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No. 11 


JULY 1, 1907 






Documont No. 300 
Office of llie Chief of t>taf 






The rupture of diplomatic relations l)y Japan on February 
6, 1904, was coincident with the dispatch of the first expedi- 
tion to the theater of operations. On this date Vice-Admiral 
Togo left Sasebo with a fleet of 7 battle ships, 18 cruisers, a 
flotilla of destroyers and one of torpedo boats, conveying the 
transports Tairen, Otaru, and Ileijo, carrying troops belong- 
ing to the Twelfth Division. 

The squadron rendezvoused off Mokpo (southern Korea) 
on the next day, and from that point Togo sent Rear-Admiral 
UryU; with 4 cruisers and a torpedo-boat flotilla, to convoy the 
transports to Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, and sailed for Port 
Arthur with the remainder of the fleet. 

Admiral Uryu arrived at Chemulpo on February 8, and all 
the troops were safely landed. On the next day Uryu en- 
gaged the Russian cruiser Varyag and gunboat Korietz which 
had been lying in Chemulpo Harbor, and which, after an en- 
gagement of about one hour, returned to the harbor, where 
they were destroyed by their commanders the same evening. 
On the night of February 8 Togo sent a torpedo-boat flotilla 
against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and succeeded in 
inflicting such damage that the Japanese evidently con- 
cluded they could continue the transportation of troops to 
the theater of war. 

By February 15, 12 transports, carrying about 3,000 horses 
and 14,000 troops, were loaded at Nagasaki and sailed to rein- 
force the troops landed at Chemulpo. 

The First Japanese Army, of which the force landed at 
Chemulpo on February 8 was the advance guard, was com- 
manded by General Kuroki, with General Fujii as chief of 
stafT. It consisted of the Second, Twelfth, and Imperial 



Guards Divisions,'^ comnmnded, respectively, by Lieutenant- 
Generals Nishi, Inoiij^e, and Hasegawa. The two brigades 
of the Second Division were commanded Ijy Major-Generals 
Matsunaga and Okasaki; of the Twelfth, by Kigoshi and 
Sasaki; of the Guards, by Asada and Watanabe. At the 
crossing of the Yalu the artillery included also twenty 12 cm. 

Primarily the Japanese intended to land the First Army 
at Sun Chong on the baj^^ of the same name, in the extreme 
southeast of Korea, about halfway between Masampo and 
MokjDo, and march thence to Seoul, and preparations were in 
progress with that end in view. Their success at Port Arthur 
and Chemulpo, however, allowed the use of Chemulpo and 
practically advanced their campaign one month. 

The main portion of the command landed at Chenuilpo on 
February 8, proceeded to Seoul, the capital of Korea, mov- 
ing principally by rail, and reinforced the Japanese garrison 
of 250 men stationed there. This not only gave the Japa- 
nese a great political advantage in Korea, but was the begin- 
ning of General Kuroki's advance by the main highway 
leading to the Yalu. 

The landing of troops and supplies was pushed at Clie- 
nmlpo, but the harbor is not favorable for rapid work. For 
example, the Fourteenth Regiment arrived on February 18 
and its landing was not completed until the 21st. 

On February 14 two companies were sent, one to Fusan 
and one to Gensan, the latter by marching from Seoul. One 
company of the Fourteenth Regiment was sent by steamer to 
Waichu, whence it marched to Phyangyang, arriving Feb- 
ruary 20. The northern advance of General Kuroki may be 
said to begin with the movement of the latter company. 
The advance by land began with the divisional cavalry and 
Fourteenth Regiment under Major-General Sasaki on Feb- 
ruary 22. 

«Each Japanese division contained normally four regiments of infantry, 
one of cavalry, one of artillery, and the various detachments of technical 
troops, making a total of about 14,000 effectives and G,000 noneffectives. 
The regiriKMit of cavalry, that of artillery, and the battalion of engineer 
troops have the same numerical designation as the division of which they 
form a part. 


On March 5 Major-General Yamani, of the Japanese engi- 
neerSj arrived with several officers and 300 engineer troops, 
for the purpose of constructing the Seoul-Wiju Railway. 

A Japanese detachment of 6 squadrons and 1 battahon 
landed at Chinampo on March 13 and marched to Anju. 

The Twelfth Division started north from Phyangyang on 
March 21, the head of the Guards Division, two battalions, 
with General Kuroki, arriving from Chinampo, where it had 
landed, about noon of that day. They were followed by the 
remainder of the division under Lieutenant-General Hase- 

On March 29 the entire Second Division had completed its 
landing at Chinampo, thus raising the force moving north- 
ward to about 45,000 men. The Guards and Second Division 
had begun embarking at Ujina, the port of Hiroshima, on 
March 8. 

The occupation of Phyangyang allowed troops and supplies 
to be landed at Chinampo, about 40 miles distant by a road 
free from difficult grades. This was a saving of 120 miles 
over the route previously used via Seoul. Profiting by high 
tides, supplies were towed up the river in sampans and landetl 
at Mankundai, only 7 miles from Phyangyang. Chinampo 
had the further advantage of a direct road to Anju, saving 
from 10 to 15 per cent of the distance via Phyangyang. 

Speaking of the manner of advance an eyewitness says: 

The advance movement of the Japanese troops reseml)les the coaling of 
a ship by small baskets at Nagasaki; rarely does a larger unit than a bat- 
talion move at one time. 

Moving north from Phyangyang to Anju the Twelfth Divi- 
sion moved on the S3^unch3'en road; the Guards, on the 
Syunan road; the Second Division, along the seashore. 

A company of Japanese infantry, from the Guards Divi- 
sion, with some cavalry, came into conflict with a body of 
about 600 Russian cavalry south of Chengju, March 28. 
Four Japanese, including an officer, were killed and 12 
wounded. The detachment occupied Chengju the same day. 

The skirmish began at 11.50 a. m., near the south gate of 
the town where the Japanese cavalry was fired upon. They 
then rode around to the north gate while the infantry attacked 
the south e:ate. 


The Russians, from the First Chita Regiment, commanded 
l)y Colonel Pavlov, withdrew toward Wiju. This regiment 
and the First Verkhne-Udinsk formed the Cossack brigade, 
commanded by Major-General Mishchenko, which reconnoi- 
tered the Japanese approach. 

On April 4 the Japanese advance guard reached and occu- 
pied Wiju, the opposing cavalry having crossed to the right 
bank of the Yalu on the preceding day. 

On April 10 and 12 small detachments of Russians 
attempted to cross the Yalu below Wiju, but failed in both 
cases after sharp skirmishes. 

In the meantime Kuroki concentrated his army at and near 
Anju and, on April 7, moved on Wiju, leaving small infantry 
garrisons at Chinampo and Phyangyang. Supplies were 
landed from the sea at the mouth of the Chyongchyen River, 
Usiho, and on the Chiulsan Peninsula, thus materially reliev- 
ing the demands upon the single road over which the army 
was moving. 

Major-General Sasaki, with a covering detachment of 3 
battalions, 1 squadron, 2 mountain batteries, and accom- 
panying service troops, was held at Phyangyang until the 
rear of the army left Anju. The detachment then marched 
on Chongsung, where it arrived al)out the same date as the 
main body arrived at Wiju, April 20. 

The twenty 12 cm. howitzers landed at Ihoaphu about 
April 10 and reached Wiju on the 26th. 

The occupation of Wiju again brought relief to the line of 
communications back through Anju, Phyangyang to Chi- 
nampo. It allowed troops and supplies to be landed in the 
estuary of the Yalu, as at Yongampo. 

This shortening of the line of communications was of 
incalculable benefit, for, across a large river not fordable 
below Suikouchen (8 miles above Wiju), a not inconsider- 
able force faced the First Japanese Army. 

This Russian force, called the Eastern Detachment, based 
on Liaoyang, with secondary base at Fenghuangcheng, con- 
sisted at first of 8 battalions, 32 sotnias, and 38 guns. On 
April 22 Lieutenant-General Zasulich arrived and took com- 
mand of the reenforced Eastern Detachment, w^hich then 
contained about 25,000 effectives, and was reorganized as fol- 
lows: The main body consisted of the Ninth, Tenth, Elev- 


entli, Twelfth, and Twenty-fourth East Siberian Rifie 
Regiments, the First, Second, and Third Batteries of the 
Third East Siberian Artillery Brigade, the Second and Third 
Batteries of the Sixth "East Siberian Artillery Brigade, and 
1 machine gun company (18 battalions, 40 guns, and 8 ma- 
chine guns), and held the right banks of the Ai and Yalu 
rivers in the region opposite Wiju, 

The left flank detachment consisted of the Argunsk and 
the Ussuri Cossack regiments and 1 mountain battery (12 
sotnias and 8 guns) under command of Colonel Trukhin, 
and covered the left flank and the road leading to Kuantien 
and Saimachi. 

The right flank detachment consisted of Major-General 
Mishchenko's Cossack brigade reenforced by the Twenty- 
first East Siberian Rifle Regiment, the First Battery of the 
vSixth East Siberian Artillery Brigade, and 1 Transbaikal 
horse battery (3 battalions, 12 sotnias, and 14 guns), and 
was charged with reconnoitering the coast ^rom the mouth 
of the Yalu to Takushan. 


(Plate I.) 

On the morning of April 26 one battalion of the Guards, 
crossing by pontoon ferry, drove the Russian outpost from 
and occupied the island of Kyurito. 

On the same morning work was begun on a bridge across 
the first branch of the river near Wiju. The work was in- 
terrupted by the Russian artillery from Conical Hill and a 
point farther south. The bridge, 237 meters long, and con- 
structed of piles, junks, and other local material, was finall}^ 
completed on the 27th. On the 27th a bridge was con- 
structed at "a," opposite the southern wall of Wiju. It 
also was of improvised material, and about 80 meters long. 

On the 26th also a small bridge, 30 meters long, was con- 
structed at "b;" the small bridge just above "b" was 
constructed on the 28th. On the night of the 27th the two 
small bridges at "c, " 108 and 113 meters long, were con- 

In the meantime a Japanese river flotilla of 2 torpedo 
boats, 2 gunboats, and 4 armed launches came up the Yalu 
on April 25, was fired upon by the Russians, and retired to 


Y()n<,^aiiipo. On the 26lli it retuniod witli a large ninnber 
of junks loaded with bridge material and made a demonstra- 
tion against Antung. The Japanese claim this demonstra- 
tion caused the Russians to send their reserves to Tientzu, 
thus materially weakening their forces facing the intended 

It is to be noted that the main road from the Yalu to 
Fenghuangcheng starts from Antung and passes through 
Tientzu. The roads from Chiuliencheng and from Chingkou 
join at Hamatan and reach the Antung-Fenghuangcheng 
road at a point about 2 miles north of Tientzu. 

On the night of April 28 the Twelfth Division, except one 
battalion, 1 squadron, and 1 mountain batter}^, left at Chong- 
sung, concentrated near Suikouchen, and began building a 
bridge the next morning. A regiment of infantry began 
crossing by pontoons about noon of the 29th, but was met 
by the fire of 2 companies, 3 sotnias, and 2 mountain guns 
from Colonel Trukhin's force. One battalion, however, suc- 
ceeded in crossing, and covered the bridge building and the 
further crossing. The bridge, 265 meters long, was com- 
pleted at 3 a. m. on the 30th, and the main body of the 
Twelfth Division crossed and moved to the west against 

In the meantime the Russian detachment which had re- 
sisted the crossing at Suikouchen fell back, the sotnias going 
to Hsiulun, about 30 miles north of Wiju, where they were 
joined the same day by the remainder of Colonel Trukhin's 
command, which had marched there by order of Lieu tenant- 
General Zasulich to cover the road leading to Kuantien. 

On April 29, under cover of the fire of the battery near 
Potiehtun, a Russian detachment crossed the Ai River near 
that village and drove a battalion, some cavalry, and some 
mountain guns from the Guards, which had occupied the 
Litzuyen Valley and Tiger Hill on the preceding day, back 
to Kyurito Island. The Russian detachment was then 
checked by the fire of the Guards artillery from near Wiju. 

At 9 a. m., on April 30, two battalions of the Guards artil- 
lery and the twenty 12 cm. howitzers began firing on the 
Russian trenches at Conical Hill. The Russian battery 
there replied until 11 a. m. and then ceased firing. The 


remaining- battalion of the Guards artillery took up a position 
on Kyurito Island, and the advance guard of the Twelfth 
Division attacked and forced back across the Ai River the 
Russian detachment at Litzuyen. By noon the main body 
of the Twelfth Division was in position about 2 miles east of 
and facing the Ai River. 

A battalion of the Guards occupied Tiger Hill and the con- 
struction of the bridges at P, Q, and R (237, 310, and 90 
meters long, respectively) was begun. The bridges were ready 
for use about 8 p. m. 

At daybreak of May 1 the Twelfth Division was close to 
and facing the Ai River, its artillery being near Litzuyen, its 
right near Shalankou; a detachment was moving from Sha- 
lankou- toward the Chingkou ford (this detachment took no 
part in the battle proper, not crossing the Ai until the Rus- 
sians at Chingkou ford had been driven away) . The Second 
Division was southwest of Tiger Hill. The Guards Division 
occupied a line from Tiger Hill north to Litzuyen, having 
followed the ^Second Division to Tiger Hill from its point of 
concentration. The reserve, 2 regiments of infantry, less 1 
battalion each, and 2 of cavalry, was on Kyurito Island. 

The Russian troops holding the right bank of the Ai River 
were commanded by Major-General Kashtalinski, and were 
distributed as follows: 

At and near Chiuliencheng were the Twelfth Regiment, 1 
battalion of the Eleventh Regiment, the Second Battery of 
the Third Brigade, and the machine-gun company. 

At and near Potiehtun were 2 battalions of the Twenty- 
second Regiment and 6 guns of the Third Battery of the 
Sixth Brigade. 

At Chingkou were one battalion of the Twenty-second 
Regiment and 2 guns of the Third Battery of the Sixth 

The remainder of the troops commanded by General 
Zasulich was ilistributed as follows: 

At and near Antung were the Tenth and Twenty-fourth 
Regiments and the Second Battery of the Sixth Brigade. 

At Tientzu, as general reserve, were the Ninth Regiment, 
two battalions of the Eleventh Regiment and the Third 
Battery of the Third Artillery Brigade. 


The riii;lit (lank detachment, under Major-General Mish- 
chenko, was guarding the coast from the mouth of the Yahi 
to Takuslian. 

The main body of the left flank detachment, under Colonel 
Trukliin, was at Hsiulun, guarding the road to Kuantien, 
with lesser detachments from the mouth of the Anping 
River, just above Suikouchen, to a point about 30 miles 
farther upstream. 

At 5.20 a. m., on May 1, the Japanese opened fire on the 
right flank of the Chiuliencheng position from the 12 cm. 
howitzers. A little later the artillery of the Second Division, 
from west of Wiju, and that of the Twelfth Division, from 
near Litzuyen, opened fire. At 7 a. m. the 6 Russian guns 
northeast of Makou began firing on the Guards artillery. 

At 7.30 a. m. the Japanese infantry moved forward. As 
it approached and was fording the Ai River it came under 
the fire of the Russian infantry and machine guns, and 
suffered considerable loss. The Russian artillery had ceased 
fu'ing. The Twelfth Division made the more rapid progress 
in the series of attacks delivered from the base of the hills on 
the right bank of the Ai River, and the two battalions of the 
Russian Twenty-se.-ond Regiment holding the Potiehtun 
position were the first to give way. Their withdrawal was 
disorderly, the greater portion going toward Chingkou and 
thus exposing the left flank of the Chiuliencheng position. 
The battery took up a second position at ''V," but having 
no infantry support and having lost heavily in men and 
horses, the 6 guns were abandoned to the Japanese. Shortly 
before noon Major-General Kigoshi's brigade, the right of 
Twelfth Division, drove back the battalion of the Twenty- 
second Regiment holding the Chingkou ford, and followed 
the retreating Russians toward Laofankou. At the same 
time the Japanese infantry resumed the assault on the left 
flank of the Chiuliencheng position, being aided by the 
artillery on Chukoutai Island. The troops holding the 
Chiuliencheng position then withdrew to the position at " Y" 
under cover of the fire of the machine gun company and that 
of the Second Battery of the Sixth Brigade, which had 
arrived from near Antung. The Ja]:)anese reserve arr-ved at 
Conical HiJl, the Second Division was dhected on Antung, 


the Guards and reserve continued moving toward the Russian 
position at ''Y" and toward Hamatan. 

Hearing of the retreat of the battahon from Chingkou 
ford and the renewal of the Japanese advance near Chiulien- 
cheng, Lieutenant-General ZasuUch decided about noon to 
retreat to Fengliuangcheng. Two battahons of the Eleventh 
Regiment and the Third Battery of the Third Brigade were 
sent from the reserve to a position, designated by Major- 
General Kashtalinski, to the east of Hamatan. The two 
battalions took up positions facing east and north, but, find- 
ing the ground of such nature as to render artillery fire im- 
practicable, Major-General Kashtalinski ordered the battery 
to withdraw. 

By 1.45 p. m. the Japanese had pressed the Twelfth Regi- 
ment, the battalion of the Eleventh Regiment, and the ma- 
chine-gun company back on the position at Hamatan. The 
Third Battery of the Third Brigade, which was endeavoring 
to carry out the order to withdraw, came under a cross fire 
at close range and was compelled to cease its withdrawal and 
take up a position. The machine-gun company took up a 
position and for a time held the Japanese back from this 
battery. In doing this the machine-gun company lost all of 
its horses and about half of its personnel. The Second Bat- 
tery of the Sixth Brigade, which had aided in covering the 
withdrawal from the Chiuliencheng position, found its loss in 
horses so great as to prevent withtlrawal of the guns from the 
position at "Y". 

The Twelfth Regiment withdrew through the Hamatan 
position, wdiich the Eleventh Regiment continued to hold for 
two hours more, thus facilitating the withdrawal of the Rus- 
sians from the vicinity of Antung. In the meantime Major- 
General Kigoshi's brigade, moving from Chingkou, had a 
severe skirmish south of Laofankou, and 2 guns took up a 
position at " Z." Tiie left of the Twelfth Division had moved 
from the Potiehtun position toward Hamatan. 

At 4 p. m. the remnants of the Eleventh Regiment began 
to withdraw toward Fengliuangcheng, being assisted in cut- 
ting their way through by the fire of a battalion of the Tenth 
Regiment, sent from the reserve to hill 522 northwest of 


The Japanese reported a loss of 5 oflicers and 218 men 
killed and 33 ollieers and TSO men wounded, and the capture 
of '2'2 iield <i;uns, 19 artillery ammunition wa-ijjons, 1,417 shells, 
8 machine guns, 8 machine-gun wagons, 37,300 machine-gun 
cartridges, 1,021 rifles, 51 small-arms ammmiition wagons, 
353,005 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 63 horses, various 
minor articles, including some taken at Fenghuangcheng, and 
18 oflicers and 613 men as prisoners. 

Lieut(Mi ant-General Zasulicli reported a loss on April 30 
and May 1 of 70 officers and 2,324 men killed, wounded, and 
taken prisoners. Major-Generai Kashtalinski was among 
tlie wounded. 

Another Russian report gives 28 oflicers and 564 men 
killed, 38 oflicers and 1,081 men wounded, and 6 ofFicers and 
679 men missing. 

Tlie Russians retreated on Fenghuangcheng and were fol- 
lowed by tlie Japanese First Army. On May 6 there were 
cavalry skirmislies nortlieast of Fenghuangclieng, wliich was 
tliat day occupied by a detacliment of Japanese infantry. 
This advance was accompanied by extensive reconnaissance, 
Kuantien being occupied by a Japanese detacliment on May 
5, while on the 11th occurred a skirmish with a force from 
the Chita Regiment of Mishchenko's brigade, withdrawing 

On May 10 a detachment of Cossacks attacked Anju, hav- 
ing come down the Cliosan-Anju road, but, after a skirmish 
lasting the greater part of the day and until the morning of 
the 11th, the attacking force was driven off by reenforce- 
ments arriving from Kasan. Had this attack been made 
just prior to General Kuroki's crossing of the Yalu and more 
vigorously pushed, it would undoubtedly have caused the 
Japanese commander considerable apprehension or even 
have delayed the crossing; but, as it turned out, tlie Japanese 
army had crossed the river and was no longer tied to its line 
of communications back through Anju, since reenforcements 
and supplies were now landed near the nioutli of the Yalu. 

An advance be3^ond Fenghuangcheng was not undertaken 
until other troops had landed and could move in cooperation 
with the First Army. 



On May 5, 1904, the Second Japanese Army, commanded 
by General Oku and consisting of the First, Third, and Fourth 
Divisions and the First Artillery Brigade, began landing 
troops of the Third Division a short distance south of Pit- 
sewo. On the 6th the First Division also began landing. On 
the 7th the place of disembarkation was shifted to a point 
about 7 miles southwest of Pitsewo. The landing was prac- 
tically completed on the 13th. Lieutenant-Generals Fu- 
shimi, Oshimi, and Ogawa commanded the First, Third, and 
Fourth Divisions, respectively; Major-General Uchiyama, the 
artillery brigade. 

This force had been in readiness for some time, the First 
Division having left Tokyo about March 19, and with the 
Third Division and First Artillery Brigade was ready for em- 
barkation from Hiroshima on April 18. The Fourth Divi- 
sion began embarking at Osaka on April 22. The transports 
containing the Second Army concentrated at Chinampo, 
where they remained until the after First Army had crossed 
the Yalu. 

To protect the landing and the large fleet of transports car- 
r^dng the Second Army, Admiral Togo, in the early morning 
of May 3 made his third attempt to block Port Arthur, send- 
ing in eight vessels to be sunk in the channel for that purpose. 

Two detachments were sent out from the Second Army on 
the 5th, one to Pitsewo, to cut the telegraph line running to 
Pulantien; the other, across the isthmus, to cut the railway 
and telegraph line at Pulantien ( Port Adams) , near the oppo- 
site coast. Both detachments succeeded. The Pulantien 
detachment arrived on the 6th, cut the railway and telegraph, 
and returned to rendezvous on the 7th. The cutting of the 
railway seems to have been confined to the destruction of a 

On the afternoon of the 7th another detachment was sent 
out with the object of breaking the railway between Pulantien 
and Sanchilipu. On the 8th it cut the telegraph and rail- 
way near Lungkou, about 4 miles north of Sanchilipu, after a 

To gather information of the landing and guard the south- 
ern portion of the railway between Wafangtien and Chinchou, 


there was sent to Wafangtien the Second Brigade of the 
Nintli East Siberian Rifles Division, tlie Second Trans})arkal 
Cossack Battery, and a squadron of cavalry, under command 
of Major-General Zikov. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Spiridonov, with a platoon of the 
Fourth Trans-Amur Railway Battalion, repaired the railway 
bridge that had been destroyed on the 7th at Pulaiitien. 
This allowed a train load of ammunition to be taken to Port 
Arthur on May 10. 

On May 12 another Japanese detachment cut the railway 
betw^cen Pulantien and Wafangtien, permanently suspending 
raihvay communication with Port Arthur. 

On the 15th the greater part of the infantry of the Fourth 
Division and the Thirteenth Regiment of the Artillery Bri- 
gade moved to a position astride the railway and about mid- 
way between Pulantien and Chinchou. The First Division 
occupied a position astride the Pitzewo-Chinchou road and 
about 8 miles from Chinchou. The Third Division and army 
reserve occupied a position facing north on the hills south 
and east of Pulantien. 

On the 16th there was a skirmish at Shisanlitai, north of 
Chinchou, where the troops of the Japanese First Division 
attacked a Russian force of 3 battalions and 8 guns. The 
Japanese drove the Russians back, losing 9 officers and 162 
men killed and wounded, and the Fourth and First Divisions 
occupied Kiulichuang and hills to the north of Chengchiatun. 
The Russian force retreated on Chinchou, reporting the Jap- 
anese force at and near Sanchilipu to consist of 2 divisions 
and 6 batteries; the Japanese concluded that the Russian 
force in the vicinity of Chinchou and Nanshan, and com- 
manded by Lieutenant-General Fock, consisted of the whole 
of the Seventh East Siberian Rifle Division and apportion of 
the Fourth East Siberian Rifle Division, subsequently pla- 
cing the Russian force between 9,000 and 10,000 men. In 
this engagement the Russians lost 10 officers and 150 men 
killed and wounded. 

On the 16th Rear- Admiral (the younger) Togo made a 
demonstration on the W' est coast of the peninsula, in the neigh- 
borhood of Kaiping, firing on some Russian troops near the 
coast. On the 17th he entered Chinchou Bay and fired on 
railway bridges and a military train. 



On May 19 the Fifth Japanese Division began its disem- 
barkation, which was completed on the 22d. The First Cav- 
ah'Y Brigade and the Eleventh Division arrived and disem- 
barked shortly after the Fifth Division. 

(Plate II.) 

On May 23 the Fourth, First, and Third Divisions, in the 
order named from right to left, concentrated in rear of the 
line Kiulichuang, Chengchiatun, Chaitzuho (southeast of 
Chengchiatun) , and spent the remainder of that day and all 
the next in reconnoitering the Russian position. 

On the 25th the Russians observed the Japanese forces for 
six hours from a balloon. The Japanese artillery fired at the 
balloon, but were unable to hit it, giving as a reason that the 
sky was overcast and the color of the balloon blendetl with 
that of the clouds. 

On the 25th the Japanese advanced to Lungwangmiao, 
Sanlichuang, Chengcliiatien, Wangchiatun, and that night 
small parties attacked Chinchou, which fell into their hands 
about 5.20 a. m. on the 26th. The attack was continued 
on the 26th, and, after a desperate struggle, Nanshan was 
occupied about 7 p. m., the Russians retiring toward Port 

Four Japanese vessels, the TsuJcushi, Ileiyen, Akagi, and 
Cliokai, accompanied by a torpedo-boat flotilla, took part in 
the battle from Chinchou Bay, firing on the western portion 
of the Russian position, especially the heights of Suchiatun 
and later those of Nankuanling, the Akagi and Cliokai being 
engaged throughout the day. The Russian gunboat Boher 
bombarded the Japanese left flank from Talienwan Bay on 
the 26th. 

Japanese forces at Nanshan. 

Division. | Infantry regiments. 



Artillery regiments. 

1st 1st, 15th, 2d, 3d 



3d . . 6th, 33d, 18th (34th) .. 



4th... . . 8th, 37th, 9th, 38th .. . 



13th, 14th, 15th. 

The Thirty-fourth Infantry, 2 squadrons and 1 artillery battalion of the Third Division, 
and 1 battalion and 2 squadrons of the Fourth Division w^ere with the Fifth Division hold- 
ing the line from Pulantien to the Tasha River. The companies of the Fifth Engineer 
Battalion were present at Nanshan. 

Combatant strength, 38,740; total strength, 53,740. 


The eng{i^einent of the 25th was mainly an artillery duel. 
The 26th also opened with an artillery duel at about 5.30 
a. ni. At 6 a. ni. the infantry of the Fourth Division ad- 
vanced west of Chinchou, the extreme right wading through 
the waters of the bay, reaching a line west of Liuchiatien 
about 8.30 a. ni. Then the infantry of the First Division 
moved forward and prolonged this line east through Liuchia- 
tien and then southeast. About 7.50 a. m. the infantry of 
the Tliird Division began moving forward and prolonged the 
line of the First Division, its own left resting near Liuchiakou. 
The Japanese artillery, which had obtained the mastery 
over the llussian artillery after firing about one hour, also 
advanced nearer to Nanshan. Two Russian field batteries 
retired to an elevation east of Nankuanling, from which 
they maintained a persistent fire on the Thirtl Division. In 
atldition the Russians strengthened their right, and, with the 
aid of the gunboat Boher, inflicted great loss on the left of the 
Third Division. 

From 9 a. m. to 6 j). m., notwithstanding the Russian ar- 
tillery at Nanshan proper had ceased firing, repeated attacks 
of the Japanese infantry were repidsed by the Russian infan- 
try and machine-gun fire, and with the exception of small 
attacking parties the Japanese line remained practically sta- 
tionary at about 500 yards from the Russian trenches. 
About 6 p. m. the Fourth Division began moving forward, 
assisted by its artillery and the fire of the vessels in Chin- 
chou Bay. The Seventh Brigade advanced its extreme right 
so far as to practically turn the position. The Russians then 
began their withdrawal. The Fourth Division then reached 
the Russian position about 7.10 p. m. and was closely fol- 
lowed by the First and Third Divisions. 

Not only was the Fourth Division aided by the fire of the 
vessels, but it was confronted by the weakest portion of the 
Russian position. The greater portion of the defensive 
works faced the east, northeast, and north. 

General Oku reported casualties as follows: Officers, 21 
killed and 100 wounded; noncommissioned officers, 5 killed 
and 12 wounded; privates, 713 killed and 5,343 wounded— 
a total of 739 killed and 5,455 wounded. 

General Stoessel reported a loss of about 30 officers and 
800 soldiers killed and wounded. 


General Oku reported the capture of about 68 cannon, 
10 machine guns, an electric battery, 3 searchlights with 
dynamo, 50 mines, a quantity of rifles and ammunition; also 
that his army buried the bodies of 10 officers and 664 men 
of the Russians at Nanshan. 

On the 27th the Japanese occupied Nankuanling. On the 
same day a detachment occupied Liushutun (the terminus of 
the Talienwan branch railway), securing 4 guns, some am- 
munition, and 45 freight cars. The Russians on the same 
da}^ evacuated Daln}', wliich was occupied by the Japanese 
on May 30. 

On this latter day an engagem(;nt occurred at Lichiatun, 
22 miles north of Pulantien, between the First Cavalry Bri- 
gade and a Cossack brigade under Major-General Simonov. 
On the 3d of June there was another skirmish near Chinchia- 
tun, and again on the 4th, south of Telissu at Chienshiatun. 
These skirmishes were between reconnaissance parties of the 
Japanese Fifth Division and its attached troops, holding the 
Pulantien-Tasha River line, on one hand, and the advance 
guard of General Stackelberg on the other, the latter having 
begun concentrating his troops from Yingkou and Kaiping 
to aid the Port Arthur garrison, the advance guard of 2 regi- 
ments of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry and 8 guns arriving 
at Mauchialing, Telissu, and Wafangtien between May 28 
and 31. The Japanese First Cavalry Brigade retired before 
this advance guard, arriving near Pitsewo June 6. 

General Stackelberg had under his command the First and 
Ninth East Siberian Rifle Divisions with their accompanying 
First and Ninth East Siberian Artillery Brigades (First 
Siberian Corps), the Second Brigade (Glasko) of the Thirty- 
fifth Infantry Division with its accompanying half of the 
Thirty-fifth Artillery Brigade, the Ninth (Tobolsk) Siberian 
Infantry Regiment (from the Third Siberian Division), one 
brigade of the Siberian Cossack Division, the Ussuri Mounted 
Brigade (2 sotnias of Frontier Guards and the Primorski 
Dragoon Regiment), a Frontier Guard battery, the Second 
Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery, and the East Siberian Sapper 
Battalion; a total of 36 battalions, 20 sotnias and squadrons, 
and 98 guns, with a possible strength of 42,000 foot and 3,000 
mounted men. 

34520—07 2 



(Plate III.) 

On Juno 6 the troops already landed and still landing near 
Pitsewo were divided into two armies. The First Division, 
reenforced by the Ninth and Eleventh Divisions, became the 
Third Army, and later moved on and besieged Port Arthur. 
General Oku, with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions, the 
First Cavalry Brigade, and First Artillery Brigade, started 
north on June 13 from near Pulantien, the Third Division and 
artillery brigade (less one regiment) moving along the Tasha 
River, the Fifth Division along the railway line, the Fourth 
Division and Fourteenth Regiment (artillery brigade) along 
the Wuchiatun-Ssuchuankou-Tahoya road leading toward 
Fuchou, and the cavalry brigade along the Pitsewo-Hsiung- 
3^ocheng road. The Sixth Division began landing at Pitsewo 
on June 13, and a portion arrived near Telissu during the 
battle, thus bringing the Japanese total to about 50,000 men 
and 180 guns. 

The Third Division came into contact with the Russian 
advance guard, which had retired from Wafangtien, on the 
afternoon of June 14 and drove it back. The Russian guns 
northeast of Lungwangmiao then opened a fire that was 
replied to by the Third, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Japanese 
artillery regiments for about two hours. The first line of the 
Japanese Third Division, after some skirmishing, reached a 
line through heights 987, 962, the one northeast of and next to 
962, and 1400. The advance guard of the Fifth Division took 
part in this engagement, advancing until its right rested on 
height 700 and its left on the Fuchou River. 

General Oku ordered the Third Division to hold the line of 
its advance guard. The Fifth Division during the night was 
sent to occupy the hills west of Tayankou with orders to at- 
tack at dawn. The Fourth Division was at Nachialing; the 
troops of the Sixth Division that arrived were held in reserve. 
The First Cavalry Brigade was at the crossing of the Tasha 
River on the Pitsewo road. 

To meet the Japanese advance. General Stackelberg had 
placed the Thirty-third and Thirty-sixth Rifle Regiments and 
2 batteries on the heights north of Tafangshan, the Fourth 
and Third, in order named, 2 field batteries and 1 mountain 


battery to the east of the railroad; the Thirty-fourth, the 
Thirty-fifth, and 2 batteries in reserve between TeHssu and 
the station; the brigade of the Thirty-fifth Division about 1 
mile east of the station. When the Russian advance guard 
was driven back on the 14th, the First and Second Rifle Regi- 
ments prolonged the main Russian line to the east, the cavalry 
of the advance guard, under Major-General Simonov, retired 
to and took position at Lungkou. 

Early in the morning of June 15, leaving the Fourth Regi- 
ment to hold about 2 miles of the line east of the railway, the 
First, Second, and Third Regiments moved forward against 
the Japanese left. The brigade of the Thirt3^-fifth Division, 
under Major-General Glasko, was to move by way of Ching- 
chiatun and make a flank attack in conjunction with this 
attack of the First Division, but, from not starting at a suffi- 
ciently early hour and from taking the wrong road either 
through inadvertence or the misinterpretation of an order, did 
not arrive on this part of the field until 11 a. m. 

In the meantime the Japanese Fifth Division attacked the 
heights of Tafangshan and, at 6 a. m., the advance of the 
Fourth Division, from Nachialing, began forming for an 
attack on Lungkou. By 10 a. m. the Nineteenth Brigade, 
Fourth Division, had driven the Russian cavalry to north 
of Lungkou and was in position with its right connecting with 
the left of the Fifth Division near Wangchiatun, while the 
remainder of the division had taken position, facing north, 
south of Kaochiatun. About 10.30 a. m. General Stackel- 
berg sent the two reserve regiments, Thirty-fourth and 
Thirty-fifth, to attack the Japanese at Lungkou. The attack 
of the Japanese Fifth Division, aided by the fire of the artillery 
brigade and by the Nineteenth Brigade on the heights west of 
Wangchiatun, had progressed so far that the Russians began 
to withdraw from the heights of Tafangshan about 11 a. m. 

By this time the attack of the Russian left had approached 
close to the Japanese right, and was now prolonged by the 
arrival of Major-General Glasko's brigade. The Japanese 
right was, however, after having a portion driven back to 
the height south of Sungchiatun, reinforced by troops from 
the general reserve, thus relieving the condition of the Third 
Division. The Japanese Third Cavalry Regiment, dis- 
mounted, was on the right of the Third Division and the 


First Cavalry Brigade, also disiuuunted, attacked the ex- 
treme Russian left, but made little progress. The fight on 
tliis part of the field continued, the Japanese being again 
reinforced from the general reserve, until the order to retreat 
reached the Russian forces, about 3 p. m., although the 
Fourth Rifle Regiment, the riglit flank of which was exposed 
by the Russian witndrawal from the heights of Tafangshan, 
had given way before the attack of troops from the Third 
and Fifth Divisions, about 2 p. m. The Russian guns on 
the heights of Lungwangmiao had ceased firing about noon 
and were abandoned when this retreat occurred. During 
this period a Russian battalion made an attack on the height 
south of Sungchiatun and reached the Japanese line. Des- 
perate hand to hand fighting resulted, in which the Russian 
battalion was practically annihilated after the remnants 
had continued the struggle until nearly dark. 

The Thirty-fourth and Thirty-fifth Rifle Regiments were 
unable to recapture Lungkou, but had succeeded in holding 
back the Japanese advance on that part of the field, and 
inflicted severe loss on the Nineteenth Brigade. The main 
body of the Fourth Division moved from Kaochiatun, drove 
the Russian cavalry still farther north and sent two com- 
panies and a battery to the heights east of Lungchiatun 
(about 8 miles northwest of Telissu), from where they were 
able to fire upon and severely injure a detachment of Rus- 
sian cavalry retiring by the Lungkao River road. 

The retreat of the Russians was covered by the Tobolsk 
Regiment, which arrived at Telissu station by rail wliile the 
battle was in progress. 

The Russians reported a loss of 18 officers killed, 85 
wounded, and 10 missing, 459 men killed, 2,155 wounded, 
and 754 missing. 

General Oku reported a loss of 7 officers and 210 men 
killed, and 43 officers and 903 men wounded. He reported 
also the capture of 300 prisoners, including 6 officers, a regi- 
mental flag, 16 field guns, 46 ammunition wagons, 953 rifles, 
37,233 rounds of small-arm ammunition, 1,121 rounds of 
artfllery ammunition, 232 sappers and miners' tools, 1,110 
barrels of cement, and other weapons, utensils, etc. 

By June 21 Stackelberg had reached Kaiping (PI. IV), 
vd[th his rear guard at 'Senucheng, about 18 miles, farther 


south, and in contact with the Japanese advance guard, 
wliich on that day occupied Hsiungyocheng. 

General Oku began now to reconnoiter to the east with 
the intention of estabhshing communication with the Japa- 
nese Fourth Army, which had begun landing at Takushan 
on May 19 and had reconnoitered north toward the First 
Ai'my in the vicinity of Fenghuangcheng and northwest 
toward Kaiping. 

On July 6 a portion of Oku's army attacked and drove 
back a regiment of Russian infantry on a mountain ridge 
about 2^ miles northeast of Ssufangtai and a second ridge 
about 2 1 miles north of the same place. At the same time 
the main force of the Japanese army pushed northward, the 
opposing cavalry falling back to line of the Erhtao River 
through Kinchiakou and Ilsiaolanchi, the Japanese left wing 
occupying the heights of Tsuichiatun. 

Continuing the advance on July 7 the Japanese army by 
noon had reached a line extending from Tatzukou to the 
heights east of Tawanghaisai, the Russian rear guard slowly 
retiring northward, delaying the advance. The main Rus- 
sian force was north of the Kaiping River, its artillery being 
posted on the heights north of Kaiping and those to the w^est 
of Hsitai, its right wing resting on the heights of Haishansai, 
and a detachment of the left wing as far to the east as 

On July 9 the Japanese cannonaded the Russians, who, 
about 8 a. m., withdrew their artillery to the heights of 
Shimen and Haishansai, the Japanese occupying the heights 
of Tapingtun, Tsaichiatun, and Tungshuangtingshan. About 
noon the Japanese attacked and carried the second Russian 
position, the artillery of the latter retiring to the heights of 
Hungchichang, Yaolingtzu, and Shinfotzu and covering the 
retreat. The Russian forces from Hungchichang and Yao- 
lingtzu concentrated near Tapingchuang on the 10th and 
subsequently retired to Tashihchiao, the junction of the 
Port Arthur-Li aoyang Railway with that running to Yingkou. 

The Japanese casualties in the neighborhood of Kaiping 
on July 6 to 9 were 24 killed and 129 wounded; Major- 
General Koizuma, Major Iwasaki, Lieutenants Iwayama, 
Morita, and Taniguchi being among the wounded. 

The Russian loss was light, not exceeding 200. The 


engagemoiit was practically an artillery lig-lit on l)oth sides, 
General Stackelberg being unable to make a determined 
stand at Kaiping without ini])orilino; his line of communica- 
tions, which was threatened by the Takushan army. 

The occupation of Kaiping and the country immediately 
to the north placed General Oku's army on the edge of the 
Liao Valley, opened the way to Yingkou and Newchwang, 
and facilitated his further advance to the north by allowing 
supplies to be received from the sea, thus shortening his line 
of communications. 


(Plate V.) 

On May 27, the day following the battle of Nanshan, a por- 
tion of Major-General Nakamura's (Second) Brigade, First 
Division,^ occupied Nankuanling, while the main force of the 
Second Army remained in the villages near Nanshan. The 
Russians burned the station of Sanshilipu and retired 

On the same day a detachment of Nakamura's brigade 
occupied Liushutun, capturing 4 guns with a quantity of 
ammunition for the same, 5 box and 40 open freight cars. 

On May 29 and 30 General Nogi's army continued to 
advance westward, and on the latter day occupied a line 
extending from Antzushan to Taitzushan, the Russians occu- 
P3ang a line through Shuangtaikou and Antzuling. 

On May 30 the Japanese occupied Dalny, which had been 
evacuated by the Russians, capturing about 300 open and 120 
box cars, 50 lighters, 2,000 tons of coal and 20,000 railway 
ties. All the smaller railway bridges in the neighborhood had 
been destroyed as had also a portion of tlie larger pier, while 
three small vessels were found sunk near the entrance and the 
bay liberally sown with mines. The docks and smaller pier 

were uninjured. 

• ■ — 

a The First Division was now being reenforced by the Eleventh Division, 
which began to land at Pitsewo on May 24, and was later reenforced by the 
IS^inth Division which landed at Dalny about June 15; also l^y the Seventh 
Division, the First and Fourth Kcbi Brigades, the Second P>rigade of field 
artillery, 7 battalions of siege artillery, a naval brigade and an engineer and 
artillery park; the whole forming the Third Army vinder General Nogi with 
Major-General Idichi as Chief of Staff. 


The occupation of Dalny was of great benefit to the Japa- 
nese, as it gave them an excellent harbor which, with Liu- 
shutiin, served as a base for the Third and Second Armies. 
There were at Dalny over 100 barracks, storehouses, etc., 
remaining in good condition. The removal of the mines that 
had been laid by the Russians cost the Japanese considerable 
time and labor. By the aid of a pilot who had been in the 
Russian service a fairway was found on June 6, up to which 
time 41 mines had been discovered and destroyed. 

The Russians, holding Shuangtaikou and Fenshuiling in 
force, advanced their outposts to within 1,000 yards of the 
Japanese outposts and began to fortify the northeastern foot 
of the hill east of Shihshankou and the line of heights running 
north and south through Antzuling from Chengerhshan to 
east of Poshan. 

On June 13 the Fifth and Twenty-eighth East Siberian Rifle 
Regiments made a vigorous reconnoissance from Chakou and 
Chuchuantzukou, that did not cease until dark. 

On June 14 the Novih and two gunboats bombarded the 
Japanese left flank for about forty minutes from off Heishih- 
chiao. The Novik and 10 destroyers had issued from Port 
Arthur that morning and driven off the Third Destroyer 
Flotilla, Commander Tsuchiya, which had been bombarding 
the Russian right in the vicinity of Hsiaopingtao. 

On June 18 a Russian flotilla appeared in the vicinity of 
Hsiaopingtao and began firing at the Japanese left flank, but 
was driven off by a Japanese squadron after an engagement 
of about thirty minutes. 

On June 26 the Eleventh Division and the left of the First 
Division moved forward to occupy higher ground from which 
the Russians could observe Dalny, and which, if captured, 
would allow the Japanese to overlook the Russian positions. 

The detachment of the First Division attacked and 
occupied the heights west and south of Pantao. 

The Eleventh Division attacked in three detachments ; the 
right moving on the heights east of Lannichiao, the center 
on the heights called Kensan, or Sword Hill, by the Japanese, 
the left on Shuangtingshan. 

The main resistance to this advance was at Kensan, held by 
one battalion with a number of machine and quick-firing guns, 
which was captured by the Forty-third Regiment only after a 


stubborn fight lastinj^ until ii))()ut 5 ]>. ni. The Japanese 
captured two 6 cm. quick-nrinij; <jims aiul some 200 shells. 

As a result of the advance, the Japanese first line extended 
from Antzushan through the heights about 1 kilometer west 
of Pantao, Kensan, and Shuangtingshan. 

B}^ June 30 the Russians extended their defensive works 
in the neighborhood of Antzuling from the southern extrem- 
ity of the heights to the smnmit of Kabutosan, and had con- 
structed works on the heights north antl south of Wangchiatun. 
They also continued to strengthen the works at Shuang- 
taikou, where one or more searchlights had been installed. 

On July 3 the Russians began a series of attacks that 
extended through three days. Shortly after noon two com- 
panies attacked in the direction of Kensan. About 4.30 
p. m. these companies were reenforced and made an attack 
on Kensan, but were repulsed. About 5.20 p. m. 4 guns 
took up a position west of Tasliihtun and covered the with- 
drawal of the infantry. About 8.30 p. m. a battalion 
attacked from the direction of Taposhan, l)ut was repulsed 
by a counter attack. The Russian force in this vicinity 
consisted of about 2 battalions, 12 field and 2 machine guns. 

A small force of infantry also advanced toward Laotaoshan 
at 6 a. m., and began skirmishing with the Japanese outposts, 
driving the latter back between 1 and 2 p. m. About 3.50 
p. m. a small force began to advance along the valley north 
of Laotaoshan, but came under the fire of a Japanese battery 
and retired. About 6.30 p. m. a battalion deployed south 
of Laotaoshan and opened fire. A few minutes later 4 guns 
took up a position north of Laotaoshan and opened a telling 
fire on the left of that portion of the Japanese position. The 
Japanese artillery replied and the firing continued until after 

On July 4, at 5 a. m., a small force of Russian infantry 
drove back the Japanese patrols in and north of Wuchia- 
yingtzu. About 9 a. m. another force opened fire from a hill 
about 2,000 meters south of Chakou, while yet another force 
on a hill north of that village opened fire on the Japanese 
positions west of Pantao; this fire continuing during the day. 
South of these detachments was another Russian detach- 
ment throwing up trenches, about 1 ,500 meters southeast 
and east of Nanchakou. 


Between 1 and 12 a. in. a small force of Russians made an 
attaclv on Kensan. At 6 a. m. the attack was renewed on 
Kensan and the heights about 3,000 meters to the southeast, 
the attacking force being increased to about 1 battalion of 
infantry, assisted by the fire of a battery in the valley west 
of Wangchiatun. By 7 a. m. the attacking force, increased 
to about 3 battalions, had approached to within 800 meters. 
Several unsuccessful attempts to assault were made between 
that time and noon, at which time the attacking force had 
increased to 7 battalions, while 2 more battahons were attack- 
ing Kensan from the west. At 3.50 p. m. the Russian artil- 
lery increased its fire and the infantry again took up the 
assault with a force of about 10 battalions. So strong was 
the assault that the general reserve was sent forward and 
placed under the orders of the commander of the left wing 
(Eleventh Division), while 3 batteries of heavy guns, just 
arrived, were pushed forward to Pantao and two others to 
Huangnichuangtashantun. The heavy naval guns also par- 
ticipated in the fight on this part of the field, which continued 
during the night. 

In the meantime heavy fighting had been going on still 
farther south. At 6 a. m. the Japanese artillery opened fire 
on the Russian positions on the north crest of Laotaoshan, 
to which tlie Russians, after attempting to reply with artil- 
lery fire, replied by advancing the infantry from these posi- 
tions in an attack on the Japanese line. At 11.30 a. m. the 
Japanese were compelled to send their reserves into the firing 
line. At 5 p. m. the Russian artillery on Laotaoshan again 
opened fire, which was joined in by a Russian vessel off 

On the morning of July 5 the Russians made a couple of 
demonstrations against the Japanese in tlie neighborhood of 
Pantao. At 10.30 a. m. a company of Japanese infantry 
attempted to seize a small height southwest of Kensan, but 
was repulsed. Shortly after noon the Russians made a 
demonstration against Kensan. 

At the end of the three days' fighting the Russians held 
a fortified line through Shuangtaikou, Antzuling, and the 
heights east of Lungwang River. 

The Japanese held one line from near Antzushan to the 
crest of the heights northeast of Hanchiatun, to a point 2,000 


meters southeast ol' Lannicliijio, and auotluu" from the hh^h 
(ground south of Lannichiao, via Kensan and Iluangnichuang- 
lashantun, to Shuangtingshan. 

On July 7, 8, 12, 17, 18, and 22, there were small recon- 
naissances by the Russians. On July 10 the Japanese estab- 
lished on the heights east of Lannichiao a battery of 12 guns 
that had been captured at Nanshan, and a battery of 6 heavy 
naval guns about 1,500 meters west of Chuchuantzukou. 

By July 23 the Ninth Division had completed its landing, 
begun by the main portion at Dalny about the 15th, and had 
joined the First and Eleventh Divisions, taking the center of 
the line. The First Kobi Brigade had landed and joined the 
First Division. 

At 7.30 a. m., on July 26, the Japanese began a general 
attack in which the Russian artillery maintained the ascend- 
ancy. However, the Japanese infantry moved forward about 
noon, and at dark the First Division had advanced nearly to 
Yingchengtzu, the Ninth Division nearly to Pienshihpentzu, 
and the Eleventh Division nearly to Taposhan. 

At 6 a. m., on the 27th, the Japanese artillery again opened 
fire, and the First and Ninth Divisions advanced on the 
salient, whose apex was Ojikeisan. The Russian fire was 
withheld until their opponents were within close range. A 
portion of the assaulting infantry was protected from frontal 
fire by the steepness of the ground, but was subjected to a 
severe flank fire from other portions of the Russian position 
and suffered severely. After repeated assaults a portion of 
the salient was captured about 3 p. m., but the Russians con- 
tinued to hold the remainder. 

The attack of the Eleventh Division on the heights east 
of the mouth of Lungwang River was not only stubbornly 
resisted by the defenders, but the assailants were subjected 
to the fire of several Russian vessels near Lungwangtang. 
An assault was made about 5 p. m. but failed. Another 
assault was begun from three sides shortly after midnight 
and the hill carried about 5 a. m. on the 28th. 

The attack of the First and Ninth Divisions was resumed 
at dawn of the 28th, and at 9 a. m. the Russians began to 
withdraw. By night the Japanese had occupied a line 
through Tungchanglingtzu and Yingkoshih, having captured 
2 heavy, 3 field, and 3 machine guns. 


On July 30 the Japanese again advanced, the First Divi- 
sion southwest along the Port Arthur road, the Ninth toward 
Kantashan, the Eleventh toward Takushan. By 11 a. m. 
they occupied a line from the heights south of Tuchengtzu 
to those east of Takushan. Hsiaokushan and Takushan 
remained in tlie hands of the Russians, who, at other points, 
had withdrawn across the road leading through Licliiatun. 

The Japanese estimate the Russian killed and wounded 
from July 26 to 30 at about 1,500. An unofRcial statement 
places the Japanese loss at 670 killed and 3,334 wounded, 
including 25 officers killed, one of which was a colonel of 
artillery, and 116 wounded, one of which was a colonel of 

On August 1 and 2 the Russians bombarded the Japanese 
and made several attacks but did not succeed in recovering 
any ground. 

On August 7 the Japanese began a bombardment of Taku- 
shan at 4 p. m. At 7.30 p. m. the Eleventh Division, during 
a high wind and heavy rain, attacked the heights, and at 
midnight succeeded in occupying the foothills of Takushan. 
On the morning of August 8 seven Russian vessels approached 
Yenchang and by a flanking fire greatly aided the Russian 
force. In the afternoon the Japanese artillery drove the 
vessels away and resumed the bombardment of the Russians 
remaining on Takushan. Toward evening the Japanese 
infantry again attacked and succeeded in occupying the 
summits about 8.30 p. m. The Japanese loss was about 
1,400 killed and wounded. 

Continuing the attack during the night, the Forty-third 
Regiment and part of the Twelfth occupied Hsiaokushan at 
4.30 a. m. on August 9. Both Takushan and Hsiaokushan 
were severely bombarded by the Russians shortly after noon 
on the 9th, the vessels again appearing off Yenchang and 
taking part in the bombardment; at 1.30 p. m. a Russian 
battalion attacked the two heights. The engagement lasted 
until night and the Japanese sufi'ered severely, but succeeded 
in holding their positions. The Russian vessels w^ere finally 
driven into the harbor by some vessels from the blockading 

During the day the Japanese naval battery bombarded 


Port Arthur and the luirl)()r, sinking one vessel and striking 
the Retvizan. 

In the early morning of August 10 the Russians opened 
a severe fire from the forts south of Tungchikuanshan. 
Otherwise the 10th, 11th, and 12th passed with only the 
ordinary exchange of gun fire. On the 10th the Japanese 
again endeavored to reach the Russian battle ships in the 
western harbor with the fire of the naval battery, but did 
not succeed in striking any of the vessels. 

On August 13 a Russian advance post set fire to and 
evacuated Wuchiafangtzu. 

On August 14 the First Division attacked and succeeded 
in advancing to a line extending from Kantashan to the 
heights west of Suichiatun via the high ground north of 
Suichiatun. The attacking force was compelled to retire by 
the Russians, who were aided in their counter attack by the 
fire of their batteries on the heights between Hsiaotungkou 
and Nienpankou. The Japanese again approached during 
the night, and on the morning of the 15th again attacked 
and at 11a. m. succeeded in making a lodgment on these 

The conclusion of this attack left the Japanese in front of 
the land defenses proper of Port Arthur. These defenses, 
divided into eastern and western sectors by the valley 
through which the railway enters the town, consisted of per- 
manent masonry forts whose gorges were connected by the 
old Chinese Wall, temporary works constructed just prior to 
and during the siege, and connecting and advance trenches. 
The west sector followed an irregular crest, with an elevation 
of about 500 feet, around the new town and terminated on 
Laotielishan, the highest point in the vicinity, with an ele- 
vation of about 1,000 feet. The east sector encircled the 
old town at a distance of from 2 to 2h miles, running along 
an irregular crest, about 350 feet in elevation, within which 
was an elevation (Wangtai or Signal Hill) of about 800 feet. 
The permanent forts were polygonal in trace and had ditches 
with caponiers and galleries. The gap between the two 
sectors was covered by the fort on Paiyushan (Quail Hill). 

Of the works most intimately connected with the siege the 
Sungshushan, Erhlungshan, North and East Tungchikuan- 
shan, Itzushan, and Antzushan forts were strong, permanent 


fortifications. The two Panlungshan forts, East and West, 
were semipermanent, redoubt-shaped fortifications. 203 
Meter Hill and Akasakayama were semipermanent works, 
with two lines of advance trenches. Kuropatkin Fort was 
a strong fieldwork, with deep ditch; the Shuishihying 
lunettes were also provided with ditches, but not so deep. 
P., H., Kobu, and Hachimakiyama w^ere more in the natui;eyi^Y^ 
of semipermanent trenches with bombproofs. '^^^-^ 

On August 16 the Japanese sent, by Major Yamaoka, a 
note, under a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of Port 
Arthur and inclosing an offer to allow the noncombatants, 
such as women, children, priests, diplomats of neutral 
countries, and military attaches, to proceed to Port Dalny. 

On August 17 the Russian refusal to surrender was sent 
to the Japanese. The offer to noncombatants was not 
accepted. . x , ,- , ' 

On the morning of August 19 the Japanese began a general 
attack. The First Division attacked and efi^ected a lodgment 
on 174 Meter Hill and Namakayama, where it was twice 
counter attacked in the afternoon and driven back. The 
Third Regiment carried one of the Shuishihying lunettes, 
but was unable to hold it. The Ninth and Eleventh Divi- 
sions, acting together, advanced and passed the night on a 
line from north of Wuchiafangtzu through the heights north 
of Wangchiatun to the western foot of Hsiaokushan. 

On August 20 the First Division and First Kobi Brigade 
completed the occupation of 174 Meter Hill, the First and 
Fifteenth Regiments making the assault. The Ninth and 
Eleventh Divisions were unable to make any progress, not 
only on account of the Russian fire, but also because of the 
extensive wire entanglements in front of Panlungshan and 
North Tungchikuanshan. They did make some progress in 
the destruction of the entanglements. Troops of the Thirty- 
sixth Regiment entered Kuropatkin Fort after severe fighting, 
but were driven out shortly afterwards. 

On August 21 troops of the Ninth Division, reenforced by 
the Fourth Kobi Brigade, charged East Panlungshan Fort in 
the early morning, but were repulsed. —Troops of the 
Eleventh Division at the same time charged North Tungchi- 
kuanshan Fort and succeeded in capturing an advanced work 
200 meters farther to the southeast. They were subjected 


to sucli a sevoro lire from the neighborinii; forts tluit they were 
(liivcii IVoiii the advanced work about 9 a. in. The Russians 
made a counter attack north of Shuishihying, but were driven 

The attack was continued on the 22d, At 9 a. m. the 
Sixth Bri<jade, Ninth Division, had captured a portion of 
East Panhm<i;shan Fort when they came under a severe fire 
from West Panlungshan Fort. Two companies, sent for- 
ward fi'om the reserve during the afternoon, assaulted and, 
after a severe fight, drove the Russians from the latter fort. 
This indirectly aided the troops attacking the east fort, 
from which the Russians were driven shortly afterwards. 
The Russians attacked both of these forts several times 
during tlie night, drove the Japanese down the slopes, and 
were in tiu-n driven back by the Japanese who succeeded in 
holding the })arapets and keeping the Russians in rear of the 

On the 23d the Ninth and Eleventh Divisions made a 
night attack on the height (H) northwest of Wangtai, 
Wangtai and North Tungchikuanshan Fort. A portion of 
the Ninth Division succeeded in reaching the heights north- 
west of Wangtai. Tliis attack was met, about 11 p. m., by 
a strong sortie in the neighborhood of Panlungshan, in 
wliich the Russians drove back those Japanese who had 
crossed the Chinese Wall beliind the Panlungshan forts at 
the foot of Wangtai and passed beyond the line of forts. 
After severe fignting the sortie was repulsed, the Japanese 
retaining possession of the Panlungshan forts. Wliile tliis 
sortie was in progress troops of the First Division attacked 
Itzushan Fort, but were repulsed with heavy loss. 

On August 24, in the early morning, the Ninth Division 
continued the attack on the height northwest of Wangtai, 
while the Eleventh Division attacked Wangtai and North 
Tungcliikuanshan forts. Both attacks failed and may be 
said to conclude the general attack, begun on August 19, 
wliich is said to have cost the Japanese over 15,000 in killed 
and wounded. 
"^* On August 28 the Russians began strengthening the 
Chinese Wall and the works in the neighborliood of Wangtai, 
mounting two heavy guns and bringing up field guns to fire 
on the two Paidungshan forts, now held by the Japanese. 


On August 29 the Russians began firing with these heavy 
guns against the two Panlungshan, forts and, about lip. m., 
a small force made a sortie against the west fort, but was 
repulsed. (^'^ C^>'^ 

On September 2 the First Division opened a heavy fire on 
Port Arthur with its field and naval guns. The Russians 
continued their daily bombardment of the two Panlungshan 
forts. They continued this bombardment on the next day 
and destro^^ed the greater part of the works the Japanese 
had constructed there. The bombardment was continued 
daily and was particularly violent on September 6, resulting 
in the demolition of the works that had been again con- 
structed by the Japanese. 

Toward midnight of the 6th a small party of Russians 
made a sortie against the extreme right of the Japanese line, 
but was repulsed. Another small party made a determined 
sortie against the Japanese center and, although fuially 
driven back, completely demoralized the siege operations of 
the Japanese in that vicinity. (1^ ,^ jjJT' p'lr) 

On September 8 the Russiahs directed a desultory fire 
against the Panlungshan forts and a more vigorous fire 
against the sapping operations, making several sorties 
against the same at night. 

By September 9 the Japanese approaches had reached to 
witliin 50 meters of Kuropatkiii Fort and 300 to 400 meters 
of the two Tungchikuanshan forts. By the 11th of Sep- 
tember the Japanese approach had reached to ^^itllin 70 
meters of the forts south of Shuishihying. These approaches 
were fired on daily by the Russian artillery.(^ -'^ OH 9'5'S j 

On September 12 small parties of Russians made two 
sorties against the approach to North Tungchikuanshan 
Fort, but were repulsed. Other sorties were made as fol- 
lows: On September 13 near Shihcliiao; on the 15tli against 
the approaches to Kuropatkin, Shuishihying, and Hachi- 
makiyama (east of Erhlungshan) forts; on the 16th two 
against the approach to Kuropatkin Fort, and on the ISth 
against the approach to the Shuishihying forts. All these 
sorties were made by small parties consisting of fi'om 40 to 
70 men, and toward the end the use of hand grenades by the / Jf 

Russians began. (J^7 kUl.... pjX-^] ^^^^^^^.AiiJ^^*^-^ 

On September 19, about 2 p. m., the Japanese opened fire 


with their siege and naval guns. Towaid the evening the 
fire was concentrated on Kuropatkin Fort, the Shuisliihy- 
ing hniettes, Namaka^^ania, and 20.'] Meter Hill. The 
attack was then begun and continued all night. Troops of 
the Ninth Division attacked Kuropatkin Fort while troops 
of the First Division and the First Kcjbi Brigade attacked 
the other j)oints mentioned. The Japanese; carried Kuro- 
patkin Fort at dawn of the 20th, the Shuishihying lunettes 
about noon, .and Naniakayania with its two works al)out 6.30 
p. ni. At S p. m. one company effected a lodgment on the 
northwest slope of 203 Meter Hill and about midnight the 
southwest summit of the hill was carried. The fire from 
AntzLishan and Itzushan forts compelled the Japanese on 
Naniakayama to withdraw from the })lateau to the upper 
trench. (^^% Wf.Ki e^\^%^ 

The Russians reinforced their troops on 203 Meter Hill, 
and desperate fighting was continued until the evening of 
September 22, when the Japanese were compelled to with- 
draw from the hill, having lost about 2,500 killed and 
wounded." General Yamamota, commanding First Brigade, 
was among the killed. (^M ^\ ' ' ^■'^•^J 

At about 8.30 p. m. on September 25 the Russians con- 
centrated a strong fire against the approach northeast of 
Erhlungshan Fort and a body of about 30, covered by the 
rifle fire of about 100 of their comrades, made a determined 
attack, the fight lasting for about thirty minutes and the 
opponents coming to hand to hand encounter. The Russian 
party left 20 killed before it retired. (^^'f' ' ^[^ p,(:,i 

In the early morning of September 27 the Russians con- 
centrated a severe fire on the approach northeast of Erhlung- 
shan Fort and made two sorties against the same. 

From September 28 the fire of the siege and naval guns was 

directed daily against the Russian vessels in the harbor; the 

fH \^ SPeresvid, Poltava, and Pobieda were struck several tinies^p 

V^ (\>-v(a'\^'^ I'^n October 2 the Russians made a strong sortie against the 

' ' Approaches to the Tungchikuanshan forts, which began about 

7.30 p. m. and continued until after midnight, when the sortie 

« From the 1st of June to the 30th of September the besieging army is said 
to have lost 23,500 killed and wounded, 20,000 from beriberi, and 5,000 
from typhoid and dysentery. 


was repulsed. At the same time a battalion made a sortie 
against the right of the Japanese siege line, but retired after 
an engagement of about one hour. 

On October 4 a party of Japanese attacked a Russian posi- 
tion south of Yenchang, dismantled a 47 mm. quick fire and a 
machine gun that had been harassing the working parties in 
the approaches, and returned to its position at the foot of 
Takushan. During the night ^^he Russians made several 
sorties against the approaches to Erhlungshan. (j;-| 2. ■■■ ^ ' \'' ti J 

On October 7 the Japanese reported that in the bombard- 
ment they had maintained from the 1st to 7th with their 
siege and naval guns the siege guns hit the Pohieda once, the 
Retvizan four times, and the Poltava five times; also that 
several vessels were hit by the naval guns; that the crew of 
the Poltava was landed on the 6th, that of the Retvizan on 
the 7th. (u\% SL^' -U ^ f . 3 ? ) 

On the night of October 10 the Russians made several 
sorties against the two Panlungshan forts. They also con- 
tinued their nightly practice of throwing grenades into the 
approaches to Tungchikuanshan Fort. The grenades were 
first thrown by hand. Later the Russians made use of a 
wooden gun for the purpose and the Japanese resorted to the 
same expedient. 

On the afternoon of October 1 1 nine Russian torpedo boats 
twice reconnoitered off Yenchang, exchanging fire with the 
Japanese torpedo boats and batteries, and retired to the 
harbor. (;il V^0-t^4. P» lUi i 

At 7 p. m. on that day three companies of Japanese infantry 
captured the railway bridge south of Lungyen and intrenched 
at a point 200 meters farther to the front. 

On October 12 to 15 the siege and naval guns continued 
firing at the vessels in the harbor and succeeded in setting the 
Peresviet on fire, causing the vessel,-4n- the opinion of the-. 
Jarpanese^, to lose her fighting capacity. On the night of the 
12th the Russians threw over 50 grenades into the Japanese 
trenches. ii\f^ Sij^\X > \-^ ''i 3 J 

On October 16, about 4.30 p. m., the Ninth Division 
attacked and captured the Russian trenches on the glacis of 
Erhlungshan and entered Hachimakiyama Fort (east of 
Erhlungshan Fort). The Russians retained possession of the 
gorge and converted it into a defensive work. The Japanese 
34520—07 3 


cai)lur(Ml 1 field gun, 1 small caliber gun 2 machine guns, j 
some rifles and a quantity of ammunition. L ^' '^ f ' ' P. -> ' / 

In the early morning of October 1 7 a small force of Rus- 
sians made a sortie from 203 Meter Hill and threw grenades 
into the Japanese trenches. About the same time sorties 
were made in the direction of Ilachimakiyama and from 

For several days the Japtyiese kept up a desultory l)om- 
bardment covering their siege operations, which were 
obstructed by the Russians, who resorted to small sorties, 
hand grenades, and bombs thrown by wooden guns. By 
October 23 the approaches were within 50 meters of North 
Tungchikuanshan Fort; on the 24th they were within the 
same distance of Erhhmgshan Fort. On the 23d the Rus- 
sians, who had been countermining from North Tungchi- 
kuanshan Fort, blew up the head of the Japanese tunneled 
approach, t' *7 K^Jw f,\xO 

On October 25 the Japanese naval guns sank a two-funnel 
three-mast ship in the harbor. 

On the morning of October 26 the Japanese began with 
their siege and naval guns a heav}^ bombardment of the Sung- 
shushan, Erhhmgshan, and Tungchikuanshan forts. From 
2 p. m. the bombardment was extended to the trenches on 
the glacis of Sungshushan and Erhlungshan forts and the 
trenches south of Hachimakiyama Fort. At 5 p. m. a force 
from the First Division attacked Sungshushan and a force 
from the Ninth Division attacked Erhlungshan and the 
trenches south of Hachimakiyama. The attacking forces 
occupied the trenches on the glacis of Sungshushan and 
Erhlungshan and those south of Hachimakiyama. The 
attack was then subjected to a severe fire from not only the 
batteries of the neighboring heights, but also from those of 
Taiyangkou, Mantoushan, Golden Hill, and Paiyushan. The 
Japanese reported that this bombardment inflicted no mate- 
rial loss on their army. During the attack the Russians 
exploded a large mine in the glacis of the Erhlungshan Fort, 
but the effect of the explosion was unimportant.^y" '/ /■ y 2- ; 

The Japanese continued their bombardment during the 
night and the Russians made several small sorties from Sung- 
shushan and Ehrlungshan forts. 


The bombardment of the Japanese on tlie 27th destroyed 
or severely injured 1 gun carriage, 3 large guns, and 2 machine 
guns in the Erhhingshan and Tungchikuanshan forts. On 
the 28th it caused the explosion of a magazine in North 
Tungchikuanshan and injured 2 guns in East Tungchikuan- 
shan Fort, and 2 in Itzushan. Fires were also started in 
Port Arthur. (^H^i Q H f. 1 O 

During the night of the 28th the Japanese sappers and 
miners resumed their work against the counterscarp galler}^ 
in the eastern corner of North Tungchikuanshan Fort, 
against which they had exploded a mine the preceding night, 
and exploded two more mines, making a large breach and 
killing a dozen of the Russians who were occupying the gal- 
lery. They also exploded a mine at the head of their 
approach to Erhlungshan Fort and destroyed a portion of the 
counterscarp^^^'^ O VA ^ • ^d) 

On October 29 a party of about 100 Russians made a sortie 
before daylight against the approach to Erhlungshan Fort. 
At the same time a similar party made a sortie against the 
tunneled passage to Sungshushan Fort and after a desperate 
struggle drove the Japanese out. About 2 p. m. the latter 
attacked and recovered the passage. «-5^ / K--'A,,, |-, | 7^6 y 

On this day the naval guns were directed against Hsitai- 
yangkou, Antzushan, Itzushan, Paiyushan, and Sungshushan 
forts, blowing up the magazine at Hsitaiyangkou. They also 
fired on five mine-removing boats in West Harbor, causing 
fires to break out on two of them. _ '- iii' ^' 

On October 30 the Japanese began a heav}^ bombardmentXr*^ 
in the early morning and at 1 p. m. began a general attack, Wi^&cl 
which was particularly directed against the Sungshushan, P, |7'8'^ 

Erhlungshan, and North Tungchikuanshan forts. Troops 
from the First and Ninth Divisions succeeded by sunset in 
occupying the glacis of the Sungshushan and North Tungchi- 
kuanshan forts and in destroying a number of side defenses. 

A portion of the Ninth Division carried P. Fort (between 
Panlungshan and North Tungchikuanshan forts) at 2 p. m. 
and began to entrench. The Russians made a determined 
attack against these troops and drove them out about 10.30 
p. m. The Japanese, personally led by Major-General Ichi- 
nohe, Sixth Brigade, Ninth Division, again attacked and re- 
captured the fort about 11 p. m., taking 3 guns, 2 macliine 


guns, juul other spoils. The Japanese renamed th(^ fort 
Ichinohe.ti^ CfKZ'RiO 

Troops from the Eleventh Division attacked the north and 
east forts of Tiingchikuanshan and the adjacent lieldworks, 
but were repulsed after having partly carried Kobuyama (an 
intrenched height north of East Tungchikuanshan Fort) and 
the trench on the glacis of the east fort. 

On the 31st the Eleventh Division again charged North 
Tungchikuanshan Fort, but was repulsed. 

On the night of the 31st the Russians made a small sortie 
against the extreme right of the Japanese line. 

During the day the fire of the Japanese heavy and naval 
guns injured the Gilyak, sank two steamers in the harbor, 
and started a conflagration near the wharf. On November^ v 
1 it sank two steamers, and on the 2d one(^C^( K.^^M^ H f %^- ^ 

On the 3d it started a conflagration near East Harbor, 
which lasted until the next morning, injured the guns in the 
gorge of North Tungchikuanshan Fort, and damaged the 
field work at H., northwest of Wangtai. 

On the 6th it caused the explosion of a magazine at the 
Old Sungshushan Fort. 

The month of November was by the Japanese devoted 
mostly to sapping and mining operations and bombard- 
ment of the Russian vessels in the harbor. The Russians 
resisted the sapping and mining operations by occasional 
sorties of small parties. The approaching exhaustion of 
their artillery ammunition caused a falling off in the action 
of this arm. and left the J^ianese artillery greater freedom 
of action, (^f Cfs--^ f.3t J 

On November 17 the Japanese destroyed the counter- 
scarp galleries of Sungshushan Fort, and completed the 
occupation of its counterscarp on the next day. On the 19th 
a powder magazine near the arsenal was exploded by a 
Japanese shell. The Russians made a determined but 
unsuccessful sortie from Erhlungshan Fort. The Seventh 
Division, landed at Dalny the preceding day, began to arrive. 

On November 20 the Japanese exploded three mines, 
blowing in the counterscarp and partly filling* the ditch of 
Erhlungshan Fort. 

On November 21 the Japanese attempted an assault on 
North Tungchikuanshan Fort, which failed;. A counter 
attack of the garrison was repulsed, [j^ ^'^' P- ''^^ ) 


On November 23 troops of the Eleventh Division cap- 
tured the trench on the northern gLacis of East Tungchi- 
kuanshan Fort, but were driven out earl}^ in the morning of 
the 24th. 

fOn the afternoon of November 26 the Japanese began a 
general attack on the Sungshushan, Erhhmgshan, and 
Timgchikuanshan forts. The storming parties were driven 
back, but the assault was continued. (^'^ 0-VA f « "^ ^ / 

On the night of November 26 a force of about 2,500 men, 
drawn from all four divisions and commanded by Major- 
General Nakamura, made an unsuccessful assault on the 
works running southwest from Sungshushan Fort (Sungsliu- 
shan supporting fort). The attack was disclosed by the 
Russian searchlights and subjected to a heavy fire, which, 
however, did but little damage. This attack ceased about 
2.30 a. m. on the 27th, after severe hand to hand fighting, 
and cost the Japanese nearly one-half of the attacking force. 

The general attack, which was very desperate on the 26th 
and 27th, continued on a lesser scale until December 2, 
when a partial armistice was entered into on the eastern 
front for the recovery of the killed and wounded. (^^^> DH P S^) 

The loss suffered by the Japanese has been estimated as 
high as 12,000 killed and wounded. Lieutenant-General 
Tsuchiya, commanding Eleventh Division, Major-General 
Saito, commanding the Fourteenth Brigade, Seventh Divi- 
sion, and Major-General Nakamura were among the wounded. 

On November 28 troops of the First Division and the 
First Kobi Brigade began an attack on 203 Meter Hill and 
Akasakayama. Both sides resorted to hand grenades, in 
the use of which the Japanese were at a disadvantage, on 
account of the higher elevation of their opponents. In 
addition, the assault was subjected to fire from Sungshushan 
and failed at Akasakayama. A small party reached the 
crest of the southwest peak of 203 Meter Hill, was driven a 
short distance below the crest, and then succeeded in holding 
on until an approach could be constructed through which 
they could be reenforced.(5''\ |CvJ-w. i- ''^1 ) 

On November 30 the Japanese brought forward their 
wooden guns and began bombarding the summit. The force 
holding the advance on the southwest peak was reenforced 
by one company and advanced to near the crest where a high 



wall of sand bags was constructed. 'I'hc P'irst Regiment 
attacked and finally occupied the Russian trenches on the 
slope of Akasakayama, but evacuated them shortly after- 
wartls on account of being fired on by their own artillery. 

Troops from the Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, and 
Twenty-eighth Regiments assaulted the northeast peak of 
203 Meter Hill, carried the Russian trenches on the slope, 
and endeavored to reach the crest, but were driven back to 
the trenches. (>'^ ^wW\ f> l'^-) 

On December 1 troops of the Seventh Division again 
assaulted 203 Meter Hill, one party passing over the crest 
of the southwest peak and clearing a portion of the summit, 
and were again repulsed. The Japanese holding the trenches 
on the slope of the northeast peak were also driven ou.ti^t^JS.^^'^-^^J 

During December 2, 3, and 4 the Japanese restricted their 
action to bombarding the Russian positions and to con- 
structing an approach up the northeast peak of 203 Meter 
Hill. On the morning of the 5th the hre of the Japanese 
artillery was increased. About 3 p. m. eight battalions of 
the Seventh Division, under Major-General Saito, advanced 
against the northeast peak and. in conjunction with the reen- 
forced troops holding the crest of the southwest peak, carried 
all of 203 Meter Hill. ( J-"^ vf^^ ^. '^S) 

The capture of 203 Meter Hill allowed the Japanese to 
bring on Akasakayama a plunging fire which, accompanied 
by demonstrations, caused the Russians to evacuate that 
height on December 6 and to withdraw from the trench 
leading toward Itzushan. It also gave an observation point 
covering both harbors and enabled the fire of the heavy siege 
and naval guns to be directed upon the Russian war ships in 
the harbor. On December 9 the Sevastopol anchored outside 
the harbor under shelter of Tiger's Tail Peninsula, but was 
subsequently torpedoed by the Japanese and sunk in deep 
water by her own commander. The other large vessels by 
that time had been crippled by the Japanese fire and scuttled 
by the Russians to protect them as much as possible from 
the Japanese fire. (^\> O V^ ^P. V'^'^") 

On December 18", at 2.30 p. m., the Japanese exploded 
mines under the parapet of North Tungchikuanshan Fort. 
The Twenty - second Regiment then charged the fort, but 
halted in the crater. About 7.30 p. m. two companies of 


the Thirty-eighth Kobi Regiment entered through the breach, 
and by michiight the fort was completely occupied, the 
Japanese capturing five 87-mm. field guns, two 74-mi>i. quick- 
fire guns, two 24-mm. guns and 4 machine guns.'* (o H (jH li i '^ >J 

On December 22, 23, and 24 the Japanese attacked and 
carried some small Russian positions near the northern arm 
of Pigeon Bay and thus advanced their right so that it ran 
from 203 Meter Hill through Luchiatun to Pigeon Bay. 

On December 28, at 10 a. m., the Japanese exploded ' 
mines under the parapet of Erhlungshan Fort and an '' 
assaulting force from the Ninth Division reached the crater ..' ' 
and intrenched. At 4 p. m. the Nineteenth and Thirty-sixth ' 3/ 
Regiments resumed the assault and reached the interior of 
the fort. The remainder of the garrison was finally driven 
back from the defense of the gorge, and at 7.30 p. m. the 
Japanese had possession of the entire fort with its armament 
of 4 heavy guns, 7 guns of smaller caliber, thirty 37-mm. guns 
and 2 machine guns. The fighting during the capture of the 
fort was severe, the_ Japanese losing about 1,000 killed and 
wounded.((D^ VyU' p. ' ,' 

On December 31 the Japanese exploded mines under the 
parapet of Sungshushan Fort, the explosion extending to the 
magazine. Troops from the First and Seventh Divisions 
then assaulted and drove out the remnants of the garrison, 
capturing with the fort and its armament 2 officers and 160 
men who had been imprisoned in the galleries by the explo- 
sion. (^^^- )Wtw P 'i' ) 

On January 1, 1905, in the early morning, the Japanese 
drove the Russians from the new Panlungshan Fort and 
H. work. At 3 p. m. a small force of Japanese reached the 
summit of Wangtai, but was driven back by the Russians, v 

who then set fire to the wooden structures of the work and 
withdrew. The Japanese again occupied the summit, losing 
some of their men through the explosion of the magazine or 
a Russian mine^^ *7 K\ct'vv\ P- \^^] 

At 9 p. m. General Nogi received from General Stoessel a 
letter proposing to hold negotiations with reference to capitu- 

" It was in this fort that General Kondratchenko and 8 other officers 
were killed l)y a liursting shell on December 15. 



Both belligerents appointed plcnipotenliaiics, who com- 
pleted their negotiations at 4.30 p. m. on January 2, and both 
armies suspended hostilities. 

By the terms of the capitulation all Russian soldiers, 
marines, and civil oflicials of the garrison and harbor were 
made prisoners; all forts, batteries, vessels, mimitions, etc., 
were transferred to the Japanese in the condition in which 
they existed at noon on January 3, and all public property, 
such as buildings, munitions of war, etc., were to be left in 
position, pending arrangement for their transfer. Officers 
of the army and navy were permitted to retain their side 
arms, and, upon signing a parole not to take arms during 
the continuance of the war, return to Russia. Noncommis- 
sioned officers and privates were to be held as prisoners. 

The organizations taking part in the defense of Port 
Arthur are shown in the following tables of prisoners trans- 
ferred : 



January 5, 1905. 

fith East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

14tti East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

January 6, 1905. 

25th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

26th East Siberian Rifle Regiment • 

27th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

28th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 

7th Reserve Battalion 

3d Reserve Battalion 

10th Regiment Staff 

11th and 12th East Siberian Regiments 

4th Artillery Brigade 

Garrison artillery 

Kuantung garrison artillery 


January 7. 1.905. 

Staff of General Stoessel 

Staff of Kuantung commander-in-chief 

Engineer Company 

Telegraph Corps 

Railway Corps 


Field, post, and telegraph offices 

Total land forces 






1 , 547 





5, 451 
























Crew of — 


































23, 469 

In addition to the above there were about 3,000 noncom- 
batants transferred and about 16,000 sick in hospital. The 
total number of prisoners, including sick, wounded, and 
prisoners was given at 41,641. 

Russian figures, not official, place the original garrison 
(including naval contingent) at 54,000; killed and died dur- 
ing the siege, 15,000; taken prisoners, 21,000, in addition to 
18,000 sick, of whom 6,000 were wounded. 

The composition of the Third Japanese Army, when com- 
pleted, was as follows: 



Chief of staff. 




/Fushimi, Mat- 
\ sumura. 


Oshima II 









fl3th . . 
tl4th .. 

22d . . . 
10th .. 


Yamamo t a , 


2d, .3d. 
1st, 15th. 

2Sth, 20th. 
27th, 28th. 
7th, 35th. 
19th, 36th. 

43d, 12th. 
44th, 22d. 

7th Division 

9th Division 


Mayeta, Hi- 


Yamanaka . . . 

Takinu c h i , 




11th Division 

1st, 15th, 

8th, 9th, 

Artillery Brigade (72 

Naval Brigade (1,200 

Fortress .\rtillery (3 
regiments, 1 bat- 
talion, 2 groups). 




The First Regiment contained 6 field batteries; the Seventh, 
2 field and 2 mountain })atteries; the Ninth, 6 mountain 
batteries; the Eleventh, G mountain batteries; the Second 
Artiller}' Brigade, 12 field batteries. 

The total artillery used by the Japanese during the siege 
is estimated at — 

(j-inch naval '. 4 

4.7-inch naval 10 

12-i)ounder naval 20 

10.5 cm. Krui)p 4 

Bronze guns (Russian ) 30 

8.7 cm. (Russian) (> 

Field guns. 120 

Mountain guns 84 

Total guns 278 

28-cm. howitzers 18 

15-cm. howitzers 16 

12-cm. howitzers 28 

Total howitzers 62 

Mortars, al)out 160 

The total effective strength at the time of the capitulation 
may be taken as about 75,000. 

The Seventeenth Regiment, Eighth Division, was present 
at the capture of 203 Meter Hill. 

Unofficial reports state that the Eighth (Osaka) Kobi 
Regiment, as punishment for misconduct on August 23, was 
withdrawn from the fighting contingent for work on the 
lines of communication. 

General Nogi reported a list of spoils in which the follow- 
ing important items are found: 59 permanent forts and 
fortifications; 546 guns; 82,670 projectiles; 35,252 rifles; 
2,266,800 rifle cartridges; 4 battle ships (not including the 
Sevastopol, which the Russians had sunk in deep water) 
comprising the Peresviet, Poltava, Pohieda, and Retvizan; 2 
cruisers, comprising the Bayan and Pallada; 14 gunboats 
and destroyers; 10 steamers; 8 steam launches. All the 
vessels were sunk and in a more or less damaged condition. 
The battle ships, cruisers, and some of the smaller vessels 
were, however, subsequently floated V)y the Japanese. 



On May 19 Rear-Admiral Hosoya, with the Fuso, Heiyen, 
Tsuhushi, Saiyen, and other vessels, convoyed transports con- 
taining troops of the Fourth Japanese Army to Takushan, 
and the debarkation began immediately, being unopposed. 

At first this arm}' consisted of the Tenth Division under 
Lieutenant-General Kawamura, with Major-Generals Marui 
and Tojo as brigade commanders. Subsequently the Fifth 
Division was joined to the Tenth, forming the Fourth Army, 
commanded by General Nodzu. 

Following two unimportant skirmishes, communication 
with the First Army was established shortly after landing, 
and the combined force began working to the west and 

On June 8 a combined detachment from the two armies 
occupied Siuyen after a skirmish at Tahuling with Major- 
General Mishchenko's Cossack brigade, which retired to- 
ward Tomucheng. On June IS a reconnoitering detachment 
sent from Siuyen encountered a Russian detachment in the 
neighborhood of Chipanling. On June 23 there was a skir- 
mish at Hsienchiayu, on the road to Tashihchiao, and again 
on the heights north of Santaoho. 


(Plate VI.) 

On June 26 the Takushan force advanced against the Rus- 
sians at Fenshuiling in three columns under Colonel Kamada 
and Major-Generals Asada and Marui. Asatla, with his 
brigade from the Guards Division, proceeded from Yang- 
pankou toward Fenshuiling; Kamada, from Tasangpoyu 
against the Russian right; Marui, from Tsiehkuanyin by a 
circuitous route against the Russian right rear. A force 
under Major-General Tojo was charged with protecting the 
rear of that under Marui. To do this, Tojo attacked the 
Russians who were occupying Shanghota and Tungchia- 
chuang with about 3 battalions, a battery of horse artillery, 
and 2 machine guns. 

The fight lasted all day without advantage to either party, 
but during the night Tojo again attacked and carried the 
position, which he occupied and in which he was several 


times attacked on the afternoon of the 271 h by tlie Russian 
force, which had received reenforcements. 

General Marui reached Tsiehkuanyin on the night of the 
26th, sent a detachment to attack the flank and rear of the 
Russians who were opposing Tojo, and with his main body 
advanced at 3 a. m. on the 27th to turn the Russian rear at 
Fenshuihng. This main body was opposed by two bat- 
tahons at Erhtaokou, but drove them back about 11a. m. 
and reached Santaokou. 

]\Iajor-General Asada, after driving back a force of Russian 
infantry and cavalry near Wanchiapu on the 26th, passed 
the night to the south of Wafantien at the eastern foot of 
Fensluiiling. At 5 a. m. Asada's artillery began firing on 
the Russian fortifications, but the Russian artillery, well 
posted and skillfully handled, maintained the advantage. 
However, Kamada's force dislodged two companies of Rus- 
sian infantry from halfway up the Tihiungshan. 

Asada then posted his guns at this latter place about 7 
a. m. and opened fire on the Russian right. Kamada with 
his infantry then left Tihiungshan, moving against the Rus- 
sian flank and rear. 

In the meantime the Fukaya regiment, detached by Asada, 
attacked at midnight of the 26th and drove two companies 
of Russian infantry from the heights west of Yangpankou 
at 7 a. m., and then moved toward the Russian left rear. 

This brought the Japanese on three sides of the Russians, 
who began to withdraw toward Tomucheng about 8 a. m., 
and Asada's infantry moved forward and occupied the pass 
at 11.30 a. m. 

Besides the pass itself the Japanese captured 88 prisoners, 
including 6 officers. They lost 75 in killed and wounded, 
including 1 officer, Major Oba, killed. The Russians lost 
about 200 men. 

The capture of Fenshuiling gave to the Takushan army 
an entrance to the Liao Valley and placed it in a position to 
quickly cooperate with General Oku, moving up from the 
south on Kaiping, should such cooperation prove necessary. 
Such cooperation would, however, expose its right wing to 
the Russian force now assembled at Haicheng and Liaoyang, 
but for the operations of the Japanese First Army by which 
it gained possession of the Fenshui Mountains north of 



In the advance from Fenghuangcheng the Japanese First 
Army marched in three columns, the Twelfth Division mov- 
ing on the Saimachi-Liaoyang road, the Second Division on 
the Lienshankuan-Liaoyang road, the Guards Division to 
the left of the Second Division and maintaining communi- 
cation with the Takushan army. 

The Second Division, leaving Fenghuangcheng on June 24, 
reached Hsuliten the same day, Hanchiatai on the 25th, and 
Washosho on the 26th, remaining at the latter place until 
the 30th for the purpose of arranging an attack on the for- 
tified position at Bunsuling. The Russians, however, on 
June 27, evacuated Bunsuling and Lienshankuan, and on the 
30th the Second Division continued to and occupied Lien- 
shankuan, the advance guard occupying Motienling with- 
out resistance. In this position roads were built, supplies 
brought up, and telegraph lines built connecting the different 
portions of the First Army. 

Moving north on the Saimachi road, the Twelfth Division 
had a skirmish on the 27th of June with some infantry and 
cavalry coining from Saimachi. The Russian force at Sai- 
machi retired toward Pensihu and was followed by the 
Twelfth Division, which thus turned the Russian position 
at Bunsuling, while the Second Division was approaching it 
from the south. A detachment of the Twelfth Division 
moved to the left as far as the Lienshankuan-Liaoyang road, 
entering Lienshankuan and Motienling on June 29. The 
line of communications of the Twelfth Division was now 
Saimachi- Aiyangpienmen-Chongsung-Yalu. 

The Third Division, East Siberian Rifles, occupying Lien- 
shankuan, had at Domonshi an outpost of 2,000 men and 
6 guns, which withdrew on June 24. 

On July 4, in the early morning and in a dense fog, two 
Russian battalions, one from the Tenth East Siberian Rifles 
and one from the Twenty-fourth, attacked the Japanese 
battalion of the Thirtieth Regiment at Motienlino-, drivino; 
the advance picket off the road by a flank attack and pene- 
trating the Japanese line. The attack was vigorously 
pushed, the opposing troops engaging in a hand to hand 
combat. Japanese reenforcements arrived, however, and 
the Russians were forced to retire toward Yanotzulinir with 


a loss of 53 killed and about 40 wounded. The Japanese 
lost 19 men killed and 2 officers and 36 men wounded. 

On July 5 some Cossacks attacked a Japanese detachment 
near North Fenshuilino; on the road from vSaimachi to Liao- 
yang, but failed to dislodge it and retreated northward after 
the skirmish. 

On July 6 a detachment of Japanese dislodged a body of 
Cossacks from Hsienchang and occupied the town." 

With the occupation of Kaiping by Oku, on July 9, the 
three Japanese armies were vmited on a front from Kaiping 
east to Fensliuiling, thence northeast through Motienling, 
with covering detachments of Kobi troops eastward at Sai- 
machi, Hsienchang, and Iluaijen. 

The Russians were concentrated in the Liao Valley at 
Tashihchiao, Haicheng, Anping, and Liaoyang. 

On July 6 Field Marshal Oyama left Tokyo to take active 
command of the Japanese Manchurian army. With him 
were General Kodama, Chief of Staff, and Major-Generals 
Fukushima and Inokuchi. 

