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Full text of "The English Works Of Thomas Hobbes Vol V"

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OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 

Accession No. 





This book snould be returned on or before the date last marked below- 



THE 

ENGLISH WORKS 

OF 

THOMAS HOBBES. 



THE 



ENGLISH WORKS 



THOMAS HOBBES 

OF MALMESBURY, 
NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED 



SIR \WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART. 



VOL. V. 



LONDON: 

JOHN BOHN, 

HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN. 

MDCCCXLI. 



LONDON: 
C. RICHARDS, PUINTF.n, ST. M4R TIN'S 



THE 

QUESTIONS CONCERNING 
LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE, 

CLEARLY STATED AND DEBATED 



DR. BRAMHALL, 

BIvSHOP OF DERRY, 

AVI) 

THOMAS HOBBES 

OF MALMESBURY. 



TO THE READER. 



You shall find in this little volume the questions 
concerning necessity, freedom, and chance, which in 
all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men, 
largely and clearly discussed, and the arguments on 
all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from 
the doctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and 
from the consequences pertaining to common life, 
truly alleged and severally weighed between two 
persons, who both maintain that men are free to do 
as they will and to forbear as they will. The things 
they dissent in are, that the one holdeth, that it is 
not in a man's power now to choose the will he shall 
have anon ; that chance produceth nothing ; that all 
events and actions have their necessary causes ; that 
the will of God makes the necessity of all things. 
The other on the contrary maintaineth, that not only 
the man is free to choose what he will do, but the 
will also to choose what it shall will ; that when a 
man willeth a good action, God's will concurreth 
with his, else not ; that the will may choose whether 
it will will 9 or not ; that many things come to pass 
without necessity, by chance ; that though God fore- 
know a thing shall be, yet it is riot necessary that 
that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the 



TO THE HEADER. 

future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they 
adhere both of them to the Scripture ; but one of 
them is a learned School-divine, the other a man 
that doth not much admire that kind of learning. 

This is enough to acquaint you withal in the 
beginning ; which also shall be more particularly ex- 
plained by and by in the stating of the question, 
and dividing of the arguments into their several 
heads. The rest you shall understand from the 
persons themselves, when they enter. Fare ye well. 

T. H. 



THE QUESTIONS 



CONCERNING 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 



WHETHER whatsoever comes to pass proceed from The occasion 

the controvert 

necessity, or some things from chance, has been a - 
question disputed amongst the old philosophers 
long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, 
without drawing into argument on either side the 
almighty power of the Deity. But the third way 
of bringing things to pass, distinct from necessity 
and chance, namely, freewill, is a thing that never 
was mentioned amongst them, nor by the Chris- 
tians in the beginning of Christianity. For St. 
Paul, that disputes that question largely and pur- 
posely, never useth the term of freewill; nor did 
jie hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is 
ilow called the doctrine of freewill ; but deriveth 
all actions from the irresistible will of God, and 
nothing from the will of him that runneth or will- 
eth. But for some ages past, the doctors of the 
Roman Church have exempted from this dominion 
of God's will the will of man ; and brought in a 
doctrtne, that not only man, but also his will is free, 
and determined to this or that action, not by the 
will of God, nor necessary causes, but by the power 
of the will itself. Arid though by the reformed 
Churchep instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, 

VOL. V. B 



THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

opinion was cast out, yet not many years since 
it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his 
followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesi- 
astical promotion ; and by discontenting those that 
held the contrary, was in some part the cause of 
the following troubles ; which troubles were the 
occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry 
at Paris, where we discoursed together of the ar- 
gument now in hand ; from which discourse we 
carried away each of us his own opinion, and for 
aught I remember, without any offensive words, as 
blasphemous, atheistical, or the like, passing be- 
tween us ; either for that the Bishop was not then 
in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in 
the presence of my Lord of Newcastle. 

But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship 
his opinion concerning the question in writing, and 
desired him to persuade me to send an answer 
thereunto likewise in writing. There were some 
reasons for which I thought it might be inconve- 
nient to let my answer go abroad ; yet the many 
obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed 
with me to write this answer, which was after- 
wards not only without my knowledge, but also 
against my will, published by one that found means 
to get a copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you 
have the occasion of this controversy. 



THE STATE OF THE QUESTION. 

THE question in general is stated by the Bishop 
himself, (towards the end of No. m.), in these 
words : " Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY^ AND CHANCE. 3 

(for we speak not now of the conversion of a sin- rThe state of 

_ . . the question. 

ner, that concerns not this question) , be prede- . 

termined extrinsically and inevitably, without 
their own concurrence ; so as all the actions and 
events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, 
nor can be otherwise after any other manner or 
in any other place, time, number, measure, order, 
nor to any other end than they are. And all this 
in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of 
extrinsical causes, determining them to one." 

Which though drawn up to his advantage, with 
as much caution as he would do a lease, yet (ex- 
cepting that which is not intelligible) I am content 
to admit. Not intelligible is, first, "that the con- 
version of a sinner concerns not the question." If 
he mean, that the conversion of a sinner is from ne- 
cessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much 
as the question concerns religion, of the same mind 
that I am ; and what he can mean else by that ex- 
ception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, 
" without their own concurrence/' are insignificant, 
unless he mean that the events themselves should 
concur to their production : as that fire doth not 
necessarily burn without the concurrence of burn- 
ing, as the words properly import : or at least 
without concurrence of the fuel. Those two clauses 
left out, I agree with him in the state of the ques- 
tion as it is put universally. But when the ques- 
tion is put of the necessity of any particular event, 
as of *the will to write, or the like, then it is the 
stating of that particular question : but it is de- 
cided in the decision of the question universal. 

He states the same question again in another 
place thus : " This is the very question where the 

B 2 



4 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

The state of wa ter sticks between us, whether there be such 

the question. t 

* ' a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical 
determination to one, or not/' And I allow it also 
for well stated so. 

Again he says, " In a word, so great difference 
there is between natural and moral efficacy, as 
there is between his opinion and mine in this ques- 
tion." So that the state of the question is reduced 
to this, " Whether there be a moral efficacy which 
is not natural ?" I say there is not : he says there 
is. 

Again he writes thus: "And therefore as it were 
ridiculous to say, that the object of sight is the 
cause of seeing ; so it is to say, that the proposing 
of the object by the understanding to the will, is 
the cause of willing." Here also the question is 
brought to this issue, "Whether the object of sight 
be the cause that it is seen ?" But for these words, 
" proposing of the object by the understanding to 
the will," I understand them not. 

Again, he often useth such words as these : " The 
will willeth ; the will suspendeth its act, (id e$t, the 
will willeth not) ; the understanding proposeth ; 
the understanding understandeth." Herein also 
lyeth the whole question. If they be true, I, if 
false, he is in error. 

Again, the whole question is decided, when this 
is decided, " Whether he that willingly permitteth 
a thing to be done, when without labour, danger, 
or diversion of mind, he might have hinderedlt, do 
not will the doing of it ?" 

Again the whole question of free-will is included 
in this, " Whether the will determine itself?" 

Again, it is included in this, " Whether there be 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 5 

an universal grace, which particular men can take The state of 

. , J _ . the question. 

without a particular grace to take it t * . - 

Lastly, there be two questions ; one, "Whether a 
man be free in such things as are within his power, 
to do what he will;" another, "Whether he be 
free to will." Which is as much as to say (because 
will is appetite), it is one question, whether he be 
free to eat that has an appetite, and another, 
whether he be free to have an appetite ? In the 
former, " whether a man be free to do what he 
will, I agree with the Bishop. In the latter, 
" whether he be free to will," I dissent from him. 
And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he 
allegeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do 
what he will, are impertinent to the question. If 
he has not been able to distinguish between these 
two questions, he has not done well to meddle with 
either : if he has understood them, to bring argu- 
ments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, 
is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently w r ith his 
readers. And thus much for the state of the ques- 
tion. 



THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION. 

THE arguments by which this question is disputed, 
are drawn from four fountains. 1 . From authori- 
ties. 2, From* the inconveniences consequent to 
either opinion. 3. From the attributes of God. 
4. Fh)m natural reason. 

The authorities are of two sorts, divine and hu- 
man. Divine are those which are taken from the 
holy Scriptures. Human also are of two sorts ; 
one, the authorities of those men that are generally 



6 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

The fountains esteemed to have been learned, especially in this 
this question, question, as the Fathers, Schoolmen, and old Philo- 
sophers : the other, are the vulgar and most com- 
monly received opinions in the world. 

His reasons and places of Scripture I will an- 
swer the best I am able ; but his human authori- 
ties I shall admit and receive as far as to Scripture 
and reason they be consonant, and no further. 

And for the arguments derived from the attri- 
butes of God, so far forth as those attributes are 
argumentative, that is, so far forth as their signifi- 
cations be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; 
but where they are given for honour only, and sig- 
nify nothing but an intention and endeavour to 
praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty 
God, there I hold them not for arguments, but for 
oblations ; not for the language, but (as the Scrip- 
ture calls them) for the calves of our lips ; which 
signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our 
brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; 
and therefore they are no sufficient premises to in- 
fer truth or convince falsehood. 

The places of Scripture that make for me are 
these. First, (Gen. xlv. 5) : Joseph saith to his 
brethren that had sold him, Be not grieved nor 
angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither : 
for God did send me before you to preserve Life. 
And again (verse 8), So now it mas not you that 
sent me hither, but God. 

And concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exofl. vii. 
3) : / will harden Pharaoh's heart. And con- 
cerning Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith, (Dent. 
ii. 30) : The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, 
and made his heart obstinate. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 7 

x\nd of Shimei that did curse David. David him- The foimt a* 

in i / r< \r 7 7 of argument in 

sell saith, (2 Sam. xvi. 10) : Let him curse, be- this question. 
cause the Lord hath said unto him, curse David. 
And(l Kings, xii. 15) : The King hearkened not 
to the people, for the curse ivasfrom the Lord. 

And Job, disputing this very question, saith, 
(Job xii. 14) : Cod shutteth man, and there can 
be no opening : and verse 16 : The deceived and 
the deceiver are his: and verse 17 : He maheth the 
Judges fools : and verse 24 : He taketh aivay the 
heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and 
causcth them to wander in a ivilderness where 
there is no way : and verse 25 : He maketh them 
to stagger like a drunken man. 

And of the King of Assyria, God saith, I will 
give him a charge to take the spoil, and to take 
the prey, and to tread them down like the mire 
of the streets. (Isaiah x. 6.) 

And Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23) : Lord, I know 
that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in 
man that walketh to direct his steps. 

And to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman 
to the house of Israel, God saith thus : When a 
righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, 
and commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block 
before him, he shall die ; because thou hast not 
given him warning, he shall die in his sin. (Ezek. 
iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, 
yet he that falleth dieth in his Sin : which shows 
thatdGod's justice in killing dependeth not on the 
sin only. 

And our Saviour saith, (John'vi. 44) : No man 
can come to me, except the Father which hath 
sent me draw him. 



8 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

The fountain* And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of 
!^ 11 Christ to the Jews, saith thus, (Acts ii. 23): Him 
being delivered by the determinate counszl and 
foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, &c. 

And again, those Christians to whom Peter and 
John resorted after they were freed from their 
troubles about the miracle of caring the lame man, 
praising God for the same, say thus : Of a truth 
against the holy child Jesus whom thou hast 
anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the 
Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered 
together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy 
counsel determined before to be done. (Acts iv. 
27, 28.) 

And St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: It is not of him that 
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that 
sheweth mercy : and verse 18, 19, 20 : Therefore 
hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and 
whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto 
me> why doth he yet find fault ; for who hath 
resisted his will? Nay but, man, who art 
thou that disputes t against God? Shall the thing 
formed say to Mm that formed it, why hast thou 
made me thus ? 

And again, (1 Cor. iv 7): Who maketh thee differ 
from another? and what hast thou that thou 
hast not received? and 1 Cor. xii. 6 : There are 
diversities of operations, but it is the same God 
that worketh all In all : and Eph. ii. 1 : We are 
his workmanship created in Jesus Christ ^unto 
good works, which God hath before or darned that 
we should walk in them: and Philip, ii. 13 : It is 
God that worketh in you both to will and to do, 
of his good pleasure. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 9 

To these places may be added all the places that ^ fountain* 

* . *, . of argumentm 

make God the giver of all graces, that is to say, of this question, 
all good habits and inclinations ; and all the places 
wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all 
these it is manifest, that although a man may live 
holily if he will, yet to will is the work of God, and 
not eligible by man. 

A second sort of places there be, that make 
equally for the Bishop and me ; and they be such 
as say that a man hath election, and may do many 
things if he will, and also if he will he may leave 
them undone; but not that God Almighty naturally 
or supernatural ly worketh in us every act of the 
will, as in my opinion ; nor that he worketh it not, 
as in the Bishop's opinion ; though he use those 
places as arguments on his side. 

The places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19) :/ 
call heaven and earth to record this day against 
yon, that I have set before you life and death, 
blessing and cursing. Therefor? 1 choose life, that 
both thou and thy seed may live : and (Ecclesiasti- 
cus xv. 14) : God in the beginning made man, and 
left him in the hand of his counsel ; and verse 16, 
1 7 : He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch 
forth thy hand to whither thou wilt. Before man 
is life and death, and whether him liheth shall be 
given him. 

And those places which the Bishop citeth : If a 
wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice, 
either to establish it, or to make it void, (Numb. 
xxx. 1 3) : and (Josh. xxiv. 1 5) : Chusc ye this day 
whom you will serve, &c. But I and my house 
will serve the Lord: and (2 Sam. xxiv. 12) : 1 
offer thee three things, choose which of them I 



10 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

The fountains shall do : and (Isaiah vii. 16): before the child 

of argument iii _ 7 T V 

this question, shall /mow to refuse the evil and choose the good. 
And besides these very many other places to the 
same effect. 

The third sort of texts are those which seem to 
make against me. As Isaiah v. 4 : What could 
have been done more to my vineyard, that I have 
not done in it ? 

And Jeremiah xix. 5 : They have also built the 
high places of Baal Jo burn their sons with fire for 
burnt offerings unto Baal ; which I commanded 
not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind. 

And Hosea xiii. 9 : O Israel, thy de traction is 
from thyself, but in me is thy help. 

And 1 Tim. ii. 4 : Who will have all men to be 
saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth. 

And Eccl. xv. 11,12: Say not thou, it is through 
the Lord I fell away ; for thou oughtest not to do 
the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he hath 
caused me to err ; for he hath no need of thee, 
sinful man. And many other places to the like 
purpose. 

You see how great the apparent contradiction is 
between the first and the third sort of texts, which 
being both Scripture, may and must be reconciled 
and made to stand together; which unless the 
rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with 
intelligible and reasonable interpretations molli- 
fied, is impossible. 

The Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the 
third sort of texts, interpret the first sort thus ; 
the words of Joseph, It was not you that sent me 
hither, but God ; they interpret in this manner : 
It was you that sold me into Egypt, God did but 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 1 I 

permit It ; it was God that sent me and not you ; 

* ^ 77- *. ^ T mi of argument m 

as it the selling were not the sending. I his is this question. 
Suarez ; of whom and the Bishop I would know, 
whether the selling of Joseph did infallibly and 
inevitably follow that permission. If it did, then 
that selling was necessitated beforehand by an 
eternal permission. If it did not, how can there 
be attributed to God a foreknowledge of it, when 
by the liberty of human will it might have been 
frustrated ? I would know also whether the selling 
of Joseph into Egypt were a sin ? If it were, why 
doth Joseph say, Be not grieved nor angry with 
yourselves that ye sold me hither ? Ought not a 
man to be grieved and angry with himself for sin- 
ning r If it were no sin, then treachery and fra- 
tricide is no sin. 

Again, seeing the selling of him consisted in 
these acts, binding, speaking, delivering, which 
are all corporeal motions, did God i?/7/they should 
not be, how then could they be done ? Or doth he 
permit barely, and neither will nor nill corporeal 
and local motions ? How then is God the first 
mover and cause of all local motion ? Did he cause 
the motion, and will the law against it, but not the 
irregularity ? How can that be, seeing the motion 
and law being existent, the contrariety of the mo- 
tion and law is necessarily coexistent ? 

So these places, He hardened Pharaotis heart , 
he made Sihons heart obstinate, they interpret 
thus : " He permitted them to make their own 
hearts obstinate." But seeing that man's heart with- 
out the grace of God, is umnclinable to good, the 
necessity of the hardness of heart, both in Pharaoh 
and in Sihori, is as easily derived from God's per- 



12 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

The fountains mission, that is, from his withholding his grace, as 

of argument in / 7 A J i .1 

this question, from his positive decree. Arid whereas they say, 
He w/7/s godly and free actions conditionally and 
consequently, that is, if the man will them, then 
God wills them, else not ; arid wills not evil ac- 
tions, but permits them ; they ascribe to God 
nothing at all in the causation of any action either 
good or bad. 

Now to the third sort of places, that seem to 
contradict the former, let us see if they may not 
be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasona- 
ble interpretation, than that wherewith the School- 
men interpret the first. 

It is no extraordinary kind of language, to call 
the commandments and exhortations and other 
significations of the will, by the name of will; 
though the will be an internal act of the soul, and 
commands are bat words and signs external of 
that internal act. So that the will and the word 
are diverse things ; and differ as the thing .signi- 
fied, and the sign. And hence it comes to pass, 
that the Word and Commandment of God, namely, 
the holy Scripture, is usually called by Christians 
God's will, but his revealed will ; acknowledging 
the very will of God, which they call his counsel 
and decree, to be another thing. For the revealed 
will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be 
sacrificed ; but it was his will he should not. And 
his revealed will to Jonas, that Nineveh should be 
destroyed within forty days ; but not his decree 
and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be 
known beforehand, but may afterwards by the 
event ; for from the event we may infer his will. 
But his revealed will, which is his word, must be 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 13 

foreknown, because it ought to be the rule of our The fountains 

of argument in 
aCtlOIlS. this question. 

Therefore, where it is said that God will have ' ' 
all men to be saved, it is not meant of his will in- 
ternal, but of his commandments or will revealed ; 
as if it had been said, " God hath given command- 
ments, by following of which all men may be 
saved." So where God says, Israel,, how often 
would I have gathered thee, &c., as a hen doth 
her chickens, but thou wouldest not, it is thus to 
be understood : " How oft have I by my prophets 
given thee such counsel, as, being followed, thou 
hadst been gathered," &c. And the like interpre- 
tations are to be given to the like places. For it 
is not Christian to think, if God had the purpose 
to save all men, that any man could be damned ; 
because it were a sign of want of power to effect 
what he would. So these words, What could have 
been done more to my vineyard, that I have not 
done : if by them be meant the Almighty power, 
might receive this answer : " Men might have been 
kept by it from sinning." But when we are to 
measure God by his revealed will, it is as if he had 
said, " What directions, what laws, what threat- 
enings could have been used more, that I have not 
used ?" God doth not will and command us to in- 
quire what his will and purpose is, and accordingly 
to do it ; for we shall do that, whether \ve will or 
not ; but to look into his commandments, that is, 
as to the Jews, the law of Moses ; and as to other 
people, the laws of their country. 

O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in 
me is thy help: or as some English translations 
have it, Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, &c., 



14 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



* s ^ tera % true > but maketh nothing against me ; 
this question, for the man that sins willingly, whatsoever be the 
cause of his will, if he be not forgiven, hath de- 
stroyed himself, as being his own act. 

Where it is said, They have offered their sons 
unto Baal, which I commanded not, nor spake it, 
nor came it into my mind; these words, nor came 
it into my mind, are by some much insisted on, as 
if they had done it without the will of God. For 
whatsoever is done comes into God's mind, that is, 
into his knowledge, which implies a certainty of 
the future action, and that certainty an antecedent 
purpose of God to bring it to pass. It cannot 
therefore be meant God did not will it, but that 
he had not the will to command it. But by the 
way it is to be noted, that when God speaks to 
men concerning his will and other attributes, he 
speaks of them as if they were like to those of 
men, to the end he may be understood. And 
therefore to the order of his work, the world, 
wherein one thing follows another so aptly as no 
man could order it by design, he gives the name of 
will and purpose. For that which we call design, 
which is reasoning, and thought after thought, 
cannot be properly attributed to God, in whose 
thoughts there is no fore nor after. 

But what shall w r e answer to the words in Eccle- 
siasticus : Say not thou, it is through the Lord I 
fell away ; say not thou, he hath caused me to err. 
If it had not been, say not thou, but " think* not 
thou," I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is 
Apocrypha, and merely human authority. But it is 
very true that such words as these are not to be 
said; first, because St. Paul forbids it: Shall the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 15 

thing formed, saith he, say to him that formed it, 
why hast thou made me so ? Yet true it is, that he this question. 
did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to 
attribute nothing to God but what we conceive to 
be honourable, and we judge nothing honourable 
but what we count so amongst ourselves ; and be- 
cause accusation of man is not honourable, there- 
fore such words are not to be used concerning God 
Almighty. And for the same cause it is not lawful 
to say that any action can be done, which God 
hath purposed shall not be done ; for it is a token 
of want of the power to hinder it. Therefore 
neither of them is to be said, though one of them 
must needs be true. Thus you see how disputing 
of God's nature which is incomprehensible, driveth 
men upon one of these two rocks. And this was 
the cause I \vas unwilling to have my answer to 
the Bishop's doctrine of liberty published. 

And thus much for comparison of our two 
opinions with the Scriptures ; which whether it 
favour more his or mine, I leave to be judged by 
the reader. And now I come to compare them 
again by the inconveniences which may be thought 
to follow them. 

First, the bishop says, that this very persuasion, 
that all things come to pass by necessity, is able to 
overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the 
world. The laws, saith he, are unjust which pro- 
hibit that which a man cannot possibly shun. 

Secondly, that it maketh superfluous and foolish 
all consultations, arts, arms, books, instruments, 
teachers, and medicines, and which is worst, piety 
and all other acts of devotion. For if the event 
be necessary, it will come to pass whatsoever we 
do, and whether we sleep or wakr. 



16 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



Die fountains f^g inference, if there were not as well a ne- 

of argument m * 

this question, cessity of the means as there is of the event, might 
be allowed for true. But according to my opinion, 
both the event and means are equally necessitated. 
But supposing the inference true, it makes as much 
against him that denies as against him that holds 
this necessity. For I believe the Bishop holds for 
as certain a truth, what shall be, shall be, as what 
is, is, or what has been, has been. And then the 
ratiocination of the sick man, " If I shall recover, 
what need I this unsavoury potion r if I shall not 
recover, what good will it do me ?'* is a good ratio- 
cination. But the Bishop holds, that it is necessary 
he shall recover or not recover. Therefore it fol- 
lows from an opinion of the Bishop's, as well as 
from mine, that medicine is superfluous. But as 
medicine is to health, so is piety, consultation, 
arts, arms, books, instruments, and teachers, 
every one to its several end. Out of the Bishop's 
opinion it follows as well as from mine, that medi- 
cine is superfluous to health. Therefore from his 
opinion as well as from mine, it followeth, (if such 
ratiocination were not unsound), that piety, con- 
sultation, &c. are also superfluous to their respec- 
tive ends. And for the superfluity of laws, what- 
soever be the truth of the question between us, 
they are not superfluous, because by the punish- 
ing of one, or of a few unjust men, they are the 
cause of justice in a great many. 

But the greatest inconvenience of all that the 
Bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion, 
is, " that God in justice cannot punish a man with 
eternal torments for doing that which it was never 
in his power to leave undone." It is true, that 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. I/ 

seeing the name of punishment hath relation to The fountain* 

,, ~ .! i - 1 of argument m 

the name of crime, there can be no punishment tin. qimtion. 
but for crimes that might have been left undone ; 
but instead of punishment if he had said qffiiction y 
may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin ? 
Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin ? 
And sometimes those that can sin, and yet not for 
sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel that was 
born blind, for the manifestation of his power 
which he hath over his creature, no less but more 
than hath the potter over his clay to make of it 
what he please ? But though God have power to 
afflict a man and not for sin without injustice, shall 
we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not 
for sin, with extreme and endless torment ? Is it 
not cruelty ? No more than to do the same for 
sin, when he that so afflicteth might without trou- 
ble have kept him from sinning. But what infalli- 
ble evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be 
after this life eternally in torments and never die ? 
Or how is it certain there is no second death, 
when the Scripture saith there is ? Or where doth 
the Scripture say that a second death is an endless 
life ? Or do the Doctors only say it r Then per- 
haps they do but say so, and for reasons best 
known to themselves. There is no injustice nor 
cruelty in him that giveth life, to give with it sick- 
ness, pain, torments, and death ; nor in him that 
giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice 
also. And thus much in answer to the incon- 
veniences that are pretended to follow the doctrine 
of necessity. 

On the other side from this position, that a man 
is free to will, it follow r eth that the prescience of 

VOL. V. C 



18 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

The fountains Qod is quite taken away . For how can it be known 

of argument m A J 

this question, beforehand what man shall have a will to, if that 
will of his proceed not from necessary causes, but 
that he have in his power to will or not will ? So 
also those things which are called future contin- 
gents, if they come not to pass with certainty, 
that is to say, from necessary causes, can never be 
foreknown ; so that God's foreknowing shall some- 
times be of things that shall not come to pass, 
which is as much to say, that his foreknowledge is 
none ; which is a great dishonour to the all-know- 
ing power. 

Though this be all the inconvenient doctrine 
that followeth free-will, forasmuch as I can now 
remember ; yet the defending of this opinion hath 
drawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many 
inconvenient and absurd conclusions, and made 
them make use of an infinite number of insignifi- 
cant words ; whereof one conclusion is in Suarez, 
that God doth so concur with the will of man, 
that if man will, then God concurs ; which is to 
subject not the will of man to God, but the will of 
God to- man. Other inconvenient conclusions I 
shall then mark out, when I come to my observa- 
tions upon the Bishop's reply. And thus far con- 
cerning the inconveniences that follow both opi- 
nions. 

The attribute of God which he draweth into 
argument is his justice, as that God cannot be just 
in punishing any man for that which he was ne- 
cessitated to do. To which I have answered be- 
fore, as being one of the inconveniences pretended 
to follow upon the doctrine of necessity. On the 
contrary, from another of God's attributes, which 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 19 

is his foreknowledge. I shall evidently derive, that TIM fountains 

11 ^ U 4- 1, ^U 4-U J C of argument in 

all actions whatsoever, whether they proceed from this question. 
the will or from fortune, were necessary from eter- "*"""* 
nity. For whatsoever God foreknoweth shall come 
to pass, cannot but come to pass, that is, it is im- 
possible it should not come to pass, or otherwise 
come to pass than it was foreknown. But what- 
soever was impossible should be otherwise, was 
necessary ; for the definition of necessary is, that 
which cannot possibly be otherwise. And whereas 
they that distinguish between God's prescience and 
his decree, say the foreknowledge maketh not the 
necessity without the decree ; it is little to the pur- 
pose. It sufficeth me, that whatsoever was fore- 
known by God, was necessary : but all things were 
foreknown by God, and therefore all things were 
necessary. And as for the distinction of foreknow- 
ledge from decree in God Almighty, I comprehend 
it not. They are acts co-eternal, and therefore one. 
And as for the arguments drawn from natural 
reason they are set down at large in the end of 
my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his 
reply ; which how well he hath answered, shall 
appear in due time. For the present, the actions 
which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will, 
must either be necessitated, or proceed from for- 
tune, without any other cause ; for certainly to will 
is impossible without thinking on what he willeth. 
But it jte in no man's election what he shall at any 
named time hereafter think on. And this I take to 
be enough to clear the understanding of the reader, 
that he may be the better able to judge of the fol- 
lowing disputation. I find in those that write of this 
argument, especially in the Schoolmen and their fol- 



20 THE QUESTIONS, ETC. 

The fountains lowers, so many words strangers to our language, 

of argument in ' ^ J . , . 9 . , T D ^ 

this question, and such confusion and inanity in the ranging or 
them, as that a man's mind in the reading of them 
distinguisheth nothing. And as things were in the 
beginning before the Spirit of God was moved 
upon the abyss, toliu and bohu, that is to say, 
confusion and emptiness ; so are their discourses. 



"TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE 

MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE, 

ETC. 



" SIR, 

" IF I pretended to compose a complete treatise 
upon this subject, I should not refuse those large 
recruits of reasons and authorities which offer 
themselves to serve in this cause, for God and 
man, religion and policy, Church and Common- 
wealth, (a) against the blasphemous, desperate, 
and destructive opinion of fatal destiny. But as (b) 
mine aim, in the first discourse, was only to press 
home those things in writing, which had been 
agitated between us by word of mouth, (a course 
much to be preferred before verbal conferences, 
as being freer from passions and tergiversations, 
less subject to mistakes and misrelations, wherein 
paralogisms are more quickly detected, imperti- 
nences discovered, and confusion avoided), so my 
present intention is only to vindicate that dis- 
course, and together with it, (c) those lights of 
the Schools, wiio were never slighted but where 
they were not understood. How far I have per- 
formed it, I leave to the judicious and impartial 
reader, resting for mine own part well contented 
with this, that I have satisfied myself. 

Your Lordship's most obliged, 
to love and serve you, 

"J. D." 



22 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON 
THE BISHOP'S EPISTLE TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE. 

(a) " AGAINST the blasphemous, desperate, and 
destructive opinion of fatal destiny." 

This is but choler, such* as ordinarily happeneth 
unto them who contend against greater difficulties 
than they expected. 

(b) " My aim in the first discourse was only to 
press home those things in writing, which had been 
agitated between us by word of mouth : a course 
much to be preferred before verbal conferences, 
as being freer from passions, &c." 

He is here, I think, mistaken ; for in our verbal 
conference there was not one passionate word, nor 
any objecting of blasphemy or atheism, nor any 
other uncivil word ; of which in his writing there 
are abundance. 

(c) " Those lights of the Schools, who were 
never slighted but where they were not under- 
stood." 

I confess I am not apt to admire every thing I 
understand not, nor yet to slight it. And though 
the Bishop slight not the Schoolmen so much as 
I do, yet I dare say he understands their writings 
as little as I do. For they are in most places un 
intelligible. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 23 



TO THE READER. 



" CHRISTIAN reader, this ensuing treatise was (a) 
neither penned nor intended for the press, but 
privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of 
the question truth might be cleared from mis- 
takes. The same was Mr. Hobbes' desire at that 
time, as appeareth by four passages in his book, 
wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may 
be kept private. But either through forgetfulness 
or change of judgment, he hath now caused or 
permitted it to be printed in England, without 
either adjoining my first discourse, to which he 
wrote that answer, or so much as mentioning this 
reply, which he hath had in his hands now these 
eight years. So wide is the date of his letter, in 
the year 1652, from the truth, and his manner of 
dealing with me in this particular from ingenuity, 
(if the edition were with his own consent). How- 
soever, here is all that passed between us upon this 
subject, without any addition, or the least varia- 
tion from the original. 

" Concerning the nameless author of the pre- 
face, who takes upon him to hang out an ivy-bush 
before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to 
invite passengers to purchase it, as I know r not 
who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard 
either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical ex- 
pressions. The Church of England is as much 
above his detraction, as he is beneath this ques- 
tion. Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by 



24 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest 
that it is more sweet than nectar ; we envy him 
not ; much good may it do him. His very frontis- 
piece is a sufficient confutation of his whole pre- 
face, wherein he tells the world, as falsely and ig- 
norantly as confidently, that ( all controversy con- 
cerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, 
merits, reprobation, &c., is fully decided and clear- 
ed.' Thus he accustometh his pen to run over 
beyond all limits of truth and discretion, to let us 
see that his knowledge in theological controversies 
is none at all, and into what miserable times we 
are fallen, w r hen blind men will be the only judges 
of colours. Quid tanto dignumferet hie promis- 
sor hiatu. 

" There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire 
to advertise the reader, (b) Whereas Mr. Hobbes 
mentions my objections to his book De Give, it is 
true that ten years since I gave him about sixty 
exceptions, the one-half of them political, the other 
half theological, to that book, and every exception 
justified by a number of reasons, to which he 
never yet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do T now 
desire it, for since that, he hath published his 
Leviathan, Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, 
cui lumen ademptum, which affords much more 
matter of exception ; and I am informed that there 
are already two, the one of our own Church, the 
other a stranger, who have shaken in pieces the 
whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in 
the air, and resolved that huge mass of his seeming 
Leviathan into a new nothing ; and that their la- 
bours will speedily be published. But if this in- 
formation should not prove true, I will not grudge 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 25 

upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that 
his principles are pernicious both to piety and 
policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, 
between prince and subject, father and child, mas- 
ter and servant, husband and wife ; and that they 
who maintain them obstinately, are fitter to live in 
hollow trees among w r ild beasts, than in any Chris- 
tian or political society. So God bless us. 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON 
THE BISHOP'S EPISTLE TO THE READER. 

(a) " NEITHER penned nor intended for the press, 
but privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of 
the question truth might be cleared. The same 
was Mr. Hobbes' desire at that time, as appeareth 
by four passages in his book, &c." 

It is true that it was not my intention to pub- 
lish any thing in this question. And the Bishop 
might have perceived, by not leaving out those four 
passages, that it \vas without my knowledge the 
book was printed ; but it pleased him better to take 
this little advantage to accuse me of want of inge- 
nuity. He might have perceived also, by the date 
of my letter, 1652, which was written 1646, (which 
error could be no advantage to me), that I knew 
nothing of the printing of it. I confess, that be- 
fore I received the bishop's reply, a French gentle- 
man of my acquaintance in Paris, knowing that I 
had written something of this subject, but not un- 
derstanding the language, desired me to give him 
leave to get it interpreted to him by an English 
young man that resorted to him ; which I yielded 
to. But this young man taking his opportunity, 



26 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

and being a nimble writer, took a copy of it for 
himself, and printed it here, all but the postscript, 
without my knowledge, and (as he knew) against 
my will ; for which he since hath asked me par- 
don. But that the Bishop intended it not for the 
press, is not very probable, because he saith he 
writ it to the end " that by the ventilation of the 
question, truth might be cleared from mistakes ;" 
which end he had not obtained by keeping it pri- 
vate. 

(b) " Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objec- 
tions to his book De Cive : it is true that ten years 
since, I gave him about sixty exceptions," &c. 

I did indeed intend to have answered those ex- 
ceptions as finding them neither political nor theo- 
logical, nor that he alleged any reasons by which 
they were to be justified. But shortly after, in- 
tending to write in English, and publish my 
thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine in that book 
which I entitled Leviathan, I thought his objec- 
tions would b)^ the clearness of my method fall off 
without an answer. Now this Leviathan he call- 
eth " Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens> cui 
lumen ademptum" Words not far fetched, nor 
more applicable to my Leviathan, than to any 
other writing that should offend him. For allow- 
ing him the word monstrum, (because it seems he 
takes it for a monstrous great fish), he can neither 
say it is informe ; for even they that approve not 
the doctrine, allow the method. Nor that it is 
ingens ; for it is a book of no great bulk. Nor 
cui lumen ademptum ; for he will find very few 
readers that will not think it clearer than his 
scholastic jargon. And whereas he saith there are 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 27 

two of our own Church (as he hears say) that are 
answering it ; and that " he himself," if I desire it, 
" will demonstrate that my principles are perni- 
cious both to piety and policy, and destructive to 
all relations," &c. : my answer is, that / desire 
not that he or they should so misspend their time ; 
but if they will needs do it, I can give them a fit 
title for their book, Behemoth against Leviathan. 
He ends his epistle with "so God bless us." Which 
words are good in themselves, but to no purpose 
here ; but are a bufFoonly abusing of the name of 
God to calumny. 



A 

VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY 

FROM 

ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY. 



7. D. " EITHER I am free to write this discourse NO. i. 
for liberty against necessity, or I am not free. If """^ 
I be free, I have obtained the cause, and ought not 
to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I 
ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of 
any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable 
necessity." 

T. H. Right Honourable, I had once resolved 
to answer J. D.'s objections to my book De Give in 
the first place, as that which concerns me most ; 
and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty 
and Necessity, which, because I never had uttered 
my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But 
seeing it was both your Lordship's and J. D.'s de- 
sire that I should begin with the latter, I was con- 
tented so to do. And here I present and submit it 
to your Lordship's judgment. 

J. D. " The first day that I did read over T. H/s 
defence of the necessity of all things, was April 
20th, 1646, Which proceeded not out of any dis- 
respect to him ; for if all his discourses had been 
geometrical demonstrations, able not only to per- 
suade, but also to compel assent, all had been one 
to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other 



30 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. i. trifles which we call business, having diverted me 
' until then. And then my occasions permitting me, 
and an advertisement from a friend awakening me, 
I set myself to a serious examination of it. We 
commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if 
they have line enough, confute themselves ; and 
their speculatives and their practices familiarly in- 
terfere one with another, (b) The very first w r ords 
of T. H.'s defence trip up the heels of his whole 
cause ; ' I had once resolved.' To resolve pre- 
supposeth deliberation. But what deliberation can 
there be of that which is inevitably determined by 
causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate ? 
Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should 
be executed or not ? It is even to as much pur- 
pose, as for a man to consult and ponder with 
himself whether he should draw in his breath, or 
whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, 
(c) to resolve implies a man's dominion over his 
own actions, and his actual determination of him- 
self. But he who holds an absolute necessity of all 
things, hath quitted this dominion over himself; 
and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the second 
extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his ac- 
tions to be determined. One may as well call again 
yesterday, as resolve or newly determine that 
which is determined to his hand already, (d) I 
have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.'s an- 
swers, considered his reasons, and conclud^ that 
he hath missed, and misled the question, that the 
answers are evasions, that his arguments are para- 
logisms, that the opinion of absolute and universal 
necessity is but a result of some groundless and 
ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 31 

himself, but that his cause will admit no better N0 . 
defence ; and therefore, by his favour, I am re- ' * 
solved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps 
another man reading this discourse with other 
eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent and well-founded. 
How comes this to pass ? The treatise is the same, 
the exterior causes are the same ; yet the resolution 
is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and 
loose ? Do they necessitate me to condemn, and 
necessitate him to maintain ? What is it then ? The 
difference must be in ourselves, either in our in- 
tellectuals, because the one sees clearer than the 
other; or in our affections, which betray our un- 
derstandings, arid produce an implicit adherence in 
the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, 
the difference is in ourselves. The outward causes 
alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor 
him to the other resolution. But T. H. may say, 
that our several and respective deliberations and 
affections are in part the causes of our contrary 
resolutions,, and do concur with the outward causes 
to make up one total and adequate cause to the 
necessary production of this effect. If it be so, 
he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for 
such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted 
of. When all the causes have actually determined 
themselves, then the effect is in being ; for though 
there be a priority in nature between the cause 
and the effect, yet they are together in time. And 
the old rule is, (e) ' whatsoever is, when it is, is 
necessarily so as it is.' .This is no absolute ne- 
cessity, but only upon supposition, that a man hath 
determined his own liberty. When we question 
whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not 



32 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. i. question whether they be necessary when they are, 
' ' nor whether they be necessary in sensu composite, 
after we have resolved and finally determined what 
to do ; but whether they were necessary before they 
were determined by ourselves, by or in the pre- 
cedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior 
causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent 
with true liberty to determine itself, but it is in- 
consistent with true liberty to be determined by 
another without itself. 

" T. H. saith further ' that upon your Lordship's 
desire and mine, he was contented to begin with 
this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,' that is, to 
change his former resolution, (f) If the chain of 
necessity be no stronger, but that it may be snap- 
ped so easily insunder ; if his will was no other- 
wise determined without himself, but only by the 
signification of your Lordship's desire and my mo- 
dest entreaty, then we may easily conclude that 
human affairs are not always governed by absolute 
necessity ; that a man is lord of his own actions, if 
not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord 
paramount of heaven and earth ; and that all 
things are not so absolutely determined in the 
outward and precedent causes, but that fair en- 
treaties and moral persuasions may work upon a 
good nature so far, as to prevent that which other- 
wise had been, and to produce that which other- 
wise had not been. He that can reconcile this with 
an antecedent necessity of all things, and a physi- 
cal or natural determination of all causes, slm \J3e 
great Apollo to me. 

" Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttei\ 
his opinion of this question, I suppose he intends 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 33 

in writing ; my conversation with him hath not NO. i. 
been frequent, yet I remember well that when v "~~' ' 
this question w r as agitated between us two in your 
Lordship's chamber by your command, he did 
then declare himself in words, both for the abso- 
lute necessity of all events, and for the ground of 
this necessity, the flux or concatenation of the 
second causes. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. I. 

(a) " The first day that I did read over T. H.'s Anina*. 

; sions upon the 

defence of necessity, &c. Bishops reply. 

His deferring the reading of my defence of ne- 
cessity, he will not, he saith, should be interpreted 
for disrespect. Tis well ; though I cannot ima- 
gine why he should fear to be thought to disre- 
spect me. " He was diverted," he saith, " by 
trifles called business/' It seems then he ac- 
knowledgeth that the will can be diverted by bu- 
siness. Which, though said on the iy, is contrary 
I think to the main, that the will is free ; for free 
it is not, if anything but itself can divert it. 

(b) "The very first words of T. H.'s defence, 
trip up the heels of his whole cause, &c." 

How so ? " I had once," saith he, " resolved. To 
resolve presupposeth deliberation. But what deli- 
beration can there be of that which is inevitably 
determined without ourselves r" There is no man 
doubts v but a man may deliberate of what himself 
shall do, whether the thing be impossible or not, 
in case he know not of the impossibility ; though 
he cannot deliberate of what another shall do to 
him. Therefore his examples of the man con- 
demned, of the man that breatheth, and of him 
VOL. v. D 



34 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.!, that groweth, because the question is not what 

tata*^ the y sha11 do > but what tlie y stall suffer, are im- 
s\om upon the pertinent. This is so evident, that I wonder how 
P S Ie py- ^ e ij^ wag b e f ore so w itty as to say, my first 
words tripped up the heels of my cause, and that 
having line enough I would confute myself, could 
presently be so dull as not to see his argument was 
too weak to support so triumphant a language. And 
whereas he seemeth to be offended with paradoxes, 
let him thank the Schoolmen, whose senseless writ- 
ings have made the greatest number of important 
truths seem paradox. 

(c) This argument that followeth is no better. 
" To resolve," saith he, " implies a man's dominion 
over his actions, and his actual determination of 
himself," &c. 

If he understand what it is to resolve, he knows 
that it signifies no more than after deliberation 
to will. He thinks, therefore, to will is to have 
dominion over his own actions, and actually to de- 
termine his own will. But no man can determine 
his own will, for the will is appetite ; nor can a 
man more determine his will than any other appe- 
tite, that is, more than he can determine when he 
shall be hungry and when not. When a man is 
hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat ; this 
is the liberty of the man ; but to be hungry or not 
hungry, which is that which I hold to proceed 
from necessity, is not in his choice. Besides these 
words, "dominion over his own actions," and 
" determination of himself," so far as they are sig- 
nificant, make against him. For over whatsoever 
things there is dominion, those things are not free, 
and therefore a man's actions are not free ; and if a 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 35 

man determine himself, the question will still 
remain, what determined him to determine himself 
in that manner. sion * pon the 

(d) "I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.'s * p8 wp *' 
answers, considered his reasons," &c. 

This and that which followeth, is talking to 
himself at random, till he come to allege that 
which he calleth an old rule, which is this : 
(e) " Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as 
it is. This is no absolute necessity, but only upon 
supposition that a man hath determined his own 
liberty," &c. 

If the bishop think that I hold no other neces- 
sity than that which is expressed in that old foolish 
rule, he neither understandeth me, nor what the 
word necessary signifieth. Necessary is that which 
is impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot 
possibly otherwise come to pass. Therefore ne- 
cessary, possible, and impossible have no significa- 
tion in reference to time past or time present, but 
only time to come. His necessary, and his in 
sensu composite, signify nothing ; my necessary is 
a necessary from all eternity ; and yet not incon- 
sistent with true liberty, which doth not consist in 
determining itself, but in doing what the will is 
determined unto. This "dominion over itself," and 
this sensi/s compositus, and this, " determining it- 
self," and this, " necessarily is when it is," are con- 
fused apd empty words. 

(f) "If the chain of necessity be no stronger but 
that it may be snapped so easily asunder, &c. by 
the signification of your lordship's desire, and my 
modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude that 
human affairs," &c. 

D 2 



36 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. i. Whether my Lord's desire and the Bishop's 
Animadvert * i&odest entreaty were enough to produce a will in 
rions upon the me f wr ite an answer to his treatise, without 

Bishops reply. y 

other concurrent causes, I am not sure. Obedi- 
ence to his Lordship did much, and my civility to 
the Bishop did somewhat, and perhaps there were 
other imaginations of mine own that contributed 
their part. But this I am sure of, that altogether 
they were sufficient to frame my will thereto ; and 
whatsoever is sufficient to produce any thing, pro- 
duceth it as necessarily as the fire necessarily 
burneth the fuel that is cast into it. And though 
the Bishop's modest entreaty had been no part of 
the cause of my yielding to it, yet certainly it would 
have been cause enough to some civil man, to have 
requited me with fairer language than he hath 
done throughout this reply. 

NO. II. 

T.H. And first I assure your Lordship, I find in it 
no new argument, neither from Scripture nor from 
reason, that I have not often heard before, which 
is as much as to say, that I am not surprised. 

J. D. (a) " Though I be so unhappy that I can 
present no novelty to T. H., yet I have this com- 
fort, that if he be not surprised, then in reason I 
may expect a more mature answer from him ; and 
where he fails, I may ascribe it to the weakness of 
his cause, not to want of preparation. But in this 
cause I like Epictetus's counsel well, that (1} the 
sheep should not brag how much they have eaten, 
or what an excellent pasture they do go in, but 
shew it in their lamb and wool. Opposite answers 
and downright arguments advantage a cause. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 37 

To tell what we have heard or seen is to no pur- NO. 11. 
pose. When a respondent leaves many things un- ' 
touched, as if they were too hot for his fingers, and 
declines the weight of other things, and alters the 
true state of the question, it is a shrewd sign either 
that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or 
else that he maintains a desperate cause." 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. II. 

(a) " Though I be so unhappy that I can present Animad 
no novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if 

he be not surprised, then in reason I may expect a 
more mature answer from him," &c. 

Though I were not surprised, yet I do not see the 
reason for which he saith he may expect a more 
mature answer from me ; or any further answer 
at all. For seeing I wrote this at his modest re- 
quest, it is no modest expectation to look for as 
many answ r ers as he shall be pleased to exact. 

(b) " The sheep should not brag how much they 
have eaten, but shew it in their lamb and wool." 

It is no great bragging, to say I was not sur- 
prised ; for whosoever chanceth to read Suarez's 
Opuscula, where he writeth of free-will and of 
the concourse of God with man's will, shall find 
the greatest part, if not all, that the Bishop hath 
urged in this question. But that which the Bishop 
hath said of the reasons and authorities which he 
saith in his epistle do offer themselves to serve in 
this cause, and many other passages of his book, 
I shall, I think, before I have done with him, make 
appear to be very bragging, and nothing else. 
And though he say it be Epictetus's counsel, 



38 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. ii. that sheep should shew what they eat in their 
Animadver -"' ^ am ^ an ^ wo0 ^ & is not likely that Epictetus 
rfom upon the should take a metaphor from lamb and wool ; for 
it could not easily come into the mind of men that 
were not acquainted with the paying of tithes. Or 
if it had, he would have said lambs in the plural, 
as laymen use to speak. That which follows of 
my leaving things untouched, and altering the 
state of the question ; I remember no such thing, 
unless he require that I should answer, not to his 
arguments only, but also to his syllables. 

NO. in. 

T. H. The preface is a handsome one, but it 
appears even in that, that he hath mistaken the 
question ; for whereas he says thus, " if I be free to 
write this discourse, I have obtained the cause," I 
deny that to be true. For it is not enough to his 
freedom of writing that he had not written it, un- 
less he would himself; if he will obtain the cause, 
he must prove that, before he wrote it, it was not 
necessary he should write it afterwards. It may be 
he thinks it all one to say, " I was free to write it," 
and " it was not necessary I should write it/' But I 
think otherwise ; for he is free to do a thing, that 
may do it if he have the will to do it, and may for- 
bear if he have the will to forbear. And yet if 
there be a necessity that he shall have the will to 
do it, the action is necessarily to follow ; ,and if 
there be a necessity that he shall have the will to 
forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The 
question, therefore, is not whether a man be a 
free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or 
forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will ; 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 39 

but whether the will to write, and the will to for- N Q. in. 
bear, come upon him according to his will, or ac- *"" ' ' 

j- -LU- i i_- T The Bishop's 

cording to any thing else in his own power. I ac- reply. 
knowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will : but 
to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd 
speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause 
upon this preface. 

/. D. " Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adver- 
saries, which evermore begin with a man's praise. 
The crisis or the catastrophe of their discourse is 
when they come to their but ; as, he is a good na- 
tured man, but he hath a naughty quality ; or, he 
is a wise man, but he hath committed one of the 
greatest follies ; so here, ' the preface is a hand- 
some one, but it appears even in this that he hath 
mistaken the question.' This is to give an inch, 
hat one may take away an ell without suspicion ; 
to praise the handsomeness of the porch, that he 
may gain credit to the vilifying of the house. 
Whether of us hath mistaken the question, I refer 
to the judicious reader, (a) Thus much I will 
maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he 
calls necessity ; nor that liberty, which he calls 
liberty ; nor that the question, which he makes the 
question. 

" First for liberty, that which he calls liberty, is 
no true liberty. 

" For the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to 
know the difference between these three, necessity, 
spontaneity, and liberty. 

"Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet 
together ; so may spontaneity and liberty ; but 
real necessity and true liberty can never meet to- 
gether. Some things are necessary and not volun- 



40 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. in . tary or spontaneous ; some things are both neces- 
The Bid * v 8ar Y an ^ voluntary ; some things are voluntary and 
reply. not free; some things are both voluntary and free; 

but those things which are truly necessary can 
never be free, and those things which are truly 
free can never be necessary. Necessity consists 
in an antecedent determination to one; sponta- 
neity consists in a conformity of the appetite, 
either intellectual or sensitive, to the object ; true 
liberty consists in the elective power of the ra- 
tional will ; that which is determined without my 
concurrence, may nevertheless agree well enough 
with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subse- 
quent consent ; but that which is determined with- 
out my concurrence or consent, cannot be the ob- 
ject of mine election. I may like that which is 
inevitably imposed upon me by another, but if it 
be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsical 
causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and 
impossible for me to choose, whether I shall un- 
dergo it or not. Reason is the root, the fountain, 
the original of true liberty, which judgeth and 
representeth to the will, whether this or that be 
convenient, whether this or that be more conve- 
nient. Judge then what a pretty kind of liberty 
it is which is maintained by T. H., such a liberty as 
is in little children before they have the use of 
reason, before they can consult or deliberate of 
any thing. Is not this a childish liberty ; and 
such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees and 
spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do 
our trades, by experience and consideration ? This 
is a brutish liberty, such a liberty as a bird hath to 
fly when her wings are clipped, or to use his own 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 41 

comparison, such a liberty as a lame man, who NO. m. 
hath lost the use of his limbs, hath to walk. Is *"~^ ' 

% , , . , . The Bbhop's 

not this a ridiculous liberty t Lastly, (which is wpij. 
worse than all these), such a liberty as a river hath 
to descend down the channel. What ! will he 
ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also, w r hich 
have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much 
as sensitive appetite ? Such is T. H.'s liberty. 

(b) " His necessity is just such another, a neces- 
sity upon supposition, arising from the concourse 
of all the causes, including the last dictate of the 
understanding in reasonable creatures. The ade- 
quate cause and the effect are together in time, 
and when all the concurrent causes are determined, 
the effect is determined also, and is become so 
necessary that it is actually in being ; but there is 
a great difference between determining, and being 
determined. If all the collateral causes concurring 
to the production of an effect, were antecedently 
determined what they must of necessity produce, 
and when they must produce it, then there is no 
doubt but the effect is necessary, (c) But if these 
causes did operate freely or contingently ; if they 
might have suspended or denied their concur- 
rence, or have concurred after another manner, 
then the effect was not truly and antecedently ne- 
cessary, but either free or contingent. This will 
be yet clearer by considering his own instance of 
casting ambs-ace, though it partake more of con- 
tingency than of freedom. Supposing the positure 
of the parties' hand who did throw the dice, sup- 
posing the figure of the table and of the dice them- 
selves, supposing the measure of force applied, and 
supposing all other things which did concur to the 



42 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. m. production of that cast, to be the very same they 
-v~ were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast 

I he lii>hop s . 

* piy- is necessary. But still this is but a necessity of 
supposition; for if all these concurrent causes, 
or some of them, were contingent or free, then 
the cast was not absolutely necessary. To begin 
with the caster, he might have denied his concur- 
rence, and not have cast at all ; he might have sus- 
pended his concurrence, and not have cast so 
soon ; he might have doubled or diminished his 
force in casting, if it had pleased him ; he might 
have thrown the dice into the other table. In all 
these cases what becomes of his ambs-ace ? The 
like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of 
the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for 
the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, 
and I know not how many other circumstances. 
In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible 
that the effect should be antecedently necessary. 
T. H. appeals to every man's experience. I am 
contented. Let every one reflect upon himself, 
and he shall find no convincing, much less con- 
straining reason, to necessitate him to any one of 
these particular acts more than another, but only 
his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. 
H.'s necessity is no absolute, no antecedent, ex- 
trinsical necessity, but merely a necessity upon 
supposition. 

(d) " Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the ques- 
tion, is not the question. ' The question is not,' 
saith he, ' whether a man may write if he will, 
and forbear if he will, but whether the will to 
write or the will to forbear come upon him ac- 
cording to his will, or according to any thing else 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 43 

in his own power.' Here is a distinction without NO. UK 
a difference. If his will do not come upon him 'r""."". 1 * 

r The Bishop 

according to his will, then he is not a free, nor yet 
so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H.'s 
liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent is 
from the freedom of the will. If the will have no 
power over itself, the agent is no more free than a 
staff in a man's hand. Secondly, he makes but an 
empty show of a power in the will, either to write 
or not to write, (e) If it be precisely and inevita- 
bly determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what 
a man shall will, and what he shall not will, what 
he shall write, and what he shall not write, to 
what purpose is this power ? God and nature 
never made any thing in vain ; but vain and frus- 
traneous is that power which never was and never 
shall be deduced into act. Either the agent is de- 
termined before he acteth, what he shall will, and 
what he shall not will, what he shall act, and what 
he shall not act, and then he is no more free to act 
than he is to will ; or else he is not determined, 
and then there is no necessity. No effect can ex- 
ceed the virtue of its cause ; if the action be free 
to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will 
or nill, must of necessity be more free. Quod 
efficit tale, illud magis est tale. If the will be de- 
termined, the writing or not writing is likewise 
determined, and then he should not say, * he may 
write or he may forbear,' but he must write or he 
must forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts 
the sense of all the world, that the will of man is 
determined without his will, or without any thing 
in his power. Why do w r e ask men whether they 
will do such a thing or not ? Why do we represent 




44 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

reasons to them ? Why do we pray them ? Why 
do we entreat them ? Why do we blame them, if 
their will come not upon them according to their 
will. Wilt thou be made clean ? said our Saviour 
to the paralytic person (John v. 6) ; to what pur- 
pose, if his will was extrinsically determined? 
Christ complains, (Matth. xi. 17) : We have piped 
unto you, and ye have not danced. How could 
they help it, if their wills were determined with- 
out their wills to forbear ? And (Matth. xxiii. 3/) : 
/ would have gathered your children together as 
the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, 
but ye would not. How easily might they answer, 
according to T. H.'s doctrine, < Alas ! blame not 
us ; our wills are not in our own power or disposi- 
tion ; if they were, we would thankfully embrace so 
great a favour.' Most truly said St. Austin, ' Our 
will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our 
power.' (f) This is the belief of all mankind, which 
we have not learned from our tutors, but is im- 
printed in our hearts by nature ; we need not turn 
over any obscure books to find out this truth. 
The poets chaunt it in the theatres, the shepherds 
in the mountains, the pastors teach it in their 
churches, the doctors in the universities, the com- 
mon people in the markets, and all mankind in the 
whole world do assent unto it, except an handful 
of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with 
paradoxical principles. Fourthly, this necessity 
which T. H, hath devised, which is grounded upon 
the necessitation of a man's will without his will, 
is the worst of all others, and is so far from lessen- 
ing those difficulties and absurdities which flow 
from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it in- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 45 

creaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable. NO. HI, 
(g) No man blameth fire for burning whole cities ; 
no man taxeth poison for destroying men; but 
those persons who apply them to such wicked 
ends. If the w r ill of man be not in his own dispo- 
sition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or 
the poison. Three things are required to make an 
act or omission culpable. First, that it be in our 
power to perform it or forbear it ; secondly, that 
we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it, respec- 
tively ; thirdly, that we omit that which we ought 
to have done, or do that which we ought to have 
omitted, (h) No man sins in doing those things 
which he could not shun, or forbearing those 
things which never were in his power. T. H. may 
say, that besides the power, men have also an ap- 
petite to evil objects, which renders them culpable. 
It is true ; but if this appetite be determined by 
another, not by themselves, or if they have not the 
use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, 
they sin no more than a stone descending down- 
ward, according to its natural appetite, or the 
brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in fol- 
lowing their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. 

(i) The question then is not whether a man be 
necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or for- 
bear. But saving the ambiguous acception of the 
vtordfree, the question is plainly this, whether all 
agents, and all events natural, civil, moral, (for we 
speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that 
concerns not this question), be predetermined ex- 
triijsically and inevitably without their own con- 
currence in the determination; so as all actions and 
events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, 



46 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. ii r. nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, or 
in any other place, time, number, measure, order, 
nor to any other end, than they are. And all 
this in respect of the supreme cause, or a con- 
course of extrinsical causes determining them to 
one. 

(Js) " So my preface remains yet unanswered. 
Either I was extrinsically and inevitably predeter- 
mined to write this discourse, without any concur- 
rence of mine in the determination, and without 
any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was 
not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not 
to be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for do- 
ing that which never was in his power to shun. If 
I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and 
my will to act, are neither compelled nor necessi- 
tated by any extrinsical causes, but I elect and 
choose, either to write or to forbear, according to 
mine own will and by mine own power. And 
when I have resolved and elected, it is but a ne- 
cessity of supposition, which may and doth consist 
with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity. 
The two horns of this dilemma are so straight, 
that no mean can be given, nor room to pass be- 
tween them. And the two consequences are so 
evident, that instead of answering he is forced to 
decline them. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. III. 

(a) " Thus much I will maintain, that this is no 
true necessity, which he calleth necessity ; nor 
that liberty which he calleth liberty ; nor that the 
question, which he makes the question," &c. "For 
the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to know the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 47 

difference between these three, necessity, sponta- NO. HI. 
neity, and liberty' 9 * ' 

I did expect, that for the knowing of the differ- sions upon the 
ence between necessity, spontaneity, and liberty, Blsho P sre ^ T - 
he would have set down their definitions. For 
without these, their difference cannot possibly ap- 
pear. For how can a man know how things differ, 
unless he first know what they are r which he 
offers not to shew. He tells us that necessity and 
spontaneity may meet together, and spontaneity 
and liberty ; but necessity and liberty never ; and 
many other things impertinent to the purpose. For 
which, because of the length, I refer the reader to 
the place. I note only this, that spontaneity is a 
word not used in common English ; and they that 
understand Latin, know it means no more than 
appetite, or will, and is not found but in living 
creatures. And seeing, he saith, that necessity 
and spontaneity may stand together, I may say 
also, that necessity and will may stand together, 
and then is not the will free, as he would have it, 
from necessitation. There are many other things 
in that which followeth, which I had rather the 
reader would consider in his own words, to which 
I refer him, than that I should give him greater 
trouble in reciting them again. For I do not fear 
it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew 
the vanity of such w r ords as these, intellectual 
appetite, conformity of the appetite to the object, 
rational will, elective power of the rational will ; 
nor understand I how reason can be the root of 
true liberty, if the Bishop, as he saith in the begin- 
ning, had the liberty to write this discourse. I 
understand how objects, and the conveniences and 



48 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. HI. the inconveniences of them may be represented to 
h^~ a man > b, the help of his senses ; but how reason 
re P resentet h anything to the will, I understand no 
more than the Bishop understands how there may be 
liberty in children, in beasts, and inanimate crea- 
tures. For he seemeth to wonder how children 
may be left at liberty ; bow beasts in prison may 
be set at liberty ; and how a river may have a 
free course ; and saith, " What ! will he ascribe 
liberty to inanimate creatures, also ?" And thus 
he thinks he hath made it clear how necessity, 
spontaneity, and liberty differ from one another. 
If the reader find it so, I am contented. 

(V) " His necessity is just such another ; a ne- 
cessity upon supposition, arising from the con- 
course of all the causes, including the last dictate 
of the understanding in reasonable creatures," &c. 
The Bishop might easily have seen, that the 
necessity I hold, is the same necessity that he de- 
nies ; namely, a necessity of things future, that is, 
an antecedent necessity derived from the very be- 
ginning of time ; and that I put necessity for an 
impossibility of not being, and that impossibility 
as well as possibility are never truly said but of 
the future. I know as well as he that the cause, 
when it is adequate, as he calleth it, or entire, as I 
call it, is together in time with the effect. But for 
all that, the necessity may be and is before the 
effect, as much as any necessity can be. And 
though he call it a necessity of supposition, it is 
no more so than all other necessity is. The fire 
burneth necessarily ; bat not without supposition 
that there is fuel put to it. And it burneth the 
fuel, when it is put to it, necessarily ; but it is by 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 49 

supposition, that the ordinary course of nature is NO. in. 
not hindered ; for the fire burnt not the three chil- A ^J^T' 
dren in the furnace. sions upon the 

Bishop s 

(c) "But if these causes did operate freely or 
contingently, if they might have suspended or de- 
nied their concurrence, or have concurred after 
another manner, then the effect was not truly and 
antecedently necessary, but either free or contin- 
gent." 

It seems by this he understands not what these 
words, free and contingent , mean. A little before, 
he wondered I should attribute liberty to inani- 
mate creatures, and now he puts causes amongst 
those things that operate freely. By these causes 
it seems he understandeth only men, whereas I 
shewed before that liberty is usually ascribed to 
whatsoever agent is riot hindered. And when a man 
doth any thing freely, there be many other agents 
immediate, that concur to the effect he intendeth, 
which work not freely, but necessarily ; as when 
the man moveth the sword freely, the sword 
woundeth necessarily, nor can suspend or deny 
its concurrence ; and consequently if the man 
move not himself, the man cannot deny his con- 
currence. To which he cannot reply, unless he 
say a man originally can move himself ; for which 
he will be able to find no authority of any that 
have but tasted of the knowledge of motion. 
Then for contingent, he understandeth not what 
it meaneth. For it is all one to say it is contingent, 
and simply to say it is ; saving that when they say 
simply it is, they consider not how or by what 
means ; but in saying it is contingent, they tell us 
they know not whether necessarily or not. But 

VOL. V. E 



50 THB QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. in. the Bishop thinking contingent to be that which 
Animadvert i s n t necessary, instead of arguing against our 
^0 upon the knowledge of the necessity of things to come, ar- 

Bishop'a reply. . . ' . G . ' 

gueth against the necessity itself. Again, he sup- 
poseth that free and contingent causes might have 
suspended or denied their concurrence. From 
which it followeth, that free causes, and contingent 
causes, are not causes of themselves, but concur- 
rent with other causes, and therefore can produce 
nothing but as they are guided by those causes 
with which they concur. For it is strange he 
should say, they might have concurred after ano- 
ther manner ; for I conceive not how, when this 
runneth one way, and that another, that they can 
be said to concur, that is, run together. And this 
his concurrence of causes contingent, maketh, he 
saith, the cast of ambs-ace not to have been abso- 
lutely necessary. Which cannot be conceived, un- 
less it had hindered it; and then it had made some 
other cast necessary, perhaps deux-ace, which 
serveth me as well. For that which he saith of 
suspending his concurrence, of casting sooner or 
later, of altering the caster's force, and the like 
accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of 
ambs-ace, otherwise than by making a necessity 
of deux-ace, or other cast that shall be thrown. 

(d) "Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the ques- 
tion, is not the question," &c. 

He hath very little reason to say this. He re- 
quested me to tell him my opinion in writing con- 
cerning free-will. Which I did, and did let him 
know a man was free, in those things that were in 
his power, to follow his will ; but that he wdJTnot 
free to will, that is, that his will did not follow his 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 51 

will. Which I expressed in these words : " The NO. in. 
question is, whether the will to write, or the will A ^^7 ' 

* * y Aniraadver- 

to forbear, come upon a man according to his will, u p n the 

j. , , . i T_- i Bi Chop's reply. 

or according to any thing else in his own power. 
He that cannot understand the difference between 
free to do if he will, andfree to will, is not fit, as 
I have said in the stating of the question, to hear 
this controversy disputed, much less to be a writer 
in it. His consequence, " if a man be not free to 
will, he is not a free nor a voluntary agent," and 
his saying, " the freedom of the agent is from the 
freedom of the will/' is put here without proof; 
nor is there any considerable proof of it through 
the whole book hereafter offered. For why ? He 
never before had heard, I believe, of any distinc- 
tion between free to do and free to will ; which 
makes him also say, " if the will have not power 
over itself, the agent is no more free, than a staif 
in a man's hand." As if it were not freedom 
enough for a man to do what he will, unless his 
will also have power over his will, and that his 
will be not the power itself, but must have another 
power within it to do all voluntary acts. 

(e) " If it be precisely and inevitably determined 
in all occurrences whatsoever, what a man shall 
will, and what he shall not will, and what he shall 
write, and what he shall not write, to what pur- 
pose is this power ?" &c. 

It is to this purpose, that all those things may 
be brought to pass, which God hath from eternity 
predetermined. It is therefore to no purpose here 
to say, that God and nature hath made nothing in 
vain. But see what weak arguments he brings next, 
which, though answered in that which is gone be- 

E 2 



52 THE QUESTIONS CONCBKNING 

if o. HI. fore, yet, if I answer not again, he will say they are 
m 7 fi n g ers - * One & : " If ^ e agent be 



sums up the determined what he shall will, and what he shall 
oj>$repy. e .^ ^ more f ree t ac t ^an he is to 



will ;" as if the will being necessitated, the doing 
of what we will were not liberty. Another is : " If 
a man be free to act, he is much more free to will ; 
because quod efficit tale, illud magis est tale ;* as 
if he should say, " if I make him angry, then I am 
more angry ; because quod effitit" &c. The third 
is : " If the will be determined, then the writing is 
determined, and he ought not to say he may write, 
but he must write." It is true, it followeth that he 
must write, but it doth not follow I ought to say 
he must write, unless he would have me say more 
than I know, as himself doth often in this reply. 

After his arguments come his difficult questions. 
" If the will of man be determined without his will, 
or without any thing in his power, why do we ask 
men whether they will do such a thing or not ?" I 
answer, because we desire to know, and cannot 
know but by their telling, nor then neither, 
for the most part. " Why do we represent reasons 
to them ? Why do we pray them ? Why do we 
entreat them ?" I answer, because thereby we 
think to make them have the will they have not. 
" Why do we blame them ?" I answer, because 
they please us not. I might ask him, whether 
blaming be any thing else but saying the thing 
blamed is ill or imperfect ? May we not say a 
horse is lame, though his lameness came from ne- 
cessity ? or that a man is a fool or a knave, if he 
be so, though he could not help it ? " To what 
purpose did our Saviour say to the paralytic person, 




LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 53 

wilt thou be made clean, if his will were extrinsi- NO. iu 
cally determined ?" I answer, that it was not be- " 

cause he would know, for he knew it before ; but 
because he would draw from him a confession of 
his want. " We have piped unto you, and ye 
have not danced ; how could they help it ?" I 
answer they could not help it. " I would have 
gathered your children as the hen gathereth her 
chickens under her wings, but ye would not. How 
easily might they answer, according to T. H.'s 
doctrine, Alas ! blame not us, our wills are not in 
our own power ?" I answer, they are to be blamed 
though their wills be not in their own power. Is 
not good good, and evil evil, though they be not in 
our power ? and shall not I call them so ? and is 
not that praise and blame r But it seems the 
Bishop takes blame, not for the dispraise of a thing, 
but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge 
against him he blameth. And where he says our 
wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks 
absurdly ; for he ought to say, the will is the 
power ; and through ignorance detecteth the same 
fault in St. Austin, who saith, " our will should 
not be a will at all, if it were not in our power ;" 
that is to say, if it were not in our will. 

(f) " This is the belief of all mankind, which we 
have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted 
in our hearts by nature," &c. 

This piece of eloquence is used by Cicero in his 
defence of Milo, to prove it lawful for a man to 
resist force with force, or to keep himself from 
killing; which the Bishop, thinking himself able 
to make that which proves one thing prove any 
thing, hath translated into English, and brought 



54 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. in. into this place to prove free-will It is true, very 
' few have learned from tutors, that a man is not 

- 

upon the free to will ; nor do they find it much in books. 
rep y. ^^ ^y ^^ .^ books, that which the poets 
chant in their theatres and the shepherds in the 
mountains, that which the pastors teach in the 
churches and the doctors in the universities, and 
that which the common people in the markets, and 
all mankind in the whole world do assent unto, is 
the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man 
hath freedom to do if he will ; but whether he hath 
freedom to will, is a question which it seems nei- 
ther the Bishop nor they ever thought on. 

(g) " No man blameth fire for burning cities, 
nor taxeth poison for destroying men," &c. 

Here again he is upon his arguments from blame, 
which I have answered before ; and we do as 
much blame them as we do men. For we say fire 
hath done hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, 
as well as we say the man hath done unjustly ; but 
we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of 
poison, because we cannot make them ask forgive- 
ness, as we would make men to do when they 
hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the 
other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evil ac- 
tion done by them, is the same in both ; but the 
malice of man is only against man. 

(K) " No man sins in doing those things which 
he could not shun/' 

He may as well say, no man halts which cannot 
choose but halt ; or stumbles, that cannot choose 
but stumble. For what is sin, but halting or stum- 
bling in the way of God's commandments ? 

(t) " The question then is not, whether a man 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 55 

be necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or NO. HI. 
forbear. But, saving the ambiguous acceptions of Animad ^ r . 
the vrordfree, the question is plainly this/' &c. U P B ** 

This question, which the Bishop stateth in this " opsrepy " 
place, I have before set down verbatim and allow- 
ed : and it is the same with mine, though he per- 
ceive it not. But seeing I did nothing, but at his 
request set down my opinion, there can be no 
other question between us in this controversy, but 
whether my opinion be the truth or not. 

(k) " So my preface remains yet unanswered. 
Either I was extrinsically and inevitably predeter- 
mined to write this discourse," &c. 

That which he saith in the preface is, " that if 
he be not free to write this discourse, he ought not 
to be blamed ; but if he be free, he hath obtained 
the cause." 

The first consequence I should have granted 
him, if he had written it rationally and civilly ; 
the latter I deny, and have shown that he ought to 
have proved that a man is free to will. For that 
which he says, any thing else whatsoever would 
think, if it knew it were moved, and did not know 
what moved it. A wooden top that is lashed by 
the boys, and runs about sometimes to one wall, 
sometimes to another, sometimes spinning, some- 
times hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible 
of its own motion, would think it proceeded from 
its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And is 
a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a 
benefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the 
world with writing errors and requiring answers, 
because he thinks he doth it without other cause 
than his own will, and seeth not what are the lash- 
ings that cause his will ? 



56 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



NO. IV. 

NO. iv. J. D. " And so to fall in hand with the ques- 
^hout any further proems or prefaces, by 
liberty) I do neither understand a liberty from sin, 
nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servi- 
tude, nor a liberty from violence, but I understand 
a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessita- 
tion ; that is, an universal immunity from all inevi- 
tability and determination to one ; whether it be of 
exercise only, which the Schools call a liberty of 
contradiction, and is found in God and in the 
good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do 
both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do 
this or that good, this or that evil, respectively ; or 
whether it be a liberty of specification and exer- 
cise also, which the Schools call liberty of contra- 
riety, and is found in men endowed with reason 
and understanding, that is, a liberty to do and not 
to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast 
being cleared," &c. 

T. H. In the next place he maketh certain dis- 
tinctions of liberty, and says, he means not liberty 
from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence, 
but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and 
determination to one. It had been better to define 
liberty, than thus to distinguish ; for I understand 
never the more what he means by liberty. And 
though he says he means liberty from necessita- 
tion, yet I understand not how such a liberty can 
be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. 
For what else is the question between us, but whe- 
ther such a liberty be possible or not ? There are 
in the same place other distinctions, as a liberty of 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 57 

exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contra- NO. iv. 
diction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, 
but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, 
respectively : and a liberty of specification and 
exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contra- 
riety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to 
do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this 
or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, 
he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he 
darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of 
exercise only, specification also, contradiction, con- 
trariety, but also with pretending distinction where 
none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of 
doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to 
consist, as he saith it doth in God and Angels, 
without a liberty of doing or not doing good or 
evil ? 

/. D. (a) " It is a rule in art, that words which 
are homonymous, of various and ambiguous signi- 
fications, ought ever in the first place to be distin- 
guished. No men delight in confused generalities, 
but either sophisters or bunglers. Vir dolosus 
versatur in generalibus, deceitful men do not love 
to descend to particulars ; and when bad archers 
shoot, the safest way is to run to the mark. Lib- 
erty is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin 
and vicious habits, as (Romans vi. 22) : Now being 
made free from sin. Sometimes to misery and 
oppression, (Isaiah Iviii. 6) : To let the oppressed 
go free. Sometimes to servitude, as (Leviticus 
xxv. 10): In the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim 
liberty throughout the land. Sometimes to vio- 
lence, as (Psalms cv. 20) : The prince of his peo- 
ple let him go free. Yet none of all these is the 



58 THR QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. iv. liberty now in question, but a liberty from neces- 
The Bishop's s ^ ^at * s > a determination to one, or rather from 
neeessitation, that is, a necessity imposed by ano- 
ther, or an extrinsical determination. These dis- 
tinctions do virtually imply a description of true 
liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it, than 
. T. H.'s roving definition, as we shall see in due 
place. And though he say that c he understands 
never the more what I mean by liberty,' yet it is 
plain, by his own ingenuous confession, both that 
he doth understand it, and that this is the very 
question where the water sticks between us, whe- 
ther there be such a liberty free from all necessita- 
tion and extrinsical determination to one. Which 
being but the stating of the question, he calls it 
amiss ' the taking of the question.' It were too 
much weakness to beg this question, which is so 
copious and demonstrable, (b) It is strange to see 
with what confidence, now-a-days, particular men 
slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and 
classic authors of former ages, as if they were not 
worthy to unloose the shoe-strings of some modern 
author, or did sit in darkness and in the shadow 
of death, until some third Cato dropped down from 
heaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the 
altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did 
never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pul- 
pit declare against School Divinity to his equally 
ignorant auditors. It is but as the fox in the fable, 
who, having lost his own tail by a mischance, would 
have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs, 
and throw them away as unprofitable burthens. 
But it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath 
been long admitted into the innermost closet of 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 59 

nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle NO. iv. 
learning, so far to forget himself as to style School- 
learning no better than a plain jargon, that is, a 
senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the 
chattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did 
sometimes too much cut truth into shreds, or 
delight in abstruse expressions, yet certainly this 
distinction of liberty into liberty of contrariety 
and liberty of contradiction, or which is all one, 
of exercise only, or exercise and specification 
jointly, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is 
so true, so necessary, so generally received, that 
there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or 
philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, 
but he useth it. 

" Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds 
of things. Therefore to be able to choose both good 
and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of specifica- 
tion. To choose this, and not to choose this, are 
contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or 
suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or 
forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not 
choose the same object, without varying of the 
kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise 
only. Now a man is not only able to do or for- 
bear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able 
both to do and to forbear to do both good and 
evil. So he hath not only a liberty of the action, 
but also a liberty of contrary objects ; not only a 
liberty of exercise, but also of specification ; not 
only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contra- 
riety. On the other side, God and the good an- 
gels can do or not do this or that good ; but they 
cannot do and not do both good and evil. So 



60 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. iv. they have only a liberty of exercise or contradic- 
The Bishop's ti n > but not a liberty of specification or contra- 
riety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of 
man is more large in the extension of the object, 
which is both good and evil, than the liberty of 
God and the good angels, whose object is only 
good. But withal the liberty of man comes 
short in the intention of the power. Man is not 
so free in respect of good only, as God or the 
good angels, because (not to speak of God, whose 
liberty is quite of another nature) the understand- 
ings of the angels are clearer, their power and 
dominion over their actions is greater, they have 
no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs 
to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is 
cleared from all darkness. 

te And where T. H. demands, how it is possible 
for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that 
good or evil, to consist in God and angels, without 
a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil ? the 
answer is obvious and easy, referenda singula 
singulis, rendering every act to its right object re- 
spectively. God and good angels have a power to 
do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have 
a power to do or not to do this or that evil ; so 
both, jointly considered, have power respectively 
to do good or evil. And yet, according to the 
words of my discourse, God and good and bad 
angels, being singly considered, have no power to 
do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. IV. 

