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Table of Contents. 




Jainism— Us Philosophy and Religfion. 

Consideration of the term Philosophy^ — 
As they understand it in the West — Aristotle 
Spencer and Hegel — Philosophy as dthned 
and taught by the Jinas or the Victors — 
Right Knowledge, Right Vision and Right 
Conduct — The Triune of Jainism — Some 
Rudimentary Ideas and Metaphysical 


75— /p. 
Prediijaments by Pre-eminence. 
Fundamental Notions — Categories or 
Predicaments by pre-eminence — Their 
Necessity and Origin — How determined — 
Advantages of such determination — Dravya, • 
Guna, Paryaya and Karma— Papa and 
Punya—Clasisification and dercription in 
general of the Predicaments — Their 

Knowledge and Its forms. 

The Correlativity of Jiva and Ajiva — 
Polarity of knowledge — Self and the Not- 
self — Consciousness and its Origin — Know- 
ledge and its Growth — Definitions of Right 
Vision and Right Knowledge — Different 
forms of Knowledoe and the Possibility of 
the Kevala Jnana — Kevalin is the Ideal- 
Real — Pure Intuitions — the true Characteris- 
tics of Real Pratyaksha. 


Epistemologry and Logric. 

Further consideration of the Processes of 
Knowledge — Judgment and its Three Ele- 
ments — Rules and canons which a Judg- 
ment should obey — Insufficiency of the 
Perceptual Source of Knowledge-— Hence 
other sources ot Knowledge. 

Pratyaksha is really Paroksha. 

The Jain dissension with reference to 
Pratyaksha Pram^n — Direct Perception is 
really Indirect-— Analysis of the Psychologi- 
cal Processes of Cognition— The Different 

( "» ) 

Stacres — From Sense to Thought- -Proof of * 
the Truth and Validity of the Jain point of 
view — The sensuous 'Pratyaksha' is really 

The Jain Theory of Formal Logic. 

Meeting the Charvakas on their own 
grounds — Refutation Oi their hypothesis and 
Demonstration of the legitimacy of Infer- 
ential knowledge — The Jain Theory of Formal 
Logic and the definitions of Pratyaksha 
— "Paroksha" includes Inference aud Testi- 
mony — Definition of Inference and Forms 
of Syllogisms — festimony or the Word — 
Definition of Pramin or Valid knowledofe 
—The World of Reals and not of Phantoms 
as hold the Buddhists. 

The Jain Logic and the **Nayas . 

Other lines of Logical or Ontological 
Inquiry — Analysis and Synthesis — The 
Nayas and the Saptabhangi — The two 
kinds of Naya— (i) the Noumenal and (ii) 
the Phenomenal— -Consideration of the Ten 

( ^ ) 

' Sub-divisions of the Noumenal Naya or the 
Analytic Method of Inquiry into the 
Ontology of Thought and Form. 


The Doctrine of Syadbad. 

Defects of the Realistic method of Inquiry 
Saptabhangi supersedes the Realistic — It is 
a better Organon of Knowledge — It leads 
to the higher Knowledge — Antkmtavad and 
Idealism — True Glimpse of Concrete Reality 
— Unity and Multiplicity — Correlativity 
essential to Unity — Dialectical Vision as 
of things as Expression of a Unity. 

Shankar and Syadbad 

Vyasa and Shankar against the Doctrine 
of Syadbad — Impossibility of the co-existence 
of the contradictory attributes in one — 
Shankar's summary of the Syadbad and its 
interpretation— Its critical examination by 
Shankar — Inconsistencies and fallacies in 


{ V ) 

Examination of Shankar. 

Examination of Shankar's animadversion 
and his po-ition — Farther discussion of the 
Principle of Syadvad and the Law of 
Contradiction — Thought is not simply, a 
distinction — It is a relation as well — Reply 
to Shankar point by point. 

The Doctrine of Unity in Difference. 

The dialectic reasoning leads to the 
Theory of Bhedabhed i.e. of Unity in differ- 
ence — Distinction presupposes Unity— The 
world system is an expression of thought 
— The Jain conception of the Absolute 
distinguished from the Absolute beyond the 
relative of the Ved^ntins. 

The Univei se as a Self-Existent Unit 

'. The Self and the Not self are but 

members of a complex Whole — DifiSculties 

in the transformation of the Subject into 

Object and vice-versa Object into Subject 

— Each pre-supposing the other, we have 

to take the Universe in the light of single 

unified System. 

( vz ) 


Theories of Evolution. 

Theories of Evolution and Creation by 

External Agency — Spencerian Formulation 

of the Principle of Evolution — Difficulties in 

in Spencerian hypothesis. 

The Sankhya Philosophy. 

Sankhya principles of Evolution — 
Traceable in the 'Ri^-veda'— -'Purush' and 
Prakriti — The Three 'Gunas' in their Equili- 
brium form 'Prakriti or the Root- Evolvent 
— Prakriti is the first Category — The Three 
other Categories — Inconsistency of the 
Sankhya Hypothesis. 

Causation and Compound Evolution. 

The world is the permutation and 
combination of atoms— Causes ol differences 
—Science fails to explain— The principles 
of causation— Criticism of Mill's conception 
of the law of causation — Patient and Agent 
— The Jain view of Causation and compound 

( vii ) 

Jainism makes no room for an extra- 
mundane God. — Laplace and Nepolean — 
The Idea is not singular in India — Yet the 
Jains are not dependant on any All-mighty 
Ruler standing in the without — Dr. Bose 
and the Super-physical Power — Spencer 
and Sv)inoza — ''Tertium Qiiid^-nature of the 
Power — The Coalescence these [cowers in 
different beings on the attainment of 
"Nirv^n" is the idea of the God-head of the 

Souls and the God-head -Materialistic 

conception of Soul — A bye-product of matter 
— Eastern and Western m.tierialism com- 
pared— Ch^rvak and Haekel and Girardian, 
the Socialist — Cosmologit:al and Moral 
difficulties involved In Materiah'sm — 
Admissions by Huxley, Spencer and Darwin 
— The Jain conception of Spirit and Matter 
— Their Correlativity ™Prade .has — Parts or 
Soul-Units — Conscious <^ffuIiJience form the 
spiritual essence of the S')U'---.S nil's constitu 
tional ireedoni — Its 'I-,;)/ - :;on iiir«.)ugh 
the grades of Sansar a;id Ea) .:. ::patiun. 


( viti ) 

The Karmi Phenoriienol' gT- 
Constitutional Freedom '^^^'\ Divii?ity of 
the Soul — 'Karma' '.\\\d Soul--! low could 
Soul get enfettered in the Chaii^s >f 'Karma* 
— Different Theories as to h* Rc-lation 
between Soul and *Karm l' — La y )f 'Karma' 
and Re birth — The Basis v)f rj r J ■ i Et'iics— 
Heredity can not ex[>lain d;f'e=-e c-'S '^^::iweea 
Organisms — Hir- lity ■\\\\ 'a nrn: *. 

Cr^AP ':iR XIX 
Chiuchianity and the Law of Xarma. 
Ciirisiian Criricisni of 'Kann a.' — 'Empty 
Heart of J ainism' — Examinarion of the Criti- 
ci'^m -Inconsistencies and Diffijulties of the 
C )rl^.I "1 Theology — God and Satan — Good 
'A\v\ i*' 'il —The Indian WIdov/s mi Christian 

Belief in Re-bict.h 
' "Karma* and Re-birtl»s — C Hiiplimentary 
aspects of one and the Same Law govern- 
in^ tiv?-. Universe — Buddhistic r-J-iiilism — -aH 
M'irhont an Ei.^o — Belief in ihe La\/ briiigs in 
Solar.e .tnd Comfort in ones Tidures — Wide 
j-y^i^or of the belief in Asia at;d Europe— 


( «* ) 

Poets, Scientists and Philosophers — Trans- 
migration lia^ its root in reality— !\irma 

B-^birth and Karma-Sarira 
Prof. HL^xley and Re-birth — Huxley's 
'Character' iud our Karma-matter — Character 
—Inner N i»are — Lino-a-deha of the Mindii 
Philosophers —The Five Koshas or the Coa- 
centric Circle/. — Prclnas of the Hindus i • l^'f 
the Jain Philosophers — Transmissio.: (^( 
Character '"h:ough Heredity Vs. Truisinl 
"[ration of iv .nna-S irira th'>n';:>!i R 

Karma-Sarira and Oiidai ika-Sarira. 
Rfclatiohs be{'V(?t:^n ihc 'K.irma' and the 
'Oudarik i' — Staov-s of drivelopment— 'Kar- 
mau* produces the 'Oad irika'^ — *Ouda''ika 
produces 'Karma' — Not Identical but two 
distinct Eiui.ies — Co existence Inexplicable 
— Then n ) Inter-action possible— Relation 
of C >iico '11 iiu Variation—- Difficulties of 
Parallelism — The ^Carman' body and the 
•Oudarika' st inAto each other in Relation of 

( ^ ) 

Free-Will and Fatalism. 

The probleto discussed ; *Is *Jiva' a free 
centre of Origination' ? — Belief in the latter 
makes Moral Judgment Inexplicable — 
Ethics lose its Injunctive Character — Leaves 
no room for Merit, Reward and Virtue — 
Examination of the Demerits' — Arguments in 

the Light of European Ethics. 

Will and Individuality. 
'Karma-Sarira' and the Nature of its 
Migration — Water-Globule and 'Karma'- 
Globule — The Veget >ble Seeds and 'Karma- 
Sarira' in Relation to Nature — Selection and 
its Character — liuman Evolution is Essen- 
tially Teleological — Humanity always Keeps 
a Goal before itself. 

Causality in the Moral World. 
What does 'Responsibility' Imply .-^ — Re- 
ward or Pan! ihirsent Unavoidable — I^aw of 
*Karma'-Caus;ility Inviolable — Prayer or 
Worship has no Efficacy — No Need of Extra 
Mundane Moral Providence — Law of 'Karma 
Is a more Rational Explanation— An Act of 

( « ) 

Vice IS not equal to Incurring a Debt — The 

Theory *Karina'-Pudgal — The Distinction 

between Right and Wrong is not an Absolute 


364 390 

Class?flieation of Karmas. 

*Karma'- Definition. — Nature and Charac- 
ter of 'Karma' — 'Karma' or Action-Currents 
— Two main Divisions of Action-Currents — 
Currents o^ Injury and of Non-Injury — Dr. 
Bose and the 'Action -Currents' — Sub- Divi- 
sions of Action-Currents of Injury to Vision, 
Knowledge, Mohaniya and Antaraya — De- 
trimental to Psychical unfoldment — Currents 
of Non-Injury — Aus, N^m. Gotra and Veda- 
niya — Determinative of the Organic Forma- 

From Metaphysics to Ethies 
How does the Theory determine the 
Practice ? — The Jafn Ethical Speculation — 
How it is determined and based on their 
Metaphysical Conclusion — A Contrast be- 
tween Buddhistic and Jain Morality 
-'—The Jain Conception of the Summum 


( ^'ii ) 

The Conceptions of Virtue and Vice. 

"Virtue and Vice — DIstincilve Principle 
between them — Hunum c ndiict is essentially 
Telcol )^i:Ml — Moksha is li^e ili^'hesl End 
of life ;nul activitv — Contrast l^etwcen the 
E isreiii iiiid Western conceptions of Vice and 
Viruu^ — Virtne» Vice iuid 'Karma' Causah'ty 

— liie Problem of evil. 

On Punya and Its Fr jitions. 
Punya and Pdpa in relation to 'Ciiaritra' 

— Analysis of Charitra or Conduct - Consi- 

derations of activitv —Good a'»d tiie 

Law of duty — Fundamv.MUal factors of Punya 

—Knowledge, Faith and Will — Punyas as 

forms of service — Sincerity is the Soul of 

Religiousity — ^Sincerityand Punya — Psychical 

and Physical fruitions for the performances 
of Punya, 

Papa, Vice or Sin. 
Constituent PLlements of Papa — 'Aiianda* 
*vis the Prime Good — Philosophy of Passion — 
-The doctrine ol fudoletifin — Eiorhteen Kinds 
of *P^pa* — Their consequences. 



( xiii ) 

Asrava or Influx. 

Influx' — Influx and Bandha — Their 
mutua! Relation of Receprocity — Causes 
of the Influx — 'Miihyriiva', '^Avirate*, 
Trani'ida' and 'Yoo^a' — Ii^.flux, Subjective 
and Objective — Forry-lvvo Channels of 
Influx of the 'Karmi'm.irier' into the Soul. 

Bandha or Bondagfe. 

Bandha — lis Classification— Possibilities 
of Bnndha — Refutation of the Theory of 
Parallelism and Dualism — Bandha is without 
Beginning — Causes of Bandha— Mithy^tva 
or Sul>repti()n — D -finition of Subreption- 
Forms and kiiids of Subreption — Possibilities 
of S'ib vip,t'.-i — P y^''^ '' >^} ^ ■ ^ Pinli)so[ihy 
of SutrejHj'on, 

Samvara or Stoppag'e. 
Samvara classified into Physical and Psv- 
chical — With Sam vara begins th<- })r,?v:'ic:d 
morality — Svviraj, ih .' uliim ite E i 1 ~ F fiv . 
seven kind . ofS mu-ara — Five Sa-n:!" Hir-- 
Guptis, Ten Rules of Asceticism— iwclv c 

( xiv ) 

Bhftvanas, Twenty-six Parishahas and Five 

Nirjara or Dissipation. 
Nirjara — 'Its Definition — Classification of 
Nirjara into Sakam i and Akama — Ihe Mu- 
mukshin strives for Sakama Nirjara to ex- 
pediate Liberation — Phases and Transforma- 
tions of Karma — Means and Methods of 
Sakclma Nirjara — The Primary Condition of 
Nirjara is Austerity — Austerity burns up the 
Karma seeds and sets the Jiva Free— Forms 
of Austerities and Dhy&nas which burn up 
the seeds of Karma before their due times. 

Mok.^ha or Emancipation. 
Moksha or Emancipation— Mokslia is 
the Highest Good — Conct^ptions of the 
Highest Good according to the Different 
Schools of Philosophy — Moksha is eternal 
and constitutional with tlie Son! — It cannot 
be worked out by Karma — For Moksha is 
not the Product of anything. 

604 — 6/Q. 

( XV ) 


The Gunasthanas or the Stepping-stones 

to Higher things — The Fourteen Stages 

squeezed up into Four only — The First 

is the Life of Conscious Selection — The 

Third is that of Conscience and Faith — And 

the Fourth is that of Knowledge and 

Delight Infinite — Fourteen Stages leading 

to Omniscience — Regulation or control 

does not mean Stultification as complained of 


Jain Church. 

The cycles of Avasarpini and Utsarpini 
— The Yugalikas and the Kalpa Trees-^ 
We get glimpses of the lives of the First 
Twenty-two Tirthankars — Regular Histori- 
cal accounts begins with Parshwanath, the 
Twenty-third Tirthankar and Mahavir, the 
Twenty- fourth — Rupture and Split — the 
Principal Subdivisions of the Swet^mbaris 

and Digambaris — The list of Gachhas 

^^7 — 6/0. 

Jain Festivals. 

Of the Festivals, Pajjusan is the Great- 
est — Chaturmasya — The Dewali — Jn^na 

Panchami— -Merh Terash — Mouna Eka- 

( xvi ) 

daslii— Pons Disami — Ciiaitri Purnima — 

Akshay-i Tritiya — A^hiia S iU!a Chatur- 



Jain Pla ces of ?il.-^ nm. .£, --i, 
Ka]) ar.ak biiiimis or Phi«.:' • of Pilgri- 
mages — Shatrunjaya ill 1 — .^ivva^juri — 
Pareshiiaih i (ills — Moujit Ai)u~Cirnar 
Hills — Raj ^ir — Beaeras — A jo '. . .y a — Cham - 

papur &c. 


CHAPTBii xxxi:-: 

Jain Literature. 

Jain Literature forms One of the Oldest 

Literary Records in the World — The Piirvas 

— The Angas — The Purvas have been lost 

' — We find mention of their Nanes only — 

Sitldhintas and their Ori'^^i i -The Jain 

Scholiasts, C nnmentaiors arid A ahors. 


Jain Art and Architeccure. 
Jain Symbolism Arts — and Arclntecture 
—Stages of D:^velopm(tiit cio ig its own 
lines — Difference between tbr Jain and 

Bud(r[)i-.t Arts — Jain Paialin ;. -lis Place 
in the Ancient: Art Gr' •*;' >; India and 

its Liflucnce over the Com.nun i) . 




A. Date of K\w Chandra Gupta i. 

B. Firmans & S tdiuds. 

(a) Akbai'; Jirman, 1592 A. D. vi. 

(h) Jr^hanirir's Do, 1608 A. D. xi. 

(c) Shali.ijanair.s Do, 1629 A. D. xiv. 

(d) Mahaii) idsbah's Do, 1657 A. D. xvi. 

(e) Prince MiraJ's Sanniid 1657 A. D xviii. 

(f) Confirin-i ion of Do, 1658 A. D. xx. 

(g) Auran >z.b's Do, 1658 A. D. xxii. 
(h) Ahmadsbairs Finnan, 1752 A. D. xxv. 
(h Abu Aiikhaii's Sunniid, 1755 A D. xxviii. 
(j) Jagats'^ib's ParwcLii^, 1775 ^' D. xxix. 

C. List of .'^g*: nir. & Nig-ams. 

(a) Jnin A:ri ms. xxxi. 

(b) Jain Nig.ims. xxxvii. 

D. TiFthankars of the present Era- xxxix. 
E List of the Gachha-heads. 

A. S we tarn bar School 

(a) Upakesh G,r:hha. xlvii, 

(b) Kliaraiaia Do. li. 
(W; Rang Vijaya Sakha of Do. IvL 
(ci Tapa Gachha Ivii, 
(c*) Paya Chand Sakh4 of Do. lix. 

( xvii ) 

(c«)Vijaya S^kh4 of Do 

(d) Lumpak Gachha 

(d*) Dhanraj paskha Sikhi of Do 

(e) Anchal Gachha 

(f) Karuamati Do 

(g) Terapanthis 

B. Digambara School 

(a) Nandi Saiigha, Chitor Sakha 
(a^) Do Nagor Sakha 
(a*) Do Subha Chandra Slkh^ 
(a') Do Sena Gana 

(b) Kastba Sangha 
















From Life of Parshwanath (Kalpa Sutra Mss.) 

Pre-Mahomedan Period Coloured 

Do Mogul Period Do 

3. Metal Image (Ardhapadmasan) 

4. Shatrunjaya Hills, Palitana. 

5. Jalamandir at Pawapuri (Behar) 

6. Dilvvara Temples (Mt. Abu) 
Ceiling work in Ditto. 
Girnar Hills. 

V Portraits of Hamchandra and Kumarpal. 
10. Palm-leaf Mss. dated 1237 A. D. 

From Kalpa Sutra M.S. 

(Lifeof ParshvaNath. 

Pre-Mahomedan Period. 

From Kalpa Sutra M. S. ( Life of Parshva Nath. ) 

Mogul Period. 


In humbly placing the present book 
entitled An Epitome of Jainism on the 
table of the World-library, a few words of 
explanation by way of an apologia are, it 
appears, needed to justify the claims, it 
lays upon the valuable time of its various 
readers. And we may state at the outset 
that it is not an attempt to supersede any 
of the modern treatises on Jainism. Its 
claim to attention, if it has any, arises from 
the fact that it is but a compilation forming 
an epitome having for its basis the most 
orthodox principles, doctrines and tenets 
as found in the Jain original works of 
authority and high antiquity, or promulgated 
on the subject by Jain speculative writers 
and conformed to by accurate thinkers in 
their spiritual inquiries. 

But to connect together these detached 
fragments of a subject never yet treated 
as a whole, from the real Jain point of view, 
in these days of transition under Western 
refinement ; to harmonise the different 
portions of the seemingly discordant notes 

( n ) 

lying scattered over the grey pagres of 
works handed down from the spirit nil sire 
to the spiritUtil son, by fr^i>i^ ihem from 
err )rs w'lic'i they 'i ive bee ):nt; m )ra or less 
shro I led with, throjj^'i U\^ r.^vjlutl)! of 
aues and empires, or tiu'on :»:i Ion '•-^t i ulin j- 
conventions which hive corns divi tons 
f v)m time Iminemoria.!, must reqiire a power 
of interprt^tation and oric;in il sp'ec.ii iiion. 
Vo other originrilliy tlian this, the volume 
1 tys n') cljim. For it goes without saying in the present age of the cuil'vation 
of universal Iedrnl)ig> when t^ie literati of 
h )'^^ the; East and tiie W rU are sedulously 
engaged in exploring the rich and almost 
i lexhaustible mines of the ancient lores of 
lo lit. it wjuld indeed b-j very presumnuotis 
on the part of any one to imagine eveti 
that he had contributed something new and 
original in the domain of ideas and ideals. 
But still for all that there is amole scope for 
thinkers to improve upon the methols of 
philoso[)tiising anl interpreting the old ideas 
and ideals, tenets and di)ctrines in perfect 
keeping with the changed conditions of the 
times to suit newer environments without 
deviating in the least from the real spirit 

.( I« ) 

and Imp >rt vvnicli they are replete with. For 
it is o\\y the forni that changes and must 
chriii'^e, sD'rit alvv lys reiii lining- esseiuially 
tr^e sin.* ili ih:' ).i^h. AU if tnore is aay 
deviation anywhere from the r^^ il sf)ii-ir. 
it shoild Vxt uvderstood as dne t • i».- 
thii);'' wMaiiiiV^" in tivi q Miiiic.iti ;.i >/ 

T • do this we hail^rth -refore, to 
b-^'^in vvitn th':i e.uMci iiion and interpre- 
. tation '..»f the J;iin principles of epistemol«v^y 
as pr ):> > L* I by the omniscient sa<jes and 
schol irs of bye-gOiie days. Epistem jlo^y 
really supplies the key-note to tiie inter- 
pretation and understanding of a system of 
thought and culture. It gives us the stand 
point to have a clear a. id correct visij- 

u.. .^,...r . .Ntroi ^o /,f t:!i!;)'j-s :v).l ti' ~^" ■' 

Mtt) the m.*:: kmvsijs o 

i\ >;i '■'! 

Tuis is thj reason whv cv^j-y syst^mi of 
thou;irtani cultuce i.i Lidii reiiiy b:^gi:is 
with a clear exposition of the principles oi' 
its epi: temology, the moment it has done 
with (Jescribing in the briefest manner 
possible, its own hypothesis, its neccssiiv 
and sn'oliaiity, and filially its rigiit lo 
be \)v cd. 

So is the case with Jaiuisin itstrll. ^ 

( IV ) 

and having, therefore, explained all these, 
in brief in our Introduction and in 
Chapters I and II from the Jain point of 
view, we have begun discussing its science 
and philosophy from Chapter III 
headed as 'Knowledge and Its Forms'. 
But with Chapter IV on 'Epistemology 
and Logic' begins the real discussion which 
ends with Chapter VIII on 'Syadvdd 
ultimately and finally indentifying logic 
with ontology. A patient perusual of these 
chapters will clearly show the readers jk^ 
ier how the formal logic of the other 
schools of thought becomes, in the hands of 
the Jain sages, metamorphosed, as it were, 
into transcendental logic in and through 
the processes of the dialectical movements of 
thought and Being inherent in their very 

B*rt howev^ It is generally held by 
students of modern thought and culture that 
this dialectic method of reasoning identifying 
logic with ontology is of Hegelian origin and 
meaning. Indeed the word dialectic means 
reasoning yi?r and against, exposing thereby 
fallacies and inconsistencies, and clearinp- 
them away. Socrates used this method of 

( V ) 

reasoning in his ontologic^l polemics with 
the sophists of his time, putting them be- 
tween the horns of two definite alternatives. 
But in A modern philosophy of the West, it 
was Kant who revived it 5 in bis exposing 
the contradictions involved in the fundamental 
assumptions of dogmatic philosophy and in 
the popular conceptions of Soul, World and 
God. B«t It was left ^to Hegel to give a 
new meaning to dialectic and to interpret 
it in a new light altogether. For with Hegel, 
Being contains within itself opposition^ 
and contradictions. Every thought, every 
reality is but a mixture of Being and 
non-Being. Dialectic with Hegel, therefore, 
is equivalent to Self-devolopment or un- 
foldment, and the world-process itself is a 
process of dialectic, of antithisis and synthesis, 
making differences serve as means to higher 
unities. The legitimate out-come of working 
out the Hegelian interpretation of the 
world-process as shown in his dialectic, is 
the pronouncement of the eternity of the 
world-process. And with it the soul is also 
declared to be in the never-ending process 
of higher and higher evolution without any 
ultimate rest or quiscent anywhere, 

( VI ) 

3^ Those who have followed our 
exposition of the Jain principles of epis- 
temology ending with SyadvSida u M\mvt^ 
iip-to ^Chapter XII, will be itf one with 
us when we state that the dialectic method 
of reasoning identifying logic with meta- 
physic was not Hegel's own making. It ori- 
ginated with the Jain sages and omniscient 
kevalins, and has been'prevelant In the field 
of philosophy in India from a time when 
Greece and Rome^those cradles of European 
iWvilization, were still steeped in the darkness 
of ignorance. It is true that with the Jains 
the Absolute is but an Expression of Unity 
in Difference as distinguished from the 
Absolute beyond the Relative of the Vedin- 
tins ( Vide Chapter XI ), and that the 
world-process is also without beginning 
and end (Vide Chapter XII to XV) ; but the 
soul according to Jainism does not remain 
for ever entano-led in the meshes of the 
dialectic process of evolution without know- 
ing any rest or repose anywhere. The 
Jains, as well is every other system of 
Indian thought and culture, hold that the 
Jiva will never ramain eternally caught up 
in the never-ending process of evolution. It 

( vn ) 

is bound to get at that state of being and 
beatitude which is all free and divine. 
For freedom is our birth-right. Every 
soul is constitutionally free and potentially 
divine. And the struggle for existence 
in this nether world means with the Jains 
not only the struggle for bare existence 
in this mortal coil, but for the realization 
as well of this Ideal Freedom and Divinity. 

With this end the enquiries constituting 
the Right Vision — the basis of Right know- 

Btrt Right Knowledge which proceeds 
from Right Vision by a coherent train of 
thought and reasoning and which can only 
lead to Right Conduct without which the 
attainment of the Goal in vision is held 
to be impossible, is the knowledge which 
embraces concisely or in details, the 
relations in which the constituent factors 
of the world stand to soul and the 
changes as well of these relations in the 
dialectic movement of thought and being. 
And all these, more technically speaking, 
begin with Chapter XVIII on the 'Karma 
Phenomenology'. The readers will find 
much interest to enter oq a new kind of 

( vin ) 

discussion on metaphysical issues of vital 
importance in regard to the relation in 
question and its changes as well. The 
question as to when and how the soul which 
is constitutionally free and potentially divine 
came to be entangled intei the meshes of the 
dialectic movements of the world-process 
without beginning and end, and which irri- 
tates the metaphysicans and speculative 
writers most in these days of scientific en- 
quiry, has been discussed andnsolution given 
once4or all. Every other position being 
untenable, the Jains hold that both the Soul 
and the Karma {i.e. the materialised units into 
which jivic energetics resolve themselves) 
stand to each other in relation of phenomenal 
conjunction, which reveals itself in the conti- 
nuity of the display from time without begin- 
ning, neither of the two being either prior 
or posterior to the other in the order of time, 
so far the question of their metaphysical 
entity is concerned — unAdi ap aschdmipurvi 
sanyoga samhandha pravdha. Such is the 
position of the jivas in the ocean of samsdr 
whereon tumultuous waves furiously surging 
in various names and forms, ruffle the vast 
expanse. And just as the angularities of 

( « ) 

the gravels at the bottom of the grugHng 
stream of strong currents are rubbed off 
by beuig drifted from place to place, so the 
angularities of the /iva sunk in ;the ocean 
of Samsdr^SirQ also rubbed off by being 
driven from womb to womb, from region 
to region, under the strong pressure of 
Karma'CAWsaWiy. In this way with the 
rubbino- off of the anaularities and^thinninof 
out of the grrjss material veil and cover- 
ing, when the /iva gets a comparatively 
improved vision into its own nature and 
ideal, it struggles to work out its own 
emancipation as a free-centre of origina- 
tion. All these and such allied subjects as 
Rebirth and the like which are required 
to determine our place and function in the 
world, have been discussed with compara- 
tive dkail8 upr»t*H Chapter XXVI on the 
'Classification of Karmas' with which ends 
the enquiries into the constitution of Right 

From Right knowledge of our ultimate 
Ideal, of our place and function in the world, 
arises the possibilites of Right Conduct 
which is imperative in the attaiment of the 
Ideal. ArtfdThe enquiries into the constitution 

( X ) 

of the Right Conduct open with Chapter 
XXVII 'From Metaphysics to Ethics.' 
No system of Indian thought and culture 
has such a stage-by-stage exposition in 
a systematic way of the ways and means to 
the attainment of that Goal which we all 
have in view. The very arrangement, it 
will appear on a careful perusual, is not only 
most psychological so far>vthe unfoldment of 
knowledge itself is concerned, but appears 
to be modern as welbwhen we judge it from 
the scientific and practical point of view. 
Having cleared up the Jain Conceptions 
of Virtue and Vice (Vide Chapter XXVIII), 
of their fruitions here and hereafter, the 
problems of evil and tlie like rudimentary 
notions of tlie Jain Ethics, the moral cate- 
gories have been taken u^ o+te by Ofte in 
consecutive order beginning with 'Influx' 
(Vide Chap XXXI) of the alien matter into 
the constitution of the soul and the conse- 
quent bondage of the same under subrep- 
tion [Mitkydtta) which is nothing else than 
taking a thing for something which is 
not that thing {asate sat buddhi). This 
mithydtva is the prime root of all troubles. 
Such being the case we have discussed 

( XI ) 

at some length, the psychology and 
philosophy of the matter and form of 
this vilthy^tva. A little reflection will be 
sufficient, we belive, to convince an impartial 
student of the history of Indian schools of 
thought.^that the theory of Mdyd resolving 
into dvaran and vikshepa j as interpreted 
by Shankar and others of his line of 
thinking, is but a distorted shadow of the 
Jain theory of mithydtva. For, to deny 
Mdyd, therefore, of any positive entity and 
to posit it at the same time as the great 
impediment in the way to the true self- 
realisation is to be guilty of substantializing 
tbe* abstraction. In order to escape from this 
difficulty, Ramanuja, another interpreter of 
the Veddnta Sutras, had to draw inspirations 
from the teachings and writtings of the Jain 
sages, and, in consequence, had to fall back 
upon the Jain doctrine of Unity in Difference 
or the Theory of Bheddbheda vad, the 
legitimate outcome of the Syadvdd or 
the dialectic method of reasoning giving a 
more comprehensive view of thought and 
Being. It is true that Ramanuja speaks of 
Bodh^yana as his authority for the 
enunciation of the doctrine of Unity in 


( XII ) 

Difference, but nowhere in liis scholium on 
the Brahm Sutris could he quote direct from 
the writtings of Bodhayana. What Bodhdyan 
taught no body knows. Had there been 
the existence of any commentary by him 
on the Sutras in question even at the time 
of Shankar, then Shankar, the upright and 
audacious, would never have left him un- 
noticed in his unrivalled commentaries and 
writtings because he is found to freely draw 
upon his predecessors, friend or opponent. 

Be that as it may, the Jain sages have 
made sifting enquiry into the nature and 
matter of this mithydtva and found 
possibilites of its removal through Samvar 
or Stoppage of the Influx and through 
Nirjard or gradual dissipation of what -^<^ 
already found its way into the soul. With 
the completion of this dissipation, the soul 
gets rid of all the veil and covering of 
Karma and shines in perfect freedom and 
omniscience enjoying bliss divine for all time 
to come; this is what/^ called Mokska of 
Nirvdn or Extinction of all pain and 
suffering, the grand Summu?n Bonum of 
one and all life and living (Vide Chapters 

( XIII ) 

But this filial and ultimate state of 
being in bliss and beatitude cannot be 
attained all of a sudden. Great indeed 
is the vision but only the few behold. 
Great is the goal, but only the few 
attain. Great really is the struggle but 
only the few can withstand. For the goal 
in fact is gradually reached by steady 
and strenuous striving subjectitig the 
self to gladly undergo a series ^practical 
disciplines in a manner a*hd along the 
lines as enjoined in the Jural {Charan) 
and Teleological {Karan) Ethics of the 
Jains. A'ftd'The stages which the mumukshtn 
has to pass through, are fourteen in number 
and are called GzinastMnas which can be 
'squeezed up into four stages to suit modern 

We have seen that according to Jainsm, 
Freedom is our birth-right and that its 
philosophy declares this freedom to be already 
in us. Freedom is constitutional with 
man. Feel that you ^re great and you will be 
great. Feel that you are free and all quarrels 
will cease. With the Jains it is but a question 
of realization in the very heart of hearts 
where life throbs and the soul of religion 

(XIV ) 

really dwells itT. Ikfl Whatever might be 
the merit of this philosophy, those who 
have studied its principles as well as the 
march of Western civilization, will naturally 
doubt a« t^ the possibility of the growth 
and formation of a religion without any 
God-head ta pr e side : ^ for, there is no 
denying the fact that throughout the history 
of the Western world, we find Philosophy 
and Religion to be at war with each other. 
There religion is based on the unstable 
basis of Belief. And surely there is nothing 
strange in the fact that the corner-stone 
of religion there, begins to shake and give 
way whenever a new philosophy rises 
against it armed with new ideas and ideals 
paving incontrovertible reasons befeirrd 
them to support/x Not only this. If a system 
of philosophy fails to drive Belief out of 
consideration and thus crush the foundation- 
stone into dust, it cannot be expected to 
thrive and drive its roots into the soil and 
create a school of its own. From all these 
it is clear that in the West, Philosophy is 
but a sworn enemy to Belief. But quite ^c/^ 
reverse is the case in the East. Here each 
school of philosophy is chiefly meant to 

( J^v ) 

serve as a basis or ground-work of a 
particular form of Faith or Religion. For 
instance, the School of Jaimini stands to sup- 
port the Karma Kdnda of the Vedic Hindus. 
The I\'ydya and the Vaisheshtka have been c^-^<^ 
to serve as the basis of the Dualistic forms 
of worship as are advocated in the Hindu 
Smrifis and the Purdnas, The Sdnkhya 
and the Yoga philosophies which clear the 
ways of renunciation and moral apathy to all 
that is worldly, not only support other 
dualistic and TAntric forms of worship but 
themselves form the science and psycho- 
logy of the . Uttar Mtmdnsd by Vy^sa. 
But when we direct our attention to the 
West, we find Socrates, the sage, poisioned 
with hemloc/cfor preaching a philosophy 
that went against the religion of his time 
and nativity. Who does not know how 
Christianity trembles even now to hear • 
the 'names of David Hume, Mill, Comte, 
Kant, Fichte, Hoefding or Hegel } ^ 

Now what is the lesson that we gather 
from a comparative study of the attitude of 
minds of both the East and the West } We 
learn that India all alofig enjoyed a kind of 
intellectual freedom and religious toleration 

{ k\l ) 

which is unique in the history of the world. 
And this is why life in India really throbs 
in religion, where as in the West, it has been 
more or less a fashion to attend the Church. 
Btrt to return to the point at issue : as in 
India the function of philosophy is to support 
a particular form of Faith, so the function of 
Jainism is to harmonise all the contend- 
ing religions of the world. And it is here 
that Jainism supersedes all the other forms 
of faith and creed. For, it is philosophy and 
religion both rolled in one. A little reflection 
on the theory itself and its predominance 
from time. to time, along with its growth and 
spread, will prove the truth and validity of 
our statement. Will any one tell the world 

what is it that so boldly declares the glorious 


dignity of man ? Is it the civilization that 
creates for man new wants and desires only 
* to bind him down more tightly to the mires 
of the world ? Or is it that -reconciles for 
man all the seeming differences without 
sacrificing anything of permanent interest, 
kills that egotism ) by virtue of which his 
envenomed passions howl at every dis- 
appointment, and ultimately opens out to him 
the way to perfection, real happiness and 

( XVII ) 

eternal beatitude where all wants and cares 
cease for ever, and all passions as well for 
good, and which makes man really to be 
his own rea/ st\( in infinite delight divine? 
Surely you will have to pronounce judgment 
in favour of the latter, and in that case 
we state once for all, a«d- tJi*t without the 
slightest fear of contradiction, that Jainism 
is thti^ means to the introduction into this 
mundane world a reign of peace, ordered 
harmony and reasonable sweetness which 
are most wanting in these days of rank 
materialism and uncompromising self-aggran- 
disement wherewith this blessed land of 
Bharat has become surcharged. 

It has, therefore, become highly impera- 
tive to repress this growing ardour of our 
youth in poletical polemics and practical 
tactics that are detrimental to and destructive 
of the felicity of their temporal and future 
lives, by a revival of the humble instructions 
of the ancient Kevalins and peaceful pre- 
ceptors of old, and reclaiming them to the 
simple mode of life led by their forefathers 
from the perverted tendencies finding a firm 
hold on them under the influence of Western 
refinement. It is this degeneracy of our 

( xyin ) 

rising generation from an utter ignorace 
of the superiority of their own code and t^i 
adoption, in consequence, of .foreign ideas 
and ideals, habits and manners, that ought 
to engage the serious attention of our 
educated children of the soil. 

Pf&w yApart from the question of any 
sublimity, necessity and utility jerf/>the cultiva- 
tion of the Philosophy of Jainism^roughly Con- 
sisting as it does in outward peace (Shanti) 
and internal tranquility (Chitta Prasdnti) 
united with contentment (5<2;^^d?^>4) and apathy 
{Vardgya) to the alluring pleasures of the 
world, a glance at the description of the Jain 
Church as portrayed in Chapter XXXVII, 
a survey of the Jain places of Pilgrimage, 
of Art and Architecture &c. (Chapters 
XXXIX &c. XLI), a study of the great and 
not yet fully accessible complex of writings 
making up the Jain Literature and record- 
ing the appearances of the Tirthankars 
in the era of avasarpini, and chronicling 
the organisation of the Sanghas, the great 
split in the original camp into the Swet^m- 
baris and the Digambaris, the consecutive 
succession of the dchdryas and the list of 
gachchas which originated with them, and 

( XIX ) 

fiaally other secular, events of historical im- 
portaace to a considerable extent, will make 
if pretty clear that Jainisni is a religion that 
is not only born of the depths of ages but 
also that its Tirthankars were real historical 
persons who lived, moved and had their 
beings amongst our forefathers. 

Besides, these pages contain historical 
.statements and allusions of no mean value. 
What^ we want to point out is that apart 
from the question of religious merit as is 
manifest in the literary works of the Jains, 
they go to a great extent to clear up many a 
historical anomaly and settle dates of impor- 
tant historical events. For instance, it is 
from the perusual of these pages that we 
cettld settle the date of Mahavira's Nirvdn 
or the accession of Chandragupta. And it is 
from these pages we find that during the time 
of Rishava Deva, the systems oijaina, Shaiva 
and Sdnkhya philosophies were exant. The 
Mimdnsd and the 7^(1)/^ flourished during the 
period of Sitalnath whereas the Bouddha and 
the Vaisheshiku came to prominence during 
the time of Parshwanath and Mahavir. This 
account of the chronological developments of 
the different Schools of Philosophy may read 

( XX ) 

very strangetrBut when one remembers that 
none of the systems of philosophy came to 
behig all of a sudden, but tl^ey were more or 
less in extant in a still remoter age, and that 
this development into systems of philosophy 
means their embodiment in the forms of 
Sutras at different periods, things become^* 
easy to understand. -For this is further corro- 
borated if we interpret the religious upheaval 
in view of the fact that in the great reliojious 
Congress of the Indian saints and sa-^es of 
yore in the NaimiskAranya, when the 
authority of the Vedas were being made as 
binding upon the free thinkers of those days, 
those who left the Congrsss in silent protest 
against such actions of the Brahman-Rishis, 
were dubbed as Ndstikas. The word 
Ndstika (atheist) in the Indian scripture 
does not mean one who did not believe 
in the existence of God, but rather one who 
did not accept the infallibility and ultimate 
authority of the Vedas. Were it otherwise 
then the System of Sankkya in which 
Kapil, like Lai^lace, did not care o^^' 
£err getting kf a God in ^ the scheme of 
his universe, would not have been taken 
as one of the six theistic systems of philo- 

( XXI ) 

sophy,as distinguished from the six atheistic 
schools beginning with that of ChdrvAka, 
Now with the settlement of the final 
authority of the Vedas, its ritualism 
became a mercilessly dominant religion 
for samettrrte; somuch so that the priest- 
class seemed to be in tlw sole possession 
of the Key to Heaven! Ar«d In conse- 
quence sincerity 'which is the soul of all reli- 
giousity almost disappeared -from the people 
yielding place to downright hypocrisy and 
dry formalism. The Kshatriya kings 
and th^ princes could not stand te^ this 
want of sincerity in the people and t«L-the 
religious monopoly in the hands of the 
Brihmans. They entered a protest against 
the same in the form of Ved^ntic militarism 
finding exprssions in such great Upani- 
shadic declarations as, ^Brahman is Atman' 
*That Thou art,': 'That I am' : in reality 
there is no essential difference between one 
soul and another. All are One and the Goal of 
all is Freedom, which cannot be reached by 
the weak and the powerless. So all conven- 
tions, all privileges must go. , Thus ensued an 
era of war between the Br^hmans and the 
Kshatriyas. The enmity and implacable 

( XXII ) 

hatred of the two families of Vasistha and 
Viswamitra for generations form subjects 
prominent throughout the vidic antiquity. 
The cursing on Harish Chandra, the King 
of Ajodhya, by Vashistha, the leader of the 
priest-class, and the consequent appoint- 
ment of Viswamitra by Harish Chandra as 
his priest is also another instance to illustrate 
the spirit of Vedantic militarism against 
Br^hmanic ritualism and monoply. Thus the 
idea militant in the Upaniskads became the 
idea tirUmphant in hands of the Kshatriya 
kings and princes. And this ^why we 
find later on that the Br^hmans are betak- 
ing themselves as pupils to the Kshatriya 
kings and princes in order to have the 
Atman expounded to them. The Brahman 
N4rad receiving instructions from Sanat 
Kumar ; Gargya Balaki from the king 
Ajatsatru of Kasi. All these are further 
confirmed by the words of the king Pravan 
Jaivali to Aruni, a Brahman pupil whom the 
king says — "Because, as you have told, O 
Goutam,the doctrine has never up to the present 
time been in circulation among the Brahmans, 
therefore in all the worlds the Government has 
remained in the hands of the warrior caste", 

( XXIII ) 

Now this philosophy of Vedantic 
militarism, though it was fully developed 
in the Upanishadic period, could not later 
on adapt itself to the changing conditions 
and to the yet prevailing society of the 
time which was^in and through ^ saturated 
with Vedic ritualism and ceremonialism. 
Artd In the course of events ; things took 
turn in such a manner that the Br^hmans, 
whose sole occupation was priest-craft, began 
to divise schemes with a view to make 
each caste flourish in its respective profession : 
so much so that they discouraged the study 
of the Upanishadas and the like by other 
castes, and the preaching as well of the 
philosophy of the 'One' to the mass. And 
thus when the gates to higher knowledge were 
effectively barred against the other classes 
by the mechanism of the Priest-class, a 
general degradation followed. People be- 
came degenerated, self interested and 
low in character. All sorts of abominable 
things like Tdntrikism which brought in 
virginity, mysticism and love to bear upon 
religion, began to be practised in the name 
of religion only. At this critical juncture 
Parshwanath, the 23rd Tirthankar appeared 

( XXIV ) 

to save the situation, and preached the 
Truth and the Law to one and all without 
disturbing the constitution of the social 
structure prevailing at the time. A general 
religious up-heaval ensued ; but so engrained 
was the soulless ritualism in the constitution 
of the society that two hundred years 
after the Ahivdn of Parshwanath, Mahabir 
Swami appeard as the 24th Reformer, and 
gave a re-statement of Jainism later on taking 
the form of the philosophy of pragmatism, 
to stem the tide of degredation, and save 
the soul of the nation from ruifing into 
-cx:^ narrow old grooves and gutters of ritualism 
, and mysticism (tdnirictsn), Goutam Buddha 
also followed suit from another direction. 
He represented the Indian school of spiritual 
democracy, and preached the principles of 
what they now call 'Romantic Improvement' 
in modern philosophy which resulted in the 
formiulaton of the subjective idealism, in the 
breaking of the social fetters, and in the 
curbing off the power of the Br^hmans to 
enforce Vedic ritualism upon the people. 
Such is the history of the religious transition 
through which India had to pass uptill the 
time of Mahavir and Guutam Buddha who are 

( ^xxv ) 

said to represent the Indian schools of 
Ideal-Realism and Real Idealism respec- 
tively. Attd^this is what we gather from 
the old and worn a«t pages of the Jain 
literature of high antiquity. 

The above is -b«t what we could glean 
from the scattered pages of the Jain literature 
so far-the contemporary events and Religious 
movements in India were concerned. 
Bbt There are other materials in the move- 
ments of the Jain genius such as inscriptions 
and epigraphs which go by the technical 
name of external evidences helping us a 
good deal in filling up the gaps and blanks 
x^ .c^ pages of I ndian history. We get from these 
inscriptions various informations on the 
reigning sovereigns, their geneologies and 
dynasties, chronological list of the gacchas, 
and the description of the different sections 
into which the Jain laymen are socially 
divided. Now both from the external and 
internal evidences which have been available 
to us up till now for our study and exami- 
nation, we can well state without the 
slightest fear of contradiction that the 
whole Jain Community is deeply indebted 
to the Swelambar Church for the pre- 


( xxyi ) 

. servation, maintenance and improvement 
of almost all their important places of 
pilgrimage. The inscriptions both on the 
pedffstal of the images and foot-prints and 
tablets {Prashastis) commemorating the 
erection or the repairs of the temples at 
these places at different times, undoubtedly 
show that the whole credit belongs to our 
worthy and venerable Swet^mbar AchsLryas 
under whose religious direction and advice, 
the Swetambari lay-followers did all they 
could to keep up their traditon and guard 
the sanctity of these sacred places all over 
India, excepting the Southern countries, the 
homes of the Digambar School. But who 
cares to devote ^ to the study of these 
movements of culture from a historic 
point of view? We have inspected and 
examined numbers of Digambari images still 
preserved and worshipped in Swetambari 
temples but have not seen the reverse. It 
is a matter of satisfaction indeed to find 
the Digambari temple in Mathian Mahalla 
in Behar, side by side with a Swetambari 
temple, like the twin sister churches in 
charge of the Swetambaris. The Digambari 
brothers are always welcome to every 

( XX vn ) 

Swetambari temple. The mere location 
of the Digambari imac^es in a corner of the 
Swetambari temples, does not show that 
these temples belong to them also. Far 
from this. It rather .'^hows the magnanimity 
and generosity of the high-souled Swetambari 
custodians of these temples. But this does 
not go to establish their managing claim 
over the temples which exclusively belong to 
th.e Swetambari sect. All along they were 
allowed the privilege of worshipping there 
for the simple reason that they did not cherish 
the idea of any selfish motive. Living in 
wealth and opulence in a period of peace 
and prosperity under the benign care of the 
British Government, it is indeed a matter 
of great regret that instead of paying atten- 
tion towards the intellectual and spiritual ad- 
vancement of the community, and other 
social reforms which have of late become 
imperative to adapt ourselves to the newer 
conditions of life and living, our Digambari 
brethren have now come forward to set the 
machinery of litigation sigoing to unrighti- 
ously snatch away from the Swetambaris, the 
founders and repairers, nay, the real owners 
of these places of Pilgrimage, so to speak, 


all rights and privileges vvhicli so long be- 
longed exclusively to them, Our Digambari 
brethren are squandering away good money 
in the name of/religion. They are showing 
a great enthusiasm, at the present moment, 
to set up claims and run to the Courts of Law 
for the settlement of issues. Everywhere, 
whether at Sametsikhar, at Pawapuri or at 
Rajgir^ we hear of litigations cropping up 
from their endeavours to get equal rights 
in the control and manaoement of the 
sacred places which the Jain Swetambari 
Community have been doing since the 
foundation of these shrines and temples. ^ 
things really go on in this way, then the 
Jain Community, as a whole, will have not 
only to pay dearly for it ; but those monu- 
mental works as well of the Jain genius in 
art, architecture and sculpture will shortly 
disappear into the surrounding ruins. And it 
grieves us much therefore to find that the 
Digambaris are quarrelling with the Swetam- 
baris without any just cause to advocate 
in claiming equal share with them. In 
the South, the Digambaris have their well- 
known images at Sravana Belgola and other 
temples in their sole management. No 

( XXVIX ) 

_' — J>. 

Swetambari ever thinks of interfering with 
the just rights of the Digambaris in those 
provinces. The DIgambdris have got lands 
from the Swetambari Sangha for erection 
of their temples, sometimes they have also 
purchased land for the purpose and have 
built separate temples. B^ ^indeed deeply 
regrettable it' is- on their part that inspite of 
these stupendous facts, they have not put a 
stop to their policy of agression. 

We, therefore, sincerely appeal to the 
Digambaris, at least to the sensible and 
educated members amongst them, to put 
an end to such sort of dealings and 
avoid litigation especially in matters of 
religion. Even before the Court of Justice, 
there is a limitation to everything. For 
centuries after centuries, the Swetambaris 
have tried their best to build, maintain 
and improve the sacred places. They hold 
Firmans, Grants, Sitnnnds and Parwanas 
from the reigning Sovereigns of the past 
and have been managing the affairs genera- 
tion after generation, without any co-opera- 
tion from the Digambaris from time imme- 
morial without any clamour, dissension or 
intervention. And it is a disgrace that they 

( «a ) 

should now come forward to disturb the 
working of an organisation born of the 
depths of ages and devise all sorts of un- 
righteous means to gain their objective before 
the Courts of Law. 

In fine, however, we beg leave to 
apologise to our readers for the numerous 
errors and mistakes which have found their 
way into these pages through the pramdd 
of their printer and reader. 

November igiy, | p. nahar, 

Calcutta. J k, GHOSH. 

Metal Image (Ardha Padmasan) 
with inscription in Southern character (back\ 

An Epitome of Jainism. 


Onif Salutation to the ^Arlhantas' or 
the Killers of the enemies ; Salutation to 
the ^Siddhas^ or the beatified Achievers 
of the Good; Salutation to the 'A chary as^ 
or the accomplished Masters legislating 
the rules of our conduct; Salutation to 
the ^TJpadhyayas^ or the Teachers 
imparting lessons on the Siddhantas ; Sa~ 
Intation to all the *Sadhus^ or the Saints of 
every region and clime who live, move and 
have their being for the good of others. 

This five-fold Salutation purging out 
all sins, is the noblest of all propitious 
utterances and the choicest of all blessings 
and benedictions ^Navakara. ^ 

The Jains, the followers of the ^ma or 
Arihanta, hrtre bce - iv a well-known community 
^A India, They are mostly confined to 
Hindusthan and are numerous particularly in 
the Punjab, Rajputana, Gujrat and some 
Southern Districts of India. They hold a 


prominent place in the Empire owing to their 
wealth, intelligence, commercial energy and 
unswerving loyalty. 

The Arihanta is the killer of the enemies. 
He is also called the Jina or the Victor for 
killing or conquering all his passions, desires 
and appetites. A Jina is the possessor of per- 
fect knowledge. He is omniscient and is the 
revealer of true nature of things. Thtjinas 
or the Victors, who in every age (past, 
present, and future) preach truths and 
organise the Order, are known by the name 
of TiHhanlzars — the Founders of Tirthuy 
Sanghtty or the Order which consists oiSadhu, 
Sddhvi and Skrdvaka, ShrdvikA i, e, male 
and female ascetics and devotees. 

The Jain friars and nuns were formerly 
designated as Nigganthas, lit. 'those who are 
freed from all bonds.* These Nigganthas are 
frequently met with in ancient Buddhist 
works. For instance, the Mahdparinibbana 
Suit a, one of the earliest books on Buddhism, 
composed in Pali before the 5th century B.Cr^ 
mentions ''Niggantha Jndtputtci' as being 
one of the six religious teachers of the time. 
This last Tirthankara of the Jains is so called 


on account of his being born of the Kshatriya 
or military clan known as Jndt or N&t. Nu- 
merous references are also to be found in 
Brdhniinical writings about the Nigganthas 
and their faith. 

Important mention has also been made of 
the Jain System of Philosophy in several of 
the most ancient Indian works. And so far 
Its antiquity is concerned, it is now admitted 
ef* aH hando that Jainism is not an off-shoot 
of Buddhism. It had been in existence long 
before Buddhism was conceived. Its indepen- 
dent existence has also been conclusively 
traced out both by external and internal evi- 
dences from various works of high antiquity 
in recent years. Special mention may be 
made of the discovery of a Jaina Stupa at 
Mathurd which gives evidence of its existence 
from nearly two thousand years back. It is 
very likely that future researches will throw 
a flood of light on the theory that Buddhism 
is rather a branch of Jainism. From a refer- 
ence to Jainism in the Rig Veda, it has been 
held that the system in question must have 
been contemporary with the Vedic culture 
or even earlier than the latter. 



After its supremacy in the East in the 
kingdoms of Magadha, Anga, and Koshal, 
Jainism flourished both in the South and in the 
West of India. At various epochs, it was the 
State Religion in different parts of the country; 
and the fact is fully corroborated by the old 
inscriptions, a few of which have only been, of 
late, brought to light and deciphered by the 
scholars and antiquarians of tke modern time. 

Jainism is an original system of thought 
and culture, quite distinct from and indepen- 
dent of all other Indian philosophical specu- 
lations. In the words of Dr. Jacobi, '*It (the 
Jain Philosophy) has, truly speaking, a 
metaphysical basis of its own, which secured 
it a distinct position apart from the rival 
systems, both of the Brahmins and of the 
Buddhists." And it now goes without saying 
that the Jains possess a high claim to the pre- 
servation of the ancient history of India. 

According to the Jains, Truth exists from 
time eternal ; and the world composed of the 
living and the non-living substances, has been 
in existence from all eternity, and undergoing 
an infinite number of variations, produced 
simply by the physical and superphysical 


powers inherent in the substances. But 
variations must be variations in time. So the 
Jain sages divide this time according to the 
two great cycles, called Avasarpini and 
Utsarptni, — Involution and Evolution. The 
idea is that of a serpent in infinite space 
coiled up, so that the tail shall touch the 
head. The world is now moving down this 
serpent from the head to the tail, — this is 
Avasarpini {Involution), When it arrives at 
the extremity of the tail, it cannot go on fur- 
ther but it must return ; and its progress up- 
wards is Utsarpini (Evolution). Now each of 
these periods is again divided into six eras, — 
(i). Sukhama Sukhmd, 
(ii). Sukhmd, 
(iii). Sukhama Dukhmd, 
(iv). Dukhhama Sukhmd^ 
(v). Dukhmd, 
(vi). Dukhama Dukhmd* 
In every great cycle, twenty-four Tirthan- 
kars appear in the field of action. These 
Tirthankars are not only pure and perfect 
beings and attain nirvdna as soon as 
they shuffle off their mortal coils, but also 
they lay down rules of conduct for the 


purification of our hearts and minds and 
establish the tirtha or the order. According 
to the Jains, the first Tirthankara 'Rishava 
Deva of the present era, gave to the world a 
systematic exposition of Truth in all its as- 
pects, both secular and spiritual. He also laid 
down rules of conduct for the proper guidance 
of the church as well as of the laity. Rishava 
Deva is also mentioned in the Hindu Scrip- 
ture, the 'Srimat Bhagvat\ as the second in 
the list of kings, who, towards the end of his 
life, abandoned the world and went about as a 
naked ascetic and rose from manhood to 
divinity by meditation. 'Pdrshwanatha', the 
twenty-third, and 'Mahavira', the twenty- 
fourth, were not founders but they were merely 
reformers like other Tirthankars in different 
ages. On the face of such overwhelming evi- 
dences as can be collated from pages of high 
antiquity, there cannot be any doubt as 
to the existence of Mahdvira or Pdrshwatha 
as historical personages. M. Guerinot, in 
the Introduction to his learned Essay on 
Jain Bibliography, indicates the important 
points of difference between the life of 
Mahavira and that of Buddha. 



I. Born at Vais^li (Kunda- i. Born at Kapilavastu about 

gr^m) about 599 B. C. 557 B. C. 

a. His parents lived to a 2. His mother died soon after 

good old age. giving b^ birth. 

3. Assumed the ascetic life 3. Made himself a monic 
with the consent of his- against the wishes of his 
relatives. father. 

4. His preparation in the 4. Obtained illumination at 
ascetic stage lasted for the end of 6 years 
12 years. only. 

5. Died at Pawa in 5. Died at Kusinagar about 

527 B.C. 488 B. C. 

Pdrshwandtha was born at Benares in 877 
B. C, and reached nirvdna in 777 B. C. on a 
hill which is still known as Pareshnath Hills 
in Bengal. Mahdvira or Vardham^na, the 
last Tirthankara of this age, only improved 
upon the then existing doctrines and customs 
according to the exigencies of the time, and 
it was he who gave Jainism its final form. 
The current tenets and practices of Jainism, 
as embodied in the existing Sutras or 
canons, are his utterances. 

Mah^vira was the son of Siddh^rtha, the 
chief of the Ndt clan of Kundagrama near the 
city of Vais^li, who belonged to a noble 


warrior race. His mother was TrishalA, sister 
of king Chetaka of Vaisili. Chetaka's daugh- 
ter Chelana was married to king Shrenika 
or Bambhs^ra who was a staunch admirer 
and adherent of Mah^vira. Shortly after the 
death of his parents, Mah^vira renounced the 
world and became an ascetic in his 31st. year. 
For the first 1 2 years, he led a life of aus- 
terities and wandered through various coun- 
tries preaching the truth of Jainism. He 
acquired perfect knowledge in his 42nd. year 
and attained nirv&na at Pawapuri, a few 
miles from modern Behar, in 527 B. C. at 
the age of 72. 

He was a senior contemporary of Gau- 
tam Buddha and the country of Magadha 
and those round about it, were his chief 
spheres of spiritual activity. It is interesting 
to note that both the great preachers, in spite 
of the fact of being contemporaneous, avoid 
mentioning each other in their utterances. 

About two centuries after Mahavira's 
death, when Chandra Gupta was the reigning 
Prince, a severe famine, lasting for twelve 
years, visited the country of Magadha. Bha- 
drab^hu was then the head of the Jain church, 


and in view of the gravity of the situa- 
tion he led his disciples towards the south 
(Carnit country), placing Sthulbhadra in 
charge of the section that remained behind. 
During this long famine, the Jain monks 
began to forget the Siddk&nta ; and towards 
the end of the famine, while Bhadrabihu 
was still absent in the South, a council assem- 
bled at Pataliputra to collect the canons or the 
sacred texts of the Jains. Gradually the man- 
ners and customs of the church changed and 
the original practice of going abroad naked 
was abandoned The ascetics began to 
wear the * White Robe'. On the other hand, 
when the emigrating party who made the 
rule of nakedness compulsory on all their mem- 
bers, returned to their country after the famine, 
they refused to hold fellowship with those 
that had remained at home, on account of 
their departure from the practices that were 
common before, or to accept the canons 
collected at Pataliputra, declaring that for 
them the canons were lost. This led to the 
final separation about the year 82 A. D. 
And thus they were divided into two branch- 
es, the original being styled as Shvetdm- 


bara, and the other became known as 

The Digamhars believe that absolute 
nudity is imperative for perfectness ; while 
the Shvetdmbars diSs^n that perfectness can 
be attained even by those who clothe them- 
selves. The difference really speaking has its 
origin in the idea that a person attaining to 
Kevala jndn (perfect knowledge) comes no 
longer under the sway of appetites or passions 
and does not therefore require any food or 
clothing. According to the Shvetdmbars, such 
a holy personage, although he need not wear 
any clothes, does not appear before society 
unclothed but clad in white robes, while the 
Digambars hold that he does not use any 
clothes and appears before 4*« att nude. 

But this is not the only point of difference 
between the two branches. There are 
also other differences as regards some 
eighty-four minor dogmas, which resulted 
in the production of sectarian literature and 
rules of conduct for the church and the laity. 
One important point of disagreement to be 
noted, is the exclusion of women from the 
Order by the Digambars, As they hold, 


women cannot attain to salvation ; and they 
are so strongly biassed in this that they 
take even the Virgin lady Malli Kumari, 
the 19th Tirthankar, not as a female but a 
male. But the Shvet^mbars hold that both 
men and women are alike entitled to and 
can actually attain to nirvdna, 

Jainism is not a monastic religion 
but truly an evangelic or a missionary 
religion, — religion intended not for the 
ascetics only ( male and female ) but for the 
world at large in which the majority are 
lay people. Some remark that Jainism lack- 
ed in that missionary spirit which gave life 
and scope to early Buddhism. But this view 
is not based on right observation of facts and 
correct interpretation of the Jain religious 
thought and culture. For in the Jain 
canonical rules for the ascetics, it is 
distinctly enjoined that a monk, excepting the 
Chaturm&sya, or the period of four months 
during the rainy season, should generally 
on no account stay at a fixed place for more 
than one month ; rather he should go on 
wandering from city to city, from village to 
village, preaching the cardinal truths of his 



faith and doctrine and thus work among the 
laity, for their moral elevation and spiritual en- 
lightenment. Equal consideration was given to 
both the church and the laity and a Sangha 
was accordingly organised by each Jina, 
The characteristic of a true Jina is most 
aptly expressed by Ratna Shekhara in the 
opening lines of his Sambodha Sattari, which 
reads as follows : — "No matter, whether he 
is a Skveidmbara or Digambara, a Buddha 
or a follower of any other creed, one who has 
realised himself the self-sameness of the soul 
i. e. one who looks on all creatures alike his 
own self, is sure to attain salvation." 

Jainism is a religion universal — its object 
being to help,as it does, all beings to salvation 
and to open its arms to all, high or low, by 
revealing to them the real truth. The High- 
est Good is found in Moksha or Nirv6Lna^^--\}ci^ 
Absolute Release of the soul from the fetters 
of births and deaths. 

The attainment of Nirvdna is usually pre- 
ceded by development oi kevala/'ndn or abso- 
lute and unimpeded knowledge. This is the 
fifth or last kind of knowledge, the other kinds 
of knowledge in the order of developments 



being ( i ) Matt, ( 2 ) Srutt\ (3) Abadhi, 
(4) Manahparyaya, 

The j^rst is intellectual knowledge, derived 
from the peripheral contact of the senses 
with their objects or from mental illumina- 
tion due to observation and inference. The 
second is clear knowledge derived from the 
study of scriptures, books or from the inter- 
pretation of symbols or signs. The third is 
the determinative knowledge of events and 
incidents taking place somewhere beyond the 
range of sense-perceptions. The fourth is the 
knowledge of others' thoughts The first two 
are natural or commonsense knowledge. The 
other three are super-sensuous knowledge. 
The third is the perception of visible objects 
which proceeds directly from the soul without 
the mediation of sense-organs. Though 
super-sensuous, still it cannot go beyond the 
limits of physical regions ; while the fourth 
goes further beyond and can penetrate into the 
secrets of the heart. The last only covers 
everything whatsover, present, past or future, 
visible or invisible. It is pure and non 
determinative in its character. The possessor 
of this fifth form of knowledge is called a 



Kevalin. When the soul of a Kevalin leaves 
its material frame, it passes out of this 
mundane world and soars up straight towards 
the hyper-physical region (Aloka),\ki^ Heaven 
of the Liberated which lies at the top of the 
Universe. There it continues ©« to shine for- 
ever in all its purity and perfection. It re- 
mains there in a state of perfect equanimity 
and delight infinite disturbed by nothing. 
And This is Nirvdna or Moksha, It is, in 
fact, the absolute release of the soul from all 
A'^r;^^- matter by the complete decay of the 
causes of bondage and physical existence. No 
soul is wholly disembodied unless it is thus 
liberated from the burden of Karma-rndXi^r. 
And this release is not the annihilation of 
the soul as the Buddhists hold, nor is it the 
merging of the Individual with the Supreme 
wherein it loses its own identity and indi- 
viduality as Shankar, the lion of the VedAn- 
tists, roars, but it is the [ivas going beyond 
whence there is no return to Sansdr again. 



Gonstcleratton of tlic term PKaloso^ky — As tkey 
unclerstanJ tt tn t\ie West. — Aristotle, Sl>encer an J 
Hegel — PKtloso;t^liy ac defined and taugkt Ly tke Jtnas 
or tke Victors. — RtgKt Knowledge, Rtgkt Vision and 
Rigkt Gondvict —Tke Triune ox Jamism— Some 
Rudimentary Ideas and Meta|>kysical Notions. 

We now turn to our enquiry into the 
Philosophy of the ^inas or the Victors — the Necessity 

of a Defini- 

more immediate subject-matter of the present tion of the 

word Thilo- 
treatise. But philosophy is one of those words sophy. 

which are often used rather loosely, leading 
to much confusion of thought with regard to 
its real end and import. To guard against any 
such misapprehension which a student of 
modern thought and culture might labour 
under, it is important that we should first dis- 
cuss in brief what the West mean by philoso- 
phy and what we the Jains understand by it. 

Aristotle defines philosophy to be the Aristotle, 
''science of principles" or **fir«t beginnings." 
Another takes it to mean a "completely spencer. 



unified knowledge". **Philosophy'\according 
Hegel. '^ ^ third, "is the science of the Absolute," 

in the sense that it takes the world of 
Nature not as a product of chance but of a 
Single Infinite Power whose activity consists 
in the working out of a plan or purpose in 
the course of which It evolves this world out 
of Itself. Thus has philosophy been vari- 
ously defined by different thinkers of diffe- 
rent ages and climes. 

The Jains, however, teach that philo- 

Philosophy • . i i i 

as defined sophy consists in the voluntary and consistent 

by the Ji- 

nas. striving, intellectual and moral, manifest 

in the removal of impediments on the way to 
Right Vision (^^J^^sjif) into the metaphysics 
of things and thoughts leading to Right 
Knowledge (^^«li '^IT) of the world as a 
whole, and of our own function and place — 
Right Conduct (^«7^ ''^if^of) therein with the 
express object of realizing finally the free and 
beatific state of our being — the ultimate end 
and purpose of all life and activity. 

Taking philosophy, then, as an attempt 
Its Method to attain to a free and beatific state of 

of enquiry. 

being by the virtue of Right Conduct — 
(^''^^ "^Tftof) proceeding from Right Know- 



ledge [samyak jndna) acquired through 
Right Vision ( samyak darshan ) into the reali- 
ties of things and thoughts, we can ascertain 

beforehand what the principal branches and 

f ^ The two 

problems of our enquiry will be. We can see fundamental 

^ -1/ factors of 

that there are two fundamental factors of the ^^^ world.— 

world : ({) Jiva, the Cogitative Substance or 

the Soul, including^ the system of finite minds ,., ^. 

' ^ J (i) Jtva, 

either in Ntgoda, fixed, fettered, or free, in the 

various gradations of their being ; (ii) Ajiva, 

the Non-Cogitative Substance, the Non-living 

or the Non Soul, including objective things 

and processes and the like. Hence our en- (") ^y^'^^- 

quiry into philosophy^ roughly speaking, will 

branch out into, — 

(i) The Cogitative Substance or Soul 

(ii) The Non-Cogitative Substance or 
the Non-Soul {ajiva), and finally, 

(iii) The End or Freedom {mokshd)ol\}(\t, 

soul in relation as to how it is attained. 

Neces sary 

But from a consideration of these funda- [^^^^ ^"^^ 


mentals, it becomesi evident that we have to 
make a frequent use of such metaphysical 
ideas and notions as Dravya (substance), 
Guna (qualityX Parydya (modality or modi- 



fication), Karma (action, motion or change 
of relative position ), KAran ( causality ) 
and the like ; and no consistent result of 
our enquiry into philosophy can be ex- 
pected until appropriate and complete un- 
derstanding has been arrived at in regard 
to these fundamental ideas and notions. But 
an understanding of the content and origin 
of these ideas involves, to a great extent, 
analytical psychology of cognition. 

Furthermore, philosophy, as we have 
And under- seen above, claims to know the realities as 

standing of 

th e s e in- they are, and therefore it must proceed 

volves a n a- 

lyticai psy- ^Jth the justification of its rig^hts by showinsf 

chology of -^ & / & 

c o g n 1 tion Yyhat the conditions or means (Pramdnas) of 

and question ^ ^ 

orcondi^ttons att'^i^"^'^'*& knowledge are, and proving as well, 
ledge." ° ^ " ^^^^ knowledge of realities corresponding to 
the above ideas is within its power and com- 
petence. Otherwise, instead of explaining 
the relations which the Jivas and Ajivas 
bear to each other, it will go on oflfy 
dogmatising, sometimes sinking into the 
lower leveb of scepticis>^ii and agnosticism, 
or at other times rising into pseudo-ratio- 
nalism — only to add to the impediments of 

which there are plenty already to obscure 




our right vision into^ realities of ideas and 
ideals and forge thereby fresh links to the 
chains of misery that tie us down to the 
mires of this suffering world. Bm To avoid 
such pitfalls and to know the realities in con- 
formity with the rules and canons required 
to be observed in the acquirement of a 
correct knowledge, we must proceed from 
such and other notions and ideas as form 
the subject-matter of the next chapter. 



Fundamental Notions. — Categories or Preaicamcnts 
Ly ^re-em%nence. — Tketr Necessity and Origtn. — How 
cletermtnecl. — Advantages of suck determination. — 
Dravya. Guna, Paryaya and Karma. — PaJ>a and Punya. 
— Classification and descrit>tion in general of tnc 
Predicaments. — Their enumeration. 

We have already seen that Right Vision, 

Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct are 

the three principal departments of our 

philosophical enquiry. 

Origin and But in dealing with these, as we have 

context of ^ 

t h e funda- remarked, we have often to-make use 

mental Ideas 

aad Notions ^f g^^|^ g^^^^j certain fundamental ideas 
such as : — 

or notions as are not only the necessary 
forms according to which we ourselves 
must conceive things but which must 
also be regarded as necessary forms and 
relations of the things themselves. For 
in thinking, to be more clear, we think 
something about a thing and what we 
think about a thing is that it has powers 



of producing effects ( ^^ %in^ITt ) in other 
things, and stands in certain relations to 
them. For finite things exist and mani- 
fest their existence by acting and re- 
acting, thereby exercising causality ( ^TT^ccf ) 
on one another ; we distinguish these 
powers of action and re-action by the 

effects which they mutually produce, and, ^ 


it goes without saying that we call these 
powers as their qualities ( g^ ). But the 
degree of the effect which a thing pro- 
duces on other things depends on certain 
relations in which it stands in regard Quality. 
to them /. e, relations of time and space 
( ^T^ and 'q^^T^l ^^"^ ). Then, again, 
we cannot think of any change or idea, End or 

any action excepting as tending towards 

the realisation of some particular end or 

idea. It is true that some hold that 

all actions and changes are due to the 

blind operation of material forces and 

fortuitous concourse of atoms and molecules 

without any idea or end to realise ; but 

there are also other angles of vision 

which find reason as underlying all pheno 

mena. From this poinjt of view we see 



that all actions and changes are co-ordinated 
according to a plan made to co-operate 
in such a /^ay as to realise a purpose or an 
end. If it>is the case, it must be that the 
end is something good and the subordinate 

Good— F^ree^ ^/^rfj must be such as to lead towards the 
realisation of the Highest Good or Freedom 
( ^Tx^Tx^ f'Tl^^I'Er, ^?r^ or fifo^M ). But 

Merit and ^|j ^j^jg involves such questions as, What is 

good, virtue or merit ( g^ ) and What is 
Bad, vice or demerit ( 17m ), and finally, How 
a man should regulate his life and thought 
i. e. What would constitute Right Conduct 
( ^T^cfi ^iftpf ) for the realisation of the 
Highest Good or Freedom ? 

Having perceived, however, that a thing 

Predicates — 

how deter- acts in a certain way upon other things, 


we integrate the idea of the thing by acts 
of judgments and thenceforth we think 
of them as attributes inherent in the thing ; 
tet in order to express this fact we put 
them into conception of the thing by an act 
of judgment and we call them Categories, 
Predicates or Predicaments by pre-eminence. 
Now the thing or the subject, which 
the predicates are ascribed to, is styled 



as and included among the fundamental 
pradicaments or categories for convenience. 
We call it substaiice or reality by 

, . I I . . p, . . . I Sat and its 

which we mean that it is ^at i. e., it has tripartite in- 

. - , . f. . f. dications. 

an independent existence ot its own tor 
its characteristic indication ( ^c55^og^^?Xr^ ). 
Sat is, again, defined as what persists in and 
through its own qualities and modifications 
( it^frT ^^m^i g^n^mi^ sqi^fh ). It 
{Sat) is further characterised as standing 
under, supporting and holding together as 
well, the attributes or qualities ( ^tij ) and 
modifications (tT^T^j) revealed in the forms of 
origination or effects (^c^T^), and destruction 
disintegration — (ogg) in and through which 
the substance asserts and maintains its 
own existence and continuance ( ^^ ) as 
perceived during the course of its interaction *" 
with other things (^cqi^-o^^-^g^^ ^^). 

Thus the characteristic indication of Definiti on 
Substance being as such, we may define (ij Substance 
it as the underlying entity (-^sji) which 
itself, remaining essentially the same in and 
through all its modes of being, gives 
support and connection to all its qualities, 
modalities and the like. 



Quality (g^) of a substance is its power 
of producing effects of changes in other 
things through time and space. It is ever- 
present in the substance. Neither being 
(ii) Quality, found to be without the other, they both 
stand in the relation of invariable con- 
comitance or simultaniety (?Jtntc^) with one 
another, instead of being in relation of 
antecedence and consequence in time {^T{- 

Modality or Modification (icr^m) again, is 
(iii) Moda- -^ -[ . . 

lity. the successive variation (TT^ITij) in the atomic 

arrangement and configuration which a 

thing undergoes in the course of time and in 


Now Substantiality^ Quality and Modality 

P r e d i c a- 

ments and being, in short, the three characteristic indi- 

their e n u- 

meratiol— cations of substance so called, quality and 
Nine -^ 

modality are also at times considered 
as substances under certain circumstances 
and relations when each of these three is 
thus characterised again with the tri-partite 
indications of substance. The Jain teachers, 
however, have come to the enumeration in 
general of nine categories or predicaments 
by pre-eminence as in the following,-— 



I. Jiva (fft^) — Cogitative substance, Soul, 
Self or Subject is that which has IntelHs^ence ,. 

•^ ^ Jiuas not 

(^fl^) for its characteristic indication. It ^^^-P^^vad- 

^ ' ing, nor one 

is marked out from Ajiva (^^^)— Non- IbsouTeiy 
cogitative substance, Non-soul, Not-self or no^n-'eternah*^ 
Object by knowing consciousness ('^(•T) which 
essentially belongs to the Jiva only. This 
individual y^^z;^ is not all-pervading, nor is it 
only one in number ; neither is it abso- 
lutely eternal or unchangeable ; nor is it 
absolutely non-eternal or transitory. It is 
innumerable in number and is both eternal 
and non eternal in accordance with the view- 
point we take. to look at these . 

This Jiva exists in the germinal state in 
the form of what is technically called Nigoda Jarstafe^of 

(f5Til\?). It contracts or expands, as the Us^chamcter^ 

1 ^ /:*. • '^.u i-U istic indica- 

requirements may be, to tit in with the tions,— 

corporeal frames it takes on at different 

stages of its migratory existence in 

order to enjoy pleasures or suffer from 

pains. In order to reap what it sows, 

it migrates here, there and everywhere 

through the processes of repeated births, 

developments and deaths. On account of 

its ever striving to break off the fetters of 


Its Divinity, 

bondage and attain to a free and beatific 

Its consti- r i_ • i_ r i t- • 

tutional State ot bcHig by means oi the Iruine 

Freedom, -. 

Gems (?:^o[2It), the ^iva is held to be 
constitutionally free and essentially all bliss 
(^I«T«'^). It is potentially divine in the sense 
that it attains to Divinity or Perfection in 
the end when it shines in all its glory and 
effulgence beyond all thought and speech near 
the regions of A/oka. 
And its infi- Now there are an infinite number of these 

magn*i"ude Jtvci^ — filling the entire space and void of the 

but in num- . , . , , . 

ber. universe and are mainly grouped into, — 

(A) Freed Jivas — -are those beings who 
(i)TheFreed have attained to divinity and become self- 


conscious and self-luminous near the hyper- 
physical regions : and, 

(B) Fettered Jivas, — are those who are 
tered//w. Still bound down with the chains of karma 

either on Earth, in Heaven, or in Purgatory. 
Which is These fettered l^ivas are arain 5ub- 

classified ' ^ ^ 

again into, divided into (i) Sthdvava and (ii) Tras, 

(i) StMvara Jivas — are those which 

{S\T\i^stha- ^^^ devoid of all power of locomotion 
and have only one organ of sense, viz, 
that of touch ( ^sr ). Earth, water, fire, 
air and all those that come within the 


vara and 

(2)The Tras. 


range of the vegetable kingdom, are known 
as Jivas belonging to the Sthdvara class. 
Symptoms of life in these Sapr&n Stk&var 
( ^^\^^ W\^\ ) or living fixtures consist, 
amongst other phenomena, in responsiveness 
which evidently involve memory as dis- 
played in the mental activity of feeling, 
cognition and re-cognition 

(ii) Trds Jivas — are those who have the 
power of locomotion and are grouped into 
four kinds according to the nature and 
number of the sense-organs they are The four 

rr^i r i'i ro- o/- kinds of the 

possessed of. The four kinds of Tras Jivas Tras, 
are ; — 

(a) those that have the organs of touch 
and taste, (^i?%^ and ?:%f%5 ) e.g., leeches, 
worms, etc. 

(b) those that have three organs such as 
touchy taste and smell, (^sjfs^g, T%f5§[€r 
and ^J^f^g^T ) e.g., ants, lice, etc. 

(c) those that have organ of sight 
( ^^^f^?I ) in addition to the above three 
organs, eg, bees, scorpions, etc. — 

(d) and, lastly, those that have all the 
above four organs in addition to that of 
the hearing ( il^^^T ) This last kind of 


An epitome of jainisM, 

Jivas includes birds, acquatics, animals and 
human beings and all those that people 
Heaven, Earth and Purgatory. 

II. Ajiva ( ^^^ )— Non-cogitative sub- 
stance, Non-soul, Not-self or the Object is 
all what is absolutely bereft of all inteUi- 
gence, and consequently of the tripartite 
Ajiva defin- ^o^^s o{ consciozcsfiess. This Ajiva or Non- 
cogitative substance is of five kinds, viz ; — 

(i) Pudgala signifies what develops fully 
only to be dissolved again. — It is that 
kind of dead dull ponderable ( ^^t') matter, 
which is qualified with touch, taste, smell 
and colour. It is found to exist generally 

Ponderable , r i • 

Ajiva-Pud- \xi two modcs of bemg : — (a) Anu (^^) — 

gal and its 

indications atom, and (b) Skandha (^TO), — compound. 

— Lakskana. 

When the dead and dull matter exists in the 
last indissoluble stage where the ingredients 
admit of no further analysis, it is called 
anu or atom. Afid 5A:«;/</^^-compound is 
. the natural conglomeration of pudgal-3.toms 
under chemical and physical laws. It is 
these Pudga la- 3.toms that incessantly en- 
ter and leave our bodies and are infinitely 
more numerous than the Jivas. Karma is a 
kind of fine Pudga I- Sitoms. 



The Pudgala-vrnXi^T is also classified in 

Pu d g a la 

the following manner according to other Classified, 
modes of its being : — 

(a) Sthula-Sthula ( ^g-^^ ) or the 
Grossest of the gross, as, for example,logs of 
wood or blocks of stone ; i.e., solids which 
can be cut into equal parts. 
' (b) Sthula ( ^^ ) or the Gross-simple, 
milk or water, i. e., liquids, which are 
restorable to their original mass-forms even 
after their measurable divisions. 

(c) Sthula- sukshma ( ^ '^-'^'^ ) or the 
Compound of the ^r^^^ and \ki^ fine (e.g. gases 
which is visible in the light of the sun or the 
moon but cannot be caught ; as for example 
smokes and the like) 

(d) Sukshma-Sthula ( ^"^-^^ ) or the 
Compound of the fine and the gross is 
what is not visible to the eye but is per- 
ceptible by the auditory or olfactory nerves ; 
as, for example, music and smell. 

(e) Sukshma ( ^^ ) or the Fine. 

(f) Sukshma- Sukshma i^^-"^^) or the 
Finest of the fine, the ultimate atoms 
which admit of no further divisions. These 
finest of the fine, are mere simples as oppos- 


An epitome of JAINISM. 

ed to compounds and like points have posi- 
sions but no magnitude. 

(ii). Dharma or Dharmdstikdya is that 
Impopder- simple imponderable (^TOtT) substance by the 

able Ajiva. . r i • i i i* 11 

Virtue 01 which bodies are able to move. 
Dha7^ma here seems to be a reality, corres- 
ponding to the Rajas (^5T^) of the Sslnkhya 
philosophy, helping to the mobility of mate- 
rial things. 

(iii). Adharma or Adh'irmAstikdya is 
that simple imponderable (^i^) substance 
by the virtue of which bodies are able to be 
at rest. Adharma^ like Dharma, appears to 
be a reality corresponding to the Tamas (cTTTO 
of the S^nkhya philosophy tending to bring 
things to a rest. 

(iv). Akdsh or Space is the uncontained 
container of all that exists. 

(v) Kdl or Time is what reveals itself in 
a series or succession of events or changes. 
It IS in the course of time that things wear 
out, unfold themselves or undergo changes^ 
It is this time that is conventionally divided 
and termed as moments, minutes, hours and 
the like for which reason it is technically 
called Kalandtmak KdL 



Ill, Pimya or Virtue or deeds of merit Punya, 
is that which helps the Jiva in his enjoy- 
ment of health, wealth and pleasures. 

IV. PdpayOYVizQ or deeds of demerit is that p^p^^ • 
which adds to the pain and suffering of the Jiva. 

V. ^^r^?z^a or Infiux, infection or trans- , 


mutation of Pudgal-^diXi\c\es into the soul. — 
The Pudgal particles, which are foreign to 
the soul, find their way into the soul through 
mind, speech and other sense organs and 
thus cause discoloration of the latter giving 
rise to love, hatred, and the like. 

VI. Bandha or bondage is the wrong 


identification of the soul with the Non-soul 
owing to the atomic transmutation of the 
latter into the former. 

VII. Sambar is the gradual cessation of 


this influx into the soul along with the deve- 
lopment of knowledge. 

VIII. AtrjarA is the absolute purging of 


the soul of all matters foreign to it. 

IX. Mokska is the Freedom of the 

soul from the fetters of the bondage due to Mokska. 
matters alien to it. 

The above is but a general statement 
with reference to the nine categories or 



predicaments as taught by the Jain teachers. 
As to their details we shall see later on in 
their proper places. Some, however, taking 
Punya and P&pa under Bandha hold that 
^'^^ categories are only seven in number. Others 
again leaving aside the moral categories 
begining with PSipa and Pnnya^ opine that 
there are only six Paddrtkas or Predicaments 
viz : Jiva, Pudgaly DkarmUy Adharmay 
Akdsh and Kdla, But, be that as it may 
the question is : what do we know of these 
categories? And in this is involved another 
question : what is knowledge f Unless wa 
satisfy ourselves in regard to this it wodd 
be difficult for us to precisely state what we 
understand by these categories, a right 
vision into the metaphysics of which, we 
are told, will bring ©*r right knowledge 
of the verities of thought and life^ helping 
in the right regulation of our conduct for 
the attainment of Freedom — the Summum 
Bonum of all life and living. 



Tke Corrclattvtty of Jtva ani Ajiva — Polartty of 
Knowledge. — Self an<l tlie Not-self — Consctousness and 
its Ortgtn— Knowledge ana xta Growth. IDenntttons of 
Rtgkt Vtston and Rtglit Knowledge — Different forms 
of Knowledge and tke PossiLtUty of tke Kevala 
Jnana. — Kevaltn ts tke Ideal Real — Pure Intuitions — tk« 
true ckaractertstte of Real Pratyakska. 

To begin with knowledge, therefore, we 
must first see as to how do we become cons- 
cious of the Self and the Not-Self; what 
we are and what we see^ hear^ taste y touch 
or smelL 

A/v tgrflmg analysis of the contents of our Correlativity 

1 11 c \ 11 11 1 .incur con- 

knowMedge of the world as a whole makes it ception of 

the world — 

pretty clear that we can arrange our ideas Jiva and 


relating to the same under two pairs of con- 
trasted alternatives, Jiva and Ajiva, as com- 
plementary aspects of reality, each of which 
suggests the other by a dielectic necessity and 
combines with the other into one more complex 
conception. Now these two contrasted alter- 
natives are but two conditions of thought : 
All thinking implies a subject which thinks — 
Cogitative principle or Soul. But as all 


thinking is thinking of something, it means 
Subject^ and ^'^^^ '^ requires a material on which the 

Object in, , .. . ., , /-,•• 

thought. thought-activity is exercised and a fortiori 

therefore, it implies an object which is discri- 
minated and understood by thought. Thus 
we can neither imagine a subject /Jor a 
thinking principle without an object to think 
upon, or a world without conceiving a cogi- 
tative principle as thinking it. And this is 
hpw we become conscious of the Self or 
Subject and the Not-Self or Object. 

Conscious- Afed /tom this It is evident that cons- 

nes s and 

knowledge ciousness arises only from the action and 

from action ' 

and interac- jnter-action of the Self and Not-Self as such ; 

tion between 

theSelrand ^^^ constituted as we are, our knowledge 
t e ot- e . j^ygj. therefore begin with sensations from 
the peripheral contact of the senses with 
their respective objects, and consists in 
Sensation the interpretation of the sensations which 
tation'^know- they arouse in us ; for, merely having sensa- 

ledge and its , i r i' 11 • 1 

formation. tions and feelings would not constitute know- 
ledge. Therefore the knowledge of a thing 
is the interpretation and understanding of 
the sensation in such a manner as would 
correspond to the existing relations between 
the self and the Not-Self and other sur- 



rounding things, the fundamental forms of 
which are called categories. It is thus 
quite apparent that interpretation precedes 
knowledge and the more accurate the inter- 
pretation of the sensation, tne more correct 
would be the knowledge thereof. When 
the sensations, caused in us by the powers in- 
herent in the objects in contact with the 
peripheral extremities, are interpreted, and 
understood quite in accordance with the forms 
and relations in which they subsist and Right Vision 

^ , . , , I, , . is the Abso- 

for which they are called categories, we lute Faith- 

, ... - . Sraddhd in 

come to know them as objective relations, theinstruc- 

• . 1 • • 1 • ^''^^ of th e 

Ai^ When this is done in perfect accord- Teacher i n 

the interpre- 

dance with the instructions imparted by the tation. 
Teacher ( 5^ ), without which a correct 
interpretation is held to be impossible, abso- 
lute faith ( ^^T ) in the instruction (i. e. in 
knowledge produced by the imparted 
teaching) is called 'Right-Vision' (^^^ ^ij *f) 
— the basis of, Right Knowledge. And Definition of 
the knowledge which embraces concisely led^e. "°^' 
or in details the predicaments, as they are 
in themselves, is called 'Right Knowledge' 
( W^^ "giT ), and without which Right Con- 
duct ( ^l^^iftcC ) is impossible. 



Now knowledge is of five different forms, 
ITkT^I such as, (i) Matt ( qfcT ), (2) Sruti ( ^frf ), 
ledge,— ^^ Abadhi (^sfftr) (4) Manaparyaya (iT«f:q%a) 

(5) and Keval ( %^^ ). Thus, — 

Matt is that form of knowledge by 
which a Jiva ( ^^ ) cognises an object 
through the operation of the sense-organs, all 
hindrances to the formation of such know- 
ledge being removed. 

(2) Sruti is the clear knowledge formed 
on some verbal testimony of the Omnis- 
cient, all obstruction to the formation of 
such knowledge being removed. 

(3) Avadhi is the knowledge in the form 
of recognition of particular physical occur- 
rences that happened in some time past, 
all obstruction to the way being removed ; 

(4) Manaparyaya is the knowledge 
of what is in others' thoughts, originating, 
as it does, from the removal of hindrances 
to the formation of such knowledge. 

(5) Keval is the pure unimpeded 
knowledge — knowledge absolute, which pre- 
cedes the attainment of Nirvdna, It is 
characterised by omniscience, transcending all 
relativity of discursive thought involving 



the idea of succession and series. Being 
devoid of every sort of ratiocinative ele- UcTndlca- 
ment, we may call it 'Jntuitton power. By ^^ intuition. 
Intuitive knowledge we mean, of course, 
what we get by a single stroke of cognition, 
unadulterated by any of the processes of repre- 
sentation. As for us, finite beings, condition- 
ed naturally by the relativity of thought, 
we cannot have this sort of cognition ; 
because a careful analysis of the psychological Impossibility 

of Intuition 

processes seems to show that by virtue of the ^X ordinary 

*^ minds. 

frame and constitution of our mind, in every 

cognition which we can have, both the pre- 
sentative and the representative elements 
are, as it were, inseparably blended together. 
Indeed, some philosophers may hold the quite 
opposite view and affirm that we can perceive 
objects directly by our senses and that forma- 
tion of the percept requires no help of repre- 
sentation. But, surely, we can meet them in the 
language of Kant by saying that mere sensa- 
tions, unalloyed with any reactionary and 
representative processes, are as good as noth- 
ing, because they are no better than manifold 
of senses quite undifferentiated and homoge- 
neous in character. But this— though an im 


possibility for us — is nevertheless possible 

But possible r /^ • • t-» • z*^ ~\ \ i i 

for an Omni- lor an Omniscient Being (^^^T^) who has 

scient Being . . i ta- • • t 

—Kevaiin\ attained to perfection and Divinity. In 
fact, we may go so far as to say that the 
opposite — a discursive knowledge — is in- 
conceivable for Him by virtue of His 
very nature. Unless we deny the very 
existence of such a being it must necessarily 
follow that as perfect knowledge means 
infinite knowledge, his knowledge embraces 
the whole sphere of thought and covers 
the whole span of time. Being immortal and 

His charac- eternally present, for him the present vanishes 

teriitic Indi- 

cations— not in the past, nor the future shoots out from 


the womb of futurity ; but all offer them- 
selves as Ever-present. For him everything is 
eternal Now. In short, He is above time, be- 
cause the question of time comes in where 
there is a succession of events or changes. 
But changes are not possible to an Eternal 
Being ; for, all changes are in Him as 
it were, but He is not changed. For 
him there is no succession, but an eternal 
and everlasting Present. Now this being 
the case what necessarily follows are the 
facts. The mind which is at once perfect 




is not merely objective nor merely objective, 

but absolute. It is the measure of all thing^s, ^f'^?i^^~, 

o ' The Ideal 

the central and comprehensive reality. Such 
a mind, such a man, such a Kevalin (^^^'f), 
we need hardly add, is not the man in the 
street nor the man in the making, but the 
mind, the man whose cardinal characteristics 
are Pure Intuitions or Transcedental per- 
ce ptions ( TTcg^ %\^ ). Indeed such a man, 
such a Kevalin is the ideal of all aspira- 
tions, the fountain-head of truth and wisdom. 
In short, he is named, God, 



F urtker constderatton o^ tlie Processes o£ Knowledge. 
— Juclgment and its TKree [Elements — Rules and Canons 
'wnten a Judgment skould obey.— Insumctency ox tne 
Perce|>tual Source of Knowledge— Hence otker Source! 
of Knowledge. 

In the preceding pages we have discussed 

Re-capitu- that Knowledge implies a Subject or a think- 

ing principle which knows and an Object on 

which it exercises its knowing power. We 

have seen also that to know an object 

is to know the relations it bears to Self 

and other surrounding things as well. 

We have also seen the particular forms of 

knowledge which the Jain savants teach 

in their own peculiar way. We have seen 

further that the last form or the Keval 

jndna is not only a form of knowledge but a 

source of knowledge as well, free from all 

mediate processes. It now behoves us to 

enquire as to what other possible sources of 

knowledge we are ordinarily aware of. 

It is but a truism to say that you and I 

depend upon our mind to know the world. 


This implies that we are dependent upon 

our organs of perception and upon our ability sources ^o^f 

1 1 r .' • . . 1 Knowle d ^ e 

to re-organize the data ot perception into the _the Sense- 
system we call Knowledge. To know, we are indriyas, 
neccesarily dependent on our sense organs ; 
for, without them the world would be to us a 
perfect blank. Rob us of our eyes, of our 
ears, touch and the like, how little should we 
know of the world in which we live, move 
and have our being ! But inspite of such a 
bold and an undeniable piece of evidence in 
this matter-of-fact world, there crops up 

a question as to the trustworthiness of 

. -J f ^u Reliability 

these our evidences ot the sense organs — of Sense-evi- 

the channels of our perception. We all tioned. 

know how the sages and philosophers of 

yore differed widely from one another in 

placing their reliance on these channels of 

perception in their quest of truth. Some 

went even so far as to urge all manner of 

evidence to bring in question the absolute 

trustworthiness of the senses ; others held it 

to be the only authoritative source of 

knowledge. In these days of modern 

culture and refinement we can have indeed 

little patience with those who seriously urge 

6 f. 



such evidence to be absolutely reliable. 
A little reflection, however, will be sufifi- 
cient to convince anyone that, really speak- 
ing, we are not wholly justified in having 
such attitude of mind as just referred to. 
For in this are involved grave questions 
of vital issues and far-reaching conse- 
quences in all forms of philosophical specu- 
Sense-evi- lation. If we remember aright, experi- 

de n ce not 

wholly reli- ence shows on many an occasion that the 

evidences of the senses are not wholly and 

entirely reliable. We have not only illusions 
and dreams but some of us are colour blind 
even. Besides, there are many things in 
heaven and earth which escape our visions — 
sense perceptions. There are many things 
which lie hidden from our view either by 
being too big or too small to come within the 
range of our direct perception. We have 
riot seen the globe as a whole nor have we 
visualised the chemical atoms. Now if these 
be the things whose existence we never per- 
ceive but infer, how many — perhaps infinitely 
"* many — are there whose existences escape 
our notice and knowledge and thus keep 
clear for fresh inquiries and discoveries ! 



Then, again, you and I perceive objects 
and so we know them. But how do we know tionsofjudg- 
them ? Clearly because they make impres- 
sions onourbrains through the senses and thus 
give rise to certain processes and states in 
our mind ; and the question is whether we 
have only mental processes and states and 
not the real objects with which they do not 
correspond at all like an image in a mirror 
and the real object imaged. This world of 
ours gives rise to perceptions with which they 
cannot be identified. The image of the book 
is evidently not the book itself. If you 
shut your eyes, the image of the book vani- 
shes, but the book existing objectively 
in space does not. Supposing, again, that 
you go away to a certain distance from where - 

the book lies and look back from there 
at it, surely the image of the book will be 

smaller and smaller as you go away from it 

farther and still farther and look back at it from 

time to time. Clearly you see the book as it 

does appear to you and not the book as it 

really is. And thus the whole thing grows 

at once perplexing and irritating ; and you 

are irresistibly led to the question — what 


would be the nature of this knowledge and 
how do we come to it ? 

It would be well to state at the very 
Knowledge cutset that this our knowledge is not 

and Ju dg- • ^ i . • ^ i 

ment. perception only as such : it consists also 

of 'Judgment.' It is true that, speaking 
psychologically, knowledge exists in the 
form of perception and this may indeed 
seem to involve a contradiction. But on 
a little reflection it is found to involve 
no such thing. For, all instances of know- 
ledge perform the same office as a 
Judgment does. To take, for example, the 
case of a baby. When the baby stretches 
forth its tiny arm towards some object 
— say, a red ball hanging at a distance 
before its eyes, — we have something very 
much akin, to be sure, to an adults 
request that the given object be brought 
to him. Here the baby does not, by 
words of mouth, ask us to get it the 
red ball ; but for its intellectual companion 
it has said something fully. So in fact 
though no request is expressed in words, still 
the attitude of the baby does not fail to 
be construed as a request, and in fact it is 


so construed by its intellectual companion. 
In other words, we may say, as we have 
done before, that all knowledge would take 
some form of Judgment, be it expressed in 
words or by implication. 

Thus the question as to the nature of „„ 

^ What consti- 

knowledge ultimately resolves into the ^em^"^"^^' 
question with regard to the nature of Judg- 
ment, and a final answer can be given by 
analysing it into its component elements. By 
an element of Judgment is meant whatever 
is necessary to its being a Judgment from 
our point of view as an interpreter. 
There are three such elements in a Judg- 
ment. A Judgment to be as such must 
have an object to be interpreted; for, an 
interpretation of nothing whatsoever is no 
interpretation at all. So, one of the ele- itsthreeEie- 

^ ments, — 

ments involved in interpretation is the object 
to be interpreted. This must be given to us. 
It must stand there revealed to us. This 
object of knowledge is termed as the given. 
The second element is the actual interpreta- 
tion itself. To deny this would involve self- 
contradiction. Thirdly, we have, as the 
final element of Judgment, those laws or 



canons that a Judgment must obey in order 
anceofvvhidi ^^^ ^^ might be true. A good and correct 
to the Judgment has some responsibility, and this 

formation of mm. i r r i 

a correct responsibihty takes on the form of rules, 


laws and canons that a Judgment must obey, 
or else be an untrue or false claimant of the 
respective demands. To disobey these rules 
would, therefore, be tantamount to treason to 
knowledge itself. 

We have already dwelt on the first two 
elements of Judgment. We are now to deal 
with the third one, or the laws and canons 
for the formation of correct Judgment. 

Students of Indian systems of thought 
Etymolo- ^ji know that the word pramdna (V(ViV^^ 

gical signi- ^ ^ ' 

ficanceof originally meant an instrument of measure- 
ment — from m&n'X.o measure and pra'{oxt}c\. 
It may be translated as a measured, stand- 
ard authority. 

But the pramdna which serves as a 

Function of means ( ^\^^ ) of determination pro- 
duces pramth' {xnVRm) which means accurate 
or right knowledge, just as s&dhan (means) 
produces siddhi (truth or certainty). 
This pram&na is a means of infor- 
mation and determination and has variously 


been admitted, divided and defined from differ- '^ ^ « ^^^^r 

vdka Cr 1 ti- 

ent points of view by different sages and ^'^"}j°^ 

scholars of different ages and climes to suit 

their respective systems of thought. 

Whoever has a little acquaintance with 

the different Indian systems of thought 

knows full well that the followers of the 

Chdrv^ka School admit of but one source 

of knowledge, viz. Experience, i. e. sense- There is but 

one Source 

perception (tT^w), contemptuously rejecting of Know- 
ledge and 

the other sources, viz. Inference, (^^hr), ^^^\ *? ^^^' 

^ "- tyaksha. 

Testimony (sj^^;), Tradition (^fklfX Iinpli* 
cation (^^Tcrf%), Probability {^'^^) and Non- 
entity (^RT^), which are warranted in drawing 
from facts of experience. Little indeed do 
we know what is really taught by the Sage 
Brihaspati, the oldest propounder of the most 
uncompromising materialism and thorough 
going Kpicuranism or whence he drew his 
inspiration to rely solely on sense perception 
or facts of actual experience and to overlook 
other logical inferences and the like which 
have been in vogue from time immemorial ; 
for, where we perceive smoke we infer at 
once the fire there, or, when a reliable per- 
son informs any one that there are fruits he 



requires on the bank of the liver, he 
runs to the place and plucks fruits. Thus, 
Inferernce and Testimony along with others 
have all along been held to be valid 
sources of knowledge. But, curiously enough, 
the Chirvikas question the validity of 
these. And so far we could gather from the 
fragments of this philosophy, scattered here 
and there in the different systems of thought 
and as collated by M^dhavich^rya in his 
Sarvadarshana Samgraha, he begins his 
enquiries into Epistemology with such 
startling questions as, what is the value of 
Inference ? How can ever its conclusions be 
certain ? 

The most elementary form of conclusion 
must invariably have three terms — two ex- 
tremes and a reason, mark or middle term 
I n7ere^nce (^ 3> ^%1( or ^T^Tr). To give a conclusion, the 
"" ' middle-term or mark (§g, f^^ or 5gT>^*fr) 

must be universally and unconditionlly con- 
nected with the major-S^dhya ( 3[iitt^, ^i\5r) 
on one side i.e., according to the phraseology 
of European logic must be distributed, 
and on the other side with the minor term- 
paksha ( TT^). But what evidence can we 



ever have that the connection between the 
major ( ^1^ ) and the middle or sign 
(ogfig, §g or \^) is necessary and universal ? 
For, — 

(a) Sense-perception ( U<5IW ) cannot 

prove it in as much as universal connection dence^cannot 
is not a fact of experience. Experience ^inference.^ 
can give only one particular fact and 
that only of the present moment and not 
of the long past nor of the distant future. 
The eye by fact of its exercising its func- 
tional activity only in the present reveals 
the objectivity of a particular thing here and 
now. But a universal truth goes infinitely 
beyond what the eye can give. Hence 
sense-perception cannot prove any necessary 
connection between the major (^1^) and the 
minor (q^) — any universal proposition or 
Pratijnd — (^SflfH ^f?T^T) ! 