On July 9 the Takushan army sent a column toward 
Tangchi via the roads leading through Hsienchiayu and 
Tsiehkmmyin, the two detachments reaching the heights 
south of these places at 9 and 11 a. m., respectively. The 
Russians at Hsienchiayu resisted the attack throughout the 
day; those at Tsiehkuanyin, about two battalions and a bat- 
tery, retired from their position in the evening. On the 
morning of the 10th the Japanese drove the Russians from 
their position west of Hsienchiayu and continued to and 
occupied the second Russian position on the heights of 

On the 10th another force from the Takushan army, 
advancing from Fenshiuling toward Tomucheng, came into 
conflict with the Russians and was repidsed, reporting the 
Russian force south of Tomucheng to consist of about one 

o These Cossack detachments belonged to the division of Lieutenant- 
General Rennenkampf, who was on the extreme left flank operating on the 
upper waters of the Taitzu River. Of the completed division the First 
Brigade, cc/mmanded by Major-General Grekov, was composed of the Second 
Verkhne-Udinsk and Second Chita Regiments, the Second Brigade, com- 
manded by Major-General Liubavin, was composed of the Second Nerchinsk 
and Second Argunsk Regiments. 



(Plate VII.) 

On July 17 IJcutoiiant-Oeueral Keller, with six repiiieuls 
of infantry from the Third and Sixth Siberian Divisions and 
the ninth European Division, a batter}^ of artillery and a 
small force of cavalr}^, attacked Motienling and vicinity held 
by the Second Japanese Division. 

In the Japanese forces the Sixteenth Ref2:iment (less one 
battalion) was at and near Ilsiamatang, the Thirtieth Regi- 
ment at and near Motienling, the Fourth Regiment at and 
near Hsinkailing, the remainder of the division in reserve 
near Lienshankuan. 

At 3 a. m. the Japanese advance post in front of Motienling 
was attacked and driven liack. By 5 a. m. the Russian line 
had reached the ridge west of Motienling and was engaged 
with the Thirtieth Regiment and one battery in position on 
the ridge east of Motienling. The Rus'sians reenforced their 
first line and continued the fight, making several attempts to 
turn the Japanese left. These attempts were met by send- 
ing some detachments to prolong the Japanese left. About 
9 a. m. three companies from the Sixteenth Regiment from 
Hsiamatang reenforced the right of the Thirtieth Regiment 
and shortly afterwards the Russians in front of Motienling 
began withdrawing. The Japanese at Motienling, now reen- 
forced by one battalion of the Twenty-ninth Regiment and 
the greater portion of the Second Cavalry Regiment, followed 
a short distance, but coming under the fire of a Russian bat- 
tery from near Lichiaputzu ceased the pursuit about 2 p. m. 

About 1 a. m. the outpost of the Japanese Fourth Regi- 
ment at Hsinkailing was attacked by two Russian battalions, 
one coming from the west and one from the north. The 
Japanese Fourth Regiment repulsed this attack and sent 
northward a detachment which at 1 p. m. was able to bring a 
long-range fire on the Russians retiring from Motienling. 

The Japanese Sixteenth Regiment at Hsiamatang had 
outpost companies on the roads leading from that village to 
the west, the northwest, and the north. About 8 a. m. the 
company on the road leading to the west was attacked. 
Three companies of the Sixteenth Regiment, en route to 
assist the Thirtieth Regiment, joined this outpost company. 


assisted in repulsing the Russians, and coutimuMl on to the 
assistance of the Thirtieth Keginieiit. 

The outpost company on the road leading northwest from 
Hsiamatang, at Shakahoshi, was attacked about 8 a. m. by 
two Russian battalions and very severely handled, losing all 
its oihcers. The fighting continued at this point until about 
4.50 p. m., the Japanese company being reenforced. by the 
outpost company from the road leading west and also from 
the reserve of the Sixteenth liegiment, which had been 
strengthened by one battalion of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, 
when the Russians retired. 

The company on the road leading north to Hsihoyen was 
attacked about 11.30 a. m. by a Russian detachment of 
infantry and cavalry and driven back to near Hsiamatang 
where it was reenforced by one company of pioneers that had 
arrived from near Lienshankuan. The Russians withdrew 
from this attack about 12.30 p. m. 

The Japanese reported their losses as 4 officers and 39 men 
killed ; 15 officers and 241 men wounded. 

The Russians reported a loss for July 17 to 19 of 8 officers 
anil 215 men killed, 37 officers and 1,069 men wounded, and 
2 officers and 224 men missing. 


(Plate VIII.) 

General Kuroki's right column (Twelfth Division) moved 
forward on the Saimachi-Hsihoyen-Anping road on July 18, 
sending an infantry detachment toward Hsiaotientzu (about 
5 miles south of Chinghochen) , which was occupied by the 

On arriving at Santaohotzu the column found that 
Hsihoyen was occupied by the Russians, commanded by 
General Herschelmann, and sent forward a battalion of the 
Forty-sixth Regiment to reconnoiter. This battalion encoun- 
tered at the river a force of about 2 battalions and 8 guns and 
was forced back a short distance after losing heavily. 

About 6.30 p. m. the Japanese battalion was reenforced by 
the other two battalions of the Forty-sixth Regiment and 
two battalions of the Twenty-fourth Regiment and continued 
the fight until dark, and then, being unable to make any 
headway, bivouacked in position. 


The Russian left rested on the Hsi River, while the right 
rested on the heights, to the southwest of Hsihoyen, rising 
from 50 to 300 f(^et ahove the valley. 

From the main body of the Japanese column at midnight 
on the 18th was sent the Forty-seventh Regiment to watch 
the road to Pensihu, and the Fourteenth Regiment through 
the hills to the south against the right of the Russian position. 
The artillery took up a position in the valley and opened fire 
at 5 a. m. on the 19th. To this lire the Russians replied 
with 32 guns. The duel, lasting until 9 a. m., seems to have 
resulted in favor of the Russians, as no further attempts 
were made in front until the Fourteenth Regiment made its 
way through the mountains and, in conjunction with a 
detachment of 6 companies of the Sixteenth Regiment, 
Second Division, sent from the neighborhood of Lienshan- 
kuan, attacked the Russian right about 3 p. m. The Rus- 
sians withdrew their artillery and presumably a considerable 
portion of their infantry. 

The main Japanese force. Twenty-fourth and Forty-sixth 
Regiments, which was in position fronting the Russian right, 
took up the attack, assisted by the fire of its artillery from 
advanced positions. Both attacks met stubborn resistance. 
At 5.40 p. m. the main force carried one of the heights to the 
southwest of Hsihoyen and the attack of the two detach- 
ments approached close to the Hsihoyen-Anping road. The 
Russian rear guard retired and the Japanese occupied the 
position about 8 p. m. 

The Russian force was reported by the Japanese to consist 
of the Thirty-fifth Infantry (4 battalions), Thirty-sixth 
Infantry (3 battalions), the Argunsk Regiment of Cossacks, 
and 32 guns. 

The Japanese reported a loss of 2 officers and 70 men 
killed and 16 officers and 437 men wounded; also, that they 
buried 131 Russian dead on July 20, took 2 officers and 45 
men prisoners, and captured 3 ammunition wagons, 300 
rifles and a large quantity of clothing. 

The Russian loss is included in that reported under the 
second attack on Motienling. 

The detachment sent toward Hsiaotientzu encountered a 
battalion of infantry and about 1,000 cavalry at Chaochiapao, 
34526—07 ± 


5 miles south of Hsiaotientzu. After a skirmish of about 
four hours the llussians retired to the right bank of the Taitzu 
with a loss of 1 killed and 13 wounded. The Japanese lost 17 
men wounded. 


On July 21 a Russian detachment, reconnoiterino; to the 
south, came into contact with a detachment of the Takushan 
army in the neighborhood of Panling Pass, and occupied the 
pass after a skirmish, in which they lost a captain killed and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Andreiev, commanding the detachment, 
and 3 soldiers wounded. The Japanese had 2 men killed. 
About noon on the next day the detachment was attacked 
from 'different directions and driven from the pass, which 
the Japanese occupied. The Japanese lost 1 officer and 8 
men killed and 22 men wounded. The Russians lost 14 men 
killed, 3 captured, and about 30 wounded. 


(Plate IX.) 

On July 23 General Oku's army left its line of positions 
near Kaiping and advanced to the line Liuchiakou-Huaru- 
shan-Wutaishan, skirmishing with Russian detachments 
during the advance, particularly in front of the Japanese left. 
The Fifth Division was on the right, the Third in the center, 
the Fourth on the left, and the Sixth in reserve. Cavalry 
from botli armies was to the west of the railway. 

The Russian "southern forces," commanded by Lieuten- 
ant-General Zarubaiev, contained the First, Second, and 
Fourth Siberian Corps and Major-General Mishchenko's 
Cossack brigade; a total of about 88 battalions, 32 squadrons, 
and 172 guns. The First and Fourth Siberian Corps occupied 
a position south of Tashihchiao, reaching from the railway, 
near Niuhsinshan, to the small stream flowing south past 
Tangchi. The Second Siberian Corps, at this time containing 
onl}^ the Fifth Division, was at Tomucheng. The Cossack 
brigade maintained connection between the two positions. 

At dawn of the 24th the Fifth Division attacked in the 
direction of Taipinling. The Russian artillery, skillfully 


placed and handl(>d, maintained a superiority over that of 
the Japanese. 

The Third Division, adied l)y the fire of its artillery near 
Huarushan, advanced as far as the heights north of Sun- 
chiatun at 10 a. m., where it was stopped by the Russian 
artillery posted between Chingshihshan and Wangmatai. 
The Fourth Division then advanced from Wutaishan, its 
artillery taking a position near Tapinchuang and engaging 
in a duel with the Russian artillery near Wangmatai, but 
soon halted. 

Orders were then sent for the Fifth Division to advance 
regardless of losses, but at sunset it had not succeeded in 
penetrating the Russian line. The Third Division succeeded 
in capturing one position, but was in turn driven back by a 
counter attack. 

The artillery fire practically ceased on both sides at sunset, 
although the Russian artillery fired occasional shots as late 
as 9 p. m. 

The commander of the Fifth Division obtained permission 
to make a night attack, and about 10 p. m. advanced the 
greater part of his infantry to near Taipinling and then cap- 
tured the Erhtaoling position. A second advance was made 
by the same body, occupying the Taipinling position about 
3 a. m. The Third Division moved forward and occupied the 
heights near Shanlisitao shortly afterwards. 

On the morning of the 25 th the artillery of the Third Divi- 
sion near Wolungkang opened fire, but received no reply. The 
infantry from that position then moved forward and occupied 
Cliingshihshan and was followed by the Fourth Division, 
which moved forward and occupied the line from Niuhsin- 
shan to Cliiataipu. 

About 11 a. m. the Russian rear guard left Tashihchiao, 
which was occupied by the Japanese shortly afterwards. 

The First Siberian Corps retired along the railway toward 
Haicheng. The Fourth Siberian Corps retired along the 
Erhtaoho road and aided the Second Siberian Corps at Tomu- 
cheng on July 3 1 . 

Lieu tenant-General Zarubaiev reported that he had 18 
battalions engaged and lost 4 officers and 141 men killed, 30 
officers and 646 men wounded, and 3 officers and 107 men 


General Oku reported that the Japanese lost 12 officers and 
136 men killed, and 47 officers and 848 men wounded. 

Durmg the 25th a detachment of Ja})anese cavalry pro- 
ceeded to and occupied Yingkou, the Russian garrison having 
retired to the northeast. 


(Plate IX.) 

On July 30 the Takushan army occupied a line from the 
height west of Tafangshan through that north of Plsiapafan- 
kou to south of Kuchiaputzu and southwest of Yinglaoshan. 

At dawn on the 31st the main body attacked the liussian 
position on the heights east of Sanchiaoshan, and the left 
wing attacked the positions on the heights north of East and 
West Yangshikou. 

By 8 a. m. the Japanese left wdng had reached the heights 
northwest of West Yangshikou, where it was repulsed by the 
Russians at Erhtaokou. The Japanese left, reinforced by the 
arrival of the Fifth Division, which w^as detached from the 
second army after the battle of Tashihchiao, resumed the 
attack and drove back the Russians from Erhtaokou about 
3 p. m., capturing 6 guns. 

The main column was able to occupy the Russian positions 
on the heights west of Tapingling at 10.30 a. m., but w^as com- 
pelled to halt there by the fh-e of the Russian artillery at 
Changsankou and on the heights east of Hsiaofangshan. The 
Russians being reinforced, took the olTensive on tliis part 
of the field about 5 p. m., and drove the Japanese from the 
positions they had occupied on the heights west of Tapingling. 

This counter attack had been ordered by General Zasulich 
to relieve the pressure on his extreme right, of which he was 
informed about 3.40 p. m. 

During the night the Russians retired toward Haicheng, 
having lost, as reported by Zasulich, on the 30th and 31st, 29 
officers and a little over 1,000 men killed and wounded. The 
Japanese reported a loss of 8 officers and 186 men killed, 24 
officers and 642 men wounded, and the capture of 6 guns and 
570 rounds of gun ammunition, 63 rifies, and various other 
articles. • 


(Plate VIII.) 

On the night of July 'SO tlie two wings of the Japanese 
First Army moved forward against the Russian East Detach- 
ment. The Twelfth Division moved in two columns from 
the neighborhood Hsihoyen-Peichai, leaving the Kobi 
Brigade, commanded by Major-General Umezaw^a, in the 
Laomuling region to watch the Pensihu district. A detach- 
ment from the Second Division, and consisting of the Thir- 
tieth Infantry and one battalion of the Sixteenth, moved 
from Hsiamatang toward Yushulingtzu in cooperation with 
the Twelfth Division. 

At dawn on the 31st the right column (Kigoshi's brigade) 
attacked the advanced Russian position, which was about 
2,000 yards in advance of the main position on the heights 
of Lakouling, and carried the same about 8.50 a. m. It 
then advanced against the main position. 

In the meantime the left column (Sasaki's brigade) came 
into conflict with a force of Russian infantry at Pienling 
about 6.35 a. m. and the Hsiamatang detachment attacked 
a Russian battalion at Niaomeihng and drove it back about 
8 a. m. In the pursuit of this force the Hsiamatang detach- 
ment flanked the Russian force at Pienling and succeeded 
in obtaining a position from which it opened a galling fire, 
at distances from 200 to 1,000 yards, upon this force during 
its withdraw^al, inflicting severe loss. 

In the afternoon the right column attacked the main Rus- 
sian position at Lakouling, but was repulsed. 

At dawn on August 1 the Russians withdrew from the 
vicinity and the Twelfth Division advanced to Lakouling. 


(Plato VII.) 

In the left wing of the Japanese First Army the Second 
Division, less the Hsiamatang detachment, operated on the 
Motienling-Anping road. The Guards Division was to the 
left of the Second, the two divisions moving in conjunction 
against the Russian position at Yangtzuling. 


In ihc early morning of July 31 a detachment of iho 
Second Division drove in the Jdissian outpost on the heights 
east of Tawan and the infantry took up positions for the 
attack on the heights west of the Lang River. Two bat- 
teries took up a position nearChinchiaputzu, })ut th(> remain- 
der of the artillery did not succeed in taking up positions 
until about 11 a. m. 

The Guards attacked from the direction of Makumentzu 
at dawn, sending detachments })y various passes to turn the 
Russian right. In addition to the opposing infantry the 
attack came imder the fire of four Russian batt(>ries posted 
on the summit of Yangtzuling and neigh])oring heights. Tlu^ 
Japanese artillery was unable to reply eifectively and the 
attack made no progress during the forenoon. The flanking 
detachments reached the heights west of Ilanchiaputzu. 

At 10.15 a. m. one battery of the Second Division opened 
fii'e but was soon silenced. 

Shortly after 2 p. m. the artillery of the Second Division 
opened fire on Tawan and the heights to its north and some 
infantry moved forward. A general artillery duel then 
ensued in which the Russian artillery, posted on the heights 
north and south of Yangtzuling, had the advantage. 

Shortly after 4 p. m. infantry of both divisions attacked 
near Tawan and Makumentzu. On the right the attack 
passed beyond Tawan, otherwise but little progress was 
made. The attack ceased at sunset, the Russians withdrew 
during the night, and on the morning of August 1 the Jap- 
anese moved forward and occupied the Yangtzuling position. 

The Russian force at Yushulingtzu comprised the Thirty- 
first and Thirty-fifth Divisions (later incorporated in the 
Tenth and Seventeenth Corps, respectively), one brigade of 
the Ninth Division (later incorporated in the Tenth Corps), 
and four batteries of artillery. The force at Yangtzuling 
comprised the Third and Sixth East Siberian Rifle Divisions 
(Third Siberian Corps), one brigade of the Ninth Division, 
and four batteries of artillery. 

General Kuroki reported his loss in the two engagements 
as about 900 killed and wounded and the capture of 2 field 
guns, 500 or 600 rifles, a quantity of ammunition and mmor 
articles, and 8 officers and 149 men. 


The Russians reported a loss of 10 officers and 349 men 
killed, 42 officers and 1,192 men wounded, and 2 officers and 
219 men missing. 

The Russian commander, Lieutenant-General Keller, was 
killed at Yangtzuling. 

The front of the combined Japanese armies on August 1 was 


(Plato IX.) 

On August 1 the Japanese Second Army moved forward 
along the railway from its positions near Tashihchiao, being 
opposed by some small rear guards. 

The Russian artillery from northeast of Hulukou and from 
Hiachiaho opened fhe on the heads of the Japanese columns 
at Liangchiaputzu and Nanchinshan, while a horse battery, 
supported by cavalry, opened fire from Hungwasai. Some 
Japanese artillery replied from near Tungchiakou and Wen- 
chiakou and a column west of the railway, driving back the 
opposing infantry and cavalry, advanced and occupied Liu- 
chiaputzu and Lienshantun. The Russian rear guard then 

On August 2 the Japanese advanced, without serious oppo- 
sition, to the Pali River, and the Russians withdrew from 
Haicheng toward Anshantien. On the next day the Japa- 
nese occupied Haicheng. 

With the conclusion of this advance the front of the Rus- 
sian forces at and in the vicinity of Liaoyang extended from 
Anshantien througli Lantzushan and the mountain range east 
of Anping to the Taitzu River. 

The Japanese front extended from Haicheng through 
Tomucheng and Yangtzuling to Yushulingtzu. 

On August 6 a Russian force bombarded and burned the 
village of Kenchuangtzu, driving back troops of the Japanese 
First Cavalry Brigade and its infantry supports and captur- 
ing some of the pack animals and some of the ovens in which 
food was being prepared. The Russians followed the Japa- 
nese to about 3 miles southeast of Kenchuangtzu and then 



(Plate X.) 

At the time of the Japanese advance on Liaoyang the Rus- 
sian forces in that vicinity were organized and stationed as 

. The southern group, Lieutenant-Ceneral Zaru>)aiov, at 
(/. 1st Siberian Corps 

b. 2ii(I Silicriaii Corps (5th Division) 

c. 4tli SilitTian Ciirps 

d. Mounted Detachment 



II. The eastern group, General Bilderling, containing: 

a. In the position near Lantzushan the 3rd Siberian 

b. In the mountain range east of Anping the 10th Corps, 
f . On the right banli of the Taitzu under Major-General 


d. ileserve at and near Liaoyang 


III. Army reserve: 

a. In Liaoyang , 

In intrenched camp. . 

b. In and near Mukden- 

5th Siberian Corps. , 
Mukden garrison 


IV. Flank detachments: 

a. Pensihu 

b. Weimngying 

r. Near Chinghochen 

d. At Tawan (on Liao River) . 


V. Lines of communications. 

Anny total. 










a Squadrons. 

Of these the Russians report 128 battalions taking part in 
the battle, 49 battalions in reserve, 10 battalions guarding 
the flanks, 12 battalions in rear; joined during the battle, 16 
battalions and 24 guns, belonging to the First European and 
First and Fifth Siberian Corps, making the total effective 
strength available for battle about 165,000. 




1st Siberian. 
2(1 Sihoriaii.. 

3d Sibt'daii. . 
4tli Silieriaii. 
.'ith Silieriaii. 
10th Army.. 
17th Aniiv. . 











(1st East Silierian Rifle 

\9th East Siberian Rifle 

5th East Siberian Rifle 

2d Brigade, 17th Infantry 

j3d East Siberian Rifle 

loth East Siberian Rifle 

i2d Infantry 

\3d Infantry 

(.54th Infantry 

\71st Infantry 

J9th Infantry 

\31st Infantry 

(3d Infantrv 

\35th Infantry 






















f Guards 


Nishi. ■ 




U mezawa. 

Kobi Brigade 






1st Cavalry Brigade 

1st Artillery Brigade 

Two Kobi Brigades 






During the latter portion of the battle the artillery brigade 
was attached to the Fourth Army. 

The total effectives taking part in the battle was about 

In moving on Anping the Japanese First Army operated in 
three columns against the Russian eastern group. The 
Guards moved by the main Fenghuangcheng-Erhtaoho road 
against the Lantzushan position; the Twelfth Division 
moved on the Saimachi-Hsihoyen- Anping road; the Second 
Division, in the center, operated via Tienshuitien and San- 
taoling against the Russian position through Tsuekou and 
Height 2070. 

As the Japanese concentration against Tsuekou became 
apparent the Second Brigade of the Russian Thirty-first 
Infantry Division crossed from the right bank of the Taitzu 
River and the forces defending Anping were rearranged as 
follows: The "right fighting section," under General Hersch- 
elmann, had in the first line between Height 2070 and Miao- 


\[n<^ 16 battalions, 54 t!;iins, S sotnias, and 2 niountpcl dotach- 
ments; in rear of the riglit of tliis line was a reserve of about 
10 battalions, with artiller}', under Major-deneral Kabinkin: 
in rear of the left was a reserve of a})out 5 l)attalions, with 
artillery, under Major-Gene ral Prince Orbeliani; south of 
Anpinf2; were two batteries, with a ))attali()n escort, arran<;ed 
to lire on the Tsuekou position should it ])e carried bv the 

Colonel Klembovski, with the One hundred and twenty- 
second (Tambov) Regiment, the Seventh Battery of the 
Thirty-first Artillery Brigade, and 2 sotnias, held the ])osition 
on Height 1911 (Hungshaling). 

The general reserve, under Major-General Yasiliev, was in 
two groups; oile, of 4 battalions, at Anping, and the other, of 
8 battalions and 50 guns, at Shunshuyantzu. 

The Guards advanced on August 23, being opposed only 
by small patrols, and on the 24th occupied a line passing 
through Erhtaoho, the Second Brigade (Watanabe) on the 
right, the First Brigade (Asada) on the left; the Second and 
Twelfth Divisions moved forward on the afternoon of the 
25th. At about 5.45 a. m. on the 25th the Guards artillery, 
from the height north of Takou, opened fire with one battery 
on the Russian line near Kofuintzu, and the infantry drove 
back the Russian outposts to the line Tahsintun-Tahsikou. 

To meet the ccmcentration of the Japanese infantry near 
Takou the Russian line was prolonged from the height west 
of Kofuintzu through that north of Hsiaohsikou to near Pao- 
shukou. This echelon, containing 7h battalions, 13? sotnias, 
and 20 guns, was placed under the command of Major-Gen- 
eral Kashtalinski. To further strengthen the threatened 
right flank of the Lantzushan position two regiments of the 
Thirty-fifth Division, Seventeenth Corps, and 3 batteries 
were concentrated at Ilsiaoling during the night of the 25th; 
the One hundred and fortieth (Zaraisk) Regiment, same 
corps, 1 battery and 6 squadrons left Tsaofangtun at mid- 
night, moving via Weichiakou on Kofuintzu. General Bil- 
derling also shifted 2 regiments from the right to the left 
bank of the Taitzu, stationing the main body at the bridge at 
Hsiaotuntzu, and sending 3 battalions to Kinchiatunhsikou. 

During the night of August 25 the Japanese Twelfth Divi- 
sion, Twenty-third Brigade (Kigoshi) on the right, the 


Twoirtli Brigade (Sasaki) on the left, moved forward and 
attacked Ilungshaling and Chipanling. The attack of tlie 
left colinnn, made in conjunction with the Second Division, 
drove back the Russians occupying the hne from near Tsue- 
kou to Miaoling to the Hne Tsuekou-Sanchiatzii, l)ut the 
Russian force at Himgslialing successfully resisted the attack. 

During this attack the Second Division also movecl for- 
ward, the Fifteenth Brigade (Okasaki) on the right, the 
Third Brigade (Matsunaga) on the left, and attacked the Rus- 
sian line, in advance of Tsuekou, running from Chipanling to 
Height 2070, and carried the greater part of the same by 
dawn. The Russian reserve, under Major-General Vasiliev, 
already en route to make a strong demonstration beyond 
Tsuekou, reenforced this part of the line, and severe fighting 
continued until about noon of August 26. The Russians 
occupied the line from Height 2070 to Yuchiakou and 
about 1.30 p. m. their artillery near Anping opened fire, thus 
assisting the troops that were being driven back from the 
position between Tsuekou and Sanchiatzu. 

At 1.30 a. m. on August 26 Lieutenant-General Ivanov 
sent from Hsiaoling the 2 regiments of the Thirty-fifth Divi- 
sion, 2 batteries and 1 squadron to take up a position on the 
height north of Kofuintzu. 

At 5.35 a. m. the Guards artillery, increased to 60 guns 
from the artillery of the Second Division, on a line from 
Ertaoho to the height north of Takou, opened fire on the 
Russian positions, especially on the heights west of Kofuintzu. 
The infantry of Asada's brigade which had driven in the 
Russian outposts, by noon had advanced to a line along the 
stream from Hsiaohsikou to the foot of the height south of 
Paoshukou, practically outflanking the Russian right. The 
Zaraisk Regiment, en route from Sanshantzu to Changchiaopu, 
on reaching a point about midway between these towns, learned 
of the situation. Its commander moved to Paoshukou and 
attacked down the valley. The Japanese line was driven 
out of the valley and by 2 p. m. the Zaraisk Regiment had 
occupied the bluffs just north of Tahsikou, where it remained 
controlling with its fire the valley about Tahsikou. During 
the forenoon the Twenty-ninth Kobi Regiment, then in the 
reserve of the Japanese First Army, was ordered to march to 
the assistance of the Guards Division. 


vVt G a. m., Au(>;ust 26, the attack of the ri^lit colunin of tlie 
Japanese Twelfth DivisioMhad reached Ilungsluihng (called the 
Peikou position by the llussians). one mountain battery lir- 
in^ij for a short time from the height about 1 mile northeast of 
Ileij^u. Unsuccessful at first, the attack was repeated in the 
afternoon with increased severity, and by 6 p. m. the Tambov 
Reo^iment and two battalions sent to its assistance were com- 
pelled to withdraw with the loss of the 8 ();uns of the Thirty- 
first Artillery Brio;ade. 

General Kuropatkin ordered that Peikou be retaken at 
any cost, but before the execution of this order was begun he 
ordered withdrawal from the Lantzushan-Anping positions, 
the second order reaching General Bilderling about midnight. 

The Russians withdrew their main forces, leaving rear 
guards to delay the Japanese advance. By evening of the 
27th the Japanese occupied a line from Hungshaling along 
the heights close to the right bank of the Tang River to 
Kofuintzu and then through the heights north of Tahsikou. 
The Russians remaining in the triangle formed by the Taitzu 
and Tang rivers retired across the latter over a military 
bridge, near Shuangmiaotzu, which they then destroyed, 
floating the pontoons down to the Taitzu River. 

General Kuroki reported the capture of 8 guns, a quantity 
of ammunition, and various articles; also that his losses on 
the 26th and 27th were about 2,000. 

General Kuropatkin reported that the battle was a serious 
one, and General Sakharov reported that the Russians had 
lost over 1,500; the greater portion of their losses occurred 
in the Tenth Corps. 

On August 27 the Japanese Fourth and Second Armies 
reached a line extending from Shangshihchiaotzu to west of 
Sumatai, skirmishing with some Russian detachments during 
the advance, and prepared to attack the Anshantien position, 
held by the First, Second, and Fourth Siberian Corps. As a 
result of the progress of the fighting near Anping the Russians 
at Anshantien did not off"er serious resistance. In their 
withdrawal the Russians were followed closely by the Japa- 
nese columns, which by 10 a. m. on the 28th had advanced 
to a line through Tiaochuntai-Tashitou-Taokuantun and 
w^ere able to bring an artillery fire upon some Russian 
columns crossing the Sha River. 


During; the withdrawal 1 battery, 8 guns, of tlie First 
Siberian Corps, mired so badly that it was found impossible 
to remove it, even when using all available horses assisted 
by soldiers with ropes, and was abandoned to the Japanese. 

On August 28 in the Japanese First Army the action of 
the Twelfth Division was confined to artillery fire with the 
opposing Russians on the right bank of the Taitzu and left 
bank of the Tang. The Second Division attacked and dis- 
placed the Russian rear guard from the heights north and 
west of Sanchiasai, Matsunaga's brigade continuing to 
Height 1701. The Guards advanced and, after some severe 
fighting, especially north of Wantsikou, occupied the line of 
heights through Ssufangtai-Sanshantzu. 

On August 29 the Twelfth Division began preparations to 
cross to the right bank of the Taitzu ; the Second Division occu- 
pied Shihtsuitzu and Tasliihmenling; the Guards advanced 
to the heights south of Hsuchiakou and reconnoitered toward 
Yayuchi. In the Japanese Fourth Army the Tenth Divi- 
sion effected a junction w4th the left of the Guards Division 
near Weichiakou, drove the Russians from that locality, and 
advanced toward Mengchiafang ; the Fifth Division occupied 
a line from Laichiapu to Ileiniuchuang. The Japanese wSecond 
Army occupied the line of the Sha River with its right 
advanced to Heiniuchuang. 

To meet the advance of the Japanese armies General 
Kuropatkin, on August 29, issued an order under which the 
various organizations under his command were to occupy 
the prepared positions and oppose a determined resistance 
to the further advance of the Japanese. The details of the 
occupation of positions were under corps commanders. 

As a result of said order in the First Siberian Corps (Gen- 
eral Stackelberg), 9 battalions and 24 guns, under Major 
General Gerngross, held the line from Kuchiatzu to the 
Ilsiaoyangtzu-Shoushanpu road; 6 battalions and 24 guns, 
under Major-General Kondratovich, extended the line from 
that road to the Hsiaoyangtzu-Hsinlitun road; the Thirty- 
third Regiment was on the height of Fangchiatun; 9 bat- 
talions, under Major-General Zikov, were held as reserve at 
the village of Shoushanpu; 2 batteries were near Chuang- 
chiatun, facing west; 2 were w^est of the Mandarin road, 
north of the spur cut by that road from the ridge north of 


Hsiaoyangtzii ; 2 were in rear of the first dij) and 2 in lear of 
the second dip east of the Man(hirin road; 2 were in the 
saddle of the Fangchiatun-Nan])aHchuang road; Colonel 
Gurko, with 8 squadrons and sotnias, was at Nanpalichuang. 

In the Third Siberian Corps (Lieu tenant-General Ivanov), 
G battalions and 16 guns, under Major-General Danilov, held 
the heights west and south of Tsaofangtun as far east as the 
Tsaofangtun-Weichiakou road, the artillery being on the 
north slope in rear of depressions, and 1 battalion holding 
an isolated peak in front of the main line ; 9 battalions, under 
Major-General Stolitzi, extended this line to across the Sui- 
changyu-Mengchiafang road. Thirty-two guns were placed 
on the northern slope of the line of low hills north of Tsao- 
fangtun, a position that gave a good field of fire on the low 
ground between the First and Third Siberian Corps ; 32 guns 
were placed on the northwestern slope of the spur that ter- 
minates at Suichangyu. The general reserve, 19 battalions 
and the 2 mountain batteries, under Major-General Kash- 
talinski, was at Tsaofangtun. The 6 sotnias, also, were at 
Tsaofangtun, ready to reconnoiter the gap between the First 
and Third Siberian Corps. 

In the Tenth Corps (Lieu tenant-General Sluchevski) 8 
battalions under Major-General Ilerschelmann, held the line 
from the left of the Third Siberian Corps to the Kaolingtzu- 
Wangpaotai road; Major-General A^asiliev, with 8 battalions, 
held the line from that road to Hsiaopu. 

The 12 mortars were in the saddle over which the Kao- 
lingtzu-Yayuchi road passes; 32 guns were at Kaolingtzu; 
32 were at Hsiaopu and on the line between that village and 
Yayuchi; 8 battalions and 24 guns were in reserve at Kao- 
lingtzu; 8 battalions were in reserve at Suichangyu. 

In the army reserve Lieutenant-General Zasulich (Second 
Siberian Corps), with 16 battalions, 32 guns, 2 sotnias, and 1 
sapper battalion, was between Ilsituchiaotzu and Tungpali- 
chuang, 4 of his battalions occupying a fortified position 
near Pachiakangtzu ; Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev (Fourth 
Siberian Corps), with 22 battalions, 32 guns, 6 sotnias, and 1 
sapper battalion, was near Talingtzu; Major-General Sam- 
sonov, with 19 sotnias and 6 guns, was at Changchialintzu, 
within the line of forts; Major-General Maslov, commander 


of the intrenched camp of Liaoyan*:;, liad 9 battahons, 32 
o;uns, and 2 sotnias. 

On the right flank Major-General Mishchenko, with 16 o;uni 
and 21 sotnias, was moving south on Wuluntai, with instruc- 
tions to connect with the detachment of 1 ])attahon, 12 guns, 
and 14 sotnias under Major-General Vhidimir Grekov at 

The left flank was guarded by 18^ battalions, 74 guns, 13i 
squadrons and sotnias under General Bilderling. Of these 
forces, 2h battalions and 8 guns were in position at Hsikuan- 
tun; 4 battalions and 24 guns near Ilsiaowagotzu; 8 bat- 
talions and 36 guns were in position from the heights at San- 
wantzu to that at Tsofankou; 12 squadrons and sotnias 
were at Hsikuantun and Chuankufen; the Fifty-second 
Dragoon Regiment was reconnotiering the right bank of the 
Taitzu River above Kuantun. 

Major-General Orlov, with 8 battalions, 16 guns, and 1 
sotnia, was near Shahopu. 

In the Japanese army at this time the orders were for the 
left of the First Army and the entire Fourth Army to attack 
the Russian line from the Wangpaotai-Kaolingtzu road to 
Heiniuchuang, and for the Second Army to attack the Shou- 
shanpu position. To comply with this order General Oku 
issued the following order: 

1. The enemy is still holding his position on the heights of Shoushanpu 
and Hsinlitun. Our cavalry brigade has advanced to the vicinity of 

2. The army will advance on the 30th against the line Shoushanpu- 
Fangchiatun, with a view to attacking the enemy. 

3. The Third Division will leave the line of the Sha River at 5 a. m., 
August 30, will move east of the railway on the front TataitzAi-Heiniu- 
chuang, and advance against the southern and southeastern heights of Shou- 
shanpu. One regiment of the artillery brigade is attached to the Third 

4. The Sixth Division will leave the line of the Sha River at 5 a. m. in 
conjunction with the Third Division, marching between the railway and the 
road through Tayaotun, Tachuntzu, Likaipu, and Liuchiasanchiatzu. 

5. The Fourth Division will leave the line of the Sha River at 6 a. m. and, 
marching by the western road, will assemble at Hsinglungtai. 

6. The artillery brigade (less one regiment) is under the commander of 
the Sixth Division and will march closely behind the same. In case of 
being compelled by bad roads, it may march on the Mandarin road. 

7. The foot artillery (34 guns and mortars) will march at 5 a. m. via the 
Mandarin road. 


8. The infantry reserves (two Kobi brigades) will march at 5 a. m., follow- 
ing the railway, and assemble at Shaho village. 

9. The commanding general will start along the railway at 5 a. m. and 
will be found at Shaho village. 

In compliance with the above order the commander of the 
Third Division issued the following order: 

1. The enemy is still holding his positions south of Shoiishaiipu and Ilsin- 
litun. The advance guard of our cavalry brigade is expected to reach the 
vicinity of Wangerhtun to-day. The army is to advance to-day to the line 
Shoushanpu-Fangchiatun, with a view to attacking the enemy. The Sixth 
Division is to leave the line of the Sha River at 5 a. m. and is expected to 
reach the line Liuchiasanchiatzu-Kuchiatzu, advancing on the roads west 
of the Mandarin road and to include the road through the villages of Tayao- 
tun, Tachuntzu, and Likaipu. 

2. The Third Division will advance against the southern and eastern hills 
of Shoushanpu. 

3. The Thirty-fourth Infantry Regiment, a section of cavalry, the Third 
Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), and one section of the Third Engi- 
neer Battalion will form the advance guard of the Seventeenth Brigade and 
will march on the southern hill of Shoushanpu via the Mandarin road. 

4. The Sixth Infantry Regiment, one battalion of the Third Artillery 
Regiment, and one section of the Third Engineer Battalion will form the 
advance guard of the Sixth Brigade, will leave the line of the Sha River at 
5.20 a. m. and march on the hill north of Hsiaoyangtzu via Yangchiaochuang 
and Heiniuchuang. 

5. The troops forming the main body of the left column will start at 6 a.m., 
following the advance guard closely in the following order: 

(a) Squadron of cavalry (less two sections); (6) division headquarters; 
(c) Eighteenth Infantry Regiment; (rf) headquarters and one company of 
the Engineer Battalion; (e) Thirteenth Artillery Regiment; (/) Thirty- 
third Infantry Regiment; (g) Ambulance Corps. 

6. The division commander will be at the head of the main body of the 
left column. 

About 5 a. m. on August 30 a small detachment from the 
Guards attacked the Russian line near Mengchiafang. The 
attack was followed by an exchange of artillery fire that con- 
tinued for about four hours. The Guards again opened a 
heavy artillery fire about 10 a. m. on the Mengchiafang- 
Yayuchi positions and moved the infantry forward to about 
1,000 yards from the Russian line. 

About 5.30 a. m. a battalion from the Tenth Division and 
Kobi brigade attacked the hill held by the Russians as an 
advance post in front of the Third Siberian Corps. A few 
minutes later a Japanese battery opened from near Kuchia- 
tzu, and the attack with increasing force was twice repeated 


and the lull carried about G a. in. From the reserve oi" the 
Tlnrd Sil)erian Cor])s two battalions were sent to reenforce 
its right, which was now subjected to a very severe infantry 
fire from the line through the hill just carried by the Japa- 
nese. The Japanese artillery from south of Mengchiafang, 
near Weichiakou and Shihchiyotzu, also opened fire on this 
portion of the Russian line," and the infantry began advanc- 
ing down the valley from Shihchiyotzu toward Wichiakou. 

At 7 a. m. General Kuropatkin ordered Lieutenant-General 
Zasulich to send 3 battalions to the reserve of the Third Sibe- 
rian Corps. Six battalions of the Tenth Corps also were sent 
to the reserve of the Third Siberian Corps, but a little later 
4 of these battalions were returned to the Tenth Corps. 

The attack down the valley toward Wichiakou was op- 
posed not only by the right of the Third Siberian Corps, but 
also by the force imder Major-General Putilov near Pachia- 
kangtzu, now consisting of 7h battalions, 55 guns, and 6 sot- 
nias. This attack was followed by several others against 
different })ortions of the front occupied by the Third Sibe- 
rian Corps. About 1 p m. tliese attacks ceased for a time, 
the artillery fu'e continuing. The fighting had been severe 
and the losses on both sides heavy. The only material ad- 
vantage on either side was the capture by the Japanese of 
the hill held as an advance post in front of the right of the 
Third Siberian Corps. 

About 3.30 p. m. the Japanese again attacked, advancing 
against the western Yayuchi heights on both sides of the 
Tsaofangtun-Weichiakou road and on Pachiakangtzu. Some 
of the trenches occupied by the Eleventh Rifle Regiment on 
the left of the Third Siberian Corps were captured about 4.30 
p. m. The Eleventh Regiment, assisted by a regiment from 
the reserve and the fire of the Russian artillery, assumed 
the offensive and drove the attacking party back to Hsu- 
chiakou. The attack of the riglit brigade of the Guards on 
the western height of Yayuchi was partly successful, but was 
halted by the arrival of 4 battalions sent from the reserve of 
the Tenth Corps to strengthen its right. About 7 p. m. the 
Japanese Thu-d Brigade made an attack on the height east 
of the Kaolingtzu-Wangpaotai road, which lasted until 10 
p. m., causing 3 battalions to be sent from the reserve of 
the Tenth Corps to that portion of its front. 
34526—07 5 


During the alloi'iioou attack on (lie 'I'saoraiiutuii li(M<j;lits 
and Pachiakanji'lzu 2 battalions of Jviissians from the latter 
])osition assumed the ofrensivc, advanciii<; as far as W^iciiia- 

On Aiio;ust 30, also, the ^Japanese Fifth Division, nioAnno; 
in conjunction with their vSecond Army, attacked the Shou- 
shanpu position. Contact with the Russians was first 
gained l)y troo])s of the Fifth Division in the vicinity of 
Tawan at dawn. About 6 a. m. the Japanese artillery opened 
fire from a line running generally from Heiniuchuang through 
Height 224 to Taputzu. The infantry of the Third Division, 
on reaching the line through Heiniuchuang and Tataitzu, 
was extended into the hills east of Heiniuchuang, joining 
the Fifth Division and occupying Hsiaoyangtzu about 10.45 
a. m. 

By 11 a. m. the Japanese Sixth Division had reached a 
line through Tachaochiatai and opened fire against the Rus- 
sian trenches at Mayetun and Kuchiatzu. At about the 
same time General Kurojiatkin received a report from 
Major-General Mishchenko saying he had found the villages 
of Wuluntai, Binmatun, and Baichialaoguawo occupied })y 
small detachments of Japanese. General Kuropatkin ordered 
that 2 battalions from the Fourth Siberian Corps and 8 sotnias 
from the Ural regiments be sent to General Mishchenko. 
Three battalions from the Second Siberian Corps were sent 
to the First Siberian Corps, and the Twelfth Siberian (Bar- 
naul) Regiment and 12 guns from the Fourth Siberian Corps 
were ordered to march to the line of the railway north of 
Kuchiatzu. A little later the Seventh (Krasnozhar) Regi- 
ment and 12 guns from the Fourth Siberian Corps were 
placed at the disposal of General Stackelberg and ordered to 

About 2 p. m. the battery with the Jaf)anese cavalry 
reached a position near Wangerhtun that permitted a fire 
upon the rear of the Russian position at Shoiishanpu. 

In the meantime one Kobi regiment was sent to reenforce 
the right of the Third Division, which, with the left of the 
Fifth Division, was operating against the height northeast 
of Hsiaoyangtzu, causing the 8 battalions and 2 batteries of 
the Second Siberian Corps to be sent from Tungpalichuang 


to Iisi|)ulicliiuiiio;, %\liile '2 l)at lories were ])Iaced at the dis- 
posal of General Stackelherii; and sent to Fanii;('hiatun. 

The Twelfth Sibeiian (Barnaul) Regiment reached Yiicliia- 
chantzii at 5.30 p. ni. The accompanying 12 guns took up a 
position along the railway and opened fire on Chuchiaputzu, 
Baichialaoguawo, and Ilsiaochmgtsuitzu. Assisted by the 
vSeventh (Ki-asnozhai ) Regiment, the Barnaul Regiment 
occupied Chuchiaputzu and stoj^ped the adviince ])arties of 
the left of the Japanese Sixth Division and of a column of 4 
battalions from the Fourth Division which had prolonged the 
Japanese left. The rifle fire continued in the nvHirboi'hood 
of Chuchiaputzu until midnight, when the Russians in that 
vicinity appear to have retired to the railroad. 

At nightfall Major-General Mishchenko retu-ed to Tan- 

At 4.25 p. m. General Oku was informed that the Russians 
had taken the offensive from the Tsaofangtun position, and 
was directed to drive the Russians from the Shoushanpu 
position as quickly as possible. Accoj-dingly, night attacks 
on that position were contemplated. The attack to the west 
of Shoushanpu was deferred because of the Russian offensive 
on that part of the field. The attack of the Third Division 
began to develop toward morning of August 31. Durmg the 
night the Japanese Tenth Division made a demonstration 
against the right flank of the Tsaofangtun position and small 
parties occupied Wichiakou, Minchialantzu, and Tassu. 

During the night of the and on the 31st of August the 
Japanese Twelfth Division and the Fifteenth Brigade, Second 
Division, forded the Taitzu River in the neighborhood of 
Lientaowan and, with but little opposition, by 6 p. m. had 
occupied the heights extending from west of Kuantun to near 
Tsakou, the Twelfth Division on the right. At Goyo was 
constructed a pontoon bridge, by which artillery crossed 
during the night of the 31st. 

Information of the crossing reached the commander of the 
Fifty-second Dragoon Regiment at 6.20 a. m. and General 
Kuropatkin at 11 a. m., the delay being said to have resulted 
from a break in the wires leading from the Seventeenth 
Corps to headquarters. In compliance with an order sent 
from General Kuropatkin's headquarters at 11.30 a. m., 


Lieutenant-Genera 1 Dobrzhinski, with 8^ battalions of the 
Seventeenth Corps, occupied a ])osition on the eastern slopes 
of Heitijlit 917, through Hsikuantun and Manjuyama, placing 
16 guns near Hsikuantun and 32 east of Sahutun. 

To guard the left of this position Major-General Orbeliani, 
with 2.\ battalions, 6 guns, and 16 sotnias, was sent to Yang- 
chiaputzu. The Fifty-second Dragoon Regiment had retired 
before the Twelfth Division to Choheiyentai. 

In the meantime the Guards Kobi Brigade crossed the 
Taitzu River, surprised the sotnia at Weiningying, and 
advanced to Pensihu. General Liubavin, who had 6 sotnias 
and 4 guns at Pensihu, 1 sotnia at Weiningying, and 2 
sotnias at Sanchiatzu, withdrew to Hsiaoshihchiaotzu, where 
he was joined the next day by the Two hundred and thir- 
teenth Orovaisk Regiment and 1 battery. 

At 3.20 a. m. August 31 the Japanese attempted to break 
through along the Mengchiafang-Suichangyu road and at 
5.30 a. m. made an attack against the right of the Tsaofangtun 
position that continued until about 8 a. m. From that time 
on the Third Siberian Corps was not subjected to any severe 
attack on the 31st, although several times subjected to a 
severe artillery fire and several lesser attacks in the afternoon. 
During the afternoon the Russians from the Pachiakangtzu 
position drove the Japanese out of Minchialantzu and Tassu. 

In front of the Russian Tenth Corps all was quiet except a 
reconnaissance by a Russian regiment, which advanced as 
far as Chututai and was then ordered to return. 

About. 3 a. m. the Japanese began an attack on the posi- 
tions of the First Siberian Corps that continued throughout 
the day with practically no interruptions. The right of the 
Third Division, in conjunction with the Fifth Division, 
attacked the height northeast of Hsiaoyangtzu. The Sixth 
Division renewed the attack on Mayetun, being assisted by 
the fire of a large number of guns. The Fourth Division 
was advancing through Chuchiaputzu, Hsiangohotzu, and 
Chougohotzu with an advance company as far as .Yuchia- 
chantzu. The First Cavalry Brigade was in the vicinity of 
Wangerhtun with a detachment at Shuitsuiyan. 

In the early morning Major-General Mishchenko moved 
from Tanchuangtzu toward Wuluntai, his 2 battalions of the 
Tenth Siberian Regiment driving the Japanese out of 


Shiiitsiiiyan. The 2 Russian batteries at Chuangchiatim 
were directed to fire against the Japanese to the west, and 7 
battalions of the Fu'st Siberian Corps reserve were moved to 
Shoushanpii, leaving but 2 battalions in reserve at Fang- 

By noon the attack against the Shoushanpu position was 
general and very severe. Shortly after noon the Ja])anese 
captured some of the advance trenches near the Hsinlitun- 
Hsiaoyangtzu road and reached the crest of the elevation. 
Here they were subjected to artillery fire from east of Fang- 
chiatun in addition to the fire of the infantry they were 
attacking, and were driven back about 1.45 p. m. to the 
lower trenches. 

About noon the Twelfth Siberian (Barnaul) Regiment and 
1 battalion from the reserve drove the Japanese company out 
of Yuchiachantzu. 

The Fu'st Siberian Corps was hard pressed throughout the 
day, being under a continuous fire of infantry and artillery, 
the fu-e of the latter being particularly severe from about 
5 p. m. until after 7 p. m. and coming from all the Japanese 
artillery within range. 

On receipt at 1 1 a. m. of the report of the Japanese crossing 
the Taitzu River, General Kuropatkin decided to withdraw 
to the main Liaoyang position and to concentrate the troops 
thus rendered available against the Japanese on the right 
bank. This decision was communicated to corps com- 
manders about noon, with instructions to defer the with- 
drawal until after nightfall. The withdrawal was rendered 
less difficult than it would otherwise have been by the fact 
that on both the 30th and 31st the trains were being sent to 
the right bank of the Taitzu River, while the railroad had 
been actively employed in the removal of stores and the 
evacuation of the wounded. 

In the withdrawal the Eighty-fifth and Two hundred and 
Eighty-second Regiments, with 8 guns, under Major-General 
Eck, were to lead, going to Ertaokou (near Hsikuantun). 

The Tenth Corps was to go to Sinchung, sending 2 battal- 
ions and 16 guns to occupy the position on the right bank 
of the Taitzu River near Muchang, and 8 battalions and 24 
guns to the Liaoyang garrison. 


Tlie Tliird Siberian Cor])s, timing its withdrawal with that 
of tlie First Siberian Corps, so as to protect the left flank of 
the latter, was to concentrate along the north wall of Liao- 
yang, detaching 6 battalions and 16 guns to the Liaoyang 

The Second and Fourth Siberian Corps were to join the 
Liaoyang garrison, to be commanded by Lieutenant-General 
Zarubaiev, thus raising the garrison to 64 battalions, 102 
field guns, 22 heav;v^ guns, 24 mortars, 10 sotnias, and 2h bat- 
talions of sappers. 

The First Siberian Corps and the force under Major- 
General Mishchenko were to withdraw entire to the right 
bank of the Taitzu River. 

The Seventh (Krasnozhar) Siberian Regiment, with 2 
additional battalions, was to hold its position near Yuchia- 
chantzu, covering the withdrawal of the First Siberian Corps 
and protecting the railroad station. 

At 6 p. m. Major-General Samsonov was ordered to at 
once proceed to and occupy the Yentai mines, to reconnoiter 
southeast of the same and protect the left flank of the Seven- 
teenth Corps. A little later Major-General Orlov, ^ith his 12 
battalions, 16 guns, and .3 sotnias, was ordered to proceed at 
daybreak on September 1 from Yentai Station to Hsiaota- 
lienkou, there to reconnoiter and attack the right flank of 
the Japanese, and to fall back toward the Yentai mines 
should he find the Japanese in superior strength. 

The Russian withdrawal was carried out as ordered. The 
First Siberian Corps began its withdrawal at 9 p. m. and 
concluded about 3 a. m. on the morning of September 1, at 
which time the First Siberian Regiment withdrew under 
rifle fire from near Mayetun. The Third Siberian and Tenth 
Corps, leaving as rear guards the detachments that were to 
be sent to the Liaoyang garrison, withdrew without being 
molested. The wShoushanj^u position was occupied by the 
Japanese by dawn of September 1, and the Tsaofangtun 
position was occupied during the forenoon of the same day. 
The Japanese Second and Fourth Armies were then fronting 
the main line of defense south and west of Liaoyang. 

This line consisted of strongly constructed field works, 
from 800 to 1,800 yards apart, connected by a network of 
shelter trenches, gun emplacements being in general back 


of and op})()site the contor of the interval between field 
works. The line began at a point about three-fourths of a 
mile southeast of Ufa, ran west to the railway, turned sharply 
north and ran through Hsinerhchung to Fort No, 8 on the 
right bank of the Taitzu River. A second defensive line 
ran from the northwest corner of the city wall to the river. 

Including the railway bridge and the one constructed at 
Ufa, 8 bridges crossed the Taitzu River within the main 
defensive line. 

On the morning of September 1 the Russian forces were 
distributed as follows: 

I. Seventeenth Corps: (a) Major-General Yanzhul, 8 bat- 
talions, 40 guns, and 2 squadrons, was holding the line from 
Sanwantzu to Tsofankou; (b) Lieutenant-General Dobr- 
zhinski, 16^ battalions, 96 guns, and 4J squadrons and sotnias, 
was holding a line from the spur southwest of Hsikuantun 
through that village to include Manjuyama; (c) Major- 
General Eck, with his unattached brigade of 7 battalions, 8 
guns, and 2 sotnias stationed at Tutaokou and Chouchingtzu, 
acted as reserve to the corps; (d) Major-General Orbeliani, 
2 battalions, 6 guns, and 12 squadrons, was at Choheiyentai 
with instructions to reconnoiter to the east and toward the 
Yentai mines, and to protect the left flank of the corps. 

II. Tenth Corps: (a) Main body, 22 battalions, 58 field 
and 7 mountain guns, 12 mortars, and 4 sotnias, was at 
Fenshan, Shangwagotzu, and Shichotzu; (b) 8 battalions and 
24 guns were in the Liaoyang garrison; (<^) 2 battalions and 
16 guns held a portion of the Muchang position. 

III. First Siberian Corps: (a) The First Division was at 
Liutsuichuang; (b) the Ninth Division was at Yingtsuishi; 
(c) Colonel Gurko, with his 9 squadrons and sotnias, was at 
Kaolichiang. The corps was nmch reduced in numbers. 
The Thirty-third Regiment was merged with the Thirty- 
fifth Regiment, bringing the strength of the latter up to 5 
companies of 10 officers and 1,020 men. Eight fresh bat- 
talions joined the corps about this time. 

IV. Third Siberian Corps : (a) 18 battalions, 48 guns, and 4 
sotnias were at Chaochialing; (b) 6 battalions and 16 guns 
were with the Liaoyang garrison. 

V. General Mishchenko, with 21 sotnias and 12 guns, was 
at Siaichiatun. 


VI. Major-General Orlov, with 12 battalions, 20 ^nns, and 
2 sotnias, was on the branch railway near ILsiaotalienkou. 

VII. Major-General Samsonov, with 6 <jiins and 19 sotnias, 
was at the Yentai mines. 

VIII. Major-General Liubavin had 4 battalions, 12 guns, 
and 12 sotnias at Hsiaoshihchiaotzu and Shangpingtaitzu. 

IX. Major-General Vladimir Grekov, with Ih battahons, 
12 guns, and 4 sotnias, was on the right bank of the Taitzu 
between Liaoyang and Hsiaopeiho, his right connecting with 
Major-General Kossagovski's detachment at Tawan on the 
Liao River. 

X. Lieu tenant-General Zarubaiev, with 58 battalions, 118 
guns, 24 mortars, 10 sotnias, and 2h battalions of sappers, 
was in the Liaoyang defenses on the left bank of the Taitzu 

Major-General Kondratovich, with 6 battalions, 8 guns, 
and 2 sotnias of the Liaoyang garrison, was on the right l)ank 
of the Taitzu River near Fort No. 8, with orders to assist 
Major-General Grekov in guarding the Taitzu below Liaoyang. 

While the Liaoyang garrison and troops assignetl to pro- 
tect the flanks of the same were to hold back any direct 
advance of the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies the 
remainder of the Russian forces under immediate command 
of General Kuropatkin were to carry out the following plan: 

The Seventeenth Corps was to liold the Hsikuantun posi- 
tion as a pivot; the Tenth Corps, First Siberian Corps, and the 
troops under Major-General Mishchenko were to advance on 
the front Sahutun-Hsiaotalienkou; Major-General Orlov was 
to move on Chuankufen, coordinating his movements with 
those of the First Siberian Corps; Major-General Samsonov 
w^as to move on the extreme left flank, reconnoitering toward 
Pensihu; 2 regiments of the First Corjis were to move from 
Mukden to Shahopu to take the ])<)sition vacated by Major- 
General Orlov. The Thii'd Sil)erian Corps was to act as 
reserve of this force. 

The organizations taking part in this attack were to 
assemble on the 1st, the concentration was to take place on 
the 2d, and the attack was to be matle on the 3d of Septem- 
ber. The troops taking part were to aggregate 95 battalions, 
60 sotnias and squadrons, and 342 guns, making a force of 
about 07,000 bavonets and 5,000 sabers. 


On Sopteniber 1 th(^ fJ{i])iUi('s(' Fifteenth Bripide, assisted 
l)y the TweH'th Division on its I'i^ht, began advancing against 
Manjuyama. At 6.30 a. in. iho Japanese artillery opened 
fire from the ridge east of (^huanknfen and the Russian 
advance ])osts retired from the ridge west of Chuankufen, 
which was occupied by the Japanese about S a. m. The 
exchange of artillery fire continued with but little inter- 
ruption throughout the day; the Japanese tiring from near 
Kuantun and Tsakou, the Russians firing from near Ilsi- 
kuantun, Yangchiatun, and Choheiyentai. 

In the Russian position tlie Tenth (Novoingermanland) 
Regiment occupied Hsikuantun and the slopes southwest 
and northeast of the same; the One hundred and thirty- 
seventh (Niezhin) Regiment occupied Manjuyama; the One 
hundred and fortieth (Zaraisk) Regiment was on the left of 
the Niezhin Regiment, the One hundred and thirty-ninth 
(Morshansk) and One hundred and thirty-eighth (Bolkhov) 
Regiments were in reserve. 

About 7 p. m. the Jaj^anese artillery increased its fire, and 
about 8 p. m. the Fifteenth Brigade, the Thirtieth Regiment 
on the right and the Sixteenth on the left, assaulted Man- 
juyama in front and on l)oth flanks. The companies of the 
Novoingermanlantl Regiment that were in Hsikuantun and 
on the slope to the northeast gave way and retreated to 
Sahutun, thus exposing the right flank of the Niezhin Regi- 
ment. The left of the latter regiment also gave way, but 
was brought back with the aid of two companies of the 
Bolkhov Regiment. The artillery with the Novoingerman- 
land Regiment retired to Tutaokou. 

After a struggle of about one hour, the assault was repulsed 
and the Japanese artillery again began firing on Manjuyama. 
This was followed l)y a second assault, which again reached 
the crest but was driven back a short distance with the aid 
of 2 ])attalions of the Morshansk Regiment (^n the right of the 
Niezhin Regiment. The assault persisted and the Japanese 
finally occupied the crest about midnight, the opposing Rus- 
sians falling back to the line from Height 917 through Sahutun 
to Choheiyentai. 

The Japanese Third Brigade, Second Division, began to 
arrive toward night of Se])teml)er 1, and 3 companies of 


the T\v(Mi(y-niiitli lleojimcnt assisted in the capture of 

The Japanese Twelfth Division appears to have been placed 
on the defensive dnrino; September 1 by the Zaraisk Ileiz;iiiient 
and the threatened advance of the Russian forces to its noiih. 
Major-General Orlov l)y 4 ]). in. had posted 4 })attalions and 
12 tjuns on the crest of the heii)i:hts l)etween the Yentai mines 
and Fanj^shen. The remaining 8 battalions and 8 guns were 
near the mines, as was also the command of Major-General 
Samsonov. Major-General Orbeliani was south of Fangshen, 
recomioitering to the east, and the Fifty-second Dragoon 
Regiment was on the heights north of Tapu. 

A small party of Japanese was in Tapu, and the heights 
south of that village were held by a larger force, the Twelfth 
Brigade, Twelfth Division. 

In the Pensihu region there was a desultory engagement 
between the cavalry of Major-General Liubavin and the Kobi 
Brigade of Major-General Umezawa. After the engagement 
Major-General Liubavin fell back to Shangpingtaitzu, where 
he was again joined by his 8 sotnias from Weiningying and 
Sanchiatzu, and by 4 battalions of infantry. 

The Japanese Second Army advanced infantry and artil- 
lery to the line Yuchiachantzu-Wanpaoshan, and a battery of 
mortars from near Shoushanpu fired at the railroad station 
and the town during the afternoon. 

Early on September 2 Major-General Orlov moved south 
along the Fangshen heights, and when northwest of Tapu 
came into contact with the right brigade (Shimamura) of the 
Japanese Twelfth Division. In a short time the Russians 
fell into confusion, lost heavily, and withdrew, a portion retir- 
ing west and the remainder taking up position farther north 
on the Fangshen heights. The Japanese continued their at- 
tack upon this latter portion, driving it also to the w est. By 
noon the Japanese Tw^elfth Division occupied the line of 
heights from near the mines to west of Tapu. Colonel Gurko 
with 7 squadrons, the advance guard of the First Siberian 
Corps, made a demonstration from Liulinkou against these 
heights, and 4 batteries of the First Siberian Corps, from near 
the same village, opened fire, while the infantry was pushed 
forward sufficiently to form a rallying point for the troops of 
Major-General Orlov. The latter was sent forward by 


Lieutenant-Geiieral Stackclber^ to a*2:ain attack the Japanese 
with a battahoii of the T\\ o hiuidred and iifteeiith llegiinent 
that had assembled near Hsiao tahenkou. The First and 
Second East Siberian Rifle Re*i^inients also took part in this 
attack, which was repulsed with heavy loss. Major-Gcneral 
Orlov and one of his brigade commanders, Major-General 
Fomin, were wounded, and the command of the Fifty-fourth 
Infantry Division was given to Major-General Stolitzi. 

^lajor-General Samsonov, from near the Yentai mines, had 
sent one of his Cossack regiments, at 1 1 .30 a. m., to aid IMajor- 
General Orlov. This regiment also withdrew, before the 
advancing Japanese, to the mines, where Major-General Sam- 
sonov was reenforced by Colonel Zapolski with 2 battalions 
and 4 guns from the First Siberian Corps. In withdrawing 
from the mines, about 6 p. m.. Colonel Zapolski took up a 
position near Sanchiatzu and Major-General Samsonov con- 
centrated his command at Kuchiatzu. 

Toward evening a panic occurred in the troops of the Fifty- 
fourth Infantry Division, reassembled along the branch rail- 
way, as a result of which the greater portion reassembled 
during the night near the Yentai station on the main railway. 

For the recapture of Manjuyama (called Niezhin Hill by 
the Russians) Lieutenant-General Dol>rzhinski directed that 
the Thirty-fifth Division, assisted by the brigade of Major- 
General Eck, should, after a sufficient preparation b}^ artil- 
lery fire, advance against the hill. At 8 a. m. 96 guns opened 
fire from east of Sahutun. In the first line from left to right 
there were 6 companies of the One hundred and thirty-eighth 
Regiment, 1 battalion of the One hundred and thirty-ninth, 
then the One hundred and twenty-first, supported by the 
remaining 6 companies of the One hundred and thirty-eighth 
Regiment. The One hundred and twenty-third Regiment 
acted as reserve to the attacking force. 

The One hundred and twenty-first Regiment, about noon, 
reached the spur southwest of Hsikuantiin, driving back 6 
companies of Japanese from the Fifteenth Brigade and Fourth 
Regiment that had advanced to this spur in the morning and 
which suffered severely from the Russian artillery fire during 
the withdrawal. The 6 companies of the One hundred and 
thirty-eighth Regiment, supporting the One hundred and 
twenty-first, advanced to the left front along the foot of 


Muiijuyaina, ciime under a cross fire of infantry aided by 
inacliine guns, and was forced back a short distance with 
heavy loss. 

In the afternoon the troops assigned for the final assault 
on Manjuyama comprised, on the left flank, under Colonel 
Istomin, commanding the One hundred and thirty-seventh 
Regiment, 7 battalions drawn from three different regiments 
of the Tenth and Seventeenth Corps; in the center, under 
Major-General Vasiliev, 13 battalions drawn from both corps; 
on the right, 7 battalions under Major-General Eck. The 
artillery at Sahutun was increased, and the total number of 
guns taking part was finally raised to 152. 

About 6 p. m. the Eighty-fifth Regiment had reached a 
point close to the southwestern slope of Manjuyama, still 
held l)y the Japanese Fifteenth Brigade with the Third 
Brigade in reserve. The Russian artillery fire ceased shortly 
before 7 p. m. (6 p. m. by the Japanese time), and the com- 
mand of Colonel Istomin assaulted the hill and made a lodg- 
ment on the crest where held by the left of the Japanese 
Thirtieth Regiment. The troops from the command of 
Major-General Vasiliev, following slightly in rear and to the 
right of those of Colonel Istomin, also made a lodgment on 
the crest where held by the right of the Japanese Sixteenth 
Regiment. The attacking Russians were forced back about 
200 yards, where they continued firing. About 10.30 p. m. 
a slight advance was made against the Japanese Sixteenth 
Regiment by the troops of Major-General Vasiliev. 

The assaulting Russians began withdrawing in small 
groups toward Sahutun, and reenforcements of 5 liattalions 
from the Seventeenth Corps and 2 from the Tenth Corps were 
sent forward. This force was attacked on its left flank, 
about 3 a. m. on September 3, by 2 battalions from the 
Japanese Third Brigade, and the entire Russian force fell 
back on Choheiyentai and Sahutun. 

The Third Siberian Corps had moved to Changshutun, 
where it was held in reserve during September 2. 

On the left bank of the Taitzu the Guards Division moved 
to Kouchingtzu, where it endeavored to force a crossing of 
the Taitzu with a view to attacking Hill 1057. 

The JapaiK^se Fourth and Second Armies completed their 
deployment in front of the main Russian ]>osition south and 


west of Liaoyan<!;; llic ai'lilk'iy boiiihardcd llu> [xjsitioii 
thr()U<i;lu)ut the (greater i)art of the day and the infantry 
(jrachially worked forward. 

About noon a counter attack was nuuk' from the Kussian 
right by a bri<2;a(k> of infantry accom])anied ])y two batteries. 
The Japanese infantry nuule an unsuccessful attack in the 
niorninf]^ and another al)out sunset. 

In tiie early niornin<i: of September 8 Lieutenant-GcTiei-al 
Stackelber^;, fearini:; his left was bein*:; turned by the Jajianese 
in the neighborhood of the Yentai mines, withdrew the First 
Siberian Corps a short distance to the southwest and took 
up a position with the left resting on the branch railway. 
General Kuropatkin then ordered the evacuation of Liaoyang. 

In the Japanese First Army the Twelfth Division remaincnl 
in ])osition. The Second Division rearranged its troops, 
placing the Third Brigade on the right of the Fifteenth. The 
Guards Division, unable to force a crossing at Kouchingtzu, 
was ordered to leave three batteries with an infantry support 
at Shuangmiaotzu and to march with the remainder to army 
headquarters at Kuantun. 

Tlie Russians continued to hold the heights southwest of 
Hsikuantun and their line in front of the Japanese First 
Army, and began the withdrawal of the troops holding 

In the Japanese Fourth and Second Armies the artillery, 
which had advanced closer to the Russian ]:)osition during 
the night, opened a heavy iire at dawn. The infantry 
reached a line that was generally about 300 yards from the 
Russian position and made a series of unsuccessful attacks 
throughout the clay. About 7 p. m. the Twentieth Brigade, 
Tenth Division, captured redoubt No. 2 (near Yuichuangmiao) 
and l)egan working forward against the gate in the city wall. 

On this day the Russian storehouses in the vicinity of 
Liaoyang station were destroyed by fire. 

On vSeptember 4 the Second Brigade (Watanabe) of the- 
Guards Division, which had been ordered to hasten forward, 
arrived at Kuantun. The fighting in that vicinity, however, 
had ceased, the Russians having withdrawn except from 
Hill 917, which was evacuated by them about 10 a.m. The 
Japanese First Army was ordered to pursue, but had made 
little progress when night came. The Guards Kobi Brigade 


(Umezawa) had loft a small force at Slian«,q)iii^(aitzu to 
hold Major-General Liubavhi's detachinonl in clu^ck and 
with tlio main body had arriv(Ml at the Ycidai mines at 1 
Y>. m. on Se])t(>mber 3. This brii^ad*^ moved noiih and, after 
a skirmish northwest of Sanehiat/Ai, oceii|)ied the hill east of 
Yumentzu a bold 6 p. m. 

The Japanese Twelfth Division, in an endeavor to advance 
alonjj; the branch railway, came into contact about midnight 
with the First Siberian Cor])s near Ilsiaotalienkou and was 
repidsed after some hand to hand iifihting, with considerable 
loss on both sides. A Russian machine gun company took 
part in the engagement. 

By 2 a. m. on September 4 troops from the Japanese 
Second Army had reached the railway station and occupied 
a portion of the walled city, where they assisted the troops 
of the Fourth Army in driving out the Russians, the street 
fighting continuing until about 10 a. m. 

The remainder of the Russians retired across the Taitzu 
River, destroyed the military bridges, and burned the wood- 
work of the railway bridge. 

On September 5 in the Japanese First Army the Guards 
Kobi Brigade remained in position on the hill east of 
Yumentzu, being opposed by the echelons of the First 
Siberian Corps in its withdrawal to the north on the Liu- 
fangtzu-Kushutzu road. The Twelfth Division reached a 
line through Talienkou, the Second Division advanced on 
Lotatai, the Guards Division remained in reserve. 

In the Russian army on that date the First Siberian Corps 
was at Himgchiatien, the Second Siberian at Lantzukai, the 
Third Siberian at Huanshan, tlie Fourth Siberian at Wuli- 
kai, the Tenth at Shahopu, the Seventeenth at Shihliho. 
General Kuropatkin telegraphed that his army, proceeding 
northward, had extricated itself from the dangerous position 
in which its center and left flank had faced the Japanese on 
a narrow front. 

The Japanese reported the following casualties for the 
battles at Liaoyang and its neighborhood : 

First Army ! 4, 866 

Second Army ' 7, 681 

Fourth Army 4, 992 

To^al 17, 539 


Of tlioso casualties llierc were l.'!(i odiccrs killed aiul 494 

The Russian General Stall" re])()rte(l 54 ollieers and 1,S1() 
men killed, 252 odicers and 10,811 men wounded, 5 officers 
and 1,212 men missinji;. 

For the month of Au<2;ust (Au(:;ust 14 to S(>|)tember 13,' 
new style), 11)04, the Russian medical I'eports ^ave 01 olli- 
eers killed and 477 wounded, 2,243 men killed and 15,370 
wounded, this exclusive of the losses at Port Arthur. 

(Plate XI.) 

After the battle of Liao3'ang the Japanese occupied a general 
front through Yentai Station and the mmes, extendmg from 
the Hun River on the left eastward to Pensihu on the Taitzu 
River, the outposts being several miles farther north. The 
First Army was on the right and extended from the Yentai 
mmes to Pensihu. The Guards Kobi Brigade (IJmezawa) was 
in advance of the Pensihu district, which seems to have been 
held by weak detachments of service troops. The Guards 
Division was near Hsiaotalienkou, the Second Division near 
the Yentai coal mines, the Twelfth Division near Tapu. 
The Second Cavalry Brigade, under Major-General Prince 
Kanin, operated on the right. 

The Fourth Army occupied the line from the Yentai mines 
to the railroad; the Second Army occupied the line to the 
west of the railroad. The First Cavalry Brigade, under 
Major-General Akiyama, was on the extreme left. A large 
portion of the divisional cavalry of the Japanese Second 
Army was under his command during the battle. 

The general reserve consisted of 3 Kobi brigades and the 
Second Artillery Brigade, containing the Sixteenth, Seven- 
teenth, and Eighteenth Regiments. 

The only severe engagement between the opposing forces 
during the remainder of September was m the neighborhood 
of Shangpingtaitzu, where the Japanese detachment was 
attacked on September 17 at noon by a mixed brigade coming 
from the direction of Fushun and Mukden. After a severe 
engagement, lasting until night, the Russian force withdrew. 

On October 2, 1904, General Kuronatkin issued an order 


ainioiiiicinsj; his iiiteiition Id lake llu^ ofrcnsivc. The troops 
at his iniiiKMliate disposal wore reported to consist of 2()1 
})a1tahons (1S1,4()0 l)ayoiiets), li'A sqiuKh'ons and sotiiias, 
864 t!;uns, '.V2 niachme ^iins, and 41 sap|)er coinpaiiies. 'I'he 
Jai)aiiese forces confront in<i; this army consisted ])riu"t ically 
of those or<i;anizations that had taken part in the battle of 
Luioyansi:, and which had aijani been raised to fnll streiiirlh, 
and a correspondinjj; lunnher of Kohi or<:;anizations. Tiie 
I*]iii;hth Division arrived diirinii; the battle, in which it appears 
to have taken part only as reserve, raising the total to fioni 
1()4 to 170 battalions, 50 squadrons, 558 field and niountjiin 
guns, 10 siege guns, and 38 howitzers and mortars. 

In the Russian Army the left wing, Eastern Detachment, 
was commanded by Tiieuten ant-General Stackellierg and con- 
sisted of the First, Second (Fifth Fast Siberian Ilillc Division 
and Two hundred and thirteenth Infantry Regiment), and 
Third Siberian Corps, one brigade of the Fourth Siberian 
Corps, and the Siberian C'Ossack Division (Major-General 
Samsonov); 73 battalions, 34 sotnias, 164 guns, 32 machine 
guns, and 10 sapper companies. 

The right wing, Western Detaclunent, was connnanded b}^ 
General Bilderling (Lieutenant-General Volkov was tempo- 
rary commander of the Seventeenth Corps) and consisted of 
the Tenth and Seventeenth Army Corps; the Fifty-first and 
Fifty-second Dragoon Regiments; one-half of the Orenburg 
Cossack Division and the l^ral Cossack Brigade (Major- 
General Grekov); 04 battalions, 26 squadrons and sotnias, 
224 guns, and 8 sapper companies. 

Lieutenant-General Dembovski's detachment, containing 
the Two hundred and fifteenth. Two hundred and sixteenth, 
and Two hundred and Eighty-fourth Infantry Regmients, 
the Tw^enty-eighth Artillery Brigade, the Caucasus Cavalry 
Brigade, the First Argunsk Cossack Regiment, the Fourth 
Transbaikal Cossack Battery (12 battalions, 16 sotnias, 32 
guns, and 2 sapper battalions) was on the right l)ank of the 
Hun and operated in conjunction with the Western Detach- 
ment in the later stages of the battle. 

The Sixth Siberian Corps (Lieutenant-General vSobolev, 
32 battalions, 8 sotnias, 96 guns, and 3 sapper companies) 
was between Tiehling and Mukden, and became a part of the 
Western Detachment in the later stages of the battle. 


Tlio tj;(MUM-al reserve consisted ol" the First, Army Corps and 
tlie Fourth Si})erian Corps (less one })ri<j;a(U') ; of) battalions, 
6 sotnias, 2-30 guns, and 7 sa|)j)er companies. 

Major-General Misheheidvo's Transbaikal Cossack Bri<.':a(h', 
containing 2;> sotnias and 8 guns, operated in front of the 
general reserve and connected the two wings in the early 
stages of the battle. 

On the extreme right was the Liao River Detachment, 
commanded by Major-General Kossagovski and contaming 
the Two hundred and eighty-first Infantry Regiment, Fourth 
Siberian Infantry Regiment, Amur Cossack Regiment; 6 bat- 
talions, o sotnias, and 12 guns. 

On the extreme left was Lieu tenant-General Rennenkampf 
with a mixed command (Eck, Pieterov, and Liubavin) con- 
sisting of troops from the Fifty -fourth and Seventy-first 
Infantry Divisions and the Second Brigade (Liubavin) of the 
Transbaikal Cossack Division; 14 battalions, 18 sotnias, 32 
guns, and 1 sapper conij)any. 

There was also a detachment under Colonel Madritov, still 
farther east, containing 1 liattalion and 6 sotnias, operating 
against Saimachi. 

The effective strength of the Russian army was about 
200,000; that of the Japanese, al)out 170,000. 

The Russian plan was to move forward on the left, seize 
Pensihu, and then advance down tiie valley of the Taitzu 
against the Japanese prepared positions in the Yentai region. 
On the right General Bilderling was to advance along the 
Mandarin road and the railway toward Liaoyang. General 
Mishchenko was to maintain communications between the 
wings and was to be followed by the general reserve. In the 
Western Detachment each echelon was to intrench each 
position occupied. 

The Russians advanced in several columns on a front reach- 
ing from west of the railway east to Fushun, and drove in the 
Japanese outposts after some skirmishing, in which the losses 
were slight on both sides. On October 6 they reoccupied 
Shaho station, and their railway troops restored the bridge 
over the Sha River the next day. 

At dusk on October 7 Umezawa's brigade began to with- 
draw from the vicinity of Pienniulupu and arrived at Liu- 

34526—07 6 


shakou the next moniiiif;. Two companies were stationed 
at Tnmentziilino;, 3 battalions and 4 guns at Taling, and 1 
regiment and 2 guns were sent to the range of heights sepa- 
rating Pensihu from the small river flowing into the Taitzu 
near Weiningying. Before the arrival of the latter detach- 
ment the advance guard of llennenkampf's force had driven 
back a Japanese outpost on the height west of Weiningying. 

In the evening of October 8 the Twelfth Japanese Division 
was ordered to march (it was then near Wangkouyuling) 
farther east, and the division commander, Lieutenant- 
General Inouye, was placed in command of troops in the 
Pensihu district. 

On October 9 one brigade of Eck's division and Liubavin's 
Cossack brigade of Rennenkampf's command crossed the 
Taitzu River at Weiningying, cut the communications of the 
troops at Pensihu and vicinity with their base at Hsihoyen, 
and intrenched. In the Eastern Detachment the Third 
Siberian Corps was at Kaotaitzu attacking the heights to the 
west; the First was at Hsiaoshihchiaotzu, with advance 
guards near Taling and Tumentzuling; the Second was at 
Pienniulupu. General Mishchenko was at Tapu; the Fourth 
Siberian Corps was at Haniutun, with advance guards at 
Mienhuapu .and Hsiaoliuhotzu. Lieutenant-General Zaru- 
baiev, with three-fourths of the Fourth Siberian Corps, was 
given command also of Mishchenko's troops and the left 
brigade of the Third Division (Lieutenant-General Mau), 
Tenth Corps, and began to intrench. Two regiments of the 
Fourth Siberian Corps intrenched east of Hanlashantzu, one 
south of Shangliuhotzu, and two southwest of Pachiatzu and 
Mienhuapu. General Man's brigade was in echelon back of 
the right flank of this line on the heights northwest of San- 
chiatzu, and General Mishchenko's brigade was sent to Mien- 
huapu to maintain communication with the Eastern Detach- 
ment. The First Army Corps was in the Erhtaokou region. 

The advance troops of the Tenth Corps occupied Kushutzu 
and the hill to the west after a short skirmish. The main 
body was on the Shihli River. The Seventeenth Corps also 
was at the Shihli River to the west of the Mandarin road, 
advance troops occupying Wulitaitzu and Erh taitzu. General 
Grekov's division was in the neighborhood of Tatungshanpu. 
The Sixth Siberian Corps, which concentrated near Tasu- 


chiapu, Laisheng^pu, niul Tatai on tho 7tli, advanced about 
2 versts and sent one briojade as advance o^nard to Ilsiao- 
shuluitzn. The First Brigade of the Fifty-fifth Division was 
occupying TiehHng and Mukden. Lieu tenant-General Dem- 
bovski was at Changtan. 

In addition to the severe fighting near Pensihu on October 
9, there were numerous skirmishes along the entire line of the 
opposing armies. On the night of the 9th the First Siberian 
Corps began the attack on Taling and Tumentziding, one 
lirigade on each pass. 

On October 10 the severe fighting continued in the neigh- 
borhood of Pensihu. The Russians in a night attack 
assaulted and carried the height west of Weiningying and 
the one east of the road leading from Pensihu to Ilualienkou. 
They also continued the attack on Taling and Tumentzuling 
and opened an artillery fire on the Second Division, to which 
the Japanese artillery replied. Liubavin's brigade, from the 
south bank of the Taitzu, endeavored to cross and advance 
against the heights southwest of Pensihu. The Japanese 
Second Cavalry Brigade was ordered to March from Huiyao 
to Hsihoyen. 

The Japanese Fourth and Second Armies began to advance, 
skirmishing with the opposing Russians. In the Fourth 
Army the Tenth Division occupied the heights east of 
Yumentzu; the left of the Fifth Division, in conjunction 
with the right of the Third Division, Second Army, attacked 
Wulitaitzu. The reserve division, of 3 Kobi brigades, was 
on the right of the Fifth Division. In the Second Army 
the left of the Third Division and right of the Sixth Division 
occupied Erhtaitzu,^ the left of the Sixth Division occupied 
Tatungshanpu. The Fourth Division, after some skirmish- 
ing, reached the vicinity of Yangchiachiantzu. The First 
Cavalry Brigade was at Chentanpu with a detachment at 

Of the Russian troops on this part of the field the Seven- 
teenth Corps withdrew its advanced troops from Erhtaitzu 
and Tatungshanpu to the line Shihliho-Entehniulu-Hsiao- 
tuntai, holding this line with the Third Division and keeping 
the Thirty-fifth Division in reserve near Liutunkou. Major- 
General Grekov's Cossack division was near Litajentun. 
Colonel Stakhovich, commanding the Fifty-second Dragoon 


Regiiiiont, who was reenforced several timos (liiriiii;' iho l)attle 
by detaclinients of infantry, connected the ri<j,hl of the Sev- 
enteenth Corps with the left of Grekov's division. 

The movements of the Japanese on October 10 had fol- 
lowed an order, issued by Marshal Oyama at 10 p. m. on 
October 9, in which he said: 

I shall attack the enemy before he completes his dephiynicnt and drive 
him back to the line Kangtolishan-Fengchiapu-Litajentun. Th(^ Twelfth 
Division and the Guards Kobi Brigade will advance on Hsiaoshihchiaot7>u, 
and the main body of the First Army on Fengchiapu as soon as Wulitaitzu, 
on the Mandarin road, has been captured by the Fourth Army. The latter 
will march on the morning of October 10 in the direction of Ninkuantun; 
the^Second Army against the line Panchiaopu-Litajentun. The latter will 
place strong reserves in rear of its right flank. The left wing will advance 
more rapidly than the right and undertake an enveloping movement. 

On October 1 1 the Japanese in the forenoon recaptured the 
heights east of Pensihu and the one east of the road near 
Hualienkou. The Russians returned to the attack in this 
region and extended the severe fighting to the Taling and 
Tumentzuling regions, the First wSiberian Corps reenforcing 
its first line. The Second Siberian Corps was in reserve at 
Hsiaoshihchiaotzu . 

There was ))ut little change in the relative positions of the 
Japanese First Army and the opposing Russians except on 
the extreme left of the former where the Fifteenth Brigade, 
moving in conjunction with the right of the Tenth Division, 
captured Temple Hill (also Sanchiatzu toward night) and 
repulsed the Russian counter attack made shortly after dark. 
The Tenth Division attacked Sankuaishihshan, held by a 
portion of the brigade of the Thirty-first Division under 
General Mau. 

This reverse to the right flank of General Zaru})aiev's line 
caused a suspension of the intended attack by the Russian 
Tenth Corps on Kushutzu and the height about 1 mile farther 
west, out of which positions the advance guard of the Tenth 
Corps had been driven that morning. The Japanese Iiad 
begun to advance from these points and thus met the attack 
of the Tenth Corps. The One hundred and thirty-eighth 
Regiment and two l)atteries of the Thirty-fifth Artillery 
Brigade had been sent to Shihliho to assist the Tenth Corps, 
permitting the latter to use its entire reserve in strength- 


oiiinii- \]]o niiiiii line on llic .Sliilili River, and cxlcndini^ it 
towni'd tlic rig'lil of (iciuM'al Man's l)ngad(> at Yini^pan. 

Jn th(^ f]a])an('se Second Ai-niy ihe \oU of tlie Tliird Division 
and the division I'eserve attacked the Kntehniulu section 
fi'oin 'Psaot.ait/Ti and Kji'htaitzii. T]\o iirst assault, about 2 
]). ]n., failed. \ second assault was made and the village 
captured al)out 5 j). m.; the assaulting troops, liaving l)een 
reenforc(Ml fioni the army i'eserv(^, also carried Hsiaolankou. 
The Sixth Division occupied Yangchiawan, from which C\)l- 
onel Stakhovich withdrew to l^MVontai, about noon and ihe 
Fourth l)i\'isi()n occupied Saiicliiatzu, with a detachment 
near Tatai where occurred a skirmish with a detachment 
of the Sixth Siberian CV^rps, the main force of which was now 
on the line Talientun-IIsiaosholuitzu. General Grekov's 
cavah"Y had withdrawn to the north and west to meet the 
movements of the Jai:>anese First Cavalry Brigafle. 

During the night of OctolxM- 11 General Zarubaiev in- 
trenched his main line on the heights north of Shangliuhotzu 
and TIsiaoliuhotzu. The Seventeenth Corps commander, 
General Volkov, sent from his reserve the One hundred and 
thirty-ninth Kegiment and two l)attalions of the One hmidred 
and fortieth Regiment against Entehniulu. This force car- 
ried the village by a bayonet charge about 11 p. m., inflicting 
severe loss on the Japanese Thirty-third Kegiment. The 
Japanese intrenched near the eastern and southern outskirts 
of the village. 

The Second Brigade of the Fifty-fifth Division, Sixth Sibe- 
rian Corps, was sent to I^iutunkou during the night and placed 
under the commander of the Seventeenth Corps, the reserve 
of which had been dej^leted by the detachment sent against 

Note. — The various movements that, liad taken place left the distrD^ution 
of troops on the Russian right flank as follows: 

On the line Talientun-Hsiaosholuitzu was Ihe main force of the Sixth 
Sib'erian Corps. 

Under Colonel Stakhovich, at Peiyentai, were the Fifty-second Dragoon 
Regiment, 2 battalions of the One hundred and fortieth Regiment, one-half 
battalion of the Eleventh Regiment, 1 battery of the Thirty-fifth Artillery 
Brigade, 2 guns of the Third Artillery Brigade, and a volunteer detachment 
from the Tenth Regiment. 

General Grekov's cavalry prolonged the line to the west: through Peilintai, 
and the troops under Dembovski were at and near Changtan. 


In the seclion Hsiaotantai-TunUii-Lantzukai were 1 battalion of the 
One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment, 2 battalions of the Tenth Regi- 
ment, the Ninth Regiment, companies of the Twelfth Regiment, and 2 
batteries of the Third Artillery Brigade. 

In Entehniulu was the One hundred and thirty-ninth Regiment. On 
the north bank of the Shihli River at this village and in Lunwanmiao were 
2 battalions of the One hundred and fortieth Regiment and 1 Ijattalion of 
the Tenth Regiment. 

Between Lunwanmiao and Shihliho were 1| battalions of the One hun- 
dred and thirty-eighth Regiment, 2 battalions of the Twelfth Regiment, and 
2 batteries of the Third Artillery Brigade. 

In Shihliho were 2^ battalions of the Eleventh Regiment, G companies of 
the One hundred and thirty-eighth Regiment, 2 companies of the Twelfth 
Regiment, 3 batteries of the Thirly-flfth Artillery Brigade, and 2 batteries 
of the Third Artillery Brigade. 

At Wulikai were 1 battalion of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Regi- 
ment and 2 squadrons of the Fifty-first Dragoons. 

In the Seventeenth Corps reserve at Liutunkou were 3 battalions of the 
One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment, 4 batteries of the Thirty-fifth 
Artillery Brigade, and, after 10 a. m. on the 12th, the Second Brigade of the 
Fifty-fifth Infantry Division, Sixth Siberian Corps. 

On October 12 the severe fighting continued with but httle 
change in the rehitive positions of the two combatants in the 
neighborhood of Pensihii, Tahng, and Tumentziihng. The 
Japanese Second Cavalry Brigade, with its niacliine-giin com- 
pany defeated Liubavin's infantry reserve near Taotingshan, 
and thus greatly aided the Japanese in the neighborhood of 
Pensihu, who up to this time had l)een hard pressed. 

Beginning in the early morning the Guards Division car- 
ried the heights south, and later those north, of Pachiatzu. 
Colonel Kasa, with the Guards and Second Division cavalry 
regiments, was sent to Mienhuapu to protect the rear and 
right flank of the Guards from the troops of Mishchenko, who 
had fallen back to Sikoii. 

In the Japanese Second Division the Third Brigade in the 
early morning completed the capture of vSanjoshishan and the 
entire division attacked the lieights of Ilsiaoliuhotzu and 
Shaotaku, the Fifteenth Brigade being directed against 

Tn the Japanese Fourth Army the Tenth Division and 3 
Kobi brigades captured Sankuaishihshan in the early morn- 
ing, relieved the Thirtieth l^egiment. Second Division, at 
Nanshan, and made an unsuccessful night at tack on Shiroyama. 
In fi-oiit of the Russian Tenth Corps the Japanese confined 


their efforts to an artillery fire. The Russian troops from 
Sankuaishihshan halted on the main line from the hill south 
of Hamatan to Tsaichiatun. The detachments of Yingpan 
and Takou retired to Shingchuang. By night the main posi- 
tion of the Tenth Corps was IIunpaoshan-Ninkuantun. 

In the Japanese Secontl Army the right of the Third Divi- 
sion attacked Shihliho and Wulikai station at daybreak; the 
left of the Third Division and right of the Sixth Division at- 
tacked Entehniulu; the left of the Sixth Division attacked 
Tuntai. The Fourth Division, reenforced from the army 
reserve, operated against the detachment of Colonel Stakho- 
vich at Peiyentai and, in conjunction with the First Cavalry 
Brigade, against the cavalry of General Grekov farther west. 