He intendeth here to make good the distinctions 
of liberty of exercise, and liberty of contradic- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 61 

tion ; liberty of contrariety, and liberty of sped- NO. iv. 
fication and exercise. And he begins thus : Animftd ^ er ;^ 

(a) " It is a rule in art. that words which are sioiw U P D * 

, c . j v -A; Bishop'* reply 

homonymous, or of various and ambiguous signifi- 
cations, ought ever in the first place to be dis- 
tinguished," &c. 

I know not what art it is that giveth this rule. 
I am sure it is not the art of reason, which men 
call logic. For reason teacheth, and the example 
of those who only reason methodically, (which are 
the mathematicians), that a man, when he will 
demonstrate the truth of what he is to say, must 
in the first place determine what he will have to 
be understood by his words ; which determination 
is called definition ; whereby the significations of 
his words are so clearly set down, that there can 
creep in no ambiguity. And therefore there will 
be no need of distinctions ; and consequently his 
rule of art, is a rash precept of some ignorant 
man, whom he and others have followed. 

The Bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes 
opposed to sin, to oppression, to servitude ; which 
is to tell us, that they whom he hath read in this 
point, are inconsistent in the meaning of their 
own words ; and, therefore, they are little beholden 
to him. And this diversity of significations he 
calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word 
in one place mean one thing, and in another an- 
other, and never tell us so, distinguish ? I think 
they rather confound. And yet he says, that 
" these distinctions do virtually imply a descrip- 
tion of true liberty, which cometh nearer the 
essence of it, than T. H,'s roving definition ;" 
which definition of mine was this : " liberty is 



62 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. iv. when there is no external impediment." So that in 
Animadver kk opinion B, man shall sooner understand liberty 
BOM upon the ^y reading these words, (Romans vi. 22) : Being 

Bishop's reply. J & ^ ^ . /T ? 

ftiacte /rtftf from sin ; or these words, (Isaiah 
Iviii. 6) : To let the oppressed go free; or by these 
words, (Leviticus xxv. 10) : You shall proclaim 
liberty throughout the land, than by these words 
of mine : " liberty is the absence of external impe- 
diments to motion." Also he will face me down, 
that I understand what he means by his distinc- 
tions of liberty of contrariety, of contradiction, 
of exercise only, of exercise and specification 
jointly. If he mean I understand his meaning, in 
one sense it is true. For by them he means to 
shift off the discredit of being able to say nothing 
to the question; as they do that, pretending to 
know the cause of every thing*, give for the cause 
of why the load-stone draweth to it iron, sympa- 
thy, and occult quality ; making they cannot tell 9 
(turned now into occult), to stand for the real 
cause of that most admirable effect. But that 
those words signify distinction, I constantly deny. 
It is not enough for a distinction to be forked ; it 
ought to signify a distinct conception. There is 
great difference between luade distinctions and 
cloven feet. 

(V) " It is strange to see with what confidence 
now-a-days particular men slight all the School- 
men, and philosophers, and classic authors of for- 
mer ages," &c. 

This word, particular men, is put here, in my 
opinion, with little judgment, especially by a man 
that pretendeth to be learned. Does the Bishop 
think that he himself is, or that there is any uni- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 63 

versal man ? It may be he means a private man. NO. iv. 
Does he then think there is any man not private, be- Animad ; elv " 
sides him that is endued with sovereign power ? But sions u P n * 

.. Tiii ii i i Bishop's reply. 

it is most likely he calls me a particular man, because 
I have not had the authority he has had, to teach 
what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am no more 
particular than he ; and may with as good a grace 
despise the Schoolmen and some of the old Philo- 
sophers, as he can despise me, unless he can shew 
that it is more likely that he should be better able 
to look into these questions sufficiently, which re- 
quire meditation and reflection upon a man's own 
thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of his 
time to preach unto the people, and to that end to 
read those authors that can best furnish him with 
what he has to say, and to study for the rhetoric 
of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to 
a good pastor is very little) hath spent no little 
part in seeking preferment and increasing of 
riches ; than I, that have done almost nothing else, 
nor have had much else to do but to meditate up- 
on this and other natural questions. It troubles 
him much that I style School-learning jargon. I 
do not call all School-learning so, but such as is 
so ; that is, that which they say in defending of 
untruths, and especially in the maintenance of 
free-will, when they talk of liberty of exercise, 
specification, contrariety, contradiction, acts eli- 
cite and exercite, and the like ; which, though he 
go over again in this place, endeavouring to ex- 
plain them, are still both here and there but jar- 
gon, or that (if he like it better) which the Scrip- 
ture in the first chaos calleth Tohu and Bohu. 
But because he takes it so heinously, that a pri- 



64 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. iv. vate man should so hardly censure School-divini- 
Ammadver *^ ^ wou ^ be g^d to know with what patience he 
sions upon the can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon 
1S opsrepy ' speaking of the same ? Martin Luther, that was 
the first beginner of our deliverance from the ser- 
vitude of the Romish clergy, had these three arti- 
cles censured by the University of Paris. The 
first of which was : " School-theology is a 
false interpretation of the Scripture, and Sacra- 
ments, which hath banished from us true and sin- 
cere theology." The second is : " At what time 
School-theology, that is, mock-theology, came up, 
at the same time the theology of Christ's Cross 
went down." The third is : " It is now almost 
three hundred years since the Church has endured 
the licentiousness of School-Doctors in corrupting 
of the Scriptures." Moreover, the same Luther in 
another place of his work saith thus ; " School- 
theology is nothing else but ignorance of the 
truth, and a block to stumble at laid before the 
Scriptures." And of Thomas Aquinas in particu- 
lar he saith, that " it was he that did set up the 
kingdom of Aristotle, the destroyer of godly doc- 
trine." And of the philosophy whereof St. Paul 
biddeth us beware, he saith it is School-theology. 
And Melancthon, a divine once much esteemed in 
our Church, saith of it thus : " It is known that that 
profane scholastic learning, which they will have 
to be called Divinity, began at Paris ; which being 
admitted, nothing is left sound in the Church, the 
Gospel is obscured, faith extinguished, the doc- 
trine of works received, and instead of Christ's 
people, we are become not so much as the people 
of the law, but the people of Aristotle's ethics 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 65 

These were no raw divines, such as he saith NO. iv. 
preached to their equally ignorant auditors. I Ani ^ d ^ r 
could add to these the slighting of School-di- <** upon the 
vinity by Calvin and other learned Protestant 180psrepy * 
Doctors ; yet were they all but private men, who, 
it seems to the Bishop, had forgot themselves as 
well as I. 

NO. v. 

/. D. " Thus the coast being cleared, the next 
thing to be done, is to draw out our forces against 
the enemy ; and because they are divided into two 
squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of 
heathen philosophers, it will be best to dispose 
ours also into two bodies, the former drawn from 
Scripture, the latter from reason." 

T. H. The next thing he doth, after the clear- 
ing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as 
he calls them, into two squadrons, one of places of 
Scripture, the other of reasons, which allegory he 
useth, I suppose, because he addresses the dis- 
course to your Lordship, who is a military man. 
All that I have to say touching this, is, that I ob- 
serve a great part of those his forces do look and 
march another way, and some of them do fight 
among themselves. 

J. D. " If T. H. could divide my forces, and 
commit them together among themselves, it were 
his only way to conquer them. But he will find 
that those imaginary contradictions, which he 
thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but 
fancies, and my supposed impertinences will prove 
his own real mistakings." 

VOL. v. F 



66 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

In this fifth number there is nothing of his or 
mine, pertinent to the question, therefore nothing 
necessary to be repeated. 

PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE. NO. VI. 

NO. vi. J. D. " First, whosoever have power of elec- 
The Bishops tion, have true liberty ; for the proper act of liberty 
* eply ' is election. A spontaneity may consist with deter- 
mination to one, as we see in children, fools, mad- 
men, brute beasts, whose fancies are determined to 
those things which they act spontaneously, as the 
bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of 
these have a liberty of election, which is an act of 
judgment and understanding, and cannot possibly 
consist with a determination to one. He that is 
determined by something before himself or with- 
out himself, cannot be said to choose or elect, un- 
less it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in 
Cambridge, whether he will have the least part or 
nothing. And scarcely so much. 

" But men have liberty of election. This is 
plain, (Numbers xxx. 13) : If a wife make a vow 
it is left to her husband's choice, either to esta- 
blish it or to make it void. And (Joshua xxiv. 
15) : Choose you this day whom you will serve, 
&c. But I and my house will serve the Lord. 
He makes his own choice, and leaves them to the 
liberty of their election. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 12) : 
/ offer thee three things, choose thee which of 
them I shall do. If one of these three things was 
necessarily determined, and the other two impossi- 
ble, how was it left to him to choose what should 
be done ? Therefore we have true liberty." 
T. H. And the first place of Scripture taken 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 67 

from Numbers xxx. 13, is one of them that look NO. vi. 
another way. The words are, If a wife make a ^^^ 
vow it is left to her husband's choice, either to reply 
establish it or make it void. For it proves no more 
but that the husband is a free or voluntary agent, 
but not that his choice therein is not necessitated 
or not determined to what he shall choose by pre- 
cedent necessary causes. 

J. D. " My first argument from Scripture is 
thus formed. 

" Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, 
are not determined to one by precedent necessary 
causes. 

" But men have liberty of election. 

" The assumption or minor proposition is proved 
by three places of Scripture, (Numbers xxx. 13 ; 
Joshua xxiv. 15 ; 2 Samuel xxiv. 12.) I need not in- 
sist upon these, because T. H. acknowledgeth ' that 
it is clearly proved that there is election in man.' 

" But he denieth the major proposition, because, 
saith he, c man is necessitated or determined to 
what he shall choose by precedent necessary 
causes.' I take away this answer three ways. 

" First, by reason. Election is evermore either 
of things possible, or at least of things conceived 
to be possible, that is, efficacious election, when 
a man hopeth or thinketh of obtaining the object. 
Whatsoever the will chooseth, it chooseth under 
the notion of good, either honest, or delightful, 
or profitable. But there can be no real goodness 
apprehended in that which is known to be impos- 
sible. It is true, there may be some wandering 
pendulous wishes of known impossibilities, as a 
man also that hath committed an offence may 

F 2 



68 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vi. wish he had not committed it. But to choose effi- 
cac i u sly an impossibility, is as impossible as an 
impossibility itself. No man can think to obtain 
that which he knows impossible to be obtained ; 
but he who knows that all things are antecedently 
determined by necessary causes, knows that it is 
impossible for anything to be otherwise than it is ; 
therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election 
to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the 
same thing to be determined to one, and to be 
not determined to one, which are contradictories. 
Again, whosoever hath an elective power, or a 
liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to 
refuse ; (Isaiah vii. 16) : Before the child shall 
know to refuse the evil and choose the good. He 
who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that 
rather than this. As Moses (Hebrews xi. 25), 
choosing to suffer affliction with the people of 
God, did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin. But 
no man hath any power to refuse that which is 
necessarily predetermined to be, unless it be as 
the fox refused the grapes which were beyond his 
reach. When one thing of two or three is abso- 
lutely determined, the others are made thereby 
simply impossible. 

(a] " Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by 
that universal notion which the world hath of elec- 
tion. What is the difference between an elective 
and hereditary kingdom, but that in an elective 
kingdom, they have power or liberty to choose this 
or that man indifferently ; but in an hereditary 
kingdom, they have no such power nor liberty ? 
Where the law makes a certain heir, there is a ne- 
cessitation to one ; where the law doth not name 
a certain heir, there is no necessitation to one, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 69 

and there they have power or liberty to choose. NO. \u 
An hereditary prince may be as grateful and ac- ^ ^. -^ 
ceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received reply, 
by them (according to that liberty which is op- 
posed to compulsion or violence), as he who is 
chosen : yet he is not therefore an elective prince. 
In Germany all the nobility and commons may as- 
sent to the choice of the emperor, or be well 
pleased with it when it is concluded ; yet none of 
them elect or choose the emperor, but only those 
six princes who have a consultative, deliberative, 
and determinative power in his election; and if 
their votes or suifrages be equally divided, three 
to three, then the King of Bohemia hath the cast- 
ing voice. So likewise in corporations or com- 
monwealths, sometimes the people, sometimes the 
common-council, have power to name so many 
persons for such an office, and the supreme magis- 
trate, or senate, or lesser council respectively, to 
choose one of those. And all this is done with 
that caution and secresy, by billets or other means, 
that no man knows which way any man gave his 
vote, or with whom to be offended. If it were 
necessarily and inevitably predetermined, that this 
individual person, and no other, shall and must be 
chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to 
do that which is not possible to be done otherwise, 
which one may do as well as a thousand, and for 
doing of which no rational man can be offended, 
if the electors were necessarily predetermined to 
elect this man and no other. And though T. H. 
was pleased to pass by my University instance, yet 
I may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. 
The junior of the mess in Cambridge divides the 



70 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vi. meat in four parts; the senior choosetR first, then 
The Bisho -s ^ e secon< i an d third in their order. The junior 
is determined to one, and hath no choice left, un- 
less it be to choose whether he will take that part 
which the rest have refused, or none at all. It 
may be this part is more agreeable to his mind 
than any of the others would have been ; but for 
all that he cannot be said to choose it, because he 
is determined to this one. Even such a liberty of 
election is that which is established by T. H. ; or 
rather much worse in two respects. The junior 
hath yet a liberty of contradiction left, to choose 
whether he will take that part, or not take any 
part ; but he who is precisely predetermined to the 
choice of this object, hath no liberty to refuse it. 
Secondly, the junior, by dividing carefully, may 
preserve to himself an equal share ; but he who is 
wholly determined by extrinsical causes, is left al- 
together to the mercy and disposition of another. 
"Thirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. (Numb. 
xxx. 13) : If a wife make a vow., it is left to her 
husbands choice, either to establish it or make 
it void. But if it be predetermined that he shall 
establish it, it is not in his power to make it void. 
If it be predetermined that he shall make it void, 
it is not in his power to establish it. And howso- 
ever it be determined, yet being determined, it is 
not in his power indifferently, either to establish 
it, or to make it void at his pleasure. So (Joshua 
xxiv. 1 5) : Choose you this day whom ye will 
serve : but I and my house will serve the Lord. 
It is too late to choose that this day, which was 
determined otherwise yesterday. Whom ye will 
serve, whether the Gods whom your fathers 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 71 

served, or the Gods of the Amorites. Where there NO. vi. 
is an election of this or that, these Gods, or those IT * ~" 

9 m * The Bishop s 

Gods, there must needs be either an indifferency 
to both objects, or at least a possibility to either. 
/ and my house will serve the Lord. If he were 
extrinsically predetermined, he should not say I 
will serve, but I must serve. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 
12) :/ offer thee three things, choose thee which 
of them I shall do. How doth God offer three 
things to David's choice, if he had predetermined 
him to one of the three by a concourse of neces- 
sary extrinsical causes ? If a sovereign prince 
should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his 
choice, whether he would be fined, or imprisoned, 
or banished, and had underhand signed the sen- 
tence of his banishment, what were it else but 
plain drollery or mockery ? This is the argument 
which in T. H.'s opinion looks another way. If it 
do, it is as the Parthians used to fight, flying. His 
reason follows next to be considered." 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP S REPLY NO. VI. 

In this number he hath brought three places of 
Scripture to prove freewill. The first is, If a 
wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice 
either to establish it or to make it void. And, 
Choose you this day whom ye will serve, fyc. But 
I and my house will serve the Lord. And, / offer 
thee three things, choose thee which of them I 
shall do. Which in the reply he endeavoureth to 
make good ; but needed not, seeing they prove 
nothing but that a man is free to do if he will, 
which I deny not. He ought to prove he is free 
to will, which I deny. 



72 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vi. (#) Secondly, " I prove it by instances, and by 
Animadvert ^at universal notion which the world hath of 

sions upon the election." 

Bishop's reply. TT f i T/V 

His instances are, first, the difference between 
an hereditary kingdom and an elective ; and then 
the difference between the senior and junior of 
the mess taking their commons ; both which prove 
the liberty of doing what they will, but not a li- 
berty to will. For in the first case, the electors are 
free to name whom they will, but not to will ; 
and in the second, the senior having an appetite, 
chooseth what he hath an appetite to ; but choos- 
eth not his appetite. 

NO. VII. 

T. H. For if there came into the husband's 
mind greater good by establishing than abrogating 
such a vow, the establishing will follow necessa- 
rily. And if the evil that will follow thereon in 
the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the con- 
trary must needs follow. And yet in this follow- 
ing of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature 
of election. So that a man may both choose this, 
and cannot but choose this. And consequently 
choosing and necessity are joined together. 

/. D. (a) " There is nothing said with more 
show of reason in this cause by the patrons of 
necessity and adversaries of true liberty than 
this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly 
follow the last dictate of the understanding, or 
the last judgment of right reason. And in this, 
and this only, I confess T. H. hath sjood seconds. 
Yet the common and approved opinion is contrary, 
and justly. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 73 

"For first, this very act of the understanding is an NO. vn. 
effect of the will, and a testimony of its power and 
liberty. It is the will, which affecting some par- 
ticular good, doth engage and command the un- 
derstanding to consult and deliberate what means 
are convenient for attaining that end. And though 
the will itself be blind, yet its object is good in 
general, which is the end of all human actions. 
Therefore it belongs to the will, as to the general 
of an army, to move the other powers of the soul 
to their acts, and among the rest the understand- 
ing also, by applying it and reducing its power into 
act. So as whatsoever obligation the understand- 
ing doth put upon the will, is by the consent of 
the will, and derived from the power of the will, 
which was not necessitated to move the under- 
standing to consult. So the will is the lady and 
mistress of human actions ; the understanding is 
her trusty counsellor, which gives no advice but 
when it is required by the will. And if the first 
consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the 
will may move a review, and require the under- 
standing to inform itself better and take advice 
of others, from whence many times the judgment 
of the understanding doth receive alteration. 

" Secondly, for the manner how the understaAd- 
ing doth determine the will, it is not naturally but 
morally. The will is moved by the understanding, 
not as by an efficient having a causal influence 
into the effect, but only by proposing and repre- 
senting the object. And therefore, as it were ridi- 
culous to say that the object of the sight is the 
cause of seeing, so it is to say that the proposing 
of the object by the understanding to the will is 



74 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vii. the cause of willing; and therefore the under- 
stan ding hath no place in that concourse of causes, 
which according to T. H. do necessitate the will. 

"Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding 
is not always practice practicum, nor of such a 
nature in itself as to oblige and determine the 
will to one. Sometimes, the understanding pro- 
poseth two or three means equally available to the 
attaining of one and the same end. Sometimes, it 
dictateth that this or that particular good is eli- 
gible or fit to be chosen, but not that it is ne- 
cessarily eligible or that it must be chosen. It 
may judge this or that to be a fit means, but 
not the only means to attain the desired end. In 
these cases no man can doubt but that the will 
may choose, or not choose, this or that indiffer- 
ently. Yea, though the understanding shall judge 
one of these means to be more expedient than 
another, yet forasmuch as in the less expedient 
there is found the reason of good, the will in re- 
spect of that dominion which it hath over itself, 
may accept that which the understanding judgeth 
to be less expedient, and refuse that which it 
judgeth to be more expedient. 

" Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the 
enft so efficaciously, but that it may be, and often 
is deterred from the prosecution of it by the dif- 
ficulty of the means ; and notwithstanding the 
judgment of the understanding, the will may still 
suspend its own act. 

" Fifthly, supposing, but not granting, that the 
will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the 
understanding, yet this proves no antecedent ne- 
cessity, but coexistent with the act ; no extrinsical 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 75 

necessity, the will and the understanding being but NO. vii. 
two faculties of the same soul ; no absolute neces- lr . , " 

The Bishops 

sity, but merely upon supposition. And therefore re p ] y- 
the same authors who maintain that the judgment 
of the understanding doth necessarily determine 
the will, do yet much more earnestly oppugn T.H/s 
absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose 
the will shall apply the understanding to delibe- 
rate and not require a review. Suppose the dic- 
tate of the understanding shall be absolute, not 
this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that 
comparatively, but this positively ; nor this freely, 
but this necessarily. And suppose the will do 
will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act. 
Then here is a necessity indeed, but neither abso- 
lute nor extrinsical, nor antecedent, flowing from 
a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a 
necessity upon supposition, which we do readily 
grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth, whilst 
he maintains, either that the apprehension of a 
greater good doth necessitate the will, or that 
this is an absolute necessity. 

(b) " Lastly, whereas he saith, that c the nature 
of election doth consist in following our hopes and 
fears,' I cannot but observe that there is not one 
word of art in this whole treatise which he useth 
in the right sense ; I hope it doth not proceed out 
of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a con- 
tempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to 
take in sunder the whole frame of learning and 
new mould it after his own mind. It were to be 
wished that at least he would give us a new dic- 
tionary, that we might understand his sense. But 
because this is but touched here sparingly, and 



76 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vu. upon the by, I will forbear it until I meet with 
** to&Mft in its proper place. And for the present 
it shall suffice to say, that hopes and fears are 
common to brute beasts, but election is a rational 
act, and is proper only to man, who is sanctim 
his animal, mentisque capacius altce. 

T. H. The second place of Scripture is Joshua 
xxiv. 15 ; the third is 2 Samuel xxiv. 12 ; whereby 
it is clearly proved, that there is election in man, 
but not proved that such election was not necessi- 
tated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations 
of good and bad to follow, which depend not on 
the will nor are subject to election. And there- 
fore one answer serves all such places, if they 
were a thousand. 

/. D. " This answer being the very same with 
the former, word for word, which hath already 
sufficiently been shaken in pieces, doth require no 
new reply. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. VII. 

(a) " There is nothing said with more show of 
reason in this cause by the patrons of necessity 
than this, that the will doth perpetually and infal- 
libly follow the last dictate of the understanding, 
or the last judgment of right reason/ &c. Yet 
the common and approved opinion is contrary, 
and justly ; for, first, this very act of the under- 
standing is an effect of the will, &c." 

I note here, first, that the Bishop is mistaken in 
saying that I or any other patron of necessity, are 
of opinion that the will follows always the last 
judgment of right reason. For it followeth as 
well the judgment of an erroneous as of a true 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 77 

reasoning ; and the truth in general is that it fol- NO. vn. 
loweth the last opinion of the goodness or ev il- A ^^7" 
ness of the object, be the opinion true or false. siom upon the 
Secondly, I note, that in making the under- lsopsrep)r ' 
standing to be an effect of the will, he thinketh a 
man may have a will to that which he not so 
much as thinks on. And in saying, that " it is the 
will which, affecting some particular good, doth 
engage and command the understanding to con- 
sult," &c, that he not only thinketh the will affect- 
eth a particular good, before the man understands 
it to be good; but also he thinketh that these words 
"doth command the understanding," and these, 
" for it belongs to the will as to the general of an 
army, to move the other powers of the soul to 
their acts," and a great many more that follow, are 
sense, which they are not, but mere confusion and 
emptiness : as, for example, " the understanding 
doth determine the will, not naturally, but morally," 
and " the will is moved by the understanding," is 
unintelligible. " Moved not as by an efficient," is 
nonsense. And where he saith, that " it is ridicu- 
lous to say the object of the sight is the cause of see- 
ing," he showeth so clearly that he understandeth 
nothing at all of natural philosophy, that I am sorry 
I had the ill fortune to be engaged with him in a 
dispute of this kind. There is nothing that the 
simplest countryman could say so absurdly con- 
cerning the understanding, as this of the Bishop, 
" the judgment of the understanding is not always 
practice practicum" A countryman will acknow- 
ledge there is judgment in men, but will as soon 
say the judgment of the judgment, as the judg- 



78 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vii. merit of the understanding. And if practice prac- 
Airimadver^ ticum had been sense, he might have made a shift 
sions upon the to put it into English. Much more followeth of 

Bishop's reply. r 

this stuff. 

(b) " Lastly, whereas he saith, ' that the nature 
of election doth consist in following our hopes and 
fears/ I cannot but observe that there is not one 
word of art in this whole treatise which he useth 
in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out 
of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a con- 
tempt of former writers," &c. 

He might have said, there is not a word of jar- 
gon nor nonsense ; and that it proceedeth from an 
affectation of truth, and contempt of metaphysical 
writers, and a desire to reduce into frame the 
learning which they have confounded and disor- 
dered. 

NO. VIII. 

T. H. Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I 
have done, that necessity and election might stand 
together, and instance in the actions of children, 
fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, 
are necessitated and determined to one : before 
these his proofs out of Scripture, he desires to pre- 
vent that instance, and therefore says, that the 
actions of children, fools, madmen, and beasts, 
are indeed determined, but that they proceed not 
from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous 
agents. As for example, that the bee, when it 
maketh honey, does it spontaneously ; and when 
the spider makes his web, he does it sponta- 
neously, and not by election. Though I never 
meant to ground any answer upon the experience 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 79 

of what children, fools, madmen, and beasts do, NO.VIII. 
yet that your Lordship may understand what can TheB j Hbo 7 f 
be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from reply. 
voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and show 
that it fighteth against its fellow arguments. Your 
Lordship therefore is to consider, that all volun- 
tary actions, where the thing that induceth the 
will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and 
said to be done by a man's own accord. As when a 
man giveth money voluntarily to another for mer- 
chandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of 
his own accord, which in Latin is sponte, and 
therefore the action is spontaneous ; though to 
give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid kill- 
ing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, 
where the motive is fear, be not called sponta- 
neous. But every spontaneous action is not there- 
fore voluntary; for voluntary presupposes some 
precedent deliberation, that is to say, some con- 
sideration and meditation of what is likely to fol- 
low, both upon the doing and abstaining from the 
action deliberated of; whereas many actions are 
done of our own accord, and are therefore sponta- 
neous ; of which nevertheless, as he thinks, we 
never consulted nor deliberated in ourselves, as 
when making no question nor any the least doubt 
in the world but that the thing we are about is 
good, we eat, or walk, or in anger strike or revile, 
which he thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary 
nor elective actions. And with such kind of ac- 
tions he says necessitation may stand, but not with 
such as are voluntary, and proceed upon election 
and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you 
that even these actions which he says proceed from 



80 THE QUESTJONS CONCERNING 

NO. vin. spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to fools, 
children, madmen, and beasts, proceed from de- 
liberation and election, and that actions inconsi- 
derate, rash and spontaneous, are ordinarily found 
in those that are, by themselves and many more, 
thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are ; 
then his argument concludeth, that necessity and 
election may stand together, which is contrary to 
that which he intendeth by all the rest of his argu- 
ments to prove. And first, your Lordship's own 
experience furnishes you with proof enough, that 
horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, do demur 
oftentimes upon the way they are to take : the 
horse, retiring from some strange figure he sees, 
and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what 
else doth man that deliberateth, but one while pro- 
ceed toward action, another while retire from it, 
as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear 
of greater evil drives him ? A child may be so 
young as to do all which it does without all de- 
liberation, but that is but till it chance to be hurt 
by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to under- 
stand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath 
once a check, shall be deliberated on a second 
time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate 
no less than the wisest men, though they make not 
so good a choice, the images of things being by 
diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so 
little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he 
would have confessed not only election, but also 
art, prudence, and policy in them, very near equal 
to that of mankind. Of bees Aristotle says, their 
life is civil. He is deceived, if he think any spon- 
taneous action, after once being checked in it, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 81 

differs from an action voluntary and elective, for NO, vw. 
even the setting of a man's foot in the posture of Ariimadv re "!om 
walking, and the action of ordinary eating, \v 
once deliberated, how and when it should be 
done ; and though it afterwards became easy and 
habitual, so as to be done without fore-thought, 
yet that does not hinder but that the act is volun- 
tary and proceeds from election. So also are the 
rashest actions of choleric persons voluntary and 
upon deliberation. For who is there, but very 
young children, that has not considered when and 
how far he ought, or safely may, strike or revile. 
Seeing then he agrees with me that such actions 
are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do 
them is determined to the actions they do, it fol- 
lows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of 
election does not take away the necessity of elect- 
ing this or that individual thing. And thus one of 
his arguments fights against another. 

J. D. " We have partly seen before how T. H. 
hath coined a new kind of liberty, a new kind of 
necessity, a new kind of election ; and now in this 
section a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind 
of voluntary actions. Although he say that here is 
nothing new to him, yet I begin to suspect that 
either here are many things new to him, or other- 
wise his election is not the result of a serious ma- 
ture deliberation, (a) The first thing that I offer, 
is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this one 
section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous 
actions to be one and the same ; he saith, I distin- 
tinguish them, so as spontaneous actions may be 
necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, 
(b) I distinguish between free acts and voluntary 

VOL. V. G 



82 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. viii. acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter 
TtoBiduT'i ma y ^ e ^deliberate 5 all free acts are voluntary, 
reply. but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith 
I confound th^em and make them the same. 
(c) Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to 
fools, childreh, madmen, and beasts ; but I acknow- 
ledge spojxtaneity hath place in rational men, both 
as it is comprehended in liberty, and as it is distin- 
guished from liberty. 

(d) " Yet I have no reason to be offended at it ; 
for he deals no otherwise with me than he doth 
with himself. Here he tells us that Voluntary 
presupposeth deliberation.' But (No. xxv.) he tells 
us contrary, f that whatsoever followeth the last 
appetite is voluntary, and where there is but one 
appetite, that is the last :' and that c no action 
of a man can be said to be without deliberation, 
though never so sudden.' So (No. xxxui.) he tells 
us, that ' by spontaneity is mean tinconsiderate pro- 
ceeding, or else nothing is meant by it :' yet here 
he tells us, that ' all voluntary actions which pro- 
ceed not from fear, are spontaneous,' whereof 
many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth 
himself, ' to give money for merchandise.' Third- 
ly, when I said that children, before they have the 
use of reason, act spontaneously, as when they 
suck the breast, but do not act freely, because 
they have not judgment to deliberate or elect, here 
T. H. undertakes to prove that they do deliberate 
and elect ; and yet presently after confesseth 
again, that f a child may be so young, as to do 
what it doth without all deliberation.' 

" Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he 
hath other errors also in this section. As this, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 83 

that no actions proceeding from fear are sponta- NO. vnr. 
neons. He who throws his goods into the sea to ' ' 

1 . 1 _. _ The Bishop's 

avoid drowning, doth it not only spontaneously, reply. 
but even freely. He that wills the end, wills the 
means conducing to that end. It is true that if 
the action be considered nakedly without all cir- 
cumstances, no man willingly or spontaneously 
casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the 
action, as in this particular case, invested with all 
the circumstances, and in order to the end, that 
is, the saving of his own life, it is not only volun- 
tary and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by 
him, as the most probable means for his own pre- 
servation. As there is an antecedent and a subse- 
quent will, so there is an antecedent and a sub- 
sequent spontaneity. His grammatical argument, 
grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous from 
sponte, weighs nothing ; we have learned in the 
rudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes 
in name only, and not in deed. He who casts his 
goods into the sea, may do it of his own accord in 
order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, 
that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only 
fear. Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth 
destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, 
by removing that knowledge which should and 
would have prohibited the action. As a man 
thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots 
his friend, which if he had known, he would not 
have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his 
own accord. 

" For the clearer understanding of these things, 
and to know what spontaneity is, let us consult 
awhile with the Schools about the distinct order 



84 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. viii. of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts 
The Bishop's proceed wholly from an extrinsical cause ; as the 
throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the draw- 
ing of a Christian by plain force to the idol's tem- 
ple ; these are called violent acts. Secondly, some 
proceed from an intrinsical cause, but without any 
manner of knowledge of the end, as the falling of 
a stone downwards ; these are called natural acts. 
Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, 
with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where 
there is an appetite to the object, but no delibera- 
tion nor election ; as the acts of fools, children, 
beasts, and the inconsiderate acts of men of judg- 
ment. These are called voluntary or spontaneous 
acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical 
cause, with a more perfect knowledge of the end, 
which are elected upon deliberation. These are 
called free acts. So then the formal reason of 
liberty is election. The necessary requisite to 
election is deliberation. Deliberation implyeth the 
actual use of reason. But deliberation and elec- 
tion cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsical 
predetermination to one. How should a man 
deliberate or choose which way to go, who knows 
that all ways are shut against him and made 
impossible to him, but only one ? This is the 
genuine sense of these words voluntary and spon- 
taneous in this question. Though they were taken 
twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically, as 
we say spontaneous ulcers, where there is no ap- 
petite at all, yet it were nothing to this contro- 
versy, which is not about words, but about things ; 
not what the words voluntary or free do or may 
signify, but whether all things be extrinsically pre- 
determined to one. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 85 

" These grounds being laid for clearing the true NO. vm. 
sense of the words, the next thing to be examined 
is, that contradiction which he hath espied in my 
discourse, or how this argument fights against his 
fellows. ' If I,' saith T. H., ' make it appear, that 
the spontaneous actions of fools, children, mad- 
men, and beasts, do proceed from election and 
deliberation, and that inconsiderate and indelibe- 
rate actions are found in the wisest men, then this 
argument concludes that necessity and election 
may stand together, which is contrary to his asser- 
tion.' If this could be made appear as easily as 
it is spoken, it would concern himself much, who, 
when he should prove that rational men are not 
free from necessity, goes about to prove that brute 
beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as much as 
to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns 
not me at all ; it is neither my assertion nor my 
opinion, that necessity and election may not meet 
together in the same subject ; violent, natural, 
spontaneous, and deliberate or elective acts may 
all meet together in the same subject. But this I 
say, that necessity and election cannot consist to- 
gether in the same act. He who is determined to 
one, is not free to choose out of more than one. 
To begin with his latter supposition, ' ' that wise men 
may do inconsiderate and indeliberate actions," I 
do readily admit it. But where did he learn to 
infer a general conclusion from particular pre- 
mises ; as thus, because wise men do some inde- 
liberate acts, therefore no act they do is free or 
elective ? Secondly, for his former supposition, 
" that fools, children, madmen, and beasts, do de- 
liberate and elect," if he could make it good, it is 



86 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. viii. not I who contradict myself, nor fight against 
The Bishop'* m * ne own assert i n 3 but it is he who endeavours to 
iepiy. prove that which I altogether deny. He may well 
find a contradiction between him and me ; other- 
wise to what end is this dispute ? But he shall 
not be able to find a difference between me and 
myself. But the truth is, he is not able to prove 
any such thing ; and that brings me to my sixth 
consideration, that neither horses, nor bees, nor 
spiders, nor children, nor fools, nor madmen do 
deliberate or elect. 

" His first instance is in the horse, or dog, 
but more especially the horse. He told me that I 
divided my argument into squadrons, to apply my- 
self to your Lordship, being a military man ; and 
I apprehend that for the same reason he gives his 
first instance of the horse, with a submission to 
your own experience. So far well, but otherwise 
very disadvantageous^ to his cause. Men used to 
say of a dull fellow, that he hath no more brains 
than a horse. And the Prophet David saith, 
(Psalm xxxii. 9) : Be not like the horse and 
mule, which have no understanding. How do they 
deliberate without understanding ? And (Psalm 
xlix. 20), he saith the same of all brute beasts : 
Man being in honour had no understanding, but 
became like unto the beasts that perish. The 
horse * demurs upon his way/ Why not ? Out- 
ward objects, or inward fancies, may produce a 
stay in his course, though he have no judgment 
either to deliberate or elect. ' He retires from 
some strange figure which he sees, and comes on 
again to avoid the spur.' So he may ; and yet be 
far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 87 

from the sensitive passion of fear, which is a per- NO. vm. 
turbation arising from the expectation of some im- TlieI J ibo ~, M 
minent evil. But he urgeth, ' what else doth a 
man that deliberateth ?' Yes, very much. The 
horse feareth some outward object, but delibera- 
tion is a comparing of several means conducing to 
the same end. Fear is commonly of one, delibe- 
ration of more than one ; fear is of those things 
which are not in our power, deliberation of those 
things which are in our power ; fear ariseth many 
times out of natural antipathies, but in these dis- 
conveniences of nature deliberation hath no place 
at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, 
and betrayeth the succours of the soul. If the 
horse did deliberate, he should consult with reason, 
whether it were more expedient for him to go that 
way or not ; he would represent to himself all the 
dangers both of going and staying, and compare 
the one with the other, and elect that which is less 
evil ; he should consider whether it were not better 
to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and 
dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his master, 
who did breed him and doth feed him. This the 
horse doth not ; neither is it possible for him to do 
it. Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth that 
they may be so young that they do not deliberate 
at all ; afterwards, as they attain to the use of 
reason by degrees, so by degrees they become free 
agents. Then they do deliberate ; before they do 
not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make 
them use their reason, when they have power to 
exercise it, but the rod cannot produce the power 
before they have it. Thirdly, for fools and mad- 
men, it is not to be understood of such madmen 



88 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. viii. as have their lucida intervalla^ who are mad and 
The Bishop'* discreet by fits ; when they have the use of reason, 
they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well 
as others ; nor yet of such fools as are only com- 
parative fools, that is, less wise than others. Such 
may deliberate, though not so clearly, nor so judi- 
ciously as others ; but of mere madmen, and mere 
natural fools, to say that they, who have not the 
use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies 
a contradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in 
his bees and spiders, ' of whose actions/ he saith, 
c if I had been a spectator, I would have confessed, 
not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, 
very near equal to that of mankind, whose life, as 
Aristotle saith, is civil/ Truly I have contemplated 
their actions many times, and have been much 
taken with their curious works ; yet my thoughts 
did not reflect so much upon them, as upon their 
Maker, who is sic magnus in magnis, that he is 
not minor in parvis ; so great in great things, that 
he is not less in small things. Yes, I have seen 
those silliest of creatures, and seeing their rare 
works I have seen enough to confute all the bold- 
faced atheists of this age, and their hellish blas- 
phemies. I saw them, but I praised the marvellous 
works of God, and admired that great and first in- 
tellect, who hath both adapted their organs, and 
determined their fancies to these particular works. 
I was not so simple as to ascribe those rarities to 
their own invention, which I knew to proceed from 
a mere instinct of nature. In all other things they 
are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write of 
bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from 
their common-sense, spread over their whole body, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 89 

and only perceiving things present. When Aristo- NO- VIIJ- 
tie calls them political or sociable creatures, he did ^ m *~~'. 

* . The Bishops 

not intend it really that they lived a civil life, but reply. 
according to an analogy, because they do such 
things by instinct as truly political creatures do 
out of judgment. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose 
of their hexagons or sexangular cells, did I there- 
fore conclude that they were mathematicians. Nor 
when I read in Crespet, that they invoke God to 
their aid when they go out of their hives, bending 
their thighs in form of a cross, aud bow r ing them- 
selves ; did I therefore think that this w r as an act 
of religious piety, or that they were capable of 
theological virtues, whom I see in all other things 
in which their fancies are not determined, to be 
the silliest of creatures, strangers not only to right 
reason, but to all resemblances of it. 

" Seventhly, concerning those actions which are 
done upon precedent and passed deliberations ; 
they are not only spontaneous, but free acts. 
Habits contracted by use and experience, do help 
the will to act with more facility and more deter- 
minately, as the hand of the artificer is helped by 
his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they 
were sad and serious, and proved by experience to 
be profitable, do save the labour of subsequent con- 
sultations ; frustra jit per plura, quod fieri po- 
test per pandora. Yet nevertheless the actions 
which are done by virtue of these formerly ac- 
quired habits, are no less free, than if the delibera- 
tion were coexistent with this particular action. 
He that hath gained an habit and skill to play such 
a lesson, needs not a new deliberation how to play 
every time that he plays it over and over. Yet I 



90 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vm. am far from giving credit to him in this, that 
waking or eating universally considered, are free 
actions, or proceed from true liberty ; not so much 
because they want a particular deliberation before 
every individual act, as because they are animal 
motions and need no deliberation of reason, as we 
see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same 
actions, as they are considered individually, and 
invested with their due circumstances, may be and 
often are free actions subjected to the liberty of 
the agent. 

" Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first mo- 
tions or rash attempts of choleric persons with 
such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those 
rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be 
facilitated sometimes by acquired habits. But yet 
for as much as actions are often altered and varied 
by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so 
as that act which at one time is morally good, at 
another time may be morally evil ; and for as 
much as a general precedent deliberation how to 
do this kind of action, is not sufficient to make 
this or that particular action good or expedient, 
which being in itself good, yet particular circum- 
stances may render inconvenient or unprofitable 
to some persons, at some times, in some places : 
therefore a precedent general deliberation how to 
do any act, as for instance, how to write, is not 
sufficient to make a particular act, as my writing 
this individual reply, to be freely done, without a 
particular and subsequent deliberation. A man 
learns French advisedly ; that is a free act. The 
same man in his choler and passion reviles his 
friend in French, without any deliberation ; this is 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 91 

a spontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he NO. vitt. 
had taken time to advise, he would not have reviled 
his friend. Yet as it is not free, so neither is it so 
necessary as the bees making honey, whose fancy 
is not only inclined, but determined, by nature to 
that act. So every way he fails. And his conclu- 
sion, that the liberty of election doth not take away 
the necessity of electing this or that individual 
thing, is no consequent from my doctrine, but from 
his own. Neither do my arguments fight one 
against another, but his private opinions fight both 
against me and against an undoubted truth. A 
free agent endowed with liberty of election, or 
with an elective power, may nevertheless be neces- 
sitated in some individual acts, but those acts 
wherein he is necessitated, do not flow from his 
elective power, neither are those acts which flow 
from his elective power necessitated." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. V11I. 

(a) " The first thing that I offer is, how often he 
mistakes my meaning in this one section. First, I 
make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one 
and the same. He saith, I distinguish them," &c. 

It is very possible I may have mistaken him ; 
for neither he nor I understand him. If they be 
one, why did he without need bring in this strange 
word, spontaneous r Or rather, why did the School- 
men bring it in, if not merely to shift off the diffi- 
culty of maintaining their tenet of free-will ? 

(b) " Secondly, he saith I distinguish between 
free acts and voluntary acts ; but he saith, I con- 
found them and make them the same." 




92 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. vin. In his reply No. n, he saith, that for the clear- 
^ n g f ^e question, we are to know the difference 
between these three, necessity, spontaneity, and 
liberty ; and because I thought he knew that it 
could not be cleared without understanding what is 
will, I had reason to think that spontaneity was his 
new word for will. And presently after, " some 
things are necessary, and not voluntary or sponta- 
neous ; some things are both necessary and volun- 
tary." These words, voluntary and spontaneous, so 
put together, would make any man believe sponta- 
neous were put as explicative of voluntary ; for it 
is no wonder in the eloquence of the Schoolmen. 
Therefore, presently after, these words, " sponta- 
neity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either 
intellectual or sensitive," signify that spontaneity is 
a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the ob- 
ject ; which to me soundeth as if he had said, that 
the appetite is like the object ; which is as proper 
as if he had said, the hunger is like the meat. If 
this be the bishop's meaning, as it is the meaning 
of the words, he is a very fine philosopher. But 
hereafter I will venture no more to say his meaning 
is this or that, especially where he useth terms of 
art. 

(c) " Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only 
to fools, children, madmen, and beasts. But I ac- 
knowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men," 
&c. 

I resolve to have no more to do with spontaneity. 
But I desire the reader to take notice, that the 
common people, on whose arbitration dependeth 
the signification of words in common use, among 
the Latins and Greeks did call all actions and mo- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 93 

tions whereof they did perceive no cause, sponta- NO. vm. 
neons and avTopara : I say, not those actions which Aninmd ; er ' 
had no causes ; for all actions have their causes ; si "P the 

, . , i T i Bishop's reply. 

but those actions whose causes they did not per- 
ceive. So that spontaneous, as a general name, 
comprehended many actions and motions of inani- 
mate creatures ; as the falling of heavy things 
downwards, which they thought spontaneous, and 
that if they were not hindered, they would descend 
of their own accord. It comprehended also all 
animal motion, as beginning from the will or appe- 
tite ; because the causes of the will and appetite 
being not perceived, they supposed, as the Bishop 
doth, that they were the causes of themselves. So 
that which in general is called spontaneous, being 
applied to men and beasts in special, is called 
voluntary. Yet the will and appetite, though the 
very same thing, use to be distinguished in certain 
occasions. For in the public conversation of men, 
where they are to judge of one another's will, and 
of the regularity and irregularity of one another's 
actions, not every appetite, but the last is esteemed 
in the public judgment for the will : nor every 
action proceeding from appetite, but that only to 
which there had preceded or ought to have pre- 
ceded some deliberation. And this I say is so, 
when one man is to judge of another's will. For 
every man in himself knoweth that what he de- 
sireth or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a 
will to, though his will may be changed before he 
hath obtained his desire. The Bishop, understand- 
ing nothing of this, might, if it had pleased him, 
have called it jargon. But he had rather pick out 
of it some contradictions of myself. And there- 
fore saith : 



94 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



NO. viii. (d) "Yet I have no reason to be oiFended at it, 
Animadver (meaning such contradictions), for he dealeth no 
dons upon the otherwise with me than he doth with himself." 

Bishop's reply. _. T i i i -i i 

It is a contradiction, he saith, that having said 
that " voluntary presupposeth deliberation," I say 
in another place, " that whatsoever followeth the 
last appetite, is voluntary, and where there is but 
one appetite, that is the last.'* Not observing that 
voluntary presupposeth deliberation, when the 
judgment, whether the action be voluntary or not, 
is not in the actor, but in the judge ; who regardeth 
not the will of the actor, where there is nothing to 
be accused in the action of deliberate malice ; yet 
knoweth that though there be but one appetite, the 
same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it 
follow, a voluntary action. 

This also he saith is a contradiction, that having 
said, " no action of a man can be said to be with- 
out deliberation, though never so sudden," I say 
afterward that "by spontaneity is meant incon- 
siderate proceeding." 

Again he observes not, that the action of a man 
that is not a child, in public judgment how rash, 
inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is to be 
taken for deliberation ; because it is supposed, he 
ought to have considered and compared his intended 
action with the law ; when, nevertheless, that sud- 
den and indeliberate action was truly voluntary. 

Another contradiction which he finds is this, that 
having undertaken to prove " that children before 
they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect," 
I say by and by after a " child may be so young 
as to do what he doth without all deliberation." I 
yet see no contradiction here ; for a child may be 
so young, as that the appetite thereof is its first 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 95 

appetite, but afterward and often before it come to NO. vm. 
have the use of reason, may elect one thing and ' ' 

J Animaclver- 

refuse another, and consider the consequences of wm upon the 
what it is about to do. And why not as well as Blshops rcpy< 
beasts, which never have the use of reason ; for 
they deliberate, as men do ? For though men and 
beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they 
differ not in the nature of their deliberation. A 
man can reckon by words of general signification, 
make propositions, and syllogisms, and compute in 
numbers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things 
computable ; which being done by the advantage 
of language, and words of general significations, a 
beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a man 
that hath language, if he misplace the words, that 
are his counters. From hence to the end of this 
number, he discourseth again of spontaneity, and 
how it is in children, madmen, and beasts ; which, 
as I before resolved, I will not meddle with ; let 
the reader think and judge of it as he pleaseth. 

NO. IX. 

J. D. " Secondly, (a) they who might have 
done, and may do, many things which they leave 
undone ; and they who leave undone many things 
which they might do, are neither compelled nor 
necessitated to do what they do, but have true 
liberty. But w r e might do many things which we 
do not, and we do many things which we might 
leave undone, as is plain, (1 Kings iii. 11) : Be- 
pause thou hast asked this thing, and hast not 
asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked 
riches for thyself ^ nor hast asked the life of thine 
enemies &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He 
might have asked riches, but then he had not asked 



96 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. ix. wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, 
but he might have asked riches, which yet he did 
not ask. And (Acts v. 4) : After it was sold, 
was it not in thine own power ? It was in his 
own power to give it, and it was in his own power 
to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not 
retain it ; and if he did retain it, he could not give 
it. Therefore we may do, what we do not. And 
we do not, what we might do. That is, we have 
true liberty from necessity." 

T. H. The second argument from Scripture 
consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, 
when, if they would, they might have done another. 
The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, 
where the history says, God was pleased that 
Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked 
riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at 
God's hands. The other is the words of St. Peter 
to Ananias, (Acts v. 4) : After it was sold, was it 
not in thine own power ? 

To which the answer is the same with that I 
answered to the former places : that they prove 
that there is election, but do not disprove the ne- 
cessity which I maintain of what they so elect. 

"We have had the very same answer twice 
before. It seemeth that he is well-pleased with 
it, or else he would not draw it in again so sud- 
denly by head and shoulders to no purpose, if 
he did not conceive it to be a panchreston, a salve 
for all sores, or dictamnum, sovereign dittany, to 
make all his adversaries' weapons to drop out of 
the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, with- 
out any application to the sore. I will not waste 
the time to show any further, how the members of 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 97 

his distinction do cross one another, and one take N0 . ix. 
away another. To make every election to be of ' 

-,.. ii IA _ The Bishop's 

one thing imposed by necessity, and of another r ep i y . 
thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make 
election to be no election at all. But I forbear to 
press that at present. If I may be bold to use his 
own phrase, his answer looks quite another way 
from mine argument. My second reason was this : 
' They who may do, and might have done many 
things which they leave undone, and who leave un- 
done many things which they might do, are not 
necessitated, nor precisely and antecedently deter- 
mined to what they do.' 

" But we might do many things which we do 
not, and we do many things which we might leave 
undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged. 
Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely 
determined, nor necessitated to do all things which 
we do. What is here of election in this argument ? 
To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. ap- 
ply his answer ? He neither affirms, nor denieth, 
nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my 
argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him 
for a more pertinent answer." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. IX. 

The Bishop, for the proving of free-will, had 
alleged this text : Because tJiou hast asked this 
thing, and hast not ashed for thyself long life, &c. 
And another, (Acts v. 4) : After it was sold, was it 
not in thine own power ? Out of which he infers, 
there was no necessity that Solomon should ask 
wisdom rather than long life, nor that Ananias 
should tell a lie concerning the price for which he 

VOL. V. H 



98 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. ix. sold his land : and my answer, that they prove 
Animadvert election, but disprove not the necessity of election, 
aions upon the satisfieth him not; because, saith he. (a) " they 

Bishop's reply. . > \ / j 

who might have done what they left undone, and 
left undone what they might have done, are not 
necessitated." 

But how doth he know (understanding power 
properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to 
ask long life ? No doubt Solomon knew nothing 
to the contrary ; but yet it was possible that God 
might have hindered him. For though God gave 
Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he 
should choose, it doth not follow, that he did not 
also give him the act of election. And for the 
other text, where it is said, that the price of the 
land was in Ananias's power, the word power 
signifieth no more than the word right, that is, 
the right to do with his own what he pleased, 
which is not a real and natural power, but a civil 
power made by covenant. And therefore the 
former answer is sufficient, that though such 
places are clear enough to prove election, they 
have no strength at all to take away necessity. 

NO. x. 

J. D. " Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but 
all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, 
then what are all those interrogations, and ob- 
jurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, 
which we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be 
it spoken with all due respect), but feigned and 
hypocritical exaggerations ? Hast tJwu eaten of 
the tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst 
not eat? (Gen. iii. 11.) And (verse 13) he saith 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 99 

to Eve, Why hast thou done this ? And (Gen. NO. x. 
iv* 6) to Cain, Why art thou wroth, and why The Bi " sho " 8 
is thy countenance cast down ? And, (Ezech. 
xviii. 31) : Why will ye die, O house of Israel? 
Doth God command openly not to eat, and 
yet secretly by himself or by the second causes 
necessitate him to eat ? Doth he reprehend 
him for doing that, which he hath antecedently 
determined that he must do ? Doth he pro- 
pose things under impossible conditions ? Or 
were not this plain mockery and derision ? Doth 
a loving master chide his servant because he doth 
not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor 
servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot 
move, by the master's own order, without the ser- 
vant's default or consent ? They who talk here 
of a twofold will of God, secret and revealed, and 
the one opposite to the other, understand not 
what they say. These two wills concern several 
persons. The secret will of God, is what he will 
do himself; the revealed will of God, is what he 
would have us to do ; it may be the secret will of 
God to take away the life of the father, yet it is 
God's revealed will that his son should wish his 
life and pray for his life. Here is no contradic- 
tion, where the agents are distinct. But for the 
same person to command one thing, and yet to 
necessitate him that is commanded to do another 
thing ; to chide a man for doing that, which he 
hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he 
must do ; this were (I am afraid to utter what they 
are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. 
God's chiding proves man's liberty." 

T. H. To the third and fifth arguments, I shall 
make but one answer. H * 




100 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

/. D. (a) " Certainly distinct arguments, as the 
third and fifth are, the one drawn from the truth 
rej)ly * of God, the other from the justice of God, the one 
from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other 
from his judgments after life, did require distinct 
answers. But the plain truth is, that neither 
here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor 
in this whole treatise, is there one word of solu- 
tion or satisfaction to this argument, or to any 
part of it. All that looks like an answer is con- 
tained, No. xn : ' That which he does is made 
just by his doing ; just, I say, in him, not always 
just in us by the example ; for a man that shall 
command a thing openly, and plot secretly the 
hinderance of the same, if he punish him whom 
he commanded so for not doing it, is unjust.' 
(4) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is 
not so bad as the words intimate and as I appre- 
hend, that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is 
truth itself, and to justify feigning and dissimula- 
tion in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infinite- 
ness of his power and the absoluteness of his 
dominion. And therefore, by his leave, I must 
once again tender him a new summons for a full 
and clear answer to this argument also. He tells 
us, that he was not surprised. Whether he were 
or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, 
that either he is not provided, or that his cause 
admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt in- 
geniously, when they met with a difficult knot 
which they could not untie, to put it upon Elias : 
Elias will answer it when Tie comes. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 101 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP S REPLY NO. X. 

The Bishop argued thus : " Thirdly, if there be NO. x 
no true liberty, but all things come to pass by Animadver 
inevitable necessity, then what are those interro- 
gations we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, 
(be it spoken with all due respect), but feigned 
and hypocritical exaggerations?" Here putting to- 
gether two repugnant suppositions, either craftily 
or (be it spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, 
he would have men believe, because I hold neces- 
sity, that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there 
is true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it 
as from necessity, and that there must of necessity 
be liberty ; but he holds it not from necessity, and 
so makes it possible there may be none. His ex- 
postulations were, first, Hast thou eaten of the 
tree whereof I commanded thee that thou sliouldst 
not eat? Secondly, Why hast thou done this? 
Thirdly, Why art thou wroth, and why is thy 
countenance cast down ? Fourthly, Why will ye 
die, house of Israel ? These arguments re- 
quiring the same answer which some other do, 
I thought fit to remit them to their fellows. But 
the Bishop will not allow me that. For he saith, 

(a) " Certainly, distinct arguments, as the third 
and fifth are, &c. did require distinct answers." 

I am therefore to give an account of the mean- 
ing of the aforesaid objurgations and expostula- 
tions ; not of the end for which God said, Hast 
thou eaten of the tree, Sfc., but how those words 
may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine 



102 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.X. of necessity. These words, Hast thou eaten of 

^ _ ^ ryyfoygQf f CO/WWW^rf tJl(tt tJlOU SjlOUldSt 

Ammadver- " 

sions upon the not eat, convince Adam that, notwithstanding God 
is ops repy. ^ a( j placed in the garden a means to keep him per- 
petually from dying in case he should accommo- 
date his will to obedience of God's commandment 
concerning the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his 
own will as to do it. Whereby is signified, that a 
mortal man, though invited by the promise of im- 
mortality, cannot govern his own will, though his 
will govern his actions ; which dependence of the 
actions on the will, is that which properly and 
truly is called liberty. And the like may be said 
of the words to Eve, Why hast thou done this ? 
and of those to Cain, Why art thou wroth ? fyc. 
and to Israel, Why will ye die, house of Israel? 
But the Bishop here will say die signifieth not 
die, but live eternally in torments ; for by such 
interpretations any man may answer anything. 
And whereas he asketh, " Doth God reprehend 
him for doing that which he hath antecedently 
determined him that he must do ?" I answer, no ; 
but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though 
immortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be 
had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only 
tree, yet he could not obtain it but by pardon, 
and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ : nor is there 
here any punishment, but only a reducing of Adam 
and Eve to their original mortality, where death 
was no punishment but a gift of God. In which 
mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had 
a numerous issue, and lived without misery, and 
I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the iin- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 103 

mortality which then he lost. Nor in all this is NO. x. 
there any plotting secretly, or any mockery or ' ' ' 

J f r J TIT t Animadver- 

derision, which the Bishop would make men be-sionsuponthe 
lieve there is. And whereas he saith, that " they isopsrepj * 
who talk here of a twofold will of God, secret and 
revealed, and the one opposite to the other, un- 
derstand not what they say :" the Protestant 
doctors, both of our and other Churches, did use 
to distinguish between the secret and revealed 
will of God ; the former they called voluntas bene 
placiti, which signifieth absolutely his will, the 
other voluntas signi, that is, the signification of 
his will, in the same sense that I call the one 
his will, the other his commandment, which may 
sometimes differ. For God's commandment to 
Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but 
his will was, that he should not do it. God's 
denunciation to Nineveh was, that it should be 
destroyed within forty days, but his will was, 
that it should not. 

(b) " I dare not insist upon it, I hope his mean- 
ing is not so bad, as the words intimate, and as I 
apprehend ; that is, to impute falsehood to Him 
that is truth itself," &c. 

What damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is 
this ? God, I said, might command a thing openly, 
and yet hinder the doing of it, without injustice ; 
but if a man should command a thing to be done, 
and then plot secretly the hinderance of the same, 
and punish for the not doing it, it were injustice. 
This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an im- 
putation of falsehood to God Almighty. And per- 
haps if the death of a sinner were, as he thinks, 
an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far 



104 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. x. as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; 
Animadver. no ^ accusing him of injustice^ because whatsoever 
fans upon the he doth is therefore just because done by him ; but 

Bishop s reply. . J . 

of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this 
expostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether 
the necessity of all things be granted or denied. 
For it is manifest that God could have made man 
impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or 
forgive him if he please ; and therefore, if he 
please not, the expostulation is as reasonable in 
the cases of liberty as of necessity. 

NO. XI. 

J. D. " Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or 
the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the 
stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physi- 
cal or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate 
of the understanding, do take away true liberty, 
then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. For 
he was subjected to the same decrees, the same 
prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, 
the same objects, the same dictates of the under- 
standing. But, quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incre- 
dulus odi ; the greatest opposers of our liberty, 
are as earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. 
Therefore none of these supposed impediments 
take away true liberty." 

T. H. The fourth argument is to this effect : "If 
the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the 
influence of the stars, or the concatenation of 
causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, 
or the last dictate of the understanding, or what- 
soever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam 
before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid osten- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 105 

des mihi sic, incredulus odi" That which I say NO. XL 
necessitated and determineth every action, (that 
he may no longer doubt of my meaning), is the 
sum of all those things, which being now existent, 
conduce and concur to the production of that ac- 
tion hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were 
wanting, the effect could not be produced. This 
concourse of causes, whereof every one is deter- 
mined to be such as it is by a like concourse of 
former causes, may well be called (in respect they 
were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all 
things, God Almighty) the decree of God. 

But that the foreknowledge of God should be a 
cause of any thing, cannot be truly said ; seeing 
foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge de- 
pendeth on the existence of the things known, and 
not they on it. 

The influence of the stars is but a small part of 
the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all 
agents. 

Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one 
simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable 
number of chains joined together, not in all parts, 
but in the first link, God Almighty ; and conse- 
quently the whole cause of an event does not 
always depend upon one single chain, but on many 
together. 

Natural efficacy of objects does determine vo- 
luntary agents, and necessitates the will, and con- 
sequently the action ; but for moral efficacy, I 
understand not what he means by it. The last 
dictate of the judgment concerning the good or 
bad that may follow on any action, is not properly 
the whole cause, but the last part of it ; and yet 



106 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xi. may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in 
*"" r7~* such manner as the last feather may be said to 

The Bishop's ' 

reply. break an horse s back, when there were so many 

laid on before as there wanted but that to do it. 

Now for his argument, that if the concourse of 
all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it 
follows, Adam had no true liberty. I deny the 
consequence ; for I make not only the effect, but 
also the election of that particular effect to be ne- 
cessary, inasmuch as the will itself, and each pro- 
pension of a man during his deliberation, is as 
much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient 
cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for exam- 
ple, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, 
than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be 
moved by fancy, should have election, that is, 
liberty to do what he has a fancy to, though it be 
not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or 
choose his election or will. 

This doctrine, because he says he hates, I doubt 
had better been suppressed ; as it should have been, 
if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me 
to an answer. 

/. D. (a) " This argument was sent forth only as 
an espy to make a more full discovery, what were the 
true grounds of T. H.'s supposed necessity. Which 
errand being done, and the foundation whereupon 
he builds being found out, which is, as I called it, a 
concatenation of causes, and, as he calls it, a con- 
course of necessary causes ; it would now be a su- 
perfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake 
the refutation of all those other opinions, which 
he doth not undertake to defend. And therefore I 
shall waive them at the present, with these short 
animadversions. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 107 

(i) "Concerning the eternal decree of God, NO. xr. 
he confounds the decree itself with the execution '- ;^f 
of his decree. And concerning the foreknowledge reply. 
of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, 
which is called the knowledge of vision, (which 
doth not produce the intellective objects, no more 
than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible 
objects), with that other knowledge of God, which 
is called the knowledge of approbation, or a prac- 
tical knowledge, that is, knowledge joined with an 
act of the will, of which divines do truly say, that 
it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the 
artist is the cause of his work. John i. : God 
made all things by his word ; that is, by his wis- 
dom. Concerning the influence of the stars, I 
wish he had expressed himself more clearly. For as 
I do willingly grant, that those heavenly bodies do 
act upon these sublunary things, not only by their 
motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, 
which we call influence, as we see by manifold ex- 
perience in the loadstone and shell-fish, &c. : so if 
he intend that by these influences they do natu- 
rally or physically determine the will, or have any 
direct dominion over human counsels, either in 
whole or in part, either more or less, he is in an 
error. Concerning the concatenation of causes, 
whereas he makes not one chain, bat an innumera- 
ble number of chains, (I hope he speaks hyperbo- 
lically, and doth not intend that they are actually 
infinite), the difference is not material whether one 
or many, so long as they are all joined together, 
both in the first link, arid likewise in the effect. It 
serves to no end but to shew what a shadow of 
liberty T. H. doth fancy, or rather what a dream 



108 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xi. of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient 
The Bishop's * l a( l P oor ma ^, but he must be clogged with 
innumerable chains. This is just such another 
freedom as the Turkish galley-slaves do enjoy. 
But I admire that T. H., who is so versed in this 
question, should here confess that he understands 
not the difference between physical or natural, and 
moral efficacy : and much more that he should 
affirm, that outward objects do determine volun- 
tary agents by a natural 1 efficacy. No object, no 
second agent, angel or devil, can determine the 
will of man naturally, but God alone, in respect of 
his supreme dominion over all things. Then the 
will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, 
besides his general influence, whereupon all second 
causes do depend, as well for their being as for 
their acting, doth moreover at some times, when it 
pleases him in cases extraordinary, concur by a 
special influence, and infuse something into the 
will, in the nature of an act, or an habit, whereby 
the will is moved and excited, and applied to will 
or choose this or that. Then the will is determined 
morally, when some object is proposed to it with 
persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to 
will. Where the determination is natural, the 
liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the 
will, but not so where the determination is moral. 
In the former case, the will is determined extrinsi- 
cally, in the latter case intrinsically ; the former 
produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a 
necessity of supposition. If the will do not sus- 
pend, but assent, then the act is necessary; but 
because the will may suspend, and not assent, 
therefore it is not absolutely necessary. In the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 109 

former case, the will is moved necessarily and de- NO. XL 
terminately ; in the latter, freely and indetermi- 
nately. The former excitation is immediate ; the 
latter is mediate mediante intellectu, and requires 
the help of the understanding. In a word, so 
great a difference there is between natural and 
moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and 
mine in this question. 

" There remains only the last dictate of the un- 
derstanding, which he maketh to be the last cause 
that concurreth to the determination of the will, 
and to the necessary production of the act, c as 
the last feather may be said to break an horse's 
back, when there were so many laid on before 
that there wanted but that to do it.' I have shewed 
(No. vn.) that the last dictate of the understand- 
ing is not always absolute in itself, nor conclusive to 
the will ; and when it is conclusive, yet it produceth 
no antecedent nor extrinsical necessity. I shall 
only add one thing more at present, that by 
making the last judgment of right reason to be of 
no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs 
the understanding as well as he doth the will ; and 
endeavours to depri\ 7 e the will of its supreme power 
of application, and to deprive the understanding 
of its supreme power of judicature and definition. 
Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the 
sensitive appetite itself, being an inferior faculty 
and affixed to the organ of the body, have any di- 
rect or immediate dominion or command over the 
rational will. It is without the sphere of their 
activity. All the access which they have unto the 
will, is by the means of the understanding, some- 
times clear and sometimes disturbed, and of reason, 



110 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xi. either right or misinformed. Without the help of 
The Bishop's ^ e understanding, all his second causes were not 
able of themselves to load the horse's back with 
so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth 
amount unto. But we shall meet with his horse- 
load of feathers again. No. xxm. 

"These things being thus briefly touched, he 
proceeds to his answer. My argument was this : 
if any of these or all these causes formerly recited, 
do take away true liberty, (that is, still intended 
from necessity), then Adam before his fall had no 
true liberty. 

" But Adam before his fall had true liberty. 

" He mis-recites the argument, and denies the 
consequence, which is so clearly proved, that no 
man living can doubt of it. Because Adam was 
subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the 
same decree, the same prescience, the same in- 
fluences, the same concourse of causes, the same 
efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. 
But it is only a mistake ; for it appears plainly by 
his following discourse, that he intended to deny, 
not the consequence, but the assumption. For he 
makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity 
before his fall, yea, he proceeds so far as to affirm 
that all human wills, his and ours, and each pro- 
pension of our wills, even during our deliberation, 
are as much necessitated as anything else whatso- 
ever ; that we have no more power to forbear those 
actions which we do, than the fire hath power not 
to burn. Though I honour T. H. for his person 
and for his learning, yet I must confess ingenuously, 
I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe 
both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 1 1 1 

seriously ponder the horrid consequences which NO.XI. 
flow from it. It destroys liberty, and dishonours 
the nature of man. It makes the second causes reply. 
and outward objects to be the rackets, and men to 
be but the tennis-balls of destiny. It makes the 
first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the intro- 
ducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as 
man, yea, more than man, by as much as the mo- 
tion of the watch is more from the artificer, who 
did make it and wind it up, than either from the 
spring, or the wheels, or the thread, if God, by his 
special influence into the second causes, did neces- 
sitate them to operate as they did. And if they, 
being thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevi- 
tably, irresistibly, not by an accidental, but by an 
essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he 
did, then one of these two absurdities must needs 
follow : either that Adam did not sin, and that 
there is no such thing as sin in the world, because 
it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially 
from God ; or that God is more guilty of it> and 
more the cause of evil than man, because man is 
extrinsically, inevitably determined, but so is not 
God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the 
cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect. 
What tyrant did ever impose laws that were im- 
possible for those to keep, upon whom they were 
imposed, and punish them for breaking those laws, 
which he himself had necessitated them to break, 
which it was no more in their power not to break, 
than it is in the power of the fire not to burn ? 
Excuse me if I >ate this doctrine with a perfect 
hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God and 
man ; which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, 



112 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xi. to steal of necessity, to be hanged of necessity, and 
to ^ e damned of necessity. And therefore I must 
say and say again, quicquid ostendes mihi sic, in- 
credulus odi. It were better to be an atheist, to 
believe no God ; or to be a Manichee, to believe 
two Gods, a God of good and a God of evil ; or 
with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods : 
than thus to charge the true God to be the proper 
cause and the true author of all the sins and evils 
which are in the world." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XI. 

(a) " This argument was sent forth only as an 
espy, to make a more full discovery, what were 
the true grounds of T. H.'s supposed necessity." 

The argument which he sendeth forth as an espy, 
is this : " If either the decree of God, or the fore- 
knowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, 
or the concatenation (which he says falsely I call a 
concourse) of causes, of the physical or moral effi- 
cacy of objects, or the last dictate of the under- 
standing, do take away true liberty, then Adam 
before his fall had no true liberty." In answer 
whereunto I said, that all the things now existent 
were necessary to the production of the effect to 
come ; that the foreknowledge of God causeth no- 
thing, though the will do ; that the influence of the 
stars is but a small part of that cause which 
maketh the necessity ; and that this consequence, 
" if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the 
effect, then Adam had no true liberty," was false. 
But in his w r ords, if these do take away true liber- 
ty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, 
the consequence is good ; but then I deny that ne- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 113 

cessity takes away liberty ; the reason whereof, 

which is this, liberty is to choose what we will, 

not to choose our will, no inculcation is sufficient si ? ns u ? on *** 

to make the Bishop take notice of, notwithstanding 

he be otherwhere so witty, and here so crafty, as 

to send out arguments for spies. The cause why 

I denied the consequence was, that I thought the 

force thereof consisted in this, that necessity hi 

the Bishop's opinion destroyed liberty. 

(b) " Concerning the eternal decree of God," &c. 

Here begins his reply. From which if we take 
these words; "knowledge of approbation;" "prac- 
tical knowledge ;" " heavenly bodies act upon sub- 
lunary things, not only by their motion, but also 
by an occult virtue, which we call influence ;" 
"moral efficacy;" "general influence;" "'special 
influence;" "infuse something into the will;" "the 
will is moved ;" " the will is induced to will ;" 
" the will suspends its own act ;" which are all 
nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, and if a beast 
could speak, unworthy of a beast, and can befal 
no creature whose nature is not depraved by doc- 
trine; nothing at all remaineth to be answered. 
Perhaps the word, occult virtue, is not to be taxed 
as unintelligible. But then I may tax therein 
the want of ingenuity in him that had rather 
say, that heavenly bodies do work by an occult 
virtue 9 than that they work he knoweth not how ; 
which he would not confess, but endeavours to 
make occult be taken for a cause. The rest of 
this reply is one of those consequences, which I 
have answered in the beginning, where I compare 
the inconveniences of both opinions, that is, " that 
either Adam did not sin, or his sin proceeded ne- 
VOL. v. I 




H4 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xi> cessarily from God ;" which is no stronger a con- 
sequence than if ont of this, " that a man is lame 
necessat %/' one should infer, that either he is not 
lame, or that his lameness proceeded necessarily 
from the will of God. To the end of this num- 
ber there is nothing more of argument. The place 
is filled up with wondering and railing. 

NO. XII. 

J. D. " Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there 
shall be no day of doom, no last judgment, no re- 
wards nor punishments after death. A man can 
never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at 
liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly 
punished for doing that which was not in his 
power to shun. To take away liberty hazards 
heaven, but undoubtedly it leaves no hell." 

T. H. The arguments of greatest consequence 
are the third and fifth, and fall both into one : 
namely, if there be a necessity of all events, that 
it will follow that praise and reprehension, reward 
and punishment, are all vain and unjust : and 
that if God should openly forbid, and secretly ne- 
cessitate the same action, punishing men for what 
they could not avoid, there would be no belief 
among them of heaven or hell. 

To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an an- 
swer from St. Paul (Rom, ix,), from the eleventh 
verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid 
down the very same objection in these words : 
When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet 
unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that 
the purpose of God according to election, not by 
works, but by him that calleth, might remain 
firm, it was said to her (viz. to Rebecca) that the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 115 

elder shall serve the younger. And what then NO. Xll* 
shall we say, is there injustice with God 9 God 
forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, 
nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth 
mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh 9 I 
have stirred thee up, that I may show my power 
in thee, and that my name may be set forth in 
all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth he 
hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth. 
Thus, you see, the case put by St. Paul is the 
same with that of J. D., and the same objection in 
these words following (verse 19) : Thou wilt ask me 
then, why will God yet complain ; for who hath 
resisted his will ? To this therefore the apostle 
answers, not by denying it was God's will, or that 
the decree of God concerning Esau was not before 
lie had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to 
do what he did ; but thus (verse 20, 21) : Who art 
tliouy man, that interrogatest God ? Shall the 
work say to the workman, why hast thou made me 
thus ? Hath not the potter power over the clay, 
of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, 
another to dishonour? According therefore to 
this answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D.'s objection, 
and say, the power of God alone, without other 
help, is sufficient justification of any action he 
doth. That which men make among themselves 
here by pacts and covenants, and call by the 
name of justice, and according whereunto men are 
counted and termed rightly just and unjust, is not 
that by which God Almighty's actions are to be 
measured or called just, no more than his counsels 
are to be measured by human wisdom. That 
which he does is made just by his doing; just 

12 



tl6 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

KO.xii; I say in him, not always just in us by the exam- 
TteBuiiop's pl e ; for a man that shall command a thing openly, 
reply - and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he 
punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is 
unjust. So also his counsels, they be therefore 
not in vain, because they be his, whether we see 
the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, 
he did object no sin to him, but justified that af- 
flicting him by telling him of his power. Hast 
thou (says God) an arm like mine ? Where wast 
thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth ? 
and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man 
that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, 
nor his parents' sin, but that the power of God 
might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to 
death and torment, yet they cannot sin. It was 
God's will it should be so. Power irresistible jus- 
tifieth all actions really and properly, in whomso- 
ever it be found. Less power does not. And 
because such power is in God only, he must needs 
be just in all his actions. And we, that not com- 
prehending his counsels, call him to the bar, com- 
mit injustice in it. 

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this 
answer, by distinguishing between will and per- 
mission. As, that God Almighty does indeed 
permit sin sometimes, and that he also foreknow- 
eth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed ; 
but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know 
also they distinguish the action from the sin of 
the action, saying, God Almighty doth indeed 
cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not 
the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the dis- 
cordance between the action and the law. Such 
distinctions as these dazzle my understanding. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 117 

I find no difference between the will to have a NO. xu. 
thing done, and the permission to do it, when 
he that permitteth it can hinder it, and knows it 
will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any 
difference between an action that is against the 
law, and the sin of that action. As for example, 
between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David 
in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of 
the action and of the law, how another can be 
cause of the disagreement between them, no more 
than how one man making a longer and shorter 
garment, another can make the inequality that is 
between them. This I know, God cannot sin, 
because his doing a thing makes it just, and con- 
sequently no sin : and because whatsoever can 
sin is subject to another's law, which God is not. 
And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin. 
But to say, that God can so order the world as a 
sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, 
I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. How- 
soever, if such or other distinctions can make it 
clear that St. Paul did not think Esau's or Pha- 
raoh's actions proceeded from the will and purpose 
of God, or that proceeding from his will could not 
therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, 
I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto 
J. D.'s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all 
this question between us, but what seemeth to me 
not obscurely, but most expressly said in this 
place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to 
his places of Scripture. 

J. D. T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one 
stone, and satisfy two arguments with one answer, 
whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. First, for 




US THE QUESTIONS^CONCERNING 

XII, my third reason, (a) Though all he say here were 
true as a & oracle ; though punishment were an 
act of dominion, not of justice in God ; yet this is 
no sufficient cause why God should deny his own 
act, or why he should chide or expostulate with 
men, why they did that which he himself did ne- 
cessitate 'them to do, and whereof he was the 
actor more than they, they being but as the stone, 
but he the hand that threw it. Notwithstand- 
ing anything which is pleaded here, this stoical 
opinion doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation 
close to God, who is truth itself. 

" And to my fifth argument, which he changeth 
and relateth amiss, as by comparing mine with 
his may appear, his chiefest answer is to oppose 
a difficult place of St. Paul (Rom. ix. 1 1 .) Hath 
he never heard, that to propose a doubt is not to 
answer an argument : nee bene respondet qui II- 
tern lite resolvit ? But I will not pay him in his 
own coin. Wherefore to this place alleged by him, 
I answer, the case is not the same. The question 
moved there is, how God did keep his promise 
made to Abraham, to be the God of him and of 
his seed) if the Jews who were the legitimate pro- 
geny of Abraham were deserted. To which the 
apostle answers (vers. 6, 7, 8), that that promise 
was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham, that 
is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which were 
the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing 
Christians ; which answer he explicateth, first by 
the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael, and after in the 
place cited of Esau and Jacob. Yet neither does 
he speak there so much of their persons aa of their 
posterities. And though some words may be $e- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE, 119 

commodated to God's predestination, which are NO. Xif- 
there uttered, yet it is not the scope of that text, 
to treat of the reprobation of any man to hell fire. replj% 
All the posterity of Esau were not eternally re- 
probated, as holy Job and many others. But this 
question which is now agitated between us, is 
quite of another nature, how a man can be a 
criminal who doth nothing but that which he is 
extrinsically necessitated to do, or how God in 
justice can punish a man with eternal torments 
for doing that which it was never in his power to 
leave undone ; or why he w r ho did imprint the mo- 
tion in the heart of man, should punish man, who 
did only receive the impression from him. So his 
answer looks another way. 

