EPICTETUS
THE
DISCOURSES AND MANUAL
TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY
P. E. MATHESON
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF NEW COLLEGE
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II.
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1916
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY
HUMPHREY MILFORD M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY
6
546.24H
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
On Adornment.
WHEN a young student of rhetoric came into his Beauty
lecture-room with his hair elaborately arranged and different
paying great attention to his dress in general: Tell creatures:
me, said he, do you not think that some dogs and j n C t h" sistS
horses are beautiful and some ugly, and is it not so fulfilment
with every creature ? of the i f
, T , . , nature.
I think so , he said.
Is not the same true of men, some are beautiful, some
ugly?
Certainly.
Now do we give the attribute beautiful to each of
them in their own 1 kind on the same grounds or on special
grounds in each case? Listen and you will see what I
mean. Since we see that a dog is born for one thing
and a horse for another, and a nightingale, if you like
to take that, for another, speaking generally one would
not be giving an absurd opinion in saying that each of
them was beautiful when it best fulfilled its nature ;
and since the nature of each is different, I think that
each of them would be beautiful in a different way,
would it not?
Yes.
A2
4 Discourses of Epictetus
So that what makes a dog beautiful makes a horse
ugly, and what makes a horse beautiful makes a dog ugly,
seeing that their natures are different ?
So it seems.
Yes, for what makes a pancratiast 2 beautiful does
not, I imagine, make a good wrestler, and makes a very
ridiculous runner ; and one who is beautiful for the
pentathlon makes a very ugly appearance as a wrestler ?
True , he said.
What then makes a man beautiful if it is not that which
in its kind makes dog and horse beautiful?
It is just that , he said.
What then makes a dog beautiful? The presence
of a dog s virtue. What makes a horse beautiful? The
presence of a horse s virtue. What makes a man beautiful?
Therefore, Is it the presence of a man s virtue? Therefore, young
beaut am man ^ y U wou ^ be beautiful, make this the object
you must of your effort, human virtue. And what is human virtue ?
Consider whom you praise, when you praise men dis-
virtue. passionately ; do you praise the just or the unjust?
The just.
Do you praise the temperate or the intemperate?
The temperate.
The continent or the incontinent ?
The continent.
Therefore if you make yourself such an one, be sure
that you will make yourself beautiful, but as long as
you neglect this you cannot help being ugly, though
you should use every device to appear beautiful.
Epictetus, But beyond this I do not know what more to say to
Book III, Chapter i 5-
you ; for, if I say what I think, I shall vex you and you if he does
will go out and perhaps never return, but if I say nothing not s P eak
f, 7 6 > out, may
consider what my conduct will be then ; you come to fairly be
me to get good, and I shall be refusing to do you good ; Iamed
you come to me to consult a philosopher, and I shall
be refusing you a philosopher s advice. Besides, it is
cruelty towards you to leave you uncorrected. 3 If some
day hereafter you come to your senses you will accuse
me with good reason : What did Epictetus find in me,
that when he saw me coming in to him in such a shameful
state he should do nothing for me and say never a word
to me? Did he so utterly despair of me? Was I not
young ? Was I not fit to listen to discourse ? How many
other young men make many mistakes like me in their
youth ? I hear that one Polemo, who had been the most
intemperate of young men, underwent such a wonderful
change. Grant that he did not think I should be a Polemo :
he could have set my hair right, have taken away my
bangles, have stopped me pulling my hairs out, but seeing
that I had the aspect of whom shall I say? 4 he said
nothing. I do not say whose aspect this is, but you
will say it for yourself when you come to look into your
own heart, and you will learn what it means and what
sort of men they are who adopt it.
If hereafter you bring this charge against me, what It is no
defence shall I be able to make ? excus u e to
say that
Yes, but suppose I do speak, and he will not obey? he would
Did Laius obey Apollo ? Did he not go away in his
drunken stupor and dismiss the oracle from his mind? listened to.
What then? Did Apollo withhold the truth from
Socrates
took no
heed of
this.
The philo
sopher is
bound to
take
interest
in men.
6 Discourses of Epictetus
him for that reason? Indeed I do not know whether
you will obey me or not, but Apollo knew most certainly
that Laius would not obey, and yet he spoke. Why
did he speak? Nay, why is he Apollo, why does he give
oracles, why has he set himself in this position, to be
a Prophet and a Fountain of truth, so that men from all
the world come to him ? Why is Know thyself written
up over his shrine, though no one understands it ?
Did Socrates persuade all who came to him to attend
to their characters ? Not one in a thousand ! Neverthe
less when appointed to this post, as he says, by the ordi
nance of God, he refused to desert it. Nay, what did
he say to his judges? If you acquit me , he says, on
these terms, that I cease to do what I do now, I shall
not accept your offer, nor give up my ways, but I shall
go to any one I meet, young or old, and put to him these
questions that I put now, and I shall question you my
fellow citizens far more than any others because you are
nearer akin to me.
Are you so fussy and interfering, Socrates ? What do
you care what we do ?
What language to use ! You are my fellow and kins
man, yet you neglect yourself and provide the city with
a bad citizen, your kinsmen with a bad kinsman, and your
neighbours with a bad neighbour !
Who are you, then?
To this question it is a weighty answer to say, I am
he who is bound to take interest in men. For ordinary
cattle dare not resist the lion ; 5 but if the bull comes up
to withstand him, say to him, if you think fit, Who are
Book ///, Chapter i 7
you? and What do you care? Man! in every class
of creatures nature produces some exceptional specimen ;
it is so among cattle, dogs, bees, horses. Do not say
then to the exception, What are you then? If you do, He is like
he will get a voice somehow and say, * I am like the purple * ^ e P" r P le
in a garment: do not require me to be like the rest, a garment.
nor blame my nature, because it made me different
from the rest.
What then? Am I fit to play this part? How can I be ? Adorn
And are you fit to hear the truth ? Would that it were > T ur
t m reason, if
so ! Nevertheless since I am condemned, it seems, to you would
wear a white beard and a cloak, and since you come to attam to
J beauty,
me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly as
though I despaired of you, but will say, Young man,
who is it that you want to make beautiful ? First get to
know who you are and then adorn yourself. You are
a man, that is, a mortal creature which has the power to
deal with impressions rationally. What does rationally
mean? Perfectly, and in accordance with nature. What
then is your distinctive possession ? Your animal nature ?
No. Your mortality? No. Your power to deal with
impressions? No. Your reasoning faculty is the dis
tinctive one : this you must adorn and make beautiful.
Leave your hair to Him that formed it in accordance
with His will. Tell me, what other names have you?
Are you man or woman?
Man.
Adorn Man then, not Woman. Woman is born smooth Do not
and tender, and if she has much hair on her body it is malce a
7 woman of
a prodigy, and exhibited in Rome as a prodigy. But in yourself,
8 Discourses of Epictetus
a. man it is a prodigy not to be hairy : if he is born smooth
it is a prodigy, and if he make himself smooth by shaving
and plucking, what are we to make of him? Where are
we to show him, and what notice are we to put up?
I will show you a man who prefers to be a woman.
What a shocking exhibition ! Every one will be astonished
at the notice : by Zeus, I think that even the men who
pluck out their hairs do so without understanding that
this is what they are doing ! Man, what complaint
have you to make of Nature? Is it that she made you
a man? Ought she to have made all to be women?
Why, if all were women, there would be no one to adorn
yourself for.
If you are not satisfied with your condition as it is,
unless you do the thing completely. Remove what shall I call
"r^cUo * tt? t ^ at w ^ cn 1S tne ca use of your hairiness; make
do so com- yourself a woman out and out, and not half-man, half-
pie y. woman, and then we shall not be misled. Whom do you
wish to please? Your darling womenkind? Then please
them as a man.
Yes, but they like smooth men.
Go and hang yourself ! If they liked unnatural
creatures, would you become one ? Is this your function,
is this what you were born for, that profligate women
should take pleasure in you? Is it with this character
that we are to make you a citizen of Corinth, and, if
it so chance, City-warden, or Governor of the Ephebi, 6
or General, or Steward of the games ? Well, and when
you have married a wife, are you going to pluck yourself
smooth? For whom and for what? And when you
Book III) Chapter \ 9
have begotten boys, are you going to bring them into
our citizenship as plucked creatures too? Noble citizen
and senator and orator ! Is this the kind of young man
we are to pray to have bred and reared for us?
Nay, by the gods, young man ! but when once you Epictetus,
have heard these words, go and say to yourself : These ^Jen"?) 118
are not the words of Epictetus : how could they be ? but beautify
some kind god speaks through him ; for it would never ^\
have occurred to Epictetus to say this, as he is not wont the mouth-
to speak to any one. Come then, let us obey God, that
we may not incur God s wrath.
Why, if a raven croaks and gives you a sign, it is not
the raven that gives the sign, but God through him :
and if He gives you a sign through a human voice, will
He not be making man tell you this, that you may learn
the power of the divine, and see that it gives signs to
some in this way, and to others in that, and of the highest
and most sovereign matters gives signs through the
noblest messenger? What else is the meaning of the
poet, when he says
Since we warned him
By Hermes Argus-slayer, clear of sight,
To slay him not nor woo his wedded wife ?
And as Hermes was sent down to tell him this, so now
the gods have sent Hermes the Argus-slayer, their
messenger, and tell you this not to pervert what is
good and right, and not to interfere with it, but to leave
man man and woman woman, the beautiful person
a beautiful person, and the ugly person an ugly person.
i o Discourses of Epictetus
For you are not flesh, nor hair, but a rational will : if
you get this beautiful, then you will be beautiful.
So far I do not dare to tell you that you are ugly,
for I think you would hear anything rather than that.
But see what Socrates says to Alcibiades, most beautiful
and charming of men : Strive then to attain beauty.
What does he say to him ? Does he say, Arrange your
hair and smooth your legs ? God forbid ! but Set
your will in order, rid it of bad judgements.
* How treat the poor body then ?
According to its nature : that is God s 7 concern, trust
it to Him.
What then? Is the body to be unclean?
God forbid ! but cleanse your true, natural self : let
man be clean as man, woman as woman, child as child.
Nay, let us pluck out the lion s mane, 8 lest it be un
clean, and the cock s comb, for he too must be clean !
Clean? yes, but clean as a cock, and the lion as a lion,
and the hound of the chase as such a hound should be.
CHAPTER II
(i) In what matters should the man who is to make progress
train himself : and (2) that we neglect what is most
vital.
There are THERE are three departments - 1 in which a man who
three de- t ^ good and noble must be trained. The first
partments
of training, concerns the will to get and will to avoid ; he must
(i) be trained not to fail to get what he wills to get nor fall
Book III, Chapter 2 n
into what he wills to avoid. The second is concerned ( 2 )
with impulse to act and not to act, and, in a word,
the sphere of what is fitting : that we should act in order,
with due consideration, and with proper care. The
object of the third is that we may not be deceived, (3)
and may not judge at random, and generally it is
concerned with assent.
Of these the most important and the most pressing
is the first, which is concerned with strong emotions, 2
for such emotion does not arise except when the will to
get or the will to avoid fails of its object. This it is
which brings with it disturbances, tumults, misfortunes,
bad fortunes, mournings, lamentations, envies ; which
makes men envious and jealous passions which make
us unable to listen to reason.
The second is the sphere of what is fitting : for I
must not be without feeling like a statue, but must main
tain my natural and acquired relations, as a religious
man, as son, brother, father, citizen.
The third department is appropriate only for those who The third,
are already making progress, and is concerned with * . .
giving certainty in the very things we have spoken of, suited only
so that even in sleep or drunkenness or melancholy no formen .
untested impression may come upon us unawares. a state of
This , says a pupil, is beyond us. progress.
But the philosophers of to-day have disregarded the
first and the second departments, and devote themselves
to the third variable premises, syllogisms concluding with
a question, hypothetical syllogisms, fallacious arguments.
Of course, he says, when a man is engaged on these
I 2
Discourses of Epictetus
subjects he must take pains to escape being deceived.
But whose business is it to do this ? It is only for the man
who is already good.
You fall In logic then you fall short : but have you reached
thisVut perfection in other subjects? Are you proof against deceit
are you in regard to money? If you see a pretty girl, do you
thefothens? resist the im P ression? If 7 our nei g nbour comes in for
an inheritance, do you not feel a twinge? Do you lack
nothing now but security of judgement? 3 Unhappy
man, even while you are learning this lesson you are in
an agony of terror lest some one should think scorn of
you, and you ask whether any one is talking about you !
And if some one comes and tells you, We were discussing
who was the best philosopher, and one who was there
said, " There is only one philosopher, So-and-so (naming
you) " , straightway your poor little four-inch soul shoots
up to two cubits ! Then if another who is by says,
Nonsense ! It is not worth while to listen to So-and-so :
what does he know ? he has the first rudiments, nothing
more , you are beside yourself, and grow pale and cry
out at once, I will show him the man I am, he shall
see I am a great philosopher. Why, the facts themselves
are evidence ; why do you want to show it by something
else? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one
of the sophists thus, making a vulgar gesture ? 4 Then,
when the man was furious, That is So-and-so, said he,
* I have shown him to you. A man is not indeed like a
stone or a log, that you can show what he is by just
pointing a finger, but you show what he is as a man,
when you show what are his judgements.
Book III, Chapter 2 13
Let us look at your judgements too. Is it not clear that Your
you set no value on your will, but look outside to things ^l"
beyond your will? what So-and-so will say, what men will show what
think of you, whether they will think you a scholar, ^ u reallv
one who has read Chrysippus or Antipater, for if you have
read them and Archedemus as well, you have read every
thing. Why are you still in an agony, lest you should fail
to show us what manner of man you are? Would you
like me to say what manner of man you showed yourself
to us? A man who comes before us mean, critical,
quick-tempered, cowardly, blaming everything, accusing
every one, never quiet, vainglorious that is what you
showed us ! Go away now and read Archedemus ; then
if a mouse fall and make a noise, you die of fright ! For
the same sort of death awaits you, as whom shall I say ?
Crinis ! He too was proud of understanding Archedemus!
Unhappy man, will you not leave these things alone, Until you
which do not concern you? They are suited only to can resist
11 i r i_ your pas-
those who can learn them without contusion, to those s i ons ft j s
who are able to say, I feel no anger, pain, or envy ; useless to
I am under no hindrance, no constraint. What is left
for me to do? I have leisure and peace of mind. Let
us see how we ought to deal with logical changes : 5 let
us see how one may adopt a hypothesis and not be led
to an absurd conclusion.
These are matters well enough for men like that. 6
It is fitting for sailors who are in good trim to light
a fire, and take their dinner, if luck serves, and to sing
and dance : but you come to me when the ship is sinking
and begin hoisting the topsails !
Discourses of Epictetus
The good
has a
natural
attraction
for the
soul. It is
like good
coin, which
cannot be
refused.
It over
rides all
other
claims.
CHAPTER III
What is the material with which the good man deals : and
what should be the object of our training.
THE material of the good man is his own Governing
Principle, as the body is the material of the physician and
trainer, the land of the farmer ; and it is the function
of the good man to deal with his impressions naturally.
And just as it is the nature of every soul to assent to what
is true and dissent from what is false, and withhold
judgement in what is uncertain, so it is its nature to
be moved with the will to get what is good and the
will to avoid what is evil, and to be neutral towards what
is neither good nor evil. For just as neither the banker
nor the greengrocer can refuse the Emperor s currency,
but, if you show it, he must part, willy-nilly, with what
the coin will buy, so it is also with the soul. The very
sight of good attracts one towards it, the sight of evil
repels. The soul will never reject a clear impression of
good, any more than we reject Caesar s currency. On this
depends every motion of man and of God. Therefore
the good is preferred to every tie of kinship.
I have no concern with my father, but with the good !
Are you so hard-hearted?
It is my nature ; this is the currency which God has
given me. Therefore if the good is different from the
noble and just, then father and brother, country and
all such things disappear.
Book ///, Chapter 3 15-
I say, am I to neglect my good, that you may get it ?
am I to make way for you ? Why should I ? l
I am your father.
But not my good.
* I am your brother.
But not my good. If we make the good consist in
right will, the mere maintenance of such relations 2 be
comes good : further, he who resigns some of his external
possessions attains the good.
My father is taking away my money.
But he is not harming you.
My brother will have the greater part of the land.
Let him have as much as he likes : does he gain in Character
character? Is he more modest, trustworthy, brotherly? * s not
T T7 , r , touched by
Who can eject one from that possession ? Not even Zeus : external
nor did He wish to eject me ; He put my character in things,
my keeping and gave it me as He had it himself, un
hindered, unfettered, unrestrained.
Inasmuch then as different people have a different Different
currency, a man shows his coin and gets what it will ^f" use
, A 1 r i different
buy. A thief has come to the province as Proconsul. What currency.
coin does he use? Money. Show him money, and carry
off what you will. An adulterer has come. What
currency does he use? Pretty girls. Take your coin ,
says he, * and sell me the thing I want. Give, and buy.
Another s heart is set on minions. Give him the coin
and take what you will. Another is a sportsman. Give
him a fine horse or dog. With sighs and groans he will
sell you what you like for it : for he is constrained from
within, by Another, who has ordained this currency. 3
Train
yourself
to reject
as false
coin all
that is be
yond the
region of
the will.
For want
of training
we pass
wrong
judge
ments.
1 6 Discourses of Epictetus
It is by this principle above all that you must guide
yourself in training. Go out as soon as it is dawn and
whomsoever you may see and hear, question yourself
and answer as to an interrogator.
What did you see ? A beautiful woman or boy. Apply
the rule : Is this within the will s control or beyond it?
Beyond. Away with it then !
What did you see? One mourning at his child s death.
Apply the rule. Is death beyond the will, or can the will
control it? Death is beyond the will s control. Put it
out of the way then !
Did a Consul meet you? Apply the rule. What is
a consulship ? Is it beyond the will s control or within
it? Beyond it. Take it away : the coin will not pass ;
reject it, you have no concern with it.
I say, if we did this and trained ourselves on this prin
ciple every day from dawn to night, we should indeed
achieve something. As it is, we are caught open-mouthed
by every impression we meet, and only in the lecture-
room, if then, does our mind wake up a little. Then
we go into the street and if we see a mourner we say,
He is undone ; if a Consul, Lucky man ; if an
outlaw, Miserable man ; if a poor man, Wretched
man, he has nothing to buy food with.
These mistaken judgements we must eradicate, and
concentrate our efforts on doing so. For what is weeping
and lamenting? A matter of judgement. What is
misfortune? Judgement. What is faction, discord,
criticism, accusation, irreligion, foolishness? All these
are judgements, nothing else, and judgements passed on
Book III) Chapter 3 17
things beyond the will, as though they were good and evil.
Only let a man turn these efforts to the sphere of the will,
and I guarantee that he will enjoy peace of mind, what
ever his circumstances may be.
The soul is like a dish full of water, and the impressions
like the rays of light which strike the water. Now when
the water is disturbed the light seems to be disturbed
too, but it is not really disturbed. So when a man has
a fit of dizziness, the arts and virtues are not put to
confusion, but only the spirit 4 in which they exist :
when this is at rest, they come to rest too.
CHAPTER IV
Against one who was indecorously excited in the theatre.
WHEN the Procurator of Epirus 1 offended decorum by The Pro-
the way he showed interest in a comedian, the people curator
who can-
reviled him for this ; thereupon when he brought word no t control
of this to Epictetus and expressed annoyance at those J is feeli ngs
who reviled him : Why ! he said, what harm were they reason to
doing? They too showed their interest as you did ! criticize
What ! said he, is this the way they show interest ?
Yes, he said, when they saw you, their Governor, the
friend and Procurator of Caesar, showing your interest
in this way, would you not expect them to do the same?
If it is not right to show interest in that way, leave off
doing it yourself : but if it is right, why are you angry
at their imitating you? For whom else but you, their
superiors, have the people to imitate? Whom are they
546.24 II B
i 8 Discourses of Epictetus
to look to when they come to the theatre but you?
See , they say, how Caesar s Procurator behaves in
the theatre. He cries out : then I will cry out too. He
jumps from his seat. I will do so too. His claque
of slaves shout from their scattered seats : I have no
slaves, I will cry as loud as I can to make up for it.
He ought You ought to know then that when you enter the theatre
to set an you enter J t as a pattern and example to all other specta-
by keeping tors how to behave. Why then did they revile you ?
his will in Because every man hates what stands in his way. They
accord
with wanted So-and-so to be crowned, you wanted another ;
nature. ^gy stO od in your way and you in theirs. You were
found to be stronger than they ; they did what they
could, they reviled what stood in their way. What
would you have then? That you should do what you
wish, and they should not even say what they wish?
Nay, what wonder they should talk so ? Do not farmers
revile Zeus, when he stands in their way? Do not sailors
revile him? Do they not revile Caesar without ceasing?
What follows? Does not Zeus know? Does not Caesar
have reported to him what men say? What does he do
then? He knows that if he punishes all who revile him
he will have no one left to rule over. What is my con
clusion? When you enter the theatre you ought not
to say, Let me have Sophron crowned , 2 but, Let me
keep my will in accord with Nature in this matter, for
no one is dearer to me than myself : it is absurd then
that I should be injured, that another may be victorious
on the stage.
Whom then do I want to win ? The victor : and
Book III, Chapter 4 19
so the victory will always be in accordance with my
wish.
* But I wish Sophron to be crowned.
Hold as many contests as you please in your own house
and proclaim him there victor in the Nemean, Pythian,
Isthmian and Olympic games : but in public do not
claim more than your share, nor steal what is public
property. If you do, you must put up with being re
viled : for when you do as the people do, you put yourself
on their level.
CHAPTER V
Against those who make illness an excuse for leaving the
lecture-room.
I AM ill here, says one, and want to go away home. A student
What, were you never ill at home ? Do you not wll is
consider whether you are doing anything here to improve learning
your will, for if you are doing no good, you might just w !^ not
as well never have come ? Go away, and attend to your turn home,
affairs at home : for if your Governing Principle cannot
be brought into accord with Nature, no doubt your bit
of land will prosper ; * you will add to your bit of money !
You will tend your old father, frequent the market
place, serve as a magistrate, do anything that comes
next, poor wretch, in your wretched way. But if you
understand that you are getting rid of bad judgements
and gaining others in their place, and that you have
transferred your attention from things outside the will s
control to things within it, and that now if you cry, Ah
B 2
20 Discourses of Epictetus
me ! it is not for your father or your brother but for
yourself that you cry, then why should you take account
Disease of illness any more? Do you not know that disease
and death an( j death are bound to overtake us whatever we are
tc^all. doing? They overtake the farmer at his farming, the
sailor on the seas. What would you like to be doing when
they overtake you? For you must needs be overtaken,
whatever you are doing. If you can find anything
better than this to be doing when you are overtaken,
do it by all means !
Let them For my own part I would wish death to overtake me
find u ? , occupied with nothing but the care of my will, trying
occupied j r T
in training to make it calm, unhindered, unconstrained, tree,
our will to would fain be found SQ em pi 07 ed, that I may be able
ODCV (jrOQ. y rr-M 1 1 T\* J
to say to God, Did I transgress Thy commands ? Did
I use the faculties Thou gavest me to wrong purpose?
Did I use my senses or my primary notions in vain?
Did I ever accuse Thee? Did I ever find fault with
Thy ordinance ? I fell sick, when it was Thy will : so
did others, but I rebelled not. I became poor when
Thou didst will it, but I rejoiced in my poverty. I held
no office, because it was Thy will : I never coveted office.
Didst Thou ever see me gloomy for that reason? Did
I ever come before Thee but with a cheerful face, ready
for any commands or orders that Thou mightest give?
Now it is Thy will for me to leave the festival. I go,
giving all thanks to Thee, that Thou didst deign to let
me share Thy festival and see Thy works and understand
Thy government. May these be my thoughts, these my
studies, writing or reading, when death comes upon me !
Book III, Chapter y 21
But I am ill, and shall not have my mother to hold This is
, , worth more
m 7 head - than home
Go to your mother then ; for you deserve to be ill, comforts.
with her to hold your head.
* But I had a nice bed to lie on at home.
Go to your nice bed then ; sick or well you deserve to
lie on a bed of that sort ! Pray do not lose what you can
do there.
But what does Socrates say? As one man , he says,
delights to improve his field, and another his horse, so
I delight in following day by day my own improvement.
In what? In paltry phrases?
Man, hold your peace.
In pretty precepts then?
Enough of that.
* Nay, but philosophers busy themselves with nothing
else, so far as I see.
Is it nothing (do you think?) never to accuse any one,
God or man, never to blame any, to go in and out with
the same countenance? These are the things which This, and
... , not phrases
Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he knew or or pre .
taught anything ; and if any one asked for phrases or <
precepts, he would take him away to Protagoras or Hippias. j )0se of jj e
In the same way if any one had come looking for greenstuff,
he would have taken him to the gardener. Which of
you then makes this 2 the purpose of his life ? Why, if
you did, you would gladly suffer sickness and hunger and
death. If any one of you was ever in love with a pretty
girl, he knows that I speak true !
22
Discourses of Epictetus
Progress
is propor
tionate to
effort
spent.
The good
man can
suffer no
defeat.
General
sense is
CHAPTER VI
Scattered sayings.
WHEN one of his acquaintances asked why more
progress was made in old days, although the processes of
reason have been more studied by the men of to-day,
he answered, On what has the effort been spent, and
in what was the greater progress in the past? for you
will find that progress to-day corresponds exactly to
the effort spent. The fact is that to-day men have spent
their effort on the analysis of syllogisms, and progress is
made in that : in old days men spent their effort on
maintaining their mind in accord with Nature, and they
made progress in that. Therefore do not confound the
processes, nor seek to spend effort on one thing and make
progress in another. If you look whether any of us who
sets himself to keep in accord with Nature and to live
his life so, fails to make progress, you will find there
is none.
The good man can suffer no defeat.
Of course, for he engages in no contest where he is
not superior. Take my lands, if you will : take my
servants, take my office, take my poor "body, yet you will
not make me fail to get what I will or fall into what I
will to avoid. This is the only contest for which he
enters that which is concerned with the sphere of the
will, and therefore he cannot fail to be invincible.
When some one asked him what general perception
meant, he replied, You might describe the faculty
Booh 111, Chapter 6
which only distinguishes sounds as general hearing, the faculty
but the faculty which distinguishes musical sounds ables .^j
you would not call general but technical . In the men to see
same way there are certain things which all men who are t hj n s
not utterly perverted can see in virtue of their general
faculties. It is this mental constitution to which the
name general perception 1 is given.
It is not easy to give stimulus to young men who Young
have no grit : you cannot lift a cream-cheese by a hook : jj^ 111 "^
but young men of parts hold fast to reason even if you if they are
try to deter them. That is why Rufus generally tried j o ^ or
to deter them, and made this his test of those who were to hold
gifted and those who were not ; for , said he, just as their own<
the stone, if you throw it up, will fall to the earth by
its own nature, so the gifted soul is all the more inclined
towards its natural object, the more you try to beat
it off.
CHAPTER VII
Dialogue with the Commissioner 1 of the Free Cities, who
was an Epicurean.
WHEN the Commissioner, who was an Epicurean, He asked
. , ^ . the Epicu-
came into his lecture-room, It is proper, said Epictetus, rean gover-
that we who are ignorant should inquire of you philo- nor, what
sophers what is the Best Thing in the world, just as those be " st part
who come to a strange city make inquiry of the citizens of man,
who know the place ; that having learnt what it is we
may pursue it for ourselves, and come to the sight of
it, as foreigners visit the sights of the cities. For all,
and elici
ted the
answer,
Not the
flesh ,
but that
which
gives
rational
delight to
the soul
that is, the
good of
the soul.
24 Discourses of Epictetus
one may say, are agreed that man has to do with
three things, soul and body and external things ; it only
remains for you to answer the question, * What is the
best in man? What shall we say to men? Shall we
say, The flesh ? and was it for this that Maximus 2
sailed as far as Cassiope to see his son on his way? Was
it to have pleasure in the flesh ? When the Commissioner
denied it, saying, God forbid ! Epictetus went on,
Is it not proper to devote our efforts to what is best
in us?
1 It is most proper.
What have we then better than the flesh?
The soul , he said.
And which are better, the goods of the best element in
us or the goods of the inferior?
Those of the best.
Are the goods of the soul in the sphere of the will
or beyond it?
* Within the sphere of the will.
Is the pleasure of the soul then within the sphere of
the will?
Yes , he said.
And what gives rise to it? Does it arise of itself?
That is inconceivable ; for we must assume the existence
of the good as something which has value in itself,
by partaking in which we shall have pleasure in the soul.
To this too he agreed.
What then will give rise to this pleasure of the soul
m us? If the goods of the soul give rise to it, then the
nature of the good is discovered ; for it is impossible
Booh III) Chapter 7 ^^
that the good and that which gives us rational delight
should be different from one another, or that the conse
quence should be good unless that on which it depends
is good. For the primary end must be good, if that
which follows on it is to be rational. But you cannot say But this
this if you have any sense, for you will be saying what [ s 1 ?" t u S
is inconsistent with Epicurus, and with the other judge- Epicurus
ments of your school. You will be reduced to saying doctnne -
that the pleasure of the soul is pleasure in bodily things :
these, as it now appears, are of primary value and are
identical with the nature of the good.
Therefore Maximus acted foolishly, if he had any motive
in sailing but the flesh, that is the highest principle. He
acts like a fool too if, as a judge, he refrains from other
men s goods when he can take them. If you think fit
to do it, the only point for us to look to is that it be
done secretly, securely, without any one s knowledge.
For even Epicurus himself does not set down stealing If you are
as evil, but only detected stealing : and he says * Do not *? be con "
sistcntj
steal , only because it is impossible to be sure of escaping you must
detection . But I tell you that if it be done cleverly
and cautiously, we shall escape detection. Further, we in such a
have powerful friends in Rome, both men and women, way ^ to
escape
and the Greeks are feeble folk : no one will have the detection.
courage to go o Rome to prosecute. Why do you
refrain from your own good? It is foolish and silly.
Nay, even if you tell me you refrain, I will not believe
you ; for just as it is impossible to assent to what appears
false and to reject what is true, so it is impossible to
hold aloof from what appears good. Now wealth is
2.6 Discourses of Epictetus
a good thing, and, so to speak, most productive of pleasure.
Why should not one acquire it? Why should we not
corrupt our neighbour s wife, if we can do it without
detection ; and if her husband talks nonsense, why should
we not break his neck as well? This, if you wish to be
a philosopher of the right sort, to be perfect and consistent
with your own judgements. Otherwise you will be no
If you do better than we so-called Stoics, 3 for we too say one thing
the flesh W ancl do anotner : we Sa 7 n ble words and do shameful
you will be deeds ! You will be suffering from the opposite perversion,
tentaTwe" of utterm shameful judgements, and doing noble deeds !
Stoics are. Before God, I ask you, can you imagine a city of
You Epicureans?
cannot , . .
imagine 1 sna U not marry (says one).
a city < N or s hall I (says another) for it is wrong to marry.
based on . . . . .. ,
Epicurus Yes, and it is wrong to get children, and wrong to
principles, be a citizen !
What is to happen then ? Where will your citizens come
from ? Who will educate them ? Who will be Governor of
the Ephebi ? Who will manage the Gymnasia ? 4 Yes,
and what will be their education ? Will it be the educa
tion the Lacedaemonians or Athenians received? Take
me a young man and bring him up in accordance with
your judgements. The judgements are bad, subversive of
the city, ruinous to family life, not even fit for women.
As the Man, leave these principles alone. You live in an imperial
aSmperial cit 7 : ^ ou must hold office J ud 8 e J ust1 ^ refrain from
city, you other men s property : no woman but your wife must
lobler iDt seem ta tf in your eyes, no boy, no silver or gold plate,
principles. You must look for judgements that will be in keeping
Book 111, Chapter 7 27
with such conduct, and will enable you to refrain with
pleasure from things so persuasive to attract and to
overcome you. If on the other hand we back up their
persuasive power by this philosophy, such as it is, that
we have discovered, thrusting us forward and confirming
us in the same direction, what is to become of us ? What
is the best part of a piece of plate, the silver or the art
spent on it? The hand in itself is mere flesh, it is the
products of the hand that claim precedence. So too Appro-
appropriate actions are of three kinds : the first class actions
relative to mere existence, 5 the second relative to parti
cular conditions, the third commanding and absolute.
On this principle too we ought not to honour man s which are
material being, his rags of flesh, but his leading character- concerned
T T71 with man s
istics. What are these? Citizenship, marriage, pro- command-
creation of children, worship of God, care of parents, m . charac-
and in general, will to get and to avoid, impulse to
act and not to act, each in its proper and natural
manner.
What is our nature? To be free, noble, self-respecting.
What other animal blushes ? What other can have
a conception of shame? We must subordinate pleasure
to these principles, to minister to them as a servant,
to evoke our interests and to keep us in the way of our
natural activities.
* But I am rich, and have need of nothing. If you pre-
Why then do you still pretend to be a philosopher? tend to be
j -i i aphiloso-
and silver plate are enough for you : what need pher, you
have you of judgements? must rule
Nay, but I also sit as judge over the Greeks. rational
28
Discourses of Epictetus
creatures,
and win
them to
emulate
your obe
dience to
God.
What ! you know how to judge? What made you
know that?
Caesar wrote me a patent.
Let him write to you to judge questions of music :
what use will it be to you ? But let that pass. How did
you get made a judge? Whose hand did you kiss? Was
it Symphorus or Numenius ? 6 In whose antechamber
did you sleep? To whom did you send gifts? After
all, do you not see that being judge is worth no more nor
less than Numenius is worth ?
Well, but I can put any one I wish in prison.
As you may a stone !
* But I can cudgel to death any one I wish.
As you can an ass ! This is not governing men. Govern
us as rational creatures by showing us what is expedient,
and we will follow it : show us what is inexpedient and
we will turn away from it. Make us admire and emulate
you, as Socrates made men do. He was the true ruler of
men, for he brought men to submit to him their will to
get and to avoid, their impulse to act and not to act.
Do this, refrain from this, or I will put you in prison.
This is not how rational beings are ruled. But, Do this
as Zeus ordained : if not, you will suffer penalty and
harm. What kind of harm? No harm but that of
failing to do your duty : you will destroy the trust
worthy, self-respecting, well-behaved man in you.
Look not for any greater harm than this !
Book ///, Chapter 8 29
CHAPTER VIII
How we should, train ourselves to deal with impressions
As we train ourselves to deal with sophistical questions,
so we ought to train ourselves day by day to deal with
impressions : for these too propound questions to us.
* The son of So-and-so is dead.
Answer, That is beyond the will, not an evil.
* So-and-so s father has disinherited him : what do
you think?
It is outside the will, not an evil.
Caesar has condemned him.
That is outside the will, not an evil.
Something has made him grieve.
That is an act of will, and evil.
* He has endured nobly.
That is an act of will, and good.
If we acquire this habit, we shall make progress, for
we shall never assent to anything but that of which we
get a convincing impression. 1
The son dies. What happens?
The son dies.
Nothing more?
Nothing.
The ship is lost. What happens ?
The ship is lost.
He is led to prison. What happens?
He is led to prison. Each man may add, * He has fared
ill , but if so, that is his own affair.
3 o Discourses of Epictetus
* Still , you say, Zeus does wrong to act so.
Why? Do you mean because He made you patient,
noble-minded, because He saved these things from being
evil, because He puts it in your power to endure these
troubles and still be happy, because He opens the door
to you, when your position is impossible? Leave the
scene, man, and do not complain.
If you would know the attitude of the Romans to
philosophers, listen to this. Italicus, a man of the highest
repute as a philosopher among them, in my presence
expressed his indignation at his lot, which he thought
intolerable, by saying, * I cannot bear it : you are ruining
me, you will make me like him , and pointed to me 1
CHAPTER IX
To a Rhetor going up to Rome for a trial.
A man s WHEN a man, who was going to Rome for an action
judge- regarding his official position, came in to see him, he
ments . . . .
determine inquired the reason for his journey, and when the man
his success went on to as k hi m \^ opinion on the matter, If you
ask me , he said, what you will do in Rome, whether
you will succeed or fail, I have no precept to offer :
but if you ask me how you will do, I can say this, that
if your judgements are right you will do well, if wrong,
you will do ill. For every man s action is determined
by a judgement. What is it that made you desire to
be elected patron 1 of the Cnossians? Judgement.
Booh II 7, Chapter 9 31
What is the reason you now go to Rome? Judgement.
Yes, and in stormy weather and at your own risk and
charges?
Necessity compels me.
Who tells you this? Your judgement. If then judge
ments are the cause of everything and a man has bad
judgements, the result resembles the cause, whatever this
be. Have we all then sound judgements ? Have you and
your opponent ? Then how are you at variance ? Have
you sound judgements any more than he? Why? You
think so. So does he, and so do madmen. Opinion is
a bad criterion. No ! Show me that you have examined You
your judgements and paid attention to them. You are shoulcl
J r therefore
now sailing to Rome to be patron of the Cnossians and are examine
not content to stay at home with the honours you had y ur J u dge-
before, but desire some greater and more distinguished
honour. When did you ever take the trouble to sail like
this in order to examine your judgements and reject any
that are bad? Whom have you ever consulted for this
purpose? What time or what part of your life have you
charged with this duty? Review the seasons of your life
in your own mind, if you respect me. Did you examine
your judgements when you were a boy? Did not you do
what you did then as you do everything now ? And when
you grew to be a youth and listened to the teachers of
rhetoric and wrote declamations of your own, what
did you imagine that you lacked? And when in early
manhood you began to enter public life and to plead
in cases and to have a reputation, did you ever think
any one your equal? Would you ever have let any one
The only
precept a
philoso
pher can
give is :
Keep your
Governing
Principle
in accord
with
nature.
It is easy
to listen
for a mo
ment and
go away
scoffing.
3 2 Discourses of Epictetus
examine you and show that your judgements were bad ?
What then would you have me tell you ?
Give me some help in the matter.
I have no precepts to offer for your purpose : and if
you have come to me for this, you have come to me as
you would come to a greengrocer or a shoemaker and not
as to a philosopher. 2
For what purpose then have philosophers precepts to
offer?
For this : that, whatever the issue may be, we should
keep our Governing Principle in accord with Nature to
our life s end. Do you think this a small matter ?
No, the greatest of all.
Well then : will a little time suffice for this, and can
it be acquired in a passing visit? Acquire it if you
can !
Then you will go away and say, I met Epictetus,
it was like meeting a stone, or a statue.
Yes, for you just saw me and no more. Man can only
meet man properly when he gets to understand his
convictions and shows him his own in turn. Get to
know my judgements, and show me yours, and then
say that you have met me. Let us question one another :
if one of my judgements is bad, remove it : if you have
anything to say, put it forward. That is how to meet
a philosopher. That s not your way, but We are
passing through : while we wait to charter our ship,
we can see Epictetus ; let us see what he is saying.
Then when you leave you say, Epictetus was nothing :
he talked bad Greek, outlandish stuff. Of course, of
Booh Illy Chapter 9 33
what else are you competent to judge, coming in like
that ?
But , he goes on, if I let myself be absorbed in these
things, I shall be like you without land, like you without
silver cups, like you without fine cattle.
To this perhaps it is sufficient to answer, I have no The philo-
need of them : but if you get a large property, you so F>h er does
still need something else, and willy-nilly you are poorer need of
than I.
What do you mean that I need ?
You need what you have not got tranquillity, a mind
in accord with Nature, and free from perturbation.
Whether I am Patron 1 or not, what does it matter?
It does matter to you. I am richer than you : I am not
in an agony as to what Caesar will think of me : I do
not flatter any one for that. This is what I have instead
of your silver and gold plate. You have vessels of gold,
but your reason judgements, assent, impulse, will is
of common clay. But mine are in accord with Nature, if his mind
and that being so, why should I not make a special ^"J^K
study of reasoning? I have leisure, and my mind is Nature,
not distracted. How can I occupy my mind that is
thus free ? I cannot find an occupation more worthy
of man than that. When you have nothing to do, you
are troubled in spirit, and enter a theatre, or wander
aimlessly. Why should not the philosopher devote his He can
efforts to developing his own reason? You devote j?? vot ? f
yourself to crystal vases, I to the syllogism called * the to logical
Liar : you to murrhine 3 vessels, I to the syllogism of
* Denial . To you all that you have appears small :
546.24 II C
We must
have our
judge
ments
ready at
the right
moment.
If illness
comes, you
must show
that you
are trained
to bear it.
34 Discourses of Epictetus
to me all I have appears great. Your desire can never
be fulfilled, mine is fulfilled already. Your case is like
that of children putting their hand into a narrow-necked
jar and pulling out raisins and almonds. If a child fills
his hand full, he cannot pull it out and then he cries.
Let a few go, child, and you will get it out. So I say to
you, * Let your desire go. Do not crave much, and you
will obtain.
CHAPTER X
How one should bear illnesses.
WE should have each judgement ready at the moment
when it is needed : judgements on dinner at dinner-time,
on the bath at bathing-time, on bed at bedtime.
Admit not sleep into your tender eyelids
Till you have reckoned up each deed of the day
How have I erred, what done or left undone ?
So start, and so review your acts, and then
For vile deeds chide yourself , for good be glad.
Keep hold of these lines for practical use, not to
declaim them as a cry like Paean Apollo . Again in
a fever we must be ready with judgements for that ;
if we fall into a fever we must not give up and forget
everything, and say, * If I ever study philosophy again,
may the worst befall me ! I must go off somewhere and
attend to my poor body. Well, but does not fever
come there ? 1 What does studying philosophy mean ?
Does it not mean preparing to face events? Do you
not understand then that what you are saying comes to
Book Hl y Chapter i o 35-
this, If I go on preparing to bear events quietly, may
the worst befall me ? That is as though a man should
give up competing for the pancration because he has
been struck. But there it is possible to leave off and so
escape a beating : but what profit do we get if we leave
off studying philosophy ?
What ought one to say then as each hardship comes?
* I was practising for this, I was training for this. 1 God
says to you, Give me a proof, whether you have kept
the rules of wrestling eaten the proper food, trained,
and obeyed the trainer. After that, are you going to
play the coward when the moment of action comes ? If
now is the time for fever, take your fever in the right way ;
if for thirst, thirst in the right way, if for hunger, hunger
aright. Is it not in your power? Who will hinder you ?
The physician will hinder you from drinking, but he
cannot hinder you from thirsting aright : he will hinder
you from eating, but he cannot hinder you from hungering
in the right way.
But am I not a student ? 2 The stu-
Why are you a student ? Slave, is it not that you may 1-
be happy and have peace of mind? Is it not that you no pur-
may conform to nature and so live your life ? What pose lf ^ e
7 cannot
hinders you in a fever from keeping your Governing bear what
Principle in accord with nature ? Here is the test of the comes<
matter, this is how the philosopher is proved. For fever
too is a part of life, like walking, sailing, travelling. Do
you read when you are walking? No. Nor do you in
a fever : but if you walk aright, you have done your part
as a walker ; if you bear your fever aright, you have done
C2
3 6 Discourses of Epictetus
your part as a sick man. What does bearing fever rightly
mean? It means not to blame God or man, not to be
crushed by what happens, to await, death in a right spirit,
to do what you are bidden ; when the physician comes in,
not to be afraid of what he may say, and if he says, You
are doing well , not to be overjoyed: for what good
is there in that? What good had you when you were
in health? It means not to be disheartened if he says,
You are doing badly ; for what does * doing badly
mean? It means drawing near the dissolution of the
Therefore soul from the body. What is there to fear in that? If
do not fear ^ QU ^ Q nQt ^raw near noW;) shall you not draw near
the phy- later ? Is the world going to be turned upside down by
sician,but ^ Qur death? Why then do you coax the physician?
his due. Why do you say, Master, if you will, I shall get well ?
Why do you give him occasion to lift his brow in arrogance ?
As you give the shoemaker his due in regard to the foot,
the builder in regard to the house, why do you not give
the physician his due (and no more) in regard to the
paltry body, for the body is not mine and is naturally
dead? This is what the moment requires from the man
in a fever : if he fulfils these requirements, he has what
is his own.
The philo- It is not the business of the philosopher to guard these
sopher has outward things paltry wine or oil or body but to
no concern .
to keep guard his Governing Principle. How is he to regard out-
outward war d things ? Only so far that he does not concern him-
only to self with them unreasonably. What occasion is left then
guard his or ear ? \Vhat occasion for anger, what occasion for fear
principles. .
concerning things that are not our own, nor ot any value r
Booh HI) Chapter 10 37
For the two principles we must have ready at command
are these : that outside the will there is nothing good
or evil, and that we must not lead events but follow
them. My brother ought not to have behaved so to
me. No, but it is his business to look to that; how
ever he may behave, I will deal with him as I ought.
This is my part, that is another s : this no one can
hinder, that is subject to hindrance.
CHAPTER XI
Scattered sayings.
THERE are certain punishments ordained as it were by In all the
f ^ i relations of
law for those who disobey the government ot (jod. jjf ewe
Whoever judges anything to be good except what depends must obey
upon the will, let him be liable to envy, desire, flattery, W h se eyes
distraction. Whoever judges anything else to be evil are upon
(save acts of the will), let distress be his, and mourning,
lamentation, misfortune. And yet, though we suffer
punishments so severe, we cannot refrain.
Remember what the poet says about the stranger :
Stranger, though baser man than thou should come,
He must be honoured, for the hand of Zeus
Guards stranger folk and poor.
One should be ready to apply this to a father : Though
a baser one than thou should come, I may not dishonour
a father ; for all depend on Zeus, God of our fathers ,
and to a brother, for all depend on Zeus, God of kindred .
In the same way we shall find that Zeus is Protector of
all other relations of life.
3 8 Discourses of Epictetus
CHAPTER XII
On training.
Training WE ought not to train ourselves in unnatural or
directed extraordinary actions, for in that case we who claim
not to to be philosophers shall be no better than mountebanks,
ordinary ^or it is difficult to walk on a tight-rope, and not only
objects, difficult but dangerous as well : ought we for that reason
to practise walking on a tight-rope or setting up a palm-
tree, 1 or embracing statues ? 2 By no means. Not every
thing that is difficult and dangerous is suitable for training,
but only that which is conducive to what is set before
but to con- us as the object of our effort. What is set before us as
the w^fl the bJ ect f our effort ? To move without hindrance in
the will to get and the will to avoid. And what does
that mean? Not to fail in what we will nor to fall into
what we avoid. To this end, therefore, let our training
be directed : for since it is impossible without great and
continuous effort to secure that the will to get fail not
and the will to avoid be not foiled, know that, if you
allow training to be directed to things lying outside and
beyond the will, you will not get what you will to get
nor avoid what you will to avoid.
especially And since habit has established a strong predominance,
viou^hab i ^ ecause we ^ ave acc pi re d the habit of turning our
has a will to get and our will to avoid only to what lies outside
Ur contr l> we must set a contrary habit to counteract
the former, and where impressions are most likely to
go wrong there employ training as an antidote.