The jvttack of the Third and Sixth Divisions made little 
progress until about 10 a. m. The Fourth Division had 
gained ground so as to attack Peiyentai from the south and 
west, and this enabled the left of the Sixth Division to ad- 
vance to the junction of the two streams north of Hsiaotuntai. 
Utilizing the valley of the creek coming from Chengchia, the 
Sixth Division continued its advance and captured Lantzukai 
and the 16 guns of the First and Second Batteries of the 
Third Artillery Brigade shortly before noon. Two unsuc- 
cessful attempts were made by the Russians to recapture the 
guns. The first attempt was made by the troops of the Lan- 
tzukai-Tuntai section; the second was made about 12.30 p. m. 
by the Two hundred and nineteenth Regiment from Cheng- 
chia and 1 battalion of the One hundred and thirty-eighth 
Regiment from Wulikai. In repulsing these attacks the 
Sixth Division was aided by a reserve brigade which arrived 
from the Second Army reserve and crossed the Shihli River at 
Tuntai to move on Liutiinkou. This brigade was brought to 
a stand on the right bank of the river and bivouacked near 

In the meantime the Third Division had made two unsuc- 
cessful assaults on Shihliho and Entehniulu, the first about 
noon, the .second about 2.30 p. m. 

At 3.50 p. m. General Volkov issued an order directing his 
troops to hold their positions until dark and then to retire. The 
Thirty-fifth Division was to occupy the line Panchiaopu- 
Chengchia, its left connecting with the Tenth Corps, the 
Tliird Division in reserve at Shulingtzu; the brigade of the 


Fift^-fifth Division to extond the Ymo from Chengchia toward 
Hunlinpii; the detachment of Colonel Stakhovich to hold 
liiinlinpu and connect with the main body of the Sixth 
Siberian Corps. The progress of the battle, however, pre- 
vented the execution of this order. The capture of Lant- 
zukai facilitated the operations of the Japanese Third Divi- 
sion, which by sunset had carried Panchiaopu and Wulikai. 
The right of this division, in conjunction with the left of the 
Fifth Division, captured 4 guns of the Russian Third Artiller}" 
Brigade west of Shihliho during the afternoon. The disaster 
to the Seventeenth Corps caused the Tenth Corps to with- 
draw during the night from the Hunpaoshan-Ninkuantun 

The Japanese Fourth Division drove the detaciiment of 
Colonel Stakhovich from Peiyentai and occupied that village 
about 4 p. m. A Russian detachment from the Sixth 
Siberian Corps, coming from Wangchuangtzu, attacked the 
Japanese at Tapingchuang and Litajentun, compelling the 
Japanese to reenforce the troops at the latter village by a de- 
tachment from the First Cavalry Brigade. 

On October 13 the Japanese in the Pensihu. region found 
that the Russians in their front had retired during the night, 
Rennenkamp's command having withdrawn up the valley of 
the Taitzu, the Third Siberian Corps to Lichiawoping en 
route to Kaotvding. Matsunaga's brigade. Second Division, 
attacked Chaohsienling, to which point it had marched 
the preceding night, and where it was in turn attacked 
by the Russians and hard pressed imtil the arrival of reen- 
forcements. In the Guards Division the right brigade 
penetrated to the height south of Maerhshanputzu. Here it 
was attacked by a detachment of the Second Siberian Corjis, 
advancing by way of Maerhshanputzu, and by a detachment 
from the left of the Fourth Siberian Corps, the main force of 
which was attacking the left Ijrigade of the Guards Division 
on the southern portion of Maerhshan. Aportion of the latter 
attack penetrated the interval between the two brigades, but 
was brought to a stand by the Fourth Guards Infantry, then 
in the division reserve, which succeeded in holding the small 
hill southwest of Houchiatunnankou. 

Colonel Kasa's detaciiment and the Third Regiment, 
Guards Division, occupying the heights from east of Nankou 


to west of Sikoii, repulsed a Russian attack IVoin Wail(»uslian. 
The Japanese l^'il'tli Division, less one regiment, was sent 
from Knsluitzu to Saneliiatzu and ))lace(l nnder the eom- 
niander ol" tlu^ First Army. The Fifteenth Brigade, Second 
Division, carritMl the heights of Ilokoshan and Shiroyama 
and then the ridge from Shiroyama to Yangehenehai, 
wher(> it repulsed a night attack. 

This night attack covered the witiidrawal of the Fourth 
Siberian Corj)s to the right bank of the Slia Kiver. The 
Thirty-seventh Division, First Army Corps, liad been placed 
in the line between the Fourth Siberian and the Tenth 
Army Corps on the lOth, and with the Twenty-second Divi- 
sion, First Army Corps, remained on the left bank of the Sha 

In the Japanese Fourth Army the Tenth Division and 
three Kobi brigades advanced as far as Manchiafm and 
Huchiakuchiatzu, the opposing Thirty-seventh Division 
falling back to the line of heights north of ITamatan, east 
of Tungshankou and north of Tungshantzu. A detachment 
from the left of the Fourth Army attacked toward Huan- 
huatien; otherwise the action of this army against the 
various positions held by the Tenth Corps was limited to 
artillery lire. 

In the Japanese Second Army the Third Division, rein- 
forced by a regiment of infantry and one of artillery, turned 
to the right and attacked Iluanhuatien in conjunction with 
the left of the Fourth Army. When north of Pachiatzu 
the flank of the Third Division was attacked by troops of 
the Tenth (^irps from Lamutun and Wukaontzu. The 
Third Division was then ordered to attack to the north 
but night came before the new attack was well developed. 
At the same time the artillery of the Sixth Division, the 
front of which had been cleared by the withtlrawal across 
the Sha of the Seventeenth C^orps, and one of its brigades, 
with the general reserve at Liutunkou, was ordered to 
attack Iluanhuatien in conjunction with the left of the 
Fourth Army. This attack, also, was but slightly developed 
when night came. The other brigade of the Sixth Division 
occu])ied Shulingtzu about 11 a. m. and at sunset was 
confrontiniT the Russians at Lamutun. 


The Foiirtli Division jidvanccd to the line Kihsiaotvm- 
CUian*2;lingpu and began developing toward Linsliengpu. 
The First Calvary Brigade concentrated at Sanchiatzu 
where it repulsed an attack of about 600 Russian calvary. 

To close the gap between the Eastern Detachment and 
the Fourth Siberian Corps, caused by the withdrawal of 
the latter across the Sha River, General Kuropatkin ordered 
two regiments of the Second and all the F'irst Siberian 
Corps to move from east to west. 

After withdrawal to the Sha River the Seventeenth Corps 
occupied a line from Lamutun through Linshengpu to 
Talientun ; the One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment was 
to the west of the railway, with 2 battalions of the One hun- 
dred and thirty-ninth Regiment as reserve; 14 companies 
of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Regiment held the 
line from the railway to Lamutun ; the Thirty-fifth Artillery 
Brigade was between the railway and a line running from 
Linshengpu to Ssufangtai; the One hundred and fortieth 
Regiment was north of Yinkua; the greater part of the 
Third Division and the Third Artillery Brigade were on 
the line Ssufangtai-Kuchiatzu. 

The various fractions that had been with (Vjlonel Stak- 
hovich rejoined the Seventeenth Corps during the day. 

The first line of the Seventeenth Corps thus prolonged 
the line held by the Tenth C\)rps, Wukaontzu-Kuchiatzu- 
Changlingtzu. The Sixth Siberian Corps, which, while 
being in echelon behind the right flank of the Seventeenth 
Cor])s, had been a part of the general reserve of the army, 
was now placed under the orders of the commander of the 
Western Detachment and ordered to prolong the line of the 
Seventeenth Corps in echelon westward through Talientun 
and TIsiaosholuitzu. Dembovski's command was still far- 
ther to the west, apparently at and near Changtan. 

For the next day an offensive movement by the Western 
Detachment was ordered. The Tenth and Seventeenth 
Corps w^ere to hold their positions even against assault. 
The Sixth Siberian (\)rps was to advance against antl 
capture Ilunlinpu and Reilintai. Lieutenant-General Dem- 
})ovski was to advance to the line Fuchiachuang-Paoh- 


On Octobor 14 in the J!H)an('S(* First Army i-cinlorcomonts 
from Saimachi rcaduMl Ilsihoyon, rollowinj:; a similar hoch' 
that Inul arrived on tho nio;lit ol" tlio l.'Uli and roinl'orcetl 
the Twoirih Division. Detachments from tho Twelfth 
and Guards Divisions attacked and carried the height west 
of Sikou. CJeneral Mishclu>nko's l)rigade and one regiment 
withdnnv across tlu^ Sha River in front of the Ciuards Di- 
vision, which advanced and occnpied the hills south of 
Fengchiaj)u. The FiftcHMith Brigade, Secontl J)ivision, ad- 
vanced to the heights north of Miaokon and then, after a 
slight engagement, to Tainshutun, the Russians withdrawing 
across the Sha Kivcn". 

In the afternoon tho Russians began withdrawing from the 
Chaohsienling region and were followed by the Japanese. 
The Japanese Twelfth Division niarchedon Ilsiaoshihchiao- 
tzu, being followed by the Guards Kobi Brigade; the Third 
Brigade, Second Division, marched on PIsiaopingtaitzu, the 
Second Cavalry Brigade on PIsiaochiahotzu. Of the oppos- 
ing Russians the Fifth East Siberian Division was at Pien- 
niulupu, the First at Yangmulingtzu, the Ninth at Kang- 
tolishan, the Third Sil)erian Corps at Kaotuling. The Ninth 
East Siberian Division, followed by one brigade of the Fifth, 
marched via Hsiaoyangtun to Liushihtaitzu. 

The Japanese Fourth Army attacked in the directions of 
Hsinglungtun and Putsaoyai, subsequently reaching the Sha 

In the Japanese Second Army one brigade of the Sixth 
Division, cooperating with the left of tho P\)urth Army, 
occupied the hill north of Iluanhuatien and then endeavored 
to carry Santaokangtzu, but was unable to do so before night. 

About 3.30 a. m. troops of the Third Division made an 
unsuccessful attack on Ilouchaishan, held by the Thirty- 
fourth and One hundred and twenty-third Regiments. About 
5 a. m. an unsuccessful attack was made on Wukaontzu. 
About 6.30 a. m. the Third Division assaulted and, about 7.30 
a. m., after very severe fighting, carried Ilouchaishan, thus 
piercing the line held l)y the Tenth (\)rps, and then Wukaon- 
tzu, north of which the Japanese captured the second group 
of the Ninth Artillery Brigade, 23 guns. A detachment of 
the Third Division continued to and occuj)ied Shahopu about 
8 a. m., the portions of the Tenth C^orps in the intrenchments 


Ix'tweon Wukaontzu :i,n(l Lamiitnn withdrawiiiji; to the right 
bank of the Sha liivor. This Japanese (letaclnnent was 
brought to a stand at Shahopu by an attack of the Thirty- 
sixth Regimen *^ which had rejoined the Tenth C-orps from 
Yinkua that morning. 

The Fourth Division repulsed three determined attacks by 
the Sixth Siberian Corps on Changhnpu, and sent a portion of 
its right, in cooperation with the Twenty-fourth Brigade, 
Sixth Division, against Linsliengpu and the hne leading from 
that village t<j Talientun. The Japanese carried all of Lin- 
sliengpu but the northern part, and the Russians remaining 
on the left bank of the Sha River between the railroad and 
Linsliengpu retired to the right bank. Six companies of 
Russians made a counter attack onLinshengpu, but could not 
advance beyond the northern outskirts of the village. 

The main .body of the First Cavalry Brigade concentrated 
at Peilintai, presumably because of Dembovski's advance. 

On October 15 the main body of the Japanese First Army 
was at the Sha River. The Guards Kobi Brigade was 
ordered to march to Sanchiatzu. 

The Fifth Division, which had returned to the Japanese 
Fourth Army, replaced the troops of the Sixth Division that 
were between Changlingtzu and Santaokangtzu and, in con- 
junction with the right of the Third Division, completed the 
occupation of the remaining territory in that vicinity as far 
as the Sha River, carrying Lone Tree Hill toward morning of 
the 16th and capturing 2 guns. The right brigade of the 
Third Division later attacked North Shahopu and, failing to 
drive the Russians out, remained facing their opponents, who 
later withdrew to the line Kuantun-Shanlantzu. 

The Japanese Sixth Division concentrated on its left 
brigade and attacked Lamutun and the line leading from 
that village to Linsliengpu and thence toward Talientun. 
After a hard fight the Japanese carried Lamutun about 5 
p. m., remaining there for the night. The Japanese Fourth 
Division extended its left to Wangchuangtzu while continu- 
ing to hold its position of the 14tli. The Sixth Siberian 
Corps, facing the Japanese Fourth Division, ])r()longed the 
Russian line from Talientun through Chitaitzu and San- 
chiatzu, and Dembovski's detachment occupied the region 


The First Cavalry Bri<i;a(l(', with oiu* nioimtcd battery, was 
al tacked by tho Russian cavalry near Litujcntuii, and retired 
to Tapingclmang at dark. 

On October 16 there was no important engagement in front 
of the Jajxuiese First Army. The Second Japanese Cavalry 
Brigade, after a skirmish near Kaoluling, retired to Kao- 
knanchai. The Second Division concentrated near Tain- 
hsiangtnn. A Knssian detachment fi-om tlie Fiftli Siberian 
Division crossed the Sha Kivcr and occupied the heights of 

The Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Thirty-sixth East Siberian 
Regiments, and the Eighty-seventh and Eighty-eighth Regi- 
ments, First Army Corps, assisted by the fire of the Eighty- 
sixth Regiment, shortly after sunset assaulted and carried 
Lone Tree Hill (including the portion called Novgovod Hill), 
held by Major-General Yamada's brigade, Fifth Division, 
capturing 14 guns and killing over 1 ,000 Japanese, with a loss 
to themselves of about 3,000 in killed and wounded. A con- 
siderable portion of the Russian loss resulted from the fire of 
the Eighty-sixth Regiment, which was unable to see in the 
darkness the distance to which the assault had been carried. 

The height was named Putilov Hill, in honor of Major- 
General Putilov, who commanded the Russian forces engaged 
hi its recapture. 

The new line taken up by the Fifth Division extended from 
near Putsaoyai to Nankangtzu. 

Several unsuccessful attacks were made on Linshengpu by 
detachments from the Russian Seventeenth Corps assisted b}^ 
its artillery, which about noon turned its fire upon Wang- 
chuangtzu, held by the left of the Fourth Division, which was 
then unsuccessfully attacked by a regiment of the Sixth 
Siberian Corps coming from Sanchiatzu. 

The main body of the First Cavalry Brigade was at Hsiao- 
tai, a detachment reoccupying Litajentun. 

On October 17 there was a reconnaissance by a regiment of 
Russians south of Pienniulupu, wliile the Japanese continued 
a desultory attack upon Waitoushan. There was no change 
of positions or important engagement in front of the Japanese 
Fourth Ai'my until night, when the Japanese made an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to recapture Putilov Hill. In the Japanese 
Second Army the Tliird Division was strongly attacked about 


11.30 a. m. After the attack, the right wing of the division 
remained about 600 yards, the left wing about 300 yards, 
from the Russians on the opposite bank of the vSha River. 

About midnight Linshengpu, occupied by the left of the 
Sixth and right of the Fourth Divisions, was unsuccessfully 
attacked by about one battalion of Russians. During the 
day the Fourth Division, giving up Linshengpu to the left of 
the Sixth Division, occupied a line from Kihsiaotun to the 
southwest of Wangchuangtzu. 

The main body of the First Cavalry Brigade remained at 
Hsiaotai, detachments occupying Litajentun, Chentanpu, 
and Heikoutai. The Russians continued intrenching the line 
through Talientun, Chitaitzu, and Sanchiatzu. Dembovski's 
detachment moved north to take position in echelon behind 
the Sixth Siberian Corps. 

On October 18 there were some unimportant skirmishes in 
front of the Japanese First Army, some small attacks in the 
early morning against the Fourth Army, and an intermittent 
artillery fire in front of the Second Army, the extreme left of 
which was attacked about noon by about 500 infantry. The 
Sixth Siberian Corps occupied the line Ssufangtai-Kuanlinpu. 
Dembovski's detachment occupied Pienchengtzu. 

On October 19 a detachment of the Guards Division drove 
some Russian cavalry from Shiucliiafan, and was in turn 
driven out by a detachment of Russian infantry. In front of 
the Fourth Army there was only an intermittent artillery fire. 
At night the troops of the Third Division withdrew from South 
Shahopu, abandoning one of the captured Russian guns, and 
took up a new position farther south and less threatened by 
enfilade fire from Putilov Hill. The entire Second Army was 
subjected to a rather severe fire shortly after sunset, but no 
attack followed. 

On October 20 there were some slight demonstrations by 
the Russians to the east of Pensihu, a desultory cannonade in 
front of the Jaj^anese Fourth and Second Armies, especially 
in the neighborhood of Shahopu, and some harassing of the 
First Cavalry Brigade, which retired to Litajentun. 

The l)attle of Sha River may be said to have terminated 
on October 20. Engagements of greater or less severity 
continued to occur almost daily between the opposing arm- 
ies, which continued with but little change in their relative 


positions to face each other, strengthenin<!: their positions 
as rapidly as possihk^ with sheher trenches and field works. 
From Linshengpu the line of separation ran west. The 
Russians continued to hold Putilov Hill and Waitoushan, 
both on the left bank of the Sha River, which otherwise 
above Linshengpu separated the opposing armies. From 
Pienniulupu, strongly fortified, the Russian line extended 
northeast and then east for a distance of about 10 miles. 

The Japanese reported the capture of 709 prisoners, 45 
gims, 37 ammunition wagons, 5,474 rifles, 6,920 rounds of 
gim amnmnition, 78,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition, 
and various other articles. 

The Russians reported the capture of 9 field and 5 moun- 
tain guns and various other articles; also the recovery of 
one of the guns that had been captured from them. 

The Japanese reported their loss as 15,879 killed and 
wounded. The Russians reported their loss as 190 officers 
and 4,894 men killed, 861 officers and 29,531 men wounded, 
and 35 officers and 5,838 men missing. 

Prior to and coincident with the battle of Sha River there 
was a demonstration b}" the Russians against Hsienchang, 
with several resulting skirmishes. The attack began on Oc- 
tober 7 and continued without much change until about 3 
a. m. on the 10th, when the Japanese detachment made an 
attack and drove the Russians back toward the northeast. 

After the battle of Sha River the opposing armies faced 
each other without material change of positions and without 
any engagement on a large scale until the battle of Chen- 
tanpu. There were, however, for sometime almost daily 
encounters of greater or less magnitude. 

On October 27 a portion of the Guards Division assaulted 
and carried Waitoushan, capturing 2 macliine guns, thus 
completing the occupation by the Japanese of the left bank 
of the Sha River in the neighborhood of Pienniulupu. 

On November 24 the Japanese from Hsienchang (Ninth 
Kobi Brigade) attacked a Russian position near Chingho- 
clien occupied by a portion of Rennenkampf's command. 
The fighting continued into the night of the 24th, and was 
renewed on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, when the Japanese with- 
drew. They were followed and attacked by the Russians 
about six miles farther south and were again driven back. 



Early in January, 1905, a force was concentrated, under 
command of Majoi-General Mishchenko, for a raid around 
the Japanese left flank. 

The composition of the force was as follows : 

1. The Ural-Transbaikal Cossack Division. The Ural 
Brigade contained the Fourth and Fifth Ural Cbssack Regi- 
ments, each less one sotnia; the Transbaikal Cossack Bri- 
gade contained the First Chita Cossack Regiment and the 
First Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, less one sotnia. 

2. The Caucasus Cavalry Brigade, containing the Second 
Daghestan Regiment, 5 sotnias of the Terek-Kuban Regi- 
ment, and 4 machine guns. 

3. The Fourth Division of Don Cossacks, containing the 
Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-sixth Regiments. 

4. The Second Independent Dragoon Brigade, containing 
the Fifty-first and Fifty-second Regiments. 

5. Four squadrons from the Maritime Province Dragoons. 

6. One sotnia of scouts, drawn from various organizations 
and under the conuuander of the expedition. 

7. Four half sotnias of frontier guards. 

8. Four companies of mounted scouts of 100 men each, 
drawn from the First Siberian Corps. 

9. The First and Second Transbaikal Mounted Cossack 
Batteries, the Twentieth Mounted Battery, one-half of a 
Frontier Guard mounted battery; total 22 guns. 

10. A section of sappers, mounted and attached to head- 

11. The train, comprising 2 ambulances, 1 column of pack 
litters, and 5 provision columns, containing 1,500 pack 

On January 8, 1905, this force moved south frcni Ssu- 
fangtai in three columns. 

The riglit column (Major-General Samsonov) contained 16^ 
squadrons and sotnias and 10 guns; the center column 
(Major-General Abramov) contained 16^ sotnias, 4 com- 
panies of mounted scouts, and 6 guns; the left columii 
(Major-General Telichev) contained 29 1 sotnias, 6 guns; the 
convoys, escorted by the First Chita Regiment, followed the 
center column; tlii'ee detachments of from 35 to 40 men, 
charged with the destruction of the railway north and south 


of Ilaiclicno- and at Tashihcliiao, were attached to the left 

On January ]() small detachments of Japanese convoying 
su])j)ly cohinms were defeated and at night a detachment 
cut tlu> telegraph lines and slightly damaged the railway- 
near llaicheng. 

On the same day the advance guard occupied Newchwang, 
from which the Japanese garrison of 1 company and 2 squad- 
rons withdrew. 

On the 11th the Russian columns advanced on Yingkou and 
made an attack shortly before night, the artillery fire start- 
ing a conilagration in some of the Japanese storehouses. The 
attack continued until the arrival by rail of some Japanese 
infantry from Tashihcliiao, when the Russians retired. On 
the 1.3th the Russians crossed to the right bank of the Liao 
River and on the 14th their right column was attacked by a 
Japanese force and suffered considerable loss. On the 15th 
the retreating Russians gained contact with the Fourteenth 
Division, Eighth Corps, that had been sent to their assistance. 

During the raid the Russians captured 1 officer, 14 men, 
and about 500 provision carts. They reported their losses as 
39 officers and 331 men killed, wounded, and missing. 

(Plate XII.) 

At the battle of Chentanpu (Sandepu) the Second Russian 
Army, commanded by General Grippenberg and forming the 
extreme Russian right, consisted of the Tenth, Eighth, and 
First (Siberian) Corps; the First, Second, and Fifth Euro- 
pean Rifle Brigades, forming a Rifle Corps; a mixed force, 
under Major-General Kossagovski, consisting of two regi- 
ments of infantry, 22 squadrons, and 2 horse batteries; 8 regi- 
ments of cavalry and 4 horse batteries under Major-General 
Mishchenko ; a total of about 84,000. The Tenth and Eighth 
Corps extended from Yamandapu westward to and across the 
Hun River, passing south of Shoukuanpu, with the Four- 
teenth Division, Eighth Corps, on the right bank of the Hun; 
the First Siberian Corps was west of the Hun River, in the 
vicinity of Ssufangtai; Kossagovski's command was on its 
34526—07 7 


right and Mishclienko's command still farther west at 
Tahoangchipu, with reconnoitering detachments reaching to 
the Liao River; the Rifle Corps was in reserve. 

The general movement, a wheel to the left with the Tenth 
Corps as a moving pivot, began on January 24, 1005. 

General Mishchenko moved in two columns south to near 
Mamikai, where he was joined by General Kossagovski, who 
had marched direct from Ssufangtai. The Japanese outposts 
in the various villages retired on the approach of the Russians 
and but little resistance was encountered. 

The First Siberian Corps, First Division on the right, 
advanced to the Hun River. The First Division occupied 
Huanlotaitzu after a preliminary bombardment, and the 
Ninth Division occupied Toutaitzu by a night assault ; neither 
division encountered serious resistance. 

The Eighth Corps drove in the Japanese outposts. 

On January 25 the batteries with Mishchenko and Kossa- 
govski bombarded Chitaitzu and Mamikai until night, when 
the two villages were assaulted and captured by Kossagov- 
ski' s infantry. 

In the First Siberian Corps, the First Division captured 
Toupao and Shihtsia, while the Ninth Division captured 
Ileikoutai and Erhchiahotzu. The Eighth Corps continued 
its slow advance to the southward and was joined in the 
movement by the right of the Tenth Corps. 

The Japanese Eighth Division and one Kobi brigade, sent 
from the Manchurian army reserve, arrived on the night of 
the 25th at Tatai. Later the Fifth Division from near Yentai 
and the Second Division and one Kobi brigade from the Jap- 
anese First Army were sent to reenforce the Japanese left. 
Major-General Aki3^ama, with the First Cavalr}" Brigade and 
parts of the divisional cavalry of the Second Army, was near 
Hsiaopeiho, ha\nng a portion of his command on the right 
bank of the Ilun River. 

On January 26 IMishchenko with his left column continued 
his advance as far as Ilsiuerhpu, capturing several Aallages. 
His right column remained facing the Japanese First Cavalry 
Brigade. Kossagovski's force remained on the Hun River. 
One of the Rifle Brigades was placed in the first line on the 
left of the First Siberian Corps. 


At 8 a. 111. the Ei(;lith Corps oponeci artillery fire on Cheii- 
iUiipu; toward iiiidninht the Fourteenth Division assaulted 
from the west and carried the adjacent villages Baotaitzii and 
Ilsiaoshiitzii; the Fifteenth Division carried Peitaitzu, and 
the Tenth (\)rps carried Iluanchi and Ilsinshantun. '^Fiie 
Japanese set fire to buildings, opened a heavy infantry and 
machine-gun hre, and made a series of attacks, driving tiie 
Russians from Baotaitzu and Hsiaoshutzu. One brigade of 
the First Siberian Corps, that was to move past the north side 
of Tatai and assault Chentanpu from the south, was attacked 
and checked by the Kobi brigade of the Tatai force moving 
from Kuchentzu. The Russian brigade then moved north 
to near Malengtzu, where it was placed in line by the com- 
mander of the Eighth Corps. 

In the meantime the left wdng of the Tatai force had 
deployed along the Sumapu-Shihtsia line to attack the P'irst 
Siberian Corps on the Toupao-Heikoutai line, directing the 
heaviest attack against Toupao. At the same time the right 
wing attacked on the Ijaochiao-Sumapu line, but was able to 
make but little progress. 

On January 27 Mshchenko, driving back the opposing 
Japanese, advanced against and attacked Langtungkou, 
but was repulsed. Receiving a wound in the knee during 
this attack, General Mishchenko turned the command of his 
column over to Major-General Grekov. This attack dis- 
closed the movements of the Japanese Fifth and Second 
Di^^sions and one Kobi brigade mo^nng northward toward 
Heikoutai and Chentanpu. 

The Second Division turned west to oppose ^lishchenko's 
command, and succeeded in reaching a line through Cliin- 
chiawopeng-Chenshao, where it was brought to a stand. The 
Fifth Division attacked the Liutiaokou-Hsiuchenghotzu line, 
from which the Russians were threatening the right and rear 
of the Eighth Di^asion and the left of the main line at 

The right wing of the Japanese Eighth Division gained a little 
ground to the north, and its Kobi brigade, from Kuchentzu, 
then advanced, coming on the line between the two wings of 
the Eighth Division. The extreme left of the Eighth Divi- 
sion, enveloped by Kossagovski's command, suffered severely 
and was driven back from Shihtsia to Sancliienpao. During 


the night of the 27th the Russians continued the attack on 
the Eighth Division, particularly at Sumapu, which was 
captured by an assault of the Ninth Division, the Thirty- 
fourth Regiment entering the village from three sides. 

On the other hand the Japanese carried out a succession 
of strong attacks in the neighborhood of Chentanpu and 

On January 28 the Japanese Fifth Division continued its 
attack, occupying Liutiaokou at 9.30 a. m. and Ilsiucheng- 
hotzu about 3 p. m. 

The Japanese Eighth Division and its Kobi brigade con- 
tinued its attack against Heikoutai and Sumapu. At the 
latter village a detachment of the Thirt3^-fourth Regiment, 
that had captured the village on the preceding night, remained 
after the adjacent portions of the Russian line had been 
driven back, was surrounded, and, after a desperate resistance, 
surrendered about 200 prisoners. The extreme left of the 
Japanese Eighth Division recaptured Sliihtsia, from which 
it had been driven the preceding day. The Japanese Second 
Division drove back its opponents of General Grekov's 
cavalry and Kossagovski's infantry and occupied Hsiuerhpu 
about 3 p. m., and a little later drove the Russians from and 
occupied Haerhpu. 

The Russian forces concerned state that their retrograde 
movements of the 2Sth were taken up in ol)edience to orders 
received that day from Manchurian army headcjuarters. 

During the day the Russian Tenth Corps carried Hsiao- 
taitzu and Yapatai. 

The Japanese continued their attack during the night and 
by 9.30 a. m. on the 29th had recaptured Heikoutai, detach- 
ments continuing to and occupying Toutaitzu and Huanlo- 
taitzu. The Second Division advanced as far as the Hun 
River, occupying Chitaitzu and Sanchiapii. Troops from 
Hsiuchenghotzu crossed the Hun and reached a point 1,000 
yards south of Changtan. On the 30th the fighting con- 
tinued on a smaller scale, the Russians continuing to bom- 
bard Chentanpu. On the 31st the Japanese attacked and 
carried Changtanhonan, but were driven out by a counter 
attack. At noon on February 1 they again carried the village 
and successfully resisted a counter attack, although the 
Russians remained in close proximity to the village. 


Tlic v\osv of the hatth loimd the Russian tr()()])s occiipyin*:; 
a lino tlir()u<2;h ('hangtaii and Ssufanj^tai, west to the Liao 

The Russians reported a loss of 49 officers and 1,()7() men 
kill(>d, 378 officers and 10,746 men wounded, 25 officers and 
1 ,277 men missing, and the capture of about 300 prisoners. 
The Japanese reported a loss of 842 killed, 8,014 wounded, 
and r)2() missino;, and the capture of 500 jn'isoners. Both 
sides sulfered severely from frostbite. 

The battle was followed by a quarrel l)etween Generals 
Grippenber<2^ and Kuropatkin, the former claiminfy that his 
turning movement was but the part of the general plan in 
which the Third Army was to follow the development of the 
turning movement by a vigorous attack on the Japanese 
center, wiiile the First Army was to join in the general attack 
as soon as the retrograde movement of the Japanese began, 
and that the latter general failed to give proper support to the 
turning movement, successfully begun, by ordering the attack 
on the Japanese center. 

General Kin-opatkin claimed that the turning movement 
failed through lack of proper concert of action between the 
corps engaged; that a general attack wovild have resulted 
only in a waste of ammunition and was rendered inadvisa})le 
by the intense cold. General Grippenberg proceeded to 
St. Petersburg and laid his complaint before the Czar, by 
whom he is said to have been rcj^rimanded. 

(Plato XIII.) 

After the battle of Chentanpu the opposing armies re- 
mained facing each other without serious engagement until 
the battle of Mukden. There were, however, almost daily 
skirmishes of greater or less severity. 

At the beginning of the battle the composition and 
arrangement from right to left of the Russian Manchurian 
army, commanded by General Kuropatkin, with Lieutenant- 
General Sakharov as chief of staff, were as follows: 

I. Second Army, General Kaulbars; chief of staff, Lieu- 
tenant-General Ruzski. 

(a) West Detachment, Rennenkampf: The Ural-trans- 
baikal Cossack Division (Rennenkampf followed by Grekov), 


composed of the First Brigade, containino; the Fourtli and 
Fifth Ural; the Second Brigade, containing the First Ver- 
khne-Udinsk and First Chita; the Caucacus Brigade, con- 
taining the Second Daghestan and Second Terek-Kuban; 
2 batteries of horse artillery, and 4 machine guns. 

A mixed brigade (Kossagovski), containing the Two hun- 
dred and fifteenth and Two hundred and forty-first Regi- 
ments drawn from the Fifth Siberian Corps. 

(h) The Rifle Corps (Kutnievich) : First Division, con- 
taining First, Second, Third, and Fourth Regiments, and 3 
batteries; Second Division, containing Fifth, Sixth, wSeventh, 
and Eighth Regiments, and 3 batteries; Fifth Division, con- 
taining Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twen- 
tieth Regiments, and 3 batteries; one-third of the First 
Orenburg Cossack Regiment from the Tenth Corps. 

(c) The Eighth Corps (Milov) : Fourteenth Infantry 
Division (Rusanov), containing Fifty-third to Fifty-sixth 
Regiments, and the Twenty-ninth Artillery Brigade of 6 
batteries; Fifteenth Infantry Division (Ivanov), containing 
Fifty-seventh to Sixtieth Regiments, and the Forty-first 
Artillery Brigade of 6 batteries; one-third of the First Oren- 
burg Cossack Regiment from the Tenth Corps; the Twelfth 
Sapper Battalion. 

(d) The Tenth Corps (Tserpitski) : Ninth Infantry Divi- 
sion (Ilerschelmann), containing Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, 
and Thirty-sixth Regiments, and the Ninth Artillery Brigade 
of 6 batteries; Thirty-first Infantry Division (Man), con- 
taining One hundred and twenty-first to One hundred and 
twenty-fourth Regiments, and the Thirty-first Artillery 
Brigade of 6 batteries; one-third of the First Orenburg Cos- 
sack Regiment; Ninth and Tenth East Siberian Mountain 
Batteries; Sixth Sapper Battalion. 

{(') The First Siberian Corps (Gerngross) : First East 
Siberian Rifle Division (Gerngross), containing the First to 
Fourth Regiments, and the First East Siberian Artillery 
Brigade of 4 batteries; Ninth East Siberian Rifle Division 
(Kondratovich), containing the Thirty-third to Thirty-sixth 
Regiments, and Ninth East Siberian Artillery Brigade of 4 
batteries; Second Brigade, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth 
Regiments, of the Sixth East Siberian Rifle Division; the 


Primorski l)ra<:;()()n R(^o;iin(Mit ; the First Kast Sihorian Sapper 

II. The Tliird Army, General liilderlin*^ in temporary 
command; chief of stafi", Lientenant-General Martson: 

(a) The Fifth SilxM-ian Corps (Dembovski): F'ifty-fourth 
Infantry Division (Artamanov), containino; Two hundred 
and thirteenth, Two hundred and fourtecntli, and Two hun- 
dred and sixteenth Regiments, and the Twenty-ei<i;htli 
Artillery Brigade of 6 batteries ; Sixty-first Infantry Division 
(Podmalniuk), containino; Two hundred and forty-second, 
Two hundred and forty-third, and Tw^o luuidred and forty- 
fourtli Regiments, and tlie Fortieth Artillery Brigade of G 
batteries; Thirty-fourth Regiment from the Tenth Corps; 
two-thirds the Argunsk Cossack Regiment; Fifth East 
Siberian Sapper Battalion. 

(J)) The Seventeenth Corps (Selimanov temporarily) : 
Third Infantry Division (Orlov), containing Ninth to 
Twelfth Regiments, and the Third Artillery Brigade of G 
batteries; Thirty-fiftli Infantry Division (Dobrzhinski), con- 
taining One hundred and thirty-seventh to One hundred and 
fortieth Regiments, and the Thirty-fifth Artillery Brigade of 
6 batteries; the Pifty-first and Fifty-second Dragoon Regi- 
ments; Seventeenth Sapper Battalion. 

(c) The Sixth Siberian Corps (Sobolev) : Fifty-fifth Infan- 
try Division (Laiming), containing Two hundred and seven- 
teenth to Two hundred and twentieth Regiments, and the 
Tenth Artillery Brigade of G batteries ; Tenth Orenburg Cos- 
sack Regiment; Sixth Sapper Battalion. 

III. First Ai'my, General Linevich; chief of staff, Lieu- 
tenant-General Kharkevich. 

(a) First Corps (Meyendorf ) : Twenty-second Infantry 
Division (Kutnievich, with rifle corps), containing Eighty- 
sixth, Eighty-seventh, and Eighty-eighth Regiments, and 
Seventh Artillery Brigade of 4 batteries; Thirty-seventh 
Infantry Division, containing One hundred and forty-fifth. 
One hundred and forty-seventh, and One hundred and forty- 
eighth Regiments, and the Forty-third Artillery Brigade of 
6 batteries; Second Brigade, Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Regiments, of the Fifth East Siberian Rifle Division, and 3 
Transbaikal horse batteries; one-half of the Second Ver- 
khne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment; First Sapper Battalion. 


(b) Fourth Siberian Corps (Zarubaiev) : Second Infantry 
Division (Levestan), containing Fifth to Eighth Regiments, 
and First Siberian Artillery Brigade of 4 batteries; Third 
Infantry Division (Kossovich), containing Ninth to Twelfth 
Regiments, and 2 batteries of the Twenty-sixth Artillery 
Brigade; two-thirds of the Seventh Siberian Cossack Regi- 
ment; Fourth East Siberian Sapper Battalion. 

(c) Second Siberian Corps (Zasulich) : Fifth East Siberian 
Rifle Division (Alexiev, with P]astern Detachment), contain- 
ing Seventeenth and Eighteenth Regiments and Fifth East 
Siberian Artillery Brigade of 4 batteries; First Siberian In- 
fantry Division (Morosov), containing First to Fourth Regi- 
ments and the Sixth East Siberian Artillery Brigade of 3f 
batteries, one-third of the Seventh East vSiberian Cossack 
Regiment and the Fifth and Seventh East Siberian Mountain 
Batteries; Second East Siberian Sapper Battalion. 

(d) Third Siberian Corps (Ivanov, Kashtalinski tempora- 
ril}^ : Third East Siberian Rifle Division (Kashtalinski), con- 
taining Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Regiments and the 
Third East Siberian Artillery Brigade of 4 batteries; Two 
hundred and eighty-fourth Regiment from the Seventy-first 
Infantry Division; the Siberian Cossack Division (Samsonov), 
containing Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Regiments and the 
Third, Fourth, and Sixth East Siberian Mountain Batteries. 

(e) East Detachment (Alexiev, then Rennenkampf) : The 
First Brigade, Twenty-first and Twenty-second Regiments of 
the Sixth East Siberian Rifle Division (Danilov) ; Ninth East 
Siberian Rifle Regiment, Two hundred and eighty-first and 
Two hundred and eighty-second Regiments of the Seventy- 
first Infantry Division (Eck) ; the Transbaikal Cossack Di- 
vision (Baumgarten), containing the Second Chita, the Sec- 
ond Nerchinsk, the Second Argunsk, the F'ourth Transbaikal 
Horse Battery, 8 machine guns, and 1 Transbaikal Cossack 
battalion; 4 batteries from the Twenty-sixth Artillery Bri- 
gade and 1 battery from the Eleventh East Siberian Artillery 
Brigade. A flank detachment (Major-General Maslov), con- 
taining the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Siberian Re- 
serve Battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 guns, was at Ilsingking. 

A flying detachment (Colonel Madritov), containing 1 
Transbaikal Cossack battalion, 5 squadrons drawn from 
the Amur, Argunsk, and Ussuri Cossack Regiments, the 


Ei^lilli Kast Siberian Alouutain liatfeiy of 4 guns, was at 

IV. (ienoral rcsorve. 

(a) vSixtoentli Corps (Topornin) : Twenty-fiftli Infantry Di- 
vision (Pncvski), containing Ninety-seven tli to One hun- 
(Irodtli Koginionts and the Twenty-fiftli Artillery Jirigade of 
() batteries: tlie First Brigade, One liundred and sixty-first 
and ()n(> luindnMl and sixty-second Regiments of the Forty- 
first I)i\ision (Birger), and 'A ])atteries of the Forty-fifth Ar- 
tillery lirigade; Sixteenth Sa])])er Battalion. 

(/>) Th(> Seventy-second Division (Tii])an-AIirza-Baranov- 
ski) from tlie Sixth Siberian Corps, containing the Two liun- 
dred and eighty-fifth to Two hundred and eighty-eighth Regi- 
ments and the Sixth Artillery Brigade of 6 batteries; One 
liundred and forty-sixth Regiment from the First Corps; one- 
third of the Amur Cossack Regiment. 

The Second Brigade of Birger's division, the Don Cossack 
Division, the Ussuri Cossack Regiment, and 1 Frontier Guard 
regiment were sent north shortly l)efore the battle to guard 
the railway. 

The Ninth and Tenth Rifle Regiments arrived during the 

There were about 250 heavy guns and 88 machine guns 
distributed along the line, the heavy guns lieing concentrated 
almost entirely near the railway and opposite Chentanpu and 

The total force taking part in the early stages of the battle 
is taken at 370 battalions, 127 squadrons and sotnias, 1,192 
field and mountain guns, 250 heavy guns, and 88 machine 

The total effective strength is estimated at 375,000. 

The composition and order from right to left of the Japa- 
nese Manchurian army, commanded by Field Marshal Oyama, 
with General Kodania as chief of staff, were as follows: 

1. Fifth Army, General Kawamura: chief of stafl', Major- 
General Uchiyama. 

(a) Eleventh Division (Samejima), composed of Tenth 
Brigade, containing Twenty-second and Forty-fourth Regi- 
ments, and Twenty-second Brigade, containing Twelfth and 
Forty-third Regiments, Eleventh Cavalry Regiment, and 
Eleventh Artillery Regiment. 


(/;) The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Ko])i Brio;ades, con- 
taining 14 or 20 l)attaHons. 

Total, 26 or 32 battahons, 3 squadrons, and 36 guns. 

II. First Army, General Kuroki; chief of staff, Major-Gen- 
eral Fujii. 

(a) Guards (Asada), composed of the First Brigade, con- 
taining the First and Second Regiments; the Second Brigade, 
containing the Third and Fourth Regiments; the Guards 
Cavalry Regiment, and Guards Artillery Regiment. 

(b) Second Division (Nishishima), composed of the Third 
Brigade, containing the Fourth and Twenty-ninth Regiments; 
the Fifteenth Brigade, containing the Sixteenth and Thirtieth 
Regiments (the Sixteenth Regiment was at army headquar- 
ters) ; the Twelfth Cavalry Regiment, and Twelfth Artillerj' 

(c) Twelfth Division (Inouye), composed of the Twelfth 
Brigade, containing the Fourteenth and Forty-seventh Regi- 
ments; the Twenty- third Brigade, containing the Twenty- 
fourth and Forty-sixth Regiments; the Twelfth Cavalry Regi- 
ment, and Twelfth Artiller}^ Regiment. 

(d) Three Kobi brigades, with their cavalry and artillery. 

(e) Five foot batteries. 

Total, 52 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 152 guns. 

III. Fourth Army, General Nodzu; chief of staff, Major- 
General I^yikaza. 

(a) Sixth Division (Okubo), composed of the Eleventh 
Brigade, containing the Thirteenth and Forty-fifth Regi- 
ments; the Twenty-fourth Brigade, containing the Twenty- 
third and Forty-eighth Regiments; the Sixth Cavalry Regi- 
ment, and Sixth Artillery Regiment. 

(b) Tenth Division (Ando), composed of the Eighth 
Brigade, containing the Tenth and Fortieth Regiments; the 
Twentieth Brigade, containing the Twentieth and Thirty- 
ninth Regiments; the Tenth Cavalry Regiment, and the 
Tenth Artillery Regiment. 

(c) Eleventh and Twelfth Kobi Brigades with their cav- 
alry and artillery. 

(d) First Artillery Brigade, containing the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Regiments. 

(e) Two regiments of 15 cm. mortars. 


Total, '.V2 or 'MS battalions, 7 or S sciuadroiis, ISO or l'.)2 
tjiins, 48 inortars. 

IV. Second Army, General Oku; chief of staff, Major- 
General Osako: 

(a) Fourth Division (Tsiisamoto), composed of the Seventh 
Brigade, containmg the Eiglith and Thirty-seventli Regi- 
ments; the Nineteenth Brigade, containing the Ninth and 
Thirty-eightli Regiments; the Fourth Cavalry Regiment, 
and Fourth Artillery Regiment. 

(h) Fifth Division (Kigoshi), composed of the Nintli Brig- 
ade, containing the Eleventh and Forty-first Regiments; the 
Twenty-first Brigade, containing the Twenty-first and Forty- 
second Regiments; the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, and the 
Fifth Artillery Regiment. 

(c) Eighth Division (Tatsumi), composed of the Fourth 
Brigade, containing the Fifth and Thirty-first Regiments; the 
Sixteenth Brigade, containing the Seventeenth and Thirty- 
second Regiments; the Eighth Cavalry Regiment, Eighth 
Artillery Regiment, and a battery of Russian guns. 

(d) Eighth and Eleventh Kobi Brigades. 

(e) First Cavalry Brigade (Akiyama), Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Regiments. 

(f) Heavy Artillery Brigade (Saisho), containing 6 bat- 
teries of four 15 cm. guns each, 4 batteries of six 12 cm. guns 
each, and 1 battery of Russian quick-fire guns. 

(g) Thirteenth Regiment of Field Artillery. 

Total, 44 or 48 battalions, 15 squadrons, 212 or 214 guns. 

V. Third Army, General Nogi; chief of staff, Major-General 
Matsunago : 

(a) First Division (Yda), composed of the First Brigade, 
containing the First and Fifteenth Regiments; the Second 
Brigade, containing the Second and Third Regiments; the 
First Cavalry Regiment, and First Artillery Regiment. 

(/>) Seventh Division (Oseho), composed of the Thirteen tli 
Brigade, containing the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth 
Regiments; the Fourteenth Brigade, containing the Twenty- 
seventh and Twenty-eighth Regiments; the Seventh Cavalry 
Regiment, and Seventh Artillery Regiment. 

(c) Ninth Division (Oshima II), composed of the Sixth 
Brigade, containing the Seventh and Thirty-fifth Regiments; 


the Eighteenth Brigade, eontaiuing the Nineteenth and 
Thirty-sixth Regiments; the Ninth Cavahy Regiment, and 
Ninth Artillery Regiment. 

{d) Fifteenth Kobi Brigade. 

{e) Second Cavalry Brigade (Tamiira), Fifteenth and 
Sixteenth Regiments. 

(f) Second Artillery Brigade (Nagata), containing the Six- 
teenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Regiments. 

VI. General reserve: 

(r/) Third Division (Okiibo) , composed of the Fifth Brigade, 
containing the Sixth and Thirty-third Regiments; the Seven- 
teenth Brigade, containing the Eighteenth and Thirty-fourth 
Regiments; the Third Cavalry Regiment, and Third Artillery 

(6) The First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Kobi Brigades. 

Total, 24 or 30 battalions, 3 squadrons, 36 guns. 

Each division has a pioneer battalion with the same 
numerical designation as the division. 

The total numljer of machine gims attached to the various 
organizations is estimated at 200. 

The number of unplaced organizations and of those that 
arrived during the battle, as well as the number of unorgan- 
ized reserves at hand to replace losses in battle, are unknown. 

The total effective strength is estimated at 325,000 °'. 

"The total troops mol)ilized by Japan during the entire war consisted of 
the 13 old and 4 new divisions, 12 Kobi brigades, the 2 independent brigades 
of artillery, the 2 independent brigades of cavalry, and the organizations 
of heavy field and siege artillery taken from the 21 battalions of coast 
artillery raised to war strength. 

The 4 new divisions, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth, 
were composed mainly of recruits, though containing men from the Kobi, 
Kokumin, and Hoju (conscript reserves). 

The Japanese division has a combatant strength in round numbers of 
14,000: ration strength, 20,000. 

In round numbers this gives a total of 485, 000 

to which must be added of the Hoju, on the lines of communi- 
cation - 200, 000 

Sick removed to Japan 281, 587 

Killed 43, 219 

Disappeared 5, 081 

Total 1, 014, 887 

The Kobi troops usvially formed l)rigades of 3 regiments of 2 battalions 
each, 1 battery and 1 squadron. 


Tlio 'roinioka DetaclHucnt consistetl of the Eiglith Kobi 
lirigade and the following from the Fourth Division: Three- 
battalions of infantry, 1 section of cavalry, 1 battalion of 
artillery, and the battery of Russian guns. 

The greater part of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Cavalfy Regimemts were attached to the First Cav- 
alry Brigade, forming the Akiyama Detachment. 

The main Russian position extended from Ssufangtai 
through Changtan, Lingshenpu, Shahopu, Fengchiatun, and 
I^ienniulupu to Kaotuling. At Shahopu it crossed to the 
left bank of the Sha River, recrossing to the right bank at 
Taslian. There was also an advanced portion of the line 
south of the Sha, reaching from opposite Fengchiapu to 
Yanghsintun. Otherwise, from Linshengpu eastward the 
main position followed the high ground on the right bank of 
the Sha River. 

From the vicinity of Laishengpu a line of prepared posi- 
tions ran north through Erhtaitzu, Machiapu, Yangshihtun, 
Xiidisiiitun, and then northeast across the Hsinmintun high- 
way in the neighborhood of Houtai. 

In the rear of the main line was a line of connected works 
constituting bridgeheads, on the left bank of the Hun, cov- 
ering the crossings from about 2 miles west of the railway 
bridge to the vicinity of Yankuantun. On the right bank of 
the Hun a prepared line extended from Fuling to Fushim. 

From the Hun River eastward to Pienniulupu the main 
Japanese position ran parallel to and practically in contact 
with the Russian line; both lines passing through the same 
village of Linshengpu. The left flank was strengthened by 
preparing for defense the villages, on the right bank of the 
Hun, extending southward to west of Hsiaopeiho. 

About 2 miles east of Pienniulupu the line turned back and 
ran in an irregular curve to the Pensihu region. 

Like the Russians the Japanese had prepared successive 
positions in rear of the main line. 

Just prior to the battle the positions in the Russian army 
of the various organizations were as follow^s: 

In the Second Army General Rennenkampf's cavalry was 
to the west of Ssufangtai, Kossagovski's brigade at Ssufang- 
tai, the rifle corps from near Ssufangtai to astride the Hun 
at Changtan, the Eighth Corps opposite Chentanpu, Tenth 


Corps north of Litajentun, and the First Si!)crian Corps in 
reserve on the right bank of the Hun, opposite Tawangkampu. 

In the Third Army the Fifth Siberian Corps, less one 
brigade, was near Tahentun, the Seventeenth Corps on the 
railway, and the Fifty-fifth Division, Sixth Siberian Corps, 
at Shahopu, 

In the First Army, the First Corps was at Putilov Hill, the 
Fourth Siberian Corps was at Erhtaokou, the Second Siberian 
Corps held the line from Fengchiapu to Kangtolishan, and 
the Third Siberian Corps held the remainder of the line to 

In the Eastern Detachment, General Eck, with 10^ bat- 
talions, 11 sotnias, and 24 guns, was in the neighborhood of 
Chinghochen; General Liubavin, with 2 J battalions, 4 sotnias, 
and G guns, was near Kaolingtzu; General Maslov, with 4 
battalions, 1 sotnia, and 2 guns, was at Hsingking. 

General Baumgarten, with 1 battalion, 18 squadrons, 30 
guns, and 8 machine guns, connected the Chinghochen Detacti- 
ment with the left of the Third Siberian Corps. 

In the general reserve the Sixteenth Corps was at Peitapu, 
the Seventy-second Division near Hsiaochentun, the One 
hundred and forty-sixth Regiment at Huanshan. 

In the Japanese army the positions were as follows: 

The Fifth Army was in the Saimachi-IIsienchang region. 

In the First Army the Twelfth Division was at Shang- 
pingtaitzu, the Guards opposite Yanghsintun, the Second 
Division near Tsaichiatun in reserve. 

In the Fourth Army the Tenth Division was opposite 
Tashan, the Sixth Division was on the Mandarin road, its 
left extending to southwest of Linshengpu. 

In the Second Army the Tomioka Detachment held the 
line from southwest of Linshengpu to Hsiaotai, the Fourth 
Division from Hsiaotai to Chentanpu, the Fifth Division 
from Chentanpu to Malengtzu, the Eighth Division from 
Malengtzu through Erhchiahotzu to Huanlotaitzu, the 
\ Akiyama Detachment at Sanchiatzu, Mamikai, and farther 

south on the right bank of the Hun. 

C The Third Army had finished its concentration south of the 

I Taitzu on February 19, and the Ninth Division was at Tasha- 

ling, the Seventh Division at Iluangniwa, the First Division 

near Hsiaopeiho, the Second Cavalry Brigade on line with 


the left of the Akiyania Dctaclinicnt, the Second Artillery 
Briijiule and tlic infantry reserve were near the Seventli 

On Fehrnary 19 the Japanese Fifth Army moved forward 
in two colnmns. On the 22d, after skirmishing witli small 
Russian detachments, it occupied the villages on the left bank 
of the TaitzAi River in preparation for an attack on the Rus- 
sian positions at Chinghochen. 

On February 21 the Second Ja})anese I3ivision marched to 
Weiningying and sent advance troops to the line Sanchiatzu- 
Kaochiaj)utzii, the Russian outposts being on the line Shin- 
kailing-Peihunling-IIouchiahotzu. On the 24tli the Third 
Brigade moved to Kaokuanchai, the opposing Cossacks, under 
Baumgarten, withdrawing before the advance. 

It was reported that false information had been conveyed 
to Russian headquarters that the Japanese reserves in the 
Yentai region had moved east. 

On Februar}^ 23 the left column of the Fifth Army attacked 
the Russian positions near Chinghochen, but was repulsed. 
The attack was renew^ed on the 24th and, in conjunction with 
the occupation of Chingtoukou by the right column, caused 
the positions to be evacuated toward evening. The Russian 
troops retired along the roads leading toward Fushun. 

On the 24th, after consultation with General Kuropatkin," 
General Kaulbars recalled the order for his army to attack 
the next day. General Kuropatkin decided to reenforce his 
left, and to that end ordered that the First Siberian Corps 
proceed by forced march to Changsamutun, the attached 
brigade of the Sixth East Siberian Rifle Division by rail to 
Fushun, the Second Brigade of the Seventy-second Division 
to Shihuichen, the One hundred and forty-sixth Regiment to 
Yingpan. General Rennenkampf was sent to take command 
of the Chinghochen detachment and all other troops arriving 
in that region. 

General Grekov succeeded Rennenkampf in command of 
the cavalry on the Russian right. General Grekov' s cavalry 
was divided into two wings. The right (Pavlov) contained 15 
sotnias and 12 guns of horse artillery; the left (Eichholz) con- 
tained 17 sotnias and 6 guns of horse artillery. 

Kossagovski's brigade was withdrawn from the West 
Detachment to the general reserve of the Second Army, and 
later joined on the Rifle Corps at Ssufangtai. 


On February 25 tlic Japanese Fifth Army engaged the 
advance gviards of the Chingliochen Detacliment, and 
advanced, the right cohiinn to Hsichuanhng, the left to 

In the Japanese First Army the Second Division concen- 
trated on the Third Brigade at Kaokuanchai, and, its left 
connecting with the right of the Twelfth Division and its 
right being at Yangtianshan, began developing the ground 
toward Kaotiiling. The Twelfth Brigade moved to the Sha 
River north of Tahopu, and the Fifth Kobi Brigade, Twelfth 
Division, to Tabekou. A battalion of the Guards made an 
unsuccessful night attack on Yanghsintun. 

On February 26 the columns of the Japanese Fifth Army 
reached Yulingkou and Shanlunkou, respectively, after slight 
skirmishing with the Russian rear guards. 

In the Japanese First Army the Second Division moved 
against the line Kaotiding-Hsikouling-Peitalinkoiding. The 
Fifteenth Brigade attacked the positions at Ilsikouling and 
Peitalinkouling, which were held by a force of about three 
battalions and a portion of the Siberian Cossack Division, 
but did not make much progress. The Third Brigade 
advanced and sent a detachment to occupy Wanfiding. 
The Fifth Kobi Brigade, Twelfth Division, occupied the 
heights south of Sungshutsuitzu. There was an exchange 
of artillery fire between the Guards and the opposing Rus- 
sians south of Fengchiapu. 

At night the Russians made small attacks, v/est of the 
railway, near Wangchuangtzu, Paotzuyen, Yapatai, and 

On February 27 the two columns of the Japanese Fifth 
Army were checked at strongly occupied positions near Tita 
and Wupainiulu, the troops in the first being under Danilov, 
in the second under Rennenkampf in person. 

In the Japanese First Army the Fifteenth Brigade, 
threatened by the Two hundred and eighty-fourth Regiment, 
wSeventy-first Division, in the hills east of Peitalinkouling and 
the arrival of a regiment of infantry at Shopu, suspended its 
intended attack on Kaotuling from the east and took up a 
defensive position, in which it continued without serious 
engagement until March 5. The right of the line from 
Peitalinkoulino; was bent back facing the east. The Third 


l^ritiiKlc altiickcd and carried a Jvussian icdoid)! ciist of 
Wanfulinji;. The Twelfth Division engaged in artillery lire, 
while the (liiards continued the exchange of artillery fire. 

The Fourth Army began to lire against Putilov Hill and 
Novgorod Hill (just east of Putilov Hill). 

In order to divert attention from the movements of the 
Japanese Third Army, the artillery of the Second, excepting 
the heavy guns, fired slowly from 8 to 9 a. m. and from noon 
to 1 p. m. The Fifth Division sent one regiment to Ku- 
chentzu, the Eighth Division sent one to Hsiaotientzu to join 
the reserve of the Second iii'my, whose headquarters were 
now at Koutzuyen. 

On this day the Japanese Third Army began its general 
turning movement. The Ninth Division movetl to the line 
Mamikai-Houfangtaitzu (west of Mamikai), the Seventh 
IXvision to Lokonto-vSojushi, the First Division to Mashan- 
chiatzu-Kalima, the artillery brigade and infantry reserve to 
Wuchiakangtzu, the Second Cavalry Brigade to Kualingteh, 
on the right bank of the Liao River. The Russian cavalry 
observed but did not resist this advance. 

The First Siberian Corps arrived south of Shihuicheng. 

On the night of the 27th a force from the Seventeenth Corps 
attacked and carried the railway bridge over the Sha River. 
It was, however, recaptured by the Japanese on the next day. 

On February 28 the two columns of the Japanese Fifth 
Ai'my began a series of determined and costly attacks against 
the positions of Tita and Wupainiulu. The right column 
made no ])rogress. The left column carried the heights north- 
east of Tiupingtai and those northwest of Wupainiulu, and at 
night made an attack on the main position on the height 
south of Machuntun, where it was repulsed. 

In front of the Japanese First and Fourth Armies there was 
but little change from the conditions of the preceding day. 

In the Japanese iSecond Army General Akiyama advanced 
from Sanchiatzu (6 miles east of Mamikai), driving back the 
opposing cavalry and infantry outposts, and occupied the two 
villages (Chien and Hon) of IVIahulingtzu with the First Cav- 
alry Brigade, and Huanlotaitzu, Toutaitzu, and Hsiaohenwai 
with the attaclied troops. The artillery of the Eightli Divi- 
sion assisted this movement by bombarding Toutaitzu and 

;u.";2G— 07 8 


Ill the Ja])anese Third Army the Ninth Division, which was 
to have occupied the hne Ssufant::tai-(^hangchiwopen<!;, haHed 
at Tsuyutai because of the vigorous defense of Ssufangtai. 
The Seventh Division advanced to Tahoangchipu, the First 
Division to Chentzukou, the vSecond Cavalry Brigade to Yang- 
langchiapu, the artillery brigade and infantry reserve to 

General Kuropatkin sent the Twenty-fifth Division, Six- 
teenth Corps, toward Shalingpu and ordered Birger's brigade 
to march toward Hsinmintun so as to arrive at Kuliuhochen 
the next day. 

On March 1 the Fifth Army made but little progress in the 
attacks on the positions at Tita and south ot Machuntun. 

In the Japanese First Army the Third Brigade, after hard 
fighting, carried two more redoubts on the heights north of 
Wanfuling. The Twelfth Brigade attacked the height 
northeast of Tungkou and was repulsed. 

The Guards made a slight advance in two parts of their line 
near to and below Pienniulupu, and, in the early morning 
completed a night attack by which they captured a Russian 
trench on the heights north of Minchia^^i, repulsing the Rus- 
sian counter attacks. 

The Fourth Army continued its artillery fire, to which the 
Russians energetically replied. 

In the Japanese Second Army the artillery of the Fifth 
Division opened fire against Lichiawopeng and Changtanho- 
nan at 7.30 a. m., and the division advanced an hour later. 
The artillery of the Fourth Division, from near Yapatai, 
opened fire on Peitaitzu, Huanchi, and Hsinshantun, while 
Ilayashi's brigade. Fourth Division, advancing past the west 
side of Chentanpu attacked a redoubt about 300 yards west of 
Peitaitzu. The Eighth Division crossed its main force to the 
right bank of the Hun and deployed against the Changtan- 
Nienyupao line, the artillery coming into action from near 
Toutaitzu. General Akiyama arrived at Toutaitzu with the 
the main portion of his command and opened artillery fire 
against Nienyupao at 9 a. m. The attack was carried on 
during the day and into the night, but the Japanese failed to 
carry any portion of the Russian line. 

In the Japanese Third Army the Ninth Division, which was 
to attack Ssufangtai as soon as the Seventh and First Divi- 


sioiis had roacluMl Suchiaan, opened iirc from the soutlioast at 
iioou. Tlie artillery brlii;ade advanced to Suchiaan, fired on 
and drove back the oj)i)osin(2; cavalry. A part of tlie l)ri<j:;a(le 
then took position at 'ra})inji;chiiang and opened lire on 
Ssufano;tai. In spit(> of the cross fire thus obtained the 
Russians held Ssufaniitai until ni,2;ht and then retired to the 
northeast. The Ninth Division made a night attaclc but 
found the village deserted. 

By nlglit the Seventli Division had reached TTuoshih- 
kangt/Ai, the First Division Ilichiawotzu (5 miles northwest 
of Huosliihkangtzu), the cavalry brigade Tamingtun, the 
artillery brigade and infantry reserve Yuchiatai (3 miles 
northwest of Suchiaan). 

On the evening of this day the First Cavalry Brigade was 
detached from the Second Army and sent to join the Third 
Army, thus giving the latter a full division of cavalry. Gen- 
eral Kuropatkin sent General Shatilov with a composite 
division, drawn from the Tenth Corps, to reenforce the 
Twent3-fifth Division, Sixteenth Corps, near Shalingpu. 
The First Siberian Corps, now with the First Army, was 
ordered to proceed to Peitapu, and then to near Mukden 
as part of the general reserve. 

To replace the Sixteenth Corps (Birger's brigade and the 
Twenty-fifth Division) in the general reserve the Eighth 
Corps was ordered withdrawn, the positions vacated by its 
withdrawal to be occupied by troops of the Rifle Corps. The 
withdrawal from Ssufangtai and vicinity of Kossagovski's 
brigade and portions of the rifle corps on the night of March 
1 , disarranged this plan and greatly increased the difficulties 
of the Eighth Corps on the next day. "^i / ^ 

On ]\larch 2 there was no material change in the conditions "^ ^^ 
in front of the Fifth Army. 

The First Siberian Corps reached Shahotzu in its retiu-n to 
the west. One-half of the Seventy-second Division remained 
in the front line north of Kaotuling, the other half was placed 
in reserve at Shihuichen. 

In the Japanese First Army the Third Brigade captured 
2 redoubts east of the Impan-Kaotuling road, but was re- 
pulsed with heavy loss in an assault on the third redoubt. 
The Twelfth Division continued the attack on the heights 
northeast of Tungkou and north of Chinghichai, captured the 


first position and failed in the attack on the second. The 
Guards began operations against the Russian position south 
of the Sha lliver in the vicinity of Fengchiapu. 

The Japanese Fourth Army began a series of small attacks 
to prevent the opposing forces l)eing withdrawn to reenforce 
other portions of the line. The most important of these 
attacks was against Putilov Hill, from the vicinity of which 
the Russians made an unsuccessful night attack. 

In the Japanese Second Army, Hayashi's brigade stormed 
the redoubt west of Peitaitzu, was driven out, made a second 
assault, which was repulsed, and finally carried the redou])t 
at 4.30 a. m., after very severe fighting. 

The Fifth Division, which had suffered severely on the 
preceding day, observed the beginning of the Russian with- 
drawal, attacked the rear guards at Changtanhonan and 
Lichiawopeng, securing possession at 5.30 and 7.30 a. m., 
respectively, and followed the Jiussians as far as Chiutsai- 

The main body of the Eighth Division, finding Changtan 
and Nienyupao deserted, advanced through the towns and 
followed up the bank of the Hun. The remainder of the 
division crossed the Hun and joined the main body. The 
Fifth, the Eighth, and the Kobi regiments of cavalry, from 
the Akiyama Detachment, were attached to the Eighth 
Division, which advanced to Hochuangtzu and by sunset 
occupied Wanchutai and Hsiaoliputzu. 

The troops of the Fourth Division that were in reserve near 
Yapatai, observing the evacuation of Huanchi, attacked and 
carried Hsinshantun at 2.30 p. m.; Hayashi's brigade, after 
having captured the redoul)t west of Peitaitzu, attacked 
Kuchiatzu, which was carried about 6 p. m. The Thirteenth 
Regiment of Artillery assisted by bombarding from a position 
taken up west of Peitaitzu. From the same position it 
assisted a regiment and battery of the Fifth Division in carry- 
ing Shoukuanpu at 5 p. m. After taking Kuchiatzu Hay- 
ashi's brigade carried Erhtaitzu at 7 p. m. The troops of the 
Fourth Division that were occupying the line near Litajentun 
advanced against and carried Fuchiachuang at midnight. 

In the Japanese Third Army the Ninth Division advanced 
to Ilsiaotaitzu. A mixed division, containing the Two hun- 
dred and fifteenth^ Two hundred and forty-first, Fifty-fourth, 


and Sixtictli Kc^iiKcnts, that had Ixmmi I'onncd foi- tli(> ])ur- 
posc of an advance via wShalino;pii, was placed under command 
of Major-General Golembatovski, a })ri^ade commander in 
the Fifteentli Division, inoved soutlieast from 8huan<!:sliutiin 
and drove the Japanese l)ack from Peihosa and Sathaisa, thus 
<>:reatly aidinj^; the Russian Eio;hth Corps in its retreat from 
territory in wliicli it was bein^ attacked (m three sides, and 
aHowin*!; it to reach the designated line, Tontaitzu-Hsintaitzu. 

The Japanese Seventh and First Divisions reached their 
destinations, the vicinity of Shalino;])u and Lamuho, respec- 
tively, about noon without havino; met resistance. From 
these positions the Seventh Division was ordered to the line 
Tachuinosuitzu-Tatzupu, the First Division to the line Chano;- 
chiafano;-IIsiniulu. The Second Cavalry Brigade reached 
Chinchiatai, the artillery brigade and infantry reserve reached 
Shalingpu by 6 p. m., the First Cavalry Brigade arrived and 
was posted at Panchiatai to close the gap between the Ninth 
and Seventh Divisions. 

Lieutenant-General Topornin, with the Twenty-fifth Rus-- 
sian- Division (Lieutenant-General Pnevski) and a mixed 
di\asion from the Tenth Corps (Major-General Shatilov), at- 
tacked Shalingpu about 5 p. m. The cross fire from the 
Seventh and First Divisions repulsed the attack. The Rus- 
sians, though losing heavily, continued to hold the villages 
in their vicinity, repulsing the attacks of the Japanese. 

On account of the progress of the Japanese following the 
Rifle Corps and Kossagovski's brigade on the right bank of 
the Ilun, a slight change was made in the Russian plan of 
withdrawal of the Second Army, which was ordered to 
occupy the line Tusampu, Changsupu, Sualpu, with reserve 
at Suhupu and advance troops at Tawankampu. The 
Tenth Corps was to march on Sualpu. In the Eighth Corps 
the Fifteenth Division was to act as rear guard of the Second 
Army and withdraw along the left bank of the Ilun. The 
mixed division under General Golembatovski was to act as 
rear guard on the right bank of the Hun, keeping abreast of 
the Fifteenth Division. A mixed division of three regiments 
from the Seventeenth Corps was sent under command of 
Major-General De Witt to strengthen the Russian force act- 
ing against Shalingpu. A -detachment of 8] battalions and 
24 guns from the Rifle Corps was sent, under Major-General 


C'hiiriii, (luriiifi; the night of March 2 to reenforce the troops 
ill this same region, where (ieneral Kaulbars took command 
in person about 9 a. m. on the 3d, leaving General Launitz 
in command in the Siihupu region. 

On March 3 the Japanese Fifth Army was still held in 
check l>y the Russians. 

In the First Army the Twelfth Division continued its 
attack, but was iniable to make any material progress. The 
Second Guards Brigade crossed the Sha River on the night 
of the 2d -3d and seized the heights north of Housung- 
mupiitzu and Tangchiatun. It then attacked the main posi- 
tion unsuccessfully, but maintained its own position on the 
right bank of the Sha River and repulsed the Russian attacks 
that were made on the night of the 3d. 

The Russians made an attack from in front of Fengchiapu, 
but were repulsed. 

There was no change in the conditions in front of the 
Fourth Army. 

In the Japanese Second Army a force from the Tomioka 
Detachment mad6 an unsuccessful attack on Tamuchinyen. 
The right of the Fourth Division, strengthened by the 
Thirty-fourth Infantry from the Third Division, advanced 
to Peilintai; the left of the Fourth Division moved forward 
from East Hsiaohantai. By night the division formed a 
line from Sanchiatzu, through Ilsiaokao, to Hoanchi. The 
Fifth Division advanced from Shoukuanpu to a line from 
west of Inerhpu to Suliandampu, skirmishing with the Rus- 
sian rear guard at Tontaitzu. The Eighth Division marched 
up both banks of the Hun, from Wanchutai and Hsiaoliputzu, 
the right column recrossing the river below Litapu to 

In the Third Army there was no change of position by the 
Seventh and First Divisions. The Ninth Division, relieved 
by the Eighth Division, Second Army, moved to Linchiatai. 

General Topornin, with his force of 32 battalions, again 
attacked Shalingpu. The Japanese First Artillery Brigade 
and infantry reserve had now deployed near this village, 
adding their fire to that of the Seventh and First Divisions. 
The Russians lost heavily, particularly in the right colunm, 
Twenty-lifth Division, under Lieutenant-General Pnevski. 
General Kaulbars arrived about 9 a. m. and directed the 


withdrawal of the attackiiii,^ I'oi'cc. 'I'lic li'oops of the 
Twonty-lifth Division were hahed near Yukuantun, those 
of the Tenth Corps, near lluankutien. De Witt's dctacli- 
ment, lU battalions, was occupying the line Maknantzii- 

On the extreme left the Japanese Second Cavalry Brio;ade 
came into contact near Tafangshen with Biro:er's l)rii2;ade, 
retirino- from (he TTsinmintun region, supported l)y about 
25 s(|uadrons of Russian cavalry. Two battalions were sent 
from the First Division to reenforce the Second Cavalry 
Brigade which, concluding that it was confronted by an 
offensive operation, took up a defensive position. In the 
evening the Russians withdrew, no severe fighting having 
occurred. Birger proceeded to Ilushihtai station with his 
main body; a detachment separated from the main body 
and reached the Midvden station. 

The first Siberian Corps arrived at Mukden station in the 

Because of the disa;ster-a4-Sh*ltngpur4lie-^RussiaB:--plairwas 
still further modified. Twenty-four battalions of the Second 
Army were to be left astride the llun River in the M'kchiapu 
position, with a rear guard at Suhupu. The remainder of / 
the Second Army was to be concentrated, on the fortified/ 
line west of Mukden, in readiness to talve the offensive against V 
the Japanese Third Army. The right of the Third Army 
was to be withdrawn so as^ to run from Linshengpu through/ 
Laishengpu. ' 

To carry out this plan. General Launitz ordered parts of 
the Tenth, Eighth, and Rifle Corps to march in two columns 
through Machiapu to Shatotzu, the trains crossing to the 
right bank of the Hun by way of the railway bridge. The 
Fifteentli Division, General Ivanov, on the left bank and 
Golembatovski's detachment on the right bank of the Hun, 
were to remain in position. General Tolmachev, command- 
ing a portion of General Grekov's cavalry was to protect the 
right flank of this line. 

The resulting movements were carried on (hu-ing the night 
and were still in progress on the 4th. ^ 

General Golembatovski apparently found himself unable \ 
to hold his portion of the line on the 3d and withdrew pre- ^ 
maturely. General Ivanov, because of this withdrawal, | 


(locidod it was not practicable to occupy ('haii*i;suj)u, but fell 
))ack at once to Tatai without occupying Suhupu. The 
latter village was occupied by a Japanese i)arty about 11 
p. ni., and General Ivanov then extended his right to the 
Hun River at Erhtait/Ai, in order to bar the further approach 
of the Japanese against the right flank of the Ilussian Third 

On March 4 the Japanese Fifth Army, finding its(>lf unable 
to advance, desisted from attacking, though remaining in 
contact with its opponents. The left of the right column 
was vigorously attacked by the Russians who were reenforced 
by the arrival of the Eighty-fifth Regiment. 

In the Japanese First Army the Fifteenth Brigade left the 
Thirty-ninth Kobi Regiment between Hsikouling and Peita- 
linkouling and concentrated the remaining troops near 
Houchiayu. The Twelfth Brigade was drawn back to north 
of Tabekou and concentrated on the remainder of the Twelfth 
Division, which then attacked and carried the first Russian 
position north of Pienniulupu. The Japanese also carried a 
trench near Housungmuputzu, thus improving the situation 
of their troops in that vicinity. 

There was no change in the conditions in front of the 
Fourth Army, to which the Tomioka Detachment and the 
Fourth Division were transferred at noon. The Fourth 
Division captured Hsiaosholuitzu and Laishengpu, repulsing 
three attempts to recapture the latter. At the time of the 
capture of Hsiaosholuitzu the left of the Tomioka Detach- 
ment moved forward and captured Tamuchinyen. The 
opposing Fifth Siberian Corps mthdrew to the line Suchiatun- 

The right of the Fifth Division, after repulsing an attack, 
advanced and occupied Inerhpu. The remainder of the 
division assembled at Changsupu. The artillery of the divi- 
sion, from between Suhupu and Suliandampu, assisted the 
advance of the Eighth Division on the opposite bank of the 
Hun. Later, the Fifth Division, leaving one detachment at 
Suhupu and one at Changsupu, crossed the Hun and pro- 
ceeded against Hsiaoshatotzu. 

The Eighth Division occupied Hiatzu, Hsiaoyushupu, and 
Tayushupu, and the advance troops took up a position from 
Yulinpu to Nienkuantun in which they were subjected to 


infantry and ai-tillorv (ire I'lom '^'angshihtun, Ilsiaoshatotzu, 
and Macliiapu. 

The lirst line of tlie Fifth ])ivisi()n then advanced against 
the portion of the hne between the old railway bridge and 
Hsiaoshatotzu, being assisted l)y the fire of the Fifth Artil- 
lery Regiment from east of Taynshnpu. The attack suffered 
severely and made no ])rogress. 

The Third Division, in the Japanese Manchiirian army 
reserve, was added to the Second Army and by sunset had 
reached Tuinandou and Ilsiaochingsuitzu. The headquar- 
ters of the Second Army moved to Waichiapu, its general 
reserve to Suliandampu. 

In the Japanese Third Army the Ninth Division was 
directed to march on Mukden station, the Seventh Division 
on the north Tombs, and the First Division on Chengitun. 
The Seventh Division reached Fentai and sent one regiment 
to attack Likuanpu, but this attack was not pressed. The 
First Di\asion reached Tashihchiao without opposition. 
The First Cavalry Brigade joined the Second, and the Cav- 
alry Division, accompanied by 2 batteries and 6 machine 
guns, reached Chienshentaitzu. 

On March 5 the Japanese Fifteenth Brigade, attacking 
from the direction of Menyaputzu, drove back the troops of 
the Two hundred and eighty-fourth Regiment and occupied a 
Hne through Tungkouling. 

In the Japanese Fourth Army the Tenth Division occupied 
Liuchiangtun and advanced its line slightly in front of 
Shahopu. The Tomioka Detachment and the Fourth Divi- 
sion advanced to the lines west Ilanchengtzu, Wenshinpu, 
Tatzuin, and Ilsiaosuchiapu, Tasuchiapu, Pechentzu, respec- 
tively. This advance was facilitated by the shifting of posi- 
tions in the Seventeenth Corps (weakened by the mixed 
division that had been drawn from it) by which the Third 
Division stood at right angles to the Fifth Siberian Corps, 
along the railway facing west while the Thirty-fifth Division 
still fronted south. The commander of the Seventeenth 
Corps, in order to close the gap that had resulted from bend- 
ing back the Fifth Siberian Corps on the fourth directed, at 9 
p. m. of that day, that his corps should swing back to the 
railway, facing west. About 11 ]). m. he issued a second 
order to hold a position, facing south, to the rear of the old 



line. Dufini;' tlie iii<j,lil tlio Thii'd Division had carr'iod out 
the first, 1111(1 the Thirty-fifth Division had carried out the 
second order. 

The result of the day's li(i;htiii*;' was that in the ]{ussian 
Third Army the Fifth Siberian Corps occupied a line from 
Pechentzu to Suchiatun; the Seventeenth Corps, from 
Suchiatiin along the railway to Ilanchengtzu and thence to 
Kuantnn; the Sixth Siberian Corps extended from Kuantun 
in the shape of a bastion front facing Shanlant7Ai ; the reserve 
of about 10 l)attalions was near Shanhotun. At this time the 
Third Army contained about 64 battalions, 208 guns, and 18 
mortars. Near Erhtaitzu was a detachment, Colonel Kuz- 
netzov, belonging to the Second Army, but transferred on 
this day to the Third Army, 

The formation of the Russian troops west of Mukden at 
this period, and the Russian plan are shown in the following 
>^ order of General Kaulbars, commanding the Second Russian 
', Army: 

\ Mukden Station, 

1905, March 5—12.45 a. m. 
Information has been received that 
in the neighborhood of the viHage of 
Sanpulio a Japanese column has 
appeared, consisting of cavalry and 
infantry. The object of the army is 
to drive the enemy westward to 
beyond the line of the old railway 
(as far as Machiapu, East Kuchiatzu, 
Hsiniiilu), advancing so as to envelop 
the enemy's flank. 

Continue scouting. Examine the 
entire region between the railway 
and the road to Hsinmintun. 

Aim: To determine the direction 
of enemy's march and the number of 
his troops. Other cavalry to con- 
tinue its work in the rear and on the 
flanks of the enemy. 
. Infantry. To assemble at 8 a. m. on the line 

1. Right rolumn: General Gem- IIsiaochiatun-Houtai. To press the 
gross; Siberian Corps; mixed enemy's left flank, enveloping and 
division, 17th Corps; mixed di- driving it to the west, 
vision, 10th Corps; the 147th 
Samara Regiment (49 battalions, 
115 -guns). 

For that purpose: 
A. Cavalry. 

Colonel Vovonov; Primorski Dra- 
goon Regiment. 


2. Center (■(iluinn; (icneral To- To remain in position nnlil llie 
pornin; 25tli Infantry Division infinenee of Uie enveloping action of 
(IG battalions, 48 guns). the right column becomes evident, 

and until the enemy withdraws l)c- 
hind the line Jahen-Yuchiatun; then 
advance west in the direction Chang- 
shihtun-Makuantzu . 

3. Left column: General Tserpit- To firmly hold positions occupied; 
ski; five infantry regiments to advance simultaneously witii the 
(5()th, 121st, 122d, 215th, and 25th Division, pivoting on Machiapu. 
33d); 5th, 7th, 8th Rifle Regi- Aim: To occupy the line of the old 
ments, 5th Rifle Brigade (34 railway from the General Dem])ov- 
battalions, 72 field, 17 old pat- ski's positions to the village of Kuch- 
tern guns, 12 mortars). iatzu, inclusive; prepare the line for 

firm defense. 

4. General reserve: General Han- To take position near the village of 
enfeld; 55th and 241st Regi- Lidvuantun. 

ments (8 battalions). 
6. Region for assembling trains: Of the right and center columns, north 
of Mukden l)etween the railway and the ]\Iandarin road; of the left 
column, between the railway and Mukden north of the Hsinmintun 
road . 

6. Hospitals and parks: As ordered by commanders of columns. 

7. Substitutes in case of emergency: General Ruzski, General von der 

8. Reports to be sent to village Houtai (village with a tower) on the 
Hsinmintun road. 

Ill the Japanese Second Army at 4 a. m. the Fifth Division / 
resumed its attack toward Hsiaoshatotzu. Its advance was/ 
covered by the fire of the battahon of field and heavy guns,j 
posted north of Tsuichiapu, and the Fifth Artillery Regi-1 
ment, posted southeast of Tayushupu, and reached the old^ 
railway embankment. Here it came under the infantry fire 
of the Russians holding Machiapu and was repulsed. The 
right of the Eighth Division, attacking with three battalions 
from the direction of Yulinpu, joined on the left of the Fifth 
Division. The main force of the Eighth Division attacked 
Yangshihtun. Both attacks failed, as did a third attack 
made about 2 p. m. The Third Division moved from Ta- 
chingtsuitzu to relieve the Ninth Division and during the 
night occupied Changshihtun and Suimintun. 

The Ninth Division then withdrew to take up a position 
between the Seventh and First Divisions. Otherwise there 
was no important movement in the Japanese Third Army. 

During the afternoon the First Siberian Corps, less 8 bat- 


talioiis of the Niiitli Division wliicli had l)C('n sent to Shatotzu 
to aid (lie (roops holding the line at and near Machiapn, had 
advanced with but little opposition to the line Taochiaotun, 
Tachiatzu-Ta fanhsintun. 

On March 6 the Japanese Fifteenth Brigade made a slight 
advance beyond Tungkouling. Otherwise conditions in 
front of the Japanese First Army did not change materially. 
The Rnssians made an nnsnccessful night attack on the 
Japanese near Tangchiatun. 

The Fourth Army continued its operations west of the 
Mandarin road, attacking Shahopu, east Hanchenztzu, 
Suchiatun, Peitaitzu and Erhtaitzu. 

The offensive movement begun by the Russian Second 
Army on tlie preceding day was to be continued according 
to the following order issued by General Kaulbars shortly 
before midnight of the .'ith-Gth: 

The enemy is concentrating his forces (three divisions) in the angle 
between the Hun and tlio old railway line. Farther to the north toward 
the Hsinmintun road have been seen infantry and artillery, numbers not 
ascertained. Northeast of the Hsinmintun road small detachments of 
cavalry are in front of our positions. 

To-morrow the army will continue the movement to occupy the line 
Shalingpu-Tehsiangyintzu-Lianchiapu, including the sand hills between 
Linminhuantzu and Tehsiangyintzu, observing also the action of the enemy 
to the north and northwest. 

To that end: 1. Colonel ZapolshVs detachment is to march from Santaitzu 
at daybreak, go to Tashihchiao, and bar the Hsinmintun road. 

2. General Ge.rmjross^s (let achvient: (a) The mixed division of the Seventeenth 
Corps (De Witt, from near Tafanhsintun), two regiments to go to Tashih- 
chiao and remain until the arrival of Colonel Zapolski's detachment, then 
to move on Jahen, Yangchiahung, Chienchiahung, Lanshantai; three 
regiments to go to Hohuntai, Yuchiatun, Houmintun, Chienmintun, 
Koulintai. {h) The First Siberian Corps, to march at daybreak: Nine bat- 
talions from ('hinsotun to move on Likuanpu, Changshihtun; nine battal- 
ions from Sanchiafin to move on Yukuantun, Nienkuantun; the sand hills 
to 1)0 fortified when taken. 

?>. General TserpitsH's detachment to hold fast the position (between 
Machiapu and Yangshihtun) occupied and support by fire the detachment 
of General Gerngross; simultaneously with attack of latter detachment on 
Changshihtun, Nienkuantun, occupy Yulinpu and later the old railway line. 

4. General Herschehnann' s detachment to hold fast the position (on hoth 
banks of Hun at Machiapu) occuj^ied. 

5. General Topornin, general reserve (Twenty-fifth Infantry Division and 
Second Brigade of the Thirty-first Infantry Division), to remain in posi- 
tions (from Yangshihtun to Niuhsintun) occupied and aid by fire the 
advance of the First Siberian Corps. 


(1. During llic lulvance all four columns to aid cacli oilier willi lire and 
bayonet, striving to take the enemy in flank. 

7. General Birger's detachment to remain near Ilushililai station and ])ro- 
tcct Mukden from the nortli. 

8. Trains of second and third categories to tak(> posit ion east of the railway. 

9. Reserve of flying artillery parks to take i)()sition at J.anyutun. 

10. Reports to be sent to Houtai. 

11. In case of emergency, next in command General Ruzski and General 
von der Launitz. 

The advance of General Tserj)itski's portion of the Hne 
(from Machiapu to Yangshihtun) was anticipated by the 
renewal and intensification of the attack by the Japanese 
Fifth and Eighth Divisions on ]\Iachiapu, Hsiaoshatotzii, and 
Yangshihtun. As on the preceding day, the Russian infantry 
in Machiapu was able to bring flank and even reverse fire on 
that portion of the Japanese line that succeeded in reacliing 
the old railway embankment. The greater part of the fire 
of the Japanese battalion of field and heavy guns north of 
Tsuichiapu and of the Fifth Ai'tillery Regiment of mountain 
guns, southeast of Tayushupu, was concentrated on Machiapu 
and Hsiaoshatotzu, and the infantry of the F'ifth Division 
made a determined but unsuccessful assault. Toward even- 
ing the Twenty-first Brigade, F^ifth Division, now on the left 
bank of the Ilun, was detached and ordered to join the Third 

The Eighth Division attacked as on the preceding day. 
Its heavy guns took position north of Hsiaoyushupu, its field 
guns crossed the railway embankment and opened fire against 
Yangshihtun. The right of the division, at Yulinpu,made 
an unsuccessful assault, losing heavily. It was assisted by 
the Thirteenth Artillery Regiment, which had rejoined the 
Eighth from the Fourth Division and had taken position east 
of Tsaochiatun. The left of the Eighth Division also made 
an unsuccessful assault. 

The Tliird Division sent two battalions to a line about 800 
yards east of Changshihtun, the divisional artillery to north- 
east of Changshihtun and the Twenty-first Brigade to 
Likuanpu. Its attack was not pressed. 

The Second Army headquarters were at Ilsifanpu, the 
general reserve of two battalions at Tsaochiatun, where it 
was joined by one battalion of the Thirty-fourth Regiment, 
Third Division, returning from duty with the Fourth Division. 


Goiieral Gemgross moved iigaiiist Tashihcliiao as ordered. 
The time was opportune, for there was a <:;aj) on tlie left of the 
Japanese Seventh Division at Tashihchiao, caused l)y the 
march north to Pinghipu-Koushihyang of the First Division, 
which had not been ck>sed by the expected arrival of the 
Ninth Division. By 11 a. m. tlie advance of this attack had 
])enetrated nearly to Tasliihchiao. The right flank guard of 
the advance, Colonel Lesh, carried Chuanwanchiao about 10 
a. m., the Japanese detachment retreating to Tiutsiahuan. 
This village was then unsuccessfully attacked l)y Colonel Lesh 
assisted by other troops from General De Witt's cohumi. 
The Japanese Third Army reserves, from Mashanchiatzu, and 
a battalion from the left of the Seventh Division succeeded 
in holding the attack in check until the Nmth Division began 
to arrive. About 3 p. m. the attack was repulsed after losing 
heavily, and General Gemgross ordered a suspension of the 
forward movement, thus concluding the last important offen- 
sive movement undertaken by the Russian army, and pre- 
sumably causmg the decision to withdraw from the Sha to the 
Ilun River. 

The Japanese Cavalry Division was checked by the oppos- 
ing cavalry in the vicinity of Erhtaitzu. 

The Second Brigade of the Thirty-first Division, Tenth 
Corps, in the reserve of General Kaulbar's army was brought, 
toward evening, from the left bank of the Ilun to Lukuantun 
m response to reports sent by General Tserpitski regarding 
the severe attacks mad6 on his line between Machiapu and 

A detachment of 4 battalions, 8 guns, and 1 scout company, 
under Colonel Tsikovich, was sent by General Kuropatkin 
from his reserves to reconnoiter northwest through Santaitzu. 
The Tenth Rifle Regiment, which had arrived by rail, was 
added, and the detachment, under command of Colonel Misse- 
vich, of the Tenth Regiment, was first ordered to hold the 
line Tachiatun-Santaitzu-Yuanchentun and then sent about 
4 p. m. to Makuantzu for the defense of the Niuhsintun- 
Makuantzu district. 

- On March 7 the left of the Japanese Fifth Army made a 
slight advance, establishing communication on the heights 
north of Tuchiaputzu with the Fifteenth Brigade, which had 
been brousjht to a halt after a slight advance. 


'Flic Russians iiiadc an attack a<j;a'msl the lu'i(j;lits north of 
Tan<^chiatun and ()iu> a<i;anist the Tenth Division, both of 
which were luisuccessful. 

East Ilanehengtzu was carried, al)out 1 1 a. m., ])y tlie Sixth 
Division and the Tomioka Detachment after an engagement 
that liad continued from the evening of the prececUng (hiy. 
In carrying out this attack the Sixtli Division concentrated 
on its k'ft, and the resulting ga]) on its right was closed by 
inserting the Third Keserve Brigade opposite Sliahopu. 

The attem{)t to carry the attack on east Ilancliengtzu to 
Kaolitun was repulsed. The Fourth Division attacked 
Ilsiaokushinpu, but did not make any headway imtil the 
next day. 

In the Japanese Second Army the Fifth Division remained 
stationary. The Eighth Division nuide a night attack, the 
right advancing from southeast of Yulinpu, the left advancing 
from north of Nienkuantun against Yangshihtun. The 
attack failed and the troops taking part retired to their origi- 
nal positions. The Third Division made an attack before 
dawn, in which the Fifth Brigade, General Nambo, carried 
Ynkuantun, held by troops of the Twenty-fifth Division. 
Desperate fighting for the possession of this village continued 
throughout the day, and at night the remnants of the Fifth 
Brigade, about 1,000 men, many of whom were wounded, 
withdrew to their old line. The desperate fighting caused 
reinforcements aggregating 4 battalions and 2 heavy batteries 
to be sent to the Japanese Third Division and 16 battalions 
to the opposing Russians. In Japanese accounts the scene of 
this fighting is frequently placed at Likuanpu. The Russian 
losses in recapturing the village were 141 officers and 5.343 
men killed and wounded. 