(b) But here a prima facie objection 

might be raised to the effect that perception ^acul'^ftt- 
being both internal and external it includes andset aside, 
intuition of reason which gives neces- 
sary and universal truth. 'Not even that,' 
thunders forth the thorough-going material- 
ist ; *there is no such thing as intuition 



or internal perception. For mind has no 
perception except throupfh the senses and 

c. f. Reld, ^ ^ ^ S 

MnTlTd therefore external. It is interesting to 
• °"^ ^' compare the Chirv^kas with Reid and 

Hamilton, who on the one hand deny the 
possibility of internal intuition of universal 
truths, and Mill and Comte on the other hand 
who reject all 'Introspective knowledge' 
as ever possible. 

(c) Then again, ''Inference,'' says the 
Indian materialist, "cannot give it ; for 
Inference (^RiTlTT'T) itself always requires 

Inference \ ^5 / ^ -i 

cannot give, universal proposition affirming^ the connec- 

for It IS only ^ ^ ^ 

assumed ^-jqj^ between the major and the middle 
as universally true." For example when 
we say that a man is mortal : Socrates is a 
man and therefore mortal, we are assuming 
a necessary connection between humanity 
and mortality. But the possibility of such 
a connection, at least of our knowing such a 
connection, even if it existed, is just what we 
require to prove. Thus we can see that mere 
Inference cannot prove it ; for it is only 
assumed. To say that the connection, 
though assumed yet makes inference possible 
is to argue in a circle. And hence we cannot 



arrive at universal truths by means of Infer- 
ence ('^liTRT^). It is important note to here 

^ ^ ^ ^ c. J, Mill's 

that T. S. Mill bases his theory of reason- Theory of 
•^ ^ Reasoning. 

ing on universal propositions. But are these 
axioms themselves proved ? No, reasoning 
assumes them — they being mere generali- 
sations from facts of experience. But this 
cannot yield absolute certainty. 

(d) Nor Testimony can prove it. For 
the validity and truth of Testimony depends Nor can 

T e s t i mony 

on Inference. Moveover Testimony itself establish it, 

depends on a middle term ( f%-^ or §g ) 

in another sense viz. the language used ; 

in as much as the meaning of the language 

used and its correspondence with reality is 

always uncertain. To illustrate the import, 

we have the communication of the old 

man with the child, neither understanding m°ony\'as 

the other's language. Hence absolute depend on 

certainty can never be founded on authority, 

we cannot accept the ipse dexit of Manu 

even. And if Testimony could convey 

universal truth, yet there could be no 

knowledge of universals to one who had 

not himself received the testimony of one 

already in the know of them. But where is 


K n o wledge 
been f rom 
time imme- 


such a person to be found ? To say that 

any one already knows universal truths and 
Hence Per- ' -' 

tlfe^on/^ can bear Testimony io \i, is but begging the 

Knowiedy/ question. Hence sense-perception ( ^cST^ ) 

is the only form of valid knowledge ( T{W% ). 

So argue the Ch^rvakas in defiance of 

Still has the the usas^e of all, times. There was never 

use of other 

means of a time when the acts of seeinp" and inferringf 
etc. were not performed. The use of these 
acts are well known ; for it is through them 
that we can choose one thing and reject 
another, and though the use of the Pramdnas 
are well-known to all, coming as it does 
from time immemorial, yet it is imperative 
that we should make a sifting enquiry into 
the truth and validity of the materialistic 
and sensationistic arguments as put forth by 
such thinkers as Charv^kas so that it might 

And there- 
fore require serve as an warning to the foolish people 
a searching 

enquiry into from taking" false knowledge for true : for it 

the truth and ^ ^ 

valid i t y o f Jo cairl • 

theChirvaka ^^ saiQ , 

attachment. nftl^T^ Hm^T'f ^^^^^t TT^5!iT^ I 

— The N&ydvatdra, 
Such is the trend of the Ch^rvslkas* 
argument who admit only one pram&na, 



And while the Buddhists and the Vaishe- 

shikas admit of only two Pramdnas viz. ofKno\^edge 

7-1 , t ' 17-/- / 1— _\as admitted 

Perception and Inference ( I7c^w and ^gi?l«! ), b y o t h e r 

the Sdnkhya School acknowledges three Indian thou- 

i. e. Testimony ( Ti^ ) in addition to 

the previous two. The School of the 

JVydya Philosophy adds Analogy ( ^trFrT*^ ) 

to the above three and thus admits of 

four only. The Prabhdkar School accepts 

Implication (^^jmfTf) as an additional means 

and thus agrees to five Pramdnas. The 

two Mimdnsakas, Purva and Uttara (^oir 

and ^Tf?:) grant six, adding Non-existence 

( ^W^ ) ; and finally, the Pourdnikas 

taking Tradition (j^w^) and Probability 

( ^'lisj ) into consideration, acknowledge 

that the sources of knowledge are after all 

eight in number. 

The scholiasts have, however, defined 
these means of knowledge variously. But 
they all agree substantially to the follow- 
ing :— 

(i) Sense-perception ( TT?55rw ) — Know- 

J . . Sen s e-p c r- 

ledge derived directly from the peripheral ception. 
contact of the sense-organs with their corres 
ponding objects. 






N o n-e X i s- 



(2) Inference ( ^gm^ )— Knowledge 
born of the apprehension of an unseen mem- 
ber from an invariable association (cgflfn) by 
the perception of another known member. 

(3) Analogy (^(^^i?!)— Knowledge from 
the recognition of likeness based on resem- 
blance i.e. from the detection of the points of 
identity and difference through the process 
of comparison and recognition of similarity 
with something well-known before. 

(4) Verbal Testimony (sji^) — Know- 
ledge derived from the pronouncements of 
authoritative persons who have sensed 
truths as it were. 

(5) Implication ( ^g[T^f% ) — Such know- 
ledge as can be determined of a thing not 
itself perceived, but implied by another. 

(6) Non-entity (^vri^) — Knowledge aris- 
ing from the cognition of absence or Nega- 
tion or Non-being as we conclude from 
the fact that Deva Datta is not in the house, 
that he must have gone out. 

(7) Tradition (^fh"^) — Knowledge gain- 
ed from such accounts, legendary or otherwise, 
which have been handed down to generation 
to generation from time immemorial. 



(8) Probability ( ^^% ) — Knowledge ac- 
cruing from the perception of equivalence 

, . r ^ 1 • Probability. 

as in the instance or twelve pences making 
up a shilling 

The above are the eight classified sources 
of information by means of which they gener- The Jain 

View of the 

ally determine the accuracy of knowledg^e. means of 

' > o Knowle age 

And it is interesting to note that Tain teach- — Sense-per- 

^ -^ cepti on in 

ers do neither admit them all, nor do they ^^^ i^direc^ 
agree to these definitions. They admit of only 
two pramdnas : one is Direct or Imme- 
diate Perception ( TT^^ '^T«T ) which has 
been discussed at length under Keval (^^^ 
^T^t) as a form of knowledge ; and the other 
is Indirect or Mediate Perception (crft^ ^T^) 
which is generally explained by the peri- 
pheral contact of the senses with their respec- 
tive objects ( f figm^ ^f^^ll ). 

The reason why knowledge born of the 
contact of the senses with their respective The reason 

^ ^ w h y t h e 

objects ( ^fj^m'^^f^^'SfTT '^R ) which is ad- ^e n s e-p e r- 
■' \>^ -«/ ceptionis 

mitted on all hands to be derived through ^''ediate o r 

^ Indirect. 

the Direct means ( tr^rf TWT^ ) has been 
considered by the Jain Sages to be Indirect 
ox Mediate (TTf\^) is best explained when 
we take into our analytic consideration of the 



states and processes of the psychology of 
cognition of extra-mental realities. 

Knowledge born of the contact of the 

Intermed ia- • i i • i* i • 

tory Stages senses With their corresponding objects 

of the forma- / r- _« <v <^ \ . i . 

tory of such ( ^t^m^ ^T if^i^if =^1^ ) IS not direct. 
There are, remark the Jain Psychologists, 
five intermediatory stages from sense 
to thought : viz. (a) VanjyanAvagraha 
( sg^^T^^f ), (b) Artkdvagraha ( 'q^lk^^ ), 
(c) Ihd ( \^\ ), (d) Avaya ( ^An ) and 
(e) Dhdrand ( ^tt^^t ) as will be presently 



Tkc Jatn dissension wttk reference to Pratyakska 
Praman. — Direct Percet>tton xs really Indtrect. — Analy- 
sts of tkc Psyckologxcal Processes or Cognition. — Tke 
Different Stages —From Sense to Tkougkt — Proof of tke 
Trutk anJ Validity of tke Jain Point of Vicw.—Tke 
sensuous 'Pratyakska is really 'Parokska . 

While discussing the questions of epis- 
temology and logic in the previous chapter, The Jam cn- 
we have seen' how the different schools of p^^'a^yal^/za 
Indian thought substantially agree as to o^i^e^r^Per- 
the character of the different instruments 
of knowledge. And so far the character- 
istic indication, specially of the Direct Per- 
ception {Vif^"^ PfllfT^), is concerned, we have 
seen too that almost all the schools, from 
the out-and-out materialist Chdrv&ka down 
to the all-believing Paardnikas, agree with 

one another. But the Jain savants, as But the Di- 
rect is really 
we have stated already, do not fall in indirect. 

with this view. According to them, the 

so-called Pratyakska — Direct Perception — is 

but an Indirect source of knowledge. The 

so-called Pratyakska is really Parokska ! 




This will indeed strike curious in the 
face of such over whelming opinions of so 
many schools of thought as well as in opposi- 
tion to the evidence of the everyday experi- 
ence. But an analysis of the psychological 
processes involved in the sense-given know- 
ledge, as the Jain savants hold, will confirm 
the truth and validity of their statement 
. when they say that the so-called Pratyaksha 
is, to all intents and purposes, Parokska, 
To enter into details, there is no 

(i) Acquis!- denvingf the fact that we think in relations, 
tional Stage. ^ ^ 

Relativity is the very soul and cement of our 
knowledge ; for, all knowledge not only 
implies a Self or Subject which knows 
and a Not-Self or Object which is known 
but a relation between them as well. 
The Object or the external world, by 
acting on the peripheral ends of our 
sense-organs, rouse in us a certain kind 
of stimulus through the channels of our 
sensation ; and this brings the Self or 
Subject to stand in particular relation with 
it, the Not-Self or the Object. This is 
vyanj andvagraha (oq^iTT^^W ) or the stage 
of acquisition of materials for knowledge. 



The relation having thus been estab- 
lished between the Self and the Not-Self in f^tj^^^'o^r 
the processes of which stimulus is carried on stage.^ 
from the outside to the cerebro-hemisphere 
where all the in-going nerves meet, there 
takes place an excitation in our mind where- 
upon it re-acts on the stimulus by way of 
converting it into sensation as well as of 
interpreting in knowing the contents of the 
same in and through the process of which, the 
mind comes to the formation of the notion 
of its being imposed by something olker 
than itself from without. This notion, thus 
formed, of the extra- mental object, is homo- 
geneous and indefinite in character in as 
much as the distinction between the Self 
and the Not-Self only begins to dawn on the 
mind in the most rudimentary forms. In 
our psychology it is called Arthdvagraha 
( ^^T^^^ ) or the presentative or cogni- 
tive stage in the processes of perceptual 

Ihd (f^T) is the third stage. The mind 

does not rest with the formation of the vague (iii) Compa- 
rative Stage, 
notion of the Not-Self, as referred to in the 

above. Rather it goes on with its search- 



ing inquiry, initiated in the previous stage, 
as to the real character and contents of 
what is imposed on it from without through 
the assimilation of the present sensation 
and its comparison as well with the other 
past but similar sensations, revived in the 
mind according to the laws of association 
and concomitant detection of the points of 
identity and difference between present and 
past sensations. 

Then follows the re-integration of the 
(iv)Recogni- pi*^sent sensation along with other sensa- 
tage. |-iQri3^ received in some past time and 
now revived in our consciousness according 
to the law of contiguity. In this stage of 
avaya (^^ir), the presentative element which 
is known as sensation is fused with other 
elements, represented in the consciousness ; 
and thus there results the recognition of the 
object, more definitely expressed in such voca- 
bularies as this and not that. 

The last stage in the present perceptual 

(v) Reflec- elaboration is Dhdrand (yiXK^I) through the 

tive or con- r i • i i i i 

c e p t u a 1 processes ot which we are by a natural and co- 

herent train of thought led to reflect that sensa- 
tion reveals qualities of things. But sensations 



must require grounds for them ; for, they 
cannot be self-caused. The qualities also, 
which these sensations reveal, cannot stand by 
themselves : for the qualities must be qualities 
of something, which not only gives them 
support and connection, but which as well 
exists extra-mentally and objectively some- 
where in space. Thus through the pro- 
cesses of objectification and localisation we 
are led to the knowledge of things as extra- 
mental realities existing objectively in space. 
Dhdrand (^itiit), thought, is but a name for 
this particular phase of knowledge of the 
thing when it is uppermost. in our mind with 
special reference to the intensity and duration 
of the knowledge as such. 

Such is the analysis of the sensuous 
perception; and this reminds us of a tendency 
in the modern psychology of perception to 
detect whether there is any interval of time 
between the contact and the (formation of) 
concept in addition to the question raised of 
late by the psycho-physiologists as to whether 
perception does not involve inference — a 
subject which was long ago discussed and 
solved by the sages of India. 



Now the above analysis of the successive 

The whole . , . - 

p r o c e s s Stages as to how the sense-given fragments 

t o thought and feelings are generalised and compressed 

is thus medi- ^ ^ . ^ 

ate. into an intimate unity — a habitual mood of 

mind — is sufficient to indicate that whole 
process from sense to thought is not only 
indirect but mediate through and through in 
the acquirement of experiential knowledge. 
The facts of experience, mediately received, 
are generalised through the principle of 
induction in the course of which the 
details only re-arrange themselves into a 
concentrated form called, — Thought. The 
extra-mental realities causing sensations and 
feelings in us from their contact with our 
peripheral extremities, are not only cemented 
together into a unity but are stripped of their 
sensible nature, as it were, and are reduced 
to their simple equivalent in terms of thought 
through the operation of induction. In this 
way from sense-fragments and feelings, an 
image or idea, representative of reality, being 
generated, there appears next the thought 
or notion proper which holds the facts in 
unity. The principle holds good in all cases 
of empirical knowledge, historic or other- 



wise. The decadence of nations in the 
lengths of time and the displacement of things 
all around us in the breadths of space are 
but condensed throusfh reading or observation 
and induction into a frame of thought, 
naturally shedding a judgment on the issues 
involved therein. Thus sensuous perception 
which enjoys the privilege of being reckoned 
as a direct source of knowledge is really, 
to all intents and purposes, an indirect or 
mediate means ( qft^ Hl^TO ) to the acquisi- 
tion of knowledge. 

It is worthy of note here that Mati-jndna 
and Sruta-fndna come within the jurisdiction 
of this indirect means to the acquirement of 

This indirect means of knowledge or 
proof IS agam sub-divided for the sake of sions of the 


convenience into : — means. 

(i) Smriti (^f?f)— is the memory which 
reveals in the form of recollection of what was 
seen or heard of or experienced otherwise 
sometime before. 

(2) PratydbkijnAna {vm\f\{^\^)—'\s the 
knowledge derived from a semblance between 
things. It manifests itself in recognising a 



thing from the resemblance of the same 
with the description of what was known 
from some other source. 

(3) Tarka ( rT^ ) — is the knowledge 
arising from the confutation according 
to the canons of invariable concomitance 
( SBfifn ). 

(4) Anumdn ( ^g^n^T ) — is the know- 
ledge of something arising from the presence 
of the characteristic insignia (f^^) of the 
same in something else. 

(5) Agam ( ^TT?! ) — is the verbal 
testimomy of some Omniscient Being. 



Aaeettng tkc CKarvakas on tneir own grounds. — 
Refutatton oi tltetr ky^otkests and Demonstratton oi tke 
legitimacy oi Inierenttal-knowlcage — Tke Jaxn Tkeory 
of Formal Logtc and definitions oi "Pratyakska . — 
"Parokska includes Inierence and Testimony — Den- 
nition or Inierence and Forms or Syllogisms —Testimony 
or tke AA^ord - Oefinition oi Praman or Valid know- 
ledge — tke W^orld of Reals and not of Pkantoms as kold 
tke Buddkists. 

So we see how in addition to Direct 
Perception (IT^?^ WT'n), Inference (^gWM ) 
is also admissible as an Indirect means 

Prima- facie 
Obj e c t i o n 
against the 

{^fm Will) according to the [ain TxhTV^ 
epistemology. But then the Purva Pakshin, ^^^^ ^^^' 
Ch^rv^k, will, indeed, remark that our 
classification of the means of knowledge 
— Pramdnas and our definition and inter- 
pretation of the logical terms — Pratyaksha 
and Paroksha — are in clear contravention to 
the common acceptation and interpretation 
of the same and as such should be rejected ; 
for where is the person so insane as to 
accept this our view, the import and uses 
of the logical vocabularies of which, are 


in manifest opposition to the uniforrnly 

The suppos- 1 ,..--. r 1 

ed abandon- accepted sense and signihcation ot the 

ment of ori- . • -^ i-» • i i . 11 

ginai posi- terms in question: Besides, this would 

tion by the 

Jains. be construed as an abandonment on our 

part of the original position ( nfhWT ^sEJl^ ) 
taken up by us in the demonstration of the 
logical possibility and validity of inferential 
knowledge (t[ft^ '^I'T) in addition to the 
perceptual and yielding as well to the view 
held by our adversary, in so far, indeed, 
as the epistimological side of the question is 
concerned, simply by a cunning display of 
pun upon words and terms from their ety- 
mological significations. Specially such is 
your position when we, Charv^kas, do not 
admit of Pure Intuitions or Transcendental 
Perceptions which are impossible on 
your own statement to the ordinary mortals 
living, moving and having their being in 
the empirical world of ideas and ideals. 

Indeed ! we, the Jains, reply. There is 

,,. ,. much of sense in your argfument. But that 

Vindication ^ ^ 

of the Jain- j^ ^j-jj^ apparently in as much as they vanish 

onhT'cMr" altogether like cob-webs on searching 

thesis. ^^°" analysis, as we shall see presently. True it 

is that our definition and interpretation of 



the logical terms in question are in contra- 
vention to the too common acceptation 
and uses of the same. But common 
is the common place and being too 
common would not diminish the weight 
and gravity of our philosophy. We walk 
straight along the lines of Rijti-sutra 
(^^ ^(p|) and interpret and explain things 
both as they are and appear instead of 
wrangling and beating about the bush. 
In our empirical life and thought, we indeed 
admit Perception as the direct and Infer- 
ence as the indirect means of knowledge. 
But, however, to meet you on your grounds; — 
First ^ — You hold that direct Perception 
( TKW^ ) in the common acceptation of the fh^'^Hypo- 
term is the one and only means of know- 
ledge and that the so-called Inference (^gRT*!) 
being not possible according to your view 
is not to be recognised as valid knowledge. 

Now, do you or do you not adduce any 
proof in support of your contention ? If you ^ ^ e Chir- 
do not, your assertions would be but ipse Dilemma. 
dixit and none will care to listen to you. On 
the other hand, if you adduce proof, yours 
would be a suicidal procedure making yourself 



guilty of a crime for the abandonment of 
the original position ( nfh^T ^W(^ ) already 
taken up by you in some form or other. 

Secondly, — Again when you maintain that 
Unconcious excepting Perception all other forms of 

admission of ri r n • j i 

induction in evidence are alike fallacious and as such 


perception, homogeneous, you admit yourself the legiti- 
macy of induction which is but a form of 

Thirdly — Then again you reject every 

Vindication kind of inference ; but how do you carry on 

of inferential , . •\ c^ ^ \ r i i • i 

knowledge. your debate r burely by means of words which 
are but symbols of thought : and when you 
attack your antagonists for their mistaken 
faith in inference without which you could 
not so much as surmise that your antagonists 
held erroneous opinions, such erroneous 
opinions being never brought into contact 
with your organs of sense but are only 
supposed to exist on the strength of inference 
(^gjTH) from the symbolic movement of 
thought. And, 

Finally y — you can not but admit of infer- 
ence being another means of knowledge 
as will be evident from the following. To 
take for example, I have been very often into 



the kitchen room as well as in other places 

and I have invariably observed that where Demonstra- 

^ tionVof the 

there was smoke there was fire. Having^ legitimacy of 

° Inference. 

met with not a single exception to the rule, 
I become convinced of the fact that there 
is an universal antecedence of fire in respect 
of smoke. Afterwards I ^o to a hill 
for a trip. I see smoke there and I 
doubt somehow whether or not there is 
fire in the hill and the moment I observe 
smoke on it, I recall to my mind the invari- 
able concommitance between fire and smoke 
of which I had become pretty well convinced 
before, and I conclude that the hill has 
fire in it as there is smoke on it. Surely 
this is a case of inference to the point and 
and you cannot but admit the legitimacy of 
the issue in question. 

Having thus refuted the Ch^rv4ka hypo- 
thesis so far their means of knowledge is ,, . ^ 

^ Necsesity of 

concerned and bavins: demonstrated as well ^ ^"^^ f?-^' 

^ vey of t h e 

the legitimate possibility oi Inference{^'^\'^) i7"fo[^m°a^ 
beyond all shadow of doubt according to the °^'^* 
general acceptation of the logical term in 
question, it is imperative that we shall, ere 
we enter on any other topics bearing upon 



our subject-matter, here set forth in brief, 
our own view of the means of knowledge — 
Pramdnas (y(^m). 

The question, therefore to begin with, 
The Jain IS, What is Pramdua, from our point 
man as dis- of view. Pvamdiia, we define, is the valid 
from other knowledge which reveals itself as well as 

s c h o o 1 s of 

thought. its knowable. It is worthy of note that by 

this we, first, put aside the Buddhist view 
that there being nothing external, knowledge 
only reveals itself and secondly, we contradict 
as well the Naiydyika and the Mimdnsaka 
schools of thought who teach that know- 
ledge does not reveal itself but reveals 
external relations. We hold, however, that 
just as colour reveals itself as well as the 
object to which it belongs, so knowledge re- 
vealing itself reveals the knowable as well. 

Now such being the characteristic indi 
cation (^^^u) of Pramdna or Valid know- 
ledge as we hold it, our sages have, 
(apart from Immediate Intuition or Transcen- 
dental Perception which is the truest 
indication of what is meant by Real Direct 
Knowledge), for the sake of convenience of 
the ordinary mortals breathing in the world 



of relativity of thought and form, deemed it 
wise to classify it into two kinds, viz. (i) 
Direct and (ii) Indirect (iToSl^and q^t^), Infer- 
ence (^^llfT), Testimony (aia^f) and the like 
all coming within the purview of the latter. 

To take the first, the Pratyaksha or the 
Direct knowledge is such that it reveals The Jain di- 

. finitionof 

the objects as lymg withm the range of the formal Pra- 
senses; while the other is called Paroksha or 

Indirect only in reference to the procedure of 

its revealing the objects of knowledge such 

as Inference (qgirif) which is not object of 

direct perception. 

Inference, again, is that kind of valid 
knowledge which is determinant of what ^^^^ ^^^' 
is to be proved, technically called Sddhya, 
arising from the sign or insignia called Linga 
standing in the relation of invariable con- 
commitance (smfn) with the same. 

Such being the characteristic indication 
of Inference according to our logic, we J.^wfudes 
thereby set aside first the view which 
maintains that (i) non-perception (=qgq^fer), 
(ii) Identity ( ^^\^ ) and (iii) Causality 
(^T%^) are but grounds of inference ; and 
secondly, also the view which declares that 


Buddhist and 


effect ('^T^), cause (sffi^^), conjunction (^^tf ), 
Naiyayika co-existence (^^TcJUT), opposition (f^^w) or 

grounds of 

Inference. such forms of ratiocinations as are known by 
the names of a-priori ( ^^^^ ) or a-postiriori 
( ^^^\ ) or analogy (^]?n*^^I^), as grounds 
of inference. 

Now this Inference, we divide into two 

tion of Infer- ki^ds, {o) Svdr^Mmimd7i{^\^'[^q]^) i.e. Infer- 


ence for ones own self ?i\\di (b) Pardrthdnuman 

(^TT^%RI*f)i.e. Ini^YtncQ/orthesake of others. 

{a) Svdrthdmimdn (^I^^gi?T«T) or Infer- 

(i) Inference ence for oue s owH Self is the valid know- 

for one's own 

self, illustra- jedge arising in one's own mind from 
repeated of observations of facts as in the 
case of having been in the kitchen many 
times and having invariably seen that where 
there was fire there was smoke, one concludes 
within himself that the hill must have fire 
in it in as much as it has smoke on it. 

It is worthy of note here that this infer- 
ence for one's own self, corresponds totidem 
verbis to the first form of Aristotle's 
syllogism : — 

All that smokes is fiery, 
The mountain smokes ; 
Therefore the mountain is fiery. 



Such is the process when we reason for 
ourselves. But if we have to convince some forVthers— 
body else of what we by inference know 
to be valid, the case is different. We then 
start with the assertion, the hill is fiery. 
We are asked, why ? and we answer, 
because it smokes. We then give our reason 
or the major premise, that all that smokes 
is fiery as you may see, for instance, on a 
kitchen hearth and the like. Now you 
perceive the hill does smoke and hence you 
will admit that I was right when I said the 
hill is fiery. Such being the processes of 
reasoning we generally adopt when we 
try to convince any one of the truth and 
validity of our statement, it is called 

(d) Pardrthdnumdn ( TT^imgjlT^ ) is a 
statement expressive of reason (fg)or middle ^X'oeffned 
term standing in relation of invariable con- 
commitance with what is {.oh^ proved (^V^ 
or major term having been composed of the 
minor term (tr^). 

It is important to note that Paksha {t\^) ^ 

^ v -' Comparative 

which corresponds with the minor te7'm syUo^^luc 
of the European logic is defined to be ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 




that with which the reason, Hetu (fg) or 

the middle term is related and whose 

relation with the major term has got to 

be demonstrated. The major term stands 

for Sddkya or what is to be proved, while 

Hetu (f g), Linga (f^g') or Sddhan (^T^f) 

can be exchanged for the middle term or 

reason which cannot stand without being in 

relation with the Sddhya or the major term. 

In language a sentence must have a 

Formulation Subject and a predicate. In a proposition 

ogis . ^^^_^^^j which is but a form of sentence, the 

subject is the Paksha or the minor and the 
predicate is the Sdddkya or the major 
term. To illustrate, let us take the pro- 
position ; — 

(i) The A/7/ (minor term) is full o{ fire 
(major term). 

(2) Since it is full of smoke (middle 

(3) Whatever is full of smoke is full 
fire, just as the kitchen (example) 

(4) So is this hill full of smoke 

(5) Therefore this hill is full of fire 



Now the exposition of this form of infer- 
ence for the benefit of others is more rhetorical ^ ^^ ^ ^l\ 
in language, persuasive in its elaboration and members, 
more useful therefore in controversy. 
When this form of exposition takes on five 
members in which it usually expresses itself 
as in the above, it is called Madhyama 
or mediocre type and when it takes on less 
than five members it is called Jaghanya or the 
worst type. But the Uttama or the best 
type of exposition consists of the following 
ten members — Daskdvayava (i) Pratijnd 
( trf^T'^T ) or Proposition, (2) Pratijnd 
Suddhi ( nfh^r^f^ ) or Correction of the 
Proposition, (3) Hetu (fg) Reason or the 
middle term, (4) Hetu- suddhi ( W g^^ ) or 
Correction of the reason or the middle term 
(5) Drishtanta (?^|5fC) or Example, (6) Drish- 
tanta-suddhi (igST^t^igff) or Correction of the 
example, (7) Upanaya i^^^ii) or Application 
(8) Upanaya-suddhi (^xxi\n%S,'^ox Correction 
of the application (9) Nigaman (fifiiqiT) or 
Conclusion and (10) Nigaman- suddhi 
(Of^fTfsjf^) or Correction of the conclusion. 

II. Testimony ii^^ is the valid know- 
ledge arising from words which being taken 


Testi m o n y, 


in their proper significance and acceptance 
express real objects not inconsistent with 
what is established by perception, 
and its This Testimony is of two kinds — {a) 

Loiikika (^f^oft) and {b) Shastraja {i{\^'^. 
- (a) Loiikika sabda (^f^^ 11^5;) is the 
Verbal Testimony from reliable persons 
having authority to speak. 

[b) Sastraja sabda (jjI'^tt) is the Scrip- 
tural Testimony. By scripture is meant that 
which was invented by self-realized persons 
who have seen truths and whose pronounce- 
ments in consequence are not incompatible 
with truths derived from perception. 

Now the Jain sages hold the Scriptural 
Knowledge to be of three different kinds, 
viz ; — 

(i) Knowledge derived from the teach- 
ciassifica- ings, recorded or otherwise, of ku devas or 

tion of the 

Shastraja bad spititual teachers. 


(2) Knowledge derived from the Naya 
Sruta or that part of the Jain scripture 
which teaches us as to the ways of compre- 
hending things and realities in one or 
the other of the many aspects they are 
possessed of. 



(3) Knowledge derived from Syadvdd 
sruta or that part of the Jain scripture which 
teaches us how to test and comprehend things 
and realities in all their aspects for which 
reason it is also called Anekdntavdd or the 
doctrine of the versatality of aspects. 

Of these three kinds of scriptural know- 
ledge, we shall deal with the Nayavdd and 
the Syddvdd in the subsequent chapters and 
leave the first to be dealt with later on 
for the sake of our arrangement and con- 



Otner lines of Logical or Ontologtcat Inquiry — 
Analysis and Synthesis -tkc Nayas anJ tke Sa|>tal>kangi 
— tlic two IcinJs of Nay a— (i) tkc Noumenal anJ (ii) 
tke Pkenomenal — Oonsiaeration of tkc Ten SukJivisions 
of tke Noumenal Nay a or tke Analytic Metkod of 
Inquiry into tkc Ontology of Tkougkt and Form. 

In the forgoing discussion on the means 
Importance ^^ knowledge, we have seen how the Formal 
of the^"iV^°" Logic of the Jain philosophers differs from 
^S^ptabhangi the systems of Logic belonging to other 
schools of thought and culture. But what 
we have stated in brief is not all that we 
know of the Jain Logic. In addition to 
this, it has other means of logical enquiry 
into the ontology of things identifying 
thereby logic with ontology which is of 
vital importance to deal with in the correct 
estimation of thought, form and being — a 
general conception of which is only attained 
by sense perception and the like ordinary 
means of knowledge. But to enter into a 
more detailed and complete apprehension 
of the actual realities which we come to 



conceive of through the ordinary channels 
in more or less indefinite forms, there are two 
other lines of ontological investigation 
which owe their origin and development to 
the empirical knowledge of things ; and these 
are (/) The Nayas and (2) The Sapta- 

Nay a is the 

bhafiH. The yf/^/ is the analytical dyoc^^s oi analytic and 

the Sapta- 

ontoloeical enquiry and the second is the syn- bhangi\s\\it, 

^ ^ ^ -^ synthetic 

thetical treatment of thing^s in their v^erse- "^^thod o f 

** study. 

tality of aspects for which reason this latter 
is called the Anekdntavdd or the Doctrine 
(teaching) of the Versatality of Aspects. It 
is these two — the Nayavdd and the Ane- 
kdntavdd — which form, as it were, the very 
ground-work on which the whole structure 
of the Jain metaphysics is safely and securely 
built up. 

To deal with Nayavdd first, Nay a is the 
analytical process of ontological investiga- Definition 

and ^function 

tion helping us to dive deep into the net- work ^^ ^he iVaya. 
of inter-related parts of the thing known 
through the ordinary means of knowledge 
and select, as well, one or the other attri- 
bute from the innumerable attributes, the 
aggregate of which makes up the being and 
expression of the said known thing with a 



view of interpreting and understanding 
the selected attribute for a correct and 
complete conception of the ontology of the 
same. Thus a Naya^ it is clear, predicates 
one of the innumerable attributes of a thing 


Whatconsti- without denvinof the rest ; for, wherever it 

tutes t h e j ^ 

fallacy in does SO inolvingf a denial of the rest of the 
attributes, it is no longer a naya proper 
but a naydbkAsa {^^\^^^) or fallacy involved 
in the analytical reasoning. 

Now there are two kinds of this analytical 
reasoning. One is the Dravydrthika Naya 
or Noumenal Naya, and the other is the 
Parydydrthika Naya or the Phenomenal 


The Dravydrthika or Noumenal Naya is 
ThcNoume- |.|^^j. pj-ocess of the analytical enquiry which 

nal Naya. ^ / i / 

which has for its subject-matter the subs- 
tratum or the noumenon of a thing. 

But what is Dravya or Noumenon ? 
Dravya is what persists in and through its 
qualities and changes (^^ and \xkm) which 
are but outward appearances of the same. 
We can well take Dravya, therefore, for the 



substantial entity or reality {^\), which is 


thus discernible by the eye of reason to is the Object 

of Reason and 

exist behind its appearances or phenomena. Phenomenon, 

of Sense. 

Hence, while ^phenomena or parydyas enter 
into experience in the form of sensation and 
feeling, the substantial reality (fli^or^sn) has to 
be filled in by rational thought, so to speak, as 
neccessary to explain and understand them. 
Thus Dravya or Noumenon is the object 
of reason in contra-distinction with parydyas 
or phenomena which are but objects of sense. 
Such being the subtle difference and 
distinction between Dravya (Noumenon) 

Ten kinds 

and Parydyas (Phenomena) according to ofNoumenal 

Nay a viz; — 

the Jain philosophy, there are various 
ways of analytically enquiring into the 
metaphysics of a thing which have been 
for convenience' sake classified under ten 
different forms, viz, — 

(i) Anvaya dravydrthika — deals directly 
with referenceto that feature of thething which ... jinvava 
constitutes the universal characteristic indica- thika-^ 
tion of the same. We cannot, for instance, 
know a substance without knowing its 
qualities or modalities at the same time; nor 
qualities or modalities without an underlying 




substance : lor a substance without quality 
or modality is as unthinkable as the quality 
or modality without a substance. 

(ii) Svadravyddi grdhaka — has for its 
(//) Svadra- Subject matter those particularising aspects 

vyd di ^ r a- ^ , . . , , , i • i • 

haka-- of a thuig HI and through which it asserts 

its existing individuality as distinct and 
separate from what it is not. A particular 
thing does not assert itself as such simply 
by the virtue of its substance, the abode 
of its many qualities and modalities ; but it 
asserts its own individuality as such equally 
through its own locality of existence, ih^ period 
its of coming into existence and the 7node of 
its existence. For instance, when we know 
that 'there is the jar,' we do not simply know 
that the jar of clay or of any other particular 
substance whereof it has been manufactured 
is there ; but we know as w^ell xX^e particular 
locality (^^of) where the jar stands, the 
particular period of time (^%\^ when the jar 
is said to have come into existence and the 
particular mode (^*TI^), capacity, colour and 
the like in and through which the jar has been 
asserting its own existence and individuality 
as distinct and separate from all others that 



lie around it. Thus it is evident that a 
finite thing asserts its own individuality 
in and through (i) its own substance (^?c5i) ; 
(ii) its own period of existence in time (^^[^); 
(iii) its own locality of existence in space 
(^^^) ; and (iv) its own mode of existence 
(^>n^). And these are the four particularis- 
ing elements which the sadravyddi grAhaka 
nay a deals with. 

(iii) Parodravyddi grAhaka — is the 
negative method of studying the metaphi- {iii) Para- 

lira V y a di 

cal aspect of a finite thing with the light of grdkaka — 
what is other than itself. Every finite thing, 
because it is finite, must stand in rela- 
tion to what gives limit to it by reason of 
which the distinction, determination and 
finitude of the thing is marked out from its 
surroundings contributing to the individuality 
of the same. To amplify the import, a 
particular thing surely stands in relation to 
other things in its neighbourhood in sharp 
contrast to the four particularising elements 
of which the individuality of the thincr 
in question is marked out. Now when 
the particularising elements of these others 
which surround the thing in question, 



predominate in our minds and give tone and 
colouration to our consciousness, the entity as 
well as the individuality of the latter is lost 
sight of by certain psychological processes, 
making the same sink into subconscious 
regions for the time being. And it is thus 
clear that when we say, 'there the jar 
exists', the jar, we mean to say, exists only 
as such in so far its own particularising 
elements are concerned ; but it enters into 
a nullity, as it were, the moment our minds, 
by a movement of thought, become occupied 
with the four particularising elements 
of those other things which surround the 
jar for which reason they are said to be but 
negations of the jar. 

(iv) Parama bkdva grdhaka — is the onto- 
bkdva%T7- logical enquiry taking into consideration the 
supremely outstanding feature of a thing 
which is singular and unique in its charac- 
teristic indcation. For instance, cons- 
ciousness is the supremely outstanding and 
unique quality of the soul in as much as it 
is not to be found in anything else but soul. 

(v) Kramopddki nirapeksha suddka etc. 
— means the consideration of a thing purely 


in regard to its noumenal aspect in quite dis- (v) Karmo- 

pddki nira- 

rerard of the changes and variations it under- P e k s h a 

suddha etc- 

goes by the virtue of its own karma. From 
this point of view all living beings are, spiri- 
tually speaking, pure souls constitutionally 
free from all taint or blemishes. 

(vi ' Utpdda vyaya gotmatve sattd grdhaka 
suddha etc. — takes into consideration the ^^^ Uipa(i<^ 

vyaya gou- 

persisting element of a thing. A thing '^Ta/a"t 

, '^ri T ^^ s V d d h a 

undergoes a variety ot changes. Ice melts etc— 
down into water ; water evaporates up into 
vapour. Nevertheless, we know that in- 
spite of all these changes, nothing is 
lost. Whatever form it may take, still 
the substance maintains itself through 
and through. Thus all through these 
transformations there is an element which 
persists, and it is this persisting reality 
which forms the subject matter of the 
present form of enquiry. 

(vii) Bheda kalpand nirapeksha — treats 
substance as non-different from its qualities ^^^a l fa^n^d 
and variations in and through which it '^'^^^^ ^^^~ 
manifests itself. 

(viii) Kramopddhi sdpekska asudha — 
means taking the thing into consideration 


under the immediately present external mode 

(viii) Kraino- r . . , r i • 

pddhi sapek- ^^ ^^s appearance as ni the case of taknig a 

shaasiidha--— .. . . r r • ir 

redhot piece iron for hre itself ; or taking a 

man to be insane for the temporary fit 

of insanity he has displayed for the moment. 

(ix) UtpMa vydya sdpekska sat id 

(ix) Utpdaa- orhaka asuddha — implies takinp- a thing- 

vyaya sapek- * r & & 

sha sattd jj^ j^g tripartite aspects of oripination, des- 

g r h d k a- ^ ^ ^ ' 

asuddha— truction and permanence at one and the 
same time ; as in the case of casting a gold 
necklace into the mould of a bracelet, the 
substance remaining the same substance 
all through the time, involving, as it 
does, in it the idea of the origination of the 
bracelet from the destruction of the 
necklace, gold remaining essentially the 
same all through. 

Bheda kalpand sdpekska asuddha — is the 

Bheda kal- consideration of the thing after resolving it 

pand sdpek- 
ska asuddha. tl;ii-ough the processes of mental abstraction 

into substance and quality, though the two 

are really non-different and inseparable 

from each other: for instance, consciousness 

is the essential quality of the soul ; but 

we often draw a line of distinction between 

consciousness and soul in our ordinary 



parlance when we say, ''the soul's conscious- 
ness," or ''conciousness of the soul", though 
soul is non different from consciousness 
or the latter from the former. 


Before we come to the discussion of 
the second class of Naya known as the 
Parydydrthika, it is imperative that we must 
have a clear understanding of what we mean 
by a parydya. 

A parydya is but a mood or state of 

Definition of 

being. Or whatever has origin and end P^ ry dy 2, 
or destruction in time is parydya. The 
ripples in waters or the surging waves 
ruffling the vast expanse of the ocean are 
but typical illustrations of what is really 

meant by parydya. 

Such being the nature of Parydyas, they 
are but phenomena or appearances and -as Classification 

*■ *■ ^ of Paryayas 

such they must be appearances of something 
with which they stand in certain relations. 
Following up the character of these relations, 
the Jain sages have classified parydyas 
primarily into (i) Sahabhdvi and (ii) Kranm- 



Of these two kinds of parydya, the first, 
{^)Sahabhavi Sakabkdvi refers to the quality which is co- 
existent with what it reveals ; as for example, 
consciousness ( ft'^i^r ) is the SahablMi 
parydya which is co-existent with soul, and 
the second, Kramabhdbi stands for the 
(ii) Krama- parydya proper. Kramabkdvi parydyas 


may be described as contingent in the 
sense that their presence depends on 
the variable circumstances so that they 
may differ in the same thing at different 
times just as happiness and misery or 
joy and grief which are not co-existent with 
the mind like consciousness but are moods 
which depend on the environment, the mind 
finds itself placed in by the virtue of its 
own karma. 

It is also interesting to note, by the way, 
how the Jain philosophers have otherwise 
classified /^rj/^y^i" as in the following : — 

(a) Svabhva dmvya vydnjana parydya 
— means substantive variation in the ultimate 

S V abhav a 

dravyavyan- constitution (^TR ^f^?:) which a thing under- 
goes in the course of its adaptation to the 

environment as we find in the cases of 
siddha souls whose nature differ only 



slightly from the ultimate and real nature 
of the soul which is essentially free and full 
of bliss. 

(b) Svabhdva gtma vydnjana paryAya 

— means variations in the natural quality (b) Svabhdva 
of a thing as we hnd m the case oi the janaparydva 
finitude of vision and imperfection of the 
embodied soul whose real and essential 
quality consists in the infinitude of vision and 
perfection which become manifest of them- 
selves in the pure and disembodied state of 
beinor on the attainment of Freedom. 

(c) Bibkdva dravya vydnjana paryAya 

— is an accidental variation in the general (c) Bibhdva 

, dravyavydn- 

constitution of a substance as is observed in janaparpaya 
the soul's transmigrations through various 
kinds of organic beings. 

(d) Bibhdvx guna vydnjana. paryAya — 
means an accidental variation in the form of 

. (d) Bibhdva 

knowledge which is but a quality of soul, gunavydn- 


as in the case of matijndn and the like as 
distinguished from the immediate intuitive 
knowledge possible to the kevalms only. 

The above is but a kind of classification of 
paryAyas as applied to living beings. But the As applied 

to Inorganic 

Jain philosophers hold that the same classi- world. 





fication is also applicable with equal logic to 
the inorganic world of pudgal-rndXitr, 

(a) Indivisible atoms or electrons are ex- 
amples of the first kind of classifications as 
applied in the non-living world. 

(b) Each kind of colour, smell, taste and 
two non-conflicting sensations of touch are 
but instances of the second class of variation 
in the non-living. 

(c) The binary and tertiary com- 
pounds of the /x/^*^/- matter are illustrations 
of the third kind of variation. 

(d) Chemical compounds stand for the 

In fine, it is also to be noted that Unity 
Unity, Varie- (^^<3) and Variety (i^Tcr^) are but modes of 

tv etc are 

but Other dippQ'drdLncc— Pal ydy a. [/nity is complete 

modes or . i rr • • • r^ '^ 

Parydyas. I deittity dino. Variety consists in Differences ox 
feature. Combination (^^t^). Configuration 
(WT'fX Division (f^4Tm), Number (^|FTT). 
Newness and Oldness under the influence of 
time are but other characteristic indications 
of parydya or phenomenon. For it is 
said, — 




From the above classification of Parydyas 
into Sahabhdvi and Kramabhdvi, we are 
constrained to discuss, in brief, qualities and 
attributes as distinguished from substances. 
For without having made our ideas and 
notions about quality and substance pretty 
clear, it would be difficult for us to under- 
stand and appreciate the utility and 
importance of Naya as applied in the 
study of the phenomenology of thought and 

Substance, as we have seen, is what has 
some degree of independent existence of 

. . Substan'ce 

its own, preservmg itself as it does by and quality 


reacting on and resisting other things. This 
power of self-preservation constitutes the 
essence or reality (^BtTT) of the thing and. 
manifests itself in the different effects which it 
produces by re-acting on other things. And 
the powers of re-action which thus mani- 
fest themselves in producing effects in other 
things are known as qualities or properties 
of the thing and are represented in terms of 
the effects they produce. To illustrate, when 
a thing has the powers of occasioning in us 



the sensations of colour, taste, smell, weight, 
we say that it has the qualities of colour, 
smell etc., for which reason qualities are 
understood to be inherent in or to consti- 
tute the nature of the thing in as much as 
they are but different ways in which the 
self-preservative power which is the real 
essence of the thing manifests itself out- 

But qualities of things appear to us 
(i) Generic ^s being of two kinds, so different that 
one may be described as essential and the 
other as non-essential. For, some of the 
qualities which perception reveals appear 
to constitute the very essence of things — 
qualities without which there cannot be any 
conception whatsoever of things as extra- 
mental realities and these are called generic 
(^1T?T*^) qualities which are common to all 
things and beings. 

The Jain sages hold that the generic 
qualities without which a thing becomes 
wholly inconcivable to us are ten in number 
viz ; — 

(i) Entity (^f^csr) — which may be 
described as having the characteristics of 



reality (^Tfl) and permanence (^^) in and 
through the principle of which it manifests 
itself as the ground for the phenomena of both 
the UniversaKT^XTW^ and P articular {^^^. 

(2) Thinghood (^g^) — may be describ- 
ed as the property revealed in and through 
the relations of the universal and particular 
in which objects subsist (^T?TT5?I f^^cfT^cff ^^). 

(3) Substantiality ( ^sg^ ) — means the 
power of self-preservation constituting the 
essence or reality (^c[) which is characteristic 
indication of Dravya. 

(4) Knowability (JT^JTc^) — may be des- 
cribed as the capacity of being known or 
measured by the means of Valid-knowledge. 

(5) Subtlety (^5^^^^) — may be des- 
cribed as the capacity of being in the state of 
irriducible minimum with a maximum inten- 
sity (of vibration) defying thought and speech. 

(6) Extension (lH^JJc^) — may be describ- 
ed as the property of occupying space. 

(7) Sensibility (^cTiTccr) — may be describ- 
ed as the capacity of responding to stimuli. 

(8) Insensibility (^^rT«Tc^) — may be des- 
cribed as the property incapable of giving 
any response to a stimulus. 



(9) Ponderableness ( i^TfccT ) — may be 
described as the quality of existing in some 

form or other. 

(10) Imponderabletiess (''^I^tTc^) — may 
be described as the power of existing without 
having any par iiculsir /orm. 

These are, then, the ten generic qualities 
of things or substances in general. 

But there are certain other qualities 
which do not appear to constitute either 

(ii) Specific 

qualities. the essence of or common to all things. 
Because the things may have them 
or be without them and yet remain 
essentially the same in kind for which 
reason these are understood to be but 
modifications of our consciousness and are 
termed as specific qualities. 

(i) Consciousness (^h), (ii) Vision (^aiT), 

Enumeration (iii) Pleasure (^^), (iv) Vigour (^^), (v) 

o f Specific 1 / ^\ / 'x «-T^ / , •'\ c- 11 / 

Qualities a s Touch (^aj), (vi) 1 aste {^^), (vn) Smell {^^), 

bel onging /^\»\ •• r^^ 

particular (viii) Colour (^^), (ix) Mobility (^kT^^ccT), 
substances. . /^ r^ 'n 

(x) Inertia ( fern ^^fccf ), (xi) Volumeness 
(^^iTT^i^f gc^), (xii) Becomingness (^iTlVf gc^), 
(xiii) Sensibility (^?T5TcSr), (xiv) Insensibility 
(^'^'tccf), (xv) Ponderableness (ij;=6^), 
(xvi) Imponderableness (^^?jTc8l). Of these 



sixteen specific properties, the ist, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 13th, and the i6th belong to the Jiva- 
soul ; the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th 14th and the 15th 
belong the Ptidgal-^-ioms] the 9th, 14th and 
the 1 6th belong to the Dharmdstikdya ; the 
loth, 14th and the i6th belong to Adharnid 
stiksdya\ the nth, 14th and i6th ioih^Akdsh 
and finally the 1 2th, 14th and the i6th to 



Having seen what is implied by 2,pary6>ya, 
it would be easy now to comprehend the 
process of analytical enquiry into parydyas or 
Phenomena which form the subject-matter 
of the Parydyarthika or Phenomenal Naya. 
Of these nayas the first is, — 

{a) Anddi nitya suddha &c — is what 
deals with that kind of poudzalic variations, 

^ * {a) Anddi 

the series of which remaining^ unbroken from nitya suddha 
time without begining puts on, in consequence, 
the appearance of permanence, inspite of the 
ravages of time upon the same. As for 
example, the Himalayas, though time has 
wrought havoc on the same, yet the high 
mountain ranges appear ever the same 
from time immemorial. 



(IS) Sddi nitya suddhaparydrthtka &c. 
s udTh^- — ^^^ f^** ^^^ subject such particular class of 

Parydrthika . . , ...... 

&c.-r- variations as have origination in time but 

undergoes no subsequent transformation : as 
for instance, when the embodied soul enters 
on a liberated state of existence, it attains to 
a state of variation which has, as a matter 
of fact, a begining in time but knows no subse- 
quent change ; because a soul once liberated 
cannot enter into any bondage again. 

(c) Sattd gounatvena utpdda vyaya 
ic) s at ta grdhaka nitya suddha &c. — enquires into that 

gounatve n a 

utpddavyaya kind of variations which flow in rapid succes- 

g r d h a k a 

nitya suddha sions of destruction and origination consisting 
as it does in the ever-changing character of 
the phenomena without looking into its 
permanent feature underlying the same. 

(d) Sattd sdpekska nitya asuddha — 
{d) Satta ^"^^^ ^^"''^y investigates into the origination and 

nitya distruction of variations but takes also into 
asuddha-^ • i • i • • i 

consideration the persisting element under- 
lying them as well. The word parydya — 
variation — usually means variations in qua- 
lity, modality and configuration, a thing under- 
goes without any reference to the substance 
itself which persists all through the changes 



and which on that account is generally left 
out of consideration. But here, as the 
persisting element is taken into considera- 
tion along with the changes in its appear- 
ances, it is called asuddha i.e. improper. 

(e) Kramopddki nirapeksha nitya 

J J, 1 1 • I 11 1 Karmopddhi 

suadka etc. — deals with regard only to the nirapeksha 

nitty a s u d- 

essential and real nature ot the noumenon dhaetc. 
irrespective of the phenomenal variations 
it undergoes. It consists in looking into 
things with reference to its real nature as 
apart from the temporal variations which 
the thing might happen to undergo. 

(f) Kramopddki sdpeksha anitya 

. . . Kafmopddhi 

asuddha &c. — is an enquiry into the tern- sdpeksha 

anitya asud- 

poral and perishable aspect of variations in dhaetc 
so far only as they are subject to causality 

of karma, 

It is now clear how the two nayaSy 
Noumenal and Phenomenal, differ from each 
other. The one enquires into the very 
substance of a thing under consideration 
and the other investigates into the pheno- 
mena in and through which the substance 
makes its appearance to us. 



The Seven 


A Naya, as we have seen, is the stand- 
fh e^^'sund^ point of the knower. A thing can be viewed 
Knower. ^^ from different stand-points. And the Jain 
sages are of opinion that there are as many 
moods of statements, so many are the nayas 
or view-points of the knower and there are 
as many nayas, so many are the number 
of doctrines. The Jain philosophers have 
thought it wise, therefore, to classify these 
view-points into seven kinds of which the 
first is, — 

(i) Naigam — is the stand -point whence 
(i) Naigam. the knower takes the most general view 
of the thing under consideration without 
drawing any hard and fast line of distinction 
between the generic (^T^l-'cr) qualities and 
the specific (ftf^cf) qualities of the thing. To 
amplify the import, when by the word 
mangoe, we understand not only certain 
properties which specifically belong to that 
fruit only, but we understand as well the 
other qualities or properties which the 
mangoe has in common with fruits in general. 
The Ndya and the Vaisheshika schools of 
the east and the Realists of the west survey 
things from this Naigam stand -point. 



(2) Sangraha — is the stand-point from 

which only the generic qualities are taken \^ angra- 
into account. And though these are generally 
accompanied by specific qualities, yet the 
enquiry from this stand-point keeps in view 
the generic qualities only. As for instance, 
when by the term man, we understand 
not the human kind only but the whole 
range animal world. The S&nkkya and the 
Adwaita schools explain things from this 
point of view. 

(3) Vydvahdra — is knowing things by 

the cash value. It is the pragmatical point of ^^'^^ Vydva- 
view from which only the specific qualities of 
a thing are taken into consideration without 
any reference to their generic qualities, 
independent of which the former cannot 
stand. It consists in taking cognizance 
of things only in their such effects as are 
most prominent, acute and hence pretty well- 
known. Thus by Vydvahdra naya we know 
things only as they affect and appear 
to us. The Chdrvdkas of the east and the 
Positivists and the Pragmatists of the west 
speak from this" point of view. They both 
measure things by their Cask Value. 



(4) Riju Sutra — is the position taken 

(vi) R i ju- , I • 1 • 11' •/ y T . 

Sutra. to look Straight HI to the thnig as it ts. It is 

important to note here that Riju-sutra does 
not refer to the past or future of the thing. It 
concerns itself only with the /r^.y^;^/ state of 
things and affairs. As when we know a thing, 
we mean thereby to know it only with reference 
to its present substantive state ( ■g;o5r), name 
(•fT^), and form (or image — ^tcc«T) without 
concerning ourselves as to how came it 
to be as such or what will it be afterwards, 
holding these equiries to be but wild 
goose chase. The Buddhists of the east 
and Subjective Idealists of the west take 
this as their stand-point. 

(5) Sabda — is the terminological stand- 
{y) Sabda. point whence the knower is in a position to 

recognise a thing simply by hearing the 
name of the same, though the etymological 
significance of the name might be in 
reference to something other than the thing 
referred to by the terminology used. 
For instance, Jiva, Atma, Soul, and Prani 
are synonymous terms and though 
these differ from one another in their 
etymological bearings, yet they all refer 



to the one and the same thing conven- 
tionally. Certain Conventionalists of the 
grammarian school in the east and the 
Empiricist of the west hold their own 
from this stand-point. 

(6) Sanbiruddha — is the position from 
which one is able to draw a hard and ruddha. 
fast line of distinction between the words 

of synonymous character and to follow 
up the line of enquiry in strict con- 
formity with the niecity of distinction thus 
drawn. The Sabda-vddi philosophers of 
the east who propound the doctrine of 
eternal relation ( fif<?l WSi"^ ) between words 
and their objects and the Objective Idealists 
of the west study from this stand-point. 

(7) Evambhuta — is the view-point of 

the knower from which one is able to bhuta. ^^^ 

designate a thing in strict conformity 

with the nature and quality as displayed 

by the thing to be designated ; as in 

the case of calling a man by the 

name of 'Victor for having qualified himself 

as such by conquering his enemies. 

The grammarians in general hold this 

point of view. 



These are the seven famous Nayas or 

metaphysical view-points of looking into the 

nature of things. Of these, the first three, 

Naigam, Samgraha and Vydvahdra have 

for their subject-matter dravya or substance, 

and the remaining four beginning with 

Riju-sutra have for their subject-matter 

Parydi,yas-Y\\^viOvatr\2L, It is important to note 

here that like quality (gm), mood (^HT^) also 

comes within the perview of Parydya with 

this difference only that while quality inheres 

in substance, mood (^41T^) inheres in both, 

— substance and quality. 

With Nayavdd ends the second part 
the Jain Logic, the Logic of Consistency 

being the first part. 



Defects of tlic ReaUsttc Metkod of Inquiry --Sat>ta- 
Lkangt supersedes tke Realistic, - It is a tetter Organon 
of Knowledge — It leads to tke ktgker Knowledge — 
Anekantavad and Idealism —True GUmt>se of Concrete 
Reality — Unity and Multit>Ucxty — Cor relativity as 
Essential to Unity — Dialectical Vision of tkmgs as 
Ex|>ression of a Unity. 

Preliminary. — A little reflection on 
what has been discussed in the foregoing the realistic 

r Ar -11 1 • Method. Its 

sections ot Nay a will make it pretty inadequacy 

for true 

clear that our ordinary: thinking con- insight, 
sists, for the most part, of generalised 
images or conceptions derived from the 
phenomenal world and so charged more or 
less with the inherent characteristics of 
their sensuous origin. Now if we carefully 
analyse this form of thought, it will be 
seen that it labours under three serious 
defects. First, we cannot get rid of the 
material or sensuous origin which conse- 
quently tend to betray the mind into illusion 

and error ; secondly, it must fail to give the 
real or organic connection, to be explained 
hereafter, and unity to objects which it deals 



with ; thirdly, it is incapable of solving 
contradiction, or reconciling the seemingly 
antagonistic elements which, on close ex- 
amination, all thought is found to contain. 
Now when these draw-backs of the ordi- 
How It IS j-|2irv or naive realistic method of reviewing^ the 

super s 1 d e d -^ & 

m^e th^o^d wot*ld are perceived and realised, men must 
bhangi. ^ ' supplement it with a newer mode of cognition 
in order to look upon the world in a more 
rationalised and synthesised way and appre- 
hend the spiritual enities in their ideal form 
and which in turn gives rise to the famous 
Anekdnta forms of cognition. This is the 
case everywhere and always ; for philosophic 
speculation develops most when men, not 
content with the facts of experience, strive to 
get hold of their reasons and ultimately into 
their unconditioned reason i.e. their rationality 
or necessity. Thus we find that the ordinary 
way of looking at the Universe and its 
objects, or to term it better, as the naive 
realistic method, falls far short of the 
standard and is quite inadequate for the 
apprehension of that kind of Unity which 
belongs to spiritual things. For the method 
which regards everything as self-identical, 



self-subsisting individual realities, cannot by 
the very nature of it, take cognizance of that 
kind of Unity, which exists not in things 
juxtaposed or following in succession, but 
in elements which internally involve and 
contain one another, so that no element can 


be known fullv in abstraction or isolation is a better 

' organon of 

from the rest. The apprehension of such a knowledge. 
truth then presupposes a deeper and sounder 
organ of knowledge, a subtler speculation, 
a deeper insight, a true penetration into the 
very heart of things. This being attained every- 
thing seems to be, though apparently diver- 
gent and often conflicting, yet bound with one 
tie, — an expression of one underlying prin- 
ciple contributing to the substantiveness of all 
thought and being. And this is exactly what 
Saptabhangi rules try to explain. 

Hence it is obvious that the know- 
ledge which 5'a/i^«^A««^/ leads to, must be xftll^'To 
the highest ideal of knowledge— a know- o^^k'no'!^ 
ledge from which the above mentioned ^ ^^' 
defects have vanished altogether and in 
which the ideal element is grasped in its 
purity and entirety, in its coherence and 
harmony. It is the only adequate form 



of knowledge so far as we are concerned ; 
because it has the characteristics of necessity 
i.e. the constituent elements of it are 
apprehended, not as isolated or independant 
terms or notions but as related to or 
flowing out of each other so that one being- 
given, the others must necessarily follow 
and the whole body of knowledge cons- 
titutes one 07'ganised system. 

A penetrating insight into things will 

Ordinary make US sure of this existing unity among 

ing Ajivas. the factors of the world. To the unreflec- 

tive observer, the objects present themselves 

as separate individual realities quite simple 

in character. But this is not the case, for 

they are essentially complex. They are made 

up of parts which lie outside of one another 

in space; they do not remain absolutely the 

same through successive movements of time. 

They are continually betraying the pheno- 

Ordinary n^^nal changes when brought into relation 

— How'^^can with Other existences around them. How, 

seem to be then, can we think of them as individual 

a unity? . . • • r i i :» 't-i 

thmgs nispite oi the changes .'' 1 he answer 
often unhesitatingly forwarded by philoso- 
phers is that we can combine diversity with 


unity in our conception of things by thinking 

, • 1' • 1 1 • • 1 1 1 Criticism of 

them as nidividual entities each endowed j^e Solutions 

.1 Til 1- • -T-i 1 offered by 

With manifold quahties. 1 hey are substances the Jaina 


according to philosophers, which possess 
various properties such as extension, soli- 
dity, weight, colour etc. Or they are subs- 
tances or subjects to whom belong the capa- 
cities of sensation, feeling, and perception 
etc. But a careful observation will show that 
such a device obviously fails to give us any 
real apprehension of existence — even though 
it may be the simplest individual existence ; 
because in trying to give unity to a number idealistic 


of unconnected determinations by ascribing supersidethe 


them to a common substance what we really 
do is to add to these determinations another 
determination, equally isolated and uncon- 
nected with the rest. Take away the other 
determinations what will be left of your 
substance ? It is impossible to explain the 
known by the unknown. So to apprehend 
the real unity of different qualities or to put 
in other words, to think them as one, what 
mind demands is, that we should think or 
have a rational notion of the relation of each 
to each and that we should discern how the 


existence of anyone involves the existence 
of all the rest and how all are so connected 
that this particular quality would not exist 
except in and through the whole to which it 
belongs. To catch hold of such substance and 
not substratum as Locke had meant, we must 
discern the principle from which this manifold- 
ness of parts and properties necessarily arises \ 
and which has its very existence and being 
in them and linking together in thought the 
differences which spring out of it. Such 
unity of substance is really a unity in differ- 
ence which manifests itself and realises in 
these differences. 

In the realm of mind or in the spiritual 
mental world '^^^ ^^ conscious beings also, there are undoubt- 
. jti^a. ^^j^ infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we 

must not overlook the fact that it is a multi- 
plicity or diversity which is no longer of parts 
divided from each other but each of which 
exists and can be conceived of by itself in 
isolation or segregation from the rest or in 
purely external relations to them. Here on 
the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is 
that of parts or elements, each of which exists 
in and through the rest and has its individual 



being and significance only in its relation 
to the rest or each of which can be known 

. True glimpse 

only when it is seen, in a sense, to be the rest. ° ^ ^^^ ^,9"" 

^ Crete Reality. 

You can not, for example, take the combina- ^^^ mature. 
tion of two externally independent things .in 
space and employ it as a representation of 
the relation of mind and its objects, for 
though thought be distinguishable from the 
object, it is not divisible from it. The thinker 
and the object thought of are nothing apart 
from each other. They are twain and yet 
one. The object is only object for the sub- 
ject, the subject for the object. They have no 
meaning or existence taken individually and 
in their union they are not two separate things 
stuck together but two that have lost or 
dissolved their duality in a higher unity. • 

Now it is this characteristic of things 
which renders impossible the correct annre- Reasons why 

• ^ ^^ the Realistic 

hension of them by ordinary mode of coe- "^^*^^^ "^"^^ 

^ ^ & necessa r 1 1 y 

nition ; because they are only to be grasped ^* * 
in a thought which embraces and solves 
contradictory elements. The ordinary or 
realistic way of looking at things can express 
and take cognizance of the nature of those 
things which are subject to the conditions 



of time and space and regards the world as 
made up of individual existences, each of 
which has a nature of its own, self-identical 
or self-complete. 

But when we rise to a higher spiritual 
Spiritual vision of thine^s, when it becomes necessary 

visionof ^' •' 

p^ession^of^a ^^ apprehend objects which are no longer 
""'^^'' self-identical units, but each of which is, 

so to speak, at once itself and other than 
itself, when we cannot affirm without at the 
same time denying or deny without affirming ; 
thus when the seeming contradictions inter 
penetrate and give reality and life to each 
other, the resources of ordinary thought fall 
short of the requirement and we are to take 
recourse to the other mode of cognition which 
is more synthetical and harmonizing. For 
if the sphere of reality be that in which 
nothing exists as a self-identical entity, how 
Inadequacy is it {^ossible that formal logic or realistic 

of Fo r m a 1 

Logic. method whose fundamental principle is the 

law of identity should be other than baffled 
in the endeavour to grasp them ? 

The only device of the rationalising 
intellect which comes uppermost in the mind 
at first sight, for attaining unity is that of 


abstraction or properly called substantialising 

- , . , . , J u r • Unity cannot 

the abstraction which proceeds by elimina- ^^ found by 

, - . , . . f- abstract i o n 

tion rather than by the harmonizing ot as attempted 

b y Realists 

differences. In philosophy, for instance, it and so gives 

rise to c o n- 

aets hold of one of the indivisible elements fusion, 
and rejects the other equally necessary and 
important element and thus gives rise to all 
sorts of confusion and controversy hitherto 
known. Either it tries to evolve dogmati- 
cally all things out of the objective element 
and so produces a system of materialism or 
sensationalism (which is its own condem- 
nation) or insisting with one-sidedness, the 
subjective element, and thus gives rise to 
pseudo idealism — a view which hardly can 
be cherished without giving up the most 
certain convictions of the mind. 

The next question which comes upper 
most in the mind is ; how thought can can thought 

♦ . . reach to such 

be capable of grasping the reality in its true a higher 


essence in such wise that all its constituent 
elements shall be seen not as isolated no- 
tions but as correlated members of an organic 
whole. In reply to the above, we may safely 
say that it can rise to a universality which is 
not foreign to, but the very inward nature of 



things in themselves and not the universal 

by^^a"moie ^^ ^^^^ abstraction from the [)articular and 

vision.^' ^ ^ different elements but the unity which finds 

in them its own necessary expression ; not an 

invention of an arbitrary mind unifying things 

which are essentially different but an idea 

which expresses the inner dialectic which 

exists in and constitutes the being of the 

^ objects themselves. This deeper unity, we 

True univer- •' ^ •' 

iTis^^~^^'^^ may designate as ideal or true unity or 
organic Universality. This Universality or 
Unity is presupposed by the divergent ele- 
ments through which it manifests itself as the 
different limbs and function of an organism 
are mere expressions of a living unity of the 
organism which we may call ''life" — Jiva 
(^^). They are its manifestations. Unity of 
life manifests itself in them and fulfils itself 
in their diversity and harmony ; consequently 
any limb of the organism loses its signi- 
ficance for which it stands when it is severed 
from the organism — the expression of the 

living unity of life. 

So in order to apprehend this unity 

Notionof - . ,. , . . , _ 

c:o:rrelaiivity and universality through your thought of 

essential ' t o 

theapprehen- what it IS you must inseparably connect 

sion of unity. 



that also with what is not. They are 

mere correlations. The thesis does not 

exist in and by itself but on the contrary 

in and throup'h what is other than itself. 

^ Dialectical 

In other words it can exist only as it denies Jjovemem of 

'' Realities. 

or gives up any separate self-identical being 
and life, only as it finds its life in the larger 
life and being of the whole. Its true being 
is in ceasing to be and its true notion 
includes affirmation of its existence as well 
as denial of its existence. But this is not all. 
It involves the idea of growth or develop- 
ment ; because denial is the life of reality. 
A thing stagnant altogether, not subject 
to changes, is no better than non-entity. 
Mere being in the sense of bare ex- 
istence whose modifications are stagnant 
and not subject to phenomenal changes 
is a mere zero, ''Pure Being" as Dr. 
Ward puts it ''is equal to Nothing." 
Being to be real in any sense of the 
term must be becoming or changing. Its 
ideal nature, therefore, must be synthetical 
comprehending and explaining all contra- 
dictory tendencies— the sharp antithesis 
merging in the wide universality of the 



synthesis. But this notion of universality 
in particulars cannot be apprhended in this 
light unless we interprete it as a process 
involving perpetual affirmation and per- 
petual negation reconciled in continual 

This would appear quite obvious if we 
The same 
dial ectical view the problem from another light 

movement as 

revealed b y which will clearly reveal the unity of the 

the relation 

of reciprocity univese which permeates through every object 

or mutual ^ ^ '-' 

fion^^"^^"^ in it. The world is a complicate system 
including innumerable factors of manifold 
character working in it for a certain goal. 
Whether this goal would be attained at 
all at any point of time in future is not 
our present consideration and should not, 
therefore, occupy our thought. So much is 
certain that the world is a system of factors 
co-operating for the same end. Now every 
factor, therefore, must be determined by all 
the rest in such a way that without any of 
them, the world-end can hardly be realised. 
Having this in view all philosophers of every 
clime and age have pronounced unanimously 
that every thing which is real is rational i, e. 
having reason behind it and this is what we 


have spoken of before. Things being so 
reciprocally determined what follows obvi- 
ously is that every factor is real so long it 
stands in relation and co-operates with other supefsid^es 

r ^ r c formal logic 

factors. In fact, we may go so tar as to say asthelatteris 

... '11 1 in -adequate 

that m the co-operation and the mutual to explain 

unity in 

determination, the life of the factor consists, difference. 
In fact, it owes it reality, individuality and 
being to this relation with other factors 
standing and working for the common end. 
Or as Lotze rightly remarks '*To be is to 
stand in relations." Any change in the 
relation of any factor of the world, 
would then, it is quite apparent, involve a 
change in all the rest ; because of their 
mutual determination and correlativity. So 
nothing can be truly apprehended unless 
we take it in the light of not only what it is 
but also what // is not ; because this not-ness 
of the factors imparts individuality and 
reality to what it is. True being, it appears 
less paradoxical to assert, consists in self 
abnegation or denial of one's individuality, 
for where lies its individuality, its self- 
sufficiency, if it depends for its existence 
upon other realities co-operating for the 



same end and to which it owes its existence 
and life ? So true aprehension can only 
be possible if we take it in the light of 
not what it is only ; but also what it is not 
as well. But this may appear parodoxical 
to an untrained mind because it obviously 
transgresses the law of contradiction. The 
most firm convictions which we have cherished 
from our cradles without the least hesitation, 
are backed up and supported also by the 
vigorous rules and canons of formal logic 
whose fundamental principle, as we have 
seen before, is the law of identity and con- 
tradiction that A is A cannot be not-A. 
In the New But now we come to a new vision of things 
things,— y^ is i^i which A appears to be not merely A but 

n o t merely n u ^ • i • r • 

A,but Nof-A not- A as well ; because A is real in so tar it 

as well. . . , , . ^ -t^i 

stands in relation with what is not-A. 1 he 

true life of A would then consist not only 

in A as formal logic teaches us but also in 

not-A. The ideal nature of a thing consists, 

therefore, not only in assertion of its being 

but also at the same time in the denial of it — 

in that which comprehends those antagonistic 

elements and yet harmonises and explains 

them. So if there be any knowledge in the 



proper sense of the term, if there be any 
vison we may call spiritual and far from 
being naive realistic, it is undoubtedly this 
notion of ours in which all antagonistic and 
contradictory elements are reconciled and 
find repose in a higher universality which 
includes them all and yet is not aggregate 
of them, which explains all and yet does not 
merge in them. This is what the Syddvdd or 
the Doctrine of the Assertion of Possibilities 
explains and emphasises. 

With these preliminary remarks we 
come straight to our subject-matter or 

Saptabhang i 

to be more definite to the Saptabhangi or Forms, 
the Heptagonic forms of our ontological 
enquiry. We have mentioned before that 
Saptabhangi is the method which supersedes 
all other methods of cognition in matters 
of apprehension of the spiritual realities 
by virtue of its universal and synthetic 
character of vision. Now we shall try to 
explain how by the help of this heptagonic 
vision, Saptabhangi Naya we get, as it 
were, into the real coherence and harmony 
which permeate through the world 


revealing themselves through a system of 
interrelated parts. 


TO^W^ : as for example — ^Tcf ^^^1 ^3 : i^e. 
May be, partly or in a certain sense the jar 

Although this form is applicable to every 
The First thing or being in affirming its existence still 

Form — Some 

/^^wthething the ^/2^/<ar, the jar, is only here taken into 


consideration as a concrete instance for the 
illustration of this heptagonic principle. This 
is no more than affirming the existence of 
the jar as such and none can ordinarily deny" 
the existence of it when clearly perceived. 
So this affirmation relative to the existence 
of the jar as such presupposes an anterior 
perception of the object. It may be con- 
tended, indeed, that we often rely upon the 
words of others and do not perceive things 
directly. But if we dive deep into the 
question, we find that everything, the exis- 
tence of which we either affirm or deny, is in 
relation to some particular thought or percep- 
tion havino- a finitude of expression — a fact 
so emphasised by the ontological argument.] 


How the 


Thus we find that we can affirm the 
existence of the jar only when we have 
previously perceived it and the formation thing is said 

^ -I *■ to exist. 

of the percept presupposes, as a careful 
psychological analysis reveals, comprehension 
of the thing in respect of the four particular- 
ising elements viz, — substance dravya 
( 5oq ), duration kOila ( ^i^ ), locality 
ksketra (^?l) and attributes hhdva (HT«r). 
There is no percept which does not involve, 
as we have elsewhere seen before, these ' 

elements, and unless a percept is formed we 
cannot be conscious of the thing at all. So 
the understanding of every object involves, 
comprehension of the object in these four 
aspects. We may go so far as to say that 
these four elements or aspects so interrelated 
as in this case of the jar go together 
to make up the identity of the jar as 
such. Take away or change one of these 
elements and the jar loses its identity. From 
these facts we may safely state that the 
identity of the jar is kept up and reveals 
itself through these four elements which 
stand mutually into peculiar relationship to 
one another. 

'^9 . 


So long these four elements exist in this 
particular combination, the jar is said to 
exist there as such. 

We may arrive at the same conclusion in 
another way. We know that there is a 
to"°ardve^^^t distinction between the noumenal and 
phenomenal aspects of a thing. Phenomenal 
aspect is that in which a thing presents itself 
to us or as it appears to us. Clearly then it 
follows that we are conscious of an object 
only as it appears to us. But a deeper 
reflection reveal to us that what we know 
of the thing is only knowledge of its powers 
and properties. What is an orange to us 
except a peculiar combination of different 
qualities viz. size, shape, colour, taste etc. 
These pecular qualities in such particular 
combination as is found in an orange 
constitute what we call the knowledge of it. 
Of course it may be objected that these 
qualities cannot exist by themselves and so 
require a ground for their inference ; so that 
these qualities themselves cannot make up 
the orange itself. But we are far from 
denying this as we hold the view that all 
that we know of the thing is merely its 



qualities or attributes which exist in such 
peculiar combination. What the thing or 
substance is apart from these modes or 
modifications, we don't know except this that 
it is a principle which manifests itself in and 
through these attributes linking them 
together and constituting what we call the 
knowledge of the object Therefore we may 
well say that so long these qualities are 
intact and exist in such peculiar and particular 
combination the object is there. 

FORM 11. 

f^f?^^ HT* — as ^Tcf Tt^T^ ^7 : i.e. May be, 
partly or in a certain sense the jar does 
not exist. 

In the previous form we have taken the 
jar as a self-subsisting, self-complete reality The Second 


as if subsisting in and by itself and possessing ^^7«/,the thing 

does not 

different attributes which go together in exist. 
making up the knowledge of the object. We 
thought of the jar as an individual indepen- 
dent object as it were amidst innumerable 
objects of the same kind in the neighbour- 
hood. In short, we took it in the light of 
a self-identical unit. But this is only a 




partial and dogmatic view of the reality as 
it overlooks one important truth viz., the 
world is a system of interrelated parts in which 
nothing is so self-identical, self-complete 
as we suppose the jar to be. Every thing 
which is, exists only in relation to and dis- 
tinction from something else. The jar exists 
^lst7inreia^ there, not alone as a self-complete reality but 
d?s 1^110^011 exists in relation to and distinction from what 
thing else, \s not -Jar, In fact, the existence of the jar 
as a self-complete unity is possible only be- 
cause it differentiates from what is not-jar. 
If, on the other hand, it looses its distinction 
and merges in the rest that is not-jar, then 
how can it present its own self-subsisting 
and identical character. We may, therefore, 
well state that because it keeps itself in 
distinction from what is not-jar, and yet 
bears at the same time essential relation to 
it as the principle of mutual reciprocity pos- 
tulates that it can lead a life of self-complete- 
ness, self-identity. But this self-complete- 
ness cannot obviously be absolute in charac- 
ter simply for the reason that it has to depend 
for its existence upon other things from which 
it rigidly distinguishes itself and yet stands 



as well in essential and vital relationship. 
To be more clear and precise, we may say 
that the true life of a being consists in self- 
abnegation or in ceasing to be. So if in 
a sense we emphasise the fact that the jar 
is a self-complete reality amidst various 
factors of the world possessing numerous 
attributes to act and react with, we can also 
with equal logic and emphasis state that 
it does not exist in the above sense ; 
because for its existence, it has to depend 
upon what is not-jar to which it must 
oppose itself to preserve its so-called 
self-subsisting aspect. Thus to sum up, we 
may say, the jar is a jar only in contradis- 
tinction with what is not-jar, expressing a 
vital relationship between the positive and 
negative character of it co-existing simul- 
taneously in the same stroke of congnition 
of the thing in question and making 
way thereby for the third form which is 
as follows. 


f€m^^5| ^?Jt l^\ as ^T(^ ^% A\Wm ^:— how thething 

"^ exist s and 

May be, partly or in a certain sense asweir^^'^* 



the jar exist as well as in a sense it does 
not exist. 

We may explain this from two different 

stand points. We will arrive at the same 

Another way conclusion if we proceed from the world 

o f a r riving i • • i • i • i 

at the same showing It to be a system m which every- 
thing is determined by everything else in 
such a way that nothing is self-identical 
and self-complete in the sense in which the 
untrained mind takes it to be. Everything 
being determined by other things in this 
system of reals, the doctrine of pluralism 
propagating the view of self-sufficiency of ob- 
jects falls to the ground as we have discussed 
at length in the preliminary remarks as well 
as in the Form II. 

Besides, we may explain the above 
otherwise which will, we believe, throw 
sufficient light on the close relationship 
which exists between the self and the 
not-self or between mind and matter. We 
must of course bear in mind on this occasion 
that though these forms apparently deal 
with concrete instances such as the jar, still 
they are no less applicable to every thing 
and being which this universe contains. So 



it would be convenient for us if, instead of 
dealing with concrete instances, we proceed 
and manipulate the subject in its generic 
aspect. In fact we will try to show that 
instead of 'saying the jar is and is not,^ we may 
say more generally that in a sense matter 
exists and does not exist at the same time. 
Of course it is necessary first of all to 
clear up our position and to defend our cause 
and vindicate our themes by defining the 
relationship as graphically as possible which 
exists between self and not-self or between 
mind and matter. 

But before stating the exact relation 
between them let us try to depict as clearly 
as possible the view cherished by the 
common people regarding it. 

To the untrained intellect, things are 
before us, — rather matter and material The view of 

the common 

objects exist apart in themselves just as we people, 
perceive them — as a world of realities 
independent of any mind to perceive them ; 
on the other hand we, who perceive the world 
are here in our complete and independent 
existence. In short, matter is matter and 
mind is mind and there exists neither any 



similarity nor anything commensurate 
between them. 

Many attempts have been made to define 
the exact relationship. Some have uncriti- 

Ofthe other 

Schools of cally asserted the hard and fast opposition 
between them giving rise to absolute 
dualism like the Sdmkkya materialist ; others 
have again tried to solve the problem 
at a stroke as it were by explaining away 
one or the other term giving rise to mate- 
rialism of the Ch^rvaka School or Subjective 
idealism of the Buddhist School. As materi- 
alism ultimately fails to evolve this world and 
all thought out of matter or material 
forces, so subjective idealism fails in showing 
that the whole objective world is but a 
phantasm of the heated brain. We won't 
speak of the rigid dualistic theory as it 
obviously fails to explain knowledge owing 
to its own inherent inconsistency of thought 
as revealed in its presupposition that the 
constituent elements of knowledge stand in 
hard opposition and cannot be reconciled. 
Now if we try to account for this failure in 
solving the problem of mind and matter, we 
will find no doubt that its main cause lies in 



the false presupposition that nature and 

mind, the world without and the world 

within, constitute two fixed independent 

realities, each by itself complete in its own 

self-included being. 

The real solution however of the 

problem in question lies not in the asser- In what lies 

the real solu- 
tion of self-individuality and self-sufficiency ^^°" '^• 

of objects constituting the external world, 
but in the surrender of this false iden- 
tity and substantiality for that principle 
of organic unity which we have discussed 
at length and explained before in the 
preliminary remarks. Beginning with the 
rigid isolated existences separated by the 
impassable gulf of self-identity, no theory or 
doctrine can ever force them into a rational co- 
herence or consistency. But when we begin 
to see in nature without and mind within not 
two independent things, one existing in isola- 
tion from the other, but two members of one 
organic whole having indeed each a being 
of its own, but a being which implies and 
finds itself in the living relation to the other, 
then and then only can we bring such two 
factors into a rational coherence. Nature in 



its very essence is related to the mind and 
Correlativity "^^"^^^ i^^ its very essence is related to matter. 

ofMatterand rr^ i ^ • ^^ t •*. • 

ui\r,d.—Bho- ^or w^at is matter, if it is not matter in 
^Bhoktd, relation to thought, and what is mind if it 

cannot enter into relation with matter ? We 
cannot obviously think of any matter which 
by its very nature cannot enter into relation 
with thought ; because it involves a 
contradiction of thought. Again we cannot 
think of mind which ,is not capable of 
thinking about something, because in it, its 
essence lies. So from this standpoint 
whatever is, is not as a self-complete reality 
existing in and by itself, but as being deter- 
mined by something else. So the true view 


of things. of anything would be not only its being but 
also of its non-being to which it owes its 
reality and individuality. In short it is by 
virtue of this self-abnegation that any 
being can be real or can exist as such. 
So the true point or view of the right 
vision or understanding of any object 
would include not only a view of things 
in their positive aspect or in their aspect 
of thesis but also a view of what they are 
not or the aspect of antithesis, which again 



ultimately lose their hard opposition in the 
view of things which are necessarily related 
and so containing and involving one another, 
— in short, in the view of the world as a 
system of reals mutually determining and 
co-operating for the same end. 


fifl^^g ^^^iftn^'Tm ^g^ H^ : as 

^l?^iao5| ^^ "^Z : — May be, partly or in a 
certain sense, the jar is indescribable. 

There is no doubt that in a certain sense 
it is impossible to describe the jar. The r^^ ^ , 
indescribable nature of the thing is here piainr""i^m- 
referred to. Of course, we do not ouraffiVirnng 

, , , . -Ill and denying 

mean here that any object is absolutely at one and 

the same 

indescribable, but that we cannot describe moment, 
what it is and what it is not at one 
and the same moment. The necessity for 
this way of speaking is that the two natures 
— positive and negative — what it is and 
what it is not,~exist in the same thing at 
one and the same time. We have seen 
before that in a certain sense or to be more 
definite, while putting stress upon the 
positive aspect of an object as in the Form 



I., we may say that it is : while again 
emphasising with equal onesidedness, on the 
negative aspect of the same as in Form II., 
we may well say as well that it is not. But a 
critical examination will reveal to us that 
both the positive and negative aspects 
exist in the same object simultaneously, 
although we cannot describe them in one 

Here we think it is worthy of note that 
Thought only our incapacity for describing at one 

transcending t i i • i 

quality of and the same moment both the seemmgly 

aspects con- 
ceives t h e antagonistic natures existing simultaneously 
c o-existence 

contradic- is only referred to. We need not imagine, 

t o r y attri- 
butes in the however, that our thoup^ht cannot apprehend 
same thing. ° ^ ^ 

them at one moment. On the other hand, 
it is thought only that by virtue of self- 
consciousness can transcend this duality of 
aspects existing in the same thing. Even, 
we may go so far as to say that the positive 
aspect, namely, what it is, can scarcely be 
known without the knowledge of the negative 
aspect namely, what it is not and vice versa. 
Either is known simultaneously in and through 
the other. We cannot question about the 
relative priority of the process of assimilation 



or discrimination ; because none of them ^ 
is possible without the other. Thus, although 
it is quite obvious that we can take 
cognizance of both these aspects — positive 
as well as negative — in the same stroke of 
cognition, yet we canuot describe this fact of 
experience at one moment. With this view 
in mind, it is held that the true nature of a 
thing is indescribable. 


^W^ Hy: as ^T^^I^r ^l^^^S^ '^Z\—May be, deration°"he 
... . , . 1 . existenceand 

partly or m a certain sense the jar indescrib- 

,, . . . . able nature 

exists as well as ni a certam sense it is both at once. 

The fifth way is to say what the thing 
is, the thing being indescribable in one 
moment. Although here we assert the 
inexpressibility at one and the same moment 
of what the thing is and what it is not, yet 
what it is i. e. its existence is taken into 
consideration. We have seen in the Form I., 
that in a certain sense, a thing may be 
said to exist. Of course we should bear in 
mind that we do not take it in the absolute 


sense; because we deny the self-identical and 
self-complete nature of anything. In asserting 
existence of anything what we mean, 
on the other hand, is that it exists only so 
long it has a particular substance ("^oSl), a 
particular locality (W ?f), a particular period 

The relative 

exist ence (^1^), and a particular attribute (hT^) in 

and indescri- 

abieness of their particular combination. So lonpf these 

the thing. ^ ^ 

four elements are present in their particular 
combination, any object to which these 
elements belong may be safely said to 
exist. In short, the perception of these four 
elements in any object is quite sufficient to 
convince us of its relative existence — an 
existence illusively thought of as absolute or 
self-complete by the realists or the common- 
sense philosophers. This we have discussed 
at length in the Form I. So, although in the 
Form V, we have emphasised on the indes- 
cribable nature* of any thing, Judging it from 
the standpoint from which all the seemingly 
antagonistic elements namely, positive and 
negative aspects of a thing (c,f. Form III.), 
resolve themselves into a higher concrete 
reality without losing their respective dis- 
tinctions, yet from the practical point of view 



we may over-estimate the positive aspect only 
and assert its existence, the idea of which is 
already forced upon us, so to speak, by the 
undeniable presence of substance, period 
etc, (^oBl^l^Tf^) inferentially or immediately 
cognised by the senses. Thus, although we 
have repeatedly described a thing to 
involve both the positive and the negative 
aspects or to put in other words, involve 
being and non-being as well, yet it would not 
be a contradiction of thought or language, 
if we contend being as essential, and say it 
exists, because we look at it now from a 
standpoint which is relatively much lower 
than the former and from which we lose 
sight altogether of another important corre- 
lative aspect namely, what it is not, 


^l^l^l^ ^l^^^sq^^fff fj^^^irmil^iT 5IT The Sixth 

^■vrf-./-cev f. Form — e x- 

^\^^^'^ T^«JT51q^^1^ ^^5TTT^H5i7!m q^ ViJ'\ as plains t h e 

-V negative 

^l^l^T^ ^l^l^^o^l I May be, partly or m character of 

the thing as 

certain sense the jar is not and indescribable well as the 


in a certain sense as well. able nature 

of the same. 

We have described what the thing is 
not, being unable to describe at one and 
the same moment what it is and what it 


IS not. As in the previous form, we have 
described what it is : so in this form we 
describe what it is not without loosing 
sight of the indescribable nature of the 
thing owing to our incapacity to give | 
expression to both the positive and the 
negative aspects of it at the same moment. 
In what sense it does not exist, we need 
not discuss here, because we have done so 
at length in the Form II., which emphasises 
on the negative aspect of the thing. We 
have seen before that we can't say *a thing 
exists' as a self-identical unit ; because it has 
to depend upon other factors to maintain 
its existence and to which it bears relations 
which are essential for the preservation of 
its own reality. So in this sense we 
may equally deny any self-existing character ; 
of anything without committing our- ' 
selves to any inconsistency in thought or i 


The Seventh ^T^^T^ ^Tr^l^T^^l^^sg^^frf 5R?T1?[ ^^mW 

synthesis of ^ .^ -v -s 

the V and ^^TT ftw^^IT "^ "^V^VX H^: as ^l^^ISf J^l^T^ 

VI Forms. -n * i i • \ 

^^?ff«J| • May be partly or ni a certain sensed 



the jar is and is not and is indescribable as 
well in a certain seme. 

In the seventh form, one speaks of what 
the thing is and is not and that it is 
impossible to express both at the same 
moment. In the Form III, we have seen 
how the true, nature of a thing implies 
being as well as non-being or positive 
as well as 'negative aspects. The only- 
point in which it differs from the third 
form is this that while agreeing with the 
former in every respect, it goes further 
and says that we cannot describe because 
it involves contradictory elements. This 
latter point we have discussed at length in 
the Form II. In this form we get a 
reconciliation of the fifth and the sixth forms 
already discussed. 



Vyasa, and SKanlcar agatnst tkc Doctrtnc of 
Syaavad, — Im|>ossil>tlxty of tkc co-existence of tke 
contradictory attributes in one — Skanlcara's summary 
of tke Syadvad anJ its inter|>retation — Its critical 
examination by okankar — Inconsistencies and fallacies 
m Syadvad, 

The above, in short, is the principle and 
The unique character oi ihtSaptabkangi Naya, the grand 
\^ht^^apta- heptangular stronghold of the Jain philo- 

bhanpim , t • r i i i i 

the arena of sophers. It IS from these angles that the 

philosophical t . i ., , . , ,. . r w 

speculation. J^^^^ philosophers see into the realities of all 
thought and being. It is from within this 
heptagonic fortress that they throw off their 
gauntlets as a challenge to their antagonists 
to outwit them. Being guarded by the 
seven trenches of this their logical synthesis, 
they measure the strength of their 
adversaries and test the truth and validity 
of their knowledge and doctrines. Such 
being the high and prominent position 
ascribed to the Saptabhangi in the 
arena of philosophical speculation in quest 
of truth, many a scholar and philosopher, 
ancient or modern, have invariably been 




found to cannonade on this heptagonic 
fortification which has been from time imme- Jar'g^et o\ 
morial shielding the whole structure of the enemies^ of 

,.,.,- . 1 TVT theSyadvad. 

Jam philosophy agamst any attack. Many 
have brought in their heavy artilleries to 
damage one or the other angles of this 
fortification and force an entrance into 
the same and many have been baffled 
in their attempts and thus become 
the buttend of all ridicule before the 
whispering galleries of the Jain philoso- 
phers and Omniscient beings. At least 
such has been the case with the venerable 
Krishna Dwaip^yan Vydsa, the compiler yyasa and 

^ ^ ^ ^ the Syadvad. 

of the Vedas, maker of the Brahma 
Sutras and the author of the Great Epic, 
Mah&bhdrata, who flourished towards the 
end of third age. 

To come straight however to the point, the 
venerable old Vyasa fired his first artillery Brahtna 

^ ' Sutra and 

"^cRf^^^^^Tq" as the thirty-third canon in Shankar. 
the Second Section of the Second Chapter 
of his Brahma SuUas, By this he wants 
us to understand that on account of the 
impossibility of co-existence of contradictory 
attributes as abiding in the same substance, 




the doctrine of the Jainas is not to be 
recognised. In his famous scholium on the 
Brahma Sutras, Achirya Shankara, the 
ablest exponent of the Adwaita Veddnta 
philosophy while commenting on the canon 
referred to, writes : — 

The Jainas admit of seven predicaments 
menta"ry ^uch as ( i) Jwa (2) Ajtva (j>) Asruva, 
Jain phi lo- {4) Sambara^ (3) Nirjard, (6) Bandha, and 

sophy as . 

summarised (j) Mokska, 1 hese seven they admit and 

by Shankar. 

nothing beyond these. 

Summarily speaking, the Jtva and 
the Ajiva, are the two primary predica- 
ments. The others are included in either 
of these two. Besides they admit of 
five composites or compounds from the 
above two categories and are designated as 
''Astikdyas'' or composites such as /ivdsti- 
kdya, Pudgaidstikdya, Dharmdstikdya, 
Adharmdstikdya, and Akdshdstikdya. They 
fancy, again, an infinite number of varia- 
tions of these 'astikdyas or composite and 
to all and each of these, they apply their 
so-called synthetic logic known by the name 
of Saptabhangi naya in the following 
manner : — 



(i) In a sense it is. (2) In a sense 
it is not. (3) In a sense it is and it is not. 
(4) In a sense it is not predicable. (5) In 
a sense it is and is not predicable. (6) In 
a sense it is not and is not predicable. 
(f) In a sense it is and is not and is not 

Now this Saptabhangi form of reasoning 
is also directed to the determination of 
such notions as, unity, plurality, eternity, 
identity, difference and the like. In other 
words following up the principle of Sapta- 
bhangi naya, they hold that existence itself 
is a contradiction ; for instance unity is 
not only unity but also a plurality as well. 
A thing is not only eternal but otherwise 
as well and so on. 

Having thus summarised the funda- Examination 

and criticism 

mentals of the Jain philosophy, and taking view point of 

the Law of 

his Stand on the above Vyasa Sutra Shankar Contradic- 

'^ tion 

Swami remarks. 
|fc I. It would be contrary to reason to 

accept the Jain doctrine. Why ? — Because Being and 

^ ^ ' Non-being 

of the impossibility of co-existence of contra- ^?" "°^ ^^ 

^ ' thesame 

dictory attributes in one. Just as a thing [Jj^ne^thin"^ 
cannot be hot and cold simultaneously, so 



being (^f%c^) and non-being (iTlf^ccT) cannot, 
at the same time, belong to one thing. 

II. And to speak of the seven predica- 
ments which have been determined to be as 
Knowledge SO many and such if they really be so many 

would be of . 

as undeter- in number and such-and-such in character, 

minate cha- 

racter as then they must as the Jains teach exist 

doubt o r 

diffidence is. in either of their modes of suchness (rfHlT^^) 
» and unsuchness (^H^Ii^tr) at one and the 

same point of time. If it were so, it would 
follow that because of the indefiniteness as 
desiderated to be expressed in their being 
as such and not-being as such at the same 
moment of time, the knowledge of the 
same would be also equally indeterminate 
like diffidence or doubt for which reason 
it cannot be held as a true criterion of 
riorht knowledore. 

o o 

^, ,^ III. If the Jains contend here that the 

The Know- "^ 

ledge, the thing itself beingf instinct with multiplicity and 

knowabilities & & f j 

kn"owinglub^ versatility of modes or aspects (^^^li^ ^«I^) 
beiVg"?n- ^^ really of determinate character as such and 
in them- the knowledge of the thing, therefore, both 

selves the 

Syadvada as being and non-being, cannot be non deter- 

cannot be a . 

source of minate and consequently non- authoritative 

valid know- 
ledge, like that of doubtful knowledge, Shankar 



rejoins, it is not right on your part to say 
all that ; for, every thing being admitted to 
be instinct with a multiplicity of nature, 
without having any check or rest any 
where, the determination of the nature of 
very determination itself through the means 
of 'partly is and 'partly -is -no f being not 
excluded it would simply result in non-deter- 
minate knowledge. And for the very reason 
as well the means of knowledge (KfTTTll), objects 
of knowledge (H^^), the knowing subject 
(TTRTrTT), and the act of knowledge (T?fi?f?T), 
all would remain themselves non-determinate. 
And where the determinator and the result 
of determination, both are thus non-deter- 
minate, how can then the teacher, who is 
thus of indefinite opinion himself, can give 
definite instructions on a doctrine the matter 
and the principles of the epistemology 
of which are themselves indeterminate in 
their very nature and character ? Again, 
what would prevail upon the followers of such 
a doctrine to actualise in life and conduct 
the moral principles inculcated in the same? 
For, if the effects of their actualisation in 
life and conduct be of themselves instinct 



with uncertainties, nobody would have any 
inclination to work for the same. Therefore 
the doctrine, pungently retorts Shankar, of 
those undecisive masters who have nothing 
definite to teach or preach, is not to be 

IV. Then, again, applying this un- 
monstration Settling principle of reasoning to that 

oftheunsett- . r i • i • i • i i 

ling charac- portion ot their doctrine which teaches 

ter of reason- - / r \ r 

ing— Fewer that the composites (^t^^m) are nve 

mor e t h a n 

five. in number, one has got to understand that 

on the one hand they are five and on the 
other, they are not five /. e. from the 
latter point of view, they are fewer or 
more than five which is a ridiculous position 
to uphold. 

V. Also you cannot logically maintain 
aTand^o^n! that the predicaments are indescribable. If 

m e n t o f , , ; i , 

Original they were so, they could on no account be 
described ; but as a matter of fact they are 
described and as such you abandon your 
original position. 

VI. If you say, on the contrary, 
seif-contra- that predicaments being so described are 

ascertained to be such and such ; and at the 
•same time they are not such and such ; 



and that the consequence of their being thus 
ascertained is Right Vision {^«?cff ^SJ'!) and 
is not Right Vision as well at one and the 
same point of time; and that Un- Right 
Vision is and is not. opposite of Right 
Vision at one and the same time, you 
will be really raving like a mad cap who is 
certainly not to be relied upon. 

VII. If you argue further that Heaven 

and Freedom, are both existent and inexis- i^^^^^V ^"^ 

r r e e dom— 

tent at once or they are both eternal and cenafn^ ""' 
non-eternal at one and the same moment, 
none will be inclined to work for the same 
the very nature of whose existence is so 
uncertain and indeterminate in nature and 
character. And, 

VIII. Finally, it having been found to 

follow from your doctrine that Jiva, Ajiva On account 

of the impos- 

etc. whose nature you claim to have sibiiityofany 

definite a s- 

ascertained and which have been in existent certainmem, 

the doctrine 

from all eternity at once relapse into the °^ ^^^ ^y^d- 

' ^ V a d a must 

condition of absolute indetermination, and p^edsbe re- 

that the being excluding the non-being and 
vice-versd, the non-being excluding the being, 
and that further more it being impossible to 
decide whether of one thing there is to be 



predicated oneness or plurality, permanency 
or non-permanency, separateness or non- 
separateness and the like, your doctrine of 
SyAdv&d must needs be rejected. 



Examinatton oi Skanlcar s antmadverston and Kas 
t>osttton - Furtker Jtscusston of the Princxt>le oi 
SyaJvftJ and tke Law oi contraatctton — Tkougkt ts 
not sini|>ly a dtsttnction — It xs a relation as well — ' 
ReJ>ly to Skanlcar |>oint oy f>otnt. 

Such is the criticism which Shankar 

makes taking his stand on the Sutra " Not; of^Shankar's 

because of the impossibility in one." ^ ^^^ ' 

— (** 'f^f^J^^ni^Tcf") of the Ved&nta Sutras 

by Vydsa. Or in other words, *it is impossi- 

Contra d i c- 

ble', remarks Shankar, 'that contradictory tory at tri- 
butes cannot 

attributes such as betHP" and non-being' co-exist 

^ ^ the s a r 

should at the same time belong to one and ^^'"^ 
the same thing.' This is the long and 
short of his whole argument as urged for the 
rejection of the doctrine of Syddvdd which 
forms the metaphysical basis of our religion. 
And it is imperative, therefore, that we 
should examine the above animadversion 
as briefly as possible and see how far his 
reasonings reveal his real insight into the 
heart of things as well as how far is 
Shankar correct in his understanding and 


m e 


estimation of the principle of our dialectic 
movement as applied to thought and being 
— a form of reasoning which originally and 
exclusively belongs to the Jain philosophy. 

To begin with, therefore, so far /v the 
fundamentals of our doctrine as summarised 
by Shankar are concerned, we must at 
once admit that he is not guilty of mis- 

But when he starts his criticism with the 
Thus Shan- Startling remark that, being and non-being 

Ir a f lavs 

stress on the cannot co-exist in one and the same thing, 

Law of con- 
tradiction, we beg to differ from him. Shankar 

puts all through his arguments, a great 
stress on the Law of Contradiction. And as 
it is a law of thought which cannot be trans- 
gressed without committing ourselves to 
contradictions and inconsistencies as the 
Formal Logic teaches, any theory which 
does the same, he says, cannot be 
accepted as having any worth at all. 

When the Formal Logic laid down the 
Law of Contradiction as the highest law 
of thought, what it evidently meant is 
simply this that distinction is necessary 
for thought. Unless things are definitely 



what they are and are kept to their 
definition, thought and knowledge become 
impossible. For instance, if A and not-A 
be the same, it is hardly possible to find 
any meaning even in the simplest state- 
ments, for the nature of the thing becomes 
absolutely indefinite and so indeterminate. 
Hence Formal Logic teaches that thought 
is distinction and is not possible without it. 

But is thought simply a distinction and 
nothing else } Is the distinction absolute and 
ultimate .J^ We, the Jains, would undoubtedly deteWna^ 
say that it can never be absolute distinction. ^°"*'"^py- 
If thought is distinction, yet it implies at the 
same time relation. Everything implies 
something other than it; 'This' implies That ; 
'Now* implies 'Then' 'Here' implies 'There' 
and the like. Each thing, each aspect of 
reality, is possible only in relation to and 
distinct from some other aspect of reality. If 
so, A is only possible in relation to and distinct 
from not- A, Thus, by marking one thing off 
from another, it, at the same time, connects 
one thing with another. A thing which has 
nothing to distinguish from, is as impossible 
as equally unthinkable is the thing which is 



absolutely separated from all others so as to 
have no community between them. An abso- 

Nothing can lute distinction would be self-contradictory 

be taken as 

absolutely for it would cut off every connection or 


relation of the thing from which it is distin- 
guished. The principle of absolute contra- 
diction is suicidal ; because it destructs itself. 
So when we, the Jains, deny the validity of 
the Law of Contradiction, we only dispute 
the claim of absolute validity. That every 
definite thought by the fact that it is definite, 
excludes other thoughts and specially the 
. opposite thought is unquestionably true, 
indeed. But it is half-truth only, or one 
aspect of the truth and not the whole of it. 
The other side of the truth, or rather the 
complimentary side of this truth is also that 
every definite thought, by the very fact that 
it is definite, has a necessary relation to its 
negative and cannot be seperated from 
it without losing its true meaning. It is 
definite by virtue of its opposition with 
what it is not. So nothing, however 
definite it may be, can be conceived as 
self-identical in the absolute sense of 
the term. 



