves as to the bias
of English tradition. According to the popular idea, which
is an absurd one, the responsibility for the entire situation
rests upon King George III, a true hearted man, although
one of decided mental limitations, and he is made to appear
as a monstrous tyrant, whereas in reality he merely shared
the views that were held by the great majority of the
English people, and which he represented, until in the
end, after the disastrous termination of the war, it was
convenient to make him the scape-goat, a tendency that
is usual under such circumstances.

Armed Neutrality 1 45

ment in the community sided with England, and
after the close of the conflict a large number of these
people emigrated to Canada where the French popu-
lation, animated by the old spirit of hostility toward
the Anglo-Americans, now held loyally to England.

France took part in this war with a hope to re-
gain her former position at sea, as well as her lost
colonial dominion, but in spite of some early suc-
cesses and although Spain made common cause
with her in 1779, without definite results of any
kind. England, however, took advantage of her
supremacy at sea to prey upon the commerce of the
other nations by privateering and by an utter disre-
gard for the rights of neutrals, an element in war-
fare to which she has held ever since without any
regard for the protests of other nations, and which
she has introduced into the present war with ut-
ter ruthlessness. The " armed neutrality," which
originated with Chararine II in 1780, now compelled
England to show some consideration for the coun-
tries bordering on the Baltic, but at the same time
afforded her the welcome opportunity to declare
war upon Holland, and, although the Dutch trium-
phantly withstood the English attack on the Dog-
gerbank, they not only lost a large part of their
merchant marine, but their possessions in eastern
India as well.

When peace was concluded, England relinquished
Ceylon to the Dutch, but retained all her conquests
on the main land of India, About this time also
the British were victorious in a fierce war with Hy-
der Ali of Mysore, who had made an alliance with

146 England's Wars

the French. This British success eventually led to
the subjugation of the Deccan, which meant the ac-
quisition of by far the greater part of peninsular
India.

It is apparent therefore that although England
lost her North American colonies, she nevertheless
emerged from the war with no inconsiderable profit
to herself,^ and, what was most important of all,
her rivals in Europe had made no appreciable gains
at any point, but had been weakened at sea, and
their commerce had been demoralized. England
on the other hand had not only maintained her mar-
itime ascendency throughout the war, but had been
able to increase it, and within a few years had
crowded the Dutch out of their leading position in
the trade of the Baltic. Not long before this time
Captain Cook had been sent on his voyages of ex-
ploration in southern seas, and in 1788 the penal
colony at Sydney was established, and thus a firm
foothold gained on the fifth continent.

English supremacy at sea found its greatest op-
portunity for development during the war main-
tained for twenty years against the French, at first
against the revolutionary power, and later against
Napoleon, with but one interval of peace endur-
ing for little more than a year, after the Peace of
Amiens. On the surface this war appeared as a
conflict for principle, and was so regarded not only

^ There were other, less important changes in territorial
possessions by which England lost some of the acquisitions
she had obtained in 1763, such as the recession of Senegal
to France, and Florida to Spain, the latter, like Louisiana,
soon to be transferred to the United States.

JVar with the French Republic 147

by men like Burke but by the great mass of the
English people. It was in fact, however, a struggle
for power, for pre-eminence in the world, — the last
and most decisive passage at arms between England
and France in their century long conflict for as-
cendency, interrupted only by brief intervals of
peace. It was precipitated not so much by the ex-
ecution of the French King as by the French con-
quest of Belgium, which took place toward the close
of the year 1792, and which the English regarded
as an immediate danger to the security that their
insular position afforded them.

By land England's conduct of the war was but a
lukewarm one, and was carried on with quite insuf-
ficient means and with a display of the usual lack
of military ability, until the uprising in Spain gave
England the opportunity to organize and support
this civil war against Napoleon with the use of her
vassal-state, Portugal, as a military base, and so
was enabled seriously to undermine the power of
the great Emperor. Otherwise England's aid to
her allies consisted chiefly in the payment of large
subsidies for the further prosecution of the war.

At sea, however, the English conducted the war
with all their usual vigor and ruthlessness. That
Holland had become vassal to France was a wel-
come opportunity of which they eagerly took ad-
vantage, and Ceylon, Capeland and the Dutch pos-
sessions in upper India fell an easy prey to English
greed. In the Mediterranean, Malta was taken to
console England for the loss of Minorca, and her
refusal to surrender it, as stipulated in the Treaty

148 England's Wars

of Amiens, was the immediate cause for a renewal
of hostilities between France and England in 1803.
In India the British subdued the uprising of the
natives of the Deccan under Tippoo Sahib in alliance
with the French in 1799, and with their defeat the
dream of a French empire in India vanished for-
ever, for, although Napoleon evidently cherished
the hope of it more than once, he never found it
possible to take even the first step toward its reali-
zation. All attempts of the French to maintain
their independent position at sea failed utterly; in
the battles of Abukir and Trafalgar the French
fleets were annihilated, and Napoleon was obliged
to abandon his plan for an invasion of England.

Hov/ little England was inclined to regard the
rights of neutrals became apparent when in 1800
the Russian Emperor, Paul, made the attempt to re-
vive the armed neutrality of the North European
states; England at once announced this to be equiv-
alent to a declaration of war, and promptly sent
Nelson to attack Copenhagen (April 2, 1801) in the
hope of forcing the entrance to the Baltic. A still
more drastic repetition of this utter regardlessness
of the rights of others occurred in 1807 when, after
peace had been concluded between Napoleon and
Alexander I, England was approached with regard
to possible terms of peace. She replied with the
demand that Denmark should relinquish her atti-
tude of neutrality and attach herself to the English
cause. When Denmark refused to comply, Copen-
hagen was immediately bombarded for three days,

War with the United States 149

from September 2 to September 5, 1807, and the
entire Danish fleet was captured and carried away,
although no rupture of the friendly relations exist-
ing between the two governments had taken place.
Henceforth England was the only country to de-
rive any benefit from the continental blockade, and
soon became the unchallenged mistress of the seas
with undisputed control of the world's commerce;
thus assured against all rivalry, her industries also
made wonderful strides forward.

America endeavored in so far as possible to
maintain its commercial relations with Europe, but
the continued inroads upon American commerce by
privateering and the persistent impressment of
American seamen for service in the British navy —
900 vessels were thus captured and about 6000
American seamen compelled into enforced service
for Britain — finally ended in a declaration of war
by the United States in 18 12, after long drawn out
negotiations had proved futile, and after the em-
bargo, by which American ports were closed to all
foreign shipping, had been maintained for four
years, a measure that had proved suicidal to Ameri-
can commerce. But both by sea and by land the
Americans were poorly prepared for war, and, in
spite of many victories, the United States was really
no match for England. Indeed, Washington, its
newly founded capital was entered by the British in
18 14 and partially destroyed by fire, including the
capitol building itself. It was not until December
24, 1814, just at the time of the Congress of Vienna,

150 England's Wars

that peace between the two countries was concluded
by the treaty of Ghent, in which everything was re-
stored as far as possible to the state which had ex-
isted before the war.

CHAPTER XI
English World Supremacy i 814- 1863

Meanwhile England had fully harvested the
fruits of the war. On the continent she had pro-
tected herself by establishing the Kingdom of the
Netherlands into which Belgium was incorporated,
and which was thus to form a barrier against any
possible future attack upon the English coast by the
French. This experiment proved a failure how-
ever, as is well known, for the Belgians, who are a
strongly Catholic people, naturally gravitated to-
ward France, and entertained a bitter feeling of
hostility toward their Protestant neighbors of the
Netherlands, with whom they had been in constant
conflict for centuries, while the pressure of rival
industries had still further deepened the antagonism
between the two nationalities.

French interests were protected by England in so
far that she would not permit the diminution of
French territory to anything less than had been in-
cluded within the limits of that country in 1700, and
further, by preventing the restoration of Alsace to
Germany. It was evidently the English intention
to keep Germany's strength fettered in so far as
possible, so that the latter might not develop suffi-
ciently to become a formidable industrial rival for

iSi

152 English World Supremacy

England. With this purpose in view the old con-
dition of confusion which had been crystallized in
the form of the German Confederation, and which
afforded a ready opportunity for interference on the
part of any one of the powerful European states,
was kept intact, and Prussian ambition was re-
pressed at every point, while Austria, England's
former ally, was eagerly supported in her aspira-
tions. As is well known, in the crisis that arose in
the settlement of European affairs by the Congress
of Vienna, England formed a secret league with
Austria and France with the intention of eventually
meeting Prussia's claims for the annexation of Sax-
ony by force of arms.

England, on the other hand, retained almost all
of her over-seas conquests. In Europe, in addi-
tion to Malta, she kept the little island of Helgo-
land, which had been taken from Denmark, and
furthermore established a British protectorate over
the Ionian Islands. In America, Trinidad, which
had belonged to Spain, now remained in the pos-
session of England, as did also the half of Guiana
that had been wrested from the Dutch, and that
part of the coast of Honduras which the English
had occupied in their conflict with the filibusters,
whereas Martinique and Guadalupe were returned
to France, and St. Thomas and the neighboring is-
lands, to Denmark. In Africa Britain's chief ac-
quisition was Cape Colony, besides which she re-
tained the colony of Sierra Leone, and in the In-
dian Ocean the island of Mauritius and the Sey-
chelles, whereas Reunion and the west African col-

England's Acquisitions 1 53

onies were receded to France. In Asia the Nether-
lands retained possession of the Sunda Islands, chief
among which was the rich island of Java; but Cey-
lon was not relinquished by the English, and in 1819
they added Singapore to their Asiatic acquisitions,
whereupon the Dutch ceded their possessions in Ma-
lacca to Great Britain in exchange for a small part
of Sumatra. From continental India the Dutch
were now excluded altogether, while the French and
Portuguese possessions there were restricted to a
few positions that could be of but little significance
in the development of the country, whereas English
influence in India was constantly being broadened,
chiefly by the subjugation of the Mahrattas (com-
pleted in 1818), and further by the concessions
which Nepal was forced to make ( 1816), and by the
seizure of the coast lands of Burma (1826), which
was followed by the subjection of the Punjab and
other native states in the basin of the Indus River
(1843-1849). To this progressive territorial ag-
grandizement must be added the gradual settlement
of Australia, the acquisition of Tasmania in 1803,
and of New Zealand in 1840.

In her domination of the world Britain now had
no rival. There was not a power on earth that
would have ventured for a moment to entertain the
idea of opposing the English at sea. Britain's em-
pire of the seas was therefore accepted by the other
nations as the decree of fate, as something unalter-
able, almost as a matter of course; and as for the
English themselves, they regarded it as their indis-
putable right, a right which had been bestowed upon

154 English World Supremacy

them, any opposition to which was to be regarded
as rebellion against the divine order of things, and
as a crime against the highest interests of mankind.

But even England could not escape the depression
that followed the tremendous struggle with Na-
poleon, and the misery was still further increased
by the mismanagement of internal affairs, and by the
convulsive clutch by which outgrown and decrepit
institutions and privileges were retained, although
they had long since been abandoned on the continent.

But as soon as Canning came into power, he gave
a new turn to English politics (from 1822 onward),
which was manifested by a disinclination on the part
of England to be subservient to the designs of the
Holy Alliance, and by the distinct purpose to follow
a purely English policy under cover of the mantle
of liberalism, although this harmonized but illy with
the existing internal conditions. The result was an
immediate re-awakening of the English spirit of en-
terprise. Furthermore, by giving the President of
the North American republic cause in his message
of December 2,1823 to assert the principle known by
his name as the Monroe Doctrine, which declared
that any attempt by European governments (in
which the colonial governments are not included) to
interfere in American conditions, or " to extend
their system to any portion of the western hemi-
sphere " would be resented by the United States, and
later, by following the example of the American re-
public in recognizing the independence of the Span-
ish-American colonies early in 1825, Canning

England's Relations to Continent 155

opened a new and extensive market for the products
of British industry. Then, when the reform legis-
lation of 1832 widened the possibilities for indus-
trial development, and finally when the Corn Laws
were repealed, and free trade was introduced, a new
impetus was given to British commercial and indus-
trial enterprise also.

Simultaneously and uninterruptedly Great Britain
proceeded with the expansion of her colonial empire
in every quarter of the globe, — in India and Indo-
China, in Africa, in AustraHa, and in the islands of
the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, from 1840 to 1842,
she waged the shameful opium war against China,
which gave her the opportunity to seize Hong Kong,
and in 1839 ^^"^^ wrested Aden from the Turkish Em-
pire, although at the time the relations of the two
countries were absolutely peaceful, and in 1857 she
completed her acquisitions in this region by adding
to them the island of Perim in the Strait of Bab-el-
Mandeb. Naturally, by such a policy of ruthless
acquisition Great Britain became embroiled in war
after war, first in one part of the world and then in
another, so that from the year 1793 until the present
time there have been but few years in which the
British were not fighting somewhere, and had Lon-
don, like Rome, possessed a temple of Janus, its
gates would rarely have been found closed.

Since these wars were carried on with an army of
mercenaries officered by men who made military
service their profession in life, the mother country
was little affected by them, and the English could

156 English World Supremacy

calmly proceed with the development of their indus-
trial pursuits, and, quite undisturbed, enjoy the bene-
fits to be derived from them.

Britain no longer found it necessary to interfere
in the affairs of continental Europe by force of
arms ; ^ all that was needed now was to rouse the
jealousy of one state for another, and, if feasible,
to stir up internal dissensions, so that no one of
these countries might gain in power sufficient to be-
come a formidable rival for Britain. To this task
the British statesmen now devoted themselves
with both zeal and persistence, for which they de-
serve the greater credit since their total ignorance of
actual conditions on the continent and of the sen-
timents prevailing among the different nationalities
there was a constant hindrance to the success of their
efforts, and led them into frequent blunders.

The past master in this art was Lord Palmerston,
who at the time of the reform legislation accepted
office in the Whig ministry although hitherto he had
been a Tory, and in the capacity of secretary for
foreign affairs now continued Canning's policy. He
soon came to be both the inspiration and the strength
of the Liberal ministries of which he continued to
be a member up to the time of his death in 1865.

^ There is but one exception; it is to be found in Britain's
participation in the Greek war of independence, to which
Canning was largely influenced by his disinclination to
allow Russia a free hand in this connection. That Eng-
land, as the ally of France and Russia, took part in the
battle of Navarino was referred to as an " untoward
event" in which the English had become involved much
against their will.

Lord Palmerston

157

He was the typical representative of the England of
his day just as the elder Pitt had been representative
of his country a century earlier. But that he was
far from being Pitt's equal either in intellectual abil-
ity or in the weight of his personality is clearly
shown by the nature of the development which Eng-
land experienced while under his influence, for this
was the time when the country entered upon its
epoch of subservience to public opinion, and there-
fore of mediocrity. Since the passage of the Re-
form Bill England has produced but two truly great
statesmen, men who were eminently self-reliant, and
because of the steadfastness of their convictions
could follow their own course and withstand the
pressure of popular currents of opinion. The first
of these. Sir Robert Peel, made the enactment of
the reform measures possible by the invincible man-
ner with which he met every hostile attack, and
overcame and discarded outgrown opinions as soon
as he was convinced that they were no longer ten-
able; the other, Disraeli, was the organizer of the
new Conservative party.

Palmerston, on the contrary, sailed with the wind,
and allowed himself to be borne on the currents of
public opinion which he had an apt way of embody-
ing in convenient but by no means profound phrases,
that had the merit, however, of being readily appre-
hended by the most ordinary intelligence, and which
were oftentimes characterized by a perplexing cyni-
cism. He was therefore the very man to be popular
with the people, — the warm-hearted aristocrat who
was in sympathy with them. If in this respect he

iqS English World Supremacy

went farther than did his more cautious and reticent
colleagues, this but served to increase his popularity.
He had a way of saying bluntly and without reserve
just what all Englishmen felt and desired in their
hearts, and he was little concerned as to whether or
not it would give offence to benighted foreigners.

Just as he did at home, so abroad in his foreign
policy also, Lord Palmerston assumed the role of the
well-meaning, inoffensive gentleman who was dis-
interested enough to give good advice to the deluded
people and Cabinets of other countries that had as
yet not attained to the height of culture and intellec-
tual superiority of the English, and to lead these for-
eign nations in the right direction, so that, as he
once said, they might follow the shining example of
England, though of necessity still far behind her.
That these plans for other nations always harmo-
nized with England's best interests was regarded as
a happy coincidence, or, more likely, as both the evi-
dence and the result of Britain's moral and political
superiority. That the principles he advocated on
one such occasion were often diametrically opposed
to the counsel he had given on another, or to Eng-
land's course of action, disturbed him not one whit,
for he was like every normal Englishman, who al-
ways has two conflicting sets of principles at his
command, either one of which may be produced as
the occasion may demand, and then be proclaimed in
lofty phrases, and with every evidence of absolute
conviction.

In contrast to the policy pursued by the powers
of the Holy Alliance, England now declared and

Policy of Interference 1 59

maintained the principle of non-intervention, — ev-
ery nation's right to settle its own affairs without
interference from abroad ; nevertheless England did
interfere unasked in every political movement of
consequence that took place on the continent. In
Spain England fomented and supported the sangui-
nary civil war between the Carlists and the Christi-
nes, and perpetuated the political unrest there by ex-
cluding the legitimate heir from the throne and se-
curing it for the female line. In France any revo-
lutionary uprising was sure of British sympathy,
every newly established form of government re-
ceived British recognition, it mattered little whether
its nature was liberal like that of the monarchy un-
der the " citizen King," or that of the Republic,
or whether it was a newly created imperial despo-
tism such as resulted from the usurpation by Napo-
leon III. In the former instances it was the liberty
of the people that had to be defended; in the latter,
the state of anarchy and the need of a restoration
of political order called for intervention; both of
these excuses served the British government as ready
catchwords in defense of its policy. The aspira-
tions for a united Italy found quick and sympathetic
response in England, where the government not only
granted asylum to the revolutionary agitators and
other Italian political refugees, but, by diplomatic
measures as well as by secretly extended financial aid
and by still other means, supported the Italian move-
ment in so far as possible without entangling the
two countries in a war. In like manner, although
faihng of the desired result, England countenanced

l6o English World Supremacy

the Polish insurrections, and was the abettor of the
revolutionists in Russia also.

In Germany every tendency tow^ard liberalism met
with encouragement from England, as did also the
aspirations of the smaller states to maintain their
sovereignty undiminished; when, however, in 1848
the German people made the attempt to achieve po-
litical unity, England was found in the ranks of their
opponents, while every effort to create a German
navy was frowned upon by England with ever in-
creasing enmity, and its new ensign was declared an
emblem of piracy. When the Belgians revolted
against the Netherlands, England intervened in sup-
port of the doctrine that every nation has the right
to decide its own destiny, and in combination with
France favored the establishment of the Belgian
kingdom, to be held henceforth as neutral territory.
But when the people of Schleswig-Holstein. who are
Germans, endeavored to throw off the Danish yoke,
England declared the integrity of the Danish king-
dom to be necessary to the stability of European con-
ditions, and, in alliance with Russia, compelled these
German duchies to return to Danish domination.

Likewise for many decades the preservation of
Turkish integrity constituted a fundamental dogma
of Britain's foreign policy because it was a neces-
sary precautionary measure, not only to protect Brit-
ish commerce with the Levant, but also to safeguard
the importation of grains from southern Russia and
from the fertile basin of the Danube. At that time
this was a matter of vital importance to Great Brit-
ain, but through the tremendous increase of grain

Relations: Turkey j Greece and Russia i6l

production in India, Australia and Canada, as well as
in the Argentine Republic, this precautionary policy
has become less and less of a necessity to Britain,
This explains the change that has gradually taken
place in the English attitude toward Turkey and
Russia, and which began at some time during the
eighties of the last century. Up to that time it
would have been fatal for England to allow a for-
eign power to gain control of the narrow water-
ways leading into the' Mediterranean, and she could
unfortunates were obliged to pay tribute to the Turk,
ish Empire to a state of vassalage. This is the rea-
son also why England looked on with indifference
while the Christian subject populations of the Sul-
tan's empire struggled for political liberty ; that these
unfortunates were obliged to pay tribute to the Turk
and were dependent upon his despotic will was re-
garded as an unalterable dispensation of Providence,
just as was Britain's sovereignty of the seas, or Ire-
land's thraldom. It explains also why England
was a partner in the negotiations by which the do-
main of the newly established Greek kingdom was
so circumscribed in extent that its political signifi-
cance was dwarfed, and a full development of its
power made impossible. What the Greek nation
has nevertheless accomplished is astounding, and
merits the highest praise.^ It was all of a piece

^ The ill treatment that Greece has suffered at the hands
of the European powers forms one of the saddest chapters
in the history of the nineteenth century. Moreover, a pes-
simistically inclined historian would find a most promising
subject for his pen in the record of the attempts by which

1 62 English World Supremacy

with this poHcy also that a Bavarian prince, who
was then still a minor, was placed upon the throne
of Greece, and was succeeded, upon his abdication,
by an entirely apathetic Danish prince who, in con-
trast to his predecessor. King Otho, never took any
deep interest in the land whose official head he had
come to be. In the despicable game of intrigue in
which the diplomats at the Court of Athens were
engaged, and by which the poor little country was
kept in a never ending state of unrest, England took
an eager hand, while the several attempts of the
Cretans to gain their liberation from the Turk, and
finally to achieve their union with Greece, were al-
ways suppressed with the force of British arms.
It was in the further pursuit of this policy of self-
interested caution that in 1840 England prevented
the victorious Pasha, Mehemet Ali, then in alliance
with France, from reaping the full fruits of his
military successes, and with the use of the powerful
British fleet compelled him to relinquish his terri-
torial acquisitions, and confined his dominion to the
limits of Egypt.

But, when in 1853 Nicholas I began his intended

the " concert of European powers " endeavored by a diplo-
macy of the grossest intrigue to get rid of the problems
that at different times threatened to precipitate a European
conflict. Fortunately these attempts generally resulted as
they deserved, — events took their own course in spite of
them, and the diplomats had their trouble for their pains.
Nevertheless it must not be overlooked that a deal of suf-
fering and much bloodshed that might have been averted
were the invariable consequences of this kind of diplo-
macy, while of good results there were none.

Loss of Prestige in Europe 163

war of aggression against the Turkish Empire, Eng-
land at once allied herself with France to stay his
sword, and proceeded against him with the imme-
diate assistance of French arms. In the progress
of the Crimean war England showed herself to be
an adept in the art of making her ally's soldiers
fight for the advancement of British interests,
whereas Napoleon found it impossible to carry out
the wider plans with which he had entered the war.
To engage the Germanic powers also, and, as in the
preceding century, to secure German armies to fight
her battles on the continent for her, was England's
further intention ; but in this she failed, despite the
pressure exerted by her diplomacy. The Prussian
state had by this time become too conscious of its
growing strength, and, in spite of much vacillation
and evidence of internal weakness in its policy, had
preserved sufficient self-esteem to prevent Prussia
from renouncing her position among the great pow-
ers of Europe and becoming vassal to Britain.
And again, both in the diplomatic and military
preparations for war, England clearly revealed the
weakness and confusion that are characteristic of
her political organization, and showed how much
of truth there is in the frequently heard English
expression of " we are drifting into the war."
Nevertheless, since England had once assumed the
attitude that she had, this war undoubtedly served
her ends.

The alluring promises with which Lord Palmer-
ston sought to win over the nations of the continent
seemed at first to meet with the desired response;

164 English World Supremacy

gradually, however, their true import became more
and more apparent. Indeed, it was hardly possible
that the absolute selfishness of England's European
policy could long remain unrecognized, for her mer-
ciless procedure with regard to the peoples of more
distant parts of the world, as well as her constantly
increasing territorial acquisitions, made too striking
a contrast to her humane sounding phrases, to judge
from which one would suppose Britain's sole pur-
pose to be the achievement of human welfare.,
Moreover, time revealed that although the demands
that the English government made under Lord Pal-
merston were both high sounding and imperious,
they were usually not insisted upon in the face of
a courageous and vigorous resistance. Only the
weak and faint-hearted were likely to suffer from
open violence at the hands of England, which in
the end always seemed timidly indisposed to become
involved in a great war, and, in view of the internal
organization, not without good reason. For rea-
sons such as these Britain suffered a gradual loss
of respect on the continent ; but the deep seated aver-
sion to the English that soon became more and more
general among the continental nations, and which
was greater than all political differences, is to be
attributed to the influence of Lord Palmerston more
than to any other cause.

The half century succeeding the fall of Napoleon
witnessed the high water mark of British suprem-
acy. During this period of her history England
may well be said to have held the sceptre of a world
empire even in a far wider sense than did Spain in

Height of English Supremacy 1 65

the sixteenth century, or than did Louis XIV, or
even the great Napoleon himself. For, although
British domination did not express itself in the sub-
jugation of the other countries but left them their
independence, and although England was by no
means in a position everywhere and at all times to
enforce her demands, nevertheless there was not a
power in the world that would have dared to oppose
her, whereas against the former empires half the
world stood in arms. England's wishes, on the con-
trary, were respected by the states of the European
continent and were usually carried out, while her
sovereignty of the seas, and with it the control of
the world's commerce, was absolute. In the other
continents, aside from the North American republic
and the Russian possessions in Asia, England's will
was law, in so far as she desired it to be enforced,
and within the limits she set for herself; nor did she
find it a difficult task, whenever it was necessary, to
compel obedience by force of arms.

CHAPTER XII

New Dangers — France — Russia — America
AND Germany

By and by, however, clouds began to appear In
the clear sky of British world domination, and then
gradually gathered into a storm that threatened to
break in violence. France, England's old-time rival,
could of course not for a moment entertain the
thought of another passage at arms with her former
enemy. But that prosperous country had soon re-
cuperated from the after effects of the Napoleonic
wars; industry and commerce received a fresh im-
petus, and France could now turn her attention to
regaining her former position on the Mediterranean,
as well as to renewed efforts to secure colonial pos-
sessions, which she inaugurated by the conquest of
Algeria, begun in 1830.

Although England resorted to arms in 1840 for
the purpose of frustrating the French attempt to gain
a preponderating influence in Egypt and in the Turk-
ish Empire, still it was not at all likely that France
would ever again become a formidable foe, able
to dispute Britain's supremacy. It was not long,
therefore, before a number of overtures were made
with the intention of establishing a " cordial un-
derstanding " between these two great powers, both

166

Attitude toward France and Russia 167

at the time of Louis Philippe and of Napoleon III,
but, it goes without saying, always with the tacit
reservation that each of these cordial friends would
take advantage of every opportunity to out-manceu-
vre the other, a part of the program which each of
the participants carried out with scrupulous care.
England and France therefore fought side by side
in the Crimean war, whereby the French influence
on the Mediterranean and in the commerce of the
Levant was greatly strengthened; nor did England
protest when Napoleon interfered in Italian affairs,
nor did she take any steps to prevent his war with
Austria, while as early as 1842 the English looked
on with complaisance when the French seized a
number of islands in the Pacific. From 1857 ^o
i860, England and France, as allies, together waged
a war of aggression against China, while at the
same time France laid the foundations for her
colonial possessions in Cochin China and Cambodia,
and took a neighborly position next to the English
near the outlet of the Red Sea on the Gulf of Ta-
jura; she also began to extend and develop her
colonial interests in Senegambia.