"But because he grounds so much upon this text, 
that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his 
opinion, I will examine all those passages which 
may seem to favour his cause. First, these words 
(ver. 11): being not yet born, neither having done 
any good or evil, upon which the w T hole weight 
of his argument doth depend, have no reference 
at all to those words (verse 1 3), Jacob have I loved, 
and Esau have I hated : for those words were first 
uttered by the prophet Malachi, many ages after 
Jacob and Esau were dead (Mai. i. 2, 3), and in- 
tended of the posterity of Esau, who were not 
redeemed from captivity as the Israelites were. 
But they are referred to those other words (verse 
12), the elder shall serve the younger, which in- 
deed were spoken before Jacob or Esau were born, 
(Gen. xxv. 23.) And though those words of Malachi 
had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were 
bora, yet it had advantaged his cause nothing : for 



120 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xii. hatred in that text doth not signify any repro- 
Cation to the flames <rf hell, much less the execu- 
tion of that decree, or the actual imposition of 
punishment, nor any act contrary to love. God 
saw all that he had made, and it was very good. 
Goodness itself cannot hate that which is good. 
But hatred there signifies comparative hatred, or 
a less degree of love, or at the most a negation of 
love. As (Gen. xxix. 31), when the Lord saw that 
Leah was hated, we may not conclude thence that 
Jacob hated his wife; the precedent verse doth 
fully expound the sense (verse 30) : Jacob loved 
Rachel more than Leah. So (Matth. vi. 24), No 
man can serve two masters, for either he will 
hate the one and love the other. So (Luke xiv. 
26), If any man hate not his father and mother, 
Sfc. lie cannot be my disciple. St. Matthew 
(x. 3/) tells us the sense of it : He that loveth 
father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me. 

"Secondly, those words (ver. 15) / will have 
mercy on whom I will have mercy, do prove no 
more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before 
Esau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was 
not a debt from God either to the one or to the 
other, but a work of mercy. And what of this ? 
All men confess that God's mercies do exceed 
man's deserts, but God's punishments do never ex- 
ceed man's misdeeds. As we see in the parable of 
the labourers (Matth. xx. 13-15) : Friend, I do thee 
no wrong. Did not I agree with thee for a penny ? 
Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as 
I will ? 1$ thy eye evil, because I am good ? 
Acts of mercy are free, but acts of justice are due, 

"That which follows (verse 17) comes some- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 121 

thing nearer the cause. The Scripture saith unto x6. xir. 
Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised lr J " 

" * * The Bisho 

thee up, (that is, I have made thee a king, or I 
have preserved thee)., that I might show my power 
in thee. But this particle, that, doth not always 
signify the main end of an action, but sometimes 
only a consequent of it, as Matth. ii. 15 : He de- 
parted into Egypt, that it might be fulfilled 
which was spoken by the prophet, out of Egypt 
have I called my son. Without doubt Joseph's 
aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil pro- 
phecies, but to save the life of the child. Yet 
because the fulfilling of the prophecy was a con- 
sequent of Joseph's journey, he saith, that it might 
be 'fulfilled. So here, / have raised thee up, that 
I might show my power. Again, though it should 
be granted that this particle that, did denote the 
intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red 
Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of 
God, which evermore respects the good and be- 
nefit of the creature, but God's consequent inten- 
tion upon the prevision of Pharaoh's obstinacy, 
that since he would not glorify God in obeying his 
word, he should glorify God undergoing his judg- 
ments. Hitherto we find no eternal punishments, 
nor no temporal punishment without just deserts. 
" It follows, (ver. 1 8), whom he will he hardeneth. 
Indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment 
that God lays upon a sinner in this life, w r orse than 
all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God 
harden the heart ? Not by a natural influence of 
any evil act or habit into the will, nor by inducing 
the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and 
rebellion (James i. 13, 14) : For God tempteth no 



123 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO, xii, wan, but every man is tempted when he is drawn 
away of his own lust and enticed. Then God is 
said to harden the heart three ways ; first, nega- 
tively, and not positively; not by imparting wick- 
edness, but by not imparting grace ; as the sun de- 
scending to the tropic of Capricorn, is said with 
us to be the cause of winter, that is, not by im- 
parting cold, but by not imparting heat. It is an 
act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but 
to detain it is no act of injustice. So the apostle 
opposeth hardening to shewing of mercy. To 
harden is as much as not to shew mercy. 

*' Secondly, God is said to harden the heart 
occasionally and not causally, by doing good, 
(which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of 
growing worse and worse), and doing evil ; as a 
master by often correcting of an untoward scho- 
lar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden his 
heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as 
he grows even to despise the rod. Or as an indul- 
gent parent by his patience arid gentleness doth 
encourage aa obstinate son to become more rebel- 
lious. So, whether we look upon God's frequent 
judgments upon Pharaoh, or God's iterated favours 
in removing and withdrawing those judgments up- 
on Pharaoh's request, both of them in their several 
kinds were occasions of hardening Pharaoh's heart, 
the one making him more presumptuous, the other 
more desperately rebellious. So that which was 
good in it was God's; that which was evil was 
Pharaoh's. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh 
was the true cause of his own obduration. This 
is clearly confirmed, Exodus viii. 15 : When Pha- 
raoh saw that there was respite, he hardened 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 123 

his heart. And Exodus ix. 34 : When Pharaoh NO. xn. 
saw that the ram and the hail and the thunders _. - f 

The Bishop s 

were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened *epiy. 
his heart, he and his servants. So Psalm cv. 25 : 
He turned their hearts, so that they hated his 
people, and dealt subtly with them. That is, 
God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the 
Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is 
plain, Exodus i. 7 , 8, 9, 10. So God hardened 
Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own 
heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to 
Pharaoh, as he did to Nebuchadnezzar, who was 
as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it occa- 
sionally ; but still Pharaoh was the true cause of 
his own obduration, by determining his own will 
to evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. 
So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8) : 
Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or 
as in the day of temptation in the wilderness. 

" Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart per- 
missively, but not operatively, nor effectively, as he 
who only lets loose a greyhound out of the slip, is 
said to hound him at the hare. Will you see 
plainly what St. Paul intends by hardening ? Read 
Rom, ix. 22, 23 : What if God, willing to shew his 
wrath and to make his power known (that is, by a 
consequent will, which in order of nature follows the 
prevision of sin), endured with much long-suffering 
the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. And 
that he might make known the riches of his glory 
on the vessels of mercy, &c. There is much dif- 
ference between enduring and impelling, or inci- 
ting the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels 
of mercy, that God prepared them unto glory. 



124 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO, xir. But of the vessels of wrath, he saith only that 
they were fitted to destruction, that is, not by God, 
but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth 
endure the vessels of wrath with much long-suf- 
fering. T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by 
the second causes all their actions good and bad, 
that he necessitateth them, and determineth them 
irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth 
as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If 
doing willingly, and enduring, if much long-suf- 
fering, and necessitating, imply not a contrariety 
one to another, reddat mihi minam Diogenes, let 
him that taught me logic, give me my money 
again. 

" But T. H. saith, that this distinction between 
the operative and permissive will of God, and that 
other between the action and the irregularity, do 
dazzle his understanding. Though he can find no 
difference between these two, yet others do ; St. 
Paul himself did (Acts xiii. 18) : About the time 
of forty years suffered he their manners in the 
wilderness. And (Acts xiv. 16) : Who in limes 
past suffered all nations to walk in their own 
ways. T. H. would make suffering to be inciting, 
their manners to be God's manners, their ways to 
be God's ways. And (Acts xvii. 30) : The times 
of this ignorance God winked at. It was never 
heard that one was said to wink or connive at 
that which was his own act. And (1 Cor. x. 
13) : God is faithful, who will not suffer you to 
be tempted above that you are able. To tempt is 
the devil's act ; therefore he is called the tempter. 
God tempts no man to sin, but he suffers them to 
be tempte$ f And so suffer^, that he could hinder 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 125 

Satan, if he would. But by T. H.'s doctrine, to NO. 
tempt to sin, and to suffer one to be tempted to sin 
when it is in his power to hinder it, is all one. 
And so he transforms God (I write it with horror) 
into the devil, and makes tempting to be God's 
own work, and the devil to be but his instrument. 
And in that noted place, (Rom. ii. 4, 5) : De- 
spisest thou the riches of his goodness and for- 
bearance and long-suffering, not knowing that 
the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance ; 
but after thy hardness and impenitent heart 
treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the 
day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous 
judgment of God ? Here are as many convincing 
arguments in this one text against the opinion of 
T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn 
that God is rich m goodness, and will not punish 
his creatures for that which is his own act ; se- 
condly, that he suffers tmAfor bears sinners long, 
and doth not snatch them away by sudden death 
as they deserve. Thirdly, that the reason of God's 
forbearance is to bring men to repentance. Fourth- 
ly, that hardness of heart and impenitency is not 
causally from God, but from ourselves. Fifthly, 
that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means 
of their conversion on God's part, which is the 
cause of men's perdition, but their own contempt 
and despising of these means. Sixthly, that pun- 
ishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an 
act of righteous judgment, whereby God renders 
to every man according to his own deeds, wrath 
to them and only to them who treasure up wrath 
unto themselves, and eternal life to those who con- 
tinue patiently in well-doing. If they deserve 




126 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xii. such punishment who only neglect the goodness 
TbeBLhop-1 and long-suffering of God, what do they who ut- 
re p'y- terly deny it, and make God's doing and his suffer- 
ing to be all one ? I do beseech T. H. to consider 
what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one ob- 
scure text wholly misunderstood to contradict the 
clear current of the whole Scripture. Of the same 
mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, (1 Peter iii. 20) : 
The long-suffering of God ivaited once in the 
days of Noah. And 2 Peter iii. 15 : Account that 
the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation. This 
is the name God gives himself, (Exod. xxxiv. 6) : 
The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, 
long-suffering, &c. 

(b) " Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. 
saith to be commonly true, that he who doth per- 
mit any thing to be done, which it is in his power 
to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it 
will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say in 
some sort, that is, either by an antecedent will, or 
by a consequent will, either by an operative will, 
or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be 
done, but not willing to do it. Sometimes an an- 
tecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer 
that to be done, which otherwise he would not suf- 
fer. So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the 
lion's den, to make good his rash decree ; so 
Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to 
make good his rash oath. How much more may 
the immutable rule of justice in God, and his 
fidelity in keeping his word, draw from him the 
punishment of obstinate sinners, though antece- 
dently he willeth their conversion ? He loveth 
all his creatures well, but his own justice better 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 127 

Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, NO', xu* 
which he doth not will directly in itself, but indi- 
rectly for some other end, or for the producing of 
some greater good ; as a man willeth that a putrid 
member be cut off from his body, to save the life 
of the whole. Or as a judge, being desirous to 
save a malefactor's life, and having power to re- 
prieve him, doth yet condemn him for example's 
sake, that by the death of one he may save the 
lives of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some 
creatures to take such courses as tend to their own 
ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the 
greater manifestation of his glory, and for the 
greater benefit of his faithful servants. This is a 
most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil 
to be in the world unless he knew how to draw 
good out of evil. Yet this ought not to be under- 
stood, as if we made any priority or posteriority 
of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. 
Nor do we make the antecedent and conse- 
quent will to be contrary one to another; be- 
cause the one respects man pure and uncor- 
rupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. 
The objects are the same, but considered after a 
diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills 
to be distinct in God ; for they are the same with 
the divine essence, which is one. But the distinc- 
tion is in order to the objects or things willed. 
Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a 
naked or a mere permission. .God causeth all good, 
permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good 
and evil. 

(c) " T. H. demands how God should be the 
cause of the action and yet not be the cause of 



128 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xn. the irregularity of the action. I answer, because 
concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but 
not by a special influence. As the earth gives 
nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hem- 
lock as to wheat ; but the reason why the one yields 
food to our sustenance, the other poison to our de- 
struction, is" not from the general nourishment of 
the earth, but from the special quality of the root. 
Even so the general power to act is from God. In 
him we live, and move, and have our being. This 
is good. But the specification, and determination 
of this general 'power to the doing of any evil, is 
from ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of 
man. This is bad. And to speak properly, the 
free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, 
as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having 
no true entity or being in it, as poison hath ; but 
rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can 
flow from him who is the highest perfection. 
(d) Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make 
the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah 
to be from God. The general power to act is 
from God, but the specification of this general arid 
good power to murder, or to any particular evil, is 
not from God, but from the free-will of man. So 
T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be 
the cause of the law, and likewise of the action in 
some sort, that is, by general influence ; and yet 
another cause concurring, by special influence and 
determining this general and good power, may 
make itself the true cause of the anomy or the 
irregularity. And therefore he may 'keep his lon- 
ger and shorter garments for some other occasion. 
Certainly, they will not fit this subject, unless he 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 129 

could make general and special influence to be all NO 



" But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case 
is the same, and the objection used by the Jews, 
(verse 19) : Why doth he yet find fault ; who hath 
resisted his will ? is the very same with my argu- 
ment ; and St. Paul's answer, (verse 20 :) man, who 
art thou that repliest against God ? Shall the 
thing formed say unto him that formed it, why 
hast thou made me thus ? Hath not the potter 
power over his clay ? &c., is the very same with 
his answer in this place, drawn from the irresisti- 
ble power and absolute dominion of God, which 
justifieth all his actions. And that the apostle in 
his answer doth not deny that it was God's will, 
nor that God's decree was before Esau's sin. 

" To which I reply, first, that the case is not at 
all the same, but quite different, as may appear by 
these particulars ; first, those words, before they had 
done either good or evil, are not, cannot be referred 
to those other words, Esau have I hated. Secondly, 
if they could, yet it is less than nothing, because be- 
fore Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were 
known to God. Thirdly, by the potter's clay, here 
is not to be understood the pure mass, but the cor- 
rupted mass of mankind. Fourthly, the hating 
here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that 
is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the hardening 
which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a 
negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace. 
Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive re- 
probation to eternal punishment, much less doth 
he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment 
VOL. v. K 





ISO THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

without sin, which is the question between us, and 
wherein T. H. differs from all that I remember to 
have read, who do all acknowledge that punish- 
merit is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the 
question be put, why God doth good to one more 
than to another, or why God imparteth more grace 
to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is 
just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sau- 
ciness in a creature in this case to reply, (Matthew 
xx. 15) : May not God do what lie will with his 
own ? No man doubteth but God imparteth grace 
beyond man's desert, (e) But if the case be put, 
why God doth punish one more than another, or 
why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another, 
which is the present case agitated between us ; to 
say with T. H., that it is because God is omnipo- 
tent, or because his power is irresistible, or merely 
because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, 
but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. 
So many differences there are between those two 
cases. It is not therefore against God that I reply, 
but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the 
bar, but my fellow-creature ; I ask no account of 
God's counsels, but of man's presumptions. It is 
the mode of these times to father their own fan- 
cies upon God, and when they cannot justify them 
by reason, to plead his omnipotence, or to cry, 
altitude, that the ways of God are unsearchable. 
If they may justify their drowsy dreams, because 
God's power and dominion is absolute ; much more 
may we reject such phantastical devices which are 
inqonsistent with the truth and goodness and jus- 
tice of God, and make him to be a tyrant, who 
is the Father of Mercies and the God of all con- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 131 

solation. The unsearchableness of God's ways 
should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and 
riot a sanctuary for spirits of error. 

" Secondly, this objection contained ver. 10, to 
which the apostle answers ver. 20, is not made in 
the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, 
but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at 
that grace and favour which God was pleased to 
vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them 
for his people, which honour they would have ap- 
propriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the 
apostle's answer is not only drawn from the sove- 
reign donrnion of God, to impart his grace to 
whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, 
but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the 
Jews, as appeareth verse 22 : What if God, willing 
(that is, by a consequent will) to shew his wrath, 
and to make his power known, endureth with much 
long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to de- 
struction. They acted, God endured ; they were 
tolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by them- 
selves ; for their much wrong-doing, here is God's 
much long-suffering. And more plainly, verse 31, 
32: Israel hath not attained to the law qfrig/ite- 
ousness. Wherefore? Because they sought it not 
by faith, but as it were by the works of the law. 
This reason is set down yet more emphatically in 
the next chapter (Rom. x, 3) : They (that is, the 
Israelites) being ignorant of God's righteousness, 
(that is, by faith in Christ), and going about to es- 
tablish their own righteousness , (that is, by the 
works of the law), have not submitted themselves 
unto the righteousness of God. And yet most ex- 
pressly (chap. xi. 20) : Because of unbelief they were 

K 2 



132 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



NO. xii. broken off> ^ ut ^ ou standest by faith. Neither 
TbeBisjio' ^^ *^ ere an Y precedent binding decree of God, to 
necessitate them to unbelief, and consequently to 
punishment. It was in their own power by their 
concurrence with God's grace to prevent these 
judgments, and to recover their former estate ; 
verse 23 : If they (that is, the unbelieving Jews) 
abide not still in unbelief, they shall be grafted 
in. The crown and the sword are immovable, (to 
use St. Anselm's comparison), but it is we that 
move and change places. Sometimes the Jews 
were under the crown, and the Gentiles under the 
sword ; sometimes the Jews under the sword, and 
the Gentiles under the crown. 

"Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts 
are not the measure of God's justice, but his jus- 
tice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready 
to give every man that which is his own, as re- 
wards to the good, punishments to the bad ; so 
nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his 
creature. He made the covenant of works with 
mankind in Adam; and therefore he punisheth not 
man contrary to his own covenant, but for the 
transgression of his duty. And divine justice is 
not measured by omnipotence or by irresistible 
power, but by God's will. God can do many things 
according to his absolute power, which he doth not. 
He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, 
but he never did so. It is a rule in theology, that 
God cannot do anything which argues any wick- 
edness or imperfection : as God cannot deny him- 
self (2 Timothy ii. 13) ; he cannot lie (Titus L 2). 
These and the like are the fruits of impotence, not 
of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 133 

with the wicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could NO 
not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in it, (Genesis 
xix. 22) ; not for want of dominion or power, but 
because it was not agreeable to his justice, nor to 
that law which himself had constituted. The 
apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), God is not un- 
righteous to forget your work. As it is a good 
consequence to say, this is from God, therefore it 
is righteous ; so is this also, this thing is unright- 
eous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We 
see how all creatures by instinct of nature do love 
their young, as the hen her chickens ; how they 
will expose themselves to death for them. And 
yet all these are but shadows of that love which 
is in God towards his creatures. How impious is 
it then to conceive, that God did create so many 
millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, 
without any fault of theirs except such as he him- 
self did necessitate them unto, merely to shew his 
dominion, and because his power is irresistible ? 
The same privilege which T. H. appropriates here 
to power absolutely irresistible, a friend of his, 
in his book De Give, cap. vi., ascribes to power 
respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, 
whose power he makes to be as absolute as a man's 
power is over himself; not to be limited by any 
thing, but only by their strength. The greatest 
propugners of sovereign power think it enough for 
princes to challenge an immunity from coercive 
power, but acknowledge that the law hath a di- 
rective power over them. But T. H. will have 
no limits but their strength. Whatsoever they do 
by power, they do justly. 
" But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but 




134 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO; xn. ji*stified his afflicting him by his pdwer. First, 
this is an argument from authority negatively, that 
is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions 
of Job were no vindicatory punishments to take 
vetigeance of his sins, (whereof we dispute), but 
probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces. 
Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might 
justly have laid greater punishments upon him, 
thsin those afflictions which he suffered. Witness 
his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of 
his nativity (Job iii. 3.) Indeed God said to Job, 
(Job xxxviii. 4) : Where wast thou, when 1 laid 
the foundations of the earth ? that is, how canst 
thoii judge of the things that were done before 
thou wast born, or comprehend the secret causes 
of my judgments ? And (Job xl. 9) : Hast thou 
an arm like God ? As if he should say, why art 
thou impatient ; dost thou think thyself able to 
strive with God ? But that God should punish Job 
without desert, here is not a word. 

" Concerning the blind man mentioned John ix, 
his blindness was rather a blessing to him than 
a punishment, being the means to raise his soul 
illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of 
God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is 
common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of 
the soul with the blessed angels. We read of 
some who have put out their bodily eyes, because 
they thought they were an impediment to the eye 
of the soul. Again, neither he nor his parents 
were innocent, being conceived and born in sin 
and iniquity (Psalm li. 5.) And in many things 
we offend all (James iii. 2.) But our Saviour's 
meaning is evident by the disciples' question, 



LIBERTY^ NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 135 

John ix. 2. They had not so sinned, that he should 
be born blind ; or they were not more grievous 
sinners than other men, to deserve an exemplary r ep i y . 
judgment more than they ; but this corporal blind- 
ness befel him principally by the extraordinary 
providence of God, for the manifestation of his 
own glory in restoring him to his sight. So his 
instance halts on both sides ; neither was this a 
punishment, nor the blind man free from sin. His 
third instance of the death and torments of beasts, 
is of no more weight than the two former. The 
death of brute beasts is not a punishment of sin, 
but a debt of nature. And though they be often 
slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast 
difference between those light and momentary 
pangs, and the unsufferable and endless pains of 
hell ; between the mere depriving of a creature of 
temporal life, and the subjecting of it to eternal 
death. I know the philosophical speculations of 
some, who affirm, that entity is better than non- 
entity, that it is better to be miserable and suffer 
the torments of the damned, than to be annihila- 
ted and cease to be altogether. This entity which 
they speak of, is a metaphysical entity abstracted 
from the matter, which is better than non-entity, 
in respect of some goodness, not moral nor natural, 
but transcendental, which.accompanies every being. 
But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where that 
saying of our Saviour often takes place, (Matthew 
xxvi. 24) : Woe unto that man by whom the Son of 
Man is betrayed. It had been good for that man, 
that he had not been born. I add, that there is 
an analogical justice and mercy due even to the 
brute beasts. Thou shalt not munxle the mouth of 




136 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO; xii, the ox that treadeth out the corn. And, a just man 

TTwBfchop't ** merciful to his beast. 

wply * (f) "But his greatest error is that which I 

touched before, to make justice to be the proper 
result of power. Power doth not measure and re- 
gulate justice, but justice measures and regulates 
power. The will of God, and the eternal law 
which is in God himself, is properly the rule and 
measure of justice. As all goodness, whether na- 
tural or moral, is a participation of divine good- 
ness, and all created rectitude is but a participation 
of divine rectitude, so all laws are but participa- 
tions of the eternal law from whence they derive 
their power. The rule of justice then is the same 
both in God and us : but it is in God, as in him 
that doth regulate and measure ; in us, as in those 
who are regulated and measured. As the will of 
God is immutable, always willing what is just and 
right and good ; so his justice likewise is immu- 
table. And that individual action which is justly 
punished as sinful in us, cannot possibly proceed 
from the special influence and determinative power 
of a just cause. See then how grossly T. H. doth 
understand that old and true principle, that the 
will of God is the rule of justice ; as if by willing 
things in themselves unjust, he did render them 
just by reason of his absolute dominion and irre- 
sistible power, as fire doth assimilate other things 
to itself, and convert them into the nature of fire. 
This were to make the eternal law a Lesbian rule. 
Sin is defined to be that which is done, or said, 
or thought, contrary to the eternal law. But by 
this doctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought, 
contrary to the will of God. St. Anselm said most 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 137 

truly, ' then the will of man is good, and just, and NO. xn. 
right, when he wills that which God would have TheB ' i8ho * 8 
him to will. But according to this doctrine, every reply. 
man always wills that which God would have him 
to will. If this be true, we need not pray, Thy 
will be done in earth as it is in heaven. T. H. 
hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth. 
The w r orst is, it is an heaven without justice. Jus- 
tice is a constant and perpetual act of the will, 
to give every one his own ; but to inflict punish- 
ment for those things which the judge himself did 
determine and necessitate to be done, is not to 
give every one his own ; right punitive justice is a 
relation of equality and proportion between the 
demerit and the punishment. But supposing this 
opinion of absolute and universal necessity, there 
is no demerit in the world. We use to say, that 
right springs from law and fact ; as in this syllo- 
gism, every thief ought to be punished, there is 
the law ; but such an one is a thief, there is the 
fact ; therefore he ought to be punished, there is 
the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the 
right to be punished, neither upon law, nor upon 
fact, but upon the irresistible power of God. Yea, 
it overturneth, as much as in it lies, all law ; first, 
the eternal law, which is the ordination of divine 
wisdom, by which all creatures are directed to 
that end which is convenient for them, that is, 
not to necessitate them to eternal flames ; then 
the law participated, which is the ordination of 
right reason, instituted for the common good, to 
show unto man what he ought to do, and what he 
ought not to do. To what purpose is it, to show 
the right way to him who is drawn and haled a 




138 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

XH . contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable 
necessity? 

(g*) " Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that 
God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him to be 
the principal and most proper cause of all sin. 
For he makes him to be the cause, not only of the 
law and of the action, but even of the irregula- 
rity itself, and the difference between the action 
and the law, wherein the very essence of sin doth 
consist. He makes God to determine David's will, 
and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes phy- 
sically and essentially subordinate, the cause of 
the cause is evermore the cause of the effect. 
These are those deadly fruits which spring from 
the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all 
things; which T. H. seeing, and that neither the 
sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor any wicked person 
do proceed from the operative, but from the per- 
missive will of God, and that punishment is an act 
of justice, not of dominion only, I hope that ac- 
cording to his promise he will change his opinion. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XII. 

The Bishop had argued in this manner: "If there 
be no liberty, there shall be no last judgment, no 
rewards nor punishments after death." To this 
I answered, that though God cannot sin, because 
what he doth, his doing maketh just, and because 
he is not subject to another's law, and that there- 
fore it is blasphemy to say that God can sin ; yet 
to say, that God hath so ordered the world that sin 
may be necessarily committed, is not blasphemy. 
And I can also further say, though Gtid be the 
cause of all motion and of all actions, and therefore 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 139 

unless sin be no motion nor action, it must derive a NO. xil. 
necessity from the first mover ; nevertheless it can- . "TT ' 

J t t Aniinadver- 

not be said that God is the author of sin, because * upon &* 
not he that necessitateth an action, but he that lshopsrepy * 
doth command and warrant it, is the author. And 
if God own an action, though otherwise it were a 
sin, it is now no sin. The act of the Israelites 
in robbing the Egyptians of their jewels, without 
God's warrant had been theft. But it was neither 
theft, cozenage, nor sin; supposing they knew the 
warrant was from God. The rest of my answer to 
that inconvenience, was an opposing to his incon- 
veniences the manifest texts of St. Paul, Rom. ix. 
The substance of his reply to my answer is this. 

(a) " Though punishment were an act of do- 
minion, not of justice, in God ; yet this is no suffi- 
cient cause why God should deny his own act, or 
why he should chide or expostulate with men, 
why they did that which he himself did necessi- 
tate them to do." 

I never said that God denied his act, but that 
he may expostulate with men ; and this may be 
(I shall never say directly, it is) the reason of that 
his expostulation, viz. to convince them that their 
wills were not independent, but were his mere 
gift ; and that to do, or not to do, is not in him 
that willeth, but in God that hath mercy on, or 
hardeneth whom he will. But the Bishop iater- 
preteth hardening to be a permission of God. 
Which is to attribute to God in such actions no 
more than he might have attributed to any of 
Pharaoh's servants, the not persuading their mas- 
ter to let the people go. And whereas he com- 
pares this permission to the indulgence of a pa- 



140 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 




NO. xir. rettt, that by his patience encourageth his son to 
become more rebellious, which indulgence is a 
sin ; he maketh God to be like a sinful man. And 
p's reply. in( j eed it seemet h that all they that hold this 

freedom of the will, conceive of God no otherwise 
than the common sort of Jews did, that God was 
like a man, that he had been seen by Moses, and 
after by the seventy elders (Exod. xxiv. 10) ; ex- 
pounding that and other places literally. Again 
he saith, that God is said to harden the heart per- 
missively, but not operatively ; which is the same 
distinction with his first, namely negatively, not 
positively, and with his second, occasionally, and 
not causally. So that all his three ways how God 
hardens the heart of wicked men, come to this 
one of permission ; which is as much as to say, 
God sees, looks on, and does nothing, nor ever 
did anything, in the business. Thus you see how 
the Bishop expoundeth St. Paul. Therefore I will 
leave the rest of his commentary upon Rom. ix. 
to the judgment of the reader, to think of the 
same as he pleaseth. 

(6) " Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. 
saith, 'that he who doth permit anything to be 
done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing 
that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in 
some sort will it;' I say in some sort, that is "either 
by an antecedent will, or by a consequent will; 
either by an operative will, or by a permissive 
will ; or he is willing to let it be done, but not 
willing to do it." 

Whether it be called antecedent, or consequent, 
or operative, or permissive, it is enough for the 
necessity of the thing that the heart of Pharaoh 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 141 

should be hardened, and if God were not willing NO. xu. 
to do it, I cannot conceive how it could be done . "~7 ' 

y Animadver* 

Without him. * upon the 

(c) "T. H. demands how God should be the Bishop ' 8 reply> 
cause of the action, and yet not be the cause of 
the irregularity of the action ? I answer, because 
he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but 
not by a special, influence." 

I had thought to pass over this place, because 
of the nonsense of general and special influence. 
Seeing he saith that God concurs to the doing of 
evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that 
if he blame me for speaking of God as of a neces- 
sitating cause, and as it were a principal agent in 
the causing of all actions, he may with as good 
reason blame himself for making him by concur- 
rence an accessory to the same. And indeed, let 
men hold what they will contrary to the truth, 
if they write much, the truth will fall into their 
pens. But he thinks he hath a similitude, which 
will make this permissive will a very clear busi- 
ness. "The earth," saith he, "gives nourishment 
to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to 
wheat ; but the reason why the one yields food to 
our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, 
is not from the general nourishment of the earth, 
but from the special quality of the root." It seern- 
eth by this similitude, he thinketh, that God doth, 
not operatively, but permissively will that the root 
of hemlock should poison the man that eateth 
it, but that wheat should nourish him he willeth 
operatively; which is very absurd ; or else he must 
confess that the venomous effects of wicked men 
are willed operatively. 




142 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

MO. xn. (d) Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to 
make the particular and determinate act of killing 
Uriah to be from God. The general power to act, 
is from God ; but the specification of this general 
and good power, to murder, or to any particular 
evil, is not from God, but from the free will of 
man." 

But why am I so mightily mistaken ? Did not 
God foreknow that Uriah in particular, should be 
murdered by David in particular ? And what God 
foreknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly 
not come so to pass ? And that which cannot pos- 
* sibly not come to pass, doth not that necessarily 
come to pass ? And is not all necessity from God ? 
I cannot see this great mistake. "The general 
power," saith he, " to act is from God, but the 
specification to do this act upon Uriah, is not from 
God, but from free-will." Very learnedly. As if 
there were a power that were not the power to do 
some particular act ; or a power to kill, and yet to 
kill nobody in particular. If the power be to kill, 
it is to kill that which shall be by that power 
killed, whether it be Uriah or any other ; and the 
giving of that power, is the application of it to the 
act ; nor doth power signify anything actually, but 
those motions and present acts from which the act 
that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily 
proceedeth. And therefore this argument is much 
like that which used heretofore to be brought for 
the defence of the divine right of the bishops to 
the ordination of ministers. They derive not, say 
they, the right of ordination from the civil sove- 
reign, but from Christ immediately. And yet they 
acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to or- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 143 

dain, if the civil power do forbid them. But how NO. xir, 
have they right to ordain, when they cannot do it A ' ^^ 

11 * ITO i Animadver- 

lawfully i Their answer is, they have the right, siom upon the 
though they may not exercise it ; as if the right 
to ordain, and the right to exercise ordination, 
were not the same thing. And as they answer 
concerning right, which is legal power, so the 
Bishop answereth concerning natural power, that 
David had a general power to kill Uriah from 
God, but not a power of applying this power in 
special to the killing of Uriah from God, but from 
his own free will ; that is, he had a power to kill 
Uriah, but not to exercise it upon Uriah, that is to 
say, he had a power to kill him, but not to kill 
him, which is absurd. 

(e) " But if the case be put why God doth punish 
one more than another, or why lie throws one 
into hell fire, and not another, which is the pre- 
sent case between us ; to say with T. H., that it is 
because God is omnipotent, or because his power 
is irresistible, or merely because it is his pleasure, 
is not only not warranted, but is plainly con- 
demned by St. Paul in this place." 

I note first, that he hath no reason to say, the 
case agitated between us is, whether the cause 
why God punisheth one man more than another, be 
his irresistible power, or man's sin. The case 
agitated between us is, whether a man can now 
choose what shall be his will anon, or at any time 
hereafter. Again, it is not true that he says, it is 
my opinion that the irresistible power of God is 
the cause why he punisheth one more than another. 
I say only that when he doth so, the irresistible 
power is enough to make it not unjust. But that 



144 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xii. the cause why God punisheth one more than ano- 
Hiany times the will he hath to show his 
P ower > ls affirmed in this place by St. Paul, Shall 
the thing formed, say to him that formed it, &c. 
And by our Saviour in the case of him that was 
born blind, where he saith, Neither hath this man 
sinned nor his parents ; but that the works of 
God may be made manifest. And by the expostu- 
lation of God with Job. This endeavour of his to 
bring the text of St. Paul to his purpose, is not 
only frustrate, but the cause of many insignificant 
phrases in his discourse ; as this : " It was in their 
own power, by their concurrence with God's grace, 
to prevent these judgments, and to recover their 
former estates," which is as good sense, as if he 
should say, that it is in his own power, with the 
concurrence of the sovereign power of England, 
to be what he will And this, that " God may 
oblige himself freely to his creature." For he that 
can oblige, can also, when he will, release ; and he 
that can release himself when he will, is not 
obliged. Besides this, he is driven to words ill-be- 
coming him that is to speak of God Almighty ; for 
he makes him unable to do that which hath been 
within the ordinary power of men to do. " God," 
he saith, " cannot destroy the righteous with the 
wicked ;" which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily 
done by armies: and " He could not destroy Sodom 
while Lot was in it ; 1f which he interpreteth, as if 
he could not do it lawfully. One text is Genesis 
xviii. 23, 24. 25. There is not a word that God 
could not destroy the righteous with the wicked. 
Only Abraham saith (as a man): Shall not the Judge 
of all the earth do right ? Another is Genesis 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 145 

xix. 22) : Haste thee, escape thither ; for I NO. xir. 
cannot do any thing 9 till thou be come thither. ^ ' ' 
Which is an ordinary phrase, in such a case where MM upon the 
God had determined to burn the city and save a Blshops reply< 
particular man, and signifieth not any obligation to 
save Lot more than the rest. Likewise concern- 
ing Job, who, expostulating with God, w r as an- 
swered only with the explication of the infinite 
power of God, the Bishop answereth, that there is 
never a word of Job's being punished without de- 
sert ; which answer is impertinent. For I say not 
that he was punished without desert, but that it 
was not for his desert that he was afflicted ; for 
punished, he was not at all. 

And concerning the blind man, (John ix.), who 
was born blind, that the power of God might be 
shewn in him ; he answers that it was not a pun- 
ishment, but a blessing. I did not say it w r as a 
punishment ; certainly it was an affliction. How 
then doth he call it a blessing ? Reasonably enough : 
" because," saith he, " it was the means to raise his 
soul illuminated, and to bring him to see the face 
of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is 
common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of 
the soul, with the blessed angels." This is very 
weH -said ; for no man doubts but some afflictions 
may be blessings ; but I doubt whether the Bishop, 
that says he reads of some who have put out their 
bodily eyes, because they thought they were an im- 
pediment to the eye of the soul, think that they 
did well. To that where I say that brute beasts 
are afflicted which cannot sin, he answereth, that 
" there is a vast difference between those light and 
momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and endless 

VOL. V. L 



146 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xii. pains of hell." As if the length or the greatness 
Animadvert ^ *^ e P a ^ n ? ma de any difference in the justice or 
sions upon the injustice of the inflicting it. 

OP * rep y . ) jj u t hi s greatest error is that which I 
touched before, to make justice to be the proper 
result of power." 

He would make men believe, I hold all things to 
be just, that are done by them who have power 
enough to avoid the punishment. This is one of 
his pretty little policies, by which I find him in 
many occasions to take the measure of his own 
wisdom. I said no more, but that the power, which 
is absolutely irresistible, makes him that hath it 
above all law, so that nothing he doth can be un- 
just. But this power can be no other than the 
power divine. Therefore let him preach what he 
will upon his mistaken text, I shall leave it to the 
reader to consider of it, without any further an- 
swer. 

(g) " Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that 
God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him to be 
the principal and most proper cause of all sin. For 
he makes him to be the cause not only of the 
law, and of the action, but even of the irregula- 
rity itself, &c. wherein the very essence of sin doth 
consist." 

I think there is no man but understands, no, 
not the Bishop himself, but that where two things 
are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, regu- 
larity or irregularity, that is between them, is made 
in and by the making of the things themselves that 
are compared. The Bishop, therefore, that denies 
God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies him 
to be the cause both of the law and of the action. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 147 

So that by his doctrine, there shall be a good law NO. XIIT. 
whereof God shall be no cause, and an action, that ' " ' 

. -, i Tne Bishop's 

is, a local motion that shall depend upon another re p i y . 
first mover that is not God. The rest of this 
number is but railing. 

PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON. NO. XIII. 

J. D. " The first argument is Herculeum or 
baculinum, drawn from that pleasant passage be- 
tween Zeno and his man. The servant had com- 
mitted some petty larceny, and the master w r as 
cudgelling him well for it. The servant thinks to 
creep under his master's blind side, and pleads for 
himself that ' the necessity of destiny did compel 
him to steal.' The master answers, c the same 
necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee.' 
He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted with 
rods than with arguments, until he confess that it 
is free for him that beats him, either to continue 
striking, or to give over, that is, to have true 

liberty." 

T. II . Of the arguments from reason, the first 
is that which he saith is drawn from Zeno's beat- 
ing of his man, which is therefore called argu- 
mcntum baculimim, that is to say, a wooden argu- 
ment. The story is this. Zeno held that all 
actions were necessary. His man therefore, be- 
ing for some fault beaten, excused himself upon 
the necessity of it. To avoid this excuse, his mas- 
ter pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. 
So that not he that maintained, but he that de- 
rided the necessity of things, w r as beaten ; contrary 
to that he would infer ; and the argument was 
rather withdrawn, than drawn, from the story. 

L2 



148 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiii. /. D. " Whether the argument be withdrawn 
^ rom *ke stor y> or ^ e answer withdrawn from the 
argument, let the reader judge. T. H. mistakes 
the scope of the reason, the strength whereof doth 
not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno, a rigid 
Stoic, which is not worth a button in this cause ; 
nor in the servant's being an adversary to stoical 
necessity. For it appears not out of the story, 
that the servant did deride necessity, but rather 
that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own 
justification. Now in the success of the fray, we 
were told even now, that no power doth justify an 
action, but only that which is irresistible. Such 
was not Zeno's. And therefore it advantageth 
neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno, nor 
this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the 
staff out of his master's hand, and beaten him 
soundly, would riot the same argument have served 
the man as well as it did the master, that the ne- 
cessity of destiny did compel him to strike again ? 
Had not Zeno smarted justly for his paradox? 
And might not the spectators well have taken up 
the judge's apothegm, concerning the dispute be- 
tween Corax and his scholar, f an ill egg of an ill 
bird' ? But the strength of this argument lies 
partly in the ignorance of Zeno, that great cham- 
pion or necessity, and the beggarliness of his 
cause, which admitted no defence but with a 
cudgel. No man, saith the servant, ought to be 
beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevi- 
tably to do : but I am compelled inevitably to steal. 
The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. 
If a strong man shall take a weak man's hand per 
force, and do violence with it to a third person, he 
whose hand is forced, is innocent, and he only cul- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 149 

pable who compelled him. The minor was Zeno's NO. xni. 
own doctrine ; what answer made the great patron ^ ^ isbo '. 
of destiny to his servant ? very learnedly he de- piy. 
nied the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant; 
telling him in effect, that though there was no 
reason why he should be beaten, yet there was a 
necessity why he must be beaten. And partly in 
the evident absurdity of such an opinion, which 
deserves not to be confuted with reasons, but with 
rods. There are four things, said the philosopher, 
which ought not to be called into question. First, 
such things whereof it is wickedness to doubt ; as 
whether the soul be immortal, whether there be a 
God, such an one should not be confuted with 
reasons, but cast into the sea with a mill-stone 
about his neck, as unworthy to breathe the air, or 
to behold the light. Secondly, such things as are 
above the capacity of reason ; as among Christians, 
the mystery of the Holy Trinity, Thirdly, such 
principles as are evidently true ; as that two and 
two are four, in arithmetic ; that the whole is 
greater than the part, in logic. Fourthly, such 
things as are obvious to the senses ; as whether 
the snow be white. He who denied the heat of 
the fire, was justly sentenced to be scorched with 
fire ; and he that denied motion, to be beaten un- 
til he recanted. So he who denies all liberty from 
necessitation, should be scourged until he become 
an humble suppliant to him that whips him, and 
confess that he hath power, either to strike, or to 
hold his hand." 

T. H. In this Number xni. which is about Zeno 
and his man, there is contained nothing necessary 
to the instruction of the reader. Therefore I pass 
it over. 



150 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



NO. XIV. 

NO. xiv. J. D. " Secondly, this very persuasion that there 
The lilt's i g no true liberty, is able to overthrow all societies 
re ^ and commonwealths in the world. The laws are 
unjust, which prohibit that which a man cannot 
possibly shun. All consultations are vain, if every 
thing be either necessary or impossible. Who 
ever deliberated whether the sun should rise to- 
morrow, or whether he should sail over moun- 
tains ? It is to no more purpose to admonish men 
of understanding than fools, children, or madmen, 
if all things be necessary. Praises and dispraises, 
rewards and punishments, are as vain as they are 
undeserved, if there be no liberty. All counsels, 
arts, arms, books, instruments, are superfluous and 
foolish, if there be no liberty. In vain we labour, 
in vain we study, in vain we take physic, in vain 
we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come to 
pass alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we 
be idle or industrious, by unalterable necessity. 
But it is said, that though future events be certain, 
yet they are unknown to us : and therefore we 
prohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dispraise, re- 
ward, punish, study, labour, and use means. Alas ! 
how should our not knowing of the event, be a suffi- 
cient motive to us to use the means, so long as we 
believe the event is already certainly determined, 
and can no more be changed by all our endea- 
vours, than we can stay the course of heaven with 
our finger, or add a cubit to our stature ? Sup- 
pose it be unknown, yet it is certain. We cannot 
hope to alter the course of things by our labours ; 
let the necessary causes do their work, we have no 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 151 

remedy but patience, and shrug up the shoulders. NO. xiv. 
Either allow liberty, or destroy all societies." ~~~~~^ " 

m TT mi i - /* The Bishop's 

T. H. I he second, argument is taken from cer- reply. 
tain inconveniences which he thinks would follow 
such an opinion. It is true that ill use may be 
made of it, and therefore your Lordship and J. D. 
ought, at my request, to keep private that I say 
here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed 
none ; and what use soever be made of truth, yet 
truth is truth ; and now the question is, not what 
is fit to be preached, but what is true. The first 
inconvenience he says is this, that laws which pro- 
hibit any action are then unjust. The second, that 
all consult tions are vain. The third, that admoni- 
tions to men of understanding, are of no more use 
than to fools, children, and madmen. The fourth, 
that praise, dispraise, reward, and punishment, are 
in vain. The fifth, that counsels, arts, arms, 
books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are 
in vain. To which argument, expecting I should 
answer by saying, that the ignorance of the event 
were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it 
were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words : 
" Alas, how should our not knowing of the event be 
a sufficient motive to make us use the means ?" 
Wherein he sa:th right ; but my answer is not that 
which he expecteth. I answer, 

First, that the necessity of an action doth not 
make the law which prohibits it unjust. To let 
pass, that not the necessity, but the will to break 
the law, maketh the action unjust, because the law 
regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes 
of action ; and to let pass, that no law can be 
possibly unjust, in as much as every man makes, 



152 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. by his consent, the law he is bound to keep, and 
^ e B : sho , which, consequently, must be just, unless a man 
can be unjust to himself: I. say, what necessary 
cause soever precedes an action, yet, if the ac- 
tion be forbidden, he that doth it willingly, may 
justly be punished. For instance, suppose the 
law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and there 
be a man who by the strength of temptation 
is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put 
to death : does not this punishment deter others 
from theft ? Is it not a cause that others steal 
not ? Doth it not frame and make their will to 
justice ? To make the law is therefore to make 
a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice ; and 
consequently it is no injustice to make such a law. 
The institution of the law is not to grieve the 
delinquent for that which is passed and not to be 
undone ; but to make him and others just, that else 
would not be so : and respecteth not the evil act 
past, but the good to come. Insomuch as without 
this good intention of future, no past act of a 
delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of 
God. But, you will say, how is it just to kill one 
man to amend another, if what was done were 
necessary ? To this I answer, that men are 
justly killed, not for that their actions are not 
necessitated, but that they are spared and pre- 
served, because they are not noxious ; for where 
there is no law, there no killing, nor any thing else 
can be unjust. And by the right of nature we 
destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, 
both beasts and men. And for beasts, we kill them 
justly, when we do it in order to our own preser- 
vation. And yet J. D. confesseth, that their 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCB. 153 

actions, as being only spontaneous and not free, NO. xiv. 
are all necessitated and determined to that one 
thing which they shall do. For men, when we 
make societies or commonwealths, we lay down 
our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as 
murder, theft, or other offensive actions. So that 
the right which the commonwealth hath, to put a 
man to death for crimes, is not created by the 
law, but remains from the first right of nature, 
which every man hath to preserve himself; for 
the law doth not take that right away, in case of 
criminals, who were by law excepted. Men are 
not therefore put to death or punished, for that 
their theft proceedeth from election ; but because 
it was noxious and contrary to men's preservation, 
and the punishment conducing to the preservation 
of the rest : inasmuch as to punish those that 
do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and 
maketh men's wills, such as men would have them. 
And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a 
voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice 
of the law that forbiddeth it, or of the magistrate 
that punisheth it. 

Secondly, I deny that it makes consultations to 
be in vain ; it is the consultation that causeth a 
man, and necessitateth him, to choose to do one 
thing rather than another. So that unless a man 
say that cause to be in vain, which necessitateth 
the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of 
consultation out of the necessity of the election 
proceeding from it. But it seems he reasons thus : 
If I must needs do this rather than that, then I 
shall do this rather than that, though I consult not 
at all ; which is a false proposition, a false conse- 



154 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. quence, arid no better than this : If I shall live till 
The loop's to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I 
re ply. run myself through with a sword to-day. If 
there be a necessity that an action shall be 
done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, 
it does not therefore follow that there is nothing 
necessarily required as a means to bring it to 
pass. And therefore, when it is determined that 
one thing shall be chosen before another, it is 
determined also for what cause it shall be chosen ; 
which cause, for the most part, is deliberation or 
consultation. And therefore consultation is not 
in vain ; and indeed the less in vain, by how much 
the election is more necessitated. 

The same answer is to be given to the third 
supposed inconvenience ; namely, that admonitions 
are in vain ; for admonitions are parts of consulta- 
tions ; the admonitor being a counsellor, for the 
time, to him that is admonished. 

The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that 
praise and dispraise, reward and punishment, will 
be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise 
and dispraise, they depend not at all on the neces- 
sity of the action praised or dispraised. For, what 
is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good ? 
Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for 
the state and commonwealth. Arid what is it to 
say an action is good, but to say, it is as I would 
wish, or as another would have it, or according to 
the will of the state, that is to say, according to 
law ? Does J. D. think, that no action can please 
me or him, or the commonwealth, that should 
proceed from necessity ? 

Things may be therefore necessary and yet 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 155 

praiseworthy, as also necessary and yet dispraised, NO. xiv. 
and neither of both in vain ; because praise and ^ ' ' 

T - J VI J i -1 i The Bishop's 

dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do reply. 
by example make and conform the will to good or 
evil. It was a very great praise, in my opinion, that 
Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he 
was good by nature, et quia aliter esse nonpotuit. 

To his fifth and sixth inconvenience, that coun- 
sels, arts, arms, books, instruments, study, medi- 
cines, and the like, would be superfluous,, the same 
answer serves that to the former ; that is to say, 
that this consequence, if the effect shall necessarily 
come to pass, then it shall come to pass without 
its cause, is a false one. And those things named, 
counsels, arts, arms, &c., are the causes of those 
effects. 

/. D. " Nothing is more familiar with T. H. 
than to decline an argument. But I will put it 
into form for him. (a) The first inconvenience 
is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyran- 
nical, which do prescribe things absolutely impos- 
sible in themselves to be done, and punish men for 
not doing of them. But supposing T. H's opinion 
of the necessity of all things to be true, all laws do 
prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done, and 
punish men for not doing of them. The former 
proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied. 
Just law T s are the ordinances of right reason; 
but those laws which prescribe absolute impossi- 
bilities, are not the ordinances of right reason. 
Just laws are instituted for the public good ; but 
those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, 
are not instituted for the public good, Just laws 
do show unto a man what is to be done, and what 



156 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. is to be shunned ; but those laws which prescribe 
impossibilities, do not direct a man what he is to 
do, and what he is to shun. The minor is as evi- 
dent. For if his opinion be true, all actions, all 
transgressions are determined antecedently inevi- 
tably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of 
extrinsical causes. Yea, even the will of man, 
and the reason itself is thus determined. And 
therefore whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing 
to be done, which is not done, or to be left undone 
which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibilities, 
and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. 
In all his answer there is not one word to this 
argument, but only to the conclusion. He saith, 
that ' not the necessity, but the will to break the 
law makes the action unjust. 1 I ask what makes 
the will to break the law ; is it not his necessity ? 
What gets he by this ? A perverse will causeth 
injustice, and necessity causeth a perverse will. 
He saith, c the law regardeth the will, but not the 
precedent causes of action.' To what proposition, 
to what term is this answer ? He neither denies nor 
distinguisheth. First, the question here is not 
what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes 
laws to be unjust. So his answer is impertinent. 
It is likewise untrue. For first, that will which the 
law regards, is not such a will as T. H. imagineth. 
It is a free will, not a determined necessitated 
will ; a rational will, not a brutish will. Secondly, 
the law doth look upon precedent causes, as well 
as the voluntariness of the action. If a ckild, 
before he be seven years old or have the use of 
reason, in some childish quarrel do willingly stab 
another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 157 

law looks not upon it as an act of murder ; because NO. xiv. 
there wanted a power to deliberate, and conse- '^^ S ^L 
quently true liberty. Manslaughter may be as re piy- 
voluntary as murder, and commonly more volun- 
tary ; because being done in hot blood there is the 
less reluctation. Yet the law considers, that the 
former is done out of some sudden passion without 
serious deliberation, and the other out of prepensed 
malice and desire of revenge ; and therefore con- 
demns murder, as more wilful and more punishable 
than manslaughter." 

(b) " He saith, c that no law can possibly be un- 
just ;' and I say, that this is to deny the conclu- 
sion, which deserves no reply. But to give him 
satisfaction, I will follow him in this also, if he 
intended no more but that unjust laws are not 
genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience, be- 
cause they are not the ordinations of right reason, 
not instituted for the common good, nor prescribe 
that which ought to be done ; he said truly, but 
nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend, 
as he doth, that there are no laws de facto, which 
are the ordinances of reason erring, instituted for 
the common hurt, and prescribing that which 
ought not to be done, he is much mistaken. Pha- 
raoh's law, to drown the male children of the 
Israelites (Exod. i. 22) ; Nebuchadnezzar's law, 
that w r hosoever did not fall down and worship the 
golden image which he had set up, should be cast 
into the fiery furnace (Dan. iii. 4-6) ; Darius's law, 
that whosoever should ask a petition of any God 
or man for thirty days, save of the king, should 
be cast into the deri of lions (Dan. vi. 7) ; Ahasue- 
rus's law, to destroy the Jewish nation, root and 



158 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. branch (Esther iii. 1 3) ; the Pharisees' law, that 
The iJisOicT'i whosoever confesseth Christ, should be excommu- 
le i^- nicated (John ix. 22) ; were all unjust laws. 

(e) "The ground of this error is as great an 
error itself (such an art he hath learned of re- 
packing paradoxes) ; which is this, * that every man 
makes by his consent the law which he is bound 
to keep.' If this were true, it would preserve 
them, if not from being unjust, yet from being 
injurious. But it is not true. The positive law of 
God, contained in the Old and New Testament ; 
the law of nature, written in our hearts by the 
finger of God ; the Jaws of conquerors, who come 
in by the power of the sword ; the laws of our 
ancestors, which were made before we were born ; 
do all oblige us to the observation of them ; yet to 
none of all these did we give our actual consent. 
Over and above all these exceptions, he builds 
upon a wrong foundation, that all magistrates at 
first were elective. The first governors were fa- 
thers of families ; and when those petty princes 
could not afford competent protection and secu- 
rity to their subjects, many of them did resign 
their several a.nd respective interests into the 
hands of one joint father of the country. 

"And though his ground had been true, that 
all first legislators were elective, which is false ; 
yet his superstructure fails : for it was done in 
hope and trust that they would make just laws. 
If magistrates abuse this trust, and deceive the 
hopes of the people by making tyrannical laws, 
yet it is without their consent. A precedent trust 
doth not justify the subsequent errors and abuses 
of a trustee. He who is duly elected a legislator, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 159 

may exercise his legislative power unduly. The NO. xiv. 
people's implicit consent doth not render the ty- Thc] 5 is])0 y s 
rannical laws of their legislators to be just. T!J- 

(d) " But his chiefest answer is, that ' an ac- 
tion forbidden, though it proceed from necessary 
causes, yet if it were done willingly, it may be 
justly punished ;' which, according to his custom, 
he proves by an instance. ' A man necessitated 
to steal by the strength of temptation, yet if he 
steal willingly, is justly put to death.' Here are 
two things, and both of them untrue. 

" First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we 
suffer justly for those necessities, which w r e our- 
selves have contracted by our own fault ; but not 
for extrinsical antecedent necessities, which were 
imposed upon us without our fault. If that law 
do not oblige to punishment, which is not inti- 
mated, because the subject is invincibly ignorant 
of it ; how much less that law which prescribes 
absolute impossibilities : unless perhaps invincible 
necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ig- 
norance. That which he adds, ' if it were done 
willingly,' though it be of great moment, if it be 
rightly understood, yet in his sense, that is, if a 
man's ' will be not in his own disposition,' and 
c if his willing do not come upon him according to 
his will, nor according to anything else in his 
power,' it weighs not half so much as the least 
feather in all his horse-load. For if that law be 
unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to 
do that which is impossible for him to do, then 
that law is likewise unjust and tyrannical, which 
commands him to will that which is impossible for 
him to will. 



160 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. " Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, 
* s a P^ a ^ n begging of the question. No man 
extrinsically, antecedently, and irresistibly ne- 
cessitated by temptation to steal. The devil may 
solicit us, but he cannot necessitate us. He hath 
a faculty of persuading, but not a power of compel- 
ling. Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flammam ciet ; 
as Gregory Nazianzen, he blows the coals, but the 
fire is our own. Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces 
illius objicientem ; as St. Austin, he bites not, until 
we thrust ourselves into his mouth. He may pro- 
pose, he may suggest, but he cannot move the 
will effectively. Resist the devil, and he will flee 
from you (James iv. 7). By faith we are able to 
quench all the fiery darts of the wicked (Ephes. 
vi. 16). And if Satan, who can both propose the 
object, and choose out the fittest times and places 
to work upon our frailties, and can suggest rea- 
sons, yet cannot necessitate the will, (which is 
most certain) ; then much less can outward objects 
do it alone. They have no natural efficacy to de- 
termine the will. Well may they be occasions, 
but they cannot be causes of evil. The sensitive 
appetite may engender a proclivity to steal, but 
not a necessity to steal. And if it should produce 
a kind of necessity, yet it is but moral, not na- 
tural ; hypothetical, not absolute ; coexistent, not 
antecedent from ourselves, nor extrinsical. This 
necessity, or rather proclivity, was free in its 
causes; we ourselves by our own negligence in not 
opposing our passions when we should and might, 
have freely given it a kind of dominion over us. 
Admit that some sudden passions may and do ex- 
traordinarily surprise us ; and therefore we say, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 161 

motus primo primi, the first motions are not al- NO. xiv. 
ways in our power, neither are they free : yet this Jr '*". 

J * J J The Bishop 

is but very rarely, and it is our own fault that 
they do surprise us. Neither doth the law punish 
the first motion to theft, but the advised act of 
stealing. The intention makes the thief. But of 
this more largely No. xxv. 

(e) " He pleads moreover, c That the law is a 
cause of justice,' that ' it frames the wills of men 
to justice,' and c that the punishment of one doth 
conduce to the preservation of many.' All this 
is most true of a just law justly executed. But 
this is no God-a-mercy to T. H/s opinion of ab- 
solute necessity. If all actions and all events 
be predetermined naturally, necessarily, extrinsi- 
cally, how should the law frame men morally to 
good actions ? He leaves nothing for the law to 
do, but either that which is done already, or that 
which is impossible to be done. If a man be 
chained to every individual act which he doth, 
and from every act which he doth not, by in- 
dissolvable bonds of inevitable necessity, how 
should the law either deter him or frame him ? If 
a dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod 
cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand laws 
that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And 
whatsoever men do, according to T. H., they do 
it as necessarily as the fire burneth. Hang up a 
thousand thieves, and if a man be determined 
inevitably to steal, lie must steal notwithstanding. 

(f) " He adds, that ' the sufferings imposed by 
the law upon delinquents., respect not the evil act 
passed, but the good to come, and that the putting 
of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any 

VOL. V. M 



162 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, 
The Bisi-o s exce pt there be a real intention to benefit others 
reply. fry hi s example.' The truth is, the punishing 
of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil 
act passed and the good to come. The ground of 
it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of it, is 
the good to come. The end without the ground 
cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make 
a good action bad ; but a good intention cannot 
make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do 
evil that good may come of it, nor to punish an 
innocent person for the admonition of others ; that 
is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncer- 
tain. Again, though there were no other end of 
penalties inflicted, neither probatory, nor casti- 
gatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to 
satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving 
to every one his own, yet the action is just and 
warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in itself, 
without all undue circumstances, was never prohi- 
bited to the lawful magistrate, who is the vice- 
gerent or lieutenant of God, from whom he derives 
his power of life and death. 

"T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning 
man catcheth at every bulrush, so he lays hold on 
every pretence to save a desperate cause. But 
first, it is worth our observation to see how oft he 
charigeth shapes in this one particular, (g) First, 
he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God 
that justifies all his actions, though he command 
one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly, 
though he be the cause not only of the action, but 
also of the irregularity ; though he both give man 
power to act, and determine this power to evil as 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 163 

well as good ; though he punish the creatures, for NO. xiv, 
doing that which he himself did necessitate them ; ; 
to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is n-pW" ^ 
tyrannical, first to necessitate a man to do his will, 
and then to punish him for doing of it, he leaves 
this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a second; 
that therefore a man is justly punished for that 
which he was necessitated to do, because the act 
was voluntary on his part. This hath more show of 
reason than the former, if he did make the will of 
man to be in his own disposition ; but maintaining 
that the will is irresistibly determined to will what- 
soever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity is the 
same, first to necessitate a man to will, and then 
to punish him for willing. The dog only bites the 
stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand, 
but they make the first cause to punish the instru- 
ment for that which is his own proper act. Where- 
fore not being satisfied with this, he casts it off 
and flies to his third shift. ' Men are not punished/ 
saith he, c therefore, because their theft proceeded 
from election,' (that is, because it was willingly 
done, for to elect and will, saith he, are both one ; 
is not this to blow hot and cold with the same 
breath ?) ' but because it was noxious and contrary 
to men's preservation.' Thus far he saith true, that 
every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to 
preserve itself : cast water into a dusty place, and 
it contracts itself into little globes, that is to pre- 
serve itself. And those who are noxious in the 
eye of the law, are justly punished by them to 
whom the execution of the law is committed ; 
but the law accounts no persons noxious, but those 
who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth 

M 2 



164 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature 
^ Bisli0 \ of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a 
re p ] y- child,before it have the use of reason. If one should 

take my hand perforce and give another a box on 
the ear with it, my hand is noxious, but the law 
punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore 
he hath reason to propose the question, ' how it is 
just to kill one man to amend another, if he who 
killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to 
do.' He might as well demand, how it is lawful to 
murder a company of innocent infants, to make a 
bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the le- 
prosy. It had been a more rational w r ay, first to 
have demonstrated that it is so, and then to have 
questioned why it is so. His assertion itself is but 
a dream, and the reason which he gives of it why 
it is so, is a dream of a dream. 

" The sum of it is this ; ' that w r here there is no 
law, there no killing or any thing else can be un- 
just ; that before the constitution of common- 
wealths, every man had power to kill another, if 
he conceived him to be hurtful to him ; that at 
the constitution of commonwealths, particular 
men lay down this right in part, and in part re- 
serve it to themselves, as in case of theft or mur- 
der ; that the right which the commonwealth 
hath to put a malefactor to death, is not created 
by the law, but remaineth from the first right of 
nature which every man hath to preserve him- 
self ; that the killing of men in this case is as the 
killing of beasts in order to our own preservation.' 
This may w r ell be called stringing of paradoxes. 

" But first, (It) there never was any such time 
when mankind was without governors and laws, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 165 



and societies. Paternal government was in the NO. xiv. 
world from the beginning, and the law of nature. ' ' ' 

. P T lle Bishop's 

There might be sometimes a root or such barba- n-piy. 
rous thievish brigands, in some rocks or deserts, 
or odd corners of the world ; but it was an abuse 
and a degeneration from the nature of man, who 
is a political creature. This savage opinion re- 
flects too much upon the honour of mankind. 

u Secondly, there never was a time when it 
was lawful, ordinarily, for private men to kill one 
another for their own preservation. If God would 
have had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears, 
or tigers, he w r ould have armed them with horns, or 
tusks, or talons, or pricks ; but of all creatures 
man is born most naked, without any weapon to 
defend himself, because God had provided a 
better means of security for him, that is, the 
magistrate. 

" Thirdly, that right which private men have to 
preserve themselves., though it be with the killing 
of another, when they are set upon to be murdered 
or robbed, is not a remainder or a reserve of some 
greater power which they have resigned, but a 
privilege which God hath given them, in case of 
extreme danger and invincible necessity, that 
when they cannot possibly have recourse to the 
ordinary remedy, that is, the magistrate, every 
man becomes a magistrate to himself. 

" Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never 
had. The people, whilst they were a dispersed 
rabble, (which in some odd cases might happen to 
be), never had justly the power of life and death, 
and therefore they could not give it by their 
election. All that they do is to prepare the mat- 



1G6 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. ter, but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul 

.iT^rr". f power. 

The B.sl.op s l 

rtpiy. " Fifthly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man 

of reason and parts to compare the murdering of 
men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The 
elements are for the plants, the plants for the 
brute beasts, the brute beasts for man. When God 
enlarged his former grant to man, arid gave him 
liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sus- 
tenance, (Gen. ix. 3), yet man is expressly ex- 
cepted (verse 6) : Whoso sheddeth man's blood, 
by man shall his blood be shed. And the reason 
is assigned, for in the image of God made he man. 
Before sin entered into the world, or before any 
creatures were hurtful or noxious to man, he had 
dominion over them as their lord and master. 
And though the possession of this sovereignty be 
lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not 
only the creatures to rebel, but also the inferior 
faculties to rebel against the superior, from 
whence it comes that one man is hurtful to 
another ; yet the dominion still remains. Wherein 
we may observe how sweetly the providence of 
God doth temper this cross ; that though the 
strongest creatures have withdrawn their obe- 
dience, as lions and bears, to shew that man hath 
lost the excellency of his dominion, and the 
weakest creatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into 
what a degree of contempt he is fallen ; yet still 
the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep 
and oxen, do in some degree retain their obe- 
dience. 

(i) " The next branch of his answer concerns 
consultations, ' which/ saith he, ' are not super- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 167 

fluous, though all things come to pass necessarily, NO. xiv. 
because they are the cause which doth necessitate ^ r ~ f . 

J The Bishop s 

the effect, and the means to bring it to pass.' We rq,i y . 
were told (No. xi.) 'that the last dictate of 
right reason was but as the last feather which 
breaks the horse's back. It is well yet, that 
reason hath gained some command again, and is 
become at least a quarter-master. Certainly if 
any thing under God have power to determine 
the will, it is right reason. But I have shewed 
sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the 
will physically, nor absolutely, much less extrin- 
sically, and antecedently ; and therefore it makes 
nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath un- 
dertaken to prove. 

(k) " He adds further, that ' as the end is ne- 
cessary, so are the means ; and when it is deter- 
mined that one thing shall be chosen before 
another, it is determined also for what cause it 
shall be so chosen.' All which is truth, but not the 
whole truth ; for as God ordains means for all 
ends, so he adapts and fits the means to their re- 
spective ends, free means to free ends, contingent 
means to contingent ends, necessary means to ne- 
cessary ends, whereas T. H. \vould have all means, 
all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered 
the world, that a man ought to use, and may freely 
use, those means of God, which he doth neglect, 
not by virtue of God's decree, but by his own 
fault ; if a man use those means of evil, which he 
ought not to use, and which by God's decree he 
had power to forbear ; if God have left to man in 
part the free managery of human affairs, and to 
that purpose hath endowed him with understand- 



168 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. ing * then consultations are of use, then provident 
^ ' ' care is needful, then it concerns him to use the 

The Bishop's 

reply. means. But if God have so ordered this world, 
that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means 
of good, which by virtue of God's decree it is pos- 
sible for him to use, and that he cannot possibly 
use any means of evil, but those which are irre- 
sistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an 
antecedent decree; then not only consultations are 
vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain. 
Do we think that we can help God Almighty to do 
his proper work ? In vain we trouble ourselves, 
in vain we take care to use those means, which 
are not in our power to use, or not to use. And 
this is that which was contained in my prolepsis 
or prevention of his answer, though he be pleased 
both to disorder it, and to silence it. We cannot 
hope by our labours, to alter the course of things 
set down by God ; let him perform his decree, let 
the necessary causes do their w 7 ork. If we be 
those causes, yet we are not in our own disposi- 
tion ; we must do what we are ordained to do, and 
more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but 
patience, and to shrug up the shoulders. This is 
the doctrine that flows from this opinion of abso- 
lute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of 
the clock which sets all the little wheels going, 
to be as the decree of God, and that the motion of 
it were perpetually infallible from an intrinsical 
principle, even as God's decree is infallible, eter- 
nal, all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels 
to be the second causes, and that they do as cer- 
tainly follow the motion of the great wheel, with- 
out missing or swerving in the least degree, as the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 169 

second causes do pursue the determination of the 
first cause. I desire to know in this case, what NO. xiv. 
cause there is to call a council of smiths, to con- The Bishop^ 
suit and order the motion of that which was or- 
dered and determined before to their hands ? Are 
men wiser than God ? Yet all men know, that the 
motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means 
to make the clock strike. 

(7) " But he tells me in great sadness, that ' my 
argument is just like this other ; if I shall live till 
to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I 
run myself through with a sword to-day ; which, 
saith he, is a false consequence, and a false pro- 
position/ Truly, if by running through, he un- 
derstands killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish 
proposition, and implies a contradiction. To live 
till to-morrow, and to die to-day, are inconsistent. 
But by his favour, this is not my consequence, but 
this is his own opinion. He would persuade us, 
that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live 
till to-morrow, and yet that it is possible that he 
may kill himself to-day. My argument is this : 
if there be a liberty and possibility for a man to 
kill himself to-day, then it is not absolutely neces- 
sary that he shall live till to-morrow ; but there is 
such a liberty, therefore no such necessity. And 
the consequence which I make here, is this : if it 
be absolutely necessary, that a man shall live till 
to-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him 
to consult and deliberate whether he should die 
to-day, or not. And this is a true consequence. 
The ground of his mistake is this, that though it 
be true, that a man may kill himself to-day, yet 
upon the supposition of his absolute necessity, it is 



170 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. impossible. Such heterogeneous arguments and 
The BisiuT-s i ns tances he produceth, which are half builded 
re pty- upon our true grounds, and the other half upon 

his false grounds. 

(m) u The next branch of my argument con- 
cerns admonitions, to which he gives no new 
answer, and therefore I need not make any new 
reply, saving only to tell him, that he mistakes my 
argument. I say not only, if all things be neces- 
sary, then admonitions are in vain ; but if all 
things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose 
to admonish men of understanding than fools, 
children, or madmen. That they do admonish 
the one and not the other, is confessedly true ; 
and no reason under heaven can be given for it 
but this, that the former have the use of reason 
and true liberty, with a dominion over their own 
actions, which children, fools, and madmen have 
not. 

" Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth 
himself. The scope of his discourse is, that ( things 
necessary may be praiseworthy.' There is no doubt 
of it ; but withal their praise reflects upon the free 
agent, as the praise of a statue reflects upon the 
workman who made it. ' To praise a thing,' saith 
he, ' is to say it is good.' (n) True, but this good- 
ness is not a metaphysical goodness ; so the worst 
of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good : 
nor a natural goodness ; the praise of it passeth 
wholly to the Author of nature ; God saw all that 
he had made, and it was very good: but a moral 
goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of 
things. The moral goodness of an action is the 
conformity of it with right reason. The moral 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 171 

evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the NO. xiv. 
alienation of it from right reason. It is moral N "~~ ni ' 

. i-i /> Tlie Bishop's 

praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To reply. 
praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally 
good, that is, conformable to right reason. The 
moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally 
bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. 
So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, 
moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty ; but 
if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is 
quite taken away, and with it all true praise arid 
dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that 'to say a 
thing is good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or 
as another would wish, or as the state would have 
it, or according to the law of the land ;' he mis- 
takes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, 
may all wish that which is not really good, but 
only in appearance. We do often wish what is 
profitable or delightful, without regarding so much 
as we ought what is honest. And though the will 
of the state where we live, or the law of the land, 
do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infal- 
lible rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his 
question, ( whether nothing that proceeds from 
necessity can please me,' I answer, yes. The 
burning of the fire pleaseth me, when I am cold ; 
and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by 
God for my use and for my good. Yet I do not 
mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, 
nor give any moral praise to it, as if it were in 
the power of the fire itself either to communicate 
its heat or to suspend it ; but I praise first the 
Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. 
As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives 



172 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. Cato, that he was good by nature, et quia aliter 
* ' ' esse non potuit ; it hath more of the orator, than 

The Bishop's \ a/r 

reply. either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man 

in the state of innocency did fall and become evil ; 
what privilege hath Cato more than he ? No, by 
his leave. Narratur et dim Catonis s&pe mero 
caluisse virtus. But the true meaning is, that he 
was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to 
some kinds of vice as others were. This is to 
praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not mo- 
rally. Socrates was not of so good a natural tem- 
per, yet proved as good a man; the more his 
praise, by how much the difficulty was the more 
to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason. 
" Concerning reward and punishment, he saith 
not a word, but only that they frame and conform 
the will to good, which hath been sufficiently an- 
swered. They do so indeed ; but if his opinion 
were true, they could not do so. But because my 
aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to satisfy 
myself, (o) though it be not urged by him, yet I 
do acknowledge that I find some improper and 
analogical rewards and punishments used to brute 
beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the master 
of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns 
without company. And if it be true, which he 
affirmeth a little before that I have confessed, 
' that the actions of brute beasts are all necessi- 
tated and determined to that one thing which they 
shall do,' the difficulty is increased. 

" But first, my saying is misalleged. I said, 
that some kinds of actions which are most excel- 
lent in brute beasts, and make the greatest show 
of reason, as the bees working their honey, and the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 173 

spiders weaving their webs, are yet done without NO.XIV. 
any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct JT~7~' 

J y J The Bishop's 

of nature, and by a determination of their fancies r ep i y . 
to these only kinds of works. But I did never 
say, I could not say, that all their individual 
actions are necessary, and antecedently determined 
in their causes, as what days the bees shall fly 
abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall 
keep in the hive, how often they shall fetch in 
thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions 
and the like, though they be not free, because 
brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are 
contingent, and therefore not necessary. 

" Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies 
of some brute creatures are determined by nature 
to some rare and exquisite works ; so in others, 
where it finds a natural propension, art, which 
is the imitator of nature, may frame and form them 
according to the will of the artist to some parti- 
cular actions and ends, as we see in setting- dogs, 
and coy-ducks, and parrots ; and the principal 
means whereby they eifect this, is by their backs 
or by their bellies, by the rod or by the morsel, 
which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of 
rewards and punishments. But we take the word 
here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, 
but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for 
that recompense which is due to honest and dis- 
honest actions. Where there is no moral liberty, 
there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither 
true reward nor punishment. 

"Thirdly, (p) when brute creatures do learn 
any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or de- 
liberation, or discourse, by inferring or concluding 



174 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. one thing from another, which they are not capa- 



Neither are they able to conceive a reason 

The Bishop's J 

^piy. of what they do, but merely out of memory or out 

of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that 
when they did after one manner, they were 
beaten ; and when they did after another manner, 
they were cherished ; and accordingly they apply 
themselves. But if their individual actions were 
absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter 
them. Most certainly, if there be any desert in it, 
or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did in- 
struct them. 

Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instru- 
ments, study, physic, and the like, he answereth 
not a word more than what is already satisfied, 
And therefore I am silent. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XIV. 

(a) " The first inconvenience is thus pressed. 
Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, which do 
prescribe things absolutely impossible in them- 
selves to be done, and punish men for not doing of 
them." 

I have already, in the beginning, where I recite 
the inconveniences that follow the doctrine of ne- 
cessity, made clear that the same inconveniences 
follow not the doctrine of necessity, any more than 
they follow this truth, whatsoever shall be, shall 
be, which all men must confess ; the same also fol- 
loweth upon this, that whatsoever God foreknows > 
cannot but come to pass in such time and manner 
as he hath foreknown it. It is therefore evident 
that these inconveniences are not rationally de- 
duced from those tenets. Again, it is a truth 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 1/5 

manifest to all men, that it is not in a man's power NO. xiv. 
to-day, to choose what will he shall have to-morrow^ . "1 7 ' 

J y m Anurumver- 

or an hour, or any time after. Intervening occa- ,,po n the 
sions, business, which the Bishop calls trifles, (trifles ls lop * TCp y 
of which the Bishop maketh here a great business), 
do change the will. No man can say what he will 
do to-morrow, unless he foreknow, which no man 
can, what shall happen before to-morrow. And 
this being the substance of my opinion, it must 
needs be that when he deduceth from it, that 
counsels, arts, arms, medicines, teachers, praise, 
prayer, and piety, are in vain, that his deduction is 
false, and his ratiocination fallacy. And though I 
need make no other answer to all that he can 
object against me, yet I shall here mark out the 
causes of his several paralogisms. 

" Those laws," he saith, " are unjust and tyran- 
nical, which do prescribe things absolutely impos- 
sible to be done, and punish men for not doing of 
them." In which words this is one absurdity, 
that a law can be unjust ; for all laws are divine 
or civil, neither of which can be unjust. Of 
the first there is no doubt. And as for civil laws, 
they are made by every man that is subject to 
them ; because every one of them consenteth to 
the placing of the legislative power. Another is 
this, in the same words, that he supposeth there 
may be laws that are tyrannical ; for if he that 
maketh them have the sovereign power, they may 
be regal, but not tyrannical ; if tyrant signify not 
King, as he thinks it doth not. Another is in 
the same words, " that a law may prescribe things 
absolutely impossible in themselves to be done," 
When he says impossible in themselves, he under- 



176 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. stands not what himself means. Impossible in 
themselves are contradictions only, as to be and 



siom upon the not to j^ ^ fae same time, which the divines say 

Bishop* reply. J J 

is not possible to God. All other things are pos- 
sible at least in themselves. Raising from the 
dead, changing the course of nature, making of a 
new heaven, and a new earth, are things possible 
in themselves ; for there is nothing in their nature 
able to resist the will of God. And if laws do not 
prescribe such things, why should I believe they 
prescribe other things that are more impossible. 
Did he ever read in Suarez of any tyrant that made 
a law commanding any man to do and not to do 
the same action, or to be and not to be at the same 
place in one and the same moment of time. But 
out of the doctrine of necessity, it followeth he 
says, that "all laws do prescribe absolute im- 
possibilities to be done." Here he has left out in 
themselves, which is a wilful fallacy. 