To illustrate let us take the instance of the 
jar. I say that the jar is a finite object. Now 
what do we mean by finite thing is this that it 
is limited in extent. And the question may 
be raised : is the limit self-imposed or 
imposed from without. Or, in other words, 
is the limit created by the object itself or 
is it due to the presence of another 
which limits it. The answer must be that 
it is limited by something else. Now, may 
it not be said that the jar is finite only by 
virtue of some thing else } It is what it is 
only in relation with something else, 
without which its existence as such would 
be impossible. So the jaw of contradiction, 
if it speaks of absolute difference, is 
manifestly a suicidal principle. 

Take any thought-determination and the 
same principle will hold good. The jar is 
what it is, because it serves certain purpose, 
has certain shape, certain colour etc. These 
different ideas constituting one whole is 
what we know as the jar. May it not be 
said then that this whole of the different ideas 
is what it is only by virtue of some thing 
or some other which is its negative ? For 



An epitome of JAIN ism 

if we try to hold this common place whole of 
ideas to the exclusion of its negative, if we 
try to hold it to itself, it disappears. 

I. We submit, therefore, that such a re- 
Further elu- mark as made by Shankar is due to his gross 

cidation of . 

the dialectic misunderstandmg of the dialectic principle 


of our reasoning. For, as we interpret and 
use the principle, it is all right. We, 
the Jains, hold that every thought or 
being is only in relation to the fourfold 
nature of itself but is not in relation to the 
fourfold nature of the other (^El^l^f^ '^^^•T 
^?^^'! •nf^ ^) : for instance, the jar 
when it is thought of in relation to (i) its 
own constituent substance, — earth ; (ii) its 
own locality of existence in space — Calcutta ; 
(iii) its own period of coming into existence 
in time — Summer and (iv) its own mode 
existence as revealed in its colour (red or the 
like)and capacity for containing and carrying 
such and such quantity of water, the jar is 
said to exist 2.^., only in relation and particular 
combination of the four- fold nature of itself 
known technically as svachatustaya, the jar is 
(%|f^), and has the nature and character of 
being (^?J^^). But when thought of in 


relation and particular combination of the 
four-fold elements viz, constituent substance, 

^ Existence is 

locality, period and mode ('^oq^ ef^T^Hl^) as contradic- 
tory itself. 

belonging to the other, say, the picture, the 
jar is not (•flf^) and is of the nature of non- 
being (^^?|:tt). Thus the picture is the nega- 
tion of the jar and vice-versA the jar is the 
negation of the picture. Every-thing is in 
relation only to the four fold elements oi itself 
but is not in relation only to the four-fold 
elements belonging to the other. If it were 
otherwise, were everything said to exist in 
either relations of /V^^^as well as o{\S\^ other, 
then every thought and being, making up 
this our universe, would have been trans- 
w formed into one uniform homogeneous whole ; 
then light and darkness, knowledge and 
ne-science, being and non-being, unity and 
plurality, eternity and non-eternity, know- 
ledge and the means thereof, all that go in 
pairs of opposites, and the like must needs 
be one homogeneous mass, so to speak, of 
one uniform nature and character without 
any difference and distinction between one 
and the other or between the parts of one 
and the same thing. But such homogeneity 


of nature and character in things all around 
us is contradicted by our sense perception 
which reveals but differences and diver- 
sities in things and realities. 

And now to turn the table, when you, 

Shankar, say * Being is Brahman, You 
Table turned 
against m=^ have to admit that when Brahman is 


thought of in relation to what is olher than 
Being, it is equal to Non-being ( ^^ ). 
If you don^t admit this, the Non-being of 
Brahman as what is other than the nature of 
Being itself, then your Brahman would be of 
the nature of Non-being, say of Ne -science 
or illusion as well. But this would lead 
to the deterioration of the true nature of 
your Brahma which is but existence pure 
and simple. 

II. To the second objection that the 
cognition of a thing in its form of suchness 
and unsuchness results in the generation 
of indefinite knowledge which is no more a 
true source of knowledge than doubt is, 
we reply ; — 

That the seven predicaments as they are 
The seven in and by themselves ^.^. so far as their own 

Predica- isv. i 

ments. four-fold nature (^^g^^tt^l) is concerned, 


they are in fact so many in number and 
such and such in character ; but as Other 
than themselves i.e. relative to the four- 
fold nature of the Other (qT'^g^mQ^l), they 
cannot but be otherwise. If this were not, 
if you Shankar do not agree to this, or 
when you say that 'True knowledge infinite 
is Brahman' (^m ^T^ ^'T'rT ^=31), if you 
do not thereby admit that Brahman as such 
has its being ; but has not its being as 
otherwise, that is say as Ne-science which is 
but an opposite of what is true knowledge, 
then must you be implicitly identifying 
Brahman which is knowledge (^T*f) with 
Ne-science (qfiRjT) which is non-knowledge 
so much so that you reduce them both to a 
state of unity which is devoid of all differ- 
ences and distinctions in it ('?RT?Tlfei^?- 
fk?:f%ff). And this tantamounts to saying 
that Brahman is but a synonym of Ne- 
science which is dull (5T^) and devoid of 
consciousness (^TT^ffef??)- But you, the 
Vedantins, hold that 'Brahman is true 
knowledge infinite'. Hence we the Jains 
rightly hold that the knowledge of things 
as determined by our dielectic movement of 



Denial of 


thought in the forms of both suchness and 
unsuchness (rfsgfi'^q and ^r??n^) is not 
invalid {^^^\^^) like doubt or diffidence 
as you contend. 

III. To meet the third objection in 
the form of your denial as to the definite 
^o^5f"^^^/^^ character of our determination of the 

racter a i s- 

proved. nature of things which are admitted to be 

instinct with multiplicity of character, we 
have to submit that our determination of 
the nature of things is not indefinite in 
itself. Why ? — Because of the fact that 
whatever is acknowledged by us exists only 
in so far as its own four-fold constituent 
elements in their particular combination 
are concerned ; but relative to the four- 
fold constituent elements as manifest in 
the particular combination of the Other, 
the former does not exist. For, as we 
have seen already, the jar as suck i,e. in 
respect of the four-fold constituent elements 
under particular combination making up 
the being and individuality of the jar, there 
it exists only as suck and does not exist 
as the picture. And this logic holds good 
with equal force in regard to the deter- 



mination of the nature of our determination 

itself. The determination is determination ourprinciple 

1 V. L ^ ^u • V • 2 ofdetermina- 

only as such; but as otherwise it is not tion is but a 

, , . . V ^. ., 1 . r true source 

(determination), bimilarly, in respect ot ofknowledge 

the determining subject and the resultant 
of determination being as suck and suck, 
they both have their being ; but as 
otkerwise i,e, as other than themselves, they 
kave not their being as well. If it were 
not the case, then being and non-being, 
§ knowledge and Ne-science, and all that go 
in pairs of opposites would become merged 
into such a homogeneous whole of one 
uniform for character as is not warranted 
by the evidences of the senses. Hence 
you must have to admit that our determina- 
tion of things as suck and not as suck being 
thus in and by itself definite, cannot 
but be a true source of knowledge and that 
our omniscient arkats are therefore the real 
teachers of right knowledge and hence 
there is every reason why people should flock 
round them and be inclined as well to act 
up to their instructions to lead a life of 
perfection and beatitude, the only end and 
aim of human evolution. 


The Number 


IV. With reference to objection regard- 
ing the composites (^i%oFTil) being numeri- 

five— of the callv five, we point out that the number 
composites. ^ ^ 

five as such is really five, but as the 
otho than five itself, />. relative to such 
numbers as four, six or seven, the five is 
not. Let us take otherwise — the num- 
ber Five only. Here we have undoubtedly a 
definite concept. Now the definite concept 
of five by the fact that it is definite excludes 
other thoughts and specially the opposite 
thought. We, the Jains, admit this ; but 
proceed still further and hold that every 
definite thought or concept by the fact that 
it is definite, has a necessary relation to its 
negative and so cannot be separated from 
it without losing its own meaning. Five 
is five as distinguished from eight, nine, 
ten, or not-sevtn and so bears essential 
relation with them. Hence we hold that 
the composites which are numerically five 
can thus be neither more nor fewer than 


V. Then again the seven predicaments, 
Indescrib- thcv are certainly never absolutely indes- 

ability. ^ 

cribable. They are indescribable in the sense 



that they cannot be described all at once 

and simultaneously (^^?l!og ^^^^^^?im) ; 

but surely they are describable gradually 

and successively (^^oJi^fi^^^f^TH). 

VI. To repudiate the sixth, we 

submit that the knowledg^e accruing from ^J"^^^ ^®P^" 

^ ^ diation. 

the ascertainment of the predicaments both 
as such and noi such, according to the 
four-fold constituent elements of themselves 
and as belonging to the Other than 
themselves and our determination as well 
of their existence and non-existence in 
like manner being Right Knowledge (^?55Jcfr 
^jjil); and Un-right Knowledge (^^^^- 
^3f if) being opposite to Right Knowledge, the 
Right Knowledge exists only as such i,e, in 
so far its own matter and form are concerned 
but does not exist in the matter and form of 
the Wrong Knowledge and vice-versa, the 
Wrong Knowledge exists in its own matter 
and form and does not exist as the 
matter and form of the Right Knowledge. 
And likewise the Heaven and Freedom, 
they are in their own matter and form ; 
but they are not as the matter and form of 
what are known as Hell and Bondage. 



Also such is the case in respect of 
eternity which is real and actual only in 
its own matter and form as distinguished 
from its opposite, the matter and form of 
what it is not. Or in other words, the 
predicaments are eternal in relation to 
noumenon only but non-eternal in relation 
to pary&ya — phenomenon. 

And this is how to a thing, being is 
ascribed in relation to Its own matter 
and form as well as non-being in relation 
to the matter and form of the Other. 



Tnc Jtalecttc reasontng leads to the Theory of 
BnedabKea i.e. of Unity m difference — Distinction t>re- 
sut>t>oses Unity — TKe world, system is an expression of 
thought — Tke Jain conce{>tion of tke Absolute aistin- 
guisKeJ from tke Absolute tcyonJ tke relative of tke 

Now what has been discussed in the 

,. C^ 1 A 7 ' ' • ^^^ ^*W of 

preceeding pages on Syadvad, it is quite contradic- 

, , , - .... I tion is the 

apparent that the law of contradiction is the n egat i o n 

aspect of the 

negative aspect of thelaw of identity. We have law of iden- 

seen that with the Jains, everything implies 
'something' opposed to it. *This' implies 
*that\ 'here' implies 'there', 'now' implies 
'then'. The trend of the argument is that 
everything is real only in relation to and 
distinction from every other thing. This 
being so, the law of contradiction is not 
virtually denied absolutely. What the Jain 
philosophers want us to understand is this 
that absolute distinction which the ordinary 
interpretation presupposes is not a correct 
view of things. Rather it is to be borne in 
mind that distinction presupposes a unity of 
which, xht/iva and Ajiva and the like that 



go in pairs of opposites are but two expres- 

The world system is not alien to thought. 
Thought is not accidental to world. Thouofht 

The world- ^ "^ 

system is the is embodied in the world-system. Popular 

expression of 

thought. view is that thoucrht is connected with man's 

brain and so accident to the world system. 
In opposition to this the Jains teach that 
the world system is the expression of 
thought. The world system is that in which 
thought goes out of itself. Thought is thus 
made the essence of the world. It is the 
Ved^nta that somewhere teaches that Nature 
is the working out of the will and is real in 
so far the intelligence of man is concerned. 
But we differ from the Vedantins and hold 
that thought which is the essence of the 
world is objective, is something universal 
or absolute in which the particular thoughts 
of particular men partake. 

But then there is ^.prwia facie objection 
we have to meet. Some says it is im- 

An objection pQgsible to take thought as the essence of 
the world. For it would tantamount to our 
ignoring the feeling or willing which is as 
important as thought. True, the objection 



would have been valid had we conceived 
thought as excluding will and feeling. 
Thought is not one thing, and feeling another 
thing. Will is not apart from thought. How 
are we to conceive of will if it is exclusive of 
thought ? 

Again thought implies will. Dynamic 
thought is Will. When I identify myself J^J^^^rls 
with the end, I am said to will. But I cannot '^^^^• 
do so unless I am conscious of the end. 
So activity is impossible without thought. 
Thus our thought is not exclusive of will. 
With us thought is concrete, thought inclu- 
sive of feeling and will and is the constitutive 
principle of the universe. 

Now therefore the Absolute is the 

ultimate unity of thought which expresses Absolute is 

the ultimate 

itself as /iva on the one side and correlative ""ity. 
of the subject as Ajiva on the other side. 
This unity is all inclusive unity which em- 
braces everything that is feal. 

But this conception of the Absolute has 
to be distinoruished from the absolute beyond Jain concep- 

^ tion of the 

the relative of the Vedantins. These philo- absolute as 

*■ d 1 stinguish- 

sophers hold that our intellect deals with ?f /-^^ ^^^ 
the relative only. The world of experience 


is the world relative only. So the absolute 
lies beyond the world of the relative — beyond 
the world of phenomena. Shankar thinks in 
this way, We hold, however, that absolute 
is not beyond the phenomena : rather all 
phenomena are but particular aspects or 
phases, of this all inclusive unity which is 
Absolute.-— The whole and the aspects of 
The whole. The whole of reality conceived 
as a single ultimate unity is noumenon and 
phenomena are but its partial phases. 

But then the question is, What is a 
Noumenon Noumenon ? Is it an aggregate of pheno- 

and Pheno- t^i tvt i i j • 

mena. 1 he Noumenon, we hold, is superior 
to phenomena ; because it is all inclusive 
whole. Phenomena are but fragmentary 
aspects of Noumenon. This all inclusive whole 
(noumenon) cannot stand apart from those 
which it includes (phenomena). If it is an all 
inclusive unity and phenomena are fragmen- 
tary aspects of this unity, then is it an aggre- 
gate of phenomena ? No. The Self is not 
apart from its various determinations or states 
of the Self. It is not something above and 
over the psychoses. What is the Self ."^ It is 
not a mere sum of its determinations as the 




Vijn^nvsLdi Buddhists hold ; nor is it differ- 
ent from the sum of its determinations as 
the Ved^ntins try to explain. It is a unity 
of all its determinations. It is an ideal unity 
which realises itself through these particular 

So the partial phases of the Absolute are 
phenomena and these are related to the Phenomena 

are but par- 

Absolute as the members of a living- body are ^'^^ phases 

^ ^ of the abso- 

related to the body itself. The particular ^"^^• 
things of experience are aspects of the 
Absolute which is the all inclusive unity 
expressing itself through particular deter- 
minations. It is the subject ; but not as 
correlative of the object ; rather a unity 
implied in the correlation. 

The Absolute is thus the ultimate Unity. 
But here again the familiar conception gives Supposed 

T r 1 A 1 difficulty in 

us trouble. If the Absolute is One, then the the accepta- 
tion of the 

Absolute is not Many. If it is unity then it is two concep- 
tion of the 

not a Plurality. The Veddntins of the type of absolute. 

Shankar hold that the absolute is the Unity. 
It is not a plurality therefore. But Plurality 
is a stupendous fact which cannot be denied. 
So plurality, according to those Vedantins, is 
but an illusion — May^ {WJXX) and not a reality. 


Plurality is a fact, although it may be 

From the ii»ir • ai 

stand-point another kind ot experience. Anyhow to give 

of the rela- . , r th • / \ • i • 

tion between It the name of Illusion (TTT^T) IS not to explain 

the One and . . i . t t 

the Many. It. 1 he question then turns to this. How 
thus Illusion comes to be reconciled with the 
Absolute ? How is this solution possible, if 
the Absolute is the One without a second to 
stand by it (^^^^if^^^). And the Ultimate 
Reality without anything to aid or stand by 
it being One, what is the source of this 
Illusion of Plurality. Thus the whole ques- 
tion resolves itself into the Relation of Unity 
and Plurality. 

If the ultimate reality be many, how can 

Difficulties you explain a single self-existent coherent 
in the estab. ^ ^ 

lishment of system ? If there is a relationship between 
the Relation 

A. B. C. D., and so on then these are 
elements of a single whole and so related 
to each other. 

If you begin with the Absolute separation 
Set out in a between Unity and Plurality, then you must 
alternative, either deny Plurality like Shankar or deny 
Unity like Kan^d, the propounder of the 
Specific (Vaisheshika) school of thought. But 
these difficulties crop up only on the assump- 
tion that the ultimate Reality is either One or 



Many. And we, the Jains, therefore, reject 

this disjunction altogether. From our point of But this dis- 

J ^ ^ junction 1 n 

view, all differences are differences of a Unity ^H ^°''"? °^ 

' definitealter- 

which is expressed in the differences. One ^^^^^^^ ^ l^l 
is One not apart from the Many ; but One is J^'"^' 
in the Many. So Plurality must be taken as 
the self-expression of this unity — the Abso- 
lute. To conceive of the Absolute as the One 
is not to conceive the facts of experience as 
Illusion — Maya {wJli), Or, the Many is real 
in as much as the Many is galvanised into ^^^ differ- 

ences being 

life by the One ; because Many is the self- differences 

^ ' of a unity 

expression of the One. The absolute is a ^^e^^drffe r" 
Unity but the Unity which is immanent in ^Jo^ aspects 
the Many. The Many, in Jainism, do not dTng^o^n^e 
vanish in the luminosity of the One like 
clouds before the rising sun as taught in the 
philosophy of Vydsa and Vasistha : rather 
the Many is vitalised by the One and is as 
real as every other facts of experience. In 
Jainism, One is shown to come out of its own 
privacy as it were and appears Itself as the 
Many. The Many vanishes in the One 
(Shankar) : but the One presents itself to us 
as the Many (the Jains). The One reveals 
itself in the Many and the Many is the self- 



expression of the ultimate Unity. In our 

philosophy, the ordinary disjunction of *either- 

or' falls to the ground. The two aspects of 

one truth do not exclude each other. The 

concrete whole is the abstract which is One 

in the Many and Many as grounded in 

^ the One. 

The Absolute is the Universal. This 

The Abso- Universal is not the abstract Universal of the 
lute is the 

Universal formal logfic but the concrete Universal. 

rev e a 1 1 n g ^ 

Itself in the yj^^ absolute expresses itself in A, but not 

Particulars. ^ ' 

limited to A. A is the particularisation of 
the Universal. Hence the Universal goes 
beyond A, to B, to C and so A, B, C, D are 
immanently and vitally connected with one 
another. The Universal comes out of Itself 
and particularises Itself in the particular 
objects of the world system and which, there- 
fore, is vitally and essentially and immanently 
connected with one another constituting the 
world system. The Universal of the Jains 
does not fight shy of the Particulars of 
the world — the categories of thought and 
being — like the Universal of the formal 
logic ; but reveals itself in the particulars of 
the world. 



Such being the Jain conception of the 
Absolute, the whole universe of things, we Everything 

i s dififerent 

see, must needs be ordered in perfect agree- and non- 

dififerent a t 

ment with our coc/nitions. We are conscious the same 

'^ time. 

of thinors as different and non-different at 
the same time. They are non-different in 
their causal or universal aspect (^TT^T^*!!- 
STifSn^JfT ^TfiT*S5;{) and different in so far 
as viewed as effects or particulars (^T^T^«TT- 

But some hold that cognition of things 
as such is impossible and remark that like Reply to the 

critiques o f 

lig^ht and darkness, the identity and ^^\ ^t>ove 

^ ^ vend. 

difference can not co-exist in the same 
thing. But we reply, the contradictoriness 
that exists between light and darkness is 
of two kinds. One is of the nature of im- 
possibility of co-existing in one and the 
other of the nature of co-existing but in 
different things. But such contradictoriness 
is not perceived in the correct intrepretation 
of the true character of the relation in which 
the cause and the effect or the universal 
and the particular mutually stand together. 
On the contrary we really perceive that 
the one and the same thing is possessed of 



dual aspect {y^^^ qsR^^ ^^ f^^ ReitgS). 

Things are Thus when we say 'This jar is clay' ; Ram 

naturally of / j 7 > 

dual charac- is a human beino^. Here in the instance of 

ter. ^ 

'clay' and *the Jar', clay is the cause and the 
jar is the effect thereof. The jar is but a 
particular state of being of the cause which 
is clay. Were co-existence of the cause and 
effect contradictory, it would never have been 
possible for clay to exist as in the form of 
the 'far : in the second instance 'Ram is a 
human beings' humanitv is the universal 
(^TifrT) and Ram is but a particular (3^%) 
expression of humanity. Were Universal and 
Particular contradictory, one excluding the 
other, then Ram could never have been a 
human being. Nor even any one of many 
Id tt experience has ever perceived anything 

de^tructTo^n having an absolutely uniform character 
absolutely devoid of all distinction and 
difference whatever in the same. Nor can 
it be upheld that just as fire consumes straw 
and other combustibles so non difference 
(^^) sets at nought the difference on the 
ground that Identity being unity, it is a 
nullity of all Difference. And therefore the 
admission of identity and difference as co- 




existing in the same involves a contradiction. 
But this, we contend, is not borne out by 
facts of experience ; nor is there any absolute 
law to the effect that identity should always 
and everywhere be destructive of difference. 
On the contrary, we have things with two- 
fold aspects, just because it is thus that they 
are perceived. For, the same thing which 
exists as clay or gold, or man &c. at 
the same time exists as jar, diadem or 
Ram. And no man is able to distinguish in impossibi- 

an object, — e.g. J^r or Ram, — placed before distinguish- 
ing between 
him, which part is clay and ivhich the Jar or the Cause 

and the 

which part is the universal character of Ram Effect or the 

Uni vers a 1 

and which the particular Rather our thought ^"^ ^^^ 

^ Particular. 

finds its true expression in the following 
judgments, 'this Jar is clay' and 'Ram is a 
man'. Nor can it be maintained that a 
distinction is made between the cause and 
the universal as objects of the idea of persis- 
tence and the effect and the particular as 
objects of the notion of discontinuance — 
difference, in as much as, truly speaking, we 
have no perception of these two factors, 
in separation. However close we may 
look into a thing, we won't be able still 


They are 
neither abso- 
lutely differ- 
ent nor abso- 
lutely n o n- 

Rather they 
stand in 
relation o f 
unity in 

A fresh ob- 
jection to the 
doctrine o f 
Unity in 

to find that this is the persisting and 
universal element in the thing and that is 
the non-persisting particular aspect of the 
thing. Just as an effect or a particular 
thing gives rise to the idea of one thing, 
so the effect plus cause and the parti- 
cular along with the universal gives rise 
to the idea of one thing only. And this 
is how we are enabled to recognise each 
individual thing, placed as it is amongst 
a multitude of things differing in place, 
time^ capacity and substance. Each thing 
being thus endowed with double aspect, the 
theory of cause and effect or universal and 
particular, being absolutely distinct and 
different falls to ground under the weight of 
the overwhelming evidences of sense- 

It might be contended here that if on 
account of grammatical co-ordination and the 
consequent of idea oneness, the judgment 
'this Jar is clay' is taken to mean the relation 
of unity in difference i.e. both difference and 
non-difference as well, then we are led by a 
coherent train of thought to infer from such 
judgments as 'I am a man' or 'I am a god', 



that the self and the body also stand in rela- 
tion of unity in difference — Bhed&bheda, 

But we, the Jains, hold this to be an 
uncritical observation in as much as it is not Defutation 

of the objec- 

based on rie^ht interpretation of the true ^i on and 

^ ^ esta b 1 1 s h- 

nature of co-ordination establishing^ the "^^^",^, ?f ^J}^ 

^ bhedabheda 

bheddbheda relation. The correct interpreta- ^^^^^^o"- 
tion is that all reality is determined by states 
of consciousness not sublated by valid means 
of proof. The imagination however of the ' 
identity of the self and the not-self (body) is 
sublated by all means of proof applicable to 
the self : it is in fact no more valid than the 
imagination of the snake in the rope and does 
not therefore prove the identity of the two. 
The co-ordination, on the other hand, which 
is meant by the judgment 'the cow is short 
horned' is never observed to have been dis- 
proved in any way and hence establishes the 
doctrine of Unity in Difference (^lir^^TcT). \ 




The Sell and tlic Not-self are tut members oi a 
comj>lex lAr hole — !Dtmculttes tn tke transiormatton oi 
t}te SuDject into Object and Vice-versa Object tnto 
SuDject — £acn ^re-sut>t>ostng tne otner, we nave to take 
tne Universe in tke Ugkt oi single uninea System. 

The task of philosophers is to find 
Difficultifes law, order and reason in what at first 

in the formu- 
lation of an sie^ht seems accidental, capricious and 

adequate ^ 

Theory o f meaningfless. And the arduousness of that 

theUniverse. ^ 

work grows with the complexity and 
intricacy of the phenomena to be explain- 
ed. The freer the play of difference, 
the harder is to find the underlying 
unity, the fiercer the conflict of opposites, 
the more difficult is it to detect the 
principle out of which it springs. And 
unless this is satisfactorily done, any 
theory of the Universe can hardly be 
attained to. Unconscious of the greatness 
of the work they were undertaking, the 
early philosophers tried to solve the whole 
problem of the Universe at a stroke and find 
some one principle or unitary method which 




would account for everything. But it 
soon became obvious that the principle, Nothing is 
and the problem of universe are not so easy ^he*reign°of 
to be solved and the citadel of know- 
ledge was not to be taken by storm. 
Thus earliest and most secure triumphs 
of science were won by separating off 
some comparatively limited sphere of 
reality and treating it as a world by 
itself. And it is just because they 
narrowed the problem that they succeeded 
in solving it. The general nature of the 
difticulties to be met with, is known 
and also the methods by which they 
can be overcome. The field is not, and 
cannot be exhausted ; but such light has 
been thrown upon it that no room is left 
for fear that within that department the 
progress of science will ever meet with any 
unsurmountable obstacle. Hence the con- 
. viction that there is no sphere of existence 
which is exempt from the reign of law has 
been gaining ground with the development 
and progress of philosophic speculation. 

Now we should attempt to investigate 
into the general nature of the Universe. 



When we consider the general nature of 
Uni verse-- x}c\^ Universe or of our life as rational beinof, 

Subject, Ob- o' 

■'unity^^ b^e^ endowed with the powers of thinking 

tween the ^^^ willing, we find that it is defined 

and, so to speak, circumscribed by three 

ideas which are closely and even 

indissolubly connected with each other. 

These three ideas are the ideas or the 

constituent elements of the universe or the 

factors of it which are inseparably con- 

/ nected with each other and so involve each 

other. These are (i) the idea of the Object 

(♦ftig') or Not-self (^^^) (ii) the idea of 

the Subject (wt^) or the Self (^rt^) (iii) and the 

idea of the Unity which is presupposed in 

the difference of the Self and the Not-self 

and in and through which they act and react 

on each other. 

To explain these terms more fully, the 
Explanation Object (ifl*^) is the general name under 

of the above ... • i i i i 11 

three terms, wliich w^e mclude the external world, 
and all things and beings in it, all 
that we know and all that we act on, 
the whole environment which conditions 
the activity of the ego and furnishes 
the means and sphere through which it rea- 


Uses itself. AH this we call Object (ift'?r) in 
order to indicate its distinction and its rela- 
tion to the Subject (wt^R) for which it exists. 
We call it by this name also to indicate 
that we are obliged to think of it as SeifandNot- 

s e 1 f — t hey 

one whole, one world, all of whose parts are but mem- 
be r s of a 
are embraced in one connection of space complex 

^ Whole. 

and all whose changes take place in one 
connection of time. All these elements 
or parts and changes therefore make up 
the elements in one whole and in one 
system and modern science teaches us to 
regard them all as connected together by 
of links of causation. There is again only 
one thing which stands over against this 
complex whole of existence and refuses 
to be regarded simply as a part of the 
system and that is the Ego, the Subject 
or the Self for which it exists : for the 
primary condition of the existence of 
such Subject is that it should distinguish 
itself from the Object as such, from each 
object and from the whole system of 
objects. Hence strictly speaking there 
is only one Subject and one Object for us ; 
for in opposition to the Subject, the totality 


of objects constitute one world, and in 
opposition to the Object, all experiences 
of the Subject, all its thoughts and actions 
lidlifemove ^'^ ^-^^x^^^ in the unity of one Self. All 
these Two^ " ^"^ ^'f^» ^" ^^^ conscious thought then 
moves between these two terms which 
are distinct from and even opposed to 
each other. Yet though thus set in 
antagonism which can never cease, be- 
cause with its ceasing the whole nature 
of the both would be subverted, they 
are also essentially related, for neither 
of them could be conceived to exist 
without the other. The consciousness of 
the one is, we might say, inseparably blended 
with the consciousness of its relation to the 
other. We know the object only as we 
bring it back to the unity of the Self 
and we know the Self only as we realise 
it in the Object. 

And lastly these two ideas within the 
spheres of which our whole life of thought and 
activity is contained and from one to the 
other of which it is continually moving to and 
fro, point back to a third term which embraces 
them both and which in turn constitutes 



their limit and ultimate condition. For 
where we have two terms which thus are 
at once essentially distinguished from and Untranslata- 

bility of the 

essentially related to, which are obliged to psychical 

into physical 

contrast and oppose to each other, seeing and vice 

versa of the 

that they have neither of them any ^a"«>^ ^"to 

' the former. 

meaning except as opposite counterparts 
of the other, and which we are obliged to 
unite, there we are necessarily driven back 
to think of these terms as the manifesta- 
tion or realisation of a third term which 
is higher than either. Recognising that 
the Object only exists in distinction from and 
relation to the Subject, we find it impossible 
to reduce the Subject to a mere Object 
^mong other objects as Materialism does. 
Recognising, again, that the Subject exists 
only as it returns upon itself in the Object, 
we find it impossible as well to reduce the 
Object to a mere phase of the Subject — a 
fallacy committed by the Buddhistic Subjective 
Idealism or Solipsism. But recognising them 
as indivisible yet necessarily related, we are 
forced to seek the secret of their being 
in a higher principle which includes and 
explains them both. How otherwise can 




we do justice at once to their distinction 

and their relation, to their independence 

and their essential and vital connection ? 

oVJe c^t— The two — Subject and Object — are the 

each presup- t- i c \ 

posing the extreme terms, nach ot them presupposes 

other cannot i i r • i i 

be the pro- the Other and therefore can neither be regard- 
duct of the 
either. ed as producing the other. Hence we are 

compelled to think of them both as rooted 

in a higher principle or to put it otherwise 

in the idea of an Absolute Unity which 

transcends all opposition of the finitude 

and specially the last opposition which 

includes all others. Hence we cannot 

understand the real nature of the universe 

unless we take it in the light of a unified 

system, whose constituent elements are 

necessarily related in the way above 


So long we have been dealing with 

Contingency ^^e nature of the universe, depicting? the 

of the world. ^ *=* 

relation which exists between different 
factors of the world. But if we consider the 
question more fully we cannot get rid of one 
idea — the idea of contingency of the world. 
The contingent world exists or the world 
of our immediate experience is contingent, 




therefore absolutely necessary Being exists. 
It starts from the thought that the 
world as presented to our immediate 
experience has in it no substantiality or 

Certain ano- 

independence. Its existence cannot be maiiespoint- 

' ing to the 

explained from itself and the mind in °^'Sf^" ^} ^^ 

*^ w o r I d at a 

trying to account for it is forced to of^^j^e.^^'"* 
fall back in something outside of it 
and finds rest only in the idea of a 
Being who is necessarily self-dependent and 
substantial. The movement of thought 
which this argument involves may be 
stated in various ways and under different 
categories. It may be put as an argu- 
ment from the world viewed as an effect 
to the first cause or more generally from 
the world viewed as finite and relative 
to an Absolute and Infinite Being on 
whom it rests. But in all these and 
other forms, the gist of the argument 
is the same. If we take it, for example, 
in the form in which it turns on the 
idea of causality, it is the argument 
that whatever does not exist necessarily exist 
only through another Being as its cause 
and that again itself not necessary through 



another and as an infinite regress of 
of finite beings related as cause and 
effect is unthinkable, mind is compelled to 
stop short and place at the head 
of the series — a First Cause, a Being 
which is Its own cause or which exists in 
and by Itself unconditionally or necessarily. 
This is in short the argument often 
Clearing up forwarded to prove that the world was 

the difficul- . . , . t> i 

ties. created at a certam point ot tmie. But when 

we atterppt to translate this experience into 
the language of formal reasoning or if we 
take it to be a syllogism proving the ex- 
istence of God as the First Creator, our 
argument becomes open to serious objec- 
tions. In short, we will find that this sort 
of argument is not at all tenable. The 
first objection which may be urged is that 
the result it gives is purely negative. You 
cannot in a syllogistic demonstration put more 
into the conclusion than what the premises 
contain. Beginning or assuming an Absolute 
or Infinite Cause you might conclude to 
finite effects ; but you cannot revert the pro- 
cesses. All that from a finite or contingent 
effect, you can infer is a finite or contingent 



cause or at most an endless series of such 
causes. But if because the mind cannot ^ 

To posit a 

rest in such infinity you try to stop short ^^kno^^^ed^e 
the mhnite regress and assert at any pomt ^^ ^y^^ ^ 
of it a cause which is not an effect, which "^^" ' 
is its own cause, infinite and unconditioned, 
the conclusion in this case would be purely 
arbitrary. To assert the existence of such a 
Being as the Creator of the world is simply 
to conceal under a phrase the breakdown of 
the argument. 

Again the argument does not prove that 
which it claims to prove, for such a Being impossibi- 
is related to the world as cause is a s the 

creator of 

to an effect. But the cause is as much the world, 
conditioned by effect as effect is by the » 

cause. So in this case also the supposed 
Being would not be Absolute as this 
argument tries to prove. 

Again another difficulty presents us if we 
dive deep into the question. How can we 
conceive God before any such creation ^ 
Why was He so long inactive .^ What led 
Him to create this Universe at a certain 
point of time after such a long period of 
inactivity ? In short innumerable difficulties 


trouble us if we suppose that world was 
created at a certain point of time. This is 
sufficient to prove that the world exists from 
eternity and we cannot conceive of a time 
when it was not. 


the world. 


JLheortes oi Cvolution and Oreatton Ly Kxternal 
Agency— S^encertan Formulation of tKc PrtnctJ>le of 
Kvolution — iJxjnc\x\t\ea tn S^encerian ny^otnesis. 

In the preceeding chapter, we have seen 
that from our point of view, the Universe ^ or«:««f;«« 
has been in existence from all eternity. We °heories°^ of 
cannot conceive of a time when it was not. 
But still for all that there are other 
hypothesis which either speak of the alternate 
eras of evolution and dessolution of the 
Universe as a whole or take it to have been 
created by the some all powerful external 
agency from the materials that lay by 
Him when all these abounding in names and 
forms were not. And ere we enter on any 
further details as to the phenomenal changes, 
transformation of the world as these present 
themselves to us, it is important that we 
should discuss in brief the different im- 
portant hypothesis which are also prevalent 
more or less in these days of scientific 
culture and refinement. 


To begin with therefore, there are only 
The three three possible hypothesis which can be 


reasonably entertained in regard to the past 
history of Nature. 

The First is the Theory of Self-existence 
which teaches that the order of Nature which 
now obtains has always obtained from all 

The Second is the Theory of Evolution or 
Self-creation according to which the present 
order of Nature has had but a limited 
duration but it supposes that the present 
order of things proceeds by natural processes 
from an antecedent order and that from 
another antecedent order and so on thus 
making way for alternate eras of Evolution 
and dissolution. And 

The Third is the Theory of Special Crea- 
tion by external agency teaching that nothing 
comes of itself: That from dull dead matter 
absolutely bereft of all intelligence, this 
phenomenal Universe which bespeaks of 
subtle organisation and most wonderful design 
cannot spring forth without the intervention 
of some intelligent cause operating ,upon the 
materials whereof Nature is composed. 



Of these three principal hypotheses, we 
have already dealt with the first — the Theory Difficulties 

' ' m conceiving 

of Self-existence. We are now to deal with ^^^ World as 

the Theory of Evolution — the second of the ^^^^ ^ ^*®^" 

three hypotheses : for some hold that the 
Universe cannot be conceived as Self-existent 
from all eternity ; for 'to conceive existence 
through infinite past-time', to quote the 
language of Spencer, 'implies the conception 
of infinite past-time which is an impossi- 
bility'. — How far this argument of Spencer 
against the Self-existence of the Universe 
from all eternity stands to reason, we shall 
see later on. Suffice it to say here that 
because of this supposed difficulty amongst 
the many others in the theory of Self- 
existence, some have been inclined to fall 
upon the Theory of Evolution and Mr. 
Spencer is the ablest exponent of this 
theory in modern times so far the Emperical 
School of European thought on the subject 
is concerned. 

To consider, therefore, first, the theory of 

Evolution, we must begin with its definition. Theory of 

Y3 I . , , . Evolution as 

oy evolution or development was meant pri- formulated 

. . . t>y Spencer, 

manly the gradual unfolding of a living germ 





from its embryonic beginning to its final and 
Evolution mature form. This adult form was regarded as 

was original- *> 

loeicaf ^ ^ ° ^^ ^^^^ aimed at through the whole process, 
so that the whole process was the working 
of an idea — entelechy or soul shaping the 
plastic material and directing the process 
of growth. Evolution, in short, implied ideal 
ends controlling physical means — in a word 
was 'teleological\ But now the term 'Evolu- 
tion', though retained, is retained merely to 
denote the process by which the mass and 
energy of the Universe have passed from 
some assumed primeval state to that of distri- 
bution which we have at present. It is also 
implied that the process will last till some 
ultimate distribution is reached whereupon 
a counterprocess of dissolution will begin 
and from which new Evolution will proceed. 
"An entire history of anything" Mr. 

spencerian Spencer tells us **must include its appearance 

definition of r i • -i i i • i- 

Evolution, out ot the imperceptible and its disappear- 
ance into the imperceptible. Be it a single 
object or the whole Universe, any account 
which begins with it in a concrete form is 
incomplete." In these and such like instances 
Mr. Spencer sees the formula of evolution 



and dissolution foreshadowed. He again 
goes on saying that *'the change from a 
diffused imperceptible form to a perceptible 
concentrated state is an integration of matter 
and concomittant dissipation of motion and 
the change from a concentrated perceptible 
state is an absorption of motion and con- 
comittant disintegration of matter." 

Now there is one obvious and yet serious Examina- 
tion of the 
objection to this theory. It proposes to treat Theory. 

the Universe or in fact requires us to treat 

the Universe as a single object. Every 

single object is first evolved and then 

dissolved and so the Universe. The 

Universe also, he thinks, emerges from the 

imperceptible and into the imperceptible it 

disappears again. Surely Mr. Spencer 

commits here the fallacy of composition. 

What is predicable of the parts, he thinks, The universe 

can not be 

can be predicated of the whole collectively, treated as a 

single Object 

Again, we may ask on what grounds is it 
assumed that the Universe was ever evolved 
at all } A given man, a given nation, a 
given continent have their general finite 
histories of birth and death, upheaval and 
subsidence. But growth and decay, rise 


and fall, evolution and dissolution are 
everywhere contemporaneous. We have 
but to extend our vision to find a permanent 
totality made up of transeient individuals 
in every stage of change. But so enlarging 
our vision we are not warranted in saying as 
Mr. Spencer does "there is an alteration of 
cras^J^Evo^ evolution and dissolution in totality of 
DissohiUon things." But now what we find so far our 

cannot be, . , 

established. Observation and experience can carry us 
is that, be it small or great, once an object 
is dissolved in the imperceptible state in Mr. 
Spencer's sense, that object never reappears. 
We do not find dead man alive again, effete 
civilisation re-juvenated, or worn out stars 
re-kindled as of yore. It is true of course 
that the history of many concrete objects is 
marked by periodic phases ; but never by 
dissolution and re-evolution ix., by the 
disappearance of the concrete individuals 
followed by the re-appearance of the 
same. So this form of evolution or the 
philosophy of evolution as formulated by 
Spencer is more mythological than philoso- 
phical. What we admit on the other hand 
and which we think almost free from every 



savour of immatured reflection is that within 
a given totality, one individual may succeed 
another, but so far that totality, the Universe, 
is concerned it remains permanent — "One 
generation passeth away and another genera- 
tion Cometh, but the earth abideth forever." 
Again, we cannot understand what led 

Mr. Spencer to conceive this world as finite Another 
^ difficulty. 

or a single object. What Mr. Spencer calls 
a single object must surely have an assign- 
able beginning and end in time and assign- 
able bounds in space. It is precisely through 
such time and space-marks that the notion 
of singleness or identity becomes possible. 
The Universe then we, may safely say, not 
only is not, but can never be a single object 
in this wise. Mr, Spencer's attempt to treat 
it after the fashion of a single object, evinces 
an unexpected paucity of imagination and 
is philosophically unsound. Experience 
provides us with instances of evolution and 

dissolution of the most varied scales but 

. . . No evidence 

of a smgle supreme evolution embracing to show the 


them all we have no title to speak. On coming to an 


the other hand, we have no evidence to 
show what we call the 'Universe' is coming 



to an end, for we have no evidence to show 

that it is finite. If taking for granted we 

Rather it is had any such evidence we should probably 
permanent \r j 

theatre of then and there conclude that we were 

per p et ual 

changes. dealing with but a part of the true Universe 
and not with the totality of things or 
Universe as a whole. Again there is no 
evidence either earthly or unearthly prevail- 
ing upon us to apply of such conceptions 
as increase and decrease, ebb and flow, or 
development and decay to this absolute 
totality or the Universe as a whole. On 
the other hand, we may safely say that 
the world, so far as we can judge from the 
physical constitution and our actual experi- 
ence, is just what it has always been — The 




SankKyas J>rtnctt)lcs of Evolution — Traceable \n tke 
*Rigve<la* — 'Purusli' anJ *Pralcritt — The Tnree *Gunas 
%n tketr EqutltLrtum form *PraKrttt or tke Root 
Evolvent — *Pralcrttx' %a tke first Category — Tke Tkree 
otker Categories — Inconsistency of tke Sankkya Hyt>o- 

Spencer's formulation of the principles of 
the Evolution, however, strongly reminds us spencer and 
of the S^nkhya Philosophy as propounded 
by the sage Kapil in India. And there is no 
denying that in comparison with the Spence- 
rian theory, Kapila's doctrine is by far more 
consistent and logical. According to this 
doctrine, the world is really a world of 
experience — the experience of the individual 
Purush or Psychi (as in the system of Fichte) 
caught in the snares spread out by the 
bewitching Prakritt evolving the twenty- 
four categories whereof the world system 
is composed for the enjoyment and beatitude 
of the individual Self. Thus according to 
Kapil, the ultimate realities are primarily 
two in number — Purush and Prakriti. 



We think in relations. To us therefore the 
Subject and conception of the world-system is nothing 
^^^ ' beyond the conception of the relation 

between the subjective and the objective 
realities. Purush, Kapil says, is, the self 
or the spirit. Empirically it is the Subjective 
reality or the Experiencer (nt^) and Prah iti 
or Nature is the Objective Reality or the 
Experienceable — (^^r). The whole universe 
where in we live, move and have our 
being is the outcome of the unfoldment of 
this relation between Purush, the Spirit or 
the Subject and Prakriti^^ih^ Nature or 
the Object. 

Some Oriental scholars hold that this 
The Origin Dualistic hypothesis as to the past history of 
Doctrine Natures which finds its echo in the Cartesan 
Theory of Dualism, w^as originally formulated 
by the sage Kapil and is of far later origin 
in comparison with the Vedas. But such 
is not the case. We are of opinion that the 
doctrine is as old as the Vedas themselves. 
And the sage drew inspirations from the 
Vedas and this is why the System of Sankhya 
Philosophy though indirectly denying the 
existence of God for want of evidence has 



been taken by the Hindus as one of their six 
orthodox Systems. For even the Rtpveda 

^ ^ Tracable in 

has in it amongst others a hymn wherein the Vedas. 
the whole doctrine as expounded by Kapil 
is contained in a nut-shell. We have in the 

qf^3T fir\?ft|fill— i?//^. V. 2-2 1- 164. 

The hymn means to say that the myste- 
rious conjunction between Purush and Praknfi and 

4- n A ^ f^ \T f^ n 

Prakriti invariably results in the evolution fold prin- 

of the seven-fold subtler principles-/a/z^^.y 
beginning with Mahattatva i.e. (i) Mahat- 
tatvay (2) Ahankartatva and the five tan- 
m&traSy — Rupa, Rasa^ Sab da, Gandha and 
Sparsha — and though such is the conse- 
quence of the conjunction, it is worthy of 
note that owing to the utter and absolute in- 
difference on the part of Purush which is 
above time and variability on the part of 
Prakriti denoting in her the equipoise 
of the gunas, it is She alone that conceives 
and yields up, in consequence, the seven-fold 
principles begining with Mahat etc. making 
up the Universe without Purush being in the 
least affected by her in any way. This is the 
reason why the word ardhagarbhd ( ^t^TH? ) 



{lit : half-descendants) has been used in the 
text. The text says further that the seven- 
fold principles are the germinal sperms or 
seeds, so to speak, for the evolution of the 
whole universe and are contained in a 
portion of the Omnipresent Ueity- Vishnu 
for which reason the phrase T?f^f! ft^firPl! 
i.e. in a portion, we find in the text. 

Now Purush or the Psyche being 
entirely and absolutely indifferent, very 

P s y che ox ^ 

Purusk. little has it left with us at the present 

stage of enquiry to deal with. We shall 
therefore concern ourselves with Prakriti 
or Nature for the present. 

By Prakriti, Kapil wants us to under- 

Prakriti o r Stand the equipoise state which the three cor- 
relative powers or qualities have arrived at. 
Any differentiation being impossible in the 
Prakriti which is no other than the gunas 
in equilibrium, Prakriti is also technically 
termed as \hQ Avyakta (^o^IB) — the Undiffer- 
entiated or the Imperceptible. 
The three gunas, however, which in 
their equilibrium constitute Prakriti or the 



Evolvent are (i) Satva {^'^) or Passivity, 

(ii) Rajas {\^^) or Activity, and (iii) Tamas characteri- 
sation of the 
(ffOT) or Inertia. gunas, 

(I) Satva is the passive principle reveal- 
ing itself at it does in receptivity, quickness, 
lightness, luminousity and transperency of 
things. It is by the virtue of this principle 
that things are capable of being worked 
upon or that they become intelligible or they 
are conducive to pleasure (^^). 

(II) Rajas is the active principle which 
is not only mobile by its very nature but 
which also galvanizes both the Satva and 
Tamas into functional activities of their own. 
Revealing itself as it does in strivings it is 
contributive to pain or misery (^i^lf). \ 

(III) Tamas is the principle of inert- 
ness or inertia which retards motion and 
growth. It is this principle of inertia that 
not only deludes us but obscures as well 
the real nature of things or adds to their 

weight (?ftf ]^^ g^-^m?:^). 

Now these gunas—Satva, Rajas, and 
Tamas, are characterised by their essential 
correlativity so much so that they are 


(a) Universally Co-existent ; (U) Universally 
Inter-dependent, (c) Universally Inter-muta- 
tive and lastly {d^ Universally Inter-anta- 
gonistic. Thus, — 

(a) They are Universally Co-existent, 
because the existence of one of the gunas 
requires the existence of the other two as 
necessary accompaniments. 

(b) But from the fact that they are 
Universally co-existent and concommittant 
as they are equally fundamental, it follows 
that they stand to one another in relation 
of mutual inter 'dependence so that none 
of them can have any functional activity 
of its own without the co-operation of the 
other two. Again, 

{c) The gunas being thus mutually 
dependent upon one another, they are 
also inter-mutative so that just as heat is 
convertible into electricity so anyone of the 
gunas may become converted into one or 
the other of the remaining two gunas. And 

(d) These ^^;2^^ stand to one another 
in relation as well of Universal inter- antagon- 
ism. Though these are always present as 



constituent factors making up the being 
of a thing yet they are not present in 
the same degree of intensity and quantity. 
These gunas are always at war with 
one another in the course of which 
one or the other gets stronger and predo- 
minates over the other two in intensity 
giving to a particular phenomenon in 
which the particular guna predominates, 
a certain form, colour and character after 
its own. 

Now it is these powers of 5'^/e^^-Passivity, 
Rajas-KcXAwiiy and Tamas-lntn'vd, reaching 
their equilibrium at the dissolution of the 
previous evolution that constitute Prakritt\ 

or Evolvent — Nature. 


The categories of the Sankhya system 
are classified mainly into four groups, viz— 

{a) That which is simply Prdkriti ot 

{b) That which is both Prakriti-Vikriii 
/>., Evolute as well as Evolvent. 

{c) That which is simply Vikritii.e., 
Evolute only. 

(d) That which is Neither. 


An epitome of jainism. 

Of these four principal categories, the first 
is that which is simply Prakriti or Evolvent, 

The reason ' 

y,hy PmkriH denoting in itself the equilibrium of the 

IS called the ° ^ 

rootless Root ^^;^^^-powers or forces. Being itself not 
derived from anything else as its root 
(cause), it is called the Rootless (causeless)- 
Evolvent (^JJ$IT Hlff?!) of everything else, ex- 
cepting the /^^jK^^^ or P//r/^j^ which is neither 
evolvent nor evolute. Moreover if we were 
to look again for a separate root for this 
Rootless-Evolvent (causeless cause) we 
should have, say the Sdnkhyas, regressus 
ad infinitum unwarranted by all manner 
of evidence. Prakriti, therefore, is the First 


Now the state of equilibrium of several 

What is equ" ^oxc^s is that State in which any one of those 

Forces. forces exactly nutralizes the effects of all 

other. And the disturbance of the same 

would mean that state in which some 

force (or forces) produces its own effects 
though modified to some extent by the 
presence of others. 

But the state of equilibrium of the three 
^tmas, the Ultimate Imperceptible Cause, 



Prakriti — in which any one of the several 
forces Satva, Rajas and Jamas, standing 


to one another in relation of equality, f "^ Distur- 

^ ' banceof 

exactly nutralizes the effects of the other s^nas. 
two and into which in consequence the 
whole universe of diverse names and forms 
dissolves at the end of the previous cycle, — 
is unstable in the sense that when the 
season, for the fruition of the seeds of 
sown by way of Jivas deeds done in 
the previous period of their existence, 
arises, the equilibrium receives an impact 
as it were and gets disturbed. By this 
disturbance of the equilibrium of forces, 
the Sdnkkyas mean that the state in which 
some one force (or forces — Satva, Rajas 
and Tamas) predominates over the other in 
intensity and produces with the help of the 
others its own effects though modified to 
some extent by the presence of those which 
help in the production. 


This is how from a single ultimate and un- 
differentiated homogeneous Cause — Mu/d 
Prakriti or iht Root-evolvent comes to being 
the Universe with all its amazing para- 



phernalia of diversities and differences in 
names and forms according to the merits and 
demerits of the y/z^^j. 

But this coming to being of the Universe, 
No absolute this evoUition from the state of homogeniety 

Time. ... . . 

to heterogeneity is but a process in time. 
Time has no absolute existence with the 
Sankkyas, It reveals itself as a series or 
succession ; and evolution being but a process 
in time, it must have a c rtain order of sue 
cession. The successive order of evolution 
as held by the Sdnkhyas is as follows : — 

From the Root-evolvent Prakriti, first 
comes to being Mahat with which begins 
the set which is both evolvent and-evolute. 
From Mahat (^f cf) appears Akankdr {^'^^\X) 
which in turn yields up Manah (?(5T')> the 
ten Indriyas (^srjfJgJi), and the five tan- 
m&iras (t^^rT^tcfl) with which end the series 
of the evolvent-and-evolute (qiffhf^irfrl). 

The simple evolutes are but the five 
Bkutas (^cTT'.) originating from the five tan 
mdtrds or the elemental rudiments. 

But Purush, the Psychd or the soul is 
neither evolvent nor evolute. Being eternal 
it stands outside the history of developement. 



Admitting in it no change which is 

but a property of time, it is above 

time, whereas all developement is in time. 

Itself being purely absolute, it really 

enters into no relation either with Prakriti, 

the Evolvent or with its subsequent 

variations — Vikriti. 

Now, of the above series of evolvent andj 

evolutes, the Mahat, the Akankdr and the Organs- 
internal and 

Manas constitute what is called Antahkaran External. 

or the Internal Organ, the External organs, 

Bahihkaran, being the five organs of sense 

(^T^f^J^l) viz., the ear, the skin, the eyes, 

the tongue, the nose plus the five organs of 

action (^i^f%a) viz. speech, hand, feet, and 

the organs of excretion and of generation. 

But the question is, what is Mahat — the 

first offsprinsf of the Root-evolvent or , (J) i"^® 
^ ^ Mahat 

Prakriti ^.v\A first item as well of the Internal 
Organ or Antahkaran ? 

The word Mahat has for its synonym 
Bucldhz-lnteWect, Intellection ( ^tzt^^t^ ) 
is the function (^^) of the Intellect. But 
intellection is a kind of intellectual activity 
of determinate character and activity being 
identical with what is active, intellection 





adhyavas&yay hold the Sdnkhyas, is the same 
with Intellect or Buddhi. T\i^ significance of 
certitude is its characteristic indication. 
It is best revealed as the decisive principle 
in the oughtness of a particular thought and 
action in the different spheres of our life. 

But is intellection a purely psychical 
process ? 

*No', reply the Sdnkhyas^ *as it is charac- 
terised by the presence of the three-fold rudi- 
mentary currents under particular combina- 
tion and condition which is nothing but the 
is stmpieT^'^ integration and intellectualisation born of the 
disturbance of the gunas in equipoise where- 
as the Purushy the Psyche or the Soul being 
neither evolvent nor evolute, is quite opposite 
of them both i.e. Absolutely Simple, 

Next the word Ahankdr is synonymous 
with Abhimdn, pride or conceit, bearing the 
sense of self-estimation or self-consciousness 
as conveyed in such expressions in our ordi- 
nary parlance as 'I am : and I feel all these 
that surround me are mine : 1 can use them as 
materials oimy knowledge to answer my own 
purpose.' The S&nkkyas say that just as he 
who makes the jar is called Kumbhakdr or 




the Jar-maker : so what generates the notion 
of subjectivity, personality or I-ness (ig[^*vn^) 
is called Ahankdr. Thus it is a principle 
(ffc^) of differentiation, individuation and sub 
jectification revealed in the form of self- 
consciousness and is intellectual in essence 
proceeding as it does from intellection. 

This Ahankdra, when affected by the 
Sattva-^c^, evolves the eleven organs and 
when affected by the Tama guna, it evolves 
the five Tanmdtras. The \S\\xdi guna, Rajas, 
is manifested in the activity implied in this 
two-fold creation. 

These are the five elemental essences 

viz., visibility, audibility, the capacity of 

, . , I . (HI) Tan- 

producmg odour, the capacity of producing matras. 

taste, and tangibility. The principle which 
generates the notion of subjectivity (ahan- 
k&ra), also generates under the influence of 
inertia or r{^\, the five rudimentary essen- 
ces or Tanmdtrds. 

Just as the Tanmdtrds are evolved by 
Ahankdra under the influence of the qualitv .,, ^, , 

^ -^ IV. The ele- 

of fT^:, SO the eleven organs are evolved ^^" organs. 
by the same principle under the influence of 
the quality of ^coT (Sattva). The eleven organs 



include Hif^-mind the central co-ordinating 
organ which corresponds to the 'central sense' 
or * common sense' admitted by Aristotle in 
his ''De Anima\ 

The five MaMbhutas or gross elements 
V. The five ^^^' ^^^^h, water, fire, air and ether, are res- 
pectively produced by the corresponding 
Tanm&trds or suitable essences, viz. smell, 
taste, form, touch and sound. The gross 
elements have each an organ corresponding 
to it. Thus, earth, water, fire, air and ether 
have for their organs, nose, tongue, eyes, 
skin and ear, respectively. 

These five Mahdbhutas and the eleven 
organs constitute what the S^nkhyas call 
the sixteen vzkdraS'Varza^zons. 

The five gross elements are the ultimate 
outward limits of cosmic evolution just as 
Prakriti is the ultimate limit in the opposite 

Last of all, we mention, Purusha, the 
^5th tattva ; we do so, not because Purusha 
is chronologically the last which it is 
certainly not, but because it is outside 
the cosmic evolution and is a distinctly 
separate principle by itself. It is, as the 


VI. Purusha 


Kdrikd says, 5T vmf^\ f ftlff^i: ; i^e. neither 

evolvent nor evolute. This Purusha is never purush is 

in bondage and is outside time. It stands 

absolutely apart from Prakriti and her 

products. Yet owing to its proximity to 

-ff?^^<^^z (Intellect), it seems to think that it 

enjoys and suffers, while in reality, it is 

above weal or woe. It is, always, free and 

its apparent bondage disappears as soon as 

it becomes cognisant of its true nature. 

The Seshvara S^nkhya or, as it is more 

often called the Yoga system is, in fact, 

the Sankhya system itself, only modified to 

satisfy the religfious side of human nature. 

It develops a system of practical discipline, 

mainly ethical and psychological by which 

concentration of thought could be attained. 

Kapila had declared that the existence 

of Ishvara God did not admit of proof. Thsism of 


Patanjali controverts this assertion and 
proceeds to prove the existence of God by 
an argument which, as Maxmuller remarks, 
reminds one of the theistic argument of 
Eleanther and Boethin. Patanjali's argument 
as explained by Bhoja, is that different de- 



grees of excellences such as omniscience, 
greatnesss, smallness etc., proves the exis- 
tence of a Being possessing the non plus 
ultra of excellence. This Being, Ishvara, 
was, with the yogins^ originally, no other 
than One among many Purushas, only with 
this difference that Ishvara had never been 
implicated in metempsychosis and was 
supreme in every sense. 

Whether this theism of Patanjalis 
Pataniali Philosophy is consistent with its S^nkhya 
^" ^P^* basis is often disputed. The simplest 
solution seems to be that Kapila was never 
directly hostile to theism, but was rather 
indifferent in his attitude towards the 
question and that this made it possible for 
Patanjali to foist his theistic yoga upon 
the S^nkhya philosophy. 

In the Yoga system, however, no such 
importance has been accorded to God as 

Soleity IS the ^ 

summum bo- qquM very Well be expected, and as we find 

num oiyoga, ' ^ 

in such European systems, otherwise 
analogous with the yoga, as those of 
Martineau, Lotze and other Persona! 
Idealists. Devotion to God, in Patanjalis 
system, is merely one of Kaivalya or Soleity 



which is the highest object of the 
K(?^^2; system. 

NyAya has always been translated by 
*logic', and there are important considerations 

'N V ^ V s' 1 s 

which partially justify such an interpretation not merely 
of the system. For, here, in the Nyaya 
system, a greater amount of space has been 
allowed to logical questions than in any of 
the other systems of Indian Philosophy, and, 
the theory of inference {antimdn) is, undoub- 
tedly the predominant feature of the system. 
Nevertheless, we must not imagine that 
Nydya Sutras are mere treatises on Formal 
Logic. Logic is not the sole nor even the JpNyTya'*^^ 
chief aim of Gotama's, Philosophy. Its chief 
end like that of all other Indian systems, is 
the attainment of liberation or as the Nyaya 
calls it, Nihshreyasa, the non plus ultra of 
blessedness. This liberation which the Nyaya 
Philosophy promises to all, is not a state of 
pure unmixed pleasure, as the Ved^ntin 
affirms, but a state of pleasure which sup- 
poses pain as its pre-condition. In fact, 
the doctrine of a pure continuous happiness 
as the summum bonum of life, is, according 



to the Naiy^yika, a chimera : it is a psycho- 

gical fallacy to assert that any such state 

exists, for, pleasure is always accompanied 

by pain and without pain there could be no 


Liberation, thus according to the Ny&ya, 

is a state of negative pleasure and is pro- 
Liberation , , , 1 |. r • T-i 
of 'Ny&ya' duced by deliverance from pain. 1 he next 

— ^how it is . • ir 1 

attained. question that naturally presents itself to the 
Naiy^yika, is * how this deliverance is to 
be secured ?' Liberation, says the Naiyayika, 
arises from the knowledge of the truth, the 
knowledge of the cause of pain and of the 
means of its removal. Liberation, however, 
must not be supposed to arise immediately 
after the knowledge of the truth has been 
attained, for, the causes of pain form a 
series which can only be annihilated in suc- 
cession, and succession is a process in time. 
The series of the sucessive causes of pain 
is : (i) false notions (mithya^nanani)^ giving 
rise to (2) faults {doshani) which lead to 
(3) activity {karma) which again is the cause 
of birth (ianmd) and birth is the cause of 
pain (dukkhd). Hence in order to shake 
off pain we have to strike at the very root 



vizy Mithyagnanain, diwd the annihilation of 
Mithyagnanam will be followed by the anni- 
hilation of the entire series of causes. 

The Naiyayika proceeds to prove the 

existence of God by an argument which is The is tic 

° argument of 

much like what is known as the cosmoloo^i- ^^® Nyaya. 
cal argument in the European Pholosophy. 
Like the latter, the Naiyayika's proof also 
reasons from the world as effect to God as 
its First Cause : ' fgmT%^ ^^^^ ^l^c^Ic[, 
• The four niahQi,bhutas require, as effects, a 

This, however, looks, at first sight, like Effect-hood 

implies a n 

a petitio principii ; for, to admit that a intelligent 

^ agentto 

thing is an effect, is to say that it has a effectuate. 
cause. The real difficulty lies, it will be 
said, not in showing that an effect must 
have a cause but in proving that a thing is 
an effect, that it has a ^g or a mark pos- 
sessed by the Paksha by means of which, 
its 5T5^ccr (effect-hood) can be inferred. The 
Naiydyika finds such a mark in ^T^g^c^ or 
the fact of possessing parts. Thus i9T^?j^ccC 
(being possessed of parts) leads to ^^c^ 
(effect-hood) and 5r«€lc^ to Iffh^Ts^c^ (the fact 
of being effectuated or caused by an agent). 



But the Naiy^yika does not stop at the 
conception of a mere cause which a purely 
cosmological argument leads to, but shows 
that Iffh^fs^^ or ^T^c^ (the fact of being 
effectuated or produced) implies, not only 
an agent but an intelligent agent — '^f^^cT 



jTiie world ts the {>ermutattoxi ana combination oi 
atoms — Oauses of differences — Science fails to ex|)lain — 
Tnc ^rinci|>les of causation — Criticism of Mills concef)- 
tton of tkc law of causation — Patient and Agent — The 
Jam vie'w of causation and compound evolution. 

Having discussed in a previous chapter 

U n i ve r s e 
how we look upon the Universe as self- "eing a seif- 


existent something having its being from all ""'*• 
eternity, and having briefly reviewed as 
well the other principal systems of thought 
bearing mainly on cosmology, we are led 
to enquire into how, according to our 
philosophy, old things change giving place 
to newer combinations and forms. We 
have seen that the Universe taken as one 
undivided whole must be in-create, eternal, 
self-existent and ever-permanent. But 
viewed from the standpoint of its inter- 
related parts, it is transitory, phenomenal 
and evanascent. And it goes without 
saying that the assertion of self-existent 
is simply an indirect denial of creation 



involving as it does the idea of an exis- 
God"*^ ° tence without beginning. But this tanta- 
mounts to a veritable denial of an extra- 
cosmic personal God who builds the cosmos 
out of the chaotic matter which, according to 
the creationists and other deists, lay diffused 
homogeneously filling up the entire space, 
at the dissolution of the Universe with the 
end of the so-called previous cycle or created 
it out of Himself or His own energy (at a 
particular point of time) through a kind of 
dialectic process as taught in the other 
theistic systems of philosophy such as the 
Yoga, the Ny^ya or the Ved^nta. 

The question, therefore, is, if God is 
denied where are we to look for a rational 

If no God 

whence this solution for the various mysteries which 


of Nature? underlie the flashes of lightning dazzling 
our vision, or the thundering cataracts 
deafning our ears ? Is it that the sprouting 
forth of the small seed bringing into 
existence a big tree, the bursting of the 
eggshells giving birth to beautifully moving 
bipeds and a variety of other awe-inspiring 
phenomenal changes, astonishingly mysteri- 
ous in character, which not only infuse in us 




a feeling of wonder and admiration but 

morally prevail upon us to posit and believe, 

as it were, in an Intelligent Designer and 

Maker behind,— is it that all these and the 

like changes are /but so many results of 

chances? Wherein lies the necessity and 

utility of the philosophy then, if it denies 

God but cannot reasonably account for the 

amazing occurances in the world of 

phenomena ? 

Indeed and it is worth while to remark Universe-a 


that a patient perusual of the preceding ^.^^ ^°^j, 
pages on the predicaments, their character ^^<^"^s. 
and their devolopments will convince anyone 
in the truth of the summary statement we 
make here that speaking of the Universe 
as a whole or in part, it is but permu- 
tations and combinations of our four primary 
rudiments viz,^ time, space, soul and Pudgal 
matter. These rudiments are resolvable into 
the minutest of their minute parts which give 
a limit to fresh divisions by not admitting 
of any further analysis. 

Now a study of the nature of these 
ultimate ingredients reveals to us that 
these — each and everyone — are surcharg- 

ed with innumerable powers having the 
Corrobora P^^^^^^^^'^^X ^^ being developed in various 
sdencc/'^^"' ways and of bringing as well into existence 
such an infinite variety of their permutations 
and combinations which will account for 
the amazing phases and phenomena of 
Nature. Even modern science has had to 
acknowledge the truth of this. Chemistry 
demonstrates beyond doubt that all com- 
pound substances owe their existence to 
the permutations and combinations of the 
atoms of Hydrozen, Oxygen, Nitrogen, 
and Carbon etc. — Heat, light, electricity, 
hold Physics, are but different arrange- 
ments of molecules-in-motion constituting 
the same. Biology teaches that all 
organisms — vegitable or animal — are only 
composed of cells under a variety of their 
combinations. This is not all. Science dives 
deep to fathom the amazing mysteries 
underlying the differences between things 
chemical, physical or biological ; and like a 
master-surgeon she dissects and analyses 
Nature and attributes the cause of the 
mutual differences between things to the said 
principle of permutation and combination 




of atoms, molecules or cells forming the 
structure and character of the chemical, 
physical or biological evolution. Thus 
even according to the researches of modern 
science, Universe is nothing more than an 
ever changing permutations and combina- 
tions of the atoms, molecules and cells 
forming the chacter and composition of the 

But what are permutations and combina- 
tions which seem to play the part of unitary 
method as it were in explaining the differ- 
ences and diversities in and through which 
the Universe reveals to us its being ? 
Permutation and Combination, we know, 
are but processes of mathematical calcula- 
tions to find order in the atomic or molecular 
arrangement of things having their being 
in time and space. We all know that in 
the science of mathematics, the members 
I, 2, 3, 4 etc. or a, b, c, d, and the like are 
but so many symbols, each giving us a 
definite idea of something conditioned as 
represented by the same. And Permutation 
is their arrangement in a line reference 
being had to the order of sequence ; as for 

What is 
P e r m u t a- 


instance, a-b and b-a are but two permuta- 
tion, tions of a and b. Similarly Combination is 
their arrangement in groups without re-' 
ference to the order of sequence ; as for 
example, 'a-b-c' is a combination involving 

a, b, and c, and *b-a-c' is but another com- 
bination, both consisting simply of a, b, 
and c, grouped together. In Combination, 
it is worthy of note, we take notice only 
of the presence or absence of a certain 

. thing and pay no regard to its place in order 
of time and space. There being but a, 

b, c, d and so on, it finds out only how 
many combinations could there possibly 
arise by taking at a time the two, three, or 
four of the symbols. 

While investigating into the structure 

Application ^j^j composition of chemical things we sub- 
of the laws ^ ^ 

°fon"Tn^d stitute, — H, N, O, C as symbolic represent- 

combination. ^^j^^ ^f Hydrozen, Nitrogen, Oxygen and 

Carbon, the ultimate rudiments or atoms 
of which are innumerable in number, in the 
places of a, b, c, d. Now experiment shows 
that it is due to the innumerable variety of 
atomic combinations of H, N, O and C. ; that 
we have differences between the different 



compounds. To take Carbo-hydrates and 

fats for examples: Analysis shows carbo- . ^ ^. 

^ in finding 

hydrates to be a compound of C, H, O ; and « " ^ ^ ^^\ 

J ^ causesof 

if we analyse fats, we get the same three f^^^-^g"^^" 
chemical elements. Therefore the question 
is : What makes for the differences both in 
colour, character and configuration between 
the two compounds, the component parts of 
a molecule of carbo-hydrate being found to 
consist of Cg Hjg Og ; and a molecule of 
fat to consist of Q^^ Hgg Og. Then, again, 
to take the cases of Strychnine, Quinine, 
and Gluten : Analysis of these three shows 
them to be but combinations of C.H.N.O. 
And it is needless to add that the three 
compounds are wholly different from one 
another. Strychnine and quinine are poison- 
ous whereas gluten is nutritious. A molecule 
of quinine is a combination of C^^H N^ 
Og whereas a molecule of strychnine is a 
combination of C^^ H^^ N^ and O^. 

Now from a reflective study of the results 


of the above analysis one mia^ht venture to explanation 

^ as to the 

remark that the mutual differences existing- ^,^"^^^ ^^ 

o difference. 

either between carbo-hydrate and fat or 
between strychnine and quinine, are due, 



it is apparent, to the numerical differences 
in the combination of the component atoms 


Muir on the constituting^ the structure of a molecule of 

point in ques- ^ 

tion. each of them. But is the numerical differ- 

ences in the combination adequate to explain 
the causes of differences in question ? The 
molecule of Ammonium of Cyanate is com- 
posed of two atoms of Nitrogen, one atom 
of Oxygen, one atom of Carbon, and four 
atoms of Hydrogen ; and the molecule of 
Urea is composed of the same number of 
the same atoms. How, then, can the pro- 
perties of the two molecules be different 
from one another ? '* What can that circum- 
stance be", rightly enquires Pattison Muir in 
answer to the above question, ''except the 
arrangement of the atoms that compose the 
molecules ?" 

But the answer of Pattison Muir oriven 
in the form of interrogation, will it satisfy 
the reflecting mind yearning for a rational 
solution for the differences in question in 
things we everyday find around us ? To 
say that the difference is due to the differ- 
ence in the arrangement of atoms forming 
the composition of the two molecules is to 



simply state a fact. It is an attempt to Scientific ex- 
" ^ ^ planation is 

explain X by Y both of which are unknown inadequete. 
quantities. It does not clear up the mystery 
that underlies the real question at issue. 
The question is : Whence is the difference ? 
Every other condition being the same, what 
is it that leads to the difference in the com- 
bination of the component parts forming the ' 
conposition of the two compounds } Modern 
science is quite out at sea here and her - 
helm of Reason is lost. She can explain 
how things happen but gets hopelessly 
comfounded and confused to answer why 
they do so. And unless this 'Why' is cleared 
up, we cannot expect to get at the reason 
that lies behind the differences in the world 
of phenomena. 

The reason why modern science cannot 

^1 . . . ,. ... The two 

answer the point \\\ question, lies simply in pindples of 

the fact that she takes only a partial view 
of things and does not look straight to the 
two principles of Causation. We have stated 
that the Universe is a system of interrelated 
parts and the parts, as such, are conditioned. 
But things conditioned, it is a truism to 
say, are but products, effects of something 



else which is termed as cause. A cause is 
stantiaiand what brings about an ^^^^Z, the latter being 
what follows from the cause. Such being 
the definitions, in general, of the cause and 
the effect, many a logician have drawn a 
line of distinction between the circumstances 
' and the active agents which co-operate to 

bring about an effect. One has been termed as 
the Substantial cause and the other as Deter- 
mining or Efjictent cause otherwise known as 
Patient and Agent in European logic. The 
reason why such distinction is drawn consists 
in this. We see the potter manufactures the 
jar out of clay by means of Danda-chakray — 
the mill-stone-and-the-lever. Thejaristhus 
the product or effect of the co-operation of 
clay, the lever, the mill-stone, and the potter 
i.e. the manufacturer himself. Such being 
the case, all these beginning with clay must 
have to be taken as the cause, the effect of 
which is the jar — the product or the output 
of the co-operation ; for a cause is the 
aggregate of all such accidents both in 
the agents and the patients as concur in 
production of the effect propounded. The 
manufacturer, the mill -stone and the like have 



all co-operated indeed to bring about the jar ; 
but they have got their peculiar functions of Nature and 
their own. So long the jar is there, clay t"h V°"t^w o 
is there too. The actual existence of the plained.^ ^'^ 
jar cannot come to be as such if you extract 
out clay from it. But after the production 
of the jar, if the manufacturer or the mill- 
stone is separated from the jar, it is not 
in the least affected. Again the function of 
the manufacturer is not the same with that 
of the mill-stone or the lever or clay even. 
It is clay that is cast into the mould 
and moulded into the form of the jar, and 
it is for this reason that clay is named as 
ih^ substantial cause and that by means of 
which the effect already existing impercep- 
tibly in the substantial cause is brought 
about or developed into a perceptible form 
is the efficient or determining cause. That 
without which nothing can there be, that 
which invariably precedes something else 
which is but an effect, is the true nature 
of the cause. When we see that the jar 
cannot come into existence either without 
the manufacturer or without the mill-stone, 
and the lever, it follows a priori therefore 



that the manufacturer, the wheel, the lever 
are also but causes which combine in the 
production of the jar. 

It is thus clear that every product or 
Every effect ^ff^^^ requires also a Determining cause (in 
Determinfng addition to the Substantial one) to bring the 
same into actual existence. We have stated 
already that the primary ingredients — each 
and every one of these — are surcharged 
with infinite powers of their own having the 
potentiality of being developed in innumer- 
able ways and these being but materials 
giving constitution and structure to all 
earthly existences are worked upon by the 
Determining cause to bring the same into 
varieties of combinations. And therefore it 
is due to the intervention of this Determining 
cause that we find the difference in the 
arrangements of atoms constituting the 
structure of the two molecules of Ammonium 
of cyanate and of Urea and it is this that 
accounts as well for other various differences 
in things in all the three worlds, chemical, 
physical and biological. But would not 
the ascription of Causality to the substance 
which is worked upon involve the difficulty 



of making the Patient to be the Agent ? 

Indeed there is a school of logic predomi- 
nent in these days of scientific culture which 
refuses to make any distinction between 
the Determining cause and the Substantial 

Mill on the 

cause in the law of causation. Even the Determining 

cause and 

most classical of the English logicians, as Substantial 


Mr. Mill, has taken exception to this dis- 
tinction. *'In most cases of causation," writes 
Mill, ''a distinction is commonly drawn 
between something which acts and some 
other thing which is acted upon, between an 
agent and 2. patient. Both of these, it would 
be universally allowed, are conditions of the 
phenomenon ; but it would be thought absurd 
to call the latter the cause — that title being 
reserved for the former." 

The distinction, contends Mr. Mill in sup« 
port, is a verbal one and not real, because 

of its vanishing on examination : for the of Mill. 

object which is acted upon and which is 

considered as the scene in which the effect 

takes place is commonly included in the 

phrase by which the effect is spoken of, so 

that if it were also reckoned as a part of 

the cause, the seeming incongruity would 


Illustrat i o n 


arise of its being supposed to cause itself. 
To cite an instance we have the faliino of 
bodies. *'VVhat is the cause which makes 
a stone fall ?" observes Mill, "and if the 
con^ntion"'' answer had been 'the stone itself the 
expression would have been in apparent 
contradiction to the meanino^ of the word 
cause. The stone, therefore, is conceived as 
the patient and the earth (or according to 
the common and most unphilosophical prac- 
tice, an occult quality of the earth) is repre- 
sented as the agent or cause. But that 
there is nothing fundamental in the distinc- 
tion may be seen from this that it is quite 
possible to conceive the stone as causing 
its own fall provided the language employed 
be such as to save the mere verbal incon- 
gruity. We might say that the stone 
moves towards the earth by the properties 
of the matter composing it, and according 
to this mode of presenting the phenomenon, 
the stone itself might without impropriety 
be called the agent ; though to save the 
established doctrine of the inactivity of 
matter, men usually prefer here also to 
ascribe the effect to an occult quality and 


say that the cause is not the stone itself 
but the weight or gravitation of the stone/' 

"Those who have contended for a radical 
distinction between agents and patients have The distinc- 
generally conceived the agent as that which cai fiction, 
causes some state of, or some change in the 
state of another object which is called the 
patient. But a little reflection will show 
that the license, we assume of speaking of 
phenomena as states of the various objects 
which take part in them (an artifice of which 
so much use has been made by some philo- 
sophers. Brown, in particular, for the appa- 
rent explanation of phenomena) is simply a 
sort of logical fiction, useful sometimes as 
one among several modes of expression but 
which should never be supposed to be the 
enunciation of a scientific truth. Even those 
attributes of an object which might seem 
with greatest propriety to be called states of 
the object itself, its sensible qualities its 
colour, hardness, shape and the like are in 
reality ( as no one has painted out more 
clearly than Brown himself ) phenomena of 
causation in which the substance is distinctly 
the agent or producing cause, the patient 


a 1 w a y s 


being our own organs and those of other 
Patients are sentient beings. What we call states of 
objects, are always sequences into which the 
objects enter generally as antecedents or 
causes ; and things are never more active 
than in the production of those phenomena 
in which they are said to be acted upon. 
Thus in the example of a stone falling to the 
earth, according to the theory of gravitation 
the stone is as much an agent as the earth, 
which not only attracts but is itself attracted 
by the stone. In the case of a sensation 
produced in our organs, the laws of our 
organism and even those of our minds are as 
directly operative in determining the effect 
produced as the laws of the outward object. 
Though we call prussic acid the agent of a 
person's death, the whole of the vital and 
organic properties of the patient are as 
actively instrumental as the poison in the 
chain of effects which so rapidly terminates 
his sentient existence. In the process of 
education we may call the teacher the agent 
and the scholar only the material acted upon. 
Yet in truth all the facts which pre-existed 
in the scholar's mind exert either co-opera- 


not identical. 


ting or counteracting agencies in relation to 
the teacher's efforts. It is not light alone 
which is the agent in vision but light coupled 
with the active properties of the eye and 
brain and with those of the visible object. 
The distinction between agent and patient 
is merely verbal '.patients are ahvays agents!' 
Taking stands on these and the like 

arguments, Hume, Whately and Mill and ^/^^'j^^^i^" 
^ ' ' -^ of Mill — Pa- 

many other scholars of the same attitude of ^^^ijMddri\x^ 
mind under European culture made them- 
selves so bold as to attribute weakness to 
the exponents of our philosophy in regard 
to our drawing a sharp line of distinction 
as between the Determining cause and the 
Substantial QdiUS^. And as the Jain cosmology 
is based on the law pf causation as stated 
herein before, it is imperative to enter into 
an examination, by the way, of Mill's doctrine 
on this point. 

Let us begin with the remark at the 
outset, that the updddn or substantial cause 
and patient of the European logicians are 
not one and the same either in mean in or or 
in their bearing. Nowhere in our works 
on the subject has it been taught that the 


KArakas' or 
the cases in 
our grammar 
and their 


substantial cause has not the least possible 
agency in any form in the causation of 
things. 'Kdrak' — case, in our grammar, is 
the general term signifying agency and the 
nominative, objective, ablative and the like 
are but specific terms implying different 
forms of the functional activity of the cases. 
The nominative, objective and the like, — they 
all act or operate no doubt ; but they never 
act of themselves and in the same way, form 
and matter. Each of the cases has to act 
differently and in its own way. By the 
term 'KriyS! — verb, we generally understand 
the changes in their most gross and visible 
form ; but in any case, we should not lose 
sight of the important fact that visible 
changes are but resultants of the co-opera- 
tion of all the cases beginning with the 
chief agent or the nominative in bringing 
about a phenomenon. 

Now though each of the various cases 
has its own agency peculiar to itself ; 
the reason why they are not all of them 
attributed with the principal agency will be 
found in the fact that the agency of the 
chief or the nominative is not of the same 



type and character as that of the other cases. 
The chief assent or the nominative case is 

The agency 

quite independent of the functional activities of theNomi- 

^ *■ native is not 

of the Other cases which hold but a subordi- ?^ the same 

type charac- 

nate position in relation to the principal ag^e^cies *of 
agent in so far its acting of its own accord 
is concerned. For, whatever is powerless 
to act of itself, must be dependant — like the 
ball in motion — on another for its activities. 
The ball has the power to roll on ; heat 
has the power to expand bodies : but the 
ball would not roll or of itself, unless it is set 
in motion ; nor heat will expand bodies, unless 
the two, heat and body, are bought in close 
relationship to each other. This is the 
reason why these are said to be dependant 
on the agency of something else which 
must be competent enough to set the ball 
in motion or to bring the two in such rela- 
tion as . will enable the heat to act on the 
body so as to expand it. But it may be 
contended that at times, when we say. 
'The ball rolls' or 'heat expands bodies' 
we really ascribe in our speech independence 
and agency to them so much so that we 
have to parse the words *bair or 'heat' as 


An epitome of jainism 

but nominatives to the verbs 'rolls' or 
'expands.' Indeed we do so in such and 

Where the 

chief agency similar Other expressions as, 'the stone is 

IS super-im- ^ 

posed on the fajjina' or the 'sword cuts well.' And the 

depe n d a n t ^ 

agent? question is, Why do we do so? What is 

it that prevails upon to acknowledge the 
independence of what we really know to be 
of dependant character ? To all this we 
have but to submit in reply that such forms 
of expressions are indeed resorted to when 
the principal agent stands beyond the range 
of our vision or where the subordinate 
agents are required to show as if they were 
playing the role of the principal agent not- 
withstanding the actual presence of the 
latter. When the other agents stand in 
close proximity with the principal, it is then 
that the subordinate character of their 
position and function becomes apparent. 
But where the principal stands in the 
background there the one or the other 
of the subordinate agents stands out as the 
principal in as much as these have their 
agencies in their respective functional acti- 
vities and this explain.s the ascription of 
primary agency to the ball, heat, or to the 



sword, in the above mode of our speech. In 
the case of the expression 'the stone is „ 

^ H o w the 

falling to the earth', as cited by Mill, we can causality of 

«^ ' s II b s t (I 71 ce 

remark that here the principal agency of .vorkedVpon 
that by dint of which all bodies attract one 
another, whose law the stone dares not 
disobey, or which mysteriously abiding in 
the stone and the earth actuates them as it 
were from within, not having been desidera- 
ted to stand out, the stone though a patient 
{Updddn,) yet it puts on the appearances of 
both the patient as well as of the agent. It 
is but a recognised rule in our grammar that 
where we find a verb {kriyd) change but no 
nominative or agent as governinqr the same, 
there the change is presumed to be going 
on of itself. And this is how we meet Mill's 
objection to the ascription of causality to the 
patient — Updddn. 

Now to resume the thread of our discus- 
sion as to the causes of differences in the 
Universe of phenomena around us with the 
remark that law of causation is but a law 
of change. Every change stands in relation 
of antecedent and consequent that is known 
to us as the relativity of the cause and 



the effect. Of these two terms the second 
is the phenomenon of changes, the first 


of causation beinor what brinpfs about the change i.e. 

so stretched & o o 

Godbeh?nd^ the cause. The cause as we have dis- 
cussed above is divided into two kinds — the 
Determining and the Substantial. We have 
invariably seen that in every act of causation 
these two co-operate together to bring 
about a change, a phenomenon, an effect; 
And it having been held that every change 
must have an antecedent cause, it seems 
naturally to follow that the universe itself 
being but an eternal process of becoming, 
mutability being its very nature, it must 
have a cause antecedent to its becoming as 
such ; and thus in their zealous attempt 
at the ascertainment as to the nature of 
this antecedent condition some have unfor- 
tunately stretched this principle of causation 
to such an extent as to reach its breaking 
point. They have gone so far as to posit 
a God, an extra-cosmic Personal Ruler of 
the Universe, creating, regulating and con- 
trolling the changes and affairs of the 
Universe from without just as a potter 
would do with regard to the manufacturing 



of jars. But little do they think of the 
ofrave difficulties that would arise if we were ^ , . 

^ T h ei s 1 1 c 

to assume the existence of an extra-cosmic arguments 

involve grave 

personal God, not Himself the Universe, one difficulties. 
Who has created good and evil, pain and 
sufferings for His creatures, but He Him- 
self stands above and unaffected by these. 
On no theory of Divine dispensation and 
intervention in the affairs of the world from 
without, can evil and suffering be explained. 
The creation of evil and suffering except by 
an implied manicheaism which practically 
annuls the Godhead in attempting to justify 
its ways or excute its work. 

In order to avoid these difficulties some 
take recourse to another line of reasoning^ Pantheistic 

^ arguments. 

making the agent and the patient to be one 
and the same and have made themselves 
bold to declare for an Ultimate Reality whose 
very nature is existence, knowledge and 
bliss infinite ; Whose consciousness is in its 
nature creative or rather self-expressive 
force capable of infinite variations in pheno- 
mena and forms, and Who is endlessly enjoy- 
ing the delight of those variations, and Who, 
therefore, might well be regarded as evolving 

233 t 



the world of nature including finite minds- 
out of his own energy, in sport, as it were. 
Just as we find all things to be mutable forms 
J of one immutable being, finite results of one 
infinite force, so we shall find that all ideas 
and ideals are but variable self-expressions of 
One Invariable and All- Embracing Delight 
of Self-existence. And this explains the 
causes underlying diversities and differences 
between all things and beings the totality 
of which go to make up this our phenomenal 

But this theory of Cosmic origin 
_.^^ is confronted with crraver difficulties 

Difficulties ^ 

in the Pan- y^hJch cannot but stand for its own con- 

tneistic con- 
ception, demnation. The whole thing, briefly 

speaking, stands thus. The One Ultimate 

Reality which has thrown It-self out 

into name and form, is a truine Existence, 

Knowledge, Bliss — Sackiddnanda. Sachida- 

nanda, it may be reasoned, is God and Who 

„ is not only a conscious Being but Who is 

also the Author of existence and all these. 

And, therefore, the question is, How could 

a God who is All-bliss Himself and from 

whom flow the dews of delight as water 



springs from a fountain, evolve a world out 
of Himself in which He inflicts sufferings on 
His creatures, sanctions pains and permits 
evil. If it is contended that these are but 
trials and ordeals, we do not solve the real 
problem at issue. We only mince matters 
and thus refuse to look straight into things. 
How could a God who is all Good and All- ^^^^J. ^"- 


love Himself has made room for what is 
called as 'bad' or 'hatred' in the Universe of 
His own make ^ For One who keeps pit- 
falls of ignorance, allows sufferings, sanc- 
tions pains or permits rooms for evils in 
the scheme of His universe as trials and 
ordeals through which the so-called poor 
Jiva has to pass, stands Himself convict- 
ed of holding thought-out temptations, deli- 
berate cruelty, and moral insensibility; and 
if a moral being at all, He must be to all 
intents and purposes — far inferior to the 
moral excellence of His own creatures. Aeain, 
we do not squarely face the question by the 
statement that they are but resultants of the 
Jivas karma for which reason he or she 
undergoes pain and suffers misery in as 
much as there is the ethical problem that 


confronts us in the form — who created or 
why and when was evolved that moral evil 
which provokes the punishment of pain and 
suffering ? One might well contend that 
Pan-entheis- the Self-same Ultimate Reality who is of 

tic concep- 
tion of the the nature of All- knowledge-bliss-absolute 


being but One Existence without a second 
to stand by It ; all that exists being but He ; 
it having been repeatedly declared that 
That Thou Art" and 'That Am I" too- 
all what is said to exist as evil or suffering, it 
is He that must labour under the same in the 
creature who is no the other than He Him- 
self. For just as a spider spins its web out of 
itself and nestles in or creeps on it, so it is 
He who throws Himself out into the world 
of names and forms, in sport, as it were, and 
it is He that crawls on them in the form of 
a child ; it is He that enjoys the pleasures 
»^ of His own make in the form of a youth and 

it is He that totters on the road leaning on 
the stick in the form of the old and worn out. 
Indeed when thus viewed, the whole problem 
shifts the ground and there cannot crop up 
the question as to how God came to create 
evil and suffering for His creature. But still 



it is worth while to enquire as to how the 
Self-same Reah'ty Who is absolute Existence, 
Simple without a second to stand by It, 
Who is of the nature of True Knowledge and 
Delight Infinite, comes to admit in Itself what 
It is not ? All-delight being necessarily All- 
good and All-love, how can evil and hateful 
standing in hard opposition to love and 
goodness and being, therefore, but a visible 
negation of All-delight, be said to exist in 
what is All-delight ? How could the Absolute, 
in short, enter into the meshes of Relativity 
of subject and object ? 

Thus the inexorable law of Karma being 
irreconciliable with a Supremely Moral and Law ^ 
Personal Deity, the pantheistic origin of the cod^cannot 
cosmos being found to involve graver ethical ^° °^^ 
difficulties, the pan-entheistic conception of 
the Universe being concived to stop short in ^ 

explaining the riddle of the Absolute entering 
into the meshes of Relativity, we decline 
to agree in the Divine dispensation and 
intervention in the affairs of the world, we 
deny the very existence of any free and 
all-governing personal God ; for all 
personality we hold to be but a creation 



of ignorance and subject to the laws of 


What, then, is the cause of all these 

diversities and differences ? Either in the 
Addission of 

the 'Chance' material world, or in the ve2:itable or the 

— theory is ^ 

the invahda- animal — no two thinp^s are alike. Are, then, the 

tion of ^ the ^ ' ' 

Law of visible differences which are evident between 


things or organisms — mere chance-results 
or fortuitious concourse of lifeless atoms ? 
To admit them as but results of chances 
is to invalidate the very law of causation. 
The doctrine of *the results of chance' can no 
more find rooms in a philosophy which seeks 
to arrive at a rational explanation for the 
changes we exprience at every moment of 
our being. Change is the soul of all 
activities and stagnation is but cold death. 
Change, therefore, constitutes the life of all 
that is. The development of the seed into 
a tree or of an ovum into an animal is 
but a series of changes constituting an 
advance from homogeneity of structure to 
heterogeneity of structure. It is this series 
of changes gone through during the period of 
development and decay that makes up the 
life history of a plant or an 'animal. In 


its primary stage, says the Biologist, every 
germ consists of a substance that is uniform 

Whence is 

throughout, both in texture and chemical ^^^ differ- 

ence ? 

composition. The first step, in the develop- 
ment of the germ, is the appearance of a 
difference between the two parts in this 
substance or as the phenomenon is called 
in physiological language — 'differentiation'. 
And the question is, whence is the difference 
or this 'differentiation' ? In the primary 
stage of the germ, it was all uniform both 
in texture and composition. But there 
appears a difference in the same afterwards. 
The substantial cause being the same, What 
is it that accounts for the difference ? 
Reason whispers that there must be something 
working from within, some cause behind it. 
But what is it ? ''No thoughtful person," 
to speak in the language of Wallace, '*can Wallace at 
contemplate without amazement the pheno- 
mena presented by the development of 
animals. We see the most diverse forms — a 
mollusc, a frog, and a mammal — arising from 
apparently identical primitive cells and 
progressing for a time by very similar initial 
changes but thereafter each persuing its 



highly complex and circuitous course of 
development with unerring certainty by 

The prin- 

c i p 1 e of fneans of laws and forces of which we are 

Natural Se- -^ ' j 

not'ex la^n" totally igftoram* Here too the original 
substantial causes in all the three instances 

are, according to the investigation of Wallace, 
apparently identical ; but what is it that 

determines one to be a mollusc, another a 
frog and the third one to be a mammal? 
The principle of Natural Selection can't 
explain this amazing phenomena ; nor the 
law of the Struggle for Existence and the 
Survival of the Fittest, however ambiguously 
it might be twisted, can account for it. All 
that these can do, is to explain as to how the 
weakest go to the walls ; but not why they 
should. They cannot throw any light as 
would explain the causes of differences which 
are evident in the different spheres of evolution 
of organisms. The theory of Special Crea- 
tion, too, cannot account for the differences, 
Nor the 

theory of f^j. ^j^^^ would require the establishment 
Special Crea- ^ 

tion. ^f ^ Deity, which is, as we have seen, an im- 

possibility. Why should one be made a king 
surrounded with all the pleasures the world 
can afford to supply with for his enjoyment 



and another a slave to starve, serve, and suffer 
under his tyranny all the indio^nities of life 

^ ^ ^ Reality is 

and living: which the humanity will shudder synonymous 

° with activity. 

at, to think of ; nor the theory of Evolution 
from One Self-same Reality, Who is of the 
nature of pure felicity, can touch at the 
root cause of the present diversity, which 
is but a visible nullity of the pre-supposition 
of such an Entity beyond all duality. Such 
being the position and situation of the 
above theories and doctrines involving grave 
difficulties as shown up, let us turn to what 
our Teachers have to say on the point at 
issue. Our philosophy teaches at the outset 
that whatever is real is rational. Reality 
is synonymous with activity. And by 
this they mean persistence in existence. 
Wherever we turn, theresoever differences 
appear to our visions. And these differences 
are not mere appearances. In every thing, 
at every turn of life, we are persistently 
conscious of these differences. These are 
real differences. And whatever is real 
being rational, it cannot but irresitibly follow 
that there must be some reason behind these 
differences. The Jain teachers are at one 



when — they ^ say that (i) Time (2|»t^) (//) 
Causes of External Nature ( ^ffl^ ) {tit) Necessity 
CO rdlngTo (f'T^f^) (^'^) Activity (W) and the desire to- 
the Jains. be-and-to-act ( ^^JT ) these five co-operating 
constitute the reason which accounts for 
the diversities in Nature. It is these five 
that by co-operating, determine the manner 
and form of the development of the seed 
or the ovum into a tree or an animal. 
Indeed it may ring curious to the un- 
accustomed ears who had not had the 
opportunity to peruse and ponder over 
the truths of these philosophical pronounce- 
ments of the Jain teachers regarding the 
differences and diversities in nature. But in 
order to be able to form a calm judgment on 
' the point in question, it is imperative that 
we should try to grasp the principle 
inculcated in these our present philosophical 
pronouncements bearing on the point. 

It has been said that summarily speak- 
ing the universe is compound of the four 
primary ingredients viz,, Time, Space, Soul 
and Pudgal. These are resolvable into 
the minutest of the minute parts which do 
not admit of any further analysis. Now 


these ultimate rudiments having nothing for 
their material cause Updddn, stand by them- 

^ ^ The five 

selves as unresolvable units. And a patient determining 


study of these ultimate units will make it 
clear that they — every one of them — are 
instinct, as it were, with infinite power 
by the virtue of which they are capable 
of being developed in innumerable ways 
through the processes of permutation 
and combination of these four original 
ingredients which form the true character, 
composition and make up of the Universe 
revealed in a diversity of names and forms. 
This diversity of names and forms in and 
through which the self-existent Universe is 
revealed to us owes its origin to the variety 
in the arrangement and combination of the 
ingredients composing the same. But what 
is it really due to ? The variety in 
the arrangement and combination is due 
to (i) K&l — Time, (2) Swabhdbd- — Nature 
i.e. favourable environment ; (3) Niyati — 
Destiny or Necessity, (4) Karma— hzixoxi 
or motion and (5) f/^aw^— Self-asser- 
tion or Effort — the five-fold Determining 
Causes (f^fft^Tf oRl^'O) all acting in conjunction 




with one another on the substance ( '^i ) 
produce changes and variations in the 

X. lie CllclraC* 

rtVionc *"^^ same, regulate their manner of unfoldment 
and determine its growth, form and con- 
figuration as well. It is important, therefore, 
to dwell briefly on the charateristic indica- 
tions ( ^"^^ ) of these five-fold determining 
causes by virtue of which the self-existent 
Universe has been the permanent theatre 
of perpetual changes and diversities — a 
strange array of ever-occurring phenomena 
that bewilders us at every moment and turn 
of our life and thought. 

(i) Time ( ^i^ ) — to begin with — is 
an aggregate of one dimension ; of itself 
and from its very nature, it flows on 
uniformly revealing itself as it does in 
relation of sequence and seasons. Suc- 
cession being thus the very property of 
time all changes are possible in time only. 

(2) Nature (^W^) is the natural or Ex- 
ternal environment of a thing or organism. It 
consists of the soil, the air, the water, the heat 
and the light. The growth of a plant may 
be referred to the seed which is the 
substantial ( ^m^^lT ) cause of the plant and 


(2) Nature. 


Causation and evolution. 

to the soil, the air etc., to the circulation 
of the sap and to the chemical action of Metabolism, 
the heat and light — in short, to the External 
environment which determine the growth. 
This is why it is said that the life of an 
organism depends on the external Nature 
whose function is to supply the wants and 
demands of the living organism which 
happens to enter into relations, the con- 
tinuous adjustment of which is called life. 
A living organism is a seat of chemical 
changes divisible into (i) Anabolic or Cons- 
tructive processes in the course of which 
the so called non-living matter is taken 
in and assimilated by the organism from 
without and into (it) Catabolic or Disinte- 
grative, destructive processes during which 
living matter or stored-up substances are 
expended. Metabolism ( TTT^^f$R?IT ) is but a 
name for these two processes of construction 
and destruction and forms the chief feature of 
a living organism. And the normal growth 
of an organism means normal metabolism 
requiring the supply of food quantitatively 
and qualitatively of the proper kind, the 
laying up of the food within the body 



and regular chemical transformation of the 
tissues and the preparation of the effette pro- 
ducts which have to be given out. It is thus 
clear that the External Nature (^T'WUlffiT) 
stands to supply the needs, demands and re- 
quirements of the organism for its proper 
nourishment and normal growth. If she in 
any way fail no supply what is demanded of 
her by the organism, the latter deteriorates 
and becomes weak to carry on the struggle, 
to cope with the undesirable forces and 
elements, or to propagate species and thus 
goes to the walls in the long run. 

3. Niyati ( f^^fff ) means, Fate or 
(3) Destiny. Destiny. According to some school of 
thought, it means Divine Decree which 
must come to pass to bear its command 
over our thoughts and activities. Thus inter- 
preted, it takes away from us all the moral 
responsibility which lies only in our option of 
doing a thing, and not in compulsion. But 
in Jain philosophy, however, the term Niyati 
signifying 'Necessity' is described as the con- 
catenation of causes whence all things must 
necessarily follow as the four follows from 
two plus two or as three angles of a triangle 



must be equal to two right angles clearing 
away everything standing in the way to offer 
it even the least possible resistance. 

4. A'arw^ (cji^) means Action or Deed 

done. Revealing itself as it does in the taking (4) Karma^ 
of the one concomitantly with the leaving of 
the other, it implies a change of relations or 
relative positions which is nothing else than 
motion itself in some form or other. The 
cause of motion or action being the substance 
itself which by exertion of power produces 
action, operation or Karma, the substance or 
the organism itself has to bear the con- 
sequences of its own Karma in any stage 
of its existence, past, present or future. And 
this explains the origin of the common 
adage "As you sow, so you reap." 

5. Udyam ( ^^^w ) — Exertion, assertion 

or effort which is in its simplest form is the 

. . Self-asser- 

desire to realise a particular end or idea. tion. 

Sifting analysis of the affairs of the 

world of phenomena in question brings us 

to the ''desire-to-be' evident in the form of 

exertion or assertion as the supreme reason 

for all existences. It is the desire-to-be, 

to exist distinct and separate from what 


it is not, that is evidently the cause of 
of the world of distinctions and forms. If 

The pleasure 

to-be or not it is asked what was the root cause of the 


organism coming into existence, we must 
reply, ''Itself,'' Who was the creator of 
the being ? 'Itself\ is the ready answer 
we have to make in response to the question. 
'Itself IS its own object and itself s\oi\q is its 
reason for existence. And, therefore, it 
has been well said that all the true reasons 
and transcendant motives a man can assign 
for the way in which he acts can be ren- 
dered into the simple formula "in that 
was my pleasured And likewise is the 
case with the wherefore of the other things 
and beings. The highest philosophy brings 
us no other reply : beings and worlds are 
because it was their pleasure-to-be. To-be 
or not-to-be is but a matter of option for self- 
assertion, or otherwise wherein lies deep the 

primordial root of all responsibility. 