A much more dangerous expansion was proceed-
ing in another quarter. Basing her claims on her
protectorate of the Eastern Christians, Russia was
exerting pressure upon the Sultan in the hope of
gaining free access to the Mediterranean by re-
ducing his empire to a state of complete subjection
to Russia. On the Asiatic continent Russia sub-
jugated the region south of the Caucasus, en-
croached upon Persia, and extended her dominions

1 68 New Dangers

southward from Siberia, not only toward the Amur
River and China (1858-1860), but into central
Asia as well, with an unwavering persistence ever
since the year 1846, although a first attempt in 1839
had ended in failure. In 1867 the province of
Turkestan was established, and the khanates of this
region made subject to Russia. Thus the danger
of Russian encroachment upon India grew more
imminent with every year; the vast resources that
the giant empire had at its command, and which
the Russians were slowly learning to utilize, were
constantly increasing its power of conquest. Con-
sequently the Russian menace of Turkey and of
Persia, as well as the Czar's eager desire for an
ice-free port on one of the world's great bodies of
water, from whence Russian trade could mingle with
the commerce of the world, were causing the Brit-
ish increasing anxiety for the maintenance of their
empire of the seas.

Thus it came about that the British began to look
upon Russia as their most formidable opponent,
and the desire to keep that vast empire within bounds
became the central thought of their foreign policy.
Although the armies of Britain and Russia had
marched together against France at the time of the
great Napoleon, the turn of affairs now led the
British to behold in their one-time ally their pres-
ent foe, and in their usual way they proceeded to
plan how all the other states of the continent might
be called to arms for a united attack upon the former
ally whose power had increased all too greatly.
Therefore France, Britain's rival of the past, that

Relations with America 1 69

by this time, however, had been sufficiently humbled,
was not only allowed a free hand, but was even
sought as an ally. After the Crimean war England
only very seldom opposed the Emperor of France,
in spite of the tension to which his restless and dar-
ingly adventurous policy often gave rise. As usual,
in this war against Russia the English posed as
the vanguard of European civilization arrayed
against Asiatic oppression and barbarism, and were
full of reproaches for the nations that would not
respond to England's call.

Meanwhile two other countries had each entered
on the road leading to political power and an ever
increasing industrial and commercial importance:
the United States of North America and Germany.
Ever since the revolutionary war the new republic
had been increasing its territory step by step until
it had reached truly vast proportions; meanwhile
the land was gradually being peopled by the con-
tinuously arriving streams of immigrants, and the
industrial and commercial interests had begun to
be developed. In the early forties of the past cen-
tury the United States began to show a desire for
Texas and the Pacific coast. This almost led to
another war with England, since, in the excited
state of American " public opinion," which had
been purposely and artificially stimulated, a claim
was made to the entire territory reaching as far
north as 54°, 40'. However, when all the vehement
talk had accomplished its purpose in the campaign
for the presidential election of 1844, the Americans,
after all, preferred to come to an agreement with

170 New Dangers

England, and the 49th parallel was decided upon to
mark the northern boundary of the United States.
The American republic then sought consolation by
an attack upon her weaker neighbor in the south,
and deprived Mexico of California and New Mex-
ico.

Very soon after these events England most de-
cidedly sounded a retreat when, by the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty (April 19, 1850), she abandoned
her plans for an inter-oceanic canal through Cen-
tral America, and discontinued her negotiations for
the purchase of the necessary territory in that re-
gion, while the United States assumed like obliga-
tions. A few years later the interpretation of this
treaty, as well as England's reckless impressment of
Americans for service in the Crimean war, involved
the two countries in serious complications, more
especially so since Lord Palmerston, with his habit-
ual haughtiness, refused to meet the Americans half
way.

Meanwhile on the other side of the water Ger-
many was making steady although slow progress
toward economic strength. Her industries were
being developed in a vigorous and alert spirit of
enterprise, although her over-seas trade was still
largely in the hands of foreign nations and of the
Hanse cities. The latter had understood well how
to increase their commercial importance and en-
large their fleet of merchantmen by pursuing a pol-
icy that had interwoven the interests of the great
powers into its fabric, and especially by fostering
amicable relations with Great Britain. This pol-

The Rise of Germany 171

icy had, however, served to alienate these cities from
the German land in v^hich they are situated, and
their relations to it came to be almost those of for-
eign states.

The leadership in the German economic develop-
ment devolved upon Prussia, this state being com-
pelled to assume the responsibility because of the
absurd distribution of the territory which the Con-
gress of Vienna had allotted to its jurisdiction, as
well as by the political questions with which it was
confronted. The deciding event was the forma-
tion of the Zollverein (customs union) ; its gradual
extension to include every part of German terri-
tory aside from Austria was a peremptory necessity,
and from it the smaller states could not, in spite of
much opposition, remain permanently aloof. More-
over, the system of universal military service which
Prussia had newly introduced exerted an influence
by which all the people of all the provinces within
Prussian jurisdiction felt themselves to be united
into a single nation, proud of their national indi-
viduality and self-reliant independence. This gave
the Prussian state a firm foundation, and one that
made the pursuit of an independent policy possible
to the government, if it had the courage to devise
one and carry it through. It is all too well known
how the English sought to disparage this highest
achievement of the modern state, and to represent
it as unworthy of a free nation, and far inferior to
the system of voluntary enlistment by means of
which Britain provides herself with an army of
hirelings disciplined with the lash, and how this

172 New Dangers

representation found an echo in the particularism
of the smaller German states, whose people were
quite content in the comfort that their quiet political
life afforded them.

Likewise England endeavored to retard the prog-
ress of the Zollverein, for this conflicted with her
doctrine of free trade, the Englishman's cure-all,
while it also set a limit to the flood of English man-
ufactured wares pouring into Germany, and made
German economic development possible. That the
German aspirations for political unity met with vig-
orous opposition from England has already been
stated. But gradually it dawned upon the English
that with the methods they were employing they
could never hope to prevent this economic and po-
litical progress, and they therefore began to recog-
nize in Germany a competitor who was likely to
cause them a deal of uneasiness in the future, al-
though for the present, England could still afford
to assume the mien of a generous magnate who did
not grudge an insignificant neighbor his small gains.

In connection with the Crimean war Prussia
showed that she, and all Germany with her, refused
to be taken in tow by England and her policy, and
that this German state was powerful enough to
proceed on the way of her own choosing. Soon
afterward, under the direction of William I, who
persevered in the face of much opposition from
among his own people, Prussia entered upon the
course by which the national aspirations could be
realized.

CHAPTER XIII

The Crisis and English Retrogression
I 862- I 864

Thus it would appear that at the beginning of
the sixties Enghsh prestige had suffered a decHne,
and that British influence was far from what it had
been during the decades just preceding this period
of her history, in spite of her material prosperity
and the continued expansion of her colonial empire.
The most serious disturbance to which that empire
had yet been subjected, the terrible Indian revolt,
had just been quelled, the East India Company
practically discontinued, and the government of In-
dia organized on a reasonable basis. Everywhere
new and intricate problems had arisen, and it was a
question whether England would be able to solve
them to the advantage of her own interests, and so
preserve to herself the latent sovereignty of the
world. For the conduct of a war on the continent
was even more impossible to England now, with her
diminutive army against the enormous military
forces at the command of the continental states, than
it had been in former times, unless, as heretofore,
she could procure powerful allies, and these were
hard to find, while nowhere, as of yore, were there
soldiers to be bought at the courts of petty princi-

173

174 Retrogression 1862-1864

palities. Nor would a serious conflict at sea be
free from dangers for Britain, even should her navy
remain quite unscathed; for British commerce and
British industry — for the very reason of their
magnitude — would incur such tremendous losses
thereby, and experience so great a set back, that
British statesmen had good reason to shrink from
such a war.

The deciding events by which the tide was turned
were the American civil war and the German con-
flict with Denmark, and may be said to date from
the year 1862 to 1864. That it would be to Brit-
ain's advantage if the American republic should be
severed into two parts each filled with hatred of the
other, and for years likely at any moment to fall
upon each other in open hostility is too obvious to
need enlargement. Should the Republic remain an
undivided country, it would inevitably develop into
a mighty power through the rapid increase of its
population by immigration from abroad, as well as
by the utilization of the " unlimited possibilities "
that were enclosed within its own boundaries.
More than once in the past had its truly invulner-
able position inspired the United States with confi-
dence sufficient to meet the British demands with a
curt refusal, which Britain had been obliged to ac-
cept. Now the opportunity seemed at hand for
England to deal this growing rival of the west a
fatal blow without over much exertion on her own
part, nor all too great an expenditure of treasure.
The industries and the commercial cities of the
northern states only were England's competitors;

American War of Secession 1 75

the southern states were her profitable customers.
Moreover, it was from this section of the country
that England annually received enormous quantities
of raw cotton, the manufacture of which constituted
a very important source of her industrial prosperity.
To these considerations must be added the sympathy
which the aristocratic circles in England entertained
for the southern gentry.

Thus a strong sentiment in favor of the slave
states prevailed in England. So intense was this
feeling that it would not be satisfied with conceding
the rights of a belligerent to the Confederacy at the
very outset of the war, in consequence of which the
seceded states ceased to be looked upon as rebels,
and their cruisers were no longer regarded as pirate
craft, but as vessels of war. It demanded still more.
— the official recognition of the Confederacy as an
independent state, for this step would inevitably
have led to an open stand in favor of the South,
and therefore to a participation in the war against
the North. That in this event England would be
fighting to maintain slavery was an ugly side-issue
which caused the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord
John Russell, many anxious doubts as to whether
he ought to follow his predisposition toward an
idealistic and humanitarian course, or surrender to
the urgent demands for the pursuit of a conscience-
less policy of self-interest on the part of England.
With his usual bluntness of speech Lord Palmerston,
who was then Prime Minister, placed the situation
squarely before the American minister at London,
Mr. Charles Francis Adams, when he said, " We

176 Retrogression 18 62- 1864

are no lovers of slavery; but we need cotton, and
your Morrill Tariff (America's high protective
tarifif) is not to our liking at all."

This sentiment in favor of the South and against
the northern states was promoted by the serious
defeats that the North suffered in the early part of
the war, and still further by the excitement which
followed a grave violation of international law by
the North through the capture of two Confederate
envoys while on their way to Europe, Mason and
Slidell, who were taken from the British steam
packet Trent by the commander of a United States
man-of-war on November 8, 1861.^ The " Times,"
which has always been both the creator and the
mouthpiece of the ruling current of public opinion,
was, as has been only too often the case, on the side
of the morally less worthy cause, which it advocated
with its customary resort to expressions of great
ethical pathos, and apparently quite untroubled by
conscientious scruples of any kind. It now became
the champion of the seceded states, proclaimed their
right to independence, and deluged the North with
vindictive abuse. Even Gladstone, who considered
himself a Liberal, and who at the time was Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, favored the official recog-

^ Whenever it is to her advantage, England assumes the
attitude of the devoted advocate of international law, and
breaks the vials of her morally justified wrath upon the
head of every offender against it; when she is the gainer
by its violation, however, she has never hesitated to
trample it under foot. In the present war England has far
outdone any breach of international law of which the
Americans were guilty in 1861.

opposition to the North lyy

fiiffon of the Confederacy. The moral justification
for this attitude was found in the phrase that the
states of the South had shown a firm determiiiatiori
to maintain their independence, and at the same time
had proved themselves to be unconquerable; it
therefore was England's duty to acknowledge the
right of every nation to decide its own destiny, and
to stand for it.

Although the Florida, a war vessel built in Liver-
pool for the Confederacy, was seized by the British
authorities in the vicinity of the Bahama Islands
soon after it had put to sea, for in this instance the
violation of the law had been all too flagrant, it soon
regained its freedom by process of law. In the case
of the Alabama, however, another English built
cruiser, the British authorities made no attempt to
detain the vessel, but allowed her to slip to sea on
July 29, 1862; hardly had she made her escape
when the order came to detain her in compliance
with a demand for an investigation of her status,
which had been made by the American minister,
the order having been intentionally delayed by the
English authorities until it was too late to enforce
it. When out at sea the Alabama was then pro-
vided with guns, ammunition and coal by two Brit-
ish vessels, — of course, without the knowledge of
the entirely innocent British government.

At last, Lord John Russell himself was per-
suaded to open negotiations for combined inter-
vention on the part of the European great powers.
Russia absolutely declined ; Napoleon, however, who
at this time was just entering upon his Mexican

178 Retrogression 1 862-1 864

adventure, eagerly accepted the opportunity, and
early in 1863 did in fact offer French mediation,
which the North, of course, politely refused. This
step on the part of Napoleon acted rather as a
deterrent upon the English government because of
the deep distrust with which it regarded the Em-
peror of the French. In addition, a strongly un-
favorable sentiment had developed in England
among the democratic masses to whom slavery was
an abomination and war a horror, and this feeling
was further stimulated by a vigorous agitation con-
ducted by a part of the Liberals under the leader-
ship of John Bright. Moreover, the United States
was very fortunate in its representative at London,
Mr. Charles Francis Adams, whose consummate
skill in handling the interests of his country, as well
as the great tact he displayed in correcting or
smoothing over the blunders made by Mr. Seward,
President Lincoln's Secretary of State, did much
toward saving the situation for the northern states.
President Lincoln made the decisive counter-
move, however, when on September 22, 1862, he
issued a preliminary proclamation, to be followed
on January i, 1863, by the final proclamation by
which the slaves were emancipated, for by this de-
parture from his original intention, he made the
war not only a struggle to maintain the Union, but
one to eradicate slavery as well. As much as the
ruling circles in England desired and tried to be-
little the character and effect of this step, its influ-
ence upon the general public could not fail even-
tually to be a powerful one. It was altogether too

England Yields lyg

incongruous that England, the country that in 1807
had prohibited the slave trade, in 1833 had abol-
ished slavery in its colonies, and since that time
had sought to suppress the slave trade on every
ocean by the pursuit and capture of all slave ships,
should now turn about and participate in open war-
fare for the preservation of slavery in the states of
the South. As late as March 2y, 1863, Lord Pal-
merston, in his speech to the Parliament, defended
the Government for the course it had pursued in
the case of the Florida and of the Alabama; but on
April 5, Lord Russell ordered the detention of an-
other war vessel that was intended for the Confed-
erate service, and which at the time was still in dock
at Liverpool. At last this long continued state of
uncertainty came to an end when, after frequent
defeats, the North was victorious at Gettysburg on
July 3, the greatest as well as the decisive battle
of the war, followed immediately afterward by the
surrender of Vicksburg to General Grant. On
September 5, two more armored cruisers that were
being built at Liverpool for the Confederacy were
prevented by Lord Russell from putting to sea ; the
claim that they were intended for France or Egypt,
and that therefore England had no right to inter-
fere with them, proved untenable, thanks to the
efforts made by Mr. Adams, and after long drawn
out negotiations the vessels were finally bought by
the English government in order to put an end to
the matter.

To make the defeat of the English attitude com-
plete the American government soon afterward

l8o Retrogrression 1862-1S64

made all the negotiations in the matter pubh'c.
There was then nothing left for Parliament to do,
in spite of much violent criticism of the Cabinet for
the discreditable and vacillating policy that it had
pursued, but to refuse to pass a vote of censure
(February 23, 1864), since this v^ould have been
equivalent to a declaration of war against the north-
ern states, and under these circumstances the Oppo-
sition could not have undertaken the government.

This ended the matter; the British intention to
support the Confederacy had come to nought, and
Britain made no further attempt to interfere in the
American civil war. That the outcome is not to
be regarded as a triumph for America only, but also
as a decided defeat for the English aristocracy and
as a complete victory for democratic tendencies, has
been pointed out by an American historian.^ It
was only two years later that Gladstone, the heir
to Lord Palmerston's leadership in the Commons,
introduced his bill for comprehensive parliamentary
reforms, and although he and his bill were defeated,

^ Brooks Adams, a son of the American minister at Lon-
don, in a paper entitled, " The Seizure of the Laird Rams "
(the armored cruisers that were built in the Birkenhead
dock near Liverpool for the southern states), and pub-
lished in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, December, 191 1, the society to which he presented
the highly interesting correspondence and documents that
were left him by his father. Other valuable and instruc-
tive material on the subject may be found in " The Trent
Affair " and in " A Crisis in Downing Street " by C. F.
Adams, another son of the American minister to England,
and published in the Proceedings of November, 191 1, and
of May, 1914.

Germany's War with Denmark i8l

it was but a short time afterward that Disraeli,
whose keen poHtical insight had recognized the sit-
uation, and who also knew well how to turn it to
the advantage of Conservative interests, put through
a bill for still wider reforms in 1867.

Meanwhile in Germany the Schleswig-Holstein
question, which had dragged on indefinitely, now
reached an acute stage. In December, 1863, the
armies of the German allies occupied Holstein, and
on February i the Prussian and Austrian forces
crossed the Eider, and the war against Denmark
was on. The English government again did all in
its power to preserve the integrity of Denmark and
to prevent Prussia from taking possession of the
Kiel Haven and the coast of Schleswig. The Eng-
lish were especially eager to frustrate the Prussian
plans because they were aware of the further, and
in the sight of England highly reprehensible plan
to cut a canal from the mouth of the Elbe through
to the Baltic, whereby Germany's naval position
would be greatly strengthened, and an end would
be made of the dangerous possibility of closing the
Baltic by a blockade of the Sound. Therefore,
while Lord Russell was again seeking an adjust-
ment, this time as to how the demands of political
moral integrity and the perfectly just German claims
might be made to harmonize with the preservation
of British interests, Palmerston, together with Lord
Clarendon and with a resort to all that English
diplomacy could ofifer, was doing what he could to
stiffen the necks of the Danes, and at the same time
to bring about another European coalition against

1 82 Retrogression 1 862-1 864

Germany, like the one of 1848. The entire Eng-
Hsh press was on the side of Denmark, and de-
clared German interference in the " internal af-
fairs " of Denmark to be absolutely unjustified.^
All England, whose fleet in 1801 and 1807 had bom-
barded Copenhagen, although the two countries
were then absolutely at peace, and in the Crimean
war had fired upon Russian seaport towns and fish-
ing hamlets without the slightest compunction, now
was ablaze with righteous indignation because dur-
ing the siege of the Diippel fortifications, the town
of Sonderburg, lying just back of them, also suf-
fered from the bombardment. Lord Shaftesbury
shed crocodile tears over so great a crime, and Lord
Palmerston portrayed with fiery eloquence the
enormity of a bombardment of Copenhagen by the
Prussians.

Thus the war against Denmark was at the same
time a war against England and her domination of
the world. In reliance upon the English promises
privately conveyed, the Danish government declined
all proffered mediation, and so lost the opportunity
to retain at least a part of Schleswig in her posses-
sion. We know how finally all obstacles and dan-
gers were overcome by Bismarck's statesmanship,
and the complete separation of the duchies from

^ Abroad this has remained the prevailing view, up to the
present day. Charles Eliot, the leader of public opinion in
America, in an article upon the present war that is re-
markable for the arrogance and self-sufficiency of its tone
as well as for the ignorance it displays, declares that Prus-
sia made war upon Denmark for the purpose of gaining
possession of the harbors of Schleswig.

Defeat in the Danish War 1 83

Denmark was accomplished. When matters came
to a final decision, it became evident how much, or
rather how little England's high sounding talk and
fierce threats really amounted to ; all obligations of
an official nature had been carefully avoided, and
England now refused to give Denmark any sup-
port whatever, and withdrew entirely from the mat-
ter. The scales were turned when Prussia gained
Russian favor by her attitude on the Polish ques-
tion, and when it became evident that Napoleon
was not at all inclined to undertake a war against
the German powers, but rather hoped in this con-
nection to find an opportunity to fish in troubled
waters, and was therefore justly regarded with little
confidence by England. Dependent upon herself
alone, England did not find it advisable to venture a
war; she might, without doubt, have destroyed Ger-
many's over-seas commerce, but her own would
have suffered incalculable loss, and for a war by
land her army was quite too insufficient.

Again there was nothing for Parliament to do
but to accept the situation as best it might, and it
did so by giving its tardy sanction to the Govern-
ment's policy with all its pitiful vacillations by a
vote of thanks to the Queen for the preservation of
peace.

CHAPTER XIV

Suspension of Colonial Aggression — Ten-
sion Between England and Russia
(1865-1881)

In consequence of these two serious defeats of
her diplomacy the prestige of England's supremacy
was somewhat dimmed ; they indicate the turning
point in British sovereignty of the world. From
this time forth, and for many years to come, Eng-
land kept aloof from the affairs of the continent,
and in a large measure allowed them to take care
of themselves. She stood by with arms crossed
when Prussia and Austria were at war, and again
when the German Confederation was established.
At the London Conference with regard to Luxem-
burg in 1867, in which England participated with
great reluctance, she made the neutralization of this
tiny state assume a most illusive nature by the ex-
planation which the Cabinet gave to the Parliament,
saying that, according to the agreement, the con-
tracting powers guaranteed the neutrality of Luxem-
burg jointly, and against a third party only, and
that should one of the contracting parties attempt
its violation, the guarantee of neutrality would in-
stantly become inoperative. During the war be-
tween Germany and France, England proclaimed

184

Attitude During the Turkish War 185

her neutrality, although this in no wise prevented
the English government from allowing the very
lucrative exportation of arms and other contraband
of war to France. When Russia improved the op-
portunity that this war gave her to renounce the
obligation never to maintain a war fleet on the
Black Sea, which had been imposed upon her by the
terms of the Peace of Paris in 1856, England not
only failed to protest against this, but was obliged
to sanction it at a conference held in London.

The only difficulties that seemed insurmountable
were those that resulted from England's relations
to Russia, and from the English purpose to main-
tain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The ten-
sion caused by Russia's advance into central Asia
was constantly growing, and threatened more than
once to end in war. Lord Salisbury's attempt to
settle the Balkan troubles by means of a conference
at Constantinople ended in utter failure early in
1877, the Sultan's checkmate to the English pro-
posal being the proclamation of a sham constitu-
tion, whereupon he announced that in the future
he could enter into no binding negotiations without
the consent of the Turkish Parliament, and that
therefore the conference would be to no purpose.
Later, when Russia, in secret alliance with Aus-
tria, began a new war upon the Turkish Empire,
England did not hesitate to offer instant opposition,
and really made serious preparations for war, in
consequence of which Russia modified her demands
at a conference held in Berlin, and at which a com-
promise was effected by means of German media-

1 86 Suspension of Colonial Aggression

tion. As usual, England again did not fail to
pocket the reward of her disinterested intervention
in behalf of the Turk and of European interests in
general, — the Sultan was obliged to cede Cypress
to her. Strange to say, and quite contrary to Eng-
land's customary skill in handling her colonial pos-
sessions, and in spite of the apparently favorable
situation of this island, England failed to utilize
the advantages it offered, and did not succeed in
establishing an efficient economic life upon the
island. Cypress is to the present day the most
neglected and undeveloped of all the British pos-
sessions. Furthermore England made the most of
the time during which Russia's hands were bound
by the war upon Turkey, to interfere in the affairs
of Turkestan, and to re-establish her former pre-
dominating influence there; in addition she widened
the boundaries of her Indian domain by taking pos-
session of the Khyber Pass, as well as of the passes
of the Suleiman Mountains and of a part of Be-
luchistan, and thus strengthened her hold upon the
entire country, since it gave her control of its nat-
ural boundaries.

Otherwise, during this epoch of her history, Eng-
land shows traces of weariness that are usually
seen in an old and glutted civilization, one that is
no longer capable of great exertion, and resignedly
accepts the inevitable, all of which are the more
apparent because of the vigor and tremendous pros-
perity that mark the period just preceding. The
restraint which is the chief characteristic of Eng-
land's foreign policy at this time, and her with-

Gladstone's Foreign Policy 187

drawal from any active participation in the affairs
of the continent were quite in keeping, it must be
said, with the theories of the Manchester School —
the " laissez aller " — the disposition to restrain, in
so far as possible, all interference on the part of the
state, and to leave everything to the natural devel-
opment of the economic forces. That the better
part of Britain's possessions in North America had
separated from the motherland, as had Mexico and
South America from Spain, together with the ever
increasing desire for an absolutely independent home
government on the part of Britain's other colonies,
led men to conclude that this was but the process
of a natural law, and that whenever colonies ar-
rived at the time when they could dispense with the
protection of the motherland, they separated from
it just as naturally as a ripe fruit drops from the
tree. With perfect sincerity the question was dis-
cussed as to whether it were not advisable for Eng-
land to break her connection with the colonies of
her own accord, to confer absolute independence
upon them, and so rid herself of the obligations
and responsibilities that their possession entailed.
Britain did in fact withdraw from the Ionian Is-
lands in 1863, and in 1856 she refused to annex the
Fiji Islands, of which she nevertheless did take pos-
session in 1874.

With this novel doctrine Mr. Gladstone was fully
in harmony, himself the greatest of dilettantes in
politics, and one who seemed better fitted to be a
professor of orthodox theology, or of Greek, than
to be the political leader of a great nation. His

1 88 Suspension of Colonial Aggression

knowledge and understanding of foreign lands and
their peoples — in sharp contrast to his rival, Dis-
raeli — were even less than were possessed by any
one of his predecessors in office, and in the myster-
ies of foreign politics he was always at sea. It
must be said, however, that he was an honest be-
liever in the doctrines that he proclaimed with great
eloquence. When in 1881 it came to a war with the
Transvaal Republic, which under Disraeli's admin-
istration had been annexed to the British dominions
in 1877, and the British arms suffered defeat at
Majuba Hill, Gladstone accepted the outcome, and,
in conformity to the doctrines he advocated, in-
duced his government to recognize the autonomy
of the Transvaal.

CHAPTER XV

The Period from i88i to 1901 — Relations
WITH France — America — Russia and
Turkey

Meanwhile it became evident that whenever
England's vital interests were at stake their con-
sideration far outweighed the claims of any polit-
ical theory. The attitude that the government had
taken, together with the ever growing influence
which was being exerted by public opinion, had for
its inevitable consequence that, instead of being the
leader in matters political, the government was now
being led, and was frequently driven to pursue a
course the end of which it could not foresee, while
behind the scenes there were irresponsible and un-
controllable forces at work, and skillful intriguers
were influencing the affairs of the state, and were
exploiting them for their own benefit. There was
the further drawback that the ministers of state
were never chosen for their professional fitness to
administer the departments of which they had
charge, but were chosen because of the political
services they had rendered their party, or in ac-
knowledgment of their influence in Parliament.

The business of the state was therefore in the hands

189

ipo Period from 1 88 1 to 1 90 1

of men who had no professional knowledge of the
affairs which they were conducting.

It is for these reasons that Britain usually finds
herself so illy prepared to enter upon large under-
takings; there is no comprehensive oversight of the
available means with which to meet them, and
therefore a want of unity in the direction of the
state's activities. Consequently England's political
conduct is characterized by irresolution and spas-
modic action. As was said at the time of the battle
of Navarino and of the Crimean war, England is
inclined to allow herself to be controlled by events
instead of herself controlling them. Usually, after
long continued irresolution, she either withdraws al-
together, if the timorous mood gains the upper hand,
or else the government takes energetic but impul-
sive measures by which a war is made inevitable,
but from which it does not appear clearly whether
this is the result of intended and definite action, or
whether the administration allowed itself to be hur-
ried unawares and by influences over which it had
no control to take an unpremeditated step, — for in-
stance, by the action of some diplomatic agent, or
by some energetic measure taken by a zealous offi-
cer, or in consequence of an agitation by the press.
Generally, a reaction ensues, the war opens with a
series of heavy defeats, for the reason that the nec-
essary military measures were unexpectedly and
hurriedly taken, and the defects in the organization
make themselves felt at every step. On the other
hand, it is in just this situation that the dogged
persistence of the Englishman is revealed at its best;

Influences at Work 191

once he finds himself at war, he does not allow him-
self to be discouraged by defeats, but fights to a
finish — a quality by which in the long and weari-
some twenty years' war wath France some glorious
results were achieved. It matters not how bitter
the opposition to the government and its measures
may have been, — as was the case at the time of
the English Revolution, — when the critical mo-
ment arrives, the administration is not embarrassed
by opposition. " Right or wrong, — my country ! "
is the watchword then, and all criticism is deferred
into the future when that which has come to pass
can no longer be undone, and, in spite of any moral
misgivings, is accepted with satisfaction. While at
the close of the war of the Spanish Succession, and
of the Seven Years' war also, the immediate change
that took place in the public mind had its origin,
no doubt, in internal conditions, still it was due in
no small degree to the fact that England had in the
main achieved her ends, and could point with pride
to rich results when she came to make peace. When
the reverse of this was true at the end of the Amer-
ican revolutionary war, the English nation came to
the conclusion that the revolting colonies were un-
conquerable, and that therefore it was best to con-
cede their independence, and so avoid what might
be worse.

