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ffKE  DBRARY 

SRiGHAM  YOUNG  UNIVEftSTT^ 

PROVO.  UTAH 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2011  with  funding  from 
Brigham  Young  University 


http://www.archive.org/details/epitomeofjainismOOnaha 


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AN 


EPITOME  OF  JAINIS 


THE    LTBRART 

BRIGHAM  Y^  UNG  UNIVERSITY 

PROV.O,  UTAH 


Table  of  Contents. 

PREFACE. 

PAGES. 

INTRODUCTION.  1-14 

CHAPTER  I. 
Jainism— Us  Philosophy  and  Religfion. 

Consideration  of  the  term  Philosophy^ — 
As  they  understand  it  in  the  West — Aristotle 
Spencer  and  Hegel — Philosophy  as  dthned 
and  taught  by  the  Jinas  or  the  Victors — 
Right  Knowledge,  Right  Vision  and  Right 
Conduct  —  The  Triune  of  Jainism — Some 
Rudimentary        Ideas      and       Metaphysical 

Notions. 

75— /p. 
CHAPTER  n. 
Prediijaments  by  Pre-eminence. 
Fundamental     Notions — Categories     or 
Predicaments      by         pre-eminence — Their 
Necessity  and  Origin — How   determined — 
Advantages  of  such  determination — Dravya,  • 
Guna,      Paryaya    and      Karma— Papa    and 
Punya—Clasisification     and     dercription     in 
general       of      the        Predicaments — Their 
enumeration. 


CHAPTER  III. 
Knowledge  and  Its  forms. 

The  Correlativity  of  Jiva  and  Ajiva — 
Polarity  of  knowledge — Self  and  the  Not- 
self — Consciousness  and  its  Origin — Know- 
ledge and  its  Growth — Definitions  of  Right 
Vision  and  Right  Knowledge — Different 
forms  of  Knowledoe  and  the  Possibility  of 
the  Kevala  Jnana — Kevalin  is  the  Ideal- 
Real — Pure  Intuitions — the  true  Characteris- 
tics of  Real  Pratyaksha. 

33—39- 
CHAPTER  IV.  ^ 

Epistemologry  and  Logric. 

Further  consideration  of  the  Processes  of 
Knowledge — Judgment  and  its  Three  Ele- 
ments— Rules  and  canons  which  a  Judg- 
ment should  obey — Insufficiency  of  the 
Perceptual  Source  of  Knowledge-— Hence 
other  sources  ot  Knowledge. 

CHAPTER  V. 
Pratyaksha  is  really  Paroksha. 

The  Jain  dissension  with  reference  to 
Pratyaksha  Pram^n — Direct  Perception  is 
really  Indirect-— Analysis  of  the  Psychologi- 
cal Processes  of  Cognition— The   Different 


(  "»  ) 

Stacres — From  Sense  to    Thought-  -Proof  of  * 
the  Truth  and   Validity  of  the    Jain  point  of 
view — The    sensuous    'Pratyaksha'    is  really 
'Paroksha'. 

CHAPTER  VI. 
The  Jain  Theory  of  Formal  Logic. 

Meeting  the  Charvakas  on  their  own 
grounds — Refutation  Oi  their  hypothesis  and 
Demonstration  of  the  legitimacy  of  Infer- 
ential knowledge — The  Jain  Theory  of  Formal 
Logic  and  the  definitions  of  Pratyaksha 
—  "Paroksha"  includes  Inference  aud  Testi- 
mony— Definition  of  Inference  and  Forms 
of  Syllogisms — festimony  or  the  Word — 
Definition  of  Pramin  or  Valid  knowledofe 
—The  World  of  Reals  and  not  of  Phantoms 
as  hold  the  Buddhists. 

CHAPTER  VII. 
The  Jain  Logic  and  the  **Nayas  . 

Other  lines  of  Logical  or  Ontological 
Inquiry — Analysis  and  Synthesis — The 
Nayas  and  the  Saptabhangi — The  two 
kinds  of  Naya— (i)  the  Noumenal  and  (ii) 
the  Phenomenal— -Consideration  of  the  Ten 


(  ^  ) 

'  Sub-divisions  of  the  Noumenal  Naya  or  the 
Analytic  Method  of  Inquiry  into  the 
Ontology  of  Thought  and  Form. 

78^103, 

CHAPTER  VJII. 
The  Doctrine  of  Syadbad. 

Defects  of  the  Realistic  method  of  Inquiry 
Saptabhangi  supersedes  the  Realistic — It  is 
a  better  Organon  of  Knowledge — It  leads 
to  the  higher  Knowledge — Antkmtavad  and 
Idealism — True  Glimpse  of  Concrete  Reality 
—  Unity  and  Multiplicity — Correlativity 
essential  to  Unity — Dialectical  Vision  as 
of  things  as  Expression  of  a  Unity. 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Shankar  and  Syadbad 

Vyasa  and  Shankar  against  the  Doctrine 
of  Syadbad — Impossibility  of  the  co-existence 
of  the  contradictory  attributes  in  one — 
Shankar's  summary  of  the  Syadbad  and  its 
interpretation— Its  critical  examination  by 
Shankar — Inconsistencies  and  fallacies  in 
Syadbad. 

136^144 


{       V      ) 

CHAPTER  X. 
Examination  of  Shankar. 

Examination  of  Shankar's  animadversion 
and  his  po-ition — Farther  discussion  of  the 
Principle  of  Syadvad  and  the  Law  of 
Contradiction — Thought  is  not  simply,  a 
distinction — It  is  a  relation  as  well — Reply 
to  Shankar  point  by  point. 

CHAPTER  XI. 
The  Doctrine  of  Unity  in  Difference. 

The  dialectic  reasoning  leads  to  the 
Theory  of  Bhedabhed  i.e.  of  Unity  in  differ- 
ence— Distinction  presupposes  Unity— The 
world  system  is  an  expression  of  thought 
— The  Jain  conception  of  the  Absolute 
distinguished  from  the  Absolute  beyond  the 
relative  of  the  Ved^ntins. 

CHAPTER  XII. 
The  Univei  se  as  a  Self-Existent  Unit 

'.  The    Self     and    the     Not  self     are    but 

members    of  a  complex    Whole — DifiSculties 

in    the    transformation    of   the  Subject  into 

Object  and   vice-versa  Object    into    Subject 

— Each   pre-supposing   the   other,  we    have 

to  take  the    Universe   in  the  light  of  single 

unified  System. 


(     vz     ) 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Theories  of  Evolution. 

Theories  of   Evolution  and  Creation    by 

External   Agency — Spencerian    Formulation 

of  the  Principle  of  Evolution — Difficulties  in 

in  Spencerian  hypothesis. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
The  Sankhya  Philosophy. 

Sankhya  principles  of  Evolution — 
Traceable  in  the  'Ri^-veda'— -'Purush'  and 
Prakriti — The  Three  'Gunas'  in  their  Equili- 
brium form  'Prakriti  or  the  Root- Evolvent 
— Prakriti  is  the  first  Category — The  Three 
other  Categories — Inconsistency  of  the 
Sankhya  Hypothesis. 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Causation  and  Compound  Evolution. 

The  world  is  the  permutation  and 
combination  of  atoms—  Causes  ol  differences 
—Science  fails  to  explain— The  principles 
of  causation— Criticism  of  Mill's  conception 
of  the  law  of  causation — Patient  and  Agent 
— The  Jain  view  of  Causation  and  compound 
evolution. 


(   vii  ) 

CHAPTEB  XVI. 
God. 
Jainism  makes  no  room  for  an  extra- 
mundane  God. — Laplace  and  Nepolean — 
The  Idea  is  not  singular  in  India — Yet  the 
Jains  are  not  dependant  on  any  All-mighty 
Ruler  standing  in  the  without — Dr.  Bose 
and  the  Super-physical  Power — Spencer 
and  Sv)inoza — ''Tertium  Qiiid^-nature  of  the 
Power — The  Coalescence  these  [cowers  in 
different  beings  on  the  attainment  of 
"Nirv^n"  is  the  idea  of  the  God-head  of  the 
Jains. 

CHAPTHIE  X7IL 
Soul. 
Souls   and    the    God-head   -Materialistic 

conception  of  Soul — A  bye-product  of  matter 
— Eastern  and  Western  m.tierialism  com- 
pared— Ch^rvak  and  Haekel  and  Girardian, 
the  Socialist — Cosmologit:al  and  Moral 
difficulties  involved  In  Materiah'sm — 
Admissions  by  Huxley,  Spencer  and  Darwin 
— The  Jain  conception  of  Spirit  and  Matter 
— Their  Correlativity  ™Prade  .has — Parts  or 
Soul-Units — Conscious  <^ffuIiJience  form  the 
spiritual  essence  of  the  S')U'---.S  nil's  constitu 
tional  ireedoni — Its  'I-,  ii.sm;)/ -  :;on  iiir«.)ugh 
the  grades  of  Sansar  a;id  Ea)  .:.  ::patiun. 

B 


(     viti    ) 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 
The  Karmi  Phenoriienol'  gT- 
Constitutional  Freedom  '^^^'\  Divii?ity  of 
the  Soul — 'Karma'  '.\\\d  Soul--! low  could 
Soul  get  enfettered  in  the  Chaii^s  >f  'Karma* 
— Different  Theories  as  to  h*  Rc-lation 
between  Soul  and  *Karm  l'  —  La  y  )f  'Karma' 
and  Re  birth — The  Basis  v)f  rj  r  J  ■  i  Et'iics— 
Heredity  can  not  ex[>lain  d;f'e=-e  c-'S  '^^::iweea 
Organisms — Hir-   lity  ■\\\\  'a  nrn:   *. 

Cr^AP  ':iR  XIX 
Chiuchianity  and  the  Law  of  Xarma. 
Ciirisiian  Criricisni  of  'Kann a.' — 'Empty 
Heart  of  J ainism' — Examinarion  of  the  Criti- 
ci'^m  -Inconsistencies  and  Diffijulties  of  the 
C  )rl^.I  "1  Theology — God  and  Satan — Good 
'A\v\  i*'  'il  —The  Indian  WIdov/s  mi  Christian 

CETAPTER  XX. 
Belief  in  Re-bict.h 
'  "Karma*  and  Re-birtl»s — C  Hiiplimentary 
aspects  of  one  and  the  Same  Law  govern- 
in^  tiv?-.  Universe — Buddhistic  r-J-iiilism — -aH 
M'irhont  an  Ei.^o — Belief  in  ihe  La\/  briiigs  in 
Solar.e  .tnd  Comfort  in  ones  Tidures — Wide 
j-y^i^or    of  the   belief  in    Asia   at;d    Europe— 


^r 


(  «*  ) 

Poets,  Scientists  and  Philosophers — Trans- 
migration lia^  its  root  in  reality— !\irma 
Sarira. 

OHAPTBE  XXI. 
B-^birth  and  Karma-Sarira 
Prof.     HL^xley    and     Re-birth — Huxley's 
'Character'  iud  our  Karma-matter — Character 
—Inner    N  i»are  —  Lino-a-deha  of  the    Mindii 
Philosophers  —The  Five  Koshas  or  the  Coa- 
centric  Circle/. — Prclnas  of  the  Hindus   i  •  l^'f 
the     Jain      Philosophers — Transmissio.:      (^( 
Character  '"h:ough    Heredity    Vs.    Truisinl 
"[ration  of  iv  .nna-S  irira  th'>n';:>!i  R 

CHA?TFR  XX  I 
Karma-Sarira  and  Oiidai  ika-Sarira. 
Rfclatiohs    be{'V(?t:^n   ihc   'K.irma'  and   the 
'Oudarik  i'  — Staov-s    of   drivelopment— 'Kar- 
mau*    produces    the     'Oad  irika'^ — *Ouda''ika 
produces    'Karma'  —  Not    Identical    but    two 
distinct  Eiui.ies — Co  existence    Inexplicable 
— Then    n  )    Inter-action    possible— Relation 
of    C  >iico '11    iiu     Variation—- Difficulties    of 
Parallelism  —  The    ^Carman'    body   and   the 
•Oudarika'  st  inAto  each  other  in  Relation  of 
Intermutation. 


(  ^  ) 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 
Free-Will  and  Fatalism. 

The  probleto  discussed  ;  *Is  *Jiva'  a  free 
centre  of  Origination'  ? — Belief  in  the  latter 
makes  Moral  Judgment  Inexplicable — 
Ethics  lose  its  Injunctive  Character — Leaves 
no  room  for  Merit,  Reward  and  Virtue — 
Examination  of  the  Demerits' — Arguments  in 

the  Light  of  European  Ethics. 

347—35^' 
OHAFTER  XXIV. 
Will  and  Individuality. 
'Karma-Sarira'     and    the    Nature    of   its 
Migration — Water-Globule     and      'Karma'- 
Globule — The  Veget  >ble  Seeds  and  'Karma- 
Sarira'  in  Relation  to  Nature  —  Selection  and 
its  Character — liuman   Evolution  is  Essen- 
tially Teleological — Humanity  always  Keeps 
a  Goal  before  itself. 

359—3^3- 
CHAPTER  XXV. 
Causality  in  the  Moral  World. 
What  does  'Responsibility'  Imply  .-^ — Re- 
ward or    Pan!  ihirsent  Unavoidable — I^aw   of 
*Karma'-Caus;ility       Inviolable — Prayer     or 
Worship  has  no  Efficacy — No  Need  of  Extra 
Mundane  Moral  Providence — Law  of 'Karma 
Is  a  more  Rational  Explanation— An  Act  of 


(  «  ) 

Vice  IS  not  equal  to  Incurring    a  Debt — The 

Theory     *Karina'-Pudgal — The     Distinction 

between  Right  and  Wrong  is  not  an  Absolute 

Distinction. 

364  390 
CHAPTER  XXVI. 

Class?flieation  of  Karmas. 

*Karma'- Definition. — Nature  and  Charac- 
ter of  'Karma' — 'Karma'  or  Action-Currents 
— Two  main  Divisions  of  Action-Currents — 
Currents  o^  Injury  and  of  Non-Injury — Dr. 
Bose  and  the  'Action -Currents' — Sub- Divi- 
sions of  Action-Currents  of  Injury  to  Vision, 
Knowledge,  Mohaniya  and  Antaraya — De- 
trimental to  Psychical  unfoldment — Currents 
of  Non-Injury — Aus,  N^m.  Gotra  and  Veda- 
niya — Determinative  of  the  Organic  Forma- 
tions. 

CHAPTER  XXVIl. 
From  Metaphysics  to  Ethies 
How  does  the  Theory  determine  the 
Practice  ? — The  Jafn  Ethical  Speculation — 
How  it  is  determined  and  based  on  their 
Metaphysical  Conclusion — A  Contrast  be- 
tween Buddhistic  and  Jain  Morality 
-'—The  Jain  Conception  of  the  Summum 
Bonura. 

*^4^ 


(  ^'ii  ) 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
The  Conceptions  of  Virtue  and  Vice. 

"Virtue  and  Vice — DIstincilve  Principle 
between  them  —  Hunum  c  ndiict  is  essentially 
Telcol  )^i:Ml — Moksha  is  li^e  ili^'hesl  End 
of  life  ;nul  activitv — Contrast  l^etwcen  the 
E  isreiii  iiiid  Western  conceptions  of  Vice  and 
Viruu^ — Virtne»  Vice  iuid    'Karma'  Causah'ty 

—  liie  Problem  of  evil. 

473-4^3' 
CRAPTH1R  XXTX. 
On  Punya  and  Its  Fr jitions. 
Punya  and  Pdpa  in  relation    to   'Ciiaritra' 

—  Analysis    of  Charitra    or  Conduct  -  Consi- 

derations    of  mor.il    activitv —Good    a'»d    tiie 

Law  of  duty — Fundamv.MUal  factors  of  Punya 

—Knowledge,  Faith    and    Will  —  Punyas    as 

forms    of  service — Sincerity    is  the  Soul    of 

Religiousity — ^Sincerityand  Punya — Psychical 

and  Physical  fruitions  for  the  performances 
of  Punya, 

CHAPTER  XXX. 
Papa,  Vice  or  Sin. 
Constituent  PLlements  of  Papa — 'Aiianda* 
*vis  the  Prime  Good — Philosophy  of  Passion — 
-The  doctrine  ol  fudoletifin — Eiorhteen  Kinds 
of  *P^pa* — Their  consequences. 


^s:^^-':. 


49^^^ 


(    xiii     ) 

OHAPTjSR  XXXI. 
Asrava  or  Influx. 

Influx' — Influx  and  Bandha — Their 
mutua!  Relation  of  Receprocity — Causes 
of  the  Influx  — 'Miihyriiva',  '^Avirate*, 
Trani'ida'  and  'Yoo^a' — Ii^.flux,  Subjective 
and  Objective — Forry-lvvo  Channels  of 
Influx  of  the  'Karmi'm.irier'  into  the  Soul. 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 
Bandha  or  Bondagfe. 

Bandha — lis  Classification— Possibilities 
of  Bnndha — Refutation  of  the  Theory  of 
Parallelism  and  Dualism — Bandha  is  without 
Beginning — Causes  of  Bandha— Mithy^tva 
or  Sul>repti()n  —  D -finition  of  Subreption- 
Forms  and  kiiids  of  Subreption — Possibilities 
of  S'ib  vip,t'.-i  — P  y^''^  ''  >^}  ^  ■  ^  Pinli)so[ihy 
of  SutrejHj'on, 

CHA  ^TSR.  XXXIII. 
Samvara  or  Stoppag'e. 
Samvara  classified  into  Physical  and  Psv- 
chical — With  Sam  vara  begins  th<-  })r,?v:'ic:d 
morality  — Svviraj,  ih  .'  uliim  ite  E  i  1  ~  F  fiv  . 
seven  kind  .  ofS mu-ara — Five  Sa-n:!"  Hir-- 
Guptis,    Ten    Rules    of  Asceticism— iwclv  c 


(    xiv     ) 

Bhftvanas,  Twenty-six  Parishahas  and  Five 
Chdritras, 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 
Nirjara  or  Dissipation. 
Nirjara — 'Its  Definition — Classification  of 
Nirjara  into  Sakam  i  and  Akama — Ihe  Mu- 
mukshin  strives  for  Sakama  Nirjara  to  ex- 
pediate  Liberation — Phases  and  Transforma- 
tions of  Karma — Means  and  Methods  of 
Sakclma  Nirjara — The  Primary  Condition  of 
Nirjara  is  Austerity — Austerity  burns  up  the 
Karma  seeds  and  sets  the  Jiva  Free— Forms 
of  Austerities  and  Dhy&nas  which  burn  up 
the  seeds  of  Karma  before  their  due  times. 

CHAPTER  XKX7. 
Mok.^ha  or  Emancipation. 
Moksha  or  Emancipation— Mokslia  is 
the  Highest  Good  —  Conct^ptions  of  the 
Highest  Good  according  to  the  Different 
Schools  of  Philosophy  — Moksha  is  eternal 
and  constitutional  with  tlie  Son! — It  cannot 
be  worked  out  by  Karma — For  Moksha  is 
not  the  Product  of  anything. 

604 — 6/Q. 


(      XV       ) 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 
Gunasthanas. 

The  Gunasthanas  or  the  Stepping-stones 

to  Higher    things — The     Fourteen     Stages 

squeezed    up    into    Four    only — The     First 

is  the    Life    of     Conscious    Selection — The 

Third  is  that  of  Conscience  and  Faith — And 

the    Fourth    is     that      of   Knowledge     and 

Delight  Infinite — Fourteen    Stages     leading 

to    Omniscience — Regulation      or       control 

does  not  mean  Stultification  as  complained  of 

620—646, 
CHAPTER  XXXVI 

Jain  Church. 

The  cycles  of  Avasarpini  and  Utsarpini 
— The  Yugalikas  and  the  Kalpa  Trees-^ 
We  get  glimpses  of  the  lives  of  the  First 
Twenty-two  Tirthankars — Regular  Histori- 
cal accounts  begins  with  Parshwanath,  the 
Twenty-third  Tirthankar  and  Mahavir,  the 
Twenty- fourth — Rupture  and  Split — the 
Principal    Subdivisions    of  the  Swet^mbaris 

and  Digambaris — The  list  of  Gachhas 

^^7 — 6/0. 
CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

Jain  Festivals. 

Of  the  Festivals,  Pajjusan  is  the  Great- 
est— Chaturmasya — The  Dewali — Jn^na 

Panchami— -Merh     Terash — Mouna      Eka- 
c 


(    xvi    ) 

daslii— Pons     Disami — Ciiaitri    Purnima  — 

Akshay-i     Tritiya — A^hiia     S  iU!a    Chatur- 

(.la^hi, 

071—6/7. 
CJ.^PTB.f^vXAVIiT. 

Jain  Pla  ces  of  ?il.-^  nm.  .£,  --i, 
Ka])  ar.ak    biiiimis    or    Phi«.:'  •    of    Pilgri- 
mages —     Shatrunjaya      ill  1    —  .^ivva^juri  — 
Pareshiiaih       i  (ills — Moujit       Ai)u~Cirnar 
Hills — Raj  ^ir —  Beaeras — A  jo '. .  .y  a —  Cham  - 

papur  &c. 

6/8—683, 

CHAPTBii  xxxi:-: 

Jain  Literature. 

Jain  Literature  forms  One  of   the  Oldest 

Literary  Records  in  the  World — The  Piirvas 

— The  Angas — The    Purvas  have    been  lost 

' — We  find  mention    of  their    Nanes  only — 

Sitldhintas     and    their     Ori'^^i  i   -The    Jain 

Scholiasts,  C  nnmentaiors  arid  A  ahors. 

6go—6g8. 
CHAPTER  XL. 

Jain  Art  and  Architeccure. 
Jain    Symbolism  Arts — and  Arclntecture 
—Stages    of   D:^velopm(tiit     cio  ig    its    own 
lines  —  Difference     between     tbr     Jain    and 

Bud(r[)i-.t    Arts — Jain    Paialin  ;.    -lis    Place 
in   the   Ancient:    Art    Gr'   •*;'     >;    India    and 

its  Liflucnce  over  the  Com.nun  i) . 

699^706 


appe^idices 


APPENDIX 

A.  Date  of  K\w  Chandra  Gupta  i. 

B.  Firmans  &  S  tdiuds. 

(a)   Akbai';  Jirman,    1592    A.    D.  vi. 

(h)  Jr^hanirir's     Do,      1608    A.  D.  xi. 

(c)  Shali.ijanair.s  Do,  1629  A.  D.  xiv. 

(d)  Mahaii)  idsbah's  Do,    1657  A.  D.  xvi. 

(e)  Prince  MiraJ's  Sanniid  1657  A.  D  xviii. 

(f)  Confirin-i  ion  of  Do,  1658  A.  D.  xx. 

(g)  Auran  >z.b's  Do,  1658  A.  D.  xxii. 
(h)  Ahmadsbairs  Finnan,  1752  A.  D.  xxv. 
(h  Abu  Aiikhaii's  Sunniid,  1755  A  D.  xxviii. 
(j)  Jagats'^ib's  ParwcLii^,  1775  ^'  D.  xxix. 

C.  List  of  .'^g*:  nir.  &  Nig-ams. 

(a)  Jnin  A:ri  ms.  xxxi. 

(b)  Jain  Nig.ims.  xxxvii. 

D.  TiFthankars  of  the  present  Era-  xxxix. 
E     List  of  the  Gachha-heads. 

A.     S  we  tarn  bar  School 

(a)  Upakesh   G,r:hha.  xlvii, 

(b)  Kliaraiaia  Do.  li. 
(W;  Rang  Vijaya  Sakha  of  Do.  IvL 
(ci  Tapa  Gachha  Ivii, 
(c*)  Paya  Chand  Sakh4  of  Do.  lix. 


(    xvii     ) 

(c«)Vijaya  S^kh4  of  Do 

(d)  Lumpak    Gachha 

(d*)  Dhanraj  paskha  Sikhi  of  Do 

(e)  Anchal  Gachha 

(f)  Karuamati  Do 

(g)  Terapanthis 

B.      Digambara  School 

(a)  Nandi  Saiigha,  Chitor  Sakha 
(a^)  Do         Nagor  Sakha 
(a*)    Do     Subha  Chandra  Slkh^ 
(a')               Do         Sena  Gana 

(b)  Kastba  Sangha 


Ixi. 

Ixi 

Ixiv. 

Ixv. 

Ixvii. 

Ixviii. 

Ixix. 

Ixxiv. 

Ixxiv. 

Ixxv. 

Ixxvii. 


I. 


2. 


'7. 
'8. 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 

From  Life  of  Parshwanath  (Kalpa  Sutra  Mss.) 

Pre-Mahomedan  Period  Coloured 

Do     Mogul  Period  Do 

3.  Metal  Image  (Ardhapadmasan) 

4.  Shatrunjaya  Hills,  Palitana. 

5.  Jalamandir  at  Pawapuri  (Behar) 

6.  Dilvvara  Temples  (Mt.  Abu) 
Ceiling  work  in    Ditto. 
Girnar  Hills. 

V     Portraits  of  Hamchandra  and  Kumarpal. 
10.  Palm-leaf  Mss.  dated  1237  A.  D. 


From  Kalpa  Sutra  M.S. 


(Lifeof  ParshvaNath. 


Pre-Mahomedan  Period. 


(    n    ) 

lying  scattered     over     the    grey   pagres    of 
works  handed  down   from  the    spirit  nil   sire 
to    the    spiritUtil  son,  by    fr^i>i^   ihem    from 
err  )rs  w'lic'i  they  'i  ive  bee  ):nt;  m  )ra    or  less 
shro  I  led    with,    throjj^'i    U\^   r.^vjlutl)!     of 
aues  and    empires,  or    tiu'on  :»:i  Ion '•-^t  i  ulin  j- 
conventions    which    hive    corns  divi    tons 
f v)m  time  Iminemoria.!,   must  reqiire  a  power 
of   interprt^tation    and    oric;in  il     sp'ec.ii  iiion. 
Vo   other    originrilliy    tlian    this,  the   volume 
1  tys  n')  cljim.      For    it    goes    without  saying 
ih.it    in    the    present  age    of  the    cuil'vation 
of  universal    Iedrnl)ig>  when   t^ie    literati     of 
h  )'^^    the;    East  and  tiie  W  rU  are  sedulously 
engaged    in    exploring    the  rich  and    almost 
i  lexhaustible  mines    of  the    ancient    lores  of 
lo  lit.  it  wjuld  indeed  b-j  very  presumnuotis 
on  the    part    of  any    one    to    imagine    eveti 
that  he  had  contributed  something  new    and 
original  in  the   domain    of  ideas  and  ideals. 
But  still  for  all  that  there  is  amole  scope   for 
thinkers    to    improve    upon    the    methols  of 
philoso[)tiising  anl   interpreting  the  old  ideas 
and  ideals,    tenets  and    di)ctrines    in    perfect 
keeping    with  the    changed  conditions  of  the 
times  to   suit    newer    environments    without 
deviating   in  the  least  from  the   real   spirit 


.(  I«  ) 

and  Imp  >rt  vvnicli  they  are  replete  with.  For 
it  is  o\\y  the  forni  that  changes  and  must 
chriii'^e,  sD'rit  alvv  lys  reiii  lining-  esseiuially 
tr^e  sin.*  ili  ih:' ).i^h.  AU  if  tnore  is  aay 
deviation  anywhere  from  the  r^^  il  sf)ii-ir. 
it  shoild  Vxt  uvderstood  as  dne  t  •  i».- 
thii);''  wMaiiiiV^"  in  tivi  q  Miiiic.iti  ;.i  >/ 
ij;trrj)r(:t<M-. 

T  •  do  this  we  hail^rth -refore,  h.il  to 
b-^'^in  vvitn  th':i  e.uMci  iiion  and  interpre- 
.  tation  '..»f  the  J;iin  principles  of  epistemol«v^y 
as  pr  ):>  >i.in  L*  I  by  the  omniscient  sa<jes  and 
schol  irs  of  bye-gOiie  days.  Epistem  jlo^y 
really  supplies  the  key-note  to  tiie  inter- 
pretation and  understanding  of  a  system  of 
thought  and  culture.  It  gives  us  the  stand 
point    to    have    a    clear    a. id    correct    visij- 


u..  .^,...r  .  .Ntroi  ^o  /,f  t:!i!;)'j-s  :v).l   ti'  ~^"  ■' 


Mtt)  the  m.*::  kmvsijs  o 


i\  >;i  '■'! 


Tuis  is  thj  reason  whv  cv^j-y  syst^mi  of 
thou;irtani  cultuce  i.i  Lidii  reiiiy  b:^gi:is 
with  a  clear  exposition  of  the  principles  oi' 
its  epi:  temology,  the  moment  it  has  done 
with  (Jescribing  in  the  briefest  manner 
possible,  its  own  hypothesis,  its  neccssiiv 
and  sn'oliaiity,  and  filially  its  rigiit  lo 
be  \)v  cd. 

So    is    the    case     with    Jaiuisin      itstrll.  ^ 


(       IV       ) 

and  having,  therefore,  explained  all  these, 
in  brief  in  our  Introduction  and  in 
Chapters  I  and  II  from  the  Jain  point  of 
view,  we  have  begun  discussing  its  science 
and  philosophy  from  Chapter  III 
headed  as  'Knowledge  and  Its  Forms'. 
But  with  Chapter  IV  on  'Epistemology 
and  Logic'  begins  the  real  discussion  which 
ends  with  Chapter  VIII  on  'Syadvdd 
ultimately  and  finally  indentifying  logic 
with  ontology.  A  patient  perusual  of  these 
chapters  will  clearly  show  the  readers  jk^ 
ier  how  the  formal  logic  of  the  other 
schools  of  thought  becomes,  in  the  hands  of 
the  Jain  sages,  metamorphosed,  as  it  were, 
into  transcendental  logic  in  and  through 
the  processes  of  the  dialectical  movements  of 
thought  and  Being  inherent  in  their  very 
nature. 

B*rt  howev^  It  is  generally  held  by 
students  of  modern  thought  and  culture  that 
this  dialectic  method  of  reasoning  identifying 
logic  with  ontology  is  of  Hegelian  origin  and 
meaning.  Indeed  the  word  dialectic  means 
reasoning  yi?r  and  against,  exposing  thereby 
fallacies  and  inconsistencies,  and  clearinp- 
them  away.     Socrates   used  this    method   of 


(       V      ) 

reasoning  in  his   ontologic^l    polemics   with 
the  sophists   of  his    time,   putting   them    be- 
tween   the  horns  of  two  definite  alternatives. 
But  in  A  modern   philosophy    of   the  West,  it 
was    Kant  who    revived  it  5  in    bis    exposing 
the  contradictions  involved  in  the  fundamental 
assumptions  of  dogmatic    philosophy  and  in 
the  popular    conceptions  of  Soul,  World  and 
God.     B«t  It    was   left  ^to  Hegel  to  give  a 
new  meaning   to   dialectic   and  to    interpret 
it  in  a  new  light  altogether.   For  with  Hegel, 
Being     contains     within    itself    opposition^ 
and    contradictions.     Every    thought,   every 
reality     is    but    a     mixture   of    Being    and 
non-Being.     Dialectic  with  Hegel,  therefore, 
is    equivalent    to    Self-devolopment   or     un- 
foldment,  and    the  world-process  itself     is  a 
process  of  dialectic,  of  antithisis  and  synthesis, 
making  differences  serve  as  means  to  higher 
unities.  The  legitimate  out-come  of  working 
out    the      Hegelian     interpretation    of    the 
world-process  as  shown    in    his    dialectic,    is 
the  pronouncement    of  the  eternity    of  the 
world-process.     And  with  it  the  soul    is  also 
declared  to  be  in    the    never-ending    process 
of  higher  and  higher  evolution    without  any 
ultimate  rest  or  quiscent  anywhere, 


(      VI      ) 

3^   Those     who     have     followed     our 
exposition     of  the    Jain    principles    of  epis- 
temology    ending     with    SyadvSida    uM\mvt^ 
iip-to  ^Chapter    XII,  will  be    itf     one    with 
us    when    we  state  that  the  dialectic   method 
of  reasoning    identifying    logic    with    meta- 
physic  was  not  Hegel's  own  making.     It  ori- 
ginated with  the  Jain    sages  and  omniscient 
kevalins,  and  has  been'prevelant  In    the  field 
of  philosophy  in    India    from    a  time    when 
Greece  and  Rome^those  cradles  of    European 
iWvilization,  were  still  steeped  in  the  darkness 
of  ignorance.      It  is  true  that   with   the  Jains 
the  Absolute  is  but    an  Expression  of  Unity 
in    Difference    as     distinguished     from    the 
Absolute  beyond  the  Relative  of  the  Vedin- 
tins    (  Vide    Chapter    XI  ),     and    that    the 
world-process    is    also     without     beginning 
and  end  (Vide  Chapter  XII  to  XV)  ;  but  the 
soul  according  to    Jainism    does  not    remain 
for   ever   entano-led    in    the    meshes    of  the 
dialectic  process  of  evolution    without  know- 
ing  any     rest    or    repose     anywhere.     The 
Jains,    as    well    is    every    other    system    of 
Indian  thought  and    culture,    hold    that    the 
Jiva  will  never    ramain    eternally  caught  up 
in  the  never-ending  process  of  evolution.     It 


(    vn    ) 

is  bound  to  get  at  that  state  of  being  and 
beatitude  which  is  all  free  and  divine. 
For  freedom  is  our  birth-right.  Every 
soul  is  constitutionally  free  and  potentially 
divine.  And  the  struggle  for  existence 
in  this  nether  world  means  with  the  Jains 
not  only  the  struggle  for  bare  existence 
in  this  mortal  coil,  but  for  the  realization 
as  well  of  this  Ideal  Freedom     and  Divinity. 

With  this  end  the  enquiries  constituting 
the  Right  Vision — the  basis  of  Right  know- 
ledge. 

Btrt  Right  Knowledge  which  proceeds 
from  Right  Vision  by  a  coherent  train  of 
thought  and  reasoning  and  which  can  only 
lead  to  Right  Conduct  without  which  the 
attainment  of  the  Goal  in  vision  is  held 
to  be  impossible,  is  the  knowledge  which 
embraces  concisely  or  in  details,  the 
relations  in  which  the  constituent  factors 
of  the  world  stand  to  soul  and  the 
changes  as  well  of  these  relations  in  the 
dialectic  movement  of  thought  and  being. 
And  all  these,  more  technically  speaking, 
begin  with  Chapter  XVIII  on  the  'Karma 
Phenomenology'.  The  readers  will  find 
much   interest   to   enter   oq   a   new  kind  of 


(    vin    ) 

discussion  on  metaphysical  issues  of  vital 
importance  in  regard  to  the  relation  in 
question  and  its  changes  as  well.  The 
question  as  to  when  and  how  the  soul  which 
is  constitutionally  free  and  potentially  divine 
came  to  be  entangled  intei  the  meshes  of  the 
dialectic  movements  of  the  world-process 
without  beginning  and  end,  and  which  irri- 
tates the  metaphysicans  and  speculative 
writers  most  in  these  days  of  scientific  en- 
quiry,  has  been  discussed  andnsolution  given 
once4or  all.  Every  other  position  being 
untenable,  the  Jains  hold  that  both  the  Soul 
and  the  Karma  {i.e.  the  materialised  units  into 
which  jivic  energetics  resolve  themselves) 
stand  to  each  other  in  relation  of  phenomenal 
conjunction,  which  reveals  itself  in  the  conti- 
nuity of  the  display  from  time  without  begin- 
ning, neither  of  the  two  being  either  prior 
or  posterior  to  the  other  in  the  order  of  time, 
so  far  the  question  of  their  metaphysical 
entity  is  concerned — unAdi  ap aschdmipurvi 
sanyoga  samhandha  pravdha.  Such  is  the 
position  of  the  jivas  in  the  ocean  of  samsdr 
whereon  tumultuous  waves  furiously  surging 
in  various  names  and  forms,  ruffle  the  vast 
expanse.     And   just    as    the    angularities   of 


(  «  ) 

the  gravels  at  the  bottom  of  the  grugHng 
stream  of  strong  currents  are  rubbed  off 
by  beuig  drifted  from  place  to  place,  so  the 
angularities  of  the  /iva  sunk  in  ;the  ocean 
of  Samsdr^SirQ  also  rubbed  off  by  being 
driven  from  womb  to  womb,  from  region 
to  region,  under  the  strong  pressure  of 
Karma'CAWsaWiy.  In  this  way  with  the 
rubbino-  off  of  the  anaularities  and^thinninof 
out  of  the  grrjss  material  veil  and  cover- 
ing, when  the  /iva  gets  a  comparatively 
improved  vision  into  its  own  nature  and 
ideal,  it  struggles  to  work  out  its  own 
emancipation  as  a  free-centre  of  origina- 
tion. All  these  and  such  allied  subjects  as 
Rebirth  and  the  like  which  are  required 
to  determine  our  place  and  function  in  the 
world,  have  been  discussed  with  compara- 
tive dkail8  upr»t*H  Chapter  XXVI  on  the 
'Classification  of  Karmas'  with  which  ends 
the  enquiries  into  the  constitution  of  Right 
Knowledore. 

From  Right  knowledge  of  our  ultimate 
Ideal,  of  our  place  and  function  in  the  world, 
arises  the  possibilites  of  Right  Conduct 
which  is  imperative  in  the  attaiment  of  the 
Ideal.  ArtfdThe  enquiries  into  the  constitution 


(  X  ) 

of  the  Right  Conduct  open  with  Chapter 
XXVII  'From  Metaphysics  to  Ethics.' 
No  system  of  Indian  thought  and  culture 
has  such  a  stage-by-stage  exposition  in 
a  systematic  way  of  the  ways  and  means  to 
the  attainment  of  that  Goal  which  we  all 
have  in  view.  The  very  arrangement,  it 
will  appear  on  a  careful  perusual,  is  not  only 
most  psychological  so  far>vthe  unfoldment  of 
knowledge  itself  is  concerned,  but  appears 
to  be  modern  as  welbwhen  we  judge  it  from 
the  scientific  and  practical  point  of  view. 
Having  cleared  up  the  Jain  Conceptions 
of  Virtue  and  Vice  (Vide  Chapter  XXVIII), 
of  their  fruitions  here  and  hereafter,  the 
problems  of  evil  and  tlie  like  rudimentary 
notions  of  tlie  Jain  Ethics,  the  moral  cate- 
gories have  been  taken  u^  o+te  by  Ofte  in 
consecutive  order  beginning  with  'Influx' 
(Vide  Chap  XXXI)  of  the  alien  matter  into 
the  constitution  of  the  soul  and  the  conse- 
quent bondage  of  the  same  under  subrep- 
tion [Mitkydtta)  which  is  nothing  else  than 
taking  a  thing  for  something  which  is 
not  that  thing  {asate  sat  buddhi).  This 
mithydtva  is  the  prime  root  of  all  troubles. 
Such     being   the   case    we  have    discussed 


(      XI      ) 

at  some  length,  the  psychology  and 
philosophy  of  the  matter  and  form  of 
this  vilthy^tva.  A  little  reflection  will  be 
sufficient,  we  belive,  to  convince  an  impartial 
student  of  the  history  of  Indian  schools  of 
thought.^that  the  theory  of  Mdyd  resolving 
into  dvaran  and  vikshepa  j  as  interpreted 
by  Shankar  and  others  of  his  line  of 
thinking,  is  but  a  distorted  shadow  of  the 
Jain  theory  of  mithydtva.  For,  to  deny 
Mdyd,  therefore,  of  any  positive  entity  and 
to  posit  it  at  the  same  time  as  the  great 
impediment  in  the  way  to  the  true  self- 
realisation  is  to  be  guilty  of  substantializing 
tbe* abstraction.  In  order  to  escape  from  this 
difficulty,  Ramanuja,  another  interpreter  of 
the  Veddnta  Sutras,  had  to  draw  inspirations 
from  the  teachings  and  writtings  of  the  Jain 
sages,  and,  in  consequence,  had  to  fall  back 
upon  the  Jain  doctrine  of  Unity  in  Difference 
or  the  Theory  of  Bheddbheda  vad,  the 
legitimate  outcome  of  the  Syadvdd  or 
the  dialectic  method  of  reasoning  giving  a 
more  comprehensive  view  of  thought  and 
Being.  It  is  true  that  Ramanuja  speaks  of 
Bodh^yana  as  his  authority  for  the 
enunciation    of    the    doctrine    of    Unity    in 


) 


(      XII      ) 

Difference,  but  nowhere  in  liis  scholium  on 
the  Brahm  Sutris  could  he  quote  direct  from 
the  writtings  of  Bodhayana.  What  Bodhdyan 
taught  no  body  knows.  Had  there  been 
the  existence  of  any  commentary  by  him 
on  the  Sutras  in  question  even  at  the  time 
of  Shankar,  then  Shankar,  the  upright  and 
audacious,  would  never  have  left  him  un- 
noticed in  his  unrivalled  commentaries  and 
writtings  because  he  is  found  to  freely  draw 
upon  his  predecessors,  friend  or  opponent. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  Jain  sages  have 
made  sifting  enquiry  into  the  nature  and 
matter  of  this  mithydtva  and  found 
possibilites  of  its  removal  through  Samvar 
or  Stoppage  of  the  Influx  and  through 
Nirjard  or  gradual  dissipation  of  what  -^<^ 
already  found  its  way  into  the  soul.  With 
the  completion  of  this  dissipation,  the  soul 
gets  rid  of  all  the  veil  and  covering  of 
Karma  and  shines  in  perfect  freedom  and 
omniscience  enjoying  bliss  divine  for  all  time 
to  come;  this  is  what/^ called  Mokska  of 
Nirvdn  or  Extinction  of  all  pain  and 
suffering,  the  grand  Summu?n  Bonum  of 
one  and  all  life  and  living  (Vide  Chapters 
XXXII  to  XXXV). 


(      XIII      ) 

But  this  filial  and  ultimate  state  of 
being  in  bliss  and  beatitude  cannot  be 
attained  all  of  a  sudden.  Great  indeed 
is  the  vision  but  only  the  few  behold. 
Great  is  the  goal,  but  only  the  few 
attain.  Great  really  is  the  struggle  but 
only  the  few  can  withstand.  For  the  goal 
in  fact  is  gradually  reached  by  steady 
and  strenuous  striving  subjectitig  the 
self  to  gladly  undergo  a  series  ^practical 
disciplines  in  a  manner  a*hd  along  the 
lines  as  enjoined  in  the  Jural  {Charan) 
and  Teleological  {Karan)  Ethics  of  the 
Jains.  A'ftd'The  stages  which  the  mumukshtn 
has  to  pass  through,  are  fourteen  in  number 
and  are  called  GzinastMnas  which  can  be 
'squeezed  up  into  four  stages  to  suit  modern 
intellect. 

We  have  seen  that  according  to  Jainsm, 
Freedom  is  our  birth-right  and  that  its 
philosophy  declares  this  freedom  to  be  already 
in  us.  Freedom  is  constitutional  with 
man.  Feel  that  you  ^re  great  and  you  will  be 
great.  Feel  that  you  are  free  and  all  quarrels 
will  cease.  With  the  Jains  it  is  but  a  question 
of  realization  in  the  very  heart  of  hearts 
where   life   throbs     and    the  soul  of  religion 


(XIV      ) 

really  dwells  itT.  Ikfl  Whatever  might  be 
the  merit  of  this  philosophy,  those  who 
have  studied  its  principles  as  well  as  the 
march  of  Western  civilization,  will  naturally 
doubt  a«  t^  the  possibility  of  the  growth 
and  formation  of  a  religion  without  any 
God-head  ta  preside  :  ^  for,  there  is  no 
denying  the  fact  that  throughout  the  history 
of  the  Western  world,  we  find  Philosophy 
and  Religion  to  be  at  war  with  each  other. 
There  religion  is  based  on  the  unstable 
basis  of  Belief.  And  surely  there  is  nothing 
strange  in  the  fact  that  the  corner-stone 
of  religion  there,  begins  to  shake  and  give 
way  whenever  a  new  philosophy  rises 
against  it  armed  with  new  ideas  and  ideals 
paving  incontrovertible  reasons  befeirrd 
them  to  support/x  Not  only  this.  If  a  system 
of  philosophy  fails  to  drive  Belief  out  of 
consideration  and  thus  crush  the  foundation- 
stone  into  dust,  it  cannot  be  expected  to 
thrive  and  drive  its  roots  into  the  soil  and 
create  a  school  of  its  own.  From  all  these 
it  is  clear  that  in  the  West,  Philosophy  is 
but  a  sworn  enemy  to  Belief.  But  quite  ^c/^ 
reverse  is  the  case  in  the  East.  Here  each 
school   of  philosophy    is    chiefly    meant    to 


(    J^v     ) 

serve  as  a  basis  or  ground-work  of  a 
particular  form  of  Faith  or  Religion.  For 
instance,  the  School  of  Jaimini  stands  to  sup- 
port the  Karma  Kdnda  of  the  Vedic  Hindus. 
The  I\'ydya  and  the  Vaisheshtka  have  been  c^-^<^ 
to  serve  as  the  basis  of  the  Dualistic  forms 
of  worship  as  are  advocated  in  the  Hindu 
Smrifis  and  the  Purdnas,  The  Sdnkhya 
and  the  Yoga  philosophies  which  clear  the 
ways  of  renunciation  and  moral  apathy  to  all 
that  is  worldly,  not  only  support  other 
dualistic  and  TAntric  forms  of  worship  but 
themselves  form  the  science  and  psycho- 
logy of  the  .  Uttar  Mtmdnsd  by  Vy^sa. 
But  when  we  direct  our  attention  to  the 
West,  we  find  Socrates,  the  sage,  poisioned 
with  hemloc/cfor  preaching  a  philosophy 
that  went  against  the  religion  of  his  time 
and  nativity.  Who  does  not  know  how 
Christianity  trembles  even  now  to  hear  • 
the 'names  of  David  Hume,  Mill,  Comte, 
Kant,  Fichte,   Hoefding  or   Hegel  }  ^ 

Now  what  is  the  lesson  that  we  gather 
from  a  comparative  study  of  the  attitude  of 
minds  of  both  the  East  and  the  West }  We 
learn  that  India  all  alofig  enjoyed  a  kind  of 
intellectual  freedom  and  religious    toleration 


{   k\l   ) 

which  is  unique  in  the  history  of  the  world. 
And  this  is  why  life  in  India  really  throbs 
in  religion,  where  as  in  the  West,  it  has  been 
more  or  less  a  fashion  to  attend  the  Church. 
Btrt  to  return  to  the  point  at  issue  :  as  in 
India  the  function  of  philosophy  is  to  support 
a  particular  form  of  Faith,  so  the  function  of 
Jainism  is  to  harmonise  all  the  contend- 
ing religions  of  the  world.  And  it  is  here 
that  Jainism  supersedes  all  the  other  forms 
of  faith  and  creed.  For,  it  is  philosophy  and 
religion  both  rolled  in  one.  A  little  reflection 
on  the  theory  itself  and  its  predominance 
from  time. to  time,  along  with  its  growth  and 
spread,  will  prove  the  truth  and  validity  of 
our  statement.     Will  any  one  tell  the  world 

what  is  it  that  so  boldly  declares  the  glorious 

ft 

dignity  of  man  ?  Is  it  the  civilization  that 
creates  for  man  new  wants  and  desires  only 
*  to  bind  him  down  more  tightly  to  the  mires 
of  the  world  ?  Or  is  it  that -reconciles  for 
man  all  the  seeming  differences  without 
sacrificing  anything  of  permanent  interest, 
kills  that  egotism  )  by  virtue  of  which  his 
envenomed  passions  howl  at  every  dis- 
appointment, and  ultimately  opens  out  to  him 
the    way  to   perfection,  real    happiness   and 


(     XVII      ) 

eternal  beatitude  where  all  wants  and  cares 
cease  for  ever,  and  all  passions  as  well  for 
good,  and  which  makes  man  really  to  be 
his  own  rea/  st\(  in  infinite  delight  divine? 
Surely  you  will  have  to  pronounce  judgment 
in  favour  of  the  latter,  and  in  that  case 
we  state  once  for  all,  a«d-  tJi*t  without  the 
slightest  fear  of  contradiction,  that  Jainism 
is  thti^ means  to  the  introduction  into  this 
mundane  world  a  reign  of  peace,  ordered 
harmony  and  reasonable  sweetness  which 
are  most  wanting  in  these  days  of  rank 
materialism  and  uncompromising  self-aggran- 
disement wherewith  this  blessed  land  of 
Bharat  has  become  surcharged. 

It  has,  therefore,  become  highly  impera- 
tive to  repress  this  growing  ardour  of  our 
youth  in  poletical  polemics  and  practical 
tactics  that  are  detrimental  to  and  destructive 
of  the  felicity  of  their  temporal  and  future 
lives,  by  a  revival  of  the  humble  instructions 
of  the  ancient  Kevalins  and  peaceful  pre- 
ceptors of  old,  and  reclaiming  them  to  the 
simple  mode  of  life  led  by  their  forefathers 
from  the  perverted  tendencies  finding  a  firm 
hold  on  them  under  the  influence  of  Western 
refinement.     It    is    this   degeneracy    of  our 


(    xyin    ) 

rising  generation  from  an  utter  ignorace 
of  the  superiority  of  their  own  code  and  t^i 
adoption,  in  consequence,  of  .foreign  ideas 
and  ideals,  habits  and  manners,  that  ought 
to  engage  the  serious  attention  of  our 
educated  children  of  the  soil. 

Pf&w  yApart  from  the  question  of  any 
sublimity,  necessity  and  utility  jerf/>the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  Philosophy  of  Jainism^roughly  Con- 
sisting as  it  does  in  outward  peace  (Shanti) 
and  internal  tranquility  (Chitta  Prasdnti) 
united  with  contentment (5<2;^^d?^>4)  and  apathy 
{Vardgya)  to  the  alluring  pleasures  of  the 
world,  a  glance  at  the  description  of  the  Jain 
Church  as  portrayed  in  Chapter  XXXVII, 
a  survey  of  the  Jain  places  of  Pilgrimage, 
of  Art  and  Architecture  &c.  (Chapters 
XXXIX  &c.  XLI),  a  study  of  the  great  and 
not  yet  fully  accessible  complex  of  writings 
making  up  the  Jain  Literature  and  record- 
ing the  appearances  of  the  Tirthankars 
in  the  era  of  avasarpini,  and  chronicling 
the  organisation  of  the  Sanghas,  the  great 
split  in  the  original  camp  into  the  Swet^m- 
baris  and  the  Digambaris,  the  consecutive 
succession  of  the  dchdryas  and  the  list  of 
gachchas   which   originated  with    them,    and 


(       XIX      ) 

fiaally  other  secular,  events  of  historical  im- 
portaace  to  a  considerable  extent,  will  make 
if  pretty  clear  that  Jainisni  is  a  religion  that 
is  not  only  born  of  the  depths  of  ages  but 
also  that  its  Tirthankars  were  real  historical 
persons  who  lived,  moved  and  had  their 
beings  amongst  our  forefathers. 

Besides,    these    pages  contain    historical 
.statements  and  allusions  of   no  mean    value. 
What^  we    want    to  point    out  is    that    apart 
from    the    question    of   religious    merit  as  is 
manifest  in    the   literary  works  of    the  Jains, 
they  go  to  a  great   extent  to  clear  up  many  a 
historical  anomaly  and  settle  dates  of  impor- 
tant  historical   events.     For    instance,    it  is 
from  the    perusual  of   these    pages    that  we 
cettld  settle  the  date   of  Mahavira's    Nirvdn 
or  the  accession  of  Chandragupta.     And  it  is 
from  these  pages  we  find  that  during  the  time 
of  Rishava  Deva,  the  systems  oijaina,  Shaiva 
and  Sdnkhya  philosophies  were  exant.     The 
Mimdnsd  and  the  7^(1)/^  flourished  during  the 
period  of  Sitalnath  whereas  the  Bouddha  and 
the  Vaisheshiku   came  to  prominence  during 
the  time  of  Parshwanath  and  Mahavir.  This 
account  of  the  chronological  developments  of 
the  different  Schools  of  Philosophy  may  read 


(      XX      ) 

very  strangetrBut  when  one  remembers  that 
none  of  the  systems  of  philosophy  came  to 
behig  all  of  a  sudden,  but  tl^ey  were  more  or 
less  in  extant  in  a  still  remoter  age,  and  that 
this  development  into  systems  of  philosophy 
means  their  embodiment  in  the  forms  of 
Sutras  at  different  periods,  things  become^* 
easy  to  understand.  -For  this  is  further  corro- 
borated if  we  interpret  the  religious  upheaval 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  in  the  great  reliojious 
Congress  of  the  Indian  saints  and  sa-^es  of 
yore  in  the  NaimiskAranya,  when  the 
authority  of  the  Vedas  were  being  made  as 
binding  upon  the  free  thinkers  of  those  days, 
those  who  left  the  Congrsss  in  silent  protest 
against  such  actions  of  the  Brahman-Rishis, 
were  dubbed  as  Ndstikas.  The  word 
Ndstika  (atheist)  in  the  Indian  scripture 
does  not  mean  one  who  did  not  believe 
in  the  existence  of  God,  but  rather  one  who 
did  not  accept  the  infallibility  and  ultimate 
authority  of  the  Vedas.  Were  it  otherwise 
then  the  System  of  Sankkya  in  which 
Kapil,  like  Lai^lace,  did  not  care  o^^' 
£err  getting  kf  a  God  in ^ the  scheme  of 
his  universe,  would  not  have  been  taken 
as   one    of  the    six  theistic  systems  of  philo- 


(      XXI      ) 

sophy,as  distinguished  from  the  six  atheistic 
schools  beginning  with  that  of  ChdrvAka, 
Now  with  the  settlement  of  the  final 
authority  of  the  Vedas,  its  ritualism 
became  a  mercilessly  dominant  religion 
for  samettrrte;  somuch  so  that  the  priest- 
class  seemed  to  be  in  tlw  sole  possession 
of  the  Key  to  Heaven!  Ar«d  In  conse- 
quence sincerity  'which  is  the  soul  of  all  reli- 
giousity  almost  disappeared -from  the  people 
yielding  place  to  downright  hypocrisy  and 
dry  formalism.  The  Kshatriya  kings 
and  th^  princes  could  not  stand  te^  this 
want  of  sincerity  in  the  people  and  t«L-the 
religious  monopoly  in  the  hands  of  the 
Brihmans.  They  entered  a  protest  against 
the  same  in  the  form  of  Ved^ntic  militarism 
finding  exprssions  in  such  great  Upani- 
shadic  declarations  as,  ^Brahman  is  Atman' 
*That  Thou  art,':  'That  I  am'  :  in  reality 
there  is  no  essential  difference  between  one 
soul  and  another.  All  are  One  and  the  Goal  of 
all  is  Freedom,  which  cannot  be  reached  by 
the  weak  and  the  powerless.  So  all  conven- 
tions, all  privileges  must  go. ,  Thus  ensued  an 
era  of  war  between  the  Br^hmans  and  the 
Kshatriyas.     The   enmity     and    implacable 


(      XXII      ) 

hatred  of  the  two  families  of  Vasistha  and 
Viswamitra  for  generations  form  subjects 
prominent  throughout  the  vidic  antiquity. 
The  cursing  on  Harish  Chandra,  the  King 
of  Ajodhya,  by  Vashistha,  the  leader  of  the 
priest-class,  and  the  consequent  appoint- 
ment of  Viswamitra  by  Harish  Chandra  as 
his  priest  is  also  another  instance  to  illustrate 
the  spirit  of  Vedantic  militarism  against 
Br^hmanic  ritualism  and  monoply.  Thus  the 
idea  militant  in  the  Upaniskads  became  the 
idea  tirUmphant  in  hands  of  the  Kshatriya 
kings  and  princes.  And  this  ^why  we 
find  later  on  that  the  Br^hmans  are  betak- 
ing themselves  as  pupils  to  the  Kshatriya 
kings  and  princes  in  order  to  have  the 
Atman  expounded  to  them.  The  Brahman 
N4rad  receiving  instructions  from  Sanat 
Kumar  ;  Gargya  Balaki  from  the  king 
Ajatsatru  of  Kasi.  All  these  are  further 
confirmed  by  the  words  of  the  king  Pravan 
Jaivali  to  Aruni,  a  Brahman  pupil  whom  the 
king  says — "Because,  as  you  have  told,  O 
Goutam,the  doctrine  has  never  up  to  the  present 
time  been  in  circulation  among  the  Brahmans, 
therefore  in  all  the  worlds  the  Government  has 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  warrior  caste", 


(      XXIII      ) 

Now  this  philosophy  of  Vedantic 
militarism,  though  it  was  fully  developed 
in  the  Upanishadic  period,  could  not  later 
on  adapt  itself  to  the  changing  conditions 
and  to  the  yet  prevailing  society  of  the 
time  which  was^in  and  through  ^  saturated 
with  Vedic  ritualism  and  ceremonialism. 
Artd  In  the  course  of  events ;  things  took 
turn  in  such  a  manner  that  the  Br^hmans, 
whose  sole  occupation  was  priest-craft,  began 
to  divise  schemes  with  a  view  to  make 
each  caste  flourish  in  its  respective  profession : 
so  much  so  that  they  discouraged  the  study 
of  the  Upanishadas  and  the  like  by  other 
castes,  and  the  preaching  as  well  of  the 
philosophy  of  the  'One'  to  the  mass.  And 
thus  when  the  gates  to  higher  knowledge  were 
effectively  barred  against  the  other  classes 
by  the  mechanism  of  the  Priest-class,  a 
general  degradation  followed.  People  be- 
came degenerated,  self  interested  and 
low  in  character.  All  sorts  of  abominable 
things  like  Tdntrikism  which  brought  in 
virginity,  mysticism  and  love  to  bear  upon 
religion,  began  to  be  practised  in  the  name 
of  religion  only.  At  this  critical  juncture 
Parshwanath,  the    23rd  Tirthankar  appeared 


(      XXIV      ) 

to  save  the  situation,  and  preached  the 
Truth  and  the  Law  to  one  and  all  without 
disturbing  the  constitution  of  the  social 
structure  prevailing  at  the  time.  A  general 
religious  up-heaval  ensued  ;  but  so  engrained 
was  the  soulless  ritualism  in  the  constitution 
of  the  society  that  two  hundred  years 
after  the  Ahivdn  of  Parshwanath,  Mahabir 
Swami  appeard  as  the  24th  Reformer,  and 
gave  a  re-statement  of  Jainism  later  on  taking 
the  form  of  the  philosophy  of  pragmatism, 
to  stem  the  tide  of  degredation,  and  save 
the  soul  of  the  nation  from  ruifing  into 
-cx:^  narrow  old  grooves  and  gutters  of  ritualism 
,  and  mysticism  (tdnirictsn),  Goutam  Buddha 
also  followed  suit  from  another  direction. 
He  represented  the  Indian  school  of  spiritual 
democracy,  and  preached  the  principles  of 
what  they  now  call  'Romantic  Improvement' 
in  modern  philosophy  which  resulted  in  the 
formiulaton  of  the  subjective  idealism,  in  the 
breaking  of  the  social  fetters,  and  in  the 
curbing  off  the  power  of  the  Br^hmans  to 
enforce  Vedic  ritualism  upon  the  people. 
Such  is  the  history  of  the  religious  transition 
through  which  India  had  to  pass  uptill  the 
time  of  Mahavir  and  Guutam  Buddha  who  are 


(  ^xxv    ) 

said  to  represent  the  Indian  schools  of 
Ideal-Realism  and  Real  Idealism  respec- 
tively.  Attd^this  is  what  we  gather  from 
the  old  and  worn  a«t  pages  of  the  Jain 
literature  of  high  antiquity. 

The  above  is  -b«t  what  we  could  glean 
from  the  scattered  pages  of  the  Jain  literature 
so  far-the  contemporary  events  and  Religious 
movements  in  India  were  concerned. 
Bbt There  are  other  materials  in  the  move- 
ments of  the  Jain  genius  such  as  inscriptions 
and  epigraphs  which  go  by  the  technical 
name  of  external  evidences  helping  us  a 
good  deal  in  filling  up  the  gaps  and  blanks 
x^  .c^  pages  of  I  ndian  history.  We  get  from  these 
inscriptions  various  informations  on  the 
reigning  sovereigns,  their  geneologies  and 
dynasties,  chronological  list  of  the  gacchas, 
and  the  description  of  the  different  sections 
into  which  the  Jain  laymen  are  socially 
divided.  Now  both  from  the  external  and 
internal  evidences  which  have  been  available 
to  us  up  till  now  for  our  study  and  exami- 
nation, we  can  well  state  without  the 
slightest  fear  of  contradiction  that  the 
whole  Jain  Community  is  deeply  indebted 
to    the      Swelambar    Church    for     the    pre- 


/? 


(    xxyi    ) 

.  servation,  maintenance  and  improvement 
of  almost  all  their  important  places  of 
pilgrimage.  The  inscriptions  both  on  the 
pedffstal  of  the  images  and  foot-prints  and 
tablets  {Prashastis)  commemorating  the 
erection  or  the  repairs  of  the  temples  at 
these  places  at  different  times,  undoubtedly 
show  that  the  whole  credit  belongs  to  our 
worthy  and  venerable  Swet^mbar  AchsLryas 
under  whose  religious  direction  and  advice, 
the  Swetambari  lay-followers  did  all  they 
could  to  keep  up  their  traditon  and  guard 
the  sanctity  of  these  sacred  places  all  over 
India,  excepting  the  Southern  countries,  the 
homes  of  the  Digambar  School.  But  who 
cares  to  devote  ^  to  the  study  of  these 
movements  of  culture  from  a  historic 
point  of  view?  We  have  inspected  and 
examined  numbers  of  Digambari  images  still 
preserved  and  worshipped  in  Swetambari 
temples  but  have  not  seen  the  reverse.  It 
is  a  matter  of  satisfaction  indeed  to  find 
the  Digambari  temple  in  Mathian  Mahalla 
in  Behar,  side  by  side  with  a  Swetambari 
temple,  like  the  twin  sister  churches  in 
charge  of  the  Swetambaris.  The  Digambari 
brothers     are     always     welcome    to     every 


(    XX vn     ) 

Swetambari  temple.  The  mere  location 
of  the  Digambari  imac^es  in  a  corner  of  the 
Swetambari  temples,  does  not  show  that 
these  temples  belong  to  them  also.  Far 
from  this.  It  rather  .'^hows  the  magnanimity 
and  generosity  of  the  high-souled  Swetambari 
custodians  of  these  temples.  But  this  does 
not  go  to  establish  their  managing  claim 
over  the  temples  which  exclusively  belong  to 
th.e  Swetambari  sect.  All  along  they  were 
allowed  the  privilege  of  worshipping  there 
for  the  simple  reason  that  they  did  not  cherish 
the  idea  of  any  selfish  motive.  Living  in 
wealth  and  opulence  in  a  period  of  peace 
and  prosperity  under  the  benign  care  of  the 
British  Government,  it  is  indeed  a  matter 
of  great  regret  that  instead  of  paying  atten- 
tion towards  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  ad- 
vancement  of  the  community,  and  other 
social  reforms  which  have  of  late  become 
imperative  to  adapt  ourselves  to  the  newer 
conditions  of  life  and  living,  our  Digambari 
brethren  have  now  come  forward  to  set  the 
machinery  of  litigation  sigoing  to  unrighti- 
ously  snatch  away  from  the  Swetambaris,  the 
founders  and  repairers,  nay,  the  real  owners 
of  these  places    of  Pilgrimage,  so    to   speak, 


(      XXVIII      ) 

all    rights    and    privileges  vvhicli  so  long  be- 
longed exclusively  to  them,     Our  Digambari 
brethren  are  squandering  away  good    money 
in  the    name  of/religion.     They  are  showing 
a  great  enthusiasm,    at  the    present  moment, 
to  set  up  claims  and  run  to  the  Courts  of  Law 
for   the    settlement  of  issues.      Everywhere, 
whether  at    Sametsikhar,  at    Pawapuri  or  at 
Rajgir^  we    hear    of    litigations   cropping  up 
from  their   endeavours  to   get    equal   rights 
in     the   control     and    manaoement    of    the 
sacred   places    which    the    Jain    Swetambari 
Community    have     been    doing   since     the 
foundation  of  these  shrines  and  temples.    ^ 
things    really  go    on    in    this  way,  then    the 
Jain  Community,  as    a  whole,  will  have    not 
only  to  pay  dearly    for  it  ;   but  those  monu- 
mental works  as  well  of  the    Jain  genius    in 
art,  architecture    and    sculpture   will    shortly 
disappear  into  the  surrounding  ruins.    And  it 
grieves  us  much    therefore     to  find  that    the 
Digambaris  are  quarrelling  with  the  Swetam- 
baris    without    any   just    cause    to    advocate 
in     claiming    equal    share    with      them.      In 
the  South,  the  Digambaris    have  their    well- 
known  images  at  Sravana  Belgola  and  other 
temples     in     their   sole     management.     No 


(     XXVIX     ) 

_'  —  J>. 

Swetambari  ever  thinks  of  interfering  with 
the  just  rights  of  the  Digambaris  in  those 
provinces.  The  DIgambdris  have  got  lands 
from  the  Swetambari  Sangha  for  erection 
of  their  temples,  sometimes  they  have  also 
purchased  land  for  the  purpose  and  have 
built  separate  temples.  B^  ^indeed  deeply 
regrettable  it' is- on  their  part  that  inspite  of 
these  stupendous  facts,  they  have  not  put  a 
stop  to  their  policy  of  agression. 

We,    therefore,   sincerely  appeal   to  the 
Digambaris,    at  least   to    the   sensible   and 
educated  members   amongst    them,   to    put 
an    end   to     such     sort    of    dealings     and 
avoid   litigation     especially    in     matters   of 
religion.     Even  before  the  Court  of  Justice, 
there  is   a     limitation   to    everything.     For 
centuries    after   centuries,    the  Swetambaris 
have   tried   their   best     to   build,     maintain 
and  improve  the  sacred   places.     They   hold 
Firmans,    Grants,  Sitnnnds   and    Parwanas 
from  the     reigning  Sovereigns  of  the   past 
and  have  been  managing  the  affairs   genera- 
tion after  generation,  without  any   co-opera- 
tion  from  the  Digambaris  from  time  imme- 
morial   without  any  clamour,    dissension    or 
intervention.     And  it  is  a  disgrace  that   they 
Q 


(  «a  ) 

should  now  come  forward  to  disturb  the 
working  of  an  organisation  born  of  the 
depths  of  ages  and  devise  all  sorts  of  un- 
righteous means  to  gain  their  objective  before 
the  Courts  of  Law. 

In  fine,  however,  we  beg  leave  to 
apologise  to  our  readers  for  the  numerous 
errors  and  mistakes  which  have  found  their 
way  into  these  pages  through  the  pramdd 
of  their  printer  and  reader. 

November  igiy,  |  p.  nahar, 

Calcutta.      J  k,  GHOSH. 


Metal    Image    (Ardha  Padmasan) 
with  inscription  in  Southern    character    (back\ 


An  Epitome  of  Jainism. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Onif  Salutation  to  the  ^Arlhantas'  or 
the  Killers  of  the  enemies  ;  Salutation  to 
the  ^Siddhas^  or  the  beatified  Achievers 
of  the  Good;  Salutation  to  the  'A chary as^ 
or  the  accomplished  Masters  legislating 
the  rules  of  our  conduct;  Salutation  to 
the  ^TJpadhyayas^  or  the  Teachers 
imparting  lessons  on  the  Siddhantas ;  Sa~ 
Intation  to  all  the  *Sadhus^  or  the  Saints  of 
every  region  and  clime  who  live,  move  and 
have  their  being  for  the  good  of  others. 

This  five-fold  Salutation  purging  out 
all  sins,  is  the  noblest  of  all  propitious 
utterances  and  the  choicest  of  all  blessings 
and  benedictions ^Navakara.  ^ 

The  Jains,  the  followers  of  the  ^ma  or 
Arihanta,  hrtre  bce-iva  well-known  community 
^A  India,  They  are  mostly  confined  to 
Hindusthan  and  are  numerous  particularly  in 
the  Punjab,  Rajputana,  Gujrat  and  some 
Southern  Districts  of   India.     They   hold  a 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

prominent  place  in  the  Empire  owing  to  their 
wealth,  intelligence,  commercial  energy  and 
unswerving  loyalty. 

The  Arihanta  is  the  killer  of  the  enemies. 
He  is  also  called  the  Jina  or  the  Victor  for 
killing  or  conquering  all  his  passions,  desires 
and  appetites.  A  Jina  is  the  possessor  of  per- 
fect knowledge.  He  is  omniscient  and  is  the 
revealer  of  true  nature  of  things.  Thtjinas 
or  the  Victors,  who  in  every  age  (past, 
present,  and  future)  preach  truths  and 
organise  the  Order,  are  known  by  the  name 
of  TiHhanlzars — the  Founders  of  Tirthuy 
Sanghtty  or  the  Order  which  consists  oiSadhu, 
Sddhvi  and  Skrdvaka,  ShrdvikA  i,  e,  male 
and  female  ascetics  and  devotees. 

The  Jain  friars  and  nuns  were  formerly 
designated  as  Nigganthas,  lit.  'those  who  are 
freed  from  all  bonds.*  These  Nigganthas  are 
frequently  met  with  in  ancient  Buddhist 
works.  For  instance,  the  Mahdparinibbana 
Suit  a,  one  of  the  earliest  books  on  Buddhism, 
composed  in  Pali  before  the  5th  century  B.Cr^ 
mentions  ''Niggantha  Jndtputtci'  as  being 
one  of  the  six  religious  teachers  of  the  time. 
This  last  Tirthankara  of  the  Jains  is  so  called 


INTRODUCtioM 

on  account  of  his  being  born  of  the  Kshatriya 
or  military  clan  known  as  Jndt  or  N&t.  Nu- 
merous references  are  also  to  be  found  in 
Brdhniinical  writings  about  the  Nigganthas 
and  their  faith. 

Important  mention  has  also  been  made  of 
the  Jain  System  of  Philosophy  in  several  of 
the  most  ancient  Indian  works.  And  so  far 
Its  antiquity  is  concerned,  it  is  now  admitted 
ef*  aH  hando  that  Jainism  is  not  an  off-shoot 
of  Buddhism.  It  had  been  in  existence  long 
before  Buddhism  was  conceived.  Its  indepen- 
dent existence  has  also  been  conclusively 
traced  out  both  by  external  and  internal  evi- 
dences from  various  works  of  high  antiquity 
in  recent  years.  Special  mention  may  be 
made  of  the  discovery  of  a  Jaina  Stupa  at 
Mathurd  which  gives  evidence  of  its  existence 
from  nearly  two  thousand  years  back.  It  is 
very  likely  that  future  researches  will  throw 
a  flood  of  light  on  the  theory  that  Buddhism 
is  rather  a  branch  of  Jainism.  From  a  refer- 
ence to  Jainism  in  the  Rig  Veda,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  system  in  question  must  have 
been  contemporary  with  the  Vedic  culture 
or  even  earlier  than  the  latter. 


OeX) 


An  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

After  its  supremacy  in  the  East  in  the 
kingdoms  of  Magadha,  Anga,  and  Koshal, 
Jainism  flourished  both  in  the  South  and  in  the 
West  of  India.  At  various  epochs,  it  was  the 
State  Religion  in  different  parts  of  the  country; 
and  the  fact  is  fully  corroborated  by  the  old 
inscriptions,  a  few  of  which  have  only  been,  of 
late,  brought  to  light  and  deciphered  by  the 
scholars  and  antiquarians  of  tke  modern  time. 

Jainism  is  an  original  system  of  thought 
and  culture,  quite  distinct  from  and  indepen- 
dent of  all  other  Indian  philosophical  specu- 
lations. In  the  words  of  Dr.  Jacobi,  '*It  (the 
Jain  Philosophy)  has,  truly  speaking,  a 
metaphysical  basis  of  its  own,  which  secured 
it  a  distinct  position  apart  from  the  rival 
systems,  both  of  the  Brahmins  and  of  the 
Buddhists."  And  it  now  goes  without  saying 
that  the  Jains  possess  a  high  claim  to  the  pre- 
servation of  the  ancient  history  of  India. 

According  to  the  Jains,  Truth  exists  from 
time  eternal ;  and  the  world  composed  of  the 
living  and  the  non-living  substances,  has  been 
in  existence  from  all  eternity,  and  undergoing 
an  infinite  number  of  variations,  produced 
simply    by   the   physical   and    superphysical 


INTRODUCTION 

powers   inherent    in    the     substances.     But 
variations  must  be  variations  in  time.  So  the 
Jain  sages  divide  this  time  according   to  the 
two   great   cycles,     called    Avasarpini  and 
Utsarptni, — Involution  and  Evolution.    The 
idea  is   that   of  a   serpent  in  infinite   space 
coiled  up,    so    that  the    tail    shall   touch   the 
head.     The  world  is  now  moving  down  this 
serpent  from  the   head    to  the  tail, — this    is 
Avasarpini  {Involution),    When  it  arrives  at 
the  extremity  of  the  tail,  it  cannot  go  on  fur- 
ther but  it  must  return  ;  and  its  progress  up- 
wards is  Utsarpini  (Evolution).  Now  each  of 
these  periods  is  again  divided  into  six  eras, — 
(i).     Sukhama  Sukhmd, 
(ii).     Sukhmd, 
(iii).    Sukhama  Dukhmd, 
(iv).    Dukhhama  Sukhmd^ 
(v).     Dukhmd, 
(vi).    Dukhama  Dukhmd* 
In  every  great  cycle,  twenty-four  Tirthan- 
kars   appear   in    the   field  of  action.     These 
Tirthankars  are  not  only    pure    and    perfect 
beings     and     attain    nirvdna    as    soon     as 
they  shuffle    off  their  mortal  coils,    but   also 
they   lay   down   rules    of  conduct  for    the 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM 

purification  of  our  hearts  and  minds  and 
establish  the  tirtha  or  the  order.  According 
to  the  Jains,  the  first  Tirthankara  'Rishava 
Deva  of  the  present  era,  gave  to  the  world  a 
systematic  exposition  of  Truth  in  all  its  as- 
pects, both  secular  and  spiritual.  He  also  laid 
down  rules  of  conduct  for  the  proper  guidance 
of  the  church  as  well  as  of  the  laity.  Rishava 
Deva  is  also  mentioned  in  the  Hindu  Scrip- 
ture, the  'Srimat  Bhagvat\  as  the  second  in 
the  list  of  kings,  who,  towards  the  end  of  his 
life,  abandoned  the  world  and  went  about  as  a 
naked  ascetic  and  rose  from  manhood  to 
divinity  by  meditation.  'Pdrshwanatha',  the 
twenty-third,  and  'Mahavira',  the  twenty- 
fourth,  were  not  founders  but  they  were  merely 
reformers  like  other  Tirthankars  in  different 
ages.  On  the  face  of  such  overwhelming  evi- 
dences as  can  be  collated  from  pages  of  high 
antiquity,  there  cannot  be  any  doubt  as 
to  the  existence  of  Mahdvira  or  Pdrshwatha 
as  historical  personages.  M.  Guerinot,  in 
the  Introduction  to  his  learned  Essay  on 
Jain  Bibliography,  indicates  the  important 
points  of  difference  between  the  life  of 
Mahavira  and  that  of  Buddha. 


INTRODUCTION 

MAHAVIRA  BUDDHA 

I.  Born  at  Vais^li  (Kunda-  i.  Born  at  Kapilavastu about 

gr^m)  about  599  B.  C.  557  B.  C. 

a.  His  parents  lived  to  a  2.  His  mother  died  soon  after 

good  old  age.  giving  b^  birth. 

3.  Assumed  the  ascetic  life  3.  Made  himself  a  monic 
with  the  consent  of  his-  against  the  wishes  of  his 
relatives.  father. 

4.  His  preparation  in  the  4.  Obtained  illumination  at 
ascetic  stage  lasted  for  the  end  of  6  years 
12  years.  only. 

5.  Died     at     Pawa     in  5.  Died  at  Kusinagar  about 

527  B.C.  488  B.  C. 

Pdrshwandtha  was  born  at  Benares  in  877 
B.  C,  and  reached  nirvdna  in  777  B.  C.  on  a 
hill  which  is  still  known  as  Pareshnath  Hills 
in  Bengal.  Mahdvira  or  Vardham^na,  the 
last  Tirthankara  of  this  age,  only  improved 
upon  the  then  existing  doctrines  and  customs 
according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  time,  and 
it  was  he  who  gave  Jainism  its  final  form. 
The  current  tenets  and  practices  of  Jainism, 
as  embodied  in  the  existing  Sutras  or 
canons,  are  his  utterances. 

Mah^vira  was  the  son  of  Siddh^rtha,  the 
chief  of  the  Ndt  clan  of  Kundagrama  near  the 
city   of  Vais^li,    who   belonged  to   a   noble 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAIN  ISM 

warrior  race.  His  mother  was  TrishalA,  sister 
of  king  Chetaka  of  Vaisili.  Chetaka's  daugh- 
ter Chelana  was  married  to  king  Shrenika 
or  Bambhs^ra  who  was  a  staunch  admirer 
and  adherent  of  Mah^vira.  Shortly  after  the 
death  of  his  parents,  Mah^vira  renounced  the 
world  and  became  an  ascetic  in  his  31st.  year. 
For  the  first  1 2  years,  he  led  a  life  of  aus- 
terities and  wandered  through  various  coun- 
tries preaching  the  truth  of  Jainism.  He 
acquired  perfect  knowledge  in  his  42nd.  year 
and  attained  nirv&na  at  Pawapuri,  a  few 
miles  from  modern  Behar,  in  527  B.  C.  at 
the  age  of  72. 

He  was  a  senior  contemporary  of  Gau- 
tam  Buddha  and  the  country  of  Magadha 
and  those  round  about  it,  were  his  chief 
spheres  of  spiritual  activity.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  both  the  great  preachers,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  of  being  contemporaneous,  avoid 
mentioning  each  other  in  their  utterances. 

About  two  centuries  after  Mahavira's 
death,  when  Chandra  Gupta  was  the  reigning 
Prince,  a  severe  famine,  lasting  for  twelve 
years,  visited  the  country  of  Magadha.  Bha- 
drab^hu  was  then  the  head  of  the  Jain  church, 


INTRODUCTION 

and  in  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion he  led  his  disciples  towards  the  south 
(Carnit  country),  placing  Sthulbhadra  in 
charge  of  the  section  that  remained  behind. 
During  this  long  famine,  the  Jain  monks 
began  to  forget  the  Siddk&nta  ;  and  towards 
the  end  of  the  famine,  while  Bhadrabihu 
was  still  absent  in  the  South,  a  council  assem- 
bled at  Pataliputra  to  collect  the  canons  or  the 
sacred  texts  of  the  Jains.  Gradually  the  man- 
ners and  customs  of  the  church  changed  and 
the  original  practice  of  going  abroad  naked 
was  abandoned  The  ascetics  began  to 
wear  the  *  White  Robe'.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  the  emigrating  party  who  made  the 
rule  of  nakedness  compulsory  on  all  their  mem- 
bers, returned  to  their  country  after  the  famine, 
they  refused  to  hold  fellowship  with  those 
that  had  remained  at  home,  on  account  of 
their  departure  from  the  practices  that  were 
common  before,  or  to  accept  the  canons 
collected  at  Pataliputra,  declaring  that  for 
them  the  canons  were  lost.  This  led  to  the 
final  separation  about  the  year  82  A.  D. 
And  thus  they  were  divided  into  two  branch- 
es,   the   original   being  styled  as   Shvetdm- 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM 

bara,  and  the  other  became  known  as 
Dts^ambara, 

The  Digamhars  believe  that  absolute 
nudity  is  imperative  for  perfectness  ;  while 
the  Shvetdmbars  diSs^n  that  perfectness  can 
be  attained  even  by  those  who  clothe  them- 
selves. The  difference  really  speaking  has  its 
origin  in  the  idea  that  a  person  attaining  to 
Kevala  jndn  (perfect  knowledge)  comes  no 
longer  under  the  sway  of  appetites  or  passions 
and  does  not  therefore  require  any  food  or 
clothing.  According  to  the  Shvetdmbars,  such 
a  holy  personage,  although  he  need  not  wear 
any  clothes,  does  not  appear  before  society 
unclothed  but  clad  in  white  robes,  while  the 
Digambars  hold  that  he  does  not  use  any 
clothes  and  appears  before  4*«  att  nude. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  point  of  difference 
between  the  two  branches.  There  are 
also  other  differences  as  regards  some 
eighty-four  minor  dogmas,  which  resulted 
in  the  production  of  sectarian  literature  and 
rules  of  conduct  for  the  church  and  the  laity. 
One  important  point  of  disagreement  to  be 
noted,  is  the  exclusion  of  women  from  the 
Order  by  the  Digambars,     As    they  hold, 


INTRODUCTtON 

women  cannot  attain  to  salvation  ;  and  they 
are  so  strongly  biassed  in  this  that  they 
take  even  the  Virgin  lady  Malli  Kumari, 
the  19th  Tirthankar,  not  as  a  female  but  a 
male.  But  the  Shvet^mbars  hold  that  both 
men  and  women  are  alike  entitled  to  and 
can  actually  attain  to  nirvdna, 

Jainism  is  not  a  monastic  religion 
but  truly  an  evangelic  or  a  missionary 
religion, — religion  intended  not  for  the 
ascetics  only  (  male  and  female  )  but  for  the 
world  at  large  in  which  the  majority  are 
lay  people.  Some  remark  that  Jainism  lack- 
ed in  that  missionary  spirit  which  gave  life 
and  scope  to  early  Buddhism.  But  this  view 
is  not  based  on  right  observation  of  facts  and 
correct  interpretation  of  the  Jain  religious 
thought  and  culture.  For  in  the  Jain 
canonical  rules  for  the  ascetics,  it  is 
distinctly  enjoined  that  a  monk,  excepting  the 
Chaturm&sya,  or  the  period  of  four  months 
during  the  rainy  season,  should  generally 
on  no  account  stay  at  a  fixed  place  for  more 
than  one  month  ;  rather  he  should  go  on 
wandering  from  city  to  city,  from  village  to 
village,  preaching  the  cardinal  truths   of  his 

// 


Ak  EPITOME  OF  jAlNtSM 

faith  and  doctrine  and  thus  work  among  the 
laity,  for  their  moral  elevation  and  spiritual  en- 
lightenment. Equal  consideration  was  given  to 
both  the  church  and  the  laity  and  a  Sangha 
was  accordingly  organised  by  each  Jina, 
The  characteristic  of  a  true  Jina  is  most 
aptly  expressed  by  Ratna  Shekhara  in  the 
opening  lines  of  his  Sambodha  Sattari,  which 
reads  as  follows  : — "No  matter,  whether  he 
is  a  Skveidmbara  or  Digambara,  a  Buddha 
or  a  follower  of  any  other  creed,  one  who  has 
realised  himself  the  self-sameness  of  the  soul 
i.  e.  one  who  looks  on  all  creatures  alike  his 
own  self,  is  sure  to  attain  salvation." 

Jainism  is  a  religion  universal — its  object 
being  to  help,as  it  does,  all  beings  to  salvation 
and  to  open  its  arms  to  all,  high  or  low,  by 
revealing  to  them  the  real  truth.  The  High- 
est Good  is  found  in  Moksha  or  Nirv6Lna^^--\}ci^ 
Absolute  Release  of  the  soul  from  the  fetters 
of  births  and  deaths. 

The  attainment  of  Nirvdna  is  usually  pre- 
ceded by  development  oi  kevala/'ndn  or  abso- 
lute and  unimpeded  knowledge.  This  is  the 
fifth  or  last  kind  of  knowledge,  the  other  kinds 
of  knowledge  in   the   order  of  developments 

12 


INTRODUCTION 

being  (  i  )   Matt,     (  2  )  Srutt\  (3)  Abadhi, 
(4)  Manahparyaya, 

The j^rst  is  intellectual  knowledge,  derived 
from  the  peripheral  contact  of  the  senses 
with  their  objects  or  from  mental  illumina- 
tion due  to  observation  and  inference.  The 
second  is  clear  knowledge  derived  from  the 
study  of  scriptures,  books  or  from  the  inter- 
pretation of  symbols  or  signs.  The  third  is 
the  determinative  knowledge  of  events  and 
incidents  taking  place  somewhere  beyond  the 
range  of  sense-perceptions.  The  fourth  is  the 
knowledge  of  others'  thoughts  The  first  two 
are  natural  or  commonsense  knowledge.  The 
other  three  are  super-sensuous  knowledge. 
The  third  is  the  perception  of  visible  objects 
which  proceeds  directly  from  the  soul  without 
the  mediation  of  sense-organs.  Though 
super-sensuous,  still  it  cannot  go  beyond  the 
limits  of  physical  regions  ;  while  the  fourth 
goes  further  beyond  and  can  penetrate  into  the 
secrets  of  the  heart.  The  last  only  covers 
everything  whatsover,  present,  past  or  future, 
visible  or  invisible.  It  is  pure  and  non 
determinative  in  its  character.  The  possessor 
of  this  fifth   form    of  knowledge    is  called   a 

^3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM 

Kevalin.  When  the  soul  of  a  Kevalin  leaves 
its  material  frame,  it  passes  out  of  this 
mundane  world  and  soars  up  straight  towards 
the  hyper-physical  region  (Aloka),\ki^  Heaven 
of  the  Liberated  which  lies  at  the  top  of  the 
Universe.  There  it  continues  ©«  to  shine  for- 
ever in  all  its  purity  and  perfection.  It  re- 
mains there  in  a  state  of  perfect  equanimity 
and  delight  infinite  disturbed  by  nothing. 
And  This  is  Nirvdna  or  Moksha,  It  is,  in 
fact,  the  absolute  release  of  the  soul  from  all 
A'^r;^^- matter  by  the  complete  decay  of  the 
causes  of  bondage  and  physical  existence.  No 
soul  is  wholly  disembodied  unless  it  is  thus 
liberated  from  the  burden  of  Karma-rndXi^r. 
And  this  release  is  not  the  annihilation  of 
the  soul  as  the  Buddhists  hold,  nor  is  it  the 
merging  of  the  Individual  with  the  Supreme 
wherein  it  loses  its  own  identity  and  indi- 
viduality as  Shankar,  the  lion  of  the  VedAn- 
tists,  roars,  but  it  is  the  [ivas  going  beyond 
whence  there  is  no  return  to  Sansdr  again. 


^4 


CHAPTER  I. 
JAINISM-ITS  PHILOSOPHY  AND  RELIGION. 

Gonstcleratton  of  tlic  term  PKaloso^ky — As  tkey 
unclerstanJ  tt  tn  t\ie  West. — Aristotle,  Sl>encer  an  J 
Hegel — PKtloso;t^liy  ac  defined  and  taugkt  Ly  tke  Jtnas 
or  tke  Victors. — RtgKt  Knowledge,  Rtgkt  Vision  and 
Rigkt  Gondvict  —Tke  Triune  ox  Jamism— Some 
Rudimentary  Ideas  and  Meta|>kysical  Notions. 

We  now  turn   to   our   enquiry    into   the 
Philosophy  of  the  ^inas  or   the  Victors — the       Necessity 

of  a    Defini- 

more  immediate  subject-matter  of  the  present    tion  of  the 

word  Thilo- 
treatise.  But  philosophy  is  one  of  those  words    sophy. 

which  are  often  used  rather  loosely,  leading 
to  much  confusion  of  thought  with  regard  to 
its  real  end  and  import.  To  guard  against  any 
such  misapprehension  which  a  student  of 
modern  thought  and  culture  might  labour 
under,  it  is  important  that  we  should  first  dis- 
cuss in  brief  what  the  West  mean  by  philoso- 
phy and  what  we  the  Jains  understand  by  it. 

Aristotle   defines   philosophy    to    be   the    Aristotle, 
''science   of  principles"  or  **fir«t  beginnings." 
Another   takes  it   to      mean  a    "completely    spencer. 

^5 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM 

unified  knowledge".     **Philosophy'\according 
Hegel.  '^  ^  third,  "is  the  science  of  the    Absolute," 

in  the  sense  that  it  takes  the  world  of 
Nature  not  as  a  product  of  chance  but  of  a 
Single  Infinite  Power  whose  activity  consists 
in  the  working  out  of  a  plan  or  purpose  in 
the  course  of  which  It  evolves  this  world  out 
of  Itself.  Thus  has  philosophy  been  vari- 
ously defined  by  different  thinkers  of  diffe- 
rent ages  and  climes. 

The   Jains,    however,    teach    that  philo- 

Philosophy  •         .       i  i  i 

as     defined    sophy  consists  in  the  voluntary  and  consistent 

by    the    Ji- 

nas.  striving,     intellectual     and    moral,    manifest 

in  the  removal  of  impediments  on  the  way  to 
Right  Vision  (^^J^^sjif)  into  the  metaphysics 
of  things  and  thoughts  leading  to  Right 
Knowledge  (^^«li  '^IT)  of  the  world  as  a 
whole,  and  of  our  own  function  and  place — 
Right  Conduct  (^«7^  ''^if^of)  therein  with  the 
express  object  of  realizing  finally  the  free  and 
beatific  state  of  our  being — the  ultimate  end 
and  purpose  of  all  life  and  activity. 

Taking  philosophy,  then,  as   an   attempt 
Its  Method    to   attain   to   a   free     and    beatific    state   of 

of  enquiry. 

being  by  the  virtue  of  Right  Conduct — 
(^''^^  "^Tftof)  proceeding  from   Right  Know- 

j6 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  RELIGION, 

ledge  [samyak  jndna)  acquired  through 
Right  Vision  (  samyak  darshan  )  into  the  reali- 
ties of  things  and  thoughts,  we  can  ascertain 

beforehand  what  the  principal   branches  and 

f         ^  The    two 

problems  of  our  enquiry  will  be.  We  can  see    fundamental 

^  -1/  factors  of 

that  there  are  two  fundamental  factors  of  the    ^^^  world.— 

world  :  ({)  Jiva,  the  Cogitative  Substance  or 

the  Soul,  including^  the  system  of  finite  minds    ,.,   ^. 

'  ^  J  (i)  Jtva, 

either  in  Ntgoda,  fixed,  fettered,  or  free,  in  the 

various  gradations  of  their  being  ;  (ii)  Ajiva, 

the  Non-Cogitative  Substance,  the  Non-living 

or  the  Non  Soul,    including  objective  things 

and  processes  and  the  like.    Hence  our  en-    (")  ^y^'^^- 

quiry  into  philosophy^  roughly  speaking,  will 

branch  out  into, — 

(i)     The  Cogitative    Substance    or    Soul 
(jiva)y 

(ii)    The    Non-Cogitative    Substance   or 
the  Non-Soul  {ajiva),  and  finally, 

(iii)  The  End  or  Freedom  {mokshd)ol\}(\t, 

soul  in  relation  as  to  how  it  is  attained. 

Neces  sary 

But  from  a  consideration  of  these    funda-    [^^^^   ^"^^ 

Notions. 

mentals,  it  becomesi  evident  that  we  have  to 
make  a  frequent  use  of  such  metaphysical 
ideas  and  notions  as  Dravya  (substance), 
Guna  (qualityX  Parydya  (modality  or    modi- 


n 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

fication),  Karma  (action,  motion  or  change 
of  relative  position  ),  KAran  (  causality  ) 
and  the  like ;  and  no  consistent  result  of 
our  enquiry  into  philosophy  can  be  ex- 
pected until  appropriate  and  complete  un- 
derstanding has  been  arrived  at  in  regard 
to  these  fundamental  ideas  and  notions.  But 
an  understanding  of  the  content  and  origin 
of  these  ideas  involves,  to  a  great  extent, 
analytical  psychology  of  cognition. 

Furthermore,     philosophy,    as    we  have 
And  under-    seen   above,  claims  to  know  the  realities  as 

standing     of 

th  e  s  e  in-    they   are,    and   therefore   it     must    proceed 

volves  a  n  a- 

lyticai  psy-    ^Jth  the  justification  of  its  rig^hts  by  showinsf 

chology     of  -^  &  /  & 

c  o  g  n  1  tion    Yyhat  the  conditions  or  means  (Pramdnas)  of 

and  question  ^  ^ 

orcondi^ttons  att'^i^"^'^'*&  knowledge  are,  and  proving  as  well, 
ledge."  °  ^ "  ^^^^  knowledge  of  realities  corresponding  to 
the  above  ideas  is  within  its  power  and  com- 
petence. Otherwise,  instead  of  explaining 
the  relations  which  the  Jivas  and  Ajivas 
bear  to  each  other,  it  will  go  on  oflfy 
dogmatising,  sometimes  sinking  into  the 
lower  leveb  of  scepticis>^ii  and  agnosticism, 
or  at  other  times  rising  into  pseudo-ratio- 
nalism— only  to  add  to   the   impediments   of 

which  there  are   plenty  already   to  obscure 

f 

l8 


PHILOSOPHY  AMD  RELIGtOM. 

our  right  vision  into^  realities  of  ideas  and 
ideals  and  forge  thereby  fresh  links  to  the 
chains  of  misery  that  tie  us  down  to  the 
mires  of  this  suffering  world.  Bm  To  avoid 
such  pitfalls  and  to  know  the  realities  in  con- 
formity with  the  rules  and  canons  required 
to  be  observed  in  the  acquirement  of  a 
correct  knowledge,  we  must  proceed  from 
such  and  other  notions  and  ideas  as  form 
the  subject-matter  of  the  next  chapter. 


ip 


CHAPTER  II. 
PREDICAMENTS    BY  PRE-EMINENCE. 

Fundamental  Notions. —  Categories  or  Preaicamcnts 
Ly  ^re-em%nence. — Tketr  Necessity  and  Origtn. — How 
cletermtnecl. — Advantages  of  suck  determination. — 
Dravya.  Guna,  Paryaya  and  Karma. — PaJ>a  and  Punya. 
— Classification  and  descrit>tion  in  general  of  tnc 
Predicaments. — Their  enumeration. 

We  have  already  seen  that  Right  Vision, 

Right  Knowledge,  and    Right    Conduct   are 

the    three    principal      departments  of     our 

philosophical  enquiry. 

Origin    and  But  in   dealing   with    these,    as  we  have 

context      of  ^ 

t  h  e  funda-    remarked,    we    have      often     to-make     use 

mental  Ideas 

aad  Notions    ^f    g^^|^    g^^^^j    certain      fundamental    ideas 
such  as  : — 

or  notions  as  are  not  only  the  necessary 
forms  according  to  which  we  ourselves 
must  conceive  things  but  which  must 
also  be  regarded  as  necessary  forms  and 
relations  of  the  things  themselves.  For 
in  thinking,  to  be  more  clear,  we  think 
something  about  a  thing  and  what  we 
think   about   a   thing   is   that  it  has  powers 


20 


PREDICAMENTS, 

of  producing  effects  (  ^^  %in^ITt  )  in  other 
things,  and  stands  in  certain  relations  to 
them.  For  finite  things  exist  and  mani- 
fest their  existence  by  acting  and  re- 
acting, thereby  exercising  causality  (  ^TT^ccf ) 
on  one  another  ;  we  distinguish  these 
powers    of  action    and     re-action      by    the 

effects   which    they   mutually   produce,  and,    ^ 

Causality. 

it  goes  without  saying  that  we  call  these 
powers  as  their  qualities  ( g^  ).  But  the 
degree  of  the  effect  which  a  thing  pro- 
duces on  other  things  depends  on  certain 
relations  in  which  it  stands  in  regard  Quality. 
to  them  /.  e,  relations  of  time  and  space 
(  ^T^  and  'q^^T^l  ^^"^ ).  Then,  again, 
we      cannot      think     of    any     change     or    idea,  End  or 

Purpose, 
any    action    excepting   as    tending   towards 

the  realisation     of  some  particular   end  or 

idea.     It     is   true     that     some     hold    that 

all   actions    and   changes   are   due     to   the 

blind     operation    of    material      forces    and 

fortuitous  concourse    of  atoms  and  molecules 

without   any   idea   or     end  to  realise  ;    but 

there     are     also     other     angles    of    vision 

which  find  reason  as  underlying    all    pheno 

mena.     From    this     poinjt   of  view  we   see 


21 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

that  all  actions  and  changes  are  co-ordinated 
according  to  a  plan  made  to  co-operate 
in  such  a  /^ay  as  to  realise  a  purpose  or  an 
end.  If  it>is  the  case,  it  must  be  that  the 
end  is  something  good  and  the  subordinate 

Good— F^ree^  ^/^rfj  must  be  such  as  to  lead  towards  the 
realisation  of  the  Highest  Good  or  Freedom 
(  ^Tx^Tx^   f'Tl^^I'Er,    ^?r^   or     fifo^M  ).        But 

Merit  and    ^|j  ^j^jg  involves  such    questions   as,  What  is 

good,  virtue  or  merit  (  g^  )  and  What  is 
Bad,  vice  or  demerit  ( 17m  ),  and  finally,  How 
a  man  should  regulate  his  life  and  thought 
i.  e.  What  would  constitute  Right  Conduct 
( ^T^cfi  ^iftpf )  for  the  realisation  of  the 
Highest  Good  or  Freedom  ? 

Having  perceived,  however,  that  a  thing 

Predicates — 

how  deter-    acts   in   a   certain    way   upon   other  things, 

mined. 

we  integrate  the  idea  of  the  thing  by  acts 
of  judgments  and  thenceforth  we  think 
of  them  as  attributes  inherent  in  the  thing  ; 
tet  in  order  to  express  this  fact  we  put 
them  into  conception  of  the  thing  by  an  act 
of  judgment  and  we  call  them  Categories, 
Predicates  or  Predicaments  by  pre-eminence. 
Now  the  thing  or  the  subject,  which 
the   predicates   are    ascribed     to,    is   styled 

22 


PREDICAMENTS, 

as  and  included  among  the  fundamental 
pradicaments  or  categories  for  convenience. 
We    call      it     substaiice     or      reality      by 

,  .   I  I  .       .      p,     .    .  .     I  Sat  and    its 

which    we    mean   that    it    is  ^at  i.  e.,  it  has    tripartite  in- 

.     -  ,  .  f.    .  f.         dications. 

an  independent  existence  ot  its  own  tor 
its  characteristic  indication  (  ^c55^og^^?Xr^  ). 
Sat  is,  again,  defined  as  what  persists  in  and 
through  its  own  qualities  and  modifications 
(  it^frT  ^^m^i  g^n^mi^  sqi^fh  ).  It 
{Sat)  is  further  characterised  as  standing 
under,  supporting  and  holding  together  as 
well,  the  attributes  or  qualities  (  ^tij  )  and 
modifications  (tT^T^j)  revealed  in  the  forms  of 
origination  or  effects  (^c^T^),  and  destruction 
disintegration — (ogg)  in  and  through  which 
the  substance  asserts  and  maintains  its 
own  existence  and  continuance  (  ^^  )  as 
perceived  during  the  course  of  its  interaction  *" 
with  other  things  (^cqi^-o^^-^g^^  ^^). 

Thus  the  characteristic  indication  of  Definiti  on 
Substance  being  as  such,  we  may  define  (ij Substance 
it  as  the  underlying  entity  (-^sji)  which 
itself,  remaining  essentially  the  same  in  and 
through  all  its  modes  of  being,  gives 
support  and  connection  to  all  its  qualities, 
modalities  and  the  like. 


23 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

Quality  (g^)  of  a  substance  is  its  power 
of  producing  effects  of  changes  in  other 
things  through  time  and  space.  It  is  ever- 
present  in  the  substance.  Neither  being 
(ii)  Quality,  found  to  be  without  the  other,  they  both 
stand  in  the  relation  of  invariable  con- 
comitance or  simultaniety  (?Jtntc^)  with  one 
another,  instead  of  being  in  relation  of 
antecedence   and  consequence   in   time   {^T{- 

Modality  or  Modification  (icr^m)  again,  is 
(iii)     Moda-  -^  -[  .  . 

lity.  the  successive  variation  (TT^ITij)  in  the  atomic 

arrangement     and     configuration     which   a 

thing  undergoes  in  the  course  of  time  and  in 

space. 

Now  Substantiality^  Quality  and  Modality 

P  r  e  d  i  c  a- 

ments   and    being,  in  short,  the  three  characteristic   indi- 

their  e  n  u- 

meratiol—    cations  of  substance   so    called,    quality  and 
Nine  -^ 

modality  are  also  at  times  considered 
as  substances  under  certain  circumstances 
and  relations  when  each  of  these  three  is 
thus  characterised  again  with  the  tri-partite 
indications  of  substance.  The  Jain  teachers, 
however,  have  come  to  the  enumeration  in 
general  of  nine  categories  or  predicaments 
by  pre-eminence  as  in  the  following,-— 


24 


PREDICAMENTS, 

I.  Jiva  (fft^) — Cogitative  substance,  Soul, 
Self  or  Subject  is  that  which  has  IntelHs^ence    ,. 

•^  ^  Jiuas     not 

(^fl^)  for    its    characteristic    indication.     It    ^^^-P^^vad- 

^  '  ing,  nor  one 

is  marked  out  from  Ajiva  (^^^)— Non-  IbsouTeiy 
cogitative  substance,  Non-soul,  Not-self  or  no^n-'eternah*^ 
Object  by  knowing  consciousness  ('^(•T)  which 
essentially  belongs  to  the  Jiva  only.  This 
individual  y^^z;^  is  not  all-pervading,  nor  is  it 
only  one  in  number ;  neither  is  it  abso- 
lutely eternal  or  unchangeable  ;  nor  is  it 
absolutely  non-eternal  or  transitory.  It  is 
innumerable  in  number  and  is  both  eternal 
and  non  eternal  in  accordance  with  the  view- 
point we  take.to  look  at  these. 

This  Jiva  exists  in  the  germinal  state    in 
the  form  of  what  is  technically  called  Nigoda    Jarstafe^of 

(f5Til\?).     It    contracts    or   expands,     as    the    Us^chamcter^ 

1         ^         /:*.    •  '^.u     i-U       istic    indica- 

requirements    may   be,    to     tit    in    with    the    tions,— 

corporeal    frames    it    takes    on     at   different 

stages     of     its      migratory      existence      in 

order    to   enjoy    pleasures   or     suffer     from 

pains.     In    order    to   reap     what     it    sows, 

it    migrates    here,    there     and     everywhere 

through     the   processes  of  repeated   births, 

developments   and   deaths.     On   account  of 

its    ever   striving  to   break  off  the  fetters  of 

^5 


Its  Divinity, 


AN  EPITOME  OF  [A  IN  ISM 
bondage   and  attain  to   a   free   and   beatific 

Its     consti-  r    i_    •  i_  r      i  t-      • 

tutional    State   ot    bcHig    by    means     oi    the      Iruine 

Freedom,  -. 

Gems  (?:^o[2It),  the  ^iva  is  held  to  be 
constitutionally  free  and  essentially  all  bliss 
(^I«T«'^).  It  is  potentially  divine  in  the  sense 
that  it  attains  to  Divinity  or  Perfection  in 
the  end  when  it  shines  in  all  its  glory  and 
effulgence  beyond  all  thought  and  speech  near 
the  regions  of  A/oka. 
And  its  infi-  Now  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  these 

magn*i"ude    Jtvci^ — filling  the  entire  space  and  void  of  the 

but  in   num-  .  ,  .    ,  ,  . 

ber.  universe  and  are  mainly  grouped  into, — 

(A)  Freed  Jivas — -are  those  beings  who 
(i)TheFreed    have  attained  to  divinity   and   become   self- 

Jiva. 

conscious  and  self-luminous  near   the  hyper- 
physical  regions  :  and, 

(B)  Fettered  Jivas, — are  those  who  are 
tered//w.       Still  bound  down  with  the    chains    of  karma 

either  on  Earth,  in  Heaven,  or  in  Purgatory. 
Which  is  These     fettered    l^ivas    are    arain    5ub- 

classified  '  ^  ^ 

again  into,       divided  into  (i)  Sthdvava  and  (ii)  Tras, 

(i)     StMvara   Jivas — are    those    which 

{S\T\i^stha-  ^^^  devoid  of  all  power  of  locomotion 
and  have  only  one  organ  of  sense,  viz, 
that  of  touch  (  ^sr ).  Earth,  water,  fire, 
air    and    all    those     that   come    within   the 


26 


vara  and 


(2)The  Tras. 


PREDICAMENTS. 

range  of  the  vegetable  kingdom,  are  known 
as  Jivas  belonging  to  the  Sthdvara  class. 
Symptoms  of  life  in  these  Sapr&n  Stk&var 
(  ^^\^^  W\^\ )  or  living  fixtures  consist, 
amongst  other  phenomena,  in  responsiveness 
which  evidently  involve  memory  as  dis- 
played in  the  mental  activity  of  feeling, 
cognition  and  re-cognition 

(ii)  Trds  Jivas — are  those  who  have  the 
power  of  locomotion  and  are  grouped  into 
four  kinds  according  to  the  nature  and 
number     of    the      sense-organs     they    are    The  four 

rr^i       r  i'i        ro-  o/-  kinds  of  the 

possessed  of.     The  four  kinds  of  Tras  Jivas    Tras, 
are  ; — 

(a)  those  that  have  the  organs  of  touch 
and  taste,  (^i?%^  and  ?:%f%5  )  e.g.,  leeches, 
worms,  etc. 

(b)  those  that  have  three  organs  such  as 
touchy  taste  and  smell,  (^sjfs^g,  T%f5§[€r 
and  ^J^f^g^T  )  e.g.,  ants,  lice,  etc. 

(c)  those  that  have  organ  of  sight 
(  ^^^f^?I  )  in  addition  to  the  above  three 
organs,  eg,  bees,  scorpions,  etc. — 

(d)  and,  lastly,  those  that  have  all  the 
above  four  organs  in  addition  to  that  of 
the    hearing    (  il^^^T  )  This     last     kind  of 

27 


An  epitome  of  jainisM, 

Jivas  includes  birds,  acquatics,  animals  and 
human  beings  and  all  those  that  people 
Heaven,   Earth  and  Purgatory. 

II.  Ajiva  (  ^^^  )— Non-cogitative  sub- 
stance, Non-soul,  Not-self  or  the  Object  is 
all  what  is  absolutely  bereft  of  all  inteUi- 
gence,  and  consequently  of  the  tripartite 
Ajiva  defin-  ^o^^s  o{  consciozcsfiess.  This  Ajiva  or  Non- 
cogitative  substance  is  of  five  kinds,  viz  ; — 

(i)  Pudgala  signifies  what  develops  fully 
only  to  be  dissolved  again. — It  is  that 
kind  of  dead  dull  ponderable  (  ^^t')  matter, 
which  is  qualified  with  touch,  taste,  smell 
and    colour.     It    is  found  to  exist  generally 

Ponderable     ,  r i     • 

Ajiva-Pud-    \xi  two  modcs  of  bemg  : — (a)   Anu  (^^) — 

gal    and    its 

indications    atom,  and   (b)  Skandha    (^TO), — compound. 

— Lakskana. 

When  the  dead  and  dull  matter  exists  in  the 
last  indissoluble  stage  where  the  ingredients 
admit  of  no  further  analysis,  it  is  called 
anu  or  atom.  Afid  5A:«;/</^^-compound  is 
.  the  natural  conglomeration  of  pudgal-3.toms 
under  chemical  and  physical  laws.  It  is 
these  Pudga la- 3.toms  that  incessantly  en- 
ter and  leave  our  bodies  and  are  infinitely 
more  numerous  than  the  Jivas.  Karma  is  a 
kind  of  fine  Pudga I- Sitoms. 

28 


PREDICAMENTS, 

The  Pudgala-vrnXi^T  is  also  classified    in 

Pu  d g a  la 

the  following    manner      according  to    other    Classified, 
modes  of  its  being  : — 

(a)  Sthula-Sthula  (  ^g-^^ )  or  the 
Grossest  of  the  gross,  as,  for  example,logs  of 
wood  or  blocks  of  stone  ;  i.e.,  solids  which 
can  be  cut  into  equal  parts. 
'  (b)  Sthula  (  ^^  )  or  the  Gross-simple, 
milk  or  water,  i.  e.,  liquids,  which  are 
restorable  to  their  original  mass-forms  even 
after  their  measurable  divisions. 

(c)  Sthula- sukshma  (  ^  '^-'^'^  )  or  the 
Compound  of  the  ^r^^^  and  \ki^  fine  (e.g.  gases 
which  is  visible  in  the  light  of  the  sun  or  the 
moon  but  cannot  be  caught  ;  as  for  example 
smokes  and  the  like) 

(d)  Sukshma-Sthula  (  ^"^-^^  )  or  the 
Compound  of  the  fine  and  the  gross  is 
what  is  not  visible  to  the  eye  but  is  per- 
ceptible by  the  auditory  or  olfactory  nerves  ; 
as,  for  example,  music  and  smell. 

(e)  Sukshma  (  ^^  )  or  the  Fine. 

(f)  Sukshma- Sukshma  i^^-"^^)  or  the 
Finest  of  the  fine,  the  ultimate  atoms 
which  admit  of  no  further  divisions.  These 
finest  of  the  fine,  are  mere  simples   as  oppos- 

2g 


An  epitome  of  JAINISM. 

ed  to  compounds  and  like  points  have  posi- 
sions  but  no  magnitude. 

(ii).    Dharma  or  Dharmdstikdya   is  that 
Impopder-    simple  imponderable  (^TOtT)  substance  by  the 

able    Ajiva.        .  r       i  •   i      i      i*  11 

Virtue  01  which  bodies  are  able  to  move. 
Dha7^ma  here  seems  to  be  a  reality,  corres- 
ponding to  the  Rajas  (^5T^)  of  the  Sslnkhya 
philosophy,  helping  to  the  mobility  of  mate- 
rial things. 

(iii).  Adharma  or  Adh'irmAstikdya  is 
that  simple  imponderable  (^i^)  substance 
by  the  virtue  of  which  bodies  are  able  to  be 
at  rest.  Adharma^  like  Dharma,  appears  to 
be  a  reality  corresponding  to  the  Tamas  (cTTTO 
of  the  S^nkhya  philosophy  tending  to  bring 
things  to  a  rest. 

(iv).  Akdsh  or  Space  is  the  uncontained 
container  of  all  that  exists. 

(v)  Kdl  or  Time  is  what  reveals  itself  in 
a  series  or  succession  of  events  or  changes. 
It  IS  in  the  course  of  time  that  things  wear 
out,  unfold  themselves  or  undergo  changes^ 
It  is  this  time  that  is  conventionally  divided 
and  termed  as  moments,  minutes,  hours  and 
the  like  for  which  reason  it  is  technically 
called  Kalandtmak  KdL 


30 


PREDICAMENTS. 

Ill,     Pimya  or  Virtue   or  deeds  of  merit    Punya, 
is   that  which  helps  the    Jiva   in  his    enjoy- 
ment of  health,  wealth  and  pleasures. 

IV.  PdpayOYVizQ  or  deeds  of  demerit  is  that    p^p^^  • 
which  adds  to  the  pain  and  suffering  of  the  Jiva. 

V.  ^^r^?z^a  or  Infiux,   infection  or  trans-      , 

Asrava, 

mutation  of  Pudgal-^diXi\c\es  into  the  soul. — 
The  Pudgal  particles,  which  are  foreign  to 
the  soul,  find  their  way  into  the  soul  through 
mind,  speech  and  other  sense  organs  and 
thus  cause  discoloration  of  the  latter  giving 
rise  to  love,  hatred,  and  the  like. 

VI.  Bandha  or  bondage  is   the    wrong 

Bandha. 

identification  of  the  soul  with  the  Non-soul 
owing  to  the  atomic  transmutation  of  the 
latter  into  the  former. 

VII.  Sambar  is  the  gradual  cessation  of 

Sambar. 

this  influx  into  the  soul  along  with  the  deve- 
lopment of  knowledge. 

VIII.  AtrjarA  is  the  absolute  purging  of 

Nirjard. 

the  soul  of  all  matters  foreign  to  it. 

IX.  Mokska    is    the     Freedom   of    the 

soul  from  the  fetters  of  the  bondage   due   to    Mokska. 
matters  alien  to  it. 

The  above   is    but   a  general    statement 
with    reference    to   the    nine    categories    or 


3^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM, 

predicaments  as  taught  by  the  Jain  teachers. 
As  to  their  details  we  shall  see  later  on  in 
their  proper  places.  Some,  however,  taking 
Punya  and  P&pa  under  Bandha  hold  that 
^'^^  categories  are  only  seven  in  number.  Others 
again  leaving  aside  the  moral  categories 
begining  with  PSipa  and  Pnnya^  opine  that 
there  are  only  six  Paddrtkas  or  Predicaments 
viz  :  Jiva,  Pudgaly  DkarmUy  Adharmay 
Akdsh  and  Kdla,  But,  be  that  as  it  may 
the  question  is  :  what  do  we  know  of  these 
categories?  And  in  this  is  involved  another 
question  :  what  is  knowledge  f  Unless  wa 
satisfy  ourselves  in  regard  to  this  it  wodd 
be  difficult  for  us  to  precisely  state  what  we 
understand  by  these  categories,  a  right 
vision  into  the  metaphysics  of  which,  we 
are  told,  will  bring  ©*r  right  knowledge 
of  the  verities  of  thought  and  life^  helping 
in  the  right  regulation  of  our  conduct  for 
the  attainment  of  Freedom — the  Summum 
Bonum  of  all  life  and  living. 


32 


CHAPTER  III. 
KNOWLEDGE  AND  ITS  FORMS. 

Tke  Corrclattvtty  of  Jtva  ani  Ajiva — Polartty  of 
Knowledge. — Self  an<l  tlie  Not-self — Consctousness  and 
its  Ortgtn— Knowledge  ana  xta  Growth.  IDenntttons  of 
Rtgkt  Vtston  and  Rtglit  Knowledge — Different  forms 
of  Knowledge  and  tke  PossiLtUty  of  tke  Kevala 
Jnana. — Kevaltn  ts  tke  Ideal  Real — Pure  Intuitions — tk« 
true  ckaractertstte  of  Real  Pratyakska. 

To  begin  with  knowledge,  therefore,  we 
must  first  see  as  to  how  do  we  become  cons- 
cious of  the  Self  and  the  Not-Self;  what 
we  are  and  what  we  see^  hear^  taste y  touch 
or  smelL 

A/v  tgrflmg   analysis  of  the  contents  of  our    Correlativity 

1  11  c    \  11  11  1  .incur  con- 

knowMedge  of  the  world  as  a  whole   makes  it    ception  of 

the  world — 

pretty  clear  that  we  can   arrange   our   ideas  Jiva   and 

Ajiva, 

relating  to  the  same  under  two  pairs  of  con- 
trasted alternatives,  Jiva  and  Ajiva,  as  com- 
plementary aspects  of  reality,  each  of  which 
suggests  the  other  by  a  dielectic  necessity  and 
combines  with  the  other  into  one  more  complex 
conception.  Now  these  two  contrasted  alter- 
natives are  but  two  conditions  of  thought : 
All  thinking  implies  a  subject  which  thinks — 
Cogitative     principle   or    Soul.     But   as   all 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

thinking    is   thinking   of  something,  it  means 
Subject^  and    ^'^^^    '^   requires   a    material    on    which    the 

Object   in,  ,  ..         .  .,  ,  /-,•• 

thought.  thought-activity    is   exercised  and  a  fortiori 

therefore,  it  implies  an  object  which  is  discri- 
minated and  understood  by  thought.  Thus 
we  can  neither  imagine  a  subject /Jor  a 
thinking  principle  without  an  object  to  think 
upon,  or  a  world  without  conceiving  a  cogi- 
tative principle  as  thinking  it.  And  this  is 
hpw  we  become  conscious  of  the  Self  or 
Subject  and  the  Not-Self  or  Object. 

Conscious-  Afed /tom  this  It   is  evident    that   cons- 

nes  s    and 

knowledge    ciousness  arises  only  from    the   action    and 

from     action  ' 

and  interac-    jnter-action  of  the  Self  and  Not-Self  as  such  ; 

tion  between 

theSelrand  ^^^  constituted  as  we  are,  our  knowledge 
t  e  ot-  e  .  j^ygj.  therefore  begin  with  sensations  from 
the  peripheral  contact  of  the  senses  with 
their  respective  objects,  and  consists  in 
Sensation  the  interpretation  of  the  sensations  which 
tation'^know-    they  arouse  in  us  ;    for,  merely  having  sensa- 

ledge  and  its       ,  i   r     i'  11  •  1 

formation.  tions  and  feelings  would  not  constitute  know- 
ledge. Therefore  the  knowledge  of  a  thing 
is  the  interpretation  and  understanding  of 
the  sensation  in  such  a  manner  as  would 
correspond  to  the  existing  relations  between 
the  self  and    the    Not-Self  and  other  sur- 

34- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  ITS  FORMS. 

rounding  things,  the  fundamental  forms  of 
which  are  called  categories.  It  is  thus 
quite  apparent  that  interpretation  precedes 
knowledge  and  the  more  accurate  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  sensation,  tne  more  correct 
would  be  the  knowledge  thereof.  When 
the  sensations,  caused  in  us  by  the  powers  in- 
herent in  the  objects  in  contact  with  the 
peripheral  extremities,  are  interpreted,  and 
understood  quite  in  accordance  with  the  forms 
and    relations    in    which    they    subsist     and    Right  Vision 

^  ,  .   ,        ,  I,     ,  .  is  the  Abso- 

for    which    they   are   called    categories,     we    lute  Faith- 

,  ...  -      .  Sraddhd    in 

come  to  know    them  as   objective    relations,    theinstruc- 

•    .  1  •       •      1  •  ^''^^  of  th  e 

Ai^  When    this    is  done  in    perfect  accord-    Teacher  i  n 

the  interpre- 

dance  with  the  instructions  imparted  by    the    tation. 
Teacher  ( 5^ ),    without    which   a     correct 
interpretation  is  held  to  be   impossible,  abso- 
lute faith  (  ^^T  )  in  the   instruction    (i.  e.  in 
knowledge    produced      by      the      imparted 
teaching)  is  called  'Right-Vision'  (^^^  ^ij  *f) 
— the    basis    of,  Right     Knowledge.     And    Definition  of 
the    knowledge    which    embraces    concisely    led^e.    "°^' 
or    in    details    the  predicaments,  as   they  are 
in  themselves,    is    called  'Right    Knowledge' 
(  W^^  "giT  ),  and  without  which  Right  Con- 
duct (  ^l^^iftcC  )  is  impossible. 

35 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  is  M. 

Now  knowledge  is  of  five  different  forms, 
ITkT^I  such  as,  (i)  Matt  (  qfcT  ),  (2)  Sruti  (  ^frf  ), 
ledge,—  ^^  Abadhi  (^sfftr)  (4)  Manaparyaya  (iT«f:q%a) 

(5)  and  Keval  (  %^^  ).     Thus, — 

Matt  is  that  form  of  knowledge  by 
which  a  Jiva  (  ^^ )  cognises  an  object 
through  the  operation  of  the  sense-organs,  all 
hindrances  to  the  formation  of  such  know- 
ledge being  removed. 

(2)  Sruti  is  the  clear  knowledge  formed 
on       some   verbal    testimony  of  the  Omnis- 
cient,   all  obstruction  to    the  formation     of 
such  knowledge   being   removed. 

(3)  Avadhi  is  the  knowledge  in  the  form 
of  recognition  of  particular  physical  occur- 
rences that  happened  in  some  time  past, 
all  obstruction  to  the  way  being  removed ; 

(4)  Manaparyaya  is  the  knowledge 
of  what  is  in  others'  thoughts,  originating, 
as  it  does,  from  the  removal  of  hindrances 
to  the  formation  of  such  knowledge. 

(5)  Keval  is  the  pure  unimpeded 
knowledge — knowledge  absolute,  which  pre- 
cedes the  attainment  of  Nirvdna,  It  is 
characterised  by  omniscience,  transcending  all 
relativity    of  discursive     thought   involving 

3^ 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  iTS  FORMS. 

the  idea  of  succession  and  series.  Being 
devoid  of  every  sort  of  ratiocinative  ele-  UcTndlca- 
ment,  we  may  call  it  'Jntuitton  power.  By  ^^  intuition. 
Intuitive  knowledge  we  mean,  of  course, 
what  we  get  by  a  single  stroke  of  cognition, 
unadulterated  by  any  of  the  processes  of  repre- 
sentation. As  for  us,  finite  beings,  condition- 
ed naturally  by  the  relativity  of  thought, 
we  cannot  have  this  sort  of  cognition ; 
because  a  careful  analysis  of  the  psychological    Impossibility 

of     Intuition 

processes  seems  to  show  that  by  virtue  of  the    ^X  ordinary 

*^  minds. 

frame  and  constitution  of  our  mind,   in  every 

cognition  which  we  can  have,  both  the  pre- 
sentative  and  the  representative  elements 
are,  as  it  were,  inseparably  blended  together. 
Indeed,  some  philosophers  may  hold  the  quite 
opposite  view  and  affirm  that  we  can  perceive 
objects  directly  by  our  senses  and  that  forma- 
tion of  the  percept  requires  no  help  of  repre- 
sentation. But,  surely,  we  can  meet  them  in  the 
language  of  Kant  by  saying  that  mere  sensa- 
tions, unalloyed  with  any  reactionary  and 
representative  processes,  are  as  good  as  noth- 
ing, because  they  are  no  better  than  manifold 
of  senses  quite  undifferentiated  and  homoge- 
neous in  character.     But  this— though  an  im 

37 


AN'  EPITOME  OF  /AINiSM. 
possibility    for    us — is    nevertheless    possible 

But  possible     r  /^        •      •  t-»    •  z*^     ~\    \        i        i 

for  an  Omni-    lor  an  Omniscient    Being    (^^^T^)    who  has 

scient  Being  .  .  i      ta-    •    •  t 

—Kevaiin\  attained  to  perfection  and  Divinity.  In 
fact,  we  may  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the 
opposite — a  discursive  knowledge — is  in- 
conceivable for  Him  by  virtue  of  His 
very  nature.  Unless  we  deny  the  very 
existence  of  such  a  being  it  must  necessarily 
follow  that  as  perfect  knowledge  means 
infinite  knowledge,  his  knowledge  embraces 
the  whole  sphere  of  thought  and  covers 
the  whole  span  of  time.     Being  immortal  and 

His  charac-    eternally  present,  for  him  the  present  vanishes 

teriitic  Indi- 

cations—    not  in  the  past,  nor  the  future  shoots  out  from 

Lakskana, 

the  womb  of  futurity  ;  but  all  offer  them- 
selves as  Ever-present.  For  him  everything  is 
eternal  Now.  In  short,  He  is  above  time,  be- 
cause the  question  of  time  comes  in  where 
there  is  a  succession  of  events  or  changes. 
But  changes  are  not  possible  to  an  Eternal 
Being  ;  for,  all  changes  are  in  Him  as 
it  were,  but  He  is  not  changed.  For 
him  there  is  no  succession,  but  an  eternal 
and  everlasting  Present.  Now  this  being 
the  case  what  necessarily  follows  are  the 
facts.     The  mind  which    is   at   once   perfect 

38 


Real. 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  ITS  FORMS. 

is  not  merely  objective  nor  merely  objective, 

but  absolute.     It  is  the  measure  of  all  thing^s,    ^f'^?i^^~, 

o   '     The  Ideal 

the  central  and  comprehensive  reality.  Such 
a  mind,  such  a  man,  such  a  Kevalin  (^^^'f), 
we  need  hardly  add,  is  not  the  man  in  the 
street  nor  the  man  in  the  making,  but  the 
mind,  the  man  whose  cardinal  characteristics 
are  Pure  Intuitions  or  Transcedental  per- 
ce  ptions  (  TTcg^  %\^  ).  Indeed  such  a  man, 
such  a  Kevalin  is  the  ideal  of  all  aspira- 
tions, the  fountain-head  of  truth  and  wisdom. 
In  short,  he  is  named,  God, 


39 


CHAPTER  IV. 
EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  LOGIC. 

F urtker  constderatton  o^  tlie  Processes  o£  Knowledge. 
— Juclgment  and  its  TKree  [Elements — Rules  and  Canons 
'wnten  a  Judgment  skould  obey.— Insumctency  ox  tne 
Perce|>tual  Source  of  Knowledge— Hence  otker  Source! 
of  Knowledge. 

In  the  preceding  pages  we  have  discussed 

Re-capitu-    that  Knowledge  implies  a  Subject  or  a  think- 
lation. 

ing  principle  which  knows  and   an  Object  on 

which  it  exercises    its  knowing   power.     We 

have  seen   also     that    to   know   an     object 

is  to  know   the   relations   it    bears    to  Self 

and      other     surrounding     things     as  well. 

We    have   also  seen    the   particular  forms  of 

knowledge    which   the   Jain   savants     teach 

in  their  own  peculiar   way.     We   have   seen 

further    that   the     last  form    or   the   Keval 

jndna  is  not  only  a  form  of  knowledge  but  a 

source    of  knowledge  as  well,    free    from   all 

mediate  processes.     It   now   behoves  us   to 

enquire     as  to  what  other  possible  sources  of 

knowledge  we  are  ordinarily  aware  of. 

It  is  but   a  truism   to  say  that   you  and  I 

depend  upon  our  mind  to  know    the   world. 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  LOGIC, 

This  implies   that    we    are    dependent    upon 

our  organs  of  perception  and  upon  our  ability    sources  ^o^f 

1        1  r  .'        •    .      .  1         Knowle  d  ^  e 

to  re-organize  the  data  ot  perception  into  the  _the  Sense- 
system  we  call  Knowledge.  To  know,  we  are  indriyas, 
neccesarily  dependent  on  our  sense  organs  ; 
for,  without  them  the  world  would  be  to  us  a 
perfect  blank.  Rob  us  of  our  eyes,  of  our 
ears,  touch  and  the  like,  how  little  should  we 
know  of  the  world  in  which  we  live,  move 
and  have  our  being  !  But  inspite  of  such  a 
bold  and  an  undeniable  piece  of  evidence  in 
this     matter-of-fact    world,    there    crops   up 

a   question     as      to  the    trustworthiness     of 

.  -J  f  ^u  Reliability 

these  our   evidences   ot  the    sense    organs —    of  Sense-evi- 

the   channels     of  our    perception.     We    all    tioned. 

know   how  the   sages     and   philosophers  of 

yore    differed    widely  from    one   another    in 

placing  their    reliance    on    these  channels  of 

perception    in    their  quest    of  truth.     Some 

went  even  so  far    as  to    urge   all   manner   of 

evidence  to  bring    in    question    the   absolute 

trustworthiness  of  the  senses  ;  others  held  it 

to     be    the     only     authoritative    source    of 

knowledge.       In     these     days     of     modern 

culture   and  refinement    we  can   have  indeed 

little  patience  with  those  who   seriously  urge 

6    f. 


iplp'i 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

such  evidence  to  be  absolutely  reliable. 
A  little  reflection,  however,  will  be  sufifi- 
cient  to  convince  anyone  that,  really  speak- 
ing, we  are  not  wholly  justified  in  having 
such  attitude  of  mind  as  just  referred  to. 
For  in  this  are  involved  grave  questions 
of  vital  issues  and  far-reaching  conse- 
quences in  all  forms  of  philosophical  specu- 
Sense-evi-    lation.       If   we      remember    aright,  experi- 

de  n  ce  not 

wholly  reli-    ence  shows    on   many    an    occasion   that  the 
able. 

evidences    of  the   senses  are  not  wholly  and 

entirely  reliable.  We  have  not  only  illusions 
and  dreams  but  some  of  us  are  colour  blind 
even.  Besides,  there  are  many  things  in 
heaven  and  earth  which  escape  our  visions — 
sense  perceptions.  There  are  many  things 
which  lie  hidden  from  our  view  either  by 
being  too  big  or  too  small  to  come  within  the 
range  of  our  direct  perception.  We  have 
riot  seen  the  globe  as  a  whole  nor  have  we 
visualised  the  chemical  atoms.  Now  if  these 
be  the  things  whose  existence  we  never  per- 
ceive but  infer,  how  many — perhaps  infinitely 
"*  many — are  there  whose  existences  escape 
our  notice  and  knowledge  and  thus  keep 
clear  for  fresh  inquiries  and  discoveries  ! 


^^ 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  LOGIC. 

Then,  again,  you  and  I  perceive  objects 
and  so  we  know  them.  But  how  do  we  know  tionsofjudg- 
them  ?  Clearly  because  they  make  impres- 
sions onourbrains  through  the  senses  and  thus 
give  rise  to  certain  processes  and  states  in 
our  mind  ;  and  the  question  is  whether  we 
have  only  mental  processes  and  states  and 
not  the  real  objects  with  which  they  do  not 
correspond  at  all  like  an  image  in  a  mirror 
and  the  real  object  imaged.  This  world  of 
ours  gives  rise  to  perceptions  with  which  they 
cannot  be  identified.  The  image  of  the  book 
is  evidently  not  the  book  itself.  If  you 
shut  your  eyes,  the  image  of  the  book  vani- 
shes, but  the  book  existing  objectively 
in  space  does  not.  Supposing,  again,  that 
you  go  away  to  a  certain  distance  from  where    - 

the     book   lies   and    look    back    from    there 
at   it,  surely  the  image   of  the    book  will    be 

smaller  and  smaller  as   you   go  away  from  it 

farther  and  still  farther  and  look  back  at  it  from 

time  to  time.     Clearly  you  see  the  book  as  it 

does  appear  to  you    and    not    the    book  as  it 

really  is.     And  thus  the  whole  thing   grows 

at  once   perplexing    and    irritating  ;  and  you 

are    irresistibly   led    to   the   question — what 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN/SM. 

would  be  the  nature  of  this  knowledge  and 
how  do  we  come  to  it  ? 

It  would   be   well    to   state   at   the    very 
Knowledge    cutset     that    this     our     knowledge     is    not 

and  Ju  dg-  •  ^  i         .  •   ^         i 

ment.  perception     only   as   such  :    it   consists   also 

of  'Judgment.'  It  is  true  that,  speaking 
psychologically,  knowledge  exists  in  the 
form  of  perception  and  this  may  indeed 
seem  to  involve  a  contradiction.  But  on 
a  little  reflection  it  is  found  to  involve 
no  such  thing.  For,  all  instances  of  know- 
ledge perform  the  same  office  as  a 
Judgment  does.  To  take,  for  example,  the 
case  of  a  baby.  When  the  baby  stretches 
forth  its  tiny  arm  towards  some  object 
— say,  a  red  ball  hanging  at  a  distance 
before  its  eyes, — we  have  something  very 
much  akin,  to  be  sure,  to  an  adults 
request  that  the  given  object  be  brought 
to  him.  Here  the  baby  does  not,  by 
words  of  mouth,  ask  us  to  get  it  the 
red  ball ;  but  for  its  intellectual  companion 
it  has  said  something  fully.  So  in  fact 
though  no  request  is  expressed  in  words,  still 
the  attitude  of  the  baby  does  not  fail  to 
be  construed  as    a    request,    and  in   fact  it  is 


EPISTEMOLOGY AND  LOGIC, 

so  construed  by  its  intellectual  companion. 
In  other  words,  we  may  say,  as  we  have 
done  before,  that  all  knowledge  would  take 
some  form  of  Judgment,  be  it  expressed  in 
words  or  by  implication. 

Thus  the  question   as  to    the    nature    of    „„ 

^  What  consti- 

knowledge  ultimately  resolves  into  the  ^em^"^"^^' 
question  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  Judg- 
ment, and  a  final  answer  can  be  given  by 
analysing  it  into  its  component  elements.  By 
an  element  of  Judgment  is  meant  whatever 
is  necessary  to  its  being  a  Judgment  from 
our  point  of  view  as  an  interpreter. 
There  are  three  such  elements  in  a  Judg- 
ment. A  Judgment  to  be  as  such  must 
have  an  object  to  be  interpreted;  for,  an 
interpretation  of  nothing  whatsoever  is  no 
interpretation   at    all.     So,    one   of  the    ele-    itsthreeEie- 

^  ments, — 

ments  involved  in  interpretation  is  the  object 
to  be  interpreted.  This  must  be  given  to  us. 
It  must  stand  there  revealed  to  us.  This 
object  of  knowledge  is  termed  as  the  given. 
The  second  element  is  the  actual  interpreta- 
tion itself.  To  deny  this  would  involve  self- 
contradiction.  Thirdly,  we  have,  as  the 
final   element   of  Judgment,  those   laws   or 

45 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

canons  that  a  Judgment  must  obey  in  order 
anceofvvhidi  ^^^  ^^  might  be  true.  A  good  and  correct 
to       the    Judgment    has    some  responsibility,  and  this 

formation  of  mm.  i         r  r         i 

a  correct    responsibihty    takes    on    the    form    of  rules, 

Judgment. 

laws  and  canons  that  a  Judgment  must  obey, 
or  else  be  an  untrue  or  false  claimant  of  the 
respective  demands.  To  disobey  these  rules 
would,  therefore,  be  tantamount  to  treason  to 
knowledge  itself. 

We  have  already  dwelt  on  the  first  two 
elements  of  Judgment.  We  are  now  to  deal 
with  the  third  one,  or  the  laws  and  canons 
for  the  formation  of  correct  Judgment. 

Students  of  Indian  systems  of  thought 
Etymolo-    ^ji    know    that    the    word  pramdna  (V(ViV^^ 

gical     signi-  ^  ^  ' 

ficanceof  originally  meant  an  instrument  of  measure- 
ment— from  m&n'X.o  measure  and  pra'{oxt}c\. 
It  may  be  translated  as  a  measured,  stand- 
ard authority. 

But   the  pramdna     which    serves    as   a 

Function  of  means  (  ^\^^  )  of  determination  pro- 
duces  pramth' {xnVRm)  which  means  accurate 
or  right  knowledge,  just  as  s&dhan  (means) 
produces  siddhi  (truth  or  certainty). 
This  pram&na  is  a  means  of  infor- 
mation and  determination  and  has    variously 

46 


EPISTEMOLOG Y  AND  L OGIC. 
been  admitted, divided  and  defined  from  differ-    '^  ^  «  ^^^^r 

vdka  Cr  1  ti- 

ent  points  of    view    by    different    sages   and    ^'^"}j°^ 

scholars    of  different  ages  and  climes  to  suit 

their  respective  systems  of  thought. 

Whoever  has  a   little   acquaintance    with 

the     different     Indian   systems    of    thought 

knows   full    well  that    the    followers    of   the 

Chdrv^ka   School    admit  of  but  one   source 

of  knowledge,   viz.  Experience,   i.  e.    sense-    There  is  but 

one     Source 

perception  (tT^w),    contemptuously   rejecting    of  Know- 
ledge and 

the  other  sources,    viz.    Inference,  (^^hr),    ^^^\  *?  ^^^' 

^      "-  tyaksha. 

Testimony    (sj^^;),    Tradition    (^fklfX  Iinpli* 
cation  (^^Tcrf%),  Probability  {^'^^)  and  Non- 
entity (^RT^),  which  are  warranted  in  drawing 
from  facts  of  experience.     Little    indeed    do 
we  know  what  is  really  taught    by  the    Sage 
Brihaspati,  the  oldest  propounder  of  the  most 
uncompromising    materialism   and    thorough 
going  Kpicuranism    or    whence    he  drew  his 
inspiration  to  rely  solely  on  sense   perception 
or  facts  of  actual  experience  and    to  overlook 
other   logical    inferences    and  the  like  which 
have    been  in  vogue  from  time   immemorial  ; 
for,    where  we    perceive  smoke  we  infer   at 
once    the  fire  there,  or,  when    a  reliable  per- 
son informs  any  one    that  there  are    fruits  he 

^7 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM, 

requires  on  the  bank  of  the  liver,  he 
runs  to  the  place  and  plucks  fruits.  Thus, 
Inferernce  and  Testimony  along  with  others 
have  all  along  been  held  to  be  valid 
sources  of  knowledge.  But,  curiously  enough, 
the  Chirvikas  question  the  validity  of 
these.  And  so  far  we  could  gather  from  the 
fragments  of  this  philosophy,  scattered  here 
and  there  in  the  different  systems  of  thought 
and  as  collated  by  M^dhavich^rya  in  his 
Sarvadarshana  Samgraha,  he  begins  his 
enquiries  into  Epistemology  with  such 
startling  questions  as,  what  is  the  value  of 
Inference  ?  How  can  ever  its  conclusions  be 
certain  ? 

The  most   elementary  form   of  conclusion 
must  invariably  have    three    terms — two   ex- 
tremes and  a  reason,    mark   or    middle   term 
I  n7ere^nce    (^ 3>  ^%1(  or  ^T^Tr).  To  give  a  conclusion,  the 
""  '      middle-term    or    mark     (§g,  f^^   or    5gT>^*fr) 

must  be  universally  and  unconditionlly  con- 
nected with  the  major-S^dhya  (  3[iitt^,  ^i\5r) 
on  one  side  i.e.,  according  to  the  phraseology 
of  European  logic  must  be  distributed, 
and  on  the  other  side  with  the  minor  term- 
paksha  ( TT^).    But    what  evidence   can    we 

48 


EPIS TEMOLOG Y  AND  LOGIC. 

ever  have  that  the  connection  between  the 
major  (  ^1^  )  and  the  middle  or  sign 
(ogfig,  §g  or  \^)  is  necessary  and  universal  ? 
For, — 

(a)  Sense-perception      (  U<5IW )     cannot 

prove  it  in  as  much  as  universal  connection  dence^cannot 
is  not  a  fact  of  experience.  Experience  ^inference.^ 
can  give  only  one  particular  fact  and 
that  only  of  the  present  moment  and  not 
of  the  long  past  nor  of  the  distant  future. 
The  eye  by  fact  of  its  exercising  its  func- 
tional activity  only  in  the  present  reveals 
the  objectivity  of  a  particular  thing  here  and 
now.  But  a  universal  truth  goes  infinitely 
beyond  what  the  eye  can  give.  Hence 
sense-perception  cannot  prove  any  necessary 
connection  between  the  major  (^1^)  and  the 
minor  (q^) — any  universal  proposition  or 
Pratijnd — (^SflfH  ^f?T^T)  ! 

(b)  But   here   a  prima  facie   objection 

might  be    raised  to  the  effect  that  perception    ^acul'^ftt- 
being  both  internal   and   external  it  includes    andset aside, 
intuition    of     reason     which    gives     neces- 
sary  and  universal  truth.      'Not  even  that,' 
thunders  forth   the  thorough-going    material- 
ist ;  *there   is    no     such    thing    as     intuition 

49 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

or  internal  perception.  For  mind  has  no 
perception    except   throupfh    the    senses  and 

c.    f.     Reld,     ^  ^  ^  S 

MnTlTd    therefore     external.     It     is     interesting    to 
•  °"^  ^'  compare     the     Chirv^kas     with    Reid    and 

Hamilton,  who  on  the  one  hand  deny  the 
possibility  of  internal  intuition  of  universal 
truths,  and  Mill  and  Comte  on  the  other  hand 
who  reject  all  'Introspective  knowledge' 
as  ever  possible. 

(c)  Then  again,  ''Inference,''  says  the 
Indian  materialist,  "cannot  give  it  ;  for 
Inference   (^RiTlTT'T)    itself    always    requires 

Inference  \      ^5  /  ^  -i 

cannot  give,    universal  proposition   affirming^    the    connec- 

for  It  IS  only  ^      ^  ^ 

assumed  ^-jqj^  between  the  major  and  the  middle 
as  universally  true."  For  example  when 
we  say  that  a  man  is  mortal  :  Socrates  is  a 
man  and  therefore  mortal,  we  are  assuming 
a  necessary  connection  between  humanity 
and  mortality.  But  the  possibility  of  such 
a  connection,  at  least  of  our  knowing  such  a 
connection,  even  if  it  existed,  is  just  what  we 
require  to  prove.  Thus  we  can  see  that  mere 
Inference  cannot  prove  it  ;  for  it  is  only 
assumed.  To  say  that  the  connection, 
though  assumed  yet  makes  inference  possible 
is  to  argue  in  a  circle.    And  hence  we  cannot 

SO 


EPISTEMOLOGY AND  LOGIC. 

arrive  at  universal  truths  by  means  of  Infer- 
ence ('^liTRT^).      It  is  important  note    to    here 

^    ^        ^  ^  c.  J,      Mill's 

that  T.  S.   Mill  bases  his   theory    of   reason-    Theory     of 
•^  ^  Reasoning. 

ing  on  universal  propositions.  But  are  these 
axioms  themselves  proved  ?  No,  reasoning 
assumes  them — they  being  mere  generali- 
sations from  facts  of  experience.  But  this 
cannot  yield  absolute  certainty. 

(d)     Nor    Testimony   can  prove  it.     For 
the  validity   and  truth  of   Testimony  depends    Nor    can 

T  e  s  t  i  mony 

on    Inference.     Moveover     Testimony    itself   establish  it, 

depends     on    a    middle    term   (  f%-^  or  §g  ) 

in   another  sense    viz.     the    language   used ; 

in  as    much   as   the  meaning  of  the  language 

used  and  its   correspondence  with   reality    is 

always    uncertain.     To  illustrate  the  import, 

we     have   the     communication    of     the    old 

man  with    the    child,    neither   understanding    m°ony\'as 

the      other's     language.       Hence     absolute    depend  on 

certainty  can  never  be  founded  on  authority, 

we  cannot  accept    the    ipse   dexit   of   Manu 

even.     And     if     Testimony     could     convey 

universal     truth,    yet     there    could     be     no 

knowledge    of   universals    to   one    who   had 

not   himself  received   the   testimony  of  one 

already  in  the  know  of  them.     But  where   is 

5/ 


K  n  o  wledge 
been  f  rom 
time  imme- 
morial. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAlNISM, 

such  a  person    to    be    found  ?     To   say    that 

any  one    already  knows   universal  truths  and 
Hence    Per-  '  -' 

tlfe^on/^    can  bear  Testimony  io  \i,  is  but  begging    the 

Knowiedy/   question.      Hence   sense-perception    (  ^cST^  ) 

is  the  only  form  of  valid  knowledge  (  T{W%  ). 