Now Time ( o|tt^ ), the External Nature 
(^m^), Necessity (fiTafrf), Action (^^*^), and 
Exertion ( ^^;r ) whose natures have been 
just discussed in brief, speak for the differ- 
ences and diversities in the world of forms 



and phenomena. To illustrate for a more 
thorough grasp of the pohit at issue as to 
how these determining causes and conditions 
co-operate in bringing about the countless 
differences and diversities in the processes of 
the compound evolution let us take the case 
of a huge tree developing from its own 

We have already stated that every 
thing in the universe is surcharged with nys^j-ationof 
infinite powers of developing itself after o^f%P[;"a^^^^^ 
its own type. So also is the case with the '" ^^^^ '°"* 
seed. The seed of a particular tree is also 
instinct with infinite powers of developing 
itself so much so that the huge form of the 
tree together with its bark, branches, twigs, 
leaves, flowers and fruits in the course of 
time, lie hidden in a potential state of exis- 
tence in the seed. The protoplasm which 
ultimately developes into the seed being the ' 
substantial cause, it changes and transforms 
itself into the seed and ultimately into the 
tree by the help of such causes, and condi- 
tions as time, nature and the like — which 
determine its manner and growth of develop- 
ment. On close examination of the seed we 



find that the granular protoplasmic particles 
— the contents of the outer shell, the cuticle, 
which holds together the granules in a parti- 

The seed is 
the seed 
under parti 

cuiar condi- ^^^^^^ combination is all through uniform both 


in texture and chemical composition without 
any difference and differentiation between 
its parts in the primary stage of its being. 
If you crush the seed so instinct with the 
potency of development, it will not bud forth 
and why not ? There are the component 
parts of the seed — the granules not an 
atom of which has been lost in any way. 
Why would it not then develop into a tree ? 
The answer is simple enough and we need 
not travel far to look for it. The seed is 
the seed under a particular arrangement 
and disposition of its constituent elements 
and as such it is the substantial cause having 
the potency of developing itself into a tree 
of its own type, if only the determining causes 
conjoin with one another to help its growth. 
But the crushing of the seed interferes 
with the relative disposition and arrange- 
ment of its constituent elements and thus 
has rendered it impossible for the five-fold 
determining causes to act on the seed. 



So we see the seed has the potency to 

develop itself into a tree after its own type, • 

clauses &na 

but it has to wait for the proper time — the fo^^ju'^i^"^ 
arrival of the season which might be the ^^P"^^"* 
rainy one. The season is there but the 
seed must be planted in the soil with such 
other natural environment as would allow 
a reasonable circulation of the sap and 
chemical action of heat and light and 
would as be well able to supply the requi- 
sitions of the seed. 

Again, granted that the time, the external 
nature, the necessity — all the three are 
present, the seed, if not planted by some 
body, does not fall on earth by the virtue 
of Its own exertion and weight, making 
all the necessary transformations thereby 

Then, again, though the season is there 
and the seed too has been planted in the 
desirable soil with favourable environment, 
yet the seed will not grow into the tree of 
such and such bulk and configuration for 
the manifestation of which it has the 
potency unless there be the concatenation 
of the causes and conditions which is but 



another name for 'Necessity' that operates 

• irresistibly. 

The seed fructifies, as is often observ- 

, ed, but yet it may not sprout forth into a tree 
of the seed ' ' ^ 

into a tree of indentical with the parent one and bearing^ 
itsparent ^ ^ 

*yp^« leaves and flowers and fruits or seeds of 

the same size, taste, colour, beauty and 
grandeur of the tree whereof the seed was 
born. And why ? Surely these are the effects 
of karma of the seed in one or the other 
periods or stages of its existence and it is 
due to this very karma even done in some 
time past, that the seed has come to be a 
seed of this and not of another organism. 

To enter a bit more into details as to \ 
the causality of karma in bringing about the 
phenominal diversities and differences, the 
existence of various kinds of vegetable 
organisms all around us, is undeniable. In 
the organic world, it is but a truism to say 
that the like produces the like. The mangoe 
seed will develop into a mangoe tree and to 
nothing else. So with the other kinds of 
seeds. Now in the processes of metabolism 
every living organism grows and undergoes 
through the adjusting and regulating influ- 



ences of the two-fold nature — Inner and 

Outer, ( ^«ri?:^^ ) The seed is the inner ,, 

^ ' Yet whence 

nature of the tree where as the outer '^ J^®. ^^f^*"* 

entiation ? 
nature comprises the soil, the water, 

the heat, the light, and the air. The 

seed has the potency to develop into 

a tree and it is only the outer nature 

that stands as a help to the seed in 

the exertion of its latent powers for its 

proper development into a tree ; but this 

outer nature is almost the same to all the 

different trees. The real difference, therefore, 

lies in the inner natures' of the different 

trees i. e. in the seeds. And the same 

old question comes round yet, Whence is 

this difference ? If it is said in reply 

that the difference is due to the difference 

in the relative disposition of the particles 

constituting the two seeds, then the 

difference is only explained by another 

difference which tantamounts to explaining 

*X' by 'Y' both of which are unknown 

quantities and therefore the second difference 

again has yet to be inquired into. Science 

stops short here. She does not know. The 

mystery, though pushed back, remains un- 


altered. However may a Lamarck take 

Biology mis. ''^^^"^^^ ^^ ^"^^ principles of conservation 
scs the mark (Heredity) and progression (Adaptation) and 
touch upon the struggle of each against all ; 
or a Darwin may twist and stretch his so 
called principle of Natural Selection to show 
the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man 
or however may a Spencer write volumes on 
the interpretations of the Law of the Survi- 
val of the Fittest through the processes 
of which the weakest go to the walls, 
or to explain the unsurmountable gaps in 
the gradations of the organic beings— r 
vegetable or animal or however may a 
Haeckel knock his brains out to find out 
the missing links in the ever-evolving 
chain of organic evolutions from Monera 
to Man, the present and the last ex- 
pression of the organism of the highest 
type. Biology only misses the mark and 
beats about the bush when she says that 
protoplasms are alike and identical but 
does not assign any reason for their subse- 
quent differentiations and variations. And 
years afterwards she will have to admit 
that there is no other alternative course 


than to take recourse to the Law of Karma 

to explain the causes of differentiations and ^^ ,.„ 

^ The diiferen- 

differences as manifest in their combinations ^^^ ^^f "°^ 

mere freaks 

and subsequent variations. The granules ^^^ 

of Nature 
are caus- 

of protoplasm were registered with impres- ditioned^b"y 

sions of the acts and deeds they have done 
in their past lives whereof they have deve- 
loped a kind of disposition or tendency 
towards each other under the influences of 
which they have come to the existing forms 
of combination making up the different 
'Inner Natures' in the different species of trees 
and other organic beings. Or what else is 
there to explain the diversities of Nature ? 
They can't be explained as her mere freaks or 
as fortuitous concourse of what is invariably 
conditional —a fact which is but a visible 
contradiction and negation of the chance- 
hypothesis ; nor can they come out of 
nothing, for, we are unable on the one 
hand to conceive nothing becoming some- 
thing or on the other something nothing. 
It being thus impossible to establish in 
thought a relation between something and 
nothing, we cannot but deduce thereof the 
indestructibility of matter (pudgal) and conti- 




nuity of motion — karma. Other determi- 
nant conditions being there, it is the conti- 
bility oipud' nuity of karma that explains why the pro- 
gal Sind con- ^ i / r 

ti nuity of perties of a molecule of urea and that of 

karma, ^ 

cyanate of ammonia are different, though 
they are composed of the same number of 
chemical elements and it is also this conti- 
nuity of karma that accounts for the develop- 
ment of the diverse forms of a mollusc, 
a frog and a mammal though arising from 
apparently identical primitive cells. 



Jarntsm malces no room for an extra-munaane Goa-^ 
Lat>tace and Nel>oleon — TKc idea is not singular in 
In<lia — Yet tkc Jains arc not Jet>enJant on any 
All-migkty Ruler standing in tkc witkout — Dr- Bosc 
and tkc Sut>cr-t>kysical Power- — Si>cnccr and St>inoaa— 
''Tcrtium Quid" nature of tkc Power —Tkc Coalescence 
tkesc f>owers in different beings on tkc attainment of 
**Nirvan ' is tlie idea of tkc God-kead of tkc Jains. 

In the last chapter on the compound Evo- 
lution and the Law of Universal Causation, it 

has been made clear as to how from the stand- ^., 

No neces- 

point of phenomenal Nay a the universe is ever ^'^^ °^ ^" 

t ir y e X t r a-mun- 

changing and transitory, and how from the ^^"^ 
stand-point of Noumenal ^aya according to 
which the universe is taken as one undivided 
whole of inter-related reals, it is self-exis- 
tent and permanent. We have also seen that 
because it is self-existent and permanent, 
/ therefore, it is not an effect of some anterior 
cause working from behind the universe ; 
and further that the diversities and differ- 
ences in the world of phenomena and forms 
owe their existences to the operation of 




the five-fold determinant causes such as 
Time, External Nature, and the like. 
Such being the trend of thought and pro- 
gressive retiocination, the Jain philosophy 
leaves no room whatsoever for an iron- 
willed capricious God in the Jain scheme of 

To posit God 

is to conceal the universe. The Jains hold that a correct 

tgnor ance '' 

unaware of understanding, according to the teaching of 
Victors, of the true principles of causality 
and phenomenology, dispenses with the 
necessity of any divine interventiom in the 
affairs of the world. They are of opinion 
that the very attempt to posit an all-ruling 
extra-mundane God is to conceal the igno- 
rance of the true principles of causality 
under a pomp of delusive reasonings — an 
ignorance unware of itself. 

Such a doctrine may indeed strike 

Laplace and curious and atheistic to the adherents of 

Nepoleon on , . i i r n/r i • 

God. the various huropean schools ot Monotheists 

and to other doctors of Divinity so as to 
give them a rude shaking. But there is 
no help to it. Truth must be told. When 
Laplace, the world-renowned French scientist 
went to make a formal presentation of 
his famous work to the world-conquering 



Emperor Napoleon, the latter remarked, **M. 
Laplace, they tell me, you have written this 
large book on the System of Universe, and 
you have never mentioned its Creator". 
Whereupon M. Laplace drew himself up 
and answered bluntly, ''Sir I had no need of 
any such hypothesis." And this piece of 
dialogue between the two greatest minds 
of the Eighteenth century, does not strike 
singular in India, and the reason is that 
from the time when Greece and Rome, 
those cradles of western civilization, were 
still steeped in profound ignorance ; nay, 
from long before the pyramids of Egypt 
had raised their hoary heads to have a 
look down upon the valleys of the Nile, 
such doctrines which do not find any rhyme 
or reason or necessity to call in the existence 
of the so-called Diety have been in vogue 
in India. The followers of the Numerical 

The Sim- 
philosophy of India— The Sdrnkhya School ^^y^» ^ ^ ^ 
* *■ Mimansaka 

of thought — not only do not postulate any etc. in God. 
such Divine being but make a definite pro- 
nouncement to the effect that "God is not in 
existence ; because of the want of all manner 
of evidence." Nor the Mimdnsaka atheists 



yield an inch in their astute denial of an 
omnipotent extra-mudane God. The Ch&r- 
vdka materialists openly and avowedly teach 
and preach that there is not only no God 
but there is no soul at all for the so-called 
redemption of which one should toil and moil 
all the day and night forsaking all pleasures 
of life and thought. 

One might well venture to remark here 
^o«! \^^ that all these schools beingf more or less 

Jains atne- ^ 

iss.— o. atheistic, are the Jains too atheists of 
similar type ? 'No', is the emphatic answer, 
we have to offer to the equirers. The Jains 
do believe in a God after their own way of 
thinking — a belief which is in and through 
saturated with all the vigour and strength of 
life. It does not make us dependant on any 
Almighty Ruler for our being and beatitude 
here or hereinafter. It does not cast us 
into the moulds of those weaklings who 
love to creep with a quivering prayer on 
their lips to the silent doors of the Deity ; 
nor of those who crawl, beating breast at 
every step before his fictitious feet or figure 
to adore. Rather it makes us feel that we 
are independent autonomous individuals 


i( h 


who can curve out paths for ourselves here 
and herein-after both for enjoyment of 
pleasures and emancipation of our souls by 
our own will and exertion. 

Here-in-before we have fairly dis- 
cussed what sort of God we do not believe 
in ; we have seen there what it is not. We 
shall see now what He is to us as taught by 
the Jain Teachers. 

According to the Jain philosophy the 
universe is not a fortuitous concourse of dead, x h e Jain 
dull matter (pudgal) only ; for that would head, 
mean crude materialism which Jainism does 
not allow. The Victors say that the series 
of changes as presented by the organic and 
inorganic worlds, show, as has been recently 
demonstrated by Dr. J. C. Bose, that in addi- 
tion to the dead dull pudgal-m^x\.^x , there is 
something superphysical both in the living 
and in the so-called non-living. When this 
something superphysical departs from the 
constitution of the living and the so-called ' 

non-living, we say it is dead by which we 
mean that it does not respond. Experiments 
have shown that like plants and animals, 
a piece of metal responds in a like manner, 



if suitably influenced. But when ''killed 
by poison," like the plant or animal, it does 
not respond. European thinkers and bio- 
logists have so far assigned the presence 
'Vital Force' of a separate 'vital force' in the physical 

a n d D r. 

Bose's super- phenomenon connected with the living 


Power. organism. In place of any real explanation, 

a hypothetical nomenclature was used either 
to explain away or to clothe in a greater 
mystery the most complex phenomena 
that we ever come across. From this posi- 
tion with its assumption of superphysi- 
cal character of response, it is clear that 
on the discovery by Dr. J. C. Bose, the 
most renowned Bengalee scientist of the 
day, of similar effects in inorganic subs- 
tances, the necessity of theoretically main- 
taining such Dualism in Nature, must fall 
to the ground. There is, therefore, not any 
unknown arbitrary vital force as Physio- 
logists have taught us to suppose but 
a law, the working of which, knows no 
change, nor any deviation ; but which, as 
the Victors hold, acts uniformly from within 
throughout the inorganic and the organic 



Now that (call it soul, spirit, superphysi- 
cal something or by any other name you ^^^ j^ ^^^^ 
like) by the departure of which the living ftan^tialUyj 

, It* r 1 1 • 1 • • 1 materiality 

becomes dead is of the highest spiritual or mentjjity 

, . 11 -T-1 T ^° ^^^ things 

essence and is common to all. 1 he manites- and beings, 
tation of this divine principle may differ 
in different living beings but the collective 
idea derived from such observations as of 
this something inherent in the living and 
in the so-called non-living, is called God. 
According to the Jains there are energies 
present both in the material and dynamic 
worlds. Living apart the material or mental 
energies, the spiritual ones as a whole is God 
giving materiality, mentality and substantiality 
to all things and beings. 

The Ultimate Spiritual Power, often 
called by Spencer, as Primal Energy, forming 
the last limit of the knowables, reveals itself Spn 
in various forms and with varying degrees 
of perfection in different grades of being. 
The universe with all its bewildering mani- 
festation, is nothing but the revelation of this 
Ultimate Power or Energy. This is by its 
nature a tertium quid being matter conscious 
only when it reveals itself through a senti- 


Spencer and 


ent organism, and remains unconscious so 
long its embodiment is the sentient one. 
This is the Primery Reality from which other 
realities owe their existence and this is the 
sap which supports every thing what we call 
real. The same or allied thought is 
expressed also by Benedict Spinoza when 
he says that mind and matter are but two 
among infinite aspects of the Ultimate Reality 
which can neither be designated as material 
or psychical in the sense of being conscious. 
God is, in short, the coalescence of this 
spiritual principle emancipated from the 
idea^ofGod^ bondages of matter in all its purity, per- 
fection, freedom and blessedness. They 
do us wrong when they say that we are 
agnostics ; for we worship this Supreme 
Essence. — the Ideal of all of life and 
thought. We bow down to this Ideal, 
because we desire to realize the Ideal in 
every acts of our life and thought. We 
worship the Tirthankaras, the pure and 
perfect souls, merely for the sake of their 
purity and perfection ; but not for the 
expectation of any reward in return. 'Lives 
of great men remind us that we can make 




our lives sublime.' By following the foot- 

prints on the sands of time of the Ideal 3 ^cssipa- 

t i on of 
a r m a 

Tirthankaras who were real heroes, pure and k 

r \ • 1 • • 1 • Nirvan has 

free, who attamed to omniscience and quie- to be reach- 
tude, Nirvdna^ by the dissipation of their 
karma, we shall be able to raise ourselves 
from the mires of the world and to attain 
to Nirvan by a like dissipation of our own 
karma and by freeing ourselves from the 
eighteen blemishes that inevitably lead 
ultimately to ominiscience, the next door to 




Souls and tke God-liead — Matenaltstic eonce^tton of 
Soul — A l>ye-^roduct of matter— Eastern and ^Vestern 
matertaltsm com|>are(l— CKarvalc and rielcel ana 
GtrarJtan, tke socialist — Cosmological ana moral aim- 
culties involve J m Materialism — Admissions ty Huxley. 
S|>encer and Oar^vm — x ke Jam conee{>tion ox S|>irit 
and Matter — Tkeir Correlativity — PraJeskas-Parts or 
Soul-units. — Conscious emilgence form tke 8i>iritual 
essence ox tke Soul, — Souls constitutional freedom — Its 
Transmigration tkrougk tke grades o£ Sansar and 

While dealing with our conception of 
Soul and God, we have seen that the individual 
soul, when it becomes free from all taints 
and blemishes, reaches perfection charac- 
terised by omniscience and realizes itself 
as a self-conscious spirit of the nature of 
all-delight, distinct and separate from other 
than itself, it becomes God. 

But what is this soul whch is thus poten- 

Conceptions ^^^"Y divine and attians to God-head, He 

being no other than the coalesence of the pure 

and free self-conscious spirits existing in a 



higher unity without losing the traces of 
their individuality in the same? What soul -a bye- 
is the naure of this soul-substance ? Is it a matter and 

. - • 1 material 

spark from the anvil of the Blacksmith, forces. 
a bye-product of matter of the Physicist, 
the nascent or the just-born of the Chemists? 
The ChdrvAka school of thought teaches 
that there is no plausible reason and evi- 
dence to demonstrate the existence of 
soul as something distinct and separate from 
matter and material forces ; for consciousness 
which is a quality of the soul-substance 
is but the resultant of the concussion of 
the brain-matter. Just as liver secrets bile 
so brain produces consciousness. This 
phenomenon of matter and material powers 
which is characterised by consciousness « 
in different forms in the living and 
the so-called non-living, is soul for 
which reason, we often take recourse to 
such forms of expressions as consist in 
saying in our common parlance that the 
plant lives, the brute lives and feels, and * 
the man lives, feels and thinks. It is 
thus evident that ^more the subtle is the 
organic mechanism, by far the more clear 



IS the manifestation of the forms of this 
Immortality bye-product of matter and material forces 
long to the revealing as these do in the phenomenon of 

Soul but to 

the Deed consciousness which is otherwise called by 

the name of soul or Atman. Just as 

lightning flashes across the horizon from 

the action and interaction of the stored-up 

(energies and powers in the etherial space 

of the sky, so the consciousness flashes 

across the so-called mental horizon wherein 

matter and material energies are stored 

up in their most subtle character. 

Such being the attitude of mind of the 

followers of the system of CkArv&ka 

philosophy towards the soul, they say 

It is not the soul that is immortal ; but 

the deeds done by the mighty minds that 

are imperishable and immortal. In the moral 

as well as in physical world, the great ones 

only immortalise themselves by their great 

achievements, but their souls die and cease to 

be with them at the death and dissolution of 

the organisms wherein they appear to be 

encased as it were. 

This denial by the Chdrvdkas of the 

different entity and immortality of the soul 



seems to receive additional support from 
the researches in Biology by some of the 
master-minds of the west. In summing 

Haeckel on 

UD his * Last Words on Evolution, Earnst the origin of 
^ ^ Soul. 

Haeckel says, **the very interesting and 
important phenomena of impregnation 
have only been known to us in details for 
thirty years. It has been conclusively 
shown after a number of detailed investi- 
gation that the individual development, of 
the erhbryo from the stem -cell or fertilised 
ovum is controlled by the same laws in 
all cases. # * # # One import- 
ant result of these modern discoveries, was 
the phenomena given to one fact that the 
personal soul has a begining of existence 
and that we can determine the precise 
moment in which this takes place ; it is 
when the parent cells, the ovum and the 
spermatazoon, coalesce. Hence what we 
call the soul of man, or animal, has not 
presisted ; but begins its career at the 
moment of impregnation. It is bound up 
with the chemical constitution of the plasm 
which is the vehicle of heredity in the 
nucleus of the maternal ovum and the 



paternal spermatazoon. One cannot see how a 
being that has thus a beginning of existence 
Piato-?m^ ^«« afterwards prove to be immortal'^ 
mortality. '" C^^e italics are ours :). Such is the idea 
of the soul and its immortality according 
to the researches of Modern science in the 
west ; but there is nothing new in it. The 
idea such an origin and nature of the 
soul is traceable as far back as Plato's time 
and since 'to the pure, all things are pure', it 
will not be labour lost to inform our readers, 
by the way, that the most famous lines,' 
"All things by a law divine 
In one another's being mingle" 
in Shelley's 'Love Philosophy' contain an 
unmistakable reference to the passage of 
Platoe's Symposium which Shelley himself 
translates as follows (see Shelley's Prose 
Works, Ed. R. H. Shepherd, Vo, II, p. 95) : 
— "The intercourse of the male and the 
female in generation, a divine work, through 
pregnancy and production, it were some- 
thing immortal in mortality'' Similar 
ideas occur also, it would be interesting 
to note, in the concluding portions of the 
' BrihadAranyaka Upanishat of the Hindus. 



But to return to the Materialistic hypo- 
thesis of the modern scientists and bio- 
loe^ists of the west, we can well say without Chirvika 

^ * ^ a n d M. 

the slightest fear of contradiction that it is EmiicGirar- 
^ di a n t h e 

but the revised echoe of the Ck&rvdka ^'"^pch So- 

School of Indian Thought. So much so that 
even the very spirit of the moral doctrine 
which the followers of that ancient sage 
Ch&rv&ka or Brihaspati openly and avow- 
edly teached and preached for the regula- 
tion of the activities of man so far his 
moral nature is concerned, persists in the 
notable declarations which M. Emile de 
Girardian laid down not merely as his own 
creed but as that of the vast majority of his 
socialistic countryman. Girardian's pointed 
aphorisms are ; — 

(/) That the world exists for itself and 
of itself solely, 

(it) That the man has no original sin 
to ransom. 

(Jii) That he bears about him memory 
and reason as flame bears in it heat and 

(iv) That he lives again in the flesh 
only in the child that he begets. 



(z/) That he survives intellectually only 
in the idea or the deed by which he immor- 
talises himself. 

iyi) That he has no ground for expect- 
ing to receive in future life a recompense or 
punishment for his present conduct. 

{yii) That moral good and evil does not 
exist substantially, absolutely, inconsistently 
by themselves ; that they exist only nomi- 
nally, relatively and arbitrarily, 

{;viii) That in fact there only exists 
risks against which man obeying the law of 
self-preservation within him, seeks to insure 
himself by the means at his command. 

Such has been in the main the conse- 
quential development of moral ideas of the 
Man does 

not live for out and out Materialistic philosophers of the 
bread alone. 

past as well of the present age. And 
constituted as we are, it sends, as it were, 
a thrill of shudder to think of these ideas 
and ideals of the most grovelling nature 
curiously chalked out to pave the way for 
the satisfaction of the most lower instincts 
and brutal propensities of our life and living. 
Man does not live for bread alone, not for 
mere animal living ; nor for the satisfaction of 

culties — man 
has a soul to 


the lower instincts and propagation of species. 
Man has a moral nature and possesses 
a soul to save and a conscience as well 
by the virtue of which he is enabled often- 
times to subdue, nay sacrifice himself for the Moral diffi 
progress of thought, culture and humanity. 
If lives were but bubbles that break at every 
breeze, why should we not make the best 
use of the short span of life, we have at 
our disposal by drawing our sharp knives 
from your ear to ear for the satisfaction of 
our own interests and instincts. What 
bar is there against our doing this ? But, 
as we often see, they do not do it always 
and invariably. They organize society 
and live in it for the common weal and 
progress. Not only they are often found 
to subdue their own personal or communal 
interests ; but they sacrifice themselves at the 
sacred alter of humanity for progress and per- 
fection. And these and the like ideas and 
ideals are not compatible with the gladiatorial 
theory of life and living as measured by the 
standard of crude materialistic hypothesis 
either of the Chdrvdka school or of Darwinian 
thought and culture. 




Besides the above moral difficulties, 
there are lots of other psychological diffi- 


cai difficul- culties of the pravest character involved in 

ties. ^ 

the very philosophy of materialism whereon 
these de-humanising moral codes are based. 
To cite only a few of them here, it is admitted 
on all hands that all phenomena of matter 
and material energies are modes of motion. 
But consciousness in and through which soul 
reveals itself is not a mode of motion, and 
hence consciousness cannot be a bye-product 
of matter and material forces. Again, the 
presence of consciousness does indeed make a 
great difference to the working of the 
organism. It is mind that controls the 
organism ^ a?»d life-work could not be the 
same if conscionsness were to cease to be in 
it. The monumental works of a genius 
are produced by a hyperphysical power^ 
infinitely superior to, and higher than the 
forces accruing from the rushings to and 
fro and ^collisions and frictions of the cells^ 

ganglions.gard molecules or other matter, 
contained in the human skull. 

These and similar numberless difficulties 
are involved in the Materialistic concep- 



tion as to the origin of conscionsness for 
which reason Huxley aptly remarks in his 
•Physical Basis of Life,' **I individually am no Admissions 

•' by Huxley, 

materealist ; but on the other hand I believe Spencer and 

' Darwin. 

materialism to involve grave philosophical 
errors." "Anti-materialistic", writes Spencer 
in his Essays, "my own view is "^ * ^ 
I agree entirely with Mr. Martineau in 
repudiating the materialistic interpretation 
as utterly futile." Darwin enquires, "Is there 
a fact or a shadow of fact supporting the 
belief that these elements acted on only 
by known forces could produce living exis- 
tence ? At present it is to us absolutely 

Such and similar other passages might 
be gleaned in numbers from the pages of 
the works of other scientific minds of position 
and authority to show that materialism fails 
to dive deep into the metaphysics of things 
and fathom the underlying mysteries, unless 
it admits of the existence of a super-physical 
principle by the virtue of which the atoms 
and molecules combine and work, ac- 
cording to the inviolable law of karma, so as 
to present to us the bewildering phenomenal 



activities of nature. And this superphysical 
position be" Principle is our soul-substance. But such 

tween spirit , . . " r i 11 

and matter, an admission 01 the soul-substance as 
distinct and apart from dead dull pudgal 
involves dualism of spirit and matter 
— Jiva ( ^^ ) and Ajiva ( ^^^ ). Indeed, 
it does involve, for spirit is as self-existent 
«^ reality as matter itself is. But the Jains 
say there is no hard opposition between 
them as would render them incapable of 
being united in such manner as we find 
in the case of milk and water. For the 
attributes of matter are not absolutely con- 
tradictory to the attributes of the soul. 
Matter is only matter in relation to what 
is not matter i. e., spirit and so is the «ase 
with the spirit itself, and thus there being an 
organic unity between the two, they stand to 
each other in relation of object and subject 
in as much as if there were any absolute dis- 
tinction between them, a distinction which by 
its very nature would be self-contradictory, 
it would cut off all connection between the 
things it distinguished. It would annihilate 
the relation implied in the distinction itself. 
An absolute difference, teach the Victors, is 



something which cannot exist within the 
intelligible world and the thought which 
attempts to fix such a difference is uncons- 
cious of its own meaning. Thus there is no squK 
reason why these two would not enter into 
relation with each other. '' Body and soul '\ 
to talk in the language of Young, '*are 
like the peevish man and wife, united jars, 
yet loath to part." Then, again, we often 
find ourselves placed in so very uncongienial 
circumstances that do not suit our constitution 
at all, and from which, in consequence, we 
necessarily try to extricate ourselves. The 
sooner we do it, the better for us. So is the 
case with the soul. However mysteriously 
and inconveniently it might have got into the 
granules of plasms yet the fact is that it is 
there. We may not see it with our eyes 
or feel it with the other senses. But what 
of that } Consituted as we are, do we see 
force .'* All that we know of, is motion in 
and through which both matter and force 
reveal themselves to us. So mysteriotisly 
subtle is this soul-substance in essence, so 
abstrusely abstract is the idea we can have 
thereof that it has been taught as belonging 



to the regions of the un-extended which 

and s'eif" ons accounts for the plurality of its existence. 

cionsness. r^\ . c . i , .1 

1 he conception ot puagal-mdiX.\.Qr is that 

it has weight and fills up space ; but the 
essence of the soul is conceived in self- 
consciousness absolutely devoid of any tinge 
of materiality whatsoever. The soul being 
as such it is according to our philosophy a 
self-existent ultimate reality without beginning 
and end. Bereft of all colour, taste, smell and 
touch, it is metaphysically formless though 
it takes on the form of that wherein it 
happens to dwell by virtue of its own Karma. 
Like the vacuous space it has innumerable 
pradeskas. By Pradeshas are meant the 
minutest parts, the soul-units, which do not 
admit of futher psychological analysis. These 
indivisible parts of the soul or soul-units 
which are infinite in number are all alike in 
essence for which reason the soul is said 
to be characterised by unity with a difference. 
They are essentially of the nature of consci- 
ous Effulgence which seems to have been 
put out, as it were, by the super-imposition of 
the Karma mdXitr on the various parts of 
the soul, just as a mirror becomes clouded 



with dusts falling on it and appears non- 

reflecting in consequence. This soul- 
Souls and 
substauce of the Jains, is not a single Sansar. 

all pervading reality without a second of 
its kind to stand by it. There is an infinity 
of these souls. And though true it is that an 
infinite number of these has become free from 
the turmoils of the world ; yet there remains 
an infinite number struggling for freedom ; 
for, if infinity is taken from infinity the 
remainder is infinity itself. It is these 
souls in plasms that lie scattered in every 
nook and corner of the universe and each 
is the doer of good or bad deeds to reap 
the consequences of which each takes to the 
repetition of births and deaths according 
to the merits of its own karma and thus 
traverses through the various grades of 
SamsAr, Heaven, Hell or pargatory or ulti- 
mately releases itself from the fetters of 
bondage by the dissipation of its own karma 
whereupon it becomes pure and perfect and 
fixed/as it were/inlthe regions oiJAloke. 

Thus we see as a reality, the soul has 
no beginning nor end ; but viewed with the 
light of its own states or grades of existence, 



it has a beginning and an end, and herein 
Emancipati- "^^ ^^ reason why the soul is stated 
tainmeru ^of ^^ be both with and without form, So long 

Nirvdnarn , j j i i i i 

Shdntam. It has to go round and round through the 
repetition of births and deaths it has a form. 
But viewed with the light of bliss and 
beatitude which it attains to by being 
freed from karma, it has no form. For, if on 
the one hand, the soul is to have a form by 
the virtue of its own, then it cannot but be 
dull insentient vcL2XX.^X'pudgal devoid of all 
consciousness and intelligence ( ^\^ "^t^i 
or ^?^r{ ) ; on the other hand, if it be abso- 
lutely formless then by the virtue of its being 
free from all activities too (fcRm-TlffflTcf), 
bondage and freedom would become incom- 
patible with its own nature and Sansdr too 
would be impossible and there would, there- 
fore, be no necessity for teachers to impart 
instructions on the real nature of the soul nor 
for sciptures enjoining duties which are 
required to be performed for the attainment 
of Nirvdnam Shdntam, 



Gonstttuttonal Freedom anJ Divtnxty oi tkc Soul — 
'Karma and Soul — How could Soul get enfettered \n 
the Ckatns of *Karma' — Different Tkeortes as to tkc 
Relation between Soul and *Karma — Law of 'Karma' 
and Ke-Dirtk — Tke Basts of tke Jam Etkics — Hercdtty 
cannot explain differences between Organisms — Heredity 
and * Karma . 

In the last chapter we have dwelt on 
soul ox jiva as an eternal self existent reality. 


We have seen also that soul is the cogitative ai Freedom 

of the Soul. 

substance in the living world and that it 
has ever been trying to break off its adaman- 
tine chains of karma which binds it down 
to the mires of the world. From the fact 
that it has been incessantly struggling to free 
itself from the shackels of karma^ that it has 
been ever striving to attain to Divinity 
by becoming pure and perfect through the 
dissipation of its own karmay we understand 
it to be constitutionally free and potentially 
divine. And here it may be question, why 
what is constitutionally free and potentially 



pure and divine came to be chained down 
to the mires of the world. Soul being but a 

Some diffi- 
culties-How self-existent reality from all eternity must 
the absolute 

became Re- be existing from periods prior to jivas 
karma. How then what is of subsequent 
growth can affect the soul which is consti- 
tutionally free, pure and formless ? 

To this the Jain Teachers say that such a 
question as the present one cannot even be 
raised. Karma is a phenomenon in time ; 
but soul stands far above time and causation, 
and until we can logically formulate the ques- 
tion, we cannot reasonably look for an answer 
to the same. When clearly put, it stands 
thus,- How, what is above time and causation 
came down into the meshes of relativity of the 
cause and effect ? How what is uncaused and 
increat came to be caused and created as it 
were .■* How what is truly pure and free became 
impure and fettered ? How what is essentially 
divine forsook its very nature ? Constituted 
as we are, we cannot answer this question. 
We think and we think in relations. So it 
is impossible for us to think of what stands 
above all relations or causes and conditions. 
Is it not absurd to enquire as to how the 


How do 


Absolute became Relative or how the Un- 
caused came to be caused as it were ? This 
is why the Jain Philosophy vehemently 
objects to the raising of such purile questions. 
But yet the fact is there and we cannot 
deny it. The soul lies there fettered in the 
plasms s\3i6\^QX to causes and conditions, to Soul and 


the law of karma by the virtue of which s t a n d t o 

' each other 

it is forced, as it were, to travel through the 
various grades /)f Sansdr. And how are we 
to account for this ? If karma be posterior 
to soul which is pure and perfect and which, 
in consequence, has nothing to do or perform, 
how would it come to perform karma ? 
Hence karma cannot be taken as posterior to 
soul. Nor can we take karma as something 
anterior to soul ; for in that case it would 
come to be interpreted as the product of 
karma ; but the characteristic indications of 
the soul as taught in our philosophy show 
nothing as such. It is not a compound of any 
ingredients standing for the substantial 
cause of the soul which is self-existent, 
and, as we have seen, has no begining nor 
end so far it is concerned as a metaphysi- 
cal entity. Then, again, the soul is formless 



and there is no functional activity of the agent 
in the manufacturinsf of what is formless. 

There is no 

room for Therefore karma cannot be anterior to 

G o d — t h e 

Creator. g^^] ^hjch is but a simple and formless 

cogitative substance. If it is contended as 
a third alternative position that both 
the soul and karma came into existence 
at one and the same time, then it would lead 
to the difficulty of explaining which would 
lead whom ? — there being ♦no subject in 
relation to an object. And such being the 
position the soul cannot suffer under the 
consequences of karma which being co- 
eternal with the soul has, like the latter 
also, nothing to stand for its substantial 
cause. We cannot hold that their Creator 
stands for the substantial cause as well 
as for the determinant cause to bring about 
the existence of soul and karma ; for it 
would involve the difficulty of explaining 
as to where was God, the Creator, when 
these were not. If it is remarked that 
there was neither merit nor demerit in the 
begining of things, save and except the soul 
which is of the nature of existence, conscious- 
ness and bliss, it becomes difficult again to 



explain the various diversities in the 
phenomenal world — the causes being absent 

All these positions being thus untenable, 
the Jains hold that both the soul and karma s o u i and 

K a r m a 

stand to each other in relations of pheno- stand to 

each other 

menal conjunction, the continuity of which J" relation 

of beginning 

is without beginning: in the sense of un- lessconjunc- 
^ ^ tion. 

broken series or su(;cession in time {anAdi 
apasckdnupurvi somyog apravdhasamvandka). 
And such is the ocean of sansdr whereon 
tumultuous waves variously swelling in 
names and forms come one after the other 
and break off dashing against weight of the 
adamantine chain of the phenomenal law of 
karma causation. Sansdr is thus subject 
to the laws of causes and conditions, to the 
laws of karma and omnipresent is the effect 
thereof in the phenomenal universe. It is 
mete here to note that suffering is not limited 
to the human world only, but spreads 
over all the abodes of existence ; such, 
as Hell {narak), the World of the goblins 
(Pretaloke), Life among the brute- class 
{Tiryakayont]y the World of demons (Asura- 
/oka) and the World of Gods (Devalokd). 



It is karma — the abiding consequences of 

our own actions — which subject us to 
Key-stone -^ 

edifice of\he ^^^^'^^ round the wheel of births and deaths 
Jain Ethics, through all these stages of existence. Our 
present state of being is not an allotment of 
a power working upon us from without, but 
rather is the cousequence of our own 
deeds done in the past, either in the present 
or in our previous live^ or stages of exis- 
tence. Whatever happens is the effect of 
some anterior causes and conditions and 
whatever one reaps, is nothing but the 
harvest of what one had previously sown. 
This is the key-stone supporting the 
grand edifice our ethics which declares 
the dignity and equality of all souls in any 
form of their existences and teaches as well 
that every soul stands erect and independent 
of the so-called inscrutable will and power 
of any superior Being to whose silent doors 
we need not creep for the gratification of our 
desires and ambitions, nor need we crawl 
weeping and moaning with a view of purging 
our souls of sins and iniquities of our own 
make by His grace. The Jain ethics based 
as it is on this automatic law of karma 



phenomenology, teaches that we are the 
makers and moulders of our own fate, and 
infuses life, strength and vigour by awaking A'^r/^a-what 

it is and what 

in us our high sense of moral obligation it means, 
and responsibility — the fountain-head of all 
virtuous deeds. 

Now what is this A^r;;^^ on the pheno- 
menology of which the whole of the Jain 
ethics is based? Etymologically it means 
action or deed. But as m philosophical 
terminology, it signifies not only — action 
but the crystalised effect as well of Ae action^ 
in so far-^it modifies the futurity of the doer 
^Esa beyond death^^d moulding his career 
to a great extent in the subsequent states 
of his existence. A close examination, for 
instance, of the appearance of man, of the 
anthropoid ape and of the bat, from almost 
identical embryos, will make it clear as to 
what we mean and understand by the 
operation of the Law of Karma in its most 
general signification. 

The embryos of the above named organ- 
isms are identical in structure and compo- 
sition. Hence the embryo of the bat ought 
to develop into a man. But it does not 


•o o»»t^ 


happen. And why ? Because of the differ- 
ence of 'heredity,' ^% iliry ^n^j^, which is the 
conservative principle accounting for the 
comparative persistency of the type of the 
organism. But the validity of this principle 
of transmission into the offsprings, is stftl 
open to question. 

Why is it that the children of the same 
parent show marked dissimilarities to their 
parents and to one another } Why do ^ 
twins develop dissimilar characters and 
possess irreconciliable tastes and tendencies, 
though coming almost at the same time, from 
the same stalk and nurtured and brought up 
with the same care and affection under similar 
conditions and environments ? These cannot 
be explained away as accidents. There 
is nothing as such in science. Nothing in 
the universe of phenomena and form is 
exempt from the inexonerable law of ^^ 
cause and effect. There must be some 
reason, therefore, underlying these inequa- 
lities. And what is that reason ? To say 
that these inequalities in children are 
due to the parents is to admit the truth 
and validity of the principles of heredity 



and adaptation to tiie- environment as 
working out these differencees in the spheres 
of organic evolution. But such eminent 

Dr. Weis- 

biologists as Dr. August Weisman and a man and 

good many others of equal authority and 
repute deny that hereditary tendencies of 
the parents predominate in one ; of the 
grand-father in another ; those of the grand- 
mother in the third and the like. Not this 
alone. Weisman goes further and reasons out 
that the acquired tendencies are never trans 
mitted to the offsprings. He believes in the 
'continuity of germ-plasvi and is of opinion 
that the inequalities are caused by the 
differences in ' germ- cells . '^I have called 
this substance ^erm'plasm\ says Weisman, 
"and have assumed that it possesses a highly 
complex structure, conferring upon it the 
power of developing into a complex organ- 
ism" Heredity — Vol. I. p. 170). Dr. Weis- 
man states further : "there is therefore conti- 
nuity of the germ-plasm from one 
generation to another. One might represent 
the germ-plasm by the metaphor of a long 
creeping root- stock from which plants arise 
at intervals, these latter representing the 





individuals of successive generations. Hence 

it follows that the transmission of acquired 

Hereditary characters is an impossibility, for if the 

t r a n s m i s - 

sion impos- aerm-plasm is not formed anew in each 

sible. ^ ^ 

individual, but is derived from what preceded 
it, its structure, and above all, its molecular 
constitution can not depend upon the 
individual in which it happens to occur, but 
such an individual only forms, as it were, the 
nutritive soil at the expense of which the 
germ-plasm grows, while the latter possess- 
ed its characteristic structure from the 
beginning, viz., before the commencement of 
growth. But the tendencies of heredity, of 
which the germ plasm is the bearer, depend 
upon this very molecular structure and hence 
only those characters can be transmitted 
through successive generations which have 
been previously inherited, vtz., those charac- 
' ters which were potentially contained in the 

structure of the germ-plasm. It also follows 
that those other characters which have been 
acquired by the influence of special, external 
conditions during the life-time of the parent, 
cannot be transmitted at all." (vol. I. p. 273-) 
"But at all events," sums up Dr. Wiesman, 



**we have gained this much that the only 
fact which appears to directly prove a trans- 
mission of acquired characters, has been 
refuted and that the only firm foundation on 
which this hypothesis had been hitherto 
based, has been destroyed."— (Vol. I. p. 461). 
So we see how the theory of heredity and 
adaptation, in short, the theory of Natural 

In s u ffi - 

Selection throupfh the cosmic processes of ciency o f 

^ ^ Natural 

which Charles Darwin and a host of others Selection. 
of his line of thinking attempted to show 
the origin of species, fails to explain the 
real causes and conditions for the specific 
differentiations in the spheres of organic 

The real causes and conditions deter- 
ming the origin of rf^e different types of 
organisms are to be found o&t in the principle 
of metempsychoses. And if the remarks 
of Dr. Weisman are read between the 
lines, it will be quite apparent that the Dr. 
stands on the very threshold of a revela- 
tion. He is knocking at the gate and it 
will open to give him an entrance into the 
mysteries of Transmigration, "the undivorce- 
able spouse of Karma' ; for, according to 



the Doctor's hyppothesis, the characters 
of each of the children referred to in 

Difficulty in- 
volved i n the above by way of concrete illustration, 

theory. ^re not the results of hereditary trans- 

mission but are a manifestation of **those 

characters which were potentially contained 
in the structure of the germ-plasm." A»d 

The, question, therefore naturally crops up in 

our minds, where did the potential characters 

and tendencies of the germ-plasm originate 

from ? He says, "from the common stock." 

But what and where ^that common stock, we 

are to look for? Dr. Weisman does not 

inform us aiiythiag on the point, nor does he 

solve the real problem at issue. 

Besides , the physiological principle of 

hereditary transmission involves grave moral 

difficulties. It means the iniquities of the 

fathers visited upon the children. One 

commits the wrong but another receives 

the punishment ! Can absurdity go any 

further ? The reason why the embryo of 

the bat cannot develop into a man, eon si sts 

m this^that ^^human organism, according to 

the Jain philosophy, is the product of a 

different set of causes and conditions ; or 



to put the idea with all the Orientality we 
can command, because the karma of the 
human beina is different. Karma, here, does Km man ac- 

^ counts also 

not mean 'heredity' through the principle of [^ chan'^es"" 
which the offsprings are alleged to inherit 
the qualities of the fathers. In Jain philo- 
sophy, it signifies what the soul carries with 
itself from an anterior stage of its being by 
virtue of its prior deeds and desires. The 
idea is that every thought we think, every 
act we do, tells upon our souls and thereby 
leaves an impression upon them, as it were, 
which continues to exercise influence on 
them in their subsequent careers. A»dAcor- 
dingly our present happiness or misery is not 
the award of any power existing outside 
ourselves but is rather the consequent of 
what we ourselves had done in the past^ 
either in this life or in an anterior birth. 
None is exempt from the operation of karma 
— Nor Krishna, nor Buddha, nor Christ Jesus. 
This doctrine of karma thus unquestionably 
furnishes the key to the interpretation of 
the phenomenal greatness in humanity. ' 

Christ Jesus of Nazereth was a Christ by 
the virtue of his own karma. So .angels 



become angels or they loose their angel- 
hood by the force of their own karma. 
"The experience gained in one life", to quote 
the language of Hartmann, the great Ger- 
man philosopher, "may not be remembered 
in their detail in the next, but the impres- 
sions which they produce will remain. 
Again and again man passes through the 
wheel of transformation, and changing his 
lower energies into higher ones until matter 
attracts him no longer and he becomes — 
what he is destined io be — A GOD." 



GKristtan Crttictsm of *Karma* — Emt>ty Heart of 
Jatntsm — Examtnatton of tke Crittctsm— Inconsxstcnctes 
and Dtf^culttes of tkc Ckristtan Theology — God and 
Satan — Good and Evil. — Indian Widows CKmsttan 
unmarried Girls. 

From what has been discussed in the 
preceeding pages so far the inexorable Law 
of Karma-cdMSd\\t,y is concerned, it is Man is the 

maker of his 

perfectly clear that man is the maker of his Destiny. 
own Destiny. This is the main principle 
whereon the grand edifice of the Jain 
ethics is securely based. But this belief 
in the ethical autonomy of man making 
him thoroughly free and independent of 
the iron will of any Being outside himself 
cannot but irritate Christian minds. 

**Ihsteadofa God delighting in mercy, 
who rules and judges the fair world that 
He has made," writes Mrs. Sinclare 
Stevenson in her latest contribution, The 
Heart of Jainsm,' *'the Jain have set in 
this place a hedious thing the accumulated 


energy of his past actions, Karma, which 

Mrs. Sinclair 

on the Law can no morc be afrectea by love or prayer 

of Kar7na 

and Rebirth than a run-away locomotive. On and on 
it goes remorsely dealing out mutilation 
and sufferiug, till the energy it has 
amassed is at last exhausted and a merciful 
silence follows. The belief in Karma 
and transmigration kills all sympathy and 
human kindness for sufferers, since any 
pain a man endures is only the wages he 
has earned in a previous birth. It is this 
belief that is responsible among other things 
for the suffering of the thousands of child- 
widows in India who are taught they are 
now reaping the fruit of their own unchastity 
in a former life." 

So writes Mrs. Sinclare in exposing 
the so-called 'Empty Heart of Jainism' and in 
vindication of her Christian creed. But alas ! 
she can not explain the world of inequalities 
and diversities from the stand-point bf her 
own Christian Theology. If an All-mercy 
Personal God created this universe out of 
nothing, could He not make all things good 
and beautiful and all beings happy ? Why 
one is a born saint and another a murderer } 



Why one waddles in wealth and opulence 
and another starves to death ? If God created 
one to enjoy the pleasures of life which the 
world can afford to supply with and another 
to labour life-long under the stiffling, 
tyrrany of his master, how could he be an 
embodiment of All-love and All-mercy ? 
Need she be told in the language of 
the poet that **A God All-mercy is a God 

Christianity teaches that man has but one 
life on earth to live either for an eternal exis- ,, 

Mercy made 

tence in Heaven or to be condemned into ^°^ Sinners. 
Hell according to the merits or demerits of 
his deeds. But this naturally encourages 
a man to make the most of his opportuni- 
ties here. Besides an appeal for mercy at 
the hands of an Omnipotent God best suits 
him who has consciously failed in the dis- 
charge of duties. But the great disadvantage 
of such form of faith is that it makes some 
violently reckless so much so that when 
the poet Henri Hein was asked if he 
believed in Divine Grace, he replied, 
**God will forgive me, for that is his 




This dramatical piece incident reminds 
us of the famous lines of another poet who 
sang in the following srain, — 

*'He who does not sin, cannct hope for mercy ; 

Mercy was made for sinners; be not sad." 

But with the Jains such conceptions do 

not count for anything-. If the Supreme 
The pit-fall . . , 

of Original Being delighting in mercy is the Prime 

Author of all that is, He should have shown 
mercy and perfect forbearance, from the very 
beginning to man, — His own handi-work, in- 
stead of allowing him to fall into the pit-fall 
of Original Sin. Man is not ommiscient, and 
according to the Christian theology, nor a 
perfect being as well, and as such he 
must have his shortcomings and failures ; 
but as he was living under the protec- 
ting and paternal care of his All-mercy 
Maker, could he not naturally expect that 
if he were to commit any mistake in 
his movements, his Omniscient Father and 
Guardian who must have fore seen things 
long before he himself could realise, should 
protect his son, showing thereby, His 
perfection of forbearance and mercy to his 
creature which he is to delight in .'* We have 



^ready remarked that we the Jains cannot 
persuade ourselves to believe in a God in 
the sense of an extra-mundane Creator who 
caused the down-fall of mankind but after- 
wards taking pity on them dropped down 
from Heaven his only Son through whose 
crucifixion mankind was saved. 

Some Christian Divines hold, however, 
that the pit-fall of Original Sin which caused 
the down fall of the entire human race was gatan work- 
but dug out by the Devil. They teach that '"^^°^^^ "• 
God created all that is good and beautiful and 
it was Satan who brought in the Evil and 
spoiled man — the handi-work of God. But 
little do these Divines think that good and evil 
are but relative terms. Good can not be 
without evil and vice versa evil without 
good. There is a soul of goodness in 
things evil and conversely there is a soul 
of evil in things good. And when God 
created what is good he must, at the same 
time, have created the evil too. Similarly, 
when the Satan created the evil, he too 
must have created, at the same time, what 
is good. Now to' veiw things as they 
stand, we cannot but logically infer that God 



and Devil worked together to create 
this universe of ours which is therefore 
but a mixture of good and evil. And 
to push the question still further, 
both of them being equally powerful and 
limited by each other, it follows that neither 
of them was omnipotent, omnipresent and 
omniscient. Does Mrs. Sinclair wish us 
to set up within the shrines of our tender 
hearts such a God the very conception of 
which is logically absurd. 

Turning to the effects of karma on social 
matters it is true, indeed, that here the 

The widows , . 1111 r \ 

of India vs. earth IS soaked by the tears of the 

the unmarri- ,.,,., , .11 n/r r^. 1 • 

cd girls of child-Widows, but Will Mrs. Sinclair 


inform her readers as to why the Christian 
world echoes with the sighs of the 
unmarried ? Here the Indian widows had 
had a chance for the husbands to love and 
to loose in this life as these were written 
in the their own Karma and there is every 
reason to hope that they would receive their 
beloved back more cordially in their 
warm embraces during the subsequent turn 
and term of their natural life quite in accor- 
dance with their own Karma. But what hope 



can Christianity, believins: as it does in a ^^^t hope 

^ can Chris- 

sinc^Ie term of life on earth, hold out to the *'^"'^y ^°^^ 

° out ? 

thousands of unfortunate girls who never get 
any husband to love, while the favoured few 
who have once been married still have many 
a chance to grant favours to other men who 
may win the woman's heart and marry them 
again ? Are there any reasons to assign for 
the poor unfortunate girls' never getting any 
husbands to love at all ? And did not the 
poet sing — 

**It is better to have loved and lost 
Than never to have loved at all." 

Besides if the fear of Hell or the hope 
of Heaven be a powerful incentive to good 
conduct in this life, the prospect of countless 
births and deaths, during the courses 
of which there are numerous chances for 
amendments of conduct and which repetition 
of births and deaths can only end with 
the attainment of emancipation from the 
thraldom of servitude must be far more so. 
With its firm conviction in the inexora- 
bility of the law of A'^r/w^-causality, Jainism 
regards every successive life as the moulder 
of the next untill through the entire and 



absolute exhaustion of the individual's 
Karma, liberation is surely and inevitably 
attained, sooner or later. 

In fine Mrs. Sinclair would do well to bear 
in mind that the law of Karma which in the 
Physical world speaks of the continuity of 
motion and indestructibility of matter teaches 
in the domain of Ethics, the immortality 
of deeds and the inevitability of the moral 
responsibility in the case of an individual, 
family, or nation. 



* Karma' and RettrtKs, Com|>limentary aspects of one 
ana tnc Same Law Governing tne Universe — Buaatstic 
Nikiltsm - all wttKout an Ego — Belief in tkc Law 
Lrings in Solace ana Comfort in ones failures — iViae 
range of tke telief in Asia and £\iro|>e — Poets Scientists 
and* Pkilosot>Kers — Transmigration kas its root m 
reality — Karma Sarir. 

While investigating into the causes 
and conditions for the differences and 

Karma and 


diversities in the world of names and forms, ?o?ent^*fLc^ 
we have seen that we cannot explain the 
differences unless we accept the Law of 
Karma and of Rebirth as determining them. 
Karma and Re- birth which are thus, potent 
factors in the evolution of the world of 
particulars constituting Sansdr are but two 
complimentary aspects of one and the same 
Law governing everything having its being 
as a part, as it were, of this ocean of Sansdr. 
Boundless is the ocean of Sansdr with 
countless waves ruffling its expanse in the 
shape of individuals and phenomena. Sansdr 

Even Bud 
hism admit! 
of K a r m J 
and Rebirth. 


is thus a composite existence subject to the 
control of the Law of Karma and Rebirth. 
Almost all the ancient systems of philosophy, 
excepting only that of the sage Brihaspati, 
of'Ka^?m'a ^re at one here. Even Budhisism which 
denied the very reality. of everything, could 
not deny the force and validity of the Law of 
Karma and Rebirth. All is impermanent, 
says a Budha, so that there is no eternal 
entity passing over to Ntrvdn across the 
ocean of Sansdr» All is without an ego so 
that there is no soul to survive the shocks 
of death and dessolution. Thus rejecting, 
on the one hand, the metaphysical entity of 
Sansdr and immortality of soul, Budhism, 
on the otherhand, teaches that it is Karma 
that sets revolving the 'Wheel of Becoming! 
Or more plainly, it is our Karma — the 
abiding consequences of our actions which 
subject us to the repetition of births and 

The belief in the law of Karma has 
been very strong in the Indian mind 
from time out of mind so much so that 
it has almost become constitutional with 
the Indians inhabiting this vast penen- 


sula. Not to speak of the higher philo- 
sophical treatises of the soil, even the 
ordinary Indian vernaculars abound in such 
passages and proverbs which unequivocably 

Wide range 

bespeak of their staunch faith in one's own of the belief. 

Karma in such a manner as makes it 

pretty clear that the belief in question has 

become a source of solace and comfort in 

one's disappointments and failures in life. 

Thus lamenting over the cruelty of fortune, 

a melodious bird of Bengal sings — "^fi§ T 

f^RtT ^w" f%fti" — *Ah! my dear, what alas ! 

was written in my karma\ 

It is important to note that this belief 
in Karma and repetition of births is not 
confined within the precincts of India only. 
It is also prevelant in China and Japan. 
There is a Japanese proverb — -"Resign thy- 
self as it is the result of thine own karma,'' 

Not the Eastern countries only : an 
enquiry into the literary contributions of the 
Christian lands unmistakeably shows 
how far the doctrine of Karma and 
metempsychoses has influenced the civiliza- 
tion of Egypt and Greece. Even the 
mighty minds of Europe and America have 



been much swayed by the doctrine. To 

Young, Dry- 
den, Shelley quote a few verses from the best poets of the 

and Words- 
worth. Christian world : In the *Night Thoughts* 

of Young, the poet sings, — 

"Look Nature through, 'tis revolution all, 
All change, no death ; day follows night, and night 
The dying day, stars rise and set, and set and rise. 
Earth takes the example. All to reflourish fades ; 
As in a wheel — all sinks to re-ascend ; 
Emblems of man, who passes, not expires." 

In Dryden's Ovid we read, — 

*'Death has no power the immortal soul to slay. 
That, when its present body turns to clay, 
Seeks a fresh home, and with unlessened might, 
Inspires another frame with life and light." 

Shelley sings in 'Queen Mab, : — 

"For birth but wakes the spirit to the sense 
Of outward shows, whose inexperienced shape 
New modes of passion to its frame may lend, 
Life is its state of action, and the store 
Of all events aggregated ^ there 
That variegate the eternal universe. 
Death is a gate of dreariness and gloom. 
That leads to azure isles and beaming skies 
And happy regions of eternal hope.' ' 

In his 'Intimations of Immortality', 
Wordsworth informs, — 



"The soul that rises with us, our life's star, 
Hath had elsewhere its setting, 
And Cometh from afar." 

In the *Two Voices' muses Tennyson — 

"Or if through lower lives I came — 
Tho' all experience past bec.ame, 
Consolidate in mind and frame — 
I might forget my weaker lot ; 
For is not our first year forgot ? 
The haunts of memory echo not." 

Walt Whitman confirms in his 'Leaves 
of Grass', — 

"As to you, Life, I reckon you are the leavings of 

many deaths, 

No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times 


Such and similar other passages might be 
culled in numbers to show how the doctrine 
of metempsychoses influenc-ed the best of 
the European minds in the domain of 

Again, Egyptian culture and polity was 
in and through saturated with the idea 
of metempsychoses. ''The Egyptians 
propounded," says Herodotus, "the theory 
that the human soul is imperishable and 
that where the body of any one dies, it enters 

and Whit- 
man, Hero- 



into some other creature that may be ready 

to receive it". 

Egypt and Pythogoras says, "All has soul ; all is soul 


wandering in the organic world and obeying 

eternal will or law." According to Maxmuller, 
claimed a subtle etherial clothing for the 
soul apart from its grosser clothing when 
united with body," 

In Greece, the doctrine was held by 
Empedocles. The students of Plato must 
have noticed that the doctrine of metempsy- 
choses forms, as it were, the key note to 
the principles of causation and compound 
' In Plato's Phsedo we find: "They 

(souls after death) wander about so long 
until through the desire of the corporeal 
nature that accompanies them, they are 
again united in a body and they are united, 
as is probable, to animals having the same 
habits as those they have given themselves 
up to during life or even into the same 
human species again." 

"The soul leaving body," says Plotinus, 
"becomes that power which it has most 
developed. Let us fly then from here 



below and rise to the intellectual world, 

that we may not fall into a purely sensilbe 

life by allowing ourselves to follow sensible 

images etc." 

Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary 

of Christ, says : "The company of ^^^^^^ p^j_ 

disembodied souls is distributed in various °:l^P:!l!'^' 


orders. The law of some of them is to 
enter mortal bodies, and after certain 
prescribed periods (as according to our 
ayuh-karma) be again set free". 

Besides these, copious passages could 
be gleaned from the philosophical writings 
and dissertations of such eminent men 
and leaders of thought as Kant, Schelling, 
Fichte, Schapenhauer, Goethe and the 
like. Even the most astute moulder of the #> 
Sensationist school of thought, Hume, the 
sceptic, in his Essay on the ^Immortality of 
Soul' had to acknowledge the truth and 
validity of the theory of rebirths. He says : 
"The metempsychoses is therefore the only 
system of this kind that philosophy can 
harken to". 

Prof. Huxley of the modern scientific 
world somewhere remarks : "None but the 



hasty thinkers will reject it =* * * Like 

the doctrine of evolution itself, that of 

transmigration has its root in the world of 


Among the Christian theologians many 

prominent theological leaders have main- 
Christian tained it. Dr. Julius Muller, the eminent 


Leaders. German theologian, supports the theory of 
Re-births in his work known as **The 
Christian Doctrine of Sin." Besides Sweden- 
borg and Emerson believed in metem- 



Prof. Huxley anJ Re-tirfh — Huxley s Gkaracter 
anJ our Karma-matter — CKaracter — Inner Nature — 
Ltnga-Jeka of tlie HmJu Pkiloso|>liers — Tkc Five 
Koakas or tke Concentric Gtrcles — Pranas ox tke 
Hindus anJ of tke Jain Pktlo8o|>kers — transmission of 
Ckaracter tkrougk Here<lity-Vs .-Transmigration of 
Karma-Sartra tkrougk Re-oirtk. 

In another place of his last Romane's 
Lectures, says Huxley, * 'Every day experi- 
ence familiarises us with the facts which L^a vf o" 
are grouped under the name of heredity. 
Every one of us bears upon him the 
obvious marks of his parentage, perhaps 
remote relationship. More particularly the 
sum of tendencies to act in a certain way 
which we call 'character' is often to be 
traced through a long series of progenitors 
and collaterals. So we may justly say that 
this 'character' — this moral and intellec- 
tual essence of a man — does veritably pass 
over from one fleshly tabernacle to another 
and does really transmigrate from genera- 
tion to generation. In the new born in- 


fant the character of the stock lies latent, 
and the ego is a little more than a bundle of 
potentialities ; but very early those become 
actualities ; from childhood to age, they 
manifest themselves, in dullness or bright- 
ness, weakness or strength, visciousness or 
uprightness ; and with each feature modified 
by confluence of another, if by nothing 
else, the character passes on to its incar- 
nation in new bodies. 

**The Indian philosophers called 'Charac- 
*Character ter' as thus defined, 'Karma, It is this 
of Huxley. karma which passed from life to life and 
linked them in chains of transmigrations 
and they held that it is modified in each 
life, not merely by confluence of parentage, 
but by its own acts. They were in fact 
strong believers in the theory, so much 
disputed just at present, of the hereditary 
transmission of acquired characters. That 
the manifestation of tendencies of a charac- 
ter may be greatly facillitated or impeded 
by conditions, of which self-discipline or the 
absence of it are among the most important, 
is indubitable : but that the 'character' itself 
is modified in this way is by no means so 


certain ; it is not so sure that the trans- Huxley's 

, , r •! 1 • misrepresen- 

mitted character of an evil-doer is worse tation and 

^ . 1 I 11 wrong inter- 

or that of a righteous man better than that pretation of 

the Law. 
which he received. Indian philosophy, how- 
ever, does not admit of any doubt on the 

subject ; the belief in the influence of 
conditions, notably self-discipline, on the 

karmas was not merely a necessary postulate 
of its theory of retribution, but it presented 
the only way of escape from the endless of 
round of transmigrations," 

Such is Prof. Huxley's interpretation and 
presentation of the law of karma and 
metempsychoses in Indian philosophy. But 
we differ from him in as much as neither the 
interpretation, nor the presentation, on that 
account, is correct. For we must have to 
draw a line of distinction between a man and 
his conditions. According to our phi- 
losophy a man may, indeed, be roughly taken 
as the embodiment of intellectual, spiritual 
and moral {^n^ ^R ^iftcC ) essences which 
Huxley sums up by the word 'character,* And 
the man as such is not different from the sum- 
total of the the energies summed up by 
'character' as just explained. But then there 



is another inviolable physical condition in 

the shape of a medium for the manifestation 

and operation of the above energies and it is 

Transmis- the mortal physical frame which the man 

sion through ^ 

Heredity takes on. And there is invariably a kind of 

or through ^ 

Re-births? chemical affinity under the secret influence of 
which the man is drawn to a particular body 
wherein he is to take birth. It is true 
that man passes from body to body through 
the repetition of births and deaths, and as 
he progresses or retrogresses quite in accord- 
ance with the good or bad deeds he per 
formed in the past, it is evident enough 
that he passes out with his own self-acquired 
habits, qualities and desires fitly called karma- 
sarira according to our philosophical ter- 
minology. But this does not necessarily 
mean that the habits and qualities he 
acquired through the processes of natural 
selection or through the processes of self- 
discipline he might have undergone — be 
these for good, or for bad — are transmitted 
to the off-springs through the physiological 
principle of heredity. True it is that the 
offsprings display at times such habits 
and tendencies as can well be traced out 



as if coming down from the parent or 

some remote ancestor. The way in which xranmission 

this hereditary transmission is explained transmifra- 

- - , 1 • 1 • t'O" of the 

by the modern physiologists cannot, as karma- 

we have seen elsewhere, give us a satis- 
factory solution of the problem in question. 
The phenomenon of apparent transmission 
through the physiological principle of 
heredity as explained in our philosophy 
seems to clear up the difficulties involved 
in the question. According to our philoso- 
phy, the re-incarnating soul, bearing as it does 
about it the karma-pudgal which the fiva 
acquired by dint of its past experiences and 
unfulfilled desires, forming its character in 
the past, automatically developes with a 
mathematical precision, a sort of affinity or 
tendency of attraction, for the appropriate 
physiological and moral conditions where- 
in it may find a fit and favourable soil for 
moulding out of the same, a suitable body 
as the manifesting media for the display of 
its powers and qualities, either to cope 
with nature in the fulfilment of its un- 
satisfied desires and enjoyment of the 
pleasures of the world, or to strive for the 

3'5 ^ 


attainment of bliss and beatitude, as the 
case may be, according to its karma in a 
previous birth. 

To enter a bit more into details : we 

have stated before that there is some ' super- 

of the prin- physical ' power in every living body, by the 

presence of which the body is enabled to 

respond, if suitably influenced. Responsive- 
ness, here, forms a predominating pheno- 
menon of life, and death of the body means 
the departure of the * super-physical ' power, 
called atman—Jiva f'soul) — from the living 
body after which it can no longer respond 
to any stimulus. 

At the time of death, when this soul 
or the * super-physical * power shuffles off its 
mortal coil, it passes out assuming the form 
of a subtle unit of energy clothing itself, as it 
does, in a subtle body as its vehicle which is 
built out of the fine ia^;;/^-matter — the 
crystalised particles of the soul's past ex- 
periences and unfulfilled desires etc. with 
which it happens to pass out. According 
to our philosophy, these fine z^^;^;;/^- matters or 
the crystalised particles of past experiences 
and unfulfilled desires, embodied in which the 



soul passes out leaving the body dead, form 
the very germ of physical life in future. 

The use of the phrase ^'karma-pudgar — 
karma'{tmtter) is singular in our philosophy. 
AW karmas, the other systems of Indian ^^V^^^J 

' puagal and 

Thought, accept unwaveringly the truth and Character, 
validity of the doctrine of karma-c3iUS3\\iy and 
re-births ; but with them karma is amurtaAm- 
ponderable. None has yet been found to take 
the word karma in the sense and significance 
as we find it to have been used in our philo- 
sophy. It is true that karma oi the /iva means 
its past activities or energies — forces of 
its own making that tend it to be a murderer 
or a saint in the next life. But the 
energies or forces, as they are in themselves 
are formless and as such they cannot act 
and react on any thing and produce changes 
in the tendency of the same. Sky, like 
void space, because of its being formless, 
cannot affect us. In order to act and re-act 
and thereby to produce changes in things 
on which they work, the energies and forces 
must have to be metamorphosed into forms or 
centres of forces. So are the cases with 
Jtva!s karma — its past-activities or energies-— 

An epitome of /a in ism 

forces of its own making, which become meta- 
morphosed as it were into the form of karma- 
particles wherein remain stored up in a poten- 
tial state all the experiences, desires and 
tendencies which Prof. Huxley sums up by 
the word * Character! 

The experiences and forces of its own, 
metamorphosed into a material particles, which 
the Jiva carries with it at the time of its 


Sarira. departure from the body wherein it had been 

encased in a previous birth, and known as the 
karma-^\)A^?\ of the Jiva — form, according 
to our sages, the physical basis of a future life. 
It is also technically called — Kdrman Sarira 
of the Jiva which along with the tejas sarira 
which is also inseparable from it, clings 
round to the soul until it reaches final libera- 
tion. Here again we find another display of the 
grand truth teaching us of the indestructibility 
of matter and continuity of motion — Karma, 
After shufflng off the gross mortal frame 
like a pair of old worn-out shoes, the in - 
dividual soul, taking the form of a subtle 
unit of energy clothed in the karma-pudgal 
as explained, instinctively flies off to one or 
the other of the different grades of sansdr or 


gatiy as it is called, for which it has developed 
a strong affinity and where, on that account, 
it may find a more favourable soil for Gatis or the 

di ff e r e n t 

fuller expressions of the eners^ies and forces grades of 
^ ^ Sansar. 

of its own making during the course of the 
previous term of the physical life. It may 
happen to be located for some time in the 
regions of hell {^K^) or go to some other 
world. It may travel among the brutes and 
beasts (f?f^T «F 'Jtf'T) or may become a god 
or a demon in the world of gods and 
demons (^^T^T ^cJi). It may also by 
the virtue of its own karma under which 
it willingly laboured, run to Heaven, the 
region of the gods, there to enjoy the 
sweetest pleasures of life which he so much 
hankered after or be born again to such 
parents in the human world (^^cn ^T^) as 
is consistent with its prior deeds and desires, 
either to waddle in wealth and prosperity, 
or to starve to death in poverty, or to strive 
after bliss and beatitude, forsaking all the 
pleasures of wordly life and living. 

So we see that the 'Character of Prof. 
Huxley is somewhat the same with the karma- 
sarira in the Jain philosophy. The Hindu 



philosophers also hold that the death of a 
living being means the departure from the 
same of a subtle body technically called, 
Linga-deha or Sukshma sarira. 

The Hindu sages have thought it wise 

to analyse an organism into five sheaths or 

koshas. The first is the Annamaya kosh, 

and the five (n) Prdnamaya kosh, (ni) Monomaya kosh, 

Koshas of 

the Hindus, (iv) Vzgndnamaya kosh and lastly (v) Anand- 
rnaya kosh. It is in the centre of the 
Anandamaya kosh or the innermost sheath 
that the soul is stated to reside — the outer- 
most being the gross nutritious vesture or 
sheath called the Annamaya, Excluding the 
out-ermost one, the Annamaya — the other 
four, one coming consecutively within 
another like concentric circles taken to- 
gether, constitute the Linga or Sukshma- 
sarira or subtle organism of the Jiva, The 
Hindus further hold that this subtle body 
consists of chitta or the mind-stuff with the 
organs of sense and actions there held 
together by the energy called Prdn playing 
through the medium of the organism. Ac- 
cording to the functional activities this Pr&n 
is further analysed into — 


(a) Prdn or the inhaling power which 

moves the lungs. The PrAnas. 

(d) Apdn or the exhaling power mani- 
fest in throwing out foreign and effete matter 
from the system. 

{c) Sam&n or the digestive and distri- 
butive energy in the system. * 

(d) Uddn — is the power of speech. It 
also helps to the descent of foodstuff through 
the alimentary canal to the stomach. And 

(e) Vydn-'^is the energy which sustains 
the body and galvanizes its parts into life 
and vigour thus protecting it from putre- 

Now these organic energies which are 
but functional activities of one and the same 
Power — called MMkhya-Prdn or the Primal 
Physical Energy along with the five elemental 
rudiments of the nutritious vesture, bearing 
the impress of desires, experiences, and ideas 
formed in the past, make up the sukshma- 
sarira of the Hindu philosophers that passes 
from body to body through the various 
grades of sansdr according to the merits and 
demerits of the embodied soul. 




But the kdrman-sarira in our philosophy 
is of different make. It is true that the Jain 
^^^Yd ^^ philosophy speaks of prdnas sls organic and 
^hiioso^h*" bodily powers ; but these develop only as 
the Jiva ascends up the scale of evolution 
from lower to higher organisms. The highest 
type of organism of a /zva has ten prdnas 
and the lowest type must have at least four. 
Of the ten pr6>nas or powers which are to be 
found in the higher types of organism as man, 
— five belong to the five organs of sense, viz., 
touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. Add 
to these five, the three powers of body, mind 
and speech {^VX J{^ ^^T). The ninth is the 
power of inhalation and exhalation termed 
(^I^T m^r) and the tenth is the ayu-bal — or the 
power whereby is determined the longivity of 
the fiva during which it has to keep to a cer- 
tain definite configuration of the body in which, 
it might happen to enter in a particular stage 
of its existence determined by its own past 
karma. The Jain philosophers hold, however, 
that of these prdnas in their abstract or 
etherial forms, accompany the karma-sarira 
clothed in which the soul departs from an 
organism wherein it dwelt for a certain period 


of time by the virtue of its ayu-bal, accruing 
from ayu-karma of which we shall have 
occasion to speak later on. And these abs- Paryiptas 

^ and Apar- 

tract (bhava) pr&nas or powers develop only y^Ptas. 
when the kdrma-sarira enters a particular 
organism according to its own karmas. But all 
the types of organism do not possess the five 
senses ; neither all can speak, nor all have the 
intellect to think. While dealing with 
the Jiva in the chapter of categories, we 
have seen >La2XJivic organisms are classifiable 
according to the number of the organs of 
sense they possess. It is important to note by 
the way that each of these types of organism 
is again divisible into two sub-classes — 
known by the names of Parydptq and 
Aparydpta. The parydptas are six in 
number, viz., akdr or the seed of life ; 
sarira, or the body ; Indriya or the senses, 
svdshochchdsa or breathings, bhdsd or speech, 
and mana or mind. The pdnas and the 
organs develop as the jiva migrates on and 
on through the processes of metempscyhoses. 
It is impossible to exhaust in the short space 
at disposal, the list of the different types of 
organism which the karma-sarira takes on, 


according to the ideas and desires registered 

The Jiva 

migrates out on it. In fact, it shows to our wonder 

with the po- 
tentialities of and admiration how could the Jain sages 
the organs of j q 

its future amass in that ancient time such wealth of 


biological informations on morphological 
variations of organisms. 

But to return to the direct subject matter : 
Prior to its migrating from the ouddrika 
body or the gross physical frame, the jiva 
fixes its gati or the particular abode, and 
actually migrates out with the potentialities 
of devoloping these firdnas and the organs. 
But these are devoloped as necessity arises 
for the formation of the particular new 
organism it is going to enter into. And the 
developments are quite in keeping with its 
previous karma and take place subsequent to 
its entering into the new body as determined. 

Thus we see the karma-sarira of a jiva, 
as explained in the Jaina philosophy, is simply 
a kind of organism born of its own experiences 
i.e. energies and forces of its own making 
which become materialised, as it were, into 
karma-pudgal or ^<2rm«-matter envelop- 
ed in which the individual soul, reducing 
itself into a unit of energy, passes out. 



Every thought we think, every word we 
speak, every act we do, every desire we 
form — becomes rarified and stored up in our Organism 

is but an oui- 

Experiential body. It remains dormant there J^^rd mani- 

^ •' lestation of 

for sometime only to reappear again in the ^^^^ wn°"^^^ 
form of mental waves with all the potentialites 
of strong desires etc. Nothing can prevent 
the courses of desires. Desires must be ful- 
filled. This is the law of Nature. The will is 
equally and indistinguishably desire and 
thought. It is the will to be, to assert and 
thereby exist as a distinct and separate from 
all the rest, that is the root of everything we 
see around us in the world of particulars. 
It is but a truism to say that different thought- 
activities manifest themselves in different 
outward forms. The science of physiognomy 
and thought-reading owe their development 
to the study of the changes in the outward 
manifestation of the organism, corresponding 
to the changes in the mental constitution. 
And organisms may vary not only in respect 
of their structures, but in respect of their 
tendencies to do this or the other in all 
kinds of ways. The thought-currents 
for tasting finally results in the organic 




formation of the tongue. So the ear, the nose 

etc, can like wise be traced to the thought- 

The will is currents for hearing^ music, for smelling 

simply the ^ ^ 

fragrance and the like respectively. Every 
bodily structure corresponds to each set of 
thought-currents called, updnga-ndma karma 
of xhejiva to which it belongs. So is the 
case with the human organisms in general. 
Human organism, to speak more pointedly, is 
but the objectification in a gross form of the 
human action-currents of will and thought. 
Kant, the great German philosopher, says 
of man that "his will* is his 'proper self.'' 
*'The will is simply the man," says T. H. 
Green. "Any act of will is the expression 
of the man as he, at the time, is. The motive 
issuing in his act, the object of his will, 
the idea, which for the time he sets himself 
to realise, are but the same thing in different 
words. Each is the reflex of what for the 
time, as at once feeling, desiring and think- 

inor the man is " Man is thus but a 

visible expression of his will which is equal 
to and indistinguishable from his thought- 
activities. But will and thought, simply as 
they are in themselves, are mere abstractions, 



and cannot therefore as such modify the charac- 
ter of our organism ; for how, what is merely 
a pure abstraction, can affect our material 
constitution ? but we feel that every act we do, 
every thought we think, and every desire we Karma- 

sarira and 

form, does actually produce changes in us and modem psy- 

there can be no denial of it. Therefore the 
actions and desires to be in a position to 
effect any change in us must transform them- 
selves into a medium of homogeneous nature 
with our physical constitution itself. But 
the question arises how can it be conceived ? 
Psychology shows quite unmistakeably that 
no desire, no feeling, no connation passes 
the threshold of our mind without, in some- 
way, modifying the neural processes. We 
forget what we felt or did before. But the 
whole system vaguely experiences a sort of 
diffused effect of what has been. Modern 
psychology would tell us that they abide 
in the region called, "subconscious." But our 
psychology teaches that just as a volume of 
water rushing out, leaves its traces of watery 
particles on the person who stands close 
by : so the action-currents of the human 
thought and will leave vestiges on its 


experiential body which brings about a 
new arrangement in the atomic distribution 
of the karma-pudg2i\ composing the' karma- 

Whatever might be the mystery, it is 
The Inner clear and certain that human thoughts and 
the "^^Outer desires are embodied in or objectified into 
the human karma-sarira. Thus the karma" 
sarira then forms the 'inner -nature of which 
the visible man is but an 'outer expression. 
The Inner and the Outer, according to our 
philosophy, are not essentially different. They 
are the same essentially with this difference 
only that one manifests through the other 
and stand to each other in the relation 
of mutual intermutation. Just as there is no 
essential difference between force and exer- 
tions ; for force is only known in and 
through exertion making it to be the effect of 
the cause which is no other than the force 
itself: so what is *inner' is but the invisible 
cause of what is outer which is but an effect 
in a visible form. 



Relations tetwcen tkc *Karma ana the *Oudartlca • — 
Stages of <levelot>nient — *Karman produces tlie 
*Ou<larvlca* — *Ou<lar%lca' t>ro<luces *Karma — Not Iden- 
tical Lut T-wo distinct Kntities — Oo-extstence In- 
explicable — Tken no Inter-action ^ossicle -Relation or 
Ooncomitant Variation — Dimculties or Parallelism — 
XKe *Karman body and ine *Oudarika stand to eacn 
otner m Relation of Interxnutation, • 

We shall now discuss the relation between 

the Karma body including TejaSj or the 

*inner nature' and the Ouddrika body or „ 

' How to treat 

the 'outer nature' of man. And as it is the question. 
a stumbling block for the beginners, it 
deserves a careful consideration. Without 
asserting any thing dogmatically, we shall 
only discuss every possible hypothesis which 
can be framed with regard to this rela- 
tion and show that, for the contradictions 
involved therein, none of them appears to be 
rationally tenable save and except the posi- 
tion held by our sages. Our procedure here, 
therefore, will be more or less dialectical 
i.e. we should point out poverty of each 



hypothesis by bringing into light the 
inconsistencies involved therein. 

One may suppose that the relation in 
question is simply that of development. The 
inner nature develops itself into the outer 
nature as the plant grows into a tree or the 
Stages of wo^l<3 develops itself into the present form 
ofThe^^m'e fi'om the primal state of nebulous matter, 
fficufties. What lends plausibility to this hypothesis 
is the fact of the inner nature being more 
subtle than the outer nature which is grosser 
than the former. The very character- 
istic indication of an effect, is its grossness 
and the reason of it, is to be found in the 
fact that what remains unmanifested in the 
cause becomes manifested in the effect. 

But unfortunately the advocates of this 
theory overlook the serious difficulties which 
lurk in it. First of all we draw atten- 
tion to this that if they be the different 
stages of development of the same thing, 
then by the very nature of the case, they 
cannot be co-existent. Development implies 
change ; change implies time. And 'stages' 
have any significance only with reference 
to different periods of time. As the plant 



ceases to exist, when it has grown up into 

a tree, so the inner world would cease to '^^^ relation 

of cause and 

have its being after its transformation into the d!fficu?t?^s ^'^ 
outer world, for they belong to the same 
thing although at different periods of its 
development. The fact of co-existence being 
thus inexplicable, the mutual interaction 
between them, which cannot be denied 
becomes inexplicable also. 

Of course i{i\\e, purvapakshin say that the 
earlier state is not altogether lost in the later 
state of a thing developing, but is retained 
there : our obvious retort will be that if it is 
retained at all, it is retained in such a trans- 
formed manner that it loses its distinct 
existence. For what is accidental to the 
different stages of a developing thing, vanish- 
es away with the lapse of time and what 
persists is the essence or the substance in 
abstract which reveals itself through these 
different stages of development. 

To get over the difficulties as exposed in 
the above, some may erroneously hold that 
the inner nature produces the outer nature 
of a man. The relation is that of a cause 
and effect. 


This theory also labours under serious 
the cause of difificulties. The first question which we put 

\\\t.Kdrman'. i i • • i i • i i 

its difficul- to such theonsts is, how does it produce the 
outer nature of man ? Mere being or the 
fact of existence of the inner nature cannot 
account for the origin of the outer nature. 
The mere being of a thing cannot explain 
the origin of another thing, so we are led 
to assert that the Kdrman-sarira transforms 
itself into the Ouddrika sarira. Here the same 
difficulties re-appear ! How to explain the 
fact of (i) Co-existence and (2) Inter-action. 

Others may think that the right theory is 
this : Kdrman-sarira does not produce the 
Ouddrika sarira, but on the contrary 
Ouddrika produces the Kdrman-sarira. 

Ouddrika is the cause of the kdrman- 
sarira : but this theory is open to another 
fresh objection in addition to the previous 
difficulties. Theactivity oi ihe Ouddrika- sarir a 
is possible only when it is actuated by desires 
and will. Has any body heard of unmotived 
activities ? And these desires and will belong 
to the Kdrman-sarira : so the obvious mistake 
is here to make the presupposition of a thing, 
the product of it. That without which the 


activity of the OudArika is'not possible, cannot 
be reasonably conceived to be the product 
of the activity itself. 

So the only way of escape from this 
difficulty, at first sight, seems to be this : 
neither of them produces the other, but both 
are co-existent. They have been maintain- 
ing their distinct existence from eternity 
so to speak. 

But to say this, is also not enough. We 
have got to define the precise relation exist- 
ing between them. It will not do to simply relation^and 

. , , I ,1 . . itsdifificulties 

say that they have been eternally existmg as 

distinct entities, for the fact of inter-action 

between them requires to be explained. 

Now different hypothesis may be framed 
with regard to the precise nature of inter- 
action. Some may suppose that there is 
no interaction proper, but the relation of 
concomitant variation subsists between 
them. The changes in the one correspond 
to the changes in the other, though they 
are two distinct entities or worlds, having 
nothing in common. 

Our reply is that it sees the half-truth 
only. In fact there is a relation of con- 



comitant variation, for the change in one 
manifests itself in a corresponding change 
in the other. But this relation is not pos- 
sible and cannot be satisfactorily explained, 
if they be not ultimately the same, or to put 
it in other words, if a common blood does not 
run through their veins. But this is nega- 
tived by the hypothesis, for by ex-hypothese 

The relation 

of concomi- they have been assumed to be two distinct 

tant varia- 
tion : its diffi- worlds having nothing in common, 

Others, in order to escape from these 

difificulties, may suppose that some influence 

in some form or other, passes into the thing 

called effect and produces changes in the 

same. The interaction is not apparent here 

as in the former case, but real. The cause 

exerts some influence upon something else 

and thereby produces changes in the same 

which we call effect. 

This at first sight seems to possess much 

of plausibility, though it cannot stand to a 

careful scrutiny of reason. The difficulty 

here is this : where docs the influence rest 

before its being received by the thing for 

which it is meant "i We cannot conceive of 

any influence passing out of a thing and 



resting in nowhere and then entering another 

thing we call effect ; for, the conception itself 

is a psychological impossibility. So here too 

is a big chasm in our thought. Thus we see 

none of these hypotheses can stand the test of 

reason and we are thus led by an immanent 

process of dialectic to our own theory, the 

only theory logically tenable and free from 

these short-comings as we shall presently see. The t w o 

stand t o 

By Karma sarira we mean that Experi- each other 

in relation of 

ential body where . the effects caused bv inter-muta- 

-^ ^ tion. 

the Ouddrika are stored up as it were in a 
subtle form. The operation of the Ouddrzka 
or the Perceptual organism leaves a per- 
manent vestige upon the kdrman, known 
as ^ar;;^^- vestige, just as the agitation of 
the brain molecules in thought, leaves a 
permanent vestige upon the brain itself. 
This is what we mean by kdrmtc effects. 
These kdrmic effects, again, as we shall show 
hereafter, determine the nature of the per- 
ceptual organism or the Ouddrika body. 
The operation of the Ouddrika body 
leaves this karma -vts^xXg^ upon the Experi- 
ential body and thereby modifies it to a 
certain extent, while on the other hand, 



the kdrman, the organ of thought, desires 
and will, determines the character of the 
former by its preferential interest. So the 
relation is intermutative. And this is borne 
out by our analysis of the question at issue. 
The relation between karma-hody and 

How they 

act and i\iQ OuMrika — this is our immediate topic. 

re-act ? ^ 

And we begin our discussion by defining the 
two in the clearest possible manner. By 
kdrman-hody we mean the Experiential-hody 
where the effects caused by the Ouddfika- 
body are stored up, as it were, in a subtle 
form. The operation of the Oddrtka-hoAy 
or the Perceptual organ leaves a permanent 
vestige upon the karma-hoAy known as 
karma-\ts\\gt, just as the agitation of 
the brain molecules in thought, leaves a 
permanent vestige upon the brain itself. 
This is what we mean by iarma-matier 
This karma^msitier again,, we shall show 
hereafter, determines the nature of the per- 
ceptual organ or the Ouddrik a-hody. The 
operation of the Ouddrika-hody leaves thus 
vestiges upon the experiential body and 
thereby modifies it to a certain extent, while 
on the other, the karma-hody or the organ 



of thought, desires and will, determines the 

character of the former by its preferential Perception 

interest. So the relation, from one aspect is iheOuddrika 

one of correlativity. We shall prove this in 
various ways. 

We all know that we have both 
perception and conception of a thing. And 
we know further that perception is directly 
related to the object, for it follows the direct 
presentment of the object to the senses, where- 
as conception is indirectly related to the object 
through perception. The former, we are 
of opinion, belongs to the ouddrika body 
( ^?lfT^ siTtT ) or the perceptual organism 
where external objects are directly presented 
to and the latter namely, conception, desire, 
and will belong to the kdrman body (^T^^^ 
aittT ; ) for these are referred to the object only 
indirectly through the senses. But what is 
a conception ? Is it not perception universa- 
lised ? A conception becomes a chimera, 
barren and empty, if it is not capable of 
being fulfilled by the direct presentment 
of the object on the senses which 
constitutes perception. How are we 
to know otherwise which conception is 




valid f Validity can well be established 
by the actual sensory contact of the 
object conceived. The conception thus be- 
comes something general, universal in 
character, which differentiates itself, so to 
Conception speak, without losing its unity and character 

to the Kar- ^ s J , 

?nan-hody. i^to SO many individual actual objects capa- 
ble of being presented to the senses. The 
individual objects, the subject-matter of the 
perceptual organ, becomes so many concrete 
embodiments of the conception itself which 
cannot be, like the former, presented to the 
senses. From the point of view of the per- 
ception also, it may be shown that they are 
unintelligible, unless they are interpreted with 
the light of the concept itself. An individual, 
or a single perception, caused by the actual 
contact of the object with the senses, remains 
unintelligible, unless it is subsumed under 
its respective concept which is, again, nothing 
but perceptions universalised. The concep- 
tion we thus see, is the perception itself in its 
universal character and embodies itself in 
the actual objects forming the subject-matter 
of the perceptual organism ( ^qlf^rft^ sjft^ )and 
the perception is nothing but specific differen- 


tiation and fulftlment of the conception. 

To say this is therefore to say that they constitution 

, r 1 I . of the Kdr- 

are but two aspects oi the same thnig — j,ian body, 
one is universal and the other is specific in 
characters. And as through perception, 
the conception becomes fulfilled, we may 
call the perceptual organism ( ^^(fT^.SditT) to 
which belongs the attribute of perception, as 
instrumental to the fulfilment of the concep- 
tual organism ( ^TH II 3JT\t ) to which belong 
these concepts, and both of them thus stand 
in the relation of mutual inter-dependence. 

Thus from what precedes it follows 
logically and necessarily, that all the varying 
experiences, which we get from time to time 
from the peripheral contact of the external 
objects with the senses, are contained in a 
nutshell, as it were, in the conception itself ; 
for here all the various perceptions which # 

occur from time to time are preserved, they 
being but specific fulfilments of the concept 
itself. This is then what we mean by saying 
that Mrma matter [^t^ g^^) is being stored 
up in the karman body (^l^^ sj^^ l) 

To discuss the question from another 
point of view by drawing a distinction 



between the experiences of the OudArik 

A study from ^^^Y ( "^^1?:% 5|^^ ) and the experiences of 
another point ^^^ kdrmatt body {^^^^ if^T I ). By ouddrika 

(^^iftcff ^tIt ) we mean our neural organism 
which is the vehicle of the sensations, gross 
in form. While the experiences of the kdrman 
body ( ^T^ ?u sjf^T ) is confined within its 
thought, ideas, desires and will. Here there 
is an important matter to note. The 
experiences of the Ouddrika body ( ^ll^lft^ 
aj^T ) which follows on the direct present- 
ment of the actual objects, have no interest 
for us unless they are owned by us i.e. 
referred to our own inner nature or 
kdrman body (^FT^Ttf 5J^T). To be conscious 
that I am experiencing such and such things, 
the whole of objective experience requires 
to be viewed as the experience of my 
inner nature or in other words the objective 
experience, belonging to the ouddrika body 
(^^iftcff I^t) must be referred back to and 
determined by the inner nature ; otherwise 
the experience, being devoid of every sub- 
jective reference, will lose all interest for us, 
and cannot be viewed as my own experience. ' 
The outer experience, unless they are referred 



back to and determined by our inner nature 
stands on the same level as other pheno- 

^ The Outer 

mena occurinof in Nature. But these states andtheinner 

^ mutually and 

of chancres become the source of interest for P^.''^^^ deter- 
^ mine eacn 

US as soon as as they are viewed as experi- °^ ^^* 
ences of the kdrman body (cRT^xir sifiT) itself. 
So our inner experience or the experience of 
the kdrman body is not only the outer ex- 
perience merely condensed and materialised, 
but it is something more. 

It is not another kind of experience to be 
set by the side of the outer experience, but 
one which includes the latter and goes beyond 
it. It is the outer experience itself focussed 
and referred to and determined by our 
inner-nattire. Hence it follows that they 
are not two distinct worlds of experience, 
but ultimately the same, with this distiction 
only that one is devoid of every subjective 
reference while the other is not. 

Hence (i) if the operation or the activity 
of the otcddrika body ( ^^ift^ nt\\, ) when 
not referred to and determined by the inner 
nature, standing on the same level as other 
phenomena of Nature, becomes morally blank, 
and assume moral quality, only on their refer- 


ence to the inner nature, and if (2) human 
The Kdrman ^^P^^^^^^^^ be possible Only on this ascription 
gesuv^e^ ^"of ^** reference, it follows necessarily that every 

the persist" • • 

ence of per- activity or karma leaves behind an effect 

sonality and 1 1 1 • i 1 r 

re-birth. either good or bad in the shape of vestiges 

on the Mrman body (^T^i'!! sttIt) — our inner 
nature or the Character of Prof. Huxley. 

Having discussed the relation between 
the Inner-nature, Karman body ( offT'iT ^ 
ajTtT ), and Oudarika body ( ^T^ltx^ 3JT)?: ), 
or Outer-nature we come to the question of 
re-birth. So long we discussed the 
problem of relation in theoretical terms. 
But the world, we live in, is a moral world, 
nay, even more, a practically significant world 
than it is a theoretically definable world. 
And we may, at once, simply say that the 
concept of the individual in its primary and 
original sense is distinctly an ethical concept 
and that is so whether you speak in theore- 
tical terms or in terms of being. So from 
this conception of individuality we hope to 
see to the possibilities of rebirth, not merely 
as a logical necessity but as that without 
which the purpose of man's individuality 
will be altogether balked. 


As a mere theoretical thinker, we cannot 
get any idea of individuality, nor can we 

^ ^ ^' The idea of 

form any clear conception of it. We can individuality 

' *• — h o w It 

prove all ^ this by psychological analysis of ^^^'^^ops? 
the development of a child's mind. A child's 
first ideas are all unconsciously universal 
or vaguely abstract ideas. Even the child's 
first conscious ideas must be of what we 
call the universal as such. The many 
presentations he cannot yet know as so many 
individuals ; for he cannot grasp single facts 
for their own sake. He only learns to 
recognise the type which persists through 
many presentations. He knows things by 
types, by universals. The one that persists 
through the many, he comes to recognise as 
the one, the universal, the type, the idea. As 
a mere theoretical thinker his progress has 
stopped and cannot go beyond it. 

But observe another side of his nature. 
He has a doll ; and say, he loves it. He 
breaks it. Now offer him another doll as 
nearly as possible like the former one. Now 
will the child accept this as compensation ? 
No. And what is the reason of this ? It is 
this that the love for this toy is in its 



subjective, instinctive, pre-conscious type an 
exclusive love, and is such a feeling that the 

The point of ^ 

individuaiton jjea of the two objects that can be concieved 
as giving equally possible satisfaction of 
this feeling is an absurd idea. At this moment 
he consciously individuates the toy and this 
is so because he loves the toy with an 
exclusive love that permits no other. With 
such exclusive interests, one learns to love 
one's home, books, children etc. Hereby one 
becomes conscious of a thing not as an object 
that represents a class, for exclusive interest 
does not permit it, but views it as a single 
member of a single class. This is the point 
where he individuates it. 

Thus we see ethical love, or organising 
interest is precisely that sort of interest that 
cannot serve two masters. It first indivi- 
duates the master and then others in 
relation to it, that come in the way of means 
to it. It is this individuating interest in 
living one kind of life for one purpose in view 
that a man becomes a moral individual, self- 
same personality and not a totality of passing 
states as the Sensationist School or the 
Buddhists hold. 



Now to consider our own theory 
regarding kdrman body ( ^l4|Tn siCt?: ) \Jiva 


incessantly tries and strup[gles to get rid of the ^^^^ bond- 

^^ ^ age—the ex- 

bondages of limitations, through Karma, as elusive mter- 
we have seen before. This becomes its excln- 
sive interest. The love for particular mode of 
living i,e. the mode in which the liberation can 
easily be achieved, becomes the exclusive 
interest for the man and tends to indivi- 
dualise him. This exclusive love for this 
state of autonomy or self-rule, which no body 
can attain just in the way open to 
him, tends to individuate his activities 
and conduct, as well as the outer organism 
the oudarika body ( ^^if?;^ ajft? ), by means . 
of which actions conducive to the self-rule or 
autonomy are performed. Thus we may say 
that though the kdrman body (^T'if ?TF 3[|T\?:) 
may resemble others of the same kind in 
types universal in character, still, considered 
as individualised that is in the sense we 
have expounded above, they are quite 
distinct and separate entities. Individuals 
they are and must be, for all have exclusive 
interest for the attainment of that state of 
autonomy, of bliss and beatitude which is 



the real and ultimate goal of all that live, 
move and have their being in the different 
abodes of the Sansdr. Now do we not see 
that without immortality and re-birth of the 
Jiva — i.e., without the persistence and conti- 
nuance of the Kdrman-hody through the 
ravages of time and the processes ofmetam- 
psychosis the whole purpose of such life and 
individuality as manifest in the incessant 
struggling of the Jiva becomes absolutely 
meaningless ! 


Doubt as to 


Tkc ^roolem JtscusseJ ; Is * Jtva' a free centre oi 
Ortgtnatton ? — -Belief tn tKe latter makes ~ Moral 
Juagment Inex|>ltcal>le — Etlitcs lose xts Injunctive 
Character — Leaves no room for Merit, Reward and 
Virtue — Examination OI tke Oemerits Arguments m 
the Ligkt of Eurot>ean £tKics. 

Hitherto we have been discussing the 
relation between the Mrman body ( ^^4^^ 

S|?:k ) and (9^^(Jr//^^ body { ^^rft^ Sift'C ) correctness 
^ / \ ^ ' of the Jain 

and the transmis^ration of the former from ^^.^^^^^n ^" 

^ F ree-will. 

body to body by means of which a /wa 
attains to higher forms of evolution and 
state of beatitude by its own moral will 
and endeavour. There we took it for granted, 
as it were, that every yiva has got capacity 
to improve itself morally and otherwise 
by its own effort. Whether this belief is 
true we did not stop there to enquire and 
consider. And, there may arise, indeed, a 
doubt as to the rationale and correctnsss 
of this belief. The Jains hold, as we shall see 


An epitome of JAlNiSM. 

later on, that either this belief must be true 
or moral judgment must inevitably become 
impossible. Thus the question raised is a very 
important one ; and moreover as the whole 
fabric of the Jain metaphysics and ethics 
which are but complementary parts of a 
singular system of thought is based on 
the belief in the Free-will of the [iva who is 
the maker and master of his own fate, it 
imperatively demands of us an immediate 
solution. In taking up the question, therefore, 
ere we enter upon any other topics, we shall 
first examine the problem from the view 
points of European Ethics, — Whether in 
the exercise of will, in the choices of 
Theproblem t^ji^s and alternative lines of action for 

of Free-will. ^ 

a particular end which the /iva has in 
view the mind is wholly determined by 
phenomenal antecedents and external con- 
ditions or itself also, as active subject 
of these objective experiences, plays the 
role of a determining cause? In short, 
whether or not, \hQ Jiva is a free centre of 
origination } 

This is the problem which now looms 
before us for solution. The two doctrines 


PREE Will and fatalism. 

which we shall develop presently, represent 
very widely divergent schemes of thought, 
which put a different interpretation upon 
every thing in nature and life of which 
we shall have occasion to speak later on. 
Those who maintain the first one of 
these two alternative doctrines, call them- 
selves, 'Necessitarians' ; because under the 
assigned conditions, the sequence of one 
particular volition, in their opinion, is an The Fatalists 
inevitable event which is no less than the willists. 
falling of a book when blown off from 
the roof of a house. And those who 
maintain the second one of the alterna- 
tives, call themselves 'Libertarians,' because 
they deem it possible, inspite of the 
assigned condition, for the mind to will, or 
not to will, or to will otherwise. It is not 
obliged to deliver itself to a bespoken 
judgment or submit to the verdict of Nature. 
The former thinkers regard man as simply 
a product or an effect of cosmic evolution 
while the latter as an originating cause 
capable of determining what was indetermi- 
nate before. According to the former view 
man has been throughout, and has always 


An epitome of j a in ism. 

and invariably to be submissive to the 
play of given laws and forces working 
upon his life that move and mould him as 
they come and go ; while according to the 
other he himself stands in the midst of the 
conflicting forces of Nature as a maker and 
master of his surroundings, as autonomous, 
as an independent centre of origination. 

The problem therefore is : Is man an 
absolute creature of the cosmic powers 
that set him up ? Is he simply a product 
of nature ? We answer, '*No," For, if he 
Evidence were simply a resultant of the cosmic pro- 
^frminism.^ cesses of life and living or if he were wholly 
and absolutely determined in his will by 
other phenomenal antecedents, then .what 
sense is there in the moral judgment which 
we pass upon others ? Does not moral 
judgment take for granted that in the 
moment of yielding to one of the competing 
solicitations which is morally bad, we might 
have preferred the other if we really willed 
it ? Does it not take for granted that we 
are not manufactured articles passable in 
the market of the world as o^ood or bad 
from the very beginning of our mundane 



existence, but to a certain extent at least 
authors of our own characters ? If you are 
already determined to take up a particular 
line of action by phenomenal antecedents, 
then, what sense is there in such sayings 
of Ethics or Gospels, of the Great as **Do 
this and that and do not do other." 
Ethics will lose its injunctive character 
and will be reduced to a mere science of 
health. In fact the experience of contrition 
which follows so often on one's doing 
something wrong, the language of praise 
and blame, we so often use when admiring 
the moral rectitude or the quality of the 
sentiment of justice, the inspiring instances 
of forgiveness, the constant reference to 
higher virtue, to the mode of plain living and 
high thinking and all of the like character 
we say, rest on this belief in the freedom 
of man. Take away the freedom of man, 
the wickedness of him comes out in 
all nakedness and horribleness in the 
same category as devastations of nature. 
If noble minds rose upon us as neces- 
sarily as lengthening summer days, we 
might indeed rejoice, but cannot be 


carried away by uplifting veneration. 
The language of ethics when translated 
into necessarian formulas, bids adieu to all 
conceptions distinctly moral and becomes 
simply discriptive of phenomena in 
natural history. It tells us what has been 
what is going on and what will be in 
the time to come ; but not what ought 
to be. For if an inevitable and invincible 
necessity makes us will what we will, 
our will is no more responsible for its voli- 
tion than the spring of a watch is responsible 
for its movement. From this point of view 
it is absurd to blame the will, which wills only 
in so as far as another cause distinct from 
it, makes it will in the manner as it wills. In 
short, if you take liberty away from man, you 
leave on the earth no vice, no virtue, no 
merit ; rewards are absurd and punishments 
become unjust. 

To enter therefore into an examination 
of the ethics of the necessarians. Some of 


of the Deter- ^hem hold that "the universal application of 

ministsargu- *■ ^ 

ments. ^]^g causal-connection leaves no room for 

caprice or freedom in the mysterious citadel 
of will". If everything in nature is deter- 



mined by antecedent conditions, why may 
not the same thing be true in the sphere of 
our volition. 

In reply to this we say that * 'against the ^ee-caiU!^ 
evidence offered for Determinism, there is 
to be set the immediate affirmation of con- 
sciousness in the moment of deliberate 
action." And a psychologist must accept 
as elementary ''what introspection carefully 
performed declares to be so". 

Moreover, as metaphysics points out, the 
primary idea of causality is derived from the 
efficiency of the will itself and a secondary 
account of causality as is found in nature 
should never be applied to the interpretation 
of human volition. , 

(2) When we fix our attention on hu- 
man action we observe that a portion of it is 
originated by subconscious influences and 

the same thing may be true of our volition, ,, ,. . 