This feature of English political life has been
clearly revealed in connection with Egyptian affairs
ever since the beginning of the political disturbances
in 1879. Up to that time Egypt had been chiefly
under the influence of the French, who had in-

192 Period from 1881 to igoi

troduced European civilization into the country to-
gether with its associated evil of political corruption,
and who now regarded it as a part of their domin-
ions, with the secret hope some day to carry out Na-
poleon's cherished plan, and, with Egypt as their
base, to launch an attack upon England's empire in
India, and upon her domination of the world as well.
England had allowed this situation to continue until
it threatened to become perilous, although in 1840
she had put an end to the tremendous political
power that Mehemet Ali had obtained with the aid
of France. The construction of the Suez Canal
(completed in 1869), financed with French capital,
was regarded by England with apprehension, and
an attempt was made to prevent it, but without suc-
cess. As the value of this new waterway became
more and more apparent, Egypt assumed a position
of tremendous importance in relation to England's
world domination. When this was fully realized,
England laid her hand upon the canal through Dis-
raeli's purchase of a large number of the company's
shares of stock in 1875. Soon afterward this states-
man secured for England a position of influence
equal to that of France in the land of the Khedive
by the introduction of the Anglo-French system of
" joint control "of Egyptian finances, which had
reached the point of bankruptcy through unparal-
leled recklessness in the expenditure of the state's
income.

Meanwhile the political mismanagement led to
the revolt of a military popular party under the
leadership of Arabi Pasha, which, after it had

English in Egypt 1 93

seized the government, soon proved itself quite in-
capable of enforcing the much needed reforms.
For a while England stood by as an observer ; then
the recently established Gladstone ministry cast to
the wind the peaceful doctrine of non-intervention
and the beautiful theory of every nation's right to
independence and self-government, which Gladstone,
as leader of the Opposition, had but lately pro-
claimed to the world with soul-stirring eloquence at
the time that he advocated intervention in behalf of
the Bulgarians and against their Turkish oppressors.
Suddenly a British fleet appeared on the coast of
Egypt and bombarded Alexandria on July 11, 1882.
France, entirely possessed by her hatred of Ger-
many and the desire for revenge, withdrew in a
spirit of short-sighted amiability, General Wolseley
took triumphant possession of the country, and made
short work of Arabi Pasha's authority. Since that
time Egypt has been a vassal state under control of
England on the same order as are the principalities
of India, although some unimportant concessions
are made to the claims of France and to the sov-
ereignty of the Sultan. When a short time after-
ward, the uprising under the Mahdi occurred, it
soon became evident how little system there really
was in the British rule, and how deplorably deficient
were the means at hand. The Anglo-Egyptian
forces in Kordofan were annihilated in 1883, and
General Gordon was sent to Khartum to fall a sac-
rifice to British inefficiency in 1885. For a decade
afterward the Sudan was left to shift for itself,
until in 1898 General Kitchener made an end of

194 Period from l88l to IQOI

the Mahdi's rule, and the Sudan was then annexed,
not to Egypt, but to the British dominions.

If on the one hand Britain opposed the domina-
tion of the French in Egypt, and crowded them out
of the valley of the Nile, it was for the sake of
placing her possession of India beyond a peradven-
dure, for in other directions she now generally al-
lowed the French a free hand. Republican France
soon developed a well-planned and vigorous co-
lonial policy whereby that country's resources were
enormously enlarged. The conquest of Tongking
was begun in 1883 and its possession successfully
defended against China; Annam became a vassal
state to France, the Kingdom of Siam was forced
to relinquish a part of its territory into French
hands, the subjugation of Madagascar was begun in
1885, and in 191 1 Tahiti was annexed. In addition
to all these acquisitions France proceeded with a
systematic plan of conquest in northwestern Africa,
for which Algeria and Senegambia served her ex-
cellently as centers of action. As early as 1881
Tunis was subjugated; in 1883 the French explorer,
de Brazza, penetrated to the banks of the Congo,
and the country as far as Lake Chad fell under
French domination, as did also the Niger territory
together with Timbuktu and the Sahara, and in 1892
Dahomey was added to the French conquests.
Thus, aside from the English and German colonies
that were sprinkled here and there among all these
French territorial possessions, and of the Canary
Islands owned by Spain, and the Cape Verde Islands
by Portugal, the control of the entire northwestern

Relations: France and America

195

part of the African continent had passed to France,
with the single exception of the Kingdom of
Morocco. This was now the only remaining inde-
pendent state, but was so closely pressed on all sides
by French territory that it was evidently the morsel
that had been reserved for the last, and it was now
but a question of time when it also would become a
victim to the French appetite for conquest.

England did not bar the way to this tremendous
expansion of French dominion, but whenever a con-
flict of interests occurred, as in Siam, allowed the
matter to be adjusted by treaty. The only time that
England assumed a threatening attitude was in 1898
when a French expedition under General Marchand
made the attempt to advance from the Congo as
far north as Fashoda on the upper Nile, and so
drive a dividing wedge between the British posses-
sions in the valley of the Nile and those in equa-
torial Africa. In this instance only did British
arms compel a surrender of French territorial aspi-
rations.

As compliant as was England's attitude toward
France, it was even more so toward North America.
When in 1895 a dispute arose between England and
Venezuela with regard to the boundary line between
the latter country and British Guiana, the United
States demanded that England should desist from
enforcing her claim by a resort to arms, and com-
pelled an adjustment by arbitration. In this con-
nection President Cleveland's Secretary of State,
Olney, construed the Monroe Doctrine in a wider
sense, and so as to include within its prohibition any

196 Period from 1881 to igoi

armed interference on the part of a European power
in American affairs, and declared that the United
States would not tolerate a European power to take
possession of any disputed territory in America.
In 1902 England was compelled, after long drawn
out negotiations, to agree to the annulment of the
treaty of 1850 regarding the construction of an in-
ter-oceanic canal through Central America, and at
the same time renounced any possible right herself
to build such a canal at any future time. Imme-
diately afterward the United States effected the
separation of the newly constituted state of Panama
from Colombia, and then undertook the construc-
tion of the canal herself.

It was at a time somewhat earlier than this that,
in order to protect the interests of California, the
most independent and self-assertive state of the
Union, the American republic felt impelled to ex-
tend the sphere of her influence beyond the shores
of the Pacific, and in 1897 annexed the Hawaiian
Islands. The war with Spain for the liberation of
Cuba in 1898, and the consequent acquisition of
over-seas territory (Porto Rico and the Philip-
pines, to which were added several islands of the
Samoan group in 1899), together with the es-
tablishment of vassal states (Cuba, soon followed
by Panama), consummated the decisive step by
which the Republic advanced beyond the con-
fines of America, and took her place among the
other nations of the world in the control of its
affairs, while at the same time it required a funda-
mental change in the internal structure of the

Relations with North America igy

American government. Thus the United States has
entered upon a course the end of which no man
can foresee, but from which, we may be certain,
there can be no turning back. It is a step which is
of as great moment to the American repubhc as
was the conquest of Sicily, and the resulting acqui-
sition of her first province, to Rome. Henceforth
American interests will be affected by all the great
questions of world politics; the immediate conse-
quence must be that the United States will find it
imperative to obtain for herself the dominating in-
fluence on the Pacific with the unavoidable result
that she will be opposed by Japan. This undoubt-
edly was a consideration when the United States
determined to construct the Panama canal, and plays
no unimportant part in shaping the attitude which
that country takes toward the confused state of af-
fairs in Mexico.

As a counterpoise to the preponderating power
of the Republic, Britain has developed her Canadian
dominion with great energy, while at the same time
she has sought to win the devotion of its people by
showing great consideration for their wishes and
interests, and by granting them an almost complete
autonomy. By opening up large areas of agricul-
tural lands in Manitoba, Assiniboia and Saskatche-
wan, and by developing the harbors on the west
coast of Canada the importance of this British
province has been greatly increased. In recent
years there has been continuous immigration from
the United States into Canada, mostly of young
men of the farming population who can there obtain

198 Period from 188 1 to I go I

much land for little money, and so find the oppor-
tunity to acquire wealth. It is a much discussed
question in America whether this element of the
population will eventually pave the way toward fu-
ture annexation to the United States, or whether,
like the French Catholic population of Canada, these
immigrants and their descendants will hold loyally
to Britain in grateful recognition of the stable and
well organized political conditions that prevail in
the land of their adoption, in striking contrast to
the frequent changes and at times almost anarchical
conditions that occur in their homeland. The an-
swer to this question will be decided by the future
development of the country; meanwhile the large
majority by which the people of Canada in 191 1
declared themselves as opposed to the proposed
reciprocal trade relations with the United States is
sufficient evidence to conclude that British affiliation
is still paramount in Canada.

In general, England has accepted the masterful
and highly independent spirit of the American pol-
icy, and has allowed the old enmity to be forgotten,
although its echoes were heard until late into the
nineteenth century. Since that time, however, Eng-
land has shown herself willing to meet the Ameri-
can republic more than half way, and has been as
unscrupulous as she has been skillful in her manipu-
lation of the American press to enlist it in favor
of English interests. Moreover, the harmonizing
influence of a common language, a common litera-
ture, and common customs and views of life is a
powerful one, and the result is that in America also

Attitude of American People 1 99

the old feeling of resentment against England and
her policy of extreme selfishness has gradually died
out, although at times and upon occasion there is
evidence that it still lingers. To what proportions
this pro-English feeling has grown, the present war
has revealed all too clearly. It generally assumes a
sentimental form, and expresses itself in the old
adage, " Blood is thicker than water," which, though
it stirs the imagination, is not upheld by the lessons
that history teaches. In reality it is never senti-
ment, but always the hard and uncompromising de-
mands of political and material conditions that de-
cide the course of historical events. Such is the
case in the present instance also, and it is by their
common opposition to the economic development of
Germany, and even in a greater measure to the po-
litical institutions of the German state, " its mili-
tarism," that England and America are united in a
common dislike of Germany.

This sentiment is deepened by the inherent Amer-
ican opposition to a monarchical form of govern-
ment, especially when it is one that is both vigorous
and creative, as it is in Germany. That the Amer-
ican people as a whole are kindly disposed and easily
touched by pity is a further consideration, and one
that is emphasized by the feminizing influence of
the schools that are almost entirely in the hands of
women. This also accounts for the visionary Amer-
ican enthusiasm for a universal brotherhood of the
nations, and the hope of an eternal peace, though,
it must be said, these sentiments harmonize but illy
with the practical policy of a nation that in the

200 Period from 1881 to I go I

nineteenth century acquired more land by conquest
than did any other one, and that has allowed itself
to be drawn into war on very slight provocation.

It is to these circumstances that we Germans must
look for the reason why our many attempts to create
a friendly relation between the American and the
German nations, and a better understanding of each
other have utterly failed in spite of repeated protes-
tations of good will on our part, and of the recent
endeavor to bring the cultural elements of the two
nations in touch by an exchange of professors at
the universities of the two countries. It would
seem that our efforts in this direction have been
harmful rather than helpful to us, in that they have
been misconstrued into an admission of weakness,
and have even been supposed to be prompted by
sinister motives. The opportunity in time of peace
to secure an influence upon the foreign press has
been neglected here as elsewhere by German di-
plomacy.

At the outbreak of the war the true sentiment of
the great body of Americans toward Gennany was
plainly revealed. Under the influence of a degen-
erate and wholly unscrupulous press they not only
lent a willing ear to all the malicious slander with
which our enemies overwhelmed us, but added to
it. Even men of weight who had apparently been
friendly to Germany, such as Carnegie and Bigelow,
the " companion of the Emperor's youth," now
made common cause with our bitterest enemies.
Harvard University, where the exchange of pro-
fessors was begun, is altogether on the side of the

Russia, Turkey and Germany 201

Allies, and although occasionally a voice is raised
in favor of Germany at Columbia University, New
York, the seat of the " Kaiser-Wilhelm-Professor-
ship," the head of this institution. President Butler,
pursues the Germans with attacks of bitter calumny
under guise of a proclaimed neutrality. That the
action of the American government has been uni-
formly detrimental to Germany's cause, and to the
advantage of her enemies will not be disputed by
any one.

The English attitude toward America, and more
especially toward France, has been determined by
Britain's relations to the other two great powers,
Russia and Germany. For a time Russia continued
to be the dreaded rival against whom England
sought to form a combination with the other powers,
and, if possible, induce them to make war upon the
colossus of the north. Russia's advance into cen-
tral Asia, the subjugation of the khanates, her en-
croachment upon Afghanistan and the Pamir, the
opening up of the economic possibilities of this con-
quered territory, and making her possession of it
assured by the construction of an extensive system
of strategically located railroads, together with the
Russian aspiration to obtain a dominating influence
in Persia, all were circumstances by which a war
between Russia and England was made a constant
possibility. In the end it was found advisable, how-
ever, to settle the main differences by compromise
or treaty, for the dangers attending such a war were
far too grave, while the remoteness of the terri-
tory and the impossibility to place any reliance upon

202 Period from i88i to I go I

the conquered or partially subjugated tribes ren-
dered the outcome too uncertain to make the venture
of a war advisable.

The other cause for irritation between England
and Russia, viz., the Turkish Empire, was grad-
ually being relegated to a position of secondary im-
portance. The changes that had taken place in
grain production and in the routes by which it was
transported, to which attention has already been
called, were making themselves felt more and more ;
traffic by way of the Black Sea had become a mat-
ter of less vital importance to England, and although
large quantities of grain are still imported by this
route, England, in time, found herself in the position
where she could drop the dogma that the integrity
of the Turkish Empire constituted a European neces-
sity. To this was added the further consideration
that England had forfeited her former influence at
Constantinople by Gladstone's intervention in be-
half of the Bulgarians during the reign of Abdul
Hamid, and by his denunciation of the " unspeakable
Turk," as well as by other blunders in diplomacy.
England could therefore afiford to allow Russia a
free hand in this direction. Austria now was Rus-
sia's chief opponent in the Balkan peninsula where
the Russian policy had blocked its own way to suc-
cess by first obtaining independence for the Bul-
garians and then according them the treatment of
an absolutely dependent state.

CHAPTER XVI

Germany's Prosperity and Her Colonial Pol-
icy — The English in Africa — Japan and
China

Meanwhile the German Empire had been at-
taining a position of constantly increasing impor-
tance. As soon as the nation was united, and the
shackles of poHtical Hmitation had fallen away, its
native vigor and spirit of enterprise asserted them-
selves to a remarkable degree. At first the buoy-
ancy consequent upon immediate success in newly
tried spheres of industry gave rise to a laxness of
conscience in business enterprise that, in 1873, re-
sulted in a financial crash from which the economic
conditions of the country recovered but slowly.
But this served the German nation as a lesson ; un-
der the widely comprehensive guidance and inspira-
tion of the government the people now entered upon
a course of self-training that led to so high a stand-
ard of business rectitude that certain products of
German industry intended for the exhibit at the
World's Fair at Philadelphia in 1876, and which
were ranked as " cheap and poor " by the German
Imperial Commissioner, Reulaux, still compared fa-
vorably with articles of the same kind that were

203

204 Germany's Prosperity

produced in other countries a number of years later,
and proved their superiority in open competition.

This development was due in great measure, and
in fact was made possible only by the wonderful
transformation that was brought about in economic
conditions by the customs tariff adopted in 1879, and
which Germany owes to Bismarck's persistent effort
in the face of bitter opposition from the doctrinaire
advocates of free trade, and from those elements
in the population that were on principle opposed to
any further extension of the authority of the Em-
pire, and of the functions of the state in general.
It was by this measure, which placed the country on
an enduring economic basis, that Bismarck finished
his great and self-imposed task of establishing the
German Empire. It is due to his foresight that
Germany accomplished what Britain neglected to
do, viz., to maintain a vigorous agricultural pro-
duction at the same time that the manufacturing in-
dustries were taking their great strides forward,
and thus secured to the German Empire self-sup-
porting conditions by which its independence of
other nations is assured. How great is Germany's
debt on this account alone to this wise statesman,
and how shortsighted and misleading was the doc-
trinaire advice of the free-trade advocates, is now
sufficiently apparent to be recognized by even the
dullest. Had Germany continued to follow Ca-
privi's policy instead of returning, as it did, to the
course laid out by Bismarck, we would now have
found it impossible to maintain the present war, and

German Trade Legislation 205

England's purpose to starve Germany out would
have proved successful.

Tariff legislation was followed by social reform
legislation in 1881. From this time forth the ma-
terial welfare of Germany has advanced with leaps
and bounds, and is enjoyed not only by the lead-
ing classes, as is the case in England, Belgium, and
other industrial countries, but is shared by the en-
tire population. Indeed, the country's prosperity
has been increasing in a measure that is not only a
surprise to other nations, but far surpasses the ex-
pectations of even the best informed Germans them-
selves. The plane of social life has been raised
throughout, and yet, in the main, this has continued
wholesome ; the facilities for intercourse and the en-
tire railroad system have been developed to a point
where they may serve as models of perfection ; pre-
viously insignificant towns have grown into flour-
ishing business centers ; and, although the population
increased from nearly 41 millions in 1871, to 65
millions in 19 10, emigration, that had reached quite
considerable proportions, has practically ceased dur-
ing this period. Germany is not only able to feed
and employ her entire population, but can offer so
attractive an existence to her people that they have
no desire to leave their native land.

The development of Germany's commercial capa-
bilities has kept pace with the degree of her indus-
trial prosperity and general welfare. The number
of sea going vessels rose from 4519 in the year
1 87 1, of which 4372 were sailing craft, to 4850 with

2o6 Germany's Prosperity

a remaining number of only 2752 sails in 1913,
while the tonnage went from 982,000 in 1871 to
3,000,000 in 19 1 3, an increase to three times the
former capacity. Hamburg has become the princi-
pal seaport on the European continent, having out-
stripped Antwerp, Rotterdam and Liverpool, and
is now exceeded in importance only by New York
and London. This commercial development made
a Gennan navy an imperative necessity, and one
which the nation had long realized. After a first
and fruitless attempt in this direction had been made
in 1848, Prussia undertook the construction of a
war fleet on a very modest scale. Although Ger-
many had reason to be proud of the ensign she had
unfurled upon the seas, still her navy was kept within
very narrow limits for fear that its support might
prove too great a drain upon the material resources
of the Empire, or that the nation's defense by land
might be weakened for the sake of the desired
strength at sea. It was for reasons such as these
also that the government entered but timidly and
with many misgivings upon the long wished for pol-
icy of acquiring for Germany some of the little re-
maining territory of the world that was still open
to colonization, and so making a beginning toward
an extension of Germany's influence and power into
world affairs. There was, moreover, a large and
influential element in the Reichstag which was
wholly opposed to this policy, and which placed en-
tire faith in the doctrine of free trade and in the
lessons that were supposedly to be learned from
England's weariness of colonial enterprise. Never-

Germany's Colonial Policy 207

theless, in 1884, Bismarck decided to acquire for
Germany the colonial territory now known as Ger-
man Southwest Africa, Togoland, Kamerun, Ger-
man East Africa and a part of New Guinea, al-
though an earlier movement to gain a footing for
Germany in the Samoan Islands had been defeated
in the Reichstag in 1880.

Thus, from a country weakened by internal po-
litical dissension, and from a nation that had been
regarded askance by most of the other great na-
tionalities of the world, Germany had developed,
over night as it were, into a powerful and aspiring
empire, and its people into a nation whose standing
in the world was worthy of the respect it demanded
and which it could at any time enforce. England
began to realize more and more that this newly estab-
lished power was destined to be her chief competitor.
That Germany's voice in continental matters was
the deciding one, and that her efficient army was the
compelling element in the enforcement of a contin-
uous state of peace in Europe, and that consequently
England could no longer gather in her customary
harvests from the continental conflicts which she
had found so advantageous to the expansion of her
empire were conditions that had to be accepted. In
fact, England had found herself in a position where
she had reason to be grateful to Germany for the
mediation by which at the Congress of Berlin the
war that was threatening with Russia had been
averted. It was indeed exasperating that there was
no way of getting at this firmly established German
state, conducted so efficiently by its thoroughly or-

2o8 Germany's Prosperity

ganized and purposeful government in spite of the
welcome illusion entertained by its antagonists, that
the Empire was being kept together only by force,
and that the smaller states, as well as the great
body of the people, were eager to throw ofif the
Prussian yoke, and so escape from the irksome duty
imposed by the Prussian institution of universal
military service. To a belief in this illusion, which
apparently had its origin in the wrangles so usual
among the political parties in Germany, the Eng-
lish were especially inclined because of their inabil-
ity to understand the conditions prevailing in foreign
lands, or to appreciate the motives and circumstances
by which the people there are influenced.

England was the more disposed to be resentful
of the great progress that German industries and
commerce had made, because the English themselves
had lost the ability to adapt themselves to the new
demands by discarding antiquated methods and cus-
tomary ways of doing things, and adopting more
modern ones. But there was little that could be
done about it; the preventive measure that was re-
sorted to had just the opposite effect of that which
was desired. It had been hoped that if all imports
from Germany were marked with the distinguishing
label, " Made in Germany," the English purchasing
public would discriminate against them, but the
astounding result was that this but increased their
sale, and therefore their importation also.

But now Germany began to manifest the intention
to step beyond her own confines by adopting a co-
lonial policy of her own beyond the seas, which

German Competition 209

would necessarily be followed by an expansion of
her war fleet. In the eyes of the English this con-
stituted a trespass upon the domain which they had
reserved to themselves; and that was more than
could be borne. Germany, therefore, was now to
be denied privileges such as France had received,
and which indeed had been conceded by England as
an offset to Germany's growing power. Similar
privileges also had been bestowed upon the King of
the Belgians by the Congo Conference in 1885, at
the time that the Congo Free State, that political
bastard, was born. England therefore now sud-
denly discovered that all the territory to which Ger-
many laid claim, or to which she aspired, or was
likely to aspire at any future time, was already
within British jurisdiction, based on well grounded
claims, and that this territory especially could not,
for most valid reasons, patent to every unbiased
mind, be relinquished to Germany for colonization,
much as England regretted this. Openly to throw
down the gauntlet to Bismarck was more than Eng-
land cared to do, however, and so there was noth-
ing to be done eventually but to withdraw the Eng-
lish objections, and, with a sour mien, to wish
Germany God-speed on her new ventures at colon-
ization. But again Britain did not fail to carry
off a prize herself. She acquired the southern part
of New Guinea — the western part was Dutch ter-
ritory — and secured recognition of her claim to
Walfish Bay, a harbor just in the middle of the
coastline of German Southwest Africa. From this
time forth the Germans encountered English oppo-

210 Germany's Prosperity

sition, even more than they had before, in whatever
they planned or undertook, even if it was no more
than the acquisition of a coaHng station.

To be sure, better relations between the two coun-
tries developed during the regrettable administra-
tion of Caprivi who, as the outspoken opponent of
any kind of German colonial policy, acted upon his
maxim of " the less we have of Africa, the better
for us," and so pursued a course that was highly
pleasing to the English. In 1890 he relinquished
Uganda and Witu to England, and resigned Ger-
many's claim to Zanzibar in exchange for Helgo-
land and a corner in Southwest Africa. That this
occasion was not utilized to secure at least Walfish
Bay for Germany is to be ascribed to a lack of inter-
est, or to a want of skill on the part of her envoys.
In the treaty by which Germany obtained possession
of Kamerun, England's claims to the entire terri-
tory of the upper Nile were recognized, which gave
great offence to France, while in the subsequent
negotiations with France in regard to the Hinter-
land of Kamerun, Germany's interests were repre-
sented with quite as little skill. At a somewhat
later date, and while engaged in the Boer war, Eng-
land agreed to Germany's long desired acquisition
of the Samoan Islands (1899), although at the
same time a number of these islands passed into the
possession of the United States. A short time pre-
vious to this, Germany had purchased the Canary
Islands from Spain.

Otherwise the chief result of Germany's entrance
into the competition for colonial acquisition was a

England's African Realm 211

re-awakening of England's spirit of colonial enter-
prise. The period of her weariness in this respect
was past; the practical interests of the day had tri-
umphed over the theories of the visionaries, and
there was now abroad in England a constantly grow-
ing realization of the incalculable value that attaches
to a political connection, even of the loosest sort,
with extensive and ever more richly developing co-
lonial dominions. Such relations are especially ad-
vantageous to the trading interests of the mother-
country, for England's colonies not only afford a
market for the products of her manufacturing in-
dustries, but provide her with a source from which
to draw raw materials, and, most important of all,
they furnish her with the most indispensable neces-
saries of life. The waning current of public opin-
ion was therefore now met by the demand for a
" greater Britain," a catchword coined by Sir
Charles Dilke, and meant to convey the idea of a
close union of all the English speaking dominions
with the English motherland in a harmonious po-
litical fraternity. This thought was later taken up
by Chamberlain, and advocated by him with great
zeal, but with little result.

Meanwhile England did what she could to secure
for herself as much as possible of that portion of
the world's territory that was not already in the
possession of one or the other of the civilized na-
tions ; in other words she now sought to supplement
her colonial empire, which already comprised Can-
ada, Australia, India, and many of the islands of
the Pacific, by the addition of an African realm

212 Germany's Prosperity

also. Leaving Capeland in 1890, Cecil Rhodes be-
gan his adventurous project by the conquest, first of
Bethuanaland, and then of Matabeleland, and then,
proceeding to the hinterland of Portugal's coast-
land territory of Mozambique, took possession of
the vast interior region wo-w known as Rhodesia,
and extending northward to the lakes of Central
Africa. There was but one hindrance to the real-
ization of Britain's ambitious desire to control the
whole of the African continent from Cape Town
to Cairo, and to connect these two extremes by a
great continental railroad system, — this hindrance
was the barrier which the Congo Free State together
with German East Africa formed directly across
the continent. But most inconvenient of all, and at
the same time most alluring, were the Boer repub-
lics enclosed on all sides, as they were, by British
colonies, and rich in diamond and gold mines. All
the world knows how on January i, 1896, Jameson
made a raid on the Transvaal in a bold attempt to
subdue it, and, when this had ended in defeat, how
the English government made the Uitlander ques-
tion the excuse for a declaration of war against the
Dutch republics, which after a long and brave re-
sistance were conquered and forced to accept Brit-
itsh rule.

Meanwhile another nation had made its entry as
a great power into the affairs of the world — the
Empire of Japan. To rid themselves of the stifling
encroachment of the Europeans, the Japanese had
come to the daring determination themselves to ac-
quire the culture of the West, which they did in an

Japan 213

amazingly short time, and then, having learned all
they desired from these intrusive foreigners, em-
phatically to show them the door. The time had
now arrived when Japan could feel that her days
of schooling were at an end, and that she could be-
gin to make use of her newly acquired ability. In
1894 the war with China was undertaken by which,
through the terms of the Peace of Shimonoseki
(1895), Japan obtained the sovereignty over Korea
and Formosa together with the harbors of Port
Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, on either side of the en-
trance to the Gulf of Pet-shi-li. This was an en-
croachment upon Russian spheres of interest, and
was therefore met by a protest from Russia with the
result that Japan was compelled to return the two
seaports to China, one of which. Port Arthur, was
occupied by the Russians themselves a few years
later (1898).