He further says that "just laws are the ordi- 
nances of right reason ;" which is an error that 
hath cost many thousands of men their lives. Was 
there ever a King, that made a law which in right 
reason had been better unmade ? And shall those 
laws therefore not be obeyed ? Shall we rather 
rebel ? I think not, though I am not so great a 
divine as he. I think rather that the reason of him 
that hath the sovereign authority, and by whose 
sword we look to be protected both against war 
from abroad and injuries at home, whether it be 
right or erroneous in itself, ought to stand for 
right to us that have submitted ourselves there- 
unto by receiving the protection. 

But the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 1/7 

in this, that whether the things be impossible in NO. xiv. 
themselves, or made impossible by some unseen ac- Animad T ver ~ 
cident, yet there is no reason that men should be sions pn tiw 

i 7 / 7 T 1 11 ^i^P'* re P'y 

punished JOT not doing them. It seems he taketh 
punishment for a kind of revenge, and can never 
therefore agree with me, that take it for nothing 
else but for a correction, or for an example, which 
hath for end \h^ framing and necessitating of the 
will to virtue ; and that he is no good man, that 
upon any provocation useth his power, though a 
power lawfully obtained, to afflict another man 
without this end, to reform the will of him or others. 
Nor can I comprehend, as having only humane 
ideas, that that punishment which neither intend- 
eth the correction of the offender, nor the correc- 
tion of others by example, doth proceed from God. 

(Z>) " He saith that no law can possibly be un- 
just," &c. 

Against this he replies that the law of Pharaoh, 
to drown the male children of the Israelites ; and 
of Nebuchadnezzar, to worship the golden image ; 
and of Darius, against praying to any but him 
in thirty days ; and of Ahasuerus, to destroy the 
Jews ; and of the Pharisees, to excommunicate the 
confessors of Christ ; were all unjust laws. The 
laws of these kings, as they were laws, have rela- 
tion only to the men that were their subjects ; and 
the making of them, which was the action of every 
one of those kings, who were subjects to another 
king, namely, to God Almighty, had relation to the 
law of God. In the first relation, there could be 
no injustice in them ; because all laws made by 
him to whom the people had given the legislative 
power, are the acts of every one of that people ; 
VOL. v. N 



178 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. and no man can do injustice to himself. But in 
Animadvert relation to God, if God have by a law forbidden it, 
riona upon the fag making O f such l aws } s injustice. Which law 

Bishops reply. J 

of God was to those heathen princes no other but 
solus populi, that is to say, the properest use of 
their natural reason for the preservation of their 
subjects. If therefore those laws were ordained 
out of wantonness, or cruelty, or envy, or for the 
pleasing of a favourite, or out of any other sinister 
end, as it seems they were, the making of those 
laws was unjust. But if in right reason they were 
necessary for the preservation of those people of 
whom they had undertaken the charge, then was 
it not unjust. And for the Pharisees, who had 
the same written law of God that we have, their 
excommunication of the Christians, proceeding, as 
it did, from envy, was an act of malicious injus- 
tice. If it had proceeded from misinterpretation 
of their own Scriptures, it had been a sin of igno- 
rance. Nevertheless, as it was a law to their sub- 
jects (in case they had the legislative power, which 
I doubt of), the law was not unjust. But the 
making of it was an unjust action, of which they 
were to give account to none but God. I fear the 
Bishop will think this discourse too subtile ; but 
the judgment is the reader's. 

(c) " The ground of this error," &c., " is this : 
that every man makes by his consent the law 
which he is bound to keep," &c. 

The reason why he thinketh this an error, is be- 
cause the positive law of God, contained in the 
Bible, is a law without our assent ; the law of na- 
ture was written in our hearts by the finger of 
God without our assent ; the laws of conquerors, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 179 

who come in by the power of the sword, were NO. xiv. 
made without our assent ; and so were the laws of . "~7 ' 

Amrnadver- 

our ancestors, which were made before we were upon the 
born. It is a strange thing that he that under- lsl ps repy " 
stands the nonsense of the Schoolmen, should not 
be able to perceive so easy a truth as this which 
he denieth. The Bible is a law. To whom ? To 
all the world ? He knows it is not. How came it 
then to be a law to us ? Did God speak it viva 
voce to us ? Have we then any other warrant for 
it than the word of the prophets ? Have we seen 
the miracles ? Have we any other assurance of 
their certainty than the authority of the Church ? 
And is the authority of the Church any other than 
the authority of the commonwealth, or that of the 
commonwealth any other than that of the head of 
the commonwealth, or hath the head of the com- 
monwealth any other authority than that which 
hath been given him by the members ? Else, why 
should not the Bible be canonical as well in Con- 
stantinople as in any other place ? They that have 
the legislative power make nothing canon, which 
they make not law, nor law, which they make not 
canon. And because the legislative power is from 
the assent of the subjects, the Bible is made law 
by the assent of the subjects. It was not the 
Bishop of Rome that made the Scripture law 
without his own temporal dominions ; nor is it the 
clergy that make it law in their dioceses and rec- 
tories. Nor can it be a law of itself without 
special and supernatural revelation. The Bishop 
thinks because the Bible is law, and lie is ap- 
pointed to teach it to the people in his diocese, 
that therefore it is law to whomsoever he teach 

N 2 



180 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. it ; which is somewhat gross, but not so gross as 
AmnrndveiT to Sa 7 that conquerors who come in by the power 
ions upon the o f the sword, make their laws also without our 

.Bishops reply. . 

assent. He thinks, belike, that if a conqueror can 
kill me if he please, I am presently obliged with- 
out more ado to obey all his laws. May not I 
rather die, if I think fit ? The conqueror makes 
no law over the conquered by virtue of his power ; 
but by virtue of their assent, that promised obe- 
dience for the saving of their lives. But how then 
is the assent of the children obtained to the laws 
of their ancestors ? This also is from the desire 
of preserving their lives, which first the parents 
might take away, where the parents be free from 
all subjection ; and where they are not, there the 
civil power might do the same, if they doubted of 
their obedience. The children therefore, when 
they be grown up to strength enough to do mis- 
chief, and to judgment enough to know that other 
men are kept from doing mischief to them by fear 
of the sword that protecteth them, in that very 
act of receiving that protection, and not re- 
nouncing it openly, do oblige themselves to obey 
the laws of their protectors ; to which, in receiv- 
ing such protection, they have assented. And 
whereas he saith, the law of nature is a law with- 
out our assent, it is absurd ; for the law of nature 
is the assent itself that all men give to the means 
of their own preservation. 

(d) " But his chiefest answer is, that an action 
forbidden, though it proceed from necessary causes, 
yet if it were done willingly, may be justly pun- 
ished," &c. 

This the Bishop also understandeth not, and 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 181 

therefore denies it. He would have the judge NO.XIV. 
condemn no man for a crime, if it were neces- . "7""? ' 

' Anirnadver- 

sitated ; as if the judge could know what acts ** pn the 
are necessary, unless he knew all that hath an- lsopsrepy - 
teceded, both visible and invisible, and what both 
every thing in itself, and altogether, can effect. 
It is enough to the judge, that the act he con- 
demneth be voluntary. The punishment where- 
of may, if not capital, reform the will of the 
offender ; if capital, the will of others by example. 
For heat in one body doth not more create heat 
in another, than the terror of an example createth 
fear in another, who otherwise were inclined to 
commit injustice. 

Some few lines before, he hath said that I built 
upon a wrong foundation, namely, " that all ma- 
gistrates were at first elective ;" I had forgot to 
tell you, that I never said nor thought it. And 
therefore his reply, as to that point, is imperti- 
nent. 

Not many lines after, for a reason why a man 
may not be justly punished when his crime is 
voluntary, he offereth this : " that law is unjust 
and tyrannical, which commands a man to will, 
that which is impossible for him to will." Where- 
by it appears, he is of opinion that a law may be 
made to command the will. The style of a law is 
do tins ^ or do not this ; or, if thou do this, thou 
shalt suffer this ; but no law runs thus, will this, 
or will not this ; or, if thou have a will to this, 
thou shalt suffer this. He objecteth further, that 
I beg the question, because no man's will is neces- 
sitated. Wherein he mistakes ; for I say no more 
in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, 



182 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. whether he be necessarily willing, or not necessa- 
Anin.adverr" r %> ma Y be justly punished. And upon this mis- 
icm* upon the take he runneth over again his former and already 

Buhop's reply. 11, 

answered nonsense, saying, " we ourselves, by our 
own negligence in not opposing our passions when 
we should and might, have freely given them a 
kind of dominion over us ;" and again, motus pri- 
mo priml^ the first motions are not always in our 
power. Which motus prlmo primly signifies no- 
thing ; and " our negligence in not opposing our 
passions," is the same with " our want of will to 
oppose our will," which is absurd ; and " that we 
have given them a kind of dominion over us," 
either signifies nothing, or that we have a do- 
minion over our wills, or our wills a dominion 
over us, and consequently either we or our wills 
are not free. 

(e) " He pleads moreover that the law is a 
cause of justice," &c. " All this is most true, of 
a just law justly executed." 

But I have shown that all laws are just, as laws, 
and therefore not to be accused of injustice by 
those that ow r e subjection to them ; and a just law 
is always justly executed. Seeing then that he 
confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true, 
it followeth that the reply itself, where it contra- 
dicteth me, is false. 

(f) " He addeth that the sufferings imposed by 
the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act 
passed, but the good to come ; and that the putting 
of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any 
crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, 
except there be a real intention to benefit others 
by his example," 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 183 

This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet NO. xiv. 
forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little pur- A " ? ' 

* A Annnauver- 

pose ; and therefore I pass it over. " upon the 

(g] " First he told us, that it was the irresist- lv>IOI>srepy ' 
ible power of God that justifies all his actions; 
though he command one thing openly, and plot 
another thing secretly; though he be the cause not 
only of the action, but also of the irregularity, &c." 

To all this, which hath been pressed before, I 
have answered before; but that he says I say, 
" having commanded one thing openly, he plots 
another thing secretly/' it is not mine, but one of 
his own ugly phrases. And the force it hath, pro- 
ceedeth out of an apprehension he hath, that af- 
fliction is not God's correction, but his revenge 
upon the creatures of his own making ; and from 
a reasoning he useth, " because it is not just in a 
man to kill one man for the amendment of another, 
therefore neither is it so in God ;" not remember- 
ing that God hath, or shall have killed all the men 
in the world, both nocent and innocent. 

My assertion, he saith, " is a dream, and the 
sum of it this ; that where there is no law, there 
no killing or anything else can be unjust ; that 
before the constitution of commonwealths, every 
man had power to kill another," &c., and adds, that 
" this may well be called stringing of paradoxes." 
To these my words he replies : 

(h) " There was never any time when mankind 
was without governors, laws, and societies." 

It is very likely to be true, that since the crea- 
tion there never was a time in which mankind was 
totally without society. If a part of it were with- 
out laws and governors, some other parts might 



184 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. be commonwealths. He saw there was paternal 
Animadvert government in Adam ; which he might do easily, as 
sions upon the being no deep consideration. But in those places 

Bishop's reply. . n , f . ., . _ r 

where there is a civil war at any time, at the same 
time there is neither laws, nor commonwealth, nor 
society, but only a temporal league, which every 
discontented soldier may depart from when he 
pleases, as being entered into by each man for 
his private interest, without any obligation of con- 
science : there are therefore almost at all times 
multitudes of lawless men. But this was a little too 
remote from his understanding to perceive. Again, 
he denies, that ever there was a time when one pri- 
vate man might lawfully kill another for his own 
preservation ; and has forgotten that these words 
of his (No, ii.), " this is the belief of all mankind, 
which we have not learned from our tutors, but is 
imprinted in our hearts by nature ; we need not 
turn over any obscure books to find out this truth," 
&c. ; which are the words of Cicero in the defence 
of Milo, and translated by the Bishop to the de- 
fence of free-will, were used by Cicero to prove this 
very thing, that it is and hath been always lawful 
for one private man to kill another for his own 
preservation. But where he saith it is not lawful 
ordinarily, he should have shown some particular 
case wherein it is unlawful. For seeing it is a 
" belief imprinted in our hearts," not only I, but 
many more are apt to think it is the law of nature, 
and consequently universal and eternal. And where 
he saith, this right of defence where it is, "is not a 
remainder of some greater power which they have 
resigned, but a privilege which God hath given 
them in case of extreme danger and invincible 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 185 

necessity," &c. ; I also say it is a privilege which NO. xiv. 
God hath given them, but we differ in the manner A ' ' ' 

Ammadver- 

how ; which to me seems this, that God doth not MOM upon the 
account such killing sin. But the Bishop it seems Bl " hops repy ' 
would have it thus : God sends a bishop into the 
pulpit to tell the people it is lawful for a man to 
kill another man when it is necesssary for the 
preservation of his own life ; of which necessity, 
that is, whether it be invincible y or whether the 
danger be extreme, the bishop shall be the judge 
after the man is killed, as being a case of con- 
science. Against the resigning of this our general 
power of killing our enemies, he argues thus : 
" Nothing can give that which it never had ; the 
people whilst they were a dispersed rabble, which 
in some odd cases might happen to be, never had 
justly the power of life and death, and therefore 
they could not give it by their election," &c. 
Needs there much acuteness to understand, what 
number of men soever there be, though not united 
into government, that every one of them in par- 
ticular having a right to destroy whatsoever he 
thinketh can annoy him, may not resign the same 
right, and give it to whom he please, when he 
thinks it conducible to his preservation ? And yet 
it seems he has not understood it. 

He takes it ill that I compare the " murdering 
of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts :" as 
also a little before, he says, " my opinion reflects 
too much upon the honour of mankind : the ele- 
ments are for the plants, the plants for the brute 
beasts, and the brute beasts for man." I pray, 
when a lion eats a man, and a man eats an ox, 
why is the ox more made for the man, than the 



186 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. man for the lion ? " Yes," he saith, " God gave 
Ammadverr man liberty (Gen. ix. 3) to eat the flesh of the 
sions upon the creatures for his sustenance." True, but the lion 

Bishop s reply. 

had the liberty to eat the flesh of man long before. 
But he will say, no ; pretending that no man of 
any nation, or at any time, could lawfully eat flesh, 
unless he had this licence of holy Scripture, which 
it was impossible for most men to have. But how 
would he have been offended, if I had said of man 
as Pliny doth : " quo nullum est animal neque 
miserius, neque superbius ?" The truth is, that 
man is a creature of greater power than other 
living creatures are, but his advantages do con- 
sist especially in two things : whereof one is the 
use of speech, by which men communicate one 
with another, and join their forces together, and 
by which also they register their thoughts that 
they perish not, but be reserved, and afterwards 
joined with other thoughts, to produce general 
rules for the direction of their actions. There be 
beasts that see better, others that hear better, and 
others that exceed mankind in other senses. Man 
excelleth beasts only in making of rules to himself, 
that is to say, in remembering, and in reasoning 
aright upon that which he remembereth. They 
which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. 
But they which mistaking the use of words, de- 
ceive themselves and others, introducing error, 
and seducing men from the truth, are so much 
less to be honoured than brute beasts, as error is 
more vile than ignorance. So that it is not merely 
the nature of man, that makes him worthier than 
other living creatures, but the knowledge that he 
acquires by meditation, and by the right use of rea- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 187 

son in making good rules of his future actions. NO. xiv. 
The other advantage a man hath, is the use of his Aniraa ^ er . ' 
hands for the making of those things which are sion * u i )on the 

Hi i i Bishop's reply. 

instrumental to his well-being. But this advan- 
tage is not a matter of so great honour, but that 
a man may speak negligently of it without offence. 
And for the dominion that a man hath over beasts, 
he saith, " it is lost in part for the sin of man, be- 
cause the strongest creatures, as lions and bears, 
have withdrawn their obedience ; but the most 
profitable and useful creatures, as sheep and oxen, 
do in some degree retain their obedience." I would 
ask the Bishop, in what consisteth the dominion 
of man over a lion or a bear. Is it in an obliga- 
tion of promise, or of debt ? That cannot be ; for 
they have no sense of debt or duty. And I think 
he will not say, that they have received a com- 
mand to obey him from authority. It resteth 
therefore that the dominion of man consists in 
this, that men are too hard for lions and bears, 
because, though a lion or a bear be stronger than 
a man, yet the strength, and art, and especially 
the leaguing and societies of men, are a greater 
power than the ungoverned strength of unruly 
beasts. In this it is that consisteth this dominion 
of man. And for the same reason when a hungry 
lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert, the lion 
hath the dominion over the man, if that of man 
over lions, or over sheep and oxen, may be called 
dominion, which properly it cannot ; nor can it be 
said that sheep and oxen do otherwise obey us, 
than they would do a lion. And if we have do- 
minion over sheep and oxen, we exercise it not as 
dominion, but as hostility ; for we keep them only 



188 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. to labour, and to be killed and devoured by us ; 
^ so *hat ^ ons an ^ bears would be as good masters 



sums upon the to them as we are. By this short passage of his 

Bishop's reply. . .. J 77- T i 

concerning dominion and obedience, I have no 
reason to expect a very shrewd answer from him 
to my Leviathan. 

(i) " The next branch of his answer concerns 
consultations, which, saith he, ' are not superflu- 
ous, though all things come to pass necessarily ; 
because they are the cause which doth necessitate 
the effect, and the means to bring it to pass.' " 

His reply to this is, that he hath " showed suffi- 
ciently, that reason doth not determine the will 
physically/' &c. If not physically, how then ? As 
he hath told us in another place, morally. But 
what it is to determine a thing morally, no man 
living understands. I doubt not but he had there- 
fore the will to write this reply, because I had 
answered his treatise concerning true liberty. My 
answer therefore was, at least in part, the cause 
of his writing ; yet that is the cause of the nimble 
local motion of his fingers. Is not the cause of 
local motion physical ? His will therefore was 
physically, and extrinsically, and antecedently, and 
not morally caused by my writing. 

(k) " He adds further that ' as the end is neces- 
sary, so are the means, and when it is determined 
that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is 
determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.' 
All which is truth, but not the whole truth," &c. 

Is it not enough that it is truth ? Must I put all 
the truth I know into two or three lines ? No. 
I should have added, that God doth adapt and fit 
the means to their respective ends, free means to 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 189 

free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, NO. xiv. 
necessary means to necessary ends. It may be I ^ l[mm { ver ~' 
would have done so, but for shame. Free, contin- 8io s u p tiw 

l j. 1 A-I j. T_ Bishop's reply. 

gent and necessary are not words that can be 
joined to means or ends, but to agents and actions ; 
that is to say, to things that move or are moved : 
a free agent being that whose motion or action 
is not hindered or stopped, and a free action, that 
which is produced by a free agent. A contingent 
agent is the same with an agent simply. But, be- 
cause men for the most part think those things 
are produced without cause, whereof they do not 
see the cause, they use to call both the agent and 
the action contingent, as attributing it to fortune. 
And therefore, when the causes are necessary, if 
they perceive not the necessity, they call those 
necessary agents and actions, in things that have 
appetite,//**^ ; and in things inanimate, contingent. 
The rest of his reply to this point is very little of 
it applied to my answer. I note only that where 
he says, " but if God have so ordered the world, 
that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means 
of good, &c. ;" he would fraudulently insinuate 
that it is my opinion, that a man is not free to do 
if he will, and to abstain if he will. Whereas 
from the beginning I have often declared that it is 
none of my opinion ; and that my opinion is only 
this, that he is not free to will, or which is all one, 
he is not master of his future will. After much 
unorderly discourse he comes in with " this is the 
doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute 
necessity ;" which is impertinent ; seeing nothing 
flows from it more than may be drawn from the 
confession of an eternal prescience. 



190 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. (1) " But he tells me in great sadness, that c my 
Animadver argument is no better than this ; if I shall live till 
sic upon the to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I 

Bishop s reply. ' ' 

run myself through with a sword to-day ; which, 
saith he, is a false consequence, and a false propo- 
sition.' Truly, if by running through, he under- 
stand killing, it is a false or rather a foolish pro- 
position." He saith right. Let us therefore see 
how it is not like to his. He says, " if it be ab- 
solutely necessary that a man shall live till to- 
morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him 
to consult whether he should die to-day or not." 
66 And this," he says, " is a true consequence." I 
cannot perceive how it is a better consequence 
than the former ; for if it be absolutely necessary 
that a man should live till to-morrow, and in 
health, which may also be supposed, why should 
he not, if he have the curiosity, have his head cut 
off to try what pain it is. But the consequence is 
false ; for if there be a necessity of his living, it is 
necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a 
curiosity. But he cannot yet distinguish between a 
seen and an unseen necessity, and that is the cause 
he believeth his consequence to be good. 

(m) " The next branch of my argument con- 
cerns admonitions," &c. 

Which he says is this : " If all things be neces- 
sary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish 
men of understanding, than fools, children, or 
madmen ; but that they do admonish the one and 
not the other, is confessedly true ; and no reason 
under heaven can be given for it but this, that the 
former have the use of reason and true liberty, 
with a dominion over their own actions, which 
children, fools, and madmen have not." 



LIBEJITY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 191 

The true reason why we admonish men and not NO. xiv. 
children. &c., is because admonition is nothing; " 

7 m 7 O Aiiimiulvcr- 

else but telling a man the good and evil conse- MO upon t\ 

r-t* j rrn T i Bishop's reply. 

quences or his actions. Ihey who have experience 
of good and evil, can better perceive the reasona- 
bleness of such admonition, than they that have 
not ; and such as have like passions to those of the 
admonitor, do more easily conceive that to be 
good or bad which the admonitor saith is so, 
than they who have great passions, and such as 
are contrary to his. The first, which is want of 
experience, maketh children and fools unapt ; and 
the second, which is strength of passion, maketh 
madmen unwilling to receive admonition ; for 
children are ignorant, and madmen in an error, 
concerning what is good or evil for themselves. 
This is not to say children and madmen want true 
liberty, that is, the liberty to do as they will, nor 
to say that men of judgment, or the admonitor 
himself 'hath a dominion over his own actions, 
more than children or madmen, (for their actions 
are also voluntary), or that when he admonisheth 
he hath always the use of reason, though he have 
the use of deliberation, which children, fools, mad- 
men, and beasts also have. There be, therefore, 
reasons under heaven which the Bishop knows 
not of. 

Whereas I had said, that things necessary may be 
praiseworthy, and to praise a thing is to say it is 
good, he distinguished and saith : 

(w) " True, but this goodness is not a metaphy- 
sical goodness; so whatsoever hath a being is good; 
nor a natural goodness ; the praise of it passeth 
wholly to the Author of nature, &c. ; but a moral 



192 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. goodness, or a goodness of actions, rather than of 
Anm?adver-~ things. The moral goodness of an action is the 
ions upon the conformity of it to right reason/' &c. 

There hath been in the Schools derived from 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, an old proverb rather 
than an axiom : ens, honum, et verum convertuntur. 
From hence the Bishop hath taken this notion of 
a metaphysical goodness, and his doctrine that 
whatsoever hath a being is good ; and by this in- 
terpreteth the words of Gen. i. 31 : God saw all 
that he had made, and it was very good. But the 
reason of those words is, that good is relative to 
those that are pleased with it, arid not of absolute 
signification to all men. God therefore saith, 
that all that he had made was very good, because 
he was pleased with the creatures of his own 
making. But if all things were absolutely good, 
we should be all pleased with their being, which 
we are not, when the actions that depend upon 
their being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to 
speak properly, nothing is good or evil but in re- 
gard of the action that proceedeth from it, and 
also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. 
Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruc- 
tion, but good to God, because he executeth his 
commandments. And so his metaphysical good- 
ness is but an idle term, and not the member of a 
distinction. And as for natural goodness and 
evilness, that also is but the goodness and evil- 
ness of actions ; as some herbs are good because 
they nourish, others evil because they poison us ; 
and one horse is good because he is gentle, strong, 
and carrieth a man easily ; another bad, because he 
resisteth, goeth hard, or otherwise displeaseth us ; 



LIBEKTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 193 

and that quality of gentleness, if there were no N o. xiv. 
more laws amongst men than there is amongst A T ' 

^ Ammauver- 

beasts, would be as much a moral good in a horse < upon the 

T * -i i / Bishop's reply. 

or other beast as in a man. It is the law from 
whence proceeds the difference between the moral 
and the natural goodness : so that it is well enough 
said by him, that "moral goodness is the confor- 
mity of an action with right reason" ; and better 
said than meant ; for this right reason, which is 
the law, is no otherwise certainly right than by 
our making it so by our approbation of it and 
voluntary subjection to it. For the law-makers 
are men, and may err, and think that law, which 
they make, is for the good of the people some- 
times when it is not. Arid yet the actions of 
subjects, if they be conformable to the law, are 
morally good, and yet cease not to be naturally 
good ; and the praise of them passeth to the Au- 
thor of nature, as well as of any other good what- 
soever. From whence it appears that moral praise 
is not, as he says, from the good use of liberty, 
but from obedience to the laws ; nor moral dis- 
praise from the bad use of liberty, but from dis- 
obedience to the laws. And for his consequence, 
" if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is 
quite taken away, and with it all true praise and 
dispraise", there is neither truth in it, nor argument 
offered for it ; for there is nothing more necessary 
than the consequence of voluntary actions to the 
will. And whereas I had said, that to say a thing 
is good, is to say it is as I or another would wish, 
or as the state would have it, or according to the 
law of the land, he answers, that " I mistake infi- 
nitely". And his reason is, because " we often 
VOL. v. o 




194 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. wish what is profitable or delightful, without re- 
garding as we ought what is honest". There is no 
man ^ n g that seet h all the consequences of an 
action from the beginning to the end, whereby to 
weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole 
sum of the evil consequence. We choose no 
further than we can weigh. That is good to 
every man, which is so far good as he can see. 
All the real good, which we call honest and mo- 
rally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to 
the law, civil or natural ; for the law is all the right 
reason we have, and, (though he, as often as it dis- 
agreeth with his own reason, deny it), is the infalli- 
ble rule of moral goodness. The reason whereof 
is this, that because neither mine nor the Bishop's 
reason is right reason fit to be a rule of our 
moral actions, we have therefore set up over our- 
selves a sovereign governor, and agreed that his 
laws shall be unto us, whatsoever they be, in the 
place of right reason, to dictate to us what is really 
good. In the same manner as men in playing turn 
up trump, and as in playing their game their 
morality consisteth in not renouncing, so in our 
civil conversation our morality is all contained in 
not disobeying of the laws. 

To my question, " whether nothing could please 
him, that proceeded from necessity", he answers : 
" yes ; the fire pleaseth h im when he is cold, and 
he says it is good fire, but does not praise it 
morally". He praiseth, he says, first the Creator 
of the fire, and then him who provided it. He 
does well ; yet he praiseth the fire when he saith 
it is good, though not morally. He does not say 
it is a just fire, or a wise, or a well-mannered fire, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 195 

obedient to the laws ; but these attributes it seems NO. xiv. 
he gives to God, as if justice were not of his na- A ^~^7^ 
ture, but of his manners. And in praising morally s > u p n the 

. i , . i Bishop's reply. 

him that provided it, he seems to say, he would 
not say the fire was good, if he were not morally 
good that did provide it. 

To that which I had answered concerning re- 
ward and punishment, he hath replied, he says, 
sufficiently before, and that that which he dis- 
courseth here, is not only to answer me, but also 
to satisfy himself, and saith : 

(o) " Though it be not urged by him, yet I do 
acknowledge that I find some improper and analo- 
gical rewards and punishments, used to brute 
beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog," &o. 

For my part, I am too dull to perceive the dif- 
ference between those rewards used to brute 
beasts, and those that are used to men. If they 
be not properly called rewards and punishments, 
let him give them their proper name. It may be 
he will say, he has clone it in calling them analogi- 
cal ; yet for any thing that can be understood 
thereby, he might have called them paragogical, 
or typical, or topical, if he had pleased. He adds 
further, that whereas he had said that the actions 
of bees and spiders were done without consulta- 
tion, by mere instinct of nature, and by a determi- 
nation of their fancies, I misallege him, and say 
he made their individual actions necessary. I have 
only this to answer, that, seeing he says that by 
instinct of nature their fancies were determined 
to special kinds of works, I might justly infer they 
were determined every one of them to some work ; 
and every work is an individual action ; for a kind 

02 



196 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xiv. of work in the general, is no work. But these 
AnbrmdverT their individual actions, he saith, " are contingent, 
sions pon the an( j therefore not necessary" ; which is no good 

Bishop's reply. //! i 

consequence : for IT he mean by contingent, that 
which has no cause, he speaketh not as a Chris- 
tian, but maketh a Deity of fortune; which I verily 
think he doth not. But if he mean by it, that 
whereof he knoweth riot the cause, the conse- 
quence is nought. 

The means whereby setting-dogs, and coy- 
ducks, and parrots, are taught to do what they do, 
" is by their backs, by their bellies, by the rod, or 
by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or 
resemblance of rewards and punishments : but 
we take the word here properly, not as it is used 
by vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and 
philosophers," &c. Does not the Bishop know 
that the belly hath taught poets, and historians, 
and divines, and philosophers, and artificers, their 
several arts, as well as parrots ? Do not men do 
their duty with regard to their backs, to their 
necks, and to their morsels, as well as setting- 
dogs, coy-ducks, and parrots ? Why then are 
these things to us the substance, and to them but 
the shadow or resemblance of rewards or punish- 
ments ? 

(p) " When brute creatures do learn any such 
'qualities, it is not out of judgment or deliberation 
or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing 
from another, which they are not capable of; 
neither are they able to conceive a reason of what 
they do," &c. : but " they remember that when 
they did after one manner, they were beaten, 
and when they did after another manner, they 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 197 

were cherished ; and accordingly they apply them- NO. xiv. 



. . . 

If the Bishop had considered the cogitations <>"* upon the 
of his own mind, not then when he disputeth, but lsiopsrepy ' 
then when he followed those businesses which he 
calleth trifles, he would have found them the very 
same which he here mentioneth ; saving instead of 
beating, (because he is exempt from that), he is to 
put in damage. For, setting aside the discourse 
of the tongue in words of general signification, 
the ideas of our minds are the same with those of 
other living creatures, created from visible, audi- 
ble, and other sensible objects to the eyes and 
other organs of sense, as their's are. For as the 
objects of sense are all individual, that is, singular, 
so are all the fancies proceeding from their opera- 
tions ; and men reason not but in words of univer- 
sal signification, uttered or tacitly thought on. 
But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of words to 
be the ideas of those things which the words sig- 
nify ; and that all fancies are not effected by the 
operation of objects upon the organs of our senses. 
But to rectify him in those points is greater labour 
(unless he had better principles) than I am willing, 
or have at this time leisure, to undergo. 

Lastly, whereas he says, " if their individual ac- 
tions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could 
not alter them" : that is true. For it is fear 
and hope, that makes them necessarily what they 
are. 

NO. xv. 

7. D. " Thirdly, let this opinion be once radi- 
cated in the minds of men, that there is no true 



198 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv, liberty, and that all things come to pass inevita- 
v - B ; -' bly, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. 
reply. Who will bewail his sins with tears ? What will 

become of that grief, that zeal, that indignation, 
that holy revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if 
men be once thoroughly persuaded that they could 
not shun what they did ? A man may grieve for 
that which he could not help ; but he will never 
be brought to bewail that as his own fault, which 
flowed not from his own error, but from antece- 
dent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous 
to perform obedience, that believeth there are in- 
evitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, 
which he can neither go beyond, nor come short 
of ? To what end shall he pray God to avert 
those evils which are inevitable, or to confer 
those favours which are impossible ? We indeed 
know not what good or evil shall happen to us : 
but this we know, that if all things be necessary, 
our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that 
which must be. In a word, the only reason why 
those persons, who tread in this path of fatal 
destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve 
God, is because the light of nature, and the 
strength of reason, and the evidence of Scripture, 
do for that present transport them from their ill- 
chosen grounds, and expel those stoical fancies 
out of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither 
pray, nor repent, nor serve God to any purpose. 
Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as 
commonwealth, religion as well as policy." 

T. H. His third argument consisteth in other in- 
conveniences which he saith will follow, namely, 
impiety and negligence of religious duties, re- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE, 199 

pentance and zeal to God's service. To which I NO. xv. 
answer, as to the rest, that they follow not. I 
must confess, if we consider the far greatest part 
of mankind, not as they should be, but as they 
are, that is, as men whom either the study of 
acquiring wealth or preferments, or whom the 
appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of 
meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong prin- 
ciples, have made unapt to discuss the truth of 
things, that the dispute of this question will rather 
hurt than help their piety. And therefore, if he 
had not desired this answer, I would not have 
written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your 
Lordship and he will keep it private. Neverthe- 
less, in very truth, the necessity of events does 
not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For 
piety consisteth only in two things ; one, that we 
honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think 
of his power as highly as we can : for to honour 
any thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of 
great power. The other, that we signify that 
honour and esteem by our w r ords and actions, 
which is called cidtus or worship of God. He 
therefore, that thinketh that all things proceed 
from God's eternal will, and consequently are 
necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? 
does he not esteem of his power as highly as is 
possible ; which is to honour God as much as can 
be in his heart ? Again, he that thinketh so, is he 
not more apt by external acts and words to ac- 
knowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? 
Yet is this external acknowledgment the same 
thing which we call worship. So this opinion 
fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally and in- 



200 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. ternally, and therefore is far from destroying it. 
The Bishop ^ n ^ ^ or re p en t ance j which is nothing but a glad 
**P I J- returning into the right way after the grief of be- 
ing out of the way, though the cause that made him 
go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason 
why he should not grieve ; and again, though the 
cause w r hy he returned into the way were neces- 
sary, there remain still the causes of joy. So 
that the necessity of the actions taketh away 
neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the 
error, nor joy for the returning. And for prayer, 
whereas he saith that the necessity of things de- 
stroys prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be 
none of the causes that move God's will, his will 
being unchangeable, yet since we find in God's 
word, he will not give his blessings but to those 
that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same. 
Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the bless- 
ings. And the prayer is decreed together in the 
same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It 
is manifest, that thanksgiving is no cause of the 
blessing passed ; and that which is passed, is sure 
and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks are 
in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, 
though we should expect no new benefit for our 
gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but 
thanksgiving for his blessings in general ; and 
though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet 
it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification 
that we expect nothing but from God, in such 
manner as He, not as we will. And our Saviour 
by w r ord of mouth bids us pray, " thy will, not our 
will be done"; and by example teaches us the same; 
for he prayed thus : Father, if it be thy will) let 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 201 

this cup pass, &c. The end of prayer, as of NO. xv. 
thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God IT * ~ ' 

m y The Bishop s 

Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can 
be effected by Him only. 

/. D. " I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, 
that it is not the coveteousness, or ambition, or sen- 
suality, or sloth, or prejudice of his readers, which 
render this doctrine of absolute necessity dange- 
rous, but that it is, in its own nature, destructive to 
true godliness ; () and though his answer consist 
more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not 
willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. 
(I) First, he errs in making inward piety to con- 
sist merely in the estimation of the judgment. If 
this were so, what hinders but that the devils should 
have as much inward piety as the best Christians ? 
For they esteem God's power to be infinite, and 
tremble. Though inward piety do suppose the 
act of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly 
in the act of the will, being that branch of justice 
which gives to God the honour which is due unto 
him. Is there no love due to God, no faith, no 
hope ? (c) Secondly, he errs in making inward piety 
to ascribe no glory to God, but only the glory of 
his power or omnipotence. What shall become 
of all other the Divine attributes, and particularly 
of his goodness, of his truth, of his justice, of his 
mercy, which beget a more true and sincere 
honour in the heart than greatness itself ? Mag- 
nos facile laudamus, bonos lubenter. (d) Thirdly, 
this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the 
truth of God, making him to command one thing 
openly, and to necessitate another privately ; to 
chide a man for doing that which he hath deter- 



202 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. mined him to do ; to profess one thing, and to 
The Bishop's intend another. It destroys the goodness of God, 
making him to be a hater of mankind, and to de- 
light in the torments of his creatures; whereas 
the very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus, in pity 
and commiseration of him. It destroys the jus- 
tice of God, making him to punish the creatures 
for that which was his own act, which they had no 
more power to shun, than the fire hath power not 
to burn. It destroys the very power of God, 
making him to be the true author of all the defects 
and evils which are in the world. These are the 
fruits of impotence, not of omnipotence. He who 
is the effective cause of sin, either in himself or in 
the creature, is not almighty. There needs no 
other devil in the world to raise jealousies and sus- 
picions between God and his creatures, or to poi- 
son mankind with an apprehension that God doth 
not love them, but only this opinion, which was 
the office of the serpent (Gen. iii. 5). Fourthly, 
for the outward worship of God ; (e) how shall 
a man praise God for his goodness, who believes 
him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the 
world ; who creates millions to burn eternally, 
without their fault, to express his power ? How 
shall a man hear the word of God with that reve- 
rence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, 
who believeth that God causeth his gospel to be 
preached to the much greater part of Christians, 
not with any intention that they should be con- 
verted and saved, but merely to harden their 
hearts, and to make them inexcusable ? How shall 
a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort 
and confidence, as a seal of God's love in Christ, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 203 

who believeth that so many millions are positively NO. xv. 
excluded from all fruit and benefit of the passions ^~ ^ ish0 p. 
of Christ, before they had done either good or evil ? fly- 
How shall he prepare himself with care and con- 
science, who apprehendeth that eating and drink- 
ing unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but, 
because God would damn a man, therefor he 
necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily? 
How shall a man make a free vow to God without 
gross ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able 
to perform nothing but as he is extrinsically ne- 
cessitated ? Fifthly, for repentance, how shall a 
man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who 
thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound 
up by God, and that he can go neither longer nor 
shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he 
is ordered by God ? If God sets him right, he 
goes right ; if God sets him wrong, he goes wrong. 
How can a man be said to return into the right 
way, who never was in any other way but that 
which God himself had chalked out for him ? 
What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute 
of all power, but as if a man should purpose 
to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath 
not a groat in his purse, purpose to build hos- 
pitals ? 

"We use to say, admit one absurdity, and a 
thousand w r ill follow. To maintain this unrea- 
sonable opinion of absolute necessity, he is necessi- 
tated (but it is hypothetically, he might change his 
opinion if he would) to deal with all ancient writers 
as the Goths did with the Romans, who destroyed 
all their magnificent works, that there might remain 
no monument of their greatness upon the face of the 



204 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. earth. Therefore he will not leave so much as one 
The Bishop's f t* 16 * 1 " opinions, nor one of their definitions, nay, 
re p ] y- not one of their terms of art standing. (/) Ob- 

serve what a description he hath given us here of 
repentance : ' it is a glad returning into the right 
way, after the grief of being out of the way'. It 
amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in 
the description of repentance. His repentance is 
not that repentance, nor his piety that piety, nor 
his prayer that kind of prayer, which the Church 
of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, 
and sackcloth, and ashes, and tears, and humi- 
cubcttioHs, used to be companions of repentance. 
Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. 
(g) It is a returning; but whose act is this return- 
ing ? Is it God's alone, or doth the penitent person 
concur also freely with the grace of God ? If it be 
God's alone, then it is his repentance, not man's re- 
pentance. What need the penitent person trouble 
himself about it? God will take care of his own work. 
The Scriptures teach us otherwise, that God expects 
our concurrence (Revel, iii. 19, 20) : Be zealous and 
repent : behold I stand at the door and knock ; if 
any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will 
come in to him. It is a ' glad returning into the 
right way'. Why dare any man call that a wrong 
way, which God himself hath determined ? He 
that willeth and doth that which God would have 
him to will and to do, is never out of his right 
way. It follows in his description, after the grief, 
&c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which 
is necessarily imposed upon him; but he can- 
not grieve for it as a fault of his own, if it never 
was in his power to shun it. Suppose a writing- 



LIBERTY,, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 205 

master shall hold his scholar's hand in his, and NO. xv. 
write with it ; the scholar's part is only to hold still ' ' 

. n -n i The Bishops 

his hand, whether the master write well or ill ; the reply. 
scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow, as 
for himself ; no man will interpret it to be his act, 
but his master's. It is no fault to be out of the 
right way, if a man had not liberty to have kept 
himself in the way. 

" And so from repentance he skips quite over 
new obedience to come to prayer, which is the last 
religious duty insisted upon by me here. But ac- 
cording to his use, without either answering or 
mentioning what I say ; which would have showed 
him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not con- 
templative prayer in general, as it includes thanks- 
giving, but that most proper kind of prayer which 
we call petition, which used to be thus defined, 
to be an act of religion by which we desire of God 
something which \ve have not, and hope that we 
shall obtain it by him ; quite contrary to this, 
T. H. tells us, (h) that prayer 'is not a cause nor 
a means of God's blessing, but only a signification 
that we expect it from him'. If he had told us 
only, that prayer is not a meritorious cause of 
God's blessings, as the poor man by begging an 
alms doth not deserve it, I should have gone along 
with him. But to tell us, that it is not so much as 
a means to procure God's blessing, and yet with 
the same breath, that ' God will not give his bless- 
ings but to those w r ho pray', who shall reconcile him 
to himself? The Scriptures teach us otherwise, 
(Johnxvi. 23): Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father 
in my name, he will give it you: (Matth. vii. 7) : 
Aslt> and it shall be given you, seek, and ye shall 



206 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you. 
St. Paul tells the Corinthians (2 Cor. i. 11), that 
he was helped by their prayers : that is not all ; 
that the gift was bestowed upon him by their 
means. So prayer is a means. And St. James 
saith (chap. v. 16) : The effectual fervent prayer 
of a righteous man availeth much. If it be effec- 
tual, then it is a cause. To show this efficacy of 
prayer, our Saviour useth the comparison of a 
father towards his child, of a neighbour towards 
his neighbour ; yea, of an unjust judge, to shame 
those who think that God hath not more compas- 
sion than a wicked man. This was signified by 
Jacob's wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer 
is like the tradesman's tools, wherewithal he gets 
his living for himself and his family. But, saith 
he, ' God's will is unchangeable'. What then ? He 
might as well use this against study, physic, and 
all second causes, as against prayer. He shows 
even in this, how little they attribute to the en- 
deavours of men. There is a great difference be- 
tween these two: mutare voluntatem, to change 
the will ; (which God never doth, in whom there is 
not the least shadow of turning by change; his 
will to love and hate was the same from eternity, 
which it now is and ever shall be ; his love and 
hatred are immovable, but we are removed ; non 
tellus cymbam, tellurem cymba reliquit) ; and velle 
mutationem, to will a change ; which God often 
doth. To change the will, argues a change in the 
agent ; but to will a change, only argues a change 
in the object. It is no inconstancy in a man to 
love or to hate as the object is changed. Freest a 
mihi omnia eadem, et idem sum. Prayer works not 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 207 

upon God, but us ; it renders not him more pro- NO. xv. 
pitious iu himself, but us more capable of mercy. ' 7^, 
He saith this, ' that God doth not bless us, except re P i y . 
we pray, is a motive to prayer'. Why talks he of 
motives, who acknowledged no liberty, nor ad- 
mits any cause but absolutely necessary ? He saith, 
' prayer is the gift of God, no less than the bless- 
ing which we pray for, and contained in the same 
decree with the blessing'. It is true, the spirit of 
prayer is the gift of God. Will he conclude from 
thence, that the good employment of one talent, 
or of one gift of God, may not procure another ? 
Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise : Come thou 
good and faithful servant, thou hast been faith- 
ful in little, I will make thee rider over much. 
Too much light is an enemy to the sight, and too 
much law is an enemy to justice. I could wish 
we wrangled less about God's decrees, until we 
understood them better. But, saith he, ' thanks- 
giving is no cause of the blessing past, and prayer 
is but a thanksgiving'. He might even as well tell 
me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when 
he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanks- 
giving is a kind of prayer, but every prayer, and 
namely petition, is not a thanksgiving. In the 
last place he urgeth, that c in our prayers we are 
bound to submit our wills to God's will.' Who ever 
made any doubt of this ? We must submit to the 
preceptive will of God, or his commandments ; we 
must submit to the effective will of God, when he 
declares his good pleasure by the event or other- 
wise. But we deny, and deny again, either that 
God wills things ad extra, without himself, neces- 
sarily, or that it is his pleasure that all second 



208 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. causes should act necessarily at all times ; which is 
* ' ' the question, and that which he allegeth to the 
contrary comes not near it. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP* S REPLY NO. XV. 

Animadver- ( a \ ^nd though his answer consist more of 

sions upon the v ' 

Bishop's reply, oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not will- 
ingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed." 

It is a promise of great exactness, and like to 
that which is in his Epistle to the Reader : " Here 
is all that passed between us upon this subject, 
without any addition or the least variation from 
the original," &c.: which promises w r ere both need- 
less, and made out of gallantry ; and therefore he 
is the less pardonable in case they be not very 
rigidly observed. I would therefore have the 
reader to consider, whether these words of mine : 
" our Saviour bids* us pray, thy will, not our will, 
be done, and by example teaches us the same ; for 
he prayed thus : Father, if it be thy will let this 
cup pass" &c. : which seem at least to imply that 
our prayers cannot change the will of God, nor 
divert him from his eternal decree : have been 
weighed by him to a grain, according to his pro- 
mise. Nor hath he kept his other promise any 
better; for (No. vin.) replying to these words 
of mine, " if he had so little to do as to be a spec- 
tator of the actions of bees and spiders, he would 
have confessed not only election, but also art, pru- 
dence, and policy in them," &c., he saith, " yes, 
I have seen those silliest of creatures, and seeing 
their rare works I have seen enough to confute all 
the bold-faced atheists of this age, and their hell- 
ish blasphemies". This passage is added to that 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 209 

which passed between us upon this subject ; for NO. xv. 
it is not in the copy which I have had by me, as ArUraad T ver _ " 
himself coiifesseth, these eight years ; nor is it ions U P Q tlie 

1 i Bishop's reply. 

in the body of the copy he sent to the press, but 
only in the margin, that is to say, added out of 
anger against me, whom he would have men think 
to be one of the bold-faced atheists of this age. 

In the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to 
prove, that it followeth from my opinion, that 
there is no use of piety. My opinion is no more 
than this, that a man cannot so determine to-day, 
the will which he shall have to the doing of any 
action to-morrow, as that it may not be changed 
by some external accident or other, as there shall 
appear more or less advantage to make him per- 
severe in the will to the same action, or to will it 
no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt 
at a certain time, if he see that* the detaining of 
the money for a little longer may advantage him- 
self, and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent 
likely to follow upon the detention, he hath his will 
changed by the advantage, and therefore had not 
determined his will himself ; but when he fore- 
seeth discredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his 
will remaineth the same, and is determined by the 
thoughts he hath of his creditor, who is therefore 
an external cause of the determination of the 
debtor's will. This is so evident to all men living, 
though they never studied school-divinity, that it 
will be very strange if he draw from it the great 
impiety he pretends to do. Again, my opinion is 
only this : that whatsoever God foreknows shall 
come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall 
not come to pass ; but that which cannot pos- 
VOL. v. p 



210 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. sibly not come to pass, that is said by all men to 

Ammadvei-r come to pass necessarily ; therefore all events that 

sions upon the Qod foreknows shall come to pass, shall come to 

pass necessarily. If therefore the Bishop draw 

impiety from this, he falleth into the impiety of 

denying God's prescience. Let us see now how 

he reasoneth. 

(b) " First, he errs in making inward piety to 
consist merely in the estimation of the judgment. 
If this were so, what hinders but that the devils 
should have as much inward piety as the best 
Christians ; for they esteem God's power to be infi- 
nite, and tremble ?" 

I said, that two things concurred to piety ; one, 
to esteem his power as highly as is possible ; the 
other, that we signify that estimation by our 
words and actions, that is to say, that we worship 
him. This latter part of piety he leaveth out ; 
and then, it is much more easy to conclude as he 
doth, that the devils may have inward piety. But 
neither so doth the conclusion follow. For good- 
ness is one of God's powers, namely, that power 
by which he worketh in men the hope they have 
in him ; and is relative ; and therefore, unless 
the devil think that God will be good to him, he 
cannot esteem him for his goodness. It does not 
therefore follow from any opinion of mine, that 
the devil may have as much inward piety as a 
Christian. But how does the Bishop know how 
the devils esteem God's power ; and what devils 
does he mean f There are in the Scripture two 
sorts of things, which are in English translated 
devils. One, is that which is called Satan, Diabo- 
lus, and Abaddon, which signifies in English, an 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 211 

enemy , an accuser, arid a destroyer of the Church NO. xv. 
of God. In which sense, the devils are but . " ? ' 

7 Aniraadver- 

wicked men. How then is he sure that they v n8 u p n tha 
esteem God's power to be infinite ? For, trembling 
infers no more than that they apprehend it to be 
greater than their own. The other sort of devils 
are called in the Scripture dcemonia, which are 
the feigned Gods of the heathen, and are neither 
bodies nor spiritual substances, but mere fancies, 
and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the 
Greeks and other heathen people, and which St. 
Paul calleth nothings ; for an idol, saith he, is 
nothing. Does the Bishop mean, that these no- 
things esteem God's power to be infinite and 
tremble f There is nothing that has a real being, 
but God, and the world, and the parts of the 
world ; nor has anything a feigned being, but the 
fictions of men's brains. The- world and the 
parts thereof are corporeal, endued with the di- 
mensions of quantity, and with figure. I should 
be glad to know, in what classes of entities which 
is a word that schoolmen use, the Bishop ranketh 
these devils, that so much esteem God's power, 
and yet not love him nor hope in him, if he 
place them not in the rank of those men who 
are enemies to the people of God, as the Jews did. 

(c) " Secondly, he errs in making inward piety 
to ascribe no glory to God, but only the glory of 
his power or omnipotence. What shall become 
of all other the Divine attributes, and particularly 
of his goodness, of his truth, of his justice, of his 
mercy," &c. 

He speaketh of God's goodness and mercy, as if 
they were no part of his power. Is not goodness, 

P2 




212 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv in him that is good, the power to make himself 
beloved, and is not mercy goodness ? Are not, 
therefore, ^ iese attributes contained in the attri- 
bute of his omnipotence ? And justice in God, is 
it anything else, but the power he hath, and exer- 
ciseth in distributing blessings and afflictions ? 
Justice is not in God as in man, the observation of 
the laws made by his superiors. Nor is wisdom 
in God, a logical examination of the means by the 
end, as it is in men ; but an incomprehensible at- 
tribute given to an incomprehensible nature, for 
to honour him. It is the Bishop that errs, in 
thinking nothing to be power but riches and 
high place, wherein to domineer and please him- 
self, and vex those that submit not to his opi- 
nions. 

(d) " Thirdly, this opinion of absolute neces- 
sity destroys the truth of God, making him to 
command one thing openly, and to necessitate 
another privately, &c. It destroys the good- 
ness of God, making him to be a hater of man- 
kind, &c. It destroys the justice of God, making 
him to punish the creatures for that which was 
his own act, &c. It destroys the very power 
of God, making him to be the true author of all 
the defects and evils which are in the world." 

If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this, 
then the opinion of God's prescience does the 
same ; for God foreknoweth nothing, that can pos- 
sibly not come to pass ; but that which cannot pos- 
sibly not come to pass, cometh to pass of necessity. 
But how doth necessity destroy the truth of God, 
by commanding and hindering what he com- 
mandeth? Truth consisteth in affirmation and 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 213 

negation, not in commanding and hindering ; it NO. xv. 
does not therefore follow, if all things be neces- ' ' 

" Animadver- 

sary that come to pass, that therefore God hath foi upon the 
spoken an untruth; nor that he professeth one Bwh P 8 "Pi- 
thing, and intendeth another. The Scripture, 
which is his word, is not the profession of what he 
intendeth, but an indication of what those men 
shall necessarily intend, whom he hath chosen to 
salvation, and whom he hath determined to des- 
truction. But on the other side, from the nega- 
tion of necessity, there followeth necessarily the 
negation of God's prescience ; which is in the 
Bishop, if not ignorance, impiety. Or how " des- 
troyeth it the goodness of God, or maketh him 
to be a hater of mankind, and to delight in the 
torments of his creatures, whereas the very dogs 
licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and commise- 
ration of him "? I cannot imagine, when living 
creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well 
as men, that God can be displeased with it : with- 
out his will, they neither are nor could be at all 
tormented. Nor yet is he delighted with it ; but 
health, sickness, ease, torments, life and death, 
are without all passion in him dispensed by him ; 
and he putteth an end to them then when they 
end, and a beginning when they begin, according 
to his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. 
That the necessity argueth a delight of God in the 
torments of his creatures, is even as true, as that it 
was pity and commiseration in the dogs that 
made them lick the sores of Lazarus. Or how 
doth the opinion of necessity " destroy the justice 
of God, or make him to punish the creatures for 
that which was his own act "? If all afflictions be 



214 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. punishments, for whose act are all other creatures 
Animadver^ punished which cannot sin ? Why may not God 
MOM upon the make the affliction, both of those men that he hath 

Bishop's reply. 7 , ,, ., 

elected, and also of those whom he hath repro- 
bated, the necessary causes of the conversion of 
those he hath elected ; their own afflictions serving 
therein as chastisements, and the afflictions of 
the rest as examples ? But he may perhaps think 
it no injustice to punish the creatures that can- 
not sin with temporary punishments, when never- 
theless it would be injustice to torment the same 
creatures eternally. This may be somewhat to 
meekness and cruelty, but nothing at all to jus- 
tice and injustice : for in punishing the innocent, 
the injustice is equal, though the punishments 
be unequal. And what cruelty can be greater 
than that which may be inferred from this opi- 
nion of the Bishop ; that God doth torment eter- 
nally, and with the extremest degree of torment, 
all those men which have sinned, that is to say, 
all mankind from the creation to the end of 
the world which have not believed in Jesus Christ, 
whereof very few r , in respect of the multitude of 
others, have so much as heard of his name ; and 
this, when faith in Christ is the gift of God himself, 
and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame 
them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them 
to believe r He hath no reason therefore, for his 
part, to tax any opinion, for ascribing to God either 
cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it " destroy the 
power of God, or make him to be the author of all 
the defects and evils which are in the world*'? 
First, he seemeth not to understand what author 
signifies. Author, is he which owneth an action, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 215 

or giveth a warrant to do it. Do I say, that any NO. xv. 
man hath in the Scripture, which is all the war- A ' ' 

x Ammauver- 

rant we have from God for any action whatsoever, *ions upon the 

a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other I " lopsrepy ' 

sin ? Does the opinion of necessity infer that 

there is such a warrant in the Scripture ? Perhaps 

he will say, no, but that this opinion makes him 

the cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think 

him the cause of all actions ? And are not sins of 

commission actions ? Is murder no action ? And 

does not God himself say, non est malum in civi- 

tate quod ego non fed ; and was murder not 

one of those evils ? Whether it were or not, I say 

no more but that God is the cause, not the author, 

of all actions and motions. Whether sin be the 

action, or the defect, or the irregularity, I mean 

not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that 

the distinction of causes into efficient and deficient 

is bohu, and signifies nothing. 

(e) " How shall a man praise God for his good- 
ness, who believes him to be a greater tyrant than 
ever was in the world ; who creates millions to 
burn eternally without their fault, to express his 
power ?" 

If tyrant signify, as it did when it came first in 
use, a king, it is no dishonour to believe that God is 
a greater tyrant than ever was in the world ; for 
he is the King of all kings, emperors, and com- 
monwealths. But if we take the word, as it is now 
used, to signify those kings only, which they that 
call them tyrants, are displeased with, that is, 
that govern not as they would have them, the 
Bishop is nearer the calling him a tyrant, than I 
am ; making that to be tyranny, which is but the 



216 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. exercise of an absolute power ; for he holdeth, 
AnhTT ' though he see it not, by consequence, in withdraw- 
sions upon the ing the will of man from God's dominion, that 
ops rep y. ever y man - g a ifag Q f hi mse i And if a man can- 
not praise God for his goodness, who creates mil- 
lions to burn eternally without their fault ; how 
can the Bishop praise God for his goodness, who 
thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn 
eternally, when he could have kept them so easily 
from committing any fault ? And to his " how shall 
a man hear the word of God with that reverence, 
and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, who be- 
lieveth that God causeth his gospel to be preached to 
the much greater part of Christians, not with any 
intention that they should be converted and saved," 
&c. ; I answer, that those men who so believe, have 
faith in Jesus Christ, or they have not faith in him. 
If they have, then shall they, by that faith, hear 
the word of God with that reverence, and de- 
votion, and faith, which is requisite to salvation. 
And for them that have no faith, I do not think he 
asketh how they shall hear the word of God with 
that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is 
requisite ; for he knows they shall not, until such 
time as God shall have given them faith. Also he 
mistakes, if he think that I or any other Christian 
believe, that God intendeth, by hardening any 
man's heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to 
make his elect the more careful. 

Likewise to his question, " how shall a man re- 
ceive the sacrament with comfort, who belie veth 
that so many millions are positively excluded from 
the benefit of Christ's passion, before they had done 
either good or evil" ; I answer as before, by faith, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 217 

if he be of God's elect ; if not, he shall not receive NO. xv. 
the sacrament with comfort. I may answer also, . " ? " 

* Ammauver- 

that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament sfon upon the 

i fit i t t i Bishop's reply. 

with comfort, by the same way that the bishop 
receiveth it with comfort. For he also believeth 
that many millions are excluded from the benefit 
of Christ's passion, (whether positively or not posi- 
tively is nothing to the purpose, nor doth positively 
signify any thing in this place) ; and that, so long 
before they had either done good or evil, as it 
was known to God before they were born that 
they were so excluded. 

To his " how shall he prepare himself with care 
and conscience, who apprehendeth that eating and 
drinking unworthily is not the cause of damna- 
tion, but because God would damn a man, there- 
fore he necessitates him" : I answer, that he that 
eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not believe 
that God necessitates him to eat and drink un- 
worthily, because he would damn him ; for neither 
does he think he eats and drinks unworthily, 
nor that God intends to damn him ; for he be- 
lieveth no such damnation, nor iutendeth any pre- 
paration. The belief of damnation is an article of 
Christian faith ; so is also preparation to the sa- 
crament. It is therefore a vain question, how he 
that hath no faith shall prepare himself with care 
and conscience to the receiving of the sacrament. 
But to the question, how they shall prepare them- 
selves, that shall at all prepare themselves ; I an- 
swer, it shall be by faith, when God shall give it 
them. 

To his " how shall a man make a free vow to 
God, who thinks himself able to perform nothing, 



218 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. but as he is extrinsically necessitated" : I answer, 
Animadvert that ^ ^ e ma ^e a vow, it is a free vow, or else 
ions upon the it is no vow ; and yet he may know, when he hath 

Bishop's reply. -. / i 

made that vow, though not before, that it was ex- 
trinsically necessitated ; for the necessity of vow- 
ing before he vowed, hindered not the freedom 
of his vow, but made it. 

Lastly, to " how r shall a man condemn and ac- 
cuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be 
like a watch which is wound up by God," &c. : I 
answer, though he think himself necessitated to 
what he shall do, yet, if he do not think him- 
self necessitated and wound up to impenitence, 
there will follow upon his opinion of necessity no 
impediment to his repentance. The Bishop dis- 
puteth not against me, but against somebody that 
holds a man may repent, that believes at the same 
time he cannot repent. 

GO " Observe what a description he has given 
us here of repentance : ' It is a glad returning 
into the right way, after the grief of being out of 
the way.' It amazed me to find gladness to be 
the first word in the description of repentance." 

I could never be of opinion that Christian re- 
pentance could be ascribed to them, that had as 
yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead a 
new r life. He that grieves for the evil that hath 
happened to him for his sins, but hath not a reso- 
lution to obey God's commandments better for the 
time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not 
for his doings ; which no divine, I think, will call 
Christian repentance. But he that resolveth upon 
amendment of life, krioweth that there is forgive- 
ness for him in Christ Jesus ; whereof a Christian 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 219 

cannot possibly be but glad. Before this gladness NO xv> 
there was a grief preparative to repentance, but the ^ - ' 
repentance itself was not Christian repentance till sio^p^tiie 
this conversion, till this glad conversion. There- Bishop ' 8 reply * 
fore I see no reason why it should amaze him to 
find gladness to be the first word in the descrip- 
tion of repentance, saving that the light amazeth 
such as have been long in darkness. And " for the 
fasting, sackcloth, and ashes", they were never 
parts of repentance perfected, but signs of the 
beginning of it. They are external things ; re- 
pentance is internal. This doctrine pertaineth to 
the establishing of Romish penance ; and being 
found to conduce to the power of the clergy, was 
by them wished to be restored. 

(g) " It is a returning ; but whose act is this 
returning ? If it be God's alone, then it is his re- 
pentance, not man's repentance ; what need the 
penitent person trouble himself about it ?" 

This is ill argued ; for why is it God's repentance, 
when he gives man repentance, more than it is 
God's faith, when he gives man faith. But he 
labours to bring in a concurrence of man's will with 
God's will ; and a power in God to give repent- 
ance, if man will take it ; but not the power to 
make him take it. This concurrence he thinks is 
proved by Revel, iii. 19, 20 : " Be zealous, and re- 
pent. Behold, I stand at the door, and knock. If 
any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will 
come in to him". Here is nothing of concurrence, 
nor of anything equivalent to it, nor mention at all 
of the will or purpose, but of the calling or voice by 
the minister. And as God giveth to the minister 
a power of persuading, so he giveth also many 



220 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv. times a concurrence of the auditor with the minis- 
Ammadver. ^ er lli being persuaded. Here is therefore some- 
sions upon the what equivalent to a concurrence with the minister, 

Bishop's reply. t / i T /i 

that is, of man with man ; but nothing of the con- 
currence of man, whose will God frameth as he 
pleaseth, with God that frameth it. And I wonder 
how any man can conceive, when God giveth a man 
a will to do anything whatsoever, how that will, 
when it is not, can concur with God's will to make 
itself be. 

The next thing he excepteth against is this, that 
I hold, (K) " that prayer is not a cause, nor a means 
of God's blessing, but only a signification that we 
expect it from him/' 

First, instead of my words, " a signification that 
we expect nothing but from him," he hath put " a 
signification that we expect it from him". There is 
much difference between my words and his, in the 
sense and meaning ; for in the one, there is honour 
ascribed to God, and humility in him that prayeth ; 
but in the other, presumption in him that prayeth, 
and a detraction from the honour of God. When 
I say, prayer is not a cause nor a means, I take 
cause and means in one and the same sense ; 
affirming that God is not moved by any thing that 
we do, but has always one and the same eternal 
purpose, to do the same things that from eternity 
he hath foreknown shall be done ; and methinks 
there can be no doubt made thereof. But the 
Bishop allegeth (2 Cor. i. 1 1) : that " St. Paul was 
helped by their prayers, and that the gift was 
bestowed upon them by their means ;" and (James 
v. 16): "The effectual and fervent prayer of a 
righteous man availeth much". In which places, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 221 

the words means, effectual, availeth, do not sig- NO. xv. 
nify any causation ; for no man nor creature living Animad T wr ~" 
can work any effect upon God, in whom there is < p< the 

111 i i ni Bishop's reply. 

nothing, that hath not been m him eternally here- 
tofore, nor that shall not be in him eternally here- 
after ; but do signify the order in which God hath 
placed men's prayers and his own blessings. And 
not much after, the Bishop himself saith, " prayer 
works not upon God, but us". Therefore, it is no 
cause of God's will, in giving us his blessings, but 
is properly a sign, not a procuration of his favour. 

The next thing he replieth to is, that I make 
prayer to be a kind of thanksgiving ; to which he 
replies, " he might even as well tell me, that when 
a beggar craves an alms, and when he gives thanks 
for it, it is all one." Why so ? Does not a beggar 
move a man by his prayer, and sometime worketh 
in him a compassion not without pain, and as the 
Scripture calls it, a yearning of the bowels ; which 
is not so in God, when we pray to him ? Our prayer 
to God is a duty ; it is not so to man. Therefore, 
though our prayers to man be distinguished from 
our thanks, it is not necessary it should be so in 
our prayers and thanks to God Almighty. 

To the rest of his reply, in this No. xv, there 
needs no further answer. 

NO. XVI. 

J. D. " Fourthly, the order, beauty, and perfec- 
tion of the world doth require that in the universe 
should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some 
free, some contingent. He that shall make, either 
all things necessary, guided by destiny; or all 
things free, governed by election; or all things 



222 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvr. contingent, happening by chance : doth overthrow 
The Bui^s ^ e b eaut y anc * *he perfection of the world." 
r^y T. H. The fourth argument from reason, is this. 

The order, beauty, and perfection of the world re- 
quireth that in the universe there should be agents 
of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some con- 
tingent. He that shall make all things necessary, 
or all things free, or all things contingent, doth 
overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world. 
In which argument I observe, first, a contradic- 
tion. For seeing he that maketh anything, in that 
he maketh it, he maketh it to be necessary, it fol- 
io weth, that he that maketh all things, maketh all 
things necessary to be. As if a workman make a 
garment, the garment must necessarily be. So if 
God make every thing, every thing must necessa- 
rily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, 
though we know it not, that some agents should 
work without deliberation, which he calls necessary 
agents ; and some agents with deliberation, and 
those both he and I call free agents ; and that 
some agents should work, and we not know how ; 
and those effects we both call contingent. But this 
hinders not, but that he that electeth, may have 
his election necessarily determined to one by for- 
mer causes ; and that which is contingent, and 
imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and 
depend on precedent necessary causes. For by 
contingent, men do not mean that which hath no 
cause, but which hath not for cause any thing 
which we perceive. As for example ; when a tra- 
veller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, 
and the rain had a cause, sufficient enough to pro- 
duce it ; but because the journey caused not the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 223 

rain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were NO. xvi. 
contingent one to another. And thus you see, *~ : t ~T 

~ J * r n, Bishop 8 

though there be three sorts of events, necessary, reply. 
contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary, 
without the destruction of the beauty or perfection 
of the universe. 

J. D. " The first thing he observes in mine argu- 
ment, is contradiction,, as he calls it ; but in truth, 
it is but a deception of the sight, as one candle 
sometimes seems to be two, or a rod in the water 
shows to be two rods ; quicquid recipitur, recipi- 
tur ad modum recipientis. But what is this con- 
tradiction? Because I say, he who maketh all 
things, doth not make them necessary. What! 
a contradiction and but one proposition ! That 
were strange. I say, God hath not made all agents 
necessary ; he saith, God hath made all agents ne- 
cessary. Here is a contradiction indeed ; but it is 
between him and me, not between me and my- 
self. But though it be not a formal contradiction, 
yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in ad- 
jccto. Wherefore to clear the matter, and dispel 
the mist w T hich he hath raised, it is true, that 
everything when it is made, it is necessary that 
it be made so as it is, that is, by a necessity of 
infallibility, or supposition, supposing that it be so 
made ; but this is not that absolute, antecedent ne- 
cessity, whereof the question is between him and 
me. As to use his own instance : before the gar- 
ment be made, the tailor is free to make it either 
of the Italian, Spanish, or French fashion indif- 
ferently ; but after it is made, it is necessary that 
it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it, that 
is, by a necessity of supposition. But this doth 



224 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xv r. neither hinder the cause from being a free cause, 
The Bfcws nor ^e e ff ect fr m being a free effect ; but the 
one did produce freely, and the other was freely 
produced. So the contradiction is vanished." 

" In the second part of his answer, (a) he grants ; 
that there are some free agents, and some contin- 
gent agents, and that perhaps the beauty of the 
world doth require it; but like a shrewd cow, 
which after she hath given her milk casts it down 
with her foot, in the conclusion he tells us, that 
nevertheless they are all necessary. This part of 
his answer is a mere logomachy, as a great part of 
the controversies in the world are, or a contention 
about words. What is the meaning of necessary, 
and free, and contingent actions ? I have showed 
before what free and necessary do properly sig- 
nify ; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all 
agents which want deliberation, to be necessary ; 
but I acknowledge that many of them are contin- 
gent, (b) Neither do I approve his definition of 
contingents, though he say I concur with him, that 
they are ' such agents as work we know not how'. 
For, according to this description, many necessary 
actions should be contingent, and many contingent 
actions should be necessary. The loadstone draw- 
eth iron, the jet chaff, we know not how ; and yet 
the effect is necessary ; and so it is in all sympa- 
thies and antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a 
man walking in the streets, a tile falls down from 
a house, and breaks his head. We know all the 
causes, we know how this came to pass. The man 
walked that way, the pin failed, the tile fell just 
when he was under it ; and yet this is a contin- 
gent effect : the man might not have walked that 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 225 

way, and then the tile had not fallen upon him. NO. xvi. 

Neither vet do I understand here in this place by ^~'. 7 
j ,.ii Tll Bish P s 

contingents, such events as happen beside the fTb 

scope or intention of the agents ; as when a man 
digging to make a grave, finds a treasure ; though 
the word be sometimes so taken. But by contin- 
gents, I understand all things which may be done 
and may not be done, may happen or may not 
happen, by reason of the indetermination or acci- 
dental concurrence of the causes. And those same 
things which are absolutely contingent, are yet 
hypothetically necessary. As supposing the pas- 
senger did walk just that way, just at that time, 
and that the pin did fail just then, and the tile fall ; 
it was necessary that it should fall upon the pas- 
senger's head. The same defence will keep out 
his shower of rain. But we shall meet with his 
shower of rain again, No. xxxiv ; whither I re- 
fer the further explication of this point." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XVI. 

In this number he would prove that there must 
be free agents and contingent agents, as well as 
necessary agents, from the order, beauty, and per- 
fection of the world. I that thought that the or- 
der, beauty, and perfection of the world required 
that which was in the world, and not that which 
the Bishop had need of for his argument, could 
see no force of consequence to infer that which he 
calls free and contingent. That which is in the 
world, is the order, beauty, and perfection which 
God hath given the world ; and yet there are no 
agents in the world, but such as work a seen 
necessity, or an unseen necessity ; and when they 

VOL. V. Q 



226 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvi. work an unseen necessity in creatures inanimate, 
AnimadreiT' t ^ ien are ti 1086 creatures said to be wrought upon 
ions upon too contingently, and to work contingently ; and 

Bibop'a reply. , , J . n i * 

when the necessity unseen is of the actions ot 
men, then it is commonly called free, and might 
be so in other living creatures ; for free and 
voluntary are the same thing. But the Bishop in 
his reply hath insisted most upon this, that I make 
it a contradiction to say that " he that maketh a 
thing, doth not make it necessary", and wonders 
how a contradiction can be in one proposition, and 
yet within two or three lines after found it might 
be. And therefore, to clear the matter, he saith 
that such necessity is not antecedent, but a neces- 
sity of supposition : which, nevertheless, is the 
same kind of necessity which he attributeth to the 
burning of the fire, where there is a necessity that 
the thing thrown into it shall be burned ; though 
yet it be but burning, or but departing from the 
hand that throws it in ; and, therefore, the neces- 
sity is antecedent. The like is in making a gar- 
ment ; the necessity begins from the first motion 
towards it, which is from eternity, though the tai- 
lor and the Bishop are equally insensible of it. If 
they saw the whole order and conjunction of 
causes, they would say it were as necessary as any 
thing else can possibly be ; and therefore God 
that sees that order and conjunction, knows it is 
necessary. 

The rest of his reply is to argue a contradiction 
in me ; for he says, 

(a) " I grant that there are some free agents, 
and some contingent agents, and that perhaps the 
beauty of the world doth require it ; but like a 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 227 

shrewd cow, which, after she hath given her milk, NO . xvi. 
casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion I . * 7 ' 

Ammadver- 

tell him, that nevertheless they are all necessary." on upon the 

T. . . .-i . T n T Bis-hop's reply. 

It is true that I say some are free agents, and 
some contingent ; nevertheless they may be all 
necessary. For according to the significations of 
the words necessary, free, and contingent, the dis- 
tinction is no more but this. Of agents, some are 
necessary, some are contingent, and some are free 
agents ; and of agents, some are living creatures, 
and some are inanimate ; which words are impro- 
per, but the meaning of them is this. Men call ne- 
cessary agents, such as they know to be necessary, 
and contingent agents, such inanimate things as 
they know not whether they work necessarily or no, 
and free agents, men whom they know not whether 
they work necessarily or no. All which confusion 
ariseth from that presumptuous men take for 
granted, that that is not, which they know not. 

(V) " Neither do I approve his definition of con- 
tingents ; that they are such agents as work we 
know not how." 

The reason is, because it would follow that many 
necessary actions should be contingent, and many 
contingent actions necessary. But that which fol- 
io weth from it really is no more but this : that 
many necessary actions would be such as w r e know 
not to be necessary, and many actions which we 
know not to be necessary, may yet be necessary ; 
which is a truth. But the Bishop defineth con- 
tingents thus : " all things which may be done 
and may not be done, may happen or may not 
happen, by reason of the indetermination or acci- 
dental concurrence of the causes". By which defi- 

Q2 



228 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvi. nition, contingent is nothing, or it is the same that 
^ - ' i sa y it j s> p or there is nothing can be done and 

Ammadver- J 

sions upon the not be done, nothing can happen and not happen, 
is ops rep y . ^ re ason of the indetermination or accidental 
concurrence of the causes. It may be done or 
not done for aught he knows, and happen or not 
happen for any determination he perceiveth ; and 
that is my definition. But that the indetermina- 
tion can make it happen or not happen, is absurd ; 
for indetermination maketh it equally to happen 
or not to happen, and therefore both ; which is 
a contradiction. Therefore indetermination doth 
nothing ; and whatsoever causes do, is necessary. 

NO. XVII. 

J. D. " Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take 
away the very nature of evil, and the formal rea- 
son of sin. If the hand of the painter were the 
law of painting, or the hand of the w r riter the 
law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or 
the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing 
therefore that the first cause is the rule and law 
of goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the 
person to evil, either by itself immediately, or 
mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it 
will no longer be evil. The essence of sin con- 
sists in this, that one commit that which he might 
avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin, there 
is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it 
appears, both from Scripture and reason, that 
there is true liberty." 

T. H. To the fifth argument from reason, which 
is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and 
formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer by 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 229 

denying the consequence. The nature of sin con- NO. xvn. 
sisteth in this, that the action done proceed from ' ' ' 

11 i-i 11 A.I .The Bishop's 

our will, and be against the law. A judge, m r ep i y . 
judging whether it be sin or not which is done 
against the law, looks at no higher cause of the 
action than the will of the doer. Now when I 
say the action was necessary, I do not say it was 
done against the will of the doer, but with his will, 
and so necessarily ; because man's will, that is, 
every act of the will, and purpose of man had a 
sufficient, and therefore a necessary cause, and 
consequently every voluntary action was necessi- 
tated. An action therefore may be voluntary 
and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And 
God may afflict by right derived from his omni- 
potency, though sin were not. And the exam- 
ple of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the 
cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less 
frequent ; for God to punish such sinners, as I 
have shewed before, is no injustice. And thus you 
have my answer to his objections, both out of 
Scripture and reason. 

J. D. " Scis tu simulare cupressum. Quid hoc ? 
It was shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to 
Themistocles, when he was busy about his accounts 
to the state ; that he should rather study how to 
make no accounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a 
more compendious way, to baulk an argument, 
than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Row- 
land against an Oliver, if he can urge a reason 
against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself 
fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that 
he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as 
those who have a politic deafness to hear nothing 



230 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvn. but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine 
into form, and then weigh what he saith 
in answer, or rather in opposition to it. (a) That 
opinion which takes away the formal reason of 
sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be 
approved ; this is clear, because both reason and 
religion, nature and Scripture, do prove, and the 
whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But 
this opinion, of the necessity of all things by rea- 
son of a conflux of second causes, ordered and de- 
termined by the first cause, doth take away the 
very formal reason of sin. This is proved thus. 
That which makes sin itself to be good, and just, 
and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and de- 
stroys the essence of sin ; for if sin be good, and 
just, and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no 
anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all 
things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and 
lawful ; for nothing can flow essentially by way 
of physical determination from the first cause, 
which is the law and rule of goodness and justice, 
but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But 
this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by 
way of physical determination from the first cause, 
as appears in T. H.'s whole discourse. Neither is 
it material at all whether it proceed immediately 
from the first cause, or mediately, so as it be by a 
necessary flux of second and determinate causes, 
which produce it inevitably. To these proofs he 
answers nothing, but only by denying the first 
consequence, as he calls it, and then sings over his 
old song, ' that the nature of sin consisteth in this, 
that the action proceed from our will, and be 
against the law', which, in our sense, is most true, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 231 

if he understand a just law, and a free rational NO. xvn. 
will, (b) But supposing, as he doth, that the law * ' ' 

. . , . -i ? - i i i i The Bishop's 

enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, reply. 
then it is an unjust and tyrannical law ; and the 
transgression of it is no sin, not to do that which 
never was in our power to do. And supposing, 
likewise as he doth, that the will is inevitably de- 
termined by special influence from the first cause, 
then it is not man's will, but God's will, and flows 
essentially from the law of goodness. 