^ ' ' Volition IS 

Specially when there is no sharp line of f^er^^^n of 
demarcation between such acts and volition ^es^^^^^"^" 
and when the gradual transformation from 
one to the other is an undeniable fact. 

Against this we may point out that it 
overlooks the fundamental characterestic of 




volition. Our exercise of will is strictly con- 
fined within the region of consciousness and 
a choice among such facts of clear conscious- 
ness forms the true characteristic of volition. 
(3) "We always explain the voluntary 
acts of others on the principle ot causation 
by character and circumstances. Indeed 
otherwise social life would be impossible." 

In reply to this we may say that inter- 
pretation of facts by reference to the known 
Character is tendencies of character illustrate but the 
and points influence of habits. But this habit is only 

to the uni- • r 1 -r • r 

form exer- an expression ot the uniform exercise of 
cise of free- 
will, free-will. Again, however adequate our 

knowledge of one's character may be, it never 

enables us to predict with absolute certainty, 

how one should act on any future occasion. 

The dictum of these philosophers in 

the domain of ethics, is that our volition 

is always determined by the strongest 

motive and the motive which can ever be 

the strongest is that of prospective pleasure. 

Be the motive passions many or few that 

are implanted in us, that which practically 

moves us into action is the strongest one 

and the strongest one among the motives 



should be recognised by its pleasure-pro- 
ducing capacity. This idea of prospective g^^ psycho- 
pleasure then becomes closely associated d'e^erminists^ 
with the strongest solicitation which prompts 
us to action. Thus will of man is alto- 
gether passive here ; for, it cannot but 
identify itself with this strongest desire. 

The obvious defect of this theory is 
that it entirely makes the will passive. And 
it is due to bad psychology. A desire 
cannot actuate, cannot lead us to do a 
particular action, unless we identify ourselves 
with this solicitation which alone can urge 
us to follow a particular course of action. When 
we identify ourselves with one of these desires, 
(this act is called will), it gets into promi- 
nence over all others and thereby becomes 
the strongest one. This strongest one, we 
call motive proper. In this act of willing 
which consists in the conscious identifica- 
tion of ourselves with one of the desires 
which are by themselves nothing more than 
mere promptings, the will is wholly active 
and is completely free. 

An objection might be taken here to the 
effect that even in this act of willing the will 



\ is determined by one's character, and 

habit, and so cannot be reckoned as 
free in its operation. But to this our 
reply is that this character which fetters 
our will in its activity, is itself nothing 
but the product of the free operation 
of ourselves, the effects of which are materia- 
lised and preserved as Character or Karma- 
matter. For what is this Character ? It is the 
settled disposition of the mind to operate 
in a particular way when opportunity comes. 
It is the habit which fetters us indeed only 

tj r-t, apparently to a certain extent later on, but as 
How Chara- r ir y 

presence^^of engendered by the free operation of ourselves. 
We say apparently, because the clear verdict 
of consciousness in every case of activity is 
that we might have preferred another course 
of action, had we but sufficient strength of 
will. We cannot, by any amount of effort as a 
clear introspection reveals, divest ourselves 
of this concioussness of freedom — i.e. 
freedom to operate otherwise if only we 
had sufficient stamina to do so. In the 
presence of this clear verdict of conscious- 
ness all the arguments arrayed by the 
Determinists fall to the ground and our 



will seems to be not determined by its 
phenomenal antecedents as has been 
wrongly alleged, but is on the other hand 
free to all intents and purposes. 

Again if our volition is completely deter- 
mined by the strongest motive, and if that 
motive be always that of prospective plea- 
sure, then we cannot but identify the deter- 
minists with the egoists. And we must neces- 
sarily charge him with the horrible consequen- 
ces of a rule of life founded upon self-interest. 
His difificulty will begin when going beyond ism^^cons^s- 

this simple psychological fact viz, that the loped leads 

, . ... to egoism, 

strongest motive determmes our volition, 

he tries to make a relative estimate of these 
hap-hazard impulses and find for them an 
ethical principle of order and to say that the 
altruists should have place rather than the 
egoists, and the sense of right than both. 
Besides these he overlooks the play of dis- 
interested impulses in mind in the shape 
of motherly affection, devotion to right, 
compassion etc. If this be the doctrine of 
the necessarians, we may conclude by saying 
that it is in no way compatible with the 
sense of duty in men and excludes all righte- 



ousness from the universe ; and thus the 
moral faith and nobleness of the neces- 
sarian becomes an intellectual inconsequence. 
Nay more, it takes away from man what 
belongs to himself properly, his freedom 
which constitutes his true worth and dignity 
and brings him down to the level of 
inanimate objects of nature. 



*Kftnna-Sarira' an J tke Nature of its Migration — 
W^ater-Glotule an J *Karma'-GloLule — The VegetaLle, 
Seeds and 'Karma-Sanra m Relation to Nature — 
Selection anJ its Gnaracter — riuman Cvolution is 
Essentially Teleological — Humanity always lceet>s a 
Goal before itself. 

Now it is this 'Kdrman Sarira\ the 
Character or the inner nature of the indivi- 
dual man that re-incarnates or expresses it- 

The Chirac- 

self successively in various forms through t c r : the 

K dr m a n 

the repetition of births and deaths. When a body re- 


man dies, the KArman-Sarira, his character 
or inner nature, is not disintegrated and 
dissolved with the death and dissolution of 
his physical mortal organism, but passes 
through womb to womb in an invisible 
form. To draw a comparison with a 
physical phenomenon, as a water-globule 
rising from the surging waves ruffling the 
vast expanse of the ocean passes through 
various stages of existence sometime in the 
invisible form of vapoury state in a cloud 


Con scious 


or changes into snow, ice or descend in 
rains to mingle again with the ocean from 
^^TK^rman which it Sprang : so the /^a;r;;/^-glob*ule, for 
° ^' it is indeed as subtle as can be imagined 

— springing up as it does in the beginning- 
less past from the vast expanse of the eter- 
nal ocean of verities, persists in its career, 
sometimes remaining invisible to our 
mortal eyes, at other times expressing itself 
through the gross material frames of living 
beings and organisms, whirling through 
a succession of births atid deaths according 
to the merits and demerits of its past 
desires and deeds moulding the inner nature 
in its subsequent career. 

The thought, will, organic want or de- 
sire moulding the inner nature or 'character' 
of an organism has a power of selection ; 
for, thinking and willing consist in determin- 
ing and selecting an alternative, and the 
subtle organism determines and selects only 
that alternative which is favourable to the 
manifestation of its character and the 
realization of its wants and desires. 
The process may best be illustrated by 
taking two seeds, say one of mangoe and 



the other of jack-fruit, as representing two 
different 'Characters or Kdrma-Sartras of ^^ Analogy 
the two different vegetable organisms. The 
power of growth and development in the two 
seeds or their inner natures is of the same 
kind. And though the external Nature 
or the environment consisting of earth, 
water, air, light and so forth is common 
to both the seeds planted within the 
bounds of a selected and definite area 
having soils of equal fertility ; yet for certain 
characteristic peculiarities latent in each 
of the stones, each determines, selects, and 
draws, according to its own constitutional 
wants, appetites, and desires, peculiar to it- 
self, such nourishment both qualitatively and 
quantitavely from the common environment 
as would be contributive to the growth and 
development of the organism and to the 
fulfilment of its own wants and desires. 
This phenomenon of selection by the seed 
is not a blind adaptation to the environ- 
ment, but selection by a conscious willing 
agent having a preferential interest in 
the thing selected from amidst an infinite 
diversity of materials and elements in the 


Selection by 


unlimited store-house of Nature. The 
nature and character of this conscious 

organism. ^"^ deliberate selection becomes more and 
more clear to our vision when we divert our 
attention to the human evolution. Man 
does not live for bread alone, not for mere 
animal living and multiplication of species ; 
but expressly for the attainment of some 
particular object, end, or idea. Human 
evolution differs from all other forms of 
evolution in this that humanity always 
keeps before itself a goal for the realisa- 
.tion of which it constantly strives and 
struggles. And its adaptation to the 
circumstances is not a blind acquiescence 
to the forces that be, a mere trimming 
of the sails and adjusting of the oars to 
suit every passing breeze ; but a conscious 
choice of will exercised in the interest of 
the object, end or idea, it keeps always in 
view. If the object, end or idea — the 
main-spring of his thoughts and activities 
— is lost sight of, man then no longer 
remains a conscious willing agent im- 
pressing his will and individuality upon the 
environment, drawing nourishment from 


nature and utilizing her in the fulfilment 
of his desires and realization of his end 
or Idea ; but becomes a dead and passive 
subject to the indiscriminate operation of 
the forces that surround him. His destiny 
then no longer remains within and under his 
control ; he becomes but a child of Nature, 
a creature of circumstances ; and his 
environment becomes all-in-all and plays the 
role of Destiny rough-hewing and shaping 
him as it wills. 



AVnat docs *Rest>onstl)iltty ImJ>ly — Reward or 
Punishment UnavotdaLle — Law of 'Karma-Causality 
Invtolatle — Prayer or WorslitJ) kas no Efiicacy — No 
Need of Extra-Mundane Moral Providence — Law of 
'Karma is more Rational Exl>lanation — An Act of 
Vice ts not equal to Incurring a DeLt— Tke Tkeory of 
'Karma -Pudgal — tkc Distinction between Rigkt and 
Wrong \s not an Absolute Distinction. 

In discussing the question of Free-will 
and Fatalism, we have seen that man 
is constitutionally free and essentially an 
autonomous being with all the potentialities 
of vision, knowledge, strength and delight 
infinite. And as such he is wholly and 
entirely responsible for all his thou'ghts and 
actions. We have seen also that responsibility 
for a thought or an act means the liability 
of the man who thinks or acts to undergo 
the consequences of his thought or act. 

But to undergo the consequences of a 
thought or an act is nothing more or less 
than the enjoyment of a reward for en- 
tertaining a good thought or performing a 




good act or suffering a punishment for 
giving way to bad thought or condescend- 


ing to do a bad deed. And however a action of the 
man might wish to taste the sweet fruits 
of righteous deeds without performing the 
same or to avoid the bitter ones for 
practising the vicious acts, he can never 
escape the firm grasp of the Law of 
Karma -cdLUSaWiy which is sure to bring him 
round and round to undergo the conse- 
quences of his thoughts and deeds in perfect 
accordance with their nature and character ; 
for the Law, so to speak, is automatic in action 
and works with mathematical precision. So 
there is not the least possibility of escape 
from its mechanical grip. You may offer up 
prayers on your knees and assure the Lord 
of your giving Him a feast with the best and 
choicest fruits, flowers and sweets or you 
may shave off your heads at places of 
pilgrimage and roll yourself on the dust and 
dirt around the temple ; or you may knock 
your brains out on the threshold of the 
shrine of your Lord, and wash his feet 
by the tears of your swollen eyes ; but 
alas ! these will not save your from the iron- 


An epitome of jAini^ m. 

grip of the great law of karma-causality 

which has been working out from times 

without beginning. 

Admitting the truth and validity of 

Liquidation Kamia-causality, however, in a more or 
of debt. ^ 

less general way, some suggest that a man 
will be judged by his actions and be 
punished and rewarded for these. But this 
implies evidently that as if there is a judge 
human or divine, as they hold, who 
may be prejudiced or partially informed or 
might be lenient in the administration of 
Justice in the case of one and strict and 
uncompromising in the case of another. 
Again, to escape from the undesirable con- 
sequences of our thoughts and actions, some 
interprete that by doing a wrong, the man 
simply incurs a debt and that this debt can 
well be paid off by the sinner himself or by 
some one else for, and on his behalf. The 
interpretation of the law of Karma in this 
wise has created a much confusion of thought 
and anomalies in the performances of religious 
and social rites. The Srddk ceremony of the 
Hindus consisting in the offerings of pindas 
on the death of the father is one amongst 



many others which partly appears to be 

resultant of such a line of thinking and ^ 

° Responsibi- 

reasoning. The crucifixion of Jesus Christ bJi^^y""^ ^^^^ 
whereby the entire race of sinners was each^othen"^ 
saved is but another illustration of the 
same kind of interpretation that can only 
proceed from Christian bigotry. 

To disown the sequence and own the 
antecedents is like the denial of attributes to 
a substance. The attributes inseparably go 
with the substance ; so does the consequence 
i.e. responsibility for the thought and act 
inseparably goes with the thought and act 
themselves. Doino- an act of vice is not 
the same as the act of borrowing money and 
incurring a debt which can well be cleared 
up, either by the debtor himself, or by 
another for and on his behalf. It is 
not like the liquidation of a debt 
some how or other, and shirking all respon- 
sibility thereby ; for,»" not only the man who 
commits an act of vice, has to undergo the 
consequence of the same ; but he has also 
to bear the burden of the Karma-pudgal 
which clinging to the soul instinctively de- 
velops a certain strength and vibratory 



motion whereby his future nature and career 

is moulded to some extent. And examination 

No common of the natural environments wherein the 


man is ushered into a physical existence, a 
study of the development of his form and 
physical constitution as well as his mental 
inclinations, the colouration of his thoughts 
and activities in the different spheres of 
life — all tend to show how he has to still 
bear the burden of Karma-pudgal of years 
and ages he passed through. 

But others, remark, there is no common 
standard whereby we are to judge between 
good and evil, and act accordingly. What 
you think to be good to A might be bad to B. 
What is happiness to you might be a 
misery to me. What is deadly poison to 
you might prove a saving nector to me. 
Besides, we do not see the good accruing 
from good, and evil begetting evil, always 
and invariably. Very often the case appears 
to be reverse to what is generally inter- 
preted according to the law of karma. 

So think the impatient minds labouring 
under a regrettable short-sightedness to look 
through Nature, the permanent theater of 



perpetual changes. But these people seem 
to have no insiefht into the metaphysics of 

° ' The use and 

things and thoug^hts and to fomet that the abuse are 

^ ^ ^ the criteria 

nothing is good in and by itself. It is disti'nction* ^ 
the use and abuse of things and powers with 
us that are either good or bad. There is 
nothing as freaks of nature in our philosophy. 
What is in the root must come out in the sap. 
Whatever happens must have a cause and 
whatever is in the cause must pass into the 
effect. Right use must result in good effects 
and bad, bad. 

The law of karma as we hold it, is but an all- 
embracing interpretation of the law of causa- 
tion which must work out things inevitably 
and invariably. If the fall of the apple, 
before the eyes of Newton who deduced 
thereof the universal law of gravitation 
whereby all what is earthly is drawn to- 
wards the earth, were but a freak of 
nature, how things of the world would 
stand ? Where would be the use of the fall 
at Niagara — if the torrents were to run down 
only occasionally without any invariability ? 
Just as the use and utility of the natural 
laws and forces lie in their invariability 



and inexon erability of the phenomena in 
and through which they present themselves 


of the opera- to US : SO it is the invariability and uniformity 

tion of Kar- 
ma-causality, of the operation of the law of karma- 

causality that makes possible the amendment 
of and atonement for our past and the 
laying down as well the lines of our action 
in future. Indeed there is a common adage 
to the effect, that what is done cannot be 
undone ; but surely we can neutralize or 
turn the direction of our past action-currents 
by quickly setting up a set of counter 
action-currents. For illustration, you sent 
a message to B, a message the breaking of 
which has every likelihood of breaking his 
heart as well. Immediately after, when you 
learn that the message you despatched was 
a wrong one, how would you act ? Surely 
• either you would run yourself to or send 
one of your chosen men with definite 
orders either to overtake the man with the 
message on the way and stop him from deli- 
vering the message, or failing which to do 
something else that would surely neutralize 
the effect produced by the delivery of the 
wrong message. And this is how the effect of 



past actions can be amended or neutralized 

by our quickly setting up currents of counter Amendment 

. 1 1 r T^ of the past 

action to run as antidotes to the former. It posibie. 
is just like setting the ball on motion in a 
certain direction and stopping the same by a 
subsequent counter-action which would either 
neutralize the effects of previous action or 
divert the ball in motion in another direction 
determined by the laws of the parallelogram 
of forces. It is true that we cannot in fact 
undo what we have already done ; but surely 
we can thus modify and improve matters 
to a large extent by setting up new forces to 
run counter to the older ones and neutralize 
or divert the currents of the same. 

So we see the law of karma, properly 
understood, is not so fatalistic that it would 
send in us a thrill of shudder to 
think of the firm grasp of the hold 
it lays upon us. However inexonerable, 
however death-like might be the grip of 
the Law to make us undergo the con- 
sequences of our own thoughts and 
deeds, it is not as cruel as Destiny herself • 

compelling us to do this and that at her 
own dictates and sweet will. For, just as 


An epitome of jainisM 

we know more of the laws of nature, the 
more intelligently we can use them to our 

The doctrine ^ 

of Karma not qwu advantapfe and benefit : so the more we 

fatalistic. ^ 

know of the character and working on of 
the Law of A:«rw^-causality, the more firmly 
we become convinced intellectually and 
morally that it is a law that has always been 
affording us ample opportunities to right 
the wrong, to remedy the evil, to amend 
the effects of the past with a view of 
moulding the inner nature — our character, 
for a higher form of evolution of a more and 
more perfect type of organism and for the 
attainment of greater perfection. And such 
is the teaching of our sages ! 

From what precedes, it seems to follow 
that every living being, specially the man 
who always keeps before himself as a goal, 
the realization of a particular end or idea, 
is free to think and act as he wills. Will, 
as we have remarked, consists in determining 
and selecting between the two or more 
alternatives. A man with certain object 
• in his mind to accomplish, invariably 

finds on reflection that there are different 
alternative means by which he can 


accomplish the end he has in his view. 
And he is free to determine and select 

Works with 

the one or the other of the alternatives that ^P end in 


would suit him best. When we ponder over 
the ways and manners in which a man thinks 
and acts, we find that his thoughts and 
activities in the different spheres of life 
consist in the conscious acceptance of one 
thing and a similar rejection of another. 
Of the different alternative means, we 
freely adopt that course of procedure 
which we think to be most conducive 
to the realization of our end, and reject 
others as being detrimental to the end. We 
do not live only for the satisfaction of the 
lower instincts and multiplication of species. 
We live for progress, for peace and 
happiness. The highest end of mankind is 
to live, move and have its being in peace and 
happiness. No doubt every one desires to 
live long and to live well also ; but what to 
live for, if it be not for the enjoyment of auto- 
nomy, of peace and bliss } Whatever might 
be the nature and constitution of this 
Summum Bonum ; however we may define 
it, it is ultimately for this end that 



the drunkard becomes addicted to wine, 

the criminal becomes habituated to crime, 
Autonomy is 
the ultimate or the devotee bends his knees in the shrine. 


Whatever we think and whatever we do, we 
think and act consciously or unconsciously 
for the attainment of peace and bliss or 
autonomy. This really constitutes the 
Highest End or Idea for which we 
all live and move and have our being in 
the universe. And in proportion the nature 
and character of this Ideal varies with the 
changes of the angles of vision we take, 
according to the principles of Naya and 
that from the different stages of our life, the 
means we employ for the realization of 
the ideal in view also vary as well. 
But in any case, there is no denial of 
the fact that it is we that are the free 
agents in the determination, selection and 
adoption of an alternative course which 
would be most conducive to the realization 
of the end we have in view for the time. 
All the aspirations of life, all our reasons 
for our living, all that we think, tend 
in reality to augment this our sense of 
freedom of thought and action. We can 



not possibly imagine that we are not 
free to think, will and act in our 

Liberty can- 

own ways. And with this liberty to think, "°f \^ Z'^- 

' ' united from 

will and to act in our own ways arises the j^esponsibi- 
question of our responsibility for the same. 

Liberty and responsibility go hand in 
hand. And it is impossible, say the Jain 
thinkers, to disunite responsibility from the 
agent who is at liberty to think and act in 
whichever way he wills for the realization of 
his ideal. To disown liability originating from 
responsibility but to enjoy the privileges 
accruing from liberty is not only a logical 
absurdity, but is indicative as well of moral 
depravity. Riches and poverty, fame and 
obscurity, power and subjection, health and 
disease, knowledge and ignorance, toil and 
pleasure, feasting and hunger, are but 
so many varying consequences of liberty we 
have and had in this life and in the past. 

To think is to act and to act is 
to resist. Resistance is action itself which 
produces changes not only in the thing 
worked upon but also in the worker as 
well — for work implies waste in both. There- 
fore, no thought, not a single deed which 



a man thinks or performs can ever be 
. . disunited from its effect which in the 

lity brings in nioral world takes the form of responsibility 

reward or *^ ' 

punishment, involving the idea of liability of the thinker 
or the doer to undergo the consequences 
of his thought or deed. And as what is in 
the root comes out in the sap ; as the 
cause passes into effect and the like 
produces the like, the consequences of a good 
thought or deed bears out good or 
bad fruits. It is clear, therefore, that 
responsibility carries with it the idea of 
enjoyment of a reward for a good act done 
or of suffering a punishment for a bad act 
committed. But so frail is human 
nature that it only wishes for the fruits of 
righteous deeds and avoid practising the 
same, wishes not to reap the harvest 
of sinful acts whereas wishes only to perpe- 
trate sinful things— 

But the whole aspect of things changes 
if we were to consider the question, 'Is man 
in fact so free as to think or do whatever 
he pleases?" If every man were free, that 



is to say, if he could act as he pleased, 
history of the world would have changed into 
otherwise for the absence of any common bond. '^.J? ^ , ^''^^" 

' will of man 

If one among: the millions of human beings ^^^v^s po 

^ ^ room for nis- 

who lived and died in the infinite number of ^°"^^^ ^^^^* 
years that have rolled by, could be found 
capable of acting purely in conformity with 
his will and desires, the free movements of 
this man in opposition to the general scheme 
of the universe would be enough to annul the 
possibility of the historical laws for all 
humanity. Nor the movements of man show 
that he is free to live and move as he choses. 
Historical laws regulating the movements of 
man, are but visible negations to the 
existence of free-will in man. Far from his 
being an agent willing and acting freely, 
observation of his movements and a study of 
his constitution clearly confirm the belief 
that he is wholly a dependant being acting 
in due obedience to Nature and natural 
laws. No man has ever been found to act 
in utter disregard of the laws of gravita- 
tion nor the phenomena of his cerebral 
activity have been found wanting in regula- 
ting and controlling his will. Man is but 





subject to these cosmic forces and laws and 

T. , , . he moves and acts with due reofard and 

Nature IS not ^ 

bemgn t o obedience to Nature to whom he owes his 
life and looks for light. For, **thus 
from the war of Nature, from famine and 
death, the most exalted object which we are 
capable of conceiving, the production of the 
higher animal follows. There is a grandeur 
in this view of life, with its several powers 
having been originally breathed by the 
Creator into a few forms or into one ; and 
that whilst this planet has gone cycling on 
according to the fixed law of gravity, from 
so simple a beginning, endless forms, most 
beautiful and most wonderful, have been, and 
are being, evolved." 

But this aspect of evolution which is being 
worked out by Nature through her warfares, 
through the principles of competition, through 
adaptation to the environment and trans- 
mission of acquired qualities through heredity, 
makes the environment, the maker and moul- 
der of the man. Man, according to this cosmic 
process of evolution is no more an inde- 
pendent being having any free will of his 
own to think and act after his own way and 



exercise his independence in the free choice 
of things and impressing his individuality ^^^ -the 
upon the sorroundings. Nature has left man cosmic* evV 
no option, no free will to act. But the cir- 
cumstances play the part of Destiny as 
it were, rough-hewing and moulding him 
after their own casts. He acts and moves 
about indeed but only impelled by the forces 
of Nature. Nor man can be taken as the 
same individual being who has been running 
down from eternity through the processes 
of metempsychoses. It is true that Nature 
has been working from time without 
beginning, ushering into existence from the 
conflict of the aggregative and separaive 
forces inherent in her, the stars and planets 
composing the astronomical cosmos ; and 
as these have been going on revolving 
round their own orbits according to the 
fixed and inexonerable laws of motion, a 
few forms of life have sprung out into 
being to crawl on earth. The cosmic 
processes of life and living in the shape of 
their adaptation to the environment and 
transmission of the acquired characters 
to the off-spring at last culminated in the 



transfiguration and evolution of Man — 

the mystery, the wonder and the climax of 

Poetry is not the cosmic evolution. Man thus is but a 

sics ! product of circumstances and has no free- 
will. Wherein lies then the possibilities 
^ of persistence and re-birth of the same indi- 
vidual running up and down from eternity 
through the processes of metempsychoses, 
of undergoing the consequences of his 
own activities and desires and of reaping 
the harvest of what he had previously sown ? 
There is a grandeur in this view of life 
indeed. But the charms of poetry cannot 
always and everywhere hide the metaphysics 
of ideas and ideals from the penetrating 
insight of the unprejudiced philosophers ! 

If we deny the very independent exist- 
ence of man and take him as derived 
product of matter and material forces 
working in him we must say that he 
must have a derivative responsibility for 
all what he thinks and does. One may 
owe his existence to something else — to 
some Higher Power but the fact itself 
cannot entitle one to shake off respon- 
sibility from his shoulder : his existence 



may be derived ; but with it comes his 
responsibility as also similarly derived. To r g s p o n- 
illustrate by a concrete instance, the king Naturalism" 
delegates his certain powers to the minister 
for the administration of a certain province. 
But is not the minister responsible for uses 
and abuses of the power he derived from 
the king. The Jain view of the point in 
question is that in the commitment of 
a murder by a servant at the uncompro- 
mising order of his master in whose hand 
he is but a tool, not only the master alone 
but the servant also is liable to receive 
punishment. And this view of liability as 
involved in responsibility holds good even in 
matters of evolution through cosmic process. 
Failures of the organisms in the right adap- 
tation to the environment cause them to be 
weak and supplanted by other organisms 
who have been successful in their adapta- 
tions. Therefore the organisms who thus 
become weak and go to the walls, are 
responsible for their movements and 
activities in their own spheres of life 
and struggle, environment being common to 
them all. 


An epitome of /aini^vl 

But to view the question from the 

psychological stand-point. Man is not 

self-reaiisa- simply a product of matter and material 

tion testifies ^ -' ^ 

iTh^ys^l^cTi ^^^^^^ engaged in a terrible conflict in 
c'^-S- which the weakest go to the walls and the 

strongest survive to multiply. Man is essen- 
tially mind~a thinking being having a soul 
in him to save ; and the soul is neither matter 
nor, like sparks of electricity, a product of 
matter and material forces. Psychologically 
as we have seen elsewhere, it is something 
super-physical. If the soul were matter or a 
product of matter and material forces 
engaged in a deadly conflict, how would 
we account for the psychical possibilities 
infinite of tripartite character viz., vision, 
knowledge and freedom infinite — the very 
esse of the soul for the unfoldment of 
which the mighty minds of all ages and 
climes have been labouring } The principles 
of naturalism, of aggression and self-assertion 
have always been in direct opposition to 
the teachings of the great minds whose 
lives have been a perpetual surrender 
for the good of mankind. For, side by 
side with this fierce movement of struggle 


for life and living in which the fittest sur- 
vive and the weaker ones g^o to the walls „ i«„>. 

^ riuxieys 

calling forth fearful vengeance upon those ^ i">ssion. 
that march trampling upon their dead 
skulls, there has been a parallel movement 
in the society of nations of all ages and 
climes — a blessed movement that seeks to 
mitigate the evil, to smooth the harshness 
of behaviour, to rub off the angularities 
of character, and to soften down the asperi- 
ties and rigours of life ; to introduce, in 
short, a reign of ordered harmony where 
there is discord and to bring in the mes- 
sages of *'peace and good will, good will 
and peace, peace and good-will to all 
mankind". If the evolution of human 
organism and the progress of humanity were 
due to the competitive movement which is 
called cosmic, how are we to account for the 
origin of this parallel movement which is 
not only essentially humane and ethical 
but works as a direct antithesis to the 
cosmic mode of life and living ? "It repu- 
diates the gladiatorial theory of existence. 

It demands each man who enters in the 
enjoyment of the advantages of polity, shall 



* be mindful of his debt to those who have 

laboriously constructed it and shall take 
heed that no act of his, weaken the fabric 
wherein he has been permitted to live. 
Laws and moral precepts are directed to 
the end of curbing the cosmic process and 
reminding the individual of his duty to the 
community, to the protection and influence 
of which he owes, if not existence itself, at 
least the life of something better than a brutal 
savage" — (Evolution and Ethics pp. 8i-8^). 

Thus from the sharp ' contrast drawn 
between the operation of the cosmic laws 
and ethical laws, between natural man and 
moral man, it is pretty clear that whatever 
be the angles of our vision as to the consti- 
tution of the thoughts and activities of man, 
d ^^^y ^^^ ^^^ determined partly by his free- 
participating ^^^ ^^ ^'^' ^"^ partly by the operation of 
acttvity""^^" the laws of necessity. Liberty and necessity 
both co-operate harmoniously in the produc- 
tion of every human thought and activity. 
Every human life and conduct therefore is 
but a re-conciliation between liberty and 
necessity. This has been the case always 
and everywhere from the days without 


beginning. We think and act partly of 
our own accord and partly our thoughts 
and activity are determined and regulated 
by the laws of karma in accordance with 
the merits and demerits of our previous 
instance. We know this not only by meta- 
physical speculations or intutions pure and 
simple ; but also an investigation in the 
lines of empirical method into the historical 
events and life-works of the mighty minds 
of yore, makes it clear that there is in fact 
a certain amount of liberty and a certain 
amount of necessity participating in every 
human thought and activtiy. 

Human life being thus but a reconcilia- 
tion between liberty and necessity, it be- „ ..^ 
hoves us to enquire by the way as to how are ^i*^^^n"^*o^f 
we to calculate and measure the parts played \'^!^^^^ *"^ 
by each in giving shapes and forms to our 
life and conduct. The Jain philophers 
hold that greater the liberty, the lesser 
the necessity, and vice-versa lesser the 
necessity, the greater the liberty ; or in other 
words necessity and liberty are inversely 
related to each other : and the proportion 
of the part played by the two in a pheno- 




menon of life has to* be ascertained from the 
different points of view we can take in our 

Liberty and examination and estimation of human con- 

ySserido!"" ^^^^^ "^^^Ix Drahya ^^, (i) BMba {y{^^) 
(\\\) Kdla (^T^) and (iv) Kshetra (%©[) and 
(v) Karma (^4|) and (vi) Udyam (^^it) and 
(vii) Niyati (fsrgf??) as already discussed in 
a previous chapter. 

But instead of entering into the compli- 
cations involved in the examination of 
certain phenomenon in the worlds of parti- 
culars from the above points of view, we 
may otherwise for convenience' sake do the 
same by considering the conduct of the 
man in the four different relations of, — 

i. Kshetra — locality or surrounding circum- 
stances in relation to which we can interpret 
that a man living, moving and having 
his being in the complexity of society or 
having a particular profession or calling 
is subject to the laws of necessity to a 
greater degree in proportion to the amount 
of liberty he is supposed to enjoy. 

The more a man lives and moves in 
the complicated net work of society, the more 
his movements are mechanical, artificial and 


he is less free to think or act after his own 

accord. But the man who stands outside How to de- 

and above the complexity of social organism, the ^amount 

or in other words, the more he lives in 

isolation, or seclusion, or wanders awayfrom 

place to place without any attachment to 

the pleasures of the world — he is more free to 

act at his own will and choice without being 

accountable to any one save himself. But 

still this wandering monk is not wholly free 

to will or to act, if we find him speaking to 

any one or working at his task or breathing 

in the atmosphere surrounding him and 

basking in the sun that shines upon. Full 

liberty of action and will only belongs 

to Him who is really a Kevaltn and 

has soared high above time, space and 


ii. K&la — Time is an important factor in 
forming proper moral judgments, for it is 
very difficult to discern the motive by which 
an individual is actually led, just after the 
accomplishment of the act. A study of 
the historical, sociological and other 
antecedents and consequents is neassary to 
make us sure whether the individual has 



been impelled by the circumstances and 
other necessities, or has freely initiated the 
action himself to serve his own ends and the 
nature of the moral judgment depends con- 
siderably on such decision. Thus time is a 
potential element in the determination of the 
participation of fate and free-will in a 
particular conduct of man. 

The devastating war between the 
Kurus and the Pandavas which killed the 
manhood of the nation, seems to have been 
caused by the free will of several people. 
The war could have been avoided. 

iii. Karma — or the abiding consequences 
of deed done in the past either in this life or 
in prior ones, which determine the inner- 
nature or character of the man in a posterior 

The movements of a man who is 
placed in very untoward circumstances 
hardly able to meet his two ends in compari- 
sion with the movements of another who is 
rocking in lap of fortune, are more determined 
by necessity than the movements of the 
other who enjoys a more liberty of thought 
and action. 



iv. Niyati — the concatenation of natural 
causes and conditions from which a certain j^Qj^^vir on 
effect must irresistibly follow just as the Liberty, 
number four follows from the concatenation 
of two and two. 

In the great battle which was waged 
against Ravan, the King of Lanka, for 
kidnapping the beautiful Sita from the 
forest's solitudes, Ram Chandra's movements 
seem to have been determined to a greater 
extent by Niyati, because from the study of 
the R&mdyan we find that the whole thing 
was due to the intrigues and instigations 
of Surpanakha, the sister of R&van. 

Thus in fine, we see no mortal man who 
lives, moves or has his being within the 
span of time, space, causation is abso- 
lutely free in his actions. His movements 
take directions in strict conformity with 
the laws of the parallelogram of forces 
which follow from the conflict between 
the constitutional freedom of his will and the 
determination of the same by necessity or 
Fate of his own make in the past. And 
this is the reason why, referring to the 
doctrine of the Fatalists in the Book I, 



Lecture i, Chapter 2 of the Sutra- Kritanga 
we find the venerable Kevalin Mahavira 
teaching, "they (the necessarians or the 
fatalists) have no knowledge and do not 
understand that things depend partly on fate 
and partly on human exertion." 



*Karma*-Dclinition, Nature and Ckaractcr of 
*Karma- — *Karma* or Action-Currents — Two matn 
Divisions of Actton-Cur rents — Currents or Injury 
ahcl of Non-Injury — Dr. 6ose and tne "Action- 
Currents * — Suk-Di visions of Action-Currents of 
Injury — Vision Knowledge. MoKaniya an J Antaray — 
Detrimental to PsycKical unfoldment, — Currents of 
Non-Injury — Aus, Nam. Gotra and Vcdaniya— 
Determinative of tne organic formations. 

In our rapid survey of causation and com- 
pound evolution of Karma phenomenloogy 
and karma-causalty as discussed in our 
philosophy, we have seen what important 
and wonderful are the parts played by the 
Law of Karma in the Jain scheme of uni- 
verse. We have also seen how it opens up 
secret chambers of the universe and unravels 
to our vision the most inscrutable mys- 
teries of Nature and her laws. We have also 
seen how it helps to amend our lives for a 
higher evolution of a more and more perfect 
order and thereby throws open to us the 
channels that lead to Right vision, Right 



knowledge and Right conduct without which 
swaraj\ self rule or autonomy i.e., the fulfil- 
ment of the destiny of th^jiva as taught in 
the Jain philosophy becomes an impossibility. 

Such beinpf the high and prominent place 
Complexity s s t^ t 

of classifica- held by the Doctrine of Karma in the 
tion. ' 

evolution of humanity, we are naturally led 
to enquire into the classification of Karma. 
But the complexity of divisions and sub- 
divisions as minutely detailed in the Jain 
philosophy in the most elaborate manner 
defy the most subtle psychological analysis. 
It may well be compared to the gigantic 
banian tree which has been growing on 
steadily through the revolutions of ages and 
empires in such a form that its original 
trunk now defies the research of the investi 
gators who approach it for the first time. If 
any stranger who is unaccustomed to walk 
in the wood-way paths of dense-forest, wills 
to do so, he is sure to be bewildered and 
disheartened by the very sight of its labyrin- 
thian complications. And therefore to make 
the subject more easy of approach we 
shall begin with the most simple and general 
classification in the following manner : 



Karma, in its philosophical sense, is mo- 
tion, vibration, action or 'action-currents* as 
Dr. J. C. Bose puts it. But in Jain Philo- 
sophy at least the word appears to bear a 
double signification viz., not only vibration 
or 'action current' but also the materialised 
effects or vestiges in so far they affect 
the fate of the actor, continuing even be- 
yond death and modifying his subsequent 
career. The Jain philosophy recognizes two 
distinct kinds oi Karma or action-currents, 
namely, — 

A. Ghatin Karma or the Action-currents 
of Injury 

B. Aghatin Karma or the Action-currents 
of Non-injury. 

The reason why the former is called the 
action-current of injury and the latter, m^a**"a^nd 
'action-current' of non-injury, thanks to Dr. Kama. 
Bose for teaching us the terms, consists 
in this : the esse of the soul as a meta- 
physical reality with infinite pradeshas 
as taught in our philosophy, viewed in 
its tripartite aspects, is infinite vision, 
infinite knowledge and infinite freedom, 
the attainment of which is the Summum 




Bonnum of every moral endeavour. 
Now in the eternal continuum of Karma 
wherewith the soul stands in relation of 
timeless conjunction [anddi apasckd^iupm^bi 
sa^nyo^a sambandha pravdha) there are 
two sets of currents which leave vestiges 
of Karma on the various Pradeshas or 
corpuscles of the soul. 

Now the one set of action-currents which 
thus inhibits or retards or is actually harm- 
ful to the unfoldment of the psychical 
tripartite possibilities infinite is called the 
action-current of Injury ( ^ifh^T "^^ ) and 
the other set of similar current which in 
the same way determines merely the physical 
condition of the psyche or the soul — its body 
and localisation — is termed as the 'action- 
current of non-injury'. 

Gkdtin karmas or the action-currents of 

Divisions of _ . r r i • i i- i 

Ghatin Kar- Injury — are ot lour kmds, accordmg as they 

ma. r 1 1 r 1 • • 

retard the unfoldment of the tripartite 
Infinite psychical possibilites, namely, Vision 
Knowledge, and Freedom. Thus : — 

I. Darshanavaraniya or the Action- 
current of injury to right vision. 



II. Jnanavaraniya or the action-current 
of injury to knowledge. 
III. MoHANiYA or what is injurious 
to the psychical equanimity re- 
sulting in the delusion or infatuation ' ^ 
of the mind from the want of right 
intuition and knowledge. 
IV. Antaraya or what is injurious to 
the higher evolution and progress 
of the soul towards the perfect un- 
foldment of its infinite-possibilities. 
The ^^/ia/z« or Non- Injurious — are also Ka^^V*" 
of four kinds according as they determine 
the duration and other physical conditions 
of the soul. These are ; — 

V Ayus or what determines the longevity 

of soul's physical existence and the 
duration of its surrounding condi- 

VI Nama — or what determines the colour 
and configuration of the souls' phy- 
sical organism, ^ 

VII GoTRA or what determines the birth 
of the soul in a certain nationality, 
race and family &c. 



VIII Vedaniya — what sends in sensations 

of pain or pleasure. 

Now the action-currents of injury and 

of non-injury making up the eight Karma 

Further sub- verities which bind down the liva and whirl 
divisions. '^ 

it round and round through the different 
gr3ides of samsdr (Ga^i) are again subdivided, 
according to the nature of effects (mrfh) they 
produce, in the following manner : — 


(i) Darshandvaraniya or the action- 
current which is detrimental to vision or per- 
ception, is subdivided into nine kinds :— 

(a) chakshu darshandvaraniya — what is 
detrimental to sight. 

(b) achakshudarshan&varaniya — what is 

detrimental to the perception through 
the other organs of sense and mind 
than the eye. 

(c) Avadhi darshdnvdraniya — what is 
detrimental to the realisation of the 
general use and importance of 
things and beings not perceived 
through the sense. 

(d) Keval darshandvaraniya — what is 

detrimental to the right Intuition. 



{ej Nzdrd vedaniya — what lulls the /iva 
into sleepiness where by it is stripped 
of its consciousness of anything what 
goes around it. 

(f) Nidrdnidr&vedaniya — what tends 
the Jiva to sink into a deep sleep in 
which it forgets every thing whereby 
perception becomes absolutely im- 

(g) Prachald -vedaniya — what causes 
restless sleep under which condition 
right perception of things is im- 

(h) Prachaldprachaldvedaniya — what 

causes extreme restlessness of the 

sleep in which the jiva does not 

properly respond to stimulii. 

(i) Stydnaradhi Vedaniya — what makes 

\\\^jiva a somnambulist in which 

state of mind, it cannot perceive 

what it does or where it moves about. 

Next comes jndndvaraniya or the 

action-currents detrimental to the formation 

of knowledge. 

It is important here to note, that follow- 
ing psychologically the order of development, 


An epitome of JainisM. 

we have placed Darshandvarana before 
fnandvarana for Darshan stands for diffu- 
sive ; undifferentiated cognition which later 
on develops into definite, categorised, 
coherent conception we generally call know- 
ledge or J nan. 

Knowledge of things, we have seen, in 
an earlier chapter on our epistemology, is of 
five forms ; and the action-currents which 
are detrimental to the unfoldment to these 
forms of knowledge respectively have been 
classed as, — 

{a) Mati-Jndndvaran — what is detri- 
mental to the formation of the con- 
ception or defined knowledge of 
things through the processes of rea- 
soning and intellection. 

(b) Sruta-Jftdndvaran — what is detri- 
mental to the formation of the 
conceptual knowledge of things 
received through the perceptual 

(c) Avadhi jndndvaran — is that kind 
of action-currents, the predominance 
of which, makes intuitive knowledge 



not dependent on any organ of sense, 

(d) Manaparyaya Jndndvarana — is the 
action-current which is detrimental 
to the reading of thoughts passing 
in anothers' mind. 

(e) Keval']nAn&varana — is the action- 
current injurious to the unfoldment 
of the soul's power of pure Intuition 


Then comes Mohaniya karma or the 
action-currents which hypnotises the )iva: 
Moha has been stated to be what deludes the 
jiva from the right vision into the true prin- 
ciples of the jivas and leads him away 
from the right path of conduct. There 
are twenty eight kinds of this Mohaniya 
karma and as these afiect either the 
vision or the conduct, they have been 
grouped under two classes namely (a) 
Darshana Mohaniya and (b) Ch&ritra 

(a) Darshan mohaniya dividing itself 
into — 

(i) Mithydtva mohaniya prevails upon 
the ]iva to take good things for bad. 



(2) Mtsra mohaniya is what makes the 
]iva oscillate between the right and the 
wrong and thus preventing him from coming 
to any particular discusion. 

(3) Samyakta mohaniya is what makes 
the ]iva unable to devote himsef to the right 
cause though he is morally convinced of it, 
there being a bit of intellectual hesitation 
in the matter. 

(b) Charitra mohaniya karma divides 
itself into two principal branches viz. 
(i) A'^^^^j/ta;- Passions ; (2) Akashaya-zoxxt- 
lates of Passions. 

(i) The kdshayas are four in number 
namely, (a) Krodha-'ssig^x ; (b) Mdn-pxide ; 
(c) Mdya-deceit ; (d) Lodka-gxeed, 

Now each of these four major KasMyas or 
passions is further analysed into four groups 
according to the intensity and protensiveness 
of influence as these have on human life, — 
(i) A kashdya which is most intense and 
protensive in exerting a life-long influence 
on the mind is called anant&nubandhi 

(ii) A kashdya which is comparatively 
less intense and protensive, influencing the 



mind only for a considerable period of time, 
goes by the name of apraly&kskydn. 

(iii) A kashdya which is of still less 
intense in character and less protensive in » 
duration influencing the mind only for a shorter 
period of life is named as Pratydkshydn. 

(\v } A kashdya which appears only to 
disappear immediately after influencing the 
life only for the shortest period possible goes 
by the name of Sanjvalan. 

Thus classified according to the quality 
and durability of each of the kaskdyas, 
the Jain Philosophers hold kashdyas to 
be sixteen in number altogether, as given 
below : — 

{a-i) Krodha Anantdnubandhi — is the 
anger of the most intense kind 
influencing the mind all through the 
life. Its currents are so furiously 
strong that it mars peace, roots out 
all feelings of amity, and causes a 
wide breach between friends. It is 
just like the deep chasm in the rock 
due to a rude shaking of the earth, 
(a-ii) Krodha Apratydkshydn — is an an- 
ger of less intense in quality and less 




durable in period. After influencing 
the life for a considerable time, it 
disappears some how or toher. The 
anger of this kind is usually compar- 
ed to splits on muddy fields dried 
up by the scorching sun, which 
continues to remain until these are 
filled up by the moistening and 
softening of the soil from heavy 
down-pour rains. 

(a-iii) Krodha Pratydkshydn — is that 
kind of anger which influences the 
mind for a still lesser period and is 
less intense in quality from the fact 
of its being compared frequently to 
line-marks in sand-fields which dis- 
appear off and on with the fleeting 
movements of sands by the breeze. 

(a-iv) Krodha Sanjvalan — is the anger 
of the shortest possible duration. It 
appears like a flash of lightning but 
gets quenched of itself immediately 
after, for which reason it is com- 
pared to a line drawn on the surface 
of water which leaves no vestige 



Mdn or Pride blinds vision and disables 
man to read things through times. 

( b-i ) Mdn Ananidmibandkt is that 
kind of intense pride which knows 
no yielding in life. It is aggressive 
in its attitude and stands out as a 
towering rock. 

(b-ii) Mdn Apratydkshydn is a kind of 
pride which makes a man almost 
stiff and unbending : it is of the 
nature of an • iron rod which can 
be warmed into bending. 

(^b-iiij Mdn Pratydkshydn — is that kind 
of pride which is characterised by 
still lessor constitutional stiffness. 
It yields just as some chips of wood 
yield to pressure after it has been 
kept under water for sometime. 

(h-\v) Mdn Sanjvalan — is a pride of cane- 
like stiffness for which reason it can 
be bent, as you would will, with 
slight effort. 

(C'\) Mdyd Anantdnubandhi — is the de- 
ceit of the most acute and durable 

^ character. It is revealed in the 
natural crookedness of the mind 



which consists in deliberately doing 
one thing with some other ulterior 
motive behind. It is a kind of 
intrigue which for its intricacy 
is usually compared to the bamboo- 
f^c-ii) Mdyd Apratydkshydn — means the 
crookedness of the mind like that 
of the antelope's horns which can 
be straightened with difficulty, 
(c-iiij Mdyd Pratydkshydn — refers to that 
crookedness of the mind which can 
well be compared to the zigzag 
course that the current of water 
takes subsequent to its springing 
from a fountain-head, 
(c-iv) Mdyd Sanjvalan — is that attitude 
of mind which moves in curves 
that can only be stretched into 
straightness like the shavings of 
wood that are flattened by a slight 
Lobha or Greed is the attitude of mind 
which makes one cleave to things worldly 
with a peculiar tenacity as if these were a 
part and parcel of its own. 



(i) Lobha Anantdnubandhi — means in- 
tense attachment to a certain 
thing which, if taken away from its 
possessor, will perhaps take his life 
as well. It is just like the fast dye 
on cloths which lasts as long as 
the cloths endures, 
(ii) Lobha Apratydkshydn — refers to the 
kind of attachment which is less 
intense in character and continues for 
a pretty long time, but not all through 
life. It is compared to the grease- 
marks from the cart-wheel which 
stick to cloth only for a certain 
(iiij Lobha Pratydkshydn — is the attach- 
ment which can be removed with 
some effort as in the washing away 
of certain colour from a piece of 
cloth with soap and water. 
(2) The Nine akashayas or Corelates 

of passions. 
The Akashayas or the Corelates of the 
Kashdyas or Passions, according to the Jain 
psychology, are nine in number as in 

the following :■ 



(i) Hdsya — frivolity, (ii) Rati — love ; (iii) 
Arati—A\d.ireA (iv) Shoka — sorrow; (v) 
Bhaya — fear ; (vi) jugupsd — likes-and-dis- 
likes ; (vii) Striveda ; (viii) Purush veda and 
(ix) Napunsaka veda. All these are detri- 
mental to the right conduct of theyVz/a. 

Of these nine necessary Corelates of Pas- 
sions, the first six we need hardly deal with, 
they being very widely understood as common 
emotions. To take therefore the last 
three ; — 

(vii) Stri veda — is that kind of karma 
which awakens sexual appetite in 
females at the sight of or in contact 
with males: just as the predominance 
of biliousness creates a desire for the 
sweets. The characteristic phenome- 
non of this erotic instinct in woman 
is such that a mere touch with the 
delicate and beautious parts which 
add to her personal charms quickens 
this lower instinct into a debasing 
• animal propensity just as a mild 
faning or blowing quckens the fire 
under ashes into a blaze to consume 

Jl 406 


(viii) Purusha veda — is what awakens 
the same sex-passion in males 
at the sight of or in company with 
females. This erotic instinct is 
compared to the nature of straw-fire : 
for, just as the fire dies out after 
consuming the straws ; so this 
purusha veda dies out immediately 
after its temporary preponderance 
and consummation, 
(ix) Napunsaka veda — is what awakens 
the sex-passion in both the male and 
the female alike for a mutual embrace 
at the sight of each other. It is 
compared to the conflagration 
which reduces the whole town into 
Thus we see that the three Darshana- 
Mohaniya Karmas and these Twentyfive 
Chdritra Mohaniya Karmas which make 
up altogether Twenty-eight kinds of 
Mohaniya Karma, — all act as so many 
hypnotising action-currents to delude the 
human mind from attaining to Right- 
knowledge through Right-vision which can 
only enable it to walk in the Right-path. 



Anlardya Karma stands for that kind 
of invisible action-currents of injury which 
flowing under the surface of things secretly 
hinder the accomplishment of a particular 
end, xki^jiva has in view. It differs from 
other action-currents of injury in this that 
these work on the jiva in such a manner 
that it may not feel any inclination to gain 
Right-knowledge through Right-vision for 
the purpose of moving in the Right-path 
leading to the realisation of the end ; but the 
A^itardya Kdrmas do not destroy this 
inclination. It only works in such a manner 
that inspite of the earnest inclination on 
the part of the ftva to do a certain 
thing and even in spite of the necessary 
requisite materials being ready at the 
elbow, the jtva fails to accomplish the end 
he has in view. 

Now this Antardya karma divides itself 
into, — 

(i) Ddndntardya — is that invisible action- 
currents which works so that a man 
practically fails to make a gift of 
anything to any one inspite of his 



ardent inclination to do so and readi- 
ness of the requisite things at hiselbow. 

(ii) Ldbhdntardya^—YtkYs to the invi- 
sible action -currents which disable 
the jiva to practically gain any profit 
from what he does, inspite of his 
working hard in the matter with all 
the necessary materials and advan- 
tages about him. 

(iii) Bkogdntardya — stands for the action- 
currents which invisibly work out ; 
so that i\\e Jiva inspite of his earnest 
inclination and good health, cannot 
enjoy the palatable dishes and the 
like which can but be enjoyed 
once. The word bhoga connotes the 
sense of enjoyment but for once. 

(iv) Upabhogdntardya — denotes that 
action- current whereby a jiva cannot 
enjoy the pleasure of a good bedding, 
woman, and the like even when these 
are at his disposal for pleasure 
and enjoyment. In the word 
upahhoga — the particle upa prefixed 
to the word bhoga has the sense of 
continual enjoyment ; but not the 




kind of enjoyment that can be 
had for once only as in the 
cases of rarely available palatable 
dishes and the like. 
(v) Virydntardya refers to that kind of 
action-currents which secretly work 
in such a way that a man, inspite of 
his having a powerful will, a good 
moral stamina and other requisite 
materials and conditions conducive 
to the accomplishment of an end, 
fails to carry out his object. In the 
word vifydntardya, the word — virya 
denotes strength, force, power or the 
will to do a thing. 
Now from what precedes, it is clear that 
the truths underlying the Antardya kArma \ 
cannot be gainsaid. Cases of failures in the 
performance and enjoyment of certain things 
and properties, other causes and conditions 
conducive to their accomplishments being 
the same, very often come into our cognis- 
ance where we fail to discover their real 
causes. The unreflecting minds, ignorant 
of the true principles of the law of Karma- 
causality, often attribute them to the 



imaginary dispensation by the Extra-Cosmic 

Here ends the classification of the 
Ghatin Kdrma or the '' Action-currents of 
Injury" comprising Forty Seven Kinds 
IN All. 


We have seen already that the Agh&tin 
kind of Karma or the action-currents of non- 
injury are those sets of vibratory currents 
which merely determine the shape, the size, 
the nature, the character, the configura- 
tion and the localisation ; in short, every 
physical condition and environment forming 
a part of the manifesting media of the 
jiva. The vibratory action-currents are 
called non-injurious, because these like 
the Gh&tin Karmas or the injurious ones, 
do not do any direct harm to the 
unfoldment of the possibilities latent in 
the soul ; but merely serve to determine 
and construct as well, the character and 
configuration of the manifesting media 
through the instrumentality of which the 
jzva works out its higher forms of evolutions 



for the unfoldment of its psychical possibi- 
^^ ^ , . . lities infinite in their indications and consti- 


Karma de- t^tin^ the real esse of the soul We have 

termines the ^ 

medil^^^'"^^ seen also that karma in our philosophy 
means not the deeds done only ; but also 
the energies of movement and form of 
the jivds own making which materialise 
into the karma-vrntter which cling round the 
soul as potential energy of the system. It 
is now admitted on all haiids that diversities 
and changes in the phenomena of nature 
are possible only on condition that energy 
of motion is capable of being stored up as 
energy of position. For, the relatively 
stable forms of materialisation of Jivic 
energetics, chemical action and reaction, 
organisation of forms, the evolution of 
vegetal and animal organisims, — all depend 
upon the locking up of the kinetic action 
in the form of latent energy reduced 
into karma particles. And it is the kinetic 
release of this locked-up or potential 
energy in the form of the kai^man body 
that can account for all the possibilities 
of diversities and changes in the phenomena 
of nature. 


take advant' 


In the processes of Integration and dis- 
integration, of combination and decomposi- 
tion, motion, by overcoming vis inertia^ gives ^l^l ^^l^^^^ 

, . , 1 1 • 1 r law of Karma 

rise mimediately to another knid of arrange- 
ment of the atoms of body, that is, to the 
production of a compound which did not 
before exist in it. These atoms must be 
previously possessed of the characteristic 
power of arranging themselves in a cer- 
tain order ; else both friction and motion 
would be without the slight influence and 

The characteristic power which the atoms 
are already previously possessed of, is no 
other than karmic forces or kinetic energies 
of the jivas own making transformed into* 
potential energy, which lies locked-up 
there as it were only to be released 
again for its kinetic manifestation in 
the future play of life ; The chemists 
very often take advantage of this law 
of life without knowing what it really is ; 
for instance, if you wish to form a certain 
compound that requires a peculiar character 
or the peculiar karmic-ioYc^, to make it 
what is required ? What must you do ? • 



You must take steps to liberate the right 
T, J- Acc '^'"^ ^^ karmic-force at the exact instant 

Bodies differ 

from the dif- j-^at you wish the union to take place. 

Karma. Yqu then get the chemical properties wanted ; 

otherwise you would not. And the reason 
for this is that the particular karma, having 
a peculiar vibratory current is not common ; 
and under other circumstances than those 
named, you cannot effectuate the meta- 

It is thus pretty clear that atoms which 
differently arrange themselves and combine 
into new forms and compounds must 
be previously possessed of certain karmic 
forces having a peculiar tendency of 
distributing and arranging themselves 
in a definite order which gives constitu- 
tion to the compound. But this distribu- 
tion and arrangement of atoms is 
nothing more than a kind of permutation 
and combination speaking for the particular 
character and configuration of the 
composite body it makes. Bodies, we see, 
differ from one another : and the 
difference, it is evident also, is due, as we 
have seen elsewhere, to the difference in the 


Other dele- 


permutation and combination of the atoms- 
and molecules. But what again is this 
difference due to ? Fortuitous, surely '"'"f^J ^aus- 

' '^ es of change. 

it is not. The difference we have stated 
is due to the differences in karma. 
And we emphasize upon the same point 
by noting further that the difference is 
rather due to the peculiar nature and 
character (Prakriti) of the forces (Karma) 
under the influence of which the atoms 
vibrate in a certain form and combine 
into the making of a particular body. 
Vibrations of atoms differ in period and 
amplitude, and the changes of their mutual 
relations in combinations taking place, differ 
according to the respective parts already 
played by them. 

Then again, apart from these varying 
phenomena of permutations and com- 
binations of atoms into the formation of 
newer bodies as explained in our philo- 
sophy, the character of the body changes 
as well from compression and variation of 
temperature i,e,, from the local and other 
surrounding causes and conditions called 
the nimittas. For instance, the capacity for 



magnetism in the same body is augmented 
^ . , by mechanical compression and is even 

Organic and ^ 

Inorganic made to differ in different directions, 

worlds. ' 

according to the mode in which the com- 
pressing force is applied. When the density 
of the body is, by nature, different in differ- 
ent directions — as in crystals — its magnetic 
capacity is likewise different. The same 
view is further corroborated and confirmed 
by the changes of the magnetic capacity 
produced by changes of temperature. 

To one it may seem that all these apply 
only to the inorganic world from which 
illustrations have been drawn. But for 
the organised bodies which appear to 
stand enterely in a different plane, we 
say that there is but little difference 
between the so-called inorganic and organic 
worlds. The difference is but a difference 
of degree in the manifestation. Both the 
worlds serve as the manifesting media for 
the display of the energies and powers 
struggling from within. Besides, physical 
organisms consist of solid, liquid, gaseous 
and etheric matter most exquisitely and deli- 
cately organised into cells and tissues. These 


again build up into organs which enable the 
jiva to become aware of the outside world 

^ Component 

and of what is winp on there. The P ^ ' ^ s o f 

° ^ man's body. 

organism thus formed is but a medium 
of the life-forces and therefore must be 
subject also to the same sets of causes 
and conditions which determine the 
character and configuration of things and 
bodies in Nature outside. A man's body, 
consists of a combination of several systems 
of parts known as skeletal, muscular, nervous, 
digestive,circulatory and genito-urinary. Each 
system is made up of a set of organs. Each 
organ is built up of tissues. All human 
tissues are born of cells. A cell in its 
simplest form is a minute mass of a 
transparent gelatinous contractible granular 
material, called Protoplasm, 

Protoplasm thus appears to be the natural 
elements of life. It has been characterised 
with uniformity of structure, chemical com- 
position and excitability of parts. When 
any part of the lump of Protoplasm is 
excited, the lump moves. An amoeba is a 
single lump of protoplasm excitable 
and contractible in all parts of its 



substance and not more so or less in one 
part than in another. Such being the 

Protoplasm. ^ 

the matter of characteristic indications of Protoplasm^ the 
physical basis, nay, the very matter of life ^ 
(for the inconceivably fine albuminous 
granules called germ plasms form the 
constituent elements of protoplasm)^ what is 
it that makes this homogeneous lump of 
matter pass into different forms of hetero- 
geneity as manifest in the differentiation 
and transfiguration not only into the 
different forms of species— /(J// of 
organic beings vegetable or animal, 
peopling the different abodes (gati) of 
Sans&r, but what is it that makes the cell 
which is but a structural unit of living being 
or to take the case of the human ovum 
which is but a typical cell, what makes it 
differentiate in the manner so that some of 
these differentiated parts combine into the 
tissues, some transform into skeletals, other 
evolves muscles, the third nerves, and the 
^ fourth, the organs of s^B and the fifth 
the organs of action and the like which all 
compose the gross material system or the 
Ouddrika sarira of the man ? 



Not only this. No two human 
bodies (sarird) even of the twin brothers 

Causes of 

or sisters, are ah'ke either in character, differentia- 
tion, and 

behaviour or in configuration {Ratt\ 
Gatt\ Murti). Natural selection in the 
sense of the struggle for existence and 
hereditary transmission as we have already 
seen, cannot explain the causes and condi- 
tions as to why the human ovum should 
differentiate in the above manner so that 
certain of its differentiated parts come to 
be destined, as it were, to work out the 
skeletal, others to evolve heart, brain etc, 
while another set of parts gives formations 
to the limbs and extremities — updngas, till 
the infant after the formation of its physical 
constitution or ouddrika body in this way for 
a certain period of time in its mother's womb 
comes out to see the light of the day. Then 
again the physical constitution of every child 
that is born is not sound, whole and entire. 
Why some are stout and healthy and 
proportionate in their limbs and extremities 
from birth, while others are lean, thin, 
emaciated as if they were dead already ? Why 
some are born with defective sense-organs 



and deformed limbs and extremities and 
others with such and such complexion adding 

the action- 

Of individua- 
tion through beauty and lustre to its constitution which is 

the action- ' 

currents of iji^^^j f^y ^1] while Others are born with such 

non-injury. ^ ' 

physical organisms as are highly loathsome ? 
Some are born to such and such parents in 
such and such family in such and such race 
and in such such place and walk and move 
with such traits and gaits in deportments 
and motions that all these taken together 
make up their respective individuality for 
which we are constrained to designate one 
as Mr so-and-so, son of Mr. so-and-so, 
of such caste, family, and the like. The 
Naturalistic hypothesis with all its vaunted 
principles of adaptation to the environment 
and transmission of the acquired qualities to 
the offspring fails to explain the causes and 
conditions which determine the physique and 
physical environment which*mark out a parti- 
cular infant from amongst many others. But 
our sages explain by attributing the same to 
ih^ agkdttn Karma — the ** action-currents of 
non-injury". It is these currents of action 
that determine the physical constitution and 
the environment which gives the ]iva its 



loi>givity and individuality by which it is 

conventionally sinorled out from the rest. 

^ "^ The Ayus 

Of such sets of action-currents of non-injury Karma, 
which individuates and singularises the ]iva 
for a certain definite period in some definite 
form comes first ; — 

The word Ayus lit. duration, refers to 
the period of existence in a particular con- 
dition. And as the word is used generally . 
to mean duration of life, it is known as 
longivity. Now the action-currents which 
determine the duration of existence in any 
of the four abodes {gatt) of sansdr is called 
— Ayuh karma. It divides itself in the 
following way, — 

(i) Devdyuh karma — is what determines 
ones existence in a subtle form in 
the region of gods to enjoy there 
the sweets of life for a certain definite 
period of time, 
(ii) Narakdyuh karma — is that set of 
action-currents by reason of which a 
jiva lives for a certain period of time 
in a hell which is so called because 
of its being devoid of all pleasures. 



(iii) Manushydyu karma* — is that by which 
d^Jiva is born in the human world to 
live and struggle there for a certain 
period of time. 

(iv) Tiryanchdyu karma — is what deter- 
mines the period of existence in the 
world of beasts and birds. 

Nama karma, or action -currents deter- 
^, minant of names, forms (n&m-rupd) and 

The action- ^ ^ -^ 

tcrmlnant^of environment which all combine to give the 
ama-rupa. y^.^^ .^^ individuality and singularity. But 
as the causes and conditions which deter- 
mine and make up the personality and indi- 
viduality by means of which a particular jiva 
is singled out from amongst the many, are 
of various kinds. The sages have thought it 
wise, therefore, to classify these karmas 
into two main divisions (a) Pinda-Prakriti 
(b) Prateyka Prakriti. 

The Pinda Prakriti Nama Karma 
Refers to those sets of action-currents 
which all combine in the concretion of ]wic' 
energetics in such a way as to make up its 
physical organism after a certain type, form, 
colour, configuration, localisation of position in 



relation to other surrounding circumstances 
which make up the particularisation of the 
Jiva as a migrating soul. These sets of 
action-currents are, — 


1. (i) Deva Gati karma — the word gati in 

the phrase means abode of existence. 
According to the Jain sages there 
are four gatis, (i) Deva gati — or 
the abode of the gods, angels, and 
fairies. It might well be compared to 
Heaven of our Christian brethren 
and Svarga or Deva ioka of our 
neighbours — the Hindus. Life is 
all pleasure here ; and as in the 
midst of pleasure there is pain, 
it cannot be absolutely devoid 
of any pain. Hence there is also 
pain and suffering in Heaven ; but 
these are here reduced to what we 
call irreduicble minimum. Life in 
Heaven ends with the full fruition 
of the karma which determines the 
/ivaSy duration and enjoyment there. 

2. (ii) Narak gati karma. — The word 

narak is synonymous with niraya 




denoting the state of existence which 
bespeaks of Jivas unspeakable 
suffering and intense agony. It stands 
for the hell of the Christians with 
this difference only that according 
to the Christian idea, a jiva once 
condemned for an act of sin against 
God into any of its numerous cham- 
bers, cannot expect to return, how- 
ever penitent it might be subse- 
quent to its being condemned there. 
But the Jain view of the question is 
that by the narak gati karma or the 
set of action-currents corresponding 
to it, a Jiva may indeed be led to live 
in and suffer in this abode of tor- 
tures and torments, but with the 
dissipation of the particular karma 
which drifted it into an abode 
like this, and if there be 
no other determinant causes and 
conditions working upon the jiva 
to prolong its period of existence in 
this suffocating condition, it gets 
rid of this state of existence and 
retires to some other gati — abode, 


according to the Kdrmic energies 
of its own making. And this might 
either lead to, 

3. (iii) Manushya gati or the human 

world — the best and the only sphere 

of life and thought even for the gods 

who have to descend here to struggle 

for the attainment of autonomy or 
self-rule, or to, 

4. (iv) Tiryak gati — the worlds of beasts 

and birds or vegetables and minerals. 

The word jdti here means species of 
living beings, and not caste into which 
the. Indian social organism is divided. As 
a biological term in the Jain philosophy, 
it is used to denote the living organ- 
isms which are classified according to the 
number of sense-organs each jiva possesses : 
every living being does not possess all the 
five sense-organs. Some possess only one, 
viz,y touch ; others possess only two, viz.y 
touch and taste, and so on. The Jain 
teachers hold that this variation in the 
number of the sense-organs as possessed by 
the jiva is due to a certain sets of action- 



currents which work out the formation of the 
sense-organs. And accordingly, they teach, — 

5. (i) Eke7idriya jdti karma is that set of 

action-currents by the virtue of which 
^.jiva has the sense of touch only. 

6. (ii) Dwindriya jdti kdrma — is that set 

of action -currents by reason of which 
the living organism has two sense- 
organs, — of touch and taste. 

7. (iii) Trindriya jdti kdrmd — is the set of 

action-currents which works towards 
the possession of the senses of touch, 
taste and smell. 

8. (iv) Chaturindriya jdti kdrmd — is the set 

of action-currents by dint of which 
xki^jiva is born to those species which 
have the origin of sight in addition to 
the above three organs. 

9. (v) Panchendriya jdti karma— IS that set 

of action-currents which make the 
jtva to be born as one amongst thdse 
species of organisms which have 
also the sense of hearing in addition 
to the above four organs. 
Now it is important to note here that 
Jainism recognised the sense of touch as 




the most fundamental organ of sense. All 
the living beings, it is true, do not possess 
all the organs of sense, but none is ever 
found to be bereft of the organ of touch, touch^is^ the 

w . t r 1 IT' most funda- 

It IS the sense of touch, says the Jam mental of the 
philosophers, that distinguishes the living 
from the non-living. If responsiveness, 
as lately demonstrated by Dr. Bose be the 
criterion of life, then every living being 
must at least be possessed of the organ of 
touch without which 'response' becomes im- 
possible. The reason why any and every 
ftva^ having its being within the relativity 
of causes and conditions, must at least be 
possessed of the sense of touch is this : 
a jtva cannot exist alone, aloof and by 
itself anywhere in the vacuous space with- 
out anything there for the jiva to come in 
contact with. With a jwa to be, means not 
only to exist somewhere but to be in 
contact with something else as distinct 
from itself; and this consciousness in the 
living being of being in contact with 
something other than itself, upon which 
it acts and re-acts, would be impossible, 
if it were devoid of the sense of 


touch. Jainism further holds that with 

With the in- ^1 . c \ i • r at t 

crease of the the increase ot the complexity of life and 

complexity of ... ... r i •• 

iife,theorga- Hving, activities on the part of the jtva too 

nism grow 

more subtle grow more and more varied and complex. 

and complex. 

The pudgal particles, which cling to 
the soul, as consequences upon the jivds 
deeds and misdeeds, in the previous 
cycle of existence set up types of action- 
currents hitherto unexperienced, and bring 
into play newer energetics, which, owing 
to the want of their proper vehicle, 
compel the jiva to find out a more 
suitable embodiment that would serve 
better the purpose of manifesting media for 
their fuller and richer display. It is also 
worthy of note that they develop pari 
passu ; for the nature and form of this new 
vehicle are to a great extent, determined 
by the simplicity or complexity of the action- 
currents set up by the subtlety or grossness 
of the energetics brought into play. The 
readers may remember here that we have 
already hinted at the same truth although 
viewed from an altogether different stand- 
point while discussing the possibility of 



Is the set of action-currents which 
determine the growth and development of 
the body (sartru) of the jwa of those sets of 
action-currents determining the character of 
the body ; — 

10. (i) Ouddrtka sartra karma — is that set 

of action currents which determine 
the ordinary physical body that we 
see, to come out actually from the 
mother womb. It is called ouddrika 
because it is born of the materials in 
the womb (udara) of its mother. 

11. (ii) Vaikriya sartra karma— \^ the set 

of fine action-currents whereby is 
evolved a kind of subtle-body 
which is variable at will. It is 
possessed by the devas and angels 
who modify it into various forms 
some times enlarging it into a 
gigantic size with four arms and 
the like and at others reducing it 
into the minutest of the minute hardly 
perceptible by our mortal eyes. 

12. (iii) Ahdrak sarira karma — is the 

set of action currents whereby a 



jiva developes the power of evol- 
ving a tin)^ body out of itself to be 
sent to distant region and clime to , 
get news from any one else or receive 
instructions at the feet of the master 
who might be travelling at the time 
in some distant countries. It is the 
Jiva's 'double ' 

13. (iv") Taijas sarira karma — is the set 

of action -currents where by jiva 
developes personal magnetism and 
heat through processes of which 
it evolves a magnetic body lumi- 
nous in character and consuming 
in its power. A jiva who has 
sufficient occult power born of his 
Sddhand — spiritual culture disci- 
pline — can project this luminous 
body out of himself and burn 
up things. 

14. (v) Kdrman sarira karma — is the 

fine-subtle body which is built out of 
the karmapudgal of the energetics 
of the jivas own making materia- 
lised into temporarily stable forms 
of Kdrntic atoms. 



It is important to note that ordinarily 
all \}!\tjivas have the Ouddrtka, Taijas and 
the Kdrman, Of these the latter two are 
inseparable from each other and must remain 
clothing the jiva till it attains to the state 
of non-chalance — Kaivalya. It is the migra- 
ting body which travels from womb to 
womb shaking off the Ouddrika in its travels 
as the snake casts off its slough. Regarding 
the relation between the Ouddrika and 
Kdrman, the reader is referred to the 
previous chapter on the subject. 


In Updnga n&ma karma^ the word updnga 

means limbs, extremities, lungs and others 

organs of action composing the body, and the 

sets of action-currents which evolve these 

component parts of the body are called 

updnga karma. The Updnga ndma karmas 

are of three kinds vtz. — 

15. (i) Ouddrika updnga karma— mtSLiis 

the set of action-currents which 

evolve the component parts of the 

gross physical body formed out of 

the materials in the mother's womb 




1 6. (ii) Vaikriya updnga karma — means the 

set of action-currents which work out 
the component parts of the vaikriya 
sarira of the gods and demi-gods. 

17. (iii) Ahdraka iip&nga karma — refers 

to the set of action-currents giving 
formation to the component parts of 
the aharaka body which the saints and 
sages can evolve out of themselves 
by the help of the powers they have 
acquired through severe austerities 
and penances they have undergone. 
It is imperative to note that the other 

two kinds of bodies — the Kdrinan and 

Taijas, have no limbs and organs. 


The word bandhan means binding, con- 
necting. We have seen elsewhere that our ; 
body is composed of six parts roughly 
speaking viz, skeletal, muscular, circulatory, 
nervous and genito-urinary according to the 
modern physiologists. These parts not only 
stand vitally related to one another but there 
is an organic unity between them. They 
are joined together by what is called 'con- 
necting tissues' equivelant to ' Sanyo] aka tantu 



in Sanskrit cementing up, as it were, into 
an organic whole. In dissecting a dead 
body when we sever its parts by our 
knives, we cannot afterwards restore them 
to their original position and connection : 
because in dissection, the connecting tissues 
which bind the muscles, the nerves etc. into 
an organic whole are also cut asunder. Now 
the bandhan ndma karma means those sets of 
action-currents which evolve and determine 
as well the nature and character of these 
connecting (links) tissues which bind together 
the component parts of a body. And as 
bodies are stated to be of five different kinds 
as noted in the above under sarira ndma 
kdrma, so the nature and character of the 
connecting tissues which bind together the 
component parts of these bodies must also 
be of different nature and character as given 
below : — 

1 8. (i) Ouddrika bandhan karma — means 
the set of action-currents which 
evolve and determine the nature and 
character of the 'connecting tissues' 
binding together the component 
parts of the gross physical body. 



19. (ii) Vaikriya handhan karma — means 
the set of action-currents determin- 
ing the connecting links joining the 
component parts which make up the 
variable body possessed by the gods 
and the demi-gods. 

20. (iii) Ah&raka bandhan kArma — refers 

to the set of action-currents evolving 
and determining the connecting 
links joining together the parts of 
the tiny body which is sent out by 
the spiritual adepts to distant regions, 
as noted in the above. 

21. (iv) Taijas bandhan karma — is what 

determines the connection between 
the parts making up the luminous 

22. (v) KArman bandhan karma — is what 

unites together the karma-pudgal or 

the materialised energetics of the 

jtvas own making vehicling on which 

the soul reducing itself to a subtle 

unit of energy passes out of the ou* 

dArtka body of the jiva, 

23 — 32. Now the five bodies oudArika etc., 

do not stand separated from one another. 



They remain intertwined with one another 
in two fold ways of warping and woofing by 
which reason we have got ten other forms of 
bandhan in addition to the five forms just 
detailed. But as the nature and character 
of these ten kinds of bandhan is not different 
from those enumerated, we do not think 
it our worth while to enter into their further 

The word sanghdtan means collecting 
and laying up of materials. Every living 
matter by the virtue of its own inherent 
power, works and collects from the out- 
side non-living matter as its food which is 
annexed or assimilated by it through the 
processes of integration or anabolism with- 
out which the formation of the tissues and the 
growth of the organism become impossible. 
Now the set of action-currents which deter- 
mines this synthetic or anabolic process in a 
living body is termed as the sanghdtan 
karma and as there are five kinds of 
living bodies, the sanghdtan karma must 
be also of five xlifferent kinds accordingly, 
viz., — 



33' (i) Ouddrika sangM^an karma — means 
the set of action-currents which det- 
ermines the construction i.e. anabolic 
processes whereby non-living matter 
is collected by the gross physical 
organism and is assimilated through 
chemical transformation into tissues 
for its growth and development. 

34. (ii) Vaikriya sanghdtan karma. — is 

the set of action-currents which 
determine the processes for the 
> variation and transformation of 
the variable bodies of the gods and 
the demi-gods. 

35. (iii) Ahdraka sanghdtan karma — means 

the action-currents set up by the 
spiritual adepts to collect materials 
from without for the construction 
and formation of the tiny bodies 
which are sent out of their gross 
. physical frame to distant regions and 

36. (iv) TaiJQS sanghdtan karma — is the 

set of action- currents by virtue of 
which heat {teja) is absorbed by the 
jtva from without. 


Zl* (v) Kdrman sanghdtan karma — refers 
to the set of action-currents whereby 
the desires and energetics of the 
Jivas own making are materialised 
into (kdrmic) atoms to adhere round 
to the soul as locked-up energy com- 
posing the kArfnan body. 

The word Samkanana, like bandhan, 
also means joining together, with this differ- 
ence only that the latter bears the import of 
binding a thing by some thing else, just as 
a man is bound down by a rope ; where as 
samhanana implies joining things by their 
mutual interpenetration. In the case of 
handhan n&ma karma the muscles, ligaments 
etc. surrounding the skeletal parts of the 
body tie them up into a particular stature 
and stoutness of the system as a whole ; 
where as in this samhanana karma, the 
skeletal parts only are joined together by 
mutual interpenitration, dove-tailing, into each 
other as in the skull. Now the manner in 
which these skeletal parts are found to be 
4 joined with one another are variously deter- 
mined as detailed below ; — 



38. (i) Vajra rishava ndrdrcha sam- 

hanana karma — is the set of actiori- 
^ currents which determines bonny 

joints of the strongest characters. In 
this kind of joints, the bones are not 
merely joined together by mutual 
interpenetration but there is a bony 
projection {vajra) along the joints 
with a cover upon it, making these 
immoveable ; such being the case 
these joints are not easy of dislocation. 

39. (ii) Rishava ndrdcha samhanana 

karma — means the set of action- 
currents determining the skeletal 
joints by mere interpenitration and 
without a vajra as in the hall and 
the socket joint of the hip. 

40. (iii) N&r&ch samhanana karma — denotes 

set of action-currents determining 
the skeletal joints in the same 
manner as in the previous one but 
without any tissue cover. 

41. (iv) Ardha ndrdcha samhanana karma 

— is the set of action-currents which 
determines the character of the joint 
at one end of the bone in the manner 



as the above while the other end is 
. Tjply kept in position by ligament 
r... in the case of the thigh-bone. 

42. (v) Kilaka samhanana karma — is the 

set of action-currents determining 
the joints of the skeletals simply 
by nails at the points of the joints 
without any pin or a tissue cover. 

43. (vi) Chhevaththu Samhanana karma — 

is the set of action-currents whereby 
the bones are simply joined to one 
another, one slightly entering into 
the socket made in another. 

The word samsthAna signifies configura- 
tion of the body and the set of action-currents 
which tends to determine the shape, size, and 
character of the configuration of the body, is 
called Samsthdna karma. 

44. (i) Samachaturasra samsthdna karma 

is the set of action-currents by reason 
of which the configuration of the 
body is kept thorougly symmetrical. 

45. (ii) Nyagrodha samsthdna karma — is 

the set of action-currents which make 
the part of the body upward from the 



naval symmetrical but retards the 
growth and development of the 
lower part. 

46. (iii) S&dt samsthdna karma — is the set 

of action-currents which make for 
the full and proper development 
only of the lower part of the body 
down from this naval leaving the 
upper part not properly formed to 
keep up the symmetry. 

47. (iv) Kiibja samsth&na karma — is the 

set of action-currents by the predo- 
minence of which only the trunk of 
the body gets deformed — limbs and 
extremities being left symmetrical 
— 'kubja means *hump-backed.' 

48. (w) Vdman samsthdn karma — is the set 

of action-currents due to the in- 
fluence of which the different parts 
of the body including the trunk do 
not develop into their normal size, 
form, and configuration as in the case 
of a dwarf which is equivalent to 
Vdman in Sanskrit. 

49. (v\) Hunda samsthdna karma — is the 

set of action-currents bv reason of 



which none of the different parts of 
the body are symmetrical and proper- 
ly adjusted so as to make the whole 
configuration attractive and graceful. 
It is important to note that the confi- 
gurations of the otiddrika bodies that 
come out of the womb (udar) are more or 
less determined by the samsthdna nama 
karma ; but those which have no ouddrika 
constitution are not subject to these action- 
currents determinant of the configuration 
under discussion. 


The word varn<x means colour or com- 
plexion ; and the set of action-currents which 
are determinant of this colour or complexion 
of the physical constitution of the jiva is 
called, varna karma or the set of action -cur- 
rents determinant of complexion. This varna 
karma is again analysed into prasastha and 
aprasastha-r-i.^. pleasing and unpleasing to 
the eyes from the aesthetic stand point. 
And these are divided into five kinds as in 
the following, — 

50. (i) Krishna varna karma — is the set of 
action-currents by the influence of 



which the colour of the physical 
constitution becomes black like the 
Nigroes of Africa. 

51. (ii) Nila varna karma-^xs set of action- 

currents by the reason of which 
the physical complexion is made blue 
like some of the Indian races of 
pre-historic time. 

52. (iii) Lohita varna karma — is the set of 

action-currents which reddens the 
complexion like those of the Red 
Indians of America. 

53. (iv) Hartdrd varna ka^ ma — is the set 

of action- currents which give yellow 
colour to the constitution as we find 
in the Yellow races of China and 

54. (v) Sveta varna karma — is the set 

of action-currents which makes 
the body white as snow like the 
complection of the White races of 

• The word gandha means odour. And it 
goes without saying that every kind of 
physical body has a particular smell about 



it. So is the case with the physical organism 
of the jiva. Now the odour which an 
organism emits is either fragrant (suravij 
or fetor (duravi) : Hence, — 

55. (i) Surabhi gandha karma — is the set of 

action-currents which makes, a body 
radiate a fine fragrance very pleasant 
to smell. 

56. ^ii) Duravi gandha karma — is the set 

of action-currents which make a 
body emit a bad stinking fetor very 


The word rasa means taste. As bodies 
have 'smells' so they have 'tastes' rasa^ as 
well, which is discerned by the sensation 
which bodies awaken in us through the 
organ of taste {rasanendriya). But as 
the matter affecting the organ must be in 
a liquid state in order to its being felt, we 
have the word rasa which bears about it the 
sense and significance of liquidity. Tastes 
differ as bodies differ in constitution, and the 
action-currents which determine the nature 
and character of these tastes are named as 
Rasa-Karma or the action-currents deter- 



minant of taste. To illustrate, the sensation 
of bitterness {tikta) as produced by quinine 
and the sensation of sweetness (madhura) as 
produced by sugar, are very definite and 
specific sensations. The Jain sages have, 
therefore, classified the gustatory qualities 
of bodies {Rasas) into five as in the 
following — 

57. (i) Katu rasa karma — is the set of 

action currents which make the body 
give hot or pungent sensation {katu) 
as in the case of pepper. 

58. (li) Tikta rasa karma — is the set of 

action-currents which make the body 
* awaken the sensation of bitterness 
{tikta) as in the case of quinine. 

59. (iii) Amla rasa karma — is the set of 

action-currents which determines the 
quality of sourness (amla) in bodies 
as in the case of acids {amla). 

60. (iv) Madhura rasa karma — is the set of 

action-currents which determines the 
sweetness (madhura) of bodies as in 
the case of sugar, 

61. (v) Kaskdya rasa karma — is the set 

of action*currents which determines 



the saline (kashdya) quality of body 

as in the case of salt. 
"In the ordinary course of things these 
sensations are excited by the contact of specific 
sapid substances with the mucous membrane 
of the mouth, the substances acting in some 
way or other, by virtue of their chemical 
constitution, on the endings of the gustatory 
fibres. When we taste quinine, the particles 
of quinine, we must suppose, set up chemi- 
cal changes in the cells of the taste-buds or 
in the other parts of epethelium, and by 
means of these changes gustatory impulses 
are started. ♦ * Substances which taste sweet 
or bitter are always found to contain certain 
definite groups in the molecule, especially the 
hydroxyle (OH) and amido (NH2\ groups. 
Moreover, it seems as if a certain definite 
balance between positive and negative 
radicals must exist in order that a subs- 
tance shall taste sweet, for when such 
substance is so altered chemically that this 
balance is upset, the resulting derivatives 
are, according to circumstances, either bitter 
or tasteless." Does this not show what is 
implied in the rasa-ndnia karma ? 



The word sparsha means touch. It is 
by touch that we understand whether a 
body is heavy or light, rough or smooth, 
warm or cold, and the like. And the set of 
action-currents which determine the nature 
and character of the tactuo-mascular sensation 
which bodies awaken in us through touch 
is named as the sparsha karma. Tactuo- 
mascular sensations are of eight kinds viz — 
62 — 69. (i) Karkash — rough ; (ii) Mrtdu — 
smooth ; (iii) Guru — heavy ; (iv) Laghu — 
light ; (v) Shita^ co\A ; (vi) Ushna — warm ; 
(vii) snigdha — moist ; (viii) Rukshma — dry. 

The word anupurva means order, series 
or succession, i.e. the order of the succession 
of bodies which the jiva has to migrate 
through after death. And the Anupurvi 
ndma karma, therefore, signifies the action- 
currents which determine the course of 
movements which the /iva has to make in 
migrating out of the oudArika body at 
death : we have seen before that after death, 
th^jiva being wrapped up in kArman body 
migrates to ihdX gati which is determined by 



the gati karma of the jivas own making 
during the period of its oud&rika existence. 
But how would it go ? the k&rman-hoAy 
clothing in which the yiva at death passes 
out of the gross mortal coil, has neither 
the organs of sense, nor of action which 
only enable the yiva in the ouddrika body 
to move along certain lines in a certain 
direction in space in order to reach a parti- 
cular destination it has in view. But the 
^Jain philosophers hold as a solution to this 
doubt that as both the GaH and the Voni 
whence the ^iva will have to take birth, 
become fixed and determined by the action- 
currents set up by the ^iva itself, so the 
direction of the Jivas movements after death 
to reach its future destination, is also deter- 
mined by its setting up of certain action- 
currents, called Anupurvi karma, which 
determine and control the direction of the 
jivds movements in space by which it is 
enabled to directly reach its destination : but 
as there are only iowv gatis or destinations 
for a Sansdri jiva to reach after it has 
shuffled off its ouddrika body, this Anupurvi 
karma takes four different forms, — 



70. (i) Devdmipurvi Karma — means the 

set of action-currents which directly 
leads \hejiva to Deva gatiox the re- 
gion of the gods and the demi-gods. 

71. (ii^ Ndrakdnupurvi karma — means the 

set of action-currents which directly 
leads xhej'iva to the Naraka gati or 

72. (iii) Manushydnupurvi karma — is the 

set of action-currents which leads 

the jiva straight to the human 


73- (}^) Tiryagdnupurvi karma — is the set 

of action-currents leading the jiva 

straight to the worlds of the beasts 

and birds. 

It is interesting to note here by the way 

that accprding to the principle of karma- 

causality, a jiva after death has to go 

straight not only to the gati or the world 

wherein he is destined by the action-currents 

of its own setting up to move about ; but 

also straight to the very Yoni or womb 

through which it is destined as well, to take 

its rebirth immediately after the termination 

of its past life. The period intervening 


between death and birth of the one and 
the same jiva is known by the name of 
Vigraha Kdla in Sanscrit or V&te vahatA in 
Guzrati. This vigraha kdla is so infinite- 
simally small that it can not easily be 
measured , the longest being the time one 
takes to count from one to four. From 
this it becomes further evident, and it 
is really held by the Jains, that it is not 
the parental soul that is born as a child ; for 
were it so, then the parent, remark the Jain 
philosophers, should have died the moment 
xh^jiva was conceived in the womb through 
the act of coition : nor again the newly 
conceived //z/a can be taken as a part of the 
parental soul for that would imply an actual 
division of the soul which is constitutionally 
indivisible by its very nature. The Jains hold, 
therefore, that the jiva that is born to 
the parent, is not the parental soul 
which remained hidden as it were, either 
in the constitution of the father, only 
to be instilled by him into the womb 
of its mother in and through the seminal 
fluid at the time of impregnation, or in 
the constitution of the mother, in her ovum 




(drtav) which passes through certain stages 
of development while coursing downwards 
into the uterus (Jardyu) where it awaits the 
embrace of the spermatozoa at the cHmax 
of the conpress. The new beino- that the 
mother conceives, according to the Jains, 
is but a jiva that has just laid aside 
its mortal coil, the ouddrika body, else- 
where, and directly comes rushing in with 
lightning speed to plant itself in the 
ovum just fertilsed through the processes 
of coition for its reception. It is true 
that through the processes of impreg- 
nation and reproduction innumerable yVz/^a;^ in 
the forms of spermatazoons in the seminal 
fluid meet their deaths ; but none of these 
is born as the child conceived by the 
mother in the act of coition. # 


74-75. Vihdyo gati means gait and 
deportment in one's movement and the set 
of action currents which control this gait and 
deportment in the movements of the nvuy is 
named as vihdyo gati karma : This vihdyo 
gati karma is either (i) s hub ha {good) 
and (ii) ashubha (bad). It is with this vihdyo 


cLassifica tion of k arm as, 

gati karma that ends the list of karmas 
( action-currents ) coming under the 
heading of Pinda Prakriti Agkdtin 


Or the action-current that runs singly 
without any differentiating characteristic 
insignia in the current. Of these Pratyeka 
Prakriti karma comes first,— 

76. Pardghdta karma — is the action - 
current by virtue of which the jiva 
becomes invincible. 

77. Utchchdsa karma — is the action- 
current which determines the courses of 
inspiration and respiration. 

78. Atapa karma — is the action-current 
which determines the light and halo of the 
personality of the jiva as we feel when 
in the presence of any high souled person, 
who changes the atmosphere around 
him by the personal magnetism it has 

79. Udyota karma — is the action-current 
determining the serenity of the influence a 

jiva of high merit sheds upon those who 
gather arround him. 



80. Aguru laghu karma — is the action- 
current by which the body is made neither 
heavy nor light. 

81. Tirthankara karma — is the action- 
currents which fit the jiva to become a 
tirthankara in some future incarnation. 

82. Nirmdn karma — is the action - 
current by which the organs become 
properly adjusted and placed in their 
respective positions. 

83. Upaghdta karma — is the action- 
current by dint of which the organs 
do not get adjusted in their respective 
places to allow a normal functional 

84. Tras karma — is the action-current 
by virtue of which the jiva passing out 
of the immoveable body like trees and 
plants etc. take to a moving body which 
can travel about. 

85. Bddara karma — is the action-cur- 
rent helping the jiva in the metamorphosis 
form an invisible minute body into a big 
visible body. 

86. The paryApta karma — is the action 
current which enables the /iva to devolop 


its organic parts to their full and complete 

87. Pratyeka karma — is the action - 
current whereby a jiva has the privilege 
of having a body of its own instead of 
sharing a body along with other jivas. 
From this it is apparent that the Jain sages 
quite understood the biological possibilities 
of a great msinyjivas swarming together in a 
common home. 

88. Sthira karma— As the action-current 
whereby a jiva has a good set of strong 
teeth, a good set of hard bonny skeletals 
and the like, adding to the strength and 
steadiness of the body. 

89. Subha karma — is the action-current 
whereby the jiva enjoys a charming 
upper part of the body inviting the atten- 
tion of other people. It differs from Nya- 
gfodha samsthAna in this that it determines 
the nature and character to an attractive finish 
of the upper part of the body, but it does not 
necessarily leave the lower part clumsy and 
defective, while the nyagrodka samsthdna 
karma as we have already seen before, 
determines the symmetrical get up of the 



upper part only, leaving the lower part 
defective and clumsy. 

90. Saubhagya karma — is the action- 
current by reason of which a jiva becomes 

91. Susvara karma — is the action- 
current whereby a jiva has the privilege 
of having a sweet melodious voice which 
charms all who hear. 

92. Adeya karma — is the action current 
which adds importance, wisdom and weight 
to the words spoken by a jiva. 

93. Yoshokirti karma — is the action- 
current whereby a jiva earns name and 

94. Sthdvara karma — 'is the action- 
current which impells a jiva to take birth 
in an organism of immovable nature like 
the trees and plants. 

95. Sukskma sarira karma — is the 
action -current whereby a jiva has a very 
fine subtle body hardly perceptible by the 

96. Aparydpfa karma — is the set of 
action-current by the influence of which a 
jiva has to succumb before it attains to a 



complete maturity of limbs and other organs 
in their entirety. 

97. Sddkdran karma — is the action- 
current whereby a jiva dwells in a body 
which is common to many. 

98. Asthira karma — is the action- 
current due to the influence of which the 
teeth, the bones etc., not being strongly set 
up are unsteady and wallable. 

99. Asubha karma — is the action- 
current due to which the upper part of the 
body is neither well-built nor pleasing to 
other eyes. 

100. Durbhdgya karma — is the action- 
current whereby ^.jiva in spite of his work- 
ing hard and doing many good deeds does 
not get any popularity in return. 

loi. Dushar karma — is the action-cur- 
rent whereby the /iva has a rough hoarse 

102. Anddeya karma — is the action- 
current due to the bad influence of which a 
jiva, however he may speak truth, or words 
of wisdom and utility, his words carry no 
weight, nor convince any one of the truth 
he speaks out. 



103. Apayasha apakirti kdrma — is the 
action-current whereby aijiva has to labour 
under a bad name and disrepute. 

Here ends the long Hst of One Hundred 
and Three Nama Karmas determining 
the environment and physical condition in 
and through which a jiva has to struggle 
on and on. 

We have seen before that ^otra karma 
means certain action-currents whereby is de- 
termined the family and the race in which a 
jiva has to be born in the next incarnation. 
But families being either high or low in social 
structure, or being of high antiquity, having 
behind it the experience of ages, the Gotra 
Karma divides itself into two distinct sets of 
action-currents, viz — 

(i) Uchcha gotra karma — is that set of 
action-currents by the influence of 
which a jiva is born to a high family 
with edifying surroundings. 
(iij Nicha gotra karma — is that set of 
action-currents under the influence 
of which a jiva is made to take 
birth in a low family with bad en- 



vironments and grovelling people 

around him. 

The word vedanA is synonymous with 
samvedana which is equivalent to sensation 
as understood in modern psychology. Sen- 
sation results from the action of an external 
stimulous on the sensative apparatus of our 
nerves. Each organ of sense produces pe- 
culiar sensations which cannot be excited by 
means of any other. The eye gives the sen- 
sation of light, the ear of sound, the nose of 

smell, the tongue of taste and the skin of 
touch. And the sensations not only differ 

from one another in kind partly with the 

organ of the sense excited, but they also 

differ partly with the nature of the stimulus 

employed in two ways either (i) shAiA or 

(ii) ashAtd. 

(i) ShdtA vedaniya karma — is the set 

of action-currents which, working 

on the sensative apparatus of our 

nerves, gives rise to pleasurable 


(ii) AshAtA vedaniya karma — is the 

set of action-currents which similarly 




occasion in us sensations of painful 

Thus we have One Hundred and Eleven 
kinds of Aghdtina Karma or the **Action- 
currents of Non-injury" determining and 
evolving as well the physical conditions of 
the psyche or the soul — i. e., its body of 
action and its localisation in space which 
stand as the manifesting media for the play 
and operation of the energetics of its own 
making in the past. 

Now to summarise the classification of 
Karmas — both Ghdtin and Aghdtin which 
together make 158 kinds of karma— -vfo, 
have, — 




5 Kinds 


Darshan&varaniy a „ 

9 „ 




28 „ 




5 .. 




4 M 








2 ,, 





2 ,, 

Total. 158 Kinds. 



The details of these jtvic energetics 
which materialise themselves into relatively 
stable character in the form of karnta- The details 

canbe work- 

pudgal clinging round the soul can be work- definitely/"* 
ed out indefinitely in strict accordance 
with the Jain philosophical treatises. A 
critical study of these questions on the for- 
mation and transformation of the energetics 
of the jivds own making, cannot but con- 
vince a reflective student, of the intense love 
of truth and freedom which prevailed upon 
the sages who renounced their hearths and 
homes to enter upon hair-splitting analysis of 
these phenomena, psychical or physiological, 
which every human being can possibly ex- 
perience, so that those who have been 
groaning under the de-humanising effects 
of their impudent conduct due to wrong 
knowledge originating from their perverted 
visions into metaphysics of things and 
ideals, might take a note of warning 
before-hand, and strive to attain to a free 
and beatific state of being by the virtue 
of Right-Conduct {samyak chdritra) proceed- 
ing from Right- Knowledge {samyak jndna) 
acquired through Right-Vision {samyak 



darshana) into the underlying realities of 

ideas and ideals. But as the present treatise 

The Jain Js but a steppinpf-stone to have a bit clearer 

metaphysics *■ *■ ^ 

*^ ^^u ^^^'^ vision into the metaphysics of ideas and 

of the Jain ^ ^ 

sophy. ^^'^° ideals lying hidden in the rich and almost 
inexhaustible mines of the Jain literature and 
philosophy ; nay as it is only an epitome 
faithfully and consistently giving, in the 
briefest manner possible, a general idea of 
the Jain epistemology, ontology and theology 
on the principles of which, the whole 
moral code of the Jains is formulated for 
our right conduct in the attainment of the 
true Self- Rule or Swaraj, pure and simple, we 
must refrain, for the present, from entering 
upon a more detailed enquiry into the subtlty 
of the still deeper truths which lie veiled 
under the phenomenology of the organic 
energetics of 158 kinds as detailed in the 
foregoing pages, and pass, from the natural 
man who has been continuously forging 
fresh links to the chain of bondages by 
yielding to the solicitations of lower nature, 
on to the consideration of the moral man 
whose life has been a constant endeavour 
to shake off the guilded shams of the senses, 



to break off the fetters, to tear asunder into 
pieces the shackles of bondages, to soar 
higher and higher into the regions of bliss 
and beatitude to shine there in all his efful- 
gence and glory. 



How Joes Theory Jetermtne the Practtce — the 
Ja\n £tkical S|>eculatton — riow tt is aetermtned and 
kasecl on tketr Nleta|>liystcal S|>eculatton -A. Oontrast 
between BuJamsttc ana Jatn AdoraUty - tke Jatn Oon- 
ce{>t-ion of the Summum Bonum. 

To man, his own inner nature, like the 

outernature which surrounds him, ' is at first a 

The man as chaos to be organised into cosmos. As his in- 

a theoretical 

and a moral tellectual interest consists in subduing" to the 

bemg.' ^ 

order and system of the world of verities, sur- 
rounding him, the varied mass of presenta- 
tions which incessantly pour in upon him, 
so as a moral being, his ethical interest lies 
in bringing the claimant and jarring impulses, 
propensities and other elements in conformity 
with the order and system of the rational 
life. As the business of a theoretical thin- 
ker, confined only to his own interest, is to 
make the world orderly enough as to be fit 
for habitation, so the business of the moral 
man, leaving out of account the theoretical 
and other interests, is to establish order, 



unity and coherence in human practice. But 

here too, as everywhere else, the head '^^^„^^^^^y 

^ of life and 

guides the hand, the intellect controls the f!l^ '^^^ °^ 
will ; for theory always determines the practice. 
Of course, it is needless to mention here that 
a clear and adequate theory comes into being, 
or become crystallised into a definite shape, 
after long crude practice, but still, it may be 
asserted, as a fact, incapable of being denied, 
that every life implies a certain plan, a cer- 
tain conception, however vague and ill-defi- 
ned, of what life means. And such a plan or 
conception, we say, is already an implicit or 
latent in every theory of life. The clearer and 
more definite the conception of the meaning 
of life becomes, the more of order and har- 
mony is also introduced into human practice. 
This is why intellectual superficiality is so 
often a main source of moral evil ; and folly 
and vice are largely synonymous. This is 
why the first step towards moral reforma- 
tion is to arouse reflection in a man or 
people ; for the claims of morality cannot be 
properly satisfied and its demands fulfilled, 
until and unless the rigours of these claims 
are properly brought clearly into view. 



Every case of moral awakening is therefore 

Ethical also a case of intellectual awakening^ ; for 

brings i n the apprehension of truth does not remain 
harmony *^ 

and reason- ^ mere matter of intellect, or job of head ; 

able sweet- J ' 

prac^tice. * " ^^^ ^^ ^^ Other far-reaching consequences 
as it rouses the emotions, higher or lower, 
and demands expression through them in 
conduct or in life. **The opinion we enter- 
tain as to man's life as a whole and its rela- 
tion at large must influence our practice of 
the art of life." 

If this be the relation between* 'the theory 
of life* and 'the art of life/ and if theory 
moulds the practice, as is evidenced by the 
history of mankind, we may easily surmise 
the nature of the ethical discipline which will 
necessarily follow from the subtle and splen- 
did metaphysical speculations of the Jains, 
we have discussed before. For the ethical 
discipline is nothing but the formulation of 
the principles in accordance and in conformity 
with the metaphysical speculation, which will 
bring order, coherence, and unity in our 
practice and thereby help us in the achieve- 
ment of the Summum Bonum, we have in 
view. And the art of life and its principles 



for the guidance of the conduct, being but 
means to the realisation of the Highest 
Good, will vary considerably with any varia- 
tion in the conception of the End itself. And 
we shall develop this presently by bringing 
the Buddhistic ethics in sharp contrast with 
the ethics of Jainism. 

The Buddhas, rejecting the view of the 
soul as a persistent entity hold out that it 
is a continuum of conscious states and 
processes, for their metaphysics leaves no 
room for any abiding substance. This 
view of momentary existence, this denial of Buddhistic 


any persistent reality as commonly under- 
stood, was extended, to utter astonishment, 
to the physical world also, it being thought 
of as mere subjective impressions having 
no permanent underlying substance. It is 
out and out subjectivism, for here the 
momentary experience becomes the sole 
reality and the only datum of consciousness. 

Now, in face of such philosophical specu- " 
lations which reduce the self as well as the 
external world into so many momentary 
but continuous existences, which conceive 
reality in the form of an ever-flowing fluid, 



the only ethical dictum which can be held 
out consistently is — ''Guard the interest of 
the present and think not for the morrow." 
The very fact that we are the children 
of every moment and not of eternity as is 
taught in direct opposition to our own doc- 
trine, makes the claim of the present, even 
Its criticism. ^^ ^^e momentary present, imperious and 
supreme beyond all others. Not the calcu- 
lating prudence, but a careless surrender 
to the present becomes the true rule of 
life. And it is a mood, we may say, which 
must recur with every moral scepticism. For 
whenever the meaning of life, as history 
reveals, is not truly realised or lost sight of 
altogether, or whenever that meaning is 
shrivelled up in the experience of the mo- 
mentary present, when no abiding interest is 
found amidst this fleeting earthly life, when 
in it, is discerned no 'whence' or 'whether' 
but only a brief, blind, continuum of consci- 
ous states and processes and of transitory 
existences, then the conclusion which is 
inevitable to come foremost in the mind, is 
that the interest of the present have a para- 
mount and supreme claim and the present 



enjoyment and future unconcern is the only 
good of life. And we may remark that -pj^^ j^i^ 
such a philosophical speculation, by the 
perfect frankness, with which it eulogises 
the life of momentary experience and under- 
mines the importance of calculating wisdom 
so essential in life, takes away from man 
what is of worth and dignity to him and thus 
bears its own condemnation. 