The"Jirpanese Third^Arnfiy^^vvas now charged with breaking 
through the defense between Chengitun and the nortli Tombs. 
Two and one-half brigades of reserves from the Manchurian 
army headquarters were added and assigned to the different 
divisions accorcling to emergency. The Seventh Division 
was to march on the north Tombs, the Ninth Division on 
Yunsontun, and the First Division on Chengitun. 

The Seventh Division carried Chuanwanchiao, held by 
Colonel Lesh, and attacked Tafanhsintun, carrying the 
latter village at niirhtfall. The Ninth Division, assisted 


by the Second Artillery Brigade, after an engagement 
lasting all day, carried Chaoluiatun, held by Colonel Zapolski 
with the Ninth Rifle lleginient and the newly arrived One 
hundred and forty-seventh Infantry Regiment, with heavy 
losses on both sides. The detachments of Colonels Lesh 
and Zapolski were both reenforced by troops from the First 
Siberian Corps. Colonel Zapolski's detachment halted at 
Tachiatzii. The Japanese First Division reached the line 
Siutaitzu-Chengitim, from which its artillery damaged the 
railway slightly. 

/ The Japanese Cavalry Division was on the line Tashmtun- 
/ Lichiaputzu after failing in an effort to cut the railway at 

> Hushihtai. 

At 1 p. m. on the 7th General Kuropatkin issued an order 
for withdrawal in which it was directed that: 

1. The Third Army to occupy the fortifications of the tete de pont from 
the Hun to redoubt No. 5 east of Muchiapu, inclusive, detailing 16 battalions 
to the strategic reserve at Mukden. 

2. The First Army to occupy the Fuling and Fushun positions, its right 
on redoubt No. 5. The detachments of Generals Danilov and Maslov to 
cover the roads leading from the line Fushun-Yingpan to Tiehling. The 
First Array to detail 24 battalions to the strategic reserve at Mukden. 

3. The Second Army and corps temporarily attached to same to cover this 
movement, holding back the enemy on the line of the villages Yuanchentun- 
Chaohuatun-Yukuantun-Yangshihtun-Shatotzu, holding enemy back on 
the right of this line to the utmost limit. 

5. The troops of the Third and First Armies to withdraw their main forces 
during the night of the 7th-8th quite secretly leaving on their positions strong 
rear guards which are to retreat only when pressed by the enemy, -holding 
him back as long as possible. 

Early on the 8th Colonel Borisov was sent to Tsuerhtun 
with the 5{* battalions and 8 guns belonging to the Fourth 
Siberian Corps and held in reserve by General Kuropatkin, 
thus forming a nucleus for the detachment formed and placed 
under command of General Milov. General Herschelmann 
and his 16 battalions were taken from General Kaulbars, 
ordered to remain in reserve at the disposition of General 
Kuropatkin, and then ordered to Tsuerhtun to report to 
General ]\Iilov. To this detachment under General ISIilov 
were to be added the 40 battalions and 14 batteries detached 
from the First Army and the 16 battalions detacned from 
the Third Army. It was to clear and hold the ground north 


and west from Tsiierhtiin so as to protect the railway and be 
ready for an energetic offensive that was to be executed on 
March 9. 

General Milov was available for the command of this 
detachment because of his own corps, th(> Eighth, having 
since March .3 been disti'ibuted among the various detach- 
ments that had been formed. 

By morning of March 8 the withdrawal of the Russian 
First i\jrmy was well under way. The withdrawal was 
announced by the flames from burning supplies, and the 
opposing Japanese took up the pursuit. The prepared roads 
leading from the })ositions back to the Ilun facilitated the 
withdrawal, which was accomplished with but few rear- 
guard actions and slight losses in personnel. By daylight 
the Russian Second Army, which lost heavily in materiel, 
had occupied its new positions with the 46 battalions remain- 
ing after detacliing the 16 battalions to the strategic reserve. 

The Japanese Fourth Army, except the Tomioka Detach- 
ment and the Fourth Division, which were transferred back 
to the Second Army, moved forward in pursuit. The detach- 
ment was ordered to hold the line from Suchiatun to 
Erhtaitzu, the Fourth Division to cross to the right bank of 
the Hun. The troops, however, were more or less disorgan- 
ized by the fighting of the preceding day and but one 
battalion, of the Thirty-seventh Infantry, had joined the 
Second Army reserve at sunset. 

The Russians had withdrawn all but a small rear guard 
from Machiapu during the night of the 7th. On the morning 
of March 8 the right of the Japanese Fifth Division, on the 
left bank of the Hun, advanced through Erhtaitzu and, by 
evening, occupied Machiapu. The left of the Fifth Division, 
which had drawn back behind the old railway embankment 
during the night, advanced to west of Hsiaoshatotzu, which 
was stili held in force. This advance was assisted by the 
mountain guns of the division from a position near the 
railway embankment. 

The Japanese Third Division failed to make any progress, 
its action consisting principally of artillery fire. 

In the Japanese Third Army the Ninth Division had a 
village at the junction of the railway and the Santaitzu road 
34526—07 9 


as ()])j('cliv(>, the Seventh Division luul Kinchiaualzu, tlie 
First Division iiad Yunsontun. 

One l)rioade of the Seventh Division attacked Ilsiaofan- 
hsintun and was repulsed with lieavy h)ss. Tiie otiier })ri- 
gade and the attached reserves made several unsuccessful 
attacks on llsiaochiatun. The Ninth Division captured 
Tachiatzu, about 1 p. ni., after severe fighting in whicli the 
Russian commander, Colonel Zapolski, was killed. The First 
Division attacked the Yuanchentun-Santaitzu line but, after 
hard fighting, was brought to a stand about (iUO yards from 
the opposing line. 

The opposing cavalry divisions engaged each other, both 
mounted and dismounted, in the vicinity of llousliintun. 

^n, March 9 the movements of both armies were influ- 
enced by a violent gale and accompanying dust storm. 

On the south front the general line of separation was the 
Hun River, with the exception of a small area in front of the 
Guards at Kiusan and of the bridge heads, covering the 
crossings south of Mukden, still held by troops from the 
Russian Third Army. 

From Fushun northeast toward Yingpan were the detach- 
ments of Rennenkampf, Danilov and Maslov; from Fushun 
west to Tayingtin were troops of the Third and Second 
Siberian Corps; from Kiusan west through Fiding to redoubt 
No. 5, at Muchiapu, were troops of the Fourth Siberian and 
First Army Corps; a total of 106 battalions after detaching 
40 battalions to tlie strategic reserve. 

The right column of the Japanese Fifth Army pursued in 
the direction of Yingpan. The advance guard of the left 
column reached Fushun but withdrew because of the strength 
with which the prepared positions north of the Fushun- 
Kapukai line were occupied. 

In the Jaj^anese First Army the right column of the 
Twelfth Division (Twenty-third Brigade) was on the left 
bank of the Hun, opposite Holungtien. The left column 
(Twelfth Brigade) occupied the heights northeast of Taying- 
tin and west of Hsiaotai with one regiment, having pene- 
trated the gap in the line between Kiusan and Tayingtin. 
The Guards reached the vicinity of Huanchiakou, sending 
the cavalry regiment and one battalion to Hushinpu. ■ The 
Guards Reserve Brigade was at Tayingtin, The Second 


Division arrived at the Hun and occupied the l)ridges at 
Fushun and Kapnkai. 

In the Jai) Fourth Army the reserve reached Yan- 
kuantun, the Tenth Division reached Wandaintun. The 
Sixth Division, leaving a detachment at Wanshitun, moved 
to in front of the bridge heads in the vicinity of Changhutun. 

In the Japanese Second Army the Toniioka Detachment 
extended to the left so as to cover the ground held by the 
Fourth Division, which concentrated at Macliiapu and sent 
one brigade across the Tlun to attack toward Tajui, aiding 
the Fifth Division. The hitter liad, by a night attack, ap- 
proached close to Shatotzu, where it was checked and suffer- 
ing severely from a cross fire. The attack of the Fourth 
Division and the fire of its artillery from near Takushinpu 
relieved the situation. 

The Eighth Division, leaving 5 battalions at Nienkuantun ' 
and Yulinpu, withdrew behind the old railway embankment 
and marched to Fentai, via Lanshantai and Jahen, to take / 
the place of the Seventh Division. The Third Division' 
extended its left by dispatching 2 battalions of infantry 
and 1 of artillery to near Fentai. The action of the Third 
Division was confined mainly to artillery fire. 

In the Japanese Third Army the Ninth Division was 
withdrawn and seilt to the left of the First Division. The 
Seventh Division moved to its left, occupied the ground 
vacated by the Ninth Division, and attacked the Hne San- 
jtaitzu-Tachiatun but was repulsed. The First Division, 
having been repulsed in a night attack on the line Santaitzu- 
Yuanchentun, was attacked from the north by General 
Herschelmann and Colonel Borisov and the left forced back 
to Chengitun, with the exception of a small party of Japanese 
wlio^ reached Santaitzu and barricaded themselves in some 
fanzas on 4.he noTtheast-ed^e— of the village, repulsing all 
efforts to dislodge them. The reserves of the Japanese First 
Division checked this counter attack about 1 p. m. and 
another detachment from the First Division again attacked 
Yuanchentun at 2 p. m. At 6 p. m. the Russians again 
advanced and drove the left of the First Division back to 
Chengitun, where it was enabled to make a stand by the 
arrival of a brioade from the general reserve. 


The Xintli Division, from Taochiatun, attacked toward 
Ilsiaocliiaotzu with its main Ixxly and Ilushihtai with a 
dotacliment. The main Ixxly reached Kuoshantun; tlie 
detachment reached Waishutzu. 

Tlie o])posino; cavalry divisions were still in the vicinity of 
Tashintun and Iloushintun. 

General Kuropatkin decided to retreat to Tiehling and 
ordered that durino; the night the armies retreat to a line 
through Hushihtai station, Puho, and farther east; the 
Third Army to withdraw from the bridgeheads, using the 
Mandarin road without entering Mukden; the Second Army 
to cover the retreat of the Third Army from the west and 
then to retreat along the railway in succession from its left 
flank; the First Army to cover the retreat of the Third Army 
with its right corps and to withdraw, covering the roads 
leading from the line Fuling-Fushun-Yingpan toward Tieh- 

At the time this order was issued General Kuropatkin 
had received no infonnation regarding the piercing of the 
line at Kiusan, and intended to make a vigorous attack 
westward with the detachment of General Milov and thus 
further facilitate the withdrawal of the Third and Second 

In the withdrawal the 14 battalions and 47 guns remain- 
ing with the Sixth Siberian Corps were to follow the road, 
running practically parallel to the Mandarin road, from 
Muchiapu to Lienhuachi; the Fifth Siberian and Seventeenth 
Corps, 31 battalions and 120 guns, w^ere to follow the Man- 
darin road, the first passing west, the second east of Mukden, 
after passing which the Seventeenth Corps was to form the 
rear guard of the Third Army. In the Second Army General 
Tserpitski wath his 45 battalions and 164 guns was to move 
from Lanyutun to east of the railway and then through 
Yuanchentun, Tsuerhtun, and Kuchentzu, keeping abreast 
the Third Army ; the Twenth-fif th Division and First Siberian 
Corps, 52 1 battalions and 144 guns, were to move through 
Wasia along the west side of the railway mthout crossing 
the same, the Twenty-fifth Division leading and the First 
Siberian Corps following successively from its left flank. 
The rear guards of the three columns of the Second Army 
were to maintain connection. General Launitz, reenforced 


to 46 battalions and IIS f<uns, was to cover the withdrawal 
by holdino^ the Tacbiatun-Santaitzii-'^'uanclu'Dtini line, drive 
the Japanese hs^iK to the line 'racliiatzu-Knoehitun and 
withdraw to Hushihtai by detaehnients from his left llaid':. 

On March 10 the left column of the Jai)an(>se Fifth Army 
and the Second Division, First Army, attacked the positions 
north of Fushun, Kapukai, and Tita, occupied by rear guards 
of the Russian First Army. These rear guards offered such 
resistance that the entire day was occupied by the .fapanese 
in reaching a line through Manyutsuantzu. The Twelfth 
Division carried the line northeast of Holungtien and com- 
pleted the occupation of the Hushinpu region. The Guards 
carried the positions on the heights northwest of Kiusan 
and followed the retreating rear guard to, and displaced it 
from, the line Pinglaotzu-Talingtzu, from where the artillery 
of the Japanese advance guard fired u])on the retreating 
columns passing north along the railway and Tiehling road. 

In the Japanese Fourth Army the Tenth Division carried 
the positions north of Tichiafang and east of Fuling and 
followed the rear guard to a line from east of Kuanchiakou 
to Tsaochiakou, where it was brcr.ght to a stand by a coun- 
ter attack. About 11a. m. it occupied the heights north 
of Tsaochiakou and fired on the retreating columns on the 
Tiehling road. The reserve of the Tenth Division, which at 
midnight had crossed the Hun northeast of Yankuantun, 
drove back a Russian force from near Sanehiatzu and Mao- 
chiatun and advanced to a line from northeast of Yulingpu to 
Erhtaitzu, where it was brought to a stand by the Seventeenth 
Corps retiring in front of the Japanese Sixth Division, which 
at midnight had crossed the Hun southwest of Yankuantini, 
and had overtaken a portion of the Seventeenth Corps at a 
point east of Mukden. 

In the Japanese Second Army, as the Russians succes- 
sively withdrew from south to north from their positions, 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Third Divisions advanced and drove 
off the opposing rear guards. The Fourth and Fifth Divi- 
sions reached points southwest and west of Mukden by 
nightfall, portions of both divisions entering the city about 
7 p. m. 

The Eighth Division, about noon, advanced to a line from 
Chinsotun through Tapingchuang to Hsiaochiatun and, at 


ni<^ht, with tho main body, occupiod the bills on wbicb ibc 
nortb Tom])s arc sitiiatod. 

In the Japanese Third Army the Seventh ] )ivisi()n had made 
a nio:ht attack on the Santaitzu-Tachiatun line, in which 4 
battalions succeeded in enterinj^ the walled inclosure of the 
north Tombs. The remainder of the attacking force was 
repulsed, tbus leavino; the 4 battalions isolated until toward 
evening, when Tachiatun was linally carried by the remain- 
der of the Seventh Division. 

The First Division carried Santaitzu about ,5 p. m. and 
Yuanchentun a little later. The Ninth Division, assisted by 
the Second Artillery Brigade, carried Tungchangshan shortly 
after noon. The detachment in front of Waishiitzu made an 
unsuccessful attack on and withstood a counter attack from 

General Milov succeeded in holding a line west of the rail- 
way, running from Waishutzu through Ilsiaochiaotzu to 
Yuanchentun, until the main bodies of the troops from the 
southwest had cleared the narrow space that still separated 
the Japanese First and Fourth Armies on the east from the 
Third Army on the west. The troops under General Milov 
had been reinforced during the day by various fractions from 
the retreating columns. 

The battle of Mukden proper came to an end with the 10th 
of March, although many scattered detachments of Russians 
surrendered to the Japanese at a later date, and the pursuit 
did not end until Tiehling had been occupied on March 16. 

As a result of the battle the Japanese captured 66 guns, 
62,200 rifles, 277,700 rounds of artillery ammunition, 
26,640,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, the tramways that 
had been used to supply the Russian positions, and various 
quantities of supplies that had been abandoned by the 

The Japanese reported their losses at about 50,000 killed 
and wounded. The Russians reported 273 officers and 8,626 
men killed, 1,576 officers and 49,426 men wounded and 336 
officers and 31,253 men missing, making a total of 2,185 
officers and 89,305 men. Of the missing Russians, about 
20,000 were made prisoners; the remainder properly belongs 
to the killed. 


Tlio Japanose forces that pursued the Russians were ])i-iii- 
eipally from the left cohiinn of the Fifth Army, the Secoud 
and Twelfth Divisions of the Fu'st Army, and, for a short dis- 
tance, the Eit:;hth Division of the Second Army. 

The Russian rear guard took position at the Fan River; 
troops from the First Army on the right flank, and the divi- 
sions of General Mishchenko, who had now returned to duty, 
on the left. On JMarch 14 the Japanese Second and Twelfth 
Divisions attacked this position. The advance troops suf- 
fered a repulse, but, with the arrival of reinforcements, the 
position was carried, and the pursuit continued through 
Tiehling, which w^as captured on March 15 after but slight 

The Russian army occupied a position, through Fenghua 
and Ssupingkai, perpendicular to the railway, the left detach- 
ment at Heilungcheng. 

The Japanese occupied a position through Fakumen, 
Changtufu, and Kaiyuan, the right detachment in the 
vicinity of Hsingking. 

Contact between the two armies w^as regained and daily 
skirmishes, of greater or less severity, continued without any 
important change of position on the part of either combatant 
until an armistice between the opposing armies was entered 
into on September 14, 1905. 


On February 6, 1904, Vice-Admiral Togo left Sasebo, con- 
V05dng the transports Tairen, Otaru, and Heijo, carrying 
troops of the Tw^elfth Division to Chemulpo. 

The fleet rendezvoused off Mokpo on the 7th, and Rear 
Admiral Uryu, with the Fourth Division, was detached to 
convoy the transports to Chemulpo, while the main fleet pro- 
ceeded to the vicinity of the Elliott Islands. From this ren- 
dezvous one flotilla of torpedo boats and destroyers was sent 
to Talienwan Bay, another to Port Arthur, with orders to 
blow up the Russian vessels. The Talienwan flotilla found 
no Russian vessels and returned to the rendezvous. The 
other flotilla found the greater part of the Russian squadron 
lying outside the harbor of Port Arthur. The torpedo boats 


advanced and discharged torjx'does, strikin^i; the Czarevicli, 
Retvizan, and Palldda. All three vessels were seriously 
injured, but were subsequently repaired by the liussians. 

Rear Admiral Uryu's division arrived off Chemulpo on the 
afternoon of Fe})ruary S. The f'Jiiyoda, which liad l)een lyino; 
in Chemulpo Harbor since the preceding December, left on 
the 7th, about 11.30 p. m., and joined the Japanese division. 

The Russian cruiser Varyag and gunboat Koryetz were also 
lying in the harbor. The latter steamed out on approach of 
the Japanese division and fired a shot, said by the Russians 
to have been accidental, and the Japanese replied })y 'dis- 
charging two torpedoes, both ineffective. The Koryetz then 
returned to the harbor. 

When the landing of troops from the transports was com- 
pleted the Japanese transports and division steamed outside 
the harbor, and Rear Admiral Uryri demanded of the com- 
mander of the Russian vessels that they leave the harbor 
before noon of February 9 under penalty of being attacked 
in the harbor; such attack not to take place before 4 p. m., 
February 9, 1904. 

The notice was also conveyed to the foreign warships in the 
harbor by the Japanese consul at Chemulpo. 

About noon the Russian vessels steamed out, and, after an 
engagement of about thirty-five minutes, returned to the 
harbor, where the Koryetz was blown up by her commander, 
and the Varyag burned the same evening. The Russian 
transport Sungari, lying in the harbor, was burned to prevent 
capture by the Japanese. 

The Japanese suffered no casualties. The Russians had 
about 100 killed and wounded. The wounded and other 
survivors were temporarily received on British, French, and 
Italian war ships. 

Besides the torpedo-boat flotilla the Japanese division 
consisted of the Asama, Chiyoda, Naniwa, Takashiho, AJcashi, 
and Niltaka. 

On the morning of the 9th Admiral Togo approached Port 
Arthur with his squadron and engaged the Russian ships and 
batteries at long range for about two hours. As a result of 
this engagement, the Poltava, Diana, Askold, and Novilc were 
injured. The Russians lost 10 men killed and 2 officers and 
44 men wounded. The Japanese lost 4 killed and 54 wounded. 


;; odiccrs Ix'iiii:,' killed ;iii(l I I (iHlccts and cadets w Diinded. 
S('^•(M•al (»r the Ja])aiiose vossois wcrc^ slfuck, bill none seriously' 

The Ja])an('s(' licet, in addition to the destroyers and tor- 
pe(h) ])()ats, contained the battle shijjs A.saJti, Mlhim, Ilat- 
svsc, S/iHi-isliinKi, Fuji, Y(wlntria, the armored cruisers Tokiwa 
Azuma, Iwate, YaJcumo, Idzumo, the protc'ctcd cmisers Taka- 
s(igo, C/iltosc, YostJirno, luif^agi, and the dispatch boat Tafsutd. 
The Russian licet, under \"ice-Adniiral Stark, in addition to 
the destroyers and torjiedo l)()ats, contained the battle ships 
Retvizan, Sevastopol, Czarrvich, Poltava, Petrojxivlovsk, Peres- 
vlet, Pobieda, tlie armored cruiser Bayan, the protected 
cruisers Askold, Diana, Pallada, Novik, Boyarin, and gunboats 
Bohfv, Otvazlmi, Gremiasliclii, Dzhizhit, Pashoinik, and (lilyak. 

On February 11 tlie Vladivostok s(piadron, consisting of 
tlu^ (rfoiriohoi, Hossia, Purik, and Bogatir, lired on the Japa- 
nese steamers Naganura Maru (700 tons) and the Zensho 
Mam (2()() tons) in the vicinity of the Tsugaru Straits. The 
latter vessel escaped; the former was sunk, two of her crew 
being drowned. 

On February 12 the Russian torpedo transport Yenisei 
struck a mine which she had just laid in Talienwan Ba}^, 
and sank ; 4 officers and 92 men were lost. The Boyarin in 
endeavoring to aid the Yenisei also struck a mine and subse- 
quently sank from her injuries. 

On the night of February 13 the fourth torpedo-boat 
flotilhi, consisting of the Murasame, Ilarusame, Asagiri, and 
Hayatori, under Commander Nagai, was dispatched against 
the Russian vessels at Port Arthur. The vessels of the 
flotilla were separated by stress of weather, and two failed to 
reach Port Arthur. The Asagiri arrived near the entrance 
about 8 a. m. (m the 14th, was fired on, discharged a torpedo 
and retired. The Hayatori did likewise about 5 a. m. 
Neither torpedo was effective. 

On February 16 the armored cruisers Nisshin and Kasuga 
(formerly Moreno and Pivadavia, each of 7,770 tons dis- 
placement and launched in 1903 and 1902, respectively, at 
Sestri Ponente, Italy), purchased by the Japanese from the 
Argentine Re])ublic shortly before the outbreak of the war, 
arrived at Yokosuka. 



The P^irst and Tliird Scjiiiulrons made an unsuccessful 
attempt on the inornino; <>r Fcht nary 24 to block Port Arthur. 
Five steamers, the TcnsJiln Maru (2,942 tons), llohoku Maru 
(2,766 tons), JinseM Maru (2,,331 tons), Buyo Maru (1,163 
tons), and Bushu Maru (1,249 tons), loaded with artificial 
stone and manned by 77 volunteer officers and crew, were to 
be taken to the entrance and there sunk by being blown up.' 
A torpedo-boat flotilla composed of the Murakumo, Yugiri, 
Shiranui, and Kagero, under command of Captain Mano, 
was to reconnoiter and destroy the Russian ships. The 
torpedo boats Tlayahusa, Kasasagi, Manazuru, Chidori, and 
Tsuhanu w^re to pick up the crews of the sunken vessels. 

About 2.30 a. m. the Russian searchlights revealed the 
presence of the Japanese vessels, which were fired upon by 
the fortifications and the Retvizan, which was still lying- 
beached near the entrance to the harbor, under Golden Hill. 
The Russian guard ship was driven back l)y the torpedo-boat 
flotilla. The Tenshin Maru grounded on the east coast of 
Laotiehshan in endeavoring to avoid the Russian search- 
lights and after being more or less damaged by fire. The 
steering gear of the Bushu Maru was struck and the vessel 
grounded not far from the Tenshin Maru, and was then 
blown up by the crew. The Buyo Maru was so seriously 
damaged that she sank l)efore reaching the harbor entrance. 
The IloJcohu Maru and Jinsen Maru reached the entrance 
and were successfully blown up, the former near the light- 
house on Tiger's Tail, the latter under Golden Hill, near the 

. With the exception of three men slightly wounded, the 
crews of the vessels were uninjured and all safely picked up, 
after having taken to their boats, by the destroyers. The 
.last of them were not picked up until the afternoon. One 
man was killed on one of the destroyers. 

On February 24 the First and Third Scpiadrons approached 
Port Arthur and engaged in an exchange of long-range fire 
with the Bayan, AsJcold, and Novik lying outside the harbor, 
and into which they withdrew. During this engagement the 
Second (Armored Cruiser) S([uadron, under Vice-Admiral 
Kamimura, discovered and chased two Russian destroyers 


iioar Livoliclislian, coininii- from a wostorly clircdioii. One 
of the destroyers escaped; the otlier, the Viivch'delni, was 
driven into I'lu'eon Vnxx and destroyed. 

On February 19 Admiral Makarov left St. Petershiirji;, to 
supersede A(hniral Stark in eoniniand of the Russian fleet 
at Port Arthur'. 

On March (1 th(^ .Ijipanese Armored Cruiser Squadron (7 
ships) l)ond)arded Vladivostok from a rani2;e of about o nules, 
but received no reply from the fortifications. 

On the 0th the Russians sank two vessels — the Ilarhin and 
the Ilnilar — outside the entrance to the harbor, for the pur- 
pose of deran<!:ing any subsequent attempt to block Port 
x\rthur. Two other vessels were simk later for the same 

Durin<^ the early morning of March 10 a flotilla of Japanese 
destroyers, commanded by Captain Asai, laid mines outside 
Port Arthur Harb(n\ At the same time a second flotilla 
encountered 6 Russian torpedo-boat destroyers and a severe 
engagement at short range ensued. Considerable damage 
resulted on both sides. The Russian destroyer Siereguschi 
was finally taken in tow by the Japanese destroyer Sazanand, 
but the towline parted and the former sank. 

The Bayan and Novik steamed out to the assistance of the 
StereguscJii, but returned to the harbor on the approach of 
the Japanese fleet, which engaged in a long-range fire with 
the fortifications. 

In the engagement between the destroyers the Japanese 
lost 9 killed and 12 wounded. The Russians lost 3 killed, 
34 wounded, and 4 captured on the StereguscJii. 

On March 16 a Russian destroyer — the Skori — while search- 
ing for mines near Port Arthur struck one and was lost. 

On the night of March 21-22 two flotillas of Japanese 
destroyers laid mines in the outer harbor of Port Arthur. 
The main squadron arrived off the harbor on the morning of 
the 22d, a portion of the fleet having proceeded to Pigeon 
Bay, and a long-range fire w^as exchanged with the fortifica- 
tions, a portion of the fire being indirect and over the Lao- 
tiehshan. The Russians on land had 5 killed, 9 wounded, 
and 1 accidentally injured. 



On March 27, a])oiit '.] a. n\., the Ja|)aiiose made a second 
atteni])! to l)l()ck Port Arthur, sendin<i- 4 vessels to be sunk 
m tlie clianiiel, under the protection of the destroyers Shira- 
Icuma, Kasumi, Asashio, Akolsuk.%, Ikazuchi, Ake})ono, Ohoro, 
Inazuma, Usugumo, Sazanarni, Shinonome, and the tor- 
pedo l)oats Karigane, Aotaka, Ilato, Tsubanu, 'Kasasagi, and 

Tlie CJiiyo Mara (1,746 tons) anchored about one-half 
cham from shore, on the western side of Golden Hill, and 
blew herself up. The Fuk'ui Maru (1,294 tons) advanced 
a little farther past the port side of the Chiyo Maru, was 
struck by a Russian torpedo and then blew herself up. The 
Yaltil^o Maru passed the port side of the Fulvui Maru, an- 
chored, and blew herself up. The Yoneyama Maru (2,693 tons) 
collided with a Russian destroyer, then passed between the 
Chiyo Maru and Fuhii Maru and reached the middle of the 
fairway, where she was struck by a Russian torpedo, blown 
up and sunk, the momentum driving her over to the left 

Among the crews of the blocking vessels there were killed 
1 officer (Commander Hiure on the FuJcui Maru) and 3 men; 
wounded, 3 officers and 6 men. 

The Russian destroyer Silini in engagement with the 
Japanese destroyers, had 7 killed and 13 wounded, stranded 
on the rocks near Golden Hill, but was taken into the harbor. 

On ]\Iarch 30 the commander of the AMtsushima accompa- 
nied the Japanese consul-general at Shanghai in the inspec- 
tion of the arms removed from the Russian gunboat Mand- 
zJi,ur, which had been in that port since the outbreak of the 
war and from which the vital parts of machinery had been 
removed on March 28. 

During the early morning of Aprd 13 the Japanese mine 
ship Koryu Maru succeeded in laying some mines near the 
entrance to Port Arthur, l)eing accompanied by the fourth 
and fifth destroyer flotillas and the fourteejith torpedo-boat 
flotilla. At dawn the second destrojer flotilla discovered 
the Russian destroyer Straslini, which had become separated 
from her own flotilla during the night while cruising outside 
the port, and after a short engagement sank her. A second 


Russian destroyer, comino; from the direction of Laotiehshan, 
was attacked, bnt escape^] into tlie har})or. 

The Bityan approached and picked up as niaiiy of tlic 
Strashni\s crew as possible, nt tlie same time returning the 
fire of tlie destroyers and (he Japanese Third Sfjiiadron, 
which liad arrived ofT Port Arthur about 8 a. m. The No- 
vik, Askold, Diana, PetropavlovsJc, Pobieda, and Poltava 
joined the Baynn and followed the slowly retirhig Third 
Sipiadron about 15 miles to the southeast. The Japanese 
First Squadron, whicli was concealed in the fog about 30 
miles of!" and had l)een called by wireless telegraphy, ar- 
rived. The Russian fleet then retired toward the harbor. 
About 8.30 p. m. the Petroparlovsl: struck two of the mines 
laid })y the Koryu Maru the preceding night; the explosion 
extended to the boilers and magazines, and the vessel broke 
in two and sank. Her complement was 650, and only about 
6 officers and 30 sailors escaped. A^ice-Admiral Makarov, 
Rear- Admiral Molas, and Captain Jakovlev were among the 
killed; the Grand Duke Cyril was among those who escaped. 
The Pobieda, while endeavoring to rescue the survivors of 
the Petropavlovsk, also struck one of the mines and was seri- 
ously injured. She succeeded in reaching the harbor, how- 
ever, and was subsequently repaired. 

On the night of April 25 the Kinsliu Maru, which had the 
preceding day carried a company of Japanese infantry from 
Gensan to Iwon, and again had the company on board, was 
torpedoed and sunk by a vessel of the Vladivostok squadron. 
Those troops on board which had not taken advantage of 
the one hour granted to leave the vessel, thus becoming 
prisoners, were lost. 

Vice-Admiral Kamimura's (armored cruiser) squadron, 
after searching for the survivors of the Kinsliu Maru, ap- 
proached Vladivostok and fired on two Russian torpedo 
boats, which retired to the harbor, and the fortifications. 
The latter returned the fire. No loss was reported on either 

In the latter part of April the Russian destroyer Beschumni, 
while searching for mines, struck one and was seriously dam- 
aged. She succeeded in returning to port, and was subse- 
quently repaired. 



About 2 a. 111. on May 3 the Japanese made a third attempt 
to block the entrance to Port Arthur. The vessels actually 
sunk consisted of the Tatoini Maru (1,953 tons), Sagami 
Maru (1,926 tons), Mikawa Maru (1,967 tons), Sakaru Maru 
{2, 97 S ions), Odaru Maru{2,5^7 tons) , Asa gao Maru {2,4^4: tons) 
Aikoku Maru (1,781 tons), and Yedo Maru (1,724 tons). Four 
other vessels, the Fusan Maru, Nagato Maru, SMbata, Maru, 
and Kokura Maru were also to be sunk, but received the 
signal of recall during the night after the fleet was scattered 
by storm and did not proceed to the entrance. 

The convoy of the blocking vessels, under Commander 
Mineo Hayashi, consisted of the gunboat Akagi (Commander 
Hideshin Fujimoto), gunboat Chokai (Commander Danjiro 
Iwamura), the second destroyer flotilla (Commander Ichiro 
Ishida), the third destroyer flotilla (Commander Mitsukane 
Tsuchiya), the fourth destroyer flotilla (Commander Gun- 
kichi Nagai), the fifth destroyer flotilla (Commander Gan- 
jiro Mano), the ninth torpedo-boat flotilla (Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Michisuke Olaki), and the fourteenth torpedo-boat 
flotilla minus the Kasasagi and Manazuru and plus torpedo 
boats Nos. 67 and 70 (Commander Yoshimaru Sakurai). Of 
the eight steamers, five, the Mikawa, Tatomi, Yedo, Odaru, and 
Sagami, reached the entrance, the Mikawa penetrating be- 
yond the boom that had been stretched. The Asagao was 
sunk near the shore of Golden Hill; the Sakaru and Aikoku 
sank before reaching the entrance. The latter three were 
probably sunk by Russian mines, torpedoes, and fire, while 
the first five were probably sunk by their own crews as well 
as from injuries inflicted by the Russians. 

Of the crews of these steamers the Japanese reported 5 
killed, 88 missing, and 23 wounded, while 41 were rescued 
uninjured. The entire crew of the Sakaru, Odaru, Asagao, 
and Sagami were reported as killed or missing. 

The Russians reported that they rescued 30 Japanese, 
among whom were 2 officers severely wounded. 

The Japanese torpedo boat No. 67 had her boiler damaged 
by shells, in addition to 3 of her crew being wounded, but 
was towed out of danger by torpedo boat No. 70. The de- 
stroyer Aotaka had her engine on the port side damaged 

KIMTOMK OF TlIK lU^SSO-.l A l>.\ \ KSK WAR. 143 

and 1 man killed. 'The dcstroyci' J/<i i/ahiisd had 1 man 

A division of the Third S(|ua(lron, Kcar-Admii-al Dcwa in 
command, arrived off the harbor about 6 a. m.; a division of 
the P^irst Stjuadron, I^ear- Admiral Nasliiha in connnand and 
Vice-Admiral To*:;o also {)resent, arrived at U a. m. Both 
divisions covered the action of tlie destroyers and torjx'do 
boats, searching:; for the survivors throu<!jliout the day. 

The total value of the 17 vessels used by the Japanese in 
the three attempts to block Port Arthur is given as o, 000, 000 

On May 1-, while endeavoring to destroy a Russian mine 
in Kerr Bay, the Japanese torpedo boat No. 48 was sunk by 
its unexpected explosion, 14 of the crew losing their lives. 

The Third Sc^uadron continued the search for mines in that 
locality, and on the 14th, when about to end the search for 
that day, a mine exploded under the stern of the dispatch 
boat Mhjako, which sank in twenty-three minutes. Of the 
crew, 2 were killed, 1 severely wounded, and 21 slightly 

During this searching for mines the various vessels of the 
squadron occasionally bombarded points on land, some of 
which were occupied by Russians who were opposing the 
searching for mines. No casualties seem to have resulted on 
either side. 

On May 14, during the absence of the blockading vessels, 
the Russians laid mines off Port Arthur in the path in which 
the blockading vessels usually cruised. The blockading 
vessels returned on May 15; the Ilatsuse struck one of the 
mines and, about thirty minutes later, struck a second mine 
which exploded the magazine, sinking the vessel almost im- 
mediately. About 300 of her complement of 741 were 
saved. A destroyer flotilla emerged from Port Arthur, but 
was repulsed by the other Japanese vessels. The Yashima 
also struck a mine, was taken in tow, but sank before reach- 
ing a place of safety. 

On the same day the Kasuga collided with the Yoshino, 
in a dense fog at sea near the Shantung promontor}-, striking 
her on the port side near the stern. The Yoshino quickly 
sank, only about 90 of her complement of 360 being saved. 


On May 16 and 17 a division of the Third Scjuadron, Rear- 
Admiral Togo commanding, reconnoitered tlu^ coast near 
Kaiping, firing at some Russian tr()o])s near the shore, then 
proceeded to Chinchou Bay, dragged for mines and entered 
the bay, the gunboats proceeding to the head of the bay and 
firing on the railway bridges, buildings, and one military 
train which was passing. On the 17th, also, the destroyer 
Akatsuhi, while engaged in the blockade of Port Arthur, 
struck a mine and sank. The gunboat OsMma was sunk in a 
collision on the 18th while cruising in Liaotung Bay, cooper- 
ating with the army. 

On May 20 a gunboat detachment and several torpedo-boat 
and destroyer flotillas approached close to tlie harbor of 
Port Arthur to reconnoiter and plant mines. Tn the firing 
that ensued several of the vessels were struck, but none 
seriously damaged. The destroyer AkatsuJci was struck by 
a shell which killed her commander, Lieutenant Naojira 
Suyetsuga, and 24 sailors. 

On May 20 the Russian cruiser Bogatir struck a rock at the 
entrance to Vladivostok Harbor. She was afterwards floated, 
repaired, and held at Vladivostok ready for use. 

On May 26 four gimboats and a torpedo-boat flotilla 
assisted the Japanese Second Army in the attack on Nan- 
shan from Chinchou Bay. The gunboats AJcagi and Chokai 
with the first torpedo-boat flotilla approached the shore and 
engaged in the morning. A shell grazed the Chohii, wound- 
ing Lieutenant Kohno, killing 2 men, and wounding 2. A 
little later the gunboats Tsukushi and Heiyen approached, 
after soundings had been taken by a detachment of torpedo 
boats, and joined in the bombardment, but withdrew about 
11a. m. on account of the ebbing tide. 

The Akagi and Chokai and a part of the torpedo-boat flo- 
tilla remained, taking part in the battle until the end. A 
shell exploded on the side of the Chokai, killing Commander 
M. Hayashi and wounding Lieutenant M. Sato and 3 men. 

Reporting on the battle of Nanshan, General Oku said: 
"In concluding this report we profoundly thank the navy for 
its invaluable assistance," 

During the same battle the Russian gunboat Boher bom- 
barded the Japanese left flank from Talienwan Bay, causing 
serious loss. 


Oil the iiiijjlit of May _?(), while reconnoitoriiig the coast of 
Laotichsliaii, the Russian destroyer Vnimatelni ran on the 
rocks and was h)st. 

On the 7th and the Stli of June a division of the Third 
Squaih'on honiharch'd various points on tlie coast near Kai- 
j)iu^, (list url)in<; some (h'tachnients of Russian troops. On the 
13th the mine-laying ship Taihoku Maru, by the unexpected 
exj)h)sion of a mine she was hiyin<ii:, lost 1!) killed and 17 

On June 15 the Vladivostok scjuadron, Rossia, Kurik, and 
Groniohoi, encountered several Japanese transports and 
uierchantmen near Okinoshima Island, sank the Izami Maru 
and Hitachi Maru and disa])led the Sado Maru. The Hita- 
chi Maru liad on board about 1,095 of the Guards Kobi 
reserves and a mercantile crew of 120. Of those on board 
the 2 vessels 77 Japanese were made prisoners. Of the 
crew of the Hitachi 17 out of 102 were picked up either by the 
Sado or by boats sent out for that purpose. The greater 
part of the troops on board were killed by the Russian fire, or 
were drowned. 

Of the Sado Maru 8 were made prisoners, 83 escaped, and 
29 were lost. Many jumped overboard, thinking the vessel 
was sinking, and subsecpiently regained the Sado after the 
Russian vessels had withdrawn. Of the Izami Maru 47 were 
made prisoners and 37 were lost. 

The Japanese Second Squadron, Vice-Admiral Kamimura 
commanding, searched the waters near Okinoshima for several 
days, but was unable to discover the Vladivostok squadron 
except w'th the scout boat Tsushima. 

On June 23 the Russian fleet made a sortie from Port 
Arthur. Repairs had been made to such an extent that the 
following vessels took part: Bayan, Diana, AsJcold, Sevasto- 
pol, Poltava, Peresviet, Pohieda, Eetvizan, Czarevich, Pallada, 
Gremiashchi, Otvazhni, Gardamak, Vsadnik, and 13 torpedo 

The fleet began emerging in the early morning, and the 
Japanese destroyers, on guard off the harbor, notified the 
various detachments of their fleet, wdiich soon began to appear 
from various directions. 

After emerging from the entrance the Russian fleet anchored 
until about 2 p. m., when it got under way, preceded by tend- 
34526—07 10 


ers and torpedo boats (lraj2;^i]i^ for mines, w]uch was opposed 
by the Japanese torpedo l)()ats. 

The Russian fleet continued on a southerly course until 
nearly sunset and then turned toward Port Artlnu'. The 
Japanese fleet had completed its concentration, and at about 
9.30 p. ni. the fourteenth torpedo-boat flotilla, followed by 
the fifth made an attack on the rear of the Russian fleet when 
the latter was about 5 miles from Port Arthur. The Russian 
vessels did not attempt to enter at night, but anchored just 
outside the harbor, where they were attacked by torpedo boats 
several times during the night. 

The Sevastopol either struck a mine or was struck by a tor- 
pedo. The best evidence is that it was a torpedo fired from 
the Shirakumo, Lieutenant-Commander Wakabayashi com- 
manding, which succeeded in approaching closely by making 
a detour under cover of Yenchang promontory. 

Early the next morning all the Russian vessels, including 
the Sevastopol, steamed or were towed into the harbor. 

The Shirakumo was struck by a shell that caused a fire, 
killed 3 men and wounded f officer and 2 men. The Chidori 
was struck in her aft engine room by a shell which did not 
explode. A cadet on board No. 53 was wounded. Nos. 64 
and 66 were struck by shells, but not seriously injured. 

On the night of June 27 the twelfth torpedo-boat flotilla, 
Lieutenant-Commander Yamada commanding, attacked and 
claimed to have sunk the Russian patrol ship at Port Arthur, 
and also a Russian destro3^er in the ensuing fight. The loss 
of these vessels was not verified. The Japanese lost 14 killed 
and 3 wounded. 

On June 30 a Russian torpedo-boat flotilla with the trans- 
port Lena made a reconnoissance of the port of Gensan, sank 
a Japanese steamer and sailing vessel and fired on the Japa- 
nese settlement and troops, wounding 2 Japanese and 2 Kore- 
ans. Some of the shells started conflagrations which were, 
however, soon extinguished. 

On July 1, at 6.20 p. m., the Japanese Second Squadron, 
Vice- Admiral Kamimura commanding, sighted the Vladivo- 
stok squadron, Vice-Admiral Bezobrazov commanding, as it 
was about to pass south through the eastern channel of Tsu- 
shima Straits. The Russian squadron turned to the north- 
east, followed by the Japanese scjuadron, whose torpedo-boat 


(lolilhi closed to witliiu a (li.stancc of about 2 Juilcs, and was 
lircd oil by the Russian vessels. At about 8.50 p. m. the 
Kiissiau vessels extinguished all lights and eluded tlieir j)ur- 

On July 5 the Japanese gunboat Kaimon struck a Russian 
mine olT Dalny and sank; her coniinander, Conunander 
Takahashi, a paymaster, gunner, and 19 sailors w ere lost. 

In the early morning of July 9 the sixth torpedo-boat flo- 
tilla under Lieutenant-Commander Uchida, approached the 
entrance of Port Arthur, and No. 58, Lieutenant Nakanmda 
commanding, discharged a torpedo, which was not effective, 
at the Asl'old. Nos. 58 and 59 of the Japanese flotilla each 
had 1 man wounded by the Russian fire. 

On July 9, about 7 a. m., the Russian vessels Bayan, Diana, 
PaUada, Poltava, Novik, 2 gunboats, and 7 destroyers came 
out of Port Arthur, preceded by a number of vessels drag- 
ging for mines. The Japanese torpedo-boat flotilla fired on 
them to retard the searching for mines, and was followed by a 
portion of the Third Squadron which also exclianged shots 
with the Bayan about 2 p. m. About 4 p. m. the Russian 
vessels returned to the harbor. There was 1 sailor wounded 
on the Japanese destroyer Asashio. 

In the early morning of July 1 1 the Japanese sixth torpedo- 
boat flotilla again approached the entrance to Port Arthur 
and endeavored to torpedo the Russian patrol boat. Nos. 57 
and 59 both discharged torpedoes, but without effect. 

On July 15 the Bayan, flying the flag of Rear- Admiral 
Reitzenstein, Retvizan, Askold, Novik, the gunboats Otvazlmi, 
Oremiashchi, and Gilyak, and a torpedo-boat flotilla enfiladed 
the left of the Japanese line near Port Arthur and then re- 
turned to the harbor. 

On July 20 the Rossia, Gromohoi, and Rurik, under Rear- 
Admiral Zhissen, passed through the Tsugaru Straits for the 
east coast of Japan to harass Japanese shipping, draw the 
blockading squadron away from Port Arthur, and thus allow 
the Russian squadron to quit Port Arthur and reach 

The raid resulted in considerable injury to the Japanese 
coasting trade. In addition, the German steamer Arabia 
was seized 100 miles oft' Yokohama on July 22, and sent as 
prize to Vladivotsok on account of having in cargo contra- 


hand consisliiig of railway material and flour destined for 

On July 23 tfie Knight Commander, an English ship, 
stopped after the Russian vessels had fired 4 guns. She was 
carrying to Japan o,5()() to 4, ()()() tons of cargo, mostly rail- 
way material. Stating that she was engaged in the trans- 
portation of contraband of war and that her coal capacity 
was so short they could not send her to Vladivostok without 
danger to themselves, the Russian took over her crew and 
papers and then sank her. 

On July 24 the German steamer TJiea was overhauled and 
sunk, being regarded by the Russians as a prize, as stipulated 
in the law. 

On July 26 the Bayan, Pallada, and Novik opened fire 
against the left of the Japanese line near Port Arthur. The 
Matsushima, Itsukushima, Chiyoda, two other second-class 
cruisers, and a torpedo-boat flotilla approached the Russian 
ships, which, after a short engagement, returned to the harbor. 

On July 30 the Russian Vladivostok scpiadron retired west- 
ward through the Tsugaru Straits, reporting they had seen 
at about 3 p. m. a cruiser, 6 torpedo boats, a sail ship, and a 
coast defense ship of the Saiyen type, that these ships were 
far back of the squadron and retired about 5 p. m. 

During the raid the squadron sank the Japanese steamer 
Rakasliima Maru, and the sailing vessels Jizai, Fuhushige, 
Hokusei, and Kyuho. 

In the meantime the Russian volunteer fleet steamers 
Petershurg and Smolensk passed through the Bosphorus on 
July 4 and 6, respectively, were raised to the rank of Russian 
second-class cruisers, and searched several neutral vessels, 
including the British steamers Malacca, Formosa, and Ardova, 
and the German steamers Prim Heinrich, Scandia, and 

The Malacca was seized as prize on the claim that she was 
carrying war material. The British Government, however, 
stated such material belonged to itself. After diplomatic 
correspondence the Malacca was released and searches and 
seizures by the Petershurg and Smolensk ceased. 

On July 24, at about 3 a. m., the fourteenth torpedo-boat 
flotilla and gunboats Nos. 10 and 11, commanded by Lieu- 
tenant Shozo Kuwajima and accompanied by torpedo boats 


sent by tht' Afihisa and Fuji, attacked tliree Russian d est rov- 
ers in Takhe Bay, wliere they were p;nardino; the riglit Hank 
of the Port Arthur defenses. 

The torpedo })oats sent from the battle ships torpe(h)ed 
the Burnkov and Boevoi. The BuraJiOV was sunk and the 
Boer>oi \erj seriously damaged, but managed to reach Port 

On July 26, while dragging for mines near Lungwangtang 
(Swansons Point), one of the Japanese gunboats got the clear- 
ing rope entangled in her propeller, began drifting toward 
Yenchang promontory, and was fired upon by the fortifica- 
tions and attacked by one or more Russian torpedo boats that 
steamed up and discharged torpedoes. Commander Hirose, 
commanding the clearing party, approached on another gun- 
boat and towed the disabled vessel out of danger. Com- 
mander Hirose, Lieutenant Kamura, and 9 men were wounded 
and 3 men were killed. 

On July 26, while cruising off Port Arthur, the Japanese 
cruiser CMyoda struck a mine, but was towed to Dalny. 

On July 27, while returning to Port Arthur from a recon- 
naissance, the Russian cruiser Bay an struck a mine near the 
entrance, but was towed into the harbor. 

On August 2 the Russian gunboat Sivucli, wliich had 
retired up the Liao River on the approach of the Japanese, 
was destroyed to prevent her falling into their hands. 

During the afternoon of August 5 fourteen Russian de- 
stroyers emerged from Port Arthur and separated into three 
divisions; the first, of four vessels, steamed southwest; the 
second, of seven, steamed south; the third, of three, steamed 
toward Yenchang promontory. After an exchange of fire 
with two Japanese destroyers, Akegono and Ohoro, commanded, 
respectively, by Commanders Kusumi Masao and Takemura 
Bungo, and the Ucazuchi, Commander Shinohara Rishichi, 
the Russian destroyers returned to the harbor. There were 
apparently no casualties on either side. 

On August 9, 15 cm. shells from a Japanese shore battery 
struck both the Retvizan and Peresviet while at anchor in the 
west port. The former was damaged considerably, the 
latter but slightly. Both took part in the sortie of the 
following day. 


At about 5 a. m., Aiio;ust 10, the Kussiaii licet of Czarevich 
(lla(i;Hliij) of Rear Admiral Wito;eft), Retvizan, Pohieda, 
Peresviet (fla<;slii]) of Hear Admiral Prince Oukhtomski, 
commanding battleship division), Se/vastoyol, Poltava, Askold 
(lla,<;sliij) of Rear Admiral Reitzenstein, commanding cruiser 
division), Diana, Pallada, Novih, 8 destroyers and the hos- 
pital ship Mongolia, began emerging from Port Arthur, all 
being out about 8 a. m. 

The Japanese torpedo boats on watch about 6 miles out 
were soon reinforced, the Yakuma, Kasagi, Talcasago, and 
Chitose appearing about 15 miles to the southwest; the 
Milcasa, Asaki, Fujii, and Sldkisliima appearing about 12 
miles to the south and being joined by the Nisshin and 
Kasuga about 10 miles to the southeast. A httle later the 
Akashi, Suma, Izum.i, Akitsushima, Yayeyama, and Asama 
joined the other Japanese vessels. 

The Russians claimed that the Japanese torpedo boats, of 
which a total of 30 took part in the engagement, steamed 
ahead of the Russian column sowing floating mines. The 
Japanese denied using any mines on this occasion. 

After proceeding south about 10 miles the Russian fleet 
turned to the east and was attacked by the Japanese, about 
1 p. m., at a point about 30 miles from Port Arthur. The 
Russian fleet then turned toward Shantung. The engage- 
ment continued intermittently until after sunset, being 
heaviest from about 4 to 4.30 j>. m., and again from 7 to 8 p. m., 
by which time the range between the leading ships of the 
opposing fleets was reduced to about 5,000 yards. 

At about 8 p. m. the steering gear of the Czarevich became 
disabled, causing the vessel to turn sharply to port. She was 
followed by the Retvizan and a portion of the other vessels. 
The cause of the Czarevich turning to port was soon dis- 
covered and considerable confusion resulted in the Russian 
fleet. During the confusion the Japanese vessels ranged 
ahead. The main portion of the Russian fleet, except the 
Czarevich, Diana, Askold, and Novik, turned to starboard 
and headed for Port Arthur, the vessels separating. 

The Japanese suft'ered a loss of 70 killed, inchiding 10 offi- 
cers, and 158 wounded, including 13 officers. On August 12 
Admiral Togo reported that the damage to his ships had been 
provisionally repaired. 


Tiio Russians lost 21 ofFioors and ;?24 mow killod and 
wounded. Among the killed was Admiral \Vit<i;eft, com- 
mandinti; tli(> Russian fleet. 

On Au<;iis( H the Retvizan, Sevastopol, Peresviet, Poltava, 
Pohieda, Pallada, and the hospital shij) Mongolia returned 
to Port Arthur, the first four badly damaged. Three torpedo 
boats also returned to Port Arthur. 

The Czarevicli and 3 destroyers went to Kiao Chow; the 
Asl-old and the destroyer Grozovoi to Shanghai; the Diana, 
to Saigon: all were subsequently disarmed. One destroyer, 
the Burnl, went ashore near Weihaiwei. The Novih went 
to Kiao Chow, but cleared from the port and endeavored to 
reach Vladivostok. 

On the night of August 10 the Russian destroyer Ryeshi- 
telni left Port Arthur for Chefoo with dispatches. She was 
discovered the next day by the Japanese destroyers Asashio 
and Kasumi, under Commander Fujimoto. At 3 a. m. on 
the 12th Lieutenant Terashima with a detail of 10 men was 
sent on board to inform the Russian commander that since 
he had been in the port more than twenty-four hours he 
must issue from the harbor or surrender. During the ensuing 
discussion the Russian commander gave orders to blow up 
the vessel, seized Lieutenant Terashima, and jumj^ed over- 
board. There was a struggle between the Russian and 
Japanese sailors, an explosion occurred in the hold, and the 
vessel, which had been disarmed in part, was towed out of the 
harbor by the Japanese at 5.15 a. m. 

A protest was lodged with the Chinese Government by 
Russia and China demanded the return of the Ryeshitelni. 
Japan declined to accede to the demand, claiming that the 
harbor of Chefoo was not properh" neutral territory since the 
Russian consulate operated a system of wireless telegraj^hy 
with Port Arthur, that the harbor had been converted into 
belligerent territory by the entry of the Ryeshitelni, that the 
vessel had not been disarmed at the time of Lieutenant 
Terashima's visit, and that the crew of the Ryeshitelni began 

On August 11, while bombarding the left of the Japanese 
Third Army near Lungwantang, the Russian gunboats 
Gilyalc and Otvazhni were attacked and driven back to Port 
Ai'thur by the Japanese gunboats Maya and Ahagi. 


On August 14 at dawn Vice-Adniiral Kaniimura, with the 
armored cruisers Mzumo, Twate, Azuma, and JbHwa, sighted 
the VlacHvostok Squadron under Admiral Zhissen, and con- 
sisting of the RuriJi', Rossia, and Oromohoi, about 20 miles off 
Ulsan, southeastern Korea, proceeding toward Port Arthur. 
The Russian fleet turned northward and firing began about 
5.30 a. m. The RuriJc was struck by a shell which wrecked 
the steering gear and left the vessel unmanageable. The 
other two vessels turned back several times to cover the 
RuriJc and allow repair of her steering gear. The attempt 
failed, the RuriJc began sinking by the stern, and the other 
two vessels steamed northward. The Naniwa and Talca- 
sJiiJio, which had now arrived, continued the engagement 
with the RuriJc, and Admiral Kamimura with the other 
vessels pursued the Rossia and Oromohoi for about two hours 
and then turned back. 

In the meantime the RuriJc had sunk and the survivors 
were being picked up by the Naniwa and TaJcasJdJio, assisted 
by the NiitaJca, TsusJiima, CJiiyoda, and a torpedo boat 
flotilla, which had arrived on the scene. The Mzumo also 
returned in time to assist in the rescue. 

Of the officers and crew of the RuriJc 437 were picked up 
uninjured, 176 were picked up wounded. Her complement 
was 768. On the other two Russian vessels there were 140 
killed and 313 wounded. 

The Japanese casualties were 45 killed and 65 wounded. 
Admiral Kamimura reported the damage to his ships as 
slight. The Iwate went to Sasebo for re])airs and re)>laced 
one of her heavy guns. 

The Rossia and Grotnohoi succeeded in reaching Vladi- 
vostok, although seriously injured. The Rossia was struck 
by 11 shells below and near the water line, the Oromohoi by 5. 
Each lost about half of its complement of officers and many 
sailors in killed and wounded. 

On August 20 the Novik, which went to Kiao Chow after 
the naval engagement of August 10 and then sailed for Vladi- 
vostok, passing to the east of Japan, and the TsusJiinia 
engaged each other for about one hour near Korsakov, Sak- 
halin. After the engagement the Novil' proceeded to the 
anchorage and the TsusJiima drew off for repairs, having 


boen struck by a shell in the hunkers and so l)a(lly daniaj^ed 
as to list. 

The CJiitosr arrived toward evening and on the 21st pro- 
ceeded to Korsakov. The Novilc was found beached and her 
crew was abandoning lier. The CJiitose fired on her for nearly 
an hour, approaching to a1)out 2,500 meters. 

A subsecpient examination by the Japanese found the 
Novik listed to starboard about 30°, bow submerged except 
the fore deck, upper deck awash more than knee-deep. 

On August 23 the Sevastopol, while outside the harbor 
bombarding the left flank of the Japanese Third Army, 
struck a mine and was towed back into Port Arthur. 

On August 24 the Russiaii destroyer Vunoslivni struck a 
mine and sank about 2 miles off Laotiehshan; a second 
destroyer struck a mine about the same time but was towed 
back into Port Arthur. 

On September 3 the Japanese destroyer Hayatori, wlule 
engaged in the blockade of Port Arthur, struck a mine and 

On September 11 the Russian transport Lena, which had 
been converted into a cruiser with an armament of 23 guns 
and a complement of 16 officers and 488 men, under command 
of Captain Berlinski, entered San Francisco Harbor after 
thirty-one days out from Vladivostok. She was subse- 
quently disarmed and her crew interned vmtil the end of the 

On September 18 the Japanese coast defense vessel Heiyen 
struck a mine in Pigeon Bay and sank; but 4 out of her com- 
plement of 289 were saved. 

During the month of September the Japanese cruiser 
OtavM, 3,048 tons displacement, 18 guns armament, and 
maximum speed of 21 knots, was completed. 

On the night of October 21 the Baltic Fleet, or Second 
Pacific Squadron, while passing over the Dogger Banks in the 
North Sea, fired on boats of the Hull fishing fleet, sinking 
the Crane, killing the captain and mate and wounding the 
remainder of the crew, 6 in number. 

The Russian admiral reported he was attacked by two 
strange torpedo boats and that the firing was produced by 
such attack. The fishermen claimed no vessels other than 


the Kiissian and lishijig- boats were in that vicinity. After 
several days of excited correspondence the two governments 
agreed to submit the matter to an international commission 
of inquiry composed of five naval officers of high rank. 

The composition and organization of the Second Pacific 
Squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Rozhestvenski, were 
as follows: 

First battleship division : Kniaz-Suvarov (flying the flag of 
Admiral Rozhestvenski, in immediate command of this divi- 
sion), Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, and Orel. 

Second battleship division: Oslabya (flying the flag of 
Rear- Admiral Felkersham, commanding the division), Sissoi 
VeliH, Navarin, and the armored cruiser Admiral NaMimov. 

Cruiser division: Dmitri Donskoi (flying the flag of Rear- 
Admiral Enquist, in command of the division), Aurora, 
Svietlana, Almaz, Zhemtchug, Kuban, Vral, and Terelc. 

First flotilla of destroyers: (Captain Shamov in command) 
Bodri, Buini, Bistri, Bezupreshchni. 

Second flotilla of destroyers: (Captain Baranov in com- 
mand) Brain, Biedovi, Blestiashchi. 

Division of military transports and auxiliary ships. 

Military transports: Kamtchatka (repair ship) and Anadir. 

Auxiliary ships : Korea, Malaya, J/e^^or (condensing plant), 
Kitai, Kniaz-Gortchakov, Jupiter, Mercury, Vladimir, Voronezh, 
Ta7nbov, Yaroslav, Kiev (flying the flag of Captain Radlov, in 
command of the division), and Orel (hospital ship). 

The fleet proceeded in two sections, the first, under 
Rozhestvenski and composed of the heavier draft vessels, 
proceeding via the Cape of Good Hope, the second, under 
Felkersham, proceeding via the Suez Canal, and rendezvoused 
at Nossi Be, northeast of Madagascar, where it was joined by 
a complementary division which passed the Suez Canal in 
January, 1905. This division, j)rovisionally under the com- 
mand of Captain Dobrotvorski, composed of the cruisers 
Oleg, Izumrud, Don, Rion {Smolensk), and Dneiper iPeters- 
hurg) and the destroyers Grozni, Gromki, Prozorlivi, Pronzi- 
telni, and Pritki, was distributed among the divisions of the 
Second Squadron. 

The transport Irtish passed through the Suez Canal on 
January 2(S, 1905, to join the Second Squadron. 



Jjiitcr the* squudroii \\ tis a<:;;un n'oiilorcc'd in the neighhor- 
hood of Kaniranh Bay, Cochin China, by the first division 
of the Third Sejuiuhon, wlncli left T^il)au Fehniary 15, IDOo, 
and was composed of Kmperof Nicolas I, squach'on battleship 
(flying the flag of Rear-Adniiral Nebogatov, in command of 
the division); Admiral Seniarin, General- Admiral Apraxin, 
Admiral Ushakov (armored guardships) ; Vladimir- Mono- 
macJi (armored cruiser) ; Russ (sea tug) ; Zenia (repair ship) ; 
Ocean (transport); Kostroma (hospital ship). 

On Novemlxn- 6, 1904, the Japanese gunboat Atago was 
wrecked on a submerged rock in the Gulf of Pcchili. 

On Novem})er 16 the Russian destroyer Rastoropni entered 
Chefoo with despatches from Port Arthur. The crew was 
landed and the vessel blo\\ai up by her commander. 

On November 30 the Japanese cruiser Saiyen struck a 
mme, while cooperating with the Third Ai'uiy at Port Ai'thur, 
and sank. Of her complement of 16 officers and 213 men, 
the commander, Captain Tajima, and 38 others were lost. 

On December 12 the Sevastopol, which had anchored out- 
side the harbor at Port Arthur, was attacked by Japanese 
torpedo boats. All other battleships and cruisers in Port 
Ai'thur had been so badly damaged, either by the Japanese 
heavy siege guns and naval batteries or intentionally by the 
Russians, as to be helpless. In the early morning of the 13th 
the attack was renewed, and one Japanese torpedo boat was 
struck by a shell and so badly damaged that she was towed 
away by one of her comrades. A third attack was made 
about 6 a. m. The torpedoes launched by the Japanese, 
while exploding, did not produce their full effect on account 
of torpedo nets and other defensive means employed by the 
Sevastopol. There were three Japanese casualties in the 
attack at 6 a. m., 3 torpedo boats receiving one shot each. 

On Deceml^er 12 the Japanese protected cruiser Takasago 
struck a mine off the entrance to Pechili Gulf and sank. But 
133 of her complement of 500 w^ere saved by the Otawa, 
which arrived shortly after the Takasago sank. 

On December 15 the Japanese torpedo boats agam attacked 
the Sevastopol, also the coast defense vessel OtvazTini and 
the torpedo-boat destroyers, losing 3 killed and 3 wounded. 
It was reported unofficially that the Japanese lost a torpedo 
boat in these attacks on the Sevastopol. 


On the night of December 16 tlie Japanese torpedo boats 
torpedoed and destroyed a llussian destroyer near the 

On the 22d Achniral Togo reported that the Sevastopol 
was so badly (Lamaged that she could not, under the condi- 
tions existing in Port Arthur, be repaired. On the same 
day he reported that he had arranged to withdraw the 
combmed fleet from before Port Arthur, having arranged for 
a closer watch to prevent ships running the blockade and 
to watch the remnant of the Russian scpiadron, consisting 
of the Otvazhni and several torpedo-boat destroyers. 

On January 2, 1905, four Russian destroyers, the Slcori, 
Stratni, Vlastni, and Serrliti, arrived at Chefoo from Port 
Arthur, and were disarmed. Two others, the Smirli and 
Boilci, went to Kiao Chow, where they also were disarmed. 

All war vessels remaining in the harbor were blown up 
b}^ the Russians prior to capitidation. The Sevastopol and 
Otvazhni were towed into deep water and sunk. 

About March 16, 1905, Admiral Rozhestvenski left Nossi 
Be and proceetled to Kamranh Bay; passing Singapore 
April 8 and arriving April 12. The length of his stay at 
the latter place was made the subject of a diplomatic protest 
by Japan to the French Government. 

On April 22 he left Kamranh Bay with the greater part 
of his vessels, the remainder sailmg on the 25th, and rendez- 
voused in the vicinity of Saddle Islands, off Shanghai, 
where he was joined on May 10 by Admiral Nebogatov's 
division, which had passed Port Said on March 24, and 
Singapore on ^Iay5. Leaving at Saddle Islands and neigh- 
borhood the greater part of the transports and colliers with 
the converted cruisers Don, Kuban, Terek, Bion (Smolensk) , 
and Dneiper {Petersburg), Admiral Rozhestvenski proceeded 
north with the following: 

First battle-ship division: Kniaz Suvarov (flying the 
Admiral's flag). Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, and Orel. 

Second battle-ship division: Oslahya (flying the flag of 
Rear-Admiral Felkersham), Sissoi Veliki, Navarin, and 
Admiral NakJiimov. 

Third battle-ship division: Emperor Nicolas I (flying the 
flag of Rear- Admiral Nebogatov), G eneral- Admiral A praxin, 
Admiral Seniavin, and AdTniral Ushakov. 


Cruiser division: Ol(</ (llyiii^^ the lla<i of Jlear-Admiral 
Enqiiist), Aurora, Vladimir Monomacli, Dmitri Donskoi. 

Li<,dit cruiser division; Svietlana (flying tlie fla^; of Captain 
Sclu'iiie), Almaz, Ural, ZJierntcliug, and Izurnrud. 

The torpedo boats and destroyers: Bodri, Buni, Bravi, 
B(2Uj>reshchni, Blestiashchi, Bistri, Biedovi, Grozni, and 

Transports: Kamtchatka, Anadir, Irtish, and Korea. 

Sea tu(i;s: Buss and Swir. 

Hospital slii|)s: Oni and Kostroma. 

En route from Satldle Islands to the Sea of Japan the 
first and second divisions of the Russian fleet formed the 
starboard colimm, the third and fourth divisions formed 
the port column, the vessels of the light cruiser division 
were used as scouts, the transports, tugs, and hospital ships 
followed in and in rear of the interval between the columns. 

On May 27, while approaching the eastern channel of the 
Straits of Korea, the Russian fleet detected, at about 7 a. m., 
oft" to the right, the Izumi; the Dmitri Donskoi fired on the 
Izum,i, which returned the fire and vanished in the fog. 

This vessel was the left Mdng scout of the inner cordon, 
consisting of the Third (Vice-Admiral Kataoka's cruiser) 
Squadron preceded by scouts. The first (battle ship) divi- 
sion, the second (armored cruiser) division, and the fourth 
(Yice-Admiral Uryu's detachment) division, because of the 
receipt of a wireless message from one of the advanced 
scouts, the Shinano Maru, at 5 a. m., of the approach and 
course of the Russian fleet, rendezvoused with the torpedo- 
boat flotillas, about noon, at a point about 10 miles north 
of Okinoshima. 

At this time the paper organization of the Japanese fleet 
was as follows: 

Commantler of fleet and First Squadron, Admiral Togo, 
with Vice-Admiral Kato as chief of staiT. The First Squad- 
ron contained the first and third divisions: 

The first division, A ice-Admiral Misu, contained the 
battle-ships Mikasa, Shikishima, Fuji, Asalii, and the 
armored cruisers Kasuga and NissJiin. 

The third division, Vice-Admiral Dewa, contained the 
protected cruisers Kasagi, Chitose, Niitaka, Otawa, and 


Tatsuta. It seems to have acted more or lesa independently 
of the First Squadron and was called the Dewa Detachment. 

The Second Squadron, Vice-Admiral Kamimura, contained 
the second and fourtli divisions: 

The second division, Rear-Admiral Shimamiira, contained 
the armored cruisers Idzumo, Adzuma, Tokiwa, Yakumo, 
Asama, and Iwate. 

The fourtli division, Vice-Admiral Uryu, contained the 
protected cruisers Naniwa, TaJcashiho, Tsushima, Akashi, 
and Chihaya. 

The Third Squadron, Vice-Admiral Kataoka, contained 
the fifth and sixth divisions: 

The fifth divsion, Rear-Admiral Takeomi, contained the 
armored cruiser Ohiyoda, the protected cruisers ItsuJcushima, 
Matsusliima, and Hashidate, and the coast -defense sliip 

The sixth division, Rear-Admiral Togo, contained the 
protected cruisers Izumi, AMtsushijna, Suma, and Yayetjama. 
It seems to have operated more or less independently of the 
Third Squadron and was called the Togo Detachment. 

There was a seventh division, Rear-Admiral Yamada, con- 
taining the coast-defense ship Fusoo, and the gunboats Banjo, 
Cliiokai, Vji, Maya, Tsukuslii, Ahagi, and Sumida. 

There were 21 destroyers divided into five divisions, the 
division commanders being Captains Fujimoto and Yajima 
and Commanders Yosliijima, Suzuki, and Hirose. 

There were in the neighborhood of 60 torpedo boats, 
usually in groups of four, whose commanders were Lieutenants 
Fukuda, Kawase, Fusimota, Otaki, Wakagagashi, Aoyama, 
Kawada, Seko, Kondo, Matsuoka, Kubo, Ogawa, Sakamoto, 
Narutomi, Wada, Ibari, and Otaki. 

There was also a special squadron, Rear-Admiral Ogura, 
containing the following auxiliary cruisers that had been 
called in from the merchant marine : America Maru, Nippon 
Maru, Ilonglcong Maru, Yawata Maru, Shinano Maru, Bingo 
Maru, Sado Maru, Tainan Maru, Taichin Maru, Daijin 
Maru, Haijo Maru, Fleijo Maru, MansTiu Maru, Koryo 
Maru, and Kasuga Maru. 

Shortly after 10 a. m. the Russians saw off to the westward 
Vice-Admiral Dewa's detachment sailino- toward the entrance 


t)f (lie strait as tlioii^'li to intersect the course of tlie Kussiau 
fleet. Shortly after 11 a. in. Felkersham's division opened 
fire airainst these vessels, which went about and disappeared 
in the fo^:;. 

At 1.20 p. m. the Russians again saw to port some of the 
vess(ds of theKataoka squadron and Dewa and Togo detacli- 
nients, now sailing northeast to effect a junction with the 
main Japanese fleet near Okinoshinia. 

The Russian fl(>et had approached the straits in two 
columns, hut at 11.40 a. m. formed into single column, the 
first battleship division leading and follow^ed by the second 
and third battlesliij^ divisions and then the cruiser division, 
while to the right were the transports and scouts accom- 
panied by the light cruiser division. At noon the course was 
changed to nortli 23° east and the leading division fell off a 
little to starboard and then held itself in column. 

At 1.40 p. m. the Russians sighted the Japanese main fleet. 
At 2.05 p. m. the leading Japanese vessel turned to port and 
the first division, followed b}" the second, advanced obliquely 
against the head of the Russian column. The Third Squad- 
ron and the Dewa and the Togo detachments, which had 
now reached the Japanese main fleet, steamed south to attack 
the Russian rear. 

The sky was clear, the horizon foggy, a moderately strong 
breeze was blowing from the southwest, and the sea was suf- 
ficiently high to interfere with the maneuvers of the torpedo 

At 2. OS p. m. the Russians at 8,500 meters opened fire, 
which was returned a little later by the Japanese wdien the 
range had been reduced to 6,000 meters. 

The Russian transports fell off to starboard, leaving the 
cruisers on their left and the scouts behind them. The head 
of the Russian column gradually fell off to starboard, thus 
causing the fleet to maneuver on the arc of a circle within 
which were the transports and destroyers. 

The second Japanese division came on to the arc of the 
outer circle on which their first division was maneuvering and 
with it concentrated their fire on the leading Russian vessels 
and those flying Admirals' flags, using high explosive shells at 
first and then armor-piercing projectiles. 


At 3.10 p. lu. the Oddhijd turned turtle and sank. The 
greater part of the officers and crew were taken off by de- 
stroyers before the vessel sank. 

The Kniaz Suvarov was unmanageable at tliis time, and in 
endeavoring to protect tliis vessel the other Russian vessels 
fell into more or less confusion. The Japanese first division 
had by tliis time forged ahead of the Russian column, led by 
the Borodino, heading nearly southeast. Thinking the Rus- 
sian vessels had headed north to pass in rear of the second 
division, the vessels of the first division turned 16 points to 
the left and steamed nearly northwest, the Nisshin leading. 
The second division also went about and followed the first 

Up to this time the most important damage to the Japan- 
ese fleet had been inflicted on the Asama, which was com- 
pelled to leave the Ime of battle by injuries to the steering 
gear and the entrance of water. After effecting temporary 
repairs the Asama rejoined the firing line. 

The Shiranui, of the Hirose flotilla, and the Asahiwo, of the 
Suzuki flotilla, were both severely injured while attempting 
to torpedo the Kniaz Suvarov at about 3.40 and 4.55 p. m., 
respectively, but were saved from sinking. One of the torpe- 
does discharged in the latter attack struck the Suvarov on the 
port side near the stern, causing a list of about 10°. 

The Suvarov was, however, in a helpless condition before 
this attack. Admiral Rozhestvenski, wounded, and some of 
the members of his staff were transferred about 3.30 p. m. to 
the Buini, one of the boats which had received the crew of 
the Oslahya. The command of the fleet was then transferred 
to Vice-Admiral Nebogatov. 

At about 4.40 p. m., havmg agam gone about and while 
steaming nearly southeast, the Japanese first and second divi- 
sions lost sight of the Russian armored vessels and steamed 
south, the second division leading, firing on special service 
vessels and scouts. At 5.30 p. m. the first division went 
about and steamed north, while the second division steamed 
to the southwest and took part in the action against the Rus- 
sian cruiser squadrons and service ships. 

About 5.40 p. m, the first division sank the ZJral, continued 
northward and came into action against six of the Russian 
armor clads steaming to the northeast. The first division. 


stcaiiiliii; parallel to and i'astcr than (hcsc vessels, caiisecl the 
latter to jijradiially turn to the north and then to tlie north- 
west, and nearly west, the Bowdlno leadlji<j:. 

To the left ol" the Russian armor elads were tiie (fl((i, A urom, 
Dniifri Donskol, and Vladir.iir Monoinach; to the left of these 
W(M-e the remaining; transj)orts eseorted by the Svietlana and 
AliiKiz; the destroyers, the Zhenitchurj, and the huinrud were 
still farther to the left. 

About 7.20 ]). ni. the Borodino, on whicli a serious fire had 
broken out, settletl to starboanl and sank, a])])arently from 
the explosion of the niagazuie. About the same time the 
Ahxander III, which had horn compelled to leave the line of 
battle some time before, also sank. 

At sunset, about 7.35 p. m., the Japanese first division drew 
ofl' to the east to allow the tor]:)edo-boat flotillas, which were 
apjiroaching from three sides, to attack during the night. 

Durmg this time the cruiser squadron and special-service 
ships of the Russians had been engaged with that portion of 
the Japanese fleet which had steamed south on receipt of the 
battle orders at 2 p. m. The Dewa and the Uryii detach- 
ments, keeping m touch, at 2.45 p. m. opened fire against the 
Russian criuser squadron while steammg parallel to and in 
the opposite direction, made a detour across the rear and 
steamed ])arallel to and in the same du-ection as the Russian 
vessels. This maneuver was repeated several times. 

About 4.20 p. m. the Ur}m detachment sank the Irtish and 
a little later disabled the Kamtchatka. At about this time 
the Third Squadron joined the Dewa and the Uryu detach- 
ments in the attack. 

At 4.40 p. m. four Russian armor clads joined from the 
north with the cruiser squadron and with it inflicted consid- 
erable damage on the Japanese vessels. 

Vice-Admiral Dewa had at that time transferred to Vice- 
Admiral Uryu all his vessels except the Kasagi and the Clii- 
tose, and with these two vessels ran into the quiet waters of 
Aburadani Bay. Vice-Admiral Dewa came out the same 
evenmg on the Chitose, but the Kasagi was too badly damaged 
to take any part in the fighting on the next day. 

At 5.10 p. m. the Naniwa, flagship of the Uryu detachment, 
was hit below the water line and compelled to retire for 

34526—07- 11 


At 5.30 p. m. the Japanese second divisioji joined in this 
attack on the Russian cruiser squadron and four armor dads 
which had joined at 4.40 p. m. 

During this fighting the Dewa and Uryu detachments con- 
centrated their fire principally on the transports, the Sviet- 
lana, the Almaz, and the Ural. The crew of the Ural was by 
order from the Svietlana transferred to the Korea prior to the 
sinkmg of the Ural by the first division at 5.40 p. m. 

The Svietlana, struck below the water line, fell out of the 
line but subsequently regained her place. The Dmitri Don- 
skoi and Vladimir Monomach several times left the line to 
protect the transports. 

As the cruiser squadron continued to give way it uncovered 
the Kniaz Suvarov and the repair ship Kamtchatka, both dis- 
abled. The Togo detachment sank the Kamtchatlca at 7.10 
p. m., and the Fujimoto destroyer flotilla twice torpedoed the 
Suvarov, which sank at 7.20 p. m. 

About this time the Japanese squadrons and detachments 
received the wireless message from the Tatsuta giving Admiral 
Togo's order to assemble at Ullondo Island, and steamed 
away to the northeast. 

At the time of withdrawal of the various Japanese squad- 
rons the course of the Russian fleet was north 23° west. 
The various Japanese torpedo-boat flotillas which had ren- 
dezvoused in Miura Bay (Tsushima) prior to the engagement, 
taking shelter from the high sea, attacked the Russian vessels 
at 8.15 p. m., the Fujimoto destroyer flotilla against the head 
of the armor-clad column from the north, the Yajima de- 
stroyer flotilla and the Kawase torpedo-boat flotilla from 
the northeast, the Yoshijima destroyer flotilla against the 
rear from the east, the Hirose (Juntaro) destroyer flotilla 
from the southeast. The torpedo-boat flotillas under 
Fukuda, Otaki, Kondo, Aoyama, and Kawada pursued from 
the south both the armor-clad column and the cruisers 
steaming parallel with and to the left rear of the armor clads. 

On the approach of the flotillas the Russian armor clads 
turned 8 points to port, so as to lessen the distance separating 
them from the cruisers. The latter also turned to port and 
the Oleg, Aurora, and Zhemtchug continued to the south, while 
the others, with the armor clads, again turned to port and 
proceeded in an eastern direction. 


The lii'e ol" the llolihiis was aided by the I'acl that their ap- 
]) roach compelled the Russian vessels to use their search- 
lijj;lits, thus l){>trayiii<:; their location and facilitatin<^ the use 
ol" the searchlights of the ilotillas. 

The Sissoi VeliJci, Admiral Nakhimov, and \ladimir Mono- 
much were torpedoed and rendered helpless. On the side of 
the Japanese, torpedo boat No. 6;) (connnander's boat) of the 
Fukuda llotilla, No. 34 (commander's boat) of the Aoj^ama 
Hot ilia, and No. 35 of the Kawada flotilla, were suidv by ^\xr\ 
lire; their crews were saved l)y their companion boats, the 
Karigane, No. 31, No. 62, and others. The destroyers Ilar- 
usame, Akatsukl, Jlazuchi, and Yugiri and torpedo boats 
Sagi, Nos. 33 and G8 were so badly damaged by gun hre and 
collisions that they were temporarily compelled to withdraw 
from the fight. 

At 2 a. m. on the 2Sth the Suzuki flotilla torpedoed and 
sank the Navarin. 

At dawn on the 2Sth the Japanese first and second divisions 
were about 20 miles south of Ullondo Island when the Third 
Squadron, from a pomt about 60 miles farther south, re- 
ported the presence of Russian ships to the east. These 
ships proved to be the battle ships Orel and Emperor Nicolas I, 
the coast-defense ships General-Admiral Apraxin and Ad- 
nilral Seniavin, and the cruiser Izumrud, Admiral Nebogatov 
commanding. The first and second divisions approached 
from the west; the Third Squadron and the Uryu detachment 
approached from the south. At 10.30 a. m. the Russian ves- 
sels were surrovmded at a point 8 miles south of Takeshima 
(Liancourt Rocks) . The Izumrud escaped ; the others surren- 
dered. The Orel was taken to Maizuru, the Nicolas I, Apraxin, 
and Seniavin to Sasebo. The four vessels in the order given 
were renamed Iwami, Iki, Okinoshima, and Minoshima. 

The Izumrud, after escaping, proceeded north, and at 1.30 
a. m. on May 30, wdiile entering Vladimir Bay, ran on a reef, 
where she was blown up by her commander, Captain Versen, 
after the crew had landed. 

At 7 a. m,, wliile proceeding northw^ard, the Uryu detach- 
ment discovered the Svietlana and the destroyer Bistri off to 
the west. A section containing the Otawa and Niikihi, under 
command of Captain Arima, was sent in pursuit and an 
engagement ensued, lasting about one hour. At 11.06 a. m. 


the Svietlana sank oil" Cliekuryon Bay. The Niitaka, in 
cooperation with the destroyer Murakumo, continued in pur- 
suit of the Bistri, which ran a<ii;roiind and was destroyed in a 
small bay about 5 miles north of Cliekuryon Bay. 

The survivors from the two Russian vessels were taken on 
board the Japanese special service ships America Maru and 
Kasuga Maru. 

The Japanese destroyer Shiranui and the special service 
ship Sado Maru, at a point about 5 miles east of Kotosaki, 
Tsushima, discovered the Admiral NaJchimov at 5.30 a. m. on 
May 28, and a little later the Vladimir Monomach, both in a 
sinking condition. After the crews had been removed the 
vessels sank, about 10 a. m. 

The GromTci appeared in this neighborhood, was pursued 
by the Shiranui and torpedo boat No. 63, and captured off 
Ulsan in a sinking condition at 11.30 a. m. She sank at 
12.43 p. m., the crew having been previously removed. 

The special-service ships Shinano Maru, Tainan Maru, and 
Yawata Maru, at a point about 30 miles northeast of Karaski, 
Tsushima, discovered the Sissoi Veliki m a sinking condition. 
The vessel sank at 11.05 a. m., the survivors being rescued. 

The Admiral TJshakov was pursued from near the place of 
Admiral Nebogatov's sm-render by the Iwate and Yalxumo 
and suiils; a little after 5 p. m.; about 300 survivors were 

The Dmitri Donskoi, steaming north, was discovered and 
followed by the Uryu detachment at 5 p. m. She was 
headed at a point some 30 miles south of Ullondo Island at 
7 p. m. by the Otawa, the Niitaka, and the destroyers Asaglri, 
Shirakumo, and FuhuJci. The firing continued until dark, 
when the destroyers attacked. Although seriously damaged, 
the Dmitri Donskoi escaped from her pursuers. Toward 
morning of the 29th her crew was landed on Ullondo Island 
and the vessel sunk by opening tlie Kingston valves. The 
survivors were taken on board the Kasuga and Fuhuki. 

The Buini, after having transferred Admiral Rozhestven- 
ski and staff to the Biedovi, and about 200 survivors of the 
Oslahya to the Dmitri Donskoi, sank. 

The Biedovi, with Admiral Rozhestvenski and staff, was 
captured by the destroyers Sazanami and Kagero about 40 
miles southwest of Ullondo Island about 4.45 p. m. 


Of the roniainiiit:; Russian torpedo l)oats the (irozni reached 
Vladivostok on May 29, the Bravi on the .31st. Tlie Bodrl 
and Blestiafihchi escaped south iii conij)any. About 5 a. m. 
May 28, the crew of the Blestiashchi, which was no lonjjer 
manat^^eable, was transferred to the Bodri and the former 
vessel sunk b}^ openinj:; the Kingston valves. The Bodri, after 
exhaust ing her water and fuel, was j^icked up in latitude 32° 
22' N., longitude 112° 42' E., by the British merchant vessel 
Kueling and towed into Wusung, where she was ijiterned. 
The Bezwpreshclini was missing. 

The Aurora, Oleg, and Zhemtchug , Rear Admiral Enquist 
commanding, arrived on June 3 at Manila, where they were 

The Almaz reached Vladivostok on May 29. 

The transport Korea and the sea tug Swir reached Wusung 
on Ma}^ 30, and were interned, as were six other transports 
that had gone into that port from the vicinity of Saddle 

The Anadir escaped and on June 28 arrived at Diego Suarez 
with a portion of the survivors of the Zlral. 

The Kostroma and Orel were taken to Sasebo by the Japa- 
nese on suspicion of violation of some of the provisions of The 
Hague Conference. The first was afterwards released, the 
second was confiscated. 

Tlie Russian casualties were 191 officers and 4,500 men 
killed and woimded and 6,143 captured. 

The Japanese reported their total casualties for this engage- 
ment as 116 oilicers and men killed, 538 wounded; their total 
naval casualties for the war, 221 officers and 1,782 men killed, 
170 officers and 1,497 men wounded, making a total of 2,003 
killed and 1,667 wounded. 

Early in June the Dneiper {Petersburg) transferred to the 
Dutch steamer Flores in the Straits of Malacca 41 of the 
Chinese crew and the mails of the British steamer >S'. Kilda, 
captured by the Dneiper with contraband on board in the 
China Sea on June 4 and sunk the next day. The European 
oflicers of the ship were retained by the Dneiper. 

On June 5 the Terel' sank the British vessel Il'liona, about 
150 miles north of Hongkong, transferring the crew to the 
Dutch vessel PerlaJc. 


On June 22 the Terel: similarly sank the Danish vessel 
Princess Marie. A few days later the Terek was disarmed 
and interned at Batavia. 

On May 30 the Don sank the German steamer Tetartos in 
the North China Sea on the charge of carryhig contraband, 
consisting of railroad timber and sleepers. The crew of the 
Tetartos was landed at Batavia. 


In Korea the Japanese, early in 1905, began the concentra- 
tion of the Sixth Army under General Hasegawa. The prin- 
cipal forces landed at Gensan and operated north along the 
coast in the direction of and against the Russian Adadivostok 
army under General Kasbeck, that had sent expeditions into 
and occupied northern Korea. 

By June the advance of General Hasegawa was in contact 
with the Russian forces and several engagements of greater 
or less severity, none of wliich reached a magnitude to merit 
the designation of battle, occured. On July 24 the Japanese 
dislodged the Russians from and occupied Puryang and Puku. 
The advent of the rainy season and the sessions of the peace 
conference at Portsmouth suspended serious operations on the 
part of these two opposing armies. 

On July 7 another Japanese force landed near Korsakovsk, 
capital of Sakhalin, and occupied the town, the Russian 
garrison withdrawing after having blown up the coast-defense 
guns and burned the government buildings. General Ilare- 
guchi commanded the Japanese forces operating in tliis region; 
General Liapunov commanded the Russian troops. 

With the aid of the fleet and transports, the Japanese j^ro- 
ceeded to various points on the island, overpowered the small 
Russian garrisons, and occupied the important villages with- 
out any very serious engagements. The bulk of the Russian 
garrison, 70 officers and 3,200 men, surrendered July 31. The 
final skirmish did not take place until September 1, 1905, but 
four days before the treaty of i:)eace was signed. 


On the initiative of President Roosevelt, plenipotentiaries 
were appointed by the two nations, Baron Konuiro and Mr. 
Takaliira by Japan, Count Witte and Baron Rosen by Russia, 
to meet and discuss terms of peace. 


The conference assembled at Portsmouth, N. II., Au<!;iist 29. 
The treaty was signed Septemper 5 and ratifications were 
exchanged November 25, 1905. 

By the terms of the treaty Russia recognized the i)aramoimt 
interest of Japan in Korea, transferred to Japan tbe Chinese 
East Siberian Railway south of Changchun (Kuanchengtzu), 
that part of Saklialin south of fiftieth parallel, and the 
Russian Liaotung lease, covering an area of about 500 scpuire 
miles, containing Port Arthur and Dalny (Tairen). Japanese 
subjects were granted certain fishing privileges along the 
Siberian littoral. Manchuria was returned to Cliina, and the 
troops of Russia and Japan, in excess of 15 men per kilometer 
of railway as guards for the same, were to be withdrawn 
within eiirhteen months. 


I !'o 

I N 1 ) F. X 


Admiral Nakhiiiiov, doslniclion of Ifi I 

Admiral Fshukov, destruction of 1(1 1 

Akatsuki, loss of 1-M 

Ak'xander III, destruction of Kil 

Ahnaz, arrival of, at Vladivostok 105 

Anadir, arrival of, at Diego Suarez 105 


Cossack attack on 12 

Japanese advance on 5 


Arrangement of Russian forces defending 57 

Withdrawal of Russian forces defending GO 

Atago, loss of 155 

Battle of Sha River: 

Capture of Russian guns in 87, 88, 91 

Japanese plan at 84 

Withdrawal of Russian left in 88 

Biedovi, capture of 164 

Buini, sinking of 164 

Burakov, destruction of 149 

Bistri, destruction of 164 

Bober, at battle of Nanshan 144 

Bodri, internment of, at Wusung 165 

Bogatir, injured on rock 144 

Borodino, destruction of 161 

Bravi, arrival of, at' Vladivostok 165 

Chefoo, disarmament of Russian destroyers at 156 

Chemulpo, naval engagement near 136 

('hengju, skirmish at 5 

Chentanpu : 

Arrival of Jajianese troo])s at l)attle of 98 

Battle of 97 

Losses at battle of 101 

Russian troops at battle of 97 

Chinampo, landing of Japanese at 5 

( "hinghochen, l>eginning of Japanese attack on, in the liattle of 

Mukden Ill 

( 'zarevich, disarmament of 151 

Dalny, occupation of, by Japanese 22 


170 INDEX. 


Diana, disarmament of 151 

Dmitri Donskoi, sinking of 164 

Dogger Banks episode 153 


Capture of, by Japanese in l)at tic of Sha River 85 

Recapture of, by Russians in 1 tattle of Sha River 85 

Erhlungshan Fort: 

Attack on 34 

Capture of, l)y Japanese 39 

Fenghuangcheng, advance from, of First Japanese Army 45 

Fenshuiling, capture of, by Japanese 43 

Gromki, sinking of 164 

Grozni, arrival of, at Vladivostok 165 

Grozovoi, disarmament 151 

Hachimakiyama, capture of, l>y Japanese 33 

Haicheng, advance on, of Second Japanese Army 55 

Hatsuse, loss of 143 

Hayatori, loss of 153 

Heikoutai, battle of 97 

Heiyen, loss of 153 

Hitachi Maru, loss of 145 

Hospital ships, disposition of Russian 165 

Hsiaokushan, capture of, by Japanese 27 

Hsienchang, occupation of, by Japanese 45 

Hsihoyen, battle of 48 

Ilungshaling, Japanese attack on 58 

Ikhona, sinking of 165 

Irtish, destruction of 161 

Itzushan Fort, attack on, by Japanese 30 

Izami Maru, loss of 145 

Izumrud, loss of 163 

Japanese Eleventh Division, landing of 22 

Japanese Fifth Division, landing of 15 

Japanese First Army: 

Landing of 3 

Organization of 3 

Japanese First Cavalry Brigade, landing of 15 

Japanese Fourth Army: 

Composition of 43 

Landing of 43 

Japanese Ninth Division, landing of 26 

Japanese Second Army, landing of 13 

Japanese Seventh Division, arrival at Port Arthur 36 

Japanese Third Army, composition of, on the Kuant\mgP(>ninsula.. 22 

Japanese torpedo boats, destruction of, in battle of Sea of Japan 163 

Japanese troops, total mobilized during war 108 

Kaimon, loss of 147 

INDEX. 171 

Kai|)ing: Page. 