Book II I) Chapter 12 39
I am inclined to pleasure : in order to train myself
I will incline beyond measure in the opposite direction.
I am disposed to avoid trouble : I will harden and train
my impressions to this end, that my will to avoid may
hold aloof from everything of this kind. For how do we
describe the man who trains? He is the man who
practises avoiding the use of his will to get, 3 and willing
to avoid only what is in the sphere of the will and who Each man
exercises himself in what is hard to overcome. And so ovcrcome
different men have to train for different objects. What different
is it to the purpose here to set up a palm-tree, or to carry
about a hut of skins or a pestle and mortar? 4 Man,
train yourself, if you are arrogant, to bear with being
reviled, and not to be annoyed when you are disparaged.
Then you will make such progress that, even if you are
struck, you will say to yourself, Imagine that you have
embraced a statue. Next train yourself to use wine
properly, not for heavy drinking for there are men mis
guided enough to train for this but first to abstain from
wine, and to leave alone pretty maids and sweet cakes.
Then, if the proper time comes, you will enter the lists,
if at all, to try yourself and learn whether your impressions
overcome you as before. But to begin with, fly far from
enemies that are stronger than you. The battle is an
unequal one when it is between a pretty maid and
a young man beginning philosophy. Pot and stone , as
the saying is, do not agree.
Next after the will to get and the will to avoid comes We have
the sphere of impulse for action and against action : JJJJJJ^
where the object is to obey reason, not to do anything action,
and for
assent.
Never
train for
show.
40 Discourses of Epictetus
at the wrong time or place, or offend the harmony of
things in any other way.
Third comes the sphere of assents, concerned with
things plausible and attractive. For, as Socrates bade
men ( not live a life without examination , so you ought
not to accept an impression without examination, but
say, Wait, let me see who you are and whence you come ,
just as the night-watch say, Show me your token.
Have you the token given by nature, which the impres
sion that is to be accepted must have ?
And to conclude, the methods which are applied to
the body by those who exercise it, may themselves
conduce to training, if they tend in this direction, that
is, if they bear upon the will to get and the will to avoid.
But if their object is display, they are the marks of one
who has swerved from the right line, whose aims are
alien, one who is looking for spectators to say, What
a great man ! This is why Apollonius was right in
saying, If you wish to train for your soul s sake, when
you are thirsty in hot weather take a mouthful of cold
water and spit it out and tell no one !
CHAPTER XIII
What a forlorn condition means., and a forlorn man.
To be ^ THE forlorn state is the condition of one without
means not ^P- For a man is not forlorn simply because he is
to be alone, alone, any more than a man in a crowd is unforlorn.
At any rate when we lose a brother or a son or a friend,
Book ///, Chapter 13 41
in whom we rest our trust, we say that we have been left without
forlorn, though often we are in Rome, with that great
throng meeting us in the streets, and those numbers
living about us, and sometimes we have a multitude of
slaves. For according to its conception the term for
lorn means that a man is without help, exposed to
those who wish to harm him. For this reason, when we
are travelling, we call ourselves forlorn most of all,
when we fall among robbers. For it is not the sight
of a man as such that relieves us from being forlorn,
but the sight of one who is faithful and self-respecting
and serviceable. For if being alone is enough to make Otherwise
one forlorn, you must say that Zeus Himself is forlorn at
the Conflagration of the Universe 1 and bewails Himself :
Unhappy me ! I have neither Hera nor Athena nor
Apollo nor, in a word, brother or son or grandson or
kinsman. And in fact this is what some say that He does,
when left alone in the Conflagration : for they cannot
conceive of the mode of life of a solitary Being : they
start with a natural principle, the fact that men are by
nature drawn by ties of fellowship and mutual affection,
and enjoy converse with their kind. But nevertheless We ought
a man must prepare himself for solitude too he must Dependent
be able to suffice for himself, and able to commune with of others
himself. Just as Zeus communes with Himself and is at f or er _
peace with Himself and reflects upon the nature of His fection.
government, and occupies Himself with thoughts appro
priate to Himself, so should we be able to talk to ourselves,
without need of others, or craving for diversion : we
should study the divine government and the relation
Caesar can
give us
outward
but not
inward
peace.
Only
reason can
give this
sense of
peace.
God, who
provides
for our
needs,
42 Discourses of Epictetus
in which we stand to other things : we should consider
what was our attitude to events before, and what it
is now : what the things are which still afflict us : how
they may be cured, how removed : if any things need to
be brought to perfection, perfect them as reason requires.
For see : Caesar 2 seems to provide us with profound
peace ; there are no wars nor battles any more, no great
bands of robbers or pirates : we are able to travel by
land at every season, and to sail from sunrise to sunset.
Can he then provide us also with peace from fever, from
shipwreck, from fire or earthquake or thunderbolt?
Go to, can he give us peace from love? He cannot.
From mourning? He cannot. From envy? No !
he cannot give us peace from any of them. But the
reasoning of philosophers promises to give us peace
from these troubles also. What does it say? Men, if
you attend to me, wherever you may be, whatever you
may be doing, you will feel no distress, no anger, no
compulsion, no hindrance, but will live undisturbed
and free from all distractions. When a man has this
peace proclaimed to him, not by Caesar (how could he
proclaim it ?) but proclaimed by God, through the voice
of reason, is he not content when he is alone ? When he
considers and reflects, Now no evil can befall me, robber
exists not for me, earthquake exists not : all is full of
peace and tranquillity : every road, every city, every
meeting, neighbour, companion all are harmless.
Another, 3 Who takes care of me, supplies food and raiment ;
He has given me senses and primary conceptions ; and
when He does not provide necessaries, He sounds the
Booh Illy Chaffer 13 43
recall, He opens the door and says, "Come." Where? gives us a
To nothing you need fear, but to that whence you were ^eatl^has
born, to your friends and kindred, the elements. So no terrors,
much of you as was fire shall pass into fire, what was earth j^ns re .
shall pass into earth, the spirit into spirit, the water into turn to the
water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, e
nor Pyriphlegethon, 4 but all is full of gods and divine
beings. When one has this to think upon, and when he
beholds the sun and moon and stars, and enjoys land and
sea, he is not forlorn any more than he is destitute of
help.
Nay, you say, but what if one come upon me alone
and murder me?
Fool, he murders not you, but your paltry body.
How can we speak any more then of being forlorn We must
and helpless? Why do we make ourselves worse than not ben ve
worse than
children? For what do children do when they are left children,
alone? They pick up potsherds and dust and build
something or other and then pull it down and build
something else again, and so they never lack diversion.
If you sail away, am I to sit and shed tears because I am
left alone and forlorn? Shall I not in that case have
my potsherds and my dust? But they do this in their
foolishness : do we in our wisdom make ourselves miser
able?
We must
5 Great power is always dangerous in a beginner. We not be too
must then bear such things according: to our strength, ambitious,
5 but cam-
but always according to nature. [A certain course may our
suit a strong man] but not a consumptive. 5 Be content P rinci P les
. . ..I mtoevery-
to practise the life of an invalid, that you may one day day life.
44 Discourses of Epictetus
live the life of a healthy man. Take scant food, drink
water : refrain from willing to get anything for a while,
that you may one day direct your will rationally. If
you do so, then, when you have some good in you, you
will direct your will aright. 6
No, you say, we want at once to live as wise men
and benefit mankind.
Benefit indeed ! What are you after? Did you ever
benefit yourself?
But I want to stir them up.
Have you stirred yourself up first? You want to
benefit them ; then show them in your own life what
sort of men philosophy makes, and cease to talk folly.
When you eat, benefit those who eat with you, when you
drink, benefit those who drink, by yielding and giving
way to all, by bearing with them : that is the way to
benefit them and not by venting your own phlegm 7
upon them !
CHAPTER XIV
Scattered sayings.
Man must As bad actors cannot sing alone, but only in a large
walk alone. com p anVj so SO me men cannot walk alone. Man, if you
are worth anything, you must walk alone, and talk to
yourself and not hide in the chorus. Learn to bear
mockery, look about you, examine yourself, that you
may get to know who you are.
Do not When a man drinks water, or puts himself in training
makeadis- 11 i_ j
in any way, he tells everybody at every opportunity,
Book III) Chapter 14 45-
* I am a water-drinker. What? Do you drink water play of
for the sake of drinking it? Man, if it is to your profit Sine^
to drink it, drink ; if not, your conduct is absurd. I say,
if you drink water because it does you good, say nothing
to those who dislike it. 1 What ? Are these the people
of all others that you wish to please ?
Actions have varying degrees of value : some are based
on first principles, 2 others are determined by circum
stances, or compromise, or compliance, or manner of
life.
There are two qualities that men must get rid of Conceit
conceit and diffidence. Conceit is to think that one ^
. diffidence
needs nothing beyond oneself : diffidence is to suppose are equally
that one cannot live the untroubled life in the midst to b . e
of so many difficulties. Now conceit is removed by cross-
questioning, and that was what Socrates began with :
that the thing is not impossible you must discover by
thought and search. This search will do you no harm :
and indeed philosophy means very little else but this
to search how it is practicable to exercise the will to get
and the will to avoid without hindrance.
* I am better than you, for my father is of consular Rank and
rank. Another says, I have been tribune, and you j^J^^.
have not. If we were horses you would say, My sire was periority.
swifter , or, I have plenty of barley and fodder , or, I
have fine trappings. If you said that, you may imagine
me replying, * Very well then, let us try our paces. Come,
is there nothing in men, like the pace of a horse, which
will enable us to distinguish the better from the worse ?
Are there not self-respect, honour, justice? Show
4 6 Discourses of Efictetus
yourself superior in these qualities, that you may be
superior as a man should be. If you say to me, I am
great at kicking , I shall answer, * That is the boast of
an ass
i >
attempt
anything
consider
it well
before
hand.
CHAPTER XV
That we should, approach everything with consideration}-
Before you IN everything you do consider what comes first and
what follows, and so approach it. Otherwise you will
come to it with a good heart at first because you have
not reflected on any of the consequences, and afterwards
when difficulties come in sight you will shamefully desist.
* I wish to win at the Olympic games.
* So do I, by the gods, for it is a fine thing.
Yes, but consider the first steps to it and what follows :
and then, if it is to your advantage, lay your hand to the
work. You must be under discipline, eat to order,
touch no sweets, train under compulsion, at a fixed hour,
in heat and cold, drink no cold water, nor wine, except
to order ; you must hand yourself over completely
to your trainer as you would to a physician. Then,
when the contest comes, you get hacked, 2 sometimes
dislocate your hand, twist your ankle, swallow plenty
of sand, get a flogging, 3 and with all this you are some-
times defeated. First consider these things and then
enter n the athlete s career, if you still wish to do
so : otherwise, look you, you will be behaving like the
children who one da X P la 7 at Athletes, another at
gladiators, then sound the trumpet, next dramatize any-
Otherwise
by turns
Book III) Chapter if 47
thing they see and admire. You will be just the same now like
athlete, now gladiator, then philosopher, then orator, children
but nothing with all your soul. Like an ape you imitate
everything you see, and one thing after another takes
your fancy, but nothing that is familiar pleases you, for
you undertake nothing with forethought ; you do not
survey the whole subject and examine it beforehand,
but you take it up half-heartedly and at random. In
the same way some people when they see a philosopher,
and hear some one speaking like Euphrates (and indeed
who can speak as he can ?) wish to be philosophers them
selves.
Man, consider first, what it is you are undertaking : Philo-
then consider your own powers, and what you can bear, s phy,hke
If you want to be a wrestler, look to your shoulders, your things,
thighs, your loins. For different men are born for , mu 1 ^ t 1 n t
. . be lightly
different things. Do you suppose that you can be taken in
a philosopher if you do as you do now ? Do you suppose "and.
that you can eat and drink as you do now, and indulge
your anger and displeasure just as before ? Nay, you must
sit up late, you must work hard, conquer some of your
desires, abandon your own people, be looked down on
by a mere slave, be ridiculed by those who meet you, get
the worst of it in everything in office, in honour, in
justice. When you have carefully considered these
drawbacks, then come to us, if you think fit : if you are
willing to pay this price for peace of mind, freedom,
tranquillity. If not, do not come near : do not be like
the children, first a philosopher, then a tax-collector,
then an orator, than one of Caesar s procurators. These
48 Discourses of Epictetu*
You must callings do not agree. You must be one man, good or
choice be- bad : 7 OU must develop either your rational soul, or
tween the y Our outward endowments, you must be busy either
inner and . , , . . , ,
the outer wltn 7 our mner man, or with things outside, that is,
life. y OU must choose between the position of a philosopher
and that of an ordinary man.
When Galba was killed some one said to Rufus, Now
the world is governed by Providence, isn t it? To
which he answered, Did I base my proof that the world
is governed by Providence upon a casual thing like
Galba s death ? 4
CHAPTER XVI
That we must be cautious in our social relations.
A man can- THE man who mixes with other people a good deal
not mix .. .
in society either for talk or for a wine-party or generally for social
without purposes, must needs either grow like them himself
it or being 3 or convert them to his likeness ; for if you put a quenched
influenced coa i by one t h at j s burning, either it will put the burning
one out, or will catch fire from it. As the risk then is
so serious, you must be cautious in indulging lightly
in the society of the untrained, for it is impossible to
rub up against one who is covered with soot and not
get sooty oneself. What are you going to do, if he talks
about gladiators, about horses, about athletes, worse still
if he talks about men : * So and so is bad , So and so is
good : That was well done , That was ill done : again,
if he mocks or jeers, or shows a malicious humour? Has
any of you the perfect skill of the lyre-player, who takes
Book III) Chapter 16 49
up his lyre and has only to touch the strings to know
which are out of tune and so tune his instrument ? Which
of you has the faculty that Socrates had, of drawing to
his side those who met him in any kind of society? How
could you have ? You must needs be converted by your
untrained companions.
Why then are they stronger than you ? It is because Unless you
these unsound sayings of theirs are based upon judgements, ^m^nn 1
but your fine words come merely from your lips : that ciples you
is why they are without life or vigour, that is why a man JJ rlUbc
may well loathe the sound of your exhortations and your
wretched virtue , which you prate of so glibly. That is
how the untrained get the better of you : for judgement
is powerful everywhere, judgement suffers no defeat.
Therefore, until your fine ideas are firmly fastened in
you, and until you acquire some power to secure them,
I advise you to be cautious in associating with the un
trained : otherwise anything you take note of in the
lecture-room will melt away day by day like wax in the
sun. Therefore go away somewhere far from the sun, While you
as long as your ideas are in this waxen state. For this j 1 ^ 6 k e e ^ rn "
reason philosophers even advise us to leave our own to yourself
countries, because old habits are a drag on us and prevent awa^from
us from beginning to acquire a new set of habits, and we the world
cannot bear men meeting us and saying, Look, So-and-so ^" ur J
is turning philosopher, behaving like this and like that. habits.
On the same principle physicians send away patients
who are ill for long to a new country and a new climate,
and rightly so. Do the same. Adopt new habits : fix
your opinions, exercise yourselves in them. No, you
546.24 II D
fo Discourses of Epictetus
leave the lecture-room to go to a show, a gladiatorial
display, a colonnade, a circus : then you come back here
from them and return there again, and nothing affects
you. So you acquire no habit that gives you distinction ;
you pay no regard or attention to yourself : you do not
watch yourself and ask, How do I deal with the impres
sions that meet me? Naturally, or unnaturally? How
am I to answer their call ? Rightly or wrongly ? Do I warn
things beyond my will that they have no concern with
me ? I say, if you are not yet in this state, then fly from
your former habits, fly from the uneducated, if you wish
to begin at last to be more than ciphers.
CHAPTER XVII
Concerning Providence.
Do not WHEN you accuse Providence, only consider the matter,
accuse an( j you w jjj understand that its action is according to
forgiving reason.
th^wicked ^ ut t ^ ie un J ust man 7 OU Sa 7> * * s better off.
In what ? In money : for in regard to this he has the
advantage over you, because he flatters, is shameless,
is vigilant. Is this surprising? But look whether he
is better off than you in being trustworthy and self-
respecting. You will find that he is not ; where you
are superior to him, you will find that you are better
off. So when some one was indignant once at the pros
perity of Philostorgos, I said, Would you be willing
to share the bed of Suras? May that day never
come I he said. Why then aie you indignant at his
Book ///, Chapter 17 5-1
getting a return for what he sells, or how do you come
to count him blessed who gets what he has by means
that you abhor? Or what is the harm in Providence
giving the better lot to those who are better? Is it not
better to be self-respecting than to be rich?
He agreed.
Man, why are you indignant then at having the better
lot? Therefore always remember the truth and be ready
to apply it that it is a law of nature for the better to
have the advantage of the worse in that in which he is
better, and then you will never be indignant.
But my wife uses me ill.
Very well : if any one asks you, What is the matter?
say, * My wife uses me ill.
Nothing else ?
Nothing.
* My father gives me nothing . . . but need you go
further in your own mind and add this lie, that poverty
is evil? For this reason it is not poverty that we must
cast out, but our judgement about poverty, and so we
shall be at peace.
Providence
gives the
better man
the better
portion.
CHAPTER XVIII
That we must not allow news to disturb us.
WHEN any disturbing news is brought you, bear this
in mind, that news cannot affect anything within the
region of the will. Can any one bring news to you that
you are wrong in your thought or wrong in your will?
Surely not : but only that some one is dead ; what does
D 2
No news
. should
disturb us,
for news
concerns
only what
is outside
the region
of the will.
$2 Discourses of Epictetus
that concern you ? That some one speaks ill of you ; what
does that concern you ? That your father has some design
or other. Against whom ? Is it against your will ? How
can he have? No, it is against your wretched body, or
your wretched property; you are safe, it is not against you.
But the judge pronounces that you are guilty of
impiety. Did not the judges pronounce the same on
Socrates? Is it your concern that the judge pronounced
on you? No. Why then do you trouble yourself?
Your father has a duty of his own, which he must fulfil,
or else lose his character as father, affectionate and gentle.
Do not try to make him lose anything else for that
reason ; for a man never suffers harm except in that
in which he is at fault.
Again, it is your duty to make your defence with
firmness, self-respect, dispassionately : otherwise you lose
your character as son, self-respecting and honourable.
What then? Is the judge free from danger? No:
he too incurs danger just as much. Why then do you
still fear what judgement he will give? What have you
to do with another s evil? Your evil is to defend yourself
badly : that is the only thing you need be careful about.
Whether you are condemned or not condemned is an
other s business, and the evil in the same way is another s.
So-and-so threatens you.
Threatens me? No.
1 He blames you.
It will be for him to see how he does his own business.
* He is going to condemn you unjustly.
All the worse for him !
Booh IIJ, Chapter 19 5-3
CHAPTER XIX
What is the difference between the philosopher and the
uneducated man. 1
THE first difference between the philosopher and the The philo-
uneducated man is that the latter says, Woe is me for ^^ 1S
my child, for my brother, woe is me for my father , guished
and the other, if he is compelled to speak, considers the [gn^-an?
matter and says, Woe is me for myself. For nothing man by
outside the will can hinder or harm the will; it can bkmeon
only harm itself. If then we accept this, and, when things the right
go amiss, are inclined to blame ourselves, remembering per
that judgement alone can disturb our peace and constancy,
I swear to you by all the gods that we have made progress.
Instead of this we have come the wrong way from
the beginning. When we were still children, if we
stumbled when we were star-gazing, the nurse, instead
of rebuking us, struck the stone. What is wrong with the
stone? Was it to move out of the way because of your
child s folly? Again, if (when children) we do not find
something to eat after our bath our attendant does not
check our appetite, but flogs the cook. Man, did we
appoint you to attend on the cook? No, on our child :
correct him, do him good. So even when we are grown
up we appear like children : for it is being a child to be
unmusical in musical things, ungrammatical in grammar,
uneducated in life.
f 4
Discourses of Epictetus
In life, as
in intel-
thins,
on our-
selves.
Thus good
maybe
gamed
from
disease
and death
CHAPTER XX
That benefit may be derived from all outward things.
IN regard to intellectual impressions it is generally
a g re ed that good and evil depend upon us and not upon
external things. No one calls the proposition, It is
^ g d r lt is night bad r Three is four
the greatest of evils. No, they say that knowledge is
good and error evil, so that good may arise even in regard
to what is false ; that is, the knowledge that it is false.
The same ought to be true in practical life.
4 Is health good, and disease evil ?
No, man.
What then?
To use health well is good, to use it ill is evil.
Do you mean that benefit can be gained even from
disease?
By heaven, can it not be gained even from death, aye
or f rom l ame ness ? * Do you think Menoeceus 2 gained
J
but little good by his death ?
* Nay, if any one says that sort of thing, I wish him
a benefit like that Menoeceus gained ! 3
Out upon you, man, did he not preserve the patriot, the
man of great mind, trustworthy and noble? And if
he had lived on, was he not bound to lose all these, and
win their very opposite? Would he not in that case
have assumed the character of the coward, the ignoble,
the hater of his country and lover of his life ? Go to, do
you think he gained but little good by his death ? Well,
Boot III, Chapter 20 55
did Admetus father gain great good by living on so ignobly
and miserably? Did he not die afterwards? I adjure
you by the gods, cease to admire material things, cease
to make yourselves slaves, first of things, and next, for
their sake,of men who can acquire them or take them away.
* Can we then get benefit from these things ? The magic
wand of
From all. Hermes
Even from one who reviles us ? turns
Why, what good does the athlete get from the man who ^ng "to
wrestles with him? The greatest. So my reviler helps gold,
to train me for the contest : he trains me to be patient,
dispassionate, gentle. You deny it ? You admit that the
man who grips my neck and gets my loins and shoulders
into order does me good, and the trainer does well to
bid me lift the pestle with both hands , and the more
severe he is, the more good do I get : and are you going
to tell me that he who trains me to be free from anger
does me no good ? That means that you do not know how
to get any good from humankind.
4 He is a bad neighbour , you say?
Yes, for himself : but he is good for me ; he trains
me to be considerate and fair-minded.
4 A bad father.
Yes, for himself, but not for me. This is the magic
wand of Hermes. Touch what you will , he says,
and it will turn to gold. Nay, bring what you will
and I will turn it to good. Bring illness, bring death,
bring poverty, bring reviling, bring the utmost peril
of the law-court : the wand of Hermes will turn them
all to good purpose !
56 Discourses of Epictetus
1 What will you make of death ?
What else but an adornment for you, what else but
a means for you to show in deed what man is when he
follows the will of nature ?
What will you make of sickness ?
I will show its nature, I will shine in it. I will be firm
and tranquil, I will not natter my physician nor pray for
death. What more do you look for ? Whatever you give
me I will make it a means of blessedness and happiness,
make it dignified and admirable.
That is not your way. You say, See you do not fall
ill, it is an evil. It is like saying, See you do not get an
impression that three is four, it is an evil. Man, how is it
an evil? If I get a right notion of it, it cannot harm me
any more. Will it not rather do me good? If then I
have proper notions of poverty, of sickness, of life without
office, is not that enough for me? Will they not serve
my good? How then should I seek any more for good
and evil in things external?
We accept But we do not act on this. W r e carry these views to
this view, i , J
but we do tne lecture-room door, but no one takes them home : as
not act soon as we leave here we are at war with our slave-boy,
with our neighbours, with those who jeer and laugh at us.
Good luck to the Lesbian, for he convicts me every day
of knowing nothing. 4
Book ///, Chapter 21 5-7
CHAPTER XXI
To those who undertake the profession of teacher with a light
heart.
THOSE who have learnt precepts and nothing more are rj not try
anxious to give them out at once, just as men with weak ^ f tcadl ou
stomachs vomit food. First digest your precepts, and havediges-
then you will not vomit them : undigested, they become te o ^^
vomit indeed, impure and uneatable. Show us that heard,
you have digested them to some purpose, and that your
Governing Principle is changed, as athletes can show
their shoulders, as a result of their training and eating,
and as those who have acquired the arts can show the
result of their learning. The carpenter does not come
and say, Hear me discourse on carpentry , but he under
takes a contract and builds a house and so shows that he
has acquired the art. Do you likewise : eat as a man,
drink as a man, adorn yourself, marry, get children, live
a citizen s life ; endure revilings, bear with an incon
siderate brother, bear with a father, a son, a travelling
companion. Show us that you can do this, and then L ive your
we shall see that you have in truth learnt something precepts
, instead of
from the philosophers. Not you : you say, Come and i ectu ring
hear me reading out comments ! Away with you, look on them,
for some one to disgorge your vomit on.
I assure you I will expound Chrysippus doctrines to
you as no one else can. I will break up his language and
make it quite clear. I will add, it may be, a touch of
Antipater s or Archedemus verve.
How can
you teach
what you
have not
learnt
yourself ?
You are
setting up
mysteries
of your
own with
out proper
prepara
tion.
5*8 Discourses of Epictetus
What ! is it for this that young men are to leave their
countries and their parents, that they may come and hear
you expounding petty points of language ? Ought they
not to return ready to bear with others and work with
them, tranquil and free from tumult, furnished with
a provision for life s journey, which will enable them to
bear what befalls them well and to adorn themselves
thereby ? And how are you to impart to them what you
do not possess yourself ? For your sole occupation from
the first has been this how you are to resolve syllogisms
and variable arguments, and arguments concluding with
a question.
1 But So-and-so gives lectures, why should not I ?
Slave, you cannot do this off-hand, and in a random
fashion. It demands mature years, and a certain way
of life, and the guidance of God.
You say no : but no one sails from harbour without
sacrificing to the gods and invoking their help, and men
do not sow at random, but only when they have invoked
Demeter ; and when a man has laid his hand to a task
so momentous as this without the gods help, will he be
secure and will those who come to him be fortunate
in their coming? Man, what are you doing but making
the Mysteries common? You say, There is a shrine at
Eleusis, lo, here is one also : there is a hierophant there :
I too will make a hierophant : there is a herald there, I
too will appoint a herald : there is a torch-bearer there,
I too will have a torch-bearer : there are torches there,
so there are here : the cries are the same. What differ
ence is there between our doings and the Mysteries ?
Book HI, Chapter 21 T9
Most impious of men, is there no difference? The
benefit of the Mysteries depends on proper place and
time: one must approach with sacrifice and prayer, with
body purified and mind ready and disposed to approach
holy rites and ancient sanctities. Only so do the Mys
teries bring benefit, only so do we arrive at the belief that
all these things were established by those of old for our
education and the amendment of our life. But you
publish and divulge them out of place and out of season,
without sacrifices or purifying : you have not the dress
which the hierophant should have, nor the proper hair,
nor the fillet : you have not the right voice nor age, you
have not lived pure as he has, but you have merely
learnt off the words and say, The words have a holy
power in themselves.
You must approach the task in another fashion : it The
is momentous and full of mystery, not a chance gift
which any one can command. The care of the young me ntous
demands, it may be, more than wisdom : yes, by Zeus, andje-
one must have a certain readiness and special fitness, high quali
and a certain habit of body, and above all the counsel f
of God advising one to discharge this duty, as He coun
selled Socrates to examine men, and Diogenes to rebuke
men in royal fashion, and Zeno to instruct and lay down
precepts. You open a doctor s consulting-room with
nothing but some drugs, without ever taking the trouble
to acquire a knowledge of when or how they are applied.
See, that s his remedy, eye-salve (you say) : I have
that too. Have you also the faculty of using it ? Do you
know when and how and to whom it will do good?
tfo Discourses of Epictetus
Why then do you play at hazard with matters of highest
moment, why are you reckless, why do you take in hand
a task unsuited to your powers ? Leave it to those who
If you can do it and do it with distinction.
attempt it -^ , .
off-hand JJo not brm g disgrace upon philosophy by your personal
you will act, nor join those who disparage the profession : but
dishonour ., , ,
philo- " tne study ot precepts really attracts you, sit quietly and
sophy. turn them over in your mind, but never call yourself
a philosopher nor allow any one else to do so, but say :
He is in error : I am unchanged ; my will, my impulses,
my assent, are what they were, and, in a word, I have
not advanced from my position, but deal with impres
sions as before. So think, so speak about yourself, if you
would think aright. But if this is beyond you, then play
at hazard and do as you are doing, for you will be acting
in character.
CHAPTER XXII
On the calling of the Cynic. 1
of h the alling WHEN one of his acquaintance, who seemed inclined
Cynic must to tne Cynic School, asked him what should be the
jlJ- be character of the Cynic, and what was the primary
assumed, conception of the school, he said, We will consider
it at leisure : but this much I can tell you, that he who
undertakes so great an enterprise without God s help
is under God s wrath, and has no other wish but to
disgrace himself in the public eye, for in a well-managed
house a man does not come forward and say to himself,
I ought to be steward : for, if he does, the master
of the house takes notice, and when he sees him swaggering
Book ///, Chapter 22 61
and ordering people about, he drags him away and gives
him the lash. So it happens also in this great City of the
Universe. Here, too, there is a Master of the House who For each
... . , creature
assigns each thing its place.
* You are the sun : your faculty is to revolve and make place al-
, j . lotted to
the year and the seasons, to give growth and increase him>
to the fruits, to rouse the winds and bring them to rest
and to give temperate warmth to men s bodies ; go,
travel on your course and so move all things from the
greatest to the least.
You are a calf : when a lion appears, do your part, or
you will suffer for it. You are a bull, come near and
fight : for this is your proper portion and lies within
your powers. You can lead the army against Ilion : be
Agamemnon. You can fight Hector in single combat :
be Achilles. But if Thersites came forward and claimed
the command he would not get it, or if he got it he
would be shamed before a multitude of witnesses.
You, like the rest, must give the matter careful thought : The Cynic
. , j is not
it is not what you think. I wear a coarse cloak now and made by
shall do so then, I sleep hard now and shall still do so, his clothes
I shall take to myself a wallet and a staff and begin outwar( j
to go about begging and reviling those I meet, and if behaviour.
I see any one using pitch-plasters, 2 or with his hair
finely dressed, or walking in scarlet, I shall rebuke him.
If that is your impression of the Cynic s calling, give
it a wide berth : do not come near it, for you have no
concern with it ; but if you have a true impression of
it and still deem yourself not unworthy, then consider
what a great enterprise you are taking in hand.
The Cynic
must have
a pure
heart, for
his only
defence
is self-
respect.
The Cynic
must rely
upon his
reason
alone.
62 Discourses of Epictetus
First, you must show a complete change in your
conduct, and must cease to accuse God or man : you must
utterly put away the will to get, 3 and must will to avoid
only what lies within the sphere of your will : you must
harbour no anger, wrath, envy, pity : a fair maid, a fair
name, favourites, or sweet cakes, must mean nothing
to you. For you must know that other men, when they
indulge in such things, have the protection of their walls
and houses and darkness. There are many things to hide
them : one, may be, has closed the door, or has set some
one to guard his chamber : If any one comes, say, " He
is out " or " He is busy." But the Cynic, instead of all
these, should have self-respect for his shelter : if he has
not that, he will be naked and exposed and put to shame.
This is his house, his door, this his chamber-guards,
this his darkness : for he must not wish to conceal
anything that is his : if he does, he disappears ; he loses
the true Cynic, the free open-air spirit, he has begun
to fear outward things, he has begun to have need of
concealment, and when he would hide himself he cannot ;
for he has no place or means to hide himself. But if
by chance the public teacher, the pedagogue is caught
erring 4 what must be his feelings ! Is it possible with these
fears before one to be confident with one s whole mind,
and command other men? It is impracticable, im
possible.
First then you must make your Governing Principle
pure, and hold fast this rule of life, ( Henceforth my mind
is the material I have to work on, as the carpenter has
his timber and the shoemaker his leather : my business is
Booh III, Chapter 22 63
to deal with my impressions aright. My wretched body
is nothing to me, its parts are nothing to me. Death?
Let it come when it will, whether to my whole body or
to a part of it. Exile? Can one be sent into exile
beyond the Universe? One cannot. Wherever I go,
there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars,
dreams, auguries, conversation with the gods.
The true Cynic when he has ordered himself thus He is a
cannot be satisfied with this : he must know that he is J^^Q
sent as a messenger from God to men concerning things
good and evil, to show them that they have gone astray
and are seeking the true nature of good and evil where
it is not to be found, and take no thought where it
really is : he must realize, in the words of Diogenes
when brought before Philip after the battle of Chaeronea,
that he is sent * to reconnoitre . 5 For indeed the Cynic
has to discover what things are friendly to men and
what are hostile : and when he has accurately made
his observations he must return and report the truth,
not driven by fear to point out enemies where there are
none, nor in any other way disturbed or confounded by
his impressions.
He must then be able, if chance so offer, to come and must
forward on the tragic stage, and with a loud voice utter ^ n
the words of Socrates : Oh race of men, whither are men
ye hurrying? What are you doing, miserable creatures?
You wander up and down like blind folk : you have
left the true path and go away on a vain errand, you seek
peace and happiness elsewhere, where it is not to be
found, and believe not when another shows the way.
against
looking for
happiness
in the
wrong
place.
The true
cause of
misery is
neglect of
the reason
64 Discourses of Epictetus
Why do you seek it outside ? Do you seek it in the body ?
It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myron, look at
Ophellius. In property? It is not there. If you
disbelieve, look at Croesus, look at the rich men of
to-day, and see how full their life is of lamentation. In
office? It is not there. If it were, then those who have
twice or thrice been consuls should be happy, but they
are not. Whom shall we trust on this matter? Shall
we trust you who look upon their fortune from outside
and are dazzled by the outward show, or the men them
selves? What do they say? Listen to them, when they
lament and sigh, and think their condition to be more
miserable and perilous just because of their consulships
and glory and distinction. Shall you find it in royalty?
It is not there. If it were, Nero would have been happy,
and Sardanapalus. Why, even Agamemnon was not
happy, though he was a finer fellow than Sardanapalus
and Nero. When the rest were snoring what did he do ?
4 Many hairs he plucked by the roots from his head ,
and what did he say himself? Thus do I wander and
am in agony of spirit, and my heart leaps from my breast?
Miserable man, what is wrong with your affairs? Is
it your property? No. Your body? No. You have
store of gold and copper \ What is wrong with you
then? You have neglected and ruined that in you
whatever it be wherewith we exercise the will to get
and to avoid, the impulse to act and not to act. How
have you neglected it? It is ignorant of the true nature
of the good to which it is born and of the nature of evil,
and of what concerns it and what does not. And so
Book III y Chapter 22 <Sy
when something that does not concern it is in bad case,
it says, Woe is me, the Hellenes are in peril ! Oh
miserable mind of man, alone neglected and uncared for !
* They are going to perish, slain by the Trojans !
And if the Trojans slay them not, will they not die?
Yes, but not all at once.
What does it matter then? If death is evil, it is
equally evil, whether men die alone or together. Will
anything else happen, but that body and soul will be
separated ?
Nothing.
And if the Hellenes perish, is the door closed to you?
Is not death within your power ?
It is.
Why do you mourn then? Bravo ! a king indeed, and
holding the sceptre of Zeus ! 6
A king cannot be miserable any more than God can
be. What are you then ? A shepherd in very truth,
for you weep just like shepherds when a wolf carries
off one of their sheep : yes and these whom you rule
are sheep too. And why did you come here? Was
there any danger to your will to get or your will to avoid,
your impulse for action and against action?
No, he says, but my brother s poor wife was
carried off.
It is a great gain to be robbed of an adulterous wife.
Are we then to suffer the scorn of the Trojans?
What are they? Are they wise or foolish? If they are
wise, why do you make war on them? If they are
foolish, what does it matter to you?
546.24 II E
66 Discourses of Epictetus
The good In what then does the good reside, since it is not in
b^und these things? Tell us, Sir Messenger and Spy.
outside us. It is where you think not, and will not seek for it.
For if you had wished you would have found it in your
selves and would not have wandered outside and would
not have sought the things of others as your own. Turn
again to yourselves., learn to understand the primary
notions which you have. Of what nature do you imagine
the good to be?
* Tranquil, fraught with happiness, unhindered.
Nay, but do you not imagine it as naturally great?
Do you not imagine it as precious ? Do you not imagine
it as free from harm? I ask you then, in what subject
must we seek for that which is tranquil and unhindered ?
In the slavish or the free?
In the free.
Your poor body then, is it slavish or free ?
We know not.
Do you not know that it is a slave to fever, gout,
ophthalmia, dysentery, the tyrant, fire, sword, everything
stronger than itself?
* Yes, it is a slave.
How then can any part of the body be still free from
hindrance? How can that which is naturally dead
earth and clay be great or precious? What then?
Have you no element of freedom?
Perhaps none.
Why, who can compel you to assent to what appears
false?
No one.
Booh ///, Chapter 22 67
And who to refuse assent to what appears true?
No one.
Here then you see that there is something in you which
is naturally free. What man among you can have will to
get or to avoid, impulse to act or not to act, or can prepare
or put an object before himself, without conceiving an
impression of what is profitable or fitting ?
1 No one.
Here too then you have free and unhindered action.
Miserable men, develop this, set your minds on this, seek
your good here.
( Nay, but how is it possible for a man who has nothing, The true
naked, without home or hearth, in squalor, without a slave, C y nic is .
without a city, to live a tranquil life ? de^enden
Lo, God has sent you one who shall show indeed that
it is possible. Look at me, I have no house or city,
property or slave : I sleep on the ground, I have no wife
or children, no miserable palace, but only earth and sky
and one poor cloak. Yet what do I lack? Am I not quit
of pain and fear, am I not free? When has any of you
ever seen me failing to get what I will to get, or falling
into what I will to avoid ? When did I blame God or man,
when did I accuse any? Has any of you seen me with
a gloomy face? How do I meet those of whom you stand
in fear and awe? Do I not meet them as slaves? Who that
sees me but thinks that he sees his king and master?
There you have the true Cynic s words ; this is his charac
ter, and scheme of life. No, you say, what makes the Cynic The Cynic
is a little wallet, and a staff and a big pair of jaws ; to who is
devour or hoard everything you give him or to revile out oulwardly
68 Discourses of Epictetus
does not o f season those who meet him, or to make a show of his
fine shoulder !
of his task. Is this the spirit in which you mean to take in hand so
great an enterprise? Take a mirror first, look at your
shoulders, take note of your loins and your thighs. Man,
it is an Olympic contest you are about to enter your name
for, not a miserable, make-believe match. At Olympia you
cannot simply be beaten and leave the grounds ; in the
first place you must be disgraced in the sight of all the
world, not before men of Athens only or of Lacedaemon
or of Nicopolis ; in the next place the man who lightly
enters the lists 7 must be flogged, but before he is flogged
he must suffer thirst and scorching heat and swallow
plenty of dust. Think it over more carefully, know your
self, inquire of heaven, attempt not the task without God.
If He advise you, know that He wishes you to become
The Cynic great or to receive many stripes. For this too is a very
must be ne stran d WOV en into the Cynic s lot : he must suffer
suffer pa- strokes like an ass and love the very men that strike him
tiently the ag though he were the father or brother of all.
discipline , . ,
of Zeus. No, no ; if a man nogs you, you must stand in the
midst and cry aloud, * Caesar, what pains I suffer under
your rule of peace ! Let us go to the proconsul.
What has the Cynic to do with Caesar or proconsul or
any one else but Zeus, Who has sent him upon earth, and
Whom he serves ? Does he call upon any one but Him ? Is
he not convinced that whatever pains he suffers are God s
training of him ? Why, Heracles, when he was being trained
by Eurystheus, did not count himself wretched, but
fulfilled all his commands without shrinking, and shall this
Booh III, Chapter 22 69
man, who is under the training and discipline of Zeus, cry
aloud in indignation, if lie be worthy to carry the staff of
Diogenes ? Listen to what Diogenes said when the fever He must
was on him to those who passed by : * Base creatures, he L ltate
said, will you not stay? You go all that way toOlympia to whore-
see athletes killed or matched in battle, and vet have vou J oic ^\ n
hardship,
no wish to see a battle between fever and a man? I sup
pose you think a man like that would have been very likely
to accuse God, Who sent him, of using him hardly? Nay,
he was proud of his distresses, and was fain to be the
spectacle of passers-by. On what ground is he to accuse
God? That he is living a seemly life, and that he is dis
playing his virtue in a clearer light? 8 But what does he and
say of poverty, of death, of pain ? How did he compare f^g^t
his own happiness with that of the Great King? Nay, happier
he did not so much as think it comparable. For where ~ ln
there are tumults, and distresses, and fears, where the will King s.
to get is unfulfilled, and the will to avoid is foiled, a
world of envies and jealousies, how can happiness find
a way there? But wherever there are unsound judge
ments, there all these passions must be.
And when the young man asked Epictetus, whether, if The Cynic
he fell sick and a friend asked him to come to his house "^f [ lot
to be tended in his sickness, he was to consent, he said, friendship
Where will you find me a Cynic s friend ? For he must f^fone
be another like himself, that he may be worthy to be who can
counted as his friend ; he must share with him the
sceptre and the kingdom and be a worthy minister, if he
is to be deemed worthy of his friendship, as Diogenes was
worthy of Antisthenes, and Crates of Diogenes. Or do
70 Discourses of Epictetus
you think that if he salutes him as he comes near that makes
him his friend, and the Cynic will count him worthy to
receive him in his house? Wherefore, if this is your
opinion and such your thoughts, look round rather for
a fine dunghill to have your fever on, one that shelters
you from the north wind, to save you from a chill. But
you seem to me to want to get away into some one s house
for a time and eat your fill. How comes it then that
you should take in hand so great a matter ?
A Cynic Will the Cynic , said his questioner, accept marriage
may marry ^ children as matters of prime importance ?
in a city of ...
wise men, If, he replied, you grant me a city of wise men, it
may be that no one will lightly adopt the Cynic s calling.
For what reason should he take upon him this manner
of life? But if we assume that he does, there will be
nothing to prevent him from marrying and getting
children ; for his wife will be like himself, and his wife s
father will be like him, and his children will be brought
but not in up on these lines. But in the present constitution of
this the world which is that of the battlefield it is a
world of question whether the Cynic should not be undistracted
conflict, entirely, devoted to the service of God, able to go to
where /J . , c
marriage and fro among men, not tied down to acts that bent
means that private occasions, nor involved in personal relations,
tracted which if he violates he will cease to keep his character
from his as a goO( marij an( j jf ^ e maintains them he will destroy
the Messenger and Spy and Herald of the gods that is
in him. For he must show services to his father-in-law,
and render them to his wife s other relations and to her
self ; and so he is reduced to being a sick nurse or a general
Booh Illy Chapter 22 71
provider. Not to speak of other things, he must needs
have a saucepan, to make water hot for the baby, to wash
him in the bath ; when his wife has had a child he must
provide wool and oil for her, and a bed and a cup the
vessels mount up at once not to mention other business
and distraction. What becomes now of that king of ours
who watches every interest of the public,
Trusted with clans and full of many cares,
whose duty it is to watch others, those who have married
and got children, to see which of them uses his wife well,
which ill, who is quarrelsome, which house is prospering
and which is not, going about like a physician and feeling
men s pulses ? You have a fever, you a headache, you
the gout ; I prescribe fasting for you, food for you, no
bath for you ; you need the surgeon s knife, you the
cautery. How can the man who is involved in the acts You take
appropriate to private life find leisure? Must he not
procure clothes for the children? Must he not send them
to the schoolmaster with their tablets and note-books, and
provide them with beds, for they cannot be Cynics from
their mother s womb? If he does not provide for them,
it were better to fling them aside as soon as born rather
than kill them thus. See to what a pass we bring our
Cynic, how we take away his kingdom !
Yes, but Crates married.
The case you mention was a special one and a love-
match, and you have to assume a wife who was a Crates
herself. Our inquiry is concerned with ordinary marriages
which are liable to distraction ; and from this point of
72 Discourses of Epictetus
view we do not find that in these circumstances marriage
has a primary claim on the Cynic.
How then , says he, f will he keep society going ?
To rear By God, do you think that those who bring into the
children is wor j ( j two or three ugly little squeakers to fill their place
not the fo J
only public do men greater benefit than those who exercise oversight,
>ervice. gQ ar ag t k ev can ^ OV er all men, to see what they do, how
they live, what they attend to, what they undutifully
neglect ? Do you think the Thebans reaped greater benefit
from those who left them children than from Epaminon-
das who died childless ? Did Priam who begat fifty sons,
rascals all, or Danaus or Aeolus contribute more to
The society than Homer? What? Shall a man abstain from
Cynic s marrying or getting children for the sake of acting as
is worth general or writing a treatise, and be thought to have
this price. g Qt a a r ^ch^gg f or hi s childlessness, and shall the
kingdom of the Cynic be thought no compensation?
We must Perhaps we do not realize his greatness nor picture at
* ts true wortn tne character of Diogenes : we only look
ideal at the Cynics of to-day,
Cynic, not
the frauds j) ogs O j t fo ta ^ g Uar dians of the gate,
who copy those of old in nothing, except perhaps in dirty
habits.
If we knew what a Cynic was we should not be moved
or astonished at his not marrying or getting children.
Man, he is parent to all men, he has men for his sons,
women for his daughters ; he approaches all and treats
all in the spirit of a father. Do you think he reviles
those he meets because he is a busybody? He does it as
Booh HI, Chapter 22 73
a father, as a brother, and as servant of Zeus, the Father
of all.
Nay, ask me if you think well, whether he will take His politics
. . . are some-
part in politics. thing
Fool, do you look for a higher form of politics than those greater
he handles now? Is he to come forward and address an J^ranguing
Athenian assembly on revenues or ways and means, when the people,
he ought to be discoursing to all mankind, alike to
Athenians, to Corinthians, and to Romans, not about ways
and means or revenues or peace and war, but about
happiness and unhappiness, good fortune and bad fortune,
slavery and freedom. When a man is engaged in politics
of such moment, do you ask me if he is to be a politician?
Nay, ask me if he is to hold office. Fool, what office is
greater than this that he holds ?