In her attitude toward Japan Russia had the
sympathy of France, and of Germany also in the
belief that she was thus serving the common cul-
tural interests of Europe against aggression by the
yellow race. This introduction of sentiment into
politics is probably the most serious blunder that
has been made in Germany's policy since the Empire
has been founded ; its consequences were revealed in
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and again in Japan's
participation in the war against Germany. Nor was
the blunder righted either by Germany's occupation
of Kiao-Chow, or by her participation, not only with
the other great powers of Europe but with Japan
herself, in quelling the Boxer rebellion.

CHAPTER XVII
Edward VII and the Hatred of Germany

Rarely in the history of mankind has a period
of poHtical development brought about so great a
transformation as did the nineteenth century. That
Africa had become a factor in European pohtics,
and above all, that two newly developed great pow-
ers, the United States and Japan, had made their
entrance into the affairs of the world and, in close
connection with this event, the manifold questions
of policy that arose in relation to the Chinese Em-
pire, had widened the horizon of the entire world
of politics, and offered wholly new problems for its
solution. The narrow relations and circumscribed
viewpoint to which Europe had been accustomed
were now relegated to the background, and politics
of world wide interest absorbed the attention of the
great powers, and determined their attitude toward
one another.

In the course of this new development England
had for the time being been crowded out of her po-
sition in the front of the stage. Russia had as-
sumed the leading role in eastern Asia, although
England had taken possession of Wei-hai-wei as an
equivalent to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur.
In Persia and central Asia, toward eastern Turke-

214

The World Situation in IQOO 215

Stan and Tibet, Russia was extending her influence
more and more, and England could do nothing to
prevent it, while her hope that Germany might be
persuaded into an alliance against Russia was
doomed to disappointment. In September, 1898,
Germany did, however, enter into a treaty with Eng-
land, by the terms of which the Germans secured
the right to purchase the Portuguese territory in
Africa — an empty promise, since, as England's
vassal state, Portugal could do nothing without Eng-
lish consent. Nevertheless, by her participation in
the treaty, Germany abandoned the anti-English
policy she had adopted in connection with the Peace
of Shimonoseki and at the time of the Jameson raid
upon the Transvaal. At the same time she main-
tained her traditional relations of friendship with
Russia, although these, too, were by no means en-
tirely free from friction, and, what was most im-
portant of all, she held unwaveringly to her stead-
fastly maintained peace policy. Then, in 1899, the
fierce Boer war broke out, in which England's lack
of organization as well as her military weakness
were even more conspicuously revealed than they
had been in her former wars. Equally conspicuous
was the total lack of political conscience displayed,
and the wholly inhuman manner of her warfare.
The concentration camps in which the Boer women
and children were confined were purposely so lo-
cated, as some of the British officers highest in com-
mand freely admitted, that the great mass of those
that were detained within them were necessarily
doomed to perish miserably, the intention being thus

2i6 Hatred of Germany

to exert pressure upon the men in the field, and at
the same time to lessen the numbers of the coming
generation that might prove dangerous to British
rule.

In her war with the Boers England discovered
how little she was in favor with the rest of the world,
and how bitter were the feelings which the arro-
gance of her attitude had engendered in the other
nations, for among them all there was not one whose
sympathies were not with the Boers. The Ger-
mans were never forgiven for their attitude in con-
nection with this war, although the German govern-
ment, in compliance with the pact of 1898, main-
tained a strict neutrality, which was a bitter disap-
pointment to the Boers, who had hoped for German
assistance. On the other hand the much greater
spirit of enmity which the French exhibited — for
they still remembered Fashoda — was quickly for-
gotten by England. But at all events, Britain had
no friends to rely upon, and so consoled herself for
this necessary dependence upon herself alone with
what comfort she could derive from her " splendid
isolation," as the newly coined phrase expressed it.

But on January 21, 190 1, the aged Queen Vic-
toria died, and her son, Edward VII, took her place
upon the English throne. This brought about a
complete change in the state of affairs. In the long
years during which as Prince of Wales he had
played the sorry part of a figurant, and had never
been expected to reveal any sign of possessing an
opinion of his own, he had adapted himself to the
situation with great skill, and had utilized the time

Edward VII: Personality and Policy 217

to enjoy life to the utmost. As King of England,
however, he showed the world what may be ac-
complished by a strong personality when placed in
a position of supreme eminence, and how, through
one man's masterful influence, the natural develop-
ment of events may be arrested and directed into an
entirely different channel. What no one had sup-
posed possible, he found it within his power to ac-
complish,— once more an English sovereign as-
sumed the leadership in determining his country's
destiny, and shaped its policy in a measure which no
other English monarch since the reign of William
III had even attempted. That the English people,
ever jealously watchful to guard against an infringe-
ment of their constitutional rights and of the pow-
ers of Parliament, accepted this new turn of affairs
without any show of resistance, may be laid to King
Edward's wonderful tact and ability to keep his own
personality in the background, and to avoid every
occasion for friction — everything that would openly
conflict with established tradition.^ By his skillful
management of the sovereigns of Europe, whom he
met during his frequent sojourns at the watering
places of the continent or upon his family visits,

^ The nearest parallel, to my knowledge, that history
affords is King Agesilaus of Sparta who, after his country
had been deeply humiliated, was able persistently to direct
its policy in a similar manner. The Spartan king however
had the advantage of being commander in chief of the
army, and therefore was in full control of it, and he also
had the right to express his opinion both to the national
council and to the people themselves, whereas the King of
England has none of these privileges.

2i8 Hatred of Germany

King Edward gained the friendship of foreign na-
tions, and secured such alliances as were desirable,
and the British ministers found themselves obliged
to relinquish the conduct of Britain's foreign policy
into his hands, in spite of any misgivings they may
have had as to the constitutionality of this proceed-
ing, since they themselves were in no way fitted to
undertake such personally conducted negotiations.

As a ruler, Edward VII stands forth as an ideal
figure in history, — a man of large ideas, and one who
was able to hew his own way to the accomplishment
of his purpose. He was endowed with a keen na-
tive discernment, was highly intelligent, cool and cal-
culating, but entirely devoid of any appreciation of
the moral forces by which human life is controlled.
To him these were no more than convenient phrases
with which dullards might be duped, and that served
the wise as cloaks with which to cover their naked
egoism ; and this egoism he held to be the mainspring
of human action. It is for this reason, his total
disregard of all the deepest sources from which are
drawn the influences that govern the history of man-
kind, that King Edward's life work has resulted in
failure despite the keenness of his calculations; for
the course into which he guided his country will not
lead to power and renown, but to ruin.

That the political situation demanded a war with
Germany, that England's future could not be free
from danger, nor her power assured without the
humiliation of Germany was the controlling thought
that Edward VII infused into England's policy.
This prince of German extraction, whose mother

The Emperor's Telegram 219

tongue was German, the fruit of a marriage that at
the time of its consummation was hailed by the
Germans with greater joy than had any other, the
uncle of the German Emperor, has proved to be the
most dangerous foe that Germany has had to
contend with during the past few generations.
Whether his attitude was the result of honest con-
viction and a truly patriotic sentiment for his Eng-
lish realm, or whether it resulted from purely per-
sonal motives, or, perhaps, from a blending of both,
who will attempt to say? Certain it is that in the
policy he followed, he had the support of a strong
current of public opinion in his own country, and
that during the years of his reign this swelled to
ever greater proportions, until it controlled by far
the greater part of the British public. The old
antipathy to Russia receded more and more into the
background, and in its place arose the fear of Ger-
many, and consequent spirit of enmity toward the
German people, which finally grew to be the dom-
inating political sentiments of the English nation.

Should we ask how this spirit of enmity received
its first impulse, we would probably be told that its
immediate occasion was the congratulatory telegram
that the German Emperor sent to President Kriiger
in January, 1896, at the time that the Jameson raid
was successfully repulsed by the Boers. This tele-
gram was of far wider significance than attaches to
a mere expression of sympathy; it could but be con-
strued, both at home and abroad, as an announce-
ment to the world that Germany was inclined to
protect the independence of the Boer republics and

220 Hatred of Germany

to defend them against an unwarranted attack from
abroad, if need be by a resort to arms. In England
it was therefore received by a spontaneous and
mighty outburst of popular wrath against Germany,
which vented itself in violent invectives against the
German Emperor. There can be no doubt that the
tendencies which the telegram indicated were
strongly approved by a large part of the German
nation. There was a feeling of moral indignation
abroad in Germany at England's ruthless breach of
the peace, and any energetic measures which the
government might have taken in disapproval of this
gross violation of political rectitude, and of the
cruel attack of the greater upon the smaller nation,
would have found as ready a response from the
German people at this time as at a somewhat earlier
date had been evinced in connection with Russia's
base interference with the Bulgarians. But just as
then Bismarck stubbornly refused to yield to the
tide of popular sentiment and, quite in opposition to
it, fostered friendly relations with Russia, so now
the German government showed no inclination to
follow up the Emperor's telegram with any cor-
responding action, but on the contrary, sought to
maintain, or rather re-establish cordial relations with
England. Accordingly the treaty with England, by
which Germany gained the right to purchase Por-
tugal's African possessions, and of which mention
has already been made, was negotiated in September,
1898. Furthermore, the German government de-
clined to support the French in their contentions
with England regarding the Fashoda expedition

Germany's Relations to Turkey 221

(1898), and preserved an attitude of strict neutral-
ity during the Boer war. The German Emperor,
moreover, made his customary visit to England,
quite undeterred by the offensive treatment that the
British press had accorded him, believing his visit
w^ould mitigate the resentment against Germany and
regain for her the British favor. Indeed he even
went so far as to advise the English with regard to
their military operations, a circumstance with which
he acquainted the public in 1908.

Occasions for a conflict of national interests and
consequent political tension such as that in 1895 h^ve
been of frequent occurrence in the course of history
without leading to a continued feeling of national
antagonism, or to war. England herself has had
the experience many a time. Moreover, in France
the indignation against England on account of the
Boer war manifested itself in a much more pro-
nounced manner than it did in Germany, — indeed it
went so far that Englishmen were insulted on the
Paris Bourse. Why, we cannot fail to ask, why did
the English tide of resentment against Germany not
subside as did that against France ?

The determining factor in the situation created by
the Emperor's telegram was that it was the first and
at the same time a most emphatic indication that
henceforth Germany meant not only to take a hand
in the affairs of the European continent, — to this
England had become accustomed, — but in those of
the world beyond as well, and demanded considera-
tion for her interests there, together with a willing-
ness to listen to her views. This was an encroach-

222 Hatred of Germany

ment upon England's sphere of influence, and it is
probably to be regarded as the decisive step by which
Germany made her entrance into world politics.
The demand then made was never withdrawn by
Germany, but, in spite of her conciliatory attitude,
has ever since been persistently maintained. If on
the one hand South Africa was relinquished to
Britain, Germany on the other hand took a much
more active part in Eastern affairs from this time
forth (1895); in 1898 she obtained Kiau-Chow
from China, and a little later gained possession of
the Caroline and Samoan islands, while in 1900, in
connection with the international adjustment of
Chinese affairs, Germany compelled the recognition
of the principle of the " open door " in China. Of
even greater moment, in all probability, was the care-
ful cultivation of cordial relations with the Turkish
Empire, a policy which may be ascribed to the Em-
peror, who with far seeing judgment adopted it at
the very beginning of his reign.

The fraternal relations with Austria made it pos-
sible for Germany to reach beyond that country to
gain a footing in territory that hitherto had been
regarded as within the domain of Russia, or of the
powers of western Europe. Before long German
influence came to be the dominating one at Con-
stantinople, and the development of the Sultan's
army was entrusted to German officers. By the con-
struction of the Bagdad railroad Germany estab-
lished herself in the more distant East, and in this,
Britain saw a future menace to her own position of
dominance on the Persian Gulf and the Indian

German Influence in East 223

Ocean. Everything was done, therefore, that Eng-
lish ingenuity could suggest to prevent the Germans
from extending this railroad beyond Bagdad to the
sea, and, as a means to that end, England seized
Kuwet to the west of the mouth of the Euphrates.
Furthermore, when the German Emperor visited
Jerusalem and Damascus in November, 1898, he did
so as the open friend and protector of Islam. Now,
by the orthodox Summite Mohammedans the Sul-
tan is regarded as the Caliph, the religious head of
all Islam, a position of influence which he magnified
by means of a skillfully devised and highly success-
ful propaganda, and which he emphasized the more
with every year that saw the political power of his
empire crumble. Through this medium the Ger-
man influence could be extended at least indirectly
to the people of a large part of the British do-
minions, and of the French and Russian as well,
since these realms count among their subjects vast
numbers of Mohammedans, aside from the fact that
the Sultan was, nominally at least, the suzerain of
Egypt.

In 1905 Germany also entered into friendly rela-
tions with Abyssinia, however with no enduring re-
sult, since the German withdrawal from Morocco
in the following year was construed by the entire
Oriental world as a surrender, and as an evidence
that Germany was not powerful enough to extend
effective protection to these distant lands. Further-
more, the German government did not find it ad-
visable to give the Turks any material aid when in
1904 England opposed their plan to increase the

224 Hatred of Germany

railroad facilities of their country by adding to the
Mecca railroad a branch line with a terminal at
Akabah, on the east arm of the Red Sea. The
Turks therefore felt compelled to abandon the con-
struction of the railroad, and at the same time had
to look on with what patience they could command
when the whole of the Sinai peninsula was annexed,
nominally to Egypt, but in reality to the British
dominions.

To these numerous causes for irritation there was
now added the supreme source of England's annoy-
ance in the constantly growing development of the
German sea power, the especial work of William
II, and one which he carried to completion with
brilliant success. With unyielding resolution he
broke away from the Prussian tradition according
to which the enlargement of the war fleet was looked
upon as a menace to the efficiency of the German
land forces; for Germany had grown strong, and
was now not only capable of maintaining her land
forces on a plane that made them superior to all
others, but also of providing herself with a defence
at sea sufficient to meet all present demands. By
arguments both spoken and written, and more espe-
cially by the arrangement and distribution of con-
venient tables which presented a comparison between
the German war fleet and the fleets of other coun-
tries, and showed its state of backwardness in a
striking and convincing manner, the Emperor won
his people over to his way of thinking.

When in 1895 the canal which connects the North
Sea with the Baltic was completed, the preliminary

The German Navy 225

condition requisite to Germany's possession of a
war fleet was provided in that the harbors on the
east and those on the west coast of Germany were
made directly accessible to each other by a water-
way passing through German territory alone. The
little island of Helgoland, that at the time of its
acquisition had appeared as an almost worthless
possession, — indeed the Germans had reason to be
thankful that it did not belong to them while they
were at war with France, but instead was owned
by England, since this made its capture and use as
a base by the French fleet impossible, — was now
fortified and turned into an impregnable defence
for the German fleet when in the North Sea, a cir-
cumstance by which the canal which connects this
sea with the Baltic is practically projected far out
into the sea. The year 1900 saw the first extensive
naval legislation enacted, and the plan for the foun-
dation of a German navy drawn up. This was not
only consistently carried out, but was greatly broad-
ened at intervals in later years, until Germany's war
fleet attained proportions that corresponded in mag-
nitude to the importance of her merchant marine,
and came to be the second largest in the world, al-
though a second that was still far behind the power-
ful British navy.

All these measures were viewed by the English
as being aimed directly at themselves, and as a con-
stantly growing menace to the maintenance of their
world dominion. And that there was reason for
this view is not to be denied, since the absolute con-
trol of the seas, which Britain claimed as hers by

226 Hatred of Germany

right, could no longer be maintained if the German
fleet became sufficiently powerful to defend German
interests at sea in defiance of Britain. In conjunc-
tion with the fleets of other nations it might even
prove more than a match for Britain's naval force,
both in numbers and efficiency.

How Britain's supremacy at sea might be assured
to her for the future assumed the proportions of a
question of life and death in the eyes of the Eng-
lish, and rightly so, for it is not only the condition
upon which the continued hold upon their vast em-
pire abroad depends, but the safety of the homeland
is involved in a still larger measure. This danger
to the mother country is two fold, for, should the
German war fleet become powerful enough to over-
match the British, the Germans might not only be
enabled to land an army on British shores, but they
could cut Britain off from her source of supplies,
which would soon bring her to her knees before her
foe. Therefore no effort must be left untried by
which this threatening danger might be averted.

The first step in this direction was the enlarge-
ment of England's navy, which not only kept pace
with that of her prospective adversary, but far ex-
ceeded its increase not only in the number of ves-
sels but in their destructive efficiency also, as shown,
for instance, in the dreadnought type first con-
structed in 1905. At first England was content
with her " two power standard " of efficiency, viz.,
the British war fleet was to be maintained on a basis
equal in strength to that of the combined fleets of
any two of the great powers, the combination

Rivalry in Naval Construction 227

against which this precautionary measure was first
directed being that of the Russian and French
fleets. In time, however, the EngHsh became con-
vinced that even this would not suffice, and that they
must be sufficiently prepared to cope successfully
with any possible combination of foes at sea. This
not only proved a serious drain upon England's
financial resources and upon the ability of the peo-
ple to bear the constantly growing burden of taxa-
tion,— so wealthy a country as England is could
have endured this drain well enough, despite the
frequently heard sighs of regret, — but it became a
question whether Britain could furnish seamen in
sufficient numbers to man so large a war fleet; for
in this respect, too, England was showing her age
and inability to adapt herself to new conditions.
The number of available British seamen has been
growing less with every year; even the vessels of
the English merchant marine are manned in large
measure by foreigners, of which by far the greater
number are Norwegians, although there are some
Germans, while the firemen are all negroes. The
men of England have grown too demanding and
fond of ease and the comforts of life, and so the
later generations of Englishmen have been as little
inclined to fill these places as they have those in
many other strenuous callings in life. Moreover,
the British sea-captains, as well as the larger em-
ployers of labor in England, prefer to hire foreign-
ers because they are not only willing to work for a
lower wage, but at the same time are more willing
and better workers. To return to the old method

228 Hatred of Germany

of procuring seamen by impressment was not pos-
sible, and to allow the British war fleet to be manned
almost wholly by foreigners involved altogether too
great a risk, a reason for which alone England saw
the time approaching when she would be compelled
to call a halt in the enlargement of her war fleet.
The only way out of this dilemma, or at least the
one that commended itself above all others, was
through an agreement between England and Ger-
many according to which neither country would
enlarge its war fleet beyond a certain percentage
of its present strength ; another proposition was that
at stated intervals of time both countries were to
observe a " fleet-holiday year," during which there
was to be a total cessation of naval construction.
Both of these proposals came to nothing, although
Germany manifested a willingness to consider them.
The truth is that no independent great power can
afford to bind itself in such a manner with regard
to questions of vital importance to its own inde-
pendence, and to surrender the control over its own
action and means of warfare to a foreign power,
even aside from the fact that England's customary
duplicity made it almost a certainty that at the con-
venient moment that country would find an excuse
in any one of her code of ethics to withdraw from
the agreement, with the disadvantages all on the side
of Germany.

To all these reasons for anxiety another was
added through the inadequacy of the British land
forces, for these were but just sufficient to carry on
England's frequent colonial wars, to keep Ireland

The German Peril

229

in subjection, and to maintain the necessary garri-
sons and reserves at home. The mihtia and the
volunteer corps that had been organized and their
development attempted as a defence for the home-
land, out of which they may not be sent, did not
attain the desired proportions in spite of the en-
thusiasm which had been aroused for them through-
out the country. The alarming conviction therefore
gained ground that England was in no way capable
of withstanding the vigorous attempt of a strong
foe to invade her territory, and a constantly grow-
ing feeling of insecurity took possession of the peo-
ple.

The *' German peril " was the spectre that made
every Englishman quake, and which yet he could
not banish. In numberless pamphlets, tales of fic-
tion, sensational plays, and moving pictures the
terrors of a German invasion of England were
vividly portrayed, and, in imitation of the French,
the Germans were represented in the entire popular
and school literature, down to the very copy books
used by the little children, as bloodthirsty barbarians
who did not shrink from any crime or deed of
cruelty. The British government did all within its
power to heighten this impression and to spread it
throughout the country ; an avaricious press, that
was well aware of the trend that public opinion was
taking and was quick to recognise in it an oppor-
tunity to make money, now both catered to it and
controlled it, and dished up to the gullible public one
imaginary and soul harrowing tale after another,
until the timid were so frightened that their hair

230 Hatred of Germany

stood on end. The paper that was especially adept
at this was the " Daily Mail," owned by an un-
scrupulous journalist, Harmsworth by name, who,
after having failed in other journalistic attempts,
made a financial success with this publication, and
then acquired others, chief among which was " The
Times." That later, as Lord Northcliffe, he be-
came a peer of the realm is in itself evidence suffi-
cient to conclude that he is in close touch with the
government and has earned its gratitude.

But the climax was reached when air craft were
developed into a new and startling means of war-
fare, the effects of which no one could foresee, and
Germany began to build her Zeppelins in 1908,
for then English terror knew no bounds. There
were constantly recurring reports in the daily papers
of how German airships had been seen flying over
English coast towns ; when the London people went
to bed their imagination pictured their city under
a night attack by air craft, and when the frightened
dreamers awoke in the morning they wondered why
the Germans had not arrived over night. There
were even people in England, and among them a
number of men well known in intellectual circles,
who kept a supply of canned food on hand in antici-
pation of the famine that might result should their
country go to war. Meanwhile the number of those
who raised a voice in favor of Germany grew con-
stantly less in England, while in every German who
came to the country a spy was suspected, or at least
an enemy in disguise, not excepting even the always
large number of German clerks and waiters em-

English Dread of Military Service 23 1

ployed in England, for these, the English were
aware, were still connected with the German army
as reservists, and therefore the imagination sug-
gested all manner of possible and impossible serv-
ices that they might be rendering their country in
this capacity. The fear of espionage and the ama-
teur search for spies took on dimensions such as
were not surpassed even in France, for the English
public knows absolutely nothing about military mat-
ters, and so the silliest inventions and the wildest
fancies of an hysterical imagination found full
credence.

It appeared, therefore, that if matters really stood
as they seemed, there was but one course open by
which war might still be averted, — England must
again follow the example set her by the states of
the continent and adopt their system of universal
military service. This step had long been advo-
cated by military authorities, such as Lord Roberts,
for instance, but. as we have seen, it was not only
contrary to English tradition, but it struck a blow
at the very foundation of the Englishman's system
of state organization and of his ideas of personal
freedom; if, after all, this measure would have to
be resorted to, the England of tradition would in-
deed be a thing of the past. The only other re-
maining way out of the difficulty was the course
which Edward VII adopted and carried to comple-
tion, viz., the war against Germany must be begun
at once, before it was too late, before Germany was
fully prepared ; and, since Britain was not strong
enough to undertake the struggle unaided from

232 Hatred of Germany

abroad, the first step to be taken was to seek allies
for her among the nations of the continent.

Repetition does not strengthen an argument;
nevertheless it cannot be overemphasized that in the
circumstances cited above lies the real reason for
the hatred of Germany and the cause of the world-
wide war that England has incited against her.
The other reasons that one hears mentioned, such
as Germany's stupendous economic development,
the conflict of colonial interests, the anticipation of
the rich profits that England would derive from her
commerce should Germany's commerce and the Ger-
man fleet be destroyed, did all doubtless enter into
the situation, but England had accepted these, and
would have continued to accept them in the future.
The truth of the whole matter undoubtedly is that
the time had arrived when two distinct forms of
state organization must face each other in a strug-
gle for life or death, one of the two being retrograde
and sterile, while the other was far in advance of it
and full of creative possibilities. In the present war
Germany — i. e., the German state together with
the form of organization peculiar to it, and the idea
that underlies it — will be crushed so completely
that it can never recover from its defeat, or else
England, if she would play any part whatever in
the world's future, must rebuild her political struc-
ture from the ground up, and adopt a state organ-
ization such as prevails on the continent, and which
has found its fullest development, and therefore its
highest efficiency in the German state.

Beyond question, therefore, the war with Ger-

Moral Factor JJnderestimatsd 233

many is very popular with the EngHsh people, and
is welcomed by them as the break in the unendur-
able tension under which they have lived for years.
That in England, as elsewhere, there are people of
distinction, and many of them, who fully appreciate
Germany and the culture for which it stands is cer-
tain, while instances of warm friendship between
individual Germans and Englishmen are of still
more frequent occurrence. But the unspoken con-
dition under which alone these kindly sentiments
might endure has always been that Germany must
eventually change her attitude, as well as the char-
acter of her state organization ; or else it was be-
lieved that the latter, together with the German
form of military service, was at heart as thoroughly
detested by the German people themselves as by the
English, and was endured by compulsion only, al-
though the Germans dared not confess it, — an illu-
sion which the English eagerly cherished. Another
interpretation of the situation, and one with which
we have grown familiar through its recently very
frequent appearance in print, was that the originally
fine German character has been corrupted by the
writings of men like Treitschke, Nietzsche, Biilow
and Bernhardi, — a remarkable idea, and one in
which the ignorance of the English, and of other
nations as well, regarding the true condition of
affairs in Germany is fully revealed. But on the
other hand the number of Englishmen who really
deplore the war are very few at present, and of
these by far the greater proportion do so because
they appreciate the seriousness of the situation, and

234 Hatred of Germany

realize far better how terrible a danger England
has incurred, than does the English government it-
self, or than do the men who are responsible for
English " public opinion."

Moreover, the English are misled in their calcu-
lations by overlooking one great factor in the situa-
tion,— they undervalue the moral element, indeed
they overlook it altogether, and are quite incapable
of understanding or appreciating it. The present
but unexpressed thought by which English opinion
is moulded is that if England had the gigantic power
that Germany possesses, she would make use of it
at once to fall upon her neighbors and ruthlessly
despoil them of their possessions, and if Germany
has so far failed to do so, it is not, as they believe,
because of any true desire for peace, but rather be-
cause the Germans have as yet not felt fully pre-
pared to carry their plans to a successful termina-
tion, and fear to show their hand prematurely.
That Germany has so long been the preserver of
peace is therefore, in their estimation, but an evi-
dence that her sinister intentions are even more
far reaching than if she had struck sooner, by which
England is more than justified in attacking her at
once, before she can carry them into effect.

Such has been England's way always. But Ger-
many is not to be gauged by the English measure.
As incredible as it may appear to the English, it
is nevertheless a fact that peace has ever been and
still is the prevailing desire of the German people,
as well as of their government, and, above all, of
their ruler. Germany desires no more than that

Desire for Peace Misunderstood 235

she may be secure against any hostile attack from
abroad, — therefore she bears the weight of her gi-
gantic armor not only willingly but gladly. She
would live at peace with all the world, but only on
condition that in the peaceable competition between
the nations as fair play shall be accorded to her
people as is enjoyed by the others, and that they
may have the privilege of advancing their interests
just as freely as do the other nations, but which has
hitherto been jealously denied them. In her foreign
relations Germany has given evidence of her peace-
able temper again and again ; her emperor, William
II, has more than once willingly withdrawn claims
to which he was justly entitled, and has entered
into negotiations and accepted terms that were of
very questionable advantage to Germany, even to
a point of leniency where, in the opinion of a large
number of his people, he had yielded more than was
advisable. Now, to be sure, we Germans realize
that we cannot be too grateful to our Emperor that
he gave this repeated proof of his desire for peace,
since it led to the wholly united and firm resolve
of the German people to stand together to the last
breath in this war that has been forced upon them,
a resolve which they have lived up to most gallantly.
With the English also William II made every
possible effort to maintain peaceable relations, to
revive the old-time feelings of mutual friendliness,
and to dissipate their distrust of Germany. The
Emperor's attempts in this direction were followed
by other manifestations of the German nation's
friendly disposition, — delegations of working men's

236 Hatred of Germany

associations, of magistrates, of clergymen and of
men of letters and science visited back and forth
between the two countries, and were feasted and
toasted with fine speeches. On these occasions we
Germans went to the verge of sacrificing our na-
tional dignity in the avowal of our peaceable inten-
tions, until it became a question seriously discussed
at home whether it were not advisable to make a
public protest against this procedure by an open
announcement of the nation's real attitude. A like
course was followed with regard to other countries ;
even in France, and especially in America no effort
was spared to convince the people of the German
nation's peaceable and friendly sentiments. But
nobody believed these protestations, and they only
reacted to our disadvantage in that they were con-
strued into attempts to curry favor abroad, and as
indications of a mean spirit of toadyism for which
the other nations despised us, while our foes re-
garded them as admissions of weakness and fear
on our part, and so felt encouraged to begin the
attack upon us without further delay. By this time,
it is to be hoped, the eyes of the German people have
been opened, and they realize how greatly they de-
meaned and injured themselves by this well meant
but wholly impolitic course of action, the fruits of
which, as shown by the attitude of the neutral na-
tions even more than by that of our openly declared
foes, have given us a bitter but much needed lesson.
The time when such an attitude on our part was
possible, and even deemed advisable, is past, and, —
may it never return !