1 )cinonstrati()n near, l)y Roar- Admiral Toujo 1-1 

Losses at and near 21 

Occupation of, l)y Japanese 20 

Kamranh Bay, Russian fleet at 150 

Kamtcliatka, destruction of 102 

Kantashan, advance on, by Japanese 28 

ICasuga, arrival of, in Japan 137 

Keller, Lieutenaiit-( U'ueral, death of 55 

Kenchuangt/.u. skirmish at 55 


Attack on, by Russians 24 

Capture of, by Japanese 23 

Kiao Chow, disarmament of Russian destroyers at 150 

Kilda, sinking of 105 

Kinshu Maru, destruction of 141 

Kiusan, ])enetration of gap in Russian line at, (hu'iiig ])attl(' of 

Mukden 130 

Knight Commander, sinking of 148 

Korea, operations in northern 100 

Korietz, destruction of 3 

Kuantung Peninsula, operations on 22 

Kuroki, Russian plan against army of at, Liaoyang 72 

Kuropatkin Fort, attack on, by Japanese 31 


Action of Zaraisk Regiment at 59 

Arrangement of Russian forces defending 58 

Lena, disarmament of 153 


Advance of Japanese armies upon 60 

Arrangement of Russian troops in advanced position of 01 

Battle of 58 

Bridges across Taitzu River near 71 

Composition of forces at battle of 50 

Losses at battle of 78 

Withdrawal of main Russian force to right 1)ank of the Taitzu 

River 09 

Liushutun, occupation of, by Japanese 22 

Machine guns, use of, with Japanese cavalry at l)attle of Sha River. . 86 

Makarov, Vice-Admiral, death of 141 

Malacca, seizure of 148 

Mandzhur, disarmament of 140 

Manila, arrival of Russian cruisers at 165 


Capture of by Japanese 73 

Russian attack on 75 

Mishchenko, Cossack Brigade of 

Miyako, loss of 143 

172 INDEX. 

Moticnling: Page. 

First attack on, by Russians 45 

Occupation of, l^y Japanese 45 

Second attack on, by Russians 47 


Battle of 101 

Composition of troops at battle of 101 

Concentration of Japanese Third Army at battle of 110 

Concentration of Russian troops north of town to hold l)ack Japa- 
nese Third Army 128 

Dispatch of Russian reserve to left flank in l^attle of Ill 

Losses at battle of 134 

Prepared positions at battle of 109 

Russian orders for offensive movement against Japanese Third 

Army in battle of 122, 124 

Naganura Maru, destruction of 137 

Kanshan : 

Battle of 15 

Japanese troops at battle of 15 

Japanese vessels at battle of 15, 144 

Losses at battle of 16 

Russian force at and near 14 

Navarin, destruction of 163 

Nebogatov, surrender of vessels of 163 

Nisshin, arrival of, in Japan 137 

Novik, destruction of 152 

174 Meter Hill, capture of, by Japanese 29 

Orlov, defeat of, near Liaoyang 74 

Oshima, loss of 144 

Otvazhni, sinking of 156 

Oyama, departure of, from Tokyo 46 

Panling Pass, occupation of, by Japanese 50 

Panlungshan forts: 

Capture of, by Japanese 29 

Russian vsortie against 30 

Petersburg, passage of, through Bosphorus 148 

Petropavlovsk, loss of 141 

Peresviet, set on fire by Japanese artillery 33 

P. fort (Ichinohe), capture of, by Japanese 35 

Phyangyang, occupation of, ])y Japanese 4 

Plate I. Battle of the Yalu. (At end of volume.) 

Plate II. Battle of Nanshan. (At end of volume. 

Plate III. Battle of Telissu. (At end of volume.) 

Plate IV. Battle of Kaiping. (At end of volume.) 

Plate V. Kuantung Peninsula. (At end of volume.) 

Plate VI. Battle of Fenshuiling. (At end of volume.) 

Plate VII. Battles of Motienling and Yangtzuling. (At end of volume.) 

Vlate VIII. Battles of Hsihoyen and Yushulingtzu. (At end of volume.) 

Plate IX. Russian position south of Tashihchiao. (At end of volume.) 

INDEX. 173 

PlaU' X. Battle of Liaoyang. (At end of volume.) 
Plate XI. Ikittlo of Sha River. (At end of volume.) 
Plate XII. Battle of ('hentani)U. (At end of volume.) 
Plate XII I. Battle of Mukden. (At end of volume. ) 
Plate XIV. Strategic map of i)art of Korea and Manchuria. (At end 

of volume.) 
Port Arthur: 

Capture of railway l)ridge near, by Japanese 33 

Captures at , 1 )y Japanese 42 

Composition of Japanese troops acting against 22 

Composition of Third Ja])anes(! Army at 41 

Damage to Russian vessels by gun fire 33 

Description of defensive Avorks 28 

Effect of Japanese artillery fire 3(5 

First attempt to block 138 

First attack on Russian fleet at 135 

First bombardment of, by Japanese fleet 136 

General assault by Japanese 35 

General attack on, by Japanese 29 

General attack by Japanese on the Sungshushan, Erhlungshan, 

and Tungchikuanshan forts 37 

Japanese demand for surrender of 29 

Naval engagement near, on August 10, 1904 150 

Progress of siege works against 31, 34 

Sortie of Russian fleet from 145 

Russian losses at 41 

Russian troops in 40 

Second attempt to block 140 

Second general attack by Japanese in campaign against 26 

Surrender of 39 

Third attempt to block 142 

Use of wooden guns to throw grenades 33 

Portsmouth, treaty of 167 

Princess Marie, sinking of 166 


Cutting railway at, by Japanese 13 

Repair of railway bridge at, by Russians 14 


Capture of, by Japanese 92 

Recapture of, by Russians 93 

Rennenkampf, composition of Cossack division of 46 

Rastoropni, destruction of 155 

Rurik, destruction of 152 

Russian Second Pacific Squadron, composition of 154 

Russian Third Pacific Squadron, first division of 155 

Ryeshitelni, capture of ■- 151 

Saddle Islands, Russian fleet at 156 

Saiyen, destruction of 155 

Sakhalin, operations in 166 

174 INDEX. 

Sea of Japan: Page. 

Coinposilion of fleets at naval battle of 156 

Naval battle of 157 

Sevastopol, sinking of 156 

Shalingpu, attack on, by liussians in battle of Mukden 117, 118 

Sha River: 

Battle of 79 

Composition of forces at Ijattle of , . . . 80 

Disj^osition of Russian Seventeenth Corps on stream in battle of 90 

Losses in battle of 95 

Russian 2)lan at l)attle of 81 

Shuisliihying redoul)ts, attack on, by Japanese 31 

Seoul, occupation of, by Japanese 4 

Shihli River, disposition of Russian troops on, in battle of Sha River. . 85 

Shoushanpu, advance of Japanese on 63 

Sissoi Veliki, destruction of 164 

Sivuch, destruction of 149 

Skori, loss of 139 

Smolensk, passage of, through Bosphorus 148 

Ssufangtai, occupation of, by Japanese in battle of Mukden 114 

Stackelberg, retrograde movement near Yentai mines 77 

Stereguschi, loss of 139 

Strashni, destruction of 140 

Sungshushan Fort, attack of. by Japanese 34 

Sungshushan, capture of fort, by Japanese 39 

Sungshushan supporting battery, attack on, by Japanese 37 

Suvarov, destruction of 162 

Svietlana, destruction of 164 

Taihoku Maru, loss on, by explosion of mine 145 

Taitzu River, crossing of, by Japanese at battle of Liaoyang 67 

Takasago, loss of 155 

Takushan, capture of, by Japanese 27 

Tashihchiao : 

Advance on, by Japanese Second Army 50 

Battle of 50 

Composition of forces in battle of 50 

Losses at battle of 51 


Battle of 18 

Concentration and composition of Russian force at 17 

Japanese cavalry at battle of 19 

Losses at battle of 20 

Temple Hill, capture of, by Japanese in battle of Sha liivcr 84 

Terek, disarmament of, at Batavia 166 

Tetartos, sinking of 166 

Thea, sinking of 148 


Battle of 52 

Skirmish south of 46 

INDEX. 175 


Tor{)t'(l( I l)()at No. IS, lutss of I43 

Tsuckou, Japanese attack on. 1 59 

Tungchikuanshan : 

Assault on nortli fort l>y .hipancsc 3(j 

Attack on north fort of, by Japanese 30 

Attack on north and east forts by Japanese 70 

Capture of nortli fort I)y Japanese 38 

North fort mined by Japanese 35 

203 Meter Hill: 

Attack on, by Japanese 32 

Capture of, by Japanese 37 

Ural, destruction of 1 (jO 

Varyag, destruction of 3 

Vladimir ^lonomach, destruction of Ifil 

Vladivostok, l)ombardment of 139-141 

Vladivostok squadron : 

Engagement t)f, with squadron of Vice- Admiral Kaniinuu-a 1.52 

Raid by 147 

Vnimatelni, loss of 145 

Vnuchitelni, destruction of 139 

Vunoslivni, loss of 153 

Wangtai-, capture of, by Japanese 39 

Weiningying, crossing by Russians of Taitzu River near, in tlie battle 

of Sha River 82 


Advance on, by Japanese First Army 6 

Arrival of Japanese advance guard at 6 

Arrival of Japanese howitzers at 6 

Russian forces near 6 

Wusung, internment at, of Russian vessels 1G5 

Yalu River: 

Bat tie at 7 

Distribution of Russian troops at battle of 9 

Japanese bridges built over 7, 9 

Losses at battle of 12 

Yangtzuling, battle of 53 

Yashima, loss of 143 

Yenisei, loss of 137 

Yingkou, raid on 96 

Yoshino, loss of 143 

Yukuantun, fighting at, in ))attle of Mukden 127 

Yushulingtzu, battle of 53 

Zikov, Major-General, observation of Japanese Second Army by 13 




Second (Military Information) Division, General Staff, No. 12 

Influence of the Experience of the 

Siege of Port Arthur upon the 

Construction of Modern 



Professor at tfie Nicholas Academy of the General Staff 
St. Petersburg 




JUNE 30, 1908 


War Department. 

Document No. .314. 

Offlc^" of The Chief of Staff, 

Influence of the Experience of the Siege of Port 
Arthur upon the Construction of Modern Fortresses. 

On this lino of forts the battles for the defense of the fortress 
must be fouiLiht ; here the artillery and infantry must offer a de- 
cisive resistance to the enemy. — Engineering Defense of the Countri/, 
hn l\. Vdichko. 


It is tho duty of every person to publish all of the valuable 
iuforniatiou which he has acquired by experience in war. 

The great length of the siege of Port Arthur allowed the 
engineers who were in the fortress to get an insight, imder 
service conditions, into many problems of fortress construc- 
tion. As one of these engineers, I have decided to give here 
all the information which I had the opportunity to collect. 
My notes are undoubtedly incomplete, as it is possible that 
many things haA^e been overlooked. 

I hope that this work, done to the best of my ability, will 
be useful to those w^ho devote themselves to the study and 
construction of fortifications. 


In the translation, the Russian designations of the de- 
fensive works, where numerals and letters were used, have 
been retained. Russian names have as far as possible been 
translated into English. As many of the fortifications and 
topographical features about Port Arthur are better known 
under designations applied to them by the Japanese and by 
military observers and correspondents, the following table 
has been prepared to connect these features with their sev- 
eral names, and a map of the Kuangtung Peninsula using the 
more familiar names has been added. 

The designations used for the various defensive works en- 
able them to be readily located, as they are numbered and 
lettered, according to their class, from right to left or contra- 
clockwise around the fortress. The following classification 
indicates the nature of the works: Forts (permanent), re- 
doubts (more or less temporary), fortifications, lunettes, capo- 
niers, and batteries (seacoast and land). This classification, 
based on the project for the fortress, does not always indicate 
the relative importance of the works at the time of the siege. 
for, as w^ill be seen, most of the forts, uncompleted at the out- 
break of the war, were really only temporary works during 
the siege, while Redoubt No. 3, called temporary, w^as in fact 
as strong as most of the forts. It is generally rated as a fort 
by other writers. 

Some explanation is necessary in regard to the term 
'" caponier " which is extensively used by the author, and has 
been retained for convenience in the translation. In addition 
to the usually understood use of the term, as a portion of the 
main work projecting into the ditch from which a flanking 
fire on the ditch may be obtained, the author in his discus- 
sion of rear (gorge) caponiers, contemplates the use of cer- 
tain '• intermediate rear caponiers " not only to afford flank- 
ing fire on the gorge ditches, but also on the intermediate 


interval to the next fort. In further extension of this idea 
of flanking the intervals between forts, he uses the term 
'* caponier " to designate certain intermediate temporary 
works, constructed for the purpose of supporting the inter- 
vals by flanking fire. The word " fortification," for want of 
a better term, has been used to designate four small numbered 
redoubts on the main line of defense in order to distinguish 
them from other redoubts on the main line. 

Tithlc (if orrcNiJoinliiii/ iiiiiik -i of irorlcs diid f( (tfiin s. 

Text. Japanese or otiicr drsij^natioii. 

Fort No. 1 Pai-yin-sliiin, Old l"oit. 

fTung-cbi-kuan-sliau, Xdrlli. 
Fort No. II {^^ ^. „ , 

[North Keo-kuan. 

Fort No. Ill Frlunj,'sLian, Urlungshan. 

Fort No, IV Itziislinii. 

Fort No. V T.^-.vaii.u-l<tni, Noilh. 

Redoubt No. 1 On Twin I'cak. 

^ , , ,, ^ fTnng-cbi-kuan-sLian, .Scnitbeast. 

Redoubt No. 2 , J.^, ., . ,- i 

iSoutbeast Kee-kuan. 

Redoubt No. 3 Sung-shu-sban. 

Redoubt No. 4 Ta-antzu-sban. 

Redoubt No. 5 Hsitaiyangkou. 

Takbe Redoubt Southeast Redoubt. 

Caponier No. 1 Pai-yiu-sbau, New Fort. 

Battery A Pai-yin-shan, North. 

„ ^ fTuug-chi-kuan-shan, East. 

Battery B J, Ti' i • 

|East Kee-kuan. 

Kuropatkin Lunette Battery Q. 

Caponier No. li Battery P. 

Fortification No. 1 East Paulun.^sban. 

Fortification No. 2 AVest Panlungsban. 

Caponier No. '.i Battery (J. 

Letters Battery Battery R. 

Small Eagle Nest Battery M. 

Eagle Nest Wangtai, Van tai. TA'antai. 

Redoubts Battery Battery H. 

Wolf Battery Ro. Battery. 

Mound Battery Tungshushan Annexed Battery. 

Aqueduct Redoubt Fort Kuroi>atkin. 

Idol Redoubt Shui-shih-ying Redoubt. 

Battery C Ilsiao-an-tzu-shan. 

Battery I) ( Saitper) Hsiao-an-tzu-shau. 

Division Hill Long Ridge. 

Long Hill Naniakayama. 

Flat Hill Asakayania. 

Wolf Ridge Feug-huang-shan. 


('llAl'TlOK I 11 

riaii of iiKxltTii fortresses in Russia and al)road — Kt'atuics 
of modern land fortresses. 

C'lIAl'TKK II 15 

The plan of the fortress of Port Arthur — The main line of 
defense — Advanced works — The central enceinte — Colonel Ve- 
lichko's plan — General scheme of the land defenses. 

Chaptkk III 29 

Condition of the fortress at the bejitinning of the war — En- 
gineering work done during mobilization — Necessity for plan 
of action in case of unexpected mobilization — Military roads — 
Condition of the fortress at the beginning of the invest- 
ment — Armaments and forces of the belligerents — Comments — 
l^abor and transportation employed during mobilization. 


Importance of advanced positions — Importance of constant 
observatioTi of the intervals between forts and of provision for 
covering the intervals with rifle fire as demonstrated by the first 
great assault — Intermediate rear caponiers. 

Ch after V 76 

Length of the intervals between forts — Filling in the intervals 
between forts and the role of the central enceinte — Bombproof 
shelters for the garrisons of the intervals — Masking of the de- 

Chapter VI 95 

Permanent and temporary emplacements — Magazines — For- 
tress communications — Searchlights — The telephone and the 

Chapter VII 122 

Garrison for a modern fortress — Infantry — Engineer troops. 

Chapter VIII 132 

Details of the construction of forts — Large caliber guns in 
forts — Necessity for turrets for observation and galleries for the 
infantry — Sheltered communications in forts — Shelters for coun- 
ter-assault guns — Armament of the fort — Casemates for the 
garrisons of forts and communications of forts with the rest of 
the fortress — Shelter for the men on duty — Telephones and 
signals — Thickness of concrete walls — Ditches and other obsta- 
cles — Counterscarp galleries — The installation of searchlights in 
the forts and the illumination of the ditches — Covered pas- 
sages — The garrison of the fort — The parade of the fort — The 
masking of forts. 

Chapter IX ](i4 

Project for a fcjrtress — I'roject for an intermediate redoubt 
for one company. 

Chapter X 171 




( In pocket. ) 

Plate 1. Plan of Port Arthur showing defenses and siege works. 
II. ■ Plan for filling the intervals between forts. 

III. Sector of fortress showing the intermediate works, roads, rail- 

roads, and masking of position. 

IV. Disposition of batteries. 
V. Fortress telephone lines. 

VI. Disposition of searchlights. 

VII. Fort No. III. 

VIII. Project for a fortress. 

IX. Project for a redoubt for one company. 

X. Details of project for redoubt for one company. 

XI. Map of the Kuangtung Peninsula. 




The modern land fortress has two separate parts, the 
enceinte and the periphery. In the center of the protected 
area is located the defended city surrounded by an enceinte 
(wall) ; along the periphery are erected separate fortifica- 
tions, forts with batteries between them. The forts, the 
intervals between them, and the batteries form a fi<yhting 
line, while the enceinte plays the role of a reserve, a last posi- 
tion. In the space between the line of forts and the enceinte 
are magazines and the lines of communication between the 
fig'hting line and the city. This is the form adopted by all \ 
nations; the fortresses of different nations differing only in ' 
the details of the design of the forts, the length of the inter- 
vals between them, the disposition of the batteries, etc. 

This plan is not the project of an individual, but is a 
natural and gradual development of the idea embodied in 
the most ancient fortresses. The design of a fortress de- 
[)ends entirel}^ upon the means of destruction possessed by 
the enemy. Hence, the degree of civilization of a nation 
and the spirit of the times play here a most important part. 
The history of fortification teaches us that in each epoch 
the defense has endeavored to adopt such a design as would 
enable the works to withstand the means of destruction of 
that epoch. We see that the following factors have the 
greatest influence upon the design of fortresses: (1) The 
development of artillery; (2) the increase of population and 
of the size of armies and garrisons; and (3) the advance of 
civilization, as shown more particularly by the improvement 
of the means of communication and by various inventions 
used in the arts of war. Under the influence of these factors 
the fortresses of the nineteenth century consisted of sepa- 



rat\ works (bastions, etc., for points of support) joined by 
a ramj^c^rl, built almost immediately on the confines of the 
city. ,,Vlthough the idea oi pla*"'" ■• the works in a more 
advanced position was advocatr ' re than fifty years ago, 
an example was necessary to ^ its adoption. Sebasto- 

poi afforded the example. 

After SeLastopol the engineers of all countries endeavored 
to place arojnid the defended city a line of works at a suffi- 
cient distarce to protect it from bombardment, the old ram- 
parts being maintained in the old fortresses. In recent 
fortresses, in addition to the outer w^orks, fortifications of 
the second line or the so-called central works were erected. 
This is the type of all large land fortresses in Russia and 
abroad. The general form being adopted, it is necessary 
to vary the details to suit the locality, 


We see that modern fortresses have the following 
features : 

1. The works have the general form of a circle. 

2. Forts are scattered along the circumference of this 

3. The forts are the points of support on the fighting line. 

4. The interval between the forts is from If to 4f miles. 

5. Permanent and temporary batteries, trenches, etc., are 
placed in the intervals. 

6. The foregoing works constitute the fighting line. 

7. Along this line and between it and the enciente run 
lines of communication consisting of roads and railways. 

8. In the center of the circle lies the city. 

9. The city is surrounded by an enceinte consisting of a 
series of points of support with a rampart and a ditch run- 
ning between them. 

10. Powder magazines are placed at various points be- 
tween the enceinte and the line of forts. 

11. Within the enceinte are the main magazines and the 
depots of supplies. 

12. The di'^tance between the forts and the enceinte varies 
from I to 3;^ des. 


The first feature of this plan, the circle is the fi'^il de- 
vel()|)nieiit of the most ancient t\ pe of fortiiicalion, t .j quad- 
rangle. In the evohiti of fortification, the i)()lyov,n suc- 
ceeded the quadrangle ; -as itself followed hv the circle, 
the most perfect form, i' excludes almost entirely long- 
range enfilade fire and ves a position without fianks. 
Flank attacks are thus rei lered impossible. 

]Moreover, forts placed on the arc of a circle a fiord greater 
facilities for mutual support than Avhen pla ed on the 
straight side of a polygon. The forts are, in fact, points of 
support so arranged that the intervals between them can not 
be taken, if the defense be well conducted, until the forts are 
captured. The distance between these forts, which constitute 
the artillery and ijifantry positions of the defense, is deter- 
mined by the facilities for mutual support. 

For quick and convenient communication the outer line is 
ccmnected by roads and railways with the city, the depots, 
magazines, and reserves. The outer line must secure the cit}'^, 
situated at the center of the circle, from bombardment. The 
distance between the outer line and the city is determined by 
the range of siege guns. At the present time this distance 
should not be less than 6 miles. To prevent the enemy from 
swarming into the city on the heels of the defeated garrisons 
of the outer line, the city is surrounded by an enceinte consist- 
ing of a rampart with a ditch and points of support, in rear 
of which are the main magazines and depots of supplies. 

The foregoing plan constitutes, so to speak, the skeleton or 
framework of the fortress. All the above-described works 
are erected in time of peace. Upon mobilization, the inter- 
vals are furnished with temporary earthworks, batteries for 
fortress artillery, trenches, etc. The fighting position for 
artillery and infantry, which does not exist in time of peace, 
is now prepared. 

The following characteristics may be pointed out with 
reference to the design and preparation of this position by 
foreign nations : 

1. The French propose to establish groups of fortifications 
in the intervals, 

•2. The Germans prefer separate permanen*^ '^)rtificati()ns 
with separate field fortifications alongside of se. 


3. Somewhat to the rear of this line and immediately in 
front of the belt road, the Germans erect in time of peace a 
row of bombproof quarters for the infantry garrison. 

4. Both the French and the Germans erect several perma- 
nent batteries in the intervals, the Germans having the so- 
called fort batteries, i. e., batteries outside of the forts but 
close to them. 

5. The guns in the forts are mounted in turrets. 

6. Underground telephones are used for communication. 

7. All the plans coincide in the following particulars: 

a. The intervals between the forts may be furnished with 
temporary works during mobilization. 

b. The main defense of the intervals is based upon the 
cross-fire of the forts. 

Thus we see that in planning a fortress it is found neces- 
sary to secure the city by the erection oif an uninterrupted 
enceinte with points of support. Less attention has been 
given to the forts on the outer line, and no thought whatever 
to the preparation of the ground on which the fight will 
take place. The Germans alone have given these neglected 
features some consideration, but far less than they deserve. 


( 8oe I'lales 1 ;uul XI.) 



Before describing the fortress of Port Arthur we shall 
speak of it under the following heads: 1, The plan; 2, 
what had been done before the war; 3, the condition of the 
fortress during mobilization and during the siege. The 
third item will undoubtedly be the most interesting, but it is 
necessary to consider the other two. 

One of the persons best acquainted with the history of the 
fortifications, M. TimchenkoTluban, in describing the for- 
tress in his book, A Few Words on Port Arthur, divides 
all the works into two parts — the central enceinte and the 
outer line. 

The project of this fortress is presented as follows in his 
detailed description : 

According to the project, the defeusive works of Port Arthur were 
to consist of a row of coast batteries, a line of land fortifications on 
the advanced heights, and the central enceinte near the old city and 
surrounding it. The armament of the fortress was to consist of 541 
guns and 40 machine guns, 64 of the guns being held in reserve. 


The line of land fortifications, which were to be armed with 237 
guns, could be divided into three fronts, the northeast, the north, and 
the west. 

The northeast front, bounded on the right by Fort No. I and on the 
left by Battery B, was to include one permanent fort (No. I), two 
redoubts (Nos. 1 and 2) of a lighter type, but of concrete, described 
in the project as "temporary," two permanent batteries (A and B). 
one separate open intermediate caponier, one rear fortification (on 
Great Hill), and three batteries which were to be erected during the 
period of mobilization. These works, with the exception of the three 
44461—08 2 15 


batteries, which were to l)e arined witli guns from the reserve, were 
to be armed with 52 guus and 12 machine guns, distributed as follows : 
(1) Twenty-eight light field guns and four machine guns to defend the 
city against assault and to fire in the zone immediately in front; (2) 
eighteen G-iuch guns (eight of G,SG2 pounds and ten of 4,334 pounds) to 
oppose the investing batteries, and (3) six 57-mm. rapid-fire caponier 
guus and eight machine guus for the defense of the ditches. On this 
front were two and one-half companies of infantry in addition to 
guard troops, battery supports, and local reserves. The length of this 
front from the flanking fortifications of the adjoining land front to 
the nearest coast battery was about 3 miles. 

Fort No. I was well placed; it covered with its fire the slopes of 
Siaokushan and Takushan and the approaches to Dragon Kidge and 
flanked the ravines between these hills. Four G-inch (G,SG2 pounds) 
guns, mounted on coast platforms in this fort, the so-called Round 
Battery, could fire upon the bay of Takhe. 

The caponier was intended to flank the approaches to the works on 
this front. 

The batteries to be ei'ected during mobilization on the heights in 
rear of the open caponier were intended to cover with their fire 
the slopes of Siaokushan and the ravine in front of Fort No. 1. 

Redoubt No. 1, which was to be erected on Danger Hill, was a 
rear point of support. 

Battery A, armed with six 6-inch guus of 4,334 pounds each, cov- 
ered with its fire the upper part of the valley of the river Takhe 
and the summits of Siaokushan and Takushan and flanked the distant 
approaches to Fort No. II. 

liedoubt No. 2, which served to connect Forts No. I and No. II, 
could not be defended by its own fire on account of the conformation 
of the ground, but could fire on the approaches to Batteries A and B, 
which, in their turn, could fire on the approaches to the redoubt. 
For this purpose it was the intention to increase the armament of 
Battery A by two light field guns and that of Battery B by four light 
field guus. 

Battery B, armed with four 6-inch guns of G,SG2 pounds, as well 
as the battery which was to be erected during mobilization in its 
rear, could fire along the front against the approaches to the nearest 
intermediate works of the nol'theast and north fronts. 

The work on Great Hill to be erected in rear of the northeast front 
opposite its center was almost secure from assault, owing to- the na- 
tui'e of the ground. It could cover the retreat from the first line in 
the direction of the enceinte. 

The main approaches to the northeast front ran along two ravines, 
plainly marked on the terrain; one on the right between Siaokushan 
and Takushan ; the other on the left extending north of Takushan. 
All the works proposed in the project were well located for covering 
these ravines. The fire of twenty-two guns could be concentrated on 
them, not including the works which were to be erected during 


The north front, bomulod on the rijilit by Fort Xo. II and on the 
loft 1)}' Redoubt No. 'A, was to include two peruianont forts (Nos. II 
and III), two works of .1 lij^htor>o ( Kajrli" Nest and IJedoubt No. 
.3), two temporary fortillcations (Nos. 1 and 2), and sevi'u batteries 
wliich were to be l)uilt durlnj: nioliilization. Excludlnfj; tlie seven l)at- 
teries, tliese worivs were to mount sixty-two guns, as follows: Thirty- 
six lijrht field guns to meet infantry attack in front, six (J-inch guns 
to oppose the investing batteries, and twenty-four 57-millimeter iai)id- 
lire caponier guns to Hank the ditches. These works were to be 
Miauned by four and one-half comi)aules of infantry in addition to the 
guard troops, the battery supports, and the local reserves. The 
length of this front was about 89 miles. 

Fort No. II. which was to be erected on the site of an old Chinese 
fortification, could fire on the approaches to the right flank and to 
the center of the north front, the rear approaches to Siaokushan, and 
the immediate vicinity of the village of Palichjuan. 

Eagle Nest on the high hill of Wautai, in rear and to 'the east 
of Fort No. II conmuinded a wide view and had an excellent range 
for its 6-inch gnus, all of the bays being in full view. The two ra- 
vines running from Wantai to the south and west could not be cov- 
ered effectively from this work. 

Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, which were to be erected on the site of 
old Chinese earthworks, were to connect Forts Nos. II and III. They 
were necessary on account of the broken ground. 

The valley of the River Lun-he was under the fire of a battery of 
0-inch guns in Fort No. III. The rear caponier of this work could fire 
on the approaches to Fort No. II and to Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, 
and the region around the village of Shuishlying. It was the inten- 
tion to prepare a site for a horse battery on an adjacent hill on ac- 
count of a large ravine which could not be reached from these works. 
Redoubt No. 3 was to serve as a support to Fort No. Ill in case it 
were attacked from the Great Mandarin road. This work could fire 
on the approaches to Forts Nos. Ill and IV, and the river valleys near 
the two villages of Sikou. 

The seven batteries which were to be erected during mobilization, 
and armed from the fortress artillery reserve, were to oppose the in- 
vesting siege batteries. 

The opinion was general that the approaches to the north front, 
and especially to Fort No. Ill, could not be covered effectively by the 
fire of the works on this front and that an energetic enemy nught 
bi-eak through the line from the direction of the Great Mandarin road. 
It was thought that these defects could be removed entirely by the 
erection of Fort P,- a strong work, the details of which will be given 

The west front, bounded on the right by Fort No. IV and on the 
left by Fortification No. 4. was to include three permanent forts (Nos. 
IV, V, and VI), two works of a lighter type (Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5), 
three temporary works (Fortifications Nos. 3 and 4 and a lunette), four 
permanent batteries (C, D, E, and the ''Salt" Battery) aucl seven 


batteries to he erected duriii,c: mobilization. Kxflndin.o; the seven 
batteries, it was the iutention to mount 110 guns and 4 machine guns, 
iis follows: Sixty-one light field guns to meet infantry attack in 
front, thirty G-inch (twelve of G,8G2 pounds and eighteen of 4,334 
pounds) to oppose the investing batteries and to fire on Pigeon Bay 
and the waters between Tiger Peninsula and the coast ridge of Liao- 
teshan, and twenty-eight 57-millimeter guns and four machine guns 
to flank the ditches. These works were manned l\v six companies of 
infantry in addition to fortress guards, battery supports, and local 
reserves. The length of the western front was TJ miles. 

Fort No. IV could support effectively the neighboring forts and 
fire into the river valleys near Sikou, Shuishiying, and Pach- 
lunshan. The end faces of this work were near the abrupt sl*pe 
of a rock 1S5 feet high and therefore its nearest approaches were 
to be defended by flanking fire from trenches to be dug along the 
sides of the fort. Batteries C and D (the Sapper) with ten 6-incli 
guns in permanent emplacements could fire into the valley of the river 
I^un-he and upon the approaches to Redoubt No. 3 and to Forts Nos. 
Ill and IV. In general, they could flank the approaches to the line 
of defense to the right and left of these batteries. The site of the 
Sapper l)uttery was well chosen to attain this end. 

Redoubt No. 4, and the adjacent " barbette " battei-y with eight 
6-inch guns of 4,334 pounds, had an excellent field of fire along the 
front and against the approaches to Fort No. V. 

Fort No. V could fire with moderate effect upon the approaches 
to Fort No. IV and Snipe Hill (site of Redoubt No. 5) and with less 
effect along their front. Its position would be bad if 203-Meter Hill, 
which conunanded it, were captured. Two strong batteries were to 
be built during mobilization to support Fort No. V, 

Battery E, with six G-inch guns of 6,SG2 pounds in permanent 
emplacements and three batteries to be built during mobilization, 
marked on the plan between Battery E and Fort No. VI, were to fire 
into the valley running to Pigeon Bay and to support Forts No. V 
and No. VI. 

Redoubt No. ">, which was to be erected on Snipe Hill, was con- 
sidered to be very important on account of its position, which closed 
the break to the Western B.asin. The possession of this work would 
enable the enemy to enfilade our entire western position. Its value 
to the enemy, the ease with which it could be approached through a 
wide valley, and the lack of support from other permanent works 
caused No. 5 to be given strong means of self-defense. 

The temporary lunette and Fortification No. 3 were considered as 
rear points of support closing the approaches to the new cit.v from the 

P'ort No. VI and Fortification No. 4 were to prevent the enemy 
from breaking through from the direction of Pigeon Bay to Tiger 
Peninsula. Salt Battery, armed with six G-inch guns of G,SG2 pounds 
on seacoast platforms, could fire ui)on the water area in the sector 
between the ri^ge of Liaoteshan and Tiger Head, the beat-h near 


the AMllagre of Bnlantze, Tiger Isthmus, tho valloy iMiniiinjc In IMgooii 
Bay, and tlie approaches to Fort No. VI. 

The west front was considered wealc, even wlien tlie !>lan was hcin^ 
made, on account of tlie want of mutual sujtport between its coni- 
lioiient parts and the proximity of commandinf; heights at short range 
from its northwestern side. Such were the works of the main lint' of 


The defects of the outer line of land defenses in the plan deter- 
mined upon by the authorities, brought about the project of strength- 
ening this line, immediately after the change of view on Port Arthur 
which took place in financial and diplomatic circles, a view so erro- 
neous, as was shown bj- subsequent events, that it is useless to discuss 
it. It was decided to strengthen the defenses by occupying Takushan 
and by erecting a group of works in front of the northwestern angle 
of the fortress. 

- A strong point of support was to be erected on the summit of 
Takushan and also a battery with six light guns. From this point 
it was possible to fire upon the approaches to the center of our 
north front and into the entire upper part of the valley of the river 
Takhe. The main object, however, of occupying Takushan was 
to prevent the enemy from occupying this height, which was only 1^ 
iinles from our line of defense and which commanded all the adjacent 
region. However, it was not thought that the occupation of Taku- 
shan by the enemy would have decisive results, as its far side was 
abrupt, almost inaccessible, where even mules and donkeys could not 
ascend. Guns could not be taken to the summit except singly and 
by hand and only on the side toward the fortress. 

In front of the northwest angle of the fortress two permanent 
forts (P and D)," one work of a lighter type on 174-Meter Hill, and 
two separate batteries in permanent emplacements (F and the Horse 
Battery) were to be built; also seven batteries were to be erected here 
during mobilization. The permanent works were to mount sixty-eight 
guns and four machine guns apportioned as follows : Twenty-four 
light field guns and four machine guns to meet infantry attack in 
front, eight G-inch guns of G,SG2 pounds, and ten 4.2-iuch guns to 
fire upon the more distant approaches and landing places, and twenty- 
six 57-mm. rapid-fire caponier guns to flank the ditches. 

Fort P could fire upon the village of Shuishiyiiig and all the 
approaches to Fort No. III. It thus filled the gap previously men- 
tioned as being a weak point in the center of the north front; for 
it served to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the direc- 
tion of the Great Mandarin road. Moreover, communication between 

" These works as such were not built and are not shown on maps. 
From what follows here and elsewhere it may be inferred that 
Fort P was to have been at the eastern end of Pachlunshau Ridge, 
Fort D at the western end of Pachlunchan Ridge. Battery F on 
Deaths Head Hill, and the Horse Battery on Long Hill. — Tr, 


Fort P and the central parts of the fortress was easy on account of 
the configuration of the ground ; retreat from the fort could be con- 
sidered as secure ; and two batteries which were to be built during 
mobilization to the left of the fort on heights absolutely inaccessible 
from the front (Fox Hill) would render it impossible for the enemy 
to occupy Fort P even if it should be evacuated by the defense. 
Hence the construction of Fort P, strongly provided with means of 
self-defense, was to begin immediately after the approval of the 
plan of the fortress, the question of obtaining credit being the main 
factor in the problem. 

Battery F was intended to fire into tljree valleys extending from 
its front, one being in front of the battery and the other two to the 

Fort D was to fire into the entire valley of Pigeon P.ay and upon the 
approaches to Battery F, Redoubt No. 3, and Fort No. V, the main 
reliance being placed upon a battery of four 6-inch guns which was to 
be installed within the fort. The great strength of Fort D precluded 
the possibility of the enemy's occupying 203-Meter Hill which was so 
vital to the defense of the entire fortress and especially to the defense 
of the city and harbor. 

The work on 174-Meter Hill could fire into Pigeon Bay valley and 
upon the approaches to T'ort D and Battery F. It could also prevent 
the eneiny from occupying 203-Meter Hill. 

The Horse Battery was to fire into' the ravine below Battery F and 
the village of Tatungkou, while the batteries to be erected during 
mobilization wei'e to oppose the investing batteries. 


The enceinte, which was to be built around the Old City, was to con- 
sist of a continuous line of parapets and ditches. Along this line, 
especially at the salient angles, several lunettes and four redoubts 
were to be erected. The armament was to consist of four 4.2-inch and 
twenty-four light field guns in the redoubts, and twenty-four machine 
guns which were to be placed elsewhere along the line intended es- 
pecially for the flank defense of the ditches. The total length of the 
enceinte was to be 4| miles. 

The enceinte, as has been stated, was to secure the vital parts of 
the nucleus against attacks of the enemy, who might break through 
into the interior of the fortress after the tall of the forts of th<» 
outer line, such attacks being made by detachments sacrificed by the 
enemy in order to destroy the supplies of the fortress and the depot 
of the fleet before the reserves could be concentrated against them. 
The enceinte was never considered as a citadel for the garrison in 
which it could oppose the attack after the fall of the forts. This was 
precluded by the commanding heights in front, from which even the 
banquettes of the enceinte could be seen. Especially was this the 
case from Great Hill and Danger Hill and the position in the vicinity 
of the left flank of Obelisk Hill, the occupation of which by the 


enemy would allow liini to bring a tlankins and. in i5ome cases, a 
reverse tin- a.iruinst the left half of tlie euci'lnte. 

In conclusion we shall add that the batteries to be erected during 
mobilization were to be armed with guns from the fortress artillery 
reserve, consisting of sixteen 4.2-inch guns and 0-inch guns of G,SO-' 
pounds, twenty-four light guns, and twenty-four G-inch Held mortars, 
and also from guns left over after the rearmament of the field artil- 
lery of the Ivuangtung detachment. 

The defense of I'ort Arthur was thus to depend upon the construc- 
tion of 22 ■l)ermament seacoast batteries," 8 i)ernianent forts, 9 per- 
manent land batteries. !) semipermanent redoubts, t) temporarj^ works 
(including the 4 redoubts of the enceinte), 24 batteries to be con- 
structed during mobilization, and about 4 miles of continuous enceinte. 
Port Arthur might have l)een transformed into a fortress of great 
passive strength by the construction of these fortifications, but by a 
methodical construction only, which should have lasted live years, and 
for which sufficient and regularly allotted sums should have been 


According to the opinion of Colonel Velichko, who was 
sent to Port Arthur in 1899 to revise and improve the plan 
for its fortification, the terrain influenced the strength and 
character of the works in a manner almost unprecedented. 
" Snch relief, such pecidiarities of soil and terrain, had never 
been encountered around any of our fortresses. The extreme 
irregularity of the ground, the rows of isolated conical peaks 
dividing a number of ridges with abrupt sides, compelled us 
to erect a great number of works in order to obtain cross fire 
and mutual support and visibility. Moreover, a great num- 
ber of deep ravines intersecting the positions made additional 
batteries, mtrenchments. and caponiers necessary. The im- 
possibility of developing a sufficiently strong frontal fire (the 
zones of fire being small on account of many dead spaces 
formed by the steep sides of ridges) rendered it necessary to 
l^rovide many flank defenses and, in places, a second line of 
defense. As the greater part of the slopes could not be covered 
by the fire of the works on their summits, skirmishers had to 
be advanced to the military crest in front of the forts, which 
thus served as keeps. The configuration of the ground made 
it possible to place the so-called intermediate batteries some- 

"As may be seen later, the author is mistaken. There were to be 
25 seacoast batteries. (See p. 22.) 


what in rear of the main line of works, either openly or 
masked, on ridges and summits commandino- the first line. 
The terrain, the size of the gun platforms, and the rocky 
nature of the soil had a great influence upon the distribution 
of the armament. 

Thus the main line of defense consisted of a line of 
trenches, a line of forts or points of support, and a line of 
intermediate batteries." 

According to the plan of Colonel Velichko,'^ approved by 
the minister of war, the coast defenses of Port Arthur were 
to consist of twenty- five seacoast batteries armed with one 
hundred and forty guns. 

{a) Salt Battery on Salt Mountain covered the waters 
within the sector between Liaoteshan and Tigers Head, and 
the beach near the village of Buladze and Tiger Isthmus. 
With guns having an all-around fire it was possible also to 
cover Pigeon Bay, the valley of Sia-dze-goii. the approaches 
to Fort No. V, the ravine on the right of Fort No. VI, and the 
approaches to the left of Fort No. V. Being both a sea- 
coast and a land battery it formed a link between the coast 
and the land defenses. 

{h) Battery No. 1 (B No. 1 on map), under Tiger Head, 
was to prevent landings on Tiger Isthmus and flank the ap- 
proaches to the intrenchments crowning the end of Tiger 

(c) Battery No. 2 (Tiger Head Battery), with guns hav- 
ing an all-around fire, covered the inner part of the western 
basin and Pigeon Bay and supported the land batteries of 
the left flank of the fortress. 

{d) Battery No. 3 (Rapid-Fire Terrace Battery) covered 
the beach of Tiger Isthmus. 

{e) Battery No. 4 (West Tiger Battery) covered the east 
coast of Liaoteshan. 

(/) Battery No. 5 (Middle Tiger Battery), with guns 
having an all-around fire, covered Pigeon Bay and supported 
the left flank of the land defenses. 

{g) Batteries Nos. 6 and 7 ((iireat Tiger Batteries) covered 
the sea, the inner roadstead, Pigeon Bay, and the entire left 
flank of the land defenses. 

" Report of Colonel Velicliko. 
^ Now inajor-seneral (1907). 


(h) Battery No. 8 (East Tiger Battery) covered the ex- 
treme left sector adjacent to Flat Cape. 

(/) Battery Xo. (Long Range Battery) had an ex- 
cellent field of fire from Electric Cliff through 1130° to the 

(y) Battery No. 10 (Artillery B on map), with guns 
having an all-around fire, coA'ered the water in the sector 
between the village of Tsnntzatun and the base of Golden 
Hill, the inner basins, and the estuary of the Lunhe. 

(/.) Battery No. 11 (Southern Quail Battery, on Quail 
Hill), with guns having an all-around fire, covered the base 
of Golden Hill, the entrance, and the western basin, the rear 
slopes of the ridges on the left flank, the southwestern and 
southeastern slopes of Great Hill and Danger Hill, the valley 
of the river Tauchen, the rear slopes of Dragon Ividge, and 
the greater part of the enceinte. 

(?) Battery No. 12 (Artillery Town Battery) was for use 
against small vessels, torpedo boats, etc., which might at- 
tempt to break into the basin. 

{m) Battery No. 13 (Golden Hill Battery), with guns 
having an all-around fire, covered the sea south of the bat- 
tery, part of the western basin, and the rear slopes of the 
land defenses. 

(n) Battery No. 14 (Foot of Golden Hill Battery) 
covered the waters near the entrance. 

(o) Battery No. 15 (Electric Battery) covered the dead 
space in front of the batteries on Tiger Peninsula. 

(p) Battery No. 16 (Camp Battery) covered the sea in the 
sector between Southern Cross and Electric Cliff. 

(q) Battery No. 17 (Rifles Battery) on the summit of 
Two-horn Hill covered the sea to the right of Southern 

{)') Battery No. 18 (Flat Cape Battery) was for service 
against torpedo boats seeking to enter the basin and com- 
manded the beach to Electric Cliff. 

(s) Battery No. 19 (Northern Cross Battery) in the de- 
])ression between the second and third summits north of 
Western Cross Hill, with guns having an all-around fire, 
covered Takhe Bay, the P'lat Cape Batteries, and the bat- 
teries in its rear. 


{t) Battery No. 20 (Western Cross Battery) near the 
western slope of Central Cross Hill covered the sector be- 
tween the Southern Cross and the Electric Cliff Batteries. 

{v) Battery Long (Middle Cross Battery) covered Takhe 
Bay and part of the terrain in front of Battery No. 20. 

(y) Battery No. 21 (Southern Cross Battery) covered 
Takhe Bay and part of the sea in front of it. 

{w) Battery No. 22 covered the valley east of Cross Hill 
and the landing at Miaotun. 

{y) Round Battery situated within Fort No. 1, like Salt 
Battery, served as a link between the seacoast and land de- 
fenses.. It was on a hill 280 feet in height and covered Takhe 
Bay, the slopes of Siaokushan and Takushan, and flanked 
the valley of the river Taklie and the approaches to Dragon 

These two batteries are not given on the plan of the for- 
tress of Port Arthur which was approved by the Emperor/' 

The line of land defenses of the fortress, according to the 
plan of Colonel Velichko, was to consist of 6 permanent forts. 
7 temporary redoubts, 1 intermediate battery, 4 fortifications, 
and 4 batteries in permanent emplacements. 

(«) Fort No. I, a permanent work on a rocky spur of 
Dragon Ridge 420 feet high, for a garrison of one company. 

(h) A permanent emplacement for 4 light guns f op flank 
defense, in the form of an open caponier, one-third mile 
north of Fort No. I. 

(c) Redoubt No. 1, for one-half company, elevation 569 
feet, temporary, on Danger Hill, a spur extending out per- 
pendicularly from Danger Ridge. This work was to be a 
rear point of support. 

{d) Permanent Battery A was to cover with its fire the 
Takhe Valley and the sunmiits of Takushan and Siaokushan 
and to flank the approaches to Fort No. II. 

(e) Redoubt No. 2, for one company, formed a link be- 
tween Forts Nos. I and II. 

(/) Permanent Battery B covered the approaches to the 
nearest works, and the slopes of Tsiaoshan, Takushan, and 

« In addition to the twenty-five coast batteries there were to be two 
stations for firing Whitehead torpedoes for the defense of the en- 


{g) Fort No. II. pcM-ninnonl. for one company, on a .salient 
hill oSn feet in heioht about 4.'i00 feet north of Redoubt No. 
2. It had an excellent held of (ire against the approaches 
to the i'i^h( and center of the northern section of the de- 
fensive line. 

{h) Ea^le Nest (Wan^tai). a temporary work on a peak 
()10 feet hi<2:h. It had an all-around fire, and from it all of 
the bays were visible. 

(/) Fortification No. 1, a temporary fieldwork for one 
company and 4 li<>ht guns, served to connect Forts Nos. II 
and III. 

( /') Fortification No. 2 was of the same size and character 
as Fortification No. 1 and served the same purpose. 

{k) Fort No. Ill, a permanent work for one company, 
5,()00 feet from Fort No. II, closed the valley of the Lunhe 
to the enemy. 

{I) Redoubt No. 3, a temporary work for one company, 
on a spur of Dragon Ridge 350 feet in height and 2.100 feet 
from Fort No. Ill, commanded the Lunhe Valley and served 
as a support to Fort No. Ill against attack from the Great 
Mandarin road. 

{m) Fort No. IV, a permanent work for one company, 
on Caponier Hill, elevation about 490 feet, covered with 
its fire Pachlunshan and the valleys of Tsirgoii (Hsikon) 
and Lunhe and gave excellent support to the neighboring 
works. Tavo permanent batteries were erected under cover 
of this fort. 

{n) Battery C, on Tooth Hill, elevation 560 feet, covered 
the Lunhe Valley, and the approaches to Redoubt No. 3, and 
Forts Nos. Ill and IV. 

(o) Batter}'^ D (Sapper Battery), on the left of Battery 
C, covered the approaches on both flanks of Fort No. IV. 

(/>) Redoubt No. 4. a temporary work for one company, 
covered very effectually the approaches to Fort No. V and 
closed the exit from the Shibantoii Valley to the western 
basin. This work, now a part of the outer line, will become 
a point of support in the enceinte when the new city is ex- 

{q) Fort No. V, a permanent work for one company, 
on the summit of Hawks Hill near Yanshigoii. It was the 


key to the west front and would support a row of batteries 
which were to be erected on the left to cover the entire valley 
and Pigeon Bay. 

(r) Battery E, the only permanent work among those 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph which were to be 
erected to cover Pigeon Bay. 

(s) Redoubt No. 5, a temporary work on Snipe Hill, 
w^as intended as a strong support to the neighboring works 
and to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the 
western basin near the salt factory. 

(t) Fortification Xo. 3. for one company and four guns, 
formed the left of the position on Hawdvs Hill. 

(u) Fort No. VI, a permanent work for one company 2f 
miles to the left of Fort No. V. It was the last fort on this 
flank of the line and was intended to prevent the enemy 
from breaking through to Tiger Peninsula. 

(v) Fortification No. 4, on White Wolf Hill, was to close 
Tiger Isthmus in case of a landing in the Liaoteshan dis- 
trict or a turning movement by the Liaoteshan Mountains. 

(w) A temporary work on Great Hill in rear of the first 
line, for a lialf company and six light guns. The command- 
ing positions of Great Hill and Danger Hill gave them great 
importance in the defense of the northeast and east sections. 

In addition to the above mentioned forts, redoubts, and 
batteries, a series of intermediate batteries was to be erected. 

The following works were to be constructed later accord- 
ing to the accepted plan : 

1. Two permanent forts, one on Pachlunshan, Fort P, 
and the other to the east of the village of Tatunkou, near 
1T4-Meter Hill, Fort D. 2. A temporary work, Angle Re- 
doubt, on 174-Meter Hill (Angle Hill). 3. A permanent 
battery (F) on the northwest summit of Yaoshan above the 
Tsirho Valley. 4. xA.n advanced w^ork of a temporary type 
on Takushan. 

This group of fortifications, being in touch with the main 
line, was to prevent the investment of the northwestern side 
of the fortress. As it was only 2 miles from Louisa Bay 
and had an excellent field of fire over the valley of this bay, 
it rendered a flanking movement from the north against the 
left of the fortress impossible. 


The nucleus of the fortress was to be defended against 
open attack bv an uninterrui)tcd enceinte, consistino: of 4 
redoubts on the most important and connnai-ding points, 
connected by a sort of cremaillere, partly bastioned and 
partly polyijonal, with ditches steeply coimterscarped and 
a glacis. l*ai't of the line Avas provided with head cover. 

" Everything in the line of construction," says Colonel 
Yelichko in his report, " nnist be completed in time of peace, 
not only forts, but temporary redoubts, fortifications, bat- 
teries, infantry entrenchments, and obstacles." 


Leaving aside the part of the project referring to sea- 
coast defense, let us examine the front of the land defenses 
in a general way. 

The line of forts followed pretty closely the arc of a 
circle, described around the port as a center, with a radius 
of 2^ miles, the end forts, Nos. 1 and 6, being 3 miles from 
the center. In front of this line there were permanent 
works on Takushan, Pachlunshan, 203-Meter Hill, and 174- 
Meter Hill at distances of 3g, 4, 5, and 4| miles from the 

The enceinte enclosed the old cit}'', running along its out- 
skirts at a distance varying from f to If miles from its center. 
According to the author of the project, it was to serve only 
against sudden attack and not as a citadel for the defense. 

The distance between the forts on the main line varied 
from 1^ to 2f miles. The gorges of Redoubts Xos. 2 and 3 
were joined by a parapet, wdiich had been constructed by 
the Chinese. It was known during the siege as the Chinese 

The selection of the main line at such a short distance 
from the city was determined by the size of the garrison and 
by the lack of a good position at a more suitable distance. 
Colonel Velichko was well aware that this line would not 
secure the city against bombardment, but the occupation of 
the hills in front of the line would go far toward remedying 
this defect. The possession of these points would render the 
attack of the city very difficult and would force the enemy 
to place his siege batteries farther out, thus safeguarding. 


in a great mensiiro, the city from honibardment. Hence the 
worlvs in front of the line were to be strongly fortified. 

The only thing which was not foreseen in the project was 
the necessity of fortifying Liaoteshan. The great impor- 
tance of this ridge as a flanking position covering the left was 
clearly shown clnring the siege of the west front. The 
project, therefore, as a whole was rational, if w^e take into 
consideration the official information on the numbers and 
arinament of the Japanese army, which served as its basis. 
/ Unfortunately a few circumstances prevented the com- 
plete execution of the plan." As a result, when war broke 
/A , I out, the following works only were ready, namely, the en- 
,^ I \ ceinte, one fort, one redoubt, and three permanent batteries. 
Of the remaining five forts, three were finished in the rough, 
the fourth w-as just begun, and the fifth was traced. None of 
the advanced points were fortified. 

The Japanese invested the fortress with means of attack 
far in excess of that which our ministry of w^ar had given 
them credit for possessing and which had, of necessity, formed 
the basis of our plan of defense. Thus, in addition to the 
ordinary 6-inch guns, the besieging army w^as supplied with 
G-inch and 8-inch howitzers, 11 -inch mortars, and 6-inch 
naval guns with a range of 8 miles. When the siege began 
it was recognized that a distance varying from 4f to 5 miles 
from the forts to the city was insufficient, as the Japanese, 
having established their 6-inch naval gun battery at a dis- 
tance of 1 mile from 174-Meter Hill (5 miles from the center) 
could bombard not only the cit}^, but even the port. The 
fact that the walls of the fortress casemates were penetrated 
by 11-inch mortar projectiles shows the necessity in comput- 
ing the thickness of walls to consider the largest projectile in 
existence and of using a factor of safety so as to give a re- 
serve of resistance, computing, for example, not for two hits 
but for three. 

« Tlie.aim of this work does not allow us to give these reasons here, 
lu view of the great interest connected with them, they will be given 
a large space in a worli, " The Defense of Port Arthur," which I have 
undertaken in collaboration with Captain Ronianovski, of the Great 
General StafC. 


(Sci> rintcs I and Nil.) 


At the booiiinini>; of the war the hind front of the fortress 
was ill the foHowing condition : On the right flank Fort Xo. I 
was unfinished. In the interior of this work was a round con- 
crete emphiceinent for four 6-inch guns. The fort was on 
the summit of a hill and had a bastion-shaped face. Its cen- 
tral part, the curtain, was not built, and the glacis was not 
graded. To the left of the fort and a little to the front of it 
was an open caponier (No. 1), intended to cover the .ap- 
proaches to the fort and to Battery A, situated to the left of 
the caponier. In rear of Battery A, on the nearest height, 
was an old Chinese work called " Eedoubt No. 2." The old 
Chinese wall, already half destroyed, joined this work to Bat- 
tery B, which had four G-inch guns. From Batter}^ B the 
Chinese wall was divided into two parts. One ran along 
the summit of an advanced ridge and formed the so-called 
•' Kuropatkin Lunette " and joined Fort No. II, while the 
other ran along the foot of Eagle Nest in the direction of 
Fort No. III. ^ 

jNIuch work had been done on Fort No. II, but the para- 
pets and the glacis were not graded; the second story of 
the two-storied casemates were not floored; the entrances 
were not protected by gratings; there were no stairways, 
and the outer walls were not covered with earth; the coun- 
terscarp gallery was unfinished; and there was no covered' 
passage between this gallery and the casemates. In the 
interval between Fort No. II and Fort No. Ill were old 
Chinese fortifications consisting of high parapets without 
ditches. One of these works near Fort No. Ill was named 
Fortification No. 2; another, quadrangular in shape, near 



Fort No. II, was named Fortification No. 1. From Fortifi- 
cation No. 2 a section of the Chinese wall ran along the ridge 
which extended from Small Eagle Nest to Fort No. III. 
• Fort No. Ill (see PL VII) was only half finished. It had 
a deep outer ditch, cut in the rock. The flanking ditches, 
which were tolerably deep at the front angles, became grad- 
ually shallow toward the gorge angles, where the depth was 
between 2 and 5 feet. The ramparts, formed of material taken 
out of the ditches, was a mass of irregularly shaped stones. 
In the fort there were permanent emplacements for fom- 
G-inch guns. In rear of these emplacements, under the ram- 
parts closing the gorge, were concrete casements for the gar- 
rison. Close to these casemates was a gorge caponier for 
the support of the intervals. 

Owing to a defect in the plan, tliis caponier could fire on 
the right against the approaches to the Chinese wall, but 
not against the approaches to Fortification No. 2. The 
gorge ditch on the right was cut in the rock. On the left 
this ditch ran through a fill made of earth. Both angles 
were likewise made of earth. The slopes were unrevetted 
and were constantly crumbling away. Part of the earth was 
thrown on the glacis, thus increasing the dead space in the 
vicinity of the fort. Flanking casemates were constructed in 
the angles of the ditch. The casemate in the right angle was 
connected by a covered passage with the shelter for the coun- 
ter-assault guns in the interior of the fort somewhat in rear 
of the outer breastworks. T4ie other casemate had no cov- 
ered communication with the fort. The only means of com- 
munication possible was along the bottom of a ditch on the 

Fort No. Ill was connected by the Chinese wall with the 
gorge of Redoubt No. 3, from which its was separated by a 
deep ravine with steep sides, in some places almost perpen- 
dicular. This work was in the following condition: The 
casemates were finished : the ditch, whose bottom was to be 
stepped, was unfinished ; there were no breastworks, and no 
glacis; and for hundreds of feet around the work there were 
piles of stones and earth which formed a vast dead space in 
front of the work. The last section of the Chinese wall ran 
from the left angle of this work across the Kurgan Hill and 
descended along its militarv crest to the railwav line. 


ENGI^:EERIXG work DI'RTXG mobtlizatiox. 31 

The enceinto aloni:- the outskirts of tlic city was parallel 
to the outer line of Avorks. It started at roast Hatterv No. IS, 
and inclosed the old city on the east, north, and northwest, 
where it terminated at the foot of Quail llill. It consisted 
of 4 redoubts connected by a ditch and a i)arapet. The ditch 
was l-t feet deep and i2s feet wide. The parapet was 14 feet 
high and i^l feet wide and was unfinished in places. 

The northwest front beaan on the west side of the Cossack 
Place d'Arnies. Here we find Fort No. IV. which was almost 
completed. It was on a high steep hill, was without ditches. 
and consisted' onh" of escarpments. To its right, and 
somewhat in rear, on the summits of neighboring heights. 
Avere Battery C (Tooth Battery), which was completed, and 
the Sapper Battery. To the left of the fort, in the interval 
between it and Fort No. V, was Eedoiibt No. 4, which was 

Fort No. Y was scarcely begun when the war broke out. 
It was only a shapeless heap of stones. The front and two 
flanking ditches had been excavated. The stones which had 
been taken out of the ditches were to be used to make breast- 
works. At the angles, excavations had been made for tAvo 
posterns. Likewise the interior had been excavated to form 
the terreplein. 

In the interval between Forts Nos. V and VI Avere Re- 
doubt No. 5, which was nearly finished, and Battery E. which 
Avas only about half finished. Construction on Fort No. VI 
had not been begun. The trace had, indeed, been made as 
Avell as a slight excavation in the rocky ground at the gorge. 


Such Avas the condition of the Avorks a*: the beginning of 
the Avar. Great efforts Avere noAv made to place the fortress in 
readiness for defense. The engineering Avork done Avith this 
end in vieAV Avas as folloAvs: Forts Nos. I, II, and III and 
Redoubts Nos. 3 and 5 were hastih^ completed and measures 
were taken for the defense of Fort No. V. InterA\als were 
filled in by means of temporary fortifications and intrench- 
ments, and temporary emplacements Avere constructed. 

At Fort No. I the curtain was graded, and the glacis, the 
gorge, and the bombproof shelters Avere completed. 
44461—08 3 


At Fort No, II the ramparts and the gUicis were i^raded, a 
section of the counterscarp gallery was finished, and the sec- 
ond stoi\y of the casemates was floored ; but there was not suf- 
ficient time to construct covered passages from the barracks 
to the counterscarp gallery and to the interior of the fort. 
The portion of the counterscarp near the left of the gorge 
was roughly revetted. The parapets above the gorge case- 
mates were not covered with earth. Traverses had been 
made along the parapets; also embrasures protected by over- 
head cover. 

At Fort No. Ill the ramparts and glacis were graded, the 
interior walls being revetted with cement barrels; the coun- 
terscarp walls of the gorge were revetted with stones; a rear 
traverse was constructed along the entire left flank; trans- 
versal traverses were constructed along all the faces; em- 
brasures and bombproof shelters Avere made ; and the gorge 
was finished, its interior walls being revetted with cement 
barrels. The rough stone revetment of the rear supporting 
walls of the gorge was changed to a revetment of stones em- 
liedded in cement, with steps for descent from the terreplein 
through the open caponier into the ditch. 

An armor-plated observation tower was erected in the 
battery in the center of the fort. Openings in the direc- 
tion of the right flank were covered by high traverses. 
In rear of the battery behind the traverse and somewhat to 
the right a large bombproof shelter was provided for the ar- 
tillerymen. Six feet of earth was placed above the shelter 
for the guns and 5 feet above the covered passage and gorge 

At each of the four angles of the fort two 57-mm. guns 
were placed on wooden platforms and a gun of the same cali- 
ber was placed in each of the flanking casemates. The case- 
mates and the entrances into the ditch from the passage lead- 
ing to the barracks were provided with iron doors five- 
eighths of an inch thick. Sliutters of iron plate, five-eighths 
of an inch thick, with loopholes for firing, were placed in 
the barrack windows. 

Shields were manufactured for the three counter-assault 
guns for protection against shrapnel and shell fragments. 
The fort was connected by telephone with the central elec- 
trical station and the nearest observation station on Rocky 


Ridge, where an armor-plated shelter was provided. In order 
to cover the dead sjjaee in front of the fort a circidar trench 
was made at the foot of the glacis; it was provided with 
embrasures, screens, and three excellent bombpioof shelters. 

To the right of the fort, in rear of the nearest height. 
Caponier Xo. 3 for two field guns was erected, covered in 
front by a trench. 

The fort was surrounded b}^ a row of simple wire entangle- 
ment and an electric fence. In tiie right casemate an elec- 
trical station was established for the fence. The installa- 
tion of a pipe for the flow of rain water from the terreplein 
to the ditch was begun but not finished. 

At Redoubt No. 3 work was begun on February 10. The 
wooden molds were removed from the embrasures by cutting 
and burning; shutters covered with Russian felt were fixed to 
all the windows; gratings, windows, and stoves were placed 
in the casemates later, and the entrances from the barracks 
into the gorge ditch were filled with sand bags. On the first 
day breastworks were constructed of stones for firing in the 
lying position, being improved later for firing in the kneel- 
ing position and ultimately for firing in the standing posi- 
tion. The interior wall of the breastworks were reyetted 
with cement barrels filled with stones. 

In February hundreds of cubic yards of soft earth were 
brought on donkev^s. Work was begun on deepening the 
ditches, leyeling the bottom, and steepening the scarp. At 
first the counterscarp was lined with stones bedded in cement, 
but after a few days an order came from the chief engi- 
neer of the fortress directing that the revetment be made 
simply of stones. At the same time the grading of the ter- 
rain was begim, the glacis was constructed at the front, and 
thousands of cubic yards of stone and grayel were excavated. 
Bomb-proof shelter was proyided at the same time for the 
kitchen, the cooks, and the bread storeroom. 

Two bombproof shelters for officers were constructed in 
March. In April two 6-inch Canet guns were mounted in 
rear of the gorge, barbettes Avere erected for the field guns 
which were to be used as counter-assault guns and for ma- 
chine guns, and trayerses were erected in front of the exit 
from the postern gate and in front of the kitchen. Addi- 
tional embrasures and trayerses were made in June, and 


head cover was provided. A Schwartz observation turret 
was erected, sand bags filled with cement mstead of stone 
being used for want of time. The fort was surrounded by 
an ordinary wire fence; fougasses w^ere placed in the ravines 
to the right and left ; and an electric fence was built in front. 

At Fort Xo. lY, Avhich was almost completed, a corduroy 
road was yet to be covered with earth ; the exits of the pos- 
terns leading into the ditch were to be securely closed ; the 
section of the outer ditch on the left flank was to be deep- 
ened; and windows and doors were needed in the casemates. 

At Redoubt No. 4, which was almost completed, the en- 
trances to the gorge were unfinished ; obstacles were needed to 
prevent entrance to the ditch from the caponier; a wide 
trench on the glacis opposite the caponier was to be filled in, 
as the field of fire from the trench was limited and the 
enemy could take cover in it before crossing the ditch; and 
wincloM's and doors were required in the casemates. 

At Battery E doors and windows Avere required in the 
casemates. The batter}^ was littered with all kinds of 
debris, and much time was lost in carrying it awa3^ On 
or near the breastworks were about 2,000 cubic yards of stone, 
400 cubic yards of sand, 1,000 barrels of cement, a large 
amount of lumber, and a concrete plant, all of which had to 
be carted away. As the platforms were read}^, the six 0-inch 
guns could be mounted. Of the seven traverses only two 
epaulments and the central traverse were ready. The uncom- 
pleted traverses were transformed into bombproof shelters 
made of 12-inch beams covered with 3 or 4 feet of earth. 
There were a few quarters in the battery, but casemates for 
the garrison, kitchens, latrines, etc., had to be constructed. 
All these buildings were placed on the right, below the l)at- 
tery. It was necessary to paint some of the new shining cor- 
rugated roofs in order to mask them. 

Redoubt No. 5 at the beginning of the war was about 
half finished ; the earth and concrete works w^ere completed, 
but casemates, caponiers, posterns, etc., were not covered 
with earth; and the interior of the work was filled with 
material dug up to install drainage. There Avere no window 
frames, windows, nor shutters in the casemates, but a few of 
the armor-plated doors were in place. There were neither 
bunks nor stoves. As the aarrison had to liVe in the fort, it 


was necessary to construct kitchens, storeroom-, officers' quar- 
ters, and lati'ines. which for economic considerations had not 
been inchided in the concrete casemates. The principal worlc 
consisted in transporting matei'ial for the manufactnre of 
concrete for the emphicenient of <i-uns. Comuuniications 
were established in the interior of the fort, and the entrance 
to the fort was closed by a heavy wooden gate with barri- 
cades placed in front of it. 

"Work on Fort Xo. VI was begun in October, 1903. At 
the beginning of the war the constrnctor had only leveled 
the surface and made a small depression in the gorge. Hence 
ordinary rifle intrenchments were made here, joined by cov- 
ered passages, while shelters were constrncted of beams 
covered with earth from 7 to 10 feet in thickness. 

An immense amount of work remained to be done on 
Fort Xo. V. Enormous shapeless heaps of stone covered 
the site selected for the parapets and impeded the work 
greatly. It was a serious problem to determine where to 
l^lace the parapets. The impossibility of removing the 
debris in time made it necessary to advance them to the 
front, where the glacis should have been. They were 
constructed of stone, the inner side being revetted with 
cement barrels taken from Battery E and filled with stone. 
Earth was being carted away at the same time and as much 
as possible of it was heaped on top of the breastworks. The 
IDOsterns were made of frames constructed of beams. The 
frames were covered with two layers of beams, over which 
was placed a layer of stones covered with cement. Over 
this was placed a layer of sheet iron one-half inch thick and 
a layer of pebbles from 2 to 3 feet thick. From the side of 
the ditch a stone curtain or screen was erected. The posterns 
served as quarters for the garrison. Four buildings of con- 
struction similar to the posterns were erected within the fort 
and a fifth in the gorge. 

Open caponiers with screens and embrasures were con- 
structed to cover the lateral ditches. The parapets were 
then begun. The lateral faces were divided from the front 
face by depressions; loopholes were made for small arms 
and embrasures for guns; and two 6-inch Canet, two 75- 
nnn., and six field guns were mounted. A strong, substantial 
ma""aziiie was constructed in rear of the front face from 


Chinese beams, covered Avith stones, over whicli cement was 
])onre(l. A roof of corriiiialed iron Avas placed over the 
whole. Quarters for officers were constructed in the interior 
of the fort from Chinese beams, covered with stones. Close 
to the right flank a small magazine for projectiles for the 
Canet guns Avas constructed of earth and stone. 

Such Avere the additions made to each of the forts. A 
hostile descent on the peninsula Avas daily expected. Hence 
the Avork Avas done Avith feverish haste and with no sem- 
blance of order and the quality suffered in consequence. 
The intervals betAveen the forts were filled Avith redoubts 
and entrenchments having obstacles in front of them. 

After May 13 the trenches Avere provided Avith loopholes, 
l)ombproofs, and Avire entanglements, and fougasses and 
naval mines Avere placed in the ravines. The front from 
Fort Xo. II to Fort Xo. IV Avas covered Avith an electric 
fence consisting of five insulated Avires carrying a current 
of 3,000 Aolts. Temporarj' emplacements for ninety-two 
fortress guns Avere constructed on the summits of the hills 
in rear of the trenches. 


A month had elapsed since the declaration of Avar and the 
enemy had not yet appeared. A greater calm prevailed 
and the situation Avas vieAved with more deliberation. It 
Avas found necessary to occupy and fortify some adA^anced 
positions, but no carefully considered plan Avas folloAved, and 
the vieAvs of the higher authorities prevailed. Hence Avork 
on the position at the aqueduct Avas begun in accordance 
Avith the desires of Adjutant-General Kuropatkin, although 
the position on Takushan Avas of far greater importance. 
The Idol Redoubt Avas begun to satisfy the wishes of General 
Stoessel. The Viceroy expressed his fears of a descent in 
Pigeon Bay under the fortress, and obstinately demanded the 
fortification of the coast of this bay. The commandant of 
the fortress insisted that 203-Meter Hill should be fortified, 
Avhile General Fock insisted upon the fortification of 174- 
Meter Hill. In short, there Avas a chaos of conflicting opin- 
ions for Avant of a settled plan in case of mobilization. AAlien 
the secondary points Avere Avell fortified the most important 


lK)ints liad not been touchetl. Nor -would thoy lia\i' liccii 
fortified had not General Kondratchcnko insisted \i\Hm it. 

At the beginning of May fortifications were begun (in 
Flat and Division hills and on the ridge of Pachlnnshan. 
The works on Takushan and Siaokushan were not l)egun 
until June. Here, where the first blow fell, the solid roolc 
precluded the jiossibility of doing anything of iuipurtancc 
in a short time. 

In conclusion we may say that it is necessar3\ when tiic 
construction of a fortress is undertaken, to forui a })lan of ac- 
tion in case of unexpected mobilization, in which shall bf 
laid down the sequence of work, beginning with the most 
important and ending with the least important. There 
was no such plan at Port Arthur, and hence the great- 
est disorder resulted. Forts were hastily completed, ad- 
vanced positions were fortified, temporary batteries were 
erected, and the intervals were filled with intrenchments and 
redoubts. Three important factors were lost from view : 

(1) The construction of roads for lateral and radial com- 
munication concealed from the enemy. 

(2) The establishment of a convenient, durable, and pro- 
tected telephone system. 

(3) The placing of the enceinte in a defensible condition. 


The greater part of the well-constructed military roads 
were laid out in full view of the enemy, and were therefore 
useless. This was so evident, even during mobilization, that 
they were called ''death roads;" but other Toads were not 
provided. The many overhead telephone lines, though they 
continued in service until the end, were often shattered in 
the midst of battle, and became useless when most needed. 
The enceinte, Avith its deej) ditch and thick ramparts, should 
have served as an excellent keep, but as it had neither bomb- 
proofs nor traverses it was useless for this purpose. 


At the beginning of the investment, July 17, 1901, the land 
front was in the following condition : 

Coast battery Xo. 22 (four (')-inch Canet guns), constructed 
durin"' moblization, was intrenched on the side of Takhe Bav. 


At a distance of 1,400 feet from it the line of intrenchments 
joined Takhe Redoubt and ran along the ridge to Fort No. 

1. Signal Hill, on the shore of Takhe Bay, in front of this 
line, was internched and armed with two small Baranovski 

To the right of Fort No. I was a battery of small guns 
covering the approaches to the fort from the right and a 
similar battery was constructed on the left. The fort itself 
had concrete emplacements for four 6-inch guns. Four 
57-mm and three machine guns formed the armament to 
repel assault. Trenches ran to the left up to Caponier No. 1 
(four light guns), in rear of which w^ere emplacements for 
two 57-mm guns. The trenches ran from the caponier in a 
broken line along the ridge to Battery A, which had em- 
placements for six 6-inch guns. In rear of this section of 
the line were Redoubt No. 1 on Danger Hill and temporary 
emplacements on Dragon Ridge for two 6-inch Canet guns. 

There were fortified positions in advance of this front. 
On Takushan were emplacements for three field guns sur- 
rounded, at the base of the hill, by trenches and wire en- 
tanglements. A new road had been constructed from the 
front to the hill ; and, betweenTakushan and the main line, 
on Height 22, were emplacements for two field guns to cover 
the Nameless River and the Dalny road. The garrison of 
Takushan consisted of two companies. On Siaokushan were 
trenches descending to the right along the ridge with wire 
entanglements in front. 

The old Chinese wall ran from Battery A to Redoubt No. 

2, an old Chinese work armed with four light field and 
two naval 5T-mm. guns, and thence to Battery B, which was 
armed with four 6-inch guns. This battery was defended by 
two tiers of intrenchments. In the interval between Battery 
B and Redoubt No. 2 were emplacements for two guns to 
repel assault. On a height in rear of the Chinese wall, some- 
what to the south of Battery B, were temporary emplace- 
ments (Letters Battery) for two 15-mm. Krupp guns. On 
the left of Battery B the Chinese wall divided. One branch 
ran to Kuropatkin's Lunette (four 6-inch mortars) on a small 
height and continued to Fort No. II. In the ravine in front of 
the wall, between the lunette and Battery B, there was a small 
height which was occupied and armed with two light guns 


to rover the approaclios to Fort Xo. II and liallcrv I). Vovi 
No. II was garrisoned by one company. Its arniaiucnt con- 
sisted of four light, four 57-mm., and two niadiine guns. 
The other branch of the Chinese wall ran along the foot of 
Small Eagle Xest, on the summit of which were emplace- 
ments for three 4.2-inch guns. To the left of Small Eagle 
Xest was an emplacement for one Armstrong 21-cm. gun. 

Below these batteries near the Chinese wall were placed 
four 5T-mm. caponier guns taken from the casemates of 
Fort Xo. II. In the ravine, between Small P^agle Xest and 
Eagle X^est, emplacements were constructed at the beginning 
of the siege for two rapid-fire field guns to repel assault. On 
the summit of Eagle Nest were emplacements for two 6- 
inch Canet guns. At the foot of Eagle Nest on a height 
in front of the Chinese wall was Caponier No. 2 for four 
field guns. On two adjacent heights to the left w^ere two 
transformed Chinese works, Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2. In 
rear of these heights behind the Chinese wall on the front 
slope of the height in rear w^ere temporary emplacements for 
three G-inch guns (Redoubts Battery). On the rear slope of 
this height, somewhat to the left of Redoubts Battery, were 
Avell-concealed emplacements for four 9-inch mortars (Wolf 
Battery). On a small hill in the interval between Fortifica- 
tion No. 2 and Fort No. Ill was Caponier No. 3 for two light 
guns communicating by a zigzag covered passage with the 
Chinese wall. Emplacements for two light guns were at 
the point where this covered passage joined the wall. 

Fort No. III. The garrison consisted of one company ; the 
armament of four G-inch, three light, eight 57-mm., and two 
machine guns. From the left angle of the fort, the Chinese 
wall ran across a deep ravine to Redoubt No. 3. The ravine 
was covered by the fire of two guns in the Ravine Battery. 
At the point where the wall joined the gorge ditch of Redoubt 
No. 3, two 57-mm. guns w^ere emplaced. The garrison of the 
redoubt consisted of one company and the armament of two 
G-inch Canet. five light, and two machine guns. From this 
work the wall ran around Mound Battery to the railway line. 
At the point were it left Redoubt No. 3, two light field guns 
were emplaced in rear of the wall to cover the deep ditch in 
front. Somewhat to the left of the two field guns were four 
57-mm. guns. ^Nlound Battery, which was well concealed, 


mounted fonr 4.2-inch and four 75-mm. guns, and four G-inch 
mortars. Near the phice where the wall crossed the railway 
were two small hills. On one of these the Cossack Lunette 
was erected ; on the other were emplacements for two small 
Baranovski guns. 

In rear of this line were the following batteries: On 
Great Hill, four light guns Avith an observation station for 
battery commanders; on Quail Hill, two 6-inch Canet guns 
and one siege gun ; at the Powder Eedoubt of the enceinte, 
tw^o 4.2-inch guns: on the other redoubts of the enceinte, 
three 87-mm. and two 57-mm, guns with shields, and four 
light guns. 

There w^as an observation station on the summit of Eocky 
Ividge to the right of P'ort Xo. III. The approaches to the 
redoubts and trenches were obstructed l)y wire entanglements 
generally in one line, but in })laces in two or three lines. All 
the ravines between the fortifications in the intervals were 
mined. From Battery A to the left to the front and along 
the entire front ran an electric fence. 

The above-described section of the fortress constituted the 
east and northeast fronts. A military road served for com- 
munication between the works on this front and the cit3^ It 
started from the south gate of the enceinte, ran by Battery 
No. 19, along the foot and in front of Dragon Kidge, and 
along the rear of Danger Hill, and approached the front line 
near Redoubt Xo. 2. Here it divided into two branches. One 
branch ran along the rear of the east front. The other ran in 
rear of the northeast front as far as Mound Batter}^ where it 
turned south, ran past the arsenal, and reentered the city 
through the northeastern gate. Another road started from 
the central gate of the enceinte and divided into two branches 
in the new Chinese city. One branch ran west of the new 
city along a well-concealed valley to Fort No. Ill, wdiile 
the other ran northeast along a ravine past Great and Spur 
hills to Redoubt Xo. 2 and Letters Battery. 

It is necessary to mention the auxiliary means of defense. 
Searchlights were installed on Battery Xo. 22, on Forts Xos. I, 
II, and III, on the Chinese wall, in the interval between Fort 
Xo. Ill and Caponier Xo. 3, and on Mound Battery. Current 
was supplied by dynamos placed in ordinary buildings partly 
bombproof. All of the searchlights except that at Fort Xo. 
Ill could be moved on trucks over railwavs. Dressing sta- 


tions for the wounded were established in tlio vicinity of 
Battery A, in the ravine in rear of Fort No. Ill, and on tlio 
road leading from this fort to the new Chinese city. 

The enceinte, as has been said, consists of cremaillere and 
polygonal fronts joining four redoubts. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the ditch was wide and deep and the ramparts high 
and thick, it had some very serious defects. Owing to a 
defectiA-e plan the greater part of the enceinte would, after the 
fall of the outer line, be subjected to enfilade and reverse fire; 
the redoubts were scarcely large enough to hold a half com- 
pany each; there Avas neither fireproof nor b()ml)proof shel- 
ter nor traverses along the entire line ; and the height of the 
breastworks was from 3 to 3^ feet, which, without enabling 
the men to fire standing, prevented them from firing in the 
kneeling position. In the old city, in rear of the enceinte, 
were the Red Cross and military hospitals, the depots of 
supplies, and the headquarters of the fortress. Communica- 
tion was carried on by means of telephones, semaphores, and 
orderlies, furnished by one sotnia " of cossacks and a com- 
mand of cyclists. Headquarters was connected by telephone 
with chiefs of fronts, and chiefs of fronts with commanders 
of forts, batteries, and other works, and regimental com- 
manders. The batteries were in communication between 
themselves and with observation stations. Unfortunately, 
the system was not sufficiently developed, and all wires were 

The line of permanent works began at the arsenal by a 
line of intrenchments which crossed the Cossack place and 
terminated at Cemetery Redoubt. In front of this line of in- 
trenchments were obstacles consisting of a ditch filled with 
water, chevaux-de-frise, fougasses, and wire entanglements. 
Cemetery Hill, on which Cemetery Battery was located with 
six 75-mm. guns. Cemetery Redoubt, and emplacements for 
a battery of l.^-inch guns, was surrounded by trenches. 
On Tootii Hill, to the left of Cemetery Hill, was Battery C 
(emplacement for four 6-inch guns). Somewhat below Bat- 
tery C were emplacements for four G-inch mortars, and some- 
what to the left was the Sa]:>per Battery (emplacements for 
four G-incii guns). Both hills were surrounded by one tier 

« The fighting strength of the sotnia is 4 otiicers and about 150 
men. — Tr. 


and in some places by two tiers of trenches. Fort No. IV 
was in front of these hills on a very high and steep height. 
Its garrison consisted of one company and its armament of 
four light, four 75-nmi., and two machine guns. To the 
left of the fort were emplacements for four 0-inch mortars 
and two light guns. There were advanced fortified positions 
all along this entire front. 

The river Lunhe was closed by the so-called aqueduct posi- 
tion, consisting of Aqueduct Redoubt (Fort Kuropatkin) and 
Idol Redoubt and a line of trenches. Two emplacements for 
field guns were constructed in the intrenchment between the 
redoubts. Most of the construction on Idol Redoubt was done 
in time of peace. During mobilization two lunettes had 
been constructed in its rear. Pachlunshan Ridge was occu- 
pied and fortified with two lunettes and a battery to support 
Idol Redoubt. All these w^orks were surrounded in front 
by a trench. The Chinese wall began again at Battery D 
and ran along Redoubt Xo. 4. The garrison of this work 
consisted of one company; the armament, of four 6-inch, 
eight light, and two machine guns. The interval between 
Redoubt No. 4 and Fort No. V was defended by two rows 
and in some places by three rows of trenches and fieldworks. 

The garrison of Fort No. V consisted of one company; 
its armament, of two 6-inch Canet, two T5-mm., five light, 
two Baranovski, and two machine guns. There Avere tem- 
porary emplacements for four 75-mm. guns (Pigeon Bat- 
tery) on a height in rear of Fort No. V. There were also 
emplacements for two light guns alongside the fort and for 
four light guns somewhat to the left of it. A little farther 
south were permanent emplacements (Battery E) for four 
6-inch and two light guns. Redoubt No. 5 had four 4.2-inch, 
four light, four Baranovski, and tAvo machine guns. The 
interval between Redoubt No. 5 and the site of Fort No. VI 
was filled with a series of intrenchments, lunettes, and field 
batteries, in front of which were wire entanglements and 
trous-de-loup. In the trenches on the site of Fort No. VI 
were four 4.2-inch and four light guns. Its garrison con- 
sisted of one company. From Fort No. VI the trenches ran 
across Salt Hill, where a redoubt was constructed and joined 
the seacoast battery, the so-called " "VMiite Wolf," on the left 
flank of the land front. In front of the interval between 


Forts Nos. IV and \' a i2-i'oiii) ol' liciohi^ \\a> ()ccin)i('(l. of 
Aviiich 174-Moter Hill and Division Hill were I'orlilied. 

The Avoi-ks between Ivedoubl No. 4 and White AVolf Bat- 
tery constituted the west front. ii03-Meter Hill, command- 
ing this section, was very weakly fortified. On its sunniiit 
were enii)lacenients for three G-inch auns. surrounded some- 
what lower by an unbroken trench and wire entanglements. 
On the three summits of Liaoteshan were constructed three 
sets of emplacements for G-inch guns. Small sections of 
rifle trenches were constructed on the shore of Pigeon Bay. 
All the permanent works on the front were in the imme- 
diate vicinity of the new city, almost on its outskirts. A road 
ran through the new city, with branches to Battery E, Re- 
doubt Xo. 4, Fort No. IV, Eedoubt No. 5, and Fort No. Y. 


The armament of the land front consisted of the follow- 
ing guns, mortars, and machine guns: 

21-fiu, guns : 2 

1.5-cm. Krupp gnus 2 

!>-iiicIi gnus S 

G-iucli guns, of G,SG2 pounds .3.3 

6-inch guns, of 4,.334 pounds 34 

4.2-incli guns 24 

Light guns 3,55 

57-mm. guns 27 

6-inch field mortars 22 

Machine guns : 48 

S7-mm. guns S 

Total - 36g 

There were SI.") guns and mortars and 48 machine guns. 
In addition to the foregoing the folloAving naval guns were 
installed on the land front : 

6-inch Canet guns 14 

6-inch short guns 2 

120-nmi. guns 1 

JJ-pounder guns 1 

75-inm. guns 28 

47-mni. guns 22 

37-mm. guns 17 

Total " 81 

"Note the error in addition here (should be 85), which occurs in 
the original. — Tr. 


The total armament of the hand front consisted of 39G guns 
and mortars and 48 machine guns. There was, moreover, a 
mobile reserve consisting of 4 batteries of rapid-fire field 
artillery of the F'ourth Brigade, 3 batteries of the Seventh Di- 
vision, and 1 battery of 57-mm. guns, a total of GO guns. 
Hence there were 456 guns in the fortress. 

The garrison of the fortress consisted of 9 rifle regiments 
of 3 battalions each, 2 companies of frontier guards of the 
Kuangtung naval brigade, 1 company of sappers, 1 railway 
compam^, 1 mining company, and 1 sotnia of cossacks. At 
the time of the investment the garrison consisted of 27,000 

The besieging army consisted of 3 divisions and 2 brigades 
with their field artillery, one artillery regiment per division, 
each regiment consisting of 4 eight-gun batteries. Thus in 
six regiments there were 6 X 32 = 192 guns. 

The siege park consisted of lOG guns and mortars, as fol- 
lows : "' 

120-mni. guns G6 

G-inch guns 22 

s-incli guns 2 

ll-inch mortars 10 


In addition to the foregoing there was a number of 6-incii, 
12-pounder, and 4.7-inch naval guns and mountain artillery. 
The total number of hostile guns was not less than 300. 
These guns were well placed on the opposite slopes of the 
ridges and were well masked. 

Such were the forces of the belligerents. 


Having shown the condition of the fortress for resistance, 
we shall now make the following comments : 

1. The right of the outer line w^as carried too far to the 
rear, thus bringing it too near the enceinte. It would have 
been of great advantage to have rested the right on Siao- 
kushan and Signal hills and to have included Takushan in 

"According to certain information tlie artillery consisted chiefly of 


the main line. Thus tiic front would li;i\c Ix-cu shorter mikI 

'2. Takushan and Siat)kushan hills were poorly i'ortitied, 
with fatal results. 

3. The forts were at a distance of 2 to 2^ miles from the 
center of the city on the east front and f mile on the west 
front. These distances Avere too small and alhnved the city 
to be bombarded, not only with big guns, but Avith field 
and mountain guns. 

4. Of the six forts one was completed, three were half 
finished, one was marked only by a ditch, and one was not 
yet begim. 

5. Numerous ditches and ravines cutting the intervals 
between the forts were not covered by fire in any way. 

G. Some of the forts were so situated as to be invisible 
from adjacent forts. Hence they were incapable of mutual 

7. The intervals between the forts ^xere filled by intrench- 
ments and old Chinese fortifications, from which a grazing 
fire could not be delivered. They were not sufficiently secure 
against assault and were ill adapted to resist artillery fire. 

8. There were no rear caponiers in the forts. The open 
gorge caponiers were not rationally constructed. 

9. On account of the unfinished state of the forts and re- 
doubts tlie}^ were surrounded by dead zones, with the excep- 
tion of Eedoubt Xo. 3. 

10. Guns of various caliber were placed in the same work. 

11. Shelters for guns to repulse assaults were insufficient 
in number. 

12. In some of the casemates of the forts there were no 
Hanking guns. This is one manifestation of the general 
neglect of flank defense for the ditches. 

13. The concrete walls of the casemates were only 3 feet 

14. The temporary emplacements for large-caliber guns 
were all erected on the summits of hills and could easily be 
seen from a distance. 

15. The mortars were insufficient in number and most of 
the guns were of an obsolete type. 

16. The forts, redoubts, and batteries were not masked 
and could easily be seen from a distance. 


17. The roads nlono- the fortress front and back to the 
city were too much exj)osed to tlie view of the enemy. 

18. There were no other means of connnanication, such 
as permanent and field raihvays. 

19. There was not a sufficient number of observation sta- 
tions in the intervals and in the rear. 

20. Xo preparations had been made for safe and secure 
observation. The turrets constructed for this purpose in 
some of the works afforded protection only against shrapnel 
and shell fragments. 

21. The telephonic comminiications for the control of 
artillery fire were not independent, but were a part of the 
general system, and were therefore ver}^ defective. 

22. The telephone system was entirely above ground, the 
wires being strung on posts. 

23. There were only fifteen searchlights, twelve of which 
Avere stationary. 

24. The apparatus for wireless telegraphy had been in- 
stalled but was not used. 

25. There were no balloons in the fortress. 

26. The stores of the engineers were limited as to instru- 
ments and material and were still more depleted by sending 
part of them to the army before the beginning of the siege. 


The completion of the forts, the construction of tem- 
porary batteries, and the filling in of the intervals lasted five 
and one-half months. 