Yet such an one has need also of a body of a certain The Cynic
quality; for if he come forward with a consumptive jjjj^|
figure, thin and pale, his testimony no longer carries the vigorous
same force. For he must not only display mental qualities
to convince the lay mind that it is possible to be good
and noble without the things that they set store by, but
his body must show that the plain and simple life of the
open air does no harm to the body Look you, how
my body and I bear witness to this. As indeed Diogenes
did ; for he went about with the glow of health on his
face, and attracted the masses by his bodily presence.
But a Cynic who excites pity is like a beggar ; every one
turns from him and takes offence at him ; for he ought
not to appear dirty, lest he should scare men away thereby ;
nay his very squalor should be cleanly and attractive.
a gracious
manner,
and a
ready wit.
Above all,
his reason
should be
unstained,
if he is to
concern
himself
with the
affairs of
all men.
74 Discourses of Epictetus
Further, the Cynic ought to have great natural grace
and quickness of wit (without this he is a driveller, nothing
more) that he may be able to give a ready and apposite
answer to each question that arises : as Diogenes answered
him who said, Are you the Diogenes who disbelieves in
the gods ? by saying, How can I be when I think the
gods hate you ? or again, when Alexander stood over
him as he slept and said :
Sleep all night long becomes not men of counsel,
replied, still in his sleep,
Trusted with clans and full of many cares.
But above all, his Governing Principle must be purer
than the sun ; otherwise he must needs be a gambler and
a reckless person ; he will be rebuking others when he is
involved in evil himself. See what this means. The kings
and tyrants of this world have their armed bodyguard
which enables them to rebuke certain persons and to punish
those who do wrong even though they are wicked them
selves, but the Cynic s conscience takes the place of arms
and bodyguard and furnishes him with this authority. 9
When he sees that he has watched and toiled for men,
and that his sleep has been pure, and that when sleep
leaves him he is purer still, and that all the thoughts of
his heart have been those of one who is a friend and
servant of the gods, and who shares the rule of Zeus, and
that everywhere he is ready to say :
Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
and If thus the gods would have it, be it so then, I ask,
Eooh III, Chapter 22 7f
why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his
brothers, to his children, and in a word to his kinsfolk ?
Therefore the man whose mind is thus disposed is not
fussy nor impertinent, for when he is inspecting the
affairs of men, he is concerned with what is not another s
but his own, unless you are to call the general too a busy- Otherwise
body, when he inspects and reviews and keeps watch J-J^JJai^
over his soldiers, and punishes those who offend against rejected,
discipline. But if you rebuke others when you are carry
ing a nice cake hid under your arm, I shall say to you,
* Would not you rather go off into a corner and eat what*
you have stolen? What have you to do with other men s
concerns ? Who are you ? Are you the bull or the queen
bee ? Show me the tokens of your royalty, like those which
nature gives her. But if you are only a drone claiming the
kingdom of the bees, do not you think that your fellow
citizens will make an end of you, as the bees do to the
drones ?
r The Cynic must have the spirit of patience in such The Cynic
J , i f r must be
measure as to seem to the multitude as unfeeling as a unmove( j
stone. Reviling or blows or insults are nothing to him ; by the
he has given his bit of a body to any one who will, to treat of his
it as he pleases. For he remembers that the inferior inferiors,
must needs be conquered by the superior, where it is
inferior, and the body is inferior to the multitude, the
weaker inferior to them that are stronger. He therefore
never enters upon this contest, where he may be con
quered, but at once resigns what does not belong to him
and does not claim power over slaves. But when it But his
comes to the will and the power of dealing with impres-
76 Discourses of Epictetus
effort is sions then you will see what eyes he has, so that you will
the region sa ^ Argus was kHnd ^ n comparison. Is there reckless
of the will, assent, is there vain impulse, will to get which fails, will
to avoid which is foiled, purpose incomplete, blame, dis
paragement or envy? It is on these he concentrates his
attention and energy ; for the rest he snores and takes
his ease, and all is peace. No one robs him of his will or
masters that.
Do they master his bit of a body?
Yes.
* And his bit of property?
Yes.
And offices and honours?
What does he care for these? When any one tries to
frighten him with these fears he says to him, Get away,
look for children to frighten. They think masks fearsome,
but I know that they are made of pot, and have nothing
inside.
The So momentous is the profession you are thinking of.
task 10 Before God I beg you to wait if you will, and look first to
demands your equipment ; for mark what Hector says to Andro-
great gifts. mache . <Q Q rat h er to t ^ e house*, he says, and weave :
War shall be men s concern,
All men s, and, mine in chief.
So truly did he realize his own endowment and her
incapacity.
Booh HI, Chapter 23
CHAPTER XXI II
To those who read and discourse for display.
FIRST say to yourself, what manner of man you want You must
to be ; when you have settled this, act upon it in all you Jj^ t y OU
do ; for in pretty nearly all pursuits we see that done, want to
Athletes first decide what they want to be, and then am
they act accordingly. If a man is to be a long-distance
runner, he takes the diet, the walking, the rubbing, and
the gymnastic suited to that ; if he is going in for the
short course, he alters all this to suit his aim, if for the
pentathlon he alters his training still more. You will find
the same done in the arts. If you are a carpenter you
will have this kind of work ; if a smith, you will have that
kind. For in everything we do, if we have no standard
to go by, we shall do it ineffectively ; if we use the wrong
standard, we shall fail completely.
Now we have two standards to go by, one general and
one special. The first is that we must act as human
beings. What does this include? We must not act like
a sheep, at random, nor like a brute, destructively. The
special standard is relative to each man s occupation and
purpose. The lyre-player must act as a lyre-player, the
carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as :. philosopher,
the orator as an orator. When therefore you say, Come
and hear me lecturing to you , see to it first that you are
not acting without aim. Then if you find you have
a standard, see to it that it is the right one.
7 8 Discourses of Epictetus
If you wish Do you wish to do men good or to receive compliments ?
to do men At once vou ] iave t ] ie answer What account do I take
good, you
must show of the praise of the multitude ?
by your An excellent answer. Nor does the musician heed the
judge- . . -
ments multitude, so far as he is a true musician, nor the geome
trician. Do you wish then to do good? What are you
aiming at ? Tell us, that we too may run to your lecture-
room. Now can any one do good to others unless he has
received good himself? No, no more than the man who
is no carpenter can help others in carpentry, or he who is
no shoemaker in shoemaking.
that you Would you really know then whether you have received
fitedb* " an7 g d? Produce y ur judgements, my philosopher.
your train- What does the will to get profess ? Success in getting.
ing- And the will to avoid ? Escape from what it avoids. Well,
do we fulfil their profession? Tell me the truth, and if
you lie, I will tell you myself. When lately your audience
were slack in their attendance, and did not applaud you,
you went away in low spirits. Again when you were lately
praised you went round and said to every one, What did
you think of me ?
I thought you wonderful, master, as I live.
* How did I give that passage ?
Which do you mean ?
Where I described Pan and the Nymphs.
Superlatively.
And yet you tell me that in respect to that will to get
and will to avoid you behave in a natural way. Go to, get
some one else to believe you ! Did you not lately praise
So-and-so against your real opinion? Did you not natter
Book 111, Chapter 23 79
So-and-so, the senator s son? Did you want your children
to be like that ?
Heaven forbid !
Why then did you praise him and pay him attention ?
* He is a young man of parts, and ready to listen to
arguments.
How do you know that?
He admires me.
Now you have stated the true reason. After all, what Do not
do you think? Do not these very admirers secretly despise flatter
you ? When a man who is conscious of no good action or hearers,
good thought meets a philosopher who says, Here is
a genius, frank and unspoilt , do not you think he is
bound to say to himself, This man wants something from
me ? Tell me, what sign of genius has he displayed ?
Why, he has been with you all this long time, he has
heard you discoursing, he has heard you lecturing. Has
he grown modest ? Has he returned to himself ? l Has
he realized what misery he is in? Has he cast away his
vanity? Is he looking for some one to teach him?
He is.
Some one to teach him how he should live? No, you
fool, but how he should speak, for that is what he ad
mires you for. .Listen and hear what he says: This
man is a perfect artist in style, his style is much finer than
Dio s. That s a different thing altogether. Does he say,
This man has self-respect, he is trustworthy and tran
quil-minded ? If he did say so, I should say, * Since he
is trustworthy, tell me what you mean by this " trust
worthy " man , and if he could not answer I should
8 o Discourses of Epictetus
add, * First learn what your words mean, and then
speak/
If you are in this sorry state, gaping for men to praise
you, and counting your audience, do you really want to
do others good?
To-day I had a much larger audience.
Yes, it was a large one.
I suppose five hundred.
Nonsense ! put them at a thousand.
Dio never had so large an audience.
How is that ?
Why, they have a fine turn for understanding argu
ments,
Study the Noble teaching, master, can move even a stone.
spirit of There you have the words of a philosopher ! 2 These are
and not his the feelings of one who is to benefit mankind, there you
sty e have a man who has listened to reason, who has read the
teaching of Socrates in the spirit of Socrates, and not as
so much Lysias or Isocrates ! " I have often wondered
by what arguments " no, " by what argument " the
singular is smoother than the plural. 3 Did you ever read
the words except as one reads paltry songs? If you had
read them properly you would not have dwelt on these
points of language, but would rather have studied the
passage, Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot
harm me , and this, * My nature is such that I cannot
attend to my affairs, but only to the argument which
appears best to me when I reflect. That was why no
one ever heard Socrates say, I know and teach ; no,
he sent one man here, another there ; and therefore they
Book ///, Chapter 23 81
used to come to him, asking to be introduced by him
to philosophers, and he took and introduced them.
No, of course, as he went with them he would say,
* Come and hear me discourse to-day in the house 4 of
Quadratus !
What am I to hear from you? Do you want to display The true
to me your fine composition? Man, you compose well philo-
enough, and what good does it do you ? should
Do praise me, I beg. draw his
. , audience
What do you mean by praise : by force of
1 Say " Bravo ! " to me, or " Marvellous ! " character
Very well, I say it ; but if praise is what philosophers
put in the category of the good, what praise can I give
you ? If correct speaking is a good thing, teach me that,
and I will praise you.
* What ? are you bound to dislike listening to fine
oratory?
Heaven forbid ! I do not dislike listening to a harp-
player, but am I therefore bound to stand and play the
harp? Hear what Socrates says, It would not be seemly
for me, sir, at this time of life, to come before you like
a youth framing fine phrases. Like a youth , he says.
Yes, it is indeed a pretty art, to select fine phrases and
put them together, and then come forward and read them
or recite them with ability, and as one reads to add,
* There are not many that can understand what I say, as
sure as you hope to live.
Does the philosopher invite men to a lecture? Does he
not draw to him those who are going to get good from
him, as the sun draws sustenance to itself? No physician
546.24 II F
8 2 Discourses of Epictetus
worth the name invites men to come and be healed by
him, though I hear that in Rome to-day physicians do
invite them ; in my day physicians were called in by
their patients.
I bid you to come and hear that you are in a bad way,
that you attend to everything rather than what you
should attend to, and that you do not know what is good
and what is evil, and are unhappy and miserable.
A fine invitation !
Surely, unless the philosopher s words force home this
and not 7 r r .
by fine lesson, they are dead and so is he. Rufus was wont to
phrases. say ^ < jf you n( j l e i sure to praise me, my words are spoken
in vain. Wherefore he spoke in such fashion that each
of us as he sat there thought he was himself accused :
such was his grip of men s doings, so vividly did he set each
man s ills before his eyes. The philosopher s school,
sirs, is a physician s consulting-room. You must leave it
in pain, not in pleasure ; for you come to it in disorder,
one with a shoulder put out, another with an ulcer,
another with fistula, another with headache. And
then you would have me sit there and utter fine little
thoughts and phrases, that you may leave me with praise
on your lips, and carrying away, one his shoulder, one
his head, one his ulcer, one his fistula, exactly in the
state he brought them to me. Is it for this you say that
young men are to go abroad and leave their parents and
friends and kinsmen and property, that they may say, Ye
gods ! to you when you deliver your phrases ? Was this
what Socrates did, or Zeno, or Cleanthes ?
You ask, Is there not the hortatory style?
Book ///, Chapter 23 83
Yes no one denies it just as there is the style for The true
proof and the style for teaching. Who has ever named hortatory
a fourth style along with them, the ostentatious? What hold on
is the hortatory style ? The power of showing to one and character,
to many what a sordid struggle they are plunged in, and
how they pay regard to everything rather than to what
they want. For they want what tends to happiness, but
they seek it in the wrong place. Is it for this that you
must set up a thousand benches 5 and invite men to come
and hear you, and then mount the rostrum in a fine robe
or an elegant cloak and describe the death of Achilles?
Cease, by all your gods, to dishonour noble words and
subjects, so far as in you lies. Nothing is more effective
in exhortation than when the speaker makes plain to his
hearers that he has need of them. 6 Tell me, in all your
readings or discourses, did you ever make one of your
audience anxious about himself or rouse him to a sense of
his position? Did you ever send one away saying, The
philosopher has got a good grip of me : I must act so no
more ? Why, even if your fame is at its height, he
only says to some one, * A pretty description that about
Xerxes ! while another puts in, No, the battle of
Thermopylae. Is this what a philosopher s lecture
comes to?
F2
84 Discourses of Epictetus
CHAPTER XXIV
That we ought not to spend our feelings on things beyond
our power.
Men s un- IF a thing goes against another s nature, you must not
happiness t ^ -^ ag ey ^ or QU . f or vou are b orn not to share
is their J J
own fault, humiliation or evil fortune, but to share good fortune.
And if a man is unfortunate, remember that his misfortune
is his own fault ; for God created all men for happiness
and peace of mind. To this end He gave men resources,
giving each man some things for his own, and some not
for his own, things subject to hindrance and deprivation
and compulsion not for his own, but things beyond
They need hindrance for his own. The true nature of good and
nevei e ev ^ j_j e g ave man for his own, as was natural for Him to
if they do, Who cares for us and protects us as a Father.
d^t" 1 i h ^^ k u t ^ have J us t P ar ted from such an one, and he
what is is distressed !
f Cir /hat Why did he count as his own what was not his ? When
is not. he rejoiced to look on you why did he not reflect that you
are mortal, and that you may go on a journey? Wherefore
he pays the penalty for his own foolishness. But why do
you bewail yourself, and to what end ? Did not you study
this distinction either? Did you, as worthless women do,
regard all the things in which you took pleasure places,
persons, ways of life as though they would always be
with you ? And so now you sit and weep because you do
not see the same persons and pass your time in the same
Booh III y Chaffer 24
place. No doubt 7011 deserve this fate to be more
wretched than rooks and ravens, who may fly where they
will and change their nests, and cross the seas, without
lamenting or longing for their first possessions.
Yes, but this happens to them because they have no
reason.
Is our reason then given us by the gods for misfortune
and misery, that we may continue in wretchedness and
mourning? Or would you have all men to be immortal,
and no one go abroad ? Are we never to go away but all
to stay rooted like plants, and if one of our close friends
goes abroad are we to sit and weep : and again, if he
return, are we to dance and clap like little children ?
Shall we not at last give up the milk of babes, and Men must
remember what we heard from the philosophers, unless go i n the
we took what they said for enchanters tales ? This world course of
is one city, and the substance of which it is constructed
is one ; and things must needs move in a cycle, one thing
giving way to another, and some things must pass away,
and others come into being, some must abide as they are
and others must move : and the universe is full of friends but the _
universe is
the gods first, and after them men, whom nature has full of
made akin to one another ; some of them must be with fri en( ls.
one another and others must go away, and we should
rejoice in those that are with us, yet not be sad at those
who go away. And man, besides being born to a high
courage, and to despise all that is beyond his will, has
this too for his own, that he is not rooted nor attached
to the earth, but goes now to one place, now to another,
at one time under the pressure of business, at another
Discourses of Epictetus
Odysseus merely to see the world. Such indeed was the lot of
and Hera- ^ ,
cles are Odysseus :
man s life, Cities of many men he saw, and learnt
its move- Their mind ,
ment, and
its ties of ^ t ear ii er i t was the l ot o f Heracles to go about all
friendship.
the inhabited world,
Beholding laws and insolence of men,
cleansing the world and casting forth the insolent, and
bringing in the rule of law. Yet how many friends,
think you, had he in Thebes, how many in Argos, how
many in Athens, and how many did he win for himself as
he went about, seeing that he married a wife, where he
thought fit, and got children, and forsook his children,
with no mourning nor longing, nor as one leaving them
orphans ? For he knew that no man is an orphan, but that
all men have always the Father Who cares for them con
tinually ; for to him it was no mere tale that he had
heard that Zeus is the Father of men, for he believed Him
to be his own father and called Him so, and all that he
did he did as looking to Him, wherefore it was in his
power to live happily everywhere. But happiness and
nging for what is absent can never be united ; for that
which is happy must needs have all that it will, and be as
it were in a state of satisfaction ; no thirst or hunger
Do not must come near it. But Odysseus, you say, had a sense
Homer if ^ ^ on ^ n S ^ or ^ s wife, and sat upon a rock and wept,
he makes Do you take Homer for your authority in everything, and
unhappy Homer s stories? If Odysseus really wept, was he not
Boot III) Chapter 24 87
miserable, and what good man is ever miserable ? The
universe is indeed managed ill if Zeus does not take care
of His citizens, that they may be happy as He is. It is
not lawful or right even to think of such a thing, and if
Odysseus wept and lamented, he was no good man. For
how can a man be good, when he knows not who he is,
and how can he know this when he has forgotten
that all things that have come into being are perishable,
and that it is impossible for man to be with man for ever ?
Now to desire what is impossible is slavish and silly ; it is
to make oneself a stranger in the world, and to fight against
God with one s own judgements, as alone one can.
But my mother mourns because she does not see me. If we ccn-
7 > A7 T j cern our-
Why does she not take to heart these lessons ? Yet I do selves wilh
not say that we must not take pains to prevent her lament- ^***
ing ; but that we must not wish absolutely for what is we shall be
not ours. Another s sorrow is no concern of mine, my miserable
. , , , , indeed.
sorrow is my own ; and so I shall absolutely check my
own sorrow, for it is in my power, but another s I shall
try to check only so far as I can, but not absolutely ;
otherwise I shall fight against God, I shall set myself
against Zeus and array myself against His conduct of the
universe, and the penalty for this battling with God and
this disobedience will be paid not only by * children s
children , but by me in my own person, by day and by
night, when I start in my dreams and am disturbed, when
I tremble at every message, when my peace of mind hangs
upon another s letters.
Some one is come from Rome.
If only it be no ill news !
8 8 Discourses of Epictetus
What ill can happen to you in a place where you are
not?
From Greece.
* If only it be no ill news 1
On this principle, every place can cause you misery.
Is it not enough that you should be miserable where you
are yourself? Must you needs be miserable overseas, and
by letter? Is this what you mean by being secure?
What happens then if your friends there die?
What else except that mortal men have died? How
can you wish at the same time to grow old and not to
see the death of any that you love? Do you not know
that in the long course of time many events of divers
sorts must happen? One man must be overcome by fever,
another by a robber, a third by a despot. For such is
the nature of the atmosphere about us, and of our com
panions ; cold and heat and unsuitable food, and travel
by land, and sea, and winds and manifold perils destroy
one man and send another into exile, and another they
send on an embassy or as a soldier. Sit still then
with your wits dazed at all these things mourning,
unfortunate, miserable, depending on something other
than yourself not one thing or two, but things in
numerable.
Life is Is this what your lesson comes to, is this what you learnt
in the philosopher s school? Do you not know that life
is a soldier s service ? One man must keep guard, another
go out to reconnoitre, another take the field. It is not
possible for all to stay where they are, nor is it better so.
But you neglect to fulfil the orders of the general and
Book III) Chapter 24 89
complain, when some severe order is laid upon you ; you
do not understand to what a pitiful state you are bringing
the army so far as in you lies ; you do not see that if all
follow your example there will be no one to dig a trench,
or raise a palisade, no one to keep night watch or fight
in the field, but every one will seem an unserviceable
soldier.
Again, if you go as a sailor on shipboard, keep to one
place and hold fast to that ; if you are called on to climb
the mast, refuse, if to run out on the bows, refuse that.
Why, what ship s master will put up with you, and not
fling you overboard like a useless bit of furniture, a mere
hindrance and bad example to the other sailors? So too
it is in the world ; each man s life is a campaign, and a
long and varied one. It is for you to play the soldier s and you
part do everything at the General s bidding, divining "^ P*J
His wishes, if it be possible. For there is no comparison and obey
between that General and the ordinary one in power JUJeen
and superiority of character. You are set in an imperial General.
City and not in some humble town ; you are always
a senator. Do you not know that such an one can attend
but little to his own household? He must spend most
of his time abroad, in command or under command, or as
subordinate to some officer, or as coldier or judge? And
yet you tell me you want to be attached like a plant and
rooted in the same place?
* Yes, for it is pleasant.
Who denies it? Dainties are pleasant too, and a beauti
ful woman is a pleasant thing. Your talk is the talk of
those who make pleasure their end.
9
Discourses of Epictetus
To talk of Do you not realize whose language you are using, the
tousethe 5 l an g ua g e f Epicureans and abandoned creatures? and
base Ian- yet though your actions and your principles are theirs,
IHcurus y ou ( l uote to us t ^ ie wor> ds of Zeno and Socrates? Fling
away from you, as far as may be, these alien properties
that you adorn yourself with, and that do not fit you !
People of that sort have no wish except to sleep without
hindrance or compulsion, and then to get up and yawn
at their ease and wash their face, then to write and read
at their pleasure, then to talk nonsense and be compli
mented by their friends, whatever they say, then to go
out for a walk and after a little walk to have a bath, then
to eat, and then go to sleep the sort of sleep men of
that kind are likely to indulge in I need say no more
you may judge what it is.
Come, now, tell me the way of life your heart is set
on you who profess to admire truth and Socrates and
Diogenes. What do you want to do in Athens? Just
To be false what you are doing? Nothing else? Then why do you
Ji. ^ call yourself a Stoic ? If those who speak falsely of the
Stoic name r . J
brings its Roman constitution are seriously punished, are those
who speak falsely of so great and serious a subject and
a name to get off scot free ? That cannot be ; none may
escape this divine and mighty law, which exacts the
greatest punishments from those whose offence is greatest.
What does it say ? He that pretends to qualities that
concern him not, let him be given to vanity and arrogance ;
let him that disobeys the divine government be an abject
slave, let him be subject to pain, envy, pity, in a word,
let him be miserable and full of lamentations.
own
punish
ment.
Book 111, Chapter 24 91
What is your conclusion ? Would you have me court You may
this great man or that and frequent his doorstep ? thTrich ^
If reason so determine, for country s sake or kindred in a good
or mankind, why should you not go to him ? You are not ^ifmust
ashamed to go to the shoemaker when you want shoes, not pay
nor to the market-gardener when you want lettuces.
Are you ashamed to go to the rich when you want
something they can give ?
* Yes, but I do not admire the shoemaker.
Do not admire the rich man either.
I shall not flatter the market-gardener."
Do not flatter the rich man either.
* How then am I to get what I want?
Do I say to you, Go, and you will get what you want ,
or only, Go, and act up to your character ?
Why do I go then ?
That you may come away feeling that you have ful
filled the acts required of a citizen, a brother, a friend.
But remember that you have gone to a shoemaker,
a greengrocer, one who has no authority over great
or high matters, though he sell what he has for a big
price. You are going as it were to fetch lettuces ;
they are worth an obol, but not a talent.
Apply this principle. The business is worth going to
a man s door for. Very well, I will go. It is worth an
interview. Very well, I will have an interview with him.
But if I must kiss his hand and flatter him with compli
ments, that is like paying a talent. I will have none of it.
It is not to my profit, nor to the profit of the city or my
friends to ruin a good citizen and a friend.
9 2 Discourses of Epictetus
Do what But men will think you took no pains if you fail.
18 r ] ght * r Have you again forgotten why you went there ? Do
mind what you not know that a good man does nothing for the
men think. ^^ of w j iat men fa m ^ but only for the sake of doing
right ?
What does he gain by doing right?
What does a man gain who writes Dio s name correctly?
The gain of writing.
Is there no further reward?
Do you look for any greater reward for a good man
than to do what is noble and right? At Olympia you
do not want anything else ; you are content to have
been crowned at Olympia. Does it seem to you so
small and worthless a thing to be noble and good and
happy? Therefore, since the gods have made you a
citizen of this city and you are bound to set your hand
betimes to a man s work, why hanker after nurses and
the breast, and allow silly women to soften you and
make you effeminate with their tears? Will you then
never cease to be a babe? Do you not know that he
who acts like a child is ridiculous in proportion to his
years ?
Flattery Did you not see any one in Athens, or go to any one s
has no .
place if house?
you are set Yes, the man I wanted to see.
judge- -Do the same here ; choose to see the man you want,
ment. and you will see him ; only do it in no abject spirit, with
out will to get or to avoid, and all will be well with you ;
but it does not depend on going or standing at the door,
but on the judgements that are within you. When you
Book III, Chapter 24 93
have come to despise things without you and beyond
your will s control, and have come to regard none of them
as your own, but only this to be right in judgement, in
thought, in impulse, in will to get and to avoid, what
room is left for flattery or abjectness of mind? Why do
you still long for the peace of your home, and for your
familiar haunts? Wait a little and these places 1 will
become familiar to you in their turn. Then if your
spirit is as degenerate as this, go weep and mourn as
soon as you are again parted from these.
* How then am I to prove myself affectionate ? You may
In a noble and not a miserable spirit. For it is against t i onate if
all reason to be of an abject and broken spirit and to y u do
depend on another and to blame God or man. Prove o n others,
yourself affectionate, but see that you observe these rules ;
if this affection of yours, or whatever you call it, is going
to make you a miserable slave, it is not for your good to
be affectionate. Nay, what prevents you loving a man as
one who is mortal and bound to leave you? Did not
Socrates love his children? Yes, but as one who is free Take
and bears in mind that the love of the gods stands first, fo^^
and therefore he failed in none of the duties of a good example;
man, either in his defence, or in assessing his penalty,
or earlier still as a member of the council or a soldier in
the field. But we abound in every kind of excuse for a
mean spirit ; with some of us it is a child, with others
our mother or our brothers. We ought not to let any
one make us miserable, but let every one make us happy,
and God above all, Who created us for this. Go to,
did Diogenes love no one, he who was so gentle
Discourses of Epictetus
or Dio
genes, who
knew the
limits of
affection.
Freedom
is to know
what is
mine
and what
is not
mine .
and kind-hearted that he cheerfully took upon him
all those troubles and distresses of body for the general
good of men? But how did he love? As the servant of
Zeus should love, caring for his friends, but submitting
himself to God. That was why he alone made the whole
world his country, and no special land, and when he was
made prisoner he did not long for Athens or for his friends
and companions there, but made himself at home with
the pirates who took him and tried to make them better,
and afterwards when he was sold he lived in Corinth just
as he lived before in Athens ; yes, and if he had gone
away to the Perrhaebians it would have been just the
same. That is how freedom is achieved. That is why
he said, Since Antisthenes freed me, I have ceased to be
a slave. How did he free him ? Hear what he says : He
taught me what is mine and what is not mine ; property
is not mine ; kinsfolk, relations, friends, reputation,
familiar places, converse with men none of these is
my own.
What is yours then?
* Power to deal with impressions. He showed me that
I possess this beyond all hindrance and compulsion ; no
one can hamper me, no one can compel me to deal with
them otherwise than I will. Who then has authority over
me any more? Has Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas,
or the Great King? How can they? for he who is to
be mastered by men, must first long before allow
himself to be mastered by things. When a man is not
overcome by pleasure, or pain, or reputation, or wealth,
and, when it seems good to him, can spit his whole
Booh ///, Chapter 24 y$
body in the tyrant s face, 2 and so leave this world, whose
slave can you call him any more? To whom is he
subject? But if he had sought his pleasure by living in
Athens, and had allowed life in Athens to have the
mastery over him, he would have been in every man s
control, and any one who was stronger than he would
have had power to cause him pain. You can imagine
how he would have flattered the pirates to sell him to
an Athenian, that he might one day see the beautiful
Peiraeus and the Long Walls and the Acropolis.
Slave, who are you that want to see them? If you are
servile and abject what good will they do you?
Nay, I shall be free.
Show me how you are free. Suppose some one, no If you can-
matter who, takes you away from your familiar course of jive away
life ; he has laid hands on you and says, * You are my from
slave, for it is in my power to prevent you from living as
you will, it rests with me to relax your servitude, or to studied to
humiliate you ; when I choose you can put on a glad face
again and go off in high spirits to Athens. What do you
say to this man who leads you captive? Whom do you
produce to set you free from him? 3 Or do you refuse
to look him in the face, and cutting arguments short
implore him to let you go? Man, you ought to go
to prison rejoicing, hastening thither before your gaoler
can lay hands on you. What ! You decline to live in
Rome, and long for Hellas? I suppose you will weep
in our faces again, when you have to die, because you
are not going to see Athens and have a walk in the
Lyceum?
Mere logi
cal pro
ficiency is
a poor
result.
Affection
is evil if
it causes
misery.
y6 Discourses of Epictetus
Is this what you went abroad for? Is this why you
sought converse with a teacher who might do you good ?
Good forsooth ! Was your object to analyse syllogisms
more readily or track out hypothetical propositions ? Was
it for this reason that you left brother, country, friends,
relations, that you might learn this lesson and return?
It was not then to secure constancy or peace of mind that
you went abroad ; it was not that you might be set
beyond harm s reach and never blame or accuse any one
any more, it was not that no one should be able to injure
you. and that so you might maintain your life unhindered
in all its relations.
A fine traffic this that you have achieved by your travels
syllogisms and shifting terms and hypothetical argu
ments ! Yes, you had better sit in the market if you
think fit, and post up a notice like the druggists. Nay !
will you not rather deny knowledge of what you learnt,
that you may not get your precepts condemned as useless ?
What harm has philosophy done you, how has Chrysippus
wronged you, that you should prove his labours to be
useless by your own act? Not content with the ills you
had at home, which were enough to cause you pain and
sorrow, even if you had not gone abroad, did you acquire
new ills besides?
Yes, and if again you have other friends and companions,
and if you attach yourself to another country you will
only multiply your causes for lamentation. Why then
do you live, only to involve yourself in trouble after
trouble and make yourself miserable ? What, man ! You
call this affection ? Affection indeed 1 If affection is
Book ///, Chapter 24 97
good, it can cause no evil. If it is evil, I have no concern
with it. I am born for what is good for me, not for
what is evil.
What then is the proper training for this? In the first Man must
place, the principal and most important thing, on the r fr U1 , lm
very threshold so to speak, is that when you are attached his friends,
to a thing, not a thing which cannot be taken away but
anything like a ewer, or a crystal cup, you should bear in
mind what it is, that you may not be disturbed when it is
broken. So should it be with persons ; if you kiss your
child, or brother, or friend, never allow your imagination
to range at large, nor allow your exultation 4 to go as far
as it will, but pluck it back, keep it in check like those who
stand behind generals driving in triumph and remind
them that they are men. In like manner you must All gifts
remind yourself that you love a mortal, and that nothing
that you love is your very own ; it is given you for the
moment, not for ever nor inseparably, but like a fig or
a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year, and
if you long for it in winter you are a fool. So too if you
long for your son or your friend, when it is not given
you to have him, know that you are longing for a fig in
winter time. For as winter is to the fig, so is the whole
pressure of the universe to that which it destroys. And
therefore in the very moment that you take pleasure in
a thing, set before your mind the opposite impressions.
What harm is there in whispering to yourself as you kiss
your child, * To-morrow you will die , and to your friend
in like manner, To-morrow you or I shall go away, and
we shall see one another no more ?
r> IK. 24 ii G
To antici
pate loss
is not ill-
omened
but
natural.
The good
man s sole
concern is
to obey
God,
9 8 Discourses of Epictetus
* But such words are of ill omen.
Yes, and so are some incantations, but because they do
good, I do not mind, if only they do good. But do you
give the name ill-omened to anything but what
signifies evil? Cowardice is an ill-omened thing, and so
is a mean spirit, mourning, sorrow, shamelessness ; these
are ill-omened words, yet even these we must not hesitate
to utter, that we may guard against the things themselves.
Do you call any word ill-omened that signifies a process
of nature? Say that harvesting ears of corn is ill-omened,
for it means destruction of the ears ; yes, but not the
destruction of the world. Say that the fall of the leaf is
ill-omened and the change of the fresh fig into the dry
and of grapes into raisins ; for all these are changes from
a previous state into a new one. This is not destruction
but an ordered dispensation and government of things.
Going abroad is a slight change ; death is a greater
change from what now is, not to what is not, but to
what is not now.
* Shall I then be no more?
Ton will not be, but something else will be, of which
the world now has need ; for indeed you came into being,
not when you willed it, but when the world had need.
For this reason the good man, remembering who he is and
whence he has come, and by whom he was created, sets
his mind on this alone, how he shall fill his place in an
orderly fashion with due obedience to God. [To God
he says,] Dost Thou want me still to live ? I will live as
one who is free and noble, in accordance with Thy will ;
for Thou didst give me freedom from hindrance in what
Booh III, Chapter 24 99
was mine. Hast Thou no more need of me? Then may
it be well with Thee ; I stayed here until now for Thee
and for none other, and so now I obey Thee and depart.
* How do you depart ?
Again, as Thou wiliest, as a free man, as Thy servant, in what-
as one who has learnt what Thou dost command and f ve . r place
he is called
forbid. But as long as I continue among Thy creatures, upon to
whom wouldst Thou have me be ? A magistrate or a serve H ni >
private person, a senator or a commoner, a soldier or
a general, a teacher or the head of a household ? Whatever
place or post Thou dost commit to my charge, I will die
ten thousand times , to use Socrates words, sooner than
abandon it. Where wouldst Thou have me be? In
Rome or Athens or Thebes or Gyara ? Only remember me
there. If Thou dost send me to a place where men departing
cannot live as their nature requires, I shall go away, 5 not f^/ives"
in disobedience but believing that Thou dost sound the the signal.
note for my retreat. I do not abandon Thee : heaven
forbid ! but I recognize that Thou hast no need of me.
But if it be given me to live in accordance with nature,
I shall not seek another place than where I am or other
society than that in which I am.
Let these thoughts be at your command by night and Fore-
day : write them, read them, talk of them, to yourself
and to your neighbour. Go first to one and then to
another, asking him, * Can you help me towards this ?
Then if some so-called undesirable event befall you,
the first immediate relief to you will be, that it was not
unexpected. For in all matters it is a great thing to say,
I knew that I had begotten a mortal. f> For this is
G 2
Obey the
law, and
fight
against
your ima
gination.
Obedience
to God is
the great
est
source of
delight.
ioo Discourses of Epictetus
what you will say, and again, I knew that I was mortal.
I knew that I might have to go away, that I might be
cast into exile, I knew that I might be thrown into
prison. Then if you reflect within yourself and ask
from what quarter the event has come, you will at once
remember, It comes from the region of things outside
my will, which are not mine ; how then does it concern
me? Then comes the most commanding question of all :
* Who has sent it me ?
The Prince or the General, the City or the Law of the
City.
Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in
everything.
And further, when your imagination (which i not in
your control) bites deep into your soul, struggle against
it with your reason, fight it down, suffer it not to grow
strong nor to advance the next step, calling up at pleasure
what pictures it will. If you are in Gyara do not imagine
your way of life in Rome, and the great delights you
enjoyed when you lived there and that you would enjoy
on your return. No, make your one effort there, to live
a brave life in Gyara, as one who lives in Gyara should ;
and if you are in Rome do not imagine life in Athens,
but make life in Rome your one study.
Further, you should put this delight first in place of all
others, the delight that comes from understanding that
you are obeying God, that not in word but in deed you
are fulfilling the part of the good man. What a fine
thing it is to be able to say to myself, * I am now putting
into action what other men talk big of in the lecture-room,
Book III, Chapter 24 101
and win a name for paradox. As they sit there it is my
virtues they are expounding, it is about m they are
inquiring, it is my praise they are singing. I say, Zeus
wished to make my experience prove this truth to me, and
He wished to discover for Himself, whether He had a soldier
in the true sense, a citizen in the true sense, and to put
me forward as a witness to the rest of mankind of what
does and does not depend on man s will. " Behold " [He
says] " your fears are idle and your desires vain. Do not
seek good things outside you but within, or you will not
find them." It is on these terms that now He brings me The good
here, and again sends me thither ; He shows me to men Q O( J S
poor, without office, sick, sends me to Gyara, puts me witness
in prison ; not that He hates me heaven forbid ! who
hates his best servant? nor that He takes no thought of
me, for He takes thought of the lowliest, but because He
is training me and using me as a witness to other men.
When I am appointed to such a service as this, it is not
for me to consider where or in whose company I am or
what they say of me, but rather to spend all my effort on
God and His commands and ordinances.
If you always have these thoughts at hand, and make
yourself familiar with them and keep them at command,
you will never want for one to comfort and strengthen
you. For dishonour consists not in having nothing to
eat, but in not having reason sufficient to secure you from
fear and pain. But if you once win yourself freedom
from fear and pain, then tyrants and their guards, and the
Emperor s household, will cease to exist for you ; you,
who have received this high office from Zeus, will not
Man s
struggle is
to attain
happiness,
and he
must not
give in.
102 Discourses of Epictetus
feel the sting of an imperial appointment or of these who
offer sacrifice on the Capitol in virtue of their offices. 7
Only make no display of your office, and boast not
yourself in it, but prove it by your conduct ; be content,
even if no one observes you, to live in true health and
happiness.
CHAPTER XXV
To those who fail to achieve what they set before them.
CONSIDER which of the aims that you set before you at
the first you have achieved, and which you have not, and
how some things give you pleasure to remember and some
give you pain ; and if possible, recover what you failed
to obtain. For those who are entering on the greatest of
all struggles must not shrink, but must be ready to endure
stripes ; for the struggle they are concerned with is not
wrestling or the pancration, in which a man may succeed
or fail, and yet be worth little or worth very much nay
more, he may be most fortunate or most miserable ; no,
his struggle is for good fortune and happiness itself.
What follows? In this competition, even if we give in
for the moment, nothing prevents us from returning to the
struggle ; we have not to wait for another four years for
the next Olympic Games to come. At once you may
recover yourself, and pull yourself together, and renew
the struggle with the same energy as before ; and if you
grow faint again, you may renew it again, and if you once
attain to victory you are as one who has never failed.
Only do not begin to take a pleasure in failing from sheer
Booh III) Chapter 2? 103
force of habit, and go about as a sorry athlete defeated in But he
the whole round of all the Games, for all the world like ac q u i re the
quails that have escaped ! habit of
. . ... ., constant
I am overpowered by the impression of a pretty maid. f a ii ure .
Well ! was I not overpowered lately? I am eager to find
fault with some one. Did I not do so lately?
You talk lightly to us, as though you had got off scot-
free. It is as though a man, when his doctor forbade
him to bathe, should say, Why, did not I bathe quite
lately ? What if the doctor can answer him, Well, what
effect did bathing have on you ? Did you not fall into
a fever ? Did you not get a headache ? So when you
found fault with some one lately, was it not the act
of a bad man, and of a foolish one? Did you not feed
this habit, by putting before it acts which were congenial
to it? And when the pretty girl was too much for you,
did you get away unpunished ? What do you mean then
by talking of what you did lately ? Nay, you ought
rather, I think, to have remembered, as slaves remember
their floggings, and to have refrained from repeating the
same offence. But it is not the same thing : pain makes
the memory of the slave, but what pain or penalty attends
your offences ? When did you acquire the habit of avoid
ing evil activities?
104 Discourses of Epictetus
CHAPTER XXVI
To those who fear want.
To fear ARE you not ashamed of being more cowardly and mean-
to show spirited than runaway slaves ? How do they leave their
a mean masters when they run away? What lands or servants
have they to trust to? Do not they steal just a morsel to
last them for the first days, and then go on their way over
land or it may be sea, contriving one resource after another
to keep themselves alive? And when did a runaway slave
ever die of hunger ? Yet you are all of a flutter and keep
awake at nights for fear you should run short of necessaries.
Miserable man, are you so blind as not to see the road, to
which want of necessaries leads you ? Where does it lead ?
The same way as fever, the same way as a falling stone to
death. Well, and is not this exactly the situation you
often described to your companions? Many a passage did
you read and write about it. How often did you boast
that you could face death at any rate with a quiet mind !
Yes, but my family will starve.
What of that? Does their hunger lead in a different
direction ? Is not the way that leads below the same, and
the world it leads to the same? Will you then not have
courage to face every form of want and necessity, and to
look on that world whither even the richest and those
who have held the highest offices must descend, nay even
kings and emperors themselves? Only you will descend
hungry, if it so chance, and they will burst with over
eating and over-drinking.
Book 111, Chapter 26 ioj
Did you ever by chance see a beggar who was not old ?
They are all far gone in years ; yet they bear the pinch
of cold night and day, and lie forlorn upon the ground,
and their food is what bare necessity demands and no
more, but they almost arrive at immortality, and yet you
who are sound in hand and foot are so afraid of starving !
Can you not draw water, or write, or take charge of
children, or be another man s doorkeeper?
But it is disgraceful, you say, to be reduced to this
necessity.
First learn then what is disgraceful, and then tell us
that you are a philosopher ; but for the present, if another
call you so, do not allow him.
When a thing is not your business, when you are not No one can
responsible for it, when it has befallen you without your J J b
own act, like a headache or a fever, can it disgrace you ? what is
If your parents were poor, or if they made others their r
heirs instead of you, if they give you no help while they
are alive, is this any disgrace to you? Is this what you
learnt with the philosophers? Did you never hear that
what is disgraceful is blameable, and the blameable is what
deserves blame, and it is absurd to blame a man for what
is not his own act, done by himself? Well, did you make
your father what he is, or is it in your power to mend his
character? Is this given you? What follows? Ought you
to desire what is not given you, or to be ashamed if you
do not attain to it? Is this all the habit you acquired
when you studied philosophy, to look to others and to
hope for nothing from yourself and your own acts?
Lament therefore and mourn, and when you eat be fearful
i 06 Discourses of Epictetus
To cherish that you will have nothing to eat to-morrow. Tremble
is to have ^ or 7 our wretched slaves, lest they should steal, or run
missed the away, or die. Live in this spirit, and never cease to live
of study. s j 7 OU w ^ never came near philosophy, except in name,
and disgraced its principles so far as in you lies, by showing
them to be useless and unprofitable to those who take
them up. You never set your will to gain constancy,
tranquillity, and peace of mind ; you never paid regard
to any master for this end, though you attended to many
for the sake of syllogisms. You never tested any of these
impressions thoroughly for yourself, asking, Can I bear it
or can I not ? What have I to look to ? No, you assumed
that all was well with you, and that you were quite secure,
and devoted your efforts to the final study of all, how to
be immovable. And in what were you to make yourself
immovable? Cowardice, a base spirit, admiration of the
rich, failure to get what you will, defeat of your will to
avoid. It was to secure these results that you spent all
your care.
Philosophy Ought you not to win some possession from philosophy,
if "cm have before y ou tr 7 to ma ke it secure ? Did you ever see any
noprin- one build a coping, unless he had a wall round which
p-uard ^ build it ? Who ever appoints a doorkeeper where there
is no door to guard?
Again, you make it your study to be able to demonstrate.
Demonstrate what? You study not to be shaken by falla
cies. Shaken from what position? Show me first what
you are guarding, what you are measuring, or what you
are weighing ; then it is time enough to show me the
balance or the bushel. How long do you mean to measure
Book III, Chapter 26 107
dust and ashes? Ought you not to demonstrate those
principles which make men happy, which make things
prosper as they wish, principles which make them not
blame any one or accuse any one, but acquiesce in the
government of the universe? Show me these.
* See, I do show them , he says. I will analyse syllo
gisms for you.
Slave, this is the measuring instrument, not that which
is measured. That is why you now pay the penalty for
your neglect of philosophy ; you tremble, you lie awake,
you take counsel with every one, and unless your plans
promise to please every one you think you have taken
bad counsel.
Then you fear starvation, as you think ; but what you It is not
really fear is not starvation ; you are afraid that you you f^ "
may not have a cook, that you may not have another to but a
cater for you, another to shoe you, another to dress you, s
others to rub you, others to follow you ; when you have
stripped in the bath and stretched yourself out like the
crucified, you want to be rubbed on this side and that,
and/then you want the masseur to stand by and say, * Turn,
and give me his side, take his head, hand me his shoulder ;
and then when you have left the bath and gone home
you expect to cry out, Will no one bring me something
to eat? and then, Remove the tables, and wipe them.
What you really fear is that you may not be able to live
the life of an invalid ; for the life of healthy men you
have only to see how slaves and labourers and true
philosophers live ; the life of Socrates, though he had
a wife and children to live with, the life of Diogenes, and
io8 Discourses of Epictetus
of Cleanthes, who combined philosophy with drawing
which any wa ter. If this is what you want to have, you will have it
have, who everywhere, and will live with confidence. Confidence
is good for i n w hat? In that which alone it is possible to confide in,
what is trustworthy, and cannot be hindered or taken
away, that is, your own will. Why have you made
yourself so useless and unprofitable that no one is willing
to take you into his house and take care of you ? Every one
will pick up a vessel that is whole and fit for use if it is
flung aside and will count it gain ; but every one will
count you loss, not gain. Cannot you even serve the
purpose of a dog or a cock? Why then do you wish to live
any more, if this is your character ?
God pro- ]) oes a ^ man eyer ear t j iat OQ( j ma a -} him ? It
vides for . _ J
the good does not fail the blind, it does not fail the lame, will it
man, so jj t ^ good man ? There is no want of some one to give
long as He
desires his pay to the good soldier, or workman, or shoemaker : will
presence. ^ good man find none ? Does God so disregard His own
principles, His servants, His witnesses, whom alone He uses
as examples to the untaught, to show that He exists and
orders the universe well, and does not disregard human
things, and that for the good man nothing is evil, whether
he lives or dies ? What if He does not provide food ?
It only means that, like a good general, He has given me
the signal to retire. I obey, I follow, I praise my Com
mander, and laud His acts. For I came when He thought
fit, and again shall go when He thinks fit ; and while
I lived this was the work I had to do, to praise God in
my own heart, and to others, be it to one or to many.
If He does not provide me with much or with abundance,
Booh 777, Chapter 26 109
His will is for me to live simply ; for He did not give Heracles
abundance to Heracles, His own son ; another than he king"yet
was king of Argos and Mycenae, and he was subject to he ruled
him and suffered toils and discipline. Yet Eurystheus ^ e ^ r
was the man he was, no true king of Argos and Mycenae, cleansing
for he was not king over himself, while Heracles was ruler 1> V
and commander of all land and sea, cleansing them from
lawlessness and wrong, and bringing in justice and right
eousness, and this he did unarmed and single-handed.