The Jains, however, on the other hand 
hold out a different ideal — an ideal of free- 
dom from bondage — which can only be 
attained by voluntary effort, both intellectual 
and moral. Here, as we have found in 
Buddhistic metaphysics, the soul is not 
reduced to a continuum of conscious states, 
to a flux of psychical impermanent and mobile 
units, but is viewed as a substantial unity, a 
true verity, which has got to undergo all the 
consequences of its thoughts and deeds 
either in this life or in life to come, till it 
attains to that state of freedom and beatitude 
which is enjoyed only by the Kevalins or 
the Omniscients. The man here does not 
escape the effects of his own deed, virtuous 
or vicious, shuffling off this mortal coil as 



taught in Buddhistic philosophy, but on the 

other hand, enters again into a state of 

The Jain bondaofe, thousrh it may be somewhat 

conception o o 

of the Sum- different from the present one, to feel the 

mum Bonum, ^ ' 

consequences he earns or has earned, and 
there is no escape from this cycle of birth 
and rebirth, till he is able to shake off by his 
own moral endeavour, the pudgal particles 
clinging round his soul on every occasion 
he acts. This bondage is also regarded 
as something alien to the soul, it being 
caused by its own misdoings and it can 
therefore regain its original state of libera- 
tion, by developing in full the capabilities 
which are now lying veiled ordormant in him. 
The Summum Bonum of life is here not the 
gratuitous enjoyment of the present in 
utter disregard of the future, as Buddhists 
hold ; on the other hand, it is the sacrifice 
of the present to the future, the sacrifice of 
flesh to enter into a life of spirit, the anna- 
hilation of passion to enjoy a state of serene 
bliss, that forms the keynote of Jainism. In 
short, the yearning after a state of freedom 
' from bondage, — a state of bliss and beatitude 
and omniscience, attainable after much moral 



endeavour from a pious home-sickness in the 
state of bondage in this earthly life is 
at the heart of Jainism. And consequently 
their ethics, is not an ethics of sensibility 
where man sells himself to nature, but is 
essentially an ethics of self-realisation in and 
through self-rule and self-regulation. 

Such being the end and aim of Jain 
morality, we turn our attention to the 
methods which should be adopted for the 
realisation of this sublime ideal. Erelong, 
we have discussed the question regarding 
the possibility of such realisation and we got 
an emphatic affirmative answer to it, nay the 
question has been already decided by a 
single stroke so to speak with the solution 
of the problem of Necessity and Free-will. 
There we have shown clearly that man has 
this peculium to criticise the impulsive 
Stream, to arrest and change its course and 
to subdue the lower, animal propensities 
leading to vicious crimes, in view of the 
sublime ideal. It is here that he stands on 
a higher level than animal, for his life, un- 
like the life of an animal, is not a life of 
blind immediacy, but a life controlled and 


The means 
to the End. 


guided by its meaning as a whole. His life 
The method is not a life of surging passions and prompt- 

for realising 

the Ideal. ings ; on the contrary, he is the critic as well 
as the subject of these and as such he is the 
maker of his own destiny. Man has to rise, 
in order to attain to this state of beatitude 
and bliss, above the impulses of the moment, 
and must view everything he feels or thinks 
or wills, in the light of the Supreme Ideal— 
the source of all moral obligation. He 
must criticise the solicitations of sense and 
his natural tendency to activity, judge, 
approve or condemn them according as 
they stand either conducive or detrimental 
to the attainment of freedom or to the 
interest of his self-realisation. Living as 
he does in this stage of bondage — a state 
of perpetual conflict between reason and 
sensibility, between ideal and actual, between 
natural and moral, he cannot avoid this rule' 
of life. He cannot without ceasing to be a 
moral personality abjure this function of 
self-legislation, which is the true way for 
self-realisation, because he feels an incessant 
craving in him for a life which would be the 
fulfilment of his true and characteristic nature. 



Virtue is not a spontaneous natural 
growth, still less an original endowment 
of man. He has to constitute himself a ^^," ^^f. ^° 

make him- 

moral or virtuous person and has to build ous ^an/^" 
up his character after a long and toilsome 
process of self-legislation and self-conquest. 
And it is the privilege and dignity to him 
to be the critic of his own impulses, to 
be the maker of his own destiny and to have 
in his own hands, the way to his own 
emancipation. No doubt this way to self- 
realisation is beset with many obstacles and 
impediments and a walk on it entails much 
struggle and pain-suffering ; but looking 
to the other aspect, we also find, in the depths 
of a moral being, a joy which is even stronger 
and more steadfast than the self-imposed 
pain itself — we mean the joy of the convic- 
tion that the struggle is worth while, nay the 
only thing which has any worth at all ; for 
the goal, he strives after, is not something 
transitory, fleeting or evanescent, like that 
of the Buddhist but is everlasting freedom, 
everlasting omniscience and everlasting 
bliss. And in the joy of anticipation of this 
blessed state— a state of unparalled sponta- 

47 J 

The state 
after realisa 


niety, freedom and naturalness, all the pity 
of pain and sorrow, of struggle and defeat, 
of^^\^he ^^ mortifications, and penances sinks out 
good. ^ ^ ^ ^f heart and mind. This is the state, where 
in the language of a philosopher, the 
indefinite potentiality of either vice or 
virtue, has been transformed into a definite 
capacity for virtue, nay even more, into 
an incapacity for vice. Here he soars 
above the region of merit and demerit, of 
reward and punishment, of public sanction 
s or censure, shuns off what is stiff, stereo- 

typed and artificial, and lives a life which is 
''free down to its very root," And we may 
conclude by saying that because man is a 
citizen of a higher world, and is potentially 
free, he feels the bondage, of the lower 
form of life and the burden of self- 
realisation becomes one which he is willing 
and eager to bear and which becomes *the 
lighter, the longer, and more faithfully it is 
borne." For better, he feels this noble 
discontent than the most perfect animal 



Virtue and vtcc — atsttnctivc t>rtnct^lc between tnem 
— Human conduct is essenttally Teleologtcal — Moksha 
ts tlie Higliest End of life and activity — Contrast 
Letween tke Eastern and Mr estern concct>tion oi Vice 
and Virtue — Virtue, Vice and Karma-causality — Tne 
|>roblem oi evil. 

Before giving a detailed list of the 
manifold virtues aud vices, as has been 
enumerated by various Jain philosophers, 
we think it necessary, for a philosophical tiveprincipie 

lDCtwe6n vir- 

treatment, to enter into the principles on tue and vice. 
which this distinction rests or the principles 
from which we may logically deduce them. 
A mere survey of the virtues and vices as 
given, in the list, (vide infra) won't help us 
much in the way of entering into the philo- 
sophy of the thing or understanding the 
rationale of such distinction. 

To enter into our subject-matter therefore, 
we first draw the attention of our readers to 
the fact, that in opposition to the philosophy 
of the West, we find even here, first, a teleo- 

. . 473 



logical conception dominating the entire 
distinction ; for the Jains do not believe 


conception— in the intrinsic worth of any particular 

the Ultimate 

End being thoup^ht or deed which is palpable to the 
so-called supernatural faculty which goes by 
the name of Conscience or Moral Sense, as is 
held by the Common-Sense philosophers of 
the West ; but on the contrary, hold that a 
thing or a thought has any worth only as 
it is conducive to the realisation of some end 
to which it is but a means. An objec- 
tion, which may seem to have much of 
plausibility, at first sight, of course, might 
be raised to the effect, that we cannot 
go on ad infinitum in this progressus ; 
so we must stop somewhere which 
must be the ultimate End and means to 
' nothing ; and this Ultimate End or Summum 
Bonum, being, by its very nature, not any 
means to any end, cannot, in strict con- 
formity with the proposition already laid 
down, have any worth at all and so 
ceases to be desirable altogether. Thus 
Moksha or Final Liberation, which is 
regarded as the Ultimate Goal of every 
moral endeavour and as the source of all 




moral obligation, may seem to have no 
worth in their eyes ! 

The criticism, in reply, we say, is beside 
the mark ; for the proposition is applicable to 

, . 7 7 • 1 r • 1 • ^^ objection 

every thnig except moksha itselr m relation to refuted, 
which we judge everything else and which is 
regarded as the fountain of all worth. This 
moksha or the state of liberation, as we have 
discussed before, is not something alien to our 
nature, but is on the other hand the fullest 
development of the capabilities now lying 
veiled or dormant in us, and all the worth it 
possesses for us, is due to its being the full" 
est realisation oi our own true and character- 
istic nature. And all the feelings, emotions 
and affections which gather round the appre- 
hension of virtue and vice, which accompany 
the sense of duty or conviction of obligation, 
and the consciousness of good or ill desert, 
remorse and self-approval, moral hopes and 
fears, — all testify unanimously to his being* in 
the state of bondage, the liberation from which 
is therefore the true goal of every moral 
progress. For whence comes the permanent 
uneasiness and discontent that are apt to 
haunt even the favoured lives .-* Undoubted- 



ly from the constant presence of unrealised 
ideals — the ideal of liberation and omnis- 
cience. The sense of short- coming, of broken 
purposes, of blighted visions which cause , 
many a chill on the most genial hours, 
admit of no other more rational explanation. 

^ And this feeling of uneasiness, this feeling 

of discontent — is that which saves the indivi- 
dual as well as the nation from every sort of 
moral stagnation and stationary existence. 

In another respect there is also a slight 
difference between Jainism and Western 

Vice or vir- philosophy which consists in this that 

tue refers not 

to character here virtue does not directly refer to 

butf to con- 

*^"^^- the excellence of character as in the 

West, but to the conduct conducive to 
the realisation of moksha. The conduct, 
being but a partial revelation of the 
character, the Jains confine the terms Pdpa 
and Punya i.e., vice and virtue, to the conduct 
itself, regarding the character which reveals 
itself through the conduct conducive to self- 
realisation, as simply religious ; for here 
religion and morality, both having the com- 
mon end in view, mingle together and are 
regarded as inseparable. 



Virtue, we thus see, is that form of 
conduct which furthers the self-realisation 
of man, helps him in the purification virtue is a 
of the heart and the attainment of libera- ^^fV:«^e 

r e I 1 n c s 

tion and a state of beatitude and bliss, ^Js^^jons!^^^ 
It has a good end — an end which justifies 
its worth — namely perfection ; for perfec- 
tion, it seems to us, is a worthy aim 
in itself and the pain we suffer from 
on our march towards it, therefore needs 
no apology. Virtue, inspite of the pain 
which it brings in its trail, is of incalcul- 
able use in correcting and disciplining 
the spirit, for it serves to soften the 
hard of hearts, to subdue the proud, to 
produce fortitude and patience, to expand 
the sympathies, to exercise the religious 
affections and lastly to refine, strengthen, 
nay, to elevate the entire moral disposition. 
It tends of its very nature to honour and 
life and vice to dishonour and death. And 
lastly it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense 
of security, of resignation and hope which 
no sensible or earthly object can elicit. It 
clarifies our vision, refines our thought, 
purifies our heart, animates our will, and 



last of all it adds we say a cubit to our 
moral stature. 

Such being the nature of virtue, how 

Virtue, vice 

and karma- can we expect in face of the operation of 


Karma-z'^\i'^2}i\X,y, other than pain and 
misery, when we commit vice. Surely the 
entail of natural evil, of pain and ipisery, 
upon moral transgression is the indispensible 
expression of the righteous adjustment 
of things by the operation of Karma- 
causality. Sin being there^ it would be simply 
monstrous, in face of such inexonerable moral 
causality as discussed above, that there 
should be no suffering, no misery, and no 
pain, and would fully justify the despair 
which now raises the sickly cry of complaint 
against the retributory wretchedness of 
moral transgression. And still in utter 
forgetfulness of such moral causation, we, 
when we are haunted by the fatalism of 
nature on our own misdoings, cry against 
the sterness and rigidity of the inexonerable 
law, with which it marches upon us ! We 
forget, in short, that the absence of physical 
evil in presence of the moral evil pleads 
against the operation of the law of Karma- 



causality, nay against the whole righteous 
adjustment ot the world, and is a horrible 

But we have not as yet got rid of 
another difficulty which may perplex the ^^y should 

^ y 1 1 there be any 

mind of one interested in this problem ; for ^'^^ ^ 
questions like this as '*why should there be 
any vice at all ?" cannot but disturb minds 
of earnest inquirers. True, they may say, 
there is the law of A'^rwa-causality, the 
firm grip of which, no one can elude on 
commission of vice — truer indeed that by 
virtue, the torpid conscience is awakened, the 
close affections are opened and the slavery 
of selfishness can be successfully escaped — 
but why is this world at all tainted with vice 
and not a world of pure unalloyed virtue ? 
Or, more briefly, why there is any sin 
at all? 

The obvious reply to such enquirers is 
that it is due to our free-will. We are as 
man, the most gifted animals in the arena 
of the universe, and this best possible 
endowment, namely the power to choose 
between good and evil regardless of their 
unavoidable consequences, includes in its 



very nature, the ability and possibility of 

its misuse. And this free-will needs no 

It is due to justification, for without it there misfht be 

our Free- 

^^'^'- some sort of goodness or docility, which 

may be properly designated as animal 
goodness, but no virtue in the strict 
sense of the term, for a virtuous being is 
one who chooses of its own accord to do 
what is right, though the heaven falls. 
And the notion of a moral being, without 
being endowed with the freedom to act 
of its own accord, without the concurrence 
and approval of its own will, is itself a 
down-right contradiction ; for otherwise, 
we would be forced to think of morality 
in stones and trees. To take away this 
freedom of man is virtually to arrest the 
system of things to a natural order and 
means the reduction of human life to animal 
spontaneity and leaves no room for the 
possibility of its culmination into an ethical 

Sin, we thus see, far from being an 
inevitable outcome of a determining neces- 
sity, is the result of the abuse of an orginal 
endowment of man — which being the ground 


of his moral nature when properly used, 
instead of depraving morality, heightens it. 
And we may further say that owing to this 
peculiar endowment, the whole resources of 
men are well in hand and the creature with 
this controlling agency when raised to its 
highest pitch, displaces a thousand obstacles 
in the way of its self-realisation. 

Thus we see that man is not moral 
owing to any peculiar organ, for there is Man is not 
no peculiar org^an in virtue of which we ^"^ peculiar 

* ° organ of his 

may say he is a moral being. On the other ^^^^1 by his 

hand, it is by the whole make and consti- and^cm^ti^- 
p I . I . , tution. 

tution of his nature, not by a particular 
faculty, that he is framed for morality. 
And as a moral being, he is placed in the 
perpetual conflict between the ideal and 
attainment, and hears incessantly the cate- 
gorically imperative demand of the ideal- 
self. He always hears the 'Thou shall' 
voice of the ideal to the actual man which 
admits of no concession or compromise. 
This ideal man stands out as the judge of 
what we do, and as such it accuses, or ex- 
cuses, condemns or approves with a voice 
of authority, which we may, owing to our 




perversity of will, disregard, but the legi- 
timacy of which we can hardly dispute. It 

Still for all -^ . 

that it is does not rule or pretend to rule even with 

better to be ^ 

chaste and ^n autocratic sway nor, does it sfive us 

generous. ^ ^ 

a law of its own making. On the contrary, 
it claims to rule us ; because it is the fulfil- 
ment of our destiny, the fullest realisation 
of our nature and the highest goal which 
mankind can keep in view. Here its 
authority is not coercion, for man lays 
the law upon himself, and it is self-imposed 
obligation. And because man is a citizen 


of a higher world, he complacently accepts 
and bears the burden of such obligation 
and feels the bondage of the lower form 
of life. 

Let us then conclude by saying in the 
language of a philosopher that **in the 
darkest hour through which a human soul 
can pass, whatever else is doubtful, this 
at last is certain, that — if there be no god 
and no future state, even then it is better 
to be generous than selfish, better to be 
chaste than licentious, better to be brave 
than a coward. Blessed beyond all earthly 
blessedness, is the man, who in the tempes- 



tuous darkness of the soul, has dared to 
hold fast to these venerable land-marks. 
Thrice blessed is he who, when all is drear 
and cheerless within and without, when his 
teachers terrify him and friends shrink from 
him, has obstinately clung to this gloom. 
Thrice blessed ! because his night shall 
pass into clear day. 



Punya anJ Pftt>a in relation to *Cnarttra — Analysis 
of OKarttra or OonJuct — Constaerations of moral 
activity. Good and tke Law of duty — Fundamental 
factors of Punya — Knowledge, Faitk and Will — 
Punya as forms of service — Sincerity as the soul of 
religiousity — Sincerity and Punya — Psycliical and 
Pkysical fruitions for tkc |>erformances of Punya. 

We have in the previous chapter 

discussed in brief the principle and the 

Punya and rationale which underlie the difference 

round Chd- and destinction between* Punya (virtue) 


and P&pa (vice), as conceived and inter- 
preted by the Jains in their scriptural 
texts and legendary accounts. We have 
seen there that the Jain conceptions of 
Punya and P&pa mostly centre round 
the word, CMritra^ which has the word 
'Conduct' for its English equivalence. Con- 
duct or Chdritra is the conscious ad- 
justment of the human activities {Karmas) 
for the attainment of a particular end 
or object. But Karmas, as we have 


Definition of 


seen elsewhere, are the vibratory action- 
currents in and through which the pudgal 
particles {Karmavargands), according to Chdritra or 
the Prakriti (nature) of which a particular 
action-current is set up, so adjust themselves 
by a change of their relative positions as 
to directly connect the agent {Kartri) with 
the end, in view of which he sets up 
a particular set of action-currents. It is 
clear, therefore, that the conscious and 
voluntary adjustment of the extremely super- 
fine Karmavargands as would — if there 
were no antardya (or impediment on the 
way),— connect the end with the agent is 
what is called chdritra or conduct. 

A conduct is either moral or otherwise. 

A moral conduct is that which has a parti- 

A Punya is 

cular moral good for its end or object, and whfat has 

moral good 

the law which connects this activity with the for its end. 

object is duty usually classified into Charan 
(Jural) and Karana (Teleological) of which 
we shall have to speak later on ; while the 
psychical disposition of the moral agent by the 
preponderance of which he obeys and loves to 
act in conformity with the law, is termed as 
Subjective or Bhdva-punya ; and, in so far as 


he, out of the love of the good, practically 
obeys the law and acts in conformity with the 
same is called Objective or Dravya Punya, 

Thus we see Punya is not the know- 
ledge of the good only ; it is also a love of 
^sts^ln^^the Z^^^ ^.nd Order at the same time, where love 
of^the^good ^^ ^^^^ merely a condition and stimulant of 
?he same! ° punya ; but it is one of its essential elements 
of no less importance than the knowledge 
of the good itself. But what is this love 
of the good ? And speaking generally, 
what is love ? Does love necessarily exclude 
knowledge ? Certainly not. Love is not the 
blind impulse of the sense and sensibility, it 
is the pleasure (dnanda), which is superadded 
to the idea of an object. Love is thus not 
only inseparable from knowledge but it is 
distinct from appetite as well. In true love, 
the idea is always mingled with delight 
and yielding to such a love therefore means 
yielding to reason and thus the agent is 

To push the question of Punya further 
on, knowledge y;^(i;/(2 and love {Sraddhd) do 
not constitute the whole and entire of 7^^;^^. 
Its conception is not limited only to these 



two elements. Instances are not wanting 
to show in how many cases, the love of the „ 

But in wtl- 

p^ood is as powerless as the knowledge A^d'pfactis- 

t> r t> ing the good 

thereof. Very often it happens that a rntdii7encf 
man who knows good and entertains as 
well a love for the same, yet fails to adjust 
his Karma for the achievement of the 
same. Who has not seen how many a 
generous soul, though uniting wisdom and 
enlightment in his being yet succumbing 
before temptations.'* Evidently, therefore, 
as the Jain sages hold, there must be, in 
addition to love and knowledge, something 
else in Punya as forming one of its funda- 
mental factors. And this additional element 
is the supreme effort, an act of personal reso- 
lution without which a Punya cannot be 
practised and completed. Revealing as it 
does in the form of last choice, the final 
decree for immediate execution without 
further deliberation, this third element is 
called the Virya, the power or the will-to-do, 
Virya is the faculty of initiating a change 
which is not determined by any anterior 
change. Thus is Virya identical with 
the ultimate authority or liberty which is a 



profoundly personal thing \\\'aX exists in and 
works from within us, and which moves 
without being itself moved. 

So we see, in every act of Punyuy Jn&na 
How one (knowledge^ SraddhA or Anurdga (love) 
Puny a van and Viryu (liberty or force) are indissolub- 


ly blended together. In a word, Punya 
(virtue) is the moral strength consisting in 
wilfully practising the good with love and 
intelligence. And the Jain sages teach 
that it is by practising the good with love 
and intelligence that one may become 
virtuous. Viewed with this light, Aristotle 
is right when he says that 'Virtue is habit ^ ; 
for a single act of virtue will not certainly 
make any one virtuous (Punyavdn), It is by 
constant repetition of virtuous acts that one 
may become virtuous in as much as this cons- 
tant repetition transforms {Pranamati) the 
soul, evolving from within it higher and more 
constant instincts and tendencies. It is im- 
portant to note that this constant repetition 
of acts which goes to the formation of 
habit, does not mean here discharging of 
duties in a mere mechanical way. In the 
mere mechanical way of doing things, the 



soul by subjecting itself to a rigid rule of 

extraneous discipline, looses the conscious- 
Nine kinds 

ness of what it was doing. It is by the spirit oi P^^y<*' 
that we must become virtuous and not merely 
by deeds ; for we should always bear in 
mind the golden maxim : ''The letter killeth 
but the spirit maketh alive." 

Now Punya being thus found to consist 
in wilfully practising the good with love 
and intelligence, the Jaina sages have laid 
down nine general ways in which it can be 
cultivated as in the following, — 
(i) By feeding the hungry and the starv- 
ing who are without means and 
therefore rightly deserve it. This 
is Annapunya. 

(2) By quenching the thirst of the help 

less thirsty. This is Pdn-funya. 

(3) By clothing the helpless nude who 

are destitute of all means where- 
with to provide themselves with 
clothing ? This is Vastra-pnnya, 
i/^ By sheltering the poor and the des- 
titute who have no place wherein 
to rest their head. This x^L&yan 




(5) By providing the tired and the 

tottering with seats and bed- 
dings to take rest and compose 
themselves. This is Sdyan-punya. 

(6) By revering the venerable worthies 

which is due to them. This is 

(7) By duly appreciating and admiring in 

words the merit of the really 
meritorious. This Vachan-punya, 

(8) By personally attending to the needs 

and necessities of anyone who is 

in real need of it. — This is Sartra 
puny a. 

(9) By respectfully bowing the notables and 

the elders who deserve it. This 

is Namashdr punya» 
These are the nine principal ways for 
any one to cultivate Punya-virtue. It will 
perhaps be remarked that these are but forms 
of social laws which a man as a social being 
ought to obey. Like the law of compromise in 
the severe struggle for existence, as summed 
up in the formula, '^Live and let live,'' 
these might be taken as a few positive prin- 
ciples of social service formulated to guide 



and regulate the social life of a man with a 

view of mutually livinor in peace and amity „ ,. 

J ^ ^ ' Religeousity 

where there is discord and introduce thereby ^^ ^^fy^ »n 

' question. 

a reign of harmony in the different spheres 

of our life and activity. But wherein lies 

the religiousity of the conduct which is 

presumed to purify the soul from the soils of 

the aboninable senses ? Shortsighted and 

unfortunate is the man who thinks in this 

vein ; for he forgets that it is in service that 

lies the soul of all religiousity. A service 

rendered with sincerity not only opens the 

vision, enlarges the heart, and draws out the 

higher instincts of man in their dynamic 

operations in the play of life here ; but also 

sets up such strong action-currents as 

would mould the environment in a way 

that would contribute to the higher evolution 

of the individual here-in-after, as we have 

seen while treating of A'^r;;^^-phenome- 

nology, "as we sow so we reap." Moreover, 

apart from the question of the immortality 

of deeds in the moral world, we can never 

secure from an idea that intense realization 

which very often comes in the wake of 

emotion. It is the feeling that counts with 



service ; emotion galvanizes the cold idea 
into life and activity. It makes it alive 

In sincerity ' 

hisreiigeous- ^nd dynamic. It is the feeling after truth 
that makes the scientists experiment with 
dangerous chemicals ; it is the feeling with 
the helpless millions suffering under various 
organic maladies, that actuates the physician 
to gladly risk his life for a new discovery. 
The man who plunges deep into the surging 
waters of a gurgling rivulet to save his 
drowning fellow man, must have felt, nay 
sensed something beyond the body. From all 
these it is apparent that a service, whatsoever 
form it may take, is not born of any social 
ceremonialism. It is boru of the internal 
and moral habit which is seated in the wilf 
and the heart. And herein lies the religiousity 
of the services we have enumerated herein 

Now such being the psychology under 
lying the cultivation of Punya exhibiting 
itself as it does in the various forms of 
services rendered, as detailed in the above, 
with all the sincerity of the will and the heart 
one could command, it is natural that these 
virtuous acts, punya, should not only clarify 

Puny A and its fruitions, 

the visions, draw out higher instincts of the per- 
former in their dynamic operations and there- 
by evoke admiration, benediction etc., from 
all humanity in its track ; but should as well 
set up such strong action-currents that would Howa/'««ja 

. . works out its 

place hmi here, m the present lite, ni a more consequen. 
favourable condition and environment afford- 
ing greater opportunities for a larger enjoy- 
ment of peace and pleasures of life as well as 
would work out for him in future, a higher 
and more befitting form of organic evolution 
as its manifesting media whereby it would 
be enabled to utilise in a different and higher 
sphere, the manifold opportunities and 
advantages that would naturally open to him 
as stepping stones to rise to a higher state 
of being and happiness. This is how the 
seeds of Punya sown in one life bear fruits 
both in the pscychical, and physical worlds, 
according to the law of Karma-C3iUS3i\ky for 
enjoyment in a subsequent life. 

The action-currents set up by the nine- 
kinds of Punya are of various pitches 
and types. But for convenience' sake the 
Jain sages have classified them into forty- 
two kinds in and through which a jwa 


The conse- 

An epitome of jainism 

enjoys the fruits of Puny a done by him in 
the past. As for instance the (i) the enjoy- 
quences of nient of pleasurable things by a jiva in this 
life must be understood as due to the set of 
action-currents known by the name of Skdtd- 
vedaniya, set up by him through some 
virtuous deeds. (2) Similarly taking birth in 
some higher caste, Kshatriya and the like 
is due to that kind of action-currents known 
by the name of Ucchagotra karma which are 
set by thejiva through the performance of 
some virtuous deeds in the past (3) Like- 
wise the birth of a jiva in the human world 
(Manuskya gatt) is or in the god-world 
Deva^ati is to be understood as due to setting 
up of such action-currents. 

In the same way is to be taken the 
dnupiirvi-karma under the influence of 
which a Jiva in Karma-sarira is directed 
towards a particular gati according to 
his Karma in the past. If after death, 
^ the Karma sarira along with the tejas 
of a jiva is directed towards the human 
world {manuskya gati) to take its birth there, 
or towards the god-world (Deva gait) to be 
born there, then it must be understood as 



due to the directive influence of the manu- 
shya or devdnupurvi action-currents set up 
by ih^jiva by his virtuous actions performed 
in the past. 

The possession of the organism with five 
senses {Panchendriya) is due to the action- 
currents known as Panchendriya jdti karma. 
So is the case with the possession of 
bodies [Sariras) which are of five kinds, 
for instance, the having of an ouddrika 
body or vaikriyciy dkdrika or taijas, and 
kdrman is due to the setting up of such 
action-currents which determined the growth 
development of these bodies from out of 
pudg-a/a-m^.tervdh. . Certain other fruits of 
virtuous acts are enjoyed by the possession 
of a set of well proportioned limbs and 
extremeties {angopdngd) in the ouddrika^ 
vaikriya or ahdraka slate of being of the 
physical organism. 

Of the Sanhananana ndma karma, the 
setting up of action-currents making way 
for the firmly joined skeletal parts, as the 
having of the vajra-rishava ndrdch is due 
to some Punya in the past ; the possession 
of a well-proportioned body with a decent 



configuration {Samachaturastra sansthAn) is 
due to the action-currents after its names* 
sake set up by some virtuous performances. 
The having of subha rasa, subha gandha, 
subha varna and subha sparsha is the result 
in the same of way of some Punya done 
in the past. If one is neither fat nor lean, 
it is due to the aguru-laghu action currents 
set up by some virtuous acts. Similarly if 
any one is so strong and stout as to get 
the upper-hand over his enemy, it is due 
to Pardghdl ndma action-currents. The 
enjoyment of a full and untroubled brea- 
thing is due to Uchch&sa ndma action - 

In the aforesaid manner, the action-currents 
known as (26) VthAyogati {2j) Udyata ndma 
(28) Nirmana ndma (29) Tras ndma (30) 
Bddarndma{2i^) Paryapta ndma (^2) Pra- 
tyeka ndma (2i2>) Shird ndma (34) Shubha 
ndma (35) Subha^a ndma (36) Suswar 
ndma {2,7) Adeyandma (38) Yasha ndma 
(39) Tirthankar ndma (40) Tiryancha 
nama (41) Manushya dyu {^2) Devdyu ndma, 
—all these the nature and character of which 
have been discussed before, in our chapter on 



Classification of Karmas under their respec- 
tive headings are set up by virtuous acts 
ensuring the jivcty the possession of a 
pleasurable sentient existence along with the 
advantages and benefits as might accrue 
from them. 




Constttuent Elements of *Pat>a, — *Anancia* xa tKe 
^rime Goocl — Pliiloso|>Ky Passton— Tlie <loctrine of 
Indolentta — EtgKteen Ktncls of *Pa|)a* — TKcir Conse- 

Having discussed in the last chapter as 
to what does Puny a {virtue) consist in, we are 
Pdpa is naturally led to enquire into the nature of 
ness. Pdpa (vice), the second of our moral 

categories. Puny a and P&pa are not only 
relative but contrary terms as well, each pre- 
supposing the other. As the Jains hold if 
Puny a, as we have already seen, is moral 
strength, P&pa is moral weakness. It is the 
preponderance of passions, of the senses and 
the •sensibility over reason : it is the 
rebellion of the lower instincts and impulses 
against the moral good and the law or duty. 
The only notable factor which is found com- 
mensurate in both Punya and Pdpa is the 
free-will of the agent who performs or com- 



mits the same. Just as Punya is really a 

Punya only when it is performed willingly, 

Will is com- 

^o P&pa \^ pApa ovlXv ^\i^\\ it is committed piensuratein 
^ ^ ^ ^ both Punya 

voluntarily ; for at the back ground of them ^"^ ^^P^- 
both stands out revealing itself as it does in 
the free choice between the two alternatives 
good and evil, in as much as liberty, so far it 
manifests itself in the free exercise of choice, 
is unstained and unstainable with anything 
obligatory or compulsory in its character. 
But viewing the thing from a different position, 
Msamyak jndna {wisdom) and samyak charitra 
{moral perfection) is characterised as being 
but a mode (parydya) of liberty and 
Mithy&tva (Subreption) and Duhskilatva 
(Perversity) as state of slavery, then punya 
might be said to consists in being voluntarily 
free diud pdpa to consist in being voluntarily 
di s\diVQ of KashAyas i,e,, of propensions and 

Such is, roughly speaking, the notion of 
vice as well as liberty of vice as conceived 
and interpreted by the Jains. Some thinkers, 
however, disagreeing with this view of the 
Jains hold that when the question of liberty 
comes in as commensurate in both Punya 



and pdpa^ there can be no p&pa at all that 
one may commit. There is punya and 
punya only. 

To maintain this, the holders of such an 
opinion argue that nobody commits a sin 
knowing it to be as such. Man plunged 

D e n i a I of 

PApa- as he is into this world of nature, is always 

found to be in want of something or 
other which he believes in and struggles 
for This end or object of his endea- 
vour is what is called Good in ethical 
language ; and when he knows this object, 
the nature of this good, the realisation, 
the attainment of which he believes will 
satisfy his want, he pursues it choosing a 
particular line of action or conduct that will 
ultimately connect him with the good, the 
object of his desire and actions ; and it is 
in this his free choice of the line of conduct 
that his liberty manifests itself, there being 
various alternative lines of conduct to select 
from. Where is Papa then ? 

But this is talking like the ChArvdkas--^ 
the uncompromising exponent of the philoso- 
phy of pleasure in antiquity. The whole 
question turns upon the idea of the good as 



they have in mind. Good is that which we 

all seek and pursue. It is that which all would 

possess if they could have it ; but what is Philosophy 
* 01 Pleasure. 

g'ood which all seek and clamour for ? It is 
dnanda — pleasure. Ananda, pleasure, is the 
good. The child is sensitive to dnanda 
pleasure : and the sage who denies it does 
with a view of the pleasure he derives in 
this his very act of denial. The pleasure 
is the watch-world of all, down from the 
savage upward to the sage. Such is the 
idea of the good in the philosophy of 
pleasure which unchaining all the passions, 
lets loose at the same time all the appetites, 
opens a free path-way for the senses and thus 
sometimes descends to shameful excesses. 
It is true that in freeing the passions from 
restraint, it acquires a certain sort of gran- 
deur — the fierce grandeur of nature ; it has 
even a sort of innocence — the innocence of 
the blind torrent which knows not whither it 
rushes; and finally, by the very fact of making 
no distinction between passions and pleasure, 
it sometimes gives free play to generous in- 
stincts and attains to a nobility which is lack- 
ing in cold calculation and mercenary virtue.' 


An epitome of jainism. 

But such a gbod as understood and con- 
ceived in terms of pleasure in the philosophy 
Criticism of ^f passion, can it secure us any basis for the 
sophy. formation of a definite moral code? In fact, 

pleasure without bounds, without choice, 
without fore-sight ; pleasure taken by chance 
and according to the impulse of the moment ; 
pleasure sought and enjoyed under any form 
in which it may present itself ; a brutal sen- 
sual pleasure preferred to any intellectual — 
pleasure thus understood destroys itself ; for 
experience teaches that it is followed by pain 
and is transformed into pain. Such a prin- 
cipal therefore is self- contradictory and falls 
before its own consequences. And this is why 
we find the ancient classifying pleasure 
into two kinds — Nitya and Anitya. The 
pleasure derived from the gratification of 
the senses is what they term as transitory — 
Anitya, It is but a mingling both of 
joy and grief; it disturbs the soul for a 
moment only to add to it more grief than 
joy. Having thus experienced the bitter 
consequences of seeking temporal good 
as transitory pleasure, the volupluous 
philosophy, however seductive it might be, 



had to seek the superior principle of the 

stable pleasure which they found in repose, 

peace or insensibility so much so that they 

thought paramount good to consist in *'the 

absence of suffering" or indolentia {dukhd- 


Thus Pdpa being found to consist in 

Subreption (mithyatva) and perversity 

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mithyatva 

(dukshilalvd) ^.s manifest in bad-will, the Iain andDushila- 
^ ^ "^ tva consti- 

moralists hold that liberty of vice manifests ^"'® Pdpa, 
itself in and through the eighteen different 
forms of action as in the following. — 
(i) Jiva Hinska—\.h\s means crushing out 
the organic energies of an embo- 
died soul. 'Akimsd parama dkar- 
ma — non-killing of life is the car- 
dinal principle of all true religio- 
sity.' Even the Mimdnsaka atheists 
teach, ''md himsydi sarva bhutdnt' 
which means don't kill any life. The 
only difference between the Jain 
moralists and Mimdnsaka sages 
in this respect of himsd, is that 
former take an uncompromising 
attitude in positively prohibiting 
the taking of any life ; while the 


latter only relatively prohibits the 
killing of any life ; for on certain 
occasions they enjoin the same as 
we find in the statement, Senena 
abhickdran yajeta' i,e,, kill ene- 
mies by the performance of Sena 
However, what is kimsd from the Jain 
point of view ? It is the crushing of the jivic 
organism into two, ouddrika and the kurman 
bodies : for non can destroy the karman body 
clothing a soul. 

It will be remarked perhaps that the sage 
Wkt Jaimini could not put in such contra- 

Himsd in Victory rules of conduct in his Karma Philo- 
the Purva , rf^i . . i 

mimdnsa sophy. 1 he answer is a very simple one. 

arid in the ^, . , r » y * 

Jain teach- 1 ne scriptural statements of interdictions 

and injunction are to be interpreted 

according to the view points from which they 

are made. The prohibition of 'not killing 

any life' is in reference to one who has 

conquerd his Krodha (anger) : while the 

injunction for the perfomance of Sena 

yajna for the slaying of enemies, is with 

reference to the man of the world who has 

anger and its correlates. So is the case with 



Jain savants. They too have had to make a 
distinction between the rules of conduct both 
for the monks and the laity. A Jain monk 
should rigidly follow the principle of non- 
killing so much s» that he is even forbidden 
to take the life of an organism that has but 
ono sensQ. But this rigidity, relaxes when 
the question of the laity comes in. The ordi- 
nary folk are forbidden to take the life of any 
organsm possessed with two or more sense- 
organis. It is interesting to note that this 
HimsA is of two kinds — Dravya and Bhdva 
i,e. Actual and Psychical. The psychical pre- 
cedes the actual and is that kind of mental 
attitude which gives rise to the desire of 
taking life in one form or other, and Dravya 
himsA is the practically killing away of life 
somehow or other. 

(2) Asatya Mrisavdda untruthfulness. — If 
Himsa is one of the most heinous 
of sins, Asatya is also no less so. 
Telling lies eats into moral vitality 
of one who tells it and habitual liars 
have no chance of gaining any 
knowledge for moral and spiritual 




(3) Adattdddn or stealing — This is 

another kind of committing sin. 
It not only means taking of 
another's belongings but means 
also of appropriating or keeping 
lost articles without any public 
declaration, accepting of bribes, 
cheating, smuggling and the like 
forms of action. 

(4) Abrahmacha^ya or Unchastity — Chas- 

tity consists, as ordinarily con- 
ceived, in one's being true to 

another in body, mind and speech, 


when these two are related as 
man and wife. And with the 
monks who are forbidden to take 
to wife, it, consists in being free 
from any kind of erotic thouhgt 
and pleasure. Unchastity, there- 
fore, consists in violation of these 
rules of conduct. 

(5) Parigraha or Covetousness — This is a 

kind of intense attachment to 
one's belongings so much so that 
if anything is lost, he gives himself 
up to excessive grief. Parigraha 



with a monk also consists in 
keeping to himself anything more 
than what he really and actually 
requires for his physical existence. 

(6) Krodha or Anger — This is also a source 

of sin ; for it like the preceding 
ones disables a man to keep the 
equanimity of temper which is bat 
an imperative requisite to obtain 
a right vision into the metaphysics 
of things. 

(7) M&n or Egotism. — This takes the form 

of akankdr or egotistic pedantry 
in one's movements. This sense of 
egotism in one, leads him astray 
from the right path by adding to 
his anger krodha which rudely dis- 
turbs the equanimity of temper. 

(8) Mdya or Hypocrisy — This is a kind of 

double-dealing revealing itself as 
it does in the act of simulating, or 
representing a thing with a motive 
or purpose which is very different 
from what is really in the heart. 

(9) Lobha, Greed or Avarice — This is a 

kind of the inordinate desire of 

507 " 


gaining and possessing wealth and 
the like. In ordinary parlance in 
Bengal even we have 'lobhi p&pa, 
p&pi mrityu! i.e. 'avarice begets 
vice and vice brings on death*. 
It is in^iportant to note here by the way 
— that these last four viz. krodha, m&n, mdyd 
and /o6Aa which combine into kasMya 
or the tie that binds a Jiva down to 
the mires of the world, have been dis- 
cussed with comparative details in our 
Chapter on the Classification of Karmas^^ 
(pages 400-407). 

(10) Rdg, Asakti or Attachment — ^This 

consists in one's being in intense 
love with anything standing 
in the way of moral detachment 
from things worldly. 

(11) Dvisa or Hatred— This is a form of 

bearing ill-will against anything. 
As one should not be in excessive 
love with anything, so he must 
not bear any hatred against any- 
one. Both love and hate are 
impediments in our upward march 
for moral perfection. 



(12) Klesk or Quarrelsomeness — It is a kind 

of vice which displays itself by 
breaking up into pieces the solidari- 
ty of family-life and national life. 

(13) Abhydkskydna or False Accusation — 

This is a kind of slandering by 
spreading false report against any 
one so as to lower him in the esti- 
mation of the public or anyone else. 

(15) Paisunya or Tale-telling — This is also 

a kind of defamation taking the 
forms of caricatures which the 
caricaturists often take recourse to 
by the help of their fertile imagi- 

(16) Rati and Arati or Joy and Grief — This 

consists in being elated with joy 
at success or being sunken with 
grief at the loss of anything. 
Both of these psychological atti- 
tudes are considered as vices in as 
much as they both tell upon the 
normal equanimity of temper of 
the soul. 

(17) Mdyd'Mrisd — This is one of the most 

acute kind of vice of doing im- 



proper things under the garb of 
propriety, or of ostensibly pre- 
senting a fair appearance but 
secretly practising vice or villany ; 
like a courtezan who plays the 
dancing drum in the way of her 
infamous profession yet with 
modesty affected within her veil. 
The import of mdyd-mrisd as 
interpreted by the Jains is fairly 
borne out by the well-known 
Bengali expression ''Ghomtdr dhz- 
tare khemtd ndchA z.e, beating a 
drum within a veil : Khemtd here 
bears the same reputation as the 
cancan does in France. 
(i8) Mithyd darshana shalya or False per- 
ception by psychological parallog- 
ism — This is the last of the eigh- 
teen kinds of the enumerated vices. 
It consists in taking a thing for 
what it is not, or viewing a thing as 
that which it is really not. Mithyd 
Darshan, therefore, is the error 
attatching to the mistaken appre- 
hension of a thing appearing as 



that which it is really not that 
thing. Or in other words, it is the 
putting of the notion of a parti- 
cular thing into that which is not 
that thing. As for example, 
putting the ivotion of a true gttru 
{Sat guru) into that person who 
is not a irxxo^-guru, is mithydtva. 
This Mithydtva is the primary 
root of all evil, all our misery. 
All the practices of mankind,all the 
empiric phenomena of life and 
living are due to this false per- 
ception by subreption — MitJiyd 
Now this Mtthyd darskan, as classified 
by the Jain sages, according to the different 
forms of its appearance, is of various kinds 
which for convenience, have been mainly 
divided into five forms as in the following : — 
(/) Abhigraha Mithydtva — is that under 
the influence of which a jiva 
thinks that his experience of 
a thing and knowledge gathered 
thereof is all right and true, while 
others' experience and knowledge 



of the same thing is false on that 
account. And this conviction is 
so strong that he refuses even to 
test and examine the truth and 
validity of his own experience and 

{ii) Anabhigraha-^i^ that under the 
influence of which a jiva thinks 
that all the different systems of 
religion and culture, however 
contradictory to one another they 
might be, are all true and, therefore, 
every one of them can lead to 
salvation or freedom. 

{Hi} Abhinibesh — is that under the 
influence of which a jiva though 
morally convinced of the errors 
that were involved in his own 
judgment, will still persist in 
enforcing the acceptance of his 
own opinion. Under Abhinibesh, 
a man 'though vanquished will 
argue stilt, 

{iv) Samshaya^s that detrimental influence 
which induces ^.jiva to entertain 
a doubt as to the truth, and 



consistency of the teachings and 
principles of the faith promulgated 
by an Omniscient Victor — /ina, 
(v) AnAbkoga — is that under the negative 
influence of which a jiva loses 
even the faculty to discriminate 
between dharma and its opposite 
and the like, hjiva with derang- 
ed organism labours under the 
influence of AnAbkoga Mithydtva. 
It is important to note here by the 
way that the question as involved in the 
principle of false vision by subreption is 
broad and far reaching in its consequences. 
Therefore, it imperatively requires a more 
detailed treatment at our hands. And this we 
propose to do when we deal with the causes 
o{ Bandha where it will suit us well according 
to the scheme of the development of our 
theme. For the present, however, we believe 
we have been able to make the Jain concep- 
tion of PApa or Vice clear to our readers. 
According to the sages the constituent ele- 
ments involved in PApa^ are False vision by 
subreption, Perversity, and Liberty of Vice or 
Bad-will — all inseparably mingled together. 



Now these are the eighteen forms of 
action in and through which a /iva commits 
WxcQ-pApa by setting up action -currents of 
injury and non-injury {GhAthi and Aghdlin) 
which acting on the soul retard the unfold- 
ment of its infinite psychical possibilities of 
vision {darshan)y knowledge (jndna) and the 
like on the one hand, and on other, deter- 
mine unfavourably the character and con- 
figuration of its manifesting media, its 
duration of life, its localisation in a sphere 
and other physical conditions as con- 
sequences of its own viscious deeds 
of the past. These psychical and physical 
consequences which the jiva has to suffer 
under by dint of its own viscious acts 
are eighty two in number as in the 

a. Darshandvaraniya karma — or the 
action-currents of injury to vision 
which are of nine kinds viz (i) 
Chalcshii ; (2) Achakshtt ; (3) 
Avadhi ; (4) Keval ; (5) NtdrA ; 
(6) Ntdrd-nidra ; (7) Prachld 
(8) Prachld-prachald ; (9) 


Papa, vice or sin, 

b, Jn dndvaraniya karmaS'^or the action- 
currents of injury to knowledge 
which are of five kinds viz, 
(i) mati (2) sruti, (3) abadhi 
and (4) mana-paryaya and (5) 

c, Antardya karnias — or the action- 

currents detrimental to the attain- 
ment of the end in view which are 
of five kinds viz (i) D&na, (2) 
L&hha, (2i) Bhoga^ (4) Upabhoga, 
and fs) Virya. 

d. Mohaniya karmas — or the action-currents 

detrimental to the psychical 
equanimity giving rise to the 
delusion and infatuation of the soul 
which are of twenty-six kinds viz. 
16 kashAyas such as krodha, 
mdna, mdyd and /ob&a together 
with their four sub-clasification 
of each and the nine correlates of 
the kashdyas such as (i) hdsya (2) 
Rait (sJ Aratt(^) Skoka (s) 
Bhaya (6) Jugiipsd (7) Strtveda 
(8) Purusaveda and (<)) Nafiun- 
saka veda. 


e, Vedaniya karma — or action-currents 
sending in sensation of pain 
called Askdid. 

/. Ayus karma — or the action-currents 
determinant of the duration of life 
in Hell {Naraka\ 

g. ' Gotra karma or the action-currents 
determinant of birth in a low 
family {Nicka). 

h, Ndma karmas — or the action-currents 
determinant of names and forms 
and other physical environments 
which combine to give the Jiva its 
physical individuality and singu- 
larity. Of the nama-karmas only 
34 are set in motion by viscious 
deeds of the past vis. — {\) Narak- 
gati {2) Tiryanck gati {2,) Nava- 
kdnufurvi (4) Tiryanckdnupufvt 
(5J Ekenciriya jciti {6) Dwien- 
driya jdti {j) Tirendriya jdti 
(8) Chaturedriya jdti (9-13) five 
samhanan viz {a) Rishava ndrdch, 
ndrach, ardh ndrdch, kiloka and 
Savartu. (14-18^ five sansthd- 
nas viz {a) nydgrodha . {b) sddi 



(c) Vdman (d) Ktibja {cj Hunaak 
(19) Aprasasiha Varna (26) 
Aprasastha Gandha (21) Aprasa- 
siha Rasa (22) Aprasastha 
Sparsha (2^) Upagh&ta {24J 
Kubih&yo goti (25) SthavAr 
("26^ Sukshma (27) Aparyapta 
(28) Sddhdran (29) Asthtra (30) 
Asubka (31) Asubhaga (33) 
Ditswar (j?) Anddeya and (34) 
A pay as ha h'rti. 
These are the eighty two ways in and 
through which a jiva, pays the penalty for 
his committing vices in the past. Thus, if a 
man is an idiot, he must have been then 
labouring under the action-currents of injury 
to knowledge. A short-sighted man must 
be under the influence of chakshu darshand- 
varaniya karma. If a man inspite of the 
presence of necessary requisites at his elbow 
and inspite of his intelligence and industry 
is not able to make profit from the business 
in which he has laid out his whole fortune, 
then it must be understood as due to idbhdn- 
tartaya action-currents set up by him through 
some viscious acts done in the past. 



So if a man becomes deluded and tempted 
into a course of action which he knows to 
be very far from the right conduct, he 
must be understood to have been labourinof 
under the influence of Mohaniya karma. 
Likewise, if a man is found to be experien- 
cing only painful or unpleasant Sensation all 
along the time, he must be taken to be 
under the influence Ashdid vedaniya karma. 
The certain duration of life which a jiva has 
to pass in hell is due to Narakdyu karma 
So is the case with the birth in a low family 
with grovelling surroundings which is due 
to the influence of the Nicha gotra karma. 
Similarly a dwarf to be taken as being under 
the influence of Vdman samasthdn karma. 
If anyone has rough hoarse voice, it must 
be due to Duswar karma. And thus are 
to be accounted for all other defects, draw- 
backs and disadvantages which a jiva may 
possibly labour unden 

Now such is the nature of pdpd-v\ce as 
conceived and interpreted by the Jains ; 
but some writers being unable to see eye to' 
eye with the Jains differ from them and 
interpret human actions in an altogether 



different light. Of course we must agree 
to differ, and when we do so, we must bear 
and forbear. But when definite charges are 
laid at the door of a creed or faith, the 
exponents of the same ought, as in duty 
bound, to examine the same and see if 
they can explain the issues in question. 
In one of her latest issues The Heart of 
JainisMy Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson made 
out a charge that the Jain conception of 
Pdpdy though differing as it does from the 
western conception, is in fact ceremonial 
rather than morale This is no doubt a 
very serious charge that can be levelled 
against any school of thought and culture 
which has a definite system of moral code 
as the legitimate outcome of the most 
subtle metaphysical conclusions. 

The observances and ethical disciplines as 
enjoined in the moral code of the Jains 
seem to her to lack in moral and religious 
character. Others also think they are more 
externals, husks, matters of minor or no 
importance and as such should be stripped 
off, if anyone wished to get straight to the 
kernel. Consistently with this view, there- 



fore, they cannot but apprehend, that these 
external practices or religious observances 
which have become, as they say, fossilised 
into dry ceremonial rites, may at some time, 
grow so as to choke the internal vitality of 
the religion itself and eat away the essence 
of the same. 

So far the moral character of these 
observances is concerned, we have discussed 
it at length both here at the beginning of 
this chapter and elsewhere, and we feel no 
necessity of recapulating them here over 
again. All that we want to show here is that 
the opinion as entertaind by Mrs. Sinclair 
or by others in her line of thinking is the 
revival of the old superficial rationalism as 
well as of no less superficial idealism which 
fail to take account of history and may be 
taken as due to perverted vision of things, 
ideas and ideals. We shall prove this 
by entering, by way of a reply, into a 
study of the psychology of religion, which 
besides corroborating what we have stated 
before will throw an additional flood of 
light on it and bring into clear vision 
of Mrs. Sinclair and her readers that for 


which she was so long groping in the 

To begin with, therefore, by drawing 
attention of our readers to the fact that every 
religion has a subjective and an objective 
side — we may designate them as Religiosity' 
and 'religion'. And it is only in constant 
action and interaction of these two ele- 
ments upon each other that the true 
nature of religion is fully revealed. We 
have also seen, that since the dawn of 
religious consciousness in mankind, a man 
has ever clothed his emotions, his thoughts, 
his aspirations and his sentiments in concep- 
tions andjideas and that he has always ex- 
pressed them in observances and practices. 
Out of the former, grows a religious doc- 
trine,»which, with the progress of civilisation 
and culture, is committed to writing in the 
shapefof sacred connons and creeds ; these 
latter gradually assume the form of common 
religious observances. But for the maintain- 
ance of the doctrine and for preservation of 
the practice in accordance with it, he allies 
himself with kindred spirits, consciously or 
unconsciously, and feels constrained to act in 



accordance with his most cherished convic- 
tions ; otherwise, as psychology reveals, the 
emotions would only pass away, the impres- 
sions would lack in stability, the sentiments 
would prove to be but vague ebullitions, and 
thus his intellect would fail to attain to 
perfect clearness even to himself. Religious 
men, borne out by history and as thinking 
beings, feel the mind as possessed of some 
conception as to their true destiny which will 
satisfy the craving of their hearts, whether 
it is derived from others or thought out by 
themselves — a conception which will satisfy 
their thinking faculty and must necessarily 
flow itself in outward observances, because 
their hearts impel them to do so. Zealous 
for truth, longing for a sense of assurance 
and clearness of insight, they naturally 
translate into outward acts those feelings 
of which their hearts arc full ; for religious 
truth is piety manifesting itself in word and, 
deed, in creed and conceptions, in doctrine 
and observances, and in other works and 
other activities of life. And if this sentiment 
is sincere and fervent, it manifests itself 
in and through a man's whole conduct and 



exerts a decisive influence on his whole 

moral nature. Of course there is no harm in 

admitting the fact that these observances 

are not a proof of religion unless genuine ; 

for they may be mere spurious imitations. 

But it must be also confessed on all hands 

that if a man abstains from all sorts of 

observances, it is a decisive proof that in his 

case his religious need is in a dormant 

state, if it exists at all. We do not of course 

subscribe to the view that all who take part 

in such observances, as handed down to 

them by tradition or scripture, are actuated 

by the same heart-felt needs ; for in this, as 

as in other cases, men's motives may differ 

very widely, but to estimate the value of a 

thing, it is injudicious to confine one's 

attention upon these only. To do this 

we must take into account the psychological 

origin of these. And we believe that 

in the case of Jainism, the root of these 

lies deep in the fact of yearning after 

a state of liberation — a state of beatitude 

and bliss,— a state of omniscience of 

whose sublimity one's imagination has 

ormed a conception, and which he f^cls 



himself inwardly capable of attaining, and 
for which he strives, so far as humanely 
possible more and more to approach. In a 
word, it is the longing of the finite man, who 
feels inwardly that he is more than finite 
that gives rise to these observances. It is 
in the striving and struggle of the individual 
to escape from the turmoils of earthly exis- 
tence — with its petty cares anxieties and great 
sorrows, with its strife and discord, its comp- 
lete immersion in sordid lusts of the world — 
in order that he may breathe a purer and 
freer atmosphere, that its origin should be 
sought for. And when studied in this light, 
we shall be able to winnow from every sort of 
religious observance, however insignificant 
or formal it may appear at first sight, the 
pure grain of religious principle. Those 
who renounce religion altogether, because 
they have become blind to the religious 
element within them may look with superci- 
lious contempt on all observances and 
dub them with the name of superstition or 
formal ceremony or whatever they like, but 
the truth stands oiit no less clear than broad 
day light, that a religion, sprung up from 



the inmost ^yearing of so many hearts and 
reared through renunciation and mortifica- 
tion ever fighting and struggling ^nd ever 
extending her sway, cannot be regarded, 
without the farthest stretch of blind imagina- 
tion as indulging only in meaningless rites or 



Influx — Influx and Bandka — TKcir mutual Relation 
of Receprocity — Causes oi tkc Influx — Mitkyatva', 
' Avtratc , 'Pramada and 'Yoga — Influx, Sukjecttve 
and Objective — Forty-two Ckannels of Influx of tke 
'Krrma-matter into tke Soul. 

Now to come to the Asrava or the third 
of the Jain moral categories. Asrava is the 
influx of the ka^^m a -pair tides into the soul. 
Or it may be said as the acquirement by the 
soul of the finest of the fine ^^r;;^^ -matter 
from without. But the soul does not always 
and invariably take in these karma'm3itttr. 
To do it the soul must be charged with 
certain requisite powers by virtue of which 
it will draw in foreign matters into its 
various chambers ox pradeskas. The requisite 
powers which galvanise the soul to draw in 
matters from without is (i)' miikydtva (sub- 
reption), (2) avirati or attachment (3) 
Kashdya or propensions ; (4) pramdda or 



negligence and {s)yogci' or the functional acti- 
vity of mind, speech and body. The soul 
being affected by these becomes transformed 
into a magnet as it were and attracts karma- 
matter towards it. The psychical condition 
which thus magnatises the soul to attract 
foreign elements is what is termed as 
Bh&vdsrava or the Subjective influx and 
the foreign matter that is actually drawn 
into by the soul to accumulate there in 
the state of sattd, is called Dravydsrava 
or the Objective influx which results ulti- 
mately into the bondages {handkan) of the 
soul. But the question is, Could there 
be any dsrava in the absence of any 
bondage.'^ If bondage is held to be 
anterior to dsrava^ then bondage cannot be 
taken as a consequent of dsrava which is 
its cause in as much as the effect which has 
something anterior to it as its cause cannot 
come to be without the cause, for it is the 
cause that passes into the effect. 

Indeed ! But there is no such contradic- 
tion as exposed in the above objection in the 
interpretation we put in to explain the causal 
relativity between dsrava and bandha, 



Asrava and Bandha, both are mutually related 
to each other as cause and effect. Asrava is 
not only the antecedent cause of bondage 
but the consequent as well of a still anterior 
bondage : and so is the case with bondage 
also. And this does not amount to moving 
in the vicious circle of cause and effect on 
account of their eternal continuity like the 
seed and the tree. 

Now the objective influx is always in 
proportion to the strength and intensity 
of the subjective influx. The stronger and 
more intense the subjective, the quicker is 
the objective inflow and consequently the 
heavier is the load of karma on \}(\^jiva to 
cast off. But the subjective condition which 
makes influx possible is not the same with 
all the souls — though all souls are essentially 
the same. The subjective conditions of the 
different souls vary with the variation in the 
intensity and protensiveness of mithy&tva, 
avirdti^ kaskdya, pramdd and yoga which 
the different souls become variously charged 
with to draw in foreign elements and 
thereby forge fresh links for their bondages. 
The intensity and protensiveness of these 


beginning with mithydlva constituting the 
psychical condition which makes influx again 
possible are determined by puny a d^wApdfia 
as practised by a jiva in the past ; for, 
as we have explained already, pApa and 
punya reveal themselves in and through a 
man's desires and deeds and a man's thoughts 
and desires in one life build his character, 
tendencies and capacities for the next. A 
strong desire along certain lines that remains 
entirely unfulfilled in one life, will produce 
a capacity along those lines for the next. 
By dwelling constantly upon a certain 
thought, a man sets up a particular tendency 
and if he fails to carry it out, he will surely 
do it in a subsequent life. And just as 
a man's desire and thoughts and the like 
build up his character, tendency, capacity and 
the like for the next : so his actions and 
deeds in one life will produce his surround- 
ings and circumstances, opportunities and 
advantages for the next. 

However, the influsc (dsrava) of karma- 
matter into the soul has been very often 
compared to the flowing of waters into the 
pond. Just as waters flow into a pond 


~ 67 


through various pours and channels in the 
earth and accumulate there ; so through a 
variety of pours and channels in \k\^jivic 
organism, karma flows into the soul and 
accumulate there to bind it down to sansdr. 
And this explains why according to the 
nature and character of the various channels 
in the /mV organism, the Jain sages have 
classified the influx (dsrava) into forty- two 
kinds ; namely, five sense-organs [Indriyas) ; 
four propensions {kaskdyas) ; five avratas 
or the non-keeping of the vows, twenty- 
five kriyds or works and three j^'^^<^^ or the 
functional activities of mind, speech and 

Of these forty-two ways, the easiest 
ones for the ^^rm^-matter to flow into the 
soul, are the five sense-organs viz., the 
ear, the eye, the nose, the taste and the 
touch. To take the case of the ear {kdna), 
for example, karma flows into the soul 
through the sense of hearing i.e.y through 
our listening to the sonorous songs which 
may ultimately delude the jiva from the 
righteous path. How often do we find men 
ektremely devoted to music lose all sense of 



right and wrong and thus fall away from the 
right conduct. So is the case with the eye 
{ckakshu) through the lust of which karma 
flows into the soul ; for, instances are not 
wanting in our every-day life to show how 
they get themselves entangled into the 
snares of the world by lustfully gazing on 
art or young women which in the long run 
charm them away from the right path. 
Kavmas also flow into the soul through the 
other senses in the same way by setting up 
vibratory action-currents running towards 
the soul. 

Next come the four kashdyas or propen- 
sions in and through which karma also 
flows into the soul ; namely, anger {krodka), 
mdna (conceit), mdyd (hypocrisy) and /o6Aa 
(greed). Indulgence in any one of these 
me^ns perverting the right vision into the 
metaphysics of things and thereby falling 
away from right conduct which can only pro- 
ceed from the right knowle4ge of things 
and ideals. 

Then there are the Avratas by dint of 
which karma flows into the soul. Avrata 
means non-abstention from doing prohibited 



actions. The five prohibitions which go 
by the name of the five great vows (pancha 
mokdvratas) are, (i) not to kill life (prAnd- 
lipdt viraman vraia) ; (ii) not to tell lies 
(mrtshdvada viraman vrata) ; (iii) not to 
steal and the like (adattdddn viraman vrata)\ 
(iv) not to be covetous (parigraha viraman 
vrata) ; (v) not to indulge in sexual congress 
(maithuna viraman vrata). These are the 
five great prohibitions which are enjoined 
on the jiva to observe for avoidance of 
influx of karma'm?XX,^x into the soul ; 
because so vicious, relentless and keen 
IS the law of karma to flow into soul that 
the moment an inlet is created by the jiva 
through a single and simple act of omission 
in the observance of these vows, the influx 
of ^^r;;^^- matter will at once take place ? 

Next in order are the kriyds (works or 
actions) which are five and twenty kinds 
through which karma also flows into the soul. 
These kriyds are, — 

(i) Kdyiki kriya — means the bodily move- 
ments through the carelessness of 
which an evil karma may flow 
into the soul. 


(2) Adkikaraniki — means the use of instru- 

ments or weapons through the 
careless handling of which evil 
karma flows in by hurting another. 

(3) Pradosha-^m^dins action originating 

from the excessive predominance 
of anger and the like. 

(4) Parit&paniki — means the action done 

in intentionally causing grief and 
sorrow to another. 

(5) Prdndlipdtaki — means the action which 

crushes out the life-energies of an 

(6) Arambkaki — means the action done in 

tilling the ground which might 
injure 2.jiva, 

(7) P&rigrahaki — means work originating 

from the excessive earning and 
hoarding of wealth ; for at times 
enormity of oppulence leads to 
various evils. 

(8) Mdyd pratyaiaki — means work born of 


(9) Mithyd darshan pratyaiaki— mt2i\\% 

actions due to subreptive vision 
into the nature of things. 



do) Apratyakskydniki — means works ori- 
ginating from not-controlling the 
propensions or kashdyays. 

(i i) Drisiiki — refers to works due to inten- 
sely gazing at Jiva or Ajiva with 
love or hatred. 

(i 2) Spristiki — action originating from actu- 
ally touching women, children &c. 
with attachment. 

(13) Pratityaki — means works originating 

as a consequent of the sinful 
desire for a Jiva or Ajiva enter- 
tained in the previous birth. 

( 1 4) Sdmantopanipdtikd — works originating 

from listening to the praise of 
one's son, brother, pupils or his 
other earthly belongings. 

(15) N a'tsprisiiki — means the works done 

in compulsion or in sheer obe- 
dience to the strict order of the 

(16) Svahastiki^-^mt,2.ViS the action perform- 

ed by one's own hand in the 
execution of a particular end. 

(17) Angndpaniki — means activities born 

of the metaphysical conclusions 



drawn by one in ignorance of the 
philosophy as taught by the 
(i8) Vaiddraniki — means works due to 
defacing or breaking any image 
of reverence and worship. 

(19) Andbkogiki — means activities born of 

discharging organic emissions any 
where without looking about the 
place thoroughly well. 

(20) Anavakdnkshd pratyaiki — is the works 

due to the disregard to and dis- 
belief in the effectiveness of the 
laws of life and conduct as pro- 
mulgated by ihQJina. 

(21) Prayoga — works born of not con- 

trolling mind, speech and bodily 
movements in the manner as 
taught in the Jain scriptures. 

(22) Samuddn — works due to the opening 

out of all the channels of the body 
through which karma may flow 
in at a time. 

(23) Prema-pratya — work due to the 

influence of deceit and greed as 



(24) Dvesha-pratyayiki — works springing 

from the co-operation of conceit 
and anger. 

(25) Iry&patha — action done in walking 

specially in the walks of the dis- 
passionate and the retired. 
These are the five and twenty kinds of 
works in and through which liarma-v[i'eXX,^x 
may flow into the soul : besides these 
there are the three yogas of mind, speech 
and body, i.e., from the functional activities 
of these three, karma also flows into soul 
and stick to it in the state of SattA. 



BanJlta — Its Classi£tatton— Posstktltttes ox Banana 
— Refutation of tke TKeory of ParalUUsm anJ^ 
Oufthsm BanJka ts wttkout begtnntng — Causes of 
BandKa — Mitkyatva or Sul>ret>tton — OeJRmtton of 
Sul>reJ>tion — Forms and Ktnds of Sul>rcJ>tion — Posst- 
btltttes of Sul>rct>tton — PsycKology and Pk%toso|>Ky of 

In the preceeding pages we have seen 
what the Jains mean by Asrava or Influx. 
Influx is the flowing of the Karmct- 
currents into the soul. And when the 
Karma particles which have flowed into 
the soul coalesce with the same, it is called 
Bandha or bondage. It is the interpene- 
tration, as it were, into each other's spheres 
of soul and Karma-m2X\.^x making both 
appear as self-same with each other. And 
like Asrava, this Bandha, which is but 
another name for the self-sameness of the 
soul and Karma-va^iXX^x, is also distinguish- 
ed into Bkdva (subjective) and Dravya 




The psychical condition which keeps 
the soul in a particular disposition so as to 
combine with Karma into a self-sameness 
as it were with the soul is called BkAba- 
bandha or Subjective bondage and the real 
Karma'm2X\.^x which flowing into the soul 
stands in relation of Identity {Tadatama 
sa7nbandha) as it were with the soul is called 
Dravya-handha or Objective bondage. 

Now according to the nature and charac- 
ter in and through which it displays itself in 
the phenomena of our life and thought, this 
bandha is classified into four kinds ; viz., — 
(A) Prakriti Bandha— Th^ word Prakriti 
here refers to the Karma pra- 
kriiis, of which there are in all, one 
hundred and fifty eight kinds. For 
convenience sake, these have been 
reduced into eight fundamental 
classes, four of which beginning 
with Darshandvaraniya Karma 
are called Ghdtin Karma or the 
Action-currents of Injury and ^he 
remaining four are Agh&tin or the 
Action-currents of Non-injury. 
Now when on the one hand these 


eight fundamental kinds o( Karmas 
classified into Gkdtin and Agkdtin 
(for a detailed discussion of which 
the reader is refered to our 
chapter on the Classification of 
Karmas,) and the soul on the 
other interpenetrate into each 
others spheres appearing thereby 
as self-same with each other, it is 
called Prakriti bandha, 
(B) Stkiti Bandha — The word Sthttt 
means here protentiveness. The 
The sages hold that all the differ- 
ent kinds of Karma which get 
into the soul and remain there in 
relation of identity {Tdddlma sam- 
bandh) with it, do not stand there 
in this relation for all time to 
come. They often fall away and 
thus break off their relationship 
with the soul ; but they do not 
fall off all at a time. Accordinor to 
certain causes and conditions some 
fall off while others yet remain there 
standing in the same relation. And 
when we speak with reference to 


AN Epitome of jainism, 

the duration of the existence of this 
relation between the soul and the 
/Carma-mditttr, we call it Sthiti 

(C) Anubh&ga Bandha — Anubhdga here 

means 'quality and intensity.' some 
Karmas which stick fast to the 
soul are sharp and acute so much 
so that the angularities of their 
character cannot be easily rubbed 
off. When we speak of bandha with 
reference to its intensity we look 
at it from the stand point of Anu- 

(D) Pradesha Bandha — Pradesha means 

parts. Karma is ponderable sub- 
stance : so it must have parts and 
the minutest part which does not 
admit of any division is called anu 


or atom. A Karma prakritt 
consists of such innumerable atoms 
and when we speak of bandha 
with reference to the number of 
atoms covering the pradeshas of 
the soul, we are said to view it 
from the stand point of Pradesha 



bandha i e,, from quantitative stand 

Such are the four different view-points 
from which Bandha (bondage) can be 
studied. As we have just seen, Bandha, is 
coalesence of the soul and /^ar#/a- matter, 
like milk and water, in which both the 
different elements entering into a relation 
of identity as it were with each other, 
{tddatma sambandha) seem to lose their 
respective differences and appear as one 
organic whole. 

But \\\e prima facie objection that is rais- 
ed to the possibilities of the bandha of the 
soul as hinted at in the above is this : The 
soul is not karma-mSiiiQr, nor karma-mRttcr 
the soul : The two are radically opposed to 
and distinct from each other : how then 
could soul and matter be so fused together 
into an identitcal whole as we find in the cases 
of organic life ? The instance of milk and 
water cited by way of analogy does not hold 
good here ; for they are both patcdgalic in 
essence and therefore chemical action and 
reaction is possible between them. But the 
soul and h rma, there being nothing common 


An epitome of JAIN!SM, 

between them, how would it be possible that 
they should mutually enter into a relation 
of identity (tdddtma sambandha) which is 
defined to be the state Bandha ? 

True, reply the Jains. The Cogitative 
substance going by the names of soul, self &c., 
IS the subject [^BhoktA, kartd) and the Non- 
cogitative substance or non-soul, not-self, is 
the object {Bhogya-drishyd), And they being 
radically opposed to each other, it is impossi- 
ble indeed to demonstrate the fusion not only 
of the subject and the object, having for their 
respective spheres the connotations of /or 
the Ego and 'Tu or the Non-^^o but of 
their respective attributes as well into a kind 
of mutual self-sameness with each other 
respectively as we find in the phenomena 
of life and thought. But the fact of there 
being such a fusion cannot be denied ; and 
it is from this fusion that there originates the 
tendency in our ordinary parlance to say — / 
am lean, this is mine and the like — a proce- 
dure of speech having for its basis a fusion 
due to w/Z^^^/^'^-subreption in the main 
with respect to subject and object and their 
respective attributes. 



One may indeed enquire as to what is 
this subreption (ntithydtva) by which they 
not only identify soul with karma-x^\^L\.\.^x 
and vice versa matter with soul but their 
respective attributes as well. 

As we remarked already, it is the putting 
of the notion of something observed else- 
where into something else present in the 
vision which is not that thing. Various 
schools of philosophy have defined this 
subreption {fnitkydtva) in various ways. As 
for instance, the Naiydyikas define it as 
the assumption of the possession of con- 
trary attributes in the very thing super- 
imposed upon another thing. The Pra- 
bhdkar school of philosophy explains it 
as the error {bhrama) attaching to mis- 
taken apprehension of the super-imposed 
thing for the thing super-imposed on. 
According to the Buddhist school, it 
is the assumption of something else's 
attributes to a thing ; while Shankar, the 
pseudo- Buddhist define, it to be the appear- 
ance of what has been seen previously in 
something else (elsewhere), taking the form 
of recollection. 



Now whatever might be the psychology 
and the fine rationale underlying the subtle 
differences and distinctions between these 
various definitions, all the schools agree to 
recognize it as the putting of the notion of 
something into something else before him 
which is not that thing and this is what we 
call Subreption {mithydtva) by which the 
body and soul are fused together into 
an identical whole from which we have 
the instinctive tendency to say i am 
tall and lean,' 'the child is mine' and the 
like in the movements of our empirical 
thought and life. Were it otherwise, it 
would have been impossible for us to be 
aggrieved at the loss of our dear ones or 
to be sorry in their sorrows and afflictions. 
And the sages hold that it is this bandha 
or combination of body and soul into an 
identical whole due to subreption (mithydtva) 
which is the primary and other secondary 
causes and conditions such as kashayas and 
the like that is the root of all our Sansdr 
and miseries. 

But still the possibilities of the bondage 
of the soul by subreption and the like is not 



made clear. Indeed we understand what is 
meant by subreption {milky diva). But is it 
possible for us to put the notions of the object 
and its accidents into the self which is not an 
object of knowledge ? Object of knowledge 
(vishaya) and Subject (viskayee i.e., non- 
object) are not only two distinct substance 
but also the accidents of the one are radically 
opposed to the accidents of the other. Such 
being the case how are we to account for the 
alleged subreption of the two incommensurate 
entities in as much as subreption as just dis- 
cussed is possible only where there is some 
thing common between the two factors under 
subreption. It is just because there is a kind 
of unity between one object and another that 
we put by subreption the notion of the one 
into another object. But between the body and 
the soul, there being no unity of any kind, 
the question of subreption of the two cannot 
come in at all, specially when, according 
to the Jain metaphysics, the soul or the self, 
from the transcendental point of view {nisckaya 
naya) is of the nature of pure consciousness 
or knowledge itself {vide Atrnd-pravAdpurva), 
Aforteriori^ therefore, the self cannot be the 




object of knowledge and hence the notion 
of the Not-self cannot be put into the self 
which is knowledge or consciousness itself. 

Then again it is not true that the notion 
of one object can always and invariably be 
put into another object whereever the latter 
might happen to be. The fact is that by 
subreption (mithydtva) we put the notion of 
some object already observed elsewhere into 
another object which is situate before us. 
To illustrate by example, when we put 
the notion of silver into the mother of pearl 
lying before us, we have an object into which 
the notion of silver is put by subreption and 
which has an existence quite distinct and 
separate from us and before us whence it 
follows that it is into an object situate before 
him that any one puts the notion of another 
object observed by him previously elsewhere. 
But in the case of bondage, how is it possible 
to put the notion of the body into the self 
filled in us from within : for this self is our 
inward self and how can it be said to have a 
separate existence situated before us ; rather 
it transcends all the connotations of the non- 
€F0 as being not an object of knowledge. 



But all these agrumentations as urged 
against the possibility of the combination of 
the self and the other into an organic whole 
do not hold good here. It is true in fact that 
subreption consisting as it does in the putting 
of the notion of something already observed 
elsewhere into something else present in the 
vision, is only possible between the different 
objects of knowledge ; but then the self is 
intuitively perceived as constitutional with 
us and as such it is the object of our intros- 
pection. And further more because the self 
is admitedly the object of the connotation 
of the /, it is also present in our vision as 
such. And this accounts for the combina- 
tion of the self and the other by subreption 
into an organic whole. 

Indeed as contended the self which is 
in reality {nisckaya naya) of the nature of 
pure consciousness and luminous of itself is 
not an object of knowledge ; and as such it is 
neither fettered nor tainted with any of the 
blemishes ; neither it is in reality the agent of 
any deed not the enjoyer of any fruits thereof. 
But in such combination by subreption as 
of the self and the other, the same self 




by reason of its manifesting itself as it does 
through the other, the media of the organ- 
ism and the senses, becomes, as it were, 
the object of introspection as well as of the 
connotation of the / and thereby appears 
as the Jiva, the doer of deeds and enjoyer 
of the fruits of thereof. It is due to this 
subreption that the self-same spirit appears 
both as the agent and enjoyer as well as the 
object of the connotation of the /. Of 
course to be the agent or enjoyer of some- 
thing, the self must have the energy to 
work and enjoy, and it might be contended 
that it is impossible with self, because of its 
being of the nature of pure consciousness 
to be as such. True as these energies are 
inherent in the mind-stuff which is bereft 
of intelligence and intellectuality ; but it 
must be understood that in the combination 
by subreption of the self and the other, 
into an organic whole, the self-same spirit 
acquires somehow the energies to work as 
well as to enjoy the fruits thereof and appear 
as the Jiva. 

But some will however remark that this 
is but arguing in a circle. For, to say that 



the subject differentiates into object by sub- 
reption and that subreption is due to differen- 
tiation is to be guilty of moving in the viscious 
circle of reasoning and hence the possibi- 
lity of the subreption of the self and th« 
other combining thereby into an organic unity 
is inadmissible. But the Jains repudiate 
the charge altogether ; since it involves 
a causal receprocity as implied in the 
causality subsisting between the seed and 
the tree — a fact of common experience. 
The fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum 
is indeed condemnable in metaphysical 
speculations drawing conclusions which have 
no analogous cases in the field of actual 
experience for verification. It is a fact of 
common experience that from the seed 
sprouts forth the tree and the tree from 
the seed again and so on ad^infinitunt. 
And as this does not involve the fallacy 
of regrestis ad infunitiim so no such thing 
is involved in the statements when we say 
that the combination in question is due to 
subreption and subreption again is due to com- 
bination and so on ad-infinitum. This is how 
the Jains say that 'mithy&tva or subreption is 



without beginning. And in fact it i$ acknow- 
ledged on all hands who has recognised the 
truth of the teaching that freedom consists 
in the realization of the self as absolutly free 
from what is alien to it. In other words 
every system of thought which finds the 
bondage to be due to subreption holds out 
the hope of liberation by the destruction of 
the cause of subreption by knowledge. 

However it is pretty clear that each 
case of subreption is invariably preceeded 
by another subreption leaving its risiduum 
in the form of lesyas or tints as its 
consequences colouring and magnatising 
the soul whence its follows that the self 
which was the object of previous subreption 
becomes the integrating principle in a 
subsequent combination by subreption ; for 
in such a combination there is always pre- 
supposed a unifying principle which must 
refer to itself at each step it takes in the 
processes of combination, since without 
such a principle referring to itself there can 
be no synthesis at all. 

And now the question is : what is this 
integrating principle ? It is the /iva, fivAtman 



or the empirical ego revealing itself as it 
does in the unity of self-consciousness. The 
underlying unity of self-consciousness fulfils 
all the conditions of an integrating and dis- 
criminating agency without which we cannot 
conceive of any other unity as involved in 
the mutual relation of factors under sub- 
reption. For, empirically speaking, in order 
to be, an object must be distinguished from 
other objects but there can be no distinction 
unless the object distinguished and those 
from which it is distinguished are held to- 
gether by a single unifying principle, the 
JMtman, The various Karma bargan&s 
are so many external things existing by 
virtue of their mutual determinations. Now 
each of these must be present to an integra- 
ting principle which holds them together 
and opposes them to one another as we find 
in the case organisms. It is clear enough 
that this combining principle cannot be in 
reality any of the objects held together and 
distinguished from each other. That which 
distinguishes must be above, though implied 
in those things that are distinguished. In 
other words the combining principle, must 



trenscend and be equally present as well 
to the objects combined and it is by subrep- 
tion {miihyAtva) and the like causes and 
conditions that we lose sight of the transen- 
dental aspect of the sdf, the integral nature 
of which is the empirical aspect of the same. 



Sam vara clasi:fic<l into Pky steal ana Psycliical : — 
^Vitk Samvar begtns tlie f^^^actical morality — Swaraj 
tkc ultimate End — Fifty seven kinds or Samvar — Five 
Samitis, tkree Gu^tis, Ten rules or Ascetisisn,, — 
Twelve Bkavanas, Twenty six Pariskakas and Five 

From what precedes it is pretty clear 
that all our poverty and degradation, all 
our sorrows and afflictions are due to dsrava 
and bandha caused by subreption {mithyd- 
tva and the like). Fresh dsravas forge 
fresh links of handhan of the soul which is 
constitutionally free and potentially divine. 
We have also seen elsewhere that in order 
to manifest this constitutional freedom and 
essential divinity of the soul, a jiva must 
shake off all karma- xwa.xx^x which being alien 
to its real nature works as a veil of ignorance 
to prevent the unfoldment of right vision 
into the verities of life and living leading to 
right-knowledge without which right conduct 
in the empirical life and thought ultimately 
crowning its efforts with a free and beatific 




state of being, a swardjya, a self-rule, an 
autonomy, for all time to come. 

But the question is, how can the soul be 
freed from the snares [pdsh) of karma ? how 
can the veil of ignorance be removed? 
The Jain processes of purging the soul out 
all karma-mdXiQv, of renting the veil of ne- 
science and the like jndna-darshan-Avara- 
nddis hiding thejiva from the knowledge of 
its own real nature begins with what is termed 
as Samvara, With samvara, the fifth principle 
of the Jain moral categories, begins the most 
practical side of the Jain moral philosophy. 
It is true that the ultimate end of all the 
different systems of thought and culture 
on this side of the Eastern Hemisphere, 
is Freedom. And the nature of this freedom 
has been variously conceived and defined 
by the different schools of philosophy. But 
with the Jains it means Swardj\ self-rule, or 
autonomy pure and simple. Swardj or self- 
rule in every department of life and activity 
is the Ideal of the Jain system of thought 
and culture. Subjection to anything alien 
being recognised as the true characteristic 
irfsignia of servitude both here and hereafter, 



the Jain sages have deemed it wise to 
lay down for the aspirants to Swardj 
and for the good of humanity in general, a 
few rules and canons, movements along the 
lines of which will surely enable the^Vz;^ to 
realize the Ideal by the removal of the aliens 
standing in the way. Of these rules of life^ 
comes first the samvar which is nothing 
more than practically putting a stop to the 
influx of foreign elements into the consti- 
tution of th^jiva. 

Like Asrava and Bandha, Samvara is 
also analysable into Subjective {Bkava) and 
Objective (Dravya). By Subjective samvar, 
we mean the kind of conscious and volun- 
tary striving, mental and moral, along 
certain lines, on the part of the jiva, to 
arrest the influx partially or wholly whereas 
Objective samvar means the actually 
shutting up of the channels against further 
influx of fresh Karma-matter into the 
constitution of \hejiva. 

Now the lines along which a jiva should 
strive and struggle for the gradual effectua- 
tion of samvara are of fifty-seven kinds ; 
viz , (A) Five Samitis. (B) Three Guptis, 



(C) Ten-fold Yati-dharma. (Dj Tw^elve 
Bhdvands. (Y.) Twenty-six Pariskahas, 
(F) and Five Chdrttras*^i]ms making up 
fifty-seven kinds in all. 

(A) The five Samitis — Samiti means the 
voluntary movements of the jiva in perfect 
accordance with the Agamas — The samiti\ 
is resolvable into five- fold ways as in the 

(i) Iry& Samiti — means cautious and care- 
ful walking, so as not to hurt any 

one. But this is practically impos- 
sible. A slight movement from 
one side to another will surely 
kill many a life. Indeed ! but 
one should be very careful to 
'walk in a manner as would cause 
the least possible injury to life. 
Irydi samiti is imperatively en- 
joined on the monks who must 
take special care to examine the 
ground before he steps' out any- 
where. He must not plod through 
grassy fields ; but should take him- 
self to high-ways fully illumined by 
the scorchingr ays of the sun and 


riot much frequented by human 
beings of either six : for in wend- 
ing his way through these sun- 
bathed highways with careful 
steps, if any^zz;^ is killed unwarily, 
the sin begotten in consequence 
thereof would not materially affect 
him in as much as the merit he 
acquires by his deliberately taking 
every precaution for not injuring 
any sentient being outweighs and 
counteracts thereby the demerit 
that accrues from the unintentional 
killing of the invisible germs and 
animalcules on the path. Such is 
the character of the first samiti 
known by the name oi IryA, 
(ii) Bkdsd samiti— This means careful 
movements of the tongue. One 
should never make any foul use 
of the tongue as is done in the 
case of filthy speaking, abusing, or 
using harsh strong words against 
any one so as to wound his 
feeling. This is how the tongue 
is to be guarded. 


An epitome of JAIN ism. 

(ill) EskanA samiti — As hdiA-karma may 
flow into the constitution of the 
jiva through the kind of food one 
' takes in, so one should be speci- 
ally careful about his meals. A 
Sddhu should never take in any 
food that is some away or other 
spoiled with forty-two defects. 

(iv) Addnnikskepa samiti — This means 
that one should take special care 
in the selection of seats to sit on, or 
in putting on garments, or in using 
the utensils so that no jiva might 
be injured thereby. 

(v) Pdrisatapannd samiti — This is but a 
precautionary measure that di sddhu 
should adopt in throwing out un- 
healthy organic elements from his 
constitution. A sadhu should not, 
for instance, spit out anywhere and 
everywhere in as much as it may 
' affect olhtYJivas swarming in the 
place he might spit on. 
These are the five samitis which are 

enjoined on the lay people in general and on 

the Jain monks in particular to observe in 


their daily lie. The imperative character 
of their importance becomes clearly evident 
when we direct our attention to questions 
of the relation of hygiene and baccilus. The 
modern baccilus theory of diseases which 
have often been declared as contagious, 
explain the scientific character of the above 
five injunctions, specially with respect to 
the monks who have to move about from 
village to village, from city to city excepting 
the period of Chdturmdsya or the four 
months of the rainy season when they are 
forbidden to visit place after place. 

(B) Now the three Gnptis : Having 
regulated the externa! movements of d^jiva 
in such a way as would help hira to arrest 
comparatively the influx of karmuy the sages 
have deemed it wise to lay down further 
rules for controlling his inner nature. Of 
these guptts or the processes of controlling 
the inner nature of 2,jiva we have first, 
(i) Manogupti which means the controlling 
of the mind. If mind is not control- 
led and regulated at will to work 
in a particular direction, nothing 
great can be achieved. So the 



first thing one should try to do 
is to control the mind which 
could be done in three ways : 
viz., — 

(a) Asatkalpandviyo^i — which means that 
one should not give himself up 
to excessive grief and the like at 
the demise of anyone dear to him 
or at the loss of anything. One 
should reflect within himself that 
all the pleasures of life and living 
are only temporal : they come and 
go like the fleeting clouds so there 
is nothing permanent to be gained 
thereof for the well-being of the 
soul which must strive and strug- 
gle on and on till the Highest- 
Good is realised. 

(J)) Samatd-bkdvini — means continuous 

thinkinp alone^ certain line that will 
bring on the equanimity {samatA) 
of the mind. He must try to 
realise that for a mumukshin jivay 
both love and hate, pain and 
pleasure, have no value ; for both 
are but chains, one of gold and the 



other of ore, which subject the 
jiva to go round and round the 
wheel of births and deaths. More- 
over unless this equanimity of 
mind is attained, a jiva cannot 
expect to have a right vision into 
the metaphysics of ideas and ideals 
without which the veil of mitkyA- 
tva cannot be torn asunder. 

(c) Atmdramatd — means 'Introspection' or 
Self-reflection. By this the mu- 
muksku jiva draws in the powers 
of his mind from the extra- 
mental world and concentrates the 
same upon the soul to study the 
different pftises it passes through. 
Thus it gradually creates an apathy 
to the things of temporal charac- 
ter by a comparative arrest of 
the influx and enhances the ardent 
desire for a speedy deliverance 
from the turmoils of the life of 

(ii) Vachan-gupti — means controlling the 
speech which can be accomplished 
in two ways, viz, — 




{a) By taking a vow of silence {mou- 

n&balambi) for a certain period 

during which the muTVtuksha 

jiva should never open ps lips. 

Or by 

(3) Vdkmyami — regulating his tongue only 

to move on imperative occasions, 
(iii) Kdya-gupH—mtd^ns controlling the 
physical organism by the mumu- 
kshu jiva in accordance with the 
various rules and regulations as 
laid down in the scriptures. 
Now from the characteristic indications 
of all the three guptis^ it is apparent 
that they are meant to help a jiva in 
the arrest of his kaf^mic inflow ; for all 
these act as an antedote to the poisons 
of temptations which the world abounds 

(C) The Ten-fold Duties of the Monk. 
A monk can well stop the influx of 
karma by acting in consistent with the 
ten duties enjoined on the human species 
specially on monks and they are, 
(i) KshamA — Forgiveness. There is nothing 
like the maxim 'forget and forgive, 





The spirit of forgiveness helps 

a great way to control anger 

which eats into the moral vitals 

of the mumukshin. It is by 

virtue of forgiveness that Christ 

Jesus of Nazereth was a Christ 

Jesus ; for do we not remember ^- 

the soul stirring exclamation from 

the cross "Father, father, forgive 

them for they know not what 

they do." 

(ii) MArdava — Humility, — There is nothing 

like it to subdue pride and 

arrogance. Arrogance deteriorates 

the mind and vitiates the right 

vision. An arrogant nian cannot 

look into the real utility and 
necessity of things or discriminate 

between the right and the wrong 

whereas an humble man awakens 

active sympathy in those with 

whom he comes in contact to his 

own advantage and sees into the 


(iii) Arjava — Simplicity, The maxim 

Simplicity pays best yields to 



none in its intrinsic merit. It 
serves to keep the mind free 
from bias without which light of 
truth cannot well be reflected in 
the heart. It adds to the courage 
of conviction and helps in the pre- 
servation of veracity of character. 

(iv) Nirlobkatd — Greedilessne^s. Greed 
begets sin and sin begets death. 
Greediness increases attachment, 
makes the jiva extremely egotis- 
tic and narrowly selfish so much so 
that he knows himself only and 
looks to his own interests whither 
you go to the wall or not. 

(v) Tapas^- Austerity, Cultivation of auste- 
rity as laid down in scriptures 
helps the jiva to have a control 
over his lower passions to 
chasten the mind, and to soften 
the heart. 

(v\) Samyama—^^sXx'dAVits of the senses, 
the speech and the mind, is the 
primary conditions for every 
moral growth and intellectual 
expansion : 



(vii) Satya or Truthfulness, It is born of 
the love of truth which must be 
the goal of every human endea- 
vour. Adherence to truth in 
every act of life and thought 
often helps to walk straight with 
head erect and steer clear of the 
rocks and shoals which the 
passage across the ocean of 
Samsdr abounds with. 

(viiij Saucha — Purity or Personal cleanli- 
ness. It includes the cleanliness 
' of both mind and body. We 
must not only guard our thoughts 
well and keep them pure but 
should as well keep our person 
clean, for mind and body act and 
react on each other. 

^ix) Akinchanatva — Renunciation. Culti- 
vation of the spirit of renunciation 
is a safeguard to the above moral 
requisites and raises a jiva from 
the lower level of grovelling life. 

(x^ Brahmacharya—Q\\^.sK\X,y» It means 
not only restraining the senses 
and the lower appetites but free- 



ing the mind from erotic thoughts 
of every sort and kind. 
(D) The Bhdvand — Next comes the 
bhdvand or reflection or thinking within 
one's own self as to the real nature and 
and character origin, use and utility of 
something else. Constant thinking of this 
nature, wakes up in the mind of the thinker, 
a knowledge of the intrinsic value of the 
object thought upon and helps him to avoid 
such things as would stand in his way to the 
realisation of the object or end he has 
in view or remove obstacles from his path- 
ways to perfection — the be all and end all of 
our life and thought. 

Such being the nature bhdvand or self- 
reflection, the Jain sages has classified 
it in twelve kinds for a mmnukshin soul 
as stepping stones to higher things and they 
are as in the following, — 
(i) Anitya bhdvand — Anitya means non- 
permanent. Anitya bhdvand-^ 
therefore means the thinking of 
the non-permanent character of 
things. Things transitory can 
not have any absolute value to a 



fmimukshin soul whose permanent 
interest lies in the realisation of 
the self. For all the relative con- 
ditions of existence which appear 
to be imperative in our empirical 
life and thought, are but so many 
fleeting clouds that come and go 
to dazzle or darken our vision. 
Beginning with such reflection on 
the temporary and perishable cha- 
racter of things, a mumukshin soul 
comes to feel within the inmost 
recesses of his heart, that the real 
permanent good is the freedom 
of the soul which must be raised 
from the mires of this transitory 
world : for health, wealth, beauty, 
strength and the like are but 
guilded shams which only hypno- 
tize the mind and tie the soul 
down to samsdr, 
(2) Asaran bhdvand — means the reflection 
on the helpless condition of a jzva 
in this world of phenomena. 
Really dijiva is without any one 
here to push him on to mokska, 



All his friends, relations and dear 
ones may wish him well, may pray 
for a long lease of his life on earth ; 
but no body can save him from 
sinking deep into the bottomless 
ocean of Samsdr which he as a 
mumukskin desires to get rid of. 
In this -vein a jiva must think on 
and on to realise within himself 
the absolutely helpless condition of 
his own in this Sansdr and there- 
fore must strain his own nerves 
and thus strive to get rid of it by 
his own power and resolute will. 
(3) Sansdr bhdvand — Sansdr is full of 
sorrows and sufferings. What we 
ordinarily call pleasure is only pain 
in another form. Miseries and afflic- 
tions permeate as it were every 
strata of Sansdr, In this theatre 
of the world, we are but so many 
actors and actresses playing our 
parts only for the time being after 
which we shall have to bid good- 
bye to all we hold dear to us ; so 
no use forming an attachment for 



these transitory trivials and know- 
ing them as such one should turn 
his face against them and seek for 
the im7nutable state of being and 
(4) Ekatva bhdvanA — Alone I came into 
the world and alone I will have 
to depart from hence. Alone do 
I work and alone shall I have to 
reap the consequences thereof. 
None of my dear ones will take off 
or unload me of my Icarma and 
set me free or give me a short 
relief; nor can they save me 
from the consequences of my 
own deeds. They are but adepts 
in having their own desires 
accomplished through me and 
what a stupid am I to yield to 
their apparently wise persuasions. 
This wont do. I alone am the 
maker and moulder of my own 
destiny and so I must forsake all 
what is not-me and thus carve 
out a path of my own for the 
fulfilment of my own Good. 



(5) Anyatva bhdvand — The Self, the I is 
not this body which I hold to be 
mine. It is but a different and 
distinct entity unadulterated by 
anything else in reality. The 
ordinary mode of speech finding 
expression in such statements 
*as I am lean', or *my limb is 
broken' or *my child is suffering' 
has for its basis wrong knowledge 
as to the real nature of our inward 
self which by subreption appears 
to be identical with our physical 
constitution : but the wise and 
the omniscient have definitely 
determined it to be otherwise. 
The Self, the / is absolutely 
different from the not-self in every 
respect. So what care I if the 
body which is neither me nor 
mine go away. What do I care 
if the child ceases to be here 
and now. Such reflections within 
one's own self along this particular 
vein and strain is called Anyatva 



(6) Asucht Bkdvand — This our mortal coil 
is of composite substance and is 
born of the admixture of various 
elements in and through the pro- 
cesses which are really repugnant 
to the right thinking. All sorts 
of dirt and filth are within this 
physical constitution. So why 
should I be encased in it like a 
bird in the cage, knowing to be a 
composite of dirt and filth, and 
originating, as it does, in moments 
of weakness and sin ? This line of 
self-reflection is what is called 
asuchi bkdvand. 

(7) Asrdva bkdvand-^Asrava or influx — 
means, as we have seen, flowing of 
^^r;;^^-matter into the consti- 
tution of the self through the 
channels and loopholes in our 
body, speech and mind. It is 
taught by the wise that looking 
upon the sentient being in terms 
of equality with ourselves ; re- 
vering the really qualified ; dealing 
politely with the rude and the 

57 ' 


rough ; feeling pity for the im- 
poverished ; all these four make 
one acquire the forty-two kinds of 
Punnyay where as roudra dhy&n^ 
drta dhydn, the five kinds of 
mithydtva (subreption), sixteen 
kashdyas, five kinds of desires, 
all lead a jiva to acquire eighty 
two kinds of Pdpa, The wise 
and the aspirant to freedom must 
know all these and reflect on the 
degrading tendencies they are 
inherent with, to work havoc on 
the Jiva through the influx ; and 
so 2. jiva should guard himself and 
conduct himself accordingly. 
(8) Samvafa Bhdvand — Samvara is the 
stopping of the influx. This 
samvara is of two kinds — relative 
and absolute. Relative samvara 
means the partial stoppage of the 
influx, while Absolute samvara 
means the complete stoppage of 
the influx. This latter kind of 5^w- 
vara is only possible with the ayogi 
kevalins. The relative samvara 


which is possible with the mumu- 
kskin on the path-ways to bliss 
and beatitude, is again resolvable 
in dravya and bkdva, Dravya 
samvara means the actual shutting 
out of the senses and other chan- 
nels against the inflow of karma- 
matter where as Bkdva samvara 
means the particular mental dis- 
position which precedes Dravya 
samvara. Now constant think- 
ing as to the ways and means of 
shutting up the various channels 
of asrava, destroying mithy&tva, 
giving up of the 6>rta and roudra 
dky&naSy practising only of shu- 
kla dhydna and dharma dhydna^ 
replacing anger by its opposite, 
pride by humility, hypocrisy by 
veracity and the like which turn 
our minds away from persuing after 
things temporary is known by the 
name of samvara bkdvand. 
(9) N'trjara bhdvand — Reflection on the 
ways and means of purging the 
soul of all impurities. Nirjard 



ox purging' is of the two kinds — 

sakdma and akdma. When aijiva 

intentionally conducts himself in 

such way as would purge his soul 
out of all impurities, it is called 
sakdm nirjard ; but when karma 
bargands are left to themselves 
for their own falling off from the 
constitution of the soul in their 
natural course, it is called akdma 
nirjard, NirJarddMvund implies, 
therefore, the thinking of the ways 
and means of voluntarily getting 
rid of the karma-mditter infesting 
the soul with the express intention 
of attaining to beatitude. 
(lo) Lokaswabhdva bMvand—mesins the 
thinking on the symbolic concep- 
tion of the universe as given in 
the Jain scriptures. The sun, the 
moon, the earth, the planets and 
stars ; the physical sky, the hell, 
the heaven and the like constitute 
one composite universe according 
to the Jain system of thought. 
Its form and configuration is 



just like a man standing erect 
with arms resting against his 
waist. Being composed of the 
six substantive categories of the 
Jain philosophy from time without 
begining, it is the permanent 
theatre of perpetual changes. 
All the jivas and the pudgal 
particles which fill up all the three 
regions known as urdha^ adha^ 
tiryak are not outside this Person 
but they are all contained in it: for 
outside this Universe-man is the 
vacuous space only going by the 
name of alok&kdsk or hyper- 
physical regions which is infinite 
in extensiveness. In the infernal 
regions {adholoka) there are seven 
worlds one upon the other wherein 
are imprisoned the jivas of the 
hell. Somewhere there also dwells 
the Bhavanapati. In the third 
world from downwards dwell the 
human beings and other animal 
lower to them. In the celestial 
regions live the gods. Such, 


roughly speaking, is the figurative 
conception of the universe, a con* 
ception which is also traceable in 
the Virdt Purush or the Cosmic 
Person of the Hindus. Now 
meditation on this figurative con- 
ception of the universe as given 
in the Jain scripture is known as 
Lokaswabk&va bhdvand, 
(ii) Bodhidurlabhatva bhdvand — This 
means reflecting on the difficult 
path one has to travel through to 
attain to a state oi pure intuition : 
for every thing in this world, 
can be had with comparative ease 
save and except the three jewels, 
viz. the Right-vision, the Right- 
knowledge and the Right-conduct 
constituting the a/pAa and ome£-a 
of our being. The Hindus also 
say, ''Khurasya cikdrA nishita 
duratvyd durgamamayam panthd 
kabayS badantiy —The way to the 
goal is so very difficult to travel 
through ; it is just like the 
walking on the sharp edge of 



a razor. Therefore, now that 
we have got the human birth 
which rarely happens to a jiva^ 
we must give up all to reach the 
goal, however difficult the path 
may be to travel through. 
(12) Dharma bhdvand — This means con- 
stantly reflecting on the essential 
nature of a true religion. Religion 
not saturated with piety, with 
the spirit of innocent service to 
humanity and other sentient 
{sacktt) beings is but a sham. For, 
it is mercy that lends colour to the 
soul of religion. Real mercy pro- 
ceeds from right-vision, veracity 
and philanthropy. He who never 
tells a lie, sticks to truth even unto 
death, is indifferent to the worldly 
loss or gain, helps the needy and 
has an unwavering faith in the 
words of dijiva, the victor, is really 
a righteous man from the Jain 
point of view. 
These are the twelve kinds of reflections 
which help ^.jiva in his efforts towards the 




actualisation of Samvara which if not culti- 
vated with propriety and judiciousness cannot 
put a stop to the incessant influx of karma- 
matter into the constitution of ih^jiva. 

Next comes the Partshahas or endurance 
of hardships without which no one can 
expect to attain to a thing ; for work implies 
not only waste but endurance as well. A 
mumukshin soul must ever be prepared to 
gladly endure all sorts of hardships as con- 
sequent on the strain and struggle he has 
been voluntarily undergoing for the realisa- 
tion of the Highest Good. The Jain sages 
have classified in their own ways these | 
various forms of hardships into twenty-two 
kinds, viz ; — 

(i) Kshutparisaha or endurance of hard-j 
ship consequent on hunger, (2) on thirst] 
{frishd)y (3) cold (skita)y (4) heat (ushna),\ 
(5) insect bite (dansha mashaka), (6) naked- 
ness (achela) i.e, tattered rag, (7) on unfavour- 
able environment {arati), (8) on the presencel 
of the opposite sex, (9) on constantly shifting 
from place to place ( chary a) \ (10) on the] 
disadvantages arising from abiding by thej 
rules of conduct in a particular quarter] 



temporarily taken as habitat (nishady&)y 
(ii) on uncomfortable beddings to sleep on 
{shayyd)y (12) on taunts and reproaches 
{akroska), (13) on personal injury {badha\ 
(14) on begging alms (ydcknyd), (15) on 
disappointment in the begging (aldbha), 
(16) on desease {roga), (17) on thorn-pricks 
{trina sparshd), (18) on physical dirt and 
impurities {mala) ; (19) on being indiffer- 
ent to words of praise and acts of service 
relative to himself {sat karma) ; (20) on the 
avoidance of the pride of learming {PrdjnA) 

(21) on the avoidance of pain due to the 
consciousness of his own ignorance {agnana), 

(22) on the avoidance of being cast down for 
not being able to acquire a right-vision into 
metaphysics of ideas and ideals. 