So  argue    the  Ch^rvakas   in   defiance    of 

Still  has  the    the    usas^e   of  all,    times.     There  was  never 

use  of  other 

means  of  a  time  when  the  acts  of  seeinp"  and  inferringf 
etc.  were  not  performed.  The  use  of  these 
acts  are  well  known  ;  for  it  is  through  them 
that  we  can  choose  one  thing  and  reject 
another,  and  though  the  use  of  the  Pramdnas 
are  well-known  to  all,  coming  as  it  does 
from  time  immemorial,  yet  it  is  imperative 
that  we  should  make  a  sifting  enquiry  into 
the  truth  and  validity  of  the  materialistic 
and  sensationistic  arguments  as  put  forth  by 
such    thinkers  as  Charv^kas  so  that  it  might 

And     there- 
fore  require    serve    as    an    warning   to    the  foolish  people 
a     searching 

enquiry  into    from   taking"  false  knowledge  for  true  :    for  it 

the  truth  and  ^  ^ 

valid  i  t  y  o  f     Jo  cairl  • 

theChirvaka     ^^  saiQ  , 

attachment.  nftl^T^  Hm^T'f  ^^^^^t  TT^5!iT^  I 

—  The  N&ydvatdra, 
Such    is   the    trend   of   the    Ch^rvslkas* 
argument   who    admit   only   one    pram&na, 

5^ 


EPIS  TB  MO  LOGY  AND  L  OGlC. 

And  while  the    Buddhists   and    the    Vaishe- 

shikas   admit   of  only    two    Pramdnas   viz.    ofKno\^edge 

7-1  ,  t '  17-/-  /  1—      _\as    admitted 

Perception  and  Inference  ( I7c^w  and  ^gi?l«! ),    b  y  o  t  h  e  r 

the    Sdnkhya    School    acknowledges    three    Indian  thou- 

i.    e.    Testimony     (  Ti^  )     in      addition     to 

the     previous     two.     The    School     of    the 

JVydya    Philosophy  adds   Analogy  (  ^trFrT*^  ) 

to    the    above    three     and    thus     admits    of 

four  only.     The  Prabhdkar  School   accepts 

Implication  (^^jmfTf)  as  an  additional  means 

and    thus   agrees   to    five   Pramdnas.     The 

two   Mimdnsakas,    Purva   and    Uttara  (^oir 

and  ^Tf?:)   grant    six,    adding   Non-existence 

( ^W^ )  ;      and      finally,      the      Pourdnikas 

taking    Tradition    (j^w^)    and    Probability 

( ^'lisj )     into      consideration,     acknowledge 

that   the  sources   of  knowledge  are   after  all 

eight  in  number. 

The  scholiasts  have,  however,  defined 
these  means  of  knowledge  variously.  But 
they  all  agree  substantially  to  the  follow- 
ing :— 

(i)     Sense-perception     (  TT?55rw  ) — Know- 

J      .  .  Sen  s  e-p  c  r- 

ledge   derived   directly    from  the  peripheral    ception. 
contact  of  the  sense-organs  with  their  corres 
ponding  objects. 

S3 


Inference. 


Analogy. 


Testimony, 


Implication. 


N  o  n-e  X  i  s- 
tence. 


Tradition. 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM, 

(2)  Inference  (  ^gm^  )— Knowledge 
born  of  the  apprehension  of  an  unseen  mem- 
ber from  an  invariable  association  (cgflfn)  by 
the  perception  of  another  known  member. 

(3)  Analogy  (^(^^i?!)— Knowledge  from 
the  recognition  of  likeness  based  on  resem- 
blance i.e.  from  the  detection  of  the  points  of 
identity  and  difference  through  the  process 
of  comparison  and  recognition  of  similarity 
with  something  well-known  before. 

(4)  Verbal  Testimony  (sji^) — Know- 
ledge derived  from  the  pronouncements  of 
authoritative  persons  who  have  sensed 
truths  as  it  were. 

(5)  Implication  (  ^g[T^f%  ) — Such  know- 
ledge as  can  be  determined  of  a  thing  not 
itself  perceived,  but  implied  by  another. 

(6)  Non-entity  (^vri^) — Knowledge  aris- 
ing from  the  cognition  of  absence  or  Nega- 
tion or  Non-being  as  we  conclude  from 
the  fact  that  Deva  Datta  is  not  in  the  house, 
that  he  must  have  gone  out. 

(7)  Tradition  (^fh"^) — Knowledge  gain- 
ed from  such  accounts, legendary  or  otherwise, 
which  have  been  handed  down  to  generation 
to  generation  from  time  immemorial. 

54 


AN  EPITOME  OF  LOGIC 

(8)     Probability  (  ^^%  ) — Knowledge  ac- 
cruing   from    the    perception  of  equivalence 

,        .  r  ^  1  •  Probability. 

as  in  the  instance  or  twelve  pences  making 
up  a  shilling 

The  above  are  the  eight  classified  sources 
of  information  by  means  of  which  they  gener-    The  Jain 

View  of  the 

ally    determine  the  accuracy   of  knowledg^e.    means    of 

'  >  o  Knowle  age 

And  it  is  interesting  to  note   that  Tain  teach-    — Sense-per- 

^  -^  cepti  on    in 

ers  do  neither  admit  them  all,  nor  do  they  ^^^  i^direc^ 
agree  to  these  definitions.  They  admit  of  only 
two  pramdnas :  one  is  Direct  or  Imme- 
diate Perception  (  TT^^  '^T«T  )  which  has 
been  discussed  at  length  under  Keval  (^^^ 
^T^t)  as  a  form  of  knowledge  ;  and  the  other 
is  Indirect  or  Mediate  Perception  (crft^  ^T^) 
which  is  generally  explained  by  the  peri- 
pheral contact  of  the  senses  with  their  respec- 
tive objects  (  f  figm^  ^f^^ll  ). 

The    reason    why  knowledge  born  of  the 
contact  of  the    senses    with    their    respective    The  reason 

^  ^  w  h  y     t  h  e 

objects  (  ^fj^m'^^f^^'SfTT  '^R  )  which    is    ad-     ^e  n  s  e-p  e  r- 
■'  \>^  -«/  ceptionis 

mitted    on    all    hands    to  be  derived  through     ^''ediate  o  r 

^         Indirect. 

the  Direct  means  (  tr^rf  TWT^  )  has  been 
considered  by  the  Jain  Sages  to  be  Indirect 
ox  Mediate  (TTf\^)  is  best  explained  when 
we  take  into  our  analytic  consideration  of  the 

55 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

states   and  processes   of  the   psychology    of 
cognition  of  extra-mental  realities. 

Knowledge  born    of  the   contact   of  the 

Intermed  ia-  •  i         i     •  i*  i  • 

tory    Stages    senses     With     their     corresponding    objects 

of  the  forma-     /      r-        _«         <v        <^  \      .  i . 

tory  of  such  (  ^t^m^  ^T  if^i^if  =^1^  )  IS  not  direct. 
There  are,  remark  the  Jain  Psychologists, 
five  intermediatory  stages  from  sense 
to  thought :  viz.  (a)  VanjyanAvagraha 
(  sg^^T^^f  ),  (b)  Artkdvagraha  ( 'q^lk^^  ), 
(c)  Ihd  (  \^\  ),  (d)  Avaya  (  ^An )  and 
(e)  Dhdrand  (  ^tt^^t  )  as  will  be  presently 
explained.^ 


56 


CHAPTER  V. 
PRATYAKSHA  IS  REALLY  PAROKSHA. 

Tkc  Jatn  dissension  wttk  reference  to  Pratyakska 
Praman. — Direct  Percet>tton  xs  really  Indtrect. — Analy- 
sts of  tkc  Psyckologxcal  Processes  or  Cognition. — Tke 
Different  Stages  —From  Sense  to  Tkougkt — Proof  of  tke 
Trutk  anJ  Validity  of  tke  Jain  Point  of  Vicw.—Tke 
sensuous  'Pratyakska   is  really  'Parokska  . 

While  discussing  the   questions   of  epis- 
temology    and  logic  in  the  previous  chapter,    The  Jam  cn- 
we  have  seen'  how    the    different    schools   of   p^^'a^yal^/za 
Indian     thought    substantially    agree   as    to    o^i^e^r^Per- 
the   character    of  the   different    instruments 
of  knowledge.     And    so    far    the  character- 
istic   indication,  specially  of  the    Direct  Per- 
ception {Vif^"^  PfllfT^),  is   concerned,  we    have 
seen    too    that    almost    all    the  schools,  from 
the  out-and-out   materialist   Chdrv&ka   down 
to  the  all-believing   Paardnikas,    agree   with 

one     another.     But     the    Jain     savants,    as    But  the  Di- 
rect is  really 
we     have     stated     already,    do    not    fall    in    indirect. 

with   this    view.     According   to   them,     the 

so-called  Pratyakska — Direct  Perception — is 

but   an  Indirect  source   of  knowledge.     The 

so-called     Pratyakska   is    really    Parokska ! 

57 

8 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

This  will  indeed  strike  curious  in  the 
face  of  such  over  whelming  opinions  of  so 
many  schools  of  thought  as  well  as  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  evidence  of  the  everyday  experi- 
ence. But  an  analysis  of  the  psychological 
processes  involved  in  the  sense-given  know- 
ledge, as  the  Jain  savants  hold,  will  confirm 
the  truth  and  validity  of  their  statement 
.  when  they  say  that  the  so-called  Pratyaksha 
is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  Parokska, 
To     enter     into     details,     there    is    no 

(i)  Acquis!-    denvingf  the  fact  that  we  think   in  relations, 
tional  Stage.  ^      ^ 

Relativity  is  the  very  soul  and  cement  of  our 
knowledge  ;  for,     all   knowledge     not    only 
implies   a     Self   or     Subject    which    knows 
and    a  Not-Self   or    Object  which  is  known 
but     a    relation     between     them     as    well. 
The    Object     or     the     external     world,    by 
acting     on     the    peripheral     ends      of  our 
sense-organs,     rouse    in    us    a   certain    kind 
of   stimulus    through    the    channels    of  our 
sensation  ;     and    this    brings     the     Self     or 
Subject  to  stand   in  particular    relation    with 
it,     the    Not-Self  or   the    Object.     This    is 
vyanj andvagraha    (oq^iTT^^W  )   or  the  stage 
of  acquisition  of  materials  for  knowledge. 

5S 


PRATYAKSHA   IS  PAROKSHA. 

The    relation    having   thus  been    estab- 
lished between  the    Self  and  the  Not-Self  in    f^tj^^^'o^r 
the  processes  of  which  stimulus   is  carried  on    stage.^ 
from  the  outside    to  the  cerebro-hemisphere 
where   all    the    in-going  nerves  meet,  there 
takes  place  an    excitation  in  our  mind  where- 
upon it    re-acts  on   the    stimulus    by  way  of 
converting  it   into   sensation    as   well    as    of 
interpreting  in    knowing  the  contents  of  the 
same  in  and  through  the  process  of  which,  the 
mind    comes  to   the   formation  of  the  notion 
of  its    being    imposed    by    something   olker 
than    itself  from  without.     This  notion,  thus 
formed,  of  the  extra- mental  object,  is   homo- 
geneous and    indefinite    in    character    in    as 
much   as    the   distinction    between   the   Self 
and  the  Not-Self  only  begins  to  dawn  on  the 
mind  in    the    most    rudimentary    forms.     In 
our   psychology    it    is  called    Arthdvagraha 
( ^^T^^^  )    or   the   presentative     or    cogni- 
tive   stage   in    the    processes    of  perceptual 
elaboration. 

Ihd  (f^T)  is  the  third  stage.     The   mind 

does  not  rest  with  the  formation  of  the  vague    (iii)  Compa- 
rative Stage, 
notion  of  the  Not-Self,  as  referred  to  in    the 

above.     Rather  it    goes  on    with  its   search- 

59 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

ing  inquiry,  initiated  in  the  previous  stage, 
as  to  the  real  character  and  contents  of 
what  is  imposed  on  it  from  without  through 
the  assimilation  of  the  present  sensation 
and  its  comparison  as  well  with  the  other 
past  but  similar  sensations,  revived  in  the 
mind  according  to  the  laws  of  association 
and  concomitant  detection  of  the  points  of 
identity  and  difference  between  present  and 
past  sensations. 

Then  follows  the  re-integration  of  the 
(iv)Recogni-  pi*^sent  sensation  along  with  other  sensa- 
tage.  |-iQri3^  received  in  some  past  time  and 
now  revived  in  our  consciousness  according 
to  the  law  of  contiguity.  In  this  stage  of 
avaya  (^^ir),  the  presentative  element  which 
is  known  as  sensation  is  fused  with  other 
elements,  represented  in  the  consciousness  ; 
and  thus  there  results  the  recognition  of  the 
object,  more  definitely  expressed  in  such  voca- 
bularies as  this  and  not  that. 

The  last  stage  in  the    present    perceptual 

(v)   Reflec-    elaboration  is  Dhdrand  (yiXK^I)   through    the 

tive  or   con-  r     i  •   i  i  i  i 

c  e  p  t  u  a  1    processes  ot  which  we  are  by  a  natural  and  co- 
Stage. 

herent  train  of  thought  led  to  reflect  that  sensa- 
tion reveals  qualities  of  things.  But  sensations 

60 


PRATYAKSHA   IS  PAROKSMA, 

must  require  grounds  for  them  ;  for,  they 
cannot  be  self-caused.  The  qualities  also, 
which  these  sensations  reveal,  cannot  stand  by 
themselves  :  for  the  qualities  must  be  qualities 
of  something,  which  not  only  gives  them 
support  and  connection,  but  which  as  well 
exists  extra-mentally  and  objectively  some- 
where in  space.  Thus  through  the  pro- 
cesses of  objectification  and  localisation  we 
are  led  to  the  knowledge  of  things  as  extra- 
mental  realities  existing  objectively  in  space. 
Dhdrand  (^itiit),  thought,  is  but  a  name  for 
this  particular  phase  of  knowledge  of  the 
thing  when  it  is  uppermost. in  our  mind  with 
special  reference  to  the  intensity  and  duration 
of  the  knowledge  as  such. 

Such  is  the  analysis  of  the  sensuous 
perception;  and  this  reminds  us  of  a  tendency 
in  the  modern  psychology  of  perception  to 
detect  whether  there  is  any  interval  of  time 
between  the  contact  and  the  (formation  of) 
concept  in  addition  to  the  question  raised  of 
late  by  the  psycho-physiologists  as  to  whether 
perception  does  not  involve  inference — a 
subject  which  was  long  ago  discussed  and 
solved  by  the  sages  of  India. 

6i 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

Now  the  above  analysis  of  the  successive 

The  whole  .  ,  .  - 

p  r  o  c  e  s  s    Stages   as  to  how  the  sense-given  fragments 

t  o    thought    and  feelings  are  generalised  and    compressed 

is  thus  medi-  ^      ^  .  ^ 

ate.  into   an  intimate    unity — a  habitual  mood   of 

mind — is  sufficient  to  indicate  that  whole 
process  from  sense  to  thought  is  not  only 
indirect  but  mediate  through  and  through  in 
the  acquirement  of  experiential  knowledge. 
The  facts  of  experience,  mediately  received, 
are  generalised  through  the  principle  of 
induction  in  the  course  of  which  the 
details  only  re-arrange  themselves  into  a 
concentrated  form  called, — Thought.  The 
extra-mental  realities  causing  sensations  and 
feelings  in  us  from  their  contact  with  our 
peripheral  extremities,  are  not  only  cemented 
together  into  a  unity  but  are  stripped  of  their 
sensible  nature,  as  it  were,  and  are  reduced 
to  their  simple  equivalent  in  terms  of  thought 
through  the  operation  of  induction.  In  this 
way  from  sense-fragments  and  feelings,  an 
image  or  idea,  representative  of  reality,  being 
generated,  there  appears  next  the  thought 
or  notion  proper  which  holds  the  facts  in 
unity.  The  principle  holds  good  in  all  cases 
of  empirical   knowledge,    historic  or   other- 

62 


PRATYAKSHA  IS   PAROKSHA. 

wise.  The  decadence  of  nations  in  the 
lengths  of  time  and  the  displacement  of  things 
all  around  us  in  the  breadths  of  space  are 
but  condensed  throusfh  reading  or  observation 
and  induction  into  a  frame  of  thought, 
naturally  shedding  a  judgment  on  the  issues 
involved  therein.  Thus  sensuous  perception 
which  enjoys  the  privilege  of  being  reckoned 
as  a  direct  source  of  knowledge  is  really, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  an  indirect  or 
mediate  means  (  qft^  Hl^TO  )  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  knowledge. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  here  that  Mati-jndna 
and  Sruta-fndna  come  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  this  indirect  means  to  the  acquirement  of 
knowledge. 

This  indirect  means  of  knowledge  or 
proof  IS  agam    sub-divided  for  the    sake  of   sions  of  the 

Indirect 

convenience  into  : —  means. 

(i)  Smriti  (^f?f)— is  the  memory  which 
reveals  in  the  form  of  recollection  of  what  was 
seen  or  heard  of  or  experienced  otherwise 
sometime  before. 

(2)  PratydbkijnAna  {vm\f\{^\^)—'\s  the 
knowledge  derived  from  a  semblance  between 
things.     It  manifests  itself  in    recognising  a 

63 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

thing  from  the  resemblance  of  the  same 
with  the  description  of  what  was  known 
from  some  other  source. 

(3)  Tarka  ( rT^  ) — is  the  knowledge 
arising  from  the  confutation  according 
to  the  canons  of  invariable  concomitance 
(  SBfifn  ). 

(4)  Anumdn  (  ^g^n^T  ) — is  the  know- 
ledge of  something  arising  from  the  presence 
of  the  characteristic  insignia  (f^^)  of  the 
same  in  something  else. 

(5)  Agam  (  ^TT?!  ) — is  the  verbal 
testimomy  of  some  Omniscient  Being. 


64 


CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC. 

Aaeettng  tkc  CKarvakas  on  tneir  own  grounds. — 
Refutatton  oi  tltetr  ky^otkests  and  Demonstratton  oi  tke 
legitimacy  oi  Inierenttal-knowlcage — Tke  Jaxn  Tkeory 
of  Formal  Logtc  and  definitions  oi  "Pratyakska  . — 
"Parokska  includes  Inierence  and  Testimony — Den- 
nition  or  Inierence  and  Forms  or  Syllogisms  —Testimony 
or  tke  AA^ord  -  Oefinition  oi  Praman  or  Valid  know- 
ledge—  tke  W^orld  of  Reals  and  not  of  Pkantoms  as  kold 
tke  Buddkists. 

So  we  see  how  in  addition  to  Direct 
Perception  (IT^?^  WT'n),  Inference  (^gWM  ) 
is     also    admissible    as  an   Indirect    means 


Prima- facie 
Obj  e  c  t  i  o  n 
against   the 


{^fm  Will)  according  to  the  [ain  TxhTV^ 
epistemology.  But  then  the  Purva  Pakshin,  ^^^^  ^^^' 
Ch^rv^k,  will,  indeed,  remark  that  our 
classification  of  the  means  of  knowledge 
— Pramdnas  and  our  definition  and  inter- 
pretation of  the  logical  terms — Pratyaksha 
and  Paroksha — are  in  clear  contravention  to 
the  common  acceptation  and  interpretation 
of  the  same  and  as  such  should  be  rejected  ; 
for  where  is  the  person  so  insane  as  to 
accept  this  our  view,  the  import  and  uses 
of   the    logical     vocabularies     of   which,  are 


65 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 
in    manifest     opposition     to    the     uniforrnly 

The  suppos-  1  ,..--.  r       1 

ed  abandon-    accepted     sense    and     signihcation     ot     the 

ment  of  ori-  .  •        -^       i-»      •  i  i  .  11 

ginai  posi-    terms     in    question:     Besides,     this     would 

tion    by    the 

Jains.  be  construed     as    an    abandonment    on    our 

part  of  the  original  position  (  nfhWT  ^sEJl^  ) 
taken  up  by  us  in  the  demonstration  of  the 
logical  possibility  and  validity  of  inferential 
knowledge  (t[ft^  '^I'T)  in  addition  to  the 
perceptual  and  yielding  as  well  to  the  view 
held  by  our  adversary,  in  so  far,  indeed, 
as  the  epistimological  side  of  the  question  is 
concerned,  simply  by  a  cunning  display  of 
pun  upon  words  and  terms  from  their  ety- 
mological significations.  Specially  such  is 
your  position  when  we,  Charv^kas,  do  not 
admit  of  Pure  Intuitions  or  Transcendental 
Perceptions  which  are  impossible  on 
your  own  statement  to  the  ordinary  mortals 
living,  moving  and  having  their  being  in 
the  empirical  world  of  ideas  and  ideals. 

Indeed  !    we,  the    Jains,  reply.     There  is 

,,.  ,.  much  of  sense  in  your   argfument.     But  that 

Vindication  ^  ^ 

of  the  Jain-    j^  ^j-jj^  apparently  in  as  much  as  they  vanish 

onhT'cMr"    altogether      like     cob-webs     on      searching 

thesis.    ^^°"    analysis,    as  we  shall  see  presently.     True  it 

is  that  our   definition   and    interpretation   of 

66 


JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC. 

the  logical  terms  in  question    are    in   contra- 
vention   to   the     too     common     acceptation 
and    uses      of    the      same.       But     common 
is     the     common      place     and    being     too 
common    would     not     diminish    the    weight 
and   gravity    of  our    philosophy.     We  walk 
straight     along     the     lines      of     Rijti-sutra 
(^^  ^(p|)   and  interpret  and  explain  things 
both    as    they    are  and    appear   instead     of 
wrangling     and     beating     about    the    bush. 
In  our  empirical  life  and   thought,  we  indeed 
admit   Perception    as   the   direct  and  Infer- 
ence  as   the    indirect   means  of  knowledge. 
But,  however,  to  meet  you  on  your  grounds; — 
First ^ — You  hold    that  direct  Perception 
(  TKW^  )  in    the    common    acceptation   of  the    fh^'^Hypo- 
term  is  the  one   and    only  means    of  know- 
ledge and  that  the  so-called  Inference  (^gRT*!) 
being  not    possible  according  to    your    view 
is  not  to  be  recognised  as  valid  knowledge. 

Now,  do  you   or  do  you  not  adduce  any 
proof  in  support  of  your  contention  ?     If  you    ^  ^  e  Chir- 
do    not,    your  assertions    would    be   but  ipse    Dilemma. 
dixit  and  none  will  care  to  listen  to  you.     On 
the  other    hand,    if  you    adduce  proof,  yours 
would  be  a  suicidal  procedure  making  yourself 

67 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

guilty  of  a  crime  for  the  abandonment  of 
the  original  position  ( nfh^T  ^W(^ )  already 
taken  up  by  you  in  some  form  or  other. 

Secondly, — Again  when  you  maintain  that 
Unconcious    excepting   Perception     all  other      forms     of 

admission  of  ri        r  n      •  j  i 

induction  in    evidence    are    alike   fallacious  and   as   such 

sensuous 

perception,  homogeneous,  you  admit  yourself  the  legiti- 
macy of  induction  which  is  but  a  form  of 
inference. 

Thirdly — Then    again    you    reject  every 

Vindication    kind  of  inference  ;   but  how  do  you   carry  on 

of  inferential  ,    .  •\  c^        ^     \  r  i        i  •   i 

knowledge.  your  debate  r  burely  by  means  of  words  which 
are  but  symbols  of  thought :  and  when  you 
attack  your  antagonists  for  their  mistaken 
faith  in  inference  without  which  you  could 
not  so  much  as  surmise  that  your  antagonists 
held  erroneous  opinions,  such  erroneous 
opinions  being  never  brought  into  contact 
with  your  organs  of  sense  but  are  only 
supposed  to  exist  on  the  strength  of  inference 
(^gjTH)  from  the  symbolic  movement  of 
thought.     And, 

Finally y — you  can  not  but  admit  of  infer- 
ence being  another  means  of  knowledge 
as  will  be  evident  from  the  following.  To 
take  for  example,  I  have  been  very  often  into 

68 


JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC, 

the  kitchen  room  as  well  as    in   other   places 

and  I  have  invariably   observed    that    where    Demonstra- 

^  tionVof     the 

there   was   smoke    there  was  fire.     Having^    legitimacy  of 

°      Inference. 

met  with  not  a  single  exception  to  the  rule, 
I  become  convinced  of  the  fact  that  there 
is  an  universal  antecedence  of  fire  in  respect 
of  smoke.  Afterwards  I  ^o  to  a  hill 
for  a  trip.  I  see  smoke  there  and  I 
doubt  somehow  whether  or  not  there  is 
fire  in  the  hill  and  the  moment  I  observe 
smoke  on  it,  I  recall  to  my  mind  the  invari- 
able concommitance  between  fire  and  smoke 
of  which  I  had  become  pretty  well  convinced 
before,  and  I  conclude  that  the  hill  has 
fire  in  it  as  there  is  smoke  on  it.  Surely 
this  is  a  case  of  inference  to  the  point  and 
and  you  cannot  but  admit  the  legitimacy  of 
the  issue  in  question. 

Having  thus  refuted  the  Ch^rv4ka  hypo- 
thesis so    far    their  means    of  knowledge    is    ,,        .      ^ 

^  Necsesity  of 

concerned  and  bavins:  demonstrated    as  well    ^  ^"^^  f?-^' 

^  vey    of  t  h  e 

the  legitimate  possibility  oi  Inference{^'^\'^)    i7"fo[^m°a^ 
beyond  all  shadow  of  doubt  according  to  the     °^'^* 
general   acceptation    of    the    logical  term  in 
question,    it    is  imperative  that  we  shall,  ere 
we  enter  on  any  other   topics    bearing    upon 

69 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

our  subject-matter,  here  set  forth  in  brief, 
our  own  view  of  the  means  of  knowledge — 
Pramdnas  (y(^m). 

The  question,  therefore  to  begin  with, 
The  Jain  IS,  What  is  Pramdua,  from  our  point 
man  as  dis-  of  view.  Pvamdiia,  we  define,  is  the  valid 
from  other    knowledge    which    reveals    itself  as    well  as 

s  c  h  o  o  1  s  of 

thought.  its  knowable.     It  is  worthy  of  note    that   by 

this  we,  first,  put  aside  the  Buddhist  view 
that  there  being  nothing  external,  knowledge 
only  reveals  itself  and  secondly,  we  contradict 
as  well  the  Naiydyika  and  the  Mimdnsaka 
schools  of  thought  who  teach  that  know- 
ledge does  not  reveal  itself  but  reveals 
external  relations.  We  hold,  however,  that 
just  as  colour  reveals  itself  as  well  as  the 
object  to  which  it  belongs,  so  knowledge  re- 
vealing itself  reveals  the  knowable  as  well. 

Now  such  being  the  characteristic  indi 
cation  (^^^u)  of  Pramdna  or  Valid  know- 
ledge as  we  hold  it,  our  sages  have, 
(apart  from  Immediate  Intuition  or  Transcen- 
dental Perception  which  is  the  truest 
indication  of  what  is  meant  by  Real  Direct 
Knowledge),  for  the  sake  of  convenience  of 
the  ordinary  mortals  breathing   in  the    world 

70 


JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC, 

of  relativity  of  thought  and  form,  deemed  it 
wise  to  classify  it  into  two  kinds,  viz.  (i) 
Direct  and  (ii)  Indirect  (iToSl^and  q^t^),  Infer- 
ence (^^llfT),  Testimony  (aia^f)  and  the  like 
all  coming  within  the  purview   of  the  latter. 

To  take  the  first,  the  Pratyaksha  or  the 
Direct    knowledge    is    such    that    it    reveals    The  Jain  di- 

.  finitionof 

the   objects  as  lymg  withm    the  range  of  the    formal  Pra- 
tyaksha 
senses;  while  the  other  is  called  Paroksha   or 

Indirect  only  in  reference  to  the  procedure  of 

its  revealing  the    objects    of  knowledge  such 

as  Inference  (qgirif)  which  is    not    object    of 

direct  perception. 

Inference,  again,  is  that  kind  of  valid 
knowledge  which  is  determinant  of  what  ^^^^  ^^^' 
is  to  be  proved,  technically  called  Sddhya, 
arising  from  the  sign  or  insignia  called  Linga 
standing  in  the  relation  of  invariable  con- 
commitance  (smfn)  with  the  same. 

Such  being  the  characteristic  indication 
of  Inference  according  to  our  logic,  we  J.^wfudes 
thereby  set  aside  first  the  view  which 
maintains  that  (i)  non-perception  (=qgq^fer), 
(ii)  Identity  (  ^^\^  )  and  (iii)  Causality 
(^T%^)  are  but  grounds  of  inference  ;  and 
secondly,  also  the    view    which  declares  that 

7^ 


Buddhist  and 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

effect  ('^T^),  cause  (sffi^^),  conjunction  (^^tf ), 
Naiyayika    co-existence    (^^TcJUT),    opposition    (f^^w)    or 

grounds      of 

Inference.  such  forms  of  ratiocinations  as  are  known  by 
the  names  of  a-priori  (  ^^^^  )  or  a-postiriori 
(  ^^^\  )  or  analogy  (^]?n*^^I^),  as  grounds 
of  inference. 

Now  this  Inference,  we    divide    into  two 

tion  of  Infer-    ki^ds,  {o)  Svdr^Mmimd7i{^\^'[^q]^)  i.e.  Infer- 


ence. 


ence  for  ones  own  self  ?i\\di  (b)  Pardrthdnuman 

(^TT^%RI*f)i.e.  Ini^YtncQ/orthesake  of  others. 

{a)     Svdrthdmimdn  (^I^^gi?T«T)  or    Infer- 

(i)  Inference    ence  for   oue  s  owH   Self    is  the    valid  know- 

for  one's  own 

self,  illustra-  jedge  arising  in  one's  own  mind  from 
repeated  of  observations  of  facts  as  in  the 
case  of  having  been  in  the  kitchen  many 
times  and  having  invariably  seen  that  where 
there  was  fire  there  was  smoke,  one  concludes 
within  himself  that  the  hill  must  have  fire 
in  it  in  as  much  as  it  has  smoke  on  it. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  here  that  this  infer- 
ence for  one's  own  self,  corresponds  totidem 
verbis  to  the  first  form  of  Aristotle's 
syllogism  : — 

All  that  smokes  is  fiery, 
The  mountain  smokes  ; 
Therefore  the  mountain  is  fiery. 

7^ 


JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC. 

Such  is  the  process  when  we  reason  for 
ourselves.  But  if  we  have  to  convince  some  forVthers— 
body  else  of  what  we  by  inference  know 
to  be  valid,  the  case  is  different.  We  then 
start  with  the  assertion,  the  hill  is  fiery. 
We  are  asked,  why  ?  and  we  answer, 
because  it  smokes.  We  then  give  our  reason 
or  the  major  premise,  that  all  that  smokes 
is  fiery  as  you  may  see,  for  instance,  on  a 
kitchen  hearth  and  the  like.  Now  you 
perceive  the  hill  does  smoke  and  hence  you 
will  admit  that  I  was  right  when  I  said  the 
hill  is  fiery.  Such  being  the  processes  of 
reasoning  we  generally  adopt  when  we 
try  to  convince  any  one  of  the  truth  and 
validity  of  our  statement,  it  is  called 
Pardrthdnumdn. 

(d)  Pardrthdnumdn  ( TT^imgjlT^ )  is  a 
statement  expressive  of  reason  (fg)or  middle  ^X'oeffned 
term  standing  in  relation  of  invariable  con- 
commitance  with  what  is  {.oh^ proved  (^V^ 
or  major  term  having  been  composed  of  the 
minor  term  (tr^). 

It  is  important  to  note  that  Paksha    {t\^)    ^ 

^  v   -'      Comparative 

which    corresponds    with     the    minor    te7'm    syUo^^luc 
of  the    European    logic    is     defined     to    be    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

73 

10 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAIN  ISM. 

that  with  which    the    reason,  Hetu   (fg)   or 

the     middle     term    is   related    and     whose 

relation    with    the   major   term   has    got   to 

be  demonstrated.     The    major   term   stands 

for    Sddkya  or    what  is  to   be  proved,  while 

Hetu    (f g),   Linga   (f^g')  or  Sddhan  (^T^f) 

can    be    exchanged  for    the    middle    term  or 

reason  which    cannot  stand  without    being  in 

relation  with  the  Sddhya  or  the  major  term. 

In    language    a    sentence    must    have    a 

Formulation    Subject  and  a    predicate.      In    a    proposition 

ogis  .    ^^^_^^^j  which  is  but  a  form  of  sentence,    the 

subject  is  the  Paksha  or  the  minor  and  the 
predicate  is  the  Sdddkya  or  the  major 
term.  To  illustrate,  let  us  take  the  pro- 
position ; — 

(i)     The  A/7/ (minor  term)  is    full    o{  fire 
(major  term). 

(2)  Since    it    is    full    of  smoke   (middle 
term). 

(3)  Whatever   is    full    of  smoke    is  full 
fire,  just  as  the  kitchen  (example) 

(4)  So     is     this     hill     full     of     smoke 
(application) 

(5)  Therefore  this    hill    is     full    of  fire 
(conclusion). 

74 


JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC, 

Now  the  exposition  of  this  form  of  infer- 
ence  for  the  benefit  of  others  is  more  rhetorical  ^  ^^  ^  ^l\ 
in  language,  persuasive  in  its  elaboration  and  members, 
more  useful  therefore  in  controversy. 
When  this  form  of  exposition  takes  on  five 
members  in  which  it  usually  expresses  itself 
as  in  the  above,  it  is  called  Madhyama 
or  mediocre  type  and  when  it  takes  on  less 
than  five  members  it  is  called  Jaghanya  or  the 
worst  type.  But  the  Uttama  or  the  best 
type  of  exposition  consists  of  the  following 
ten  members — Daskdvayava  (i)  Pratijnd 
( trf^T'^T  )  or  Proposition,  (2)  Pratijnd 
Suddhi  (  nfh^r^f^  )  or  Correction  of  the 
Proposition,  (3)  Hetu  (fg)  Reason  or  the 
middle  term,  (4)  Hetu- suddhi  (  W  g^^  )  or 
Correction  of  the  reason  or  the  middle  term 
(5)  Drishtanta  (?^|5fC)  or  Example,  (6)  Drish- 
tanta-suddhi  (igST^t^igff)  or  Correction  of  the 
example,  (7)  Upanaya  i^^^ii)  or  Application 
(8)  Upanaya-suddhi  (^xxi\n%S,'^ox  Correction 
of  the  application  (9)  Nigaman  (fifiiqiT)  or 
Conclusion  and  (10)  Nigaman- suddhi 
(Of^fTfsjf^)  or  Correction  of  the  conclusion. 

II.      Testimony  ii^^    is   the  valid  know- 
ledge arising  from  words  which  being  taken 

75 


Testi  m  o  n  y, 


.     AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

in   their   proper    significance  and  acceptance 
express    real    objects    not    inconsistent    with 
what  is  established  by  perception, 
and      its  This     Testimony    is     of  two     kinds — {a) 

Loiikika    (^f^oft)  and    {b)  Shastraja  {i{\^'^. 
-  (a)     Loiikika  sabda   (^f^^  11^5;)    is    the 
Verbal    Testimony     from     reliable     persons 
having  authority  to  speak. 

[b)  Sastraja  sabda  (jjI'^tt)  is  the  Scrip- 
tural Testimony.  By  scripture  is  meant  that 
which  was  invented  by  self-realized  persons 
who  have  seen  truths  and  whose  pronounce- 
ments in  consequence  are  not  incompatible 
with  truths  derived  from  perception. 

Now  the  Jain  sages  hold  the  Scriptural 
Knowledge  to  be  of  three  different  kinds, 
viz  ; — 

(i)     Knowledge  derived  from  the    teach- 
ciassifica-    ings,    recorded    or    otherwise,  of  ku  devas  or 

tion     of   the 

Shastraja    bad  spititual  teachers. 

Testimony. 

(2)  Knowledge  derived  from  the  Naya 
Sruta  or  that  part  of  the  Jain  scripture 
which  teaches  us  as  to  the  ways  of  compre- 
hending things  and  realities  in  one  or 
the  other  of  the  many  aspects  they  are 
possessed  of. 

76 


JAIN  THEORY  OF  FORMAL  LOGIC 

(3)  Knowledge  derived  from  Syadvdd 
sruta  or  that  part  of  the  Jain  scripture  which 
teaches  us  how  to  test  and  comprehend  things 
and  realities  in  all  their  aspects  for  which 
reason  it  is  also  called  Anekdntavdd  or  the 
doctrine  of  the  versatality  of  aspects. 

Of  these  three  kinds  of  scriptural  know- 
ledge, we  shall  deal  with  the  Nayavdd  and 
the  Syddvdd  in  the  subsequent  chapters  and 
leave  the  first  to  be  dealt  with  later  on 
for  the  sake  of  our  arrangement  and  con- 
venience. 


77 


CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  "NAYAS." 

Otner  lines  of  Logical  or  Ontologtcat  Inquiry  — 
Analysis  and  Synthesis  -tkc  Nayas  anJ  tke  Sa|>tal>kangi 
—  tlic  two  IcinJs  of  Nay  a—  (i)  tkc  Noumenal  anJ  (ii) 
tke  Pkenomenal — Oonsiaeration  of  tkc  Ten  SukJivisions 
of  tke  Noumenal  Nay  a  or  tke  Analytic  Metkod  of 
Inquiry  into  tkc  Ontology  of  Tkougkt  and  Form. 

In  the  forgoing  discussion   on  the  means 
Importance    ^^  knowledge,  we  have  seen  how  the  Formal 
of  the^"iV^°"    Logic  of  the  Jain    philosophers    differs    from 
^S^ptabhangi    the   systems    of    Logic    belonging    to    other 
schools  of  thought   and   culture.     But    what 
we  have  stated  in    brief   is    not    all    that    we 
know    of  the  Jain    Logic.      In    addition    to 
this,  it  has  other   means    of  logical    enquiry 
into     the     ontology     of    things     identifying 
thereby    logic    with    ontology     which    is    of 
vital  importance  to  deal  with  in    the    correct 
estimation    of  thought,   form   and    being — a 
general  conception  of  which  is  only  attained 
by    sense  perception    and    the  like    ordinary 
means    of  knowledge.     But  to    enter  into  a 
more    detailed   and    complete   apprehension 
of  the    actual    realities   which    we   come   to 

7S 


THE  IAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  FAS. 

conceive  of  through  the  ordinary  channels 
in  more  or  less  indefinite  forms,  there  are  two 
other  lines  of  ontological  investigation 
which  owe  their  origin  and  development  to 
the  empirical  knowledge  of  things  ;  and  these 
are  (/)   The  Nayas   and    (2)    The    Sapta- 

Nay  a  is  the 

bhafiH.    The  yf/^/  is  the  analytical  dyoc^^s  oi   analytic  and 

the  Sapta- 

ontoloeical  enquiry  and  the  second  is  the  syn-    bhangi\s\\it, 

^  ^       ^  -^  synthetic 

thetical   treatment  of  thing^s    in    their    v^erse-    "^^thod    o  f 

**  study. 

tality  of  aspects  for  which  reason  this  latter 
is  called  the  Anekdntavdd  or  the  Doctrine 
(teaching)  of  the  Versatality  of  Aspects.  It 
is  these  two — the  Nayavdd  and  the  Ane- 
kdntavdd — which  form,  as  it  were,  the  very 
ground-work  on  which  the  whole  structure 
of  the  Jain  metaphysics  is  safely  and  securely 
built  up. 

To  deal  with  Nayavdd  first,  Nay  a  is   the 
analytical    process    of   ontological    investiga-    Definition 

and  ^function 

tion  helping  us  to  dive  deep  into  the  net- work  ^^  ^he  iVaya. 
of  inter-related  parts  of  the  thing  known 
through  the  ordinary  means  of  knowledge 
and  select,  as  well,  one  or  the  other  attri- 
bute from  the  innumerable  attributes,  the 
aggregate  of  which  makes  up  the  being  and 
expression   of  the  said    known  thing    with    a 

79 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

view  of  interpreting  and  understanding 
the  selected  attribute  for  a  correct  and 
complete  conception  of  the  ontology  of  the 
same.  Thus  a  Naya^  it  is  clear,  predicates 
one  of  the  innumerable    attributes  of  a  thing 

4 

Whatconsti-    without  denvinof   the    rest  ;  for,    wherever  it 

tutes   t  h  e  j      ^ 

fallacy  in  does  SO  inolvingf  a  denial  of  the  rest  of  the 
attributes,  it  is  no  longer  a  naya  proper 
but  a  naydbkAsa  {^^\^^^)  or  fallacy  involved 
in  the  analytical  reasoning. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  this  analytical 
reasoning.  One  is  the  Dravydrthika  Naya 
or  Noumenal  Naya,  and  the  other  is  the 
Parydydrthika  Naya  or  the  Phenomenal 
Naya. 

I.    THE  NOUMENAL  NAFA. 

The  Dravydrthika  or  Noumenal  Naya  is 
ThcNoume-    |.|^^j.    pj-ocess    of  the  analytical  enquiry  which 

nal  Naya.  ^  /  i       / 

which  has  for  its  subject-matter  the  subs- 
tratum or  the  noumenon  of  a  thing. 

But  what  is  Dravya  or  Noumenon  ? 
Dravya  is  what  persists  in  and  through  its 
qualities  and  changes  (^^  and  \xkm)  which 
are  but  outward  appearances  of  the  same. 
We   can  well  take  Dravya,  therefore,  for  the 

80 


J 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  YAS. 
substantial  entity  or  reality    {^\),    which    is 

Noumenon 

thus    discernible    by    the    eye    of   reason    to    is  the  Object 

of  Reason  and 

exist  behind  its  appearances   or  phenomena.    Phenomenon, 

of  Sense. 

Hence,  while  ^phenomena  or  parydyas  enter 
into  experience  in  the  form  of  sensation  and 
feeling,  the  substantial  reality  (fli^or^sn)  has  to 
be  filled  in  by  rational  thought,  so  to  speak,  as 
neccessary  to  explain  and  understand  them. 
Thus  Dravya  or  Noumenon  is  the  object 
of  reason  in  contra-distinction  with  parydyas 
or  phenomena  which  are  but  objects  of  sense. 
Such  being  the  subtle  difference  and 
distinction    between     Dravya     (Noumenon) 

Ten  kinds 

and     Parydyas    (Phenomena)   according  to    ofNoumenal 

Nay  a    viz; — 

the  Jain  philosophy,  there  are  various 
ways  of  analytically  enquiring  into  the 
metaphysics  of  a  thing  which  have  been 
for  convenience'  sake  classified  under  ten 
different  forms,  viz, — 

(i)  Anvaya  dravydrthika — deals  directly 
with  referenceto  that  feature  of  thething  which  ...  jinvava 
constitutes  the  universal  characteristic  indica-  thika-^ 
tion  of  the  same.  We  cannot,  for  instance, 
know  a  substance  without  knowing  its 
qualities  or  modalities  at  the  same  time;  nor 
qualities  or  modalities  without  an  underlying 

81 

II 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  A INISM, 

substance  :  lor  a  substance  without  quality 
or  modality  is  as  unthinkable  as  the  quality 
or  modality  without  a  substance. 

(ii)    Svadravyddi   grdhaka — has     for    its 
(//)   Svadra-    Subject  matter  those  particularising  aspects 

vyd  di  ^  r  a-        ^         ,  .         .  ,       ,  ,  i  •   i       • 

haka--  of  a  thuig  HI  and    through   which    it    asserts 

its  existing  individuality  as  distinct  and 
separate  from  what  it  is  not.  A  particular 
thing  does  not  assert  itself  as  such  simply 
by  the  virtue  of  its  substance,  the  abode 
of  its  many  qualities  and  modalities ;  but  it 
asserts  its  own  individuality  as  such  equally 
through  its  own  locality  of  existence,  ih^ period 
its  of  coming  into  existence  and  the  7node  of 
its  existence.  For  instance,  when  we  know 
that  'there  is  the  jar,'  we  do  not  simply  know 
that  the  jar  of  clay  or  of  any  other  particular 
substance  whereof  it  has  been  manufactured 
is  there  ;  but  we  know  as  w^ell  xX^e  particular 
locality  (^^of)  where  the  jar  stands,  the 
particular  period  of  time  (^%\^  when  the  jar 
is  said  to  have  come  into  existence  and  the 
particular  mode  (^*TI^),  capacity,  colour  and 
the  like  in  and  through  which  the  jar  has  been 
asserting  its  own  existence  and  individuality 
as  distinct  and  separate  from  all    others  that 

8^ 


THE  jAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  VAS. 

lie  around  it.  Thus  it  is  evident  that  a 
finite  thing  asserts  its  own  individuality 
in  and  through  (i)  its  own  substance  (^?c5i)  ; 
(ii)  its  own  period  of  existence  in  time  (^^[^); 
(iii)  its  own  locality  of  existence  in  space 
(^^^)  ;  and  (iv)  its  own  mode  of  existence 
(^>n^).  And  these  are  the  four  particularis- 
ing elements  which  the  sadravyddi  grAhaka 
nay  a  deals  with. 

(iii)     Parodravyddi     grAhaka — is      the 
negative    method  of  studying    the   metaphi-    {iii)  Para- 

lira  V y  a  di 

cal  aspect  of  a  finite  thing  with  the  light  of  grdkaka  — 
what  is  other  than  itself.  Every  finite  thing, 
because  it  is  finite,  must  stand  in  rela- 
tion to  what  gives  limit  to  it  by  reason  of 
which  the  distinction,  determination  and 
finitude  of  the  thing  is  marked  out  from  its 
surroundings  contributing  to  the  individuality 
of  the  same.  To  amplify  the  import,  a 
particular  thing  surely  stands  in  relation  to 
other  things  in  its  neighbourhood  in  sharp 
contrast  to  the  four  particularising  elements 
of  which  the  individuality  of  the  thincr 
in  question  is  marked  out.  Now  when 
the  particularising  elements  of  these  others 
which      surround     the    thing    in      question, 

83 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

predominate  in  our  minds  and  give  tone  and 
colouration  to  our  consciousness,  the  entity  as 
well  as  the  individuality  of  the  latter  is  lost 
sight  of  by  certain  psychological  processes, 
making  the  same  sink  into  subconscious 
regions  for  the  time  being.  And  it  is  thus 
clear  that  when  we  say,  'there  the  jar 
exists',  the  jar,  we  mean  to  say,  exists  only 
as  such  in  so  far  its  own  particularising 
elements  are  concerned  ;  but  it  enters  into 
a  nullity,  as  it  were,  the  moment  our  minds, 
by  a  movement  of  thought,  become  occupied 
with  the  four  particularising  elements 
of  those  other  things  which  surround  the 
jar  for  which  reason  they  are  said  to  be  but 
negations  of  the  jar. 

(iv)  Parama  bkdva  grdhaka — is  the  onto- 
bkdva%T7-  logical  enquiry  taking  into  consideration  the 
supremely  outstanding  feature  of  a  thing 
which  is  singular  and  unique  in  its  charac- 
teristic indcation.  For  instance,  cons- 
ciousness is  the  supremely  outstanding  and 
unique  quality  of  the  soul  in  as  much  as  it 
is  not  to  be  found  in  anything  else  but  soul. 

(v)     Kramopddki  nirapeksha  suddka  etc. 
— means  the  consideration   of  a  thing  purely 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NAYAS, 

in  regard  to  its  noumenal  aspect  in  quite  dis-    (v)  Karmo- 

pddki  nira- 

rerard  of  the  changes  and  variations  it  under-   P  e  k  s  h  a 

suddha  etc- 

goes  by  the  virtue  of  its  own  karma.  From 
this  point  of  view  all  living  beings  are,  spiri- 
tually speaking,  pure  souls  constitutionally 
free  from  all  taint  or  blemishes. 

(vi '  Utpdda  vyaya gotmatve  sattd  grdhaka 
suddha   etc. — takes    into     consideration    the    ^^^    Uipa(i<^ 

vyaya     gou- 

persisting     element   of    a    thing.     A    thing    '^Ta/a"t 

,  '^ri  T  ^^        s  V  d  d  h  a 

undergoes  a  variety  ot  changes.  Ice  melts  etc— 
down  into  water  ;  water  evaporates  up  into 
vapour.  Nevertheless,  we  know  that  in- 
spite  of  all  these  changes,  nothing  is 
lost.  Whatever  form  it  may  take,  still 
the  substance  maintains  itself  through 
and  through.  Thus  all  through  these 
transformations  there  is  an  element  which 
persists,  and  it  is  this  persisting  reality 
which  forms  the  subject  matter  of  the 
present  form  of  enquiry. 

(vii)    Bheda   kalpand  nirapeksha — treats 
substance  as  non-different   from   its   qualities    ^^^a  l  fa^n^d 
and    variations     in    and     through     which    it    '^'^^^^  ^^^~ 
manifests  itself. 

(viii)  Kramopddhi     sdpekska     asudha — 
means    taking  the   thing   into    consideration 

S5 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 
under  the  immediately  present  external  mode 

(viii)  Kraino-        r  .  .        ,  r        i  • 

pddhi  sapek-    ^^  ^^s  appearance  as  ni  the  case    of  taknig    a 

shaasiidha--—  ..  .  .  r        r         •       ir 

redhot  piece  iron  for  hre   itself ;  or  taking    a 

man    to    be     insane    for     the    temporary   fit 

of  insanity  he  has  displayed  for  the  moment. 

(ix)      UtpMa      vydya      sdpekska      sat  id 

(ix)  Utpdaa-    orhaka     asuddha — implies     takinp-   a  thing- 

vyaya  sapek-    *  r  &  & 

sha  sattd    jj^    j^g    tripartite   aspects  of  oripination,  des- 

g  r  h  d  k  a-  ^  ^  ^  ' 

asuddha—  truction  and  permanence  at  one  and  the 
same  time  ;  as  in  the  case  of  casting  a  gold 
necklace  into  the  mould  of  a  bracelet,  the 
substance  remaining  the  same  substance 
all  through  the  time,  involving,  as  it 
does,  in  it  the  idea  of  the  origination  of  the 
bracelet  from  the  destruction  of  the 
necklace,  gold  remaining  essentially  the 
same  all  through. 

Bheda  kalpand  sdpekska  asuddha — is    the 

Bheda    kal-    consideration   of  the  thing  after  resolving    it 

pand  sdpek- 
ska asuddha.    tl;ii-ough    the    processes  of  mental  abstraction 

into  substance  and  quality,    though    the   two 

are     really     non-different     and     inseparable 

from  each  other:  for    instance,  consciousness 

is    the     essential     quality    of  the    soul  ;  but 

we    often  draw  a  line  of  distinction  between 

consciousness     and    soul    in    our      ordinary 

86 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  YAS, 

parlance  when  we  say,  ''the  soul's  conscious- 
ness," or  ''conciousness  of  the  soul",  though 
soul  is  non  different  from  consciousness 
or  the  latter  from  the  former. 

ON  FAR  FA  FAS. 

Before  we  come  to  the  discussion  of 
the  second  class  of  Naya  known  as  the 
Parydydrthika,  it  is  imperative  that  we  must 
have  a  clear  understanding  of  what  we  mean 
by  a  parydya. 

A   parydya    is  but   a   mood   or   state  of 

Definition  of 

being.     Or    whatever     has   origin   and    end    P^  ry  dy  2, 
or   destruction    in    time    is    parydya.     The 
ripples     in    waters    or   the    surging     waves 
ruffling  the  vast    expanse    of  the   ocean   are 
but    typical    illustrations    of  what     is    really 

meant  by  parydya. 

Such  being  the  nature  of  Parydyas,  they 
are    but    phenomena   or   appearances  and  -as    Classification 

*■  *■  ^  of   Paryayas 

such  they  must  be  appearances  of  something 
with  which  they  stand  in  certain  relations. 
Following  up  the  character  of  these  relations, 
the  Jain  sages  have  classified  parydyas 
primarily  into  (i)  Sahabhdvi  and  (ii)  Kranm- 
bhdbi. 

87 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

Of  these  two  kinds  of  parydya,  the  first, 
{^)Sahabhavi  Sakabkdvi  refers  to  the  quality  which  is  co- 
existent with  what  it  reveals  ;  as  for  example, 
consciousness  (  ft'^i^r )  is  the  SahablMi 
parydya  which  is  co-existent  with  soul,  and 
the  second,  Kramabhdbi  stands  for  the 
(ii)    Krama-  parydya      proper.      Kramabkdvi    parydyas 

bhahi 

may  be  described  as  contingent  in  the 
sense  that  their  presence  depends  on 
the  variable  circumstances  so  that  they 
may  differ  in  the  same  thing  at  different 
times  just  as  happiness  and  misery  or 
joy  and  grief  which  are  not  co-existent  with 
the  mind  like  consciousness  but  are  moods 
which  depend  on  the  environment,  the  mind 
finds  itself  placed  in  by  the  virtue  of  its 
own  karma. 

It  is  also  interesting  to  note,  by  the  way, 
how  the  Jain  philosophers  have  otherwise 
classified /^rj/^y^i"  as  in  the  following  : — 

(a)  Svabhva  dmvya  vydnjana  parydya 
— means  substantive  variation  in  the  ultimate 

S  V abhav a 

dravyavyan-    constitution  (^TR  ^f^?:)  which  a  thing  under- 
goes in    the  course    of   its  adaptation  to  the 

environment    as    we     find   in    the    cases    of 
siddha     souls     whose       nature     differ     only 

$8 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NAY  AS. 

slightly  from  the  ultimate  and  real  nature 
of  the  soul  which  is  essentially  free  and  full 
of  bliss. 

(b)  Svabhdva  gtma    vydnjana  paryAya 

— means  variations  in  the  natural  quality  (b)  Svabhdva 
of  a  thing  as  we  hnd  m  the  case  oi  the  janaparydva 
finitude  of  vision  and  imperfection  of  the 
embodied  soul  whose  real  and  essential 
quality  consists  in  the  infinitude  of  vision  and 
perfection  which  become  manifest  of  them- 
selves in  the  pure  and  disembodied  state  of 
beinor  on  the  attainment  of  Freedom. 

(c)  Bibkdva   dravya  vydnjana  paryAya 

— is  an  accidental    variation    in    the  general    (c)   Bibhdva 

,  dravyavydn- 

constitution  of  a  substance  as    is  observed  in   janaparpaya 
the    soul's    transmigrations    through   various 
kinds  of  organic  beings. 

(d)  Bibhdvx  guna  vydnjana.  paryAya — 
means  an  accidental  variation    in  the  form  of 

.  (d)   Bibhdva 

knowledge    which    is  but  a  quality    of  soul,    gunavydn- 

janaparydya 

as  in  the  case  of  matijndn  and  the  like  as 
distinguished  from  the  immediate  intuitive 
knowledge   possible  to  the  kevalms  only. 

The  above  is  but  a  kind  of  classification  of 
paryAyas  as  applied  to  living  beings.   But  the    As     applied 

to   Inorganic 

Jain  philosophers  hold  that  the  same    classi-    world. 

89 

12 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

) 

fication  is  also  applicable  with  equal  logic  to 
the  inorganic  world  of  pudgal-rndXitr, 

(a)  Indivisible  atoms  or  electrons  are  ex- 
amples of  the  first  kind  of  classifications  as 
applied  in  the  non-living  world. 

(b)  Each  kind  of  colour,  smell,  taste  and 
two  non-conflicting  sensations  of  touch  are 
but  instances  of  the  second  class  of  variation 
in  the  non-living. 

(c)  The  binary  and  tertiary  com- 
pounds of  the /x/^*^/- matter  are  illustrations 
of  the  third  kind  of  variation. 

(d)  Chemical  compounds  stand  for  the 
fourth. 

In  fine,  it  is  also  to    be  noted  that  Unity 
Unity, Varie-    (^^<3)  and  Variety  (i^Tcr^)  are  but  modes  of 

tv    etc     are 

but  Other    dippQ'drdLncc— Pal ydy a.      [/nity   is    complete 

modes    or  .  i    rr        •  •  •       r^  '^ 

Parydyas.  I deittity  dino.  Variety  consists  in  Differences  ox 
feature.  Combination  (^^t^).  Configuration 
(WT'fX  Division  (f^4Tm),  Number  (^|FTT). 
Newness  and  Oldness  under  the  influence  of 
time  are  but  other  characteristic  indications 
of  parydya  or  phenomenon.  For  it  is 
said, — 

90 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  VAS. 

SUBSTANCE  AND  QUALITY. 

From  the  above  classification  of  Parydyas 
into  Sahabhdvi  and  Kramabhdvi,  we  are 
constrained  to  discuss,  in  brief,  qualities  and 
attributes  as  distinguished  from  substances. 
For  without  having  made  our  ideas  and 
notions  about  quality  and  substance  pretty 
clear,  it  would  be  difficult  for  us  to  under- 
stand and  appreciate  the  utility  and 
importance  of  Naya  as  applied  in  the 
study  of  the  phenomenology  of  thought  and 
being. 

Substance,  as  we  have  seen,  is  what  has 
some    degree    of   independent     existence    of 

.        .  Substan'ce 

its    own,    preservmg     itself    as    it    does    by    and    quality 

distinguished 

reacting  on  and  resisting  other  things.  This 
power  of  self-preservation  constitutes  the 
essence  or  reality  (^BtTT)  of  the  thing  and. 
manifests  itself  in  the  different  effects  which  it 
produces  by  re-acting  on  other  things.  And 
the  powers  of  re-action  which  thus  mani- 
fest themselves  in  producing  effects  in  other 
things  are  known  as  qualities  or  properties 
of  the  thing  and  are  represented  in  terms  of 
the  effects  they  produce.  To  illustrate,  when 
a  thing  has  the  powers  of  occasioning    in    us 

gi 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

the  sensations  of  colour,  taste,  smell,  weight, 
we  say  that  it  has  the  qualities  of  colour, 
smell  etc.,  for  which  reason  qualities  are 
understood  to  be  inherent  in  or  to  consti- 
tute the  nature  of  the  thing  in  as  much  as 
they  are  but  different  ways  in  which  the 
self-preservative  power  which  is  the  real 
essence  of  the  thing  manifests  itself  out- 
wardly. 

But  qualities  of  things  appear  to  us 
(i)  Generic  ^s  being  of  two  kinds,  so  different  that 
one  may  be  described  as  essential  and  the 
other  as  non-essential.  For,  some  of  the 
qualities  which  perception  reveals  appear 
to  constitute  the  very  essence  of  things — 
qualities  without  which  there  cannot  be  any 
conception  whatsoever  of  things  as  extra- 
mental  realities  and  these  are  called  generic 
(^1T?T*^)  qualities  which  are  common  to  all 
things  and  beings. 

The  Jain  sages  hold  that  the  generic 
qualities  without  which  a  thing  becomes 
wholly  inconcivable  to  us  are  ten  in  number 
viz  ; — 

(i)  Entity  (^f^csr) — which  may  be 
described    as   having    the    characteristics    of 

g2 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  YAS. 

reality  (^Tfl)  and  permanence  (^^)  in  and 
through  the  principle  of  which  it  manifests 
itself  as  the  ground  for  the  phenomena  of  both 
the  UniversaKT^XTW^  and  P articular {^^^. 

(2)  Thinghood  (^g^) — may  be  describ- 
ed as  the  property  revealed  in  and  through 
the  relations  of  the  universal  and  particular 
in  which  objects  subsist  (^T?TT5?I  f^^cfT^cff  ^^). 

(3)  Substantiality  (  ^sg^  ) — means  the 
power  of  self-preservation  constituting  the 
essence  or  reality  (^c[)  which  is  characteristic 
indication  of  Dravya. 

(4)  Knowability  (JT^JTc^) — may  be  des- 
cribed as  the  capacity  of  being  known  or 
measured  by  the  means  of  Valid-knowledge. 

(5)  Subtlety  (^5^^^^) — may  be  des- 
cribed as  the  capacity  of  being  in  the  state  of 
irriducible  minimum  with  a  maximum  inten- 
sity (of  vibration)  defying  thought  and  speech. 

(6)  Extension  (lH^JJc^) — may  be  describ- 
ed as  the  property  of  occupying  space. 

(7)  Sensibility  (^cTiTccr) — may  be  describ- 
ed as  the  capacity  of  responding  to  stimuli. 

(8)  Insensibility  (^^rT«Tc^) — may  be  des- 
cribed as  the  property  incapable  of  giving 
any  response  to  a  stimulus. 

93 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM,    ' 

(9)  Ponderableness  (  i^TfccT  ) — may  be 
described  as  the    quality  of  existing  in  some 

form  or  other. 

(10)  Imponderabletiess  (''^I^tTc^) — may 
be  described  as  the  power  of  existing  without 
having  any  par iiculsir /orm. 

These  are,  then,  the  ten  generic  qualities 
of  things  or  substances  in  general. 

But  there  are  certain  other  qualities 
which     do     not  appear   to   constitute  either 

(ii)     Specific 

qualities.  the  essence  of  or  common  to  all  things. 
Because  the  things  may  have  them 
or  be  without  them  and  yet  remain 
essentially  the  same  in  kind  for  which 
reason  these  are  understood  to  be  but 
modifications  of  our  consciousness  and  are 
termed  as  specific  qualities. 

(i)  Consciousness  (^h),  (ii)  Vision  (^aiT), 

Enumeration    (iii)    Pleasure    (^^),    (iv)  Vigour  (^^),    (v) 

o  f     Specific  1    /      ^\    /    'x  «-T^  /  ,    •'\  c-        11  / 

Qualities  a  s    Touch  (^aj),  (vi)  1  aste  {^^),  (vn)  Smell  {^^), 

bel  onging  /^\»\  ••  r^^ 

particular    (viii)  Colour  (^^),    (ix)    Mobility   (^kT^^ccT), 
substances.  .  /^    r^    'n 

(x)  Inertia  (  fern  ^^fccf  ),  (xi)  Volumeness 
(^^iTT^i^f  gc^),  (xii)  Becomingness  (^iTlVf  gc^), 
(xiii)  Sensibility  (^?T5TcSr),  (xiv)  Insensibility 
(^'^'tccf),  (xv)  Ponderableness  (ij;=6^), 
(xvi)    Imponderableness  (^^?jTc8l).     Of  these 

94 


THE  IAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NAY  AS. 

sixteen  specific  properties,  the  ist,  2nd,  3rd, 
4th,  13th,  and  the  i6th  belong  to  the  Jiva- 
soul ;  the  5th,  6th,  7th,  8th  14th  and  the  15th 
belong  the  Ptidgal-^-ioms]  the  9th,  14th  and 
the  1 6th  belong  to  the  Dharmdstikdya  ;  the 
loth,  14th  and  the  i6th  belong  to  Adharnid 
stiksdya\  the  nth,  14th and  i6th  ioih^Akdsh 
and  finally  the  1 2th,    14th   and    the    i6th    to 

K&la. 

II.    THE  PHENOMENAL  NAVA. 

Having  seen  what  is  implied  by  2,pary6>ya, 
it  would  be  easy  now  to  comprehend  the 
process  of  analytical  enquiry  into  parydyas  or 
Phenomena  which  form  the  subject-matter 
of  the  Parydyarthika  or  Phenomenal  Naya. 
Of  these  nayas  the  first  is, — 

{a)  Anddi  nitya  suddha  &c — is  what 
deals    with  that  kind  of  poudzalic  variations, 

^        *  {a)    Anddi 

the  series  of  which  remaining^  unbroken  from  nitya  suddha 
time  without  begining  puts  on,  in  consequence, 
the  appearance  of  permanence,  inspite  of  the 
ravages  of  time  upon  the  same.  As  for 
example,  the  Himalayas,  though  time  has 
wrought  havoc  on  the  same,  yet  the  high 
mountain  ranges  appear  ever  the  same 
from  time  immemorial. 

95 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(IS)     Sddi  nitya   suddhaparydrthtka    &c. 
s  udTh^-    — ^^^  f^**  ^^^  subject  such  particular    class    of 

Parydrthika  .      .  ,  ...... 

&c.-r-  variations    as  have    origination  in    time  but 

undergoes  no  subsequent  transformation  :  as 
for  instance,  when  the  embodied  soul  enters 
on  a  liberated  state  of  existence,  it  attains  to 
a  state  of  variation  which  has,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  a  begining  in  time  but  knows  no  subse- 
quent change  ;  because  a  soul  once  liberated 
cannot  enter  into  any  bondage  again. 

(c)  Sattd     gounatvena    utpdda     vyaya 
ic)  s  at  ta  grdhaka  nitya  suddha  &c. — enquires  into  that 

gounatve  n  a 

utpddavyaya    kind  of  variations  which  flow  in  rapid  succes- 

g  r  d  h  a  k  a 

nitya  suddha  sions  of  destruction  and  origination  consisting 
as  it  does  in  the  ever-changing  character  of 
the  phenomena  without  looking  into  its 
permanent  feature  underlying  the  same. 

(d)  Sattd    sdpekska     nitya    asuddha — 
{d)  Satta    ^"^^^  ^^"''^y  investigates  into  the  origination  and 

nitya    distruction    of  variations    but    takes  also  into 
asuddha-^  •  i  •  i  •     •  i 

consideration  the  persisting  element  under- 
lying them  as  well.  The  word  parydya — 
variation — usually  means  variations  in  qua- 
lity, modality  and  configuration,  a  thing  under- 
goes without  any  reference  to  the  substance 
itself  which  persists   all  through  the  changes 

9^ 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NA  YAS, 

and  which  on  that  account  is  generally  left 
out  of  consideration.  But  here,  as  the 
persisting  element  is  taken  into  considera- 
tion along  with  the  changes  in  its  appear- 
ances, it  is  called  asuddha  i.e.  improper. 

(e)  Kramopddki       nirapeksha        nitya 

J  J,  1      1         •  I  11  1         Karmopddhi 

suadka  etc. — deals  with    regard  only    to    the    nirapeksha 

nitty  a  s  u  d- 

essential  and  real  nature  ot  the  noumenon  dhaetc. 
irrespective  of  the  phenomenal  variations 
it  undergoes.  It  consists  in  looking  into 
things  with  reference  to  its  real  nature  as 
apart  from  the  temporal  variations  which 
the  thing  might  happen  to  undergo. 

(f)  Kramopddki       sdpeksha         anitya 

.  .  .  Kafmopddhi 

asuddha   &c. — is  an   enquiry    into   the    tern-    sdpeksha 

anitya  asud- 

poral    and   perishable  aspect  of  variations  in    dhaetc 
so  far  only  as  they  are    subject    to   causality 

of  karma, 

THE  SEVEN  NAYAS. 
It  is  now  clear  how  the  two  nayaSy 
Noumenal  and  Phenomenal,  differ  from  each 
other.  The  one  enquires  into  the  very 
substance  of  a  thing  under  consideration 
and  the  other  investigates  into  the  pheno- 
mena in  and  through  which  the  substance 
makes  its  appearance  to  us. 

97 

13 


The     Seven 
Nayas. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

A  Naya,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  stand- 
fh  e^^'sund^  point  of  the  knower.  A  thing  can  be  viewed 
Knower.  ^^  from  different  stand-points.  And  the  Jain 
sages  are  of  opinion  that  there  are  as  many 
moods  of  statements,  so  many  are  the  nayas 
or  view-points  of  the  knower  and  there  are 
as  many  nayas,  so  many  are  the  number 
of  doctrines.  The  Jain  philosophers  have 
thought  it  wise,  therefore,  to  classify  these 
view-points  into  seven  kinds  of  which  the 
first  is, — 

(i)  Naigam — is  the  stand -point  whence 
(i)  Naigam.  the  knower  takes  the  most  general  view 
of  the  thing  under  consideration  without 
drawing  any  hard  and  fast  line  of  distinction 
between  the  generic  (^T^l-'cr)  qualities  and 
the  specific  (ftf^cf)  qualities  of  the  thing.  To 
amplify  the  import,  when  by  the  word 
mangoe,  we  understand  not  only  certain 
properties  which  specifically  belong  to  that 
fruit  only,  but  we  understand  as  well  the 
other  qualities  or  properties  which  the 
mangoe  has  in  common  with  fruits  in  general. 
The  Ndya  and  the  Vaisheshika  schools  of 
the  east  and  the  Realists  of  the  west  survey 
things  from  this  Naigam  stand -point. 

9<? 


THE  JAIN  LOGIC  AND  THE  NAY  AS. 

(2)  Sangraha — is  the  stand-point    from 

which  only  the  generic  qualities  are  taken  \^  angra- 
into  account.  And  though  these  are  generally 
accompanied  by  specific  qualities,  yet  the 
enquiry  from  this  stand-point  keeps  in  view 
the  generic  qualities  only.  As  for  instance, 
when  by  the  term  man,  we  understand 
not  the  human  kind  only  but  the  whole 
range  animal  world.  The  S&nkkya  and  the 
Adwaita  schools  explain  things  from  this 
point  of  view. 

(3)  Vydvahdra — is    knowing    things   by 

the  cash  value.  It  is  the  pragmatical  point  of  ^^'^^  Vydva- 
view  from  which  only  the  specific  qualities  of 
a  thing  are  taken  into  consideration  without 
any  reference  to  their  generic  qualities, 
independent  of  which  the  former  cannot 
stand.  It  consists  in  taking  cognizance 
of  things  only  in  their  such  effects  as  are 
most  prominent,  acute  and  hence  pretty  well- 
known.  Thus  by  Vydvahdra  naya  we  know 
things  only  as  they  affect  and  appear 
to  us.  The  Chdrvdkas  of  the  east  and  the 
Positivists  and  the  Pragmatists  of  the  west 
speak  from  this"  point  of  view.  They  both 
measure  things  by  their  Cask  Value. 

99 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

(4)  Riju  Sutra — is  the    position    taken 

(vi)  R  i  ju-  ,       I  •    1       •  11'  •/   y  T       . 

Sutra.  to  look  Straight  HI  to  the  thnig  as  it  ts.     It   is 

important  to  note  here  that  Riju-sutra  does 
not  refer  to  the  past  or  future  of  the  thing.  It 
concerns  itself  only  with  the /r^.y^;^/  state  of 
things  and  affairs.  As  when  we  know  a  thing, 
we  mean  thereby  to  know  it  only  with  reference 
to  its  present  substantive  state  ( ■g;o5r),  name 
(•fT^),  and  form  (or  image — ^tcc«T)  without 
concerning  ourselves  as  to  how  came  it 
to  be  as  such  or  what  will  it  be  afterwards, 
holding  these  equiries  to  be  but  wild 
goose  chase.  The  Buddhists  of  the  east 
and  Subjective  Idealists  of  the  west  take 
this  as  their  stand-point. 

(5)  Sabda — is  the  terminological   stand- 
{y)  Sabda.    point    whence  the  knower  is  in  a  position  to 

recognise  a  thing  simply  by  hearing  the 
name  of  the  same,  though  the  etymological 
significance  of  the  name  might  be  in 
reference  to  something  other  than  the  thing 
referred  to  by  the  terminology  used. 
For  instance,  Jiva,  Atma,  Soul,  and  Prani 
are  synonymous  terms  and  though 
these  differ  from  one  another  in  their 
etymological    bearings,    yet    they     all    refer 

100 


THE  JAIN  L  OGIC  A  ND  THE  NA  YA  S. 

to  the  one  and  the  same  thing  conven- 
tionally. Certain  Conventionalists  of  the 
grammarian  school  in  the  east  and  the 
Empiricist  of  the  west  hold  their  own 
from  this  stand-point. 

(6)  Sanbiruddha — is  the   position    from 
which     one    is    able  to    draw     a    hard    and    ruddha. 
fast  line    of  distinction    between   the    words 

of  synonymous  character  and  to  follow 
up  the  line  of  enquiry  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  niecity  of  distinction  thus 
drawn.  The  Sabda-vddi  philosophers  of 
the  east  who  propound  the  doctrine  of 
eternal  relation  (  fif<?l  WSi"^  )  between  words 
and  their  objects  and  the  Objective  Idealists 
of  the  west  study  from  this  stand-point. 

(7)  Evambhuta — is     the    view-point  of 

the    knower   from     which     one     is  able    to   bhuta.  ^^^ 

designate     a     thing     in     strict     conformity 

with    the    nature    and    quality    as    displayed 

by     the     thing     to     be    designated  ;    as    in 

the       case     of     calling     a     man     by       the 

name   of  'Victor  for  having  qualified  himself 

as     such     by      conquering      his      enemies. 

The    grammarians     in     general     hold    this 

point  of  view. 

lOI 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

These  are    the  seven    famous   Nayas  or 

metaphysical    view-points  of  looking  into  the 

nature  of  things.     Of  these,  the    first    three, 

Naigam,    Samgraha   and    Vydvahdra    have 

for  their  subject-matter  dravya   or  substance, 

and    the    remaining     four     beginning     with 

Riju-sutra   have     for    their     subject-matter 

Parydi,yas-Y\\^viOvatr\2L,  It  is  important  to  note 

here  that  like  quality  (gm),  mood  (^HT^)  also 

comes  within   the  perview  of  Parydya   with 

this  difference  only  that  while  quality  inheres 

in  substance,    mood  (^41T^)  inheres  in    both, 

— substance  and  quality. 

With    Nayavdd  ends    the     second    part 
the  Jain    Logic,    the    Logic    of   Consistency 

being  the  first  part. 


102 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

Defects  of  tlic  ReaUsttc  Metkod  of  Inquiry  --Sat>ta- 
Lkangt  supersedes  tke  Realistic,  -  It  is  a  tetter  Organon 
of  Knowledge — It  leads  to  tke  ktgker  Knowledge — 
Anekantavad  and  Idealism —True  GUmt>se  of  Concrete 
Reality — Unity  and  Multit>Ucxty — Cor  relativity  as 
Essential  to  Unity — Dialectical  Vision  of  tkmgs  as 
Ex|>ression  of  a  Unity. 

Preliminary. — A      little      reflection     on 
what  has  been    discussed    in    the    foregoing    the  realistic 

r     Ar  -11  1  •  Method.   Its 

sections      ot    Nay  a    will     make    it      pretty    inadequacy 

for    true 

clear  that  our  ordinary:  thinking  con-  insight, 
sists,  for  the  most  part,  of  generalised 
images  or  conceptions  derived  from  the 
phenomenal  world  and  so  charged  more  or 
less  with  the  inherent  characteristics  of 
their  sensuous  origin.  Now  if  we  carefully 
analyse  this  form  of  thought,  it  will  be 
seen  that  it  labours  under  three  serious 
defects.  First,  we  cannot  get  rid  of  the 
material  or  sensuous  origin  which  conse- 
quently tend  to  betray  the  mind  into  illusion 

and  error  ;  secondly,  it  must  fail  to  give  the 
real  or  organic  connection,  to  be  explained 
hereafter,  and  unity  to  objects  which  it  deals 

703 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

with  ;  thirdly,  it  is  incapable  of  solving 
contradiction,  or  reconciling  the  seemingly 
antagonistic  elements  which,  on  close  ex- 
amination, all  thought  is  found  to  contain. 
Now  when  these  draw-backs  of  the  ordi- 
How    It  IS    j-|2irv  or  naive  realistic  method  of  reviewing^  the 

super  s  1  d  e  d  -^  & 

m^e  th^o^d  wot*ld  are  perceived  and  realised,  men  must 
bhangi.  ^  '  supplement  it  with  a  newer  mode  of  cognition 
in  order  to  look  upon  the  world  in  a  more 
rationalised  and  synthesised  way  and  appre- 
hend the  spiritual  enities  in  their  ideal  form 
and  which  in  turn  gives  rise  to  the  famous 
Anekdnta  forms  of  cognition.  This  is  the 
case  everywhere  and  always  ;  for  philosophic 
speculation  develops  most  when  men,  not 
content  with  the  facts  of  experience,  strive  to 
get  hold  of  their  reasons  and  ultimately  into 
their  unconditioned  reason  i.e.  their  rationality 
or  necessity.  Thus  we  find  that  the  ordinary 
way  of  looking  at  the  Universe  and  its 
objects,  or  to  term  it  better,  as  the  naive 
realistic  method,  falls  far  short  of  the 
standard  and  is  quite  inadequate  for  the 
apprehension  of  that  kind  of  Unity  which 
belongs  to  spiritual  things.  For  the  method 
which    regards    everything  as    self-identical, 

104. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

self-subsisting  individual  realities,  cannot  by 
the  very  nature  of  it,  take  cognizance  of  that 
kind  of  Unity,  which  exists  not  in  things 
juxtaposed  or  following  in  succession,  but 
in  elements  which  internally  involve  and 
contain  one  another,    so  that  no  element    can 

Saptabhangi 

be   known    fullv    in    abstraction    or    isolation    is    a    better 

'  organon     of 

from  the  rest.  The  apprehension  of  such  a  knowledge. 
truth  then  presupposes  a  deeper  and  sounder 
organ  of  knowledge,  a  subtler  speculation, 
a  deeper  insight,  a  true  penetration  into  the 
very  heart  of  things.  This  being  attained  every- 
thing seems  to  be,  though  apparently  diver- 
gent and  often  conflicting,  yet  bound  with  one 
tie, — an  expression  of  one  underlying  prin- 
ciple contributing  to  the  substantiveness  of  all 
thought  and  being.  And  this  is  exactly  what 
Saptabhangi  rules  try  to  explain. 

Hence     it    is    obvious    that    the    know- 
ledge which  5'a/i^«^A««^/ leads  to,    must    be    xftll^'To 
the    highest    ideal    of   knowledge— a    know-    o^^k'no'!^ 
ledge    from    which     the     above     mentioned     ^  ^^' 
defects    have    vanished     altogether     and   in 
which    the    ideal  element   is    grasped    in    its 
purity    and    entirety,    in   its    coherence    and 
harmony.      It    is    the    only    adequate     form 

14 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

of  knowledge  so  far  as  we  are  concerned  ; 
because  it  has  the  characteristics  of  necessity 
i.e.  the  constituent  elements  of  it  are 
apprehended,  not  as  isolated  or  independant 
terms  or  notions  but  as  related  to  or 
flowing  out  of  each  other  so  that  one  being- 
given,  the  others  must  necessarily  follow 
and  the  whole  body  of  knowledge  cons- 
titutes one  07'ganised  system. 

A    penetrating    insight    into    things    will 

Ordinary    make  US    sure    of  this  existing    unity    among 

ing  Ajivas.     the  factors   of  the  world.     To    the    unreflec- 

tive  observer,  the  objects  present  themselves 

as  separate  individual  realities    quite    simple 

in  character.     But  this  is    not    the  case,    for 

they  are  essentially  complex.  They  are  made 

up  of  parts  which  lie  outside  of  one   another 

in  space;  they  do  not  remain    absolutely    the 

same  through  successive  movements  of  time. 

They  are  continually    betraying    the    pheno- 

Ordinary    n^^nal    changes  when    brought    into  relation 

— How'^^can    with  Other  existences    around    them.     How, 

seem  to  be    then,  can    we    think  of   them    as    individual 

a  unity?  .  .  •         •  r    i         i  :»      't-i 

thmgs  nispite  oi  the  changes  .''  1  he  answer 
often  unhesitatingly  forwarded  by  philoso- 
phers is    that  we  can  combine  diversity  with 

io6 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 
unity  in  our  conception  of  things  by  thinking 

,  •     1'    •  1      1  •  •  1  1  1     Criticism   of 

them    as    nidividual    entities    each   endowed    j^e  Solutions 

.1  Til  1-  •  -T-i  1  offered  by 

With  manifold  quahties.    1  hey  are  substances    the  Jaina 

Realistic. 

according  to  philosophers,  which  possess 
various  properties  such  as  extension,  soli- 
dity, weight,  colour  etc.  Or  they  are  subs- 
tances or  subjects  to  whom  belong  the  capa- 
cities of  sensation,  feeling,  and  perception 
etc.  But  a  careful  observation  will  show  that 
such  a  device  obviously  fails  to  give  us  any 
real  apprehension  of  existence — even  though 
it  may  be  the  simplest  individual  existence  ; 
because  in  trying  to  give  unity  to  a    number    idealistic 

solutions 

of  unconnected    determinations  by  ascribing    supersidethe 

Realistic. 

them  to  a  common  substance  what  we  really 
do  is  to  add  to  these  determinations  another 
determination,  equally  isolated  and  uncon- 
nected with  the  rest.  Take  away  the  other 
determinations  what  will  be  left  of  your 
substance  ?  It  is  impossible  to  explain  the 
known  by  the  unknown.  So  to  apprehend 
the  real  unity  of  different  qualities  or  to  put 
in  other  words,  to  think  them  as  one,  what 
mind  demands  is,  that  we  should  think  or 
have  a  rational  notion  of  the  relation  of  each 
to  each  and  that  we  should  discern  how    the 


AN  EPITOME  OF   JAINISM, 

existence  of  anyone  involves  the  existence 
of  all  the  rest  and  how  all  are  so  connected 
that  this  particular  quality  would  not  exist 
except  in  and  through  the  whole  to  which  it 
belongs.  To  catch  hold  of  such  substance  and 
not  substratum  as  Locke  had  meant,  we  must 
discern  the  principle  from  which  this  manifold- 
ness  of  parts  and  properties  necessarily  arises  \ 
and  which  has  its  very  existence  and  being 
in  them  and  linking  together  in  thought  the 
differences  which  spring  out  of  it.  Such 
unity  of  substance  is  really  a  unity  in  differ- 
ence which  manifests  itself  and  realises  in 
these  differences. 

In  the  realm  of  mind  or  in    the    spiritual 
mental  world    '^^^  ^^  conscious  beings  also,  there  are  undoubt- 
.  jti^a.  ^^j^  infinite  multiplicity  and  diversity,  but  we 

must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  it  is  a  multi- 
plicity or  diversity  which  is  no  longer  of  parts 
divided  from  each  other  but  each  of  which 
exists  and  can  be  conceived  of  by  itself  in 
isolation  or  segregation  from  the  rest  or  in 
purely  external  relations  to  them.  Here  on 
the  contrary,  the  multiplicity  or  diversity  is 
that  of  parts  or  elements,  each  of  which  exists 
in  and  through  the  rest  and  has  its  individual 

io8 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

being    and    significance   only    in    its  relation 
to  the  rest  or  each  of  which   can    be    known 

.  True  glimpse 

only  when  it  is  seen,  in  a  sense,  to  be  the  rest.    °  ^  ^^^  ^,9"" 

^  Crete  Reality. 

You  can  not,  for  example,  take  the  combina-  ^^^  mature. 
tion  of  two  externally  independent  things  .in 
space  and  employ  it  as  a  representation  of 
the  relation  of  mind  and  its  objects,  for 
though  thought  be  distinguishable  from  the 
object,  it  is  not  divisible  from  it.  The  thinker 
and  the  object  thought  of  are  nothing  apart 
from  each  other.  They  are  twain  and  yet 
one.  The  object  is  only  object  for  the  sub- 
ject, the  subject  for  the  object.  They  have  no 
meaning  or  existence  taken  individually  and 
in  their  union  they  are  not  two  separate  things 
stuck  together  but  two  that  have  lost  or 
dissolved  their  duality  in  a  higher  unity.  • 

Now    it    is    this   characteristic    of  things 
which  renders  impossible  the   correct    annre-    Reasons  why 

•  ^  ^^  the  Realistic 

hension    of  them    by  ordinary  mode  of  coe-    "^^*^^^  "^"^^ 

^  ^  &       necessa  r  1 1  y 

nition  ;  because  they  are  only  to  be  grasped  ^*  * 
in  a  thought  which  embraces  and  solves 
contradictory  elements.  The  ordinary  or 
realistic  way  of  looking  at  things  can  express 
and  take  cognizance  of  the  nature  of  those 
things    which    are  subject  to  the   conditions 

log 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

of  time  and  space  and  regards  the  world  as 
made  up  of  individual  existences,  each  of 
which  has  a  nature  of  its  own,  self-identical 
or  self-complete. 

But    when  we    rise    to  a  higher  spiritual 
Spiritual    vision  of  thine^s,  when  it    becomes  necessary 

visionof  ^'  •' 

p^ession^of^a    ^^  apprehend   objects    which  are    no    longer 
""'^^''  self-identical    units,     but   each    of  which    is, 

so  to  speak,  at  once  itself  and  other  than 
itself,  when  we  cannot  affirm  without  at  the 
same  time  denying  or  deny  without  affirming  ; 
thus  when  the  seeming  contradictions  inter 
penetrate  and  give  reality  and  life  to  each 
other,  the  resources  of  ordinary  thought  fall 
short  of  the  requirement  and  we  are  to  take 
recourse  to  the  other  mode  of  cognition  which 
is  more  synthetical  and  harmonizing.  For 
if  the  sphere  of  reality  be  that  in  which 
nothing  exists  as  a  self-identical  entity,  how 
Inadequacy    is  it  {^ossible    that    formal    logic   or    realistic 

of  Fo  r  m  a  1 

Logic.  method  whose    fundamental  principle   is  the 

law   of  identity    should  be  other  than  baffled 
in  the  endeavour  to  grasp  them  ? 

The  only  device  of  the  rationalising 
intellect  which  comes  uppermost  in  the  mind 
at   first    sight,    for  attaining    unity   is  that  of 

no 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD, 
abstraction  or  properly  called  substantialising 

-         ,  .  ,  .   ,  J       u  r     •  Unity  cannot 

the  abstraction  which   proceeds    by    elimina-    ^^  found  by 

,  -  .  ,  .   .  f-    abstract  i  o  n 

tion    rather    than    by    the     harmonizing     ot    as  attempted 

b  y    Realists 

differences.      In    philosophy,    for  instance,  it    and  so  gives 

rise  to  c  o  n- 

aets  hold  of  one  of  the  indivisible  elements  fusion, 
and  rejects  the  other  equally  necessary  and 
important  element  and  thus  gives  rise  to  all 
sorts  of  confusion  and  controversy  hitherto 
known.  Either  it  tries  to  evolve  dogmati- 
cally all  things  out  of  the  objective  element 
and  so  produces  a  system  of  materialism  or 
sensationalism  (which  is  its  own  condem- 
nation) or  insisting  with  one-sidedness,  the 
subjective  element,  and  thus  gives  rise  to 
pseudo  idealism — a  view  which  hardly  can 
be  cherished  without  giving  up  the  most 
certain  convictions  of  the  mind. 

The  next  question    which    comes    upper 
most    in    the    mind    is  ;    how    thought     can    can  thought 

♦  .  .  reach  to  such 

be  capable  of  grasping  the  reality  in  its    true    a  higher 

stand-point. 

essence  in  such  wise  that  all  its  constituent 
elements  shall  be  seen  not  as  isolated  no- 
tions but  as  correlated  members  of  an  organic 
whole.  In  reply  to  the  above,  we  may  safely 
say  that  it  can  rise  to  a  universality  which  is 
not  foreign  to,  but  the  very  inward  nature  of 

/// 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

things  in  themselves  and   not    the    universal 

by^^a"moie    ^^  ^^^^    abstraction    from    the    [)articular   and 

vision.^' ^   ^     different  elements  but  the  unity    which    finds 

in  them  its  own  necessary  expression  ;  not  an 

invention  of  an  arbitrary  mind  unifying  things 

which    are    essentially    different    but  an  idea 

which   expresses    the   inner    dialectic    which 

exists    in   and    constitutes    the  being   of  the 

^  objects  themselves.     This    deeper    unity,  we 

True  univer-  •'  ^  •' 

iTis^^~^^'^^  may  designate  as  ideal  or  true  unity  or 
organic  Universality.  This  Universality  or 
Unity  is  presupposed  by  the  divergent  ele- 
ments through  which  it  manifests  itself  as  the 
different  limbs  and  function  of  an  organism 
are  mere  expressions  of  a  living  unity  of  the 
organism  which  we  may  call  ''life" — Jiva 
(^^).  They  are  its  manifestations.  Unity  of 
life  manifests  itself  in  them  and  fulfils  itself 
in  their  diversity  and  harmony  ;  consequently 
any  limb  of  the  organism  loses  its  signi- 
ficance for  which  it  stands  when  it  is  severed 
from    the    organism — the    expression    of  the 

living  unity  of  life. 

So     in    order    to    apprehend    this    unity 

Notionof  -  .  ,.  ,  .  .  ,  _ 

c:o:rrelaiivity    and  universality    through    your    thought   of 

essential  '  t  o 

theapprehen-    what    it    IS    you    must    inseparably    connect 

sion  of  unity. 

112 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

that     also     with    what   is     not.     They    are 

mere     correlations.     The    thesis     does    not 

exist    in   and    by   itself  but    on  the  contrary 

in    and    throup'h    what    is   other   than  itself. 

^  Dialectical 

In  other  words  it  can  exist  only  as  it   denies    Jjovemem  of 

''  Realities. 

or  gives  up  any  separate  self-identical  being 
and  life,  only  as  it  finds  its  life  in  the  larger 
life  and  being  of  the  whole.  Its  true  being 
is  in  ceasing  to  be  and  its  true  notion 
includes  affirmation  of  its  existence  as  well 
as  denial  of  its  existence.  But  this  is  not  all. 
It  involves  the  idea  of  growth  or  develop- 
ment ;  because  denial  is  the  life  of  reality. 
A  thing  stagnant  altogether,  not  subject 
to  changes,  is  no  better  than  non-entity. 
Mere  being  in  the  sense  of  bare  ex- 
istence whose  modifications  are  stagnant 
and  not  subject  to  phenomenal  changes 
is  a  mere  zero,  ''Pure  Being"  as  Dr. 
Ward  puts  it  ''is  equal  to  Nothing." 
Being  to  be  real  in  any  sense  of  the 
term  must  be  becoming  or  changing.  Its 
ideal  nature,  therefore,  must  be  synthetical 
comprehending  and  explaining  all  contra- 
dictory tendencies— the  sharp  antithesis 
merging   in    the    wide    universality     of  the 

U3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

synthesis.  But  this  notion  of  universality 
in  particulars  cannot  be  apprhended  in  this 
light  unless  we  interprete  it  as  a  process 
involving  perpetual  affirmation  and  per- 
petual negation  reconciled  in  continual 
re-affirmations. 

This  would  appear    quite  obvious    if  we 
The    same 
dial  ectical    view      the      problem     from      another    light 

movement  as 

revealed  b  y    which  will    clearly    reveal    the    unity    of  the 

the   relation 

of  reciprocity    univese  which  permeates  through  every  object 

or  mutual  ^  ^  '-' 

fion^^"^^"^  in  it.  The  world  is  a  complicate  system 
including  innumerable  factors  of  manifold 
character  working  in  it  for  a  certain  goal. 
Whether  this  goal  would  be  attained  at 
all  at  any  point  of  time  in  future  is  not 
our  present  consideration  and  should  not, 
therefore,  occupy  our  thought.  So  much  is 
certain  that  the  world  is  a  system  of  factors 
co-operating  for  the  same  end.  Now  every 
factor,  therefore,  must  be  determined  by  all 
the  rest  in  such  a  way  that  without  any  of 
them,  the  world-end  can  hardly  be  realised. 
Having  this  in  view  all  philosophers  of  every 
clime  and  age  have  pronounced  unanimously 
that  every  thing  which  is  real  is  rational  i,  e. 
having  reason  behind  it  and  this  is  what    we 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

have  spoken  of  before.  Things  being  so 
reciprocally  determined  what  follows  obvi- 
ously is  that  every  factor  is  real  so  long  it 
stands  in  relation  and  co-operates    with  other    supefsid^es 

r  ^      r  c  formal    logic 

factors.      In  fact,  we  may  go  so  tar  as  to  say    asthelatteris 

...  '11  1     in -adequate 

that    m     the    co-operation    and   the    mutual    to  explain 

unity     in 

determination,  the  life  of  the  factor  consists,  difference. 
In  fact,  it  owes  it  reality,  individuality  and 
being  to  this  relation  with  other  factors 
standing  and  working  for  the  common  end. 
Or  as  Lotze  rightly  remarks  '*To  be  is  to 
stand  in  relations."  Any  change  in  the 
relation  of  any  factor  of  the  world, 
would  then,  it  is  quite  apparent,  involve  a 
change  in  all  the  rest  ;  because  of  their 
mutual  determination  and  correlativity.  So 
nothing  can  be  truly  apprehended  unless 
we  take  it  in  the  light  of  not  only  what  it  is 
but  also  what  //  is  not ;  because  this  not-ness 
of  the  factors  imparts  individuality  and 
reality  to  what  it  is.  True  being,  it  appears 
less  paradoxical  to  assert,  consists  in  self 
abnegation  or  denial  of  one's  individuality, 
for  where  lies  its  individuality,  its  self- 
sufficiency,  if  it  depends  for  its  existence 
upon    other     realities     co-operating   for    the 

/^5 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

same   end   and  to  which  it  owes  its  existence 
and    life  ?     So    true   aprehension    can    only 
be   possible    if   we    take    it    in    the  light    of 
not  what    it  is   only  ;  but   also   what  it  is  not 
as  well.     But    this    may  appear    parodoxical 
to  an  untrained    mind    because    it    obviously 
transgresses  the    law    of  contradiction.     The 
most  firm  convictions  which  we  have  cherished 
from  our  cradles  without  the  least  hesitation, 
are    backed  up   and    supported   also   by   the 
vigorous  rules    and    canons   of  formal    logic 
whose    fundamental    principle,    as    we    have 
seen   before,   is  the   law   of  identity  and  con- 
tradiction  that  A    is   A    cannot    be   not-A. 
In  the  New    But    now  we  come  to  a  new  vision   of  things 
things,— y^  is    i^i  which  A  appears  to  be   not  merely  A  but 

n  o  t   merely  n       u  ^    •  i   •  r         • 

A,but Nof-A    not- A  as  well  ;  because  A  is  real  in  so  tar    it 

as  well.  .  .  ,       ,        .  ^       -t^i 

stands  in    relation  with  what  is  not-A.      1  he 

true  life  of  A    would    then    consist   not  only 

in  A  as    formal    logic  teaches  us  but    also   in 

not-A.     The  ideal  nature  of  a  thing  consists, 

therefore,   not   only    in  assertion  of  its  being 

but  also  at  the  same  time  in  the  denial  of  it — 

in  that  which  comprehends  those  antagonistic 

elements  and  yet    harmonises    and    explains 

them.     So  if  there  be  any  knowledge  in    the 

ii6 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD, 

proper  sense  of  the  term,  if  there  be  any 
vison  we  may  call  spiritual  and  far  from 
being  naive  realistic,  it  is  undoubtedly  this 
notion  of  ours  in  which  all  antagonistic  and 
contradictory  elements  are  reconciled  and 
find  repose  in  a  higher  universality  which 
includes  them  all  and  yet  is  not  aggregate 
of  them,  which  explains  all  and  yet  does  not 
merge  in  them.  This  is  what  the  Syddvdd  or 
the  Doctrine  of  the  Assertion  of  Possibilities 
explains  and  emphasises. 

SAPTABHANGI  FORMS. 
With     these     preliminary     remarks     we 
come     straight     to    our     subject-matter     or 

Saptabhang  i 

to  be  more  definite  to  the  Saptabhangi  or  Forms, 
the  Heptagonic  forms  of  our  ontological 
enquiry.  We  have  mentioned  before  that 
Saptabhangi  is  the  method  which  supersedes 
all  other  methods  of  cognition  in  matters 
of  apprehension  of  the  spiritual  realities 
by  virtue  of  its  universal  and  synthetic 
character  of  vision.  Now  we  shall  try  to 
explain  how  by  the  help  of  this  heptagonic 
vision,  Saptabhangi  Naya  we  get,  as  it 
were,  into  the  real  coherence  and  harmony 
which       permeate        through      the      world 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

revealing    themselves  through    a    system    of 
interrelated  parts. 

FORM  I. 

TO^W^  :  as  for  example — ^Tcf  ^^^1  ^3 :  i^e. 
May  be,  partly  or  in  a  certain  sense  the  jar 
exists. 

Although  this  form  is  applicable  to  every 
The  First    thing  or  being  in  affirming  its  existence    still 

Form — Some 

/^^wthething    the  ^/2^/<ar,  the  jar,  is    only    here  taken    into 

exists, 

consideration  as  a  concrete  instance  for  the 
illustration  of  this  heptagonic  principle.  This 
is  no  more  than  affirming  the  existence  of 
the  jar  as  such  and  none  can  ordinarily  deny" 
the  existence  of  it  when  clearly  perceived. 
So  this  affirmation  relative  to  the  existence 
of  the  jar  as  such  presupposes  an  anterior 
perception  of  the  object.  It  may  be  con- 
tended, indeed,  that  we  often  rely  upon  the 
words  of  others  and  do  not  perceive  things 
directly.  But  if  we  dive  deep  into  the 
question,  we  find  that  everything,  the  exis- 
tence of  which  we  either  affirm  or  deny,  is  in 
relation  to  some  particular  thought  or  percep- 
tion havino-  a  finitude  of  expression — a  fact 
so  emphasised  by  the  ontological    argument.] 

Ji8 


How     the 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

Thus  we  find  that  we  can  affirm  the 
existence  of  the  jar  only  when  we  have 
previously    perceived    it   and    the  formation    thing  is  said 

^  -I      *■  to  exist. 

of  the  percept  presupposes,  as  a  careful 
psychological  analysis  reveals,  comprehension 
of  the  thing  in  respect  of  the  four  particular- 
ising elements  viz, — substance  dravya 
(  5oq  ),  duration  kOila  (  ^i^  ),  locality 
ksketra  (^?l)  and  attributes  hhdva  (HT«r). 
There  is  no  percept  which  does  not  involve, 
as   we    have    elsewhere    seen    before,    these  ' 

elements,  and  unless  a  percept  is  formed  we 
cannot  be  conscious  of  the  thing  at  all.  So 
the  understanding  of  every  object  involves, 
comprehension  of  the  object  in  these  four 
aspects.  We  may  go  so  far  as  to  say  that 
these  four  elements  or  aspects  so  interrelated 
as  in  this  case  of  the  jar  go  together 
to  make  up  the  identity  of  the  jar  as 
such.  Take  away  or  change  one  of  these 
elements  and  the  jar  loses  its  identity.  From 
these  facts  we  may  safely  state  that  the 
identity  of  the  jar  is  kept  up  and  reveals 
itself  through  these  four  elements  which 
stand  mutually  into  peculiar  relationship  to 
one  another. 

'^9  . 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

So  long  these  four  elements  exist  in  this 
particular  combination,  the  jar  is  said  to 
exist  there  as  such. 

We  may  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion  in 
another  way.     We    know   that   there     is   a 
to"°ardve^^^t    distinction       between     the      noumenal     and 
phenomenal  aspects  of  a  thing.     Phenomenal 
aspect  is  that  in  which  a  thing  presents  itself 
to  us  or  as  it  appears  to  us.     Clearly  then    it 
follows  that  we  are    conscious   of  an    object 
only    as    it    appears    to    us.     But  a   deeper 
reflection    reveal  to  us   that  what  we  know 
of  the  thing  is  only  knowledge  of  its    powers 
and    properties.     What    is    an  orange  to  us 
except  a    peculiar    combination    of   different 
qualities  viz.     size,  shape,   colour,  taste    etc. 
These    pecular    qualities    in    such    particular 
combination    as    is     found      in     an    orange 
constitute  what  we  call  the    knowledge   of  it. 
Of  course  it    may    be    objected    that    these 
qualities  cannot  exist  by  themselves    and    so 
require  a  ground  for  their  inference  ;   so   that 
these  qualities   themselves   cannot    make    up 
the    orange   itself.      But    we    are     far     from 
denying  this  as  we   hold    the    view    that   all 
that  we   know   of    the    thing    is   merely   its 

120 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

qualities  or  attributes  which  exist  in  such 
peculiar  combination.  What  the  thing  or 
substance  is  apart  from  these  modes  or 
modifications,  we  don't  know  except  this  that 
it  is  a  principle  which  manifests  itself  in  and 
through  these  attributes  linking  them 
together  and  constituting  what  we  call  the 
knowledge  of  the  object  Therefore  we  may 
well  say  that  so  long  these  qualities  are 
intact  and  exist  in  such  peculiar  and  particular 
combination  the  object  is  there. 

FORM  11. 

f^f?^^  HT* — as  ^Tcf  Tt^T^  ^7  :  i.e.  May  be, 
partly  or  in  a  certain  sense  the  jar  does 
not  exist. 

In  the  previous  form  we   have    taken  the 
jar  as  a  self-subsisting,  self-complete    reality    The  Second 

YQxvci—Some 

as  if  subsisting  in  and  by  itself  and  possessing    ^^7«/,the thing 

does    not 

different  attributes  which  go  together  in  exist. 
making  up  the  knowledge  of  the  object.  We 
thought  of  the  jar  as  an  individual  indepen- 
dent object  as  it  were  amidst  innumerable 
objects  of  the  same  kind  in  the  neighbour- 
hood. In  short,  we  took  it  in  the  light  of 
a   self-identical   unit.     But   this    is  only     a 

121 

i6 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM. 

partial    and  dogmatic   view  of  the    reality  as 
it    overlooks  one    important    truth    viz.,    the 
world  is  a  system  of  interrelated  parts  in  which 
nothing   is    so     self-identical,     self-complete 
as  we  suppose   the  jar  to   be.     Every  thing 
which    is,  exists  only  in  relation    to   and  dis- 
tinction from  something  else.     The  jar  exists 
^lst7inreia^    there,  not  alone  as  a  self-complete  reality  but 
d?s  1^110^011    exists  in  relation  to  and  distinction  from  what 
thing  else,        \s  not -Jar,     In   fact,  the   existence    of  the  jar 
as  a  self-complete   unity  is    possible  only  be- 
cause   it    differentiates  from    what  is  not-jar. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  looses  its  distinction 
and    merges  in  the  rest  that  is   not-jar,  then 
how  can    it  present    its    own    self-subsisting 
and  identical  character.     We  may,  therefore, 
well   state    that   because    it    keeps   itself   in 
distinction    from    what    is    not-jar,    and    yet 
bears    at  the  same  time    essential  relation   to 
it   as  the  principle  of  mutual  reciprocity  pos- 
tulates that  it  can  lead  a  life  of  self-complete- 
ness,  self-identity.     But    this   self-complete- 
ness cannot  obviously  be  absolute  in   charac- 
ter simply  for  the  reason  that  it  has  to  depend 
for  its  existence  upon  other  things  from  which 
it  rigidly  distinguishes  itself  and    yet  stands 

122 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD, 

as  well  in  essential  and  vital  relationship. 
To  be  more  clear  and  precise,  we  may  say 
that  the  true  life  of  a  being  consists  in  self- 
abnegation  or  in  ceasing  to  be.  So  if  in 
a  sense  we  emphasise  the  fact  that  the  jar 
is  a  self-complete  reality  amidst  various 
factors  of  the  world  possessing  numerous 
attributes  to  act  and  react  with,  we  can  also 
with  equal  logic  and  emphasis  state  that 
it  does  not  exist  in  the  above  sense  ; 
because  for  its  existence,  it  has  to  depend 
upon  what  is  not-jar  to  which  it  must 
oppose  itself  to  preserve  its  so-called 
self-subsisting  aspect.  Thus  to  sum  up,  we 
may  say,  the  jar  is  a  jar  only  in  contradis- 
tinction with  what  is  not-jar,  expressing  a 
vital  relationship  between  the  positive  and 
negative  character  of  it  co-existing  simul- 
taneously in  the  same  stroke  of  congnition 
of  the  thing  in  question  and  making 
way  thereby  for  the  third  form  which  is 
as  follows. 

FORM  III. 

f€m^^5|  ^?Jt  l^\     as  ^T(^  ^%  A\Wm  ^:—     how  thething 

"^  exist  s      and 

May     be,    partly   or     in    a     certain    sense    asweir^^'^* 

123 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

the  jar  exist  as  well    as  in    a   sense    it    does 
not  exist. 

We    may  explain    this  from  two  different 

stand  points.     We  will  arrive    at    the    same 

Another  way    conclusion    if  we    proceed    from    the    world 

o  f  a  r  riving       i         •  •  i  •         i  •   i 

at  the  same  showing  It  to  be  a  system  m  which  every- 
thing is  determined  by  everything  else  in 
such  a  way  that  nothing  is  self-identical 
and  self-complete  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
untrained  mind  takes  it  to  be.  Everything 
being  determined  by  other  things  in  this 
system  of  reals,  the  doctrine  of  pluralism 
propagating  the  view  of  self-sufficiency  of  ob- 
jects falls  to  the  ground  as  we  have  discussed 
at  length  in  the  preliminary  remarks  as  well 
as  in  the  Form  II. 

Besides,  we  may  explain  the  above 
otherwise  which  will,  we  believe,  throw 
sufficient  light  on  the  close  relationship 
which  exists  between  the  self  and  the 
not-self  or  between  mind  and  matter.  We 
must  of  course  bear  in  mind  on  this  occasion 
that  though  these  forms  apparently  deal 
with  concrete  instances  such  as  the  jar,  still 
they  are  no  less  applicable  to  every  thing 
and  being  which  this  universe   contains.     So 

124 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD, 

it  would  be  convenient  for  us  if,  instead  of 
dealing  with  concrete  instances,  we  proceed 
and  manipulate  the  subject  in  its  generic 
aspect.  In  fact  we  will  try  to  show  that 
instead  of  'saying  the  jar  is  and  is  not,^  we  may 
say  more  generally  that  in  a  sense  matter 
exists  and  does  not  exist  at  the  same  time. 
Of  course  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to 
clear  up  our  position  and  to  defend  our  cause 
and  vindicate  our  themes  by  defining  the 
relationship  as  graphically  as  possible  which 
exists  between  self  and  not-self  or  between 
mind  and  matter. 

But  before  stating  the  exact  relation 
between  them  let  us  try  to  depict  as  clearly 
as  possible  the  view  cherished  by  the 
common  people  regarding  it. 

To  the  untrained  intellect,  things  are 
before     us, — rather     matter     and      material    The  view  of 

the   common 

objects  exist  apart  in  themselves  just  as  we  people, 
perceive  them — as  a  world  of  realities 
independent  of  any  mind  to  perceive  them  ; 
on  the  other  hand  we,  who  perceive  the  world 
are  here  in  our  complete  and  independent 
existence.  In  short,  matter  is  matter  and 
mind  is  mind  and    there    exists    neither   any 

^25 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

similarity      nor      anything      commensurate 
between  them. 

Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  define 
the    exact  relationship.     Some   have  uncriti- 

Ofthe  other 

Schools  of  cally  asserted  the  hard  and  fast  opposition 
between  them  giving  rise  to  absolute 
dualism  like  the  Sdmkkya  materialist ;  others 
have  again  tried  to  solve  the  problem 
at  a  stroke  as  it  were  by  explaining  away 
one  or  the  other  term  giving  rise  to  mate- 
rialism of  the  Ch^rvaka  School  or  Subjective 
idealism  of  the  Buddhist  School.  As  materi- 
alism  ultimately  fails  to  evolve  this  world  and 
all  thought  out  of  matter  or  material 
forces,  so  subjective  idealism  fails  in  showing 
that  the  whole  objective  world  is  but  a 
phantasm  of  the  heated  brain.  We  won't 
speak  of  the  rigid  dualistic  theory  as  it 
obviously  fails  to  explain  knowledge  owing 
to  its  own  inherent  inconsistency  of  thought 
as  revealed  in  its  presupposition  that  the 
constituent  elements  of  knowledge  stand  in 
hard  opposition  and  cannot  be  reconciled. 
Now  if  we  try  to  account  for  this  failure  in 
solving  the  problem  of  mind  and  matter,  we 
will  find  no  doubt   that  its  main  cause  lies   in 

126 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

the    false    presupposition     that    nature   and 

mind,     the    world    without     and   the    world 

within,    constitute     two    fixed     independent 

realities,  each  by   itself  complete    in  its  own 

self-included  being. 

The      real      solution      however     of  the 

problem  in    question    lies    not    in  the   asser-    In  what  lies 

the  real  solu- 
tion   of  self-individuality  and  self-sufficiency    ^^°"  '^• 

of  objects  constituting  the  external  world, 
but  in  the  surrender  of  this  false  iden- 
tity and  substantiality  for  that  principle 
of  organic  unity  which  we  have  discussed 
at  length  and  explained  before  in  the 
preliminary  remarks.  Beginning  with  the 
rigid  isolated  existences  separated  by  the 
impassable  gulf  of  self-identity,  no  theory  or 
doctrine  can  ever  force  them  into  a  rational  co- 
herence or  consistency.  But  when  we  begin 
to  see  in  nature  without  and  mind  within  not 
two  independent  things,  one  existing  in  isola- 
tion from  the  other,  but  two  members  of  one 
organic  whole  having  indeed  each  a  being 
of  its  own,  but  a  being  which  implies  and 
finds  itself  in  the  living  relation  to  the  other, 
then  and  then  only  can  we  bring  such  two 
factors  into  a  rational  coherence.     Nature  in 


727 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

its  very  essence    is  related  to   the   mind  and 
Correlativity    "^^"^^^  i^^  its  very  essence  is  related  to  matter. 

ofMatterand     rr^  i     ^  •  ^^  t    •*.  • 

ui\r,d.—Bho-    ^or   w^at  is  matter,     if    it  is    not   matter    in 
^Bhoktd,  relation    to  thought,    and  what  is    mind  if  it 

cannot  enter  into  relation  with  matter  ?  We 
cannot  obviously  think  of  any  matter  which 
by  its  very  nature  cannot  enter  into  relation 
with  thought  ;  because  it  involves  a 
contradiction  of  thought.  Again  we  cannot 
think  of  mind  which  ,is  not  capable  of 
thinking  about  something,  because  in  it,  its 
essence  lies.  So  from  this  standpoint 
whatever  is,  is  not  as  a  self-complete  reality 
existing  in  and  by  itself,  but  as  being  deter- 
mined by  something  else.     So  the  true  view 

Thetrucvicw 

of  things.  of  anything  would  be  not  only  its  being  but 
also  of  its  non-being  to  which  it  owes  its 
reality  and  individuality.  In  short  it  is  by 
virtue  of  this  self-abnegation  that  any 
being  can  be  real  or  can  exist  as  such. 
So  the  true  point  or  view  of  the  right 
vision  or  understanding  of  any  object 
would  include  not  only  a  view  of  things 
in  their  positive  aspect  or  in  their  aspect 
of  thesis  but  also  a  view  of  what  they  are 
not   or  the  aspect   of  antithesis,  which  again 

IZ8 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

ultimately  lose  their  hard  opposition  in  the 
view  of  things  which  are  necessarily  related 
and  so  containing  and  involving  one  another, 
— in  short,  in  the  view  of  the  world  as  a 
system  of  reals  mutually  determining  and 
co-operating  for  the  same  end. 

FORM  IV. 

fifl^^g    ^^^iftn^'Tm     ^g^   H^ :    as 

^l?^iao5|  ^^  "^Z  : — May  be,  partly  or  in  a 
certain  sense,  the  jar  is  indescribable. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  a  certain  sense 
it  is     impossible    to    describe    the  jar.    The    r^^     ^      , 
indescribable    nature  of  the   thing     is    here    piainr""i^m- 
referred      to.       Of     course,      we     do      not    ouraffiVirnng 

,  ,  ,  .  -Ill        and  denying 

mean    here    that    any    object     is    absolutely    at  one  and 

the  same 

indescribable,  but  that  we  cannot  describe  moment, 
what  it  is  and  what  it  is  not  at  one 
and  the  same  moment.  The  necessity  for 
this  way  of  speaking  is  that  the  two  natures 
— positive  and  negative — what  it  is  and 
what  it  is  not,~exist  in  the  same  thing  at 
one  and  the  same  time.  We  have  seen 
before  that  in  a  certain  sense  or  to  be  more 
definite,  while  putting  stress  upon  the 
positive  aspect  of  an  object   as  in    the    Form 

^7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

I.,  we  may  say  that  it  is :  while  again 
emphasising  with  equal  onesidedness,  on  the 
negative  aspect  of  the  same  as  in  Form  II., 
we  may  well  say  as  well  that  it  is  not.  But  a 
critical  examination  will  reveal  to  us  that 
both  the  positive  and  negative  aspects 
exist  in  the  same  object  simultaneously, 
although  we  cannot  describe  them  in  one 
moment. 

Here  we  think  it   is  worthy  of  note    that 
Thought    only   our    incapacity    for    describing    at    one 

transcending  t       i        i  •       i 

quality  of    and  the    same  moment    both    the    seemmgly 

aspects  con- 
ceives   t  h  e    antagonistic  natures   existing    simultaneously 
c  o-existence 

contradic-    is  only  referred    to.     We    need  not  imagine, 

t  o  r  y   attri- 
butes in  the    however,  that  our  thoup^ht  cannot  apprehend 
same  thing.  °  ^  ^ 

them  at  one  moment.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  thought  only  that  by  virtue  of  self- 
consciousness  can  transcend  this  duality  of 
aspects  existing  in  the  same  thing.  Even, 
we  may  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  positive 
aspect,  namely,  what  it  is,  can  scarcely  be 
known  without  the  knowledge  of  the  negative 
aspect  namely,  what  it  is  not  and  vice  versa. 
Either  is  known  simultaneously  in  and  through 
the  other.  We  cannot  question  about  the 
relative  priority  of  the  process  of  assimilation 

/JO 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD. 

or  discrimination  ;  because  none  of  them  ^ 
is  possible  without  the  other.  Thus,  although 
it  is  quite  obvious  that  we  can  take 
cognizance  of  both  these  aspects — positive 
as  well  as  negative — in  the  same  stroke  of 
cognition,  yet  we  canuot  describe  this  fact  of 
experience  at  one  moment.  With  this  view 
in  mind,  it  is  held  that  the  true  nature  of  a 
thing  is  indescribable. 

FORM  V. 

^W^  Hy:  as  ^T^^I^r  ^l^^^S^  '^Z\—May  be,     deration°"he 
...  .  ,     .  1  .         existenceand 

partly     or     m     a     certain     sense     the    jar    indescrib- 

,,  .  .  .       .       able     nature 

exists   as    well    as    ni    a    certam    sense  it    is    both  at  once. 
indescribable. 

The  fifth  way  is  to  say  what  the  thing 
is,  the  thing  being  indescribable  in  one 
moment.  Although  here  we  assert  the 
inexpressibility  at  one  and  the  same  moment 
of  what  the  thing  is  and  what  it  is  not,  yet 
what  it  is  i.  e.  its  existence  is  taken  into 
consideration.  We  have  seen  in  the  Form  I., 
that  in  a  certain  sense,  a  thing  may  be 
said  to  exist.  Of  course  we  should  bear  in 
mind  that  we  do  not  take  it  in    the    absolute 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

sense;  because  we  deny  the  self-identical  and 
self-complete  nature  of  anything.  In  asserting 
existence  of  anything  what  we  mean, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  that  it  exists  only  so 
long  it  has  a  particular  substance  ("^oSl),  a 
particular   locality  (W  ?f),    a  particular  period 

The  relative 

exist  ence    (^1^),     and  a  particular   attribute    (hT^)     in 

and  indescri- 

abieness   of    their  particular  combination.     So  lonpf  these 

the  thing.  ^  ^ 

four  elements  are  present  in  their  particular 
combination,  any  object  to  which  these 
elements  belong  may  be  safely  said  to 
exist.  In  short,  the  perception  of  these  four 
elements  in  any  object  is  quite  sufficient  to 
convince  us  of  its  relative  existence — an 
existence  illusively  thought  of  as  absolute  or 
self-complete  by  the  realists  or  the  common- 
sense  philosophers.  This  we  have  discussed 
at  length  in  the  Form  I.  So,  although  in  the 
Form  V,  we  have  emphasised  on  the  indes- 
cribable nature* of  any  thing,  Judging  it  from 
the  standpoint  from  which  all  the  seemingly 
antagonistic  elements  namely,  positive  and 
negative  aspects  of  a  thing  (c,f.  Form  III.), 
resolve  themselves  into  a  higher  concrete 
reality  without  losing  their  respective  dis- 
tinctions, yet  from  the  practical  point  of  view 

132 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD, 

we  may  over-estimate  the  positive  aspect  only 
and  assert  its  existence,  the  idea  of  which  is 
already  forced  upon  us,  so  to  speak,  by  the 
undeniable  presence  of  substance,  period 
etc,  (^oBl^l^Tf^)  inferentially  or  immediately 
cognised  by  the  senses.  Thus,  although  we 
have  repeatedly  described  a  thing  to 
involve  both  the  positive  and  the  negative 
aspects  or  to  put  in  other  words,  involve 
being  and  non-being  as  well,  yet  it  would  not 
be  a  contradiction  of  thought  or  language, 
if  we  contend  being  as  essential,  and  say  it 
exists,  because  we  look  at  it  now  from  a 
standpoint  which  is  relatively  much  lower 
than  the  former  and  from  which  we  lose 
sight  altogether  of  another  important  corre- 
lative aspect  namely,  what  it  is  not, 

FORM  VI. 

^l^l^l^    ^l^^^sq^^fff  fj^^^irmil^iT   5IT  The    Sixth 

^■vrf-./-cev  f.  Form — e  x- 

^\^^^'^  T^«JT51q^^1^  ^^5TTT^H5i7!m  q^  ViJ'\   as  plains    t  h  e 

-V  negative 

^l^l^T^  ^l^l^^o^l  I     May  be,  partly    or    m    character  of 

the  thing  as 

certain  sense  the  jar  is  not  and    indescribable    well  as   the 

indescrib- 

in  a  certain  sense  as  well.  able    nature 

of  the  same. 

We  have  described  what  the  thing  is 
not,  being  unable  to  describe  at  one  and 
the    same    moment    what    it   is   and  what  it 


AN  EPITOME  Of  JAIN  ISM. 

IS  not.  As  in  the  previous  form,  we  have 
described  what  it  is  :  so  in  this  form  we 
describe  what  it  is  not  without  loosing 
sight  of  the  indescribable  nature  of  the 
thing  owing  to  our  incapacity  to  give  | 
expression  to  both  the  positive  and  the 
negative  aspects  of  it  at  the  same  moment. 
In  what  sense  it  does  not  exist,  we  need 
not  discuss  here,  because  we  have  done  so 
at  length  in  the  Form  II.,  which  emphasises 
on  the  negative  aspect  of  the  thing.  We 
have  seen  before  that  we  can't  say  *a  thing 
exists'  as  a  self-identical  unit  ;  because  it  has 
to  depend  upon  other  factors  to  maintain 
its  existence  and  to  which  it  bears  relations 
which  are  essential  for  the  preservation  of 
its  own  reality.  So  in  this  sense  we 
may  equally  deny  any  self-existing  character  ; 
of  anything  without  committing  our-  ' 
selves   to  any    inconsistency    in  thought   or   i 

language. 

FORM  VII. 
The  Seventh     ^T^^T^  ^Tr^l^T^^l^^sg^^frf  5R?T1?[  ^^mW 

synthesis     of  ^  .^  -v  -s 

the  V   and     ^^TT  ftw^^IT  "^  "^V^VX  H^:  as  ^l^^ISf  J^l^T^ 

VI  Forms.  -n  *  i  i  •  \ 

^^?ff«J|  •    May  be  partly  or  ni  a  certain  sensed 

^34 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SYADVAD, 

the  jar  is    and  is   not  and  is  indescribable  as 
well  in  a  certain  seme. 

In  the  seventh  form,  one  speaks  of  what 
the  thing  is  and  is  not  and  that  it  is 
impossible  to  express  both  at  the  same 
moment.  In  the  Form  III,  we  have  seen 
how  the  true,  nature  of  a  thing  implies 
being  as  well  as  non-being  or  positive 
as  well  as  'negative  aspects.  The  only- 
point  in  which  it  differs  from  the  third 
form  is  this  that  while  agreeing  with  the 
former  in  every  respect,  it  goes  further 
and  says  that  we  cannot  describe  because 
it  involves  contradictory  elements.  This 
latter  point  we  have  discussed  at  length  in 
the  Form  II.  In  this  form  we  get  a 
reconciliation  of  the  fifth  and  the  sixth  forms 
already  discussed. 


135 


CHAPTER  IX. 
SHANKAR  AND  SYADVAD. 

Vyasa,  and  SKanlcar  agatnst  tkc  Doctrtnc  of 
Syaavad, — Im|>ossil>tlxty  of  tkc  co-existence  of  tke 
contradictory  attributes  in  one  — Skanlcara's  summary 
of  tke  Syadvad  anJ  its  inter|>retation — Its  critical 
examination  by  okankar — Inconsistencies  and  fallacies 
m  Syadvad, 

The  above,  in  short,  is  the  principle  and 
The  unique  character  oi  ihtSaptabkangi  Naya,  the  grand 
\^ht^^apta-    heptangular    stronghold    of  the    Jain    philo- 

bhanpim  ,  t       •       r  i  i  i  i 

the  arena  of    sophers.      It    IS    from    these  angles  that  the 

philosophical      t    .         i  .,  ,  .  ,  ,.  .  r     w 

speculation.  J^^^^  philosophers  see  into  the  realities  of  all 
thought  and  being.  It  is  from  within  this 
heptagonic  fortress  that  they  throw  off  their 
gauntlets  as  a  challenge  to  their  antagonists 
to  outwit  them.  Being  guarded  by  the 
seven  trenches  of  this  their  logical  synthesis, 
they  measure  the  strength  of  their 
adversaries  and  test  the  truth  and  validity 
of  their  knowledge  and  doctrines.  Such 
being  the  high  and  prominent  position 
ascribed  to  the  Saptabhangi  in  the 
arena  of  philosophical  speculation  in  quest 
of  truth,  many  a  scholar  and  philosopher, 
ancient     or    modern,    have    invariably    been 

1^6 


I 


SHANK AR  AND  SYADVAD. 

found     to   cannonade    on     this     heptagonic 
fortification  which  has  been  from  time  imme-    Jar'g^et  o\ 
morial    shielding    the  whole  structure  of  the    enemies^  of 

,.,.,-  .  1         TVT  theSyadvad. 

Jam  philosophy  agamst  any  attack.  Many 
have  brought  in  their  heavy  artilleries  to 
damage  one  or  the  other  angles  of  this 
fortification  and  force  an  entrance  into 
the  same  and  many  have  been  baffled 
in  their  attempts  and  thus  become 
the  buttend  of  all  ridicule  before  the 
whispering  galleries  of  the  Jain  philoso- 
phers and  Omniscient  beings.  At  least 
such  has  been  the  case  with  the  venerable 
Krishna     Dwaip^yan    Vydsa,     the  compiler    yyasa  and 

^    ^  ^  ^  the  Syadvad. 

of  the  Vedas,  maker  of  the  Brahma 
Sutras  and  the  author  of  the  Great  Epic, 
Mah&bhdrata,  who  flourished  towards  the 
end  of  third  age. 

To  come  straight  however  to  the  point,  the 
venerable  old    Vyasa  fired  his    first    artillery    Brahtna 

^  '      Sutra    and 

"^cRf^^^^^Tq"  as  the  thirty-third  canon  in  Shankar. 
the  Second  Section  of  the  Second  Chapter 
of  his  Brahma  SuUas,  By  this  he  wants 
us  to  understand  that  on  account  of  the 
impossibility  of  co-existence  of  contradictory 
attributes  as  abiding  in  the    same    substance, 

137 

18 


AN  EPITOME  OF   JAINISM. 

the  doctrine  of  the  Jainas  is  not  to  be 
recognised.  In  his  famous  scholium  on  the 
Brahma  Sutras,  Achirya  Shankara,  the 
ablest  exponent  of  the  Adwaita  Veddnta 
philosophy  while  commenting  on  the  canon 
referred  to,  writes  : — 

The  Jainas  admit  of  seven  predicaments 
menta"ry  ^uch  as  ( i)  Jwa  (2)  Ajtva  (j>)  Asruva, 
Jain  phi  lo-    {4)  Sambara^  (3)  Nirjard,  (6)  Bandha,  and 

sophy    as  . 

summarised    (j)  Mokska,      1  hese   seven  they  admit  and 

by  Shankar. 

nothing  beyond  these. 

Summarily  speaking,  the  Jtva  and 
the  Ajiva,  are  the  two  primary  predica- 
ments. The  others  are  included  in  either 
of  these  two.  Besides  they  admit  of 
five  composites  or  compounds  from  the 
above  two  categories  and  are  designated  as 
''Astikdyas''  or  composites  such  as  /ivdsti- 
kdya,  Pudgaidstikdya,  Dharmdstikdya, 
Adharmdstikdya,  and  Akdshdstikdya.  They 
fancy,  again,  an  infinite  number  of  varia- 
tions of  these  'astikdyas  or  composite  and 
to  all  and  each  of  these,  they  apply  their 
so-called  synthetic  logic  known  by  the  name 
of  Saptabhangi  naya  in  the  following 
manner  : — 

138 


SHANKAR  AND  SYADVAD. 

(i)  In  a  sense  it  is.  (2)  In  a  sense 
it  is  not.  (3)  In  a  sense  it  is  and  it  is  not. 
(4)  In  a  sense  it  is  not  predicable.  (5)  In 
a  sense  it  is  and  is  not  predicable.  (6)  In 
a  sense  it  is  not  and  is  not  predicable. 
(f)  In  a  sense  it  is  and  is  not  and  is  not 
predicable. 

Now  this  Saptabhangi  form  of  reasoning 
is  also  directed  to  the  determination  of 
such  notions  as,  unity,  plurality,  eternity, 
identity,  difference  and  the  like.  In  other 
words  following  up  the  principle  of  Sapta- 
bhangi naya,  they  hold  that  existence  itself 
is  a  contradiction  ;  for  instance  unity  is 
not  only  unity  but  also  a  plurality  as  well. 
A  thing  is  not  only  eternal  but  otherwise 
as  well  and  so  on. 

Having    thus     summarised    the    funda-    Examination 

and  criticism 

mentals    of  the    Jain  philosophy,    and  taking    view  point  of 

the    Law   of 

his  Stand  on  the  above  Vyasa  Sutra  Shankar    Contradic- 

'^  tion 

Swami  remarks. 
|fc         I.     It    would  be    contrary   to   reason   to 

accept   the  Jain   doctrine.     Why  ? — Because     Being  and 

^  ^  '  Non-being 

of  the  impossibility  of  co-existence  of  contra-    ^?"  "°^    ^^ 

^  '  thesame 

dictory  attributes    in    one.     Just   as  a    thing    [Jj^ne^thin"^ 
cannot    be   hot   and    cold  simultaneously,  so 

^9 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

being  (^f%c^)  and  non-being  (iTlf^ccT)  cannot, 
at  the  same  time,  belong  to  one  thing. 

II.     And  to  speak  of  the  seven   predica- 
ments   which  have  been  determined  to  be  as 
Knowledge    SO   many   and  such  if  they  really  be  so  many 

would  be    of     . 

as    undeter-    in    number   and   such-and-such  in    character, 

minate    cha- 

racter  as    then    they   must    as    the    Jains   teach     exist 

doubt   o  r 

diffidence  is.    in  either  of  their  modes    of  suchness  (rfHlT^^) 
»  and    unsuchness    (^H^Ii^tr)    at    one    and    the 

same  point  of  time.  If  it  were  so,  it  would 
follow  that  because  of  the  indefiniteness  as 
desiderated  to  be  expressed  in  their  being 
as  such  and  not-being  as  such  at  the  same 
moment  of  time,  the  knowledge  of  the 
same  would  be  also  equally  indeterminate 
like  diffidence  or  doubt  for  which  reason 
it  cannot  be  held  as  a  true  criterion  of 
riorht  knowledore. 

o  o 

^,     ,^  III.      If  the  Jains    contend  here   that  the 

The  Know-  "^ 

ledge,  the    thing  itself  beingf  instinct  with  multiplicity  and 

knowabilities  &  &  f         j 

kn"owinglub^  versatility  of  modes  or  aspects  (^^^li^  ^«I^) 
beiVg"?n-  ^^  really  of  determinate  character  as  such  and 
in    them-    the  knowledge    of  the    thing,  therefore,  both 

selves     the 

Syadvada    as  being  and  non-being,  cannot  be  non  deter- 

cannot   be  a         . 

source  of    minate    and    consequently    non- authoritative 

valid    know- 
ledge, like    that     of  doubtful    knowledge,    Shankar 

140 


SHANKAR  AND  SYADVAD, 

rejoins,  it  is  not  right  on  your  part  to  say 
all  that  ;  for,  every  thing  being  admitted  to 
be  instinct  with  a  multiplicity  of  nature, 
without  having  any  check  or  rest  any 
where,  the  determination  of  the  nature  of 
very  determination  itself  through  the  means 
of  'partly  is  and  'partly -is -no f  being  not 
excluded  it  would  simply  result  in  non-deter- 
minate knowledge.  And  for  the  very  reason 
as  well  the  means  of  knowledge  (KfTTTll), objects 
of  knowledge  (H^^),  the  knowing  subject 
(TTRTrTT),  and  the  act  of  knowledge  (T?fi?f?T), 
all  would  remain  themselves  non-determinate. 
And  where  the  determinator  and  the  result 
of  determination,  both  are  thus  non-deter- 
minate, how  can  then  the  teacher,  who  is 
thus  of  indefinite  opinion  himself,  can  give 
definite  instructions  on  a  doctrine  the  matter 
and  the  principles  of  the  epistemology 
of  which  are  themselves  indeterminate  in 
their  very  nature  and  character  ?  Again, 
what  would  prevail  upon  the  followers  of  such 
a  doctrine  to  actualise  in  life  and  conduct 
the  moral  principles  inculcated  in  the  same? 
For,  if  the  effects  of  their  actualisation  in 
life  and    conduct  be    of  themselves    instinct 

141 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

with  uncertainties,  nobody  would  have  any 
inclination  to  work  for  the  same.  Therefore 
the  doctrine,  pungently  retorts  Shankar,  of 
those  undecisive  masters  who  have  nothing 
definite  to  teach  or  preach,  is  not  to  be 
accepted. 

IV.  Then,    again,     applying     this   un- 
monstration    Settling      principle     of  reasoning     to    that 

oftheunsett-  .  r      i     •  i  •  i  •   i  i 

ling  charac-    portion    ot    their     doctrine     which     teaches 

ter  of  reason-  -  /    r  \  r 

ing— Fewer    that     the    composites     (^t^^m)   are     nve 

mor  e  t  h  a  n 

five.  in  number,  one    has  got   to   understand  that 

on  the  one  hand  they  are  five  and  on  the 
other,  they  are  not  five  /.  e.  from  the 
latter  point  of  view,  they  are  fewer  or 
more  than  five  which  is  a  ridiculous  position 
to  uphold. 

V.  Also  you  cannot   logically    maintain 
aTand^o^n!    that  the    predicaments  are    indescribable.     If 

m  e  n  t      o  f      ,  ,  ;  i  , 

Original  they  were  so,  they  could  on  no  account  be 
described  ;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  are 
described  and  as  such  you  abandon  your 
original  position. 

VI.  If     you     say,     on     the     contrary, 
seif-contra-    that    predicaments    being   so   described   are 

ascertained  to  be  such  and  such  ;  and  at  the 
•same    time    they   are    not   such     and    such ; 

14.2 


SHANKAR  AND  SYADVAD^ 

and  that  the  consequence  of  their  being  thus 
ascertained  is  Right  Vision  {^«?cff  ^SJ'!)  and 
is  not  Right  Vision  as  well  at  one  and  the 
same  point  of  time;  and  that  Un- Right 
Vision  is  and  is  not.  opposite  of  Right 
Vision  at  one  and  the  same  time,  you 
will  be  really  raving  like  a  mad  cap  who  is 
certainly  not  to  be  relied  upon. 

VII.  If  you   argue  further  that  Heaven 

and  Freedom,    are  both  existent  and    inexis-    i^^^^^V  ^"^ 

r  r  e  e  dom— 

tent  at  once  or  they  are  both  eternal  and  cenafn^  ""' 
non-eternal  at  one  and  the  same  moment, 
none  will  be  inclined  to  work  for  the  same 
the  very  nature  of  whose  existence  is  so 
uncertain  and  indeterminate  in  nature  and 
character.     And, 

VIII.  Finally,  it  having  been  found    to 

follow    from  your  doctrine    that  Jiva,  Ajiva    On  account 

of  the  impos- 

etc.   whose     nature     you     claim     to     have    sibiiityofany 

definite    a  s- 

ascertained  and  which  have  been  in  existent    certainmem, 

the   doctrine 

from   all    eternity  at  once    relapse    into    the    °^  ^^^  ^y^d- 

'  ^  V  a  d  a   must 

condition    of  absolute    indetermination,  and    p^edsbe  re- 
jected. 

that  the  being  excluding  the  non-being  and 
vice-versd,  the  non-being  excluding  the  being, 
and  that  further  more  it  being  impossible  to 
decide  whether   of  one  thing   there  is    to  be 

^¥3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

predicated  oneness  or  plurality,  permanency 
or  non-permanency,  separateness  or  non- 
separateness  and  the  like,  your  doctrine  of 
SyAdv&d  must  needs  be  rejected. 


^H 


CHAPTER  X. 
BXAMINATION  OF  SHANKAR. 

Examinatton     oi   Skanlcar  s    antmadverston    and    Kas 
t>osttton  -  Furtker       Jtscusston     of    the     Princxt>le      oi 
SyaJvftJ     and    tke    Law  oi   contraatctton — Tkougkt    ts 
not   sini|>ly    a    dtsttnction — It    xs    a    relation    as    well — ' 
ReJ>ly  to  Skanlcar  |>oint  oy  f>otnt. 

Such  is    the    criticism    which    Shankar 

makes  taking  his  stand  on  the  Sutra    "  Not;    of^Shankar's 

because     of     the      impossibility     in     one."    ^  ^^^ ' 

— (**  'f^f^J^^ni^Tcf")  of  the  Ved&nta   Sutras 

by  Vydsa.     Or  in  other  words,  *it  is  impossi- 

Contra  d  i  c- 

ble',    remarks     Shankar,    'that  contradictory    tory  at  tri- 
butes cannot 

attributes     such     as    betHP"    and     non-being'   co-exist 

^  ^      the   s  a  r 

should  at  the  same  time  belong  to  one  and  ^^'"^ 
the  same  thing.'  This  is  the  long  and 
short  of  his  whole  argument  as  urged  for  the 
rejection  of  the  doctrine  of  Syddvdd  which 
forms  the  metaphysical  basis  of  our  religion. 
And  it  is  imperative,  therefore,  that  we 
should  examine  the  above  animadversion 
as  briefly  as  possible  and  see  how  far  his 
reasonings  reveal  his  real  insight  into  the 
heart  of  things  as  well  as  how  far  is 
Shankar    correct  in    his    understanding   and 

19 


in 
m  e 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

estimation  of  the  principle  of  our  dialectic 
movement  as  applied  to  thought  and  being 
— a  form  of  reasoning  which  originally  and 
exclusively  belongs  to  the  Jain  philosophy. 

To  begin  with,  therefore,  so  far /v the 
fundamentals  of  our  doctrine  as  summarised 
by  Shankar  are  concerned,  we  must  at 
once  admit  that  he  is  not  guilty  of  mis- 
representation. 

But  when  he  starts  his  criticism  with  the 
Thus  Shan-    Startling  remark   that,    being  and    non-being 

Ir  a  f     lavs 

stress  on  the    cannot  co-exist  in  one  and  the   same    thing, 

Law  of  con- 
tradiction,       we    beg     to     differ     from      him.      Shankar 

puts  all  through  his  arguments,  a  great 
stress  on  the  Law  of  Contradiction.  And  as 
it  is  a  law  of  thought  which  cannot  be  trans- 
gressed without  committing  ourselves  to 
contradictions  and  inconsistencies  as  the 
Formal  Logic  teaches,  any  theory  which 
does  the  same,  he  says,  cannot  be 
accepted  as  having  any  worth  at  all. 

When  the  Formal  Logic  laid  down  the 
Law  of  Contradiction  as  the  highest  law 
of  thought,  what  it  evidently  meant  is 
simply  this  that  distinction  is  necessary 
for   thought.     Unless   things   are    definitely 

14.6 


EXAMINA  TION  OF  SHANKAR. 

what  they  are  and  are  kept  to  their 
definition,  thought  and  knowledge  become 
impossible.  For  instance,  if  A  and  not-A 
be  the  same,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  find 
any  meaning  even  in  the  simplest  state- 
ments, for  the  nature  of  the  thing  becomes 
absolutely  indefinite  and  so  indeterminate. 
Hence  Formal  Logic  teaches  that  thought 
is  distinction  and  is  not  possible  without  it. 

But  is  thought  simply  a  distinction  and 
nothing  else  }  Is  the  distinction  absolute  and 
ultimate  .J^  We,  the  Jains,  would  undoubtedly  deteWna^ 
say  that  it  can  never  be  absolute  distinction.  ^°"*'"^py- 
If  thought  is  distinction,  yet  it  implies  at  the 
same  time  relation.  Everything  implies 
something  other  than  it;  'This'  implies  That ; 
'Now*  implies  'Then'  'Here'  implies  'There' 
and  the  like.  Each  thing,  each  aspect  of 
reality,  is  possible  only  in  relation  to  and 
distinct  from  some  other  aspect  of  reality.  If 
so,  A  is  only  possible  in  relation  to  and  distinct 
from  not- A,  Thus,  by  marking  one  thing  off 
from  another,  it,  at  the  same  time,  connects 
one  thing  with  another.  A  thing  which  has 
nothing  to  distinguish  from,  is  as  impossible 
as  equally  unthinkable   is  the  thing  which  is 

^47 


AM  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

absolutely   separated  from  all  others  so  as  to 
have  no  community  between  them.    An  abso- 

Nothing  can    lute  distinction    would   be   self-contradictory 

be  taken   as 

absolutely    for    it    would    cut    off  every    connection    or 

self-identical 

relation  of  the  thing  from  which  it  is  distin- 
guished. The  principle  of  absolute  contra- 
diction is  suicidal  ;  because  it  destructs  itself. 
So  when  we,  the  Jains,  deny  the  validity  of 
the  Law  of  Contradiction,  we  only  dispute 
the  claim  of  absolute  validity.  That  every 
definite  thought  by  the  fact  that  it  is  definite, 
excludes  other  thoughts  and  specially  the 
.  opposite  thought  is  unquestionably  true, 
indeed.  But  it  is  half-truth  only,  or  one 
aspect  of  the  truth  and  not  the  whole  of  it. 
The  other  side  of  the  truth,  or  rather  the 
complimentary  side  of  this  truth  is  also  that 
every  definite  thought,  by  the  very  fact  that 
it  is  definite,  has  a  necessary  relation  to  its 
negative  and  cannot  be  seperated  from 
it  without  losing  its  true  meaning.  It  is 
definite  by  virtue  of  its  opposition  with 
what  it  is  not.  So  nothing,  however 
definite  it  may  be,  can  be  conceived  as 
self-identical  in  the  absolute  sense  of 
the  term. 

148 


EXAMINATION  OF  SHANKAR. 

To  illustrate  let  us  take  the  instance  of  the 
jar.  I  say  that  the  jar  is  a  finite  object.  Now 
what  do  we  mean  by  finite  thing  is  this  that  it 
is  limited  in  extent.  And  the  question  may 
be  raised  :  is  the  limit  self-imposed  or 
imposed  from  without.  Or,  in  other  words, 
is  the  limit  created  by  the  object  itself  or 
is  it  due  to  the  presence  of  another 
which  limits  it.  The  answer  must  be  that 
it  is  limited  by  something  else.  Now,  may 
it  not  be  said  that  the  jar  is  finite  only  by 
virtue  of  some  thing  else  }  It  is  what  it  is 
only  in  relation  with  something  else, 
without  which  its  existence  as  such  would 
be  impossible.  So  the  jaw  of  contradiction, 
if  it  speaks  of  absolute  difference,  is 
manifestly  a  suicidal  principle. 

Take  any  thought-determination  and  the 
same  principle  will  hold  good.  The  jar  is 
what  it  is,  because  it  serves  certain  purpose, 
has  certain  shape,  certain  colour  etc.  These 
different  ideas  constituting  one  whole  is 
what  we  know  as  the  jar.  May  it  not  be 
said  then  that  this  whole  of  the  different  ideas 
is  what  it  is  only  by  virtue  of  some  thing 
or  some    other   which    is  its  negative  ?  For 

^49 


Illustrations 


An  epitome  of  JAIN  ism 

if  we  try  to  hold  this  common  place  whole  of 
ideas  to  the  exclusion  of  its  negative,  if  we 
try  to  hold  it  to  itself,  it  disappears. 

I.  We  submit,  therefore,  that  such  a  re- 
Further  elu-    mark  as  made  by  Shankar  is  due  to  his  gross 

cidation     of         . 

the  dialectic    misunderstandmg    of  the   dialectic   principle 

principle. 

of  our  reasoning.  For,  as  we  interpret  and 
use  the  principle,  it  is  all  right.  We, 
the  Jains,  hold  that  every  thought  or 
being  is  only  in  relation  to  the  fourfold 
nature  of  itself  but  is  not  in  relation  to  the 
fourfold  nature  of  the  other  (^El^l^f^  '^^^•T 
^?^^'!  •nf^  ^)  :  for  instance,  the  jar 
when  it  is  thought  of  in  relation  to  (i)  its 
own  constituent  substance, — earth  ;  (ii)  its 
own  locality  of  existence  in  space — Calcutta  ; 
(iii)  its  own  period  of  coming  into  existence 
in  time — Summer  and  (iv)  its  own  mode 
existence  as  revealed  in  its  colour  (red  or  the 
like)and  capacity  for  containing  and  carrying 
such  and  such  quantity  of  water,  the  jar  is 
said  to  exist  2.^.,  only  in  relation  and  particular 
combination  of  the  four- fold  nature  of  itself 
known  technically  as  svachatustaya,  the  jar  is 
(%|f^),  and  has  the  nature  and  character  of 
being    (^?J^^).     But     when     thought    of  in 


EXAMINATION  OF  SHANKAR, 

relation   and   particular   combination    of  the 
four-fold  elements  viz,  constituent  substance, 

^  Existence    is 

locality,  period  and  mode  ('^oq^  ef^T^Hl^)  as    contradic- 
tory itself. 

belonging  to  the  other,  say,  the  picture,  the 
jar  is  not  (•flf^)  and  is  of  the  nature  of  non- 
being  (^^?|:tt).  Thus  the  picture  is  the  nega- 
tion of  the  jar  and  vice-versA  the  jar  is  the 
negation  of  the  picture.  Every-thing  is  in 
relation  only  to  the  four  fold  elements  oi  itself 
but  is  not  in  relation  only  to  the  four-fold 
elements  belonging  to  the  other.  If  it  were 
otherwise,  were  everything  said  to  exist  in 
either  relations  of /V^^^as  well  as  o{\S\^  other, 
then  every  thought  and  being,  making  up 
this  our  universe,  would  have  been  trans- 
w  formed  into  one  uniform  homogeneous  whole ; 
then  light  and  darkness,  knowledge  and 
ne-science,  being  and  non-being,  unity  and 
plurality,  eternity  and  non-eternity,  know- 
ledge and  the  means  thereof,  all  that  go  in 
pairs  of  opposites,  and  the  like  must  needs 
be  one  homogeneous  mass,  so  to  speak,  of 
one  uniform  nature  and  character  without 
any  difference  and  distinction  between  one 
and  the  other  or  between  the  parts  of  one 
and  the  same  thing.     But  such  homogeneity 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

of  nature  and  character  in  things  all  around 
us  is  contradicted  by  our  sense  perception 
which  reveals  but  differences  and  diver- 
sities in  things  and  realities. 