The lack of cfficial reports, unfortunately, does not allow 
us to give exact information as to the number of workmen 
employed during this time on the different positions, the 
amount of material expended, and the number of vehicles 
used for carrying the material. But in view of the great im- 
portance of such information under similar conditions we 
shall give such information as we possess. Three-fourths of 
the Seventh Division — about 8,000 men daily — were detailed 
to the works during February and ]\Iarch. During April and 
May this n.umber was decreased to 2.000. After JMay 15 the 
Fifth Regiment was added, thus giving 1.000 more per day. 
In June and July about one-fourth of the force was at work 


on the positions — that is to say. not nioi-c than :').()()() incii 
l^er day. About ('),()()() Chinese were daily employed on the 
works, which was e(piivalent to the addition of 4,0UU liu.s- 

Thus 1-2.000 men were employed daily <hn'ino: February 
and March, giving (51)xl2,000) seven hundred and eight 
thousand workdays. During April and up to May 15, about 
10,000 men were employed daily, giving four fundred and 
sixty thousand workdays. During one-third of ]May, June, 
and July, about 8,000 men were employed daily, giving four 
bundled and eighty-eight thousand workdays. Thus one 
million six hundred and fifty-six thousand days' labor Avere 
expended upon the works, or one hundred and eighteen thou- 
sand two hundred and eighty-six days per mile, assuming 
that the line of defense extended 14 miles. 

For a modern fortress with a perimeter of 27 miles and a 
garrison of 40.000 men, 1,4{)() men per mile should be detailed 
to complete the works in seventy-nine days, or 1,000 men per 
mile to complete them in one hundred and eighteen days. 

One hundred and fifty two-wheeled vehicles were furnished 
dail}^ by the Seventh Division, and about 80 Chinese arbas 
were employed; a total equivalent in carrying capacity to 
200 two- wheeled vehicles. 
444G1— OS i 


(See I'lates I iuul XI.) 


Having- described the fortress in its three stages of devel- 
opment, commented upon some of its peculiar features, and 
compared the forces of the belligerents, we shall now de- 
scribe certain actions which demonstrated the importance of 
the ditferent works and exposed defects in the methods of 
fortification generally accepted in Russia. 

On July 30, 1904, the troops were driven within the works 
and the siege began. The enemy having forced us to evac- 
uate Feng-huang-shan occupied it himself and immediately 
began to fortify it. 

The line of investment ran along the summits of this 
ridge and extended almost parallel to our north and north- 
east fronts. In the beginning it formed very nearly a 
^raight line parallel to our center and at a considerable 
I distance from our flanks. The works on Takushan pre- 
vented the enemy from apj^roaching our right flank while 
those on 17-t-Meter Hill held him at a considerable dis- 
tance from our left. Hence the imj^ortance of these posi- 
tions was immediately perceived. It became clear that as 
long as Takushan and ITi-Meter Hill were in our hands 
': we could maintain possession of Takhe Bay, Pigeon Bay, 
and the entire plain between the shore of Pigeon Bay and 
the works on our west front. It was also evident that until 
1T4-Meter Hill was captured the investment of the west front 
was impossible. The great tactical importance of these 
two hills did not escape the Japanese. In addition to other 
advantages offered by their possession, these hills were of 
I still greater importance to the Japanese, as the Russian 
batteries on their summits prevented the Japanese from 
1 constructing advanced siege batteries. 
^ 48 


Hence, in order to estnhli^li a close investment and to util- 
ize c()nnnan(lin<>- positions for sieo(> |)atteries, the enemy had 
to take Taknshan and lT4-Met(M- Ilill. Before undertakino- 
decisive movements he awaited the concentration of his 
army, the comjiletion of arraiiacments to secnre his line 
of investment, and tlie constrnction of batteries behind Fen<^- 
hnanjishan. Xot nntil Augnst 9 did he begin to attack 
our advanced positions. The result of numerous obstinate at- 
tacks Avas the capture of Taknshan and Siaokushan; 174- 
Meter Hill still held out. It prevented the enemy from ex- 
tending his line of investment to our left, but the capture of 
Taknshan enabled him to attack our right. 

The importance of advanced positions has often been dis- 
cussed at home and abroad. Only a short time ago Mr. 
Timchenko-Kuban, in his pamphlet, A Few Words on Port 
Arthur, in speaking about planning fortresses, endeavored 
to explain the role of advanced positions and the importance 
of the struggle for their possession. He said : 

Some have called attention to the fact that the siege of Port Arthur 
showed in a definite manner the importance of advaneed positions and 
the part which such positions played in prolonging the resistance of 
the fortress and have shown the necessity of including within the 
defensive lines the greatest possible number of advanced positions. 
Others have not agreed with this view. They do not believe in a 
departure from what have been considered the fundamental principles 
of fortress warfare by giving too much importance to advanced posi- 
tions. They maintain that such positions, hastily constructed and 
occupied at the expense of men and material and incapable of offering 
sufficient resistance to the enemy, lead to the useless sacrifice of part 
of the fortress artillery and garrison. Bearing in mind the chief func- 
tion of fortifications — that of supplying a lack of men by the use of 
works — I. am inclined to think tljat they are right. 

Laying before us two diametrically opposite views, Mr. 
Timchenko-Rnban leans toward the second and does not 
deem it advantageous to use advanced positions. 

SomeAvhat further lie says : 

The advanced positions played a secondary part at Port Arthur. 
The greatest resistance was offered by the line of forts. 

On the f olloAving page he concludes : 

If we add to the above that Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, included in 
the perimeter of the fortress, were taken l^y the attack on August 22, 
we see clearly how erroneous were our suppositions with regard to the 
role of advanced positions and advanced fortifications. 


I do not concur in the opinion of the author. I shall now 
attempt to give some information which will throw light 
upon this question. 

In planning a fortress care is taken to place the works at 
points which are capable of defense and which have a special 
tactical importance. If the fortress be situated in a plain 
and if the forts be placed so as to command a level terrain 
which may be easily observed and covered by fire, it is nat- 
ural that the entire defense should devolve upon the line of 
forts. But such cases are extremely rare. The terrain in 
front of fortresses is generally hilly and broken. 

In front of the fortresses there are positions consisting of 
sei^arate hills or of groups of hills. According to their rela- 
tive situation, height, adaptability for defense, and distance 
from the fortress, some of these positions assume, during the 
siege of the fortress, great importance both for the attack 
and the defense. Because of economic considerations no per- 
manent fortifications are constructed on these heights during 
peace; but they are occupied during mobilization, the works 
constructed being, for want of time, of a temporary charac- 
ter called " advanced fortified positions." 

Such was the case at Port Arthur. It was remarked at the 
time the works were building that the terrain in front of the 
line of forts was so broken by all kinds of ravines, ditches, 
canyons, and hills that at a distance of two-thirds of a mile 
from the fortress there were areas which could not be reached 
by fire. Such a conformation of the terrain was very fa- 
vorable to the enemy, enabling him to concentrate his troops 
in security behind ridges and in ravines close to the fortress 
and convenient for assault. 

In front of our line of forts at distances varying from 1 
to 1^^ miles were commanding positions at Takushan, Siao- 
kushan, 171-Meter Hill, and ;203-Meter Hill. These heights 
were appreciated at their true value by Colonel A^elichko, who 
decided to occupy them with permanent fortifications, but 
economy stood in the vi'ay. They were forgotten and remem- 
bered only a short time before the siege began. 

Takushan commanded all the forts and redoubts on the 
east front. From its summit could be seen not only the forts 
but all the roads between the forts and those running back 
to the enceinte, the temporary batteries in rear, the enceinte. 


the city itself, part of the harbor, and the vos.sel.s in the 
roadstead. It also served the enemy iis an excellent shield 
to cover his position in rear of its northeast slope. It was 
impossible to see what was taking- place there from a single 
fort or redonbt. 

The possession of this hill enabled the defense to follow 
the distant movements of attacking parties and harass them ; 
to force the siege batteries to take np distant positions and 
thus to save the city in a great measure from bombard- 
ment : and to bring a flank and reverse fire upon all storming 
parties assailing the east front, thus precluding the possi- 
bility of assault on this front. 

The possession of this hill by the enemy enabled him to 
observe not only the entire area in rear of the forts of the 
east front, but all our movements and changes of position 
and some of the vessels in the inner bay; to correct by ob- 
servation his fire against our forts and batteries, so that 
even 11-inch shells struck our guns at the second shot ; and 
to secure the flank of the line of investment and facilitate 
storming the east front. 

From the foregoing comparative statements it is easy to 
understand the great value of this hill both to the attack and 
the defense. Hence the obstinacy of the Japanese in trying 
to capture it and the determination of our commandant to re- 
tain it. But it is hard to comprehend the indifference to its 
importance, the lack of appreciation of its value, and the 
languor in fortifying it while danger was yet afar off. 

The war began February 6. It was not until June 19 
that work on Takushan was begun, it having been decided 
to place there two companies and eight guns. The natural 
solid rock impeded the work and very little had been done 
when the Japanese appeared before the fortress. 

The fortress was invested July 30. Not until August '2 
did we decide to construct two closed works on Takushan 
and Siaokushan. Engineer Rashevski was ordered to com- 
plete tlie work as quickly as possible. He began most ener- 
getically, but the Japanese understood too well the impor- 
tance of these hills. They impeded the work by shrapnel 
fire and five days later began a series of attacks. They took 
the hills August 9. If Takushan had been appreciated at 
its just value and fortified in time, it would not have been 


taken so quicklj^ nor so easily', if we may judge by our ex- 
perience near the aqueduct. 

During the first Aveek of the investment the Japanese 
erected siege batteries behind Fenghuangshan, where they 
were comparatively safe from molestation. They could not 
begin such batteries in the vicinity of Takushan until the hill 
was captured; nor would they risk an assault on the eastern 
front before taking Takushan, although they fully realized 
that a day lost by them was a day gained by us. The}^ com- 
pleted their batteries on Takushan on August IG. With a 
good observation station on this hill for fire control and for 
general purposes, they could now operate against our east 
front with all the advantages possessed by the umpire in a 
game of kriegspiel. 

On August 22 they took Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2 by 
assault. With the assistance of the captured works they be- 
gan operations against Forts Nos. II and III. Could they 
have threatened a single one of these works with a hostile 
garrison in their rear on Takushan? Certainly they could 
not. How is it possible, then, to maintain seriously that ad- 
vanced positions lead to the useless sacrifice of part of the 
fortress artillery and garrison? It is necessary, indeed, that 
such positions be really fortified positions — not mere naked 
hills. In occupying them the chief function of forti- 
fications should not be forgotten — that of compensating 
for a lack of men by the use of works. The blood of the 
defenders should not compensate for the lack of works. 

The enormous importance of Takushan Avas realized by 
Colonel Yelichko, Avho proposed to erect here a strong point 
of support. This Avas not done for reasons over Avhich he had 
no control. His idea Avas misunderstood, unappreciated, for- 
gotten. The period of mobilization Avas so long that a strong 
temporary fortification with substantial obstacles might have 
been erected. The general features of the hill, the steepness 
of the slope toAvard the enemy, Avere A^ery favorable. But 
nothing commensurate Avith the importance of the place Avas 
clone toAvard fortifying the hill ; for it must be admitted that 
Avhat might have been Avell done in hve months, could not, in 
this instance, be done at all in one. This shoAvs again that 
not only the intervals between the forts, but important ad- 
vanced ])ositions should be fortified in time of peace. Taku- 


shall fell early and led to a useless sacriticf of incii and 
material only because it had not been fortified. 

The history of 208-Meter Hill illustrates our \ie\v of the 
value of advanced positions. The works here were more ex- 
tensive than those on Taknshan, and they were manned l)v the 
heroic Fifth Reo^imeiit. They withstood repeated furious as- 
saults for four months and eaii-cd a loss of 20,000 men. The 
importance of the hill was realized by both sides; no efforts 
were spared to capture it, and the greatest obstinacy was dis- 
plaved in its defense. \When at last it fell, on December 5, 
the weary, heartbroken Kondratchenko said, " This is the be- 
o-inning of the end." Three days later the remnants of the 
Pacific squadron were resting on the bottom of the sea, and a 
month later the fortress had fallen. 

The position at the Aqueduct, much better fortified than 
the others, held out to the end. The position on Pachlun- 
shan remained partly in our hands until the end, and, with 
that on Division Hill, prevented the enemy from executing 
his skillful maneuver of 1894: against the Chinese. It is 
impossible to limit the application of the principles of 
fortress warfare to a line of forts. The use of advanced 
positions is not contrary to these principles, but forms a most 
essential part of them. The essential feature of fortress 
warfare consists in the use of all possible means to prolong 
the defense, yielding the ground inch In' inch ; hence the 
endeavor to take advantage of important advanced positions 
adapted to defense, is the only means to carry out the 
cardinal principle of fortress warfare. 

It may be urged that the use of advanced positions at Port 
Arthur was unavoidable on account of the unfinished condition 
of its fortifications. Let us suppose, however, that the for- 
tress were completed according to the project. Would there 
have been any necessity to occupy advanced positions? If 
Ave examine the map of the Kuangtung Peninsula, the most 
striking feature which arrests the eye is the long ridge of 
Fenghuangshan extending at a distance of 1-^ to 2 miles in 
front of the line of forts. It is high and rather steep. A 
great valley, 7 niiles wide, extends beyond it. 

Along this valley run the principal roads to Port Arthur, 
and only through this valley could a siege train l)e taken to 
Port Arthur. Here only was it possible for the besiegers 


to establish their great depots, camps, and lines of supply. 
All that takes place in the valley is hidden from the view 
of the fortress by Fenghuangshan. The occupation of this 
ridge by the enemy secured his entire front. The for- 
tress could not, therefore, interfere in any way while the 
enemy was bringing up supplies and concentrating to attack. 
On the other hand, if we had had long-range rapid-fire guns 
on this ridge, the enemy could easily have been kept out of 
the valley and deprived of the use of the bays of Ten Ships 
and Yenhentzu. He would have been compelled to concen- 
trate against our right flank in a hilly locality without roads 
or level space to assemble his men and munitions of war," 
The construction of railways in such a locality would have 
been very difficult and the transportation of mortars quite 
impossible. Would the siege have been successful under 
such circumstances? We think not. 

It will be granted that the condition of the fortress was 
such that Fenghuangshan could not be occupied ; but it 
would have been imperative to occupy it as an advanced 
position, had the fortress been completed. 

It has been asserted that the use of advanced positions 
has been condemned by the majority of those who have been 
qualified to express an opinion. Such is not the case. Let 
us recall how this idea was spread in the eighteenth cen- 
tury by Carnot, the "organizer of victories;'' let us recall 
Carnot's operations at Antwerp in 1814, Davout's at Ham- 
burg in 1813, and 1814, and Rapp's at Danzig in 1813, and 
the more recent seiges of Sebastopol and Belfort. Todleben, 
who, at the beginning of the seige of Sebastopol had not 
occupied the advanced positions on the Kilen-balka Heights, 
in front of the Malakhoff Mound and on the shore of Quar- 
antine Bay, realized their importance during the siege and 
insisted upon occupying them. At Belfort advanced posi- 
tions, even with weak garrisons, played an important role. 

These examples prove that the defense should not be lim- 
ited to a passive resistence within the fortress. It is a fatal 
mistake to await patiently the enemy's attack, allowing him 
to occupy advantageous positions and to make preparations 

n This view was expi'essed by General Fock before the iuvestmeiit. 
It was confirmed during the siege. 


for assault. It is wise to impede his movements at a distance 
from the fortress and make each step in advance more and 
more difficult for him. In addition to other advantajives, 
the active defense of a fortress, which consists chiefly in 
opposing the enemy in advanced positions, helps to maintain 
the spirit of the garrison which is a very important element 
in war. 

Of course it is impossible to occupy and defend every 
hill in front of fortified works. Onl}^ those positions 
should be occupied which may be of importance during the 
siege on account of their situation, adaptability for defense, 
height, and distance from the fortress. Hills which have 
these advantages should be occupied, fortified, and defended. 



After taking Takushan the enemy attacked 1T4:-Meter Hill, 
and, after a series of attacks, succeeded, on August 15, in tak- 
ing the approaches. The attack on the hill itself show^ed 
the impossibility of quickly constructing siege batteries and 
investing the fortress from the west; 174-Meter Hill must 
first be taken. It was difficult to foresee the result of another 
attack, although it was only a question of time when the hill 
must fall. In the meanwhile Marshal Oyama began to ad- 
vance against General Kuropatkin, but his forces were not 
sufficient to inflict a decisive defeat upon our Manchurian 
army. Hence Marshal Oyama demanded of General Xogi 
the speedy capture of Port Arthur. Actuated on the one 
hand by the desire to march to the support of Oyama, and 
on the other by the example of 1804, when he had success- 
fully stormed Port Arthur with his brigade. General Nogi 
decided to assault the fortress according to the plan recom- 
mended by the Bavarian General Sauer. 

AVe find in the interesting book of David James" a de- 
tailed and exact desci-iptitsn'of this "ent^pris^j^ which is here 
inserted. ^^~^^^ 

'^ The siege of Port Artliur, l)y David II. James, Loudon, T. Fisher 
Uuwin, 1905, pp. 67-90.— Tr. 


Roughly, the plan of assault was as follows: Wantai (Eagle 
Nest),° in the center of the north-eastern sector, was the objective. 
From Wantai it was proposed to drive in a wedge between the east- 
ern fortifications, and take the Erhlung (Fort No. Ill) and Sungshu 
(Redoubt No. 3) forts in reverse. This accomplished, the captured 
ground was to serve as the basis of a general movement against the 
town. An overwhelming rush was to carry the secondary line of 
eastern defenses, to swamp the garrison and reduce the rest of the 
position by storm. There was a good deal of rush necessary for the 
successful carrying out of this plan, and success depended largely on 
the suddenness and daring of the scheme. The preceding operations, 
it will be remembered, took the form of a demonstration against the 
west by the first division. This feint attack was made with a two- 
fold object : first, to create a diversion, and delude the garrison into 
the belief that the Japanese were following in detail the successful 
operations against the Chinese in 18U4 ; and, secondly, to allow the 
ninth division to steal thtf ground necessary for frontally attacking the 
Panlungs ^ (the first obstacles en route to Wantai). (In fact, under 
this ruse the ground was actually occupied by the ninth divison pre- 
vious to the 19th of August.) On the 19th of August the disposition 
of the investing force was as follows: — 

RUjht Wing. — First division (First and Second Brigades, Tokio, 
regiments 1, 15, 2, 3), from the northern shores of Louisa Bay in an 
almost straight line to the foothills a quarter of a mile north of 
Sueishi village. 

Center. — Ninth division (sixth and eighteenth brigades, Kaua- 
zawa, regiments 7, 35, 19, 36), from north of the Sueishi village curv- 
ing over the valley and crossing the railway at a point half a mile due 
east of the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2) and northwest of 

Left Wing. — Eleventh division (tenth and twenty-second brigades, 
Shikoku, regiments 12, 43, 22, 44), a line from the east coast — paral- 
lel to the eastern fortifications at a distance of 1,000 yards— to the 
foothills of Ta-ku-sban. 

General Reserves. — Two independent brigades, 18,000 of second re- 
serves (six regiments, 1, 15, 16, 30, 38, 9), under direct orders of 
(ieneral Nogi. 

These infantry reserves were bivouacked in groups upon terraces 
cut in the reverse slopes of the hill, where they were absolutely safe 
from shell fire. General Nogi was in touch by a perfect system of 
telephone wires with all branches of troops, while the hospital serv- 
ice was directed similarly by General Ochai. Ammunition columns, 

" The English author's place-names and spelling have not been 
altered. Names used in this publication have been inserted in paren- 
theses or added in footnotes, where they differ from thc^se used by thu 
English author. — Tr. 

^ Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2. — Tk. 


comnilssary depots, pioneer corps, engineers, sappers, imd auxiliary 
arms were in direct conmiunieation with headquarters, as also the 
naval detachment, while wireless conmiunieation was maintained from 
Dalny and Shaio-ping-tao with the hlockadiui: squadron under Ad- 
miral Togo. 

The bulk of the artillery, including the siege park, was emi)laced 
upcm a semicircular Tine extending from the east coast to the western 
plain near Louisa Bay: the center of this artilk-ry line was a mile 
and a half to the north of the Erhlung (Fort No. Ill) hills, and zig- 
zagged at irregular distances to the east and west. The artillei-y was 
not evenly distributed, for the majority of howitzer batteries were 
sci'eened in the Feng-Iiwang-shans. 

About 300 pieces of cannon in all were ranged against the fortifi- 
cations, and included 15- and 12-centimetre howitzers (ten batteries 
of these), 9-centimetre howitzers, and some old 21-centimetre howit- 
zers captured at Nanshan, 4.7 and 12-pounder naval guns, 6-inch siege 
guns, and mountain artillery batteries. 

Two uaval 0-inch guns were brought up from Dalny, but were not 
emplaced in time for the first assault. 

All guns were beautifully emplaced, the battery positions on the 
reverse slopes of the hills splendidly concealed and masked on the 
tiauks by sandbags and mounds artificially blended with the hillside. 
The units of the batteries were in subdivisions of the emplacement, 
and traverses of sand bags protected the working numbers of the 
gnu detachments. 

From the siege park a heavy concentration of direct fire upon 
the eastern forts was possible, but the presence of the north and 
central hills prevented similar fire being brought to bear on Tai- 
yang-kou, etc. 

The artillery commander. General Teshiuia, directed the battery 
fire from Observation Hill (center Feug-hwang-shaus), from which 
point a systematic network of telephone wires connected up subordi- 
nate artillery observation points and the balloon section ojierating 
in the rear." The Japanese took every precaution to insure suc- 
cess, and made the utmost of a favourable position for attack. From 
the highest to the lowest, from general to private, all obeyed with 
cheerful cooperation the word of General Nogi, who was in supreme 
undisputed control of the operations from skirmishes to concentrated 
artillery fire. 

The hopes of the troops ran high on the ISth of August when the 
gun crews rested from their drill and commenced to prod the Rus- 
sian fortifications with sighting shots, and early the next morning 
to open a general bombardment of the entire line. 

The hopes of other less important individuals went up with a 
bound the next day, for the Pen Brigade (war correspondents) were 
accorded an interview with the commander-in-chief, General Baron 

"A very important indication of the excellent manner in which the 
artillerv fire was conducted and the communications were organized. 


Nof^i, jit Shwang-tai-kou, and aftt'r a kindly welcome we're cbeer- 
fully informed that "you have come just in time to see the close of 
a successful canipaij-'n," " and, inidcr an escort of otticial interpreters 
(whose qualification for this position was misinterpretation of j^eneral 
orders and qualities of irritation), were marcluMl to tlu; firing line. 
Feng-liwang-shan was allotted as an observation post, and from this 
point I will describe tlie events of the first few days. 

The Japanese artillery were now (9 a. m., liJth August) busily en- 
gaged covering an attack on 174 Metre Hill by the right wing of the 
first division. Divisional artillery had moved up, and were lending 
general support to this attack, while a couple of batteries of howitzers 
were engaging the garrison of I-tzu-shan (Fort No. IV). Shortly 
afterwards the division artillery opened up with shrai)nel on 174 
Metre, and bubbling wreaths of smoke were floating over the hill when 
the infantry of the 15th Itegiment could be made out skirmishing 
over the slopes with fixed bayonets. At this time a rattle of musketry 
announced the volleys of the defenders ; the line of Japanese bayonets 
thinned and retired to cover. An astonishing general rapid fire had 
now been developed by the entire siege park, to which the Russians 
returned a slow, spasmodic reply, making indifferent practice. There 
was now evidence of infantry movement in our immediate front, in 
the Sueishi valley. A detachment of the right wing of the first divi- 
sion were endeavouring to work into the Sueishi village, and main- 
taining a sharp exchange of rifie fire with the Russian outposts in 
this part of the field. Farther west the 15th Regiment made an 
assault on 174, but, being smai'tly shrapneled, were again forced to 
retire. A brigade of reserves was at this time dispatched to reenforce 
the right wing, and in the afternoon the artillery concentrated on the 
eastern forts and succeeded in silencing the two Panlungs (Fortifica- 
tions Nos. 1 and 2) and "P" fortification (Caponier No. 2). A fur- 
ther attempt to storm 174 was made at two in the afternoon, and they 
had gained the glacis entanglements before the Russians on the left 
flank (from the hills* south-east of 174), opened up a murderous rifle 
and machine-gun fire, which the Japanese artillery, being unable to 
silence, little clusters of the 15th were quickly bolting for cover, 
smartly shraimeled as they made for shelter. This was, however, not 
the main attacking force, and the glasses failed to locate them, for 
they were pressing the attack all afternoon, and a heavy fire was 
maintained till evening from the direction of the west of the hill. The 
Russians slowly awakened more cannon, and commenced searching in 
the foothills for the howitzer batteries, but met with no success. On 
the other hand, the Japanese practice appeared to be steadily improv- 
ing and bearing fruit, for the eastern line was now smothered in a 
dense black cloud of earth and smoke, and by twilight scarcely a shot 
was fired from the Russian line, save in the west, where small-arm 

"Note the confidence of the Japanese commander in the success of 
the enterprise. 
* Long Hill.— Te. 


lire broke out afresh. The day, one of brilliant simslilne. was Ijiit tiie 

eiirtain raiser, the preliniiiiary practice of the orchestra of .•'.(mi j.'iiiis. 


Long before daylight we were afoot and tranii)ing bade to tlie fir- 
ing line. The .Japanese had maintained their geiwral howitzer fire 
throughout the night, and we were not a little anxious to ascertain 
the changes in the position of the infantry. The hills were already 
ringing with echoes when we siiread ourselves over the roclcy sum- 
mit of Feng-hwang-shan aud swung anxious eyes over the position. 
The citadel was bathed in all the glory of morning sunshine, and 
from behind the fortified ridges rose the lazy curling smoke of morn- 
ing fires, drifting in wreaths to the slcy. Signal Hags fluttering in 
the halyards on (Jolden Hill; a couple of slim torpedo boats slip- 
ping into the harbour from night patrol ; in the West I'ort a tug slowly 
steaming uj) to a sheer-legged pontoon alongside of which lay a 
many-funneled torpedo boat — apart from this there was a heavy 
silence brooding over the fortifications. 

In the lines of the invaders there was ceaseless activity. The over- 
night bombardment had enabled a field battery" to establish itself a 
few hundred yards to the north-east of the P^rhlung lunette (Aqueduct 
Redoubt). Infantry were already picking their way through the water 
courses, and ammunition was being passed along to the Japanese 
infantry hidden in the l)roken ground of the valley. All morning 
the artillery pecked away at the forts in a busy manner, with less 
rapidity and better practice than on the previous day. Shortly before 
noon the right of the artillery concentrated on 174 Metre Hill, and 
the 15th IJegiment developed its attack from ground won overnight, 
the sappers having destroyed the entanglements by cutting the stakes 
(the wire having previously i-esisted all the efforts of the pioneers 
with sheers). • 

' The artillery ceased its fire on 174 Metre Hill, when the Japanese 
infantry negotiating the obstacle stormed the trenches. 

4: :{: ^ 4: 4: ^: 4: 

The vigilance of the garrison and the havoc wrought by the ma- 
chine guns, aided by the clever handling of the searchlight when 
the Japanese reached the entanglements, defeated the attempts of 
the Japanese to gain the ground necessary for developing the assault. 
At 8 o'clock in the morning a small force rushed and carried the 
"P" fortification (Caponier No. 2) at the point of the bayonet, but 
were quickly shelled out, and forced to retire with the other troops. 
The attacks on "Q" fortification (Kuropatkin Lunette) were easily 
checked, and the infantry operating in this work were unmercifully 
handled in the morning before the Japanese artillery could smother 
the Russian fire and cover their retirement. The lines of stretchers, 
with their burdens of torn flesh passing through the shady kowliang 
fields all morning, were conclusive evidence of the hard night's work. 

"This was made possible by the high kaoliang in the fields. 


At tlio railway station of Cliaii^'-liug-tsii " (tlie supply hospital for 
Dalny) I counted a battalion of severely wounded men brought in 
from a coui»Ie of rej^imeuts of the nintli division, and this before ten 
o'clock in the morning. 

KIsewhere in the field hospitals and dressing stations there were 
overflows of wounded men, waiting in silent groui)S for attendance. 
It had been a night of discovery, and of very unpleasant discovery, 
for the Japanese, who still desired to storm Port Arthur. 

The morning was given over to the artillery, and especially the 
naval brigade, which kept up a furious direct fire on the Panlungs 
(Fortifications Xos. 1 and 2). During the afternoon a detachment 
of pioneers, about half a company strong, carried out demonstrations 
against the entanglements, fixing nooses around the stakes by which 
many of the posts were hauled down. 

Others, rushing up to the entanglements, fell down and feigned 
death, then crawling under the wires turned over on their backs, and, 
manipulating sheers, succeeded in cutting gaps in the obstacle. But 
the Russians soon discovered this ruse, and commenced a systematic 
slaughter of all wounded or seeming wounded lying anywhere in the 
vicinity of the entanglements. And many innocent Tommies were 
drilled full of holes to make sure that they were not shamming death 
for strategical purposes. 

The Sueishi lunettes (Idol Redoubt and two lunettes) were pep- 
pered with shrapnel during the afternoon, and the Russians re- 
taliated by shelling the village. The naval brigade was located soon 
after midday from its peculiarly short barking report, and the tars 
stuck manfully to their guns, although they were hopelessly out- 
classed in metal by the Russian 11-inch howitzers. Before sunset 
the Japanese opened a rapid fire, which was smartly replied to, and 
a terrific cannoiyide closed a practically uneventful day. 

On the afternoon of August 21, General Xogi ordered a brigade of 
reserves to support the ninth division, and the plan of assault to 
be advanced another stage after moonset in the early hours of the 
morning of the 22nd of August. Soon after midnight the Russians 
switched on their searchlights, and it was evident that no part of 
the line was seriously threatened by immediate capture. From 2.30 
a. m. the Japanese attack was developed with redoubled fury along 
the entire front of the center and left wing. The fighting was fiercest 
in the vicinity of the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2) and 
the lines of entanglements hedging in " P," "Q" (Caponier No. 2 
and Kuropatkin Lunette), and North fort (Fort No. II). For the 
first time since the opening of the assault the attacks were pressed, 
but, meeting the decimating volleys of the concealed enemy, were 
beaten back at every point. Fresh troops were continually added to 
the firing line, and desperate efforts made to effect the capture of 
the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2) ; but insufficient lanes had 
been cut in the entanglements, and the troops were frightfully mauled 

" Seven and one-fourth miles from Port Arthur. 


while cuttiiifr fresh jtaths 1hrnn.i.'h those ohstaeles. Luckily llio 
(•allies of the mines were IocmIimI ami cut hefnrc use could be iiuide of 
them by the garrison; but the (h'\ilisli ulilily of the searchlights 
was again demonstrated by the skilful niaiuier in which Ihey wen- 
manipulated in locating the masses of Jjtpanesc for the general tire 
of the garrist)n. Despite the disadvantages, the attack was per- 
sistently presse<l until ."i a. m., when, linding that no advantage had 
been obtained, the shattered columns were withdrawn to the cover 
of the many ravines and dongas rmming at right angles to the Kus- 
sian line. 

The Division cooperated in the attack just ix-fore dawn, and 
were able to advance their tiring line and cover the moving of the 
divisional artillery to the slojics about a iniU> to llic uoiMh-west of 
1-tzu-shan (Fort No. IV). 

The .Japanese fleet was also in active cooi)eration throughout the 
night, lending supitort from off the south-east of Ta-ku-shan. Two 
battalions of reserves were disi»atched to the ninth division at day- 
light, when the artillery immediately opened a heavy concentrated 
tire on the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2), and, succeednig in 
squashing the Russian fire, enabled the broken battalions to re-form 
for continuing the night attack against these two fortifications. The 
7th Regiment of the ninth division had been allotted the task of 
capturing the semi-permanents. and had been all night under arms 
striving to make some impression, but with no success. General Nogi, 
seriously refiecting ui)on the nnexiiected strength developed by the 
opposition, summoned a council <>t divisional commanders to head- 
quarters to reconsider the plan of attack. During the absence of 
General Oshima (commanding the ninth division), the commander of 
the 7th Regiment, Colonel Ouchi, together with his battalion leaders 
and junior ofiicers, forwarded a request to be allowed to innne- 
diately proceed with the attack on the Panlungs (Fortifications 
Xos. 1 and 2). Their wish being granted, the artillery redoubled its 
fire, and, when the belching mouths had smothered the defenses of 
the Slate Dragons with a deluge of shell and shrapnel, the gallant 
7th attacked. With deliberate courage they worked up over the 
broken ground in a disjointed frontal attack, the companies cleverly 
converging on the position as if on manoeuvres. When a battalion or 
more had developed a strong firing line they w-ere caught by a furious 
cross fire from East Panlung (Fortification No. 1) and North fort 
(Fort No. II). Volley after volley was poured into them from the 
enceinte wall, and the tiring line literally mowed down by a sustaiutnl 
scythe of rifle fire, which quickly forced them to break ground and 
retire. It was now about eleven o'clock, and a small j tarty of this 
daring force, stubbornly maintaining its position, effected a lodgment 
in the dip of ground between the East Panlung (Fortification No. 1) 
and " P '' fortification (Caponier No. 2)." 

o This show's clearly the existence of dead areas around the works. 


This party then set about reconiioitriuj,' the position, and a vol- 
unteor, armod with a canister of dynamite, crawled up to the very 
breastworks of the redoul)t, and, affixing tlie charge, managed to 
destroy one of the machine-gun shelters before being discovered and 
killed. This raised the hopes of the little party, and was repeated 
again with equal success. The rest of the regiment now renewed the 
attack and doubled back hi squads of thirty and forty, making for the 
shelter of the depression, where the little party had established 
itself. Full two l)attalions reached this cover and overflowetl the 
shelter it afforded. The Russians then brought a cf)uple of machine 
guns to bear on them, and the force, smarting under the lash of this 
fire, wavered, and, breaking from the unfriendly shelter, were dart- 
ing individually back over the glacis when an officer, reckless of life, 
leapt up from cover, dashed for the redoubt, and firmly planted the 
regimental colours before paying the penalty of his heroism. The 
effect of this self-sacrifice was momentous and dramatically tragical, 
for his lead was quickly followed by others, who kept the colours fly- 
ing at the sacrifice of their lives. But the fluttering colours had 
been seen ; the men ceased running, and joining the struggling mass 
of humanity, forced the standard nearer the redoubt. Bayonets 
flashed in the sunlight as the line of steel, not to be denied, surged 
over the breastworks and dashed at the waiting foe. A wild, bloody 
melee followed, and the cold steel of Japanese bayonets won the day 
as the fort changed hands. But it was not over. The garrisons in 
the West Panlung (Fortification No. 2) and North fort (Fort No. II) 
enfiladed the 7th Regiment in the captured works, who tena- 
ciously held on, striving to re-create the defenses in the battered 
work, while the Japanese artillery, with increasing desperation, plied 
round after round into the forts. It was a critical time, and the 
7th grimly waited with rapidly thinning i-anks for relief. It 
came from an unexpected quarter. Two companies of reserves (de- 
tached to cover the operations of the 7th Regiment), seeing the 
dilemma of that force, asked for permission to attempt the capture of 
the West Panlung (Fortification No. 2), which at this time, set on 
fire by the Japanese shelling, was burning fiercely. The permission 
being obtained, these two companies made a spirited rush for the 
burning redoubt, and dashed into the flames. The suddenness of this 
daring attack threw the garrison into confusion, and the Japanese, 
making the utmost of the opportunity, were quickly masters of the 

This immediately relieved the tension on the 7th Regiment ; but 
although it was now five o'clock, the dislodged garrisons, refusing 
to vacate the position altogether, maintained a heavy rifle fire on 
the lost works. But no human force or hellish agency was able to 
make the gallant 7th budge from their own. The slopes of the 
Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2) were like shambles, and the 
Russians continued to pour in hailstorms of shrapnel; but what had 
been won by the self-sacrificing devotion of one of the bravest regi- 

NOGt's plan FOI! rilK ASRAFT/r. (')'.] 

iiiciits tliat i'\(M' tixcd liayoiicls was hcydiul rccapl nrc Al i-Ncniiiir 
llir r.illi KcuiniiMit nf llic iiiiilh divisidu driuuiisl ralf;! a^'aiiisl tlic 
Mi'liliiiiL.' Liiiu>tle ( l'"(>i'l Xi). Ill I. and niidcf cover of tlio diversion sup- 
ports wore rushed up to the itattalionloss Till, ruder cover of dai-U- 
ness they were twice des]terate]y coiuilcr-attackcd i)y the liussiaus, 
juul fierce fiybtiug was lu^cessary to inaintaiu liohl on tlie captured 
jtosition. But a continual stream of su|iports was dribbled into tin- 
tiriuj; line, and tlie jrround secureiv Jield despite fraidic shelliiif,' and 
desperate assaults on the part of the ejected pirrisous. A battalion 
of reserves was added to the couunand of General Osliinia, and the 
nij^ht passed without further attcMupts beiuir made to advance the 
j,'eneral plan of assault. 'I'he \v;iy had been cleai'ed to Wantai (Kajrle 
Nest) at a terrible sacrifice, and the "division" that was to l>e sacri- 
ficed in the storminjj; operation was almost already out of action. 
The spirit of the ti'ooi»s was excellent, and one and all were ready 
to doidile the sacrifice if the end could be broui^ht in sifjht. P>ut 
there were elements in the struggle that they could not eliminate 
by self-sacrifice, and, but for the national desire, the assault would 
most surely have been abandoned: but. as it was. the woi'd had 
gorte out, and Port Arthur was to be stormed at any price. So 
fierce was the fighting after the 20th that no atteuii)ts were made 
to l)enetit by the (Jeneva Convention and use the Red Cross flag. The 
wt>unded were allowed to lie for days under the blistering sun with- 
out succour, and left slowly to perish on the reeking, shambled slopes. 
Tnder cover of night rescue parties did go out to gather some of 
these unfortunate wounded, but, being forced to crawl ovei- the 
ground, had to fasten ropes around the legs of the wounded and haul 
them over the uneven ground, thus inflicting terrible torture on the 
suffering and almost insane men. Men with just a spark of life in 
them were brought to the dressing stations with their ])odies crawl- 
ing with maggots from their decayed wounds; and scenes more horri- 
ble — but I refrain from further reference to the awful condition of the 
Japanese wounded. 

From the foregoing quotation we see that General Xogi's 
])hui was as follows: 

1. To concentrate a strong artillery fire along the entire 
front of the fortress, but chiefly against the interval between 
Forts Xos. II and III. 

2. To maintain this fire until our fortifications were de- 
stroyed and our artillery silenced, three days being consid- 
ered sufficient for this purpose. 

3. Simultaneously with the oj^ening of fire, to begin a 
series of demonstrations against the north front and against 
the western and the extreme eastern flanks. 

4. Under cover of these attacks and of the artillery fire, 
the division selected for the main attack was to occupy its 

4-1401— OS .") 


position and bcfjin the attack when it should berome evident 
that the Japanese artillery fire had accomplished its purpose. 

5. The object of the main attack was to break through the 
line between Forts Nos. II and III, capturing the works in 
this interval, and to take possession of Eagle Xest. 

6. Having thus divided the northeast front into two halves, 
to attack the intermediate batteries and Forts Nos. II and 
III from the rear, and fortify the captured positions. 

7. By a final operation to drive the Russians behind the 
central enceinte and to storm the city. 

The following measures were taken to execute this plan : 

1. Three hundred siege guns were provided to destroy the 
Russian fortifications and silence their batteries. 

2. A division was detailed to make each separate attack. 

3. Each division had its divisional artillery to support its 

4. A strong reserve of six regiments under the direct con- 
trol of the commander in chief was to support the main 
attack and strike the final blow. 

5. The squadron was to support the attack by operating 
against the flanks. 

6. The siege artillery was to fire against the forts, bat- 
teries, and intermediate fortifications. 

7. Sappers were detailed to accompany the advance de- 
tachments to remove obstacles. 

8. The movements of troops and the concentration of fire 
were controlled by an excellent telephone system connecting 
the batteries and the headquarters of the detachments with 
the observation stations. 

The assailants were favored by the unfinished condition 
of the Russian fortifications and the fact that these works 
were absolutely unmasked, by the villages and gardens which 
had not been destroyed in the vicinity of the fortifications, 
and by the broken terrain and large dead spaces in the vallej'^ 
of the Lunhe and in the immediate vicinity of the works. 

In order to give as full a picture of the battle as possible 
we give here the following official telephone messages: 

1. To the Staff, Seventh Division, 7.40 a. m. August 19 : 

At 5 a. m. the Japanese began to fire from Fengliuangslian against 
Fort No. Ill and Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2." 

'^ The attack of 174-Meter Hill began at the same time. 


'2. To the Stall'. Scxciilli l)i\i>i<)ii. 11.05 u. ni., Aii'nisl I'.i: 
Uodoubt No. 1 completely deslioyiMl to-d.-iy liy hoiiiliMnliiiciil. All 

1li«' irmis except one daniiif^ed. 'I'lirec lMiiiil»iir(»<)f slicllers dcslruyi'd. 

Tliree men killed and twenty woiiiidcd. Al INnM .\n. Ill :ill the |;iri:r 

{runs are daiuajied. Gorbatovski, (ieiieral. 

;>. To the Chief of the Seventh Division, 7.85 p. m., Aii- 
^•u.-t 19: 

The coniniandant of Fortification No. 2. ("'aiHaiii Kniglik, reiiorts" 
nuiveuients of troops iii several coluiiins in k.ioliaiij,' and ravines in tho 
direction of the villatre of Dapolich.jnaii. The cartridge niairazine at 
Fort No. Ill has been set on lire by hostile shot. 

4. To the Stair, 7.40 p. in.. Aui>-ust 19: 

At 7 p. ni. attack by two or uKtre .J;ip;incs(> battalions on Aqnednct 
Redoubt ceased/' It api)ears that the assault has been repulsed by 
the aid of the artillery. The ion of the company is critical. 
The .Japanese have taken the ditch and surround the redoubt. Can 
the company retreat V Seraenhoft", Colonel.^ 

5. To Colonel Semenhoir. 7..")0 p. m.. Auijiist 19: 

It is not possible to retreat from Aqueduct Redoubt. Send two bat- 
teries of field artillery to fire against the approaches to the redoubt. 
Smirnoff, Lieutenant General. 

(>. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 6.15 p. m., Ali- 
enist 19 : 

Slielters of Aqueduct Redoubt are entirely destroyed according to 
tlie report of the company commander, and the men are firing above 
the shelters. Two companies have been sent as reinforcements. 

7. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 6.15 p. in., Au- 
gust 20 : 

The enemy is firing furiously against the two fortifications, especially 
against No. 1 and the batteries connected with it. At this moment 
itreaches are being made in the Chinese wall. Field artillery is to 
be seen in the kaoliang and in rear of it considerable detachments of 
infantry. I believe that the enemy will attack the fortification to-d:iy. 
(Jorbatovski, Major General. 

" In addition to this report on the movements of the enemy there 
was another from the armored observation station on Rocky Hill close 
to Fort No. III. 

^ Demonstration against the northern front. These movements were 
not seen from Forts Nos. II and III. 

'"This message, as well as messages (» and s, shows clearly the inex- 
j'ediency of filling in the intervals between the forts with temi)orary 
fortifications so easily destroyed. 


8. To Major General (lorbatovski. August 21: 

AH the men who have been sent to the eiitreuchmeiits of Fortiliea- 
tion No. 1 have been killed. Impossible to hold out. We are avpaiting 
orders. Sokolovski, Fourteenth East-Siberian Rifles, and Krivoru- 
chenko, Captain, Sixteenth East-Siberian KiJics. 

In forwardinj; this report to the fortress staff, I wish to add that 
all the local reserves liave been exhausted and that I can send no 
help to the fortifications. Gorbatovski, Major General. 

9. August 21 : 

The valley in the vicinity of the new maj^azine is under heavy (ire. 
The reserves will be worn out by night if kept under fire all day. 
General Fock. 

10. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 4.40 a. m., Au- 
gust 21 : 

The enemy is attacliiug the east front, the first shots having been 
heard at 4 a. m. Main attaclv appears to be directed against the two 
fortifications. Gorbatovski, Major General. 

11. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 8.40 a. m., Au- 
gust 21 : 

It is apparent that the enemy is advancing in great force between 
Forts Nos. II and III. The lack of artillery and of bombproofs ren- 
ders the situation very trying. The reserves are being exhausted, 
only four companies remaining. The men are firm, but suffer terrildy 
from shell, shrapnel, and machine gun fire, Gorbatovski, Major 

12. At 0.15 a. m., August 21 : 

The lack of artillery i-cnders the situation very dangerous. I ear- 
nestly request you to support us with field batteries. (Jorbatovski, 
Major General. 

13. At 0.45 a. m.. August 21: 

The ranks are thinning with frightful rapidity. Am expending my 
last reserves. Gorbatovski. 

14. From Fort No. I to Getieral Suiiruoff at 10.40 a. m., 
August 21 : 

The enemy is crossing the valley through which railway passes, and 
moving partly against the left flank of the Third Company, Twenty- 
fifth Kegiment, but chiefly against Dapalichwan. Fort No. I is 
under fire. Artillery should fire against closed columns. They are 
preparing to assault. The reserve must be brought closer. Stoessel. 

15. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 11 a. m., Au- 
gust 21 : 

I consider situation very serious. Tlie forts and redoubts are all 
destroyed, and an enormous number of the defenders are hors de 


■•onihat. Tho nrtillory is silencpd. The siiiall t:niis an* nlniust all 
<laiiin',itHl, tho icsorves arc oxhaustoil, and liclp is (IcniaiKJcd uti all 
siilcs. 'I'licic arc fdiiipaiiics \vitlin\it ;i man in ranks. Tin- iufscnl 
Inll ill till' tiriiij: iudifates preparation and concentration of tlic ciu'iny 
to storm. (lorbatovski, Major General. 

I have reiid the report. If they break tlirou^'h a K^neral reserve 
must be formed and all the marines must be brought from the treiielu's. 
stoessel, Lieutenant General. 

16. To General Fock, 12 jioon, Auoust 21 : 

I would request that you give instructions for the advance of two 
battalions of the Fourteenth Reiiimeiit to Magazine A in the valley 
between Great Hill and the works. Smirnoff, Major (Jeneral. 

17. To the ConiniiUKlant of the Fortress, 12.25 p. m.. Au- 
jriist 21 : 

Instructions for the advance of two battalions to the reserve were 
jriven by me immediately upon receipt of your order. I deem it my 
duty to rei)ort that the jioint to which the reserve has been ordered 
has been under shrapnel tire throughout the entire night. I likewise 
expect the Japanese to attack during the night, hence I would like to 
have fresh and not worn out reserves. At the present luoment tlit^ 
Japanese are acting strictly according to the pi-ecept of Saner. Tlic 
reserves of General Gorbatovski are sufhcient to serve as a bait for 
them. Fock. Major General. 

18. To the Coniinanclant of the Fortress. 4.4.") ]x m.. Au- 
gust 21 : 

The situation is unchanged ; it is not worse. Unfortunately I must 
report that four rapid-tire guns, which were being taken to Kiu-o- 
liatkin Lunette, did not reach their destination, having fallen under 
strong shell fiie. There is a telephone station here; the line is 
broken; it has been repaired several timeo; but is again out of order. 
After dark we will do all we can to place the guns in position. The 
enemy concentrated against the fortifications in great force at a dis- 
tance between 200 and 000 paces from them, especially against No. L 
(lorbatovski, INIajor (Tcneral. 

19. To the Cominaiuhint of the Fortress. .^.lO a. in.. Au- 
gust 22: 

At .3.30 a. m. hot tiring took place near Fortitication Xo. 1 : at the 
present moment the enemy is pouring shiapiu'l into it. Gorbatovski, 
^lajor (ieneral. 

20. To the Coiuiiiaii(hiiit of the F()rtres.s. (> a. in.. Au- 
gust 22 : 

The enemy is firing everywhere with shrapnel and at Fortification 
No. 1 with small arms. Two comi»aiiies of the Fourteenth Kegiment. 
which I held as local reserves, have been sent, at the reipiest of Gen- 


enil Fock, to join the ki'IhtuI reserve. In addition to the marines, 
I liuve only one company of rifles, which was sent to R on account 
of the precarious condition of affairs at that iioiiit. Do not compre- 
hend movement of enemy's troops. (Jorltatovski, .Major General. 

21. To the Comniandant of the Fortress, 9.20 a. m., Au- 
gust 2'2 : 

There are small parties of the enemy in folds in the ground in front 
of the fortifications firing against the fortifications. Along the entire 
line the enemy is firing slowly with shrapnel and sheW. Gorbatovski, 
Major General. 

22. To the Commandant of tlie Fortress, 11.25 a. m., Au- 
gust 22 : 

At 10.30 a. m. the enemy concentrated all his artillery fire on For- 
tifications Xos. 1 and 2 and sent several columns to the attack. He 
drove the weak garrison out of Xo. 1, but could not hold it long. 
Our rifles retook it and were in their turn supported by all the ma- 
rine companies. At tliis moment the fortification is in our hands, but 
is again under hot artillery fire. We are answering with mortars and 
two rapid-fire guns. I wish to testify to the courage of the marines 
and rifles. The combat continues, and tlie reserves are exhausted 
with the exception of one battalion of the Fourteenth Regiment. Gor- 
batovski, Major General. 

23. To Lieutenant Colonel Poklad, from Fort Xo. II, at 
12.20 p. m., Augtist 22 : 

The fort has no defenders. Only forty men are left. All the guns 
and two' machine guns are damaged and the breastworks are de- 
stroyed. The hostile artillery is firing against the fort from the land ; 
also from the sea with high-explosive shell. Infantry in large num- 
bers is concealed in the nearest ravines. Kwatz, Second Captain. 

In forwarding this report to his excellency Major General Gorl)a- 
tovski, I have the honor to report that I have no reserve. Fushkar- 
ski, Lieutenant Colonel. 

24. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 1 p. m., Au- 
gust 22 : 

I have no reserve. All is expended. There remains only a half 
company of marines. TJLie loss in officers is great. Fortification No. 
1 has four times changed hands. At this moment one part of it is 
occupied by our men and the other by the .Japanese. Both fortifi- 
cations are under a terrific fire, and the men begin to show fatigue. 
The loss in the rank and file is likewise great. Gorbatovski, Major 

25. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 1.40 p. m., Au- 
gust 22 : 

The losses are enormous in the rank and file and among the officers. 
I have no reserve. The smallest effort on the part of the Japanese 


may result in their bronkint: through ovoii to tlio riiinoso wall, lor 
we liave no one to defeiid it. I earnestly re(iiiest you to plaee a 
reserve at uiy (lisposiliou. Corh.itovski, Major Ceneral. 

2(). To the Start" from Tooth Battery, 1.45 p. m., Au- 
iUMist 22: 

We have nobody for observation. All the olliccrs are wounded. 
The chief of i^roup-sectors is bruised and wounded. Send an ofli- 
i-er for observation. 

27. To the Commandant of the Fortress, 4.30 p. m., Aii- 
o-ust 22 : 

I report to your excellency that the condition of affairs is critical. 
After the combat tliere remained in each unit only a few men almost 
without otiicers. Although the fortilications may be considered to be 
in our hands, we have in fact no men to occupy tliem, for we liave 
uo companies either in the fighting line or in the reserve except 
l)itiful remnants and tliree companies of the Fourteenth Regiment. 
With such poor remains which have not yet been re-formed In an 
orderly manner, it will be impossible to withstand even the weakest 
attack, whicli may be expected at any moment. I do not consider 
it possible for me to leave m5' position for personal report to your 
excellency. Hence I beg of you that you would either find it con- 
venient to come up to Rocky Ridge, where I deem your presence 
indispensable on the field of battle, or give me permission to rei)ort 
to you. Gorbatovski, Major General. 

28. To the Commandant of the Fortress, August 22 : 

I have to report that Fortifications Xo. 1 and No. 2 are in the hands 
of the Japanese. They are therefore near the Chinese Wall. In 
the interior of the position men are falling, and the weak remnants 
of the defenders are melting away every hour. I consider defense 
impossible, not only with what remains, but with much greater 
forces. Until the fortifications are retaken the Japanese may be 
expected to break through at any moment. Gorbatovski, Major 

29. To the Commandant of the Fortress, August 22 : 

Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2 are evacuated. Our men have retreated 
beyond the Chinese wall. They were driven out by a strong ar- 
tillery cross fire. Almost all the defenders were killed, and the 
Japanese occupied the fortifications. Six times our forces were sent 
to retake the fortifications and recaptured them, but the Japanese 
again killed off the defenders by a hotter fire. It is impossible to 
keep the fortifications. P'^ort \o. Ill liolds out. but there are only 
forty men in it. The Japanese are in considerable numbers under the 
glacis. Prepax-ed scaling ladders may be seen. It is evident that 
the fort is going to be stormed to-uight. All the guns iu the fort are 


(laniayed. Tlic mm at the iiiacliinc .miiis arc all killed, and there is 
nobody to fire tlieiii. I'oklad. ("ohmel. 

30. To the Staff of the Fortress, O.Or) p. in., August 22: 

The Aqueduct Redoubt i-oports that Fortification No. 2 is occupied 
by two battalions of Jai)anese. Fort No. II is not occupied, but 
there are about three Japanese regiments near the breastworks, and 
in tlieir rear reenforcenients may be seen. Seminoff. Colonel. 

31. To the Chief of Staff, 6.16 p. m., August 22: 

The battalion of the Fourteenth Kej^iment holds the defile near the 
magazine." Dmitrevski, colonel. 

On the morning of August 19 the Japanese opened a vig- 
orous artillery fire against the principal point of attack, 
the interval between Forts Nos. II and III, and the adjacent 
,. communications. In order to mask their intentions, they 
/ opened a heavy fire against the rest of the line and against 
the city and began to storm 1T4-Meter Hill and the north- 
west front. To capture the intermediate fortifications, the 
dismantling of the forts and the silencing of their artillery 
was a necessary preliminary. Deprived of the support of the 
forts, isolated and greatly damaged by a strong hostile fire, 
these fortifications could hardly offer serious resistance. This 
result was all the more probable as these fortifications were 
old transformed Chinese works without outer ditches. The 
Japanese plan in regard to the intermediate fortifications 
was not without excellent foundation, however senseless was 
their attempt to take Fort No. II by open assault. 

Havine- p-iven a general view of the great assault, we shall 
now examine it in detail in order to obtain instructive data 
which will serve as a basis for comment upon desirable 
changes in the theory of fortress defense in general and the 
construction of forts and smaller works in particular. 

The demonstrations against the north and northwest 
fronts were successful in that they led us to believe that these 
fronts were the objects of the main attack and caused us to 
send the major part of our reserve to reenforce them with 
General Kondratchenko at its head. This end Avas attained 
by bringing as strong a fire against these fronts as against 
the real points to be attacked and by the simultaneous ap- 

" Alas, it came too late. This shows clearly the necessity of having 
shelter for the troops near the fighting line. 


pearance of the stoniiini:- coluinns of tlu' First Division. 
The moveiiieiits of the other divisions were more ciiiifcnlcl 
and Avere not discovered so soon. 

The artillery fire eoncvntratcd a<j:ainst Forts Nos. II and III 
was so stron*; in the afternoon of the first day that their 
artillery was silenced as reported in inessaii'e No. 'J, as wa-< 
also the fire of some of the other batteries. This was due in 
part to thuna<>:e done to the guns, hut mainly to the fact that 
the personnel could not serve the «j,uiis placed in full view 
of the enemy and fired at from all sides. The success of the 
fFapanese was due to the unwise location of our guns. The 
fire, which was begun in the morning, was continued until 
(■) p. m. About 12,400 projectiles were fired at Fort Xo. Ill, 
at the rate of 200 per hour or 3;^ per minute. At Battery B 
('•00 six-inch projectiles fell, being at the rate of one project- 
ile per minute. The number of large-caliber projectiles was 
one-third or one-fourth the number of smaller projectiles 
from mountain and field guns. Hence the batteries received 
as many projectiles as the forts— that is, three or four per 
minute. Half of the projectiles were percussion shells, the 
rest shrapnel. The destruction of the forts and batteries 
proceeded simultaneously with the destruction of the men 
exposed in the open. It was impossible -to serve the guns 
continuously under such a fire without having all of the gun- 
ners killed in one day. Some of the batteries therefore fired 
at great intervals, while the forts and certain batteries were 
(pute silent," the gunners remaining in the shelters and case- 

The jrarrisons of the forts had been concentrated since 
morning in the gorge casemates. There was one armored 
tower with a cupola for observation at Fort Xo, III, on the 
left flank of the G-inch gun battery. This cupola was con- 
structed of iron five-eighths of an inch thick, upon a stone 
foundation bedded in cement on the parapet of the battery, 
commanding it only by G feet. An artilleryman observed 
the hostile fire and the movements of the hostile troops 
from this post; but it was impossible to observe the move- 
ments of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of the forts, as 

" The artillerymen now beiiiui to speak al)Out tlie desirability of liav- 
ing shields at the guns for protection against shrapnel. 


the battery on wliicli the tower was situated was in the 
interior of the fort. In order to observe the approaches to 
the forts and the intervals, volunteers went out upon the 
parapets of the fort. They hid in rear of the traverses 
and observed through the embrasures under cover of the 
shrapnel screens. But the fire was so strong that three of the 
five volunteers were put hors de combat before noon. Then 
the number of volunteers decreased markedly, and it may be 
said that, beginning with noon of August 19, observation 
from the forts was very unsatisfactory. Generally it was 
possible only during short intervals of five to ten minutes, 
when the enemy's fire slackened for some reason. Corporal 
Yakimoff, Private Chaplinski of the Rifles, and two or three 
others then jumped to the breastworks and observed the 
terrain around the fort. 

While the garrisons of the forts sought shelter in the 
casemates from the artillery fire, the Japanese division de- 
tailed for the assault advanced one by one, in Indian file, 
in small groups through the ravines, the thick kaoliang, and 
ditches, and occupied the nearest villages, ready for assault. 
We saw nothing of this, knew nothing, suspected nothing. 
Xone of the observation stations discovered the advance of 
the Japanese on August 19 and 20. This subdued condition 
of the garrison, forced to hide deep in the interior of the 
casemates, continued during the remaining days of the bom- 
bardment, and when, on August 22, the Japanese approached 
Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2 and began to storm them, increas- 
ing the fire against the forts, all observation at the forts had 
ceased. This is Avhy the garrisons of the forts not only did 
not support the intervals, but did not know when the fortifi- 
cations were taken. 

We were greatly astonished in the fort at a distance of 500 
paces from the captured works when the chief of the detach- 
ment sent us a note ordering us to open fire against our own 
fortification. Thinking it a mistake, the commandant sent 
for an explanation. Alas, it soon came ! 

The interval between Forts Nos. II and III was thus de- 
prived of support by rifle fire from the two forts by an un- 
interrupted artillery fire against the forts. This fire de- 
prived us of both eyes and hands. We conclude that it is 
absolutely necessary to provide forts with means to observe 

interm?:dtate rear caponiers. 73 

without mte^FiMiptimi aiul to sujjport the interval-; at tin- 
proper time under the heaviest artillery lire The Hr-t oh- 
ject nuiy be attained by the erection of several ai-nioi-ed ob- 
servation to^ve^s at various points about the fort: the second, 
by the erection alon<; the parapets of concrete galleries with 
loopholes for small arms or by several turrets for nuu-hine 
guns. We wish to emphasize our conviction that forts will 
not support the intervals between them if the riflemen when 
firing are Avithout secure shelter against shrai)n(^l and shell 
fragments. With a few slight alterations I believe that the 
galleries for infantry. pro]iosed by Col. A. P. Shoshin would 
answer this purpose. 


The irrational construction of open-gorge caponiers at 
Forts Nos. II and III, and their faulty disposition rendered 
them useless as intermediate rear caponiers for flanking fire 
on the adjacent intervals. The assault of August 22, that 
which took place on the night of August 23-24:, together with 
the following considerations, clearly show the value of these 
caponiers if well placed and properly constructed. In con- 
.structing them it is desirable to place the embrasures so as 
to be able to direct the fire against the glacis in rear of the 
fort to which they belong, and also against the glacis of the 
neighboring forts some 1.200 to 1,400 yards distant. Thus 
constructed rear caponiers ma}^ assist the forts until the last 
moment and the dead space in the interval will be negligible. 

In speaking of the great importance of rear caponiers. Ave 
revert instinctively to the assault on the Chinese wall during 
the night of August 23-24, and the important Avork which 
fell to the lot of Fort No. Ill upon its right flank in repuls- 
ing this assault. The fact is that, on account of the unfinished 
state of the fort, instead of there being traA'erses to cover the 
angle of the gorge from fire from the front, there were large 
heaps of earth covering completely the tAvo guns Avhich Avere 
to be used in repulsing assault, one a field gun in the angle, 
the other a 37-mm. gun on a platform. When, during 
the night of August 23-24, the Japanese began to advance 
from Fortifications Xos. 1 and 2 to the Chinese wall, the 
commandajit of the fort ordered the nearest searchlight to 
direct its beam upon them and the battery connnander opened 


fire from the machine guns, two field guns, one :5T-mm. gun, 
and the 37-mm. gun of the gorge caponier. This fire at very 
sho»t range was very deadly. General Kondriitcliciilco stated 
that the fort destroyed about 3,000 Japanese. 

It wull readily be understood that such effective support of 
the interval could only be given because, on account of tho 
darkness, the Japanese could not concentrate a strong artil- 
lery fire against the fort, and thus beat down its fire. During 
all the next daj's assaults on the works in the vicinity of the 
fort, our artillery intended to oppose assault o]ierated very 
feebly. Taking advantage of the unfinished condition of the 
gorge ditch, at the angles of which the depth Avas only 3^ feet, 
we prepared the gorge caponier of the fort as a rear caponier 
and fired from it on the glacis of Eedoubt Xo. 3 and Fortifica- 
tion So. '2 W'ith the 37-mm. gmis. This defense of the inter- 
vals and of the neighboring fortifications was primitive, but 
it caused so much havoc to the Japanese that they determined 
to destroy the caponier. For this purpose they fired upon it 
for a long time with H-inch shells from l)oth sides and 
succeeded in breaching the left face wall. Not until Decem- 
ber 28 did they succeed in damaging the right face wall and 
destroying the embrasures. But Captain Dobroff, of the En- 
gineers, succeeded in removing the fallen mass of earth by 
breaking it up under the hottest fire with small charges of 
pyroxilin. These examples show the advantages of firing 
against the intervals from well constructed caponiers and 
how baneful they are to the attack. 

While leasing the defense of the intervals npon the prin- 
ciple of mutual support from the flanks of forts and rear 
caponiers, it is' wrong to construct rear caponiers only. The 
siege showed the great importance of small, open caponiers, 
constructed to the right and left of the forts. The fact is 
that there Avill always be some ravine or ditch in front of 
a fort suited to the enemy's purposes which it will be impos- 
sible to fill and difficult to cover with fire from otlier forts 
at long range. If the terrain will permit, open intermediate 
caponiers should be constructed at short distances from snch 
ditches. The importance of such works is shown l)y the his- 
tory of Caponier Xo. 3. About 200 paces to the right of P^ort 
No. Ill, on a level with its end face, was a small height, 
separated from the fort by a deep ditch. Observing that 

in'ii:k.mi;i)[ate hear capoxiehs. 75 

Iho nearest ap])roaclies to the foit could he covered hy lire 
from this height, 1 soarjK'd il.-^ rear shjpe and constructed 
eniphicements for two field guns. One of them was for 
(he support of the fort; the other for the support of Forti- 
fication No. 2. The battery was protected in front hy in- 
fantry entrenchments and a wire entanglement. According 
(o reports of eye-witnesses during the storming of Fortifi- 
cation No. 2 on August 22, the caponier, firing one gun to 
the right, did much damage to the Japanese and prevented 
them from turning the fortification by the left. It likewise 
prevented the Japanese from attacking Fort Xo. III. In 
its turn, being near the fort, it Avas always supported by the 
fire of the fort. In order to capture it, the Japanese had 
to undertake siege operations lasting one and one-half 
months. Only after having taken this caponier, which, 
after all, was merely a temporary field work, did the Jap- 
anese begin the nearer approaches to Fort Xo. III. 


(See Plates I, II, III. and \III.) 


The oxainination of plans of variou.^ fortresses, Russian 
and foreign, shows us that the intervals Ijetween forts vary 
greatly, not only in different fortresses, but even in the same 
fortress. Generally they vary, according to the terrain, 
betAveen 1^ and 2| miles, although in some forts there are 
intervals of 3^, 4, 4|, and even ^)^^ miles. Hence the ques- 
tion. What distance ought to be accepted as the normal? Tt 
may be that a distance of IJ miles is too small and 5^ miles 
should be taken. Perhaps 5-^ miles is too great and 1;^ miles 
is correct ; or perhaps an interval of '21 to 3^ miles should 
be adopted. 

Let us return to the plan of the fortress of Port Artlmi'. 
The intervals between the forts were as follows: 


1. From Coast Battery No. 22 to Fort NO. I 1 

2. From Fort No. I to Fort No. II 2$ 

3. From Fort No. II to Fort No. Ill , Ik 

4. From Fort No. Ill to Fort No. IV 2^ 

.5. From Fort No. IV to Fort No. V 2 

u. From Fort No. V to site for Fort No. VI .3i 

The intervals varied here between 1 and 3 A mile.-. 

The principal attack was directed against the interval 
between Forts Nos, II and III. As compared to other in- 
tervals it was almost the strongest as regards fortifications 
on account of the defensive parapet constructed by the Chi- 
nese, known as the Chinese wall. Forts Xos. II and III 
Avere on heights somewhat advanced from Dragon Ridge. 
Between the forts were four heights separated from each 
other by deep ravines, the two central heights being higher 
than the other two. They were almost equal in height to 
Fort No. II and somewhat higher than Fort No. III. 
Works constructed on these heights by the Chinese and 


transformed by us into fortifications of hip;li profile almosit 
entirely concealed the forts from each other. As the forts 
were not visible from each other, they c(Mild not oivc each 
other mutual support. The sites for the forts were well 
chosen, but in filling in the interval between them the neces- 
sity for mutual support should have received more consid- 
♦»ration. In place of Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, permanent 
works should have been constructed capable of filling the 
gap and supporting the forts. 

The early capture of Fortifications Xos. 1 and 2 does not 
allow us to say how far they might have fulfilled this object. 
We can give the following facts in regard to cases where 
forts supported works in adjacent intervals: 

1. Fort Xo. Ill often supported very effectively the neigh- 
boring works. Redoubt Xo. 3 and Caponier Xo. 3, distant 
459 paces." It supported the Aqueduct Redoubt and Idol 
Redoubt very feebly at a distance of 2,550 paces. 

2. Fort Xo. II supported Caponier Xo. 2, distant 450 
paces; and Kuropatkin Lunette, distant 350 paces. Its aid 
Avas ineffective at greater distances. 

3. Redoubt Xo. 3 supported Fort Xo. Ill at a distance 
of 300 paces and, with its artillery fire, the Aqueduct Re- 
doubt at a distance of 1-^ miles. 

4. Fort Xo. lY effectively supported Redoubt Xo. 3 with 
fire from its 75-mm. naval guns at a distance of If miles. 

5. Redoubt Xo. 3 and the Mound Battery were supported 
effectively from the trenches on Cossack Place with rifle 
and artillery fire at a distance of 1,500 paces. 

G. Kuropatkin Lunette su^Dported Battery B with rifle fire 
at a distance of 600 paces. 

7. The Liaoteshan position supported 203-Meter Hill with 
()-inch Canet gims at a distance of 4 miles, but only in the 

Thus we see that mutual support by rifle fire was effective 
at a distance of 600 paces in broken ground and 1.500 i)aces 
in open ground. During night attacks support was given 
at almost equal ranges; for, with a searchlight 24 in. in 
diameter, targets were clearly visible at ranges from 600 
to 800 paces, and with a searchlight 30 to 36 in. in diameter 

« The Russian pace = 2.S inches, or 2^ feet.— Tr. 


the tai-oct was visible al distances from 1.'200 to 1,500 paces. 
After luucli discussiou we came to the conchision at Port 
Arthur that the tiiial rule in the repulse of an attack fell 
always to the infantry, the role of the artillery being second- 
ary. This was due to the fact that the assailants approached 
the works by single files and small groups and not in column. 
Under such conditions shrapnel is of no avail, Avhile rifle* 
fire and bayonets are decisive. Rapid-fire artillery has un- 
doubtedly been and will be of great advantage, but only 
at distances Avhere small groups of men are clearly visible 
to the commander and pointer. 

We think that the principal line of defense of modern for- 
tresses — the line of forts — may be compared to the enceintes 
of the old fortresses. During the period of stone ramparts 
the role of the forts Avas played by the towers, erected at a 
distance of twice the flight of an arrow, flanking the ap- 
proaches to the forts. With earthen ramparts this role was 
l)layed by the bastions. The distance betAveen them was de- 
termined by the range of case shot. But these ranges did 
not exceed the limit of the vision of men. Hence the dis- 
tances betAveen toAvers and bastions depended in no Avay 
upon the question of the A^isibility of the target. The range 
of the gun is no longer the controlling factor, EA^'erything 
depends npon A^sual poAver. The defense of the intervals 
can not, therefore, be based only upon shrapnel fire from rear 
ditch caponiers. In determining the distances betAveen forts 
Ave must be guided not by the range of artillery, but by the 
ability of man to see clearly by daA', and by night Avith the 
aid of searchlights. Assuming that, AA^ith a searchlight 30 to 
36 in. in diameter, an etfectiAe fire can be maintained at 
ranges from 1,000 to 1,500 paces, we see that intervals should 
not exceed 3,000 paces, or 7.000 feet — 14 miles. With such 
interA^als each fort should haA^e the support of rifle fire from 
intermediate Avorks and of artillery fire from the rear cap- 
oniers of the neighboring forts. During the day neighboring 
forts will be able to support each other Avith rifle fire. 

In locating forts and redoubts Ave must therefore be guided 
by the folloAving rules: 

1. The forts and I'edoubts should l)e clearly visible from 
each other by day and also during the night Avitli the aid of 


2. The distance between them shouhl be such that nuitual 
support may be given with rifle lire botli by day and by night. 

3. If there is to be a j^ermanent redoubt between the forts, 
the distance between the forts must not exceed \\ miles. 

4. In case no intermediate redoubts are to be built the dis- 
tance between the forts must not exceed two-thirds of a mile. 


After the siege of Sebastopol the plan of fortresses was 
changed from a closed polygon into a circle of scattered inde- 
pendent fortifications. The time-honored principle of the 
closed work was cast aside. For the stubborn defense of a 
separate work, it has always been held that it should be 
closed. The same jjrinciple applied for ages to the fortress. 
In the decade which followed Sebastopol this eternal prin- 
ciple Jsvaj diregarded, and fortresses were constructed con- 
sisting of from ten to^ twelve separate warks with intervals 
bet^veen-tTiem somewhat like wide gates in the interior of 
the-oM fortress. But the principle of the closed^ work was 
fotmded too deeply to be rejected so easily. It was now , 
agreed that the intervals should be fortified during mobiliza- f 
tion with entrenchments and other temporary works. But as j 
these were to be constructed only at the beginning of military ' 
operations, it was decided to maintain the central enceintes,' 
iiiJhe old fortresses forjlefense against sudden attack, andl 
to construct enceintes in new fortresses. 

The objectjxf the enceinte was to protect the stores and 
magazines. For this purpose permanent works were con- ^ ^ 
structed, but for the security of the fighting line temporary 
works were deemed sufficient, as though the vital parts of a 
fortress were the stores of powder and other supplies, and 
not the line of forts and batteries, against the capture of 
which by sudden attack no steps were taken in time of peace. . 
^Hence we see that the principl e o f _the_closed work was not's,^ 
entirety diseaFdedphirrTr was altered in its appFicatibrr.- It / 
was retained where it was not vitally necessary and rejected 
where it was absolutely indispensable. 

It is, indeed, difficult to see why the center of the fortressTV ' I 
Avith its magazines and offices, is the vital part ; it is difficult ' 
■±4461— OS 6 


to comprehend the reasoning of those wlio regard the capture 
of the supplies as a fatality and the capture of two or three 
forts as a secondary matter. The fall of the forts seals the 
fate of the fortress, howcA^er great may be the quantity of 
supplies within the enceinte. The supreme efforts of the de- 
fense should be concentrated not upon. ±lie defenses in rear, 
but upon the fighting line. We see, however, that the exactly 
opposite rule has been follow^ed, as a result of financial con- 
siderations. It was thought permanent works for -the^ de^ 
fense of the intervals would cost too much, and that this 
defense could be prcnided for by cross fire from the forts and 
intermediate Avorks, supplemented by the frontal fire from 
entrenchments. During the last "fifty years those who have 
planned and built fortresses have been guided by these con- 
siderations. Such views prevailed in the construction of all 
rnodern fortresses, including that of Port Arthur. 

During the last twenty yenvti a few voices have been raised 
in protest. Two plans have been suggested: The first, to 
reconcile the principle of the closed work with economic 
' conditions by constructing permanent, continuous parapets 
and concrete casemates; the second, to construct separate 
permanent works in the intervals. Both propositions were 
made by llussian engineers in 1890; the first by Colonel 
Velichko, the second by Lieutenant Colonel Prussak. Both 
projects caused heated discussions; they were defended by 
some and attacked by others. An interchange of opinions 
took place in the Engineering Journal and thus the matter 
ended. In the higher engineering spheres these projects did 
not receive special notice and they were never tried. To illus- 
trate the effect which the adoption oi these projects would 
have had upon the defense of Port Arthur, let us take the 
assaults of the 22d of August and of the night of the 23d 
and 24th of the same month. It has been made clear that 
the interval between Forts Nos. II and III had a parapet 
connecting the gorges of these forts. On heights in front 
of this parapet, at distances between 300 and 400 paces, 
were four works absolutely independent of each other. Dur- 
ing the assault of August 22 the two central works, 
Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, fell into the hands of the 
enemy. Their capture w^as due, leaving aside consideration 
of their extremel}^ unsatisfactory condition for defense, to 



the lack ot" support from the forts on iiccoiiiit of the adxaiicfd 
j)ositi()iis of the fortifications and to the hicU of sustained 
coninuinication with the forts. The two other Avorks, Capo- 
niers Nos. '2 and 3, remained in our hands only on accoinit of 
their proximity to the forts. IIavin<i- taken the centi'al works, 
the Japanese decided to finish their operations a«!,ainst that 
front l\v breakinii' throuiih the intrenchments, captniinii- 
Ea<>:le Xest, attackino- the forts and intermediate batteries 
from the rear, and stormino; the city. The sortie during the 
night for the recapture of the lost fortifications frnstrated the 
Japanese plan, but, in itself, was unsuccessful. As soon as 
it was over the Japanese endeavored to take the offensive 
again and advance against the enceinte. 

The English correspondent. David James, writes as 
follows : 

On the morning of the 2orcl of August the remnants of the Tth 
Regiment sallied out from the East Panlung (L^ortifieation No. 1) and 
worked up toward Wantai (Eagle Xest). Tliey were unmercifully 
handled, and had to crouch in shell holes for cover, where they lay 
all day, monuments of plucky determination carried too far." 

It must be inferred that this sortie was nothing but a 
reconnaissance of the enceinte. On - the following niglit 
the Japanese stormed it. The assault is described by Mr. 
James as follows: 

They had penetrated deeply into the heart of the enemy's 
territory ; the thin edge of a wedge that could not be hanunered in. 
Through the day, on account of a lack of anmumition, the .Japanese 
artillery were strangely inactive, and apart from the action of the 
Tth Regiment, there was no infantry work. Meanwhile the plan 
of the Japanese commander da\Yned upon the defenders, and they 
were not slow to act, for General Krondrachenko planned a countei*- 
niove. which, though not successfully carried out in detail, frustratwl 
the rush tactic^s of the Japanese and held them in check for many 
months. The inactivity of the Japanese on the 23rd allowed ani])le 
time for developing these plans. Briefly stated, the idea was to coun- 
ter attack the Japanese before they got their battalions moving for 
the great assault, and then, after throwing the Japanese lines into 
disorder, retire and contest the ground in front of the position the 
Japanese were intending to assault. The sortie was to move out in 
three colums, one from the direction of " Q " fortification (Knro- 
patkin Lunette), a second from the Ehrlung fort (Fort No. Ill), and 

" James, p. 90, 


the third ceiitriil coluiiin from W'autai ( Ktigle Nest), It will l>f seen 
later how this was carried out, and iu what details it failed. 

* * * « « * * 

As it was evident tliat the j^'reat assaidt would take detinite shape 
that uight, a couple of us (deciding to join the actual firing line), 
iu the singularly quiet evening that passed, slipped out of camp 
unnoticed. It was then a little after eleven o'clock, and hardly had 
we got clear of Feng-hw^ang-shan than a faint rattling of ritle fire 
came from the foot of Wantai (Eagle Nest). No less than seven 
searchlights were flashing from the fortifications, and three of these 
converged on the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2). The rifle 
tire steadily increased, and the quiet searchlights swung down to 
where the regiments of the ninth and eleventh divisions were wait- 
ing to attack. A few minutes later the rays of light commenced work- 
ing up and down the slopes of the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 
and ll), and Eussian rifle fire working down the slope of Wantai 
(Eagle Nest) could be distinctly heard above the general rattle of 
musketry. The Japanese reserved their fire for a few minutes, and 
the Russians, eontiiiuing their unchecked advance behind the rays 
of the searchlights, quickly drove the wasted remnants of the 7th 
Kegiment into the East Tanluug (Fortification No. 1). Then the 
Japanese opened up with a sickening burr of musketry, which 
momentarily halted the Russians. SuL)ported by a heavy machine gun 
and artillery fire from "Q" fortification (Kuropatkin Lunette), 
the wings of the sortie now joined the center, and working up a 
heavy fire bore down on the Panlungs (Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2). 
Star-shells bursting in rapid confusion over the Japanese troops 
aided in the w'ork of the sortie and hampered the movements of 
the Japanese. Beneath the Panlungs the main body of the besieg- 
ers were gathered, waiting to make their attack, and these quickly 
developed a firing line and joined issue with the garrisons of the 
Panlungs. The Russian force now split up into two bodies and at- 
tempted to carry out Krondrachenko's plan of enveloping the lost 
semi-permanents. One force made a desperate attempt to descend 
to the west of the West Panlung (Fortification No. 2), while the 
other made an equally determined effort to work down between the 
East I'anlung (Fortification No. 1) and north fort (Fort No. II). 
Their object was to join forces between the two Panlungs, and then, 
by falling back on them, annihilate the garrisons and effect a re- 
capture. Here the sortie failed, for the main body of Japanese were 
now well up and pouring in a hot fire upon them ; and the two Rus- 
sian forces, forced to give way, retired to the enceinte, where, sup- 
ported by the fire from all the fortifications in the neighbourhood, 
they made a determined stand. Volley now answered volley, and all 
the seven searchlights were busy flashing in the faces of the Jap- 
anese infantry. A regular fury of firing filled the air as the Japanese 
assumed the offensive and attacked the enceinte beneath Wantai. 
The firing remained stationary for a while until the Japanese brought 
up their machine guns and quick-firers and commenced pounding 


TKiiSl^^'^ toY^H^.W, UiJ! 

J ^flA^/ /^ 


;iwny at tlio dovoi'ly hidden cniiutcriiarls of llio iMicniy. Thon a 
donhlo itui'i'iiii,' of niachiiic ,mms and a diaihlc cdilioii of tt'rror-strik- 
iu,:,' lioiii-poiiiiii.i; was Iicai'd .dioxc llic coni imious I'onr of iimski'try. 
The awful hissing of hullots, the bewil(U'i'ins fury of the volleys. 
the thrillinji jilay of machine suns, and the hum of human eries all 
sounded in the distance like tlic rush of a hurricane through a leafy 
forest. And when this medley of noises had merged into a monoto- 
nous screech, high above the awful battle noise came the thrilling 
sound of soldiers" voices raised in soldiers' cheers. Three h>ng 
zais then busied the hills with echoes, and announced the fact that 
the Russians were br(>aking ground and retiring. Slowly they re- 
lii-i'd, helped back to tlieii' lines by the dazzling glare of the silent 
searchlights and llu^ noisy, wicked deviltry of the concealed machine 

The Japanese w^re. however, smartly held at the enceinle. and for 
;5 time their advance stopped by cross tire from the lotteries on 
either tiank of Wantai (Eagle Nest). This moment was selected by 
the tenth brigade of the eleventh division for making an attack 
on "Q" fortification (Kuroitatkin Lunette) to create a diversion 
in favour of the troops halted at the enceinte. They had scarcely 
got moving before they were unma'sked by star-shells, and under the 
glare of a couple of searchlights subjected to a terrific fire from tht> 
Keekwan south fort (Battery B) and west battery, and this. coui>led 
with the tire of "Q" (Kuropatkin Lunette), soon broke u]) tlieir 

Further he says : 

From now on — although the only probable result of continuing the 
unprotected assault in full sight of a concealed enemy was a repulse — 
the general assault was vigorously developed and became intensely 
impressive, for a wonderful scene was now enacted. General Nogi's 
plans — delayed by the sortie — were now set in motion, and the ninth 
and eleventh divisions made the attempt to drive in the wedge and 
reach the summit of Wantai (Eagle Nest). Against almost un- 
precedented methods of warfare and unnamable odds, the Japanese 
infantry, displaying most wonderful courage, went steadfastly to 
work, to do or die. Isolated bands gained footing and crouclu'd in 
agonising suspense, waiting to gather enough force to warrant a rush 
for the trenches, and in their isolation were found by the light of star- 
shells and pounced on by the glaring searchlight for the decimating 
fire of hidden machine guns and riflemen. Some, heedless of life, by 
strenuous bravery gained the trenches, only to be riddled by bullets 
and clubbed by rifles. It was cruelly impressive to listen in the cool 
of the morning to the shrieking shell, tapping of pom-poms, and whirls 
of machine gun fire, to see in the grim darkness the flashes of artil- 
lery and the sparks of rifles, and the pale fliclcering of particles of 
star-shells and the dazzling glare of searchlights, and to know that it 

"" JsTTnes. ]ii i. 00-05. 


was all slanffhter, a butchery of wHlinf: nion vainly niassacrod for tlio 
sake of a national sentiment that could nut wait for reveniie. Dawn 
was lonjr, long in couiinj;, and tlie tijjhtinj-' slowly, so slowly, subsided, 
like a disappointed child sobbinj; itself to sleep. Six hours of carnage 
were over, ami those wlio watched and did not light could but imag- 
ine what had hapijened. Soon over the scene of strife came the 
blood-red beams of the rising sun, struggling through the morning 
mist heavily laden with drifting smoke, and ere it cleared the Jap- 
anese artillery screeclied out in wild defiance and ushered in another 
day of carnage. The great assault was over, the great assault that 
failed, and the wonderful concentrated artillery fire that followed was 
but the afterniiith. 

(Quickly working from either end of the eastern fort ridge, tin- 
artillery fire met midway in the line at Wantai above the I'anlungs, 
which were now covered with clouds of shrapnel- from the Russian 
artillery, which had early responded to the Japanese fire. The con- 
centrated fire worked backwards and forwards along the whole line, 
until, in an hour, so accurate was the shelling that the line of eastern 
fortifications were smothered in clouds of earth and smoke raised by 
the bursting sliells. The preponderance of Japanese fire early made 
itself felt, and by the devastation of this terrible cannonade the Rus- 
sian gunners were overpowered and silenced, for it was the result 
of the fifteen days' range-finding practice of their enemy. Under 
cover of this artillery fire the Ja[)anese infantry made a last attempt 
to reach Wantai (Eagle Nest), but, directly they got moving, the 
Russian guns in the west opened a heavy shell fire which crushed 
the life out of the attack, and forced the responsible commanders to 
realize the hopelessness of persisting in the assault; and the Jap- 
anese, beaten, but by no means defeated, retired beyond the enceinte, 
and were only able to claim, as the result of four days' continual 
fighting, the two semi-permanents of Pauluug (Fortifications Nos. 1 
and 2).« 

These descriptions, however, do not give a complete pic- 
ture of the storniino-. 

The affair was in reality as follows: 

About 10 p. m. on August 23 the Japanese began to 
assault the entire east front from Fort No. Ill to Battery 
B. The main attack was directed against the section of the 
Chinese wall between Caponiers Nos. 2 and 3. Elsewhere 
the attack was in the nature of a demonstration to conceal 
the real point of attack. Having assembled considerable 
forces in Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, the Japanese rushed 
the Chinese wall. They were seen in time and a hot fire 
was opened upon them. The rapid-fire field artillery and 
Fort No. Ill opened a deadly fire against them, but the dis- 

« James, pp. 07-99. 



tancG was so short that the Japanese were able to reach the 
wall. A bayonet ti«>ht took place here. Owin^ to their 
^reat numerical superiority, the Japanese succeeded in 
breakino- throuoh the line. They appeared on the slopes of 
Redoubts Battery and Eagle Nest, and broke through the 
wall near the angle where part of it branches off toward 
Fortification No. 1, Being much damaged by bombardment, 
this place was favorable for assault. It was impossible for 
them to break through elsewhere. Two comj^anies of the 
reserve, coming up at that moment, repulsed the Japanese. 
One company advanced from Wolf Battery, the other from 
Ivedoubts Battery and Eagle Nest. Advancing from three 
directions, they destroyed all who had entered the breach. 
At 11.30 p. m. the assault w^as over. Desiring to get posses- 
sion of the wall and Eagle Nest at any price, and fully 
alive to the immense importance of this operation, the Jap- 
anese repeated the attack at 2 a. m. The garrison had now 
been reenforced, and the Japanese could not break through. 
After an hour the assault was finally repulsed. From this 
we see (1) that isolated works, situated in the middle of 
intervals without conr.ection with the forts, fall at the first 
blow; (2) that without a defensive parapet between the 
intermediate batteries and the works these batteries 'would 
have been just as easily taken; and (3) that three attacks 
against the wall were repulsed by small forces. 

From the foregoing we believe we may safely affirm that 
only the existence of the Chinese Avail saved the fortress 
from falling in August. It may be said that an entrance was 
made. True, but at this point the wall was Ioav (4^ to 5 
feet), and it had been breached by projectiles. Where it 
was sufficiently high and in good condition no breaches were 
made. This shows, nevertheless, that a ])arapet without a 
ditch does not entirely secure an interval against assault. 
Hence it is not sufficient to supply the intervals Avith para- 
l^ets, which are so easily surmounted. Although a parapet 
without a ditch gives good results, the only safe way to se- 
cure the intervals against assault is by constructing a parapet 
with a ditch, the ditch being the most important feature, as 
it is crossed with difficulty. 

I must, hoAvever, remark that the Chinese Avail played an 
important role only by accident. In the beginning of the 


siege it was not considered of any importance whatsoever. 
The entire defense of the intervals was to be made on the line 
of forts. Earth was taken from the wall to fill sandbags for 
the nearest batteries. It grew thinner day by day and 
would soon have disappeared in places. It had no bomb- 
proofs, no embrasures, no garrison. One company was sta- 
tioned in the vicinity of Fort No. Ill, and tAvo shelters had 
been constructed for it. 

On August 17, while riding alon^ the line with General 
Kondratchenko, I invited his attention to the importance of 
this position. He thereupon ordered General Gorbatovski to 
send two more companies to the interval between Forts Nos. 
II and III. The section engineer was ordered to construct 
shelters for them. The bombardment of the 19th to the 22d 
of August interfered vcith this construction, and when the 
attack on the wall began it was, indeed, in a very precarious 
condition. Nevertheless, its higli profile (8 to 12 feet), the 
excellent adaptation of the terrain to defense, the lack of 
dead areas immediately in front, the abrupt inner side of 
the breastworks which afforded excellent shelter for the in- 
fantry, and the good communication with the forts, enabled 
the wall to fulfill its purpose. It i)revented the enemy from 
breaking through on a wide front, taking the batteries, at- 
tacking the forts from the rear, and storming the city. Had 
there .been no Chinese wall, the Japanese divisions would 
have broken through along the entire front, 1^ miles in 
width. It would not only have been impossible to stop them 
with two companies, but even two regiments would not have 
been sufficient. The following may be alleged in support of 
the assertion that the fortress would have fallen on the night 
of the 23d of August had the enemy succeeded in breaking 
through the wall : 

1. Inforuiation that the Japanese had broken through the 
Chinese wall and of their appearance on Redoubts Bat- 
ter}' spread rapidly along the entire northeast front and 
created a panic. The connnandant of Fort No. Ill prepared 
for the defense of tlie gorge and burnt the gorge bridge. 

2. There was virtually no second line of defense as yet, its 
entire garrison consisting of only one company of marines. 

3. From the main reserve, which consisted of two battalions 
of the Thirteenth Ivegiment and two battalions of the P'our- 
teenth, onlv the tAvo battalions of the Fourteenth could have 


been sent into action, as the Thirteenth .was stationed in ilii. 
New Eni'opean City at a distance of .").', miles. 

4. There was no o-arrison whatever in the ceiiir;!! enceinte. 
There were only three sentinels near the pite>. and two 
monntain and two obsolete field <2:nns in the r'edonbts. 