(c) " That which he adds of a judge, is altoge- 
ther impertinent as to his defence. Neither is a 
civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the 
land the proper rule of sin. But it makes strongly 
against him ; for the judge goes upon a good 
ground ; and even this which he confesseth, that 
* the judge looks at no higher cause than the will 
of the doer', proves that the will of the doer 
did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor 
had liberty to have kept the law, if he would. 
Certainly, a judge ought to look at all material cir- 
cumstances, and much more at all essential causes. 
Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause, 
will come to be examined more properly, No. xxxi. 
For the present it shall suffice to say, that liberty 
flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from 
the debility of the cause, (d) Nature never in- 
tends the generation of a monster. If all the 
causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is 
produced ; but by reason of the insufficiency, or 
debility, or contingent aberration of some of the 
causes, sometimes a monster is produced. Yet the 
causes of a monster were sufficient for the produc- 
tion of that which was produced, that is a monster : 



232 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvii. otherwise a monster had not been produced. 
Th? Bishop's What is it then ? A monster is not produced 
reply. by virtue of that order which is set in nature, 
but by the contingent aberration of some of the 
natural causes in their concurrence. The order 
set in nature is, that every like should beget its 
like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes 
to be such as it is in the generation of a monster, 
the generation of a monster is necessary ; as all 
the events in the world are when they are, that is, 
by an hypothetical necessity, (e) Then he betakes 
himself to his old help, that God may punish by 
right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. 
The question is not now what God may do, but 
what God will do, according to that covenant which 
he hath made with man, fac hoc et vives, do this 
and thou shalt live. Neither doth God punish 
any man contrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9) : 
Israel) thy destruction is from thyself ; but in 
me is thy help. He that wills not the death of a 
sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent 
creature. By death or destruction in this dis- 
course the only separation of soul and body is not 
intended, which is a debt of nature, and which 
God, as Lord of life and death, may justly do, and 
make it not a punishment, but a blessing to the 
party ; but we understand, the subjecting of the 
creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of 
that benefit which redounds to others from exem- 
plary justice ; which is most true, but not accord- 
ing to his own grounds. For neither is it justice to 
punish a man for doing that which it was impossi- 
ble always for him not to do ; neither is it lawful to 
punish an innocent person, that good may come of 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 233 

it. And if his opinion of absolute necessity of all 
things were true, the destinies of men could not be 
altered, either by examples or fear of punishment." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XVII. NO. XVII 

Whereas he had in his first discourse made this An"^^ 
consequence : " if you take away liberty, you 
away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason 
of sin" : I denied that consequence. It is true, 
he w r ho taketh away the liberty of doing, according 
to the will, taketh away the nature of sin ; but he 
that denieth the liberty to will, does not so. But 
he supposing I understood him not, will needs 
reduce his argument into form, in this manner. 
(a) " That opinion which takes away the formal 
reason of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not 
to be approved." This is granted. "But the opinion 
of necessity doth this." This I deny ; he proves it 
thus: "this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially, 
by way of physical determination from the first 
cause. But whatsoever proceeds essentially by way 
of physical determination from the first cause, is 
good, and just, and lawful. Therefore this opinion 
of necessity maketh sin to be very good, just, and 
lawful." He might as w r ell have concluded, what- 
soever man hath been made by God 5 is a good and 
just man. He observeth not that sin is not a thing 
really made. Those things which at first were ac- 
tions, were not then sins, though actions of the 
same nature with those which were afterwards 
sins ; nor was then the will to anything a sin, 
though it were a will to the same thing, which in 
willing now, we should sin. Actions became sins 
then first, when the commandment came ; for, as 



234 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvii. St. Paul saith, without the law sin is dead ; and 
Animadvert ^ being but a transgression of the law, there 

HODS upon the can k e no action made sin but by the law. There- 
Bishops reply m J 

fore this opinion, though it derive actions essen- 
tially from God, it derives not sins essentially from 
him, but relatively and by the commandment. 
And consequently the opinion of necessity taketh 
not away the nature of sin, but necessitateth that 
action which the law hath made sin. And where- 
as I said the nature of sin consisteth in this, that 
'it is an action proceeding from our will and 
against the law', he alloweth it for true ; and 
therefore he must allow also, that the formal rea- 
son of sin lieth not in the liberty or necessity of 
willing, but in the will itself, necessary or unne- 
cessary, in relation to the law. And whereas he 
limits this truth which he allowed, to this, that the 
law be just, and the will a free rational will, it 
serves to no purpose ; for I have shown before, 
that no law can be unjust. And it seemeth to me 
that a rational will, if it be not meant of a will 
after deliberation, whether he that deliberateth 
reasoneth aright or not, signifieth nothing. A ra- 
tional man is rightly said ; but a rational will, in 
other sense than I have mentioned, is insignifi- 
cant. 

(V) " But supposing, as he doth, that the law 
enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, 
then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and the 
transgression of it no sin," &c. " And supposing 
likewise, as he doth, that the will is inevitably de- 
termined by special influence from the first cause, 
then it is not man's will, but God's will." He mis- 
takes me in this. For I say not the law enjoins 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 235 

things impossible in themselves; for so I should NO. xvn. 
say it enjoined contradictories. But I say the law """"" ' 

11 T t t Animadver- 

sometimes, the law-makers not knowing the secret sums upon the 
necessities of things to come, enjoins things made IS opsrepy ' 
impossible by secret and extrinsical causes from all 
eternity. From this his error he infers, that the 
laws must be unjust and tyrannical, and the trans- 
gression of them no sin. But he who holds that 
laws can be unjust and tyrannical, will easily find 
pretence enough, under any government in the 
world, to deny obedience to the law r s, unless they 
be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be 
made. He says also, that I suppose the w T ill is 
inevitably determined by special influence from 
the first cause. It is true ; saving that senseless 
word influence, w T hich I never used. But his con- 
sequence, " then it is not man's will, but God's 
will", is not true ; for it may be the will both of 
the one and of the other, and yet not by concur- 
rence, as in a league, but by subjection of the will 
of man to the will of God. 

(c) " That which he adds of a judge, is alto- 
gether impertinent as to his defence. Neither is 
a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the 
land a proper rule of sin." A judge is to judge of 
voluntary crimes. He has no commission to look in- 
to the secret causes that make them voluntary. And 
because the Bishop had said the law cannot justly 
punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it 
was no impertinent answer to say, "the judge 
looks at no higher cause than the will of the 
doer". And even this, as he saith, is enough to 
prove, that " the will of the doer did determine 
itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty 



236 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvii. to have kept the law if he would". To which I 
AmmadveT"' answer, that it proves indeed that the malefactor 
sions upon the had liberty to have kept the law if he would ; but 

Bishop's reply. . . iii-iii.* 

it proveth not that he had the liberty to have a 
will to keep the law. Nor doth it prove that the 
will of the doer did determine itself freely ; for, 
nothing can prove nonsense. But here you see 
what the Bishop pursueth in this whole reply, 
namely, to prove that a man hath liberty to do if 
he will, which I deny not ; and thinks when he hath 
done that, he hath proved a man hath liberty to 
will, which he calls the will's determining of itself 
freely. And whereas he adds, " a judge ought to 
look at all essential causes" ; it is answer enough to 
say, he is bound to look at no more than he thinks 
he can see. 

( d) " Nature never intends the generation of a 
monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a 
perfect creature is produced; but by reason of 
the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberra- 
tion of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is 
produced." He had no sooner said this, but find- 
ing his error he retracteth it, and confesseth that 
" the causes of a monster were sufficient for the 
production of that which was produced, that is, of 
a monster ; otherwise a monster had not been 
produced ;" which is all that I intended by suffi- 
ciency of the cause. But whether every sufficient 
cause be a necessary cause or not, he meaneth to 
examine in No. xxxi. In the meantime he 
saith only, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, 
and contingency from the debility of the cause ; 
and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. 
I must note also, that where he says nature never 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 237 

intends the generation of a monster, I understand NO. xvn. 
not whether by nature he means the Author of ' ' 

i / n Animadver- 

nature, in which meaning he derogates from God ; won* upon the 
or nature itself, as the universal work of God; 1!ilopsrepy * 
and then it is absurd ; for the universe, as one 
aggregate of things natural, hath no intention. 
His doctrine that followeth concerning the gene- 
ration of monsters, is not worth consideration ; 
therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the 
reader. 

(e) " Then he betakes himself to his old help, 
that God may punish by right of omnipotence, 
though there were no sin. The question is not, 
now what God may do, but what God will do, 
according to that covenant which he hath made 
w r ith man, Fac hoc et vives, do this and thou 
shalt live." It is plain (to let pass that he puts 
punishment where I put affliction, making a true 
sentence false) that if a man do this he shall live, 
and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop 
and I disagree not. This therefore is not the 
question ; but whether the will to do this, or not 
to do this, be in a man's own election. Whereas 
he adds, ' he that wills not the death of a sinner, 
doth much less will the death of an innocent crea- 
ture' ; he had forgot for awhile, that both good 
and evil men are by the will of God all mortal ; 
but presently corrects himself, and says, he means 
by death, eternal torments, that is to say, eternal 
life, but in torments ; to which I have answered 
once before in this book, and spoken much more 
amply in another book, to which the Bishop hath 
inclination to make an answer, as appeareth by his 
epistle to the reader. That which followeth to the 



238 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

end of this number, hath been urged and answered 
already divers times ; I therefore pass it over. 

NO. xviii. NO. xvm. 

The Bishop's /. D. " But the patrons of necessity being 
reply driven out of the plain field with reason, have cer- 

tain retreats or distinctions which they fly unto 
for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoical 
necessity and Christian necessity, between which 
they make a threefold difference. 

" First, say they, the Stoics did subject Jupiter to 
destiny, but we subject destiny to God. I answ r er, 
that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one and 
the same ; Fatum, quasi ejfatum Jovis. Hear 
Seneca: Destiny is the necessity of all things 
and actions depending upon the disposition of 
Jupiter, &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater 
liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these stoical 
Christians do to God over his decrees, either for 
the beginnings of things, as Euripides, or for the 
progress of them, as Chrysippus, or at least of the 
circumstances of time and place, as all of them 
generally. So Virgil : Sed trailer e et moras ducere, 
&c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him to 
prolong his life, ultra fato constituta tempora, 
beyond the times set down by the destinies. 

" Next, they say, that the Stoics did hold an 
eternal flux and necessary connexion of causes ; 
but they believed that God doth act pr&ter et 
contra naturam, besides and against nature. 
I answer, that it is not much material whether 
they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, 
or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish 
necessity. The former reasons do not only con- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 239 

demn the ground or foundation of necessity, but NO. xvm. 
much more necessity itself upon what ground so- T1 ~ B { sbo ~\ 
ever. Either they must run into this absurdity, reply. 
that the effect is determined, the cause remaining 
undetermined ; or else hold such a necessary con- 
nexion of causes as the Stoics did. 

" Lastly, they say, the Stoics did take away 
liberty and contingence, but they admit it. I an- 
swer, what liberty or contingence was it they ad- 
mit but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of 
contingence, who do profess stiffly that all actions 
and events, which either are or shall be, cannot 
but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other 
manner, in any other place, time, number, order, 
measure, nor to any other end, than they are ; and 
that in respect of God determining them to one. 
What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingency is 
this! 

" Secondly, they distinguish between the first 
cause, and the second causes ; they say, that in 
respect of the second causes many things are free, 
but in respect of the first cause all things are 
necessary. This answer may be taken away two 
ways. 

" First, so contraries shall be true together ; the 
same thing at the same time shall be determined 
to one, and not determined to one ; the same 
thing at the same time must necessarily be, arid 
yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the 
same respect. But that which strikes at the root 
of this question is this, if all the causes were only 
collateral, this exception might have some colour : 
but where all the causes being joined together, 
and subordinate one to another, do make but one 



240 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvm. total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) 
' ' "" in the whole series or subordination of causes be 

The Bishop's . . , . 

reply. necessary, it determines the rest, and without 
doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or 
liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but 
from all the causes joined together. If one link 
in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest. 

" Secondly, I would have them tell me whether 
the second causes be predetermined by the first 
cause, or not. If it be determined, then the eifect 
is necessary, even in respect of the second causes. 
If the second cause be not determined, how is the 
eifect determined, the second cause remaining un- 
determined ? Nothing can give that to another 
which it hath not itself. But say they, neverthe- 
less the power or faculty remaineth free. True, 
but not in order to the act, if it be once deter- 
mined. It is free, in sensu diviso, but not in 
sensu composite. When a man holds a bird fast 
in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she 
will, because she hath wings ? Or a man impri- 
soned or fettered, is he therefore free to walk 
where he will, because he hath feet and a loco- 
motive faculty ? Judge without prejudice, what 
a miserable subterfuge is this which many men 
confide so much in. 

CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE 
BROUGHT TO HIS ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED. 

T. H. He saith, " a man may perhaps answer, 
that the necessity of things held by him is not a 
Stoical necessity, but a Christian necessity," &c., 
but this distinction I have not used, nor indeed 
have ever heard before. Nor do I think any man 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 211 

could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of NO. x\ in. 
necessities, though they may be two kinds of doc- ~~ * . ~~ 

y ^ J The Bishop s 

trine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his argu- riy- 
ments from the authority of any sect, but from 
the nature of the things themselves. 

But here I must take notice of certain words of 
his in this place, as making against his own tenet. 
" Where all the causes", saith he, u being joined 
together, and subordinate one to another, do make 
but one total cause, if any one cause, much more 
the first, in the whole series of subordination of 
causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and 
without doubt maketh the effect necessary." For 
that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, 
is the joining together of all causes subordinate 
to the first, into one total cause. If any one of 
those, saith he, especially the first, produce its 
effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined, 
and the effect also necessary. Now, it is mani- 
fest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of 
all the effects that are next and immediate to it ; 
and therefore by his own reason, all effects are 
necessary. Nor is that distinction of necessary 
in respect of the first cause, and necessary in re- 
spect of second causes, mine ; it does, as he well 
noteth, imply a contradiction. 

J. D. " Because T. H. disavows these two dis- 
tinctions, I have joined them together in one para- 
graph. He likes not the distinction of necessity, 
or destiny, into Stoical and Christian ; no more do 
I. We agree in the conclusion, but our motives 
are diverse. My reason is, because I acknowledge 
no such necessity either as the one or as the 
other ; and because I conceive that those Christian 

VOL. V. R 



242 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvui. writers, who do justly detest the naked destiny of 
^ ' ^ the Stoics, as fearing to fall into those gross ab- 

The Bishops ' . ~ ?- n 

surdities and pernicious consequences which flow 
from thence, do yet privily, though perhaps un- 
wittingly, under another form of expression in- 
troduce it again at the back-door, after they had 
openly cast it out at the fore-door. But T. H. 
rusheth boldly without distinctions, which he ac- 
counts but jargon, and without foresight, upon 
the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of 
the Stoics. He confesseth, that "they may be 
two kinds of doctrine." May be ? Nay, they are ; 
without all peradventure. And he himself is the 
first who bears the name of a Christian, that I 
have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost 
out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. 
But yet he likes not the names of Stoical and 
Christian destiny. I do not blame him, though he 
would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To ad- 
mit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is to 
make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first 
call that kind of destiny which is maintained by 
Christians, Christian destiny : and that other main- 
tained by Stoics, Stoical destiny f But I am not 
the inventor of the term. If he had been as care- 
ful in reading other men's opinions, as he is confi- 
dent in setting down his own, he might have found 
not only the thing, but the name itself often used. 
But if the name of fatum Christianum do offend 
him, let him call it with Lipsius, fatum verum ; 
who divides destiny into four kinds : 1. mathe- 
matical or astrological destiny : 2. natural des- 
tiny: 3. Stoical or violent destiny: and 4. true 
destiny ; which he calls, ordinarily, nostrum, our 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 243 

destiny, that is, of Christians ; and fatum plum, NO. xvm. 
that is, godly destiny ; and defines it lust as T. H. ' " 

'<-'' ^ ^ Tin Bishops 

doth his destiny, to be (a) a series or order of causes 
depending upon the divine counsel (De Constantly 
lib. 1 . cap. xvii. xviii. xix). Though he be more cau- 
telous thanT. H. to decline those rocks which some 
others have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines 
thought he came too near them ; as appears by his 
Epistle to the Reader in a later edition, and by 
that note in the margin of his twentieth chapter, 
6 Whatsoever I dispute here, I submit to the judg- 
ment of the wise, and being admonished I will 
convert it ; one may convince me of error, but 
not of obstinacy.' So fearful was he to over-shoot 
himself ; and yet he maintained both true liberty 
and true contingency. T. H. saith, 'he hath not 
sucked his ans\ver from any sect' ; and I say, so 
much the w r orse. It is better to be the disciple of 
an old sect, than the ring-leader of a new. 

(7;) " Concerning the other distinction, of liberty 
in respect of the first cause, and liberty in re- 
spect of the second causes ; though he will not 
see that which it concerned him to answer, like 
those old Lamia, which could put out their eyes 
when they list; as, namely, that the faculty of 
willing, when it is determined in order to the act, 
(which is all the freedom that he acknowledged}), 
is but like the freedom of a bird when she is first 
in a man's hand, &c. : yet he hath espied another 
thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, 
that if any one cause in the whole series of causes, 
much more the first cause, be necessary, it deter- 
mineth the rest. But, saith he, ' it is manifest that 
the first cause is a necessary cause of all the 

R 2 



244 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. XVIIT. effects that are next'. I am glad ; yet it is not I 
contradict myself, but it is some of his manl- 
f es f truths which I contradict ; that ' the first 
cause is a necessary cause of all effects' ; which I 
say is a manifest falsehood. Those things which 
God wills without himself, he wills freely, not ne- 
cessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or w r orks neces- 
sarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all 
that is in its power. But it is evident that God 
doth not all things without himself, which he can 
do, or which he hath power to do. He could have 
raised up children unto Abraham of the very 
stones which were upon the banks of Jordan 
(Luke iii. 8) ; but he did not. He could have sent 
twelve legions of angels to the succour of Christ, 
(Matth. xxvi. 53) ; but he did not. God can make 
T. H. live the years of Methuselah ; but it is not 
necessary that he shall do so, nor probable that he 
will do so. The productive power of God is infi- 
nite, but the whole created world is finite. And, 
therefore God might still produce more, if it 
pleased him. But thus it is, when men go on in a 
confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If 
T. H. had considered the difference between a ne- 
cessary being, and a necessary cause, or between 
those actions of God which are immanent within 
himself, and the transient works of God which 
are extrinsical without himself; he would never 
have proposed such an evident error for a mani- 
fest truth. Qui pauca consider at, facile pro- 
nuntiat? 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XVIII. 

The Bishop, supposing I had taken my opinion 
from the authority of the Stoic philosophers, not 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 245 

from my own meditation, falleth into dispute against NO. xvni. 
the Stoics : whereof I might, if I pleased, take no . T 

07 I 7 Aniraarlver- 

notice, but pass over to No. xix. But that he M<HM upon the 

T , . , , , . 1 . Bishop's replv. 

may know I have considered their doctrine con- 
cerning fate, I think fit to say thus much, that 
their error consisteth not in the opinion of fate, 
but in feigning of a false God. When therefore 
they say, fatum est cffatum Jovis, they say no 
more but that e /V/te is the word of Jupiter. If 
they had said it had been the word of the true 
God, I should not have perceived anything in it to 
contradict ; because I hold, as most Christians do, 
that the whole world was made, and is now 
governed by the w r ord of God, which bringeth a 
necessity of all things and actions to depend upon 
the Divine disposition. Nor do I see cause to find 
fault with that, as he does, which is said by Lip- 
sius, that (a) fate is a series or order of causes 
depending upon the Divine counsel ; though the 
divines thought he came too near the rocks, as he 
thinks I do now. And the reason why he was 
cautelous, was, because being a member of the 
Romish Church he had little confidence in the 
judgment and lenity of the Romish clergy ; and 
not because he thought he had over-shot himself. 
(b) " Concerning the other distinction, of liberty 
in respect of the first cause, and liberty in re- 
spect of the second causes, though he will not 
see that which it concerned him to answer, &c."> 
" as, namely, that the faculty of willing, &c." I 
answer, that distinction he allegeth, not to be 
mine, but the Stoics' ; and therefore I had no 
reason to take notice of it ; for he disputeth not 
against me, but others. And whereas he says, // 
concerned me to make that answer which he hath 




246 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xvin. set down in the words following ; I cannot conceive 
how it conccnieth me (whatsoever it may do sonie- 

kdy e ^ se ) to s P ea k absurdly. 

I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of 
all the effects that are next and immediate to it ; 
which cannot be doubted, and though he deny it, 
he does not disprove it. For when he says, " those 
things which God wills without himself, he wills 
freely and not necessarily" ; he says rashly, and 
untruly. Rashly, because there is nothing with- 
out God, w r ho is infinite, in whom are all things, 
and in whom we live, move, and have our be- 
ing ; and untruly, because whatsoever God fore- 
knew from eternity, he willed from eternity, and 
therefore necessarily. But against this he argueth 
thus : " Whatsoever cause acts or works necessa- 
rily, doth work or act all that it can do, or all that 
is in its power ; but it is evident that God doth 
not all things which he can do," &c. In things 
inanimate, the action is always according to the 
extent of its pow r er ; not taking in the power of 
willing, because they have it not. But in those 
things that have will, the action is according to 
the whole power, will and all. It is true, that God 
doth not all things that he can do if he will ; but that 
he can will that which he hath not willed from all 
eternity, I deny ; unless that he can not only will a 
change, but also change his will, which all divines 
say is immutable ; and then they must needs be 
necessary effects, that proceed from God. And 
his texts, God could have raised up children unto 
Abraham, &c. ; and sent twelve legions of an- 
gels, &c., make nothing against the necessity of 
those actions, which from the first cause proceed 
immediately. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 247 
NO. XIX. 

J. D. " Thirdly, they distinguish between liber- NO. xix. 
ty from compulsion, and liberty from necessita- The B is]lo ,/ s 
tion. The will, say they, is free from compulsion, **&? 
but not free from necessitation. And this they 
fortify with two reasons. First, because it is 
granted by all divines, that hypothetical neces- 
sity, or necessity upon a supposition, may consist 
with liberty. Secondly, because God and the 
good angels do good necessarily, and yet are 
more free than we. To the first reason, I confess 
that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes 
consist with true liberty, as when it signifies only 
an infallible certitude of the understanding in 
that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. 
But if the supposition be not in the agent's power, 
nor depend upon anything that is in his power ; if 
there be an exterior antecedent cause which doth 
necessitate the effect ; to call this free, is to be mad 
with reason. 

" To the second reason, I confess that God and 
the good angels are more free than we are, that is, 
intensively in the degree of freedom, but not ex- 
tensively in the latitude of the object ; according to 
a liberty of exercise, but not of specification. A 
liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do, may 
consist well with a necessity of specification, or a 
determination to the doing- of good. But a liberty 
of exercise, and a necessity of exercise, a liberty 
of specification, and a necessity of specification, 
are not compatible, nor can consist together. He 
that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not 
free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all 
to the purpose/' 



248 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. T. H. But the distinction of free, into free from 
1; ' ~\ compulsion, and free from necessitation, I acknow- 

The Bishops r > * 

p ] y. ledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to do a 
thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to 
do it. For a man is then only said to be com- 
pelled, when fear makes him willing to it ; as when 
a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to 
save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of 
being killed. Thus all men that do anything from 
love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion ; 
and yet their actions may be as necessary as those 
which are done upon compulsion. For sometimes 
other passions work as forcibly as fear ; but free 
from necessitation I say nothing can be. And it 
is that which he undertook to disprove. This 
distinction, he says, use.th to be fortified by two 
reasons. But they are not mine. The first, he 
says, is, " that it is granted by all divines, that an 
hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon supposi- 
tion, may stand with liberty". That you may un- 
derstand this, I will give you an example of hypo- 
thetical necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat ; this 
is an hypothetical necessity. Indeed, it is a ne- 
cessary proposition ; that is to say, it is necessary 
that that proposition should be true, whensoever 
tittered ; but it is not the necessity of the thing, 
nor is it therefore necessary, that the man shall 
live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use 
to fortify my distinctions with such reasons. Let 
him confute them as he will, it contents me. But 
I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, 
how an easy and plain thing, but withal false, may 
be, with the grave usage of such words as hypo- 
thetical necessity, and necessity upon supposition, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 249 

and such like terms of Schoolmen, obscured and NO. xjx. 
made to seem profound learning. 

The second reason that may confirm the distmc- - j piy- 
tion of free from compulsion, and free from neces- 
sitation, he says, is that ' God and good angels do 
good necessarily, and yet are more free than we'. 
This reason, though I had no need of it, yet I 
think it so far forth good, as it is true that God 
and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are 
free. But because I find not in the articles of our 
faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down 
in what manner I am to conceive God and good 
angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they 
work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point ; 
arid am content that there may be a freedom from 
compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessita- 
tion, as hath been proved in that, that a man may 
be necessitated to some actions without threats 
and without fear of danger. But how he can 
avoid the consisting together of freedom and ne- 
cessity, supposing God and good angels are freer 
than men and yet do good necessarily, that we 
must now examine. 

" I confess," saith he, " that God and good an- 
gels are more free than we, that is, intensively in 
degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude 
of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, 
not of specification." Again we have here two 
distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to 
seem so by terms invented, by I know not whom, 
to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding 
of the reader. For it cannot be conceived that 
there is any liberty greater than for a man to do 
what he will, and to forbear what be will. One 



250 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. heat may be more intensive than another, but not 
The Bishops one liberty than another. He that can do what 
"^y- he will, hath all liberty possible ; and he that can- 
not, has none at all. Also liberty (as he says the 
Schools call it) of exercise, which is, as I have 
said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be 
without a liberty, which they call of specification ; 
that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or 
that in particular. For how can a man conceive, 
that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not 
liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particu- 
lar ? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, 
and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, 
how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat 
flesh, more than he that hath no license at all ? 

You may by this again see the vanity of dis- 
tinctions used in the Schools ; and I do not doubt 
but that the imposing of them by authority of 
doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause 
that men have laboured, though by sedition and 
evil courses, to shake them off ; for, nothing is 
more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising 
over man's reason and understanding, especially 
when it is done, not by the Scripture, but by pre- 
tence of learning, and more judgment than that 
of other men. 

J. D. " He who will speak with some of our 
great undertakers about the grounds of learning, 
had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to 
learn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or 
canting) lately devised, not to set forth the truth, 
but to conceal falsehood. He must learn a new 
liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new 
sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deli- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 251 

beration, a new kind of election, a new eternity, a NO. xix. 
new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new nothing. The i^opl 
(a) This proposition, the will is free, may be un- o>iy- 
derstood in two senses ; either that the will is not 
compelled, or that the will is not always necessi- 
tated ; for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free 
from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there 
is freedom from necessity. The former sense, that 
the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all 
the world as a truth undeniable : voluntas non 
cogitur. For if the will may be compelled, then 
it may both will and not will the same thing at the 
same time, under the same notion ; but this im- 
plies a contradiction. Yet this author, like the 
good woman whom her husband sought up the 
stream when she was drowned upon pretence that 
when she was living she used to go contrary 
courses to all other people, holds, that true com- 
pulsion and fear may make a man will that which 
he doth not will, that is, in his sense may compel 
the will : " as when a man willingly throws his 
goods into the sea to save himself, or submits 
to his enemy for fear of being killed". I answer, 
that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse. 
(b) "First, he erreth in this, to think that 
actions proceeding from fear are properly com- 
pulsory actions : which in truth are not only volun- 
tary, but free actions ; neither compelled, nor so 
much as physically necessitated. Another man, 
at the same time, in the same ship, in the same 
storm, may choose, and the same individual man 
otherwise advised might choose not, to throw his 
goods overboard. It is the man himself, who 
chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It 



252 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or 
The Bebop's if h e were freed from the grounds of his present 
re i )1 J"- fears, he would not choose neither the casting of 

his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his 
enemy. But considering the present exigence of 
his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two 
inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a com- 
parative good. Neither doth he will this course 
as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the 
means to attain his end. And what fear doth in 
these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in 
other cases ; that is, may occasion a man to elect 
those means to obtain his willed end, which other- 
wise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven 
years more, rather than not to enjoy his beloved 
Rachel. The merchant, to hazard himself upon 
the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be 
so violent, that they may necessitate the will, that 
is, when they prevent deliberations ; but this is 
rarely, arid then the will is not free. But they 
never properly compel it. That which is com- 
pelled, is against the will ; and that which is 
against the will, is not willed. 

(c) " Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he 
saith, that ' a man is then only said to be com- 
pelled, when fear makes him willing to an action' : 
as if force were not more prevalent with a rnan, 
than fear. We must know therefore, that this 
word compelled is taken two ways : sometimes 
improperly, that is, when a man is moved or oc- 
casioned by threats or fear, or any passion, to do 
that which he would not have done, if those threats 
or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is 
taken properly ; when we do any thing against 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 253 

our own inclination, moved by an external cause, NO. xix. 
the will not consenting nor concurring, but re- ' ' 

, . . . i The Bishop's 

sisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when reply. 
a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the 
idol's temple. Or as in the case of St. Peter (John 
xxi. 18) : Another shall gird thee, and carry 
tliee whither tltou wouldest not. This is that com- 
pulsion, which is understood when w r e say, the will 
may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that 
the imperate actions of the will, that is the ac- 
tions of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily 
moved by the will, may be compelled : but that 
the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, 
to choose, cannot be compelled ; because it is the 
nature of an action properly compelled, to be done 
by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence 
of the will. 

(d) " Thirdly, the question is not, whether all 
the actions of a man be free, but whether they be 
ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so 
sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, 
and betray the succours of the soul, and prevent 
deliberation ; as we see in some motusprimoprimi, 
or antipathies, how some men will run upon the 
most dangerous objects, upon the first view of a 
loathed creature, without any power to contain 
themselves. Such actions as these, as they are 
not ordinary, so they are not free ; because there is 
no deliberation nor election. But where delibera- 
tion and election are, as when a man throws his 
goods overboard to save the ship, or submits to 
his enemy to save his life, there is always true 
liberty. 

" Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I 



254 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. produce in favour of his cause, yet they who urged 
The Bishop's them deserved not to be slighted, unless it were 
Te v ] y- because they were School-men. The former rea- 

son is thus framed : a necessity of supposition 
may consist with true liberty. But that necessity 
which flows from the natural and extrinsical deter- 
mination of the will, is a necessity of supposition. 
To this, my answer is in effect, that (<?) a necessity 
of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes the 
thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, 
or not to do. As for a Romish priest to vow con- 
tinence, upon supposition that he be a Romish 
priest, is necessary ; but because it was in his 
power to be a priest or not to be a priest, there- 
fore his vow is a free act. So supposing a man to 
have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at 
home ; yet because it was in his power to take a 
medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at 
home is free. Again, sometimes the thing sup- 
posed is not in the power of the agent to do, or 
not to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, 
it is necessary that he keep at home ; or suppos- 
ing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a 
cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees 
her : because this antipathy, and this sickness, are 
not in the power of the party affected, therefore 
these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, 
Balaam blessed Israel ; these two acts being done, 
are both necessary upon supposition. But it was 
in Jacob's power, not to have blessed his sons ; so 
was it not in Balaam's power, not to have blessed 
Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob's will was deter- 
mined by himself; Balaam's will was physically de- 
termined by God. Therefore Jacob's benediction 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 255 

proceeded from his own free election ; and Ba- NO. xix. 
laam's from God's determination. So was Caiphas' 
prophecy (John xi. 51) : therefore the text saith, 
he spake not of himself. To this T. H. saith 
nothing ; but only declareth by an impertinent 
instance, what hypothetical signifies; and then 
adviseth your Lordship, to take notice how errors 
and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholas- 
tic terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lord- 
ship to take notice, that the greatest fraud and 
cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of 
plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up 
their sleeves, arid promise extraordinary fair deal- 
ing, before they begin to play their tricks. 

" Concerning the second argument drawn from 
the liberty of God and the good angels ; as I can- 
not but approve his modesty, in c suspending his 
judgment concerning the manner how God and the 
good angels do work necessarily or freely, because 
he finds it not set down in the Articles of our 
faith, or the decrees of our Church', especially in 
this age, which is so full of atheism, and of those 
scoffers which St. Peter prophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), 
who neither believe that there is God or angels, or 
that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep 
their bodies from putrifaction ; so I can by no 
means assent unto him in that which follows, that 
is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and ne- 
cessity of the same kind may consist together, that 
is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exer- 
cise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity 
of specification. Those actions which he saith are 
necessitated by passion, are for the most part dic- 
tated by reason, either truly or apparently right, 



256 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles 
him, ^al I say that God and the good angels are 
more free than men, intensively in the degree of 
freedom, but not extensively in the latitude of the 
object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not 
of specification : which he saith are no distinctions, 
but terms invented to cover ignorance. Good 
words. Doth he only see ? Are all other men stark 
blind ? By his favour, they are true and necessary 
distinctions ; and if he alone do riot conceive them, 
it is because distinctions, as all other things, have 
their fates, according to the capacities or preju- 
dices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. 
c One heat/ saith he, c may be more intensive than 
another, but not one liberty than another.' Why 
not, I wonder ? Nothing is more proper to a man 
than reason ; yet a man is more rational than a 
child, and one man more rational than another, 
that is, in respect of the use and exercise of rea- 
son. As there are degrees of understanding, so 
there are of liberty. The good angels have clearer 
understandings than we, and they are not hindered 
with passions as we, and by consequence they have 
more use of liberty than we. (/) His second 
reason is : f he that can do what he will, hath all 
liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath 
no liberty'. If this be true, then there are no de- 
grees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls 
liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty to 
do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or 
not to shoot, although he cannot hit the white 
whensoever he would. We do good freely, but 
with more difficulty and reluctance than the good 
spirits. The more rational, and the less sensual 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 257 

the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty. NO . xix. 
His other exception against liberty of exercise, and ^ T", 

* . . * The Bishop's 

liberty of specification, is a mere mistake, which reply. 
grows merely from not rightly understanding what 
liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A liberty 
of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not 
to do this or that in particular. Upon better 
advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty 
of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and 
not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be 
free to do or not to do this or that particular 
good, is a liberty of contradiction ; so likewise, to 
be free to do or not to do this or that particular 
evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is 
a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary 
objects or to diverse kind of things. So his rea- 
son to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be 
without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the 
ground : and he may lay aside his leiiten licence 
for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist 
upon these things, wiiich are so evident that no 
man can question them who doth understand 
them. 

(g) " And here he falls into another invective 
against distinctions and scholastical expressions, 
and the ' doctors of the Church, who by this means 
tyrannized over the understandings of other men/ 
What a presumption is this, for one private man, 
who will not allow human liberty to others, to as- 
sume to himself such a licence to control so ma- 
gistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and 
tyrannising over men's judgments, yea, as causes 
. of the troubles and tumults which are in the world, 
the doctors of the Church in general, who have 
VOL. v. s 



258 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. flourished in all ages and all places, only for a few 
"""' ~? necessary and innocent distinctions. Truly, said 

The Bishop s J J 

"piy Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light 

of the sun. (h) What then, must the logicians lay 
aside their first and second intentions, their ab- 
stracts and concretes, their subjects and predicates, 
their modes and figures, their method synthetic 
and analytic, their fallacies of composition and 
division, &c. ? Must the moral philosopher quit 
his means and extremes, his principia congenita et 
acquisita, his liberty of contradiction and contra- 
riety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c. ? 
Must the natural philosopher give over his inten- 
tional species, his understanding agent and patient, 
his receptive and eductive power of the matter, 
his qualities infmce or influxce, symbol or dlssym- 
bolte, his temperament adpondus arid adjustitiam, 
his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sym- 
pathies and antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c. ? 
Must the astrologer and the geographer leave their 
apogceum and pcrigceum, their artic and antartic 
poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, ho- 
rizon, zones, &c.? Must the mathematician, the me- 
taphysician^and the divine, relinquish all their terms 
of art and proper idiotisms, because they do not re- 
lish with T. H.'s palate ? But he will say, they are 
obscure expressions. What marvel is it, when the 
things themselves are more obscure ? Let him put 
them into as plain English as he can, and they shall 
be never a whit the better understood by those 
who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is 
clearer than mathematical demonstration : yet let 
one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics 
hear it, and he will hold it to be as T. H. terms 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 259 

these distinctions, plain fustian or jargon. Every NO. xix. 
art or profession hath its proper mysteries and T ~ o ^ 
expressions, which are well known to the sons of piy- 
art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with 
military men, with physicians, with navigators ; and 
he shall find this true by experience. Let him go 
on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their 
starboard and larboard, because they please not 
him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no : 
it is not the School divines, but innovators and se- 
ditious orators, who are the true causes of the pre- 
sent troubles of Europe, (i) T. H. hath forgotten 
what he said in his book, DC Give, cap. xn. : c that 
it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the know- 
ledge of good and evil belongs to private persons' : 
and cap. xvn. c that in questions of faith, the ci- 
vil magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical 
doctors, to whom God's blessing is derived by im- 
position of hands so as not to be deceived in ne- 
cessary truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised 
infallibility.' These are the very men whom he 
traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to 
them ; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious 
ignorance. There he attributes too much to them ; 
here he attributes too little. Both there and here 
he takes too much upon him ; (1 Cor. xiv. 32) : 
The spirits of the prophets are subject to the 
prophets." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XIX. 

(a) " This proposition, the will is free, may 
be understood in two senses ; either that the will is 
not compelled, or that the will is not always neces- 
sitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not 

S2 



260 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix, compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a 
Animadvert tru th undeniable." I never said the will is com- 
sions upon the pelled, but do agree with the rest of the world 

nisnops reply. \ 

in granting that it is not compelled. It is an ab- 
surd speech to say it is compelled, but not to 
say it is necessitated, or a necessary effect of some 
cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel 
heat ; so likewise when some cause maketh the will 
to anything, it doth not compel it. Many things 
may compel a man to do an action, in producing 
the will ; but that is not a compelling of the will, 
but of the man. That which I call necessitation, 
is the effecting and creating of that will which was 
not before, not a compelling of a will already exis- 
tent. The necessitation or creation of the will, is the 
same thing with the compulsion of the man, saving 
that we commonly use the word compulsion, in those 
actions which proceed from terror. And therefore 
this distinction is of no use ; and that raving which 
followeth immediately after it, is nothing to the 
question, whether the will be free, though it be to 
the question, whether the man be free. 

(V) " First he erreth in this, to think that ac- 
tions proceeding from fear are properly compul- 
sory actions ; which in truth are not only voluntary, 
but free actions." I never said nor doubted, but 
such actions were both voluntary and free ; for 
he that doth any thing for fear, though he say 
truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that 
he had election to do or not to do, and conse- 
quently that he was a voluntary and free agent. 
But this hinders not, but that the terror might be 
a necessary cause of his election of that which 
otherwise he would not have elected, unless some 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 261 

other potent cause made it necessary he should NO. xix. 
elect the contrary. And therefore, in the same Al > ad ; er ;^ 
ship, in the same storm, one man may be necessi- sions u p n the 

r 111 i Bishop's reply. 

tated to throw his goods overboard, and another 
man to keep them within the ship ; and the same 
man in a like storm be otherwise advised, if all the 
causes be not like. But that the same individual 
man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his 
goods overboard, might chose not to throw his 
goods overboard, I cannot conceive ; unless a man 
can choose to throw overboard and not to throw 
overboard, or be so advised and otherwise ad- 
vised, all at once. 

(c) " Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he 
saith, that ( a man is then only said to be com- 
pelled, when fear makes him willing to an action/ 
As if force were not more prevalent with a man 
than fear," &c. When I said fear, 1 think no man 
can doubt but the fear of force was understood. I 
cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly 
take, at saying that a man is compelled by fear 
only ; unless he think it may be called compulsion 
when a man by force, seizing on another man's 
limbs, moveth them as himself, not as the other 
man pleaseth. But this is not the meaning of com- 
pulsion : neither is the action so done, the action 
of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the 
force. But this, as if it were a question of the 
propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop de- 
nies ; and says when a man is moved by fear, it is 
improperly said he is compelled. But when a 
man is moved by an external cause, the will resist- 
ing as much as it can, then he says, he is properly 
said to be compelled; as in a rape, or when a 



262 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the 
> , idol's temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it 

Annmulver- -t J 

n<n upon the were very proper English to say. that a stone were 

Bishops reply. 11 j i *. *i t, 1, 

compelled when it is thrown, or a man when he 
is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand 
compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures 
only, which are moved only by their own animal 
motion, in such manner as they would not be 
moved without the fear. But of this dispute the 
English and well-bred reader is the proper judge. 

(d) " Thirdly, the question is not, whether all 
the actions of a man be free, but w r hether they be 
ordinarily free." Is it impossible for the Bishop 
to remember the question, which is whether a 
man be free to will ? Did I ever say, that no ac- 
tions of a man are free ? On the contrary, I say 
that all his voluntary actions are free, even those 
also to which he is compelled by fear. But it 
does not therefore follow but that the will, from 
whence those actions and their election proceed, 
may have necessary causes, against which he hath 
never yet said anything. That which followeth 
immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as expli- 
cation, how the passions of a man surprise him ; 
therefore I let it pass, noting only that he ex- 
poundeth motus primo primi, which I understood 
not before, by the word antipathy. 

(e) " A necessity of supposition is of two kinds; 
sometimes a thing supposed, is in the power of the 
agent to do or not to do, &c. ; sometimes a thing 
supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or 
not to do," &c. 

When the necessity is of the former kind of sup- 
position, then, he says, freedom may consist with 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 263 

this necessity, in the latter sense that it cannot. NO. xix. 
And to use his own instances, to vow continence " ? ' 

. . Annnauver- 

in a Romish priest, upon supposition that he is a < upon the 

_.,... . , ., . Billion's renlv. 

Romish priest, is a necessary act, because it was in 
his power to be a priest or not. On the other 
side, supposing a man having a natural antipathy 
against a cat ; because this antipathy is not in the 
power of the party affected, therefore the run- 
ning away from the cat is no free act. 

I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish 
priest to vow continence, not upon the supposition 
that he was a Romish priest, but because he had 
not done it unless he would ; if he had not been a 
Romish priest, it had been all one to the freedom 
of his act. Nor is his priesthood anything to the 
necessity of his vow, saving that if he would not 
have vowed he should not have been made a 
priest. There was an antecedent necessity in the 
causes extrinsical ; first, that he should have the 
will to be a priest, and then consequently that he 
should have the will to vow. Against this he 
allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the man's 
running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, 
and arising from a false apprehension (which 
nevertheless he cannot help) of some hurt or 
other the cat may do him. And therefore the 
act is as free as the act of him that throweth his 
goods into the sea. So likewise the act of Jacob 
in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in 
blessing Israel, are equally free and equally vo- 
luntary, yet equally determined by God, who is 
the author of all blessings, and framed the will of 
both of them to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul 
saith, cannot be resisted. Therefore both their 



264 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. actions were necessitated equally ; and, because 
AT *m dvr ^ e y were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas' 
siom upon the his prophecy, which the text saith he spake not of 

Bishop's, reply. 7 7 /* ri i i 

himself, it was necessary ; first, because it was by 
the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as 
sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to 
speak to the people as from the mouth of God, 
that is to say, to prophecy ; and secondly, when- 
soever he did speak not as from God, but as from 
himself, it was nevertheless necessary he should 
do so, not that he might not have been silent if he 
would, but because his will to speak was antece- 
dently determined to what he should speak from 
all eternity, which he hath yet brought no argu- 
ment to contradict. 

He approveth my modesty in suspending my 
judgment concerning the manner how the good 
angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I 
find it not set down in the articles of our faith, 
nor in the decrees of our Church. But he useth 
not the same modesty himself. For whereas he 
can apprehend neither the nature of God nor of 
angels, nor conceive what kind of thing it is 
which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless 
takes upon him to attribute to them liberty of ex- 
ercise, and to deny them a liberty of specifica- 
tion ; to grant them a more intensive liberty than 
we have, but not a more extensive ; using, not in- 
congruously, in the incomprehensibility of the sub- 
ject incomprehensible terms, as liberty of exer- 
cise and liberty of specification, and degrees of 
intension in liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, 
might be more intensive than another. It is true 
that there is greater liberty in a large than in a 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 265 

straight prison, but one of those liberties is not NO. xix, 
more intense than the other. Anhiwdvc* ^ 

(f) " His second reason is, he that can do MOM upon the 
what he will, hath all liberty, and he that 
cannot do what he will, hath no liberty. If 
this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty 
indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is ra- 
ther an omnipotence than a liberty." It is one 
thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, 
and another thing to say he hath power to do 
what he will. A man that is bound, w r ould say 
readily he hath not the liberty to walk ; but he will 
not say he w r ants the power. But the sick man 
w T ill say he wants the power to \valk, but not the 
liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the Eng- 
lish tongue : and consequently an Englishman 
will not say, the liberty to do what he will, but the 
pow f er to do what he will, is omnipotence. And 
therefore either I or the Bishop understand not 
English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the 
meaning of the words liberty of specification, I am 
sure that in that way wherein I expound them, 
there is no absurdity. But if he say, I understand 
not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not 
contend with him ; for I think they know not 
what they mean themselves. 

(g) " And here he falls into another invective 
against distinctions and scholastical expressions, 
and the doctors of the Church, who by this means 
tyrannized over the understanding of other men. 
What a presumption is this, for one private man," 
&c. That he may know I am no enemy to intelli- 
gible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in 
the defence of myself against this his accusation. 



266 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. I say therefore that some distinctions are scho- 
Au^i^T^ la&tical only, and some are scholastical and sa- 
aioiiH upon the piential also. Against those that are scholastical 

Bishop's ri'ply. ITT i i -r A. ^i 

only, I do and may inveigh. But against those 
that are scholastical and sapiential also, I do not 
inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, 
as Suarez, Johannes a Duns, and their imitators, 
to breed in men such opinions as the Church of 
Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write 
such things as neither other men nor themselves 
understood. These I confess I have a little slight- 
ed. Other doctors of the Church, as Martin 
Luther, Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, William 
Perkins, and others, that did write their sense 
clearly, I never slighted, but always very much 
reverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth 
my presumption ? If it be because I am a pri- 
vate man, let the Bishop also take heed he contra- 
dict not some of those whom the world worthily 
esteems, lest he also (for he is a private man) be 
taxed of presumption. 

(h) " What then, must the logicians lay aside 
their first and second intentions, their abstracts 
and concretes &c. : must the moral philosopher 
quit his means and extremes, his principia conge- 
nita et acquisita, his liberty of contradiction and 
contrariety, his necessity absolute arid hypo- 
thetical, &c. : must the natural philosopher give 
over his intentional species, &c. : because they 
do not relish with T. H.'s palate ?" I confess 
that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, 
Ferio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop 
think that words of first and second intention, 
that abstract and concrete, that subjects and 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 267 

predicates, moods and figures, method synthetic NO. xix. 
and analytic, fallacies of composition and dim- ^ ^' * 
sion, be terms of art, I am not of his opinion. For <ww p<> * 

. . . , 7 . Bishop's reply. 

these are no more terms of art m logic, than lines, 
figures, squares, triangles, &c. in the mathematics. 
Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are 
terms of art, invented for the easier apprehension 
of young men, and are by young men understood. 
But the terms of the School with which I have 
found fault, have been invented to blind the un- 
derstanding, and cannot be understood by those 
that intend to learn divinity. And to his question 
whether the moral philosopher must quit his means 
and extremes, I answer, that though they are not 
terms of art, he ought to quit them when they 
cannot be understood ; and w r hen they can, to use 
them rightly. And therefore, though means and 
extremes be terms intelligible, yet I would have 
them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of 
vice in the other. But for his liberty of contra- 
diction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and 
hypothetical, if any moral philosopher ever used 
them, then away with them ; they serve for no- 
thing but to seduce young students. In like man- 
ner, let the natural philosopher no more mention 
his intentional species, his understanding agent 
and patient, his receptive and eductive power of 
the matter, his qualities hifusce or influxce, sym- 
bolce or dissymbolce, his temperament ad pondus 
and ad justitiam. He may keep his parts homo- 
geneous and heterogeneous ; but his sympathies 
and antipathies, his antiperistasis and the like 
names of excuses rather than of causes, T would 
have him fling away. And for the astrologer, (un- 



268 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. less he means astronomer), I would have him' throw 
, >, , away his whole trade. But if he mean astronomer. 

Ammadver- * 

siom upon the then the terms of apogceum and perigceum, artic, 
Bishops reply. antart j CB e q ua t r 9 zodiac, zenith, meridian, hori- 
zon, zones, &c. are no more terms of art in astro- 
nomy, than a saw or a hatchet in the art of a 
carpenter. He cites no terms of art for geometry; 
I was afraid he would have put lines, or perhaps 
equality or inequality, for terms of art. So that 
now I know not what be those terms he thinks I 
would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his 
metaphysician, I would have him quit both his 
terms and his profession, as being in truth (as 
Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of Alex- 
ander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, 
but made only for an essay to the learner ; and 
the divine to use no word in preaching but such 
as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a com- 
mon reader, may understand. And all this, not 
for the pleasing of my palate, but for the promo- 
tion of truth. 

(i) " T, H. hath forgotten what he said in his 
book, De Cive, cap. xn, that it is 'a seditious 
opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and 
evil belongs to private persons' : and cap. xvn, 
that 'in questions of faith the civil magistrates 
ought to consult with the ecclesiastical doctors, 
to whom God's blessing is derived by imposition 
of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary 
truths,' &c. There he attributes too much to 
them, here he attributeth too little ; both there and 
here he takes too much upon him. The spirits of 
the pfophets are subject to the prophets." He 
thinks he hath a great advantage against me from 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 269 

my own words in my book De Cive, which he NO. xix. 
would not have thought if he had understood "~ r """"" 

_ _ ! Animadver- 

them. The knowledge of good and evil is judi- sion upon ti.e 
cature, which in Latin is cognltio causarum, not 1MOp8repy ' 
scientia. Every private man may do his best to 
attain a knowledge of w T hat is good and evil in 
the action he is to do ; but to judge of what is 
good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but 
to those whom the sovereign power appointeth 
thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or 
forgetting, that cognoscere is to judge, as Adam 
did of God's commandment, hath cited this place 
to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the 
ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it 
is not that they cannot be deceived, but that a 
subject cannot be deceived in obeying them when 
they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For 
the supreme ecclesiastical doctor, is he that hath 
the supreme power : and in obeying him no sub- 
ject can be deceived, because they are by God 
himself commanded to obey him. And what the 
ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully constituted, do tell 
us to be necessary in point of religion, the same 
is told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, 
though we may be deceived by them in the belief 
of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by them in 
the duty of our actions. And this is all that I as- 
cribe to the ecclesiastical doctors. If they think 
it too much, let them take upon them less. Too 
little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, 
for a burthen. And for them who seek it as a 
worldly preferment, it is too much. I take, he 
says, too much upon me. Why so ? Because the 
spirits of the prophets are subject to the pro- 



270 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xix. phets. This is it that he finds fault with in me, 
Animadvert when he says that I am a private man, that is 
sions upon the to say, no prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By 

Bishop's reply. -..,. i 

which it is manifest, that the Bishop subjecteth 
not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. 
I admit that every man ought to subject his spirit 
to the prophets. But a prophet is he that speaketh 
unto us from God ; which I acknowledge none to 
do, but him that hath due authority so to do. 
And no man hath due authority so to do imme- 
diately, but he that hath the supreme authority 
of the commonwealth ; nor mediately, but they 
that speak such things to the people, as he that 
hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as 
it is true in this sense, that the spirits of the 
prophets are subject to the prophets; so it is also 
true that we ought not to believe every spirit, 
but to try the spirits, whether they arc of God ; 
because many false prophets are gone out into 
the world (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I that arn a 
private man, may examine the prophets ; which to 
do, I have no other means but to examine whether 
their doctrine be agreeable to the law ; which theirs 
is not, who divide the commonwealth into two 
commonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical. 

NO. xx. 

J. D. " Now to the distinction itself, I say, first, 
that the proper act of liberty is election, and elec- 
tion is opposed, not only to coaction, but also to 
coarctation, or determination to one. Necessita- 
tion or determination to one, may consist with 
spontaneity, but not with election or liberty ; as 
hath been showed. The very Stoics did acknow- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 271 

ledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not NO. xx. 
yet gone out of the confines of the Stoics. 

u Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this busi- 
ness, this I take to be the clear resolution of the 
Schools. There is a double act of the will : the one 
more remote, called imperatus^ that is, in truth 
the act of some inferior faculty, subject to the 
command of the will, as to open or shut one's eyes ; 
without doubt these actions may be compelled. 
The other act is nearer, called actus elicitus, an 
act drawn out of the will, as to will, to choose, 
to elect. This may be stopped or hindered by the 
intervening impediment of the understanding, as 
a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural 
motion ; otherwise the will should have a kind of 
omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to 
an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone 
is throw T n upwards into the air ; for that is both 
to incline and not to incline to the same object 
at the same time, w r hich implies a contradiction. 
Therefore to say the will is necessitated, is to say, 
the will is compelled so far as the will is capable 
of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand 
of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, 
hcec quidem vis est, this is violence; the weaker did 
not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was 
compelled. But now suppose this strong man had 
the will of the weaker in his power as well as the 
hand, and should not only incline, but determine 
it secretly and insensibly to commit this act : is not 
the case the same ? Whether one ravish Lucretia 
by force, as Tarquin, or by amatory potions and 
magical incantations not only allure her, but ne- 
cessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her 



272 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO, xx. effectually, and draw her inevitably and irresistibly, 
The Bishop's to follow him spontaneously, Lucretia in both these 
conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person is 
more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, 
who endeavours also, so much as in him lies, to 
make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I 
dare not apply it, but thus only : take heed how 
we defend those secret and invincible necessita- 
tions to evil, though spontaneous and free from 
coaction. 

" These are their fastnesses." 

T. H. In the next place, he bringeth two argu- 
ments against distinguishing between being free 
from compulsion, and free from necessitation. 
The first is, that election is opposite, not only to 
coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation 
or determination to one. This is it he was to 
prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth 
no new argument to prove it. And to those 
brought formerly, I have already answered; and 
in this place I deny again, that election is opposite 
to either. For when a man is compelled, for exam- 
ple, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he 
hath still election left in him, and a deliberation 
to bethink which of these two he can better 
endure ; and he that is led to prison by force, hath 
election, and may deliberate, whether he will be 
haled and trained on the ground, or make use of 
his feet. 

Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the 
strength of temptation to do an evil action, being 
greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily 
determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates 
whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 273 

motives to forbear, are working on him. and con- NO.XX. 
sequently he electeth which he will. But com- ' ' ' 

, i -11 i 11 The Bishop's 

monly, when we see and know the strength that reply. 
moves us, we acknowledge necessity ; but when 
we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we 
then think there is none, and that it is not causes, 
but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it 
is that they think he docs not choose this, that of 
necessity chooseth it ; but they might as well say 
fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. 
The second argument is not so much an argument, 
as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be 
said that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in 
what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as 
from the authority of the Schools and that which 
u rippeth up the bottom of the question", that 
there is a double act of the will. The one, he 
says, is actits imperatus, an act done at the com- 
mand of the will by some inferior faculty of the 
soul, as to open or shut one's eyes : and this act may 
be compelled. The other, he says, is act us elicitus, 
an act allured, or an act drawn forth by allure- 
ment out of the will, as to will, to choose, to 
elect : this, he says, cannot be compelled. Wherein 
letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing 
command and subjection to the faculties of the 
soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family 
among themselves, and could speak one to ano- 
ther, which is very improper in searching the 
truth of the question : you may observe first, 
that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but 
to will it. For it is all one to say, my will 
commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing 
of any other action, and to say, I have the will to 
VOL. v. T 



274 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. shut mine eyes. So that actus imperatus here, 
The Bl^'s ght as easily have been said in English, a 
^piy. voluntary action, but that they that invented the 
term understood not any thing it signified. Se- 
condly you may observe, that actus elicitus is 
exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to 
choose, which are all one ; and so to will is here 
made an act of the will ; and indeed, as the will is 
a faculty or power of a man's soul, so to will is 
an act of it according to that power. But as it is 
absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or 
drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance ; 
so it is also to say, that to will is an act allured 
or drawn out of the power to will, which power is 
commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the 
sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may 
be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul 
means ; but to will that or any act cannot be but 
by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair 
means, allurements, and enticements, produce the 
action which they do produce as necessarily as 
threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will 
may be made as necessary as any thing that is 
done by compulsion. So that the distinction of 
actus imperatus., and actus elicitus, are but 
words, and of no effect against necessity. 

J. D. "In the next place follow two reasons of 
mine own against the same distinction, the one 
taken from the former grounds, that election 
cannot consist with determination to one. To 
this, he saith, he hath answered already. No ; 
truth is founded upon a rock. He hath been so 
far from prevailing against it, that he hath not 
been able to shake it. (a) Now again he tells us, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 275 

that f election is not opposite to either', necessita- N o. xx. 
tion or compulsion. He might even as well tell A" f 

r . , __ The Bishop's 

us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally ; reply. 
or that a woman can be ravished with her own 
will. Consent takes away the rape. This is the 
strangest liberty that ever was heard of, that 
a man is compelled to do what he would not, and 
yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells 
us upon the old score, that ' he who submits to his 
enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit'. 
But we have seen formerly, that this which he 
calls compulsion, is not compulsion properly, nor 
that natural determination of the will to one, 
which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits 
to an enemy for saving his life, doth either only 
counterfeit, and then there is no will to submit ; (this 
disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid a 
present blow) ; or else he doth sincerely will a sub- 
mission, and then the will is changed. There is a 
vast difference between compelling and changing 
the will. Either God or man may change the will 
of man, either by varying the condition of things, 
or by informing the party otherwise: but com- 
pelled it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will 
this and not will this, as it is invested with the 
same circumstances ; though, if the act were other- 
wise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely 
which now it wills freely, (ft) Wherefore this kind 
of actions are called mixed actions, that is partly 
voluntary, partly involuntary. That which is 
compelled in a man's present condition or distress, 
that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is 
chosen, as the remedy of its distress, that is volun- 
tary. So hypothetically, supposing a man were 



276 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO* xx. not in that distress, they are involuntary ; but ab- 
The Bho ' solely without any supposition at all, taking the 
case as it is, they are voluntary, (c) His other in- 
stance of * a man forced to prison, that he may 
choose whether he will be haled thither upon the 
ground, or walk upon his feet/ is not true. By 
his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it 
pleaseth them who have him in their power. If 
they will drag him, he is not free to walk ; and if 
they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be 
dragged, (d) Having laid this foundation, he 
begins to build upon it, that c other passions do 
necessitate as much as fear'. But he errs doubly; 
first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine 
the rational will naturally and necessarily. The 
last and greatest of the five terrible things is death ; 
yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved 
mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than 
death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not 
compel the three children to worship an idol, nor 
the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his 
duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more 
afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dan- 
gers, because they are nearer our senses ; as little 
children fear a mouse or a visard more than fire or 
weather. But as a fit of the stone takes away the 
sense of the gout for the present, so the greater 
passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of 
God's wrath and eternal torments doth expel cor- 
poreal fear : fear not them who Mil the body, but 
fear him who is able to cast both body and soul 
into hell (Luke xii. 4). (e) Da veniam imperator ; 
tu career em, ille gehennam minatur. Excuse me, 
O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 277 

he threatens me with hell, (f) Secondly, he errs NO. xxl 
in his superstruction also. There is a great differ- ^_. ^.r^. 
ence, as to this case of justifying, or not justifying reply, 
an action, between force and fear, and other 
passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but 
takes it quite away. He who forced a betrothed 
damsel was to die ; ' but unto the damsel,' saith 
he, 'thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no 
fault worthy of death' (Deut. xxii. 26). Tamar's 
beauty, or Ammon's love, did not render him inno- 
cent ; but Ammon's force rendered Tamar innocent. 
But fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed if 
fear be great and justly grounded, such as may 
fall upon a constant man, though it do not dis- 
pense with the transgression of the negative pre- 
cepts of God or nature, because they bind to all 
times, yet it diminisheth the offence even against 
them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth 
in many cases with the transgression of the posi- 
tive law, either divine or human ; because it is not 
probable that God or the law would oblige man to 
the observation of all positive precepts, with so 
great damage as the loss of his life. The omission 
of circumcision was no sin, whilst the Israelites 
were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.'s 
permission, (g) I will propose a case to him. A 
gentleman sends his servant with money to buy 
a dinner ; some Russians meet him by the way, and 
take it from him by force ; the servant cried for 
help, and did what he could to defend himself, but 
all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he 
were to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or 
suppose the Russians did not take it from him by 
force, but drew their swords and threatened to 



278 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx, kill him except he delivered it himself; no wise 



The Bisho *s man w ^ conceive, that it was either the master's 
intention or the servant's duty to hazard his life 
or limbs for saving of such a trifling sum. But on 
the other side, suppose this servant, passing by 
some cabaret or tennis-court where his comrades 
were drinking or playing, should stay with them, 
and drink or play away his money, and afterwards 
plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by 
the mere strength of temptation. I trow, neither 
T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, 
but punish him for it : because neither was he neces- 
sitated by the temptation, and what strength it had 
was by his own fault, in respect of that vicious habit 
which he had contracted of drinking or gaming : 
( James i. 14): Every man is tempted, when he is 
drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Disor- 
dered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be con- 
sequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow 
from deliberation and election, they do not only 
not diminish the fault, but they aggravate it, and 
render it much greater. 

(h) " He talks much of the ' motives to do and 
motives to forbear, how they work upon and de- 
termine a man'; as if a reasonable man were no 
more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by 
the rackets of the second causes ; as if the will had 
no power to move itself, but were merely passive, 
like an artificial popingay removed hither and 
thither by the bolts of the archers, who shoot on 
this side and on that. What are motives, but rea- 
sons or discourses framed by the understanding, 
and freely moved by the will ? What are the will 
and the understanding, but faculties of the same 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 279 

soul ? And what is liberty but a power resulting NO. xx. 
from them both ? To say that the will is deter- 
mined by these motives, is as much as to say that 
the agent is determined by himself. If there be no 
necessitation before the judgment of right reason 
doth dictate to the will, then there is no antece- 
dent, no extrinsical necessitation at all. (i) All 
the world knows, that when the agent is deter- 
mined by himself, then the effect is determined 
likewise in its cause. But if he determined him- 
self freely, then the effect is free. Motives deter- 
mine not naturally, but morally ; which kind of 
determination may consist with true liberty. But 
if T. H.'s opinion were true, that the will were na- 
turally determined by the physical and special in- 
fluence of extrinsical causes, not only motives were 
vain, but reason itself and deliberation were vain. 
No, saith he, they are not vain, because they are the 
means. Yes, if the means be superfluous, they are 
vain. What needed such a circuit of deliberation 
to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already 
determined extrinsically what must be done ? 

(//) " He saith, c that the ignorance of the true 
causes and their power, is the reason why we as- 
cribe the effect to liberty ; but when we seriously 
consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a 
necessity'. No such thing, but just the contrary. 
The more we consider, and the clearer we under- 
stand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the 
knowledge of our own liberty. The less we con- 
sider, and the more incapable that the understand- 
ing is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge 
of it. And where there is no consideration nor 
use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is 



280 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by rea- 
son that tf 16 * 1 * exterior senses are not totally bound, 
have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such 
a one in that case should cast himself down a 
pair of stairs or from a bridge, and break his neck 
or drown himself; it were a mad jury that would 
find this man accessary to his own death. Why ? 
Because it was not freely done, he had not then the 
use of reason. 

(/) " Lastly, he tells us, that ' the will doth 
choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of 
necessity'. If he intend no more but this, that 
election is the proper and natural act of the will 
as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power 
is as necessarily in a man as visibility, he speaks 
truly, but most impertinently ; for, the question is 
not now of the elective power, in actu primo, 
whether it be an essential faculty of the soul, but 
whether the act of electing this or that particular 
object, be free and undetermined by any antece- 
dent and extrinsical causes. But if he intend it 
in this other sense, that as the fire hath no power 
to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between 
those combustible matters which are put unto it, 
but burns that which is put unto it necessarily, if 
it be combustible ; so the will hath no power to 
refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own 
appetite : he errs grossly. The will hath power 
either to will or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither 
to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the 
burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is in- 
vested with all particular circumstances, is not 
otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. ima- 
gineth. (m) Two things are required to make an 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 281 

effect necessary. First, that it be produced by a NO* xx. 
necessary cause, such as fire is ; secondly, that it TheB : sho ^ 
be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, 
begafc his book thus : ' Concerning the Gods, I have 
nothing to say, whether they be or they be not' : 
for which his book was condemned by the Athe- 
nians to be burned. The fire was a necessary 
agent, but the sentence or the application of the 
fire to the book was a free act ; and therefore 
the burning of his book was free. Much more the 
rational will is free, which is both a voluntary 
agent, and acts voluntarily. 

(ri) " My second reason against this distinction, 
of liberty from compulsion but not from necessi- 
tation, is new, and demonstrates clearly that to 
necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to 
compel the will so far as the will is capable of 
compulsion ; and that he who doth necessitate the 
will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of 
evil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will 
itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is not sur- 
prised, can be contented upon better advise to 
steal by all this in silence. And to hide this ter- 
giversation from the eyes of the reader, he makes 
an empty shew of braving against that famous and 
most necessary distinction, between the elicitc and 
imperatc acts of the will ; first, because the terms 
are improper ; secondly, because they are obscure. 
What trivial and grammatical objections are these, 
to be used against the universal current of divines 
and philosophers. Verlorum ut nummomm, it is in 
words as it is in money : use makes them proper 
and current. A tyrant at first signified a lawful 
and just prince ; now, use hath quite changed the 



282 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. sense of it, to denote either a usurper or an op- 
The Bishops P ressor - The word pr&munire is now grown a 
reply. good word in our English laws, by use and tract of 
time ; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for 
a pr&monere. The names of Sunday, Monday, 
Tuesday, were derived at first from those heathen- 
ish deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike god 
of the Germans. Now we use them for distinc- 
tion sake only, without any relation to their first 
original. He is too froward, that will refuse a 
piece of coin that is current throughout the world, 
because it is not stamped after his own fancy. So 
is he that rejects a good word, because he under- 
stands not the derivation of it. We see foreign 
words are daily naturalized and made free deni- 
zens in every country. But why are the terms 
improper ? ' Because,' saith he, ' it attributes com- 
mand, and subjection to the faculties of the soul, 
as if they made a commonwealth or family among 
themselves, and could speak one to another.' 
Therefore, he saith, (0) they who invented this 
term of actus imperatus, understood not anything 
what it signified. No ; why not ? It seemeth to 
me, they understood it better than those who ex- 
cept against it. They knew there are mental terms., 
which are only conceived in the mind, as well as 
vocal terms, which are expressed with the tongue. 
They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate 
a direction to his inferior, it is still a command. 
Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off 
the tops of the poppies, and was by him both un- 
derstood and obeyed. Though there be no formal 
commonwealth or family either in the body or in 
the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 283 

the body, of the inferior members to the head; NO.XX. 
there is a subordination in the soul, of the inferior lr f 

7 t The Bishops 

faculties to the rational will. Far be it from a 
reasonable man so far to dishonour his own na- 
ture, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the 
sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A 
power of command there is, without all question ; 
though there be some doubt in what faculty this 
command doth principally reside, whether in the 
will or in the understanding. The true resolution 
is, that the directive command or counsel is in 
the understanding ; and the applicative command, 
or empire for putting in execution of what is 
directed, is in the will. The same answer serves 
for his second impropriety, about the word clicitc. 
For saith he, ( as it is absurdly said, that to dance 
is an act allured, or drawn by fair means, out of the 
ability to dance ; so is it absurdly said, that to will 
or choose, is an act drawn out of the power to 
will'. His objection is yet more improper than 
the expression. The art of dancing rather re- 
sembles the understanding than the will. That 
drawing which the Schools intend, is clear of 
another nature from that which he conceives. By 
elicitation, he understands a persuading or enticing 
with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinua- 
tions, to choose this or that. But that elicitation 
which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the power 
of the will into act ; that drawing which they 
mention, is merely from the appetibility of the 
object, or of the end. As a man draws a child after 
him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd 
draws his sheep after him with the sight of a green 
bough : so the end draws the will to it by a me- 



284 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. taphorical motion. What he understands here by 
The Bishop's an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any 
repi 7 . mail e i se) until he express himself in more proper 
terms ; whether he understand the locomotive fa- 
culty alone, or the art or acquired habit of danc- 
ing alone, or both of these jointly. It maybe said 
aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing 
is drawn out (elicitur) of the locomotive faculty 
helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scru- 
pulous about the received phrases of the Schools, 
should not have let so many improper expressions 
have dropt from his pen ; as in this very passage, he 
confounds the compelling of a voluntary action, 
with the commanding of a voluntary action, and 
willing with electing, which, he saith, c are all one'. 
Yet to will properly respects the end, to elect the 
means. 

(p) " His other objection against this distinc- 
tion of the acts of the will into elicit e and imperate, 
is obscurity. ' Might it not,' saith he, ' have been 
as easily said in English, a voluntary action.' Yes, 
it might have been said as easily, but not as truly, 
nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from 
the will, whether immediately or mediately, whe- 
ther it be a proper act of the will itself, as to 
elect, or an act of the understanding, as to delibe- 
rate, or an act of the inferior faculties or of the 
members, is a voluntary action : but neither the 
act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive 
appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts 
of the will, nor drawn immediately out of the will 
itself; but the members and faculties are applied 
to their proper and respective acts by the power of 
the will. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 285 

" And so he comes to cast up the total sum of NO. xx. 
my second reason with the same faith that the "" \ f 

* . The Bishop s 

unjust steward did make his accounts (Luke xvi). reply. 
'The sum of J. D.'s distinction is/ saith he, 
' that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion/ 
(just contrary to what I have maintained), ' that is 
to say, by foul means: but to will that or any 
act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means.' I 
confess the distinction is mine, because I use it ; as 
the sun is mine, or the air is mine, that is common 
to me with all who treat of this subject, (q) But 
his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my 
mind and his own, that the reader may conclude 
he is wandered out of his known way. I will 
do my duty to show him the right way. First, 
no acts which are properly said to be compelled, 
are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, (which he 
calls foul means) 3 which are sometimes in a large 
improper sense called compulsory actions, may be, 
and for the most part are, consistent with true 
liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding from bland- 
ishments or sweet persuasions, (which he calls fair 
means), if they be indeliberated, as in children 
who want the use of reason, are not presently free 
actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent and 
deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor 
excuse from punishment, as just fears of extreme 
and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsical 
agents often do ; because the strength of the for- 
mer proceeds from our own fault, and was freely 
elected in the causes of it ; but neither desires nor 
fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do 
absolutely necessitate the will. 



286 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP S REPLY NO. XX. 

NO. xx. (a) " Now again he tells us, that election is not 
opposite to either necessitation or compulsion. He 




upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be 
ravished with her own will. Consent takes away 
the rape," &c. If that which I have told him 
again, be false, why shows he not why it is false ? 
Here is not one word of argument against it. To 
say, I might have said as well that a stone thrown 
upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a 
denial. I will not dispute with him, whether a 
stone thrown up move naturally or not. I shall 
only say to those readers whose judgments are not 
defaced with the abuse of words, that as a stone 
moveth not upwards of itself, but by the power of 
the external agent who giveth it a beginning of 
that motion ; so also when the stone falleth, it is 
moved downward by the power of some other 
agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the 
eye, is not imperceptible to reason. But because 
this is not proper discourse for the Bishop, and 
because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof ex- 
pressly, I shall say nothing of it here. And 
whereas he says, f consent takes away the rape' ; 
it may perhaps be true, and I think it is ; but here 
it not only inferreth nothing, but was also need- 
less, and therefore in a public writing is an inde- 
cent instance, though sometimes not unnecessary 
in a spiritual court. In the next place, he won- 
ders how " a man is compelled, and yet free to do 
what he will" ; that is to say, how a man is made 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 287 

to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he NO* xx. 
had said, he wondered how a man can be compelled " r ~~" 
to will, and yet be free to do that which he would ^Ipontte 
have done if he had not been compelled, it had Bishop ' s reply ' 
been somewhat ; as it is, it is nothing. Again he 
says, "he who submits to an enemy for saving 
his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his will 
is changed," &c. : all which is true. But when 
he says he doth counterfeit, he doth not in- 
sinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully ; for that 
would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should 
have need of quarter. But how this maketh for 
him, or against me, I perceive not. " There is a 
vast difference," saith he, "between compelling 
and changing the will. Either God or man may 
change the will of man, either by varying the con- 
dition of things, or by informing the party other- 
wise ; but compelled it cannot be," &c. I say the 
same ; the will cannot be compelled ; but the man 
may be, and is then compelled, when his will is 
changed by the fear of force, punishment, or other 
hurt from God or man. And when his will is 
changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it 
be by God or man), and that necessarily ; and con- 
sequently the actions that flow from that will, are 
both voluntary, free, and necessary, notwithstand- 
ing that he was compelled to do them. Which 
maketh not for the Bishop, but for me. 

(b) t( Wherefore this kind of actions are called 
mixed actions, that is partly voluntary, partly in- 
voluntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in 
that distress, they are involuntary." That some 
actions are partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is 
not a new, but a false opinion. For one and the 



288 . THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO- xx. same action can never be both voluntary and in- 
AnimadverT^ voluntary* If therefore parts of an action be ac- 
sions upon tiie tions, he says no more but that some actions are 

Bishop's reply. . 1-1 

voluntary, some involuntary ; or that one multitude 
of actions may be partly voluntary, partly involun- 
tary. But that one action should be partly volun- 
tary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the 
absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave 
credit to. But to say, supposing the man had 
not been in distress, that then the action had been 
involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a 
man's goods into the sea, supposing he had not 
been in a storm, had been an involuntary action ; 
which is also an absurdity ; for he would not have 
done it, and therefore it had been no action at all. 
And this absurdity is his own. 

(c) " His other instance of a man forced to 
prison, that he may choose whether he will be 
haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his 
feet, is not true. By his leave, that is riot as he 
pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him 
in their power." It is enough for the use I 
make of that instance, that a man when in the ne- 
cessity of going to prison, though he cannot elect 
nor deliberate of being prisoner in the jail, may 
nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall 
walk or be haled thither. 

(d) " Having laid this foundation, he begins to 
build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as 
much as fear. But he errs doubly,' 1 &c. First, he 
says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines 
the rational will naturally and necessarily. And 
first, I answ r er, that I never used that term of 
rational will. There is nothing rational but God, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 289 

angels, and men. The will is none of these. I NO. xx. 
would not have exeepted against this expression, Auimadver '" 
but that every where he speaketh of the will hi <^ pn trit; 

,.,,,. 'x- liibhop's reply. 

and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men s 
bellies. Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove 
the contrary. For that which follow r eth : " the last 
and greatest of five terrible things is death ; yet 
the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved 
mind to a dishonest action ; the fear of the fiery 
furnace could not compel the three children to 
worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessi- 
tate Daniel to omit his duty to God," &c. : I grant 
him that the greatest of five (or of fifteen, for he 
had no more reason for five than fifteen) terrible 
things doth not always necessitate a man to do a 
dishonest action, and that the fear of the fiery fur- 
nace could not compel the three children, nor the 
lions Daniel, to omit their duty ; for somewhat else, 
namely j their confidence in God, did necessitate 
them to do their duty. That the fear of God's 
wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well said, and 
according to the text he citeth : and proveth 
strongly, that fear of the greater evil may ne- 
cessitate in a man a courage to endure the lesser 
evil. 

(e) " Da veniam imperator ; tu career em y ille 
gehennam minatur: Excuse me, O Emperor ; thou 
threatenest men with prison, but God threatens me 
with hell." This sentence, and that which he saith 
No. xvn, that neither the civil judge is the proper 
judge, nor the law of the land is the proper rule of 
sin, and divers other sayings of his to the same effect, 
make it impossible for any nation in the world to 
preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men 
VOL. v. u 



290 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. living equally acknowledging, that the High and 
mmadver ~* Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before the great- 
ons upon the es t emperors ; every one may pretend the com- 



op* . mjm( j men j. O f Q Q( j fo justify his disobedience. And 
if one man pretendeth that God commands one 
thing, and another man that he commands the 
contrary, what equity is there to allow the pre- 
tence of one more than of another ? Or what 
peace can there be, if they be all allowed alike ? 
There will therefore necessarily arise discord and 
civil war, unless there be a judge agreed upon, with 
authority given to him by every one of them, to 
show them and interpret to them the Word of 
God ; w r hich interpreter is always the emperor, 
king, or other sovereign person, who therefore 
ought to be obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that 
to shew us and interpret to us the Word of God, 
belongeth to the clergy ; wherein I cannot consent 
unto him. Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me 
with that you cannot do ; but the emperor threat- 
eneth me with death, and is able to do what he 
threateneth. 