And when Odysseus was shipwrecked and cast ashore, Odysseus
his necessity never broke his spirit, or made it abject, b^ 1 )
Nay, how did he approach the maidens to ask of them the disaster,
necessaries of life, which men think it most shameful fuj^
to beg from another? judge
ments.
Like hill-bred lion, trusting in his might.
Trusting in what? Not in reputation, not in money, nor
office, but in his own might, that is in judgements on
things within our power and beyond it. For it is these
alone that make free men, whom nothing can hinder,
which lift up the neck of those who are in humiliation,
and make them look with unwavering eyes upon rich men
and upon despots.
And this was what the philosopher had to give, but Illness and
you are going to leave him, it seems, not with courage nothing^
but trembling for your pitiful clothes and plate. Misera- to him
ble man ! have you so wasted your time until now? achieved
What then, if I fall ill? freedom.
You shall bear illness well.
4 Who shall tend me?
i i o Discourses of Epictetus
God, and your friends.
* I shall lie on a hard bed.
But you can do it like a man.
I shall not have a proper house.
If you have one, you will be ill all the same.
Who will give me food ?
Those who find it for others ; you will be no worse off
than Manes x on your sick-bed. And what is the end of
the illness? Nothing worse than death. Will you realize
once for all that it is not death that is the source of all
man s evils, and of a mean and cowardly spirit, but
rather the fear of death? Against this fear then I would
have you discipline yourself; to this let all your reason
ings, your lectures, and your trainings be directed ; and
then you will know that only so do men achieve their
freedom.
BOOK IV
CHAPTER I
On Freedom.
THAT man is free, who lives as he wishes, who is proof Freedom
against compulsion and hindrance and violence, whose ainmtram
impulses are untrammelled, who gets what he wills to get milled
and avoids what he wills to avoid. rl
Who then would live in error?
No one.
Who would live deceived, reckless, unjust, intemperate,
querulous, abject?
No one.
No bad man then lives as he would, and so no bad man
is free.
Who would live in a state of distress, fear, envy, pity,
failing in the will to get and in the will to avoid?
No one.
Do we then find any bad man without distress or fear,
above circumstance, free from failure?
None. Then we find none free.
If a man who has been twice consul hear this, he will not in
forgive you if you add, But you are wise, this does not bir ^ . or
concern you. But if you tell him the truth, saying, *
You are just as much a slave yourself as those who have
been thrice sold , what can you expect but a flogging?
I I 2
Discourses of Epictetus
Slavery
means
compul
sion of
the will.
The
tyranny of
passion
may be
greater
than that
of Caesar.
1 How can I be a slave ? he says ; my father is free,
my mother is free, no one has bought me ; nay, I am
a senator, and a friend of Caesar, I have been consul and
have many slaves.
In the first place, most excellent senator, perhaps your
father too was a slave of the same kind as you, yes and
your mother and your grandfather and the whole line of
your ancestors. And if really they were ever so free, how
does that affect you? What does it matter if they had
a fine spirit, when you have none, if they were fearless
and you are a coward, if they were self-controlled and
you are intemperate?
Nay, what has this to do with being a slave ? he
replies.
Does it seem to you slavery to act against your will,
under compulsion and with groaning?
I grant you that, he says, but who can compel me
except Caesar, who is lord of all ?
Why, then, your own lips confess that you have one
master : you must not comfort yourself with the thought
that he is, as you say, the common master of all, but
realize that you are a slave in a large household. You
are just like the people of Nicopolis, who are wont to cry
aloud, By Caesar s fortune, we are free.
However, let us leave Caesar for the moment if you
please, but tell me this : Did you never fall in love with
any one, with a girl, or a boy, or a slave, or a free man ?
1 What has that to do with slavery or freedom ?
Were you never commanded by her you loved to do
anything you did not wish? Did you never natter your
Book IV, Chapter i 113
precious slave-boy ? Did you never kiss his feet ? Yet if
anyone compel you to kiss Caesar s, you count it an out
rage, the very extravagance of tyranny. What is this if
not slavery ? Did you never go out at night where you
did not wish, and spend more than you wished and utter
words of lamentation and groaning ? Did you put up
with being reviled and shut out ? If you are ashamed to
confess your own story, see what Thrasonides says and
does : he had served in as many campaigns or more
perhaps than you and yet, first of all, he has gone out at
night, at an hour when Getas does not dare to go, nay, if
he were forced by his master to go, he would have made
a loud outcry and have gone with lamentations over his
cruel slavery, and then, what does he say ?
A worthless girl has made a slave of me,
Whom never foe subdued.
Poor wretch, to be slave to a paltry girl and a worthless
one too ! Why do you call yourself free then any more?
Why do you boast of your campaigns? Then he asks for
a sword, and is angry with the friend who refuses it out of
goodwill, and sends gifts to the girl who hates him, and
falls to praying and weeping, and then again when he has
a little luck he is exultant. How can we call him free
when he has not learnt to give up desire and fear? 1
Now look at the lower animals and see how we apply ,,
. r r / The love
the notion of freedom to them. Men put lions in cages of freedom
and rear them as tame creatures and feed them, and flower
sometimes even take them about with them. Yet who animals,
will call a lion like that free ? The softer he lives, the
546.24 II H
ii4 Discourses of Epictetus
worse is his slavery. What lion, if he got sense or reason,
would wish to be a lion of that sort? Look at the birds
yonder and see what lengths they go in striving to escape,
when they are caught and reared in cages ; why, some of
them actually starve themselves rather than endure that
sort of life ; and even those that do not die, pine away
and barely keep alive, and dash out if they find any chance
of an opening. So strong is their desire for natural
freedom, an independent and unhindered existence.
Why, what ails you in your cage?
f What a question ! I am born to fly where I will, to
live in the air, to sing when I will ; you take all this away
from me, and say, " What ails you? "
Therefore we will call only those creatures free, that do
not endure captivity, but escape by death as soon as they
are caught. So too Diogenes says somewhere, A quiet
death is the one sure means of freedom , and he writes to
the Persian king, You cannot enslave the city of the
Athenians any more than you can enslave fishes.
What ! shall I not capture them ?
If you capture them, he says, they will straightway
leave you and be gone, like fishes ; for when you take
one of them, he dies. So if the Athenians die as soon as
you take them, what is the good of your armament?
These are the words of a free man who has seriously
examined the question and found the truth, as is reason
able ; but if you look for it elsewhere than where it is,
what wonder if you never find it ?
The slave ^ s j aye anx | ous to be set free at once. Why? Do
wrongly
thinks that you think it is because he is anxious to pay the tax on his
Book U \ Chapter i 1 1 y
manumission? No! the reason is he imagines that up enfran-
chisement
till now he is hampered and ill at ease because he has not j s freedom,
got his freedom. If I am enfranchised, he says, at once
all will be well, I heed nobody, I talk to all men as an
equal and one of their quality, I go where I will, I come
whence I will and where I will. Then he is emancipated,
and having nothing to eat 2 he straightway looks for
some one to natter and to dine with ; then he either has
to sell his body to lust and endure the worst, and if he and then
, , , , . i becomes
gets a manger to eat at, he has plunged into a slavery t h es i aveo
much severer than the first ; or if perchance he grows passion or
rich, being a low-bred fellow he dotes on some paltry
girl and gets miserable and bewails himself and longs to be
a slave again.
What ailed me in those days? Another gave me
clothes and shoes, another fed me and tended me in sick
ness, and the service I did him was a small matter. Now,
how wretched and miserable I am, with many masters
instead of one ! Still, if I can get rings 3 on my fingers
I shall live happily and prosperously enough.
And so first, to get them, he puts up with what he
deserves, and having got them repeats the process. Next
he says, If I go on a campaign I am quit of all my
troubles. He turns soldier and endures the lot of a
criminal, but all the same he begs for a second campaign
and a third. 4 Lastly, when he gets the crown to his
career and is made a senator, once more he becomes
a slave again as he goes to the senate ; then he enjoys the
noblest and the sleekest slavery of all.
Let him not be foolish, let him learn, as Socrates said,
H 2
failure to
apply pri
mary con
ceptions.
116 Discourses of Epictetus
The error what is the true nature of everything, and not apply
is due to a pr i mary conceptions at random to particular facts. For
foilurp tn J
this is the cause of all the miseries of men, that they are
not able to apply their common primary conceptions to
particular cases. One of us fancies this, another that.
One fancies he is ill. Not at all ; it is only that he does
not apply his primary conceptions. Another fancies
that he is poor, that his father or mother is cruel, another
that Caesar is not gracious. But really it is one thing,
and one thing only ; they do not know how to adjust
their primary conceptions. For who has not a primary
notion of evil that it is harmful, to be shunned, by every
means to be got rid of? One primary notion does not
conflict with another, the conflict is in the application.
What then is this evil which is harmful and to be
shunned?
Not to be Caesar s friend , 5 he says.
He has gone out of his way, he has failed to apply his
notions, he is in sore distress, he is seeking for what is
nothing to the purpose ; for when he has got Caesar s
friendship he has equally failed of his object. For what
is the object of every man s search? To have a quiet
mind, to be happy, to do everything as he will, to be free
from hindrance and compulsion. Very well : when he
becoming becomes Caesar s friend is he relieved from hindrance
Caesar s an( j compulsion, is he in peace and happiness? Of whom
friend but TT71 , 11
by inward are we to inquire? Whom can we better trust than the
peace. V ery man who has become Caesar s friend?
Come forward and tell us ! when was your sleep more
tranquil, now or before you became Caesar s friend?
The "rue
aim of
men is
achieved.
Book II , Chapter
1 17
At once the answer comes, Cease, by the gods I beg
you, to mock at my fortune ; you do not know what
a miserable state is mine ; no sleep comes near to me, but
in comes some one to say, " Now he s awake, now he ll be
coming out " ; then troubles and cares assail me.
Tell me, when did you dine more agreeably, now or
before ?
Hear again what he says about this : if he is not invited,
he is distressed, and if he is invited he dines as a slave with
his lord, anxious all the while for fear he should say or do
something foolish. And what do you think he fears? To
be flogged like a slave ? How should he come off so well ?
No, so great a man as he, and Caesar s friend, must fear
to lose his neck ; nought less were fitting. When did you
bathe with more peace of mind, or exercise yourself more
at your ease? In a word, which life would you rather live,
to-day s or the old life ? No one, I can swear, is so wanting
in sense or feeling, 6 that he does not lament his lot the
louder the more he is Caesar s friend.
Inasmuch then as neither those who bear the name of No one
kings nor kings friends live as they will, what free men wllois Li
, c c . miserable
are left r beck, and you shall find, for nature supplies you can be free,
with means to find the truth. If, with these means and J hou gh he
be a king
) more to guide you, you cannot find the answer for or a king s
yourself, then listen to those who have made the search. friend -
What do they say?
Does freedom seem to you a good thing ?
1 The greatest good.
Can any one who attains the greatest good be miserable
or fare badly?
1 1 8 Discourses of Epictetus
Freedom
implies
indepen
dence of
another s
will or
authority,
No.
Whensoever then you see men unhappy, miserable,
mourning, you may declare with confidence that they are
not free.
* I do declare it.
Well then, we have got away from buying and selling,
and that kind of disposal of property which they deal with.
For if you are right in making these admissions, no one
who is miserable can be free, 7 whether he be a great king or
a little one, a consular or one who has twice been consul.
Granted.
Answer me once more. Does freedom seem to you
a great and noble and precious thing?
Certainly.
Can then one who possesses so great and precious and
noble a thing be of a humble spirit?
* He cannot.
Therefore when you see a man cringing to another or
flattering him against his true opinion, you may say with
confidence that he too is not free, and not only if he does
it for a paltry dinner, but even if he does it for a province
or a consulship. But those who do it for small objects you
may call slaves on a small scale, and the others, as they
deserve, slaves on a large scale.
* I grant you this too.
Again, does freedom seem to you to be something inde
pendent, owning no authority but itself?
* Certainly.
Then whenever a man can be hindered or compelled
by another at will, assert with confidence that he is not
Book // 7 j Chapter i 1 1 9
free. Do not look at his grandfathers and great grand
fathers and search whether he was bought or sold, but if
you hear him say Master from the heart and with
feeling, then call him slave, though twelve fasces go be
fore him ; 8 and if you hear him say, * Wretched am I, that
I am so treated , call him slave ; in a word, if you see him
bewailing himself, complaining, miserable, call him slave,
though he wears the purple hem. If, however, he does
not behave like this, call him not free yet, but get to
know his judgements and see whether they are liable to
compulsion or hindrance or unhappiness, and if you find
any such, call him a slave on holiday at the Saturnalia ;
say that his master is away ; he will presently return and
then you will learn his true condition.
* In what form will he return ?
In the form of every one who has authority over the
things that a man wishes for, to get them for him or to take
them away.
1 Have we then so many masters?
Yes, for even before these personal masters, we have
masters in circumstance, and circumstances are many.
It must needs follow then that those who have authority
over any of these are our masters. For no one really We fear
fears Caesar himself; men fear death, exile, deprivation r e
Caesar, not
of property, prison, disfranchisement. Nor does any for hiin-
one love Caesar, unless he has great merit; we love se [ f > b ^ tfor
. 3 what he
wealth, the tribunate, the praetorship, the consulship, controls.
When we love and hate and fear these, the men who have
authority over them are bound to be our masters, and
that is why we worship them like gods ; for we consider
Indepen
dence lies
not in the
things be
yond our
control,
120 Discourses of Epictetus
that that which has authority over the greatest benefit is
divine ; and then if we make a false minor premiss, this
man has control over the greatest benefit , our conclusion
is bound to be wrong too.
What is it then which makes man his own master and
free from hindrance ? Wealth does not make him so, nor
a consulship, nor a province, nor a kingdom ; we must
find something else. Now what is it which makes him
unhindered and unfettered in writing?
Knowledge of how to write.
What makes him so in flute-playing?
* Knowledge of flute-playing.
So too in living, it is knowledge of how to live. You
have heard this as a general principle ; consider it in
detail. Is it possible for one who aims at an object which
lies in the power of others to be unhindered ? Is it possible
for him to be untrammelled ?
No.
It follows that he cannot be free. Consider then : have
we nothing which is in our power alone, or have we every
thing? Or only some things in our power, and some in
that of others ?
How do you mean ?
When you wish your body to be whole, is it in your
power or not?
It is not.
And when you wish it to be healthy?
That is not in my power.
And when you wish it to be beautiful?
That is not in my power.
Book IV ^ Chapter i 121
And to live or die?
That is not mine either.
The body then is something not our own and must give
an account to any one who is stronger than ourselves.
Granted.
Is it in your power to have land when you will, and as
long as you will, and of the quality you will?
No.
And slaves?
No.
And clothes?
No.
And your bit of a house?
No.
And horses ?
None of these things.
And if you wish your children or your wife or your
brother or your friends to live, whatever happens, is
that in your power?
No, that is not either.
Have you nothing then which owns no other authority, but in
nothing which you alone control, or have you something ^ich
of that sort ? owns no
< T j i , authority
I do not know. outside it
Look at the matter thus and consider it. Can any one in the
make you assent to what is false? Hssen t im-
No one. pulse, will
Well, then, in the region of assent you are unhindered
and unfettered.
Granted.
I 22
Discourses of Epictetus
Again, can any one force your impulse towards what
you do not wish?
* He can ; for when he threatens me with death or
bonds, he forces my impulse.
Well now, if you despise death and bonds, do you heed
him any longer ?
No.
Is it your doing then to despise death, or is it not
yours ?
Mine.
It rests with you then to be impelled to action, does
it not?
I grant it rests with me.
And impulse not to act, with whom does that rest? It
is yours too.
Supposing that my impulse is to walk, and he hinders
me, what then?
What part of you will he hinder ? Your assent ?
* No, but my poor body.
Yes, as a stone is hindered.
Granted ; but I do not walk any more.
Who told you that it is your business to walk unhin
dered? The only thing I told you was unhindered was
your impulse ; as to the service of the body, and its co
operation, you have heard long ago that it is no affair of
yours.
I grant you this too.
Can any one compel you to will to get what you do not
wish ?
Book 7/^j Chapter i 123
Or to purpose or to plan, or in a word to deal with the
impressions that you meet with?
* No one can do this either ; but if I will to get some
thing a man will hinder me from obtaining it.
How will he hinder you, if you set your will upon
things which are your own and beyond hindrance?
Not at all.
But no one tells you that he who wills to get what is
not his own is unhindered.
* Am I then not to will to get health ? You must
Certainly not, nor anything else that is not your own. 1 ! m ! t your
For nothing is your own, that it does not rest with you what is
to procure or to keep when you will. Keep your hands your own
far away from it ; above all, keep your will away, or else
you surrender yourself into slavery, you put your neck
under the yoke, if you admire what is not your own, and
set your heart on anything mortal, whatever it be, or
anything that depends upon another.
Is not my hand my own?
It is a part of you, but by nature a thing of clay, subject
to hindrance and compulsion, slave to everything that is
stronger than itself. Nay, why do I name you the hand ?
You must treat your whole body like a poor ass, with its The body
burden on its back, going with you just so far as it may, is a beast
, , . . . of burden,
and so tar as it is given you ; but if the king s service calls, to be given
and a soldier lays hands on it, let it go, do not resist or "P if need
murmur ; if you do, you will only get a flogging and lose
your poor ass all the same.
But when this is your proper attitude to your body,
consider what is left for you to do with other things that
If you dis-
tinguish
what is
your own
from what
is not your
own you
have noth-
mg to fear.
This is
E J y U
the philo-
learn* 8 t0
124 Discourses of Epictetus
are procured for the body s sake. As the body is the poor
ass, other things become the ass s bridle and pack-saddle,
shoes and barley and fodder. Give them up too, let them
go quicker and with a lighter heart than the ass itself.
And when you have prepared and trained yourself
thus to distinguish what is your own from what is not
i i
your own, things subject to hindrance from things un-
hindered, to regard these latter as your concern, and the
. , ,
former as not, to direct your will to gam the latter and
to avoid the former, then have you any one to fear any
more ?
* No one.
Of course. What should you fear for? Shall you fear
for what is your own, that is, for what makes good and
evil for you? Nay, who has authority over what is
yours? Who can take it away, who can hinder it, any
more than they can hinder God? Is it your body and
your property that you fear for? Are you afraid for
what is not your own, for what docs not concern you
at all?
Why, what have you been studying all along but to
distinguish what is yours from what is not yours, what is
in your power from what is not in your power, things
su ^J ect to hindrance from things unhindered? Why did
you go to the philosophers ? Was it that you might be just
as unfortunate and miserable as ever? I say that so
trained you will be free from fear and perturbation.
What has pain to do with you now, for it is only things
that cause fear in expectation which cause pain when they
come? What shall you have desire for any longer, for
Book 7/ 7 , Chapter i 125-
your will is tranquil and harmonious, set on objects
within its compass to obtain, objects that are noble and
within your reach, and you have no wish to get what is
beyond your will, and you give no scope to that jostling
element of unreason which breaks all bounds in its
impatience?
When once you adopt this attitude towards things, no
man can inspire fear in you any longer. For how can
man cause fear in man by his aspect or his talk or by his
society generally, any more than fear can be roused by
horse or dog or bee in another horse or dog or bee? No,
it is things which inspire fear in every man ; it is the power
of winning things for another or of taking them away from
him, that makes a man feared.
How then is the citadel destroyed? Not by fire or The inner
sword, but by judgements. For if we pull down the ( ] estroye( j
citadel in the city, we have not got rid of the citadel not by
which is held by fever or by fair women, in a word the
citadel in ourselves and the tyrants who are within us, ments.
who threaten each one of us day by day, now in new forms,
now in old. This is the point where we must begin, this
is where the citadel must be destroyed, and the tyrants
cast forth ; we must give up our body, and all that
belongs to it faculties, property, reputation, offices,
honours, children, brothers, friends all these we must
regard as having no concern for us.
If the tyrants are cast forth from this, what need is The
there for me to blockade the outward citadel ? What harm c \ lM \ e \
does it do to me by standing? Why do I try and cast forth
the guards? I feel them no longer ; their rods and their w ju j s g u b-
126 Discourses of Epictetus
mitted to spears and swords are pointed against others. I was never
.,? s hindered in my will or compelled against my wish.
Nay, how can this be ?
I have submitted my will 9 to God. He wills that
I should have a fever ; I will it too. He wills that I should
have an impulse. I will it too. He wills that I should
will to get a thing. I too will it. He wills that I should
get something, and I wish it ; He wills that I should not,
I wish it no more. I am willing then (if He wills it) to
die or be put on the rack. Who can hinder me any more
against my own judgement or put compulsion on me?
I am as safe as Zeus.
The travel- j act as ^ more cautious travellers do. A man has
seeking a heard that the road is infested by robbers ; he does not
faithful dare to venture on it alone, but waits for companv
companion }
will a legate, or a quaestor, or a proconsul and joining him
attach h c p asscs sa f e ly on the road. The prudent man does the
to God. same in the world ; in the world are many haunts of
robbers, tyrants, storms, distresses, chances of losing
what is dearest. Where is a man to escape? How is he
to go on his way unrobbed? What company is he to wait
for that he may pass through in safety? To whom is he to
join himself? To this or that rich man, or consular?
What is the good of that? Your great man himself is
stripped, and utters mourning and lamentation. What
if my fellow traveller turns against me himself to rob me ?
What am I to do ? I will be " a friend of Caesar " ; if I am
his "companion no one will do me wrong. But first, how
many things must I endure and undergo, to become a
distinguished person ! How often must I suffer robbery
Booh ll\ Chapter
127
and from how many ! And then, if I rise to distinction,
even Caesar is mortal. And if some circumstance lead
him to become my enemy, where, I ask, is it better for
me to retire? To the wilderness? Why, does not fever
come there? What is to become of me then ? Is it impos
sible to find a travelling-companion who is safe, trust
worthy, strong, proof against attack? Thus he reflects
and comes to understand that if he attaches himself to
God, he will pass through the world in safety.
What do you mean by " attach " himself?
That what God wills, he may will too, and what God
wills not, he may not will either.
How then is this to be done?
How else, but by examining the purposes 10 of God and
His governance of the world. What has He given me
to be my own, and independent, what has He reserved
for Himself? He has given me all that lies within the
sphere of my choice, and has put it in my hands, unfettered,
unhindered. How could He make my clay body free
from hindrance? My property, my chattels, my honour,
my children, my wife, He made subject to the revolu
tion of the universe. Why then do I fight against God ?
Why do I will what is not for me to will, what is not given
me to hold under all conditions, but to hold only as it is
given and so far as it is given?
Suppose He that gave takes away. Why then do I
resist ? I shall not merely be silly, if I try to compel Him
that is stronger ; first of all I shall be doing wrong. For
whence did I bring what I have into the world? My
father gave them me. And who gave them him? Who
He must
make
God s will
his will,
and study
God s pur
poses.
We must
resign
what God
takes
away.
128 Discourses of Epictetus
is it that has made the sun, and the fruits of the earth,
and the seasons, and the union and fellowship of men
with one another ?
God gave You have received everything, nay your very self, from
you every- Another ii anc [ y et vou complain and blame the Giver, if
thing, yet J
you com- He takes anything away from you. Who are you and
plain if or w k at k ave vou com e ? Did not He bring you into the
to give up world ? Did not He show you the light ? Has He not
anything. g- yen y OU f e }l ow workers? Has He not given you senses
too, and reason? And in what character did He bring
you into life? Was it not as a mortal, one who should
live upon earth with his little portion of flesh and behold
God s governance and share for a little while in His
pageant and His festival? Will you not then look at the
pageant and the festal gathering as long as it is given you,
and then, when God leads you forth, go away with an
obeisance to Him and thanksgiving for what you have
heard and seen?
No, I wanted to go on feasting.
You must Yes, those at the Mysteries too want to go on with the
tolSf/ ceremony, and those at Olympia to see fresh competitors,
the festival but the festival is at an end. Leave it and depart, in
time 1 the a thankful anc ^ modest spirit ; make room for others,
comes, Others must come into being, even as you did, and being
and make ^ Qrn must j iave room anc [ dwellings and necessaries. But
room tor
others. if the first comers do not retire, what is left for them?
Why will nothing satisfy or content you? Why do you
crowd the world s room ?
Yes, but I want my wife and my children to be with me.
Are they yours ? Are they not His who gave them ?
Book II 7 , Chapter i 129
Are they not His who has made you? Will you not
give up what is not yours, and give way to Him who is
stronger than you ?
Why then did He bring me into the world on these
terms?
Depart, if la it does not suit you. God has no need of There is no
a querulous spectator. He needs men who join in the place f or a
i . , , querulous
least and m the dance, ready to applaud and glorify and spectator.
praise the festival. But the impatient and miserable
He will gladly see left outside the festival : for even
when they were there they did not behave as at a festival
nor fill the place appropriate to them, but were peevish
and complained of fate and fortune and their company :
insensible to fortune s gifts and to their own faculties,
which they have received for just the opposite a great
heart, a noble spirit, and the very freedom we are now
in search of.
4 For what then have I received these gifts ?
To use them. Mygifts
For how long? are given
Just so long as He who lent them wills. a-Tlong as*
But what if they are necessary for me ? Gocl wills -
Do not set your heart on them, and they will not be.
Do not tell yourself that they are necessary, and they
are not.
This is what you ought to practise from sunrise to But it
sunset, beginning with the meanest things and those J-^Jre^"
most subject to injury a jug or a cup. From this sign them,
go on to a tunic, a dog, a horse, a field ; and from that
to yourself, your body and its members .your children,
K.An 01
546.24 II
Only so
can you
win free
dom like
Diogenes,
who was
master
though
a slave ;
for mastery
depends on
skill, not
on power
to punish.
i 3 o Discourses of Epictetus
your wife, your brothers. Look carefully on all sides
and fling them away from you. Purify your judgements,
and see that nothing that is not your own is attached to
you or clings to you, that nothing shall give you pain
if it is torn from you. And as you train yourself day by
day, as in the lecture-room, say not that you are a philo
sopher (I grant you that would be arrogant), but that
you are providing for your enfranchisement ; for this
is freedom indeed. This was the freedom which Diogenes
won from Antisthenes, and said that no one could enslave
him any more. That explains his bearing as a captive,
and his behaviour to the pirates : did he call any of them
master? I do not mean the mere name (I have no fear
of that), but the state of mind, of which it is the expression.
Think how he rebukes them for feeding their prisoners
badly. Think how he was sold : did he look for a master ?
No, for a slave. 13 And when he was sold, think how he bore
himself towards his master : he began talking to him
at once, telling him that he ought not to dress as he did,
or shave as he did, and what life his sons ought to lead.
What wonder in that? For if he had bought a slave
skilled in gymnastic would he have used him as a servant
in the palaestra or as a master ? As a master ; and in
the same way if he had bought a man skilled in medicine
or in architecture. And on this principle the man with
skill is bound in every subject to be superior to the man
without skill. Whoever then possesses knowledge of
life in general must be master. For who is master on
shipboard?
The helmsman.
Book IV, Chapter i 131
Why? Is it because any one who disobeys him is
punished ? [No ! but because he possesses skill in
steering.] 14
4 But my master can flog me.
Can he do it with impunity?
So I thought.
But as he cannot do it with impunity, therefore he
has no authority to do it. No one can do wrong acts
with impunity.
What penalty falls on the man who imprisons his own The cruel
slave, if he think fit 15 ? master vio
lates his
Ihe very act of imprisoning him is his penalty, and nature, and
this you will admit yourself, if you will hold fast the
principle that man is not a brute but a civilized creature.
For when does a vine do badly? When it acts against
its nature. When does a cock do badly? In the same
conditions. The same is true of a man. What is his nature
then? Is it to bite and kick and cast into prison and
behead? No, but to do good, to work with others and
pray for them. Therefore, whether you will or no,
man does badly when he acts without sense.
Did not Socrates then do badly?
No, but his judges and accusers did.
Did not Helvidius in Rome do badly? It was not
No, but his murderer did. ^Sdid
* What do you mean? badly, but
Just as you do not say the fighting-cock has done
badly when it has won and been wounded, but when it
has been beaten without a scratch, and you do not count
a hound happy when he does not strain in the pursuit,
I 2
1 3 2 Discourses of Epictetus
but when you see him sweating, in distress, his flanks
bursting with the chase. What is there incredible in
the statement that every man s evil is that which con
tradicts his nature? Is this incredible? Is it not what
you say in every other sphere? Why then do you take
another line only when man is in question? Is our
other statement then 16 incredible that man s nature is
civilized and affectionate and trustworthy?
for they No, this is not, either.
were false How comes it then, further, that he suffers no harm
naturTand though he be flogged or imprisoned or beheaded? Is
he was _ not j t true that, if he suffer these things in a noble spirit,
hlS he goes away the gainer, and is profited, whereas he who
suffers harm is the man who undergoes the most pitiful
and shameful fate, the man who changes from a man into
a wolf or a serpent or a wasp ?
Freedom Come now and let us review the conclusions we have
a S reed to " He is free wh m n ne Can hinder the man
who can deal with things as he wishes. But the man
what is our who can be hindere( j or compelled or lettered or driven
owrij cinci ATI
accepting into anything against his will, is a slave. And who is
Destiny. he w hom none can hinder ? The man who fixes his aim
on nothing that is not his own. And what does not his
own mean? All that it does not lie in our power to
have or not to have, or to have of a particular quality
or under particular conditions. The body then does
not belong to us, its parts do not belong to us, our pro
perty does not belong to us. If then you set your heart on
one of these as though it were your own, you will pay the
penalty deserved by him who desires what does not belong
Book //^ Chapter r 133
to him. The road that leads to freedom, the only release
from slavery is this, to be able to say with your whole soul :
Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
Whither ordained is by your decree.
But, what say you, my philosopher, suppose the tyrant When you
call on you to say something unworthy of you ? Do you *
assent or refuse ? Tell me. you have
< Let me think it over. d ne with
the ques-
You will think it over now, will you? And what, pray, tionsof
did you think over when you were at lecture? Did vou thelecture-
7 room. You
not study what things are good and what are evil, and know what
what are neither? good and
Yes, I did/
What conclusion did you approve then?
That things right and noble were good, things wrong
and shameful bad.
Is life a good thing?
No.
Is death evil?
No.
Is prison?
No.
And what did you think of ignoble and faithless speech,
and treachery to a friend and flattery of a tyrant?
We thought them evil.
Why do you ask the question now, then ? You should
have asked it and made up your mind long ago. 17 It is
nonsense to question now whether, when I can win
the greatest goods, it is fitting for me not to win the
134 Discourses of Epictetus
greatest evils? A fine and necessary question forsooth,
needing a deal of thought ! Man, why do you mock
us?
You ought That is not the sort of thing that men question .
to apply H y u rea % imagined shameful acts to be bad, and noble
ypurde- ac ts good, and all else to be indifferent, you would not
cisions at . , . ,,
once and nave proceeded to raise this question : not at all : you
at a glance, would at once have been able to decide the question by
intuition, as an act of sight. For when do you question
whether black things are white, or heavy things light,
instead of following the obvious conclusions of your
senses ? Why then do you talk now of considering
whether things indifferent are more to be shunned than
things evil? These are not your judgements: prison
and death do not seem to you indifferent, but the greatest
evils, nor do base words and acts 18 seem evil, they seem
not to matter for us.
Men keep This is the habit to which you have trained yourself
llicir true
judge- from the first. Where am I? In the lecture-room.
merits for And who are listening to me ? I am talking to philosophers.
Schools, But now I have left the lecture-room. Away with those
fal d ^o Sa 7 m g s of pedants and fools ! That is how a philosopher
them in gives witness against a friend, that is how a philosopher
the world, turns parasite: that is how he hires himself out at a
price, and speaks against his real opinion in the Senate,
while in his heart 19 his judgement cries aloud, not a flat
and miserable apology for an opinion, hanging to idle
discussions as by a hair-thread, but a, judgement strong
and serviceable, trained by actions, whicrf is the true
initiation. Watch yourself and see how you take the
Book IV, Chapter i 135*
news, I do not say that your child is dead (how should
that befall you ?), but that your oil is spilt, or your wine
drunk up : well may one who stands by, as your temper
rises high, say just this to you, Philosopher, you use
different language in the lecture-room : why do you
deceive us ? Why, worm that you are, do you call yourself
a man ? I would fain stand by one of these men when he
is indulging his lust, that I might see how eager he is,
and what words he utters, and whether he remembers
his own name, or the discourses which he hears or
delivers or reads.
* Yes, but what has this to do with freedom?
Nay ! what else but this has to do with it, whether It is
you rich people agree, or not ? ^urtrich
And who is your witness to this ? old men
Why, it is none other than your very selves. You who ^" men
own that great master, and live at his nod and motion,
and your blood runs cold if he so much as look at one of
you with a sour face : you who pay court to old women
and old men, and say, I cannot do that, I am not allowed.
Why are you not allowed? Did you not just now contend
with me and assert you were free ?
* Yes, but Aprulla has forbidden me.
Tell the truth then, slave that you are, and do not run
away from your masters, nor disown your slavery, nor
dare to claim your enfranchisement, when you have so
many proofs of slavery against you. I declare that the The pas-
man who is compelled by love to act against his opinion, ^vefis
seeing the better course all the time, but wanting the more ex-
strength to follow it, one might be more inclined to think c
1 3 6 Discourses of Epictetus
deserving pardon, as overpowered by an influence vio
lent and in a way divine. But who can bear with you,
whose love is all for old women and old men, wiping their
faces clean and washing them and giving them presents,
and tending them like a slave in their illness, while all
the time you are praying for them to die, and question
ing the doctors, whether they are sick unto death at last?
tisde- Or again, when you kiss the hands of other people s
court slaves in order to get those great and splendid offices and
slaves for honours, becoming the slave of men who are not even
of office, free? Then, if you please, you walk in splendour as
praetor or consul. Do I not know how you became
praetor, where you got the consulship, who gave it you ?
For my part I would not wish to live, if I had to owe my
life to Felicio, and put up with his contempt and slavish
arrogance ; for I know what a slave is who is prosperous
as the world thinks and puffed up with vanity.
Are you then free? says one.
I do not By the gods, I wish to be and pray to be, but I cannot
profess to i i i r r T -n
be wholly vet look m t ^ ie face of m 7 masters, I still set store by my
free, but I poor body, I count it of great moment to keep it sound,
you to" 1 ves tnou gh I have not a sound body to begin with.
Diogenes, But I can show you one who is free, that you may not
have to look for your example. Diogenes was free. How
came he by this? Not because he was of free parents
(he was not), but because he was free himself, had cast
away all the weakness that might give slavery a hold
on him, and so no one could approach or lay hold on
him to enslave him. Everything he had he was ready to
let go, it was loosely attached to him. If you had laid
Book IV, Chapter i 137
hold on his property, he would have let it go rather than
have followed you for it ; if you seized his leg, he would
have let that go ; if his whole poor body, he would have
let his whole body go ; and the same with kinsfolk,
friends, and country. For he knew whence he had
them and from whom, and on what conditions he-
received them. His true ancestors, the gods, and his
true Country he would never have deserted, nor have
suffered another to yield them more obedience or atten
tion, nor would another have died for his Country more
cheerfully. For he never sought to get the reputation
of acting for the universe, but he remembered that
everything that comes to pass has its source there and
is done for that true Country s sake 20 and is entrusted to
us by Him that governs it. Wherefore look what he says
and writes himself : Therefore, Diogenes, he says,
1 you have power to converse as you will with the king
of the Persians and with Archidamus, king of the
Lacedaemonians. Was it because he was the son of
free parents ? When all the men of Athens and Lacedae-
mon and Corinth were unable to converse with them as
they wished, and feared and flattered them instead,
was it because they were sons of slaves? Why have
I the power to do it then? he says. * Because I count
my poor body not my own, because I need nothing,
because law and nothing else is all in all to me. These
were the things which left him free.
And that you may not think that I point you to the and
example of a man alone in the world, with no wife or
children or country or friends or kindred, who might memory i
as potent
as his
presence.
138 Discourses of Epictetus
have bent his will and drawn him from his purpose, take
Socrates and look at him : he had wife and children, but
regarded them as not his own ; a country, in such
manner and so far as duty allowed : friends, kinsmen,
all these things he had made subject to law and obedience
to law. For this reason, when duty called him to take
the field, he was the first to leave Athens and ran all
risks of battle most ungrudgingly, but when he was sent
by the Tyrants to fetch Leon, he never entertained the
idea, because he thought it shameful, though he knew that
he would have to die, if it so chanced. And what did
it matter to him ? Why, he wanted to preserve something
else not his poor flesh, but his honour and self-respect.
These are things which cannot be trusted to another or
made subject to another. Afterwards when he had to
plead for his life, did he behave as one who had children
or as one who had a wife ? No, but as one alone in the
world. And again, when he had to drink the poison,
how did he behave ? When he might have saved himself,
and when Crito said to him, Escape, for the sake of
your children , what did he say ? Did he think the chance
a godsend? No, he looked at what was fitting, and had
no eye, no thought for anything besides. For he wished
to save not his poor body, but that which right increases
and preserves, and wrong diminishes and makes to wither .
Socrates refuses to save himself with dishonour : he
who would not put the question to the vote, when the
Athenians bade him, who despised the Tyrants, who
held such noble discourse on virtue and goodness it
is impossible to save him with dishonour : his safety
Book IV^ Chapter i 139
is secured by death, not by flight. For the good actor
too, if he stops when he ought, has more chance of safety
than one who acts out of season.
What will your children do then ?
If I had gone away to Thessaly you would have looked
after them : and when I have gone away to Hades, will
there be no one to look after them ?
See how he calls death by smooth names and scoffs at it.
But if you and I had been in his place, we should at once
have argued that we ought to repay injury with injury :
and we should have added, I shall be useful to many
men if I keep alive, but to no one if I die. Nay, had it
been necessary to creep out through a hole in the rock
to escape, we should have done so. And yet how could
we have been of use to any one? For those we were
trying to help would not have stood fast. 21 Or again, if
we did good by living, should we not have done much
more good to men by dying when and as we ought?
Even so now that Socrates is dead, the memory of what
he did or said in his lifetime is no less useful to men,
or it may be even more useful than before.
Make this your study, study these judgements, and these True free-
r ...... dom is
sayings : nx your eyes on these examples, if you wish wort h p ay .
to be free, if you set your desires on freedom as it deserves. ing a R reat
T . . . . . , . price for.
It is no wonder that you pay this great, this heavy price
for so vast an object. Men hang themselves, or cast
themselves down headlong, nay sometimes whole cities
perish for the sake of what the world calls freedom ,
and 22 will you not repay to God what He has given,
when He asks it, for the sake of true freedom, the freedom
140 Discourses of Epictetus
which stands secure against all attack? Shall you not
Practise practise, as Plato says, not death only, but torture
L 1V1 ^ i . and exile and flogging, in a word practise giving back
is not all that is not yours ? If not, you will be a slave among
irs slaves, even if you are consul ten thousand times, and no
less, if you go up into Caesar s Palace ; and you will
discover that what philosophers say may be contrary
to opinion , as Cleanthes said, but not contrary to
and you reason . For you will really get to know that what
cover the ^^ sa ^ * s true > anc ^ tnat n o ne of these objects that men
true values admire and set their hearts on is of any use to those who
uns - get them, though those who have never chanced to have
them get the impression, that if only these things were
theirs their cup of blessings would be full, and then,
when they get them, the sun scorches them and the sea
tosses them no less, and they feel the same boredom and
the same desire for what they have not got. For freedom
is secured not by the fulfilling of men s desires, but by the
It may be removal of desire. To learn the truth of what I say, you
worth . i . . i r
while after mu st spend your pains on these new studies instead of
all to your studies in the past : sit up late that you may acquire
listen to 7 7 \
a philo- a judgement that makes you free : pay your attentions
sopher. not to a rich old man, but to a philosopher, and be
seen about his doors : to be so seen will not do you
discredit : you will not depart empty or without profit,
if you approach in the right spirit. If you doubt my
word, do but try : there is no disgrace in trying.
Booh 7/ 7 ? Chapter 2 141
CHAPTER II
On intercourse with men.
THE one thing to be careful about beyond all others Be true to
is this not to get so involved with any of your former y urs . e lf>
. / even if you
companions or friends, as to compromise your character thereby
for his sake, for if you do this you will destroy yourself. }? e *,
If the thought slips in, I shall seem rude to him, and he
will not be the same to me as before , remember that
nothing is done without paying for it, and that it is
not possible to be the same man that you once were,
unless you do as you did before. Choose then which
you will to be like your former self and be loved as be
fore by those who loved you, or to be better than before,
and so miss what they once gave you. For if this is the
better choice, then incline to this, and let no irrelevant
arguments distract you, for no one can make progress You can-
by facing both ways. No, if you have chosen this course not ad ~
, c 11 ., . , vance by
before all, if you wish to devote yourself to this and facing both
nothing else, and to spend all your labour on this, then vvavs
dismiss all other thoughts, or else this facing both ways
will produce a double result you will not make progress
as you ought, and you will fail to get what you got before ;
for before, when you frankly set your desires on worthless
objects, you were agreeable to your companions. You
cannot excel both ways ; in proportion as you succeed
on the one side, you must needs fall short on the other.
When you do not drink with those whom you used to
drink with, you cannot seem as agreeable to them as
You can
not make
the best
of both
worlds.
You might
as well try
to com
bine Aga
memnon
and
Thersites.
If you are
careful to
get good
value in
exchange,
you will
keep your
character,
142 Discourses of Epictetus
of old ; choose then, whether you wish to be a drinker
and gratify them, or sober and displease them. If you
do not sing with those that you sang with, you cannot
win their affection as before : here too then you must
choose which you prefer. For if it is better to have self-
respect and self-control, than to have it said of one,
What a charming fellow ! , then give up all other con
siderations, put them from you, turn away from them,
and have nothing to do with them. But if this is not
going to satisfy you, then turn round completely, and
practise the very opposite unnatural- lust, adultery,
and all that is in keeping with them, and you shall get
what you want. Yes, jump up and shriek applause
over your dancer.
But characters so opposite do not mix : you cannot act
both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you want to be
Thersites you must be humpbacked and bald, if Agamem
non, you must be handsome and tall, and love your
subjects.
CHAPTER III
What to aim at in exchange.
IF you give up any external possession, mind you see
what you are to get in exchange for it : and if it is worth
more, then never say, I have been a loser. You will
not lose if you get a horse for an ass, an ox for a sheep,
a noble action for a piece of money, true peace instead
of pedantry, self-respect instead of foul language. If
you remember this you will everywhere preserve your
Book IV, Chapter 3 143
character as it ought to be : if you do not remember
it, I warn you that your time perishes for nought, and
you will waste and overthrow all the pains that you now
spend upon yourself. It needs but a little to overthrow
and destroy everything just a slight aberration from
reason. For the helmsman to wreck his vessel, he does not but to do
need the same resources, as he needs to save it : if he ^5^"
turn it but a little too far to the wind, he is lost ; yes, careful
and if he do it not deliberately but from mere want of a
attention, he is lost all the same. It is very much the
same in life : if you doze but a little, all that you have
amassed up till now leaves you. Keep awake then and
watch your impressions : it is no trifle you have in keep
ing, but self-respect, honour, constancy, a quiet mind,
untouched by distress, or fear, or agitation in a word,
freedom.
What are you going to sell all this for ? Look and see
what your purchase is worth.
But I am not going to sell my freedom for anything
of that kind. 51
Well, suppose you waive external gain, 2 consider
what the exchange is that you are making. [It is yours to
say] Self-control for me, a tribunate for him : a praetor-
ship for him, self-respect for me. I do not clamour,
when to do so is unseemly, I will not jump from my
seat, when I ought not, for I am free and God s friend,
to obey Him of my own free will. I must not lay claim Do not
to anything else body, property, office, reputation, clalm
anything in short, for He does not wish me to lay claim things, but
to them : had He wished it, He would have made them onl y y u , r
own good,
144 Discourses of Epictetus
as God good for me, but He has not done so, and therefore
ms< I cannot transgress any of His commands. In everything
you do, guard what is your own good : for the rest,
be content just to take anything that is given you, so
far as you may use it rationally. Otherwise you will
be wretched and miserable, hampered and hindered.
These are the laws that are sent you from God, these are
His ordinances. These you must expound, and these
obey, riot those of Masurius and Cassius. 3
CHAPTER IV
To those whose heart is set on a quiet life.
Men will REMEMBER that it is not only desire of office and of
themselv wea ^ tn tnat ma kes men abject and subservient to others,
to others but also desire of peace and leisure and travel and learning.
ob ects^ R g ar d for any external thing, whatever it be, makes
you subservient to another. What difference does it
make then whether you desire to be a senator, or not
to be a senator, to be in office, or to be out of office ?
What difference is there between saying, I am miserable,
I don t know what to do, I am tied to my books like
a corpse , and saying, I am miserable, I have no leisure
to read ? For books, like salutations and office, belong
to the outer world which is beyond your own control.
The only If you deny it, tell me why do you want to read? If
arcUs^ c " you are drawn by the mere pleasure of reading, or by
peace of curiosity, you are a trifler, without perseverance : * but
if you judge it by the true standard, what is that but
Book 7T 7 , Chapter 4 145-
peace of mind? If reading does not win you peace of
mind, what is the good of it?
* Nay, he says, it does, and that is just why I am vexed
at being deprived of it.
And what, pray, is this peace of mind, which any one True peace
can hinder I do not mean Caesar, or Caesar s friend m ,!
can be cul-
but a raven, a flute-player, a fever, countless other tivated at
things? Nothing is so characteristic of peace of mind as a
that it is continuous and unhindered. Suppose now I am ing can
called away to do something : I shall go and attend V 1
to the limits which one must observe acting with a question
self-respect and security, with no will to get or to avoid readln -
external things, watching men also to see what they say
and how they move, and that not from ill nature, nor
to blame or mock at them, but looking at myself all the
time to see if I am making the same mistakes too.