And    now  to  turn    the  table,  when     you, 

Shankar,     say    *  Being    is    Brahman,     You 
Table  turned 
against    m=^  have  to  admit    that    when   Brahman  is 

Shankar. 

thought  of  in  relation  to  what  is  olher  than 
Being,  it  is  equal  to  Non-being  (  ^^ ). 
If  you  don^t  admit  this,  the  Non-being  of 
Brahman  as  what  is  other  than  the  nature  of 
Being  itself,  then  your  Brahman  would  be  of 
the  nature  of  Non-being,  say  of  Ne -science 
or  illusion  as  well.  But  this  would  lead 
to  the  deterioration  of  the  true  nature  of 
your  Brahma  which  is  but  existence  pure 
and  simple. 

II.  To  the  second  objection  that  the 
cognition  of  a  thing  in  its  form  of  suchness 
and  unsuchness  results  in  the  generation 
of  indefinite  knowledge  which  is  no  more  a 
true  source  of  knowledge  than  doubt  is, 
we  reply  ; — 

That  the  seven   predicaments  as  they  are 
The  seven    in  and  by  themselves  ^.^.  so  far   as  their  own 

Predica-  isv.  i 

ments.  four-fold  nature  (^^g^^tt^l)  is   concerned, 


EXAMINATION  OF  SHANKAR, 

they   are   in  fact    so   many   in    number   and 
such  and  such  in   character  ;  but   as    Other 
than    themselves    i.e.    relative    to    the    four- 
fold nature  of  the  Other  (qT'^g^mQ^l),    they 
cannot  but  be  otherwise.      If  this  were    not, 
if  you    Shankar   do    not   agree    to    this,    or 
when  you  say  that  'True   knowledge    infinite 
is    Brahman'  (^m    ^T^   ^'T'rT  ^=31),    if   you 
do  not  thereby  admit  that    Brahman  as  such 
has    its    being  ;    but     has    not    its    being    as 
otherwise,  that  is  say  as   Ne-science  which  is 
but   an    opposite  of  what  is  true  knowledge, 
then    must    you    be     implicitly    identifying 
Brahman    which   is    knowledge  (^T*f)    with 
Ne-science  (qfiRjT)  which  is    non-knowledge 
so  much  so  that  you  reduce  them  both   to   a 
state    of  unity   which  is  devoid  of  all  differ- 
ences   and     distinctions     in     it    ('?RT?Tlfei^?- 
fk?:f%ff).    And    this   tantamounts   to   saying 
that    Brahman    is   but   a    synonym    of   Ne- 
science which  is    dull    (5T^)    and    devoid    of 
consciousness     (^TT^ffef??)-     But     you,    the 
Vedantins,    hold     that    'Brahman     is     true 
knowledge    infinite'.     Hence    we    the   Jains 
rightly   hold  that    the    knowledge    of  things 
as  determined  by  our  dielectic  movement  of 

'53 

20 


Denial  of 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

thought  in  the  forms  of  both  suchness  and 
unsuchness  (rfsgfi'^q  and  ^r??n^)  is  not 
invalid  {^^^\^^)  like  doubt  or  diffidence 
as  you  contend. 

III.     To     meet    the    third   objection    in 
the  form  of  your   denial   as   to   the   definite 
^o^5f"^^^/^^    character      of     our      determination    of    the 

racter    a  i  s- 

proved.  nature   of  things    which    are   admitted  to  be 

instinct  with  multiplicity  of  character,  we 
have  to  submit  that  our  determination  of 
the  nature  of  things  is  not  indefinite  in 
itself.  Why  ? — Because  of  the  fact  that 
whatever  is  acknowledged  by  us  exists  only 
in  so  far  as  its  own  four-fold  constituent 
elements  in  their  particular  combination 
are  concerned ;  but  relative  to  the  four- 
fold constituent  elements  as  manifest  in 
the  particular  combination  of  the  Other, 
the  former  does  not  exist.  For,  as  we 
have  seen  already,  the  jar  as  suck  i,e.  in 
respect  of  the  four-fold  constituent  elements 
under  particular  combination  making  up 
the  being  and  individuality  of  the  jar,  there 
it  exists  only  as  suck  and  does  not  exist 
as  the  picture.  And  this  logic  holds  good 
with    equal    force    in    regard   to   the  deter- 

^54 


EXAMINA  TION  OF  SHANK AR, 

mination  of  the  nature   of  our  determination 

itself.     The    determination   is  determination    ourprinciple 

1  V.       L    ^  ^u         •         V    •  2    ofdetermina- 

only   as  such;    but   as    otherwise    it   is  not    tion  is  but  a 

,  ,  .        .      V        ^.     .,     1         .  r    true     source 

(determination),     bimilarly,    in      respect    ot    ofknowledge 

the  determining  subject  and  the  resultant 
of  determination  being  as  suck  and  suck, 
they  both  have  their  being  ;  but  as 
otkerwise  i,e,  as  other  than  themselves,  they 
kave  not  their  being  as  well.  If  it  were 
not  the  case,  then  being  and  non-being, 
§  knowledge  and  Ne-science,  and  all  that  go 
in  pairs  of  opposites  would  become  merged 
into  such  a  homogeneous  whole  of  one 
uniform  for  character  as  is  not  warranted 
by  the  evidences  of  the  senses.  Hence 
you  must  have  to  admit  that  our  determina- 
tion of  things  as  suck  and  not  as  suck  being 
thus  in  and  by  itself  definite,  cannot 
but  be  a  true  source  of  knowledge  and  that 
our  omniscient  arkats  are  therefore  the  real 
teachers  of  right  knowledge  and  hence 
there  is  every  reason  why  people  should  flock 
round  them  and  be  inclined  as  well  to  act 
up  to  their  instructions  to  lead  a  life  of 
perfection  and  beatitude,  the  only  end  and 
aim  of  human  evolution. 


'55 


The  Number 


AM  EPITOME  OP  JAIN  ISM. 

IV.  With  reference  to   objection  regard- 
ing the   composites  (^i%oFTil)  being   numeri- 

five— of  the    callv  five,    we    point   out   that   the    number 
composites.  ^  ^ 

five  as  such  is  really  five,  but  as  the 
otho  than  five  itself,  />.  relative  to  such 
numbers  as  four,  six  or  seven,  the  five  is 
not.  Let  us  take  otherwise — the  num- 
ber Five  only.  Here  we  have  undoubtedly  a 
definite  concept.  Now  the  definite  concept 
of  five  by  the  fact  that  it  is  definite  excludes 
other  thoughts  and  specially  the  opposite 
thought.  We,  the  Jains,  admit  this  ;  but 
proceed  still  further  and  hold  that  every 
definite  thought  or  concept  by  the  fact  that 
it  is  definite,  has  a  necessary  relation  to  its 
negative  and  so  cannot  be  separated  from 
it  without  losing  its  own  meaning.  Five 
is  five  as  distinguished  from  eight,  nine, 
ten,  or  not-sevtn  and  so  bears  essential 
relation  with  them.  Hence  we  hold  that 
the  composites  which  are  numerically  five 
can  thus    be    neither   more    nor    fewer   than 

five. 

V.  Then  again  the   seven  predicaments, 
Indescrib-    thcv   are   certainly    never   absolutely   indes- 

ability.  ^ 

cribable.   They  are  indescribable  in  the  sense 

'5(> 


EXAMINATION  OF  SHANKAR. 

that    they   cannot   be    described   all  at  once 

and    simultaneously     (^^?l!og    ^^^^^^?im)  ; 

but   surely    they   are    describable   gradually 

and  successively  (^^oJi^fi^^^f^TH). 

VI.     To       repudiate       the      sixth,    we 

submit   that   the    knowledg^e   accruing   from    ^J"^^^  ^®P^" 

^  ^  diation. 

the  ascertainment  of  the  predicaments  both 
as  such  and  noi  such,  according  to  the 
four-fold  constituent  elements  of  themselves 
and  as  belonging  to  the  Other  than 
themselves  and  our  determination  as  well 
of  their  existence  and  non-existence  in 
like  manner  being  Right  Knowledge  (^?55Jcfr 
^jjil);  and  Un-right  Knowledge  (^^^^- 
^3f  if)  being  opposite  to  Right  Knowledge,  the 
Right  Knowledge  exists  only  as  such  i,e,  in 
so  far  its  own  matter  and  form  are  concerned 
but  does  not  exist  in  the  matter  and  form  of 
the  Wrong  Knowledge  and  vice-versa,  the 
Wrong  Knowledge  exists  in  its  own  matter 
and  form  and  does  not  exist  as  the 
matter  and  form  of  the  Right  Knowledge. 
And  likewise  the  Heaven  and  Freedom, 
they  are  in  their  own  matter  and  form ; 
but  they  are  not  as  the  matter  and  form  of 
what    are     known    as    Hell     and    Bondage. 

^57 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAlNtSM. 

Also  such  is  the  case  in  respect  of 
eternity  which  is  real  and  actual  only  in 
its  own  matter  and  form  as  distinguished 
from  its  opposite,  the  matter  and  form  of 
what  it  is  not.  Or  in  other  words,  the 
predicaments  are  eternal  in  relation  to 
noumenon  only  but  non-eternal  in  relation 
to  pary&ya — phenomenon. 

And  this  is  how  to  a  thing,  being  is 
ascribed  in  relation  to  Its  own  matter 
and  form  as  well  as  non-being  in  relation 
to  the  matter  and  form  of  the  Other. 


158 


CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  DOCTRINE  OF  UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE. 

Tnc  Jtalecttc  reasontng  leads  to  the  Theory  of 
BnedabKea  i.e.  of  Unity  m  difference — Distinction  t>re- 
sut>t>oses  Unity — TKe  world,  system  is  an  expression  of 
thought — Tke  Jain  conce{>tion  of  tke  Absolute  aistin- 
guisKeJ  from  tke  Absolute  tcyonJ  tke  relative  of  tke 
Vedantms. 

Now    what    has    been    discussed    in    the 

,.  C^  1      A     7         '  '  •  ^^^      ^*W       of 

preceeding   pages   on    Syadvad,   it    is   quite    contradic- 

,  ,       ,  -  ....         I         tion    is    the 

apparent  that  the  law  of  contradiction  is    the    n  egat  i  o  n 

aspect  of  the 

negative  aspect  of  thelaw  of  identity.  We  have  law  of  iden- 
tity. 

seen  that  with  the  Jains,  everything  implies 
'something'  opposed  to  it.  *This'  implies 
*that\  'here'  implies  'there',  'now'  implies 
'then'.  The  trend  of  the  argument  is  that 
everything  is  real  only  in  relation  to  and 
distinction  from  every  other  thing.  This 
being  so,  the  law  of  contradiction  is  not 
virtually  denied  absolutely.  What  the  Jain 
philosophers  want  us  to  understand  is  this 
that  absolute  distinction  which  the  ordinary 
interpretation  presupposes  is  not  a  correct 
view  of  things.  Rather  it  is  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  distinction  presupposes  a  unity  of 
which,   xht/iva  and  Ajiva  and  the  like  that 

'59 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

go  in  pairs  of  opposites  are  but  two   expres- 
sions. 

The  world  system  is  not  alien  to  thought. 
Thought  is  not  accidental  to  world.  Thouofht 

The   world-  ^  "^ 

system  is  the    is  embodied  in    the    world-system.     Popular 

expression  of 

thought.  view  is  that  thoucrht  is  connected  with  man's 

brain  and  so  accident  to  the  world  system. 
In  opposition  to  this  the  Jains  teach  that 
the  world  system  is  the  expression  of 
thought.  The  world  system  is  that  in  which 
thought  goes  out  of  itself.  Thought  is  thus 
made  the  essence  of  the  world.  It  is  the 
Ved^nta  that  somewhere  teaches  that  Nature 
is  the  working  out  of  the  will  and  is  real  in 
so  far  the  intelligence  of  man  is  concerned. 
But  we  differ  from  the  Vedantins  and  hold 
that  thought  which  is  the  essence  of  the 
world  is  objective,  is  something  universal 
or  absolute  in  which  the  particular  thoughts 
of  particular  men  partake. 

But  then  there  is  ^.prwia  facie    objection 
we   have    to    meet.     Some   says    it   is     im- 

An  objection  pQgsible  to  take  thought  as  the  essence  of 
the  world.  For  it  would  tantamount  to  our 
ignoring  the  feeling  or  willing  which  is  as 
important  as   thought.     True,  the  objection 

l6o 


UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE. 

would  have  been  valid  had  we  conceived 
thought  as  excluding  will  and  feeling. 
Thought  is  not  one  thing,  and  feeling  another 
thing.  Will  is  not  apart  from  thought.  How 
are  we  to  conceive  of  will  if  it  is  exclusive  of 
thought  ? 

Again  thought  implies  will.  Dynamic 
thought  is  Will.  When  I  identify  myself  J^J^^^rls 
with  the  end,  I  am  said  to  will.  But  I  cannot  '^^^^• 
do  so  unless  I  am  conscious  of  the  end. 
So  activity  is  impossible  without  thought. 
Thus  our  thought  is  not  exclusive  of  will. 
With  us  thought  is  concrete,  thought  inclu- 
sive of  feeling  and  will  and  is  the  constitutive 
principle  of  the  universe. 

Now     therefore     the     Absolute    is     the 

ultimate    unity    of  thought    which  expresses    Absolute    is 

the  ultimate 

itself  as  /iva  on  the  one  side  and  correlative    ""ity. 
of  the    subject   as  Ajiva   on   the  other  side. 
This  unity  is  all  inclusive    unity    which    em- 
braces everything  that  is  feal. 

But    this    conception  of  the  Absolute  has 
to  be  distinoruished  from  the  absolute  beyond    Jain  concep- 

^  tion    of    the 

the  relative   of  the  Vedantins.     These  philo-    absolute    as 

*■  d  1  stinguish- 

sophers    hold    that    our   intellect    deals  with    ?f /-^^  ^^^ 
the  relative  only.     The  world   of  experience 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

is  the  world  relative  only.  So  the  absolute 
lies  beyond  the  world  of  the  relative — beyond 
the  world  of  phenomena.  Shankar  thinks  in 
this  way,  We  hold,  however,  that  absolute 
is  not  beyond  the  phenomena :  rather  all 
phenomena  are  but  particular  aspects  or 
phases,  of  this  all  inclusive  unity  which  is 
Absolute.-— The  whole  and  the  aspects  of 
The  whole.  The  whole  of  reality  conceived 
as  a  single  ultimate  unity  is  noumenon  and 
phenomena  are  but  its  partial  phases. 

But  then    the    question    is,    What   is     a 
Noumenon    Noumenon  ?    Is  it  an  aggregate    of  pheno- 

and    Pheno-  t^i       tvt  i     i  j    • 

mena.  1  he  Noumenon,  we  hold,  is  superior 
to  phenomena ;  because  it  is  all  inclusive 
whole.  Phenomena  are  but  fragmentary 
aspects  of  Noumenon.  This  all  inclusive  whole 
(noumenon)  cannot  stand  apart  from  those 
which  it  includes  (phenomena).  If  it  is  an  all 
inclusive  unity  and  phenomena  are  fragmen- 
tary aspects  of  this  unity,  then  is  it  an  aggre- 
gate of  phenomena  ?  No.  The  Self  is  not 
apart  from  its  various  determinations  or  states 
of  the  Self.  It  is  not  something  above  and 
over  the  psychoses.  What  is  the  Self  ."^  It  is 
not   a   mere  sum  of  its  determinations  as  the 

162 


mena. 


UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE. 

Vijn^nvsLdi  Buddhists  hold  ;  nor  is  it  differ- 
ent from  the  sum  of  its  determinations  as 
the  Ved^ntins  try  to  explain.  It  is  a  unity 
of  all  its  determinations.  It  is  an  ideal  unity 
which  realises  itself  through  these  particular 
determinations. 

So  the  partial  phases  of  the  Absolute  are 
phenomena    and    these    are    related     to    the    Phenomena 

are  but   par- 

Absolute  as  the  members  of  a  living-  body  are    ^'^^  phases 

^  ^  of  the  abso- 

related  to  the  body  itself.  The  particular  ^"^^• 
things  of  experience  are  aspects  of  the 
Absolute  which  is  the  all  inclusive  unity 
expressing  itself  through  particular  deter- 
minations. It  is  the  subject ;  but  not  as 
correlative  of  the  object  ;  rather  a  unity 
implied  in  the  correlation. 

The   Absolute  is  thus  the  ultimate  Unity. 
But  here  again  the  familiar  conception    gives    Supposed 

T  r    1         A  1  difficulty    in 

us  trouble.  If  the  Absolute  is  One,  then  the  the  accepta- 
tion  of   the 

Absolute  is  not  Many.  If  it  is  unity  then  it  is  two  concep- 
tion   of   the 

not  a  Plurality.  The  Veddntins  of  the  type  of   absolute. 

Shankar  hold  that  the  absolute  is  the  Unity. 
It  is  not  a  plurality  therefore.  But  Plurality 
is  a  stupendous  fact  which  cannot  be  denied. 
So  plurality,  according  to  those  Vedantins,  is 
but  an  illusion — May^  {WJXX)  and  not  a  reality. 

163 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  A  IN  ISM. 
Plurality  is    a    fact,   although    it    may  be 

From     the  ii»ir  •  ai 

stand-point    another  kind  ot  experience.    Anyhow  to  give 

of   the  rela-     .      ,  r  th      •        /  \  •  i    • 

tion  between    It  the  name  of  Illusion  (TTT^T)  IS  not  to  explain 

the  One  and     .  .  i  .  t  t 

the  Many.  It.  1  he  question  then  turns  to  this.  How 
thus  Illusion  comes  to  be  reconciled  with  the 
Absolute  ?  How  is  this  solution  possible,  if 
the  Absolute  is  the  One  without  a  second  to 
stand  by  it  (^^^^if^^^).  And  the  Ultimate 
Reality  without  anything  to  aid  or  stand  by 
it  being  One,  what  is  the  source  of  this 
Illusion  of  Plurality.  Thus  the  whole  ques- 
tion resolves  itself  into  the  Relation  of  Unity 
and  Plurality. 

If  the  ultimate  reality  be  many,  how    can 

Difficulties    you    explain    a    single  self-existent    coherent 
in  the  estab.     ^  ^ 

lishment    of   system  ?     If   there   is  a  relationship  between 
the  Relation 

A.  B.  C.  D.,  and  so  on  then  these  are 
elements  of  a  single  whole  and  so  related 
to  each  other. 

If  you  begin  with  the  Absolute  separation 
Set  out  in  a  between  Unity  and  Plurality,  then  you  must 
alternative,  either  deny  Plurality  like  Shankar  or  deny 
Unity  like  Kan^d,  the  propounder  of  the 
Specific  (Vaisheshika)  school  of  thought.  But 
these  difficulties  crop  up  only  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  ultimate  Reality  is  either  One  or 

164 


UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE, 

Many.     And    we,  the  Jains,  therefore,  reject 

this  disjunction  altogether.   From  our  point  of    But  this  dis- 

J  ^  ^  junction     1  n 

view,  all  differences  are  differences  of  a  Unity    ^H  ^°''"?  °^ 

'      definitealter- 

which  is  expressed  in  the  differences.  One  ^^^^^^^  ^  l^l 
is  One  not  apart  from  the  Many  ;  but  One  is  J^'"^' 
in  the  Many.  So  Plurality  must  be  taken  as 
the  self-expression  of  this  unity — the  Abso- 
lute. To  conceive  of  the  Absolute  as  the  One 
is  not  to  conceive  the  facts  of  experience  as 
Illusion — Maya  {wJli),  Or,  the  Many  is  real 
in  as  much  as  the  Many    is    galvanised    into    ^^^  differ- 

ences    being 

life   by  the  One  ;    because  Many  is  the  self-    differences 

^  '  of    a     unity 

expression   of  the  One.     The    absolute  is   a    ^^e^^drffe r" 
Unity  but  the  Unity   which    is    immanent  in    ^Jo^  aspects 
the  Many.     The   Many,  in    Jainism,  do    not    dTng^o^n^e 
vanish    in    the    luminosity    of   the  One    like 
clouds  before  the  rising  sun  as  taught  in    the 
philosophy    of  Vydsa    and    Vasistha  :    rather 
the    Many    is  vitalised  by    the  One  and  is  as 
real  as  every  other    facts   of  experience.      In 
Jainism,  One  is  shown  to  come  out  of  its  own 
privacy  as  it  were  and  appears  Itself  as    the 
Many.     The     Many    vanishes    in    the    One 
(Shankar)  :  but    the  One  presents  itself  to  us 
as  the  Many   (the  Jains).     The  One   reveals 
itself  in  the  Many  and  the  Many  is  the  self- 

165 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

expression    of  the    ultimate  Unity.     In    our 

philosophy,  the  ordinary  disjunction  of  *either- 

or'    falls  to  the  ground.      The  two  aspects  of 

one    truth    do  not  exclude  each  other.     The 

concrete  whole  is  the  abstract   which    is  One 

in     the   Many    and    Many    as   grounded    in 

^    the  One. 

The    Absolute    is    the    Universal.     This 

The  Abso-    Universal  is  not  the  abstract  Universal  of  the 
lute     is    the 

Universal    formal     logfic     but    the    concrete  Universal. 

rev  e  a  1  1  n  g  ^ 

Itself  in  the    yj^^  absolute  expresses  itself  in  A,    but    not 

Particulars.  ^  ' 

limited  to  A.  A  is  the  particularisation  of 
the  Universal.  Hence  the  Universal  goes 
beyond  A,  to  B,  to  C  and  so  A,  B,  C,  D  are 
immanently  and  vitally  connected  with  one 
another.  The  Universal  comes  out  of  Itself 
and  particularises  Itself  in  the  particular 
objects  of  the  world  system  and  which,  there- 
fore, is  vitally  and  essentially  and  immanently 
connected  with  one  another  constituting  the 
world  system.  The  Universal  of  the  Jains 
does  not  fight  shy  of  the  Particulars  of 
the  world — the  categories  of  thought  and 
being — like  the  Universal  of  the  formal 
logic  ;  but  reveals  itself  in  the  particulars  of 
the  world. 

i66 


UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE. 

Such  being  the    Jain   conception    of   the 
Absolute,    the    whole  universe  of  things,   we    Everything 

i  s    dififerent 

see,  must  needs  be  ordered  in   perfect   agree-    and   non- 

dififerent    a  t 

ment  with  our  coc/nitions.     We  are  conscious    the   same 

'^  time. 

of  thinors  as  different  and  non-different  at 
the  same  time.  They  are  non-different  in 
their  causal  or  universal  aspect  (^TT^T^*!!- 
STifSn^JfT  ^TfiT*S5;{)  and  different  in  so  far 
as  viewed  as  effects  or  particulars  (^T^T^«TT- 

But   some   hold  that  cognition  of  things 
as  such  is  impossible    and    remark    that  like    Reply  to  the 

critiques    o  f 

lig^ht     and       darkness,     the     identity     and    ^^\   ^t>ove 

^  ^  vend. 

difference  can  not  co-exist  in  the  same 
thing.  But  we  reply,  the  contradictoriness 
that  exists  between  light  and  darkness  is 
of  two  kinds.  One  is  of  the  nature  of  im- 
possibility of  co-existing  in  one  and  the 
other  of  the  nature  of  co-existing  but  in 
different  things.  But  such  contradictoriness 
is  not  perceived  in  the  correct  intrepretation 
of  the  true  character  of  the  relation  in  which 
the  cause  and  the  effect  or  the  universal 
and  the  particular  mutually  stand  together. 
On  the  contrary  we  really  perceive  that 
the    one  and    the  same  thing  is  possessed  of 

167 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM. 

dual    aspect    {y^^^    qsR^^  ^^     f^^  ReitgS). 

Things  are    Thus  when    we  say    'This  jar  is  clay'  ;   Ram 

naturally    of  /  j  7     > 

dual  charac-    is  a  human  beino^.      Here  in  the   instance    of 

ter.  ^ 

'clay'  and  *the  Jar',  clay  is  the  cause  and    the 
jar  is  the  effect    thereof.     The  jar    is    but    a 
particular  state  of  being  of  the    cause    which 
is  clay.     Were  co-existence  of  the  cause  and 
effect  contradictory,  it  would  never  have  been 
possible  for  clay  to  exist   as  in   the    form    of 
the    'far  :  in    the  second  instance  'Ram  is  a 
human    beings'    humanitv    is     the     universal 
(^TifrT)    and    Ram    is    but    a  particular  (3^%) 
expression  of  humanity.  Were  Universal  and 
Particular    contradictory,  one   excluding    the 
other,   then  Ram    could    never   have  been  a 
human  being.     Nor  even    any    one  of  many 
Id    tt  experience    has     ever     perceived     anything 

de^tructTo^n  having  an  absolutely  uniform  character 
absolutely  devoid  of  all  distinction  and 
difference  whatever  in  the  same.  Nor  can 
it  be  upheld  that  just  as  fire  consumes  straw 
and  other  combustibles  so  non  difference 
(^^)  sets  at  nought  the  difference  on  the 
ground  that  Identity  being  unity,  it  is  a 
nullity  of  all  Difference.  And  therefore  the 
admission  of  identity  and    difference    as    co- 

l68 


ofdifferences 


UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE. 

existing  in  the  same  involves  a  contradiction. 
But  this,  we  contend,  is  not  borne  out  by 
facts  of  experience  ;  nor  is  there  any  absolute 
law  to  the  effect  that  identity  should  always 
and  everywhere  be  destructive  of  difference. 
On  the  contrary,  we  have  things  with  two- 
fold aspects,  just  because  it  is  thus  that  they 
are  perceived.  For,  the  same  thing  which 
exists  as  clay  or  gold,  or  man  &c.  at 
the  same  time  exists  as  jar,  diadem  or 
Ram.     And    no  man  is  able  to  distinguish  in    impossibi- 

an  object, — e.g.  J^r  or  Ram, — placed  before    distinguish- 
ing between 
him,  which  part  is  clay  and  ivhich  the  Jar    or    the    Cause 

and      the 

which  part  is  the  universal  character  of  Ram    Effect  or  the 

Uni  vers  a  1 

and  which  the  particular      Rather  our  thought    ^"^     ^^^ 

^  Particular. 

finds  its  true  expression  in  the  following 
judgments,  'this  Jar  is  clay'  and  'Ram  is  a 
man'.  Nor  can  it  be  maintained  that  a 
distinction  is  made  between  the  cause  and 
the  universal  as  objects  of  the  idea  of  persis- 
tence  and  the  effect  and  the  particular  as 
objects  of  the  notion  of  discontinuance — 
difference,  in  as  much  as,  truly  speaking,  we 
have  no  perception  of  these  two  factors, 
in  separation.  However  close  we  may 
look  into   a    thing,    we    won't    be    able    still 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM. 


They  are 
neither  abso- 
lutely differ- 
ent nor  abso- 
lutely n  o  n- 
different. 


Rather  they 
stand  in 
relation  o  f 
unity  in 
diflferences. 


A  fresh  ob- 
jection to  the 
doctrine  o  f 
Unity  in 
Difference. 


to  find  that  this  is  the  persisting  and 
universal  element  in  the  thing  and  that  is 
the  non-persisting  particular  aspect  of  the 
thing.  Just  as  an  effect  or  a  particular 
thing  gives  rise  to  the  idea  of  one  thing, 
so  the  effect  plus  cause  and  the  parti- 
cular along  with  the  universal  gives  rise 
to  the  idea  of  one  thing  only.  And  this 
is  how  we  are  enabled  to  recognise  each 
individual  thing,  placed  as  it  is  amongst 
a  multitude  of  things  differing  in  place, 
time^  capacity  and  substance.  Each  thing 
being  thus  endowed  with  double  aspect,  the 
theory  of  cause  and  effect  or  universal  and 
particular,  being  absolutely  distinct  and 
different  falls  to  ground  under  the  weight  of 
the  overwhelming  evidences  of  sense- 
perception. 

It  might  be  contended  here  that  if  on 
account  of  grammatical  co-ordination  and  the 
consequent  of  idea  oneness,  the  judgment 
'this  Jar  is  clay'  is  taken  to  mean  the  relation 
of  unity  in  difference  i.e.  both  difference  and 
non-difference  as  well,  then  we  are  led  by  a 
coherent  train  of  thought  to  infer  from  such 
judgments  as    'I  am  a  man'  or  'I  am  a    god', 


lyo 


UNITY  IN  DIFFERENCE. 

that  the    self  and  the  body  also  stand  in  rela- 
tion of  unity  in  difference — Bhed&bheda, 

But    we,    the    Jains,  hold  this    to    be  an 
uncritical  observation  in  as    much  as  it  is  not    Defutation 

of  the  objec- 

based    on    rie^ht    interpretation    of  the    true    ^i  on  and 

^  ^  esta  b  1 1  s  h- 

nature     of    co-ordination     establishing^     the    "^^^",^,  ?f  ^J}^ 

^  bhedabheda 

bheddbheda  relation.  The  correct  interpreta-  ^^^^^^o"- 
tion  is  that  all  reality  is  determined  by  states 
of  consciousness  not  sublated  by  valid  means 
of  proof.  The  imagination  however  of  the  ' 
identity  of  the  self  and  the  not-self  (body)  is 
sublated  by  all  means  of  proof  applicable  to 
the  self :  it  is  in  fact  no  more  valid  than  the 
imagination  of  the  snake  in  the  rope  and  does 
not  therefore  prove  the  identity  of  the  two. 
The  co-ordination,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
is  meant  by  the  judgment  'the  cow  is  short 
horned'  is  never  observed  to  have  been  dis- 
proved in  any  way  and  hence  establishes  the 
doctrine  of  Unity  in  Difference  (^lir^^TcT).      \ 


171 

i 


CHAPTER  XII. 
THE  UNIVERSE  AS  A  SELF-EXISTENT  UNIT. 

The  Sell  and  tlic  Not-self  are  tut  members  oi  a 
comj>lex  lAr  hole — !Dtmculttes  tn  tke  transiormatton  oi 
t}te  SuDject  into  Object  and  Vice-versa  Object  tnto 
SuDject — £acn  ^re-sut>t>ostng  tne  otner,  we  nave  to  take 
tne  Universe  in  tke  Ugkt  oi  single  uninea  System. 

The    task     of   philosophers    is     to     find 
Difficultifes    law,    order     and     reason    in     what     at    first 

in  the  formu- 
lation of  an    sie^ht       seems       accidental,     capricious     and 

adequate  ^ 

Theory     o  f    meaningfless.     And   the    arduousness  of  that 

theUniverse.  ^ 

work  grows  with  the  complexity  and 
intricacy  of  the  phenomena  to  be  explain- 
ed. The  freer  the  play  of  difference, 
the  harder  is  to  find  the  underlying 
unity,  the  fiercer  the  conflict  of  opposites, 
the  more  difficult  is  it  to  detect  the 
principle  out  of  which  it  springs.  And 
unless  this  is  satisfactorily  done,  any 
theory  of  the  Universe  can  hardly  be 
attained  to.  Unconscious  of  the  greatness 
of  the  work  they  were  undertaking,  the 
early  philosophers  tried  to  solve  the  whole 
problem  of  the  Universe  at  a  stroke  and  find 
some   one  principle  or  unitary  method  which 

iy2 


THE  UNIVERSE. 

m 

would  account  for  everything.  But  it 
soon  became  obvious  that  the  principle,  Nothing  is 
and  the  problem  of  universe  are  not  so  easy  ^he*reign°of 
to  be  solved  and  the  citadel  of  know- 
ledge was  not  to  be  taken  by  storm. 
Thus  earliest  and  most  secure  triumphs 
of  science  were  won  by  separating  off 
some  comparatively  limited  sphere  of 
reality  and  treating  it  as  a  world  by 
itself.  And  it  is  just  because  they 
narrowed  the  problem  that  they  succeeded 
in  solving  it.  The  general  nature  of  the 
difticulties  to  be  met  with,  is  known 
and  also  the  methods  by  which  they 
can  be  overcome.  The  field  is  not,  and 
cannot  be  exhausted  ;  but  such  light  has 
been  thrown  upon  it  that  no  room  is  left 
for  fear  that  within  that  department  the 
progress  of  science  will  ever  meet  with  any 
unsurmountable  obstacle.  Hence  the  con- 
.  viction  that  there  is  no  sphere  of  existence 
which  is  exempt  from  the  reign  of  law  has 
been  gaining  ground  with  the  development 
and  progress  of  philosophic  speculation. 

Now  we    should  attempt   to   investigate 
into    the  general    nature   of  the    Universe. 

^73 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

When    we    consider    the   general    nature    of 
Uni  verse--    x}c\^  Universe  or  of  our  life  as  rational    beinof, 

Subject,  Ob-  o' 

■'unity^^  b^e^    endowed     with     the     powers     of     thinking 

tween    the    ^^^    willing,    we    find    that     it     is     defined 

and,    so    to   speak,    circumscribed    by    three 

ideas       which       are       closely      and       even 

indissolubly    connected     with     each     other. 

These    three    ideas   are     the     ideas    or    the 

constituent   elements    of  the    universe  or  the 

factors   of  it     which     are    inseparably   con- 

/  nected  with  each  other  and  so    involve  each 

other.     These  are  (i)  the  idea  of  the   Object 

(♦ftig')    or   Not-self   (^^^)   (ii)   the   idea  of 

the  Subject  (wt^)  or  the  Self  (^rt^)  (iii)  and  the 

idea  of  the  Unity    which    is    presupposed  in 

the    difference    of  the  Self  and  the  Not-self 

and  in  and  through  which  they  act  and  react 

on  each  other. 

To    explain   these   terms  more  fully,    the 
Explanation     Object    (ifl*^)    is   the   general    name    under 

of  the  above        ...  •      i     i  i  i  11 

three  terms,  wliich  w^e  mclude  the  external  world, 
and  all  things  and  beings  in  it,  all 
that  we  know  and  all  that  we  act  on, 
the  whole  environment  which  conditions 
the  activity  of  the  ego  and  furnishes 
the  means  and  sphere  through  which  it    rea- 


THE  UNIVERSE. 

Uses  itself.  AH  this  we  call  Object  (ift'?r)  in 
order  to  indicate  its  distinction  and  its  rela- 
tion to  the  Subject  (wt^R)  for  which  it  exists. 
We  call  it  by  this  name  also  to  indicate 
that    we    are   obliged    to     think     of     it     as    SeifandNot- 

s  e  1  f — t  hey 

one  whole,    one   world,    all    of   whose    parts    are  but  mem- 
be  r  s  of  a 
are    embraced    in    one    connection    of  space    complex 

^  Whole. 

and  all  whose  changes  take  place  in  one 
connection  of  time.  All  these  elements 
or  parts  and  changes  therefore  make  up 
the  elements  in  one  whole  and  in  one 
system  and  modern  science  teaches  us  to 
regard  them  all  as  connected  together  by 
of  links  of  causation.  There  is  again  only 
one  thing  which  stands  over  against  this 
complex  whole  of  existence  and  refuses 
to  be  regarded  simply  as  a  part  of  the 
system  and  that  is  the  Ego,  the  Subject 
or  the  Self  for  which  it  exists  :  for  the 
primary  condition  of  the  existence  of 
such  Subject  is  that  it  should  distinguish 
itself  from  the  Object  as  such,  from  each 
object  and  from  the  whole  system  of 
objects.  Hence  strictly  speaking  there 
is  only  one  Subject  and  one  Object  for  us  ; 
for  in  opposition    to  the  Subject,  the  totality 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

of  objects  constitute  one  world,  and  in 
opposition  to  the  Object,  all  experiences 
of  the  Subject,  all  its  thoughts  and  actions 
lidlifemove  ^'^  ^-^^x^^^  in  the  unity  of  one  Self.  All 
these Two^  "  ^"^  ^'f^»  ^"  ^^^  conscious  thought  then 
moves  between  these  two  terms  which 
are  distinct  from  and  even  opposed  to 
each  other.  Yet  though  thus  set  in 
antagonism  which  can  never  cease,  be- 
cause  with  its  ceasing  the  whole  nature 
of  the  both  would  be  subverted,  they 
are  also  essentially  related,  for  neither 
of  them  could  be  conceived  to  exist 
without  the  other.  The  consciousness  of 
the  one  is,  we  might  say,  inseparably  blended 
with  the  consciousness  of  its  relation  to  the 
other.  We  know  the  object  only  as  we 
bring  it  back  to  the  unity  of  the  Self 
and  we  know  the  Self  only  as  we  realise 
it  in    the  Object. 

And  lastly  these  two  ideas  within  the 
spheres  of  which  our  whole  life  of  thought  and 
activity  is  contained  and  from  one  to  the 
other  of  which  it  is  continually  moving  to  and 
fro,  point  back  to  a  third  term  which  embraces 
them    both   and    which   in    turn    constitutes 

,76 


THE  UNIVERSE. 

their  limit  and  ultimate  condition.  For 
where  we  have  two  terms  which  thus  are 
at   once    essentially    distinguished    from  and    Untranslata- 

bility  of  the 

essentially  related    to,  which    are    obliged    to    psychical 

into  physical 

contrast    and  oppose    to    each    other,    seeing    and    vice 

versa  of  the 

that     they     have      neither     of     them     any    ^a"«>^     ^"to 

'      the  former. 

meaning  except  as  opposite  counterparts 
of  the  other,  and  which  we  are  obliged  to 
unite,  there  we  are  necessarily  driven  back 
to  think  of  these  terms  as  the  manifesta- 
tion or  realisation  of  a  third  term  which 
is  higher  than  either.  Recognising  that 
the  Object  only  exists  in  distinction  from  and 
relation  to  the  Subject,  we  find  it  impossible 
to  reduce  the  Subject  to  a  mere  Object 
^mong  other  objects  as  Materialism  does. 
Recognising,  again,  that  the  Subject  exists 
only  as  it  returns  upon  itself  in  the  Object, 
we  find  it  impossible  as  well  to  reduce  the 
Object  to  a  mere  phase  of  the  Subject — a 
fallacy  committed  by  the  Buddhistic  Subjective 
Idealism  or  Solipsism.  But  recognising  them 
as  indivisible  yet  necessarily  related,  we  are 
forced  to  seek  the  secret  of  their  being 
in  a  higher  principle  which  includes  and 
explains   them    both.     How    otherwise    can 

177 

23 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

we   do  justice   at  once   to   their   distinction 

and    their  relation,     to  their     independence 

and    their   essential   and    vital    connection  ? 

oVJe  c^t—    The     two — Subject    and     Object — are    the 

each  presup-  t-      i         c    \ 

posing     the    extreme  terms,     nach    ot  them    presupposes 

other  cannot  i     i  r  •  i        i 

be  the  pro-    the  Other  and  therefore  can  neither  be  regard- 
duct  of  the 
either.  ed  as   producing  the  other.     Hence   we   are 

compelled    to   think  of  them  both  as  rooted 

in  a  higher   principle   or  to  put   it  otherwise 

in  the    idea    of  an    Absolute  Unity   which 

transcends    all     opposition    of    the    finitude 

and     specially     the     last   opposition    which 

includes     all     others.     Hence     we      cannot 

understand    the  real  nature  of  the  universe 

unless   we   take   it  in   the   light   of  a  unified 

system,     whose     constituent     elements    are 

necessarily      related      in     the     way     above 

described. 

So     long     we   have   been   dealing   with 

Contingency    ^^e   nature   of  the  universe,      depicting?   the 

of  the  world.  ^  *=* 

relation  which  exists  between  different 
factors  of  the  world.  But  if  we  consider  the 
question  more  fully  we  cannot  get  rid  of  one 
idea — the  idea  of  contingency  of  the  world. 
The  contingent  world  exists  or  the  world 
of  our  immediate    experience  is   contingent, 


//cP 


I 


THE  UNIVERSE, 

therefore  absolutely  necessary  Being  exists. 
It  starts  from  the  thought  that  the 
world  as  presented  to  our  immediate 
experience    has    in     it    no   substantiality   or 

Certain  ano- 

independence.     Its     existence      cannot     be    maiiespoint- 

'  ing    to    the 

explained     from    itself    and     the     mind    in    °^'Sf^"  ^}  ^^ 

*^  w  o  r  I  d  at  a 

trying  to  account  for  it  is  forced  to  of^^j^e.^^'"* 
fall  back  in  something  outside  of  it 
and  finds  rest  only  in  the  idea  of  a 
Being  who  is  necessarily  self-dependent  and 
substantial.  The  movement  of  thought 
which  this  argument  involves  may  be 
stated  in  various  ways  and  under  different 
categories.  It  may  be  put  as  an  argu- 
ment from  the  world  viewed  as  an  effect 
to  the  first  cause  or  more  generally  from 
the  world  viewed  as  finite  and  relative 
to  an  Absolute  and  Infinite  Being  on 
whom  it  rests.  But  in  all  these  and 
other  forms,  the  gist  of  the  argument 
is  the  same.  If  we  take  it,  for  example, 
in  the  form  in  which  it  turns  on  the 
idea  of  causality,  it  is  the  argument 
that  whatever  does  not  exist  necessarily  exist 
only  through  another  Being  as  its  cause 
and   that   again  itself  not  necessary  through 

n9 


AN  PEITOME  OF  JAlNiS.M 

another  and  as  an  infinite  regress  of 
of  finite  beings  related  as  cause  and 
effect  is  unthinkable,  mind  is  compelled  to 
stop  short  and  place  at  the  head 
of  the  series — a  First  Cause,  a  Being 
which  is  Its  own  cause  or  which  exists  in 
and  by  Itself  unconditionally  or  necessarily. 
This  is  in  short  the  argument  often 
Clearing  up    forwarded     to     prove    that    the    world    was 

the    difficul-  .  .  ,     .  t>  i 

ties.  created  at  a  certam  point  ot  tmie.     But  when 

we  atterppt  to  translate  this  experience  into 
the  language  of  formal  reasoning  or  if  we 
take  it  to  be  a  syllogism  proving  the  ex- 
istence of  God  as  the  First  Creator,  our 
argument  becomes  open  to  serious  objec- 
tions. In  short,  we  will  find  that  this  sort 
of  argument  is  not  at  all  tenable.  The 
first  objection  which  may  be  urged  is  that 
the  result  it  gives  is  purely  negative.  You 
cannot  in  a  syllogistic  demonstration  put  more 
into  the  conclusion  than  what  the  premises 
contain.  Beginning  or  assuming  an  Absolute 
or  Infinite  Cause  you  might  conclude  to 
finite  effects  ;  but  you  cannot  revert  the  pro- 
cesses. All  that  from  a  finite  or  contingent 
effect,  you  can  infer  is  a  finite  or   contingent 

i8o 


THE  UNIVERSE. 

cause  or  at  most  an  endless  series  of  such 
causes.     But    if  because    the    mind    cannot    ^ 

To    posit    a 

rest    in    such    infinity    you    try  to  stop  short    ^^kno^^^ed^e 
the    mhnite    regress    and  assert  at  any  pomt    ^^  ^y^^  ^ 
of  it  a    cause    which    is   not  an  effect,   which    "^^"  ' 
is  its    own  cause,  infinite  and  unconditioned, 
the   conclusion  in  this  case  would   be    purely 
arbitrary.     To  assert  the  existence  of  such  a 
Being  as    the  Creator  of  the  world  is  simply 
to  conceal  under  a  phrase  the  breakdown  of 
the  argument. 

Again  the  argument  does  not  prove    that 
which    it   claims    to  prove,  for   such  a  Being    impossibi- 
is     related     to      the     world     as     cause    is    a  s      the 

creator       of 

to  an  effect.     But     the    cause    is     as  much    the  world, 
conditioned    by    effect    as    effect    is  by    the  » 

cause.  So  in  this  case  also  the  supposed 
Being  would  not  be  Absolute  as  this 
argument  tries  to  prove. 

Again  another  difficulty  presents  us  if  we 
dive  deep  into  the  question.  How  can  we 
conceive  God  before  any  such  creation  ^ 
Why  was  He  so  long  inactive  .^  What  led 
Him  to  create  this  Universe  at  a  certain 
point  of  time  after  such  a  long  period  of 
inactivity  ?     In  short  innumerable  difficulties 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

trouble  us  if  we  suppose  that  world  was 
created  at  a  certain  point  of  time.  This  is 
sufficient  to  prove  that  the  world  exists  from 
eternity  and  we  cannot  conceive  of  a  time 
when  it  was  not. 


182 


the  world. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
THEORIES  OF  EVOLUTION. 

JLheortes  oi  Cvolution  and  Oreatton  Ly  Kxternal 
Agency—  S^encertan  Formulation  of  tKc  PrtnctJ>le  of 
Kvolution — iJxjnc\x\t\ea  tn  S^encerian  ny^otnesis. 

In  the  preceeding  chapter,  we  have  seen 
that  from  our  point  of  view,  the  Universe  ^  or«:««f;«« 
has  been  in  existence  from  all  eternity.  We  °heories°^  of 
cannot  conceive  of  a  time  when  it  was  not. 
But  still  for  all  that  there  are  other 
hypothesis  which  either  speak  of  the  alternate 
eras  of  evolution  and  dessolution  of  the 
Universe  as  a  whole  or  take  it  to  have  been 
created  by  the  some  all  powerful  external 
agency  from  the  materials  that  lay  by 
Him  when  all  these  abounding  in  names  and 
forms  were  not.  And  ere  we  enter  on  any 
further  details  as  to  the  phenomenal  changes, 
transformation  of  the  world  as  these  present 
themselves  to  us,  it  is  important  that  we 
should  discuss  in  brief  the  different  im- 
portant hypothesis  which  are  also  prevalent 
more  or  less  in  these  days  of  scientific 
culture  and  refinement. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

To    begin    with   therefore,  there  are  only 
The    three    three     possible     hypothesis     which    can    be 

Hypotheses. 

reasonably  entertained  in  regard  to  the  past 
history  of  Nature. 

The  First  is  the  Theory  of  Self-existence 
which  teaches  that  the  order  of  Nature  which 
now  obtains  has  always  obtained  from  all 
eternity. 

The  Second  is  the  Theory  of  Evolution  or 
Self-creation  according  to  which  the  present 
order  of  Nature  has  had  but  a  limited 
duration  but  it  supposes  that  the  present 
order  of  things  proceeds  by  natural  processes 
from  an  antecedent  order  and  that  from 
another  antecedent  order  and  so  on  thus 
making  way  for  alternate  eras  of  Evolution 
and  dissolution.     And 

The  Third  is  the  Theory  of  Special  Crea- 
tion by  external  agency  teaching  that  nothing 
comes  of  itself:  That  from  dull  dead  matter 
absolutely  bereft  of  all  intelligence,  this 
phenomenal  Universe  which  bespeaks  of 
subtle  organisation  and  most  wonderful  design 
cannot  spring  forth  without  the  intervention 
of  some  intelligent  cause  operating  ,upon  the 
materials  whereof  Nature  is  composed. 

184 


THE  OR  Y  OF  E  VOL  UTION, 

Of  these   three  principal  hypotheses,  we 
have  already  dealt  with  the  first — the  Theory    Difficulties 

'  '      m  conceiving 

of  Self-existence.     We  are  now  to   deal  with    ^^^  World  as 

Self-existent 
the   Theory  of  Evolution — the  second  of  the    ^^^^  ^  ^*®^" 

three  hypotheses  :  for  some  hold  that  the 
Universe  cannot  be  conceived  as  Self-existent 
from  all  eternity  ;  for  'to  conceive  existence 
through  infinite  past-time',  to  quote  the 
language  of  Spencer,  'implies  the  conception 
of  infinite  past-time  which  is  an  impossi- 
bility'.— How  far  this  argument  of  Spencer 
against  the  Self-existence  of  the  Universe 
from  all  eternity  stands  to  reason,  we  shall 
see  later  on.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that 
because  of  this  supposed  difficulty  amongst 
the  many  others  in  the  theory  of  Self- 
existence,  some  have  been  inclined  to  fall 
upon  the  Theory  of  Evolution  and  Mr. 
Spencer  is  the  ablest  exponent  of  this 
theory  in  modern  times  so  far  the  Emperical 
School  of  European  thought  on  the  subject 
is  concerned. 

To  consider,  therefore,  first,  the  theory  of 

Evolution,  we  must  begin  with  its  definition.  Theory     of 

Y3  I      .  ,         ,  .  Evolution  as 

oy  evolution  or  development  was  meant  pri-  formulated 

.  .    .  t>y  Spencer, 

manly  the  gradual  unfolding  of  a  living  germ 

185 

24 


II 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

from  its  embryonic  beginning  to  its  final  and 
Evolution    mature  form.  This  adult  form  was  regarded  as 

was  original-  *> 

loeicaf  ^  ^  °  ^^  ^^^^  aimed  at  through  the  whole  process, 
so  that  the  whole  process  was  the  working 
of  an  idea — entelechy  or  soul  shaping  the 
plastic  material  and  directing  the  process 
of  growth.  Evolution,  in  short,  implied  ideal 
ends  controlling  physical  means — in  a  word 
was  'teleological\  But  now  the  term  'Evolu- 
tion',  though  retained,  is  retained  merely  to 
denote  the  process  by  which  the  mass  and 
energy  of  the  Universe  have  passed  from 
some  assumed  primeval  state  to  that  of  distri- 
bution which  we  have  at  present.  It  is  also 
implied  that  the  process  will  last  till  some 
ultimate  distribution  is  reached  whereupon 
a  counterprocess  of  dissolution  will  begin 
and  from  which  new  Evolution  will  proceed. 
"An   entire     history    of  anything"    Mr. 

spencerian    Spencer  tells  us  **must  include  its  appearance 

definition   of  r    i         •  -i  i  i  •        i- 

Evolution,  out  ot  the  imperceptible  and  its  disappear- 
ance into  the  imperceptible.  Be  it  a  single 
object  or  the  whole  Universe,  any  account 
which  begins  with  it  in  a  concrete  form  is 
incomplete."  In  these  and  such  like  instances 
Mr.  Spencer   sees   the   formula  of  evolution 

j86 


THEOR  Y  OF  E  VOL  UTION, 

and  dissolution  foreshadowed.  He  again 
goes  on  saying  that  *'the  change  from  a 
diffused  imperceptible  form  to  a  perceptible 
concentrated  state  is  an  integration  of  matter 
and  concomittant  dissipation  of  motion  and 
the  change  from  a  concentrated  perceptible 
state  is  an  absorption  of  motion  and  con- 
comittant disintegration  of  matter." 

Now  there  is  one  obvious  and  yet  serious    Examina- 
tion of   the 
objection  to  this  theory.     It  proposes  to  treat    Theory. 

the  Universe  or  in  fact  requires   us    to   treat 

the    Universe   as   a   single     object.     Every 

single     object     is     first    evolved   and    then 

dissolved     and      so     the     Universe.      The 

Universe   also,    he  thinks,  emerges  from  the 

imperceptible  and  into    the    imperceptible    it 

disappears      again.      Surely     Mr.    Spencer 

commits   here   the     fallacy   of  composition. 

What   is   predicable   of  the  parts,  he  thinks,    The  universe 

can  not  be 

can  be  predicated  of  the   whole   collectively,    treated  as  a 

single  Object 

Again,  we  may  ask  on  what  grounds  is  it 
assumed  that  the  Universe  was  ever  evolved 
at  all }  A  given  man,  a  given  nation,  a 
given  continent  have  their  general  finite 
histories  of  birth  and  death,  upheaval  and 
subsidence.     But   growth    and    decay,     rise 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

and  fall,  evolution  and  dissolution  are 
everywhere  contemporaneous.  We  have 
but  to  extend  our  vision  to  find  a  permanent 
totality  made  up  of  transeient  individuals 
in  every  stage  of  change.  But  so  enlarging 
our  vision  we  are  not  warranted  in  saying  as 
Mr.  Spencer  does  "there  is  an  alteration  of 
cras^J^Evo^  evolution  and  dissolution  in  totality  of 
DissohiUon    things."     But  now  what  we  find   so   far   our 

cannot      be,  .  , 

established.  Observation  and  experience  can  carry  us 
is  that,  be  it  small  or  great,  once  an  object 
is  dissolved  in  the  imperceptible  state  in  Mr. 
Spencer's  sense,  that  object  never  reappears. 
We  do  not  find  dead  man  alive  again,  effete 
civilisation  re-juvenated,  or  worn  out  stars 
re-kindled  as  of  yore.  It  is  true  of  course 
that  the  history  of  many  concrete  objects  is 
marked  by  periodic  phases  ;  but  never  by 
dissolution  and  re-evolution  ix.,  by  the 
disappearance  of  the  concrete  individuals 
followed  by  the  re-appearance  of  the 
same.  So  this  form  of  evolution  or  the 
philosophy  of  evolution  as  formulated  by 
Spencer  is  more  mythological  than  philoso- 
phical. What  we  admit  on  the  other  hand 
and  which  we  think  almost  free   from   every 

i88 


THEORY  OF  EVOLUTION. 

savour  of  immatured  reflection  is  that  within 
a  given  totality,  one  individual  may  succeed 
another,  but  so  far  that  totality,  the  Universe, 
is  concerned  it  remains  permanent — "One 
generation  passeth  away  and  another  genera- 
tion Cometh,  but  the  earth  abideth  forever." 
Again,  we    cannot   understand    what  led 

Mr.  Spencer  to  conceive  this  world  as    finite    Another 
^  difficulty. 

or  a  single  object.  What  Mr.  Spencer  calls 
a  single  object  must  surely  have  an  assign- 
able beginning  and  end  in  time  and  assign- 
able bounds  in  space.  It  is  precisely  through 
such  time  and  space-marks  that  the  notion 
of  singleness  or  identity  becomes  possible. 
The  Universe  then  we,  may  safely  say,  not 
only  is  not,  but  can  never  be  a  single  object 
in  this  wise.  Mr,  Spencer's  attempt  to  treat 
it  after  the  fashion  of  a  single  object,  evinces 
an  unexpected  paucity  of  imagination  and 
is  philosophically  unsound.  Experience 
provides  us  with  instances   of  evolution   and 

dissolution    of   the    most    varied   scales    but 

.  .  .  No  evidence 

of  a   smgle    supreme    evolution   embracing    to  show  the 

universe 

them   all   we   have   no   title  to  speak.     On    coming  to  an 

end. 

the  other  hand,  we  have  no  evidence  to 
show  what  we  call  the  'Universe'  is   coming 

i8g 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

to   an   end,  for  we  have  no  evidence  to  show 

that  it  is  finite.     If  taking   for   granted    we 

Rather  it  is    had  any  such  evidence   we    should    probably 
permanent  \r  j 

theatre  of   then     and     there     conclude   that    we    were 

per  p  et  ual 

changes.  dealing  with  but  a  part  of  the  true  Universe 
and  not  with  the  totality  of  things  or 
Universe  as  a  whole.  Again  there  is  no 
evidence  either  earthly  or  unearthly  prevail- 
ing upon  us  to  apply  of  such  conceptions 
as  increase  and  decrease,  ebb  and  flow,  or 
development  and  decay  to  this  absolute 
totality  or  the  Universe  as  a  whole.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  may  safely  say  that 
the  world,  so  far  as  we  can  judge  from  the 
physical  constitution  and  our  actual  experi- 
ence, is  just  what   it  has  always  been — The 

PERMANENT  THEATRE  OF  PERPETUAL  CHANGES. 


igo 


CHAPTER  XIV. 
THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 

SankKyas  J>rtnctt)lcs  of  Evolution — Traceable  \n  tke 
*Rigve<la* — 'Purusli'  anJ  *Pralcritt  — The  Tnree  *Gunas 
%n  tketr  EqutltLrtum  form  *PraKrttt  or  tke  Root 
Evolvent — *Pralcrttx'  %a  tke  first  Category — Tke  Tkree 
otker  Categories — Inconsistency  of  tke  Sankkya  Hyt>o- 
tkesis. 

Spencer's  formulation  of  the  principles  of 
the  Evolution,  however,  strongly  reminds  us  spencer  and 
of  the  S^nkhya  Philosophy  as  propounded 
by  the  sage  Kapil  in  India.  And  there  is  no 
denying  that  in  comparison  with  the  Spence- 
rian  theory,  Kapila's  doctrine  is  by  far  more 
consistent  and  logical.  According  to  this 
doctrine,  the  world  is  really  a  world  of 
experience — the  experience  of  the  individual 
Purush  or  Psychi  (as  in  the  system  of  Fichte) 
caught  in  the  snares  spread  out  by  the 
bewitching  Prakritt  evolving  the  twenty- 
four  categories  whereof  the  world  system 
is  composed  for  the  enjoyment  and  beatitude 
of  the  individual  Self.  Thus  according  to 
Kapil,  the  ultimate  realities  are  primarily 
two  in  number — Purush  and  Prakriti. 


igi 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

We  think  in  relations.  To  us  therefore  the 
Subject  and    conception   of  the   world-system   is    nothing 
^^^ '  beyond     the     conception     of    the     relation 

between  the  subjective  and  the  objective 
realities.  Purush,  Kapil  says,  is,  the  self 
or  the  spirit.  Empirically  it  is  the  Subjective 
reality  or  the  Experiencer  (nt^)  and  Prah  iti 
or  Nature  is  the  Objective  Reality  or  the 
Experienceable — (^^r).  The  whole  universe 
where  in  we  live,  move  and  have  our 
being  is  the  outcome  of  the  unfoldment  of 
this  relation  between  Purush,  the  Spirit  or 
the  Subject  and  Prakriti^^ih^  Nature  or 
the  Object. 

Some  Oriental  scholars  hold  that  this 
The  Origin  Dualistic  hypothesis  as  to  the  past  history  of 
Doctrine  Natures  which  finds  its  echo  in  the  Cartesan 
Theory  of  Dualism,  w^as  originally  formulated 
by  the  sage  Kapil  and  is  of  far  later  origin 
in  comparison  with  the  Vedas.  But  such 
is  not  the  case.  We  are  of  opinion  that  the 
doctrine  is  as  old  as  the  Vedas  themselves. 
And  the  sage  drew  inspirations  from  the 
Vedas  and  this  is  why  the  System  of  Sankhya 
Philosophy  though  indirectly  denying  the 
existence  of  God    for  want   of  evidence  has 

ig2 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY, 

been  taken  by  the  Hindus  as  one  of  their  six 
orthodox   Systems.    For  even   the   Rtpveda 

^  ^  Tracable   in 

has  in   it  amongst  others  a   hymn  wherein    the  Vedas. 
the  whole  doctrine  as  expounded   by  Kapil 
is  contained  in  a  nut-shell.     We  have  in  the 

qf^3T  fir\?ft|fill— i?//^.    V.   2-2 1- 164. 

The  hymn  means  to  say  that  the   myste- 
rious   conjunction    between     Purush     and    Praknfi  and 

4-    n    A       ^   f^    \T  f^   n 

Prakriti  invariably  results  in  the  evolution    fold  prin- 
ciples. 

of  the  seven-fold  subtler  principles-/a/z^^.y 
beginning  with  Mahattatva  i.e.  (i)  Mahat- 
tatvay  (2)  Ahankartatva  and  the  five  tan- 
m&traSy — Rupa,  Rasa^  Sab  da,  Gandha  and 
Sparsha — and  though  such  is  the  conse- 
quence of  the  conjunction,  it  is  worthy  of 
note  that  owing  to  the  utter  and  absolute  in- 
difference on  the  part  of  Purush  which  is 
above  time  and  variability  on  the  part  of 
Prakriti  denoting  in  her  the  equipoise 
of  the  gunas,  it  is  She  alone  that  conceives 
and  yields  up,  in  consequence,  the  seven-fold 
principles  begining  with  Mahat  etc.  making 
up  the  Universe  without  Purush  being  in  the 
least  affected  by  her  in  any  way.  This  is  the 
reason  why  the  word  ardhagarbhd  (  ^t^TH?  ) 

25 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

{lit :  half-descendants)  has  been  used  in  the 
text.  The  text  says  further  that  the  seven- 
fold principles  are  the  germinal  sperms  or 
seeds,  so  to  speak,  for  the  evolution  of  the 
whole  universe  and  are  contained  in  a 
portion  of  the  Omnipresent  Ueity- Vishnu 
for  which  reason  the  phrase  T?f^f!  ft^firPl! 
i.e.  in  a  portion,  we  find  in  the  text. 

Now     Purush     or     the     Psyche    being 
entirely     and     absolutely    indifferent,     very 

P s y che  ox       ^ 

Purusk.  little     has   it   left    with   us   at     the    present 

stage  of  enquiry  to  deal  with.  We  shall 
therefore  concern  ourselves  with  Prakriti 
or  Nature  for  the  present. 

PRAKRITI. 
By   Prakriti,   Kapil    wants    us  to  under- 

Prakriti  o  r  Stand  the  equipoise  state  which  the  three  cor- 
relative  powers  or  qualities  have  arrived  at. 
Any  differentiation  being  impossible  in  the 
Prakriti  which  is  no  other  than  the  gunas 
in  equilibrium,  Prakriti  is  also  technically 
termed  as  \hQ  Avyakta  (^o^IB) — the  Undiffer- 
entiated or  the  Imperceptible. 
GUNAS-THB  CONSTITUENT  OF  PRAKRITI. 
The  three  gunas,  however,  which  in 
their  equilibrium  constitute  Prakriti  or  the 

19^ 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 

Evolvent   are    (i)   Satva  {^'^)  or    Passivity, 

(ii)  Rajas  {\^^)  or    Activity,  and  (iii)  Tamas    characteri- 
sation of  the 
(ffOT)  or  Inertia.  gunas, 

(I)  Satva  is  the  passive  principle  reveal- 
ing itself  at  it  does  in  receptivity,  quickness, 
lightness,  luminousity  and  transperency  of 
things.  It  is  by  the  virtue  of  this  principle 
that  things  are  capable  of  being  worked 
upon  or  that  they  become  intelligible  or  they 
are  conducive  to  pleasure  (^^). 

(II)  Rajas  is  the  active  principle  which 
is  not  only  mobile  by  its  very  nature  but 
which  also  galvanizes  both  the  Satva  and 
Tamas  into  functional  activities  of  their  own. 
Revealing  itself  as  it  does  in  strivings  it  is 
contributive  to  pain  or  misery  (^i^lf).  \ 

(III)  Tamas  is  the  principle  of  inert- 
ness or  inertia  which  retards  motion  and 
growth.  It  is  this  principle  of  inertia  that 
not  only  deludes  us  but  obscures  as  well 
the   real  nature   of  things  or   adds  to    their 

weight  (?ftf ]^^  g^-^m?:^). 

OORRPLATIVITY  OP  THE  GUNAS. 
Now    these  gunas—Satva,    Rajas,   and 
Tamas,    are  characterised   by  their    essential 
correlativity    so     much   so     that     they    are 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM, 

(a)  Universally  Co-existent ;  (U)  Universally 
Inter-dependent,  (c)  Universally  Inter-muta- 
tive  and  lastly  {d^  Universally  Inter-anta- 
gonistic.    Thus, — 

(a)  They  are  Universally  Co-existent, 
because  the  existence  of  one  of  the  gunas 
requires  the  existence  of  the  other  two  as 
necessary  accompaniments. 

(b)  But  from  the  fact  that  they  are 
Universally  co-existent  and  concommittant 
as  they  are  equally  fundamental,  it  follows 
that  they  stand  to  one  another  in  relation 
of  mutual  inter 'dependence  so  that  none 
of  them  can  have  any  functional  activity 
of  its  own  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
other  two.     Again, 

{c)  The  gunas  being  thus  mutually 
dependent  upon  one  another,  they  are 
also  inter-mutative  so  that  just  as  heat  is 
convertible  into  electricity  so  anyone  of  the 
gunas  may  become  converted  into  one  or 
the  other  of  the  remaining  two  gunas.  And 
lastly, 

(d)  These  ^^;2^^  stand  to  one  another 
in  relation  as  well  of  Universal  inter- antagon- 
ism.    Though   these   are   always  present  as 

i()6 


777^  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 

constituent  factors  making  up  the  being 
of  a  thing  yet  they  are  not  present  in 
the  same  degree  of  intensity  and  quantity. 
These  gunas  are  always  at  war  with 
one  another  in  the  course  of  which 
one  or  the  other  gets  stronger  and  predo- 
minates over  the  other  two  in  intensity 
giving  to  a  particular  phenomenon  in 
which  the  particular  guna  predominates, 
a  certain  form,  colour  and  character  after 
its  own. 

Now  it  is  these  powers  of  5'^/e^^-Passivity, 
Rajas-KcXAwiiy  and  Tamas-lntn'vd,  reaching 
their  equilibrium  at  the  dissolution  of  the 
previous   evolution  that   constitute  Prakritt\ 

or  Evolvent — Nature. 

CATEGORIES. 

The  categories  of  the  Sankhya  system 
are  classified  mainly  into  four  groups,  viz— 

{a)  That  which  is  simply  Prdkriti  ot 
Evolvent. 

{b)  That  which  is  both  Prakriti-Vikriii 
/>.,  Evolute  as  well  as  Evolvent. 

{c)  That  which  is  simply  Vikritii.e., 
Evolute  only. 

(d)     That  which  is  Neither. 

19? 


An  epitome  of  jainism. 

Of  these  four  principal  categories,  the  first 
is  that  which  is  simply  Prakriti  or  Evolvent, 

The     reason  ' 

y,hy  PmkriH   denoting     in   itself  the    equilibrium   of  the 

IS  called   the  °  ^ 

rootless  Root  ^^;^^^-powers  or  forces.  Being  itself  not 
derived  from  anything  else  as  its  root 
(cause),  it  is  called  the  Rootless  (causeless)- 
Evolvent  (^JJ$IT  Hlff?!)  of  everything  else,  ex- 
cepting the /^^jK^^^  or  P//r/^j^  which  is  neither 
evolvent  nor  evolute.  Moreover  if  we  were 
to  look  again  for  a  separate  root  for  this 
Rootless-Evolvent  (causeless  cause)  we 
should  have,  say  the  Sdnkhyas,  regressus 
ad  infinitum  unwarranted  by  all  manner 
of  evidence.  Prakriti,  therefore,  is  the  First 
Category. 

DEVELOPBMBNT  OP  CATEGORIES. 

Now   the   state   of  equilibrium  of  several 

What  is  equ"  ^oxc^s  is  that  State  in  which  any  one  of  those 

Forces.  forces   exactly   nutralizes   the   effects   of  all 

other.     And   the  disturbance   of  the    same 

would   mean     that     state    in    which     some 

force  (or  forces)  produces  its  own  effects 
though  modified  to  some  extent  by  the 
presence  of  others. 

But  the    state  of  equilibrium  of  the  three 
^tmas,    the    Ultimate   Imperceptible    Cause, 

ig8 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY, 

Prakriti — in  which   any   one  of  the   several 
forces    Satva,  Rajas  and    Jamas,   standing 

EquUbnum 

to   one    another     in     relation    of  equality,    f  "^  Distur- 

^  '        banceof 

exactly  nutralizes  the  effects  of  the  other  s^nas. 
two  and  into  which  in  consequence  the 
whole  universe  of  diverse  names  and  forms 
dissolves  at  the  end  of  the  previous  cycle, — 
is  unstable  in  the  sense  that  when  the 
season,  for  the  fruition  of  the  seeds  of 
sown  by  way  of  Jivas  deeds  done  in 
the  previous  period  of  their  existence, 
arises,  the  equilibrium  receives  an  impact 
as  it  were  and  gets  disturbed.  By  this 
disturbance  of  the  equilibrium  of  forces, 
the  Sdnkkyas  mean  that  the  state  in  which 
some  one  force  (or  forces — Satva,  Rajas 
and  Tamas)  predominates  over  the  other  in 
intensity  and  produces  with  the  help  of  the 
others  its  own  effects  though  modified  to 
some  extent  by  the  presence  of  those  which 
help  in  the  production. 

THE  ORDER  OP  EVOLUTION, 

This  is  how  from  a  single  ultimate  and  un- 
differentiated homogeneous  Cause — Mu/d 
Prakriti  or  iht  Root-evolvent  comes  to  being 
the    Universe  with  all    its  amazing    para- 

199 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

phernalia  of  diversities  and  differences  in 
names  and  forms  according  to  the  merits  and 
demerits  of  the  y/z^^j. 

But  this  coming  to  being  of  the  Universe, 
No  absolute    this   evoUition  from  the  state  of  homogeniety 

Time.  ...  .         . 

to  heterogeneity  is  but  a  process  in  time. 
Time  has  no  absolute  existence  with  the 
Sankkyas,  It  reveals  itself  as  a  series  or 
succession  ;  and  evolution  being  but  a  process 
in  time,  it  must  have  a  c  rtain  order  of  sue 
cession.  The  successive  order  of  evolution 
as  held  by  the  Sdnkhyas  is  as  follows  : — 

From  the  Root-evolvent  Prakriti,  first 
comes  to  being  Mahat  with  which  begins 
the  set  which  is  both  evolvent  and-evolute. 
From  Mahat  (^f  cf)  appears  Akankdr  {^'^^\X) 
which  in  turn  yields  up  Manah  (?(5T')>  the 
ten  Indriyas  (^srjfJgJi),  and  the  five  tan- 
m&iras  (t^^rT^tcfl)  with  which  end  the  series 
of  the  evolvent-and-evolute  (qiffhf^irfrl). 

The  simple  evolutes  are  but  the  five 
Bkutas  (^cTT'.)  originating  from  the  five  tan 
mdtrds  or  the  elemental  rudiments. 

But  Purush,  the  Psychd  or  the  soul  is 
neither  evolvent  nor  evolute.  Being  eternal 
it  stands  outside  the  history  of  developement. 

300 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 

Admitting     in     it      no     change     which     is 

but     a     property      of    time,     it     is    above 

time,  whereas   all  developement   is    in  time. 

Itself     being     purely     absolute,    it     really 

enters  into  no  relation  either  with   Prakriti, 

the     Evolvent     or     with     its      subsequent 

variations —  Vikriti. 

Now,  of  the  above  series  of  evolvent  andj 

evolutes,  the  Mahat,    the  Akankdr  and  the    Organs- 
internal  and 

Manas  constitute  what  is  called  Antahkaran    External. 

or  the   Internal  Organ,  the  External  organs, 

Bahihkaran,  being  the  five   organs  of  sense 

(^T^f^J^l)   viz.,  the   ear,    the   skin,  the  eyes, 

the   tongue,  the  nose  plus  the  five  organs  of 

action   (^i^f%a)  viz.  speech,  hand,  feet,   and 

the  organs  of  excretion  and  of  generation. 

But  the  question  is,  what   is  Mahat — the 

first    offsprinsf     of    the     Root-evolvent    or    ,  (J)    i"^® 
^       ^  Mahat 

Prakriti  ^.v\A  first  item  as  well  of  the  Internal 
Organ  or  Antahkaran  ? 

The  word  Mahat  has  for  its  synonym 
Bucldhz-lnteWect,  Intellection  (  ^tzt^^t^  ) 
is  the  function  (^^)  of  the  Intellect.  But 
intellection  is  a  kind  of  intellectual  activity 
of  determinate  character  and  activity  being 
identical    with   what     is   active,    intellection 

201 

26 


Intellection. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

adhyavas&yay  hold  the  Sdnkhyas,  is  the  same 
with  Intellect  or  Buddhi.  T\i^  significance  of 
certitude  is  its  characteristic  indication. 
It  is  best  revealed  as  the  decisive  principle 
in  the  oughtness  of  a  particular  thought  and 
action  in  the  different  spheres  of  our  life. 

But  is  intellection  a  purely  psychical 
process  ? 

*No',  reply  the  Sdnkhyas^  *as  it  is  charac- 
terised by  the  presence  of  the  three-fold  rudi- 
mentary currents  under  particular  combina- 
tion and  condition  which  is  nothing  but  the 
is  stmpieT^'^  integration  and  intellectualisation  born  of  the 
disturbance  of  the  gunas  in  equipoise  where- 
as the  Purushy  the  Psyche  or  the  Soul  being 
neither  evolvent  nor  evolute,  is  quite  opposite 
of  them  both  i.e.  Absolutely  Simple, 

Next  the  word  Ahankdr  is  synonymous 
with  Abhimdn,  pride  or  conceit,  bearing  the 
sense  of  self-estimation  or  self-consciousness 
as  conveyed  in  such  expressions  in  our  ordi- 
nary parlance  as  'I  am  :  and  I  feel  all  these 
that  surround  me  are  mine :  1  can  use  them  as 
materials  oimy  knowledge  to  answer  my  own 
purpose.'  The  S&nkkyas  say  that  just  as  he 
who  makes  the  jar  is  called  Kumbhakdr  or 

20^ 


(II)Ahankar 


THE  SANKHYA  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Jar-maker :  so  what  generates  the  notion 
of  subjectivity,  personality  or  I-ness  (ig[^*vn^) 
is  called  Ahankdr.  Thus  it  is  a  principle 
(ffc^)  of  differentiation,  individuation  and  sub 
jectification  revealed  in  the  form  of  self- 
consciousness  and  is  intellectual  in  essence 
proceeding  as  it  does  from  intellection. 

This  Ahankdra,  when  affected  by  the 
Sattva-^c^,  evolves  the  eleven  organs  and 
when  affected  by  the  Tama  guna,  it  evolves 
the  five  Tanmdtras.  The  \S\\xdi  guna,  Rajas, 
is  manifested  in  the  activity  implied  in  this 
two-fold  creation. 

These   are   the    five   elemental    essences 

viz.,    visibility,    audibility,    the     capacity   of 

,      .  ,  I  .  (HI)  Tan- 

producmg   odour,    the  capacity  of  producing    matras. 

taste,  and  tangibility.  The  principle  which 
generates  the  notion  of  subjectivity  (ahan- 
k&ra),  also  generates  under  the  influence  of 
inertia  or  r{^\,  the  five  rudimentary  essen- 
ces or  Tanmdtrds. 

Just  as  the  Tanmdtrds  are  evolved  by 
Ahankdra  under  the  influence  of  the  qualitv    .,,  ^,     , 

^  -^      IV.  The  ele- 

of  fT^:,     SO    the    eleven   organs  are  evolved    ^^"  organs. 
by  the  same  principle  under  the    influence  of 
the  quality  of  ^coT  (Sattva).  The  eleven  organs 

203 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

include  Hif^-mind  the  central  co-ordinating 
organ  which  corresponds  to  the  'central  sense' 
or  *  common  sense'  admitted  by  Aristotle  in 
his  ''De  Anima\ 

The  five  MaMbhutas  or  gross  elements 
V.  The  five  ^^^'  ^^^^h,  water,  fire,  air  and  ether,  are  res- 
pectively produced  by  the  corresponding 
Tanm&trds  or  suitable  essences,  viz.  smell, 
taste,  form,  touch  and  sound.  The  gross 
elements  have  each  an  organ  corresponding 
to  it.  Thus,  earth,  water,  fire,  air  and  ether 
have  for  their  organs,  nose,  tongue,  eyes, 
skin  and  ear,  respectively. 

These  five  Mahdbhutas  and  the  eleven 
organs  constitute  what  the  S^nkhyas  call 
the  sixteen  vzkdraS'Varza^zons. 

The  five  gross  elements  are  the  ultimate 
outward  limits  of  cosmic  evolution  just  as 
Prakriti  is  the  ultimate  limit  in  the  opposite 
direction. 

Last  of  all,  we  mention,  Purusha,  the 
^5th  tattva  ;  we  do  so,  not  because  Purusha 
is  chronologically  the  last  which  it  is 
certainly  not,  but  because  it  is  outside 
the  cosmic  evolution  and  is  a  distinctly 
separate    principle   by   itself.     It   is,    as  the 

204 


VI.  Purusha 


THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 

Kdrikd   says,  5T  vmf^\  f  ftlff^i:  ;  i^e.  neither 

evolvent  nor  evolute.  This  Purusha  is  never    purush  is 

in    bondage   and   is  outside  time.     It  stands 

absolutely   apart    from     Prakriti     and   her 

products.     Yet   owing   to   its   proximity   to 

-ff?^^<^^z  (Intellect),  it  seems  to  think   that   it 

enjoys   and   suffers,    while    in    reality,    it   is 

above  weal  or  woe.     It  is,  always,    free   and 

its   apparent   bondage  disappears  as  soon  as 

it  becomes  cognisant  of  its  true  nature. 

THE  YOGA  PHILOSOPHY. 
The  Seshvara  S^nkhya  or,  as    it  is  more 

often    called    the    Yoga    system    is,  in  fact, 

the  Sankhya  system  itself,  only    modified    to 

satisfy    the    religfious   side   of  human  nature. 

It  develops  a  system    of  practical  discipline, 

mainly   ethical    and   psychological  by  which 

concentration  of  thought  could  be  attained. 

Kapila  had   declared   that   the  existence 

of  Ishvara    God   did    not   admit  of    proof.     Thsism  of 

Patanjah, 

Patanjali  controverts  this  assertion  and 
proceeds  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  by 
an  argument  which,  as  Maxmuller  remarks, 
reminds  one  of  the  theistic  argument  of 
Eleanther  and  Boethin.  Patanjali's  argument 
as  explained  by  Bhoja,  is   that    different  de- 

205 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

grees  of  excellences  such  as  omniscience, 
greatnesss,  smallness  etc.,  proves  the  exis- 
tence of  a  Being  possessing  the  non  plus 
ultra  of  excellence.  This  Being,  Ishvara, 
was,  with  the  yogins^  originally,  no  other 
than  One  among  many  Purushas,  only  with 
this  difference  that  Ishvara  had  never  been 
implicated  in  metempsychosis  and  was 
supreme  in  every  sense. 

Whether  this  theism  of  Patanjalis 
Pataniali  Philosophy  is  consistent  with  its  S^nkhya 
^"  ^P^*  basis  is  often  disputed.  The  simplest 
solution  seems  to  be  that  Kapila  was  never 
directly  hostile  to  theism,  but  was  rather 
indifferent  in  his  attitude  towards  the 
question  and  that  this  made  it  possible  for 
Patanjali  to  foist  his  theistic  yoga  upon 
the  S^nkhya  philosophy. 

In   the    Yoga  system,  however,  no  such 
importance    has   been   accorded   to   God  as 

Soleity  IS  the  ^ 

summum  bo-   qquM  very  Well  be  expected,  and   as  we  find 

num  oiyoga,  '  ^ 

in  such  European  systems,  otherwise 
analogous  with  the  yoga,  as  those  of 
Martineau,  Lotze  and  other  Persona! 
Idealists.  Devotion  to  God,  in  Patanjalis 
system,  is  merely  one  of  Kaivalya  or  Soleity 

206 


THE  NY  AY  A  PHILOSOPHY, 

which      is     the     highest      object     of     the 
K(?^^2;  system. 

THE  NYAYA  PHILOSOPHY. 
NyAya    has   always   been    translated    by 
*logic',  and  there  are  important  considerations 

'N  V  ^  V  s'  1  s 

which  partially  justify  such  an    interpretation    not  merely 
of  the   system.     For,    here,    in    the   Nyaya 
system,  a  greater  amount  of  space   has    been 
allowed    to   logical    questions  than  in  any  of 
the  other  systems  of  Indian  Philosophy,  and, 
the  theory  of  inference  {antimdn)  is,  undoub- 
tedly  the  predominant  feature  of  the  system. 
Nevertheless,  we  must  not  imagine   that 
Nydya  Sutras  are  mere  treatises  on    Formal 
Logic.     Logic  is  not  the  sole  nor   even   the    JpNyTya'*^^ 
chief  aim  of  Gotama's,  Philosophy.     Its  chief 
end  like  that  of  all  other  Indian    systems,    is 
the  attainment  of  liberation  or  as  the  Nyaya 
calls    it,  Nihshreyasa,  the  non  plus  ultra   of 
blessedness.  This  liberation  which  the  Nyaya 
Philosophy  promises  to  all,  is  not  a  state  of 
pure   unmixed   pleasure,     as   the    Ved^ntin 
affirms,    but  a   state   of  pleasure  which  sup- 
poses  pain   as    its    pre-condition.     In    fact, 
the   doctrine  of  a  pure  continuous  happiness 
as  the  summum  bonum   of  life,   is,    according 

2oy 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM  • 

to  the  Naiy^yika,  a  chimera  :  it  is  a  psycho- 

gical   fallacy   to   assert   that   any  such  state 

exists,  for,  pleasure   is   always   accompanied 

by  pain  and  without  pain  there  could    be   no 

pleasure. 

Liberation,  thus  according  to  the  Ny&ya, 

is   a   state   of  negative    pleasure  and  is  pro- 
Liberation      ,         ,  ,        1   |.  r  •  T-i 
of   'Ny&ya'    duced  by  deliverance  from  pain.      1  he    next 

— ^how  it  is  .  •       ir  1 

attained.  question  that  naturally  presents  itself  to  the 
Naiy^yika,  is  *  how  this  deliverance  is  to 
be  secured  ?'  Liberation,  says  the  Naiyayika, 
arises  from  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  the 
knowledge  of  the  cause  of  pain  and  of  the 
means  of  its  removal.  Liberation,  however, 
must  not  be  supposed  to  arise  immediately 
after  the  knowledge  of  the  truth  has  been 
attained,  for,  the  causes  of  pain  form  a 
series  which  can  only  be  annihilated  in  suc- 
cession, and  succession  is  a  process  in  time. 
The  series  of  the  sucessive  causes  of  pain 
is  :  (i)  false  notions  (mithya^nanani)^  giving 
rise  to  (2)  faults  {doshani)  which  lead  to 
(3)  activity  {karma)  which  again  is  the  cause 
of  birth  (ianmd)  and  birth  is  the  cause  of 
pain  (dukkhd).  Hence  in  order  to  shake 
off  pain  we  have   to   strike  at  the  very   root 

208 


THE  NY  AY  A  PHILOSOPHY, 

vizy  Mithyagnanain,  diwd  the  annihilation  of 
Mithyagnanam  will  be  followed  by  the  anni- 
hilation of  the  entire  series  of  causes. 

The    Naiyayika   proceeds   to   prove   the 

existence  of  God  by   an   argument    which  is    The  is  tic 

°  argument  of 

much  like  what  is  known  as  the  cosmoloo^i-  ^^®  Nyaya. 
cal  argument  in  the  European  Pholosophy. 
Like  the  latter,  the  Naiyayika's  proof  also 
reasons  from  the  world  as  effect  to  God  as 
its  First  Cause  :  '  fgmT%^  ^^^^  ^l^c^Ic[, 
•  The  four  niahQi,bhutas  require,  as  effects,  a 
cause. 

This,  however,  looks,  at  first  sight,    like    Effect-hood 

implies     a  n 

a  petitio    principii ;    for,    to   admit  that    a    intelligent 

^  agentto 

thing  is  an  effect,  is  to  say  that  it  has  a  effectuate. 
cause.  The  real  difficulty  lies,  it  will  be 
said,  not  in  showing  that  an  effect  must 
have  a  cause  but  in  proving  that  a  thing  is 
an  effect,  that  it  has  a  ^g  or  a  mark  pos- 
sessed by  the  Paksha  by  means  of  which, 
its  5T5^ccr  (effect-hood)  can  be  inferred.  The 
Naiydyika  finds  such  a  mark  in  ^T^g^c^  or 
the  fact  of  possessing  parts.  Thus  i9T^?j^ccC 
(being  possessed  of  parts)  leads  to  ^^c^ 
(effect-hood)  and  5r«€lc^  to  Iffh^Ts^c^  (the  fact 
of  being  effectuated  or  caused  by  an  agent). 

27 


AN  EPITOME  Of  /AINISM. 

But  the  Naiy^yika  does  not  stop  at  the 
conception  of  a  mere  cause  which  a  purely 
cosmological  argument  leads  to,  but  shows 
that  Iffh^fs^^  or  ^T^c^  (the  fact  of  being 
effectuated  or  produced)  implies,  not  only 
an    agent    but   an   intelligent  agent — '^f^^cT 


210 


CHAPTER  XV. 
CAUSATION  AND  COMPOUND  EVOLUTION 

jTiie  world  ts  the  {>ermutattoxi  ana  combination  oi 
atoms — Oauses  of  differences  —  Science  fails  to  ex|)lain — 
Tnc  ^rinci|>les  of  causation —  Criticism  of  Mills  concef)- 
tton  of  tkc  law  of  causation  —  Patient  and  Agent — The 
Jam  vie'w  of  causation  and  compound  evolution. 

Having  discussed  in  a  previous  chapter 

U  n  i  ve  r  s  e 
how   we   look   upon    the    Universe   as   self-    "eing  a  seif- 

existent 

existent  something  having  its  being  from  all  ""'*• 
eternity,  and  having  briefly  reviewed  as 
well  the  other  principal  systems  of  thought 
bearing  mainly  on  cosmology,  we  are  led 
to  enquire  into  how,  according  to  our 
philosophy,  old  things  change  giving  place 
to  newer  combinations  and  forms.  We 
have  seen  that  the  Universe  taken  as  one 
undivided  whole  must  be  in-create,  eternal, 
self-existent  and  ever-permanent.  But 
viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  its  inter- 
related parts,  it  is  transitory,  phenomenal 
and  evanascent.  And  it  goes  without 
saying  that  the  assertion  of  self-existent 
is   simply   an     indirect   denial    of    creation 

211 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

involving  as  it  does  the  idea  of  an  exis- 
God"*^  °  tence  without  beginning.  But  this  tanta- 
mounts  to  a  veritable  denial  of  an  extra- 
cosmic  personal  God  who  builds  the  cosmos 
out  of  the  chaotic  matter  which,  according  to 
the  creationists  and  other  deists,  lay  diffused 
homogeneously  filling  up  the  entire  space, 
at  the  dissolution  of  the  Universe  with  the 
end  of  the  so-called  previous  cycle  or  created 
it  out  of  Himself  or  His  own  energy  (at  a 
particular  point  of  time)  through  a  kind  of 
dialectic  process  as  taught  in  the  other 
theistic  systems  of  philosophy  such  as  the 
Yoga,  the  Ny^ya  or  the  Ved^nta. 

The    question,    therefore,    is,    if  God   is 
denied  where    are    we  to   look  for  a  rational 

If  no    God 

whence  this    solution     for   the   various     mysteries    which 

vissicitudes 

of  Nature?  underlie  the  flashes  of  lightning  dazzling 
our  vision,  or  the  thundering  cataracts 
deafning  our  ears  ?  Is  it  that  the  sprouting 
forth  of  the  small  seed  bringing  into 
existence  a  big  tree,  the  bursting  of  the 
eggshells  giving  birth  to  beautifully  moving 
bipeds  and  a  variety  of  other  awe-inspiring 
phenomenal  changes,  astonishingly  mysteri- 
ous in  character,  which  not  only  infuse  in  us 


212 


k 


CA  US  AT  ION  AND  E  VOL  UTION. 

a  feeling  of  wonder     and     admiration     but 

morally  prevail    upon  us  to  posit  and  believe, 

as  it   were,   in    an   Intelligent    Designer  and 

Maker  behind,— is  it   that  all  these  and  the 

like   changes   are /but   so   many     results  of 

chances?    Wherein   lies   the    necessity    and 

utility  of  the    philosophy  then,    if  it   denies 

God  but   cannot  reasonably   account  for  the 

amazing     occurances     in      the      world      of 

phenomena  ? 

Indeed  and  it  is  worth    while   to    remark     Universe-a 

permutation 

that  a     patient   perusual    of    the    preceding    ^.^^   ^°^j, 
pages   on    the   predicaments,  their  character    ^^<^"^s. 
and  their  devolopments  will  convince  anyone 
in    the   truth   of  the  summary   statement  we 
make   here    that   speaking   of  the  Universe 
as   a   whole    or   in    part,    it   is   but   permu- 
tations and  combinations  of  our  four  primary 
rudiments  viz,^  time,  space,  soul    and  Pudgal 
matter.     These  rudiments  are  resolvable  into 
the  minutest  of  their  minute  parts  which  give 
a   limit    to  fresh  divisions  by    not   admitting 
of  any  further  analysis. 

Now  a  study  of  the  nature  of  these 
ultimate  ingredients  reveals  to  us  that 
these — each    and    everyone — are     surcharg- 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 
ed    with    innumerable   powers     having     the 
Corrobora     P^^^^^^^^'^^X   ^^   being   developed    in  various 
sdencc/'^^"'    ways   and    of  bringing  as  well  into  existence 
such  an  infinite  variety  of  their  permutations 
and  combinations    which    will    account     for 
the    amazing     phases    and    phenomena    of 
Nature.      Even  modern  science  has    had  to 
acknowledge    the  truth    of  this.     Chemistry 
demonstrates    beyond    doubt    that   all    com- 
pound  substances  owe     their     existence  to 
the  permutations   and     combinations  of  the 
atoms    of     Hydrozen,     Oxygen,     Nitrogen, 
and    Carbon    etc. — Heat,    light,    electricity, 
hold    Physics,   are    but     different    arrange- 
ments   of    molecules-in-motion    constituting 
the     same.       Biology      teaches      that      all 
organisms — vegitable     or     animal — are  only 
composed    of  cells   under   a  variety  of  their 
combinations.    This  is  not  all.    Science  dives 
deep    to     fathom     the     amazing    mysteries 
underlying   the   differences    between    things 
chemical,    physical  or    biological  ;  and  like  a 
master-surgeon     she   dissects   and    analyses 
Nature   and   attributes   the     cause     of    the 
mutual  differences  between  things  to  the  said 
principle   of    permutation    and   combination 

21^ 


I 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

of  atoms,  molecules  or  cells  forming  the 
structure  and  character  of  the  chemical, 
physical  or  biological  evolution.  Thus 
even  according  to  the  researches  of  modern 
science,  Universe  is  nothing  more  than  an 
ever  changing  permutations  and  combina- 
tions of  the  atoms,  molecules  and  cells 
forming  the  chacter  and  composition  of  the 
same. 

But  what  are  permutations  and  combina- 
tions which  seem  to  play  the  part  of  unitary 
method  as  it  were  in  explaining  the  differ- 
ences and  diversities  in  and  through  which 
the  Universe  reveals  to  us  its  being  ? 
Permutation  and  Combination,  we  know, 
are  but  processes  of  mathematical  calcula- 
tions to  find  order  in  the  atomic  or  molecular 
arrangement  of  things  having  their  being 
in  time  and  space.  We  all  know  that  in 
the  science  of  mathematics,  the  members 
I,  2,  3,  4  etc.  or  a,  b,  c,  d,  and  the  like  are 
but  so  many  symbols,  each  giving  us  a 
definite  idea  of  something  conditioned  as 
represented  by  the  same.  And  Permutation 
is  their  arrangement  in  a  line  reference 
being  had  to  the  order  of  sequence  ;  as    for 


What  is 
P  e  r  m  u  t  a- 
tion. 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

instance,  a-b  and  b-a  are  but  two  permuta- 
tion, tions  of  a  and  b.  Similarly  Combination  is 
their  arrangement  in  groups  without  re-' 
ference  to  the  order  of  sequence ;  as  for 
example,   'a-b-c'  is   a   combination  involving 

a,  b,  and  c,  and  *b-a-c'  is  but  another  com- 
bination, both  consisting  simply  of  a,  b, 
and  c,  grouped  together.  In  Combination, 
it  is  worthy  of  note,  we  take  notice  only 
of  the    presence   or   absence   of    a    certain 

.  thing  and  pay  no  regard  to  its  place  in  order 
of  time   and   space.     There    being   but     a, 

b,  c,  d  and  so  on,  it  finds  out  only  how 
many  combinations  could  there  possibly 
arise  by  taking  at  a  time  the  two,  three,  or 
four  of  the  symbols. 

While    investigating   into   the    structure 

Application    ^j^j  composition  of  chemical  things  we   sub- 
of  the    laws  ^  ^ 

°fon"Tn^d    stitute, — H,  N,  O,  C  as    symbolic  represent- 

combination.    ^^j^^   ^f   Hydrozen,  Nitrogen,  Oxygen   and 

Carbon,  the  ultimate  rudiments  or  atoms 
of  which  are  innumerable  in  number,  in  the 
places  of  a,  b,  c,  d.  Now  experiment  shows 
that  it  is  due  to  the  innumerable  variety  of 
atomic  combinations  of  H,  N,  O  and  C.  ;  that 
we   have   differences  between    the  different 

216 


CA  USAT/ON  AND  E  VOL  UTION. 

compounds.     To   take   Carbo-hydrates    and 

fats   for   examples:    Analysis   shows    carbo-    .     ^    ^. 

^  in    finding 

hydrates  to  be  a  compound  of  C,  H,  O  ;  and    «  "  ^     ^  ^^\ 

J  ^  causesof 

if  we   analyse   fats,   we   get    the  same  three    f^^^-^g"^^" 
chemical    elements.     Therefore  the  question 
is  :  What   makes  for   the  differences  both  in 
colour,  character   and   configuration  between 
the  two  compounds,  the  component   parts   of 
a  molecule   of  carbo-hydrate  being  found  to 
consist   of   Cg    Hjg  Og  ;   and  a  molecule  of 
fat  to  consist  of  Q^^  Hgg  Og.     Then,  again, 
to   take   the   cases    of  Strychnine,    Quinine, 
and  Gluten  :  Analysis  of  these  three   shows 
them    to   be   but  combinations  of  C.H.N.O. 
And    it   is   needless    to  add   that   the  three 
compounds   are   wholly    different    from  one 
another.    Strychnine  and  quinine  are  poison- 
ous whereas  gluten  is  nutritious.    A  molecule 
of  quinine  is   a  combination  of  C^^H      N^ 
Og    whereas   a    molecule  of  strychnine  is   a 
combination  of  C^^  H^^  N^  and  O^. 

Now  from  a  reflective  study  of  the  results 

Scientific 

of  the   above  analysis  one  mia^ht  venture  to    explanation 

^  as    to    the 

remark  that  the    mutual  differences    existing-    ^,^"^^^   ^^ 

o     difference. 

either     between     carbo-hydrate    and    fat    or 
between    strychnine   and     quinine,    are  due, 

2% 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

it  is   apparent,    to   the  numerical  differences 
in  the  combination   of  the  component  atoms 

Pattison 

Muir  on  the    constituting^   the   structure  of  a   molecule  of 

point  in  ques-  ^ 

tion.  each  of  them.     But  is  the    numerical   differ- 

ences in  the  combination  adequate  to  explain 
the  causes  of  differences  in  question  ?  The 
molecule  of  Ammonium  of  Cyanate  is  com- 
posed of  two  atoms  of  Nitrogen,  one  atom 
of  Oxygen,  one  atom  of  Carbon,  and  four 
atoms  of  Hydrogen  ;  and  the  molecule  of 
Urea  is  composed  of  the  same  number  of 
the  same  atoms.  How,  then,  can  the  pro- 
perties of  the  two  molecules  be  different 
from  one  another  ?  '*  What  can  that  circum- 
stance be",  rightly  enquires  Pattison  Muir  in 
answer  to  the  above  question,  ''except  the 
arrangement  of  the  atoms  that  compose  the 
molecules  ?" 

But  the  answer  of  Pattison  Muir  oriven 
in  the  form  of  interrogation,  will  it  satisfy 
the  reflecting  mind  yearning  for  a  rational 
solution  for  the  differences  in  question  in 
things  we  everyday  find  around  us  ?  To 
say  that  the  difference  is  due  to  the  differ- 
ence in  the  arrangement  of  atoms  forming 
the   composition   of  the  two  molecules  is  to 

sr8 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 


simply   state   a   fact.     It   is   an    attempt  to    Scientific  ex- 
"  ^  ^  planation    is 

explain  X  by  Y  both  of  which  are  unknown  inadequete. 
quantities.  It  does  not  clear  up  the  mystery 
that  underlies  the  real  question  at  issue. 
The  question  is  :  Whence  is  the  difference  ? 
Every  other  condition  being  the  same,  what 
is  it  that  leads  to  the  difference  in  the  com- 
bination of  the  component  parts  forming  the  ' 
conposition  of  the  two  compounds  }  Modern 
science  is  quite  out  at  sea  here  and  her  - 
helm  of  Reason  is  lost.  She  can  explain 
how  things  happen  but  gets  hopelessly 
comfounded  and  confused  to  answer  why 
they  do  so.  And  unless  this  'Why'  is  cleared 
up,  we  cannot  expect  to  get  at  the  reason 
that  lies  behind  the  differences  in  the  world 
of  phenomena. 

The    reason  why  modern  science  cannot 

^1  .       .  .  ,.  ...       The         two 

answer  the  point  \\\   question,  lies   simply  in    pindples  of 

the  fact  that  she  takes  only  a  partial  view 
of  things  and  does  not  look  straight  to  the 
two  principles  of  Causation.  We  have  stated 
that  the  Universe  is  a  system  of  interrelated 
parts  and  the  parts,  as  such,  are  conditioned. 
But  things  conditioned,  it  is  a  truism  to 
say,  are    but  products,    effects   of  something 

2ig 


AJy  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

else  which  is  termed  as  cause.  A  cause  is 
stantiaiand  what  brings  about  an  ^^^^Z,  the  latter  being 
what  follows  from  the  cause.  Such  being 
the  definitions,  in  general,  of  the  cause  and 
the  effect,  many  a  logician  have  drawn  a 
line  of  distinction  between  the  circumstances 
'  and  the  active  agents    which    co-operate    to 

bring  about  an  effect.  One  has  been  termed  as 
the  Substantial  cause  and  the  other  as  Deter- 
mining or  Efjictent  cause  otherwise  known  as 
Patient  and  Agent   in  European  logic.     The 
reason  why  such  distinction  is  drawn  consists 
in  this.     We  see  the  potter  manufactures  the 
jar  out  of  clay  by  means  of  Danda-chakray — 
the  mill-stone-and-the-lever.     Thejaristhus 
the  product  or    effect  of  the    co-operation  of 
clay,  the  lever,  the  mill-stone,  and  the  potter 
i.e.  the   manufacturer   himself.     Such    being 
the  case,  all  these  beginning  with   clay  must 
have    to    be    taken  as  the  cause,  the  effect  of 
which  is  the  jar — the  product  or   the   output 
of  the     co-operation  ;  for     a   cause    is    the 
aggregate    of    all    such    accidents      both    in 
the    agents    and    the   patients    as    concur  in 
production  of  the    effect    propounded.     The 
manufacturer,  the  mill -stone  and  the  like  have 

220 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

all  co-operated  indeed  to  bring  about  the  jar  ; 
but  they  have  got  their  peculiar  functions  of  Nature  and 
their  own.  So  long  the  jar  is  there,  clay  t"h V°"t^w  o 
is  there  too.  The  actual  existence  of  the  plained.^  ^'^ 
jar  cannot  come  to  be  as  such  if  you  extract 
out  clay  from  it.  But  after  the  production 
of  the  jar,  if  the  manufacturer  or  the  mill- 
stone is  separated  from  the  jar,  it  is  not 
in  the  least  affected.  Again  the  function  of 
the  manufacturer  is  not  the  same  with  that 
of  the  mill-stone  or  the  lever  or  clay  even. 
It  is  clay  that  is  cast  into  the  mould 
and  moulded  into  the  form  of  the  jar,  and 
it  is  for  this  reason  that  clay  is  named  as 
ih^  substantial  cause  and  that  by  means  of 
which  the  effect  already  existing  impercep- 
tibly in  the  substantial  cause  is  brought 
about  or  developed  into  a  perceptible  form 
is  the  efficient  or  determining  cause.  That 
without  which  nothing  can  there  be,  that 
which  invariably  precedes  something  else 
which  is  but  an  effect,  is  the  true  nature 
of  the  cause.  When  we  see  that  the  jar 
cannot  come  into  existence  either  without 
the  manufacturer  or  without  the  mill-stone, 
and   the  lever,    it   follows  a  priori  therefore 

221 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

that  the  manufacturer,  the  wheel,  the  lever 
are  also  but  causes  which  combine  in  the 
production  of  the  jar. 

It  is  thus  clear  that  every  product  or 
Every  effect  ^ff^^^  requires  also  a  Determining  cause  (in 
Determinfng  addition  to  the  Substantial  one)  to  bring  the 
same  into  actual  existence.  We  have  stated 
already  that  the  primary  ingredients — each 
and  every  one  of  these — are  surcharged 
with  infinite  powers  of  their  own  having  the 
potentiality  of  being  developed  in  innumer- 
able ways  and  these  being  but  materials 
giving  constitution  and  structure  to  all 
earthly  existences  are  worked  upon  by  the 
Determining  cause  to  bring  the  same  into 
varieties  of  combinations.  And  therefore  it 
is  due  to  the  intervention  of  this  Determining 
cause  that  we  find  the  difference  in  the 
arrangements  of  atoms  constituting  the 
structure  of  the  two  molecules  of  Ammonium 
of  cyanate  and  of  Urea  and  it  is  this  that 
accounts  as  well  for  other  various  differences 
in  things  in  all  the  three  worlds,  chemical, 
physical  and  biological.  But  would  not 
the  ascription  of  Causality  to  the  substance 
which  is  worked  upon  involve    the   difficulty 

222 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION,      , 

of  making  the  Patient  to  be  the  Agent  ? 

Indeed  there  is  a  school  of  logic  predomi- 
nent  in  these  days  of  scientific  culture  which 
refuses  to  make  any  distinction  between 
the   Determining  cause   and  the  Substantial 

Mill  on   the 

cause  in    the   law  of  causation.     Even   the    Determining 

cause  and 

most   classical   of  the    English   logicians,   as    Substantial 


cause. 


Mr.  Mill,  has  taken  exception  to  this  dis- 
tinction. *'In  most  cases  of  causation,"  writes 
Mill,  ''a  distinction  is  commonly  drawn 
between  something  which  acts  and  some 
other  thing  which  is  acted  upon,  between  an 
agent  and  2.  patient.  Both  of  these,  it  would 
be  universally  allowed,  are  conditions  of  the 
phenomenon  ;  but  it  would  be  thought  absurd 
to  call  the  latter  the  cause — that  title  being 
reserved  for  the  former." 

The  distinction,  contends  Mr.  Mill  in  sup« 
port,    is   a  verbal  one  and   not  real,   because 

Arguments 
of  its   vanishing   on    examination  :  for   the    of  Mill. 

object   which    is   acted    upon  and    which    is 

considered   as   the   scene  in  which  the  effect 

takes   place   is    commonly   included   in    the 

phrase  by   which  the   effect  is   spoken  of,  so 

that   if  it   were  also   reckoned  as  a   part  of 

the  cause,    the    seeming   incongruity   would 

223 


Illustrat  i  o  n 


AN  EPITOME  OE  JAIN  ISM. 

arise  of  its  being   supposed    to    cause    itself. 
To  cite  an  instance  we   have    the    faliino    of 
bodies.     *'VVhat  is    the  cause    which    makes 
a   stone   fall  ?"     observes  Mill,    "and   if  the 
con^ntion"''    answer   had    been    'the    stone     itself     the 
expression    would    have    been    in     apparent 
contradiction    to  the    meanino^    of  the    word 
cause.     The  stone,  therefore,  is  conceived  as 
the  patient  and  the    earth    (or    according   to 
the   common  and  most  unphilosophical  prac- 
tice, an  occult  quality  of  the  earth)    is    repre- 
sented   as    the     agent   or   cause.     But    that 
there  is  nothing  fundamental  in    the   distinc- 
tion   may    be   seen  from  this  that  it  is  quite 
possible     to  conceive  the   stone    as  causing 
its  own  fall  provided  the  language  employed 
be    such  as  to  save  the  mere    verbal    incon- 
gruity.    We    might     say     that     the     stone 
moves  towards  the  earth    by    the    properties 
of  the  matter  composing    it,    and    according 
to  this  mode  of  presenting  the  phenomenon, 
the  stone    itself   might    without    impropriety 
be    called    the   agent  ;  though    to    save    the 
established     doctrine    of    the    inactivity     of 
matter,    men   usually    prefer    here     also   to 
ascribe  the  effect    to   an    occult    quality  and 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

say  that  the   cause   is    not   the   stone    itself 
but  the  weight  or  gravitation  of  the  stone/' 

"Those  who  have  contended  for  a  radical 
distinction  between  agents  and  patients  have    The  distinc- 
generally  conceived  the  agent  as  that    which    cai  fiction, 
causes  some  state  of,  or  some  change  in    the 
state   of  another   object   which   is  called  the 
patient.     But   a   little    reflection    will    show 
that   the   license,  we  assume   of  speaking  of 
phenomena  as  states   of  the  various   objects 
which  take  part  in  them  (an  artifice  of  which 
so  much   use  has  been   made  by  some  philo- 
sophers. Brown,  in  particular,  for    the   appa- 
rent explanation  of  phenomena)  is    simply    a 
sort   of  logical   fiction,    useful    sometimes  as 
one  among  several  modes  of  expression    but 
which   should    never   be   supposed  to  be  the 
enunciation  of  a  scientific  truth.     Even  those 
attributes   of  an   object    which    might  seem 
with  greatest  propriety  to  be  called  states   of 
the   object   itself,    its   sensible    qualities    its 
colour,    hardness,    shape   and  the  like  are  in 
reality   ( as    no  one    has   painted    out    more 
clearly    than    Brown  himself  )  phenomena  of 
causation  in  which  the  substance  is  distinctly 
the  agent   or   producing   cause,    the  patient 

29 


a  1  w  a  y    s 
agents. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

being   our   own    organs    and    those  of  other 
Patients  are    sentient    beings.     What    we    call     states    of 
objects,  are  always  sequences  into  which  the 
objects   enter   generally   as    antecedents    or 
causes ;  and    things    are    never    more  active 
than  in  the  production    of  those    phenomena 
in    which    they    are   said    to   be  acted  upon. 
Thus  in  the  example  of  a  stone  falling  to  the 
earth,  according  to  the  theory    of  gravitation 
the    stone    is  as  much  an  agent  as  the  earth, 
which  not  only  attracts  but  is  itself  attracted 
by  the   stone.      In    the    case    of  a   sensation 
produced    in    our    organs,    the    laws    of  our 
organism  and  even  those  of  our  minds  are  as 
directly  operative  in  determining    the    effect 
produced    as   the  laws  of  the  outward  object. 
Though  we  call  prussic  acid  the    agent    of  a 
person's    death,    the    whole    of  the  vital  and 
organic    properties    of   the     patient     are    as 
actively    instrumental    as    the    poison  in  the 
chain  of  effects  which  so    rapidly   terminates 
his    sentient    existence.     In   the    process    of 
education  we  may  call  the  teacher  the    agent 
and  the  scholar  only  the  material  acted  upon. 
Yet  in  truth  all  the  facts    which    pre-existed 
in    the   scholar's  mind  exert  either  co-opera- 

226 


not  identical. 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

ting  or  counteracting  agencies  in  relation  to 
the  teacher's  efforts.  It  is  not  light  alone 
which  is  the  agent  in  vision  but  light  coupled 
with  the  active  properties  of  the  eye  and 
brain  and  with  those  of  the  visible  object. 
The  distinction  between  agent  and  patient 
is  merely  verbal  '.patients  are  ahvays  agents!' 
Taking   stands    on    these    and     the    like 

arguments,    Hume,  Whately     and  Mill    and    ^/^^'j^^^i^" 
^  '  '  -^  of  Mill — Pa- 

many  other  scholars  of  the  same  attitude  of  ^^^ijMddri\x^ 
mind  under  European  culture  made  them- 
selves so  bold  as  to  attribute  weakness  to 
the  exponents  of  our  philosophy  in  regard 
to  our  drawing  a  sharp  line  of  distinction 
as  between  the  Determining  cause  and  the 
Substantial QdiUS^.  And  as  the  Jain  cosmology 
is  based  on  the  law  pf  causation  as  stated 
herein  before,  it  is  imperative  to  enter  into 
an  examination,  by  the  way,  of  Mill's  doctrine 
on  this  point. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  remark  at  the 
outset,  that  the  updddn  or  substantial  cause 
and  patient  of  the  European  logicians  are 
not  one  and  the  same  either  in  mean  in  or  or 
in  their  bearing.  Nowhere  in  our  works 
on    the    subject    has    it  been  taught  that  the 

22y 


KArakas'  or 
the  cases  in 
our  grammar 
and  their 
agencies. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAlNISM, 

substantial  cause  has  not  the  least  possible 
agency  in  any  form  in  the  causation  of 
things.  'Kdrak' — case,  in  our  grammar,  is 
the  general  term  signifying  agency  and  the 
nominative,  objective,  ablative  and  the  like 
are  but  specific  terms  implying  different 
forms  of  the  functional  activity  of  the  cases. 
The  nominative,  objective  and  the  like, — they 
all  act  or  operate  no  doubt ;  but  they  never 
act  of  themselves  and  in  the  same  way,  form 
and  matter.  Each  of  the  cases  has  to  act 
differently  and  in  its  own  way.  By  the 
term  'KriyS! — verb,  we  generally  understand 
the  changes  in  their  most  gross  and  visible 
form  ;  but  in  any  case,  we  should  not  lose 
sight  of  the  important  fact  that  visible 
changes  are  but  resultants  of  the  co-opera- 
tion of  all  the  cases  beginning  with  the 
chief  agent  or  the  nominative  in  bringing 
about  a  phenomenon. 

Now  though  each  of  the  various  cases 
has  its  own  agency  peculiar  to  itself ; 
the  reason  why  they  are  not  all  of  them 
attributed  with  the  principal  agency  will  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  the  agency  of  the 
chief  or  the    nominative    is  not  of  the  same 

228 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

type  and  character  as  that  of  the  other  cases. 
The  chief  assent  or    the    nominative    case   is 

The   agency 

quite  independent  of   the  functional  activities    of  theNomi- 

^  *■  native  is  not 

of  the  Other  cases  which  hold  but  a  subordi-    ?^  the  same 

type  charac- 

nate  position  in  relation  to  the  principal  ag^e^cies  *of 
agent  in  so  far  its  acting  of  its  own  accord 
is  concerned.  For,  whatever  is  powerless 
to  act  of  itself,  must  be  dependant — like  the 
ball  in  motion — on  another  for  its  activities. 
The  ball  has  the  power  to  roll  on  ;  heat 
has  the  power  to  expand  bodies  :  but  the 
ball  would  not  roll  or  of  itself,  unless  it  is  set 
in  motion  ;  nor  heat  will  expand  bodies,  unless 
the  two,  heat  and  body,  are  bought  in  close 
relationship  to  each  other.  This  is  the 
reason  why  these  are  said  to  be  dependant 
on  the  agency  of  something  else  which 
must  be  competent  enough  to  set  the  ball 
in  motion  or  to  bring  the  two  in  such  rela- 
tion as .  will  enable  the  heat  to  act  on  the 
body  so  as  to  expand  it.  But  it  may  be 
contended  that  at  times,  when  we  say. 
'The  ball  rolls'  or  'heat  expands  bodies' 
we  really  ascribe  in  our  speech  independence 
and  agency  to  them  so  much  so  that  we 
have  to  parse   the    words    *bair  or    'heat'    as 

22g 


An  epitome  of  jainism 

but     nominatives     to     the    verbs     'rolls'    or 
'expands.'     Indeed    we    do   so    in    such  and 

Where   the 

chief  agency    similar  Other  expressions    as,    'the    stone    is 

IS    super-im-  ^ 

posed  on  the    fajjina' or  the    'sword    cuts    well.'     And    the 

depe  n  d  a  n  t  ^ 

agent?  question  is,    Why  do  we    do    so?     What    is 

it  that  prevails  upon  to  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  what  we  really  know  to  be 
of  dependant  character  ?  To  all  this  we 
have  but  to  submit  in  reply  that  such  forms 
of  expressions  are  indeed  resorted  to  when 
the  principal  agent  stands  beyond  the  range 
of  our  vision  or  where  the  subordinate 
agents  are  required  to  show  as  if  they  were 
playing  the  role  of  the  principal  agent  not- 
withstanding the  actual  presence  of  the 
latter.  When  the  other  agents  stand  in 
close  proximity  with  the  principal,  it  is  then 
that  the  subordinate  character  of  their 
position  and  function  becomes  apparent. 
But  where  the  principal  stands  in  the 
background  there  the  one  or  the  other 
of  the  subordinate  agents  stands  out  as  the 
principal  in  as  much  as  these  have  their 
agencies  in  their  respective  functional  acti- 
vities and  this  explain.s  the  ascription  of 
primary    agency  to  the  ball,    heat,    or  to  the 

^30 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

sword,  in  the  above  mode  of  our  speech.      In 
the   case     of   the    expression    'the    stone    is     „ 

^  H  o  w    the 

falling  to  the  earth',  as  cited  by  Mill,   we  can    causality    of 

«^  '  s  II  b  s  t  (I  71  ce 

remark  that  here  the  principal  agency  of  .vorkedVpon 
that  by  dint  of  which  all  bodies  attract  one 
another,  whose  law  the  stone  dares  not 
disobey,  or  which  mysteriously  abiding  in 
the  stone  and  the  earth  actuates  them  as  it 
were  from  within,  not  having  been  desidera- 
ted to  stand  out,  the  stone  though  a  patient 
{Updddn,)  yet  it  puts  on  the  appearances  of 
both  the  patient  as  well  as  of  the  agent.  It 
is  but  a  recognised  rule  in  our  grammar  that 
where  we  find  a  verb  {kriyd)  change  but  no 
nominative  or  agent  as  governinqr  the  same, 
there  the  change  is  presumed  to  be  going 
on  of  itself.  And  this  is  how  we  meet  Mill's 
objection  to  the  ascription  of  causality  to  the 
patient — Updddn. 

Now  to  resume  the  thread  of  our  discus- 
sion as  to  the  causes  of  differences  in  the 
Universe  of  phenomena  around  us  with  the 
remark  that  law  of  causation  is  but  a  law 
of  change.  Every  change  stands  in  relation 
of  antecedent  and  consequent  that  is  known 
to  us   as   the    relativity  of  the   cause     and 

2JT 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

the  effect.     Of  these  two  terms   the   second 
is   the    phenomenon    of    changes,    the    first 

Theprinciple 

of  causation    beinor    what    brinpfs    about    the    change    i.e. 

so   stretched  &  o  o 

Godbeh?nd^  the  cause.  The  cause  as  we  have  dis- 
cussed above  is  divided  into  two  kinds — the 
Determining  and  the  Substantial.  We  have 
invariably  seen  that  in  every  act  of  causation 
these  two  co-operate  together  to  bring 
about  a  change,  a  phenomenon,  an  effect; 
And  it  having  been  held  that  every  change 
must  have  an  antecedent  cause,  it  seems 
naturally  to  follow  that  the  universe  itself 
being  but  an  eternal  process  of  becoming, 
mutability  being  its  very  nature,  it  must 
have  a  cause  antecedent  to  its  becoming  as 
such  ;  and  thus  in  their  zealous  attempt 
at  the  ascertainment  as  to  the  nature  of 
this  antecedent  condition  some  have  unfor- 
tunately stretched  this  principle  of  causation 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  reach  its  breaking 
point.  They  have  gone  so  far  as  to  posit 
a  God,  an  extra-cosmic  Personal  Ruler  of 
the  Universe,  creating,  regulating  and  con- 
trolling the  changes  and  affairs  of  the 
Universe  from  without  just  as  a  potter 
would  do  with  regard  to   the   manufacturing 

2^2 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

of  jars.     But   little   do   they   think   of    the 
ofrave  difficulties  that  would  arise  if  we  were    ^ ,     . 

^  T  h  ei  s  1 1  c 

to  assume   the   existence  of  an  extra-cosmic    arguments 

involve  grave 

personal  God,  not  Himself  the  Universe,  one  difficulties. 
Who  has  created  good  and  evil,  pain  and 
sufferings  for  His  creatures,  but  He  Him- 
self stands  above  and  unaffected  by  these. 
On  no  theory  of  Divine  dispensation  and 
intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the  world  from 
without,  can  evil  and  suffering  be  explained. 
The  creation  of  evil  and  suffering  except  by 
an  implied  manicheaism  which  practically 
annuls  the  Godhead  in  attempting  to  justify 
its  ways  or  excute  its  work. 

In  order  to  avoid  these  difficulties   some 
take    recourse  to  another  line    of  reasoning^    Pantheistic 

^     arguments. 

making  the  agent  and  the  patient  to  be  one 
and  the  same  and  have  made  themselves 
bold  to  declare  for  an  Ultimate  Reality  whose 
very  nature  is  existence,  knowledge  and 
bliss  infinite  ;  Whose  consciousness  is  in  its 
nature  creative  or  rather  self-expressive 
force  capable  of  infinite  variations  in  pheno- 
mena and  forms,  and  Who  is  endlessly  enjoy- 
ing the  delight  of  those  variations,  and  Who, 
therefore,  might  well  be  regarded  as  evolving 

233  t 

30 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

the  world  of  nature  including  finite  minds- 
out  of  his  own  energy,  in  sport,  as  it  were. 
Just  as  we  find  all  things  to  be  mutable  forms 
J  of  one  immutable  being,  finite  results  of  one 
infinite  force,  so  we  shall  find  that  all  ideas 
and  ideals  are  but  variable  self-expressions  of 
One  Invariable  and  All- Embracing  Delight 
of  Self-existence.  And  this  explains  the 
causes  underlying  diversities  and  differences 
between  all  things  and  beings  the  totality 
of  which  go  to  make  up  this  our  phenomenal 
Universe. 

But     this      theory     of   Cosmic       origin 
_.^^  is      confronted       with       crraver      difficulties 

Difficulties  ^ 

in  the  Pan-    y^hJch   cannot  but  stand    for    its    own    con- 

tneistic  con- 
ception, demnation.      The      whole       thing,        briefly 

speaking,  stands  thus.     The    One    Ultimate 

Reality     which     has     thrown     It-self      out 

into   name    and  form,  is  a  truine  Existence, 

Knowledge,  Bliss — Sackiddnanda.    Sachida- 

nanda,  it  may  be  reasoned,  is  God  and  Who 

„     is    not    only    a    conscious  Being  but  Who  is 

also  the  Author  of   existence    and    all  these. 

And,    therefore,   the  question    is,  How  could 

a  God    who    is    All-bliss  Himself  and   from 

whom     flow  the   dews   of  delight   as   water 

^34 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

springs  from  a  fountain,  evolve  a  world  out 
of  Himself  in  which  He  inflicts  sufferings  on 
His  creatures,  sanctions  pains  and  permits 
evil.  If  it  is  contended  that  these  are  but 
trials  and  ordeals,  we  do  not  solve  the  real 
problem  at  issue.  We  only  mince  matters 
and  thus  refuse  to  look  straight  into  things. 
How    could  a  God  who  is  all  Good  and  All-       ^^^^J.  ^"- 

congruities. 

love  Himself  has  made  room  for  what  is 
called  as  'bad'  or  'hatred'  in  the  Universe  of 
His  own  make  ^  For  One  who  keeps  pit- 
falls of  ignorance,  allows  sufferings,  sanc- 
tions pains  or  permits  rooms  for  evils  in 
the  scheme  of  His  universe  as  trials  and 
ordeals  through  which  the  so-called  poor 
Jiva  has  to  pass,  stands  Himself  convict- 
ed of  holding  thought-out  temptations,  deli- 
berate cruelty,  and  moral  insensibility;  and 
if  a  moral  being  at  all,  He  must  be  to  all 
intents  and  purposes — far  inferior  to  the 
moral  excellence  of  His  own  creatures.  Aeain, 
we  do  not  squarely  face  the  question  by  the 
statement  that  they  are  but  resultants  of  the 
Jivas  karma  for  which  reason  he  or  she 
undergoes  pain  and  suffers  misery  in  as 
much  as    there  is    the    ethical  problem    that 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

confronts  us  in  the  form — who  created  or 
why  and  when  was  evolved  that  moral  evil 
which  provokes  the  punishment  of  pain  and 
suffering  ?  One  might  well  contend  that 
Pan-entheis-    the  Self-same    Ultimate    Reality   who   is   of 

tic     concep- 
tion   of  the    the    nature    of  All- knowledge-bliss-absolute 

Vedanta. 

being  but  One  Existence  without  a  second 
to  stand  by  It ;  all  that  exists  being  but  He  ; 
it  having  been  repeatedly  declared  that 
That  Thou  Art"  and  'That  Am  I"  too- 
all  what  is  said  to  exist  as  evil  or  suffering,  it 
is  He  that  must  labour  under  the  same  in  the 
creature  who  is  no  the  other  than  He  Him- 
self. For  just  as  a  spider  spins  its  web  out  of 
itself  and  nestles  in  or  creeps  on  it,  so  it  is 
He  who  throws  Himself  out  into  the  world 
of  names  and  forms,  in  sport,  as  it  were,  and 
it  is  He  that  crawls  on  them  in  the  form  of 
a  child  ;  it  is  He  that  enjoys  the  pleasures 
»^  of  His  own  make  in  the  form  of  a  youth  and 

it  is  He  that  totters  on  the  road  leaning  on 
the  stick  in  the  form  of  the  old  and  worn  out. 
Indeed  when  thus  viewed,  the  whole  problem 
shifts  the  ground  and  there  cannot  crop  up 
the  question  as  to  how  God  came  to  create 
evil  and  suffering  for  His  creature.     But  still 

236 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

it  is  worth  while  to  enquire  as  to  how  the 
Self-same  Reah'ty  Who  is  absolute  Existence, 
Simple  without  a  second  to  stand  by  It, 
Who  is  of  the  nature  of  True  Knowledge  and 
Delight  Infinite,  comes  to  admit  in  Itself  what 
It  is  not  ?  All-delight  being  necessarily  All- 
good  and  All-love,  how  can  evil  and  hateful 
standing  in  hard  opposition  to  love  and 
goodness  and  being,  therefore,  but  a  visible 
negation  of  All-delight,  be  said  to  exist  in 
what  is  All-delight  ?  How  could  the  Absolute, 
in  short,  enter  into  the  meshes  of  Relativity 
of  subject  and  object  ? 

Thus  the  inexorable  law  of  Karma  being 
irreconciliable    with  a  Supremely  Moral    and    Law      ^ 
Personal  Deity,  the  pantheistic  origin  of  the    cod^cannot 
cosmos  being  found  to  involve  graver  ethical    ^°  °^^ 
difficulties,     the  pan-entheistic  conception   of 
the  Universe  being  concived  to  stop  short  in  ^ 

explaining  the  riddle  of  the  Absolute  entering 
into  the  meshes  of  Relativity,  we  decline 
to  agree  in  the  Divine  dispensation  and 
intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the  world,  we 
deny  the  very  existence  of  any  free  and 
all-governing  personal  God  ;  for  all 
personality    we  hold  to    be    but     a     creation 

^7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

of   ignorance    and     subject    to    the    laws   of 

Karma, 

What,    then,    is   the    cause     of    all  these 

diversities    and    differences  ?     Either    in  the 
Addission  of 

the  'Chance'    material    world,    or    in    the   ve2:itable    or  the 

— theory     is  ^ 

the  invahda-    animal — no  two  thinp^s  are  alike.  Are,  then,  the 

tion    of  ^  the  ^  '  ' 

Law      of    visible  differences  which  are  evident  between 

Causation. 

things  or  organisms — mere  chance-results 
or  fortuitious  concourse  of  lifeless  atoms  ? 
To  admit  them  as  but  results  of  chances 
is  to  invalidate  the  very  law  of  causation. 
The  doctrine  of  *the  results  of  chance'  can  no 
more  find  rooms  in  a  philosophy  which  seeks 
to  arrive  at  a  rational  explanation  for  the 
changes  we  exprience  at  every  moment  of 
our  being.  Change  is  the  soul  of  all 
activities  and  stagnation  is  but  cold  death. 
Change,  therefore,  constitutes  the  life  of  all 
that  is.  The  development  of  the  seed  into 
a  tree  or  of  an  ovum  into  an  animal  is 
but  a  series  of  changes  constituting  an 
advance  from  homogeneity  of  structure  to 
heterogeneity  of  structure.  It  is  this  series 
of  changes  gone  through  during  the  period  of 
development  and  decay  that  makes  up  the 
life  history    of   a    plant     or    an  'animal.     In 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

its  primary  stage,    says   the   Biologist,  every 
germ    consists    of  a  substance  that  is  uniform 

Whence      is 

throughout,    both    in     texture  and   chemical    ^^^     differ- 

ence  ? 

composition.  The  first  step,  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  germ,  is  the  appearance  of  a 
difference  between  the  two  parts  in  this 
substance  or  as  the  phenomenon  is  called 
in  physiological  language — 'differentiation'. 
And  the  question  is,  whence  is  the  difference 
or  this  'differentiation'  ?  In  the  primary 
stage  of  the  germ,  it  was  all  uniform  both 
in  texture  and  composition.  But  there 
appears  a  difference  in  the  same  afterwards. 
The  substantial  cause  being  the  same,  What 
is  it  that  accounts  for  the  difference  ? 
Reason  whispers  that  there  must  be  something 
working  from  within,  some  cause  behind  it. 
But  what  is  it  ?  ''No  thoughtful  person," 
to  speak  in  the  language  of  Wallace,  '*can  Wallace  at 
contemplate  without  amazement  the  pheno- 
mena presented  by  the  development  of 
animals.  We  see  the  most  diverse  forms — a 
mollusc,  a  frog,  and  a  mammal — arising  from 
apparently  identical  primitive  cells  and 
progressing  for  a  time  by  very  similar  initial 
changes    but     thereafter    each    persuing    its 

239 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

highly   complex     and     circuitous  course     of 
development     with     unerring   certainty     by 

The       prin- 

c  i  p  1  e    of   fneans  of  laws  and  forces  of  which  we  are 

Natural    Se-  -^  '  j 

not'ex  la^n"     totally    igftoram*     Here  too     the    original 
substantial   causes  in  all    the  three   instances 

are,  according  to  the  investigation  of  Wallace, 
apparently    identical  ;    but    what    is     it    that 

determines  one  to  be  a  mollusc,  another  a 
frog  and  the  third  one  to  be  a  mammal? 
The  principle  of  Natural  Selection  can't 
explain  this  amazing  phenomena  ;  nor  the 
law  of  the  Struggle  for  Existence  and  the 
Survival  of  the  Fittest,  however  ambiguously 
it  might  be  twisted,  can  account  for  it.  All 
that  these  can  do,  is  to  explain  as  to  how  the 
weakest  go  to  the  walls  ;  but  not  why  they 
should.  They  cannot  throw  any  light  as 
would  explain  the  causes  of  differences  which 
are  evident  in  the  different  spheres  of  evolution 
of  organisms.  The  theory  of  Special  Crea- 
tion, too,  cannot  account  for  the  differences, 
Nor     the 

theory  of   f^j.   ^j^^^   would     require     the  establishment 
Special  Crea-  ^ 

tion.  ^f  ^  Deity,  which  is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  im- 

possibility. Why  should  one  be  made  a  king 
surrounded  with  all  the  pleasures  the  world 
can    afford  to  supply  with  for  his  enjoyment 

2^0 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

and  another  a  slave  to  starve,  serve,  and  suffer 
under  his  tyranny  all  the   indio^nities  of    life 

^  ^  ^  Reality       is 

and    living:  which  the  humanity  will  shudder    synonymous 

°  with  activity. 

at,  to  think  of  ;  nor  the  theory  of  Evolution 
from  One  Self-same  Reality,  Who  is  of  the 
nature  of  pure  felicity,  can  touch  at  the 
root  cause  of  the  present  diversity,  which 
is  but  a  visible  nullity  of  the  pre-supposition 
of  such  an  Entity  beyond  all  duality.  Such 
being  the  position  and  situation  of  the 
above  theories  and  doctrines  involving  grave 
difficulties  as  shown  up,  let  us  turn  to  what 
our  Teachers  have  to  say  on  the  point  at 
issue.  Our  philosophy  teaches  at  the  outset 
that  whatever  is  real  is  rational.  Reality 
is  synonymous  with  activity.  And  by 
this  they  mean  persistence  in  existence. 
Wherever  we  turn,  theresoever  differences 
appear  to  our  visions.  And  these  differences 
are  not  mere  appearances.  In  every  thing, 
at  every  turn  of  life,  we  are  persistently 
conscious  of  these  differences.  These  are 
real  differences.  And  whatever  is  real 
being  rational,  it  cannot  but  irresitibly  follow 
that  there  must  be  some  reason  behind  these 
differences.     The  Jain  teachers  are   at   one 

31 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

when — they  ^  say    that   (i)   Time    (2|»t^)  (//) 
Causes  of    External    Nature   ( ^ffl^ )   {tit)     Necessity 
CO rdlngTo    (f'T^f^)  (^'^)  Activity  (W)  and  the  desire  to- 
the  Jains.        be-and-to-act  (  ^^JT )  these  five  co-operating 
constitute     the    reason    which   accounts   for 
the  diversities  in  Nature.     It   is   these   five 
that   by  co-operating,  determine  the  manner 
and    form  of  the  development    of  the   seed 
or   the    ovum    into   a   tree   or    an   animal. 
Indeed   it    may   ring    curious   to     the     un- 
accustomed    ears   who    had    not   had     the 
opportunity     to     peruse    and    ponder   over 
the   truths  of  these  philosophical  pronounce- 
ments of   the   Jain   teachers  regarding   the 
differences  and  diversities  in  nature.     But  in 
order  to  be  able  to  form  a  calm  judgment  on 
'         the  point   in  question,  it   is  imperative   that 
we     should      try   to    grasp     the     principle 
inculcated  in  these  our  present  philosophical 
pronouncements  bearing  on  the  point. 

It  has  been  said  that  summarily  speak- 
ing the  universe  is  compound  of  the  four 
primary  ingredients  viz,,  Time,  Space,  Soul 
and  Pudgal.  These  are  resolvable  into 
the  minutest  of  the  minute  parts  which  do 
not   admit   of    any   further   analysis.     Now 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

these  ultimate  rudiments    having  nothing  for 
their  material  cause  Updddn,  stand  by  them- 

^  ^  The    five 

selves  as  unresolvable   units.     And  a  patient    determining 

causes. 

study  of  these  ultimate  units  will  make  it 
clear  that  they — every  one  of  them — are 
instinct,  as  it  were,  with  infinite  power 
by  the  virtue  of  which  they  are  capable 
of  being  developed  in  innumerable  ways 
through  the  processes  of  permutation 
and  combination  of  these  four  original 
ingredients  which  form  the  true  character, 
composition  and  make  up  of  the  Universe 
revealed  in  a  diversity  of  names  and  forms. 
This  diversity  of  names  and  forms  in  and 
through  which  the  self-existent  Universe  is 
revealed  to  us  owes  its  origin  to  the  variety 
in  the  arrangement  and  combination  of  the 
ingredients  composing  the  same.  But  what 
is  it  really  due  to  ?  The  variety  in 
the  arrangement  and  combination  is  due 
to  (i)  K&l — Time,  (2)  Swabhdbd- — Nature 
i.e.  favourable  environment ;  (3)  Niyati — 
Destiny  or  Necessity,  (4)  Karma— hzixoxi 
or  motion  and  (5)  f/^aw^— Self-asser- 
tion or  Effort — the  five-fold  Determining 
Causes  (f^fft^Tf  oRl^'O)  all  acting  in  conjunction 

243 


cations. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

with   one   another  on   the  substance  ( '^i  ) 
produce    changes     and     variations   in     the 

X.  lie     CllclraC* 

rtVionc  *"^^  same,  regulate  their  manner  of  unfoldment 
and  determine  its  growth,  form  and  con- 
figuration as  well.  It  is  important,  therefore, 
to  dwell  briefly  on  the  charateristic  indica- 
tions (  ^"^^  )  of  these  five-fold  determining 
causes  by  virtue  of  which  the  self-existent 
Universe  has  been  the  permanent  theatre 
of  perpetual  changes  and  diversities — a 
strange  array  of  ever-occurring  phenomena 
that  bewilders  us  at  every  moment  and  turn 
of  our  life  and  thought. 

(i)  Time  (  ^i^  ) — to  begin  with — is 
an  aggregate  of  one  dimension  ;  of  itself 
and  from  its  very  nature,  it  flows  on 
uniformly  revealing  itself  as  it  does  in 
relation  of  sequence  and  seasons.  Suc- 
cession being  thus  the  very  property  of 
time  all  changes  are  possible  in  time  only. 

(2)  Nature  (^W^)  is  the  natural  or  Ex- 
ternal environment  of  a  thing  or  organism.  It 
consists  of  the  soil,  the  air,  the  water, the  heat 
and  the  light.  The  growth  of  a  plant  may 
be  referred  to  the  seed  which  is  the 
substantial  (  ^m^^lT  )  cause  of  the  plant  and 


(i)Time. 


(2)  Nature. 


H4 


Causation  and  evolution. 

to  the  soil,  the  air  etc.,  to  the  circulation 
of  the  sap  and  to  the  chemical  action  of  Metabolism, 
the  heat  and  light — in  short,  to  the  External 
environment  which  determine  the  growth. 
This  is  why  it  is  said  that  the  life  of  an 
organism  depends  on  the  external  Nature 
whose  function  is  to  supply  the  wants  and 
demands  of  the  living  organism  which 
happens  to  enter  into  relations,  the  con- 
tinuous adjustment  of  which  is  called  life. 
A  living  organism  is  a  seat  of  chemical 
changes  divisible  into  (i)  Anabolic  or  Cons- 
tructive processes  in  the  course  of  which 
the  so  called  non-living  matter  is  taken 
in  and  assimilated  by  the  organism  from 
without  and  into  (it)  Catabolic  or  Disinte- 
grative, destructive  processes  during  which 
living  matter  or  stored-up  substances  are 
expended.  Metabolism  ( TTT^^f$R?IT  )  is  but  a 
name  for  these  two  processes  of  construction 
and  destruction  and  forms  the  chief  feature  of 
a  living  organism.  And  the  normal  growth 
of  an  organism  means  normal  metabolism 
requiring  the  supply  of  food  quantitatively 
and  qualitatively  of  the  proper  kind,  the 
laying    up    of    the    food     within    the     body 

245 


AN  EPITOME  OF  jAINiSM. 

and  regular  chemical  transformation  of  the 
tissues  and  the  preparation  of  the  effette  pro- 
ducts which  have  to  be  given  out.  It  is  thus 
clear  that  the  External  Nature  (^T'WUlffiT) 
stands  to  supply  the  needs,  demands  and  re- 
quirements of  the  organism  for  its  proper 
nourishment  and  normal  growth.  If  she  in 
any  way  fail  no  supply  what  is  demanded  of 
her  by  the  organism,  the  latter  deteriorates 
and  becomes  weak  to  carry  on  the  struggle, 
to  cope  with  the  undesirable  forces  and 
elements,  or  to  propagate  species  and  thus 
goes  to  the  walls  in  the  long  run. 

3.  Niyati  ( f^^fff  )  means,  Fate  or 
(3)  Destiny.  Destiny.  According  to  some  school  of 
thought,  it  means  Divine  Decree  which 
must  come  to  pass  to  bear  its  command 
over  our  thoughts  and  activities.  Thus  inter- 
preted, it  takes  away  from  us  all  the  moral 
responsibility  which  lies  only  in  our  option  of 
doing  a  thing,  and  not  in  compulsion.  But 
in  Jain  philosophy,  however,  the  term  Niyati 
signifying  'Necessity'  is  described  as  the  con- 
catenation of  causes  whence  all  things  must 
necessarily  follow  as  the  four  follows  from 
two  plus  two  or  as  three  angles  of  a  triangle 

2/1.6 


CA  USA  TION  AND  E  VOLUTION. 

must  be  equal  to  two  right  angles  clearing 
away  everything  standing  in  the  way  to  offer 
it  even  the  least  possible  resistance. 

4.  A'arw^  (cji^)  means  Action  or  Deed 

done.  Revealing  itself  as  it  does  in  the  taking  (4)  Karma^ 
of  the  one  concomitantly  with  the  leaving  of 
the  other,  it  implies  a  change  of  relations  or 
relative  positions  which  is  nothing  else  than 
motion  itself  in  some  form  or  other.  The 
cause  of  motion  or  action  being  the  substance 
itself  which  by  exertion  of  power  produces 
action,  operation  or  Karma,  the  substance  or 
the  organism  itself  has  to  bear  the  con- 
sequences of  its  own  Karma  in  any  stage 
of  its  existence,  past,  present  or  future.  And 
this  explains  the  origin  of  the  common 
adage  "As  you  sow,  so  you  reap." 

5.  Udyam  ( ^^^w  ) — Exertion,  assertion 

or  effort  which  is  in  its  simplest  form    is   the 

.  .  Self-asser- 

desire  to   realise    a    particular   end   or  idea.    tion. 

Sifting     analysis     of    the     affairs     of     the 

world  of  phenomena   in   question    brings   us 

to  the  ''desire-to-be'  evident  in    the  form  of 

exertion   or  assertion  as  the  supreme  reason 

for   all    existences.     It   is   the   desire-to-be, 

to   exist   distinct   and   separate    from   what 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

it  is  not,  that  is  evidently  the  cause  of 
of  the    world   of  distinctions  and  forms.     If 

The  pleasure 

to-be  or  not    it  is  asked  what  was   the   root   cause   of  the 

to-be. 

organism  coming  into  existence,  we  must 
reply,  ''Itself,''  Who  was  the  creator  of 
the  being  ?  'Itself\  is  the  ready  answer 
we  have  to  make  in  response  to  the  question. 
'Itself  IS  its  own  object  and  itself  s\oi\q  is  its 
reason  for  existence.  And,  therefore,  it 
has  been  well  said  that  all  the  true  reasons 
and  transcendant  motives  a  man  can  assign 
for  the  way  in  which  he  acts  can  be  ren- 
dered into  the  simple  formula  "in  that 
was  my  pleasured  And  likewise  is  the 
case  with  the  wherefore  of  the  other  things 
and  beings.  The  highest  philosophy  brings 
us  no  other  reply  :  beings  and  worlds  are 
because  it  was  their  pleasure-to-be.  To-be 
or  not-to-be  is  but  a  matter  of  option  for  self- 
assertion,    or  otherwise  wherein  lies  deep  the 

primordial  root  of  all  responsibility. 

Now  Time  (  o|tt^  ),  the  External  Nature 
(^m^),  Necessity  (fiTafrf),  Action  (^^*^),  and 
Exertion  (  ^^;r  )  whose  natures  have  been 
just  discussed  in  brief,  speak  for  the  differ- 
ences and  diversities  in  the   world   of  forms 

248 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

and  phenomena.  To  illustrate  for  a  more 
thorough  grasp  of  the  pohit  at  issue  as  to 
how  these  determining  causes  and  conditions 
co-operate  in  bringing  about  the  countless 
differences  and  diversities  in  the  processes  of 
the  compound  evolution  let  us  take  the  case 
of  a  huge  tree  developing  from  its  own 
seed. 

We     have     already     stated    that    every 
thing    in   the  universe   is   surcharged     with     nys^j-ationof 
infinite   powers     of  developing     itself  after    o^f%P[;"a^^^^^ 
its  own  type.     So  also  is  the   case    with  the    '"  ^^^^  '°"* 
seed.     The  seed  of  a  particular  tree  is  also 
instinct  with  infinite  powers  of  developing 
itself  so  much  so  that  the  huge  form  of  the 
tree   together  with  its  bark,  branches,  twigs, 
leaves,  flowers   and  fruits   in  the  course  of 
time,    lie   hidden  in  a  potential  state  of  exis- 
tence  in    the  seed.     The  protoplasm   which 
ultimately   developes  into  the  seed  being  the      ' 
substantial  cause,  it  changes  and    transforms 
itself  into  the  seed   and  ultimately  into  the 
tree  by  the   help   of  such  causes,  and  condi- 
tions as   time,    nature   and   the  like — which 
determine  its  manner  and  growth  of  develop- 
ment. On    close  examination  of  the  seed  we 

32 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 


find  that  the  granular  protoplasmic  particles 
— the  contents  of  the  outer  shell,  the  cuticle, 
which  holds  together  the  granules  in  a   parti- 


The  seed  is 
the  seed 
under    parti 

cuiar  condi-    ^^^^^^  combination  is  all  through  uniform  both 


tions. 


in  texture  and  chemical  composition  without 
any  difference  and  differentiation  between 
its  parts  in  the  primary  stage  of  its  being. 
If  you  crush  the  seed  so  instinct  with  the 
potency  of  development,  it  will  not  bud  forth 
and  why  not  ?  There  are  the  component 
parts  of  the  seed — the  granules  not  an 
atom  of  which  has  been  lost  in  any  way. 
Why  would  it  not  then  develop  into  a  tree  ? 
The  answer  is  simple  enough  and  we  need 
not  travel  far  to  look  for  it.  The  seed  is 
the  seed  under  a  particular  arrangement 
and  disposition  of  its  constituent  elements 
and  as  such  it  is  the  substantial  cause  having 
the  potency  of  developing  itself  into  a  tree 
of  its  own  type,  if  only  the  determining  causes 
conjoin  with  one  another  to  help  its  growth. 
But  the  crushing  of  the  seed  interferes 
with  the  relative  disposition  and  arrange- 
ment of  its  constituent  elements  and  thus 
has  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  five-fold 
determining  causes  to  act  on  the  seed. 

250 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

So  we  see  the  seed   has    the    potency    to 

develop  itself  into    a  tree  after  its    own  type,  • 

clauses    &na 

but  it  has  to  wait  for  the  proper  time — the  fo^^ju'^i^"^ 
arrival  of  the  season  which  might  be  the  ^^P"^^"* 
rainy  one.  The  season  is  there  but  the 
seed  must  be  planted  in  the  soil  with  such 
other  natural  environment  as  would  allow 
a  reasonable  circulation  of  the  sap  and 
chemical  action  of  heat  and  light  and 
would  as  be  well  able  to  supply  the  requi- 
sitions of  the  seed. 