Now these are the two and twenty 
Parishahas or forms of endurance which 
otherwise tell upon a mumukskin jiva so as 
to cast him away from the right path and 
conduct without which the progress towards 
the highest state of being and bliss is held 
to be impossible. 

Then there are the Five-fold Conduct for 
further stoppage of the influx. The five-told 



conduct are but the Five Rules along the 

lines of which a jiva should move himself 

to stop the inflow of "karma'VazXX^x into its 

constitution. They are — 

(i) Samayika CMr//r^— which enjoins on 
the mumukskin, the abandonment 
of bad companions and retirement 
to seclusion for meditation. 

iii) Chedopasthdpannya Chdritra — which 
enjoins a full and complete confes- 
sion with repentance to a guru 
of the sins and crimes done inten- 
tionally or otherwise by a mumu- 
kshin jiva and humbly submitting 
to any punishment that might be 
inflected on him in consequent 

(tii) Parihar Vishudha Charitra, — It goes 
without saying that without the 
purification of the heart, right- 
vision into the metaphysics of 
things and thoughts leading to 
right knowledge resulting in the 
diefication of the inward self fs 
impossible : we have also in the 
Bible. ''Blessed are the pure 



in heart for they shall see God." 
So without chittasuddhi or puri- 
fication of the heart nothing is 
possible. Now there are various 
means and disciplines whereby the 
heart can be purified. Of these 
the most preleminary for a mumu- 
kshin is to serve the sddktis, the 
monks. The most typical of these 
services is the services rendered 
to the monk engaged in Tapa — 
austeiority. Performance of tapas 
may cover the period of even 
eighteen months and if a mumu- 
kshin serves a monk who is thus 
engaged in Tapas in such a man- 
ner as to see that nothing there 
takes place externally as to 
break the Tapas of the monk, he 
is said to be achieving the puri- 
fication of the heart to a certain 
extent. The psychology under- 
lying this is too obvious to require 
any further elaboration, 
(iv) Sukshma Sampardya. — The more the 
heart is purified the more the 


light of truth will be reflected 
thereon and he will realise the 
temporary character of the things 
wordly, along which he will become 
less and less attached to them, with 
a growing spirit of renunciation 
born of right knowledge of the 
real values and functions of these. 
This is how should 2.jiva cultivate 
apathy and indifference to things 
worldly. So long a fiva living, 
moving and having his being 
in this empirical world of ours, 
he must have to work and the 
more he works out things with 
attatchent the more fettered does 
he become ; but if he does his 
duty for duty's sake without wait- 
ing for the result thereof, he will 
devolope by this his mode of 
conduct, a spirit of renunciation 
which will help him to preserve the 
equanimity of temper in the midst 
of intense activity, 
(v) Yathdkshyata. — Having thus gradually 
devoloped the spirit of doing 



things without the least attatch- 
ment he will attain to such a state 
of being when all the five fold 
rules of conduct will be observed 
automatically so much so that the 
jiva himself will be left to himself 
for introspection into and self- 
reflection upon its own nature, 
phases and phenomena. 
Thus we see how the various ways of 
arresting the inflow of karma into the consti' 
tution oilht jiva can be classified into fifty- 
seven modes or types viz , five Samity, three 
Gupti, ten Yati dharma, twelve BhdvandSy 
twenty two Parishahas and five-fold Conduct- 
Ck&ritra. A jiva desirous of salvation from 
the thraldom of the senses must meke 
strenuous efforts to gradually stop the influx 
of fresh matter foreign to the soul. For as 
we have already seen it is these karma 
particles getting into the constitution of the 
jiva that blind its vision into the metaphysics 
of things and there by prevents its right 
knowledge without which right conduct is 
held to be impossible. 



Ntrjara — Its Deiinitton — Cla88t£cattoxi of Ntrjara 
tnto Salcama and Akama — TKe Mumulcslitn strtvea £or 
Salcam Ntrjara to ex{>e<ltat« Ltberatton — Pnaaea ana 
Transformations of Karma — Means and MetKodi of 
Sakama Ntrjara — Tke Prtmary Condition of Nirjara xa 
Austerity — Austerity Lurns \xp tlie Karma seeds and sets 
tKe Jiva free —Forms of Austerities and IDkyanas wKick 
kurn u{> tke seeds of Karma kef ore tkeir due times. 

Along with the practice, of Samvar or 
arresting the influx of fresh karma-pudgal as 
stated in the preceding chapter a mumu- 
kskinjiva is requiren to act in such a way as 
would help him in throwing away the already 
acquired dirt of karma which has been sub- 
jecting him to go round and round the wheel 
of births and deaths. For untill and unless a 
jivas entire z^^;';;^^- matter clothing his soul- 
worked out or neutralized in a manner as 
would make it impossible to transform into 
udaya — kinetic state of its being, a jiva can- 
not expect to attain to freedom. — And the 
processes and activities whereby the karma- 
matter clothing the soul is worked out or 



their effects completely neutralized so much 
So that they would fall away from the consti- 
tution of the jzva is called NirjarOi. 

The Jain sages have classified this Nirjara 
into two kinds viz ; (i) Akdma Nirjara 
& (ii) Sakdma Nirjara. 

To deal with Akdma Nirjara^ karma- 
pudgals while standing in some relation with 
the soul assume various phases through 
successive processes of tansition according to 
laws inhent in them. This is the reason 
why the sages have come to another kind of 
classification of the karma-barganas by the 
names of (i) Sattd^ (2) Bandha (3) Udaya 
and (4) Udirnd. 

(i) By sattd karma — The sages mean the 
karma-bargands which getting in 
to the constitution of the jiva 
remain there merged as it were 
in the soul. Sattd-karma corres- 
ponds to the Sanckita- karma of 
the Hindus : The whole man 
that still remains behind the man 
not yet worked out — the entire 
unpaid balance of the debit and 
credit account. 



By Bandha Karma — the Sages mean the 
karma-bargands in the state of 
saM enter by virtue of sub- 
reption of the j'/z/^ into a relation 
of identity with the soul where- 
by they^z;^ takes in further karma- 
matter in its current lease of life 
to mould its destiny for the future. 
This Bandha karma is anologous 
to the Kriyamdn karma of the 
Vedanta philosophers. 

By Udaya Karma — The sages mean the 
karma bargands which standing 
simply in relation of identity with 
the soul for sometime devolop 
into 3n energy of movement for 
the enjoyment of the soul at the 
commencement of each life. This 
is analogious to the Prdrabdha 
Karma of the Hindus by which 
they mean the amount apportioned 
to the man at the beginning of his 
life on earth. It is important to 
note here that this third type, 
the Udaya karma, is the only 
destiny which can be said to exist 



for man and this is what an 
astrologer might fore-tell for us, 
that we have apportioned to us 
so much good and evil fortune 
^— so much of the good and evil 
actions of our past lives which will 
react on us in this life. 
(4) By UdirnA Karma — The sages mean 
the karma bargands which by the 
resolute will and exertion of the 
soul are worked out into the energy 
of movement for the enjoyment of 
the J ha before they are due. 
Now if the fiva allows himself to be 
drifted from wave to wave surging in 
everflowing currents of karma, his destiny 
will no longer remains his hands but the 
environment will become all in all in the 
making and moulding of his destiny. For he 
will be under the complete sway of his own 
karma creating conditions of his being and 
will be reaping the consequences of his own 
karma without any will or individuality 
of his own to stem the tide of the influx. 
For karma-mditt^r according to its laws 
and forces which it is instinct with will 



continually get into the jiva to be there 
in the state of satid for some time only to 
be awakened into kinetic energies whirling 
th^jtva round through the different grades 
of sansdr, while others will indeed fall off 
yielding places to newer ones. Therefore, 
instead of leaving the life to chances, the 
sages have devised means and methods 
whereby the seeds of karma could so burnt 
as to wholly neutralize their effects and 
leave the soul free and pure to soar up and up 
into the regions of the Siddhasila, Experience 
have taught us that the karmic-seeds — the 
root-evolvent of miseries — could be burnt up 
into nought in the glow of austerities — Tapas, 
Just as fire consumes the combustible so 
do the /^/>a5-austerities burn up the karma- 
hija of the jiva and sets him free from the 
turmoils of sansdra. These austerities 
are of various kinds and types which for 
the sake of convenience, have been classi- 
fied by the Jain moralists, primarily into 
(I) Bdhya, exterior and (II) Antar, Interior 

(i) By Bdhya, exterior or physical 
austerities, our physical nature is so con- 



trolled as to work out automatically towards 
the furtherance of the end in view whereas by 
the Antaranga tapas or Interior or psychi- 
cal austerities mind is so controlled as to 
help xki^jiva in getting an insight into the 
real nature of things with a view of attaining 
to a right knowledge thereof and their values 
as well without which right conduct on the 
part of the jiva becomes a rarity. And 
mind and body being found to act and react 
on each other through the principle of con- 
commiltance, the relative importance of both 
the forms of austerities is quite evident. 

Now of the two kinds of tapas, the bdhya^ 

the exterior or the physical consists in the 

processes of controlling the physical nature 

of the J zva in six following ways. — 

(i) Anashan Vrata — />. the vow of fasting. 

Importance of fasting from time 

to time to give the physical system 

a rest goes without saying in 

these days of scientific culture 

and refinement. It is said in the 

scripture that fasting purifies the 

sense-organs and adds to their 

.sensibility so much so that it 



makes them to respond to a any fine 
and delicate vibration that might 
be set up in the outside. 

(2) Unodori — Avoidance of full meals. It 

adds to the agility of the jiva. 
Full meals bring on slumber and 
laziness and are the causes of dys- 
pepsia which is very difficult 
to get rid of. 

(3) Vritti sankhepa — Dietetic restrictions 

which can be observed in different 
ways from the view-points of 
dravya, kshettray k&la and swa- 
bk&va. As for instance, I am in the 
habit of taking meals consisting of 
nine or ten kinds of eatables and to 
observe the vow oi vr it tt sankhepa 
from the stand-point of dravya, \ 
will have to reduce the number of 
the eatables, say, to five kinds mak- 
ing up the meal would take. 
Then again I may put in further 
restriction to the obtaining of the 
meal from certain quarter from the 
view-point of kshettra. Thirdly, 
1 may put still further .restriction 



to the time kdloi my taking meals. 
I may take once a day and that 
again say by 3 p.m. every ; day ; 
and lastly, from the view-point 
of bhdvuy I may put still another 
restriction in obtaining food from 
people with certain peculiar men- 
tality and position. I may take 
the vow of having meals only 
from the chaste and pure passers- 
by whom I may happen to meet on 
my to a certain destination. 

(4) Rasataydga — Renunciation of palatable 

articles or dainty dishes, such as 
a variety of sweets, milk, butter, 
sugar, salt and the like which may 
awaken in me a sense of attach- 
ment to the pleasures of life. 

(5) Kdyakleska — Endurance of physical 

troubles. A mumukshin must ever 
be ready to undergo all sorts of 
physical discomforts without, in 
the least, losing the equanimity 
of temper. He must take both 
heat and cold (shita and ushna) 
in the one and the same light. 



To realize this, he may undertake 
to practise meditation either 
in the scorching rays of the sun 
on an elevated seat in the summer 
or in a cold uncovered place in 
the winter. 
(6) Samlinatd — Turning the senses from 
their respective objects. This 
will develope the spirit of renun- 
ciation in the mumukshi'n jtva 
and strengthen his moral rectitude 
in such a manner as to make one 
look upon things most charming 
to the worldly as of no use and 
avail to him. This is how 
the senses, we are told, guarded 
against all temptations (Indriya 
samlinatSb). Then again the 
mumukshin must control the 
passions and their correlates, such 
as anger, deceit, pride and greed 
{kasdya samltnatd) as well as his 
thought, speech and body (yoga 
samlinatd). And lastly, there is 
the viviktacharya which means 
previous ascertainment by a mu- 



mukshin as to whether any one 
of the opposite sex is there at 
the place of his future destination 
where he will be next going. 
These are the six forms of exterior 
austerities {b&kya tapd) for regulating and 
controlling the physical nature of the mumu 
ksktn jiva. Besides, there are six interior 
austerities (dntar tapd) of which the first is, — 
^i) PrAyasckitta — penance and repentance 
for the blunders committed through 
pramdd or negligence. It often 
takes the form of a moral con- 
fession to the spiritual guru, or 
to an other sddku instead, of 
the sins and crimes one might 
have done through commission or 
omission with repentance and ac- 
cept the penalty to be imposed on 
him by the guru and act according 
to the regulations as laid down 
in the scriptures and repeat every 
mcrning micchami dukkadami i.e, 
may my sins be forgiven ! 
(2) Vinaya or Humility — A mumukshin 
soul must also cultivate humility, 




for this serves to kill all pride and 
saturate the mind with sympathe- 
tic feelings. Of vinaya there are 
four kinds, — 

{a) Jndna vinaya — i,e* to be humble and 
respectful to all who are superior 
in knowledge and wisdom. 

(b) Darshan vinaya— i.e, to be humble and 
respectful to those who have 
gained a real insight into the meta- 
physics of things and thoughts. 

{c) Charitra vinaya — to be humble and 
polite to the men having a good 
moral stamina by the virtue of 
which he follows a right course 
of conduct. 

{d) Mana vinaya — to be always in a kind of 
mental attitude as to pay respect 
to all the saints and sages of the 
world who live for others, and 
therefore, worthy of our reverence. 

(3) Vaiydvritya — Service to humanity. 
It takes a thousand and one 
forms in and throuo[h which the 
acquired dirt of karma is worked 
off. Vaiydvritya consists chiefiy 



in services rendered to ascetics ; 
feeding the poor, sheltering the 
helpless and the like forms of 
social services. In these days of 
flood and famine, the sddkus of 
the Ramakrishna Mission have 
been, it is important to record, 
seriously engaging themselves in 
the performance of this VatyA- 
vrttya, Viydvritya brings on 
chitta-suddht or purification of the 

(4) Svddhydya — means study : here it re- 
fers to the study Jain scriptures : 
following the rules of conduct as 
laid down therein for practical 
guidance ; testing the truth and 
validity of the Jain metaphysical 
conclusions and being convinced of 
the same, preach them out to the 
world for the good of humanity 
in right earnest and energy. This 
clearly shows the evangelical 
spirit of Jainism. 

(5) Vyutsarga — descrimination between 
the soul and the non-soul. It is 



just like the nitydnitya vastu 
viveka of the Vedantists. 
(6) Dkydna — meditation, contemplation or 
uniform unbroken concentration of 
mind upon something. To be more 
clear, dhydna is an unbroken 
thread of thought evoloving out of 
continuous thinking on an object 
or an Idea. This dhydna has been 
classified into four kinds accord- 
ing to the object or Idea where- 
on a y/f^ concentrates his atten- 
tion ; viz, (i) Aria, (2) Roudra, 
(3) Dharma and (4) Sukla, 
To take the first, Arta Dkydna^ it is the 
most intense hankering with attatchment 
after an object of enjoyment revealing itself 
as it does in four forms namely, 
{a) Ishta viyoga — constantly thinking of 
the loss of what was dear to him ; 
grieving too much for the dead 
and the departed dear ones or 
wailing and beating breast in grief 
for the loss sustained. 
{b) Anista Samyoga^ — to be constantly 
brooding over entering on a new 


relation with of something 
undesirable and unpleasant, and 
thereby gradually sinking into 
despondency as if no more hope 
were left to recast his lot. 
(c) Roga chmtd — to be constantly labour- 
ing under an anxiety for some 
physical malady, or in other words 
always thinking of the physical 
{d) Agrasocha or Nt'ddndrtka — to be 
occupied with the thought of the 
future and future only, that I will 
do this, then that, next the thing 
will as a natural consequence and 
I have my objective fulfilled. 
It is important no note here by the way 
that Arta dhydna is possible between the 
I St. mithyatva^.nA the 6th gimasthdn and 
leads jivas to take birth in the Tiryak 

2. The second of the Dhydnas is 

Roudra dhydna which means to be absorbed 

in the thought of wreaking vengeance for 

. some loss or damage one sustained through 

the action of another. This thought of 


An epitome of JAINISM. 

wreaking vangence {Roudra dhy&na) ex- 
presses itself into four forms viz,— 

{a) Htsdnubandhi, (b) Mriskdnubandhi, 
{c) Steynubandhly {d) Samrakshanu 

Arta and Roudra Dhydnas always lead 
mind to concentrate its energies on things 
extra-ongaric. These instead of dissipating 
the karmic energetics rather keep the jiva 
under such influence as to acquire karma- 
matter subjecting it to the repetition of births 
and deaths in the different grades sansdr, 

(3) But the third one, Dharma dhydna 
which means constant thinking of the ways 
and means to and following the same in prac- 
tice for the realisation of the true nature of 
our inward self, helps ihejiva to work out 
its own karma, Dharma dhydna has been 
analysed into four phases, namely — 
(a) Agnd vichaya — to have a firm faith 
and sincere belief in the meta- 
physical conslusions as arrived at 
by the omniscient kevalins and 
and in their teachings. 
(U) Apdya vichaya — the belief tbat what 
is non-self is not only alin to the 


real self, but constant thinking of 
the not-self enfetters the self. 
{c) Vipdka vichaya — the belief that from 
the ontological point of view, 
though the self is a positive entity 
all pure and free, but viewed from 
the phenomenal stand point, it 
appears to be otherwise owing to 
the eight kinds of karma loaded 
with which \ki^ jiva passes through 
births and deaths. 
(d) Samsthdn vickaya^^mental ideation or 
picturing in the mind of the four- 
teen worlds as well as the nature of 
the constituent elements of the same 
as taught in the Jain philosophy. 
(4) Lastly comes the Suk/a dhydna, 
Sukla lit, means white which is but a sym- 
bolic representation of purity when it follows 
that Sukla dhy&n is nothing else than think- 
ing of the soul in all its purity i. e, to be 
absorbed in the meditation of the transen- 
dental nature of our inward self as constitu- 
tionally free and potentially divine. Such 
being the import as understood by Sukla 
dhydna it expresses in four forms viz : — 





(a) Prttvakatva Vitarka Sapravickdra — > 

consisting as it does in the « 
ideation of the substance as 
characterised with origination, 
dessolution, continuation {utpdda 
vyaya dhrouva yuktam sat) as well 
as in tiie descrimination between 
such pair of opposites as jiva 
and ajiva ; guna and parydya ; 
swabhdva and hibhdva tending 
to the formation of the right 
knowledge of the soul as it is in 
itself. This attitude of the mind 
becomes manifest when the jiva 
is between the 8th and nth 

(6) Ekatva vitarka apravichdra, — consists 
in thinking of the unity in diffe- 
rence between the pairs of oppo- 
sits and thereby to arrive at the 
knowledge of unity amidst the 
diversity of things and thoughts. 
It appears to develop in the 12 

[c) Sukskma kriyd Pratipati — -consists in 
continuous thinking and striving 



to resist the yog-as of mind, speech 
and body in and through which 
karmic matter flow into they/W. 
This d/zydnsi is possible to a jzva 
in the thirteenth gunasthdn, 
(d) Vicchinna kriyd apratipdti — By this 
type of sukla dkydna which is 
the last and final of the dkydnas, 
helps the mumukshin soul to tear 
assunder for good the veil and 
covering which so long stood in 
the ways of the jivas realization 
of the true nature of itself. It is 
a kind of mental striving which 
becomes more and more intense 
as the days go by to realize the 
siddhakood of the jiva. To a 
jiva in the fourteenth gmtastkdn 
this dhydna is possible. 
It is important to note that A^^la and 
Roudra dkydnas engage the mind of the 
people moving up and down between the ist 
and the 3rd ^zmastkdnas : Dharma dhydna 
between 4th and 6th gunasthdnas ; Sukla 
dhydna is possible to the jivas entering on 
the Jih gtmasthan and onwards. 




Besides the above way of classifying the 
dhydnas, The Jain sages have also otherwise 
classified them into (i) Padastha, (2) 
Pindastha, (3) Rupastha and (4) Rupdtita. 
To take the first, 

(i) Padastha dhydna — is the continuous 
meditation on the nature of the 
Perfect souls, the kev alius or the 
Punch Paramesti, 

(2) Pindastha dhydna — is to think that the 

self within is in reality of the 

same essence with those of the 
arihantas and the like. 

(3) Rupastha dhydna — is to think or 

meditate in the manner that this 
our inward self is not of the 
nature of pudgal whereof our 
physical constitution is compos- 
ed ; for vision, knowledge and 
delight ■ infinite constitute the 
very essence of our soul. Be 
it noted here that all these three 
dhydnas come within the range 
of Dharma dhydna discussed here- 
in before. 

(4) Rupdtita dhydna — This is to think the 



soul within as superphysical, 
eternally free, pure, withouts parts 
and desire. Essentially it is intel- 
lectual delight revealing itself as 
it does in and through its four 
quarternary infinite technically 
know as the emanta chatustaya. 



Molcska or £mancT|)atton — Molcslta is the Htghest 
Gooa — Oonce{>ttons of tnc ritgkest Good, according to 
tlic Different SckooI$ of PliilosoJ>liy — Mokska ts 
eternal and constitutional witk tke Soul — It cannot 
be "worked out by Karma — For j^dokska is not tke 
Product of anytking. 

Now comes Mohsha or Beatitude, the 
last and final of the Jain moral categories. 
Those who have followed our line of thought 
from A^^r;;^^-phenomenology to the chapter 
proceeding this, must have understood the 
inner psychology of the whole trend of 
thought and culture, the sole objective 
of which is the emancipation of the soul 
from thd miseries of the world and its 
attainment to a state of the highest felicity 
which it is the concern of every man to know 
and which the Sddku takes so much pains to 
acquire. The Jain Sddhn, as it is now well- 
known, aims at nothing less than the 
complete deliverance of the soul from all veil 
and coYQnng'--^SarvAvaranavimukttr7nu'kti'k. 
But it is not so with the followers of the 



other systems of thought and culture. They 
have various states of the beatitude which 
they aim at according to the different schools 
of thought to which they belong. For 
instance the Vedantist has two states of bliss 
in view viz., one inferior v^\\\q}cs. is attained in 
this life by means of knowledge, tatrdparah 
jivanmtckii lakshanam ialvajndndnt arena ; 
and the other superior, obtainable after 
many births of gradual advancement to 
perfection, param nihsreyasam kramena 

Similarly the Charvakas hold it to be 
either absolute autonomy here in this life or 
death that is bliss, svdtantryam mrityurbd 

The Mddhyamikas say, that it is the 
extinction of the self-hood that is called 
liberation, dtmochhedo mokskak. 

The Vijndni philosophers have it to be 
for a clear and edified understanding, 
nirmala jndnodayak. 

The Rdtndnujists bold it be the know- 
ledge of vdsudeva as the cause of this all, 

Vdsudeva jndnaf)i' 

The Ballahkis find it in the sporting with 



Krishna in H^diVtn^ Krishnena sahagoloke 

The Pdsupatas and the Maheswaran 
see it in the holding of all dignity, 

The Kdpdlikas define it to be the delight 
found in the sweet embrace of Hara and 
Parvati, Hara-Pdrvatydltnganam. 

The Raseswarvddms find it in the 
possession of sound health and happiness by 
virtue of mercurry, Pdradena dehasthairydm. 

The Vaishesikas seek it in the extinction 
of all kinds of pain — dukkha ntvritiiritt. 

The Mhndnsakas trace it in the enjoy- 
ment of Heavenly hWss^—Swargddz sukha 

The Panini gramarians find it in the 
powers of speech, Br^ma rupdyd bdnyd 

The Sankkya materialists has it in the 
fusion of matter and spirit — Prakritoiv 

The Uddsina 'atheists trace it in the 
eradication of egotism, ahamkdra nivrittt. 

The Pdtanjalas set it in the absolute 
non-chalant state of the Person originating 



as it does from the utter indifference 
to matters worldly, Purusasya nirlepa 

The Pratydbhigndnis interprete it as the 
realisation of the perfection of the soul, 
Purndtmd labhah. 

The Sarvagnas find it in the eternal 
continuum of the feeling of the highest 
felicity — mitya ntratishaya sukha hodhah. 

The Mdydvddins say it to be manifest 
on the removal of the error of one's 
having a separate existence as a particle of 
the Supreme Being — Brahmdnsika jivasya 
mithydjndna mvrittz. 

Such are the conceptions of the Highest 
Good which the different schools of thought 
ultimately aim at. A comparative study of the 
nature of these conceptions will make it clear 
that the Jain conception of the same gives 
us but a clear idea as to what a mumukshin 
soul really strives and struggle, for. It is a 
kind oi swaraj\ self-rule, a state of autonomy, 
pure and simple, which every /Vt;^ instinctive- 
ly aspires after to realize by tearing assunder 
the veil or the covering in and through the 
process of which the Ideal is Realised. In the 



ordinary empirical state of our being the 
Ideal is ideal ; it is far ahead of the practical. 
And the Jains hold that if the ideal remains 
an ideal, far ahead of the practical forever and 
evermore, u can never be made realizable. 
So the Jains interprete it otherwise, from 
their points o*" view, and really speaking, 
ther2 are tWO tendencies running oarallel 
all through the human life and culture. 
One is .o idealize the real and ihe other is 
realize the ideal. These two tendencies 
are often zX war with each other. One tends 
us 10 take the existing state of things and 
affairs cis the besl of their kind and so we 
must make the most of it. From this point 
of view whoever is found to go out of the 
way and to pull the world up to a higher 
level to have a so-called richer outlook 
of life, he is dubbed as the impatient idealist 
moving in eccentric orbits. But the other 
tendency by virtue of which they struggle 
to raise the world to a higher or ideal state 
of things, Lhe tendency that is born of the 
intense dissatisfaction at the present state of ' 
things and Ltffairs, is the tendency to realize j 
the Ideal. 



Be that as it may, complete deliverance 
from the veil and covering oi karma is called 
mokska or emancipation from the miseries 
and afiflictions of the world. Karma, we 
have seen, is the cause of bondage of the 
soul. But the karma which whirls us round 
and round through the cycle of sansdr has 
been classified either into pdpa or puny a. 
Punya and pdpa are the causes of all our 
weals and woes with this difference only 
that those who commit sin go down to 
the lower grades of sansdr, or sink into 
hell to suffer penalties as the natural 
consequences thereof whereas those who 
perform virtuous acts take births in the 
higher grades of sansdr to enjoy there 
the pleasures of life and achieve the objects 
of their desire. So pdpa and punya both 
have got to be worked out for the attain- 
ment of freedom — mokska. 

Here one may argue that if nirjard, or 
purging means complete washing out the soul 
of all karma'\:ci2X\.^r , pdpa and punya, foreign 
to it, how are we then to look upon punya- 
karma which is enjoined on us as means to 
the attainment of the state of bliss and beati- 



tude which is only possible when the soul 
has got rid of all karmt-msLiter ? 

To this the Jains reply, it is true that 
punya ensures comfort, and happiness ; but 
they are but comforts or pleasures of this 
mundane world. The eternal felicity born 
of the complete deliverence from all veil 
and coverning, cannot be the consequence 
ol punya however wisely and carefully may 
it have t)een discharged ; for the conse- 
quences of punya karma are always con- 
ditioned in as much as karma and the 
consequences thereof are possible only in so 
far as the mundane existence is concerned, 
but with reference to what is devoid of 
all name and form, being above all 
causality,. it is not possible. In other words, 
karma cannot evolve things of permanent 
character. Karma can produce, transform, 
conjoin, or re-adjust. Over nothing beyond 
these has karma any jurisdiction. Thus it 
is clear that karma is possible only in 

Some may remark that karma done with 
judiciousness and indifference to the conse- 
quences thereof might result in the eman-j 



cipation of the soul. But this, the Jains 
hold, does not stand to reason ; because 
moksha is not the result of anything 
done or performed. Mokska is the tearing 
assunder of the snares of karma binding 
the jiva under the sway of subreption to 
the sansdr, and, therefore, it is not the 
effect of anything preceding it as its 
% cause. A karma cannot destroy karma. It 
changes only to re-appear in another form. 
Besides the effects of karma are traced in 
things which have origination (utpMa) and 
the like. But moksha which is eternal in 
reality cannot be said to be the result of 
any work. Ordinarily karma manifests itself 
in the production of a thing, in joining one 
thing to another, in transforming one into 
another and the like But speaking from the 
nishckaya nay a, moksha has no origin. The 
jivay as we have seen elsewhere, is consti- 
tutionally free and potentially divine. And it 
is simply due to subreption (mithydtva) that 
it appears to us as otherwise. 

Indeed what is contended is partially 
true, replies the opponent, but not wholly 
admissible ; since the nature of the work done 



without the knowledge thereof is of one 
kind ; and different is the nature of the 
duty discharged with a thorough knowledge 
of the same and simply discharged for 
duty's sake with absolute indifference to 
the results that would accrue thereof. 
To show an analogous case, poison kills : 
but when judiciously administered by a 
physician efficient in the science and art of' 
the administration of drugs, it acts like 
nector. And this is what we mean when we 
state that moksha or deliverance is derived 
or results from the wise discharging of 
duties for duty's sake. 

But we the Jains hold it to be altogether 
meaningless or misleading, since the analogy 
does not hold good here ; nor is there any 
proof to verify the truth of the statement : 
for, it is in and through origination, con- 
junction, transformation or re-adjustment, 
that karma can work itself out and through 
nothing else beyond these four ; because of 
the want of all manner of evidence, direct or 
indirect. So it cannot be maintained that 
moksha is derived from the wise discharging" 
of duties for duty's sake. 



The opponent might remark that to say 
this is to deny the merit of such scriptural 
injunctions as laid down under the heading of 
Jural Seventies {Ckaran sittari) which have 
been imperatively enjoined both on the monks 
and the laity. Does not this denial stand as 
an indirect evidence to prove that moksha 
results from the wise discharging of duties as 
laid down in the Jural Ethics ? Complete 
deliverence from the veil and covering, 
therefore, we hold, is the result, though not 
the effect, of our wisely working along the 
lines of Jural Ethics which is imparatively 
enjoined on every man. Otherwise none 
would have ever been inclined in any way to 
work along the lines of Jural Ethics. 

To say this rejoind the Jains is to state 
that 'mokska is the result of our being true in 
thought and deed to the injuctions of Jural 
Ethics and on that account it cannot b^ said 
to be the effect of our doing something.' 
But what does this your statement mean ? 
Mere euphonic difference in the words result 
and effect which are synonymous in sense 
and significance does not always make out 
the difference in respect of their imports, 



For, it involves a contradiction to say 
that though moksha is the result of our 
being true to the injunctions of Jural Ethics 
yet it is not the effect of our performing 
the duties as laid down therein. Of course 
to maintain your position you will perhaps 
contend that here karma takes the position 
of knowledge. Though moksha is not really 
the product of knowledge yet in common 
perlance we say 'deliverance is due to 
knowledge' ! But this your contention we, the 
Jains, hold is of no avail ; because when we 
say deliverance is due to knowledge, we thereby 
mean that the light of knowledge dispells the 
darkness of ignorance hindering the deliver- 
ence and it is because of the light of know- 
ledge dispelling the hindering darkness of 
ignorance whereby moksha is realised, that we 
say 'moksha or deliverance is due to know- 
ledge' ; but karma cannot remove this dark 
veil of ignorance. Karma is conceived as 
hinderance to moksha and this hinderance 
cannot be removed by karma itself ; because 
karma cannot destroy karma ; rather karma 
generates karma and untill and unless all 
karmic energetics are dessipated away from 


the body of the soul, its natural freedom 
cannot be made manifest. And moreover be- 
cause this moksha or freedom is constitu- 
tional (swabhava) with the very soul itself, 
it cannot be said to be derived out of or 
result from anything else. 

Then again it can't be maintained that 
karma removes ne-science (Avidya) for there 
IS a gulf of difference in the essential nature 
between karma and knowledge. To make 
it more clear, ne-science or non-knowledge 
Xajndna) is subreption as to the true nature 
of one's own self, while knowledge (Jndna) 
as opposed to ne-science is the realization 
of the true nature of the same. Hence 
ne-science which is of the nature of the sub- 
reption is contradictory to knowledge which 
is of the nature of true realization. And in 
this way we may well inter prete that light of 
knowledge dispells darkness of ne-science. 
Therefore kafma and knowledge are alto- 
gether opposite to each other in kind. But 
karma does not stand in such relation of 
opposition to ne-science. Hence karma can- 
not be said to remove ne-science {ajndna). 
Taking an alternative position, if we 



interprete ne-science either as want of 
knowledge, doubtful knowledge or mis- 
apprehension, then this ne-science can only 
be removed by knowledge alone and not by 
karma, because ne-science taken as such 
does not stand in opposition to karma. 

So we see moksha is not the product of 
anything. It is the realisation of the Ideal 
Self in and by Itself which is possible only 
when all the karma 'particles have fallen 
off from It, fivasya krita karma kshayena 
yatswariipdzyastkAnam tanmoksha, ConvA- 
tionally (Vyavahdr nay a) moksha is said to 
be a kind of paryAya of the jiva. It is 
important to note that soul is no airy nothing 
as the Intellectualist or the Buddhists hold. 
It is a substantative, positive entity, and 
as such it must exist in a state of being 
called a paryAya from the phenomenal 
point of view (vyavahdr naya). And this 
paryAya too cannot be wholly distinct and 
different from the substance itself whereof 
it is 2i paryAya ; lor, who has ever seen or 
conceived of a substance bereft of parydya 
and paryAya without substance, dravyam 
parydya viyutam parydyA dravya barjitAh : 



kak kadd kena kim rupA drisid mdnena 
kena veti, 

Mokska, thus, is the emancipation of the 
soul from the snares oi karma {karma-pdshay 
Like the other moral categories the Jain 
sages have also resolved this moksha into 
bkdva and dravya. When the soul becomes 
free from the four Ghdtiya karmas or the 
'Action-currents of Injury' it is said to 
have bhdva moksha and when the four 
Aghatiya karmas or the 'Action-currents 
of Non-injury' disappear from the consti- 
tution • of the soul, it is said to have 
attained dravya moksha. The psychology 
underlying this resolution of moksha into 
subjective {bkavd) and objective {dravycC), 
is too obvious to require any detailed 
discussion. When the soul in and through 
the processes of nirjard or dissipation of 
karmas, gets rid of the four-fold action-cur- 
rents of injury to the natural vision {darshan) 
knowledge {jndnd), and the like of the soul, 
it becomes omniscient {kevalin), because 
the soul is just like a mirror which becomes 
dim and hazy when the karma bargands 
veil its surface. By nirjard, the karma* 



bargan&s are purged from the constitution 

of the soul which on that account, atta ins 
to clearness and omniscience (Jceval /ndna). 
Having attained the keva/ /ndna^ the cause 
of forging fresh fetters of bondage being 
absent by virtue of samvar or stoppage, 
and nirjarA being yet in the processes of 
working, the jivanmukta kevalin gradually 
becomes free from all the residuum of 
Aghattya karmas known as vedanya, dyu, 
ndma and go^ra and thereafter attains to 
a state of bliss never-ending and beatitude 
everlasting. The realization by this jwa 
of this viz., his permanent state of being in 
knowledge and delight infinite is what is 
termed as Moksha-y freedom or emancipation 
from the snares oi karma for which reason we 
have the adage, — karma-pasha vinirmuktah 
mokshah. And when the soul is thus libera- 
ted it goes straight up to the Siddhasila or 
the Region of the Free and the Liberated at 
the summit of LokAkAsh. Speaking from 
the stand-point of noumenal naya, a siddha 
has no form whereof he is imperceptible by 
the senses, but viewed from zy/dt/^Mr^ stand- 
point he has a shadowy form of a human 



figure which is but an embodiment of Right- 
vision, Right-knowledge and Right-conduct 
in and through which d^jiva attains to a state 
of perfection bliss and beatitude which is 
otherwise known omniscience and Freedom 




Tke Guntstkanftff or tKe Ste|>^ing Stonef to Htgker 
<ftiitjff.-^T[ he Fcviiccn Sieges SqvcczcJ \i^ into Fcwr 
cj»ly — Tlie First is tlie Life of AstmaKty and Imt>ul8efl 
— -The Secoxio tKc Life of Coxisctous Selection — TKe 
Tktrd %B tkat of Conscience and Fattk — And tke Fourtk 
18 tkat of Knowledge and Deltgkt Infinite '—Fourteen 
Stagef leading to Omniscience — Regulation or Control 
does not mean Stultification as Complained of. 

To anyone who knows the nature of 
Moksha and the means prescribed for it in 
the Jain scriptures, there will be no difficulty 
in apprehending that the realization of the 
self is preceded invariably by a series of 
conditions which must be fulfilled one after 
another and that perfection itself is the 
culmination of a graduated scale or hierarchy 
of nfjoral activities, which have been classi- 
fied into fourteen stages and have been called 
GunasMnas by the Jainas. So long as 
the soul is bound by karmUy it can never 
attain that deliverance from mundane 
existence which is the be-all and end-all of 
all that live, move and have their beings on 



earth. The Jains believe that there is a 
ladder of fourteen steps by which a jiva 
may climb up to the stage called moksha. 
The sages have, therefore, divided the path 
which leads to the nirvana into fourteen stages 
or stepping stones, each of which represents a 
particular stage of development, condition or 
phase of the soul, following up from the 
quiescence, elimination or partial quiescence 
or partial elimination of certain energies 
of karma, the final outcome of which is the 
manifestation of those traits and attributes so 
long held in check as it were by the karmic 

To begin with the psychological observa- 
tions which underlie the whole fabric of these 
gunastkdnaSy we may remark at the outset, 
that these fourteen stages may be squeezed 
up more generally into four only in the 
moral ascent of the soul. The First stage, 
we may roughly speak of as the stage of 
impulsive life, of lust and enjoyment, when the 
soul is quite in the dark as to its true destiny 
and goal, and is least removed from the 
animal existence ; the Second is the life of 
conscious selection and pursuit, where the 



goal and true method of realisation are still 

misapprehended ; the Third is the life of 
conscience and faith where the ends are 

taken not as we like, but as we aught, and 
the Fourth^ the stage where all such conflicts 
disappear altogether and the soul shines forth 
in all its naturalness and omniscience. 

Now as to the question as to why the 
stages should succeed one another in the order 
stated above, and not in any other way we 
remark that as soon as the self-conscious life 
is thrown in the front or induced by the 
pains and miseries of the animal life, the life 
of impulses, the conscious will of man wakes 
up and learns to remain in the ruinous spread 
of blind propensity and animal spontaniety. 
Here, by the mere shrinking from the 
membered misery of recklessness, some har- 
mony is introduced and under the measured 
checks offered by Reason and sober think- 
ing, a certain unity of movement is given to 
the activities. At the same time we should 
not ignore the fact that here no new force is 
introduced and the whole operation is rather 
regulative than creative and it shows its 
want of intensity by being swept away before 



some flood- tide of affection that bears us 
right away out of ourselves. 

The third stage begins with the changes 
in the dynamical conditions otherwise pre- 
sent to us which .ire occasioned by the blind 
perception of the moral superiority of the 
higher springs of action. It is a stage of un- 
working faith, of implicit apprehension of the 
true way of realisation notwithstanding the 
want of a clear intellectual discernment as 
to the moral worth or imperativeness of the 
course of action adopted. Here the soul does 
not only exert a restraining influence, or has 
a mere regulative control over some of the 
springs of action, and other propensities, lest 
they might when freely indulged in, give rise 
to other pains and miseries incident to the 
first and second stages ; but also itself volun- 
tarily sides with one of the solicitations it 
has implicitly apprehended as the right 
course of action. Some sort of harmony 
and concord have truly been attained, some 
conditions have been truly worked out for 
the attainment of the desired End ; but still 
this harmony is incomplete, inchoate and 
unstable so long Reason is called in to 



decide between rival desires ; in as much 
as this harmony is brought about and kept 
up untarnished, not by leaving every chord 
of heart to vibrate freely, but by laying the 
silencing hand on everything that would 
speak in discord, if once left alone. The 
constitution here is undoubtedly regulated, 
the passions and propensities of life have 
been curbed and restrained to make the 
achievement of the observed End possible, 
and some sort of harmony truly shines forth, 
But still it goes without saying, that the right 
order is purchased here by some sacrifice of 
force, by exertion of will, some of which is 
spent still only in holding down the clamouring 
impulses of life and consequently the constitu- 
tion can hardly be said to be properly tuned. 
The fourth stage of life begins when the 
competition of impulses cease with the 
absolute concurrence of the natural solicita- 
tions with what ought to be, with the 
harmony of the scale of intensity of the 
impulses of life, with the scale of their 
excellence and moral efficiency. This stage 
is made possible only after a clear inteHec- 
tual discernment (Jn&na) of what ought to 


be and of the proper means of its realisation. 
Here the harmony that is introduced is not 
partial or unstable as in the previous stages 
but is complete and it effects its end and 
works out itself with complete naturalness 
and spontaniety. 

Thus to generalise further we may say 
that of these four stages, the first is charac- 
terised by indiscrimination or caprice, free- 
dom without restraint, the second and third 
by voluntary and much strained Regulation 
at the expense of the so-called freedom, and 
the fourth by the coincidence of freedom 
and regulation. And as each person shtnas 
forth in its true light, he becomes one with 
itself, as he passes from the preceding stages 
to those succeeding, reconciling now some 
warring inconsistencies, satisfying some 
haunting claim and getting rid of some 
gnawing uneasiness, and thus stands forth 
in greater vigour, keeping clear of all 
enfeebling defects ; because to the lower 

^ stages some hesitation and cowardice, some 
sort of indecision and indiscrimination 

forever cling. 

Another thought which occupied tb« 




minds of the Jain philosophers and which 
practically moulded their philosophy into its 
present shape is that the additional sufferings 
which our soul undergoes beyond the limits 
of animal sensibility are contributed by our 
own intellectual endowments. It is because 
we look before and after from the point 
where we are now standing, because our 
mind can well detect beforehand the actual 
and the possible, because the visible has 
no powei^ to blot out the invisible from 
our thought, that with us no pain can perish 
in a moment, but on the contrary, leaves on 
us many a vestige on its departure. Memory 
although it seems to have the cruel property 
of stripping the evil of its transitoriness, 
has also the brighter aspects as well in as 
much as it sends forth a notice of the 
approach of the evil and betrays the secret of 
it and men suffer as they fail to catch these 
warnings. What would then be the correct 
view of it ? Would you renounce this 
foresight, this reason altogether and revert 
to the mere animal existence to be saved 
from the tears ? Would you forsake your 
many-chambered mind and shut yourself up 



in a single cell and draw down its blinds so 
that you may feel no storm, see no lightning 
and know nothing till you are struck down? 
Certainly not, says our Jain teacher, for the 
expansion of your vision, your intellectual 
consciousness will help you in having a con- 
trol over your distresses and it is the only 
condition of whatever control you may have 
over them. It is only by continuance in 
thought that we can distinguish their kinds, 
investigate into their causes and discover 
their remedies and it is the self-knowledge 
of suffering that will open up before you 
the way to its own remedy. Most of the 
misfortunes and miseries incident to our life 
are due to our own ignorance ; to the want 
of our own true insight into the real nature 
of things and they are gradually sure to be 
removed with the expansion of our intellec- 
tual and moral endowment. 

To understand the principle underlying 
the arrangement of the gunastkdnas, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the fact that the 
attainment of every end requires Right 
Vision, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct 
Of these ihree, Right^ Vision precedes Right 



KtibWl^dge, while Right Conduct is a 
characteristic of those alone who have almost 
perfected themselves in Vision and Wisdom. 
Hence, the earliest stage of the journey 
ts necessarily that which marks the tran- 
SfCfOn from the state of settled wrong 
convictions to the acquisition of true faith 
and knowledge. Thus we see that in Jain 
philosophy a great importance is also attach- 
ed to the reflective thought or in other 
words to the conscious reaction of the mind 
upon the results of its own unconscious or 
obscurely conscious movements. The four- 
teen stages also clearly show that however 
sfow the movement of advance may be, the 
time must come when reason must turn 
back to measure and criticise, to select and 
reject, to reconsider and remould by 
reflexion the immediate products of crude 
and imperfect knowledge or faith. It must 
also be remembered in this connection that 
ahhough there is a relative opposition 
between the immediate, unreflective move- 
ment of man's mind or Faith and that which 
is conscious and reflective, yet it is the same 
ftifei^^dn of ttran that fs at work in both and 


all that reflection can do is to bring to light, 
the processes and categories which underlie 
the unreflective action of intelligence. We 
must therefore maintain that though reason 
may accidentally or at the first stage of life 
may become opposed to faith, its ultimate 
and healthy action must preserve for us or 
restore to us all that is valuable in it. Nay 
in the long run a living faith or immediate 
vision (Samyak darshan) will absorb into 
itself the elements of the criticism which is 
directed against it and it will develop 
pari passu with other two elements namely : 
Right knowledge and Conduct. And Jainism 
by giving equal stress on all the three 
elements, namely, right vision i,e. immediate 
perception, right knowledge i,e. intellectual 
discrimination, and right conduct Le, volition 
may best be characterised as both intuitive 
and reflective, practical and speculative, 
conscious and self-conscious ! 

Let us now discuss the successive stages 

through which the soul passes from the 

darkness of ignorance to the illumination of 

knowledge, from the state of bondage to 

that of complete deliverance. 



The first stage is called Mitkydtva or the 
stage of false knowledge. It is the starting 
point of all spiritual evolution, the first step 
in the ascent of the soul, signifying only 
ignorance which is the normal condition of 
all jivas involved in the cycle of Sansdra, 
The soul in this ^tage is completely under 
the infiuence of karma as a consequence of 
which no true view of things is possible to 
the soul. When a man thoroughly dis- 
satisfied with the actual state of things of the 
world, tries to get rid of this miserable con- 
dition of being, he tries to speculate upon 
the state of the world and his relation to it 
which enables him to hold down in check 
the three kinds of energetics of darshana 
mohoniya karma, namely, (i) mtthydtva 
which invariably deludes the soul to settled 
wrong beliefs (2) samyag mitkydtva which 
is characterised by a mixture of truth and 
falsehood and (3) Samyakta, signifying only 
blurred faith i.e,, stinged with superstition 
and (4) the results of anantdnubandhts type 
oi kashdyas, namely, anger, pride, deceit and 
greed, producing what is known disPrathamo- 
pdsama-Samyaktva^^dL kind of faith, which 



being Itself unstable and ill-grounded, sub- 
sides sooner or later with the preponderance 
of anyone of the anantdnubandhi kashdyas 
mentioned above. It can safely be inferred 
here in this connection that the subsidence 
of the seven energies of karma is the 
primary requisite of obtaining a true insight. 

There are two divisions of this stage 
namely, first, when other people can know 
that one is mistaking a false view of things 
for a true one, is misapprehending an object 
or event and secondly, where such detection 
is not possible although one may still con- 
tinue in this state. A Jaina sloka says : 

**As a man blind from birth is not able to 
say what is ugly and what is beautiful, so a 
man in the mithydtva gunasthdnaka cannot 
determine what is real and what is false." 

The second stage appears when the soul, 
whirling round and round in the cycle of 
existence, loses some of its crudeness and 
ignorance and rises to the state called 
granthibheda and learns to distinguish first 
between what is false and what is right, as 
opposed to the first stage where no such 
distinction is possible, being itself confined 



absolutely within the limits of ignorance only. 
It next rises to the state called upasama 
samakita where, it forgets the above 
distinction and consequently is not able to 
act according to such distinctions ; but later 
on when the soul again gets hold of such 
distinction and fresh remembrance of it 
comes back, the soul enters on another stage 
namely, Sasvddana gunasthanaka, which is 
characterised by exhausted faith. 

Next the soul that rises to the third stage 
namely Misra gunasthdnaka is so to speak 
in a state of tension, oscillating between the 
stage of knowledge and doubt. At one 
moment it gets hold of the truth and at the 
next doubts it. It is a stage of uncertainty 
and vascillation. But the peculiarity of 
this stage is that the soul cannot remain 
permanently in this stage but must either 
slide down to the second stage or must rise 
up to the fourth one. 

The fourth stage is called Avirati — 
Samyagdhristi which follows as soon as the 
doubts of an individual have been removed 
either by meditation or by instruction of the 
guru. This stage is so named because the 



person here becomes a true believer. It is 
called Avirata because the soul here is still 
unable to take those vows which strengthen 
and protect men from the reaction of karma, 
A person at this stage can control, anger, 
pride, greed and three other branches of 
mohaiiiya karmd mentioned above in as 
much as we can say that this stage is the 
result of partial or entire subsidence of the 
seven energies of karma discussed in the 
first stage. It should also be remembered 
in this connection that partial subsidence of 
these energies oi karma \s very dangerous, 
because it may cause the soul at this stage 
to slip back again into lower stages. The 
soul too at this stage gains five good things 
which should not also be lost sight of 
namely, (i) Sama i.e, the power of controll- 
ing anger ; (2) Samvega, Le., the knowledge 
that the world is full of evil and as the law 
of karma only works here, one should have 
the least affection for this world ; (3) 
Nirveda 2:.^., the knowledge that his wife and 
children do not really belong to him ; (4) 
Anukampd i.e. the sympathy or affection to 
relieve others in distress : (5) AsthA i.e., 




a firm, unflinchiiiaf faith in all the Victors 
or Jinas. 

The next stage is known as Desavirati, 
otherwise called Samayatd-samyata gunas- 
thdnaka. It is here the sou! which was so 
long guided by the mere influence of faith, 
first realises the great importance of conduct 
and so can take the twelve vows which 
really enable a man to fight against the 
energies of karma. This stage attaches 
much importance to different kinds of 
behaviour on account of which it has been 
divided into three parts. First, \\\ Jaghanya 
desaviratt, a man takes a vow not to drink 
intoxicating drugs or to eat flesh. He 
constantly repeats the Migadhi salutation 
to the Five Great Ones — 'Salutation to 
AkirantUt salutation to Siddho^ to Ackdrya, 
to UpadhayQy and to all the Sddkus of the 
world." The soul may still rise higher 
while continuing in this stage and without 
forsaking the previous vows may take a 
fresh vow to make money in righteous ways 
only. The person here takes a special care 
to observe the six rules for daily life 
namely, "One must worship god, serve the 



guru, study the scriptures, control the senses, 
perform austerites and give alms." He may 
also rise further up and may attain to the 
state of Utkristo desavirati by taking up 
vows of eating once a day, maintaing 
absolute chastity, renouncing the company of 
the most beloved, and finally of becoming a 
sddhus At this stage too, moderate anger, 
deceit, pride and greed are not only subdued 
but sometimes entirely destroyed. 

The next stage is known as Pramatta 
Gunasthdnaka which can be reached by 
the ascetics, only. Here slight passions are 
either controlled or destroyed and only a 
few Pramddas (negligences) yet linger. 
These Pramddas are five in number, namely 
Pride, Enjoyment of Senses, - Kashdyas 
(anger, conceit, intrigue and greed) and Sleep. 
According to the Jaina Scriptures, a man 
to rise higher than these stages must not 
indulge in any of these, for he may 
otherwise be levelled down to the mithydtva 
stage. As to why the Jain philosophers 
condemn anger so vehemently we may 
say, that because anger appears so evidently 
and displays itself with so little discrimina* 



tion towards all sources of injury, real or 
imaginative, because it gives us so much 
trouble with its suggestions, at an age 
when better means of self protection are at 
our disposal, it is so clearly the business 
of all reflective knowledge of evil not to 
indulge in it but to subdue it. Its instinctive 
character forces itself irresistively on our 
convictions. It is the sudden rising against 
opposition and harm of any kind, real or 
prospective, without originally any idea of 
moral injury or the reflection on the nature 
of the object that hurts us. Again, all those 
persons who attempt to put stress on the 
enjoyment of sense, do so obviously on the 
erroneous notion that the beautiful is 
resolvable into what is pleasing to the 
senses and they propose to show how a 
certain stock of primitive sensible pleasures 
spreads and ramifies by countless association 
and confers a factitious attraction on a 
thousand things in themselves indifferent. 
But this is absurd ! For their character is 
changed into something odious as soon as 
they become self-chosen indulgents. Those 
who smoothly indulge in gratification of 



the senses, betray their general weakness 
which can never be a strong proof against 
the fascinations of the Sense. So the Jaina 
philosophy enjoins that our will should always 
be directed not to enforce the energetics 
oi Kashayas, but to lull them into sleep, 
into complete forgetfulness, to weaken them 
altogether, so that they may not prove even 
in future a menace to the abiding peace of 
the soul. 

The seventh stage is generally known 
as Apramatta gunasthdnaka. Anger has 
been here completely subdued and only 
greed, deceit and pride still linger in a very 
slight degree. The power of concentration 
and meditation increases here and the soul 
gets rid of all sorts of negligences. That 
which brings stupor or sleep bieng altogether 
absent here, all the active powers latent in 
the soul become by degrees more and more 

In the eighth stage called Apurva- 
karanUy the conduct becomes perfect so far 
the observances of vows are concerned and 
man's heart becomes filled with such joy as 
had never been experienced before. As 



anger was entirely disappearing in the pre- 
vious stage, so does pride here. The jtva 
now applies himself to holy meditation, and 
the fetters of karma become, as its conse- 
quence, more and more loosened. This 
step, is often characterised as the Unique 
owing to its loftiness. 

The next stage is known as Aniyah- 
bAdara gunasth$,naka. As in the previous 
stage pride disappears altogether, so does 
deceit here. The man practically rises 
above all sex-idea and devotes himself to 

The tenth stage is reached by advanced 
ascetic only | who "thereupon loses all sense 
of humour, all aesthetic pleasure in beauty 
of sound or form, and all perceptions of 
pain, fear, grief, disgust and smells. The 
ascetic gladly renounces his worldly ambition 
and with it all his worldly cares and anxieties 
disappear. Slight greed which still lingers 
iu this stage only remains to be eradicated. 
This is known as StLlishrna samparya 

The eleventh stage, Upasdntamoka gunas- 
thdnaka is the most critical peiiod of life. 



If the ascetic here be able to completely 
subdue or destroy the lingering tinge of 
greed, he is safe and pisses on to the twelfth 
stage. But if it remains only in check by 
utmost exertion of the soul, then in time 
to come, it may gather sufficient strength 
to overcome the controlling forces of the 
agent, and m ly cause the soul to slip 
back even into the lowest stage. If on the 
otherhand he successfully combats greed, 
he becomes an Anitttaravdsi Deva and 
knows that he is destined to become a 
Siddha after his next birth. 

In the twelfth stage, Kshinamoha gunas- 
thdnakaj the ascetic not only eludes the 
grasp of greed, but also becomes free from 
the influence of all Gkdiin karma or those 
which prove to be impediments in way of 
obtaining omniscience. And although the 
Agkdtin karma still persists, it is too weak 
to bring the soul under its control. The 
soul at this stage passing through the re- 
maining two stages enters at once into 

The thirteenth stage is known as Sayogi- 
kevali Gumistkdnaka. The man who reaches 



this stage shines in 'eternal wisdom, and 
•deh'ght infinite/ This stage is often known 
as that of jihan mukta\ for there is an 
entire destruction of the four kinds oi gkdtin 
karma. There is still the operation of the 
aghdtin prakrifis in virtue of which the soul 
remains yet locked up as it were within the 
mortal coil. The man haying reached this 
stage, forms a Tirtha or 'Order' and subse- 
quently becomes Tirthankara or Maker of 
the Order. These Tirthankaras explain the 
truth in the ''divine anaksharf manner 
which is garbed in popular languages by ad- 
vanced disciples. These an aks har i \.\iO\kg\iis 
or suggestions, whatever they might be, 
become translated into popular speech which 
afterwards are designated as the Agamas, 
the ordinary mode of conversation being 
altogether impossible for the Tirthankaras 
owing to the organic changes brought 
about by the severity of their own austerities. 
The truths thus communicated by such Tir- 
thankaras are generally known as Revela- 
tions and the warantee of their truth rests on 
on the fact that they come out from men 
who being free from the influence of moho- 



nya karma have attained omniscience and 
stand on a far higher platform than we do. 
The latter portion of this stage is occupied 
with Sukla dky^na or pure contemplation 
which reaches its culmination or highest 
perfection when the body disappears like 
burnt comphor as will be described in the 
next staofe. It is the man at this staore 
that people worship ; for in the next the 
person adored loses all earthly interest and 
shuffles off his mortal coil. 

The next stage begins when all influence 
of karma energetics has ehher been success- 
fully dessipated or entirely destroyed. The 
man at this stage attains moksha and is called 
Siddhx or the Self- Realized. In such stage 
the Siddkcis do not merge themselves in 
an all-embracing One, but remain in the 
Siddhasila or the Region of the Liberated 
as freed souls, enjoying perfect freedom from 
every sort of bondage caused by karma 
particles. Siddhas, being omniscient and 
omnipotent, must have right vision and right 
knowledge revealing them spontaneously in 
their right conduct. Such Tirthas, breaking 
loose from the shackles of mortal coil and 




karma and being possessed of all those 
divine qualities whic'i we cannot but 
revere and admire mo^i, soar high up into 
a kind spiritual atmosphere where everyone 
shines forth as an embodiment of Faith, 
Truth and Culture. 

It is not infrequently that we meet with 
a few criticisms hurled against Jainism by 
its detractors mainly resting on the erroneous 
belief that Jainism, instead of helping in 
the development of personality, furthers its 
stultification and that it is a mystery how the 
Siddhas, after becoming free from all bond- 
age oi karma, and becoming alike in nature, 
do not lose their individuality and merge in an 
all-inciusive One. It is further contended that 
while Jainism silently accepts the action and 
influence of Siddhas in an atmosphere wholly 
spiritual, it excludes that from our earthly 
or mortal life, precisely the sphere nearest 
to them. Are we then to find them in a 
sphere which lies beyond the region of our 
dream even and to miss them in our thought, 
our duty and our love ? 

The evident reply of Jainism would be : 
"Far from it." For, although the Siddhas 



live a transcendent life still >ye are In 
communion with them. It is not they indeed 
that under the mask of our personality, do 
our thinking and pray against our tempta- 
tions and wipe our tears. These are truly 
our own. But still they are in presence of 
a sympathy free to answer, spirit to spirit ; 
neither merging in the other, although both 
are in the same affections and inmost 
preferences. Did we remove this element 
of transcendency of Siddhas so as to render 
them absolutely universal, the effect would 
be the reverse of objector's expectations, and 
instead of gaining something more noble 
and divine for these Siddhas, we should in 
reality lose all. For all transcendency would 
then be gone and no range would be left for 
the life of these Divine Siddhas ; they 
would be all in all But the conception of 
personality requires that of a personal being, 
living with persons and acting on grounds 
of reason and righteousness. In proportion 
as a being mechanises himself and commits 
all his energy to immutable methods and 
degrees which is inevitable if he happens 
to be wholly untranscendental, he abdicates 


his personal prerogative and permits his will 
to sleep off into a continuous automatism. 
Without freedom to act freshly from imme- 
diate thought and affection, that is without 
some place unbespoken by habit, character 
and personality can have no place whatsoever. 
This fatal effectof annihilation of personality 
ceases the moment the universality is remov- 
ed. Let there be some realm of divine action 
of the Siddhas, some transcendent form of 
life in which our spirit is not found, and 
after learninof there the livinof thouofht and 
love of them, we can try our best to follow 
their footsteps. It does not kill out the 
characterstics of personal existence. On 
the otherhand, it is but the mixture indis- 
pensible to intellectual and moral perfection 
and from their quickening touch and con- 
verse in the spiritual walks of our experience, 
we can look and see without dismay in the 
customary ways of righteous life only a 
message of hope, the steadfastness of a 
promise and moral Ideal and not the indiffer- 
ence to, or the iron grip of Fate. 

As regards the second objection often 
hurled against Jainism as to why the 



Siddhas would not lose there individuality 
in an all, embracing Self, the retort 
of Jainism would of course be that if 
the so called Infinite Self includes us all 
and all our experiences, — sensations and 
sins as well as the rest, in the unity of 
one life, and if there is but one and same 
final Self for us and each all, then with a 
literalness it, indeed appalling. He is we and 
we are He ; nay He is I and I am He. Now 
if we read the conception in the first way 
what becomes of our ethical independance ? 
— What, of our personal reality, our righte- 
ousness and ethical responsibility ? What 
becomes of Him ? Then surely He is but 
another name for me or you of any of the 
Siddhas, And how can there be a talk of a 
moral order, of a moral cosmos, since there 
is but a single mind in this case and we 
cannot ligitimately call that a Person ! When 
it is made to mean absolute identity, then all 
the worth of true nearness is gone and with 
it the openness of access, the freedom of 
converse and the joy of true reciprocity vanish 
altogether. These precious things all draw 
their meaning from the distinct reility of 



different persons ; for life is eternal and is 
eternally germinating the supreme consci- 
ousness of the Ideal that seats the central 
reality of each human being in an .eternal 
circle of Persons, and establishes each as a' 
free citizen in the all-founding, all-illumina- 
ting realm of spirits. But when we turn 
that mood into literal philosophy and cause 
our centre of selfliood to vainsh in an all- 
embracing Oae or One's to vanish into ours, 
we lose the tone of relioflon thit is true and 
wholesome ; for true religion is built only 
on firm foundation of duty and responsibility, 
on ethical rights and righteousness ; and 
these, again rest on the footing of freedom 
and Personality. A religion based on such 
firm foundation is truJy a genuine and 
inspiring religion — the religion not of sub- 
mission but of aspiration, not of bondage but 
of freedom, not of Fate but rather of Faith 
and Hope and Insight. 



Tkc Cyclsg of Al5asart>xni ana Utsart>int — Tnc 
Yugalikas and tli2 Kal{>a Tree— Ws get gltm|>3es o£ tlie 
Uv23 of tks First Tw>jnfcy two Ttrtkanlcars — Regular 
Mtstortcal Accounts bsgxn with Pdre3iianatli, the Twenty 
tltird Tirjlianlcar ani Minavir in? Twenty fourtk— 
Hi^ture anl S^lit ~tl\3 Prin2tt>al Suodtvistons of tnc 
Owetamkart and t!i3 Digamkari — The List of GaccKas. 

We have already seen how the Jains 
establish the eienial existence of the universe 
as a single unit and of the two great ever- 
recurring cycles of ages, Abasarpini and 
Utsarpini. The Jains believe that in each of 
these, there flourish twenty-four Tirthankars. 
During the present period of y:/5^^^^i;^i, 
Rishav Dev or Adinath as he is also called, 
was the first Tirthankar and the last one 
was Maliavira or Vardhmin. It was 
Rishavdev, who first taught the people, 
men and women, the different arts and 
industries. But previous to his era was 
the period of Yii^aliksy when, as the Jain 
tradition goes, human beings were born in 
pairs ; they lived as husbands and wives 



and all their necessaries were supplied by 
Kalpa trees. The idea of Yugaliks is, 
peculiar to the Jains, as we have not 
come across any description of Yugaliks in 
any other work of other religionists. 
Gradually with the degenerating tendency of 
of the tune, \hQ. Kalpa trees failed in yielding 
up the desires of mankind and the world 
became full of miseries so much so, that to 
alleviate this, Adinath introduced reforms in 
everything, spiritual or worldly. After his 
nirvan, twentyone Tirthankars followed 
before Parshwanath, the twenty-third, 
during which period many saints and heroes 
flourished. Detailed accounts of these heroes 
are lost to us. But we come across only 
with some important events of their lives 
and of the times abounding with legends 
and myths. They were all great personages 
and yet for the above reasons, their accounts 
throw in little light from the historic point 
of view. 

Parshwanath was born in ^JJ B. C, and 
reached moksha in the hundredth year of his 
age in '/'j'j B. C. There is a chronological 
list showing heads of the Church, known as 



Upakesh Gachha (see Appendix E) running 
down up to the present day. His first 
ganadhar or chief disciple was Shubha Datt, 
who was succeeded by \\w\ Datt. Then 
came Arya Samudra and his disciple Prava 
Suri. Next Keshi Kumar succeeded to the 
headship of the Church. Acharya Keshi 
Kumar was a contemporary of Mahavira. 
Both Keshi, the spiritual head of the Church 
and Gautam the chief disciple of Mahavira 
had interviews on spiritual reforms. 

Lord Mahavira attained nirvan in 527 
B. C His prominent disciples or ganadhars 
were eleven viz : 

1. Indrabhuti, better known as Gautam 
from hisgoira. 

2. Agnibhuti ; belonging to Gautam 

3. Vayubhuti, belonging to Gautam 

4. Vyakta, belonging to Bhardwaja^t?/ra, 

5. Sudharma, belonging to Agniveshyan 

6. Mandit, belon:;iag to Vasista ^(j/^'a. 

7. Mouryaputra, belonging to Kashyap 



8. Akampit, belonging to Gautam gotra. 

9. Achalbhr^ta, belonging to H3.ritayan 

10. Metarya, belonging to Kodinna 

11. Prabhds, also belonging to Kodinna 
gotra . 

Except the first and the fifth, all the nine 
ganadhars got moksha during the life-time of 
their master. 

In those remote ages in India, there were 
small kingdoms each with its own king, who 
from time to time was forced to acknowledge 
the supremacy of another or who used to 
throw off the allegiance according to his own 
convenience or power. In Jain texts we 
find the names of the following contemporary 
kings of such kingdoms during Mahavir's 
time. And it is important to note that 
all these kings were admirers of the last 
Tirthankar and appreciated the reforms he 
introduced in the Sangha and many of 
them were actually his followers. 

1. Srenika was king of Magadha at 

2. Dadhibahan was king of Anga at 

Jain church. 

Champa where Srenik*s son- Konik or 
Asokchandra removed his capital after his 
father*s death. 

3. Chetak was king at Vaisali near 
modern Bihar. 

4. Malliks were reigning at Baranasi 

5. Lachhiks or the Lachhavis were 
kings of Koshala (Ajodhya). 

6. King Bfjoya was reigning at Palash- 

7. Sweta was king at Amalkalpa; 

8. Udayan was reigning at Yitabh^ya 

9. Shantanik and then his son 
Udayan Vatsa, a lover of music were kings 
of Vatsya at Kosambi near niodern 

io.i King Nandivardhan was reignmg^^ 
at Kshatriyakund. 

II. Chanda Pradyotan was king^ of" 
Malwa at Ujjain. 

12* Sal and Mahasal were reigning ar^ 

13^ Hrasaana Chandra was king' ate^ 


14. Adinshatru was reigning at 

15. Dhanabaha was reigning at 

16. Birkrishna Mitra was king at 

17. Vdsab Dutt was king at Bijoypur. 

18. Priya Chandra was reigning at 

19. Mitranandi was king at Siketpur. 

20. King Apratihat was reigning at 

21. Arjun was king at Sughosh. 

22. King Bala was reigning at Mohapur. 

23. King Dasarna was reigning at 

Now a rupture took place in the Jain 
Church about the year 300 B.C. and the final 
separation came about in the year 82 A. D. 
as stated in the Introduction. This is the 
beginning of the bifurcation and origin 
of the two great sects, the Swetamharis 
and the Digambarisy each of which is again 
subdivided into different minor sects accord- 
ing to the difference in acknowledging or 
interpreting the religious texts. These 



minor sects gradually sprang up for the 
most part on account of different interpre- 
tations the pontiffs put on the canonical 
texts from time to time. 

The principal divisions of the Swetam- 
bari sect are : — 

{a) Pujera. 

(i) Dundhia or Bistola, 

{c) Terapanthi. 

The original stock is now known as 
Pujera, as its followers are thorough worship- 
pers. The Dundhias had tlieir origin about 
the year 1580 A.D. and although they re- 
cognise the images of Tirthankars, they do 
not indulge in worship with formal rites and 
formulas. The Terapanthis flourished only 
lately in the year 1762 A.D., or thereabout 
and they do not believe in images or allow 
its worship in any form whatever. 

The Digambaris are also subdivided 
into several sects. The important ones 
are :— 

(a) Bispanthi, who allows worship to 
a certain extent. 

(6) Terapanthi, who had their origin 
about the 17th century A.D., acknowledges 


images, but does not allow any sort of 
worship of the same. 

(r) Samaiy^panthi, a non-idolatrous sect, 
entirely does away with the image or its 
worship, but simply acknowledges the sanc- 
tity ot the sacred books which are worship- 
ped by placing them on an altar. It is also 
known as Taranpanthi as it was founded by 
Taranswami. He was born in 1448 A. D. 
and died in 151 5 A. D. 

{d) Gumanpanthi, flourished of late in 
the 1 8th century A. D., and so called from 
the name of its founder Guman Ram. 

{e) Totapanthi. 

In the Digambari Church there also 
arose a number of Sanghas viz ; 

(i) Mul Sangha with its subsects viz. 
^ {a) Sinha Sangha 
(5) Nandi Sangha 
{c) Sen Sangha. 

(2) Dravid Sangha 

(3) Yapaniya Sangha 

(4) Kastha Sangha 

(5) Mathur Sangha 

III the Sanghas there are Ganas and 
Gachlias e. g. the Nandi Sangha hai|. 


Baldtkar gana, Saraswallgachka, & Painjat 

We find several lists of the teachers of 
these various sanjIi^Sy ganus, and gachhas 
111 the pattJLvahs and inscriptions that have 
come to liglit up till now. (See Appendix) 
Of their Acharyas Kund-kundi-chirya, the 
author of Panchastikaya and other works 
who flourished just before the Christian era 
(8 B. C.) and Uniaswati, author of the 
famous treatise Tatw^rthasutra and other 
Sanskrit works who flourished about the 
middle of the ist century A. D., deserve 
special mention. Others as Amitgati, 
author of Dharmapariksha, Subhslsitratna 
Sandoha (about 993 A, D.) Akalanka Dev, 
Dhananjoy, the author of the well known 
epic Dwisandhan (827 A. D.j Harichandra, 
author of Dliarmasliarmibhudaya, Devn indi 
Virnandi, author ofCh I'ldraprabha Charitam, 
Ba^diraj, Some D-v, author of Yasastilak, 
were all great scholars and authors of works 
of high repute. 

After Mahavir's nirvan a number of 
Gachhas (schools) also came to being in 
the Swetambar Church. -They originated 


from the different Jain teachers, who 
assumed themselves as heads of their own 
gachhas, alleging differences in religious 
practices and holding different interpretations 
of the texts of the Sutras, These Sutras 
of the Jain Sid.lhanta of the Swetambaris 
were handed orally till they were 
reduced to writing about 980 years after 
Mahavir's nirvan (453 A D.) by Davardhi- 
gani Ksham^shraman who was a pupil of 
Lohitya Suri, in the city of Vallabhi in 
Gujrat, before a great Council which met 
for the purpose. The Swetambar Church 
have got lists of their gachhas and their 
members and these throw much light on the 
dark pages of Indian History. The mention 
of Jain hierarchs, teachers and their schools 
in the inscription discovered at Maihura and 
other places of late, is of great importance 
to verify the statements in Kalpa Sutra and 
other Jain texts of such guna or gachha 
(the school) the Kula (the line) and Shakha 
(the branch) of the miinjain Church. Its 
literature has preserved the list of Saris or 
hierarchs, noting down the important 
events during their time. Therein we find 



that after Udyotan Suri, his eighty-four 
disciples started 84 gachhas (937 A. D.) as 
all of them were created Acharyas by him. 
Although many of them are extinct now, 
yet they are of great value and the Swetam- 
bar literature possesses complete lists of the 
heads of the gachhas from this Acharya. 

We give belaw, in brief, an account of 
the heads of the Church from Mahavir, the 
last Tirthankar up to Acharya Udyotan, 
as far as could be gathered from the matter 
available to us« Further Chronological lists 
are given in the Appendix and they may 
be useful for reference. 

I. Mahavir a. He belonged to Iksh- 
waku Kula, K^syap gotra, was the son of 
King Siddh^rtha of Kshatri-kund, a town 
in Magadh and queen Trisalsl. Born in 
599 B. C. on.Chaitra Sukla 13. He passed 
30 years as a householder, 12 years 6 
months and i fortnight in Chhadamast 
State —(Intermediate state between a house 
holder and a perfect sage) and 29 years 5 
months and 15 days as a Kevali, till he 
attained nirv^n at the age of 72 in the town 
of P^p^ about 8 miles from modern Bihar 


on Kartic Badi 15 in 527 B. C. He had 
24000 sadhus (male disciples), 36000 
Sadhwis (female disciples), 1,59000 Srivaks 
(male followers) and 3,18000 Sravik^s 
ffemale followers^. 

His principal disciple was Indrabhuti 
better known as Gautam from his gotra. 
He was a Brahmin by caste, son of 
Vasubhuti and Prithivi and was born in 
607 B. C. in the village Gobbar (Gobbra 
or Govaraya) near Rajgriha. He was 
for 50 years a householder, for 30 years a 
Chhadamast and 12 years as Kevali and 
reached nirvan at the age of 92 in 515 B. C. 

After Mahaviras nirvan, Sudharm^, the 
fifth qanadhar succeeded to the headship of 
the Church as Gautam, the first ganadhar 
became a Kevali, immediately after his 
Lord's mohsha and Sudharm^ was the only 
available ganadhar. Moreover the Sadhus 
converted by. Gautam died early and other 
ganadhars yielded up their pupils to 
Sudharm^. The headship therefore fell 
upon him. 

2. Sudharmd. He was born in 607 B.C. 
the year in which Gautam was born. He 



was the son of Dhammilla and Bhaddala of 
Koll^g village and belonged to Agni Vesayan 
gotra. He lived 50 years as a "householder, 
42 years in Chhadamast state and 8 years as 
a Kevali and reached moksha in his looth 
year 20 years after Mahavir*s nirvan in 
507 B. C. 

3. Jambu. He succeeded to the headship 
when Sudharma became a Kevali in 515B.C. 
He was a native of Rajgriha, son of a banker 
Rishav Dutt and Dh^rini of K^syap gotra. 
He entered the order at the age of 16, 
passed 20 years in Chhadamast state and 44 
years as a Kevali. He was the last of the 
KevalinSy and got nirvan at the age of 80 
in 463 B.C., 64 years after Mahavira. 

4, Prabhava. After Jambu, he assumed 
the headship. He was of K^ty^un gotra, 
son of king Jaisena of Jaipur near Vindhya 
Hills, remained 30 years as a householder, 
64 (according to some 44) years in SiStmanya 
brata and 1 1 years as head of the church 
and died at the advanced age of 105 
(according to some 85) in 45a B.C., i.e. 
75 years after Mahavira. 

5. Sajjambhava. He was a native of 


Rajgriha and was next appointed as the head 
of the church. He was of Batsya gotra and 
was converted by the appearance of an 
image of Tirthankar Shdntin^th, when cele- 
brating a sacrifice as a Brahmin. He left 
home at the age of 28, passed 1 1 years in 
Sftmanya Vrata and 23 years as head of the 
church up to 429 B.C. He died 98 years 
after Mahavira at the age of 62. He was 
the author of the famous ''Dasavaik^lika 
Sutra" which he composed for his son Manak. 

6. Yasobhadra. He succeeded Sajjam- 
bhava and remained 50 years as head of the 
church up to 379 B.C. He belonged to 
Tungiyayan gotra, left home at the age of 
22 and passed 14 years in Samanya vrata 
and died at the age of 86 i,e, 148 years after 
Mahavir's nirvan. 

7. Sambhuti Vijay. He was the next 
spiritual head and remained as such for 8 years 
up to 371 B.C. He was of MathaLV gotra and 
was a householder up to the age of 42. He 
passed 40 years in S^manya vrata and died 
at the age of 90 i.e. 1 56 years after Mahavira. 

8. Bhadrabahu. He succeeded Sam- 
bhuti Vijay although he was not his dis- 



ciple, but a brother disciple. He repre- 
sented the church for 14 years up to 357 
B.C. He sprang from Prachin gotra, an 
inhabitant of Pratisthanpur in the South. 
He was initiated at the age of 45 and 
remained 17 years in S^manya vrata before 
he became the head. He died at the age of 
76 or about 170 years after Mahavira. He 
was a great scholar and commentator. His 
niryukiis on Jain Siddhant are handed 
dorwn to us, as living examples of his vast 
learning and knowledge of our Shastras. 
His brother according to Jain tradition was 
Bardhamihir, the well-known astronomer. 

9. Sthulabhadra. He was a native of 
P4taliputra and belonged to Gautama gotra 
His parents were Sak4dala and Lachhal 
Devi, the former was a minister of the 9th 
Nanda King. He lived 30 years in home, 
and passed 20 years in Samanya vrata and 
49 years as head of the church up to 308 
B.C. He converted several Maurya kings 
to Jainism and was a great scholar of the 
time. He breathed his last 219 years 
(according to some 215 years) after 
Mahavira in his 99th year. 



10. Arya Mah^giri. He was of ElA- 
patya ^otra, entered the order at the age of 
30, passed 40 years in S^manya vrata 
and was the head of the church for 30 
years up to 278 B.C. He died at the age 
of 100, that is 249 years after Mahavira. 
He had two pupils named Behula and 
Balissaha, the latter's pupil was the famous 
Umaswati V^chaka, author of Tattwartha 
Sutra and other works and his pupil was 
Shydm£Lcharya, the author of Pannavani 

11. Arya Suhasti. Like Bhadrab^hu, 
he was a brother-disciple of Mah^giri and 
belonged to V^sistha Gotra. He was a house- 
holder for 30 years and the head of the church 
for 46 years (16 years after Mahdgiri) up to 
262 B. C. He died 265 years (according to 
some 291 years) after Mahavira, at the age of 
100. He converted king Samprati, grandson of 
the great Asoka, to Jainism, who erected 
many temples and dedicated vast number 
of images throughout the length and breadth 
of his empire. He tried to spread Jainism 
even in foreign lands. He was the 17th 
successor of king Srenika and his reign 


began from 229 B.C. Suhasti had 2 pupils 
Susthita and Supratibaddha. 

12. Arya Susthita. After Suhasti, Sus- 
thita succeeded as the head of the church and 
remained as such for 48 years up to 2 14 B.C.. 
He was of Vy^grh^patya gotra and a 
resident of Kdkandi. He lived 31 years as a 
householder before entering the order and 
remained 17 years in S^manya vrata and 
died at the age of 96 about 316 years after 
Mahavira. Previous to his period the Jain 
Church was known by the name of 

' Nigrantha Gachha, but from him the name 
was changed to Kotika Gachha from 235 
B.C.. The tradition is that the origin of the 
name was due to his counting Surimantra 
for crores (koti) of times. 

13. Indradinna. He belonged to Kou- 
shika gotra. We do not find accounts of both 
this Acharya and his successor Dinna 
Suri except that they were heads of the 
Jain Church and that the former breathed 
his last 441 years after Mahavira in 86 B.C. 
We have seen that Arya-Susthita Suri 
breathed his last in 214 B.C., or according 
to some in 188 B.C. It may therefore be 



said that there must have existed other 
Suris or heads of the church between Arya- 
Susthita (No. 12) and Arya Sinhagiri 
(No. 15) besides Indradinna and Dinna 
(Nos. 13 and 14). But unfortunately the 
Pattavalis, we have come across, are as well 
silent on the point except that during Indra- 
dinna's time the famous K4lik^ch^rya 

14. Dinna. He belonged to Gautam 
gotra. His two disciples were Sdnti Sen 
and Sinhagiri. 

15. Sinhagiri. He was of Kousik 
gotra and assumed the headship after Dinna. 
During his time the great Acharya named 
Padaliptacharya better known as Bridhabadi 
Suri, flourished and his well-known pupil 
Siddha Sena, Divakar f^Kumudchandra) 
a contemporary of king Vikramaditya identi- 
fied by some with Kshapanaka composed 
the famous stotra known as Kalyanmandir. 
According to Jain tradition king Vikrama- 
ditya ascended the throne 470 years after 
Mahavira in 57 B.C. and was a believer in 
Jainism. Sinhagiri Suri died in 20 A.D. 
547 years after Mahavira. 



1 6. Vajra. He succeeded Sinhagiriin 
A.D. 21 and belonged to Gautama ^(?/ra. 
His parents were Dhanagiri and Sunanda 
who lived at Tumbaban. He was born in 
B.C. 31. i.e. 496 years after Mahavira and 
lived 8 years only as householder. He 
passed 44 years in Samanya vrata and 
remained as head of the church for 36 years 
up to his death at the age of 88 in 57 A.D. 
that is up to 584 years after Mahavir's 
nirvan. He was the last to know the 
complete ten Purvas and from him arose 
the Vajra Shakha of the Jain Church. He 
is known to have converted a large number 
of Buddhists to Jainism. 

17. Vajra Sen. He was of IJtkoshik 
g'otra and was during his time, head of his 
Church up to A. D. 93. The well-known 
separation of the Church into Swetam- 
baris and Digambaris took place in A. D. 82 
Arya Rakshit Suri was his contemporary. 
He lived 9 years as householder, 86 years 
in Samanya vrata and 36 years as the head 
of the church. He died at the age of 128 in 
the 620th year after Mahavira's nirvan. He 
converted four brothers Nagendra, Chandra, 



Nirvitti and Vidy^dhar who after hard study 
became great scholars and were created 
Acharyas. They founded the 4 Kulas after 
their own names. 

1 8. Chandra. He succeeded Vajra Sen 
and remained as the head of the church for 
7 years, up to A. D 100. He passed his 
life as householder for 37 years and was 
23 years in Samanya Vrata and died at the 
age of 67 that is, 627 years after Mahavir's 
nirvan. With him originated the appella 
tion Chandra Kula. 

19. Samanta bhadra. ' He suceeded 
Chandra Suri as head of the church, but 
there is no mention of the period of his 
headship. He was also known as Banbasi. 

20. Deva. He is also known as 
Briddha Deva Suri. He is said to have 
attended the installation ceremony of a temple 
dedicted to Mahavira Swami at Satyapur 
(Sanchore) 670 years after Mahavir, in 

A. D. 143' 

21. Pradyotana He attended the 
installation ceremony of Adinath's temple | 

at Ajmer. 

22. Manadeva. He composed the 


JAIN church: 

Shanti Stotra which is still much esteemed 
by the Jains. 

23. MA,ntunga — author of the popular 
Vaktamar Stotra and other works and was 
contemporary of the well-known king Bhoja. 
He flourished about 700 years after 


24. Vira. He performed the consecra- 
tion ceremony at Nagpur of Nemi Nath 
temple in 253 A. D. 770 years after 

25. Jai Deva. 

26. Devananda. At Devki Pattan, a 
city in the west, he performed the consecra- 
tion ceremony of Parshwanath Temple. 

27. Vikrama. 

28. Narasingha, 

29. Samudra. During his time the 
famous Hari Bhadra Suri one of the greatest 
Jain Logicians flourished in 493 A. D. 

30. Manadeva. During his time 1055 
years after Mahavira in 528 A. D. Hari 
Bhadra Suri, the great author, breathed his 
last. According to some he died in 538 
A. D. (S^ 585.) 

31. Bibudhaprava. 


32. Jagananda. 

33. Rabiprava. He attended the 
installation ceremony of a temple of Nariii 
Nath at Nadulpur in A. D. 643. 

34. Yasobhadra, also known as 
Yasodeva. During his time Anhilpurpatan 
was founded by Vanraja in 745 A. D (S. 
802) about 1272 years after Mahavira. 

35. Pradyumna. We do not find the 
name of this Acharya \2>S^. and his successor 
Manadeva (36) in many of the lists, but they 
mention Vimalchandra {2>7) ^^ succeeding 
to Yasobhadra (34). 

36. Manadeva. 

37. Vimalchandra. 

38. Udyotana Suri. It was after him 
that the 84 gachhas had originated from 
his 84 pupils, each of whom was made a 
head of the Sadlius under him. This took 
place in Vikram Sam vat 994 or about 1464 
years after Mahavira (937 A. D.) at a place 
named Teli near Mount Abu. He died on his 
way to a pilgrimage to Mount Shatrunjaya 
and according to some at a town named 
Dhaval near Med Pat (Merta in Marwar). 
He placed Sarbadeva Suri with 8 other 




Acharyas as the head of his line which is 
also known as ''Bark Gackha' from the 
time, till it was changed to ''Khartara 
gachhd' from Jineswar Suri. 

The following is a list of the names of 
the Gachhas commonly found and most of 
them have become now extinct. 



















































































































Or tlic Festivals, Pajjusazi ts tlic Greatest — Ckatur- 
masya — TKc Oewalt — Jnana Panckami — ^ern Tcrask 
Mouna £ka<laskt — Pous Oasamt — Ckattra Pvirmma — 
Akskaya Tritiya ~~ Askara Sukla Ckaturdaskt. 

Like other communities of India, the 
Jains have got a number of festivals during 
the year. These are especially connected 
with the anniversaries of the births and 
deaths of the Tirthankars. And the greatest 
festival of the Jains, is Pajjusan in the 
month of Bkddra (August— September). 
Ckaturmdsya commences from the 15th 
Sukla Paksha or full moon oi Asdrk endmg 
on the 15th Sukla Paksha of Kdrtik and 
this festival is celebrated during this period 
from Bkddra Krishna Trayodashi lasting for 
8 days till Bkddra Sukla Pauckami. Among 
some Gackkas of the Swetambar, Pajjusan 
begins from Bkddra Kriskna Dwddaski, 
endinor with Bkddra Sukla Ckaturtki. 

Among the Digambaris, the festival is 
known as **Das]akshini" which begins on 



this latter date lastinor for 70 days till the 
14th Sukla Paksha of Kkrtik. The day of 
Bkddra Sakla Panchami is also known among 
the Hindus as *'Rishi Panchami". Lite- 
rally Pajjusan means Pari sdmastayena 
usand sevand i. e. serving with a whole- 
hearted devotion. This is the religious 
session during the rains. Formerly it was res- 
tricted to the Jain sages only ; but now all of 
the Sangha, whether a Sddhu or a Srdvak, 
male or female, take part in it and thus it 
has become almost common with the Jains. 

Among the Swetambaris, during this 
festival covering the periods of 8 days, 
the only festival in the rainy season, Kalpa 
Sutra is read and explained before the 
assembly — a group of lay devotees hy yatis 
and ascetics. Lectures on its commentaries 
are delivered for the first seven days and 
on the last day, fasting is observed and the 
text of the Sutra is read out to the whole 
assembly of men and women who hear the 
same with great attention, respect and vene- 
ration. It will not be out of place here to 
speak a few words about the work. This 
Sutra principally deals with three subjects 



Viz. lives of the Tirthankars, list of sages, and 

rules and regulations be to followed by the 

Jain monks. Life of the last Tirthankar 

Mahavira is elaborately dwelt with, 

while the lives of the 23rd, 22nd and first 

are summarily given with few touches of 

embellishment here and theres from historical 

point of view and the list of the Jaina 

Church from the last Tirthankar. 

During this festival, the annual or the 

ofreat Pratikraman or confession called 

Sambatsari Pratikraman is performed, in 
order to remove all ill-feelings over all 
living beings and to ask pardon from all 
living beings for any act done knowingly or 
unknowingly in the course of their mutual 
exchange during the whole year. This is 
considered to be an act of great merit and 
as imperative on all the Jains. 

Another meritorious and important reli- 
gious ceremony known as Siddha Chakra 
worship is celebrated twice a year in the 
months of Aswin and Chaitra, each lasting 
for 9 days and called Oliji from the 7th to 
the 15th of the full moon. On a chauki or 
small table of wood or stone or on a plate of 




silver, generally a circle is described which 
is divided by eight radius into 8 chambers. 
In these chambers are written names or 
less frequently images of Siddha, Achdrya, 
Upddkya and SMliu and the words 
Daraskana, /ndn, Chdriti^a and Tap a in 
their consecutive order, and in the centre 
is written the word Arihanta. 

During this festive occasion Puja is daily 
performed to all these names collectively 
and each name is also worshipped in turn 
with special ceremonies and offerings for 
nine days. The worshipper keeps special 
fast known as Amil for the whole period 
taking on the third part of the day water and 
one food simply boiled, without mixing any 
thing with it to make palatable. The victual 
has also to be decided according to the 
colour symbolised for each name. Thty 
are as follows <^i) white (2) red (3) yellow 
(4) blue (5) black (6) to (9) white. This 
OH Tapa is performed 9 times i. e. for 
4J years or 9 years by those who cele- 
brate it only once a year. Its completion, 
udydpana {ujaonds is celebrated with great 
pomp and expense to acquire the full merit 


of the Tapa, Rice is generally used for 
white, gram for red, wheat for yellow, pulse 
for blue and black pulse for black. On the 
last day *'Navapada" Puja is performed 
with great eclat before the Siddha Chakra 
Mandal with singings and offerings and 
pouring pots of Pakhal consisting of water, 
milk, saffron and clarified butter. 

The Dewali or Kartick Budi 15 is cele- 
brated amongst all the Hindu communities 
of India as a day of rejoicings and invoking 
the Goddess of Wealth. The Jains hold it 
as specially sacred as the day of Nirvsln 
of Mahavir Swami. They present offerings 
of sweets particularly the ball-shaped sweets 
called **Laddu" in the temple. A large 
number of them visit Pawapuri in Bihar to 
attend the anniversary and Mahotsab at the 
place where this Nirvan took place more 
than five centuries before Christ. 

Kartick Sukla 5 is known as fnydn 
Panchami when the Jains celebrate Puja 
in their temples and worship Jnydn or 
Knowledge with offerings and prayers. 
Kartick Sukla 15 is also another day of 
religious observances and rejoicings like 



Chaitra Purnima. The Chaturm&sya ends 
with this day and the Jains generally visit 
Shatrunjaya Hills in Kathiawad to worship 
the deity on that day. 

Another religious day of the Jains is 
Merh Terash on Margasirsa (Agrahayan) 
Badi I J or T3th day of the dark moon 
of the month of Agrahayan. This is 
the day of Nirvan of Rishavdev, the 
first of the Tirthankars of the present 
age Avasarpim. 

The Mouna Ekddasi is celebrated on the 
Margasirsha Sukla nth. This day is 
generally spent in fasting with a vow of 
silence for the whole day. They also observe 
posadh or sitting in one place for 12 or 24 
hours. The day is connected with the i8th, 
19th and 2 1 St Tirthankaras. 

Pons Badi 10 is another day of celebra- 
tion in connection with Parswanath, the 
23rd Tirthankar as his birthday anniversary. 
People generally visit Pareshnath Hills on 
that day. 

Ckaitra Purnima is also celebrated 

with great eclat on the mount Shatrunjaya 
as a very auspicious day when a large 



number of the Jains flock to the place to 
worship Adinath, the presiding God. 

Akshaya Tritiya or Baisakk Sudi 3 is 
also observed in connection with the ist 
Tirthankar Adinath. 

Ashark Sukla Chaturdasi is consi- 
dered as a day of religious merit. Chatur- 
masya commences from this day and it is 
generally observed with fasting by the Jains. 
Ckaturmasya ends on the Kartick Sukla 
Chaturdashi after four months, as already 



KalyanaKDhumts or Places of Ptlgaimages — 
Skatrunjaya Hills- Pa wat>urt — ParesKnatk Hills — 
MLount ALu — Girnar Htlls — Rajgtr, — Beneras, — 
Ayoclkya, — Ckam^at>ur ^c. 

The reader is already aware that the 
Jains acknowledge the Twenty-four Tirthan- 
kars, who flourished during this era in Bharat 
Khanda (India). Of the various events 
connected with the lives and careers of 
these Tirthankars, the Jains attach a great 
religious importance specially to five things 
which they designate by the phrase 
Kalydnak Bhumi, and they are : — 

(i) the last place previous to his being 
conceived in the womb (chyawan) 

(ii) the place of his birth (Janma) 

(iii) the place where he first renounced 
the sansdr and initiated into a religious life 

(iv) the place where he first became a 
kevalin or achieved omniscience (Keval 



(v) the place where he realized 
emancipation {Nirvdn) 

Each of these places being thus associated 
with the life of a Tirthankar, has not only 
become a place historically important but has 
been as well a place of pilgrimage sacred to 
the Jains in general, whether a Swetambari 
or a Digambari. From remote periods, the 
Jains built temples at these places which 
stand even to this day as monumental works 
of the Jain arts and architecture. These 
inspire the people with such spirit of awe and 
veneration that they worship the images 
installed or foot-prints inscribed therein. 
Besides these, there are also a good 
number of big temples erected at different 
times at enormous costs and they are also 
held in great esteem. The reader will find 
translations of some Persian Firmans in the 
Appendix from which it would be clear that 
the Swetambar Jains were a powerful 
community. During the Mahomedan period 
too exercised persuasive influence over the 
reigning sovereings from Vhom they were 
able to obtain grants of places of pilgrimage 
throughout the length and breath of India, 




Shatrunjaya or Siddhagiri (lit. hill of the 
perfected) also known as Siddhachal, is a 
celebrated place of pilgrimage at Palitana 
in Kathiawad (Bombay Presidency). A 
full description of this sacred place is to be 
found in 'The Temples of Satrunjaya" by 
J. Burgess and the following lines from it 
would be an interesting reading. 

**It is truly r wonderful, a unique place, 
a city of temples for except a few tanks, 
there is nothing else within the gates. 
Through court beyond court, the visitor 
proceeds over smooth pavements of grey 
chunam, visiting temple after temple 
most of these built of stone quarried near 
Gopenath, but a few marble : — all elaborately 
sculptured and some of striking proportions 
and as he passes along, the glassy-eyed 
images of pure white marble, seem to peer 
out at him from hundreds of cloister cell ; 
such a place is surely without a match in the 
world : and there is a cleanliness withal, 
about every square and passage, porch and 
hall, that is itself no mean source of 



Visitors will find very picturesque 

scenery of large groups of the Jain temples 

on different tonlos or sammits of the hill. 

The most important of these are (i) Tonk 

of Adishwar Bhagwan. It is Adishwar or 

Rishavdeva's image consecrated by his son 

Bslhubal that imoarts its peculiar sanctity 

to Shatrunjaya. Although the old image is 

replaced, yet it is regarded as the greatest 

of the Tirthas by the Swetambaris as the 

whole hill i; considered very sacred, it being 

the place where \ large number of saints 

entered on Nirvan. 

(2) Khartar vasi Tonk. 

(3) Chhipa vasi Tonk. 

(4) Bimal vasi Tonk. 

(5) Choumukhji Tonk, 

All of these have temples, large or 
small, built by the Jains of different ages 
and climes. 

We refer to the learned article by 
Dr. Buhler, 'The Jain inscriptions from 
Shatrunjaya', published in Epigraphia Indica 
Vol : lip. 34-36 where a number of 
import I'lt inscription^; have been translated 
with the text and other useful historical 





inforaiations gathered thereof as to (i) the 

political hi^jtory of W rsireni liidii, (2) the 

dififereiit Schools of J iiii .iioiiks, aitd (3) the 
social. classification of the Jain laymen. 

This is a holy place in llie Sub-division of 
Bihar in the district of Patna about 7 miles 
South of Bihar. It was here that the last 
Tinhankar Mahavir attained nirvdn. There 
is a tank in the place, in the midst of 
which stands the temole known as Jalmandir. 
The foot-prints of Mahavira Swami are 
inscribed there. It was the place of his 
cremation. Tradition says that countless 
people came to attend the funeral ceremony 
and the mere act of takiaJ^ a pinch of ashes, 
from the place where th- s i:je was cremated, 
created such a '^reiit - :: )llow all round 
the spot, that afterwards it being filled with 
water, became transformed into the present 
tank, which is about a mile in circum- 
ference. There is also a stone bridge about 
600 feet in length across the tank from the 
bank to the temple. The scenery around is 
really charming. Visitors and pilgrims who 








from time to time go there, find at proper 
season of the year, the lake decked with 
lotuses and the picturesque temple standing 
in the middle with its dazzling whiteness 
and the hills of Rajgir at a distance 
as a suitable back-ground with tall 
Tac trees scattered here and there 
all over the country. There is 
another ancient temple known as Gaon 

It has now been ascertained from the 

inscription {Prashasti] that the old temple was 

repaired during the reign of Emperor Shah 

Jahan in 1641 A.D, There is another temple 

known as Samosaran. This word *Samo- 

saran' is not a corruption of *Sravansala' 

as suggested by Sir A. Cunningham in his 

Reports Vol. XI. p, 171 ; but it is a noun 

from the verb 'Samavasarati' *to present 

one's-seir. The tradition is that the place 

where a Tirthankar presents himself 

to preach his sermons, people sit in 

concentric circles around. It is also said 

that this whole arrangement is made 

by gods who also used to attend His 



The Sammet Sikhar or better known as 
the Paresnath Hills is another important 
place of pilgrimage of the Jains in India. 
The mountain is situated in the District of 
Hazaribagh in Bengal or more properly 
now in Bihar and Orissa Presidency and is 
the highest one in this part of the country. 
Twenty Tirthankars out of twenty-four 
attained nhvan on the different summits 
of this mountain and there are as many 
temples built on these holy places to 
commemorate their memories. 

The scenery of this range of hills, is very 
beautiful and the distance is about 12 
miles from the Railway Station to the foot 
of the Hills known as Madhuban. There 
are also temples here built by both the 
Swetambaxis and Digambaris. The whole 
region is shrouded with thick forest and 
the ascent to some of the summits is very 
steep. One has to travel 20 miles or there- 
about to take a round to these summits 
from Madhuban. Streams and rivulets lie 
across the way through the valleys between 
these summits. There are only foot-prints 

Ceiling Work in Dllv/ara Temples (Mt, Abu). 


of the different Tirthaiikars in these temples 
on the hills except the one dedicated to 
Parshvvanath, where there is installed the 
stone image of this 23rd Tirthankar. 

Next we may mention the celebrated 
Jain Temples at Dilwara on Mount Abu in 
Rajputana. Col. Todd says : — ''Beyond 
controversy this is the most superb of all 
the temples in India and there is not an 
edifice beside the Taj Mahal, that can 
approach it." These are built of white 
marble at an enormous cost by rich Jain 
merchants and are very widely known for 
delicacy of carving, beauty of details and 
magnificent ornamentation. The illustration 
is a portion of a celiing and the reader can 
easily form an idea of its grandeur, which 
stands unrivalled as a piece of architecture. 
There are four temples, the principal one 
being dedicated to Rishavdeva, the first 
Tirthankar. Vimal Shah a merchant and 
banker of Guzrat purchased only the site 
from the king by covering the ground 
with silver coins and paying the same 



as its price. It took 14 years to build, 
and is said to have cost 18 crores of 
rupees besides 59 lacs in levelling the hill. 
There is an equestrian statue of the founder. 
Vardhman Suri, the head of the Swetambar 
Church presided at the dedication ceremony 
by Vimal Shah on Mount Abu in 1031 
A. D. The second temple is dedicated to 
Neminath the 22nd Tirthankar 

Vastupal and Tejpal brother ministers of 
king Viradhavala of Guzrat erected the temple 
in 1231 A. D. in the front wall of which 
there are two niches ornamented with elegant 
and exquisite designs unequalled in India. 

On another summit, a few miles above 
Dilwara, at Achalgarh there is a temple 
containing big metal images. All these 
temples and images have got inscriptions 
of great historic value and dates between 
13th to 1 6th century A. D. 


It is the place of nirvan of our 22nd 
Tirthankar Neminath. It is in Sourastra, 
modern Kathiawad in the Bombay Presi- 
dency. The hill consists of several peaks 



on which stand numerous Jain temples. 
The grandeur of the scenery round about, 
is simply charming as will be seen from the 
half-tonef plate of one of the peaks given 
herein. The famous rock inscriptions of 
Asoka, lie at the foot of the hill. There 
are other important Jain inscriptions at 
the place. The Hindus also visit the hill 
as being sacred to the memory of the 
anchorite Dattatreya, the incarnation of 


Rajgir or Rajagriha is another place of 
pilgrimage of the Jains. It is one of the 
most ancient cities of India and was capital 
of Magadh. The kings of Magadh continued 
to have their seat of G:)vernment here for 
a long time and it played an important 
part during the time of Buddha. King 
Jarasandh, a contemporary of Krishna 
also flourished here. Our last Tirthankar 
had also long association with this city 
as he passed the greatest number of 
Chaturmasya (14) after he became an 
ascetic. King Prasenjit, and his son Shrenik 



who was contemporary of Mahavir, were its 
kings. It was his son Konik who removed 
the capital yr^w Rajgir to Champa. 

Dhanna, ShaHbhadra, Acharya Janibu- 
Swami were its inhabitants. The place is 
^sacred to the Hindus, the Mahomedans, 
.the Buddhists and the Jains alike. There 
are several hot springs held sacred to the 
followers of Vedas known as Brahma kund, 
Surya kund and others, and a fair, mela 
i^ held covering the period of one month 
about these springs, every third year when 
flocks of pilgrims crowd the place. The 
spring water is excellent and has got 
mineral properties. Some Mahomedan saints 
breathed their last in the place. There 
are shown a number of caves and other 
favourite places of Buddha. The Jains 
hold it sacred and as a place of pilgrimage 
on account of the fanma, Dikska and Keval 
/nan of the 20th Tirthankar Muni Suvrat, 
a contemporary of the King Ram 
Chandra, an incarnation of Vishnu of the 

The five hills are known as : — (i) Vipul- 
giri (2) Ratnagiri (3) Udaigiri (4) Swarnagiri 



and (5) Vaibhargiri. On every one of these 
there are Jain Swetambar temples. 