How then shall I cease [to err]? you ask. 2
Time was when I made the same mistakes as others,
but I do so no more, thanks be to God. If you have
acted thus and devoted yourself to this, have you
done worse than if you had read a thousand lines or
written as many ? When you eat, are you vexed that
you are not reading ? Are you not content with
eating as your reading bids you ? And the same when
you wash and take exercise? Why, then, do you not
keep an equable tenor always, even when you approach
Caesar or this or that great man? What do you lack,
if you keep yourself free from passion, undismayed,
modest, if you are rather a spectator of events than
a spectacle to others, if you do not envy those pre-
546.24 II
Study is
a prepara
tion for
life, not
an end
in itself.
We fail
because we
cannot
apply our
studies to
practice.
146 Discourses of Epictetus
ferred to you, if you are not dazzled by material
things ?
You say you lack books ? How, or to what end ?
Books are, no doubt, a preparation for life, but life
itself is made up of things different from books. To
ask for books is as though an athlete should com
plain, as he enters the arena, that he is not training
outside. Life is what you were training for all along,
this is what the leaping-weights, and the sawdust, and
the young men you wrestled with were leading up to.
What? Are you hankering after them, when the time
for action is come? It is as if in the sphere of assent,
when impressions are presented to us, some which are
apprehensive , and some which have no such power, we
should refuse to distinguish between them and should
prefer to read the theory of apprehensive impressions. 3
What, then, is the reason of our failure?
The reason is that we never directed our reading or our
writing to the right object that is, to dealing naturally
with the impressions that come upon us, when we have
to act. We are content to go thus far and no farther
to understand what is said, and to be able to explain
it to another, to analyse the syllogism and trace out the
hypothetical argument. Therefore hindrance besets us
in the sphere where our pains are spent.
Do you want things which are not always in your power ?
Be condemned, then, to hindrance, obstruction, failure.
But if we were to study the doctrine of impulse, not to
see what is said about impulse but to make our own
impulses good, if we were to study the will to get and
Booh II \ Chapter 4 147
the will to avoid to the end that we may never fail to
get what we will nor fall into what we avoid, and study
the doctrine of what is fitting that we may remember
our true relations and may do nothing irrationally or
contrary to what is fitting then we should not have to
suffer vexation at being hindered in regard to the prin
ciples we have studied, but should find contentment in
acting in accordance with them, and we should cease
to calculate as we have been wont to do till to-day,
* To-day I read so many lines, wrote so many , and should
reckon thus, To-day I governed my impulse by the
precepts of the philosophers, I did not entertain desire,
I avoided only things within the compass of my will,
I was not awed by this man, or over-persuaded by that
man, but trained my faculty of patience, of abstinence,
of co-operation : and then we should give thanks to
God, for the gifts for which our thanks are due.
As it is, we do not realize that we too, with a difference, We behave
behave like the multitude. Another man fears that he n^j^e
may not become a magistrate, you fear that you may instead
be one. Man, act not so. Nay, just as you laugh at him gocrates
who fears he may not hold office, so laugh at yourself who made
too. There is nothing to choose between being thirsty
with fever, and shunning water like a madman. If you
act thus, how shall you be able to say, as Socrates did, If
God so wills, so be it ? Do you think that, if Socrates
had set his desire on a life of leisure and daily conversation
with young men in the Lyceum or the Academy, he would
have cheerfully gone on all the campaigns in which
he served? Would he not have groaned and lamented,
K 2
148 Discourses of Epictetus
1 Unhappy that I am, wretched and miserable in the
field, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum.
What? Was this your task in life, to sun yourself? Was
it not to have a mind at peace, to be free from hindrance
and encumbrance? Nay, how would he have been
Socrates any more, if he had lamented like that? How
could he have written songs of triumph in prison ?
If your will j n a wo rd, then, remember this, that, whenever you
free*, you pay regard to anything outside your will s control, you
mustig- so f ar destroy your will. And freedom from office lies
that lies outside your will just as much as office, leisure just as
outside its muc h as business.
Am I, then, to pass my life amid this tumult?
What do you mean by tumult ?
Amid a multitude of men.
Well, and what is there hard in that? Imagine yon
are at Olympia, make up your mind that it is a festival.
There, too, one cries this, another that, one does this,
another that, and one man jostles another. The public
baths, too, are thronged, yet which of us does not enjoy
this assemblage, and leave it with pain? Be not dissatis
fied nor peevish at what happens. Vinegar disgusts me,
for it is acid ; honey disgusts me, for it upsets my tone ;
I dislike green stuff. In the same way you say, c I dislike
retirement, it means solitude ; I dislike a crowd, it means
disturbance.
Say not so, but, if things so turn out, that you live
alone or in a small company, call it peace and make
a proper use of it : converse with yourself, train your
mult of the impressions, develop your primary notions. If you
and make
the most
of your
circum
stances.
Booh IV ^ Chapter 4 149
chance on a crowd, call it * games , assembly , festival , world may
and try to share the feast with your fellow men. For ^ *|J"J ed
what sight is pleasanter for the man who loves his kind account,
than a multitude of men? We are pleased to see troops
of horses or oxen, we delight to see a multitude of ships:
does the sight of a multitude of men vex us ?
Nay, but their clamour overwhelms me.
Well, that is only a hindrance to your hearing : how
does it affect you ? Does it affect your faculty of dealing
with your impressions? Who can hinder you from
dealing naturally with the will to get and the will to
avoid, the impulse to act and not to act? What tumult
can avail to touch these? God s will
Only remember these general principles : What is j; s ^ e one
mine, what is not mine? What is given me? What whether
does God wish me to do now ? What does He not wish ? He S lves
A little while ago His will was that you should live a quiet or the
life in converse with yourself, and write on these matters, tumi ! It of
! conflict,
read, listen, prepare yourself : you had sufficient time
for this. Now He says to you, Now come into the
conflict, show us what you have learnt, how you have
trained. How long are you going to exercise yourself
in solitude ? The time has now come for you to discover
whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one
of those who go about the world suffering continual
defeat. Why, then, are you vexed ? There is no conflict
without a crowd : there must be many to train beforehand,
many to cry applause, many stewards, many spectators.
* Yes, but I wanted to live a quiet life.
Lament and mourn, then, as you deserve : for what
For free
dom you
must give
up, if need
be, even
Athens or
Rome,
with all
their at
tractions.
15-0 Discourses of Epictetus
greater penalty than this can fall on him who is unin-
structed and disobedient to the ordinances of God than
to be distressed, to mourn, to envy, in a word, to be un
happy and miserable ? Have you no wish to free yourself
from these ills ?
And how shall I free myself?
Have you not often heard, that you must get rid of
the will to get 4 altogether, and must will to avoid only
those things which are within your control ? That you
must give up everything body, property, reputation,
books, the throng, office, private life? For if once you
swerve from this path you become a slave and a subject,
you are liable to hindrance and compulsion, and com
pletely at the mercy of others. But the saying of Clean-
thes is ready to our need,
Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny.
Will you have me go to Rome? To Rome then. To
Gyara? I will go to Gyara. To Athens? I will go to
Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If once you
say, When are we to get away to Athens? you are lost.
That wish, if unfulfilled, must make you miserable,
and, if fulfilled, it must make you puffed up, elated on
false grounds : again, if you are hindered, it must make
you unhappy, at the conflict between circumstances
and your will. Give up all these things then.
Athens is beautiful.
Yes, but happiness is far more beautiful freedom
from passion and disturbance, the sense that your affairs
depend on no one.
In Rome there is crowd and salutations.
Book IV) Chapter 4 iyi
Yes, but peace of mind outweighs all discomforts.
If, then, the time for these has come, why do you not get
rid of your will to avoid them? Why must you bear
your burden like a cudgelled ass? If you do this, you
must needs (look you) be the perpetual slave of him
who has power to accomplish your departure, or him who
can in any way hinder it, and you are bound to pay
respect to him as to an Evil Genius.
There is but one way to peace of mind (keep this JJ ake y. our
. j . j Governing
thought by you at dawn and in the day-time and at p r i nc iple
night) to give up what is beyond your control, to count the one ob-
6 1-1 j jectofyour
nothing your own, to surrender everything to heaven and stu dy, and
fortune, to leave everything to be managed by those all will
11 ir be well,
to whom Zeus has given control, and to devote yourselt
to one object only, that which is your own beyond all
hindrance, and in all that you read and write and hear
to make this your aim. Therefore I cannot call a man
industrious, if I am merely told that he reads or writes,
no, not even if one adds he is at work all night , unless
I know what he is working for. You do not call a man
industrious who keeps late hours for the sake of a mistress :
neither do I. But if he does it for glory, I call him
ambitious ; if for money, I call him fond of money, not
fond of work. But if the object of his work is his own
Governing Principle, if he is working to make this live
a natural life, then and then only I call him industrious.
You must never praise or blame men for qualities that
are indifferent, but for their judgements. For it is these
which are each man s property, these which make their
actions base or noble. Bear this in mind and rejoice in
1 5" 2 Discourses of Epictetus
what is at hand and be content with what the moment
brings. If you see any of the principles that you have
learnt and thought over being realized by you in action,
rejoice over them. If you have put away bad nature,
and evil-speaking, or made them less, if you have got rid
of wantonness, foul speaking, recklessness, slackness, if
you are not excited by things that once excited you, or at
least not as before, then you can keep festival day by day,
to-day because you behaved well in this action, to-morrow
because you did well in another. How much greater
cause is this for offering sacrifice than if you were made
consul or prefect ! These things come to you from your
own self and from the gods. Remember Who is the Giver,
and to whom He gives and why. If you are brought up
to reason thus, you need no longer raise the question,
Where shall I be happy? and Where shall I please
God ? Do not men have their equal portion in all places ?
Do they not everywhere alike behold what comes to
pass?
CHAPTER V
To those that are contentious and, brutal.
The good THE good and noble man does not contend with any
man avoids , , , n .
contention one anc * to t ^ ie 3est * " 1S P ower does not sutter others
to contend. We have an illustration of this, as of other
qualities, set out for us in the life of Socrates, who not
only avoided contention himself on all occasions, but
tried to prevent the contentions of others. Look at the
Symposium of Xenophon and see how many contentions
he has reconciled, and again how patient he was with
Book IV \ Chapter y 15-3
Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles, and how
patient always with his wife, and with his son, when
his son tried to convict him of fallacious arguments.
For he remembered to hold fast the truth that no man is
master of another s Governing Principle. Therefore he not inter-
wished to do nothing that was not his own. What does fe " n g t wltl1
others
that mean? Not to move other people to act naturally, action, but
for that is not his to do : but to let others act for them- followln g
nature,
selves, as they think fit, and himself none the less to live
and spend his days in accord with nature, only doing his
own business in such a way that they, too, should follow
nature. For this is the conduct which the good and noble
man always has set before him.
Is it his will to become praetor ?
No : but if this is given him, to keep his own Governing
Principle in these circumstances.
To marry?
No, but if marriage is given him, to keep himself in
a natural state in those circumstances. But if he wills
that his son or his wife should not go wrong, then he
wills to make his own what is not his own. In fact educa
tion is this, to learn what is one s own and what is not.
Where, then, is there any room for contention if a man Then he
bears himself thus ? Is he amazed at anything that hap- ^ vll j. f iever
J be disap-
pens? Does anything take him by surprise? Does he not pointed.
expect the wicked to deal worse and more severely with
him than the event turns out? Does he not count
everything gain in which they fall short of the worst?
* Such a one reviled you.
Many thanks to him for not striking.
1 5- 4 Discourses of Epictetus
If his
neighbour
attacks
him he will
take no
revenge,
for that
would be
to lose
what
stamps
him as a
man his
rational
faculty.
But he did strike too.
Many thanks to him for not wounding.
But he did wound.
Many thanks to him for not killing. For when, or
in whose school, did he learn that man is a gentle
and sociable creature and that wrongdoing in itself
does great harm to the wrongdoer ?
If, then, he has not learnt this or been convinced of it,
why should he not follow what appears to be his interest ?
My neighbour has thrown stones.
Is that any offence on your part ?
* But my crockery is broken.
You are no piece of crockery : you are a rational will.
You ask what is given you to meet this attack? If you
want to act the wolf, you may bite back, and throw
more stones at him than he threw : but if you seek to
act as a man, then examine your store and see what
faculties you have brought into the world with you.
Have you brought the faculty of a brute, the faculty of
revenging wrongs? When is a horse miserable? When
it is deprived of its natural faculties, not when it is
unable to crow like a cock, but when it is unable to run.
And the dog? Not when it cannot fly, but when it
cannot follow a trail. On the same principle a man is
wretched, not when he cannot throttle lions or embrace
statues 1 (for he has not been endowed by nature with
faculties for this), but when he has lost his rational and
trustworthy faculty. This is he for whom men
should meet and mourn
The miseries he has come to,
Book IF \ Chapter y i y f
not, by Zeus, the man who is born or dies, but he whose
lot it is to lose while he lives what is his own not his
patrimony, his paltry field or house or inn or slaves
(for none of these is man s own, but all are alien to him,
all are subject and subservient to their Masters, who give
them now to one now to another) to lose the qualities
that make him man, the distinctive stamp impressed
upon his mind : like the stamp we look for on coins,
which if we find we pass them, and if we do not, fling them
away.
Whose imprint does this sesterce bear?
4 Trajan s.
Here with it.
Nero s.
Fling it away, it will not pass, it is good for nothing.
So, too, it is with man. What stamp have his judge- For a man
ments? * Gentle, sociable, patient, affectionate. Good, Jfr Rejected
I accept him, I make him a citizen, I accept him as a for his
neighbour and fellow voyager. Only beware that he has
not the stamp of Nero. Is he hot-tempered, is he wrath
ful, is he querulous ? If it takes his fancy, he cuffs the
heads of those he meets. Why, then, did you say that
he is a man? Is everything judged by its outward form
alone ? On that principle you must call your waxen apple
an apple. No, it must smell and taste like an apple : the
outward semblance is not enough. So, when you judge
man, nose and eyes are not sufficient, you must see if he
has the judgements of a man. Here is one who does not
listen to reason, does not understand when his fallacies
are exposed ; he is an ass. Here is one whose self-respect
i f 6 Discourses of Epictetus
is deadened : he is useless, anything rather than a man.
Here is one looking to find some one he can kick or bite ;
it follows he is not even a sheep or an ass, but some savage
beast or other.
He will pay < What then? Do you want me to be despised?
the opinion By whom? By those who know? Nay, how will
of the those who know despise one who is gentle and self-
respecting? By those who do not know? What do you
care for them? No craftsman cares for those who have
no skill !
4 Yes, but they will attack me much more.
What do you mean by me ? Can any one injure your
will or hinder you from dealing with the impressions
you meet with in a natural way ?
No.
Why, then, do you persist in being troubled and want
to show yourself a man of fears ? Why do you not come
forward and openly proclaim that you are at peace with
all men, whatever they do, and that you laugh above all
at those who think that they are harming you? saying,
These slaves do not know who I am, nor where to find
what is good or bad for me, for they have no way of getting
at my position. In the same way those who inhabit
a strong city laugh at those who besiege it. Why are
these men troubling themselves for nothing? Our wall
is secure, we have food for a long time, and all other
Hissecur- supplies. These are the things that make a city secure
is m against capture ; the soul of man is made secure by
ments. b judgements alone. For what wall is so strong, or what
substance so impenetrable, or what property so secure
Book IF 9 Chaffer r 15-7
against robbery, or what reputation so unassailable ? When
the objects that a man sets his mind on are bound to
bring him trouble of mind, sick hopes, fear, mourning,
disappointment of the will to get, failure of the will to
avoid, they are always subject to death and to capture.
If this be so, are we not willing to make the one means He shall
of safety which is given us secure, and, abandoning what tnere f re
is mortal and slavish, to spend our efforts on what is has right
immortal and free by nature? Do we not remember J udge ~
1 ment on
that one man does not harm nor benefit another? It is outward
man s judgement on each situation that harms him. thin s
It is this which overthrows him, this is contention, this
is faction, this is war. The conflict of Eteocles and
Polynices was caused by nothing else but this judgement,
the judgement on kingship, the judgement on exile
that exile is the worst of evils, kingship the greatest good :
and the nature of every man is this to pursue the good,
to avoid the evil, to consider him who takes away from
one s good and who involves one in evil as an enemy and
aggressor, even though he be a brother, a son, a father,
for no kinship is closer than that of the good. Wherefore,
if these outward things are reckoned good and evil,
there is no love between father and sons or between brother
and brother, but the whole world is full of enemies,
v T c -i -11 i and then
aggressors, malicious persons. But if a right will is the he will be
only good thing, and a wrong will the only evil, what free from
becomes of conflict and reviling? How can it arise? t j on< ^
Over things that do not concern us ? With whom should Socrates
we contend? With the ignorant, the miserable, with
those who are deluded in regard to the highest matters?
1 5-8 Discourses of Epictetus
Socrates remembered this when he lived in his own house
and bore with a most shrewish wife and an unfeeling son.
For what did her shrewishness mean ? Pouring water at
will over his head, and trampling on his cake. What is
that to me, if I make up my mind that it is nothing to
me? This is what I have to do, and no king nor master
shall hinder me against my will, the many shall not prevail
against the one, nor the stronger against the weaker :
for God has given each man his reason to use unhindered.
These judgements make affection in a household, con
cord in a city, peace among nations ; they make a man
grateful towards God, confident in all places, for he looks
on outward things as alien to him and as worth nothing.
But though we are capable of writing and reading these
sentiments, though we can praise them as we read, yet
they do not bring conviction to us, nor anything like it.
Wherefore the proverb about the Lacedaemonians,
Lions at home, foxes at Epbesus,
will fit us too. In the lecture-room we are lions, and foxes
in the world outside !
CHAPTER VI
To those who are distressed at being pitied.
Those who I AM vexed , he says, * at being pitied.
of being ^ s it y ur doing that you are pitied, or the doing of
pitied are those who pity you ? Or again, does it rest with you
really ac- , . .
ceptingthe tost P their pity?
multi- t Yes, if I show them that I do not deserve their pity.
tucle s
Book IV) Chapter 6 1^9
But is it in your power, or is it not, not to deserve pity? standard of
I think that it is in my power. happiness,
But these men do not pity you for what would deserve
pity, if anything did I mean for your errors but for
poverty and lack of office and diseases and death and other
things of this sort. Are you, then, prepared to persuade and can
the multitude that none of these things, after all, is evil, theirpity
but that it is possible for a man who is poor, and without onl y b Y
office or honour, to be happy, or do you try to show off
to them as a man of wealth and office? The second
course stamps you as a braggart without taste or worth.
And consider by what means you would achieve your
pretence : you will have to borrow some wretched
slaves and possess a few pieces of plate, and show them
many times over, if you can, and try not to let men know
that they are the same ; and you must display gay
apparel and other splendours and show yourself off as
one who is honoured by eminent persons 1 and must try
to dine at their table, or at least be thought to do so ;
and you must use base arts on your person, to make
yourself seem handsomer and better made than you really
are : these are the contrivances you must adopt, if you
wish to take the second way of avoiding pity.
But the first way is a long, nay an endless, one to How can
attempt the very task which Zeus could not accomplish vnceth"e
to convince all men of what is good and what is evil, multitude,
Is this given to you? No ! This only is given you to ^vTfaUed
convince yourself: you have not yet done that: and to convince
yet you are already attempting are you ? to convince > ourself ?
others. Why ! who has been your companion so long
i6o Discourses of Epictetus
as you have been yourself, and who can exercise such
persuasion on you as you can on yourself, and who is
more kindly and friendly disposed to you than you are?
How is it, then, that you have not yet persuaded yourself
to learn? Are not your thoughts turned upside down?
Have you set your mind on this, and not on learning how
to be quit of pain and trouble and humiliation, and so to
be free ? Have you not heard, then, that there is but one
way which leads to this to give up all that lies beyond
the will, to abandon it and confess that it is not yours ?
To what class of things does another man s opinion
about you belong?
To what is outside the will.
Then it concerns you not at all ?
Not at all.
While, then, you still allow yourself to be vexed and
troubled at men s opinion, do you imagine that you have
attained conviction as to what is good and evil?
Why is it Will you not, then, let other men alone and become your
that mere Qwn master anc | pup il ? < Other men shall see for themselves
acceptance
ofprin- whether it is to their advantage to be in an unnatural
ciples has t t an jj t ^ e j }j ^ ut no man j g nearer me t han
no effect ?
I am myself. Why is it, then, that though I have heard
the arguments of philosophers and assent to them, they
have not lightened my burden? Am I so wanting in
ability? Why, in all the other things I chose to under
take, I was not found to be duller than most. I was quick
at learning letters and wrestling and geometry and the
analysis of syllogisms. Is it, then, that reason has failed
to convince me? Why, there is nothing which I have
Book IV, Chapter 6 161
so stamped with my approval and choice from the first
and even now these principles are the subject of my read
ing, I hear and write of nothing else : up till to-day we
have found no argument to prevail against this. What
then do I lack? Is it that the contrary judgements have Is it due to
not been removed from my mind? Is it that my own want . of .
. . practice m
convictions are untrained and unaccustomed to confront applying
facts, like arms put away in a cupboard and grown them ?
rusty, that cannot be fitted to my body? Yes, of course !
In wrestling or writing or reading I am not content
with merely learning ; I twist the arguments put before
me to and fro and construct new ones, and I deal with
variable premisses in like manner. But when I have to
deal with those necessary principles, which enable a man,
if he grounds himself on them, to escape pain, fear,
passion, hindrance to be free, I do not exercise myself
in them nor devote to them the practice that is proper
for them. And then, am I concerned by what the multi
tude will say of me, and whether in their eyes I shall appear
a happy or important personage ?
Miserable man, will you not see what opinion you It is your
pronounce on yourself? How do you appear to yourself ? -JJJ^? 1 " 11 "
What manner of man in thought, in will to get and will self which
to avoid : what manner of man in impulse, preparation, counts -
design, and the other activities of man? Yet you are
concerned whether other men pity you ?
Yes, but they pity me when I do not deserve it. J
Is this what pains you? and is the man who is pained
to be pitied?
Yes.
546.24 II
162 Discourses of Epictetus
Then you are not pitied without deserving it after
all. By the very feelings you entertain in regard to pity
you make yourself worthy of pity. What does Antisthenes
say? Did you never hear? It is the part of a king,
If you are Cyrus, to do well and be ill-spoken of. My head is
teflthyou sound and all think that I have a headache. What do
pay no \ care ? I am free from fever, and men sympathize
tiSosewho with me as though I had fever : Unhappy man, this
think you } on g time you have had fever without ceasing. I put
on a gloomy face and assent : It is quite true I have
been ill for a long time. What is to happen then?
4 What God wills : and as I say it I laugh in my sleeve
at those who pity me.
Do the What prevents me, then, from doing the same here too ?
^"arcTto 1 * am P oor ^ Ut * hold a right judgement on poverty :
men s esti- what do I care then, whether they pity me for poverty ?
mate of j am - n Q ^ ce an( j ot ^ QT5 are . k ut I hold the right
your hap
piness, opinion as to being in office and out of it. Those who
pity me shall take their own views : I have neither
hunger nor thirst nor cold, but their own hunger or
thirst makes them imagine the same of me. What am
I to do for them then ? I go about proclaiming and saying,
Sirs, be not deluded, all is well with me, I take no heed
of poverty, or want of office, or, in a word, of anything
at all except right judgements : these I hold free from
hindrance, I have paid regard to nothing besides. Yet
what nonsense am I talking? How do I hold right
judgements any longer if I am not content with being
what I am, and am excited over other men s opinion
of me?
Book IF, Chapter 6
But others will get more than I do, and will be pre- Men
ferred to me. a f hieve th
objects
Well, what is more reasonable than that those who have they work
spent their pains on any object should have the advantage su ? h ,
in that on which they have spent their pains ? They have or office,
spent their pains on office, you on judgements, they on
wealth, you on the way to deal with impressions. See
whether they have the advantage of you in that on
which you have spent pains and which they neglect :
whether in assent they keep more to natural standards,
whether they are more successful in getting what they
will to get, and in avoiding what they will to avoid,
whether in design, in purpose, in impulse they aim better
than you, whether they do what is fitting for them as
men, as sons, and as parents, and in each relation that you
name in turn. But if they hold office and you do not,
will you not tell yourself the truth that you do nothing
to gain office, and they do everything, and it is most
unreasonable that one who pays attention to a thing
should have less success in it than one who does not?
Nay, but I pay regard to right j udgements and therefore If you
it is more reasonable that I should rule. have fi . xed
your aim
Yes, in judgements, for you have devoted yourself on other
to them : but you must give place to others in that thm S s vou
7 cannot
to which they have devoted themselves. You might as hope to
achieve
this too.
well claim to be a better shot with the bow than regular acnieve
bowmen because you have right judgements, or to be
better at smith s work than the professional smith. Give
up your devotion to judgements then and busy yourself
with the objects you wish to obtain, and then complain
L2
i<*4 Discourses of Epictetus
if you do not succeed, for you have a right to complain.
But, as it is, you say you are bent on other things, and
attending to other things, and the proverb of the people
is a good one : One business has nothing in common
with another. One man rises at dawn and tries to find
whom he can salute as he leaves home, or to whom he
can make a pleasant speech, or send a gift, how he can
please the dancer, how he can deal maliciously with one
man to gratify another. When he prays, his prayers
are for this object ; when he sacrifices, his sacrifice is for
this ; the prayer of Pythagoras
That sleep fall not upon his tender eyes 2
he has turned to this end. < How went I wrong ? Was
it in matters of flattery? What wrought I? Have
I acted as a free man and a gentleman? And if he finds
himself acting so he blames and accuses himself, and says,
Whatever should you say this for? Might you not
have told a lie ? Even philosophers say, " There is nothing
to hinder one s telling a lie." :
If you But if you have really given your mind to nothing
prefer the j 3Ut ^ ow to j ea i properly with impressions, then as soon
ftfeto the as you get up in the morning you must consider, What
life of flat- ^ Q j i ac k to secure freedom from passion? What do I
object^ 1 lack to be unperturbed? What am I? am I a mere body,
freedom. or property, or reputation ?
None of these.
What then ?
A rational creature.
What then are the demands upon me?
Book IV, Chapter 6
Reflect upon your actions. Where have I gone
wrong in regard to peace of mind ? What have I done
unfriendly, or unsociable, or heartless? What did I fail
to accomplish in this regard that I ought to have done ?
Seeing then that there is this great difference in men s And you
desires and acts and prayers, do you still wish to be equal c j a j m
with them in matters to which they have given their equality
minds and you have not? And, that being so, are you
surprised and annoyed if they pity you ? They are not chosen the
annoyed if you pity them. Why? Because they are
convinced that their lot is a good one, and you are not
convinced. That is why you are not content with your
portion, but hanker after theirs, and they are content
with their portion and do not hanker after yours. For,
if you were really convinced that you are right in regard
to what is good and that they are far away from the
truth, you would never have taken any account of what
they say of you.
CHAPTER VII
On freedom from fear.
WHAT makes the Emperor an object of fear? The man
, , , to whom
The guards, one says, with their swords, and the jjf e anc j
chamberlains and those who close the door against those posses
sions are
who enter. indifferent
Why is it then that, if you bring a child to him when his fears no
guards are with him, the child is not afraid ? Is it because
the child is not aware of them? Now if a man is aware
1 6 6 Discourses of Epictetus
of the guards and their swords, but comes for that very
purpose, because his misfortunes make him wish to die
and he is anxious to die easily by some one else s hand,
does he fear the guards?
No, for he wishes for the very thing which makes men
fear them.
If then a man whose will is not set on dying or living,
but who is content with what is given him, comes before
the Tyrant, what prevents him from coming without fear ?
Nothing.
Now suppose a man is of the same mind in regard to
property as this man in regard to his body : suppose he
feels the same about wife and children : suppose, in
a word, he is so distracted and desperate that he regards
it as indifferent whether he has these things or not :
just as children playing with potsherds are anxious about
the game, but do not care for the potsherds in themselves,
so he has not set his heart on material things, but accepts
the game cheerfully, and enjoys handling them how can
any tyrant, how can any guards or swords inspire fear
in such a one?
The ra- Yet if madness can produce this attitude of mind, if even
knowsThat ^*^ can P r duce it in the Galilaeans, can reason and de-
he is part monstration teach no one that God has made all things in
t ^ ie wor ^> anc ^ tne world itself as a whole to have its own
end without hindrance, but its individual parts to subserve
the whole ? Now all other things are without the capacity
of understanding His governance, but the rational creature
has faculties that enable him to reflect on all these things,
to realize that he is a part, and what part he is, and that
Book
Chapt
er
167
it is well for the parts to give way to the whole. And
further, being by nature noble and generous and free,
he sees that he has some of the things about him un
hindered and in his own control, and some again subject
to hindrance and dependent on others, the acts of his
will unhindered, and things beyond his will subject
to hindrance. And therefore if he makes up his mind
that his good and his interest lie in the former alone,
in things that are unhindered and depend upon himself,
he will be free, tranquil, happy, unharmed, high-minded,
reverent, giving thanks for everything to God, on no
, . . < i i
occasion blaming or accusing any one tor what happens ;
but if he finds his good in things outside and beyond
his will, he is bound to be hindered and hampered, and
to be the slave of those who have authority over those
things on which his admiration and his fear are centred,
he is bound to be irreverent because he thinks that
God is injuring him, and unfair, always seeking to win
for himself more than his share ; he is bound to be of
a mean and paltry spirit.
If a man understands this, there is nothing to prevent
him from living with an easy and obedient spirit, content
with his past lot and awaiting with a gentle spirit all that
may yet befall him.
Would you give me poverty ? Give it me and you
shall learn what poverty is when a good actor plays the
part. Would you give me office? Give it me, and
troubles with it. Exile? Wherever I go, it will be
well with me : for even here it was not the place that
T , ..
made me well off, but my judgements, and these I shall
If he finds
that are ^
^ntrol, K
nothing
can dis-
He will
j )0 v ert y
and exile
with con-
tentment.
The man
whom God
has made
free is
under no
one s au
thority
and has
no fears.
1 68 Discourses of Epictetus
carry away with me, for no one can rob me of them ;
these alone are my own and cannot be taken away, with
these I am content wherever I am and whatever I do.
But now the time is come to die. What do you mean
by die ? Do not use fine words, but state the facts as
they are. Now is the time for your material part to
be restored to the elements of which it was composed.
What is there dreadful in that ? What loss to the universe
will this mean, what strange or irrational event? Is
this a thing to make one fear the tyrant? Is this what
makes the swords of the guards seem long and sharp?
Let others look to that ; I have considered the whole
matter, and no one has authority over me. God has
set me free, I have learnt to understand His commands,
no one can make a slave of me any more, my judges
and he who claims my freedom 1 are as they should be.
Am I not master of your body?
What does that concern met
Am I not master of your property?
Well, how does that concern met
Am I not master of exile and imprisonment?
Again, I resign all, yes, and my body itself for you to
deal with, when you will. Only try your authority
and you will learn how far it extends. What then can
I fear any more ? The chamberlains ? What should I fear
their doing? Fear their shutting me out? If they find
me wanting to enter, let them shut me out !
Why then do you come to the king s door ?
Because I think it is fitting for me to join in the game
while it lasts.
Book IV ^ Chapter 7
How then do you escape being shut out?
If I am not received, it is not my will to enter ; my
will is always to prefer what comes to pass, for I consider
what God wills better than what I will. I will attach He makes
myself to Him as His minister and servant, my impulses {^^j^ 111
and my wishes are one with His, in a word my will is His
will. There can be no exclusion for me, but only for
those who try to press in.
Why then do I not press in ?
Because I know that nothing good is given within to
those who have entered. But when I hear a man called
happy because he is honoured by Caesar I say, * What
is his portion? [A province or a procuratorship.] l
Does he also get a judgement, such as a governor should
have? Does he get the skill to use a procuratorship?
Why should I push my way in any more ? Some one ^d re _
flings a shower of figs and nuts : the children try to gards
seize them, and fight with one another for them ; grown ^ t h e nuts
men do not, for they count it a small matter. If one that
n- 11 i ., i T i children
limg potsherds even children do not try to catch them. scram ble
Governorships are being given to this man and that : f r
the children shall see to them ! A praetorship, a con
sulship : let the children scramble for them : let them
be shut out and beaten, let them kiss the hands of
the giver and his slaves ; for me they are figs and nuts.
But what if a fig chance to fall into my lap when he is
throwing? Take and eat it, for one may value a fig so
far. But if I stoop for it and upset my neighbour or am
upset by him, if I flatter those who enter, the fig is not
worth while, nor is any other of the good things which
170 Discourses of Eptctetus
the philosophers have persuaded me not to believe to
be good.
The Show me the swords of the guards.
theg d u S ards See how lar g e and h W shar P th ^ ^^
deserve no Well, what do these large, sharp swords do?
more re- < Th ^U
spect than
a fever or What does fever do ?
a falling < Thesame .>
What does a tile do ?
The same.
Would you have me then stand in awe of all these
things, and pay them reverence, and go about as the slave
of all?
God forbid ! No, if I have once learnt that what is
born must needs also be destroyed in order that the
world may not stand still or be hindered, it makes no
difference to me whether a fever is to destroy it or a falling
tile or a soldier, but if I must compare them I know that
the soldier will do the thing quicker and with less pain.
Serve Seeing then that I neither fear anything that he can
irs do to me nor desire anything that he can provide,
requires why do I stand in awe and amazement before him any
nothing more? Wh do j fear h ards? Wh do i re j oice if
unreason- J .
able : if he speaks to me in a friendly way and gives me a welcome?
he requires Wh do j t u Qther k how he talked me? j
more, give J
up the he a Socrates or a Diogenes, that his praise of me should
be a proof of what I am? Do I admire his character?
No, it is to keep up the game that I come to him and serve
him, so long as he commands me to do nothing stupid or
unseemly. But if he says to me, Go and fetch Leon
Book IV) Chapter 7 171
of Salamis , I say to him, Look for some one else, I will
play no longer.
Away with him.
I follow ; it is in the game.
But you lose your neck.
Well ! does the Emperor himself, and you who obey
him, keep his neck for ever?
But you will be flung abroad unburied.
I shall be, if I and the dead body are one, but if I am
not the same as the dead body, state the facts with more
discrimination, and do not try to frighten me. These
are things to frighten children and fools. But if a man
has once entered a philosopher s lecture-room and does
not know what his true self is, he deserves to fear and
to natter what he flattered afterwards : I mean, if he
has not yet learnt that he is not flesh or bones or sinews,
but the faculty which uses them, and which also governs
the impressions and understands them.
Yes, but these arguments make men despise the laws. Philosophy
Nay, these arguments of all others make those who |jnonly
adopt them obedient to the laws. Law is not what any what is
fool can do. Yet see how these arguments make us
behave rightly even towards our critics, since they teach
us to claim nothing against them, in which they can
surpass us. They teach us to give way in regard to our
poor body, to give way in regard to property, children,
parents, brothers, to give up everything, resign every
thing : only our judgements they reserve, and these Zeus
willed should be each man s special property. How
can you call this lawlessness, how can you call it stupidity ?
172
Discourses of Epictetus
I give way to you in that wherein you are better and
stronger than I : where, on the other hand, I am the
better man, it is for you to give way to me, for I have
made this my concern, and you have not. You make
it your concern, how to live in a palace, how slaves and
freedmen are to serve you, how youare towear conspicuous
raiment, how you are to have a multitude of huntsmen,
But the minstrels, players. Do I lay claim to any of these? But
ra 1 tlon .^ 1 1 you, for your part, have you concerned yourself with
grow foul judgements? Have you concerned yourself with your own
rational self? Do 7 OU know what are its constituents >
exercised, what is its principle of union, how it is articulated, what
are its faculties and of what nature ? Why are you vexed
then, if another who has made these things his study
has the advantage of you here ?
But these are the greatest matters of all.
Who, I ask, prevents you from busying yourself with
these and devoting your attention to these? Who has
a larger equipment of books, of leisure, of masters who
will do you good? Only incline your mind to these
things, bestow a little time, if no more, on your own
Governing Principle, consider what this possession is and
whence it has come to you, this faculty which uses all
the rest, which proves all the rest, selecting and rejecting.
So long as you busy yourself with external things, no
one will succeed with them so well as you, but this
faculty of reason will be, what your own choice makes
it, mouldy and neglected.
Book IV, Chapter 8 173
CHAPTER VIII
To those who hastily assume the character of Philosophers.
NEVER bestow praise or blame on any one for qualities Do not
which are indifferent, nor credit them with skill or want
of skill ; then you will escape at once from recklessness outside.
and malice. This man washes hastily. Does he do
evil then? Not at all. What is it he does then? He
washes hastily. Do you mean that everything is well
done? By no means: but acts based on right judgements
are done well and those based on bad judgements are
done badly. Until you have learnt from what judgement
each of a man s acts proceeds, do not praise or blame him.
But a judgement is not easily determined by externals.
This man is a carpenter. Why? He uses an adze. An adze
What has that to do with it? * This man is a musician, ^J 1 ^
for he sings. What does that matter? This man is carpenter,
a philosopher. Why? He wears a cloak and long hair. ^^ Oa
But what do mountebanks wear? Therefore, if a man sopher.
sees one of them misbehaving,he says at once, Look what
the philosopher is doing. But his misconduct should
rather have led him to say that he was no philosopher.
For, if this is the primary conception and profession of
a philosopher, to wear a cloak and long hair, they would
be right : but if it is rather this to be free from error
why do they not deprive him of the name philosopher
because he does not fulfil the philosopher s profession ?
For this is what happens in other arts. When one sees
a man planing badly, one does not say, * What is the good
1 74 Discourses of Epictetus
of the carpenter s art, see what bad work carpenters
do , but one says quite the contrary, * This man is not
a carpenter, for he planes badly. In like manner if
one hears a man singing badly, one does not say, See
how badly musicians sing , but rather, This man is no
musician. It is only in regard to philosophy that men
behave so : when they see any one acting contrary to
the philosopher s profession, instead of refusing him the
name, they assume that he is a philosopher, and then
finding from the facts that he is misbehaving, they
infer that there is no use in being a philosopher. What
is the reason for this? The reason is that we pay regard
to the primary notion of the carpenter, and to that of the
musician, and to that of other craftsmen in like manner,
but pay no regard to the notion of the philosopher, but
as it is indistinct and inarticulate in our minds we judge
it by externals only. Can you name any other art that
is acquired by dress and hair, and is destitute of principles
and subject-matter and end?
Whatdis- What then is the subject-matter of the philosopher?
tinguishes Isitacloak?
the philo
sopher is No, it is reason.
What is his end ? Is il tO WCar a d ak?
No, but to keep his reason right.
What are his principles ? Are they concerned with how
to grow a long beard or thick hair?
No, but rather, as Zeno says, to understand the elements
of reason, the true nature of each, and how they are
duly related to one another, and all that is consequential
on this. Will you not, then, first see whether he fulfils
Book IV, Chapter 8 175-
his profession by behaving unseemly, and only then,
if it be so, accuse his calling? As it is, when you think
that he is behaving ill, when your own conduct is discreet,
you say, Look at the philosopher , as though it were
fitting 1 to call the man who acts so a philosopher, and
again, There s your philosopher! But you do not say,
Look at the carpenter , or * Look at the musician ,
when you discover one of that class in adultery or see him
eating greedily. So true it is that you realize the philo
sopher s profession to a certain extent, but you fall away
from it and are confounded by sheer want of practice.
But even those who are called philosophers use vulgar There are
means to pursue their calling : they just put on a cloak P hil - >
and let their beard grow and say, I am a philosopher. who dress
But no one if he merely buys a harp and a plectrum will for the
say, * I am a musician , nor if he puts on a smith s cap F
and apron will say, I am a smith : no doubt they fit
the dress to the art, but they take their name from the
art and not from the dress. For this reason Euphrates but it is
was right in saying, For a long time I tried not to be better
known for a philosopher and this was useful to me. announce
For, in the first place, I knew that what I did rightly ? ne s cal1
j r ln R> but
was done for my own sake and not for the spectators : it j e t one s
was for myself that I ate rightly and was modest in my act ons
aspect and my gait : all was for myself and God. Secondly,
as the performance was mine only, so also was the risk :
if I did anything shameful or unseemly the cause of philo
sophy was not endangered, nor did I injure the public
by going wrong as a philosopher. For this reason those
who did not know my design wondered how it was
1 7 6 Discourses of Epictetus
that, though I was familiar and conversant with all
philosophers, I was not a philosopher myself. What
harm is there in the philosopher being discovered by my
acts, and not by outward signs?
See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear
and forbear, how I work for others, how I exercise the
will to get and the will to avoid, how I observe my
relationships, natural and acquired, without confusion and
without hindrance. Judge me by this, if you can. But
if you are so deaf and blind, that you do not consider
Hephaestus a good smith unless you see him with his
smith s cap on his head, what harm is there in being
unrecognized by so foolish a judge?
So it was that most men did not recognize Socrates
for a philosopher, and they came to him and asked him
to introduce them to philosophers. Well, was he annoyed
with them, as we should be ? Did he say, Do not you
think me a philosopher ? No, he took them and intro
duced them, and was content with this one thing, that
he was a philosopher, and was glad that he was not
vexed at being not taken for one : for he remembered
his proper business.
What is the business of a good and true man? To
have many pupils?
Certainly not : those who have set their heart on that
shall look to that. Is it then to take difficult principles
and define them precisely?
Others there will be who will look to this.
Where then was it that Socrates asserted himself
and wished to assert himself?
Book IP, Chapter 8
177
In the region of injury and benefit. If any one ,
said he, can injure me, I am of no good ; if I wait for
some one to benefit me, I am naught. If I will, and my
will is not done, I am miserable/ This was the great
field of conflict 2 to which he challenged every man, and
in which I think he would have given way to none.
But how, think you? Was it by proclaiming aloud,
This is the man I am ? Never! but by being the
man he was. For, again, it is a fool s and a braggart s
part to say, ( I am free from passion and tumult. Men,
I would have you know, that, while you are in turmoil and
disturbance about worthless matters, I alone am relieved
from all perturbation. What, are you not content to be
free from pain, without proclaiming, Come, all ye who
suffer from gout, headache, fever, come ye lame and blind
and behold how I am untouched by any sickness ? That
is a vain and vulgar boast, unless, like Asclepius, you can
at once show them by what treatment they too can be
relieved of disease, and for this purpose produce your
own good health as an example.
Such is the character of the Cynic whom Zeus has
deemed worthy of crown and sceptre. He says, Men,
you are looking for happiness and peace not where it
is but where it is not, and, that you may see this, behold
I have been sent to you by God as an example, having
neither property nor house nor wife nor children no,
not even a bed or a tunic or a piece of furniture. See
how healthy I am. Try me, and if you see that I am at
peace in my mind, hear my remedies and the treatment
which cured me. This indeed is a humane and noble
546.24 II
Socrates
was con
tent to be
the man
he was.
The true
Cynic ap
peals to
men by his
simple life,
while the
would-be
philo
sopher
puts dress
before
discipline.
It is better
to let your
character
grow in
secret, like
the seed.
1 7 8 Discourses of Epictetus
saying. But notice whose work it is : the work of Zeus
or whomsoever He thinks worthy of this service never
to lay bare before the multitude any weakness whereby
he should make of none effect the witness which he bears
to virtue, and bears against outward things.
His noble face ni er paled, nor from his cheeks
Wiped he a tear.
Not only so, he must not long for anything or hanker
after anything human being or place or way of life
as children hanker after sweet grapes or holidays : he
must be adorned with self-respect on every side, as others
find their adornment in walls and doors and door
keepers.
Instead of that your would-be philosophers just take
a start towards philosophy, and, like dyspeptics rushing
to some dainty food, of which they are bound soon to
grow sick, they claim at once the sceptre and the kingdom.
He lets his hair grow, assumes a cloak, bares his shoulder
for all to see, fights with those that meet him, and, if
he sees any one in a fine cloak, quarrels with him. Man,
discipline yourself first : watch your own impulse, to
see that it is not like the sickly craving of a woman with
child. Study first not to let men know what you are :
keep your philosophy to yourself for a little. That is
how fruit is produced. The seed must needs be buried
first, and be hidden, and increase by slow degrees, that
it may come to fullness. But if it bear the ear before it
grows the stalk, it is like a plant from the garden of
Adonis and comes to no good. That is the sort of plant
Book IV y Chapter 8 179
you are : you have blossomed sooner than you ought,
and will wither away when the storm comes.
Look what farmers say about seeds, when the hot
weather comes before its time. They are all anxiety
for fear that the seeds should grow insolent and then
a single frost seize them and expose their weakness. You,
too, man, must beware : you have grown insolent and
have leapt to an opinion before the time : you think
yourself a somebody, fool that you are among fools;
you will be frost-bitten, nay you are frost-bitten already
down at the root, though above you still blossom for a
little and therefore think you are still alive and flourishing.
Leave us at least to ripen in the natural course. Why
do you expose us to the air, why do you force us ? We
cannot bear the air yet. Let the root grow, and then
produce the stem, first one joint, then the second, then
the third : then in that way the fruit will force its way
naturally, whether I will or no.
For who that has conceived and travailed with such
great judgements does not become aware of his own gifts
and hasten to act in accordance with them? Why,
a bull is not ignorant of his own nature and endowment
when he catches sight of a wild beast, nor does he wait
for some one to encourage him ; and so with a dog,
when he sees a wild animal. If then I have the equipment
of a good man, am I to wait for you to equip me to do
my proper work? But as yet I have not the equipment,
believe me. Why then would you make me wither away
before the time, just as you have withered away yourself?
M2
> Discourses of Epictetus
CHAPTER IX
To one who was modest and has become shameless.
It is better WHEN you see another man in office, set against his
to be with- Q ^ ce t ^ e f act t ^ at y OU h ave no nee d of office : when you
out wealth . . , Tr
or office, see another rich, look what you have instead. If you
than to be j iaye notn ing instead, you are miserable, but if you have
the slave . . . ,
of your this that you have no need of wealth know that you
passions ; are better off and have something much more valuable.
Another has a beautiful wife, you have freedom from
desire for a beautiful wife. Do these seem to you
small matters? Nay, what a price the rich themselves,
and those who hold office, and who live with beautiful
wives, would give to despise wealth and office and the
very women whom they love and win ! Do you not know
what the thirst of a man in a fever is like, how different
from the thirst of a man in health? The healthy man
drinks and his thirst is gone : the other is delighted for
a moment and then grows giddy, the water turns to gall,
and he vomits and has colic, and is more exceeding
thirsty. Such is the condition of the man who is haunted
by desire in wealth or in office, and in wedlock with
a lovely woman : jealousy clings to him, fear of loss,
shameful words, shameful thoughts, unseemly deeds,
for that * Nay, but what do I lose? he says.
oTman- 053 ^an, )" ou were se ^- res P ect i n g an d are so no more >
hood. have you lost nothing? Instead of Chrysippus and Zeno
you read Aristides and Evenus ; have you lost nothing?