There is therefore no donbt that, if the Japanese had been 
snccessful in their ert'orts to bi'eak thron«ih the wall, they 
conld have entered the city that ni_<>ht. There wonld have 
been little resistance at the enceinte and the operation wonld 
lia\'e been without risk. But such a course would not have 
been necessary or desirable. The Japanese Avould have made 
a series of attacks from the rear upon the intermediate bat- 
teries, thrown back the garrisons of the remaining-, sections 
of the wall, cut off Forts Xos. I and II from communica- 
tion with the fortress, taken possession of seacoast batteries 
Xos. 19, 20, and 2*2 without opposition, and occupied Dragon 
Ridge. By morning they would have held in their hands 
the entire northeast and east fronts of the Xew Chinese 

If we consider the natural weakness of the enceinte at 
I*()rt Arthur and its defenseless condition, we see clearly the 
difficult position in which the fortress would have been placed. 
It would have changed hands without further slaitghter. But 
if there had been a sufficient garrison and an adequate arma- 
ment properly placed, it Avould have surely fulfilled its func- 
tion as a second line of defense, and the fall of the fortress 
would have been postponed for several months. 

The role of the enceinte is very important, indeed, as a 
citadel, as a last place for resistance, but not as a mere means 
of protecting the stores and headquarters of the fortress 
from sudden attack. 

Having determined the role of the enceinte, it is necessary* 
to decide which is more important, the fighting line or its 
enceinte. Preference should certainly be given to the fight- 
ing line, for it is here that the fate of the fortress is decided. 
If this be true, it is evident that the first line must be 
stronger in every respect than the second.'' The first line 

"Let us recall the words of Colonel Velichko: "On this line of 
forts the battles for the defense of the fortress must bo fouirlit : here 
the artillei-y and infantry must offer a decisive resistance to the 


must be permanent, Avliilo the second may be temporary — 
not the reverse, accor(lin<>" to the rule followed to-day. 
In conclusion Ave maintain: 

1. The necessity of ap])lying the principle of the closed 
Avork to the fighting position. 

2. That it is necessary that the intervals between the forts 
be supplied with permanent works. 

3. That the enceinte of the city, the function of which is 
to serve as the last line of defense, should be so constructed 
as to cover the first line Avith its fire. In time of peace it may 
consist only of points of support. During mobilization its 
intervals must be supplied Avith intrenchments and obstacles. 
The points of support being less important than the forts 
of the first line may be smaller. They may have thinner con- 
crete walls, a smaller number of shelters, no rear caponiers, 
no galleries for the infantry. 

After the fall of the main line of forts the eneni}" Avill 
begin to attack the city. It is probable, howeA^er, that the 
attack of the first line, on account of its duration and stub- 
bornness, Avill have exhausted the forces and means of the 
assailants, so that he Avill not undertake a sIoav methodical 
attack upon the city. It is probable, too, that, as the end 
approaches, the operations will become more intense and 
that the assailants will attempt to take the last position 
by open assault. It would be preceded by a bombardment 
Avhich Avould necessitate bombproofs for the garrison. 

It is desirable, therefore, to have at least one concrete 
casemate in each interval between the points of support of 
the second line. Such a casemate should be large enough 
to accommodate tAvo companies during the Avar. These 
shordd be supplemented by solid bombproof shelters con- 
structed by the reserves and by the inhabitants of the city 
who labor much more willingly on the enceinte than on 
the "advanced works. 


If AA'e accept the conclusion " as to the necessity of erecting 
during peace, in the intervals betAveen the forts, permanent 
Avorks and connecting parapets, Ave close the door which other- 

« See rules or locating forts and redoubts, pp. 78, 79 ; also remarks 
l)p. 84-8S.— Tr. 


wise would remain wide open and invite the ciieinv to enter. 
AVe can now be sure that the eross fire of two fort> and one 
redoubt erected in accordance with this princii)le, reenforced 
by strong frontal fire from the parapets, wonld render an 
attempt to break throu<j:h between two forts ;i most liopeh'ss 
enter])rise. The enemy woukl undoubtedly ai)i)reciate the 
difticuhy of such an operation and would either desist from 
the attempt and beo:in sie<re operations, or would endeavor 
to open a way for himself by a heavy bombardment. The 
aim of such a bombardment woidd be the destruction of the 
])arapet at several points, as well as the obstructions, the 
(•a})oniers covering the ditches, the shelters, aiul the traverses. 
In short, he would try to make it impossil)le for infantry to 
remain in the trenches. 

We saw examples of such pitiless bombardments at Port 
Arthur duriui!; the second half of October and in Xovember 
and December. As we have already remarked, our defensive 
parapet, the Chinese wall, did not answer at the bei>innino- of 
the siege the requirements of such works. Only when its true 
role had been clearly defined — that is, after August -H^ — was 
a great number of troops concentrated here, the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Regiments and one battalion each from the 
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Regiments. The troops occupied sec- 
tions assigned to them. l)ut there were no shelters. Not until 
the troops arrived was the erection of shelters begun. As a 
great numljer of shelters were needed, it Avas necessary to re- 
sort to the simplest form. Excavations were made under the 
firing banquette of the parapet and covered with boards 
or sheet iron and a thin layer of earth. Loopholes were 
constructed along the tiring line and traverses of sand bags 
were erected on the banquette. Two weeks were neces- 
sary for this work. Not until the middle of September was 
work begun on better shelters for the infantry. For this pur- 
pose deep ditches were dug in rear of the banquette and bomb- 
proof shelters were built of thick beams covered with a layer 
of 3i to 5 feet of earth. Some of these shelters were covered 
in addition with 1^ to 2^ feet of stones and with sheet iron 
five-eighths of an inch thick. 

Such shelters stood the fall of G-inch shells, but were de- 
stroyed by 11 -inch projectiles. These shelters were completed 
by the middle of Xovember. We could never have finished 


thoin had not the Japanese allowed us to work without firing 
at us. After the shelters were finished the enemy began to fire 
(hiily against the Chinese \vi\ll and the shelters in rear, r 
These bombardments w'roughl great damage. It was neces-' 
sary to make repairs every night requiring an enormous ex- 
penditure of labor and material. P"ew vehicles were avail- 
able and there were few men free from service. Neverthe- 
less the shelters w^ere repaired and breaches in the wall 
itself vrere filled with sand bags. But in November, when 
the garrison had been decreased b}^ inore thaiTtAvo-tHiY'ds, 
and the daily bombardments were followed by nightly 
•y/ cannonades, further repairs became almost impossible^and 
■* the defense here was in a most precariouS~T?cmrlit-ioft; — Otif 
daily losses increased considerably ai:d most of ^he_^iel- 
\ ters^'ere destroyed^ The enemy, liaving brought his guns 
ancl lTiTnTng~apparatusTo close range, bombarded the wall 
day and night. By the middle of .December the exhaustion 
and the .strain of the garrison had reached the extreme limit. 
It now became aj^parent to all that parapets without bomb- 
proof slielters for the garrison were utterly insufficient. 
Concrete bombproof casemates should, therefore, be built 
at the same time that the parapets are built." In the imme- 
diate vicinity of the fighting line there should be casemates 
for the men on duty and their officers, and, somewhat far- 
ther in rear, for the reliefs oif duty. The first should be 
under the traverses; the second, about 50 paces in rear, 
under cover of folds in the ground. How many casemates 
are necessary? For an interval of 1^ miles at Port Arthur, 
one regiment of three battalions was detailed. During the 
assaults reserves were brought up. One-third of the force 
w^as detailed daily for duty — that is, one battalion of four 
companies. The men of the battalion on duty remained in 
the shelters during the day, with sentinels on the parapets. 
During the night they were reenforced by one battalion. 
This battalion remained in the shelters, the men being dressed, 
while the first battalion was on the parapets. The third 
battalion passed the night in its shelters in rear, with per- 
mission to undress. 

« This Avas proposed by Colonel Velichko, of the P^ngiiieers, in his 
hook, Study of the Latest Methods of Siege and Defense of Land 

Fortresses, 1S90. 

BOMiunjooF siTKi/rr.Hs. 01 

Thus Ave see that caseniates for four coiniiaiiies on a <.\:w 
footiiiir sii'e lU'ccssai'v for the ti'oops on duly. IvtMiuMiilu'rinLT 
that the space allotttMi to one company in lime of peace will 
sullice for two companies (hiring- a siciie. four casemates, 
each for tlie accomnuxhition of a half company during i)eace, 
.-houkl he elected under the parajjet in each interval of 1.', 
miles at distances of 1.0.")0 to 1.400 feet from each other. One 
of the other two hattalions will always be on duty. Addi- 
tional casemates should, therefore, be constructed in rear for 
the accommodation of four companies during a siege. Foi- 
this purpose two casemates, each for the acconnnodation of 
one company in time of peace or two companies during a 
siege, should be constructed. Therefore, for each interval 
four casemates for one-half company each and two casemates 
for one company each during peace should be constructed. 
On level terrain easily observed by the enemy casemates 
Avill be required for sectional reserves, but on broken terrain 
such casemates will not be necessary. 

At Port Arthur the reserves did not suifer in ordinary shel- 
ters. It is also difficult to foresee in advance where the re- 
serves should be placed. During a siege this question is easily 
solved and the reserves may be placed at points little exposed 
to fire. 

The foregoing remarks have been made with reference 
to the front which is most likely to be assailed by the enenw. 
In every fortress there are intervals the attack of which, in 
view of local conditions, is absolutely impossible. In such 
intervals it will not be necessary to construct casemates. In 
intervals where attack is possible but less probable a smaller 
number Avill suffice. 

The timely construction of intrenchments and casemates 
is especially necessary for fortresses where their construc- 
tion in time of mobilization is quite impossible or diffi- 
cult, as, for example, on mar.shy or rocky ground. There 
are fortresses on sites where surface water in abundance. 
is struck at a depth of 1 foot. Trenches and shelters can 
not be constructed here during mobilization. There are 
likewise fortresses so near the frontier that the period of 
mobilization will be very short, perhaps only a few days, 
during which the defense Avill not be able to do anything on 
the main line. In such cases the permanent fortitication of 


the intervals and the construction of concrete casemates are 
extremely necessary. 


Success in the attack of a fortress depends in a great 
measure upon abilitj^ to observe hits and the effect of tire, the 
movements of the garrison, transportation, changes of posi- 
tion of guns, the construction of works; in short, success in 
attack depends uj^on ability to observe the life of the fortrest^. 
The defense naturally seeks to conceal everything from the 
enemy. Port Arthur had, from this point of view, many 
negative as well as positive features; unfortunately the posi- 
tive were due solely to the natural conditions of the locality, 
while the negative were not corrected in any way by art. 
The forts, intermediate redoubts, trenches, most of the bat- 
teries, and the wire entanglements were clearly visil)le from 
afar, even to the naked eye. This was due mainly to the fact 
that no measures had been taken to mask them. Even from 
the summit of Fenghuangshan, 3.^ miles away, the fort-^ 
could be' observed as if the^^ lay on the palm of one's hand. 
All the fortifications were erected on the summits of hills, on 
the green slopes of which the bright yellow clay of the para- 
]5ets and breastworks Avere very conspicuous. As the area 
of each fort was quite large, these yellow spots presented 
excellent targets, and there was no difficulty whatever in 
getting the range. The good features of the fortress were 
due to the fact that immediately in rear of the forts was the 
high Dragon Ridge concealing from the enemy the entire 
interval between the line of forts and the city and masking 
all our movements. Alive to the importance of observation, 
the Japanese spared no efforts to get possession of points 
in the vicinity of the forts commanding Dragon Ridge. 
Hence their energetic attacks on Takushan, which I have al- 
ready mentioned. After their success at this point they were 
able to observe part of the harbor and the area between the 
line of forts and the city. The w^ar vessels had to change 
their stations immediately, the part of the harl)or Jinder ob- 
servation being forbidden ground. Fortunately, some parts 
of the harbor could not be observed from Takushan, and the 
reserve could remain unobserved in ordinary shelters. As it 
was impossible to observe the left flank of the northeast front 



from Takiisliaii, tlic Japaiiosc cMvctod a second ohstn-vation 
staliou on l*achlunslian. From Ikto the road to the New 
Chinese City. was clearly visible. Whenever a man was seen 
on this road, the observer informed the nearest battery of 
47 nun. onns, indicated the s(juare by telephone, and a salvo 
from two, three, or fonr guns was directed against that one 
man. The Russians were soon compelled to abandon this 
road and to establish zigzag ways of connnunication. Am- 
munition, water, food, and other material were transported 
only during the night. We have already iclated the fate of 
our squadron when "iOI^-Meter Hill fell. Henceforth traffic 
ill the New City became very difficult. 

All this shows the imi)ortance to both sides of obsiMvation 
of the fortress, the possibility of aid to the attack and injury 
to the defense. The etforts of the assailants to get a view of 
the interior are as great as those of the defense to effect con- 
cealment. Unfortunately during a siege the defense is lim- 
ited in its efforts to the construction of covered ways of 
communication. To provide safe communications along the 
entire front of a fortress would require so much labor that 
the task could never be performed by the garrison. Hence 
means of concealment must be provided in time of peace. 
The only way to do this, we think, is to plant trees in such a 
way as to mask the fighting line and the interior of the 

On broken terrain it Avill be sufficient to mask the fighting- 
position only: on level terrain it will be necessary to mask 
part of the ground in rear in addition to the fighting line. 
One belt of trees should run in front of the parapet, and 
others in rear, the number and width of the belts being 
determined by the view obtainable from the nearest com- 
manding heights. The first belt should run continuously 
along the entire perimeter of the fortress. In some for- 
tresses efforts to secure concealment have been made most 
unwisely by planting trees on the glacis of the forts, the in- 
tervals being left without a single tree. Is this not a good 
means to indicate to the enemy the exact positions of the 
forts? An uninterrupted belt of trees, on the contrary, will 
conceal the forts entirely and give no indication whatsoever 
of their position. Only a part of the area in rear of the 
Avorks will be masked bv this belt. Hence other belts will 



be necessary. In some cases belts parallel to the outer line 
may be necessary ; in other cases it may be sufficient to plant 
trees at particular places only. The trees should not inter- 
fere in any case with the fire of the second line against the 

Shrubs should never be used along the outer line, as they 
will interfere with the fire of the defense and afford conceal- 
ment to hostile parties creeping up to our lines before an at- 

It is desirable to use trees having trunks from 3 to 5 inches 
in diameter planted in regular rows, the lower branches being 
cut off. Thus a good screen Avill be obtained and the firing 
capacity of the works will remain unimpaired. In very 
broken terrain there will scarcely be any necessity to plant 
trees. The works may be masked Ijy covering them with 
turf, or in case there should be no turf near the works, by 
painting them the prevailing color of the locality." The 
composition used for this purpose at Port Arthur gave 
excellent results. 

"The advantages of this me^ns are the rapklity with which the 
worlv may be done, the small number of workmen required, cheapness, 
and adaptability to all kinds of terrain. Paint is not washed off by 
the rain, it can not be carried off by the wind, and it is easy to obtain 
the shale of the locality. 



(See Plates I. II. 111. IV, V, VI. and VIII.) 



Up to the present time fortress nuns have l)een fired at hifjh 
unifies, the guns being concealed behind parapets. The par- 
apets, however, being situated on the tops of hills or on their 
front .slopes were plainly' visible. Moreover, the positions 
of the batteries were further disclosed by the muzzles of the 
guns when elevated for firing. Hence, the position of each 
battery was very quickly and easily determined by the 
enemy, who then had no difficulty in finding the range. 
Most of our permanent and temporary batteries at Port 
Arthur were constructed in this manner. 

The permanent concrete emplacements at Port Arthur 
were as follows: Battery A, for six 6-inch guns; Battery B, 
for four G-inch guns on Durlacher seacoast carriages ; Tooth 
Battery, for four G-inch guns; Sapper Battery, for four 
6-inch guns; Battery E, for six 6-inch guns. 

All these were erected on summits of hills and were clearly 
visible at a distance of 3^ miles. 

The following temporary emplacements constructed during 
mobilization Avere open to the same criticism : Letters Bat- 
tery, for two 15-cm. Krupp guns; Small Eagle Xest, for 
three •i.2-inch guns; Eagle Xest, for two 6-inch Canet 
guns; Redoubts Battery, for three 6-incli guns on high 
carriages. There were other batteries on summits of hills 
(Redoubts Battery was on the slope), which were not so 
noticeable because they were sunk in the ground. The Jap- 
anese siege guns were all placed according to modern artil- 
lery ideas on the rear slopes of hills for the purpose of using 
indirect fire. Thus, while our batteries were clearly visible to 
the enemy, who could follow the operations not only of each 
44461—08 7 95 


battery, but of each particular o;iin. we remained utterly ig- 
norant as to the location of his batteries and the number of 
his guns. This difference rendered the situation of the bellig- 
erents very unequal. While the Japanese fired with little 
chance for error against well-defined targets, we knew not 
where to answer. As a result, there was either a damaged 
gun or carriage in each of the above-mentioned batteries at 
the end of the first day's bombardment." At night it was 
possible to determine the position of the howitzer batteries 
by the flashes and to injure them somewhat on the following 
days. It took fifteen daj^s to locate the other batteries.'^ We 
then began to fire at definite not supposititious targets and 
the conditions confronting the belligerents became a little 
less unequal. We had lost many guns.*^ The lesson was 
severe and was not forgotten. 

When the direction of the attack became evident and it 
Avas necessary to strengthen the artillery on the assailed 
front, ten 75-mm. and two 120-mm. guns taken from the war 
vessels, as well as several 47-mm. and two 6-inch reserve guns, 
were placed on Seacoast Ridge and on Spur Hill well con- 
cealed from the enemy. The naval guns were placed on 
the rear slope of the ridge and the 6-inch guns on the front 
slope of Spur Hill. As they were invisible to the enemy, he 
never did them the slightest injury, no matter how fierce his 
fire, as he could not observe its effect. These batteries re- 
mained uninjured until the end of the siege. 

At the present time the correct position for batteries is 
not only clear, but there is scarcely a person who would now 
select any other than a completely concealed position for 
firing against invisible targets. Such being the case, why 
should we build peramnent concrete emplacements? 

Oui^ temporary earth emplacements and their shelters were 
sufficient to withstand ()-inch projectiles, but they suffered 
much more than the concrete emplacements. Shelters 
against 8-inch projectiles may also be lightly constructed. 

« These ideas were modern for the Russian artillery, although they 
had been put in practice by other nations for ten years. Indeed, thej' 
were followed in some of the liussian fortresses, as, for example, at 
Novogeorgievsk. See telephone message No. 2, p. 65. 

^The Siege of Port Arthur, David H. James. 

Tort No. Ill, 2 guns: Kedoubts Battery, 1; Eagle Nest, 2; Small 
Eagle Nest, 1 ; Battery B, 1 ; Letters Battery, one magazine blown up. 


Both typos ftuH'orod (^qunlly from ll-iiu-h inortni- projortilos. 
Itiit (he repair of the concrete einphiceiiieiits was much iiKH-e, 
(lilliciilt than that of the temporary em])hicements. Cei-- 
tainly. l)v usin<j:; sufficient concrete, we may secure immiinitv 
a<rainst destruction and peneti-ation. a thina' we can not attain 
for a teni|)orary eartli emi)lacement. hut the thickenin<j: of 
concrete wails will demand a ureat deal of excavation and 
will complicate the construction of (he emplacements and 
increase the expense. 

Would it not be better to cease constructing- concrete em- 
jdacements and to build only eartli emplacements!' The 
number of these may be greatly increased. Let part of them 
be unarmed. This will enable us, after the enemy has found 
the range of a battery, to mount its guns in another emplace- 

Before finally deciding upon this question, another ques- 
tion closely connected with it must be considered. Artillery 
and engineer officers, who have not seen Avar, insist upon 
having a few batteries placed in the open for reconnoiter- 
ing purposes and to oppose hostile sapping. Tt would ap- 
pear that belief in the necessity of such batteries'exists only 
because these persons do not realize that it is possible to bring 
a rapid and effective fire to bear from a concealed battery 
against a moving target. We think such belief is founded 
wholly in error, and that to install guns in the open, even in 
concrete emplacements, is equivalent to committing them to 
absolute destruction in a very short time. It will then be 
necessary to resort to indirect fire from concealed batteries. 
At Port Arthur the role of reconnoitering fell at first upon 
the following long-range batteries: Letters Battery, with 
two 15-cm. Krupp guns; Eagle Xest, with two 6-inch Canet 
guns, and Redoubt Xo. 3, with two 0-inch Canet guns placed 
openly on the hilltops. 

All the guns of these batteries Avere damaged in August 
and September, and then the role of reconnoitering batteries 
devolved upon the li2-inch guns of the battle ships firing 
from the harbor, the 12-cm. guns on Seacoast Ridge using 
indirect fire, and one 6-inch gun placed near INIound Bat- 
tery. The ships fired at a distance of 7 or 8 miles, while 
the batteries fired at distances varying from 4f to 5-J miles, 


the |)()iiit.s of observation l)eiii<>- at Eai^le Nest and on (ireat 

It must be said that the firing of the ()-inch, 12-cm.. and 
Tr)-inni. guns, corrected from Eagle Nest, was very effect- 
ive. Even in the last stages of the siege no need was felt 
for battery reconnoitering guns. Sapping at long range 
may also be successfully opposed by meap.s of indirect fire. 
At short ranges, mortars in concealed positions should 
mainly be relied upon. As to batteries which are to oppose 
assaults, it is true that it is desirable for greater rapidity 
of fire that the pointer see the target. Such batteries must, 
therefore, be concealed immediately in rear of the crest 
and must not be exposed to view until the moment for the 
assault arrives. We shall speak about them more in detail 

We have thus come to the conclusion that all of the bat- 
teries in a fortress must be concealed from the view of the 
enenw. Not a single battery should be exposed to view. 
We must not forget that the best guaranty of success for 
the oifense lies in ability to see, and for the defense, in con- 
cealment. If it be possible to conceal our guns in rear of a 
hill, we must do so. If all our batteries are to be concealed, 
are not concrete emplacements unnecessary? If, as is true, 
temporary emj^lacements for concealed batteries passed 
through such a prolonged and obstinate siege as that of 
Port Arthur without essential injury, would it not be well 
to discard the use of concrete around such emplacements 
except for the construction of small casemates for the 
gunners ? 

Such a change we think desirable. Injuries to earthen 
parapets or traverses may easily be repaired, but an fl- 
inch projectile penetrating a casemate will place hors de 
comljat the greater part of the men if not all of them.'' Good 
concrete casemates Avill preserve the men during the severest 
bombardment. In such casemates they will be much safer 
than in the casemated traverses of the concrete emplace- 
ments. A small part of such casemates may be divided otf 
for the officers, kitchens, storerooms, latrines, etc. While 

"The following are instances of losses caused by single projectiles: 
(1) The (letachnient commander and 4 men; (2) 5 men; and (3) the 
detachment commander and IS men. 



WO think that coiicivtc (r:i\crM-s -liould 1k> discanlcd. we 
(let'in it of the utmost importance to jirovidc a mimlu'i- ol" 
emplacements with concrete casemates. In or(h'i- to conceal 
such casemates effectively iVom hre. it was j'(.ini<l necessary 
to construct them under the parapets, with exits to the 'nuis. 
Traverses should be constructed between the iruns dui-in;L'' 
the period of mobilization. How many such l)atteries will 
be necessary in an interval? 

The solution of this question depends upon the numlu'r 
of siege guns which the enemy may bring against the for- 
tress and the time required for him to bring his ai-tillerv to 
bear. The number of the enemy's siege guns multi|)lied by 
l.\ will give approximately the number of guns required 
for the fortress, while the enemy's delay in opening fire 
measures the interval at our disposal for the construction of 
temporary emplacements, and, consequently, the munber of 
temporary emplacements that may be constructed. Em- 
placements which can not be constructed during mobiliza- 
tion must be constructed in time of peace. The relative 
number of concrete and earthen emi)lacements must be de- 
termined by the nature of the terrain. The more level and 
open the terrain, the greater will be the number of concrete 
emplacements required. This question will not admit of a 
general solution, but must be solved for each fortress sep- 
arately and for each of its intervals. 

Where shall the batteries be placed and what measures 
shall be taken to safeguard them against assault? The 
siege of Port Arthur has thrown much light upon these 
questions. Taking into consideration the plan of the for- 
tress in general and of the intervals between Forts Xos. I, 
II, and III in particular, we see that these batteries Avere 
often on the line of forts (concrete batteries included), a 
few somewhat in front of the line, and others consideral)ly 
in rear. The emplacements for these batteries were mostly 
constructed during mobilization and during the siege. The 
following batteries were on the line of forts: The batteries 
in Fortifications Xos. 1 and 2, Caponier Xo, 2, and Kuro- 
patkin Lunette. Battery B, Battery A, and the batteries in 
Fort X^o. I and Fort Xo. III. ,^ 

Of these seven batteries, four were mounted in permanent 
emplacements and three in temjiorary enq)lacement>. I)nr- 


inir tlic first ^reat assault Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2 were 
taken, with their guns; Caponier No. 2 was talven in October; 
while Kuropatkin Lunette and Battery B were sevei'al times 
taken by open assault and retaken. These batteries, as well 
as those in Fortifications Xos. 1 and 2, had no other protec- 
tion against assault than breastworks and wire entangle- 
ments, with the exception of Battery B, which had two rows 
of trenches in front of it. 

These examples clearly indicate a faulty disposition. The 
batteries should be farther to the rear, so that the enemy may 
not be able to attack them before he has taken possession 
of the entire interval. The batteries intended to oppose the 
enemy's artillery — that is, the intermediate batteries — are the 
mainstay of the fortress, and should be protected by all possi- 
ble means against capture. The liability of these batteries 
to capture is shown by the examples here given. This lia- 
bility was early recognized by liussian and foreign engineers, 
and many projects were proposed to protect them." Outer 
ditches were suggested with flanking defenses and artificial 
obstacles, as well as gorge barracks, machine guns, and in- 
fantry garrisons. In this way a battery w^as to be trans- 
formed into a fort. Strange as it may appear, the term 
battery was still retained to describe such a work. 

When an infantry garrison is detailed for the protection 
of such a battery it is taken from the reserve, and thus the 
reserve is weakened. Is this wise, in view of the inactivity 
of the garrison of such a battery, unless the particular battery 
be assaulted? If these projects be adopted, we shall see 
forts, redoubts, and batteries — that is to say, a lot of sep- 
arate works — along the entire interval, each protected from 
assault, but in a most unpractical manner; for the security 
from capture of independent fortifications does not preclude 
the enemy from breaking through between them in many 

All these measures are directed only against small de- 
tachments, on the supposition that the small garrison of the 
battery will be able to hold out until the arrival of the 
reserve. Admitting the possibility of small detachments 
breaking through, we take no measures against them bv 

" Such were the projects of Colonel ^'elichko, Colonel Buynitski, 
OMptnin Ilyasheff. the French C;iiit;iin Snndier. etc. 


luisbandiiio- an aiiiple reserve, but seek only to rendei- 
the assault of each i)articular position difficult. "We for<r<'t 
entirely that a sensible enemy Avill never detail a company to 
Ijreak throufjh an interval, nor a battalion, nor even a regi- 
ment, but a division at least. Is not this equivalent to let- 
ting the thief enter the house and hiding from him after- 
wards by locking the cupboard? Is it not better to bar the 
doors and windows? AVould it not be better to avoid use- 
less expenditures for the transformation of batteries into 
forts and devote the funds allotted for this purpose to the 
construction of a permanent parapet ? Not one of the bat- 
teries in rear of such a parapet would need any other measure 
of protection. The batteries would be safe and would re- 
main batteries, and it would not be necessary to transform 
them into forts and detail special garrisons for them. 

The folloAving batteries in temporary emplacements in rear 
of the Chinese wall held out to the end of the siege protected 
only by the wall : Mound Battery, Redoubts Battery, Kavine 
Battery, Wolf Battery, the Mortar Battery, Eagle Xest, 
Small Eagle Xest, Letters Battery, Spur Hill, the batteries 
on Seacoast Ridge and Dragon Ridge, and others. It is 
true that during the night of August 23 the Japanese almost 
succeeded in reaching the parapets of Redoubts Battery: 
but this happened only because the Chinese. wall was espe- 
cially weak at the point breached, was of low profile at this 
point, and had no ditch, all of which speaks in favor of 
l)ermanent parapets. 

How many guns should there be in each battery? ]\Iany 
artillerymen who took part in the defense insist that all 
batteries should consist of four guns. They believe such 
a grouping of the guns is better than any other for secur- 
ing unity of command and concentration of fire. They say 
that these ends will be defeated by decreasing the number 
of guns per battery and increasing the number of batteries. 
I believe that this opinion arises from the fact that auxiliary 
apjDaratus such as telephones, heliographs, etc., were not 
used extensively by the defense. If a fortress be well sup- 
plied with such auxiliaries, these objections will fall to the 
ground. Personally, I believe in two-gun batteries. By 
decreasing the number of guns per battery by one-half, the 
area of thebatterv is decreased in like proportion, and conse- 


quently the probability of hits is docreaseih On the other 
hand, the number of batteries is (h)ubled." 

As to unity of command, I do not believe that it will be 
impaired in the least. It is onl}^ necessary to have a large 
network of telephones. In firing against an invisible tar- 
get the battery commander will not be at his battery, but at 
the observation station. Will it make much difference to 
him whether his orders be transmitted to one battery or to 
two ? The Japanese scattered their guns by fours, twos, and 
even by ones, but succeeded wonderfully well in concentrat- 
ing their fire against a common target. They attained unity 
of command by a vast network of telephones. It is there- 
fore desirable, in my opinion, to have two-gun batteries, 
but in order to be able to fire salvos of four guns a few four- 
gun batteries may be retained. I believe that such batteries 
should be supplied with concrete casemates. Temporary 
batteries constructed between them should have two guns. 

The number of batteries would thus be greatly increased, 
but there will always be ample room for them. They must 
not be arranged in a narrow line parallel to the line of forts, 
as in the project of the Austrian engineer. Captain Malchev- 
ski von Tarnava,^ but should be scattered over the entire 
area between the fighting line and the enceinte. It is desir- 
able to arrange them as follows: (1) Mortar and recon- 
noitering batteries near the line of forts, (2) howitzer bat- 
teries, and (3) other batteries. It is also desirable to com- 
bine the batteries into groups of four or five under a com- 
mander provided with an ol)servation station. Batteries to 
repulse assaults should be placed along the parapet. In 
hilly localities the}^ should be immediately in rear of the 
parapet on heights affording facilities for firing over the 
parapet at visible targets. The guns should be kept con- 
cealed and should be run out for firing only at the moment 
of the assault. 

" In bis pamplilet entitled " Diary of an Engineer," the author 
says : " I favor increasing tlie number of batteries in the intervals 
and decreasing the number of guns per battery. It would then 
benefit the enemy very little to concentrate the fire of two or three 
of his batteries upon one of ours. This will necessarily result in 
his scattering his fire, which will, therefore, be weaker and less effect- 
ive, and the combat will be upon more equal terms." 

^ Beitriige zum Studium der Befestigu'iu'sfrage. 



The stereotyped ])l;iii of nri'Mn^^in^- the ])()\v(Icr ina^a/.iin's 
of a fortress is as follows: 

{(/) Service (or expense) mapiziiics at tlic l)atteri('>. with 
a capacity for one day's supph^ 

{h) A line of supply nia<i:azines ahont l."200 yards in icar 
of the first line, with a capacity for three days"- su])ply. 

((■) A line of sector magazines in I'car of the supply 
inajrazines, each magazine havinf!; a capacity for four days' 
supph' for tlie fjuns of the sector. 

(d) The central magazines, which contain the entire re- 
serve sup])ly. 

It was thought that one day's supply at the batteries wouhl 
be sufficient for immediate use. Each line was to be replen- 
ished from the line innnediately in rear. Before a projectile 
reached the muzzle of the gun it was loaded in a wagon or 
other vehicle, transported, and unloaded four times. It was 
prepared and filled in the laboratory and then taken to the 
central nuigazine, whence it passed successively through the 
sector and supply magazines to the service magazines at 
the batteries. This required nnich time and labor and a 
great deal of transportation. 

But this was not the greatest objection. One day's supply 
in the service magazines is utterly inadequate to the require- 
ments of artillery duels lasting several days." AMiile the 
main part of the enemy's artillery fires upon the batteries of 
the defense in order to destroy them, a part of his artillery 
fires upon the communications leading to the batteries in 
order to prevent the replenishment of sujiplies. Railway 
trains are subjected to shell fire, hand carts to shra2)nel fire. 
Such were the methods of the Japanese at Port Arthur. 

Xotwithstanding conditions of the terrain favorable to 
connnunication v\-ith the line of batteries, it was impossible 
to annnunition during bombardments to the bat- 
teries even from the supply magazines on account of the 
great distance of these magazines from the batteries. In 
such cases the defense has two lines of conduct which it 

'-As, for instance, the bonibartUnent from August 10 to August 22 
and tlie bombardments of 20.3-Meter Hill from September 10 to Sep- 
tember 2.3 and Xoveniber 28 to Decemhpr .^. 


may pursue. It may fire slowly so as to make one day's sup- 
2)ly last tAvo days or three days, or it n^aj expend all in one 
day and cease firing. Both courses are very favorable to the 
attack and inifavoi'able to the defense. 

In order to avoid this the service magazines should contain 
at least three days' supply of ammunition ; and the supply 
magazines sliould contain anmiunition for five days and 
should be so near the first line that ammunition may be 
brought up during intervals in firing. 

Thus we would have on these two lines, one at the bat- 
teries and the other very close to them, an eight-days' supply 
of ammunition, an amount equal to the greatest probable 

It is evident that the third line, under the circumstances, 
is useless, for it is immaterial whether the ammunition be 
brought to the second line from the central magazines or 
from the sector magazines. To save time, men, and trans- 
portation, all of the rest of the ammunition should be kept 
in the central magazines. 

Thus the magazines of a fortress should be arranged as 
follows : 

1. A service magazine at each battery containing a three- 
days' supply of ammunition for the battery. 

2. A line of supply magazines (one for every three, four, 
or five batteries) 200 to 350 yards in rear of the batteries 
containing a five-days' supply. 

3. In rear of the enceinte, the laboratories and the central 
magazines containing the entire reserve supply. The serv- 
ice magazines for the second line of defense should contain 
ammunition for three days, which should be replenished di- 
rectly from the central magazines. 

An additional reason for the adoption of the plan here 
suggested is to be found in the defenseless condition of the 
sector magazines. Lying between the fighting line and the 
enceinte they might easily be captured by the enemy and 
destroyed if he succeeded in breaking through the outer 
line, thus increasing his triumph and Aveakening our strength. 

« Notwithstanding circumstances highly favorable to the Japanese, 
such as the railway and two surface roads from Daluy and transpor- 
tation by sea, they were unable to accumulate more than six days" 
supply of ammunition in November. In' August they had only three 
days" supply. They thus explain their unsuccessful attacks. 



The communications in fortressfs connoctinfr tlio forts 
und hattories of the main line with each otlier and with the 
enceinte are intended to facilitate and quicken, durini; mo- 
bilization and afterwards, the movements of trooi)s, the 
transportation and distribution of anununition, and the 
trans])ortation of guns and various materials for the repair 
of damages in the forts and batteries of the fighting line. 
Xo changes are needed in plans for fortress connnunica- 
tions proposed in Colonel Velichko's work. Everybody 
knows that he initiated the use of railways in our fortresses, 
for, according to his opinion, successful artillery duels and 
a stubborn defense are impossible in modern fortresses Avith- 
out a network of railways." 

As a jDroof of the great necessitj- for railways, Colonel 
Velichko states that the amount of artillery freight to be 
forwarded to the fighting line is about 72,000,000 pounds. 
This collossal amount, according to Colonel Velichko, can 
be transported in a short time only by means of a railwa}' 
with steam traction. In addition to the vast amount of 
freight to be transported, railways are necessary .to avoid the 
maintenance of an immense number of horses, which other- 
wise would be necessary. 

The experience at Port Arthur, while it confirms the gen- 
eral idea of Colonel Velichko, enables us to supplement his 
work. In addition to artillery freight it is necessary to 
carry a great amount of engineering material required dur- 
ing mobilization and during the entire siege. In addition to 
armament and supplies for the batteries, it is also necessary 
to put the intervals and forts in a state of defense. Although 
Count Todleben has said that, " in order that it be possible to 
make use of the greater part of the infantry for the stubborn 
defense of the area situated to the front it is necessary that the 
defense be first of all an artillery defense,'' it should be re- 
membered that at Sebastopol the construction of the points 
of support and defensive walls was simultaneous with the 
erection and armament of the batteries. If we take into con- 
sideration that an energetic enemy will first of all attempt to 
take the fortress by open assault, there can be no doubt ujjon 

" Fortresses and Fortress Itaihvnys. 


this point. It Avill be clear that while 2)reparing for the ar- 
tillery defense it ^\i\\ be necessary to prepare at the same time 
for infantry defense. These remarks have special reference 
to fortresses without permanent parapets in the intervals. 
Even if permanent parapets be provided it will be necessary 
to brinof a larjje amount of material for such Avork on the 
intervals as can not and should not be done in time of peace, 
as for instance: 

1. The erection of observation stations for the comman- 
dant of the fortress, two or three for the chief of artillery, 
and others for constant observation. 

2. The erection on the fighting- line of shelters, traverses, 
embrasures, and overhead cover. 

3. The preparation of artificial obstacles, such as wire 
entanglements, barricades, and mines. 

4. The installment of a network of telephones for the 
conduct of artillery fire. 

5. The placing of the forts and redoubts in a defensive 

('). The construction of temporary batteries and magazines. 

7. The clearing of the terrain in front of the fortress. 

Taking into consideration that the mobilization period for 
frontier fortresses is always very short, it wall be seen that 
this work must be executed in the shortest time possible, 
perhaps in a few days. In order to do so it will l)e necessary 
to transport hastily a vast amount of material, such as 
limber, beams, boards, poles, concrete, cement, gravel, sand, 
sand bags, ware, fougasse bombs, mines, etc. 

In Port Arthur about 12,000,000 pounds of freight of this 
class was carried. The length of the line of defense was 12 
miles. A modern land fortress has a line of defense of 27 to 
40 miles, which increases the amount of engineering freight 
to 25,000,000 and even to 30,000,000 pounds. 

If we assume that the period of mobilization will last ten 
daj^s, it will then be necessary to transport daily about 3,600,000 
pounds of freight. Assuming the carrying capacity of army 
two-wdieeled vehicles to be 900 pounds and that a horse can 
make two round trips daily to the positions (20 to 24 miles), 
about 1,000 vehicles and 2,000 horses would be required. 
This vast amount of transportation will be necessary for the 
engineer material alone. Ex]:)erience at Port Arthur shows 


FORTRESS COM!\rrN'I(\TI()XS. 1 ( >7 

that the (k'iii:iii(l thiriiiii' the .sieiie for tin- t raiisporlaliou 
of material is vvvy ^i-eat." For the repair of tin- main 
line of defense diirina' ti^■e months almost twice a^ much 
material was expiMuled as during the five months of mol»ili- 
zation when it Avas put in a state of defense. Durini:; a sie<j:e. 
material mnst be transported chiefly at ni^ht, I)i»tween 8 j). m. 
and 1 or -2 a. m. — that is, durino- five or six hours. Hence, if 
the period of the siege is four times as long as that of mol)i- 
lization (or forty days). 2,000 horses and 1.000 carts will be 
necessary every night. Thus we see what a vast amount of 
transiwrtation is recpiired by the engineers. 

This ti'ansportation should be especially i)rovided for the 
engineers or otherwise it mnst l)e taken from the artillery, to 
the great disadvantage of the artillery defense. As the artil- 
lery manifestly will not consent to this, it will be necessary to 
provide the engineers with their own transportation, allowing 
a wide margin for horses killed and wounded. It would be 
most inconvenient to keep so many horses in time of peace 
and" hardly possible to procure them during mobilization. 
Thus fortresses will generally have an utterly inadequate 
number of horses for the transportation of artillery and engi- 
neer material, as was the case at Port Arthur, where we were 
often compelled to neglect necessary defensive w^orks, not on 
account of lack of material, but because it was impossible to 
transport it to the points where it was needed. 

While the success in the artillery duel depends not only 
upon the number of guns, but also upon the number of pro- 
jectiles delivered to the guns, the entire defense of the fort- 
ress and its duration depend greatly on the repair of dam- 
ages by the engineers. It is necessary to have transportation 
for the needed material. 

The adoption of the plan for the arrangement of the 
magazines of a fortress herein proposed insures a supply of 
ammunition for eight days, which will enable the defense 
to maintain a prolonged artillery duel. The position of 
the second line of magazines in close proximity to the 
batteries permits the replenishment of the service maga- 

" lu the defense of Sebastopol, 240,000 gabions, 130.000 fasciues, 
1.000.000 saiicl bags— a total weiglit not less than 21.04li tons — were 
expended. The weight of beams, boards, briclv. and stone has not 
been fomputed, but it was undoubtedly very great. 


zinos by means of wagonettes, handcarts, stretchers, etc. 
In fact it ahnost obviates the necessity of using other means 
of transportation Avhich may be utilized for the transporta- 
tion of annnunition from the central magazines to the supply 
magazines. The engineers are in a different position. It 
will ahvays be necessary to bring engineer material from the 
central depots, as the establishment of intermediate depots 
would be unwise on account of the great danger of their 
l)eing destroyed. Thus the engineer material will have to 
be transported from G to 10 miles every night from the center 
of the fortress. The quantity of material which has been 
found necessary during sieges in the past must be greatly 
increased for sieges in the future, as the attack will bring 
much more powerful guns to bear than did the Japanese at 
Port Arthur. 

It is reported that one of the nations of western Europe 
is manufacturing 12-inch howitzers. We do not know the 
weight of the bursting charge, but it wdll certainly be far 
greater than that of the Japanese 11-inch mortars. In pro- 
portion as the destructive effect of the projectile is increased, 
the damage to the works and the necessary repairs will be 

The foregoing considerations, as well as the necessity so 
signally showm at Port Arthur of concentrating rapidly the 
greatest possible number of guns on an assailed front, for 
which an energetic commandant will not hesitate to strip 
an unassailed front, and the urgent need for rapid transpor- 
tation for reserves from one front to another, leads us to con- 
sider the question of communcations as one of great impor- 
tance, indeed as of no less importance than the proper ar- 
rangements for the defense of the intervals between the forts 
and the correct disposition of the artillery emplacements. 

Unfortunately this element of defense was sadly neg- 
lected at Port Arthur. There were no railways, no met- 
aled roads — only surface roads. Owing to the rocky soil 
and the excellent construction of these roads they answered 
well the purpose of metaled roads. But, as I have already 
remarked, all the roads had one great defect — they were not 
sufficiently masked. ]\Iany sections ran on slopes or crossed 
high passes clearly visible to the enemy. All such places 
were constantly observed by the enemy and the use of the 


roads rrrcw more and more danfrproiis as the liostilo troops 
approached our lines. As early as Aiifriisl it was iicccssarv 
to abandon some of the loads mid iiiaUc dcloms. 

When the Japanese reaelied the «>lacis of the forts in Oc- 
tober, communication by day, even by means of a sinj^le man, 
was at an end. Covered passages were then made through 
the passes for men on foot, and ravines Avere used for connnu- 
nication. Material and supplies could be transported only l)y 
night. Understanding the moral importance of cutting off 
communication with the fighting line, the Japanese took 
all possible measures to render this communication as diffi- 
cult and dangerous as possible. During the day they care- 
fully observed all roads and whenever a single man ap- 
peared they opened upon him by salvo with field guns and 
even with 4T-nnn. guns. During the night they recognized 
the apiH-oach of trains by the noise of the vehicles and, 
guided by the sound, opened fire. 

Hence the first requirement to be considered in the con- 
struction of fortress roads and railways is that they be con- 
cealed. An unmasked road is a death trap. 

In order to mask the communications, attempts at short- 
ening them must be abandoned. In most fortresses, roads and 
railways radiate from the center in long, straight lines in 
order to shorten them, but such roads are exposed to enfilade 
fire. Eoads may easily be masked in a hilly country by tak- 
ing advantage of defiles, turning mountains by the rear, and 
digging tunnels through passes. On a level terrain the task 
is more difficult. Nevertheless they must be concealed. As 
an excellent means we would advocate the planting of trees; 
but trees should not he planted in narrow lines on either 
side of a road, as such an arrangement would only render 
the road conspicuous. They should not be planted regu- 
larly, but in sejoarate woods, groups, orchards, scattered in 
such a manner as to conceal the road entirely from com- 
manding heights, and even from balloons. 

There were no railways in Port Arthur, but the need for 
them was greatly felt during the siege, especially toward 
the end, when most of the horses had been killed or eaten. 
But I am convinced that the use of steam traction would 
have been of doubtful benefit. The enemy fired at our 
vehicles during the night, locating them by the noise. It 


would be still easier for him to locate a train with a puffing 
engine having sparks flying out of its smokestack. Hence it 
would be well to use electric or some other power, which 
would be free from noise and sparks. 

It would also be advantageous to have a supply of hf)rse 
carts and handcarts, which could be used where movements 
by rail may be impossible. They would be very useful in 
a fortress situated on a level site. 

Our views may be summarized as follows : 

1. Narrow-gauge railways are necessary in addition to a 
vast network of metaled roads. 

2. There should be t"\vo classes of railways, permanent 
railways constructed during peace and portable railways to 
be laid during mobilization. There should be a permanent 
belt road. It should run in rear of the batteries immediately 
behind the magazines, where the road and the trains will be 
well protected. The portable railways should run from the 
belt line to some of the forts and to all of the magazines 
and thence to the batteries. 

3. Locomotives should be replaced by some form of trac- 
tion which does not generate noise, smoke, or sparks. 

4. Noiseless automobiles should be used on the roads to 
transport heavy loads. 

5. Long, straight sections should be avoided and the roads 
should be completely masked. 


During the siege of Port Arthur the searchlights played a 
secondary part. This was due to lack of practice in handling 
them and to the small number of searchlights available. The 
siege, however, showed the great importance of search- 
lights to the defense. We believe that the searchlight will be 
as indispensable in the siege warfare of the future as the siege 
gini, the rifle, and the spade. 

The role of the searchlight in the defense begins with the 
first day of the siege and ends with the last. During the 
early period searchlights impede and embarrass the enemy 
in moving his troops and in constructing works along the line 
of investment. Searchlights can not now interfere with the 
construction of emplacements for siege batteries, as they are 
all placed on rear slopes or behind screens, and therefore 



under cover; but intrenohments and other works on heights 
may be reached by searclilights, and work here may begreativ 
hampered at night. The general duties to be performed by 
searchlights may l)e sunniiarized as follows: 

1. By lighting distant areas, to embarrass the movements 
of larger bodies of hostile troops and disclose the transporta- 
tion of freight and the movements of trains, as well as work 
in progress on the line of investment. 

2. By lighting the nearest approaches to hamper mining 
and sapping work and disclose the approach of assaulting 

3. By forming lighted zones to impede the Avork of hostile 

It will readily be understood that it would be xery unwise 
to have one standard searchlight for these three purposes. 
More poAverful searchlights are needed for lighting distant 
areas than for observing near approaches, while special 
searchlights are necessary to combat hostile searchlights. 
It is therefore desirable to have searchlights of two or three 
ditferent diameters. Searchlights for distant lighting and 
for neutralizing the effect of the hostile searchlights must be 
on the forts. In addition, there must be searchlights in the 
caponiers of the forts and near them to light the approaches 
to the intervals from the flanks. 

The guns in intermediate caponiers are effective at night 
in covering the approaches to the neighboring fort and inter- 
vals only when the gunners can see the target clearl3^ This 
is possible with a strong light directed against the point 
which is being assaulted. In order to use a counter-assault 
battery effectively a searchlight must be at the immediate 
disposition of the battery commander. Searchlights should 
therefore form part of the equipment of intermediate capo- 
niers. There should be complete harmony in the operations 
of the searchlight and the caponier guns. Such light should 
illuminate the glacis of the neighboring forts and the near- 
est approaches to these forts and to the intervals. The 
searchlight will be useless without the fire of its l)attery and 
the guns are useless at night without searchlights, while the 
greatest advantage is ol)tained from the combined action of 
the two. The searchlights may be termed the eyes of the 

444<)1— 08 8 


As they have a more limited field of operation than the 
searchlights for distant lightine:, the caponier searchlights 
may he of a smaller diameter — say from 24 to 32 inches. 

In order to impede the night work of the assailants, each 
interval of Ifj miles between the forts should have four 
searchlights,'* each intermediate redoubt having one. As 
they will be required to light a limited area between the first 
parallel and the works, not more than 1;^ miles wide, they 
may be still smaller than the other searchlights — that is, be- 
tween 16 and 21 inches. Thus the plan for the disposition 
of searchlights on the main line of defense would be as fol- 

1. At each fort a strong searchlight for distant lighting, 
with a diameter between 36 and 15 inches. 

2. A similar searchlight at each intermediate redoubt. 

3. At each rear intermediate* caponier of the forts two 
searchlights with a diameter from 21 to 32 inches to flank 
the intervals. If not close to the caponiers, they should be 
connected with them by telephone. 

1. Four projectors with a diameter from 16 to 21 inches 
in the intervals between the forts to light the nearest ap- 
proaches to the intervals. 

5. In case there is a second line of defense, which must be 
placed so that the first line can be seen from the second and 
covered by its fire, searchlights must be provided for the 
second line to light the first line in case the enemy breaks 
through it. A few very strong searchlights are needed here, 
capable of giving good illumination at about 3 miles. As 
previously stated, searchlights for flanking the intervals 
may be located in the caponiers, special embrasures being 
provided for them. Sometimes local conditions are such 
that the best effect is secured when the light comes from one 
side and not from the caponier itself, in which case it should 
be placed on a flank at such a distance as will give the best 

It is difficult to lay down rules for the installation of 
searchlights, as everything depends upon local conditions. 

'^We recommend four searcbliglits for each interval iu order that 
it be possible, in case a searchliiilit should be damaged at one of the 
forts or in the intermediate redoubt, to light the approaches from two 


Sometimes it 'will be best to eonstnict u special capoinei- for 
the searchlight; sometimes it should be placed on one of the 
flanks of the fort or above the caponier. One condition is in- 
dispensable. AVhen the searchlight is not placed in n con- 
crete casemate, but in a light-armored cupola or in the open, 
it must be movable, in order that, by changing its posi- 
tion, the enemy may be impeded in finding its range. In 
such cases the searchlight may be placed on trucks and moved 
over rails, as was done at Fort Xo. III. If the searchlight 
for flanking the intervals is not placed in the caponier itself, 
it must be connected with the caponier commander b}" tele- 
phone, who can thus direct it to cease lighting or throw its 
beam from one j^lace to another or seek a new target. 

Searchlights placed in the intervals between the forts must 
be still more portable, for their function is to impede work 
which takes place in a direction that can not be flanked. 
It will be necessary to change the position of such lights quite 
often. To this end they must be light in weight and inde- 
jiendent of the point where the current for them is generated. 
While searchlights may and even must be uncovered, the 
apparatus which supplies them with current must be in pro- 
tected positions. For the searchlights at the forts, dynamos 
ma}^ be installed in the forts. For other lights, djaiamos may 
be placed in the nearest concrete casemate, from which cables 
may branch oif to each of the searchlights ; but such a method 
of procedure has an essential defect, for the cable, in order 
that the searchlight may be moved from place to place, can 
not be buried. Although this defect may be remedied to a 
considerable extent by laying a cable along the entire inter- 
val, yet it would be desirable to avoid this dependence of the 
searchlight on the apparatus by inventing a searchlight 
carrying its own generator. 

The great moral influence of searchlights was often felt by 
us at Port Arthur. As soon as a light i-eached our lines we 
Avere immediately forced to stop work. During the first days 
the Japanese did not notice our working parties on account of 
the great distance of their searchlights (about 3 J miles). 
Their lights, after remaining upon our works for a few mo- 
ments, would glide off and we would continue our labor. 
Later on they su.cceeded in finding our Avorking parties. 
Tliev would then hold their lights on our men and open fire. 


AVe had to have recourse to a ruse. Stoppin<^ work at the 
point disclosed we began it at another point, and when this, 
too, was discovered, wo resumed work at the former place. 
Nevertheless, on account of the small number and the great 
distance of the Japanese searchlights they interfered with 
us but little. 

To our great regret we have little information regarding 
the inconvenience caused by our searchlights to the Japanese 
working parties. As to the advantages derived from search- 
lights by the defenders in repulsing assaults, I would invite 
attention to the case previously narrated, where I was an 
eyewitness. I also select the following extracts from Mr. 
James's Siege of Port Arthur: 

The vigilance of the garrison and the havoc wrought by the ma- 
chine gnns, aided by the clever handling of the searchlight when the 
Japanese reached the entanglements, defeated the attempts of the 
Japanese to gain the ground necessary for developing the assault." 

Further on he saj^s: 

The devilish utility of the searchlights was again demonstrated by 
the skillful manner in wliich they were manipulated in locating the 
masses of Japanese for the general fire of the garrison.?" 

A little further still he says: 

A faint rattling of rifle fire came from the foot of Wantai (Eagle 
Nest). No less than seven searchlights were flashing from the 
fortifications, and three of these converged on the Panlungs (For- 
tifications Nos. 1 and 2). The rifle fire steadily increased, and the 
quiet searchlights swung down to where the regiments of the ninth 
and eleventh divisions were waiting to attack. A few minutes later 
the rays of light commenced working up and down the slopes of the 
Panlungs, and Russian rifle fire working down the slope of Wantai 
could be distinctly heard above the general rattle of musketry. The 
Japanese reserved their fire for a few minutes, and the Russians, con- 
tniuing their unchecked advance behind the rays of the searchlights, 
quiclvly drove the wasted remnants of the 7th Regiment into the 
East Panlung.f 

Again : 

They had scarcely got moving before they were unmasked by star- 
shells, and under the glare of a couple of searchlights subjected to 
a terrific fire from the Keekwau south fort (Battery B) and west 
battery, and this, coupled with the fire of " Q " (Kuropatkin Lunette) 
sf)on broke up their attack.'' 

«. James, p. 80. '' Il»id., p. 02. 

* Ibid., p. 84. » Ibid., p. 05. 




They were pounced on liy the ^'l.iriii;.' >c,iiilili^,'lil I'm- llie deciuiu- 
liiiiLi fire of liidden iiincliinc ,L,'niis :iih1 ritlcnieii." 

In the coui'so of his hook the author fr(M|iieiitly rotnnis <o 
this suhject, whieh seems to have made a deep uupi-osion 
upon him. lie assigns the i)hice of hoiioi- to seaichlights 
as means of defense. Our space will not permit us to give 
all of his pertinent references to searchlights, hut there are 
two more which we can not forhear to <|uote. 

In his description of the storming of Idol liedouht he says: 
But all that darkness might have given to the assaulters was 
sneaked away by the light of the searchlights — a cool, quiet light that 
aided but one side and hampered the other.* 

According to the author the following incident took })lace 
at the storming of Rocky Kedouht on August 24: /^ 

In the west the first division commenced some pi'etty artillery 
practice on the western searchlights, and shells so frequently blanked 
the face of the lights that we were not suriirised to see two lights 
die out. By this time the moon had set, and the change giving the 
searchlights greater power, they were now etflciently employed in the 
east, where firing broke out afresh. Over in the west, between the 
Sueishi Valley and the hill 174 metre, many star-shells were falling f j J /^ 
iu pretty confusion and lighting up the blackness of early morning. 
A detachment of the left wing of the first division, taking advan- 
tage of the absence of the two powei-ful searchlights in that part of 
the field, were advancing iu skirmishing order, and making their 
presence felt by the Russian outposts, when suddenly the extin- 
guished searchlights reflashed, swung over the sky, and right down 
on the now perplexed and illuminated ranks of the Japanese infan- 
try. The next act was truly tragedy. Xo sooner had the search- 
lights converged on them than from I-tzu-shan (Fort No. 4), An-tzu- 
shau (Redoubt No. 4), and the approximate ridges roared sinnilta- 
ueous salvos of fortress artillery, and from concealetl infantry a 
long volley of rifle fire. The extinguishing of the searchlights had 
been a Muscovite trap, which the .Japanese stuml)led into, and now 
the searchlights kept crossing and recrossing each other's rays in a 
l)ewildering manner, and it needed all the strenuous efforts of the 
artillery to extricate the advanced Japanese. Then all became sig- 
nificantly silent in the west.*^ 

We have given this testimony of an eyewitness to show 
the absolute necessity of providing fortresses with search- 
lights in great numbers, and to counteract the opinion of 
those wdio may think that we are too enthusiastic in advo- 
cating the general adoption of searchlights. 

" .Tames, p. !)7. '' Ibid., p. 121. '' Ibid., p. 0(i. 




Each of the elements of defense of a modern fortress is 
so important that it is difficuh to say which is most impor- 
tant. In saying that the line of forts, redoubts, and bat- 
teries ijlays a most important role, it must be understood that 
without adequate communication between these works them- 
selves and between the works and the enceinte they will not 
be able to fulfill the part expected of them. Thus com- 
munications are not less important than forts and batteries. 
But even with most excellent roads, the works will perform 
their function most imperfectly if unprovided with such ap- 
pliances as will enable their operations to be combined. The 
maximum strength of the defense may be developed only 
by the faultless cooperation of the different works. 

Thus it may be necessary to concentrate the fire of the 
batteries on a certain target, it may be necessary to change 
target quickly, or to assign batteries to different targets, 
or to order one fort to support another, or to order 'the re- 
serves to hurry to a distant point. We shall not undertake 
to enumerate all the cases where it may be necessary to send 
orders quickly to distant points. 

The value of such apparatus as will insure the prompt 
transmission of the orders of commanders is recognized 
Avillingly by everybody, yet in man}^ fortresses the provi- 
sion of such apparatus is neglected. Thus at Port Arthur 
there was none at all in time of peace and the network of 
telephones had to be laid hurriedly during mobilization. It 
is easy to understand that a hastily established telejihone 
system will not operate regularlj^ and uninterruptedly as 
is necessary and desirable. We then saw clearly the neces- 
sity of installing an adequate telephone system in time of 
peace equal to the demands that may be made upon it in 

The first essential is that there be two practically inde- 
pendent systems. The first system should connect the works 
with each other and with the commandant. This system 
should be installed simultaneously with the construction 
of the fortress. The other system should be for the service 
of the artillery, its principal object being to enable the chief 
of artillery to conduct the fire of his batteries. A part of 


this system connecting the hatterie.-- in icniponiiv cniplacc- 
inents can. of course, l)e instalh'd only when these hatteries 
are constructed; that is, during mobilization. 

The second essential is that these conuuiniications should 
fimction Avithout interruption during the heaviest hom- 
bardments. This can be attained by the establishment oi' 
iniderground connection and by wireless telegraphy. 

The necessity for two separate telephone systems and for 
uninterrupted connection was fully demonstrated at l*ort Ar- 
thur, Avhere a vast telephone network was established. 
The liead(|uarters of the fortress was connected with a 
central station, wdiicli in turn was connected with section 
central stations. These section central stations were con- 
nected with the head(iuarters of the detachments; which, in 
their turn, were connected with the various works. The chief 
of artiller}^ had no special telephone system at his disposal, 
but had to use the general fortress system. This system lia<l 
to serve for the transmission of the orders of the staif of the 
fortified sector, the instructions of the commandant and other 
authorities in command, and the numerous reports of the de- 
tachment statfs, forts, batteries, observation stations, etc. The 
large number of telephones in use led to the establishment of 
many intermediate central stations. 

In order to transmit an order to a fort or batter}', it was 
necessary to call up several central stations. The connection 
demanded was often busy, and much time was lost in waiting. 
As a consequence, orders frequently arrived Avhen they had 
become useless. At the appearance of a moving target the 
observation stations were ordered to report to the chief of 
artillery for orders, but" when the order " such or such bat- 
tery open fire " was received, the target had often disap- 
peared or had gotten beyond the range of the batter}'. Dur- 
ing battle the control of the fire of the batteries was well- 
nigh impracticable for the chief of artillery, as reports, or- 
ders, and instructions were received in great numbers from 
all sides just at the time when it was necessary to issue orders 
and instructions. It was on account of this circumstance that 
it was rarely possible to concentrate the fire of as large a num- 
ber of guns as the Japanese. Whenever this was possible 
it was not on account of the fire control being concentrated 
in the hands of one chief, but because of the activitv of in- 

,<\^*^ i cation 


dependent chiefs of sections and battery commanders. The 
Japanese were able to concentrate their fire in such an excel- 
lent way by means of a well-organized system of communi- 

We find the follow^ing statement in Mr. James's liook in re- 
gard to this fact : 

From the siege park a heavy concentration of direct fire upon the 
eastern forts was possible. * * * The artillery conniiander, Gen- 
eral Teshima, directed the battery tire from Observation Hill (center 
Feng-hwang-shans), from which point a systematic network of tele- 
l)hone wires connected np snbordinate artillery observation points and 
the balloon section operating in the rear.** 

Somewhat before these lines we read : 

General Xogi was in touch by a perfect system of telephone wires 
with all branches of troops, while the hospital service was directed 
similarly by General Ochai. Ammunition columns, commissary depots, 
pioneer corps, engineers, sai)pers, and auxiliary arms were in direct 
communication with headquarters, as also the naval detachment, while 
wireless communication was maintained from Dalny and Sliaio-piug- 
tao with the blockading squadron under Admiral Togo.* 

The author explains in another part of his book that there 
were two separate observation stations for the commander of 
the Japanese army and for the chief of artillery, so that they 
were able to make observations and to transmit orders inde- 
pendently of each other. We find the same statement in Mr. 
Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett's book,« who indicates the points, 
where these stations were established, in the plan appended 
to his work. 

In the same book we read interesting information concern- 
ing the fact that the Japanese storming columns were suj)- 
plied with telephones which connected them with the divi- 
sional statf on the one hand and with the batteries on the 
other, thus enabling the artillery to support the columns, to 
cease firing at the opportune moment, to change target, to 
correct its fire, etc. 

Thus the Japanese by a proper use of the telephone could 
conduct operations harmoniously during assaults, as well as 
during bombardments. To this fact much of their success 

" James, p. 70. 

6 Ibid., p. G9. 

" Port Arthur, the Siege and Capitulation, by Ellis 
lett. 2d ed. Edinburgh and London, W. Blackwood & Sons. 1900, p. 


must 1)0 a(tril)nle(]. Their uiulortakiiij^ would Iimxc Itci'ii 
more difficult had we made a judicious use of the siiuu- means. 

The defense has the advantage of being able to establish 
its connnunications in time of peace. It can use all the 
newest technical appliances, which the attacking jiarty can 
not always have at hand. "Wireless telegraphy has ri'ached 
such a state of perfection that its use for communication in 
a fortress is not only desirable but necessary. But as the 
use of wireless telegraphy may be hampered by its use in the 
hostile army, it should not be the chief or only means of 
communication. Other means, such as the ordinary tele- 
graph and the telephone, are necessary. 

"We have already said that it is absolutely necessary for 
the communications in a fortress to function Avithout inter- 
ruption during bombardment. This end may be attained 
by using underground connection for the telephone, the ca- 
bles being buried deep in the soil. All of the defenders of 
Port Arthur concur in the opinion that overhead Avires 
must be discarded, but opinion is divided as to the best 
method of laying the underground lines. Some maintain 
that the cables should be laid so deep that they may be safe 
from the largest projectiles. To repair defects they recom- 
mend that manholes be provided at distances of about 150 to 
200 feet. Others maintain that deep trenches are not neces- 
sary, that projectiles Avould rarely hit the cables if buried in 
shallow trenches, and that it will be sufficient to secure the 
lines from shell fragments by burying them in trenches at a 
depth of 1 to U feet. 

I have come to the following conclusions as a result of 
my experience at Port Arthur : 

1. All overhead telei:>hone lines in a fortress must be 
replaced by underground connections. 

2. The underground telephone system of a fortress may 
be divided into two parts — one within the area of constant 
artillery fire and the other outside of this area. 

3. Part of the telephones situated within the area of 
constant artillery fire must be secured entirely from injury, 
and the cables must therefore be buried as deeply as possible, 
while the other part nearer to the enceinte and liable only 
to chance hits, may be secured only against shell fragments 
and concussion from shells bursting in the vicinity. 


4. Cables buried at a depth of 1 foot often refused to 
work, notably at Fort No. III. When the cable was exam- 
ined it was found that it had not been damaged by project- 
iles. It still refused to work. On further examination it 
was ascertained that the cable had been injured by water, 
connection with the earth being thus established. The cable 
was then placed in a triangular trough made of thin boards, 
and the line worked perfectly. As this may always happen, 
it is desirable to place the cables in such troughs." 

5. To insure uninterrupted service it is necessary to have 
a double connection between each important point and the 
headquarters of the detachment commander to whom it is 
subordinate, in order that one line may be available if the 
other is damaged. 

In general, the plan of fortress telephones, according to 
our opinion, should be as follows (see PL V) : 

1. The headquarters of the fortress should be connected 
with the chiefs of detachments, the observation stations of 
the chief of artillery and of the commandant, and the indi- 
vidual forts, 

2. The central stations of headquarters of detachments 
should be connected with each other, with the central stations 
of sections, and the observation stations of the detachments. 

3. The central station at section headquarters should be 
connected with the forts and other works of the section. 

4. The central observation station should be connected 
with fortress headquarters, the commandant's observation 
stations, and the observation stations of the chiefs of groups 
who should be connected with the batteries of their groups. 

Such a system will enable the commandant to direct the 
general course of operations, the chief of artillery to control 
the fire of the batteries, and the chiefs of detachments to di- 
rect the operations of the forts and othei works and the 
troops in the intervals. 

The forts may communicate directly with fortress head- 

Metallic connection and underground cables will secure the 
uninterrupted working of the lines. 

° This applies to temporary Hues. In permanent lines tlie cables 
should be laid in conduits of more durable material. 



The followino- lines need iioi onlinai'ily hr di-cplv laid: 

1. Those connecting' fortress lie:id(|ii:ii-ier> with the coni- 
luandant's observation stations. 

2. Those connecting fortress hea(h|uarlers and detach- 
ment headquarters. 

3. Those connecting the observation stations of the chief 
of artillery Avith fortress headquarters and the artillery 
observation stations. 

The detachment and section heachjuarters are compara- 
tively secure, and therefore their cables need not be deeply 
laid. Certain sections of the artillery network should be 
securely laid; but as these cables must be laid during mo- 
bilization, much will depend upon the time available. The 
lines connecting the forts with each other and with section 
headquarters should be laid securely during peace. 

A railwav telegraph line is likewise necessary, connecting 
the railway stations and fortress headquarters. The same 
measures should be used for its security as for telephone 

AVireless telegraphy may be used to connect the fortress 
with other cities situated without the lines of the blockading 
army, to connect a 'Coast fortress with the fleet, to connect 
fortress headquarters yvith the advanced fortified positions, 
and to connect the fortress with isolated works. 

Various means of signaling, such as the heliograph and 
the semaphore, may be of great service to the defense, but 
these systems require much peace training for the personnel, 
which must be well acquainted with the terrain, for other- 
wise little w^ill be accomplished. 


(See riatp I.) 



Ill Chapter III we gave the reasons why the line of forts 
at Port Arthur was so close to the city. An important rea- 
son lay in the necessity of making the line of defense corre- 
spond with the small garrison. 

This garrison was fixed at 11,300 men. The length of the 
line of forts was only 10 miles. Thus there were 1,130 men 
per mile of perimeter. This figure is approximately the 
same as that adopted in Germany (1,100) in the allotment of 
garrisons to fortresses; but the Germans have additional 
mobile troops for the active defense of positions. It is evi- 
dent that after the investment these troops will form part of 
the garrison, thus increasing it to a considerable extent. It 
was evident at Port Arthur before the beginning of the 
siege that it would be necessary to occupy a few^ advanced po- 
sitions for the successful defense of the fortress. If the 
fortress were not to be reenforced, it w^ould be necessary to 
scatter 11,300 men over 14 miles, giving only 807 men per 
mile. With such a garrison a successful defense was hopeless. 
It would have been necessary then to desist from the defense 
of the advanced positions, but the importance of these posi- 
tions was so great, as previously stated in Chapter IV, that it 
was impossible to think of a protracted defense without 

Colonel Velichko's comments are very apposite upon this 
question. "It is impossible to decide defense questions 
wisely," said he, " when your superiors say to you, ' this city 
is very important and we shall assign a garrison of 25,000 
men to defend it. Construct a fortress here to be manned 
by 25,000 men. That port is less important, and we shall 
assign only 8,000 men to defend it. Construct a fortress 
there to fit a garrison of 8,000 men.' " 





But luck smiled unt'XiH'cttnlly on Port Arthur. At the last 
niouient the garrison was increased considerahly by chance. 
When the investment began it consisted of 41,01G men, of 
which 34.50:^ Avere combatants lit for duty, 4.180 noncom- 
batants. and ■2.r)'24 sick in the hospitals." If we add to this 
the Kuangtn.n<; naval brioade of 8,500 men. other small de- 
tachments, and 13 companies of citizens — li.noo men, we find 
that the garrison consisted of about 50.000 men, more than 
four times the garrison originally intended. Let ns see how 
this garris(m was distributed and liow it answered the needs 
of the defense. 

At the time of the investment the gan-isoii was distributed 
as follows: 

1. For the defense of the seacoast l)atteries, H battalions. 

2. For the occupation of the advanced positions and the 
line of forts, 25| battalions. 

3. General reserve, 7| battalions. 

4. For the enceinte, 13 companies of volunteers and 1 rifle 

One question immediately suggests itself. AVith such a 
large garrison why was it not possible to detail a larger re- 
serve? Seven and one-fourth battalions were less than one- 
sixth of the entire strength. 

We find the detailed distribution of the garrison in the 
orders of the commandant of July 30. 1904. It is as follows : 

Disixisition of the f/arrison of the fortrcsft of Port Artliur (.Yo. 2) 

Jul 11 11. lOO.'i. 

For the defense of the fortress the troojis are assigned as follows: ^ 

1. Seacoast Front. 

a. Western section. 

(Lieutenant Colonel Stolnikoff. ) 

2Ttli East Siberian Rifles, 1 com- 

28tli East Siheriaii liitlps, 1 coui- 

Kuanirtuni: Naval Brigade, 1 com- 

Total. 5 battalion. 

To defend Tiger Peninsula from 
the barrael<s of the 27th East 
Siberian Rifle Regiment to 
Tigers Tail, inclusive. 


« Official data. 

* The units of the advant-ed detachment shall dci-upy tlie points 
designated in the disposition, after evacuating the advanced positions 
on Fenghuaiigshan. 



b. Eastern ■scclidit. 
(Lieutenant Colonel X'eiiritski. ( 
Knaugtunj; Naval Brigade, 4 eciii- 

Total, 1 battalion. 

2. Land Front. 

(Major General Kondratchen'ko.) 

a. First section. 

(Major General Gorbatovski.) 
25tli and 2Gtli East Siberian 

Ritles, battalions. 
15tli and IGtli East Siberian 

Rifles, 6 battalions. 
28th East Siberian Rifles, 1 bat- 
od and Ttli reserve battalions, 2 

Knangtung Naval Brigade, 2 com-'' 

Frontier Guards, 2 companies 
Railway Battalion, 1 company. 
1st battery, 4tli East Siberian 

Artillery Brigade, 8 guns. 
1st battery, 7tli East Siberian 

Artillery Brigade, 8 guns. 
57-mm. rapid-fire field battery, (i 

2 independent batteries, S guns. 

Total, 16i battalions and 
30 guns. 

b. Second section. 
(Major General Tserpitski.) 
oth East Siberian Rifles, 3 bat- 
27tli East Siberian Rifles, 2 J l)at- 

28th East Siberian Rifles, IJ bat- 
Kuangtung Naval Brigade, 1 bat- 
Mining Company. 
Mixed company of the 11th and 
• 12th P:ast ' Siberian Rifles, 1 

4th East Siberian Artillery Bri- 
gade, 16 guns. 

Total, 9 battalions and K". 

T(i defend the section from Golden 
Hill t(. liattery No. 22, inclusive. 

To defend the section from Cross 
Hill to Fort No. V, inclusive, 
including all forts, redoubts, 
batteries, and trenches on this 
line of defense, and to occupy 
the advanced posts at Siaoku- 
shan, Takushan, the Aqueduct, 
Idol Redoubt, Miaoshan, and 

To defend the section from Fort 
No. y to White Wolf, including 
all the forts, redoubts, batteries, 
and trenches on this line of de- 
fense, and to occupy the ad- 
vanced posts on Division Hill, 
20.3-Meter Hill, 174-Meter Hill, 
and Liaoteshan. 



3. General Ivkservk. 

(Major (Joiiornl Fock.) 

l.Jtli and 14tli East Siberian 

liitles, G battalions. 
4tli Reserve Battalion. 
7th East SibiTJaii Artillery I>i- 

visioii, 1<> t;uns. 
4th East Sii)c'riau Artillery Bri- 

^^adc, s mins. 
Kiianj;tun,sj; Sapper Coniiiaiiy. 
4th Sotnia of the First Verkhnen- 
dinsk Cossack Resiment. 

Total, 7i battalions, 24 
guns, and 1 sotnia. . 

To occniiy Old City and New City : 
In tlie Old City: tlic 1411i East 
Siberian Rifle ReKiiueiit and 2 
italteries of the 7th East Sibe- 
liaii Artillery Division near the 
barracks of t^ie 10th Kej,'iineiit. 
In tlie New City: the i:]th East 
Siberian Ritle RefjinuMit, tlie 
Itli Reserv(> Battalion, and 1 
battery of the 4th East Siberian 
Artillery Iirij,'ade near the bar- 
racks of the 11th Regiment. 
The sapper company will be dis- 
tributed along the entire line of 

To defend the Central Enceinte 
from Redoubt No. 1 to the 
railway station. 

4. Central Enceinte. 
t Lieutenant Colonel DuA'ernois.) 
12 comi>anies of volunteers. 
Port Arthur Foot Company. 
Detachments of the 9th and 10th 
East Siberian Rifles, 1 company. 
Total, 14 companies. 

."). Reports will be sent to fortress headquarters. 

The small reserve was divided into two parts, so that there 
was one regiment each in the old and new cities, at a distance 
of G miles from each other. The line of forts was likewise 
weakly occupied. Thus, on General Gorbatovski's section, 
]:>etween Cross Hill (B. Xo. 19) and Fort No. V, after de- 
tailing twelve companies to garrison Taktishan, Siao- 
kushan, the Aqueduct position, Idol Redoubt, and Pach- 
lunshan, and one company each to seventeen forts and re- 
doubts, onl}^ thirty-six companies remained for the defense of 
8 miles of interval, which gave four and one-half companies 
per mile, without local reserves. 

AVhen active operations began, the disposition of the troops 
was immediately changed, as it was found that four and 
one-half companies per mile of interval were utterly insuffi- 
cient. The Thirteenth Regiment reenforced the interval 
between Forts Xos. II and III, and part of the Twenty- 
eighth Regiment the interval between Forts Nos. T and TI. 
When it became evident that the main attack would be made 


against the interval between Forts Nos. II and III, one bat- 
talion of the Fourteenth Regiment reenforced the Twenty- 

On the fourth day of the bombardment, there remained 
in the fortress only two battalions of the reserve. About 
noon it was found that a break might be made in the 
interval, and 1,500 men were taken from the vessels and 
formed into a naval brigade. This force w'as sufficient to 
hold the line, but it was not strong enough to retake the re- 
doubts. It now became evident that the garrison was hardly 
adequate to hold the fortress and far too small to keep the 
advanced positions and even two fortifications in the center 
of the interval. 

At the beginning of the attacks two battalions each of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth regiments and two companies 
each from the Fifteenth and Sixteenth regiments, in all five 
battalions, or twenty companies, were concentrated to defend 
\\ miles of interval — or about fifteen companies per mile.'' 
Seven companies formed a local reserve for the entire front 
of 1 miles. This garrison was sufficient for passive defense, 
but it was necessary to desist from sorties in masses. The _ 

/ ararrison melted like wax from constant losses and bv Novem- 

/ c> - — -^ 

ber very few companies had more than 60 or TO men. Unm- 
' \ terrupted work exhausted the men and bred disease. It w^as 
7 impossible to relieve the men at the front to let them rest, 
I which had fatal consequences, as exhaustion brought aBbut 
(jloss of spirit and the thought of surrender. 

Toward the end of the siege there remained about 5,000 
men in good health in the fortress and only about 12,000 men 
fit for fighting. The number of men put hors de combat was 
20.000, more than twice the normal garrison of 11,300 men." 
One of the main causes of the failure of the defense is to 
be found in the inadequate garrison during the latter part 
of the siege and the complete exhaustion of the men. 

Hence we come to the conclusion that one of the most im- 
portant requirements for the successful defense of a for- 

"At tlie same time attacks were made against the west front, 
and it was tlierefore impossible to weaken tlie garrison there. 

* The company at that time connted from 120 to 150 bayonets. 

'^ Twelve thousand liilled and 14,000 sick and wounded in the hos- 


tress is that the garrison bo larcre enou*]:h so that a relief 
may rest occasionally for a short interval. 

How large must the garrison of a modern fortress be 
under these circumstances? To answer this (|ues(ion ;i> 
fully as possible we shall divide the entire garrison into 
its component parts, according to tlie arms of the service, 
and we shall be guided by experience gained at Port 


This arm was the most numerous. It consisted of nine regi- 
ments of rifles, three reserve battalions, two companies of 
frontier guards, one mixed company of rifles, the Kuangtung 
Xaval Brigade, and a landing force from the ships. In 
the beginning of the siege the entire infantry force amounted 
to 29,000 men. The number gradually decreased to 17,000 on 
November 15. During November the fortress withstood 
a series of assaults, and the garrison was still able to struggle 
on with success. By December 15 it was seen than it was 
impossible to continue to hold 203-Meter Hill for want of 
men. Only 13,897 men remained, a minimum number for 
the defense of the line of forts. AVe shall take this number as 
a basis to determine the necessary strength of the garrison. 

Taking the official disposition of tlie troops, we find that 
4,755 men were concentrated along the assailed front of 2?^ 
miles, and 7,730 men on the unassailed front of 10;^ miles. 

The reserve of the attacked front consisted of 40G men: 
the reserve of the unattacked front of 496 men, and the gen- 
eral reserve of 510 men. 

Consequently there were 2,038 men per mile on the at- 
tacked front, or 1.16 per yard. 

On the unattacked fronts there were 725 men per mile, or 
0.41 man per yard. 

Duty was performed as follows: 

One-third of the men Avere on duty, one-third were repair- 
ing damages, and the remainder were divided into two sec- 
tions, one of which rested without undressing while the other 
rested undressed. 

Half of the reserve was detailed every night for urgent 
work. Thus the men at the front slept every third day and 
the men of the reserve every other day. But as a night sel- 

444<;i— OS 9 



dom passed without an alarm, it was impossible to sleep 
throughout the entire night. This told both on the plivsical 
and mental condition of the troops, and it was clearly^ seen 
that for further stubborn defense doul)le the number of men 
\ was necessary in order to give the relief a complete rest. 

Taking the figures just deduced and assuming the radius 
of a fortress to be G miles, let us now compute the required 
strength of the garrison. The .circumference of the fortress 
will be 37§ miles, the number of forts 23, and hrimbef of in- 
termediate redoubts 23. Let us assume that the attack is di- 
rected against 3 forts, 2 redoubts, and 2 intervals, the total 
extent being 2f miles. 

There would be 1.16 men per yard on the attacked front 
and 0.41 man on the unattacked fronts. Consequently we 
will have in our example: 1, on the attacked front, 5,000 
men; 2, on the unattacked front, 20,800 men; total, 25,800 

To afford rest to the men it is necessary to double this num- 
ber, and we therefore obtain 25,800X2 = 51,600 men. 

We have seen how insignificant were the general and local 
reserves, which consisted of less than one-tenth of the entire 
force. In consequence of this in December it was impos- 
sible to support the positions energetically when assaults 
were directed against them, and they had to be evacuated. 
This demonstrates the necessity of having a reserve of at least 
one-fourth of the force on the fighting line — that is, one- 
fourth of 51,600, or 12,900 men. 

We thus obtain a total of 51,600+12,900=64,500 men. But 
during the five months of the siege the infantry garrison 
incurred a loss of more than 50 per cent, as it numbered 
29,000 men at the beginning of the siege and only 13,897 in 
November. Having computed the garrison necessary at 
the end of the fifth month, without taking account of losses, 
we must double the figure obtained and we thus arrive at the 
required strength of the garrison — 64,500X2=129,000 men. 

This is not an overestimate. Such great numbers are 
required on account of the great losses in modern fortress 
warfare and the necessity for rest, without which a stubborn 

"The author's figures all through this calculation are very rough, 
his approximations reducing the total from 30,5r)S to that given. 
25,800.— Tr. 



resistance is impossible. AVe arc conviiiccd of this hv the 
followino; plan for the disposition of such :i «r:nri<f)n at I he 
he^innino- of the siege: 

(Jarrison for 2.3 forts, 400 mcu ciicli. .iiid l'.". r('il(iiil)ts, L'oo 

iiKMi each ., „ 14.0(K> 

(iarrison for the intervals of tlio attacked front .5, 0<)0 

(larrison foi- tlu' intervals of tiio nnattackcd fi-ont 20,800 

Local reserves 12, flOO 

General reserves 70, 300 


Aftei' ii\-e months' siege with .")() pei- cent of losses: 

Garrison of forts necessarily the same 14,000 

Garrison of the intervals of the attacked front _ ."». 000 

(Jarrison of the intervals of the miattacked front 20,800 

Local reserves 12, 000 

General reserve 11, 800 

Losses 04. ."jOO 

120, 000 

The general reserve is snch that a relief can be given only 
every third day. Hence after one or two months this reserve 
will have melted away and then there will be no rest what- 
ever. We do not increase the number, however, as having 
had a rest every second day at the beginning of the siege and 
every third day later on, the garrison would be al^le to hold 
out three months even under the conditions at Port Arthur. 
But it is clear that 129.000 is not an overestimate, but rather 
an underestimate. 

Let us see now how the construction of a parapet between 
the forts would atfect the infantry garrison. For the de- 
fense of permanent works fewer troops suffice than for a 
combat in the open. Hence the construction of a para]jet 
permits a decrease in the garrison. To develop sufficient 
fire, it would not be necessary to detail more than 0.642 men 
per yard of the attacked front and 0.214 men per yard of the 
unattacked fronts. We thus obtain : 

1.760X0.642X 2§= 3,rMX)inenl 

1.700X .214X.35 =1.3.000 men P^^^^'' ^^^"^'^^ '"^"• 

This number must be doubled to aft'ord rest for the men: 
hence IH.OOOX 2= 82,000 men. 



The reserve may be decreased, as the ditches are obstacles 
against assault. Hence we will take the reserve at one-fifth, 
or G,400 men. 32,000 -f 0,400=38,400 men. Donblinir this 
number in view of losses, we see that the infantry garrison 
should number 76,800 men. 

If we distribute this garrison on the positions according to 
the above-mentioned plans, Ave shall have — 

At the beginning of the siege : 

Garrison of the forts :; 14, OCMJ 

Garrison of the intervals of tlie attaclved front 3,000 

Garrison of the intervals of the unattackecl fronts 1.3,000 

Local reserves G, 400 

General reserve , 40, 400 

7(1 800 
After five months' siege : 

Garrison of the forts 14, 0(tO 

Garrison of the intervals of the attacked front 3,000 

Garrison of the intervals of the nnattacked fronts 13,000 

Local reserves G, 400 

General reserves 2, 000 

Losses - 38, 400 

76, SOO 

The general reserve of 2,000 men does not allow the men on 
duty to be relieved. Hence in order to have a rest at least 
every third day it is necessary to add at least 3,000 or 4,000 
men. The infantry garrison should therefore number about 
80,000 men. Thus permanent works in the intervals will 
enable us to decrease the garrison by about 50.000 men. 


The siege of Port Arthur has shown the necessity of the 
following engineer troops : 

1. At each fort and at each intermediate redoubt, one 
section of sappers with two officers to repair damages, and 
at attacked forts, in addition to the preceding, one platoon 
of miners w^ith four officers for mining work. 

2. On nnattacked fronts, one section per interval to repair 

3. On attacked fronts, one section per interval to repair 


4. At the ivsorvo of the altMckod fi'ont : 

a. One platoon per interval for emergency work. 

h. One eonipany for eonntei'-approarh work. 

c. Three platoons of miners. 

Applying- these rules to our fortress, we would require: 

1. At the 'l-\ forts, '28 sections. 

2. For unattacked intervals. 21 sections. 

3. For attacked intervals: 

id) Sections 2 

(h) Platoons (reserve) 2 

(c) Companies (reserve) .2 

Total nunilier of sapper sections 46 

Platoons 2 

Companies 2 

Total of sapper comi)aiiles S 

Miners for 3 forts — platoons 3 

Miners for 2 intermediate redoubts — platoons 2 

Reserve — platoons 3 

Total miners — platoons " 8 

ov 2 companies. 

Increasing the number of sappers 25 per cent in view of 
losses and for unforeseen work (second line of defense, roads, 
etc.), we find that ten companies or two and one-half battal- 
ions are required. 

There Avill be about 130 miles of railway for the operation 
of which not less than one battalion of the railway troops will 
be necessary. One battalion of telegraph troops and a balloon 
section for three stations will also be required. 


° ^%e-R«sslan sappei'-compa ny oonsi stsJu-K-ar of i oflicers and 251 J 
men. Aj_)!atoou is understood to be i of a company and a section A a C_ U^ 
platoon. With this assumption, the total number of sapper companies [ 
in the table.,should_be_Sa. — Tr. j 


(See Plates Y, YI, and YII.) 



A fort, as a point of support, must fulfill the following- 
requirements : 

1. That all attacks upon it be rendered as difficult as 

2. That it be able, unaided, to repulse attacks upon it. 

3. That it be able to defend the intervals to the right and 
left of it. 

Unless a fort fulfills these three requirements, it can not 
be considered as a useful factor in the defense. 

Forts are now built of such strength that open assault is 
a hopeless undertaking. Hence we are led to believe that 
the enemy will not attempt to storm them but will attack 
the intervals between them. Such was the course pursued 
by the Japanese at Port Arthur. The intervals must there- 
fore be strengthened, and there are many who advocate per- 
manent fortification for them. If this be adopted, if the 
fire of rear caponiers be widely utilized, as well as the flank- 
ing fire from the forts, the capture of an interval will become 
a most difficult feat, and it will probably lead the enemy to 
attack the fort instead of the interval. 

" This chapter is talien from my essay " Notes on fortification from 
the siege of Port Arthur," written in the fortress and publlslied in 
No. of the Engineering Journal for 1005. The essay is here revised 
and amplified. 


In former times the attack was first directed against tin- 
salient anfrles; bastions were constructed and the attack was 
directed against the curtain; ditches were dug in tVoiit of 
the curtain and the attack was directed against the bastions. 

Forts are rightly called '" points of support," IxH-ause 
sorties, advances, and other operations can not be made with- 
out their assistance. 

The fall of a redoubt in an interval does not involve the 
fall of an important part of the Uiain lighting ])ositioM. 
It is otherwise when a fort is taken. Port Arthur affords 
excellent examples of the two cases. In August — that is. at 
the very beginning of the siege — the Japanese took Fortifi- 
cations Nos. I and II in the interval between Forts Nos, II 
and III. This was, indeed, a great misfortune to us. but. 
nevertheless, the remaining part of the position held out 
four months, with the assistance of the Chinese wall. On 
December 28 Fort No. Ill was taken, and on the very night 
l)art of the position was evacuated by ns. When, three days 
later. Redoubt No. 3 was taken (a fort, in reality), the entire 
position had to be abandoned, and we had to go to the sec- 
ond line of defense. 

The permanent fortification of the intervals decreases the 
importance of the forts to a certain extent, for it is quite 
possible that with a permanent parapet it would not be 
necessary to evacuate the line after the fall of a fort. But 
even with permanent parapets, forts will play a very impor- 
tant part in the defense as a protection for the parapet, for 
until the forts are taken it will be very difficult to reach the 

We therefore believe that permanent parapets in the inter- 
vals between forts will change the point of attack from the 
interval to the fort. Hence it will be necessary with per- 
manent parai:>ets to strengthen the forts further in order that 
they may be able to meet fully the three requirements of 
a fort. 

In order to render the attack upon a fort as difficult as 
possible, and to enable it to resist attacks unaided, it should 
have — 

1. Effective obstacles against assault that can be well 
covered with fire. 


2. Outworks to cover the approaches, so constructed that 
it should 1)6 impossible to destroy them by bombardment or 
by progressive attacks. 

3. Bombproof shelters sufficient for the garrison and for 
the counter-assault guns. 

The third condition demands the construction in a fort of 
shelters for observation not only to the front, but also to 
the flanks of the fort, and for uninterrupted artillery and 
infantry support of the neighboring intervals and redoubts, 
even under the hottest fire. For artiller}' such shelter is 
already provided in the shape of rear caponiers, but armored 
turrets for observation and firing galleries for the infantry 
must be provided. 

I do not understand why we construct sheltered caponiers 
for the guns and allow the infantry to fire without cover. 
Is it possible that fragments of projectiles and shrapnel are 
found to be less dangerous for infantry than for guns? Is 
the disabling of one gun more important than that of ten 
infantrymen? Is it the intention to give preference to ar- 
tillery defense over infantry defense? We certainly think 
not. It is unwise to exalt either the gun or the rifle at the 
expense of the other. Success is to be attained by the wise 
cooperation of the two principal weapons of defense — the 
rifle and the gun. 

The erection of rear caponiers for the guns in the forts 
marked an epoch in fortress warfare. Add sheltered gal- 
leries for the infantry and machine guns and you will make 
the fort impregnable. 

As a point of support, to guard the interval and prevent 
it from being taken, the fort must be supplied with a proper 
garrison and armament to fulfill its purpose. The artillery 
duel therefore no longer forms a pai't of its role, and guns 
of large caliber to oppose the batteries of the enemy are un- 
necessary. To mount large-caliber guns in it and to enter 
into combat with the siege batteries will invite the enemy's 
fire and subject it to all the disagreeable consequences. At_ 
/Port Arthur large caliber guns were placed in all the forts, 
/ and they took part in firing against the siege batteries. 
.Jk ) In answering them, the artillery of fTie attack fulfilled three 
Cf^^' ( objects at the same time: It fired at a battery, it damaged 
^ ^ a fort, and it caused great losse s, in the infa ntry garrison. 