Moral Responsibility 237

We can but conclude that the reason why our in-
tentions were doubted and our assurances disbe-
lieved, is to be found in the circumstance that outside
of Germany no one has any idea of how fully the
German people realize the great responsibility they
have assumed through the institution of universal
military service and the national strength that arises
from it, or in how large a measure this sense of re-
sponsibility is the controlling element in the action
of the German government, and that it is in a still
higher sense the guiding influence by which the Em-
peror's every thought and deed are inspired. In a
state such as England is there is no conception of
what true responsibility means, for the formal re-
sponsibility of the ministry which is passed upon
by a vote of the Parliament, and, in case of an accu-
sation, is determined in the House of Lords by a
long and wearisome procedure that is complicated
by the introduction of all manner of personal and
party questions, does not enter into our considera-
tion here.

All true responsibility must necessarily be of a
purely moral nature, accounted for before the tri-
bunal of a personal conscience, and the sense of
it is in no way deepened by a legal responsibility,
but, on the contrary, is lessened by it. Now in
England there is no one who bears the burden of
such responsibility. The King does not, for he has
no voice in state affairs, and can only indirectly in-
fluence the destiny of his realm by the sort of skill-
ful manoeuvring in which Edward VII was so great
an adept. Although the ministers of state are re-

238 Hatred of Germany

sponsible to their party, they are not so to the state
as a whole, and when they lose the support of the
majority in Parliament, they retire, and their places
are filled by new men whose business it then is to
carry on the government as best they may. More-
over, on all important measures the decision rests
with the Cabinet, and there it becomes a question of
majorities and minorities, whereby each individual
member is shielded from criticism, and is relieved
of all personal sense of responsibility. Further-
more, it is in the very nature of things that a cor-
porate body cannot be the bearer of true responsi-
bility, for responsibility shared is not responsibility
at all. In England, therefore, politics in a meas-
ure assume the character of a game that doubtless
has its charms and at times becomes highly inter-
esting, the outcome of which, however, is entirely
dependent upon a thousand possibilities and the com-
bination of a variety of forces, which it is quite
impossible for the leading statesman either fully to
recognise or to control.

In a strongly monarchical government on the
other hand, like that of Prussia or of the German
Empire, the final decision in every measure that the
state undertakes rests with the sovereign, who there-
fore assumes full responsibility for it, both in what
is done and in what is left undone, and no one can
relieve him of it. Although he may be following
the advice of his prime minister absolutely, still, by
giving his consent to a measure, the sovereign makes
it his own act, and he therefore must bear the re-
sponsibility for its consequences. In this personal

The German Monarchy 239

element lies the tremendous advantage that a mo-
narchical form of government has over any other, in
that it unites in one person the power to act for the
state together with the undivided responsibility to
conscience for the consequences of the act. Of this
highest conception of monarchy and its consequent
tremendous moral superiority to any other form of
state organization, the English, and the Americans
especially, have not the faintest idea ; therefore they
believe in childish naivete that they have reason to
look down upon our splendidly creative monarchy
as upon a less advanced form of government which,
in the evolutionary development of state organiza-
tion, has long since been overtaken and distanced
by their own.

That our sovereigns have realized this great re-
sponsibility that their position entails, and have
shouldered the full weight of the burden that it
imposes, has been manifested by all of them ever
since the days of Frederick William I ; Frederick
William IV succumbed to it. This in itself is
sufficient reason why it is quite impossible, from
a moral, not legal standpoint, that a German sov-
ereign should precipitate his country into a war by
which the lives of thousands of his people will be
sacrificed, unless the highest interests of the state
are at stake, and if it can be avoided without loss of
honor. The restraint and desire for peace that Wil-
liam II has evinced have surely not been indications
of weakness or of faint-heartedness, — this has been
so conclusively proven by the present war that even
those who were inclined to doubt it must now be

240 Hatred of Germany

convinced, — but, on the contrary, were the result
of a full appreciation of the great responsibility
which rests upon him, and which is heightened by
the realization of how gigantic are the means at his
command. " Neither our own people nor the peo-
ple of other lands have formed any correct estimate
of the high national spirit and conscientious devo-
tion to duty that form the guiding motives of our
German rulers and their ministers, in the control of
their country's affairs," said Bismarck in his speech
on February 6, 1888.

In consequence of their failure duly to appreciate
the moral factor, the English under Edward VII
made still another miscalculation, and in quite a
different direction from the one we have so far fol-
lowed. Because of it, they underestimated, nay, to-
tally disregarded the moral and physical power of
endurance of which the German people are capable,
as well as their sense of national unity, and their
unswerving devotion to the fatherland ; for this rea-
son alone the English could form no correct idea of
the potency of Germany's means of warfare. The
opportunity to become acquainted with them, and so
learn to value them correctly, was open to the Eng-
lish, but they failed to take advantage of it, pre-
ferring, instead, to remain disillusioned and continue
in their belief in conditions as their fancy had
painted them, just as did the French in 1870.

Had the English had any clear conception of Ger-
many's giant strength, of the inexhaustible numbers
of her people, of her ability to feed them all, of her
great economic possibilities, of her financial strength,

German Strength Underestimated 24 1

of her perfectly organized system of defence, of her
complete command of all that science and technical
skill can offer by way of aid, of the exalted spirit
of devotion by which the German nation is inspired,
and which knows no weakness when once it has been
roused, — had they had any adequate appreciation
of the dangers which England would encounter in
combat with this German resourcefulness, they
might yet have hesitated to undertake the struggle,
in spite of all the allies they could marshal to their
side. As it is, the English have jeopardized the
very thing they were so eager to secure against any
peradventure of the future, for in this titanic strug-
gle which England has brought about, the integrity
of the British Empire is at stake, and the future
alone can tell in what condition it will emerge from
it.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Triple Entente and the Alliance with
Japan — Morocco

Immediately after his accession to the throne
Edward VII brought the Boer war to a close by
compelHng his ministers to grant terms that were
acceptable to the vanquished, and then, by making
some concessions to Ireland, pacified that island also
in a measure. When so much was accomplished,
the King of England turned to the task which he
had set himself to be his life work. The first and
greatest obstacle to be encountered was the opposi-
tion between English and Russian interests, — the
English, in their desire to thwart Russia in her en-
croachment upon Manchuria, Persia and in central
Asia, having but just asked aid of Germany, and
been refused. At that time, therefore, Russia was
still regarded as Britain's chief rival, and the Eng-
lish press overflowed with bitter criticism of the
greed for territory, and of the political misrule of
this state so opposed to European culture, and still
so barbarous.

The course which commended itself to England
was first, to accomplish the humiliation of the giant
empire to a point where its government would wel-
come an agreement with England, and then to change

242

Alliance with Japan and France 243

about and combine with this one-time enemy in alH-
ance against the friend of former days, the friend
that had fought shoulder to shoulder with England
in the Seven Years' war and at Waterloo. For this
change of front the British public had to be pre-
pared, and this was done by means of the propa-
ganda against the Germans, as has been described.
Japan's aspiration to power offered England the
first opportunity to enter upon her proposed course
of action. On January 30, 1902, England formed
an alliance with Japan to continue for ten years;
by its terms Japan secured recognition of her de-
sired position in eastern Asia, and each of the two
allies agreed to aid the other if, while engaged in
war with another power, it were to be attacked by
a second foe.^ By this treaty Japan felt she had
obtained backing suf^cient to justify her in a war
upon Russia, and this was promptly begun with the
attack upon Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, just
as Russia was about to re-open her Balkan policy,
and to instigate new disturbances within the Turk-
ish Empire. The outcome is known to every one.
By the terms of the peace that was brought about
by American mediation, Russia beat a decided re-
treat in Asia, while the defeat she had suffered led
to the great Russian revolution which, although it

^ Subsequently the treaty was so modified by England
that its terms did not apply to the United States, whereby
Japan was left to face that country alone in case of a war
between the two, — a conflict that in all likelihood will be
the next great war, and one which may not be far distant,
— while England was left free to determine upon the
course she would pursue in that event.

244 '^^^ Triple Entente

was suppressed, nevertheless resulted in a change
of government, in form at least, from an absolute
to a constitutional monarchy.

Meanwhile England had made use of the time
during which Russia was prostrated by the war to
come to an agreement with France, Russia's ally.
On April 8, 1904, a treaty was concluded between
the two countries. By its terms, a number of co-
lonial differences were adjusted (with regard to the
fishing rights along the coast of Newfoundland,
which France relinquished, and with regard to Siam,
Senegambia, etc.), and France desisted from her
demand that England should withdraw from Egypt
at the end of a stated time, and to offset this, Eng-
land consented to the establishment of a French
protectorate over Morocco. An understanding with
Spain was also foreshadowed in the treaty, whereas
the strong German interests in Morocco were abso-
lutely ignored; that these were to be crowded out
was evidently the fully intended, though unex-
pressed purpose of the treaty.

By this agreement the " entente cordiale " be-
tween France and England was effected; the bitter
hatred of England that the Fashoda contentions
had inflamed anew, and that at the time of the Boer
war had found expression in the press, and had
burst forth in passionate manifestations of popular
wrath, now began to cool off. In its place the
dream of the French to revenge themselves upon
Germany was revived, and grew ever stronger. By
connivance, as well as by open participation, the
French government stirred up a feeling of ani-

The Conference of Algeciras 245

mosity toward the Germans, just as was being done
in England; through the press and in the schools,
as in every other way by which the people could be
reached, the Germans were maligned, and their
bloodthirsty conduct in the war of 1870 portrayed,
together with the ill treatment that Alsace-Lorraine
had suffered at their hands, until this slander of the
German nation attained amazing proportions.

Germany's countermove to the agreement between
England and France was the Emperor's visit to
Tangier on March 31, 1905, for this served as the
occasion to recognise the independence of the Sul-
tan of Morocco, which was sharply emphasized for
the benefit of the world at large. The consequent
diplomatic negotiations led to the Conference of
Algeciras early in 1906. Here Germany's views
were supported by Austria alone ; even Italy, the
third member of the Triple Alliance, assumed a
more than doubtful attitude, for the government
of that country had been previously won over by
English and French promises that Italy would be
allowed a free hand in Tripoli ; henceforth her re-
lations to her official allies grew gradually less cor-
dial. With an evident desire to excuse this attitude
of the third member of the Triple Alliance, Chan-
cellor von Billow wittily alluded to it as early as
January 8, 1902, in his speech to the Reichstag as
an " extra tour." ^ The actual result of the con-
ference, therefore, was that French supremacy in
Morocco was established, although very thinly

^ The German expression for " cutting in " during a
dance. Translator.

246 The Triple Entente

veiled by the formal wording in which it was ex-
pressed. The interests of the German mercantile
firms in Morocco were recognised, however, and
were promised protection. This result of the con-
ference was looked upon, and rightly so, not only
as a retreat on the part of Germany, but as a definite
defeat. By the whole world it was regarded as
such, but more especially so by all the governments
of the Orient, to as remote a land as Abyssinia.

As soon as the entente was concluded, arrange-
ments were made for the co-operation of the Brit-
ish and French military forces in case of war with
Germany. To this end plans were laid for an ad-
vance of the two armies into Belgium as soon as
the British troops should have landed at Calais and
Dunkirk, with the intention of proceeding through
that country on the way to the Rhine provinces.
At the time of the Algeciras conference negotiations
had been begun by the British military attache at
Brussels and the Belgian General Staff for the pur-
pose of making definite arrangements for Belgian
co-operation with the French and English allies, and
for a mutual and precise knowledge of the military
plans made by each of the countries, and of the
means of warfare at their command. These nego-
tiations were not dropped when the conference was
over and peace was again assured, but were con-
tinued into the month of September, 1906. A copy
of an official note found by the Germans when they
occupied Brussels, a facsimile of which has been
published, gives exa'ct information with regard to
these arrangements. Nominally they were to be en-

Agreement with Belgium 247

forced in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality
by the Germans ; in fact, however, it is quite as ob-
vious that at the outbreak of the war the Allies would
have found a reason for entering Belgium with
their troops, as that, by making this agreement, Bel-
gium had ceased to be a neutral state at all. As it
was, the Belgians forthwith proceeded to strengthen
their fortifications at Liege, Namur and Antwerp,
in which they were aided by both England and
France, these fortifications being open at all times
to inspection by the army officers of either of these
countries. It was evidently intended that they were
to form bases for military action against Germany
in the anticipated war.

Meanwhile Russia had arrived at the point where
she was ready to enter into the English schemes.
Her defeat in the war with Japan had made it im-
possible for her to carry out her plans with regard
to eastern Asia. Therefore, as soon as the internal
disorders were somewhat subdued, Russian atten-
tion turned westward again to satisfy that impulse
for expansion by which Russian politics have been
controlled ever since the time of Peter the Great,
and more especially so since the reign of Catharine
11. The old plans with regard to Persia and Con-
stantinople were now revived. In Persia frequent
revolts among the mountain tribes against their
oppression by the government had finally led to
the granting of a constitution in 1906, and imme-
diately afterward to conflicts between the Shah and
his Parliament, by which Russia was furnished with
the welcome opportunity to intervene, and occupy

248 The Triple Entente

Tabriz, in 1906. Here, however, the Russian ad-
vance came in conflict with England's claim to su-
premacy over the region bordering on the Persian
Gulf, and to maintain which she had taken pos-
session of the port of Bushire. On the other hand,
a renewal of Russian interference in the affairs of
the Balkan peninsula would undoubtedl)^ lead to a
conflict with Austria, who had Germany at her back.
The conviction, therefore, gained ground in Russia
that " the road to Constantinople lay by way of
Berlin," and that a war with both the Teutonic
powers would have to be incurred, if her cherished
plans were to be carried out.

Russia also was therefore quite ready to fall in
with the English designs. On August 31, 1907,
both powers signed the convention by which their
differences with regard to their claims in Tibet and
Afghanistan were adjusted, and their separate
spheres of interest in Persia definitely hmited. By
this arrangement all other nations were prevented
from gaining any foothold in that country, which
was thus reserved exclusively to English and Rus-
sian domination. This did not, however, prevent
these two great powers from encouraging the con-
stantly recurring revolts and the state of anarchy
under which this unhappy country languished, for
this condition of affairs afforded repeated and con-
venient opportunity for their intervention. ,

By this agreement the alliance between Russia
and France was widened, and became the " Triple
Entente," to counterbalance the Triple Alliance be-
tween Germany, Austria and Italy. It was pur-

The Triple Entente 249

posely always spoken of as an understanding, and
never as an alliance, for neither the British Ministry
nor the King of Great Britain is empowered to en-
ter into so formal an engagement as an alliance, since
this entails the assumption of obligations by the
nation, and therefore requires the consent of the
Parliament, the nominal sovereign power in Eng-
land. The less the government concerned itself
with it, the more this fiction was officially upheld, —
the " conversations " with the representatives of
the continental powers were mere informal discus-
sions in which a provisional agreement to meet cer-
tain assumed situations was outlined, by which Eng-
land, however, was in no way bound, but on the
contrary, both the country and the Parliament were
left free to act in the matter as they might deem
best in the future. Under these circumstances the
existence of an alliance, especially one of an aggres-
sive nature, could be disclaimed at any time, as, in-
deed, it was with solemn asseveration whenever it
seemed advisable.^ In the meantime all requisite
arrangements could be made as occasion seemed to
demand, so that when the time was ripe for action,
the desired measure could be placed before the Par-
liament and the people, — whose opinion had mean-
while been moulded in the manner that has been
described, — as a completed fact. There was then
little left for Parliament to do but to acquiesce in the
decision that had already been made, just as in the

^ " The Triple Entente was not an alliance ; it was a
diplomatic group" (Sir Edward Grey in his speech to the
Parliament on August 3, 1914).

250 The Triple Entente

nominal monarchies in which there is a fully de-
veloped parliamentary government, the sovereign, or
the president in France, affixes his signature to
whatever measures the ministry places before him.^

^ The position which the English Parliament occupies
with respect to England's foreign policy is analogous to
that which the Roman comitia (officially the sole power
that had the right to declare war and to enter into alliances)
occupied with respect to the Roman Senate, and later, dur-
ing the years of the RepubHc's agony, to the generals, who
were quite independent in their action. Nothing falls
wider of the mark than the opinion which prevails in
America, that in England and France the right to decide
for war or for peace lies in the hands of the people acting
through their representatives, whereas in Germany and
Austria the people are forced into war by an irresponsible
monarch. The exact reverse of this is true, aside from the
fact that in England and France, and in Russia also, the
people are in favor of the present war as a direct result of
the systematic manner in which the three governments
have been inciting their people against their present foes.
Whether by a free vote of the people, if that were a pos-
sibility, they would have declared for war is doubtful
nevertheless.

CHAPTER XIX

The Encircling of Germany — Belgium —
Agadir — The Balkan War

Edward VII and his ministers made strenuous
efforts to persuade still other states to join the
alliance against the Germans, and so to complete
the encircling of Germany, With Belgium they
were wholly successful, and with Italy partially so,
in spite of her official adherence to the Triple Al-
liance. Italy made her position more secure by
entering into agreements with France, England and
Russia (Oct, 24, 1909), while the wording of the
treaty constituting the Triple Alliance was so al-
tered that Italy was not bound to participate in a
war. Practically this was the end of the Triple
Alliance, even though nominally it was renewed,
and Italy avers that it still is in force. But at the
outbreak of the war Italy assumed an attitude of
friendly neutrality toward the Allies, and more es-
pecially toward France, and would in all probability
have sided with them altogether if the German arms
had not met with such immediate and eminent suc-
cess. So far, therefore, Italy has hesitated to enter
the conflict, although her attitude has made it pos-
sible for the French to withdraw their troops from
the Italian frontier, while it compelled Austria to

251

252 The Encircling of Germany

keep a strong force in the Alps, and Italy's attempts
to secure Trient and Trieste were renewed.

Of support from Portugal, her vassal state, Eng-
land felt practically assured from the outset, and at
one time it appeared that in spite of some misgiv-
ings on the part of the government, the services of
Portugal's army of hirelings would be sold to Eng-
land, and that the German vessels interned in the
harbor of Lisbon would become Portugal's easy
prey. At present, however (February, 191 5) the
peace party seems once more to be in control. On
the other hand, Portugal's attitude had the effect of
greatly stimulating the pro-German sentiment iri
Spain, where, in addition to the native antagonism
that exists between the Spaniard and the Portuguese,
the smart still lingers from the blow that England
dealt Spain with the capture of Gibraltar. Besides
this, there was the tension between France and Spain
on account of Morocco, and above all else, the ef-
fect of the anti-Catholic policy that the French Re-
public has followed in contrast to Germany's friendly
disposition toward both the Catholic Church and
the Pope.

In America the sentiment was entirely in favor
of England. From the very beginning of the war
the anti-German feeling manifested by the vast ma-
jority of Anglo-Americans has not only become in-
tensive, but is elemental in its nature. The appeal
made by the German Emperor to President Wilson,
asking that the influence of the United States be
exerted to secure a more humane mode of warfare,
and one more in keeping with the demands of inter-

Portugal. America. The Netherlands 253

national law, was answered, or rather refused with
offensive curtness. In spite of all the humanitarian
and peace-loving sentiments that are constantly on
the lips of the Americans, they are quite content to
accept the English method of making war upon the
German people by an attempt to starve them out.
The British consul at New York was allowed to
carry on an enlistment bureau for the English serv-
ice. There can in fact be no doubt that the govern-
ment of the United States is wholly on the side of
Germany's enemies, and gives them whatever sup-
port is compatible with the preservation of a nom-
inal neutrality, while at the same time the American
people are making money out of the war. Should
the United States openly declare war against Ger-
many, the situation would hardly become more seri-
ous for us, since in reality the Americans can do
us but little harm.

Moreover, this anti-German attitude will be little
changed by the course of the war, nor will it be
affected by England's illegal interference with neu-
tral trade, but on the contrary, this is much more
likely to add to the American dislike of the Germans
because they are not inclined meekly to submit to
this interference, and do what they can to oppose it.
There is reason, however, to hope for better things
from the West where a strong anti-Japanese senti-
ment prevails, and from the Irish element in Amer-
ica, which is bitterly resentful of English methods,
and above all from the German- Americans, who, un-
der the influence of the present war, have been
roused to a stronger sense of solidarity, and polit-

254 The Encircling of Germany

ically have, in a measure, combined with the Irish.
In the congressional elections on November 3, 1914,
the Democratic party, now in power, did in fact
suffer serious defeat in consequence of their com-
bined opposition. It is therefore possible that the
pressure exerted by these elements in the American
population may affect the future attitude of the
United States toward the belligerents as the war
progresses, and induce the government to take a
truly neutral stand, equally impartial to both sides,
in spite of its strong disinclination to do so.

The attempt that Edward VII made to win Aus-
tria over to a co-operation with his plans, and to
estrange her from Germany, proved utterly futile.
The Netherlands refused quite as firmly to enter
into the English schemes, in spite of the pressure
that England can bring to bear upon the Dutch
coast and commerce, and above all upon the colonial
possessions of the Netherlands. In April 1906, the
British military attache, Colonel Barnardiston, noti-
fied the Chief of the Belgian General Staff that " at
the time ^ he had little hope of either support or
intervention from Holland." And as matters then
stood, they remained. This attitude on the part of
the Netherlands prevented the British from making
a landing at Antwerp, their nearest point of ap-
proach, since to reach this port they would have had

1 The word " actuellement " was subsequently inserted
into the sentence by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff.
This is of especial significance, since it indicates that the
hope to secure the co-operation of Holland had not then
been abandoned.

Denmark: Japan 255

to pass through the mouth of the Scheldt, which
belongs to Holland. When in 1908, and again in
191 1, the Netherlands made plans to fortify Flush-
ing in order to be able to make their neutrality ef-
fective, England revealed how little was really meant
by her officially proclaimed and high sounding re-
solve to recognise and protect the rights of neutral
states. Since the proposed fortifications were for
the purpose of defending the Netherlands against
an English invasion, an immediate and indignant
protest was raised by England against the execution
of these plans for Holland's protection, and the
Dutch government was not allowed to carry them
out. This is but another illustration of the Eng-
lish interpretation of neutrality, which is nothing
more nor less than that the country in question is
expected to hold with England, and that although
all other nations are to be debarred from crossing
its frontiers, its territory is to be open to an entry
by the English at any time.

With Denmark, British diplomacy had better suc-
cess, as might have been expected, since its ruler
is closely related to both the English and the Rus-
sian royal houses, and since the conflict regarding
North Schleswig still keeps alive the feeling of re-
sentment against the Germans that has been strong
among the Danes. In 191 1, so far as can be
learned, a plan for the landing of British troops on
the coast of Jutland was not only taken into con-
sideration, but its immediate execution was for a
time seriously contemplated. But at that time an
outbreak of hostilities was avoided, and when in

256 The Encircling of Germany

August, 19 14, the anticipated war had become a
reality, Denmark had decided upon an attitude of
strict neutrality, which has been maintained in a
highly creditable manner by closing the Sound to
the vessels of all the belligerents.

Japan, however, was to be included in the alliance
against Germany, as the ultimatum issued on Au-
gust 17, 19 1 4, stated that by her treaty of alliance
with Great Britain Japan was obligated " to insure
to eastern Asia a firmly established and enduring
peace." Although England had declared war
against Germany and had attacked her colonies,
Germany was nevertheless regarded as the disturber
of the peace, because, forsooth, she was inclined to
defend her colonial possessions, and sent her war
vessels to oppose the depredations of the British
raiders. As a result of her " entente " with Brit-
ain, Japan now entered into relations with Rus-
sia also. On July 3, 19 10, these two countries came
to an agreement with respect to Manchuria, and at
the same time Japan was allowed a free hand in
Korea, followed by its prompt and unqualified an-
nexation to the Empire of Japan.

In May, 1910, Edward VII died, and his son,
George V, who followed him upon the throne, is
neither fitted by nature, nor is he inclined to main-
tain the role that his father played in English poli-
tics ; as a consequence, the political leadership has
again devolved upon the Cabinet. Therefore the
reign of Edward VII, although a very interesting
one, was nevertheless but a fleeting episode in the
history of Britain's internal politics. But for her

Agadir 257

foreign policy, on the contrary, it was an epoch-
making decade, with consequences far reaching in
their effect. After the death of King Edward the
Liberal Asquith Cabinet, with Sir Edward Grey as
Minister for Foreign Affairs, continued his poHcy,
and held to its consequences.

Meanwhile the negotiations with regard to Mo-
rocco dragged on, and were made more intricate by
a war between two brothers who were battling with
each other for the control of the country that was
fast slipping from their grasp. This state of af-
fairs played into the hands of France and gave her
the opportunity to gain a complete ascendency in the
land, and to displace German influence altogether.
Hereupon Germany again manifested her disap-
proval, and dispatched a gunboat to the harbor of
Agadir on July i, 191 1. Germany made no claim
to territory in Morocco, if for no other reason than
for the sufficient one that as the protector of Islam
she could ill afford to annex any Mohammedan ter-
ritory; all that Germany desired was a sufficient
indemnification for the claims she had relinquished.
If, therefore, Germany and France had been left
to settle the matter between themselves, it would
soon have been adjusted. But behind France stood
England, encouraging her to opposition, and taking
advantage of this opportunity to take a bold stand
against Germany, and peremptorily to deny her the
right to acquire any harbor on the Atlantic Ocean,
— not so much even as a coaling station. As a con-
sequence, the excitement in France over " la geste
d' Agadir " grew ever greater, and for weeks an out-

258 The Encircling of Germany

break of hostilities seemed daily imminent. Eng-
land not only planned to land her troops in Den-
mark, but made all the preliminary arrangements for
sending an army of 160,000 men to Belgium. On
this occasion Ostende and Zeebrugge were chosen
as ports for the landing of the troops, and the Bel-
gians were informed that this army " would land on
their shores even if Belgium did not ask aid of
Britain." ^ Eventually, however, an amicable set-
tlement was reached on November 4, according to
which Germany withdrew from Morocco, while
France ceded to her a part of the Kamerun hinter-
land and two small sections of territory reaching to
the Congo. This outcome of the negotiations was
looked upon both at home and abroad as a decided
defeat for the Germans, who had allowed them-
selves to be intimidated by England and France.