Instead of Socrates and Diogenes you admire the man
who can cajole and corrupt most women. You want
Book IV, Chapter 9 i 8 i
to be handsome and you make yourself up as what you
are not ; you want to show off glittering clothes, that
you may attract women s eyes, and you count yourself
lucky if you light on some precious cosmetic. Before,
you thought of none of these things ; your only concern
was to find seemly discourse, a man of worth, a noble
thought ; and therefore you slept like a man, you walked
like a man, you dressed like a man, your conversation
was what a good man s should be. Can you say then,
I have lost nothing ? Do you mean that men lose
nothing but mere money ? Is there no loss of self-respect,
no loss of decency? Does the loss of these count for
nothing? To you perhaps the loss of these qualities seems
as nothing : there was a time when you counted this the
only loss and the only harm, and when your one anxiety
was that no one should dislodge you from these views
and these acts.
And lo ! you have been dislodged from them, but by If you
none other than yourself. Fight against yourself, deliver ^^sdf
yourself, that you may be modest, self-respecting, free, respect,
If any one ever told you that some one was compelling f-}] t mi
me to be a profligate, to dress like a profligate, to scent against
myself, would you not go and murder the man who y urseI V
so abused me? Will you not help yourself then? And
how much easier this help is to give ! There is no need
to kill or to imprison or to assault any one, no need to come
out into the market-place : you have only to talk to
yourself, to the man who is most likely to be persuaded,
and whom no one can persuade better than yourself.
Therefore, first realize what is happening to you, and
Fight and
fight again ;
victory
will be its
own re
ward.
Men s diffi-
concerned
with
things.
182 Discourses of Epictetus
having done so, do not be faint-hearted or behave as
men of a mean spirit do, who when once they have
given in surrender completely and are swept away, so
to speak, by the stream : no, learn a lesson from the
trainers. The boy has fallen, suppose. Get up , says the
trainer, and wrestle again, until you are made strong.
Let this be your attitude ; for know that nothing is
more amenable than the mind of man. You have but to
will a thing and it is done, and all is right ; on the other
hand you have but to relax your effort and all is lost.
For destruction and deliverance lie within you.
What good do I get then?
What greater good do you look for than this? You
were shameless and shall be self-respecting, you were
undisciplined and shall be disciplined, untrustworthy and
you shall be trusted, dissolute and you shall be self-
controlled. If you look for greater things than these, go
on doing as you do now : not even a god can save you.
CHAPTER X
What things we should despise, and what we should deem
important.
ALL men s difficulties and perplexities are concerned
w ^^ external things. What am I to do? How is
it to be done ? How is it to turn out ? I fear this
or tnat ma 7 befall me. All these phrases are used by
persons occupied with matters outside their will, For who
says, How am I to refuse assent to the false? How
am I to refuse to swerve from the true? If a man is
Book IV ^ Chapter 10 183
so gifted by nature as to be anxious about these things,
I will remind him: Why are you anxious? It rests
with you : be not troubled. Be not over-hasty in assent,
before you have applied the rule of nature.
Again, if he is anxious about his will to get, lest it should They may
fail of its object and miss the mark, and about his will anx i ety if
to avoid, lest it should fall into what it avoids, first of they direct
all I will salute him, because he has got rid of the excite-
ments and fears of other men, and has turned his thoughts- not beyond
to his own business where his true self lies. Then I shall contro i .
say to him : If you would not fail to get what you will,
nor fall into what you will to avoid, do not will to get
what is not your own, nor to avoid what is not in your
control : otherwise you are bound to fail and to fall into
disaster. Where is the difficulty if you do as I say?
What room is there for phrases like, " How am I to get
it? " " How is it to turn out ? " " I fear this or that
may befall me." :
Is not the issue of the future outside our will ? for good
< v and^evil
J- es - are in the
And the essence of good and evil is in the region of region of
the will.
the will?
Yes.
Is it in your power then to make a natural use of every
event that happens ? Can any one hinder you from that ?
No one.
Say no more then, What is to happen ? For whatever
happens, you will turn it to good purpose, and the issue
will be your good fortune. What would Heracles have
been if he had said, How am I to prevent a big lion from
Death
comes to
all. Let
it find us
busy with
a man s
highest
concerns.
The man
who has
accepted
God s will
has a
happy end
184 Discourses of Epictetus
appearing, or a big boar, or brutal men? What care
you, I say? If a big boar appears, you will have a greater
struggle to engage in ; if evil men appear, you will free
the world from evil men.
But if I die thus?
You will die a good man, fulfilling a noble action.
For since you must die in any case, you must be found
doing something whatever it be farming or digging or
trading or holding the consulship or suffering indigestion
or diarrhoea. What then would you have death find you
doing? For my part I would be found busy with some
humane task, whatever it be something noble, beneficent,
advancing the common weal. And if I cannot be found
doing great things like these, I would do what none
can hinder, what is given me to do, setting myself
right, bringing to perfection the faculty that deals with
impressions, working to "achieve freedom from passion,
rendering what is due to each relation in life ; nay, if
I am so fortunate, attaining to the third sphere of activity, 1
that concerned with certainty of judgements.
If death finds me thus occupied, I am content if I can
lift up my hands to God and say, * I have not neglected
the faculties which I received from Thee, to enable me
to understand Thy governance and follow it, I have not
dishonoured Thee so far as in me lay. See how I have
dealt with my senses, see how I have dealt with my
primary notions. Did I ever complain of Thee, did I ever
show discontent with anything that happened to any one,
or wish it to happen otherwise, did I offend in my rela
tions towards others ? In that Thou didst beget me
Book II 7 , Chapter 10 185-
I am grateful for Thy gifts : in so far as I have used what
Thou gavest me I am satisfied. Take Thy gifts back again
and place them where Thou wilt : for they were all Thine,
Thou hast given them to me. Are you not content to
leave the world in this state of mind? Nay, what life
is better or more seemly than his who is so minded, and
what end can be more happy?
But to achieve this, you must put up with great troubles But to
and great losses. You cannot have this and wish to get jjjis^ou
a consulship, you cannot have this and set your heart on must pay
owning lands, you cannot take thought for yourself the P nce -
and for wretched slaves at the same time. No, if you
wish for what is not your own, you lose what is yours.
This is in the nature of things : nothing is done but at
a price. And what need for wonder? If you wish to
become consul, you must keep late hours, run to and fro,
kiss people s hands, lie perishing at other men s doors,
say and do many things unfit for a free man, send gifts
to many, and presents every day to some. And what
do you get for it ? Twelve bundles of rods, 2 the privilege
of sitting three or four times on the tribunal and of
giving games in the Circus, and doles in baskets. If it
be not so, let any one show me what there is besides.
Will you then spend nothing, and use no effort to secure
release from passion and perturbation, that sleeping you
may sleep and waking you may wake, that you may
fear nothing and be anxious for nothing? But if while
you are thus engaged you have losses or spend money
amiss, or if another gets what you ought to have got,
are you going to be vexed all at once at what happens?
1 8 6 Discourses of Epictetus
Will you not weigh what the exchange is and how
precious your gain, instead of wishing to obtain this
great prize for nothing ? Nay, how can you ? * One
business interferes with another. 3
You can- You cannot combine attention to outward possessions
j ? 111 with attention to your own Governing Principle. If
dulge your J ...
desires and you want outward things, let your reason go, or you will
follow your h ne i t h e r the one nor the other, being pulled both
reason too. . ,
ways. If you wish for reason, you must let outward
things go. The oil will be spilt, my poor furniture will
perish, but I shall be free from passion. Say a fire shall
arise when I am away and my books perish, yet I shall deal
with my impressions in accord with nature.
But I shall have nothing to eat.
Death is If I am so miserable, death is my harbour. Death : this
th^laft ^ is the harbour > this the refu e from a11 thin g s tnerefore
resort, and nothing in life is difficult. When you wish, you leave, and
m o e u a ^ e no smoke annoys you. 4 Why then are you anxious, why
control keep late hours? Why do you not reckon up at once
wnere y ur g d and y ur evil lie > and sa y> * Botn are in
my power : no one can deprive me of my good, and no
one can plunge me in evil against my will. Why then do
I not snore at my ease? I am secure in what is mine :
what is not mine will be the concern of any one who gets
it as a gift from Him who has authority to give it. Who
am I to will that what is not mine should be thus or thus ?
Is it given to me to choose? Has any one set me to ad
minister it? I am content with the things over which
I have authority. These I must make as beautiful as
possible; the rest must be as their master wills.
Book IV, Chapter 10 187
If a man has this before his eyes he is no longer wakeful, The la
hither and thither tossed . What would he have, or Som
what does he long for? Does he long for Patroclus or heroes
Antilochus or Menelaus? When did he think any of his ta
friends was immortal? When had he not before his right
eyes the fact that to-morrow or the day after he or his
friend must die?
* Yes, he says, but I thought he would outlive me
and enrich my son.
Yes, for you were a fool, and set your thoughts on
uncertainties. Why then do you not accuse yourself,
instead of sitting crying like young girls?
* Nay, but he set food for me to eat.
Yes, fool, for he was alive : now he cannot. But
Automedon will set meat for you, and if he dies you will
find another. If the pot in which your meat was boiling
is broken, must you needs die of hunger, because you have
lost the pot you are used to? Do not you send and buy
another?
* Nay, he says,
* No worse z// could befall me. 9
What ! Is this what you call ill ? And yet you forbear to
remove it and blame your mother for not warning you,
that you might spend your days lamenting ever since.
What think you? Did not Homer compose these lines
on purpose that we might see that there is nothing
to prevent the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the most
handsome, from being most wretched and most miserable
when they have not the judgements they should have?
1 8 8 Discourses of Epictetus
Cleanliness
k dis ."
ofman.
Thepri-
is inward,
springs
from
ments.
CHAPTER XI
On cleanliness.
SOME men raise the question whether the social
faculty is a necessary element in man s nature : neverthe-
less even they, I think, would not question that cleanli
ness at any rate is essential to it, and that this, if anything,
divides him from the lower animals. So when we see
one of the other animals cleaning itself, we are wont to
say in our surprise. He does it like a man. And again, if
some one finds fault with an animal for being dirty we
are wont to say at once, as if in defence, Of course
he is not a man. So true is it that we think the quality
to be distinctive of man, deriving it first from the gods.
For since the gods are by nature pure and unalloyed,
just in so far as men have approached them by virtue
of reason, they have a tendency to purity and cleanliness.
But since it is impossible for their nature to be entirely
pure, being composed of such stuff as it is, the reason
which they have received endeavours, so far as in it lies,
to make this stuff clean.
The primary and fundamental purity is that of the
sou ^ anc ^ so w ^ i m P ur ity- You cannot find the same
impurity in a soul as in a body : the soul s impurity you
will find to be just this that which renders it unclean
J
for its own functions ; and the functions of a soul are :
impulse to act and not to act, will to get and will to avoid,
preparation, design, assent. What is it then which
renders the soul foul and unclean in these functions ? It
Book Il\ Chapter n 189
is nothing but its evil judgements. And so the soul s
impurity consists in bad judgements, and purification
consists in producing in it right judgements, and the
pure soul is one which has right judgements, for this
alone is proof against confusion and pollution in its
functions.
And one ought to endeavour, as far as may be, to Bodily
achieve a similar cleanliness in one s body too. Man s cleanli ness
ought to
temperament is such that there must needs be mucous follow,
discharge : for this reason nature made hands, and the
nostrils themselves like channels to cleanse his humours.
If he swallows them I say that he does not act as a man
should. It was impossible for men s feet not to be made
muddy and dirty when they pass through mud and dirt ;
for this reason nature provided water and hands to
wash with. It was impossible that some impurity
should not stick to the teeth from eating. Therefore
we are bidden to wash our teeth. Why? That you may otherwise
be a man and not a beast or a pig. It was impossible that jj m ?j n IS
sweat and the pressure of our clothes should not leave human or
some defilement clinging to the body, and needing to fi tf . or
be cleansed. Therefore we have water, olive-oil, hands,
towel, strigils, soap, and on occasion every other sort of
apparatus, to make the body clean.
* Not for me , you say.
What ! The smith will clean his iron tool of rust,
and will have instruments made for the purpose, and even
you will wash your plate when you are going to eat,
unless you are absolutely foul and dirty, and yet you will
not wash nor make clean your poor body ? Why should I ?
Your body
deserves
as much
care as
a horse.
Socrates
did not
neglect
his body.
1 9 o Discourses of Epictetus
says he. I will tell you again : first, that you may act
like a man, next, that you may not annoy those you meet.
You are doing something very like it even here, though
you are not aware of it. You think you deserve to have
a scent of your own. Very well, deserve it : but do you
think those who sit by you deserve it too, and those who
recline by you, and those who kiss you? Go away then
into a wilderness, where you deserve to go, and live
by yourself, and have your smell to yourself, for it is
right that you should enjoy your uncleanness by yourself.
But if you are in a city, what sort of man are you making
yourself, to behave so thoughtlessly and inconsiderately?
If nature had trusted a horse to your care, would you have
left it uncared for? Imagine that your body has been
committed to you as a horse : wash it, rub it down well,
make it such that no one will shun it or turn from it.
But who does not turn from a man who is dirty, odorous,
foul-complexioned, more than from one who is bespat
tered with muck? The smell of the latter is external
and accidental, that of the former comes from want
of tendance ; it is from within, and shows a sort of
inward rottenness.
But Socrates rarely washed.
Why, his body was clean and bright, nay, it was so
gracious and agreeable that the handsomest and noblest
were in love with him, and desired to recline by him
rather than by those who were perfect in beauty. He
might have never washed or bathed, if he had liked :
I tell you his ablutions, if rare, were powerful. If you
will not wash in hot water, wash in cold.
Book 7T 7 , Chapter 1 1 1 9 1
But Aristophanes says :
/ mean the pallid folk, that shoeless go.
True, but he also says he trod the air and stole clothes
from the Gymnasium. The fact is, that all who have
written about Socrates bear witness to just the opposite :
he was not only pleasant to hear, but pleasant to look
upon. They write the same again about Diogenes.
You must not scare away the masses from philosophy Ihephilo-
by your bodily appearance, but show yourself cheerful f
and unruffled in the body as in other things. * Men, frightens
look at me, I have nothing, I need nothing ; without awa X his
house, without city, an exile, if it so chance, and without
a hearth, behold how I live a life more tranquil and happy
than all the noble and the rich : but you see also that my
poor body is not disfigured by my hard living ! But
if a man says this to me, and wears the face and figure of
one condemned, no god will ever persuade me to come
near philosophy, if that is the sort of men she makes.
Far be it from me : though it were to make me wise,
I would not.
By the gods, when the young man feels the first A sense of
stirrings of philosophy I would rather he came to me however
with his hair sleek than dishevelled and dirty : for that misdi-
shows a sort of reflection of the beautiful, and a longing [^yVe
for the comely, and where he imagines these to be, there turned to
he spends his effort. It only remains then to point " g
him the way and say, Young man, you are in search of
the beautiful, and you do well. Know then, that it
is to be found where your reason is. Seek for it in the
192 Discourses of Epictetus
region of impulses to act and not to act, in the region of
the will to get and the will to avoid. This is your
distinctive possession, your body is born to be but clay.
Why do you toil for it in vain? Time, if nothing else,
will teach you that it is nothing. But if he comes to
me befouled, dirty, with a beard trailing to his knees, what
can I say to him, what similitude can I use to attract
him ? To what is he devoted that has any likeness to
the beautiful, that I may change his direction and say,
The beautiful is not here, but here ? Would you have
me say to him, * The beautiful is to be found not in
filthiness but in reason ? Does he want the beautiful?
Does he show any sign of it? Go and reason with
a pig, that he wallow no more in the mire ! That was
why Xenocrates discourses laid hold on Polemo, for
he was a young man of taste ; he had come with glim
merings of devotion to the beautiful, though he sought
it elsewhere.
Theani- Why, nature did not make even those lower animals
jTveVitlf ^ rt y w ^ assoc ^ ate w i tn men - Does a horse or a well-
man are bred dog wallow in mire? No, it is only the pig, and greasy
h ho Id eese an< ^ worms and spiders, creatures the furthest
you be removed from human society. Do you then, being
a man c ^ oose to ke a wretched worm or spider, lower
even than the animals that associate with men ? Will
you never wash, be it how you will ? Will you not cleanse
yourself? Will you not come clean among us that you
may give pleasure to your companions ? What ! do you
enter our temples, where customforbids spitting or wiping
the nose, in this condition, a man of filth and drivel?
Book II r y Chapter 1 1 193
What ? you ask. Do you call on us to adorn our- Man is
selves? adorned by
his reason,
Far from it, if it be not with our natural adornment but must
of reason, judgements, activities, and the body only so ^? ^llm
far as to be cleanly and give no offence. If you hear to avoid
that you must not wear scarlet, must you needs go off c
and spread filth on your cloak, or tear it in half ?
But how am I to have a beautiful cloak?
Man, you have water, wash it. Here is a young man
worthy to be loved, here is an old man worthy to love
and to be loved, one to whom a man is to hand over his
son to be instructed : daughters and young men will
come to him, if it so chance, and for what? That he
may discourse to them on a dunghill? God forbid.
All eccentricity springs from some human source, but
this comes near to being inhuman altogether.
CHAPTER XII
On attention.
WHEN you relax your attention for a little, do not Attention
... , . . cannot be
imagine that you will recover it wherever you wish, tak en up
but bear this well in mind, that your error of to-day must an d drop-
. . , , . pedatwill.
of necessity put you in a worse position tor other occasions.
For in the first place and this is the most serious thing
a habit of inattention is formed, and next a habit of
deferring attention : and you get into the way of putting
off from one time to another the tranquil and becoming
life, the state and behaviour which nature prescribes.
546-24 II N
i 94 Discourses of Epictetus
Now if such postponement of attention is profitable,
it would be still more profitable to abandon it altogether :
but if it is not profitable, why do 7011 not keep up your
attention continuously?
* I want to play to-day.
What prevents you, if you attend ?
I want to sing.
It has a What prevents you, if you attend? Is any part of
bearing on jj excluded, on which attention has no bearing, any
all parts
of life, that you will make worse by attention, and better by
inattention? Nay, is there anything in life generally
which is done better by those who do not attend ? Does
the carpenter by inattention do his work better? Does
the helmsman by inattention steer more safely ? and is any
of the minor duties of life fulfilled better by inattention?
Do you not realize, that when once you have let your
mind go wandering, you lose the power to recall it, to
bring it to bear on what is seemly, self-respecting, and
modest : you do anything that occurs to you and follow
your inclinations?
but above To what then must I attend ? First to those universal
Vi l \A K principles I have spoken of : these you must keep at
directed command, and without them neither sleep nor rise,
to the um- ^rink nor eat nor deal with men : the principle that
versa! prin
ciples that no one can control another s will, and that the will
govern life. a [ one j s t j ie S p nere o f good and evil. No one then has
power to procure me good or to involve me in evil,
but I myself alone have authority over myself in these
matters. So, when I have made these secure, what
need have I to be disturbed about outward things?
Book
Chapt
er 12
195-
What need have I to fear tyrant, or disease, or poverty,
or disaster?
But I do not please So-and-so. J
Well, is he my doing? Is he my judgement?
No.
What concern is it of mine then ?
Nay, but he is highly thought of.
That will be for him to consider, and for those who
think much of him : I have One Whom I must please,
One to Whom I must submit myself and obey God and
those who come next to God. He commended me to
myself, and made my will subject to me alone, and gave
me rules for the right use of it ; and if I follow these
in syllogisms I pay no heed to any one who contradicts
me, if I follow them in dealing with variable premisses
I pay regard to no one. Why then am I annoyed by those
who criticize me in greater matters ? What is the reason
for this perturbation? It is none other than that I have
had no training in this sphere. For every science is
entitled to despise ignorance and the ignorant, and
this is true of arts as well as of sciences. Take any shoe
maker, any carpenter you like, and you find he laughs
the multitude to scorn when his own craft is in question.
First then we must have these principles ready to
our hand. Without them we must do nothing. We must
set our mind on this object : pursue nothing that is
outside us, nothing that is not our own, even as He that
is mighty has ordained : pursuing what lies within our will,
and all else only so far as it is given us to do so. Further,
we must remember who we are, and by what name we
N 2
Then there
is nothing
to fear, for
he who has
knowledge
can despise
criticism.
Hold fast
your prin
ciples, and
set your
mind on
objects
that your
will can
compass,
an din each
1 9 6 Discourses of Epictetus
We must consider what is the time for singing, what
act take are called, and must try to direct our acts to fit each
account of s i tuat ion and its possibilities.
the si"- -
tion.
the time for play, and in whose presence : what will be
unsuited to the occasion ; whether our companions are
to despise us, or we to despise ourselves : when to jest,
and whom to mock at : and on what occasion to be
conciliatory and to whom : in a word, how one ought
to maintain one s character in society. Wherever you
swerve from any of these principles, you suffer loss at
once ; not loss from without, but issuing from the very
act itself.
You can- What then? Is it possible to escape error altogether ?
not escape N O , it is impossible : but it is possible to set one s mind
itTs^rth continuously on avoiding error. For it is well worth
while to w hile to persist in this endeavour, if in the end we escape
m the a few errors, and no more. As it is, you say, I will fix my
endeavour. attent ion to-morrow : which means, let me tell you,
To-day I will be shameless, inopportune, abject : others
shall have power to vex me : to-day I will harbour
anger and envy. Look what evils you allow yourself.
Nay, if it is well to fix my attention to-morrow,how much
better to do so to-day ! If it is profitable to-morrow,
much more so is it to-day : that you may be able to do
the same to-morrow, and not put off again to the day
after.
Booh y/ 7 . Chapter 13 197
CHAPTER XIII
To those who lightly communicate their secrets.
WHEN a man seems to have talked frankly to us about We are led
his own affairs, how we are drawn to communicate our [ [hose *
own secrets to him and think this is frankness! First whocon-
because it seems unfair to have heard our neighbour s
affairs and yet not give him a share of our own in turn :
next because we think we shall not give the impression
of being frank if we are silent about our own affairs.
In fact we often find men in the habit of saying, I ve
told you all my affairs, won t you tell me any of yours?
How is that ? Besides we think we may safely confide in
one who has already confided his affairs to us : for we
have a sort of feeling that he would never talk of our
affairs for fear that we should talk of his. This is exactly That is
the way in which reckless persons are caught by soldiers
in Rome. A soldier sits by you in civilian dress, and begins in Rome.
to speak ill of the Emperor : then, as you have, so to speak,
taken security from him for his good faith in the fact
that he began the abuse, you are led to speak your own
mind and so are arrested and imprisoned. The same sort
of thing happens to us in ordinary life. Still, though he If your
has confided his affairs to me with security, am I to do babbleT*
the same to the first man I meet? No, I hear and hold there is no
my tongue, if I am that sort of man, but he goes off and n ^ tQ 01
tells every one. Then, if I hear what he has done, if do so.
I am like him, I go and tell his secrets, because I want
198 Discourses of Epictetus
to have my revenge, and so I bring confusion to others
and myself. 1 But if I bear in mind, that one man does
not harm another, but that it is his own acts which help
or harm a man, I achieve this conquest that I abstain
from doing the same as he did, but still my own babbling
has put me in the position I am in. 2
You are Yes, you say ; but it is unfair to hear your neighbour s
not bound secrets anc [ g i ve him no share of your own in return.
to repay
a man s Man, did I invite your confidences? Did you tell me
conn- y 0ur secrets on conditions, that you might hear mine
if he is not in return ? If you are a babbler and think every one you
fit to be mee t is a friend, do you want me to be like yourself?
What ! if you have done well to confide in me, but it is
not possible to confide in you and do well, do you still
want me to unbosom myself? That is just as though
I had a sound cask and you an unsound one, and you came
and handed over your wine to me to put it into my cask,
and then were vexed that I did not trust my wine to
you, because your cask had a hole in it.
There is What becomes of your equality now? You trusted
no equality tQ Qne W J IQ - g trustworthy, self-respecting, who believes
character that good and harm depend on his own activities and on
is not nothing outside: would you have me confide in you,
both sides, you who have made light of your own will and want
to get pelf or office or advancement at court, even at
the cost of slaying your children like Medea ? Where is
the equality in that?
A trust- No, show yourself to me as one who is trustworthy,
character se ^~ res P ect i n g5 sa ^ e > show that your judgements are those
invites of a friend, show that your vessel is not unsound, and then
Rook y/ 7 , Chapter 13 199
you will see that I will not wait for you to confide your confi-
affairs to me, but will come to you myself and ask you
to hear mine. For who is there that will not use a goodly
vessel, who that despises a loyal and faithful counsellor,
who that will not gladly welcome one who is ready to
share the burden of his distresses and to relieve him by
the very fact of sharing in them?
* Yes ; but I trust you, and you do not trust me.
In the first place you do not trust me ; you are only The mere
garrulous and therefore cannot keep anything back. ^ e ^ s
For if what you say is true, trust your secrets to me and no return.
no one else : instead of which, whenever you see any one
at leisure, you sit down by him and say, My brother,
you are the dearest friend I have ; I beg you to listen
to my story . And you do this to those you have not
known even for a short while. If you really trust me,
you trust me, of course, because I am trustworthy
and self-respecting, not because I told you my secrets.
Let me too then be allowed to think as you do. Prove
to me that if a man tells his secrets to another, he is
therefore trustworthy and self-respecting. If that were
so, I should have gone about the world telling every
man my affairs, if that were going to make me trust
worthy and self-respecting. It is not really so. No, Tobereally
i i j u trust-
to be trustworthy a man needs judgements beyond the W0rt j 1 y a
ordinary. If you see that a man is devoted to things man must
outside his own will and has made his will subject to ^/has no
these, be sure that he has countless persons who hinder concern
and constrain him. He has no need of a pitch-plaster
or a rack to make him reveal what he knows, but the nod is truly
his own.
200 Discourses of Epictetus
of a pretty maid, if it so chance, will shake his principles,
a kindness from one of Caesar s officers, a lust for office
or inheritance, and countless other motives such as these.
You must therefore remember generally, that confidences
require trust and trustworthy principles : and where can
you easily find these nowadays? Let me be shown
a man who is so minded as to say, I have no concern
except with what is my own, with what is beyond
hindrance and by nature free. This is the true good,
and it is mine : all else I leave to the Giver of events
to decide, and raise no question.
FRAGMENTS
FROM ARRIAN THE PUPIL OF EPICTETUS. To ONE
DISCOURSING ON SUBSTANCE.
WHAT matters it whether the world is composed of
atoms or of infinite parts or of fire and earth? Is it not
enough to know the true nature of good and evil, and the
limits of the will to get and the will to avoid, and again
of impulses for action and against it, and using these as
rules so to order our life, and dismiss those things that are
beyond us. It may be that the human mind cannot com
prehend them, and even if one should assume that it can,
of what use is it to comprehend them ? Should we not say
that those who lay down that these things are necessary
for the philosopher trouble themselves in vain? Is then
the command at Delphi also superfluous: Know thyself?
* No, he replies.
WTiat then is its meaning? If one ordered a chorus-
singer to know himself, would he not attend to the order
by paying heed to his fellows in the chorus so as to sing in
harmony with them ?
Yes.
And the same with a sailor and a soldier. Do you
think then that man is a creature made to live by himself
or for society?
* For society.
By whom?
By Nature.
202 Epictetus
What Nature is and how it administers the universe and
whether it is or no these are matters it is not necessary to
trouble ourselves with. 1 Stob. Flor. 80. 14 ; Eel. ii . 1 . 1 8 a .
2 FROM ARRIAN.
He who is discontented with what he has and with
what is given him by fortune is an ignoramus in life, and
he who bears it in a noble spirit and makes reasonable use
of it deserves to be considered a good man. Flor. 108. 65.
3 FROM THE SAME.
All things obey and serve the Universe 2 earth and sea
and sun and the other stars and the plants and animals of
the earth ; and our body too obeys it, enjoying sickness
or health, and passing through youth and old age and
other changes when the Universe wills. Is it not reason
able then that what is in our power, that is our judgement,
should not be the only thing to strive against it ? For the
Universe is strong and superior to us and has provided
for us better than we can, ordering our goings along with
all things. And, besides, to act against it is to side with
unreason, and brings nothing with it but vain struggle,
involving us in miseries and pains. Flor. 108. 66.
4 RUFUS : FROM THE SAYINGS OF EPICTETUS ON
FRIENDSHIP.
God has divided all things into those that He put in
our power, and those that are not in our power. He put
in our power that which is noblest and highest, that
which in fact constitutes His own happiness, the power
to deal with impressions. For this faculty when rightly
exercised is freedom, peace, courage, steadfastness, and
Fragments 203
this too is justice and law and self-control and all virtue.
All else He put beyond our power. We ought then to
will what God wills and, adopting His division, hold fast by
all means to what is in our power and leave what is not in
our power to the world s order, and gladly resign to it
children, or country, or body, or anything else it may ask
of us. Ed. ii. 7. 30.
RUFUS : FROM EPICTETUS ON FRIENDSHIP. C
Which of us does not admire that saying of Lycurgus
the Lacedaemonian? For when one of his young fellow
citizens had blinded him in one eye and was handed over to
Lycurgus by the people to be punished as he chose, he did
not punish him but educated him and made a good man
of him, and brought him before the Lacedaemonians in the
theatre, and when they wondered he said, * This man, when
you gave him me, was insolent and violent ; I give him
back to you a free and reasonable citizen . Flor. 19. 13.
FROM THE SAME. 6
But this above all things is the function of Nature, to
associate in close harmony the impulse that springs from
the impression of what is fitting and that which springs
from the impression of what is serviceable. Flor. 20. 60.
FROM THE SAME. 7
It is a sure work of folly and want of breeding to think
that we shall be contemptible if we do not take every
means to injure the first enemies we meet ; for we say
that a man is perceived to be contemptible by his incapa
city of doing harm, whereas really it is much more by his
incapacity to do good. Flor. 20. 61.
204 Epictetus
8 RUFUS : FROM EPICTETUS ON FRIENDSHIP.
Such was and is and shall be the nature of the universe,
and it is impossible that what happens should be other
than it is. And this process of revolution and change is
shared not only by mankind and the other living creatures
upon earth, but also by things divine ; yes, and even by
the four elements themselves, which turn and change
upwards and downwards, earth turning into water and
water into air, and this again into ether ; and similarly
the elements change from above downwards. If a man
endeavours to adjust his mind to this and to persuade
himself to accept necessity with a good will, he will live
out his life very reasonably and harmoniously. Flor. 1 08 . 60 .
9 FROM THE SAME.
A philosopher famous in the Stoic school . . . brought
out of his satchel the fifth book of Epictetus the philoso
pher s Discourses, which were arranged by Arrian, and no
doubt are in agreement with the writings of Zeno and
Chrysippus. In this book, written of course in Greek, we
read this sentence : Impressions (which philosophers
call <ai/Tacrxi), by which man s mind is struck at first
sight of anything that reaches his intellect, are not under
his will or control, but thrust themselves on the recognition
of men by a certain force of their own ; but the assents
(which they call o-vyKaratfeo-eis) by which these impres
sions are recognized are voluntary and depend on man s
control. Therefore when some fearful sound of thunder
or a falling house or sudden news of some danger or other,
or something else of this sort happens, even the wise man
Fragments 205-
is bound to be moved for a while and shrink and grow
pale, not from anticipation of any evil, but from rapid
and unconsidered movements forestalling the action of
the rational mind. Presently, however, the wise man doe
not assent to such impressions (that is, these appearances
which terrify his mind), he does not approve or confirm
them by his opinion, but rejects and repels them and does
not think that there is anything formidable in them ; and
this they say is the difference between the wise man and
the fool, that the fool thinks that the impressions which
at first strike him as harsh and cruel are really such,
and as they go on approves them with his own assent
and confirms them by his opinion as if they were really
formidable (Trpoo-tTriSo^a^ei is the phrase the Stoics use in
discussing this), while the wise man, after showing emotion
in colour and complexion for a brief moment, does not
give his assent, but keeps the opinions which he has
always held about such impressions, firm and strong, as of
things which do not really deserve to be feared at all, but
only inspire an empty and fictitious terror.
These opinions and words of Epictetus the philosopher,
derived from the judgements of the Stoics, we read, in
the book I have mentioned, that he held and expressed.
Aul.Gell. N.A. 19. i.
I have heard Favorinus say that Epictetus the philoso- 10
pher said that most of those who seemed to philosophize
were philosophers only with their lips and without action.
There is a still stronger saying which Arrian in the books
that he composed on his lectures has recorded that he
constantly used. For, said he, when he noticed a man
20 6 Epictetus
lost to shame, of misdirected energy and debased morals,
bold and confident in speech and devoting attention to all
else but his soul, when he saw a man of this sort meddling
with the pursuits and studies of philosophy, venturing
into Physics and studying Dialectic, and initiating many
inquiries of this sort, he would appeal to gods and men, and
so appealing would chide the man in these words : Man,
where are you putting them ? Look and see whether your
vessel is made clean. For if you put them into the vessel
of fancy (01770-19) they are lost ; if they turn bad, they
might as well be vinegar or urine or worse. Nothing
surely could be truer or weightier than these words, in
which the greatest of philosophers asserted that the
written doctrines of philosophy, if poured into the dirty
and defiled vessel of a false and debased mind, are altered,
changed and spoilt, and (to use his Cynic phrase) turn to
urine or anything fouler than that. Moreover Epictetus
also, as we heard from the same Favorinus, used to say
that there were two faults far more serious and vile than
any others, want of endurance and want of self-control,
the failure to bear and endure the wrongs we have to bear,
and the failure to forbear the pleasures and other things
that we ought to forbear. And so, he said, if a man
should take to heart these two words, and watch and
command himself to keep them, he will be free for the
most part from error and will live a most peaceful life.
And the words he said were these two : Bear and
* Forbear >. Aul. Cell. N. A. 17. 19.
IO a When the safety of our souls and regard for our true
selves is in question, one may have to act at times without
Fragments 207
reason : this is a saying of Epictetus quoted with approval
by Arrian. Arnobius, Against the Heathen, 2. 78.
FROM THE DISCOURSES OF ARRIAN, EXHORTING TO VIRTUE, n
But when Archelaus sent for Socrates and said he would
make him rich, he bade the messenger take back word
to him, At Athens one can buy four quarts of barley-
meal for an obol, and there are running springs of water .
For if what I have is not sufficient for me, yet I am
sufficient for it, and so it is sufficient for me. Do you
not see that Polus did not act Oedipus the king in better
voice or with greater pleasure than he acted Oedipus the
poor beggar at Colonus ? What ! is the good man and true
to show himself inferior to Polus, instead of playing any
part well that Providence puts upon him? Will he not
rather make Odysseus his pattern, who was just as remark
able in his rags as in his rich cloak of purple? Flor. 97. 28.
FROM ARRIAN. I2
There are certain persons who indulge their anger
gently, and who do all that the most passionate do, but
in a quiet passionless way. Now we must guard against
their error as a much worse fault than passionate anger.
For the passionate are soon sated with their revenge, but
the colder spirits persist for a long period like men who
take a fever lightly. Flor. 20. 48.
FROM THE MEMORABILIA 3 OF EPICTETUS. j,
But , one says, I see the noble and good perishing of
hunger and cold.
Well, and do you not see those who are not noble and
good perishing of luxury and ostentation and vulgarity?
20 8 Epictetus
1 Yes ; but it is base to be maintained by another.
Miserable man, is there any one that maintains him
self ? Only the Universe does that. The man who accuses
Providence because the wicked are not punished, but are
strong and rich, is acting just as absurdly as if, when they
hadlost their eyes, he said that they had notbeen punished,
because their nails were sound. For my part I hold that
there is a much greater difference between virtue and
vice than between eyes and nails. Ed. i. 3. 50.
I A FROM THE MEMORABILIA 3 OF EPICTETUS.
. . . bringing forward the peevish philosophers, who hold
that pleasure is not natural, but accompanies things which
are natural justice, self-control, freedom. Why then does
the soul take a calm delight, as Epicurus says, in the lesser
goods, those of the body, and does not take pleasure in her
own good things, which are the greatest ? I tell you that
nature has given me a sense of self-respect, and I often
blush when I think I am saying something shameful. It is
this emotion which prevents me from regarding pleasure
as a good thing and as the end of life. Flor. 6. 50.
15 FROM THE SAME. 3
In Rome women make a study of Plato s Republic,
because he enacts community of wives ; for they only
attend to the man s words and not to his spirit, not
noticing that he does not first enact the marriage of one
man and one woman and then wish wives to be common,
but removes the first kind of marriage and introduces
another kind in its place. And in general men are fond
of finding justifications for their own faults ; for philo-
Fragments 209
sophy says that one ought not even to hold out one s finger
at random. Flor. 6. 58.
FROM THE MEMORABILIA 3 OF EPICTETUS. l6
You must know that it is not easy for a man to arrive"~j
at a judgement, unless he should state and hear the same
principles every day and apply them all the time to his
life. Flor. 29. 84.
FROM EPICTETUS. ^
When we are invited to a drinking-party we enjoy
what is before us, and if one should bid his entertainer to
serve him fish or cakes one would be thought eccentric.
Yet in the world we ask the gods for what they do not
give us, and that although there are many gifts which
they have given us. Flor. 4. 92.
FROM THE SAME. 18
Fine fellows, he said, are they who pride themselves on
those things which are beyond our control. * I am better
than you, says one, * for I have abundance of lands, and
you are prostrate with hunger. Another says, I am
a consular ; another, * I am a procurator ; another,
I have curly hair . A horse does not say to a horse, I am
better than you, for I have plenty of fodder and plenty
of barley, and I have bridles of gold and saddles of
inlaid work , but for I am swifter than you . And every
creature is better or worse according as its own virtue or
vice makes it so. Is man then the only creature that has
no virtue of his own, that we should have to look at his hair
and his clothes and his ancestors? Flor. 4. 93.
Sick men are angry with their physician when he gives 19
them no advice, and think that he has given them up. Why
546.24 II
210 Epictetus
should one not adopt the same attitude to the philosopher
and conclude that he has given up hope of one s wisdom,
if he tells one nothing that is of use? Flor. 4. 94.
20 FROM EPICTETUS.
/ ^Those whose bodies are in good condition can endure
heat and cold ; so those whose souls are in good condition
can bear anger and pain and exultation and other emotions.
21 Flor. 4. 95.
FROM THE SAME.
It is right to praise Agrippinus for this reason, that having
shown himself a man of the highest worth, he never praised
himself, but blushed if any one else praised him. His char
acter was such that when any distress befell him he wrote
a eulogy of it; if fever was his portion he praised fever; if
disrepute, he praised disrepute ; and if exile, he praised exile.
And one day, when he was about to breakfast, a messenger
interrupted him to say that Nero ordered him into exile.
Well then, said he, we will breakfast at Aricia. Flor. J. 17.
22
[FROM AGRIPPINUS.] 4
Agrippinus, when governor, tried to convince those
whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be
sentenced. It is not as their enemy , he said, or as
a robber that I give sentence against them, but as their
guardian and kinsman, just as the physician encourages
the man on whom he is operating and persuades him to
submit his body. Flor. 48. 44.
FROM EPICTETUS.
Wondrous is Nature, and fond of her creatures , as Xeno-
phon says. At any rate, we love and tend the body, the least
agreeable and most vile of all things ! for if we had to tend
Fragments 211
our neighbour s body for ten days only we could not bear
it. Consider what it would be to get up in the morning
and clean some one else s teeth, and then to perform some
other necessary office for him. Truly it is wondrous that
we should love that for which we do such mean services day
by day. I stuff this bag ; then I empty it ; what could
be more tiresome? But I am bound to serve God. That
is why I stay here and put up with washing this miserable
body of mine, and giving it fodder and shelter; and when
I was younger, it laid other commands on me as well, and
yet I bore with it. Why then, when Nature, who gave you
your body, takes it away, can you not bear it? * I love it,
he says. Well, but is it not Nature, as I said just now, that
has given you this very love of it ? And yet Nature too
says, Let it go now, and trouble no more . Flor. 121 . 29.
FROM THE SAME. 24
If a man dies young he accuses the gods, [and an old man
sometimes accuses them] because he still is put to trouble
when the time for rest has fully come, 6 and yet, when death
comes near, he is fain to live and sends to his doctor and bids
him spare no pains or effort. Wondrous, he said, are men,
for they are unwilling to live or to die. Flor. 121. 30.
FROM THE SAME. 25
When you attack a man with threats and show of
violence, remember to warn yourself that you are not
a wild beast ; then you will do nothing savage, and will
live your life through without having to repent or be
called to account. Flor. 20. 67.
You are a little soul, carrying a corpse, as Epictetus 26
used to say. M. Aurelius iv. 41.
O 2
21 2
Epictetus
27 Epictetus said that we must discover the art of assent,
and use careful attention in the sphere of the will ; our
impulses must be with qualification , 6 and social and
according to desert : we must abstain altogether from
the will to get, 7 and not attempt to avoid any of those
things that are not in our power. M. Aurelius xi. 37.
28 It is no ordinary matter that is at stake, he said ; the ques
tion is between sanity and madness. M. Aurelius xi. 38.
The remaining fragments are regarded by Dr. H. Schenkl as
spurious or doubtful.
29 Always take thought for nothing so much as what is safe ;
silence is safer than speech ; refrain from saying what shall
be void of sense and open to blame. Flor. 35. 10.
30 We must not fasten our ship to one small anchor nor
our life to one hope. Flor. no. 22.
31 We must not stretch our hopes too wide, any more
than our stride. Flor. no. 23.
32 It is more needful to heal soul than body ; for death
is better than living ill. Flor. 121. 27.
33 The rarest pleasures give most delight. Flor. 6. 59.
34 If a man should go beyond the mean, the most joyous
things would turn to utter joylessness. Flor. 6. 60.
35 No one is free that is not his own master. Flor. 6. 59.
36 Truth is a thing immortal and eternal; it gives us not
a beauty that fades with time ; nor does it take away the
confident speech that is based on justice, but confirms
things just and lawful, distinguishing things unjust from
them and showing their falsehood. Antonius i. 21.
MANUAL OF EPICTETUS
OF all existing things some are in our power, and others
are not in our power. In our power are thought, impulse,
will to get and will to avoid, and, in a word, everything
which is our own doing. Things not in our power include
the body, property, reputation, office, and, in a word,
everything which is not our own doing. Things in our
power are by nature free, unhindered, untrammelled;
things not in our power are weak, servile, subject to
hindrance, dependent on others. Remember then that
if you imagine that what is naturally slavish is free, and
what is naturally another s is your own, you will be ham
pered, you will mourn, you will be put to confusion, you
will blame gods and men ; but if you think that only
your own belongs to you, and that what is another s is
indeed another s, no one will ever put compulsion or
hindrance on you, you will blame none, you will accuse
none, you will do nothing against your will, no one will
harm you, you will have no enemy, for no harm can
touch you.
Aiming then at these high matters, you must remember
that to attain them requires more than ordinary effort ; l
you will have to give up some things entirely, and put
off others for the moment. And if you would have these
2 1 4 Epictetus
also office and wealth it may be that you will fail to
get them, just because your desire is set on the former,
and you will certainly fail to attain those things which
alone bring freedom and happiness.
Make it your study then to confront every harsh
impression with the words, You are but an impression,
and not at all what you seem to be . Then test it by
those rules that you possess ; and first by this the chief
test of all Is it concerned with what is in our power
or with what is not in our power? And if it is concerned
with what is not in our power, be ready with the answer
that it is nothing to you.
2 Remember that the will to get promises attainment of
what you will, and the will to avoid promises escape from
what you avoid ; and he who fails to get what he wills is
unfortunate, and he who does not escape what he wills to
avoid is miserable. If then you try to avoid only what
is unnatural in the region within your control, you will
escape from all that you avoid ; but if you try to avoid
disease or death or poverty you will be miserable.
Therefore let your will to avoid have no concern with
what is not in man s power ; direct it only to things in
man s power that are contrary to nature. But for the
moment you must utterly remove the will to get ; 2 for
if you will to get something not in man s power you are
bound to be unfortunate ; while none of the things in
man s power that you could honourably will to get is yet
within your reach. Impulse to act and not to act, these
are your concern ; yet exercise them gently and without
strain, and provisionally. 2
Manual 2 1 f
When anything, from the meanest thing upwards, is at- 3
tractive or serviceable or an object of affection, remember
always to say to yourself, * What is its nature? If you
are fond of a jug, say you are fond of a jug ; then you will
not be disturbed if it be broken. If you kiss your child
or your wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human
being, for then if death strikes it you will not be
disturbed.
When you are about to take something in hand, remind 4
yourself what manner of thing it is. If you are going to
bathe put before your mind what happens in the bath
water pouring over some, others being jostled, some
reviling, others stealing ; and you will set to work more
securely if you say to yourself at once : I want to bathe,
and I want to keep my will in harmony with nature, and
so in each thing you do ; for in this way, if anything
turns up to hinder you in your bathing, you will be
ready to say, I did not want only to bathe, but to keep
my will in harmony with nature, and I shall not so keep
it, if I lose my temper at what happens .
What disturbs men s minds is not events but their 5
judgements on events. For instance, death is nothing
dreadful, or else Socrates would have thought it so. No,
the only dreadful thing about it is men s judgement that
it is dreadful. And so when we are hindered, or disturbed,
or distressed, let us never lay the blame on others, but on
ourselves, that is on our own judgements. To accuse
others for one s own misfortunes is a sign of want of
education ; to accuse oneself shows that one s education
2 i 6 Epictetus
has begun ; to accuse neither oneself nor others shows
that one s education is complete.
6 Be not elated at an excellence which is not your own.
If the horse in his pride were to say, < I am handsome , we
could bear with it. But when you say with pride, I have
a handsome horse , know that the good horse is the ground
of your pride. You ask then what you can call your own.
The answer is the way you deal with your impressions.
Therefore when you deal with your impressions in accord
with nature, then you may be proud indeed, for your
pride will be in a good which is your own.
7 When you are on a voyage, and your ship is at anchorage,
and you disembark to get fresh water, you may pick up
a small shellfish or a truffle by the way, but you must
keep your attention fixed on the ship, and keep looking
towards it constantly, to see if the Helmsman calls you ;
and if he does, you have to leave everything, or be bundled
on board with your legs tied like a sheep. So it is in life.