Again,  granted  that  the  time,  the  external 
nature,  the  necessity — all  the  three  are 
present,  the  seed,  if  not  planted  by  some 
body,  does  not  fall  on  earth  by  the  virtue 
of  Its  own  exertion  and  weight,  making 
all  the  necessary  transformations  thereby 
impossible. 

Then,  again,  though  the  season  is  there 
and  the  seed  too  has  been  planted  in  the 
desirable  soil  with  favourable  environment, 
yet  the  seed  will  not  grow  into  the  tree  of 
such  and  such  bulk  and  configuration  for 
the  manifestation  of  which  it  has  the 
potency  unless  there  be  the  concatenation 
of  the  causes  and    conditions  which   is     but 

251 


AN  EPITOME  OF  jAINtSM. 

another  name  for  'Necessity'    that   operates 

•  irresistibly. 

The  seed    fructifies,  as   is  often  observ- 

,    ed,  but  yet  it  may  not  sprout  forth  into  a  tree 
of  the    seed  '  '  ^ 

into  a  tree  of   indentical  with  the  parent   one   and  bearing^ 
itsparent  ^  ^ 

*yp^«  leaves    and    flowers   and    fruits  or  seeds  of 

the  same  size,  taste,  colour,  beauty  and 
grandeur  of  the  tree  whereof  the  seed  was 
born.  And  why  ?  Surely  these  are  the  effects 
of  karma  of  the  seed  in  one  or  the  other 
periods  or  stages  of  its  existence  and  it  is 
due  to  this  very  karma  even  done  in  some 
time  past,  that  the  seed  has  come  to  be  a 
seed  of  this  and  not  of  another  organism. 

To  enter  a  bit  more  into  details  as  to  \ 
the  causality  of  karma  in  bringing  about  the 
phenominal  diversities  and  differences,  the 
existence  of  various  kinds  of  vegetable 
organisms  all  around  us,  is  undeniable.  In 
the  organic  world,  it  is  but  a  truism  to  say 
that  the  like  produces  the  like.  The  mangoe 
seed  will  develop  into  a  mangoe  tree  and  to 
nothing  else.  So  with  the  other  kinds  of 
seeds.  Now  in  the  processes  of  metabolism 
every  living  organism  grows  and  undergoes 
through  the  adjusting  and  regulating  influ- 

252 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

ences   of    the   two-fold   nature — Inner  and 

Outer,     (  ^«ri?:^^  )  The  seed  is  the  inner    ,, 

^  '  Yet    whence 

nature    of    the    tree    where   as    the     outer    '^  J^®.  ^^f^*"* 

entiation  ? 
nature      comprises     the     soil,     the     water, 

the     heat,    the    light,    and     the    air.     The 

seed    has    the    potency     to    develop     into 

a    tree     and    it   is   only     the   outer    nature 

that     stands     as  a     help   to     the    seed     in 

the   exertion   of  its   latent    powers     for   its 

proper    development  into   a   tree ;  but  this 

outer   nature   is   almost  the  same    to  all  the 

different  trees.  The  real  difference,  therefore, 

lies   in    the   inner   natures'  of  the  different 

trees    i.  e.    in   the   seeds.      And    the     same 

old  question    comes   round    yet,     Whence  is 

this     difference  ?    If    it     is     said     in    reply 

that  the  difference    is  due    to   the    difference 

in  the    relative  disposition   of  the    particles 

constituting      the   two      seeds,      then      the 

difference    is   only     explained     by     another 

difference  which   tantamounts   to   explaining 

*X'     by     'Y'   both   of  which    are   unknown 

quantities  and  therefore  the  second  difference 

again  has  yet  to  be   inquired   into.     Science 

stops  short  here.     She  does  not  know.     The 

mystery,    though   pushed   back,  remains  un- 

253 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 
altered.     However    may    a    Lamarck   take 

Biology  mis.    ''^^^"^^^    ^^   ^"^^   principles   of  conservation 
scs  the  mark    (Heredity)  and  progression  (Adaptation)  and 
touch  upon  the  struggle  of  each   against  all  ; 
or  a  Darwin  may   twist   and   stretch   his   so 
called  principle   of  Natural  Selection  to  show 
the  Origin  of  Species  and  the  Descent  of  Man 
or  however  may  a  Spencer  write  volumes   on 
the    interpretations  of  the  Law  of  the  Survi- 
val  of    the    Fittest    through  the     processes 
of  which   the   weakest    go    to     the     walls, 
or  to   explain    the  unsurmountable    gaps     in 
the     gradations   of    the     organic     beings— r 
vegetable     or   animal    or   however   may    a 
Haeckel    knock   his    brains  out    to    find  out 
the     missing    links     in     the     ever-evolving 
chain    of  organic    evolutions  from    Monera 
to    Man,     the     present     and    the   last    ex- 
pression    of    the   organism   of    the    highest 
type.    Biology   only    misses    the    mark   and 
beats   about   the    bush    when   she  says  that 
protoplasms     are   alike    and     identical     but 
does  not  assign  any  reason    for  their   subse- 
quent  differentiations   and  variations.     And 
years   afterwards   she   will    have    to     admit 
that     there    is    no   other   alternative  course 


CAUSATION  AND  EVOLUTION, 

than  to  take  recourse  to  the  Law  of    Karma 

to  explain  the  causes  of  differentiations    and    ^^    ,.„ 

^  The  diiferen- 

differences  as  manifest  in  their   combinations    ^^^  ^^f  "°^ 

mere    freaks 


and    subsequent    variations.     The    granules    ^^^ 


of       Nature 
are  caus- 

of  protoplasm  were    registered  with    impres-    ditioned^b"y 


sions  of  the  acts  and  deeds  they  have  done 
in  their  past  lives  whereof  they  have  deve- 
loped a  kind  of  disposition  or  tendency 
towards  each  other  under  the  influences  of 
which  they  have  come  to  the  existing  forms 
of  combination  making  up  the  different 
'Inner  Natures'  in  the  different  species  of  trees 
and  other  organic  beings.  Or  what  else  is 
there  to  explain  the  diversities  of  Nature  ? 
They  can't  be  explained  as  her  mere  freaks  or 
as  fortuitous  concourse  of  what  is  invariably 
conditional  —a  fact  which  is  but  a  visible 
contradiction  and  negation  of  the  chance- 
hypothesis  ;  nor  can  they  come  out  of 
nothing,  for,  we  are  unable  on  the  one 
hand  to  conceive  nothing  becoming  some- 
thing or  on  the  other  something  nothing. 
It  being  thus  impossible  to  establish  in 
thought  a  relation  between  something  and 
nothing,  we  cannot  but  deduce  thereof  the 
indestructibility  of  matter  (pudgal)  and  conti- 

255 


Karma. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

nuity   of    motion — karma.     Other    determi- 
nant conditions  being   there,  it  is    the    conti- 
Indestructi- 
bility oipud'    nuity  of  karma   that   explains  why    the    pro- 
gal  Sind  con-  ^  i  /  r 

ti nuity  of   perties    of  a  molecule    of   urea  and    that    of 

karma,  ^ 

cyanate  of  ammonia  are  different,  though 
they  are  composed  of  the  same  number  of 
chemical  elements  and  it  is  also  this  conti- 
nuity of  karma  that  accounts  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  diverse  forms  of  a  mollusc, 
a  frog  and  a  mammal  though  arising  from 
apparently  identical  primitive  cells. 


2$6 


CHAPTER   XVI. 
GOD. 

Jarntsm  malces  no  room  for  an  extra-munaane  Goa-^ 
Lat>tace  and  Nel>oleon — TKc  idea  is  not  singular  in 
In<lia — Yet  tkc  Jains  arc  not  Jet>enJant  on  any 
All-migkty  Ruler  standing  in  tkc  witkout — Dr-  Bosc 
and  tkc  Sut>cr-t>kysical  Power- — Si>cnccr  and  St>inoaa— 
''Tcrtium  Quid"  nature  of  tkc  Power  —Tkc  Coalescence 
tkesc  f>owers  in  different  beings  on  tkc  attainment  of 
**Nirvan  '  is  tlie  idea  of  tkc  God-kead  of  tkc  Jains. 

In  the  last  chapter  on  the  compound  Evo- 
lution and  the  Law  of  Universal  Causation,  it 

has  been  made  clear  as  to  how  from  the  stand-    ^., 

No      neces- 

point  of  phenomenal  Nay  a  the  universe  is  ever    ^'^^    °^   ^" 

t  ir  y  e  X  t  r  a-mun- 

changing  and  transitory,  and  how  from  the  ^^"^ 
stand-point  of  Noumenal  ^aya  according  to 
which  the  universe  is  taken  as  one  undivided 
whole  of  inter-related  reals,  it  is  self-exis- 
tent and  permanent.  We  have  also  seen  that 
because  it  is  self-existent  and  permanent, 
/  therefore,  it  is  not  an  effect  of  some  anterior 
cause  working  from  behind  the  universe  ; 
and  further  that  the  diversities  and  differ- 
ences in  the  world  of  phenomena  and  forms 
owe   their   existences   to   the   operation     of 

257 

33 


AN  EPITOME  OF  [A  IN  ISM 

the  five-fold  determinant  causes  such  as 
Time,  External  Nature,  and  the  like. 
Such  being  the  trend  of  thought  and  pro- 
gressive retiocination,  the  Jain  philosophy 
leaves  no  room  whatsoever  for  an  iron- 
willed  capricious  God  in  the  Jain   scheme   of 

To  posit  God 

is  to  conceal    the  universe.     The  Jains  hold  that  a  correct 

tgnor  ance  '' 

unaware  of  understanding,  according  to  the  teaching  of 
Victors,  of  the  true  principles  of  causality 
and  phenomenology,  dispenses  with  the 
necessity  of  any  divine  interventiom  in  the 
affairs  of  the  world.  They  are  of  opinion 
that  the  very  attempt  to  posit  an  all-ruling 
extra-mundane  God  is  to  conceal  the  igno- 
rance of  the  true  principles  of  causality 
under  a  pomp  of  delusive  reasonings — an 
ignorance  unware  of  itself. 

Such     a     doctrine     may     indeed    strike 

Laplace  and    curious   and   atheistic   to   the    adherents   of 

Nepoleon  on       ,  .  i        i        r  n/r  i     • 

God.  the  various  huropean  schools  ot  Monotheists 

and  to  other  doctors  of  Divinity  so  as  to 
give  them  a  rude  shaking.  But  there  is 
no  help  to  it.  Truth  must  be  told.  When 
Laplace,  the  world-renowned  French  scientist 
went  to  make  a  formal  presentation  of 
his   famous  work  to   the   world-conquering 

25S 


GOD, 

Emperor  Napoleon,  the  latter  remarked,  **M. 
Laplace,  they  tell  me,  you  have  written  this 
large  book  on  the  System  of  Universe,  and 
you  have  never  mentioned  its  Creator". 
Whereupon  M.  Laplace  drew  himself  up 
and  answered  bluntly,  ''Sir  I  had  no  need  of 
any  such  hypothesis."  And  this  piece  of 
dialogue  between  the  two  greatest  minds 
of  the  Eighteenth  century,  does  not  strike 
singular  in  India,  and  the  reason  is  that 
from  the  time  when  Greece  and  Rome, 
those  cradles  of  western  civilization,  were 
still  steeped  in  profound  ignorance  ;  nay, 
from  long  before  the  pyramids  of  Egypt 
had  raised  their  hoary  heads  to  have  a 
look  down  upon  the  valleys  of  the  Nile, 
such  doctrines  which  do  not  find  any  rhyme 
or  reason  or  necessity  to  call  in  the  existence 
of  the  so-called  Diety  have  been  in  vogue 
in  India.     The  followers   of  the    Numerical 

The  Sim- 
philosophy  of  India— The  Sdrnkhya  School  ^^y^»  ^  ^  ^ 
*  *■  Mimansaka 

of  thought — not   only  do    not  postulate  any    etc.  in  God. 
such  Divine  being  but  make   a  definite  pro- 
nouncement to  the  effect  that  "God  is   not  in 
existence  ;  because  of  the  want  of  all  manner 
of  evidence."     Nor  the  Mimdnsaka  atheists 

^59 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

yield  an  inch  in  their  astute  denial  of  an 
omnipotent  extra-mudane  God.  The  Ch&r- 
vdka  materialists  openly  and  avowedly  teach 
and  preach  that  there  is  not  only  no  God 
but  there  is  no  soul  at  all  for  the  so-called 
redemption  of  which  one  should  toil  and  moil 
all  the  day  and  night  forsaking  all  pleasures 
of  life  and  thought. 

One  might  well  venture  to   remark   here 
^o«!     \^^    that   all   these  schools   beingf   more   or   less 

Jains     atne-  ^ 

iss.—  o.  atheistic,  are  the  Jains  too  atheists  of 
similar  type  ?  'No',  is  the  emphatic  answer, 
we  have  to  offer  to  the  equirers.  The  Jains 
do  believe  in  a  God  after  their  own  way  of 
thinking — a  belief  which  is  in  and  through 
saturated  with  all  the  vigour  and  strength  of 
life.  It  does  not  make  us  dependant  on  any 
Almighty  Ruler  for  our  being  and  beatitude 
here  or  hereinafter.  It  does  not  cast  us 
into  the  moulds  of  those  weaklings  who 
love  to  creep  with  a  quivering  prayer  on 
their  lips  to  the  silent  doors  of  the  Deity  ; 
nor  of  those  who  crawl,  beating  breast  at 
every  step  before  his  fictitious  feet  or  figure 
to  adore.  Rather  it  makes  us  feel  that  we 
are      independent     autonomous     individuals 

260 


i(  h 


GOD. 

who  can  curve  out  paths  for  ourselves  here 
and  herein-after  both  for  enjoyment  of 
pleasures  and  emancipation  of  our  souls  by 
our  own  will  and  exertion. 

Here-in-before  we  have  fairly  dis- 
cussed what  sort  of  God  we  do  not  believe 
in  ;  we  have  seen  there  what  it  is  not.  We 
shall  see  now  what  He  is  to  us  as  taught  by 
the  Jain  Teachers. 

According  to  the  Jain  philosophy  the 
universe  is  not  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  dead,  x  h  e  Jain 
dull  matter  (pudgal)  only  ;  for  that  would  head, 
mean  crude  materialism  which  Jainism  does 
not  allow.  The  Victors  say  that  the  series 
of  changes  as  presented  by  the  organic  and 
inorganic  worlds,  show,  as  has  been  recently 
demonstrated  by  Dr.  J.  C.  Bose,  that  in  addi- 
tion to  the  dead  dull  pudgal-m^x\.^x ,  there  is 
something  superphysical  both  in  the  living 
and  in  the  so-called  non-living.  When  this 
something  superphysical  departs  from  the 
constitution  of  the    living   and    the  so-called  ' 

non-living,  we  say  it  is  dead  by  which  we 
mean  that  it  does  not  respond.  Experiments 
have  shown  that  like  plants  and  animals, 
a  piece    of  metal  responds  in  a  like  manner, 

26t 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIJStlSM. 

if  suitably  influenced.  But  when  ''killed 
by  poison,"  like  the  plant  or  animal,  it  does 
not  respond.  European  thinkers  and  bio- 
logists have  so  far  assigned  the  presence 
'Vital  Force'    of  a   separate  'vital  force'    in  the    physical 

a  n  d       D  r. 

Bose's  super-    phenomenon     connected     with      the    living 

physical 

Power.  organism.     In  place  of  any  real  explanation, 

a  hypothetical  nomenclature  was  used  either 
to  explain  away  or  to  clothe  in  a  greater 
mystery  the  most  complex  phenomena 
that  we  ever  come  across.  From  this  posi- 
tion with  its  assumption  of  superphysi- 
cal  character  of  response,  it  is  clear  that 
on  the  discovery  by  Dr.  J.  C.  Bose,  the 
most  renowned  Bengalee  scientist  of  the 
day,  of  similar  effects  in  inorganic  subs- 
tances, the  necessity  of  theoretically  main- 
taining such  Dualism  in  Nature,  must  fall 
to  the  ground.  There  is,  therefore,  not  any 
unknown  arbitrary  vital  force  as  Physio- 
logists have  taught  us  to  suppose  but 
a  law,  the  working  of  which,  knows  no 
change,  nor  any  deviation  ;  but  which,  as 
the  Victors  hold,  acts  uniformly  from  within 
throughout  the  inorganic  and  the  organic 
worlds. 

262 


GOD, 

Now  that  (call  it  soul,  spirit,   superphysi- 
cal  something  or  by   any   other   name   you    ^^^  j^  ^^^^ 
like)    by    the   departure   of  which  the  living    ftan^tialUyj 

,  It*  r     1         1  •    1  •   •        1     materiality 

becomes   dead    is   of  the    highest     spiritual    or  mentjjity 

,  .  11       -T-1  T  ^°  ^^^   things 

essence  and  is  common  to  all.  1  he  manites-  and  beings, 
tation  of  this  divine  principle  may  differ 
in  different  living  beings  but  the  collective 
idea  derived  from  such  observations  as  of 
this  something  inherent  in  the  living  and 
in  the  so-called  non-living,  is  called  God. 
According  to  the  Jains  there  are  energies 
present  both  in  the  material  and  dynamic 
worlds.  Living  apart  the  material  or  mental 
energies,  the  spiritual  ones  as  a  whole  is  God 
giving  materiality,  mentality  and  substantiality 
to  all  things  and  beings. 

The  Ultimate  Spiritual  Power,  often 
called  by  Spencer,  as  Primal  Energy,  forming 
the  last  limit  of  the  knowables,  reveals  itself  Spn 
in  various  forms  and  with  varying  degrees 
of  perfection  in  different  grades  of  being. 
The  universe  with  all  its  bewildering  mani- 
festation, is  nothing  but  the  revelation  of  this 
Ultimate  Power  or  Energy.  This  is  by  its 
nature  a  tertium  quid  being  matter  conscious 
only  when  it  reveals  itself  through   a  senti- 

26^ 


Spencer  and 
ioza. 


^       AN  EPITOME  OF  f A  IN  ISM, 

ent  organism,  and  remains  unconscious  so 
long  its  embodiment  is  the  sentient  one. 
This  is  the  Primery  Reality  from  which  other 
realities  owe  their  existence  and  this  is  the 
sap  which  supports  every  thing  what  we  call 
real.  The  same  or  allied  thought  is 
expressed  also  by  Benedict  Spinoza  when 
he  says  that  mind  and  matter  are  but  two 
among  infinite  aspects  of  the  Ultimate  Reality 
which  can  neither  be  designated  as  material 
or  psychical  in  the  sense  of  being  conscious. 
God  is,  in  short,  the  coalescence  of  this 
spiritual  principle  emancipated  from  the 
idea^ofGod^  bondages  of  matter  in  all  its  purity,  per- 
fection, freedom  and  blessedness.  They 
do  us  wrong  when  they  say  that  we  are 
agnostics  ;  for  we  worship  this  Supreme 
Essence. — the  Ideal  of  all  of  life  and 
thought.  We  bow  down  to  this  Ideal, 
because  we  desire  to  realize  the  Ideal  in 
every  acts  of  our  life  and  thought.  We 
worship  the  Tirthankaras,  the  pure  and 
perfect  souls,  merely  for  the  sake  of  their 
purity  and  perfection  ;  but  not  for  the 
expectation  of  any  reward  in  return.  'Lives 
of  great    men    remind  us  that  we  can  make 

264 


head. 


GOD, 

our  lives  sublime.'     By   following  the   foot- 


prints  on   the   sands  of  time   of  the    Ideal    3    ^cssipa- 

t  i  on      of 
a  r  m  a 


Tirthankaras  who  were  real  heroes,  pure  and    k 

r  \  •       1  •     •  1  •         Nirvan  has 

free,  who  attamed  to  omniscience  and  quie-  to  be  reach- 
tude,  Nirvdna^  by  the  dissipation  of  their 
karma,  we  shall  be  able  to  raise  ourselves 
from  the  mires  of  the  world  and  to  attain 
to  Nirvan  by  a  like  dissipation  of  our  own 
karma  and  by  freeing  ourselves  from  the 
eighteen  blemishes  that  inevitably  lead 
ultimately  to  ominiscience,  the  next  door  to 
Nirv&nam, 


265 

34 


CHAPTER  XVII. 
SOUL. 

Souls  and  tke  God-liead — Matenaltstic  eonce^tton  of 
Soul — A  l>ye-^roduct  of  matter— Eastern  and  ^Vestern 
matertaltsm  com|>are(l—  CKarvalc  and  rielcel  ana 
GtrarJtan,  tke  socialist — Cosmological  ana  moral  aim- 
culties  involve  J  m  Materialism — Admissions  ty  Huxley. 
S|>encer  and  Oar^vm — x  ke  Jam  conee{>tion  ox  S|>irit 
and  Matter — Tkeir  Correlativity — PraJeskas-Parts  or 
Soul-units. — Conscious  emilgence  form  tke  8i>iritual 
essence  ox  tke  Soul, — Souls  constitutional  freedom — Its 
Transmigration  tkrougk  tke  grades  o£  Sansar  and 
Emancit>ation, 

While  dealing  with  our  conception  of 
Soul  and  God,  we  have  seen  that  the  individual 
soul,  when  it  becomes  free  from  all  taints 
and  blemishes,  reaches  perfection  charac- 
terised by  omniscience  and  realizes  itself 
as  a  self-conscious  spirit  of  the  nature  of 
all-delight,  distinct  and  separate  from  other 
than  itself,  it  becomes  God. 

But  what  is  this  soul  whch  is  thus  poten- 

Conceptions    ^^^"Y    divine   and  attians  to  God-head,    He 

being  no  other  than  the  coalesence  of  the  pure 

and  free    self-conscious   spirits  existing   in  a 

266 


SOUL. 

higher   unity   without   losing   the    traces    of 
their     individuality     in     the    same?     What    soul -a bye- 
is  the  naure   of    this  soul-substance  ?    Is  it  a    matter    and 

.      -         •  1        material 

spark    from    the     anvil    of  the   Blacksmith,    forces. 
a   bye-product   of    matter   of  the   Physicist, 
the  nascent  or  the  just-born  of  the  Chemists? 
The    ChdrvAka   school  of    thought  teaches 
that  there   is    no  plausible   reason   and   evi- 
dence    to    demonstrate     the      existence   of 
soul  as  something  distinct  and  separate  from 
matter  and  material  forces  ;  for  consciousness 
which    is   a    quality   of    the    soul-substance 
is   but  the   resultant  of  the     concussion    of 
the  brain-matter.     Just  as  liver   secrets    bile 
so    brain      produces     consciousness.       This 
phenomenon    of  matter  and  material  powers 
which    is     characterised     by     consciousness    « 
in     different     forms      in     the     living     and 
the       so-called      non-living,      is     soul      for 
which    reason,     we    often   take  recourse   to 
such   forms    of  expressions   as     consist    in 
saying  in   our   common   parlance    that     the 
plant   lives,  the    brute    lives   and    feels,  and        * 
the     man     lives,    feels   and   thinks.     It     is 
thus   evident    that  ^more  the   subtle   is    the 
organic    mechanism,  by   far   the    more  clear 

267 


AN  EPITOME  OF  jAlNtSM. 

IS  the  manifestation  of  the  forms  of  this 
Immortality  bye-product  of  matter  and  material  forces 
long  to  the    revealing  as  these  do  in  the    phenomenon  of 

Soul  but    to 

the      Deed    consciousness  which  is  otherwise   called   by 
done. 

the     name     of    soul     or     Atman.     Just   as 

lightning   flashes    across   the   horizon   from 

the  action  and   interaction   of  the   stored-up 

(energies  and   powers    in  the  etherial   space 

of  the   sky,     so    the    consciousness  flashes 

across  the  so-called  mental    horizon  wherein 

matter    and   material    energies    are    stored 

up      in      their     most      subtle      character. 

Such   being   the   attitude   of    mind   of    the 

followers     of    the    system     of      CkArv&ka 

philosophy      towards     the    soul,    they    say 

It   is   not     the  soul   that    is   immortal  ;  but 

the   deeds    done   by  the  mighty  minds  that 

are  imperishable  and  immortal.   In  the  moral 

as   well  as  in  physical  world,  the  great  ones 

only  immortalise   themselves   by  their   great 

achievements,  but  their  souls  die  and  cease  to 

be  with  them  at  the  death  and   dissolution  of 

the  organisms   wherein   they   appear  to  be 

encased  as  it  were. 

This  denial   by   the     Chdrvdkas  of  the 

different   entity  and  immortality  of  the  soul 

268 


SOUL, 

seems  to  receive  additional  support  from 
the  researches  in  Biology  by  some  of  the 
master-minds    of   the   west.     In     summing 

Haeckel     on 

UD   his    *  Last  Words  on   Evolution,   Earnst    the  origin  of 
^  ^  Soul. 

Haeckel  says,  **the  very  interesting  and 
important  phenomena  of  impregnation 
have  only  been  known  to  us  in  details  for 
thirty  years.  It  has  been  conclusively 
shown  after  a  number  of  detailed  investi- 
gation that  the  individual  development,  of 
the  erhbryo  from  the  stem -cell  or  fertilised 
ovum  is  controlled  by  the  same  laws  in 
all  cases.  #  *  #  #  One  import- 
ant result  of  these  modern  discoveries,  was 
the  phenomena  given  to  one  fact  that  the 
personal  soul  has  a  begining  of  existence 
and  that  we  can  determine  the  precise 
moment  in  which  this  takes  place  ;  it  is 
when  the  parent  cells,  the  ovum  and  the 
spermatazoon,  coalesce.  Hence  what  we 
call  the  soul  of  man,  or  animal,  has  not 
presisted ;  but  begins  its  career  at  the 
moment  of  impregnation.  It  is  bound  up 
with  the  chemical  constitution  of  the  plasm 
which  is  the  vehicle  of  heredity  in  the 
nucleus  of    the   maternal     ovum     and    the 

26g 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

paternal  spermatazoon.  One  cannot  see  how  a 
being  that  has  thus  a  beginning  of  existence 
Piato-?m^  ^««  afterwards  prove  to  be  immortal'^ 
mortality.  '"  C^^e  italics  are  ours  :).  Such  is  the  idea 
of  the  soul  and  its  immortality  according 
to  the  researches  of  Modern  science  in  the 
west  ;  but  there  is  nothing  new  in  it.  The 
idea  such  an  origin  and  nature  of  the 
soul  is  traceable  as  far  back  as  Plato's  time 
and  since  'to  the  pure,  all  things  are  pure',  it 
will  not  be  labour  lost  to  inform  our  readers, 
by  the  way,  that  the  most  famous  lines,' 
"All  things  by  a  law  divine 
In  one  another's  being  mingle" 
in  Shelley's  'Love  Philosophy'  contain  an 
unmistakable  reference  to  the  passage  of 
Platoe's  Symposium  which  Shelley  himself 
translates  as  follows  (see  Shelley's  Prose 
Works,  Ed.  R.  H.  Shepherd,  Vo,  II,  p.  95)  : 
— "The  intercourse  of  the  male  and  the 
female  in  generation,  a  divine  work,  through 
pregnancy  and  production,  it  were  some- 
thing immortal  in  mortality''  Similar 
ideas  occur  also,  it  would  be  interesting 
to  note,  in  the  concluding  portions  of  the 
' BrihadAranyaka  Upanishat  of  the  Hindus. 

270 


SOUL, 

But  to  return  to  the  Materialistic  hypo- 
thesis of  the  modern  scientists  and  bio- 
loe^ists  of  the    west,  we  can  well  say  without    Chirvika 

^  *  ^  a  n  d         M. 

the  slightest   fear   of  contradiction  that    it    is    EmiicGirar- 
^  di  a  n    t  h  e 

but    the    revised    echoe    of    the     Ck&rvdka    ^'"^pch    So- 
cialist. 

School  of  Indian  Thought.  So  much  so  that 
even  the  very  spirit  of  the  moral  doctrine 
which  the  followers  of  that  ancient  sage 
Ch&rv&ka  or  Brihaspati  openly  and  avow- 
edly teached  and  preached  for  the  regula- 
tion of  the  activities  of  man  so  far  his 
moral  nature  is  concerned,  persists  in  the 
notable  declarations  which  M.  Emile  de 
Girardian  laid  down  not  merely  as  his  own 
creed  but  as  that  of  the  vast  majority  of  his 
socialistic  countryman.  Girardian's  pointed 
aphorisms  are  ; — 

(/)  That  the  world  exists  for  itself  and 
of  itself  solely, 

(it)  That  the  man  has  no  original  sin 
to  ransom. 

(Jii)  That  he  bears  about  him  memory 
and  reason  as  flame  bears  in  it  heat  and 
light. 

(iv)  That  he  lives  again  in  the  flesh 
only  in  the  child  that  he  begets. 

2yi 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(z/)  That  he  survives  intellectually  only 
in  the  idea  or  the  deed  by  which  he  immor- 
talises himself. 

iyi)  That  he  has  no  ground  for  expect- 
ing to  receive  in  future  life  a  recompense  or 
punishment  for  his  present  conduct. 

{yii)  That  moral  good  and  evil  does  not 
exist  substantially,  absolutely,  inconsistently 
by  themselves  ;  that  they  exist  only  nomi- 
nally, relatively  and  arbitrarily, 

{;viii)  That  in  fact  there  only  exists 
risks  against  which  man  obeying  the  law  of 
self-preservation  within  him,  seeks  to  insure 
himself  by  the  means  at  his  command. 

Such  has  been  in   the   main  the  conse- 
quential development  of  moral  ideas   of  the 
Man    does 

not  live  for   out  and  out  Materialistic  philosophers  of  the 
bread  alone. 

past  as  well  of  the  present  age.  And 
constituted  as  we  are,  it  sends,  as  it  were, 
a  thrill  of  shudder  to  think  of  these  ideas 
and  ideals  of  the  most  grovelling  nature 
curiously  chalked  out  to  pave  the  way  for 
the  satisfaction  of  the  most  lower  instincts 
and  brutal  propensities  of  our  life  and  living. 
Man  does  not  live  for  bread  alone,  not  for 
mere  animal  living  ;  nor  for  the  satisfaction  of 


culties — man 
has  a  soul  to 
save. 


SOUL. 

the  lower  instincts  and  propagation  of  species. 
Man     has    a  moral    nature    and    possesses 
a  soul   to   save   and   a   conscience    as   well 
by   the  virtue   of  which  he  is  enabled  often- 
times to  subdue,  nay  sacrifice  himself  for  the    Moral   diffi 
progress  of  thought,  culture  and    humanity. 
If  lives  were  but  bubbles  that  break  at  every 
breeze,  why  should    we    not   make  the  best 
use    of  the  short    span    of  life,  we    have    at 
our   disposal    by  drawing   our  sharp   knives 
from  your  ear  to  ear   for  the    satisfaction  of 
our    own     interests     and     instincts.     What 
bar  is  there   against   our   doing  this  ?     But, 
as   we   often   see,  they   do  not  do  it  always 
and     invariably.     They      organize      society 
and    live   in    it    for   the   common   weal   and 
progress.     Not  only   they   are   often   found 
to  subdue  their  own    personal   or  communal 
interests  ;  but  they  sacrifice  themselves  at  the 
sacred  alter  of  humanity  for  progress  and  per- 
fection.    And  these   and   the  like  ideas  and 
ideals  are  not  compatible  with  the  gladiatorial 
theory   of  life  and  living  as  measured  by  the 
standard   of    crude   materialistic    hypothesis 
either  of  the  Chdrvdka  school  or  of  Darwinian 
thought  and  culture. 

273 

35 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

Besides    the    above     moral     difficulties, 
there  are  lots  of  other    psychological    diffi- 

Psychologi 

cai    difficul-    culties  of  the  pravest    character    involved  in 

ties.  ^ 

the  very  philosophy  of  materialism  whereon 
these  de-humanising  moral  codes  are  based. 
To  cite  only  a  few  of  them  here,  it  is  admitted 
on  all  hands  that  all  phenomena  of  matter 
and  material  energies  are  modes  of  motion. 
But  consciousness  in  and  through  which  soul 
reveals  itself  is  not  a  mode  of  motion,  and 
hence  consciousness  cannot  be  a  bye-product 
of  matter  and  material  forces.  Again,  the 
presence  of  consciousness  does  indeed  make  a 
great  difference  to  the  working  of  the 
organism.  It  is  mind  that  controls  the 
organism  ^  a?»d  life-work  could  not  be  the 
same  if  conscionsness  were  to  cease  to  be  in 
it.  The  monumental  works  of  a  genius 
are  produced  by  a  hyperphysical  power^ 
infinitely  superior  to,  and  higher  than  the 
forces  accruing  from  the  rushings  to  and 
fro   and  ^collisions  and  frictions  of  the   cells^ 


ganglions.gard  molecules  or  other   matter, 
contained  in  the  human  skull. 

These  and  similar  numberless  difficulties 
are    involved    in     the    Materialistic  concep- 

274 


SOUL, 

tion  as  to  the  origin  of  conscionsness  for 
which  reason  Huxley  aptly  remarks  in  his 
•Physical  Basis  of  Life,'  **I  individually  am  no    Admissions 

•'  by     Huxley, 

materealist  ;  but  on  the  other  hand  I  believe    Spencer  and 

'  Darwin. 

materialism  to  involve  grave  philosophical 
errors."  "Anti-materialistic",  writes  Spencer 
in  his  Essays,  "my  own  view  is  "^  *  ^ 
I  agree  entirely  with  Mr.  Martineau  in 
repudiating  the  materialistic  interpretation 
as  utterly  futile."  Darwin  enquires,  "Is  there 
a  fact  or  a  shadow  of  fact  supporting  the 
belief  that  these  elements  acted  on  only 
by  known  forces  could  produce  living  exis- 
tence ?  At  present  it  is  to  us  absolutely 
inconceivable." 

Such  and  similar  other  passages  might 
be  gleaned  in  numbers  from  the  pages  of 
the  works  of  other  scientific  minds  of  position 
and  authority  to  show  that  materialism  fails 
to  dive  deep  into  the  metaphysics  of  things 
and  fathom  the  underlying  mysteries,  unless 
it  admits  of  the  existence  of  a  super-physical 
principle  by  the  virtue  of  which  the  atoms 
and  molecules  combine  and  work,  ac- 
cording to  the  inviolable  law  of  karma,  so  as 
to  present  to  us  the  bewildering  phenomenal 

215 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM. 

activities  of  nature.     And  this  superphysical 
position   be"    Principle   is    our   soul-substance.     But   such 

tween    spirit  ,     .     .    "  r       i  11 

and  matter,  an  admission  01  the  soul-substance  as 
distinct  and  apart  from  dead  dull  pudgal 
involves  dualism  of  spirit  and  matter 
— Jiva  (  ^^  )  and  Ajiva  (  ^^^  ).  Indeed, 
it  does  involve,  for  spirit  is  as  self-existent 
«^  reality  as  matter  itself  is.  But  the  Jains 
say  there  is  no  hard  opposition  between 
them  as  would  render  them  incapable  of 
being  united  in  such  manner  as  we  find 
in  the  case  of  milk  and  water.  For  the 
attributes  of  matter  are  not  absolutely  con- 
tradictory to  the  attributes  of  the  soul. 
Matter  is  only  matter  in  relation  to  what 
is  not  matter  i.  e.,  spirit  and  so  is  the  «ase 
with  the  spirit  itself,  and  thus  there  being  an 
organic  unity  between  the  two,  they  stand  to 
each  other  in  relation  of  object  and  subject 
in  as  much  as  if  there  were  any  absolute  dis- 
tinction between  them,  a  distinction  which  by 
its  very  nature  would  be  self-contradictory, 
it  would  cut  off  all  connection  between  the 
things  it  distinguished.  It  would  annihilate 
the  relation  implied  in  the  distinction  itself. 
An  absolute  difference,  teach  the  Victors,    is 

276 


SOUL. 

something  which  cannot  exist  within  the 
intelligible  world  and  the  thought  which 
attempts  to  fix  such  a  difference  is  uncons- 
cious of  its  own  meaning.  Thus  there  is  no  squK 
reason  why  these  two  would  not  enter  into 
relation  with  each  other.  ''  Body  and  soul  '\ 
to  talk  in  the  language  of  Young,  '*are 
like  the  peevish  man  and  wife,  united  jars, 
yet  loath  to  part."  Then,  again,  we  often 
find  ourselves  placed  in  so  very  uncongienial 
circumstances  that  do  not  suit  our  constitution 
at  all,  and  from  which,  in  consequence,  we 
necessarily  try  to  extricate  ourselves.  The 
sooner  we  do  it,  the  better  for  us.  So  is  the 
case  with  the  soul.  However  mysteriously 
and  inconveniently  it  might  have  got  into  the 
granules  of  plasms  yet  the  fact  is  that  it  is 
there.  We  may  not  see  it  with  our  eyes 
or  feel  it  with  the  other  senses.  But  what 
of  that  }  Consituted  as  we  are,  do  we  see 
force  .'*  All  that  we  know  of,  is  motion  in 
and  through  which  both  matter  and  force 
reveal  themselves  to  us.  So  mysteriotisly 
subtle  is  this  soul-substance  in  essence,  so 
abstrusely  abstract  is  the  idea  we  can  have 
thereof  that  it  has  been  taught  as  belonging 

277 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

to   the  regions   of    the   un-extended   which 

and  s'eif"  ons   accounts   for   the   plurality  of  its   existence. 

cionsness.         r^\  .  c     .      i      ,  .1 

1  he   conception    ot    puagal-mdiX.\.Qr   is    that 

it  has  weight  and  fills  up  space  ;  but  the 
essence  of  the  soul  is  conceived  in  self- 
consciousness  absolutely  devoid  of  any  tinge 
of  materiality  whatsoever.  The  soul  being 
as  such  it  is  according  to  our  philosophy  a 
self-existent  ultimate  reality  without  beginning 
and  end.  Bereft  of  all  colour,  taste,  smell  and 
touch,  it  is  metaphysically  formless  though 
it  takes  on  the  form  of  that  wherein  it 
happens  to  dwell  by  virtue  of  its  own  Karma. 
Like  the  vacuous  space  it  has  innumerable 
pradeskas.  By  Pradeshas  are  meant  the 
minutest  parts,  the  soul-units,  which  do  not 
admit  of  futher  psychological  analysis.  These 
indivisible  parts  of  the  soul  or  soul-units 
which  are  infinite  in  number  are  all  alike  in 
essence  for  which  reason  the  soul  is  said 
to  be  characterised  by  unity  with  a  difference. 
They  are  essentially  of  the  nature  of  consci- 
ous Effulgence  which  seems  to  have  been 
put  out,  as  it  were,  by  the  super-imposition  of 
the  Karma  mdXitr  on  the  various  parts  of 
the  soul,  just  as   a  mirror   becomes   clouded 

.78 


SOUL, 

with    dusts  falling  on   it    and   appears   non- 

reflecting     in      consequence.       This     soul- 
Souls      and 
substauce    of    the    Jains,    is    not     a    single    Sansar. 

all  pervading  reality  without  a  second  of 
its  kind  to  stand  by  it.  There  is  an  infinity 
of  these  souls.  And  though  true  it  is  that  an 
infinite  number  of  these  has  become  free  from 
the  turmoils  of  the  world  ;  yet  there  remains 
an  infinite  number  struggling  for  freedom  ; 
for,  if  infinity  is  taken  from  infinity  the 
remainder  is  infinity  itself.  It  is  these 
souls  in  plasms  that  lie  scattered  in  every 
nook  and  corner  of  the  universe  and  each 
is  the  doer  of  good  or  bad  deeds  to  reap 
the  consequences  of  which  each  takes  to  the 
repetition  of  births  and  deaths  according 
to  the  merits  of  its  own  karma  and  thus 
traverses  through  the  various  grades  of 
SamsAr,  Heaven,  Hell  or  pargatory  or  ulti- 
mately releases  itself  from  the  fetters  of 
bondage  by  the  dissipation  of  its  own  karma 
whereupon  it  becomes  pure  and  perfect  and 
fixed/as  it  were/inlthe  regions  oiJAloke. 

Thus  we  see  as  a  reality,  the  soul  has 
no  beginning  nor  end  ;  but  viewed  with  the 
light  of  its  own  states  or  grades  of  existence, 

279 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

it  has  a  beginning  and  an  end,  and  herein 
Emancipati-  "^^  ^^  reason  why  the  soul  is  stated 
tainmeru  ^of   ^^  be  both  with  and  without  form,     So  long 

Nirvdnarn     ,  j  j  i      i  i       i 

Shdntam.  It  has  to  go  round  and  round  through  the 
repetition  of  births  and  deaths  it  has  a  form. 
But  viewed  with  the  light  of  bliss  and 
beatitude  which  it  attains  to  by  being 
freed  from  karma,  it  has  no  form.  For,  if  on 
the  one  hand,  the  soul  is  to  have  a  form  by 
the  virtue  of  its  own,  then  it  cannot  but  be 
dull  insentient  vcL2XX.^X'pudgal  devoid  of  all 
consciousness  and  intelligence  ( ^\^  "^t^i 
or  ^?^r{ )  ;  on  the  other  hand,  if  it  be  abso- 
lutely formless  then  by  the  virtue  of  its  being 
free  from  all  activities  too  (fcRm-TlffflTcf), 
bondage  and  freedom  would  become  incom- 
patible with  its  own  nature  and  Sansdr  too 
would  be  impossible  and  there  would,  there- 
fore, be  no  necessity  for  teachers  to  impart 
instructions  on  the  real  nature  of  the  soul  nor 
for  sciptures  enjoining  duties  which  are 
required  to  be  performed  for  the  attainment 
of  Nirvdnam  Shdntam, 


2S0 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 
THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY. 

Gonstttuttonal  Freedom  anJ  Divtnxty  oi  tkc  Soul — 
'Karma  and  Soul  —  How  could  Soul  get  enfettered  \n 
the  Ckatns  of  *Karma' — Different  Tkeortes  as  to  tkc 
Relation  between  Soul  and  *Karma  — Law  of  'Karma' 
and  Ke-Dirtk — Tke  Basts  of  tke  Jam  Etkics  — Hercdtty 
cannot  explain  differences  between  Organisms — Heredity 
and   *  Karma  . 

In    the   last   chapter   we   have   dwelt  on 
soul  ox  jiva  as  an  eternal  self  existent  reality. 

Constitution- 

We  have  seen  also  that  soul  is  the  cogitative    ai    Freedom 

of  the  Soul. 

substance  in  the  living  world  and  that  it 
has  ever  been  trying  to  break  off  its  adaman- 
tine chains  of  karma  which  binds  it  down 
to  the  mires  of  the  world.  From  the  fact 
that  it  has  been  incessantly  struggling  to  free 
itself  from  the  shackels  of  karma^  that  it  has 
been  ever  striving  to  attain  to  Divinity 
by  becoming  pure  and  perfect  through  the 
dissipation  of  its  own  karmay  we  understand 
it  to  be  constitutionally  free  and  potentially 
divine.  And  here  it  may  be  question,  why 
what  is  constitutionally  free  and    potentially 

36 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

pure  and    divine    came    to  be    chained  down 
to    the  mires  of  the  world.     Soul  being  but  a 

Some     diffi- 
culties-How   self-existent    reality  from    all    eternity    must 
the  absolute 

became  Re-  be  existing  from  periods  prior  to  jivas 
karma.  How  then  what  is  of  subsequent 
growth  can  affect  the  soul  which  is  consti- 
tutionally free,  pure  and  formless  ? 

To  this  the  Jain  Teachers  say  that  such  a 
question  as  the  present  one  cannot   even   be 
raised.     Karma  is  a  phenomenon   in   time  ; 
but  soul  stands  far  above  time  and  causation, 
and  until  we  can  logically  formulate  the  ques- 
tion, we  cannot  reasonably  look  for  an  answer 
to  the   same.     When    clearly  put,    it   stands 
thus,-  How,  what  is  above  time  and  causation 
came  down  into  the  meshes  of  relativity  of  the 
cause  and  effect  ?  How  what  is  uncaused  and 
increat  came  to   be  caused  and  created  as  it 
were  .■*  How  what  is  truly  pure  and  free  became 
impure  and  fettered  ?  How  what  is  essentially 
divine  forsook  its  very  nature  ?    Constituted 
as  we  are,  we  cannot    answer    this    question. 
We    think   and  we  think  in  relations.     So  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  think   of  what   stands 
above   all  relations  or  causes  and  conditions. 
Is  it  not  absurd   to  enquire   as   to   how   the 

282 


How      do 


THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY, 

Absolute  became  Relative  or  how  the  Un- 
caused came  to  be  caused  as  it  were  ?  This 
is  why  the  Jain  Philosophy  vehemently 
objects  to  the  raising  of  such  purile  questions. 
But  yet  the  fact  is  there  and  we  cannot 
deny  it.  The  soul  lies  there  fettered  in  the 
plasms  s\3i6\^QX   to   causes  and  conditions,  to    Soul     and 

Karma 

the   law   of  karma   by    the  virtue  of  which    s  t  a  n  d  t  o 

'  each  other 

it  is  forced,  as  it  were,  to  travel  through  the 
various  grades /)f  Sansdr.  And  how  are  we 
to  account  for  this  ?  If  karma  be  posterior 
to  soul  which  is  pure  and  perfect  and  which, 
in  consequence,  has  nothing  to  do  or  perform, 
how  would  it  come  to  perform  karma  ? 
Hence  karma  cannot  be  taken  as  posterior  to 
soul.  Nor  can  we  take  karma  as  something 
anterior  to  soul  ;  for  in  that  case  it  would 
come  to  be  interpreted  as  the  product  of 
karma  ;  but  the  characteristic  indications  of 
the  soul  as  taught  in  our  philosophy  show 
nothing  as  such.  It  is  not  a  compound  of  any 
ingredients  standing  for  the  substantial 
cause  of  the  soul  which  is  self-existent, 
and,  as  we  have  seen,  has  no  begining  nor 
end  so  far  it  is  concerned  as  a  metaphysi- 
cal entity.     Then,  again,  the  soul    is  formless 

2S3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

and  there  is  no  functional  activity  of  the  agent 
in    the    manufacturinsf   of  what   is   formless. 

There  is  no 

room     for    Therefore     karma     cannot    be  anterior    to 

G  o  d — t  h  e 

Creator.  g^^]    ^hjch    is   but   a    simple   and    formless 

cogitative  substance.  If  it  is  contended  as 
a  third  alternative  position  that  both 
the  soul  and  karma  came  into  existence 
at  one  and  the  same  time,  then  it  would  lead 
to  the  difficulty  of  explaining  which  would 
lead  whom  ? — there  being  ♦no  subject  in 
relation  to  an  object.  And  such  being  the 
position  the  soul  cannot  suffer  under  the 
consequences  of  karma  which  being  co- 
eternal  with  the  soul  has,  like  the  latter 
also,  nothing  to  stand  for  its  substantial 
cause.  We  cannot  hold  that  their  Creator 
stands  for  the  substantial  cause  as  well 
as  for  the  determinant  cause  to  bring  about 
the  existence  of  soul  and  karma  ;  for  it 
would  involve  the  difficulty  of  explaining 
as  to  where  was  God,  the  Creator,  when 
these  were  not.  If  it  is  remarked  that 
there  was  neither  merit  nor  demerit  in  the 
begining  of  things,  save  and  except  the  soul 
which  is  of  the  nature  of  existence,  conscious- 
ness  and    bliss,    it  becomes  difficult  again  to 

284 


THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY, 

explain  the  various  diversities  in  the 
phenomenal  world — the  causes  being  absent 
thereof. 

All  these  positions  being  thus  untenable, 
the  Jains  hold  that   both  the  soul  and  karma    s  o  u  i    and 

K  a   r  m  a 

stand    to   each   other  in    relations  of  pheno-    stand    to 

each      other 

menal  conjunction,  the    continuity  of    which    J"     relation 

of  beginning 

is   without    beginning:  in    the   sense    of  un-    lessconjunc- 
^  ^  tion. 

broken  series  or  su(;cession  in  time  {anAdi 
apasckdnupurvi  somyog  apravdhasamvandka). 
And  such  is  the  ocean  of  sansdr  whereon 
tumultuous  waves  variously  swelling  in 
names  and  forms  come  one  after  the  other 
and  break  off  dashing  against  weight  of  the 
adamantine  chain  of  the  phenomenal  law  of 
karma  causation.  Sansdr  is  thus  subject 
to  the  laws  of  causes  and  conditions,  to  the 
laws  of  karma  and  omnipresent  is  the  effect 
thereof  in  the  phenomenal  universe.  It  is 
mete  here  to  note  that  suffering  is  not  limited 
to  the  human  world  only,  but  spreads 
over  all  the  abodes  of  existence  ;  such, 
as  Hell  {narak),  the  World  of  the  goblins 
(Pretaloke),  Life  among  the  brute- class 
{Tiryakayont]y  the  World  of  demons  (Asura- 
/oka)   and  the    World   of  Gods   (Devalokd). 

28s 


AN  EPITOME  OFJAINISM, 

It   is    karma — the  abiding  consequences    of 

our    own     actions — which     subject     us     to 
Key-stone  -^ 

edifice  of\he  ^^^^'^^  round  the  wheel  of  births  and  deaths 
Jain  Ethics,  through  all  these  stages  of  existence.  Our 
present  state  of  being  is  not  an  allotment  of 
a  power  working  upon  us  from  without,  but 
rather  is  the  cousequence  of  our  own 
deeds  done  in  the  past,  either  in  the  present 
or  in  our  previous  live^  or  stages  of  exis- 
tence. Whatever  happens  is  the  effect  of 
some  anterior  causes  and  conditions  and 
whatever  one  reaps,  is  nothing  but  the 
harvest  of  what  one  had  previously  sown. 
This  is  the  key-stone  supporting  the 
grand  edifice  our  ethics  which  declares 
the  dignity  and  equality  of  all  souls  in  any 
form  of  their  existences  and  teaches  as  well 
that  every  soul  stands  erect  and  independent 
of  the  so-called  inscrutable  will  and  power 
of  any  superior  Being  to  whose  silent  doors 
we  need  not  creep  for  the  gratification  of  our 
desires  and  ambitions,  nor  need  we  crawl 
weeping  and  moaning  with  a  view  of  purging 
our  souls  of  sins  and  iniquities  of  our  own 
make  by  His  grace.  The  Jain  ethics  based 
as  it     is    on     this   automatic  law   of  karma 

286 


THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY, 

phenomenology,  teaches  that  we  are  the 
makers  and  moulders  of  our  own  fate,  and 
infuses  life,  strength  and  vigour  by  awaking    A'^r/^a-what 

it  is  and  what 

in   us   our   high   sense  of  moral  obligation    it  means, 
and   responsibility — the  fountain-head  of  all 
virtuous  deeds. 

Now  what  is  this  A^r;;^^  on  the  pheno- 
menology of  which  the  whole  of  the  Jain 
ethics  is  based?  Etymologically  it  means 
action  or  deed.  But  as  m  philosophical 
terminology,  it  signifies  not  only — action 
but  the  crystalised  effect  as  well  of  Ae  action^ 
in  so  far-^it  modifies  the  futurity  of  the  doer 
^Esa  beyond  death^^d  moulding  his  career 
to  a  great  extent  in  the  subsequent  states 
of  his  existence.  A  close  examination,  for 
instance,  of  the  appearance  of  man,  of  the 
anthropoid  ape  and  of  the  bat,  from  almost 
identical  embryos,  will  make  it  clear  as  to 
what  we  mean  and  understand  by  the 
operation  of  the  Law  of  Karma  in  its  most 
general  signification. 

The  embryos  of  the  above  named  organ- 
isms are  identical  in  structure  and  compo- 
sition. Hence  the  embryo  of  the  bat  ought 
to   develop   into   a   man.     But   it    does  not 

287 


•o  o»»t^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

happen.  And  why  ?  Because  of  the  differ- 
ence of  'heredity,'  ^%  iliry  ^n^j^,  which  is  the 
conservative  principle  accounting  for  the 
comparative  persistency  of  the  type  of  the 
organism.  But  the  validity  of  this  principle 
of  transmission  into  the  offsprings,  is  stftl 
open  to  question. 

Why  is  it  that  the  children  of  the  same 
parent  show  marked  dissimilarities  to  their 
parents  and  to  one  another }  Why  do  ^ 
twins  develop  dissimilar  characters  and 
possess  irreconciliable  tastes  and  tendencies, 
though  coming  almost  at  the  same  time,  from 
the  same  stalk  and  nurtured  and  brought  up 
with  the  same  care  and  affection  under  similar 
conditions  and  environments  ?  These  cannot 
be  explained  away  as  accidents.  There 
is  nothing  as  such  in  science.  Nothing  in 
the  universe  of  phenomena  and  form  is 
exempt  from  the  inexonerable  law  of  ^^ 
cause  and  effect.  There  must  be  some 
reason,  therefore,  underlying  these  inequa- 
lities. And  what  is  that  reason  ?  To  say 
that  these  inequalities  in  children  are 
due  to  the  parents  is  to  admit  the  truth 
and   validity    of  the    principles    of  heredity 

288 


THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY. 

and  adaptation  to  tiie-  environment  as 
working  out  these  differencees  in  the  spheres 
of  organic     evolution.     But    such    eminent 

Dr.       Weis- 

biologists   as    Dr.  August    Weisman   and  a    man     and 


good  many  others  of  equal  authority  and 
repute  deny  that  hereditary  tendencies  of 
the  parents  predominate  in  one  ;  of  the 
grand-father  in  another  ;  those  of  the  grand- 
mother in  the  third  and  the  like.  Not  this 
alone.  Weisman  goes  further  and  reasons  out 
that  the  acquired  tendencies  are  never  trans 
mitted  to  the  offsprings.  He  believes  in  the 
'continuity  of  germ-plasvi  and  is  of  opinion 
that  the  inequalities  are  caused  by  the 
differences  in  ' germ- cells  .  '^I  have  called 
this  substance  ^erm'plasm\  says  Weisman, 
"and  have  assumed  that  it  possesses  a  highly 
complex  structure,  conferring  upon  it  the 
power  of  developing  into  a  complex  organ- 
ism" Heredity — Vol.  I.  p.  170).  Dr.  Weis- 
man states  further  :  "there  is  therefore  conti- 
nuity of  the  germ-plasm  from  one 
generation  to  another.  One  might  represent 
the  germ-plasm  by  the  metaphor  of  a  long 
creeping  root- stock  from  which  plants  arise 
at   intervals,    these    latter    representing   the 

289 

37 


Heredity. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

individuals  of  successive  generations.  Hence 

it  follows  that   the    transmission    of  acquired 

Hereditary      characters   is    an     impossibility,    for   if  the 

t  r  a  n  s  m  i  s  - 

sion   impos-    aerm-plasm     is    not    formed   anew  in   each 

sible.  ^  ^ 

individual,  but  is  derived  from  what  preceded 
it,  its  structure,  and  above  all,  its  molecular 
constitution  can  not  depend  upon  the 
individual  in  which  it  happens  to  occur,  but 
such  an  individual  only  forms,  as  it  were,  the 
nutritive  soil  at  the  expense  of  which  the 
germ-plasm  grows,  while  the  latter  possess- 
ed its  characteristic  structure  from  the 
beginning,  viz.,  before  the  commencement  of 
growth.  But  the  tendencies  of  heredity,  of 
which  the  germ  plasm  is  the  bearer,  depend 
upon  this  very  molecular  structure  and  hence 
only  those  characters  can  be  transmitted 
through  successive  generations  which  have 
been  previously  inherited,  vtz.,  those  charac- 
'  ters  which  were  potentially  contained  in   the 

structure  of  the  germ-plasm.  It  also  follows 
that  those  other  characters  which  have  been 
acquired  by  the  influence  of  special,  external 
conditions  during  the  life-time  of  the  parent, 
cannot  be  transmitted  at  all."  (vol.  I.  p.  273-) 
"But  at  all  events,"  sums  up    Dr.  Wiesman, 

290 


THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY. 

**we  have  gained  this  much  that  the  only 
fact  which  appears  to  directly  prove  a  trans- 
mission of  acquired  characters,  has  been 
refuted  and  that  the  only  firm  foundation  on 
which  this  hypothesis  had  been  hitherto 
based,  has  been  destroyed."— (Vol.  I.  p.  461). 
So  we  see  how  the  theory  of  heredity  and 
adaptation,    in   short,    the  theory  of  Natural 

In     s  u  ffi  - 

Selection    throupfh  the    cosmic    processes   of   ciency      o  f 

^  ^  Natural 

which  Charles  Darwin  and  a  host  of  others  Selection. 
of  his  line  of  thinking  attempted  to  show 
the  origin  of  species,  fails  to  explain  the 
real  causes  and  conditions  for  the  specific 
differentiations  in  the  spheres  of  organic 
evolution. 

The  real  causes  and  conditions  deter- 
ming  the  origin  of  rf^e  different  types  of 
organisms  are  to  be  found  o&t  in  the  principle 
of  metempsychoses.  And  if  the  remarks 
of  Dr.  Weisman  are  read  between  the 
lines,  it  will  be  quite  apparent  that  the  Dr. 
stands  on  the  very  threshold  of  a  revela- 
tion. He  is  knocking  at  the  gate  and  it 
will  open  to  give  him  an  entrance  into  the 
mysteries  of  Transmigration,  "the  undivorce- 
able  spouse    of  Karma'  ;  for,    according   to 

2()I 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

the  Doctor's     hyppothesis,      the   characters 
of    each    of   the    children     referred     to    in 

Difficulty  in- 
volved    i  n    the   above   by    way   of  concrete  illustration, 
Weisman's 

theory.  ^re    not    the     results   of    hereditary   trans- 

mission   but  are   a   manifestation   of  **those 

characters  which  were   potentially  contained 
in   the   structure   of  the  germ-plasm."     A»d 

The,  question,  therefore  naturally  crops  up  in 

our  minds,  where  did  the  potential  characters 

and  tendencies  of  the  germ-plasm   originate 

from  ?     He   says,  "from  the  common  stock." 

But  what  and  where  ^that   common  stock,  we 

are   to   look   for?     Dr.  Weisman   does    not 

inform  us  aiiythiag  on  the  point,  nor  does  he 

solve  the  real  problem  at  issue. 

Besides  ,  the   physiological    principle     of 

hereditary  transmission  involves  grave  moral 

difficulties.     It   means   the    iniquities  of  the 

fathers  visited     upon     the     children.     One 

commits   the   wrong   but   another     receives 

the   punishment  !     Can   absurdity    go     any 

further  ?     The  reason    why  the   embryo   of 

the   bat  cannot  develop  into  a  man,  eonsists 

m  this^that ^^human    organism,    according   to 

the    Jain     philosophy,     is  the  product    of  a 

different   set    of  causes   and    conditions  ;  or 

2g2 


THE  KARMA  PHENOMENOLOGY, 

to  put  the  idea  with  all  the  Orientality  we 
can  command,  because  the  karma  of  the 
human  beina  is  different.    Karma,  here,  does    Km  man  ac- 

^  counts     also 

not    mean   'heredity'  through  the  principle  of   [^  chan'^es"" 
which  the  offsprings   are   alleged    to   inherit 
the   qualities   of  the  fathers.     In  Jain   philo- 
sophy, it  signifies  what   the  soul  carries  with 
itself  from  an  anterior  stage  of  its    being    by 
virtue    of  its  prior  deeds    and    desires.     The 
idea   is    that    every  thought  we  think,  every 
act  we   do,   tells  upon  our  souls  and  thereby 
leaves   an  impression  upon  them,  as  it  were, 
which    continues    to    exercise    influence     on 
them  in  their  subsequent  careers.  A»dAcor- 
dingly  our  present  happiness  or  misery  is  not 
the    award    of  any    power    existing    outside 
ourselves   but   is  rather  the    consequent   of 
what  we    ourselves    had    done    in    the   past^ 
either    in    this    life    or    in  an    anterior  birth. 
None  is  exempt  from  the  operation  of  karma 
— Nor  Krishna,  nor  Buddha,  nor  Christ  Jesus. 
This   doctrine  of  karma  thus  unquestionably 
furnishes     the     key  to  the   interpretation    of 
the    phenomenal      greatness     in    humanity.  ' 

Christ    Jesus    of  Nazereth  was  a  Christ    by 
the   virtue    of  his  own    karma.     So  .angels 

293 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAlNISM 

become  angels  or  they  loose  their  angel- 
hood by  the  force  of  their  own  karma. 
"The  experience  gained  in  one  life",  to  quote 
the  language  of  Hartmann,  the  great  Ger- 
man philosopher,  "may  not  be  remembered 
in  their  detail  in  the  next,  but  the  impres- 
sions which  they  produce  will  remain. 
Again  and  again  man  passes  through  the 
wheel  of  transformation,  and  changing  his 
lower  energies  into  higher  ones  until  matter 
attracts  him  no  longer  and  he  becomes — 
what  he  is   destined  io  be — A  GOD." 


294 


CHAPTER  XIX. 
CHURCHIANITY  AND  THE  LAW  OF  KARMA. 

GKristtan  Crttictsm  of  *Karma* — Emt>ty  Heart  of 
Jatntsm — Examtnatton  of  tke  Crittctsm— Inconsxstcnctes 
and  Dtf^culttes  of  tkc  Ckristtan  Theology — God  and 
Satan — Good  and  Evil. — Indian  Widows  CKmsttan 
unmarried  Girls. 

From  what  has  been  discussed  in  the 
preceeding  pages  so  far  the  inexorable  Law 
of   Karma-cdMSd\\t,y    is     concerned,     it     is    Man  is  the 

maker  of  his 

perfectly  clear  that  man    is   the  maker  of  his    Destiny. 
own  Destiny.     This   is   the    main   principle 
whereon     the    grand   edifice   of    the     Jain 
ethics  is   securely   based.      But   this    belief 
in   the   ethical   autonomy   of    man    making 
him   thoroughly    free   and    independent    of 
the   iron  will  of  any    Being  outside   himself 
cannot  but  irritate  Christian  minds. 

**Ihsteadofa  God  delighting  in  mercy, 
who  rules  and  judges  the  fair  world  that 
He  has  made,"  writes  Mrs.  Sinclare 
Stevenson  in  her  latest  contribution,  The 
Heart  of  Jainsm,'  *'the  Jain  have  set  in 
this   place   a  hedious  thing    the  accumulated 

295 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISIVL 
energy   of  his   past   actions,  Karma,    which 

Mrs.  Sinclair 

on  the  Law    can    no  morc  be  afrectea  by  love  or  prayer 

of      Kar7na 

and  Rebirth  than  a  run-away  locomotive.  On  and  on 
it  goes  remorsely  dealing  out  mutilation 
and  sufferiug,  till  the  energy  it  has 
amassed  is  at  last  exhausted  and  a  merciful 
silence  follows.  The  belief  in  Karma 
and  transmigration  kills  all  sympathy  and 
human  kindness  for  sufferers,  since  any 
pain  a  man  endures  is  only  the  wages  he 
has  earned  in  a  previous  birth.  It  is  this 
belief  that  is  responsible  among  other  things 
for  the  suffering  of  the  thousands  of  child- 
widows  in  India  who  are  taught  they  are 
now  reaping  the  fruit  of  their  own  unchastity 
in  a  former  life." 

So  writes  Mrs.  Sinclare  in  exposing 
the  so-called  'Empty  Heart  of  Jainism'  and  in 
vindication  of  her  Christian  creed.  But  alas  ! 
she  can  not  explain  the  world  of  inequalities 
and  diversities  from  the  stand-point  bf  her 
own  Christian  Theology.  If  an  All-mercy 
Personal  God  created  this  universe  out  of 
nothing,  could  He  not  make  all  things  good 
and  beautiful  and  all  beings  happy  ?  Why 
one  is  a  born  saint  and  another  a  murderer  } 

2g6 


CHURCHIANITY:  LA  W  OF  KARMA. 

Why  one  waddles  in  wealth  and  opulence 
and  another  starves  to  death  ?  If  God  created 
one  to  enjoy  the  pleasures  of  life  which  the 
world  can  afford  to  supply  with  and  another 
to  labour  life-long  under  the  stiffling, 
tyrrany  of  his  master,  how  could  he  be  an 
embodiment  of  All-love  and  All-mercy  ? 
Need  she  be  told  in  the  language  of 
the  poet  that  **A  God  All-mercy  is  a  God 
Unjust." 

Christianity  teaches  that  man  has  but  one 
life  on  earth  to  live  either  for  an  eternal  exis-    ,, 

Mercy  made 

tence  in  Heaven  or  to  be  condemned  into  ^°^  Sinners. 
Hell  according  to  the  merits  or  demerits  of 
his  deeds.  But  this  naturally  encourages 
a  man  to  make  the  most  of  his  opportuni- 
ties here.  Besides  an  appeal  for  mercy  at 
the  hands  of  an  Omnipotent  God  best  suits 
him  who  has  consciously  failed  in  the  dis- 
charge of  duties.  But  the  great  disadvantage 
of  such  form  of  faith  is  that  it  makes  some 
violently  reckless  so  much  so  that  when 
the  poet  Henri  Hein  was  asked  if  he 
believed  in  Divine  Grace,  he  replied, 
**God  will  forgive  me,  for  that  is  his 
profession". 

297 

38 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

This  dramatical  piece  incident  reminds 
us  of  the  famous  lines  of  another  poet  who 
sang  in  the  following  srain, — 

*'He  who  does  not  sin,  cannct  hope  for  mercy  ; 

Mercy  was  made  for  sinners;   be  not   sad." 

But  with  the  Jains   such   conceptions    do 

not   count   for   anything-.     If  the    Supreme 
The    pit-fall  .  .        , 

of   Original    Being    delighting    in    mercy    is   the    Prime 
Sin. 

Author  of  all  that  is,  He  should  have  shown 
mercy  and  perfect  forbearance,  from  the  very 
beginning  to  man, — His  own  handi-work,  in- 
stead of  allowing  him  to  fall  into  the  pit-fall 
of  Original  Sin.  Man  is  not  ommiscient,  and 
according  to  the  Christian  theology,  nor  a 
perfect  being  as  well,  and  as  such  he 
must  have  his  shortcomings  and  failures  ; 
but  as  he  was  living  under  the  protec- 
ting and  paternal  care  of  his  All-mercy 
Maker,  could  he  not  naturally  expect  that 
if  he  were  to  commit  any  mistake  in 
his  movements,  his  Omniscient  Father  and 
Guardian  who  must  have  fore  seen  things 
long  before  he  himself  could  realise,  should 
protect  his  son,  showing  thereby,  His 
perfection  of  forbearance  and  mercy  to  his 
creature  which  he  is  to  delight  in  .'*  We  have 

^9^ 


CHURCHIANITY:  LA  W  OF  KARMA.       ' 

^ready  remarked  that  we  the  Jains  cannot 
persuade  ourselves  to  believe  in  a  God  in 
the  sense  of  an  extra-mundane  Creator  who 
caused  the  down-fall  of  mankind  but  after- 
wards taking  pity  on  them  dropped  down 
from  Heaven  his  only  Son  through  whose 
crucifixion  mankind  was  saved. 

Some  Christian  Divines  hold,  however, 
that  the  pit-fall  of  Original  Sin  which  caused 
the  down  fall  of  the  entire  human  race  was  gatan  work- 
but  dug  out  by  the  Devil.  They  teach  that  '"^^°^^^  "• 
God  created  all  that  is  good  and  beautiful  and 
it  was  Satan  who  brought  in  the  Evil  and 
spoiled  man — the  handi-work  of  God.  But 
little  do  these  Divines  think  that  good  and  evil 
are  but  relative  terms.  Good  can  not  be 
without  evil  and  vice  versa  evil  without 
good.  There  is  a  soul  of  goodness  in 
things  evil  and  conversely  there  is  a  soul 
of  evil  in  things  good.  And  when  God 
created  what  is  good  he  must,  at  the  same 
time,  have  created  the  evil  too.  Similarly, 
when  the  Satan  created  the  evil,  he  too 
must  have  created,  at  the  same  time,  what 
is  good.  Now  to'  veiw  things  as  they 
stand,  we  cannot  but  logically  infer  that  God 

299 


AJ\^  EPITOME  OF  JAtNISM, 

and  Devil  worked  together  to  create 
this  universe  of  ours  which  is  therefore 
but  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil.  And 
to  push  the  question  still  further, 
both  of  them  being  equally  powerful  and 
limited  by  each  other,  it  follows  that  neither 
of  them  was  omnipotent,  omnipresent  and 
omniscient.  Does  Mrs.  Sinclair  wish  us 
to  set  up  within  the  shrines  of  our  tender 
hearts  such  a  God  the  very  conception  of 
which  is  logically  absurd. 

Turning  to  the  effects  of  karma  on  social 
matters  it  is   true,  indeed,    that     here     the 

The  widows  ,        .  1111  r         \ 

of  India  vs.   earth     IS     soaked    by     the    tears     of      the 

the  unmarri-       ,.,,.,  ,  .11       n/r  r^.      1    • 

cd    girls  of   child-Widows,      but       Will     Mrs.       Sinclair 

Europe. 

inform  her  readers  as  to  why  the  Christian 
world  echoes  with  the  sighs  of  the 
unmarried  ?  Here  the  Indian  widows  had 
had  a  chance  for  the  husbands  to  love  and 
to  loose  in  this  life  as  these  were  written 
in  the  their  own  Karma  and  there  is  every 
reason  to  hope  that  they  would  receive  their 
beloved  back  more  cordially  in  their 
warm  embraces  during  the  subsequent  turn 
and  term  of  their  natural  life  quite  in  accor- 
dance with  their  own  Karma.  But  what  hope 

300 


CHURCHIANITY:  LAW  OF  KARMA. 

can  Christianity,   believins:  as    it   does  in  a    ^^^t   hope 

^  can      Chris- 

sinc^Ie  term  of  life   on   earth,  hold  out  to  the    *'^"'^y  ^°^^ 

°  out  ? 

thousands  of  unfortunate  girls  who  never  get 
any  husband  to  love,  while  the  favoured  few 
who  have  once  been  married  still  have  many 
a  chance  to  grant  favours  to  other  men  who 
may  win  the  woman's  heart  and  marry  them 
again  ?  Are  there  any  reasons  to  assign  for 
the  poor  unfortunate  girls'  never  getting  any 
husbands  to  love  at  all  ?  And  did  not  the 
poet  sing — 

**It  is  better  to  have  loved  and  lost 
Than  never  to   have  loved  at  all." 

Besides  if  the  fear  of  Hell  or  the  hope 
of  Heaven  be  a  powerful  incentive  to  good 
conduct  in  this  life,  the  prospect  of  countless 
births  and  deaths,  during  the  courses 
of  which  there  are  numerous  chances  for 
amendments  of  conduct  and  which  repetition 
of  births  and  deaths  can  only  end  with 
the  attainment  of  emancipation  from  the 
thraldom  of  servitude  must  be  far  more  so. 
With  its  firm  conviction  in  the  inexora- 
bility of  the  law  of  A'^r/w^-causality,  Jainism 
regards  every  successive  life  as  the  moulder 
of  the  next   untill  through    the   entire    and 

301 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

absolute  exhaustion  of  the  individual's 
Karma,  liberation  is  surely  and  inevitably 
attained,  sooner  or  later. 

In  fine  Mrs.  Sinclair  would  do  well  to  bear 
in  mind  that  the  law  of  Karma  which  in  the 
Physical  world  speaks  of  the  continuity  of 
motion  and  indestructibility  of  matter  teaches 
in  the  domain  of  Ethics,  the  immortality 
of  deeds  and  the  inevitability  of  the  moral 
responsibility  in  the  case  of  an  individual, 
family,  or  nation. 


30^ 


CHAPTER    XV. 
BELIEF  IN  RE-BIRTH. 

*  Karma'  and  RettrtKs,  Com|>limentary  aspects  of  one 
ana  tnc  Same  Law  Governing  tne  Universe — Buaatstic 
Nikiltsm  -  all  wttKout  an  Ego — Belief  in  tkc  Law 
Lrings  in  Solace  ana  Comfort  in  ones  failures — iViae 
range  of  tke  telief  in  Asia  and  £\iro|>e — Poets  Scientists 
and*  Pkilosot>Kers — Transmigration  kas  its  root  m 
reality — Karma  Sarir. 

While     investigating     into     the    causes 
and    conditions    for     the    differences     and 


Karma    and 


tors. 


diversities  in  the  world  of  names  and  forms,  ?o?ent^*fLc^ 
we  have  seen  that  we  cannot  explain  the 
differences  unless  we  accept  the  Law  of 
Karma  and  of  Rebirth  as  determining  them. 
Karma  and  Re- birth  which  are  thus,  potent 
factors  in  the  evolution  of  the  world  of 
particulars  constituting  Sansdr  are  but  two 
complimentary  aspects  of  one  and  the  same 
Law  governing  everything  having  its  being 
as  a  part,  as  it  were,  of  this  ocean  of  Sansdr. 
Boundless  is  the  ocean  of  Sansdr  with 
countless  waves  ruffling  its  expanse  in  the 
shape  of  individuals  and  phenomena.  Sansdr 


Even  Bud 
hism  admit! 
of  K  a  r  m  J 
and  Rebirth. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

is  thus  a  composite  existence  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  Law  of  Karma  and  Rebirth. 
Almost  all  the  ancient  systems  of  philosophy, 
excepting  only  that  of  the  sage  Brihaspati, 
of'Ka^?m'a  ^re  at  one  here.  Even  Budhisism  which 
denied  the  very  reality. of  everything,  could 
not  deny  the  force  and  validity  of  the  Law  of 
Karma  and  Rebirth.  All  is  impermanent, 
says  a  Budha,  so  that  there  is  no  eternal 
entity  passing  over  to  Ntrvdn  across  the 
ocean  of  Sansdr»  All  is  without  an  ego  so 
that  there  is  no  soul  to  survive  the  shocks 
of  death  and  dessolution.  Thus  rejecting, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  metaphysical  entity  of 
Sansdr  and  immortality  of  soul,  Budhism, 
on  the  otherhand,  teaches  that  it  is  Karma 
that  sets  revolving  the  'Wheel  of  Becoming! 
Or  more  plainly,  it  is  our  Karma — the 
abiding  consequences  of  our  actions  which 
subject  us  to  the  repetition  of  births  and 
deaths. 

The  belief  in  the  law  of  Karma  has 
been  very  strong  in  the  Indian  mind 
from  time  out  of  mind  so  much  so  that 
it  has  almost  become  constitutional  with 
the    Indians   inhabiting    this     vast     penen- 


BELIEF  IN  RE -BIRTH. 

sula.  Not  to  speak  of  the  higher  philo- 
sophical treatises  of  the  soil,  even  the 
ordinary  Indian  vernaculars  abound  in  such 
passages  and  proverbs  which   unequivocably 

Wide   range 

bespeak  of  their  staunch  faith   in  one's  own    of  the  belief. 

Karma     in     such   a   manner    as   makes   it 

pretty   clear   that   the  belief  in  question   has 

become   a   source   of  solace   and  comfort  in 

one's   disappointments    and    failures  in   life. 

Thus  lamenting  over  the  cruelty   of  fortune, 

a  melodious    bird  of  Bengal    sings — "^fi§  T 

f^RtT  ^w"  f%fti" — *Ah!  my  dear,  what  alas  ! 

was  written  in  my  karma\ 

It  is  important  to  note  that  this  belief 
in  Karma  and  repetition  of  births  is  not 
confined  within  the  precincts  of  India  only. 
It  is  also  prevelant  in  China  and  Japan. 
There  is  a  Japanese  proverb — -"Resign  thy- 
self as  it  is  the  result  of  thine  own  karma,'' 

Not  the  Eastern  countries  only :  an 
enquiry  into  the  literary  contributions  of  the 
Christian  lands  unmistakeably  shows 
how  far  the  doctrine  of  Karma  and 
metempsychoses  has  influenced  the  civiliza- 
tion of  Egypt  and  Greece.  Even  the 
mighty  minds  of  Europe  and   America  have 

305 

39 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 
been   much    swayed   by   the    doctrine.     To 

Young,  Dry- 
den,  Shelley    quote  a  few  verses  from  the  best  poets  of  the 

and    Words- 
worth. Christian   world :  In    the    *Night    Thoughts* 

of  Young,  the  poet  sings, — 

"Look  Nature  through,  'tis  revolution  all, 
All  change,  no  death ;  day  follows  night,  and  night 
The  dying  day,  stars  rise  and  set,  and  set  and  rise. 
Earth  takes  the  example.     All  to  reflourish  fades ; 
As  in  a  wheel — all  sinks  to  re-ascend  ; 
Emblems  of  man,  who  passes,  not  expires." 

In  Dryden's  Ovid  we  read, — 

*'Death  has  no  power  the  immortal  soul  to  slay. 
That,  when  its  present  body  turns  to  clay, 
Seeks  a  fresh  home,  and  with  unlessened  might, 
Inspires  another  frame  with  life  and  light." 

Shelley  sings  in  'Queen  Mab,  : — 

"For  birth  but  wakes  the  spirit  to  the  sense 
Of  outward  shows,  whose  inexperienced  shape 
New  modes  of  passion  to  its  frame  may  lend, 
Life  is  its  state  of  action,  and  the  store 
Of  all  events  aggregated  ^  there 
That  variegate  the  eternal  universe. 
Death  is  a  gate  of  dreariness  and  gloom. 
That  leads  to  azure  isles  and  beaming  skies 
And  happy  regions  of  eternal  hope.' ' 

In     his     'Intimations     of   Immortality', 
Wordsworth  informs, — 

306 


BELIEF  IN  RE'BtRTH. 


"The  soul  that  rises  with  us,  our  life's  star, 
Hath  had  elsewhere  its  setting, 
And  Cometh  from  afar." 

In  the  *Two  Voices'  muses  Tennyson — 

"Or  if  through  lower  lives  I  came — 
Tho'  all  experience  past  bec.ame, 
Consolidate  in  mind  and  frame — 
I  might  forget  my  weaker  lot ; 
For  is  not  our  first  year  forgot  ? 
The  haunts  of  memory  echo  not." 

Walt  Whitman  confirms  in  his  'Leaves 
of  Grass', — 

"As  to  you,  Life,  I  reckon  you  are  the  leavings  of 

many  deaths, 

No  doubt  I  have  died  myself  ten  thousand  times 

before." 

Such  and  similar  other  passages  might  be 
culled  in  numbers  to  show  how  the  doctrine 
of  metempsychoses  influenc-ed  the  best  of 
the  European  minds  in  the  domain  of 
Poetry. 

Again,  Egyptian  culture  and  polity  was 
in  and  through  saturated  with  the  idea 
of  metempsychoses.  ''The  Egyptians 
propounded,"  says  Herodotus,  "the  theory 
that  the  human  soul  is  imperishable  and 
that  where  the  body  of  any  one  dies,  it  enters 


Tennyson 
and  Whit- 
man, Hero- 
dotus. 


307 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

into  some   other  creature  that  may  be  ready 

to  receive  it". 

Egypt    and  Pythogoras  says,  "All  has  soul ;  all  is  soul 

Greece. 

wandering  in  the  organic  world  and  obeying 

eternal  will  or  law."  According  to  Maxmuller, 
claimed  a  subtle  etherial  clothing  for  the 
soul  apart  from  its  grosser  clothing  when 
united  with  body," 

In  Greece,  the  doctrine  was  held  by 
Empedocles.  The  students  of  Plato  must 
have  noticed  that  the  doctrine  of  metempsy- 
choses forms,  as  it  were,  the  key  note  to 
the  principles  of  causation  and  compound 
evolution. 
'  In     Plato's     Phsedo    we     find:     "They 

(souls  after  death)  wander  about  so  long 
until  through  the  desire  of  the  corporeal 
nature  that  accompanies  them,  they  are 
again  united  in  a  body  and  they  are  united, 
as  is  probable,  to  animals  having  the  same 
habits  as  those  they  have  given  themselves 
up  to  during  life  or  even  into  the  same 
human  species  again." 

"The  soul  leaving  body,"  says  Plotinus, 
"becomes  that  power  which  it  has  most 
developed.     Let   us     fly     then      from    here 

30S 


BELIEF  IN  RE' BIRTH. 

below   and   rise     to   the   intellectual   world, 

that   we  may   not   fall  into  a  purely  sensilbe 

life  by  allowing  ourselves  to   follow  sensible 

images  etc." 

Philo     of  Alexandria,    a    contemporary 

of      Christ,      says  :     "The      company      of   ^^^^^^  p^j_ 

disembodied   souls   is  distributed  in  various     °:l^P:!l!'^' 

scientists* 

orders.  The  law  of  some  of  them  is  to 
enter  mortal  bodies,  and  after  certain 
prescribed  periods  (as  according  to  our 
ayuh-karma)  be  again  set  free". 

Besides  these,  copious  passages  could 
be  gleaned  from  the  philosophical  writings 
and  dissertations  of  such  eminent  men 
and  leaders  of  thought  as  Kant,  Schelling, 
Fichte,  Schapenhauer,  Goethe  and  the 
like.  Even  the  most  astute  moulder  of  the  #> 
Sensationist  school  of  thought,  Hume,  the 
sceptic,  in  his  Essay  on  the  ^Immortality  of 
Soul'  had  to  acknowledge  the  truth  and 
validity  of  the  theory  of  rebirths.  He  says  : 
"The  metempsychoses  is  therefore  the  only 
system  of  this  kind  that  philosophy  can 
harken  to". 

Prof.  Huxley   of  the   modern    scientific 
world  somewhere  remarks  :  "None  but   the 

509 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINlSM. 

hasty  thinkers  will  reject  it    =*     *     *     Like 

the    doctrine  of  evolution    itself,    that      of 

transmigration  has  its  root  in  the   world   of 

reality.' 

Among  the   Christian    theologians  many 

prominent    theological   leaders   have    main- 
Christian    tained   it.    Dr.  Julius    Muller,    the   eminent 

Theological 

Leaders.  German  theologian,  supports  the  theory  of 
Re-births  in  his  work  known  as  **The 
Christian  Doctrine  of  Sin."  Besides  Sweden- 
borg  and  Emerson  believed  in  metem- 
psychoses. 


^10 


CHAPTER  XVI. 
RE-BIRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA. 

Prof.  Huxley  anJ  Re-tirfh — Huxley  s  Gkaracter 
anJ  our  Karma-matter — CKaracter — Inner  Nature — 
Ltnga-Jeka  of  tlie  HmJu  Pkiloso|>liers — Tkc  Five 
Koakas  or  tke  Concentric  Gtrcles — Pranas  ox  tke 
Hindus  anJ  of  tke  Jain  Pktlo8o|>kers — transmission  of 
Ckaracter  tkrougk  Here<lity-Vs  .-Transmigration  of 
Karma-Sartra  tkrougk  Re-oirtk. 

In  another  place  of  his  last  Romane's 
Lectures,  says  Huxley,  * 'Every  day  experi- 
ence familiarises  us  with  the  facts  which  L^a  vf  o" 
are  grouped  under  the  name  of  heredity. 
Every  one  of  us  bears  upon  him  the 
obvious  marks  of  his  parentage,  perhaps 
remote  relationship.  More  particularly  the 
sum  of  tendencies  to  act  in  a  certain  way 
which  we  call  'character'  is  often  to  be 
traced  through  a  long  series  of  progenitors 
and  collaterals.  So  we  may  justly  say  that 
this  'character' — this  moral  and  intellec- 
tual essence  of  a  man — does  veritably  pass 
over  from  one  fleshly  tabernacle  to  another 
and  does  really  transmigrate  from  genera- 
tion  to   generation.     In   the   new   born  in- 


AN  EPITOME  OF  [AINISM. 

fant  the  character  of  the  stock  lies  latent, 
and  the  ego  is  a  little  more  than  a  bundle  of 
potentialities  ;  but  very  early  those  become 
actualities ;  from  childhood  to  age,  they 
manifest  themselves,  in  dullness  or  bright- 
ness, weakness  or  strength,  visciousness  or 
uprightness  ;  and  with  each  feature  modified 
by  confluence  of  another,  if  by  nothing 
else,  the  character  passes  on  to  its  incar- 
nation in  new  bodies. 

**The  Indian  philosophers  called  'Charac- 
*Character  ter'  as  thus  defined,  'Karma,  It  is  this 
of  Huxley.  karma  which  passed  from  life  to  life  and 
linked  them  in  chains  of  transmigrations 
and  they  held  that  it  is  modified  in  each 
life,  not  merely  by  confluence  of  parentage, 
but  by  its  own  acts.  They  were  in  fact 
strong  believers  in  the  theory,  so  much 
disputed  just  at  present,  of  the  hereditary 
transmission  of  acquired  characters.  That 
the  manifestation  of  tendencies  of  a  charac- 
ter may  be  greatly  facillitated  or  impeded 
by  conditions,  of  which  self-discipline  or  the 
absence  of  it  are  among  the  most  important, 
is  indubitable  :  but  that  the  'character'  itself 
is  modified  in  this  way   is   by   no  means  so 

312 


RE'BIRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA, 
certain  ;  it   is   not   so   sure   that  the   trans-    Huxley's 

,       ,  r  •!    1  •  misrepresen- 

mitted   character   of  an   evil-doer   is   worse    tation     and 

^  .    1  I  11  wrong  inter- 

or  that  of  a  righteous  man  better    than  that    pretation  of 

the  Law. 
which  he  received.     Indian  philosophy,  how- 
ever, does   not  admit   of  any  doubt  on  the 

subject  ;  the  belief  in  the  influence  of 
conditions,    notably   self-discipline,     on    the 

karmas  was  not  merely  a  necessary  postulate 
of  its  theory  of  retribution,  but  it  presented 
the  only  way  of  escape  from  the  endless  of 
round  of  transmigrations," 

Such  is  Prof.  Huxley's  interpretation  and 
presentation  of  the  law  of  karma  and 
metempsychoses  in  Indian  philosophy.  But 
we  differ  from  him  in  as  much  as  neither  the 
interpretation,  nor  the  presentation,  on  that 
account,  is  correct.  For  we  must  have  to 
draw  a  line  of  distinction  between  a  man  and 
his  conditions.  According  to  our  phi- 
losophy a  man  may,  indeed,  be  roughly  taken 
as  the  embodiment  of  intellectual,  spiritual 
and  moral  {^n^  ^R  ^iftcC  )  essences  which 
Huxley  sums  up  by  the  word  'character,*  And 
the  man  as  such  is  not  different  from  the  sum- 
total  of  the  the  energies  summed  up  by 
'character'  as  just  explained.    But  then  there 

40 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM, 

is  another  inviolable    physical   condition    in 

the  shape  of  a   medium  for  the  manifestation 

and  operation  of  the  above  energies  and  it  is 

Transmis-    the   mortal   physical    frame    which  the   man 

sion  through  ^ 

Heredity    takes  on.     And   there  is  invariably  a  kind  of 

or      through  ^ 

Re-births?      chemical  affinity  under  the  secret  influence  of 
which  the  man  is  drawn  to  a   particular  body 
wherein    he     is    to    take    birth.     It    is  true 
that  man  passes  from  body  to  body   through 
the  repetition  of  births  and    deaths,    and    as 
he  progresses  or  retrogresses  quite  in  accord- 
ance with  the  good   or   bad   deeds   he   per 
formed  in   the   past,    it   is    evident  enough 
that  he  passes  out  with  his  own  self-acquired 
habits,  qualities  and  desires  fitly  called  karma- 
sarira  according   to    our  philosophical   ter- 
minology.    But   this    does    not    necessarily 
mean   that    the    habits     and     qualities     he 
acquired    through   the    processes  of  natural 
selection   or   through  the   processes  of  self- 
discipline   he     might     have   undergone — be 
these  for  good,  or  for   bad — are  transmitted 
to  the   off-springs  through    the  physiological 
principle   of   heredity.     True   it  is  that  the 
offsprings    display     at     times     such    habits 
and   tendencies   as   can   well  be  traced    out 


Sarira, 


kE-BIRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA. 

as     if  coming   down    from     the    parent   or 

some  remote  ancestor.     The  way   in  which    xranmission 

this     hereditary    transmission    is    explained    transmifra- 

-  -  ,  1       •    1       •  t'O"    of   the 

by     the    modern    physiologists     cannot,    as    karma- 

we  have  seen  elsewhere,  give  us  a  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  problem  in  question. 
The  phenomenon  of  apparent  transmission 
through  the  physiological  principle  of 
heredity  as  explained  in  our  philosophy 
seems  to  clear  up  the  difficulties  involved 
in  the  question.  According  to  our  philoso- 
phy, the  re-incarnating  soul,  bearing  as  it  does 
about  it  the  karma-pudgal  which  the  fiva 
acquired  by  dint  of  its  past  experiences  and 
unfulfilled  desires,  forming  its  character  in 
the  past,  automatically  developes  with  a 
mathematical  precision,  a  sort  of  affinity  or 
tendency  of  attraction,  for  the  appropriate 
physiological  and  moral  conditions  where- 
in it  may  find  a  fit  and  favourable  soil  for 
moulding  out  of  the  same,  a  suitable  body 
as  the  manifesting  media  for  the  display  of 
its  powers  and  qualities,  either  to  cope 
with  nature  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  un- 
satisfied desires  and  enjoyment  of  the 
pleasures  of  the  world,  or  to  strive    for    the 

3'5  ^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  jAtNtSM. 

attainment  of  bliss  and  beatitude,  as  the 
case  may  be,  according  to  its  karma  in  a 
previous  birth. 

To  enter   a   bit   more   into   details  :  we 

have  stated  before  that  there  is  some  '  super- 
Exposition 

of  the  prin-    physical '  power  in  every  living  body,  by  the 
ciple. 

presence  of  which  the    body   is   enabled   to 

respond,  if  suitably  influenced.  Responsive- 
ness, here,  forms  a  predominating  pheno- 
menon of  life,  and  death  of  the  body  means 
the  departure  of  the  *  super-physical '  power, 
called  atman—Jiva  f'soul) — from  the  living 
body  after  which  it  can  no  longer  respond 
to  any  stimulus. 

At  the  time  of  death,  when  this  soul 
or  the  *  super-physical  *  power  shuffles  off  its 
mortal  coil,  it  passes  out  assuming  the  form 
of  a  subtle  unit  of  energy  clothing  itself,  as  it 
does,  in  a  subtle  body  as  its  vehicle  which  is 
built  out  of  the  fine  ia^;;/^-matter — the 
crystalised  particles  of  the  soul's  past  ex- 
periences and  unfulfilled  desires  etc.  with 
which  it  happens  to  pass  out.  According 
to  our  philosophy,  these  fine  z^^;^;;/^- matters  or 
the  crystalised  particles  of  past  experiences 
and  unfulfilled  desires,  embodied  in  which  the 

316 


k^'BlRTH,  AND  KARMA-SARIRA 

soul  passes  out  leaving  the  body  dead,   form 
the  very  germ  of  physical  life  in  future. 

The  use  of  the  phrase  ^'karma-pudgar — 
karma'{tmtter)  is  singular  in  our  philosophy. 
AW  karmas,    the    other    systems  of    Indian    ^^V^^^J 

'  puagal    and 

Thought,  accept  unwaveringly  the  truth  and  Character, 
validity  of  the  doctrine  of  karma-c3iUS3\\iy  and 
re-births  ;  but  with  them  karma  is  amurtaAm- 
ponderable.  None  has  yet  been  found  to  take 
the  word  karma  in  the  sense  and  significance 
as  we  find  it  to  have  been  used  in  our  philo- 
sophy. It  is  true  that  karma  oi  the  /iva  means 
its  past  activities  or  energies — forces  of 
its  own  making  that  tend  it  to  be  a  murderer 
or  a  saint  in  the  next  life.  But  the 
energies  or  forces,  as  they  are  in  themselves 
are  formless  and  as  such  they  cannot  act 
and  react  on  any  thing  and  produce  changes 
in  the  tendency  of  the  same.  Sky,  like 
void  space,  because  of  its  being  formless, 
cannot  affect  us.  In  order  to  act  and  re-act 
and  thereby  to  produce  changes  in  things 
on  which  they  work,  the  energies  and  forces 
must  have  to  be  metamorphosed  into  forms  or 
centres  of  forces.  So  are  the  cases  with 
Jtva!s  karma — its  past-activities  or  energies-— 


An  epitome  of  /a  in  ism 

forces  of  its  own  making,  which  become  meta- 
morphosed as  it  were  into  the  form  of  karma- 
particles  wherein  remain  stored  up  in  a  poten- 
tial state  all  the  experiences,  desires  and 
tendencies  which  Prof.  Huxley  sums  up  by 
the  word  *  Character! 

The  experiences  and  forces  of  its  own, 
metamorphosed  into  a  material  particles,  which 
the  Jiva  carries    with  it    at    the   time  of  its 

Karma- 

Sarira.  departure  from  the  body  wherein  it  had  been 

encased  in  a  previous  birth,  and  known  as  the 
karma-^\)A^?\   of  the  Jiva — form,  according 
to  our  sages,  the  physical  basis  of  a  future  life. 
It  is  also  technically  called — Kdrman  Sarira 
of  the  Jiva  which  along  with  the  tejas  sarira 
which    is    also  inseparable   from    it,    clings 
round  to  the   soul  until  it  reaches  final  libera- 
tion. Here  again  we  find  another  display  of  the 
grand  truth  teaching  us  of  the  indestructibility 
of  matter  and  continuity  of  motion — Karma, 
After  shufflng  off  the  gross  mortal  frame 
like  a   pair  of  old    worn-out  shoes,    the    in  - 
dividual    soul,  taking  the  form    of  a   subtle 
unit  of  energy  clothed  in  the  karma-pudgal 
as  explained,  instinctively  flies  off  to  one  or 
the  other  of  the  different  grades  of  sansdr  or 


RE^BIRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA. 

gatiy  as  it  is  called,  for  which  it  has  developed 
a  strong  affinity  and  where,  on  that  account, 
it   may     find     a   more    favourable    soil    for    Gatis  or  the 

di  ff  e  r  e  n  t 

fuller  expressions  of  the  eners^ies   and  forces    grades  of 
^  ^  Sansar. 

of  its  own  making  during  the  course  of  the 
previous  term  of  the  physical  life.  It  may 
happen  to  be  located  for  some  time  in  the 
regions  of  hell  {^K^)  or  go  to  some  other 
world.  It  may  travel  among  the  brutes  and 
beasts  (f?f^T  «F  'Jtf'T)  or  may  become  a  god 
or  a  demon  in  the  world  of  gods  and 
demons  (^^T^T  ^cJi).  It  may  also  by 
the  virtue  of  its  own  karma  under  which 
it  willingly  laboured,  run  to  Heaven,  the 
region  of  the  gods,  there  to  enjoy  the 
sweetest  pleasures  of  life  which  he  so  much 
hankered  after  or  be  born  again  to  such 
parents  in  the  human  world  (^^cn  ^T^)  as 
is  consistent  with  its  prior  deeds  and  desires, 
either  to  waddle  in  wealth  and  prosperity, 
or  to  starve  to  death  in  poverty,  or  to  strive 
after  bliss  and  beatitude,  forsaking  all  the 
pleasures  of  wordly  life  and  living. 

So  we  see  that  the  'Character  of  Prof. 
Huxley  is  somewhat  the  same  with  the  karma- 
sarira  in  the  Jain   philosophy.     The   Hindu 

319 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

philosophers  also  hold  that  the  death  of  a 
living  being  means  the  departure  from  the 
same  of  a  subtle  body  technically  called, 
Linga-deha  or  Sukshma  sarira. 

The    Hindu   sages   have   thought  it  wise 

to  analyse  an  organism  into  five   sheaths   or 

koshas.     The   first   is   the   Annamaya  kosh, 

and  the  five   (n)   Prdnamaya   kosh,    (ni)  Monomaya  kosh, 

Koshas       of 

the  Hindus,  (iv)  Vzgndnamaya  kosh  and  lastly  (v)  Anand- 
rnaya  kosh.  It  is  in  the  centre  of  the 
Anandamaya  kosh  or  the  innermost  sheath 
that  the  soul  is  stated  to  reside — the  outer- 
most being  the  gross  nutritious  vesture  or 
sheath  called  the  Annamaya,  Excluding  the 
out-ermost  one,  the  Annamaya — the  other 
four,  one  coming  consecutively  within 
another  like  concentric  circles  taken  to- 
gether, constitute  the  Linga  or  Sukshma- 
sarira  or  subtle  organism  of  the  Jiva,  The 
Hindus  further  hold  that  this  subtle  body 
consists  of  chitta  or  the  mind-stuff  with  the 
organs  of  sense  and  actions  there  held 
together  by  the  energy  called  Prdn  playing 
through  the  medium  of  the  organism.  Ac- 
cording to  the  functional  activities  this  Pr&n 
is  further  analysed  into — 

320 


RE-BIRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA. 
(a)     Prdn  or  the   inhaling  power   which 

moves  the  lungs.  The  PrAnas. 

(d)  Apdn  or  the  exhaling  power  mani- 
fest in  throwing  out  foreign  and  effete  matter 
from  the  system. 

{c)  Sam&n  or  the  digestive  and  distri- 
butive energy  in  the  system.  * 

(d)  Uddn — is  the  power  of  speech.  It 
also  helps  to  the  descent  of  foodstuff  through 
the  alimentary  canal  to  the  stomach.  And 
lastly, 

(e)  Vydn-'^is  the  energy  which  sustains 
the  body  and  galvanizes  its  parts  into  life 
and  vigour  thus  protecting  it  from  putre- 
faction. 

Now  these  organic  energies  which  are 
but  functional  activities  of  one  and  the  same 
Power — called  MMkhya-Prdn  or  the  Primal 
Physical  Energy  along  with  the  five  elemental 
rudiments  of  the  nutritious  vesture,  bearing 
the  impress  of  desires,  experiences,  and  ideas 
formed  in  the  past,  make  up  the  sukshma- 
sarira  of  the  Hindu  philosophers  that  passes 
from  body  to  body  through  the  various 
grades  of  sansdr  according  to  the  merits  and 
demerits  of  the  embodied  soul. 

J2l 

41 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

But  the  kdrman-sarira  in  our  philosophy 
is  of  different  make.  It  is  true  that  the  Jain 
^^^Yd  ^^  philosophy  speaks  of  prdnas  sls  organic  and 
^hiioso^h*"  bodily  powers  ;  but  these  develop  only  as 
the  Jiva  ascends  up  the  scale  of  evolution 
from  lower  to  higher  organisms.  The  highest 
type  of  organism  of  a  /zva  has  ten  prdnas 
and  the  lowest  type  must  have  at  least  four. 
Of  the  ten  pr6>nas  or  powers  which  are  to  be 
found  in  the  higher  types  of  organism  as  man, 
— five  belong  to  the  five  organs  of  sense,  viz., 
touch,  taste,  smell,  sight  and  hearing.  Add 
to  these  five,  the  three  powers  of  body,  mind 
and  speech  {^VX  J{^  ^^T).  The  ninth  is  the 
power  of  inhalation  and  exhalation  termed 
(^I^T  m^r)  and  the  tenth  is  the  ayu-bal — or  the 
power  whereby  is  determined  the  longivity  of 
the  fiva  during  which  it  has  to  keep  to  a  cer- 
tain definite  configuration  of  the  body  in  which, 
it  might  happen  to  enter  in  a  particular  stage 
of  its  existence  determined  by  its  own  past 
karma.  The  Jain  philosophers  hold,  however, 
that  of  these  prdnas  in  their  abstract  or 
etherial  forms,  accompany  the  karma-sarira 
clothed  in  which  the  soul  departs  from  an 
organism  wherein  it  dwelt  for  a  certain  period 


kE-BlRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA. 

of  time  by  the  virtue  of  its  ayu-bal,  accruing 
from  ayu-karma  of  which  we  shall  have 
occasion  to  speak  later   on.     And  these  abs-    Paryiptas 

^  and       Apar- 

tract  (bhava)  pr&nas  or  powers  develop  only  y^Ptas. 
when  the  kdrma-sarira  enters  a  particular 
organism  according  to  its  own  karmas.  But  all 
the  types  of  organism  do  not  possess  the  five 
senses ;  neither  all  can  speak,  nor  all  have  the 
intellect  to  think.  While  dealing  with 
the  Jiva  in  the  chapter  of  categories,  we 
have  seen  >La2XJivic  organisms  are  classifiable 
according  to  the  number  of  the  organs  of 
sense  they  possess.  It  is  important  to  note  by 
the  way  that  each  of  these  types  of  organism 
is  again  divisible  into  two  sub-classes — 
known  by  the  names  of  Parydptq  and 
Aparydpta.  The  parydptas  are  six  in 
number,  viz.,  akdr  or  the  seed  of  life ; 
sarira,  or  the  body  ;  Indriya  or  the  senses, 
svdshochchdsa  or  breathings,  bhdsd  or  speech, 
and  mana  or  mind.  The  pdnas  and  the 
organs  develop  as  the  jiva  migrates  on  and 
on  through  the  processes  of  metempscyhoses. 
It  is  impossible  to  exhaust  in  the  short  space 
at  disposal,  the  list  of  the  different  types  of 
organism  which  the   karma-sarira  takes   on, 

323 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 
according  to  the  ideas  and  desires  registered 

The       Jiva 

migrates  out    on     it.     In     fact,   it   shows  to   our   wonder 

with  the  po- 
tentialities of    and    admiration    how    could    the  Jain    sages 
the  organs  of  j  q 

its      future    amass  in  that   ancient   time   such    wealth   of 

body. 

biological  informations  on  morphological 
variations  of  organisms. 

But  to  return  to  the  direct  subject  matter  : 
Prior  to  its  migrating  from  the  ouddrika 
body  or  the  gross  physical  frame,  the  jiva 
fixes  its  gati  or  the  particular  abode,  and 
actually  migrates  out  with  the  potentialities 
of  devoloping  these  firdnas  and  the  organs. 
But  these  are  devoloped  as  necessity  arises 
for  the  formation  of  the  particular  new 
organism  it  is  going  to  enter  into.  And  the 
developments  are  quite  in  keeping  with  its 
previous  karma  and  take  place  subsequent  to 
its  entering  into  the  new  body  as  determined. 

Thus  we  see  the  karma-sarira  of  a  jiva, 
as  explained  in  the  Jaina  philosophy,  is  simply 
a  kind  of  organism  born  of  its  own  experiences 
i.e.  energies  and  forces  of  its  own  making 
which  become  materialised,  as  it  were,  into 
karma-pudgal  or  ^<2rm«-matter  envelop- 
ed in  which  the  individual  soul,  reducing 
itself  into  a  unit  of  energy,  passes  out. 

3H 


kE-BIRTH  AI^D  KARMA-SARIRA. 

Every  thought  we  think,  every  word  we 
speak,  every  act  we  do,  every  desire  we 
form — becomes  rarified  and  stored  up  in   our     Organism 

is  but  an  oui- 

Experiential  body.   It  remains  dormant  there    J^^rd   mani- 

^  •'  lestation     of 

for  sometime  only  to  reappear  again  in  the  ^^^^  wn°"^^^ 
form  of  mental  waves  with  all  the  potentialites 
of  strong  desires  etc.  Nothing  can  prevent 
the  courses  of  desires.  Desires  must  be  ful- 
filled. This  is  the  law  of  Nature.  The  will  is 
equally  and  indistinguishably  desire  and 
thought.  It  is  the  will  to  be,  to  assert  and 
thereby  exist  as  a  distinct  and  separate  from 
all  the  rest,  that  is  the  root  of  everything  we 
see  around  us  in  the  world  of  particulars. 
It  is  but  a  truism  to  say  that  different  thought- 
activities  manifest  themselves  in  different 
outward  forms.  The  science  of  physiognomy 
and  thought-reading  owe  their  development 
to  the  study  of  the  changes  in  the  outward 
manifestation  of  the  organism,  corresponding 
to  the  changes  in  the  mental  constitution. 
And  organisms  may  vary  not  only  in  respect 
of  their  structures,  but  in  respect  of  their 
tendencies  to  do  this  or  the  other  in  all 
kinds  of  ways.  The  thought-currents 
for   tasting    finally    results    in    the    organic 

325 


man. 


AN  EPITOME  OP  // AN  IS  XL 

formation  of  the  tongue.  So  the  ear,  the  nose 

etc,  can  like   wise  be  traced  to  the  thought- 

The  will  is    currents   for    hearing^    music,    for     smelling 

simply      the  ^  ^ 

fragrance  and  the  like  respectively.  Every 
bodily  structure  corresponds  to  each  set  of 
thought-currents  called,  updnga-ndma  karma 
of  xhejiva  to  which  it  belongs.  So  is  the 
case  with  the  human  organisms  in  general. 
Human  organism,  to  speak  more  pointedly,  is 
but  the  objectification  in  a  gross  form  of  the 
human  action-currents  of  will  and  thought. 
Kant,  the  great  German  philosopher,  says 
of  man  that  "his  will*  is  his  'proper  self.'' 
*'The  will  is  simply  the  man,"  says  T.  H. 
Green.  "Any  act  of  will  is  the  expression 
of  the  man  as  he,  at  the  time,  is.  The  motive 
issuing  in  his  act,  the  object  of  his  will, 
the  idea,  which  for  the  time  he  sets  himself 
to  realise,  are  but  the  same  thing  in  different 
words.  Each  is  the  reflex  of  what  for  the 
time,  as  at  once  feeling,  desiring    and    think- 

inor   the  man    is  "     Man    is    thus  but   a 

visible  expression  of  his  will  which  is  equal 
to  and  indistinguishable  from  his  thought- 
activities.  But  will  and  thought,  simply  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  are  mere  abstractions, 

326 


RE^BIRTH  AND  KARMA-SARIRA. 

and  cannot  therefore  as  such  modify  the  charac- 
ter of  our  organism  ;  for  how,  what  is  merely 
a  pure   abstraction,    can  affect   our    material 
constitution  ?  but  we  feel  that  every  act  we  do, 
every  thought  we  think,  and  every  desire  we    Karma- 

sarira      and 

form,  does  actually  produce  changes  in  us  and    modem  psy- 
chology. 

there  can  be  no  denial  of  it.  Therefore  the 
actions  and  desires  to  be  in  a  position  to 
effect  any  change  in  us  must  transform  them- 
selves into  a  medium  of  homogeneous  nature 
with  our  physical  constitution  itself.  But 
the  question  arises  how  can  it  be  conceived  ? 
Psychology  shows  quite  unmistakeably  that 
no  desire,  no  feeling,  no  connation  passes 
the  threshold  of  our  mind  without,  in  some- 
way, modifying  the  neural  processes.  We 
forget  what  we  felt  or  did  before.  But  the 
whole  system  vaguely  experiences  a  sort  of 
diffused  effect  of  what  has  been.  Modern 
psychology  would  tell  us  that  they  abide 
in  the  region  called,  "subconscious."  But  our 
psychology  teaches  that  just  as  a  volume  of 
water  rushing  out,  leaves  its  traces  of  watery 
particles  on  the  person  who  stands  close 
by  :  so  the  action-currents  of  the  human 
thought     and     will     leave    vestiges   on   its 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

experiential  body  which  brings  about  a 
new  arrangement  in  the  atomic  distribution 
of  the  karma-pudg2i\  composing  the'  karma- 
sarira. 

Whatever  might  be  the  mystery,  it  is 
The  Inner  clear  and  certain  that  human  thoughts  and 
the  "^^Outer  desires  are  embodied  in  or  objectified  into 
the  human  karma-sarira.  Thus  the  karma" 
sarira  then  forms  the  'inner -nature  of  which 
the  visible  man  is  but  an  'outer  expression. 
The  Inner  and  the  Outer,  according  to  our 
philosophy,  are  not  essentially  different.  They 
are  the  same  essentially  with  this  difference 
only  that  one  manifests  through  the  other 
and  stand  to  each  other  in  the  relation 
of  mutual  intermutation.  Just  as  there  is  no 
essential  difference  between  force  and  exer- 
tions ;  for  force  is  only  known  in  and 
through  exertion  making  it  to  be  the  effect  of 
the  cause  which  is  no  other  than  the  force 
itself:  so  what  is  *inner'  is  but  the  invisible 
cause  of  what  is  outer  which  is  but  an  effect 
in  a  visible  form. 


32S 


CHAPTER  XXII. 
KARMA-SARIRA  AND  OUDARIKA-SARIRA. 

Relations  tetwcen  tkc  *Karma  ana  the  *Oudartlca  • — 
Stages  of  <levelot>nient — *Karman  produces  tlie 
*Ou<larvlca* — *Ou<lar%lca'  t>ro<luces  *Karma  — Not  Iden- 
tical Lut  T-wo  distinct  Kntities — Oo-extstence  In- 
explicable— Tken  no  Inter-action  ^ossicle  -Relation  or 
Ooncomitant  Variation — Dimculties  or  Parallelism — 
XKe  *Karman  body  and  ine  *Oudarika  stand  to  eacn 
otner  m  Relation  of  Interxnutation,  • 

We  shall  now  discuss  the  relation  between 

the   Karma   body   including    TejaSj   or  the 

*inner    nature'   and  the    Ouddrika   body   or    „ 

'  How  to  treat 

the  'outer  nature'  of  man.  And  as  it  is  the  question. 
a  stumbling  block  for  the  beginners,  it 
deserves  a  careful  consideration.  Without 
asserting  any  thing  dogmatically,  we  shall 
only  discuss  every  possible  hypothesis  which 
can  be  framed  with  regard  to  this  rela- 
tion and  show  that,  for  the  contradictions 
involved  therein,  none  of  them  appears  to  be 
rationally  tenable  save  and  except  the  posi- 
tion held  by  our  sages.  Our  procedure  here, 
therefore,  will  be  more  or  less  dialectical 
i.e.  we  should  point   out     poverty    of  each 

329 
42 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

hypothesis     by     bringing      into     light     the 
inconsistencies  involved  therein. 

One   may   suppose   that   the  relation  in 
question  is  simply  that  of  development.    The 
inner    nature   develops    itself  into  the  outer 
nature  as  the  plant  grows  into  a  tree   or   the 
Stages      of   wo^l<3   develops   itself  into  the  present  form 
ofThe^^m'e    fi'om    the   primal    state   of  nebulous    matter, 
fficufties.         What   lends   plausibility   to   this  hypothesis 
is   the   fact   of  the  inner    nature  being  more 
subtle  than  the  outer  nature  which  is  grosser 
than     the    former.      The     very    character- 
istic indication  of  an  effect,    is   its   grossness 
and  the  reason  of  it,  is    to   be   found    in    the 
fact  that  what  remains    unmanifested   in    the 
cause  becomes  manifested  in  the  effect. 

But  unfortunately  the  advocates  of  this 
theory  overlook  the  serious  difficulties  which 
lurk  in  it.  First  of  all  we  draw  atten- 
tion to  this  that  if  they  be  the  different 
stages  of  development  of  the  same  thing, 
then  by  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  they 
cannot  be  co-existent.  Development  implies 
change  ;  change  implies  time.  And  'stages' 
have  any  significance  only  with  reference 
to  different   periods   of  time.     As  the   plant 

330 


KARMA  AND  OUDARIKA^SARIRA. 

ceases  to  exist,  when  it   has   grown   up   into 

a   tree,    so   the   inner   world  would  cease  to    '^^^  relation 

of  cause  and 

have  its  being  after  its  transformation  into  the  d!fficu?t?^s ^'^ 
outer  world,  for  they  belong  to  the  same 
thing  although  at  different  periods  of  its 
development.  The  fact  of  co-existence  being 
thus  inexplicable,  the  mutual  interaction 
between  them,  which  cannot  be  denied 
becomes  inexplicable  also. 

Of  course  i{i\\e,  purvapakshin  say  that  the 
earlier  state  is  not  altogether  lost  in  the  later 
state  of  a  thing  developing,  but  is  retained 
there  :  our  obvious  retort  will  be  that  if  it  is 
retained  at  all,  it  is  retained  in  such  a  trans- 
formed manner  that  it  loses  its  distinct 
existence.  For  what  is  accidental  to  the 
different  stages  of  a  developing  thing,  vanish- 
es away  with  the  lapse  of  time  and  what 
persists  is  the  essence  or  the  substance  in 
abstract  which  reveals  itself  through  these 
different  stages  of  development. 

To  get  over  the  difficulties  as  exposed  in 
the  above,  some  may  erroneously  hold  that 
the  inner  nature  produces  the  outer  nature 
of  a  man.  The  relation  is  that  of  a  cause 
and  effect. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

This  theory   also   labours   under   serious 
the  cause  of    difificulties.     The  first  question  which  we  put 

\\\t.Kdrman'.  i      i  •         •      i  i  •  i  i 

its  difficul-  to  such  theonsts  is,  how  does  it  produce  the 
outer  nature  of  man  ?  Mere  being  or  the 
fact  of  existence  of  the  inner  nature  cannot 
account  for  the  origin  of  the  outer  nature. 
The  mere  being  of  a  thing  cannot  explain 
the  origin  of  another  thing,  so  we  are  led 
to  assert  that  the  Kdrman-sarira  transforms 
itself  into  the  Ouddrika  sarira.  Here  the  same 
difficulties  re-appear !  How  to  explain  the 
fact  of  (i)  Co-existence  and  (2)  Inter-action. 

Others  may  think  that  the  right  theory  is 
this  :  Kdrman-sarira  does  not  produce  the 
Ouddrika  sarira,  but  on  the  contrary 
Ouddrika  produces  the  Kdrman-sarira. 

Ouddrika  is  the  cause  of  the  kdrman- 
sarira  :  but  this  theory  is  open  to  another 
fresh  objection  in  addition  to  the  previous 
difficulties.  Theactivity  oi ihe Ouddrika- sarir a 
is  possible  only  when  it  is  actuated  by  desires 
and  will.  Has  any  body  heard  of  unmotived 
activities  ?  And  these  desires  and  will  belong 
to  the  Kdrman-sarira  :  so  the  obvious  mistake 
is  here  to  make  the  presupposition  of  a  thing, 
the  product  of  it.     That   without   which   the 


kARMA  A^D  OUDARIKA-SARIRA. 

activity  of  the  OudArika  is'not  possible,  cannot 
be  reasonably  conceived  to  be  the  product 
of  the  activity  itself. 

So  the  only  way  of  escape  from  this 
difficulty,  at  first  sight,  seems  to  be  this  : 
neither  of  them  produces  the  other,  but  both 
are  co-existent.  They  have  been  maintain- 
ing their  distinct  existence  from  eternity 
so  to  speak. 

But  to  say  this,  is  also  not  enough.  We 
have  got  to  define  the  precise  relation  exist- 
ing between  them.     It  will  not  do  to  simply    relation^and 

.  ,         ,  I  ,1  .     .  itsdifificulties 

say  that  they  have  been  eternally  existmg  as 

distinct   entities,   for   the  fact  of  inter-action 

between  them  requires  to  be  explained. 

Now  different  hypothesis  may  be  framed 
with  regard  to  the  precise  nature  of  inter- 
action. Some  may  suppose  that  there  is 
no  interaction  proper,  but  the  relation  of 
concomitant  variation  subsists  between 
them.  The  changes  in  the  one  correspond 
to  the  changes  in  the  other,  though  they 
are  two  distinct  entities  or  worlds,  having 
nothing  in  common. 

Our  reply  is  that  it  sees  the  half-truth 
only.     In   fact    there   is   a   relation  of  con- 

'333 


AN  EPITOME  OF /AINTSM. 

comitant  variation,  for  the  change  in  one 
manifests  itself  in  a  corresponding  change 
in  the  other.  But  this  relation  is  not  pos- 
sible and  cannot  be  satisfactorily  explained, 
if  they  be  not  ultimately  the  same,  or  to  put 
it  in  other  words,  if  a  common  blood  does  not 
run  through  their  veins.  But  this  is  nega- 
tived by  the  hypothesis,    for    by  ex-hypothese 

The  relation 

of  concomi-    they  have  been  assumed  to   be    two   distinct 

tant      varia- 
tion:  its  diffi-    worlds  having  nothing  in  common, 
culties. 

Others,  in   order   to   escape  from    these 

difificulties,  may  suppose  that  some  influence 

in  some  form  or  other,  passes  into  the    thing 

called   effect   and   produces   changes  in  the 

same.     The  interaction  is  not  apparent   here 

as  in  the  former  case,  but   real.     The   cause 

exerts   some   influence   upon  something  else 

and   thereby   produces   changes  in  the  same 

which  we  call  effect. 

This  at  first  sight  seems  to  possess  much 

of  plausibility,    though    it  cannot  stand   to  a 

careful    scrutiny   of  reason.     The    difficulty 

here  is  this  :  where  docs   the    influence   rest 

before   its   being   received    by   the  thing  for 

which  it  is  meant  "i     We  cannot   conceive  of 

any   influence   passing  out   of  a   thing  and 

334 


KARMA  AND  OUDARIKA-SARIRA 

resting  in  nowhere  and  then  entering  another 

thing  we  call  effect  ;  for,  the  conception  itself 

is  a  psychological  impossibility.    So  here  too 

is  a  big  chasm  in  our  thought.     Thus  we  see 

none  of  these  hypotheses  can  stand  the  test  of 

reason  and  we  are  thus  led  by  an   immanent 

process   of  dialectic   to  our  own  theory,    the 

only  theory  logically  tenable  and    free   from 

these  short-comings  as  we  shall  presently  see.    The     t  w  o 

stand        t  o 

By  Karma  sarira  we  mean  that  Experi-    each     other 

in  relation  of 

ential    body   where  .  the   effects   caused     bv    inter-muta- 

-^  ^      tion. 

the  Ouddrika  are  stored  up  as  it  were  in  a 
subtle  form.  The  operation  of  the  Ouddrzka 
or  the  Perceptual  organism  leaves  a  per- 
manent vestige  upon  the  kdrman,  known 
as  ^ar;;^^- vestige,  just  as  the  agitation  of 
the  brain  molecules  in  thought,  leaves  a 
permanent  vestige  upon  the  brain  itself. 
This  is  what  we  mean  by  kdrmtc  effects. 
These  kdrmic  effects,  again,  as  we  shall  show 
hereafter,  determine  the  nature  of  the  per- 
ceptual organism  or  the  Ouddrika  body. 
The  operation  of  the  Ouddrika  body 
leaves  this  karma -vts^xXg^  upon  the  Experi- 
ential body  and  thereby  modifies  it  to  a 
certain    extent,    while   on   the   other    hand, 

335 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM 

the  kdrman,  the  organ  of  thought,  desires 
and  will,  determines  the  character  of  the 
former  by  its  preferential  interest.  So  the 
relation  is  intermutative.  And  this  is  borne 
out  by  our  analysis  of  the  question  at  issue. 
The  relation   between   karma-hody   and 

How       they 

act      and    i\iQ  OuMrika — this  is   our  immediate  topic. 

re-act  ?  ^ 

And  we  begin  our  discussion  by  defining  the 
two  in  the  clearest  possible  manner.  By 
kdrman-hody  we  mean  the  Experiential-hody 
where  the  effects  caused  by  the  Ouddfika- 
body  are  stored  up,  as  it  were,  in  a  subtle 
form.  The  operation  of  the  Oddrtka-hoAy 
or  the  Perceptual  organ  leaves  a  permanent 
vestige  upon  the  karma-hoAy  known  as 
karma-\ts\\gt,  just  as  the  agitation  of 
the  brain  molecules  in  thought,  leaves  a 
permanent  vestige  upon  the  brain  itself. 
This  is  what  we  mean  by  iarma-matier 
This  karma^msitier  again,,  we  shall  show 
hereafter,  determines  the  nature  of  the  per- 
ceptual organ  or  the  Ouddrik a-hody.  The 
operation  of  the  Ouddrika-hody  leaves  thus 
vestiges  upon  the  experiential  body  and 
thereby  modifies  it  to  a  certain  extent,  while 
on  the   other,  the  karma-hody  or  the  organ 

3S^ 


KARMA  AND  OUDARIKA-SARIRA. 

of  thought,  desires   and  will,  determines  the 

character  of  the   former  by    its    preferential    Perception 

interest.     So  the  relation,  from  one  aspect  is    iheOuddrika 

one  of  correlativity.     We  shall  prove  this  in 
various  ways. 

We     all     know     that     we     have     both 
perception  and   conception  of  a  thing.     And 
we  know  further  that   perception   is   directly 
related  to  the  object,  for  it  follows  the  direct 
presentment  of  the  object  to  the  senses,  where- 
as conception  is  indirectly  related  to  the  object 
through   perception.     The   former,    we    are 
of  opinion,    belongs     to   the   ouddrika  body 
(  ^?lfT^  siTtT  )  or  the  perceptual  organism 
where  external  objects  are  directly  presented 
to  and  the  latter   namely,  conception,  desire, 
and  will  belong  to  the    kdrman  body  (^T^^^ 
aittT  ; )  for  these  are  referred  to  the  object  only 
indirectly  through  the   senses.     But   what  is 
a  conception  ?  Is  it  not  perception   universa- 
lised  ?     A  conception    becomes    a   chimera, 
barren  and    empty,    if  it   is     not  capable    of 
being  fulfilled    by   the    direct      presentment 
of      the       object     on      the     senses    which 
constitutes       perception.       How      are      we 
to  know      otherwise    which    conception    is 

337 

43 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

valid  f  Validity  can  well  be  established 
by  the  actual  sensory  contact  of  the 
object  conceived.  The  conception  thus  be- 
comes something  general,  universal  in 
character,  which  differentiates  itself,  so  to 
Conception    speak,  without  losing  its  unity  and  character 

to   the   Kar-       ^  s  J  , 

?nan-hody.  i^to  SO  many  individual  actual  objects  capa- 
ble of  being  presented  to  the  senses.  The 
individual  objects,  the  subject-matter  of  the 
perceptual  organ,  becomes  so  many  concrete 
embodiments  of  the  conception  itself  which 
cannot  be,  like  the  former,  presented  to  the 
senses.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  per- 
ception also,  it  may  be  shown  that  they  are 
unintelligible,  unless  they  are  interpreted  with 
the  light  of  the  concept  itself.  An  individual, 
or  a  single  perception,  caused  by  the  actual 
contact  of  the  object  with  the  senses,  remains 
unintelligible,  unless  it  is  subsumed  under 
its  respective  concept  which  is,  again,  nothing 
but  perceptions  universalised.  The  concep- 
tion we  thus  see,  is  the  perception  itself  in  its 
universal  character  and  embodies  itself  in 
the  actual  objects  forming  the  subject-matter 
of  the  perceptual  organism  ( ^qlf^rft^  sjft^  )and 
the  perception  is  nothing  but  specific  differen- 


kAkMA  AND  OUDARiKA'SARlRA. 

tiation    and     fulftlment    of  the     conception. 

To  say    this    is    therefore   to    say  that  they    constitution 

,  r      1  I  .  of  the    Kdr- 

are  but  two  aspects  oi  the  same  thnig —  j,ian  body, 
one  is  universal  and  the  other  is  specific  in 
characters.  And  as  through  perception, 
the  conception  becomes  fulfilled,  we  may 
call  the  perceptual  organism  (  ^^(fT^.SditT)  to 
which  belongs  the  attribute  of  perception,  as 
instrumental  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  concep- 
tual organism  (  ^TH II  3JT\t  )  to  which  belong 
these  concepts,  and  both  of  them  thus  stand 
in  the  relation  of  mutual  inter-dependence. 

Thus  from  what  precedes  it  follows 
logically  and  necessarily,  that  all  the  varying 
experiences,  which  we  get  from  time  to  time 
from  the  peripheral  contact  of  the  external 
objects  with  the  senses,  are  contained  in  a 
nutshell,  as  it  were,  in  the  conception  itself  ; 
for  here   all    the  various   perceptions  which  # 

occur  from  time  to  time  are  preserved,  they 
being  but  specific  fulfilments  of  the  concept 
itself.  This  is  then  what  we  mean  by  saying 
that  Mrma  matter  [^t^  g^^)  is  being  stored 
up  in  the  karman  body  (^l^^  sj^^  l) 

To  discuss  the  question  from  another 
point    of   view    by    drawing    a    distinction 

339 


AN'  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  IS  M, 

between    the     experiences    of    the    OudArik 

A  study  from    ^^^Y  (  "^^1?:%  5|^^  )  and  the  experiences  of 
another  point    ^^^  kdrmatt  body  {^^^^  if^T  I ).  By  ouddrika 

(^^iftcff  ^tIt  )  we  mean  our  neural  organism 
which  is  the  vehicle  of  the  sensations,    gross 
in  form.  While  the  experiences  of  the  kdrman 
body    (  ^T^  ?u  sjf^T  )    is  confined  within  its 
thought,  ideas,  desires  and  will.     Here  there 
is    an    important     matter      to    note.       The 
experiences  of  the  Ouddrika    body  (  ^ll^lft^ 
aj^T  )  which  follows    on  the   direct  present- 
ment of  the  actual  objects,  have  no  interest 
for  us    unless    they    are  owned   by   us    i.e. 
referred   to     our    own      inner    nature      or 
kdrman  body  (^FT^Ttf  5J^T).     To  be  conscious 
that  I  am  experiencing  such  and  such  things, 
the   whole  of  objective    experience    requires 
to    be    viewed   as    the     experience    of    my 
inner  nature  or  in  other  words  the  objective 
experience,  belonging  to    the  ouddrika  body 
(^^iftcff  I^t)  must  be    referred  back  to  and 
determined  by  the  inner  nature  ;    otherwise 
the   experience,    being    devoid  of  every  sub- 
jective reference,    will  lose  all  interest  for  us, 
and  cannot  be  viewed  as  my  own  experience. ' 
The  outer  experience,  unless  they  are  referred 

340 


kAkMA  AND  OUDARIKA-SARIRA. 

back  to  and  determined  by  our  inner  nature 
stands   on   the   same   level  as   other  pheno- 

^  The      Outer 

mena  occurinof  in  Nature.     But  these  states    andtheinner 

^  mutually  and 

of  chancres  become  the   source  of  interest  for    P^.''^^^  deter- 
^  mine      eacn 

US  as  soon  as  as  they  are  viewed  as  experi-  °^  ^^* 
ences  of  the  kdrman  body  (cRT^xir  sifiT)  itself. 
So  our  inner  experience  or  the  experience  of 
the  kdrman  body  is  not  only  the  outer  ex- 
perience merely  condensed  and  materialised, 
but  it  is  something  more. 

It  is  not  another  kind  of  experience  to  be 
set  by  the  side  of  the  outer  experience,  but 
one  which  includes  the  latter  and  goes  beyond 
it.  It  is  the  outer  experience  itself  focussed 
and  referred  to  and  determined  by  our 
inner-nattire.  Hence  it  follows  that  they 
are  not  two  distinct  worlds  of  experience, 
but  ultimately  the  same,  with  this  distiction 
only  that  one  is  devoid  of  every  subjective 
reference  while  the  other  is  not. 

Hence  (i)  if  the  operation  or  the  activity 
of  the  otcddrika  body  (  ^^ift^  nt\\,  )  when 
not  referred  to  and  determined  by  the  inner 
nature,  standing  on  the  same  level  as  other 
phenomena  of  Nature,  becomes  morally  blank, 
and  assume  moral  quality,  only  on  their  refer- 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM\ 

ence  to  the  inner  nature,  and  if  (2)  human 
The  Kdrman  ^^P^^^^^^^^  be  possible  Only  on  this  ascription 
gesuv^e^  ^"of   ^**  reference,  it  follows  necessarily  that  every 

the     persist"  •    • 

ence  of  per-    activity    or    karma   leaves    behind  an   effect 

sonality   and  1         1      1  •         i  1  r 

re-birth.  either  good  or  bad  in   the    shape  of   vestiges 

on  the  Mrman  body  (^T^i'!!  sttIt) — our  inner 
nature  or  the  Character  of  Prof.   Huxley. 

Having  discussed  the  relation  between 
the  Inner-nature,  Karman  body  (  offT'iT  ^ 
ajTtT  ),  and  Oudarika  body  (  ^T^ltx^  3JT)?:  ), 
or  Outer-nature  we  come  to  the  question  of 
re-birth.  So  long  we  discussed  the 
problem  of  relation  in  theoretical  terms. 
But  the  world,  we  live  in,  is  a  moral  world, 
nay,  even  more,  a  practically  significant  world 
than  it  is  a  theoretically  definable  world. 
And  we  may,  at  once,  simply  say  that  the 
concept  of  the  individual  in  its  primary  and 
original  sense  is  distinctly  an  ethical  concept 
and  that  is  so  whether  you  speak  in  theore- 
tical terms  or  in  terms  of  being.  So  from 
this  conception  of  individuality  we  hope  to 
see  to  the  possibilities  of  rebirth,  not  merely 
as  a  logical  necessity  but  as  that  without 
which  the  purpose  of  man's  individuality 
will  be  altogether  balked. 


KARMA  AND  OUDARIKA-SARIRA 

As  a  mere  theoretical    thinker,  we  cannot 
get  any    idea    of    individuality,  nor  can  we 

^  ^  ^'  The  idea  of 

form    any  clear  conception  of  it.     We    can    individuality 

'  *•  — h  o  w       It 

prove  all  ^ this  by  psychological  analysis  of  ^^^'^^ops? 
the  development  of  a  child's  mind.  A  child's 
first  ideas  are  all  unconsciously  universal 
or  vaguely  abstract  ideas.  Even  the  child's 
first  conscious  ideas  must  be  of  what  we 
call  the  universal  as  such.  The  many 
presentations  he  cannot  yet  know  as  so  many 
individuals  ;  for  he  cannot  grasp  single  facts 
for  their  own  sake.  He  only  learns  to 
recognise  the  type  which  persists  through 
many  presentations.  He  knows  things  by 
types,  by  universals.  The  one  that  persists 
through  the  many,  he  comes  to  recognise  as 
the  one,  the  universal,  the  type,  the  idea.  As 
a  mere  theoretical  thinker  his  progress  has 
stopped  and  cannot  go  beyond  it. 

But  observe  another  side  of  his  nature. 
He  has  a  doll  ;  and  say,  he  loves  it.  He 
breaks  it.  Now  offer  him  another  doll  as 
nearly  as  possible  like  the  former  one.  Now 
will  the  child  accept  this  as  compensation  ? 
No.  And  what  is  the  reason  of  this  ?  It  is 
this     that    the    love    for  this    toy    is    in     its 

343 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

subjective,    instinctive,  pre-conscious  type  an 
exclusive  love,  and  is  such   a  feeling  that  the 

The  point  of  ^ 

individuaiton  jjea  of  the  two  objects  that  can  be  concieved 
as  giving  equally  possible  satisfaction  of 
this  feeling  is  an  absurd  idea.  At  this  moment 
he  consciously  individuates  the  toy  and  this 
is  so  because  he  loves  the  toy  with  an 
exclusive  love  that  permits  no  other.  With 
such  exclusive  interests,  one  learns  to  love 
one's  home,  books,  children  etc.  Hereby  one 
becomes  conscious  of  a  thing  not  as  an  object 
that  represents  a  class,  for  exclusive  interest 
does  not  permit  it,  but  views  it  as  a  single 
member  of  a  single  class.  This  is  the  point 
where  he  individuates  it. 

Thus  we  see  ethical  love,  or  organising 
interest  is  precisely  that  sort  of  interest  that 
cannot  serve  two  masters.  It  first  indivi- 
duates the  master  and  then  others  in 
relation  to  it,  that  come  in  the  way  of  means 
to  it.  It  is  this  individuating  interest  in 
living  one  kind  of  life  for  one  purpose  in  view 
that  a  man  becomes  a  moral  individual,  self- 
same personality  and  not  a  totality  of  passing 
states  as  the  Sensationist  School  or  the 
Buddhists  hold. 

344 


KARMA  AND  OUDARIKA-SARIRA 

Now      to     consider   our     own      theory 
regarding  kdrman  body  (  ^l4|Tn  siCt?:  )  \Jiva 

Freedom 

incessantly  tries  and  strup[gles  to  get  rid  of  the    ^^^^    bond- 

^^  ^  age—the  ex- 

bondages  of  limitations,  through  Karma,  as  elusive  mter- 
we  have  seen  before.  This  becomes  its  excln- 
sive  interest.  The  love  for  particular  mode  of 
living  i,e.  the  mode  in  which  the  liberation  can 
easily  be  achieved,  becomes  the  exclusive 
interest  for  the  man  and  tends  to  indivi- 
dualise him.  This  exclusive  love  for  this 
state  of  autonomy  or  self-rule,  which  no  body 
can  attain  just  in  the  way  open  to 
him,  tends  to  individuate  his  activities 
and  conduct,  as  well  as  the  outer  organism 
the  oudarika  body  (  ^^if?;^  ajft?  ),  by  means . 
of  which  actions  conducive  to  the  self-rule  or 
autonomy  are  performed.  Thus  we  may  say 
that  though  the  kdrman  body  (^T'if  ?TF  3[|T\?:) 
may  resemble  others  of  the  same  kind  in 
types  universal  in  character,  still,  considered 
as  individualised  that  is  in  the  sense  we 
have  expounded  above,  they  are  quite 
distinct  and  separate  entities.  Individuals 
they  are  and  must  be,  for  all  have  exclusive 
interest  for  the  attainment  of  that  state  of 
autonomy,    of  bliss   and   beatitude  which   is 

44 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISIVL 

the  real  and  ultimate  goal  of  all  that  live, 
move  and  have  their  being  in  the  different 
abodes  of  the  Sansdr.  Now  do  we  not  see 
that  without  immortality  and  re-birth  of  the 
Jiva — i.e.,  without  the  persistence  and  conti- 
nuance of  the  Kdrman-hody  through  the 
ravages  of  time  and  the  processes  ofmetam- 
psychosis  the  whole  purpose  of  such  life  and 
individuality  as  manifest  in  the  incessant 
struggling  of  the  Jiva  becomes  absolutely 
meaningless  ! 


3^6 


Doubt  as   to 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 
FREE-WILL  AND  FATALISM, 

Tkc  ^roolem  JtscusseJ  ;  Is  * Jtva'  a  free  centre  oi 
Ortgtnatton  ? — -Belief  tn  tKe  latter  makes  ~  Moral 
Juagment  Inex|>ltcal>le — Etlitcs  lose  xts  Injunctive 
Character — Leaves  no  room  for  Merit,  Reward  and 
Virtue — Examination  OI  tke  Oemerits  Arguments  m 
the  Ligkt  of  Eurot>ean  £tKics. 

Hitherto  we  have    been    discussing   the 
relation   between    the   Mrman   body  (  ^^4^^ 

S|?:k  )    and  (9^^(Jr//^^  body    {  ^^rft^    Sift'C  )     correctness 
^  /     \        ^  '     of  the    Jain 

and    the  transmis^ration    of  the  former   from    ^^.^^^^^n  ^" 

^  F  ree-will. 

body  to  body  by  means  of  which  a  /wa 
attains  to  higher  forms  of  evolution  and 
state  of  beatitude  by  its  own  moral  will 
and  endeavour.  There  we  took  it  for  granted, 
as  it  were,  that  every  yiva  has  got  capacity 
to  improve  itself  morally  and  otherwise 
by  its  own  effort.  Whether  this  belief  is 
true  we  did  not  stop  there  to  enquire  and 
consider.  And,  there  may  arise,  indeed,  a 
doubt  as  to  the  rationale  and  correctnsss 
of  this  belief.  The  Jains  hold,  as  we  shall  see 

347 


An  epitome  of  JAlNiSM. 

later  on,  that  either  this  belief  must  be  true 
or  moral  judgment  must  inevitably  become 
impossible.  Thus  the  question  raised  is  a  very 
important  one  ;  and  moreover  as  the  whole 
fabric  of  the  Jain  metaphysics  and  ethics 
which  are  but  complementary  parts  of  a 
singular  system  of  thought  is  based  on 
the  belief  in  the  Free-will  of  the  [iva  who  is 
the  maker  and  master  of  his  own  fate,  it 
imperatively  demands  of  us  an  immediate 
solution.  In  taking  up  the  question,  therefore, 
ere  we  enter  upon  any  other  topics,  we  shall 
first  examine  the  problem  from  the  view 
points  of  European  Ethics, — Whether  in 
the  exercise  of  will,  in  the  choices  of 
Theproblem    t^ji^s    and    alternative    lines    of  action    for 

of  Free-will.  ^ 

a  particular  end  which  the  /iva  has  in 
view  the  mind  is  wholly  determined  by 
phenomenal  antecedents  and  external  con- 
ditions or  itself  also,  as  active  subject 
of  these  objective  experiences,  plays  the 
role  of  a  determining  cause?  In  short, 
whether  or  not,  \hQ  Jiva  is  a  free  centre  of 
origination  } 

This   is    the    problem  which    now  looms 
before  us  for    solution.     The    two    doctrines 

34S 


PREE  Will  and  fatalism. 

which  we  shall  develop  presently,   represent 
very   widely  divergent   schemes   of  thought, 
which   put   a   different   interpretation    upon 
every   thing    in    nature   and    life   of  which 
we   shall    have   occasion    to  speak  later  on. 
Those     who     maintain     the     first    one     of 
these  two    alternative    doctrines,    call  them- 
selves, 'Necessitarians'  ;  because    under   the 
assigned    conditions,    the    sequence    of  one 
particular   volition,    in    their   opinion,    is  an    The  Fatalists 
inevitable   event  which   is  no   less  than    the    willists. 
falling     of  a   book    when    blown    off    from 
the   roof    of   a     house.     And     those     who 
maintain    the   second     one   of    the   alterna- 
tives, call  themselves    'Libertarians,'  because 
they     deem     it     possible,     inspite     of     the 
assigned  condition,  for   the    mind  to  will,   or 
not  to   will,   or   to   will  otherwise.     It  is  not 
obliged   to   deliver    itself    to     a     bespoken 
judgment  or  submit  to  the  verdict  of  Nature. 
The  former  thinkers  regard  man    as    simply 
a   product   or  an  effect    of  cosmic    evolution 
while     the    latter  as    an    originating     cause 
capable  of  determining  what  was  indetermi- 
nate before.     According  to  the  former    view 
man  has  been   throughout,    and    has   always 

349 


An  epitome  of  j a  in  ism. 

and  invariably  to  be  submissive  to  the 
play  of  given  laws  and  forces  working 
upon  his  life  that  move  and  mould  him  as 
they  come  and  go  ;  while  according  to  the 
other  he  himself  stands  in  the  midst  of  the 
conflicting  forces  of  Nature  as  a  maker  and 
master  of  his  surroundings,  as  autonomous, 
as  an  independent  centre  of  origination. 

The  problem  therefore  is  :  Is  man  an 
absolute  creature  of  the  cosmic  powers 
that  set  him  up  ?  Is  he  simply  a  product 
of  nature  ?  We  answer,  '*No,"  For,  if  he 
Evidence  were  simply  a  resultant  of  the  cosmic  pro- 
^frminism.^  cesses  of  life  and  living  or  if  he  were  wholly 
and  absolutely  determined  in  his  will  by 
other  phenomenal  antecedents,  then  .what 
sense  is  there  in  the  moral  judgment  which 
we  pass  upon  others  ?  Does  not  moral 
judgment  take  for  granted  that  in  the 
moment  of  yielding  to  one  of  the  competing 
solicitations  which  is  morally  bad,  we  might 
have  preferred  the  other  if  we  really  willed 
it  ?  Does  it  not  take  for  granted  that  we 
are  not  manufactured  articles  passable  in 
the  market  of  the  world  as  o^ood  or  bad 
from  the    very    beginning   of  our    mundane 

350 


FREE  WILL  AND  FATALISM, 

existence,  but  to  a  certain  extent  at  least 
authors  of  our  own  characters  ?  If  you  are 
already  determined  to  take  up  a  particular 
line  of  action  by  phenomenal  antecedents, 
then,  what  sense  is  there  in  such  sayings 
of  Ethics  or  Gospels,  of  the  Great  as  **Do 
this  and  that  and  do  not  do  other." 
Ethics  will  lose  its  injunctive  character 
and  will  be  reduced  to  a  mere  science  of 
health.  In  fact  the  experience  of  contrition 
which  follows  so  often  on  one's  doing 
something  wrong,  the  language  of  praise 
and  blame,  we  so  often  use  when  admiring 
the  moral  rectitude  or  the  quality  of  the 
sentiment  of  justice,  the  inspiring  instances 
of  forgiveness,  the  constant  reference  to 
higher  virtue,  to  the  mode  of  plain  living  and 
high  thinking  and  all  of  the  like  character 
we  say,  rest  on  this  belief  in  the  freedom 
of  man.  Take  away  the  freedom  of  man, 
the  wickedness  of  him  comes  out  in 
all  nakedness  and  horribleness  in  the 
same  category  as  devastations  of  nature. 
If  noble  minds  rose  upon  us  as  neces- 
sarily as  lengthening  summer  days,  we 
might     indeed     rejoice,    but       cannot      be 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM 

carried  away  by  uplifting  veneration. 
The  language  of  ethics  when  translated 
into  necessarian  formulas,  bids  adieu  to  all 
conceptions  distinctly  moral  and  becomes 
simply  discriptive  of  phenomena  in 
natural  history.  It  tells  us  what  has  been 
what  is  going  on  and  what  will  be  in 
the  time  to  come ;  but  not  what  ought 
to  be.  For  if  an  inevitable  and  invincible 
necessity  makes  us  will  what  we  will, 
our  will  is  no  more  responsible  for  its  voli- 
tion than  the  spring  of  a  watch  is  responsible 
for  its  movement.  From  this  point  of  view 
it  is  absurd  to  blame  the  will,  which  wills  only 
in  so  as  far  as  another  cause  distinct  from 
it,  makes  it  will  in  the  manner  as  it  wills.  In 
short,  if  you  take  liberty  away  from  man,  you 
leave  on  the  earth  no  vice,  no  virtue,  no 
merit ;  rewards  are  absurd  and  punishments 
become  unjust. 

To  enter  therefore   into   an   examination 
of  the  ethics   of  the  necessarians.     Some  of 

Examination 

of  the  Deter-    ^hem  hold  that  "the  universal  application    of 

ministsargu-  *■  ^ 

ments.  ^]^g    causal-connection   leaves   no   room   for 

caprice  or  freedom  in  the  mysterious  citadel 
of  will".     If  everything   in    nature    is  deter- 


35^ 


FREE-WILL  AND  FATALISM. 

mined  by  antecedent  conditions,  why  may 
not  the  same  thing  be  true  in  the  sphere  of 
our  volition. 

In  reply  to  this  we  say  that  * 'against  the  ^ee-caiU!^ 
evidence  offered  for  Determinism,  there  is 
to  be  set  the  immediate  affirmation  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  moment  of  deliberate 
action."  And  a  psychologist  must  accept 
as  elementary  ''what  introspection  carefully 
performed  declares  to  be  so". 