Benares, Ajodhya, Chanipapur (Bhagal- 

pur) are also regarded as holy places to 

the Jains as being Kalyanak bhumis of 

different Tirthankars and contain temples 

and Dharamsalas, 



Jain Literature forms Om of tL. Oltlest Literary 
Records in tke WorU Tke Pur/as— Tke Angas — 
Tkc Purvas liave keen lose -We hni mention of tkeir 
Nam23only -Slllkin^raa aai t:i?ir Oxnjin -Tite Jain 
Sckohasts, C j^m ra^acors zsA Autkorg. 

The J crA LiieratUi.- is om- of the oldest 
litt-'Miart:: .>i lidin. Accordiiio- to the Jains 
the last Prophet M ihavira Swami taught 
the ''Purvas'' to his disciples who afterwards 
composed, the Angas, The ''Purvas'' literally 
means "Earlier" and they were so called 
because they existed prior to the composition 
of 'Angas' They were also known as 
DristibAd. The date of the original com- 
position of these An^as which are in popular 
dialects, has been placed tovards the end 
of the 4th and the beginning of the 3rd 
century B. C , by the Western Scholars. 
But it is not proved that these Angas did 
not exist previous to this date. We only 
find mention made of the fact that the earliest 
collection of these sacred texts or the Agams 
took place at Pataliputra and belonged to 



theSwetambari sect who are still in possession 
the oldest of the Jain literature. This collec- 
tion consisted of fourteen Purvas and eleven 
An^as, and though the text, of these Purvas 
have been entirely lost but their names and 
conspectus have been handed down to us, as 
in the following :■ — 

I. Utpdd. 2. Ae'rdyani. 3. Viryaprab&d. 
4. Astindsti prabad. 5. fnyan prabad, 6. Satya 
prahdd. 7. Atma prabad, 8. Karma prabad. 
9. Pratydkkydn prabdd, 10. Vaidydnu 
prabdd. 11. Abandhya, 12. Prdndyu. 13. 
Kriyd Visdl. \^. Lokvindusdr, 

Gradually the Jain canons fell into 
disorder as they were not then systematically 
reduced to writing. In order to save them 
from becoming extinct altogether, another 
Council was held in Vallabhi (Guzrat) under 
the presidency of Devardhi-gani Kshama- 
shraman, when it was decided to collect all 
the existing texts and to preserve the same 
in writing. This great personage, not only 
collected the vast sacred literature, then avail- 
able, but revised and arranged the whole of 
them, writing them down from memory. 
This redaction took place about the year 



466 A. D. This collection is the origin of 
the present Jain canons. Another redaction 
was made by Skandilacharya at Mathura, 
which is known as "Mathuri Vslchana" or 
Mathura reading. 

About these sacred books of the Jains 
Dr. Jacobi says "Regarding their antiquity 
many of these books can vie. with the 
oldest books of the Northern Buddhists". 
These sacred texts or Agams are collectively 
called ''Siddhdnia^\ They are 45 in number 
and are divided under following heads : — 

Eleven Angus 

Twelve Up&ngas 

Four Mul Sutras 

Six Chhed Sutras 

Ten Pdyannas 

Two Chulikas. 

There are also theJainiVi^<ai;«5or Upanishads 

which are 36 is number. (See Appendix) 

The Siddhantas or more properly the 

fain Sutras have four-fold commentary 

under the names of Ttkd, Niryukti, Churm 

. .1. ■ . 

and Bk&sya and with the origuial texts 

which are in Prakrit, they constitute the, 

five-fold PanckAngi Siddhantas, The 



Hierarch Abhaideva Suri was one of the 
great commentators of these canons. Hari- 
bhadra Suri was also a well-known author 
of some of these commentaries. As the Jain 
Hterature devoloped very rapidly throughout 
the length and breadth of India, we find a 
large number of Jain scholars, authors, com- 
mentators and poets cropping up in almost 
every age up to the present time. The 
texts or original canons are in Prakrit or 
M^gadhi or more properly speaking 
Ardha-Magadhi, the popular dialect as we 
have already stated, and the commentaries 
are embodied in Sanskrit. 

Bhadrab^hu, who was a very distin- 
guished Jain ascetic and scliolar of the age, 
was the head of the Church, when the Sahgha 
met at Pataliputra to collect the canonical 
texts : He composed the Kalpa Sutra, 
which is one of the nine divisions of Chapter 
vHl on the discourse on PrdiydkhyAn 
of a great 'work known as Dasdshruta 
Skanda. It is held in high estimation as 
airea!dy stated and is annually read diiriftg 
tihe Pajjusan festival in Ckaturma^ya "w\i\i 
g^eat veiieration arid eclat. 


It is beyond doubt that the Jain writers 
hold a prominent position in literary activity 
of the country. Besides the Jain Siddhanta 
and its commentaries, there are a great 
number of other works both in Prakrit and 
Sanskrit on Philosophy, Logic, Astronomy, 
Grammar, Rhetoric, Lives of Saints etc. 
both in prose and poetry. Some of these 
poems are in epic style full of poetic imagery 
which can fully cope with the best existing 
literature ot the Hindus. We further 
possess a number of Kivyas both in Prakrit 
and Sanskrit, which for the most part 
describe the lives of Tirthankars and 
Ach^rjyas and other great personages and 
are generally known as Charitras. They 
generally add to the knowledge of our 
ancient literature of India. As to the time 
their composition dates back as early as the 
first century of the Christian era. Of the 
Prakrit Kcivyas, many of them are now 
lost to us. Among the existing ones, the 
Paum Charitum (Padma Charita) is worthy 
of mention, as one of the oldest Prakrit 
epics, the **Vasudeva Hindi" is also a 
voluminous work in Prakrit in three parts 


containing in a fluent style, narrations of a 
great many legendry stories and accounts. 
The ''Samaraicha Kaha" and the *'Mahipal 
Charium" are also old and important works 
in Prakrit. In short the Jain literature 
comprising as it does, all the branches of 
ancient Indian literature, holds noinsignificant 
a niche in the gallery of that literature and as 
is truly said by Prof. Hertal ''with respect to 
its narrative part, it holds a prominent 
position not only in the Indian literature but 
in the literature of mankind" 

The Jains, specially their monks, were 
never behind in literary activity. Besides 
' Bhadrab^hu, Devardigani, Abhaideva 
Suri, Haribhadra Suri, as already noticed, 
we find a great many Jain scholars and 
philosophers composing works on different 
subjects over and above their treatises on 
religion and ethics. Sh^kt^yana, known as 
one of the eight principal grammarians, was 
a Jain. He was much earlier to Panini 
and Patanjali as they reapeatedly mentioned 
him in their works. Siddhasena Divakar, 
a contemporary of king Vikramaditya, was 
the author of many philosophical works. 



Malayagiri was also a well-known author. 
Devendra Suri, Shanti Suri, and Dharma 
S^gar also composed many important works. 
Among the later authors Acharjya Hem- 
chandra is well-known in the literary circle 
and he contributed greatly towards the 
preservation of the history of our sect. His 
dictionary and other works besides the life of 
King Kumarpala, a prince of Guzrat, and his 
chief disciple, have made him immortal 
and proclaim the wealth and richness of 
Jain literature. 

The Jains have got a rich store of old 
and valuable Palm-leaf manuscripts still 
preserved with care m various Bhandar^ 
in the West and South. The reader will 
find specimens of an illustrated palm-leaf 
manuscript written in the 12th century 
A. D. and preserved in the Patau Bhandar. 
The Jain library in Jesalmir is far famed as 
containing a large number of ancient 
manuscripts both on palm and paper leaves. 
The various Jain libraries of Patau, Ahmeda- 
bad, Cambay, Bhavnagar and Bikanir are 
also well known. These are consequences qf 
a customery practice with the Jains which find 







in startinsj a Bhandar or library in connection 
with temples, Upasaras or Poshdids. This is 
the reason why we find Jain libraries in almost 
every big city of Rajputana. Malwa, Guzrat 
and Kathiawad, attached to some temple 
or upasara, established at different periods for 
the use of the Sangha. Dr. Buhler mentions 
a Mss. of the Avasyak Sutra, which bears 
date A. D. 1132 and is declared to be the 
oldest exiant Sanskrit manuscript on paper. 
The oldest classical literature of both the 
Kanarese and Tamil are composed by the 
Jains. Further to quote the words of Dr. 
Barnett "Some day, when the whole of the 
Jain Scriptures will have been critically 
edited and their contents lexically tabulated, 
together with their ancient glosses, they 
will throw many lights on the dark places 
of ancient and modern Indian languages 
and literature " 

The latter Jain works abound in 
Sanskrit and Vernacular pieces. We find 
extensive Vernacular literature among the 
Jains from the 14th or isth century till the 
present day. These deal mosdy with lives 
and biographies of famous Jain Saints and 



Srdvaks, tlieir followers. There are also a 
large number of pieces replete with masterly 
literary, moral precepts arid rales and lessons 
on the technics of the Jain philosophy. They 
are composed in melodious verses and in 
different popular metres a-id tunes and known 
as Choupai, Choudhalia, Rasa, Sijhyaya, etc. 
The Jain Acharyas, Sadr.u;., Munis etc. seem 
to be very active in this period in composing 
these poems in Vernacular which must have 
been in very popular use both in Guzrat and 
Rajputana and they are still read by thousands 
of the Jains in their leisure hours. The 
names of Yasavijoyji, Anandghanji, Samya- 
sundarji, Devchandji, Lalvijoyji, Jin Harkha 
Suriji are worthy of mention in this con- 



Jam SymLousm — Arts and Arclittccture —Stages of 
Davelo^ment along tt9 own Unas — Dtnerenee Latween 
tlie Jam and Baidktst Arts — Jatn Patnttngs — Iti 
Plaea tn tke Ancient Art Gallery of India and Influence 
over tke Community, 

Alike its philosophy Jain symbolism has 
its own peculiarities. A translation, of ideas 
on some visible substance with the object 
of permanency is the first principle of all 
arts and architecture. Mr. Balabhai truly 
says in his article on Jain Architecture 
**that Architecture is nothing but a kind 
of ' history ; that it is a standing and 
living record and it supplies us a mor^ ' 
vivid and lasting picture of a nation than 
History does." In a chapter on **Jain 
Architecture and Literature" of a recently 
published book "Thi Heart of Jainism", the 
author says ^'The earliest Jain Architects 
seem to have u^ed wood as their chief 
building material". We think this theory is 
not based on facts and cannot be md,intained 



In the first place as far as we can gather 
from the existing materials, this religion 
took its hold among the middle class ; 
and its followers, the Srdvakas, were mostly 
engaged in trade and higher callings. The 
architectJvfor the most part, came from lower 
classes, and were only engaged by the Jains. 
In order to give permanency to their objects 
of worship, they invariably used stone and 
metal. The discovery in recent years of the 
ruins of many Jain temples built centuries 
before the Christian era, also confirms the 
fact that the earliest Jain Architecture was 
not only limited to wood. 

Much has been written in recent years 
about Indian Art and Architecture and to 
some extent this is applicable to Jain Art. 
Mr. V. A. Smith in his "History of Fine 
Arts in India and Ceylon" says, "Hindu 
Art including Jain and Buddhist in the 
comprehensive term, is the real Indian Art" 
The special feature of Jain Art lies in the fact 
that it shows the relative position of natural 
objects with gre<it fineness. It is sometimes 
aiccused of Conventionalism, but this is true 
of all arts devoted to religions subjects." 



In the opinion of Col Tod. 'Their 
(Jains) arts like their religion, were of a 
character quite distinct from those of Shiva. 
The temple of Mahavira at Nadole, 
(Marwar) the last of their twenty-four 
apostles, is a very fine piece of Architecture. 
Its vaulted roof is a perfect model of the 
most ancient style of dome in the East, 
probably invented anterior to the Romans." 
The famous Jain temples on Mount Abu, 
are triumphs of Architecture ; the delicacy 
and richness of their carvings are unsur- 
passed in the whole world. As for the 
antiquity of Jain architecture, the excavation 
of Kankalt TillA near Mathura, establishes 
it without any doubt that the erection of the 
Stupas must have taken place several cen- 
turies before the Christian Era and according 
to Western Scholars, these are perhaps 
the oldest buildings in India. Formerly 
the Jains used to build Stupas as imitated 
by the Buddhistic and their ancient relief 
sculptures are also well-known. They were 
the greatest temple-builders in Western India. 
The great Jain Temple on the Shatrunjoy 
Hills near Palitana in Kathiawar as already 

j4N epitome of JAIN ism. 

noted, are all imposing edifices. The wh6le 
hill appears like one mass of temples and 
the grouping of buildings in a limited area 
is another peculiarity of the Jain Art There 
exist several Jain columns in Southern 
India and they are described as specimens 
of "a remarkably pleasing design. They 
are a wonder of light, elegant, highly 
decorated stone work and nothing can 
surpass the stately grace of these beautiful 
pillars whose proportions and adaptations 
to surrounding scenery are always perfect 
and whose richness of decoration never 
offends. In the whole range of Indian Art, 
there is nothing perhaps equal to the 
Kanara Jain pillars for good taste." 

Numerous Jain cave temples have been 
discovered in different parts of India in 
the West and South. The Jain caves at 
Elura form a series by themselves and 
contain very elaborate and superior Architec- 
ture works. Mr. Griffitlis says in the 
'Introduction' of his well-known work 
•Ajanta'. *The Jains excavated sorne five 
or si^ extensive works which form a very 
impofta?tit group of caves, of*e <rf the largest 


and most elaborate, the Indra S <bha being 
about 90 feet deep and 80 feet wide and 
14 feet high". There are a number of 
ancient Jain caves in Orissa on hills known 
2iS Khindgiri, C/datg'iri 'a.nd W/f/W, dating 
as far back as 2nd century. B C. 

The ideas of Jain and Buddhist sculp- 
tures are almost alike and the images of 
Jain Tirthankars and Buddhas are ofct^m 
mistaken one for another. In the common 
posture of padmdsan they look similar 
except for the symbols cognisant of the 
Tirthiinkaras and signs of garment or thread 
over the neck and body of the Buddhas 
We have seen some Buddhist images being 
worshipped by the Jains as their own. The 
images of Jain Tirthankars are generally 
sitting in Pidm^s n and s jmetimes in 
standing Kdyotsarga posture, and some time 
Ardha padmas^in style. One of the illustra- 
tions of the book is a half-tone print of a very 
old metal image from the South. Among 
the Swetambaris there are also metal images 
known as ''Pancktirthis' or images of the 
Five Tirthankars in one piece. The middle 
image is one of any of the 24 Tirthankars in 


padmdsan^ two standing, Kayotsarga ones, 
one on each side of the middle one and two 
padrndsan images on both sides on the top 
of the standinor figures. We moreover find 
other fiorures of o-ods and goddesses as 
musicians and votaries some worshipping 
and some waving chamars, some in prayers 
kneelino- or standing; with folded hands &c. 
We also find figures of elephants carrying 
water or water-pots with their trunks pouring 
over the head of the Tirthaiikars on both 

The statues at Sravana Belgola (Mysore) 
of Dio'ambaris and Karkala and Yemur in 
South Canara are well-known, gigantic and 
perhaps the largest free-standing statues in 
Asia. The biggest one is about 57 feet in 
height and is cut out' of one solid block of 

The place of Jain paintings among the 
Indian Fine Arts is also of importance. A 
special feature of Jain painting lies in the drift 
and quality of its line. Line is the chief thing 
which shows the difference of objects. This 
line is so finely drawn in the Jain School 
of Painting that there is no school of Art 

70 f 


which bears a comparison with it. Chinese 
Art is famous for its powerful lines. The 
excellence of this painting lies in the fact 
of its being obtained by the application of 
line. It has been denionostrated that this 
art was borrowed from India. Time may 
prove that the Chinese might have learnt 
the skill from the Jains. Like the ancient 
Hindu and Buddhistic paintings, the Jain 
ones, too were restricted to pictures of ^ 
unseen subjects depicting important events 
of history, the deeds of saint'-^ and heroes. 
These paintings were confined to religious 
subjecfs and as they had a sanctity of their 
own, they were generally preserved both in 
temples and homes with great veneration. 
The Jains were also fond of illustrating 
their religions texts with paintings. 

Dr. Coomarswami in his Notes on the 
Jain Art says, **The Jain paintings are not 
only very important for the students of Jain 
Iconography, Archeology and as illustra- 
ting costumes, manners and customs, but are 
of equal or greater interest as being oldest 
known Indian paintings on paper." The 
reader will find two plates prepared from the 




paiiitings in the N.ihar F; nvMy collection in 
manuscripts of Kalpa Sutra by Bhadrabahu 
(about 356 B. C.) where \y.^ deals with the 
lives of the Jains. They 3-e on the same 
suhject from the life of Parswanath, the 
23rd Tirthankar and i>ive ox*:ellent points for 
compaiison. In one of thest: pictures will be 
found the very sharp-hooked nose and large 
eyes with no less asthetlc value of early 
Indian paintings. In the second one we find 
much developed ideas uhJtir the influence 
of the Maiiomedan period. The interesting 
changes in dr.ipery, posture, colouring and 
everything else, is very striking. 

Another plate (through the courtesy of 
J. S. Conference, Bombay, ": contains portraits 
of the Jain Acharya Hem Chandra and King 
Kuvnarpal from a pahrj 1^ vf manuscript 
wisiten in the ytr^v i:. j; A. D. and 
preserved in the Bh i.i at Patau. 
These pictures show the peculiar style and 
serve as specimens of e.irlv Jnin paintings. 
The Mrihomedan period entirely changed 
the idea. It is only in the later period that 
we find painiinos of bui! Ji^'i^s, scenery and 
portraits throughout the country. 








Appendix A. 

Date of King Chandra Gupta> 

Much has been written by various scholars 
European, Indian and others, quoting various 
authorities in support of their researches into 
the date of this great king. I do not, therefore, 
discuss the subject at any length but consider- 
ing that the following note may be of some 
help to the students of antiquity, I quote a few 
extracts from our ancient Jain works. The 
generally accepted date of his reign according to 
European Scholars, is from 321 or 322 B.C. to 
296 or 298 B. C. i. e. about 24 or 25 years. 
It is already mentioned in the Introduction that 
Mahavira attained nirvdn in 527. B.C. or 470 
years before the Vikram Era Sdrnva^). The 
period of 470 years covers therefore the time 
from 527 B.C. to 57 B.C. and it is clear 
therefore that Chandra Gupta must have 
flourished during the time. According to the 
Ceylonese account Chandra Gupta ruled for 

[ ii ] 

28 years. In Jain works, we find a number 
of dynasties of Kings to reign during the 
aforesaid period. 

To cite authority in support of the point 
in question reference is made to the following 
extracts from Tithoogdltya Payannd. 

^'^ Iigfftf ftlFf T'^ ^Xi frTST^^ iTWll^Tt I 

mg^^^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^^fti^m ^^t^ i 
g^^T^ '^is^^t ?ft^T Hii ^ fw^m II 

^gfHTT wgfiTTn ^I^^TfT^I fff?T 5!^%^ I 

^\^ wii{n 5^ qf%^^??r ^'ft TTm II 

^ft fsfs^q^ ^Tf eft ^^5^ ^Jft TT^T II'* 
We find almost the same version in the 
* ' Tirthoddhdra Prakirnaka, ' 

^f ^^ gftsn^ ^ f^^ 3^f??Tfw II ^11 

[Substance : — In the same night in which 
Tirthankar Mahavira attained nirvdn. King 
Paluka of Avanti was installed. He reigned for 
60 years. Then came the 9 Nanda kings who 
successively reigned for 155 years. Then Mourya 

[ iii ] 

kings reigned for io8 years. After that Puspamitra 
ruled for 30 years. Then came Balamitra and 
Bhanumitra, whose reign lasted for 60 years. 
Nalavahan or Navabahan ( another reading is 
•T^ ^^ i-e. THt ^TWW) succeeded them as a king 
and ruled for 40 years. He was followed by 
Gardhavilla, who again reigned for 13 years and 
then came king Shaka for 4 years.] 

According to these authorities the dates are 
as follows : — 

Mahavira's nirvAn 

King Paluka 

Nanda Kings 

Mourya Kings 

Pushpa Mitra 


Bhanumitra , 

Nalavahana 1 
or NavavahanaJ 


Shaka Kings 

527 B.C. 
527 — 467 B.C. 
467 — 312 B.C. 
312 — 204 B.C. 
204—174 B.C. 

174 — 114 B.C. 

114 — 74 B.C. 

74—61 B.C. 
61 --57 B.C. 
Hem Chandra gives the date of Chandra 
Gupta in his Parishishta Parvus as, — 

i.e. 155 years after Mahavira's nirvdn or 372 B.C. 

[ iv ] 

Chandra Gupta is said to be contemporary of 
Bhadrabahu whose date 371 — 357 B.C. does not 
also appear to be correct. 

It is therefore difficult to reconcile the differ- 
ence of 60 years (372 — 312), although we find 
this last date viz, 312 B.C. referred to in other 
, Jain works of high antiquity, as the date of 
this king. Moreover there is only difference 
of 9 or 10 years in this date of the great 
king and the one, generally acknowledged by 
the Western Orientalists. Hema Chandra must 
have omitted by oversight, to count the 
period of 60 years of King Paluka after 

It appears from the Jain records that the 
king Srenika, son of the king Prasenajit, known 
otherwise as Bimbisara or Bambhasara, was 
reigning at Rajgriha and was a contemporary 
of Mahavira. He was succeeded by his son 
Asoka Chandra or Kunika who removed his 
capital from Rajgriha to Champd and was 
followed by his son Udayee. It was he who 
founded P^taliputra and removed his capital 
from Champi to the new city and died without 
any issue. Then came the 9 Nanda kings 
followed up by Mourya kings beginning with 
Chandra Gupta. 

t V ] 

We may reasonably refer this gap of a few 
years between Mahavira's nirvdn and the 
accession to the throne by the first Nanda king, 
to Kunika and Udayee as they were reigning in 
the interim. This ascription of sixty years to 
the se two kings does not at all appear to be 

Chandra Gupta was succeeded by his son 

Bindusara and then came his grandson the great 

Asoka, King Priyadarshi of the inscriptions. 

Asoka was succeeded by his grandson Samprati, 

as his son Kunala was blind. Samprati was a 

great Jain monarch and a staunch supporter of the 

faith. He erected thousands of temples throughout 

the length and breadth of his vast empire and 

consecrated large number of images. I have not 

come across any inscription of his time although 

I have seen a considerable number of images 

which are said to have been consecrated by this 

king, The peculiarity of these images lies 

in the fact that all the images have got marks 

of pillow under the elbow. He is stated further 

to have sent Jain missionaries and ascetics abroad 

to preach Jainism in the distant countries and 

to spread the faith amongst people there. 

Appendix B. 

Firmans and Sunnuds. 


[Firman of Emperor Akbar dated 1592 A.D. 
in the 37th year of his reign. In Ain Akbari 
( Gladwin's translation Vol. I, p. 538 ) in the 
list of the learned men of his time, Heer Vijoy 
Suri, is mentioned as Hariji Sur (No. 16.)] 

Firman of Jelaliiddin Mahomed Akbar 
Badsha^ the Victorious* 


Glory of religion and world. Jelaluddin 
Akbar Badsha, the son of Humayaon 
Badsha> the son of Babar Badsha, the son 
of Shaik Omer Mirza, the son of Sultan 
Aboo Syud, the son of Sultan Mahomed 
Mirza the son of Meerum Shah, the son 
of Amir Tymoor, the Lord of happy 
conjunction (Jupiter and Venus). -Seal. 

Know ! ye officers of the present and future 
times, . and the Governors, Tax-collectors and 
the Jagirdars of the subas of Malwa (torn) of 
Akbarabad, the seat of Callips of Lahore, the 
Metropolis of Mooltan and Ahmedabad, the 
places of safety of Ajmer, the place of blessed- 
ness of Meerut, Gujrat and the Sooba of Bengal 
and of other territories under our Government. 

[ vii ] . 

Whereas the whole of our noble thought and 
attention is directed to attend to the wishes 
and seek the pleasures of subjects, and the 
sole aim of our mind which wishes well of all, 
is to secure love and affection of the people 
and the ryots who are the noblest trust (com- 
mitted to our charge) of the Lord, the great 
bestower of bounties, and whereas our mind 
is specially occupied in searching for the men 
of pure hearts, and those that are devotional, 
therefore whenever tidings of any person or 
persons of any religion and creed passing his 
valuable time solely in contemplation of God 
comes to our ear, we become extremely desirous 
of ascertaining his virtues and intrinsic merits, 
without any regard to his religion, faith or creed, 
and by laudable means and in honorable manner 
we bring him from afar, admit him into our 
presence, and enjoy the pleasure of his company. 

As many a time the accounts of the godliness 
and austere devotion of Hur Bejoy Soor, an 
Acharja (preceptor) of the Jain Sitambari 
sect and those of his disciples and followers 
who live a't the ports of Gujrat, had come to 
noble ear, we sent for and called him after the 
interview which made us very glad, was over, 
he intended to take leave in order to return to 

[ viii ] :_ 

his beloved and native country. He therefore 
requested that by way of extreme kindness 
and favour a Royal Mandate, which is obeyed 
by all the world, be issued to the effect that the 
heaven-reaching mountains of Siddhachalji 
Girnarji, Tarungaji, Kessurianathji and Abooji 
situate in the country of Gujrat, and all the 
five mountains of Rajgirji, and the mountain 
of Somed Sekhurji alias Paresnathji, situate in 
the country of Bengal, and all the cotees and all 
temples below the mountains, and all the places 
of worship and pilgrimage of (followers of) the 
Jain Sitambari religion throughout our empire. 
Wherever they may be, be in his possession ; 
and that no one can slaughter any animal on 
those mountains and in the temples or below 
or about them. As he had come from a long 
distance and in truth his request was just and 
proper, and appeared not to be repugnant to the 
Mohamedan Law ; it being the rule of the reli- 
gious sages to respect and preserve all religions ; 
and as it become evident upon our enquiry and 
after thorough investigation that all those moun- 
tains and places of worship really belong to the 
(followers of the) Jain Sitambari religions from 
a long space of time, therefore we comply with 
his request and grant to, and bestow upon, Hur 

[ ix ] 

Bejoy Soor Acharj of the Jain Sitambari 
religion the mountain of Siddhachal, the moun- 
tain of Girnar, the mountain of Tarunga, the 
mountain of Kesuria Nath, and the mountain of 
Abbo lying in the country of Gujrat, and the 
five mountains of Rajgiree, and the mountain 
of Somed Sekhur alias Pareshnath, situate in 
the country of Bengal, and all the places of 
worship and pilgrimage below the mountains 
and wherever these may be, any places of 
worship appertaining to the Jain Sitambary 
religion throughout our empire. It is proper 
that he should perform his devotion with the 
ease of mind. 

Be it known that although these mountains 
and places of worship and pilgrimage, the seats 
of the Jain Sitambari religion, have been given 
to Hur Bejoy Soor Acharj, yet in reality they 
all belong to the followers of the Jain Sitambari 

Let the orders of this everlasting Firman 
shine like the sun and the moon amongst the 
followers of the Jain Sitambari religion, so 
long as the sun, the illumination of the universe, 
continues to impart light and brightness to the 
day, and the moon remains to give splendour 
and beauty to the night. Let no one offer any 

[ X ] 

opposition or raise any objection to the same, and 
let no body slaughter any animal, on, below or 
about the mountains and in the places of worship 
and pilgrimage. Let the orders of this Firman 
be obeyed by all the world, be acted upon and 
carried out, and let none depart from the same 
or demand a new Sanad. Dated the 7th of 
the month Urdi Bihisht, corresponding with the 
month Rabeoolawwal of the thirty-.seventh year 
of the auspicious reign." 

Translated by me 
(Sd,) Md. Abdulla Munshi 
Rajkoomar College, Rajkote. 


(b) . 

[Firman of Emperor Jehangir dated i6o^. 
A. D. in the 2nd year of his reign.] 

A Firman of the Victorious King Noroodin 
Mohanimad Jahan(fir Badshah Gazi. 


Nooroodin Mohammad Jahangir Badshah 
Gazi. The son of Akbar Badshah, the 
son of Hoomayoon Badshah, the son 
of Babar Badshah, the son of Omar 
the son of Sooltan Aboo Syed. the son 
of Sooltan Mohammad Mirza Shah, 
the son of Miran Sahab, the son 
of Amir Timoor Saheb Kiran.— Seal. 

May it be known to the noble Governors and 
the Officers (who by. thriftness (bring about) 
prosperity and the Jagirdar and tax-gatherers 
and the accountants connected with the impor- 
tant affairs and all (those) having to do with , 
the protected territories especially of the Soobah 
of Gujarat that : — Whereas, the heart of him, 
who knows his duty (and is) truly a well wisher 
of the creatures of God namely of every section 
and community is occupied with and takes an 
interest in the prosperity of all creatures, there- 
fore at present Bekah Harakh Parmananda Jati 

[ xii ] 

having presented himself in the presence of the 
protector of creatures^ made a representation 
to those who were standing at the foot of the 
throne as follows : — (That as) Baji Sen Soor 
and Baji Dev Soor and Khoosh Faham Nand. 
Baji Paran have temples and Dharamshalas in 
every place and every town and are engaged 
in (the practice of) austerity and devotion and 
seeking after God. And whereas the circum- 
stances relative to the devotional exercises and 
meditating on God of the abovementioned Bekah 
Harakh Paramanand Jati became known (to us) 
thereupon the order of the king of the world 
(and) the nations was issued as follows : — "No 
one shall put up in the temples and Dharma- 
shalas of that community and no one shall enter 
into them without permission. And should they 
wish to rebuild them, no one shall oppose them 
And no one shall alight at the houses of their 
disciples. And should (they go) to the holy 
place (Tirat of) Satrunja in the country Sorat 
for the purpose of worshipping, no one shall ask 
and demand from them (anything)." And 
further in accordance with the representation and 
request of that man, (His Majestys') exalted 
order was issued that on Sunday and Thursday 
in every week and the day of new moon of every 

C xiii ] 

month and the days of feasts and every new 
year's day and in the month of Navroj and one 
day in the month of Yar Mah on which blessed 
(day^ we were weighed for governing the per- 
manent Kingdom shall be observed year after 
year as long as the years of our permanent 
Kingdom shall pass on. On one day there shall 
be no killing of animals in (ourj protected king- 
dom ; and no one on that day shall hunt and 
catch and kill birds and fish and such like. It is 
necessary that paying attention to the above- 
mentioned order they shall not deviate and go 
astray ; in respect of its being carried out and 
becoming permanent. This shall be considered 
as (their) duty. Dated the month of Yar in the 
year 3. 

High Court, Bombay. ( A true translation ) 
26tk June, 1875. (Sd.) Goolam Mohaideen 



[Firman of Emperor Shahjahan dated 1629 
A.D., Second year of his reign] 

A Firman of the Victorious King SJinh- 
hoodin Mohonimad Haheh Kirmi Sani Shah 
Jahan Badshah Gazi 

The Victorious King Shahboodin Moha- 
mmad Saheb Kiran Sani Shah Jahan 
Badshah Gazi, the son of Jahangir 
Badsdah, the son Akbar Padshah, the 
son of Hum^yun Badshah. th'^ son of 
Babar Badshah, the son of Shekh Oomar 
Mirza, the son of Sooltan Sayed, 
the son of Sultan Mohammad Mirza, 
the son of Miran Shah, the son 
of Amir Timoor Saheb Kiran -Seal. 


Whereas His Majesty has received a repre- 
sentation as follows : — The temples of Chinta- 
man and Satronja and Sankesar and Kesari 
existed from the ancient time before the fortu- 
nate accession of ( His Majesty ) to the throne 
and there are three Posals at Ahmedabad and 
four others at Khambait ( Cambay ) and one 
at Sorat and one at Radhanpur in the possession 
of Satidas. The gracious and noble command 

[ XV ] 

of ( His Majesty ) whom the world obeys who 
is as exalted as are the heavens has issued to the 
effect that no person shall put up at the above- 
mentioned places and spots, and no one shall 
approach them, for they have been granted to 
them. And the Sevras may read aloud &c the 
books of Sagar and Sarookan, may live in the 
Soobah of Goojrat. and shall not quarrel, among 
themselves, and shall not ( do anything ) against 
orders ; and they shall employ themselves in 
praying for the permanency of the Kingdom. 
It is necessary that the Governors and officers 
of those places in accordance herewith, knowing 
( this ) to be settled, shall not allow any person 
to transgress ( this ) Written on the twenty first 
of the month of Azarma Ilahi in the year 2. 

High Court, Bombay. ( A true translation, ) 
26th June 1865. Sd. Goolam Mohaideen., 



[Firman of Emperor Shahjahan dated 1657 
A.D. 31st year of his reign.] 


A Firman of the victorious king Mohant' 
niedshah Saheb Kir an Sani Badahah GaH. 

Mohammad .. Saheb Kiran Sani 
Badshah Gazi, the son of Jahangir 
Badshah, the son of Akbar Badshah, 

the son of Humayon the son of 

Amir Timor Kiran Saheb. — Seal. 

At this time the exalted and auspicious 
Firman of His Majesty is issued and published as 
follows : — The parganah of Palitana (is) situated 
within the jurisdiction of Sorat a dependency of 
the Soobah of Ahmedabad that is called Satranja 
and was given as a Jagir to (my) fortunate son 
the object most charming to the sight of the state 
(who is as) a white mark on the forehead (of a 
horse) auguring the prosperity (of the state who 
is as) a flourishing plant of the garden of mon- 
archy, a seedling of the orchard of the kingdom, 
the light of the pupil of grandeur, the fruit of the 
garden of greatness, the noble, the dignified 
prince Mohammad Moorad Baksh. The revenue 
thereof being two lacs of money, the same has 

[ xvii ] ^ 

been given as I nam as above-mentioned to Sati- 
das, the jeweller by way of an Altamga (grant) 
from the beginning of the harvest time, (i,e., 
month of) Takhakavil. It is necessary that the 
noble, the dignified children and the exalted 
Amirs and Vazirs who are thrifty and the future 
accountants, employed in the civil department 
and the Governors and Officers and Jagirdars 
and tax gatherers shall exert (themselves) to 
carry out and uphold this sacred order of His 
Majesty and let the above-mentioned Parganah 
remain in the possession of the above-named 
(person) and his children, generation after gene- 
ration ; and shall consider as abolished (the 
levying) of all monies and dues and taxes and all 
(other) revenues ; and with regard to this matter 
they shall not demand every year, a new order 
and a Sanad, and they shall not swerve from what 
is (here) commanded. Dated the 19th, of the 
auspicious month of Ramzan in the 31st, of the 
auspicious reign corresponding with the Hijra 
year 1067 (A.D., 1657). 

26th June 1875. ( A true translation ) 

Bombay High Court Sd, Goolam Mohaideen. 


[ Sunnud from Prince Moorad as Suba of 
Guzrat, dated 1657 A.D., in the 30th year of 
Emperor Shah Jahan's reign. He was son of 
Shahjahan and Viceroy of Guzrat.] 

In the name of God, the Compassionate^ the 


Moorad Baksh, the eon of Shahaboodin 
Mohamed Saheb Kiran Sani, Saheb Jahan 
the Victorious, Emperor, 1049 Seal. 

The present and future accounts of the 
Sarkar (i.e. district) of Sorath (who) have become 
exalted by the Royal favour and hopeful ( of 
distinction) are to know that whereas at this 
time the best of the grandees (namely) Satidas 
the Jeweller, has represented amongst those 
standing [before us] in the place of the assembly 
which resembles paradise, that in the village 
of Palitana (which is one) of the Dependancies of 
the above mentioned Sarkar, there is a place 
of worship belonging to the Hindoos, that is 
called Satranja, and that the people of the 
surrounding districts come there on a pilgrimage. 
The order of the highly dignified, the possessor 
of exalted rank, has been graciously issued to the 
effect that the above mentioned Village has 

[ xix ] 

been granted from the beginning of the season 
of Kharif Nijuit (i.e. harvest time) as an Inam to 
the above mentioned person, the best of the 
grandees. It is therefore necessary that con- 
sidering the above mentioned Village as an 
Inam ( i.e. grant) to him, you shall not interfere 
(with it) in any way, in order that the people 
of the neighbouring districts and localities may 
come on a pilgrimage to that place with (their) 
minds at ease. In this matter, regarding (this) 
as a complete injunction, you are not to swerve 
( herefrom ). Written on the 29th day of the 
holy month of Mohurrum in the 30th of our 
auspicious reign : — 

The handwriting of the humble servant AH 

The 4th of Safar in the thirtieth year of the 
reign Presented to the Hoozoor. 

The 4th of Safar in the thirtieth year. A 
copy was taken in the Divans (i.e. prime minis- 
ter's) office. 

The 4th of Safar in the thirtieth year 

The 4th of Safar A true translation 

(Sd.) Goo lam Mohaideen 



[ Confirmation of Sunnud \^e) by Emperor 
Moorad Bux dated 1658 a. d, in the first year 
of his reign. As soon as he came to the throne 
he was murdered. J 

Padsha Moorad Bux A. H, 1068. Seal 

This high command is now issued, declaring 
that as the Purgunnah of Palitana under the 
Sirkar of Soruth, a dependency, on the Subah of 
Ahmedabad and which Perguna is also called 
Istrinja is by former Sunnud conferred on 
Satidas Jwahuree as an I nam or Gift, the said 
Satidas has presented a petition praying that 
in this manner a new high command should be 
given. This world binding mandate is therefore 
now issued declaring that we confirm to the said 
Satidas and to his descendants the I nam or 
Gift he held by former Sunnud and a Royal 
patent, and it behoves the Dewans and Vuzeers 
and Mootusudees present and the future and 
the Jageerdars and Kuroorees of that District to 
respect the said Gift according to the above 
order, and not to molest or hinder him under 
pretence of expenses and taxes etc, but they 
must act so that this order may continue and 


[ xxi ] 

abide, knowing this order to be peremptory, no 
opposition shall be made. Dated 29th Ramzan 
first year of his reign. 

Recorder's Court. Sd. J. Taylor 

Translator's Office Translator. 

30th June 1820. 


[Sunnud from Emperor Aurungzeb dated 
1658 A. D.] 

In the name o/Godf the Compassionate the 

God the victorious Mohammad Ourung- 
zeb Sha Bahadoor, the son of 
Saheb Kiran Sani 1068. -Seal. 

Whereas at this time, the beginning of which 
is auspicious ( and ) the end of which will be 
happy, Satidas, the Jeweller has represented to 
the noble, most holy, exalted ( and ) elevated 
presence through persons who constitute the 
holy assembly of the Court, that whereas accord- 
ing to a Firman of His Majesty, the exalted 
( and ) as dignified as Soloman, the protector 
of the office of the successors ( of Mohammad ) 
the shadow of God, dated the nineteenth of the 
holy month of Ramzan, in the year thirty 
one, the district of Palitana, which is called 
Satranja in the Jurisdiction of the Sorath 
Sarkar, a dependency of the Suba of 
Ahmedabad ( and ) the revenue of which is two 
lacs of Ddms has been settled as a perpetual 
I nam on the slave ( the petitioner ) ( and ) that 

[ xxiii ] 

he ( the petitioner ) therefore hopes that a 
glorious edict may also be granted by our Court ; 
Therefore in the same manner as before we have 
granted ( to the petitioner ) the above men- 
tioned district as a perpetual I nam. It is there- 
fore incumbent in the present and future mana- 
gers of the Suba and the above mentioned 
Sarkar, to exert themselves for the continual 
and permanent observance of this hallowed 
ordinance ( and ) to permit the above mentioned 
district to remain in the possession of the above 
mentioned person and of his descendants in 
lineal succession from generation to generation 
and to consider him exempted from all demands 
and taxes and all other dues ( and ) not to 
demand from him in resf)ect hereof a new sunnud 
every year ( and ) they shall not swerve from 
this order. Written on the 9th of the month of 
Telkand in the Hijra year 1068. 

( On back ) 

A mandate of the Nawab, the possessor of 
holy titles, the fruit of the garden, a worthy 
successor, the fruit of the 'tree of greatness, a 
lamp of the noble family, a light of the great 
house, the pupil of the eye of grandeur and 
fortune, the pride of greatness and glory, of 
noble birth, the exalted, the praised one by the 




tongue of the slave and free, the famous ( and ) 
victorious prince Mohammad Sultan Bahadoor, 

32. Mohammad Sultan Bahadoor the 
son of the Victorious. Mohammad 
Ourungzeb Sha Bahadoor 1068— seal 

Translated by me 
Sd. Goolam Mohaideen, 


[Firman of Emperor Ahmed Shah dated] 
1752 A.D., fifth year of his reign. 

In the name of the Purest^ Highest in 


Be it known to the Officers and Managers of 
the present and future affairs of the Province of 
Bengal and the other Provinces under dominion, 
that Jugut Sett Mahtaub Roy represented to us 
the high in dignity that mountain Paresnathjee, 
situate in the country of Bengal, the place of 
worship according to the Jain Setamburee 
religion also the Cotee at station Mudhoobun, 
on a rent-free lakheraj ) ground, butted and 
bounded by four boundaries belong ( to the 
followers of ) the Jain Setamburee religion and 
that he, the devoted supplicant is a follower of 
the Jain Setamburee religion, he therefore, is 
hopeful of the Royal bounty that the mountain 
and the Cotee aforesaid, be bestowed by the 
resplendent Huzoor on that obedient supplicant, 
so that, composed in mind, he may devote him- 
self to pray according to that religion. Whereas 

[ xxvi ] 

the person aforesaid deserves Royal favour and 
bounty, also as it appears that the property he 
asks for has a particular connection with him, 
and ( as ) it appeared on inquiry instituted by this 
High in Dignity that mountain Paresnath and the 
Cotee aforesaid have from a long time apper- 
tained to the ( followers of the ) Jain Setamburee 
religion, therefore the whole of the mountain 
and the Cotee at Mudhoobun butted and bounded 
by four boundaries, are bestowed by the Royal 
Court on the aforesaid person. It is required 
that he should always devote to pray himself 
for the welfare and prosperity of the State ; 
and no one should offer opposition respecting 
the mountain Paresnath and the Cotee at 

Knowing this to be a very urgent matter, 
let them act as directed. Finis, 

The whole of mountain Paresnath situate in 
the country of Bengal, 

Three hundred and one Beeghas of Lakhraj 
land of Mudhoobun, situate in the country of 
Bengal, butted and bounded by four boundaries 
specified below. 

On the West — the water coursej of Joyporiah, 
alias Jaynugger. 

On the East — the old water-course, {nala) 

[ xxvii j 

On the North — the koond or reservoir 
( called ) Julhurrey prepared by the ( followers of 
the ) Jain Setambaree religion. 

On the South — the base of Mountain 

Written on the 27th day of the month of 
Jemadeeoolawal, the fifth year of the King's 
reign. ( On the back ) The Khan of Khans 
Kumirooddeen Khan Bahadur, Victorious in 
War, The Vizier of Territories, Managers 
of affairs. Noblest of Nobles, the Head of the 
country. Commander in-Chief, a faithful friend 
and servant of the King Ahmud Shah, the Hero. 

A true translation of the annexed Persian 
Document for Baboo Pooran Chund. 

(Sd) Shamachurn Sircar 
Chief Interpreter and Translator 
High Court, Original Jurisdiction, 
The 19th March 1868. 


[Sunnud of Aboo Ali Khan Bahadur, dated 
the third year of reign.] 

Aboo Ali Khan Bahadur Emperor 
and Champion of Faith— Seal. 


The Motsuddees of the present time and of 
future of Pergunnah Bissoonpore Pachrookhy in 
the province of Behar. 

Take notice that 

Since Mouzah Palgunge in the aforesaid 
Purgunnah has been as heretofore exempted 
from all liabilities in the name of Raja Padman 
Singh as a charitable endowment to all the 
temples of Pareshnath made by Juggut Sett, 
the same is therefore upheld and confirmed in 
the year 1169 Fusli. ( 1755 a. d. ) You shall raise 
no objection and offer no opposition in any way 
whatever in respect of the said Mouzah and shall 
release and leave it to the use and possession 
of the above named Rajah so that he may apply 
the profits thereof to necessary purposes and 
continue to pray for the welfare of the empire 
to last for ever. Written on the 27th day of 
Jamadi-us-sani in the third year of reign. 


True translation 
(Sd.) Iswaree Persad 


[Parwana of Jaggat Sett Khushal Chand, ^ 
dated 1775 A.D.] 

Jaggat Sett KhoshuU Chund 1187--Seal. 

High in dignity Baboo Sookhul Chand Sahoo 
and Boola Sahoo, Managers of the temples of 
Jain Situmbury, i.e. on the hills of Pareshnathjee 
alias Somed Shekhurjee, be of good cheer. 

A long time ago since the reigns of the 
Emperors, the hills of Pareshnathjee, being 
considered the holy place of the persons of Jain 
Situmbury religion, were made over to my 
father, because we were also of the religion of 
Jain Situmbury, But owing to my having been 
charged with various affairs, and the said holy 
place being situate at a great distance I could 
not manage the affairs thereof. I therefore 
having appointed you as the manager of the 
affairs write to you that you should most care- 
fully manage all affairs so that the pilgrims might 
with perfect ease travel there and return there- 
from. This hill and the holy place have been 
in the possession of the persons of Jain Situm- 
bury. No other persons has any thing to do 

[ XXX ] 

with it. Therefore this Perwanah or order is 
written to you that you should act accordingly. 
If any of the authorities or landholders set up 
opposition in any way you should produce this 
Perwanah. Dated the i6th of the month of 
Zakund 1189 Hedgree. 

True translation, 
(Sd.) Jadub Chunder Mitter. 

Appendix C 

List of Jain ngams and Nigams 

[The reader will find a valuable and excellent 
account in detail of these sacred canons by Dr. 
Weber in Indische Studien Vols XVI— XVII ; 
translated by Dr. Smyth and published in Indian 
Antiquary Vols. XVII to XXL] 

A. Jain Agams 

These are 45 in numbers and are divided 
into I. Angas II. UpAngas III. Mula Sutras IV. 
Chheda Sutras, V. Payannds VI. ChuHkds. 

I. Angas. 
Anga Sutras are eleven in number, 

1. Ayaranga Suttam (Skr. Acharanga Sutra) 

It deals with Jain Philosophy and rules of 
conduct for members of the order. (Tran- 
slated in the Sacred book of the East 
Vol. XXII.) 

2. SuYAGADANGAM SuTTAM (Skr. Sutrakritan- 
gam Sutra) It deals with the doctrines of 
the 363 different heretical sects (Translated 
in the Sacred Book of the East Vol. XLV.) 

3. Thanangam Suttam (Skr. Sthanangam 

Sutra). It deals with an exposition of 

[ xxxii ] 

'Sthans' (points of view) of one to ten ele- 
ments of the universe according to the Jain 

4. Samavayangam Suttam (Skr. Samavayna- 
gam Sutra), It deals with the nature of 
one to innumerable matters of the universe. 

5. ViYAHAPANNATTi or comniouly known as 
. Bhagavati Suttam (Skr. Vyakhya praj- 

napti Sutra). This is a most important 
work in the list of the Jain canons, dealing 
with 36,000 querries and their answers 
between Mahavira and Goutama. 

6. Nayadhammakaha Suttam Skr. Jnata 
dharma katha Sutra). It contains stories 
and parables of religious personages and 
also exposition of elements. 

7. UvASAGADASAO SuTTAM (Skr. Upasaka- 
dasha Sutra). It deals with the lives of 
the ten principle lay-disciples of Mahavira 
and sets out rules of conduct for lay-men. 
(Published in the Bibliotheca Indica, 

8. Antagadadasao Suttam (Skr. Antakritada 
sha Sutra). It deals with the history of 
the 90 personages who attained moksha 
(Translated in the Oriental Translation 
Fund Vol. XVII.) 

[ xxxiii ] 

9. Anuttarovavaiyadasao Suttam (Skr. 
Anuttaraupapatikadashah Sutra). It nar- 
rates the story of the ten ascetics who 
took birth in Anuttara Vimana (Translated 
in the Oriental Translation Fund Vol. 

10. Panhavagaranam Suttam (Skr. Prashna- 
vyakarana Sutra). It deals with Jain Philo- 
sophy especially the actions of merit and 

11. Vivagasuyam Suttam (Skr. Vipakashrutam 

Sutra). It describes the five souls taking 
birth with distress and five with comfort 
produced by action. 

II. Upangas. 

Upanga Sutras are twelve in number. 

1. UvAVAVi Suttam (Skr. Aupapatika Sutra) 
It contains lectures on the birth of 22 differ- 
ent kinds of souls and other relisi^ious 

2. Raipaseni Suttam (Skr. Rajprashniya 
Sutra.) It contains discourse of Keshi 
Ganadhar with King Pradeshi, an un- 

3. JiVAviGAM Suttam (Skr. Jivavigama Sutra). 

It contains lectures on soul and non-soul, 

[ xxxiv ] 

4. Pannavana Suttam (Skr. Prajiiapana 
Sutra). It contains discourse on 36 objects 
in 36 stanzas. 

5. Jambudeep Pannatti Suttam (Skr. Jambu- 

dwipa Prajnapti Sutra.) It contains descrip 
tion of Jambudwipa including accounts of 
its mountains, rivers &c. 

6. Chandapannatti Suttam (Skr. Chandra 

Prajnapati Sutra). 

7. SuRYA Pannatti Suttam (Skr. Surya Praj- 
napti Sutra.) These two canons (Nos. 6 
and 7) contain description of sun and moon 
and other celestial spheres. 

8. Kappiya Suttam including Niriyavali 

Suttam (Skr. Kalpika Sutra including Nirya 
vali Sutra). 

9. Kappaodosia Suttam (Skr. Kalpavatan- 

shika Sutra.) 
ID. Puppiyjv Suttam (Skr. Pushpika Sutra.) 

11. PuppACHULiYA Suttam (Skr. Pushpachooli- 

ka Sutra.) 

12. Banhidasa Suttam (Skr. Banhidasha 

These series of canons from Nos. 8 to 12 
contain description of heaven and hell, battles 
of kings &c. 

[ XXXV ] 

III. Mul Sutras. 

These are four in number. 

1. AvASYAKA Sutra including Vishesavasyaka 
and Pakshika Sutras. These deal with 
higher Jain principles and philosophy, logic 
and history. 

2. Dasavaikalika Sutra. It contains rules of 
conduct for the ascetics. 

3. Pindaniryukti and Oghniryukti Sutras. 
These contain rules of begging and collec- 
lecting alms and food by the ascetics. 

4. Uttaradhyayan Sutra. It contains 36 
lectures on various interesting subjects 
(Translated in the Sacred Book of the 
East Vol XLV.) 

IV. Ohheda Sutras. 
Chheda Sutras are six in number and they 
contain rules of penance and other regulations 
of the church. 

1. Vyabahardasakalpa Sutra. 

2. Vrihatkalpa Sutra. 

3. Dashashrutaskandha Sutra. 

4. Nishitha Sutra. 

5. Mahanishitha Sutra. 

6.* Panchakalpa Sutra (now extinct) and Jit- 
KALPA Sutra. 

[ xxxvi J 

V Payennas (Skr. Prajnapana) 
These are ten in number. They deal mostly 
with ethical rules and other regulations both for 
the church and the laity. 

1. CHOusaran payenna Suttam (Skr. 

Chatuhsharan prajnyapana Sutra.) 

2. Santhar payenna Suttam (Skr. Sanstha- 

raka prajnyapana Sutra.) 

3. Tandul payenna Suttam (Skr. Tandul 
prajnyapana Sutra.) 

4. Chandavijjaga Suttam (Skr. Chandra- 

vedhyak Sutra.) 

5. Gainvijjiya Suttam. (Skr. Gainvidya 



I pratyakhyan Sutra.) 


(Skr. Virastaba or Devendrastaba Sutram.) 

8. Mahapachachakhana Suttam (Skr. Maha 
pratyakhyan Sutra.) 

9. Gachchhachar Suttam (Skr. Gachchha 

chara Sutra.) 


karanda Sutra.^ 
In the places of 9 and 10 some hold Bhatta- 
pachchakhana and Samadhimarana Sutra as the 
9th and loth Chheda Sutras, 

[ xxxvii ] 
VI Ohulika Sutras. 
Chulika Sutras are two in number. They 
contain discourse on five kinds of knowledge and 
other subjects. 

1. Anuyogadwar Sutra. 

2. Nandi Sutra. 


These are 36 in number. 

I. Uttaranyaka. 
3. Bahureech. . 
5. Vijnaneshwar. 
7. Navatatwa nidana- 

2. Panchadhyaya. 
4. Vijnanaghanarnava. 
6. Vijnanagunarnava. 
8. Tatwartha Nidhi- 

9. Vishudhatma guna 10. Arhadharmagama- 



II. Utsargapavadava- 

13. Nijamanonayanal- 

15. Siddahagama sanke- 

17. Ragijananirvedaja- 

19. Kavijanakalpadru- 


12. Astinasti viveka 
nigama nirnaya. 

14. Ratnatrayanidan- 

16. Bhavyajanabhaya- 

18. Strimuktinidana- 
20. Sakalaprapancha 

[ xxxviii ] 

21. Shraddhadharma- 22. Saptnayanidana. 

23. Vandhamoksh^pa- 24. Ishtakamaniyasiddhi. 

gam a. 



















N igam^gamay akya 














, Virataviratasama- 



Appendix D. 

The Tirthankars of the Present Bra. 

I. Adinatha better known as Rishava 
Deva, belonged to Ikshaku race and was the son 
of King Nabhi and Queen Marudevi. His place 
of birth was Vinita (Ajodhya), in the country of 
Koshala, but according to some in the north of 
Kashmir. He was born towards the end of the 
period of Yugaliks. According to the custom of 
the time, he was married to his own twin sister 
Sumangala and another Sunanda whose brother 
died in childhood. Sumangala's issues were 
Bharat and Bramhi (the twin) and 98 other twin 
sons and by Sunanda he had Bahubal and Sun- 
dari. From the descendants of Bharat and 
Bahubali the Surja and Chandra dynasties were 
respectively originated, and the country was 
named Bharat after the eldest prince. He re- 
signed his empire to his sons and laid foundation 
of the Jain Church in this era. He was initiated 
at the city of Vinita and attained nirvdUy on 
Astapada mountain. He is represented as of 
golden complexion and having a bull ( ^i? ) 
for his cognizance, 

[ xl ] 

2. AjiTANATHA belonged to the same race 
and was son of King Jitashatru and Queen 
Bijoya. He was born in Ajodhya and was ini- 
tiated at the same place and reached nirvdn on 
Samet Sikhar mountain or better known as 
Pareshnath Hill in Bengal. He was also of 
golden complexion and had an elephant ('sf^) as 
his cognizance. King Sagar flourished during 
his time. 

3. Sambhavanatha was son of King Jitari 
and Oueen Sena and belonged to the same race. 
He was born at Sdwathi (Sriwasthi) — modern 
*'Setmet k^ sfkila", near Balarampur U. P. and 
was initiated at the same city and attained nirvdn 
on mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was 
of golden colour and his cognizance was horse 

4. Abhinandana was born of King Sambara 
aud Queen Siddhartha belonging to the Ikshaku 
race. He was of golden complexion and had 
monkey (olifcr) as his cognizance. He was born 
at Ajodhya and was initiated at the same place 
and his nirvdn took place on Mount Samet 

(5) Sumatinatha was the son of King 
Megha by Queen Mangala at Ajodhya belonging 
to the Ikshaku race and was initiated at the same 

[ xli ] 

city and his nirvdn also occured at Mount Samet 
Sikhar. He was also of golden complexion and 
had a curlew (^^) for his cognizance. According 
to the Digambaris, it was red goose (^^^T<lf). 

6. Padmaprava was the son of King Sree- 
dhar by Queen Sushima. He belonged to the 
Ikshaku race and was born in Koshambi — re- 
ceiving initiation at the same place and attaining 
nirvdn at Mount Samet Sikhar. His cognizance 
was lotus (tt^) and his complexion was of red 

7. SuPARSWANATHA was the son of King 
Pratista and his mother was Prithivi and belong^- 
ed to the Ikshaku race. He was born at Bena- 
ras and was initiated at the same city. Attained 
nirvdn on Mount Samet Sikhar. He was of 
golden, but according to Digambaris, green 
complexion. His cognizance was the figure, 
Swastika (^f^^). 

8. CiiANDRAPRAVA belonged to the Ikshaku 
race and was the son of King Mahasena by 
Lakshmana and was born at Chandrapura and 
was initiated at the same city and attained Moksha 
on Samet Sikhar. He is described as of white 
complexion and had moon (^55) as his cognizance. 

9. SuBiDHiNATHA was the son of King 
Sugriva and Queen Rama belonging to the 

[ xlii ] 

Ikshaku race. He was born in the city of 
Kakandi and was initiated there attaining nhvdn 
on Mount Samet Sikhar. He was of white 
complexion and had Makara (?T^T) a fabulous 
acquatic animal as his cognizance. He is also 
known as Pushpadanta. 

10. Shitalanatha belonging to the Ikshaku 
race, was the son of King Drirharatha and 
Queen Susnanda. His birth-place was the city 
of Bhadilpur where he took his initiation and 
reached nirv&n on Mount Samet Sikhar. His 
complexion was golden aud his cognizance 
was the figure Sreevatsa (^2J^), Digambaris 
say Kalpa tree (cR^g^) and it was in his time 
that the famous Harivansa took its origin. 

11. Shreanshanatha also belonged to the 
Ikshaku race and his parents were King Vishnu 
and Queen Vishna. He was born at Sinhapur 
near Benares and took his initiation at the 
same city and reached nirvdn on Mount 
Samet Sikhar. He was of golden complexion 
and his cognizance was rhinoceros ( ^!f ) while 

Digambaris say, it was bird Garura (^^). 


12. Vasupujya came of the same Ikshaku 
race and was son of King Vashupujya by Queen 
Jay^. His birth place was at the city of Champ^ 
modern Nathnagar, near Bhagalpur where he 

[ xliii ] 

took his initiation as well as reached nirvdn. He 
was of red complexion and his cognizance was 
buffalo (Jlfecr). 

13, ViMALANATHA was the son of King Kri- 
tavarma by Queen Shyama belonging to the 
Ikshaku race. He was born at the city of Kam- 
pilpur where he took initiation and reached 
Moksha on Mount Samet Sikhar. His com- 
plexion was of golden colour and his cognizance 
was boar (^?[T^). 

14. Anantanatha belonged to the Ikshaku 
race and was the'son of King Sinhasena by Queen 
Sujasa. His place of birth was Ajodhya where 
he was initiated and reached nirvdn on Mount 
Samet Sikhar. He was of golden complexion and 

his cognizance was falcon (^ «!) while according 
to the Digambaris his symbol was a bear (^If ^). 

15. Dharmanatha was the son of King 
Bhanu and Queen Suhrita belonging to the 
Ikshaku race. His birth place was the city of 
Ratnapuri near Ajodhya where he was initiated 
and reached Moksha on Mount Samet Sikhar. 
jpis complexion was of golden colour and his 
cognizance was a thunderbolt (21^). 

16. Shantinatha belonged to the Ikshaku- 
race and was the son of King Vishwa Sena by 
Queen Achira. He was born in of Hastina- 

[ xliv j 

pura also known as Gajapura near Meerut where 
he took his initiation reachinor nirvAn on Mount 
Samet Sikhar. He is described as of yellow 
colour and his cognizance was an antelope (^J^). 

17. KuNTHANATHA was the son of King Sura 
by Sree belonging to the Ikshaku race. His birth 
place was the city of Hastinapura, and he took his 
initiation at the same place and attained moksha 
on Mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of 
yellow colour and his cognizance was a goat (^T^). 

18. Aranatha was born in the same city 
of Hastinapura and his parents were King Sudar- 
shana and Queen Devi belonging to the Ikshaku 
race. His place of initiation was Gajpura and 
reached nirvdn on Mount Samet Sikhar. His 
complexion was golden and his cognizance was a 
figure (•T'^T^'=^) diagram and according to the Dig- 
ambaris his symbol was a fish (^*f). Parashurama. 
a Hindu Avatara, flourished in his time. 

19. Mallinatha belonged to the Ikshaku 
race and was the daughter (according to Digam- 
baris, who do not admit of moksha for the women, 
she was a son) of King Kumbha by ParvabatJU 
His place of birth was Mathura where he was 
initiated and reached nirvdn on mount Samet 
Sikhar. His complexion was of blue colour and 
his cognizance was a water-jug ( gill ). 

[ xlv ] 

20. Muni Subrata belonged to the race 
known as Harivansa and was the son of king 
Sumitra! by Padmabati of the city of Rajgir where 
he was initiated and reached nirvdn on mount 
Samet Sikhar. He was of dark complexion and 
his cognizance was a tortoise (^i^). Dasaratha 
and Ram Chandra were his contemporaries. 

21. Naminatha belonged to the Ikshaku 
race and was the son of King Bijoya and Queen 
Bipra. He was born in the city of Mathura 
where he was initiated and attained moksha on 
mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of 
yellow colour and his cognizance was a blue 
lotus. (^^IriT^) According to the Digambars he 
was of green colour. 

22. Neminatha also known as Arista Nemi 
belonged to the Harivansa. He was the son of 
Samudra Vijoya by Shiva. His place of birth 
was Souripur where he was initiated and attained 
nirvdn on mount Girnar and was of black com- 
plexion with a conch (si^) as his symbol. He 
was related to the Hindu Avatar, Krishna, whose 
father Vasudeva, was a brother of Samudra Vijoy. 
It was arranged that he should marry Rajamati, 
daughter of Ugrasena king of Jirnadurga or 
Junagad. On hearing the piteous cries of birds 
and beasts which were collected for the marriage 

t xlvi ] 

feast, he refused to marry and went out to mount 
Girnar. In the Hindu Vedas and Purans, we 
find mention of Arista Nemi or Nemi Nath. 
Kurus and Pandavas flourished during his time. 

23. Parshwanatha belonged to the Ikshaku 
race and was the son of King Ashwa Sen by 
Bama Devi. He was born in 877 B.C. and his 
birth place was Benares where he was initiated 
and attained nirvdn on mount Samet Sikhar. 
He was of blue complexion and his cognizance 
was a serpent (w)- Parshwanatha attained nirban 
in his hundredth year, some 250 years before the 
nirv&n of Mahavira i e. about 770 B.C. 

24. Mahavira or Vardhmana also known as 
Natputta, the last Tirthankar, belonged to the 
Ikshaku race and was the son of KingSiddharatha 
by Queen Trisala. His place of birth was Ksha- 
triya-kund-gram where he was initiated and 
reached nirvdn in the town of Pawapuri. He 
was of yellow complexion and had a lion ( f^w ) 
as his cognizance. The date of his nirvdn is 
527 B. C. 

Appendix E. 
Chronological List of the Gachchha-heads. 


(a) Vpakesh Qaehchha, <^ 

[The 'Gachchha traces its origin from Parshwa- 
natha, the 23rd. Tirthankar. His chief disciples 
or Ganadharas were (i) Subhadatta (ii) Arya- 
ghosa (iii) Vishista (iv) Bramhadhari (v) Soma 
(vi) Sivadhara (vii) Vira Bhadra (viii) Yashaswi. 
Shubhadatta, being the eldest, became the head 
of the church after the Lord. The title 'Suri or 
Acharya of the pontiffs is indiscriminately used 
in this 'Gachchha' e. g. Siddhha Suri or Siddhd- 
charya ; Kakka Suri or Kakk^chdrya or Kakudd- 
charya. Vide Heornle's list published in Indian 
Antiquary, vol XIX pp. 233-252.] 

1. Tirthankara Parshwanatha, 

2. Shubhadatta. 

3. Hari datta. 

4. Arya Sumudra. 

5. Keshi (contemporary of Mahavira ; some 
place 'Prabha' between 4 & 5 .) 

[ xlviii 





Ratnaprabha I ( 457 b. c. ) 


Yaksadeva I, 9. 

Kakka I, 


Devagupta I. 

1 1. 

Siddha. I. 12. 

Ratnaprabha II. 


Yaksha II. 14. 

Kakka II. 


Devagupta II. 16, 

Siddha II. 


Ratnaprabha III. 


Yaksha III. 

19. Kakka III. (By oversight Dr. Heornle 
has put No. 19 instead of No 18.) 

20. Devagupta III. 

21. Siddha II. 22. Ratnaprabha IV. 

23. Yaksha IV. 24. Kakka IV (63 a. d.) 

25. Devagupta IV ( 13 a. d. ) 

26. Siddha IV. 

27. Ratnaprabha V ( 18 a. d. ) 

28. Yaksha V. ( 85 a. d. Converted king 
Chitrangada of Kanouj) 

39. Kakka V. 30. Devagupta V. 

31. Siddha V, 32, Ratnaprabha VI. 

33. Yaksha VI. 

24. Kakka VI. (had extra-ordinary powers ; 
pursuent to the remonstration of goddess 
'Sachchika\ the two names i. Ratnaprabha and 
ii. Yaksha were removed from the Gachchha.) 

35. Devagupta VI. 36. Siddha VL 

[ xlix ] 

KakkaVII. 3S. Devegupta VII. 

Siddha VII. 40. Kakka VIII. 

Devagupta VIII ( 933 a. d. ) 
Siddha VIIi; 

Kakka IX (Author of 'Pancha Pramdna) 
Devagupta IX. ( do. of 'Navatatwa Pra- 
karan' 1015 A. d. ) 
45. Siddha IX. 





47. Devagupta X. 

49. Kakka XI. 

50. Devagupta XI 

46. Kakka X. 
48, Siddha X. ' 

[ Dr. Heornle's Mss. 
gives s. 1 108 ( 105 1 A. D. ) My Mss. has s. 1 105 
( 1048 A. D. ) 

51. Siddha XI. 

Kakka XII. ( s. 1 154 = 1097 a. d, ) 

Devagupta XII. 54. Siddha XII. 

Kakka XIII. ( s. 1252 = r 195 a. d. ) 

Devagupta XIII. 

Siddha XIII. 58, Kakka XIV. 

Devagupta XIV. 60. Siddha XIV. 

Kakka XV. 62. Devegupta XV. 

Siddha XV. ' 64. Kakka XVI. 

Devagupta XVI. 

Siddha XVI. (s. 1330= 1273 a. d.) 

Kakka XVII. ( s. 1371=1314 a. d., 
Author of 'Gachcha Prabandha' ) 

68. Devagupta XVII. ( s. 1409= 1352 a. d. ) 







: 1 ] 

6g. Siddha XVII. (s. 1475= 1418 a. d.) 

70. Kakka XVII. (s. 1428= 1441 a d.) 

71. Devagupta XVIII. (s. 1528= 147 1 a. d.) 

72. Siddha XVIII. (s. 1565= 1508 a. d.) 

73. Kakka, XIX. (s. 1505= 1553 a. d.) 

74. Devagupta XIX. (s. 1631 = 1574 a d.) 

75. Siddha XIX. (s. 1652 = 1598 a. d.) 
(Dr Heornle's list closes here) 

76. Kakka XX. (Installed at Bikanir s. 1689 
= 1632 A. D.) 

77. Devagupta XX. (s. 1727= 1670, A. d. ) 

78. Siddha XX. (s. 1767 = 17 10 a. d.) 

79. Kakka XXI. (s. 1107 = 1750 a. d.) 

80. Devagupta XXI. (s. 1807 = 1750 a. d.) 

81. Siddha XXI. (s. 1848 = 1790 a. d.) 

82. Kakka XXII. (s. 1891 =1934 a. d.) 

83. Devagupta XXII. 

84. -Siddha XXII. 

85. Kakka Suri XXIII. 


[ Branches (i) Madhukara (ii) Rudrapalli (iii) 
Laghu (iv) Begarh (v) Pinpali^i (vi) Barha Acha- 
rya (vii) Bhavaharsha (viii) Laghu Acharya (ix) 
Rangvijay (x) Mandoria. ] 

38. Udyotana Suri, up to 937 a.d. (S.994). 

32. Vardhamana Suri, up to 103 1 a. d. (^. 
1088 ) confirmed by Abu inscriptions. He 
created his pupil Jineshwara an Acharya in 1022 
A. D. ( S. 1079 ). Afterwards he performed the 
installation ceremony of the temple on Mt. Abu 
known as Vimal Vasi in S. 1088, the year in 
which he reached heaven. 

40, Jineshwara Suri I. In 1023 a. d. (S. 
1080 ) in a debate before king Durlabha of An- 
hillapura ( Gujrat ) he was victorious and got 
the biruda ( title ) of Kharatara which is borne 
by this gachchha up to the present moment. 

c,f." '^^rTsfl ?RWTf^>it n'^% 

[from Rajgriha Prashastti,dated s. 1355 = 141 2 a.d.] 

t Hi ] 
'^^rTT' f^^ g^ ^f?T g^ I 

41. Jina Chandra Suri I. 

(It was he who foretold to Moujdin that he 
would become Sultan and on his ascending the 
throne, the Acharya was invited with great pomp 
to his capital Delhi where he resided for some- 
ti^lje and composed the work 'Sambegarangshala . 
He was succeded by his brother disciple Abhai- 
deva and from him we find every fourth Acharya, 
of the gachchha named as Jina Chandra Suri ) 

42. Abhaideva Suri, the great commen- 

43. Jina Ballava Suri. He survived only 
for two months after he became an Acharya and 
died in mo a. d. ( S. 1167 ) — the first branch 
Madhukara started from 1 1 10 a. d. 

44. Jina Datta Suri. mo a. d, — 1154 a. d. 
( S. 1167 — 1211. ) — the second branch 'Rudra- 
pali' started from 1147 a. d. 

45. Jina Chandra Suri H. 1158 — 1166 a. d. 
(S. 121 1— 1223). Anchal gachchha started during 
his time from 1156 a. d. ( S. 1213 ) 

46. Jina Pati Suri. 1166 — 1220 a. d. ( S. 
1223— 1277) 

47. Jineshwara Suri H. 1221 — 1274 a d. (S. 
,278 — 1 301 ) — the third branch 'Laghu Khara- 

[ Hii ] 

tara started from 1274 a. d. (S. 1331) and it was 
during his headship in 1248 a. d. (S. 1285) that 
the 'Chitrawal' gachchha was named "Tapa"- 
gachchha from Jagata Chandra Suri 

48. Jina Prabodha Suri 1274 — 1284 a.d. (S. 
1341 — 1441 ) 

49. Jina Chandra Suri III, 1383 — 131 2 a.d. 
( S. 1341— 1376) 

50. Jina Kushala Suri. 1320 — 1332 a. d. 
(S. 1377— 1982 ) 

51. Jina Padma Suri. 1332— 1343 a. d. ( S. 
1389— 1400) 

52. Jina Labdhi Suri. 1343 — 1349 a. d. ( S. 
1400 — 1406 ) 

53. Jina Chandra Suri IV. 1349 — 1358 a. d. 
( S. 1406— 1415 ) 

54. Jinodaya Suri. 1358— 1377 a. d. ( S. 
8415 — 1432 ) — the fourth branch 'Begarh star- 
ted during his headship. 

55. Jina R^ja Suri I. 1375 — 1404 A. d. ( S. 
1432— 1461 ) 

55A. Jina Vardhan Suri, 1404 — 1418 a, d. 
( S. 1461 — 1475 )— the fifth branch Tipalia 
started from S. 1474 (1417 a. d.)— this Acharya 
was expelled from the church in 141 8 
a. d. ( S. 1475 ) and so not counted in 
the list. 

[ liv J 

56. Jina Bhadra Suri. 1418 — 1457 a. d. ( S. 


57. Jina Chandra Suri V. 1457 — 1473 a.d. 
( S. 1504— 1530) 

58. Jina Samudra Suri. I470;r-i4i8 a. d. 
(S. 1530— 1555) ' 

59. Jina Hansa Suri I. 1498 — 1525 a. d. 
( S. 1555— 1582 )— sixth branch Barha 
Acharya started from S. 1564 ( 1507 a. d. ) 
Karuamati gachchha started from S. 1570 
(1513A. D. ) 

60. Jina Manikya Suri. 1525 — 1555 a. d. 
( S. 1582— 1612) 

61. Jina Chandra Suri VI. 1555 — 16 14 a d. 
(S. 1612— 1970) — seventh branch 'Bhavaharsha 
gachchha started from S. 162 1 ( 1564 

A. D.) 

62. Jina Sinha Suri. 1614 — 1618 a. d. ( S. 
1670 — 1674) 

63. Jina R<ija Suri II. 1618 — 1642 a, d. ( S. 
1674 — 1699 ) — eighth branch Laghu Acharya 
started from S. 1616 ( 1622 a. d. ) 

64. Jina Ratna Suri. 1642 — ^1654 a. d. 
(S. 1699— 171 1) — ninth branch Ranga Vijaya 
started from S. 1700 (1643 a. d.") 

65. Jina Chandra Suri VII. 1654 — 1709 a.d. 
( S. 1711— 1763 ) 

[ Iv ] 

66. Jina Sukhha Suri. 1706 — 1723 a. d. ( S. 
1763— 1780) 

67. Jina Bhakti Suri. 1723 — 1747 a. d. (S. 
1 7 10 — 1804 ) 

68. Jina Labha Suri. 1747 — 1777 a. d. ( S. 
1804— 1834 ) 

69. Jina ChandraSuri.VIII. 1777 — 1799 a.d. 
( S. 1 134-- 1156) 

70. Jina Harsba Suri. 1799 — 1135 a. d. ( S. 
1856 — 1892 ) — tenth branch Mandoria started 
from S, 1892 ( 1835 A. D. ) Dr. Klatt's Mss. 
ends here ( Indian Antiquery Vol. XI. p. 250. ) 

71. Jina Soukhya Suri. IX. 1835— 1861 a.d. 
(S. 1892 — 1917 ) 

72. Jina Hansa Suri. II. i86t — 1871 a. d. 

(s. 1917— 1935 ) 

73. Jina Chandra Suri. 1879 — 1898 a. d. (S. 

1935— 1955 ) 

74. Jina Kirti Suri. 1898 — 191 1 a. d. ( S, 

1955— 1967 ) 

75. Jina Charitra Suri. 191 1. a. d. (S. 1167) 
— the present head of the gachchha. 

[ Dr, Heornle adds to Dr. Klatt's list No. 71. 
Jina Mahendra ( S. 1892 — 1914 ) and 72, 
Jina Mukti ; but these pontiffs belong to another 
branch of the gachchha. ] 


[ It is the 9th branch of 'Kharatara gachcha' 
in whose list {b) we find Jina Raja Suri as 
No. 63. Both his disciples Jina Ratna and Jina 
Ranga assumed headship, the former of the 
main line as No. 64 and the other Jina Ranga 
also as No. 64 of this branch which got its 
name as *Ranga Vijaya ,from this Suri and has 
been known so up to the present time.] 

64. Jina Ranga Suri. (died in S. 1711= 1654 
A. D.) 






A. D.) 

74, Jina Ratna Suri (succeeded in 1884 A.D. 
and is the present head of this branch). 

ina Chandra VII. 

ina Vimala. 

ina Lalita. 

ina Akshaya. 

ina Chandra VIII. 

ina Nandivardhana. 

ina Jayashekhara. 

ina Kalyana. 

ina Chandra IX. (died in S. 1941 = 1884. 


[The list of this Gachchha does not count No. i, 
Mahavira, and includes No. 7 in No. 6 and No. 10 
in No. 9 : So the number of Udyotana Suri comes 
to 35 instead of ^S. Dr. Klatt published the list 
in Indian Antiquary Vol. XI P 253. The 
Gachchha was named as 'Tapa' from S. 1^85 
(1211 A, D.) during the headship of No. 44 
Jagatachandra Suri.] 

35. Udyotana. 36. Sarvadeva I. 

;^7. Deva. 38. Sarvadeva II. 

39. Yashobhadra and Nemichandra. (brother 


40. Munichandra (contemporary of Hema- 


41. Ajitadeva. 42. Bijoyasinha. 

43. Somaprabha I and Maniratna. 

44. Jagatchandra. (S. 1285 = 1228 A. D.) 

45. Devendra (author of Karma grantha, died 

S. 1327 = 1270 A. D.) 

46. Dharmaghosha (died S. 1357 = 1300 A.D.) 

47. Somaprabha II, died S, 1373= 1316 A.D.) 

48. Somatilaka, (died S. 1424= 1367 A.D.) 

49. Devasundara. 

50. Somesundara, (died S. 1499 = 1442 A.D.) 

51. Munisundara (died S. 1503 = 1446 A. D.) 


[ Iviii ] 

52. Ratnashekhara(died S. 1517 = 1460 A.D.) 

53. Lakshmisagara. 

54. Surnatisadhu. 

55. Hemavimala. (during his time *Karuamati 

started from S. 1562 = 1505 A.D. and 
Tarshvvachandra', started from S. 1572 
= 1515 A.D.) 

56. Anandavimala. (died S. 1 596 = 1 539 A. D.) 
5^. Vijayadana (died S. 1622= 1565. A. D.) 
58 Heeravijaya. (contemporary of Akbar, 

died S. 1652 = 1595. A. D.) 
•59. Vijayasena. (died S. 1671 = 1614. A.D.) 

60. Vijayadeva. (died S. 1713 = 1656. A.D.) 

61. Vijayaprabha. 

(Dr. Klatt's list closes here.) 

62. Vijayaratna. 

63. Vijayakshema. 

64. Vijayadaya. * 

65. Vijayadharma I. 

66. Vijayajinendra. 

67. Vijayadhaneshwar. 

68. Vijayadevendra. 

69. Vijayadharma II. 



[The list of the Gachchha counts from 
Goutama, the first 'ganadhar of Mahavira, 
instead of beginning from Mahavira or Sudharma 
as in (b) or (c). It is a branch of the *Tapa' and 
so we find, up to No 40 Munichandra, similarity 
in names with slight difference. Unlike Tapa it 
does not include Nos 7 and 10 in Nos 6 and 9 
respectively. It excludes Dinna Suri (No 14) from 
the list. The number, therefore, of Udyotana Suri 
comes to 37. Dr. Klatt does not explain this 
(Indian Antiquary Vol XXIII p. 181). The Mss. 
give the date of Indradinna (No. 13) as 74 B.C.]. 

'i^T, Udyotana. 

38. Sarvadeva I. presentin S 1010(953 A.D.) 

39. Deva I. 40. Sarvadeva II. 
41. Yashobhadra. 42. Nemichandra. 

43. Munichandra. 

44. Deva II. brother pupilwith Ajitadeva No. 

41. of(c) ; (died in S. 1226 = 1169 A.D.) 

45. Padmaprabha 46. Prasannachandra. 
47. Gunasamudra, Dr. Klatt mentions Jaya- 

shekhara as 47 and again as 49. My Mss. has 
only one 'Jayashekhara 48; possibly it may be a 
mistake of Dr. Klatt's Mss.) 

t Ix ] 

48. Jayasekhara (S. 1301 =1244, A.D.) 

49. Vayarasena or Vajrasena ( converted 
many families in S. 1342 = 1285 A.D.) 

50. Hematilaka (S. 1362 = 1305 A.D.) 

51. Ratnashekhara (S. 1399 = 1342 A.D.) 

52. H emachandra. 

53. Purnachandra (S. 14^4 = 1367 A.D.) 

54. Hemahansa (S. 1453 = 1396 A.D.) 

55. Lakshminivas Panyas. 

56. Punyaratna Panyas. 

57. Sadhuratna Panyas. 

58. Parshwachandra Suri ( S. 1565 = 1508 
A. D. founded the Gachchha ; died 

S. 1612=1555 A.D.) 

59 Samarachandra (S. 1626= 1569 A.D ) 

60. Rayachandra (S. 1669=1672 A.D.) 

61. Vimalachandra (S. 1674 = 1617 A.D.) 

62. Jayachandra (S. 1698 = 1641, A.D.) 

63. Padmachandra (S. 1744 = 1687 A.D.) 

64. Munichandra (S. 1750 = 1693 A.D.) 

65. Nemichandra (S. 1797 = 1740 A.D.) 

66. Kanakachandra (S. 1810 = 1753 A.D.) 

67. Sivachandra (S. 1833 = 1777 A.D.) 

68. Bhanuchandra (S. 1837= 1780 A.D.) 

69. Vivekachandra. 70. Labdhichandra. 
71. Harshachandra 72. Hemachandra. 
73. Bhratrichandra and Devachandra, 


Nos. I to 60 the same as (c) 

60. Vijayadeva Suri. 

61. Vijayasinha Suri. 

62. Satyavijaya Gani. 

63. Kapuravijaya Gani. 

64. Kshamavijaya Gani. 

65. Jinavijaya Gani. 

66. Uttamavijaya Gani. 

67. Padmavijaya Gani. 

68. Rupavijaya Gani. 

69. Kirtivijaya Gani. 

70. Kasturavijaya Gani. 

71. Manivijaya Gani. " 

72. Buddhivijaya Gani. 
y2>' Ananadvijaya Suri. 

74. Kamalavijaya x^charya, the present 


{ The tradition is that the Gachchha took 
its rise from Lunkaji, who flourished in S. 
1508 = 1451 A. D. But the first sadhu who 
occupied the pontifical chair of the new line 
was Bhana Rishi. He was a native of Arhot- 

i ixii ] 

wada, belonged to Porwad caste and was self-ini- 
tiated in Ahmedabad in S. 1524= 1467 A. D. In 
some Mss. the date is S. 1528= 147 1 A. D. ; but 
in Jain Tatwadarsha, by Atmaramji the date is 
S. 1533=1476 A. D. Another Mss. give S. 
1531=1474 A. D. The Gachchas principal 
branches are : (i) Gujrati, (ii) Nagori (iii) Utradhi. 
In the list of the heads of the Gachchhas, which 
begins with Mahavira, as usual, the names are 
the same up to Arya Mahagiri, No 10. The dates 
in my Mss. are in regular order up to 453 A. D., 
when the Jain canons were reduced to writing. 
The dates, against the names of each, denote the 
year of their demise.] 

10. Mahagiri, 282 B. C. 

11. Balasinha, 247 B. C. 4 

1 2. Shanta, 195 B. C. 

13. Shyama, 154 B. C. 

14. Sandila, 121 B. C. 

15. Jitadharma, 73 B. C. 

16. Samudra, 19 B, C, 

17. Nandila, 64 A. D. 

18. Nslgahasti, 117 A, D. 

19. Revati, 191 A. D. 

20. Skhandil, 267 A. D. 

21. Sinha, 287 A. D. 

22. Samita, 321 A. D. 

[ Ixiii ] 


Nagarjun, 348 



Govinda, 350 



Bhutadin, 435 

A. D. 


Lohitashpa, 420 A. D 



Dusha, 448 A. 



Devardhi, 453 

A. D. 


Vii^ibhadra I 


Shankar Bhadra 




Virabhadra II. 


Variyama Sena. 34. 

Yasha Sena. 


Harsha Sena. 


Jaya Sena. 


Jagamala I. 


Deva I. 








Deva II. 




















Deva II 


Sura Sena. 


Mahasur Sena. 


Maha Sena. 


Jaya Raja. 


Gaya Sena. 


Mitta Sena. 


Vijaya Sinha. 


Shiva Raja. 






Bhana Rishi. 


Bheeda, (S. i 


493. A.D), 


Noona (S. 1556= 1499 A.D.) 




Jagamala II, 

[ Ixiv ] 

68. Sorbo. 

69. Roopa. (S. 1566= 1509 A.D.) 

70. Jiva. (N^gori Branch took its rise from 

this Acharaya). 

71. Vara Sinha. (Mss. closes here.) 

Atmaramji's list gives as follow^ : — 

63. Bhana(S. 1533= 1476 A.D,) 

64. Roopa (S. 1568=1511 A.D.) 

65. Jiva (S. 1578 = 1521 A.D.) 

66. Vara Sinha, Senior (S. 1587= 1530 A.D.) 

67. Vara Sinha (S. 1606= 1549 A.D.) 

68. Jashwanta (S. 1649 = 1592 A.D.) 








(Gujrati — Dhanrajpaskh? 

L Branch.) 




Varasingji (Barh). 

Varasingji (Laghu). 



Roopsingji II. 



















[ l^v j 


[The Gachha is also known as 'Vidhipaksha 
and started from S. 1214=1157 A.D. 

Its Pattavali was published by Dr. Klatt in 
'Indian Antiquary Vol XXIII p. 174, cf. Dr. 
Buhler's list in Epigraphia Indica Vol. II, p 39.] 

35. Udyotana. 36. Sarvadeva. 

2,y. Padmadeva. 38. Udayaprabha. 

39. Prabhananda. 40. Dharmachandra. 

41. Suvinayachandra 42. Gunasamudra. 

43. Vijayaprabha. 44. Narachandra. 

45. Virachandra. 46. Jayasinha. 

47. Aryarakshita. 

(S. 1202 — 12236 = 1145 — 1179A. D.) 

48. Jayasinha. 

(S. 1236—1258 = 1179—1201 A.D.) 

49. Dharma^hosha. 

(S. 1258— 1268 = 1201— 1210 A. D.) 

50. Mahendrasinha. 

(S. 1269— 1309= 1212— 1252 A. D.) 

51. Sinhaprabhu. 

(S. 1309— 1313=^1252— 1256 A.D.) 

52. Ajitasinha. 

(S. 1314—1339=1257— 1282 A. D.) 

53. Devendrasinha. 

(S. 1339— 1371 = 1282— 1313 A. D.) 

[ Ixvi ] 

54. Dharmaprabha. 

(S. 1391—1393 = 1313- 

55. Sinhatilaka. 

(S. 1393—1395=1336- 

56. Mahendra. 

.(s. 1395—1444 = 1338- 

57. Merutunga. 

(S. 1446—1471=1389- 

58. Jayakirti. 

(S. 1473—1500=1416- 

59. Jayakeshari. 

(S. 1501—1542 = 1444- 

60. Siddhantasagara. 

(S, 1542—1560=1485' 

61. Bhavasslgar. 

(S. 1560—1583 = 1503- 

62. Gunanidh^na. 

(S. 1584 — 1602 = 1527- 

63. Dharmartiurti. 

(S. 1602—1073=1545- 

64. Kalyinasigara. 

(S. 1670 — 1718 = 1613- 

65. Amaras^gara. 

(S. 1718 — 1762 = 1661- 

66. Vidyis^gara. 

(S. 1762—1797 = 1705. 






















1526 A. 

















[ Ixvii ] 

67. Udayasdgara. 

(S. 1797 — 1826= 1740 — 1769 A. D.) 

68. Kirtis^gara. 

■'S. 1826— 1843=1769— 1786 A. D.) 

69. Punyas^gara. 

(S. 1843— 1860= 1786— 1803 A. D.) 

70. Muktis^gara. 

(S. 1860-1892 = 1803— 1835 A. D.) 

71. Rajendrasagara. 

(S. 1892-1914-1835— 1857 A. D.) 

72. Ratnasagara. 

(S. 1914 — [928=1857 — 1871 A. D.) 

73. Vivekasdgara, from S. 1928=1877 A.D. 


1. Mahan KarV>ua. 

S. 1524—1564=1467—1507 A. D.) 

2. M. Khima. 

(S. 1564-1571=1507—1514 A. DJ 

3. M. Beera. 

(S. 1571--1601 =1514— 1544 A. D.) 

4. M. Jivaraj. 

(S. 1601 — 1644=1544 — 1587 A. D.) 

5. M. Tejapal I, 

(S. 1644— 1646- 1587— 1589 A, D.) 

[ Ixviii ] 


6. M. Ratnapal. 

(S. r646-'i66i=i589— :6o4 A. I^-) 

7. M. JI;iada.s. 

(S. 1661 — 1670 = 1674 — 1513 A. D.) 

8. M. Tej.pala II (S. 1670-1684 = 1613— 
1627 A. D. He was present in 1627 A.D.) 
with his c'^ief disciple Kaly^na and others, 
when the Mss. was written.) 


BhikhamjVe Swrinii (S. 1817 = 176^1 A.D. 



Bh.'\ramoli^^J SA^imi. ^ (S. 1860=1803 A.D. 

Raichandjte Swanii. (S. 1878=1821 A.D. 


Jitniiljce Swanii. (S. 1908= 1851 A. D. 

Maohr;'jj?:;e Swami. (S. 1938= i88r A. D. 


Mcinaklalj.^e Swami. (S. 1949 = 1892 A. D. 

Dalchandjce Swami. (S. 1954 = 1897 A.D. 

Kaluraniajee Swami. (S. 1966= 1909 A.D. 
— the present poiuiff. 

I Ixix ] 


(a) Nandi Sangha Ohitor Sakha. 

[ This Nandi Sangha was founded by Megha- 

nandin, a disciple of Guptigupta or Arhadbali 

and is also known as Saraswati Gachchha and 

Balitkslra Gana. The following list is based 

upon the Pattavali as lately published in the 
Jain Siddhanta Bhaskara, a Digambar Journal 

and by Dr. Hoernle in "Indian Antiquary" 

Vols. XX, pp. 341 — 361 and XXI, pp. 57 — 84. 

The pontiffs of the Gachchha generally use the 

four surnames viz. Nandin, Chandra, Kirti and 

Bhushana. The table begins from Gautama the 

first Ganadhara or disciple of Mahavira who is 

known as the founder of the Mula Sangha by 

the Digambaris. The dates against the names 

indicate the year of their succession.] 

I. Gotamaup to 515 B.C. 2. Sudharama 503 B.C. 
3. Jambu 465 B.C. 4. Vishnu 451 B.C. 

5. Nandi 435 B.C. 6. Aparajita 413 B.C. 

7. Gobardhana 394 B.C. 8. Bhadrabahu I 365 B.C. 
9. Vis^kha 355 B.C. 10. Proshthila 336 B.C. 

II. Kshatriya 319 B.C. 12. Jaya Sena 298 B.C. 
13. Naga Sena 280 B.C. 14. Siddhirtha 263 B.C. 
15. DKirsti Sena 245 B.C. 16. VijayaSena 232 B.C. 
17. Buddhilinga 212 B C. 18. Deva I 198 B.C. 
19. Dhara Sena 184 B.C. 20. Nakshatra 166 B.C. 

21. Jayapalaka 146 B.C. 22. Pandava 107 B.C. 

23. Dhruva Sena 93 B.C. 24. Kansa 61 B.C. 

25. Subhadra 57 B.C. 26. Yasobhadra 39 B.C. 

27. Bhadrabahu II 16 B C. 

( Other dates are 31, 33 and 53 B.C. See 
notes by Dr. Hoernle, Indian Antiquary Vol. XX 
pp. 341 and 357—360). 

28. Guptigupta2i B.C. 29. MeghanandinI i7B.C- 
30. Jinachandra I 8 B.C. 31. Kundakunda44 A.D. 
32. Umasvamin 85 A.D. ^^. Lohacharya 96 A.D. 
34. Yasahkirti 154 A.D. 35. Yasonandin 201 A.D. 

36. Devanandin I 

251 A. D. 
38. Gunanandin 

307 A. D. 
40. Kumarnandin 

360 A. D. 
42. Prabhachandra 

421 A. D. 
44. Bhanunandin 

451 A. D. 
46. Vasunandin 

474 A. D. 
48. Ratnanandin 
. 528 A. D. 
50. Meghchandra 

560 A. D. 

37. Jayanandin 

296 A. D. 
39. Vajranandin 

329 A. D. 
41. Lokachandra 

396 A. D. 
43. Nemichandra 

430 A. D. 
45. Nayananandin 

468 A. D. 
47. Viranandin 

504 A. D. 
49. Manikyanandin 

544 A. D. 

51. Shantikirti I 

585A. D. 


52. Merukirti 
629 A. D, 

54. Vishnunandin 

669 A. D. 
56. Shrichandra 

692 A. D. 
58. Desabhushana 
708 A. D. 
60. Dharmanandin 

751 A. D. 
62. Ramachandra 

790 A. D. 
64. Abhayachandra 

840 A. D. 
66. Nagachandra 

882 A. D. 
68. Harichandra 
917 A. D. 
70. Maghachandra I 

966 A. D, 
72. Gunakirti 

991A. D. 
74. Lokachandra 
1022 A. D. 
76. Bh^vachandra 
1058 A. D. 

Ixxi ] 

53. Mahikirti 
647 A. D. 

55. Shribhushana I 

678 A, D, 
57. Shrinandin 

708 A. D. 
59. Anantakirti 

728 A. D. 
61. Vidy^nandi 

783 A. D. 
63. R^ma kirti 

821 A. D. 
65. Navachandra 

859 A. D. 
67. Harinandi. 

891 A. D. 
69. Mahichandra I 

933 A- D. 

71. Lakshmichandra 

970 A. D. 
73. Gunachandra 

1009 A. D. 
75. Shrutakirti 

1037 A. D. 
77. Mahichandra II 
1083 A. D. 

[ Ixxii ] 

78. Mighachandra II 

1087 A. D. 
80. Devanandin II 

1098 A. D. 
82. Harinandin 

T103 A. D. 
84. Devanandin III 

1113 A. D. 
86. Surachandra 

1 1 27 A. D. 
88. Jnananandin 

1 142 A. D. 
90. Simhakirti 

1152 A. D. 
92. Charunandin 

1 166 A. D. 
94. N^bhikirti 

1175 A. D. 
96. Shrichandra II 

1191 A. D. 
98. Vardham§,na 

1 199 A. D. 
100. Lalitakirti 

1204 A. D. 
102. Ch^rukirti 

1207 A. D. 

79. Brahmanandin 
1091 A. D. 
81. Visvachandra 
1099 A. D. 
83. Bhavanandin 

mo A. D. 

85. Vidyachandra 

1 1 19 A. D. 

S7, Maghnandin II 

1131 A. D. 

89. Gang^kirti 

1 149 A. D. 
91. Hemakirtti 

1 159 A. D. 
93. Neminandin II 
95. Narendrakirti 

1 184 A. D, 

1 196 A, D. 

1200 A. D. 
1 01. Kesavachandra 

1205 A. D. 
103. Abhayakirti 
1207 A. D. 



[ Ixxiii J 
104. Vasantakirti 105. Prakshantikirti 

1209 A, D. 

106 Vishalakirti 
1214 A. D. 

108. Ratnakirti II. 

1253 A. D. 
no, Padmanandin 

1393 A. D, 
112. Prabhachandra III. 

1514 A. D. 
114. Dharamachandra II. 

1546 A. D. 
116. Chandrakirti 

1605 A. D. 
/18. Narendrakirti 

1665 A. D. 
120. Jagatakirti 

1713 A. D, 
122. Mahendrakirti I. 

1758 A. D. 
124. Surendrakirti 

1795 A. D. 
126. Nainakirti 

1826 A. D. 

1211 A. D. 

107. Dharmachandra 
1239 A D. 

109. Prabhachandra 

1328 A. D. 
III. Subhachandra 

1440 A. D. 
113. Jinachandra II. 

1524 A. D. 
115. Lalitakirti 

1565 A. D. 
117, Devendrakirti 

1634A. D. 
119. Surendrakirti 

1676 A. D. 
121. Devendrakirti II. 

1735 A. D. 
123. Khemendrakirti 

1765 A. D. 
125. Sukhendrakirti 

1822 A. D. 

127. Devendrakirti III 
1881 A. D. 

128. Mahendrakirti 1881 A.D. 

[ Ixxiv ] 


[After Jina Chandra II (No. 113) we find two 
lines, as one section removed to Nagor and the 
other continued to reside in Chitor.] 

113. Jinachandra II, up to 1524 A.D, 

114. Ratnakirti III, 1529 A.D. 

115. Bhuvanakirti, 1533 AD. 

116. Dharmakirti, 1544 A.D. 

117. Vishalakirti, from 1544 A. D. ; there is a 
break down in the list up to 1740 A.D. 
when Bhuvanabhushana (120) succeeded. 

120. Bhuvanbhushana up to 1745 A.D, 

121. Vijayakirti 1773 A. D. 

122. Lokendrakirti 1783 A.D. 

123 Bhuvanakirti II from 1793 A.D. 


[The line starts from Acharya Shubha 
Chandra No. 116 author of Pandava Purana. 

In the list the names differ from Vishalakirti 
No. 106. as below.] 

106 Vishalakirti. - 107, Shubhakirti. 

108. Dharmachandra. 109. Ratnakirti. 

no. Prabhachandra. in. Padmanandi. 

ii2.,Sakalakirti. 113. Bhuvanakirti. 

114. Indubhushana. 115. Vijayakirti, 

[ Ixxv ] 
ii6. Shubhachandra. 117= Sumatikirti 

118. Gunakirti. 
120. Ramakirti. 
122. Padmanandi. 
124. Kshemendrakirti 
126. Vijayakirti 
128. Chandrakirti 

119. Vadibhushana. 
121. Yashakirti. 
123. Devendrakirti. 
125. Narendrakirti. 
127. Nemichandra. 

[ The list is given from the Jaina Siddhanta 
Bhaskara. Up to Bhadrabahu II (No. 28) there 
is little difference. Next comes Lohacharya, a 
disciple of Bhadrabahu II and the 'Gana' was 
founded by his disciple Jina Sena I, from whom 
the name is derived ] 

I. Lohacharya I. 

3. Ravi Sena. 

5. Rama Sena. 

7. Bandhu Sena. 

9. Main Sena. 
II. Bhava Sena. 
13. Sihadbali. 
15. Guna Sena I. 
17. Samantabhadra I. 
19. Vira Sena I. 
21. Gunabhadra I. 
23. Chhatra Sena I. 

2. Jina Sena I. 
4. Shivayan. 
6. Kanaka Sena. 
8. Vishnu Sena. 
10. Mahavira. 
12.- Aristanemi. 
14. Ajita Sena. 
16. Siddha Sena. 
18. Shivakoti. 
20. Jina Sena II. 
22. Nemi Sena. 
24. Arya Sena. 

[ Ixxvi ] 

25. Lohacharya II. 
27. Sura Sena. 
29, Devendra. 
19. Durlava Sena. 
33. Sree Sena. 
35. Some Sena I. 
37. Dhara Sena III. 
39. Soma Sena II. 
41. Deva Sena II. 
41. Vira. 

45. Guna Sena II. 
47. Soma Sena III. 
49. Gunabhadra III, 
51. Jina Sena II. 
53. Chhatra Sena II. 

26. Bramha Sena. 
28. Kamalabhadra. 
30. Kumara Sena. 
32. Dhara Sena II. 
34. Laksmi Sena I. 
36. Shrutavira. 
48, Deva Sena I. 
40. Gunabhadra II. 
42. Vira Sena II. 
44. M^nikya Sena I. . 
46. Laksmi Sena II. 
48. Manikya Sena II. 
50. Soma Sena IV. 
52. Samantabhadra II. 

[ Ixxvii ] 


r The list is taken from *Jaina Siddhanta 
Bhaskara ] 

I. Mahavira 

3. Sudharmd. 

5. Vishnu. 

7. Aparijita 

9. Bhadrabahu I. 

II. Prosthila. 

13. Ndgasena. 

15. Dhritasena. 

17. Gangadeva 

19. Nakshatra. 

21. Pandu. 

23. Kansa, 

25. Yashobhadra. 

27. LohsLcharya. 

29. Virasena. 

31. Rudrasena. 

33. Kirtisena. 

35. Vishvakirti. 

37. Bhutasena. 

39. Vishvachandra. 

41. M^ghachandra. 

43. Vinayachandra. 

2. Goutama. 

4. Jambu. 

6. Nandimitra. 

8. Govardhana. 

10. Vishakh4. 

12. Kshatriya. 

14. Jayasena I. 

16. Vijay. 

18. Dharmasena. 

20. Jayap^Ia. 

22. Dhruvasena. 

24. Samudra. 

26. Bhadrabahu II. 

28. Jayasena. 

30. Bramhasena. 
32. Bhadrasena. 

34. Jayakirti. 

36. Abhayasena. 

38. Bhavakirti. 

40. Abhayachandra. 

42. Nemichandra. 

44. BS.lachandra. 

45. Tribhuvanachandral. 46. Rftmachandra. 
47. Vijayachandra. 48. Yashakitri I. 

[ Ixxviii 1 

49. Abhayakirti. 
^ 51. Kundakirti. 
53. Rdmasena. 
55. Guna Sena. 
57. Prdt^psena. 
59. Vijayasena. 
61. Shrey^nsasena. 
63. Kamalakirti I. 
65. Hemakirti. 
67. Kumdrsena II. 
69. Padmaiiandni. 
71. Kshemakirti. 
73. Sahasrakirti. 
75. Devendrakirti. 
77. Lalitakirti. 
79. Munindrakirti. 

50. Mah^sena. 

52. Tribuvanachandra II. 

54. Harshasena. 
56. Kumdrsena I. 
58. Mahavasena. 
60. Nayanasena. 
62. Anantakirti. 
64. Kshemakirti I. 
66. Kamalakirti. 
68. Hemachandra. 
70. Yashahkirti. 
72. Tribhuvanakirti. 
74. Mahichandra. 
76. Jagatakirti. 
78. Rajendrakirti. 


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