If you have a dear wife or child given you, they are like
the shellfish or the truffle, they are very well in their
way. Only, if the Helmsman call, run back to your ship,
leave all else, and do not look behind you. And if you
are old, never go far from the ship, so that when you are
called you may not fail to appear.
8 Ask not that events should happen as you will, but let
your will be that events should happen as they do, and
you shall have peace.
9 Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to the will,
Manual 217
unless the will consent. Lameness is a hindrance to the
leg, but not to the will. Say this to yourself at each event
that happens, for you shall find that though it hinders
something else it will not hinder you.
When anything happens to you, always remember to 10
turn to yourself and ask what faculty you have to deal
with it. If you see a beautiful boy or a beautiful woman,
you will find continence the faculty to exercise there ;
if trouble is laid on you, you will find endurance ; if
ribaldry, you will find patience. And if you train yourself
in this habit your impressions will not carry you away.
Never say of anything, I lost it , but say, I gave it 1 1
back . Has your child died? It was given back. Has
your wife died? She was given back. Has your estate
been taken from you ? Was not this also given back? But
you say, He who took it from me is wicked . What
does it matter to you through whom the Giver asked it
back? As long as He gives it you, take care of it, but not
as your own ; treat it as passers-by treat an inn.
If you wish to make progress, abandon reasonings of 12
this sort : If I neglect my affairs I shall have nothing to
live on ; If I do not punish my son, he will be wicked.
For it is better to die of hunger, so that you be free from
pain and free from fear, than to live in plenty and be
troubled in mind. It is better for your son to be wicked
than for you to be miserable. Wherefore begin with little
things. Is your drop of oil spilt? Is your sup of wine stolen?
Say to yourself, This is the price paid for freedom from
passion, this is the price of a quiet mind. Nothing can be
2 1 8 Epictetus
had without a price. When you call your slave-boy, reflect
that he may not be able to hear you, and if he hears you, he
may not be able to do anything you want. But he is not
so well off that it rests with him to give you peace of mind.
13 If you wish to make progress, you must be content in
external matters to seem a fool and a simpleton ; do not
wish men to think you know anything, and if any should
think you to be somebody, distrust yourself. For know
that it is not easy to keep your will in accord with nature
and at the same time keep outward things ; if you attend
to one you must needs neglect the other.
IA It is silly to want your children and your wife and your
friends to live for ever, for that means that you want
what is not in your control to be in your control, and what
is not your own to be yours. In the same way if you
want your servant to make no mistakes, you are a fool,
for you want vice not to be vice but something different.
But if you want not to be disappointed in your will to
get, you can attain to that.
Exercise yourself then in what lies in your power. Each
man s master is the man who has authority over what he
wishes or does not wish, to secure the one or to take away
the other. Let him then who wishes to be free not wish
for anything or avoid anything that depends on others ;
or else he is bound to be a slave.
15 Remember that you must behave in life as you would
at a banquet. A dish is handed round and comes to you ;
put out your hand and take it politely. It passes you ;
Manual 2 1 9
do not stop it. It has not reached you ; do not be
impatient to get it, but wait till your turn comes. Bear
yourself thus towards children, wife, office, wealth, and
one day you will be worthy to banquet with the gods.
But if when they are set before you, you do not take them
but despise them, then you shall not only share the gods
banquet, but shall share their rule. For by so doing
Diogenes and Heraclitus and men like them were called
divine and deserved the name.
When you see a man shedding tears in sorrow for a child 1 6
abroad or dead, or for loss of property, beware that you
are not carried away by the impression that it is outward
ills that make him miserable. Keep this thought by
you : What distresses him is not the event, for that does
not distress another, but his judgement on the event.
Therefore do not hesitate to sympathize with him so far
as words go, and if it so chance, even to groan with him ; but
take heed that you do not also groan in your inner being. 3
Remember that you are an actor in a play, and the 17
Playwright chooses the manner of it : if he wants it short,
it is short ; if long, it is long. If he wants you to act
a poor man you must act the part with all your powers ;
and so if your part be a cripple or a magistrate or a plain
man. For your business is to act the character that is
given you ana act it well ; the choice of the cast is
Another s.
When a raven croaks with evil omen, let not the impres- 18
sion carry you away, but straightway distinguish in your
220 Epictetus
own mind and say, * These portents mean nothing to me ;
but only to my bit of a body or my bit of property or
name, or my children or my wife. But for me all omens
are favourable if I will, for, whatever the issue may be, it
is in my power to get benefit therefrom.
19 You can be invincible, if you never enter on a contest
where victory is not in your power. Beware then that
when you see a man raised to honour or great power or
high repute you do not let your impression carry you
away. For if the reality of good lies in what is in our
power, there is no room for envy or jealousy. And
you will not wish to be praetor, or prefect or consul,
but to be free ; and there is but one way to freedom to
despise what is not in our power.
20 Remember that foul words or blows in themselves are
no outrage, but your judgement that they are so. So
when any one makes you angry, know that it is your own
thought that has angered you. Wherefore make it your
first endeavour not to let your impressions carry you
away. For if once you gain time and delay, you will
find it easier to control yourself.
21 Keep before your eyes from day to day death and exile
and all things that seem terrible, but death most of all,
and then you will never set your thoughts on what is low
and will never desire anything beyond measure.
22 If you set your desire on philosophy you must at once
prepare to meet with ridicule and the jeers of many who
will say, Here he is again, turned philosopher. Where
Manual 221
has he got these proud looks? Nay, put on no proud
looks, but hold fast to what seems best to you, in confi
dence that God has set you at this post. And remember
that if you abide where you are, those who first laugh at
you will one day admire you, and that if you give way to
them, you will get doubly laughed at.
If it ever happen to you to be diverted to things outside, 23
so that you desire to please another, know that you have
lost your life s plan. Be content then always to be a
philosopher ; if you wish to be regarded as one too, show
yourself that you are one and you will be able to achieve it,
Let not reflections such as these afflict you : I shall 24
live without honour, and never be of any account ; for
if lack of honour is an evil, no one but yourself can involve
you in evil any more than in shame. Is it your business
to get office or to be invited to an entertainment?
Certainly not.
Where then is the dishonour you talk of? How can you
be of no account anywhere , when you ought to count
for something in those matters only which are in your
power, where you may achieve the highest worth ?
But my friends , you say, * will lack assistance.
What do you mean by lack assistance ? They will not
have cash from you and you will not make them Roman
citizens. Who told you that to do these things is in our
power, and not dependent upon others? Who can give
to another what is not his to give?
Get them then, says he, that we may have them.
If I can get them and keep my self-respect, honour,
222 Epictetus
magnanimity, show the way and I will get them. But if
you call on me to lose the good things that are mine, in
order that you may win things that are not good, look
how unfair and thoughtless you are. And which do you
really prefer? Money, or a faithful, modest friend?
Therefore help me rather to keep these qualities, and do
not expect from me actions which will make me lose them.
* But my country , says he, * will lack assistance, so far
as lies in me.
Once more I ask, What assistance do you mean? It will
not owe colonnades or baths to you. What of that? It
does not owe shoes to the blacksmith or arms to the shoe
maker ; it is sufficient if each man fulfils his own function.
Would you do it no good if you secured to it another
faithful and modest citizen?
Yes.
Well, then, you would not be useless to it.
What place then shall I have in the city ?
Whatever place you can hold while you keep your
character for honour and self-respect. But if you are
going to lose these qualities in trying to benefit your city,
what benefit, I ask, would you have done her when you
attain to the perfection of being lost to shame and honour ?
25 Has some one had precedence of you at an entertainment
or a levee or been called in before you to give advice? If
these things are good you ought to be glad that he got them;
if they are evil, do not be angry that you did not get them
yourself. Remember that if you want to get what is not
in your power, you cannot earn the same reward as others
Manual 223
unless you act as they do. How is it possible for one who
does not haunt the great man s door to have equal shares
with one who does, or one who does not go in his train
equality with one who does ; or one who does not praise
him with one who does? You will be unjust then and
insatiable if you wish to get these privileges for nothing,
without paying their price. What is the price of a
lettuce? An obol perhaps. If then a man pays his obol
and gets his lettuces, and you do not pay and do not get
them, do not think you are defrauded. For as he has the
lettuces so you have the obol you did not give. The same
principle holds good too in conduct. You were not
invited to some one s entertainment? Because you did
not give the host the price for which he sells his dinner.
He sells it for compliments, he sells it for attentions.
Pay him the price then, if it is to your profit. But if you
wish to get the one and yet not give up the other, nothing
can satisfy you in your folly.
What ! you say, you have nothing instead of the dinner ?
Nay, you have this, you have not praised the man you
did not want to praise, you have not had to bear with the
insults of his doorstep.
It is in our power to discover the will of Nature from 26
those matters on which we have no difference of opinion.
For instance, when another man s slave has broken the
wine-cup we are very ready to say at once, Such things
must happen . Know then that when your own cup is
broken, you ought to behave in the same way as when
your neighbour s was broken. Apply the same principle
2 24 Epictetus
to higher matters. Is another s child or wife dead ? Not
one of us but would say, Such is the lot of man ; but
when one s own dies, straightway one cries, Alas !
miserable am I . But we ought to remember what our
feelings are when we hear it of another.
27 As a mark is not set up for men to miss it, so there is
nothing intrinsically evil in the world.
28 If any one trusted your body to the first man he met,
you would be indignant, but yet you trust your mind to
the chance comer, and allow it to be disturbed and con
founded if he revile you ; are you not ashamed to do so?
29 In everything you do consider what comes first 4 and
what follows, and so approach it. Otherwise you will
come to it with a good heart at first because you have not
reflected on any of the consequences, and afterwards,
when difficulties have appeared, you will desist to your
shame. Do you wish to win at Olympia ? So do I, by
the gods, for it is a fine thing. But consider the first steps
to it, and the consequences, and so lay your hand to the
work. You must submit to discipline, eat to order, touch
no sweets, train under compulsion, at a fixed hour, in
heat and cold, drink no cold water, nor wine, except by
order ; you must hand yourself over completely to your
trainer as you would to a physician, and then when the
contest comes you must risk getting hacked, 5 and some
times dislocate your hand, twist your ankle, swallow plenty
of sand, sometimes get a flogging, and with all this suffer
defeat. When you have considered all this well, then
Manual
22?
enter on the athlete s course, if you still wish it. If you
act without thought you will be behaving like children,
who one day play at wrestlers, another day at gladiators,
now sound the trumpet, and next strut the stage. Like
them you will be now an athlete, now a gladiator, then
orator, then philosopher, but nothing with all your soul.
Like an ape, you imitate every sight you see, and one thing
after another takes your fancy. When you undertake a
thing you do it casually and half-heartedly, instead of
considering it and looking at it all round. In the same
way some people, when they see a philosopher and hear
a man speaking like Euphrates (and indeed who can speak
as he can?), wish to be philosophers themselves.
Man, consider first what it is you are undertaking ; then
look at your own powers and see if you can bear it. Do
you want to compete in the pentathlon or in wrestling?
Look to your arms, your thighs, see what your loins are
like. For different men are born for different tasks. Do
you suppose that if you do this you can live as you do now
eat and drink as you do now, indulge desire and discon
tent just as before? Nay, you must sit up late, work hard,
abandon your own people, be looked down on by a mere
slave, be ridiculed by those who meet you, get the worst
of it in everything in honour, in office, in justice, in
every possible thing. This is what you have to consider :
whether you are willing to pay this price for peace of mind,
freedom, tranquillity. If not, do not come near ; do
not be, like the children, first a philosopher, then a tax-
collector, then an orator, then one of Caesar s procurators.
These callings do not agree. You must be one man,
546-24 II
2 2 6 Fpictetus
good or bad ; you must develop either your Governing
Principle, or your outward endowments ; you must study
either your inner man, or outward things in a word, you
must choose between the position of a philosopher and
that of a mere outsider.
30 Appropriate acts 6 are in general measured by the rela
tions they are concerned with. He is your father. This
means you are called on to take care of him, give way to
him in all things, bear with him if he reviles or strikes you.
* But he is a bad father.
Well, have you any natural claim to a good father ? No,
only to a father.
My brother wrongs me.
Be careful then to maintain the relation you hold to
him, and do not consider what he does, but what you
must do if your purpose is to keep in accord with nature.
For no one shall harm you, without your consent ; you
will only be harmed, when you think you are harmed.
You will only discover what is proper to expect from
neighbour, citizen, or praetor, if you get into the habit
of looking at the relations implied by each.
31 For piety towards the gods know that the most impor
tant thing is this : to have right opinions about them
that they exist, and that they govern the universe well
and justly and to have set yourself to obey them, and
to give way to all that happens, following events with
a free will, in the belief that they are fulfilled by the
highest mind. For thus you will never blame the gods,
Manual 227
nor accuse them of neglecting you. But this you cannot
achieve, unless you apply your conception of good and
evil to those things only which are in our power, and not
to those which are out of our power. For if you apply
your notion of good or evil to the latter, then, as soon as
you fail to get what you will to get or fail to avoid what
you will to avoid, you will be bound to blame and hate
those you hold responsible. For every living creature
has a natural tendency to avoid and shun what seems
harmful and all that causes it, and to pursue and admire
what is helpful and all that causes it. It is not possible
then for one who thinks he is harmed to take pleasure in
what he thinks is the author of the harm, any more than
to take pleasure in the harm itself. That is why a father
is reviled by his son, when he does not give his son a share
of what the son regards as good things ; thus Polynices
and Eteocles were set at enmity with one another by
thinking that a king s throne was a good thing. That is
why the farmer, and the sailor, and the merchant, and
those who lose wife or children revile the gods. For men s
religion is bound up with their interest. Therefore he
who makes it his concern rightly to direct his will to get
and his will to avoid, is thereby making piety his concern.
But it is proper on each occasion to make libation and
sacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the custom
of our fathers, with purity and not in slovenly or careless
fashion, without meanness and without extravagance.
When you make use of prophecy remember that while 32
you know not what the issue will be. but are come to learn
P2
228 Epictetus
it from the prophet, you do know before you come what
manner of thing it is, if you are really a philosopher.
For if the event is not in our control, it cannot be either
good or evil. Therefore do not bring with you to the
prophet the will to get or the will to avoid, and do not
approach him with trembling, but with your mind made
up, that the whole issue is indifferent and does not affect
you and that, whatever it be, it will be in your power to
make good use of it, and no one shall hinder this. With
confidence then approach the gods as counsellors, and
further, when the counsel is given you, remember whose
counsel it is, and whom you will be disregarding if you
disobey. And consult the oracle, as Socrates thought
men should, only when the whole question turns upon
the issue of events, and neither reason nor any art of man
provides opportunities for discovering what lies before
you. Therefore, when it is your duty to risk your life
with friend or country, do not ask the oracle whether you
should risk your life. For if the prophet warns you that
the sacrifice is unfavourable, though it is plain that this
means death or exile or injury to some part of your body,
yet reason requires that even at this cost you must stand
by your friend and share your country s danger. Where
fore pay heed to the greater prophet, Pythian Apollo,
who cast out of his temple the man who did not help his
friend when he was being killed. 7
33 Lay down for yourself from the first a definite stamp and
style of conduct, which you will maintain when you are
alone and also in the society of men. Be silent for the
Manual 229
most part, or, if you speak, say only what is necessary and in
a few words. Talk, but rarely, if occasion calls you, but
do not talk of ordinary things of gladiators, or horse-races,
or athletes, or of meats or drinks these are topics that
arise everywhere but above all do not talk about men in
blame or compliment or comparison. If you can, turn
the conversation of your company by your talk to some
fitting subject ; but if you should chance to be isolated
among strangers, be silent. Do not laugh much, nor at
many things, nor without restraint.
Refuse to take oaths, altogether if that be possible, but
if not, as far as circumstances allow.
Refuse the entertainments of strangers and the vulgar. 8
But if occasion arise to accept them, then strain every
nerve to avoid lapsing into the state of the vulgar. For
know that, if your comrade have a stain on him, he that
associates with him must needs share the stain, even though
he be clean in himself.
For your body take just so much as your bare need
requires, such as food, drink, clothing, house, servants,
but cut down all that tends to luxury and outward show.
Avoid impurity to the utmost of your power before
marriage, and if you indulge your passion, let it be done
lawfully. But do not be offensive or censorious to those
who indulge it, and do not be always bringing up your
own chastity. If some one tells you that so and so speaks
ill of you, do not defend yourself against what he says, but
answer, * He did not know my other faults, or he would
not have mentioned these alone.
It is not necessary for the most part to go to the games ;
230 Epictetus
but if you should have occasion to go, show that your
first concern is for yourself ; that is, wish that only to
happen which does happen, and him only to win who does
win, for so you will suffer no hindrance. But refrain
entirely from applause, or ridicule, or prolonged excite
ment. And when you go away do not talk much of what
happened there, except so far as it tends to your improve
ment. For to talk about it implies that the spectacle
excited your wonder.
Do not go lightly or casually to hear lectures ; but if
you do go, maintain your gravity and dignity and do not
make yourself offensive. When you are going to meet
any one, and particularly some man of reputed eminence,
set before your mind the thought, What would Socrates
or Zeno have done ? and you will not fail to make proper
use of the occasion.
When you go to visit some great man, prepare your
mind by thinking that you will not find him in, that you
will be shut out, that the doors will be slammed in your
face, that he will pay no heed to you. And if in spite of
all this you find it fitting for you to go, go and bear what
happens and never say to yourself, It was not worth all
this ; for that shows a vulgar mind and one at odds with
outward things.
In your conversation avoid frequent and dispropor
tionate mention of your own doings or adventures ; for
other people do not take the same pleasure in hearing
what has happened to you as you take in recounting your
adventures.
Avoid raising men s laughter ; for it is a habit that
Manual 2 3 1
easily slips into vulgarity, and it may well suffice to lessen
your neighbour s respect.
It is dangerous too to lapse into foul language ; when
anything of the kind occurs, rebuke the offender, if the
occasion allow, and if not, make it plain to him by your
silence, or a blush or a frown, that you are angry at his
words.
When you imagine some pleasure, beware that it does 34
not carry you away, like other imaginations. Wait a
while, and give yourself pause. Next remember two
things : how long you will enjoy the pleasure, and also
how long you will afterwards repent and revile yourself.
And set on the other side the joy and self-satisfaction
you will feel if you refrain. And if the moment seems
come to realize it, take heed that you be not overcome
by the winning sweetness and attraction of it ; set in the
other scale the thought how much better is the conscious
ness of having vanquished it.
When you do a thing because you have determined that 35
it ought to be done, never avoid being seen doing it, even
if the opinion of the multitude is going to condemn you.
For if your action is wrong, then avoid doing it altogether,
but if it is right, why do you fear those who will rebuke
you wrongly?
The phrases, It is day and It is night , mean a great 36
deal if taken separately, but have no meaning if combined.
In the same way, to choose the larger portion at a banquet
may be worth while for your body, but if you want to
232 Epictetus
maintain social decencies it is worthless. Therefore,
when you are at meat with another, remember not
only to consider the value of what is set before you for
the body, but also to maintain your self-respect before
your host.
37 If you try to act a part beyond your powers, you not
only disgrace yourself in it, but you neglect the part
which you could have filled with success.
38 As in walking you take care not to tread on a nail or to
twist your foot, so take care that you do not harm your
Governing Principle. And if we guard this in everything
we do, we shall set to work more securely.
39 Every man s body is a measure for his property, as the
foot is the measure for his shoe. If you stick to this limit,
you will keep the right measure ; if you go beyond it,
you are bound to be carried away down a precipice in the
end ; just as with the shoe, if you once go beyond the
foot, your shoe puts on gilding, and soon purple and
embroidery. For when once you go beyond the measure
there is no limit.
40 Women from fourteen years upwards are called
madam 9 by men. Wherefore, when they see that the
only advantage they have got is to be marriageable, they
begin to make themselves smart and to set all their hopes
on this. We must take pains then to make them under
stand that they are really honoured for nothing but
a modest and decorous life.
Manual 233
It is a sign of a dull mind to dwell upon the cares of the 41
body, to prolong exercise, eating, drinking, and other
bodily functions. These things are to be done by the
way ; all your attention must be given to the mind.
When a man speaks evil or does evil to you, remember 42
that he does or says it because he thinks it is fitting for
him. It is not possible for him to follow what seems
good to you, but only what seems good to him, so that,
if his opinion is wrong, he suffers, in that he is the victim
of deception. In the same way, if a composite 10 judge
ment which is true is thought to be false, it is not the
judgement that suffers, but the man who is deluded about
it. If you act on this principle you will be gentle to him
who reviles you, saying to yourself on each occasion, He
thought it right.
Everything has two handles, one by which you can 43
carry it, the other by which you cannot. If your brother
wrongs you, do not take it by that handle, the handle
of his wrong, for you cannot carry it by that, but rather
by the other handle that he is a brother, brought up
with you, and then you will take it by the handle that
you can carry by.
It is illogical to reason thus, I am richer than you, there- 44
fore I am superior to you , I am more eloquent than
you, therefore I am superior to you. It is more logical
to reason, I am richer than you, therefore my property
is superior to yours , I am more eloquent than you,
therefore my speech is superior to yours. You are
something more than property or speech
234 Epictetus
45 If a man wash quickly, do not say that he washes badly,
but that he washes quickly. If a man drink much wine,
do not say that he drinks badly, but that he drinks much.
For till you have decided what judgement prompts him,
how do you know that he acts badly? If you do as I say,
you will assent to your apprehensive impressions n and to
none other.
46 On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, nor talk at
large of your principles among the multitude, but act on
your principles. For instance, at a banquet do not say
how one ought to eat, but eat as you ought. Remember
that Socrates had so completely got rid of the thought
of display that when men came and wanted an introduc
tion to philosophers he took them to be introduced ; so
patient of neglect was he. And if a discussion arise
among the multitude on some principle, keep silent for
the most part ; for you are in great danger of blurting
out some undigested thought. And when some one says
to you, You know nothing , and you do not let it provoke
you, then know that you are really on the right road.
For sheep do not bring grass to their shepherds and show
them how much they have eaten, but they digest their
fodder and then produce it in the form of wool and milk.
Do the same yourself ; instead of displaying your princi
ples to the multitude, show them the results of the
principles you have digested.
47 When you have adopted the simple life, do not pride
yourself upon it, and if you are a water-drinker do not
say on every occasion, I am a water-drinker. And if
Manual 235*
you ever want to train laboriously, keep it to yourself
and do not make a show of it. Do not embrace statues. 12
If you are very thirsty take a good draught of cold water,
and rinse your mouth and tell no one.
The ignorant man s position and character is this : he 48
never looks to himself for benefit or harm, but to the
world outside him. The philosopher s position and
character is that he always looks to himself for benefit and
harm.
The signs of one who is making progress are : he blames
none, praises none, complains of none, accuses none,
never speaks of himself as if he were somebody, or as if he
knew anything. And if any one compliments him he
laughs in himself at his compliment ; and if one blames
him, he makes no defence. He goes about like a conva
lescent, careful not to disturb his constitution on its road
to recovery, until it has got firm hold. He has got rid of
the will to get, 13 and his will to avoid is directed no longer
to what is beyond our power but only to what is in our
power and contrary to nature. In all things he exercises
his will without strain. If men regard him as foolish
or ignorant he pays no heed. In one word, he keeps
watch and guard on himself as his own enemy, lying in
wait for him.
When a man prides himself on being able to understand 49
and interpret the books of Chrysippus, say to yourself,
If Chrysippus had not written obscurely this man would
have had nothing on which to pride himself.
What is my object? To understand Nature and follow
2 3 6 Epictetus
her. I look then for some one who interprets her, and
having heard that Chrysippus does I come to him. But
I do not understand his writings, so I seek an interpreter.
So far there is nothing to be proud of. But when I have
found the interpreter it remains for me to act on his
precepts ; that and that alone is a thing to be proud of.
But if I admire the mere power of exposition, it comes
to this that I am turned into a grammarian instead of
a philosopher, except that I interpret Chrysippus in place
of Homer. Therefore, when some one says to me, Read
me Chrysippus , when I cannot point to actions which
are in harmony and correspondence with his teaching,
I am rather inclined to blush.
50 Whatever principles you put before you, hold fast to
them as laws which it will be impious to transgress. But
pay no heed to what any one says of you ; for this is some
thing beyond your own control.
5 1 How long will you wait to think yourself worthy of the
highest and transgress in nothing the clear pronounce
ment of reason? You have received the precepts which
you ought to accept, and you have accepted them. Why
then do you still wait for a master, that you may delay
the amendment of yourself till he comes ? You are a youth
no longer, you are now a full-grown man. If now you are
careless and indolent and are always putting off, fixing one
day after another as the limit when you mean to begin
attending to yourself, then, living or dying, you will
make no progress but will continue unawares in ignorance.
Therefore make up your mind before it is too late to live
Manna! 237
as one who is mature and proficient, and let all that seems
best to you be a law that you cannot transgress. And
if you encounter anything troublesome or pleasant or
glorious or inglorious, remember that the hour of struggle
is come, the Olympic contest is here and you may put
off no longer, and that one day and one action determines
whether the progress you have achieved is lost or main
tained.
This was how Socrates attained perfection, paying
heed to nothing but reason, in all that he encountered.
And if you are not yet Socrates, yet ought you to live as
one who would wish to be a Socrates.
The first and most necessary department of philosophy 152
deals with the application of principles ; for instance, not
to lie . The second deals with demonstrations ; for
instance, How comes it that one ought not to lie ? The
third is concerned with establishing and analysing these
processes ; for instance, * How comes it that this is a de
monstration ? What is demonstration, what is consequence,
what is contradiction, what is true, what is false? It
follows then that the third department is necessary because
of the second, and the second because of the first. The
first is the most necessary part, and that in which we must
rest. But we reverse the order : we occupy ourselves
with the third, and make that our whole concern, and the
first we completely neglect. Wherefore we lie, but are
ready enough with the demonstration that lying is wrong.
On every occasion we must have these thoughts at 53
hand,
238 Epictetus
4 Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
Whither ordained is by your decree.
I ll follow, doubting not, or if with will
Recreant I falter, I shall follow still.
Who rightly with necessity complies
In things divine we count him skilled and wise.
Well, Crito, if this be the gods will, so be it.
* Anytus and Meletus have power to put me to death,
but not to harm me.
NOTES
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
1. fyavraaia. (i) The power of presenting an image to the
mind s eye ; (2) the image so presented. It therefore in
cludes all the materials which are presented to the mind
for it to work on, and so is almost the data of consciousness .
No single word, impressions , appearances , presentations ,
quite renders it, but impressions seems the nearest word
in familiar English, and this word will be generally used
in this version. See Introd., p. 28.
2. This is an attempt to render the force of the diminutive
termination, so common in the lectures. Sometimes it
appears to have little force, but here at least there is a touch
of contempt.
3. op(is . . . fKK\iois. This is the first occurrence in the
Discourses of these words, which constantly recur. On the
whole it has been thought best to translate them by will to
get and will to avoid . It is a first principle of Epictetus
teaching that these must be directed only to objects which
lie within the control of man s will (TCI Tr/joaiperiKa). But
occasionally, as i. 4. i, iii. 12. 8, and Ench. ii. 2, &c., he
speaks of opegis as something to be removed or deferred.
The idea is that in the early stages, when the beginner has
not yet learnt to direct his will to what is good, it is better
to possess his soul in quietness until he has got his training.
Cf. iii. 13. 21, Refrain for a while from willing to get anything^
till one day you may do so rationally. The desire for lower
objects is expressed by (Vtdu/Jta.
For o t )prj . . . dcpopur), impulse to act . . . impulse not to act ,
see Introd., p. 31.
240 Epictetus
CHAPTER II
1. Preconceptions . The Stoics regard all conceptions
(eWomi) as produced by the mind working on impressions.
Some of these conceptions they call TrpoA^eif, preconceptions
or primary notions . They are certain general terms used
commonly by men (such as good , happiness , justice ),
and their proper application not being reasoned out by the
individual before he uses them, they are in a sense anticipa
tions of^reasoned knowledge.
2. auifta TrapaKpareli 1 = matellant praebere.
3. The meaning is that when once a man begins to weigh
external things against his true good, he is bound to give the
wrong answer.
4. To Epictetus the pattern philosophers are Socrates and
Diogenes : to these he sometimes adds Zeno and Chrysippus.
CHAPTER IV
1 . TTpoKonf], progress , and 6 TTPOKOTTTCOV, the man who is in
a state of progress , are technical terms in the Stoic philosophy
from Chrysippus onwards. The distinctive character of the
man who is in a state of progress is that he is on the right
road, that he has recognized the true good and is on the
way to perfection. Sometimes the term is applied to one
who has almost approached perfection, sometimes to one who
is beginning his moral progress. See Bonhoffer, ii, p. 149, and
Introd., p. 34.
2. Epictetus here sums up the three fields or spheres (TO/TOI)
of man s activity as those of (i) opei? and CKK\KTIS, will to
get and will to avoid, (2) 6pp.r] and d^op^u;, impulse positive
and negative, (3) <rvyiMTafa(Ttf, assent. (See Introd., p. 30.)
3. Even if the poets description of Priam s misery is
a delusion, it is worth while if it makes men realize true
values.
Nofes. Book I 241
CHAPTER VII
i. For Epictetus view of the value of logical studies see
Introd., p. 30. Variable premisses (T>V nfraninrovro^v}.
A premiss is said to vary (ficrairtirrrty) when it becomes
untrue at some subsequent time. Epictetus, when he wishes
to speak of the function of logic, frequently sums it up as
consisting in the analysis of syllogisms and in dealing with
fallacies caused by variable premisses.
2. Lit. what is fitting . TO KaQijKov is what is fitting in
man s relations with other beings (gods or men). Its perform
ance depends on a knowledge of the relations (rr^t o-fts) in
which man stands to others. It is the word translated
officium by Cicero in his de Officiis. To translate it duty
suggests a conflict, which is not implied in the word. (See
Bonhoffer, ii, p. 200, &c.)
3. Omitting, with Wolf, Trepi TWOS 17 (TKe\l/L? ; jrepl Ka6r)KnvTos.
CHAPTER VIII
, attacking proof, and cVdv/uq/m are both
forms of argument which belong rather to rhetoric than to
logic proper. An epicheireme appears to mean an argument
with which we attack or assail an opponent rather than
an attempted proof. An enthymeme is a rhetorical
demonstration (Ar. Rbet. i. i. 11), a syllogism from prob
able propositions and signs (e^eiKoruv KOI o-q/ifi oji/), and often
consists of fewer propositions than those of which the normal
syllogism is composed (Ar. Rbet. i. 2. 13). Both fall short
of conclusive or demonstrative proof. See Schweighauser s
note on the passage, and Aldrich, Art. Log. Rud., p. 97.
2. Reading OVK ovv with Schw.
3. TTOUI 7rpoatf)(cris, omitting (f)ai>T(uri(oi>,
546.24 ii
242 Epictetus
CHAPTER IX
1. TbvTrpeo-fivTfpov, the elder . Epictetus uses this epithet,
it would seem, to avoid the more formal word teacher or
master . Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 182, where Chrysippus calls
Cleanthes the old man (6 TrpecrfBvTrjs}.
2. authority , cgovaiav. Epictetus often contrasts the
authority of the tyrant, based on material force, with the
philosopher s authority over his own character and inner
life. It is the Cynic s conscience which enables him to speak
to man with authority (iii. 22, p. 74). See Dr. Edwin
Abbott, The Son of Man, 3143, and note 9 or iii. 22.
3. The meaning seems to be that as Epictetus is content
to take what comes from his master, good or bad, as the
lot of man , he is beyond the need of help : he is his own
master.
CHAPTER XI
i . cSogtv rjp.lv, we are so minded . The verb corresponds to
So-y/zara, * judgements , which according to Epictetus are the
foundation of every action. See Introd., p. 34.
CHAPTER XII
i. TO? inroQfo-cis. The conditions, the data of existence,
what is given to man for him to work from, in thought and
action. In i. 29 it is used of the exercise or task prescribed
to an athlete. For the uses of the word in Greek philosophy
see J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy (Thales to Plato), p. 162.
CHAPTER XIII
i. TO ftdpriQpov. The ravine at Athens into which the
corpses of criminals were thrown : hence used metaphorically
of the extreme of misery or degradation.
Notes. Rook 1 243
CHAPTER XIV
1. Cf. Wordsworth, And are upgathered now like sleeping
flowers .
2. Zeus is used by Epictetus interchangeably with 6f6s,
God , and TO ddov, the divine , to express the Divine Spirit
of the universe.
3. Genius , Sai/jiwv, used by the Stoics not in its popular
sense of an external spirit intermediate between gods and
men, but as identical with man s reason or higher nature, hie
conscience, the voice of God within him.
4. Inserting liv with Schweighauser.
5. i. e. that we will put our highest self, which is divine,
before all. rWov&i, in our world , i.e. among the Stoics.
CHAPTER XV
i. TO rjyffjLoviKov, the Governing Principle . This is the first
passage in which Epictetus uses the term, which is frequent
in his writings and those of Marcus Aurelius. It is the govern
ing principle of the soul, and as the highest aspect of the soul
is rational, it is often equivalent to ftuivoia and Xoyio-/zor, but
must not be regarded as purely intellectual : it is the soul as
feeling and willing, as well as thinking. See Bonhoffer, i,
pp. 94 ff.
CHAPTER XVII
1. \nyos *(TT\v o diapdpwv. 8iap6povi> is the process of
analysis which makes knowledge articulate and complete. So
in Encb. 52 6 SiapOpwrLKos TOTTOJ, the sphere of analysis ,
is coextensive with logic.
2. Ofpcnrevfiv. The treatment of the affections in order to
discipline them for right conduct. oM-y/znTn /cat nadr), or some
such words (Wolf), seem necessary after Qepcnrtvetv.
3. i. e. because no step can be taken without logical process.
Q 2
244 Epictetus
4. Diog. Laert. vi. 17 says that Antisthenes wrote Trfpl
TratSem? r) ovop.(iT(ov, on Education or the Use of Terms .
5. ^uTTjr, lit. sacrificer , used of the seer who examines the
flesh of the victim for signs, and then applied to the philosopher,
who is consulted like a seer.
CHAPTER XVIII
1. naQelv, like the English feeling , is used of thought
as well as of sensation.
2. The text is defective.
3. fo-a>0i> TOL p,t] (TTfvd&js : lit. yet do not groan within .
These words occur again in a more important passage, chap. 16
of the Manual, where Mr. Bevan translates them from the
heart . Professor Gilbert Murray translates yet in the
centre of your being do not groan . The chief idea which
Epictetus seems to have in his mind is that these expressions
of feeling must not touch the inward judgement, that nothing
external really counts, either for me or for my friend.
CHAPTER XIX
i. OWK, the conjecture of O. Hirschfeld, would be local
contracts for the collection of taxes or the like.
CHAPTER XX
i. 7rpor]yov[iei>a)VTij>ti)v. This participle, used as an adjective
meaning principal , is frequent in Epictetus. Here it is used
of the principal object or material with which an art or faculty
deals : more characteristically it is applied at the end of the
chapter to the reason as the element in men of commanding
value. Similarly in iii. 7 it is applied to virtue as good in
itself, in contrast with the joy foapa) which accompanies it
(eTriyevvr]p.a) but is not of its essence.
2 .(Ti>(TTr]p.a (K 7ToiS)v (pcivTdcj iu>v. This seems at first a passive
Notes. Book 1 245-
conception ; but he is thinking of reason (o Xdyov) for the
moment not so much as a faculty, but rather as an organized
system of sensations and ideas, differing in each man according
to circumstance and opportunity. Bonhoffer, i, p. 207.
3. sagacity , c^po^o-ty, is one of the four cardinal virtues
of the Stoics. It is sometimes used as equivalent to the
supreme virtue aoffoia (wisdom), sometimes in a narrower
sense as the faculty specially concerned with what is fitting
(TCI KadrjKovTa) in conduct. Cf. Bonhoffer, ii, pp. 180, 214, &c.
4. ddutyopa, things neither good nor bad. Introd., p. 19.
CHAPTER XXII
1. Tr/joA/^ewj . See Introd., p. 29, and note i on i. 2.
2. (ri>/j.(f)pov, interest , here, as in chap, xix, p. 103, is
the true interest of man, the interest of his true self.
3. These seem to be the words of the student of philosophy,
who is still mad in the sense that he does not know what
is good and what evil. In this state he is confronted by the
rich worldling, who bids him go his own way and not listen
to philosophers. Instead of refuting him, the student gets
rid of him by confessing his passion for philosophy.
CHAPTER XXIII
1. KotvuviKoi. Elter s conjecture instead of vnovoijTiKoi.
2. Epicurus perhaps had contemptuously compared children
to mice, and Epictetus retorts if they are mice they need
not trouble him ; but Epicurus knows that a child makes an
irresistible appeal.
3. If you take a low view of politics and treat men as
flies , no doubt you will degrade yourself. There may be
an allusion to Domitian s pastime of killing flies. Sueton.
Dom. 3.
4. A reference to the custom of putting away children
who were physically unfit.
246 Epictetus
CHAPTER XXIV
1. Reading ae instead of ye, with Upton.
2. Epictetus, lecturing at Nicopolis in Epirus, speaks of
sending his pupil to Rome to spy out the land, to see how
things are going in the capital under Domitian, who had
expelled all philosophers.
3. The broad purple hem is the mark of a senator, the narrow
hem of the knight 5 the ordinary commoner wore the plain toga.
4. The tragic cry of Oedipus when he discovers his fate.
CHAPTER XXV
1. authority , egovaia. See note 2 on i. 9.
2. TO TTioroV, elsewhere, coupled with TO aldrjuov, as part of
the soul s moral equipment. Here the text is imperfect, and
probably other attributes have dropped out.
3. /on oXXos p.f KooAuei. If the text is correct the meaning
probably is and Another (i.e. God) forbids me . For this
reverent use of Another f or a divine Helper see Abbott,
The Son of Man, 3618.
4. i. e. to the commands of the absolute ruler.
5. The point seems to be that the man s self is untouched
by this indignity : you say strip the man , but only his
clothes are affected.
CHAPTER XXVI
i. cu /u,eyaXcu v\ai etVi. The power of outward things, as em
bodied in the highest society of Rome, is contrasted with the
moral standard of the lecture-room in Nicopolis.
CHAPTER XXVII
1. 6 TreTraifiei^ueVos 1 , the educated man , who is trained in
philosophy, as opposed to the untrained layman, 6 t
2. Death is necessary, and therefore not an evil.
Notes. Books /, // 247
3. The other that is, the belief that death is not evil.
Horn. //. xii. 328. Sarpedon says : But a thousand fates
of death stand over us, which mortal man may not flee from
nor avoid ; then let us on, and give glory or obtain it our
selves. (Purves trans.)
4. rf) avvqfciq, the familiar, customary position , i. e. the
common-sense view of knowledge as opposed to the sceptical
position. Cf. infra, r^vai ri}v <rvvr]t)ciav. Epictetus will
leave the defence of the orthodox position to those philo
sophers who have leisure.
5. Some words seem needed to complete the sense.
CHAPTER XXVIII
1. Medea.
2. Omitting p-rj.
CHAPTER XXIX
1. Epictetus often refers to Socrates trial and death as
the typical protest of reason against unreason. (See Plato s
Apology.}
2. the managers , rols eViTpoTroir. The schools (ludi) of
gladiators, four of which are attributed to Domitian, were
under imperial procurators.
3. Qeapeiv is used both of taking cognizance of things and
of watching a spectacle.
4. Cf. Plato, Pbaedo 63, 116.
CHAPTER XXX
i. God. See note 3 on i. 25.
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
1. Feathers, used by beaters.
2. This is Reiske s reading : he inserts ovdeis as an answer
to the preceding words.
248 Epictetus
3. In the ceremony of manumission. The twentieth is
the tax of 5 per cent, on manumission. Epictetus, himself
a freedman, often refers to the process of manumission in
connexion with moral freedom.
4. 7Tpio8ta. Schw. The reading of the manuscript 17 68os
V Xe-yo) seems to be corrupt. Kronenberg in Class. Quarterly,
v. 2, suggests r,v $ os, r) V V fyoo, said he and said I , thinking
that Epictetus refers to writing in dialogue.
CHAPTER II
1. drapagia, imperturbability .
2. He applies to this moral achievement the words suitable
to the parts of a rhetorical composition.
3. 14. This section seems out of place here : the references
to caution and confidence seem to belong to the preceding
chapter.
4. dvaftaiveis, Coraes conjecture for
CHAPTER IV
i. Epictetus states the community of women as a Stoic
doctrine (cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 33. 131), and then shows its
limitations.
CHAPTER V
1. (Warof, Wolf, for dvvarai.
2. Reading yLiav eXaftes.
3. Accepting Elter s reading Xa/Scti/ a 8t1 8ta6i<r6at r avra
to? eVi/3aAAei.
CHAPTER VI
1. Reading Tpiftfjs . . . ro QTT avrfjs 7rpiyiyvop.fvov, Elter.
2. upp-av av, I should direct my impulse towards it .
3. TrepiVraemis used (i) in a neutral sense, of circumstances
generally, (2) as here, of hard circumstances .
4. ri; viro\rpl?fi. I am not only in danger objectively, but
am also conscious of my danger.
Notes. Booh II 249
CHAPTER VII
i. TOV opviffapiov Kparovpev K<U coy deov cVntcuXou/jei/, Elter.
CHAPTER IX
1. Reading tffcopj^tara, Elter, instead of
2. It is not certain whether in this sentence and the next
Epictetus is thinking of Jews or of Christians, who at this
time were often confused with them.
CHAPTER XII
i. This seems to mean before I had suffered from the
insolence of the rich .
CHAPTER XIII
i. rmjSoXq and rrpodto-is are species of oppf} and can hardly
be distinguished from it 5 both indicate stages in the act of
willing, the latter perhaps rather a more advanced stage than
nri/3oAq [which is according to Stobaeus defined by the Stoics
as oppr) Trpo opfjajs]. Cf. Bonhoffer, i, pp. 257 ff.
CHAPTER XIV
1. Three campaigns in the cavalry or six in the infantry
were the period laid down in the so-called Municipal Law of
Caesar as a qualification for a seat in a municipal Senate.
2. ra Ka6riK.ovTa diwdidus. You perform the acts fitting and
appropriate to each occasion. TO KudiJKov is wider than duty
and covers all acts which are appropriate to man s rational
being and to the circumstances in which he finds himself,
whether they are (i) merely the satisfaction of his natural
wants, or (2) the fulfilment of the accepted social code, or
(3) the fulfilment of those higher claims which go beyond the
accepted code, c. g. love of enemies, sacrifice of revenge, &c.
Sec Bonhoffer, ii, pp. 202 ff.
Epictetus
3. Cf. Bacon, OJ Atheism, I had rather believe all the
Fables in the Legend and the Talmud and the Alcoran than
that this universal frame is without a mind.
CHAPTER XV
1. The suggestion is that it is just as foolish to stick to
a wrong decision in conduct as to persist in believing it is
night when it is day.
2. The Great City is the City of the world (cf. iii. 22. 4),
and the small city is the human city or state, Rome or another.
3. Hellebore was the ordinary remedy for insanity.
4. The relation of this sentence to the context is obscured
by its form. To correspond with the context it would run :
I escape with my life. Why ? You have decided.
CHAPTER XVI
1. The spring of Dirce was at Thebes : the Marcian water
is that of the Marcian aqueduct at Rome.
2. A contemptuous description of the Acropolis and its
buildings.
3. Cf. Ench. v.
4. Be thou (if I may say so) a very desperado (Abbott).
5. Epictetus, after describing the right spirit, suddenly
turns round and suggests in ironical contrast the attitude of
the unweaned creature helplessly waiting to be fed.
CHAPTER XVII
i. tiftoprjfjiaTa (see BonhofTer, i, p. 7), speculative principles .
Epictetus, in iv. 6. 16, speaks of avayKola decop^ara which have
an immediate bearing on conduct and character ; in iii. 5. 15
and elsewhere he speaks more contemptuously of $6<op7/jana,
paltry speculations . There is no real contradiction.
Theoretical principles are necessary for the rational life, but
Notes. Book 11 25-1
the study of them, apart from conduct, may easily become
a snare.
2. avu.Tf.wvv, hold out , i. e. take no food .
3. Epictetus refers to the three departments (TOTTOI) of
study, (i) op(eis (will), (2) op/W (impulse), (3) avyKuTtiOea-fis
(assent). Cf. iii. 2.
4. The Liar , 6 \l/fvS6ptvos: the best-known instance of this
sophism is Epimenides says the Cretans are always liars, but
is himself a Cretan. Does he lie or tell the truth ? Cf. Reid
on Cic. Academ. Prior, ii. 95.
5. Reading tunpffl instead of dn c
CHAPTER XVIII
1. 6 Kvpifvw, the Master argument described fully in
chap. xix. The name appears to be a colloquial one.
2. The Liar . Cf. chap. xvii. 6 rjavxafav, the resting
argument . The logical fallacy of the sorites was met by
stopping and refusing to answer. To this Epictetus here
refers. Cf. Cic. Academ. Prior, ii. 93, and Reid s note.
3. Castor and Pollux, * the great twin brethren who watch
over voyagers.
CHAPTER XIX
i. with one another , i. e. any two with the third.
CHAPTER XX
1. It seems more forcible to take these words as a sarcastic
comment by Epictetus than as a continuation of the Academic s
words.
2. Text corrupt.
CHAPTER XXI
i. The Liar . See note 4 on ii. 17.
2^2 Epictetus
CHAPTER XXII
1. <pv\dorariv ras cr^eVets, maintain fitting relations with
other men. Cf. Introd., p. 35.
2. ws %<H U, Elter s conjecture for cos- T a oprj.
CHAPTER XXIII
1. Trvev/jLa, spirit . According to the Stoics the spirit
of vision connected the central mind (TO fjye POVLKOV) with the
pupil of the eye and similarly with other senses. For other
uses of the word see iii. 3, note 4.
2. The text here has the words or wheat, or barley, or
horse, or dog , which seem out of place.
3. From a letter of Epicurus. Diog. Laert. x. 22.
CHAPTER XXVI
i. The text, vya> eTrippe-^fi, is corrupt, but something like
inclines to what moves it seems required.
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
1. aimof, Schw., instead of aurw.
2. The pancration consisted of boxing and wrestling, and
was supposed to test all a man s powers. The pentathlon
included running, jumping, quoit-throwing, spear-throwing,
and wrestling.