Moreover,  as  metaphysics  points  out,  the 
primary  idea  of  causality  is  derived  from  the 
efficiency  of  the  will  itself  and  a  secondary 
account  of  causality  as  is  found  in  nature 
should  never  be  applied  to  the  interpretation 
of  human  volition.  , 

(2)  When  we  fix  our  attention  on  hu- 
man action  we  observe  that  a  portion  of  it  is 
originated    by    subconscious    influences   and 

the  same  thing  may  be  true  of  our   volition,    ,,  ,. . 

^         '  '     Volition      IS 

Specially   when    there    is   no   sharp   line   of   f^er^^^n  of 
demarcation  between  such  acts    and    volition    ^es^^^^^"^" 
and   when  the  gradual    transformation   from 
one  to  the  other  is  an  undeniable  fact. 

Against  this  we  may  point  out  that  it 
overlooks  the  fundamental   characterestic    of 

353 

45 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

volition.  Our  exercise  of  will  is  strictly  con- 
fined within  the  region  of  consciousness  and 
a  choice  among  such  facts  of  clear  conscious- 
ness forms  the  true  characteristic  of  volition. 
(3)  "We  always  explain  the  voluntary 
acts  of  others  on  the  principle  ot  causation 
by  character  and  circumstances.  Indeed 
otherwise  social  life  would  be  impossible." 

In  reply  to  this    we  may  say    that    inter- 
pretation of  facts  by  reference  to  the    known 
Character  is    tendencies   of  character    illustrate     but   the 
and    points    influence  of  habits.     But  this   habit    is   only 

to    the    uni-  •  r       1  -r  •  r 

form     exer-    an   expression    ot    the   uniform    exercise   of 
cise  of  free- 
will, free-will.       Again,     however    adequate    our 

knowledge  of  one's  character  may  be,  it  never 

enables  us  to  predict  with  absolute  certainty, 

how  one  should  act  on  any  future  occasion. 

The   dictum   of  these     philosophers     in 

the   domain  of  ethics,    is   that   our   volition 

is     always     determined     by   the     strongest 

motive  and  the   motive    which    can   ever   be 

the  strongest  is   that  of  prospective  pleasure. 

Be  the  motive   passions   many   or   few   that 

are  implanted  in   us,    that   which   practically 

moves  us  into   action   is    the    strongest   one 

and   the  strongest  one   among   the   motives 

35i 


FREE -WILL  AND  FATALISM. 

should  be  recognised  by  its  pleasure-pro- 
ducing capacity.  This  idea  of  prospective  g^^  psycho- 
pleasure  then  becomes  closely  associated  d'e^erminists^ 
with  the  strongest  solicitation  which  prompts 
us  to  action.  Thus  will  of  man  is  alto- 
gether passive  here  ;  for,  it  cannot  but 
identify  itself  with  this  strongest  desire. 

The  obvious  defect  of  this  theory  is 
that  it  entirely  makes  the  will  passive.  And 
it  is  due  to  bad  psychology.  A  desire 
cannot  actuate,  cannot  lead  us  to  do  a 
particular  action,  unless  we  identify  ourselves 
with  this  solicitation  which  alone  can  urge 
us  to  follow  a  particular  course  of  action.  When 
we  identify  ourselves  with  one  of  these  desires, 
(this  act  is  called  will),  it  gets  into  promi- 
nence over  all  others  and  thereby  becomes 
the  strongest  one.  This  strongest  one,  we 
call  motive  proper.  In  this  act  of  willing 
which  consists  in  the  conscious  identifica- 
tion of  ourselves  with  one  of  the  desires 
which  are  by  themselves  nothing  more  than 
mere  promptings,  the  will  is  wholly  active 
and  is  completely  free. 

An  objection  might  be  taken  here  to  the 
effect  that  even  in  this  act  of  willing  the   will 

355 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

\  is     determined     by    one's     character,     and 

habit,  and  so  cannot  be  reckoned  as 
free  in  its  operation.  But  to  this  our 
reply  is  that  this  character  which  fetters 
our  will  in  its  activity,  is  itself  nothing 
but  the  product  of  the  free  operation 
of  ourselves,  the  effects  of  which  are  materia- 
lised and  preserved  as  Character  or  Karma- 
matter.  For  what  is  this  Character  ?  It  is  the 
settled  disposition  of  the  mind  to  operate 
in  a  particular  way  when  opportunity  comes. 
It  is  the  habit  which  fetters    us    indeed    only 

tj      r-t,         apparently  to  a  certain  extent  later  on,  but  as 
How  Chara-      r ir  y 

presence^^of  engendered  by  the  free  operation  of  ourselves. 
We  say  apparently,  because  the  clear  verdict 
of  consciousness  in  every  case  of  activity  is 
that  we  might  have  preferred  another  course 
of  action,  had  we  but  sufficient  strength  of 
will.  We  cannot,  by  any  amount  of  effort  as  a 
clear  introspection  reveals,  divest  ourselves 
of  this  concioussness  of  freedom — i.e. 
freedom  to  operate  otherwise  if  only  we 
had  sufficient  stamina  to  do  so.  In  the 
presence  of  this  clear  verdict  of  conscious- 
ness all  the  arguments  arrayed  by  the 
Determinists    fall     to   the   ground   and   our 


free-will. 


PREE-WILL  AND  FATALISM, 

will  seems  to  be  not  determined  by  its 
phenomenal  antecedents  as  has  been 
wrongly  alleged,  but  is  on  the  other  hand 
free  to  all  intents  and  purposes. 

Again  if  our  volition  is  completely  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive,  and  if  that 
motive  be  always  that  of  prospective  plea- 
sure, then  we  cannot  but  identify  the  deter- 
minists  with  the  egoists.  And  we  must  neces- 
sarily charge  him  with  the  horrible  consequen- 
ces of  a  rule  of  life  founded  upon  self-interest. 
His  difificulty  will  begin  when  going    beyond    ism^^cons^s- 

this  simple  psychological    fact    viz,  that    the    loped  leads 

,  .  ...  to  egoism, 

strongest    motive   determmes   our    volition, 

he  tries  to  make  a  relative  estimate  of  these 
hap-hazard  impulses  and  find  for  them  an 
ethical  principle  of  order  and  to  say  that  the 
altruists  should  have  place  rather  than  the 
egoists,  and  the  sense  of  right  than  both. 
Besides  these  he  overlooks  the  play  of  dis- 
interested impulses  in  mind  in  the  shape 
of  motherly  affection,  devotion  to  right, 
compassion  etc.  If  this  be  the  doctrine  of 
the  necessarians,  we  may  conclude  by  saying 
that  it  is  in  no  way  compatible  with  the 
sense  of  duty  in  men  and  excludes  all  righte- 

357 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

ousness  from  the  universe  ;  and  thus  the 
moral  faith  and  nobleness  of  the  neces- 
sarian becomes  an  intellectual  inconsequence. 
Nay  more,  it  takes  away  from  man  what 
belongs  to  himself  properly,  his  freedom 
which  constitutes  his  true  worth  and  dignity 
and  brings  him  down  to  the  level  of 
inanimate  objects  of  nature. 


%S8 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
WILL  AND  INDIVIDUALITY. 

*Kftnna-Sarira'  an  J  tke  Nature  of  its  Migration — 
W^ater-Glotule  an  J  *Karma'-GloLule — The  VegetaLle, 
Seeds  and  'Karma-Sanra  m  Relation  to  Nature — 
Selection  anJ  its  Gnaracter  —  riuman  Cvolution  is 
Essentially  Teleological — Humanity  always  lceet>s  a 
Goal  before  itself. 

Now  it  is  this  'Kdrman  Sarira\  the 
Character  or  the  inner  nature  of  the  indivi- 
dual man  that    re-incarnates    or  expresses  it- 

The  Chirac- 

self  successively   in    various    forms  through    t  c  r :    the 

K  dr  m  a  n 

the  repetition  of  births  and  deaths.     When  a    body    re- 

incartes. 

man  dies,  the  KArman-Sarira,  his  character 
or  inner  nature,  is  not  disintegrated  and 
dissolved  with  the  death  and  dissolution  of 
his  physical  mortal  organism,  but  passes 
through  womb  to  womb  in  an  invisible 
form.  To  draw  a  comparison  with  a 
physical  phenomenon,  as  a  water-globule 
rising  from  the  surging  waves  ruffling  the 
vast  expanse  of  the  ocean  passes  through 
various  stages  of  existence  sometime  in  the 
invisible   form   of  vapoury  state   in   a  cloud 

3^9 


Con  scious 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

or    changes   into   snow,    ice   or   descend   in 
rains  to  mingle  again    with    the   ocean   from 
^^TK^rman    which  it  Sprang  :     so  the  /^a;r;;/^-glob*ule,  for 
°  ^'  it   is  indeed  as   subtle    as   can    be   imagined 

— springing  up  as  it  does  in  the  beginning- 
less  past  from  the  vast  expanse  of  the  eter- 
nal ocean  of  verities,  persists  in  its  career, 
sometimes  remaining  invisible  to  our 
mortal  eyes,  at  other  times  expressing  itself 
through  the  gross  material  frames  of  living 
beings  and  organisms,  whirling  through 
a  succession  of  births  atid  deaths  according 
to  the  merits  and  demerits  of  its  past 
desires  and  deeds  moulding  the  inner  nature 
in  its  subsequent  career. 

The  thought,  will,  organic  want  or  de- 
sire moulding  the  inner  nature  or  'character' 
of  an  organism  has  a  power  of  selection  ; 
for,  thinking  and  willing  consist  in  determin- 
ing and  selecting  an  alternative,  and  the 
subtle  organism  determines  and  selects  only 
that  alternative  which  is  favourable  to  the 
manifestation  of  its  character  and  the 
realization  of  its  wants  and  desires. 
The  process  may  best  be  illustrated  by 
taking  two   seeds,  say  one  of  mangoe    and 

^60 


WILL  AND  INDIVIDUALITY, 

the  other  of  jack-fruit,  as  representing  two 
different  'Characters  or  Kdrma-Sartras  of  ^^  Analogy 
the  two  different  vegetable  organisms.  The 
power  of  growth  and  development  in  the  two 
seeds  or  their  inner  natures  is  of  the  same 
kind.  And  though  the  external  Nature 
or  the  environment  consisting  of  earth, 
water,  air,  light  and  so  forth  is  common 
to  both  the  seeds  planted  within  the 
bounds  of  a  selected  and  definite  area 
having  soils  of  equal  fertility  ;  yet  for  certain 
characteristic  peculiarities  latent  in  each 
of  the  stones,  each  determines,  selects,  and 
draws,  according  to  its  own  constitutional 
wants,  appetites,  and  desires,  peculiar  to  it- 
self, such  nourishment  both  qualitatively  and 
quantitavely  from  the  common  environment 
as  would  be  contributive  to  the  growth  and 
development  of  the  organism  and  to  the 
fulfilment  of  its  own  wants  and  desires. 
This  phenomenon  of  selection  by  the  seed 
is  not  a  blind  adaptation  to  the  environ- 
ment, but  selection  by  a  conscious  willing 
agent  having  a  preferential  interest  in 
the  thing  selected  from  amidst  an  infinite 
diversity  of  materials  and   elements  in    the 

46 


Selection  by 
human 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

unlimited      store-house     of     Nature.     The 
nature     and    character     of    this     conscious 


organism.        ^"^  deliberate   selection  becomes  more    and 
more  clear  to  our  vision  when  we  divert   our 
attention    to     the     human   evolution.     Man 
does  not  live  for   bread   alone,  not  for  mere 
animal  living    and    multiplication  of  species  ; 
but   expressly    for   the   attainment   of  some 
particular    object,    end,     or     idea.     Human 
evolution    differs    from   all    other   forms     of 
evolution    in     this     that     humanity    always 
keeps   before   itself  a   goal  for   the   realisa- 
.tion   of    which     it    constantly   strives     and 
struggles.       And      its     adaptation     to     the 
circumstances    is    not   a  blind    acquiescence 
to   the    forces     that   be,  a    mere    trimming 
of  the   sails  and   adjusting   of  the    oars    to 
suit   every  passing  breeze  ;  but  a  conscious 
choice   of  will  exercised  in    the  interest   of 
the  object,  end    or  idea,  it  keeps  always    in 
view.     If     the   object,     end     or     idea — the 
main-spring  of  his   thoughts   and    activities 
— is   lost     sight   of,    man    then    no     longer 
remains     a     conscious     willing    agent     im- 
pressing his  will   and    individuality  upon  the 
environment,     drawing     nourishment    from 


WILL  AND  INDIVIDUALiry. 

nature  and  utilizing  her  in  the  fulfilment 
of  his  desires  and  realization  of  his  end 
or  Idea  ;  but  becomes  a  dead  and  passive 
subject  to  the  indiscriminate  operation  of 
the  forces  that  surround  him.  His  destiny 
then  no  longer  remains  within  and  under  his 
control  ;  he  becomes  but  a  child  of  Nature, 
a  creature  of  circumstances  ;  and  his 
environment  becomes  all-in-all  and  plays  the 
role  of  Destiny  rough-hewing  and  shaping 
him  as  it  wills. 


3^3 


CHAPTER  XXV. 
CAUSALITY  IN  THE  MORAL  WORLD- 

AVnat     docs     *Rest>onstl)iltty     ImJ>ly — Reward     or 
Punishment    UnavotdaLle — Law    of   'Karma-Causality 
Invtolatle  — Prayer  or  WorslitJ)    kas    no     Efiicacy — No 
Need  of  Extra-Mundane     Moral    Providence  — Law    of 
'Karma     is    more   Rational    Exl>lanation — An     Act  of 
Vice  ts    not  equal  to  Incurring  a  DeLt— Tke  Tkeory  of 
'Karma  -Pudgal — tkc    Distinction  between   Rigkt    and 
Wrong  \s  not  an  Absolute  Distinction. 

In  discussing  the  question  of  Free-will 
and  Fatalism,  we  have  seen  that  man 
is  constitutionally  free  and  essentially  an 
autonomous  being  with  all  the  potentialities 
of  vision,  knowledge,  strength  and  delight 
infinite.  And  as  such  he  is  wholly  and 
entirely  responsible  for  all  his  thou'ghts  and 
actions.  We  have  seen  also  that  responsibility 
for  a  thought  or  an  act  means  the  liability 
of  the  man  who  thinks  or  acts  to  undergo 
the  consequences  of  his  thought  or  act. 

But  to  undergo  the  consequences  of  a 
thought  or  an  act  is  nothing  more  or  less 
than  the  enjoyment  of  a  reward  for  en- 
tertaining   a    good    thought  or  performing  a 

S6^ 


Law. 


CAUSALITY  IN  MORAL   WORLD. 

good    act    or   suffering    a     punishment     for 
giving  way   to  bad    thought  or   condescend- 

Automatic 

ing  to  do  a  bad  deed.  And  however  a  action  of  the 
man  might  wish  to  taste  the  sweet  fruits 
of  righteous  deeds  without  performing  the 
same  or  to  avoid  the  bitter  ones  for 
practising  the  vicious  acts,  he  can  never 
escape  the  firm  grasp  of  the  Law  of 
Karma -cdLUSaWiy  which  is  sure  to  bring  him 
round  and  round  to  undergo  the  conse- 
quences of  his  thoughts  and  deeds  in  perfect 
accordance  with  their  nature  and  character  ; 
for  the  Law,  so  to  speak,  is  automatic  in  action 
and  works  with  mathematical  precision.  So 
there  is  not  the  least  possibility  of  escape 
from  its  mechanical  grip.  You  may  offer  up 
prayers  on  your  knees  and  assure  the  Lord 
of  your  giving  Him  a  feast  with  the  best  and 
choicest  fruits,  flowers  and  sweets  or  you 
may  shave  off  your  heads  at  places  of 
pilgrimage  and  roll  yourself  on  the  dust  and 
dirt  around  the  temple  ;  or  you  may  knock 
your  brains  out  on  the  threshold  of  the 
shrine  of  your  Lord,  and  wash  his  feet 
by  the  tears  of  your  swollen  eyes  ;  but 
alas  !    these  will  not  save  your  from  the  iron- 

3^5 


An  epitome  of  jAini^  m. 

grip    of    the   great   law   of  karma-causality 

which    has    been    working   out    from     times 

without  beginning. 

Admitting     the   truth     and     validity     of 

Liquidation    Kamia-causality,    however,     in     a    more    or 
of  debt.  ^ 

less  general  way,  some  suggest  that  a  man 
will  be  judged  by  his  actions  and  be 
punished  and  rewarded  for  these.  But  this 
implies  evidently  that  as  if  there  is  a  judge 
human  or  divine,  as  they  hold,  who 
may  be  prejudiced  or  partially  informed  or 
might  be  lenient  in  the  administration  of 
Justice  in  the  case  of  one  and  strict  and 
uncompromising  in  the  case  of  another. 
Again,  to  escape  from  the  undesirable  con- 
sequences of  our  thoughts  and  actions,  some 
interprete  that  by  doing  a  wrong,  the  man 
simply  incurs  a  debt  and  that  this  debt  can 
well  be  paid  off  by  the  sinner  himself  or  by 
some  one  else  for,  and  on  his  behalf.  The 
interpretation  of  the  law  of  Karma  in  this 
wise  has  created  a  much  confusion  of  thought 
and  anomalies  in  the  performances  of  religious 
and  social  rites.  The  Srddk  ceremony  of  the 
Hindus  consisting  in  the  offerings  of  pindas 
on   the   death   of  the  father  is  one  amongst 

^66 


CA  USALITY  IN  MORAL   WORLD. 

many    others    which    partly   appears   to   be 

resultant   of    such     a   line   of  thinking    and    ^ 

°  Responsibi- 

reasoning.     The   crucifixion   of  Jesus  Christ    bJi^^y""^  ^^^^ 
whereby    the   entire    race   of     sinners     was    each^othen"^ 
saved   is    but    another     illustration     of    the 
same   kind   of  interpretation   that   can    only 
proceed  from  Christian  bigotry. 

To  disown  the  sequence  and  own  the 
antecedents  is  like  the  denial  of  attributes  to 
a  substance.  The  attributes  inseparably  go 
with  the  substance  ;  so  does  the  consequence 
i.e.  responsibility  for  the  thought  and  act 
inseparably  goes  with  the  thought  and  act 
themselves.  Doino-  an  act  of  vice  is  not 
the  same  as  the  act  of  borrowing  money  and 
incurring  a  debt  which  can  well  be  cleared 
up,  either  by  the  debtor  himself,  or  by 
another  for  and  on  his  behalf.  It  is 
not  like  the  liquidation  of  a  debt 
some  how  or  other,  and  shirking  all  respon- 
sibility thereby  ;  for,»"  not  only  the  man  who 
commits  an  act  of  vice,  has  to  undergo  the 
consequence  of  the  same  ;  but  he  has  also 
to  bear  the  burden  of  the  Karma-pudgal 
which  clinging  to  the  soul  instinctively  de- 
velops  a     certain     strength   and     vibratory 

3^7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

motion  whereby  his  future  nature  and  career 

is  moulded  to  some  extent.  And  examination 

No  common    of  the    natural     environments     wherein    the 

standard. 

man  is  ushered  into  a  physical  existence,  a 
study  of  the  development  of  his  form  and 
physical  constitution  as  well  as  his  mental 
inclinations,  the  colouration  of  his  thoughts 
and  activities  in  the  different  spheres  of 
life — all  tend  to  show  how  he  has  to  still 
bear  the  burden  of  Karma-pudgal  of  years 
and  ages  he  passed  through. 

But  others,  remark,  there  is  no  common 
standard  whereby  we  are  to  judge  between 
good  and  evil,  and  act  accordingly.  What 
you  think  to  be  good  to  A  might  be  bad  to  B. 
What  is  happiness  to  you  might  be  a 
misery  to  me.  What  is  deadly  poison  to 
you  might  prove  a  saving  nector  to  me. 
Besides,  we  do  not  see  the  good  accruing 
from  good,  and  evil  begetting  evil,  always 
and  invariably.  Very  often  the  case  appears 
to  be  reverse  to  what  is  generally  inter- 
preted according  to  the  law  of  karma. 

So  think  the  impatient  minds  labouring 
under  a  regrettable  short-sightedness  to  look 
through    Nature,  the  permanent   theater   of 

368 


CAUSALITY  IN  MORAL   WORLD, 

perpetual    changes.     But  these  people    seem 
to  have  no  insiefht  into    the    metaphysics    of 

°  '  The  use  and 

things  and    thoug^hts    and    to    fomet    that    the  abuse  are 

^  ^  ^  the     criteria 

nothing  is  good  in  and  by  itself.  It  is  disti'nction*  ^ 
the  use  and  abuse  of  things  and  powers  with 
us  that  are  either  good  or  bad.  There  is 
nothing  as  freaks  of  nature  in  our  philosophy. 
What  is  in  the  root  must  come  out  in  the  sap. 
Whatever  happens  must  have  a  cause  and 
whatever  is  in  the  cause  must  pass  into  the 
effect.  Right  use  must  result  in  good  effects 
and  bad,  bad. 

The  law  of  karma  as  we  hold  it,  is  but  an  all- 
embracing  interpretation  of  the  law  of  causa- 
tion which  must  work  out  things  inevitably 
and  invariably.  If  the  fall  of  the  apple, 
before  the  eyes  of  Newton  who  deduced 
thereof  the  universal  law  of  gravitation 
whereby  all  what  is  earthly  is  drawn  to- 
wards the  earth,  were  but  a  freak  of 
nature,  how  things  of  the  world  would 
stand  ?  Where  would  be  the  use  of  the  fall 
at  Niagara — if  the  torrents  were  to  run  down 
only  occasionally  without  any  invariability  ? 
Just  as  the  use  and  utility  of  the  natural 
laws   and    forces    lie   in    their   invariability 

47 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

and    inexon  erability    of  the   phenomena   in 
and    through  which  they  present   themselves 

Invariability 

of  the  opera-    to  US  :  SO  it  is  the  invariability  and  uniformity 

tion  of  Kar- 
ma-causality,   of     the      operation    of     the    law  of  karma- 

causality  that  makes  possible  the  amendment 
of  and  atonement  for  our  past  and  the 
laying  down  as  well  the  lines  of  our  action 
in  future.  Indeed  there  is  a  common  adage 
to  the  effect,  that  what  is  done  cannot  be 
undone  ;  but  surely  we  can  neutralize  or 
turn  the  direction  of  our  past  action-currents 
by  quickly  setting  up  a  set  of  counter 
action-currents.  For  illustration,  you  sent 
a  message  to  B,  a  message  the  breaking  of 
which  has  every  likelihood  of  breaking  his 
heart  as  well.  Immediately  after,  when  you 
learn  that  the  message  you  despatched  was 
a  wrong  one,  how  would  you  act  ?  Surely 
•  either  you  would  run  yourself  to  or  send 
one  of  your  chosen  men  with  definite 
orders  either  to  overtake  the  man  with  the 
message  on  the  way  and  stop  him  from  deli- 
vering the  message,  or  failing  which  to  do 
something  else  that  would  surely  neutralize 
the  effect  produced  by  the  delivery  of  the 
wrong  message.    And  this  is  how  the  effect  of 

37^ 


CAUSALITY  IN  MORAL  WORLD. 

past   actions   can  be  amended  or  neutralized 

by  our  quickly  setting  up  currents  of  counter    Amendment 

.  1  1        r  T^     of  the    past 

action  to  run  as  antidotes  to  the  former.  It  posibie. 
is  just  like  setting  the  ball  on  motion  in  a 
certain  direction  and  stopping  the  same  by  a 
subsequent  counter-action  which  would  either 
neutralize  the  effects  of  previous  action  or 
divert  the  ball  in  motion  in  another  direction 
determined  by  the  laws  of  the  parallelogram 
of  forces.  It  is  true  that  we  cannot  in  fact 
undo  what  we  have  already  done  ;  but  surely 
we  can  thus  modify  and  improve  matters 
to  a  large  extent  by  setting  up  new  forces  to 
run  counter  to  the  older  ones  and  neutralize 
or  divert  the  currents  of  the  same. 

So  we  see  the  law  of  karma,  properly 
understood,  is  not  so  fatalistic  that  it  would 
send  in  us  a  thrill  of  shudder  to 
think  of  the  firm  grasp  of  the  hold 
it  lays  upon  us.  However  inexonerable, 
however  death-like  might  be  the  grip  of 
the  Law  to  make  us  undergo  the  con- 
sequences of  our  own  thoughts  and 
deeds,  it    is   not   as  cruel  as  Destiny  herself  • 

compelling  us  to    do    this    and    that    at    her 
own    dictates    and    sweet  will.    For,    just    as 

37^ 


An  epitome  of  jainisM 

we  know  more  of  the  laws   of  nature,    the 
more   intelligently   we  can    use  them    to  our 

The  doctrine  ^ 

of  Karma  not    qwu  advantapfe  and  benefit  :  so  the  more  we 

fatalistic.  ^ 

know  of  the  character  and  working  on  of 
the  Law  of  A:«rw^-causality,  the  more  firmly 
we  become  convinced  intellectually  and 
morally  that  it  is  a  law  that  has  always  been 
affording  us  ample  opportunities  to  right 
the  wrong,  to  remedy  the  evil,  to  amend 
the  effects  of  the  past  with  a  view  of 
moulding  the  inner  nature — our  character, 
for  a  higher  form  of  evolution  of  a  more  and 
more  perfect  type  of  organism  and  for  the 
attainment  of  greater  perfection.  And  such 
is  the  teaching  of  our  sages  ! 

From  what  precedes,  it  seems  to  follow 
that  every  living  being,  specially  the  man 
who  always  keeps  before  himself  as  a  goal, 
the  realization  of  a  particular  end  or  idea, 
is  free  to  think  and  act  as  he  wills.  Will, 
as  we  have  remarked,  consists  in  determining 
and  selecting  between  the  two  or  more 
alternatives.  A  man  with  certain  object 
•  in     his     mind     to      accomplish,     invariably 

finds     on    reflection  that  there  are    different 
alternative     means      by      which       he     can 


CAUSALITY  IN    MORAL    WORLD. 

accomplish  the  end  he  has  in  his  view. 
And   he   is   free    to   determine    and   select 

Works    with 

the  one  or  the  other  of  the  alternatives    that    ^P     end  in 

view. 

would  suit  him  best.  When  we  ponder  over 
the  ways  and  manners  in  which  a  man  thinks 
and  acts,  we  find  that  his  thoughts  and 
activities  in  the  different  spheres  of  life 
consist  in  the  conscious  acceptance  of  one 
thing  and  a  similar  rejection  of  another. 
Of  the  different  alternative  means,  we 
freely  adopt  that  course  of  procedure 
which  we  think  to  be  most  conducive 
to  the  realization  of  our  end,  and  reject 
others  as  being  detrimental  to  the  end.  We 
do  not  live  only  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
lower  instincts  and  multiplication  of  species. 
We  live  for  progress,  for  peace  and 
happiness.  The  highest  end  of  mankind  is 
to  live,  move  and  have  its  being  in  peace  and 
happiness.  No  doubt  every  one  desires  to 
live  long  and  to  live  well  also  ;  but  what  to 
live  for,  if  it  be  not  for  the  enjoyment  of  auto- 
nomy, of  peace  and  bliss  }  Whatever  might 
be  the  nature  and  constitution  of  this 
Summum  Bonum  ;  however  we  may  define 
it,     it     is      ultimately     for      this     end    that 

373 


An  EPttOME  OF  JAINISM. 

the    drunkard    becomes    addicted     to    wine, 

the  criminal  becomes    habituated     to    crime, 
Autonomy  is 
the  ultimate    or  the  devotee  bends  his  knees  in  the  shrine. 

Ideal. 

Whatever  we  think  and  whatever  we  do,  we 
think  and  act  consciously  or  unconsciously 
for  the  attainment  of  peace  and  bliss  or 
autonomy.  This  really  constitutes  the 
Highest  End  or  Idea  for  which  we 
all  live  and  move  and  have  our  being  in 
the  universe.  And  in  proportion  the  nature 
and  character  of  this  Ideal  varies  with  the 
changes  of  the  angles  of  vision  we  take, 
according  to  the  principles  of  Naya  and 
that  from  the  different  stages  of  our  life,  the 
means  we  employ  for  the  realization  of 
the  ideal  in  view  also  vary  as  well. 
But  in  any  case,  there  is  no  denial  of 
the  fact  that  it  is  we  that  are  the  free 
agents  in  the  determination,  selection  and 
adoption  of  an  alternative  course  which 
would  be  most  conducive  to  the  realization 
of  the  end  we  have  in  view  for  the  time. 
All  the  aspirations  of  life,  all  our  reasons 
for  our  living,  all  that  we  think,  tend 
in  reality  to  augment  this  our  sense  of 
freedom    of  thought  and  action.     We     can 

374 


CAUSALITY  IN   MORAL    WORLD. 

not    possibly     imagine    that    we     are     not 
free     to     think,     will      and      act      in      our 

Liberty  can- 

own  ways.     And  with    this  liberty  to  think,    "°f  \^  Z'^- 

'  '  united    from 

will    and  to  act  in  our  own    ways   arises  the    j^esponsibi- 
question  of  our  responsibility  for  the  same. 

Liberty  and  responsibility  go  hand  in 
hand.  And  it  is  impossible,  say  the  Jain 
thinkers,  to  disunite  responsibility  from  the 
agent  who  is  at  liberty  to  think  and  act  in 
whichever  way  he  wills  for  the  realization  of 
his  ideal.  To  disown  liability  originating  from 
responsibility  but  to  enjoy  the  privileges 
accruing  from  liberty  is  not  only  a  logical 
absurdity,  but  is  indicative  as  well  of  moral 
depravity.  Riches  and  poverty,  fame  and 
obscurity,  power  and  subjection,  health  and 
disease,  knowledge  and  ignorance,  toil  and 
pleasure,  feasting  and  hunger,  are  but 
so  many  varying  consequences  of  liberty  we 
have  and  had  in  this  life  and  in  the  past. 

To  think  is  to  act  and  to  act  is 
to  resist.  Resistance  is  action  itself  which 
produces  changes  not  only  in  the  thing 
worked  upon  but  also  in  the  worker  as 
well — for  work  implies  waste  in  both.  There- 
fore, no  thought,     not  a  single   deed   which 

S75 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

a   man    thinks   or   performs   can     ever     be 
.   .     disunited     from     its     effect     which    in    the 

Responsibi- 
lity brings  in    nioral  world  takes  the  form    of  responsibility 

reward       or  *^  ' 

punishment,  involving  the  idea  of  liability  of  the  thinker 
or  the  doer  to  undergo  the  consequences 
of  his  thought  or  deed.  And  as  what  is  in 
the  root  comes  out  in  the  sap ;  as  the 
cause  passes  into  effect  and  the  like 
produces  the  like,  the  consequences  of  a  good 
thought  or  deed  bears  out  good  or 
bad  fruits.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that 
responsibility  carries  with  it  the  idea  of 
enjoyment  of  a  reward  for  a  good  act  done 
or  of  suffering  a  punishment  for  a  bad  act 
committed.  But  so  frail  is  human 
nature  that  it  only  wishes  for  the  fruits  of 
righteous  deeds  and  avoid  practising  the 
same,  wishes  not  to  reap  the  harvest 
of  sinful  acts  whereas  wishes  only  to  perpe- 
trate sinful  things— 

But  the  whole  aspect  of  things  changes 
if  we  were  to  consider  the  question,  'Is  man 
in  fact  so  free  as  to  think  or  do  whatever 
he    pleases?"     If  every  man  were  free,  that 

37(> 


CAUSALITY  IN  MORAL    WORLD. 

is  to  say,  if  he  could  act  as  he  pleased, 
history  of  the  world  would  have  changed  into 
otherwise  for  the  absence  of  any  common  bond.    '^.J?  ^ ,  ^''^^" 

'  will  of  man 

If  one  among:  the  millions  of  human    beings    ^^^v^s      po 

^  ^       room  for  nis- 

who  lived  and  died  in  the  infinite  number  of  ^°"^^^  ^^^^* 
years  that  have  rolled  by,  could  be  found 
capable  of  acting  purely  in  conformity  with 
his  will  and  desires,  the  free  movements  of 
this  man  in  opposition  to  the  general  scheme 
of  the  universe  would  be  enough  to  annul  the 
possibility  of  the  historical  laws  for  all 
humanity.  Nor  the  movements  of  man  show 
that  he  is  free  to  live  and  move  as  he  choses. 
Historical  laws  regulating  the  movements  of 
man,  are  but  visible  negations  to  the 
existence  of  free-will  in  man.  Far  from  his 
being  an  agent  willing  and  acting  freely, 
observation  of  his  movements  and  a  study  of 
his  constitution  clearly  confirm  the  belief 
that  he  is  wholly  a  dependant  being  acting 
in  due  obedience  to  Nature  and  natural 
laws.  No  man  has  ever  been  found  to  act 
in  utter  disregard  of  the  laws  of  gravita- 
tion nor  the  phenomena  of  his  cerebral 
activity  have  been  found  wanting  in  regula- 
ting  and   controlling  his    will.   Man  is   but 

m 

48 


man. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

subject   to  these  cosmic  forces  and  laws  and 

T. ,  ,     .  he   moves   and   acts  with   due     reofard   and 

Nature  IS  not  ^ 

bemgn  t  o  obedience  to  Nature  to  whom  he  owes  his 
life  and  looks  for  light.  For,  **thus 
from  the  war  of  Nature,  from  famine  and 
death,  the  most  exalted  object  which  we  are 
capable  of  conceiving,  the  production  of  the 
higher  animal  follows.  There  is  a  grandeur 
in  this  view  of  life,  with  its  several  powers 
having  been  originally  breathed  by  the 
Creator  into  a  few  forms  or  into  one  ;  and 
that  whilst  this  planet  has  gone  cycling  on 
according  to  the  fixed  law  of  gravity,  from 
so  simple  a  beginning,  endless  forms,  most 
beautiful  and  most  wonderful,  have  been,  and 
are  being,  evolved." 

But  this  aspect  of  evolution  which  is  being 
worked  out  by  Nature  through  her  warfares, 
through  the  principles  of  competition,  through 
adaptation  to  the  environment  and  trans- 
mission of  acquired  qualities  through  heredity, 
makes  the  environment,  the  maker  and  moul- 
der of  the  man.  Man,  according  to  this  cosmic 
process  of  evolution  is  no  more  an  inde- 
pendent being  having  any  free  will  of  his 
own  to  think  and  act  after  his  own  way  and 

37* 


CAUSALITY  IN    MORAL     WORLD. 

exercise  his  independence  in  the  free  choice 
of  things  and  impressing  his  individuality  ^^^  -the 
upon  the  sorroundings.  Nature  has  left  man  cosmic*  evV 
no  option,  no  free  will  to  act.  But  the  cir- 
cumstances play  the  part  of  Destiny  as 
it  were,  rough-hewing  and  moulding  him 
after  their  own  casts.  He  acts  and  moves 
about  indeed  but  only  impelled  by  the  forces 
of  Nature.  Nor  man  can  be  taken  as  the 
same  individual  being  who  has  been  running 
down  from  eternity  through  the  processes 
of  metempsychoses.  It  is  true  that  Nature 
has  been  working  from  time  without 
beginning,  ushering  into  existence  from  the 
conflict  of  the  aggregative  and  separaive 
forces  inherent  in  her,  the  stars  and  planets 
composing  the  astronomical  cosmos  ;  and 
as  these  have  been  going  on  revolving 
round  their  own  orbits  according  to  the 
fixed  and  inexonerable  laws  of  motion,  a 
few  forms  of  life  have  sprung  out  into 
being  to  crawl  on  earth.  The  cosmic 
processes  of  life  and  living  in  the  shape  of 
their  adaptation  to  the  environment  and 
transmission  of  the  acquired  characters 
to  the   off-spring  at  last    culminated    in  the 

319 


AN-  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

transfiguration      and    evolution    of    Man — 

the  mystery,   the   wonder  and  the  climax  of 

Poetry  is  not    the    cosmic   evolution.     Man   thus   is  but  a 

metaphy- 
sics !  product   of  circumstances  and  has    no    free- 
will.    Wherein    lies   then    the     possibilities 
^     of  persistence  and  re-birth  of  the  same  indi- 
vidual running  up   and    down  from    eternity 
through   the   processes   of  metempsychoses, 
of  undergoing   the       consequences     of    his 
own   activities   and    desires    and   of  reaping 
the  harvest  of  what  he  had  previously  sown  ? 
There  is  a  grandeur  in    this  view   of  life 
indeed.     But   the  charms   of  poetry   cannot 
always  and  everywhere  hide  the  metaphysics 
of    ideas   and    ideals    from    the   penetrating 
insight  of  the  unprejudiced  philosophers  ! 

If  we  deny  the  very  independent  exist- 
ence of  man  and  take  him  as  derived 
product  of  matter  and  material  forces 
working  in  him  we  must  say  that  he 
must  have  a  derivative  responsibility  for 
all  what  he  thinks  and  does.  One  may 
owe  his  existence  to  something  else — to 
some  Higher  Power  but  the  fact  itself 
cannot  entitle  one  to  shake  off  respon- 
sibility  from   his     shoulder :    his     existence 

3^0 


CAtfSALITY  IN   MORAL    WORLD. 

may  be  derived  ;  but  with  it  comes  his 
responsibility  as  also  similarly  derived.  To  r  g  s  p  o  n- 
illustrate  by  a  concrete  instance,  the  king  Naturalism" 
delegates  his  certain  powers  to  the  minister 
for  the  administration  of  a  certain  province. 
But  is  not  the  minister  responsible  for  uses 
and  abuses  of  the  power  he  derived  from 
the  king.  The  Jain  view  of  the  point  in 
question  is  that  in  the  commitment  of 
a  murder  by  a  servant  at  the  uncompro- 
mising order  of  his  master  in  whose  hand 
he  is  but  a  tool,  not  only  the  master  alone 
but  the  servant  also  is  liable  to  receive 
punishment.  And  this  view  of  liability  as 
involved  in  responsibility  holds  good  even  in 
matters  of  evolution  through  cosmic  process. 
Failures  of  the  organisms  in  the  right  adap- 
tation to  the  environment  cause  them  to  be 
weak  and  supplanted  by  other  organisms 
who  have  been  successful  in  their  adapta- 
tions. Therefore  the  organisms  who  thus 
become  weak  and  go  to  the  walls,  are 
responsible  for  their  movements  and 
activities  in  their  own  spheres  of  life 
and  struggle,  environment  being  common  to 
them  all. 

3S1 


An  epitome  of  /aini^vl 

But    to   view     the    question       from     the 

psychological      stand-point.     Man       is      not 

self-reaiisa-    simply  a    product   of  matter     and    material 

tion  testifies  ^  -'  ^ 

iTh^ys^l^cTi    ^^^^^^      engaged    in    a   terrible    conflict     in 
c'^-S-  which  the    weakest   go  to  the    walls  and  the 

strongest  survive  to  multiply.  Man  is  essen- 
tially mind~a  thinking  being  having  a  soul 
in  him  to  save  ;  and  the  soul  is  neither  matter 
nor,  like  sparks  of  electricity,  a  product  of 
matter  and  material  forces.  Psychologically 
as  we  have  seen  elsewhere,  it  is  something 
super-physical.  If  the  soul  were  matter  or  a 
product  of  matter  and  material  forces 
engaged  in  a  deadly  conflict,  how  would 
we  account  for  the  psychical  possibilities 
infinite  of  tripartite  character  viz.,  vision, 
knowledge  and  freedom  infinite — the  very 
esse  of  the  soul  for  the  unfoldment  of 
which  the  mighty  minds  of  all  ages  and 
climes  have  been  labouring  }  The  principles 
of  naturalism,  of  aggression  and  self-assertion 
have  always  been  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  teachings  of  the  great  minds  whose 
lives  have  been  a  perpetual  surrender 
for  the  good  of  mankind.  For,  side  by 
side    with  this   fierce    movement  of  struggle 


CA  USALITY  IN  MORAL  WORLD. 

for  life  and   living  in    which    the  fittest  sur- 
vive and    the    weaker   ones  g^o  to  the  walls    „      i«„>. 

^  riuxieys 

calling  forth  fearful  vengeance  upon  those  ^  i">ssion. 
that  march  trampling  upon  their  dead 
skulls,  there  has  been  a  parallel  movement 
in  the  society  of  nations  of  all  ages  and 
climes — a  blessed  movement  that  seeks  to 
mitigate  the  evil,  to  smooth  the  harshness 
of  behaviour,  to  rub  off  the  angularities 
of  character,  and  to  soften  down  the  asperi- 
ties and  rigours  of  life  ;  to  introduce,  in 
short,  a  reign  of  ordered  harmony  where 
there  is  discord  and  to  bring  in  the  mes- 
sages of  *'peace  and  good  will,  good  will 
and  peace,  peace  and  good-will  to  all 
mankind".  If  the  evolution  of  human 
organism  and  the  progress  of  humanity  were 
due  to  the  competitive  movement  which  is 
called  cosmic,  how  are  we  to  account  for  the 
origin  of  this  parallel  movement  which  is 
not  only  essentially  humane  and  ethical 
but  works  as  a  direct  antithesis  to  the 
cosmic  mode  of  life  and  living  ?  "It  repu- 
diates   the    gladiatorial   theory  of  existence. 

It   demands    each    man    who   enters   in    the 
enjoyment  of  the   advantages   of  polity,  shall 

383 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

*  be    mindful    of  his   debt    to  those   who  have 

laboriously  constructed  it  and  shall  take 
heed  that  no  act  of  his,  weaken  the  fabric 
wherein  he  has  been  permitted  to  live. 
Laws  and  moral  precepts  are  directed  to 
the  end  of  curbing  the  cosmic  process  and 
reminding  the  individual  of  his  duty  to  the 
community,  to  the  protection  and  influence 
of  which  he  owes,  if  not  existence  itself,  at 
least  the  life  of  something  better  than  a  brutal 
savage" — (Evolution  and  Ethics  pp.  8i-8^). 

Thus   from    the   sharp  '  contrast     drawn 
between  the   operation   of  the   cosmic    laws 
and  ethical  laws,    between    natural    man  and 
moral  man,  it  is  pretty   clear  that    whatever 
be  the  angles  of  our  vision  as  to   the  consti- 
tution  of  the  thoughts  and  activities    of  man, 
d    ^^^y  ^^^  ^^^  determined  partly  by    his    free- 
participating    ^^^    ^^   ^'^'  ^"^   partly  by  the  operation    of 
acttvity""^^"    the  laws  of  necessity.     Liberty  and  necessity 
both  co-operate  harmoniously  in    the  produc- 
tion of  every    human  thought   and    activity. 
Every  human  life  and    conduct   therefore    is 
but    a    re-conciliation    between    liberty    and 
necessity.     This  has  been    the   case   always 
and    everywhere    from     the   days     without 


CAUSALITY  IN    MORAL     WORLD. 

beginning.  We  think  and  act  partly  of 
our  own  accord  and  partly  our  thoughts 
and  activity  are  determined  and  regulated 
by  the  laws  of  karma  in  accordance  with 
the  merits  and  demerits  of  our  previous 
instance.  We  know  this  not  only  by  meta- 
physical speculations  or  intutions  pure  and 
simple  ;  but  also  an  investigation  in  the 
lines  of  empirical  method  into  the  historical 
events  and  life-works  of  the  mighty  minds 
of  yore,  makes  it  clear  that  there  is  in  fact 
a  certain  amount  of  liberty  and  a  certain 
amount  of  necessity  participating  in  every 
human  thought  and  activtiy. 

Human  life  being   thus  but   a  reconcilia- 
tion   between   liberty  and    necessity,  it    be-    „         ..^ 
hoves  us  to  enquire  by  the  way  as  to  how  are    ^i*^^^n"^*o^f 
we  to  calculate  and  measure  the  parts  played    \'^!^^^^  *"^ 
by  each  in  giving  shapes  and   forms   to   our 
life     and    conduct.     The     Jain      philophers 
hold   that   greater    the     liberty,    the    lesser 
the     necessity,    and     vice-versa     lesser     the 
necessity,  the  greater  the  liberty  ;  or  in  other 
words    necessity   and    liberty   are   inversely 
related  to  each   other  :    and  the   proportion 
of  the  part  played  by  the   two   in   a   pheno- 

385 

49 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

menon  of  life  has  to*  be  ascertained  from    the 
different  points  of  view  we  can    take   in   our 

Liberty  and    examination  and  estimation   of  human   con- 
necessity 

ySserido!""  ^^^^^  "^^^Ix  Drahya  ^^,  (i)  BMba  {y{^^) 
(\\\)  Kdla  (^T^)  and  (iv)  Kshetra  (%©[)  and 
(v)  Karma  (^4|)  and  (vi)  Udyam  (^^it)  and 
(vii)  Niyati  (fsrgf??)  as  already  discussed  in 
a  previous  chapter. 

But  instead  of  entering  into  the  compli- 
cations involved  in  the  examination  of 
certain  phenomenon  in  the  worlds  of  parti- 
culars from  the  above  points  of  view,  we 
may  otherwise  for  convenience'  sake  do  the 
same  by  considering  the  conduct  of  the 
man  in  the  four  different  relations  of, — 

i.  Kshetra — locality  or  surrounding  circum- 
stances in  relation  to  which  we  can  interpret 
that  a  man  living,  moving  and  having 
his  being  in  the  complexity  of  society  or 
having  a  particular  profession  or  calling 
is  subject  to  the  laws  of  necessity  to  a 
greater  degree  in  proportion  to  the  amount 
of  liberty  he  is  supposed  to  enjoy. 

The  more  a  man  lives  and  moves  in 
the  complicated  net  work  of  society,  the  more 
his  movements  are  mechanical,   artificial  and 


CAUSALITY  IN  MORAL  WORLD. 

he  is  less  free  to  think  or  act   after   his   own 

accord.     But   the    man    who   stands  outside    How  to  de- 

and  above  the  complexity  of  social  organism,    the  ^amount 

or   in   other   words,    the  more   he    lives   in 

isolation,  or   seclusion,  or  wanders  awayfrom 

place   to   place   without   any   attachment  to 

the  pleasures  of  the  world — he  is  more  free  to 

act  at  his  own  will  and  choice  without  being 

accountable  to  any  one  save  himself.      But 

still  this  wandering  monk  is  not  wholly   free 

to   will   or  to  act,  if  we  find  him  speaking  to 

any  one  or  working   at   his  task  or  breathing 

in    the    atmosphere    surrounding    him    and 

basking  in  the  sun  that   shines   upon.     Full 

liberty   of  action    and     will     only    belongs 

to    Him     who     is     really     a    Kevaltn   and 

has  soared   high   above   time,     space     and 

causality. 

ii.  K&la — Time  is  an  important  factor  in 
forming  proper  moral  judgments,  for  it  is 
very  difficult  to  discern  the  motive  by  which 
an  individual  is  actually  led,  just  after  the 
accomplishment  of  the  act.  A  study  of 
the  historical,  sociological  and  other 
antecedents  and  consequents  is  neassary  to 
make   us   sure   whether   the    individual  has 

3^7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  ;A  IN  ISM 

been  impelled  by  the  circumstances  and 
other  necessities,  or  has  freely  initiated  the 
action  himself  to  serve  his  own  ends  and  the 
nature  of  the  moral  judgment  depends  con- 
siderably on  such  decision.  Thus  time  is  a 
potential  element  in  the  determination  of  the 
participation  of  fate  and  free-will  in  a 
particular  conduct  of  man. 

The  devastating  war  between  the 
Kurus  and  the  Pandavas  which  killed  the 
manhood  of  the  nation,  seems  to  have  been 
caused  by  the  free  will  of  several  people. 
The  war  could  have  been  avoided. 

iii.  Karma — or  the  abiding  consequences 
of  deed  done  in  the  past  either  in  this  life  or 
in  prior  ones,  which  determine  the  inner- 
nature  or  character  of  the  man  in  a  posterior 
incarnation. 

The  movements  of  a  man  who  is 
placed  in  very  untoward  circumstances 
hardly  able  to  meet  his  two  ends  in  compari- 
sion  with  the  movements  of  another  who  is 
rocking  in  lap  of  fortune,  are  more  determined 
by  necessity  than  the  movements  of  the 
other  who  enjoys  a  more  liberty  of  thought 
and  action. 

S88 


CA  USALITY  IN  MORAL   WORLD. 

iv.    Niyati — the  concatenation  of  natural 
causes  and  conditions  from    which  a   certain    j^Qj^^vir  on 
effect    must   irresistibly    follow  just   as    the    Liberty, 
number  four  follows    from    the  concatenation 
of  two  and  two. 

In  the  great  battle  which  was  waged 
against  Ravan,  the  King  of  Lanka,  for 
kidnapping  the  beautiful  Sita  from  the 
forest's  solitudes,  Ram  Chandra's  movements 
seem  to  have  been  determined  to  a  greater 
extent  by  Niyati,  because  from  the  study  of 
the  R&mdyan  we  find  that  the  whole  thing 
was  due  to  the  intrigues  and  instigations 
of  Surpanakha,  the  sister  of  R&van. 

Thus  in  fine,  we  see  no  mortal  man  who 
lives,  moves  or  has  his  being  within  the 
span  of  time,  space,  causation  is  abso- 
lutely free  in  his  actions.  His  movements 
take  directions  in  strict  conformity  with 
the  laws  of  the  parallelogram  of  forces 
which  follow  from  the  conflict  between 
the  constitutional  freedom  of  his  will  and  the 
determination  of  the  same  by  necessity  or 
Fate  of  his  own  make  in  the  past.  And 
this  is  the  reason  why,  referring  to  the 
doctrine    of    the    Fatalists   in    the   Book    I, 

3^9 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

Lecture  i,  Chapter  2  of  the  Sutra- Kritanga 
we  find  the  venerable  Kevalin  Mahavira 
teaching,  "they  (the  necessarians  or  the 
fatalists)  have  no  knowledge  and  do  not 
understand  that  things  depend  partly  on  fate 
and  partly  on  human  exertion." 


390 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 
CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS 

*Karma*-Dclinition,  Nature  and  Ckaractcr  of 
*Karma- — *Karma*  or  Action-Currents — Two  matn 
Divisions  of  Actton-Cur rents — Currents  or  Injury 
ahcl  of  Non-Injury — Dr.  6ose  and  tne  "Action- 
Currents  * — Suk-Di  visions  of  Action-Currents  of 
Injury — Vision  Knowledge.  MoKaniya  an  J  Antaray — 
Detrimental  to  PsycKical  unfoldment, — Currents  of 
Non-Injury — Aus,  Nam.  Gotra  and  Vcdaniya— 
Determinative   of  tne  organic  formations. 

In  our  rapid  survey  of  causation  and  com- 
pound evolution  of  Karma  phenomenloogy 
and  karma-causalty  as  discussed  in  our 
philosophy,  we  have  seen  what  important 
and  wonderful  are  the  parts  played  by  the 
Law  of  Karma  in  the  Jain  scheme  of  uni- 
verse. We  have  also  seen  how  it  opens  up 
secret  chambers  of  the  universe  and  unravels 
to  our  vision  the  most  inscrutable  mys- 
teries of  Nature  and  her  laws.  We  have  also 
seen  how  it  helps  to  amend  our  lives  for  a 
higher  evolution  of  a  more  and  more  perfect 
order  and  thereby  throws  open  to  us  the 
channels   that   lead   to  Right  vision,    Right 

39' 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM, 

knowledge  and  Right  conduct  without  which 
swaraj\  self  rule  or  autonomy  i.e.,  the  fulfil- 
ment of  the  destiny  of  th^jiva  as  taught  in 
the  Jain  philosophy  becomes  an  impossibility. 

Such  beinpf  the  high  and  prominent  place 
Complexity  s  s  t^  t 

of  classifica-    held    by     the    Doctrine   of   Karma    in    the 
tion.  ' 

evolution  of  humanity,  we  are  naturally  led 
to  enquire  into  the  classification  of  Karma. 
But  the  complexity  of  divisions  and  sub- 
divisions as  minutely  detailed  in  the  Jain 
philosophy  in  the  most  elaborate  manner 
defy  the  most  subtle  psychological  analysis. 
It  may  well  be  compared  to  the  gigantic 
banian  tree  which  has  been  growing  on 
steadily  through  the  revolutions  of  ages  and 
empires  in  such  a  form  that  its  original 
trunk  now  defies  the  research  of  the  investi 
gators  who  approach  it  for  the  first  time.  If 
any  stranger  who  is  unaccustomed  to  walk 
in  the  wood-way  paths  of  dense-forest,  wills 
to  do  so,  he  is  sure  to  be  bewildered  and 
disheartened  by  the  very  sight  of  its  labyrin- 
thian  complications.  And  therefore  to  make 
the  subject  more  easy  of  approach  we 
shall  begin  with  the  most  simple  and  general 
classification  in  the  following  manner  : 

392 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

Karma,  in  its  philosophical  sense,  is  mo- 
tion, vibration,  action  or  'action-currents*  as 
Dr.  J.  C.  Bose  puts  it.  But  in  Jain  Philo- 
sophy at  least  the  word  appears  to  bear  a 
double  signification  viz.,  not  only  vibration 
or  'action  current'  but  also  the  materialised 
effects  or  vestiges  in  so  far  they  affect 
the  fate  of  the  actor,  continuing  even  be- 
yond death  and  modifying  his  subsequent 
career.  The  Jain  philosophy  recognizes  two 
distinct  kinds  oi  Karma  or  action-currents, 
namely, — 

A.  Ghatin  Karma  or  the  Action-currents 
of  Injury 

B.  Aghatin  Karma  or  the  Action-currents 
of  Non-injury. 

The  reason  why  the  former  is  called  the 
action-current  of  injury  and  the  latter,  m^a**"a^nd 
'action-current'  of  non-injury,  thanks  to  Dr.  Kama. 
Bose  for  teaching  us  the  terms,  consists 
in  this :  the  esse  of  the  soul  as  a  meta- 
physical reality  with  infinite  pradeshas 
as  taught  in  our  philosophy,  viewed  in 
its  tripartite  aspects,  is  infinite  vision, 
infinite  knowledge  and  infinite  freedom, 
the  attainment  of  which   is    the   Summum 

393 

50 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

Bonnum  of  every  moral  endeavour. 
Now  in  the  eternal  continuum  of  Karma 
wherewith  the  soul  stands  in  relation  of 
timeless  conjunction  [anddi  apasckd^iupm^bi 
sa^nyo^a  sambandha  pravdha)  there  are 
two  sets  of  currents  which  leave  vestiges 
of  Karma  on  the  various  Pradeshas  or 
corpuscles  of  the  soul. 

Now  the  one  set  of  action-currents  which 
thus  inhibits  or  retards  or  is  actually  harm- 
ful to  the  unfoldment  of  the  psychical 
tripartite  possibilities  infinite  is  called  the 
action-current  of  Injury  (  ^ifh^T  "^^  )  and 
the  other  set  of  similar  current  which  in 
the  same  way  determines  merely  the  physical 
condition  of  the  psyche  or  the  soul — its  body 
and  localisation — is  termed  as  the  'action- 
current  of  non-injury'. 

A.  DIVISIONS  OP  GHATIN  KARMAS. 
Gkdtin  karmas  or  the  action-currents  of 

Divisions  of     _    .  r  r  i  •     i  i-  i 

Ghatin  Kar-    Injury — are  ot  lour  kmds,    accordmg  as  they 

ma.  r   1  1  r        1  •  • 

retard  the  unfoldment  of  the  tripartite 
Infinite  psychical  possibilites,  namely,  Vision 
Knowledge,  and  Freedom.  Thus  : — 

I.    Darshanavaraniya    or   the  Action- 
current  of  injury  to  right  vision. 

39^ 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

II.    Jnanavaraniya  or  the  action-current 
of  injury  to  knowledge. 
III.    MoHANiYA    or     what     is      injurious 
to     the     psychical    equanimity     re- 
sulting in  the  delusion  or  infatuation  '  ^ 
of  the  mind  from  the  want   of  right 
intuition  and  knowledge. 
IV.    Antaraya  or    what   is    injurious    to 
the   higher   evolution    and  progress 
of  the  soul  towards    the   perfect   un- 
foldment  of  its  infinite-possibilities. 
B.    DIVISIONS  OP  AGHATIN  KARMAS.           Divisions  of 
The  ^^/ia/z«  or  Non- Injurious — are  also    Ka^^V*" 
of  four   kinds   according  as  they  determine 
the  duration  and  other  physical   conditions 
of  the  soul.     These  are  ; — 

V  Ayus  or  what  determines  the  longevity 

of  soul's  physical  existence  and  the 
duration  of  its  surrounding  condi- 
tions. 

VI  Nama — or  what  determines  the  colour 
and  configuration  of  the  souls'  phy- 
sical organism,  ^ 

VII  GoTRA  or  what  determines  the  birth 
of  the  soul  in  a  certain  nationality, 
race  and  family  &c. 

395 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

VIII  Vedaniya — what  sends    in  sensations 

of  pain  or  pleasure. 

Now   the    action-currents  of  injury  and 

of  non-injury   making   up  the   eight    Karma 

Further  sub-    verities  which  bind  down  the  liva  and  whirl 
divisions.  '^ 

it  round  and  round  through  the  different 
gr3ides  of  samsdr  (Ga^i)  are  again  subdivided, 
according  to  the  nature  of  effects  (mrfh)  they 
produce,  in  the   following  manner  : — 

I    DARSHANAVARANIYA  KARMAS. 

(i)  Darshandvaraniya  or  the  action- 
current  which  is  detrimental  to  vision  or  per- 
ception, is  subdivided  into  nine  kinds  :— 

(a)  chakshu darshandvaraniya — what  is 
detrimental  to  sight. 

(b)  achakshudarshan&varaniya — what   is 

detrimental  to  the  perception  through 
the  other  organs  of  sense  and  mind 
than  the  eye. 

(c)  Avadhi  darshdnvdraniya — what  is 
detrimental  to  the  realisation  of  the 
general  use  and  importance  of 
things  and  beings  not  perceived 
through  the  sense. 

(d)  Keval  darshandvaraniya — what      is 

detrimental  to  the  right  Intuition. 

39^ 


CLASSIFICATION    OP  KARMAS. 

{ej  Nzdrd  vedaniya — what  lulls  the  /iva 
into  sleepiness  where  by  it  is  stripped 
of  its  consciousness  of  anything  what 
goes  around  it. 

(f)  Nidrdnidr&vedaniya — what  tends 
the  Jiva  to  sink  into  a  deep  sleep  in 
which  it  forgets  every  thing  whereby 
perception  becomes  absolutely  im- 
possible. 

(g)  Prachald -vedaniya — what  causes 
restless  sleep  under  which  condition 
right  perception  of  things  is  im- 
possible. 

(h)        Prachaldprachaldvedaniya — what 

causes   extreme   restlessness   of  the 

sleep  in   which   the  jiva   does    not 

properly  respond  to  stimulii. 

(i)    Stydnaradhi  Vedaniya — what  makes 

\\\^jiva    a    somnambulist   in   which 

state   of  mind,    it    cannot     perceive 

what  it  does  or  where  it  moves  about. 

Next      comes     jndndvaraniya     or     the 

action-currents  detrimental  to   the  formation 

of  knowledge. 

It  is  important  here  to  note,    that   follow- 
ing psychologically  the  order  of  development, 

397 


An  epitome  of  JainisM. 

we  have  placed  Darshandvarana  before 
fnandvarana  for  Darshan  stands  for  diffu- 
sive ;  undifferentiated  cognition  which  later 
on  develops  into  definite,  categorised, 
coherent  conception  we  generally  call  know- 
ledge or  J  nan. 

II.  JNANAVARANIYA  KARMAS. 
Knowledge  of  things,  we  have  seen,  in 
an  earlier  chapter  on  our  epistemology,  is  of 
five  forms  ;  and  the  action-currents  which 
are  detrimental  to  the  unfoldment  to  these 
forms  of  knowledge  respectively  have  been 
classed  as, — 

{a)  Mati-Jndndvaran — what  is  detri- 
mental to  the  formation  of  the  con- 
ception or  defined  knowledge  of 
things  through  the  processes  of  rea- 
soning and  intellection. 

(b)  Sruta-Jftdndvaran — what  is  detri- 
mental to  the  formation  of  the 
conceptual  knowledge  of  things 
received  through  the  perceptual 
organs. 

(c)  Avadhi  jndndvaran — is  that  kind 
of  action-currents,  the  predominance 
of  which,  makes  intuitive  knowledge 

39S 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

not  dependent  on  any  organ  of  sense, 
impossible. 

(d)  Manaparyaya  Jndndvarana — is  the 
action-current  which  is  detrimental 
to  the  reading  of  thoughts  passing 
in  anothers'  mind. 

(e)  Keval']nAn&varana — is  the  action- 
current  injurious  to  the  unfoldment 
of  the  soul's  power  of  pure  Intuition 

III    MOHANIYA  KARMA. 

Then  comes  Mohaniya  karma  or  the 
action-currents  which  hypnotises  the  )iva: 
Moha  has  been  stated  to  be  what  deludes  the 
jiva  from  the  right  vision  into  the  true  prin- 
ciples of  the  jivas  and  leads  him  away 
from  the  right  path  of  conduct.  There 
are  twenty  eight  kinds  of  this  Mohaniya 
karma  and  as  these  afiect  either  the 
vision  or  the  conduct,  they  have  been 
grouped  under  two  classes  namely  (a) 
Darshana  Mohaniya  and  (b)  Ch&ritra 
Mohaniya. 

(a)  Darshan  mohaniya  dividing  itself 
into — 

(i)  Mithydtva  mohaniya  prevails  upon 
the  ]iva  to  take  good  things  for  bad. 

399 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(2)  Mtsra  mohaniya  is  what  makes  the 
]iva  oscillate  between  the  right  and  the 
wrong  and  thus  preventing  him  from  coming 
to  any  particular  discusion. 

(3)  Samyakta  mohaniya  is  what  makes 
the  ]iva  unable  to  devote  himsef  to  the  right 
cause  though  he  is  morally  convinced  of  it, 
there  being  a  bit  of  intellectual  hesitation 
in  the  matter. 

(b)  Charitra  mohaniya  karma  divides 
itself  into  two  principal  branches  viz. 
(i)  A'^^^^j/ta;- Passions  ;  (2)  Akashaya-zoxxt- 
lates  of  Passions. 

(i)  The  kdshayas  are  four  in  number 
namely,  (a)  Krodha-'ssig^x  ;  (b)  Mdn-pxide  ; 
(c)  Mdya-deceit  ;  (d)  Lodka-gxeed, 

Now  each  of  these  four  major  KasMyas  or 
passions  is  further  analysed  into  four  groups 
according  to  the  intensity  and  protensiveness 
of  influence  as  these  have  on  human  life, — 
(i)  A  kashdya  which  is  most  intense  and 
protensive  in  exerting  a  life-long  influence 
on  the  mind  is  called  anant&nubandhi 
kashdya. 

(ii)     A  kashdya   which  is   comparatively 
less   intense  and  protensive,   influencing  the 

^00 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

mind  only  for  a  considerable    period  of  time, 
goes  by  the  name  of  apraly&kskydn. 

(iii)     A   kashdya    which   is   of    still   less 
intense  in  character   and  less    protensive    in     » 
duration  influencing  the  mind  only  for  a  shorter 
period  of  life  is  named  as  Pratydkshydn. 

(\v }  A  kashdya  which  appears  only  to 
disappear  immediately  after  influencing  the 
life  only  for  the  shortest  period  possible  goes 
by  the  name  of  Sanjvalan. 

Thus  classified  according  to  the  quality 
and  durability  of  each  of  the  kaskdyas, 
the  Jain  Philosophers  hold  kashdyas  to 
be  sixteen  in  number  altogether,  as  given 
below  : — 

{a-i)     Krodha     Anantdnubandhi — is  the 
anger   of    the     most     intense    kind 
influencing  the  mind  all  through    the 
life.    Its   currents    are    so   furiously 
strong   that   it  mars  peace,  roots  out 
all    feelings  of  amity,  and   causes   a 
wide  breach   between   friends.    It   is 
just  like  the  deep  chasm  in    the  rock 
due  to  a  rude  shaking  of  the  earth, 
(a-ii)    Krodha  Apratydkshydn — is  an  an- 
ger  of  less  intense  in  quality  and  less 

401 

51 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

durable  in  period.  After  influencing 
the  life  for  a  considerable  time,  it 
disappears  some  how  or  toher.  The 
anger  of  this  kind  is  usually  compar- 
ed to  splits  on  muddy  fields  dried 
up  by  the  scorching  sun,  which 
continues  to  remain  until  these  are 
filled  up  by  the  moistening  and 
softening  of  the  soil  from  heavy 
down-pour  rains. 

(a-iii)  Krodha  Pratydkshydn — is  that 
kind  of  anger  which  influences  the 
mind  for  a  still  lesser  period  and  is 
less  intense  in  quality  from  the  fact 
of  its  being  compared  frequently  to 
line-marks  in  sand-fields  which  dis- 
appear off  and  on  with  the  fleeting 
movements  of  sands  by  the  breeze. 

(a-iv)  Krodha  Sanjvalan — is  the  anger 
of  the  shortest  possible  duration.  It 
appears  like  a  flash  of  lightning  but 
gets  quenched  of  itself  immediately 
after,  for  which  reason  it  is  com- 
pared to  a  line  drawn  on  the  surface 
of  water  which  leaves  no  vestige 
behind. 

402 


CLASSIFICATION    OF  K ARMAS, 

Mdn  or  Pride  blinds    vision  and  disables 
man  to  read  things  through  times. 

(  b-i  )  Mdn  Ananidmibandkt  is  that 
kind  of  intense  pride  which  knows 
no  yielding  in  life.  It  is  aggressive 
in  its  attitude  and  stands  out  as  a 
towering  rock. 

(b-ii)  Mdn  Apratydkshydn  is  a  kind  of 
pride  which  makes  a  man  almost 
stiff  and  unbending  :  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  an  •  iron  rod  which  can 
be  warmed  into  bending. 

(^b-iiij  Mdn  Pratydkshydn — is  that  kind 
of  pride  which  is  characterised  by 
still  lessor  constitutional  stiffness. 
It  yields  just  as  some  chips  of  wood 
yield  to  pressure  after  it  has  been 
kept  under  water  for  sometime. 

(h-\v)  Mdn  Sanjvalan — is  a  pride  of  cane- 
like stiffness  for  which  reason  it  can 
be  bent,  as  you  would  will,  with 
slight  effort. 

(C'\)  Mdyd  Anantdnubandhi — is  the  de- 
ceit   of  the    most  acute  and    durable 

^  character.  It  is  revealed  in  the 
natural     crookedness    of   the    mind 

403 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

which  consists   in  deliberately    doing 
one    thing  with    some  other   ulterior 
motive    behind.     It    is    a      kind   of 
intrigue     which     for     its     intricacy 
is    usually  compared  to  the  bamboo- 
knot, 
f^c-ii)    Mdyd  Apratydkshydn — means  the 
crookedness    of  the  mind  like    that 
of  the  antelope's    horns    which  can 
be  straightened  with  difficulty, 
(c-iiij  Mdyd  Pratydkshydn — refers  to  that 
crookedness  of  the  mind  which   can 
well    be    compared    to   the     zigzag 
course    that    the      current   of  water 
takes     subsequent    to    its    springing 
from  a  fountain-head, 
(c-iv)     Mdyd  Sanjvalan — is  that  attitude 
of  mind    which     moves     in     curves 
that    can    only     be     stretched    into 
straightness     like    the     shavings   of 
wood    that    are  flattened  by  a  slight 
pressure. 
Lobha  or  Greed  is    the  attitude  of  mind 
which    makes  one  cleave    to  things  worldly 
with    a  peculiar  tenacity   as    if  these  were  a 
part  and  parcel  of  its  own. 

404 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

(i)  Lobha  Anantdnubandhi — means  in- 
tense attachment  to  a  certain 
thing  which,  if  taken  away  from  its 
possessor,  will  perhaps  take  his  life 
as  well.  It  is  just  like  the  fast  dye 
on  cloths  which  lasts  as  long  as 
the  cloths  endures, 
(ii)  Lobha  Apratydkshydn — refers  to  the 
kind  of  attachment  which  is  less 
intense  in  character  and  continues  for 
a  pretty  long  time,  but  not  all  through 
life.  It  is  compared  to  the  grease- 
marks  from  the  cart-wheel  which 
stick  to  cloth  only  for  a  certain 
time, 
(iiij  Lobha  Pratydkshydn — is  the  attach- 
ment which  can  be  removed  with 
some  effort  as  in  the  washing  away 
of  certain  colour  from  a  piece  of 
cloth  with  soap  and  water. 
(2)    The   Nine  akashayas    or   Corelates 

of  passions. 
The    Akashayas  or  the  Corelates  of  the 
Kashdyas  or  Passions,  according  to  the  Jain 
psychology,     are     nine    in     number    as    in 


the  following  :■ 


405 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(i)  Hdsya — frivolity,  (ii)  Rati — love  ;  (iii) 
Arati—A\d.ireA  (iv)  Shoka — sorrow;  (v) 
Bhaya — fear  ;  (vi)  jugupsd — likes-and-dis- 
likes  ;  (vii)  Striveda  ;  (viii)  Purush  veda  and 
(ix)  Napunsaka  veda.  All  these  are  detri- 
mental to  the  right  conduct  of  theyVz/a. 

Of  these  nine  necessary  Corelates  of  Pas- 
sions, the  first  six  we  need  hardly  deal  with, 
they  being  very  widely  understood  as  common 
emotions.  To  take  therefore  the  last 
three ; — 

(vii)  Stri  veda — is  that  kind  of  karma 
which  awakens  sexual  appetite  in 
females  at  the  sight  of  or  in  contact 
with  males:  just  as  the  predominance 
of  biliousness  creates  a  desire  for  the 
sweets.  The  characteristic  phenome- 
non of  this  erotic  instinct  in  woman 
is  such  that  a  mere  touch  with  the 
delicate  and  beautious  parts  which 
add  to  her  personal  charms  quickens 
this  lower  instinct  into  a  debasing 
•  animal  propensity  just  as  a  mild 
faning  or  blowing  quckens  the  fire 
under  ashes  into  a  blaze  to  consume 
things. 

Jl  406 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

(viii)     Purusha   veda — is  what   awakens 
the     same     sex-passion      in      males 
at  the  sight  of  or   in    company   with 
females.      This      erotic    instinct     is 
compared  to  the  nature  of  straw-fire  : 
for,  just    as    the  fire    dies    out   after 
consuming     the     straws  ;      so     this 
purusha  veda    dies    out  immediately 
after   its    temporary    preponderance 
and  consummation, 
(ix)     Napunsaka  veda — is  what  awakens 
the  sex-passion  in  both  the  male  and 
the  female  alike  for  a  mutual  embrace 
at   the   sight   of  each   other.     It  is 
compared      to      the      conflagration 
which  reduces  the    whole   town    into 
ashes. 
Thus    we  see  that  the  three   Darshana- 
Mohaniya   Karmas   and   these  Twentyfive 
Chdritra   Mohaniya    Karmas    which    make 
up      altogether     Twenty-eight     kinds     of 
Mohaniya    Karma, — all    act     as    so   many 
hypnotising    action-currents  to    delude     the 
human     mind    from     attaining     to     Right- 
knowledge  through  Right-vision  which    can 
only    enable   it  to  walk  in  the  Right-path. 

407 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

IV.  ANTARAYA-KARMA. 
Anlardya  Karma  stands  for  that  kind 
of  invisible  action-currents  of  injury  which 
flowing  under  the  surface  of  things  secretly 
hinder  the  accomplishment  of  a  particular 
end,  xki^jiva  has  in  view.  It  differs  from 
other  action-currents  of  injury  in  this  that 
these  work  on  the  jiva  in  such  a  manner 
that  it  may  not  feel  any  inclination  to  gain 
Right-knowledge  through  Right-vision  for 
the  purpose  of  moving  in  the  Right-path 
leading  to  the  realisation  of  the  end  ;  but  the 
A^itardya  Kdrmas  do  not  destroy  this 
inclination.  It  only  works  in  such  a  manner 
that  inspite  of  the  earnest  inclination  on 
the  part  of  the  ftva  to  do  a  certain 
thing  and  even  in  spite  of  the  necessary 
requisite  materials  being  ready  at  the 
elbow,  the  jtva  fails  to  accomplish  the  end 
he  has  in  view. 

Now  this  Antardya  karma  divides  itself 
into, — 

(i)  Ddndntardya — is  that  invisible  action- 
currents  which  works  so  that  a  man 
practically  fails  to  make  a  gift  of 
anything  to  any  one    inspite  of  his 

408 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

ardent  inclination  to  do  so  and  readi- 
ness of  the  requisite  things  at  hiselbow. 

(ii)  Ldbhdntardya^—YtkYs  to  the  invi- 
sible action -currents  which  disable 
the  jiva  to  practically  gain  any  profit 
from  what  he  does,  inspite  of  his 
working  hard  in  the  matter  with  all 
the  necessary  materials  and  advan- 
tages about  him. 

(iii)  Bkogdntardya — stands  for  the  action- 
currents  which  invisibly  work  out  ; 
so  that  i\\e  Jiva  inspite  of  his  earnest 
inclination  and  good  health,  cannot 
enjoy  the  palatable  dishes  and  the 
like  which  can  but  be  enjoyed 
once.  The  word  bhoga  connotes  the 
sense  of  enjoyment  but  for  once. 

(iv)  Upabhogdntardya — denotes  that 
action- current  whereby  a  jiva  cannot 
enjoy  the  pleasure  of  a  good  bedding, 
woman,  and  the  like  even  when  these 
are  at  his  disposal  for  pleasure 
and  enjoyment.  In  the  word 
upahhoga — the  particle  upa  prefixed 
to  the  word  bhoga  has  the  sense  of 
continual    enjoyment  ;    but   not   the 

409 

52 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

kind   of    enjoyment     that    can     be 
had     for     once     only      as     in     the 
cases    of  rarely    available    palatable 
dishes  and  the  like. 
(v)      Virydntardya  refers  to  that  kind  of 
action-currents    which  secretly  work 
in  such  a  way  that  a  man,  inspite   of 
his  having    a   powerful    will,  a  good 
moral  stamina  and     other   requisite 
materials  and    conditions   conducive 
to    the    accomplishment  of  an  end, 
fails  to   carry  out  his  object.     In  the 
word  vifydntardya,  the  word — virya 
denotes  strength,  force,  power  or  the 
will  to  do  a  thing. 
Now  from  what  precedes,  it  is  clear  that 
the    truths  underlying   the  Antardya  kArma     \ 
cannot  be  gainsaid.     Cases  of  failures  in  the 
performance  and  enjoyment  of  certain  things 
and  properties,   other  causes  and   conditions 
conducive    to    their     accomplishments  being 
the  same,  very  often  come    into    our  cognis- 
ance   where    we  fail    to   discover   their  real 
causes.     The   unreflecting  minds,  ignorant 
of  the  true  principles  of  the  law   of  Karma- 
causality,     often     attribute      them     to    the 

410 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

imaginary  dispensation  by  the  Extra-Cosmic 
Providence. 

Here  ends  the  classification  of  the 
Ghatin  Kdrma  or  the  ''  Action-currents  of 
Injury"  comprising  Forty  Seven  Kinds 
IN  All. 

B:  AGHATIN-KARMA  AND  ITS 
CLASSIFICATION. 

We  have  seen  already  that  the  Agh&tin 
kind  of  Karma  or  the  action-currents  of  non- 
injury are  those  sets  of  vibratory  currents 
which  merely  determine  the  shape,  the  size, 
the  nature,  the  character,  the  configura- 
tion and  the  localisation  ;  in  short,  every 
physical  condition  and  environment  forming 
a  part  of  the  manifesting  media  of  the 
jiva.  The  vibratory  action-currents  are 
called  non-injurious,  because  these  like 
the  Gh&tin  Karmas  or  the  injurious  ones, 
do  not  do  any  direct  harm  to  the 
unfoldment  of  the  possibilities  latent  in 
the  soul  ;  but  merely  serve  to  determine 
and  construct  as  well,  the  character  and 
configuration  of  the  manifesting  media 
through  the  instrumentality  of  which  the 
jzva  works  out  its  higher  forms  of  evolutions 

411 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

for  the  unfoldment   of  its    psychical  possibi- 
^^     ^  , .  .      lities  infinite  in  their  indications  and    consti- 

HowAghatm 

Karma    de-    t^tin^     the    real  esse  of  the  soul     We  have 

termines  the  ^ 

medil^^^'"^^  seen  also  that  karma  in  our  philosophy 
means  not  the  deeds  done  only  ;  but  also 
the  energies  of  movement  and  form  of 
the  jivds  own  making  which  materialise 
into  the  karma-vrntter  which  cling  round  the 
soul  as  potential  energy  of  the  system.  It 
is  now  admitted  on  all  haiids  that  diversities 
and  changes  in  the  phenomena  of  nature 
are  possible  only  on  condition  that  energy 
of  motion  is  capable  of  being  stored  up  as 
energy  of  position.  For,  the  relatively 
stable  forms  of  materialisation  of  Jivic 
energetics,  chemical  action  and  reaction, 
organisation  of  forms,  the  evolution  of 
vegetal  and  animal  organisims, — all  depend 
upon  the  locking  up  of  the  kinetic  action 
in  the  form  of  latent  energy  reduced 
into  karma  particles.  And  it  is  the  kinetic 
release  of  this  locked-up  or  potential 
energy  in  the  form  of  the  kai^man  body 
that  can  account  for  all  the  possibilities 
of  diversities  and  changes  in  the  phenomena 
of  nature. 

412 


Chemists 
take  advant' 


CLASSIPICTION  OF  K ARM  AS, 

In  the  processes  of  Integration  and  dis- 
integration, of  combination  and  decomposi- 
tion, motion,  by  overcoming  vis  inertia^  gives    ^l^l  ^^l^^^^ 

, .        ,  1         1  •     1      r  law  of  Karma 

rise  mimediately  to  another  knid  of  arrange- 
ment of  the  atoms  of  body,  that  is,  to  the 
production  of  a  compound  which  did  not 
before  exist  in  it.  These  atoms  must  be 
previously  possessed  of  the  characteristic 
power  of  arranging  themselves  in  a  cer- 
tain order  ;  else  both  friction  and  motion 
would  be  without  the  slight  influence  and 
significance. 

The  characteristic  power  which  the  atoms 
are   already    previously  possessed  of,    is    no 
other   than  karmic  forces  or  kinetic  energies 
of  the  jivas   own  making   transformed    into* 
potential      energy,     which     lies       locked-up 
there    as    it    were     only     to     be     released 
again    for     its       kinetic      manifestation      in 
the    future     play     of    life  ;     The     chemists 
very    often    take      advantage     of  this    law 
of  life    without    knowing   what    it    really  is  ; 
for   instance,    if  you   wish  to  form  a  certain 
compound  that  requires  a  peculiar    character 
or   the    peculiar    karmic-ioYc^,    to     make    it 
what   is    required  ?     What    must     you   do  ?    • 

4n 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM. 

You   must   take   steps   to  liberate    the  right 
T,  J-     Acc      '^'"^   ^^  karmic-force  at   the   exact    instant 

Bodies  differ 

from  the  dif-    j-^at   you    wish    the   union     to     take   place. 

Karma.  Yqu  then  get  the  chemical  properties  wanted  ; 

otherwise  you  would  not.  And  the  reason 
for  this  is  that  the  particular  karma,  having 
a  peculiar  vibratory  current  is  not  common  ; 
and  under  other  circumstances  than  those 
named,  you  cannot  effectuate  the  meta- 
morphosis. 

It  is  thus  pretty  clear  that  atoms  which 
differently  arrange  themselves  and  combine 
into  new  forms  and  compounds  must 
be  previously  possessed  of  certain  karmic 
forces  having  a  peculiar  tendency  of 
distributing  and  arranging  themselves 
in  a  definite  order  which  gives  constitu- 
tion to  the  compound.  But  this  distribu- 
tion and  arrangement  of  atoms  is 
nothing  more  than  a  kind  of  permutation 
and  combination  speaking  for  the  particular 
character  and  configuration  of  the 
composite  body  it  makes.  Bodies,  we  see, 
differ  from  one  another  :  and  the 
difference,  it  is  evident  also,  is  due,  as  we 
have  seen  elsewhere,   to  the  difference  in  the 

4H 


Other    dele- 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

permutation  and  combination  of  the  atoms- 
and  molecules.  But  what  again  is  this 
difference      due      to  ?       Fortuitous,     surely    '"'"f^J  ^aus- 

'  '^      es  of  change. 

it  is  not.  The  difference  we  have  stated 
is  due  to  the  differences  in  karma. 
And  we  emphasize  upon  the  same  point 
by  noting  further  that  the  difference  is 
rather  due  to  the  peculiar  nature  and 
character  (Prakriti)  of  the  forces  (Karma) 
under  the  influence  of  which  the  atoms 
vibrate  in  a  certain  form  and  combine 
into  the  making  of  a  particular  body. 
Vibrations  of  atoms  differ  in  period  and 
amplitude,  and  the  changes  of  their  mutual 
relations  in  combinations  taking  place,  differ 
according  to  the  respective  parts  already 
played  by  them. 

Then  again,  apart  from  these  varying 
phenomena  of  permutations  and  com- 
binations of  atoms  into  the  formation  of 
newer  bodies  as  explained  in  our  philo- 
sophy, the  character  of  the  body  changes 
as  well  from  compression  and  variation  of 
temperature  i,e,,  from  the  local  and  other 
surrounding  causes  and  conditions  called 
the  nimittas.     For  instance,  the   capacity  for 

4^5 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

magnetism  in  the  same  body  is  augmented 
^       .        ,    by    mechanical    compression    and    is    even 

Organic  and  ^ 

Inorganic    made     to   differ     in      different      directions, 

worlds.  ' 

according  to  the  mode  in  which  the  com- 
pressing force  is  applied.  When  the  density 
of  the  body  is,  by  nature,  different  in  differ- 
ent directions — as  in  crystals — its  magnetic 
capacity  is  likewise  different.  The  same 
view  is  further  corroborated  and  confirmed 
by  the  changes  of  the  magnetic  capacity 
produced  by  changes  of  temperature. 

To  one  it  may  seem  that  all  these  apply 
only  to  the  inorganic  world  from  which 
illustrations  have  been  drawn.  But  for 
the  organised  bodies  which  appear  to 
stand  enterely  in  a  different  plane,  we 
say  that  there  is  but  little  difference 
between  the  so-called  inorganic  and  organic 
worlds.  The  difference  is  but  a  difference 
of  degree  in  the  manifestation.  Both  the 
worlds  serve  as  the  manifesting  media  for 
the  display  of  the  energies  and  powers 
struggling  from  within.  Besides,  physical 
organisms  consist  of  solid,  liquid,  gaseous 
and  etheric  matter  most  exquisitely  and  deli- 
cately organised  into  cells  and  tissues.  These 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

again  build  up  into  organs  which  enable  the 
jiva  to    become    aware  of  the  outside  world 

^  Component 

and     of   what     is     winp     on     there.     The    P  ^ '  ^  s    o  f 

°        ^  man's  body. 

organism  thus  formed  is  but  a  medium 
of  the  life-forces  and  therefore  must  be 
subject  also  to  the  same  sets  of  causes 
and  conditions  which  determine  the 
character  and  configuration  of  things  and 
bodies  in  Nature  outside.  A  man's  body, 
consists  of  a  combination  of  several  systems 
of  parts  known  as  skeletal,  muscular,  nervous, 
digestive,circulatory  and  genito-urinary.  Each 
system  is  made  up  of  a  set  of  organs.  Each 
organ  is  built  up  of  tissues.  All  human 
tissues  are  born  of  cells.  A  cell  in  its 
simplest  form  is  a  minute  mass  of  a 
transparent  gelatinous  contractible  granular 
material,  called  Protoplasm, 

Protoplasm  thus  appears  to  be  the  natural 
elements  of  life.  It  has  been  characterised 
with  uniformity  of  structure,  chemical  com- 
position and  excitability  of  parts.  When 
any  part  of  the  lump  of  Protoplasm  is 
excited,  the  lump  moves.  An  amoeba  is  a 
single  lump  of  protoplasm  excitable 
and     contractible      in      all      parts     of     its 

53 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM, 

substance  and  not  more   so   or   less    in    one 
part    than     in     another.     Such     being    the 

Protoplasm.  ^ 

the  matter  of  characteristic  indications  of  Protoplasm^  the 
physical  basis,  nay,  the  very  matter  of  life ^ 
(for  the  inconceivably  fine  albuminous 
granules  called  germ  plasms  form  the 
constituent  elements  of  protoplasm)^  what  is 
it  that  makes  this  homogeneous  lump  of 
matter  pass  into  different  forms  of  hetero- 
geneity as  manifest  in  the  differentiation 
and  transfiguration  not  only  into  the 
different  forms  of  species— /(J//  of 
organic  beings  vegetable  or  animal, 
peopling  the  different  abodes  (gati)  of 
Sans&r,  but  what  is  it  that  makes  the  cell 
which  is  but  a  structural  unit  of  living  being 
or  to  take  the  case  of  the  human  ovum 
which  is  but  a  typical  cell,  what  makes  it 
differentiate  in  the  manner  so  that  some  of 
these  differentiated  parts  combine  into  the 
tissues,  some  transform  into  skeletals,  other 
evolves  muscles,  the  third  nerves,  and  the 
^  fourth,  the  organs  of  s^B  and  the  fifth 
the  organs  of  action  and  the  like  which  all 
compose  the  gross  material  system  or  the 
Ouddrika  sarira  of  the  man  ? 

418 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARMAS, 

Not      only       this.       No      two      human 
bodies  (sarird)  even    of  the    twin    brothers 

Causes        of 

or   sisters,     are    ah'ke    either    in    character,    differentia- 
tion, and 

behaviour      or      in        configuration      {Ratt\ 
Gatt\    Murti).     Natural     selection     in     the 
sense    of  the   struggle    for    existence      and 
hereditary    transmission  as  we   have  already 
seen,    cannot  explain    the  causes  and  condi- 
tions as  to    why    the    human    ovum    should 
differentiate    in    the  above    manner   so  that 
certain  of   its    differentiated    parts   come    to 
be    destined,    as    it    were,    to  work    out  the 
skeletal,  others    to   evolve  heart,    brain    etc, 
while  another  set   of  parts  gives  formations 
to  the   limbs   and  extremities — updngas,   till 
the  infant  after  the  formation  of  its  physical 
constitution  or  ouddrika  body  in  this  way  for 
a  certain  period  of  time  in  its  mother's  womb 
comes  out  to  see  the  light  of  the  day.     Then 
again  the  physical  constitution  of  every  child 
that  is  born  is  not  sound,  whole  and    entire. 
Why   some     are     stout    and    healthy     and 
proportionate  in  their  limbs  and    extremities 
from     birth,   while    others     are    lean,    thin, 
emaciated  as  if  they  were  dead  already  ?  Why 
some    are    born  with  defective  sense-organs 

4'9 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

and   deformed    limbs   and     extremities   and 
others  with  such  and  such  complexion  adding 

the      action- 


Of  individua- 
tion through    beauty  and  lustre  to  its    constitution  which  is 

the      action-  ' 

currents     of   iji^^^j  f^y  ^1]   while  Others  are  born  with    such 

non-injury.  ^         ' 

physical  organisms  as  are  highly  loathsome  ? 
Some  are  born  to  such  and  such  parents  in 
such  and  such  family  in  such  and  such  race 
and  in  such  such  place  and  walk  and  move 
with  such  traits  and  gaits  in  deportments 
and  motions  that  all  these  taken  together 
make  up  their  respective  individuality  for 
which  we  are  constrained  to  designate  one 
as  Mr  so-and-so,  son  of  Mr.  so-and-so, 
of  such  caste,  family,  and  the  like.  The 
Naturalistic  hypothesis  with  all  its  vaunted 
principles  of  adaptation  to  the  environment 
and  transmission  of  the  acquired  qualities  to 
the  offspring  fails  to  explain  the  causes  and 
conditions  which  determine  the  physique  and 
physical  environment  which*mark  out  a  parti- 
cular infant  from  amongst  many  others.  But 
our  sages  explain  by  attributing  the  same  to 
ih^  agkdttn  Karma — the  **  action-currents  of 
non-injury".  It  is  these  currents  of  action 
that  determine  the  physical  constitution  and 
the   environment  which   gives   the    ]iva   its 

420 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

loi>givity    and    individuality    by    which    it  is 

conventionally   sinorled   out   from    the     rest. 

^  "^  The       Ayus 

Of  such  sets  of  action-currents   of  non-injury    Karma, 
which  individuates  and  singularises  the  ]iva 
for  a  certain  definite  period  in   some    definite 
form  comes  first  ; — 

V.  THE  AYUS  KARMA. 
The  word  Ayus  lit.  duration,  refers  to 
the  period  of  existence  in  a  particular  con- 
dition. And  as  the  word  is  used  generally  . 
to  mean  duration  of  life,  it  is  known  as 
longivity.  Now  the  action-currents  which 
determine  the  duration  of  existence  in  any 
of  the  four  abodes  {gatt)  of  sansdr  is  called 
— Ayuh  karma.  It  divides  itself  in  the 
following  way, — 

(i)  Devdyuh  karma — is  what  determines 
ones  existence  in  a  subtle  form  in 
the  region  of  gods  to  enjoy  there 
the  sweets  of  life  for  a  certain  definite 
period  of  time, 
(ii)  Narakdyuh  karma — is  that  set  of 
action-currents  by  reason  of  which  a 
jiva  lives  for  a  certain  period  of  time 
in  a  hell  which  is  so  called  because 
of  its  being  devoid  of  all  pleasures. 

^21 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

(iii)  Manushydyu  karma* — is  that  by  which 
d^Jiva  is  born  in  the  human  world  to 
live  and  struggle  there  for  a  certain 
period  of  time. 

(iv)    Tiryanchdyu  karma — is  what   deter- 
mines the  period  of  existence   in  the 
world  of  beasts  and  birds. 
VI.    THE  NAMA  KARMAS. 

Nama  karma,    or  action -currents  deter- 
^,  minant     of  names,    forms    (n&m-rupd)   and 

The    action-  ^  ^    -^ 

tcrmlnant^of  environment  which  all  combine  to  give  the 
ama-rupa.  y^.^^  .^^  individuality  and  singularity.  But 
as  the  causes  and  conditions  which  deter- 
mine and  make  up  the  personality  and  indi- 
viduality by  means  of  which  a  particular  jiva 
is  singled  out  from  amongst  the  many,  are 
of  various  kinds.  The  sages  have  thought  it 
wise,  therefore,  to  classify  these  karmas 
into  two  main  divisions  (a)  Pinda-Prakriti 
(b)  Prateyka  Prakriti. 

The  Pinda  Prakriti  Nama  Karma 
Refers  to  those  sets  of  action-currents 
which  all  combine  in  the  concretion  of  ]wic' 
energetics  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  up  its 
physical  organism  after  a  certain  type,  form, 
colour,  configuration,  localisation  of  position  in 

422 


CLASSIFICATION    OF  KARMAS. 

relation  to  other  surrounding    circumstances 
which  make    up   the  particularisation  of  the 
Jiva   as  a    migrating    soul.       These    sets    of 
action-currents  are, — 

4.     GATI  NAMA  KARMA. 

1.  (i)     Deva  Gati  karma — the  word  gati  in 

the  phrase  means  abode  of  existence. 
According  to  the  Jain  sages  there 
are  four  gatis,  (i)  Deva  gati — or 
the  abode  of  the  gods,  angels,  and 
fairies.  It  might  well  be  compared  to 
Heaven  of  our  Christian  brethren 
and  Svarga  or  Deva  ioka  of  our 
neighbours — the  Hindus.  Life  is 
all  pleasure  here  ;  and  as  in  the 
midst  of  pleasure  there  is  pain, 
it  cannot  be  absolutely  devoid 
of  any  pain.  Hence  there  is  also 
pain  and  suffering  in  Heaven  ;  but 
these  are  here  reduced  to  what  we 
call  irreduicble  minimum.  Life  in 
Heaven  ends  with  the  full  fruition 
of  the  karma  which  determines  the 
/ivaSy  duration  and  enjoyment  there. 

2.  (ii)     Narak    gati    karma. — The     word 

narak    is     synonymous    with  niraya 

4^3 


# 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

denoting  the  state  of  existence  which 
bespeaks  of  Jivas  unspeakable 
suffering  and  intense  agony.  It  stands 
for  the  hell  of  the  Christians  with 
this  difference  only  that  according 
to  the  Christian  idea,  a  jiva  once 
condemned  for  an  act  of  sin  against 
God  into  any  of  its  numerous  cham- 
bers, cannot  expect  to  return,  how- 
ever penitent  it  might  be  subse- 
quent to  its  being  condemned  there. 
But  the  Jain  view  of  the  question  is 
that  by  the  narak  gati  karma  or  the 
set  of  action-currents  corresponding 
to  it,  a  Jiva  may  indeed  be  led  to  live 
in  and  suffer  in  this  abode  of  tor- 
tures and  torments,  but  with  the 
dissipation  of  the  particular  karma 
which  drifted  it  into  an  abode 
like  this,  and  if  there  be 
no  other  determinant  causes  and 
conditions  working  upon  the  jiva 
to  prolong  its  period  of  existence  in 
this  suffocating  condition,  it  gets 
rid  of  this  state  of  existence  and 
retires  to  some   other   gati — abode, 


CLASSIFICA  TION  OF  K ARM  AS, 

according  to  the  Kdrmic  energies 
of  its  own  making.  And  this  might 
either  lead  to, 

3.  (iii)    Manushya     gati    or    the    human 

world — the  best  and  the  only  sphere 

of  life  and  thought  even  for  the  gods 

who  have  to  descend  here  to  struggle 

for  the  attainment  of  autonomy  or 
self-rule,  or  to, 

4.  (iv)  Tiryak  gati — the    worlds   of  beasts 

and  birds  or  vegetables  and  minerals. 

6.  J  ATI  NAM  A  KARMA. 
The  word  jdti  here  means  species  of 
living  beings,  and  not  caste  into  which 
the.  Indian  social  organism  is  divided.  As 
a  biological  term  in  the  Jain  philosophy, 
it  is  used  to  denote  the  living  organ- 
isms which  are  classified  according  to  the 
number  of  sense-organs  each  jiva  possesses  : 
every  living  being  does  not  possess  all  the 
five  sense-organs.  Some  possess  only  one, 
viz,y  touch ;  others  possess  only  two,  viz.y 
touch  and  taste,  and  so  on.  The  Jain 
teachers  hold  that  this  variation  in  the 
number  of  the  sense-organs  as  possessed  by 
the  jiva  is  due  to  a   certain    sets  of  action- 

54 


AN^  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

currents  which  work  out  the  formation  of  the 
sense-organs.  And  accordingly,  they  teach, — 

5.  (i)  Eke7idriya    jdti  karma  is  that  set  of 

action-currents  by  the  virtue  of  which 
^.jiva  has  the  sense  of  touch  only. 

6.  (ii)  Dwindriya  jdti  kdrma — is    that  set 

of  action -currents  by  reason  of  which 
the  living  organism  has  two  sense- 
organs, — of  touch  and  taste. 

7.  (iii)    Trindriya  jdti  kdrmd — is  the  set  of 

action-currents  which  works  towards 
the  possession  of  the  senses  of  touch, 
taste  and  smell. 

8.  (iv)  Chaturindriya  jdti  kdrmd — is  the  set 

of  action-currents  by  dint  of  which 
xki^jiva  is  born  to  those  species  which 
have  the  origin  of  sight  in  addition  to 
the  above  three  organs. 

9.  (v)  Panchendriya  jdti  karma— IS  that  set 

of  action-currents  which  make  the 
jtva  to  be  born  as  one  amongst  thdse 
species  of  organisms  which  have 
also  the  sense  of  hearing  in  addition 
to  the  above  four  organs. 
Now  it  is  important  to  note  here  that 
Jainism    recognised    the    sense   of  touch  as 

426 


senses. 


CLASSIFlCA  TION  OF  KARMAS. 

the  most  fundamental  organ  of  sense.  All 
the  living  beings,  it  is  true,  do  not  possess 
all  the  organs  of  sense,  but  none  is  ever 
found    to    be    bereft  of  the  organ    of  touch,    touch^is^  the 

w       .        t  r  1  IT'        most    funda- 

It    IS    the    sense    of    touch,    says    the     Jam    mental  of  the 
philosophers,    that   distinguishes    the    living 
from     the     non-living.      If     responsiveness, 
as    lately    demonstrated   by  Dr.  Bose  be  the 
criterion    of  life,    then  every    living     being 
must  at  least  be  possessed    of  the  organ   of 
touch  without  which    'response'  becomes  im- 
possible.    The    reason    why    any  and  every 
ftva^  having  its   being  within    the  relativity 
of  causes   and    conditions,  must   at  least   be 
possessed    of  the   sense    of  touch    is   this  : 
a    jtva    cannot    exist   alone,    aloof  and    by 
itself  anywhere    in    the  vacuous  space  with- 
out anything  there  for  the  jiva    to  come   in 
contact  with.    With  a  jwa  to  be,  means  not 
only     to   exist    somewhere     but   to     be   in 
contact    with     something     else  as     distinct 
from    itself;  and   this    consciousness    in  the 
living      being      of  being      in  contact  with 
something   other   than    itself,    upon    which 
it    acts    and    re-acts,    would    be  impossible, 
if   it      were    devoid      of    the      sense      of 

427 


AN  EPITOME  OP  JAINISM, 
touch.     Jainism       further  holds     that     with 

With  the  in-     ^1       .  c     \  i       •  r  at  t 

crease  of  the    the  increase   ot  the    complexity  of  life    and 

complexity  of    ...  ...  r     i         •• 

iife,theorga-    Hving,  activities   on  the  part  of  the  jtva  too 

nism      grow 

more   subtle    grow  more  and  more    varied    and    complex. 

and  complex. 

The  pudgal  particles,  which  cling  to 
the  soul,  as  consequences  upon  the  jivds 
deeds  and  misdeeds,  in  the  previous 
cycle  of  existence  set  up  types  of  action- 
currents  hitherto  unexperienced,  and  bring 
into  play  newer  energetics,  which,  owing 
to  the  want  of  their  proper  vehicle, 
compel  the  jiva  to  find  out  a  more 
suitable  embodiment  that  would  serve 
better  the  purpose  of  manifesting  media  for 
their  fuller  and  richer  display.  It  is  also 
worthy  of  note  that  they  develop  pari 
passu  ;  for  the  nature  and  form  of  this  new 
vehicle  are  to  a  great  extent,  determined 
by  the  simplicity  or  complexity  of  the  action- 
currents  set  up  by  the  subtlety  or  grossness 
of  the  energetics  brought  into  play.  The 
readers  may  remember  here  that  we  have 
already  hinted  at  the  same  truth  although 
viewed  from  an  altogether  different  stand- 
point while  discussing  the  possibility  of 
re-birth. 

^28 


CLASSIFICA  TION  OF  K ARM  AS, 

5.  SARIRA  NAM  A  KARMA. 
Is  the  set  of  action-currents  which 
determine  the  growth  and  development  of 
the  body  (sartru)  of  the  jwa  of  those  sets  of 
action-currents  determining  the  character  of 
the  body  ; — 

10.  (i)     Ouddrtka  sartra  karma — is  that  set 

of  action  currents  which  determine 
the  ordinary  physical  body  that  we 
see,  to  come  out  actually  from  the 
mother  womb.  It  is  called  ouddrika 
because  it  is  born  of  the  materials  in 
the  womb  (udara)  of  its  mother. 

11.  (ii)     Vaikriya  sartra  karma— \^  the  set 

of  fine  action-currents  whereby  is 
evolved  a  kind  of  subtle-body 
which  is  variable  at  will.  It  is 
possessed  by  the  devas  and  angels 
who  modify  it  into  various  forms 
some  times  enlarging  it  into  a 
gigantic  size  with  four  arms  and 
the  like  and  at  others  reducing  it 
into  the  minutest  of  the  minute  hardly 
perceptible  by  our  mortal  eyes. 

12.  (iii)     Ahdrak   sarira    karma — is      the 

set   of  action    currents    whereby     a 

429 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM, 

jiva  developes  the  power  of  evol- 
ving a  tin)^  body  out  of  itself  to  be 
sent  to  distant  region  and  clime  to  , 
get  news  from  any  one  else  or  receive 
instructions  at  the  feet  of  the  master 
who  might  be  travelling  at  the  time 
in  some  distant  countries.  It  is  the 
Jiva's  'double  ' 

13.  (iv")   Taijas  sarira   karma — is    the    set 

of  action -currents  where  by  jiva 
developes  personal  magnetism  and 
heat  through  processes  of  which 
it  evolves  a  magnetic  body  lumi- 
nous in  character  and  consuming 
in  its  power.  A  jiva  who  has 
sufficient  occult  power  born  of  his 
Sddhand — spiritual  culture  disci- 
pline— can  project  this  luminous 
body  out  of  himself  and  burn 
up  things. 

14.  (v)     Kdrman    sarira    karma — is     the 

fine-subtle  body  which  is  built  out  of 
the  karmapudgal  of  the  energetics 
of  the  jivas  own  making  materia- 
lised into  temporarily  stable  forms 
of  Kdrntic  atoms. 

430' 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS, 

It  is  important  to  note  that  ordinarily 
all  \}!\tjivas  have  the  Ouddrtka,  Taijas  and 
the  Kdrman,  Of  these  the  latter  two  are 
inseparable  from  each  other  and  must  remain 
clothing  the  jiva  till  it  attains  to  the  state 
of  non-chalance — Kaivalya.  It  is  the  migra- 
ting body  which  travels  from  womb  to 
womb  shaking  off  the  Ouddrika  in  its  travels 
as  the  snake  casts  off  its  slough.  Regarding 
the  relation  between  the  Ouddrika  and 
Kdrman,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
previous  chapter  on  the  subject. 

3.     UPANGA  NAMA  KARMA. 

In  Updnga  n&ma  karma^  the  word  updnga 

means  limbs,    extremities,  lungs   and    others 

organs  of  action  composing  the  body,  and  the 

sets   of  action-currents  which    evolve  these 

component    parts   of  the    body    are   called 

updnga  karma.  The   Updnga  ndma  karmas 

are  of  three  kinds  vtz. — 

15.     (i)     Ouddrika    updnga  karma— mtSLiis 

the    set     of    action-currents     which 

evolve  the  component  parts   of  the 

gross   physical    body  formed  out  of 

the  materials  in  the  mother's   womb 

''tidara.' 

43^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM 

1 6.  (ii)   Vaikriya  updnga  karma — means  the 

set  of  action-currents  which  work  out 
the  component  parts  of  the  vaikriya 
sarira  of  the  gods  and  demi-gods. 

17.  (iii)     Ahdraka  iip&nga    karma — refers 

to  the  set  of  action-currents  giving 
formation  to  the  component  parts  of 
the  aharaka  body  which  the  saints  and 
sages  can  evolve  out  of  themselves 
by  the  help  of  the  powers  they  have 
acquired  through  severe  austerities 
and  penances  they  have  undergone. 
It  is  imperative  to    note    that    the    other 

two    kinds     of    bodies — the    Kdrinan    and 

Taijas,  have  no  limbs  and  organs. 

15.     BANDHA  NAMA  KARMA. 

The  word  bandhan  means  binding,  con- 
necting. We  have  seen  elsewhere  that  our  ; 
body  is  composed  of  six  parts  roughly 
speaking  viz,  skeletal,  muscular,  circulatory, 
nervous  and  genito-urinary  according  to  the 
modern  physiologists.  These  parts  not  only 
stand  vitally  related  to  one  another  but  there 
is  an  organic  unity  between  them.  They 
are  joined  together  by  what  is  called  'con- 
necting tissues'  equivelant  to  ' Sanyo] aka  tantu 

432 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

in  Sanskrit  cementing  up,  as  it  were,  into 
an  organic  whole.  In  dissecting  a  dead 
body  when  we  sever  its  parts  by  our 
knives,  we  cannot  afterwards  restore  them 
to  their  original  position  and  connection  : 
because  in  dissection,  the  connecting  tissues 
which  bind  the  muscles,  the  nerves  etc.  into 
an  organic  whole  are  also  cut  asunder.  Now 
the  bandhan  ndma  karma  means  those  sets  of 
action-currents  which  evolve  and  determine 
as  well  the  nature  and  character  of  these 
connecting  (links)  tissues  which  bind  together 
the  component  parts  of  a  body.  And  as 
bodies  are  stated  to  be  of  five  different  kinds 
as  noted  in  the  above  under  sarira  ndma 
kdrma,  so  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
connecting  tissues  which  bind  together  the 
component  parts  of  these  bodies  must  also 
be  of  different  nature  and  character  as  given 
below  : — 

1 8.  (i)  Ouddrika  bandhan  karma — means 
the  set  of  action-currents  which 
evolve  and  determine  the  nature  and 
character  of  the  'connecting  tissues' 
binding  together  the  component 
parts  of  the  gross  physical  body. 

55 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

19.  (ii)  Vaikriya  handhan  karma — means 
the  set  of  action-currents  determin- 
ing the  connecting  links  joining  the 
component  parts  which  make  up  the 
variable  body  possessed  by  the  gods 
and  the  demi-gods. 

20.  (iii)     Ah&raka  bandhan  kArma — refers 

to  the  set  of  action-currents  evolving 
and  determining  the  connecting 
links  joining  together  the  parts  of 
the  tiny  body  which  is  sent  out  by 
the  spiritual  adepts  to  distant  regions, 
as  noted  in  the  above. 

21.  (iv)   Taijas  bandhan    karma — is  what 

determines  the  connection  between 
the  parts  making  up  the  luminous 
body. 

22.  (v)    KArman   bandhan  karma — is  what 

unites  together  the  karma-pudgal  or 

the    materialised    energetics   of  the 

jtvas  own  making  vehicling  on  which 

the  soul    reducing    itself  to  a   subtle 

unit  of  energy  passes  out   of  the  ou* 

dArtka  body  of  the  jiva, 

23 — 32.     Now  the  five  bodies  oudArika  etc., 

do    not     stand  separated  from  one  another. 

^34 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

They  remain  intertwined  with  one  another 
in  two  fold  ways  of  warping  and  woofing  by 
which  reason  we  have  got  ten  other  forms  of 
bandhan  in  addition  to  the  five  forms  just 
detailed.  But  as  the  nature  and  character 
of  these  ten  kinds  of  bandhan  is  not  different 
from  those  enumerated,  we  do  not  think 
it  our  worth  while  to  enter  into  their  further 
details. 

6.  SANGHATAN  NAM  A  KARMA. 
The  word  sanghdtan  means  collecting 
and  laying  up  of  materials.  Every  living 
matter  by  the  virtue  of  its  own  inherent 
power,  works  and  collects  from  the  out- 
side non-living  matter  as  its  food  which  is 
annexed  or  assimilated  by  it  through  the 
processes  of  integration  or  anabolism  with- 
out which  the  formation  of  the  tissues  and  the 
growth  of  the  organism  become  impossible. 
Now  the  set  of  action-currents  which  deter- 
mines this  synthetic  or  anabolic  process  in  a 
living  body  is  termed  as  the  sanghdtan 
karma  and  as  there  are  five  kinds  of 
living  bodies,  the  sanghdtan  karma  must 
be  also  of  five  xlifferent  kinds  accordingly, 
viz., — 

435 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

33'  (i)  Ouddrika  sangM^an  karma — means 
the  set  of  action-currents  which  det- 
ermines the  construction  i.e.  anabolic 
processes  whereby  non-living  matter 
is  collected  by  the  gross  physical 
organism  and  is  assimilated  through 
chemical  transformation  into  tissues 
for  its  growth  and  development. 

34.  (ii)   Vaikriya      sanghdtan      karma. — is 

the  set  of  action-currents  which 
determine  the  processes  for  the 
>  variation  and  transformation  of 
the  variable  bodies  of  the  gods  and 
the  demi-gods. 

35.  (iii)  Ahdraka  sanghdtan  karma — means 

the  action-currents  set  up  by  the 
spiritual  adepts  to  collect  materials 
from  without  for  the  construction 
and  formation  of  the  tiny  bodies 
which  are  sent  out  of  their  gross 
.  physical  frame  to  distant  regions  and 
climes. 

36.  (iv)  TaiJQS   sanghdtan    karma — is     the 

set  of  action- currents  by  virtue  of 
which  heat  {teja)  is  absorbed  by  the 
jtva  from  without. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

Zl*  (v)  Kdrman  sanghdtan  karma — refers 
to  the  set  of  action-currents  whereby 
the  desires  and  energetics  of  the 
Jivas  own  making  are  materialised 
into  (kdrmic)  atoms  to  adhere  round 
to  the  soul  as  locked-up  energy  com- 
posing the  kArfnan  body. 
6.     SAMHANANA  NAM  A  KARMA. 

The  word  Samkanana,  like  bandhan, 
also  means  joining  together,  with  this  differ- 
ence only  that  the  latter  bears  the  import  of 
binding  a  thing  by  some  thing  else,  just  as 
a  man  is  bound  down  by  a  rope  ;  where  as 
samhanana  implies  joining  things  by  their 
mutual  interpenetration.  In  the  case  of 
handhan  n&ma  karma  the  muscles,  ligaments 
etc.  surrounding  the  skeletal  parts  of  the 
body  tie  them  up  into  a  particular  stature 
and  stoutness  of  the  system  as  a  whole  ; 
where  as  in  this  samhanana  karma,  the 
skeletal  parts  only  are  joined  together  by 
mutual  interpenitration,  dove-tailing,  into  each 
other  as  in  the  skull.  Now  the  manner  in 
which  these  skeletal  parts  are  found  to  be 
4  joined  with  one  another  are  variously  deter- 
mined as  detailed  below  ; — 

437 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM, 

38.  (i)     Vajra     rishava     ndrdrcha     sam- 

hanana  karma — is  the  set  of  actiori- 
^  currents    which    determines     bonny 

joints  of  the  strongest  characters.  In 
this  kind  of  joints,  the  bones  are  not 
merely  joined  together  by  mutual 
interpenetration  but  there  is  a  bony 
projection  {vajra)  along  the  joints 
with  a  cover  upon  it,  making  these 
immoveable  ;  such  being  the  case 
these  joints  are  not  easy  of  dislocation. 

39.  (ii)     Rishava      ndrdcha      samhanana 

karma — means  the  set  of  action- 
currents  determining  the  skeletal 
joints  by  mere  interpenitration  and 
without  a  vajra  as  in  the  hall  and 
the  socket  joint  of  the  hip. 

40.  (iii)  N&r&ch  samhanana  karma — denotes 

set  of  action-currents  determining 
the  skeletal  joints  in  the  same 
manner  as  in  the  previous  one  but 
without  any  tissue  cover. 

41.  (iv)  Ardha  ndrdcha  samhanana  karma 

— is  the  set  of  action-currents  which 
determines  the  character  of  the  joint 
at  one  end  of  the  bone  in  the  manner 

43^ 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

as  the  above  while  the  other  end  is 
.  Tjply  kept  in  position  by  ligament 
r...  in  the  case  of  the  thigh-bone. 

42.  (v)    Kilaka  samhanana  karma — is  the 

set  of  action-currents  determining 
the  joints  of  the  skeletals  simply 
by  nails  at  the  points  of  the  joints 
without  any  pin  or  a  tissue  cover. 

43.  (vi)  Chhevaththu  Samhanana  karma — 

is  the  set  of  action-currents  whereby 
the  bones  are  simply  joined  to  one 
another,  one  slightly  entering  into 
the  socket  made  in  another. 

6.  SAMSTHANA  NAMA  KARMA. 
The  word  samsthAna  signifies  configura- 
tion of  the  body  and  the  set  of  action-currents 
which  tends  to  determine  the  shape,  size,  and 
character  of  the  configuration  of  the  body,  is 
called  Samsthdna  karma. 

44.  (i)    Samachaturasra  samsthdna  karma 

is  the  set  of  action-currents  by  reason 
of  which  the  configuration  of  the 
body  is  kept  thorougly  symmetrical. 

45.  (ii)    Nyagrodha  samsthdna  karma — is 

the  set  of  action-currents  which  make 
the  part  of  the  body  upward  from  the 

439 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

naval  symmetrical  but  retards  the 
growth  and  development  of  the 
lower  part. 

46.  (iii)  S&dt  samsthdna  karma — is  the  set 

of  action-currents  which  make  for 
the  full  and  proper  development 
only  of  the  lower  part  of  the  body 
down  from  this  naval  leaving  the 
upper  part  not  properly  formed  to 
keep  up  the  symmetry. 

47.  (iv)  Kiibja  samsth&na  karma — is    the 

set  of  action-currents  by  the  predo- 
minence  of  which  only  the  trunk  of 
the  body  gets  deformed — limbs  and 
extremities  being  left  symmetrical 
— 'kubja  means  *hump-backed.' 

48.  (w)  Vdman  samsthdn  karma — is  the  set 

of  action-currents  due  to  the  in- 
fluence of  which  the  different  parts 
of  the  body  including  the  trunk  do 
not  develop  into  their  normal  size, 
form,  and  configuration  as  in  the  case 
of  a  dwarf  which  is  equivalent  to 
Vdman  in  Sanskrit. 

49.  (v\)    Hunda  samsthdna  karma — is  the 

set  of  action-currents   bv  reason  of 

440 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

which  none  of  the  different  parts  of 
the  body  are  symmetrical  and  proper- 
ly   adjusted  so  as  to  make  the  whole 
configuration  attractive  and  graceful. 
It  is   important   to    note    that    the   confi- 
gurations    of      the    otiddrika      bodies    that 
come  out  of   the   womb   (udar)  are   more  or 
less   determined    by    the    samsthdna    nama 
karma  ;  but  those    which  have  no   ouddrika 
constitution  are  not  subject   to   these  action- 
currents    determinant    of     the    configuration 
under  discussion. 

5.      VARNA  NAMA  KARMA. 

The  word  varn<x  means  colour  or  com- 
plexion ;  and  the  set  of  action-currents  which 
are  determinant  of  this  colour  or  complexion 
of  the  physical  constitution  of  the  jiva  is 
called,  varna  karma  or  the  set  of  action -cur- 
rents determinant  of  complexion.  This  varna 
karma  is  again  analysed  into  prasastha  and 
aprasastha-r-i.^.  pleasing  and  unpleasing  to 
the  eyes  from  the  aesthetic  stand  point. 
And  these  are  divided  into  five  kinds  as  in 
the  following, — 

50.    (i)  Krishna  varna  karma — is  the  set  of 
action-currents    by  the   influence   of 

56 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

which  the  colour  of  the  physical 
constitution  becomes  black  like  the 
Nigroes  of  Africa. 

51.  (ii)  Nila  varna  karma-^xs  set  of  action- 

currents  by  the  reason  of  which 
the  physical  complexion  is  made  blue 
like  some  of  the  Indian  races  of 
pre-historic  time. 

52.  (iii)  Lohita  varna  karma — is  the  set  of 

action-currents  which  reddens  the 
complexion  like  those  of  the  Red 
Indians  of  America. 

53.  (iv)  Hartdrd  varna  ka^  ma — is   the   set 

of  action- currents  which  give  yellow 
colour  to  the  constitution  as  we  find 
in  the  Yellow  races  of  China  and 
Japan. 

54.  (v)  Sveta     varna   karma — is    the   set 

of  action-currents  which  makes 
the  body  white  as  snow  like  the 
complection  of  the  White  races  of 
Europe. 

GANDHA  NAMA  KARMA. 
•    The  word  gandha   means  odour.    And  it 
goes   without    saying   that    every    kind    of 
physical    body  has  a   particular   smell  about 

4^2 


CLASSIFICTION  OF  K ARM  AS, 

it.  So  is  the  case  with  the  physical  organism 
of  the  jiva.  Now  the  odour  which  an 
organism  emits  is  either  fragrant  (suravij 
or  fetor  (duravi)  :    Hence, — 

55.  (i)  Surabhi  gandha  karma — is  the  set  of 

action-currents  which  makes,  a  body 
radiate  a  fine  fragrance  very  pleasant 
to  smell. 

56.  ^ii)  Duravi  gandha  karma — is   the  set 

of  action-currents  which  make  a 
body  emit  a  bad  stinking  fetor  very 
unpleasant. 

5.     RASA  NAM  A  KARMA. 

The  word  rasa  means  taste.  As  bodies 
have  'smells'  so  they  have  'tastes'  rasa^  as 
well,  which  is  discerned  by  the  sensation 
which  bodies  awaken  in  us  through  the 
organ  of  taste  {rasanendriya).  But  as 
the  matter  affecting  the  organ  must  be  in 
a  liquid  state  in  order  to  its  being  felt,  we 
have  the  word  rasa  which  bears  about  it  the 
sense  and  significance  of  liquidity.  Tastes 
differ  as  bodies  differ  in  constitution,  and  the 
action-currents  which  determine  the  nature 
and  character  of  these  tastes  are  named  as 
Rasa-Karma   or    the    action-currents  deter- 

443 


Alsr  EPITOME  OF  /AiNISM, 

minant  of  taste.  To  illustrate,  the  sensation 
of  bitterness  {tikta)  as  produced  by  quinine 
and  the  sensation  of  sweetness  (madhura)  as 
produced  by  sugar,  are  very  definite  and 
specific  sensations.  The  Jain  sages  have, 
therefore,  classified  the  gustatory  qualities 
of  bodies  {Rasas)  into  five  as  in  the 
following — 

57.  (i)  Katu    rasa    karma — is    the    set    of 

action  currents  which  make  the  body 
give  hot  or  pungent  sensation  {katu) 
as  in  the  case  of  pepper. 

58.  (li)  Tikta  rasa   karma — is     the   set  of 

action-currents  which  make  the  body 
*        awaken    the  sensation    of   bitterness 
{tikta)  as  in  the  case  of  quinine. 

59.  (iii)  Amla    rasa  karma — is    the  set    of 

action-currents  which  determines  the 
quality  of  sourness  (amla)  in  bodies 
as  in  the  case  of  acids  {amla). 

60.  (iv)  Madhura  rasa  karma — is  the  set  of 

action-currents  which  determines  the 
sweetness  (madhura)  of  bodies  as  in 
the  case  of  sugar, 

61.  (v)  Kaskdya   rasa   karma — is  the   set 

of  action*currents  which  determines 

444 


CLASSIFICATION    OF  KARMAS, 

the  saline  (kashdya)  quality  of  body 

as  in  the  case  of  salt. 
"In  the  ordinary  course  of  things  these 
sensations  are  excited  by  the  contact  of  specific 
sapid  substances  with  the  mucous  membrane 
of  the  mouth,  the  substances  acting  in  some 
way  or  other,  by  virtue  of  their  chemical 
constitution,  on  the  endings  of  the  gustatory 
fibres.  When  we  taste  quinine,  the  particles 
of  quinine,  we  must  suppose,  set  up  chemi- 
cal changes  in  the  cells  of  the  taste-buds  or 
in  the  other  parts  of  epethelium,  and  by 
means  of  these  changes  gustatory  impulses 
are  started.  ♦  *  Substances  which  taste  sweet 
or  bitter  are  always  found  to  contain  certain 
definite  groups  in  the  molecule,  especially  the 
hydroxyle  (OH)  and  amido  (NH2\  groups. 
Moreover,  it  seems  as  if  a  certain  definite 
balance  between  positive  and  negative 
radicals  must  exist  in  order  that  a  subs- 
tance shall  taste  sweet,  for  when  such 
substance  is  so  altered  chemically  that  this 
balance  is  upset,  the  resulting  derivatives 
are,  according  to  circumstances,  either  bitter 
or  tasteless."  Does  this  not  show  what  is 
implied  in  the  rasa-ndnia  karma  ? 

445 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JATNISM. 

8.     SPARSHA    NAMA    KARMA. 
The  word   sparsha  means   touch.     It   is 
by    touch    that   we    understand    whether    a 
body    is    heavy     or   light,  rough    or  smooth, 
warm  or   cold,  and  the  like.     And  the  set  of 
action-currents    which  determine   the    nature 
and  character  of  the  tactuo-mascular  sensation 
which    bodies   awaken    in    us  through  touch 
is  named  as    the   sparsha  karma.     Tactuo- 
mascular  sensations  are  of  eight  kinds  viz — 
62 — 69.  (i)   Karkash — rough  ;  (ii)  Mrtdu — 
smooth  ;    (iii)  Guru — heavy  ;  (iv)   Laghu — 
light  ;  (v)  Shita^  co\A  ;  (vi)  Ushna — warm  ; 
(vii)  snigdha  — moist  ;  (viii)  Rukshma — dry. 

4.  ANUPURVI  NAMA  KARMA. 
The  word  anupurva  means  order,  series 
or  succession,  i.e.  the  order  of  the  succession 
of  bodies  which  the  jiva  has  to  migrate 
through  after  death.  And  the  Anupurvi 
ndma  karma,  therefore,  signifies  the  action- 
currents  which  determine  the  course  of 
movements  which  the  /iva  has  to  make  in 
migrating  out  of  the  oudArika  body  at 
death  :  we  have  seen  before  that  after  death, 
th^jiva  being  wrapped  up  in  kArman  body 
migrates  to  ihdX  gati  which  is  determined  by 

446 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS. 

the  gati  karma  of  the  jivas  own  making 
during  the  period  of  its  oud&rika  existence. 
But  how  would  it  go  ?  the  k&rman-hoAy 
clothing  in  which  the  yiva  at  death  passes 
out  of  the  gross  mortal  coil,  has  neither 
the  organs  of  sense,  nor  of  action  which 
only  enable  the  yiva  in  the  ouddrika  body 
to  move  along  certain  lines  in  a  certain 
direction  in  space  in  order  to  reach  a  parti- 
cular destination  it  has  in  view.  But  the 
^Jain  philosophers  hold  as  a  solution  to  this 
doubt  that  as  both  the  GaH  and  the  Voni 
whence  the  ^iva  will  have  to  take  birth, 
become  fixed  and  determined  by  the  action- 
currents  set  up  by  the  ^iva  itself,  so  the 
direction  of  the  Jivas  movements  after  death 
to  reach  its  future  destination,  is  also  deter- 
mined by  its  setting  up  of  certain  action- 
currents,  called  Anupurvi  karma,  which 
determine  and  control  the  direction  of  the 
jivds  movements  in  space  by  which  it  is 
enabled  to  directly  reach  its  destination  :  but 
as  there  are  only  iowv  gatis  or  destinations 
for  a  Sansdri  jiva  to  reach  after  it  has 
shuffled  off  its  ouddrika  body,  this  Anupurvi 
karma  takes  four  different  forms, — 

H7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

70.  (i)     Devdmipurvi   Karma — means  the 

set  of  action-currents  which  directly 
leads  \hejiva  to  Deva  gatiox  the  re- 
gion of  the  gods  and  the  demi-gods. 

71.  (ii^   Ndrakdnupurvi  karma — means  the 

set  of  action-currents  which  directly 
leads  xhej'iva  to  the  Naraka  gati  or 
hell. 

72.  (iii)    Manushydnupurvi  karma — is    the 

set    of  action-currents    which    leads 

the    jiva    straight    to     the     human 

world. 

73-  (}^)     Tiryagdnupurvi  karma — is  the  set 

of  action-currents    leading   the  jiva 

straight    to    the  worlds  of  the  beasts 

and  birds. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  here  by   the   way 

that   accprding   to   the    principle  of  karma- 

causality,    a  jiva     after    death    has     to    go 

straight  not    only    to    the  gati  or    the    world 

wherein  he  is   destined  by  the  action-currents 

of  its   own   setting  up  to  move    about ;    but 

also    straight    to    the  very    Yoni    or    womb 

through  which  it  is  destined  as  well,    to   take 

its  rebirth   immediately  after  the  termination 

of  its   past    life.       The    period    intervening 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

between  death  and  birth  of  the  one  and 
the  same  jiva  is  known  by  the  name  of 
Vigraha  Kdla  in  Sanscrit  or  V&te  vahatA  in 
Guzrati.  This  vigraha  kdla  is  so  infinite- 
simally  small  that  it  can  not  easily  be 
measured ,  the  longest  being  the  time  one 
takes  to  count  from  one  to  four.  From 
this  it  becomes  further  evident,  and  it 
is  really  held  by  the  Jains,  that  it  is  not 
the  parental  soul  that  is  born  as  a  child  ;  for 
were  it  so,  then  the  parent,  remark  the  Jain 
philosophers,  should  have  died  the  moment 
xh^jiva  was  conceived  in  the  womb  through 
the  act  of  coition  :  nor  again  the  newly 
conceived //z/a  can  be  taken  as  a  part  of  the 
parental  soul  for  that  would  imply  an  actual 
division  of  the  soul  which  is  constitutionally 
indivisible  by  its  very  nature.  The  Jains  hold, 
therefore,  that  the  jiva  that  is  born  to 
the  parent,  is  not  the  parental  soul 
which  remained  hidden  as  it  were,  either 
in  the  constitution  of  the  father,  only 
to  be  instilled  by  him  into  the  womb 
of  its  mother  in  and  through  the  seminal 
fluid  at  the  time  of  impregnation,  or  in 
the   constitution  of  the  mother,  in  her  ovum 

449 

57 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(drtav)  which  passes  through  certain  stages 
of  development  while  coursing  downwards 
into  the  uterus  (Jardyu)  where  it  awaits  the 
embrace  of  the  spermatozoa  at  the  cHmax 
of  the  conpress.  The  new  beino-  that  the 
mother  conceives,  according  to  the  Jains, 
is  but  a  jiva  that  has  just  laid  aside 
its  mortal  coil,  the  ouddrika  body,  else- 
where, and  directly  comes  rushing  in  with 
lightning  speed  to  plant  itself  in  the 
ovum  just  fertilsed  through  the  processes 
of  coition  for  its  reception.  It  is  true 
that  through  the  processes  of  impreg- 
nation and  reproduction  innumerable yVz/^a;^  in 
the  forms  of  spermatazoons  in  the  seminal 
fluid  meet  their  deaths  ;  but  none  of  these 
is  born  as  the  child  conceived  by  the 
mother  in  the  act  of  coition.       # 

2.     VIHA  YO  GATI  NAM  KARMA. 

74-75.  Vihdyo  gati  means  gait  and 
deportment  in  one's  movement  and  the  set 
of  action  currents  which  control  this  gait  and 
deportment  in  the  movements  of  the  nvuy  is 
named  as  vihdyo  gati  karma  :  This  vihdyo 
gati  karma  is  either  (i)  s  hub  ha  {good) 
and  (ii)  ashubha  (bad).     It  is  with  this  vihdyo 

450 


cLassifica  tion  of  k arm  as, 

gati  karma  that  ends  the  list  of  karmas 
(  action-currents  )  coming  under  the 
heading  of  Pinda  Prakriti  Agkdtin 
Karma. 

THE    PRATYEKA    PRAKRITI    KARMA 

Or  the  action-current  that  runs  singly 
without  any  differentiating  characteristic 
insignia  in  the  current.  Of  these  Pratyeka 
Prakriti  karma  comes  first,— 

76.  Pardghdta  karma — is  the  action - 
current  by  virtue  of  which  the  jiva 
becomes  invincible. 

77.  Utchchdsa  karma — is  the  action- 
current  which  determines  the  courses  of 
inspiration  and  respiration. 

78.  Atapa  karma — is  the  action-current 
which  determines  the  light  and  halo  of  the 
personality  of  the  jiva  as  we  feel  when 
in  the  presence  of  any  high  souled  person, 
who  changes  the  atmosphere  around 
him  by  the  personal  magnetism  it  has 
developed. 

79.  Udyota  karma — is  the  action-current 
determining  the   serenity  of  the   influence    a 

jiva  of  high    merit   sheds    upon    those    who 
gather  arround  him. 

45^ 


AN  EPtTOME  OF  jAtNtSM. 

80.  Aguru  laghu  karma — is  the  action- 
current  by  which  the  body  is  made  neither 
heavy  nor  light. 

81.  Tirthankara  karma — is  the  action- 
currents  which  fit  the  jiva  to  become  a 
tirthankara  in  some  future  incarnation. 

82.  Nirmdn  karma — is  the  action - 
current  by  which  the  organs  become 
properly  adjusted  and  placed  in  their 
respective  positions. 

83.  Upaghdta  karma — is  the  action- 
current  by  dint  of  which  the  organs 
do  not  get  adjusted  in  their  respective 
places  to  allow  a  normal  functional 
activity. 

84.  Tras  karma — is  the  action-current 
by  virtue  of  which  the  jiva  passing  out 
of  the  immoveable  body  like  trees  and 
plants  etc.  take  to  a  moving  body  which 
can  travel  about. 

85.  Bddara  karma — is  the  action-cur- 
rent helping  the  jiva  in  the  metamorphosis 
form  an  invisible  minute  body  into  a  big 
visible  body. 

86.  The  paryApta  karma — is  the  action 
current   which  enables   the  /iva   to  devolop 


CLASSIFICA  TION  OF  K ARM  AS 

its  organic  parts  to   their    full  and    complete 
development. 

87.  Pratyeka  karma — is  the  action - 
current  whereby  a  jiva  has  the  privilege 
of  having  a  body  of  its  own  instead  of 
sharing  a  body  along  with  other  jivas. 
From  this  it  is  apparent  that  the  Jain  sages 
quite  understood  the  biological  possibilities 
of  a  great  msinyjivas  swarming  together  in  a 
common  home. 

88.  Sthira  karma— As  the  action-current 
whereby  a  jiva  has  a  good  set  of  strong 
teeth,  a  good  set  of  hard  bonny  skeletals 
and  the  like,  adding  to  the  strength  and 
steadiness  of  the  body. 

89.  Subha  karma — is  the  action-current 
whereby  the  jiva  enjoys  a  charming 
upper  part  of  the  body  inviting  the  atten- 
tion of  other  people.  It  differs  from  Nya- 
gfodha  samsthAna  in  this  that  it  determines 
the  nature  and  character  to  an  attractive  finish 
of  the  upper  part  of  the  body,  but  it  does  not 
necessarily  leave  the  lower  part  clumsy  and 
defective,  while  the  nyagrodka  samsthdna 
karma  as  we  have  already  seen  before, 
determines  the  symmetrical   get  up  of  the 

453 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAiNISM. 

upper     part    only,    leaving    the     lower   part 
defective  and  clumsy. 

90.  Saubhagya  karma — is  the  action- 
current  by  reason  of  which  a  jiva  becomes 
popular. 

91.  Susvara  karma — is  the  action- 
current  whereby  a  jiva  has  the  privilege 
of  having  a  sweet  melodious  voice  which 
charms  all  who  hear. 

92.  Adeya  karma — is  the  action  current 
which  adds  importance,  wisdom  and  weight 
to  the   words  spoken  by  a  jiva. 

93.  Yoshokirti  karma — is  the  action- 
current  whereby  a  jiva  earns  name  and 
fame. 

94.  Sthdvara  karma — 'is  the  action- 
current  which  impells  a  jiva  to  take  birth 
in  an  organism  of  immovable  nature  like 
the  trees  and  plants. 

95.  Sukskma  sarira  karma — is  the 
action -current  whereby  a  jiva  has  a  very 
fine  subtle  body  hardly  perceptible  by  the 
sense-organs. 

96.  Aparydpfa  karma — is  the  set  of 
action-current  by  the  influence  of  which  a 
jiva  has    to  succumb  before    it   attains    to  a 

454 


CLASSIFICA  riON  OF  K ARM  AS. 

complete  maturity  of  limbs  and    other  organs 
in  their  entirety. 

97.  Sddkdran  karma — is  the  action- 
current  whereby  a  jiva  dwells  in  a  body 
which  is  common  to  many. 

98.  Asthira  karma — is  the  action- 
current  due  to  the  influence  of  which  the 
teeth,  the  bones  etc.,  not  being  strongly  set 
up  are  unsteady  and  wallable. 

99.  Asubha  karma — is  the  action- 
current  due  to  which  the  upper  part  of  the 
body  is  neither  well-built  nor  pleasing  to 
other  eyes. 

100.  Durbhdgya  karma — is  the  action- 
current  whereby  ^.jiva  in  spite  of  his  work- 
ing hard  and  doing  many  good  deeds  does 
not  get  any  popularity  in  return. 

loi.  Dushar  karma — is  the  action-cur- 
rent whereby  the  /iva  has  a  rough  hoarse 
voice. 

102.  Anddeya  karma — is  the  action- 
current  due  to  the  bad  influence  of  which  a 
jiva,  however  he  may  speak  truth,  or  words 
of  wisdom  and  utility,  his  words  carry  no 
weight,  nor  convince  any  one  of  the  truth 
he  speaks  out. 

455 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

103.  Apayasha  apakirti  kdrma — is  the 
action-current  whereby  aijiva  has  to  labour 
under  a  bad  name  and  disrepute. 

Here  ends  the  long  Hst  of  One  Hundred 
and  Three  Nama  Karmas  determining 
the  environment  and  physical  condition  in 
and  through  which  a  jiva  has  to  struggle 
on  and  on. 

VI.— GOTRA  KARMA. 
We  have  seen  before  that  ^otra  karma 
means  certain  action-currents  whereby  is  de- 
termined the  family  and  the  race  in  which  a 
jiva  has  to  be  born  in  the  next  incarnation. 
But  families  being  either  high  or  low  in  social 
structure,  or  being  of  high  antiquity,  having 
behind  it  the  experience  of  ages,  the  Gotra 
Karma  divides  itself  into  two  distinct  sets  of 
action-currents,  viz — 

(i)  Uchcha  gotra  karma — is  that  set  of 
action-currents  by  the  influence  of 
which  a  jiva  is  born  to  a  high  family 
with  edifying  surroundings. 
(iij  Nicha  gotra  karma — is  that  set  of 
action-currents  under  the  influence 
of  which  a  jiva  is  made  to  take 
birth    in  a  low  family   with  bad  en- 

^S6 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS. 

vironments    and    grovelling  people 

around  him. 

VII.-VEDANIYA  KARMA. 
The  word  vedanA  is  synonymous  with 
samvedana  which  is  equivalent  to  sensation 
as  understood  in  modern  psychology.  Sen- 
sation results  from  the  action  of  an  external 
stimulous  on  the  sensative  apparatus  of  our 
nerves.  Each  organ  of  sense  produces  pe- 
culiar sensations  which  cannot  be  excited  by 
means  of  any  other.  The  eye  gives  the  sen- 
sation of  light,  the  ear  of  sound,  the  nose  of 

smell,  the   tongue   of  taste  and    the   skin  of 
touch.     And  the    sensations  not   only   differ 

from   one   another   in    kind    partly  with   the 

organ  of   the    sense   excited,    but   they  also 

differ  partly  with  the  nature   of  the  stimulus 

employed  in   two   ways   either  (i)   shAiA   or 

(ii)  ashAtd. 

(i)  ShdtA   vedaniya  karma — is    the    set 

of    action-currents   which,     working 

on   the    sensative   apparatus    of  our 

nerves,   gives   rise     to     pleasurable 

sensations. 

(ii)  AshAtA     vedaniya   karma — is      the 

set  of  action-currents  which  similarly 

457 

58 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

occasion  in  us  sensations  of  painful 
character. 

Thus  we  have  One  Hundred  and  Eleven 
kinds  of  Aghdtina  Karma  or  the  **Action- 
currents  of  Non-injury"  determining  and 
evolving  as  well  the  physical  conditions  of 
the  psyche  or  the  soul — i.  e.,  its  body  of 
action  and  its  localisation  in  space  which 
stand  as  the  manifesting  media  for  the  play 
and  operation  of  the  energetics  of  its  own 
making  in  the  past. 

Now  to  summarise  the  classification  of 
Karmas — both  Ghdtin  and  Aghdtin  which 
together  make  158  kinds  of  karma— -vfo, 
have, — 


I. 

Jndndvaraniya 

karma 

5  Kinds 

II. 

Darshan&varaniy  a  „ 

9       „ 

III. 

Mohaniya 

}* 

28       „ 

IV. 

Antar&ya 

)> 

5       .. 

V. 

Ayuh 

»> 

4                   M 

VI. 

NAnta 

>i 

103 

VII. 

Gotra 

)> 

2       ,, 

VIII. 

1 

Vidaniya 

)> 

2       ,, 

Total.       158  Kinds. 


4SS 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  K ARM  AS, 

The  details  of  these  jtvic  energetics 
which  materialise  themselves  into  relatively 
stable    character      in    the     form    of  karnta-    The   details 

canbe  work- 

pudgal  clinging  round  the  soul  can  be  work-    definitely/"* 
ed    out    indefinitely    in     strict     accordance 
with    the    Jain    philosophical     treatises.     A 
critical  study  of  these  questions   on  the    for- 
mation and  transformation  of  the  energetics 
of  the  jivds   own  making,  cannot   but  con- 
vince a  reflective  student,  of  the  intense  love 
of  truth  and  freedom  which    prevailed    upon 
the   sages   who  renounced  their  hearths  and 
homes  to  enter  upon  hair-splitting  analysis  of 
these  phenomena,  psychical  or  physiological, 
which  every   human  being   can  possibly  ex- 
perience,   so     that     those    who    have   been 
groaning   under   the  de-humanising    effects 
of  their    impudent    conduct   due     to   wrong 
knowledge  originating   from   their  perverted 
visions   into     metaphysics     of    things     and 
ideals,    might     take     a     note     of    warning 
before-hand,  and  strive   to   attain    to   a  free 
and    beatific   state  of  being   by  the     virtue 
of  Right-Conduct  {samyak  chdritra)  proceed- 
ing from  Right- Knowledge  {samyak jndna) 
acquired       through     Right-Vision    {samyak 

459 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

darshana)  into  the    underlying    realities    of 

ideas  and  ideals.     But  as  the  present  treatise 

The       Jain    Js  but  a  steppinpf-stone  to  have  a  bit  clearer 

metaphysics  *■  *■      ^ 

*^  ^^u   ^^^'^    vision   into    the     metaphysics    of  ideas  and 

of    the   Jain  ^    ^ 

sophy.  ^^'^°  ideals  lying  hidden  in  the  rich  and  almost 
inexhaustible  mines  of  the  Jain  literature  and 
philosophy  ;  nay  as  it  is  only  an  epitome 
faithfully  and  consistently  giving,  in  the 
briefest  manner  possible,  a  general  idea  of 
the  Jain  epistemology,  ontology  and  theology 
on  the  principles  of  which,  the  whole 
moral  code  of  the  Jains  is  formulated  for 
our  right  conduct  in  the  attainment  of  the 
true  Self- Rule  or  Swaraj,  pure  and  simple,  we 
must  refrain,  for  the  present,  from  entering 
upon  a  more  detailed  enquiry  into  the  subtlty 
of  the  still  deeper  truths  which  lie  veiled 
under  the  phenomenology  of  the  organic 
energetics  of  158  kinds  as  detailed  in  the 
foregoing  pages,  and  pass,  from  the  natural 
man  who  has  been  continuously  forging 
fresh  links  to  the  chain  of  bondages  by 
yielding  to  the  solicitations  of  lower  nature, 
on  to  the  consideration  of  the  moral  man 
whose  life  has  been  a  constant  endeavour 
to  shake  off  the  guilded  shams  of  the  senses, 

460 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  KARMAS, 

to  break  off  the  fetters,  to  tear  asunder  into 
pieces  the  shackles  of  bondages,  to  soar 
higher  and  higher  into  the  regions  of  bliss 
and  beatitude  to  shine  there  in  all  his  efful- 
gence and  glory. 


461 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 
FROM  METAPHYSICS  TO  ETHICS- 

How  Joes  Theory  Jetermtne  the  Practtce — the 
Ja\n  £tkical  S|>eculatton — riow  tt  is  aetermtned  and 
kasecl  on  tketr  Nleta|>liystcal  S|>eculatton  -A.  Oontrast 
between  BuJamsttc  ana  Jatn  AdoraUty  -  tke  Jatn  Oon- 
ce{>t-ion  of  the  Summum  Bonum. 

To  man,    his  own  inner  nature,  like   the 

outernature  which  surrounds  him,  '  is  at  first  a 

The  man  as    chaos  to  be  organised  into  cosmos.  As  his  in- 

a  theoretical 

and  a  moral    tellectual  interest  consists  in  subduing"  to  the 

bemg.'  ^ 

order  and  system  of  the  world  of  verities,  sur- 
rounding him,  the  varied  mass  of  presenta- 
tions which  incessantly  pour  in  upon  him, 
so  as  a  moral  being,  his  ethical  interest  lies 
in  bringing  the  claimant  and  jarring  impulses, 
propensities  and  other  elements  in  conformity 
with  the  order  and  system  of  the  rational 
life.  As  the  business  of  a  theoretical  thin- 
ker, confined  only  to  his  own  interest,  is  to 
make  the  world  orderly  enough  as  to  be  fit 
for  habitation,  so  the  business  of  the  moral 
man,  leaving  out  of  account  the  theoretical 
and    other    interests,    is   to   establish  order, 

462. 


METAPHYSICS  TO  ETHICS,  \ 

unity  and  coherence  in  human  practice.    But 

here   too,    as     everywhere    else,    the     head    '^^^„^^^^^y 

^  of   life     and 

guides  the  hand,  the  intellect  controls  the  f!l^  '^^^  °^ 
will  ;  for  theory  always  determines  the  practice. 
Of  course,  it  is  needless  to  mention  here  that 
a  clear  and  adequate  theory  comes  into  being, 
or  become  crystallised  into  a  definite  shape, 
after  long  crude  practice,  but  still,  it  may  be 
asserted,  as  a  fact,  incapable  of  being  denied, 
that  every  life  implies  a  certain  plan,  a  cer- 
tain conception,  however  vague  and  ill-defi- 
ned, of  what  life  means.  And  such  a  plan  or 
conception,  we  say,  is  already  an  implicit  or 
latent  in  every  theory  of  life.  The  clearer  and 
more  definite  the  conception  of  the  meaning 
of  life  becomes,  the  more  of  order  and  har- 
mony is  also  introduced  into  human  practice. 
This  is  why  intellectual  superficiality  is  so 
often  a  main  source  of  moral  evil  ;  and  folly 
and  vice  are  largely  synonymous.  This  is 
why  the  first  step  towards  moral  reforma- 
tion is  to  arouse  reflection  in  a  man  or 
people  ;  for  the  claims  of  morality  cannot  be 
properly  satisfied  and  its  demands  fulfilled, 
until  and  unless  the  rigours  of  these  claims 
are     properly     brought    clearly    into   view. 