(f) " Secondly, he errs in his superstruction 
also. There is a great difference, as to this case of 
justifying or not justifying an action, between 
force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen 
the sin, but takes it quite away, &c." I know not 
to what point of my answer this reply of his is to 
be applied. I had said, the actions of men com- 
pelled are, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that 
he calleth compulsion force ; but I call it a fear of 
force, or of damage to be done by force, by which 
fear a man's w r ill is framed to somewhat to which 
he had no will before. Force taketh away the sin, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 291 

because the action is not his that is forced, but his NO. xx. 
that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion ; ' ' ' 

-, , i f Amraadver- 

because, in this case, a man electeth the less now upon the 
evil under the notion of good. But his instances lshops reply ' 
of the betrothed damsel that was forced, and of 
Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the 
text, be instances of compulsion, and yet the dam- 
sel and Tamar be both innocent. In that which 
immediately followeth, concerning how far fear 
may extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be an- 
swered. I perceive in it he hath some glimmering 
of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It 
is true, that just fear dispenseth not with the pre- 
cepts of God or nature ; for they are not dispensa- 
ble ; but it extenuateth the fault, not by diminish- 
ing anything in the action, but by being no trans- 
gression. For if the fear be allowed, the action 
it produceth is allowed also. Nor doth it dispense 
in any case with the law positive, but by making 
the action itself lawful ; for the breaking of a law 
is always sin. And it is certain that men are 
obliged to the observation of all positive precepts, 
though with the loss of their lives, unless the right 
that a man hath to preserve himself make it, in 
case of a just fear, to be no law. " The omission 
of circumcision was no sin," he says, " whilst the 
Israelites were travelling through the wilderness." 
It is very true, but this has nothing to do with 
compulsion. And the cause why it w r as no sin, 
was this : they were ready to obey it, whensoever 
God should give them leisure and rest from travel, 
whereby they might be cured; or at least when 
God, that daily spake to their conductor in the 
desert, should appoint him to renew that sacra- 
ment, u 2 



292 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

i\o. xx. (g) " I will propose a case to him," &c. The 
Animad ' ver 7 case is this. A servant is robbed of his master's 
sions upon the money by the highway, but is acquitted because he 

Bishop's repiy. PI 41 11- , 

was forced. Another servant spends his master s 
money in a tavern. Why is he not acquitted also, 
seeing he was necessitated ? " Would," saith he, 
"T. H. admit of this excuse ?" I answer, no : but 
I would do that to him, which should necessitate 
him to behave himself better another time, or at 
least necessitate another to behave himself better 
by his example. 

(h) " He talks much of the motives to do, and 
the motives to forbear > how they work upon and 
determine a man ; as if a reasonable man were no 
more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by 
the rackets of the second causes," &c. May not 
great things be produced by second causes, as well 
as little ; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball ? 
But the Bishop can never be driven from this, that 
the will hath power to move itself ; but says it is all 
one to say, that " an agent can determine itself," 
and that " the will is determined by motives ex- 
trinsical". He adds, that " if there be no necessi- 
tation before the judgment of right reason doth 
dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor 
extrinsical necessitation at all". I say indeed, the 
effect is not produced before the last dictate of the 
understanding; but I say not, that the necessity 
was not before ; he knows I say, it is from eter- 
nity. When a cannon is planted against a wall, 
though the battery be not made till the bullet 
arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while 
the bullet was going to it, if the wall stood still ; 
and if it slipped away, the hitting of somewhat 
else was necessary, and that antecedently. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 293 

(i) " All the world knows, that when the agent NO. xx. 
is determined by himself, then the effect is deter- * ' 

,,.,... xr , , Anhnadver- 

mined likewise in its cause. Yes, when the sums upon the 
agent is determined by himself, then the effect is ls opsrepy * 
determined likewise in its cause ; and so anything 
else is what he will have it. But nothing is de- 
termined by itself, nor is there any man in the 
world that hath any conception answerable to 
those words. But " motives," he says, " determine 
not naturally, but morally". This also is insigni- 
ficant ; for all motion is natural or supernatural. 
Moral motion is a mere word, without any imagi- 
nation of the mind correspondent to it. I have 
heard men talk of a motion in a court of justice ; 
perhaps this is it which he means by moral mo- 
tion. But certainly, when the tongue of the 
judge and the hands of the clerks are thereby 
moved, the motion is natural, and proceeds from 
natural causes ; which causes also were natural 
motions of the tongue of the advocate. And 
whereas he adds, that if this were true, then "not 
only motives, but reason itself and deliberation 
were vain" ; it hath been sufficiently answered be- 
fore, that therefore they are not vain, because by 
them is produced the effect. I must also note, 
that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in 
instead of mine, those terms of his own, which 
upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity ; as 
here he makes me to say, that which I did never 
say, " special influence of extrinsical causes". 

(le) " He saith, that ' the ignorance of the true 
causes and their power, is the reason why we 
ascribe the effect to liberty ; but when we se- 
riously consider the causes of things, we acknow- 



294 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. ledge a necessity.' No such thing, but just the 
v, ^ . contrary." If he understand the authors which 

Ammadver- J 

.ions upon the he readeth upon this point, no better than he un- 
is ops repy. ( j ergtan( j s what j h ave h ere written, it is no wonder 

he understandeth not the truth of the question. I 
said not, that when we consider the causes of 
things, but when we see and know the strength 
that moves us, we acknowledge necessity. "No 
such thing," says the Bishop, " but just the con- 
trary ; the more we consider, and the clearer we 
understand, the greater is the liberty," &c. Is 
there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God 
foreknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, 
but that he would also see and know the causes 
which shall bring it to pass, and how they work, 
and make the eifect necessary ? For necessary it is, 
whatsoever God foreknoweth. But we that fore- 
see them not, may consider as much as we will, 
and understand as clearly as we will, but are never 
the nearer to the knowledge of their necessity; 
and that, I said, was the cause why we impute those 
events to liberty, and not to causes. 

(I) "Lastly, he tells us, that the will doth 
choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of 
necessity. If he intend no more but this, that 
election is the proper and natural act of the will, 
as burning is of the fire &c., he speaks truly, 
but most impertinently ; for the question is not 
now of the elective power, in actu primo, &c." 
Here again he makes me to speak nonsense. I 
said, " the man chooseth of necessity" ; he says I 
say, " the will chooseth of necessity". And why : 
but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, 
and say as he does here, that " election is the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 295 

act of the will". No : election is the act of a man, N O . xx. 
as power to elect is the power of a man. Election A ' 

i * 11 Animadver- 

and will are all one act of a man ; and the power oiw upon the 
to elect, and the power to will, one and the same 
power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded 
by the use of calling by the name of will, the 
power of willing in the future ; as they also were 
confounded, that first brought in this senseless 
term of actus primus. My meaning is, that the 
election I shall have of anything hereafter, is now 
as necessary, as that the fire, that now is and con- 
tinueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown 
into it hereafter : or to use his own terms, the 
will hath no more power to suspend its willing, 
than the burning of the fire to suspend its burn- 
ing : or rather more properly, the man hath no 
more power to suspend his will, than the fire to 
suspend its burning. Which is contrary to that 
which he would have, namely, that a man should 
have power to refuse what he wills, and to sus- 
pend his own appetite. For to refuse what one 
willeth, implieth a contradiction ; the which also is 
made much more absurd by his expression. For he 
saith, the will hath power to refuse what it wills, 
and to suspend its own appetite : whereas the will, 
and the willing, and the appetite is the same 
thing. He adds that "even the burning of the 
fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all 
particular circumstances, is not so necessary an 
action as T. H. imagineth". He doth not suffi- 
ciently understand what I imagine. For I ima- 
gine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred 
years hence, I may truly say now, it shall burn ne- 
cessarily ; and of that which shall not burn then, 



296 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible 
A " "" ' matter thrown into it. as in the case of the three 

Animadver- 

sions upon the children), that it is necessary it shall not burn. 
isiops repy. ^ are required to make an effect 



necessary : first that it be produced by a neces- 
sary cause^ &c. : secondly, that it be necessarily 
produced, &c." To this I say nothing, but that 
I understand not how a cause can be necessary, 
and the effect not be necessarily produced. 

(ri) " My second reason against this distinction 
of liberty from compulsion, but not from necessi- 
tation, is new, and demonstrates clearly, that to 
necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to 
compel the will, so far as the will is capable of com- 
pulsion ; and that he who doth necessitate the will 
to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, 
&c." By this second reason, which he says is new, 
and demonstrates, &e, I cannot find what reason 
he means. For there are but two, whereof the latter 
is in these words : " Secondly, to rip up the bot- 
tom of this business, this I take to be the clear re- 
solution of the Schools ; there is a double act of the 
will ; the one more remote, called imperatus, &c. ; 
the other act is nearer, called actus elicitus" &c. 
But I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. 
For this being the resolution of the Schools, is not 
new ; and being a distinction only, is no demon- 
stration ; though perhaps he may use the word 
demonstration, as every unlearned man now-a- 
days does, to signify any argument of his own. 
As for the distinction itself, because the terms are 
Latin, and never used by any author of the Latin 
tongue, to shew their impertinence I expounded 
them in English, and left them to the reader's judg- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 297 

ment to find the absurdity of them himself. And NO. xx. 
the Bishop in this part of his reply endeavours to A ^ imad ' ver "' 
defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and gram- sions U P the 

. . , Bishop's reply. 

inatical objection, to say they are improper and 
obscure. Is there anything less beseeming a di- 
vine or a philosopher, than to speak improperly 
and obscurely, where the truth is in question ? 
Perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, 
but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate. It 
is not the universal current of divines arid philo- 
sophers, that giveth words their authority, but the 
generality of them who acknowledge that they un- 
derstand them. Tyrant and pramunire, though 
their signification be changed, yet they are under- 
stood; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, 
Monday, Tuesday. And when English readers not 
engaged in School divinity, shall find imperate and 
elicit acts as intelligible as those, I will confess 
I had no reason to find fault. 

But my braving against that famous and most ne- 
cessary distinction, between the elicit and imperate 
acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the 
eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering 
this argument of his ; ' he who doth necessitate the 
will to evil, is the true cause of evil ; but God is not 
the cause of evil ; therefore he does not necessitate 
the will to evil'. This argument is not to be found 
in this No. xx, to which I here answered ; nor had " 
I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, 
taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now 
in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in 
this inference concerning the cause of evil, and 
thinks he shall force me to say that God is the 
cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the 



298 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx. Scripture, non est malum, quod ego nonfeci. I shall 
AmnwdveiT sa Y w ^ at Micaiah saith to Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23) : 
mo upon the JBekold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into the 
mouth of all these thy prophets. I shall say that 
that is true, which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. 
xvi. 10) : Let him curse ; because the Lord hath 
said unto him, curse David. But that which God 
himself saith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15) : The 
king hearkened not to t he people , for the cause was 
from the Lord: I will not say, least the Bishop ex- 
claim against me ; but leave it to be interpreted 
by those that have authority to interpret the 
Scriptures. I say further, that to cause sin is 
not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not 
subject to some higher power ; but to use so un- 
seemly a phrase, as to say that God is the cause of 
sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God 
sinneth, I can never be forced by so weak an ar- 
gument as this of his. Luther says, we act neces- 
sarily ; necessarily by necessity of immutability., 
not by necessity of constraint : that is in plain 
English, necessarily, but not against our wills. 
Zanchius says, (Tract. Theol. cap. vi. Thes. i) : 
The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, 
that there is no necessity of our sinning; but 
in this, that there is no constraint. Bucer (Lib. 
de Concordia) : Whereas the Catholics say, man 
has free will, we must understand it of freedom 
from constraint, and not freedom from neces- 
sity. Calvin (fast. cap. n. sec. vi) : And thus 
shall man be said to have free will, not because 
he hath equal freedom to do good and evil, 
but because he does the evil he does, not by 
constraint, but willingly. Monsr. du Moulin, in 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 299 

his Buckler of the Faith (art. ix) : The necessity NO. xx. 
of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the Aninia(1 ^ er "" 
will. Witness the devils ', who are necessarily MOM upon the 
wicked, and yet sin freely without constraint. And 1S ps rep 7 ' 
the Synod of Dort : Liberty is not opposite to all 
hinds of necessity and determination. It is in- 
deed opposite to the necessity of constraint : but 
standeth well enough with the necessity of infalli- 
bility. I could add more : for all the famous 
doctors of the Reformed Churches, and with them 
St. Augustin, are of the same opinion. None of 
these denied that God is the cause of all motion 
and action, or that God is the cause of all laws ; 
and yet they were never forced to say, that God is 
the cause of sin. 

(0) " ' They who invented this term of actus im- 
peratus, understood not', he saith, ' any thing what 
it signified.' No ? Why not ? It seemeth to me, 
they understood it better than those who except 
against it. They knew there are mental terms, 
which are only conceived in the mind, as well as 
vocal terms ^ which are expressed with the tongue, 
&c." In this place the Bishop hath discovered the 
ground of all his errors in philosophy, which is 
this ; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the 
words of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he 
fancieth the words without speaking them, that 
then he conceiveth the things which the words sig- 
nify : and this is the most general cause of false 
opinions. For men can never be deceived in the 
conceptions of things, though they may be, and are 
most often deceived by giving unto them wrong 
terms or appellations, different from those which 
are commonly used and constituted to signify their 



300 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx, conceptions. And therefore they that study to 
A "TT ' attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use 

A mm a aver- 

sions upon the to set down beforehand all the terms they are to 

Bishop's reply. _ - 111 i 

express themselves by, and declare in what sense 
they shall use them constantly. And by this means, 
the reader having an idea of every thing there 
named, cannot conceive amiss. But when a man 
from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the 
thing signified, but only of the sound and of the 
letters whereof the word is made, which is that he 
here calleth mental terms , it is impossible he should 
conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but ab- 
surdity ; as he doth here, when he says, " that 
when Tarquin delivered his commands to his son 
by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did 
it by mental terms"; as if to strike off the head of 
a poppy, were a mental term. It is the sound and 
the letters, that maketh him think elicitus and im- 
peratus somewhat. And it is the same thing that 
makes him say, for think it he cannot, that to will 
or choose, is drawn, or allured, or fetched out of 
the power to will. For drawing cannot be ima- 
gined but of bodies ; and therefore to will, to 
speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or any way to 
be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be drawn, 
much less to be drawn out of a power, that is to 
say, out of an ability ; for whatsoever is drawn 
out, is drawn out of one place into another. He 
that can discourse in this manner in philosophy, 
cannot probably be thought able to discourse ra- 
tionally in any thing. 

(p) " His other objection against this distinc- 
tion of the acts of the will into elicit and impe- 
rate, is obscurity. ' Might it not/ saith he, ' have 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 301 

been as easily said in English, a voluntary action?' NO. xx. 
Yes it might have been said as easily, but not as ' ' 

. Aiiimadver- 

truly, nor as properly." He says, actus impera- siou* upon the 

i iii ^ * i Bishop's reply. 

tus is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the 
command of the will. I say, when a man opens 
and shuts his eyes according to his will, that it is a 
voluntary action ; and I believe we mean one and 
the same thing. Whether of us speak more pro- 
perly or more truly, let the reader judge. 

(q) " But his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will 
do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no 
acts which are properly said to be compelled, are 
voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c." This is 
nothing but Tohu and Bohu. 

NO. XXI. 

/. D. " The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. 
First, the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty 
to the motions of heaven, to the aspects and ascen- 
sions of the stars : 

Plus ctcnim fati valet hora benigni, 

Quam si nos Veneris commendet cpistola Marti. 

" I stand not much upon them, who cannot see 
the fishes swimming beside them in the rivers, yet 
believe they see those which are in heaven ; who 
promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat 
for themselves. The stars at the most do but in- 
cline, they cannot necessitate. 

" Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the 
complexion and temperature of the body. But 
yet this comes not home to a necessity. Socrates, 
and many others, by assiduous care have corrected 
the pernicious propensions, which flowed from 
their temperatures." 



302 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxi. T. H. In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth 
The Bishops U P the opinions of certain professions of men, 
touching the causes wherein the necessity of 
things, which they maintain, consisteth. And 
first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his necessity 
from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attri- 
buteth it to the temper of the body. For my part, 
I am not of their opinion ; because neither the 
stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient 
alone is able to produce any effect without the 
concurrence of all other agents. For there is 
hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, 
to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is 
in rerum natura. Which, because it is a great 
paradox, and depends on many antecedent specu- 
lations, I do not press in this place. 

J. D. " Towards the latter end of my discourse, 
I answered some specious pretences against liberty. 
The two first were of the astrologer and the phy- 
sician : the one subjecting liberty to the motions 
and influences of the heavenly bodies ; the other 
to the complexions of men. (a) The sum of my 
answer was, that the stars and complexions do in- 
cline, but not at all necessitate the will : to which 
all judicious astronomers and physicians do assent. 
And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it. So 
as to this part, there needs no reply. 

(V) " But whereas he mentions a ( great para- 
dox of his own, that there is hardly any one ac- 
tion to the causing of which concurs not whatso- 
ever is in rerum natura' ; I can but smile to see 
with what ambition our great undertakers do 
affect to be accounted the first founders of strange 
opinions, as if the devising of an ill- grounded 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 303 

paradox were as great an honour as the invention NO. xxi. 
of the needle, or the discovery of the new world. TheBi T sbop ' S 
And as to this paradox in particular, I meddle not 
with natural actions, because the subject of my 
discourse is moral liberty. But if he intend not 
only the kinds of things, but every individual 
creature, and not only in natural but voluntary 
actions, I desire to know how Prester John, or the 
great Mogul, or the king of China, or any one of 
so many millions of their subjects, do concur to 
my writing of this reply. If they do not, among 
his other speculations concerning this matter I 
hope he will give us some restrictions. It were 
hard to make all the negroes accessary to all the 
murders that are committed in Europe." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XXI. 

There is not much in this part of his reply that 
needeth animadversion. But I must observe, where 
he saith, (a) " the sum of my answer was, that the 
stars and complexions do incline, but not at all ne- 
cessitate the will :" he answereth nothing at all 
to me, who attribute not the necessitation of the 
will to the stars and complexions, but to the 
aggregate of all things together that are in mo- 
tion. I do not say, that the stars or complexions 
of themselves do incline men to will ; but when 
men are inclined, I must say that that inclination 
was necessitated by some causes or other. 

(b) " But whereas he mentions ' a great para- 
dox of his own ; that there is hardly any one ac- 
tion, to the causing of which concurs not whatso- 
ever is in rerum natural ; I can but smile to see 



304 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. XXL with what ambition our great undertakers do affect 
Animadvert to ^ e accounted the first founders of strange opi- 
sions upon the nions, &c." The Bishop speaks often of paradoxes 

Bishop's reply, . , , T , , -. 

with such scorn or detestation, that a simple reader 
would take a paradox either for felony or some 
other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous 
turpitude ; whereas perhaps a judicious reader 
knows what the word signifies ; and that a para- 
dox, is an opinion not yet generally received. 
Christian religion was once a paradox ; and a 
great many other opinions which the Bishop now 
holdeth, were formerly paradoxes. Insomuch as 
when a man calleth an opinion a paradox, he doth 
not say it is untrue, but signifieth his own igno- 
rance ; for if he understood it, he would call it 
either a truth or an error. He observes not, that 
but for paradoxes we should be now in that savage 
ignorance, which those men are in that have not, 
or have not long had laws and commonwealth, from 
whence proceedeth science and civility. There was 
not long since a scholar that maintained, that if the 
least thing that had weight should be laid down 
upon the hardest body that could be, supposing it 
an anvil of diamant, it would at the first access 
make it yield. This I thought, and much more 
the Bishop would have thought, a paradox. But 
when he told me, that either that would do it, or 
all the weight of the world would not do it, be- 
cause if the whole weight did it, every the least 
part thereof would do its part, I saw no reason to 
dissent. In like manner when I say, ' there is 
hardly any one action to the causing of w T hich 
concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natural it 
seems to the Bishop a great paradox ; and if I 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 305 

should say that all action is the effect of motion, NO. xxr. 
and that there cannot be a motion in one part of , * ? ' 

* Anuuailver- 

the world, but the same must also be communi- *"* p< th 

cated to all the rest of the world, he would say that I5>l ps rcp3 ' 

this were no less a paradox. But yet if I should 

say, that if a lesser body, as a concave sphere or 

tun, were filled with air, or other liquid matter, 

and that any one little particle thereof were moved, 

all the rest would be moved also, he would conceive 

it to be true, or if not he, a judicious reader would. 

It is not the greatness of the tun that altereth the 

case ; and therefore the same would be true also, 

if the whole world were the tun ; for it is the 

greatness of this tun that the Bishop comprehend- 

eth not. But the truth is comprehensible enough, 

and may be said without ambition of being the 

founder of strange opinions. And though a grave 

man may smile at it, he that is both grave and wise 

will not. 

:\o. xxn. 

J. I). " Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us 
how we are haled hither and thither with outward 
objects. To this I answer, " First, that the power 
which outward objects have over us, is for the 
most part by our own default, because of those 
vicious habits which we have contracted. There- 
fore though the actions seem to have a kind of 
violence in them, yet they were free and voluntary 
in their first originals. As a paralytic man, to use 
Aristotle's comparison, shedding the liquor deserves 
to be punished, for though his act be unwilling, yet 
his intemperance was willing, whereby he con- 
tracted this infirmity. 

VOL. v. v 




306 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxii. " Secondly I answer, that concupiscence, and 
custom, and bad company, and outward objects do 
indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By 
prayers, tears, meditations, vows, w r atchings, fast- 
ings, humi-cubations, a man may get a contrary 
habit, and gain the victory, not only over outward 
objects, but also over his own corruptions, and be- 
come the king of the little world of himself. 

Si metuis, si prava cupis, hi duceris ira, 
Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas 
Interius leges. Tune omnia jure tenebis, 
Cum poteris rex esse tui. 

"Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all 
things judiciously and provides for all occurrences, 
is not so easily surprised with outward objects. 
Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife 
and son. I would beat thec, said the philosopher, 
but that I am angry. One spake lowest, when he 
was most moved. Another poured out the water, 
when he was thirsty. Another made a covenant 
with his eyes. Neither opportunity nor enticement 
could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the 
fire, with the three children. It is not the strength 
of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which 
causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do 
not impose a moral, much less a physical necessity ; 
they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive 
to true liberty." 

T. H. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion 
of them that say, external objects presented to 
men of such and such temperatures, do make their 
actions necessary ; and says, the power, that such 
objects have over us, proceeds from our own fault. 
But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 307 

of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own NO. xxn. 
power. And therefore that opinion may hold true, ' j ' 
for all this answer. Further, he saith, prayer, reply, * P * 
fasting, &c., may alter our habits. It is true : but 
when they do so, they are causes of the contrary 
habit, and make it necessary ; as the former habit 
had been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not 
been. Besides we are not moved, nor disposed to 
prayer or any other action, but by outward ob- 
jects, as pious company, godly preachers, or some- 
thing equivalent. In the next place he saith, a re- 
solved mind is not easily surprised. As the mind 
of Ulysses, who, when others wept, he alone wept 
not. And of the philosopher that abstained from 
striking, because he found himself angry. And 
of him that poured out the water, when he was 
thirsty ; and the like. Such things I confess have, 
or may have been done ; and do prove only that it 
was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor 
for the philosopher to strike, nor for that other 
man to drink: but it does not prove that it w r as 
not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, 
from weeping ; nor the philosopher to abstain, as 
he did, from striking ; nor the other man to forbear 
drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought 
to have proved. 

Lastly, he confesseth that the disposition of ob- 
jects may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be 
destructive. To which I answer, it is impossible ; 
for liberty is never in any other danger than to be 
lost. And if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, 
I may infer it can be in no danger at all. 

J. D. (a) " The third pretence was out of moral 
philosophy misunderstood, that outward objects do 

X2 



308 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxii. necessitate the will. I shall not need to repeat 
The Bisho w hat he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his ex- 
ceptions. (b) The first is, that 'it is not material, 
c though the power of outward objects do proceed 
from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed 
not from causes in our own power'. Well, but 
what if they do proceed from causes that are in 
our own power, as in truth they do ? Then his 
answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults pro- 
ceed from causes that are not, and were not in our 
own power, then they are not our faults at all. It 
is not a fault in us, not to do those things which 
never were in our power to do : but they are the 
faults of these causes from whence they do pro- 
ceed, (c) Next he confesseth, that it is in our 
power, by good endeavours, to alter those vicious 
habits which we had contracted, and to get the 
contrary habit. c True,' saith he, ' but then the 
contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as 
well as the former habit did the other way.' By 
which very consideration it appears, that that 
which he calls a necessity, is no more but a 
proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could 
not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. 
The truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the 
faculty ; but they do not necessitate the faculty. 
He who hath gotten to himself an habit of tem- 
perance, may yet upon occasion commit an intem- 
perate act. And so on the contrary. Acts are not 
opposed to habits, but other habits, (d] He adds, 
f that we are not moved to prayer or any other ac- 
tion, but by outward objects, as pious company, 
godly preachers, or something equivalent'. Wherein 
are two other mistakes: first, to make godly preach- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 309 

ers and pious company to be outward objects; NO. xxii. 
which are outward agents : secondly, to affirm 
that the will is not moved but by outward objects. 
The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, 
by the sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, 
by men ; and most effectually by acts or habits in- 
fused by God, whereby the will is excited extraor- 
dinarily indeed,but efficaciously and determinately. 
This is more than equivalent with outward objects. 
" Another branch of mine answer was, that a 
resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both 
the appetibility of objects, and the unruliness of 
passions : as I showed by example, (e) He an- 
swers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated 
to weep, nor the philosopher to strike; but I 
do not prove that they were not necessitated to 
forbear. He saith true. I am not now proving, 
but answering. Yet my answ ? er doth sufficiently 
prove that which I intend ; that the rational will 
hath power, both to slight the most appetible ob- 
jects, and to control the most unrulypassions. When 
he hath given a clear solution to those proofs 
which I have produced, then it will be time for 
him to cry for more work. 

''Lastly, whereas I say, that outward objects 
may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive to 
true liberty ; he catcheth at it, (/) and objects, 
that c liberty is in no danger but to be lost ; but I 
say it cannot be lost, therefore 1 , he infers that, 'it is 
in no danger at all/ I answer, first, that liberty 
is in more danger to be abused, than to be lost. 
Many more men do abuse their wits, than lose 
them. Secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to 
be weakened or diminished ; as when it is clogged 



310 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxn. by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet 
The Bishop's i* i g not totally lost. Thirdly, though liberty can- 
not be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be 
totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the 
exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty ; and 
though nothing be more natural to a man than 
reason, yet many by excess of study, or by con- 
tinual gormandizing, or by some extravagant pas- 
sion which they have cherished in themselves, 
or by doting too much upon some affected object, 
do become very sots, and deprive themselves of 
the use of reason, and consequently of liberty. 
And when the benefit of liberty is not thus uni- 
versally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this 
or that particular occasion. As lie who makes 
choice of a bad wife, hath lost his former liberty 
to choose a good one. 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOPS REPLY NO. XX 

(a) " The third pretence was out of moral phi- 
losophy misunderstood, that outward objects do 
necessitate the will." I cannot imagine how the 
question, whether outward objects do necessitate 
or not necessitate the will, can any way be referred 
to moral philosophy. The principles of moral phi- 
losophy are the laws; \\lierewith outward objects 
have little to do, as being for the most part inani- 
mate, and which follow always the force of nature 
without respect to moral laws. Nor can I con- 
ceive what purpose he had to bring this into his 
reply to my answer, wherein I attribute nothing in 
the action of outward objects to morality. 

(I) " His first exception is, that it is not mate- 
rial that the power of outw r ard objects do proceed 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 311 

from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed NO. xxn. 
not from causes in our own power'. Well, but ^/^^ 
what if they do proceed from causes that are in ?on the 

, ,1 ,1 i * rm i Bishop's reply. 

our own power, as in truth they do r Then his an- 
swer is a mere subterfuge." But how proves he 
that in truth they do ? c Because else,' saith he, 
'they are not our faults at all.' Very well rea- 
soned. A horse is lame from a cause that was not 
in his power : therefore the lameness is no fault in 
the horse. But his meaning is, it is no injustice 
unless the causes were in his own power. As if it 
were not injustice, whatsoever is willingly done 
against the law ; whatsoever it be, that is the cause 
of the will to do it. 

(c) " Next he confesseth, that it is in our power 
by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits 
which we had contracted, and to get the contrary 
habits. 1 ' There is no such confession in my 
answer. I said, prayer, fasting, &c., may alter 
our habits. But I never said that the will to 
pray, fast, &c. is in our own power. tc ' True,' saith 
he, * but then the contrary habit doth necessitate 
the one way, as well as the former habit did the 
other way.' By which very consideration it ap- 
pears, that that which he calls a necessity, is no 
more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, 
it could not be avoided, nor altered by our endea- 
vours." Again he mistakes : for I said that prayer, 
fasting, &c. when they alter our habits, do necessa- 
rily cause the contrary habits ; which is not to say, 
that the habit necessitates, but is necessitated. 
But this is common with him, to make me say that 
which out of reading, not out of meditation, he 
useth to say himself. But how doth it appear, 




312 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxn. that prayer and fasting, &c. make but a proclivity 
in tneu to do what they do ? For if it were but a 
P roc li v ity> ^^ w ^^t they do they do not. There- 
fore they either necessitate the will, or the will 
followeth not. I contend for the truth of this 
only, that when the will followeth them, they ne- 
cessitate the will ; and when a proclivity follow- 
eth, they necessitate the proclivity. But the 
Bishop thinks I maintain, that that also is pro- 
duced necessarily, which is not produced at all. 

(d) " He adds, ' that we are not moved to prayer 
or any other action, but by outward objects, as 
pious company, and godly preachers, or something 
equivalent'. Wherein are two other mistakes : 
first, to make godly preachers and pious company 
to be outward objects, which are outward agents ; 
secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but 
by outward objects. The will is moved by itself, 
&c". The first mistake, he urgeth that I call 
preachers and company objects. Is not the 
preacher to the hearer the object of his hearing ? 
No, perhaps he will say, it is the voice which is the 
object ; and that we hear not the preacher, but his 
voice ; as before he said, the object of sight was 
not the cause of sight. I must therefore once 
more make him smile with a great paradox, which 
is this ; that in all the senses, the object is the 
agent ; and that it is, when we hear a preacher, the 
preacher that we hear ; and that his voice is the 
same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the 
hearer, though the motion of the lips and other 
organs of speech be his that speaketh. But of this 
I have written more largely in a more proper 
place. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 313 

My second mistake, in affirming that the will is not NO. xxn. 
moved but by outward objects, is a mistake of his 



own. For I said not. the will is not moved, but ions U P U the 

.- ., Bishop's reply. 

we are not moved : for I always avoid attributing 
motion to any thing but body. The will is produced, 
generated, formed, and created in such sort as ac- 
cidents are effected in a corporeal subject; but 
moved it cannot be, because it goeth not from 
place to place. And whereas he saith, " the will 
is moved by itself," if he had spoken properly as 
he ought to do, and said, the will is made or cre- 
ated by itself, he would presently have acknow- 
ledged that it w r as impossible. So that it is not 
without cause men use improper language, when 
they mean to keep their errors from being detected. 
And because nothing can move that is not itself 
moved, it is untruly said that either the will or 
any thing else is moved by itself, by the under- 
standing, by the sensitive passions, or by acts or 
habits ; or that acts or habits are infused by God. 
For infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but 
bodies. 

(e) " He answers, that I prove Ulysses was 
not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to 
strike, but I do not prove that they were not ne- 
cessitated to forbear. He saith true ; I am not 
now proving, but answering." By his favour, 
though he be answering now, he was proving then. 
And what he answers now, maketh nothing more 
toward a proof than w r as before. For these words, 
" the rational will hath power to slight the most ap- 
petible objects, and to control the most unruly 
passions/' are no more, being reduced into proper 
terms, than this : the appetite hath power to be 



314 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. XXIK without appetite towards most appetible objects, 
an( ^ to w ^ contrary to the most unruly will ; 



sions upon the "which is 
Bishop's reply. 

(/) " He objects that c liberty is in no danger, 
but to be lost ; but I say it cannot be lost ; there- 
fore', he infers, ; that it is in no danger at all.' I 
answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be 
abused, than lost, &c. ; secondly, liberty is in dan- 
ger likewise to be weakened by vicious habits ; 
thirdly, it may be totally lost." It is true that a 
man hath more liberty one time than another, and 
in one place than another ; which is a difference of 
liberty as to the body. But as to the liberty of 
doing what we will, in those things we are able to 
do it cannot be greater one time than another. 
Consequently outward objects can no ways endan- 
ger liberty, further than it destroyeth it. And his 
answer, that liberty is in more danger to be abused 
than lost, is not to the question, but a mere shift 
to be thought not silenced. And whereas he says 
liberty is diminished by vicious habits, it cannot 
be understood otherwise than that vicious habits 
make a man the less free to do vicious actions ; 
which I believe is not his meaning. And lastly, 
whereas he says that " liberty is lost, when reason 
is lost ; and that they who by excess of study, or 
by continual gormandising, or by extravagant 
passion, &c,, do become sots, have consequently 
lost their liberty" : it requireth proof. For, for any 
thing that I can observe, mad men and fools have 
the same liberty that other men have, in those 
things that are in their power to do. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 315 



NO. xxiir. 

J.D. " Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth NO.XXIII. 
teach, that the will doth necessarily follow the last T h e Bishop* 
dictate of the understanding. It is true indeed ni)1}r> 
the will should follow the direction of the under- 
standing ; but I am not satisfied that it doth ever- 
more follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place : 
video me/iora proboque, deteriora seqnor. As 
that great Roman said of two suitors, that the one 
produced the better reasons, but the other must 
have the office. So reason often lies dejected at 
the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses 
move more powerfully. Do what a man can, lie 
shall sorrow more for the death of his child, than 
for the sin of his soul ; yet appreciatively in the 
estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of 
God a greater evil than any temporal loss. 

" Next, I do not believe that a man is bound to 
weigh the expedience or inexpedience of every 
ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the 
balance of his understanding ; or to run up into his 
watch-tower with his perspective to take notice of 
every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hid- 
den danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution 
of reason to petit observations as concerning every 
rag that a man wears, each drop of drink, each 
morsel of bread that lie eats, each pace that he 
walks. Thus many steps must he go, not one 
more nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What 
is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience ? 
But God leaves many things indifferent : though 
man may be so curious, he will not. A good archi- 
tect will be sure to provide sufficient materials for 



316 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiii. his building ; but what particular number of stones 
The Bisi or trees, he troubles not his head. And suppose he 
* e pb- should weigh each action thus, yet he doth not ; 

so still there is liberty. Thirdly, I conceive it 
is possible in this mist and weakness of human 
apprehension, for two actions to be so equally cir- 
cumstantiated, that no discernible difference can 
appear between them upon discussion. As sup- 
pose a chirurgeon should give two plaisters to his 
patient, and bid him apply either of them to his 
wound ; what can induce his reason more to the one 
than to the other, but that he may refer it to 
chance whether he will use ? 

But leaving these probable speculations, which 
I submit to better judgments, I answer the philo- 
sopher briefly thus : admitting that the will did 
necessarily follow the last dictate of the under- 
standing, as certainly in many things it doth : yet, 
first, this is no extrinsical determination from 
without, and a man's own resolution is not de- 
structive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. 
So the person is still free. 

" Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, 
but joined with the action. The understanding 
and the will, are not different agents, but distinct 
faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, 
or an hypothetical necessity as we say, qmcqmdest, 
quando est> necesse est esse : a necessity of conse- 
quence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though 
an agent have certainly determined, and so the 
the action be become infallible, yet if the agent did 
determine freely, the action likewise is free." 

T. H. The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, 
is of them that make the wall necessarily to follow 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 317 

the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems NO. xxm. 
he understands that tenet in another sense than I The Bi ' shop . s 
do. For he speaketh as if they that held it, did ry p ] y- 
suppose men must dispute the sequel of every ac- 
tion they do, great and small, to the least grain ; 
which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be 
untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the 
will follows the last opinion or judgment, imme- 
diately preceding the action, concerning whether it 
be good to do it or not ; whether he hath weighed it 
long before, or not at all. And that I take to be the 
meaning of them that hold it. As for example : 
when a man strikes, his will to strike follows ne- 
cessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his 
stroke, immediately before the lifting of his hand. 
Now if it be understood in that sense, the last dic- 
tate of the understanding does certainly necessi- 
tate the action, though not as the whole cause, yet 
as the last cause : as the last feather necessitates 
the breaking of a horse's back, when there are so 
many laid on before, as there needeth but the ad- 
dition of that one to make the weight sufficient. 
That which he allegeth against this, is first, out of 
a poet, who in the person of Medea says, video 
meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. But the 
saying, as pretty as it is, is not true. For though 
Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her 
children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was 
that the present revenge on her husband out- 
weighed them all ; and thereupon the wicked ac- 
tion followed necessarily. Then the story of the 
Roman, that of two competitors said one had 
the better reasons, but the other must have the 
office : this also maketh against him. For the last 



318 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxm. dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing 
The BiduT's ^ ^ e G ^ ce ) was ^is ; that it was better to take a 
reply. great bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, 
he objects, that things nearer the senses move more 
powerfully than reason. What folio we th thence 
but this ; that the sense of the present good is com- 
monly more immediate to the action, than the 
foresight of the evil consequents to come ? Fourthly, 
whereas he says, that do what a man can, he shall 
sorrow more for the death of his son, than for the 
sin of his soul : it makes nothing to the last dic- 
tate of the understanding ; but it argues plainly, 
that sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by con- 
sequence, repentance proceedeth from causes. 

J. D. " The fourth pretence alleged against li- 
berty was, that the will doth necessarily follow r 
the last dictate of the understanding. This objec- 
tion is largely answered before in several places of 
this reply, and particularly No. vii. In my for- 
mer discourse I gave two answers to it : the one 
certain and undoubted, that () supposing the last 
dictate of the understanding did always determine 
the will, yet this determination being not antecedent 
in time, nor proceeding from extrinsical causes, 
but from the proper resolution of the agent, who 
had now freely determined himself, it makes no 
absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, upon 
supposition that the agent hath determined his 
own will after this or that manner. Which being 
the main answer, T. H. is so far from taking it 
away, that he takes no notice of it. The other 
part of mine answer was probable ; that it is not 
always certain that the will doth always actually 
follow the last dictate of the understanding, though 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 319 

it always ought to follow it. (b) Of which I gave NO. xxin. 
then three reasons. One was, that actions may be ^ B ; sho \ 
so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intri- 
cate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, 
but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To 
this he answers not a word. Another of my rea- 
sons was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is 
bound to weigh the convenience or inconvenience 
of every individual action to the uttermost grain 
in the balance of true judgment. The truth of 
this reason is confessed by T. H. ; though he might 
have had more abetters in this than in the most 
part of his discourse, that nothing is indifferent ; 
that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side, 
but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to 
omit it. From which confession of his it follows, 
that in all those actions wherein reason doth not 
define what is most convenient, there the will is 
free from the determination of the understanding ; 
and by consequence the last feather is wanting to 
break the horse's back. A third reason was, be- 
cause passions and affections sometimes prevail 
against judgment : as I proved by the example of 
Medea and Csesar, by the nearness of the objects 
to the senses, and by the estimation of a temporal 
loss more than sin. Against this reason his whole 
answer is addressed. And first, (c) he explaineth 
the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the 
last feather ; wherewith he seems to be delighted, 
seeing he useth it now the second time. But let 
him like it as he will, it is improper, for three rea- 
sons. First, the determination of the judgment is 
no part of the weight, but is the sentence of the 
trier. The understanding weigheth all things, ob- 



320 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiii. jeets, means, circumstances, convenience, inconve- 
ThTBUh^s nience ; but itself is not weighed. Secondly, the 
re pb * sensitive passion, in some extraordinary cases, may 
give a counterfeit weight to the object, if it can 
detain or divert reason from the balance : but or- 
dinarily the means, circumstances, and causes 
concurrent, they have their whole weight from 
the understanding ; so as they do not press the 
horse's back at all, until reason lay them on. 
Thirdly, he conceives that as each feather has a 
certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not 
arbitrarily, but necessarily towards the overcharg- 
ing of the horse ; so all objects and causes have a 
natural efficiency, whereby they do physically de- 
termine the will ; which is a great mistake. His 
objects, his agents, his motives, his passions, and 
all his concurrent causes, ordinarily do only move 
the will morally, not determine it naturally. So 
as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion 
over itself. 

" His other example, of a man that strikes, 
'whose will to strike followeth necessarily that 
thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, imme- 
diately before the lifting up of his hand' : as it con- 
founds passionate, mdeliberate thoughts, with the 
dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain ; 
for between the cup and the lip, between the lift- 
ing up of the hand and the blow, the will may 
alter, and the judgment also. And lastly, it is im- 
pertinent ; for that necessity of striking proceeds 
from the free determination of the agent, and not 
from the special influence of any outward deter- 
mining causes. And so it is only a necessity upon 
supposition. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 321 

" Concerning Medea's choice, the strength of the NO. xxm. 
argument doth not lie either in the fact of Medea, _/ _; .~". 

^ y The Tiislinji s 

"which is but a fiction, or in the authority of the reply. 
poet, who writes things rather to be admired than 
believed, but in the experience of all men : who 
find it to be true in themselves, that sometimes 
reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of 
his passion, that what he desires is but a pleasant 
good, that what he loseth by such a choice is an 
honest good, that that which is honest is to be 
preferred before that which is pleasant ; yet the will 
pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that 
which is honest. St. Paul (Rom. vii. 15) saith as 
much in earnest, as is feigned of Medea : that he 
approved not that which he did) and that he did 
that which he hated. The Roman story is mis- 
taken : there was no bribe in the case but affection. 
Whereas I urge, that those things which are 
nearer to the senses do move more powerfully, he 
lays hold on it ; and without answering to that for 
which I produced it, infers, ' that the sense of pre- 
sent good, is more immediate to the action than 
the foresight of evil consequents 1 : which is true ; 
but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent 
necessity. Let a man do what he may do, and 
what he ought to do, and sensitive objects will 
lose that power which they have by his own fault 
and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate concu- 
piscence doth sometimes, but rarely, surprise a 
man, and render the action not free. But conse- 
quent and deliberated concupiscence, which pro- 
ceeds from the rational will, doth render the action 
more free, not less free, and introduceth only a ne- 
cessity upon supposition. 

VOL. v. Y 



322 THE QUESTIONS CQNCERN1NG 

NO. xxin. " Lastly, he saith, that a man's mourning more 
r ~" for the loss of his child than for his sin, makes 

The Bishop's IT -IT 

reply. nothing to the last dictates of the understanding . 
Yes, very much. Reason dictates that a sin com- 
mitted is a greater evil than the loss of a child, 
and ought more to be lamented for : yet we see 
daily how affection prevails against the dictate ol 
reason. That which he infers from hence, that 
6 sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by conse- 
quence that repentance proceedeth from causes'; 
is true as to the latter part of it, but not in his 
sense. The causes from whence repentance doth 
proceed, are God's grace preventing, and man's 
will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs 
freely. Those inferior agents, which sometimes do 
concur as subordinate to the grace of God, do not, 
cannot, determine the will naturally. And there- 
fore the former part of his inference, that sorrow 
for sin is not voluntary, is untrue, and altogether 
groundless. That is much more truly and much 
more properly said to be voluntary, which pro- 
ceeds from judgment and from the rational will, 
than that which proceeds from passion and from 
the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all 
T. H.'s errors in this question is, that he acknow- 
ledgeth no efficacy but that which is natural. 
Hence is this wild consequence ; ( repentance hath 
causes', and therefore ' it is not voluntary'. Free 
effects have free causes, necessary effects neces- 
sary causes : voluntary effects have sometimes free, 
sometimes necessary causes." 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 323 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XXIII. 

(a) " Supposing the last dictate of the under- NO. xxm. 
standing did always determine the will, yet this Anhna ^. er _^ 
determination, being not antecedent in time, nor * ion u r n tlio 

. Bishop'-s reply, 

proceeding from extrinsical causes, but from the 
proper resolution of the agent, who had now free- 
ly determined himself, makes no absolute necessity, 
but only hypothetical, &c." This is the Bishop's 
answer to the necessity inferred from that, that 
the will necessarily followeth the last dictate of 
the understanding ; which answer he thinks is not 
sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the 
understanding is in time together with the will it- 
self, and therefore not antecedent. It is true, that 
the will is not produced but in the same instant 
with the last dictate of the understanding ; but 
the necessity of the will, and the necessity of the 
last dictate of the understanding, may have been 
antecedent. For that last dictate of the under- 
standing was produced by causes antecedent, and 
\vas then necessary though not yet produced ; as 
when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching 
the earth is antecedent to the touch itself. For 
all motion through any determined space, necessa- 
rily makes a motion through the next space, unless 
it be hindered by some contrary external motion ; 
and then the stop is as necessary, as the proceed- 
ing would have been. The argument therefore 
from the last dictate of the understanding, suffi- 
ciently inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great 
as the necessity that a stone shall fall when it is 
already falling. As for his other answer, that 
" the will does not certainly follow the last dictate 



324 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxin. of the understanding, though it always ought to 

AmraaaieiT fH w i fc "> he himself says it is but probable ; but 

sions upon the any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks of 

rep jr. presently find it false ; and that 



it is impossible to will anything that appears not 
first in his understanding to be good for him. 
And whereas he says the will ought to follow the 
last dictate of the understanding, unless he mean 
that the man ought to follow it, it is an insignifi- 
cant speech ; for duties are the man's not the will's 
duties : and if hemeans so, then it is false ; for a 
man ought not to follow the dictate of the under- 
standing, when it is erroneous. 

(b) " Of which I gave then three reasons. One 
was, that actions may be so equally circumstanti- 
ated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, 
but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To 
this he answers not a word." There was no need 
of answer : for he hath very often in this discourse 
contradicted it himself, in that he maketh " reason 
to be the true root of liberty, and men to have 
more or less liberty, as they have more or less 
reason". How then can a man leave that to liber- 
ty, when his reason can give no sentence ? And 
for his leaving it to chance ; if by chance he mean 
that which hath no causes, he destroy eth Provi- 
dence ; and if he mean that which hath causes, but 
unknown to us, he leaveth it to necessity. Besides, 
it is false that " actions may be so equally circum- 
stantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sen- 
tence". For though in the things to be elected 
there may be an exact equality : yet there may be 
circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him 
resolve upon that of the two which he considered! 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 325 

for the present ; and to break off all further delibe- NO, XXHI. 
ration for this cause, that he must not (to use his . 1 ? ** 

J v t Amraadver- 

own instance) by spending time in vain, apply sion sup on the 

.i r^ i -,. T,- T, ^ i- Bishops reply. 

neither of the plaisters, which the chirurgeon gives 
him, to his wound. " Another of his reasons was, 
because reason doth not weigh every individual 
action to the uttermost grain/' True ; but does it 
therefore follow, a man gives no sentence ? The 
will therefore may follow the dictate of the judg- 
ment, whether the man weigh or not weigh all 
that might be weighed. " His third reason was, 
because passions and affections sometimes pre- 
vail against judgment." I confess they prevail 
often against wisdom, which is it he means here 
by judgment. But they prevail not against the 
dictate of the understanding, which he knows is 
the meaning of judgment in this place. And the 
will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less 
follow the dictate of that little understanding he 
hath, than the will of the wisest man followeth his 
wisdom. 

(c) " He explaineth the sense of the assertion 
by the comparison of the last feather : wherewith 
he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now 
the second time. But let him like it as he will, it 
is improper, for three reasons." To me this com- 
parison seemeth very proper; and therefore I made 
no scruple (though not much delighted with it, as 
being no new comparison) to use it again, when 
there was need again. For in the examination of 
truth, I search rather for perspicuity than elegance. 
But the Bishop with his School-terms is far from 
perspicuity. How near he is to elegance, I shall 
not forget to examine in due time. But why is 



326 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxni. this comparison improper? " First, because the 
Animadvert determination of the judgment is no part of the 
MOIU upon the weight : for the understanding weigheth all things. 

Bishop s reply. ^ . o o o ? 

objects, means, circumstances, convenience, incon- 
venience ; but itself is not weighed." In this com- 
parison, the objects, means, &c, are the weights, 
the man is the scale, the understanding of a con- 
venience or inconvenience is the pressure of those 
weights, which incline him now one way, now 
another ; and that inclination is the will. Again, 
the objects, means, &c, are the feathers that press 
the horse, the feeling of that pressure is under- 
standing, and his patience or impatience the will 
to bear them, if not too many, or if too many, to 
lie down under them. It is therefore to little 
purpose that he saith, the understanding is not 
weighed. " Secondly", he says the comparison is im- 
proper, " because ordinarily, the means, circum- 
stances, and causes concurrent, have their whole 
weight from the understanding ; so as they do not 
press the horse's back at all, until reason lay them 
on." This, and that which followeth, " that my 
objects, agents, motives, passions, and all my con- 
current causes, ordinarily do only move the will 
morally, not determine it naturally, so as it hath 
in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself," 
is all nonsense. For no man can understand, that 
the understanding maketh any alteration in the 
object in weight or lightness ; nor that reason 
lays on objects upon the understanding ; nor that 
the will is moved, nor that any motion is moral ; 
nor that these words, the will hath a free domi- 
nion over itself] signify anything. With the rest 
of this reply I shall truat the reader ; and only 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 3*J7 

note the last words, where he makes me say, NO. xxni. 
repentance hath causes, and therefore it is not An \ ma(1 r ver ^ 
voluntary. But I said, repentance hath causes, &ions tl p n tbo 

, . . 111 - \ Bishop's reply. 

and mat it is not voluntary ; he chops in, and 
therefore, and makes an absurd consequence, 
which he would have the reader believe was mine, 
and then confutes it with these senseless words : 
" Free effects have free causes, necessary effects 
necessary causes; voluntary effects have sometimes 
free, sometimes necessary causes". Can any man 
but a Schoolman think the will is voluntary ? But 
yet the will is the cause of voluntary actions. 

NO. xxiv. 

/. D. " Fifthly and lastly, the divine labours to 
find out a way how liberty may consist with the 
prescience and decrees of God. But of this I had 
not very long since occasion to write a full dis- 
course, in answer to a treatise against the prescience 
of things contingent. I shall for the present only 
repeat these two things. First, we ought not to 
desert a certain truth, because we are not able to 
comprehend the certain manner. Cod should be 
but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to 
comprehend all his actions and attributes. Se- 
condly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do 
and ever shall submit to better, the readiest way 
to reconcile contingence and liberty with the de- 
crees and prescience of God, and most remote 
from the altercations of these times, is to subject 
future contingents to the aspect of God, according 
to that presentiality which they have in eternity. 
Not that things future, which are not yet ex- 
istent, are co-existent with God : but because the 



328 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO, xxiv. infinite knowledge of God, incircling all times in 
IT * ~* the point of eternity, doth attain to their future 

The Bishop s * J y 

Tqiy. being, from whence proceeds their objective and 
intelligible being. The main impediment which 
keeps men from subscribing to this way, is because 
they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succes- 
sion, and not one indivisible point. But if they 
consider, that whatsoever is in God is God ; that 
there are no accidents in him, (for that which is 
infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected) ; that 
as God is not wise, but wisdom itself, not just, but 
justice itself, so he is not eternal, but eternity itself : 
they must needs conclude, that therefore this eter- 
nity is indivisible, because God is indivisible ; and 
therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite 
point, comprehending all times within itself." 

T. H. The last part of this discourse containeth 
his opinion about reconciling liberty with the 
prescience and decrees of God, otherwise than 
some divines have done ; against whom he had for- 
merly written a treatise, out of which he only re- 
peateth two things. One is, that " we ought not to 
desert a certain truth, for not being able to compre- 
hend the certain manner of it". And I say the same ; 
as for example, that he ought not to desert this cer- 
tain truth : that there are certain and necessary 
causes, which make every man to will what he 
willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what 
manner the will of man is caused. And yet I 
think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive : 
seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, re- 
ward, punishment, good and evil sequels of men's 
actions retained in memory, do frame and make us 
to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect ; 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 329 

and that the memory of such things proceeds from NO. xxiv. 
the senses, and sense from the operation of the ob- _ : * 
jects of sense, which, are external to us, and go- P iy. 
verned only by God Almighty ; and by conse- 
quence, all actions, even of free and voluntary 
agents, are necessary. 

The other thing he repeateth is, that " the best 
way to reconcile contingency and liberty with the 
prescience and decrees of God, is to subject future 
contingents to the aspect of God". The same is 
also my opinion, but contrary to what he hath all 
this w r hile laboured to prove. For hitherto he 
held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty 
and the decrees of God, irreconcilable ; unless the 
aspect of God (which word appeareth now the first 
time iu this discourse) signify somewhat else be- 
sides God's will and decree, which I cannot under- 
stand. But he adds, that we must subject them 
i( according to that presentiality which they have in 
eternity" ; which he says cannot be done by them 
that conceive eternity to be an everlasting succes- 
sion, but only by them that conceive it an indivisible 
point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can con- 
ceive eternity to be an indivisible point, or any thing 
but an everlasting succession, I will renounce all I 
have written on this subject. I know St. Thomas 
Aquinas calls eternity nunc stans, an ever abiding 
now ; which is easy enough to say, but though I 
fain would, I never could conceive it ; they that 
can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time 
he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, 
save only those that conceive in their minds a 
nunc stans; which I think are none. I understand 
as little, how it can be true that " God is not just, 



330 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. but justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not 
-T ' T ~f eternal but eternity itself": nor how he concludes 

1 he Bishop * 

re pb*. thence that " eternity is a point indivisible, and not 

a succession": nor in what sense it can be said, 
that an " infinite point," &c, wherein is no succes- 
sion, can " comprehend all times," though time be 
successive. 

These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I 
wonder therefore what was the design of the 
Schoolmen to bring them up ; unless they thought 
a man could not be a true Christian, unless his un- 
derstanding be first strangled with such hard 
sayings. 

And thus much in answer to his discourse ; 
wherein I think not only his squadrons, but also 
his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now 
your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning 
the same question, with my reasons for it, posi- 
tively and briefly as I can, without any terms of 
art, in plain English. 

J. D. (a) " That poor discourse which I men- 
tion, was not written against any divines, but in 
way of examination of a French treatise, which 
your Lordship's brother did me the honour to show 
me at York, (ty My assertion is most true, that 
we ought not to desert a certain truth because we 
are not able to comprehend the certain manner. 
Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the 
will of man in ordinary actions is free from ex- 
trinsical determination : a truth demonstrable in 
reason, received and believed by all the world. 
And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend 
or express exactly the certain manner how it con- 
sists together with God's eternal prescience and 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 331 

decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I NO.XXIV. 
ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. .":.'." 

o 1 ne riisnop s 

But T. H.'s opinion, of the absolute necessity of wpiy. 
all events by reason of their antecedent determi- 
nation in their extrinsical and necessary causes, is 
no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange 
paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all 
authors, yea, by all the world. Neither is the 
manner how the second causes do operate, so ob- 
scure, or so transcendent above the reach of rea- 
son, as the eternal decrees of God are. And there- 
fore in both these respects, he cannot challenge the 
same privilege. I am in possession of an old truth, 
derived by inheritance or succession from mine an- 
cestors. And therefore, though I were not able to 
clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my 
possession until a better title were showed for ano- 
ther. He is no old possessor, but a new pretender, 
and is bound to make good his claim by evident 
proofs : not by weak and inconsequent suppositions 
or inducements, such as those are which he useth 
here, of ' praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, 
the memory of good and evil sequels and events' ; 
which may incline the will, but neither can nor do 
necessitate the will : nor by uncertain and acci- 
dental inferences, such as this ; ' the memory of 
praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and 
evil sequels, do make us' (he should say, dispose us) 
4 to elect what we elect ; but the memory of these 
things is from the sense, and the sense from the 
operation of the external objects, and the agency 
of external objects is only from God ; therefore all 
actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are ne- 
cessary', (c) To pass by all the other great im- 



332 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO, xxiv. perfections which are to be found in this sorite, 
The BWwT's ^ * s j ust ^ke that old sophistical piece : He that 
drinks well sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks 
no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives well ; therefore 
he that drinks well lives well. 

(d) " In the very last passage of my discourse I 
proposed mine own private opinion, how it might 
be made appear, that the eternal prescience and 
decrees of God are consistent with true liberty 
and contingency. And this I set down in as plain 
terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation 
w r ould permit : which is almost wholly misunder- 
stood by T. H., and many of my words w r rested to 
a wrong sense. As first, where I speak of the 
aspect of God, that is, his view, his knowledge, by 
which the most free and contingent actions were 
manifest to him from eternity, (Heb. iv. 13, all 
things are naked and open to his eyes), and this 
not discursively, but intuitively, not by external 
species, but by his internal essence ; he confounds 
this with the will and the decrees of God ; though 
he found not the word aspect before in this dis- 
course, he might have found prescience, (e) Se- 
condly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I have main- 
tained that ' liberty and the decrees of God are 
irreconcilable,' If I have said any such thing, my 
heart never went along with my pen. No, but his 
reason why he chargeth me on this manner is, be- 
cause I have maintained that ' liberty and the abso- 
lute necessity of all things' are irreconcilable. That 
is true indeed. What then ? ' Why,' saith he, ' ne- 
cessity and God's decrees are all one.' How all 
one ? That were strange indeed. Necessity may be 
a consequent of God's decrees ; it cannot be the de- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 333 

cree itself, (f) But to cut his argument short : God NO. xxiv. 
hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time; "~ 7 

1 The Bishop 

yet not all after the same manner, but according to reply. 
the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of 
his creatures, which he doth not destroy by his de- 
cree ; some he acteth, with some he co-operateth 
by special influence, and some he only permitteth. 
Yet this is no idle or bare permission ; seeing he 
doth concur both by way of general influence, 
giving power to act ; and also by disposing all 
events necessary, free, and contingent to his own 
glory. (g) Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I ' allow 
all men to be of his opinion, save only those that 
conceive in their minds a nunc stems, or how eter- 
nity is an indivisible point, rather than an ever- 
lasting succession'. But I have given no such 
allowance. I know there are many other ways 
proposed by divines, for reconciling the eternal 
prescience and decrees of God with the liberty 
and contingency of second causes ; some of which 
may please other judgments better than this of 
mine. Howsoever, though a man could compre- 
hend none of all these ways, yet remember what 
I said, that a certain truth ought not to be re- 
jected, because we are not able, in respect of our 
weakness, to understand the certain manner or 
reason of it. I know the loadstone hath an at- 
tractive power to draw the iron to it ; and yet I 
know not how it comes to have such a power. 

" But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in 
this section is, whether eternity be an indivisible 
point, as I maintain it; or an everlasting succession, 
as he would have it. According to his constant 
use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, 



334 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. but pleads against it from his own incapacity. c I 
i%e Bishops never could conceive/ saith he, 'how eternity 
should be an indivisible point.' I believe, that 
neither we nor any man else can comprehend it so 
clearly as we do these inferior things. The nearer 
that anything comes to the essence of God, the 
more remote it is from our apprehension. But 
shall we therefore make potentialities, and succes- 
sive duration, and former and later, or a part with- 
out a part, as they say, to be in God ? Because 
we are not able to understand clearly the divine 
perfection, we must not therefore attribute any 
imperfection to him. 

(li) " He saith moreover, that c he understands 
as little how it can be true which I say, that God 
is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eter- 
nity itself/ It seems, howsoever he be versed in 
this question, that he hath not troubled his head 
overmuch with reading School-divines or metaphy- 
sicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in 
God really distinct from his essence. God is a 
most simple or pure act, which can admit no 
composition of substance and accidents. Doth he 
think, that the most perfect essence of God cannot 
act sufficiently without faculties and qualities ? 
The infinite perfection of the Divine essence ex- 
cludes all passive or receptive powers, and cannot 
be perfected more than it is by any accidents. 
The attributes of God are not divers virtues or 
qualities in him, as they are in the creatures ; but 
really one and the same with the Divine essence, 
and among themselves. They are attributed to 
God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are 
not able to understand that which is to be known 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 335 

of God under one name, or one act of the under- NO. xxiv. 
standing. rt '~ : ~r 

The Bishop s 

"Furthermore he saith, that 'he understands pi.v. 
not how I conclude from hence, that eternity is 
an indivisable point, and not a succession'. (/) I 
will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible ; 
but eternity is the Divine substance. The major 
is evident, because God is actus simplicissimus, a 
most simple act ; wherein there is no manner of 
composition, neither of matter and form, nor of 
subject and accidents, nor of parts, &c ; and by 
consequence no divisibility. The minor hath been 
clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last 
doubt, and is confessed by all men that whatso- 
ever is in God, is God. 

" Lastly, he saith, he conceives not c how it can 
be said, that an infinite point, wherein is no suc- 
cession, can comprehend all time which is succes- 
sive'. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it 
formally, as time is successive ; but eminently and 
virtually, as eternity is infinite. To-day all eter- 
nity is co-existent with this day : to-morrow all 
eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow : and 
so in like manner with all the parts of time, being 
itself without parts. He saith, * he finds not these 
phrases in the Scripture'. No, but he may find 
the thing in the Scripture, that God is infinite in 
all his attributes, and not capable of any imper- 
fection. 

"And so to show his antipathy against the School- 
men, that he hath no liberty or power to contain 
himself when he meets with any of their phrases 
or tenets, he falls into another paroxism or fit of 
inveighing against them ; and so concludes his 



336 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. answer with a plaudite to himself, because he had 
The Bishop's defeated both my squadrons of arguments and 
reserves of distinctions 

Dicite lo pasan, et lo bis dicite psean. 

But because his eyesight was weak, and their 
backs were towards him, he quite mistook the 
matter. Those whom he saw routed and running 
away, were his own scattered forces." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY, NO. XXIV. 

(a) " That poor discourse which I mention, was 
not written against any divines, but in way of ex- 
amination of a French treatise, &c". This is in reply 
to those words of mine, " this discourse containeth 
his opinion about reconciling liberty with the pre- 
science and decrees of God, otherwise than some 
divines have done, against whom he had for- 
merly written a treatise". If the French treatise 
were according to his mind, what need was there 
that the examination should be written ? If it 
were not to his mind, it was in confutation of him, 
that is to say, written against the author of it : un- 
less perhaps the Bishop thinks that he writes not 
against a man, unless he charge him with blas- 
phemy and atheism, as he does me. 

(b) " My assertion is most true, that we ought 
not to desert a certain truth, because we are not 
able to comprehend the certain manner." To this 
I answered, that it was true ; and as he alleged it 
for a reason why he should not be of my opinion, 
so I alleged it for a reason why I should not be of 
his. But now in his reply he saith, that his opinion 
is " a truth demonstrable in reason, received and 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 337 

believed by all the world. And therefore, though he N0 . xxrv, 
be not able to comprehend or express exactly the ' ' ' 

i \i vi *. * 'ii i Animadveir- 

certam manner how this liberty of will consists with on upon the 
God's eternal prescience and decrees, yet he ought Blshop8reply 
to adhere to that truth which is manifest." But 
why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to 
himself? And if it be manifest to himself, why does he 
deny that he is able to comprehend it ? And if he 
be not able to comprehend it, how knows he that it is 
demonstrable ? Or why says he that so confidently, 
which he does not know ? Methinks that which I 
have said, namely, that " that which God fore- 
knows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, 
and at the same time that he foreknew it should be ; 
but that which cannot but be, is necessary ; there- 
fore what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and 
at the time foreknown" : this I say looketh some- 
what liker to a demonstration, than any thing that 
he hath hitherto brought to prove free will. 
Another reason why I should be of his opinion, 
is that he is " in possession of an old truth de- 
rived to him by inheritance or succession from his 
ancestors". To which I answer, first, that I am 
in possession of a truth derived to me from the 
light of reason. Secondly, that whereas he know- 
eth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth, 
or not ; because he confesseth he knows not how 
it can consist with God's prescience and decrees ; 
I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of neces- 
sity not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth 
from the eternal prescience and decrees of God. 
Besides, it is an unhandsome thing for a man to 
derive his opinion concerning truth by succession 
from his ancestors; for our ancestors, the first Chris- 

VOL. V. Z 



338 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. tians, derived not therefore their truth from the 
.^ ? ' Gentiles, because they were their ancestors. 

Animadver- y J 

sions upon the (A " To pass by all the other great imperfec- 

Bishop's reply. . V ' _ r J , , . . r . 

tions which are to be round in this sonte, it is 
just like an old philosophical piece : he that drinks 
well, sleeps well ; he that sleeps well, thinks no 
hurt ; he that thinks no hurt, lives well ; therefore 
he that drinks well, lives well." My argument was 
thus : " election is always from the memory of good 
and evil sequels ; memory is always from the sense ; 
and sense always from the action of external 
bodies ; and all action from God ; therefore all 
actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from 
God, and consequently necessary". Let the Bishop 
compare now his scurrilous argumentation with 
this of mine ; and tell me, whether he that sleeps 
well, doth all his lifetime think no hurt. 

(d) " In the very last passage of my discourse 
I proposed my own private opinion, how it might 
be made appear that the eternal prescience and 
decrees of God are consistent with true liberty 
and contingency, &c." If he had meant by liberty, 
as other men do, the liberty of action, that is, of 
things which are in his power to do which he will, 
it had been an easy matter to reconcile it with the 
prescience and decrees of God ; but meaning the 
liberty of will, it was impossible. So likewise, if 
by contingency he had meant simply coming to 
pass, it had been reconcilable with the decrees of 
God ; but meaning coming to pass without neces- 
sity, it was impossible. And therefore though it 
be true he says, that " he set it down in as plain 
terms as he could", yet it was impossible to set 
it down in plain terms. Nor ought he to charge 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY^ AND CHANCE. 339 

me with misunderstanding him, and wresting his NO. xxiv. 
words to a wrong sense. For the truth is, I did * ' ' 

-IT -ii i Animadver- 

not understand them at all, nor thought he under- ons upon the 
stood them himself; but was willing to give them Blf>hop8repl3r - 
the best interpretation they would bear ; which he 
calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, 
I understood not what he meant by the aspect of 
God. For if he had meant his foreknowledge, which 
word he had often used before ; what needed he in 
this one place only to call it aspect ? Or what need 
he here call it his view ? Or say that all things 
are open to the eyes of God not discursively, 
but intuitively ; which is to expound eyes in that 
text, Hebr. iv. 1 3, not figuratively but literally, 
nevertheless excluding external species, which the 
Schoolmen say are the cause of seeing ? But it was 
well done to exclude such insignificant speeches, 
upon every occasion whatsoever. And though I 
do not hold the foreknowledge of God to consist in 
discourse ; yet I shall be never driven to say it is 
by intuition, as long as I know that even a man 
hath foreknowledge of all those things which he 
intendeth himself to do, not by discourse, but by 
knowing his own purpose ; saving that man hath a 
superior power over him, that can change his pur- 
pose ; which God hath not. And whereas he says, 
I confound this aspect with the will and decrees of 
God, he accuseth me wrongfully. For how could 
I so confound it, when I understood not what it 
meant ? 

(e) " Secondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I 
have maintained that ' liberty and the decrees of 
God are irreconcileable'". And the reason why I 
do so is, because he maintained that liberty and the 

Z2 



340 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable. 
Animadvert If liberty cannot stand with necessity, it cannot 
ions upon the stand with the decrees of God. of which decrees 

Bishop's reply. t 

necessity is a consequent. I needed not to say, nor 
did say, that necessity and God's decrees are all 
one : though if I had said it, it had not been with- 
out authority of learned men, in whose writings 
are often found this sentence, voluntas Dei, neces- 
sitas rerum. 

(f) " But to cut his argument short : God hath 
decreed all effects which come to pass in time, yet 
not all after the same manner, but according to 
the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of 
his creatures ; which he doth not destroy by his 
decree : some he acteth." Hitherto true. Then 
he addeth : " with some he co-operateth by special 
influence ; and some he only permitteth ; yet this 
is no idle or bare permission". This is false. For 
nothing operateth by its own original power, but 
God himself. Man operateth not but by special 
power, (I say special power, not special influence), 
derived from God. Nor is it by God's permission 
only, as I have often already shown, and as the 
Bishop here contradicting his former words con- 
fesseth. For to permit only, and barely to permit, 
signify the same thing. And that which he says, 
that God concurs by way of general influence, is 
jargon. For every concurrence is one singular and 
individual concurrence ; and nothing in the world 
is general, but the signification of words and other 
signs. 

> (g) " Thirdly, he chargeth me, that ( I allow all 
inch to be of his opinion, save only those that 
conceive in their minds a mine stans, or how eter- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 341 

nity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlast- NO, xxiv. 
ing succession.' But I have given no such allow- A ^^T^ 
ance." Surely if the reason wherefore my opinion nsupon the 

, i /* 1-1 T Bishop's reply. 

is false, proceed trom this, that I conceive not 
eternity to be nunc stans, but an everlasting suc- 
cession, I am allowed to hold my opinion till I can 
conceive eternity otherwise : at least he allows men 
not till then to be of his opinion. For he hath said, 
" that the main impediment which keeps men from 
subscribing to that way of his, is because they con- 
ceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and * 
ilot one indivisible point". As for the many other 
ways which he says are " proposed by divines for 
reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of 
God with the liberty and contingency of second 
causes", if they mean such liberty and contingency 
as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in vain ; 
for truth and error can never be reconciled. But 
" however," saith he, " though a man could com- 
prehend none of all these ways, yet we must re- 
member that a certain truth ought not to be re- 
jected, because we are not able to understand the 
reason of it." For " he knows," he says, " the load- 
stone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to 
it, and yet he knoweth not how it cometh to have 
such a power." I know the load-stone hath no 
such attractive power ; and yet I know that the 
iron cometh to it, or it to the iron ; and therefore 
wonder not, that the Bishop knoweth not how it 
cometh to have that power. In the next place he 
saith, I bring nothing to prove that eternity is not 
an indivisible point, but my own incapacity " that 
I cannot conceive it". The truth is, I cannot dis- 
pute neither for nor against (as he can do) the 



342 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. positions I understand not. Nor do I understand 
AmrnadTer- ^ w ^at derogation it can be to the divine perfection, 
sions upon the to attribute to it potentiality, that is (in English) 

Bishop's reply. , r . _ . \ .? 

power, and successive duration ; for such attributes 
are often given to it in the Scripture. 

(h) " He saith moreover, that ' he understands 
as little how it can be true which I say, that 
God is not just, but justice itself, nor eternal, 
but eternity itself. It seems, howsoever he be 
versed in this question, that he hath not troubled 
his head over-much with reading School-divines, 
or metaphysicians." They are unseemly words to 
be said of God : I will not say, blasphemous and 
atheistical, which are the attributes he gives to my 
opinions, because I do not think them spoken out 
of an evil mind, but out of error : they are, I say, 
unseemly words to be said of God, that he is not 
just, that he is not eternal, and (as he also said) 
that he is not wise ; and cannot be excused by any 
following but, especially when the but is followed 
by that which is not to be understood. Can any 
man understand how justice is just, or wisdom 
wise ? and whereas justice is an accident, one of 
the moral virtues, and wisdom another ; how God 
is an accident or moral virtue ? It is more than 
the Schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand ; 
whose writings have troubled my head more than 
they should have done, if I had known that amongst 
so many senseless disputes, there had been so few 
lucid intervals. But I have considered since, where 
men will undertake to reason out of natural philo- 
sophy of the incomprehensible nature of God, that 
it is impossible they should speak intelligibly, or in 
other language than metaphysic, wherein they may 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 343 

contradict themselves, and not perceive it ; as he NO. xxiv. 
does here, when he says, " the attributes of God Aniraad ; er . "~ 



are not diverse virtues or qualities in him, as they * p n the 

* .. , Bishop's reply. 

are in the creatures, but really one and the same 
with the divine essence and amongst themselves, 
and attributed to God to supply the defect of our 
capacity". Attributes are names ; and therefore it 
is a contradiction, to say they are really one and 
the same with the divine essence. But if he mean 
the virtues signified by the attributes, as justice, 
wisdom, eternity, divinity, &c ; so also they are vir- 
tues, and not one virtue, (which is still a contra- 
diction) ; and we give those attributes to God, not 
to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, 
but to signify how we think it best to honour 
him. 

(i) " e In the next place he will help me to un- 
derstand,' he says, ' how eternity is an indivisible 
point/ The divine substance is indivisible ; but 
eternity is the divine substance. The major is 
evident, because God is actus simplicissimus ; the 
minor hath been clearly demonstrated in my an- 
swer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, 
that whatsoever is attributed to God is God." The 
major is so far from being evident, that actus sim- 
plicissimus signifieth nothing. The minor is said 
by some men, thought by no man ; for whatsoever 
is thought, is understood. And all that he hath 
elsewhere and here dilated upon it, is as perfect 
nonsense, as any man ever writ on purpose to 
make merry with. And so is that whereby he 
answers to my objection, that a point cannot com- 
prehend all time, which is successive ; namely, 
his distinction, that " a point doth not comprehend 



344 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxiv. all time formally, as time is successive ; but emi- 
Animadvert * ncntty and virtually, as eternity is infinite". And 
sions upon the this, " to-day all eternity is co-existent with this 

Bishop's reply. , , . .,, , 

day, and to-morrow all eternity will be co-existent 
with to-morrow". It is well that his eternity is 
now come from a nunc starts to be a nunc fluens, 
flowing from this day to the next, and so on. This 
kind of language is never found in the Scripture. 
No, but the thing, saith he, is found there, namely, 
that God is infinite in all his attributes. I would 
he could shew me the place where God is said to 
be infinite in all his attributes. There be places 
enough to shew that God is infinite in power, in 
wisdom, mercy, &c : but neither is he said to be in- 
finite in names (which is the English of attributes), 
nor that he is an indivisible point, nor that a point 
doth comprehend time eminently and virtually ; 
nor that to-day all eternity is co-existent with to- 
day, &c. And thus much in answer to his reply 
upon my answer. That which remaineth, is my 
reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on 
this subject. 

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV. 

T. H. First, I conceive that when it cometh 
into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain 
action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing 
or abstaining necessarily followeth the present 
thought he had of the good or evil consequence 
thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden 
anger the action shall follow the thought of re- 
venge, in sudden fear the thought of escape. Also 
when a man hath time to deliberate, but delibe- 
rates not, because never anything appeared that 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 345 

could make him doubt of the consequence, the NO. xxv. 
action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm ' 7". ' 
of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I about liberty 
understand him aright, calls them spontaneous. I an necesslty * 
call them voluntary, because those actions that 
follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary. 
And here, where there is one only appetite, that 
one is the last. 

Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash 
action ; which could not be justly done by man, 
unless the same were voluntary. For no action of 
a man can be said to be without deliberation, 
though never so sudden ; because it is supposed he 
had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his 
life, whether he should do that kind of action or 
not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a 
sudden passion of anger, shall nevertheless be 
justly put to death : because all the time wherein 
he was able to consider w r hether to kill were good 
or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation ; 
and consequently the killing shall be judged to pro- 
ceed from election. 

J. D. " This part of T. H.'s discourse hangs to- 
gether like a sick man's dreams, (a) Even now 
he tells us, that ' a man may have time to delibe- 
rate, yet not deliberate'. By and by he saith, that 
' no action of a man, though never so sudden, can 
be said to be without deliberation'. He tells us, 
No. xxxin, that c the scope of this section is to 
show what is spontaneous'. Howbeit he showeth 
only what is voluntary ; (ft) so making volun- 
tary and spontaneous to be all one ; whereas before 
he had told us, that ( every spontaneous action is 
not voluntary, because indeliberate ; nor every 



346 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxv. voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from 
The BiskT's f ear '' ( c ) Now he tells us, that ' those actions 
which follow the last appetite, are voluntary ; and 
where there is one only appetite, that is the last'. 
But before he told us, that ' voluntary presuppos- 
eth some precedent deliberation and meditation of 
what is likely to follow, both upon the doing arid 
abstaining from the action', (d) He defines liberty, 
No. xxix, to be * the absence of all extrinsical im- 
pediments to action'. And yet in his whole dis- 
course he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever 
is not done, is therefore not done, because the 
agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to 
do it. Are not extrinsical causes, which determine 
him not to do it, extrinsical impediments to action ? 
So no man shall be free to do any thing but that 
which he doth actually. He defines a free agent 
to be ' him who hath not made an end of deliber- 
ating' (No. xxvm). And yet defines liberty to be 
' an absence of outward impediments'. There may 
be outward impediments, even whilst he is deliber- 
ating. As a man deliberates whether he shall play 
at tennis : and at the same time the door of the 
tennis-court is fast locked against him. And after a 
man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no out- 
ward impediments : as when a man resolves not to 
play at tennis, because he finds himself ill-disposed, 
or because he will not hazard his money. So the 
same person, at the same time, should be free and 
not free, not free and free. And as he is not firm 
to his own grounds, so he confounds all things, the 
mind and the will, the estimative faculty and the 
understanding, imagination with deliberation, the 
end with the means, human will with the sensitive 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 347 

appetite, rational hope or fear with irrational pas- NO, xxv. 
sions, inclinations with intentions, a beginning __7_:, 7 

7 The Bishop 

of being with a beginning of working, sufficiency 
with efficiency. So as the greatest difficulty is to 
find out what he aims at. So as I had once 
resolved not to answer this part of his discourse ; 
yet upon better advice I will take a brief survey of 
it also ; and show how far I assent unto, or dissent 
from that which I conceive to be his meaning. 