3. Reading TTCO? 8e /cat OVK a>/ji6v eVrif ... 5 Coraes.
4. The suggestion is that the pupil comes to Epictetus
looking like a profligate.
5. Omitting aura).
6. These are all local officers in Corinth. The Ephebi were
young men of 18-20, under military training.
Notes. Book III 25-3
7. uXXo>, lit. Another s concern, here as elsewhere used
for God. Cf. i. 25, note 3.
8. Epictetus ironically suggests that tire student s notion of
cleanliness is merely external.
CHAPTER II
1. TOTTWJ/, departments of study. See Introd., p. 30
2. irdffrjj strong emotions . See Bonhoffer, i, p. 278.
3. dpinnrrMrJa, freedom from logical error, or security of
judgement. Cf. iii. 26. 14 (Trans., p. 106, 11. 14, 15).
4. lit. stretching out the middle finger . This was an
obscene gesture.
5. rar pfTcnTTWiTfis TWV Xoycor, alterations in logical terms
or premisses and the like . Cf. i. 7. 20.
6. i. e. men who are free from passion and tumult of mind.
CHAPTER III
1. It seems best to take the words aXX . . . avrl nW ;
as spoken by Epictetus.
2. relations ((r^/rms), J. e. relations with father, brother,
&c. Introd., p. 35.
3. lit. Another constrains him , i. e. God. Cf. note 3 on
i. 25. God has ordained that man should put first whatever
he regards as his good : the choice of his good depends
on himself.
4. irvcvpa, spirit , here used as equivalent to ^rv\^
soul , or f)yfpoi iKoi>. Cf. Ji. i. 17. The word is used in
two other senses by Epictetus : in ii. 23. 3 of the spirit
which makes vision and other sensations possible, and in
iii. 13. 15 as one of the four elements (with earth, fire, and
water) into which man returns at death. (See Bonhoffer,
i, p. 30.)
2 5*4 Epictetus
CHAPTER IV
1. This passage shows that at this time Epirus was under
a separate governor, a Procurator of equestrian rank.
2. Reading ov TOVTO elrrelv with no mark of interrogation.
CHAPTER V
1. evd(vrj(TTai, Elter s conjecture for 8vvr)<reTm.
2. That is, the ideal of Socrates, peace of mind.
CHAPTER VI
i. KOIVOS vois is the perception common to man, by which,
unless his nature is perverted, he can see certain elementary
moral notions. Cf. BonhofTer, i, pp. 121, 224.
CHAPTER VII
1. Commissioner , ftiop0a>Trjs. Such special commissioners,
sent to set in order the affairs of the free cities , date from
Trajan s reign. We do not know who this commissioner was.
2. Maximus. Schw. identifies this man with L. Appius
Maximus Norbanus, who commanded in a Parthian expedi
tion in Trajan s reign and died in the East. May it not refer
to Pliny s friend who was corrector of the free cities of
Achaea ? Plin. Ep. viii. 24.
3. SraH.vcoy. Elter conjectures i6 x icorooi>, but this misses
Epictetus hit at his own school. The Stoics are as incon
sistent as the rest.
4. yvfjivao-iapxia in earlier Greek means the duty of pro
viding for the Lampadephoria and similar performances.
Here it seems to refer to management of the Gymnasia.
5. For this threefold division of appropriate acts see
Bonhoffer, ii, p. 205. The classification is obscure and not very
relevant here. The division appears to imply a distinction
Notes. Rook III 2?f
between actions concerned with outward existence (the first
and second class) and those concerned with man s higher
life (the third class). The former have only a relative, the
latter an absolute, value (TTporjyov^fVfi).
6. Symphorus and Numenius are not known : they were
probably freedmen who had risen to high position.
CHAPTER VIII
i. KaToXrjTTTiKri (parraaia, apprehensive or convincing
impression, though rarely used by Epictetus, is a technical
term of the Stoics for an overmastering impression which con
vinces those to whom it comes of its truth. It is, as BonhofTer
says, not so much the criterion of truth (for this in the last
resort is aio-drjo-is or Xoyo?) but the symptom by which the sub
ject recognizes the presence of truth. Bonh. i, p. 730. It is
not clear whether the adjective means that lays hold of the
mind , or that gets a grasp on reality (Bevan, p. 19).
CHAPTER IX
1. Patron , Trpoorarijy. Every municipal town in Italy
and the provinces had one or more patrons , who were sup
posed to represent them in Rome, but the relation was often
purely honorary. Later in the chapter Epictetus uses the
Roman word irarp&v,
2. i. e. you have come to me to buy ready-made judgments,
as if they were goods from a tradesman, instead of coming
for live inspiration.
3. murrhine vessels . These were vases of valuable material
and varied markings, but whether of natural stone or of glass
is uncertain. See Stuart Jones, Companion to Roman History,
p. 442.
CHAPTER X
i. The text as it stands is corrupt. The translation is from
the reading: TTOV TTOT aTrtX^oira TOU ffupariov
Epictetus
2. The objector suggests that as a student of philosophy
he is above these petty considerations. Epictetus reminds
him of the purpose of philosophy.
CHAPTER XII
1. (poiviKa Iffrdvai. c Setting-up a palm-tree seems to be
mentioned as an acrobatic feat.
2. embracing statues . Cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 23. This was
one of Diogenes forms of self-discipline in winter.
3. See Introd., p. 32.
4. The tent and the pestle and mortar are the furniture
of the simple life .
CHAPTER XIII
1. Conflagration . See Introd., p. 18.
2. Trajan after his conquest of Dacia.
3. God. Gf. i. 25, note 3.
4. The rivers of Hades.
5. The connexion with the preceding sections is obscure.
The general sense is that a beginner in philosophy must not
behave as though he were a past-master.
6. Cf. Introd., p. 32.
7. <p\tyiJLa probably, as Elter suggests, refers to TM $6i(riKto,
1 the consumptive . It is the drivel of the sickly novice in
philosophy.
CHAPTER XIV
1. Reading rwi> avdpwn^i^ with Elter, for rot? dvOpw-rrois.
2. 7rpor)yovfj.va>s TrparTerm, are of commanding importance .
71-porjyovp.fvos here, as in i. 20. 14 and elsewhere, is used of
things or actions of primary importance as opposed to what is
opportunist and accidental.
Notes. Bool^ 111 25-7
CHAPTER XV
1. The first part of this chapter is repeated with slight
variations in chapter xxix of the Manual.
2. 7rapopv(r<T(r0ai is probably a technical term of the arena :
cf . Diog.Laert. vi. 2, (Diogenes) e Aeye re nepl p.ev TOV irapopvTTciv
KOI XaKrifciv ayu)v (.(a-6ai TOVS avdpwTrovs, Trepl 8e KaXoKayatiias
fj.T]8fi>a. Liddell and Scott explain it of digging against
one another by way of training , but this does not suit
ev rep ayuvi. The precise meaning is uncertain, possibly
* get hacked (cf. our colloquial use of the word dig in
a dig in the ribs ), or get covered with dust .
3. Flogging would be a punishment for fouling or any
other breach of the rules.
4. i. e. such a conclusion demands serious, systematic study.
CHAPTER XIX
i . 6 idiuiTTjs is the layman, who has had no philosophic train
ing and is therefore unskilled in the art of living.
CHAPTER XX
1. Perhaps a reference to Epictetus himself.
2. Menoeceus gave his life to save Thebes.
3. The sarcastic answer of an opponent.
4. The connexion is not quite clear. The Lesbian , as
Upton suggests, may be a slave or a scoffer ; Epictetus, by
way of reproof to those who quarrel with the first person they
meet, wishes good luck to his slave for reminding him of his
ignorance.
CHAPTER XXII
i. Nowhere else does Epictetus so completely adopt the
Cynic name as in this chapter. The Cynic whom he describes
546-24 II R
2^8 Epictetus
is the ideal Stoic teacher, who is distinguished from the
ordinary Stoic by a more austere and isolated life. See
Introd., p. 36.
2. Pitch-plaster , used to get a smooth skin.
3. opeti> apai. Cf. Introd., p. 32.
4. efjLTreo-i]. Schw. translates is deceived . ( let in
perhaps gives the metaphor.)
5. KaracrKOTroff, spy or scout . The philosopher is sent
into the world to spy out the land, and discover what forces
in the world are good and what are evil.
6. Omitting the inverted commas before ova and after
e xcoi>. To a Stoic a miserable king is a contradiction, for
the wise man is the only king.
7. Reading eiVeXtfovra for e ^eA^ozra.
8. Omitting on Kar^yopfl.
9. authority . See i. 9, note 2. Abbott, The Son of Man,
3143 : The Cynic is a natural king; he goes about like a
Hercules destroying noxious beasts, and like Aesculapius
healing diseases Warrior and Physician in one. In both
these capacities he receives from God authority over men,
and men recognize it in him, because they perceive him to
be their benefactor and deliverer.
CHAPTER XXIII
1. The notion is partly of a man returning to himself ,
partly of turning his attention to his true self.
2. The words are ironical.
3. The words I have often . . . arguments are from the
beginning of Xenophon s Memorabilia. The point is that
the discourses of Socrates are treated as matters of language
and style, without regard for their substance.
4. Rich Romans lent their houses for lectures and reci
tations.
Notes. Eool^lll 25-9
5. i. e. a big gallery or theatre.
6. i. e. that there is a spiritual relation between them. As
God has need of the world (to exhibit his reason), so the true
teacher has something to give, which his hearers cannot do
without, just as he cannot do without them.
CHAPTER XXIV
1. The places where you now are.
2. Probably refers to the story that Nicocreon ordered
Anaxarchus tongue to be cut out, whereupon he bit it off
himself and spat it in Nicocreon s face. Diog. Laert. ix. 59.
3. Kap-mo-Trjs vindex or assertor^ the man by the touch of
whose wand the slave became free, if his master made no
counter-claim. The word is used again in iv. i and iv. 7.
For Epictetus references to manumission cf. -ii. i, note 3.
4. fiia^uo-jy, here and later in the chapter, of pleasure as
something diffused or expansive (opp. to o-wroA^).
5. i. e. take my life .
6. Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 13, a saying attributed to Solon,
Anaxagoras, and Xenophon.
7. Reading o7r</>iKi oiy, Coraes. The Latin words Caesar iani,
ordinatio, officia in this chapter are lifted into Greek from
Latin. The Greek of Epictetus, like that of the New Testa
ment, was not classical Greek, but the popular speech (Koii/r;)
of the Hellenistic world. Cf. Hahn, Rom und Romanismus
im griechisch-rdmiscben Osten, p. 256 ; Douglas S. Sharp,
Epictetus and the New Testament.
CHAPTER XXVI
i. Manes, a slave s name. Epictetus uses the name and
not the word slave because he does not wish to suggest
a slave s spirit.
R 2
26 o Epictetus
BOOK IV
CHAPTER I
1. Inserting O7ro/za0coj> before OVTOS and making the sen
tence a question (C. Schenkl).
2. TL <pdyr], Coraes, instead of rrol (frayy.
3. The gold ring given to a freedman would open to him
an official career as a knight.
4. Three campaigns are a qualification for office.
5. Caesar s friend , a technical phrase for one who is
received at Court.
6. afaXy^roy, Upton, for dvnXijdrjs.
7. e irj must be inserted.
8. The privilege of a consul.
9. op/^^ impulse , commonly used of the first step in
a particular action, is here applied to the will in general.
10. op/zos-, the will of God in its various manifestations.
11. i.e. God; cf. i. 25, note 3.
12. Omit Km.
13. Diog. Laert. vi. 2. 29. Menippus in The Sale of
Diogenes says that when he was taken prisoner and sold
he was asked what he could do. He answered, Rule men ,
and to the auctioneer he said, Does any one wish to buy
himself a master ?
14. These words, as Schenkl says, seem necessary for the
sense.
15. Reading dovXov, rjv 0/07 5
1 6. ovv, Schw., for OVK.
17. Wolf, TL ovv ovceVrfl, ov\i 5 ea-Ke^/ai Kal /3e/3oi;Xei;o-ai ;
1 8. raCra . . . cKfiva seem to refer to the things mentioned
above as indifferent and evil respectively.
19. evSoOev within , probably means in his heart .
Epictetus is describing the spurious philosopher, whose
Notes. Bool^ IV 261
wisdom is only of the lecture-room, and whose real judgements
trained by actions are revealed by his base conduct in the
world. See note 3 on eo-o>0er, i. 18.
20. vnep fKeivrjS) Schw.
21. The meaning seems to be that by their bad example in
clinging to life they would demoralize those whom they were
trying to help.
22. Insert 6V before rrjs a\r)6ivf)S.
CHAPTER III
1. i. e. anything external.
2. Reading anoTvyxavw with Reiske.
3. Famous lawyers of the first century A. D.
CHAPTER IV
1. uTaXaiVcopos 1 , Schw.
2. The connexion of this sentence with the preceding is
not clear. I have tried to make sense by dividing it between
the student who asks what is the good of attending to one s
conduct, and Epictetus who answers that God has helped
him to escape from error, and his pupil may escape in the
same way.
3. Apprehensive impressions . See Introd., p. 28, and
note on iii. 8.
4. opeti/ apai. See Introd., p. 32.
CHAPTER V
i. Cf. iii. 12, note 2.
CHAPTER VI
1. Omitting TOVTO>V*
2. Quoted from verses attributed to Pythagoras : cf.
262 Epictetus
CHAPTER VII
I. KapTTLarriv e^o). Cf. iii. 24, note 3.
2. These words are not in the text, but something of the
kind seems required for the sense.
CHAPTER VIII
1. Omitting ov.
2. o-Ktt/Lijua, a pit made for wrestlers or jumpers.
CHAPTER X
1. Cf. iii. 2.
2. The 12 fasces (bundles of rods with axes) were the mark
of a consul.
3. Cf. iv. 6. This seems to be the meaning of the proverb
epyov epyo) ov Koivowel,.
4. ov Kmrvi^rj.
CHAPTER XIII
1. cpvpo) KCH (pvpop.ai. This phrase, used also in ii. 12. 13,
seems to be a colloquial expression for making a muddle .
2. i. e. the position of having given away my secret.
NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS
Preliminary Note. Most of these fragments come from
two selections from Greek writers, made by Stobaeus, John of
Stobi in Macedonia (sixth century A. D.). Those marked Eel.
are from his ExXoyai cpvo~iKai diaXeKTiKoi KOI rjdiKai and those
marked Flor. from his Ai/tfoXdyioi/ (Florilegium). Frs. 9
and 10 are from the Noctes Atticae of Aulus Gellius, a Latin
grammarian of the second century A. D. 5 26, 27, 28 from the
Meditations (Ta els eavrov) of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius
Antoninus; 10 a from the Against the Heathen (Adversus
Notes
Gentes) of Arnobius, an African Latin writer (circ. A.D. 300) ;
36 from Antonius Melissa ( The Bee ), a Greek monk of
uncertain date. The reference to Musonius Rufus in the
headings of 4-8 is not clear ; the natural meaning would be
that they are sayings of Rufus, incorporated by Epictetus
in his discourses on Friendship.
1. Schenkl prints this as a question, but that does not
suit the context.
2. 6 Ko<rfiof, the ordered universe, which is sometimes
identified with its Creator, God.
3. Memorabilia, dTro^vrjfj.ovevfjinTa. We hear of this work
only from these headings in Stobaeus. Like the Memora
bilia of Socrates by Xenophon it was probably a record
of the philosopher s sayings, distinct from those compiled
by Arrian.
4. Attributed by Stobaeus to Agrippinus, but by Gaisford
to Epictetus ; cf. Discourses, i. 18. Schenkl is doubtful.
5. The end of the fragment implies that Epictetus has
spoken both of the young man who is loth to die and of the
old man who wishes to die and be at rest, but afterwards
changes his mind.
6. with qualification : that is, must be subject to cir
cumstances.
7. Cf. Introd., p. 32.
NOTES ON THE MANUAL
The word cyxfipidiov is an adjective, meaning in
the hand or ready to hand . With frftXiov (book) it
means a handy book or hand-book, with i<f>os (sword)
a handy sword, or dagger. Epictetus in the Discourses often
speaks of the principles which his disciples should have ready
to their hand (7rpoxpa) 5 a nd it: was natural that Arrian,
after putting together his notes of his master s discourses,
2 tf 4 Epictetus
should attempt to embody his teaching in more compendious
form in this Manual. So far as we know it is Arrian s selection.
1. ov Set /jifT picas KKivrjfj.i ov, KT\.
2. See Introd., p. 32. Here, as in the Manual generally,
it is the beginner who is chiefly addressed.
3. eo-eotfe*/, within . Your inner being is to remain
serene both in your own trouble and in that of your friend.
See note 3 on i. 18.
4. TO. Kadrjyovp.fi/aj what comes first , used here and in
iii. 15, of which this chapter is largely a repetition.
5. risk getting hacked , Trapopvao-fofiai. Cf. iii. 15, note 2.
6. Ta KaOrjKOvra. Cf. note 2 on i. 7.
7. Aelian, Far. Hist., tells how three men sent to Delphi
had an encounter with robbers. One ran away, another
accidentally killed the third in trying to defend him. The
Oracle would have nothing to say to the runaway, and absolved
the homicide.
8. tdtom/cd?, i. e. of the tSicoT^r, the man who has no know
ledge or understanding of philosophy.
9. Kvpia, mistress or lady .
10. (TvprTTi\typtvoV) a composite judgement in which the
parts are connected by /cat. Zeller, Stoics, pp. 107, 108.
11. KaraXrjTrTiKai (pavraaiai. See Introd., p. 28, and note
on iii. 8.
12. Cf. note 2 on iii. 12.
13. See Introd., p. 32.
LIST OF THE CHIEF PASSAGES FROM
OTHER AUTHORS QUOTED OR RE
FERRED TO IN THE TEXT
The numbers refer to volume, page, and line.
I. 56. 17. Plato, Crito 43 D.
73. 16-23. Plato, Apology 290, 28 E.
83. 3. Homer, Iliad x. 279.
115. 10. Author unknown.
12. Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 1391.
123. 7. Plato, Apology 38 A.
127. 9. Euripides, Medea 1078.
133. 14, 15. Plato, Apology 30 c ; Crito 43 D.
139. 24. Plato, Phaedo n6D.
144. 6. Author unknown.
12. Plato, Phaedo 77 E.
148. 24. Xenophon, Apologia Socratis 2, 3.
156. 5. Plato, Apology 27 c.
167. 27. Homer, Iliad i. 526.
170. i. General Stoic doctrine : cf. Diogenes Laertius
vii. 10 1.
179.19. Plato, Gorgias 474 A.
1 8 1. 4. Hesiod, Theogony 82.
184. 26. Homer, Iliad xiii. 281.
198. 1 8. Euripides, Phoenissae 368.
208. 29. Plato, Laws 8543.
210. 13. Hesiod, Works and Days 413.
212. 25. Homer, Odyssey ix. 39.
227. 30. Euripides, Alcestis 691.
228. 13. Euripides, Phoenissae 621.
266 Epictetus
238. 13. Cleanthes.
242. 28. Homer, Iliad ii. 25.
II. 6. 13. Plato, Apology 29 c.
9. 21. Homer, Odyssey i. 37.
12. 6. Plato, Alcibiades i. 1310.
23. 9. Musonius Rufus.
34. 14. Pythagoras.
37. 20. Homer, Odyssey xiv. 56.
64. 19. Homer, Iliad x. 15, 91, 94, 95.
71. 6. Homer, Iliad ii. 25.
72. 19. Homer, Iliad xxii. 69.
74. 7, 9. Homer, 7/zW ii. 24, 25.
76. 21. Homer, Iliad vi. 492.
81. 20. Plato, Apology 170.
86. 3. Homer, Odyssey i. 3.
7. Homer, Odyssey xvii. 487.
108. 22. Plato, Apology 41 D.
109. 15. Homer, Odyssey vi. 130.
113. 15. Menander s Hated .
133. 3 and 150. 14. Cleanthes.
139. 5. Plato, Crito 54 A.
158. 1 8. Author unknown.
164. 12. Pythagoras.
178. 6. Homer, Odyssey xi. 529.
187. 2. Homer, Iliad xxiv. 5.
21. Homer, Iliad xix. 321.
191. 2. Aristophanes, Clouds 103.
238. 1-4. Cleanthes.
5. Euripides.
6. Plato, Cn to 43 D.
7. Plato, Apology 30 c.
INDEX OF NAMES
The numbers are those of Books and Chapters.
ACADEMIA (IV. 4), a gymnasium in the north-west of Athens,
where Plato taught. The Academics (I. 27, II. 20)
combated by Epictetus are those of the Middle and New
Academy (third century B. c.). They maintained that no
certainty is to be found. They are therefore coupled
with the Sceptics, who followed Pyrrho.
ACHILLES (I. n, 22, 28 ; II. 23 ; III. 23), son of Peleus, hero
of the Iliad.
ADMETUS FATHER (II. 22, III. 20), a typical instance of
desire for long life, familiar from the Alcestis of Euripides.
ADONIS, garden of (IV. 8), plants grown in a pot for the
festival of Adonis : used of transitory things.
AGRIPPINUS, PACONIUS (I. i, I. 2), a famous Stoic, for
two years proconsul of Crete under Claudius. Cf. Tac.
Ann. xvi. 28.
ALCIBIADES (III. i), the Athenian statesman, pupil and
friend of Socrates.
ALEXANDER THE GREAT (II. 22) the passionate lover of
Hephaestion ; (II. 13) contrasted with Diogenes 5 (III. 24)
a type of absolute rule.
AMPHIARAUS (II. 22), legendary king of Argos, persuaded by
his wife Eriphyle, who had been bribed with a necklace by
Polynices, to take part in the expedition against Thebes,
though he foresaw that it meant his death.
ANTIGONUS GONATAS (II. 13), King of Macedonia (lived about
320-240 B. c.) and friend and admirer of Zeno, the founder
of the Stoic School. (See Tarn, Antigonus Gonatas, pp. 3 1-5.)
ANTILOCHUS (IV. 10), legendary son of Nestor, mentioned as
a friend of Achilles.
268 Epictetus
ANTIPATER (II. 17, III. 2), of Tarsus, a Stoic, who taught
Panaetius, the friend of the Scipios (circ. 140 B. c.).
ANTISTHENES (I. 17, II. 17, III. 22), founder of the Cynic
School (about 426-356 B. c.).
ANYTUS and MELETUS (II. 2, III. 23), two of the accusers of
Socrates in the trial which ended in his condemnation and
death 399 B. c.
APOLLONIUS (III. 12), Pythagorean philosopher of Tyana in
Cappadocia (see Philostratus Life of Apollonius, translated
by J. S. Phillimore, Oxford Translations).
APRULLA (IV. i. 146), apparently the name of a rich woman,
to whom some legacy-hunter is enslaved.
ARCHEDEMUS (II. 4, 17 ; III. 2, 21), a Stoic of Tarsus, coupled
with Antipater by Cicero and Epictetus.
ARCHIDAMUS III (IV. i), king of Sparta, 361-338 B.C.
ARGUS (III. 22), the legendary hundred-eyed guardian of lo.
ARICIA (I. i), a country town on the Appian road, about
20 miles south of Rome, on the skirts of the Alban hills.
ARISTIDES (IV. 9), of Miletus, supposed author of licentious
Milesian tales of the Alexandrian period.
ASCLEPIUS (= Aesculapius) (II. 22, IV. 8), the god of healing.
According to one account Alexander, on the death of
Hephaestion, ordered the shrine of Asclepius at Ecbatana
to be destroyed. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 14.
ATHENS (I. 25, II. 16, III. 24, IV. 4), mentioned as the city
a philosopher would wish to live in.
AUTOMEDON (IV. 10), charioteer of Achilles.
BATO (I. 2), probably the name of a famous trainer, who lived
into the reign of Marcus Aurelius.
CALLICLES (IV. 5), a character in Plato s Gorgias, who advo
cates the free life of uncontrolled passions.
CASSIOPE (III. 7), a port in Epirus.
CASSIUS (IV. 3), C. Cassius Longinus, a great jurist in the
first century A.D., the founder of a legal school.
Index of Names 269
CHAERONEA (III. 22), the site of a great battle in Boeotia
in which the combined Athenian and Theban forces were
defeated by Philip of Macedon in 338 B. c.
CHRYSANTAS (II. 6), a Persian, who, when about to strike his
enemy, obeyed Cyrus who suddenly ordered the retreat.
CHRYSIPPUS (I. 4, &c.), the great Stoic teacher (280-207 B. c.).
See Introd., p. 16.
CLEANTHES (I. 17), a famous Stoic (about 300-220 B. c.) whose
hymn to Zeus is still extant.
CNOSSUS (III. 9), the chief town of Crete, with a Roman
colony.
CRATES (III. 22), a Theban pupil of Diogenes the Cynic
(flor. 320 B. c.).
CRINIS (III. 2), a Stoic philosopher, who wrote on Dialectic.
CROESUS (I. 2, III. 22), king of Lydia, the typical rich
man.
CYNIC, the (III. 22), the ideal teacher.
DEMETER (II. 20), mentioned with KORE ( = Persephone) and
PLUTO, as giver of corn to men.
DEMETRIUS (I. 25), a distinguished Cynic teacher, often
referred to by Seneca, his contemporary. Tacitus names
him as one of those whose discourses Thrasea had attended,
Ann. xvi. 34.
DEMOSTHENES (II. 23), the greatest Athenian orator of the
fourth century B. c.
DIODORUS (II. 19), a philosopher at Alexandria under Ptolemy
Soter, famous for his skill in dialectic.
DIOGENES (of Babylon) (II. 19), a pupil of Chrysippus and
successor of Zeno as head of the Stoic school : sent on an
embassy from Athens to Rome in 155 B. c.
DIOGENES the Cynic (I. 24, &c.) (about 412-323 B.C.), to
Epictetus one of the great heroes of the world who have
left an example for all time.
DION CHRYSOSTOM (III. 23), of Prusa in Bithynia, a con-
270 Epictetus
temporary of Epictetus ; his orations are good specimens
of the discourses of the Greek teachers or sophists of that
day. (See Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus
Aurelius, bk. iii, chap. 2.)
DIRCE (II. 1 6), a famous clear-flowing river in Boeotia.
DOMITIAN (II. 7), the last of the Flavian Emperors (A. D. 81-
96), in whose reign Epictetus with other philosophers was
driven into exile.
ECBATANA (II. 1 6), the great capital of the Median kingdom ;
described by Herodotus, i. 98.
ELEUSIS (III. 21), north-west of Athens, the home of the
great Mysteries of Demeter and Persephone.
EPAMINONDAS (III. 22), the great general and statesman, who
raised Thebes to be the leading power in Greece (379-
366 B. c.).
EPAPHRODITUS (I. i, 19, 26), freedman and secretary of Nero
and master of Epictetus.
EPICURUS (I. 20, 23, &c.), the philosopher (342-270 B.C.),
whose doctrine Epictetus combated as illogical and demoral
izing. For the influence of the Epicurean doctrine in
Rome see R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean.
EPIRUS (III. 4), to the north-west of Greece : under the early
Empire part of the province of Achaea ; but Epictetus
mentions a Procurator of Epirus , which implies a separate
government.
ETEOCLES and POLYNICES (II. 22, &c.), the two legendary sons
of Oedipus, whose quarrel over the government of Thebes
led to the expedition of The Seven against Thebes .
EUPHRATES (III. 15), an eloquent Stoic contemporary of
Epictetus. See Dill, Roman Society, iii. 2.
EURIPIDES (I. 28; II. 16, 17, 22; IV. 5), the tragic poet,
480-406 B. C.
EURYSTHEUS (III. 22), legendary king of Tiryns, in whose
service Heracles accomplished his labours.
Index of Names 271
EVENUS (IV. 9), of Paros, a writer of elegiac poems (about
460-390 B. c.).
FELICIO (I. 19, IV. i), name used for the type of an
influential slave.
FLORUS (I. 2), possibly L. Annaeus Florus, the author of an
Epitome of Roman history, who was probably a contem
porary of Epictetus.
GALBA (III. 15), Emperor for six months after Nero s fall
(A. D. 68-9).
GALILAEANS (IV. 7), a name for Christians.
GETAE (III. 22), used by Epictetus as a name for the Dacian
tribes on the Danube, with whom the Romans were at
war from Domitian to Trajan.
GETAS (IV. i), a character in Menander s play Hated .
GRATILLA (II. 7), a noble Roman lady, exiled by Domitian.
GYARA (II. 6, 16; III. 24), one of the smaller Cyclades, used
as a place of banishment under the Empire.
HELEN (I. 28 5 II. 19, 23), legendary wife of Menelaus, the
cause of the Trojan war.
HELLANICUS (II. 19), a Lesbian, one of the earliest Greek
historians (about 496-410 B.C.). Only fragments of his
works remain.
HELVIDIUS PRISCUS (I. 2, IV. i), son-in-law of Thrasea Paetus,
whose Stoic principles he shared : put to death by Vespasian.
HERACLES (I. 6, &c.), the hero, son of Zeus and Alcmena,
regarded by Epictetus with Socrates and Diogenes as one of
the great examples of devoted human service.
HERACLITUS (II. 2), a friend of Epictetus.
HERACLITUS (II. 5), the great philosopher of Ephesus (fifth
century B.C.). See Burnet, Greek Philosophy (Thales to
Plato), chap. 3.
HERMES (III. i, 20), the messenger of the gods.
HIPPIAS (III. 5) , of Elis, one of the most famous of the sophists,
contemporary with Socrates.
272 Epictetus
HIPPOCRATES (I. 8, II. 17), of Cos, the great physician (about
460-360 B. c.).
ISOCRATES (III. 23), one of the ten Greek orators, a contem
porary of Demosthenes, and master of a fluent and finished
style.
ITALICUS (III. 8), unknown.
LAIUS (III. i), the father of Oedipus in the Theban legend ;
he consulted the oracle of Delphi, who warned him that he
would kill his son if he begat one.
LATERANUS, PLAUTIUS (I. i), executed by Nero for com
plicity in the conspiracy of Piso, A. D. 65.
LEON (IV. i), of Salamis, whom Socrates was ordered by the
Thirty Tyrants to arrest.
LYCEUM (IV. 4), a gymnasium north-east of Athens, a haunt
of Socrates.
LYCURGUS (II. 20), the Spartan lawgiver.
LYSIAS (111.23), an Attic orator of the fourth century B.C.,
famous for the charm of his plain style.
MANES (III. 26), used as a typical slave name, to avoid the
ambiguity of the word slave .
MASURIUS SABINUS (IV. 3), a Roman knight and jurisconsult
under Augustus and Tiberius.
MAXIMUS (III. 7), perhaps L. Appius Maximus Norbanus,
who suppressed the rebellion of Saturninus in A.D. 88, and
afterwards went with Trajan against the Parthians and
died in Parthia.
MEDEA (II. 17), wife, who took vengeance on- Jason, her
unfaithful husband, by killing their children.
MELETUS, see ANYTUS.
MENOECEUS (III. 20), son of Creon, who, according to Greek
legend, sacrified himself to save Thebes.
MILO (L 2), the typical strong man of antiquity (sixth
century B. c.).
MYRO (III. 22), given as the name of a gladiator.
Index of Names 273
NASO (II. 14), a hearer of Epictetus.
NERO (II. 1 6, &c.), Emperor A. D. 54-68.
NICOPOLIS (I. 19), a town in Epirus, founded by Augustus in
memory of the victory of Actium. There Epictetus lived
and taught.
ODYSSEUS (I. 12; II. 24; III. 24, 26), the hero of Homer s
Odyssey, mentioned for his belief in God s presence, his
eloquence, his travels, and his independence.
OEDIPUS (I. 4, 24), legendary king of Thebes, the type of
tragic suffering.
OPHELLIUS (III. 22), a gladiator.
PANTHOIDES (II. 19), a Stoic, who wrote on Logic (early third
century B.C.).
PARIS (I. 28, II. 19), second son of Priam, who carried off
Helen, and so caused the Trojan war.
PATROCLUS (I. 1 1), the legendary friend of Achilles.
PERRHAEBIANS (III. 24), a powerful tribe of northern Greece :
to go among them means to go into wild outlandish
regions.
PHIDIAS (I. 6, II. 19), the sculptor who adorned the Parthenon
at Athens (490-432 B.C.).
PHILOSTORGUS (III. 17), an example of a rich but degraded
man.
POLEMO (III. i, IV. 11), a young profligate converted to the
philosophic life by Xenocrates ; head of the Academy, circ.
314-273 B.C.
POLUS (IV. 5), a Sicilian sophist of the fifth century B. c. ;
a character in Plato s Gorgias.
POLYNICES (II. 22), son of Oedipus. See ETEOCLES.
PROTAGORAS (III. 5), of Abdera, one of the most distinguished
sophists of the fifth century B. c., who lived for many years
in Athens.
PYRRHONISTS (I. 27), followers of Pyrrho the Sceptic (fourth
century B. c.), who denied the possibility of knowledge.
646.24 II
274 Epictetus
PYTHAGORAS (IV. 6), of Samos, one of the earliest Greek
philosophers (flor. 540-510 B.C.). See Burnet, Greek
Philosophy (Thales to Plato), pp. 36-56.
QUADRATUS (III. 23). C. Ummidius Quadratus was governor
of Lusitania in A. D. 37 and of Syria circ. A.D. 50-60.
ROME, its attraction (I. 10), its dangers (I. 24, II. 12), exile
from (I. 25, II. 6), trial in (III. 9), physicians in (III. 23),
spies in (IV. 13).
RUFUS, C. MUSONIUS (I. i), an Etruscan knight who lectured
on Stoicism and was one of the teachers of Epictetus.
Cf. Tac. Hist. iii. 81, and C. Musonii Run Reliquiae, ed.
0. Hense (Teubner). Cf. vol. ii, p. 82.
SARDANAPALUS (III. 22), king of Nineveh, a typical tyrant.
SARPEDON (I. 27), a legendary Lycian prince, ally of the
Trojans. See Horn. //. xii. 310-28.
SATURNALIA (I. 25, 295 IV. i), festival of Saturn, December 17
and following days 5 one feature of it was that slaves were
waited on by their masters.
SOPHRON (III. 4), an actor.
STOICS (II. 19, III. 24), see Introduction.
SURA (III. 17), possibly the Palfurius Sura of Juv. iv. 53, an
orator said to have been expelled from the Senate by
Vespasian : afterwards an informer (delator] under Domitian ;
he was condemned on Domitian s death.
SUSA (II. 1 6), capital of Elam, a favourite residence of the
Persian kings. (0. T. Shushan the palace : modern
SHUSTER.)
THEOPOMPUS (II. 17), historian and rhetorician, circ. 380-305
B.C.
THERMOPYLAE (II. 20, III. 23), the pass between Thessaly
andLocris, defended against Xerxes by Leonidas and three
hundred Lacedaemonians in 480 B. c.
THERSITES (II. 23, IV. 2), the type of ugliness and insolence
in the Iliad.
Index of Names 275-
THESEUS (II. 16), the legendary hero of Attica, who
cleared the land of robbers, among them Sciron and
Procrustes.
THRASEA PAETUS (I. i), a senator and Stoic put to death in
A. D. 66 under Nero, the noblest and the wisest of the Stoic
opposition (Dill).
THRASONIDES (IV. i), a character in Menander s play
Hated .
THRASYMACHUS (IV. 5), the famous sophist of Chalcedon,
often mentioned by Plato.
TRAJAN (iv. 5), Emperor A. D. 98-117.
TRIPTOLEMUS (I. 4), the legendary founder of agriculture and
civilized life.
VESPASIAN (I. 2), Emperor A. D. 70-79.
XENOCRATES (IV. 1 1), of Chalcedon, a Platonist and for twenty-
five years head of the Academy (396-314 B. c.).
XENOPHON (I. 17, &c.), an Athenian, a pupil of Socrates, of
whose life and teaching he gave an account in his Memora
bilia (about 440-350 B. c.).
ZENO (I. 17, 205 II. 13; III. 21 ; IV. 8, 9 j Man. 33), of
Citium in Cyprus, the founder of Stoicism.
INDEX OF MATTERS
The numbers refer to volumes and pages. Where the
number of the volume is not given it is that of the preceding
reference.
Admiration, desire for, i. 108.
Adultery, i. 98, 152.
Affection, family, i. 76 foil. ;
limits of, ii. 96.
Anger, two kinds of, ii. 207.
Another = God, i. 118 (note),
ii. 15, 128.
Anxiety, i. 182 foil.
Appropriate acts (/ta^Kc^Ta),
ii. 27, 226. Introd. 33.
Assent, i. 126; ii. 40, 211.
Attachment to places, ii. 95,
150-.
Attention, ii. 193 foil.
Authority, i. 116, 132; ii.
170-1 ; of the Cynic, 75.
Babbling, ii. 198.
Bazaar, the, of life, i. 190.
Beauty, the fulfilment of
one s nature, ii. 3.
Body, a beast of burden, ii.
123 ; needs care, 190 5 body
and mind, i. 52; ii." 66,
211.
Books and life, i. 122, 205.
Caesar s court, i. 161 ; fortune,
ii. 112 ; friends, 1 16.
Character, to be true to one s,
i. 47.
Children, i. 135 ; ii. 43, 169.
Citadel, the inner and the
outer, ii. 125.
City, the great, ii. 61, 89;
the small, 157. Introd.
35-.
Cleanliness, inward and out
ward, ii. 1 88 foil.
Community, the, its claims
on all, i. 103.
Conceit (o lrjais), i. 201 ; ii. 45.
Confidence, based on skill,
i. 1 86; confidence and
caution, 142 foil.
Conflict, i. 109.
Consideration, need for, ii.
46 foil.
Constancy, i. 131 foil.
Contention, ii. 152 foil.
Contentment, i. 82 foil.
Conversation, ii. 229, 230.
Craftsman, the, in nature,
i-,59-
Crisis, the, shows the value
of study, i. 135 5 what it
demands, 140, 147.
Cynic, the, the ideal teacher,
ii. 60 foil., 177.
Death, i. 124, 144, 160, 1685
ii. 109, 184.
Departments of study (TOTTOI),
ii. 10.
Index of blatters
277
Destiny, i. 238; ii. 74, 133,
. 2 3 8 .
Difficulties try men, i. 113.
Diffidence, ii. 45.
Discontent, i. 85 ; ii. 202.
Discussion, its true nature,
i. 179.
Display to be shunned, ii.
45> 77-
Diviners, i. 162.
Doctrine and life, i. 170, 212,
214.
Door, the open, i. 73, 115,
118, 145; ii. 30.
Educated, the
>os), and the uneducated
(tfiicorr/r), i. 138.
Education (see also Teacher),
i. 48, 109, 204.
Enfranchisement not free
dom, ii. 115.
Equality of character, ii. 198.
Error, i. 98, 244 ; ii. 196.
Evil means loss, i. 173.
Examples, great (Socrates
and others), i. 209 ; ii. 93,
109, 136-8.
Expression and eloquence, i.
232 foil.
Facing both ways, ii. 141.
Faculties maintained by exer
cise, i. 169.
Fear, i. 116, 183 ; ii. 165.
Festival, life a, ii. 128.
Flattery, ii. 93.
Flesh, the, ii. 24 foil.
Forlorn, ii. 40 foil.
Freedom, i. 83; ii. 94, in,
118, 130, 164, 168.
Friendship, i. 226 foil. ;
limits of, ii. 69.
Game, how to play the, i.
154-5-
Games (public), i. 61 ; ii. 46,
92, 229.
Genius, man s guardian, i. 89.
Given, what is, i. 46.
Gladiators, i. 136.
God, the Father of men, {.52,
7> 73) 8 75 beholds all,
88 5 worthy of praise, 93.
God s will, ii. 127, 147, 184.
Good, conception of, i. 2025
nature of, i. 164; ii. 66;
from outward things, 54 5
in the region of the will,
i. in, 131 ; ii. 14.
Governing Principle (//ye^o-
1 iKov), i. 106, 122, 147; ii.
9> 22 > 3 2 > 35? I 5 I -
Greatness, i. 129.
Growth, gradual and unseen,
i. 91 ; ii. 178.
Habit, to be conquered by
habit, i. 123; confirmed by
exercise, 206 ; ii. 103.
Happiness, ii. 102.
Helmsman, the, ii. 216.
Hymn to God, i. 93.
Impressions ((^ni/Tno-uu), i.
44, 123, 127; apprehensive
impressions, i. 28 ; ii. 14,
29, 146. Introd. 28.
Indifferent things, i. 140,
158 foil., 213.
Introductions, i. 199, 206.
Inward and outward, i. 149.
2 7 8
Epictetus
Judgements (fioy/xara), im
portance of, i. 80 foil, 97,
102, 197; ii. 13, 34, 78,
134, 155 ^foll., 215 5 stub
bornness in, i. 191.
Law of life, the, i. 120 foil.
Lecture-room, the, i. 224 ; ii.
19, 56, 100, 134.
Letters of introduction, i.
73-4, IS 1 -
Liar , the, argument, i. 205,
208, 225.
Life, a spectacle, i. 61 5 a
soldier s service, ii. 88 5 a
festival, 128 ; a prepara
tion, i. 148 5 a banquet, ii.
2185 a play, 219; a bazaar,
i. 190.
Listening requires skill,i.24O.
Logical studies, value of, i.
64 foil., 94 foil. ; for whom
suited, ii. n.
Loss and gain, ii. 108.
Lower animals, lessons from,
Man, takes cognizance of him
self, i. 60 ; a portion of
God s being, 89,1655 part of
a larger whole, ii. 157, 166;
not a beast or a sheep, 171.
Manumission, i. 145.
Marriage, ii. 70; in Plato s
Republic, Fr. 15.
Master , the, argument, i.
210.
Masters, i. 139, 185.
Mastery, ii. 130.
Material things, wrongly
valued, i. 99, 154.
Messenger, the, within, ii. 70.
Moral judgements need train
ing, i. 122.
Mysteries, ii. 58, 128.
Names suggest conduct, i.
171.
Natural, i. 157.
Nature, harmony with, i. 61 ;
to understand, 95 ; God s
will, 45 5 the will of Nature,
Obedience, limits of, i. 117;
obedience to God, ii. 98,
100.
Obstinacy, a sign of weakness,
i. 193.
Office wrongly valued, i. 104.
Officials, Roman, ii. 17, 23 5
local, 8.
Official career, ii. 185.
One s own and not one s own,
i. 99, 129; ii. 84, 124, 143,
213.
Oracles, ii. 228.
Outside, the, no test, ii. 173.
Pancration, ii. 4
Passion, i. 208 ; tyranny of,
ii. 112.
Patron of Cnossus, ii. 30.
Peace of mind, i. 114 (Dio
genes), 120 (Socrates), 145.;
ii. 42, 116, 145.
Pentathlon, ii. 4, 77.
Philosopher, the, depends on
himself, i. 71 ; may learn
from worldlings, 75 ; must
assert man s freedom, 97 ;
trains men, 123 ; profes
sion of, 1 68 ; differs from
the layman, 138 ; ii. 53 ;
Index of Matt en
279
how to be a, 220 ; a hard
task, 225 ; should act on
his principles, 234 ; sham
philosophers, 175.
Philosophy, what it professes,
i. 90 ; beginning of, 175;
a slow process, 187 ; needs
care, ii. 47 ; philosophy
and principles, 106.
Piety, ii. 226.
Pity, ii. 158.
Pleasure, ii. 208.
Power, responsibility and, i.
86: things in our, ii. 213.
Practice, value of, i. 101, 194.
Primary conceptions, i. 108
foil. 5 how to apply, 201.
Progress, i. 53 foil., 174; ii.
22, 2I7-I8, 235.
Providence, i. 59> 92-3 ; n.
50.
Purple, the purple thread, 5.
49 5 7-
Rank, ii. 45.
Reading no substitute for
character, i. 55.
Reason, i. 43 ; man s good ,
86 ; takes cognizance of
itself, 105.
Relations (rrxeVa?), ii. !$
Rhetorical arguments, their
danger, i. 68 foil. ; their
value secondary, 70.
School, life a, i. 62. _
Self-advancement, i. 74 foil.
Self-control, i. 87.
Self-respect, ii. 180-1, 222.
Self-sufficiency, ii. 41.
Shows and spectacles, i. 48.
Signal, the, to retire, ii. 42,
99, 108.
Simple life, ii. 107, 234.
Slavery, ii. 112, 135.
Sorrow, ii. 87, 135.
Social life, rules for,ii. 229foll.
Society, influence of, ii. 48.
Standards, i. 48 ; necessary,
78 ; and freedom, 84 ; in
conduct, 130; found by
philosophy, 177; of Na
ture, 219.
Strength of mind, false, i. 58.
Student, the, ii. 35.
Study, necessity of, i. 82,
107; ii. 32, 107; _ true
and false, i. 121 ; its limits,
125 ; relation of study to
life, 196; ii. 35, 57, 146,
236.
Suicide, warning against
hasty, i. 72; allowed (the
open door), 115 ; (God s
signal), ii. 99.
Sun and stars, i. 198.
Superiority, ii. 45, 233.
Sympathy, ii. 219.
Teacher and pupil, deadness
of, i. 73 ; influence each
other, 76, 216, 241 ; the
true spirit of the teacher,
223 5 his duty, ii. 5 ; his
attraction, 81 ; a bene
factor, i. 57 ; must be
trained, ii. 57; the Ideal
Teacher, ii. 60.
Theatre, excitement in, ii. 17.
Things (rr/Ki-ypira), tyranny
of, ii. 119.
Tragedy, due to false values,
i. 56, 130.
280
Epictetus
Training, i. 47 5 ii.38foll., 209.
Traveller, the, in life, ii.
126.
Troubles, their origin, i.
124. ^
Truth, ii. 212.
Tyrants, have limited power,
i. 100 foil., 131 ; tragic
figures, 115; within us, ii.
125.
Uneducated, the, ii. 53.
Unhappiness, men s fault, ii.
84.
Universe, the, composition of,
ii. 201 ; Conflagration of,
ii. 41; all things obey, 202,
the process of, 203 ; full of
friends, 85.
Values, true, ii. 140, 142, 162.
Wand, the, of Hermes, ii. 55.
War, origin of, i. 229.
Will, training of the, i. 47;
ii. 30, 127; not to be sold
cheap, i. 51.
Witness to God, i. 137 ; il.
101.
World, the tumult of the, ii.
148-9.
Zeus sees all, ii. 37.
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