46s 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

Every   case  of  moral  awakening  is  therefore 

Ethical    also   a   case   of  intellectual  awakening^  ;   for 
discipline 

brings      i  n    the   apprehension   of  truth    does  not   remain 
harmony  *^ 

and  reason-    ^   mere   matter  of  intellect,   or  job  of  head  ; 

able    sweet-  J  ' 

prac^tice.  * "  ^^^  ^^  ^^  Other  far-reaching  consequences 
as  it  rouses  the  emotions,  higher  or  lower, 
and  demands  expression  through  them  in 
conduct  or  in  life.  **The  opinion  we  enter- 
tain  as  to  man's  life  as  a  whole  and  its  rela- 
tion at  large  must  influence  our  practice  of 
the  art  of  life." 

If  this  be  the  relation  between* 'the  theory 
of  life*   and    'the  art  of  life/   and    if  theory 
moulds  the  practice,    as  is  evidenced  by   the 
history  of  mankind,  we    may  easily  surmise 
the  nature  of  the  ethical  discipline  which  will 
necessarily  follow  from  the  subtle  and  splen- 
did metaphysical  speculations  of   the  Jains, 
we  have  discussed    before.     For  the   ethical 
discipline  is  nothing   but  the    formulation  of 
the  principles  in  accordance  and  in  conformity 
with  the  metaphysical  speculation,  which  will 
bring    order,     coherence,    and    unity  in    our 
practice  and  thereby  help  us  in  the  achieve- 
ment  of  the  Summum  Bonum,   we   have   in 
view.  And  the  art  of  life   and    its   principles 

^6^ 


METAPHYSICS  TO  ETHICS. 

for  the  guidance  of  the  conduct,  being  but 
means  to  the  realisation  of  the  Highest 
Good,  will  vary  considerably  with  any  varia- 
tion in  the  conception  of  the  End  itself.  And 
we  shall  develop  this  presently  by  bringing 
the  Buddhistic  ethics  in  sharp  contrast  with 
the  ethics  of  Jainism. 

The  Buddhas,  rejecting  the  view  of  the 
soul  as  a  persistent  entity  hold  out  that  it 
is  a  continuum  of  conscious  states  and 
processes,  for  their  metaphysics  leaves  no 
room  for  any  abiding  substance.  This 
view  of  momentary   existence,  this  denial  of    Buddhistic 

Ethics. 

any  persistent  reality  as  commonly  under- 
stood, was  extended,  to  utter  astonishment, 
to  the  physical  world  also,  it  being  thought 
of  as  mere  subjective  impressions  having 
no  permanent  underlying  substance.  It  is 
out  and  out  subjectivism,  for  here  the 
momentary  experience  becomes  the  sole 
reality  and  the  only  datum  of  consciousness. 

Now,  in  face  of  such  philosophical  specu-    " 
lations   which    reduce  the  self  as  well    as  the 
external    world    into   so    many     momentary 
but   continuous   existences,    which  conceive 
reality  in  the  form  of  an    ever-flowing  fluid, 

59 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

the  only  ethical    dictum    which    can  be    held 
out   consistently   is — ''Guard  the   interest  of 
the   present  and  think  not  for  the   morrow." 
The  very    fact   that    we   are    the     children 
of  every  moment  and    not   of  eternity  as   is 
taught  in  direct   opposition  to  our  own    doc- 
trine,   makes   the  claim  of  the   present,  even 
Its  criticism.    ^^  ^^e   momentary    present,    imperious  and 
supreme  beyond  all  others.     Not   the  calcu- 
lating  prudence,    but    a   careless   surrender 
to   the   present   becomes    the    true   rule   of 
life.     And  it  is  a  mood,  we    may  say,    which 
must  recur  with  every  moral  scepticism.  For 
whenever  the   meaning    of  life,    as    history 
reveals,   is  not  truly  realised  or  lost  sight    of 
altogether,    or    whenever   that     meaning   is 
shrivelled  up  in  the   experience   of  the   mo- 
mentary present,  when  no  abiding  interest  is 
found    amidst  this  fleeting  earthly  life,  when 
in  it,  is   discerned    no  'whence'    or  'whether' 
but  only  a  brief,  blind,  continuum    of  consci- 
ous  states   and  processes  and    of  transitory 
existences,    then    the    conclusion     which   is 
inevitable   to   come  foremost  in  the  mind,  is 
that  the  interest  of  the  present  have  a  para- 
mount  and   supreme   claim  and  the  present 

466 


METAPHYSICS  70  ETHICS. 

enjoyment  and  future  unconcern  is  the  only 
good  of  life.  And  we  may  remark  that  -pj^^  j^i^ 
such  a  philosophical  speculation,  by  the 
perfect  frankness,  with  which  it  eulogises 
the  life  of  momentary  experience  and  under- 
mines the  importance  of  calculating  wisdom 
so  essential  in  life,  takes  away  from  man 
what  is  of  worth  and  dignity  to  him  and  thus 
bears  its  own  condemnation. 

The  Jains,  however,  on  the  other  hand 
hold  out  a  different  ideal — an  ideal  of  free- 
dom from  bondage — which  can  only  be 
attained  by  voluntary  effort,  both  intellectual 
and  moral.  Here,  as  we  have  found  in 
Buddhistic  metaphysics,  the  soul  is  not 
reduced  to  a  continuum  of  conscious  states, 
to  a  flux  of  psychical  impermanent  and  mobile 
units,  but  is  viewed  as  a  substantial  unity,  a 
true  verity,  which  has  got  to  undergo  all  the 
consequences  of  its  thoughts  and  deeds 
either  in  this  life  or  in  life  to  come,  till  it 
attains  to  that  state  of  freedom  and  beatitude 
which  is  enjoyed  only  by  the  Kevalins  or 
the  Omniscients.  The  man  here  does  not 
escape  the  effects  of  his  own  deed,  virtuous 
or    vicious,    shuffling   off  this  mortal    coil  as 

467 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

taught   in  Buddhistic  philosophy,  but  on  the 

other   hand,    enters   again   into   a    state   of 

The  Jain    bondaofe,     thousrh     it   may     be     somewhat 

conception  o  o 

of  the  Sum-    different   from    the   present  one,   to  feel   the 

mum  Bonum,  ^  ' 

consequences  he  earns  or  has  earned,  and 
there  is  no  escape  from  this  cycle  of  birth 
and  rebirth,  till  he  is  able  to  shake  off  by  his 
own  moral  endeavour,  the  pudgal  particles 
clinging  round  his  soul  on  every  occasion 
he  acts.  This  bondage  is  also  regarded 
as  something  alien  to  the  soul,  it  being 
caused  by  its  own  misdoings  and  it  can 
therefore  regain  its  original  state  of  libera- 
tion, by  developing  in  full  the  capabilities 
which  are  now  lying  veiled  ordormant  in  him. 
The  Summum  Bonum  of  life  is  here  not  the 
gratuitous  enjoyment  of  the  present  in 
utter  disregard  of  the  future,  as  Buddhists 
hold  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  sacrifice 
of  the  present  to  the  future,  the  sacrifice  of 
flesh  to  enter  into  a  life  of  spirit,  the  anna- 
hilation  of  passion  to  enjoy  a  state  of  serene 
bliss,  that  forms  the  keynote  of  Jainism.  In 
short,  the  yearning  after  a  state  of  freedom 
'  from  bondage, — a  state  of  bliss  and  beatitude 
and  omniscience,  attainable  after  much  moral 

468 


METAPHYSICS  TO  ETHICS. 

endeavour  from  a  pious  home-sickness  in  the 
state  of  bondage  in  this  earthly  life  is 
at  the  heart  of  Jainism.  And  consequently 
their  ethics,  is  not  an  ethics  of  sensibility 
where  man  sells  himself  to  nature,  but  is 
essentially  an  ethics  of  self-realisation  in  and 
through  self-rule  and  self-regulation. 

Such  being  the  end  and  aim  of  Jain 
morality,  we  turn  our  attention  to  the 
methods  which  should  be  adopted  for  the 
realisation  of  this  sublime  ideal.  Erelong, 
we  have  discussed  the  question  regarding 
the  possibility  of  such  realisation  and  we  got 
an  emphatic  affirmative  answer  to  it,  nay  the 
question  has  been  already  decided  by  a 
single  stroke  so  to  speak  with  the  solution 
of  the  problem  of  Necessity  and  Free-will. 
There  we  have  shown  clearly  that  man  has 
this  peculium  to  criticise  the  impulsive 
Stream,  to  arrest  and  change  its  course  and 
to  subdue  the  lower,  animal  propensities 
leading  to  vicious  crimes,  in  view  of  the 
sublime  ideal.  It  is  here  that  he  stands  on 
a  higher  level  than  animal,  for  his  life,  un- 
like the  life  of  an  animal,  is  not  a  life  of 
blind    immediacy,  but   a  life   controlled  and 

469 


The  means 
to  the  End. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAtMlSM. 

guided  by  its  meaning  as  a  whole.     His  life 
The  method    is  not  a  life  of  surging  passions  and  prompt- 

for  realising 

the  Ideal.  ings  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  is  the  critic  as  well 
as  the  subject  of  these  and  as  such  he  is  the 
maker  of  his  own  destiny.  Man  has  to  rise, 
in  order  to  attain  to  this  state  of  beatitude 
and  bliss,  above  the  impulses  of  the  moment, 
and  must  view  everything  he  feels  or  thinks 
or  wills,  in  the  light  of  the  Supreme  Ideal— 
the  source  of  all  moral  obligation.  He 
must  criticise  the  solicitations  of  sense  and 
his  natural  tendency  to  activity,  judge, 
approve  or  condemn  them  according  as 
they  stand  either  conducive  or  detrimental 
to  the  attainment  of  freedom  or  to  the 
interest  of  his  self-realisation.  Living  as 
he  does  in  this  stage  of  bondage — a  state 
of  perpetual  conflict  between  reason  and 
sensibility,  between  ideal  and  actual,  between 
natural  and  moral, he  cannot  avoid  this  rule' 
of  life.  He  cannot  without  ceasing  to  be  a 
moral  personality  abjure  this  function  of 
self-legislation,  which  is  the  true  way  for 
self-realisation,  because  he  feels  an  incessant 
craving  in  him  for  a  life  which  would  be  the 
fulfilment  of  his  true  and  characteristic  nature. 

i70 


METAPHYSICS  TO  ETHICS.  *        ^ 

Virtue  is  not  a  spontaneous  natural 
growth,  still  less  an  original  endowment 
of  man.     He    has    to    constitute    himself  a    ^^,"  ^^f.  ^° 

make     him- 

moral  or  virtuous  person  and  has  to  build  ous  ^an/^" 
up  his  character  after  a  long  and  toilsome 
process  of  self-legislation  and  self-conquest. 
And  it  is  the  privilege  and  dignity  to  him 
to  be  the  critic  of  his  own  impulses,  to 
be  the  maker  of  his  own  destiny  and  to  have 
in  his  own  hands,  the  way  to  his  own 
emancipation.  No  doubt  this  way  to  self- 
realisation  is  beset  with  many  obstacles  and 
impediments  and  a  walk  on  it  entails  much 
struggle  and  pain-suffering ;  but  looking 
to  the  other  aspect,  we  also  find,  in  the  depths 
of  a  moral  being,  a  joy  which  is  even  stronger 
and  more  steadfast  than  the  self-imposed 
pain  itself — we  mean  the  joy  of  the  convic- 
tion that  the  struggle  is  worth  while,  nay  the 
only  thing  which  has  any  worth  at  all  ;  for 
the  goal,  he  strives  after,  is  not  something 
transitory,  fleeting  or  evanescent,  like  that 
of  the  Buddhist  but  is  everlasting  freedom, 
everlasting  omniscience  and  everlasting 
bliss.  And  in  the  joy  of  anticipation  of  this 
blessed  state— a  state  of  unparalled   sponta- 

47  J 


The       state 
after  realisa 
tion 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

niety,  freedom  and  naturalness,  all  the  pity 
of  pain  and  sorrow,  of  struggle  and  defeat, 
of^^\^he  ^^  mortifications,  and  penances  sinks  out 
good.  ^  ^  ^  ^f  heart  and  mind.  This  is  the  state,  where 
in  the  language  of  a  philosopher,  the 
indefinite  potentiality  of  either  vice  or 
virtue,  has  been  transformed  into  a  definite 
capacity  for  virtue,  nay  even  more,  into 
an  incapacity  for  vice.  Here  he  soars 
above  the  region  of  merit  and  demerit,  of 
reward  and  punishment,  of  public  sanction 
s  or  censure,    shuns    off  what   is   stiff,  stereo- 

typed and  artificial,  and  lives  a  life  which  is 
''free  down  to  its  very  root,"  And  we  may 
conclude  by  saying  that  because  man  is  a 
citizen  of  a  higher  world,  and  is  potentially 
free,  he  feels  the  bondage,  of  the  lower 
form  of  life  and  the  burden  of  self- 
realisation  becomes  one  which  he  is  willing 
and  eager  to  bear  and  which  becomes  *the 
lighter,  the  longer,  and  more  faithfully  it  is 
borne."  For  better,  he  feels  this  noble 
discontent  than  the  most  perfect  animal 
contentment. 


472 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
THE  CONCEPTION  OF  VIRTUE  AND  VICE. 

Virtue  and  vtcc — atsttnctivc  t>rtnct^lc  between  tnem 
—  Human  conduct  is  essenttally  Teleologtcal — Moksha 
ts  tlie  Higliest  End  of  life  and  activity — Contrast 
Letween  tke  Eastern  and  Mr  estern  concct>tion  oi  Vice 
and  Virtue — Virtue,  Vice  and  Karma-causality — Tne 
|>roblem  oi  evil. 

Before  giving  a  detailed  list  of  the 
manifold  virtues  aud  vices,  as  has  been 
enumerated  by  various  Jain  philosophers, 
we   think  it    necessary,    for    a    philosophical    tiveprincipie 

lDCtwe6n  vir- 

treatment,  to  enter  into  the  principles  on  tue  and  vice. 
which  this  distinction  rests  or  the  principles 
from  which  we  may  logically  deduce  them. 
A  mere  survey  of  the  virtues  and  vices  as 
given,  in  the  list,  (vide  infra)  won't  help  us 
much  in  the  way  of  entering  into  the  philo- 
sophy of  the  thing  or  understanding  the 
rationale  of  such  distinction. 

To  enter  into  our  subject-matter  therefore, 
we  first  draw  the  attention  of  our  readers  to 
the  fact,  that  in  opposition  to  the  philosophy 
of  the  West,  we  find  even  here,  first,  a  teleo- 

.    .  473 

60 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

logical    conception     dominating     the   entire 
distinction  ;     for    the    Jains    do    not  believe 

Teleological 

conception—    in    the    intrinsic    worth     of  any     particular 

the  Ultimate 

End  being    thoup^ht    or   deed    which    is    palpable  to  the 
so-called  supernatural  faculty  which  goes    by 
the  name  of  Conscience  or  Moral  Sense,  as  is 
held  by  the  Common-Sense   philosophers   of 
the  West ;     but  on  the  contrary,    hold  that  a 
thing  or  a  thought    has    any    worth    only  as 
it  is  conducive  to  the  realisation  of  some  end 
to   which    it    is    but   a    means.     An     objec- 
tion,   which    may     seem    to   have    much   of 
plausibility,    at    first   sight,  of  course,    might 
be    raised    to     the    effect,     that    we    cannot 
go     on     ad    infinitum  in    this  progressus  ; 
so     we      must       stop      somewhere      which 
must   be    the   ultimate    End    and    means  to 
'  nothing  ;  and  this  Ultimate  End  or  Summum 
Bonum,    being,    by   its  very  nature,  not  any 
means    to    any   end,    cannot,    in    strict    con- 
formity   with    the    proposition    already   laid 
down,    have    any     worth    at    all     and     so 
ceases   to    be     desirable    altogether.     Thus 
Moksha     or     Final    Liberation,     which     is 
regarded   as   the    Ultimate   Goal   of    every 
moral   endeavour  and   as  the   source   of  all 

414 


^jm 


CONCEPTION  OF  VIRTUE  &  VICE. 

moral    obligation,    may   seem    to    have     no 
worth  in  their  eyes  ! 

The  criticism,  in  reply,  we  say,  is    beside 
the  mark  ;  for  the  proposition  is  applicable  to 

,  .  7    7      •       1  r  •  1      •  ^^  objection 

every  thnig  except  moksha  itselr  m  relation  to  refuted, 
which  we  judge  everything  else  and  which  is 
regarded  as  the  fountain  of  all  worth.  This 
moksha  or  the  state  of  liberation,  as  we  have 
discussed  before,  is  not  something  alien  to  our 
nature,  but  is  on  the  other  hand  the  fullest 
development  of  the  capabilities  now  lying 
veiled  or  dormant  in  us,  and  all  the  worth  it 
possesses  for  us,  is  due  to  its  being  the  full" 
est  realisation  oi  our  own  true  and  character- 
istic nature.  And  all  the  feelings,  emotions 
and  affections  which  gather  round  the  appre- 
hension of  virtue  and  vice,  which  accompany 
the  sense  of  duty  or  conviction  of  obligation, 
and  the  consciousness  of  good  or  ill  desert, 
remorse  and  self-approval,  moral  hopes  and 
fears, — all  testify  unanimously  to  his  being*  in 
the  state  of  bondage,  the  liberation  from  which 
is  therefore  the  true  goal  of  every  moral 
progress.  For  whence  comes  the  permanent 
uneasiness  and  discontent  that  are  apt  to 
haunt  even  the  favoured  lives  .-*    Undoubted- 

475 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

ly  from  the  constant  presence  of  unrealised 
ideals — the  ideal  of  liberation  and  omnis- 
cience. The  sense  of  short- coming,  of  broken 
purposes,  of  blighted  visions  which  cause  , 
many  a  chill  on  the  most  genial  hours, 
admit  of  no  other  more  rational    explanation. 

^  And    this   feeling  of  uneasiness,  this  feeling 

of  discontent — is  that  which  saves  the  indivi- 
dual as  well  as  the  nation  from  every  sort  of 
moral  stagnation  and  stationary  existence. 

In  another  respect  there  is  also   a   slight 
difference     between    Jainism     and    Western 

Vice  or  vir-    philosophy     which     consists     in     this     that 

tue  refers  not 

to  character    here    virtue      does     not     directly     refer    to 

butf  to    con- 

*^"^^-  the    excellence      of     character     as     in     the 

West,  but  to  the  conduct  conducive  to 
the  realisation  of  moksha.  The  conduct, 
being  but  a  partial  revelation  of  the 
character,  the  Jains  confine  the  terms  Pdpa 
and  Punya  i.e.,  vice  and  virtue,  to  the  conduct 
itself,  regarding  the  character  which  reveals 
itself  through  the  conduct  conducive  to  self- 
realisation,  as  simply  religious  ;  for  here 
religion  and  morality,  both  having  the  com- 
mon end  in  view,  mingle  together  and  are 
regarded  as  inseparable. 

476 


CONCEPTION  OF  VIRTUE  &  VICE. 

Virtue,    we   thus   see,     is   that    form   of 
conduct   which    furthers    the   self-realisation 
of  man,     helps     him     in     the     purification    virtue  is  a 
of  the   heart   and    the  attainment  of  libera-    ^^fV:«^e 

r  e  I  1  n  c  s 

tion  and  a  state  of  beatitude  and  bliss,  ^Js^^jons!^^^ 
It  has  a  good  end — an  end  which  justifies 
its  worth — namely  perfection  ;  for  perfec- 
tion, it  seems  to  us,  is  a  worthy  aim 
in  itself  and  the  pain  we  suffer  from 
on  our  march  towards  it,  therefore  needs 
no  apology.  Virtue,  inspite  of  the  pain 
which  it  brings  in  its  trail,  is  of  incalcul- 
able use  in  correcting  and  disciplining 
the  spirit,  for  it  serves  to  soften  the 
hard  of  hearts,  to  subdue  the  proud,  to 
produce  fortitude  and  patience,  to  expand 
the  sympathies,  to  exercise  the  religious 
affections  and  lastly  to  refine,  strengthen, 
nay,  to  elevate  the  entire  moral  disposition. 
It  tends  of  its  very  nature  to  honour  and 
life  and  vice  to  dishonour  and  death.  And 
lastly  it  sheds  upon  us  a  deep  peace,  a  sense 
of  security,  of  resignation  and  hope  which 
no  sensible  or  earthly  object  can  elicit.  It 
clarifies  our  vision,  refines  our  thought, 
purifies   our   heart,    animates  our    will,    and 

477 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

last  of  all  it   adds    we   say  a     cubit   to   our 
moral  stature. 

Such    being    the    nature   of  virtue,    how 

Virtue,    vice 

and  karma-    can    we    expect    in    face    of  the  operation  of 

causality. 

Karma-z'^\i'^2}i\X,y,  other  than  pain  and 
misery,  when  we  commit  vice.  Surely  the 
entail  of  natural  evil,  of  pain  and  ipisery, 
upon  moral  transgression  is  the  indispensible 
expression  of  the  righteous  adjustment 
of  things  by  the  operation  of  Karma- 
causality.  Sin  being  there^  it  would  be  simply 
monstrous,  in  face  of  such  inexonerable  moral 
causality  as  discussed  above,  that  there 
should  be  no  suffering,  no  misery,  and  no 
pain,  and  would  fully  justify  the  despair 
which  now  raises  the  sickly  cry  of  complaint 
against  the  retributory  wretchedness  of 
moral  transgression.  And  still  in  utter 
forgetfulness  of  such  moral  causation,  we, 
when  we  are  haunted  by  the  fatalism  of 
nature  on  our  own  misdoings,  cry  against 
the  sterness  and  rigidity  of  the  inexonerable 
law,  with  which  it  marches  upon  us !  We 
forget,  in  short,  that  the  absence  of  physical 
evil  in  presence  of  the  moral  evil  pleads 
against  the  operation  of  the  law  of  Karma- 

478 


CONCEPTION  OF  VIRTUE  &  VICE. 

causality,  nay  against  the  whole  righteous 
adjustment  ot  the  world,  and  is  a  horrible 
inconsistency. 

But  we  have  not  as  yet  got  rid  of 
another   difficulty   which    may    perplex    the    ^^y  should 

^  y      1       1  there  be  any 

mind  of  one  interested  in  this  problem  ;  for  ^'^^  ^ 
questions  like  this  as  '*why  should  there  be 
any  vice  at  all  ?"  cannot  but  disturb  minds 
of  earnest  inquirers.  True,  they  may  say, 
there  is  the  law  of  A'^rwa-causality,  the 
firm  grip  of  which,  no  one  can  elude  on 
commission  of  vice — truer  indeed  that  by 
virtue,  the  torpid  conscience  is  awakened,  the 
close  affections  are  opened  and  the  slavery 
of  selfishness  can  be  successfully  escaped — 
but  why  is  this  world  at  all  tainted  with  vice 
and  not  a  world  of  pure  unalloyed  virtue  ? 
Or,  more  briefly,  why  there  is  any  sin 
at  all? 

The  obvious  reply  to  such  enquirers  is 
that  it  is  due  to  our  free-will.  We  are  as 
man,  the  most  gifted  animals  in  the  arena 
of  the  universe,  and  this  best  possible 
endowment,  namely  the  power  to  choose 
between  good  and  evil  regardless  of  their 
unavoidable   consequences,     includes   in    its 

^79 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

very  nature,    the   ability   and   possibility  of 

its     misuse.     And   this    free-will    needs    no 

It  is  due  to   justification,    for    without    it  there  misfht    be 

our     Free- 

^^'^'-  some    sort   of  goodness    or   docility,    which 

may  be  properly  designated  as  animal 
goodness,  but  no  virtue  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term,  for  a  virtuous  being  is 
one  who  chooses  of  its  own  accord  to  do 
what  is  right,  though  the  heaven  falls. 
And  the  notion  of  a  moral  being,  without 
being  endowed  with  the  freedom  to  act 
of  its  own  accord,  without  the  concurrence 
and  approval  of  its  own  will,  is  itself  a 
down-right  contradiction  ;  for  otherwise, 
we  would  be  forced  to  think  of  morality 
in  stones  and  trees.  To  take  away  this 
freedom  of  man  is  virtually  to  arrest  the 
system  of  things  to  a  natural  order  and 
means  the  reduction  of  human  life  to  animal 
spontaneity  and  leaves  no  room  for  the 
possibility  of  its  culmination  into  an  ethical 
society. 

Sin,  we  thus  see,  far  from  being  an 
inevitable  outcome  of  a  determining  neces- 
sity, is  the  result  of  the  abuse  of  an  orginal 
endowment  of  man — which  being  the  ground 


CONCEPTION  OF  VIRTUE  &  VICE 

of  his  moral  nature  when  properly  used, 
instead  of  depraving  morality,  heightens  it. 
And  we  may  further  say  that  owing  to  this 
peculiar  endowment,  the  whole  resources  of 
men  are  well  in  hand  and  the  creature  with 
this  controlling  agency  when  raised  to  its 
highest  pitch,  displaces  a  thousand  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  its  self-realisation. 

Thus   we   see    that    man     is   not    moral 
owing   to   any  peculiar  organ,    for  there  is    Man  is  not 
no  peculiar   org^an   in   virtue   of  which    we    ^"^  peculiar 

*  °  organ    of  his 

may  say   he  is  a  moral  being.     On  the  other    ^^^^1  by  his 

hand,  it  is   by   the  whole  make  and   consti-    and^cm^ti^- 
p   I  .  I  .      ,         tution. 

tution  of  his  nature,  not  by  a  particular 
faculty,  that  he  is  framed  for  morality. 
And  as  a  moral  being,  he  is  placed  in  the 
perpetual  conflict  between  the  ideal  and 
attainment,  and  hears  incessantly  the  cate- 
gorically imperative  demand  of  the  ideal- 
self.  He  always  hears  the  'Thou  shall' 
voice  of  the  ideal  to  the  actual  man  which 
admits  of  no  concession  or  compromise. 
This  ideal  man  stands  out  as  the  judge  of 
what  we  do,  and  as  such  it  accuses,  or  ex- 
cuses, condemns  or  approves  with  a  voice 
of  authority,    which   we    may,  owing  to   our 

481 

61 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

perversity   of  will,    disregard,  but   the  legi- 
timacy of  which  we  can  hardly    dispute.     It 

Still   for    all  -^  . 

that  it  is    does   not  rule  or  pretend  to  rule   even  with 

better  to  be  ^ 

chaste    and    ^n   autocratic    sway   nor,    does    it   sfive   us 

generous.  ^  ^ 

a  law  of  its  own  making.  On  the  contrary, 
it  claims  to  rule  us  ;  because  it  is  the  fulfil- 
ment of  our  destiny,  the  fullest  realisation 
of  our  nature  and  the  highest  goal  which 
mankind  can  keep  in  view.  Here  its 
authority  is  not  coercion,  for  man  lays 
the  law  upon  himself,  and  it  is  self-imposed 
obligation.     And    because  man   is  a   citizen 

i 

of  a  higher  world,  he  complacently  accepts 
and  bears  the  burden  of  such  obligation 
and  feels  the  bondage  of  the  lower  form 
of  life. 

Let  us  then  conclude  by  saying  in  the 
language  of  a  philosopher  that  **in  the 
darkest  hour  through  which  a  human  soul 
can  pass,  whatever  else  is  doubtful,  this 
at  last  is  certain,  that — if  there  be  no  god 
and  no  future  state,  even  then  it  is  better 
to  be  generous  than  selfish,  better  to  be 
chaste  than  licentious,  better  to  be  brave 
than  a  coward.  Blessed  beyond  all  earthly 
blessedness,  is  the  man,  who  in  the  tempes- 

^82 


CONCEPTION  OF  VIRTUE  &  VICM 

tuous  darkness  of  the  soul,  has  dared  to 
hold  fast  to  these  venerable  land-marks. 
Thrice  blessed  is  he  who,  when  all  is  drear 
and  cheerless  within  and  without,  when  his 
teachers  terrify  him  and  friends  shrink  from 
him,  has  obstinately  clung  to  this  gloom. 
Thrice  blessed  !  because  his  night  shall 
pass  into  clear  day. 


4^3 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
ON  PUNYA  AND  ITS  FRUITIONS. 

Punya  anJ  Pftt>a  in  relation  to  *Cnarttra  —  Analysis 
of  OKarttra  or  OonJuct — Constaerations  of  moral 
activity.  Good  and  tke  Law  of  duty — Fundamental 
factors  of  Punya — Knowledge,  Faitk  and  Will — 
Punya  as  forms  of  service — Sincerity  as  the  soul  of 
religiousity — Sincerity  and  Punya — Psycliical  and 
Pkysical  fruitions  for  tkc  |>erformances  of  Punya. 

We    have      in     the     previous     chapter 

discussed    in    brief    the   principle    and    the 

Punya    and    rationale     which     underlie     the     difference 

round    Chd-    and   destinction     between*  Punya    (virtue) 

ritra, 

and  P&pa  (vice),  as  conceived  and  inter- 
preted by  the  Jains  in  their  scriptural 
texts  and  legendary  accounts.  We  have 
seen  there  that  the  Jain  conceptions  of 
Punya  and  P&pa  mostly  centre  round 
the  word,  CMritra^  which  has  the  word 
'Conduct'  for  its  English  equivalence.  Con- 
duct or  Chdritra  is  the  conscious  ad- 
justment of  the  human  activities  {Karmas) 
for  the  attainment  of  a  particular  end 
or     object.     But     Karmas,     as     we     have 

484 


Definition  of 


PUNYA  AND  ITS  FRUITIONS, 

seen  elsewhere,  are  the  vibratory  action- 
currents  in  and  through  which  the  pudgal 
particles  {Karmavargands),  according  to  Chdritra  or 
the  Prakriti  (nature)  of  which  a  particular 
action-current  is  set  up,  so  adjust  themselves 
by  a  change  of  their  relative  positions  as 
to  directly  connect  the  agent  {Kartri)  with 
the  end,  in  view  of  which  he  sets  up 
a  particular  set  of  action-currents.  It  is 
clear,  therefore,  that  the  conscious  and 
voluntary  adjustment  of  the  extremely  super- 
fine Karmavargands  as  would — if  there 
were  no  antardya  (or  impediment  on  the 
way),— connect  the  end  with  the  agent  is 
what  is  called  chdritra  or  conduct. 

A   conduct  is   either  moral  or  otherwise. 

A  moral  conduct   is  that  which  has  a  parti- 

A  Punya  is 

cular  moral  good    for  its  end   or  object,  and    whfat  has 

moral    good 

the  law  which  connects  this  activity  with  the    for  its  end. 

object  is  duty  usually  classified  into  Charan 
(Jural)  and  Karana  (Teleological)  of  which 
we  shall  have  to  speak  later  on  ;  while  the 
psychical  disposition  of  the  moral  agent  by  the 
preponderance  of  which  he  obeys  and  loves  to 
act  in  conformity  with  the  law,  is  termed  as 
Subjective  or  Bhdva-punya ;  and,  in  so  far  as 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  Aims  M. 

he,  out  of  the  love  of  the  good,  practically 
obeys  the  law  and  acts  in  conformity  with  the 
same  is  called  Objective  or  Dravya  Punya, 

Thus  we   see  Punya    is   not    the   know- 
ledge of  the  good  only  ;  it  is   also  a   love  of 
^sts^ln^^the    Z^^^  ^.nd  Order  at  the  same  time,  where  love 
of^the^good    ^^  ^^^^  merely   a   condition    and  stimulant  of 
?he  same!  °    punya  ;  but  it  is  one  of  its  essential  elements 
of  no  less   importance    than    the  knowledge 
of  the   good   itself.      But    what    is  this  love 
of    the    good  ?     And     speaking    generally, 
what  is  love  ?  Does  love  necessarily  exclude 
knowledge  ?   Certainly  not.    Love  is  not  the 
blind  impulse  of  the  sense   and  sensibility,  it 
is  the  pleasure  (dnanda),  which  is  superadded 
to  the  idea  of  an    object.     Love   is  thus  not 
only   inseparable   from    knowledge  but   it  is 
distinct  from  appetite  as  well.     In  true  love, 
the   idea   is    always   mingled    with    delight 
and  yielding  to  such  a  love    therefore  means 
yielding  to  reason    and    thus    the  agent    is 
free. 

To  push  the  question  of  Punya  further 
on,  knowledge y;^(i;/(2  and  love  {Sraddhd)  do 
not  constitute  the  whole  and  entire  of  7^^;^^. 
Its  conception    is  not   limited   only  to  these 

486 


PUNY  A  AND  ITS  FRUITIONS, 

two  elements.     Instances    are   not    wanting 
to  show   in  how  many  cases,    the  love  of  the    „ 

But    in  wtl- 

p^ood    is   as    powerless    as     the    knowledge  A^d'pfactis- 

t>  r  t>       ing  the  good 

thereof.     Very     often     it   happens   that     a    rntdii7encf 
man    who    knows  good   and     entertains   as 
well  a  love  for  the  same,    yet  fails   to  adjust 
his  Karma   for   the     achievement     of    the 
same.     Who     has   not   seen  how     many   a 
generous   soul,  though    uniting   wisdom  and 
enlightment    in    his    being   yet    succumbing 
before    temptations.'*      Evidently,    therefore, 
as  the    Jain   sages    hold,  there    must    be,  in 
addition  to  love  and    knowledge,    something 
else  in  Punya    as    forming  one  of  its  funda- 
mental factors.     And  this  additional  element 
is  the  supreme  effort,  an  act  of  personal  reso- 
lution   without    which   a   Punya   cannot    be 
practised    and    completed.       Revealing  as  it 
does    in    the    form  of  last   choice,  the   final 
decree    for      immediate     execution    without 
further    deliberation,  this     third    element    is 
called  the  Virya,  the  power  or  the  will-to-do, 
Virya  is  the   faculty  of  initiating   a   change 
which  is    not  determined    by    any    anterior 
change.     Thus    is     Virya      identical     with 
the  ultimate   authority  or   liberty  which   is  a 

487 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

profoundly  personal  thing  \\\'aX  exists  in  and 
works  from  within  us,  and  which  moves 
without  being  itself  moved. 

So  we  see,  in  every  act  of  Punyuy  Jn&na 
How  one  (knowledge^  SraddhA  or  Anurdga  (love) 
Puny  a  van    and  Viryu  (liberty  or  force)     are    indissolub- 

(virtuous). 

ly  blended  together.  In  a  word,  Punya 
(virtue)  is  the  moral  strength  consisting  in 
wilfully  practising  the  good  with  love  and 
intelligence.  And  the  Jain  sages  teach 
that  it  is  by  practising  the  good  with  love 
and  intelligence  that  one  may  become 
virtuous.  Viewed  with  this  light,  Aristotle 
is  right  when  he  says  that  'Virtue  is  habit ^ ; 
for  a  single  act  of  virtue  will  not  certainly 
make  any  one  virtuous  (Punyavdn),  It  is  by 
constant  repetition  of  virtuous  acts  that  one 
may  become  virtuous  in  as  much  as  this  cons- 
tant repetition  transforms  {Pranamati)  the 
soul,  evolving  from  within  it  higher  and  more 
constant  instincts  and  tendencies.  It  is  im- 
portant to  note  that  this  constant  repetition 
of  acts  which  goes  to  the  formation  of 
habit,  does  not  mean  here  discharging  of 
duties  in  a  mere  mechanical  way.  In  the 
mere  mechanical  way  of  doing   things,    the 

4SS 


PUNY  A  AND  ITS  FRUITIONS. 

soul    by  subjecting  itself  to  a   rigid   rule    of 

extraneous  discipline,  looses   the   conscious- 
Nine    kinds 

ness  of  what  it  was  doing.     It  is  by  the  spirit    oi P^^y<*' 
that  we  must  become  virtuous  and  not  merely 
by    deeds ;    for  we   should   always    bear   in 
mind  the  golden  maxim  :  ''The  letter  killeth 
but  the  spirit  maketh  alive." 

Now  Punya  being  thus  found  to  consist 
in  wilfully   practising  the   good    with     love 
and  intelligence,  the  Jaina   sages   have  laid 
down    nine  general  ways  in   which  it  can  be 
cultivated  as  in  the  following, — 
(i)     By  feeding  the  hungry  and  the   starv- 
ing who  are   without   means   and 
therefore  rightly  deserve  it.     This 
is  Annapunya. 

(2)  By   quenching   the   thirst   of  the  help 

less  thirsty.     This  is  Pdn-funya. 

(3)  By   clothing   the    helpless     nude    who 

are  destitute  of  all  means  where- 
with to  provide  themselves  with 
clothing  ?  This  is  Vastra-pnnya, 
i/^  By  sheltering  the  poor  and  the  des- 
titute who  have  no  place  wherein 
to  rest  their  head.  This  x^L&yan 
Punya. 

489 

62 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

(5)  By     providing     the     tired      and     the 

tottering  with  seats  and  bed- 
dings to  take  rest  and  compose 
themselves.    This  is  Sdyan-punya. 

(6)  By    revering   the    venerable     worthies 

which  is  due  to  them.  This  is 
MAn-pmiya. 

(7)  By  duly   appreciating   and  admiring  in 

words  the  merit  of  the  really 
meritorious.     This  Vachan-punya, 

(8)  By   personally  attending  to  the  needs 

and  necessities  of  anyone   who    is 

in  real  need  of  it. — This  is  Sartra 
puny  a. 

(9)  By  respectfully  bowing  the  notables  and 

the  elders  who  deserve    it.     This 

is  Namashdr  punya» 
These  are  the  nine  principal  ways  for 
any  one  to  cultivate  Punya-virtue.  It  will 
perhaps  be  remarked  that  these  are  but  forms 
of  social  laws  which  a  man  as  a  social  being 
ought  to  obey.  Like  the  law  of  compromise  in 
the  severe  struggle  for  existence,  as  summed 
up  in  the  formula,  '^Live  and  let  live,'' 
these  might  be  taken  as  a  few  positive  prin- 
ciples  of  social    service   formulated  to  guide 

^90 


PUNYA  AND  ITS  FRUlTIOJ^S. 

and  regulate  the  social  life  of  a   man    with  a 

view  of   mutually  livinor  in  peace  and  amity    „  ,. 

J  ^         ^  '      Religeousity 

where  there  is  discord  and  introduce  thereby    ^^  ^^fy^  »n 

'      question. 

a  reign  of  harmony    in    the  different  spheres 

of  our  life    and    activity.     But  wherein    lies 

the    religiousity   of   the     conduct     which    is 

presumed  to  purify  the  soul   from  the  soils  of 

the   aboninable   senses  ?     Shortsighted    and 

unfortunate    is    the   man  who  thinks  in  this 

vein  ;  for  he  forgets  that  it  is  in  service  that 

lies  the  soul  of  all  religiousity.     A  service 

rendered  with  sincerity  not  only   opens  the 

vision,  enlarges  the  heart,  and  draws  out  the 

higher  instincts   of    man    in    their   dynamic 

operations  in  the   play   of  life  here  ;  but  also 

sets     up     such    strong     action-currents     as 

would     mould    the   environment   in    a   way 

that  would  contribute  to  the  higher  evolution 

of  the   individual    here-in-after,  as    we    have 

seen     while     treating    of   A'^r;;^^-phenome- 

nology,  "as  we  sow  so  we  reap."    Moreover, 

apart  from  the   question    of  the   immortality 

of  deeds  in  the  moral  world,  we   can    never 

secure   from  an  idea  that  intense  realization 

which   very   often    comes   in     the   wake   of 

emotion.     It  is   the  feeling  that  counts  with 

491 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

service  ;  emotion   galvanizes   the   cold  idea 
into   life  and     activity.     It   makes   it   alive 

In    sincerity  ' 

hisreiigeous-  ^nd  dynamic.  It  is  the  feeling  after  truth 
that  makes  the  scientists  experiment  with 
dangerous  chemicals  ;  it  is  the  feeling  with 
the  helpless  millions  suffering  under  various 
organic  maladies,  that  actuates  the  physician 
to  gladly  risk  his  life  for  a  new  discovery. 
The  man  who  plunges  deep  into  the  surging 
waters  of  a  gurgling  rivulet  to  save  his 
drowning  fellow  man,  must  have  felt,  nay 
sensed  something  beyond  the  body.  From  all 
these  it  is  apparent  that  a  service,  whatsoever 
form  it  may  take,  is  not  born  of  any  social 
ceremonialism.  It  is  boru  of  the  internal 
and  moral  habit  which  is  seated  in  the  wilf 
and  the  heart.  And  herein  lies  the  religiousity 
of  the  services  we  have  enumerated  herein 
before. 

Now  such  being  the  psychology  under 
lying  the  cultivation  of  Punya  exhibiting 
itself  as  it  does  in  the  various  forms  of 
services  rendered,  as  detailed  in  the  above, 
with  all  the  sincerity  of  the  will  and  the  heart 
one  could  command,  it  is  natural  that  these 
virtuous  acts,  punya,  should  not  only    clarify 


Puny  A  and  its  fruitions, 

the  visions,  draw  out  higher  instincts  of  the  per- 
former in  their  dynamic  operations  and  there- 
by evoke  admiration,  benediction  etc.,  from 
all  humanity  in  its  track ;  but  should  as  well 
set  up  such  strong  action-currents  that  would    Howa/'««ja 

.  .  works  out  its 

place  hmi  here,  m  the  present  lite,  ni  a  more  consequen. 
favourable  condition  and  environment  afford- 
ing greater  opportunities  for  a  larger  enjoy- 
ment of  peace  and  pleasures  of  life  as  well  as 
would  work  out  for  him  in  future,  a  higher 
and  more  befitting  form  of  organic  evolution 
as  its  manifesting  media  whereby  it  would 
be  enabled  to  utilise  in  a  different  and  higher 
sphere,  the  manifold  opportunities  and 
advantages  that  would  naturally  open  to  him 
as  stepping  stones  to  rise  to  a  higher  state 
of  being  and  happiness.  This  is  how  the 
seeds  of  Punya  sown  in  one  life  bear  fruits 
both  in  the  pscychical,  and  physical  worlds, 
according  to  the  law  of  Karma-C3iUS3i\ky  for 
enjoyment  in  a  subsequent  life. 

The   action-currents  set  up  by   the  nine- 
kinds    of   Punya     are     of    various    pitches 
and  types.     But    for  convenience'  sake   the 
Jain    sages    have  classified    them  into  forty- 
two    kinds    in    and    through    which    a  jwa 

493 


The     conse- 


An  epitome  of  jainism 

enjoys  the  fruits  of  Puny  a  done  by  him  in 
the  past.  As  for  instance  the  (i)  the  enjoy- 
quences  of  nient  of  pleasurable  things  by  a  jiva  in  this 
life  must  be  understood  as  due  to  the  set  of 
action-currents  known  by  the  name  of  Skdtd- 
vedaniya,  set  up  by  him  through  some 
virtuous  deeds.  (2)  Similarly  taking  birth  in 
some  higher  caste,  Kshatriya  and  the  like 
is  due  to  that  kind  of  action-currents  known 
by  the  name  of  Ucchagotra  karma  which  are 
set  by  thejiva  through  the  performance  of 
some  virtuous  deeds  in  the  past  (3)  Like- 
wise the  birth  of  a  jiva  in  the  human  world 
(Manuskya  gatt)  is  or  in  the  god-world 
Deva^ati  is  to  be  understood  as  due  to  setting 
up  of  such  action-currents. 

In  the  same  way  is  to  be  taken  the 
dnupiirvi-karma  under  the  influence  of 
which  a  Jiva  in  Karma-sarira  is  directed 
towards  a  particular  gati  according  to 
his  Karma  in  the  past.  If  after  death, 
^  the  Karma  sarira  along  with  the  tejas 
of  a  jiva  is  directed  towards  the  human 
world  {manuskya  gati)  to  take  its  birth  there, 
or  towards  the  god-world  (Deva  gait)  to  be 
born  there,  then    it  must    be   understood    as 

494 


PUNY  A  AND  ITS  FRUITIONS. 

due  to  the  directive  influence  of  the  manu- 
shya  or  devdnupurvi  action-currents  set  up 
by  ih^jiva  by  his  virtuous  actions  performed 
in  the  past. 

The  possession  of  the  organism  with  five 
senses  {Panchendriya)  is  due  to  the  action- 
currents  known  as  Panchendriya  jdti  karma. 
So  is  the  case  with  the  possession  of 
bodies  [Sariras)  which  are  of  five  kinds, 
for  instance,  the  having  of  an  ouddrika 
body  or  vaikriyciy  dkdrika  or  taijas,  and 
kdrman  is  due  to  the  setting  up  of  such 
action-currents  which  determined  the  growth 
development  of  these  bodies  from  out  of 
pudg-a/a-m^.tervdh.  .  Certain  other  fruits  of 
virtuous  acts  are  enjoyed  by  the  possession 
of  a  set  of  well  proportioned  limbs  and 
extremeties  {angopdngd)  in  the  ouddrika^ 
vaikriya  or  ahdraka  slate  of  being  of  the 
physical  organism. 

Of  the  Sanhananana  ndma  karma,  the 
setting  up  of  action-currents  making  way 
for  the  firmly  joined  skeletal  parts,  as  the 
having  of  the  vajra-rishava  ndrdch  is  due 
to  some  Punya  in  the  past  ;  the  possession 
of  a  well-proportioned  body  with   a   decent 

495 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

configuration  {Samachaturastra  sansthAn)  is 
due  to  the  action-currents  after  its  names* 
sake  set  up  by  some  virtuous  performances. 
The  having  of  subha  rasa,  subha  gandha, 
subha  varna  and  subha  sparsha  is  the  result 
in  the  same  of  way  of  some  Punya  done 
in  the  past.  If  one  is  neither  fat  nor  lean, 
it  is  due  to  the  aguru-laghu  action  currents 
set  up  by  some  virtuous  acts.  Similarly  if 
any  one  is  so  strong  and  stout  as  to  get 
the  upper-hand  over  his  enemy,  it  is  due 
to  Pardghdl  ndma  action-currents.  The 
enjoyment  of  a  full  and  untroubled  brea- 
thing is  due  to  Uchch&sa  ndma  action - 
currents. 

In  the  aforesaid  manner,  the  action-currents 
known  as  (26)  VthAyogati  {2j)  Udyata  ndma 
(28)  Nirmana  ndma  (29)  Tras  ndma  (30) 
Bddarndma{2i^)  Paryapta  ndma  (^2)  Pra- 
tyeka  ndma  (2i2>)  Shird  ndma  (34)  Shubha 
ndma  (35)  Subha^a  ndma  (36)  Suswar 
ndma  {2,7)  Adeyandma  (38)  Yasha  ndma 
(39)  Tirthankar  ndma  (40)  Tiryancha 
nama  (41)  Manushya  dyu  {^2)  Devdyu  ndma, 
—all  these  the  nature  and  character  of  which 
have  been  discussed  before,  in  our  chapter  on 

^p6 


PUNY  A  AND  ITS  FRUITIONS. 

Classification  of  Karmas  under  their  respec- 
tive headings  are  set  up  by  virtuous  acts 
ensuring  the  jivcty  the  possession  of  a 
pleasurable  sentient  existence  along  with  the 
advantages  and  benefits  as  might  accrue 
from  them. 


^97 

63 


CHAPTER  XXV. 
PAPA.  VICE  OR  SIN. 

Constttuent   Elements   of   *Pat>a, — *Anancia*    xa   tKe 
^rime    Goocl — Pliiloso|>Ky     Passton— Tlie    <loctrine     of 
Indolentta — EtgKteen    Ktncls     of   *Pa|)a* — TKcir  Conse- 
quences. 


Having  discussed  in  the   last   chapter   as 
to  what  does  Puny  a  {virtue)  consist  in,  we  are 
Pdpa     is    naturally  led  to  enquire    into   the    nature   of 
ness.  Pdpa   (vice),     the     second     of    our     moral 

categories.  Puny  a  and  P&pa  are  not  only 
relative  but  contrary  terms  as  well,  each  pre- 
supposing the  other.  As  the  Jains  hold  if 
Puny  a,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  moral 
strength,  P&pa  is  moral  weakness.  It  is  the 
preponderance  of  passions,  of  the  senses  and 
the  •sensibility  over  reason  :  it  is  the 
rebellion  of  the  lower  instincts  and  impulses 
against  the  moral  good  and  the  law  or  duty. 
The  only  notable  factor  which  is  found  com- 
mensurate in  both  Punya  and  Pdpa  is  the 
free-will  of  the  agent  who  performs  or   com- 

498 


PAPA,  VICE  OR  SIN. 

mits  the  same.     Just  as  Punya  is   really  a 

Punya  only  when  it   is    performed    willingly, 

Will  is  com- 

^o  P&pa  \^  pApa  ovlXv  ^\i^\\    it    is    committed    piensuratein 
^  ^  ^  ^  both   Punya 

voluntarily  ;  for  at  the  back  ground  of  them  ^"^  ^^P^- 
both  stands  out  revealing  itself  as  it  does  in 
the  free  choice  between  the  two  alternatives 
good  and  evil,  in  as  much  as  liberty,  so  far  it 
manifests  itself  in  the  free  exercise  of  choice, 
is  unstained  and  unstainable  with  anything 
obligatory  or  compulsory  in  its  character. 
But  viewing  the  thing  from  a  different  position, 
Msamyak  jndna  {wisdom)  and  samyak  charitra 
{moral  perfection)  is  characterised  as  being 
but  a  mode  (parydya)  of  liberty  and 
Mithy&tva  (Subreption)  and  Duhskilatva 
(Perversity)  as  state  of  slavery,  then  punya 
might  be  said  to  consists  in  being  voluntarily 
free  diud  pdpa  to  consist  in  being  voluntarily 
di  s\diVQ  of  KashAyas  i,e,,  of  propensions  and 
passions. 

Such  is,  roughly  speaking,  the  notion  of 
vice  as  well  as  liberty  of  vice  as  conceived 
and  interpreted  by  the  Jains.  Some  thinkers, 
however,  disagreeing  with  this  view  of  the 
Jains  hold  that  when  the  question  of  liberty 
comes  in   as  commensurate    in    both    Punya 

499 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM 

and  pdpa^  there  can  be  no  p&pa  at  all  that 
one  may  commit.  There  is  punya  and 
punya  only. 

To  maintain  this,  the  holders  of  such  an 
opinion  argue  that  nobody  commits  a  sin 
knowing   it   to   be   as   such.     Man  plunged 

D  e  n  i  a  I  of 

PApa-  as  he   is  into  this   world  of  nature,   is  always 

found  to  be  in  want  of  something  or 
other  which  he  believes  in  and  struggles 
for  This  end  or  object  of  his  endea- 
vour is  what  is  called  Good  in  ethical 
language  ;  and  when  he  knows  this  object, 
the  nature  of  this  good,  the  realisation, 
the  attainment  of  which  he  believes  will 
satisfy  his  want,  he  pursues  it  choosing  a 
particular  line  of  action  or  conduct  that  will 
ultimately  connect  him  with  the  good,  the 
object  of  his  desire  and  actions  ;  and  it  is 
in  this  his  free  choice  of  the  line  of  conduct 
that  his  liberty  manifests  itself,  there  being 
various  alternative  lines  of  conduct  to  select 
from.     Where  is  Papa  then  ? 

But  this  is  talking  like  the  ChArvdkas--^ 
the  uncompromising  exponent  of  the  philoso- 
phy of  pleasure  in  antiquity.  The  whole 
question  turns  upon  the  idea  of  the   good    as 

500 


PAPA,   VICE  OR  S/At. 

they  have  in  mind.     Good  is  that  which  we 

all  seek  and  pursue.  It  is  that  which  all  would 

possess  if  they  could   have   it  ;    but   what  is    Philosophy 
*  01  Pleasure. 

g'ood  which  all  seek  and  clamour  for  ?  It  is 
dnanda — pleasure.  Ananda,  pleasure,  is  the 
good.  The  child  is  sensitive  to  dnanda 
pleasure  :  and  the  sage  who  denies  it  does 
with  a  view  of  the  pleasure  he  derives  in 
this  his  very  act  of  denial.  The  pleasure 
is  the  watch-world  of  all,  down  from  the 
savage  upward  to  the  sage.  Such  is  the 
idea  of  the  good  in  the  philosophy  of 
pleasure  which  unchaining  all  the  passions, 
lets  loose  at  the  same  time  all  the  appetites, 
opens  a  free  path-way  for  the  senses  and  thus 
sometimes  descends  to  shameful  excesses. 
It  is  true  that  in  freeing  the  passions  from 
restraint,  it  acquires  a  certain  sort  of  gran- 
deur— the  fierce  grandeur  of  nature  ;  it  has 
even  a  sort  of  innocence — the  innocence  of 
the  blind  torrent  which  knows  not  whither  it 
rushes;  and  finally,  by  the  very  fact  of  making 
no  distinction  between  passions  and  pleasure, 
it  sometimes  gives  free  play  to  generous  in- 
stincts and  attains  to  a  nobility  which  is  lack- 
ing in  cold  calculation  and  mercenary  virtue.' 

501 


An  epitome  of  jainism. 

But  such  a  gbod  as  understood  and   con- 
ceived in  terms  of  pleasure  in  the  philosophy 
Criticism  of   ^f  passion,  can  it  secure  us  any  basis  for   the 
sophy.  formation  of  a  definite  moral  code?     In  fact, 

pleasure  without  bounds,  without  choice, 
without  fore-sight  ;  pleasure  taken  by  chance 
and  according  to  the  impulse  of  the  moment ; 
pleasure  sought  and  enjoyed  under  any  form 
in  which  it  may  present  itself  ;  a  brutal  sen- 
sual pleasure  preferred  to  any  intellectual — 
pleasure  thus  understood  destroys  itself ;  for 
experience  teaches  that  it  is  followed  by  pain 
and  is  transformed  into  pain.  Such  a  prin- 
cipal therefore  is  self- contradictory  and  falls 
before  its  own  consequences.  And  this  is  why 
we  find  the  ancient  classifying  pleasure 
into  two  kinds — Nitya  and  Anitya.  The 
pleasure  derived  from  the  gratification  of 
the  senses  is  what  they  term  as  transitory — 
Anitya,  It  is  but  a  mingling  both  of 
joy  and  grief;  it  disturbs  the  soul  for  a 
moment  only  to  add  to  it  more  grief  than 
joy.  Having  thus  experienced  the  bitter 
consequences  of  seeking  temporal  good 
as  transitory  pleasure,  the  volupluous 
philosophy,    however    seductive  it  might  be, 

5^2 


PAPA,  VICE  OR  SIN. 

had   to   seek   the   superior  principle   of  the 

stable  pleasure  which  they  found  in    repose, 

peace  or    insensibility  so  much  so  that  they 

thought  paramount  good  to  consist   in    *'the 

absence  of  suffering"    or   indolentia   {dukhd- 

bhdbd). 

Thus   Pdpa   being   found   to   consist  in 

Subreption     (mithyatva)      and       perversity 

^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^     Mithyatva 

(dukshilalvd)  ^.s  manifest  in  bad-will,  the  Iain    andDushila- 
^  ^  "^  tva     consti- 

moralists  hold  that  liberty   of  vice   manifests    ^"'®  Pdpa, 
itself  in  and  through    the   eighteen   different 
forms  of  action  as  in  the  following. — 
(i)     Jiva  Hinska—\.h\s  means  crushing  out 
the  organic  energies  of  an   embo- 
died soul.    'Akimsd  parama  dkar- 
ma — non-killing  of  life  is  the  car- 
dinal principle   of  all  true    religio- 
sity.' Even  the  Mimdnsaka  atheists 
teach,  ''md himsydi sarva  bhutdnt' 
which  means  don't  kill  any  life.  The 
only  difference   between   the  Jain 
moralists   and   Mimdnsaka   sages 
in    this  respect    of  himsd,    is  that 
former    take   an   uncompromising 
attitude  in   positively    prohibiting 
the   taking  of  any    life  ;  while  the 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAIN  ISM 

latter  only  relatively  prohibits    the 
killing  of  any  life  ;  for   on    certain 
occasions  they  enjoin  the  same   as 
we  find  in  the   statement,    Senena 
abhickdran  yajeta'  i,e,,    kill   ene- 
mies by  the  performance  of  Sena 
yajna. 
However,  what  is   kimsd   from   the  Jain 
point  of  view  ?    It  is  the  crushing  of  the  jivic 
organism  into  two,  ouddrika  and  the  kurman 
bodies  :  for  non  can  destroy  the  karman  body 
clothing  a  soul. 

It  will  be  remarked  perhaps  that  the  sage 
Wkt  Jaimini  could   not  put   in   such  contra- 

Himsd  in    Victory  rules  of  conduct  in  his  Karma  Philo- 
the     Purva  ,  rf^i  .  .        i 

mimdnsa    sophy.      1  he   answer   is  a   very  simple  one. 

arid    in    the     ^,  .  ,  r    »  y     * 

Jain    teach-     1  ne    scriptural    statements   of    interdictions 

and      injunction     are     to      be     interpreted 

according  to  the  view  points  from  which  they 

are   made.     The   prohibition  of  'not   killing 

any    life'   is   in    reference   to   one   who   has 

conquerd   his   Krodha   (anger)  :  while     the 

injunction     for   the     perfomance     of    Sena 

yajna   for    the   slaying  of   enemies,     is  with 

reference  to  the   man  of  the  world  who  has 

anger  and  its  correlates.    So  is  the  case  with 

5H 


PAPA,   VICE,  OR  SIN. 

Jain  savants.  They  too  have  had  to  make  a 
distinction  between  the  rules  of  conduct  both 
for  the  monks  and  the  laity.  A  Jain  monk 
should  rigidly  follow  the  principle  of  non- 
killing  so  much  s»  that  he  is  even  forbidden 
to  take  the  life  of  an  organism  that  has  but 
ono  sensQ.  But  this  rigidity,  relaxes  when 
the  question  of  the  laity  comes  in.  The  ordi- 
nary folk  are  forbidden  to  take  the  life  of  any 
organsm  possessed  with  two  or  more  sense- 
organis.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  this 
HimsA  is  of  two  kinds — Dravya  and  Bhdva 
i,e.  Actual  and  Psychical.  The  psychical  pre- 
cedes the  actual  and  is  that  kind  of  mental 
attitude  which  gives  rise  to  the  desire  of 
taking  life  in  one  form  or  other,  and  Dravya 
himsA  is  the  practically  killing  away  of  life 
somehow  or  other. 

(2)  Asatya  Mrisavdda  untruthfulness. — If 
Himsa  is  one  of  the  most  heinous 
of  sins,  Asatya  is  also  no  less  so. 
Telling  lies  eats  into  moral  vitality 
of  one  who  tells  it  and  habitual  liars 
have  no  chance  of  gaining  any 
knowledge  for  moral  and  spiritual 
redemption. 

505 

64 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINlSM 

(3)  Adattdddn       or       stealing — This       is 

another  kind  of  committing  sin. 
It  not  only  means  taking  of 
another's  belongings  but  means 
also  of  appropriating  or  keeping 
lost  articles  without  any  public 
declaration,  accepting  of  bribes, 
cheating,  smuggling  and  the  like 
forms  of  action. 

(4)  Abrahmacha^ya  or   Unchastity — Chas- 

tity consists,  as  ordinarily  con- 
ceived,   in    one's     being     true   to 

another  in  body,  mind  and  speech, 

» 

when  these  two  are  related  as 
man  and  wife.  And  with  the 
monks  who  are  forbidden  to  take 
to  wife,  it,  consists  in  being  free 
from  any  kind  of  erotic  thouhgt 
and  pleasure.  Unchastity,  there- 
fore, consists  in  violation  of  these 
rules  of  conduct. 

(5)  Parigraha  or  Covetousness — This  is  a 

kind  of  intense  attachment  to 
one's  belongings  so  much  so  that 
if  anything  is  lost,  he  gives  himself 
up  to  excessive  grief.     Parigraha 

506 


PAPA,  VICE  OR  SIN. 

with  a  monk  also  consists  in 
keeping  to  himself  anything  more 
than  what  he  really  and  actually 
requires  for  his  physical  existence. 

(6)  Krodha  or  Anger — This  is  also  a  source 

of  sin  ;  for  it  like  the  preceding 
ones  disables  a  man  to  keep  the 
equanimity  of  temper  which  is  bat 
an  imperative  requisite  to  obtain 
a  right  vision  into  the  metaphysics 
of  things. 

(7)  M&n  or  Egotism. — This  takes  the  form 

of  akankdr  or  egotistic  pedantry 
in  one's  movements.  This  sense  of 
egotism  in  one,  leads  him  astray 
from  the  right  path  by  adding  to 
his  anger  krodha  which  rudely  dis- 
turbs the  equanimity  of  temper. 

(8)  Mdya  or  Hypocrisy — This  is  a  kind  of 

double-dealing  revealing  itself  as 
it  does  in  the  act  of  simulating,  or 
representing  a  thing  with  a  motive 
or  purpose  which  is  very  different 
from  what  is  really  in  the  heart. 

(9)  Lobha,    Greed    or    Avarice — This  is    a 

kind    of   the    inordinate    desire  of 

507   " 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAlJSflSM 

gaining  and  possessing  wealth  and 
the  like.     In  ordinary  parlance  in 
Bengal  even  we  have  'lobhi  p&pa, 
p&pi    mrityu!  i.e.    'avarice   begets 
vice  and  vice  brings  on  death*. 
It  is  in^iportant  to  note  here  by   the   way 
— that  these  last  four  viz.  krodha,  m&n,  mdyd 
and    /o6Aa    which    combine    into    kasMya 
or     the   tie     that    binds     a    Jiva   down   to 
the    mires   of    the     world,    have    been   dis- 
cussed    with     comparative     details    in   our 
Chapter  on  the  Classification   of  Karmas^^ 
(pages  400-407). 

(10)  Rdg,    Asakti    or     Attachment — ^This 

consists  in  one's  being  in  intense 
love  with  anything  standing 
in  the  way  of  moral  detachment 
from  things  worldly. 

(11)  Dvisa  or  Hatred— This  is  a  form   of 

bearing  ill-will  against  anything. 
As  one  should  not  be  in  excessive 
love  with  anything,  so  he  must 
not  bear  any  hatred  against  any- 
one. Both  love  and  hate  are 
impediments  in  our  upward  march 
for  moral  perfection. 

50S 


PAPA,  VICE  OR  SIN. 

(12)  Klesk  or  Quarrelsomeness — It  is  a  kind 

of  vice  which  displays  itself  by 
breaking  up  into  pieces  the  solidari- 
ty of  family-life  and  national  life. 

(13)  Abhydkskydna  or  False  Accusation — 

This  is  a  kind  of  slandering  by 
spreading  false  report  against  any 
one  so  as  to  lower  him  in  the  esti- 
mation of  the  public  or  anyone  else. 

(15)  Paisunya  or  Tale-telling — This  is  also 

a  kind  of  defamation  taking  the 
forms  of  caricatures  which  the 
caricaturists  often  take  recourse  to 
by  the  help  of  their  fertile  imagi- 
nation. 

(16)  Rati  and  Arati  or  Joy  and  Grief — This 

consists  in  being  elated  with  joy 
at  success  or  being  sunken  with 
grief  at  the  loss  of  anything. 
Both  of  these  psychological  atti- 
tudes are  considered  as  vices  in  as 
much  as  they  both  tell  upon  the 
normal  equanimity  of  temper  of 
the  soul. 

(17)  Mdyd'Mrisd — This  is  one  of  the  most 

acute  kind  of   vice    of  doing   im- 

509 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

proper  things   under   the   garb  of 
propriety,    or     of  ostensibly   pre- 
senting   a   fair     appearance     but 
secretly  practising  vice  or  villany  ; 
like   a   courtezan   who  plays  the 
dancing  drum  in  the   way   of  her 
infamous      profession     yet     with 
modesty  affected   within  her  veil. 
The   import     of  mdyd-mrisd    as 
interpreted  by  the    Jains   is  fairly 
borne     out     by    the     well-known 
Bengali  expression  ''Ghomtdr  dhz- 
tare  khemtd  ndchA  z.e,   beating   a 
drum  within  a  veil  :  Khemtd  here 
bears  the  same  reputation   as   the 
cancan  does  in  France. 
(i8)     Mithyd  darshana  shalya  or  False  per- 
ception by  psychological  parallog- 
ism — This  is  the  last  of  the   eigh- 
teen kinds  of  the  enumerated  vices. 
It   consists   in    taking  a   thing  for 
what  it  is  not,  or  viewing  a  thing  as 
that  which  it  is  really  not.  Mithyd 
Darshan,    therefore,  is   the  error 
attatching  to   the  mistaken  appre- 
hension   of  a    thing  appearing  as 

510 


PAPA,   VICE  OR  SIN, 

that   which   it   is   really   not  that 
thing.   Or  in  other  words,  it  is  the 
putting  of  the     notion   of  a  parti- 
cular thing    into  that  which  is  not 
that      thing.     As     for     example, 
putting  the  ivotion    of  a  true  gttru 
{Sat  guru)  into    that   person  who 
is   not  a    irxxo^-guru,  is  mithydtva. 
This     Mithydtva   is   the   primary 
root   of  all    evil,    all   our   misery. 
All  the  practices  of  mankind,all  the 
empiric   phenomena     of  life   and 
living  are  due    to   this  false   per- 
ception    by     subreption — MitJiyd 
Darshana, 
Now  this  Mtthyd   darskan,    as   classified 
by  the  Jain  sages,  according   to  the  different 
forms  of  its    appearance,  is  of  various  kinds 
which   for   convenience,    have    been   mainly 
divided  into  five  forms  as  in  the  following  : — 
(/)     Abhigraha    Mithydtva — is   that     under 
the    influence    of    which  a    jiva 
thinks     that    his     experience     of 
a  thing   and  knowledge  gathered 
thereof  is  all  right  and  true,   while 
others'  experience   and  knowledge 

5^^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

of  the  same  thing  is  false  on  that 
account.  And  this  conviction  is 
so  strong  that  he  refuses  even  to 
test  and  examine  the  truth  and 
validity  of  his  own  experience  and 
knowledge. 

{ii)  Anabhigraha-^i^  that  under  the 
influence  of  which  a  jiva  thinks 
that  all  the  different  systems  of 
religion  and  culture,  however 
contradictory  to  one  another  they 
might  be,  are  all  true  and,  therefore, 
every  one  of  them  can  lead  to 
salvation  or  freedom. 

{Hi}  Abhinibesh — is  that  under  the 
influence  of  which  a  jiva  though 
morally  convinced  of  the  errors 
that  were  involved  in  his  own 
judgment,  will  still  persist  in 
enforcing  the  acceptance  of  his 
own  opinion.  Under  Abhinibesh, 
a  man  'though  vanquished  will 
argue  stilt, 

{iv)  Samshaya^s  that  detrimental  influence 
which  induces  ^.jiva  to  entertain 
a   doubt   as    to    the    truth,     and 

SI2 


PAPA.  VICE  OR  SIN. 

consistency   of  the  teachings  and 
principles  of  the  faith  promulgated 
by  an  Omniscient  Victor — /ina, 
(v)    AnAbkoga — is  that  under   the  negative 
influence    of  which   a  jiva  loses 
even   the  faculty    to   discriminate 
between  dharma  and  its  opposite 
and  the  like,    hjiva  with  derang- 
ed  organism    labours    under   the 
influence  of  AnAbkoga  Mithydtva. 
It  is   important     to   note   here    by   the 
way   that   the   question    as  involved    in  the 
principle   of  false    vision    by     subreption   is 
broad  and  far  reaching  in   its  consequences. 
Therefore,    it  imperatively   requires   a  more 
detailed  treatment  at  our  hands.  And  this  we 
propose  to  do  when  we  deal  with    the  causes 
o{  Bandha  where  it  will  suit  us  well  according 
to   the  scheme  of  the   development   of  our 
theme.  For  the  present,  however,  we  believe 
we  have  been  able  to  make  the  Jain   concep- 
tion of  PApa  or  Vice  clear   to   our  readers. 
According  to  the  sages  the   constituent   ele- 
ments involved  in  PApa^  are  False  vision  by 
subreption,  Perversity,  and  Liberty  of  Vice  or 
Bad-will — all  inseparably  mingled  together. 

65 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

Now  these  are  the  eighteen  forms  of 
action  in  and  through  which  a  /iva  commits 
WxcQ-pApa  by  setting  up  action -currents  of 
injury  and  non-injury  {GhAthi  and  Aghdlin) 
which  acting  on  the  soul  retard  the  unfold- 
ment  of  its  infinite  psychical  possibilities  of 
vision  {darshan)y  knowledge  (jndna)  and  the 
like  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  other,  deter- 
mine unfavourably  the  character  and  con- 
figuration of  its  manifesting  media,  its 
duration  of  life,  its  localisation  in  a  sphere 
and  other  physical  conditions  as  con- 
sequences of  its  own  viscious  deeds 
of  the  past.  These  psychical  and  physical 
consequences  which  the  jiva  has  to  suffer 
under  by  dint  of  its  own  viscious  acts 
are  eighty  two  in  number  as  in  the 
following. 

a.  Darshandvaraniya  karma — or  the 
action-currents  of  injury  to  vision 
which  are  of  nine  kinds  viz  (i) 
Chalcshii  ;  (2)  Achakshtt  ;  (3) 
Avadhi  ;  (4)  Keval ;  (5)  NtdrA  ; 
(6)  Ntdrd-nidra  ;  (7)  Prachld 
(8)  Prachld-prachald  ;  (9) 
Sty&nardhi, 

5H 


Papa,  vice  or  sin, 

b,  Jn dndvaraniya  karmaS'^or  the  action- 
currents  of  injury  to  knowledge 
which  are  of  five  kinds  viz, 
(i)  mati  (2)  sruti,  (3)  abadhi 
and  (4)  mana-paryaya  and  (5) 
KevaL 

c,  Antardya     karnias — or      the      action- 

currents  detrimental  to  the  attain- 
ment of  the  end  in  view  which  are 
of  five  kinds  viz  (i)  D&na,  (2) 
L&hha,  (2i)  Bhoga^  (4)  Upabhoga, 
and  fs)  Virya. 

d.  Mohaniya  karmas — or  the  action-currents 

detrimental  to  the  psychical 
equanimity  giving  rise  to  the 
delusion  and  infatuation  of  the  soul 
which  are  of  twenty-six  kinds  viz. 
16  kashAyas  such  as  krodha, 
mdna,  mdyd  and  /ob&a  together 
with  their  four  sub-clasification 
of  each  and  the  nine  correlates  of 
the  kashdyas  such  as  (i)  hdsya  (2) 
Rait  (sJ  Aratt(^)  Skoka  (s) 
Bhaya  (6)  Jugiipsd  (7)  Strtveda 
(8)  Purusaveda  and  (<))  Nafiun- 
saka  veda. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

e,  Vedaniya  karma — or  action-currents 
sending  in  sensation  of  pain 
called  Askdid. 

/.  Ayus  karma — or  the  action-currents 
determinant  of  the  duration  of  life 
in  Hell  {Naraka\ 

g.  '  Gotra  karma  or  the  action-currents 
determinant  of  birth  in  a  low 
family  {Nicka). 

h,  Ndma  karmas — or  the  action-currents 
determinant  of  names  and  forms 
and  other  physical  environments 
which  combine  to  give  the  Jiva  its 
physical  individuality  and  singu- 
larity. Of  the  nama-karmas  only 
34  are  set  in  motion  by  viscious 
deeds  of  the  past  vis. — {\)  Narak- 
gati  {2)  Tiryanck  gati  {2,)  Nava- 
kdnufurvi  (4)  Tiryanckdnupufvt 
(5J  Ekenciriya  jciti  {6)  Dwien- 
driya  jdti  {j)  Tirendriya  jdti 
(8)  Chaturedriya  jdti  (9-13)  five 
samhanan  viz  {a)  Rishava  ndrdch, 
ndrach,  ardh  ndrdch,  kiloka  and 
Savartu.  (14-18^  five  sansthd- 
nas  viz    {a)    nydgrodha  .  {b)  sddi 

5f6 


PAPA,  VICE  OR  SIN. 

(c)  Vdman  (d)  Ktibja  {cj  Hunaak 
(19)     Aprasasiha      Varna     (26) 
Aprasastha  Gandha  (21)  Aprasa- 
siha      Rasa     (22)     Aprasastha 
Sparsha     (2^)     Upagh&ta    {24J 
Kubih&yo      goti      (25)     SthavAr 
("26^    Sukshma    (27)    Aparyapta 
(28)    Sddhdran   (29)  Asthtra  (30) 
Asubka     (31)     Asubhaga       (33) 
Ditswar    (j?)  Anddeya  and  (34) 
A  pay  as  ha  h'rti. 
These  are  the    eighty    two   ways  in  and 
through  which  a  jiva,    pays   the  penalty  for 
his   committing  vices  in  the  past.     Thus,  if  a 
man    is  an  idiot,  he    must   have    been    then 
labouring  under  the  action-currents  of  injury 
to  knowledge.     A    short-sighted  man   must 
be  under  the  influence  of  chakshu  darshand- 
varaniya   karma.     If  a   man  inspite  of  the 
presence  of  necessary  requisites  at  his   elbow 
and    inspite   of  his  intelligence   and  industry 
is  not  able  to  make  profit  from  the   business 
in   which    he  has  laid   out  his  whole  fortune, 
then  it  must  be  understood  as  due  to  idbhdn- 
tartaya  action-currents  set  up  by  him  through 
some  viscious  acts  done  in  the  past. 

517 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

So  if  a  man  becomes  deluded  and  tempted 
into  a  course  of  action  which  he  knows  to 
be  very  far  from  the  right  conduct,  he 
must  be  understood  to  have  been  labourinof 
under  the  influence  of  Mohaniya  karma. 
Likewise,  if  a  man  is  found  to  be  experien- 
cing only  painful  or  unpleasant  Sensation  all 
along  the  time,  he  must  be  taken  to  be 
under  the  influence  Ashdid  vedaniya  karma. 
The  certain  duration  of  life  which  a  jiva  has 
to  pass  in  hell  is  due  to  Narakdyu  karma 
So  is  the  case  with  the  birth  in  a  low  family 
with  grovelling  surroundings  which  is  due 
to  the  influence  of  the  Nicha  gotra  karma. 
Similarly  a  dwarf  to  be  taken  as  being  under 
the  influence  of  Vdman  samasthdn  karma. 
If  anyone  has  rough  hoarse  voice,  it  must 
be  due  to  Duswar  karma.  And  thus  are 
to  be  accounted  for  all  other  defects,  draw- 
backs and  disadvantages  which  a  jiva  may 
possibly  labour  unden 

Now   such  is  the    nature   of pdpd-v\ce  as 
conceived    and    interpreted    by     the    Jains  ; 
but  some  writers  being  unable  to   see  eye  to' 
eye    with    the    Jains    differ    from    them   and 
interpret    human    actions    in    an     altogether 

5r8 


PAPA,   VICE  OR  SIN. 

different  light.  Of  course  we  must  agree 
to  differ,  and  when  we  do  so,  we  must  bear 
and  forbear.  But  when  definite  charges  are 
laid  at  the  door  of  a  creed  or  faith,  the 
exponents  of  the  same  ought,  as  in  duty 
bound,  to  examine  the  same  and  see  if 
they  can  explain  the  issues  in  question. 
In  one  of  her  latest  issues  The  Heart  of 
JainisMy  Mrs.  Sinclair  Stevenson  made 
out  a  charge  that  the  Jain  conception  of 
Pdpdy  though  differing  as  it  does  from  the 
western  conception,  is  in  fact  ceremonial 
rather  than  morale  This  is  no  doubt  a 
very  serious  charge  that  can  be  levelled 
against  any  school  of  thought  and  culture 
which  has  a  definite  system  of  moral  code 
as  the  legitimate  outcome  of  the  most 
subtle  metaphysical  conclusions. 

The  observances  and  ethical  disciplines  as 
enjoined  in  the  moral  code  of  the  Jains 
seem  to  her  to  lack  in  moral  and  religious 
character.  Others  also  think  they  are  more 
externals,  husks,  matters  of  minor  or  no 
importance  and  as  such  should  be  stripped 
off,  if  anyone  wished  to  get  straight  to  the 
kernel.     Consistently  with  this  view,    there- 

S^9 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM 

fore,  they  cannot  but  apprehend,  that  these 
external  practices  or  religious  observances 
which  have  become,  as  they  say,  fossilised 
into  dry  ceremonial  rites,  may  at  some  time, 
grow  so  as  to  choke  the  internal  vitality  of 
the  religion  itself  and  eat  away  the  essence 
of  the  same. 

So  far  the  moral  character  of  these 
observances  is  concerned,  we  have  discussed 
it  at  length  both  here  at  the  beginning  of 
this  chapter  and  elsewhere,  and  we  feel  no 
necessity  of  recapulating  them  here  over 
again.  All  that  we  want  to  show  here  is  that 
the  opinion  as  entertaind  by  Mrs.  Sinclair 
or  by  others  in  her  line  of  thinking  is  the 
revival  of  the  old  superficial  rationalism  as 
well  as  of  no  less  superficial  idealism  which 
fail  to  take  account  of  history  and  may  be 
taken  as  due  to  perverted  vision  of  things, 
ideas  and  ideals.  We  shall  prove  this 
by  entering,  by  way  of  a  reply,  into  a 
study  of  the  psychology  of  religion,  which 
besides  corroborating  what  we  have  stated 
before  will  throw  an  additional  flood  of 
light  on  it  and  bring  into  clear  vision 
of  Mrs.  Sinclair   and   her  readers   that   for 


PAPA,   VICE  OR  SIN. 

which     she   was   so    long  groping     in   the 
dark. 

To  begin  with,  therefore,  by  drawing 
attention  of  our  readers  to  the  fact  that  every 
religion  has  a  subjective  and  an  objective 
side — we  may  designate  them  as  Religiosity' 
and  'religion'.  And  it  is  only  in  constant 
action  and  interaction  of  these  two  ele- 
ments upon  each  other  that  the  true 
nature  of  religion  is  fully  revealed.  We 
have  also  seen,  that  since  the  dawn  of 
religious  consciousness  in  mankind,  a  man 
has  ever  clothed  his  emotions,  his  thoughts, 
his  aspirations  and  his  sentiments  in  concep- 
tions andjideas  and  that  he  has  always  ex- 
pressed them  in  observances  and  practices. 
Out  of  the  former,  grows  a  religious  doc- 
trine,»which,  with  the  progress  of  civilisation 
and  culture,  is  committed  to  writing  in  the 
shapefof  sacred  connons  and  creeds  ;  these 
latter  gradually  assume  the  form  of  common 
religious  observances.  But  for  the  maintain- 
ance  of  the  doctrine  and  for  preservation  of 
the  practice  in  accordance  with  it,  he  allies 
himself  with  kindred  spirits,  consciously  or 
unconsciously,  and  feels  constrained  to  act  in 

$21 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

accordance  with  his  most  cherished  convic- 
tions ;  otherwise,  as  psychology  reveals,  the 
emotions  would  only  pass  away,  the  impres- 
sions would  lack  in  stability,  the  sentiments 
would  prove  to  be  but  vague  ebullitions,  and 
thus  his  intellect  would  fail  to  attain  to 
perfect  clearness  even  to  himself.  Religious 
men,  borne  out  by  history  and  as  thinking 
beings,  feel  the  mind  as  possessed  of  some 
conception  as  to  their  true  destiny  which  will 
satisfy  the  craving  of  their  hearts,  whether 
it  is  derived  from  others  or  thought  out  by 
themselves — a  conception  which  will  satisfy 
their  thinking  faculty  and  must  necessarily 
flow  itself  in  outward  observances,  because 
their  hearts  impel  them  to  do  so.  Zealous 
for  truth,  longing  for  a  sense  of  assurance 
and  clearness  of  insight,  they  naturally 
translate  into  outward  acts  those  feelings 
of  which  their  hearts  arc  full  ;  for  religious 
truth  is  piety  manifesting  itself  in  word  and, 
deed,  in  creed  and  conceptions,  in  doctrine 
and  observances,  and  in  other  works  and 
other  activities  of  life.  And  if  this  sentiment 
is  sincere  and  fervent,  it  manifests  itself 
in  and  through    a  man's    whole    conduct  and 

522 


PAPA,  VICE  OR  SIN, 

exerts  a   decisive   influence    on   his     whole 

moral  nature.     Of  course  there  is  no  harm  in 

admitting  the    fact   that    these    observances 

are  not  a  proof   of  religion  unless  genuine  ; 

for  they    may    be    mere    spurious  imitations. 

But  it    must    be   also  confessed  on  all  hands 

that  if   a    man    abstains    from    all    sorts     of 

observances,  it  is  a  decisive  proof  that    in  his 

case    his   religious    need    is   in   a    dormant 

state,  if  it  exists  at  all.     We  do  not  of  course 

subscribe  to  the  view  that  all   who  take  part 

in   such    observances,     as    handed    down    to 

them  by  tradition  or  scripture,    are    actuated 

by  the  same  heart-felt  needs  ;  for    in  this,  as 

as  in  other  cases,  men's  motives    may   differ 

very  widely,  but    to   estimate    the  value  of  a 

thing,     it   is    injudicious    to     confine    one's 

attention    upon     these   only.     To    do     this 

we  must  take  into  account  the   psychological 

origin    of     these.      And     we    believe    that 

in    the    case  of  Jainism,  the  root    of  these 

lies    deep    in    the    fact    of    yearning   after 

a   state   of  liberation — a    state  of  beatitude 

and      bliss,— a      state     of    omniscience    of 

whose      sublimity      one's    imagination     has 

ormed   a   conception,    and    which    he   f^cls 

5^3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

himself  inwardly   capable   of  attaining,  and 
for   which  he   strives,    so   far   as    humanely 
possible  more  and  more   to  approach.     In  a 
word,  it  is  the  longing  of  the  finite  man,  who 
feels  inwardly   that  he   is  more   than    finite 
that  gives  rise  to  these   observances.       It  is 
in  the  striving  and  struggle  of  the  individual 
to  escape  from  the   turmoils  of  earthly  exis- 
tence— with  its  petty  cares  anxieties  and  great 
sorrows,  with  its  strife  and  discord,  its  comp- 
lete immersion  in  sordid  lusts  of  the  world — 
in  order  that   he  may   breathe  a   purer   and 
freer  atmosphere,  that   its   origin   should  be 
sought  for.     And  when  studied  in  this  light, 
we  shall  be  able  to  winnow  from  every  sort  of 
religious  observance,    however   insignificant 
or  formal    it    may   appear   at  first  sight,  the 
pure    grain     of  religious   principle.     Those 
who   renounce   religion   altogether,    because 
they   have    become   blind   to  the     religious 
element  within  them  may  look  with   superci- 
lious   contempt     on   all     observances     and 
dub  them  with  the  name   of  superstition  or 
formal  ceremony  or  whatever  they   like,  but 
the  truth  stands  oiit  no  less  clear  than  broad 
day  light,  that  a  religion,    sprung    up   from 

524 


PAPA,   VICE,  OR  SW. 

the  inmost  ^yearing  of  so  many  hearts  and 
reared  through  renunciation  and  mortifica- 
tion ever  fighting  and  struggling  ^nd  ever 
extending  her  sway,  cannot  be  regarded, 
without  the  farthest  stretch  of  blind  imagina- 
tion as  indulging  only  in  meaningless  rites  or 
ceremonies. 


5^5 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 
ASRAVA  OR  THE  INFLUX. 

Influx — Influx  and  Bandka — TKcir  mutual  Relation 
of  Receprocity — Causes  oi  tkc  Influx — Mitkyatva', 
' Avtratc  ,  'Pramada  and  'Yoga — Influx,  Sukjecttve 
and  Objective — Forty-two  Ckannels  of  Influx  of  tke 
'Krrma-matter   into  tke  Soul. 


Now  to  come  to  the  Asrava  or  the  third 
of  the  Jain  moral  categories.  Asrava  is  the 
influx  of  the  ka^^m  a -pair  tides  into  the  soul. 
Or  it  may  be  said  as  the  acquirement  by  the 
soul  of  the  finest  of  the  fine  ^^r;;^^ -matter 
from  without.  But  the  soul  does  not  always 
and  invariably  take  in  these  karma'm3itttr. 
To  do  it  the  soul  must  be  charged  with 
certain  requisite  powers  by  virtue  of  which 
it  will  draw  in  foreign  matters  into  its 
various  chambers  ox  pradeskas.  The  requisite 
powers  which  galvanise  the  soul  to  draw  in 
matters  from  without  is  (i)'  miikydtva  (sub- 
reption), (2)  avirati  or  attachment  (3) 
Kashdya  or   propensions  ;  (4)   pramdda    or 

526 


ASRAVA  OR  THE  INFLUX. 

negligence  and  {s)yogci'  or  the  functional  acti- 
vity of  mind,  speech  and  body.  The  soul 
being  affected  by  these  becomes  transformed 
into  a  magnet  as  it  were  and  attracts  karma- 
matter  towards  it.  The  psychical  condition 
which  thus  magnatises  the  soul  to  attract 
foreign  elements  is  what  is  termed  as 
Bh&vdsrava  or  the  Subjective  influx  and 
the  foreign  matter  that  is  actually  drawn 
into  by  the  soul  to  accumulate  there  in 
the  state  of  sattd,  is  called  Dravydsrava 
or  the  Objective  influx  which  results  ulti- 
mately into  the  bondages  {handkan)  of  the 
soul.  But  the  question  is,  Could  there 
be  any  dsrava  in  the  absence  of  any 
bondage.'^  If  bondage  is  held  to  be 
anterior  to  dsrava^  then  bondage  cannot  be 
taken  as  a  consequent  of  dsrava  which  is 
its  cause  in  as  much  as  the  effect  which  has 
something  anterior  to  it  as  its  cause  cannot 
come  to  be  without  the  cause,  for  it  is  the 
cause  that  passes  into  the  effect. 

Indeed  !  But  there  is  no  such  contradic- 
tion as  exposed  in  the  above  objection  in  the 
interpretation  we  put  in  to  explain  the  causal 
relativity     between     dsrava     and     bandha, 

$27 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAINISM 

Asrava  and  Bandha,  both  are  mutually  related 
to  each  other  as  cause  and  effect.  Asrava  is 
not  only  the  antecedent  cause  of  bondage 
but  the  consequent  as  well  of  a  still  anterior 
bondage :  and  so  is  the  case  with  bondage 
also.  And  this  does  not  amount  to  moving 
in  the  vicious  circle  of  cause  and  effect  on 
account  of  their  eternal  continuity  like  the 
seed  and  the  tree. 

Now  the  objective  influx  is  always  in 
proportion  to  the  strength  and  intensity 
of  the  subjective  influx.  The  stronger  and 
more  intense  the  subjective,  the  quicker  is 
the  objective  inflow  and  consequently  the 
heavier  is  the  load  of  karma  on  \}(\^jiva  to 
cast  off.  But  the  subjective  condition  which 
makes  influx  possible  is  not  the  same  with 
all  the  souls — though  all  souls  are  essentially 
the  same.  The  subjective  conditions  of  the 
different  souls  vary  with  the  variation  in  the 
intensity  and  protensiveness  of  mithy&tva, 
avirdti^  kaskdya,  pramdd  and  yoga  which 
the  different  souls  become  variously  charged 
with  to  draw  in  foreign  elements  and 
thereby  forge  fresh  links  for  their  bondages. 
The   intensity   and   protensiveness  of  these 


ASRAVA  OR  THE  INFLUX. 

beginning  with  mithydlva  constituting  the 
psychical  condition  which  makes  influx  again 
possible  are  determined  by  puny  a  d^wApdfia 
as  practised  by  a  jiva  in  the  past  ;  for, 
as  we  have  explained  already,  pApa  and 
punya  reveal  themselves  in  and  through  a 
man's  desires  and  deeds  and  a  man's  thoughts 
and  desires  in  one  life  build  his  character, 
tendencies  and  capacities  for  the  next.  A 
strong  desire  along  certain  lines  that  remains 
entirely  unfulfilled  in  one  life,  will  produce 
a  capacity  along  those  lines  for  the  next. 
By  dwelling  constantly  upon  a  certain 
thought,  a  man  sets  up  a  particular  tendency 
and  if  he  fails  to  carry  it  out,  he  will  surely 
do  it  in  a  subsequent  life.  And  just  as 
a  man's  desire  and  thoughts  and  the  like 
build  up  his  character,  tendency,  capacity  and 
the  like  for  the  next  :  so  his  actions  and 
deeds  in  one  life  will  produce  his  surround- 
ings and  circumstances,  opportunities  and 
advantages  for  the  next. 

However,  the  influsc  (dsrava)  of  karma- 
matter  into  the  soul  has  been  very  often 
compared  to  the  flowing  of  waters  into  the 
pond.     Just   as     waters    flow    into   a   pond 

529 

~    67 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

through    various   pours  and    channels  in  the 
earth   and   accumulate  there  ;  so  through  a 
variety   of  pours   and   channels    in  \k\^jivic 
organism,    karma   flows   into   the    soul  and 
accumulate  there  to  bind  it  down    to  sansdr. 
And    this   explains     why   according   to   the 
nature  and  character  of  the  various  channels 
in  the /mV  organism,    the   Jain    sages    have 
classified  the  influx  (dsrava)    into   forty- two 
kinds  ;  namely,  five  sense-organs  [Indriyas)  ; 
four   propensions    {kaskdyas)  ;  five   avratas 
or  the   non-keeping   of  the   vows,    twenty- 
five  kriyds  or  works  and  three  j^'^^<^^   or    the 
functional     activities   of  mind,    speech    and 
body. 

Of  these  forty-two  ways,  the  easiest 
ones  for  the  ^^rm^-matter  to  flow  into  the 
soul,  are  the  five  sense-organs  viz.,  the 
ear,  the  eye,  the  nose,  the  taste  and  the 
touch.  To  take  the  case  of  the  ear  {kdna), 
for  example,  karma  flows  into  the  soul 
through  the  sense  of  hearing  i.e.y  through 
our  listening  to  the  sonorous  songs  which 
may  ultimately  delude  the  jiva  from  the 
righteous  path.  How  often  do  we  find  men 
ektremely  devoted  to  music  lose  all  sense  of 

530 


ASRAVA  OR  THE  INFLUX. 

right  and  wrong  and  thus  fall  away  from  the 
right  conduct.  So  is  the  case  with  the  eye 
{ckakshu)  through  the  lust  of  which  karma 
flows  into  the  soul  ;  for,  instances  are  not 
wanting  in  our  every-day  life  to  show  how 
they  get  themselves  entangled  into  the 
snares  of  the  world  by  lustfully  gazing  on 
art  or  young  women  which  in  the  long  run 
charm  them  away  from  the  right  path. 
Kavmas  also  flow  into  the  soul  through  the 
other  senses  in  the  same  way  by  setting  up 
vibratory  action-currents  running  towards 
the  soul. 

Next  come  the  four  kashdyas  or  propen- 
sions  in  and  through  which  karma  also 
flows  into  the  soul  ;  namely,  anger  {krodka), 
mdna  (conceit),  mdyd  (hypocrisy)  and  /o6Aa 
(greed).  Indulgence  in  any  one  of  these 
me^ns  perverting  the  right  vision  into  the 
metaphysics  of  things  and  thereby  falling 
away  from  right  conduct  which  can  only  pro- 
ceed from  the  right  knowle4ge  of  things 
and  ideals. 

Then  there  are  the  Avratas  by  dint  of 
which  karma  flows  into  the  soul.  Avrata 
means  non-abstention  from  doing  prohibited 

53^ 


Ah'  EPITOME  OFJAIN/SM. 

actions.     The   five   prohibitions     which   go 
by    the  name  of  the  five  great  vows  (pancha 
mokdvratas)  are,  (i)  not  to  kill    life  (prAnd- 
lipdt  viraman   vraia)  ;  (ii)    not  to   tell   lies 
(mrtshdvada  viraman   vrata)  ;  (iii)   not   to 
steal  and  the  like  (adattdddn  viraman  vrata)\ 
(iv)  not  to  be  covetous  (parigraha  viraman 
vrata)  ;  (v)  not  to  indulge  in  sexual  congress 
(maithuna  viraman  vrata).     These  are  the 
five  great   prohibitions    which   are   enjoined 
on    the  jiva    to   observe    for   avoidance   of 
influx      of   karma'm?XX,^x     into     the     soul  ; 
because   so     vicious,    relentless     and    keen 
IS   the   law   of  karma  to  flow  into  soul  that 
the  moment  an  inlet   is   created   by  the  jiva 
through   a  single  and  simple   act  of  omission 
in  the  observance  of  these    vows,  the  influx 
of  ^^r;;^^- matter  will  at  once  take  place  ? 

Next  in  order  are  the  kriyds  (works  or 
actions)  which  are  five  and  twenty  kinds 
through  which  karma  also  flows  into  the  soul. 
These  kriyds  are, — 

(i)  Kdyiki  kriya — means  the  bodily  move- 
ments through  the  carelessness  of 
which  an  evil  karma  may  flow 
into  the  soul. 


ASRAVA,  OR  THE  INFLUX. 

(2)  Adkikaraniki — means  the  use  of  instru- 

ments or  weapons  through  the 
careless  handling  of  which  evil 
karma  flows  in  by  hurting  another. 

(3)  Pradosha-^m^dins     action     originating 

from  the  excessive   predominance 
of  anger  and  the  like. 

(4)  Parit&paniki — means  the   action   done 

in  intentionally  causing  grief  and 
sorrow  to  another. 

(5)  Prdndlipdtaki — means  the  action  which 

crushes  out  the  life-energies  of  an 
organism. 

(6)  Arambkaki — means  the  action    done  in 

tilling  the  ground  which  might 
injure  2.jiva, 

(7)  P&rigrahaki — means   work  originating 

from  the  excessive  earning  and 
hoarding  of  wealth  ;  for  at  times 
enormity  of  oppulence  leads  to 
various  evils. 

(8)  Mdyd  pratyaiaki — means  work   born  of 

hypocrisy. 

(9)  Mithyd     darshan     pratyaiaki— mt2i\\% 

actions  due  to  subreptive  vision 
into  the  nature  of  things. 

533 


AN  MPITOME  OF  JAINtSM. 

do)  Apratyakskydniki — means  works  ori- 
ginating from  not-controlling  the 
propensions  or  kashdyays. 

(i  i)  Drisiiki — refers  to  works  due  to  inten- 
sely gazing  at  Jiva  or  Ajiva  with 
love  or  hatred. 

(i  2)  Spristiki — action  originating  from  actu- 
ally touching  women,  children  &c. 
with  attachment. 

(13)  Pratityaki — means   works  originating 

as  a  consequent  of  the  sinful 
desire  for  a  Jiva  or  Ajiva  enter- 
tained in  the  previous  birth. 

( 1 4)  Sdmantopanipdtikd — works  originating 

from  listening  to  the  praise  of 
one's  son,  brother,  pupils  or  his 
other  earthly  belongings. 

(15)  N a'tsprisiiki — means  the  works  done 

in  compulsion  or  in  sheer  obe- 
dience to  the  strict  order  of  the 
employer. 

(16)  Svahastiki^-^mt,2.ViS  the  action  perform- 

ed by  one's  own  hand  in  the 
execution  of  a  particular  end. 

(17)  Angndpaniki — means    activities    born 

of  the    metaphysical     conclusions 

534 


ASRAVA  OR  THE  INFLUX, 

drawn  by  one  in  ignorance  of  the 
philosophy  as  taught  by  the 
Arihanta, 
(i8)  Vaiddraniki — means  works  due  to 
defacing  or  breaking  any  image 
of  reverence  and  worship. 

(19)  Andbkogiki — means   activities  born  of 

discharging  organic  emissions  any 
where  without  looking  about  the 
place  thoroughly  well. 

(20)  Anavakdnkshd  pratyaiki — is  the  works 

due  to  the  disregard  to  and  dis- 
belief in  the  effectiveness  of  the 
laws  of  life  and  conduct  as  pro- 
mulgated by  ihQJina. 

(21)  Prayoga — works   born    of    not    con- 

trolling mind,  speech  and  bodily 
movements  in  the  manner  as 
taught  in  the  Jain  scriptures. 

(22)  Samuddn — works  due  to   the   opening 

out  of  all  the  channels  of  the  body 
through  which  karma  may  flow 
in  at  a  time. 

(23)  Prema-pratya — work     due     to      the 

influence  of  deceit  and  greed  as 
well. 

S3& 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(24)  Dvesha-pratyayiki — works    springing 

from   the   co-operation   of  conceit 
and  anger. 

(25)  Iry&patha — action   done    in    walking 

specially  in  the  walks  of  the  dis- 
passionate and  the  retired. 
These  are  the  five  and  twenty  kinds  of 
works  in  and  through  which  liarma-v[i'eXX,^x 
may  flow  into  the  soul  :  besides  these 
there  are  the  three  yogas  of  mind,  speech 
and  body,  i.e.,  from  the  functional  activities 
of  these  three,  karma  also  flows  into  soul 
and  stick  to  it  in  the  state  of  SattA. 


536 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 
BANDHA  OR  BONDAGE. 

BanJlta — Its  Classi£tatton— Posstktltttes  ox  Banana 
— Refutation  of  tke  TKeory  of  ParalUUsm  anJ^ 
Oufthsm  BanJka  ts  wttkout  begtnntng — Causes  of 
BandKa — Mitkyatva  or  Sul>ret>tton — OeJRmtton  of 
Sul>reJ>tion — Forms  and  Ktnds  of  Sul>rcJ>tion — Posst- 
btltttes  of  Sul>rct>tton — PsycKology  and  Pk%toso|>Ky  of 
Sul>ret>tton. 

In  the  preceeding  pages  we  have  seen 
what  the  Jains  mean  by  Asrava  or  Influx. 
Influx  is  the  flowing  of  the  Karmct- 
currents  into  the  soul.  And  when  the 
Karma  particles  which  have  flowed  into 
the  soul  coalesce  with  the  same,  it  is  called 
Bandha  or  bondage.  It  is  the  interpene- 
tration,  as  it  were,  into  each  other's  spheres 
of  soul  and  Karma-m2X\.^x  making  both 
appear  as  self-same  with  each  other.  And 
like  Asrava,  this  Bandha,  which  is  but 
another  name  for  the  self-sameness  of  the 
soul  and  Karma-va^iXX^x,  is  also  distinguish- 
ed into  Bkdva  (subjective)  and  Dravya 
(objective). 

53? 

68 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM. 

The  psychical  condition  which  keeps 
the  soul  in  a  particular  disposition  so  as  to 
combine  with  Karma  into  a  self-sameness 
as  it  were  with  the  soul  is  called  BkAba- 
bandha  or  Subjective  bondage  and  the  real 
Karma'm2X\.^x  which  flowing  into  the  soul 
stands  in  relation  of  Identity  {Tadatama 
sa7nbandha)  as  it  were  with  the  soul  is  called 
Dravya-handha  or  Objective  bondage. 

Now  according  to  the  nature  and   charac- 
ter in  and  through  which  it  displays  itself   in 
the  phenomena  of  our  life   and  thought,    this 
bandha  is  classified  into  four  kinds  ;  viz., — 
(A)     Prakriti  Bandha— Th^  word  Prakriti 
here    refers   to   the   Karma  pra- 
kriiis,  of  which  there  are  in  all,  one 
hundred  and  fifty  eight  kinds.   For 
convenience  sake,  these  have  been 
reduced    into    eight     fundamental 
classes,  four    of  which    beginning 
with    Darshandvaraniya  Karma 
are   called  Ghdtin  Karma  or  the 
Action-currents  of  Injury  and  ^he 
remaining  four  are  Agh&tin  or  the 
Action-currents      of     Non-injury. 
Now  when  on  the  one  hand  these 


BANDHA  OR  BONDAGE. 

eight  fundamental  kinds  o(  Karmas 
classified  into  Gkdtin  and  Agkdtin 
(for  a  detailed   discussion  of  which 
the     reader     is     refered     to     our 
chapter    on    the    Classification   of 
Karmas,)    and    the   soul     on    the 
other     interpenetrate      into     each 
others  spheres   appearing   thereby 
as  self-same  with  each  other,    it   is 
called  Prakriti  bandha, 
(B)     Stkiti     Bandha — The      word      Sthttt 
means   here   protentiveness.     The 
The  sages  hold  that  all  the   differ- 
ent   kinds   of  Karma   which   get 
into  the  soul  and  remain    there   in 
relation  of  identity  {Tdddlma  sam- 
bandh)  with  it,    do  not  stand  there 
in   this    relation     for  all    time   to 
come.     They  often    fall   away  and 
thus    break   off  their   relationship 
with   the  soul  ;    but    they    do    not 
fall  off  all  at  a  time.     Accordinor  to 
certain  causes  and  conditions  some 
fall  off  while  others  yet  remain  there 
standing  in  the  same  relation.  And 
when  we  speak  with    reference    to 

539 


AN  Epitome  of  jainism, 

the  duration  of  the  existence  of  this 
relation  between  the  soul  and  the 
/Carma-mditttr,  we  call  it  Sthiti 
bandha* 

(C)  Anubh&ga     Bandha — Anubhdga     here 

means  'quality  and  intensity.'  some 
Karmas  which  stick  fast  to  the 
soul  are  sharp  and  acute  so  much 
so  that  the  angularities  of  their 
character  cannot  be  easily  rubbed 
off.  When  we  speak  of  bandha  with 
reference  to  its  intensity  we  look 
at  it  from  the  stand  point  of  Anu- 
bkAga. 

(D)  Pradesha    Bandha — Pradesha    means 

parts.  Karma  is  ponderable  sub- 
stance :  so  it  must  have  parts  and 
the  minutest  part  which  does  not 
admit  of  any  division  is  called  anu 

9 

or  atom.  A  Karma  prakritt 
consists  of  such  innumerable  atoms 
and  when  we  speak  of  bandha 
with  reference  to  the  number  of 
atoms  covering  the  pradeshas  of 
the  soul,  we  are  said  to  view  it 
from  the  stand  point  of  Pradesha 

540 


BANDHA  OR  BONDAGE, 

bandha  i  e,,  from  quantitative  stand 
point. 

Such  are  the  four  different  view-points 
from  which  Bandha  (bondage)  can  be 
studied.  As  we  have  just  seen,  Bandha,  is 
coalesence  of  the  soul  and  /^ar#/a- matter, 
like  milk  and  water,  in  which  both  the 
different  elements  entering  into  a  relation 
of  identity  as  it  were  with  each  other, 
{tddatma  sambandha)  seem  to  lose  their 
respective  differences  and  appear  as  one 
organic  whole. 

But  \\\e  prima  facie  objection  that  is  rais- 
ed to  the  possibilities  of  the  bandha  of  the 
soul  as  hinted  at  in  the  above  is  this  :  The 
soul  is  not  karma-mSiiiQr,  nor  karma-mRttcr 
the  soul :  The  two  are  radically  opposed  to 
and  distinct  from  each  other  :  how  then 
could  soul  and  matter  be  so  fused  together 
into  an  identitcal  whole  as  we  find  in  the  cases 
of  organic  life  ?  The  instance  of  milk  and 
water  cited  by  way  of  analogy  does  not  hold 
good  here  ;  for  they  are  both  patcdgalic  in 
essence  and  therefore  chemical  action  and 
reaction  is  possible  between  them.  But  the 
soul  and  h   rma,  there  being  nothing  common 

54^ 


An  epitome  of  JAIN!SM, 

between  them,  how  would  it  be  possible  that 
they  should  mutually  enter  into  a  relation 
of  identity  (tdddtma  sambandha)  which  is 
defined  to  be  the  state  Bandha  ? 

True,  reply  the  Jains.  The  Cogitative 
substance  going  by  the  names  of  soul,  self  &c., 
IS  the  subject  [^BhoktA,  kartd)  and  the  Non- 
cogitative  substance  or  non-soul,  not-self,  is 
the  object  {Bhogya-drishyd),  And  they  being 
radically  opposed  to  each  other,  it  is  impossi- 
ble indeed  to  demonstrate  the  fusion  not  only 
of  the  subject  and  the  object,  having  for  their 
respective  spheres  the  connotations  of  /or 
the  Ego  and  'Tu  or  the  Non-^^o  but  of 
their  respective  attributes  as  well  into  a  kind 
of  mutual  self-sameness  with  each  other 
respectively  as  we  find  in  the  phenomena 
of  life  and  thought.  But  the  fact  of  there 
being  such  a  fusion  cannot  be  denied  ;  and 
it  is  from  this  fusion  that  there  originates  the 
tendency  in  our  ordinary  parlance  to  say — / 
am  lean,  this  is  mine  and  the  like — a  proce- 
dure of  speech  having  for  its  basis  a  fusion 
due  to  w/Z^^^/^'^-subreption  in  the  main 
with  respect  to  subject  and  object  and  their 
respective  attributes. 

54^ 


BANDHA  OR  BONDAGE. 

One  may  indeed  enquire  as  to  what  is 
this  subreption  (ntithydtva)  by  which  they 
not  only  identify  soul  with  karma-x^\^L\.\.^x 
and  vice  versa  matter  with  soul  but  their 
respective  attributes  as  well. 

As  we  remarked  already,  it  is  the  putting 
of  the  notion  of  something  observed  else- 
where into  something  else  present  in  the 
vision  which  is  not  that  thing.  Various 
schools  of  philosophy  have  defined  this 
subreption  {fnitkydtva)  in  various  ways.  As 
for  instance,  the  Naiydyikas  define  it  as 
the  assumption  of  the  possession  of  con- 
trary attributes  in  the  very  thing  super- 
imposed upon  another  thing.  The  Pra- 
bhdkar  school  of  philosophy  explains  it 
as  the  error  {bhrama)  attaching  to  mis- 
taken apprehension  of  the  super-imposed 
thing  for  the  thing  super-imposed  on. 
According  to  the  Buddhist  school,  it 
is  the  assumption  of  something  else's 
attributes  to  a  thing  ;  while  Shankar,  the 
pseudo- Buddhist  define,  it  to  be  the  appear- 
ance of  what  has  been  seen  previously  in 
something  else  (elsewhere),  taking  the  form 
of  recollection. 

543 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM. 

Now  whatever  might  be  the  psychology 
and  the  fine  rationale  underlying  the  subtle 
differences  and  distinctions  between  these 
various  definitions,  all  the  schools  agree  to 
recognize  it  as  the  putting  of  the  notion  of 
something  into  something  else  before  him 
which  is  not  that  thing  and  this  is  what  we 
call  Subreption  {mithydtva)  by  which  the 
body  and  soul  are  fused  together  into 
an  identical  whole  from  which  we  have 
the  instinctive  tendency  to  say  i  am 
tall  and  lean,'  'the  child  is  mine'  and  the 
like  in  the  movements  of  our  empirical 
thought  and  life.  Were  it  otherwise,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  us  to  be 
aggrieved  at  the  loss  of  our  dear  ones  or 
to  be  sorry  in  their  sorrows  and  afflictions. 
And  the  sages  hold  that  it  is  this  bandha 
or  combination  of  body  and  soul  into  an 
identical  whole  due  to  subreption  (mithydtva) 
which  is  the  primary  and  other  secondary 
causes  and  conditions  such  as  kashayas  and 
the  like  that  is  the  root  of  all  our  Sansdr 
and  miseries. 

But  still  the  possibilities  of  the  bondage 
of  the  soul  by  subreption    and  the  like  is  not 

544 


BANDHA  OR  BONDAGE, 

made  clear.  Indeed  we  understand  what  is 
meant  by  subreption  {milky diva).  But  is  it 
possible  for  us  to  put  the  notions  of  the  object 
and  its  accidents  into  the  self  which  is  not  an 
object  of  knowledge  ?  Object  of  knowledge 
(vishaya)  and  Subject  (viskayee  i.e.,  non- 
object)  are  not  only  two  distinct  substance 
but  also  the  accidents  of  the  one  are  radically 
opposed  to  the  accidents  of  the  other.  Such 
being  the  case  how  are  we  to  account  for  the 
alleged  subreption  of  the  two  incommensurate 
entities  in  as  much  as  subreption  as  just  dis- 
cussed is  possible  only  where  there  is  some 
thing  common  between  the  two  factors  under 
subreption.  It  is  just  because  there  is  a  kind 
of  unity  between  one  object  and  another  that 
we  put  by  subreption  the  notion  of  the  one 
into  another  object.  But  between  the  body  and 
the  soul,  there  being  no  unity  of  any  kind, 
the  question  of  subreption  of  the  two  cannot 
come  in  at  all,  specially  when,  according 
to  the  Jain  metaphysics,  the  soul  or  the  self, 
from  the  transcendental  point  of  view  {nisckaya 
naya)  is  of  the  nature  of  pure  consciousness 
or  knowledge  itself  {vide  Atrnd-pravAdpurva), 
Aforteriori^  therefore,  the  self  cannot  be  the 

545 

69 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM, 

object  of  knowledge  and  hence  the  notion 
of  the  Not-self  cannot  be  put  into  the  self 
which  is  knowledge  or  consciousness  itself. 

Then  again  it  is  not  true  that  the  notion 
of  one  object  can  always  and  invariably  be 
put  into  another  object  whereever  the  latter 
might  happen  to  be.  The  fact  is  that  by 
subreption  (mithydtva)  we  put  the  notion  of 
some  object  already  observed  elsewhere  into 
another  object  which  is  situate  before  us. 
To  illustrate  by  example,  when  we  put 
the  notion  of  silver  into  the  mother  of  pearl 
lying  before  us,  we  have  an  object  into  which 
the  notion  of  silver  is  put  by  subreption  and 
which  has  an  existence  quite  distinct  and 
separate  from  us  and  before  us  whence  it 
follows  that  it  is  into  an  object  situate  before 
him  that  any  one  puts  the  notion  of  another 
object  observed  by  him  previously  elsewhere. 
But  in  the  case  of  bondage,  how  is  it  possible 
to  put  the  notion  of  the  body  into  the  self 
filled  in  us  from  within  :  for  this  self  is  our 
inward  self  and  how  can  it  be  said  to  have  a 
separate  existence  situated  before  us  ;  rather 
it  transcends  all  the  connotations  of  the  non- 
€F0  as  being  not  an  object  of  knowledge. 

546 


BAN  DM  A  OR  BONDAGE, 

But  all  these  agrumentations  as  urged 
against  the  possibility  of  the  combination  of 
the  self  and  the  other  into  an  organic  whole 
do  not  hold  good  here.  It  is  true  in  fact  that 
subreption  consisting  as  it  does  in  the  putting 
of  the  notion  of  something  already  observed 
elsewhere  into  something  else  present  in  the 
vision,  is  only  possible  between  the  different 
objects  of  knowledge  ;  but  then  the  self  is 
intuitively  perceived  as  constitutional  with 
us  and  as  such  it  is  the  object  of  our  intros- 
pection. And  further  more  because  the  self 
is  admitedly  the  object  of  the  connotation 
of  the  /,  it  is  also  present  in  our  vision  as 
such.  And  this  accounts  for  the  combina- 
tion of  the  self  and  the  other  by  subreption 
into  an  organic  whole. 

Indeed  as  contended  the  self  which  is 
in  reality  {nisckaya  naya)  of  the  nature  of 
pure  consciousness  and  luminous  of  itself  is 
not  an  object  of  knowledge ;  and  as  such  it  is 
neither  fettered  nor  tainted  with  any  of  the 
blemishes  ;  neither  it  is  in  reality  the  agent  of 
any  deed  not  the  enjoyer  of  any  fruits  thereof. 
But  in  such  combination  by  subreption  as 
of  the    self  and    the    other,    the    same    self 

5^7 


AJSt  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

sat- 

by  reason  of  its  manifesting  itself  as  it  does 
through  the  other,  the  media  of  the  organ- 
ism and  the  senses,  becomes,  as  it  were, 
the  object  of  introspection  as  well  as  of  the 
connotation  of  the  /  and  thereby  appears 
as  the  Jiva,  the  doer  of  deeds  and  enjoyer 
of  the  fruits  of  thereof.  It  is  due  to  this 
subreption  that  the  self-same  spirit  appears 
both  as  the  agent  and  enjoyer  as  well  as  the 
object  of  the  connotation  of  the  /.  Of 
course  to  be  the  agent  or  enjoyer  of  some- 
thing, the  self  must  have  the  energy  to 
work  and  enjoy,  and  it  might  be  contended 
that  it  is  impossible  with  self,  because  of  its 
being  of  the  nature  of  pure  consciousness 
to  be  as  such.  True  as  these  energies  are 
inherent  in  the  mind-stuff  which  is  bereft 
of  intelligence  and  intellectuality  ;  but  it 
must  be  understood  that  in  the  combination 
by  subreption  of  the  self  and  the  other, 
into  an  organic  whole,  the  self-same  spirit 
acquires  somehow  the  energies  to  work  as 
well  as  to  enjoy  the  fruits  thereof  and  appear 
as  the  Jiva. 

But  some  will  however  remark   that   this 
is  but  arguing  in  a  circle.     For,  to    say    that 

54S. 


BAND  HA  OR  BONDAGE, 

the  subject  differentiates  into  object  by  sub- 
reption and  that  subreption  is  due  to  differen- 
tiation is  to  be  guilty  of  moving  in  the  viscious 
circle  of  reasoning  and  hence  the  possibi- 
lity of  the  subreption  of  the  self  and  th« 
other  combining  thereby  into  an  organic  unity 
is  inadmissible.  But  the  Jains  repudiate 
the  charge  altogether  ;  since  it  involves 
a  causal  receprocity  as  implied  in  the 
causality  subsisting  between  the  seed  and 
the  tree — a  fact  of  common  experience. 
The  fallacy  of  the  regressus  ad  infinitum 
is  indeed  condemnable  in  metaphysical 
speculations  drawing  conclusions  which  have 
no  analogous  cases  in  the  field  of  actual 
experience  for  verification.  It  is  a  fact  of 
common  experience  that  from  the  seed 
sprouts  forth  the  tree  and  the  tree  from 
the  seed  again  and  so  on  ad^infinitunt. 
And  as  this  does  not  involve  the  fallacy 
of  regrestis  ad  infunitiim  so  no  such  thing 
is  involved  in  the  statements  when  we  say 
that  the  combination  in  question  is  due  to 
subreption  and  subreption  again  is  due  to  com- 
bination and  so  on  ad-infinitum.  This  is  how 
the  Jains  say  that  'mithy&tva  or    subreption  is 

S49 


AhJ  EPITOME  OFjAlNtSM. 

without  beginning.  And  in  fact  it  i$  acknow- 
ledged on  all  hands  who  has  recognised  the 
truth  of  the  teaching  that  freedom  consists 
in  the  realization  of  the  self  as  absolutly  free 
from  what  is  alien  to  it.  In  other  words 
every  system  of  thought  which  finds  the 
bondage  to  be  due  to  subreption  holds  out 
the  hope  of  liberation  by  the  destruction  of 
the  cause  of  subreption  by  knowledge. 

However  it  is  pretty  clear  that  each 
case  of  subreption  is  invariably  preceeded 
by  another  subreption  leaving  its  risiduum 
in  the  form  of  lesyas  or  tints  as  its 
consequences  colouring  and  magnatising 
the  soul  whence  its  follows  that  the  self 
which  was  the  object  of  previous  subreption 
becomes  the  integrating  principle  in  a 
subsequent  combination  by  subreption  ;  for 
in  such  a  combination  there  is  always  pre- 
supposed a  unifying  principle  which  must 
refer  to  itself  at  each  step  it  takes  in  the 
processes  of  combination,  since  without 
such  a  principle  referring  to  itself  there  can 
be  no  synthesis  at  all. 

And  now  the  question  is :  what  is  this 
integrating  principle  ?  It  is  the  /iva,  fivAtman 

550 


BANDHA  OR  BONDAGE. 

or  the  empirical  ego  revealing  itself  as  it 
does  in  the  unity  of  self-consciousness.  The 
underlying  unity  of  self-consciousness  fulfils 
all  the  conditions  of  an  integrating  and  dis- 
criminating agency  without  which  we  cannot 
conceive  of  any  other  unity  as  involved  in 
the  mutual  relation  of  factors  under  sub- 
reption. For,  empirically  speaking,  in  order 
to  be,  an  object  must  be  distinguished  from 
other  objects  but  there  can  be  no  distinction 
unless  the  object  distinguished  and  those 
from  which  it  is  distinguished  are  held  to- 
gether by  a  single  unifying  principle,  the 
JMtman,  The  various  Karma  bargan&s 
are  so  many  external  things  existing  by 
virtue  of  their  mutual  determinations.  Now 
each  of  these  must  be  present  to  an  integra- 
ting principle  which  holds  them  together 
and  opposes  them  to  one  another  as  we  find 
in  the  case  organisms.  It  is  clear  enough 
that  this  combining  principle  cannot  be  in 
reality  any  of  the  objects  held  together  and 
distinguished  from  each  other.  That  which 
distinguishes  must  be  above,  though  implied 
in  those  things  that  are  distinguished.  In 
other  words   the    combining   principle,    must 

$5^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM, 

trenscend  and  be  equally  present  as  well 
to  the  objects  combined  and  it  is  by  subrep- 
tion {miihyAtva)  and  the  like  causes  and 
conditions  that  we  lose  sight  of  the  transen- 
dental  aspect  of  the  sdf,  the  integral  nature 
of  which  is  the  empirical  aspect  of  the  same. 


55^ 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

Sam  vara  clasi:fic<l  into  Pky  steal  ana  Psycliical  : — 
^Vitk  Samvar  begtns  tlie  f^^^actical  morality — Swaraj 
tkc  ultimate  End — Fifty  seven  kinds  or  Samvar — Five 
Samitis,  tkree  Gu^tis,  Ten  rules  or  Ascetisisn,, — 
Twelve  Bkavanas,  Twenty  six  Pariskakas  and  Five 
Okaritras. 

From  what  precedes  it  is  pretty  clear 
that  all  our  poverty  and  degradation,  all 
our  sorrows  and  afflictions  are  due  to  dsrava 
and  bandha  caused  by  subreption  {mithyd- 
tva  and  the  like).  Fresh  dsravas  forge 
fresh  links  of  handhan  of  the  soul  which  is 
constitutionally  free  and  potentially  divine. 
We  have  also  seen  elsewhere  that  in  order 
to  manifest  this  constitutional  freedom  and 
essential  divinity  of  the  soul,  a  jiva  must 
shake  off  all  karma- xwa.xx^x  which  being  alien 
to  its  real  nature  works  as  a  veil  of  ignorance 
to  prevent  the  unfoldment  of  right  vision 
into  the  verities  of  life  and  living  leading  to 
right-knowledge  without  which  right  conduct 
in  the  empirical  life  and  thought  ultimately 
crowning  its   efforts    with    a  free  and  beatific 

553 

70 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

state   of  being,  a   swardjya,    a  self-rule,    an 
autonomy,  for  all  time  to  come. 

But  the  question  is,  how  can  the  soul  be 
freed  from  the  snares  [pdsh)  of  karma  ?  how 
can  the  veil  of  ignorance  be  removed? 
The  Jain  processes  of  purging  the  soul  out 
all  karma-mdXiQv,  of  renting  the  veil  of  ne- 
science and  the  like  jndna-darshan-Avara- 
nddis  hiding  thejiva  from  the  knowledge  of 
its  own  real  nature  begins  with  what  is  termed 
as  Samvara,  With  samvara,  the  fifth  principle 
of  the  Jain  moral  categories,  begins  the  most 
practical  side  of  the  Jain  moral  philosophy. 
It  is  true  that  the  ultimate  end  of  all  the 
different  systems  of  thought  and  culture 
on  this  side  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere, 
is  Freedom.  And  the  nature  of  this  freedom 
has  been  variously  conceived  and  defined 
by  the  different  schools  of  philosophy.  But 
with  the  Jains  it  means  Swardj\  self-rule,  or 
autonomy  pure  and  simple.  Swardj  or  self- 
rule  in  every  department  of  life  and  activity 
is  the  Ideal  of  the  Jain  system  of  thought 
and  culture.  Subjection  to  anything  alien 
being  recognised  as  the  true  characteristic 
irfsignia  of  servitude  both  here  and  hereafter, 

55^ 


SAM  VARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

the  Jain  sages  have  deemed  it  wise  to 
lay  down  for  the  aspirants  to  Swardj 
and  for  the  good  of  humanity  in  general,  a 
few  rules  and  canons,  movements  along  the 
lines  of  which  will  surely  enable  the^Vz;^  to 
realize  the  Ideal  by  the  removal  of  the  aliens 
standing  in  the  way.  Of  these  rules  of  life^ 
comes  first  the  samvar  which  is  nothing 
more  than  practically  putting  a  stop  to  the 
influx  of  foreign  elements  into  the  consti- 
tution of  th^jiva. 

Like  Asrava  and  Bandha,  Samvara  is 
also  analysable  into  Subjective  {Bkava)  and 
Objective  (Dravya).  By  Subjective  samvar, 
we  mean  the  kind  of  conscious  and  volun- 
tary striving,  mental  and  moral,  along 
certain  lines,  on  the  part  of  the  jiva,  to 
arrest  the  influx  partially  or  wholly  whereas 
Objective  samvar  means  the  actually 
shutting  up  of  the  channels  against  further 
influx  of  fresh  Karma-matter  into  the 
constitution  of  \hejiva. 

Now  the  lines  along  which  a  jiva  should 
strive  and  struggle  for  the  gradual  effectua- 
tion of  samvara  are  of  fifty-seven  kinds  ; 
viz  ,  (A)  Five  Samitis.     (B)  Three   Guptis, 

555 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

(C)  Ten-fold  Yati-dharma.  (Dj  Tw^elve 
Bhdvands.  (Y.)  Twenty-six  Pariskahas, 
(F)  and  Five  Chdrttras*^i]ms  making  up 
fifty-seven  kinds  in  all. 

(A)     The  five  Samitis — Samiti    means  the 
voluntary   movements  of  the  jiva  in  perfect 
accordance  with  the    Agamas — The   samiti\ 
is    resolvable  into  five- fold   ways   as    in  the 
following, 

(i)     Iry&  Samiti — means  cautious  and  care- 
ful walking,  so  as  not  to  hurt   any 

one.  But  this  is  practically  impos- 
sible. A  slight  movement  from 
one  side  to  another  will  surely 
kill  many  a  life.  Indeed  !  but 
one  should  be  very  careful  to 
'walk  in  a  manner  as  would  cause 
the  least  possible  injury  to  life. 
Irydi  samiti  is  imperatively  en- 
joined on  the  monks  who  must 
take  special  care  to  examine  the 
ground  before  he  steps'  out  any- 
where. He  must  not  plod  through 
grassy  fields ;  but  should  take  him- 
self to  high-ways  fully  illumined  by 
the  scorchingr  ays  of  the    sun  and 


SAM  VARA  OR  STOPPAGM. 

riot  much  frequented  by  human 
beings  of  either  six  :  for  in  wend- 
ing his  way  through  these  sun- 
bathed highways  with  careful 
steps,  if  any^zz;^  is  killed  unwarily, 
the  sin  begotten  in  consequence 
thereof  would  not  materially  affect 
him  in  as  much  as  the  merit  he 
acquires  by  his  deliberately  taking 
every  precaution  for  not  injuring 
any  sentient  being  outweighs  and 
counteracts  thereby  the  demerit 
that  accrues  from  the  unintentional 
killing  of  the  invisible  germs  and 
animalcules  on  the  path.  Such  is 
the  character  of  the  first  samiti 
known  by  the  name  oi  IryA, 
(ii)  Bkdsd  samiti— This  means  careful 
movements  of  the  tongue.  One 
should  never  make  any  foul  use 
of  the  tongue  as  is  done  in  the 
case  of  filthy  speaking,  abusing,  or 
using  harsh  strong  words  against 
any  one  so  as  to  wound  his 
feeling.  This  is  how  the  tongue 
is  to  be  guarded. 

557 


An  epitome  of  JAIN  ism. 

(ill)  EskanA  samiti — As  hdiA-karma  may 
flow  into  the  constitution  of  the 
jiva  through  the  kind  of  food  one 
'  takes  in,  so  one  should  be  speci- 
ally careful  about  his  meals.  A 
Sddhu  should  never  take  in  any 
food  that  is  some  away  or  other 
spoiled  with  forty-two  defects. 

(iv)  Addnnikskepa  samiti — This  means 
that  one  should  take  special  care 
in  the  selection  of  seats  to  sit  on,  or 
in  putting  on  garments,  or  in  using 
the  utensils  so  that  no  jiva  might 
be  injured  thereby. 

(v)  Pdrisatapannd  samiti — This  is  but  a 
precautionary  measure  that  di sddhu 
should  adopt  in  throwing  out  un- 
healthy organic  elements  from  his 
constitution.  A  sadhu  should  not, 
for  instance,  spit  out  anywhere  and 
everywhere  in  as  much  as  it  may 
'  affect  olhtYJivas  swarming  in  the 
place  he  might  spit  on. 
These   are   the    five   samitis    which    are 

enjoined  on  the  lay  people  in  general  and  on 

the  Jain    monks  in   particular   to  observe  in 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

their  daily  lie.  The  imperative  character 
of  their  importance  becomes  clearly  evident 
when  we  direct  our  attention  to  questions 
of  the  relation  of  hygiene  and  baccilus.  The 
modern  baccilus  theory  of  diseases  which 
have  often  been  declared  as  contagious, 
explain  the  scientific  character  of  the  above 
five  injunctions,  specially  with  respect  to 
the  monks  who  have  to  move  about  from 
village  to  village,  from  city  to  city  excepting 
the  period  of  Chdturmdsya  or  the  four 
months  of  the  rainy  season  when  they  are 
forbidden  to  visit  place  after  place. 

(B)     Now     the     three    Gnptis :    Having 
regulated  the   externa!    movements  of  d^jiva 
in  such   a  way    as    would  help   hira  to  arrest 
comparatively  the  influx  of  karmuy  the  sages 
have  deemed    it    wise   to   lay    down  further 
rules  for   controlling    his   inner    nature.     Of 
these  guptts   or  the   processes    of  controlling 
the  inner  nature  of  2,jiva  we  have  first, 
(i)     Manogupti  which  means  the  controlling 
of  the  mind.    If  mind  is  not  control- 
led and  regulated    at  will  to  work 
in  a   particular   direction,  nothing 
great  can    be   achieved.     So    the 

559 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAIN  ISM. 

first    thing    one   should    try  to  do 
is     to     control    the   mind    which 
could    be    done     in    three    ways  : 
viz., — 

(a)  Asatkalpandviyo^i — which  means  that 
one  should  not  give  himself  up 
to  excessive  grief  and  the  like  at 
the  demise  of  anyone  dear  to  him 
or  at  the  loss  of  anything.  One 
should  reflect  within  himself  that 
all  the  pleasures  of  life  and  living 
are  only  temporal  :  they  come  and 
go  like  the  fleeting  clouds  so  there 
is  nothing  permanent  to  be  gained 
thereof  for  the  well-being  of  the 
soul  which  must  strive  and  strug- 
gle on  and  on  till  the  Highest- 
Good  is    realised. 

(J))     Samatd-bkdvini — means  continuous 

thinkinp  alone^  certain  line  that  will 
bring  on  the  equanimity  {samatA) 
of  the  mind.  He  must  try  to 
realise  that  for  a  mumukshin  jivay 
both  love  and  hate,  pain  and 
pleasure,  have  no  value  ;  for  both 
are  but  chains,  one  of  gold  and  the 

560 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

other  of  ore,  which  subject  the 
jiva  to  go  round  and  round  the 
wheel  of  births  and  deaths.  More- 
over unless  this  equanimity  of 
mind  is  attained,  a  jiva  cannot 
expect  to  have  a  right  vision  into 
the  metaphysics  of  ideas  and  ideals 
without  which  the  veil  of  mitkyA- 
tva  cannot  be  torn  asunder. 

(c)  Atmdramatd — means  'Introspection'  or 
Self-reflection.  By  this  the  mu- 
muksku  jiva  draws  in  the  powers 
of  his  mind  from  the  extra- 
mental  world  and  concentrates  the 
same  upon  the  soul  to  study  the 
different  pftises  it  passes  through. 
Thus  it  gradually  creates  an  apathy 
to  the  things  of  temporal  charac- 
ter by  a  comparative  arrest  of 
the  influx  and  enhances  the  ardent 
desire  for  a  speedy  deliverance 
from  the  turmoils  of  the  life  of 
servitude, 

(ii)  Vachan-gupti — means  controlling  the 
speech  which  can  be  accomplished 
in  two  ways,  viz, — 

561 

71 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /A  IN  ISM. 

{a)     By    taking    a    vow    of  silence    {mou- 

n&balambi)    for   a   certain  period 

during      which      the    muTVtuksha 

jiva    should  never  open   ps   lips. 

Or  by 

(3)     Vdkmyami — regulating  his  tongue  only 

to  move  on  imperative  occasions, 
(iii)     Kdya-gupH—mtd^ns     controlling     the 
physical   organism  by  the  mumu- 
kshu  jiva   in  accordance    with  the 
various    rules  and   regulations   as 
laid  down  in  the  scriptures. 
Now  from   the   characteristic  indications 
of   all    the    three     guptis^    it    is     apparent 
that  they  are    meant    to    help    a    jiva    in 
the  arrest   of  his    kaf^mic    inflow  ;  for     all 
these   act    as   an  antedote    to    the     poisons 
of    temptations   which    the    world   abounds 
with. 

(C)  The  Ten-fold  Duties  of  the  Monk. 
A  monk  can  well  stop  the  influx  of 
karma  by  acting  in  consistent  with  the 
ten  duties  enjoined  on  the  human  species 
specially  on  monks  and  they  are, 
(i)  KshamA — Forgiveness.  There  is  nothing 
like  the  maxim  'forget  and  forgive, 

S62 


\ 

\ 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

The    spirit   of  forgiveness   helps 

a   great     way    to   control     anger 

which    eats    into    the  moral  vitals 

of    the     mumukshin.     It     is     by 

virtue   of  forgiveness   that   Christ 

Jesus   of  Nazereth    was   a   Christ 

Jesus  ;  for  do   we   not   remember       ^- 

the  soul  stirring  exclamation  from 

the  cross  "Father,  father,   forgive 

them    for   they     know   not   what 

they  do." 

(ii)  MArdava — Humility, — There  is  nothing 

like     it     to     subdue     pride     and 

arrogance.  Arrogance  deteriorates 

the    mind   and  vitiates  the   right 

vision.    An  arrogant  nian   cannot 

look     into   the     real   utility    and 
necessity  of  things  or  discriminate 

between  the  right  and   the  wrong 

whereas  an  humble  man  awakens 

active     sympathy    in    those   with 

whom  he  comes   in  contact  to  his 

own  advantage   and  sees  into    the 

truth. 

(iii)     Arjava — Simplicity,         The      maxim 

Simplicity   pays    best     yields     to 

5^3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

none  in  its  intrinsic  merit.  It 
serves  to  keep  the  mind  free 
from  bias  without  which  light  of 
truth  cannot  well  be  reflected  in 
the  heart.  It  adds  to  the  courage 
of  conviction  and  helps  in  the  pre- 
servation of  veracity  of  character. 

(iv)  Nirlobkatd — Greedilessne^s.  Greed 
begets  sin  and  sin  begets  death. 
Greediness  increases  attachment, 
makes  the  jiva  extremely  egotis- 
tic and  narrowly  selfish  so  much  so 
that  he  knows  himself  only  and 
looks  to  his  own  interests  whither 
you  go  to  the  wall  or  not. 

(v)  Tapas^- Austerity,  Cultivation  of  auste- 
rity as  laid  down  in  scriptures 
helps  the  jiva  to  have  a  control 
over  his  lower  passions  to 
chasten  the  mind,  and  to  soften 
the  heart. 

(v\)  Samyama—^^sXx'dAVits  of  the  senses, 
the  speech  and  the  mind,  is  the 
primary  conditions  for  every 
moral  growth  and  intellectual 
expansion  : 

5H 


SAM  AVAR  A  OR  STOPPAGE. 

(vii)  Satya  or  Truthfulness,  It  is  born  of 
the  love  of  truth  which  must  be 
the  goal  of  every  human  endea- 
vour. Adherence  to  truth  in 
every  act  of  life  and  thought 
often  helps  to  walk  straight  with 
head  erect  and  steer  clear  of  the 
rocks  and  shoals  which  the 
passage  across  the  ocean  of 
Samsdr  abounds  with. 

(viiij  Saucha — Purity  or  Personal  cleanli- 
ness. It  includes  the  cleanliness 
'  of  both  mind  and  body.  We 
must  not  only  guard  our  thoughts 
well  and  keep  them  pure  but 
should  as  well  keep  our  person 
clean,  for  mind  and  body  act  and 
react  on  each  other. 

^ix)  Akinchanatva — Renunciation.  Culti- 
vation of  the  spirit  of  renunciation 
is  a  safeguard  to  the  above  moral 
requisites  and  raises  a  jiva  from 
the  lower  level  of  grovelling  life. 

(x^  Brahmacharya—Q\\^.sK\X,y»  It  means 
not  only  restraining  the  senses 
and  the  lower  appetites  but    free- 

5^5 


AN  EPITOME  OE  J  AW  ISM. 

ing  the  mind  from  erotic  thoughts 
of  every  sort  and  kind. 
(D)  The  Bhdvand — Next  comes  the 
bhdvand  or  reflection  or  thinking  within 
one's  own  self  as  to  the  real  nature  and 
and  character  origin,  use  and  utility  of 
something  else.  Constant  thinking  of  this 
nature,  wakes  up  in  the  mind  of  the  thinker, 
a  knowledge  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
object  thought  upon  and  helps  him  to  avoid 
such  things  as  would  stand  in  his  way  to  the 
realisation  of  the  object  or  end  he  has 
in  view  or  remove  obstacles  from  his  path- 
ways to  perfection — the  be  all  and  end  all  of 
our  life  and  thought. 

Such  being  the  nature   bhdvand   or   self- 
reflection,     the    Jain     sages    has     classified 
it  in   twelve   kinds    for   a   mmnukshin   soul 
as  stepping  stones  to  higher  things  and  they 
are  as  in  the  following, — 
(i)     Anitya  bhdvand — Anitya  means  non- 
permanent.      Anitya      bhdvand-^ 
therefore    means   the    thinking  of 
the    non-permanent    character    of 
things.      Things    transitory    can 
not  have  any  absolute  value   to  a 

566 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

fmimukshin  soul  whose  permanent 
interest  lies  in  the  realisation  of 
the  self.  For  all  the  relative  con- 
ditions of  existence  which  appear 
to  be  imperative  in  our  empirical 
life  and  thought,  are  but  so  many 
fleeting  clouds  that  come  and  go 
to  dazzle  or  darken  our  vision. 
Beginning  with  such  reflection  on 
the  temporary  and  perishable  cha- 
racter of  things,  a  mumukshin  soul 
comes  to  feel  within  the  inmost 
recesses  of  his  heart,  that  the  real 
permanent  good  is  the  freedom 
of  the  soul  which  must  be  raised 
from  the  mires  of  this  transitory 
world  :  for  health,  wealth,  beauty, 
strength  and  the  like  are  but 
guilded  shams  which  only  hypno- 
tize the  mind  and  tie  the  soul 
down  to  samsdr, 
(2)  Asaran  bhdvand — means  the  reflection 
on  the  helpless  condition  of  a  jzva 
in  this  world  of  phenomena. 
Really  dijiva  is  without  any  one 
here   to  push   him    on  to  mokska, 

567 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIINSM, 

All  his  friends,  relations   and  dear 
ones  may  wish  him  well,  may  pray 
for  a  long  lease  of  his  life  on  earth  ; 
but    no   body    can   save  him  from 
sinking   deep   into  the  bottomless 
ocean   of  Samsdr  which   he  as  a 
mumukskin  desires    to  get    rid  of. 
In  this -vein  a  jiva  must  think  on 
and  on  to   realise   within    himself 
the  absolutely  helpless  condition  of 
his  own  in  this  Sansdr  and  there- 
fore must   strain  his    own    nerves 
and  thus   strive  to  get  rid  of  it  by 
his  own  power  and  resolute  will. 
(3)     Sansdr  bhdvand — Sansdr     is     full    of 
sorrows  and  sufferings.     What  we 
ordinarily  call  pleasure  is  only  pain 
in  another  form.  Miseries  and  afflic- 
tions  permeate   as  it  were  every 
strata  of  Sansdr,     In  this   theatre 
of  the  world,  we  are  but  so   many 
actors    and    actresses  playing    our 
parts  only  for  the  time  being  after 
which  we    shall  have  to  bid  good- 
bye to  all  we  hold   dear  to  us  ;  so 
no  use  forming  an  attachment  for 

568 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

these  transitory  trivials  and  know- 
ing them  as  such  one  should  turn 
his  face  against  them  and  seek  for 
the  im7nutable  state  of  being  and 
bliss. 
(4)  Ekatva  bhdvanA — Alone  I  came  into 
the  world  and  alone  I  will  have 
to  depart  from  hence.  Alone  do 
I  work  and  alone  shall  I  have  to 
reap  the  consequences  thereof. 
None  of  my  dear  ones  will  take  off 
or  unload  me  of  my  Icarma  and 
set  me  free  or  give  me  a  short 
relief;  nor  can  they  save  me 
from  the  consequences  of  my 
own  deeds.  They  are  but  adepts 
in  having  their  own  desires 
accomplished  through  me  and 
what  a  stupid  am  I  to  yield  to 
their  apparently  wise  persuasions. 
This  wont  do.  I  alone  am  the 
maker  and  moulder  of  my  own 
destiny  and  so  I  must  forsake  all 
what  is  not-me  and  thus  carve 
out  a  path  of  my  own  for  the 
fulfilment  of  my  own  Good. 

7« 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

(5)  Anyatva  bhdvand — The  Self,  the  I  is 
not  this  body  which  I  hold  to  be 
mine.  It  is  but  a  different  and 
distinct  entity  unadulterated  by 
anything  else  in  reality.  The 
ordinary  mode  of  speech  finding 
expression  in  such  statements 
*as  I  am  lean',  or  *my  limb  is 
broken'  or  *my  child  is  suffering' 
has  for  its  basis  wrong  knowledge 
as  to  the  real  nature  of  our  inward 
self  which  by  subreption  appears 
to  be  identical  with  our  physical 
constitution  :  but  the  wise  and 
the  omniscient  have  definitely 
determined  it  to  be  otherwise. 
The  Self,  the  /  is  absolutely 
different  from  the  not-self  in  every 
respect.  So  what  care  I  if  the 
body  which  is  neither  me  nor 
mine  go  away.  What  do  I  care 
if  the  child  ceases  to  be  here 
and  now.  Such  reflections  within 
one's  own  self  along  this  particular 
vein  and  strain  is  called  Anyatva 
bMvand. 

570 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

(6)  Asucht  Bkdvand — This  our  mortal  coil 
is  of  composite  substance  and  is 
born  of  the  admixture  of  various 
elements  in  and  through  the  pro- 
cesses which  are  really  repugnant 
to  the  right  thinking.  All  sorts 
of  dirt  and  filth  are  within  this 
physical  constitution.  So  why 
should  I  be  encased  in  it  like  a 
bird  in  the  cage,  knowing  to  be  a 
composite  of  dirt  and  filth,  and 
originating,  as  it  does,  in  moments 
of  weakness  and  sin  ?  This  line  of 
self-reflection  is  what  is  called 
asuchi  bkdvand. 