"And first, concerning sudden passions, as anger 
or the like, (e) That which he saith, that * the action 
doth necessarily follow the thought', is thus far 
true ; that those actions which are altogether unde- 
liberated and do proceed from sudden and violent 
passions, or motus prlmo primi, which surprise a 
man, and give him no time to advise with reason, 
are not properly and actually in themselves free, 
but rather necessary actions ; as when a man runs 
away from a cat or a custard out of a secret anti- 
pathy. 

(f) "Secondly, as for those actions ' wherein 
actual deliberation seems not necessary, because 
never anything appeared that could make a man 
doubt of the consequence' : I do confess, that ac- 
tions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, 
without any actual deliberation in the present, 
when the act is done, may notwithstanding be 
truly both voluntary and free acts, yea, in some 
cases and in some sense, more free than if they 
were actually deliberated of in present. As one 
who hath acquired by former deliberation and ex- 
perience a habit to play upon the virginals, needs 
not deliberate what man or what jack he must 
touch, nor what finger of his hand he must move 



348 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxv. to play such a lesson ; yea, if his mind should be 
or intent to every motion of his hand, or 
every touch of a string, it would hinder his play, 
and render the action more troublesome to him. 
Wherefore I believe, that not only his playing in 
general, but every ^notion of his hand, though it 
be not presently deliberated of, is a free act, by 
reason of his precedent deliberation. So then 
(saving improprieties of speech, as calling that 
voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to 
the last appetite ; and other mistakes, as that no 
act can be said to be without deliberation) we 
agree also for the greater part in this second ob- 
servation. 

(g) "Thirdly, whereas he saith, that ' some sad- 
den acts proceeding from violent passions, which 
surprise a man, are justly punished' ; I grant they 
are so sometimes ; but not for his reason, because 
they have been formerly actually deliberated of ; 
but because they were virtually deliberated of, or 
because it is our fault that they were not actually 
deliberated of, whether it was a fault of pure ne- 
gation, that is, of not doing our duty only, or a 
fault of bad disposition also, by reason of some 
vicious habit which we had contracted by our for- 
mer actions. To do a necessary act is never a 
fault, nor justly punishable, when the necessity is 
inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsical causes. 
As if a child, before he had the use of reason, shall 
kill a man in his passion ; yet because he wanted 
malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain 
him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict 
rules of particular justice, unless there be some 
mixture of public justice in the case. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 349 

(K) " But if the necessity be contracted by our- NO. xxv. 
selves, and by our own faults, it is justly punish- 
able. As he who by his wanton thoughts in the 
day-time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution : 
a man cannot deliberate in his sleep, yet it is ac- 
counted a sinful act, and consequently, a free act, 
that is, not actually free in itself, but virtually free 
in its causes ; and though it be not expressly willed 
and chosen, yet it is tacitly and implicitly willed and 
chosen, when that is willed and chosen from whence 
it was necessarily produced. By the Levitical law, 
if a man digged a pit and left it uncovered, so that 
his neighbour's ox or his ass did fall into it, he 
was bound to make reparation ; not because he did 
choose to leave it uncovered on purpose that 
such a mischance might happen, but because he 
did freely omit that which he ought to have done, 
from whence this damage proceeded to his neigh- 
bour. Lastly, there is great difference between 
the first motions, which sometimes are not in our 
power, and subsequent acts of killing or stealing, 
or the like, which always are in our power if we 
have the use of reason, or else it is our own fault 
that they are not in our power. Yet to such 
hasty acts done in hot blood the law is not so se- 
vere, as to those which are done upon long deli- 
beration and prepensed malice, unless, as I said, 
there be some mixture of public justice in it. He 
that steals a horse deliberately, may be more 
punishable by the law than he that kills the owner 
by chance-medley : yet the death of the owner was 
more noxious, (to use his phrase), and more 
damageable to the family, than the stealth of the 
horse. So far was T. H. mistaken in that also, 



350 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

that the right to kill men doth proceed merely 
from their being noxious (No. xiv)." 

NO. XXV. ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S ANSWER TO MY 

' - OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV. 

Animadver- 
sions upon <he (a) " Even now he tells us, that c a man may 

Bishop's reply. . V J . , .._ , ... ^ J 

have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate . By 
and by he saith, that ' no action of a man, though 
never so sudden, can be said to be without deliber- 
ation'. " He thinks he hath here caught me in a 
contradiction ; but he is mistaken ; and the cause 
is, that he observed not that there may be a differ- 
ence between -deliberation and that which shall be 
construed for deliberation by a judge. For a man 
may do a rash act suddenly without deliberation ; 
yet because he ought to have deliberated, and had 
time enough to deliberate whether the action were 
lawful or not, it shall not be said by the judge that 
it was without, deliberation, who supposeth that 
after the law known, all the time following was 
time of deliberation. It is therefore no contra- 
diction, to say a man deliberates not, and that he 
shall be said to deliberate by him that is the judge 
of voluntary actions. 

(6) " Again, where he says, c he maketh volun- 
tary and spontaneous actions to be all one', whereas 
before he had told us that ( every spontaneous ac- 
tion is not voluntary, because indeliberate ; nor 
every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed 
from fear'. " He thinks he hath espied another 
contradiction. It is no wonder if speaking of 
spontaneous, which signifieth nothing else in Latin 
(for English it is not) but that which is done deli- 
berately or indeliberately without compulsion, I 



LIBERTY, NECESS^ ^ ...^ CHANCE. 351 

seem to the Bishop, who hath never given any de- KO. xxv. 
finition of that word, not to use it as he would * ' ' 

i A J *. * i A. * Animadver- 

have me. And it is easy for him to give it any slot* upon the 
signification he please, as the occasion shall serve Bl * hopsreply 
to charge me with contradiction. In what sense 
I have used that word once, in the same I have 
used it always, calling that spontaneous which is 
without co-action or compulsion by terror. 

(c) " Now he tells us, that c those actions which 
follow the last appetite are voluntary, and where 
there is one only appetite, that is the last'. But 
before he told us, that 'voluntary presupposeth 
some precedent deliberation and meditation of 
what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and 
abstaining from the action' ." This is a third con- 
tradiction he supposeth he hath found, but is again 
mistaken. For when men are to judge of actions, 
whether they be voluntary or not, they cannot call 
that action voluntary, which followed not the last 
appetite. But the same men, though there were 
no deliberation, shall judge there was, because it 
ought to have been, and that from the time that 
the law was known to the time of the action itself. 
And therefore both are true, that voluntary may 
be without, and yet presupposed in the law not to 
be without deliberation. 

(d) " He defines liberty (No. xxix.) to be c the 
absence of all extrinsical impediments to action'. 
And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to 
make good, that whatsoever is not done, is there- 
fore not done, because the agent was necessitated 
by extrinsical causes not to do it. Are not ex- 
trinsical causes which determine him not to do it, 
extrinsical impediments to action ?" This defini- 



352 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxv. tion of liberty, that it is " the absence of all ex- 
Animadverr tritisical impediments to action", he thinks he hath 
sions upon the sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrin- 

fiishop's reply. ' ,. i -, f . * 1 

sical causes, which determine a man not to do an 
action, be not extrinsical impediments to action. 
It seems by his question he makes no doubt bat 
they are ; but is deceived by a too shallow con- 
sideration of what the word impediment sigriifieth. 
For impediment or hinderance signifieth an op- 
position to endeavour. And therefore if a man 
be necessitated by extrinsical causes not to en- 
deavour an action, those causes do riot oppose his 
endeavour to do it, because he has no such endea- 
vour to be opposed ; and consequently extrinsical 
causes that take away endeavour, are not to be 
called impediments ; nor can any man be said to 
be hindered from doing that, which he had no pur- 
pose at all to do. So that this objection of his 
proceedeth only from this, that he understandeth 
not sufficiently the English tongue. From the 
same proceedeth also that he thinketh it a con- 
tradiction, to call a free agent him that hath not 
yet made an end of deliberating, and to call li- 
berty an absence of outward impediments, " For," 
saith he, " there may be outward impediments, 
even while he is deliberating." Wherein he is de- 
ceived. For though he may deliberate of that 
which is impossible for him to do ; as in the exam- 
ple he allegeth of him that deliberateth whether 
he shall play at tennis, not knowing that the door 
of the tennis-court is shut against him ; yet it is 
no impediment to him that the door is shut, till he 
have a will to play ; which he hath not till he hath 
done deliberating whether he shall play or not. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 353 

That which followeth of my confounding mind NO. xxv. 
and will ; the estimative faculty and the under- . ' ' 

i- i iii-i i Auimadver. 

standing ; the imagination and deliberation ; the wm upon the 
end and the means; the human will and the lsop8repy * 
sensitive appetite ; rational hope or fear, and ir- 
rational passions ; inclinations and intentions ; a 
beginning of being and a beginning of working ; 
sufficiency and efficiency : I do not find in any- 
thing that I have written, any impropriety in the 
use of these or any other English words ; nor do 
I doubt but an English reader, who hath not lost 
himself in School-divinity, will very easily con- 
ceive what I have said. But this I am sure, that 
I never confounded beginning of being with be- 
ginning of working, nor sufficiency with efficiency ; 
nor ever used these words, sensitive appetite, ra- 
tional hope, or rational fear, or irrational passions. 
It is therefore impossible I should confound them. 
But the Bishop is either mistaken, or else he makes 
no scruple to say that which he knows to be false, 
when he thinks it will serve his turn. 

(e) " That which he saith, that * the action doth 
necessarily follow the thought', is thus far true ; 
that those actions which, are altogether undelibe- 
rated, and do proceed from violent passions, &c, 
are not properly, and actually in themselves free, 
but rather necessary actions, as when a man runs 
away from a cat or a custard." Thus far he says 
is true. But when he calls sudden passions motus 
primo primi, I cannot tell whether he says true or 
not, because I do not understand him ; nor find 
how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his 
example of a cat and a custard, because I know 
not what he means by a secret antipathy. For 
VOL.V. A A 



354 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxv. what that antipathy is he explaineth not by calling 
Animadvert ** secret, but rather confesseth he knows not how 
siom upon the to explain it. And because he saith, it is thus far 

Bishop's reply. 

true, I expect he should tell me also how far it is 
false. 

(f) "Secondly, as for those actions wherein 
actual deliberation seems not necessary, ' because 
never anything appeared that could make a man 
doubt of the consequence' ; I do confess that ac- 
tions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, 
without any actual deliberation for the present, 
may notwithstanding be truly voluntary and free 
acts." In this he agrees with me. But where he 
adds, " yea, in some cases, and in some sense more 
free, than if they were actually deliberated of in 
present", I do not agree with him. And for the 
instance he bringeth to prove it, in the man that 
playeth on an instrument with his hand it maketh 
nothing for him. For it proveth only, that the 
habit maketh the motion of his hand more ready 
and quick ; but it proveth not that it maketh it 
more voluntary, but rather less ; because the rest of 
the motions follow the first by an easiness ac- 
quired from long custom; in which motion the 
will doth not accompany all the strokes of the 
hand, but gives a beginning to them only in the 
first. Here is nothing, as I expected, of how far 
that which I had said, namely, that the action 
doth necessarily follow the thought, is false ; unless 
it be "improprieties of speech, as calling that 
voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to 
the last appetite ; and other mistakes, as that no 
act can be said to be without deliberation". For 
improprieties of speech, I will not contend with 




LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 355 

one that can use motus primo primi, practice NO.XXV. 
practicum, actus elicitus, and many other phrases 
of the same kind. But to say that free actions are sta 
voluntary ; and that the will which causeth a volun- Bl8hop ' 8 
tary action, is the last appetite ; and that that ap- 
petite was immediately followed by the action ; and 
that no action of a man can be said in the judg- 
ment of the law, to be without deliberation : are 
no mistakes, for anything that he hath proved to 
the contrary. 

(g) " Thirdly, whereas he saith, that ' some 
sudden acts, proceeding from violent passions 
which surprise a man, are justly punished'; I grant 
they are so sometimes, but not for his reason, &e." 
My reason was, " because he had time to deliberate 
from the instant that he knew the law, to the in- 
stant of his action, and ought to have deliberated", 
that therefore he may be justly punished. The 
Bishop grants they are justly punished, arid his 
reason is, " because they were virtually deliberated 
of", or, " because it is our fault they were not ac- 
tually deliberated of". How a man does delibe- 
rate, and yet not actually deliberate, I understand 
not. If virtual deliberation be not actual delibe- 
ration, it is no deliberation. But he calleth virtual 
deliberation, that which ought to have been, and 
was not ; and says the same that he condemns in 
me. And his other reason, namely, because it is 
our fault that we deliberated not, is the same that 
I said, that we ought to have deliberated, and did 
not. So that his reprehension here, is a repre- 
hension of himself, proceeding from that the cus- 
tom of School-language hath made him forget the 
language of his country. And to that which he 

AA2 



356 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

/ 

NO. xxv. adds, Ct that a necessary act is never a fault, nor 
A n im ad ve r ;^ justly punishable, when the necessity is inevitably 
MOM upon the imposed upon us by extrinsical causes", I have 

Bishop's reply. JL . , r H /. i i 

sufficiently answered before in diverse places; shew- 
ing that a fault may be necessary from extrinsical 
causes, and yet voluntary ; and that voluntary 
faults are justly punishable. 

(h) " But if the necessity be contracted by our- 
selves, it is justly punishable. As he who by his 
wanton thoughts in the day time, doth procure his 
own nocturnal pollution." This instance, because 
it maketh not against anything I have held, and 
partly also because it is a stinking passage, (for 
surely if, as he that ascribes eyes to the under- 
standing, allows me to say it hath a nose, it stink- 
eth to the nose of the understanding) ; this sen- 
tence I pass over, observing only the canting 
terms, not actually free in itself, but virtually 
free in its causes. In the rest of his answer to 
this No. xxv, I find nothing alleged in confutation 
of anything I have said, saving that his last words 
are, that " T. H. is mistaken in that also, that the 
right to kill men doth proceed merely from their 
being noxious" (No. xiv.). But to that I have in 
the same No. xiv. already answered. I must not 
pass over, that a little before he hath these words : 
"If a child, before he have the use of reason, shall kill 
a man in his passion, yet because he wanted malice 
to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from 
it, he shall not die for it, in the strict rules of par- 
ticular justice, unless there be some mixture of 
public justice in the case". The Bishop would 
make but an ill judge of innocent children, for 
such are they that, for want of age, have not use 
enough of reason to abstain from killing. For the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 357 

want of reason proceeding from want of age, does NO. xxv 
therefore take away the punishment, because it . T ' 

J x * Ammadver- 

taketh away the crime, and makes them innocent. "pon th 
But he introduceth another justice, which he call- * P 
eth public ; whereas he called the other particular. 
And by this public justice, he saith,the child though 
innocent may be put to death. I hope we shall 
never have the administration of public justice in 
such hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall 
take counsel from him. But the distinction he 
makes is not by himself understood. There are 
public causes, and private causes. Private are 
those, where the parties to the cause are both pri- 
vate men. Public are those, where one of the par- 
ties is the commonwealth, or the person that re- 
presenteth it, and the cause criminal. But there 
is no distinction of justice into public and private. 
We may read of men that, having sovereign power, 
did sometimes put an innocent to death, either up- 
on a vow ; as Jepthah did in sacrificing his daugh- 
ter ; or when it hath been thought fit that an inno- 
cent person should be put to death to save a great 
number of people. But to put to death a child, not 
for reason of state, w r hich he improperly calls pub- 
lic justice, but for killing a man, and at the same 
time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime, I 
think was never heard of. 

NO. XXVI. 

T. H. Secondly, I conceive when a man delibe- 
rates whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, 
that he does nothing else but consider whether it 
be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And 
to consider an action, is to imagine the conse- 



358 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxvi. quences of it, both good and evil. From whence is 

lr , ~ \ to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but 

The Bishops * *-' 

alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels 
of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate 
hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or acquit 
the action of which he deliberateth. 

/. D. (a) " If I did not know what deliberation 
was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by 
this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a 
consideration, or an act of the understanding; some- 
times an imagination, or an act of the fancy ; some- 
times he makes it to be an alternation of passions, 
hope and fear. Sometimes he makes it concern 
the end, sometimes to concern the means. So he 
makes it I know not what. The truth is this in 
brief : ' Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, 
whether this or that, definitely considered, be a 
good and fit means, or, indefinitely, what are good 
and fit means to be chosen for attaining some 
wished end.' " 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVI. 

(a) " If I did not know what deliberation was, 
I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this 
description. Sometimes he makes it to be a con- 
sideration, or an act of the understanding, some- 
times an imagination, or an act of the fancy, &c. 
So he makes it I know not what." If the Bishop 
had observed what he does himself, when he de- 
liberates, reasons, understands, or imagines, he 
would have known what to make of all that I have 
said in this Number. He would have known that 
consideration, understanding, reason, and all the 
passions of the mind, are imaginations. That to 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 359 

consider a thing, is to imagine it ; that to under- NO. xxvi. 
stand a thing, is to imagine it ; that to hope and Animad ^ er 
fear, are to imagine the things hoped for and upon the 
feared. The difference between them is, that lsopsrepy> 
when we imagine the consequence of anything, we 
are said to consider that thing ; and when we have 
imagined anything from a sign, and especially from 
those signs we call names, we are said to under- 
stand his meaning that maketh the sign ; and when 
we reason, we imagine the consequence of affirma- 
tions and negations joined together ; and when we 
hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to 
ourselves : insomuch as all these are but imagina- 
tions diversely named from different circumstances : 
as any man may perceive as easily as he can look 
into his own thoughts. But to him that thinketh 
not himself upon the things whereof, but upon the 
words wherewith he speaketh, and taketh those 
words on trust from puzzled Schoolmen, it is not 
only hard, but impossible to be known. And this 
is the reason that maketh him say, I make delibe- 
ration he knows not what. But how is delibera- 
tion defined by him ? " It is", saith he, " an inquiry 
made by reason, whether this or that definitely 
considered, be a good and fit means ; or indefi- 
nitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen 
for attaining some wished end." If it were not 
his custom to say, the understanding understand- 
eth, the will willeth, and so of the rest of the 
faculties, I should have believed that when he says 
deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, he 
meaneth an inquiry made by the man that reason- 
eth ; for so it will be sense. But the reason which 
a man useth in deliberation, being the same thing 



360 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxvi. that is called deliberation, his definition that de- 
Animadmr* liberation is an inquiry made by reason, is no more 
sionsupon the than if he had said, deliberation is an inquiry made 

Bishop's reply. t . ,,,.. , , i 

by deliberation ; a definition good enough to be 
made by a Schoolman. Nor is the rest of the de- 
finition altogether as it should be ; for there is no 
such thing as an " indefinite consideration of what 
are good and fit means" ; but a man imagining 
first one thing, then another, considereth them 
successively and singly each one, whether it con- 
duceth to his ends or not. 

NO. XXVII. 

T. H. Thirdly, I conceive, that in all delibera- 
tions, that is to say, in all alternate succession of 
contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the 
will, and is immediately before the doing of the 
action, or next before the doing of it become im- 
possible. All other appetites to do and to quit, 
that come upon a man during his deliberation, are 
usually called intentions and inclinations, but not 
wills ; there being but one will, which also in this 
case may be called last will, though the intention 
change often. 

J. D. (a) " Still here is nothing but confusion ; he 
confounds the faculty of the will with the act of 
volition ; he makes the will to be the last part of 
deliberation ; he makes the intention, which is a 
most proper and elicit act of the will, or a willing 
of the end, as it is to be attained by certain means, 
to be no willing at all, but only some anteceda- 
neous inclination or propension. He might as 
well say, that the uncertain agitation of the needle 
hither and thither to find out the pole, and the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 361 

resting or fixing of itself directly towards the NO.XXVH. 
pole, were both the same thing. But the grossest 
mistake is, that he will acknowledge no act of reply. 
man's will, to be his will, but only the last act, 
which he calls the last will. If the first were no 
will, how comes this to be the last will ? Accord- 
ing to his doctrine, the will of a man should be as 
unchangeable as the will of God, at least so long 
as there is a possibility to effect it. (b) According 
to this doctrine, concupiscence with consent should 
be no sin ; for that which is not truly willed is not 
a sin ; or rather should not be at all, unless either 
the act followed, or were rendered impossible by 
some intervening circumstances. According to 
this doctrine no man can say, this is my will, be- 
cause he knows not yet whether it shall be his 
last appeal. The truth is, there be many acts of 
the will, both in respect of the means and of the 
end. But that act which makes a man's actions 
to be truly free, is election ; which is the delibe- 
rate choosing or refusing of this or that means, 
or the acceptation of one means before another, 
where divers are represented by the understanding. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVII. 

(a) " Still here is nothing but confusion ; he con- 
founds the faculty of the will with the act of voli- 
tion ; he makes the will to be the last part of deli- 
beration ; he makes the intention, which is a most 
proper and elicit act of the will, to be no willing at 
all, but only some antecedaneous (he might as well 
have said, antecedent) inclination." To confound 
the faculty of the will with the will, were to con- 
found a will with no will ; for the faculty of the 



362 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xx VH. will is no will ; the act only which he calls voli- 



* , , jj j g t j ie w ]k ^ g a man 

Ammadver- y 



- 

upon the power of seeing, and seeth not, nor hath for that 
Bishops reply. sight ; so also he hath the power of will- 



ing, but willeth nothing, nor hath for that time 
any will. I must therefore have departed very 
much from my own principles, if I have confounded 
the faculty of the will with the act of volition. 
He should have done well to have shown where I 
confounded them. It is true, I make the will to 
be the last part of deliberation ; but it is that will 
which maketh the action voluntary, and therefore 
needs must be the last. But for the preceding va- 
riations of the will to do and not to do, though 
they be so many several wills, contrary to and 
destroying one another, they usually are called 
intentions ; and therefore they are nothing to the 
will, of which we dispute, that maketh an action 
voluntary. And though a man have in every long 
deliberation a great many wills and nills, they 
use to be called inclinations, and the last only will 
which is immediately followed by the voluntary 
action. But nevertheless, both he that hath those 
intentions, and God that seeth them, reckoneth 
them for so many wills. 

(b) " According to this doctrine, concupiscence 
with consent should be no sin ; for that which is 
not truly willed, is not a sin." This is no conse- 
quent to my doctrine : for I hold that they are, in 
the sight of God, so many consents, so many will- 
ings, which would have been followed by actions, 
if the actions had been in their power. It had 
been fitter for a man in whom is required gravity 
and sanctity more than ordinary, to have chosen 



LIBERTY^ NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 363 

some other kind of instance. But what meaneth NO. xxvir. 
he by concupiscence with consent ? Can there be Animad ^ r ^ 
concupiscence without consent ? It is the consent 



i <* rru 11 i r i Bishop s reply. 

itself. There may be also a lawful concupiscence 
with consent. For concupiscence makes not the 
sin, but the unlawfulness of satisfying such concu- 
piscence ; and not the consent, but the will and 
design to prosecute that which a man knoweth to 
be unlawful. An appetite to another man's bread, 
is concupiscence ; and though it be with consent 
to eat, it is no sin ; but the design to take it from 
the other, notwithstanding that he may fail in his 
design, that is the sin. And this instance might 
have served his turn as well as the other ; and 
for consent, if he had understood the truth, he 
might have put design. 

NO. XXVIII. 

T. H. Fourthly, that those actions which man 
is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be vo- 
luntary, and done upon choice and election. So 
that voluntary action, and action proceeding from 
election, is the same thing. And that of a volun- 
tary agent, it is all one to say he is free, and to say 
he hath not made an end of deliberating. 

J. D. (a) " This short section might pass without 
an animadversion, but for two things. The one is, 
that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act. 
A free act is only that which proceeds from the 
free election of the rational will after deliberation ; 
but every act that proceeds from the sensitive 
appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or 
election, is truly voluntary, (b) The other thing 
observable is his conclusion, that ' it is all one to 



364 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxviii. say a man is free, and to say he hath not made 
The Bishop's au eil( ^ f deliberating* ; which confession of 
his overturns his whole structure of absolute 
necessity. For if every agent be necessitated to 
act what he doth act by a necessary and natural 
flux of extrinsical causes, then he is no more 
free before he deliberates, or whilst he deliberates, 
than he is after ; but by T. H.'s confession here, 
he is more free widlst he deliberates, than he is 
after. And so after all his flourishes, for an abso- 
lute or extrinsical necessity, he is glad to set him- 
self down, and rest contented with an hypothetical 
necessity, w r hich no man ever denied or doubted 
of; ascribing the necessitation of a man in free 
acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate 
acts to his last thought, No. xxv. What is this to 
a natural and special influence of extrinsical causes? 
(c) " Again, ' liberty', saith he, ' is an absence of 
extrinsical impediments'; but deliberation doth 
produce no new extrinsical impediment ; therefore 
let him choose which part he will, either he is free 
after deliberation, by his own doctrine, or he was 
not free before. Our own deliberation, and the 
direction of our own understanding, and the elec- 
tion of our own will, do produce an hypothetical 
necessity, that the event be such as the understand- 
ing hath directed, and the will elected. But for 
as much as the understanding might have directed 
otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, 
this is far from an absolute necessity. Neither 
doth liberty respect only future acts, but present 
acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create the 
world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, 
it is free, according to a priority of nature, though 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 365 

not of time, to elect otherwise. And so in a di- NO. xxvm. 
vided sense, the will is free, even whilst it acts ; 
though in a compounded sense it be not free. 
Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy 
liberty. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVIII. 

(a) " This short section might pass, but for 
two things ; one is, that he confounds a voluntary 
act with a free act.'* I do indeed take all volun- 
tary acts to be free, and all free acts to be volun- 
tary ; but withal that all acts, whether free or 
voluntary, if they be acts, were necessary before 
they were acts. But where is the error ? ' A 
free act', saith he, 'is only that which proceeds 
from the free election of the rational will, after de- 
liberation ; but every act that proceeds from the 
sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliber- 
ation or election, is truly voluntary.' So that my 
error lies in this, that I distinguish not between a 
rational will and a sensitive appetite in the same 
man. As if the appetite and will in man or beast 
were not the same thing, or that sensual men and 
beasts did not deliberate, and choose one thing 
before another, in the same manner that wise men 
do. Nor can it be said of wills, that one is 
rational, the other sensitive ; but of men. And if 
it be granted that deliberation is always (as it is 
not) rational, there were no cause to call men 
rational more than beasts. For it is manifest by 
continual experience, that beasts do deliberate, 

(b) " The other thing observable is his conclu- 
sion, that ' it is all one to say, a man is free, and 
to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating' : 



366 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxviii. which confession of his overturns his whole struc- 
x, , . ture o absolute necessity." Why so ? ' Because' 

Animauvcr- . w J 

sions upon the saith he, ' if every agent be necessitated to act 
is ops rep y . ^^ k e fofa ^ ^y extrinsical causes, then he is 

no more free before he deliberates, or whilst he 
deliberates, than he is after'. But this is a false 
consequence ; he should have inferred thus : 
" then he is no less necessitated before he deliber- 
ates than he is after" ; which is true, and yet 
nevertheless he is more free. But taking neces- 
sity to be inconsistent with liberty, which is the 
question between us : instead of necessitated he 
puts in not free. And therefore to say ' a man is 
free till he hath made an end of deliberating', is 
no contradiction to absolute and antecedent ne- 
cessity. And whereas he adds presently after, 
that I ascribe the necessitation of a man in free 
acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate 
acts to his last thoughts : he mistakes the matter. 
For I ascribe all necessity to the universal series 
or order of causes, depending on the first cause 
eternal : which the Bishop understandeth, as if I 
had said in his phrase, to a special influence of ex- 
trinsical causes ; that is, understandeth it not at all. 
(c) " Again, < liberty,' saith he, ' is an absence 
of extrinsical impediments' : but deliberation doth 
produce no new extrinsical impediment ; therefore 
either he is free after deliberation, or he was not 
free before." I cannot perceive in these words 
any more force of inference, than of so many other 
words whatsoever put together at adventure. But 
be his meaning what he will, I say not that deliber- 
ation produceth any impediments : for there are 
no impediments but to the action, whilst we are 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 367 

endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have NO. xxvm. 
done deliberating. But during the deliberation N "~~' ' 

. i Y t -i T TI * Animadver- 

there arise thoughts in him that deliberates, con- siom upon the 
cerning the consequence of the action whereof he de- Blshops rep]y> 
liberateth, which cause the action following ; which 
are not impediments to that action which was not 
done, but the causes of that which was done. 
That which followeth in this Number is not intelli- 
gible, by reason of the insignificance of these 
words, "understanding directeth ; will electeth ; 
hypothetical necessity" ; which are but jargon, and 
his "divided sense" and "compounded sense", 
nonsense. And this also, " liberty respecteth not 
future acts only, but present acts also", is unintel- 
ligible. For how can a man have liberty to do or 
not to do that which is at the same instant already 
done. For where he addeth, " otherwise God did 
not freely create the world", it proves nothing; 
because he had the liberty to create it, before it was 
created. Besides, it is a profaning of the name of 
God, to make instances of his incomprehensible 
working in a question as this is, merely natural. 

NO. XXIX. 

T. H. Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly 
defined in this manner : Liberty is the absence of 
all the impediments to action, that are not con- 
tained in the nature, and in the intrinsical quality 
of the agent. As for example, the water is said to 
descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by 
the channel of the river, because there is no impe- 
diment that way ; but not across, because the banks 
are impediments. And though water cannot as- 
cend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to 



368 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxix. ascend, but the faculty or power ; because the im- 
The Bishop's pediment is in the nature of the water and in- 
trinsical. So also we say, he that is tied wants the 
liberty to go, because the impediment is not in 
him, but in his bonds ; whereas we say not so of 
him that is sick or lame, because the impediment 
is in himself. 

/. D. (a) " How that should be a right defini- 
tion of liberty, which comprehends neither the 
genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor 
form of liberty, which doth not so much as ac- 
cidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens ; 
how a real faculty or the elective power should be 
defined by a negation, or by an absence, is past 
my understanding, and contrary to all the rules of 
right reason which I have learned. Negatives 
cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By 
this definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into 
the air, because there is no outward impediment 
to hinder it ; and so a violent act may be a free 
act. Just like his definition are his instances of 
the liberty of the water to descend down the 
channel, and a sick or lame man's liberty to go. 
The latter is an impotence, and not a power or a 
liberty. The former is so far from being a free 
act, that it is scarce a natural act. Certainly the 
proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy 
bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards 
the centre ; as we see in rain, which falls down 
perpendicularly. Though this be far from a free 
act, which proceeds from a rational appetite ; yet 
it is a natural act, and proceeds from a natural 
appetite, and hath its reason within itself. So 
hath not the current of the river in its channel, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 369 

which must not be ascribed to the proper nature NO. xxix. 
of the water, but either to the general order of the ' ' 

_ . , . , /. The Bishop's 

universe, for the better being and preservation of reply. 
the creatures : (otherwise the waters should not 
move in seas and rivers as they do, but cover the 
face of the earth, and possess their proper place 
between the air and the earth, according to the 
degree of their gravity) : or to an extrinsical 
principle, whilst one particle of water thrust- 
eth and forceth forward another, and so comes a 
current, or at least so comes the current to be 
more impetuous ; to which motion the position of 
the earth doth contribute much, both by restrain- 
ing that fluid body with its banks from dispersing 
itself, and also by affording way for a fair and 
easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly, 
that "the water wants liberty to go over the 
banks, because there is an extrinsical impediment ; 
but to ascend up the channel, it wants not liberty, 
but power". Why ? Liberty is a power ; if it 
want power to ascend, it wants liberty to ascend. 
But he makes the reason why the water ascends 
not up the channel, to be intrinsical, and the 
reason why it ascends not over the banks, to be 
extrinsical; as if there were not a rising of the 
ground up the channel, as well as up the banks, 
though it be not so discernible, nor always so 
sudden. The natural appetite of the water is as 
much against the ascending over the banks, as 
the ascending up the channel. And the extrinsical 
impediment is as great, ascending up the channel, 
as over the banks ; or rather greater, because there 
it must move, not only against the rising soil, but 
also against the succeeding waters, which press 

VOL. V. B B 



370 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxix. forward the former. Either the river wants liberty 
f r both, or else it wants liberty for neither. 

But to leave his metaphorical faculties, and his 
catachrestical liberty: how far is his discourse 
wide from the true moral liberty ; which is the 
question between us ? His former description of a 
free agent, that is, ( he who hath not made an end 
of deliberating', though it was wide from the mark, 
yet it came much nearer the truth than this de- 
finition of liberty ; unless perhaps he think that the 
water hath done deliberating whether it will go 
over the banks, but hath not done deliberating 
whether it will go up the channel". 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXIX. 

(a) " How that should be a right definition of 
liberty, which comprehends neither the genus nor 
the difference, neither the matter nor the form of 
liberty, &c : how a real faculty or the elective 
power, should be defined by a negation or by an 
absence : is past my understanding, and contrary to 
all the rules of right reason which I have learned." 
A right definition is that which determineth the 
signification of the word defined, to the end that 
in the discourse where it is used, the meaning 
of it may be constant and without equivocation. 
This is the measure of a definition, and intelligible 
to an English reader. But the Bishop, that mea- 
sures it by the genus and the difference, thinks, it 
seems, though he write English, he writes not to 
an English reader unless he also be a Schoolman. 
I confess the rule is good, that we ought to define, 
when it can be done, by using first some more 
general term, and then by restraining the signifi- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 371 

cation of that general term, till it be the same NO. xxix. 
with that of the word defined. And this general A * ' ' 

, Ammadver- 

term the School calls genus, and the restraint dij- *ions upon the 
ference. This, I say, is a good rule where it can Blshop8 reply * 
be done ; for some words are so general, that they 
cannot admit a more general in their definition. 
But why this ought to be a law of definition, I 
doubt it would trouble him to find the reason ; 
and therefore I refer him (he shall give me leave 
sometimes to cite, as well as he,) to the fourteenth 
and fifteenth articles of the sixth chapter of my 
book De Corpore. But it is to little purpose that 
he requires in a definition so exactly the genus 
and the difference, seeing he does not know them 
when they are there. For in this my definition of 
liberty, the genus is absence of impediments to 
action; and the difference or restriction is that 
they be not contained in the nature of the agent. 
The Bishop therefore, though he talk of genus and 
difference, understands not what they are, but re- 
quires the matter and form of the thing in the 
definition. Matter is body, that is to say, corpo- 
real substance, and subject to dimension, such as 
are the elements, and the things compounded of 
the elements. But it is impossible that matter 
should be part of a definition, whose parts are 
only words ; or to put the name of matter into the 
definition of liberty, which is immaterial. " How 
a real faculty can be defined by an absence, is", 
saith he, "past my understanding." Unless he 
mean by real faculty a very faculty, I know not 
how a faculty is real. If he mean so, then a very 
absence is as real as a very faculty. And if the 
word defined signify an absence or negation, I 

B B2 



372 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxix. hope he would not have me define it by a pre- 
. \ J ~* sence or affirmation. Such a word is liberty ; for 

Anunadver- * 

sions upon the it signifieth freedom from impediments, which is 
is ops repy. ^ ^^ ^.^ ^ absence of impediments, as I have 

defined it. And if this be contrary to all the rules 
of right reason, that is to say, of logic, that he 
hath learned, I should advise him to read some 
other logic than he hath yet read, or consider 
better those he did read when he was a young 
man and could less understand them. He adds, 
that " by this definition, a stone hath liberty to 
ascend into the air, because there is no outward 
impediment to hinder it". How knows he whether 
there be impediments to hinder it or not ? Cer- 
tainly if a stone were thrown upwards, it would 
either go upwards eternally, or it must be stopped 
by some outward impediment, or it must stop 
itself. He hath confessed, that nothing can move 
itself; I doubt not therefore that he will confess 
also, that it cannot stop itself. But stopped we 
see it is ; it is therefore stopped by impediments 
external. He hath in this part of his answer ven- 
tured a little too far in speaking of definition, 
and of impediments, and motion ; and bewrayed 
too much his ignorance in logic and philosophy ; 
and talked so absurdly of the current of rivers, 
and of the motion of the seas, and of the weight 
of water, that it cannot be corrected otherwise 
than by blotting it all out. 

NO. XXX. 

T. H. Sixthly, I conceive nothing taketh be- 
ginning from itself, but from the action of some 
other immediate agent without itself: and that 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 373 

therefore when first a man had an appetite or will NO. xxx. 
to something, to which immediately before he had T ~ : " 
no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not 
the will itself, but something else not in his own 
disposing. So that, whereas it is out of contro- 
versy that of voluntary actions the will is a neces- 
sary cause ; and by this which is said, the will is 
also caused by other things whereof it disposeth 
not ; it followeth that voluntary actions have all of 
them necessary causes, and therefore are neces- 
sitated. 

J. D. " This sixth point doth not consist in ex- 
plicating of terms, as the former ; but in two proofs, 
that voluntary actions are necessitated. The former 
proof stands thus : c Nothing takes beginning from 
itself, but from some agent without itself, which is 
not in its own disposing therefore, &c'. Concedo 
omnia ; (a) I grant all he saith. The will doth 
not take beginning from itself. Whether he un- 
derstand by will the faculty of the will, which is 
a power of the reasonable soul, it takes not begin- 
ning from itself, but from God, who created and 
infused the soul into man, and endowed it with 
this power : or whether he understand by will the 
act of willing, it takes not beginning from itself, 
but from the faculty or from the power of willing, 
which is in the soul. This is certain ; finite and 
participated things cannot be from themselves, nor 
be produced by themselves. What would he con- 
clude from hence ? That therefore the act of willing 
takes not its beginning from the faculty of the 
will? Or that the faculty is always determined 
antecedently, extrinsically, to will that which it 
doth will ? He may as soon draw water out of a 



374 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxx* pumice, as draw any such conclusion out of these 
P rem ises. Secondly, for his " taking a beginning", 
either he understands a beginning of being, or a 
beginning of working and acting. If he under- 
stand a beginning of being, he saith most truly, 
that nothing hath a beginning of being in time 
from itself. But this is nothing to his purpose : 
the question is not between us, whether the soul 
of man or the will of man be eternal. But if he 
understand a beginning of working or moving ac- 
tually, it is a gross error. All men know that 
when a stone descends, or fire ascends, or when 
water, that hath been heated, returns to its former 
temper ; the beginning or reason is intrinsical, and 
one and the same thing doth move and is moved 
in a diverse respect. It moves in respect of the 
form, and it is moved in respect of the matter. 
Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge 
and prenotion of the end, is most properly said to 
move himself. Yet I do not deny but that there 
are other beginnings of human actions, which do 
concur with the will : some outward, as the first 
cause by general influence, which is evermore re- 
quisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits 
by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, 
the understanding by directing. So passions and 
acquired habits. But I deny that any of these do 
necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by 
determining it physically to one, except God alone, 
who doth it rarely, in extraordinary cases. And 
where there is no antecedent determination to one, 
there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty. 

(4) " His second argument is ex concessis : ' It 
is out of controversy', saith he, * that of voluntary 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 375 

actions the will is a necessary cause'. The argu- NO. xxx. 
ment may be thus reduced : necessary causes pro- 
duce necessary effects ; but the will is a necessary 
cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his 
major. Necessary causes do not always produce 
necessary effects, except they be also necessarily 
produced ; as I have shewed before in the burning 
of Protagoras's book. But I answer clearly to the 
minor, that the will is not a necessary cause of 
what it wills in particular actions. It is without 
controversy indeed, for it is without all probability. 
That it w r ills when it wills, is necessary ; but that 
it wills this or that, now or then, is free. More 
expressly, the act of the will may be considered 
three ways ; either in respect of its nature, or in 
respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. 
First, for the nature of the act : that which the 
will wills, is necessarily voluntary, because the will 
cannot be compelled. And in this sense, e it is out 
of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of 
voluntary actions'. Secondly, for the exercise of 
its acts, that is not necessary : the will may either 
will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object, 
that is not necessary, but free : the will is not ex- 
trinsically determined to its objects. As for ex- 
ample : the cardinals meet in the conclave to 
choose a Pope ; whom they choose, he is necessarily 
Pope. But it is not necessary that they shall choose 
this or that day. Before they were assembled, they 
might defer their assembling ; when they are as- 
sembled, they may suspend their election for a day 
or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will 
choose, it is freely in their own power ; otherwise if 
the election were not free, it were void, and no 



376 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxx. election at all. So that which takes its beginning 
The Bishop's fr m ^ e W *^> * s necess &rily voluntary ; but it is not 
necessary that the will shall will this or that in 
particular, as it was necessary that the person 
freely elected should be Pope : but it was not ne- 
cessary either that the election should be at this 
time, or that this man should be elected. And 
therefore voluntary acts in particular have not 
necessary causes, that is, they are not necessita- 
ted." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXX. 

I had said, that nothing taketh beginning from 
itself, and that the cause of the will is not the will 
itself, but something else which it disposeth not of. 
Answering to this, he endeavours to shew us the 
cause of the will. 

(a) " I grant", saith he, " that the will doth not 
take beginning from itself, for that the faculty of 
the will takes beginning from God, who created 
the soul, and poured it into man, and endowed it 
with this power ; and for that the act of willing 
takes not beginning from itself, but from the 
faculty or from the power of willing, which is in 
the soul. This is certain ; finite and participated 
things cannot be from themselves, nor be produced 
by themselves. What would he conclude from 
hence ? That therefore the act of willing takes 
not its beginning from the faculty of the will ?" 
It is well that he grants finite things (as for his 
participated, it signifies nothing here) cannot be 
produced by themselves. For out of this I can 
conclude that the act of willing is not produced by 
the faculty of willing. He that hath the faculty 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 377 

of willing, hath the faculty of willing something NO. xxx. 
in particular. And at the same time he hath the . v ! ? ' 

A % Ammadver- 

faculty of nilling the same. If therefore the faculty MOM upon the 
of willing be the cause he willeth anything what- Islopsrep3r * 
soever, for the same reason the faculty of nilling 
will be the cause at the same time of nilling it : and 
so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same 
time, which is absurd. It seems the Bishop had 
forgot, that matter and power are indifferent to 
contraryjfoms and contrary acts. It is somewhat 
besides the matter, that determineth it to a certain 
form ; and somewhat besides the power, that pro- 
duceth a certain act : and thence it is, that is in- 
ferred this that he granteth, that nothing can be 
produced by itself; which nevertheless he presently 
contradicteth, in saying, that " all men know when 
a stone descends, the beginning is intrinsical", and 
that " the stone moves in respect of the form". 
Which is as much as to say, that the form moveth 
the matter, or that the stone moveth itself ; which 
before he denied. When a stone ascends, the be- 
ginning of the stone's motion was in itself, that is 
to say, intrinsical, because it is not the stone's mo- 
tion, till the stone begins to be moved ; but the 
motion that caused it to begin to ascend, was a 
precedent and extrinsical motion of the hand or 
other engine that threw it upward. And so when 
it descends, the beginning of the stone's motion is 
in the stone ; but nevertheless, there is a former 
motion in the ambient body, air or water, that 
causeth it to descend. But because no man can 
see it, most men think there is none ; though rea- 
son, wherewith the Bishop (as relying only upon 
the authority of books) troubleth not himself, con- 
vince that there is. 



378 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxx. (V) " His second argument is, ex concessis : ' It 
Animadvert * s out ^ controversy, that of voluntary actions 
sions upon the the will is a necessary cause'. The argument may 

Bishop's reply. , , j j j 

be thus reduced : necessary causes produce ne- 
cessary effects ; but the will is a necessary cause 
of voluntary actions. I might deny his major ; 
necessary causes do not always produce necessary 
effects, except they be also necessarily produced." 
He has reduced the argument to nonsense, by say- 
ing necessary causes produce not necessary effects. 
For necessary effects, unless he mean such effects 
as shall necessarily be produced, is insignificant. 
Let him consider therefore with what grace he can 
say, necessary causes do not always produce their 
effects, except those effects be also necessarily pro- 
duced. But his answer is chiefly to the minor, and 
denies that the will is not a necessary cause of what 
it wills in particular actions. That it wills when 
it wills, saith he, is necessary ; but that it wills 
this or that, is free. Is it possible for any man to 
conceive, that he that willeth, can will anything 
but this or that particular thing ? It is therefore 
manifest, that either the will is a necessary cause 
of this or that or any other particular action, or 
not the necessary cause of any voluntary action at 
all. For universal actions there be none. In that 
which followeth, he undertaketh to make his doc- 
trine more expressly understood by considering 
the act of the will three ways : " in respect of its 
nature, in respect of its exercise, and in respect 
of its object". For the nature of the act, he saith, 
that " that which the will wills, is necessarily volun- 
tary", and that in this sense he grants it is out 
of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 3/9 

of voluntary actions. Instead of " that which, the NO. xxx. 
will wills", to make it sense, read that which the A "7""? ' 

' 9 * Ammadver- 

man wills ; and then if the man's will be, as he con- ** pn * he 

... Bishop's reply. 

iesseth, a necessary cause ot voluntary actions, it is 
no less a necessary cause that they are actions, than 
that they are voluntary. For the exercise of the 
act, he saith that " the will may either will, or sus- 
pend its act". This is the old canting, which hath 
already been sufficiently detected. But to make it 
somewhat, let us read it thus : the man that willeth, 
may either will or suspend his will : and thus it is 
intelligible, but false ; for how can he that willeth, 
at the same time suspend his will ? And for the 
object he says, that "it is not necessary but free", 
&c. His reason is, because, he says, it was not neces- 
sary, for example, in choosing a Pope, to choose 
him this or that day, or to choose this or that man. 
I would be glad to know, by what argument he can 
prove the election not to have been necessitated: for 
it is not enough for him to say, I perceive no ne- 
cessity in it ; nor to say, they might have chosen 
another, because he knows not whether they might 
or not ; nor to say if he had not been freely elected, 
the election had been void or none. For though that 
be true, it does not follow that the election was not 
necessary ; for there is no repugnance to necessity, 
either in election or in freedom. And whereas he 
concludeth, " therefore voluntary acts in particular, 
are not necessitated" ; I would have been glad he 
had set down what voluntary acts there are, not 
particular, which by his restricting of voluntary 
acts he grants to be necessitated. 



380 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



NO. XXXI. 

NO. xxxi. T. H. Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient 
The Bishop's caus e> to which nothing is wanting that is needful 
re v ] y- to the producing of the effect. The same is also a 

necessary cause : for if it be possible that a suffi- 
cient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then 
there wanted somewhat which was needful to the 
producing of it ; and so the cause was not sufficient. 
But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should 
not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a 
necessary cause : for that is said to produce an 
effect necessarily, that cannot but produce if. 
Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, 
is produced necessarily : for whatsoever is pro- 
duced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or 
else it had not been. And therefore also voluntary 
actions are necessitated. 

/. D. " This section contains a third argument 
to prove that all effects are necessary ; for clear- 
ing whereof, it is needful to consider how a cause 
may be said to be sufficient or insufficient. 

" First, several causes singly considered may be 
insufficient, and the same taken conjointly be suffi- 
cient to produce an effect. As (a) two horses 
jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either 
of them singly is insufficient to do. Now to make 
the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach neces- 
sary, it is not only required that the two horses 
be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunc- 
tion be necessary, arid their habitude such as they 
may draw it. If the owner of one of these horses 
will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod 
the other in the quick, and lamed him ; if the 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 381 

horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade, and will NO. xxxi. 
not draw but when he list ; then the effect is not The BUhop-1 
necessarily produced, but contingently more or less, re &y- 
as the concurrence of the causes is more or less 
contingent. 

(b) " Secondly, a cause may be said to be suffi- 
cient, either because it produceth that effect which 
is intended, as in the generation of a man ; or else, 
because it is sufficient to produce that which is 
produced, as in the generation of a monster. The 
former is properly called a sufficient cause, the 
latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the 
debility of the cause be not necessary, but contin- 
gent, then the effect is not necessary, but contin- 
gent. It is a rule in logic, that the conclusion 
always follows the weaker part. If the premises 
be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demon- 
strative. It holds as well in causes as in proposi- 
tions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. 
If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, 
the effect cannot be necessary. 

" Thirdly, that which concerns this question of 
liberty from necessity most nearly, is that (c) a 
cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability 
of it to act, riot in respect of its will to act. The 
concurrence of the will is needful to the produc- 
tion of a free effect. But the cause may be suffi- 
cient, though the will do not concur. As God 
is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds ; but it 
doth not follow from thence, either that he hath 
produced them, or that he will produce them. The 
blood of Christ Is a sufficient ransom for all man- 
kind; but it doth not follow therefore, that all 
mankind shall be actually saved by virtue of his 



382 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxi. blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor., though 

The Bishop ^ e W ^ not teac h ever y scholar, and a sufficient 
physician, though he will not administer to every 
patient. For as much therefore as the concur- 
rence of the will is needful to the production of 
every free effect, and yet the cause may be sufficient 
in sensu diviso, although the will do not concur ; it 
follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, 
and yet something which is needful to the produc- 
tion of the effect, may be wanting ; and that every 
sufficient cause is not a necessary cause. 

"Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against 
so clear light, and say, that though the free agent 
be sufficient in sensu diviso, yet he is not sufficient 
in sensu composite, to produce effect without the 
concurrence of the will, he saith true : but first, he 
bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the for- 
mer argument, which is a mere trifling between 
sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a 
compounded sense. And seeing the concurrence 
of the will is not predetermined, there is no ante- 
cedent necessity before it do concur ; and when it 
hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, 
which may consist with liberty." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXI. 

In this place he disputeth against my definition 
of a sufficient cause, namely, that cause to which 
nothing is wanting needful to the producing of 
the effect. I thought this definition could have 
been misliked by no man that had English enough 
to know that a sufficient cause, and cause enough, 
signifieth the same thing. And no man will say 
that that is cause enough to produce an effect, to 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 383 

which any thing is wanting needful to the produc- NO. xxxi. 
ing of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he set down Vniraad y er 
what he understands by sufficient, it would serve si upon the 
to confute my definition: and therefore says: 
(a) " Two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a 
coach, which either of them singly is insufficient to 
do. Now to make the effect, that is, the drawing 
of the coach necessary, it is not only required 
that the two horses be sufficient to draw it, but 
also that it be necessary they shall be joined, and 
that the owner of the horses will let them draw, 
and that the smith hath not lamed them, and they be 
not resty, and list not to draw but when they list : 
otherwise the effect is contingent". It seems the 
Bishop thinks two horses may be sufficient to draw 
a coach, though they will not draw, or though they 
be lame, or though they be never put to draw ; and 
I think they can never produce the effect of draw- 
ing, without those needful circumstances of being 
strong, obedient, and having the coach some way 
or other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient 
cause of drawing, that they be coach horses, though 
they be lame or will not draw. But I say they 
are not sufficient absolutely, but conditionally, if 
they be not lame nor resty. Let the reader judge, 
whether my sufficient cause or his, may properly 
be called cause enough. 

(b) " Secondly, a cause may be said to be suffi- 
cient, either because it produceth that effect which 
is intended, as in the generation of a man ; or else, 
because it is sufficient to produce that which is 
produced, as in the generation of a monster : the 
former is properly called a sufficient cause, the 
latter a weak and insufficient cause." In these 



384 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxi. few lines he hath said the cause of the generation 
Animadvert ^ a monster is sufficient to produce a monster, 
sions upon tiie and that it is insufficient to produce a monster. 
How soon may a man forget his words, that doth 
not understand them. This term of insufficient 
cause, which also the School calls deficient, that 
they may rhyme to efficient, is not intelligible, but 
a word devised like hocus poem, to juggle a diffi- 
culty out of sight. That which is sufficient to 
produce a monster, is not therefore to be called an 
insufficient cause to produce a man ; no more than 
that which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be 
called an insufficient cause to produce a monster. 
(c) " Thirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in 
respect to the ability of it to act, not in respect of 
its will to act, &c. As God is sufficient to produce 
a thousand worlds." He understands little, when 
men say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, 
if he understand not the meaning to be, that he is 
sufficient to produce them if he will. Without 
this supposition, if he will, a man is not sufficient 
to produce any voluntary action, not so much as 
to walk, though he be in health and at liberty. 
The will is as much a sufficient cause without the 
strength to do, as the strength without the will. 
To that which he adds, that my definition is " a 
mere trifling between a sufficiency in a divided 
sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense", 
I can make no answer ; because I understand no 
more what he means by sufficiency in a divided 
sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, than 
if he had said sufficiency in a divided nonsense, 
and sufficiency in a compounded nonsense. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 385 
NO. XXXII. 

T. H. Lastly, I hold that the ordinary definition NQ.XXXIT. 
of a free agent, namely, that a free agent is that, The Bishop's 
which when all things are present which are reply< 
needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not 
produce it, implies a contradiction, and is non- 
sense ; being as much as to say, the cause may be 
sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not 
follow. 

J. D. " This last point is but a corollary, or an 
inference from the former doctrine, that c every 
sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily'; 
which pillar being taken away the superstructure 
must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left 
to support it. f Lastly, I hold', saith he. What he 
is able to prove, is something : so much reason, 
so much trust. But what he holds, concerns him- 
self, not others. But what holds he ? ' I hold', 
saith he, ' that the ordinary definition of a free 
agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense.' 
That which he calls the ' ordinary definition' of 
liberty, is the very definition which is given 
by the much greater part of Philosophers and 
Schoolmen. And doth he think that all these 
spake nonsense : or had no more judgment than 
to contradict themselves in a definition? He 
might much better suspect himself, than censure 
so many. Let us see the definition itself : ' A free 
agent is that, which when all things are present 
that are needful to produce the effect, can never- 
theless not produce it.' I acknowledge the old 
definition of liberty, with little variation. But I 
cannot see this nonsense, nor discover this contra- 
VOL. v. c c 



386 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxii. diction. For (a) in these words, ' all things need- 



Ti7eBisiuT's fr^'> or ' a ^ th^S 8 requisite', the actual determina- 
tion of the will is not included. But by all things 
needful or requisite, all necessary power either 
operative or elective, all necessary instruments and 
adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical, and all con- 
ditions are intended. As he that hath pen, and 
ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art 
of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all 
things requisite to write if he will ; and yet he may 
forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and 
money, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a 
just cause, hath all things requisite for war ; yet he 
may make peace if he will. Or as the king pro- 
claimed in the gospel (Matth. xxii. 4) : / have pre- 
pared my dinner, my oxen and my fallings are 
killed, all things are ready ; come unto the mar- 
riage. According to T. H.'s doctrine, the guests 
might have told him that he said not truly, for 
their own wills were not ready. (V) And indeed 
if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated 
extrinsically to every act of willing, if it had no 
power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to 
will what it doth not will ; then if the will were 
wanting, something requisite to the producing of 
the effect was wanting. But now when science 
and conscience, reason and religion, our own and 
other men's experience doth teach us, that the will 
hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill 
without extrinsical necessitation, if the power to 
will be present in actu primo, determinable by 
ourselves, then there is no necessary power want- 
ing in this respect to the producing of the effect. 
" Secondly, these words, ' to act or not to act, to 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 38/ 

work or not to work, to produce or not to pro- NO. xxxn. 
duce', have reference to the effect, not as a thing TheB j sho \ 
which is already done or doing, but as a thing to re p ] y- 
be done. They imply not the actual production, 
but the producibility of the effect. But when once 
the will hath actually concurred with all other 
causes and conditions and circumstances, then the 
effect is no more possible nor producible, but it is 
in being, and actually produced. Thus he takes 
away the subject of the question. The question is, 
whether effects producible be free from necessity. 
He shuffles out * effects producible', and thrusts in 
their places ( effects produced', or which are in the 
act of production. Wherefore I conclude, that it is 
neither nonsense nor contradiction to say that a 
free agent, when all things requisite to produce 
the effect are present, may nevertheless not pro- 
duce it. 



ANIMADVERSIONS UPON 7 THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXII. 

The question is here whether these words c a 
free agent is that, which when all things needful 
to the production of the effect are present, can ne- 
vertheless not produce it', imply a contradiction ; 
as I say it does. To make it appear no contradiction, 
he saith : (a) " In these words, c all things needful', 
or ' all things requisite', the actual determination of 
the will is not included" : as if the will were not 
needful nor requisite to the producing of a volun- 
tary action. For to the production of any act 
whatsoever, there is needful, not only those things 
which proceed from the agent, but also those that 
consist in the disposition of the patient. And to 

C C2 



388 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXII. use his own instance, it is necessary to writing, 
. T7 ' not only that there be pen, ink, paper, &c. ; but 

Ammadver- J i i i r- i, u 

siom upon the also a will to write. He that hath the former, hath 

Bishop's reply. ^ ^.^ requigite t() wr j te Jf he ^ but not ^ 

things necessary to writing. And so in his other 
instances, he that hath men and money, &c. (with- 
out that which he putteth in for a requisite), hath 
all things requisite to make war if he will, but not 
simply to make war. And he in the Gospel that 
had prepared his dinner, had all things requisite 
for his guests if they came, but not all things re- 
quisite to make them come. And therefore " all 
things requisite", is a term ill defined by him. 

(b) " And indeed if the will were (as he con- 
ceives it is) necessitated extrinsically to every act 
of willing ; if it had no power to forbear willing 
what it doth will, nor to will what it does not will ; 
then if the will were wanting, something requisite 
to the producing of the effect were wanting. But 
now when science and conscience, reason and re- 
ligion, our own and other men's experience doth 
teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its 
own acts to will or nill without extrinsical neces- 
sitation, if the power to will be present in actu 
primo, determinable by ourselves, then there is no 
necessary power wanting in this respect to the 
producing of the effect." These words, " the will 
hath power to forbear willing what it doth will" ; 
and these, " the will hath a dominion over its own 
acts" ; and these, " the power to will is present 
in actu primo, determinable by ourselves" ; are as 
wild as ever were any spoken within the walls of 
Bedlam : and if science, conscience, reason, and 
religion teach us to speak thus, they make us mad. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 389 

And that which followeth is false : " to act or not NO.XXXII. 
to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not Animad ' ver _ " 
to produce, have reference to the effect, not as a ^ns upon the 

, . i i i 11 i i . Bishop's reply. 

thing which is already done or doing, but as a 
thing to be done". For to act, to work, to pro- 
dace, are the same thing with to be doing. It is 
not the act, but the power that hath reference to 
the future : for act and power differ in nothing but 
in this, that the former signifieth the time present, 
the latter the time to come. And whereas he adds, 
that I shuffle out effects producible, and thrust 
into their places effects produced ; I must take it 
for an untruth, till he cite the place wherein I have 
done so. 

NO. xxxin, 

T. H. For my first five points ; where it is expli- 
cated, first, what spontaneity is ; secondly, what de- 
liberation is; thirdly, what will, propension, and ap- 
petite is; fourthly, what a free agent is ; fifthly, what 
liberty is : there can be no other proof offered but 
every man's own experience, by reflecting on him- 
self, and remembering what he useth to have in his 
mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he 
saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, 
such is his will, that agent or that action is free. 
Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot but be 
satisfied, that deliberation is the considering of the 
good and evil sequels of the action to come ; that 
by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding ; 
for else nothing is meant by it ; that will is the 
last act of our deliberation ; that a, free agent, is 
he that can do if he will and forbear if he will ; 
and that liberty is the absence of external impe- 



390 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxm. diments. But to those that out of custom speak 

The Biceps not W ^ at ^ e Y conce i ve > but what they hear, and are 
piy- not able or will not take the pains to consider 
what they think, when they hear such words, no 
argument can be sufficient ; because experience and 
matter of fact is not verified by other men's argu- 
ments, but by every man's own sense and memory. 
For example, how can it be proved, that to love a 
thing and to think it good are all one, to a man 
that does not mark his own meaning by those 
words ? Or how can it be proved that eternity is 
not nunc stans, to a man that says these words by 
custom, and never considers how he can conceive 
the thing itself in his mind ? Also the sixth point, 
that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin 
without a cause, can no other way be made known 
but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he 
try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no 
cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at 
one time as another, that is, he hath equal reason 
to think it should begin at all times, which is im- 
possible. And therefore he must think there was 
some special cause, why it began then rather than 
sooner or later ; or else, that it began never, but 
was eternal. 

J. D. " Now at length he comes to his main 
proofs ; he that hath so confidently censured the 
whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of 
nonsense, had need to produce strong evidence for 
himself. So he calls his reasons, No. xxxvi, de- 
monstrative proofs. All demonstrations are either 
from the cause or the effect, not from private no- 
tions and conceptions which we have in our minds. 
That which he calls a demonstration, deserves 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 391 

not the name of an intimation. He argues thus : NO. xxxin. 
' that which a man conceives in his mind by these TheB ' isho ^ 
words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c.; that they are'. 
This is his proposition, which I deny, (a) The 
true natures of things are not to be judged by the 
private ideas, or conceptions of men, but by their 
causes and formal reasons. Ask an ordinary person 
what upwards signifies, and whether our antipodes 
have their heads upwards or downwards ; and he 
will not stick to tell you, that if his head be up- 
wards, theirs must needs be downwards. And this 
is because he know r s not the formal reason thereof ; 
that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is 
towards heaven is upwards. This same erroneous 
notion of upwards and downwards, before the true 
reason was fully discovered, abused more than or- 
dinary capacities ; as appears by their arguments of 
penduli homines, and pendultc arbores. Again, 
what do men conceive ordinarily by this word 
empty, as when they say an empty vessel, or by 
this word body, as when they say, there is no body 
in that room? They intend not to exclude the air, 
either out of the vessel or out of the room : yet 
reason tells us, that the vessel is not truly empty, 
and that the air is a true body. I might give a 
hundred such like instances. He who leaves the 
conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar no- 
tions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors ; 
like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an 
ignusfatuus, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his pro- 
position is false, (b) His reason, 'that matter 
of fact is not verified by other men's arguments, 
but by every man's own sense and memory', is 
likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear 



392 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxiii, such words or not, is matter of fact ; and sense is 
The Bishop *k e P r P er judge of it : but what these words 
do, or ought truly to signify, is not to be judged 
by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason may, 
and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its 
proper object. Sense tells us that the sun is no 
bigger than a good ball ; but reason demonstrates, 
that it is many times greater than the whole globe 
of the earth. As to his instance : ' how can it be 
proved, that to love a thing and to think it good 
is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own 
meaning by these words', I confess it cannot be 
proved ; for it is not true. Beauty, and likeness, 
and love, do conciliate love as much as goodness, 
cos amor is amor. Love is a passion of the will ; 
but to judge of goodness is an act of the under- 
standing. A father may love an ungracious child, 
and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his 
own house better than another man's ; yet he can- 
not but esteem many others better than his own. 
His other instance, f how can it be proved that 
eternity is not nunc stans, to a man that says these 
words by custom, and never considers how he can 
conceive the thing itself in his mind', is just like 
the former, not to be proved by reason, but by 
fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not 
unlike the counsel which one gave to a novice 
about the choice of his wife, to advise with the 
bells : as he fancied so they sounded, either take 
her or leave her. 

(c) " Then for his assumption, it is as defective 
as his proposition, that by those words spontaneity, 
&c, men do understand as he conceives. No 
rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 393 

and an indeliberate action to be all one. Every NO. xxxm. 
indeliberate action is not spontaneous ; the fire ' 

. f The Bifehop's 

considers not whether it should burn, yet the 
burning of it is not spontaneous. Neither is every 
spontaneous action indeliberate ; a man may de- 
liberate what he will eat, and yet eat it sponta- 
neously, (d) Neither doth deliberation properly 
signify, the considering of the good and evil sequels 
of an action to come, but the considering whether 
this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest 
means for obtaining such an end. The physician 
doth not deliberate whether he should cure his 
patient, but by what means he should cure him. 
Deliberation is of the means, not of the end. 
(e) Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. 
that deliberation is an imagination, or an act of 
fancy not of reason, common to men of discretion 
with madmen, and natural fools, and children, 
and brute beasts, (f) Thirdly, neither doth any 
understanding man conceive, or can conceive, that 
4 the will is an act of our deliberation' ; (the un- 
derstanding and the will are two distinct faculties) ; 
or that ' only the last appetite is to be called our 
will'. So no man should be able to say, this is 
my will, because he knows not whether he shall 
persevere in it or not. (g) Concerning the fourth 
point we agree, that ' he is a free agent that can 
do if he will, and forbear if he will'. But I won- 
der how this dropped from his pen. What is now 
become of his absolute necessity of all things, if 
a man be free to do and to forbear anything ? 
Will he make himself guilty of the nonsense of the 
Schoolmen, and run with them into contradic- 
tions for company ? It may be he will say, he can 



394 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxi IK do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot 

TheBisho^s W ^ ^ ^ W ^' ^IS W *^ n0t SerVC h* 8 tUrn 5 f r tf 

reply. the cause of a free action, that is, the will to do it be 
determined, then the effect, or the action itself is 
likewise determined; a determined cause cannot pro- 
duce an undetermined eifect ; either the agent can 
will and forbear to will, or else he cannot do and 
forbear to do. (h) But we differ wholly about the 
fifth point. He who conceives liberty aright, con- 
ceives both a liberty in the subject to will or not 
to will, and a liberty to the object to will this or 
that, and a liberty from impediments. T. H. by 
a new way of his own cuts off the liberty of the 
subject ; as if a stone was free to ascend or de- 
scend, because it hath no outward impediment : and 
the liberty towards the object ; as if the needle 
touched with the loadstone were free to point 
either towards the north or towards the south, 

because there is not a barricado in its wav to 

* 

hinder it. Yea, he cuts off the liberty from inward 
impediments also ; as if a hawk were at liberty to 
fly when her wings are plucked, but not when they 
are tied. And so he makes liberty from extrin- 
sical impediments to be complete liberty ; so he 
ascribes liberty to brute beasts, and liberty to 
rivers, and by consequence makes beasts and rivers 
to be capable of sin and punishment. Assuredly 
Xerxes, who caused the Hellespont to be beaten 
with so many stripes, was of this opinion. Lastly, 
T. H.'s reason, that c it is custom, or want of abi- 
lity, or negligence, which makes a man conceive 
otherwise 1 , is but a begging of that which he should 
prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself, 
with as much judgment as himself, with less preju- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 395 

dice than himself, and yet they can apprehend no NO.XXXIII. 
such sense of these words. Would he have other 
men feign they see fiery dragons in the air, be- 
cause he affirms confidently that he sees them, and 
wonders why others are so blind as not to see 
them ? 

(i) " The reason for the sixth point is like the 
former, a fantastical or imaginative reason. ' How 
can a man imagine anything to begin without a 
cause, or if it should begin without a cause, why 
it should begin at this time rather than at that 
time ?* He saith truly, nothing can begin without 
a cause, that is, to be ; but it may begin to act of 
itself without any other cause. Nothing can begin 
without a cause ; but many things may begin, and 
do begin without necessary causes. A free cause 
may as well choose his time when he will begin, 
as a necessary cause be determined extrinsically 
when it must begin. And although free eifects 
cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly 
predetermined in their causes ; yet when the free 
causes do determine themselves, they are of as 
great certainty as the other. As when I see a bell 
ringing, I can conceive the cause of it as well why 
it rings now, as I know the interposition of the 
earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, 
or the most certain occurrent in the nature of 
things. 

(k) " And now that I have answered T. H.'s ar- 
guments drawn from the private conceptions of 
men concerning the sense of w r ords, I desire him 
seriously without prejudice to examine himself, 
and those natural notions which he finds in him- 
self, (not of words, but of things ; these are from 



396 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXIIT. nature, those are by imposition), whether he doth 
The Bishop not ^ n ^ ky ex P er i ence > that he doth many things 
reply. which he might have left undone if he would, 

and omits many things which he might have done 
if he would ; whether he doth not some things 
out of mere animosity and will, without either re- 
gard to the direction of right reason or serious 
respect of what is honest or profitable, only to 
show that he will have a dominion over his own 
actions ; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise 
men find at some times in themselves by expe- 
rience ; (and I apprehend this very defence of 
necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind) ; 
whether he is not angry with those who draw 
him from his study, or cross him in his desires ; 
(if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be 
angry with them, any more than he is angry with 
a sharp winter, or a rainy day that keeps him at 
home against his antecedent will ?) ; whether he 
doth not sometimes blame himself, and say, '0 
what a fool was I to do thus and thus', or wish to 
himself, ' that I had been wise', or, ' that I 
had not done such an act'. If he have no do- 
minion over his actions, if he be irresistibly neces- 
sitated to all things that he doth, he might as well 
wish, * that I had not breathed,' or blame him- 
self for growing old, ' what a fool was I to grow 
old'. " 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIII. 

I have said in the beginning of this number, 
that to define what spontaneity is, what deliber- 
ation is, what will, propension, appetite, a free 
agent, and liberty is, and to prove they are well 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 397 

defined, there can be no other proof offered, but NO.XXXHI, 
every man's own experience and memory of what Animad ; er . ' 
he meaneth by such words. For definitions being 8ion * u p n the 

i ! / 11 i . i Bishop's reply. 

the beginning of all demonstration, cannot them- 
selves be demonstrated, that is, proved to another 
man ; all that can be done, is either to put him in 
mind what those words signify commonly in the 
matter whereof they treat, or if the words be un- 
usual, to make the definitions of them true by 
mutual consent in their signification. And though 
this be manifestly true, yet there is nothing of it 
amongst the Schoolmen, who use to argue not by 
rule, but as fencers teach to handle weapons, by 
quickness only of the hand and eye. The Bishop 
therefore boggles at this kind of proof; and says, 
(a) "the true natures of things are not to be 
judged by the private ideas or conceptions of men, 
but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an 
ordinary person what upwards signifies," &c. But 
what will he answer, if I should ask him, how he 
will .judge of the causes of things, whereof he hath 
no idea or conception in his own mind ? It is 
therefore impossible to give a true definition of 
any word without the idea of the thing which that 
w r ord signifieth, or not according to that idea or 
conception. Here again he discovereth the true 
cause why he and other Schoolmen so often speak 
absurdly. For they speak without conception of 
the things, and by rote, one receiving what he 
saith from another by tradition, from some puz- 
zled divine or philosopher, that to decline a diffi- 
culty speaks in such manner as not to be under- 
stood. And where he bids us ask an ordinary 
person what upwards signifieth, I dare answer for 



398 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXIH. that ordinary person he will tell us as significantly 
Animadvert as any scholar, and say it is towards heaven ; and 
sions upon the as soon as he knows the earth is round, makes no 

Bishop's reply. . 

scruple to believe there are antipodes, being wiser 
in that point than were those which he saith to have 
been of more than ordinary capacities. Again, 
ordinary men understand not, he saith, the words 
empty and body ; yes, but they do, just as well 
as learned men. When they hear named an empty 
vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned mean 
and understand the same thing, namely, that there 
is nothing in it that can be seen ; and whether it 
be truly empty, the ploughman and the Schoolman 
know alike. " I might give", he says, " a hundred 
such like instances." That is true; a man may 
give a thousand foolish and impertinent instances 
of men ignorant in such questions of philosophy 
concerning emptiness, body, upwards, and down- 
wards, and the like. But the question is not whether 
such and such tenets be true, but whether such and 
such words can be well defined without thinking 
upon the things they signified; as the Bishop 
thinks they may, when he concludeth with these 
words, " so his proposition is false". 

(b) " His reason, f that matter of fact is not ve- 
rified by other men's arguments, but by every 
man's own sense and memory', is likewise maimed 
on both sides. Whether we hear such words or 
not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper 
judge of it ; but what these words do, or ought 
truly to signify, is not to be judged by sense, but 
by reason/' A man is born with a capacity after 
due time and experience to reason truly ; to which 
capacity of nature, if there be added no discipline 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 399 

at all, yet as far as he reasoneth he will reason NO. xxxm. 
truly ; though by a right discipline he may reason Animad ; er ;^ 
truly in more numerous and various matters. But *P< thc 

, -I1T1 T i n T Bishop's reply. 

he that hath lighted on deceiving or deceived mas- 
ters, that teach for truth all that hath been dic- 
tated to them by their own interest, or hath been 
cried up by other such teachers before them, have 
for the most part their natural reason, as far as 
concerneth the truth of doctrine, quite defaced 
or very much weakened, becoming changelings 
through the enchantments of words not under- 
stood. This cometh into my mind from this say- 
ing of the Bishop, that matter of fact is not 
verified by sense and memory, but by arguments. 
How is it possible that, without discipline, a man 
should come to think that the testimony of a wit- 
ness, which is the only verifier of matter of fact, 
should consist not in sense and memory, so as he 
may say he saw and remembers the thing done, 
but in arguments or syllogisms ? Or how can an 
unlearned man be brought to think the words he 
speaks, ought to signify, when he speaks sincerely, 
anything else but that which himself meant by 
them ? Or how can any man without learning take 
the question, " whether the sun be no bigger than 
a ball, or bigger than the earth", to be a ques- 
tion of fact ? Nor do I think that any man is so 
simple, as not to find that to be good which he 
loveth ; good, I say, so far forth, as it maketh him 
to love it. Or is there any unlearned man so stu- 
pid, as to think eternity is this present instant of 
time standing still, and the same eternity to be the 
very next instant after ; and consequently that 
there be so many eternities as there can be instants 



400 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

No.xxxm. of time supposed? No, there is scholastic learning 
t required in some measure to make one mad. 



iom upon the ( c \ Then for his assumption, it is as defective 

Bishop's reply. x ' . . , 

as his proposition, that by these words, sponta- 
neity, &c. men do understand as he conceives, &c. 
No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous ac- 
tion and an indeliberate action to be all one ; 
every indeliberate action is not spontaneous, &c." 
Not every spontaneous action indeliberate ? This 
I get by striving to make sense of that which he 
strives to make nonsense. I never thought the 
word spontaneity English. Yet because he used it, 
I make such meaning of it as it would bear, and said 
it " meant inconsiderate proceeding, or nothing". 
And for this my too much officiousness, I receive 
the reward of being thought by him not to be a 
rational man. I know that in the Latin of all au- 
thors but Schoolmen, actlo spontanea signifies that 
action, whereof there is no apparent cause derived 
further than from the agent itself; and is in all 
things that have sense the same with voluntary, 
whether deliberated or not deliberated. And there- 
fore where he distinguished it from voluntary, I 
thought he might mean indeliberate. But let it 
signify what it will, provided it be intelligible, it 
would make against him. 

(d) " Neither doth deliberation properly signify 
' the considering of the good and evil sequels of 
an action to come' ; but the considering whether 
this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest 
means, for obtaining such an end." If the Bishop's 
words proceeded not from hearing and reading of 
others, but from his own thoughts, he could never 
have reprehended this definition of deliberation, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 401 

especially in the manner he doth it ; for he says, it NO. xxxin, 
is the considering whether this or that be a good Animttd ; er r 
and fit means for obtaining such an end; as if simwu P nthe 

. , . , ,, , , Bishop's reply. 

considering whether a means oe good or not, were 
not all one with considering whether the sequel of 
using those means be good or evil. 

(e) "Much less doth any man conceive with 
T. H. that 4 deliberation is an act of fancy', not of 
reason, common to men of discretion with mad- 
men, natural fools, children, and brute beasts". I 
do indeed conceive that deliberation is an act of 
imagination or fancy ; nay more, that reason and 
understanding also are acts of the imagination, 
that is to say, they are imaginations. I find it so 
by considering my own ratiocination ; and he 
might find it so in his, if he did consider his own 
thoughts, and not speak as he does by rote ; by 
rote I say, when he disputes ; not by rote, when he 
is about those trifles he calleth business ; then 
when he speaks, he thinks of, that is to say, he 
imagines, his business ; but here he thinks only 
upon the words of other men that have gone be- 
fore him in this question, transcribing their con- 
clusions and arguments, not his own thoughts. 

(/) " Thirdly, neither doth any understanding 
man conceive, or can conceive, either ' that the 
will is an act of our deliberation' (the understand- 
ing and the will are two distinct faculties) ; or c that 
only the last appetite is to be called our will'.'* 
Though the understanding and the will were two 
distinct faculties, yet followeth it not that the 
will and the deliberation are two distinct faculties. 
For the whole deliberation is nothing else but so 
many wills alternatively changed, according as a 
VOL. v. D D 




402 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil 
of the thing concerning which he delibe- 
rateth whether he shall pursue it. or of the means 

BBtatyrs reply. . . _ r , , . 

whether they conduce or not to that end, whatso- 
ever it be, he seeketh to obtain. So that in deli- 
beration there be many wills, whereof not any is 
the cause of a voluntary action but the last ; as I 
have said before, answering this objection in ano- 
ther place. 