In the meantime Russia had again assumed a more
friendly mien toward Germany. During a visit
that Nicholas II made at Potsdam in 19 10, it was
agreed that neither Germany nor Russia would be-
come a party to an alliance inimical to the other,
which was in no way an inconsistency, since, accord-
ing to the terms of both the Triple Alliance and the
Triple Entente, these were to be defensive only,
and moreover, from an official standpoint the latter
was no "alliance" at all. In August, 191 1, while
the Morocco question was still unsettled, an agree-
ment favorable to Germany was reached in regard
to the Oriental railroads. A little later England

^ This document also was found in Brussels, and a
facsimile of it has been published.

Preparations for War 259

took a corresponding attitude, and toward the close
of the year 19 13 entered into negotiations that were
to lead to an understanding with respect to the Bag-
dad railroad, as well as to the adjustment of other
differences. On July 15, 19 14, it was announced
that the German Ambassador at London and the
British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward
Grey, had signed an agreement which disposed of
these affairs. But this w^as all a ruse; it mattered
little how many concessions were made to Germany
for the sake of deluding her into a sense of security,
for with the outbreak of the anticipated war these
would of course all be nullified.

For the preparations for war had never been
abandoned, but were being vigorously pushed. On
the occasion of the visit made by the President of
the French Ministry, Poincare, to St. Petersburg
in 19 1 2, France agreed to increase the strength of
her army by re-instituting the three years' term of
military service, and in January, 19 13, just after
Poincare had been made President of the Republic,
the French Chambers adopted the measures neces-
sary to this step. At the same time Russia obtained
another large loan from France (2^ milliards of
francs in five-year instalments), in return for which
Russia pledged herself to build a number of stra-
tegically advantageous railroads in Poland, for the
purpose of facilitating the quick transportation of
troops to the German frontier. Russia also under-
took to rebuild her fleet, which had been practically
destroyed in the Japanese war and in the subsequent
revolution.

26o The Encircling of Germany

By these measures France became vassal to Rus-
sia; for, if she would not lose the vast sums she had
loaned, she would be compelled to follow unques-
tioningly the lead of Russia in her foreign policy,
and to go to war at her behest. At a somewhat
earlier date England had come to an understanding
with France with regard to the disposition of their
war fleets, according to which the defence of the
Mediterranean was assigned to France with the use
of Malta as a base, while the British fleet was thus
left free to be permanently concentrated near the
shores of the British Isles. From the other and
more distant naval stations all war vessels were
either withdrawn entirely, or the number remain-
ing was reduced to a minimum. By concentrating
her fleet in the Mediterranean, France left her
coasts on the Atlantic Ocean and on the English
Channel wholly unprotected against an attack by
the German fleet; in other words, England under-
took the defence of these coasts with her fleet.
With the consummation of this arrangement the
close alliance between the two states was openly
acknowledged despite the manifold official denials.
England had pledged herself so deeply for France
that a withdrawal was unthinkable.

On November 22, 19 12, the British Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, and the French
Ambassador at London, Paul Cambon, exchanged
similarly worded documents declaring that the con-
versations between the military and naval experts of
the two states were not to be construed as consti-
tuting an obligation by which the freedom of action

Anglo-French Agreement 261

of either state was to be restricted in any way, and
" that, for instance, the present disposition of the
British and French fleets was not based on any obH-
gation by which the two fleets would be expected
to act together in the event of war." By this
shrewdly devised course of action it was intended
to give the distribution of the naval forces of the
two countries the appearance of being most inoffen-
sive in its intentions. But who could be so easily
duped as not to recognise in it a moral obligation
of the strongest kind, since it brought about a sit-
uation between the two states that was wholly un-
tenable without their mutual support of each other?
In answer to a possible objection raised by the Am-
bassador, Sir Edward Grey made the further state-
ment that in case of " immediate danger of an un-
provoked attack by a third power " upon either
Great Britain or France, the government of the
threatened state would have to ascertain at once
whether it could rely upon the other for support.
Therefore, should such a situation actually develop,
negotiations must immediately be set afoot with
regard to joint measures to be taken, and as to the
advisability of making an effort to preserve the
peace. Should the decision be for war, the plans
of the two general staffs must immediately be taken
into further consideration. This diplomatic achieve-
ment excellently displays the true nature of the En-
tente,— upon the surface, no more than the harm-
less discussion of measures that might be taken
under certain contingencies, — in fact, however, a
binding agreement by which two states are firmly

262 The Encircling of Germany

united through the assumption of definite obliga-
tions. It needs no vivid imagination to picture to
one's self the furtively knowing look that was ex-
changed between the two diplomats at the same
time that they exchanged documents.

Meanwhile the negotiations with Belgium were
still under way. It was in vain that Baron Greindl,
the Belgian representative at Berlin, sent his govern-
ment a warning on December 23, 191 1, with regard
to the disclosures, as perfidious as they were naive,
that had been made by Colonel Barnardiston at the
time that the Entente Cordiale was concluded,^ —
a warning to show that Belgium was in quite as
much danger of a French invasion supported by
Britain, against w^hich precautionary measures must
be taken, as it was of a violation of its territory by
Germany.^ This warning remained unheeded by

^ See page 246.

2 " The danger from France does not menace us from
the South only, by way of Luxemburg; it threatens us
along our whole common border. This conclusion is not
based upon conjecture, but upon positive evidence. The
design to surround Belgium from the north doubtless
forms a part of the combined plans of the Entente
Cordiale. If this were not the case, there would not have
been so great an outcry made both in Paris and in London
over our intention to fortify Flushing; there was not even
an attempt made at the time to conceal the reason for the
evident desire that the Scheldt should remain unprotected.
The object in view undoubtedly was to keep the way open
for a British garrison to be transported to Antwerp, the
ultimate purpose being to secure a base of operations in
Belgium for an offensive directed against the Lower
Rhine and Westphalia, and thus to sweep us into the cur-
rent of the war, which would have proved no difficult
task."

Understanding : England and Belgium 263

the Belgian government, which gladly welcomed
every suggestion from the powers of the Entente,
of whose ultimate victory not the slightest doubt
was entertained. That they might have a strong
army to depend upon, the Belgians now also adopted
the system of universal military service through leg-
islative enactment on May 28, 19 13, with a fifteen
months' term of service. English and French offi-
cers were constantly traveling back and forth
through the country, and their presence in the Bel-
gian fortifications was a common occurrence even
before the beginning of the war. The Belgian gov-
ernment furnished the British General Staff with all
the material necessary for a detailed description of
the military topography of Belgium,^ so explicit,
indeed, that it filled four volumes, which, when
printed (1912-1914), were trustfully handed over
to the British officers. During the course of the
war these books fell into the hands of the Germans,
and did them good service in the conduct of their
military operations.^ It would seem, therefore,
that Belgium invited the fate that overtook her.

Meanwhile Germany's reputation abroad suffered
another setback throught the events that were trans-
piring in the Turkish Empire. Here the frightful

^ Belgium, Road and River Reports prepared by the
General Staff, War Office, 4 vol!., 1912-1914.

2 There were also found a large number of copies of the
formularies for levying requisitions to be furnished to the
British General Staff, and which had been printed in ad-
vance and marked with the stamp of the British Legation,
A facsimile was published in the " Norddeutsche All-
gemeine Zeitung" of November 5, 1914.

264 The Encircling of Germany

oppression by the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, who lived
in daily terror of assassination, had resulted in a
thoroughly organized military conspiracy, in the
granting of a constitution, and finally to the deposi-
tion of the Sultan (1908-1909). The adoption of
this constitution gave Bulgaria the opportunity to
renounce her allegiance to the Sultan, and to con-
stitute herself an independent kingdom, while it
compelled Austria to decide upon the formal annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two provinces
that in 1878 had been placed under her administra-
tion ; at the same time, and with an amazing degree
of shortsightedness, Austria relinquished the sanjak
of Novipazar to Turkey. That this act of annexa-
tion, which after all was but a mere matter of form,
roused a storm of fiery indignation in both Russia
and her protege, Servia, and that the war which
threatened in consequence was averted only by the
firm stand that Germany took in behalf of her ally,
are matters of common knowledge. Against the
firmly welded alliance of the two central powers
Russia and her partners dared not yet venture a
war.^ Servia was compelled to demobilize, and on
March 31, 1909, agreed to withdraw her objection
to the annexation, and henceforth '' to live on a
friendly footing " with Austria.

Two years later, in the fall of 191 1, Italy under-
pin a speech made on September 11, 1914, the First Lord
of the Admiralty, Churchill, declared that the present war
" would have been undertaken in 1909 if Russia had not
then so far humiliated herself as to retreat before the
German threats."

The Balkan War 265

took her long planned step to gain possession of
Tripoli and Barka, and to this end made war upon
the Turks, who were not at the time in a position
to offer an effective resistance. And again Eng-
land did not fail to get a share of the spoils, for on
this occasion she seized the Libyan port of Solum,
250 km. west of Alexandria. These events deter-
mined Russia to proceed with her old plans, and to
carry them to completion. In March, 19 12, the
Czar brought about the alliance between Bulgaria,
Servia, and Montenegro, by which it was hoped to
put an end to Turkish rule in Europe, with the
reservation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles
for Russia herself. Bulgaria was to have the lion's
share in the distribution of the spoils of this con-
templated war, whereas Servia, the chief representa-
tive of Russian interests in the Balkan peninsula,
and Montenegro also, were to receive but meager
portions. The unexpressed but very evident inten-
tion was that these two states were to get their
reward at the expense of Austria. These plans
were frustrated, or at least greatly modified, by the
participation of Greece in the war, and by the skill-
ful and far-seeing statesmanship of Venizelos, the
Greek Premier, as well as by the course which the
war took. By far the heaviest burden of the war
fell upon Bulgaria, and she succeeded, although not
without a heavy sacrifice, in forcing the Turks back
upon Constantinople ; this success would hardly have
been possible, however, without the aid of Greece,
whose fleet prevented the transportation of the Sul-
tan's troops from Asiatic Turkey to the European

266 The Encircling of Germany

front. But soon the old wrangles over Macedonia
divided the allies; the Greeks held Salonica, alhed
themselves with Servia, and drove the Bulgarians
back. Meanwhile the Rumanians entered Bulgaria,
made sure of a gain in territory along their south-
ern frontier in the Dobruja, and compelled the Peace
of Bucharest (August lo, 1913). Russia had not
been in a position to lend her aid, and so the world-
wide war was still postponed ; there was now noth-
ing for her to do but to make the best of a bad sit-
uation, and therefore to abandon the hopes that had
been entertained with regard to Bulgaria. Never-
theless the Russian attitude in these events revealed
both her sympathy for Servia and her deep-seated
distrust of Bulgaria, in which, from the Russian
standpoint, she was quite justified, for the Bul-
garians were striving to achieve a true independence,
as free from oppression by the Czar as by the Sul-
tan. For these reasons Bulgaria began to incline
toward Austria and the Triple Alliance, for she
realized that she had been betrayed by Russia.

By these conflicts Austria felt herself touched in
the most vital interests of her empire; there was
nothing left for her to do but to mobilize, which she
did toward the end of 1908. Otherwise, however,
Austria remained passive; and again she failed to
seize Novipazar, and so drive a wedge between
Servia and Montenegro, which would have made
her mistress of the situation, but at the same time
might have precipitated Europe into a general war.
Instead, Austria turned her attention to energet-
ically conducted negotiations with the other great

Outcome of the Balkan War 267

powers concerning the reconstruction of affairs
along the Adriatic. The result was the birth of the
principality of Albania, the worthy offspring of the
" European concert of powers," a political change-
ling, at whose birth stood the wrangling great pow-
ers seeking a compromise between their perplexities
and their jealousies, and in which each one hoped
to outwit the other. For a long time the outbreak
of the great European conflict seemed imminent,
but still both sides hesitated to undertake it, and
so the mediatory endeavors on the part of both Ger-
many and England proved successful. For the next
few months appearances seemed to indicate that the
stage of acute irritation had passed, and that there
was a prospect of a return to the old relations of
friendliness. In the Balkan peninsula the inflamed
passions were subsiding, and conditions were be-
coming more stable, as was indicated by the close
relations into which Bulgaria and Turkey soon en-
tered in spite of the fact that the Turks had re-
taken Adrianople. England, as has been said,
opened the way to an agreement with Germany, the
British Ministry expressed cordial sentiments, and
Lord Haldane came to Berlin on a mission of peace.
From English official circles downward an effort
was made to repress the anti-German feeling among
the English people, and the way seemed again clear
for a renewal of Germany's earnest endeavors to
make peace a certainty. The official expression of
this desire by the German Ambassador was supple-
mented by numerous deputations and associations,
in speeches and at banquets.

268 The Encircling of Germany

On the part of Germany and of Austria this atti-
tude was one of absolute sincerity. In both these
countries the people realized how much was at
stake, and preferred to be overlenient rather than
to assume the responsibility for precipitating the gi-
gantic struggle of the nations, if it could be averted.
But with England and her allies it was all pretense,
for while the official protestations of friendship and
of a desire for peace were being made, the prelim-
inary arrangements for war were being unremit-
tingly continued, and were now nearing completion.
The defeat suffered by the Turkish armies that had
been trained by German officers was everywhere re-
garded to be synonymous to a defeat of the Ger-
mans themselves. The inferiority of their methods,
of their organization, of their military efficiency,
that supposedly had degenerated into mere drill, of
their guns even, seemed now to have been proved
beyond question, and was triumphantly proclaimed
in numberless articles in the English, French and
Russian press.

In the Turkish Empire too, German prestige had
suffered a severe blow ; the mistake that Germany
had made in expecting the ultimate victory of the
Sultan's armies was to her political disadvantage;
the Turkish government now turned for support to
the powers of the Entente ; from France a large
loan was obtained ; and there was very little good
will for Germany at Constantinople. Even so slight
a favor as a request from the German government
to share in the results of the excavations made by the
German Oriental Society, although based on pre-

Germany's Loss of Prestige 269

viously made conditions, was refused. In Decem-
ber, 19 13, Germany suffered another serious diplo-
matic defeat when, in consequence of objection from
Russia, she was compelled to refrain from her pur-
pose of sending General Linian to Turkey as in-
structor. It appeared, therefore, that the time was
ripe for beginning the war. Germany's disposition
to yield a point was of course not believed to be
rooted in a sincere desire for peace — no one within
the territory of the three allied powers had the
slightest faith in that — but was construed as a con-
fession of weakness, and that in spite of her alli-
ance with Austria, and nominally with Italy also,
Germany lacked confidence to grapple with her foes.

CHAPTER XX

The Preliminary Arrangements for War —
The Beginning of the World War

In April, 19 14, the King of England, accom-
panied by his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Grey,
went on an official visit to Paris. There they met
the Russian Ambassador, Iswolski, the chief repre-
sentative of Russia's aggressive policy, — aside from
the energetic Grand Duke Nicholas, who controlled
the weak-willed Czar altogether and terrorized him
unsparingly, — and together they laid the basis for
a military agreement between England and Russia,
analogous to the one existing between England and
France, and supplementary to the measures estab-
lished by the alliance between Russia and France.
Through negotiations concluded at St. Petersburg
on May 26, this agreement received definite form.

The British and the Russian fleets were to enter
into close relations with each other, and were to
exchange information with regard to their own or-
ganization and latest technical equipment, as well as
with regard to what had been learned concerning
other fleets. By a similar arrangement to that
which had been made for the disposition of the
British and French fleets, the Russian fleet was now
also to co-operate with the British navy according

270

Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement 271

to a definitely and previously established plan, al-
though the two would necessarily be separated by
distance. Russia's part in the intended operations
was to force a passage through the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles, and to this end her fleet was to be
allowed to use the British and French harbors in the
western Mediterranean as bases. The British were
to hold as large a part of the German fleet as pos-
sible in the North Sea, and so give Russia an oppor-
tunity to land her armies in Pomerania, a measure
which was to be facilitated by the dispatch of Brit-
ish transport ships into the Baltic " before the be-
ginning of hostilities." For the rest, reliance was
placed on the hope of being able to compel Denmark
and Holland to join the alliance against Germany.
These plans were frustrated by the inferiority of
the Russian navy and by the watchful alertness of
the German fleet, as also by the inactivity of the
British, who dared not venture a bold attack upon
the well protected position of the German fleet for
the purpose of utterly destroying it, by which, how-
ever, a large number of their own vessels would
necessarily be sacrificed.

Naturally the convention with Russia carried as
little official obligation with it as did the similar
agreement with France. This furnished Sir Ed-
ward Grey with an ostensible reason for the cool
effrontery with which he denied the existence of an
alliance with Russia when he was questioned con-
cerning it in Parliament, and just as he had done on
a previous occasion, a year earlier, with regard to
the French agreement, he now declared that in case

272 Preltminary Arrangements

of war between the European powers " there were no
agreements existing by which the free decisions of
the English government, or of the Parliament to
determine whether or not Great Britain should be
a participant would be either hampered or re-
strained ; nor were there any such negotiations now
in progress, and, so far as he could judge, it was not
at all likely that any would be undertaken; should
any such agreement be concluded, however, it would,
in his opinion, have to be submitted to the Parlia-
ment, and this would in all probability be the case."
The absolute untruthfulness of this statement was
recognised and publicly arraigned in the " Man-
chester Guardian," but with no further result than
to elicit a renewed denial in the semi-official press.
Both the Parliament and " public opinion " were
more than willing to be duped ; evidently there was
a perfect mutual understanding with regard to the
situation.

In Russia the same game of duplicity was carried
on. There was no longer even an attempt made to
conceal either the hatred of Germany or the prepara-
tions for war.^ In this respect the Russian press,

^ I cannot refrain from quoting in this connection from
a conversation that took place at the time that the Inter-
national Congress of Historical Sciences met at London
during Easter week of 1913. When the Russian delegation
invited the Congress to meet for its next session, in 1918,
at St. Petersburg, an eminent Russian savant with whom I
was on most friendly terms said to me : " We thought
we would risk the invitation although by that time we
shall have been at war with one another; but I trust that
five years hence we shall all be friends again." At that

The Situation: Summer of IQ14 273

usually so fettered, was allowed a free hand. Un-
der Russian encouragement the Servian agitation
in Croatia proceeded vigorously despite all official
protestations to the contrary. Among the Rutheni-
ans also disturbances were fomented, and no effort
was spared to incite them against Austria. Fur-
thermore, a ruthless espionage was being conducted,
in the face of which Austria remained absolutely
passive. Nevertheless, when in July of 19 14 the
German Ambassador referred to these matters in
conversation with Minister Ssasonow, the latter de-
clared : " The information with regard to a Russo-
Anglican naval convention, that has ostensibly been
concluded, exists only in the fancy of the ' Berliner
Tageblatt ' " (which had at once published an ac-
count of it) " and in the moon." At this very time
the President of the French Republic, Poincare, and
his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viviani, were in
St. Petersburg for the purpose of carrying the nego-
tiations still further, and to re-emphasize the inti-
mate relations existing between the two states ; but,
naturally enough, among the toasts that were ex-
time I looked upon this expression of opinion as one of
extreme pessimism, although I was aware that the speaker
was a pan-Slavist. Since then, however, my thoughts have
recurred to it again and again, and it now seems to me to
be an evidence of the nature of Russian sentiment at the
time, and of how much publicity had been given to the
plans of the Russian government. In its first half the
prediction has been fulfilled; but its second half, I venture
to say, will never be realized ; for, should we live to the
age of Methuselah, we will not all meet again in an inter-
national congress.

274 Preliminary Arrangements

changed on this occasion there were none that were
not of a most harmless and friendly nature.

As has been learned from subsequent publications,
the German government was far better informed of
this state of affairs than we in Germany at first
knew, or had any reason to know in the face of
the inconceivable reticence observed by the govern-
ment at the outbreak of the war. It would now
appear that it would have been to our advantage
if the German government had done as Bismarck did
on similar occasions in so masterly a manner, and
had placed all the evidence it possessed before the
public, and called the world's attention to it. This
would have made Germany's position and her rela-
tions to neutral nations an entirely different one
from what it is to-day. The German Emperor did,
however, express himself very frankly with regard
to the situation in the speech which he made at the
launching of the Bismarck on June 20, when he
alluded to the grave dangers by which Germany was
beset from all sides, and then quoted Bismarck's
words, " We Germans fear God, but nothing else
in the world," with an increasing emphasis toward
the end of the phrase. It is quite remarkable that
these words, spoken as they were by the Emperor,
and which should therefore have left hardly a doubt
in the minds of his hearers that the world-wide war
was at hand, did not at the time make a deeper im-
pression upon his people. But we Germans be-
lieved in peace, and would not believe otherwise;
we could not conceive it possible that England,
holding the decision in her hand as she did, would

The Crime of Sarajevo 275

force us into a war with half the world against us,
for without her co-operation, or at least without her
explicit promise of a definitely friendly attitude,
Russia and France had not ventured upon a war in
the past, nor would they have done so now.

It would appear that before the outbreak of the
war the Allies had fixed upon the spring of 19 15
as the most auspicious time for them to begin it;
by that time, it was expected, their preparations
would be complete, in a measure at least. ■*• Mean-
while the Russians began the " trial mobilization "
of their army in Poland, which gave them the oppor-
tunity to mass a tremendous body of troops on their
western frontier, some being called in from as dis-
tant parts of the Empire as Siberia and eastern
Asia. A naval parade to be conducted on a gi-
gantic scale furnished England with the excuse to,
concentrate her fleet off Portsmouth in the Spit-
head. All would then be in readiness, and the
negotiations could be set afoot by means of which
the war could be precipitated at any time when the
propitious moment had arrived.

But on June 28, 1914, the crime at Sarajevo
hastened the fatal day. Although Austria had long
endured the Servian agitation and the Russian
espionage, and almost without active resentment,
the time had now come when she must act, or else

^ In his celebrated pamphlet Frobenius designates the
year 1916 as the " fateful year for the German Empire,"
viz., the year that had been decided upon as the one for
beginning the war. Considering the measures that were
resorted to in the spring and summer of 1914, it would
appear that the intention was not to wait until that time.

276 Preliminary Arrangements

abandon all hope of a future. At the trial that fol-
lowed, all the complexities of the plot were un-
raveled, and the complicity of the Servian govern-
ment was established beyond a doubt. Austria
therefore delivered an ultimatum to Servia on July
23, with a time limit of two days in which to receive
the reply. When this proved to be an evasion, the
Austrian representative at Belgrade was recalled,
and took his departure on the evening of July 25,
and on July 28 Austria's declaration of war fol-
lowed.

The nature of the conditions which Austria had
made, and with which she peremptorily demanded
absolute compliance, was such that Russia was
forced to choose between the alternatives of aban-
doning her Servian protege, or of going to war for
her sake. By advising the Servian government to
yield, and at the same time accepting Austria's
declaration that the integrity of the Servian terri-
tory would be respected, Russia would have aban-
doned the position she had taken in recent years,
and would have returned to the old standpoint of
1876 and 1877, since it would have been a virtual
recognition of Austrian supremacy in the north-
western section of the Balkan peninsula. On the
other hand there could be no doubt that this was a
matter of vital importance to Austria, and that she
could no longer tolerate the Servian agitation that,
in imitation of the example set by Russian politics,
had resorted to the dagger, the bomb and other
criminal means to secure its ends. Not only did
Austria realize that this evil must be utterly up-

Attempted Mediation 277

rooted, but also that, as instigator of the entire situa-
tion, Russia must be regarded as the real evil doer,
and the Servians but as the ready and willing tools.
If Austria could not have done otherwise than
she did, it was not to be expected that in the end
she would yield, and more especially was this true
in consideration of the unscrupulous attitude that
Russia had assumed in this connection, as in all
others. Nevertheless, it seems, the war party was
not at once predominant; but on the contrary, the
current of opinion that inclined toward seeking
some kind of adjustment maintained itself for some
time side by side with the one for war, — how sin-
cerely it was meant is, however, a question. Even
now the efforts to avoid war received the earnest
support of the German government. The German
Under-Secretary of State went so far as to assure
the British Ambassador, on the evening of July 26,
that the expected and hurried return of the German
Emperor from his summer trip ^ in the North was
not due to any action on the part of the German
government, which was rather disposed to regret
it, " since it was likely to give rise to disturbing
rumors." ^ England also manifested a desire for
peace by suggesting a conference of the powers in

^ In order to make it clear to the world that Germany
was not a participant in the negotiations, nor making any
military preparations, but was merely a watchful observer
of the course that events were taking, the German Em-
peror had not allowed the murder of the Austrian Crown
Prince to prevent him from starting on his journey, nor
had he discontinued it.

2 English Blue book, No. 33.

278 Preliminary Arrangements

which England, France, Germany and Italy were
to participate for the purpose of suggesting a basis
of mediation. This proposition was of course un-
acceptable, since it would have entailed a deep hu-
miliation for Austria, and for Germany as well, if
the Hapsburg monarchy, the state that had been
deeply injured, and whose very existence was being
gravely imperiled, were to appear before a court of
the European powers virtually in the role of de-
fendant, on an equal footing with Servia, the state
whose hands were stained with murder, and there
allow herself to be driven to make concessions.
Therefore, on July 2y, Germany rejected the pro-
posal made by the English, and at the same time
directed their attention to the circumstance that if
the Russians were mobilizing not only in the south,
on their Austrian frontier, but in the north as
well, Germany would feel compelled to resort to
counter measures.^ Furthermore, it was stated
that Germany viewed the conflict between Austria
and Servia as a local matter in ^vhich she could not
interfere, but in which Austria must be allowed a
free hand. Austria took a similar stand, declined
the proposed conference, as well as the suggestion
made by England for further negotiations on the
ground that the Servian reply was not complete, as
she also did the proposal of a direct exchange of
opinions between the Russian and the Austrian gov-
ernments. And then, to leave no doubt as to the

"^ Ibid., Nos. 43, 55 (toward the close), 67, 71, 81, 84.
German White book, Appendix 12.

Attempts at Mediation Fail 279

finality of her decision, Austria declared war on
Servia.

The result was that the Russian government now
gave the official order for mobilization in her south-
ern military districts, which practically, however,
was already well under way, and on July 29, its
formal announcement was received at Berlin. The
German government expressed regret to England
that Austria had made so immediate a decision,^
but did not remit its efforts in concert with the Eng-
lish to seek an adjustment through mediation.^ In
its further action the German government prevailed
upon Austria not to break off her negotiations with
Russia, and on July 30 forwarded to Vienna the
English proposal, suggested as a basis for possible
future negotiations, that after her armies had en-
tered Servia, Austria should there dictate her terms.
At the same time the German government called at-
tention at St. Petersburg to the circumstance that
the Austrian mobilization was directed against Ser-
via and not against Russia, that, moreover, Austria
did not desire acquisition of Servian territory, that
there seemed therefore to be no reason at present
for interference on the part of Russia, and that in
Germany the Russian championship of Servia's
cause after the terrible deed at Sarajevo could not
be comprehended.^

^ English Blue book, Nos. 75, y6.

2 Ibid., Nos. 46, 60, 67-69. German White book. Appen-
dix 13-16, 19.

3 German White book, Appendix 19-233, as well as in the
main text.

28o Preliminary Arrangements

The final decision lay in the hands of England.
Had she declined to support her associates of the
Entente by declaring that she would not tolerate a
war in Europe, and that they who violated the peace
would find her opposed to them, even if only by the
observation of a stern and truly non-partisan neu-
trality, we may be almost sure that the Russian
war party would not have succeeded in the endeavor
to hurry France into the war, for the French would
have realized all too well that it would be they who
would have to bear the brunt of it, and Russia
would then have been compelled to modify her de-
mands. Then, too, the possibility would have re-
mained that by their concerted action England and
Germany might have been successful in their efforts
at mediation, while in the meantime Germany could
have influenced Austria to temper her procedure
against Servia.