(7)  Asrdva  bkdvand-^Asrava  or  influx — 
means,  as  we  have  seen,  flowing  of 
^^r;;^^-matter  into  the  consti- 
tution of  the  self  through  the 
channels  and  loopholes  in  our 
body,  speech  and  mind.  It  is 
taught  by  the  wise  that  looking 
upon  the  sentient  being  in  terms 
of  equality  with  ourselves  ;  re- 
vering the  really  qualified ;  dealing 
politely    with    the   rude   and   the 

57  ' 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINtSM 

rough  ;  feeling   pity    for   the    im- 
poverished ;  all  these    four   make 
one  acquire  the  forty-two  kinds  of 
Punnyay  where  as   roudra  dhy&n^ 
drta   dhydn,     the    five    kinds    of 
mithydtva     (subreption),     sixteen 
kashdyas,     five    kinds   of  desires, 
all  lead  a  jiva   to    acquire   eighty 
two   kinds     of  Pdpa,     The   wise 
and    the  aspirant  to  freedom  must 
know  all  these    and    reflect  on  the 
degrading     tendencies    they    are 
inherent  with,  to    work  havoc   on 
the  Jiva  through  the  influx  ;     and 
so  2.  jiva  should  guard  himself  and 
conduct  himself  accordingly. 
(8)     Samvafa  Bhdvand — Samvara     is    the 
stopping    of    the       influx.     This 
samvara  is  of  two  kinds — relative 
and  absolute.     Relative    samvara 
means  the  partial  stoppage    of  the 
influx,    while    Absolute    samvara 
means    the  complete   stoppage   of 
the  influx.  This  latter  kind  of  5^w- 
vara  is  only  possible  with  the  ayogi 
kevalins.     The   relative  samvara 


SAMVARA   OR  S TOP P AGS. 

which  is  possible  with  the  mumu- 
kskin  on  the  path-ways  to  bliss 
and  beatitude,  is  again  resolvable 
in  dravya  and  bkdva,  Dravya 
samvara  means  the  actual  shutting 
out  of  the  senses  and  other  chan- 
nels against  the  inflow  of  karma- 
matter  where  as  Bkdva  samvara 
means  the  particular  mental  dis- 
position which  precedes  Dravya 
samvara.  Now  constant  think- 
ing as  to  the  ways  and  means  of 
shutting  up  the  various  channels 
of  asrava,  destroying  mithy&tva, 
giving  up  of  the  6>rta  and  roudra 
dky&naSy  practising  only  of  shu- 
kla  dhydna  and  dharma  dhydna^ 
replacing  anger  by  its  opposite, 
pride  by  humility,  hypocrisy  by 
veracity  and  the  like  which  turn 
our  minds  away  from  persuing  after 
things  temporary  is  known  by  the 
name  of  samvara  bkdvand. 
(9)  N'trjara  bhdvand — Reflection  on  the 
ways  and  means  of  purging  the 
soul   of  all   impurities.     Nirjard 

573 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

ox  purging'  is  of  the   two   kinds — 

sakdma  and  akdma.    When  aijiva 
to 

intentionally  conducts   himself   in 

such  way  as  would  purge  his  soul 
out  of  all  impurities,  it  is  called 
sakdm  nirjard  ;  but  when  karma 
bargands  are  left  to  themselves 
for  their  own  falling  off  from  the 
constitution  of  the  soul  in  their 
natural  course,  it  is  called  akdma 
nirjard,  NirJarddMvund  implies, 
therefore,  the  thinking  of  the  ways 
and  means  of  voluntarily  getting 
rid  of  the  karma-mditter  infesting 
the  soul  with  the  express  intention 
of  attaining  to  beatitude. 
(lo)  Lokaswabhdva  bMvand—mesins  the 
thinking  on  the  symbolic  concep- 
tion of  the  universe  as  given  in 
the  Jain  scriptures.  The  sun,  the 
moon,  the  earth,  the  planets  and 
stars ;  the  physical  sky,  the  hell, 
the  heaven  and  the  like  constitute 
one  composite  universe  according 
to  the  Jain  system  of  thought. 
Its     form    and    configuration     is 

S7¥ 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

just  like  a  man  standing  erect 
with  arms  resting  against  his 
waist.  Being  composed  of  the 
six  substantive  categories  of  the 
Jain  philosophy  from  time  without 
begining,  it  is  the  permanent 
theatre  of  perpetual  changes. 
All  the  jivas  and  the  pudgal 
particles  which  fill  up  all  the  three 
regions  known  as  urdha^  adha^ 
tiryak  are  not  outside  this  Person 
but  they  are  all  contained  in  it:  for 
outside  this  Universe-man  is  the 
vacuous  space  only  going  by  the 
name  of  alok&kdsk  or  hyper- 
physical  regions  which  is  infinite 
in  extensiveness.  In  the  infernal 
regions  {adholoka)  there  are  seven 
worlds  one  upon  the  other  wherein 
are  imprisoned  the  jivas  of  the 
hell.  Somewhere  there  also  dwells 
the  Bhavanapati.  In  the  third 
world  from  downwards  dwell  the 
human  beings  and  other  animal 
lower  to  them.  In  the  celestial 
regions     live    the    gods.      Such, 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM 

roughly  speaking,  is  the  figurative 
conception  of  the  universe,  a  con* 
ception  which  is  also  traceable  in 
the  Virdt  Purush  or  the  Cosmic 
Person  of  the  Hindus.  Now 
meditation  on  this  figurative  con- 
ception of  the  universe  as  given 
in  the  Jain  scripture  is  known  as 
Lokaswabk&va  bhdvand, 
(ii)  Bodhidurlabhatva  bhdvand — This 
means  reflecting  on  the  difficult 
path  one  has  to  travel  through  to 
attain  to  a  state  oi pure  intuition  : 
for  every  thing  in  this  world, 
can  be  had  with  comparative  ease 
save  and  except  the  three  jewels, 
viz.  the  Right-vision,  the  Right- 
knowledge  and  the  Right-conduct 
constituting  the  a/pAa  and  ome£-a 
of  our  being.  The  Hindus  also 
say,  ''Khurasya  cikdrA  nishita 
duratvyd  durgamamayam  panthd 
kabayS  badantiy —The  way  to  the 
goal  is  so  very  difficult  to  travel 
through  ;  it  is  just  like  the 
walking    on  the   sharp    edge   of 

57^ 


.  SAM  VARA  OR  STOPPAGE, 

a   razor.       Therefore,    now      that 
we   have   got   the     human    birth 
which    rarely    happens  to  a  jiva^ 
we  must  give  up  all    to    reach  the 
goal,   however   difficult   the    path 
may  be  to  travel  through. 
(12)     Dharma   bhdvand — This  means  con- 
stantly reflecting  on    the  essential 
nature  of  a  true  religion.    Religion 
not     saturated    with    piety,     with 
the   spirit   of  innocent    service    to 
humanity      and     other     sentient 
{sacktt)  beings  is  but  a  sham.  For, 
it  is  mercy  that  lends  colour  to  the 
soul  of  religion.     Real  mercy  pro- 
ceeds  from   right-vision,    veracity 
and  philanthropy.     He  who  never 
tells  a  lie,  sticks  to  truth  even  unto 
death,  is  indifferent  to  the  worldly 
loss  or  gain,    helps  the    needy  and 
has   an   unwavering    faith  in    the 
words  of  dijiva,  the  victor,  is  really 
a   righteous    man    from    the    Jain 
point  of  view. 
These  are  the  twelve  kinds  of  reflections 
which  help  ^.jiva  in  his  efforts  towards    the 

577 

n 


AN  EPITOME  OF  J  AIM  ISM. 

actualisation  of  Samvara  which  if  not  culti- 
vated with  propriety  and  judiciousness  cannot 
put  a  stop  to  the  incessant  influx  of  karma- 
matter  into  the  constitution  of  ih^jiva. 

Next  comes  the  Partshahas  or  endurance 
of  hardships  without  which  no  one  can 
expect  to  attain  to  a  thing ;  for  work  implies 
not  only  waste  but  endurance  as  well.  A 
mumukshin  soul  must  ever  be  prepared  to 
gladly  endure  all  sorts  of  hardships  as  con- 
sequent on  the  strain  and  struggle  he  has 
been  voluntarily  undergoing  for  the  realisa- 
tion of  the  Highest  Good.  The  Jain  sages 
have  classified  in  their  own  ways  these  | 
various  forms  of  hardships  into  twenty-two 
kinds,  viz  ; — 

(i)  Kshutparisaha  or  endurance  of  hard-j 
ship  consequent  on  hunger,  (2)  on  thirst] 
{frishd)y  (3)  cold  (skita)y  (4)  heat  (ushna),\ 
(5)  insect  bite  (dansha  mashaka),  (6)  naked- 
ness (achela)  i.e,  tattered  rag,  (7)  on  unfavour- 
able environment  {arati),  (8)  on  the  presencel 
of  the  opposite  sex,  (9)  on  constantly  shifting 
from  place  to  place  ( chary  a)  \  (10)  on  the] 
disadvantages  arising  from  abiding  by  thej 
rules    of  conduct   in   a   particular     quarter] 

57S 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

temporarily  taken  as  habitat  (nishady&)y 
(ii)  on  uncomfortable  beddings  to  sleep  on 
{shayyd)y  (12)  on  taunts  and  reproaches 
{akroska),  (13)  on  personal  injury  {badha\ 
(14)  on  begging  alms  (ydcknyd),  (15)  on 
disappointment  in  the  begging  (aldbha), 
(16)  on  desease  {roga),  (17)  on  thorn-pricks 
{trina  sparshd),  (18)  on  physical  dirt  and 
impurities  {mala)  ;  (19)  on  being  indiffer- 
ent to  words  of  praise  and  acts  of  service 
relative  to  himself  {sat  karma)  ;  (20)  on  the 
avoidance  of  the  pride  of  learming  {PrdjnA) 

(21)  on  the  avoidance  of  pain  due  to  the 
consciousness  of  his  own  ignorance  {agnana), 

(22)  on  the  avoidance  of  being  cast  down  for 
not  being  able  to  acquire  a  right-vision  into 
metaphysics  of  ideas  and  ideals. 

Now  these  are  the  two  and  twenty 
Parishahas  or  forms  of  endurance  which 
otherwise  tell  upon  a  mumukskin  jiva  so  as 
to  cast  him  away  from  the  right  path  and 
conduct  without  which  the  progress  towards 
the  highest  state  of  being  and  bliss  is  held 
to  be  impossible. 

Then  there  are  the  Five-fold  Conduct  for 
further  stoppage  of  the  influx.    The  five-told 

579 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

conduct  are  but  the   Five    Rules   along  the 

lines  of  which  a  jiva   should    move   himself 

to  stop  the  inflow   of  "karma'VazXX^x   into   its 

constitution.     They  are — 

(i)  Samayika  CMr//r^— which  enjoins  on 
the  mumukskin,  the  abandonment 
of  bad  companions  and  retirement 
to  seclusion  for  meditation. 

iii)  Chedopasthdpannya  Chdritra — which 
enjoins  a  full  and  complete  confes- 
sion with  repentance  to  a  guru 
of  the  sins  and  crimes  done  inten- 
tionally or  otherwise  by  a  mumu- 
kshin  jiva  and  humbly  submitting 
to  any  punishment  that  might  be 
inflected  on  him  in  consequent 
thereof. 

(tii)  Parihar  Vishudha  Charitra, — It  goes 
without  saying  that  without  the 
purification  of  the  heart,  right- 
vision  into  the  metaphysics  of 
things  and  thoughts  leading  to 
right  knowledge  resulting  in  the 
diefication  of  the  inward  self  fs 
impossible  :  we  have  also  in  the 
Bible.     ''Blessed     are     the   pure 

580 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGB. 

in  heart  for  they  shall  see  God." 
So  without  chittasuddhi  or  puri- 
fication of  the  heart  nothing  is 
possible.  Now  there  are  various 
means  and  disciplines  whereby  the 
heart  can  be  purified.  Of  these 
the  most  preleminary  for  a  mumu- 
kshin  is  to  serve  the  sddktis,  the 
monks.  The  most  typical  of  these 
services  is  the  services  rendered 
to  the  monk  engaged  in  Tapa — 
austeiority.  Performance  of  tapas 
may  cover  the  period  of  even 
eighteen  months  and  if  a  mumu- 
kshin  serves  a  monk  who  is  thus 
engaged  in  Tapas  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  see  that  nothing  there 
takes  place  externally  as  to 
break  the  Tapas  of  the  monk,  he 
is  said  to  be  achieving  the  puri- 
fication of  the  heart  to  a  certain 
extent.  The  psychology  under- 
lying this  is  too  obvious  to  require 
any  further  elaboration, 
(iv)  Sukshma  Sampardya. — The  more  the 
heart   is     purified    the     more    the 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

light  of  truth  will  be  reflected 
thereon  and  he  will  realise  the 
temporary  character  of  the  things 
wordly,  along  which  he  will  become 
less  and  less  attached  to  them,  with 
a  growing  spirit  of  renunciation 
born  of  right  knowledge  of  the 
real  values  and  functions  of  these. 
This  is  how  should  2.jiva  cultivate 
apathy  and  indifference  to  things 
worldly.  So  long  a  fiva  living, 
moving  and  having  his  being 
in  this  empirical  world  of  ours, 
he  must  have  to  work  and  the 
more  he  works  out  things  with 
attatchent  the  more  fettered  does 
he  become  ;  but  if  he  does  his 
duty  for  duty's  sake  without  wait- 
ing for  the  result  thereof,  he  will 
devolope  by  this  his  mode  of 
conduct,  a  spirit  of  renunciation 
which  will  help  him  to  preserve  the 
equanimity  of  temper  in  the  midst 
of  intense  activity, 
(v)  Yathdkshyata. — Having  thus  gradually 
devoloped     the   spirit     of     doing 

5S2 


SAMVARA  OR  STOPPAGE. 

things  without   the   least   attatch- 
ment  he  will  attain  to  such  a  state 
of  being  when   all    the    five   fold 
rules  of  conduct  will    be  observed 
automatically  so  much  so  that  the 
jiva  himself  will  be  left  to   himself 
for    introspection  into   and     self- 
reflection     upon  its     own    nature, 
phases  and  phenomena. 
Thus  we  see   how   the   various   ways   of 
arresting  the  inflow  of  karma  into  the  consti' 
tution  oilht  jiva  can  be   classified  into  fifty- 
seven  modes  or  types  viz  ,  five  Samity,  three 
Gupti,    ten  Yati  dharma,   twelve  BhdvandSy 
twenty  two  Parishahas  and  five-fold  Conduct- 
Ck&ritra.     A  jiva  desirous  of  salvation  from 
the  thraldom    of   the     senses     must     meke 
strenuous  efforts  to  gradually  stop  the  influx 
of  fresh  matter  foreign  to  the   soul.     For  as 
we   have    already   seen    it    is    these   karma 
particles  getting  into  the  constitution    of  the 
jiva  that  blind  its  vision  into  the  metaphysics 
of  things   and   there    by    prevents  its    right 
knowledge  without    which    right    conduct    is 
held  to  be  impossible. 


sss 


CHAPTER  XXVIV. 
NIRJARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

Ntrjara — Its  Deiinitton — Cla88t£cattoxi  of  Ntrjara 
tnto  Salcama  and  Akama — TKe  Mumulcslitn  strtvea  £or 
Salcam  Ntrjara  to  ex{>e<ltat«  Ltberatton — Pnaaea  ana 
Transformations  of  Karma — Means  and  MetKodi  of 
Sakama  Ntrjara — Tke  Prtmary  Condition  of  Nirjara  xa 
Austerity — Austerity  Lurns  \xp  tlie  Karma  seeds  and  sets 
tKe  Jiva  free  —Forms  of  Austerities  and  IDkyanas  wKick 
kurn  u{>  tke  seeds  of  Karma  kef  ore  tkeir  due  times. 

Along  with  the  practice,  of  Samvar  or 
arresting  the  influx  of  fresh  karma-pudgal  as 
stated  in  the  preceding  chapter  a  mumu- 
kskinjiva  is  requiren  to  act  in  such  a  way  as 
would  help  him  in  throwing  away  the  already 
acquired  dirt  of  karma  which  has  been  sub- 
jecting him  to  go  round  and  round  the  wheel 
of  births  and  deaths.  For  untill  and  unless  a 
jivas  entire  z^^;';;^^- matter  clothing  his  soul- 
worked  out  or  neutralized  in  a  manner  as 
would  make  it  impossible  to  transform  into 
udaya — kinetic  state  of  its  being,  a  jiva  can- 
not expect  to  attain  to  freedom. — And  the 
processes  and  activities  whereby  the  karma- 
matter  clothing    the   soul    is  worked    out  or 

5S4 


NIR/ARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

their  effects  completely  neutralized  so  much 
So  that  they  would  fall  away  from  the  consti- 
tution of  the  jzva  is  called  NirjarOi. 

The  Jain  sages  have  classified  this  Nirjara 
into  two  kinds  viz  ;  (i)  Akdma  Nirjara 
&  (ii)     Sakdma  Nirjara. 

To  deal  with  Akdma  Nirjara^  karma- 
pudgals  while  standing  in  some  relation  with 
the  soul  assume  various  phases  through 
successive  processes  of  tansition  according  to 
laws  inhent  in  them.  This  is  the  reason 
why  the  sages  have  come  to  another  kind  of 
classification  of  the  karma-barganas  by  the 
names  of  (i)  Sattd^  (2)  Bandha  (3)  Udaya 
and  (4)   Udirnd. 

(i)  By  sattd  karma — The  sages  mean  the 
karma-bargands  which  getting  in 
to  the  constitution  of  the  jiva 
remain  there  merged  as  it  were 
in  the  soul.  Sattd-karma  corres- 
ponds to  the  Sanckita- karma  of 
the  Hindus  :  The  whole  man 
that  still  remains  behind  the  man 
not  yet  worked  out — the  entire 
unpaid  balance  of  the  debit  and 
credit  account. 

74 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAINISM 

By  Bandha  Karma — the     Sages   mean    the 
karma-bargands   in    the   state    of 
saM    enter    by    virtue     of    sub- 
reption of  the  j'/z/^  into  a   relation 
of  identity    with   the  soul    where- 
by they^z;^  takes  in  further  karma- 
matter  in  its  current  lease    of  life 
to  mould  its  destiny  for  the  future. 
This  Bandha  karma  is  anologous 
to   the  Kriyamdn   karma   of  the 
Vedanta  philosophers. 

By  Udaya  Karma — The  sages  mean  the 
karma  bargands  which  standing 
simply  in  relation  of  identity  with 
the  soul  for  sometime  devolop 
into  3n  energy  of  movement  for 
the  enjoyment  of  the  soul  at  the 
commencement  of  each  life.  This 
is  analogious  to  the  Prdrabdha 
Karma  of  the  Hindus  by  which 
they  mean  the  amount  apportioned 
to  the  man  at  the  beginning  of  his 
life  on  earth.  It  is  important  to 
note  here  that  this  third  type, 
the  Udaya  karma,  is  the  only 
destiny  which  can  be  said  to  exist 

^S6 


NIR/ARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

for     man     and    this   is    what   an 
astrologer   might   fore-tell   for  us, 
that   we   have    apportioned   to  us 
so   much   good   and    evil   fortune 
^— so  much   of  the   good   and  evil 
actions  of  our  past  lives  which  will 
react  on  us  in  this  life. 
(4)     By   UdirnA   Karma — The  sages  mean 
the  karma  bargands  which  by  the 
resolute  will  and    exertion  of  the 
soul  are  worked  out  into  the  energy 
of  movement  for  the  enjoyment  of 
the  J  ha  before  they  are  due. 
Now   if  the   fiva   allows    himself  to   be 
drifted     from    wave    to     wave    surging    in 
everflowing  currents   of  karma,  his    destiny 
will    no   longer   remains   his  hands  but   the 
environment   will  become    all    in    all  in    the 
making  and  moulding  of  his  destiny.    For  he 
will  be  under  the  complete  sway   of  his   own 
karma   creating   conditions  of  his  being  and 
will  be    reaping  the  consequences  of  his  own 
karma    without     any     will    or   individuality 
of  his    own   to  stem  the    tide  of  the   influx. 
For     karma-mditt^r     according   to   its    laws 
and  forces    which   it   is     instinct     with    will 

5S7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

continually   get   into    the  jiva   to  be    there 
in  the  state  of  satid  for   some    time    only  to 
be  awakened  into   kinetic    energies   whirling 
th^jtva  round  through   the   different  grades 
of  sansdr,  while  others    will    indeed    fall   off 
yielding  places  to   newer   ones.     Therefore, 
instead    of  leaving  the  life   to   chances,    the 
sages   have     devised    means   and     methods 
whereby  the  seeds  of  karma  could    so   burnt 
as    to    wholly    neutralize     their   effects   and 
leave  the  soul  free  and  pure  to  soar  up  and  up 
into  the  regions  of  the  Siddhasila,  Experience 
have   taught   us  that  the   karmic-seeds — the 
root-evolvent  of  miseries — could  be  burnt  up 
into  nought  in  the  glow  of  austerities — Tapas, 
Just   as   fire    consumes  the   combustible    so 
do  the   /^/>a5-austerities  burn  up  the  karma- 
hija   of  the  jiva  and  sets  him  free  from  the 
turmoils     of    sansdra.      These     austerities 
are   of  various    kinds   and    types   which  for 
the  sake  of  convenience,    have    been    classi- 
fied by   the    Jain    moralists,    primarily    into 
(I)  Bdhya,  exterior  and  (II)  Antar,  Interior 
austerities. 

(i)     By    Bdhya,     exterior    or   physical 
austerities,    our   physical    nature   is  so   con- 

588 


NIRJARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

trolled  as  to  work  out  automatically  towards 
the  furtherance  of  the  end  in  view  whereas  by 
the  Antaranga  tapas  or  Interior  or  psychi- 
cal  austerities  mind  is  so  controlled  as  to 
help  xki^jiva  in  getting  an  insight  into  the 
real  nature  of  things  with  a  view  of  attaining 
to  a  right  knowledge  thereof  and  their  values 
as  well  without  which  right  conduct  on  the 
part  of  the  jiva  becomes  a  rarity.  And 
mind  and  body  being  found  to  act  and  react 
on  each  other  through  the  principle  of  con- 
commiltance,  the  relative  importance  of  both 
the  forms  of  austerities  is  quite  evident. 

Now  of  the  two  kinds  of  tapas,  the  bdhya^ 

the   exterior   or  the   physical  consists  in  the 

processes  of  controlling    the  physical  nature 

of  the  J  zva  in  six  following  ways. — 

(i)     Anashan  Vrata — />.  the  vow  of  fasting. 

Importance   of  fasting   from  time 

to  time  to  give  the  physical  system 

a    rest   goes     without     saying   in 

these    days    of  scientific     culture 

and  refinement.     It  is  said  in    the 

scripture  that  fasting   purifies    the 

sense-organs    and    adds    to    their 

.sensibility     so   much     so    that   it 

589 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM. 

makes  them  to  respond  to  a  any  fine 
and  delicate  vibration  that  might 
be  set  up  in  the  outside. 

(2)  Unodori — Avoidance  of  full  meals.     It 

adds  to  the  agility  of  the  jiva. 
Full  meals  bring  on  slumber  and 
laziness  and  are  the  causes  of  dys- 
pepsia which  is  very  difficult 
to  get  rid  of. 

(3)  Vritti  sankhepa — Dietetic   restrictions 

which  can  be  observed  in  different 
ways  from  the  view-points  of 
dravya,  kshettray  k&la  and  swa- 
bk&va.  As  for  instance,  I  am  in  the 
habit  of  taking  meals  consisting  of 
nine  or  ten  kinds  of  eatables  and  to 
observe  the  vow  oi  vr it tt  sankhepa 
from  the  stand-point  of  dravya,  \ 
will  have  to  reduce  the  number  of 
the  eatables,  say,  to  five  kinds  mak- 
ing up  the  meal  would  take. 
Then  again  I  may  put  in  further 
restriction  to  the  obtaining  of  the 
meal  from  certain  quarter  from  the 
view-point  of  kshettra.  Thirdly, 
1  may  put  still    further  .restriction 

590 


NIRJARA  OR  DISSIPA  TION, 

to  the  time  kdloi  my  taking  meals. 
I  may  take  once  a  day  and  that 
again  say  by  3  p.m.  every  ;  day  ; 
and  lastly,  from  the  view-point 
of  bhdvuy  I  may  put  still  another 
restriction  in  obtaining  food  from 
people  with  certain  peculiar  men- 
tality  and  position.  I  may  take 
the  vow  of  having  meals  only 
from  the  chaste  and  pure  passers- 
by  whom  I  may  happen  to  meet  on 
my  to  a  certain  destination. 

(4)  Rasataydga — Renunciation  of  palatable 

articles  or  dainty  dishes,  such  as 
a  variety  of  sweets,  milk,  butter, 
sugar,  salt  and  the  like  which  may 
awaken  in  me  a  sense  of  attach- 
ment to  the  pleasures  of  life. 

(5)  Kdyakleska — Endurance      of    physical 

troubles.  A  mumukshin  must  ever 
be  ready  to  undergo  all  sorts  of 
physical  discomforts  without,  in 
the  least,  losing  the  equanimity 
of  temper.  He  must  take  both 
heat  and  cold  (shita  and  ushna) 
in    the   one    and    the    same  light. 

59' 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM 

To  realize  this,  he  may  undertake 
to      practise     meditation      either 
in     the  scorching   rays   of  the  sun 
on  an  elevated  seat  in  the  summer 
or   in   a  cold  uncovered  place   in 
the  winter. 
(6)     Samlinatd — Turning     the    senses  from 
their     respective     objects.      This 
will    develope  the  spirit  of  renun- 
ciation    in    the    mumukshi'n    jtva 
and  strengthen  his  moral  rectitude 
in  such  a  manner  as   to  make  one 
look  upon    things   most  charming 
to  the  worldly   as   of  no   use   and 
avail      to     him.     This      is     how 
the  senses,  we  are   told,    guarded 
against   all    temptations  (Indriya 
samlinatSb).     Then      again      the 
mumukshin     must      control     the 
passions  and  their  correlates,  such 
as  anger,  deceit,  pride  and    greed 
{kasdya  samltnatd)  as  well  as   his 
thought,  speech   and    body   (yoga 
samlinatd).     And    lastly,  there   is 
the   viviktacharya    which    means 
previous  ascertainment  by    a   mu- 

^592 


NIRJARA  OR  DISS  IP  A  TION. 

mukshin   as   to  whether   any  one 
of  the   opposite    sex    is   there   at 
the  place  of  his  future    destination 
where  he  will  be  next  going. 
These    are   the     six    forms    of  exterior 
austerities   {b&kya   tapd)   for  regulating    and 
controlling  the  physical  nature  of  the    mumu 
ksktn  jiva.     Besides,  there    are     six  interior 
austerities  (dntar  tapd)  of  which  the  first  is, — 
^i)     PrAyasckitta — penance  and  repentance 
for  the  blunders  committed  through 
pramdd  or  negligence.     It   often 
takes  the    form    of  a   moral   con- 
fession  to  the   spiritual  guru,    or 
to    an  other     sddku    instead,     of 
the   sins    and    crimes   one   might 
have  done  through  commission  or 
omission   with  repentance  and  ac- 
cept the  penalty  to  be  imposed  on 
him  by  the  guru  and  act  according 
to   the    regulations    as    laid  down 
in  the  scriptures  and  repeat  every 
mcrning  micchami  dukkadami  i.e, 
may  my  sins  be  forgiven  ! 
(2)     Vinaya    or    Humility — A     mumukshin 
soul  must  also  cultivate    humility, 

S93 

75 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

for  this  serves  to  kill  all  pride  and 
saturate  the  mind  with  sympathe- 
tic feelings.  Of  vinaya  there  are 
four  kinds, — 

{a)  Jndna  vinaya — i,e*  to  be  humble  and 
respectful  to  all  who  are  superior 
in  knowledge  and  wisdom. 

(b)  Darshan  vinaya— i.e,  to  be  humble  and 
respectful  to  those  who  have 
gained  a  real  insight  into  the  meta- 
physics of  things  and  thoughts. 

{c)  Charitra  vinaya — to  be  humble  and 
polite  to  the  men  having  a  good 
moral  stamina  by  the  virtue  of 
which  he  follows  a  right  course 
of  conduct. 

{d)  Mana  vinaya — to  be  always  in  a  kind  of 
mental  attitude  as  to  pay  respect 
to  all  the  saints  and  sages  of  the 
world  who  live  for  others,  and 
therefore,  worthy  of  our  reverence. 

(3)  Vaiydvritya — Service  to  humanity. 
It  takes  a  thousand  and  one 
forms  in  and  throuo[h  which  the 
acquired  dirt  of  karma  is  worked 
off.     Vaiydvritya  consists   chiefiy 

5?^ 


NIRJARA  OR  DtSSlPA  TION. 

in  services  rendered  to  ascetics ; 
feeding  the  poor,  sheltering  the 
helpless  and  the  like  forms  of 
social  services.  In  these  days  of 
flood  and  famine,  the  sddkus  of 
the  Ramakrishna  Mission  have 
been,  it  is  important  to  record, 
seriously  engaging  themselves  in 
the  performance  of  this  VatyA- 
vrttya,  Viydvritya  brings  on 
chitta-suddht  or  purification  of  the 
heart. 

(4)  Svddhydya — means  study  :  here  it  re- 
fers to  the  study  Jain  scriptures  : 
following  the  rules  of  conduct  as 
laid  down  therein  for  practical 
guidance ;  testing  the  truth  and 
validity  of  the  Jain  metaphysical 
conclusions  and  being  convinced  of 
the  same,  preach  them  out  to  the 
world  for  the  good  of  humanity 
in  right  earnest  and  energy.  This 
clearly  shows  the  evangelical 
spirit  of  Jainism. 

(5)     Vyutsarga —  descrimination       between 
the  soul  and   the   non-soul.     It  is 

595 


AM  EPITOME  OF  JAIINSM. 

just    like     the     nitydnitya    vastu 
viveka  of  the  Vedantists. 
(6)     Dkydna — meditation,  contemplation  or 
uniform  unbroken  concentration  of 
mind  upon  something.  To  be  more 
clear,    dhydna    is     an    unbroken 
thread  of  thought  evoloving  out  of 
continuous  thinking  on  an   object 
or  an  Idea.  This  dhydna  has  been 
classified  into    four   kinds  accord- 
ing to   the   object  or  Idea  where- 
on a  y/f^   concentrates  his  atten- 
tion ;  viz,   (i)  Aria,  (2)  Roudra, 
(3)  Dharma  and    (4)  Sukla, 
To  take  the  first,  Arta  Dkydna^  it  is  the 
most    intense    hankering   with   attatchment 
after  an  object  of  enjoyment  revealing  itself 
as  it  does  in  four  forms  namely, 
{a)     Ishta   viyoga — constantly    thinking   of 
the  loss  of  what  was  dear  to  him  ; 
grieving   too    much  for  the   dead 
and   the    departed   dear   ones   or 
wailing  and  beating  breast  in  grief 
for  the  loss  sustained. 
{b)     Anista    Samyoga^ — to     be     constantly 
brooding  over   entering  on  a  new 


NIRfARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

relation      with       of       something 
undesirable   and   unpleasant,    and 
thereby     gradually     sinking    into 
despondency    as  if  no  more  hope 
were  left  to  recast  his  lot. 
(c)    Roga   chmtd — to  be  constantly  labour- 
ing  under   an   anxiety   for   some 
physical  malady,  or  in  other  words 
always   thinking   of  the   physical 
ill-health. 
{d)     Agrasocha     or     Nt'ddndrtka — to      be 
occupied    with    the  thought  of  the 
future  and  future  only,  that  I    will 
do  this,  then  that,  next  the    thing 
will  as  a  natural    consequence  and 
I  have  my  objective  fulfilled. 
It  is  important    no  note  here    by  the  way 
that  Arta  dhydna  is    possible  between  the 
I  St.  mithyatva^.nA    the   6th  gimasthdn  and 
leads    jivas   to   take    birth   in   the     Tiryak 
goti, 

2.     The    second    of     the    Dhydnas    is 

Roudra  dhydna  which  means  to  be  absorbed 

in  the   thought   of  wreaking   vengeance   for 

.    some  loss  or  damage   one  sustained  through 

the    action    of    another.     This   thought   of 

597 


An  epitome  of  JAINISM. 

wreaking    vangence    {Roudra   dhy&na)  ex- 
presses itself  into  four  forms  viz,— 

{a)  Htsdnubandhi,  (b)  Mriskdnubandhi, 
{c)  Steynubandhly  {d)  Samrakshanu 
bandhi 

Arta  and  Roudra  Dhydnas  always  lead 
mind  to  concentrate  its  energies  on  things 
extra-ongaric.  These  instead  of  dissipating 
the  karmic  energetics  rather  keep  the  jiva 
under  such  influence  as  to  acquire  karma- 
matter  subjecting  it  to  the  repetition  of  births 
and  deaths  in  the  different  grades  sansdr, 

(3)     But  the  third  one,  Dharma  dhydna 
which  means  constant  thinking  of  the   ways 
and  means  to  and  following  the  same  in  prac- 
tice for  the  realisation  of  the   true  nature  of 
our  inward   self,  helps   ihejiva  to   work  out 
its   own   karma,   Dharma  dhydna  has  been 
analysed  into  four  phases,  namely — 
(a)     Agnd   vichaya — to   have   a   firm  faith 
and  sincere   belief  in   the   meta- 
physical conslusions  as  arrived  at 
by     the   omniscient  kevalins  and 
and  in  their  teachings. 
(U)     Apdya  vichaya — the   belief  tbat    what 
is  non-self  is    not  only  alin   to  the 


NIRJARA  OR  DISSIPA  TION. 

real  self,  but  constant   thinking  of 
the  not-self  enfetters  the  self. 
{c)     Vipdka  vichaya — the    belief  that    from 
the     ontological    point   of    view, 
though  the  self  is  a  positive  entity 
all  pure  and  free,  but  viewed  from 
the   phenomenal     stand   point,    it 
appears  to  be  otherwise   owing  to 
the  eight  kinds   of  karma   loaded 
with  which  \ki^  jiva  passes  through 
births  and  deaths. 
(d)     Samsthdn  vickaya^^mental  ideation  or 
picturing  in  the  mind  of  the  four- 
teen worlds  as  well  as  the  nature  of 
the  constituent  elements  of  the  same 
as  taught  in  the  Jain  philosophy. 
(4)     Lastly   comes   the    Suk/a    dhydna, 
Sukla  lit,   means   white  which  is  but  a  sym- 
bolic representation  of  purity  when  it  follows 
that  Sukla  dhy&n  is  nothing  else  than  think- 
ing of  the    soul    in   all    its    purity  i.  e,  to  be 
absorbed    in  the    meditation  of  the  transen- 
dental  nature  of  our  inward  self  as   constitu- 
tionally  free  and    potentially  divine.     Such 
being   the   import   as  understood  by    Sukla 
dhydna  it  expresses  in  four  forms  viz  : — 

599 


! 

AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM.  \ 

\ 

(a)    Prttvakatva    Vitarka    Sapravickdra —    > 

consisting     as     it     does     in     the    « 
ideation     of    the      substance     as 
characterised      with     origination, 
dessolution,   continuation    {utpdda 
vyaya  dhrouva yuktam  sat)  as  well 
as  in  tiie   descrimination    between 
such   pair     of  opposites     as  jiva 
and  ajiva  ;  guna    and  parydya  ; 
swabhdva    and     hibhdva    tending 
to   the     formation     of   the    right 
knowledge  of  the  soul    as    it   is  in 
itself.     This  attitude   of  the  mind 
becomes   manifest  when   the  jiva 
is     between     the    8th     and    nth 
Gunastkdn. 

(6)  Ekatva  vitarka  apravichdra, — consists 
in  thinking  of  the  unity  in  diffe- 
rence between  the  pairs  of  oppo- 
sits  and  thereby  to  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  unity  amidst  the 
diversity  of  things  and  thoughts. 
It  appears  to  develop  in  the  12 
Gunadhan, 

[c)      Sukskma  kriyd   Pratipati — -consists   in 
continuous  thinking   and    striving 

600 


NIRJARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

to  resist  the  yog-as  of  mind,  speech 
and  body    in    and  through    which 
karmic   matter   flow  into  they/W. 
This  d/zydnsi  is  possible  to  a  jzva 
in  the  thirteenth  gunasthdn, 
(d)      Vicchinna  kriyd   apratipdti — By     this 
type    of    sukla   dkydna    which    is 
the  last   and  final    of  the  dkydnas, 
helps    the  mumukshin  soul  to  tear 
assunder    for   good    the    veil    and 
covering  which   so   long  stood    in 
the   ways  of  the  jivas  realization 
of  the  true  nature   of  itself.     It   is 
a   kind   of  mental   striving  which 
becomes    more   and  more   intense 
as   the  days  go    by   to  realize  the 
siddhakood    of  the   jiva.     To    a 
jiva  in  the   fourteenth  gmtastkdn 
this  dhydna  is  possible. 
It  is   important   to    note   that  A^^la   and 
Roudra  dkydnas    engage   the   mind    of  the 
people  moving  up  and  down  between  the  ist 
and  the    3rd  ^zmastkdnas  :  Dharma   dhydna 
between   4th    and    6th  gunasthdnas ;  Sukla 
dhydna  is  possible  to  the  jivas   entering   on 
the  Jih  gtmasthan  and  onwards. 

601 

76 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

Besides  the  above  way  of  classifying  the 
dhydnas,  The  Jain  sages  have  also  otherwise 
classified  them  into  (i)  Padastha,  (2) 
Pindastha,  (3)  Rupastha  and  (4)  Rupdtita. 
To  take  the  first, 

(i)  Padastha  dhydna — is  the  continuous 
meditation  on  the  nature  of  the 
Perfect  souls,  the  kev alius  or  the 
Punch  Paramesti, 

(2)  Pindastha  dhydna — is  to  think  that  the 

self  within   is    in     reality   of  the 

same  essence  with  those  of  the 
arihantas  and  the  like. 

(3)  Rupastha     dhydna — is     to     think  or 

meditate  in  the  manner  that  this 
our  inward  self  is  not  of  the 
nature  of  pudgal  whereof  our 
physical  constitution  is  compos- 
ed ;  for  vision,  knowledge  and 
delight  ■  infinite  constitute  the 
very  essence  of  our  soul.  Be 
it  noted  here  that  all  these  three 
dhydnas  come  within  the  range 
of  Dharma  dhydna  discussed  here- 
in before. 

(4)  Rupdtita  dhydna — This  is  to   think   the 

^02 


NIR/ARA  OR  DISSIPATION. 

soul  within  as  superphysical, 
eternally  free,  pure,  withouts  parts 
and  desire.  Essentially  it  is  intel- 
lectual delight  revealing  itself  as 
it  does  in  and  through  its  four 
quarternary  infinite  technically 
know  as  the  emanta  chatustaya. 


603 


CHAPTER  XXVV. 
MOKSHA  OR  EMANCIPATION. 

Molcska  or  £mancT|)atton — Molcslta  is  the  Htghest 
Gooa — Oonce{>ttons  of  tnc  ritgkest  Good,  according  to 
tlic  Different  SckooI$  of  PliilosoJ>liy — Mokska  ts 
eternal  and  constitutional  witk  tke  Soul — It  cannot 
be  "worked  out  by  Karma — For  j^dokska  is  not  tke 
Product  of  anytking. 

Now   comes  Mohsha  or   Beatitude,    the 
last  and    final    of  the  Jain    moral  categories. 
Those  who  have  followed  our  line  of  thought 
from   A^^r;;^^-phenomenology  to  the  chapter 
proceeding   this,  must  have    understood    the 
inner   psychology    of  the     whole     trend   of 
thought     and     culture,    the     sole   objective 
of  which    is    the    emancipation    of  the    soul 
from    thd   miseries    of    the    world     and     its 
attainment   to   a   state  of  the  highest  felicity 
which  it  is  the  concern  of  every  man  to  know 
and  which  the  Sddku  takes  so  much  pains  to 
acquire.     The  Jain  Sddhn,  as  it  is  now  well- 
known,    aims   at     nothing     less    than     the 
complete  deliverance  of  the  soul  from  all  veil 
and  coYQnng'--^SarvAvaranavimukttr7nu'kti'k. 
But    it    is    not    so  with    the  followers  of  the 

604 


MOKSHA  OR  EMANCIPATION. 

other  systems  of  thought  and  culture.  They 
have  various  states  of  the  beatitude  which 
they  aim  at  according  to  the  different  schools 
of  thought  to  which  they  belong.  For 
instance  the  Vedantist  has  two  states  of  bliss 
in  view  viz.,  one  inferior  v^\\\q}cs.  is  attained  in 
this  life  by  means  of  knowledge,  tatrdparah 
jivanmtckii  lakshanam  ialvajndndnt arena  ; 
and  the  other  superior,  obtainable  after 
many  births  of  gradual  advancement  to 
perfection,  param  nihsreyasam  kramena 
bkavati. 

Similarly  the  Charvakas  hold  it  to  be 
either  absolute  autonomy  here  in  this  life  or 
death  that  is  bliss,  svdtantryam  mrityurbd 
mokskak. 

The  Mddhyamikas  say,  that  it  is  the 
extinction  of  the  self-hood  that  is  called 
liberation,  dtmochhedo  mokskak. 

The  Vijndni  philosophers  have  it  to  be 
for  a  clear  and  edified  understanding, 
nirmala  jndnodayak. 

The  Rdtndnujists  bold  it  be  the  know- 
ledge   of  vdsudeva  as  the  cause  of  this   all, 

Vdsudeva  jndnaf)i' 

The  Ballahkis  find  it  in  the  sporting  with 

60s 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM 

Krishna   in  H^diVtn^  Krishnena  sahagoloke 
Itl&nubhdva. 

The  Pdsupatas  and  the  Maheswaran 
see  it  in  the  holding  of  all  dignity, 
Paramaiswaryam. 

The  Kdpdlikas  define  it  to  be  the  delight 
found  in  the  sweet  embrace  of  Hara  and 
Parvati,  Hara-Pdrvatydltnganam. 

The  Raseswarvddms  find  it  in  the 
possession  of  sound  health  and  happiness  by 
virtue  of  mercurry,  Pdradena  dehasthairydm. 

The  Vaishesikas  seek  it  in  the  extinction 
of  all  kinds  of  pain — dukkha  ntvritiiritt. 

The  Mhndnsakas  trace  it  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  Heavenly  hWss^—Swargddz  sukha 
bhoga. 

The  Panini  gramarians  find  it  in  the 
powers  of  speech,  Br^ma  rupdyd  bdnyd 
darshanam. 

The  Sankkya  materialists  has  it  in  the 
fusion  of  matter  and  spirit — Prakritoiv 
Puruskasydvasthdnam. 

The  Uddsina  'atheists  trace  it  in  the 
eradication  of  egotism,  ahamkdra  nivrittt. 

The  Pdtanjalas  set  it  in  the  absolute 
non-chalant  state    of  the  Person  originating 

606 


MOKSHA  OR  EMANCIPA  TION. 

as  it  does  from  the  utter  indifference 
to  matters  worldly,  Purusasya  nirlepa 
kaivalyam. 

The  Pratydbhigndnis  interprete  it  as  the 
realisation  of  the  perfection  of  the  soul, 
Purndtmd  labhah. 

The  Sarvagnas  find  it  in  the  eternal 
continuum  of  the  feeling  of  the  highest 
felicity — mitya  ntratishaya  sukha  hodhah. 

The  Mdydvddins  say  it  to  be  manifest 
on  the  removal  of  the  error  of  one's 
having  a  separate  existence  as  a  particle  of 
the  Supreme  Being — Brahmdnsika  jivasya 
mithydjndna  mvrittz. 

Such  are  the  conceptions  of  the  Highest 
Good  which  the  different  schools  of  thought 
ultimately  aim  at.  A  comparative  study  of  the 
nature  of  these  conceptions  will  make  it  clear 
that  the  Jain  conception  of  the  same  gives 
us  but  a  clear  idea  as  to  what  a  mumukshin 
soul  really  strives  and  struggle,  for.  It  is  a 
kind  oi  swaraj\  self-rule,  a  state  of  autonomy, 
pure  and  simple,  which  every /Vt;^  instinctive- 
ly aspires  after  to  realize  by  tearing  assunder 
the  veil  or  the  covering  in  and  through  the 
process  of  which  the  Ideal  is  Realised.    In  the 

doy 


AN  EPITOME   OF  JAIN  ISM 

ordinary  empirical  state  of  our  being  the 
Ideal  is  ideal  ;  it  is  far  ahead  of  the  practical. 
And  the  Jains  hold  that  if  the  ideal  remains 
an  ideal,  far  ahead  of  the  practical  forever  and 
evermore,  u  can  never  be  made  realizable. 
So  the  Jains  interprete  it  otherwise,  from 
their  points  o*"  view,  and  really  speaking, 
ther2  are  tWO  tendencies  running  oarallel 
all  through  the  human  life  and  culture. 
One  is  .o  idealize  the  real  and  ihe  other  is 
realize  the  ideal.  These  two  tendencies 
are  often  zX  war  with  each  other.  One  tends 
us  10  take  the  existing  state  of  things  and 
affairs  cis  the  besl  of  their  kind  and  so  we 
must  make  the  most  of  it.  From  this  point 
of  view  whoever  is  found  to  go  out  of  the 
way  and  to  pull  the  world  up  to  a  higher 
level  to  have  a  so-called  richer  outlook 
of  life,  he  is  dubbed  as  the  impatient  idealist 
moving  in  eccentric  orbits.  But  the  other 
tendency  by  virtue  of  which  they  struggle 
to  raise  the  world  to  a  higher  or  ideal  state 
of  things,  Lhe  tendency  that  is  born  of  the 
intense  dissatisfaction  at  the  present  state  of  ' 
things  and  Ltffairs,  is  the  tendency  to  realize  j 
the  Ideal. 

608 


MOKSHA  OR  EMAN'CIPATION. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  complete   deliverance 
from  the  veil  and  covering  oi  karma  is  called 
mokska  or  emancipation    from    the    miseries 
and   afiflictions   of  the    world.     Karma,    we 
have   seen,  is  the   cause   of  bondage    of  the 
soul.     But  the  karma  which  whirls  us  round 
and  round  through   the  cycle  of  sansdr  has 
been    classified    either   into   pdpa  or  puny  a. 
Punya  and  pdpa  are   the  causes   of  all  our 
weals   and    woes    with    this    difference   only 
that  those     who    commit    sin   go   down    to 
the    lower  grades    of  sansdr,    or   sink    into 
hell   to     suffer   penalties     as     the      natural 
consequences    thereof  whereas     those   who 
perform    virtuous    acts     take    births  in    the 
higher     grades     of  sansdr    to   enjoy    there 
the  pleasures   of  life  and  achieve  the  objects 
of  their   desire.     So  pdpa   and  punya  both 
have  got  to  be  worked    out   for   the    attain- 
ment of  freedom — mokska. 

Here  one  may  argue  that  if  nirjard,  or 
purging  means  complete  washing  out  the  soul 
of  all  karma'\:ci2X\.^r ,  pdpa  and  punya,  foreign 
to  it,  how  are  we  then  to  look  upon  punya- 
karma  which  is  enjoined  on  us  as  means  to 
the  attainment  of  the  state  of  bliss  and  beati- 

77 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

tude   which   is  only    possible   when  the  soul 
has  got  rid  of  all  karmt-msLiter  ? 

To  this  the  Jains  reply,  it  is  true  that 
punya  ensures  comfort,  and  happiness  ;  but 
they  are  but  comforts  or  pleasures  of  this 
mundane  world.  The  eternal  felicity  born 
of  the  complete  deliverence  from  all  veil 
and  coverning,  cannot  be  the  consequence 
ol punya  however  wisely  and  carefully  may 
it  have  t)een  discharged  ;  for  the  conse- 
quences of  punya  karma  are  always  con- 
ditioned in  as  much  as  karma  and  the 
consequences  thereof  are  possible  only  in  so 
far  as  the  mundane  existence  is  concerned, 
but  with  reference  to  what  is  devoid  of 
all  name  and  form,  being  above  all 
causality,. it  is  not  possible.  In  other  words, 
karma  cannot  evolve  things  of  permanent 
character.  Karma  can  produce,  transform, 
conjoin,  or  re-adjust.  Over  nothing  beyond 
these  has  karma  any  jurisdiction.  Thus  it 
is  clear  that  karma  is  possible  only  in 
sdnsdr. 

Some  may  remark  that  karma  done  with 
judiciousness  and  indifference  to  the  conse- 
quences   thereof  might  result    in  the    eman-j 

6io 


MORS  HA  OR  EMANCIPATION. 

cipation  of  the  soul.  But  this,  the  Jains 
hold,  does  not  stand  to  reason  ;  because 
moksha  is  not  the  result  of  anything 
done  or  performed.  Mokska  is  the  tearing 
assunder  of  the  snares  of  karma  binding 
the  jiva  under  the  sway  of  subreption  to 
the  sansdr,  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  the 
effect  of  anything  preceding  it  as  its 
%  cause.  A  karma  cannot  destroy  karma.  It 
changes  only  to  re-appear  in  another  form. 
Besides  the  effects  of  karma  are  traced  in 
things  which  have  origination  (utpMa)  and 
the  like.  But  moksha  which  is  eternal  in 
reality  cannot  be  said  to  be  the  result  of 
any  work.  Ordinarily  karma  manifests  itself 
in  the  production  of  a  thing,  in  joining  one 
thing  to  another,  in  transforming  one  into 
another  and  the  like  But  speaking  from  the 
nishckaya  nay  a,  moksha  has  no  origin.  The 
jivay  as  we  have  seen  elsewhere,  is  consti- 
tutionally free  and  potentially  divine.  And  it 
is  simply  due  to  subreption  (mithydtva)  that 
it  appears  to  us  as  otherwise. 

Indeed  what  is  contended  is  partially 
true,  replies  the  opponent,  but  not  wholly 
admissible  ;  since  the  nature  of  the  work  done 

6rt 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

without  the  knowledge  thereof  is  of  one 
kind  ;  and  different  is  the  nature  of  the 
duty  discharged  with  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  the  same  and  simply  discharged  for 
duty's  sake  with  absolute  indifference  to 
the  results  that  would  accrue  thereof. 
To  show  an  analogous  case,  poison  kills  : 
but  when  judiciously  administered  by  a 
physician  efficient  in  the  science  and  art  of' 
the  administration  of  drugs,  it  acts  like 
nector.  And  this  is  what  we  mean  when  we 
state  that  moksha  or  deliverance  is  derived 
or  results  from  the  wise  discharging  of 
duties  for  duty's  sake. 

But  we  the  Jains  hold  it  to  be  altogether 
meaningless  or  misleading,  since  the  analogy 
does  not  hold  good  here  ;  nor  is  there  any 
proof  to  verify  the  truth  of  the  statement : 
for,  it  is  in  and  through  origination,  con- 
junction, transformation  or  re-adjustment, 
that  karma  can  work  itself  out  and  through 
nothing  else  beyond  these  four  ;  because  of 
the  want  of  all  manner  of  evidence,  direct  or 
indirect.  So  it  cannot  be  maintained  that 
moksha  is  derived  from  the  wise  discharging" 
of  duties  for  duty's  sake. 

6t» 


MOKSBA  on  EMANCIPATION. 

The  opponent  might  remark  that  to  say 
this  is  to  deny  the  merit  of  such  scriptural 
injunctions  as  laid  down  under  the  heading  of 
Jural  Seventies  {Ckaran  sittari)  which  have 
been  imperatively  enjoined  both  on  the  monks 
and  the  laity.  Does  not  this  denial  stand  as 
an  indirect  evidence  to  prove  that  moksha 
results  from  the  wise  discharging  of  duties  as 
laid  down  in  the  Jural  Ethics  ?  Complete 
deliverence  from  the  veil  and  covering, 
therefore,  we  hold,  is  the  result,  though  not 
the  effect,  of  our  wisely  working  along  the 
lines  of  Jural  Ethics  which  is  imparatively 
enjoined  on  every  man.  Otherwise  none 
would  have  ever  been  inclined  in  any  way  to 
work  along  the  lines  of  Jural  Ethics. 

To  say  this  rejoind  the  Jains  is  to  state 
that  'mokska  is  the  result  of  our  being  true  in 
thought  and  deed  to  the  injuctions  of  Jural 
Ethics  and  on  that  account  it  cannot  b^  said 
to  be  the  effect  of  our  doing  something.' 
But  what  does  this  your  statement  mean  ? 
Mere  euphonic  difference  in  the  words  result 
and  effect  which  are  synonymous  in  sense 
and  significance  does  not  always  make  out 
the   difference    in    respect   of  their  imports, 

6/3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

For,  it  involves  a  contradiction  to  say 
that  though  moksha  is  the  result  of  our 
being  true  to  the  injunctions  of  Jural  Ethics 
yet  it  is  not  the  effect  of  our  performing 
the  duties  as  laid  down  therein.  Of  course 
to  maintain  your  position  you  will  perhaps 
contend  that  here  karma  takes  the  position 
of  knowledge.  Though  moksha  is  not  really 
the  product  of  knowledge  yet  in  common 
perlance  we  say  'deliverance  is  due  to 
knowledge' !  But  this  your  contention  we,  the 
Jains,  hold  is  of  no  avail  ;  because  when  we 
say  deliverance  is  due  to  knowledge,  we  thereby 
mean  that  the  light  of  knowledge  dispells  the 
darkness  of  ignorance  hindering  the  deliver- 
ence  and  it  is  because  of  the  light  of  know- 
ledge dispelling  the  hindering  darkness  of 
ignorance  whereby  moksha  is  realised,  that  we 
say  'moksha  or  deliverance  is  due  to  know- 
ledge' ;  but  karma  cannot  remove  this  dark 
veil  of  ignorance.  Karma  is  conceived  as 
hinderance  to  moksha  and  this  hinderance 
cannot  be  removed  by  karma  itself ;  because 
karma  cannot  destroy  karma  ;  rather  karma 
generates  karma  and  untill  and  unless  all 
karmic  energetics  are  dessipated  away   from 


MORS  HA  OR  EMANCIPATION, 

the  body  of  the  soul,  its  natural  freedom 
cannot  be  made  manifest.  And  moreover  be- 
cause this  moksha  or  freedom  is  constitu- 
tional (swabhava)  with  the  very  soul  itself, 
it  cannot  be  said  to  be  derived  out  of  or 
result  from  anything  else. 

Then  again  it  can't  be  maintained  that 
karma  removes  ne-science  (Avidya)  for  there 
IS  a  gulf  of  difference  in  the  essential  nature 
between  karma  and  knowledge.  To  make 
it  more  clear,  ne-science  or  non-knowledge 
Xajndna)  is  subreption  as  to  the  true  nature 
of  one's  own  self,  while  knowledge  (Jndna) 
as  opposed  to  ne-science  is  the  realization 
of  the  true  nature  of  the  same.  Hence 
ne-science  which  is  of  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
reption is  contradictory  to  knowledge  which 
is  of  the  nature  of  true  realization.  And  in 
this  way  we  may  well  inter  prete  that  light  of 
knowledge  dispells  darkness  of  ne-science. 
Therefore  kafma  and  knowledge  are  alto- 
gether opposite  to  each  other  in  kind.  But 
karma  does  not  stand  in  such  relation  of 
opposition  to  ne-science.  Hence  karma  can- 
not be  said  to  remove  ne-science  {ajndna). 
Taking     an       alternative     position,     if    we 

615 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

interprete  ne-science  either  as  want  of 
knowledge,  doubtful  knowledge  or  mis- 
apprehension, then  this  ne-science  can  only 
be  removed  by  knowledge  alone  and  not  by 
karma,  because  ne-science  taken  as  such 
does  not  stand  in  opposition  to  karma. 

So  we  see  moksha  is  not  the  product  of 
anything.  It  is  the  realisation  of  the  Ideal 
Self  in  and  by  Itself  which  is  possible  only 
when  all  the  karma 'particles  have  fallen 
off  from  It,  fivasya  krita  karma  kshayena 
yatswariipdzyastkAnam  tanmoksha,  ConvA- 
tionally  (Vyavahdr  nay  a)  moksha  is  said  to 
be  a  kind  of  paryAya  of  the  jiva.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  soul  is  no  airy  nothing 
as  the  Intellectualist  or  the  Buddhists  hold. 
It  is  a  substantative,  positive  entity,  and 
as  such  it  must  exist  in  a  state  of  being 
called  a  paryAya  from  the  phenomenal 
point  of  view  (vyavahdr  naya).  And  this 
paryAya  too  cannot  be  wholly  distinct  and 
different  from  the  substance  itself  whereof 
it  is  2i  paryAya  ;  lor,  who  has  ever  seen  or 
conceived  of  a  substance  bereft  of  parydya 
and  paryAya  without  substance,  dravyam 
parydya  viyutam  parydyA  dravya  barjitAh  : 

6i6 


MOKSHA  OR  EMANCIPATION. 

kak   kadd   kena  kim  rupA     drisid   mdnena 
kena  veti, 

Mokska,  thus,  is  the  emancipation  of  the 
soul  from  the  snares  oi  karma  {karma-pdshay 
Like   the   other   moral  categories   the    Jain 
sages  have  also   resolved    this    moksha   into 
bkdva  and  dravya.    When  the  soul  becomes 
free   from   the   four  Ghdtiya   karmas  or  the 
'Action-currents    of    Injury'    it     is   said    to 
have     bhdva     moksha   and    when    the    four 
Aghatiya  karmas  or   the        'Action-currents 
of  Non-injury'  disappear   from    the     consti- 
tution •  of  the     soul,    it   is     said    to     have 
attained  dravya    moksha.     The  psychology 
underlying    this    resolution     of  moksha  into 
subjective    {bkavd)  and  objective    {dravycC), 
is   too    obvious     to    require     any    detailed 
discussion.     When  the  soul  in  and    through 
the   processes   of  nirjard  or    dissipation   of 
karmas,  gets  rid   of  the  four-fold  action-cur- 
rents of  injury  to  the  natural  vision  {darshan) 
knowledge  {jndnd),  and  the  like  of  the  soul, 
it   becomes     omniscient     {kevalin),    because 
the  soul  is  just  like  a  mirror  which    becomes 
dim  and   hazy    when   the   karma   bargands 
veil   its   surface.     By   nirjard,   the   karma* 

7« 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

bargan&s  are   purged   from  the  constitution 

of  the   soul  which  on   that  account,  atta  ins 
to  clearness   and  omniscience  (Jceval  /ndna). 
Having  attained  the  keva/ /ndna^    the    cause 
of  forging   fresh   fetters   of  bondage    being 
absent   by   virtue  of  samvar  or    stoppage, 
and   nirjarA   being   yet   in   the  processes  of 
working,    the  jivanmukta   kevalin  gradually 
becomes   free     from     all   the     residuum   of 
Aghattya  karmas   known  as   vedanya,    dyu, 
ndma  and  go^ra   and   thereafter   attains   to 
a   state   of  bliss  never-ending  and  beatitude 
everlasting.     The    realization    by     this  jwa 
of  this  viz.,  his  permanent  state  of  being   in 
knowledge   and   delight   infinite   is    what  is 
termed  as  Moksha-y  freedom  or  emancipation 
from  the  snares  oi  karma  for  which  reason  we 
have   the  adage, — karma-pasha  vinirmuktah 
mokshah.     And  when  the  soul  is  thus  libera- 
ted  it  goes  straight  up  to    the   Siddhasila  or 
the  Region  of  the  Free  and  the  Liberated  at 
the   summit   of  LokAkAsh.     Speaking   from 
the  stand-point  of  noumenal  naya,    a   siddha 
has  no  form    whereof  he  is  imperceptible  by 
the  senses,  but  viewed  from  zy/dt/^Mr^  stand- 
point  he   has   a   shadowy  form  of  a  human 

6i8 


MORS  HA  OR  EMANCIPATION. 

figure  which  is  but  an  embodiment  of  Right- 
vision,  Right-knowledge  and  Right-conduct 
in  and  through  which  d^jiva  attains  to  a  state 
of  perfection  bliss  and  beatitude  which  is 
otherwise  known  omniscience  and  Freedom 
Absolute. 


tf// 


CHAPTER  XXXVl. 

GUNASTHANAS. 

Tke  Guntstkanftff  or  tKe  Ste|>^ing  Stonef  to  Htgker 
<ftiitjff.-^T[  he  Fcviiccn  Sieges  SqvcczcJ  \i^  into  Fcwr 
cj»ly — Tlie  First  is  tlie  Life  of  AstmaKty  and  Imt>ul8efl 
— -The  Secoxio  tKc  Life  of  Coxisctous  Selection — TKe 
Tktrd  %B  tkat  of  Conscience  and  Fattk — And  tke  Fourtk 
18  tkat  of  Knowledge  and  Deltgkt  Infinite '—Fourteen 
Stagef  leading  to  Omniscience — Regulation  or  Control 
does  not  mean  Stultification  as  Complained  of. 

To  anyone  who  knows  the  nature  of 
Moksha  and  the  means  prescribed  for  it  in 
the  Jain  scriptures,  there  will  be  no  difficulty 
in  apprehending  that  the  realization  of  the 
self  is  preceded  invariably  by  a  series  of 
conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  one  after 
another  and  that  perfection  itself  is  the 
culmination  of  a  graduated  scale  or  hierarchy 
of  nfjoral  activities,  which  have  been  classi- 
fied into  fourteen  stages  and  have  been  called 
GunasMnas  by  the  Jainas.  So  long  as 
the  soul  is  bound  by  karmUy  it  can  never 
attain  that  deliverance  from  mundane 
existence  which  is  the  be-all  and  end-all  of 
all  that  live,  move  and  have  their   beings  on 

620 


GVNASTHANAS, 

earth.  The  Jains  believe  that  there  is  a 
ladder  of  fourteen  steps  by  which  a  jiva 
may  climb  up  to  the  stage  called  moksha. 
The  sages  have,  therefore,  divided  the  path 
which  leads  to  the  nirvana  into  fourteen  stages 
or  stepping  stones,  each  of  which  represents  a 
particular  stage  of  development,  condition  or 
phase  of  the  soul,  following  up  from  the 
quiescence,  elimination  or  partial  quiescence 
or  partial  elimination  of  certain  energies 
of  karma,  the  final  outcome  of  which  is  the 
manifestation  of  those  traits  and  attributes  so 
long  held  in  check  as  it  were  by  the  karmic 
energetics. 

To  begin  with  the  psychological  observa- 
tions which  underlie  the  whole  fabric  of  these 
gunastkdnaSy  we  may  remark  at  the  outset, 
that  these  fourteen  stages  may  be  squeezed 
up  more  generally  into  four  only  in  the 
moral  ascent  of  the  soul.  The  First  stage, 
we  may  roughly  speak  of  as  the  stage  of 
impulsive  life,  of  lust  and  enjoyment,  when  the 
soul  is  quite  in  the  dark  as  to  its  true  destiny 
and  goal,  and  is  least  removed  from  the 
animal  existence  ;  the  Second  is  the  life  of 
conscious   selection   and   pursuit,    where  the 

6sii 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

goal  and  true    method   of  realisation  are  still 

misapprehended ;  the  Third  is  the  life  of 
conscience  and   faith   where   the   ends    are 

taken  not  as  we  like,  but  as  we  aught,  and 
the  Fourth^  the  stage  where  all  such  conflicts 
disappear  altogether  and  the  soul  shines  forth 
in  all  its  naturalness  and  omniscience. 

Now  as  to  the  question  as  to  why  the 
stages  should  succeed  one  another  in  the  order 
stated  above,  and  not  in  any  other  way  we 
remark  that  as  soon  as  the  self-conscious  life 
is  thrown  in  the  front  or  induced  by  the 
pains  and  miseries  of  the  animal  life,  the  life 
of  impulses,  the  conscious  will  of  man  wakes 
up  and  learns  to  remain  in  the  ruinous  spread 
of  blind  propensity  and  animal  spontaniety. 
Here,  by  the  mere  shrinking  from  the 
membered  misery  of  recklessness,  some  har- 
mony is  introduced  and  under  the  measured 
checks  offered  by  Reason  and  sober  think- 
ing, a  certain  unity  of  movement  is  given  to 
the  activities.  At  the  same  time  we  should 
not  ignore  the  fact  that  here  no  new  force  is 
introduced  and  the  whole  operation  is  rather 
regulative  than  creative  and  it  shows  its 
want  of  intensity  by  being  swept  away  before 

6^s 


GUNASTHANAS. 

some    flood- tide   of  affection    that    bears    us 
right  away  out  of  ourselves. 

The  third  stage  begins  with  the  changes 
in  the  dynamical  conditions  otherwise  pre- 
sent to  us  which  .ire  occasioned  by  the  blind 
perception  of  the  moral  superiority  of  the 
higher  springs  of  action.  It  is  a  stage  of  un- 
working  faith,  of  implicit  apprehension  of  the 
true  way  of  realisation  notwithstanding  the 
want  of  a  clear  intellectual  discernment  as 
to  the  moral  worth  or  imperativeness  of  the 
course  of  action  adopted.  Here  the  soul  does 
not  only  exert  a  restraining  influence,  or  has 
a  mere  regulative  control  over  some  of  the 
springs  of  action,  and  other  propensities,  lest 
they  might  when  freely  indulged  in,  give  rise 
to  other  pains  and  miseries  incident  to  the 
first  and  second  stages  ;  but  also  itself  volun- 
tarily sides  with  one  of  the  solicitations  it 
has  implicitly  apprehended  as  the  right 
course  of  action.  Some  sort  of  harmony 
and  concord  have  truly  been  attained,  some 
conditions  have  been  truly  worked  out  for 
the  attainment  of  the  desired  End  ;  but  still 
this  harmony  is  incomplete,  inchoate  and 
unstable    so   long    Reason   is    called    in   to 

6^3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

decide   between   rival     desires  ;    in  as  much 
as  this   harmony    is  brought   about  and  kept 
up  untarnished,  not  by  leaving  every   chord 
of  heart  to  vibrate    freely,  but  by  laying   the 
silencing    hand    on    everything   that     would 
speak   in    discord,    if  once   left  alone.     The 
constitution  here  is   undoubtedly    regulated, 
the   passions   and   propensities   of  life   have 
been   curbed    and    restrained    to   make   the 
achievement  of  the  observed    End   possible, 
and  some  sort  of  harmony  truly  shines  forth, 
But  still  it  goes  without  saying,  that  the  right 
order  is  purchased  here  by  some  sacrifice  of 
force,  by  exertion  of  will,    some   of  which  is 
spent  still  only  in  holding  down  the  clamouring 
impulses  of  life  and  consequently  the  constitu- 
tion can  hardly  be  said  to  be  properly   tuned. 
The  fourth  stage  of  life  begins  when    the 
competition   of  impulses     cease     with     the 
absolute  concurrence  of  the   natural   solicita- 
tions    with     what     ought   to   be,    with   the 
harmony   of  the   scale    of  intensity   of   the 
impulses   of  life,     with    the   scale   of  their 
excellence  and  moral  efficiency.     This  stage 
is  made  possible   only  after   a  clear   inteHec- 
tual   discernment  (Jn&na)  of  what   ought   to 


GUNASTHANAS. 

be  and  of  the  proper  means  of  its  realisation. 
Here  the  harmony  that  is  introduced  is  not 
partial  or  unstable  as  in  the  previous  stages 
but  is  complete  and  it  effects  its  end  and 
works  out  itself  with  complete  naturalness 
and  spontaniety. 

Thus  to  generalise  further  we  may  say 
that  of  these  four  stages,  the  first  is  charac- 
terised by  indiscrimination  or  caprice,  free- 
dom without  restraint,  the  second  and  third 
by  voluntary  and  much  strained  Regulation 
at  the  expense  of  the  so-called  freedom,  and 
the  fourth  by  the  coincidence  of  freedom 
and  regulation.  And  as  each  person  shtnas 
forth  in  its  true  light,  he  becomes  one  with 
itself,  as  he  passes  from  the  preceding  stages 
to  those  succeeding,  reconciling  now  some 
warring  inconsistencies,  satisfying  some 
haunting  claim  and  getting  rid  of  some 
gnawing  uneasiness,  and  thus  stands  forth 
in  greater  vigour,  keeping  clear  of  all 
enfeebling   defects  ;    because   to    the   lower 

^  stages  some   hesitation   and  cowardice,  some 
ft 
sort     of    indecision     and      indiscrimination 

forever  cling. 

Another  thought   which     occupied     tb« 

62s 

79 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM^ 

minds  of  the   Jain  philosophers   and  which 
practically  moulded  their  philosophy  into   its 
present  shape  is  that  the  additional  sufferings 
which  our  soul  undergoes  beyond   the  limits 
of  animal  sensibility  are  contributed    by   our 
own  intellectual  endowments.     It  is  because 
we   look   before   and    after    from   the   point 
where   we   are   now   standing,    because   our 
mind  can  well  detect  beforehand    the   actual 
and  the   possible,    because    the   visible   has 
no  powei^   to   blot   out   the    invisible     from 
our  thought,  that  with  us  no  pain  can    perish 
in  a  moment,  but  on  the  contrary,   leaves  on 
us  many  a  vestige  on  its  departure.   Memory 
although  it  seems  to  have  the  cruel    property 
of  stripping   the   evil    of    its   transitoriness, 
has  also   the   brighter   aspects  as  well  in  as 
much    as     it   sends    forth    a    notice     of  the 
approach  of  the  evil  and  betrays  the  secret  of 
it  and  men  suffer   as  they    fail  to  catch  these 
warnings.     What  would  then  be  the  correct 
view   of  it  ?     Would     you     renounce     this 
foresight,  this  reason    altogether   and  revert 
to  the   mere   animal   existence   to  be  saved 
from  the   tears  ?     Would    you   forsake  your 
many-chambered  mind    and  shut   yourself  up 

626 


GUNASTHANAS. 

in  a  single  cell  and  draw  down  its  blinds  so 
that  you  may  feel  no  storm,  see  no  lightning 
and  know  nothing  till  you  are  struck  down? 
Certainly  not,  says  our  Jain  teacher,  for  the 
expansion  of  your  vision,  your  intellectual 
consciousness  will  help  you  in  having  a  con- 
trol over  your  distresses  and  it  is  the  only 
condition  of  whatever  control  you  may  have 
over  them.  It  is  only  by  continuance  in 
thought  that  we  can  distinguish  their  kinds, 
investigate  into  their  causes  and  discover 
their  remedies  and  it  is  the  self-knowledge 
of  suffering  that  will  open  up  before  you 
the  way  to  its  own  remedy.  Most  of  the 
misfortunes  and  miseries  incident  to  our  life 
are  due  to  our  own  ignorance  ;  to  the  want 
of  our  own  true  insight  into  the  real  nature 
of  things  and  they  are  gradually  sure  to  be 
removed  with  the  expansion  of  our  intellec- 
tual and  moral  endowment. 

To  understand  the  principle  underlying 
the  arrangement  of  the  gunastkdnas,  it  is 
necessary  to  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  the 
attainment  of  every  end  requires  Right 
Vision,  Right  Knowledge  and  Right  Conduct 
Of  these  ihree,  Right^  Vision  precedes  Right 

62;^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JATNISM. 

KtibWl^dge,     while     Right     Conduct    is   a 
characteristic  of  those  alone  who  have  almost 
perfected  themselves  in  Vision  and  Wisdom. 
Hence,    the   earliest   stage   of  the  journey 
ts  necessarily   that   which  marks   the   tran- 
SfCfOn   from   the    state     of    settled     wrong 
convictions   to   the   acquisition   of  true  faith 
and  knowledge.     Thus  we  see  that   in   Jain 
philosophy  a  great  importance  is  also  attach- 
ed  to   the   reflective   thought     or  in  other 
words  to  the  conscious  reaction  of  the   mind 
upon  the  results  of  its  own    unconscious  or 
obscurely  conscious  movements.     The   four- 
teen   stages  also   clearly  show  that  however 
sfow  the  movement  of  advance  may  be,    the 
time   must   come  when   reason     must   turn 
back  to  measure  and  criticise,  to   select   and 
reject,      to     reconsider     and     remould     by 
reflexion   the   immediate   products  of  crude 
and  imperfect  knowledge  or  faith.     It   must 
also  be  remembered  in  this   connection   that 
ahhough     there     is    a    relative     opposition 
between  the  immediate,   unreflective   move- 
ment of  man's  mind  or  Faith  and  that  which 
is  conscious  and  reflective,  yet  it  is  the  same 
ftifei^^dn  of  ttran  that  fs  at   work  in  both   and 


GUNASTHANAS. 

all  that  reflection  can  do  is  to  bring  to  light, 
the  processes  and  categories  which  underlie 
the  unreflective  action  of  intelligence.  We 
must  therefore  maintain  that  though  reason 
may  accidentally  or  at  the  first  stage  of  life 
may  become  opposed  to  faith,  its  ultimate 
and  healthy  action  must  preserve  for  us  or 
restore  to  us  all  that  is  valuable  in  it.  Nay 
in  the  long  run  a  living  faith  or  immediate 
vision  (Samyak  darshan)  will  absorb  into 
itself  the  elements  of  the  criticism  which  is 
directed  against  it  and  it  will  develop 
pari  passu  with  other  two  elements  namely  : 
Right  knowledge  and  Conduct.  And  Jainism 
by  giving  equal  stress  on  all  the  three 
elements,  namely,  right  vision  i,e.  immediate 
perception,  right  knowledge  i,e.  intellectual 
discrimination,  and  right  conduct  Le,  volition 
may  best  be  characterised  as  both  intuitive 
and  reflective,  practical  and  speculative, 
conscious  and  self-conscious  ! 

Let  us  now  discuss  the  successive  stages 

through    which    the     soul    passes    from    the 

darkness  of  ignorance    to  the  illumination  of 

knowledge,    from    the   state   of  bondage   to 

that  of  complete  deliverance. 

6^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

The  first  stage  is  called  Mitkydtva  or  the 
stage  of  false  knowledge.  It  is  the  starting 
point  of  all  spiritual  evolution,  the  first  step 
in  the  ascent  of  the  soul,  signifying  only 
ignorance  which  is  the  normal  condition  of 
all  jivas  involved  in  the  cycle  of  Sansdra, 
The  soul  in  this  ^tage  is  completely  under 
the  infiuence  of  karma  as  a  consequence  of 
which  no  true  view  of  things  is  possible  to 
the  soul.  When  a  man  thoroughly  dis- 
satisfied with  the  actual  state  of  things  of  the 
world,  tries  to  get  rid  of  this  miserable  con- 
dition of  being,  he  tries  to  speculate  upon 
the  state  of  the  world  and  his  relation  to  it 
which  enables  him  to  hold  down  in  check 
the  three  kinds  of  energetics  of  darshana 
mohoniya  karma,  namely,  (i)  mtthydtva 
which  invariably  deludes  the  soul  to  settled 
wrong  beliefs  (2)  samyag  mitkydtva  which 
is  characterised  by  a  mixture  of  truth  and 
falsehood  and  (3)  Samyakta,  signifying  only 
blurred  faith  i.e,,  stinged  with  superstition 
and  (4)  the  results  of  anantdnubandhts  type 
oi  kashdyas,  namely,  anger,  pride,  deceit  and 
greed,  producing  what  is  known  disPrathamo- 
pdsama-Samyaktva^^dL  kind   of  faith,  which 

6jo 


GUNASTHANAS. 

being  Itself  unstable  and  ill-grounded,  sub- 
sides sooner  or  later  with  the  preponderance 
of  anyone  of  the  anantdnubandhi  kashdyas 
mentioned  above.  It  can  safely  be  inferred 
here  in  this  connection  that  the  subsidence 
of  the  seven  energies  of  karma  is  the 
primary  requisite  of  obtaining  a  true  insight. 

There  are  two  divisions  of  this  stage 
namely,  first,  when  other  people  can  know 
that  one  is  mistaking  a  false  view  of  things 
for  a  true  one,  is  misapprehending  an  object 
or  event  and  secondly,  where  such  detection 
is  not  possible  although  one  may  still  con- 
tinue in  this  state.     A  Jaina  sloka  says  : 

**As  a  man  blind  from  birth  is  not  able  to 
say  what  is  ugly  and  what  is  beautiful,  so  a 
man  in  the  mithydtva  gunasthdnaka  cannot 
determine  what  is  real  and  what  is  false." 

The  second  stage  appears  when  the  soul, 
whirling  round  and  round  in  the  cycle  of 
existence,  loses  some  of  its  crudeness  and 
ignorance  and  rises  to  the  state  called 
granthibheda  and  learns  to  distinguish  first 
between  what  is  false  and  what  is  right,  as 
opposed  to  the  first  stage  where  no  such 
distinction  is  possible,  being    itself  confined 

6$t 


A.V  EPITOME  OF  J  Aims  M, 

absolutely  within  the  limits  of  ignorance  only. 
It  next  rises  to  the  state  called  upasama 
samakita  where,  it  forgets  the  above 
distinction  and  consequently  is  not  able  to 
act  according  to  such  distinctions  ;  but  later 
on  when  the  soul  again  gets  hold  of  such 
distinction  and  fresh  remembrance  of  it 
comes  back,  the  soul  enters  on  another  stage 
namely,  Sasvddana  gunasthanaka,  which  is 
characterised  by  exhausted  faith. 

Next  the  soul  that  rises  to  the  third  stage 
namely  Misra  gunasthdnaka  is  so  to  speak 
in  a  state  of  tension,  oscillating  between  the 
stage  of  knowledge  and  doubt.  At  one 
moment  it  gets  hold  of  the  truth  and  at  the 
next  doubts  it.  It  is  a  stage  of  uncertainty 
and  vascillation.  But  the  peculiarity  of 
this  stage  is  that  the  soul  cannot  remain 
permanently  in  this  stage  but  must  either 
slide  down  to  the  second  stage  or  must  rise 
up  to  the  fourth  one. 

The  fourth  stage  is  called  Avirati — 
Samyagdhristi  which  follows  as  soon  as  the 
doubts  of  an  individual  have  been  removed 
either  by  meditation  or  by  instruction  of  the 
guru.     This  stage  is  so  named   because    the 

6^2 


GUNASTHANAS. 

person  here  becomes  a  true  believer.  It  is 
called  Avirata  because  the  soul  here  is  still 
unable  to  take  those  vows  which  strengthen 
and  protect  men  from  the  reaction  of  karma, 
A  person  at  this  stage  can  control,  anger, 
pride,  greed  and  three  other  branches  of 
mohaiiiya  karmd  mentioned  above  in  as 
much  as  we  can  say  that  this  stage  is  the 
result  of  partial  or  entire  subsidence  of  the 
seven  energies  of  karma  discussed  in  the 
first  stage.  It  should  also  be  remembered 
in  this  connection  that  partial  subsidence  of 
these  energies  oi  karma  \s  very  dangerous, 
because  it  may  cause  the  soul  at  this  stage 
to  slip  back  again  into  lower  stages.  The 
soul  too  at  this  stage  gains  five  good  things 
which  should  not  also  be  lost  sight  of 
namely,  (i)  Sama  i.e,  the  power  of  controll- 
ing anger  ;  (2)  Samvega,  Le.,  the  knowledge 
that  the  world  is  full  of  evil  and  as  the  law 
of  karma  only  works  here,  one  should  have 
the  least  affection  for  this  world  ;  (3) 
Nirveda  2:.^.,  the  knowledge  that  his  wife  and 
children  do  not  really  belong  to  him  ;  (4) 
Anukampd  i.e.  the  sympathy  or  affection  to 
relieve     others   in   distress  :  (5)    AsthA   i.e., 

(>33 

80 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

a  firm,  unflinchiiiaf  faith    in   all    the    Victors 
or  Jinas. 

The  next  stage  is  known  as  Desavirati, 
otherwise  called  Samayatd-samyata  gunas- 
thdnaka.  It  is  here  the  sou!  which  was  so 
long  guided  by  the  mere  influence  of  faith, 
first  realises  the  great  importance  of  conduct 
and  so  can  take  the  twelve  vows  which 
really  enable  a  man  to  fight  against  the 
energies  of  karma.  This  stage  attaches 
much  importance  to  different  kinds  of 
behaviour  on  account  of  which  it  has  been 
divided  into  three  parts.  First,  \\\  Jaghanya 
desaviratt,  a  man  takes  a  vow  not  to  drink 
intoxicating  drugs  or  to  eat  flesh.  He 
constantly  repeats  the  Migadhi  salutation 
to  the  Five  Great  Ones — 'Salutation  to 
AkirantUt  salutation  to  Siddho^  to  Ackdrya, 
to  UpadhayQy  and  to  all  the  Sddkus  of  the 
world."  The  soul  may  still  rise  higher 
while  continuing  in  this  stage  and  without 
forsaking  the  previous  vows  may  take  a 
fresh  vow  to  make  money  in  righteous  ways 
only.  The  person  here  takes  a  special  care 
to  observe  the  six  rules  for  daily  life 
namely,    "One  must  worship   god,  serve  the 

634 


GUNASTHANAS, 

guru,  study  the  scriptures,  control  the  senses, 
perform  austerites  and  give  alms."  He  may 
also  rise  further  up  and  may  attain  to  the 
state  of  Utkristo  desavirati  by  taking  up 
vows  of  eating  once  a  day,  maintaing 
absolute  chastity,  renouncing  the  company  of 
the  most  beloved,  and  finally  of  becoming  a 
sddhus  At  this  stage  too,  moderate  anger, 
deceit,  pride  and  greed  are  not  only  subdued 
but  sometimes  entirely  destroyed. 

The  next  stage  is  known  as  Pramatta 
Gunasthdnaka  which  can  be  reached  by 
the  ascetics,  only.  Here  slight  passions  are 
either  controlled  or  destroyed  and  only  a 
few  Pramddas  (negligences)  yet  linger. 
These  Pramddas  are  five  in  number,  namely 
Pride,  Enjoyment  of  Senses,  -  Kashdyas 
(anger,  conceit,  intrigue  and  greed)  and  Sleep. 
According  to  the  Jaina  Scriptures,  a  man 
to  rise  higher  than  these  stages  must  not 
indulge  in  any  of  these,  for  he  may 
otherwise  be  levelled  down  to  the  mithydtva 
stage.  As  to  why  the  Jain  philosophers 
condemn  anger  so  vehemently  we  may 
say,  that  because  anger  appears  so  evidently 
and  displays  itself  with  so    little   discrimina* 

^35 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

tion    towards  all   sources  of  injury,   real  or 
imaginative,  because    it   gives   us  so   much 
trouble   with    its     suggestions,    at    an    age 
when   better  means   of  self  protection  are  at 
our   disposal,    it  is   so   clearly    the  business 
of  all    reflective    knowledge    of  evil    not    to 
indulge  in  it  but  to  subdue  it.     Its  instinctive 
character   forces   itself  irresistively   on    our 
convictions.     It  is  the  sudden  rising  against 
opposition   and   harm  of  any  kind,    real  or 
prospective,  without   originally   any  idea  of 
moral  injury  or  the  reflection   on  the  nature 
of  the  object  that  hurts  us.     Again,  all  those 
persons  who  attempt  to   put   stress   on  the 
enjoyment  of  sense,  do  so   obviously  on  the 
erroneous     notion     that     the     beautiful    is 
resolvable     into     what   is    pleasing   to   the 
senses   and   they   propose   to   show    how  a 
certain  stock  of  primitive  sensible  pleasures 
spreads  and  ramifies  by  countless  association 
and   confers   a   factitious     attraction    on   a 
thousand   things   in   themselves  indifferent. 
But  this  is   absurd  !     For   their  character  is 
changed  into   something   odious  as  soon  as 
they  become  self-chosen  indulgents.     Those 
who   smoothly     indulge   in   gratification   of 

6^6 


GUNASTHANAS. 

the  senses,  betray  their  general  weakness 
which  can  never  be  a  strong  proof  against 
the  fascinations  of  the  Sense.  So  the  Jaina 
philosophy  enjoins  that  our  will  should  always 
be  directed  not  to  enforce  the  energetics 
oi  Kashayas,  but  to  lull  them  into  sleep, 
into  complete  forgetfulness,  to  weaken  them 
altogether,  so  that  they  may  not  prove  even 
in  future  a  menace  to  the  abiding  peace  of 
the  soul. 

The  seventh  stage  is  generally  known 
as  Apramatta  gunasthdnaka.  Anger  has 
been  here  completely  subdued  and  only 
greed,  deceit  and  pride  still  linger  in  a  very 
slight  degree.  The  power  of  concentration 
and  meditation  increases  here  and  the  soul 
gets  rid  of  all  sorts  of  negligences.  That 
which  brings  stupor  or  sleep  bieng  altogether 
absent  here,  all  the  active  powers  latent  in 
the  soul  become  by  degrees  more  and  more 
kinetic. 

In  the  eighth  stage  called  Apurva- 
karanUy  the  conduct  becomes  perfect  so  far 
the  observances  of  vows  are  concerned  and 
man's  heart  becomes  filled  with  such  joy  as 
had   never   been   experienced     before.     As 

637 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM, 

anger  was  entirely  disappearing  in  the  pre- 
vious stage,  so  does  pride  here.  The  jtva 
now  applies  himself  to  holy  meditation,  and 
the  fetters  of  karma  become,  as  its  conse- 
quence, more  and  more  loosened.  This 
step,  is  often  characterised  as  the  Unique 
owing  to  its  loftiness. 

The  next  stage  is  known  as  Aniyah- 
bAdara  gunasth$,naka.  As  in  the  previous 
stage  pride  disappears  altogether,  so  does 
deceit  here.  The  man  practically  rises 
above  all  sex-idea  and  devotes  himself  to 
meditation. 

The  tenth  stage  is  reached  by  advanced 
ascetic  only | who  "thereupon  loses  all  sense 
of  humour,  all  aesthetic  pleasure  in  beauty 
of  sound  or  form,  and  all  perceptions  of 
pain,  fear,  grief,  disgust  and  smells.  The 
ascetic  gladly  renounces  his  worldly  ambition 
and  with  it  all  his  worldly  cares  and  anxieties 
disappear.  Slight  greed  which  still  lingers 
iu  this  stage  only  remains  to  be  eradicated. 
This  is  known  as  StLlishrna  samparya 
Gunasthdndka. 

The  eleventh  stage,  Upasdntamoka gunas- 
thdnaka   is    the    most   critical  peiiod  of  life. 

6^ 


GUMASTHAVAS. 

If  the  ascetic  here  be  able  to  completely 
subdue  or  destroy  the  lingering  tinge  of 
greed,  he  is  safe  and  pisses  on  to  the  twelfth 
stage.  But  if  it  remains  only  in  check  by 
utmost  exertion  of  the  soul,  then  in  time 
to  come,  it  may  gather  sufficient  strength 
to  overcome  the  controlling  forces  of  the 
agent,  and  m  ly  cause  the  soul  to  slip 
back  even  into  the  lowest  stage.  If  on  the 
otherhand  he  successfully  combats  greed, 
he  becomes  an  Anitttaravdsi  Deva  and 
knows  that  he  is  destined  to  become  a 
Siddha  after  his  next  birth. 

In  the  twelfth  stage,  Kshinamoha  gunas- 
thdnakaj  the  ascetic  not  only  eludes  the 
grasp  of  greed,  but  also  becomes  free  from 
the  influence  of  all  Gkdiin  karma  or  those 
which  prove  to  be  impediments  in  way  of 
obtaining  omniscience.  And  although  the 
Agkdtin  karma  still  persists,  it  is  too  weak 
to  bring  the  soul  under  its  control.  The 
soul  at  this  stage  passing  through  the  re- 
maining two  stages  enters  at  once  into 
Mo]isha, 

The  thirteenth  stage  is  known  as  Sayogi- 
kevali  Gumistkdnaka.  The  man  who  reaches 

6s9 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

this  stage  shines  in  'eternal  wisdom,  and 
•deh'ght  infinite/  This  stage  is  often  known 
as  that  of  jihan  mukta\  for  there  is  an 
entire  destruction  of  the  four  kinds  oi  gkdtin 
karma.  There  is  still  the  operation  of  the 
aghdtin  prakrifis  in  virtue  of  which  the  soul 
remains  yet  locked  up  as  it  were  within  the 
mortal  coil.  The  man  haying  reached  this 
stage,  forms  a  Tirtha  or  'Order'  and  subse- 
quently becomes  Tirthankara  or  Maker  of 
the  Order.  These  Tirthankaras  explain  the 
truth  in  the  ''divine  anaksharf  manner 
which  is  garbed  in  popular  languages  by  ad- 
vanced disciples.  These  an aks har i  \.\iO\kg\iis 
or  suggestions,  whatever  they  might  be, 
become  translated  into  popular  speech  which 
afterwards  are  designated  as  the  Agamas, 
the  ordinary  mode  of  conversation  being 
altogether  impossible  for  the  Tirthankaras 
owing  to  the  organic  changes  brought 
about  by  the  severity  of  their  own  austerities. 
The  truths  thus  communicated  by  such  Tir- 
thankaras are  generally  known  as  Revela- 
tions and  the  warantee  of  their  truth  rests  on 
on  the  fact  that  they  come  out  from  men 
who  being  free  from  the    influence   of  moho- 

6^0 


GUNASTHANAS. 

nya  karma  have  attained  omniscience  and 
stand  on  a  far  higher  platform  than  we  do. 
The  latter  portion  of  this  stage  is  occupied 
with  Sukla  dky^na  or  pure  contemplation 
which  reaches  its  culmination  or  highest 
perfection  when  the  body  disappears  like 
burnt  comphor  as  will  be  described  in  the 
next  staofe.  It  is  the  man  at  this  staore 
that  people  worship ;  for  in  the  next  the 
person  adored  loses  all  earthly  interest  and 
shuffles  off  his  mortal  coil. 

The  next  stage  begins  when  all  influence 
of  karma  energetics  has  ehher  been  success- 
fully dessipated  or  entirely  destroyed.  The 
man  at  this  stage  attains  moksha  and  is  called 
Siddhx  or  the  Self- Realized.  In  such  stage 
the  Siddkcis  do  not  merge  themselves  in 
an  all-embracing  One,  but  remain  in  the 
Siddhasila  or  the  Region  of  the  Liberated 
as  freed  souls,  enjoying  perfect  freedom  from 
every  sort  of  bondage  caused  by  karma 
particles.  Siddhas,  being  omniscient  and 
omnipotent,  must  have  right  vision  and  right 
knowledge  revealing  them  spontaneously  in 
their  right  conduct.  Such  Tirthas,  breaking 
loose  from   the  shackles   of  mortal  coil  and 

641 

81 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

karma  and  being  possessed  of  all  those 
divine  qualities  whic'i  we  cannot  but 
revere  and  admire  mo^i,  soar  high  up  into 
a  kind  spiritual  atmosphere  where  everyone 
shines  forth  as  an  embodiment  of  Faith, 
Truth  and  Culture. 

It  is  not  infrequently  that  we  meet  with 
a  few  criticisms  hurled  against  Jainism  by 
its  detractors  mainly  resting  on  the  erroneous 
belief  that  Jainism,  instead  of  helping  in 
the  development  of  personality,  furthers  its 
stultification  and  that  it  is  a  mystery  how  the 
Siddhas,  after  becoming  free  from  all  bond- 
age oi  karma,  and  becoming  alike  in  nature, 
do  not  lose  their  individuality  and  merge  in  an 
all-inciusive  One.  It  is  further  contended  that 
while  Jainism  silently  accepts  the  action  and 
influence  of  Siddhas  in  an  atmosphere  wholly 
spiritual,  it  excludes  that  from  our  earthly 
or  mortal  life,  precisely  the  sphere  nearest 
to  them.  Are  we  then  to  find  them  in  a 
sphere  which  lies  beyond  the  region  of  our 
dream  even  and  to  miss  them  in  our  thought, 
our  duty  and  our  love  ? 

The  evident  reply  of  Jainism    would  be  : 
"Far    from  it."     For,  although    the   Siddhas 


SI 


GUNASTHANAS. 

live   a    transcendent   life   still   >ye     are     In 
communion  with  them.  It  is  not  they  indeed 
that  under  the    mask   of  our  personality,  do 
our  thinking  and  pray  against  our     tempta- 
tions and  wipe  our   tears.      These   are  truly 
our  own.     But  still    they   are  in  presence  of 
a  sympathy  free  to   answer,    spirit    to  spirit  ; 
neither  merging  in  the  other,  although  both 
are   in     the     same     affections    and    inmost 
preferences.     Did   we    remove  this    element 
of  transcendency  of  Siddhas    so  as  to  render 
them  absolutely  universal,  the    effect   would 
be  the  reverse  of  objector's  expectations,  and 
instead  of  gaining    something   more     noble 
and  divine  for  these  Siddhas,    we   should  in 
reality  lose  all.     For  all  transcendency  would 
then  be  gone  and  no  range    would  be  left  for 
the   life   of    these    Divine    Siddhas  ;     they 
would  be  all   in   all       But  the  conception  of 
personality  requires  that  of  a  personal  being, 
living  with  persons  and   acting   on    grounds 
of  reason  and  righteousness.      In  proportion 
as  a  being  mechanises  himself  and   commits 
all  his   energy   to   immutable    methods  and 
degrees   which  is   inevitable   if  he   happens 
to  be  wholly   untranscendental,  he   abdicates 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINTSM. 

his  personal   prerogative  and  permits  his  will 
to   sleep   off  into  a  continuous   automatism. 
Without   freedom  to  act  freshly  from  imme- 
diate thought  and   affection,    that  is  without 
some  place  unbespoken   by   habit,  character 
and  personality  can  have  no  place  whatsoever. 
This  fatal  effectof  annihilation  of  personality 
ceases  the  moment  the  universality  is  remov- 
ed. Let  there  be  some  realm  of  divine  action 
of  the  Siddhas,  some  transcendent   form   of 
life  in  which   our   spirit   is   not   found,    and 
after  learninof  there  the    livinof   thouofht   and 
love  of  them,  we  can   try  our  best  to   follow 
their  footsteps.      It  does    not   kill   out   the 
characterstics   of  personal   existence.       On 
the   otherhand,    it  is   but   the  mixture  indis- 
pensible  to  intellectual  and  moral   perfection 
and  from  their   quickening   touch   and    con- 
verse in  the  spiritual  walks  of  our  experience, 
we  can  look  and  see   without   dismay  in   the 
customary   ways     of    righteous   life   only   a 
message    of   hope,    the    steadfastness   of  a 
promise  and  moral  Ideal  and  not  the  indiffer- 
ence to,  or  the  iron  grip  of  Fate. 

As  regards  the   second    objection   often 
hurled    against    Jainism    as   to    why    the 

644 


GUNASTHANAS, 

Siddhas  would  not  lose  there  individuality 
in  an  all,  embracing  Self,  the  retort 
of  Jainism  would  of  course  be  that  if 
the  so  called  Infinite  Self  includes  us  all 
and  all  our  experiences, — sensations  and 
sins  as  well  as  the  rest,  in  the  unity  of 
one  life,  and  if  there  is  but  one  and  same 
final  Self  for  us  and  each  all,  then  with  a 
literalness  it,  indeed  appalling.  He  is  we  and 
we  are  He  ;  nay  He  is  I  and  I  am  He.  Now 
if  we  read  the  conception  in  the  first  way 
what  becomes  of  our  ethical  independance  ? 
— What,  of  our  personal  reality,  our  righte- 
ousness and  ethical  responsibility  ?  What 
becomes  of  Him  ?  Then  surely  He  is  but 
another  name  for  me  or  you  of  any  of  the 
Siddhas,  And  how  can  there  be  a  talk  of  a 
moral  order,  of  a  moral  cosmos,  since  there 
is  but  a  single  mind  in  this  case  and  we 
cannot  ligitimately  call  that  a  Person  !  When 
it  is  made  to  mean  absolute  identity,  then  all 
the  worth  of  true  nearness  is  gone  and  with 
it  the  openness  of  access,  the  freedom  of 
converse  and  the  joy  of  true  reciprocity  vanish 
altogether.  These  precious  things  all  draw 
their  meaning    from   the    distinct   reility  of 

^45 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

different  persons  ;  for  life  is  eternal  and  is 
eternally  germinating  the  supreme  consci- 
ousness of  the  Ideal  that  seats  the  central 
reality  of  each  human  being  in  an  .eternal 
circle  of  Persons,  and  establishes  each  as  a' 
free  citizen  in  the  all-founding,  all-illumina- 
ting realm  of  spirits.  But  when  we  turn 
that  mood  into  literal  philosophy  and  cause 
our  centre  of  selfliood  to  vainsh  in  an  all- 
embracing  Oae  or  One's  to  vanish  into  ours, 
we  lose  the  tone  of  relioflon  thit  is  true  and 
wholesome  ;  for  true  religion  is  built  only 
on  firm  foundation  of  duty  and  responsibility, 
on  ethical  rights  and  righteousness  ;  and 
these,  again  rest  on  the  footing  of  freedom 
and  Personality.  A  religion  based  on  such 
firm  foundation  is  truJy  a  genuine  and 
inspiring  religion — the  religion  not  of  sub- 
mission but  of  aspiration,  not  of  bondage  but 
of  freedom,  not  of  Fate  but  rather  of  Faith 
and  Hope  and  Insight. 


646 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 
JAIN  CHURCH. 

Tkc  Cyclsg  of  Al5asart>xni  ana  Utsart>int — Tnc 
Yugalikas  and  tli2  Kal{>a  Tree— Ws  get  gltm|>3es  o£  tlie 
Uv23  of  tks  First  Tw>jnfcy  two  Ttrtkanlcars — Regular 
Mtstortcal  Accounts  bsgxn  with  Pdre3iianatli,  the  Twenty 
tltird  Tirjlianlcar  ani  Minavir  in?  Twenty  fourtk— 
Hi^ture  anl  S^lit  ~tl\3  Prin2tt>al  Suodtvistons  of  tnc 
Owetamkart  and  t!i3  Digamkari — The  List  of  GaccKas. 

We  have  already  seen  how  the  Jains 
establish  the  eienial  existence  of  the  universe 
as  a  single  unit  and  of  the  two  great  ever- 
recurring  cycles  of  ages,  Abasarpini  and 
Utsarpini.  The  Jains  believe  that  in  each  of 
these,  there  flourish  twenty-four  Tirthankars. 
During  the  present  period  of  y:/5^^^^i;^i, 
Rishav  Dev  or  Adinath  as  he  is  also  called, 
was  the  first  Tirthankar  and  the  last  one 
was  Maliavira  or  Vardhmin.  It  was 
Rishavdev,  who  first  taught  the  people, 
men  and  women,  the  different  arts  and 
industries.  But  previous  to  his  era  was 
the  period  of  Yii^aliksy  when,  as  the  Jain 
tradition  goes,  human  beings  were  born  in 
pairs  ;  they   lived   as    husbands  and    wives 

6^7 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

and  all  their  necessaries  were  supplied  by 
Kalpa  trees.  The  idea  of  Yugaliks  is, 
peculiar  to  the  Jains,  as  we  have  not 
come  across  any  description  of  Yugaliks  in 
any  other  work  of  other  religionists. 
Gradually  with  the  degenerating  tendency  of 
of  the  tune,  \hQ.  Kalpa  trees  failed  in  yielding 
up  the  desires  of  mankind  and  the  world 
became  full  of  miseries  so  much  so,  that  to 
alleviate  this,  Adinath  introduced  reforms  in 
everything,  spiritual  or  worldly.  After  his 
nirvan,  twentyone  Tirthankars  followed 
before  Parshwanath,  the  twenty-third, 
during  which  period  many  saints  and  heroes 
flourished.  Detailed  accounts  of  these  heroes 
are  lost  to  us.  But  we  come  across  only 
with  some  important  events  of  their  lives 
and  of  the  times  abounding  with  legends 
and  myths.  They  were  all  great  personages 
and  yet  for  the  above  reasons,  their  accounts 
throw  in  little  light  from  the  historic  point 
of  view. 

Parshwanath  was  born  in  ^JJ  B.  C,  and 
reached  moksha  in  the  hundredth  year  of  his 
age  in  '/'j'j  B.  C.  There  is  a  chronological 
list  showing  heads  of  the  Church,  known  as 

64S 


JATN  CHURCH. 

Upakesh  Gachha  (see  Appendix  E)  running 
down  up  to  the  present  day.  His  first 
ganadhar  or  chief  disciple  was  Shubha  Datt, 
who  was  succeeded  by  \\w\  Datt.  Then 
came  Arya  Samudra  and  his  disciple  Prava 
Suri.  Next  Keshi  Kumar  succeeded  to  the 
headship  of  the  Church.  Acharya  Keshi 
Kumar  was  a  contemporary  of  Mahavira. 
Both  Keshi,  the  spiritual  head  of  the  Church 
and  Gautam  the  chief  disciple  of  Mahavira 
had  interviews  on  spiritual  reforms. 

Lord  Mahavira  attained  nirvan  in  527 
B.  C  His  prominent  disciples  or  ganadhars 
were  eleven  viz  : 

1.  Indrabhuti,  better  known  as  Gautam 
from  hisgoira. 

2.  Agnibhuti  ;  belonging  to  Gautam 
gotta. 

3.  Vayubhuti,  belonging  to  Gautam 
gotra. 

4.  Vyakta,  belonging  to  Bhardwaja^t?/ra, 

5.  Sudharma,  belonging  to  Agniveshyan 
gotra, 

6.  Mandit,  belon:;iag  to  Vasista  ^(j/^'a. 

7.  Mouryaputra,    belonging  to  Kashyap 


gotra. 


A^'  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

8.  Akampit,  belonging  to  Gautam  gotra. 

9.  Achalbhr^ta,  belonging  to  H3.ritayan 
gotra. 

10.  Metarya,  belonging  to  Kodinna 
gotra, 

11.  Prabhds,  also  belonging  to  Kodinna 
gotra . 

Except  the  first  and  the  fifth,  all  the  nine 
ganadhars  got  moksha  during  the  life-time  of 
their  master. 

In  those  remote  ages  in  India,  there  were 
small  kingdoms  each  with  its  own  king,  who 
from  time  to  time  was  forced  to  acknowledge 
the  supremacy  of  another  or  who  used  to 
throw  off  the  allegiance  according  to  his  own 
convenience  or  power.  In  Jain  texts  we 
find  the  names  of  the  following  contemporary 
kings  of  such  kingdoms  during  Mahavir's 
time.  And  it  is  important  to  note  that 
all  these  kings  were  admirers  of  the  last 
Tirthankar  and  appreciated  the  reforms  he 
introduced  in  the  Sangha  and  many  of 
them  were  actually  his  followers. 

1.  Srenika   was    king   of   Magadha    at 
Rajgriha. 

2.  Dadhibahan    was   king   of   Anga  at 


Jain  church. 

Champa  where  Srenik*s  son-  Konik  or 
Asokchandra  removed  his  capital  after  his 
father*s  death. 

3.  Chetak  was  king  at  Vaisali  near 
modern  Bihar. 

4.  Malliks  were  reigning  at  Baranasi 
(Kashi) 

5.  Lachhiks  or  the  Lachhavis  were 
kings  of  Koshala  (Ajodhya). 

6.  King  Bfjoya  was  reigning  at  Palash- 
pur. 

7.  Sweta  was  king  at  Amalkalpa; 

8.  Udayan  was  reigning  at  Yitabh^ya 
Pattan- 

9.  Shantanik  and  then  his  son 
Udayan  Vatsa,  a  lover  of  music  were  kings 
of  Vatsya  at  Kosambi  near  niodern 
Allahabad.: 

io.i  King  Nandivardhan  was  reignmg^^ 
at  Kshatriyakund. 

II.  Chanda  Pradyotan  was  king^  of" 
Malwa  at  Ujjain. 

12*  Sal  and  Mahasal  were  reigning  ar^ 
Pristacbampa. 

13^  Hrasaana  Chandra  was  king'  ate^ 
Pouaapur. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

14.  Adinshatru       was        reigning      at 
Hastishirsha. 

15.  Dhanabaha       was       reigning      at 
Rishavpur. 

16.  Birkrishna     Mitra     was     king     at 
Birpur. 

17.  Vdsab  Dutt  was  king  at  Bijoypur. 

18.  Priya    Chandra    was    reigning    at 
Kanakpur. 

19.  Mitranandi  was  king  at  Siketpur. 

20.  King   Apratihat    was     reigning   at 
Saugandhik. 

21.  Arjun  was  king  at  Sughosh. 

22.  King  Bala  was  reigning  at  Mohapur. 

23.  King     Dasarna     was    reigning   at 
Dasarnapur. 

Now  a  rupture  took  place  in  the  Jain 
Church  about  the  year  300  B.C.  and  the  final 
separation  came  about  in  the  year  82  A.  D. 
as  stated  in  the  Introduction.  This  is  the 
beginning  of  the  bifurcation  and  origin 
of  the  two  great  sects,  the  Swetamharis 
and  the  Digambarisy  each  of  which  is  again 
subdivided  into  different  minor  sects  accord- 
ing to  the  difference  in  acknowledging  or 
interpreting     the     religious     texts.     These 

6^2 


JAI^  CHURCH. 

minor  sects  gradually  sprang  up  for  the 
most  part  on  account  of  different  interpre- 
tations the  pontiffs  put  on  the  canonical 
texts  from  time  to  time. 

The  principal  divisions  of  the  Swetam- 
bari  sect  are  : — 

{a)     Pujera. 

(i)      Dundhia  or  Bistola, 

{c)      Terapanthi. 

The  original  stock  is  now  known  as 
Pujera,  as  its  followers  are  thorough  worship- 
pers. The  Dundhias  had  tlieir  origin  about 
the  year  1580  A.D.  and  although  they  re- 
cognise the  images  of  Tirthankars,  they  do 
not  indulge  in  worship  with  formal  rites  and 
formulas.  The  Terapanthis  flourished  only 
lately  in  the  year  1762  A.D.,  or  thereabout 
and  they  do  not  believe  in  images  or  allow 
its  worship  in  any  form  whatever. 

The  Digambaris  are  also  subdivided 
into  several  sects.  The  important  ones 
are  :— 

(a)  Bispanthi,  who  allows  worship  to 
a  certain  extent. 

(6)  Terapanthi,  who  had  their  origin 
about  the  17th   century  A.D.,  acknowledges 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

images,     but   does    not   allow     any    sort   of 
worship  of  the  same. 

(r)  Samaiy^panthi,  a  non-idolatrous  sect, 
entirely  does  away  with  the  image  or  its 
worship,  but  simply  acknowledges  the  sanc- 
tity ot  the  sacred  books  which  are  worship- 
ped by  placing  them  on  an  altar.  It  is  also 
known  as  Taranpanthi  as  it  was  founded  by 
Taranswami.  He  was  born  in  1448  A.  D. 
and  died  in  151 5  A.  D. 

{d)  Gumanpanthi,  flourished  of  late  in 
the  1 8th  century  A.  D.,  and  so  called  from 
the  name  of  its  founder  Guman  Ram. 

{e)     Totapanthi. 

In  the  Digambari  Church  there  also 
arose  a  number   of  Sanghas  viz  ; 

(i)     Mul  Sangha  with  its  subsects  viz. 
^    {a)     Sinha  Sangha 
(5)     Nandi  Sangha 
{c)     Sen  Sangha. 

(2)  Dravid  Sangha 

(3)  Yapaniya  Sangha 

(4)  Kastha  Sangha 

(5)  Mathur  Sangha 

III  the  Sanghas  there  are  Ganas  and 
Gachlias    e.  g.     the     Nandi    Sangha     hai|. 


JAIN  CHURCH. 

Baldtkar gana,  Saraswallgachka,  &  Painjat 
gachha. 

We  find  several  lists  of  the  teachers  of 
these  various  sanjIi^Sy  ganus,  and  gachhas 
111  the  pattJLvahs  and  inscriptions  that  have 
come  to  liglit  up  till  now.  (See  Appendix) 
Of  their  Acharyas  Kund-kundi-chirya,  the 
author  of  Panchastikaya  and  other  works 
who  flourished  just  before  the  Christian  era 
(8  B.  C.)  and  Uniaswati,  author  of  the 
famous  treatise  Tatw^rthasutra  and  other 
Sanskrit  works  who  flourished  about  the 
middle  of  the  ist  century  A.  D.,  deserve 
special  mention.  Others  as  Amitgati, 
author  of  Dharmapariksha,  Subhslsitratna 
Sandoha  (about  993  A,  D.)  Akalanka  Dev, 
Dhananjoy,  the  author  of  the  well  known 
epic  Dwisandhan  (827  A.  D.j  Harichandra, 
author  of  Dliarmasliarmibhudaya,  Devn  indi 
Virnandi,  author  ofCh  I'ldraprabha  Charitam, 
Ba^diraj,  Some  D-v,  author  of  Yasastilak, 
were  all  great  scholars  and  authors  of  works 
of  high  repute. 

After  Mahavir's  nirvan  a  number  of 
Gachhas  (schools)  also  came  to  being  in 
the  Swetambar    Church.    -They     originated 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

from  the  different  Jain  teachers,  who 
assumed  themselves  as  heads  of  their  own 
gachhas,  alleging  differences  in  religious 
practices  and  holding  different  interpretations 
of  the  texts  of  the  Sutras,  These  Sutras 
of  the  Jain  Sid.lhanta  of  the  Swetambaris 
were  handed  do.vn  orally  till  they  were 
reduced  to  writing  about  980  years  after 
Mahavir's  nirvan  (453  A  D.)  by  Davardhi- 
gani  Ksham^shraman  who  was  a  pupil  of 
Lohitya  Suri,  in  the  city  of  Vallabhi  in 
Gujrat,  before  a  great  Council  which  met 
for  the  purpose.  The  Swetambar  Church 
have  got  lists  of  their  gachhas  and  their 
members  and  these  throw  much  light  on  the 
dark  pages  of  Indian  History.  The  mention 
of  Jain  hierarchs,  teachers  and  their  schools 
in  the  inscription  discovered  at  Maihura  and 
other  places  of  late,  is  of  great  importance 
to  verify  the  statements  in  Kalpa  Sutra  and 
other  Jain  texts  of  such  guna  or  gachha 
(the  school)  the  Kula  (the  line)  and  Shakha 
(the  branch)  of  the  miinjain  Church.  Its 
literature  has  preserved  the  list  of  Saris  or 
hierarchs,  noting  down  the  important 
events  during    their  time.      Therein    we  find 

6s6 


JAIN  CHURCH. 

that  after  Udyotan  Suri,  his  eighty-four 
disciples  started  84  gachhas  (937  A.  D.)  as 
all  of  them  were  created  Acharyas  by  him. 
Although  many  of  them  are  extinct  now, 
yet  they  are  of  great  value  and  the  Swetam- 
bar  literature  possesses  complete  lists  of  the 
heads  of  the  gachhas  from  this  Acharya. 

We  give  belaw,  in  brief,  an  account  of 
the  heads  of  the  Church  from  Mahavir,  the 
last  Tirthankar  up  to  Acharya  Udyotan, 
as  far  as  could  be  gathered  from  the  matter 
available  to  us«  Further  Chronological  lists 
are  given  in  the  Appendix  and  they  may 
be  useful  for  reference. 

I.  Mahavir  a.  He  belonged  to  Iksh- 
waku  Kula,  K^syap  gotra,  was  the  son  of 
King  Siddh^rtha  of  Kshatri-kund,  a  town 
in  Magadh  and  queen  Trisalsl.  Born  in 
599  B.  C.  on.Chaitra  Sukla  13.  He  passed 
30  years  as  a  householder,  12  years  6 
months  and  i  fortnight  in  Chhadamast 
State —(Intermediate  state  between  a  house 
holder  and  a  perfect  sage)  and  29  years  5 
months  and  15  days  as  a  Kevali,  till  he 
attained  nirv^n  at  the  age  of  72  in  the  town 
of  P^p^  about  8    miles  from    modern    Bihar 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

on  Kartic  Badi  15  in  527  B.  C.  He  had 
24000  sadhus  (male  disciples),  36000 
Sadhwis  (female  disciples),  1,59000  Srivaks 
(male  followers)  and  3,18000  Sravik^s 
ffemale  followers^. 

His  principal  disciple  was  Indrabhuti 
better  known  as  Gautam  from  his  gotra. 
He  was  a  Brahmin  by  caste,  son  of 
Vasubhuti  and  Prithivi  and  was  born  in 
607  B.  C.  in  the  village  Gobbar  (Gobbra 
or  Govaraya)  near  Rajgriha.  He  was 
for  50  years  a  householder,  for  30  years  a 
Chhadamast  and  12  years  as  Kevali  and 
reached  nirvan  at  the  age  of  92  in  515  B.  C. 

After  Mahaviras  nirvan,  Sudharm^,  the 
fifth  qanadhar  succeeded  to  the  headship  of 
the  Church  as  Gautam,  the  first  ganadhar 
became  a  Kevali,  immediately  after  his 
Lord's  mohsha  and  Sudharm^  was  the  only 
available  ganadhar.  Moreover  the  Sadhus 
converted  by.  Gautam  died  early  and  other 
ganadhars  yielded  up  their  pupils  to 
Sudharm^.  The  headship  therefore  fell 
upon  him. 

2.  Sudharmd.  He  was  born  in  607  B.C. 
the  year  in  which    Gautam    was    born.      He 

658 


fAIN  CHURCH. 

was  the  son  of  Dhammilla  and  Bhaddala  of 
Koll^g  village  and  belonged  to  Agni  Vesayan 
gotra.  He  lived  50  years  as  a  "householder, 
42  years  in  Chhadamast  state  and  8  years  as 
a  Kevali  and  reached  moksha  in  his  looth 
year  20  years  after  Mahavir*s  nirvan  in 
507  B.  C. 

3.  Jambu.  He  succeeded  to  the  headship 
when  Sudharma  became  a  Kevali  in  515B.C. 
He  was  a  native  of  Rajgriha,  son  of  a  banker 
Rishav  Dutt  and  Dh^rini  of  K^syap  gotra. 
He  entered  the  order  at  the  age  of  16, 
passed  20  years  in  Chhadamast  state  and  44 
years  as  a  Kevali.  He  was  the  last  of  the 
KevalinSy  and  got  nirvan  at  the  age  of  80 
in  463  B.C.,  64  years  after  Mahavira. 

4,  Prabhava.  After  Jambu,  he  assumed 
the  headship.  He  was  of  K^ty^un  gotra, 
son  of  king  Jaisena  of  Jaipur  near  Vindhya 
Hills,  remained  30  years  as  a  householder, 
64  (according  to  some  44)  years  in  SiStmanya 
brata  and  1 1  years  as  head  of  the  church 
and  died  at  the  advanced  age  of  105 
(according  to  some  85)  in  45a  B.C.,  i.e. 
75  years  after  Mahavira. 

5.     Sajjambhava.     He   was   a  native   of 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

Rajgriha  and  was  next  appointed  as  the  head 
of  the  church.  He  was  of  Batsya  gotra  and 
was  converted  by  the  appearance  of  an 
image  of  Tirthankar  Shdntin^th,  when  cele- 
brating a  sacrifice  as  a  Brahmin.  He  left 
home  at  the  age  of  28,  passed  1 1  years  in 
Sftmanya  Vrata  and  23  years  as  head  of  the 
church  up  to  429  B.C.  He  died  98  years 
after  Mahavira  at  the  age  of  62.  He  was 
the  author  of  the  famous  ''Dasavaik^lika 
Sutra"  which  he  composed  for  his  son  Manak. 

6.  Yasobhadra.  He  succeeded  Sajjam- 
bhava  and  remained  50  years  as  head  of  the 
church  up  to  379  B.C.  He  belonged  to 
Tungiyayan  gotra,  left  home  at  the  age  of 
22  and  passed  14  years  in  Samanya  vrata 
and  died  at  the  age  of  86  i,e,  148  years  after 
Mahavir's  nirvan. 

7.  Sambhuti  Vijay.  He  was  the  next 
spiritual  head  and  remained  as  such  for  8  years 
up  to  371  B.C.  He  was  of  MathaLV  gotra  and 
was  a  householder  up  to  the  age  of  42.  He 
passed  40  years  in  S^manya  vrata  and  died 
at  the  age  of  90  i.e.  1 56  years  after  Mahavira. 

8.  Bhadrabahu.  He  succeeded  Sam- 
bhuti Vijay   although  he   was   not   his     dis- 

660 


JAIN  CHURCH, 

ciple,  but  a  brother  disciple.  He  repre- 
sented the  church  for  14  years  up  to  357 
B.C.  He  sprang  from  Prachin  gotra,  an 
inhabitant  of  Pratisthanpur  in  the  South. 
He  was  initiated  at  the  age  of  45  and 
remained  17  years  in  S^manya  vrata  before 
he  became  the  head.  He  died  at  the  age  of 
76  or  about  170  years  after  Mahavira.  He 
was  a  great  scholar  and  commentator.  His 
niryukiis  on  Jain  Siddhant  are  handed 
dorwn  to  us,  as  living  examples  of  his  vast 
learning  and  knowledge  of  our  Shastras. 
His  brother  according  to  Jain  tradition  was 
Bardhamihir,  the  well-known  astronomer. 

9.  Sthulabhadra.  He  was  a  native  of 
P4taliputra  and  belonged  to  Gautama  gotra 
His  parents  were  Sak4dala  and  Lachhal 
Devi,  the  former  was  a  minister  of  the  9th 
Nanda  King.  He  lived  30  years  in  home, 
and  passed  20  years  in  Samanya  vrata  and 
49  years  as  head  of  the  church  up  to  308 
B.C.  He  converted  several  Maurya  kings 
to  Jainism  and  was  a  great  scholar  of  the 
time.  He  breathed  his  last  219  years 
(according  to  some  215  years)  after 
Mahavira  in  his  99th  year. 

66i 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fATNISM, 

10.  Arya  Mah^giri.  He  was  of  ElA- 
patya  ^otra,  entered  the  order  at  the  age  of 
30,  passed  40  years  in  S^manya  vrata 
and  was  the  head  of  the  church  for  30 
years  up  to  278  B.C.  He  died  at  the  age 
of  100,  that  is  249  years  after  Mahavira. 
He  had  two  pupils  named  Behula  and 
Balissaha,  the  latter's  pupil  was  the  famous 
Umaswati  V^chaka,  author  of  Tattwartha 
Sutra  and  other  works  and  his  pupil  was 
Shydm£Lcharya,  the  author  of  Pannavani 
Sutra. 

11.  Arya  Suhasti.  Like  Bhadrab^hu, 
he  was  a  brother-disciple  of  Mah^giri  and 
belonged  to  V^sistha  Gotra.  He  was  a  house- 
holder for  30  years  and  the  head  of  the  church 
for  46  years  (16  years  after  Mahdgiri)  up  to 
262  B.  C.  He  died  265  years  (according  to 
some  291  years)  after  Mahavira,  at  the  age  of 
100.  He  converted  king  Samprati,  grandson  of 
the  great  Asoka,  to  Jainism,  who  erected 
many  temples  and  dedicated  vast  number 
of  images  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  his  empire.  He  tried  to  spread  Jainism 
even  in  foreign  lands.  He  was  the  17th 
successor   of  king    Srenika    and   his    reign 


JAIN  CHURCH. 

began  from  229  B.C.  Suhasti   had  2    pupils 
Susthita  and  Supratibaddha. 

12.  Arya  Susthita.  After  Suhasti,  Sus- 
thita succeeded  as  the  head  of  the  church  and 
remained  as  such  for  48  years  up  to  2 14  B.C.. 
He  was  of  Vy^grh^patya  gotra  and  a 
resident  of  Kdkandi.  He  lived  31  years  as  a 
householder  before  entering  the  order  and 
remained  17  years  in  S^manya  vrata  and 
died  at  the  age  of  96  about  316  years  after 
Mahavira.  Previous  to  his  period  the  Jain 
Church     was      known     by     the    name     of 

'  Nigrantha  Gachha,  but  from  him  the  name 
was  changed  to  Kotika  Gachha  from  235 
B.C..  The  tradition  is  that  the  origin  of  the 
name  was  due  to  his  counting  Surimantra 
for  crores  (koti)  of  times. 

13.  Indradinna.  He  belonged  to  Kou- 
shika  gotra.  We  do  not  find  accounts  of  both 
this  Acharya  and  his  successor  Dinna 
Suri  except  that  they  were  heads  of  the 
Jain  Church  and  that  the  former  breathed 
his  last  441  years  after  Mahavira  in  86  B.C. 
We  have  seen  that  Arya-Susthita  Suri 
breathed  his  last  in  214  B.C.,  or  according 
to  some  in    188  B.C.     It  may    therefore    be 

6(^3 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

said  that  there  must  have  existed  other 
Suris  or  heads  of  the  church  between  Arya- 
Susthita  (No.  12)  and  Arya  Sinhagiri 
(No.  15)  besides  Indradinna  and  Dinna 
(Nos.  13  and  14).  But  unfortunately  the 
Pattavalis,  we  have  come  across,  are  as  well 
silent  on  the  point  except  that  during  Indra- 
dinna's  time  the  famous  K4lik^ch^rya 
flourished. 

14.  Dinna.  He  belonged  to  Gautam 
gotra.  His  two  disciples  were  Sdnti  Sen 
and  Sinhagiri. 

15.  Sinhagiri.  He  was  of  Kousik 
gotra  and  assumed  the  headship  after  Dinna. 
During  his  time  the  great  Acharya  named 
Padaliptacharya  better  known  as  Bridhabadi 
Suri,  flourished  and  his  well-known  pupil 
Siddha  Sena,  Divakar  f^Kumudchandra) 
a  contemporary  of  king  Vikramaditya  identi- 
fied by  some  with  Kshapanaka  composed 
the  famous  stotra  known  as  Kalyanmandir. 
According  to  Jain  tradition  king  Vikrama- 
ditya ascended  the  throne  470  years  after 
Mahavira  in  57  B.C.  and  was  a  believer  in 
Jainism.  Sinhagiri  Suri  died  in  20  A.D. 
547  years  after  Mahavira. 

664 


JAIN  CHURCH, 

1 6.  Vajra.  He  succeeded  Sinhagiriin 
A.D.  21  and  belonged  to  Gautama  ^(?/ra. 
His  parents  were  Dhanagiri  and  Sunanda 
who  lived  at  Tumbaban.  He  was  born  in 
B.C.  31.  i.e.  496  years  after  Mahavira  and 
lived  8  years  only  as  householder.  He 
passed  44  years  in  Samanya  vrata  and 
remained  as  head  of  the  church  for  36  years 
up  to  his  death  at  the  age  of  88  in  57  A.D. 
that  is  up  to  584  years  after  Mahavir's 
nirvan.  He  was  the  last  to  know  the 
complete  ten  Purvas  and  from  him  arose 
the  Vajra  Shakha  of  the  Jain  Church.  He 
is  known  to  have  converted  a  large  number 
of  Buddhists  to  Jainism. 

17.  Vajra  Sen.  He  was  of  IJtkoshik 
g'otra  and  was  during  his  time,  head  of  his 
Church  up  to  A.  D.  93.  The  well-known 
separation  of  the  Church  into  Swetam- 
baris  and  Digambaris  took  place  in  A.  D.  82 
Arya  Rakshit  Suri  was  his  contemporary. 
He  lived  9  years  as  householder,  86  years 
in  Samanya  vrata  and  36  years  as  the  head 
of  the  church.  He  died  at  the  age  of  128  in 
the  620th  year  after  Mahavira's  nirvan.  He 
converted  four  brothers  Nagendra,   Chandra, 

665 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM. 

Nirvitti  and  Vidy^dhar  who  after  hard  study 
became  great  scholars  and  were  created 
Acharyas.  They  founded  the  4  Kulas  after 
their  own  names. 

1 8.  Chandra.  He  succeeded  Vajra  Sen 
and  remained  as  the  head  of  the  church  for 
7  years,  up  to  A.  D  100.  He  passed  his 
life  as  householder  for  37  years  and  was 
23  years  in  Samanya  Vrata  and  died  at  the 
age  of  67  that  is,  627  years  after  Mahavir's 
nirvan.  With  him  originated  the  appella 
tion  Chandra   Kula. 

19.  Samanta  bhadra.  '  He  suceeded 
Chandra  Suri  as  head  of  the  church,  but 
there  is  no  mention  of  the  period  of  his 
headship.      He  was  also  known  as  Banbasi. 

20.  Deva.  He  is  also  known  as 
Briddha  Deva  Suri.  He  is  said  to  have 
attended  the  installation  ceremony  of  a  temple 
dedicted  to  Mahavira  Swami  at  Satyapur 
(Sanchore)     670    years     after    Mahavir,    in 

A.  D.  143' 

21.  Pradyotana  He  attended  the 
installation    ceremony    of   Adinath's     temple    | 

at  Ajmer. 

22.  Manadeva.       He      composed     the 

666 


JAIN  church: 

Shanti  Stotra  which  is  still    much   esteemed 
by  the  Jains. 

23.  MA,ntunga — author  of  the  popular 
Vaktamar  Stotra  and  other  works  and  was 
contemporary  of  the  well-known  king  Bhoja. 
He      flourished     about     700      years     after 

Mahavira, 

24.  Vira.  He  performed  the  consecra- 
tion ceremony  at  Nagpur  of  Nemi  Nath 
temple  in  253  A.  D.  770  years  after 
Mahavira. 

25.  Jai  Deva. 

26.  Devananda.  At  Devki  Pattan,  a 
city  in  the  west,  he  performed  the  consecra- 
tion ceremony  of  Parshwanath   Temple. 

27.  Vikrama. 

28.  Narasingha, 

29.  Samudra.  During  his  time  the 
famous  Hari  Bhadra  Suri  one  of  the  greatest 
Jain  Logicians  flourished  in  493  A.  D. 

30.  Manadeva.  During  his  time  1055 
years  after  Mahavira  in  528  A.  D.  Hari 
Bhadra  Suri,  the  great  author,  breathed  his 
last.  According  to  some  he  died  in  538 
A.  D.   (S^  585.) 

31.  Bibudhaprava. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAIAUSM. 

32.  Jagananda. 

33.  Rabiprava.  He  attended  the 
installation  ceremony  of  a  temple  of  Nariii 
Nath  at  Nadulpur  in  A.   D.  643. 

34.  Yasobhadra,  also  known  as 
Yasodeva.  During  his  time  Anhilpurpatan 
was  founded  by  Vanraja  in  745  A.  D  (S. 
802)  about  1272  years  after  Mahavira. 

35.  Pradyumna.  We  do  not  find  the 
name  of  this  Acharya  \2>S^.  and  his  successor 
Manadeva  (36)  in  many  of  the  lists,  but  they 
mention  Vimalchandra  {2>7)  ^^  succeeding 
to   Yasobhadra  (34). 

36.  Manadeva. 

37.  Vimalchandra. 

38.  Udyotana  Suri.  It  was  after  him 
that  the  84  gachhas  had  originated  from 
his  84  pupils,  each  of  whom  was  made  a 
head  of  the  Sadlius  under  him.  This  took 
place  in  Vikram  Sam  vat  994  or  about  1464 
years  after  Mahavira  (937  A.  D.)  at  a  place 
named  Teli  near  Mount  Abu.  He  died  on  his 
way  to  a  pilgrimage  to  Mount  Shatrunjaya 
and  according  to  some  at  a  town  named 
Dhaval  near  Med  Pat  (Merta  in  Marwar). 
He   placed    Sarbadeva  Suri   with   8   other 

669 


i 


JAIN  CHURCH, 

Acharyas  as  the  head  of  his  line  which  is 
also  known  as  ''Bark  Gackha'  from  the 
time,  till  it  was  changed  to  ''Khartara 
gachhd'  from  Jineswar  Suri. 

The  following  is  a  list  of  the  names  of 
the  Gachhas  commonly  found  and  most  of 
them  have  become  now  extinct. 


Agama. 

Chitourha. 

Anchal. 

Chitrawala. 

Anpuri. 

Dashiya. 

Bagherwal. 

Dekacharha. 

Baherha. 

Dhandhusha. 

Bapana. 

Dharmaghosha. 

Barhgachha. 

Dobandanik, 

Barodia. 

Dokarha. 

Belia. 

Gachhapala. 

Bharuachha, 

Gandhara. 

Bhatnera. 

Gangesara. 

Bhavaharsha. 

Ghanghodhara. 

Bhawadara. 

Ghoghara. 

Bhawaraja. 

Ghoshwala. 

Bhimpalli. 

Gubela. 

Bhimsena. 

Guptauba. 

Bhinmala. 

Hansaraka. 

Bidyadhara. 

1 
Jalori. 

Bijaya. 

Jangarha. 

Birejiwal. 

Jawaharha. 

Boresingha. 

Jherantia, 

Bramhana. 

JirawaU. 

669 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 


Chhapara. 

Kachhela. 

Kamalkalasha, 

Kamboja. 

Kandobia. 

Kapursingha. 

Kattakpur. 

Kawal. 

Khambhayata. 

Kharatara, 

Korantwala. 

Koshipura. 

Krishnarshi. 

Kuchora, 

Kutubpura, 

Lumpaka. 

Madhukara, 

Mandalia. 

Mandharana. 

Mandowara. 

Manghorha. 

Maladhara. 

Masena. 

Mathura. 

Muhasorarha. 

Murandawala. 

Nadola. 

Nagadraha, 

Nagarkota. 

Nagarwala. 

Nagendra. 

Nagori. 

Nagpura 

Nanawala. 

Narhiya. 


Jithara. 

Negama. 

Palanpur. 

Pallikiya. 

Palliwala. 

Panchabahali. 

Parshwachandra. 

Pippal. 

PurnataUa 

Puruima. 

Ramsena. 

Rangvijaya. 

Revati 

RudrapalU 

Sagara 
Sanchora. 

Sanderaka. 
Sanjata. 

Saraswati, 

Sarawak. 

Sardhapunamiya 

Sewantara. 

Siddhanta. 

Siddhapura. 

Soratha. 

Surana. 

Tanawala. 

Tapa. 

Thambhana. 

Trengdia. 

Tribhavia. 

Upakesha. 

Ustawala.- 

Utabiya. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 
JAIN  FESTIVALS. 

Or  tlic  Festivals,  Pajjusazi  ts  tlic  Greatest — Ckatur- 
masya — TKc  Oewalt — Jnana  Panckami — ^ern  Tcrask 
Mouna  £ka<laskt — Pous  Oasamt — Ckattra  Pvirmma — 
Akskaya  Tritiya  ~~  Askara  Sukla  Ckaturdaskt. 

Like  other  communities  of  India,  the 
Jains  have  got  a  number  of  festivals  during 
the  year.  These  are  especially  connected 
with  the  anniversaries  of  the  births  and 
deaths  of  the  Tirthankars.  And  the  greatest 
festival  of  the  Jains,  is  Pajjusan  in  the 
month  of  Bkddra  (August— September). 
Ckaturmdsya  commences  from  the  15th 
Sukla  Paksha  or  full  moon  oi  Asdrk  endmg 
on  the  15th  Sukla  Paksha  of  Kdrtik  and 
this  festival  is  celebrated  during  this  period 
from  Bkddra  Krishna  Trayodashi  lasting  for 
8  days  till  Bkddra  Sukla  Pauckami.  Among 
some  Gackkas  of  the  Swetambar,  Pajjusan 
begins  from  Bkddra  Kriskna  Dwddaski, 
endinor  with  Bkddra  Sukla  Ckaturtki. 

Among  the  Digambaris,  the  festival  is 
known    as    **Das]akshini"    which    begins    on 

6ti 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

this  latter  date  lastinor  for  70  days  till  the 
14th  Sukla  Paksha  of  Kkrtik.  The  day  of 
Bkddra  Sakla  Panchami  is  also  known  among 
the  Hindus  as  *'Rishi  Panchami".  Lite- 
rally Pajjusan  means  Pari  sdmastayena 
usand  sevand  i.  e.  serving  with  a  whole- 
hearted devotion.  This  is  the  religious 
session  during  the  rains.  Formerly  it  was  res- 
tricted to  the  Jain  sages  only  ;  but  now  all  of 
the  Sangha,  whether  a  Sddhu  or  a  Srdvak, 
male  or  female,  take  part  in  it  and  thus  it 
has  become  almost  common  with  the  Jains. 

Among  the  Swetambaris,  during  this 
festival  covering  the  periods  of  8  days, 
the  only  festival  in  the  rainy  season,  Kalpa 
Sutra  is  read  and  explained  before  the 
assembly — a  group  of  lay  devotees  hy  yatis 
and  ascetics.  Lectures  on  its  commentaries 
are  delivered  for  the  first  seven  days  and 
on  the  last  day,  fasting  is  observed  and  the 
text  of  the  Sutra  is  read  out  to  the  whole 
assembly  of  men  and  women  who  hear  the 
same  with  great  attention,  respect  and  vene- 
ration. It  will  not  be  out  of  place  here  to 
speak  a  few  words  about  the  work.  This 
Sutra  principally    deals   with    three  subjects 

6^2 


JAIN  FESTIVALS. 

Viz.  lives  of  the  Tirthankars,  list  of  sages,  and 

rules  and  regulations  be   to   followed  by  the 

Jain    monks.     Life   of  the  last    Tirthankar 

Mahavira      is      elaborately       dwelt       with, 

while  the  lives  of  the  23rd,    22nd    and    first 

are  summarily    given    with    few    touches    of 

embellishment  here  and  theres  from  historical 

point   of  view    and     the   list    of   the    Jaina 

Church  from  the  last  Tirthankar. 

During   this   festival,    the   annual  or  the 

ofreat     Pratikraman     or   confession     called 
,0 

Sambatsari  Pratikraman  is  performed,  in 
order  to  remove  all  ill-feelings  over  all 
living  beings  and  to  ask  pardon  from  all 
living  beings  for  any  act  done  knowingly  or 
unknowingly  in  the  course  of  their  mutual 
exchange  during  the  whole  year.  This  is 
considered  to  be  an  act  of  great  merit  and 
as  imperative  on  all  the  Jains. 

Another  meritorious  and  important  reli- 
gious ceremony  known  as  Siddha  Chakra 
worship  is  celebrated  twice  a  year  in  the 
months  of  Aswin  and  Chaitra,  each  lasting 
for  9  days  and  called  Oliji  from  the  7th  to 
the  15th  of  the  full  moon.  On  a  chauki  or 
small  table  of  wood  or  stone  or  on  a  plate  of 

673 

85 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

silver,  generally  a  circle  is  described  which 
is  divided  by  eight  radius  into  8  chambers. 
In  these  chambers  are  written  names  or 
less  frequently  images  of  Siddha,  Achdrya, 
Upddkya  and  SMliu  and  the  words 
Daraskana,  /ndn,  Chdriti^a  and  Tap  a  in 
their  consecutive  order,  and  in  the  centre 
is  written  the  word  Arihanta. 

During  this  festive  occasion  Puja  is  daily 
performed  to  all  these  names  collectively 
and  each  name  is  also  worshipped  in  turn 
with  special  ceremonies  and  offerings  for 
nine  days.  The  worshipper  keeps  special 
fast  known  as  Amil  for  the  whole  period 
taking  on  the  third  part  of  the  day  water  and 
one  food  simply  boiled,  without  mixing  any 
thing  with  it  to  make  palatable.  The  victual 
has  also  to  be  decided  according  to  the 
colour  symbolised  for  each  name.  Thty 
are  as  follows  <^i)  white  (2)  red  (3)  yellow 
(4)  blue  (5)  black  (6)  to  (9)  white.  This 
OH  Tapa  is  performed  9  times  i.  e.  for 
4J  years  or  9  years  by  those  who  cele- 
brate it  only  once  a  year.  Its  completion, 
udydpana  {ujaonds  is  celebrated  with  great 
pomp  and    expense  to  acquire  the  full  merit 


JAIN  FESTIVALS. 

of  the  Tapa,  Rice  is  generally  used  for 
white,  gram  for  red,  wheat  for  yellow,  pulse 
for  blue  and  black  pulse  for  black.  On  the 
last  day  *'Navapada"  Puja  is  performed 
with  great  eclat  before  the  Siddha  Chakra 
Mandal  with  singings  and  offerings  and 
pouring  pots  of  Pakhal  consisting  of  water, 
milk,  saffron  and  clarified  butter. 

The  Dewali  or    Kartick  Budi  15  is  cele- 
brated amongst  all  the    Hindu    communities 
of  India  as  a  day  of  rejoicings    and  invoking 
the  Goddess  of  Wealth.       The    Jains  hold  it 
as  specially    sacred   as    the    day    of   Nirvsln 
of  Mahavir  Swami.     They  present    offerings 
of  sweets  particularly  the  ball-shaped    sweets 
called    **Laddu"    in    the    temple.      A     large 
number  of   them  visit  Pawapuri   in   Bihar   to 
attend  the  anniversary    and  Mahotsab  at   the 
place  where    this    Nirvan    took   place   more 
than  five  centuries  before  Christ. 

Kartick  Sukla  5  is  known  as  fnydn 
Panchami  when  the  Jains  celebrate  Puja 
in  their  temples  and  worship  Jnydn  or 
Knowledge  with  offerings  and  prayers. 
Kartick  Sukla  15  is  also  another  day  of 
religious   observances   and     rejoicings     like 

67s 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM. 

Chaitra  Purnima.  The  Chaturm&sya  ends 
with  this  day  and  the  Jains  generally  visit 
Shatrunjaya  Hills  in  Kathiawad  to  worship 
the  deity  on  that  day. 

Another  religious  day  of  the  Jains  is 
Merh  Terash  on  Margasirsa  (Agrahayan) 
Badi  I J  or  T3th  day  of  the  dark  moon 
of  the  month  of  Agrahayan.  This  is 
the  day  of  Nirvan  of  Rishavdev,  the 
first  of  the  Tirthankars  of  the  present 
age  Avasarpim. 

The  Mouna  Ekddasi  is  celebrated  on  the 
Margasirsha  Sukla  nth.  This  day  is 
generally  spent  in  fasting  with  a  vow  of 
silence  for  the  whole  day.  They  also  observe 
posadh  or  sitting  in  one  place  for  12  or  24 
hours.  The  day  is  connected  with  the  i8th, 
19th  and  2 1  St  Tirthankaras. 

Pons  Badi  10  is  another  day  of  celebra- 
tion in  connection  with  Parswanath,  the 
23rd  Tirthankar  as  his  birthday  anniversary. 
People  generally  visit  Pareshnath  Hills  on 
that  day. 

Ckaitra    Purnima     is     also     celebrated 

with  great     eclat  on  the  mount   Shatrunjaya 
as   a   very     auspicious   day   when   a    large 

676 


fAIN  FESTIVALS. 

number  of  the   Jains  flock  to   the  place     to 
worship  Adinath,  the  presiding  God. 

Akshaya  Tritiya  or  Baisakk  Sudi  3  is 
also  observed  in  connection  with  the  ist 
Tirthankar  Adinath. 

Ashark  Sukla  Chaturdasi  is  consi- 
dered as  a  day  of  religious  merit.  Chatur- 
masya  commences  from  this  day  and  it  is 
generally  observed  with  fasting  by  the  Jains. 
Ckaturmasya  ends  on  the  Kartick  Sukla 
Chaturdashi  after  four  months,  as  already 
noted. 


677 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 
JAIN  PLACES  OF  PILGRIMAGE. 

KalyanaKDhumts      or      Places      of      Ptlgaimages — 
Skatrunjaya    Hills-  Pa wat>urt — ParesKnatk       Hills — 
MLount       ALu — Girnar       Htlls — Rajgtr, — Beneras, — 
Ayoclkya, — Ckam^at>ur  ^c. 

The  reader  is  already  aware  that  the 
Jains  acknowledge  the  Twenty-four  Tirthan- 
kars,  who  flourished  during  this  era  in  Bharat 
Khanda  (India).  Of  the  various  events 
connected  with  the  lives  and  careers  of 
these  Tirthankars,  the  Jains  attach  a  great 
religious  importance  specially  to  five  things 
which  they  designate  by  the  phrase 
Kalydnak  Bhumi,  and  they  are  : — 

(i)  the  last  place  previous  to  his  being 
conceived  in  the  womb  (chyawan) 

(ii)     the  place  of  his  birth  (Janma) 

(iii)  the  place  where  he  first  renounced 
the  sansdr  and  initiated  into  a  religious  life 
(diksha) 

(iv)  the  place  where  he  first  became  a 
kevalin  or  achieved  omniscience  (Keval 
JnyAn) 

678 


JAIN  PLACES    OF   PILGRIMAGE. 

(v)     the      place      where     he      realized 
emancipation  {Nirvdn) 

Each  of  these  places  being  thus  associated 
with  the  life  of  a   Tirthankar,   has  not    only 
become  a  place  historically  important  but  has 
been  as  well  a  place  of  pilgrimage    sacred  to 
the  Jains  in  general,  whether  a  Swetambari 
or  a  Digambari.     From  remote  periods,    the 
Jains  built    temples    at    these    places    which 
stand  even  to  this  day  as  monumental  works 
of  the    Jain    arts   and    architecture.     These 
inspire  the  people  with  such  spirit  of  awe  and 
veneration    that    they  worship    the    images 
installed     or    foot-prints     inscribed    therein. 
Besides      these,     there   are     also     a     good 
number   of  big  temples  erected  at   different 
times  at  enormous  costs  and  they   are   also 
held  in  great  esteem.     The  reader    will  find 
translations  of  some  Persian  Firmans  in    the 
Appendix  from  which  it  would  be  clear  that 
the     Swetambar     Jains     were    a     powerful 
community.      During  the  Mahomedan  period 
too   exercised  persuasive    influence  over  the 
reigning   sovereings  from  Vhom    they  were 
able  to  obtain  grants  of  places  of  pilgrimage 
throughout  the  length  and  breath  of  India, 

679 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

THE  SHATRUNJAYA  HILLS. 

Shatrunjaya  or  Siddhagiri  (lit.  hill  of  the 
perfected)  also  known  as  Siddhachal,  is  a 
celebrated  place  of  pilgrimage  at  Palitana 
in  Kathiawad  (Bombay  Presidency).  A 
full  description  of  this  sacred  place  is  to  be 
found  in  'The  Temples  of  Satrunjaya"  by 
J.  Burgess  and  the  following  lines  from  it 
would  be  an  interesting  reading. 

**It  is  truly  r  wonderful,  a  unique  place, 
a  city  of  temples  for  except  a  few  tanks, 
there  is  nothing  else  within  the  gates. 
Through  court  beyond  court,  the  visitor 
proceeds  over  smooth  pavements  of  grey 
chunam,  visiting  temple  after  temple 
most  of  these  built  of  stone  quarried  near 
Gopenath,  but  a  few  marble  : — all  elaborately 
sculptured  and  some  of  striking  proportions 
and  as  he  passes  along,  the  glassy-eyed 
images  of  pure  white  marble,  seem  to  peer 
out  at  him  from  hundreds  of  cloister  cell  ; 
such  a  place  is  surely  without  a  match  in  the 
world  :  and  there  is  a  cleanliness  withal, 
about  every  square  and  passage,  porch  and 
hall,  that  is  itself  no  mean  source  of 
pleasure." 

6So 


JAIN  PLACES  OF    PILGRIMAGE. 

Visitors      will     find      very     picturesque 

scenery  of  large  groups  of  the  Jain    temples 

on    different   tonlos    or   sammits    of  the   hill. 

The  most  important  of  these    are  (i)    Tonk 

of  Adishwar  Bhagwan.     It  is    Adishwar   or 

Rishavdeva's    image  consecrated  by   his  son 

Bslhubal    that    imoarts  its    peculiar    sanctity 

to  Shatrunjaya.      Although  the  old    image  is 

replaced,    yet  it  is    regarded    as  the  greatest 

of  the    Tirthas  by  the    Swetambaris  as    the 

whole  hill  i;  considered  very   sacred,  it  being 

the  place    where    \   large    number    of  saints 

entered  on  Nirvan. 

(2)  Khartar  vasi  Tonk. 

(3)  Chhipa  vasi  Tonk. 

(4)  Bimal  vasi  Tonk. 

(5)  Choumukhji  Tonk, 

All  of  these  have  temples,  large  or 
small,  built  by  the  Jains  of  different  ages 
and  climes. 

We  refer  to  the  learned  article  by 
Dr.  Buhler,  'The  Jain  inscriptions  from 
Shatrunjaya',  published  in  Epigraphia  Indica 
Vol  :  lip.  34-36  where  a  number  of 
import  I'lt  inscription^;  have  been  translated 
with    the    text    and     other  useful    historical 

681 

S6 


<l^ 


'     AN  EPITO  AE  OF  /AIUSM,  ' 

inforaiations    gathered    thereof  as  to  (i)  the 

political    hi^jtory   of  W  rsireni    liidii,    (2)  the 

dififereiit  Schools  of  J  iiii   .iioiiks,   aitd  (3)  the 
social. classification  of  the  Jain  laymen. 