(g) " Concerning the fourth point we agree, that 
e he is a free agent, that can do if he will and for- 
bear if he will'. But I wonder how this dropped 
from his pen ? &c. It may be he will say he can 
do if he will and forbear if he will, but he cannot 
will if he will." He has no reason to wonder how 
this dropped from my pen. He found it in my 
answer No. in, and has been all this while about 
to confute it, so long indeed that he had forgot I 
said it ; and now again brings another argument 
to prove a man is free to will, which is this : 
" Either the agent can will and forbear to will, or 
else he cannot do and forbear to do". There is no 
doubt a man can will one thing or other, and for- 
bear to will it. For men, if they be awake, are al- 
ways willing one thing or other. But put the case, 
a man has a will to-day to do a certain action to- 
morrow ; is he sure to have the same will to-mor- 
row, When he is to do it ? Is he free to-day, to 
choose to-morrow's will ? This is it that is now 
in question, and this argument maketh nothing 
for the affirmative or negative. 

(K) But we differ wholly about the fifth point. 
He who conceives liberty aright, conceives both a 
'liberty in the subject', to, will or not to will, and 




LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 403 

a 'liberty to the object' to will this or that, and 
* liberty from impediments'. T. H., by a new way 
of his own, cuts off the ' liberty of the subject', as 
if a stone were free to ascend or descend because * dp ** ** 
it hath no outward impediment ; and the ' liberty 
towards the object', as if the needle touched with 
the loadstone were free to point either towards 
the north or towards the south, because there 
is not a barricado in its way." How does it ap- 
pear, that he who conceives liberty aright, con- 
ceives a liberty in the subject to will or not to will; 
unless he mean liberty to do if he will, or ndt to 
do if he will not, which was never denied ? Or 
how does it follow, that a stone is as free to ascend 
as descend, unless he prove there is no outward 
impediment to its ascent ; which cannot be proved, 
for the contrary is true ? Or how proveth he, that 
there is no outward impediment to keep that point 
of the loadstone, which placeth itself towards the 
north, from turning to the south ? His igno- 
rance of the causes external is not a sufficient 
argument that there are none. And whereas he 
saith, that according to my definition of liberty, 
" a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are 
plucked, but not when they are tied" ; I answer 
that she is not at liberty to fly when her wings are 
tied ; but to say, when her wings are plucked that 
she wanted the liberty to fly, were to speak im- 
properly and absurdly ; for in that case, men that 
speak English use to say she cannot fly. And for 
his reprehension of my attributing liberty to brute 
oeasts and rivers ; I would be glad to know whe- 
ther it be improper language, to say a bird or 
beast may be set at liberty from the cage wherein 

D D3 



404 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXIII. they were imprisoned or to say that a river, which: 
. T""? ' was stopped, hath recovered its free course ; and 

Ammauver- rr 7 

ftions upon the how it follows, that a beast or river recovering this 
<s ops reply. f ree( j orn mus ^ ne eds therefore "be capable of sin 
and punishment" ? 

(i) " The reason for the sixth point is like the 
former, a phantastical or imaginative reason : 
4 How can a man imagine anything to begin without 
a cause ; or if it should begin without a cause, 
why it should begin at this time, rather than at 
that time r* He saith truly, nothing can begin 
without a cause, that is to be ; but it may begin to 
act of itself without any other cause. Nothing 
can begin without a cause ; but many things may 
begin without a necessary cause." He granteth 
nothing can begin without a cause ; and he hath 
granted formerly that nothing can cause itself. 
And now he saith, it may begin to act of itself. 
The action therefore begins to be without any 
cause, which he said nothing could do, contradict- 
ing what he had said but in the line before. And 
for that that he saith, that " many things may be- 
gin not without a cause, but without a necessary 
cause" ; it hath been argued before ; and all 
causes have been proved, if entire and sufficient 
causes, to be necessary. And that which he repeat- 
eth here, namely, that " a free cause may choose 
his time when he will begin to work" ; arid that 
u although free effects cannot be foretold, because 
they are not certainly predetermined in their 
causes, yet when the free causes do determine 
themselves, they are of as great certainty as the 
other" ; it has been made appear sufficiently before 
that it is but jargon, the words free cause and de- 
termining themselves being insignificant, and hav- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 405 

ing nothing in the mind of man answerable tONO.xxxm. 



(k) " And now that I have answered T. H.'s ar- 

j r> ^ * Bishop's teplj 

gumentS; drawn from the private conceptions of 
men concerning the sense of words,, I desire him 
seriously to examine himself, &c." One of his in- 
terrogatories is this, " whether I find not by expe- 
rience, that I do many things which I might have 
left undone if I would". This question was need- 
less, because all the way I have granted him that 
men have liberty to do many things if they will, 
which they left undone because they had not the 
will to do them. Another interrogatory is this, 
" whether I do not some things without regard to 
the direction of right reason, or serious respect of 
what is honest or profitable". This question was 
in vain, unless he think himself my confessor. 
Another is, " whether I writ not this defence 
Bgainst liberty, only to show I will have a domi- 
nion over my own actions". To this I answer, 
no : but to show I have no dominion over my will, 
and this also at his request. But all these ques- 
tions serve in this place for nothing else, but to 
deliver him of a jest he was in labour withal : and 
therefore his last question is, " whether I do not 
sometimes say, * Oh, what a fool was I to do thus 
and thus P or, c Oh, that I had been wise P or, 
' Oh, what a fool was I to grow old P Subtle 
questions, and full of episcopal gravity ! I would he 
had left out charging me with blasphemous, des- 
perate, destructive, and atheistical opinions. I 
should then have pardoned him his calling me 
fool ; both because I do many things foolishly, and 
because, in this question disputed between us, I 
think he will appear a greater fool than I. 



406 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 



NO. XXXIV. 

KXXIV. T. H. For the seventh point, that all events 
The Bishop ^ ave necessar Y causes, it is there proved in that 
they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in this 
place also suppose any event never so casual, as for 
example, the throwing ambs-ace upon a pair of 
dice ; and see if it must not have been necessary 
before it was thrown. For, seeing it was thrown, it 
bad a beginning, and consequently a sufficient 
cause to produce it ; consisting partly in the dice, 
partly in the outward things, as the posture of the 
party's hand, the measure of force applied by the 
caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and 
the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting that 
was necessarily requisite to the producing of that 
particular cast ; and consequently, that cast was 
necessarily thrown. For if it had not been thrown^ 
there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throw- 
ing of it; and so the cause had not been sufficient. 
In the like manner it may be proved that every 
other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or 
how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessari- 
ly ; which is that J. D. disputes against. The same 
also may be proved in this manner* Let the case 
l>e put for example, of the weather. It is neces- 
sary, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. 
If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is 
necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not 
necessary that the proposition, it shall rain or it 
shall not rain> should be true. I know there are 
SQine that say, it may necessarily be true, that o$e 
Q$ tl^e two sh^U come tp pass, but not sii)gly ? $h&t 
it shall rain or it shall not rain. Which is as 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 4Q7 

much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet NO 
neither of them is necessary. And therefore, to 
seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinc- 
tion, that neither of them is true determinate, but 
indeterminate. Which distinction either signifies 
no more than this : one of them is true, but we 
know not which, and so the necessity remains, 
though we know it not : or if the meaning of the 
distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And 
they might as well have said, one of them is true 
tytyrice, but neither of them tupatulice. 

J. D. (a) " His former proof, that all sufficient 
causes are necessary causes, is answered before 
(No. xxxi). (/>) And his two instances of casting 
ambs-ace, and raining to-morrow, are altogether 
impertinent to the question now agitated between 
us, for two reasons. First, our present controver- 
sy is concerning free actions, which proceed from 
the liberty of man's will : both his instances are of 
contingent actions, which proceed from the inde- 
termination or contingent concurrence of natural 
causes. First, that there are free actions which 
proceed merely from election, without any out- 
ward necessitation, is a truth so evident as that 
there is a sun iu the heavens; and he that doubteth 
of it, may as well doubt whether there be a shell 
without the nut, or a stone within the olive. A 
man proportions his time each day, and allots so 
much to his devotions, so much to his study, so 
much to his diet, so much to his recreations, so 
much to necessary or civil visits, so much to his 
rest ; he who will seek for I know not what causes 
of all this without himself, except that; gopgl $$$ 
who hath given him a reasonable soul, may as 




408 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxiv. well seek for a cause of the Egyptian pyramids 
the Bishop s ainoil g the crocodiles of Nilus. (c) Secondly, for 
reply. mixed actions which proceed from the concurrence 

of free and natural agents, though they be not 
free, yet they are not necessary. As, to keep my 
former instance, a man walking through a street 
of a city to do his occasions, a tile falls from a 
house and breaks his head. The breaking of his 
head was not necessary, for he did freely choose 
to go that way without any necessitation ; neither 
was it free, for he did not deliberate of that acci* 
dent; therefore it was contingent, and by un- 
doubted consequence, there are contingent actions 
in the world which are not free. Most certainly 
by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the 
good and bad angels, and men, with natural 
agents, sometimes on purpose and sometimes by 
accident, many events happen, which otherwise 
had never happened ; many effects are produced, 
which otherwise had never been produced. And 
admitting such things to be contingent, not neces- 
sary, all their consequent effects, not only imme- 
diate, but mediate, must likewise be contingent, 
that is to say, such as do not proceed from a con- 
tinued connexion and succession of necessary 
causes ; which is directly contrary to T. H.'s opi- 
nion. 

( d) " Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, 
though they be not free, though they have not the 
use of reason to restrain their appetites from that 
which is sensitively good by the consideration of 
what is rationally good, or what is honest, and 
though their fancies be determined by nature to 
some kinds of work ; yet to think that every indi- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHAN'CE. 409 

vidual action of theirs, and each animal motion of NO. xxxiv. 
theirs, even to the least murmur or gesture, is Thel5 : sh ^ 
bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the njy. * 
extrinsical causes or objects, I see no ground for 
it. Christ saith, one of these sparrows doth not fall 
to the ground without your heavenly Father, that 
is, without an influence of power from him, or ex- 
empted from his disposition ; he doth not say, which 
your heavenly Father casteth not down. Lastly, 
for the natural actions of inanimate creatures, 
wherein there is not the least concurrence of any 
free or voluntary agents, the question is yet more 
doubtful. For many things are called contingent in 
respect of us, because \ve know not the cause of 
them, which really and in themselves are not con- 
tingent, but necessary. Also many things are 
contingent in respect of one single cause, either 
actually hindered, or in possibility to be hindered, 
which are necessary in respect of the joint concur- 
rence of all collateral causes, (e) But whether 
there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes 
from the beginning, so as they must all have con- 
curred as they have done, and in the same degree 
of power, and have been deficient as they have 
been in all events whatsoever, would require a fur- 
ther examination, if it were pertinent to this ques- 
tion of liberty ; but it is not. It is sufficient to 
my purpose, to have showed that all elective actions 
are free from absolute necessity : and moreover, 
that the concurrence of voluntary and free agents 
with natural causes, both upon purpose and acci- 
dentally, hath helped them to produce many effects, 
which otherwise they had not produced, and hin- 
dered them from producing many effects, which 




410 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

N0, x#$iv, otherwise they had produced : and that if this in- 
tervention of voluntary and free agents had been 
more frequent than it hath been, as without doubt 
it might have been, many natural events had been 
otherwise than they are. And therefore he might 
have spared his instance of casting ambs-ace and 
raining to-morrow. And first, for his casting 
ambs-ace : if it be thrown by a fair gamester with 
indifferent dice, it is a mixed action ; the casting 
of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is 
contingent. A man may deliberate whether he 
will cast the dice or not ; but it were, folly to deli- 
berate whether he will cast ambs-ace or not, because 
it is not in his power, unless he be a cheater that 
can cog the dice, or the dice be false dice ; arid then 
the contingency, or degree of contingency, ceaseth 
accordingly as the caster hath more or less cun- 
ning, or as the figure or making of the dice doth 
incline them to ambs-ace more than to another cast, 
or necessitate them to this cast arid no other. 
Howsoever, so far as the cast is free or contingent, 
so far it is not necessary : and where necessity 
begins, there liberty and contingency do cease to be. 
Likewise his other instance of raining or not raining 
to-morrow, is not of a free elective act, nor always 
qf a contingent act. In some countries, as they have 
their statl venti, their certain winds at set seasons ; 
so they have their certain and set rains. The 
Ethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of 
the certain inundation of Nilus. In some eastern 
countries they have rain only twice a year, and 
tjbesg constant ; which the Scriptures call the far- 
mer $$A the later rain. In such plaees not only 
the causes do act determinately and necessarily, 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 411 

bat also the determination or necessity of the event 
is foreknown to the inhabitants. In our climate, the 
natural causes celestial and sublunary do not pro- 
duce rain so necessarily at set times; neither can we 
say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, 
or it will not rain to-morrow. Nevertheless, it 
may so happen that the causes are so disposed and 
determined, even in our climate, that this propo- 
sition, it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain 
to-morrow, may be necessary in itself; and the 
prognostics, or tokens, may be such in the sky, in 
our own bodies, in the creatures, animate and in- 
animate, as weather glasses, &c., that it may be- 
come probably true to us that it will rain to-mor<- 
mow, or it will not rain to-morrow. But ordina- 
rily, it is a contingent proposition to us ; whether it 
be contingent also in itself, that is, whether the 
concurrence of the causes were absolutely neces- 
sary, whether the vapours or matter of the rain 
may not yet be dispersed, or otherwise consumed, 
or driven beyond our coast, is a speculation which 
no way concerns this question. So we see one 
reason why his two instances are altogether im- 
pertinent ; because they are of actions which are 
not free, nor elective, nor such as proceed from 
the liberty of man's will. 

" Secondly, our dispute is about absolute neces- 
sity; his proofs extend only to hypothetical ne- 
cessity. Our question is, whether the concurrence 
and determination of the causes were necessary 
before they did concur, or were determined. He 
proves that the effect is necessary after the causes 
h$ve concurred, and are determined. The freest 
actions of God or man are necessary, by such a 




412 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxtv. necessity of supposition, and the most contingent 
the Bishop events that are, as I have showed plainly, No. in, 
reply. where his instance of ambs-ace is more fully an- 
swered. So his proof looks another way from 
his proposition. His proposition is, 'that the 
casting of ambs-ace was necessary before it was 
thrown'. His proof is, that it was necessary W 7 hen 
it was thrown. Examine all his causes over and 
over, and they will not afford him one grain of an- 
tecedent necessity. The first cause is in the dice : 
true, if they be false dice there may be something 
in it ; but then his contingency is destroyed : if they 
43e square dice, they have no more inclination to 
ambs-ace, than to cinque and quatre, or any other 
cast. His second cause is 'the posture of the 
party's hand' : but what necessity was there that 
he should put his hands into such a posture ? None 
at all. The third cause is ' the measure of the 
force applied by the caster'. Now for the credit of 
his cause let him but name, I will not say a con- 
vincing reason nor so much as a probable reason, 
but even any pretence of reason, how the caster 
was necessitated from without himself to apply 
just so much force, and neither more nor less. If 
he cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold 
his peace for ever. His last cause is the posture 
of the table. But tell us in good earnest, what 
necessity there was why the caster must throw 
into that table rather than the other, or that the 
dice must fall just upon that part of the table, be- 
fore the cast was thrown : he that makes these to 
be necessary causes, I do not wonder if he make 
all effects necessary effects. If any one of these 
fcauses i>e contingent, it is sufficient to render 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 413 

the cast contingent ; and now that they are all so $o. 
contingent, yet he will needs have the effect to be 
necessary. Arid so it is when the cast is thrown ; 
but not before the cast was thrown, which he un- 
dertook to prove. Who can, blame him for being 
so angry with the Schoolmen, and their distinctions 
of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing 
they touch his freehold so nearly ? 

" But though his instance of raining to-morrow 
be impertinent, as being no free action, yet because 
he triumphs so much in his argument, I will not 
stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend. 
For I confess the validity of the reason had been 
the same, if he had made it of a free action, a& 
thus : either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, 
or I shall not finish this reply to-morrow, is a ne- 
cessary proposition. But because he shall not 
complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of 
his terms, 1 will for once adventure upon his shower 
of rain. And first, I readily admit his major, that 
this proposition, either it will rain to-morrow or it 
will not rain to-morrow, is necessarily true : for of 
two contradictory propositions, the one must of 
necessity be true, because no third can be given. 
But his minor, that ' it could not be necessarily 
true, except one of the members were necessarily 
true', is most false. And so is his proof likewise, 
that * if neither the one nor the other of the mem- 
bers be necessarily true, it cannot be affirmed that 
either the one or the other is true'. A conjunct 
proposition may have both parts false, and yet the 
proposition be true ; as, if the sun shine it is day > is 
a true proposition at midnight. And T. H. con-* 
fesseth ^s much, No. xix. * If I shall live I shall 




414 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxiv. eat, is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is 
necessary that that proposition should be true 
whensoever uttered. But it is not the necessity 
of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the 
man shall live or that the man shall eat'. And so 
T. H. proceeds : * I do not use to fortify my distinc- 
tions with such reasons'. But it seemeth he hath 
forgotten himself and is contented with such poor 
fortifications. And though both parts of a disjunc- 
tive proposition cannot be false ; because if it be a 
right disjunction, the members are repugnant, 
whereof one part is infallibly true ; yet vary but the 
proposition a little to abate the edge of the disjunc- 
tions, and you shall find in that which T. H. saith 
to be true, that it is not the necessity of the thing 
which makes the proposition to be true. As for ex- 
ample, vary it thus : / know that either it will rain 
to-morrow or that it will not rain to-morrow, is a 
true proposition : but it is not true that I know it 
will rain to-morrow, neither is it true that I know 
it will not rain to-morrow ; wherefore the certain 
truth of the proposition doth not prove that either 
of the members is determinately true in present. 
Truth is a conformity of the understanding to the 
thing known, whereof speech is an interpreter. 
If the understanding agree not with the thing, it is 
an error ; if the words agree not with the under- 
standing, it is a lie. Now the thing known, is 
known either in itself or in its causes. If it be 
known in itself as it is, then we express our ap- 
prehension of it in words of the present tense ; as 
the sun is risen. If it be known in its cause, we? 
express ourselves in words of the future tense ; as 
will be an eclipse of the moon* But if 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 415 

we neither know it in itself, nor in its causes, then NO. 
there may be a foundation of truth, but there is no ,!'- 

* . , The BtJnop s 

such determinate truth of it that we can reduce it reply. 
into a true proposition. We cannot say it doth rain 
to-morrow, or it doth not rain to-morrow ; that 
were not only false but absurd. We cannot posi- 
tively say it will rain to-morrow, because we do 
not know it in its causes, either how they are de- 
termined or that they are determined. Wherefore 
the certitude and evidence of the disjunctive pro- 
position is neither founded upon that which will 
be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do 
not know that ; nor yet upon the determination of 
the causes, for then we would not say indifferently 
either it will rain or it will not rain, but posi- 
tively it will rain, or positively it will not rain. 
But it is grounded upon an undeniable principle, 
that of two contradictory propositions the one 
must necessarily be true. (/} And therefore to 
say, either this or that will infallibly be, but it i& 
not yet determined whether this or that shall be, 
is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a 
tytyrice tupatulice, but an evident truth which no 
man that hath his eyes in his head can doubt of. 

(g) " If all this will not satisfy him, I will give 
one of his own kind of proofs ; that is, an instance. 
That which necessitates all things, according to 
T. H. (No. xi), is the decree of God, or that order 
which is set to all things by the eternal cause. Now 
God himself, who made this necessitating decree, 
was not subjected to it in the making thereof ; nei- 
ther was there any former order to oblige the first 
cause necessarily to make such a decree ; there- 
fore this decree being an act ad extra, was freely 



41(J THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxiv, made by God without any necessitation. Yet 
never theless this disjunctive proposition is neces- 
sarily true : either God did make such a decree, 
or he did not make such a decree. Again, though 
T. H/s opinion were true, that all events are ne- 
cessary, and that the whole Christian world are 
deceived who believe that some events are free 
from necessity ; yet he will not deny, but if it had 
been the good pleasure of God, he might have 
made some causes free from necessity ; seeing that 
it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any 
contradiction. Supposing therefore that God had 
made some second causes free from any such an- 
tecedent determination to one ; yet the former dis- 
junction would be necessarily true : either this 
free undetermined cause will act after this manner, 
or it will not act after this manner. Wherefore 
the necessary truth of such a disjunctive proposi- 
tion doth not prove that either of the members of 
the disjunction singly considered, is determinately 
true in present ; but only that the one of them will 
be determinately true to-morrow. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIV. 

(a) " His former proof, that all sufficient causes 
are necessary causes, is answered before (No. 
xxxi)." When he shall have read my animadver- 
sions upon that answer of his, he will think other- 
wise, whatsoever he will confess. 

(b) " And his two instances of casting ambs-ace, 
and of raining to~morrow r , are altogether imperti- 
nent to the question, for two reasons." His first 
reason is, "because", saith he, " our present con- 
troversy is concerning free actions, which pro- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 4IJ 

ceed from the liberty of man's will ; and both his NO. xxxiv. 
instances are of contingent actions, which proceed A ^ m V CT ^ 
from the indetermiriation, or contingent concur- ^ons upon the 
rence of natural causes". He knows that this lsopsrcpy * 
part of my discourse, which beginneth at No. xxv, 
is no dispute with him at all, but a bare setting 
down of my opinion concerning the natural neces- 
sity of all things ; which is opposite, not only to 
the liberty of will, but also to all contingence that 
is not necessary. And therefore these instances 
were not impertinent to my purpose ; and if they 
be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of 
man's will, he does impertinently to meddle with 
them. And yet for all he pretends here, that the 
question is only about liberty of the will ; yet in 
his first discourse (No. xvi), he maintains that 
" the order, beauty, and perfection of the world 
doth require that in the universe should be agents 
of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some con- 
tingent". And my purpose here is to show by 
those instances, that those things which we esteem 
most contingent are nevertheless necessary. Be- 
sides, the controversy is not whether free actions 
which proceed from the liberty of man's will, be 
necessary or not ; for I know no action which pro- 
ceedeth from the liberty of man's will. But the 
question is, whether those actions which proceed 
from the man's will, be necessary. The man's will- 
is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing. 
Again, the question is not whether contingent ac- 
tions which proceed from the indetermination or 
contingent concurrence of natural causes, (for there 
is nothing that can proceed from indetermination), 
but whether contingent actions be necessary before 
VOL. v. E E 



418 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxiv. they be done; or whether the concurrence of 
Anima^rT n &tural causes, when they happen to concur, were 
sions npon the not necessitated so to happen ; or whether whatso- 



ops. chanceth, be not necessitated so to chance. 



And that they are so necessitated, I have proved 
already with such arguments as the Bishop, for 
aught I see, cannot answer. For to say, as 
he doth, that " there are free actions which pro- 
ceed merely from election, without any outward 
necessitation, is a truth so evident as that there is 
a sun in the heavens", is no proof. It is indeed as 
clear as the sun, that there are free actions pro- 
ceeding from election ; but that there is election 
without any outward necessitation, is dark enough. 
(c) " Secondly, for mixed actions, which pro- 
ceed from the concurrence of free and natural 
agents, though they be not free, yet they are not 
necessary, &c." For proof of this he instanceth in 
a tile, that falling from a house breaks a man's 
head, neither necessarily nor freely, and therefore 
contingently. Not necessarily, "for", saith he, 
" he did freely choose to go that way without any 
necessitation". Which is as much as taking the 
question itself for a proof. For what is else the 
question, but whether a man be necessitated to 
choose what he chooseth ? " Again", saith he, " it 
was not free, because he did not deliberate whe- 
ther his head should be broken or not" ; and con- 
cludes " therefore it was contingent ; and by un- 
doubted consequence, there are contingent actions 
iti the world which are not free". This is true, 
and denied by hone ; but he should have proved, 
that such contingent actions are not antecedently 
necessary by a concurrence of natural causes ; 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 419 

though a little before he granteth they are. For NO. xxxtr. 
whatsoever is produced by a concurrence of natural An ^ aa ;^ ' 
causes, was antecedently determined in the cause >* ?<> * 

/. -i i i i 11 , Bishop's reply. 

of such concurrence, though, as he calls it, contin- 
gent concurrence ; not perceiving that concurrence 
and contingent concurrence are all one, and sup- 
pose a continued connection and succession of 
causes which make the effect necessarily future. 
So that hitherto he hath proved no other contin- 
gence than that which is necessary. 

(d) " Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, 
&c, to think each animal motion of theirs is 
bound by the chain of unalterable necessity, I see 
no ground for it." It maketh nothing against the 
truth, that he sees no ground for it. I have pointed 
out the ground in my former discourse, and am 
not bound to find him eyes. He himself immedi- 
ately citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it, 
where Christ saith, one of these sparrows doth not 
fall to the ground without your heavenly Father ; 
which place, if there were no more, were a suffi- 
cient ground for the assertion of the necessity of 
all those changes of animal motion in birds and 
other living creatures, which seem to us so uncer- 
tain. But when a man is dizzy with influence 
of power, elicit acts, permissive will, hypotheti- 
cal necessity, and the like unintelligible terms, the 
ground goes from him. By and by after he con- 
fesseth that " many things are called contingent 
in respect of us, because we know not the cause of 
them, which really and in themselves are not con- 
tingent, but necessary" ; and errs therein the other 
way ; for he says in eifect, that many things are, 
which are not ; for it is all one to say, they are not 

T?. 1? <> 



,420 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO, xxxiv. contingent, and they are not. He should have 

things, the necessity of whose 



upon the continence we cannot or do not know. 

Bishop's reply. , \ -n ti 

(e) " But whether there be a necessary connex- 
ion of all natural causes from the beginning, so as 
they must all have concurred as they have done, 
&c, would require a further examination, if it were 
pertinent to this question of liberty ; but it is not. 
It is sufficient to my purpose to have showed, &c." 
If tfyere be a necessary connexion of all natural 
causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt 
but that all things happen necessarily, which is 
that that I have all this while maintained. But 
whether there be or no, he says, it requires a 
further examination. Hitherto therefore he knows 
not whether it be true or no, and consequently all 
his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor 
hath he showed anything to prove, what he pur- 
posed, that elective actions are not necessitated. 
And whereas a little before he says, that to my ar- 
guments to prove that sufficient causes are neces- 
sary, he hath already answered ; it seemeth he dis- 
trusteth his own answer, and answers again to the 
two instances of casting ambs-ace, and raining or 
not raining to-morrow ; but brings no other ar- 
gument to prove the cast thrown not to be neces- 
sarily thrown, but this, that he does not deliberate 
whether he shall throw that cast or not. Which 
argument may perhaps prove that the casting of it 
proceedeth not from free will, but proves not any- 
thing against the antecedent necessity of it. And 
to prove that it is not necessary that it should rain 
or not rain to-morrow ; after telling us that the 
Ethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus ; 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 421 

that in some eastern countries they have rain NO. xxxiv. 
only twice a year, which the Scripture, he saith, A ^. ~" 

J 7 / 7 7 7 . Awmadrer- 

calleth the former and the latter rain; (I thought si ? m u p on th ' 
he had known it by the experience of some travel- 
lers, but I see he only gathereth it from that 
phrase in Scripture of former and latter rain) ; I 
say, after he has told us this, to prove that it is not 
necessary it should rain or not rain to-morrow he 
saith that "in our climate the natural causes, 
celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so ne- 
cessarily at set times, as in the eastern countries ; 
neither can we say so certainly and infallibly, it 
will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-mor- 
row". By this argument a man may take the 
height of the Bishop's logic. " In our climate the 
natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily 
at set times, as in some eastern countries. There- 
fore they do not produce rain necessarily in our 
climate, then when they do produce it". And 
again, " we cannot say so certainly and infallibly, 
it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-mor- 
row ; therefore it is not necessary either that it 
should rain, or that it should not rain to-morrow" : 
as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof 
we know not. Another reason, he saith, why my 
instances are impertinent, is because " they extend 
only to an hypothetical necessity", that is, that the 
necessity is not in the antecedent causes; and 
thereupon challenge th me for the credit of my 
cause to name some reason, " how the caster was 
necessitated from without himself to apply just so 
much force to the cast, and neither more nor less ; 
or what necessity there was why the caster must 
throw into that table rather than the other, of 



422 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxiv. that the diee must fall just upon that part of the 

A*Sfd'^ table, before the cast was thrown". Here again, 

a^uponth? from our ignorance of the particular causes that 

op 3 rep y , COJlcurr | n g ma ^ e the necessity he inferreth, that 

there was no such necessity at all ; which indeed 

is that which hath iq all this question deceived 

llim, and all other men that attribute events to 

fortune. But I suppose he will not deny that 

event to be necessary, where all the causes of the 

cast, and their concurrence, and the cause of that 

concurrence are foreknown, and might be told 

him, though I cannot tell him. Seeing therefore 

God foreknows them all, the cast was necessary ; 

and that from antecedent causes from eternity; 

which is no hypothetical necessity. 

And whereas to my argument to prove, that 
'raining to-morrow if it shall then rain, and not 
raining to-morrow if it shall then not rain', was 
therefore necessary, because ' otherwise this dis- 
junctive proposition, it shall rain or not rain to- 
morrow, is not necessary', he answereth that f f a 
conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and 
yet the proposition be true ; as, if the sun shine it 
is day, is a true proposition at midnight": what 
has a conjunct proposition to do with this in ques- 
tion, which is disjunctive ? Or what be the parts 
of this proposition, if the sun shine, it is day ? 
It is not njade of two propositions, as a disjunctive 
is ; but is one simple proposition, namely, this,, the 
shining of the sun is day. Either he has no logic 
at all, or thinks they have no reason at all that 
are his readers. But he hag a trick, he s^ith, to 
e edge of the disjunction, by varying the 
0ius, " I know that it will rain to mor- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 423 

row, or thfit it will not rain to-morrow, is a true NO. xxxiv. 
proposition" ; and yet saith he, " it is neither true A >-/ ^ 

r ..,",. . Anixadv|r:. 

that I know it will ram to-morrow, neither is it *** u^m the 
true that I know it will not rain to-morrow". op8repy * 
What childish deceit, or childish ignorance is this ; 
when he is to prove that neither of the members 
is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition, 
to bring for instance a proposition not disjunc- 
tive ? It had been disjunctive if it had gone thus, 
/ know that it will rain to-morrow, or I know that 
it will not rain to-morrow ; but then he had cer- 
tainly known determinately one of the two. 

(f) " And therefore to say, either this or that 
will infallibly be, but it is not yet determined 
whether this or that shall be, is no such senseless 
assertion that it deserved a tytyrice tupatulice". 
But it is a senseless assertion, whatsoever it de- 
serve, to say that this proposition, it shall rain or 
not rain, is true indeterminedly, and neither of 
them true determinedly ; and little better, as he 
hath now qualified it, " that it will infallibly be, 
though it be not yet determined whether it shall 
be or no". 

(g) " If all this will not satisfy him, I will give 
him one of his own kinds of proof, that is, an in- 
stance. That which necessitates all things, accord- 
ing to T. H. is the decree of God, &c." His in- 
stance iSj " that God himself made this necessita- 
ting decree, and therefore this decree, being an act 
ad extra, was freely made by God, without any 
necessitation". I do believe the Bishop himsplf 
fceli^veth that all the decrees of God hav$ 
from $11 eternity, and therefore he will ijot 
to this, that God's decrees were ever 



424 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxi v* whatsoever hath been made, hath had a. beginning, 
v-^, . Besides, God's decree is his will ; and the Bishop 

Ammadver- ' 9 * 

MODS upon the hath said formerly, that the will of God is God, the 
w ops $ y . j ugt j ce Q f Q Q ^ Q O( J^ fa jf therefore God made a 

decree, according to the Bishop's opinion God 
made himself. By which we may see, what fine 
stuff it is that proceedeth from disputing of 
incomprehensibles. Again he says, "if it had 
been the good pleasure of God, he might have 
made some causes free from necessity ; seeing that 
it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any 
contradiction". If God had made either causes or 
effects free from necessity, he had made them free 
from his own prescience; which had been imper- 
fection. Perhaps he will say, that in these words of 
his, the decree, being an act ad extra, was freely 
made by God, I take no notice of that act ad 
extra, as being too hot for my fingers. Therefore 
now I take notice of it, and say that it is neither 
Latin, nor English, nor sense. 

NO. xxxv. 

T. H. The last thing, in which also consisteth the 
whole controversy, namely, that there is no such 
thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite 
to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to 
produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no 
such thing as freedom from necessity; is easily in- 
ferred from that which hath been before alleged. 
For if it be an agent, it can work ; and if it work, 
there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to 
produce the action ; and consequently the cause of 
the action is sufficient ; and if sufficient, then also 
necessary > as hath been proved before. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY,, AND CHANCE. 425 

J. D. "I wonder that T. H. should confess, NO.XXXV. 
that the whole weight of this controversy doth 
rest upon this proposition : * that there is no such wri- 
thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite 
to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to 
act" ; and yet bring nothing but such poor bull- 
rushes to support it. (a) ' If it be an agent', saith 
he, ( it can work' ; what of this ? A posse ad 
esse non valet argumentum: from can work to will 
work, is a weak inference. And from will work 
to doth work upon absolute necessity, is another 
gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus : c if it 
work, there is nothing wanting of what is requi- 
site to produce the action'. True, there wants 
nothing to produce that which is produced ; but 
there may want much to produce that which was 
intended. One horse may pull his heart out, and 
yet not draw the coach whither it should be, if he 
want the help or concurrence of his fellows. f And 
consequently', saith he, 4 the cause of the action is 
sufficient'. Yes, sufficient to do what it doth, 
though perhaps with much prejudice to itself; but 
not always sufficient to do what it should do, or 
what it would do. As he that begets a monster, 
should beget a man, and would beget a man if he 
could. The last link of his argument follows : 
(ft) ' and if sufficient, then also necessary'. Stay 
there ; by his leave, there is no necessary connexion 
between sufficiency and efficiency ; otherwise God 
himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his ar- 
gument is vanished; But I will deal more favour- 
ably with him, and grant him all that which he 
labours so much in vain to prove, that every effect 
in the world hath sufficient causes ; yea more. 



426 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

xsxv. that supposing the determination of the. free and 
contingent causes, every effect in the world is ne- 
eessary. (c) But all this will not advantage his 
cause the black of a bean : for still it amounts but 
to an hypothetical necessity, and differs as much 
from that absolute necessity, which he maintains, 
as a gentleman who travels for his pleasure, differs 
from a banished man, or a free subject from a 
slave." 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXV. 

(a) " ' If it be an agent,' saith he, ' it can work'. 
What of this ? A posse ad esse non valet argu- 
mentum ; from can work to will work, is a weak 
inference. And from will work to doth work 
upon absolute necessity, is another gross incon- 
sequence." Here he has gotten a just advantage ; 
for I should have said, if it be an agent it worketh, 
not it can work. But it is an advantage which 
profiteth little to his cause. For if I repeat my 
argmnent again in this manner: that which is 
an agent, worketh ; that which worketh, wanteth 
nothing requisite to produce the action or the 
effect it produceth, and consequently is thereof a 
sufficient cause ; and if a sufficient cause, then also 
a necessary cause : his answer will be nothing to 
t^e purpose. For whereas to these words, ' that 
whiph worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to pro- 
duce the action or the effect it produceth,' he an- 
swereth, " it is true, but there may want much to 
produce that which was intended", it is not con- 
trpry to any tjung that J have said, For I n$ver 
maintained, that whatsoever a man intendeth, is ne- 
cessarily performed ; but this, whatsoever a man 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 42? 

performeth, is necessarily performed, and what he NO. xxxv, 
intendeth, necessarily intended, and that from ' ' "* 

Animad^Cf- 

causes antecedent. And therefore to say, as he sums upon fte 
doth, that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth, Bls opsr<?p3r ' 
but not always sufficient to do what a man should 
or would do, is to say the same that I do. For I 
say not, that the cause that bringeth forth a mon- 
ster, is sufficient to bring forth a man ; but that 
every cause is sufficient to produce only the effect 
it produceth ; and if sufficient, then also neces- 
sary. 

(b) "' And if sufficient, then also necessary'. 
Stay there ; by his leave, there is no necessary con- 
nexion between sufficiency and efficiency ; other- 
wise God himself should not be all-sufficient." All- 
sufficiency signifieth no more, when it is attri- 
buted to God, than omnipotence; and omnipo- 
tence signifieth no more, than the power to do all 
things that he will. But to the production of 
any thing that is produced, the will of God is 
as requisite as the rest of his power and suffi- 
ciency. And consequently, his all-sufficiency sig- 
riifieth not a sufficiency or power to do those 
things he will not. But he will deal, he says, so 
favourably with me, as to grant me all this, which 
I labour, he saith, so much in vain to prove: and 
adds, (c) " But all thisj^vill not advantage his cause 
the black of a bean ; for still it amounts but to an 
hypothetical necessity". If it prove no more, it 
proves no necessity at all ; for by hypothetical ne- 
cessity he means the necessity of this proposition, 
the effect is, then when it is ; whereas necessity is 
only said truly of somewhat in future. For ne- 
cessary is that which cannot possibly be othtr- 



428 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxv. wise ; and possibility is always understood of some 

Aiumadver f uture *i m ^- But seeing he granteth so favourably 

sions upon the that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall 

* op * rep y. eag jjy conc } U( j e f rom ^ ^at whatsoever those 

causes do cause, are necessary antecedently. For 
if the necessity of the thing produced, when pro- 
duced, be in the same instant of time with the ex- 
istence of its immediate cause ; then also that 
immediate cause was in the same instant with 
the cause by which it was immediately produced ; 
the same may be said of the cause of this cause, 
and so backward eternally. From whence it will 
follow, that all the connexion of the causes of 
any effect from the beginning of the world, were 
altogether existent in one and the same instant ; 
and consequently, all the time from the beginning 
of the world, or from eternity to this day, is but 
one instant, or a nunc stans ; which he knows by 
this time is not so. 

NO. xxxvi. 

T. H. And thus you see how the inconvenien- 
ces, which he objecteth must follow upon the hold- 
ing of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity 
itself demonstratively proved. To which I could 
add, if I thought it good logic, the inconvenience 
of denying necessity ; as th#t it destroys both the 
decrees and prescience of God Almighty. For what- 
soever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man 
as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, 
a man, if he have liberty, such as he affirmeth from 
necessitation, might frustrate and make not to 
come to pass : and God should either not fore- 
know it and not decree it, or he should foreknow 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 429 

such thii^gs shall be as shall never be, and decree NO. xxxvi. 
that which shall never come to pass. 1~J^ 

r The Bishop a 

/. Z). " Thus he hath laboured in vain to sa- reply. 
tisfy my reasons, and to prove his own assertion. 
But for demonstration, there is nothing like it 
among his arguments. Now he saith, () he could 
add other arguments, if he thought it good logic. 
There is no impediment in logic, why a man may 
not press his adversary with those absurdities 
which flow from his opinion ; argumentum ducens 
ad impossible or ad absurdum, is a good form of 
reasoning. But there is another reason of his 
forbearance, though he be loath to express it. 
Hceret lateri Icethalis arundo. The arguments 
drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close 
in the sides of his cause, that he hath no mind to 
treat of that subject. By the way, take notice of 
his own confession, that * he could add other rea- 
sons, if he thought it good logic'. If it were pre- 
determined in the outward causes, that he must 
make this very defence and no other, how could it 
be in his power to add or subtract any thing : just 
as if a blind man should say in earnest, / could see 
if I had mine eyes ? Truth often breaks out w r hilst 
men seek to smother it. (i) But let us view his ar- 
gument : ' if a man have liberty from necessitation, 
he may frustrate the decrees of God, and make his 
prescience false'. First, for the decrees of God, 
this is his decree that man should be a free agent ; 
if he did consider God as a most simple act, 
without priority or posteriority of time, or any 
composition ; he would not conceive of his decrees, 
as of the laws of the Medes and Persians, long 
since enacted and passed before we were born, but 



430 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO. xxxvi. as coexistent with ourselves, and with, the acts 
Tte Bishops w ^ich we do by virtue of those decrees. Decrees 
and attributes are but notions to help the weak- 
ness of our understanding to conceive of God. The 
decrees of God are God himself, and therefore 
justly said to be before the foundation of the world 
was laid : and yet coexistent with ourselves, be- 
cause of the infinite and eternal being of God. The 
sum is this, the decree of God, or God himself 
eternally, constitutes or ordains all effects which 
come to pass in time, according to the distinct 
natures or capacities of his creatures. An eter- 
nal ordination is neither past nor to come, but 
always present. So free actions do proceed as 
well from the eternal decree of God, as necessary ; 
and from that order which he hath set in the 
world. 

"As the decree of God is eternal, so is his 
knowledge. And therefore to speak truly and 
properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor after- 
knowledge in him. The knowledge of God com- 
prehends all times in a point, by reason of the emi- 
nence and virtue of its infinite perfection. And yet 
I confess, that this is called fore-knowledge in re- 
spect of us. But this fore-knowledge doth produce 
no absolute necessity. Things are not therefore, 
because they are foreknown ; but therefore they are 
foreknown, because they shall come to pass. If any 
thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth, 
yet God's knowledge could not be irritated by it ; 
for then he did not know that it should come to 
pass, as now it doth. Because every knowledge 
of vision necessarily presupposeth its object, God 
did know that Judas should betray Christ ; but 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 431 

Judas was not necessitated to be a traitor by God's NO. 
knowledge. If Judas had not betrayed Christ, 
then God had not fore-known that Judas should reply. 
betray him. The case is this : a watchman standing 
on the steeple's-top, as it is the use in Germany, 
gives notice to them below, who see no such 
things, that company are coming, and how many ; 
his prediction is most certain, for he sees them. 
What a vain correction were it for one below to say, 
what if they did not come, then a certain predic- 
tion may fail. It may be urged, that there is a 
difference between these two cases. In this case, the 
coming is present to the watchman ; but that which 
God fore-knows, is future. God knows what shall 
be ; the watchman only knows what is. I answer, 
that this makes no difference at all in the case, by 
reason of that disparity which is between God's 
knowledge and ours. As that coming is present 
to the watchman, which is future to them who are 
below : so all those things which are future to us, 
are present to God, because his infinite and eternal 
knowledge doth reach to the future being of all 
agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknow- 
ledged by T. H. No. xi : that 'fore-knowledge is 
knowledge, and knowledge depends on the exis- 
tence of the things known, and not they on it'. To 
conclude, the prescience of God doth not make 
things more necessary than the production of the 
things themselves ; but if the agents were free 
agents, the production of the things doth not make 
the events to be absolutely necessary, but only upon 
supposition that the causes were so determined. 
God's prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility, 
but not of antecedent extrinsical determination to 





432 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVI. one. If any event should not come to pass, God 
never foreknow that it would come to pass. 
For every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its 
object. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVI. 

(a) " 'He could add', he saith, 'other arguments, 
if he thought it good logic,' &c. There is no im- 
pediment in logic, why a man may not press his 
adversary with those absurdities which flow from 
his opinion." Here he misrecites my words; 
which are, ' I could add, if I thought it good 
logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity ; as 
that it destroys both the decrees and prescience 
of God Almighty'. But he makes me say I could 
add other arguments ; then infers, that there is no 
impediment in logic, why a man may not press his 
adversary with the absurdities that flow from his 
opinion, because argumentum ducens ad impossi- 
bile is a good form of reasoning ; making no dif- 
ference between absurdities, which are impossibili- 
ties, and inconveniences, which are not only possible 
but frequent. And though it be a good form of 
reasoning to argue from absurdities, yet it is no 
good form of reasoning to argue from inconve- 
niences ; for inconvenience may stand well enough 
with truth. 

( b) " But let us view r his argument : c If a man 
have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate 
the decrees of God, and make his prescience false*. 
This is his decree, that man should be a free agent. 
If he did consider God as a most simple act, with- 
out priority or posteriority of time, or any compo- 
sition, he would not conceive of his decrees as 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 433 

long since enacted, but as coexistent with our- NO. xxxvr. 
selves". Here again he would have me conceive Anima< ^ er ^ 
eternity to be nunc stans* that is, an instant of sionsu P nthe 

11 . / 1/^1 i i Bishop's reply 

time, and that instant of time to be God ; which 
neither he nor I can conceive, nor can without 
impiety say, as he doth here, that the decrees of 
God are God. In which consisteth all the rest of 
his answer to this Number, saving that he putteth 
in sometimes, that " the foreknowledge of God 
produceth not necessity", which is granted him; 
but that anything can be foreknown which shall 
not necessarily come to pass, which was not grant- 
ed, he proveth no otherwise than by his assertion, 
" that every instant of time is God"; which is 
denied him. 

NO. xxxvn. 

T. H. This is all that hath come into my mind 
touching this question, since I last considered it. 
And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communi- 
cate it only to J. D. And so praying God to 
prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take 
leave, and am, my most noble and obliging Lord, 
Your most humble servant, 

T. H. 

J. D. " He is very careful to have this discourse 
kept secret, as appears in this section, and in the 
xivth and xvth sections. If his answer had been 
kept private, I had saved the labour of a reply. 
But hearing that it was communicated, I thought 
myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and my- 
self. I do not blame him to be cautious ; for IB 
tiruth, this assertion is of desperate consequence, 
and destructive to piety, policy, and morality, 
VOL. v. F F 



434 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVII. (a) If he had desired to have it kept secret, the 
_T ~f way had been to have kept it secret himself. It 

The Bishop s J r 

will not suffice to say, as No. xiv, that 'truth is 
truth' : This is the common plea of all men. 
Neither is it sufficient for him to say, as No. xv, 
that ' it was desired by me', long before that he 
had discovered his opinion by word of mouth. 
And my desire was to let some of my noble friends 
see the weakness of his grounds, and the perni- 
cious consequences of that opinion, (b) But if he 
think that this ventilation of the question between 
us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge 
of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily 
hurt any rational man, who is not too much pos- 
sessed with prejudice. 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVII. 

In this place I said nothing, but that I would 
have my Lord of Newcastle to communicate it 
only to the Bishop. And in his answer he says, 
(a) " if I had desired to have it kept secret, the 
way had been to have kept it secret myself. My 
desire was, it should not be communicated by my 
Lord of Newcastle to all men indifferently. But I 
barred not myself from showing it privately to my 
friends ; though to publish it was never my inten- 
tion, till now provoked by the uncivil triumphing 
of the Bishop in his own errors to my disadvan- 
tage. 

(b) " But if he think that this ventilation of the 
question may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge 
of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily 
hurt any rational man, who is not too much pos- 
sessed with prejudice." It is confidently said ; but 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 435 

not very pertinently to the hurt I thought might NO.XXXVH. 
proceed from a discourse of this nature. For I Aniinad y er . 
never thought it could do hurt to a rational man. 8i01 ; 8 u P n ^ ie 

. , Bishop's reply. 

but only to such men as cannot reason m those 
points which are of difficult contemplation. For a 
rational man will say with himself, they whom 
God will bring to a blessed and happy end) those 
he will put into an humble, pious, and righteous 
way ; and of those whom he will destroy, he will 
harden the hearts : and thereupon examining him- 
self whether he be in such a way or not, the 
examination itself would, if elected, be a necessary 
cause of working out his salvation with fear and 
trembling. But the men who I thought might 
take hurt thereby, are such as reason erroneously, 
saying with themselves, if I shall be saved, I shall 
be saved whether I walk uprightly or no : and 
consequently thereunto, shall behave themselves 
negligently, and pursue the pleasant way of the 
sins they are in love with. Which inconvenience 
is not abated by this discourse of the Bishop ; be- 
cause they understand not the grounds he goeth 
on, of nunc stans 9 motus primo primi, elicit acts, 
imperate acts, and a great many other such unin- 
telligible words. 

NO. XXXVIII. 

T. H. Postscript. Arguments seldom work on 
men of wit and learning, when they have once en- 
gaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If any- 
thing do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of 
their errors, which is this. Pious men attribute to 
God Almighty, for honour sake, whatsoever they see 
is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, will- 

FF 2 



436 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII ing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c, : but deny him 
Thesisho su k P oor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other 
reply organs, without which we worms neither have nor 

can conceive such faculties to be : and so far they 
do well. But when they dispute of God's actions 
philosophically, then they consider them again as 
if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we 
have them. This is not well ; and thence it is they 
fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dis- 
pute of God's nature ; he is no fit subject of our 
philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience 
to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such 
honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in 
their several lieutenancies shall ordain. 

/. D. "Though sophistical captions do seldom 
work on men of wit and learning, because by con- 
stant use they have their senses exercised to dis- 
cern both good and evil (Heb. v. 14), yet (a] 
solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon 
them than upon weaker judgments. The more 
exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the 
real weight that is put into it ; especially if the 
proofs be proposed without passion or opposition. 
Let sophisters and seditious orators apply them- 
selves to the many-headed multitude, because they 
despair of success with men of wit and learning. 
Those whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it 
tried by the touch. Since the former way hath 
not succeeded, T. H. hath another to shew as the 
causes of our errors, which he hopes will prove 
more successful. When he sees he can do no 
good by sight, he seeks to circumvent us under 
colour of courtesy : Fistula dulce canit, volucrem 
dum decipit auceps. As they who behold them- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 437 

selves in a glass, take the right hand for the left, NO.XXXVIH 
and the left for the right (T. H. knows the com- TheBish ^ s 
parison) ; so we take our own errors to be truths, 
and other men's truths to be errors, (i) If we be 
in an error in this, it is such an error as we sucked 
from nature itself, such an error as is confirmed in 
us by reason and experience, such an error as God 
himself in his sacred Word hath revealed, such an 
error as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in 
all ages have delivered, such an error wherein we 
have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, 
both natural and moral, such an error as bringeth 
to God the glory of justice, and wisdom, and good- 
ness, and truth, such an error as renders men more 
devout, more pious, more industrious, more hum- 
ble, more penitent for their sins. Would he have 
us resign up all these advantages, to dance blind- 
fold after his pipe ? No, he persuades us too much 
to our loss. But let us see what is the imaginary 
cause of our imaginary error. Forsooth, because 
6 we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in 
the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, 
justice, wisdom; but deny him such poor things as 
eyes, ears, brains ; and so far, he saith ' we do well.' 
He hath reason, for since we are not able to con- 
ceive of God as he is, the readiest way we have, is 
by removing all that imperfection from God, which 
is in the creatures ; so we call him infinite, im- 
mortal, independent : or by attributing to him all 
those perfections which are in the creatures, after 
a most eminent manner; so we call him best, 
greatest, most wise, most just, most holy, (c) But 
saith he, ' When they dispute of God's actions 
philosophically, then they consider them again, 



438 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII as if be had such faculties, and in that manner as 

T^SaJ we have them'. 

reply. And is this the cause of our error : That 

were strange indeed; for they who dispute philoso- 
phically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him 
in that manner that we have them, nor yet do they 
attribute any proper faculties at all to God. God's 
understanding and his will is his very essence, 
which, for the eminency of its infinite perfection, 
doth perform all those things alone in a most 
transcendant manner, which reasonable creatures 
do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties. Thus 
to dispute of God with modesty and reverence, 
and to clear the Deity from the imputation of ty- 
ranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none do 
throw upon God with more presumption than 
those who are the patrons of absolute necessity, is 
both comely and Christian. 

" It is not the desire to discover the original of a 
supposed error, which draws them ordinarily into 
these exclamations against those who dispute of 
the Deity. For some of themselves dare anato- 
mize God, and publish his eternal decrees with as 
much confidence, as if they had been all their lives 
of his cabinet council. But it is for fear lest those 
pernicious consequences which flow from that doc- 
trine essentially, and reflect in so high a degree 
upon the supreme goodness, should be laid open to 
the view of the world ; just as the Turks do first 
establish a false religion of their own devising, and 
then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute 
upon religion ; or as the priests of Moloch, the 
abomination of the Ammonites, did make a noise 
with their timbrels all the while the poor infants 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 439 

were passing through' the fire in Tophet, to keep NO.XXXVIII 
their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents. 
So (d) they make a noise with their declamations 
against those who dare dispute of the nature of 
God, that is, who dare set forth his justice, and his 
goodness, and his truth, and his philanthropy, 
only to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the 
Christian world, lest they should hear the lament- 
able ejulations and howlirigs, or see that rueful 
spectacle of millions of souls tormented for ever- 
more (e) in the flames of the true Tophet, that is, 
hell, only for that which, according to T. H.'s 
doctrine, was never in their power to shun, but 
which they were ordered and inevitably necessi- 
tated to do, only to express the omnipotence and 
dominion, and to satisfy the pleasure of Him, who 
is in truth the Father of all mercies, and the God of 
all consolation. (/) This is life eternal (saith 
our Saviour), to know the only true God, and 
Jesus Christ whom he hath sent (John xvii. 3.). 
Pure religion, and undejiled before God and the 
Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows 
in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted 
from the world, saith St. James (James i. 27-) 
Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is 
the whole duty of man, saith Solomon (Eccles. 
xii. 13.). But T. H. hath found out a more com- 
pendious way to heaven : ' True religion', saith he, 
consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and 
giving God such honour, both in attributes and 
actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall 
ordain'. That is to say, be of the religion of every 
Chistian country where you come. To Tmake the 
civil magistrate to be Christ's lieutenant upon 



440 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.xxxvm earth, for matters of religion, and to make him to 
Animadvert be supreme judge in all controversies, whom all 
sums upon the m ust obey, is a doctrine so strange, and snch an 

Bishop s reply. * * m D y 

uncouth phrase to Christian ears, that I should 
have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with 
his book, De Give, c. xv. sect. 16, and c. xvn. sect. 
28. What if the magistrate shall be no Christian 
himself ? What if he shall command contrary to 
the law of God or nature ? Must we obey him 
rather than God? (Acts iv. 19.) Is the civil ma- 
gistrate become now the only ground and pillar of 
truth ? I demand then, why T. H. is of a dif- 
ferent mind from his sovereign, and from the laws 
of the land, concerning the attributes of God and 
his decrees ? This is a new paradox, and concerns 
not this question of liberty and necessity. Where- 
fore I forbear to prosecute it further, and so con- 
clude my reply with the words of the Christian 
poet, 

Jussum est Caesaris ore Galieni, 
Quod princeps colit ut colamus omnes. 
Sternum colo Principem, dierum 
Factorem, Dominuraqne Galieni.* 

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO THE POST- 
SCRIPT NO. XXXVIII. 

He taketh it ill that I say that arguments do 
seldom work on men of wit and learning, when 
they have once engaged themselves in a contrary 
opinion. Nevertheless it is not only certain by 
experience, but also there is reason for it, and 
that grounded upon the natural disposition of man- 
kind. For it is natural to all men to defend those 
opinions, which they have once publicly engaged 



Prudentius. -mpi oTttyctvw. Hymn. vi. 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 441 

themselves to maintain ; because to have that de- NO.XXXVJH 
tected for error, which they have publicly main- Animad ; er 
tained for truth, is never without some dishonour, *<> upon * 
more or less ; and to find in themselves that they Bls opsrepy ' 
have spent a great deal of time and labour in de- 
ceiving themselves, is so uncomfortable a thing, as 
it is no wonder if they employ their wit and learn- 
ing, if they have any, to make good their errors. 
And, therefore, where he saith, (a) " solid and 
substantial reasons work sooner upon them, than 
upon weaker judgments ; and that the more exact 
the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real 
weight that is put into it" : I confess, the more 
solid a man's wit is, the better will solid reasons 
work upon him. But if he add to it that which 
he calls learning, that is to say, much reading 
of other men's doctrines without weighing them 
with his own thoughts, then their judgments be- 
come weaker, and the balance less exact. And 
whereas he saith, " that they whose gold is true, 
are not afraid to have it tried by the touch" ; he 
speaketh as if I had been afraid to have my doc- 
trine tried by the touch of men of wit and learn- 
ing ; wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning 
by men of learning (as I said before) such as had 
read other men, but not themselves. For by reading 
others, men commonly obstruct the way to their 
own exact and natural judgment, and use their 
wit both to deceive themselves with fallacies, and 
to requite those, who endeavour at their own en- 
treaty to instruct them, with revilings. 

(b) " If we be in an error, it is such an error as 
is sucked from nature ; as is,confirmed*by reason, 
by experience, and by Scripture ; as the Fathers 



442 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII and Doctors of the Church of all ages have deli- 
Animadver. vered ; an error, wherein we have the eoncur- 
i<m upon the rcnce of all the best philosophers, an error that 

Bisliop's reply. ,.., /> -i i i * 

bnngeth to God the glory of justice, &c. ; that 
renders men more devout, more pious, more hum- 
ble, more industrious, more penitent for their sins." 
All this is but said ; and what heretofore hath 
been offered in proof for it, hath been sufficiently 
refuted, and the contrary proved ; namely, that it 
is an error contrary to the nature of the will ; re- 
pugnant to reason and experience ; repugnant to 
the Scripture ; repugnant to the doctrine of St. 
Paul, (and 'tis pity the Fathers and Doctors of the 
Church have not followed St. Paul therein) ; an 
error not maintained by the best philosophers, 
(for they are not the best philosophers, which 
the Bishop thinketh so) ; an error that taketh from 
God the glory of his prescience, nor bringeth to 
him the glory of his other attributes ; an error 
that maketh men, by imagining they can repent 
when they will, neglect their duties ; and that 
maketh men unthankful for God's graces, by think- 
ing them to proceed from the natural ability of 
their own will. 

(c) " ' But,' saith he, < when they dispute of God's 
actions philosophically, then they consider them 
again as if he had such faculties, and in such man- 
ner as we have them.' And is this the cause of 
our error ? That were strange indeed ; for they 
who dispute philosophically of God, do neither 
ascribe faculties to him, in that manner that we 
have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper 
faculties at all to God. God's understanding and 
his will is his very essence, &c." Methinks he 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 443 

should have known at these years, that to dispute NO.XXXVIII 
philosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and An ~ ad ; er ^ 
from principles evident by the light of nature, and * *p n the 
to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the * opsrcpy ' 
subject whereof they treat. It is therefore unskil- 
fully said by him, that they who dispute philoso- 
phically of God, ascribe unto him no proper facul- 
ties. If no proper faculties, I would fain know of 
him what improper faculties he ascribes to God. I 
guess he will make the understanding and the will, 
and his other attributes, to be in God improper fa- 
culties, because he cannot properly call them facul- 
ties ; that is to say, he knows not how to make it 
good that they are faculties, and yet he will have 
these words, " God's understanding and his will 
are his very essence", to pass for an axiom of phi- 
losophy. And whereas I had said, we ought not 
to dispute of God's nature, and that He is no fit 
subject of our philosophy, he denies it not, but 
says I say it. 

(d) " With a purpose to make a noise with de- 
claiming against those who dare dispute of the 
nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his jus- 
tice and his goodness, &c." The Bishop will have 
much ado to make good, that to dispute of the na- 
ture of God, is all one with setting forth his justice 
and his goodness. He taketh no notice of these 
words of mine, ' pious men attribute to God Al- 
mighty for honour's sake, whatsoever they see is 
honourable in the world' ; and yet this is setting 
forth God's justice, goodness, &c, without disputing 
of God's nature. 

(e) " In the flames of the true TopUet, that is 
hell" The true Tophet was a place not far from 



444 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

No.xxxvm the walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the 
Animadvert earth. I cannot imagine what he will say to this 
sioiw upon the j n hi s answer to my Leviathan, if there he find the 

Bishop's replr. i-ii i.i 

* same, unless he say, that in this place by the true 
Tophet, he meant a not true Tophet. 

(f) " This is life eternal (saith our Saviour) to 
know the only true God, and Jesus Christ, &c." 
This which folio weth to the end of his answer 
and of the book, is a reprehension of me, for say- 
ing that c true religion consisteth in obedience to 
Christ's lieutenants'. If it be lawful for Christians 
to institute amongst themselves a commonwealth 
and magistrates, whereby they may be able to live 
in peace one with another, and unite themselves 
in defence against a foreign enemy ; it will cer- 
tainly be necessary to make to themselves some 
supreme judge in all controversies, to whom they 
ought all to give obedience. And this is no such 
strange doctrine, nor so uncouth a phrase to 
Christian ears, as the Bishop makes it, whatsoever 
it be to them that would make themselves judges 
of the Supreme Judge himself. No ; but, saith 
he, Christ is the Supreme Judge, and we are not to 
obey men rather than God. Is there any Christian 
man that does not acknowledge that we are to be 
judged by Christ, or that we ought not to obey 
him rather than any man that shall be his lieute- 
nant upon earth ? The question therefore is, not 
of who is to be obeyed, but of what be his com- 
mands. If the Scripture contain his commands, 
then may every Christian know by them what they 
are. And what has the Bishop to do with what 
God says** to me when I read them, more than I 
have to do with what God says to him when he 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 445 

reads them, unless he have authority given him by NO.XXXVIH 
him whom Christ hath constituted his lieutenant ? . ^""7 ' 

Ammadver- 

This lieutenant upon earth, I say, is the supreme *> ons upon the 

.., . r , /, , , , Bihhop's reply. 

civil magistrate, to whom belongeth the care and 
charge of seeing that no doctrine may be taught 
the people, but such as may consist with the gene- 
ral peace of them all, and with the obedience that 
is due to the civil sovereign. In whom would the 
Bishop have the authority reside of prohibiting 
seditious opinions, when they are taught (as they 
are often) in divinity books and from the pulpit ? 
I could hardly guess, but that I remember that 
there have been books written to entitle the 
bishops to a divine right, underived from the civil 
sovereign. But because he maketh it so heinous a 
matter, that the supreme civil magistrate should 
be Christ's lieutenant upon earth, let us suppose 
that a bishop, or a synod of bishops, should be set 
up (which I hope never shall) for our civil sove- 
reign ; then that which he objecteth here, I could 
object in the same words against himself. For I 
could say in his own words, This is life eternal, to 
know the only true God, and Jestts Christ (John 
xvii. 3.). Pure religion, and undefiled before 
God is this, to visit the fatherless, &c. (James i. 
27-} Fear God and keep his commandments 
(Eccles. xii. 13.). But the Bishop hath found a 
more compendious way to heaven, namely, that 
true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's 
lieutenants ; that is (now by supposition), to the 
bishops. That is to say, that every Christian of 
what nation soever, coming into the country which 
the bishops govern, should be of their ""religion. 
He would make the civil magistrate to be Christ's 



446 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII lieutenant upon earth for matters of religion, and 
supreme judge in all controversies, and say they 



ons u p n the ought to be obeyed by all ; how strange soever and 

Bishop's reply. . . , . - . . , 

uncouth it seem to him now, the sovereignty being 
in others. And I may say to him, what if the ma- 
gistrate himself (I mean by supposition the bishops) 
should be wicked men ; what if they should com- 
mand as much contrary to the law of God or nature, 
as ever any Christian king did, (which is very pos- 
sible) ; must we obey them rather than God ? Is 
the civil magistrate become now the only ground 
and pillar of truth ? No : 

Synedri jussum est voce f piscoporum, 
Ipsum quod col it ut colatnus oinnes. 
Sternum colo Principem, dierum 
Factorem, Domhmmque episcoporum. 

And thus the Bishop may see, there is little dif- 
ference between his Ode and my Parode to it ; and 
that both of them are of equal force to conclude 
nothing. 

The Bishop knows that the kings of England, 
since the time of Henry VIII, have been declared 
by act of Parliament supreme governors of the 
Church of England, in all causes both civil and 
ecclesiastical, that is to say, in all matters both ec- 
clesiastical and civil, and consequently of this 
Church supreme head on earth ; though perhaps 
he will not allow that name of head. I should 
wonder therefore, whom the Bishop would have to 
be Christ's lieutenant here in England for matters 
of religion, if not the supreme governor and head 
of the Church of England, whether man or woman 
whosoeverlie be, that hath the sovereign power, but 
that I know he challenges it to the Bishops, and 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 447 

thinks that King Henry VIII. took the ecclesiastical NO.XXXVIII 
power away from the Pope, to settle it not in himself, A ^ Md ^ er ~" 
but them. But he ought to have known, that what sions upon the 

. j. ,. p , . . . . , ,, Bishop's reply. 

jurisdiction, or power of ordaining ministers, the 
Popes had here in the time of the king's predecessors 
till Henry VIII, they derived it all from the king's 
power, though they did not acknowledge it ; and 
the kings connived at it, either not knowing their 
own right, or not daring to challenge it ; till such 
time as the behaviour of the Roman clergy had un- 
deceived the people, which otherwise would have 
sided with them. Nor was it unlawful for the king 
to take from them the authority he had given 
them, as being Pope enough in his own kingdom 
without depending on a foreign one: nor is it to be 
called schism, unless it be schism also in the head 
of a family to discharge, as often as he shall see 
cause, the school-masters he entertaineth to teach 
his children. If the Bishop and Dr. Hammond, 
when they did write in the defence of the Church 
of England against imputation of schism, quitting 
their own pretences of jurisdiction and jus divinum, 
had gone upon these principles of mine, they had 
not been so shrewdly handled as they have been, 
by an English Papist that wrote against them. 

And now I have done answering to his arguments, 
I shall here, in the end of all, take that liberty of 
censuring his whole book, which he hath taken in 
the beginning, of censuring mine. f I have', saith 
he, (No. i.) ' persused T. H.'s answers, considered 
his reasons, and conclude he hath missed and mis- 
laid the question ; that his answers are evasions, 
that his arguments are paralogisms, ancTthat the 
opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a 



448 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII result of some groundless and ill chosen principles.' 

Ammadier. ^^ n W ** * S ^ tUri1 t0 CeI1Slire - And first, for 

sions upon the the strength of his discourse and knowledge of the 

Bishop's reply. . . . T i i i / i 

point m question, 1 think it much inferior to that 
which might have been written by any man living, 
that had no other learning besides the ability to 
write his mind ; but as well perhaps as the same 
man would have done it if to the ability of writing 
his mind he had added the study of School-divi- 
nity. Secondly, for the manners of it, (for to a 
public writing there belongeth good manners), it 
consisteth in railing and exclaiming and scurrilous 
jesting, with now and then an unclean and mean 
instance. And lastly, for his elocution, the virtue 
whereof lieth not in the flux of words, but in per- 
spicuity, it is the same language with that of the 
kingdom of darkness. One shall find in it, espe- 
cially where he should speak most closely to the 
question, such words as these : divided sense, com- 
pounded sense, hypothetical necessity, liberty of 
exercise, liberty of specification, liberty of contra- 
diction, liberty of contrariety, knowledge of appro- 
bation, practical knowledge, general influence, spe- 
cial influence, instinct, qualities infused, efficacious 
election, moral efficacy, moral motion, metaphori- 
cal motion, practice practicum, motus primo primi, 
actus eliciti, actus imperati, permissive will, con- 
sequent will, negative obduration, deficient cause, 
simple act, mine stans; and other like words of non- 
sense divided : besides many propositions such as 
these : the will is the mistress of human actions, 
the understanding is her counsellor, the will 
chooseth, tiie will willeth, the will suspends its own 
act, the understanding understandeth, (I wonder 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 449 

how he missed saying, the understanding suspendeth NO.XXXVHI 
its own act,) the will applies the understanding to Animad T yer 7 
deliberate ; the will requires of the understanding u i*> n the 
a review ; the will determines itself; a change may " opsn * 3r ' 
be willed without changing of the will ; man con- 
curs with God in causing his own will ; the will 
causeth willing; motives determine the will not 
naturally, but morally ; the same action may be 
both future and not future ; God is not just but jus- 
tice, not eternal but eternity; eternity is nunc starts; 
eternity is an infinite point which comprehendeth 
all time, not formally, but eminently ; all eternity 
is co-existent with to-day, and the same co-existent 
with to-morrow : and many other like speeches of 
nonsense compounded, which the truth can never 
stand in need of. Perhaps the Bishop will say, 
these terms and phrases are intelligible enough ; 
for he hath said in his reply to No. xxiv, that his 
opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be 
not able to comprehend, how it consisteth together 
with God's eternal prescience ; and though it ex- 
ceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to 
that truth which is manifest. So that to him that 
truth is manifest, and demonstrable by reason, 
which is beyond his capacity ; so that \vords beyond 
capacity are with him intelligible enough. 

But the reader is to be judge of that. I could 
add many other passages that discover, both his 
little logic, as taking the insignificant words above 
recited, for terms of art ; and his no philosophy in 
distinguishing between moral and natural motion, 
and by calling some motions metaphoq^al, and 
by his blunders at the causes of sight and of the 
descent of heavy bodies, and his talk of the inelina- 
VOL. v. G G 



450 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII tion of the load-stone, and divers other places in 
. "~7 ' his book. 

Animadver- 

sions upon the But to make an end, I shall briefly draw up the 
w ops rep y. g ^^ ^ what we have both said. That which I have 



maintained is, that no man hath his future will in 
his own present power. That it may be changed 
by others, and by the change of things without 
him ; and when it is changed, it is not changed 
nor determined to any thing by itself ; and that 
when it is undetermined, it is no will; because 
every one that willeth, willeth something in parti- 
cular. That deliberation is common to men with 
beasts, as being alternate appetite, and not ratioci- 
nation ; and the last act or appetite therein, and 
which is immediately followed by the action, is the 
only will that can be taken notice of by others, 
and which only maketh an action in public judg- 
ment voluntary. That to be free is no more than 
to do if a man will, and if he will to forbear ; and 
consequently that this freedom is the freedom of 
the man, and not of the will. That the will is not 
free, but subject to change by the operation of 
external causes. That all external causes depend 
necessarily on the first eternal cause, God Almighty, 
who worketh in us both to will and to do, by the 
mediation of second causes. That seeing neither 
man nor any thing else can work upon itself, 
it is impossible that any man in the framing of 
his own will should concur with God, either as 
an actor or as an instrument. That there is no- 
thing brought to pass by fortune as by a cause, 
nor anything without a cause, or concurrence of 
causes, sufficient to bring it so to pass ; and that 
every such cause, and their concurrence, do pro- 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 451 

ceed from the providence, good pleasure, and NO.XXXVIII 
working of God ; and consequently, though I do Animad ; el T J 
with others call many events contingent, and iw upon the 
say they happen, yet because they had every of I80psr * py * 
them their several sufficient causes, and those 
causes again their former causes, I say they hap- 
pen necessarily. And though we perceive not 
what they are, yet there are of the most contin- 
gent events as necessary causes as of those events 
whose causes we perceive ; or else they could not 
possibly be foreknown, as they are by him that 
foreknoweth all things. On the contrary, the 
Bishop maintaineth : that the will is free from ne- 
cessitation ; and in order thereto that the judg- 
ment of the understanding is not always practice 
practicum, nor of such a nature in itself as to 
oblige and determine the will to one, though it be 
true that spontaneity and determination to one 
may consist together. That the will determineth 
itself, and that external things, when they change 
the will, do work upon it not naturally, but mo- 
rally, not by natural motion, but by moral and 
metaphorical motion. That when the will is 
determined naturally, it is not by God's general 
influence, whereon depend all second causes, but 
by special influence, God concurring and pouring 
something into the will. That the will when it 
suspends not its act, makes the act necessary ; but 
because it may suspend and not assent, it is not 
absolutely necessary. That sinful acts proceed not 
from God's will, but are willed by him by a permis- 
sive will, not an operative will, and that he hard- 
eneth the heart of man by a negative oMuration. 
That man's will is in his own power, but his motus 



452 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII primo primi not in his own power, nor necessary 
Animadver- save on ty ty a hypothetical necessity. That the 
sums upon the w jn to change, is not always a change of will. That 

Bishop's reply. i, , . -, , -, ? 

*' not all things which are produced, are produced 
from sufficient, but some things from deficient 
causes. That if the power of the will be present 
in actu primo, then there is nothing wanting to 
the production of the effect. That a cause may 
be sufficient for the production of an effect, though 
it want something necessary to the production 
thereof ; because the will may be wanting. That a 
necessary cause doth not always necessarily pro- 
duce its effect, but only then when the effect is 
necessarily produced. He proveth also, that the 
will is free, by that universal notion which the 
world hath of election : for when of the six Electors 
the votes are divided equally, the King of Bohe- 
mia hath a casting voice. That the prescience of 
God supposeth no necessity of the future existence 
of the things foreknown, because God is not eter- 
nal but eternity, and eternity is a standing now, 
without succession of time ; and therefore God 
foresees all things intuitively by the presentiality 
they have in nunc stans, which comprehendeth in 
it all time past, present, and to come, not formally, 
but eminently and virtually. That the will is free 
even then when it acteth, but that is in a com- 
pounded, not in a divided sense. That to be 
made, and to be eternal, do consist together, be- 
cause God's decrees are made, and are neverthe- 
less eternal. That the order, beauty, and perfec- 
tion of the^ world doth require that in the universe 
there should be agents of all sorts, some neces- 
sary, some free, some contingent. That though it 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 453 

be true, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain, NO.XXXVIH 
yet neither of them is true determinate. That the ' ' ' 

i . , Animadver- 

doctrme of necessity is a blasphemous, desperate, siom upon the 
and destructive doctrine. That it were better to be 18hop8 
an Atheist, than to hold it ; and he that maintaineth 
it, is fitter to be refuted with rods than with argu- 
ments. And now whether this his doctrine or 
mine be the more intelligible, more rational, or 
more conformable to God's word, I leave it to the 
judgment of the reader. 

But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed ques- 
tion, the reader may peradventure think I have 
not used the Bishop with that respect I ought, 
or without disadvantage of my cause I might 
have done ; for which I am to make a short apo- 
logy. A little before the last parliament of the 
late king, when every man spake freely against 
the then present government, I thought it worth 
my study to consider the grounds and conse- 
quences of such behaviour, and whether it were 
conformable or contrary to reason and to the 
Word of God. And after some time I did put in 
order and publish my thoughts thereof, first in 
Latin, and then again the same in English ; where 
I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scrip- 
ture, that they who have once submitted them- 
selves to any sovereign governor, either by express 
acknowledgment of his power, or by receiving pro- 
tection from his laws, are obliged to be true and 
faithful to him, and to acknowledge no other su- 
preme power but him in any matter or question 
whatsoever, either civil or ecclesiastical^ In which 
books of mine, I pursued my subject without taking 
notice of any particular man that held any opinion 



454 THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING 

NO.XXXVIII contrary to that which I then wrote ; only in 
Anhnadver- general I maintained that the office of the clergy, 
sions upon the in respect of the supreme civil power, was not 

Bishop's reply. . . , , i 11 , i 

^ magisterial, but ministerial ; and that their teach- 
ing of the people was founded upon no other 
authority than that of the civil sovereign ; and all 
this without any word tending to the disgrace 
either of episcopacy or of presbytery. Neverthe- 
less I find since, that divers of them, whereof the 
the Bishop of Derry is one, have taken oifence 
especially at two things ; one, that I make the 
supremacy in matters of religion to reside in the 
civil sovereign ; the other, that being no clergyman, 
I deliver doctrines, and ground them upon words 
of the Scripture, which doctrines they, being by 
profession divines, have never taught. And in this 
their displeasure, divers of them in their books and 
sermons, without answering any of my arguments, 
have not only exclaimed against my doctrine, but 
reviled me, and endeavoured to make me hateful 
for those things, for which (if they knew their own 
and the public good) they ought to have given me 
thanks. There is also one of them, that taking 
oifence at me for blaming in part the discipline 
instituted heretofore, and regulated by the autho- 
rity of the Pope, in the universities, not only ranks 
me amongst those men that would have the revenue 
of the universities diminished, and says plainly I 
have no religion, but also thinks me so simple and 
ignorant of the world as to believe that our univer- 
sities maintain Popery. Arid this is the author of 

the book called Vindicice Academiarum. If either 

tcfl>*^'- r 

of the universities had thought itself injured, I be- 
lieve it could have authorised or appointed some 



LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. 455 

member. of theirs, whereof there be many abler NO.XXXVIII 
men than he, to have made their vindication. But * ' ' 

__. _ /TIT -i I- Animadyer- 

this V index, (as little dogs to please their masters sions upo^he 
use to bark, in token of their sedulity, indiffer- Blshopsreply ' 
ently at strangers, till they be rated off), unpro- 
voked by me hath fallen upon me without bidding. 
I have been publicly injured by many of whom I 
took no notice, supposing that that humour would 
spend itself; but seeing it last, and grow higher 
in this writing I now answer, I thought it neces- 
sary at last to make of some of them, and first of 
this Bishop, an example. 



END OF VOL. V. 



LONDON : 
CHARLES RICHAEDS, 100, ST. MARTIN'S LANK.