But it was soon revealed that all the negotiations
and proposed conferences were but shams, sug-
gested for the sake of gaining time in which to com-
plete the preparations for war,^ and to weaken the
German and Austrian position both from a military

^ On July 29 the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
Sir G. Buchanan, reported that he had told the German
Ambassador that " the Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Ssasonow) gave me (the British Ambassador) to under-
stand that Russia did not wish to hasten the outbreak of
the war by an immediate crossing of her frontiers, and that
it would require at least a week or more before the mobili-
zation could be completed. Meanwhile we would all have
to work together to find a way out of the dangerous situa-
tion." English Blue book, No. 78.

Russia's Decision for War 28 1

and a moral standpoint. The members of the En-
tente understood one another perfectly, and both in
Russia and in France there was a due appreciation
of how much was really meant by Lord Grey's at-
tempts to preserve the peace, and by his equivocal
declarations. During the night of July 30 a de-
cision was reached at St. Petersburg. A report
made at the time by the Belgian charge d'affaires
there, and which later fell into the hands of the
Germans, gives this account of it: It had been im-
possible during the two preceding days to dis-
tinguish between the true and the false among the
rumors concerning the intention of the Russian
government ; " the one thing that has been indis-
putably established is that both here and at Vienna
the German government has spared no effort to
avoid a general conflagration." These efforts were
frustrated, however, by the determination of the
Vienna Cabinet not to withdraw a single demand,
as well as by the Russian distrust of Austria.
** This morning an official communique to the press
announces that the reservists in a certain number of
provinces have been called in. Any one who is
familiar with these official Russian communiques,
and is aware of how much they always withhold,
will realize that this means a general mobilization."
" At the outset, England intimated that she would
not allow herself to be drawn into the conflict; Sir
George Buchanan made this statement openly. To-
day, St. Petersburg is convinced, indeed the assur-
ance has been received, that England will stand by
France. This promise of English co-operation is

282 Preliminary Arrangements

of great significance, and it is largely due to it that
the war party here has gained the upper hand," —
principally for the reason, as is enlarged upon later,
that because of Russia's weakness by sea, England's
support was indispensable. " In the Cabinet coun-
sel that took place yesterday, a difference of
opinion was still evident; the order to mobilize was
delayed; but since then a marked change has taken
place ; the war party is now predominant, and early
this morning, at 4 o'clock, the order for mobiliza-
tion was given."

It was the English attitude therefore by which
Russia was influenced to decide upon war. A num-
ber of telegrams passed between Berlin and St.
Petersburg (July 28 to 31) in the hope still enter-
tained by the German Emperor that by a direct ap-
peal to the Czar, peace might yet be preserved. Al-
though the replies received from the Czar bore a
favorable tone as a whole, and were accompanied by
a request that the ^Emperor continue his mediatory
endeavors, they contained the expression that " a
dastardly war has been declared against a weaker
nation, and the indignation which it has aroused in
Russia, and which I fully share, is a tremendous
one." But even before the formally delivered
declaration, saying that " Russia is far removed
from harboring any desire for war " and that " as
long as negotiations with Austria in regard to
Servia are in progress the Russian armies will take
no belligerent action" (July 31, 2 p.m.), was re-
ceived, the information was at hand that, beyond a
doubt, a general mobilization of the Russian forces

War Declared Against Russia 283

had been ordered, and that it was therefore directed
against Germany as well as against Austria.
Knowing this, it would have been a fatal mistake
to have waited longer; with every hour of hesita-
tion Germany was losing ground in the military
situation by which she was confronted. An ulti-
matum was therefore dispatched to Russia, and
when this remained unanswered, the order for
mobilization was given on August i, at 5 p. m,, and
war was declared.

That France was Russia's ally and would join
her in the war was never for a moment doubted,
and was fully confirmed by the French reply to the
German note of inquiry sent to France at the same
time with the ultimatum to Russia, asking whether
France intended to remain neutral ; for the answer
was that France would do what her interests de-
manded of her.

The more real the danger of war became, the
more earnest grew the efforts on the part of the
German government to continue the friendly rela-
tions that had apparently been established with
England in the concerted endeavor at mediation
which had just been made, and to secure a promise
of neutrality from the English government. The
fact is that, in spite of all they knew and had ex-
perienced, neither the German Foreign Office nor
the men who shaped Germany's diplomacy could as
yet believe that England, or to be more correct, the
British Cabinet, had long ago determined upon its
course of action, and was now deliberately bring-
ing about the war for which it had so long made

284 Preliminary Arrangements

preparation. On July 29, Sir Edward Grey very
frankly said to the German Ambassador, as quoted
in the English Blue book, that " he must not be mis-
led by the friendly tone of our conversations into
any sense of false security that we should stand
aside if all the efforts to preserve peace, which we
are making in common with Germany, failed." ^
But even this was evidently not understood in its
full meaning in Berlin, although it was practically
equivalent to a declaration of war. The truth is
that the Germans were not used to the custom that
prevails throughout England, and is followed even
in private intercourse, and according to which dis-
cussions such as this abound in all manner of gen-
eral and aimless remarks, while the chief thought,
and the one that alone is of significance, is only
casually mentioned and in a most cordial manner,
even though it is absolutely antagonistic to all that
is desired by the other party to the discussion.
This accounts for Gennany's many and continued
attempts by far-reaching concessions to secure from
England a promise to remain neutral, but which
was always politely but persistently refused.

The Germans were fully aware that on account
of the obligations that England had assumed with
regard to France, she could not allow the German
fleet to make an attack upon the French coast along
the English Channel, which was left undefended by
French war vessels, according to the Anglo-French
naval agreement. And it was realized quite as well
that England would resent it as a trespass upon her

^ English Blue book, Nos. 87, 89, 102.

Negotiations with England 285

interests, if the forced passage of troops through
Belgian territory that the German military authori-
ties were planning, and in which they were fully
justified by the practical breach of neutrality of
which Belgium herself had been guilty, were car-
ried into effect. The offer was therefore made that
when the time for making terms of peace had ar-
rived, Germany would respect the integrity of
French territory, and furthermore that the German
fleet would make no attack upon the French coast,
and eventually even that Belgian neutrality would
in no way be violated ; but all without the slightest
effect. On July 30, Lord Grey absolutely refused
to enter into any agreement by which England would
be bound to refrain from participation in the war.^
On July 31, he informed the French Ambassador
that he had " not only definitely declined to agree
that England would remain neutral, but this morn-
ing he had gone so far as to say to the German
Ambassador that if France and Germany were to
become involved in war England would necessarily
be drawn into the conflict." ^ On August ist the
German Ambassador asked him " whether if Ger-
many gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutral-
ity, Great Britain would remain neutral," and that
he (Grey) replied that he "could not say that,"
that he did not think Great Britain " could give a
promise of neutrality on that condition alone."
Further Sir E. Goschen says : " The Ambassador
pressed me as to whether I could not formulate con-

1 English Blue book, Nos. 85, loi.

2 English Blue book. No. 119.

286 Preliminary Arrangements

ditions on which we would remain neutral. He
even suggested that the integrity of France and her
colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt
obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain
neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that
we must keep our hands free." ^

"^ Ihid., No. 123. Compare the German White book, ap-
pendix 33-36, and " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung " of
September 5. At the outset the Ambassador believed that
a promise of English neutrality could be obtained if Ger-
many would declare that in case France remained neutral,
she would make no attack upon French territory, provided
that England would guarantee French neutrality. But
when the German Emperor in a telegram to King George
intimated that such an agreement would meet with his
approval, the reply that was immediately sent by the King
said that there must be some misunderstanding. These
circumstances plainly reveal how little was really meant by
the proposition that Lord Grey made to Berlin on July 30
(English Blue book. No. loi), and for which, in the in-
troduction to the Blue book (P. VII), he takes so much
credit to himself as an evidence of his honest desire for
peace, "If the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the
present crisis safely passed, his own endeavor would be to
promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a
party, by which she could be assured that no aggression or
hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by
France, Russia, and England, jointly or separately. He
had desired this and worked for it, so far as he could,
through the Balkan crisis, and Germany having a cor-
responding object, their relations sensibly improved. The
idea had hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of
definite proposals, but if this present crisis ... be safely
passed, he was hopeful that the relief and reaction which
would follow might make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the powers than had been possible

England Determines upon War '2%'7

In other words, England had long been bound to
France by an agreement, and therefore, in spite of
all her apparent endeavors to obtain an adjustment,
declined to consider every proposal that was made
by which the war might have been averted or re-
stricted. England wanted war. The situation is
clearly stated in a letter addressed by Charles Tre-
velyan, Under-secretary of State for Education, to
his constituents when he resigned his position at the
same time that his father, Sir George Trevelyan,
Lord Morley and Mr. Burns left the Cabinet. He
frankly says that if France had violated Belgian
neutrality " we would not have rushed into war, but
would have contented ourselves with a protest."
" The German offer to refrain from an attack upon
the French coast on condition that we would remain
neutral shows that Germany had by no means as-
sumed an attitude that would not admit of an ad-
justment. But we were not in the mood for it.
We had already taken the other side."

On August 2, Lord Grey took the decisive step.
As based on a decision of the Cabinet he announced
to the French Ambassador : " I am authorized to
give an assurance that if the German fleet comes
into the Channel or through the North Sea to un-
dertake hostile operations against the French coasts
or shipping, the British fleet will give all protection
in its power." To this he added, as he naturally
would: "This assurance is, of course, subject to
the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving

hitherto." These were however mere conventional
phrases without any true significance whatever.

288 Preliminary Arrangements

the support of Parliament, and must not be taken
as binding His Majesty's Government to take any
action until the above contingency of action by the
German fleet takes place."

The ancient illusion was to be kept up even now.
On the following day Lord Grey submitted the mat-
ter to Parliament. He gave the necessary informa-
tion with regard to the declarations that had been
exchanged on November 22, 191 2, which, he stated,
were in no way binding, and then proceeded in a
like manner with regard to the announcement he
had made to the French Ambassador on the day
before, and which he assured Parliament was as yet
not to be regarded as a declaration of war, and left
that body entirely free to act. Of the agreement
made with Russia he said not a word, and quite as
little, no one will be surprised to learn, about the
one with Belgium. To the long continued injuries
inflicted upon Austrian interests he made no allu-
sion, nor did he mention the perilous position into
which Germany had been brought, whereas the new
intimacy with France, entered into since the old
differences were laid aside, was sharply emphasized,
together with the moral obligation not to desert this
newly acquired friend. To this was now to be
added the German entry into Belgium, which was
about to be undertaken, and came to pass on the
evening of the same day. The Parliament was fur-
ther informed that the British fleet was already mob-
ilized,— it was then assembled in the Spithead, off
Portsmouth, for the ostensible purpose of a naval
parade, — and that the mobilization of the army

England Declares War 289

must be begun at once. Any allusion to the cir-
cumstance that by making certain declarations to
France and Russia, or even by announcing her pur-
pose of observing a strict neutrality, England might
have averted the war was avoided with evident in-
tention. Instead, Lord Grey declared that in the
war that had been begun England could not remain
neutral. And in this connection the underlying mo-
tive with which England entered the war comes to
the surface in the partially veiled intimation of the
financial advantage which she was to gain from it,
when Lord Grey added : " For us, with a power-
ful fleet, which we believe able to protect our com-
merce, to protect our shores and our interests, if
we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little
more than we shall suffer if we stand aside." The
Parliament of course accepted these representations
and sanctioned what had been done. On the fol-
lowing day (August 4) the British Ambassador at
Berlin again questioned the German government
concerning its intentions with regard to Belgium,
and when he was informed that the order for the
entry of the German army into Belgium could no
longer be countermanded, he at once announced the
British declaration of war against Germany, at 7
o'clock in the evening of the same day.

It would seem that the British government would
gladly have delayed participation in the war for
some time, for in the meantime the army equipment
could have been vigorously pushed, and England
would then have entered the war at a time when
Germany was fully engaged in the conflict, and

290 Preliminary Arrangements

therefore had already been somewhat weakened.
England would then graciously have extended aid
to her allies, and, with little sacrifice to herself, have
destroyed Germany's commerce and seized her col-
onies. The entry of the German army into Bel-
gium rendered this course impossible to her. It
must be admitted that at the same time it furnished
England with a ready and popular pretext for par-
ticipating in the war, and we know all too well to
what extent she made use of it to her advantage,
both at home and abroad. The moral indignation
with which she clothed her pre-conceived purpose of
entering the war was the more readily assumed be-
cause, in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4,
the Imperial Chancellor openly and candidly ad-
mitted that the German occupation of Belgium was
a violation of international law. The additional
statement that the German government was at the
time aware of the French intention to occupy Bel-
gium (England's purpose to participate in this action
could not at the time be disclosed since England
had not as yet declared war) was at first discredited
by every one except those whose sympathies were
wholly with the Germans, while Germany's position
of extreme peril, by which she was justified in
grasping at any means of defense against the mur-
derous attack upon her from all sides, was recog-
nized quite as little. How much regard for her
agreements with other nations, and for their neu-
trality, England has shown in the past, we have al-
ready seen, and it has again been revealed in the
present war.

Effect upon the German Nation 291

After the representations that had been made at
BerHn by the British Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen,^
the German diplomats were not prepared for Eng-
land's declaration of war, in spite of all that had
preceded it, and were both painfully surprised and
depressed by it. The German nation felt differently
about it. There can be no doubt that when we first
learned of it, and realized all that the gigantic strug-
gle in which we were about to engage would demand
of us, the German people were deeply affected. In
the beginning we, too, could hardly believe that all
our attempts to convince the English of the peace-
ful nature of our intentions had been in vain, and
that all the courteous and conciliatory messages that
we had received from them, especially in response
to our most recent overtures, were all mere empty
phrases. Then we set our faces grimly to the task

^ It is worthy of notice that the two ambassadors who
delivered the British declaration of war at Berlin and at
Vienna were both of German origin, Sir E. Goschen, a
descendant of the well known publisher who lived at the
time of the classical period of our literature, and Sir M. de
Bunsen, a grandson of the renowned friend of Frederick
William IV, who, as representative at London played so
disastrous a role in diplomacy, and in which he was as
much of a dilettant as he was in historical science, and
who felt highly flattered when the English aristocracy
welcomed him in its circles and accorded him almost the
treatment of an equal. The King of Great Britain also
is of German extraction. The question suggests itself
whether, in spite of their naturalization, these men will be
suspected of being German sympathisers, and so be sub-
jected to treatment similar to that which the Prince of
Battenberg and so many others have received.

292 Preliminary Arrangements

before us, fully recognising at last that an open foe
is far preferable to a perfidious friend. If it must
be, we would battle for victory with this latest re-
vealed foe also, and, in this struggle with a world in
arms, the moral and physical force of our nation
should be steeled and strengthened as never before.
And again the German Emperor was fully in sym-
pathy with his people. When in the evening of the
day on which the British declaration of war was
received, the windows of the British Embassy were
stoned, and which, according to the testimony of
trustworthy witnesses, was provoked by the bravado
of some of the employees of the Embassy, who
shouted " Hurrah ! " out of the windows, and threw
copper coins into the street, with the taunt that they
were intended to defray the costs of the war, the
Secretary of State, von Jagow, made excuses for
this demonstration. " The German Emperor, how-
ever," I quote the words of Sir E. Goschen, " sent
an adjutant to me on the following morning with
the message : ' The Emperor has charged me to
express to your Excellency his regret for the occur-
rence of last night, but at the same time to tell you
that you will gather from those occurrences an idea
of the feelings of his people respecting the action
of Great Britain in joining with other nations
against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty
also begs that you will tell the King that he has
been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and
British Admiral, but that in consequence of what
has occurred he must now divest himself of these
titles.' I could add," continues Sir E. Goschen,

Sentiment in England and Germany 293

" that the message lost none of its acerbity by the
manner of its deHvery." ^

For a time the idea was entertained in wide cir-
cles in Germany that England had been hurried into
the war through the machinations of unscrupulous
politicians, that a large number of Englishmen, al-
though swept along by their feelings in the excite-
ment of the moment, would soon awaken to a real-
ization of what was involved, and disapprove of it,
and that a pro-German sentiment would then set in
by which the Government would find itself opposed
in its measures after the same manner that it had
been by the strong Opposition that developed at the
time of the Boer war. Gradually, however, we dis-
covered that this too was an illusion. The number
of voices in England that were raised in our favor,
or at least, against the war, it would not have been
difficult to count, — some of them have already been
alluded to. Among the English savants, too, and
at the universities, where hitherto closer relations
with Germany had been so frequently both sought
and fostered, only few voices friendly to Germany
were heard, and many of the men who hitherto had
been counted among her staunchest friends were now
to be found with her most zealous opponents.
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the war
upon Germany is highly popular in England through-
out all the various grades of her population, and that
the conviction that it was not only a necessity, but
was inevitable, is practically universal among her
people. Not on Servia's account, nor for the sake

^ English Blue book, No. 160.

294 Preliminary Arrangements

of Belgium, was it undertaken; but because Ger-
many's ruin was believed to be a necessary condi-
tion to the preservation of England's position of
dominance in the world. " Only children," writes
a highly intelligent Italian, " will now or in the fu-
ture speak of this war as a French or a Russian
war, whereas history and men will recognize in it
a struggle to the death between England and Ger-
many, fought out on French and Russian soil."
This aspect of it is strikingly revealed in the man-
ner in which Austria, the nominal instigator of the
war, once this was decided upon, immediately re-
ceded into the background, even before the negotia-
tions with regard to the war had been concluded.
The nations, and especially their governments, are
not fighting Austria, nor because of Austrian ag-
gressions on the Balkan peninsula, but against the
German Empire and the German nation, and deplore
the fact that Austria has remained their faithful
ally.^ As a nation we grasped this situation at
once; and at the present time there is a conscious-
ness abroad among the German people, from the
highest to the lowest station in life, that England
is their deadly foe, and that it is England who has

^ After the war with Germany had begun Russia still
allowed her ambassador at Vienna to remain at his post
for the purpose of continuing the negotiations with
Austria, until, on August 6, the latter country put an end
to this absurdity by declaring war against Russia. Eng-
land did not declare herself to be at war with Austria until
August 12, and then with the accompanying explanation
that by declaring war upon Russia, Austria was also prac-
tically at war with Russia's ally, France.

England, Germany's Bitter Foe 295

forced upon them this conflict which is to decide
whether they are to be or not to be, — this battle
for their national existence and for all that is of
highest worth to them.

CHAPTER XXI

England's Conduct of the War — The Moral
Decadence of the English

To speak of the course that the war will take
would be out of place at this time, for as yet the
end can in no way be foreseen. At the outset Eng-
land has sent her allies into the field; she herself
could send but a relatively small army to Belgium
and France, the trained army of mercenaries with
which up to the present time she has fought her
wars. Contrary to all expectation the British fleet
has remained inactive, whereby all the proud threats
in which the British indulged before the war began,
as for instance that the day after war had been de-
clared the German fleet would have ceased to exist,
were proved to be but vain boasts. The course pur-
sued by the British fleet stands in striking contrast
to the spirit of enterprise shown by the German
vessels, and by the many splendid and surprising re-
sults of their activity. By this attitude of her fleet
Great Britain virtually admits the danger of her
position. She dares not risk the destruction of a
large number of her war vessels in a great and
decisive battle with the German fleet, well protected
as it is by its sheltered position, not only because
Britain's supremacy at sea would be imperiled

296

Control of the Seas 297

through a possible reduction in the strength of her
sea power below that of the French/ and especially
below that of the Americans, but above all because
the British fleet must remain adequate to the task
of insuring safety to Britain's import trade. Should
this be tied up, or even restricted in a measure suffi-
cient to cause a food famine, British resistance
would be broken. Therefore the British fleet is fully
employed in securing to England the control of the
ocean routes, and above all, of the open sea to the
north of Scotland. To these demands that are made
on the fleet must be added the necessity of pursuing
the German cruisers, a purpose for which the Brit-
ish fleet alone was evidently deemed insufficient,
since the co-operation of the Japanese was accepted,
and for which Britain was obliged to extend thanks
to them for the victory in the battle of the Falkland
Islands, the most humiliating testimony to Britain's
inadequacy that she has yet been forced to render.^

^ The inactivity of the French fleet in the Mediterra-
nean, augmented, as it is, by British vessels, can only be
explained in a similar manner. Its first duty is to insure
safety to the intercourse with the African possessions,
and secondly, to hold Italy in check. An attack upon the
Austrian coast and fleet could therefore not be ventured.
Whether an attempt to force the Dardanelles with a view
to protecting the Suez Canal will be made, remains to be
seen.

2 Since then England has however lowered her national
dignity even to a greater degree ; for at the very time
when her First Lord of the Admiralty was boasting to
Parliament that Britain's sovereignty of the seas had
never been as absolute as at the moment, orders were
being issued to the British merchant marine to lower the

298 Conduct of the War

Whether the future will bring about a change in this
respect, and the British naval authorities will de-
cide upon a vigorous attack, and what dimensions
the war at sea will then assume, no one can foretell.

Of one thing we may be certain, however, which
is that, as the war progresses, England will greatly
increase her strength by land, until far beyond any-
thing she has hitherto accomplished in this direc-
tion. The appeal to the national spirit has met
with a wide response, especially from among the
upper classes, and although the results of the efforts
to obtain recruits have not fulfilled the high hopes
that had been entertained of them, and the men of
Ireland are evading service in the British army as
far as possible, nevertheless it would be a grave
error to value lightly the armies that are now being
trained in England. Through her desire to attack
and destroy militarism abroad, England will find
herself compelled to adopt the very institution she
is supposed to be fighting, for whatever may be the
outcome of the present war, certain it is that its in-
evitable consequence for England will be the intro-
duction of the universal military service she abhors.

In other respects England has so far conducted
the war in the manner traditional with her ; her allies
are fighting for her with all their available strength,
while the British forces that can be sent to the front
are both small in numbers, and are exposed as little
as possible. To this end England went begging

national emblem in fear of an attack by German sub-
marine boats, and fly in its place the flag of a neutral
nation.

England Seeks Aid 299

among all the nations of the earth for troops to aid
her. And again, as of old, although she annexed
Egypt, subjugated the Boers, and is now compelling
them to fight against the Germans in East Africa,
and views with cold indifference the subjugation of
Finland by violence, England still poses as the lib-
erator and defender of the small states, and as the
noble champion of the independence of the nations.^
While pretending to be battling against a violation
of neutrality by Germany, England is at the same
time seeking with every means at her command,
by the pressure of her powerful fleet, by the re-
straint of their commerce, as well as by direct
threats, to coerce the neutral states into a combina-
tion with her in a war that does not concern them,
and is, in fact, opposed to their interests. As yet
her results have been meager; even the Portuguese,
as used as they are to obey the commands of their
English lords, still seem to hesitate despite their evi-
dent willingness. This is but another evidence of
the loss that English prestige has suffered, princi-
pally through the inactivity of the British fleet, fur-

^ " Should I be asked what we are fighting for," said
Premier Asquith to the Parliament on August 6, " my an-
swer would be in two sentences, — in the first place, to fulfill
a solemn international pledge (Belgian neutrality). . . .
And secondly, we are fighting in defense of the principle —
in these days when force, material force, at times seems to
be the dominating factor in the development of mankind, —
for the principle that small nations shall not be crushed at
the pleasure of a strong power by which they are over-
whelmed in defiance of international fidelity and trust."
This is a true specimen of real English " cant."

-200 Conduct of the War

thermore through the exploits of the German ves-
sels, and, by no means least, through the wonderful
results achieved by the German submarine boats.

Japan, on the contrary, grasped eagerly at the op-
portunity, in conformity to her alliance with Britain,
to drive the Germans out of their positions on the
Pacific Ocean. And the Japanese would like to go
very much farther, and assume the protection of
British and French interests in Asia, but the ques-
tion would then arise as to how much they would be
willing to relinquish in the end. Whereas hitherto
England has held herself to be the champion of the
white race against all others, and although the
Briton looks with haughty disdain upon all men of
color, — in India, for instance, refusing social equal-
ity to Hindoos even of the highest culture, — the
English now combine with the Japanese, and set
them on the Germans, indifferent to the fact that
by so doing they are not only violating the princi-
ples they advocate, but are educating to efficiency the
future foe from whom they will have the most to
fear for their empire of the seas, just as they are
also willing to turn the European continent over to
Russian dominance. Nor is England ashamed, any
more than is France, to let loose against the Ger-
mans all manner of foreign races, — yellow, brown
and black hordes, down to the most brutal negroes.
The two nations who look upon themselves as the
vanguard of culture and morality in this war against
the modern Hun are truly worthy of each other!

In other directions also England's methods in the
present war have been in harmony with her usual

Manner of Conducting the War 30 1

disregard of all standards of humane consideration,
only that now, in correspondence with the magnitude
of the present conflict, this exceeds even its ordinary-
limits. All German colonies are being destroyed in
so far as this is possible through English agency,
and thus numerous centers for a wide and beneficent
service in the interest of civilization are being blotted
out. Moreover, Britain is not content with paralyz-
ing her enemies' commerce and capturing their mer-
chant vessels, but holds up all neutral shipping on
the high seas, to search for and capture German
citizens. Neither has she hesitated to violate the
mails to and from Germany. She interferes with
the trade of neutral nations at her pleasure, detains
their ships, declares to be contraband whatever it is
to her advantage to consider as such, and altogether
proceeds with an utter disregard of international
law and of the obligations she assumed through in-
ternational agreements. And the neutrals submit to
all this, although not without an occasional sigh of
regret; of them all, only the Americans venture to
make a half-hearted protest when the results are too
severe on their pocketbooks, but only to be put ofif
with fair words and a few crumbs of comfort. But
even they submit meekly when vessels plying be-
tween the United States and its island possession,
Porto Rico, are stopped by the British, and any Ger-
mans that may be found on them are seized and
carried off to Jamaica or to the Bahama Islands.
And this is what the Americans call neutrality! Al-
though the other nations are little inclined to admit
it, it is daily being demonstrated that Germany's war

-702 Conduct of the War

against England is at the same time a war for the
liberation of the seas, and for the true independence
of nations.

But the worst that the war has revealed is the
appalling lack of conscience that England displays,
and the terrible decadence of the English character.
How much lying and empty phrasing is masked be-
hind the display of high motives that the English
parade before the world, how little they really mean
by their frequently quoted " love of fair play " as
soon as their own advantage is at stake, how dis-
reputable the individual Englishman often is who
outwardly passes for a perfect gentleman, the world
has long been learning; but the depth of moral base-
ness that they have shown in connection with this
war, no one would heretofore have believed possible.
In the masses, even of the more educated, this is ex-
cusable, for they believe what is told them, and
know no better; but all the more heavily does the
responsibility for it rest upon the leading classes —
the statesmen, the writers, the press, and to some
extent even with the higher army officers. We have
discovered that English " gentlemen " do not shrink
from any crime, if only outward appearances can be
preserved. Lord Haldane openly declared that in
the spring of 19 14, when he was the British Secre-
tary for War, and came to Berlin, ostensibly on a
mission of peace, and accepted the honors that were
bestowed upon him there as the messenger of peace,
that in reality he went there ** not to pave the way
for more amicable relations, but to learn all that he
could from the German military organization which

English Brutality 303

might prove useful to England." This is probably
false ; but all the more significant is the fact that the
noble Lord eagerly claims to be the perpetrator of a
contemptible action for the sake of gaining pop-
ular favor in England, and one of which he was not
even guilty.