PAWAPURI. 
This  is  a  holy  place  in  llie  Sub-division  of 
Bihar  in  the  district    of  Patna    about  7  miles 
South  of  Bihar.      It  was    here    that    the  last 
Tinhankar  Mahavir  attained  nirvdn.    There 
is    a    tank   in     the    place,    in    the     midst    of 
which  stands  the  temole  known  as  Jalmandir. 
The     foot-prints   of    Mahavira    Swami    are 
inscribed   there.      It    was    the    place    of    his 
cremation.     Tradition     says    that    countless 
people  came  to  attend    the  funeral  ceremony 
and  the  mere  act  of  takiaJ^  a    pinch  of  ashes, 
from  the  place  where  th-  s  i:je  was  cremated, 
created    such    a     '^reiit  -   ::  )llow      all    round 
the    spot,  that  afterwards  it  being  filled    with 
water,  became  transformed    into  the  present 
tank,     which     is    about    a    mile    in    circum- 
ference.    There  is  also  a  stone  bridge  about 
600  feet  in  length    across    the  tank    from  the 
bank  to  the  temple.     The  scenery    around  is 
really  charming.     Visitors  and    pilgrims  who 

682 


CD 


a. 


<a3 


03 


i 


JAIN  PLACES  OF  PILGRIMAGE, 

from  time  to  time  go  there,  find  at  proper 
season  of  the  year,  the  lake  decked  with 
lotuses  and  the  picturesque  temple  standing 
in  the  middle  with  its  dazzling  whiteness 
and  the  hills  of  Rajgir  at  a  distance 
as  a  suitable  back-ground  with  tall 
Tac  trees  scattered  here  and  there 
all  over  the  country.  There  is 
another  ancient  temple  known  as  Gaon 
Mandir. 

It  has    now    been    ascertained    from    the 

inscription  {Prashasti]  that  the  old  temple  was 

repaired  during  the  reign  of  Emperor    Shah 

Jahan  in  1641  A.D,   There  is  another  temple 

known  as     Samosaran.     This    word  *Samo- 

saran'    is    not    a    corruption    of   *Sravansala' 

as  suggested    by  Sir  A.    Cunningham  in    his 

Reports  Vol.    XI.   p,    171  ;    but  it    is  a  noun 

from    the    verb     'Samavasarati'    *to   present 

one's-seir.     The  tradition    is  that    the  place 

where      a       Tirthankar       presents     himself 

to    preach     his      sermons,     people     sit     in 

concentric   circles    around.      It    is    also   said 

that     this     whole      arrangement     is      made 

by    gods     who   also    used    to     attend     His 

lectures. 


Ah'  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

THE  PARESNATH  HILLS. 
The  Sammet  Sikhar  or  better  known  as 
the  Paresnath  Hills  is  another  important 
place  of  pilgrimage  of  the  Jains  in  India. 
The  mountain  is  situated  in  the  District  of 
Hazaribagh  in  Bengal  or  more  properly 
now  in  Bihar  and  Orissa  Presidency  and  is 
the  highest  one  in  this  part  of  the  country. 
Twenty  Tirthankars  out  of  twenty-four 
attained  nhvan  on  the  different  summits 
of  this  mountain  and  there  are  as  many 
temples  built  on  these  holy  places  to 
commemorate  their  memories. 

The  scenery  of  this  range  of  hills,  is  very 
beautiful   and     the   distance     is     about     12 
miles  from  the  Railway  Station    to   the  foot 
of  the    Hills  known   as  Madhuban.     There 
are     also   temples   here    built   by   both    the 
Swetambaxis    and    Digambaris.     The  whole 
region   is   shrouded   with    thick    forest   and 
the   ascent   to   some  of  the  summits   is  very 
steep.     One   has  to  travel  20  miles  or  there- 
about   to   take   a  round   to  these   summits 
from  Madhuban.      Streams   and   rivulets  lie 
across  the   way  through  the  valleys    between 
these   summits.     There  are  only   foot-prints 


Ceiling  Work  in  Dllv/ara  Temples   (Mt,  Abu). 


JAIN  PLACES   OF  PILGRIMAGE. 

of  the  different  Tirthaiikars  in  these  temples 
on  the  hills  except  the  one  dedicated  to 
Parshvvanath,  where  there  is  installed  the 
stone  image  of  this  23rd  Tirthankar. 

MOUNT  ABU. 
Next  we  may  mention  the  celebrated 
Jain  Temples  at  Dilwara  on  Mount  Abu  in 
Rajputana.  Col.  Todd  says  : — ''Beyond 
controversy  this  is  the  most  superb  of  all 
the  temples  in  India  and  there  is  not  an 
edifice  beside  the  Taj  Mahal,  that  can 
approach  it."  These  are  built  of  white 
marble  at  an  enormous  cost  by  rich  Jain 
merchants  and  are  very  widely  known  for 
delicacy  of  carving,  beauty  of  details  and 
magnificent  ornamentation.  The  illustration 
is  a  portion  of  a  celiing  and  the  reader  can 
easily  form  an  idea  of  its  grandeur,  which 
stands  unrivalled  as  a  piece  of  architecture. 
There  are  four  temples,  the  principal  one 
being  dedicated  to  Rishavdeva,  the  first 
Tirthankar.  Vimal  Shah  a  merchant  and 
banker  of  Guzrat  purchased  only  the  site 
from  the  king  by  covering  the  ground 
with     silver     coins   and   paying     the  same 

6Ss 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM, 

as  its  price.  It  took  14  years  to  build, 
and  is  said  to  have  cost  18  crores  of 
rupees  besides  59  lacs  in  levelling  the  hill. 
There  is  an  equestrian  statue  of  the  founder. 
Vardhman  Suri,  the  head  of  the  Swetambar 
Church  presided  at  the  dedication  ceremony 
by  Vimal  Shah  on  Mount  Abu  in  1031 
A.  D.  The  second  temple  is  dedicated  to 
Neminath  the  22nd  Tirthankar 

Vastupal  and  Tejpal  brother  ministers  of 
king  Viradhavala  of  Guzrat  erected  the  temple 
in  1231  A.  D.  in  the  front  wall  of  which 
there  are  two  niches  ornamented  with  elegant 
and  exquisite  designs  unequalled  in  India. 

On  another  summit,  a  few  miles  above 
Dilwara,  at  Achalgarh  there  is  a  temple 
containing  big  metal  images.  All  these 
temples  and  images  have  got  inscriptions 
of  great  historic  value  and  dates  between 
13th  to  1 6th  century  A.  D. 

6IRNAR  HILLS. 

It  is  the  place  of  nirvan  of  our  22nd 
Tirthankar  Neminath.  It  is  in  Sourastra, 
modern  Kathiawad  in  the  Bombay  Presi- 
dency.    The   hill   consists  of  several  peaks 

6S6 


TAIN  PLACES   OF  PILGRIMAGE, 

on  which  stand  numerous  Jain  temples. 
The  grandeur  of  the  scenery  round  about, 
is  simply  charming  as  will  be  seen  from  the 
half-tonef  plate  of  one  of  the  peaks  given 
herein.  The  famous  rock  inscriptions  of 
Asoka,  lie  at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  There 
are  other  important  Jain  inscriptions  at 
the  place.  The  Hindus  also  visit  the  hill 
as  being  sacred  to  the  memory  of  the 
anchorite  Dattatreya,  the  incarnation  of 
Shiva. 

RAJGIR. 

Rajgir  or  Rajagriha  is  another  place  of 
pilgrimage  of  the  Jains.  It  is  one  of  the 
most  ancient  cities  of  India  and  was  capital 
of  Magadh.  The  kings  of  Magadh  continued 
to  have  their  seat  of  G:)vernment  here  for 
a  long  time  and  it  played  an  important 
part  during  the  time  of  Buddha.  King 
Jarasandh,  a  contemporary  of  Krishna 
also  flourished  here.  Our  last  Tirthankar 
had  also  long  association  with  this  city 
as  he  passed  the  greatest  number  of 
Chaturmasya  (14)  after  he  became  an 
ascetic.     King  Prasenjit,  and  his  son  Shrenik 

68^ 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM, 

who  was  contemporary  of  Mahavir,  were  its 
kings.  It  was  his  son  Konik  who  removed 
the  capital  yr^w  Rajgir  to  Champa. 

Dhanna,  ShaHbhadra,  Acharya  Janibu- 
Swami  were  its  inhabitants.  The  place  is 
^sacred  to  the  Hindus,  the  Mahomedans, 
.the  Buddhists  and  the  Jains  alike.  There 
are  several  hot  springs  held  sacred  to  the 
followers  of  Vedas  known  as  Brahma  kund, 
Surya  kund  and  others,  and  a  fair,  mela 
i^  held  covering  the  period  of  one  month 
about  these  springs,  every  third  year  when 
flocks  of  pilgrims  crowd  the  place.  The 
spring  water  is  excellent  and  has  got 
mineral  properties.  Some  Mahomedan  saints 
breathed  their  last  in  the  place.  There 
are  shown  a  number  of  caves  and  other 
favourite  places  of  Buddha.  The  Jains 
hold  it  sacred  and  as  a  place  of  pilgrimage 
on  account  of  the  fanma,  Dikska  and  Keval 
/nan  of  the  20th  Tirthankar  Muni  Suvrat, 
a  contemporary  of  the  King  Ram 
Chandra,  an  incarnation  of  Vishnu  of  the 
Hindus. 

The  five  hills  are  known  as  : — (i)   Vipul- 
giri  (2)  Ratnagiri  (3)  Udaigiri  (4)  Swarnagiri 

t88 


JAIN  PLACES  OF  PILGRIMAGE. 

and  (5)  Vaibhargiri.     On  every  one  of  these 
there  are  Jain  Swetambar  temples. 

Benares,  Ajodhya,  Chanipapur    (Bhagal- 

pur)   are   also    regarded    as   holy  places    to 

the   Jains    as   being     Kalyanak   bhumis    of 

different    Tirthankars    and    contain  temples 

and  Dharamsalas, 


«7 


CHAPTER  XL. 
JAIN  LITEHATUPxE, 

Jain  Literature  forms  Om  of  tL.  Oltlest  Literary 
Records  in  tke  WorU  Tke  Pur/as— Tke  Angas  — 
Tkc  Purvas  liave  keen  lose  -We  hni  mention  of  tkeir 
Nam23only -Slllkin^raa  aai  t:i?ir  Oxnjin -Tite  Jain 
Sckohasts,  C  j^m  ra^acors  zsA  Autkorg. 

The  J  crA  LiieratUi.-  is  om-   of  the    oldest 
litt-'Miart::  .>i  lidin.      Accordiiio-  to   the    Jains 
the  last    Prophet    M  ihavira    Swami    taught 
the  ''Purvas''  to  his  disciples  who  afterwards 
composed,  the  Angas,  The  ''Purvas''  literally 
means    "Earlier"   and    they    were    so  called 
because  they  existed  prior  to  the  composition 
of    'Angas'     They     were    also     known     as 
DristibAd.     The  date    of  the    original    com- 
position of  these  An^as  which  are  in  popular 
dialects,  has  been    placed    tovards    the    end 
of  the   4th   and    the    beginning    of  the    3rd 
century    B.  C ,    by    the    Western    Scholars. 
But  it  is    not    proved    that    these  Angas  did 
not   exist    previous    to    this  date.     We  only 
find  mention  made  of  the  fact  that  the  earliest 
collection  of  these  sacred  texts  or  the  Agams 
took  place   at    Pataliputra   and  belonged  to 

690 


JAIN  LIT  ERA  TURE. 

theSwetambari  sect  who  are  still  in  possession 
the  oldest  of  the  Jain  literature.  This  collec- 
tion consisted  of  fourteen  Purvas  and  eleven 
An^as,  and  though  the  text,  of  these  Purvas 
have  been  entirely  lost  but  their  names  and 
conspectus  have  been  handed  down  to  us,  as 
in  the  following  :■ — 

I.  Utpdd.  2.  Ae'rdyani.  3.  Viryaprab&d. 
4.  Astindsti prabad.  5.  fnyan prabad,  6.  Satya 
prahdd.  7.  Atma  prabad,  8.  Karma  prabad. 
9.  Pratydkkydn  prabdd,  10.  Vaidydnu 
prabdd.  11.  Abandhya,  12.  Prdndyu.  13. 
Kriyd  Visdl.  \^.  Lokvindusdr, 

Gradually  the  Jain  canons  fell  into 
disorder  as  they  were  not  then  systematically 
reduced  to  writing.  In  order  to  save  them 
from  becoming  extinct  altogether,  another 
Council  was  held  in  Vallabhi  (Guzrat)  under 
the  presidency  of  Devardhi-gani  Kshama- 
shraman,  when  it  was  decided  to  collect  all 
the  existing  texts  and  to  preserve  the  same 
in  writing.  This  great  personage,  not  only 
collected  the  vast  sacred  literature,  then  avail- 
able, but  revised  and  arranged  the  whole  of 
them,  writing  them  down  from  memory. 
This  redaction  took   place    about   the  year 


;A 


AN  EPITOME   OFJAINISM. 

466  A.  D.  This  collection  is  the  origin  of 
the  present  Jain  canons.  Another  redaction 
was  made  by  Skandilacharya  at  Mathura, 
which  is  known  as  "Mathuri  Vslchana"  or 
Mathura  reading. 

About  these  sacred  books  of  the  Jains 
Dr.  Jacobi  says  "Regarding  their  antiquity 
many  of  these  books  can  vie.  with  the 
oldest  books  of  the  Northern  Buddhists". 
These  sacred  texts  or  Agams  are  collectively 
called  ''Siddhdnia^\  They  are  45  in  number 
and  are  divided  under  following  heads  : — 

Eleven  Angus 

Twelve  Up&ngas 

Four  Mul  Sutras 

Six  Chhed  Sutras 

Ten  Pdyannas 

Two  Chulikas. 

There  are  also  theJainiVi^<ai;«5or  Upanishads 

which  are  36  is  number.     (See  Appendix) 

The   Siddhantas   or    more    properly  the 

fain     Sutras     have     four-fold   commentary 

under  the  names  of  Ttkd,   Niryukti,  Churm 

.  .1.  ■   . 

and   Bk&sya   and   with    the   origuial    texts 

which  are   in   Prakrit,   they   constitute   the, 

five-fold      PanckAngi    Siddhantas,         The 

1^ 


JAIN  LITERATX^kE. 

Hierarch  Abhaideva  Suri  was  one  of  the 
great  commentators  of  these  canons.  Hari- 
bhadra  Suri  was  also  a  well-known  author 
of  some  of  these  commentaries.  As  the  Jain 
Hterature  devoloped  very  rapidly  throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  India,  we  find  a 
large  number  of  Jain  scholars,  authors,  com- 
mentators and  poets  cropping  up  in  almost 
every  age  up  to  the  present  time.  The 
texts  or  original  canons  are  in  Prakrit  or 
M^gadhi  or  more  properly  speaking 
Ardha-Magadhi,  the  popular  dialect  as  we 
have  already  stated,  and  the  commentaries 
are  embodied  in  Sanskrit. 

Bhadrab^hu,  who  was  a  very  distin- 
guished Jain  ascetic  and  scliolar  of  the  age, 
was  the  head  of  the  Church,  when  the  Sahgha 
met  at  Pataliputra  to  collect  the  canonical 
texts :  He  composed  the  Kalpa  Sutra, 
which  is  one  of  the  nine  divisions  of  Chapter 
vHl  on  the  discourse  on  PrdiydkhyAn 
of  a  great 'work  known  as  Dasdshruta 
Skanda.  It  is  held  in  high  estimation  as 
airea!dy  stated  and  is  annually  read  diiriftg 
tihe  Pajjusan  festival  in  Ckaturma^ya  "w\i\i 
g^eat  veiieration  arid  eclat. 


AN  EPITOME  OF  /AINISM. 

It  is  beyond  doubt  that  the  Jain  writers 
hold  a  prominent  position  in  literary  activity 
of  the  country.  Besides  the  Jain  Siddhanta 
and  its  commentaries,  there  are  a  great 
number  of  other  works  both  in  Prakrit  and 
Sanskrit  on  Philosophy,  Logic,  Astronomy, 
Grammar,  Rhetoric,  Lives  of  Saints  etc. 
both  in  prose  and  poetry.  Some  of  these 
poems  are  in  epic  style  full  of  poetic  imagery 
which  can  fully  cope  with  the  best  existing 
literature  ot  the  Hindus.  We  further 
possess  a  number  of  Kivyas  both  in  Prakrit 
and  Sanskrit,  which  for  the  most  part 
describe  the  lives  of  Tirthankars  and 
Ach^rjyas  and  other  great  personages  and 
are  generally  known  as  Charitras.  They 
generally  add  to  the  knowledge  of  our 
ancient  literature  of  India.  As  to  the  time 
their  composition  dates  back  as  early  as  the 
first  century  of  the  Christian  era.  Of  the 
Prakrit  Kcivyas,  many  of  them  are  now 
lost  to  us.  Among  the  existing  ones,  the 
Paum  Charitum  (Padma  Charita)  is  worthy 
of  mention,  as  one  of  the  oldest  Prakrit 
epics,  the  **Vasudeva  Hindi"  is  also  a 
voluminous   work   in   Prakrit  in   three  parts 


J  An:  LITERATURE. 

containing  in  a  fluent  style,  narrations  of  a 
great  many  legendry  stories  and  accounts. 
The  ''Samaraicha  Kaha"  and  the  *'Mahipal 
Charium"  are  also  old  and  important  works 
in  Prakrit.  In  short  the  Jain  literature 
comprising  as  it  does,  all  the  branches  of 
ancient  Indian  literature,  holds  noinsignificant 
a  niche  in  the  gallery  of  that  literature  and  as 
is  truly  said  by  Prof.  Hertal  ''with  respect  to 
its  narrative  part,  it  holds  a  prominent 
position  not  only  in  the  Indian  literature  but 
in   the  literature  of  mankind" 

The  Jains,  specially  their  monks,  were 
never  behind  in  literary  activity.  Besides 
'  Bhadrab^hu,  Devardigani,  Abhaideva 
Suri,  Haribhadra  Suri,  as  already  noticed, 
we  find  a  great  many  Jain  scholars  and 
philosophers  composing  works  on  different 
subjects  over  and  above  their  treatises  on 
religion  and  ethics.  Sh^kt^yana,  known  as 
one  of  the  eight  principal  grammarians,  was 
a  Jain.  He  was  much  earlier  to  Panini 
and  Patanjali  as  they  reapeatedly  mentioned 
him  in  their  works.  Siddhasena  Divakar, 
a  contemporary  of  king  Vikramaditya,  was 
the   author   of   many     philosophical    works. 

6gi 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINISM. 

Malayagiri  was  also  a  well-known  author. 
Devendra  Suri,  Shanti  Suri,  and  Dharma 
S^gar  also  composed  many  important  works. 
Among  the  later  authors  Acharjya  Hem- 
chandra  is  well-known  in  the  literary  circle 
and  he  contributed  greatly  towards  the 
preservation  of  the  history  of  our  sect.  His 
dictionary  and  other  works  besides  the  life  of 
King  Kumarpala,  a  prince  of  Guzrat,  and  his 
chief  disciple,  have  made  him  immortal 
and  proclaim  the  wealth  and  richness  of 
Jain  literature. 

The  Jains  have  got  a  rich  store  of  old 
and  valuable  Palm-leaf  manuscripts  still 
preserved  with  care  m  various  Bhandar^ 
in  the  West  and  South.  The  reader  will 
find  specimens  of  an  illustrated  palm-leaf 
manuscript  written  in  the  12th  century 
A.  D.  and  preserved  in  the  Patau  Bhandar. 
The  Jain  library  in  Jesalmir  is  far  famed  as 
containing  a  large  number  of  ancient 
manuscripts  both  on  palm  and  paper  leaves. 
The  various  Jain  libraries  of  Patau,  Ahmeda- 
bad,  Cambay,  Bhavnagar  and  Bikanir  are 
also  well  known.  These  are  consequences  qf 
a  customery  practice  with  the  Jains  which  find 


Q 


CO 


ON 
CSI 


CO 


CO 


JAIN  LITERATURE. 

in  startinsj  a  Bhandar  or  library  in  connection 
with  temples,  Upasaras  or  Poshdids.  This  is 
the  reason  why  we  find  Jain  libraries  in  almost 
every  big  city  of  Rajputana.  Malwa,  Guzrat 
and  Kathiawad,  attached  to  some  temple 
or  upasara,  established  at  different  periods  for 
the  use  of  the  Sangha.  Dr.  Buhler  mentions 
a  Mss.  of  the  Avasyak  Sutra,  which  bears 
date  A.  D.  1132  and  is  declared  to  be  the 
oldest  exiant  Sanskrit  manuscript  on  paper. 
The  oldest  classical  literature  of  both  the 
Kanarese  and  Tamil  are  composed  by  the 
Jains.  Further  to  quote  the  words  of  Dr. 
Barnett  "Some  day,  when  the  whole  of  the 
Jain  Scriptures  will  have  been  critically 
edited  and  their  contents  lexically  tabulated, 
together  with  their  ancient  glosses,  they 
will  throw  many  lights  on  the  dark  places 
of  ancient  and  modern  Indian  languages 
and  literature  " 

The  latter  Jain  works  abound  in 
Sanskrit  and  Vernacular  pieces.  We  find 
extensive  Vernacular  literature  among  the 
Jains  from  the  14th  or  isth  century  till  the 
present  day.  These  deal  mosdy  with  lives 
and    biographies  of   famous  Jain    Saints  and 


88 


A  A   EPITOME  OF  JAIN  ISM, 

Srdvaks,  tlieir  followers.  There  are  also  a 
large  number  of  pieces  replete  with  masterly 
literary,  moral  precepts  arid  rales  and  lessons 
on  the  technics  of  the  Jain  philosophy.  They 
are  composed  in  melodious  verses  and  in 
different  popular  metres  a-id  tunes  and  known 
as  Choupai,  Choudhalia,  Rasa,  Sijhyaya,  etc. 
The  Jain  Acharyas,  Sadr.u;.,  Munis  etc.  seem 
to  be  very  active  in  this  period  in  composing 
these  poems  in  Vernacular  which  must  have 
been  in  very  popular  use  both  in  Guzrat  and 
Rajputana  and  they  are  still  read  by  thousands 
of  the  Jains  in  their  leisure  hours.  The 
names  of  Yasavijoyji,  Anandghanji,  Samya- 
sundarji,  Devchandji,  Lalvijoyji,  Jin  Harkha 
Suriji  are  worthy  of  mention  in  this  con- 
nection. 


M 


CHAPTER  XLI. 
JAIN  ART  AND  ARCHITECTURE. 

Jam  SymLousm — Arts  and  Arclittccture  —Stages  of 
Davelo^ment  along  tt9  own  Unas — Dtnerenee  Latween 
tlie  Jam  and  Baidktst  Arts — Jatn  Patnttngs — Iti 
Plaea  tn  tke  Ancient  Art  Gallery  of  India  and  Influence 
over  tke  Community, 

Alike  its  philosophy  Jain  symbolism  has 
its  own  peculiarities.  A  translation,  of  ideas 
on  some  visible  substance  with  the  object 
of  permanency  is  the  first  principle  of  all 
arts  and  architecture.  Mr.  Balabhai  truly 
says  in  his  article  on  Jain  Architecture 
**that  Architecture  is  nothing  but  a  kind 
of  '  history ;  that  it  is  a  standing  and 
living  record  and  it  supplies  us  a  mor^  ' 
vivid  and  lasting  picture  of  a  nation  than 
History  does."  In  a  chapter  on  **Jain 
Architecture  and  Literature"  of  a  recently 
published  book  "Thi  Heart  of  Jainism",  the 
author  says  ^'The  earliest  Jain  Architects 
seem  to  have  u^ed  wood  as  their  chief 
building  material".  We  think  this  theory  is 
not  based  on  facts  and  cannot  be  md,intained 

^P9 


AN  EPITOME  OF  fAINISM. 

In  the  first  place  as  far  as  we  can  gather 
from  the  existing  materials,  this  religion 
took  its  hold  among  the  middle  class  ; 
and  its  followers,  the  Srdvakas,  were  mostly 
engaged  in  trade  and  higher  callings.  The 
architectJvfor  the  most  part,  came  from  lower 
classes,  and  were  only  engaged  by  the  Jains. 
In  order  to  give  permanency  to  their  objects 
of  worship,  they  invariably  used  stone  and 
metal.  The  discovery  in  recent  years  of  the 
ruins  of  many  Jain  temples  built  centuries 
before  the  Christian  era,  also  confirms  the 
fact  that  the  earliest  Jain  Architecture  was 
not  only  limited  to  wood. 

Much  has  been    written  in   recent    years 
about    Indian  Art   and   Architecture    and  to 
some  extent    this  is    applicable  to    Jain  Art. 
Mr.  V.  A.    Smith  in    his    "History   of    Fine 
Arts    in    India  and    Ceylon"    says,   "Hindu 
Art    including    Jain    and     Buddhist    in    the 
comprehensive  term,  is  the  real    Indian  Art" 
The  special  feature  of  Jain  Art  lies  in  the  fact 
that   it  shows  the  relative  position  of  natural 
objects  with  gre<it  fineness.      It  is  sometimes 
aiccused  of  Conventionalism,   but  this  is    true 
of  all  arts  devoted  to  religions  subjects." 

TOO 


JAIN  ART  AND  ARCHITECTURE. 

In  the  opinion     of  Col     Tod.     'Their 
(Jains)    arts   like    their    religion,    were    of  a 
character  quite  distinct  from    those  of  Shiva. 
The      temple     of      Mahavira    at     Nadole, 
(Marwar)     the    last    of    their    twenty-four 
apostles,  is  a  very  fine  piece  of  Architecture. 
Its    vaulted    roof  is  a   perfect    model    of  the 
most    ancient    style    of    dome  in    the    East, 
probably  invented  anterior  to  the  Romans." 
The  famous    Jain    temples    on    Mount    Abu, 
are  triumphs  of   Architecture  ;    the    delicacy 
and    richness    of   their    carvings    are   unsur- 
passed   in    the    whole    world.     As    for    the 
antiquity  of  Jain  architecture,  the  excavation 
of  Kankalt  TillA    near  Mathura,  establishes 
it  without  any  doubt  that  the  erection  of    the 
Stupas  must  have  taken    place    several   cen- 
turies before  the  Christian  Era  and  according 
to   Western    Scholars,    these     are     perhaps 
the     oldest   buildings    in     India.     Formerly 
the  Jains  used  to  build    Stupas  as    imitated 
by  the    Buddhistic    and    their   ancient   relief 
sculptures  are   also  well-known.     They  were 
the  greatest  temple-builders  in  Western  India. 
The  great  Jain    Temple  on    the    Shatrunjoy 
Hills  near  Palitana  in  Kathiawar  as   already 


j4N  epitome  of  JAIN  ism. 

noted,  are  all  imposing  edifices.  The  wh6le 
hill  appears  like  one  mass  of  temples  and 
the  grouping  of  buildings  in  a  limited  area 
is  another  peculiarity  of  the  Jain  Art  There 
exist  several  Jain  columns  in  Southern 
India  and  they  are  described  as  specimens 
of  "a  remarkably  pleasing  design.  They 
are  a  wonder  of  light,  elegant,  highly 
decorated  stone  work  and  nothing  can 
surpass  the  stately  grace  of  these  beautiful 
pillars  whose  proportions  and  adaptations 
to  surrounding  scenery  are  always  perfect 
and  whose  richness  of  decoration  never 
offends.  In  the  whole  range  of  Indian  Art, 
there  is  nothing  perhaps  equal  to  the 
Kanara  Jain  pillars  for  good  taste." 

Numerous  Jain  cave  temples  have  been 
discovered  in  different  parts  of  India  in 
the  West  and  South.  The  Jain  caves  at 
Elura  form  a  series  by  themselves  and 
contain  very  elaborate  and  superior  Architec- 
ture works.  Mr.  Griffitlis  says  in  the 
'Introduction'  of  his  well-known  work 
•Ajanta'.  *The  Jains  excavated  sorne  five 
or  si^  extensive  works  which  form  a  very 
impofta?tit  group  of  caves,   of*e  <rf  the  largest 


JAIN  ART  AND  ARCHITECTURE. 

and  most  elaborate,  the  Indra  S  <bha  being 
about  90  feet  deep  and  80  feet  wide  and 
14  feet  high".  There  are  a  number  of 
ancient  Jain  caves  in  Orissa  on  hills  known 
2iS  Khindgiri,  C/datg'iri 'a.nd  W/f/W,  dating 
as  far  back  as  2nd  century.  B    C. 

The  ideas  of  Jain  and  Buddhist  sculp- 
tures are  almost  alike  and  the  images  of 
Jain  Tirthankars  and  Buddhas  are  ofct^m 
mistaken  one  for  another.  In  the  common 
posture  of  padmdsan  they  look  similar 
except  for  the  symbols  cognisant  of  the 
Tirthiinkaras  and  signs  of  garment  or  thread 
over  the  neck  and  body  of  the  Buddhas 
We  have  seen  some  Buddhist  images  being 
worshipped  by  the  Jains  as  their  own.  The 
images  of  Jain  Tirthankars  are  generally 
sitting  in  Pidm^s  n  and  s  jmetimes  in 
standing  Kdyotsarga  posture,  and  some  time 
Ardha  padmas^in  style.  One  of  the  illustra- 
tions of  the  book  is  a  half-tone  print  of  a  very 
old  metal  image  from  the  South.  Among 
the  Swetambaris  there  are  also  metal  images 
known  as  ''Pancktirthis'  or  images  of  the 
Five  Tirthankars  in  one  piece.  The  middle 
image  is  one  of  any  of  the  24  Tirthankars  in 


AN  EPITOME  OF  JAINTSM. 

padmdsan^  two  standing,  Kayotsarga  ones, 
one  on  each  side  of  the  middle  one  and  two 
padrndsan  images  on  both  sides  on  the  top 
of  the  standinor  figures.  We  moreover  find 
other  fiorures  of  o-ods  and  goddesses  as 
musicians  and  votaries  some  worshipping 
and  some  waving  chamars,  some  in  prayers 
kneelino-  or  standing;  with  folded  hands  &c. 
We  also  find  figures  of  elephants  carrying 
water  or  water-pots  with  their  trunks  pouring 
over  the  head  of  the  Tirthaiikars  on  both 
sides. 

The  statues  at  Sravana  Belgola  (Mysore) 
of  Dio'ambaris  and  Karkala  and  Yemur  in 
South  Canara  are  well-known,  gigantic  and 
perhaps  the  largest  free-standing  statues  in 
Asia.  The  biggest  one  is  about  57  feet  in 
height  and  is  cut  out' of  one  solid  block  of 
stone. 

The  place  of  Jain  paintings  among  the 
Indian  Fine  Arts  is  also  of  importance.  A 
special  feature  of  Jain  painting  lies  in  the  drift 
and  quality  of  its  line.  Line  is  the  chief  thing 
which  shows  the  difference  of  objects.  This 
line  is  so  finely  drawn  in  the  Jain  School 
of  Painting    that  there    is  no    school  of   Art 

70  f 


.f AIM  ART  AND   ARCHITECTURE. 

which  bears  a    comparison  with  it.     Chinese 
Art  is    famous   for    its  powerful    lines.     The 
excellence  of  this    painting   lies  in   the    fact 
of  its   being    obtained  by    the    application  of 
line.     It    has  been   denionostrated    that  this 
art  was    borrowed    from  India.     Time    may 
prove    that  the    Chinese    might    have  learnt 
the  skill    from  the    Jains.      Like  the  ancient 
Hindu    and    Buddhistic    paintings,    the  Jain 
ones,    too    were     restricted     to   pictures    of  ^ 
unseen  subjects    depicting   important   events 
of  history,    the  deeds   of   saint'-^    and  heroes. 
These    paintings    were  confined    to  religious 
subjecfs  and  as    they  had  a   sanctity  of  their 
own,  they  were    generally  preserved  both  in 
temples    and    homes   with    great  veneration. 
The     Jains    were    also    fond    of  illustrating 
their  religions  texts  with  paintings. 

Dr.  Coomarswami  in  his  Notes  on  the 
Jain  Art  says,  **The  Jain  paintings  are  not 
only  very  important  for  the  students  of  Jain 
Iconography,  Archeology  and  as  illustra- 
ting costumes,  manners  and  customs,  but  are 
of  equal  or  greater  interest  as  being  oldest 
known  Indian  paintings  on  paper."  The 
reader  will  find  two  plates  prepared  from   the 

705 

89 


Aisr  EPITOME  OF  J  A  IN  ISM. 

paiiitings  in  the  N.ihar  F;  nvMy  collection  in 
manuscripts  of  Kalpa  Sutra  by  Bhadrabahu 
(about  356  B.  C.)  where  \y.^  deals  with  the 
lives  of  the  Jains.  They  3-e  on  the  same 
suhject  from  the  life  of  Parswanath,  the 
23rd  Tirthankar  and  i>ive  ox*:ellent  points  for 
compaiison.  In  one  of  thest:  pictures  will  be 
found  the  very  sharp-hooked  nose  and  large 
eyes  with  no  less  asthetlc  value  of  early 
Indian  paintings.  In  the  second  one  we  find 
much  developed  ideas  uhJtir  the  influence 
of  the  Maiiomedan  period.  The  interesting 
changes  in  dr.ipery,  posture,  colouring  and 
everything  else,    is  very   striking. 

Another  plate  (through  the  courtesy  of 
J.  S.  Conference,  Bombay, ":  contains  portraits 
of  the  Jain  Acharya  Hem  Chandra  and  King 
Kuvnarpal  from  a  pahrj  1^  vf  manuscript 
wisiten  in  the  ytr^v  i:. j;  A.  D.  and 
preserved  in  the  Bh  i.i  :.ir  at  Patau. 
These  pictures  show  the  peculiar  style  and 
serve  as  specimens  of  e.irlv  Jnin  paintings. 
The  Mrihomedan  period  entirely  changed 
the  idea.  It  is  only  in  the  later  period  that 
we  find  painiinos  of  bui! Ji^'i^s,  scenery  and 
portraits  throughout  the  country. 

FINIS, 


Q 


CO 


s 


S 


O 


1 


Appendix  A. 


Date  of  King  Chandra  Gupta> 

Much  has  been  written  by  various  scholars 
European,  Indian  and  others,  quoting  various 
authorities  in  support  of  their  researches  into 
the  date  of  this  great  king.  I  do  not,  therefore, 
discuss  the  subject  at  any  length  but  consider- 
ing that  the  following  note  may  be  of  some 
help  to  the  students  of  antiquity,  I  quote  a  few 
extracts  from  our  ancient  Jain  works.  The 
generally  accepted  date  of  his  reign  according  to 
European  Scholars,  is  from  321  or  322  B.C.  to 
296  or  298  B.  C.  i.  e.  about  24  or  25  years. 
It  is  already  mentioned  in  the  Introduction  that 
Mahavira  attained  nirvdn  in  527.  B.C.  or  470 
years  before  the  Vikram  Era  Sdrnva^).  The 
period  of  470  years  covers  therefore  the  time 
from  527  B.C.  to  57  B.C.  and  it  is  clear 
therefore  that  Chandra  Gupta  must  have 
flourished  during  the  time.  According  to  the 
Ceylonese   account    Chandra   Gupta     ruled     for 


[     ii     ] 

28  years.  In  Jain  works,  we  find  a  number 
of  dynasties  of  Kings  to  reign  during  the 
aforesaid  period. 

To  cite  authority  in  support  of  the  point 
in  question  reference  is  made  to  the  following 
extracts  from  Tithoogdltya  Payannd. 

^'^  Iigfftf  ftlFf  T'^  ^Xi  frTST^^  iTWll^Tt  I 

mg^^^  ^  ^^  ^^  ^^fti^m  ^^t^  i 
g^^T^  '^is^^t  ?ft^T  Hii  ^  fw^m  II 

^gfHTT  wgfiTTn  ^I^^TfT^I  fff?T  5!^%^  I 

^\^  wii{n  5^  qf%^^??r  ^'ft  TTm  II 

^ft  fsfs^q^  ^Tf  eft  ^^5^  ^Jft  TT^T  II'* 
We   find    almost   the   same    version    in     the 
* '  Tirthoddhdra  Prakirnaka, ' 

^f  ^^  gftsn^  ^  f^^  3^f??Tfw  II  ^11 

[Substance  : — In  the  same  night  in  which 
Tirthankar  Mahavira  attained  nirvdn.  King 
Paluka  of  Avanti  was  installed.  He  reigned  for 
60  years.  Then  came  the  9  Nanda  kings  who 
successively  reigned  for  155  years.  Then  Mourya 


[  iii  ] 

kings  reigned  for  io8  years.  After  that  Puspamitra 
ruled  for  30  years.  Then  came  Balamitra  and 
Bhanumitra,  whose  reign  lasted  for  60  years. 
Nalavahan  or  Navabahan  ( another  reading  is 
•T^  ^^  i-e.  THt  ^TWW)  succeeded  them  as  a  king 
and  ruled  for  40  years.  He  was  followed  by 
Gardhavilla,  who  again  reigned  for  13  years  and 
then  came  king  Shaka  for  4  years.] 

According  to  these  authorities  the    dates   are 
as  follows  : — 


Mahavira's  nirvAn 

King  Paluka 

Nanda  Kings 

Mourya  Kings 

Pushpa  Mitra 

Balamitra 

and 
Bhanumitra  , 

Nalavahana      1 
or  NavavahanaJ 

Gardhavilla 

Shaka  Kings 


527  B.C. 
527 — 467  B.C. 
467 — 312  B.C. 
312 — 204  B.C. 
204—174  B.C. 

174 — 114  B.C. 

114 — 74  B.C. 

74—61  B.C. 
61 --57  B.C. 
Hem    Chandra   gives   the    date   of  Chandra 
Gupta  in  his  Parishishta  Parvus  as, — 

i.e.  155  years  after  Mahavira's  nirvdn  or  372  B.C. 


[     iv     ] 

Chandra  Gupta  is  said  to  be  contemporary  of 
Bhadrabahu  whose  date  371 — 357  B.C.  does  not 
also  appear  to  be  correct. 

It  is  therefore  difficult  to  reconcile  the  differ- 
ence of  60  years  (372 — 312),  although  we  find 
this  last  date  viz,  312  B.C.  referred  to  in  other 
,  Jain  works  of  high  antiquity,  as  the  date  of 
this  king.  Moreover  there  is  only  difference 
of  9  or  10  years  in  this  date  of  the  great 
king  and  the  one,  generally  acknowledged  by 
the  Western  Orientalists.  Hema  Chandra  must 
have  omitted  by  oversight,  to  count  the 
period  of  60  years  of  King  Paluka  after 
Mahavira. 

It  appears  from  the  Jain  records  that  the 
king  Srenika,  son  of  the  king  Prasenajit,  known 
otherwise  as  Bimbisara  or  Bambhasara,  was 
reigning  at  Rajgriha  and  was  a  contemporary 
of  Mahavira.  He  was  succeeded  by  his  son 
Asoka  Chandra  or  Kunika  who  removed  his 
capital  from  Rajgriha  to  Champd  and  was 
followed  by  his  son  Udayee.  It  was  he  who 
founded  P^taliputra  and  removed  his  capital 
from  Champi  to  the  new  city  and  died  without 
any  issue.  Then  came  the  9  Nanda  kings 
followed  up  by  Mourya  kings  beginning  with 
Chandra  Gupta. 


t       V      ] 

We  may  reasonably  refer  this  gap  of  a  few 
years  between  Mahavira's  nirvdn  and  the 
accession  to  the  throne  by  the  first  Nanda  king, 
to  Kunika  and  Udayee  as  they  were  reigning  in 
the  interim.  This  ascription  of  sixty  years  to 
the  se  two  kings  does  not  at  all  appear  to  be 
inconsiderable. 

Chandra   Gupta    was   succeeded    by    his  son 

Bindusara  and  then  came  his  grandson  the  great 

Asoka,   King     Priyadarshi    of    the     inscriptions. 

Asoka    was  succeeded  by  his  grandson  Samprati, 

as  his  son    Kunala  was    blind.     Samprati    was   a 

great  Jain  monarch  and  a  staunch  supporter  of  the 

faith.    He  erected  thousands  of  temples  throughout 

the  length   and    breadth    of  his  vast  empire   and 

consecrated  large  number  of  images.     I  have  not 

come  across    any  inscription  of  his  time  although 

I  have   seen   a   considerable    number  of    images 

which  are  said  to  have    been    consecrated  by  this 

king,     The    peculiarity    of     these     images    lies 

in  the  fact  that  all    the    images  have   got    marks 

of  pillow  under  the  elbow.     He  is  stated  further 

to  have  sent  Jain  missionaries  and  ascetics  abroad 

to   preach  Jainism  in    the  distant   countries   and 

to   spread  the  faith  amongst  people  there. 


Appendix  B. 

Firmans  and  Sunnuds. 

(a) 

[Firman  of  Emperor  Akbar  dated  1592  A.D. 
in  the  37th  year  of  his  reign.  In  Ain  Akbari 
(  Gladwin's  translation  Vol.  I,  p.  538  )  in  the 
list  of  the  learned  men  of  his  time,  Heer  Vijoy 
Suri,  is  mentioned  as  Hariji  Sur  (No.  16.)] 

Firman  of  Jelaliiddin  Mahomed  Akbar 
Badsha^  the  Victorious* 

GOD  IS  GREAT, 

Glory  of  religion  and  world.  Jelaluddin 
Akbar  Badsha,  the  son  of  Humayaon 
Badsha>  the  son  of  Babar  Badsha,  the  son 
of  Shaik  Omer  Mirza,  the  son  of  Sultan 
Aboo  Syud,  the  son  of  Sultan  Mahomed 
Mirza  the  son  of  Meerum  Shah,  the  son 
of  Amir  Tymoor,  the  Lord  of  happy 
conjunction   (Jupiter  and  Venus).  -Seal. 

Know  !  ye  officers  of  the  present  and  future 
times, .  and  the  Governors,  Tax-collectors  and 
the  Jagirdars  of  the  subas  of  Malwa  (torn)  of 
Akbarabad,  the  seat  of  Callips  of  Lahore,  the 
Metropolis  of  Mooltan  and  Ahmedabad,  the 
places  of  safety  of  Ajmer,  the  place  of  blessed- 
ness of  Meerut,  Gujrat  and  the  Sooba  of  Bengal 
and  of  other  territories  under  our  Government. 


[     vii     ]    . 

Whereas  the  whole  of  our  noble  thought  and 
attention  is  directed  to  attend  to  the  wishes 
and  seek  the  pleasures  of  subjects,  and  the 
sole  aim  of  our  mind  which  wishes  well  of  all, 
is  to  secure  love  and  affection  of  the  people 
and  the  ryots  who  are  the  noblest  trust  (com- 
mitted to  our  charge)  of  the  Lord,  the  great 
bestower  of  bounties,  and  whereas  our  mind 
is  specially  occupied  in  searching  for  the  men 
of  pure  hearts,  and  those  that  are  devotional, 
therefore  whenever  tidings  of  any  person  or 
persons  of  any  religion  and  creed  passing  his 
valuable  time  solely  in  contemplation  of  God 
comes  to  our  ear,  we  become  extremely  desirous 
of  ascertaining  his  virtues  and  intrinsic  merits, 
without  any  regard  to  his  religion,  faith  or  creed, 
and  by  laudable  means  and  in  honorable  manner 
we  bring  him  from  afar,  admit  him  into  our 
presence,  and  enjoy  the  pleasure  of  his  company. 

As  many  a  time  the  accounts  of  the  godliness 
and  austere  devotion  of  Hur  Bejoy  Soor,  an 
Acharja  (preceptor)  of  the  Jain  Sitambari 
sect  and  those  of  his  disciples  and  followers 
who  live  a't  the  ports  of  Gujrat,  had  come  to 
noble  ear,  we  sent  for  and  called  him  after  the 
interview  which  made  us  very  glad,  was  over, 
he  intended  to  take  leave  in   order   to   return   to 


[     viii     ]  :_ 

his   beloved   and    native  country.     He  therefore 
requested   that   by   way     of  extreme     kindness 
and    favour   a  Royal    Mandate,    which  is  obeyed 
by  all  the  world,  be  issued  to  the  effect    that   the 
heaven-reaching      mountains      of      Siddhachalji 
Girnarji,    Tarungaji,   Kessurianathji    and   Abooji 
situate    in    the    country    of  Gujrat,    and    all   the 
five    mountains   of   Rajgirji,    and    the   mountain 
of  Somed  Sekhurji  alias   Paresnathji,    situate    in 
the    country  of  Bengal,  and  all  the  cotees  and  all 
temples  below  the  mountains,    and    all  the  places 
of  worship  and  pilgrimage  of  (followers   of)     the 
Jain    Sitambari   religion    throughout  our  empire. 
Wherever   they   may    be,    be    in  his  possession  ; 
and   that    no   one   can    slaughter  any  animal  on 
those   mountains   and    in  the   temples   or    below 
or   about   them.     As   he    had  come  from  a  long 
distance   and    in    truth    his   request  was  just  and 
proper,    and  appeared  not  to  be  repugnant  to  the 
Mohamedan  Law  ;  it  being   the    rule  of  the  reli- 
gious sages  to  respect  and  preserve  all  religions  ; 
and  as  it  become  evident  upon    our  enquiry   and 
after  thorough  investigation  that  all  those  moun- 
tains and    places   of  worship  really  belong  to  the 
(followers    of  the)    Jain    Sitambari  religions  from 
a  long   space   of  time,    therefore  we  comply  with 
his  request  and  grant  to,  and  bestow    upon,    Hur 


[     ix     ] 

Bejoy  Soor  Acharj  of  the  Jain  Sitambari 
religion  the  mountain  of  Siddhachal,  the  moun- 
tain of  Girnar,  the  mountain  of  Tarunga,  the 
mountain  of  Kesuria  Nath,  and  the  mountain  of 
Abbo  lying  in  the  country  of  Gujrat,  and  the 
five  mountains  of  Rajgiree,  and  the  mountain 
of  Somed  Sekhur  alias  Pareshnath,  situate  in 
the  country  of  Bengal,  and  all  the  places  of 
worship  and  pilgrimage  below  the  mountains 
and  wherever  these  may  be,  any  places  of 
worship  appertaining  to  the  Jain  Sitambary 
religion  throughout  our  empire.  It  is  proper 
that  he  should  perform  his  devotion  with  the 
ease  of  mind. 

Be  it  known  that  although  these  mountains 
and  places  of  worship  and  pilgrimage,  the  seats 
of  the  Jain  Sitambari  religion,  have  been  given 
to  Hur  Bejoy  Soor  Acharj,  yet  in  reality  they 
all  belong  to  the  followers  of  the  Jain  Sitambari 
religion. 

Let  the  orders  of  this  everlasting  Firman 
shine  like  the  sun  and  the  moon  amongst  the 
followers  of  the  Jain  Sitambari  religion,  so 
long  as  the  sun,  the  illumination  of  the  universe, 
continues  to  impart  light  and  brightness  to  the 
day,  and  the  moon  remains  to  give  splendour 
and  beauty  to  the  night.  Let  no  one  offer  any 
B 


[  X  ] 

opposition  or  raise  any  objection  to  the  same,  and 
let  no  body  slaughter  any  animal,  on,  below  or 
about  the  mountains  and  in  the  places  of  worship 
and  pilgrimage.  Let  the  orders  of  this  Firman 
be  obeyed  by  all  the  world,  be  acted  upon  and 
carried  out,  and  let  none  depart  from  the  same 
or  demand  a  new  Sanad.  Dated  the  7th  of 
the  month  Urdi  Bihisht,  corresponding  with  the 
month  Rabeoolawwal  of  the  thirty-.seventh  year 
of  the  auspicious  reign." 

Translated  by  me 
(Sd,)     Md.  Abdulla  Munshi 
Rajkoomar  College,  Rajkote. 

II-II75- 


(b)      . 

[Firman    of   Emperor    Jehangir  dated    i6o^. 
A.  D.  in  the  2nd  year  of  his  reign.] 

A  Firman  of  the  Victorious  King  Noroodin 
Mohanimad  Jahan(fir  Badshah  Gazi. 

GOD  IS  GREAT. 

Nooroodin  Mohammad  Jahangir  Badshah 
Gazi.  The  son  of  Akbar  Badshah,  the 
son  of  Hoomayoon  Badshah,  the  son 
of  Babar  Badshah,  the  son  of  Omar 
the  son  of  Sooltan  Aboo  Syed.  the  son 
of  Sooltan  Mohammad  Mirza  Shah, 
the  son  of  Miran  Sahab,  the  son 
of    Amir    Timoor     Saheb      Kiran.— Seal. 

May  it  be  known  to  the  noble  Governors  and 
the  Officers  (who  by.  thriftness  (bring  about) 
prosperity  and  the  Jagirdar  and  tax-gatherers 
and  the  accountants  connected  with  the  impor- 
tant affairs  and  all  (those)  having  to  do  with  , 
the  protected  territories  especially  of  the  Soobah 
of  Gujarat  that  : — Whereas,  the  heart  of  him, 
who  knows  his  duty  (and  is)  truly  a  well  wisher 
of  the  creatures  of  God  namely  of  every  section 
and  community  is  occupied  with  and  takes  an 
interest  in  the  prosperity  of  all  creatures,  there- 
fore at  present  Bekah  Harakh    Parmananda    Jati 


[     xii     ] 

having  presented  himself  in  the  presence  of  the 
protector  of  creatures^  made  a  representation 
to  those  who  were  standing  at  the  foot  of  the 
throne  as  follows  : — (That  as)  Baji  Sen  Soor 
and  Baji  Dev  Soor  and  Khoosh  Faham  Nand. 
Baji  Paran  have  temples  and  Dharamshalas  in 
every  place  and  every  town  and  are  engaged 
in  (the  practice  of)  austerity  and  devotion  and 
seeking  after  God.  And  whereas  the  circum- 
stances relative  to  the  devotional  exercises  and 
meditating  on  God  of  the  abovementioned  Bekah 
Harakh  Paramanand  Jati  became  known  (to  us) 
thereupon  the  order  of  the  king  of  the  world 
(and)  the  nations  was  issued  as  follows  : — "No 
one  shall  put  up  in  the  temples  and  Dharma- 
shalas  of  that  community  and  no  one  shall  enter 
into  them  without  permission.  And  should  they 
wish  to  rebuild  them,  no  one  shall  oppose  them 
And  no  one  shall  alight  at  the  houses  of  their 
disciples.  And  should  (they  go)  to  the  holy 
place  (Tirat  of)  Satrunja  in  the  country  Sorat 
for  the  purpose  of  worshipping,  no  one  shall  ask 
and  demand  from  them  (anything)."  And 
further  in  accordance  with  the  representation  and 
request  of  that  man,  (His  Majestys')  exalted 
order  was  issued  that  on  Sunday  and  Thursday 
in  every  week  and  the  day  of  new  moon  of  every 


C     xiii     ] 

month  and  the  days  of  feasts  and  every  new 
year's  day  and  in  the  month  of  Navroj  and  one 
day  in  the  month  of  Yar  Mah  on  which  blessed 
(day^  we  were  weighed  for  governing  the  per- 
manent Kingdom  shall  be  observed  year  after 
year  as  long  as  the  years  of  our  permanent 
Kingdom  shall  pass  on.  On  one  day  there  shall 
be  no  killing  of  animals  in  (ourj  protected  king- 
dom ;  and  no  one  on  that  day  shall  hunt  and 
catch  and  kill  birds  and  fish  and  such  like.  It  is 
necessary  that  paying  attention  to  the  above- 
mentioned  order  they  shall  not  deviate  and  go 
astray  ;  in  respect  of  its  being  carried  out  and 
becoming  permanent.  This  shall  be  considered 
as  (their)  duty.  Dated  the  month  of  Yar  in  the 
year  3. 

High  Court,  Bombay.       (  A  true  translation  ) 
26tk  June,  1875.        (Sd.)  Goolam  Mohaideen 

Translator, 


(c) 

[Firman  of  Emperor  Shahjahan  dated  1629 
A.D.,  Second  year  of  his  reign] 

A  Firman  of  the  Victorious  King  SJinh- 
hoodin  Mohonimad  Haheh  Kirmi  Sani  Shah 
Jahan  Badshah  Gazi 

The  Victorious  King  Shahboodin  Moha- 
mmad Saheb  Kiran  Sani  Shah  Jahan 
Badshah  Gazi,  the  son  of  Jahangir 
Badsdah,  the  son  Akbar  Padshah,  the 
son  of  Hum^yun  Badshah.  th'^  son  of 
Babar  Badshah,  the  son  of  Shekh  Oomar 
Mirza,  the  son  of  Sooltan  A.boo  Sayed, 
the  son  of  Sultan  Mohammad  Mirza, 
the  son  of  Miran  Shah,  the  son 
of    Amir    Timoor    Saheb      Kiran -Seal. 

GOD  IS  GREAT. 

Whereas  His  Majesty  has  received  a  repre- 
sentation as  follows  : — The  temples  of  Chinta- 
man  and  Satronja  and  Sankesar  and  Kesari 
existed  from  the  ancient  time  before  the  fortu- 
nate accession  of  (  His  Majesty  )  to  the  throne 
and  there  are  three  Posals  at  Ahmedabad  and 
four  others  at  Khambait  (  Cambay  )  and  one 
at  Sorat  and  one  at  Radhanpur  in  the  possession 
of  Satidas.     The   gracious   and   noble   command 


[       XV      ] 

of  (  His  Majesty  )  whom  the  world  obeys  who 
is  as  exalted  as  are  the  heavens  has  issued  to  the 
effect  that  no  person  shall  put  up  at  the  above- 
mentioned  places  and  spots,  and  no  one  shall 
approach  them,  for  they  have  been  granted  to 
them.  And  the  Sevras  may  read  aloud  &c  the 
books  of  Sagar  and  Sarookan,  may  live  in  the 
Soobah  of  Goojrat.  and  shall  not  quarrel,  among 
themselves,  and  shall  not  (  do  anything  )  against 
orders  ;  and  they  shall  employ  themselves  in 
praying  for  the  permanency  of  the  Kingdom. 
It  is  necessary  that  the  Governors  and  officers 
of  those  places  in  accordance  herewith,  knowing 
(  this  )  to  be  settled,  shall  not  allow  any  person 
to  transgress  (  this  )  Written  on  the  twenty  first 
of  the  month  of  Azarma  Ilahi  in  the  year  2. 


High  Court,  Bombay.         (  A  true  translation,  ) 
26th  June  1865.  Sd.  Goolam  Mohaideen., 

Translator, 


(d) 

[Firman  of  Emperor  Shahjahan    dated     1657 
A.D.  31st  year  of  his  reign.] 

GOD  IS  GREAT. 

A  Firman  of  the  victorious    king  Mohant' 
niedshah  Saheb  Kir  an  Sani  Badahah  GaH. 

Mohammad  ..  Saheb  Kiran  Sani 
Badshah  Gazi,  the  son  of  Jahangir 
Badshah,  the  son  of  Akbar  Badshah, 

the  son  of  Humayon the  son  of 

Amir  Timor    Kiran    Saheb. — Seal. 

At  this  time  the  exalted  and  auspicious 
Firman  of  His  Majesty  is  issued  and  published  as 
follows : — The  parganah  of  Palitana  (is)  situated 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  Sorat  a  dependency  of 
the  Soobah  of  Ahmedabad  that  is  called  Satranja 
and  was  given  as  a  Jagir  to  (my)  fortunate  son 
the  object  most  charming  to  the  sight  of  the  state 
(who  is  as)  a  white  mark  on  the  forehead  (of  a 
horse)  auguring  the  prosperity  (of  the  state  who 
is  as)  a  flourishing  plant  of  the  garden  of  mon- 
archy, a  seedling  of  the  orchard  of  the  kingdom, 
the  light  of  the  pupil  of  grandeur,  the  fruit  of  the 
garden  of  greatness,  the  noble,  the  dignified 
prince  Mohammad  Moorad  Baksh.  The  revenue 
thereof  being   two   lacs   of  money,  the  same  has 


[     xvii     ]  ^ 

been  given  as  I  nam  as  above-mentioned  to  Sati- 
das,  the  jeweller  by  way  of  an  Altamga  (grant) 
from  the  beginning  of  the  harvest  time,  (i,e., 
month  of)  Takhakavil.  It  is  necessary  that  the 
noble,  the  dignified  children  and  the  exalted 
Amirs  and  Vazirs  who  are  thrifty  and  the  future 
accountants,  employed  in  the  civil  department 
and  the  Governors  and  Officers  and  Jagirdars 
and  tax  gatherers  shall  exert  (themselves)  to 
carry  out  and  uphold  this  sacred  order  of  His 
Majesty  and  let  the  above-mentioned  Parganah 
remain  in  the  possession  of  the  above-named 
(person)  and  his  children,  generation  after  gene- 
ration ;  and  shall  consider  as  abolished  (the 
levying)  of  all  monies  and  dues  and  taxes  and  all 
(other)  revenues  ;  and  with  regard  to  this  matter 
they  shall  not  demand  every  year,  a  new  order 
and  a  Sanad,  and  they  shall  not  swerve  from  what 
is  (here)  commanded.  Dated  the  19th,  of  the 
auspicious  month  of  Ramzan  in  the  31st,  of  the 
auspicious  reign  corresponding  with  the  Hijra 
year  1067  (A.D.,  1657). 

26th  June  1875.  (  A  true  translation  ) 

Bombay  High  Court        Sd,  Goolam  Mohaideen. 

Translator. 


(e) 
[  Sunnud    from    Prince  Moorad   as   Suba   of 
Guzrat,    dated    1657    A.D.,    in  the    30th  year  of 
Emperor    Shah    Jahan's    reign.     He  was  son  of 
Shahjahan  and  Viceroy  of  Guzrat.] 

In  the  name  of  God,  the  Compassionate^  the 

Merciful. 

Moorad  Baksh,  the  eon  of  Shahaboodin 
Mohamed  Saheb  Kiran  Sani,  Saheb  Jahan 
the    Victorious,      Emperor,      1049    Seal. 

The   present    and     future     accounts     of  the 
Sarkar  (i.e.  district)  of  Sorath  (who)  have  become 
exalted    by   the    Royal    favour   and  hopeful    (  of 
distinction)    are   to    know   that  whereas   at  this 
time   the   best   of  the  grandees  (namely)  Satidas 
the   Jeweller,   has   represented     amongst     those 
standing  [before  us]  in  the  place  of  the    assembly 
which    resembles    paradise,    that    in    the    village 
of  Palitana  (which  is  one)  of  the  Dependancies  of 
the  above    mentioned  Sarkar,    there   is  a   place 
of  worship   belonging   to    the    Hindoos,    that  is 
called    Satranja,    and    that     the     people   of    the 
surrounding  districts  come  there  on  a  pilgrimage. 
The  order  of  the   highly  dignified,  the  possessor 
of  exalted  rank,  has  been  graciously  issued  to  the 
effect   that   the   above    mentioned     Village   has 


[     xix     ] 

been  granted  from  the  beginning  of  the  season 
of  Kharif  Nijuit  (i.e.  harvest  time)  as  an  Inam  to 
the  above  mentioned  person,  the  best  of  the 
grandees.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  con- 
sidering the  above  mentioned  Village  as  an 
Inam  (  i.e.  grant)  to  him,  you  shall  not  interfere 
(with  it)  in  any  way,  in  order  that  the  people 
of  the  neighbouring  districts  and  localities  may 
come  on  a  pilgrimage  to  that  place  with  (their) 
minds  at  ease.  In  this  matter,  regarding  (this) 
as  a  complete  injunction,  you  are  not  to  swerve 
(  herefrom  ).  Written  on  the  29th  day  of  the 
holy  month  of  Mohurrum  in  the  30th  of  our 
auspicious  reign  : — 

The  handwriting  of  the  humble  servant  AH 
Nakhi. 

The  4th  of  Safar  in  the  thirtieth  year  of  the 
reign  Presented  to  the  Hoozoor. 

The  4th  of  Safar  in  the  thirtieth  year.  A 
copy  was  taken  in  the  Divans  (i.e.  prime  minis- 
ter's) office. 

The  4th  of  Safar  in  the  thirtieth  year 
received. 

The  4th  of  Safar  A  true  translation 

(Sd.)     Goo  lam  Mohaideen 
Translator. 


K.'* 


(f) 

[  Confirmation  of  Sunnud  \^e)  by  Emperor 
Moorad  Bux  dated  1658  a.  d,  in  the  first  year 
of  his  reign.  As  soon  as  he  came  to  the  throne 
he  was  murdered.  J 

Padsha  Moorad  Bux  A.  H,    1068.    Seal 

This  high  command  is  now  issued,  declaring 
that  as  the  Purgunnah  of  Palitana  under  the 
Sirkar  of  Soruth,  a  dependency,  on  the  Subah  of 
Ahmedabad  and  which  Perguna  is  also  called 
Istrinja  is  by  former  Sunnud  conferred  on 
Satidas  Jwahuree  as  an  I  nam  or  Gift,  the  said 
Satidas  has  presented  a  petition  praying  that 
in  this  manner  a  new  high  command  should  be 
given.  This  world  binding  mandate  is  therefore 
now  issued  declaring  that  we  confirm  to  the  said 
Satidas  and  to  his  descendants  the  I  nam  or 
Gift  he  held  by  former  Sunnud  and  a  Royal 
patent,  and  it  behoves  the  Dewans  and  Vuzeers 
and  Mootusudees  present  and  the  future  and 
the  Jageerdars  and  Kuroorees  of  that  District  to 
respect  the  said  Gift  according  to  the  above 
order,  and  not  to  molest  or  hinder  him  under 
pretence  of  expenses  and  taxes  etc,  but  they 
must   act   so   that    this   order  may    continue  and 


/ 


[     xxi     ] 

abide,  knowing  this  order  to  be  peremptory,  no 
opposition  shall  be  made.  Dated  29th  Ramzan 
first  year  of  his  reign. 

Recorder's   Court.  Sd.     J.  Taylor 

Translator's  Office  Translator. 

30th  June  1820. 


rg) 

[Sunnud     from    Emperor     Aurungzeb   dated 
1658  A. D.] 

In  the  name  o/Godf  the  Compassionate  the 
Merciful. 

God  the  victorious  Mohammad  Ourung- 
zeb  Sha  Bahadoor,  the  son  of 
Saheb        Kiran        Sani         1068. -Seal. 

Whereas  at  this  time,  the  beginning  of  which 
is  auspicious  (  and  )  the  end  of  which  will  be 
happy,  Satidas,  the  Jeweller  has  represented  to 
the  noble,  most  holy,  exalted  (  and  )  elevated 
presence  through  persons  who  constitute  the 
holy  assembly  of  the  Court,  that  whereas  accord- 
ing to  a  Firman  of  His  Majesty,  the  exalted 
( and  )  as  dignified  as  Soloman,  the  protector 
of  the  office  of  the  successors  (  of  Mohammad  ) 
the  shadow  of  God,  dated  the  nineteenth  of  the 
holy  month  of  Ramzan,  in  the  year  thirty 
one,  the  district  of  Palitana,  which  is  called 
Satranja  in  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  Sorath 
Sarkar,  a  dependency  of  the  Suba  of 
Ahmedabad  (  and  )  the  revenue  of  which  is  two 
lacs  of  Ddms  has  been  settled  as  a  perpetual 
I  nam  on  the    slave  (  the  petitioner  )  (  and  )  that 


[     xxiii     ] 

he  (  the  petitioner  )  therefore  hopes  that  a 
glorious  edict  may  also  be  granted  by  our  Court  ; 
Therefore  in  the  same  manner  as  before  we  have 
granted  (  to  the  petitioner  )  the  above  men- 
tioned district  as  a  perpetual  I  nam.  It  is  there- 
fore incumbent  in  the  present  and  future  mana- 
gers of  the  Suba  and  the  above  mentioned 
Sarkar,  to  exert  themselves  for  the  continual 
and  permanent  observance  of  this  hallowed 
ordinance  (  and  )  to  permit  the  above  mentioned 
district  to  remain  in  the  possession  of  the  above 
mentioned  person  and  of  his  descendants  in 
lineal  succession  from  generation  to  generation 
and  to  consider  him  exempted  from  all  demands 
and  taxes  and  all  other  dues  ( and  )  not  to 
demand  from  him  in  resf)ect  hereof  a  new  sunnud 
every  year  (  and  )  they  shall  not  swerve  from 
this  order.  Written  on  the  9th  of  the  month  of 
Telkand  in  the  Hijra  year  1068. 

(  On  back  ) 

A  mandate  of  the  Nawab,  the  possessor  of 
holy  titles,  the  fruit  of  the  garden,  a  worthy 
successor,  the  fruit  of  the  'tree  of  greatness,  a 
lamp  of  the  noble  family,  a  light  of  the  great 
house,  the  pupil  of  the  eye  of  grandeur  and 
fortune,  the  pride  of  greatness  and  glory,  of 
noble  birth,  the  exalted,   the  praised  one    by    the 


[ 


XXIV 


] 


tongue  of  the  slave  and  free,    the    famous   (  and  ) 
victorious  prince  Mohammad  Sultan  Bahadoor, 

32.  Mohammad  Sultan  Bahadoor  the 
son  of  the  Victorious.  Mohammad 
Ourungzeb  Sha  Bahadoor  1068— seal 


Translated  by  me 
Sd.    Goolam  Mohaideen, 
Translator. 


(h) 

[Firman   of   Emperor    Ahmed     Shah   dated] 
1752  A.D.,  fifth  year  of  his  reign. 

In  the  name  of  the    Purest^    Highest    in 
Station* 

Seal 

Be  it  known  to  the  Officers  and  Managers  of 
the  present  and  future  affairs  of  the  Province  of 
Bengal  and  the  other  Provinces  under  dominion, 
that  Jugut  Sett  Mahtaub  Roy  represented  to  us 
the  high  in  dignity  that  mountain  Paresnathjee, 
situate  in  the  country  of  Bengal,  the  place  of 
worship  according  to  the  Jain  Setamburee 
religion  also  the  Cotee  at  station  Mudhoobun, 
on  a  rent-free  lakheraj  )  ground,  butted  and 
bounded  by  four  boundaries  belong  (  to  the 
followers  of )  the  Jain  Setamburee  religion  and 
that  he,  the  devoted  supplicant  is  a  follower  of 
the  Jain  Setamburee  religion,  he  therefore,  is 
hopeful  of  the  Royal  bounty  that  the  mountain 
and  the  Cotee  aforesaid,  be  bestowed  by  the 
resplendent  Huzoor  on  that  obedient  supplicant, 
so  that,  composed  in  mind,  he  may  devote  him- 
self to  pray  according  to  that  religion.     Whereas 


[     xxvi     ] 

the  person  aforesaid   deserves  Royal  favour   and 
bounty,  also  as  it  appears   that   the   property   he 
asks    for   has    a   particular   connection  with  him, 
and  (  as  )  it  appeared  on  inquiry  instituted  by  this 
High  in  Dignity  that  mountain  Paresnath  and  the 
Cotee   aforesaid    have  from    a   long  time  apper- 
tained to  the  (  followers  of  the  )  Jain  Setamburee 
religion,    therefore    the    whole   of  the   mountain 
and  the  Cotee  at  Mudhoobun  butted  and  bounded 
by  four  boundaries,  are  bestowed    by  the    Royal 
Court  on  the   aforesaid    person.     It  is   required 
that   he   should   always  devote    to    pray   himself 
for   the    welfare   and    prosperity     of  the  State  ; 
and    no   one    should  offer   opposition    respecting 
the    mountain     Paresnath     and   the     Cotee     at 
Mudhoobun. 

Knowing  this  to  be  a  very  urgent  matter, 
let  them  act  as  directed.    Finis, 

The  whole  of  mountain  Paresnath  situate  in 
the  country  of  Bengal, 

Three  hundred  and  one  Beeghas  of  Lakhraj 
land  of  Mudhoobun,  situate  in  the  country  of 
Bengal,  butted  and  bounded  by  four  boundaries 
specified  below. 

On  the  West — the  water  coursej  of  Joyporiah, 
alias  Jaynugger. 

On  the  East — the  old  water-course,  {nala) 


[     xxvii     j 

On  the  North — the  koond  or  reservoir 
(  called  )  Julhurrey  prepared  by  the  (  followers  of 
the  )  Jain  Setambaree  religion. 

On  the  South — the  base  of  Mountain 
Paresnath. 

Written  on  the  27th  day  of  the  month  of 
Jemadeeoolawal,  the  fifth  year  of  the  King's 
reign.  (  On  the  back  )  The  Khan  of  Khans 
Kumirooddeen  Khan  Bahadur,  Victorious  in 
War,  The  Vizier  of  Territories,  Managers 
of  affairs.  Noblest  of  Nobles,  the  Head  of  the 
country.  Commander  in-Chief,  a  faithful  friend 
and  servant  of  the  King  Ahmud  Shah,  the  Hero. 

A  true  translation  of  the  annexed  Persian 
Document  for  Baboo  Pooran  Chund. 

(Sd)  Shamachurn  Sircar 
Chief  Interpreter  and  Translator 
High  Court,  Original  Jurisdiction, 
The  19th  March  1868. 


(1) 

[Sunnud  of  Aboo  Ali    Khan  Bahadur,    dated 
the  third  year  of  reign.] 

Aboo  Ali  Khan  Bahadur  Emperor 
and    Champion    of  Faith— Seal. 

To 

The  Motsuddees  of  the  present  time  and  of 
future  of  Pergunnah  Bissoonpore  Pachrookhy  in 
the  province  of  Behar. 

Take  notice  that 

Since     Mouzah    Palgunge     in    the    aforesaid 
Purgunnah    has    been     as    heretofore     exempted 
from  all  liabilities  in  the   name   of   Raja   Padman 
Singh    as   a    charitable     endowment   to    all    the 
temples   of   Pareshnath    made    by    Juggut    Sett, 
the   same   is   therefore    upheld  and  confirmed  in 
the  year  1169  Fusli.  (  1755  a.  d.  )  You  shall  raise 
no  objection  and  offer  no  opposition  in    any    way 
whatever  in  respect  of  the  said  Mouzah   and  shall 
release  and  leave   it   to   the   use   and  possession 
of  the  above  named  Rajah  so  that  he   may   apply 
the   profits   thereof  to    necessary     purposes  and 
continue   to   pray  for    the   welfare  of  the  empire 
to  last    for  ever.     Written    on   the    27th   day   of 
Jamadi-us-sani  in  the  third  year  of  reign. 


.^1-1-89. 


True  translation 
(Sd.)  Iswaree  Persad 


(j) 

[Parwana    of  Jaggat    Sett    Khushal    Chand,  ^ 
dated  1775  A.D.] 

Jaggat  Sett  KhoshuU  Chund  1187--Seal. 

High  in  dignity  Baboo  Sookhul  Chand  Sahoo 
and  Boola  Sahoo,  Managers  of  the  temples  of 
Jain  Situmbury,  i.e.  on  the  hills  of  Pareshnathjee 
alias  Somed  Shekhurjee,  be  of  good  cheer. 

A  long  time  ago  since  the  reigns  of  the 
Emperors,  the  hills  of  Pareshnathjee,  being 
considered  the  holy  place  of  the  persons  of  Jain 
Situmbury  religion,  were  made  over  to  my 
father,  because  we  were  also  of  the  religion  of 
Jain  Situmbury,  But  owing  to  my  having  been 
charged  with  various  affairs,  and  the  said  holy 
place  being  situate  at  a  great  distance  I  could 
not  manage  the  affairs  thereof.  I  therefore 
having  appointed  you  as  the  manager  of  the 
affairs  write  to  you  that  you  should  most  care- 
fully manage  all  affairs  so  that  the  pilgrims  might 
with  perfect  ease  travel  there  and  return  there- 
from. This  hill  and  the  holy  place  have  been 
in  the  possession  of  the  persons  of  Jain  Situm- 
bury.    No   other   persons   has   any  thing   to   do 


[       XXX       ] 

with  it.  Therefore  this  Perwanah  or  order  is 
written  to  you  that  you  should  act  accordingly. 
If  any  of  the  authorities  or  landholders  set  up 
opposition  in  any  way  you  should  produce  this 
Perwanah.  Dated  the  i6th  of  the  month  of 
Zakund  1189  Hedgree. 


True  translation, 
(Sd.)  Jadub  Chunder  Mitter. 


Appendix  C 

List  of  Jain  ngams  and  Nigams 

[The  reader  will  find  a  valuable  and  excellent 
account  in  detail  of  these  sacred  canons  by  Dr. 
Weber  in  Indische  Studien  Vols  XVI— XVII  ; 
translated  by  Dr.  Smyth  and  published  in  Indian 
Antiquary  Vols.  XVII  to  XXL] 

A.  Jain  Agams 

These  are  45  in  numbers  and  are  divided 
into  I.  Angas  II.  UpAngas  III.  Mula  Sutras  IV. 
Chheda  Sutras,  V.  Payannds  VI.  ChuHkds. 

I.    Angas. 
Anga  Sutras  are  eleven  in  number, 

1.  Ayaranga  Suttam  (Skr.  Acharanga  Sutra) 

It  deals  with  Jain  Philosophy  and  rules  of 
conduct  for  members  of  the  order.  (Tran- 
slated in  the  Sacred  book  of  the  East 
Vol.  XXII.) 

2.  SuYAGADANGAM  SuTTAM  (Skr.  Sutrakritan- 
gam  Sutra)  It  deals  with  the  doctrines  of 
the  363  different  heretical  sects  (Translated 
in  the  Sacred  Book  of  the  East  Vol.  XLV.) 

3.  Thanangam    Suttam     (Skr.     Sthanangam 

Sutra).     It   deals    with    an     exposition    of 


[     xxxii     ] 

'Sthans'  (points  of  view)  of  one  to  ten  ele- 
ments of  the  universe  according  to  the  Jain 
system, 

4.  Samavayangam  Suttam  (Skr.  Samavayna- 
gam  Sutra),  It  deals  with  the  nature  of 
one  to  innumerable  matters  of  the  universe. 

5.  ViYAHAPANNATTi  or    comniouly     known    as 
.  Bhagavati   Suttam    (Skr.    Vyakhya  praj- 

napti  Sutra).  This  is  a  most  important 
work  in  the  list  of  the  Jain  canons,  dealing 
with  36,000  querries  and  their  answers 
between  Mahavira  and  Goutama. 

6.  Nayadhammakaha  Suttam  Skr.  Jnata 
dharma  katha  Sutra).  It  contains  stories 
and  parables  of  religious  personages  and 
also  exposition  of  elements. 

7.  UvASAGADASAO  SuTTAM  (Skr.  Upasaka- 
dasha  Sutra).  It  deals  with  the  lives  of 
the  ten  principle  lay-disciples  of  Mahavira 
and  sets  out  rules  of  conduct  for  lay-men. 
(Published  in  the  Bibliotheca  Indica, 
Calcutta.) 

8.  Antagadadasao  Suttam  (Skr.  Antakritada 
sha  Sutra).  It  deals  with  the  history  of 
the  90  personages  who  attained  moksha 
(Translated  in  the  Oriental  Translation 
Fund  Vol.  XVII.) 


[     xxxiii     ] 

9.  Anuttarovavaiyadasao  Suttam  (Skr. 
Anuttaraupapatikadashah  Sutra).  It  nar- 
rates the  story  of  the  ten  ascetics  who 
took  birth  in  Anuttara  Vimana  (Translated 
in  the  Oriental  Translation  Fund  Vol. 
XVII.) 

10.  Panhavagaranam  Suttam  (Skr.  Prashna- 
vyakarana  Sutra).  It  deals  with  Jain  Philo- 
sophy especially  the  actions  of  merit  and 
demerit. 

11.  Vivagasuyam  Suttam  (Skr.   Vipakashrutam 

Sutra).  It  describes  the  five  souls  taking 
birth  with  distress  and  five  with  comfort 
produced  by  action. 

II.    Upangas. 

Upanga  Sutras  are  twelve  in  number. 

1.  UvAVAVi  Suttam  (Skr.  Aupapatika  Sutra) 
It  contains  lectures  on  the  birth  of  22  differ- 
ent kinds  of  souls  and  other  relisi^ious 
subjects. 

2.  Raipaseni  Suttam  (Skr.  Rajprashniya 
Sutra.)  It  contains  discourse  of  Keshi 
Ganadhar  with  King  Pradeshi,  an  un- 
believer. 

3.  JiVAviGAM  Suttam  (Skr.  Jivavigama  Sutra). 

It  contains  lectures  on  soul  and  non-soul, 


[     xxxiv     ] 

4.  Pannavana  Suttam  (Skr.  Prajiiapana 
Sutra).  It  contains  discourse  on  36  objects 
in  36  stanzas. 

5.  Jambudeep  Pannatti  Suttam  (Skr.  Jambu- 

dwipa  Prajnapti  Sutra.)  It  contains  descrip 
tion  of  Jambudwipa    including   accounts    of 
its  mountains,  rivers  &c. 

6.  Chandapannatti     Suttam    (Skr.    Chandra 

Prajnapati  Sutra). 

7.  SuRYA  Pannatti  Suttam  (Skr.  Surya  Praj- 
napti Sutra.)  These  two  canons  (Nos.  6 
and  7)  contain  description  of  sun  and  moon 
and  other  celestial  spheres. 

8.  Kappiya      Suttam      including      Niriyavali 

Suttam  (Skr.  Kalpika  Sutra  including  Nirya 
vali  Sutra). 

9.  Kappaodosia     Suttam   (Skr.    Kalpavatan- 

shika  Sutra.) 
ID.     Puppiyjv  Suttam  (Skr.  Pushpika  Sutra.) 

11.  PuppACHULiYA  Suttam  (Skr.    Pushpachooli- 

ka  Sutra.) 

12.  Banhidasa      Suttam      (Skr.      Banhidasha 

Sutra.) 
These   series   of  canons  from  Nos.  8    to    12 
contain  description    of  heaven    and    hell,    battles 
of  kings  &c. 


[      XXXV      ] 

III.    Mul  Sutras. 

These  are  four  in  number. 

1.  AvASYAKA  Sutra  including  Vishesavasyaka 
and  Pakshika  Sutras.  These  deal  with 
higher  Jain  principles  and  philosophy,  logic 
and    history. 

2.  Dasavaikalika  Sutra.  It  contains  rules  of 
conduct  for  the  ascetics. 

3.  Pindaniryukti  and  Oghniryukti  Sutras. 
These  contain  rules  of  begging  and  collec- 
lecting  alms  and  food  by  the  ascetics. 

4.  Uttaradhyayan  Sutra.  It  contains  36 
lectures  on  various  interesting  subjects 
(Translated  in  the  Sacred  Book  of  the 
East  Vol  XLV.) 

IV.    Ohheda  Sutras. 
Chheda  Sutras  are  six  in  number   and    they 
contain    rules    of  penance   and    other    regulations 
of  the  church. 

1.  Vyabahardasakalpa  Sutra. 

2.  Vrihatkalpa  Sutra. 

3.  Dashashrutaskandha  Sutra. 

4.  Nishitha  Sutra. 

5.  Mahanishitha  Sutra. 

6.*  Panchakalpa  Sutra  (now  extinct)  and  Jit- 
KALPA   Sutra. 


[     xxxvi    J 

V  Payennas  (Skr.  Prajnapana) 
These  are  ten  in   number.     They  deal  mostly 
with    ethical    rules  and  other  regulations  both  for 
the  church  and  the  laity. 

1.  CHOusaran  payenna  Suttam  (Skr. 

Chatuhsharan  prajnyapana  Sutra.) 

2.  Santhar   payenna   Suttam  (Skr.  Sanstha- 

raka  prajnyapana  Sutra.) 

3.  Tandul    payenna    Suttam   (Skr.    Tandul 
prajnyapana  Sutra.) 

4.  Chandavijjaga   Suttam     (Skr.      Chandra- 

vedhyak  Sutra.) 

5.  Gainvijjiya      Suttam.     (Skr.      Gainvidya 

Sutra.) 

6.  AURPACHCHAKHANA       SuTTAM      (Skr.       Aur- 

I  pratyakhyan  Sutra.) 

7.  ViRTHUBO     OR        DeVINDATTHAVA        SuTTAM, 

(Skr.  Virastaba  or  Devendrastaba  Sutram.) 

8.  Mahapachachakhana  Suttam  (Skr.     Maha 
pratyakhyan  Sutra.) 

9.  Gachchhachar   Suttam   (Skr.    Gachchha 

chara  Sutra.) 

10.       JOTISIKKANDARA         SUTTAM        (^Skr.       Jyotlsk 

karanda  Sutra.^ 
In   the   places  of  9  and  10  some  hold  Bhatta- 
pachchakhana  and    Samadhimarana  Sutra  as  the 
9th  and  loth   Chheda  Sutras, 


[     xxxvii     ] 
VI    Ohulika  Sutras. 
Chulika  Sutras  are    two   in    number.     They 
contain  discourse  on  five  kinds  of  knowledge  and 
other  subjects. 

1.  Anuyogadwar  Sutra. 

2.  Nandi  Sutra. 


B.  JAIN  NIGAMS  OR  UPANISHADS, 

These  are  36  in  number. 


I.  Uttaranyaka. 
3.  Bahureech.     . 
5.  Vijnaneshwar. 
7.  Navatatwa    nidana- 
nirnaya. 


2.  Panchadhyaya. 
4.  Vijnanaghanarnava. 
6.  Vijnanagunarnava. 
8.  Tatwartha     Nidhi- 
ratnakar. 


9.  Vishudhatma    guna     10.  Arhadharmagama- 

nirnaya. 


crambhira. 


II.  Utsargapavadava- 
chananaikanta. 

13.  Nijamanonayanal- 
hada. 

15.  Siddahagama  sanke- 

tastavaka. 
17.  Ragijananirvedaja- 

naka. 
19.  Kavijanakalpadru- 

mopama. 


12.  Astinasti  viveka 
nigama  nirnaya. 

14.  Ratnatrayanidan- 
nirnaya. 

16.  Bhavyajanabhaya- 

pah^raka. 
18.  Strimuktinidana- 
nirnaya. 
20.  Sakalaprapancha 
pathnidana. 


[     xxxviii     ] 

21.  Shraddhadharma-         22.  Saptnayanidana. 

sadhyapavarga. 
23.  Vandhamoksh^pa-        24.  Ishtakamaniyasiddhi. 


gam  a. 

25- 

Bramhakamaniya- 
siddhi. 

26. 

Naikarmakamaniy 

27. 

Chaturvarga 

28. 

Panchajnyanaswa 

^ 

chint^mani. 

rupavedana. 

29. 

Panchadarshana 

30. 

Panchcharitraswa 

swaruparahasya. 

ruparahasya. 

31- 

N  igam^gamay  akya 

32. 

Vyavaharsadhya- 

vivarana. 

pavarga. 

33. 

Nishchayaika 

34- 

Prayashchittaik 

sadhyapavarya. 

sadhyapavarga. 

35- 

Darshanaikasadd- 

36. 

,  Virataviratasama- 

hyapavarga. 

napavarga. 

Appendix  D. 

The  Tirthankars  of  the  Present  Bra. 

I.  Adinatha  better  known  as  Rishava 
Deva,  belonged  to  Ikshaku  race  and  was  the  son 
of  King  Nabhi  and  Queen  Marudevi.  His  place 
of  birth  was  Vinita  (Ajodhya),  in  the  country  of 
Koshala,  but  according  to  some  in  the  north  of 
Kashmir.  He  was  born  towards  the  end  of  the 
period  of  Yugaliks.  According  to  the  custom  of 
the  time,  he  was  married  to  his  own  twin  sister 
Sumangala  and  another  Sunanda  whose  brother 
died  in  childhood.  Sumangala's  issues  were 
Bharat  and  Bramhi  (the  twin)  and  98  other  twin 
sons  and  by  Sunanda  he  had  Bahubal  and  Sun- 
dari.  From  the  descendants  of  Bharat  and 
Bahubali  the  Surja  and  Chandra  dynasties  were 
respectively  originated,  and  the  country  was 
named  Bharat  after  the  eldest  prince.  He  re- 
signed his  empire  to  his  sons  and  laid  foundation 
of  the  Jain  Church  in  this  era.  He  was  initiated 
at  the  city  of  Vinita  and  attained  nirvdUy  on 
Astapada  mountain.  He  is  represented  as  of 
golden  complexion  and  having  a  bull  (  ^i?  ) 
for  his  cognizance, 


[      xl     ] 

2.  AjiTANATHA  belonged  to  the  same  race 
and  was  son  of  King  Jitashatru  and  Queen 
Bijoya.  He  was  born  in  Ajodhya  and  was  ini- 
tiated at  the  same  place  and  reached  nirvdn  on 
Samet  Sikhar  mountain  or  better  known  as 
Pareshnath  Hill  in  Bengal.  He  was  also  of 
golden  complexion  and  had  an  elephant  ('sf^)  as 
his  cognizance.  King  Sagar  flourished  during 
his  time. 

3.  Sambhavanatha  was  son  of  King  Jitari 
and  Oueen  Sena  and  belonged  to  the  same  race. 
He  was  born  at  Sdwathi  (Sriwasthi) — modern 
*'Setmet  k^  sfkila",  near  Balarampur  U.  P.  and 
was  initiated  at  the  same  city  and  attained  nirvdn 
on  mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His  complexion  was 
of  golden    colour   and   his  cognizance  was  horse 

4.  Abhinandana  was  born  of  King  Sambara 
aud  Queen  Siddhartha  belonging  to  the  Ikshaku 
race.  He  was  of  golden  complexion  and  had 
monkey  (olifcr)  as  his  cognizance.  He  was  born 
at  Ajodhya  and  was  initiated  at  the  same  place 
and  his  nirvdn  took  place  on  Mount  Samet 
Sikhar. 

(5)  Sumatinatha  was  the  son  of  King 
Megha  by  Queen  Mangala  at  Ajodhya  belonging 
to  the  Ikshaku  race  and  was  initiated  at  the  same 


[     xli     ] 

city  and  his  nirvdn  also  occured  at  Mount  Samet 
Sikhar.  He  was  also  of  golden  complexion  and 
had  a  curlew  (^^)  for  his  cognizance.  According 
to  the  Digambaris,  it  was  red  goose  (^^^T<lf). 

6.  Padmaprava  was  the  son  of  King  Sree- 
dhar  by  Queen  Sushima.  He  belonged  to  the 
Ikshaku  race  and  was  born  in  Koshambi — re- 
ceiving initiation  at  the  same  place  and  attaining 
nirvdn  at  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His  cognizance 
was  lotus  (tt^)  and  his  complexion  was  of  red 
colour. 

7.  SuPARSWANATHA  was  the  son  of  King 
Pratista  and  his  mother  was  Prithivi  and  belong^- 
ed  to  the  Ikshaku  race.  He  was  born  at  Bena- 
ras  and  was  initiated  at  the  same  city.  Attained 
nirvdn  on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  He  was  of 
golden,  but  according  to  Digambaris,  green 
complexion.  His  cognizance  was  the  figure, 
Swastika  (^f^^). 

8.  CiiANDRAPRAVA  belonged  to  the  Ikshaku 
race  and  was  the  son  of  King  Mahasena  by 
Lakshmana  and  was  born  at  Chandrapura  and 
was  initiated  at  the  same  city  and  attained  Moksha 
on  Samet  Sikhar.  He  is  described  as  of  white 
complexion  and  had  moon  (^55)  as  his  cognizance. 

9.  SuBiDHiNATHA    was     the    son    of    King 
Sugriva    and    Queen     Rama    belonging    to   the 


[     xlii     ] 

Ikshaku  race.  He  was  born  in  the  city  of 
Kakandi  and  was  initiated  there  attaining  nhvdn 
on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  He  was  of  white 
complexion  and  had  Makara  (?T^T)  a  fabulous 
acquatic  animal  as  his  cognizance.  He  is  also 
known  as  Pushpadanta. 

10.  Shitalanatha  belonging  to  the  Ikshaku 
race,  was  the  son  of  King  Drirharatha  and 
Queen  Susnanda.  His  birth-place  was  the  city 
of  Bhadilpur  where  he  took  his  initiation  and 
reached  nirv&n  on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His 
complexion  was  golden  aud  his  cognizance 
was  the  figure  Sreevatsa  (^2J^),  Digambaris 
say  Kalpa  tree  (cR^g^)  and  it  was  in  his  time 
that  the  famous  Harivansa  took  its  origin. 

11.  Shreanshanatha  also  belonged  to  the 
Ikshaku  race  and  his  parents  were  King  Vishnu 
and  Queen  Vishna.  He  was  born  at  Sinhapur 
near  Benares  and  took  his  initiation  at  the 
same  city  and  reached  nirvdn  on  Mount 
Samet  Sikhar.  He  was  of  golden  complexion 
and  his  cognizance  was  rhinoceros    (  ^!f  )    while 

Digambaris  say,  it  was  bird  Garura  (^^). 

* 

12.  Vasupujya  came  of  the  same  Ikshaku 
race  and  was  son  of  King  Vashupujya  by  Queen 
Jay^.  His  birth  place  was  at  the  city  of  Champ^ 
modern    Nathnagar,    near  Bhagalpur    where   he 


[     xliii     ] 

took  his  initiation  as  well  as  reached  nirvdn.  He 
was  of  red  complexion  and  his  cognizance  was 
buffalo  (Jlfecr). 

13,  ViMALANATHA  was  the  son  of  King  Kri- 
tavarma  by  Queen  Shyama  belonging  to  the 
Ikshaku  race.  He  was  born  at  the  city  of  Kam- 
pilpur  where  he  took  initiation  and  reached 
Moksha  on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His  com- 
plexion was  of  golden  colour  and  his  cognizance 
was  boar  (^?[T^). 

14.  Anantanatha  belonged  to  the  Ikshaku 
race  and  was  the'son  of  King  Sinhasena  by  Queen 
Sujasa.  His  place  of  birth  was  Ajodhya  where 
he  was  initiated  and  reached  nirvdn  on  Mount 
Samet  Sikhar.    He  was  of  golden  complexion  and 

his    cognizance  was  falcon  (^ «!)  while  according 
to  the  Digambaris  his  symbol  was  a  bear  (^If  ^). 

15.  Dharmanatha  was  the  son  of  King 
Bhanu  and  Queen  Suhrita  belonging  to  the 
Ikshaku  race.  His  birth  place  was  the  city  of 
Ratnapuri  near  Ajodhya  where  he  was  initiated 
and  reached  Moksha  on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar. 
jpis  complexion  was  of  golden  colour  and  his 
cognizance  was  a  thunderbolt  (21^). 

16.  Shantinatha  belonged  to  the  Ikshaku- 
race  and  was  the  son  of  King  Vishwa  Sena  by 
Queen  Achira.  He  was  born  in  the.city  of  Hastina- 


[     xliv     j 

pura  also  known  as  Gajapura  near  Meerut  where 
he  took  his  initiation  reachinor  nirvAn  on  Mount 
Samet  Sikhar.  He  is  described  as  of  yellow 
colour  and  his  cognizance  was  an  antelope  (^J^). 

17.  KuNTHANATHA  was  the  son  of  King  Sura 
by  Sree  belonging  to  the  Ikshaku  race.  His  birth 
place  was  the  city  of  Hastinapura,  and  he  took  his 
initiation  at  the  same  place  and  attained  moksha 
on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His  complexion  was  of 
yellow  colour  and  his  cognizance  was  a  goat  (^T^). 

18.  Aranatha  was  born  in  the  same  city 
of  Hastinapura  and  his  parents  were  King  Sudar- 
shana  and  Queen  Devi  belonging  to  the  Ikshaku 
race.  His  place  of  initiation  was  Gajpura  and 
reached  nirvdn  on  Mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His 
complexion  was  golden  and  his  cognizance  was  a 
figure  (•T'^T^'=^)  diagram  and  according  to  the  Dig- 
ambaris  his  symbol  was  a  fish  (^*f).  Parashurama. 
a  Hindu  Avatara,  flourished  in  his  time. 

19.  Mallinatha  belonged  to  the  Ikshaku 
race  and  was  the  daughter  (according  to  Digam- 
baris,  who  do  not  admit  of  moksha  for  the  women, 
she  was  a  son)  of  King  Kumbha  by  ParvabatJU 
His  place  of  birth  was  Mathura  where  he  was 
initiated  and  reached  nirvdn  on  mount  Samet 
Sikhar.  His  complexion  was  of  blue  colour  and 
his  cognizance  was  a  water-jug  (  gill  ). 


[     xlv     ] 

20.  Muni  Subrata  belonged  to  the  race 
known  as  Harivansa  and  was  the  son  of  king 
Sumitra!  by  Padmabati  of  the  city  of  Rajgir  where 
he  was  initiated  and  reached  nirvdn  on  mount 
Samet  Sikhar.  He  was  of  dark  complexion  and 
his  cognizance  was  a  tortoise  (^i^).  Dasaratha 
and  Ram  Chandra  were  his  contemporaries. 

21.  Naminatha  belonged  to  the  Ikshaku 
race  and  was  the  son  of  King  Bijoya  and  Queen 
Bipra.  He  was  born  in  the  city  of  Mathura 
where  he  was  initiated  and  attained  moksha  on 
mount  Samet  Sikhar.  His  complexion  was  of 
yellow  colour  and  his  cognizance  was  a  blue 
lotus.  (^^IriT^)  According  to  the  Digambars  he 
was  of  green  colour. 

22.  Neminatha  also  known  as  Arista  Nemi 
belonged  to  the  Harivansa.  He  was  the  son  of 
Samudra  Vijoya  by  Shiva.  His  place  of  birth 
was  Souripur  where  he  was  initiated  and  attained 
nirvdn  on  mount  Girnar  and  was  of  black  com- 
plexion with  a  conch  (si^)  as  his  symbol.  He 
was  related  to  the  Hindu  Avatar,  Krishna,  whose 
father  Vasudeva,  was  a  brother  of  Samudra  Vijoy. 
It  was  arranged  that  he  should  marry  Rajamati, 
daughter  of  Ugrasena  king  of  Jirnadurga  or 
Junagad.  On  hearing  the  piteous  cries  of  birds 
and  beasts  which  were  collected   for  the  marriage 


t     xlvi      ] 

feast,  he  refused  to  marry  and  went  out  to  mount 
Girnar.      In  the    Hindu  Vedas    and    Purans,    we 
find  mention    of    Arista    Nemi    or    Nemi    Nath. 
Kurus  and  Pandavas  flourished  during  his  time. 

23.  Parshwanatha  belonged  to  the  Ikshaku 
race  and  was  the  son  of  King  Ashwa  Sen  by 
Bama  Devi.  He  was  born  in  877  B.C.  and  his 
birth  place  was  Benares  where  he  was  initiated 
and  attained  nirvdn  on  mount  Samet  Sikhar. 
He  was  of  blue  complexion  and  his  cognizance 
was  a  serpent  (w)-  Parshwanatha  attained  nirban 
in  his  hundredth  year,  some  250  years  before  the 
nirv&n  of   Mahavira  i  e.  about  770  B.C. 

24.  Mahavira  or  Vardhmana  also  known  as 
Natputta,  the  last  Tirthankar,  belonged  to  the 
Ikshaku  race  and  was  the  son  of  KingSiddharatha 
by  Queen  Trisala.  His  place  of  birth  was  Ksha- 
triya-kund-gram  where  he  was  initiated  and 
reached  nirvdn  in  the  town  of  Pawapuri.  He 
was  of  yellow  complexion  and  had  a  lion  (  f^w  ) 
as  his  cognizance.  The  date  of  his  nirvdn  is 
527  B.  C. 


Appendix  E. 
Chronological  List  of  the  Gachchha-heads. 

I.    SWETAMBAR  SCHOOL. 

(a)     Vpakesh  Qaehchha,  <^ 

[The  'Gachchha  traces  its  origin  from  Parshwa- 
natha,  the  23rd.  Tirthankar.  His  chief  disciples 
or  Ganadharas  were  (i)  Subhadatta  (ii)  Arya- 
ghosa  (iii)  Vishista  (iv)  Bramhadhari  (v)  Soma 
(vi)  Sivadhara  (vii)  Vira  Bhadra  (viii)  Yashaswi. 
Shubhadatta,  being  the  eldest,  became  the  head 
of  the  church  after  the  Lord.  The  title  'Suri  or 
Acharya  of  the  pontiffs  is  indiscriminately  used 
in  this  'Gachchha'  e.  g.  Siddhha  Suri  or  Siddhd- 
charya  ;  Kakka  Suri  or  Kakk^chdrya  or  Kakudd- 
charya.  Vide  Heornle's  list  published  in  Indian 
Antiquary,  vol  XIX  pp.  233-252.] 

1.  Tirthankara  Parshwanatha, 

2.  Shubhadatta. 

3.  Hari  datta. 

4.  Arya  Sumudra. 

5.  Keshi  (contemporary  of  Mahavira  ;   some 
place  'Prabha'  between  4  &  5  .) 


[     xlviii 

- 

6. 

Sayamprabha. 

7- 

Ratnaprabha    I  (  457  b.  c.  ) 

8. 

Yaksadeva  I,        9. 

Kakka  I, 

lO. 

Devagupta  I. 

1 1. 

Siddha.  I.            12. 

Ratnaprabha  II. 

13- 

Yaksha  II.          14. 

Kakka  II. 

i5» 

Devagupta  II.    16, 

Siddha  II. 

17- 

Ratnaprabha  III. 

i8. 

Yaksha  III. 

19.  Kakka  III.  (By  oversight  Dr.  Heornle 
has  put  No.  19  instead  of  No  18.) 

20.  Devagupta  III. 

21.  Siddha  II.  22.      Ratnaprabha  IV. 

23.  Yaksha  IV.       24.     Kakka  IV  (63  a.  d.) 

25.  Devagupta  IV  (  13  a.  d.  ) 

26.  Siddha  IV. 

27.  Ratnaprabha  V   (  18  a.  d.  ) 

28.  Yaksha  V.  (  85  a.  d.  Converted  king 
Chitrangada  of  Kanouj) 

39.      Kakka  V.  30.     Devagupta  V. 

31.     Siddha  V,  32,     Ratnaprabha  VI. 

33.     Yaksha  VI. 

24.  Kakka  VI.  (had  extra-ordinary  powers  ; 
pursuent  to  the  remonstration  of  goddess 
'Sachchika\  the  two  names  i.  Ratnaprabha  and 
ii.  Yaksha  were  removed  from  the  Gachchha.) 

35.     Devagupta  VI.     36.     Siddha  VL 


[     xlix     ] 

KakkaVII.  3S.     Devegupta  VII. 

Siddha  VII.  40.     Kakka  VIII. 

Devagupta  VIII  (  933  a.  d.  ) 
Siddha  VIIi; 

Kakka  IX  (Author  of  'Pancha  Pramdna) 
Devagupta  IX.  (  do.  of  'Navatatwa  Pra- 
karan'  1015  A.  d.  ) 
45.     Siddha  IX. 


2>7' 

39. 
41. 

42. 

43. 
44. 


47.     Devagupta  X. 

49.  Kakka  XI. 

50.  Devagupta    XI 


46.     Kakka  X. 
48,     Siddha  X.  ' 

[  Dr.  Heornle's  Mss. 
gives  s.  1 108  (  105 1  A.  D.  )  My  Mss.  has  s.  1 105 
(  1048  A.  D.  ) 

51.     Siddha  XI. 

Kakka  XII.  (  s.  1 154  =  1097  a.  d,  ) 

Devagupta  XII.   54.  Siddha  XII. 

Kakka  XIII.  (  s.  1252  =  r  195  a.  d.  ) 

Devagupta  XIII. 

Siddha  XIII.     58,  Kakka  XIV. 

Devagupta  XIV.   60.  Siddha  XIV. 

Kakka  XV.      62.  Devegupta  XV. 

Siddha  XV.  '        64.  Kakka  XVI. 

Devagupta  XVI. 

Siddha  XVI.  (s.  1330=  1273  a.  d.) 

Kakka     XVII.    (   s.    1371=1314  a.  d., 
Author  of  'Gachcha  Prabandha'  ) 

68.     Devagupta  XVII.  (  s.  1409=  1352  a.  d.  ) 


52 
53 
55 
56 

57 

59 
61 

63 

65 
66 

67 


:  1  ] 

6g.  Siddha  XVII.  (s.  1475=  1418  a.  d.) 

70.  Kakka  XVII.  (s.  1428=  1441  a  d.) 

71.  Devagupta  XVIII.  (s.  1528=  147 1  a.  d.) 

72.  Siddha  XVIII.  (s.  1565=  1508  a.  d.) 

73.  Kakka,  XIX.  (s.  1505=  1553  a.  d.) 

74.  Devagupta  XIX.  (s.  1631  =  1574  a  d.) 

75.  Siddha  XIX.  (s.  1652  =  1598  a.  d.) 
(Dr  Heornle's  list  closes  here) 

76.  Kakka  XX.  (Installed  at  Bikanir  s.  1689 
=  1632  A.  D.) 

77.  Devagupta  XX.  (s.  1727=  1670,  A.  d.  ) 

78.  Siddha  XX.  (s.  1767  =  17 10  a.  d.) 

79.  Kakka  XXI.  (s.  1107  =  1750  a.  d.) 

80.  Devagupta  XXI.  (s.  1807  =  1750  a.  d.) 

81.  Siddha  XXI.  (s.  1848  =  1790  a.  d.) 

82.  Kakka  XXII.  (s.  1891  =1934  a.  d.) 

83.  Devagupta  XXII. 

84.  -Siddha  XXII. 

85.  Kakka  Suri  XXIII. 


(b)    BARHA  OR  KHARATARA  GACHCHHA. 

[  Branches  (i)  Madhukara  (ii)  Rudrapalli  (iii) 
Laghu  (iv)  Begarh  (v)  Pinpali^i  (vi)  Barha  Acha- 
rya  (vii)  Bhavaharsha  (viii)  Laghu  Acharya  (ix) 
Rangvijay  (x)  Mandoria.  ] 

38.      Udyotana  Suri,  up  to  937  a.d.  (S.994). 

32.  Vardhamana  Suri,  up  to  103 1  a.  d.  (^. 
1088  )  confirmed  by  Abu  inscriptions.  He 
created  his  pupil  Jineshwara  an  Acharya  in  1022 
A.  D.  (  S.  1079  ).  Afterwards  he  performed  the 
installation  ceremony  of  the  temple  on  Mt.  Abu 
known  as  Vimal  Vasi  in  S.  1088,  the  year  in 
which  he  reached  heaven. 

40,  Jineshwara  Suri  I.  In  1023  a.  d.  (S. 
1080  )  in  a  debate  before  king  Durlabha  of  An- 
hillapura  (  Gujrat  )  he  was  victorious  and  got 
the  biruda  (  title  )  of  Kharatara  which  is  borne 
by  this  gachchha  up  to  the  present  moment. 

c,f."  '^^rTsfl  ?RWTf^>it  n'^% 

[from  Rajgriha  Prashastti,dated  s.  1355  =  141 2  a.d.] 


t    Hi     ] 
'^^rTT'  f^^  g^  ^f?T  g^  I 

41.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  I. 

(It  was  he  who  foretold  to  Moujdin  that  he 
would  become  Sultan  and  on  his  ascending  the 
throne,  the  Acharya  was  invited  with  great  pomp 
to  his  capital  Delhi  where  he  resided  for  some- 
ti^lje  and  composed  the  work  'Sambegarangshala . 
He  was  succeded  by  his  brother  disciple  Abhai- 
deva  and  from  him  we  find  every  fourth  Acharya, 
of  the  gachchha  named  as  Jina  Chandra  Suri  ) 

42.  Abhaideva  Suri,  the  great  commen- 
tator. 

43.  Jina  Ballava  Suri.  He  survived  only 
for  two  months  after  he  became  an  Acharya  and 
died  in  mo  a.  d.  (  S.  1167  ) — the  first  branch 
Madhukara  started  from  1 1 10  a.  d. 

44.  Jina  Datta  Suri.  mo  a.  d, — 1154  a.  d. 
(  S.  1167 — 1211.  ) — the  second  branch  'Rudra- 
pali'  started  from  1147  a.  d. 

45.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  H.  1158 — 1166  a.  d. 
(S.  121 1— 1223).  Anchal  gachchha  started  during 
his  time  from  1156  a.  d.  (  S.  1213  ) 

46.  Jina  Pati  Suri.  1166 — 1220  a.  d.  (  S. 
1223— 1277) 

47.  Jineshwara  Suri  H.  1221  — 1274  a  d.  (S. 
,278 — 1 301  ) — the  third    branch  'Laghu  Khara- 


[    Hii    ] 

tara  started  from  1274  a.  d.  (S.  1331)  and  it  was 
during  his  headship  in  1248  a.  d.  (S.  1285)  that 
the  'Chitrawal'  gachchha  was  named  "Tapa"- 
gachchha  from  Jagata  Chandra  Suri 

48.  Jina  Prabodha  Suri  1274 — 1284  a.d.  (S. 
1341  — 1441  ) 

49.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  III,  1383 — 131 2  a.d. 
(  S.  1341— 1376) 

50.  Jina  Kushala  Suri.  1320 — 1332  a.  d. 
(S.  1377— 1982  ) 

51.  Jina  Padma  Suri.  1332— 1343  a.  d.  (  S. 
1389— 1400) 

52.  Jina  Labdhi  Suri.  1343 — 1349  a.  d.  (  S. 
1400 — 1406  ) 

53.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  IV.  1349 — 1358  a.  d. 
(  S.  1406— 1415  ) 

54.  Jinodaya  Suri.  1358— 1377  a.  d.  (  S. 
8415 — 1432  ) — the  fourth  branch  'Begarh  star- 
ted during  his  headship. 

55.  Jina  R^ja  Suri  I.  1375 — 1404  A.  d.  (  S. 
1432— 1461  ) 

55A.  Jina  Vardhan  Suri,  1404 — 1418  a,  d. 
(  S.  1461 — 1475  )— the  fifth  branch  Tipalia 
started  from  S.  1474  (1417  a.  d.)— this  Acharya 
was  expelled  from  the  church  in  141 8 
a.  d.  (  S.  1475  )  and  so  not  counted  in 
the  list. 


[     liv     J 

56.  Jina  Bhadra  Suri.  1418 — 1457  a.  d.  (  S. 

1475—1514) 

57.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  V.  1457 — 1473  a.d. 
(  S.  1504— 1530) 

58.  Jina  Samudra  Suri.  I470;r-i4i8  a.  d. 
(S.  1530— 1555)   ' 

59.  Jina  Hansa  Suri  I.  1498 — 1525  a.  d. 
(  S.  1555— 1582  )— sixth  branch  Barha 
Acharya  started  from  S.  1564  (  1507  a.  d.  ) 
Karuamati  gachchha  started  from  S.  1570 
(1513A.  D.  ) 

60.  Jina  Manikya  Suri.  1525 — 1555  a.  d. 
(  S.  1582— 1612) 

61.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  VI.  1555 — 16 14  a  d. 
(S.  1612— 1970) — seventh  branch  'Bhavaharsha 
gachchha     started       from       S.        162 1       (  1564 

A.   D.) 

62.  Jina  Sinha  Suri.  1614 — 1618  a.  d.  (  S. 
1670 — 1674) 

63.  Jina  R<ija  Suri  II.  1618 — 1642  a,  d.  (  S. 
1674 — 1699  ) — eighth  branch  Laghu  Acharya 
started  from  S.   1616  (  1622  a.  d.  ) 

64.  Jina  Ratna  Suri.  1642 — ^1654  a.  d. 
(S.  1699— 171 1) — ninth  branch  Ranga  Vijaya 
started  from  S.  1700  (1643  a.  d.") 

65.  Jina  Chandra  Suri  VII.  1654 — 1709  a.d. 
(  S.   1711— 1763  ) 


[     Iv     ] 

66.  Jina  Sukhha  Suri.  1706 — 1723  a.  d.  (  S. 
1763— 1780) 

67.  Jina  Bhakti  Suri.  1723 — 1747  a.  d.  (S. 
1 7 10 — 1804  ) 

68.  Jina  Labha  Suri.  1747 — 1777  a.  d.  (  S. 
1804— 1834  ) 

69.  Jina  ChandraSuri.VIII.  1777 — 1799  a.d. 
(  S.  1 134-- 1156) 

70.  Jina  Harsba  Suri.  1799 — 1135  a.  d.  (  S. 
1856 — 1892  ) — tenth  branch  Mandoria  started 
from  S,  1892  (  1835  A.  D.  )  Dr.  Klatt's  Mss. 
ends  here  (  Indian  Antiquery  Vol.  XI.  p.  250.  ) 

71.  Jina  Soukhya  Suri.  IX.  1835— 1861  a.d. 
(S.  1892 — 1917  ) 

72.  Jina  Hansa  Suri.  II.    i86t  — 1871    a.   d. 

(s.  1917— 1935 ) 

73.  Jina  Chandra  Suri.  1879 — 1898  a.  d.  (S. 

1935— 1955  ) 

74.  Jina  Kirti  Suri.    1898 — 191 1    a.  d.     (  S, 

1955— 1967  ) 

75.  Jina  Charitra  Suri.  191 1.  a.  d.  (S.  1167) 
— the  present  head  of  the  gachchha. 

[  Dr,  Heornle  adds  to  Dr.  Klatt's  list  No.  71. 
Jina  Mahendra  (  S.  1892  — 1914  )  and  72, 
Jina  Mukti  ;  but  these  pontiffs  belong  to  another 
branch  of  the  gachchha.  ] 


(b-1)    RANGA  VIJYA  SAKHA. 

[  It  is  the  9th  branch  of  'Kharatara  gachcha' 
in  whose  list  {b)  we  find  Jina  Raja  Suri  as 
No.  63.  Both  his  disciples  Jina  Ratna  and  Jina 
Ranga  assumed  headship,  the  former  of  the 
main  line  as  No.  64  and  the  other  Jina  Ranga 
also  as  No.  64  of  this  branch  which  got  its 
name  as  *Ranga  Vijaya  ,from  this  Suri  and  has 
been  known  so  up  to  the  present  time.] 

64.  Jina  Ranga  Suri.  (died  in  S.  1711=  1654 
A.  D.) 

65. 
66. 

67. 

68. 

69. 
70. 

71. 
72. 

73. 
A.  D.) 

74,  Jina  Ratna  Suri  (succeeded  in  1884  A.D. 
and  is  the  present  head  of  this  branch). 


ina  Chandra  VII. 

ina  Vimala. 

ina  Lalita. 

ina  Akshaya. 

ina  Chandra  VIII. 

ina  Nandivardhana. 

ina  Jayashekhara. 

ina  Kalyana. 

ina  Chandra  IX.  (died  in  S.  1941  =  1884. 


(c)    TAPA  GACHCHHA. 

[The  list  of  this  Gachchha does  not  count  No.  i, 
Mahavira,  and  includes  No.  7  in  No.  6  and  No.  10 
in  No.  9  :  So  the  number  of  Udyotana  Suri  comes 
to  35  instead  of  ^S.  Dr.  Klatt  published  the  list 
in  Indian  Antiquary  Vol.  XI  P  253.  The 
Gachchha  was  named  as  'Tapa'  from  S.  1^85 
(1211  A,  D.)  during  the  headship  of  No.  44 
Jagatachandra  Suri.] 

35.   Udyotana.  36.  Sarvadeva  I. 

;^7.  Deva.  38.  Sarvadeva  II. 

39.  Yashobhadra  and  Nemichandra.    (brother 

disciples.) 

40.  Munichandra    (contemporary   of    Hema- 

chandra). 

41.  Ajitadeva.  42.   Bijoyasinha. 

43.  Somaprabha  I  and  Maniratna. 

44.  Jagatchandra.  (S.  1285  =  1228  A.  D.) 

45.  Devendra  (author  of  Karma  grantha,  died 

S.  1327  =  1270  A.  D.) 

46.  Dharmaghosha  (died  S.  1357  =  1300  A.D.) 

47.  Somaprabha  II,  died  S, 1373=  1316  A.D.) 

48.  Somatilaka,  (died  S.  1424=  1367  A.D.) 

49.  Devasundara. 

50.  Somesundara,  (died  S.  1499  =  1442  A.D.) 

51.  Munisundara   (died  S.  1503  =  1446  A.  D.) 

H 


[     Iviii     ] 

52.  Ratnashekhara(died  S.  1517  =  1460  A.D.) 

53.  Lakshmisagara. 

54.  Surnatisadhu. 

55.  Hemavimala.  (during  his  time  *Karuamati 

started  from  S.  1562  =  1505  A.D.  and 
Tarshvvachandra',  started  from  S.  1572 
=  1515  A.D.) 

56.  Anandavimala.  (died  S.  1 596  =  1 539  A.  D.) 
5^.   Vijayadana  (died  S.  1622=  1565.  A.  D.) 
58     Heeravijaya.    (contemporary    of     Akbar, 

died  S.  1652  =  1595.  A.  D.) 
•59.  Vijayasena.  (died  S.  1671  =  1614.  A.D.) 

60.  Vijayadeva.  (died  S.    1713  =  1656.  A.D.) 

61.  Vijayaprabha. 

(Dr.  Klatt's  list  closes  here.) 

62.  Vijayaratna. 

63.  Vijayakshema. 

64.  Vijayadaya.  * 

65.  Vijayadharma  I. 

66.  Vijayajinendra. 

67.  Vijayadhaneshwar. 

68.  Vijayadevendra. 

69.  Vijayadharma  II. 


'    (c-1)    PAYACHAND  OR  PARSHWACHANDRA 

GACHCHHA. 

[The  list  of  the  Gachchha  counts  from 
Goutama,  the  first  'ganadhar  of  Mahavira, 
instead  of  beginning  from  Mahavira  or  Sudharma 
as  in  (b)  or  (c).  It  is  a  branch  of  the  *Tapa'  and 
so  we  find,  up  to  No  40  Munichandra,  similarity 
in  names  with  slight  difference.  Unlike  Tapa  it 
does  not  include  Nos  7  and  10  in  Nos  6  and  9 
respectively.  It  excludes  Dinna  Suri  (No  14)  from 
the  list.  The  number,  therefore,  of  Udyotana  Suri 
comes  to  37.  Dr.  Klatt  does  not  explain  this 
(Indian  Antiquary  Vol  XXIII  p.  181).  The  Mss. 
give  the  date  of  Indradinna  (No.  13)  as  74  B.C.]. 

'i^T,   Udyotana. 

38.  Sarvadeva  I.  presentin  S  1010(953  A.D.) 

39.  Deva    I.  40.   Sarvadeva  II. 
41.  Yashobhadra.     42.   Nemichandra. 

43.  Munichandra. 

44.  Deva  II.  brother  pupilwith  Ajitadeva  No. 

41.  of(c)  ;  (died  in  S.  1226  =  1169  A.D.) 

45.  Padmaprabha     46.   Prasannachandra. 
47.     Gunasamudra,  Dr.  Klatt  mentions  Jaya- 

shekhara  as  47  and  again  as  49.  My  Mss.  has 
only  one  'Jayashekhara  48;  possibly  it  may  be  a 
mistake  of  Dr.  Klatt's  Mss.) 


t     Ix     ] 

48.  Jayasekhara  (S.  1301  =1244,  A.D.) 

49.  Vayarasena     or    Vajrasena   (  converted 
many  families  in  S.  1342  =  1285  A.D.) 

50.  Hematilaka  (S.  1362  =  1305  A.D.) 

51.  Ratnashekhara  (S.  1399  =  1342  A.D.) 

52.  H  emachandra. 

53.  Purnachandra  (S.  14^4  =  1367  A.D.) 

54.  Hemahansa  (S.  1453  =  1396  A.D.) 

55.  Lakshminivas  Panyas. 

56.  Punyaratna  Panyas. 

57.  Sadhuratna  Panyas. 

58.  Parshwachandra    Suri    (  S.   1565  =  1508 
A.    D.    founded    the    Gachchha  ;   died 

S.  1612=1555  A.D.) 

59  Samarachandra  (S.  1626=  1569  A.D  ) 

60.  Rayachandra  (S.  1669=1672  A.D.) 

61.  Vimalachandra  (S.  1674  =  1617  A.D.) 

62.  Jayachandra  (S.  1698  =  1641,   A.D.) 

63.  Padmachandra  (S.  1744  =  1687  A.D.) 

64.  Munichandra  (S.  1750  =  1693  A.D.) 

65.  Nemichandra  (S.  1797  =  1740  A.D.) 

66.  Kanakachandra  (S.  1810  =  1753  A.D.) 

67.  Sivachandra  (S.  1833  =  1777  A.D.) 

68.  Bhanuchandra  (S.  1837=  1780  A.D.) 

69.  Vivekachandra.       70.      Labdhichandra. 
71.  Harshachandra      72.     Hemachandra. 
73.  Bhratrichandra  and  Devachandra, 


(c-2)    TAPA  GACHCHHA-VIJAYA  SAKHA 

Nos.  I  to  60  the  same  as  (c) 

60.  Vijayadeva  Suri. 

61.  Vijayasinha  Suri. 

62.  Satyavijaya  Gani. 

63.  Kapuravijaya  Gani. 

64.  Kshamavijaya  Gani. 

65.  Jinavijaya  Gani. 

66.  Uttamavijaya  Gani. 

67.  Padmavijaya  Gani. 

68.  Rupavijaya  Gani. 

69.  Kirtivijaya  Gani. 

70.  Kasturavijaya  Gani. 

71.  Manivijaya  Gani.     " 

72.  Buddhivijaya  Gani. 
y2>'  Ananadvijaya  Suri. 

74.  Kamalavijaya      x^charya,     the     present 
pontiff. 


(d)    LUMPAKA  GACHCHHA 

{ The  tradition  is  that  the  Gachchha  took 
its  rise  from  Lunkaji,  who  flourished  in  S. 
1508  =  1451  A.  D.  But  the  first  sadhu  who 
occupied  the  pontifical  chair  of  the  new  line 
was    Bhana  Rishi.     He   was  a    native  of  Arhot- 


i   ixii   ] 

wada,  belonged  to  Porwad  caste  and  was  self-ini- 
tiated in  Ahmedabad  in  S.  1524=  1467  A.  D.  In 
some  Mss.  the  date  is  S.  1528=  147 1  A.  D.  ;  but 
in  Jain  Tatwadarsha,  by  Atmaramji  the  date  is 
S.  1533=1476  A.  D.  Another  Mss.  give  S. 
1531=1474  A.  D.  The  Gachchas  principal 
branches  are  :  (i)  Gujrati,  (ii)  Nagori  (iii)  Utradhi. 
In  the  list  of  the  heads  of  the  Gachchhas,  which 
begins  with  Mahavira,  as  usual,  the  names  are 
the  same  up  to  Arya  Mahagiri,  No  10.  The  dates 
in  my  Mss.  are  in  regular  order  up  to  453  A.  D., 
when  the  Jain  canons  were  reduced  to  writing. 
The  dates,  against  the  names  of  each,  denote  the 
year  of  their  demise.] 

10.  Mahagiri,  282  B.  C. 

11.  Balasinha,  247  B.  C.  4 

1 2.  Shanta,    195  B.    C. 

13.  Shyama,    154  B.  C. 

14.  Sandila,  121  B.  C. 

15.  Jitadharma,    73  B.  C. 

16.  Samudra,    19    B,  C, 

17.  Nandila,    64  A.  D. 

18.  Nslgahasti,  117  A,  D. 

19.  Revati,  191  A.  D. 

20.  Skhandil,  267  A.    D. 

21.  Sinha,  287  A.  D. 

22.  Samita,  321  A.  D. 


[     Ixiii     ] 


23- 

Nagarjun,  348 

A.D. 

24. 

Govinda,  350 

A.D. 

25- 

Bhutadin,  435 

A.  D. 

26. 

Lohitashpa,  420  A.  D 

• 

27. 

Dusha,  448  A. 

D. 

28. 

Devardhi,  453 

A.  D. 

29. 

Vii^ibhadra  I 

30. 

Shankar  Bhadra 

3'- 

Yasobhadra. 

32- 

Virabhadra  II. 

33- 

Variyama  Sena.     34. 

Yasha  Sena. 

35- 

Harsha  Sena. 

36. 

Jaya  Sena. 

37- 

Jagamala  I. 

38. 

Deva  I. 

39- 

Bhima. 

40. 

Karma. 

41. 

Raja. 

42. 

Deva  II. 

43- 

Shankara. 

44. 

Lakshmilabha. 

45- 

Rama. 

46. 

Padma. 

46. 

Harisama. 

48. 

Kushalaprabhu. 

49- 

Upran. 

50. 

Jaya. 

51- 

Baja. 

52. 

Deva  II 

53- 

Sura  Sena. 

54- 

Mahasur  Sena. 

55- 

Maha  Sena. 

56. 

Jaya  Raja. 

57- 

Gaya  Sena. 

58. 

Mitta  Sena. 

59- 

Vijaya  Sinha. 

60. 

Shiva  Raja. 

61. 

Lala. 

62. 

Jnyan. 

63- 

Bhana  Rishi. 

64. 

Bheeda,  (S.    i 

540=1 

493.  A.D), 

65. 

Noona  (S.    1556=  1499  A.D.) 

66. 

Bhima. 

67- 

Jagamala  II, 

[     Ixiv     ] 

68.  Sorbo. 

69.  Roopa.  (S.  1566=  1509  A.D.) 

70.  Jiva.     (N^gori  Branch  took  its  rise  from 

this  Acharaya). 

71.  Vara  Sinha.  (Mss.  closes  here.) 

Atmaramji's  list  gives  as  follow^  : — 

63.  Bhana(S.  1533=  1476  A.D,) 

64.  Roopa  (S.  1568=1511  A.D.) 

65.  Jiva  (S.  1578  =  1521  A.D.) 

66.  Vara  Sinha,  Senior  (S.  1587=  1530  A.D.) 

67.  Vara  Sinha  (S.  1606=  1549  A.D.) 

68.  Jashwanta  (S.  1649  =  1592  A.D.) 


4 

5 

7 

9 

II 

13 
^5 
17 


(d-1)    LUMPAKA  GACHCHHA. 

(Gujrati — Dhanrajpaskh? 

L  Branch.) 

Roopsingji. 

2. 

Jivarajaji. 

Varasingji  (Barh). 

Varasingji  (Laghu). 

Jashwantasingji. 

6. 

Roopsingji  II. 

Damodarsingji. 

8. 

Dhanrajji. 

Chintamanaji. 

lO. 

Kshemakaranji. 

Dharmasingji. 

12. 

Nagarajaji. 

Jayarajaji. 

14. 

Meghrajaji. 

Akshayarajaji. 

16. 

Ajayarajaji. 

Amararajaji. 

18. 

Kshemarajaji. 

[     l^v     j 

(e)    ANCHAL  GAGHCHHA 

[The  Gachha  is  also  known  as  'Vidhipaksha 
and  started  from  S.  1214=1157  A.D. 

Its  Pattavali  was  published  by  Dr.  Klatt  in 
'Indian  Antiquary  Vol  XXIII  p.  174,  cf.  Dr. 
Buhler's  list  in  Epigraphia  Indica  Vol.  II,  p  39.] 

35.     Udyotana.  36.     Sarvadeva. 

2,y.     Padmadeva.  38.     Udayaprabha. 

39.     Prabhananda.        40.     Dharmachandra. 

41.     Suvinayachandra  42.     Gunasamudra. 

43.     Vijayaprabha.         44.     Narachandra. 

45.     Virachandra.  46.     Jayasinha. 

47.  Aryarakshita. 

(S.  1202 — 12236  =  1145 — 1179A.  D.) 

48.  Jayasinha. 

(S.   1236—1258  =  1179—1201  A.D.) 

49.  Dharma^hosha. 

(S.  1258— 1268  =  1201— 1210  A.  D.) 

50.  Mahendrasinha. 

(S.  1269— 1309=  1212— 1252  A.  D.) 

51.  Sinhaprabhu. 

(S.    1309— 1313=^1252— 1256  A.D.) 

52.  Ajitasinha. 

(S.  1314—1339=1257— 1282  A.  D.) 

53.  Devendrasinha. 

(S.  1339— 1371  =  1282— 1313  A.  D.) 


[     Ixvi     ] 

54.  Dharmaprabha. 

(S.  1391—1393  =  1313- 

55.  Sinhatilaka. 

(S.  1393—1395=1336- 

56.  Mahendra. 

.(s.  1395—1444  =  1338- 

57.  Merutunga. 

(S.   1446—1471=1389- 

58.  Jayakirti. 

(S.  1473—1500=1416- 

59.  Jayakeshari. 

(S.   1501—1542  =  1444- 

60.  Siddhantasagara. 

(S,   1542—1560=1485' 

61.  Bhavasslgar. 

(S.  1560—1583  =  1503- 

62.  Gunanidh^na. 

(S.  1584 — 1602  =  1527- 

63.  Dharmartiurti. 

(S.  1602—1073=1545- 

64.  Kalyinasigara. 

(S.   1670 — 1718  =  1613- 

65.  Amaras^gara. 

(S.  1718 — 1762  =  1661- 

66.  Vidyis^gara. 

(S.  1762—1797  =  1705. 


1336 

A. 

D.) 

1338 

A. 

D.) 

1387 

A. 

D.) 

I4I4 

A. 

D.) 

1443 

A. 

D.) 

1485 

A. 

D.) 

•1503 

A. 

D.) 

1526  A. 

D.) 

1545 

A. 

D.) 

1613 

A, 

D.) 

■1661 

A. 

D.) 

•1705 

A. 

D.) 

1740 

A. 

D.) 

[     Ixvii     ] 

67.  Udayasdgara. 

(S.   1797 — 1826=  1740 — 1769  A.  D.) 

68.  Kirtis^gara. 

■'S.  1826— 1843=1769— 1786  A.  D.) 

69.  Punyas^gara. 

(S.   1843— 1860=  1786— 1803  A.  D.) 

70.  Muktis^gara. 

(S.  1860-1892  =  1803— 1835  A.  D.) 

71.  Rajendrasagara. 

(S.  1892-1914-1835— 1857  A.  D.) 

72.  Ratnasagara. 

(S.   1914 — [928=1857 — 1871  A.  D.) 

73.  Vivekasdgara,  from  S.  1928=1877  A.D. 


(f)    KARUAMATI  GACHCHHA. 

1.  Mahan  KarV>ua. 

S.      1524—1564=1467—1507  A.  D.) 

2.  M.  Khima. 

(S.      1564-1571=1507—1514  A.  DJ 

3.  M.      Beera. 

(S.   1571--1601  =1514— 1544  A.  D.) 

4.  M.     Jivaraj. 

(S.     1601  —  1644=1544 — 1587  A.  D.) 

5.  M.     Tejapal  I, 

(S.  1644— 1646-  1587— 1589  A,  D.) 


[     Ixviii     ] 

« 

6.  M.     Ratnapal. 

(S.      r646-'i66i=i589— :6o4  A.  I^-) 

7.  M.  JI;iada.s. 

(S.   1661  — 1670  =  1674 — 1513  A.  D.) 

8.  M.  Tej.pala  II  (S.  1670-1684  =  1613— 
1627  A.  D.  He  was  present  in  1627  A.D.) 
with  his  c'^ief  disciple  Kaly^na  and  others, 
when  the  Mss.  was  written.) 


(g-)    THERAPANTHIS 

BhikhamjVe  Swrinii        (S.    1817  =  176^1   A.D. 

I 

I 

Bh.'\ramoli^^J  SA^imi.  ^  (S.  1860=1803  A.D. 


Raichandjte  Swanii.  (S.    1878=1821  A.D. 

I. 

Jitniiljce  Swanii.  (S.   1908=  1851  A.  D. 

Maohr;'jj?:;e  Swami.  (S.  1938=  i88r  A.  D. 

J 

Mcinaklalj.^e  Swami.  (S.  1949  =  1892  A.  D. 


Dalchandjce  Swami.      (S.    1954  =  1897  A.D. 

Kaluraniajee  Swami.       (S.  1966=  1909  A.D. 
—  the  present  poiuiff. 


I     Ixix     ] 

B.  DIGAMBARA  SCHOOL  OR  MULA  SANGHA. 

(a)    Nandi  Sangha     Ohitor  Sakha. 

[  This  Nandi  Sangha  was  founded  by  Megha- 

nandin,    a  disciple   of  Guptigupta    or    Arhadbali 

and    is    also    known    as  Saraswati  Gachchha  and 

Balitkslra    Gana.     The   following    list   is  based 

upon    the    Pattavali  as    lately    published    in  the 
Jain    Siddhanta  Bhaskara,  a  Digambar   Journal 

and    by     Dr.    Hoernle    in    "Indian     Antiquary" 

Vols.  XX,  pp.  341 — 361    and    XXI,    pp.  57 — 84. 

The  pontiffs  of  the  Gachchha  generally   use  the 

four  surnames  viz.  Nandin,  Chandra,    Kirti  and 

Bhushana.     The  table  begins  from   Gautama  the 

first  Ganadhara  or  disciple   of  Mahavira  who   is 

known  as  the  founder   of  the    Mula    Sangha   by 

the  Digambaris.     The  dates  against    the    names 

indicate  the  year  of  their  succession.] 

I.  Gotamaup  to  515  B.C.  2.  Sudharama  503  B.C. 
3.  Jambu  465  B.C.  4.  Vishnu  451  B.C. 

5.   Nandi  435  B.C.  6.  Aparajita  413  B.C. 

7.  Gobardhana  394  B.C.   8.  Bhadrabahu  I  365  B.C. 
9.  Vis^kha  355  B.C.  10.  Proshthila  336  B.C. 

II.  Kshatriya  319  B.C.      12.  Jaya  Sena  298  B.C. 
13.  Naga  Sena  280  B.C.   14.  Siddhirtha  263  B.C. 
15.   DKirsti  Sena  245  B.C.  16.  VijayaSena  232  B.C. 
17.   Buddhilinga  212  B  C.  18.  Deva  I  198  B.C. 
19.   Dhara  Sena  184  B.C.  20.  Nakshatra  166  B.C. 


21.   Jayapalaka  146  B.C.  22.  Pandava  107  B.C. 

23.   Dhruva  Sena  93  B.C.  24.  Kansa  61  B.C. 

25.  Subhadra  57  B.C.       26.  Yasobhadra  39  B.C. 

27.  Bhadrabahu  II  16  B  C. 

(  Other  dates  are  31,  33  and  53  B.C.  See 
notes  by  Dr.  Hoernle,  Indian  Antiquary  Vol.  XX 
pp.  341  and  357—360). 

28.  Guptigupta2i  B.C.    29.  MeghanandinI  i7B.C- 
30.  Jinachandra  I  8  B.C.  31.  Kundakunda44  A.D. 
32.   Umasvamin  85  A.D.  ^^.  Lohacharya  96  A.D. 
34.  Yasahkirti  154  A.D.  35.  Yasonandin  201  A.D. 


36.   Devanandin  I 

251  A.  D. 
38.  Gunanandin 

307  A.  D. 
40.  Kumarnandin 

360  A.  D. 
42.  Prabhachandra 

421  A.  D. 
44.  Bhanunandin 

451  A.  D. 
46.  Vasunandin 

474  A.  D. 
48.   Ratnanandin 
.       528  A.  D. 
50.  Meghchandra 

560  A.  D. 


37.  Jayanandin 

296  A.  D. 
39.  Vajranandin 

329  A.  D. 
41.   Lokachandra 

396  A.  D. 
43.  Nemichandra 

430  A.  D. 
45.  Nayananandin 

468  A.  D. 
47.  Viranandin 

504  A.  D. 
49.  Manikyanandin 

544  A.  D. 

51.  Shantikirti  I 

585A.  D. 


c 

52.  Merukirti 
629  A.  D, 

54.  Vishnunandin 

669  A.  D. 
56.  Shrichandra 

692  A.  D. 
58.   Desabhushana 
708  A.  D. 
60.  Dharmanandin 

751  A.  D. 
62.  Ramachandra 

790  A.  D. 
64.  Abhayachandra 

840  A.  D. 
66.  Nagachandra 

882  A.  D. 
68.   Harichandra 
917  A.  D. 
70.  Maghachandra  I 

966  A.  D, 
72.  Gunakirti 

991A.  D. 
74.   Lokachandra 
1022  A.  D. 
76.   Bh^vachandra 
1058  A.  D. 


Ixxi     ] 

53.   Mahikirti 
647  A.  D. 

55.  Shribhushana  I 

678  A,  D, 
57.  Shrinandin 

708  A.  D. 
59.  Anantakirti 

728  A.  D. 
61.  Vidy^nandi 

783  A.  D. 
63.  R^ma  kirti 

821  A.  D. 
65.  Navachandra 

859  A.  D. 
67.   Harinandi. 

891  A.  D. 
69.   Mahichandra  I 

933  A-  D. 

71.   Lakshmichandra 

970  A.  D. 
73.  Gunachandra 

1009  A.  D. 
75.  Shrutakirti 

1037  A.  D. 
77.   Mahichandra  II 
1083  A.  D. 


[     Ixxii     ] 

78.  Mighachandra  II 

1087  A.  D. 
80.   Devanandin  II 

1098  A.  D. 
82.   Harinandin 

T103  A.  D. 
84.   Devanandin  III 

1113  A.  D. 
86.  Surachandra 

1 1 27  A.  D. 
88.  Jnananandin 

1 142  A.  D. 
90.  Simhakirti 

1152  A.  D. 
92.  Charunandin 

1 166  A.  D. 
94.  N^bhikirti 

1175  A.  D. 
96.  Shrichandra  II 

1191  A.  D. 
98.  Vardham§,na 

1 199  A.  D. 
100.  Lalitakirti 

1204  A.  D. 
102.  Ch^rukirti 

1207  A.  D. 


79.   Brahmanandin 
1091  A.  D. 
81.  Visvachandra 
1099  A.  D. 
83.  Bhavanandin 

mo  A.  D. 

85.  Vidyachandra 

1 1 19  A.  D. 

S7,  Maghnandin  II 

1131  A.  D. 

89.  Gang^kirti 

1 149  A.  D. 
91.   Hemakirtti 

1 159  A.  D. 
93.  Neminandin  II 
1173A.D. 
95.   Narendrakirti 

1 184  A.  D, 
Padmakirti 

1 196  A,  D. 
Akalankachandra 

1200  A.  D. 
1 01.   Kesavachandra 

1205  A.  D. 
103.   Abhayakirti 
1207  A.  D. 


97 


99 


[     Ixxiii     J 
104.  Vasantakirti  105.   Prakshantikirti 


1209  A,  D. 

106  Vishalakirti 
1214  A.  D. 

108.  Ratnakirti   II. 

1253  A.  D. 
no,  Padmanandin 

1393  A.  D, 
112.  Prabhachandra  III. 

1514  A.  D. 
114.  Dharamachandra  II. 

1546  A.  D. 
116.  Chandrakirti 

1605  A.  D. 
/18.  Narendrakirti 

1665  A.  D. 
120.  Jagatakirti 

1713  A.  D, 
122.  Mahendrakirti  I. 

1758  A.  D. 
124.  Surendrakirti 

1795  A.  D. 
126.  Nainakirti 

1826  A.  D. 


1211  A.  D. 

107.  Dharmachandra 
1239  A  D. 

109.   Prabhachandra 

1328  A.  D. 
III.  Subhachandra 

1440  A.  D. 
113.   Jinachandra  II. 

1524  A.  D. 
115.   Lalitakirti 

1565  A.  D. 
117,   Devendrakirti 

1634A.  D. 
119.  Surendrakirti 

1676  A.  D. 
121.  Devendrakirti  II. 

1735  A.  D. 
123.  Khemendrakirti 

1765  A.  D. 
125.  Sukhendrakirti 

1822  A.  D. 

127.  Devendrakirti  III 
1881  A.  D. 


128.  Mahendrakirti  1881  A.D. 


[     Ixxiv     ] 

(a-l)  NAGOR  SAKHA, 

[After  Jina  Chandra  II  (No.  113)  we  find  two 
lines,  as  one  section  removed  to  Nagor  and  the 
other  continued  to  reside  in  Chitor.] 

113.  Jinachandra  II,  up  to  1524  A.D, 

114.  Ratnakirti  III,  1529  A.D. 

115.  Bhuvanakirti,    1533  AD. 

116.  Dharmakirti,      1544  A.D. 

117.  Vishalakirti,  from  1544  A.  D.  ;  there  is  a 
break  down  in  the  list  up  to  1740  A.D. 
when  Bhuvanabhushana  (120)  succeeded. 

120.  Bhuvanbhushana  up  to  1745  A.D, 

121.  Vijayakirti  1773  A.  D. 

122.  Lokendrakirti  1783  A.D. 

123   Bhuvanakirti  II  from  1793  A.D. 


(a  2)  SUBHA  CHANDRA  SHAKHA. 

[The    line     starts     from  Acharya      Shubha 
Chandra    No.  116   author    of   Pandava    Purana. 

In  the    list    the    names  differ  from     Vishalakirti 
No.  106.  as  below.] 

106    Vishalakirti.      -  107,  Shubhakirti. 

108.   Dharmachandra.        109.  Ratnakirti. 

no.  Prabhachandra.         in.  Padmanandi. 

ii2.,Sakalakirti.  113.  Bhuvanakirti. 

114.   Indubhushana.  115.  Vijayakirti, 


[     Ixxv     ] 
ii6.   Shubhachandra.         117=  Sumatikirti 


118.  Gunakirti. 
120.  Ramakirti. 
122.   Padmanandi. 
124.  Kshemendrakirti 
126.  Vijayakirti 
128.  Chandrakirti 


119.  Vadibhushana. 
121.  Yashakirti. 
123.   Devendrakirti. 
125.  Narendrakirti. 
127.   Nemichandra. 


SENA  6ANA. 
[  The  list  is  given  from  the  Jaina  Siddhanta 
Bhaskara.  Up  to  Bhadrabahu  II  (No.  28)  there 
is  little  difference.  Next  comes  Lohacharya,  a 
disciple  of  Bhadrabahu  II  and  the  'Gana'  was 
founded  by  his  disciple  Jina  Sena  I,  from  whom 
the  name  is  derived  ] 


I.   Lohacharya  I. 

3.  Ravi  Sena. 

5.  Rama  Sena. 

7.  Bandhu  Sena. 

9.  Main  Sena. 
II.  Bhava  Sena. 
13.  Sihadbali. 
15.  Guna  Sena  I. 
17.  Samantabhadra  I. 
19.  Vira  Sena  I. 
21.  Gunabhadra  I. 
23.  Chhatra  Sena  I. 


2.  Jina  Sena  I. 
4.  Shivayan. 
6.  Kanaka  Sena. 
8.  Vishnu  Sena. 
10.  Mahavira. 
12.-  Aristanemi. 
14.  Ajita  Sena. 
16.  Siddha  Sena. 
18.  Shivakoti. 
20.  Jina  Sena  II. 
22.  Nemi  Sena. 
24.  Arya  Sena. 


[     Ixxvi     ] 


25.   Lohacharya  II. 
27.  Sura  Sena. 
29,   Devendra. 
19.  Durlava  Sena. 
33.  Sree  Sena. 
35.  Some  Sena  I. 
37.  Dhara  Sena  III. 
39.  Soma  Sena  II. 
41.   Deva  Sena  II. 
41.  Vira. 

45.  Guna  Sena  II. 
47.  Soma  Sena  III. 
49.  Gunabhadra  III, 
51.  Jina  Sena  II. 
53.  Chhatra  Sena  II. 


26.   Bramha  Sena. 
28.  Kamalabhadra. 
30.  Kumara  Sena. 
32.  Dhara  Sena  II. 
34.  Laksmi  Sena  I. 
36.  Shrutavira. 
48,  Deva  Sena  I. 
40.  Gunabhadra  II. 
42.  Vira  Sena  II. 
44.  M^nikya  Sena  I.  . 
46.   Laksmi  Sena  II. 
48.  Manikya  Sena  II. 
50.  Soma  Sena  IV. 
52.  Samantabhadra  II. 


[     Ixxvii     ] 


(b)  KASHTHA  SANGHA. 

r  The   list   is     taken    from  *Jaina  Siddhanta 
Bhaskara  ] 


I.  Mahavira 

3.  Sudharmd. 

5.  Vishnu. 

7.  Aparijita 

9.  Bhadrabahu  I. 

II.  Prosthila. 

13.  Ndgasena. 

15.  Dhritasena. 

17.  Gangadeva 

19.  Nakshatra. 

21.  Pandu. 

23.  Kansa, 

25.  Yashobhadra. 

27.  LohsLcharya. 

29.  Virasena. 

31.  Rudrasena. 

33.  Kirtisena. 

35.  Vishvakirti. 

37.  Bhutasena. 

39.  Vishvachandra. 

41.  M^ghachandra. 

43.  Vinayachandra. 


2.  Goutama. 

4.  Jambu. 

6.   Nandimitra. 

8.  Govardhana. 

10.   Vishakh4. 

12.   Kshatriya. 

14.  Jayasena  I. 

16.  Vijay. 

18.  Dharmasena. 

20.  Jayap^Ia. 

22.   Dhruvasena. 

24.  Samudra. 

26.   Bhadrabahu  II. 

28.  Jayasena. 

30.   Bramhasena. 
32.  Bhadrasena. 

34.  Jayakirti. 

36.  Abhayasena. 

38.  Bhavakirti. 

40.  Abhayachandra. 

42.   Nemichandra. 

44.   BS.lachandra. 


45.  Tribhuvanachandral.  46.   Rftmachandra. 
47.  Vijayachandra.        48.  Yashakitri  I. 


[     Ixxviii     1 


49.  Abhayakirti. 
^      51.  Kundakirti. 
53.  Rdmasena. 
55.  Guna  Sena. 
57.   Prdt^psena. 
59.  Vijayasena. 
61.  Shrey^nsasena. 
63.   Kamalakirti  I. 
65.   Hemakirti. 
67.   Kumdrsena  II. 
69.   Padmaiiandni. 
71.   Kshemakirti. 
73.  Sahasrakirti. 
75.   Devendrakirti. 
77.  Lalitakirti. 
79.  Munindrakirti. 


50.  Mah^sena. 

52.  Tribuvanachandra  II. 

54.  Harshasena. 
56.   Kumdrsena  I. 
58.   Mahavasena. 
60.  Nayanasena. 
62.   Anantakirti. 
64.  Kshemakirti  I. 
66.  Kamalakirti. 
68.   Hemachandra. 
70.  Yashahkirti. 
72.  Tribhuvanakirti. 
74.   Mahichandra. 
76.  Jagatakirti. 
78.  Rajendrakirti. 


nr^ 


MVMai.^>!k!UUIBI  ■V.dli 


A  Epitome  of 

Jainism 


nW^ 


-v 


J' 


BRIGHAM  YOUNG  UNIVERSITY 


3  1197  00643  1065 


DATE  DUE 


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2  7  1998 


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•OV  2  1  1998 


NOV   0  6  1998 


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Brigham  Young  University  » 


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