The hideous dumdum bullets, such as the British
have long been using in their wars with " savage "
peoples, are being supplied to the army in great
quantities. The judges in England set aside every
idea of right or of justice with a smile of cold in-
difference when dealing with a German in the dis-
charge of their official duties. German men who
have been domiciled in England for decades, some
having been in the public service there, — at the uni-
versities, for instance, are apprehended, separated
from their families, and crowded together in concen-
tration camps, such as were used in the Boer war (p.
215),^ or are placed on detention ships in the Ports-

^ Winston Churchill, now Britain's First Lord of the
Admiralty, who was war correspondent for the " Morning
Post " during the Boer war, wrote at the time : " There
is but one way in which the opposition of the Boers can be
broken, and that is by the most severe measures of sup-
pression,— we must kill the parents in order that their
children may have respect for us." Kitchener carried this
doctrine into effect in the most cruel manner. In the con-
centration camps 54,326 children and 38,022 women were
crowded together; of these, according to the British figures,
14,000, and according to those of the Boers, 20,000 per-
ished. English newspapers published in November, 1901,
reported of these camps that " the mortality is greater than
during an epidemic of cholera," and that of every 1,000
persons, an average of 383 died.

304 Conduct of the War

mouth harbor. And in the face of these deeds of
their own, the EngHsh are making a great and ap-
peahng outcry over the alleged brutalities of which
the Germans are supposed to have been guilty on hos-
tile territory. The terrible and barbarous methods
that were resorted to in this war almost at the outset
are due to the English even more than to the French.
They compelled us to take measures of reprisal to
which we had recourse with great reluctance, such
as that of interning the English who were domiciled
in Germany; they have brought our soldiers to the
point where they look upon their British opponents
as their mortal foes, with whom they therefore fight
in a spirit of bitter hatred quite foreign to them
when in battle with the French or Russians. Since
the Germans cannot be vanquished in open warfare,
the great endeavor of the English is to cut them off
from all food supplies, and so to subdue them by
famine. The " humane " Americans seem to find
this method of procedure quite in the natural order
of things, but they nevertheless raise a cry of pro-
test at the injuries inflicted upon their interests when
we meet the English intention to starve us out by
declaring that we will destroy the merchant vessels
that are taking food to England. The evident in-
tention is not only to annihilate the power of the
German state, but to destroy the entire German peo-
ple as well, and above all else, their industries, their
factories, and their cities. With malicious satisfac-
tion the English technical journals, such as " The
Engineer," are portraying to their readers the large
profits that will accrue to Britain from such a result.

Defamation of the Germans 305

The most despicable of all, however, is the fabric
of lies that the English have been weaving, and have
spread over the world. It reveals a moral degen-
eracy from which one turns with disgust. No
calumny is too despicable, no lie too unreasonable
to serve their purpose. That the very next day may
prove it false does not in the least deter them, for
once having been set afloat, it has done its mission,
and the mass of the British public is too ignorant
and too credulous to allow an opinion once formed
to be corrected by a later and truer statement of
facts. At the same time the total want of general
information, and the consequent inability to under-
stand other nations that prevails among the Eng-
lish people is drastically revealed. Momentarily
the English have achieved most astounding results
by this procedure to which they have had resort;
but in other countries there is even now a gradual
awakening to the truth, and the day must come when
in England also the eyes of the people will be opened.
Then, when it is too late to mend, they will realize
that, aside from the moral wrong, the greatest in-
jury inflicted by this system of calumny has been
to themselves and to their country's reputation.

PART III

THE NEW WORLD CONDITIONS AND THE
PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

CHAPTER XXII

The New World Conditions and the Problems
OF THE Future

While the final negotiations about Sicily were
being concluded between Rome and Carthage, be-
fore they went to war about that island in the year
264 B. c, the Carthaginian said to the Roman
tribune : " What are you thinking of that you are
willing to go to war with us about an island ? You
have no fleet, you are inexperienced in the conduct
of a war at sea; without our permission you dare
not even venture to wash your hands in the sea."
But the Roman answered : " We have always made
it a practice to learn from our enemies. We have
frequently altered our method of warfare and our
army organization from the ground up, — we did
this a little at a time; do not therefore force us to
go to sea, for, once we are driven to it, we shall
soon have more and better ships than you have, and
shall then conquer you by sea as well as by land."
This prophecy was immediately fulfilled when Duil-
lius won the victory in the first battle at sea, and
again in many later encounters upon the water.

This is precisely the situation in which Germany
finds herself to-day with regard to England, with
the exception, however, that in the war about Sicily,

309

3IO New World Conditions

Rome was the aggressor, whereas in the present con-
flict Germany is the one that has been forced against
her desire to engage in it. Whether the outcome
will bear out the similarity — who will venture to
prophesy ?

Then Hannibal took charge of the war against
Rome, and not only dealt her one staggering blow
after another, but also succeeded in forming a pow-
erful coalition against her, with the intention of
destroying this Italian state, and forcing Rome back
again into the unimportant position that she had
held in past centuries. In seeking to explain why
Rome nevertheless bore off the final victory, Polybius
draws a comparison between the character of the
two states. " The Carthaginian constitution," he
says, " was originally and in its main features a
well regulated one. The Carthaginians had a king,
the Counsel exercised the functions of an aristocracy,
and the people were given the rights to which they
were entitled. But at the time of Hannibal the
Carthaginian state had already passed the zenith of
its power, whereas Rome was then at the height of
its development. Carthage had arrived at that
stage of her history when most of the important mat-
ters of state were submitted to the people for deci-
sion (a fully developed democracy, therefore),
whereas in Rome the Senate, composed of the ablest
Romans, was in control. Consequently the deci-
sions of the Romans, and the measures they adopted
were superior to those of the Carthaginians, and
therefore they eventually conquered them." For
this achievement it was greatly to the advantage of

Analogy 311

the Romans that they possessed an abundance of ma-
terial, especially the necessaries of life, or at least
had easy access to them, as Polybius points out,
" So far as the conduct of the war is concerned," he
then continues, " the Carthaginians were, of course,
better equipped and better trained for the war at
sea, whereas for the war on land the Romans were
far better prepared. For to this, the Romans de-
voted themselves with great ardor; the Carthagini-
ans, on the contrary, neglected their foot soldiers,
and made provisions only for their horsemen. The
reason for this is that the Carthaginians employed
foreigners and mercenaries, whereas the Roman sol-
diers were natives and citizens. The fortune of the
Carthaginians therefore depended upon the mood of
the mercenaries they hired, while the Romans placed
their dependence upon their own valor, and upon the
support of their allies. Even though the Romans
might lose at the beginning, they would nevertheless
continue without loss of zeal, which the Cartha-
ginians would not ; for the Romans were fighting
for their fatherland and for their children; their
courage knew no abatement, therefore, and they
fought to the end, even to the sacrifice of their lives,
until the foe was vanquished. Because of the valor
shown by their warriors in the conflict at sea, they
were victorious there also, despite their lack of ex-
perience; for at the critical moment the courage of
the ship's soldiery is of higher value than is tech-
nical experience."

We need not follow this parallel in its particu-
lars. The divergences, mainly due to the great

312 'New World Conditions

changes that have taken place in the methods of
warfare, are apparent to every one. But quite as
evident also is the fact that the decisive elements in
the two situations are identical.

The analogy between the present war, between
England and Germany, and the Punic wars must
claim the attention of every student of history, and
has been frequently commented upon by historians,
without as well as within our own land. In the an-
cient conflict, however, the theater of war was con-
fined to the narrow limits of the Mediterranean
countries, whereas the one of to-day well nigh en-
circles the globe. Furthermore, Hannibal's invita-
tion to all the peoples and states of the ancient world
to combine with him against Rome, for its destruc-
tion, did not receive the wide response that Eng-
land's efforts to gain allies for a world war against
Germany have found. How completely in other
respects the analogy is borne out, in the struggle of
the state whose greatest strength is by sea with the
one whose main dependence is upon its land forces,
as well as in the utterly different structure of the
two state organizations, the careful reader will have
recognised.

The Punic wars are the turning point in ancient
history. With them the ancient system of state
organization begins to crumble, and at the same
time the development of ancient civilization has
reached its zenith, and henceforth slowly but stead-
ily declines, until it ends in the dead level of complete
disintegration and primitive conditions. Again the
similarity of events and of the historic situation is

Utter Change in the World 313

plainly and undeniably evident. What may be the
relations and circumstances that will develop at the
close of the present gigantic struggle, the manner
of whose termination no eye can foresee, and in
what condition the individual states and nations will
emerge from it, no one would be rash enough to
prophesy, and as often as this question may be asked
of the future on either side of the firing lines, just
so often would it prove vain to venture an answer.

We Germans are firmly convinced that we shall
endure to the end, and, undismayed, shall carry the
war to a successful termination. But whether it
will then be possible to solve all the stupendous
problems by which the world will be confronted,
who can say? In other words, will England's tyran-
nous supremacy at sea be broken, and a true free-
dom of the seas be secured, with a consequent free
intercourse between the nations, or will the general
exhaustion be so great that no more than a tem-
porary adjustment can be made, and the map of
Europe in no wise be changed ? Should this be the
case, the peace that will follow the war will be no
more than a prolonged armistice, only a period of
waiting until the final solution must be reached.

But of so much we may be certain, — the world
in which we shall find ourselves after peace has been
concluded will be totally dififerent from the one
with which we have been familiar, even should there
be no outward change, no shifting of the old-time
boundary lines. For this war that England has
brought about is not only the greatest war in the
history of mankind, but it is the most epoch making

314

New World Conditions

event of modern history. The world as we knew
it before August i, 19 14, has ceased to be. What
precedes that date seems to belong to a remote past,
so far removed from us that we can hardly realize
that we had a share in it; we have suddenly been
called upon to adjust ourselves to a new world, and
to force our minds into wholly new channels of
thought. In addition to the new problems that the
war has brought with it, many old ones have been
revived, — problems that we had supposed were dis-
posed of, never to disturb us again, but which now
urgently demand adjustment. The responsibility
which this places upon us, — upon the government,
upon each one of us individually, and upon the peo-
ple as a whole, is a stupendous one, and one which
no one can realize without anxious misgivings.
But in this we are not alone, for the other nations,
those that forced this war upon us, deliberately
planned and began it, will discover that for them too
it will become a struggle for existence, or at least
for their political position in the world.

This is pre-eminently true of England, the insti-
gator of the war. The English set it afoot because
they believed continued peace to be incompatible
with the preservation of their position of dominance
in the world. But it has developed that the very
dangers that it was hoped would be averted by the
war are still clamoring at England's heels, and that
her world dominion and her empire of the seas are
menaced to-day as never before, not even during
the time when anxious fear of Napoleon's threat-
ened domination would not allow William Pitt to

British Empire Imperiled 315

rest in peace, and hastened his early death. What-
ever may be the issue of a great battle at sea, the
belief that Britain is invincible upon the water has
been shattered; the fear of her fleet is w^aning, and
the achievements of the submarine boats have proved
her floating iron giants to be vulnerable. For the
first time in a period of two hundred years Eng-
land has had her coasts attacked and bombarded by
an enemy's vessels. She has been compelled to
close her ports to foreign vessels, and to restrict
her ocean routes in a measure that heretofore would
hardly have been deemed possible. The few Ger-
man cruisers and raiders have inflicted considerable
damage on British trade, and have carried the fear
of them to India's distant shores and into the Pacific.
While England plans to starve the Germans into
submission, the prices of grain have advanced to a
much higher level in Great Britain than they have in
Germany, and the fishing industry, upon which the
British are very dependent for food, is lying pros-
trate. As little as they may be disposed to admit
it, there can be no doubt that the anxious question
frequently suggests itself to the men of England
who bear the responsibility for the welfare of its
people, whether they will find it possible to supply
the British Isles uninterruptedly with at least the
minimum of necessary imports, especially if Ger-
many should decide to adopt the plan proposed by
Admiral von Tirpitz, and announce a blockade of the
British coast, and then proceed ruthlessly against
all merchant shipping destined for British ports, a
proceeding in which Germany is fully justified by

-2 1 6 New World Conditions

England's total disregard for the demands of inter-
national law.

To these anxious cares another is added by the
manifest unrest in various parts of the British Em-
pire. That the Irish question has again reached an
acute stage has already been mentioned. The Irish
are persistently refusing to enlist in the British
army, and the authorities in England feel compelled
to keep a strict guard upon the island, to suppress
all freedom of speech and of the press, and have
again resorted to the suspension of the Habeas Cor-
pus Act, that time hallowed institution for safe-
guarding the personal freedom of every citizen of
Great Britain. Irish patriots, both at home and in
America, are cherishing the hope that Ireland may
find her opportunity to sever her relations with
England, if not in this war then in a following one;
and since, if accomplished, this step would be the
death blow to England's dominance at sea, Ireland
might then hope that her independence would prove
an enduring one.^

In South Africa the Boers have again taken up
arms, and although they have sufifered defeat, it is
clearly to be seen from the nature of the English
reports that as yet they are not entirely subdued.
How matters stand in India no one outside of the
initiated few in government circles has any idea.
But the most significant event in this connection is
the uprising of Islam against Britain, together with
Turkey's participation in the war, and the conse-

^ See note, page 98, referring to a pamphlet by Sir
Roger Casement.

European Culture Endangered 317

quent menace to Britain's supremacy in Egypt and
her control of the Suez Canal, the main artery of sup-
ply to the British Kingdom. And even should Eng-
land and her allies be the victors in the war, these
dangers will not be lessened for that reason, but on
the contrary, they will become even greater. For
aside from the fact that the end of the war will by
no means assure the end of this political ferment,
England will then have to cope with the new situa-
tion which she herself will have created in deliver-
ing the whole of the European continent, together
with a large part of Asia, over to Russian domina-
tion, and at the same time having raised Japan to
a position of power at sea in both the Pacific and
Indian oceans, by which this island empire of the
East will but have had its appetite whetted for
further conquests. The inevitable consequence, and
one which English statesmen must fully realize, will
be that not many years after the present war is over,
England will be at war again, not only with Rus-
sia, but with Japan also, in a conflict that in all like-
lihood will assume even greater proportions than the
one in which she is engaged at present.

And for him who views the world's history in its
entirety, there looms up behind all these problems
of the future the haunting thought that the analogy
between the present and the Punic wars may persist
to the end, and that with the outbreak of this war
modem civilization may have reached its turning
point, and the future will witness its gradual de-
cline. The fact is that the indications point that
way in whatever direction we may look for evidence.

3ii

New World Conditions

International law has been annihilated by England;
and although the attempt may be made to rehabili-
tate it when the war is over, who is credulous enough
to believe that in the future it will prove more en-
during than it has proved in the past? From the
outset, the present war has been characterized by
brutality such as no war of the nineteenth century
has shown. The reason for this is to be found in
the systematic and malicious slander of the Germans,
begun while the nations were still at peace by the
officially conducted propaganda among the French
soldiers, by which they were given the impression
that the Germans give no quarter in battle, and,
when established in an enemy's country, deport
themselves like barbarians there. A further reason
is to be found in the practice of the French soldiers,
when in action, of throwing down their arms and
displaying the white flag, and then, when the Ger-
man soldiers move forward with the expectation of
finding no further resistance, suddenly firing upon
them, — a trick which the English officers were
quick to learn from the French, and to accept as an
established military ruse, and to teach their soldiers.
In addition, there was the demoralizing effect of the
wholly irresponsible and untrustworthy behavior of
the Belgian people, many of whom not only par-
ticipated in the fighting clad as civilians, but treach-
erously fell upon the German soldiers, while in their
quarters and unarmed, to destroy them, frequently
perpetrating the most cruel mutilations.

Dispelled for all time are the dreams of those well
intentioned visionaries who hoped for a day when

End of Internationalism 319

the nations would be at peace forever, and all their
disputes would be settled at the bar of an interna-
tional tribunal of arbitration by which war would
be made impossible, — dreams that have been so
widely entertained in America where the people have
become effeminate in their sentiments in recent
years. The Hague peace conferences instituted at
the suggestion of the Czar — how great a travesty in
the world's history ! — and the palace in which they
were held, are a satire on the times, and subsequent
events have fully justified Germany in her disinclina-
tion at first to participate in this empty farce.

Instead of continuous peace, a series of long and
sanguinary wars will mark the century upon which
we have but just entered, unless, indeed, Germany
should bear off a decisive victory now, and could
then stand for peace throughout the world, as for
forty-three years she has stood for peace in Europe,
much to the chagrin of England and her allies. But
in any case, the dominating circumstance by which
coming events will be most strongly influenced will
be the impassible gulf that has opened between Eng-
land and Germany, and their feeling of bitter enmity
for each other. So far as we can scan the future,
a reconciliation is not possible; we Germans can
never forget how England has served us.

After the confused cosmopolitanism of the
eighteenth century, and in marked contrast to it, the
nineteenth century developed a strong sense of in-
dividualism among the nations ; they grew strongly
conscious of their distinct existence as nations, and
of the power that is inherent in national unity. But

320

New World Conditions

in more recent years there seemed to have arisen in
conjunction with the free expansion of the indi-
vidual nationalities, a desire for co-operation among
the peoples of the world, under fixed international
regulations, and in vigorous but friendly competi-
tion. This disposition toward combined action
among the nations may be regarded as the necessary
complement to their well defined individualism, and
seemed to promise an enduring and harmonious
progress of universal culture. But this, too, was a
dream that has vanished. The era of international-
ism is past and will never return. It will be re-
placed by a period of vigorous and ruthless assertion
of national ambition, — the struggle of the nations
with one another, — not in friendly rivalry now,
however, but in a much wider field, and by force of
arms.

We Germans have all too long given ourselves
over to the hallucination that by our well meant over-
tures of friendship we might arouse an honest recip-
rocation of our sentiments among the other na-
tions, and, by overcoming all prejudice, secure the
recognition of our equal position among them, —
the recognition of our right to a free exercise of our
national vigor within limits set by a just regard
for the rights of others. But at last the scales have
fallen from our eyes; not only has the onslaught
made upon us by our open enemies convinced us that
we have been pursuing an illusion, and hoping for
the impossible, but the attitude of the neutrals has
tended even more toward undeceiving us. This is
perhaps the bitterest disappointment we have yet ex-

Loss to Cultural Influences 321

perienced; but we are men, and will face the truth,
and know how to bear it. Henceforth the welfare
of our own people and the measures necessary to its
preservation shall be our sole care. To the dictates
of conscience we will give ear, and it will be our
first duty to quicken it and keep it ever on guard ;
but to return to the paths of internationalism, and
again sacrifice interests of great importance to our-
selves for the sake of it, would be a crime against
our own people.

But that the highest interests of civilization must
suffer when the nations are thus isolated through
the intensity of their individualism will be apparent
to every one. Science and art will be affected the
most of all. The international organizations that
were instituted for their advancement are dissolved,
and the ties that have thus been severed can never
again be restored. Personal relations of friendship
between individual savants and artists from among
even those nations that are now at bitter enmity
with one another will, we hope, be renewed; but
anything more than this can never, in so far as we
can foresee, be re-established. The gulf which
yawns between the nations cannot be closed within
the lifetime of the present generation.

And in this connection we cannot refrain from
deploring the terrible gaps that the war has torn in
the ranks of the entire younger generation, and
therefore also among the young men upon whom the
future of the intellectual life of the nation depends.
Quite beyond the power of our reckoning is the toll
of sacrifice in this respect that we have paid, and to

322

New World Conditions

which we are daily adding, — promising young sci-
entists, and men in the fulness of their intellectual
powers, whose names are everywhere honored for
the services they have rendered mankind. Of Aus-
tria and France, and Russia also, this is quite as true,
and even England will learn what the war entails
when once her volunteers are fighting at the front.
In deep sorrow and with anxious misgivings for the
nation's intellectual future, we scan the lists of the
missing from day to day. How can that which has
thus been destroyed ever be replaced!

There is yet another resemblance in which the
parallel between the present epoch in history and the
corresponding one in ancient times would appear to
be maintained, and perhaps the one in which the
similarity is most significantly apparent. The im-
mediate, and at the same time the most disastrous
result of Hannibal's war, and of the subsequent wars
that Rome waged with the Macedonian powers in
the eastern Mediterranean region, was the emanci-
pation of the Orient. Up to this period of time the
Hellenic form of culture, that had developed from
the Greek, had extended unrivaled throughout the
entire civilized world as far east as the Indus toward
the south, and northward to the Aral-Caspian steppe,
while its influence penetrated even farther, and made
an enduring impression upon India and central Asia.
As a result of the Roman conquests, that part of
Asia east of the Euphrates severed its connection
with the West, and ere long this political reaction
was followed by a corresponding return to the ear-
lier form of culture, — the re-awakening of the peo-

Emancipation of the Orient 323

pie of the Orient and of its civilization. Rapidly
the movement spread — to Syria and to Egypt ; the
re-invigoration that Judaism experienced as a result
of it, is historically its most significant consequence.
But the deepest inroads it made were within the Ro-
man Empire itself, and upon the development of
western culture. Steadily the movement pressed
onward, until eventually it culminated in the advance
of the Arabs into Spain, the south of France and
Italy, and later in the acquisition of Constantinople,
the Balkan peninsula and Hungary by the Turks,
and therewith reached the limits beyond which it
could not penetrate.

At present there are indications that a similar
movement is under way, but, like all else at this time,
on a much larger scale. Until toward the close
of the nineteenth century, western civilization was
pressing forward with such persistence that there
was reason to believe it would ere long encompass
the world; even in China, whose homogeneous cul-
ture had maintained itself uninfluenced for three
thousand years, it made an effort to gain a foot-
hold. The first interruption to its onward march
was through the rise of the Japanese, the nation
of the East that accepted the outward forms and
acquirements of western culture for the purpose of
keeping its empire free from the interference of
Europeans, or at least with the intention to be rid
of them in time, and so to preserve its national in-
dependence, that rested on an entirely diflFerent basis.
This seemed quite acceptable to the western world,
and, by recognizing Japan as a great power, this

324

New World Conditions

eastern empire was welcomed into the circle of states
whose entire structure was based on European ideals
of culture. Their purpose to divide the world
among themselves was by no means relinquished,
however, and we have seen in this brief outline
that we have been following, with what energy it
was being carried out in recent years.

How different is the prospect of the future that
the present war has opened to our eyes! Every-
where we see evidences of Asia's intention to sever
its connection with Europe. Japan is openly reach-
ing out to grasp the power that will give her the
dominating influence in the Pacific and Indian
oceans, while her endeavor to acquire supremacy
in China no longer encounters opposition from
Europe. Nevertheless, as has already been said, the
inevitable consequences will be a war with America
on the one hand, and with Europe and Australia
on the other, upon the outcome of which the fu-
ture of these countries will depend. In India a
strong current of sentiment is setting steadily to-
ward liberation from the British yoke, and it will
not be turned aside, no matter what may be the
issue of the present war, but on the contrary, it will
bide its time and will take advantage of the earliest
opportunity, when England's hands are tied, to ac-
complish its object.

But of supreme significance is the participation
of Islam in the present conflict. The Turks have
begun the struggle for the preservation of their em-
pire, knowing full well that its end is at hand if
Germany and Austria meet with disaster. The

Holy War 325

Holy War which has been declared as a far reach-
ing call to the Moslem world, is meeting with in-
creasing response ; even the Shiite Persians are tak-
ing steps toward freeing their land from English
and Russian oppression, and are grasping at this,
their last opportunity, to regain their national inde-
pendence. How affairs will shape themselves if this
Mohammedan uprising is productive of results, —
whether, in the first place, the Turkish Empire under
the regime of the Young Turk party will find physi-
cal and intellectual force within itself sufficient to
allow of its reconstruction on foundations that will
be enduring, no one can foretell. But of this we
may feel certain, — if the present Islamitic move-
ment succeeds, the day will have dawned for a new
era of history for Asia Minor and Egypt, but not
for them alone!

To the dangers by which civilization in Africa is
being threatened, but a brief allusion will be made.
Not only is a valuable achievement of much labor,
and an agency for the dissemination of western cul-
ture being wantonly destroyed in the war of an-
nihilation that England is waging against the Ger-
man colonies in Africa,^ but through the ruthless

^ On the other hand, the terrible deeds that were perpe-
trated in the Congo Free State — another bastard product
of the " concert of European powers " — under the mis-
rule of the now so much lauded Belgiums, were not only
viewed with indifference, but actually protected by the
English and French, until the Irishman, Sir Roger Case-
ment, exposed their ghastly cruelties, and made it im-
possible to refrain from taking at least some outward
measures to do away with the worst of them.

2 26 New World Conditions

conflict in which the white settlers there are engaged,
the unrest among the natives is being promoted.
Their smouldering opposition to the white race, and
the awakening sense of their own power is stimu-
lated in even a greater degree, however, by the
shameful fact that England and France have trans-
ported, not only the Caucasian and semi-Caucasian
races of north Africa, but all the Negroes whom they
could procure, to fight for them on the battle fields
of Europe in the great conflict by which the fate
of the European nations is to be decided. It is
quite possible that consequences of a terrible nature
may eventually result from this step, and that the
European colonies, together with the rule of the
white man in Africa, will be as much a thing of the
past at the close of another century, as were the
Greek colonies and Greek rule in Bactria and Per-
sia in the second century b. c.

Should England and her allies carry off a decided
victory, the results, although different, will be even
more disastrous to the progress of western culture.
For in that event both Europe and Asia will be de-
livered over to Russian domination. The Russians
are not an integral part of the European world of
culture however, despite the veneer of its civiliza-
tion that they have laid on, but, on the contrary, are
distinctly opposed to it, as the leaders of the nation
have always declared; not only do they have noth-
ing in common with it, but to assail it is regarded
by them to be their mission in the world's history.
At present they are again revealing their true atti-
tude in the relentless oppression of the Germans,

Responsibilities of the Future 327

Fins and Poles who are domiciled within the Rus-
sian Empire. The whole world is aware of what
Russian supremacy in Europe would mean ; the Eng-
lish and the French know it too, as eagerly as they
would appear to have forgotten it. There can be
no doubt that where Russia treads, all true culture
and all national freedom are crushed under foot.

Whatever may be the outcome of the war, its
unalterable consequence has been an immeasurable
loss in those influences that make for the highest
cultural interests of the race, and this sacrifice will
continue even into the remote future. That we
Germans have been thoroughly roused to a national
self-consciousness, and have become absolutely
united as a nation, that a wonderful impetus has been
given to the idealistic side of our national life, and
a mighty wave of self-sacrificing devotion to all that
is highest has swept our land, we fully appreciate as
splendidly ennobling to our people, in spite of all the
misery and heart-ache we see on every hand. But
when weighed in the balance with all that has been
lost to mankind and to the progress of civilization
through this war, the gain is far outweighed by the
sacrifice. And the responsibility for all this, that
world conditions reached such a pass, is England's !
Hers is the crime of having plunged the world into
a war brought about by the English statesmen who
followed the course laid out for his country by Ed-
ward VII, and for which they will be called to ac-
count before the tribunal of history!

Even with regard to our internal organization our

•728 'New World Conditions

nation and our state will be called upon to solve
wholly new problems, and undertake wholly new
tasks. The old differences and antagonisms on
which the conflict of interests and of the political
parties was based, will, in a large measure, recede
into the background, or will at least take new forms,
or be re-adjusted, and new questions of tremendous
importance will take their place. But in this re-
spect, too, it is impossible to pierce the veil that hides
the future, and to foretell that which will come to
pass. Yet even now every German must clearly dis-
cern that if the German nation would maintain its
position in the world, there are three things that we
must cleave to as the inviolable basis of our inde-
pendent and vigorous existence, and which must
therefore be placed beyond the power of political
parties, — our military organization ; our economic
organization, together with protection for our agri-
cultural industries, for by these the necessities of
life are assured to us, and we are made independent
of supplies from abroad ; and lastly, a virile mo-
narchical government placed beyond the influence of
party strife, and wholly independent to act, that it
may be free to combine and utilize in creative activity
all the forces of which the nation is capable. For
the beneficent results of this activity we had every
reason to be grateful when the outbreak of the war
found us fully supplied with material, and thor-
oughly prepared, while every day that the war con-
tinues gives us renewed evidence of its efficiency.

THE END

VA

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