In order to destroy a l)atlery, the <>iiiis luiist he striicU. for 
Avliich a lar^e iiuinher of projectiles is necessary. When 
several thousand projectiles are fired at a fort containin^f a 
battery, only a few hit the battery. The greater miinix'i- fall 
on the i:)ai-apets and into the parade, causinjj: damage and 
loss of life. The battery can continue its work by replacing 
damaged guns, but the damage done to the fort, though it 
may in great measure be repaired during the night, in- 
creases all the time, ai:d the fort may be brought to such a 
state that at the moment of the assault it will no longer be 
in a conditicm to fulfill its function. To bring about this 
end is the aim of the attack. Why play into the enemy's 

If a large caliber battery has not been placed in a fort, but 
outside of it, the enemy will have to divide his fire and direct 
part of it against the fort and part against the battery. The 
number of projectiles falling in the fort will l)e snuiller, and 
the damage and losses will be less. 

To keep the fort intact until the assault is the great ob- 
ject of the defense. Now if the fort begins to show its hand 
before the proper time by firing, for example, at moving 
trains, it will immediately draw the enemy's fire. It would 
appear, therefore, that reconnoitering guns should not be 
mounted in forts. Such guns may well be placed in the 
vicinity of the fort, wdiere they can fulfill their function with 
success. They are much safer outside the fort than within, 
because they may be better concealed, and safety lies in con- 
cealment. That such is really the case is shown by telephone 
message No. 2, sent only four hours after the beginning of 
the first bombardment, which says : '' At Fort No. Ill all the 
large guns are damaged." 

In order to come to a conclusion as to the changes which 
are desirable in our forts, w^e shall uoav describe one of the 
Port Arthur forts and invite attention to defects which be- 
came evident during the siege." 

«The appended sketch of Fort No. Ill, brouglit from Port Arthur, 
has no notes on it. The lack of a full sketch does not allow us to cor- 
rect this defect, iloreover, as may be seen from the description, the 
true condition of the fort in detail does liot correspond with the 

136 FORT NO. III. 

Fort No. Ill was built on the summit of a hill at the end 
of a spur projectin<i: almost perpendicularly from Dragon 
Kidge. The summit of this hill is separated from the ridge 
by a small saddleback. It pi-esented an area sufficient for 
the construction of the entire fort. However, probably on 
account of the desire to improve the condition for firing 
against the front sloi)es of the hill, the fort was placed some- 
what to the rear, and hence part of the gorge ditch had to be 
made in a fill. 

The fort consisted of a front face, two flanks, and a gorge, 
which was somewhat broken in the center. The front ditch, 
28 feet wide and 21 feet deep, was cut entirely through solid 
rock, its sides being almost vertical, but the flank ditches 
were unfinished. They were deep at the angles of the front 
face, but reached the ground level in the gorge, having at the 
gorge angles a depth of only G feet. The gorge ditch Avas 
21 feet deep at its middle part, but was shallow at the angles. 

The ditches were defended from casemates in the counter- 
scarp in the angles of the front face. In the right angle were 
two casemates with embrasures on different levels, because the 
bottom of the flank ditch was 7 feet lower than the bottom of 
the front ditch. Access to these casemates was gained 
through the postern. It was the intention to construct a gal- 
lery from the center of the postern to the left casemate, but 
work had only commenced upon it at the beginning of the 
siege and the only communication with the left casemate was 
through the left flank ditch. 

The postern ended in the parade in a bombproof casemate 
consisting of two parts, one designed for use as a magazine, 
the other as a shelter for the counter-assault guns. 

This shelter was separated from the ditch by the main 
rampart 35 feet thick. This rampart consisted of the natural 
solid rock, which was covered with 2 or 3 feet of earth 
during mobilization. In the center of the parade, adjoining 
its flank, were concrete emplacements for four 6-inch guns. 
In order to fire over the front rampart an elevated position 
was necessary, and the emplacements were therefore placed 
on the summit of the hill. The battery parapet consisted of 
solid rock, which was covered during mobilization with earth. 
The front rampart of the fort should have been lowered. 
This, however, had not been done when war broke out and 

FORT NO. III. 137 

it was impossible to do so (Iiiiin<2- iho pcM'iod of iiiol.iliza- 
tion, as stones and <>:ravel, du*;- out of tlu> front ditch, had 
been thrown out foi-ward, and, thus increasin<_r the hci^dit 
of the glacis, had made at the same time a dead area 
ill front to a distance of [.'200 ])aces from tlie fort. Hence, 
only the <.daeis and the a])proaclies Ix'vond l.iiOO ])ac('s couhl 
be fired upon from the infantry breastworks. To haxc cut 
down the ram])arts would liave inci'eased the dead aj-ea in 
front of the fort. 

It was considered advisable to leave the rampart as it 
was for covering the glacis and to cut down the glacis as 
much as possible and i:)lace entrenchments at its base to cover 
the dead area in front. To enable the infantry to remain at 
their breastworks when the battery was fii-ing a small ditch 
was cut in the rock, which enabled the men to lire in a 
sitting position. 

The gorge was immediately in rear of the ])attery, a case- 
mate for the garrison being under the gorge parapet. This 
casemate was finished and consisted of a long corridor 9 
feet wide and 12 feet high. It had windows 2 feet 4 inches 
by 3 feet (> inches which looked into the gorge ditch. There 
was one exit into the parade through the postern, covered 
by a grating. The casemate was parallel to the front face 
and its exit could be covered with fire from the right and 
left. The exit was protected by thick traverses on both sides. 
The gorge parapet was erected during mobilization, and, in 
order to complete the work more rapidly, its inner face was 
revetted with cement barrels filled with stones. In the 
gorge ditch the gorge caponier adjoined the casemate. 
Through the upper part of the caponier there was an open- 
ing affording communication from the interior of the fort 
to the rear by means of a small bridge thrown across the 
ditch. This upper part of the caponier was arranged for 
flanking the approaches on the left to Redoubt No. 3 and on 
the right to Fortification No. 2, and for this reason the 
entire platform of the caponier w^as surounded by i^arapets 
3 feet high. 

The left flank of the fort w^as clearly visible from the 
summit of Takushan. AVlien the enemy occui)ied this hill 
he could count men standing on the banquette of this face. 
It was necessary to i)rovide cover, therefore, and having in- 

138 FORT NO, III. 

creased the width of the banquette, a rear traverse \yas erected 
along the entire flank. On the right flank, which was en- 
filaded from Fenghnangshan, transverse traverses "were con- 
structed at intervals of 14 feet. Along the entire firing line 
embrasures of sand bags were constructed. After the batth^ 
of Xanshan, in which the advantage of light shelters against 
shrapnel was demonstrated, we began to construct such 
shelters in the forts. Orders w^ere therefore given to cover 
the interval between the breastwork on the left flank and 
the rear traverse with boards and a layer of earth 2 feet 
thick and the intervals in a similar way on the right flank. 
Thus a kind of gallery was constructed on each flank. 

The following measures were taken to destroy the dead 
area surrounding the fort : 

1. The glacis was cut down on the right and in front. 

2. A trench was dug in front at the base of the glacis. 

3. A trench w^as begun on the glacis along the entire left 

The glacis was cut dow'n on the right flank, which per- 
mitted the bottom of the ravine to be covered by the fire from 
the breastworks on this flank. It was impossible to cut off 
the entire glacis from the front face, and only part of it was 
removed. The base was surrounded by a heavy intrench- 
ment. The right of this intrenchment ran close to the ditch 
above the casemate, while the left ran along the entire left 
flank to the Chinese wall. Only thus was it possible to cover 
the approaches nearest to the fort. At each of the four salient 
angles of the forts were barbettes, each barbette mounting 
two counter-assault guns. However, there was a shelter for 
tw^o guns only. The exit from this shelter to the right bar- 
bette, which was covered by a grating, could be enfiladed at 
right angles from the right. The possibility of this struck 
the commander before the beginning of the siege, and he had 
it covered by a traverse made of sand bags. 

The exit toward the left barbette was 12 feet below the 
platform of the barbette, and the ramp to the barbette was 
very steep. Drills in the middle of June, before the begin- 
ing of the siege, showed that it would be very difficult to run 
the gun from the shelter to the barbette. Consequently, 
taking advantage of the abrupt rocky face of the banquette 

FORT NO. III. i;^{> 

slope, a platform was made and the coiinter-assaiilt <.niii was 
kept here luujer cover of the I'oclv. 

Tlie <>-or<2:e was almost on a level with the front face, hut 
the rear part of the parade, between the }x<n-*^v and the hat- 
ter}', was from 2 to 3^ feet higher than the fi'ont |)ai'( he- 
tween the breastwork and the battery. Hence rain watei- 
from the entire ])arade ran to the front, and, havini; no 
ontlet, flowed through the shelter and thence through the 
postern to the casemate and inundated the lower storj' and 
drove the inmates into the ditch through the narrow em- 
brasures. The ti'ouble was serious. The casemate was built 
for one company on a jieace footing. The company on 
a war footing had not sufficient room and occupied the 
shelters and the postern. There were no shelters for the 
officers, no storerooms, no kitchen. The officers were, there- 
fore, quartered in the flanking casemates and the magazine.. 
In the covered passage to the casemate barrels with water and 
the tAvo remaining counter-assault guns were placed. Here 
also tlie storeroom for mines and hand grenades was estab- 
lished, and one corner of the casemate was partitioned off for 
a kitchen. 

When the garrison was increased in view of the impend- 
ing attack a row of sleeping shelves was added. The over- 
crowding and the closeness of the atmosphere were terrible. 
The casemate was without means of ventilation and was 
lighted by kerosene lamps, which produced soot and stench 
and thus aggravated the conditions. There were no latrines 
near the casemate, and the gorge ditch of the caponier, at 
the end where no firing was taking place at the time, was 
used by the men. There was an exit from the casemate into 
the ditch in the direction of Fortification No. 2, but there 
was no exit to the rear from the ditch. We felt grateful 
toward the Japanese when they made a breach in the gorge 
counterscarp and thus transformed it into a convenient exit. 
A telephone was established in the casemate, connected by 
an overhead line with the headquarters of the section and 
with the general line. Such was the condition of the fort 
at the beginning of the siege. It held out for five months 
and suffered assaults and all the consequences of progressive 


The following discussion and conclusions are based upon 
experience gained at this fort. 


As soon as the first bombardment began at G a. m. on Au- 
gust 19, the 6-inch battery in the fort began to reply. Its 
open and elevated situation, its well-defined position in the 
center of the fort, and its visibility from afar soon brought 
about such a condition that General Gorbatovski, command- 
ing the east front, telephoned at 10 a. m. to the commandant, 
"All the guns in Fort No. Ill are damaged.'' The battery 
was silenced, but the enemy continued to bombard it. 
Grenades and shell were fired alternately with shrapnel. It 
was evident that the enemy had decided not only to prevent 
the battery from opening fire again but to destroy it. 

The Japanese fired very accurately, and seldom, indeed, 
Avas a bad shot observed from the fort. Eveiy shot which 
fell short hit either the scarp, the parapet, or the parade, 
destrojdng embrasures and screens and wounding and 
killing the men. Every shot which went over was caught 
by the gorge. When a projectile hit a barrel the stones 
which filled it flew in all directions like the spray of a 
fountain. It was seen at once what harm may be done to a 
fort by having a silent battery in it serving as a target. We 
now came to the conclusion that the mounting of large cali- 
ber guns in a fort for use against the siege guns of the enemy 
is a fatal error. 

The guns which were damaged during the first bombard- 
ment were re[)aired and the battery continued in service until 
the end. Often when a moving target w^as seen at a distance, 
as, for example, a train, cavalry, or an infantry column, 
the battery was ordered to open fire against it. But as soon 
as the muzzles of our guns were elevated the enemy saAV 
them, and by the time we had fired a few shots he had an- 
swered with an overwhelming fire. The battery was quickly 
silenced, not only without having injured its target, but with- 
out having found the range. This led to the conclusion that 
reconnoitering guns should not be mounted in forts, and 
when mounted elsewhere should use indirect fire. Indirect 
fire is slow and ineffective only when there has been a lack of 
practice in time of peace. If the personnel has been prop- 


erly trained, it may be used with oivat eU'ecl. just as tliou-rli 
the target were well in view from the guns. 

The first desirable change is the removal of large calibei- 
guns from the forts. 


^^'e have already stated in Chapter I\' that when the Ja[)a- 
uese columns advanced to storm the fortress none of the forts 
discovered the movement in time. It has also been stated 
that the garrison of Fort No. Ill did not know when an 
adjacent fortification was taken and gave it no sui)])ort. 
Fort Xo. II, which attempted to assist the fortification, soon 
had 310 out of 350 of its garrison disabled, and its five 
guns and two machine guns damaged. In the same chapter 
we also stated our second conclusioiij to wit, the necessity, in 
forts, of turrets for observation, concrete galleries for the 
infantry, and machine guns and concrete caponiers. 


The garrison of the fort was divided into two parts: One 
platoon was placed in the shelter for the counter-assault 
guns, under the front face, and three platoons were placed 
in the gorge casemate. Here also the commandant of the 
fort had his headquarters. The shelter and the casemate 
were connected by telephone, but this connection was soon 
interrupted. The only communication between the separate 
parts of the garrison was across the parade, a distance of 120 

During a bombardment the men on duty had to go to the 
casemate for food and orders, and to the ditch. JMany 
were killed or wounded on the very first day. The sur- 
vivors preferred to suffer hunger, and abstained from going 
to the ditch until the end of the bombardment. Such ab- 
normal conditions lasted during each of the bombardments, 
when the casemate in the gorge and the shelter in the front 
part of the fort became, so to speak, two islands without any 
communication. When the enemy approached and oc- 
cupied the glacis, communication even in time of lulls grcAV 
impossible and a covered passage had to be provided by zig- 
zags through the parade. Shells and mines destroyed tlie 


zigzag every day and it was very difficult to repair and 
deepen it through the rock. 

We now saw the need of a safe covered passage between 
the gorge casemate and the shelter for the men on duty at 
the front face. 


The artillery armanent of the forts, which must consist 
of field guns only, is divided into two parts: The armament 
of the rear caponier, which is used to defend the intervals 
and support the neighboring forts, and the counter-assault 
guns, which are used chiefly to repulse assault against the 
fort and the adjacent works. These guns are supposed to be 
kept in special casemates or shelters until the assault, whence 
they are run to the barbettes when the enemy is near. These 
barbettes are at the salient angles of the fort. 

It has been said that Fort Xo. Ill had l)ut one shelter 
for two guns, erected in the center of the front face. The 
exits were at a distance of 88 feet from the l^arbette. The 
elevation of the barbette platforms above the exits from the 
shelters was 12 feet. This elevation and the great distance 
of the barbettes from the shelters made it very difficult to run 
the guns to the barbettes. In fair weather 10 men Avere 
necessary for this work, and from two to two and one-half 
minutes were required. In rainy weather, from 16 to 20 men 
were necessary and three minutes were required. To remain 
such a length of time under fire meant the loss of all the gun- 
ners. This is why from the very first days of the bombard- 
ment the artillerymen declined to return the guns to the shel- 
ter. The guns were, therefore, left in the open, and the shelter 
was occupied by the infantry. This shelter had another great 
defect. The exit was enfiladed from the direction of Takushan 
and was even visible from its summit. When we saw this we 
screened it with a traverse. On the first day a bomb fell in a 
corner of the exit and another knocked down part of the tra- 
verse, and we hastened to close this exit. There were similar 
hits in other forts, accompanied by casualties. Such exits are 
always filled with men on account of the overcrowding 
and bad air in the casemates and the impossibility of going 
to the parade for a breath of fresh air. Thus 50 men were 


at one time put hors de combat at one of the forts and 7 ai 
another time. Hence ^Ye came to the coiichision tliat tlic 
exits of slielters for counter-assault <^-uns should be as near 
the barbettes as possible and at the smallest possible distance 
beloAY the terreplein of the barbette. 

In the construction of shelters and casemates the following 
rule must be strictly observed : The possibility of the enemy's 
reaching the exits of covered passages by oblique fire must l)e 
carefully considered and these exits must be made absolutely 
safe from all fire. If this rule is not observed, the covered 
jiassage, however useful in itself, will become a death trap. 


We have already said that the armament of a fort should 
be limited to that required to repulse assault and that such 
artillery should not go into action until the enemy is near at 
hand. The guns should open fire at the instant the enemy 
rushes forward in force to the assault, the last shot being fired 
as the mass mounts the breastworks. Thus the time of opera- 
tion for these guns is ver}^ short. In order for them to inflict 
great losses, they must fire many shots in a short time, and 
must perforce be rapid-fire guns. The old field guns, used 
b}' us for this purpose, were unequal to their task. All such 
guns should be replaced by rapid-fire guns. Although they 
are habitually kept in shelters, counter-assault gmis are run 
up to the barbettes for action, and their position in action 
thus soon becomes known to the enemy who will endeavor to 
avoid them. 

The assault on Fort No. Ill on October 29 furnishes an 
excellent example. The Japanese, having occupied and 
crowned the glacis and having taken possession of the coun- 
terscarp galleries, did not storm the front face where we had 
four counter-assault guns, but attacked the left flank of the 
fort notwithstanding the fact that it was supported from 
Redoubt No. 3. 

It is very difficult to change the position of guns at the 
moment of assault, as in storming the breastworks the enemy 
fires at the interior of the fort. It is therefore very desir- 
able to have, in addition to rapid-fire and machine guns for 
use at definite places, some mobile machine guns, which may 
be taken quickly to the breastworks or elsewhere. 
44461— OS 10 



The opinions of defenders of the fortress vary with regard 
to machine guns as weapons to repulse assault. Some main- 
tain that the counter-assault guns should be entirely replaced 
by machine guns, while others hold the opposite view. 
There is no doubt as to the fact that the machine gun is a 
poAverful weapon to repulse assaults, but the weapon opposed 
to it is no less powerful and simple. During the assaults on 
Redoubt No. 3 the Japanese carried along with them bags, 
shields, and breastplates, and, covered by these, crept for- 
ward. The machine gun could do nothing against enemies 
thus j^rotected, while case or shell would have been very 

It would be unwise, we think, to discard the counter- 
assault gun, but when the enemy appears on the breastworks, 
the role of this gun is at an end, at which time the fire of a 
o-reat number of machine guns is decisive. 

Sentinels may be provided with machine guns to great ad- 
vantage, as was demonstrated at Fort No. III. Machine 
/ guns are also excellent for flanking ditches, but their' great - 
est use is in the defense of the intervals. 

The small 37-mm. guns taken from the ships were also very 
effective. The}^ were j)laced on the lateral faces and were 
nsed for firing at single men and groups at ranges of about 
1^ miles. At such ranges rifles and machine guns are inef- 
fective and 3-inch projectiles ought not to be expended for 
such purposes. On the other hand ammunition for 37-mm. 
guns is easily and cheaply supplied, and their fire is effective 
at such ranges. 


The casemate for the garrison was located under the gorge 
rampart. It is difficult to find a better place in a fort, 
as far as security from projectiles is concerned. But such 
casemates as we had at Port Arthur should not be tolerated. 
Except that they Avere secure, nothing good can be said of 
them. They were narrow, small, dark, close, ill ventilated, 
without officers' quarters, storerooms, or latrines, without cov- 
ered passages, either with the front face or to the rear, and 
with oidy one exit into the parade and one into the ditch. 


The unsanitary features caused various diseases; the lack ol" 
officers' quarters compelled the ollicers to occupy the jjassa'^! 
iu the ^orge caponier among the guns; the hick of store- 
rooms forced us to store food supplies, ammunition, hand 
grenades, pyroxilin, and Whitehead torpedijes under ihe 
men's bunks and to till the covered passages with barrels of 
water; the lack of latrines caused great hardship; and the 
want of safe communication with the rear of the fort and 
with the front face caused many useless wounds and deaths. 
The fact that the casemates had but one opening into the 
parade and one into the ditch needs no comment. It was 
responsible for the loss of Kedoubt No. 3 on December ol, 
when one of the exits was closed by the enemy's fire and 
the other Avas closed as the result of an explosion. Thus the 
garrison could not get out to meet the assault; the work 
Avas quickly taken and the garrison made prisoners. 

Some of the engiueers say that this example should not be 
quoted, as the destruction of the exit into the gallery was 
the result of the chance explosion of the small grenades 
stored near the exit. The cause of the explosion is imma- 
terial. The fact remains that the exit w^as blocked and 
there w^as no other, and the redoubt w^as deprived of its 
defenders. Unless these defects are eliminated casemates 
have no right to the name and are only a kind of shelter. 
Casemates should be provided with two covered passages into 
the parade, an underground communication with the shelter 
of the front face and flanks, two open exits into the ditch, 
and one underground passage from the rear of the fort to 
the nearest natural cover. 

"When the enemy is assaulting a fort he attempts not only 
to overwhelm the fort Avith fire, but also to prevent reserves 
from reaching the fort. Hence, Avhen storming columns 
approach, the fire is directed to the center of the fort and to 
its communications wdth the fortress. 

On August 22 General Kondratchenko, while on a rocky 
ridge about 300 paces from Fort No. Ill, sent me a note at 
11 a. m. by his orderly, but the fire against the fort and along 
the road in the rear Avas so fierce that the orderly could not 
reach the fort and brought the note to me only at 4 p. m. No 
supplies could reach the forts during such firing, and Ave 
Avere absolutely cut off from the rest of the troops. Reserves 


sent to the forts never reached them intact. Thus during the 
assauh on Fort No. II, onl}^ a little more than half of the 
reenforcements sent, reached the fort, and a similar fate befell 
the men sent to Fort No. III. 

A covered passage was constructed in October from the 
gorge ditch of Fort No. Ill to the nearest hill and onh^ by 
means of this passage was communication possible with the 
fortress; but water could not be brought to the fort until 
Captain Debroff, of the engineers, laid pipes through this 
passage. The isolated condition of the fort had a most de- 
pressing influence upon the garrison, while the artillery often 
remained without ammunition, the engineers without mate- 
rials, and the entire garrison without bread and water. 

It must be added to this that the only opening into the 
ditch was at that time no longer practicable. Communication 
between the casemate and the covered passage on the other 
side of the gorge ditch was effected by creeping through 
a small window of the casemate. It was then necessary to 
run across the ditch, which was covered by fire from Japanese 
trenches on the glacis of Redoubt No. 3, and climb up the 
destroyed counterscarp to get to Captain Dobroff's passage. 
This illustrates clearly how valuable would have been an 
underground passage under the bottom of the ditch to the 
rear. Having safe communication with the fortress, the 
garrison would not have felt isolated from the reserve, the 
spirits of the men would have been raised, their strength 
revived, and the defense would have been prolonged. 


In order to have the men as near as possible to the firing 
line, the garrison of the fort was divided into two parts; 
three platoons were in the casemate and one occupied the 
magazine and the shelter for the counter-assault ginis. 
Thus the shelter for the guns served also as shelter for the 
platoon on duty. Not having been designed for this purpose, 
however, it had none of the conveniences required for an 
inhabited place — no Avindow, no door, no stoves, no ven- 
tilation, no latrine. It consisted of a dark cell, with one exit 
covered by a grating. At the other end of the shelter was the 
entrance to the flankina" casemate. There was a continual 


draft, which iimdc the hunj)s smoke and hroufrht sickness 
and colds. 

The shelter for the men on duty shoidd he constructed 
especially for the purpose and should fulfill all the re(|uiie- 
meiits for gorge casemates, from whicli it should dill'ei- onlv 
in size. This shelter should l)e ])laced at the middle of t he- 
front face. It should have an exit into the parade and 
should be connected by galleries with the shelter for ilie 
counter-assault guns. In these galleries there should he 
manholes from place to place to enable the men to run 
(juickly from the shelter and climb out upon the infantry 
banquette. In order that these openings should not take up 
any room on the firing line, light slides in grooves should be 
i^rovided to cover them. 

A small cut is made in the concrete j^arapets for the elbow, 
and separate shields against shrapnel and bullets are affixed 
for each man by means of hinges. The shield is kept down 
habitually and is raised during firing, Avhen it is held in 
position b}' a support. The openings from the galleries 
likewise furnish egress into the parade. In order that frag- 
ments of projectiles may not get into these openings, they 
should be closed by sliding doors. The dimensions of the 
galleries are 6 by 2 feet. 


We have alreadj' spoken of the necessity- of turrets for 
double sentinels for observation to the front and flanks. If 
the enemy appears in small numbers, the sentinel on duty 
should be able to drive him back by machine-gun fire. 
When large forces appear the sentinel should immediately 
notify the commandant. He can not leave his post for this 
purpose, nor can he send the other sentinel, as he would 
almost inevitabh" be killed on the wa}'. Great assistance 
may be derived in such cases from the use of telephones con- 
necting the observation stations with the fort, and from 
electric bells connecting the observation stations. As soon 
as a sentinel observes movements of the eneni}" he should be 
able to attract the attention of the other sentinels by means 
of the electric bell and to advise the fort commander by 
telephone. It was our own fault that we failed to utilize 
these simple but very useful aids. At Port Arthur one 


sentinel was stationed on the breastworks under cover of 
traverses to observe through an embrasure, while a second 
sentinel observed the first from a secure place near the case- 
mate, delivered at the casemate information which he re- 
ceived, and reported the fact in case the sentinel was killed 
or wounded. There were instances when both sentinels were 
killed and the fort remained without observers. The enemy 
managed to take advantage of these intervals, even when 
they were very short. To fulfill its purposes, observation 
must be uninterrupted and the results must be reported 
without delay. This necessitates bombproof turrets for the 
sentinels and secure telephonic communications. 

Thus each fort must have its own telephone system. It is 
superfluous to say that this system must be installed in time 
of peace and that it should be absolutely secure from injury. 
Four or five telephones should be placed in the casemate, 
with wires branching off to the posts of observation, the shel- 
ter for the men on duty, and to the rear caponiers. 

Each fort should also be connected by telephone with the 
neighboring forts and with section headquarters. This line 
must also be absolutely secure from injury. 

Fort No. Ill was connected with the fortress by an over- 
head line which was damaged a countless number of times — 
and always at the most important moment — during an 
assault. The fort was also connected with the mining station 
in front by a telephone cable laid underground at a depth 
from 1 to 1^ feet, but the cable refused to work on rainy days 
on account of defective insulation. 


The walls of concrete casemates, shelters for counter-assault 
guns, flanking caponiers, and other casemated buildings of 
forts at Port Arthur were 3 feet thick. They were built to 
resist 6-inch howitzer shells, and they successfully stood the 
test. I had an opportunity upon more than one occasion to 
observe the effect of such hits. In most cases when a 6-inch 
shell hit a wall and exploded, it made a depression 3 or 4 
inches deep, having a diameter of about 1^ feet. In striking 
upon a roof it made a funnel-shaped hole 4 or 5 inches deep 
and about 1| feet in diameter. If a second projectile hit in 


the samo place, it deepened the hole by 1 to li inches, in- 
creased the diameter to -2 feet, and broke otf a piece of con- 
crete on the inside from 1 to U inches thick. There were 
cases where several shells hit in the same place. Each time 
the damage was increased, and after sevei-al hits cracks 
appeared on the inside. The holes made by the projectiles 
on the roof and on the sides were easily repaired duriiiir the 

'J'he greatest damage was done l)y shells hitting the angles 
of buildings. Large pieces of concrete were broken oti", 3^ 
feet long and 1^ to 2 feet wide. It was impossible to cover 
such places with concrete, for, before the concrete had time 
to set it would be broken otf by projectiles striking in the 
same place or at other points. The destruction of concrete 
structures began at the corners and was completed by the 
gradual increase of this damage. A layer of earth of 4|- to 
5 feet entirely secured concrete structures against injurj^ 
from 6-inch howitzer projectiles. 

Matters changed, however, when the 11-inch mortars ap- 
peared on the scene. The projectiles from these mortars 
penetrated roofs 3 feet thick, and there were cases where 
roofs were perforated by these projectiles without their 
exploding. Many engineers attribute this to the bad quality- 
of the concrete. As I did not construct the Port Arthur 
forts and had no occasion to test the concrete used, I can not 
give a positive opinion upon this question. Yet it seems to 
me that such is not the case. If the concrete roofs resisted 
G-inch shells, for which they were built, the concrete must 
have been of good quality. If they could not withstand the 
impact of 11- inch shells which did not explode, this must 
have been due to the lack of thickness of the walls and not 
to the poor quality of the concrete. 

The resistance of concrete is similar to that of armor, 
the thickness of which must be increased with the increase 
of the diameter of the projectile used to attack it. In 
the case under consideration the diameter of the projec- 
tile was almost doubled, and the weight of the bursting 
charge was increased while the thickness of the concrete 
wall remained the same. Naturally the wall must be pene- 
trated. To resist the larger projectile the thickness must be 
increased. How much should it be increased i It woidd 


appear sufficient to double it ; but experience at Port Artliur 
showed that with a thickness of 5 feet and two hits in the 
same place there remained a layer of only about 1^ feet of 
concrete. This layer was not solid and was easily perforated 
by a third projectile. These facts and the possible appear- 
ance of still larger projectiles with greater bursting charges 
lead us to recommend that concrete w^alls be built to resist 
the maximum effect of three 11 -inch projectiles striking in 
the same place. This would require a thickness of 9 feet. 
Such a great thickness may appear unnecessary at first sight, 
but it should not be decreased, because it will not always be 
possible to cover the concrete with earth. 

The influence of a layer of earth in increasing the resist- 
ance to 11-inch projectiles was very great, as may be seen 
from the following examples : 

1. At Fort No. Ill a layer of earth 3 feet thick was placed 
over the concrete traverse of a battery. An 11-inch projectile 
struck it, exploded, and made a hole 9 inches deep in the con- 
crete and a hair crack on the inside of the traverse. 

2. The roof of the postern and the covered passage to the 
casemate consisted of 5 feet of concrete. It was covered 
with a layer of earth 3^ feet thick, over which was a layer of 
gravel and cobblestones 1^ feet thick. This roof was fre- 
quently struck by 11-inch projectiles, which made funnel- 
shaped holes in the top layer only. The concrete remained 
intact until the la^t day of the siege. The holes were quickly 
filled after each hit. Upon one occasion an 11-inch pro- 
jectile struck the roof and was followed by a 6-inch pro- 
jectile in the same place. The concrete did not suffer. 

3. A concrete roof was covered with 5 feet of clay, each 
layer of 1 foot being thoroughly tamped. Several 6-inch 
projectiles struck this roof without affecting the concrete. 

These examples show clearly that a layer of earth not only 
absorbs the force of impact of the projectile, but weakens the 
effect of the explosion. It was also made clear that with a 
thickness of 5 feet of clay the clay did not have a tamping 
effect on the explosion of the shell. Observation on other 
hits in layers of 14 feet of clay did not show any tamping 

Hence it would appear that the proposed thickness of 9 feet 
for concrete walls may be somewhat decreased ; but neverthe- 


less o-reat dano-er is incurred in (lerroasin<r i(. We liavc 
already iiieiuioned in Chapter VT tlial (ici-inaiiy has con- 
structed 12-inch howitzers and another counlrv is re- 
ported to be constructino- iS-inch howitzers. What mon- 
strous bursting charges their i)rojectiles will have I Must we 
not anticipate the progress of artillery? Must we not l)e pre- 
pared to o])pose due resistance to such projectiles? Is it 
not better and cheaper to construct at once than to recon- 
struct, add. and reform later? AVe nuist not forget that the 
Germans say with reference to their howitzers, '' AVir Averden 
alles vertobacken " (AVe will upset everything). They prob- 
ably have good reason to say so. The constrtuction of bomb- 
proof shelters must be based upon definite information. 
AA"e have already made it apparent that sufficient informa- 
tion is available for this purpose. 

It seems strange that the thickness of roofs varies accord- 
ing to the character of the building. Thus the roofs of 
magazines are thicker than the roofs of casemates, which in 
turn are thicker than the roofs of shelters, posterns, and cov- 
ered passages. Are the constructors guided by the size of the 
arch or the importance of the building? The arch depends 
upon the type of the building. There are casemates 18 feet 
wide and other 9 feet wide, the thickness of the roofs 
being the same." As to the relative importance of build- 
ings, I do not understand why a magazine should be more im- 
portant than a casemate, or why a casemate should be more 
important than the postern and covered passages. If the 
roof of the magazine is perforated, several rounds of am- 
munition may be destroyed; if the roof of- the casemate is 
perforated, the greater part, if not the entire garrison, will 
be killed or wounded; if the covered passages be destroyed, 
the garrison will be confined to the casemates, and this may 
happen even with two outlets. 

We do not consider the postern and the covered passages 
as secondary appurtenances to the casemates. They are as 
important as the casemates themselves. The following facts 
should not be forgotten : Each magazine and each casemate 
has a thick covering of earth on top and in rear; the cov- 
ered passages are generall}' near the surface and often have 
no covering of earth, and the layer on the postern grad- 

" Such \A'as the case in many buildings in I'ort Arthur. 


iially decreases as it approaches the covered passages. Tak- 
ing- this into consideration, it Avoidd appear more rational to 
increase the thickness of the walls of the postern rather than 
to decrease it. The walls of shelters for counter-assault guns 
and rear caponiers should also be made thicker. We believe 
that the successful defense of the intervals and of the forts 
rests with the artillery and the infantry. Should we, in 
order to save a thousand roubles, decrease the thickness of 
walls b}^ 1 to li feet and risk the loss of the garrison? 

We conclude that the so-called bombproof shelters in forts 
should be bombproof in fact ; that they are all of equal im- 
portance ; that no one should be made strong at the expense of 
the others; and that therefore the thickness of their walls 
should be everywhere the same. In order that the:se w^alls 
meet not only present requirements, but afford adequate pro- 
tection ten years hence, they should be at least 9 feet thick. 


It has been said at the beginning of this chapter that in 
order that a fort may be capable of fulfilling its role as a 
point of support, it should have sufficiently strong obstacles 
against assault. The siege of Port Arthur showed clearly 
that the best obstacles, the most difficult to surmount, are 
deep, wide ditches with abrupt sides. If such ditches have 
a flanking defense, it will be so difficult to cross them that 
the enemy will scarcely attempt it. The Japanese did not 
attempt to cross them. 

On August 21 everything was ready to assault Fort No. 
II. The ladders, anchors, etc., were prepared, and three 
regiments with these accessories were hid in the dead area 
at the foot of the glacis. The commander of the Twenty- 
sixth Regiment reported this fact to the commandant of the 
fortress. Only 40 defenders remained in the fort. The 
Japanese would not risk an assault during dajdight and 
awaited darkness. But they did not assault at night and 
retired at 8 p. m., leaving their ladders behind. According to 
rejiort, they retreated because they had received information 
through their scouts that there were caponiers in the ditch. 
We believe this explanation, as the operation could not have 
been a demonstration, for the preparations for assault were 
too oreat. 


Tho Japanoso oxplaiii llioir rctiral In- allcfrin^- that tlicii' 
ladders were (oo sliort to span the ditch. Thoe ladders were 
21 feet long, widie the ditch was 28 feet wide. I'.nt thev 
were long enough to reach the bottom of the ditch, whicji Ma> 
onl}^ I7i feet deep. The Japanese did net dare do this, hut 
preferred to spend two months on progressive attacks in 
order to be able to destroy the flanking capoiders and take 
possession of the ditch. It would appear that with the 
caponiers destroyed and the counterscarp surmounted there 
remained but a trifle to be done to scale the scarp and take 
the fort. But the rocky scarp served its purpose. Repeated 
efforts to reach the breastworks by means of the ladders 
placed against the scarp met with failure, and the Japanese 
had to spend two months more in mining through solid it)ck 
to complete the passage of the ditch. The difficnlty of crossing / 
a ditch was shown when the .Taiwanese in storming Aqueduct/ 
Redoubt reached the ditch, which was neither deep nor 
covered by fire, but could not scale the earthen scarp and 
were repidsed in the night by sixteen of the relief on duty. 

These facts speak in favor of ditches, and it is evident 
that the wider and deeper the ditch, and the steeper its sides, 
the more serious will such an obstacle be to the storming 
party. Hence we believe that modern (jerman fortresses 
with small triangular ditches and sloping scarps Avould not 
be capable of offering formidable resistance. 

By chance Fort No. Ill had very nearly vertical scarps 
and counterscarps almost as steep, thanks to the solid rock. 
In most of the European fortresses the concrete counterscarp 
is almost vertical, fences being substituted for the scarps. 
Is this wise? During the first bombardment of Fort Xo. Ill 
we frequently observed the Japanese firing against the scarp 
with 6-inch howitzers. They probably did not know that 
it was a monolith and were trying to destro}^ it. In the 
nnddle of the scarp a small depression had been made, which 
was afterwards filled with earth and stones. JNlany pro- 
jectiles struck here, but during a month they only succeeded 
in breaking the depression down about 2^ feet at the top. 

It seemed to us, then, that if the scarp had consisted of 
earth with a fence it would have been easy to destroy it. 
Each shell would have reduced the slope aiul when the 
counterscarp had fallen into the hands of the Japanese the 


linal destruction of the fence and capture of the fort would 
not have been difficuh. Such ditches would offer only half 
the resistance offered by the ditches at Port Arthur. The 
determination of the best type of scarp is a most important 
problem. In my opinion we should return to the vertical 
concrete scarp. The enemy will endeavor to destroy it by 
curved fire, which it must therefore be constructed to with- 
stand. Economy might be considered by constructing it in 
offsets thick at the top and thin at the bottom. For pro- 
tection against fire the ditch should be limited in width to 
35 feet and the glacis should be as high as possible, or the 
ditch might be dug by offsets, making it deeper at the scarp 
than at the coiniterscarp. Thus the half of the ditch next 
the scarp might be 31^ feet, the other half being only 21 feet. 


One of the most important i)rol>lems raised by the siege 
of Port Arthur is that of flanking ditches. The opinions 
of the defenders of the fortress and of engineers who were 
not at the seat of war vary greatly, and many controversies 
have arisen. Some assert that the counterscarp galleries 
did not fire a single shot and that, in general, the siege has 
]:)roved that such galleries are utterly useless; others assert 
that the siege proved the great importance of these flank- 
ing galleries. ^Mio is right? Should the flanking galler- 
ies be retained, and if retained should they remain unaltered, 
or should they be replaced by the old type of caponiers and 
half-caponiers near the scarp? To solve this mooted ques- 
tion it is necessary to determine what may be expected of the 
different types of flanking defenses and what will be required 
of them. 

It has been stated that the counterscarp galleries of Fort 
No. II played an important role on i\.ugust 22, forcing the 
Japanese to desist from the assault. The same results would 
have been accomplished by caponiers constructed in the 
ditch. The usefulness of the counterscarp galleries was 
not affected by the appearance of 11-inch mortars, but such 
would not have been the case with caponiers in the ditch. 
When we consider the accurate firing of the mortars which 
hit the target at the second shot (a gun at Fort No. Ill and 
a casemate at Fort No. II, on October 1), it is easy to see that 


Ihese half-caponiers would very (|uickly become uiiteiial)!*'. 
AVe had an excellent example in the case of the ^^or^^c 
caponier of Fort Xo. III. It is true that nuich time wm- 
required to silence this caponier, hut exci-y iior^c caponiei- 
is better covered than the caponier at the middle of the 
front face and the half-caponiers on the flanks. The com 
plete security of counterscarp galleries fi-om the effects of 
shell fire is a feature AA^hich should not be overlooked. 
'J'hose who oppose counterscarp galleries nuiintain that the 
Japanese easily took possession of such galleries by explod- 
ing bursting charges over them and that the ditches thus 
remained without defense. 

The fact that these galleries were so easily taken was our 
OAvn fault. Thus, the first damage to the counterscarp gal- 
lery of P'ort Xo. II was not caused by a Japanese shell, as is 
asserted by some, nor Avas it because the rear Avail of the gal- 
lery Avas exposed to vicAv by a small landslip. It Avas the 
result of the explosion of one of our OAvn camoufiets, Avhich 
laid bare the rear Avail." This suggested the idea to. the 
Japanese of leaving their gallery and bloAving in the ex- 
posed gallery from above. 

At the counterscarp galleries of Fort Xo. Ill, conditions 
Avere not better. . It has already been mentioned that there 
Avas a trench at the foot of the glacis of this fort. The right 
flank of this trench near the ditch Avas immecliateh^ above the 
roof of the gallery. After they had taken this trench the 
Japanese AA'ere able to reach the roof of the gallery easil3\ 
About tAvo Aveeks before they took the trench orders had 
been given, in vieAv of the approach of the Japanese to the 
crest of the glacis, to make a countermining galkny from' 
the counterscarp gallery. It must be observed that the coun- 
terscarp gallery had been covered Avith a lav'er of gravel. In 
order to make the mining gallery it Avas necessary to cut a 
hole through the concrete rear Avail and excavate the gallery 
in the gravel. Much graA^el fell into the excaA'ation from' 
aboA^e and Avas carried out. The upper part of the counter- 

" " On the contrary, part of the rear concrete wall of the counter- 
scarp gallery was bare, which betrayed its presence to the Japanese 
and presented a convenient point of attack for further mining wai'- 
fare." The Fight for Port Arthur, appendix to Streffleur's Militiirische 
Zeitschrift, page 149. 


scarp gallery was thus exi)osed to view. Here again we ex- 
posed to the Japanese that which should have been concealed. 

It is true that Ave would have gained only two or three 
nights had this not happened, but it is equally true that little 
energy was displayed in the defense of the galleries. This 
was due in great measure to the fact that little importance 
Avas attached to the galleries Avhen the fort Avas building. 
At the beginning of the siege there Avere no guns in these 
galleries, the 57-mm. guns intended for them haA^ng been 
placed on the Chinese Avail. In order to complete the equip- 
ment of the gallery of Fort No. Ill, we had to beg three 
37-mm. guns from the marines. 

Another example of the contempt in which, the counter- 
scarp galleries Avere held may be found at Redoubt No. Ill, 
where it was preferred to cover them with stones and cement 
rather than to lead out countermines from them. Is there 
any Avonder that the garrisons defended them Aveakly? 

It is alleged that the counterscarp galleries did not fire 
a single shot. This was because they completely fulfilled 
their purpose Avhile they Avere in our hands Avithout being 
required to fire. The enemy feared them and would not ex- 
pose himself to their fire. He decided to take possession of 
them by a slow but sure process, thus preventing them from 
firing, after which he Avould be free to storm the forts. If 
fortress Avarfare be a struggle for time, the "counterscarp 
galleries should be given credit for having kept off the enemy 
for two months and not for having failed to fulfill the end 
for Avhich they were built. 

The counterscarp galleries might certainly have been held 
longer and been more useful to the defense if more care had 
been gi\"en to their construction and if adequate measures 
had been taken for their defense. Little Avas done to fulfill 
these ends. A concrete Avork was sunk into the ground ; the 
men sitting in it could see nothing; the garrison in the fort 
took little thought of it and did little to defend it ; and noAv 
Ave say that counterscarp galleries are Avorthless. Such an 
opinion can be formed only in ignorance by men Avho do not 
comprehend Avhat j-eally took place. The ])r()blem is so simple 
that there should be no ground for contention. It is clear 
that half-caponiers, adjoining the scarp, and head capo- 
niers may be subjected not only to enfilade and curved 
fire, but to direct fire, and may be quickly demolished. It 


is equally clear that fialleries in the counterscarp are jjro- 
tected from fire. The a(lvanta<^e lies on tiie -^i(l«' of the 
counterscarp galler3\ As to the ease Avith wliich counter- 
scarp <>:alleries may be mined, it may be said that, if coun- 
ter mines have to be laid for the defense of counterscarp 
ji:alleries, they must also be laid for the defense of the capo- 
niers, which may be mined almost as easily as the <;alleries. 
It is onl}' necessary to capture the crest of the glacis, sink a 
shaft into the ditcli. and diive a gallery across it. 

For the mining defense of caponiers adjoining the scarp, 
it is necessary to dig a special gallery in the counterscarp. 
For the counterscarp galleries this work is easier, the con- 
struction of a countermining system being simpler and 

AVe therefore come to the conclusion that the defense of 
ditches must remain such as it was at Port Arthur, and that 
in constructing counterscarp galleries, galleries for counter- 
mining should also be constructed. 

The interior dimensions of the connterscarp galleries were 
satisfactory. The front wall, which is not exposed to fire, 
need not be over 3 feet thick, but the thickness of the roof 
and of the rear wall should be increased to 9 feet, as two 
or three men can always creep unnoticed to the counterscarp 
even in the early period of an attack, place a dynamite cart- 
ridge of 50 or 60 pounds over the gallery and explode it. 
With 9 feet of concrete such an explosion will haA^e no effect. 
To bring a larger charge wotdd require such a large detach- 
ment that it would not be able to approach the gallery un- 


A special chapter has been devoted to searchlights. We 
proposed three searchlights for each fort, one lai-ge light in 
the fort itself and two small lights for the rear cajionier. 

It is impossible to specify the exact point at which the 
large searchlight should be placed. This depends in each 
case on the type of the fort and the configuration of the ter- 
rain. The first requirement for the large searchlight is that, 
in lighting the terrain around the fort, it shcmld not illumi- 
nate the fort itself. This end mav l)e attained bv various 


appliances. The second requirement is that ranging by the 
enemy on the searclilight should Ije rendered difficult by 
making it mobile, so that its place may be changed fre- 
quently. The infantry banquette, where it may be covered 
and where its ra3^s do not fall on the fort, appears to be the 
best place for it. 

The location for the dynamo depends upon the location of 
the searchlight. The dynamo may be placed in the shelter 
for the men on duty, or in one of the flanking galleries. It 
is desirable that the illuminated arc be as near 180° as possi- 
ble, so as to be able to light up not only the terrain in front, 
but also the approaches to the adjacent forts. 

The purpose, location, and operation of the searchlights 
for intermediate caponiers have already been discussed in 
Chapter VI, page 111. 

The question of lighting the ditches has raised a contro- 
versy^ among the defenders of Port Arthur like that raised 
by counterscarp galleries. Some hold that the ditches should 
be lighted every night, while others maintain the opposite 
opinion. According to my personal observation this ques- 
tion should be decided as follows : In keeping the ditches 
constantly lighted we provide in a way for their immediate 
security, but we enable all who approach the top of the coun- 
terscarp to observe the ditch easily, and thus assist them to 
reconnoiter it and determine its width and depth, and the 
position of the counterscarp galleries, sentinels, etc. More- 
over, the constant lighting of the ditches discloses the posi- 
tion of the fort from afar, for it is impossible to illuminate 
the ditches so that the enemy can not see the light from a 
great distance. 

From this point of view, the constant lighting of the 
ditches is harmful. On the other hand, it is very desirable 
to be able to illuminate them at the moment the enemy en- 
ters them, so that the garrison can take in the full situation 
and the guns and machine guns operate with effect against 
the ladders and groups of the storming parties. The great 
necessity for this was shown at Fort No. Ill during the Oc- 
tober assaults, when it was necessary to throw into the ditch 
burning sheaves of straw soaked in kerosene. Brilliant 
ilhmiination at the opportune moment has a great moral 
effect ; it encourages the garrison and spreads panic among 


the assailants. Ditches shouhl therefore he liLf^litod (liiriiM-- 
assaults, hut not constantly. Moreover, the}' shouhl he 
lighted from a counterscarp gallery, and a special enihrasure 
should be made for this purpose. 


Nothing proves better the necessity for the strictest service 
of security in the defense of forts than the history of the 
capture of the counterscari) galleries of Forts Nos. II and 

The fact that the enemy could approach the very top of 
the counterscarp unnoticed and measure the ditch of Fort 
Xo. II and that nobody hindered him from putting bursting 
charges under the walls of the flanking casemates of the tAvo 
forts and exploding them (this was done twice at Fort Xo. 
Ill) would appear to indicate clearly either that the security 
service of the forts in general and of the flanking casemates 
in 23articular Avas not of the best or that there was no watch 
whatever. Such criticism is unwarranted. The sentinels 
Avere stationed on the banquettes of the parapets and ob- 
served throtigh the embrasures. On dark nights thej^ could 
see nothing that was taking place in front at a distance of 
more than 40 or 50 paces, the width of the parapets and 
part of the glacis, and the enemy, taking advantage of the 
holes in the glacis plowed up by projectiles, coidd reach the 
top unnoticed. 

It was impossible to place other sentinels nearer to the 
glacis, as there was no shelter for them. As early as August 
we saw the necessity for covered communications. The ex- 
plosions luider the Avails of the counterscarp galleries, in 
October, confirmed us still more in this opinion and also 
confirmed the truth of Vauban's dictum that " covered com- 
munications are the eyes and the ears of a fort." 


What should be the garrison of a fort? All the forts...of 
Port Arthur Avere constructed for one company each, 200 
strong. During the first period of the defense only one com- 
paiiy Avas assigned to each fort but the garrisons of some' 
forts far exceeded 200jnfiiu__Thus the company stationed at 
444G1— OS 11 


Fort No. Ill consisted of 350 men, but even this number was 


One-fourth of the garrison of this fort was detailed every 

night for security service, one-fourth for duty, and one-fourth 
\ to repair damages, while the other fourth rested. At least 
jV_80 men were necessary for security service and the number 

fj detailed for this duty was never smaller." To repair damages 
/ 40 men were detailed until midnight and 40 after midnight. 
r / V To distribute the work equally, the garrison should have four 
A I reliefs of 80 men each plus a certain number for interior serv- 
/ ice. Hence 350 men are required at the lowest estimate. We 
I must also bear in mind that the garrison will suffer losses 
from the beginning of the siege. It will therefore be de- 
sirable to have in each fort tw^o companies of -200 men each, 
or 400 men in all. 

Assuming the firing line of the front face to be 280 feet 
in length and of the lateral faces 280 feet, and assuming 1 
man for every 7 feet of parapet, we find that 80 men are re- 
quired; adding one-fourth for the reserve, we see that 100 
men are required for one relief. There should be four reliefs 
and the entire garrison should consist of 400 men. Such a 
garrison is necessary during the first part of the siege. Dur- 
ing the period close to the assault, when the enemy is near 
the glacis and has his reserves in the second parallel, i. e., 
nearer to his advance troops than our reserves are from the 
fort, the garrison should be increased by at least one com- 
pany so that it would number GOO men. Such Avere the meas- 
ures required for the defense of the forts at Port Arthur. 
The failure to recognize the necessities of the case had imme- 
diate and fatal consequences for Fort No. II. 

The entire garrison must be stationed in bombproof shel- 
ters. With the construction in forts of a separate shelter 
for the men on duty and of infantry galleries, in addition 
to the casemate, it will be possible tt) shelter tlie entire gar- 
rison. The gorge casemate should accommodate one com- 
pany. It should have tw^o exits, a separate room for the 
officers, a kitchen, and a storeroom. The height of the case- 
mate should be such that a second tier of sleeping shelves 
may be added in time of mobilization, so as to accommodate 
an additional company. 



Wo have nlroady spoken of the elevated l)attery in per- 
manent eniphu-enients at Fort No. III. We have also spoken 
of the injury done by the fire drawn by this battery. But 
there was one exceHent feature connected with it. The battery 
parapet stopped manv a projectik^ which would have fallen 
into the covered passage to the casemate. Althou<rh this 
passage Avas covered with earth on the side exposed to fire, 
yet the constant fall of large projectiles would i)robably 
have destroyed it and blocked the exit. When it l)ecame evi- 
dent that the enemy was going to blow up the rauii)art this 
battery was utilized as a retrenchment for a second line of 
defense in the fort. The concrete of the emplacement was 
much damaged, however, and the trench constructed in solid 
rock in front was shallow, and the retrenchment could not 
hold out long. If better constructed, it might have been of 
great use. 

The value of a retrenchment as a rear traverse with regai'd 
to the gorge became apparent. The gorge constitutes a de- 
fensive position against attack from the rear of the fort. 
Having sent troops to the rear of a fort to assault the 
gorge, the enemy will prepare for the assault by shrapnel 
fire from his batteries in front of the fort against the un- 
protected rear of the troops lining the gorge parapet. This 
Avas so evident at Port Arthur that it was decided that the 
infantry parapet of the gorge of Redoubt No. 8 should not 
be manned. A trench was dug on the gorge rampart 14 
feet from the crest, so that the men Avere protected from the 
rear. A similar trench was dug on the left flank of the gorge 
of Fort Xo. Ill Avhen the rear tra Averse Avas destroyed. 

We conclude, therefore, that the gorge of the fort should 
be loAver than the face and flanks and that it should be 
coA'ered by a traverse as high as the front face or a little 
higher. This traverse will coAer the rear of the gorge and 
serve as a retrenchment for firing against the parade in front 
of it. BetAveen the retrenchment and the flanks, passages 
should be left, and a traverse should be constructed from the 
center of the retrenchment to the front face as a protection 
against enfilade fire and to localize the effects of shell burst- 
ing in the parade. 


THP: MASKIX(! OI" foiits. 

We have already said that measures to conceal the fort 
should be taken while it is under construction, as a fort 
Avhich is not masked at the time it is building: will never be 
completely masked. The means required to conceal it 
later will be different from what would be required 
during its construction. In the past no effort has been 
made to leave the configuration of the terrain as little al- 
tered as possible. Care was taken that the parapets 
should be of sufficient height and thickness and that a 
spacious parade should l)e formed in the interior allowing 
free movements unhampered by traverses, etc. The plan 
was begun by determining a theoretical and in most cases 
horizontal area as a basis to form the necessary number of 
mounds and depressions. Thus the site of the fort lost its 
primitive shape. 

Tlie parapets of the forts had to be higher than the sur- 
rounding terrain. If we add that the firing lines of the 
forts were always strictly horizontal, a configuration never 
met in nature, except in the case of water areas, it will 
readily be understood that forts could not be concealed by 
the nu)st skillful use of turf. The slopes of the ramparts, 
presenting plane surfaces, were often joined directly to sharp 
ridges, easily detected by the shadows formed by the sunlight 
at various times during the day. The use of soft, rounded 
connections between the slopes was utterly ignored. 

The system of fort construction must, therefore, be funda- 
mentally altered. The site on which the fort is to be con- 
structed should not have its configuration changed. A most 
irregular trace will sometimes be the result; the faces will 
be of different heights; the ditches may not be parallel to 
the ramparts; while the firing line, traverses, and retrench- 
ments will have a wavy shape corresponding to the relief of 
the site, etc. The fort, however, if it conforms to the terrain, 
will not be easily detected and ranging will be difficult. 
The construction, moreover, will not suffer. The ramparts, 
traverses, and retrenchments will in many cases consist of 
the natural soil which is more solid and resistant than arti- 
ficial earth construction. Mounds and depressions may be 
joined to each other and harmonized by the use of soft, 


I'ound connections conntiMfcitinii- nature. It shonld not he 
forgotten that tlu' cost of cartli construction in a fort gen- 
erally forms only from 10 to 15 per cent of the entire expen- 
diture. These measures, in addition to affording excellent 
I'oncealment, will give great solidity to the ramparts and 
a better cover for the gorge, and will localize the effects of 
shell fragments. 

Such measures are possible only in a hilly region, but in the 
construction of forts on level terrain it is equally' desirable 
to nuisk them better than formerly. It is advisable to avoid 
a regulation height for ramparts, which in each case should 
not exceed the height required for firing, the depth of the 
[)arade being increased by excavation if necessary. 

It Avill be difficult, under any circumstances, to secure entire 
concealment by such methods and it will therefore be neces- 
sary to plant trees. They should be planted not only in front 
but also in rear of the works, so that the trees in front may 
not stand out in bold relief against the sky. This measure 
will to a great extent prevent the enemy from determining 
the site of the works. Trees should l)e ])lanted not only in the 
immediate vicinity of the forts but along the entire front. 


(See Plates V, VII, VIII, IX, and X.) 


The following plan for a fortress is suggested. It con- 
tains a resume of all that has been said.« 

In order to protect the nucleus of the fortress from bom- 
bardment the line of forts has been advanced to (> miles from 
the city. On account of local conditions, however, the dis- 
tance from the city varies between 5^ and 6f miles. The 
perimeter of the fortress is 35^ miles. The distance between 
the forts does not exceed 1^ miles. The distance between 
forts and intermediate redoubts varies between one-half and 
five-sixths of a mile. 

In view of the local conditions some of the intermediate 
caponiers are located without reference to the forts. The 
intervals between the forts are equipped partly with para- 
pets and ditches and partly with a parapet onl3^ The 
parapet and ditch is used on comparatively unbroken ter- 
rain, the parapet only, on very broken terrain. The para- 
pets are on the line of forts in places, but are generally 
about 120 yards in rear of the forts, passages being left on 
each side of the forts and interjnediate redoubts for sorties 
and for troops entering or leaving the fortress. These pas- 
sages are narrow, not exceeding from 50 to 60 yards, for 
the narrower the passage the more easily it may be defended, 
and, moreover, troops never leave or enter a fortress on a 
wide front. It is better to have numerous narrow passages 
rather than a few wide passages. The firing banquette of 
the parapet is greatly widened in places to form positions 
for counter-assault guns. 

The ditches in front of the parapet have a flanking defense 
from 57-min. and machine guns mounted in caponiers in 

"A section of the fortress is sliown in PI. VIII. 


tho ditches or in mol)ilc armored turrets placed in the ditches 
or in the open. The ditches are ])rotected by a <rlacis with 
a covered way for sentinels. 

Tniniediatcly in i-ear of the parapets arc cascinated 
traverses for the troops on (hity in the intervals, each inter- 
val of 1;\ miles bein^ equipped with four half-company con- 
crete ca.semates. About 120 yards in rear of the ])arapets, 
covered by folds in the <i;Tound, are two one-company concrete 
casemates for each interval. 

In rear of the company casemates, but as near to them 
as possible, there is a metaled road protected by accidents of 
the terrain. >vith branches to the forts and ivdoubts. Con- 
tinuous belts of trees run alono- the <::lacis and at its foot 
around the entire fortress. Roads and casemates should be 
masked in the same Avay if the terrain is open and the i)ara- 
pets do not afford concealment. The foreooini^ measures are 
necessary for the preparation of the infantry fighting posi- 

The road forms the outer limit of the artillery position. 
The batteries are distributed from this line to the center of 
the fortress. Close to the forts are the reconnoitering bat- 
teries and the mortar batteries, a little farther in rear 
the howitzer batteries, and still farther in rear the re- 
maining long-range batteries of 6-inch Canet, G-inch, and 
4.-2-inch guns. Each battery has from two to four guns. In 
time of peace the sites for the batteries are marked. Small 
concrete casemates are constructed for the gunners and maga- 
zines for a three days' supply of ammunition. Three or 
four batteries form a fire command. On the elevated points 
of the artillery position permanent observation stations arc 
built for the fire commanders. They are constructed of con- 
crete or are armored turrets. The batteries of each fire com- 
mand are connected with each other and with the fire com- 
mander's station by underground telephone. Fire com- 
manders' stations are connected by telephone with the obser- 
vation station of the commander of the fortress artillery. 

Each fire command has a magazine with sufficient annnu- 
nition for five days, located from 350 to 4.')0 yards in rear of 
the batteries, in a well-concealed position. It is connected 
with the batteries by a portable raihvay. AVell concealed in 
rear of the artillery position runs the main Ihie of the fortress 


railwa}^, connected by radiating branches with the magazines 
and depots in the city and by branches of portable railway 
with all the magazines, with each front of the fortress, and 
with the metaled road. 

All batteries, magazines, observation stations, roads, and 
railways are carefully concealed from the observation of the 
enemy. Xo expenditure can be too great to secure conceal- 
ment, so well will it be repaid in time of siege. 

The second line of defense is from 2 to 2f miles in rear 
of the first line of forts. It consists only of forts as points 
of supports, the intervals between the forts being fortified 
during mobilization by trenches and temporary works. Here 
greater economy may be exercised. The forts may be from 
1^ to 2 miles from each other. The parapets need not be 
constructed in time of peace, but it would be desirable to 
have a one-company concrete casemate in each interval. In 
establishing the second line one imperative requirement must 
be observed. The first line must be effectiveh' covered every- 
where by the fire of the second. 

A permanent observation station for the commandant is 
shown on Height 95.« This station is connected by under- 
ground telephone with the detachment headquarters. De- 
tachment headquarters are likewise connected with sec- 
tion headquarters, which in turn are connected with the 
forts and redoubts. Metallic circuits are used and the sys- 
tem is independent of the artillery telephone system. 

Three searchlights are placed in each fort, one on each 
redoubt and four in each interval between the forts. The 
smaller details are not shown in the plan. 


The plan here proposed for an intermediate redoubt is 
based upon experience gained at the siege of Port Arthur. 

The parade, in order to defilade it effectively, is sunk 21 
feet ; the ramparts are partly built up and consist in part of 
undisturbed natural soil. The work is somewhat elongated in 
depth, as it is constructed to conform to the terrain. As 
may be seen from Plate IX, the casemates for the garrison 
are under the gorge rampart. The separate casemates have 

" This height is not shown in the sketch. — Tr. 


windows lookin«>: into the goi<i^e ditoli and doors opening; into 
ii rear covered passage. This passage coinniunioates with 
the gallei'V under the retrenolunent througli an underground 
passage, with the infantry galleries on the faces, the scarp 
gallery, the gorge ditch, the counterscarp gallery by a pas- 
sage under the gorge ditch, and with the passage running to 
the rear of the redoubt. 

The gallery under the retrenchment has exits into the 
parade between the gorge rampart and the retrenchment, 
and between the front face and the retrenchment. It com- 
municates with the shelter under the front face for the men 
on duty and with the infantry galleries on the flanks. 

The shelter for the men on duty is a two-storied casement. 
The detachment occupies the lower story, while the upper 
serves as a shelter for the counter-assault guns. The lower 
story is connected with the passage to the scarp and counter- 
scarp galleries. 

The parai^ets on the front face are cut in the natural soil. 

The flanks of the fort gradually decrease in height from 
the angles with the front face of the gorge, which is 14 feet 
lower than the front face. Being covered, also, by the rear 
traverse, the gorge is thus protected from accurate fire from 
the front. The rear traverse is prepared for infantry de- 
fense and serves as a retrenchment, the necessity for which 
was demonstrated at all the forts and redoubts, attacked at 
Port Arthur. This retrenchment serves, moreover, as a 
background for the parapets in front, which will thus be 
less clearly defined than against the clear background of 
the sky. 

The traverse running from the retrenchment to the front 
face is a protection against flank fire and localizes the effects 
of shell bursting in the parade. 

Two barbettes for four counter-assault 57-mm. rapid-fire 
guns each are erected at the angles of the front face. These 
guns are kept in shelters close to the barbettes. The eleva- 
tion of the barbettes above the platform in front of the shel- 
ters is only 8 feet. The slope is one- fifth, which allows the 
guns to be run quickly into position for firing. A whip 
may be used for this purpose, the block being secured in the 


In the shelter for the guns there are separate rooms for 
officers and for the gunners, a small magazine, and a latrine. 
The detachment on duty, which consists of a platoon, is 
<|uartered in the loAver story. The men mount by a stairway 
to the upper story and emerge through four exits on the 
banquette. The lower story communicates directly with the 
flank galleries and the gorge casemates. 

On account of the impossibility, so signally shown at Port 
Arthur, of supporting the intervals between the forts by rifle 
fire from the flanks of the forts when the forts are sub- 
jected to artillery fire, it is necessary to construct special pro- 
tection for the firing lines on the flanks. Concrete or ar- 
mored galleries serve this purpose. Among those who did 
not take part in the war and see the advantages of such gal- 
leries in practice, our celebrated engineer, A. P. Shoshin, 
alone shares our opinion on this question. He constructed 
such a gallery in 1905. 

His gallery, however, can be used only on the front face, 
as it is open in rear and affords no protection against enfilade 
and reverse fire when placed on the flanks. The galleries 
which we propose are closed altogether. They are covered 
at the top with 4-inch steel armor which, according to Gen- 
eral Durlacher's tables, can not be penetrated by 11-inch 
mortar shells at a range of 3^ miles. The gallery is divided 
every 10|^ feet by 2-inch concrete traverses, which serve to 
localize the effects of gases and shell fragments in case the 
armor should be pierced. Moreover, this allows the armor 
to be placed in sections and fastened to the traverses and to 
the rear wall of the gallery. 

Two or three reserve plates are provided to cover dam- 
aged places temporarily and to replace broken plates. The 
gallery is provided with ventilators at the top. To provide 
additional protection in rear the gallery extends 7 feet in 
front of the banquette, which permits a layer of earth to be 
placed in rear and an infantry parapet to be placed on top. 
The parapet may be used by the reserves, especially at ^ 
night, when the enemy can not fire effectively with his artil- 
lery. Traverses should be built on the banquette during 
mobilization. The men will be covered from the front by 
shields, as shown in profile 8, Plate X. 


Til the ffoi'ae iinirles ctf the unlU'iies are arniore<l turrets 
for iiiiichine iruns. soiiiewlial advanced, so as to increase the 
arc of fii-c. A covered passaire leads from these jjorj^e 
aiiirh's to the covered jtassaffe or corrider in rear of the 
liorge casemates. There are ten casemates for the men, an 
officers* quarters, a kitchen, and two hitrines for ten persons 
each. Larire recesses may be formed in the rear wall of the 
corridor for the storage of su])plies. 

Almost Avithout exception the Port Arthur forts were 
absolutely cut oti' from the foi"ti'ess durinii" bombardments 
and assaults. The approaches near the forts were fired 
upon by the enemy, and it Avas impossible to reach the forts. 
TTence the reserves could not reach them in time to reen- 
force the garrisons. This occurred not once, but frequoiitly. 
It is therefore of the utmost importance to have safe com- 
munication from the fort to the nearest place in its rear 
i-apable of covering movements of troops, such as a depres- 
sion, ravine, wood, or hill. The defenders of Port Arthur 
are almost unanimous in favor of such communications. 
An underground gallery for this purpose is shown leading 
to the rear from the central casemate. 

For the transportation of heavy articles ramps are made 
in the counterscarj) and the scarp of the gorge ditch. 

On account of the properties of the soil (sand) and for the 
purpose of increasing the obstacles to assaults, the scarp and 
counterscarp are made of concrete in the shape of galleries. 
The flanking casemates are in the counterscarp. Each flank- 
ing casemate has one 57-mm. and a machine gun and an em- 
brasure for lighting the ditch. The flanking casemates and 
the counterscarp galleries are protected by a countermine 
system running 100 feet to the front. The gallery in the 
scarp is protected in the same way. but here the countermine 
system runs 14 feet below the first system. The gorge coun- 
terscarp need not be i:e vetted. 

Observation maj' be made from two turrets placed on the 
ramparts of the front face for this purpose, from the nui- 
chine-gun turrets, and from the firing galleries. The gorge 
ditch is flanked by four machine guns in the caponier 
adjoining the casemates. Embrasures are provided for 

The thickness of the concrete in all constructions is *,> feet 
with the exception of the shelter for the counter-assault guns 


Avhere reeiiforced concrete 7 aiicl 7^ feet is used and for the 
underground passage from the casemates, the location of 
^Yhich is difficult to find. Where reenforcecl concrete- is used 
the thickness of the Avails may be considerably decreased. 

The opinion formerly held that the defense of the intervals 
could be effected by the cross fire of artillery from points of 
supports, brought about the proposition to construct in the 
forts, rear intermediate caponiers ■' and casemated flanks.'' 
It was thought that the forts would be capable of giving each 
other such a strong mutual support that something like a 
•' fire curtain " would be formed in front of the interval, 
Avhich the enemy would be unable to penetrate. But doubt 
arose as to the reliability of such defense. Among various 
propositions for strengthening the defense of the intervals, 
that of General Todleben, developed by Colonel Velichko, and 
hiter the proposition of Lieutenant-Colonel Prussak, favored 
the permanent fortification of intervals. In Chapter IV, I 
spoke of these propositions, and stated that the first days of 
the attack shoAved that the expectation of basing the defense 
of the intervals exclusively on the fire of the forts Avas 

It Avas found that it Avas impossible to combine the in- 
fantry fire of the forts with the fire of the rear caponiers, that 
forts can not give infantry fire support during the day, and 
that the operations of the rear caponiers are greatly ham- 
pered by broken terrain. In the night the infantry could 
fire Avhile the fire of the caponiers could not be utilized to 
advantage. Searchlights afforded some assistance, but little 
in broken ground. Without the expenditure of enormous 
amounts of ammunition modern conditions are such that 
forts can not support the intervals by infantry fire under 
the fire AAdiich may be concentrated upon them. It Avas 
proA'ed that trenches and temporary works can not Avithstand 
the onrush of an energetic attack. It Avas proved, too, that 
the enemy can, by skillful demonstrations, easily deflect re- 
serves from the point where they haA'e decided to break 
through, and that the reserves shoidd not, therefore, be re- 
lied upon to preA'ent the enemy from penetrating into the 

"Colonel X'elicliko. ''Colonel Prnssak. 


(See riate I.) 

In summarizinof all that has been said upon the many ques- 
tions raised bv the siege, we come to the conclusion that the 
siege of Port Arthur, in addition to affording information 
on other topics, showed decisiA'ely that the fate of a modern 
fortress is decided on the line of forts. This was clear be- 
fore the siege. Port Arthur only confirmed it. The for- 
tress succumbed the day after the line of forts fell. This 
demonstrates the secondary importance of enceintes and in- 
termediate lines of defense and shows the line of forts to be 
the main fighting line, the vital part of the fortress. 

Having taken as an epigraph for our work the Avords of 
Colonel Velichko. '' On this line of forts the battles for the 
defense of the fortress must be fought ; here the artillery 
and infantry must offer a decisive resistance to the eneni}^," 
and fully sharing his conviction, we have considered, in as 
detailed a manner as possible, the measures necessary to 
enable the garrison to offer this decisive resistance to the 

One of the proposed measures was the erection of perma- 
nent Avorks in the intervals between the forts — i. e.. the con- 
struction of sections of permanent parapets with ditches. 
This solution is not new. It has been proposed many times: 
it has given rise to many discussions; and will doubtless be 
the subject of many a future controversy. I am convinced, 
however, that I am more favorably circumstanced than my 
jDredecessors. for I am able to base my proposition not upon 
theory alone, but upon experience in war. It is possible, 
indeed, that I have failed to understand the questions in- 
volved and have made incorrect deductions. 

Let us tr}' to sift the matter. The quotation from Colonel 
Velichko shows clearly the importance which he attaches to 
the line of forts. Deciding here to make a most energetic 
resistance on this line, he has sought the means by which for- 
tifications may assist the artillery and infantry most effec- 




BiisiiiiT all (lecliictioii.s upon examples from the assaults 
at Port Arthur, ^Ye have said that the idea of defending the 
intervals with the aid of the cross fire of forts, correct 
in itself, can not be relied upon alone, but needs an essential 
and indispensable supplement in the form of permanent 
])arapets and ditches between the forts. Only thus is it pos- 
sible to put into practice the fine conception contained in our 

Our conclusion is based upon the important part played by 
the Chinese wall during the assault in the night of August 
23-24, when, owing to its existence, a small reserve of two 
companies succeeded in preventing the enemy from breaking 
through on a wide front. We would invite attention to the 
importance of this Avail during the rest of the siege. 

The first consequence of this unsuccessful assault was a 
radical change in the enem^-'s plan of attack. A council 
convoked on the following day by (leneral Nogi came to the 
iniwelcome but definite conclusion that it was impossible to 
break through the interval, however desirable it might be to 
do so, and that the fortress could lie taken only by regular 
siege operations. 

On the morning of August 20 the first siege works, consist- 
ing of long covered communications from the captured works, 
Fortifications Xos. 1 and 2. back to the Japanese lines, were 
begun, and on the 31st the direction of the first parallel was 
clearly defined. After this, approaches were begun from the 
first parallel to Forts Xos. TI and III and to Caponiers 
Nos. 2 and 3. 

The failure to break through inspired such awe in the J"ap- 
iinese for the Chinese wall that e\en after capturing the 
caponiers, the last remaining work> in the interval between 
the forts, they did not assault it again, but continued siege 
operations, not only against the forts, but against the Avall 
itself. Having approached it to within a distance of 15 to 
30 paces, they began mining operations against it in De- 

""The successful repulse of this fe.irfn] attack gave the Russians 
more than four months, because it forced the enemy to retreat. 
* * * rndoubtedly this was the greatest success which could be 
<»btained in a struggle with so bold and determined an enemy." Die 
Kiimpfe um I'ort Arthur. 


The tliird important benefit unined from the Chinese Wiiil 
was that it enabled a small <i;arrison to hold a wide extent 
of front, and thus released a lai'ii'e part of the general reserve 
for the defense of such important positions as 174-Meter Hill. 
Undoubtedly it was only the existence of the Chinese wall 
that curbed the impulse of the Japanese for decisive action, 
made them resort to the slow operations of a siege, and 
enabled us to gain four months and hold 174-Meter Hill 
until December. This was so evident during the siege that 
there was no difference among the defenders as to the value 
of the Chinese wall to the defense. 

Having demonstja^ed-thF actual possibility of breaking 
through intervals betAveen forts, having shown that trenches 
and temporary works are not sufficient for the defense of the 
intervals, and^ having supported our conclusions by descrip- 
tions of combats and a series of official telephone messages, 
we proposed to strengthen the intervals by premanent forti- 
fications. We are firmly convinced that a different solution 
of this problem is impossible. 

One question remains: Should all the intervals be fur- 
nished with permanent fortifications? The answer to this 
question depends upon the nature and purpose of a fortress. 

The purpose of a fortress is, according to Professor Eng- 
man, " to detain around it the greatest possible number of 
hostile troops for the longest possible time with the smallest 
possible garrison." In a later edition of his work this defini- 
tion is somewhat altered and reads: 

The purpose of a fortress is to enable the smallest possible garrison 
to defend a given strategic point for the longest possible period, detain- 
ing around it the greatest possible number of hostile troops. 

In the last edition, published this year and edited by 
Colonel Zubareff, this definition has undergone another 
change — 

The purpose of a fortress is to defend a given strategic point with 
the smallest possible garrison for the longest possible period against 
numerically superior forces of the enemy. 

Thus within a period of ten years the definition has under- 
gone a series of changes. The only cause is to be found in 
the want of clearness in the meaning of the term " fortress." 
That this is the case may be seen if we examine the definition 
in the essay of 1895. This definition is conditional, non- 



committal. We do not receivt' a clear conception of the pur- 
pose of a fortress, but only the vague images — " the greatest 
possible number," " the longest possible time," " the smallest 
j)ossible garrison." All is "■ possible " and nothing more. 
Not a word is said about stubborn defense or the holding of 
what is being defended, as if the entire sense lies in the ex- 
pression " detain around." It is evident that the author of 
the definition perceived its vagueness. He formulated it 
somewhat differently in the next edition; but the vagueness 
still existed, although somewhat diminished. The definition 
was still conditional. 

The third form of the definition is clearer than the others, 
but even there " j^ossible " is used twice. Lastly, according 
to the definition of Colonel Yelichko, the purpose of a for- 
tress is " the protection of important strategic points on the 
main theater of war for the purpose of assisting as much as 
possible the defensive as well as the offensive operations 
(maneuvering) of the field armies." " This definition is more 
definite than the others, but it is conditional. The exasper- 
ating " possible " remains, and the definition is made more 
obscure by the addition of the word " maneuvering." This 
term called for a further definition which we forbear to 

Fortresses have existed since the most ancient times and 
will ever continue to exist for one purpose only, the " stub- 
born defense of a given point." The shape of fortresses has 
changed, as well as their dimensions, armaments, garrisons, 
and outAvorks, but their purpose can not change. The 
" point " and the " fortress " must not be confounded. The 
value of a point may change. To-day it is important for 
political reasons; to-morrow its political importance may 
have passed away and it may have only a commercial im- 
portance; later, its strategic importance ma}^ be recognized, 
etc. The value of the point depends on various circum- 
stances, but the object of its fortifications Avill always be the 
same. Only with a change in the importance of the point 
can the shape and extent of the fortifications be changed. 

We therefore arrive at the folloAving definition : " The 
purpose of a fortress is to assist in the stubborn defense of a 
given point until the end of the war." 


Tho EuifiiH'crinL' Dc^fcnse of the Country." 


The iniportaiice of the point from a striite<ric point of 
view detennines the influence of the fortress upon events. 
Thus the fortress may jirotect a crossing, secure a line of 
communications, or shelter an army. Dependin*: ui)on the 
importance of the point, a forti-ess is built so as to fulfill 
its i)roi)er role, and this is attained cither by dimensions or 
armament. This importance may l)e seen lono- in advance or 
only during the course of a campaign. Fortresses, accord- 
ingly, are built either during peace or in time of war, and 
although one and the same purpose is served, namely, de- 
fense, the stubbornness of the defense will va^3^ 

In the course of the same campaign the strategic impor- 
tance of a point may vary, but the purpose of the fortress 
remains the same. Let us take the case of Liaoyang. At 
the beginning of the war it served as a point for the deploy- 
ment of the army. A temporary fortress was erected. 
When the lines of advance of the Japanese became clearly 
defined in August, 1904, Liaoyang became important as a 
[)osition to prevent their further advance, but its fortifica- 
tions had still the same purpose — stubborn defense, resist- 
ance, protection. Undoubtedly the fortifications enabled 
(xeneral Kuropatkin to maneuver with his main forces 
against Kuroki, but this was only of an accidental and sec- 
ondary importance, w'hile the essential purpose of the fortress 
remained unchanged. 

There are many historical examples of the use of fortresses 
for such strategic purposes, from which we may see that 
fortresses have often assisted armies to maneuver. But these 
examples prove that this use of fortresses was rarely fore- 
seen, and that in most cases it was acci(;lental and always 
secondary. The principal thing which was, is, and ever 
shall be demanded of a fortress is the stubborn defense until 
the end of the war of a point which the country has found 
necessary to hold and has fortified for this purpose. It is 
this purpose which must be considered in the planning and 
construction of fortresses. This is the indispensable require- 
ment calling for their erection and is the whole object of 
their existence. 

It is not alone for the rational construction of fortresses 
that it is necessary to have a clear conception of their pur- 
pose. It is equally important that the commandants defend- 
444G1— OS 12 


ino- them bo thoroiifjlily poiiotratod by this idea, and that they 
adopt no other. If Marshal liazaiiio had <ri'asped this idea, 
if he had imderstood clearly the pui-pose of the fortress 
Avhich he connnniid(Ml. he woidd never have said that once 
Paris \vas bh)cka(led, INIetz had phiyed ont its role, that it 
was no longer necessary, and could be surrendered. So also 
with Port Arthur. Tt could not be inferred, when the con- 
centration of Kuropatkin's army had been completed, that 
the role of Port Arthur was at an end. 

General Leer has said that " to name a thing right is to un- 
derstand it right." As the correctness of action depends upon 
correctness of understanding, we shall paraphrase General 
Leer's aphorism as follows : " To name a thing right is to un- 
derstand it right and to use it right." Therefore it is most 
important that those who construct and those who command 
fortresses should understand once and for all that the pur- 
pose of a fortress is " to assist in the stubborn defense of a 
given point until the end of the war." Then only will for- 
tresses be properly constructed and properly defended. 

Bearing in mind the purpose of a fortress and remember- 
ing that the fate of a fortress is decided on the line of forts, 
we come to the conclusion that it is necessary to construct 
permanent works in the intervals between the forts. These 
works must consist of a ditch covered by fire, boomproof 
shelters for the garrison of the intervals, and parapets for 
the infantry and the counter-assault artillery. As the para- 
pets will sometimes serve as a screen for the batteries in the 
rear, no definite dimensions can be prescribed for them. In 
some places high massive earthworks will be required, and in 
others, trenches sunk into the ground. All depends upon the 
requirements for effective fire, screening, and concealment. 

In answer to the question as to what intervals should be 
fortified, we would say that they should all be fortified ac- 
cording to the necessities in each case. All, however, can not 
be well fortified without great expenditure of funds. Some 
intervals will have good natural obstacles, so that artificial 
obstacles will not be required, and some will be intersected 
by deep rocky ravines, where the construction of a ditch 
would require deep cuts and high fills. Here sections of 
parapets should suffice. Every fortress and every interval 
requires a different solution. The necessity for active -de- 

COXCLUyiON. 177 

fense requirina" sorties must bo considered and passao-es 
must be left for this purixjsc. The entrance of a tiehl army 
into the fortress must also be considered. For this a <»'reater 
number of passa<2:es is recpiired. In fortresses where no ma- 
neuvering is to be expected these passages sliould be few in 
number; in fortresses where armies will assemble or advance 
or retreat there should be many passages. 

The construction of such passages will not violate the 
principle of the closed work and need not interfere with the 
fortification of the intervals. These passages will corre- 
•^pond to the gates of ancient fortresses. They may be closed 
easily at the last moment, nor will it be necessary for this 
purpose to use such a great force of laborers as is required 
to fortif}' the intervals during mobilization. The question as 
to the most probable point to be attacked must not be solved 
in advance, except in cases where, on account of local condi- 
tions, some of the intervals can not be attacked. It nnist be 
assumed that each front which does not present any insur- 
mountable obstacles may be attacked. The intentions of the 
enemy can not be discovered in advance, and an assumption 
that one front is more liable than another to attack is always 
without foundation and nearly always erroneous. This was 
.shown at Port Arthur, where it was assumed that the \vest 
and not the east front would be attacked. 

It has already been said that the purpose of a fortress is 
stubborn defense until the end of the war. The commandant 
should be imbued with this idea and should be given inde- 
pendent command. 

When the purpose of a fortress is clear to the commandants 
of fortresses, there is no need for commanders of fortified 
regions, who will only violate unity of will and authority. 
The great size of modern armies renders the fortification of 
one strategic point (as, for instance. Port Arthur) of small 
importance in the development of military operations in 
ireneral. At present it is necessary to have an extensive sys- 
tem of fortified places between which field armies may op- 
erate absolutely independent of the fortresses. With their 
flanks and rears secured by fortresses, armies that have not 
had sufficient time to mobilize may oppose numerically su- 
perior forces without fear of being cut off or defeated. 
Armies must not take refuire in fortresses; but thev may 


pass through them, take advantage of crossings, and use 
them as supports to secure their flanks or centers. Had the 
system of fortifications of the entire Knangtung Peninsuhi 
been adequately prepared, it would have [)layed a different 
role in the late campaign and would have protected Port Ar- 
thur and the fleet until the end of the Avar. The fortifica- 
tions at Liaoyang Avould also have played a different part, if, 
in addition to Liaoyang, the Yantay mines and the crossing 
below Liaoyang had been equally well fortified. 

With this I close my investigation. Many may fail to 
agree with my solution of the questions here presented, but 1 
console myself with the hope that my work Avill evoke dis- 
cussion of these questions by my comrades in arms and by 
others interested in this branch of military science. May the 
Lord assist their competence and love of country to an early 
solution of the questions involved, so that the comment of 
Frederick the Great may not be applied to Russian fortresses : 
"In spite of so much labor and such terrible appliances, mod- 
ern fortresses are not impregnable.'' 

I wish to record my profound gratitude to those of my 
comrades in the defense of Port Arthur who have assisted 
me in matters pertaining to their special branches; in particu- 
lar I wish to mention Major General Stolnikoff, Lieutenant 
Colonel Gobiato, and Captain Vysokikh, of the Artillery; 
Colonel Krestinski and Captains Rodionoff and Dobroff, of 
the Engineers, and Captain Romanovski, of the General 

St. Petersburg, Septemher^ 1906. 


1. Personal iiiipivssioiis ivt-eived during tlu- siege of Port Arthur. 

2. Intel-change of opinions with many of the defenders of the 

3. Official data, telephone messages, reports, accounts, information 
on the disposition of troops, diaries, etc. 

-1. Literary works: 

The Siege of I'ort Arthur, by David IT. James. 

A Few Words on Port Arthur, by Timchenko-Ruban. 

The Passion Days of Port Arthur, by P. Lai-enko. 

P.eitriige zum Stndium der Bestigungsfrage, by MalczevsUi 

von Tarnawa, Vienna, 1000. 
Fortresses and Fortress Railways, by K. Velichko. 
(,'ompendinni of Articles, 1X78-1800, by C. Cni. 
The Engineering Defense of the Country, by K. A'elichko. 
Study of the Latest Methods of Siege and Defense of Land 

Fortresses, by K. Velichko. 
Modern Condition of Fortitication, by N. Buynitiski, lOd.'J. 
Articles of X. Prussak and P. Klokacheff in the P^ngineering 

Journal for 1800-1000. 
Experience of the Fighting Value of Fortresses, by E. Meiss- 

History of Fortress Warfare, by G. Miller. 
I'ort Arthur — Siege and Capitulation, by E. Ashmead-Bartlett. 
Beihefte zu Strotflers Osterreichische MilitJir-Zeitschrift, Die 

Kiimpfe um Port Arthur. 



Advanced positions, 38, -12, V22: iiuiMn-taiice of. 4S-r»r); at Port Ar- 
tbur, reason for occupyiuu, 27. 

Advanced works, at Port Arthur, I'.t; see also Advanced jiositioiis. 

Anchor, 17>'2. 

Antwerp, siege of, 54. 

Armament, of forts, 142 ; of Japanese beslesinjr army, 2S, 43 ; of Port 
Arthur, in, 43; of rear caponiers, 142. 

Armor-plated doors, see Doors. 

Artillery, duels of, 103, 107, 134; effect of fire of, on concrete, 148; 
tire of, 71. 72, 77; in forts, 142; freight of, in a fortress, 105; im- 
portance of, in repulsing attack, 78; Japanese, how emplaced, 57; 
range of, no longer controlling factor in locating forts, 78; trans- 
portation for, 107; see Forts, cross fire of, and Armaments. 

Ashmead-P.artlett, E., quoted, 118. 

Automobiles, use of, in fortresses, 110. 

Balloons, 40. 

Barbettes, for counter-assault guns, 138, 167. 

Barricades, 100. 

Batteries, fort, so-called, 14; location of, in model fortress, 95, 165; 
number of guns in, 101; permanent, in Intervals in French and 
(ierman fortresses, 14 ; see Emplacements and Seacoast batteries. 

Bayonets, use of, 85. 

Bazaine, Marshal, 170. 

Belfort, siege of, 54. 

Bells, electric, 147. 

Bombproofs. in German fortresses, 14; see Shelters. 

Cables, electric light, 113. 

Caponier, author's use of term, 5; concrete in forts, 141; for ditch 
defense, 152-154, 104; fire of, 132; of model fortress, 164; gorge, 
45, 73, 137 ; for guns, 134 ; rear, 45 ; rear, armament of, 142 ; inter- 
mediate rear, 73; searchlights for. 111, 112; for searchlights, 113. 

Caponiers Nos. 2 and 3, 74, 81, 84, 100. 172. 

Carnot, uses advanced positions at Antwerp, 54. 

Casemates, for garrisons of batteries, 105; for garrison of forts, 137, 
139, 144, 100, 165; for garrison of intervals, 88, 90, 165; roofs of, 
151 ; for second line of defense, 166 ; in model redoubt, 166, 167 ; see 
Bombproofs, Counterscarp galleries, and Shelters. 

Cavalr.v, in garrison of Port Arthur, 41, 44. 125. 

Central Enceinte, condition at begiiming of war. 31 ; delay in i)lacliig 
in defensil)le condition, 37 ; not to serve as keep, 37 ; length of, and 
worlds. 20, 27 ; position and i)uri)Ose, 27 ; see Enceinte. 


182 INDEX. 

Clievaux-de-frise, 41, 

Chinese wall, 27, 29, 30, 65, G9, 78, 7(>, 84, .S5, 80, 89, 9(i, lol, 133, 138, 

156, 173 ; position of, 38, 39. 
Closed work, 79, 88. 

Commandant of fortress, duty of, 175. 

Commandant of tlie fortress of Port Arthur, insists upon fortification 
of 203-Meter Hill, 30. 

Commander, flre, see Fire connnander. 

Commander of fortified region, 177. 

Command, fire, see Fire command. 

Communications, of fort with rest of fortress, 144; fortress, 105; 
sheltered, in forts, 141 ; see Covered passages. 

Concealment, of guns, 44 : of emplacements, forts, redoubts, and bat- 
teries, 45, 04, 92 ; of model fort, 102 ; in model fortress, 100 ; of rail- 
ways, 110 ; of roads, 37, 108, 109 ; see Covered passages, Communi- 
cations, Faint, and Trees. 

Concrete, reenforced, 170; walls, see Concrete walls. 

Cossacks, in garrison of Port Arthur, 41, 44, 125. 

Council of war, 01, 172. 

Counter-assault guns, 73, 98, 102, 138, 139 ; barbettes for, 167 ; machine 
guns as, 143; should be rapid-fire guns, 145; in model redoubt, 107; 
searchlights for. 111; shelters for, 45, 134, 130, 138, 141, 142, 168; 
walls for shelter of. 152. 

Countermining, 155, 157, 169; see Mines and Mining. 

Counterscarps, 153, 169. 

Counterscarp galleries, 136, 154, 159, 169. 

Cover, overhead, see Overhead cover. 

Covered passages, 109; in model redoubt, 167. 169; in forts, 141, 143, 
144-146, 159 ; see Concealment, Commimications, and Trees. 

Cyclists, 41. 

Danzig, siege of, 54. 

Davout, Marshal, uses advanced positions at Hamburg, 54. 

Dead zones, spaces, areas, etc., 45, 64, 73, 74, 86, 137. 

Demonstrations, to deflect reserves, 70, 170. 

Disease, in besieged places, 126, 145. 

Ditches, around forts and redoubts, 100, 1.36. 1.37, 1.52: illumination of, 

157, 169; wet, 41; see Counterscarp galleries :ind Parajiets. 
Dobroff, Captain, 74, 146, 178. 

Doors, armor-plated, 34. 
Dragon Ridge, 92, 101. 
Drainage, in forts, 139. 

Dressing stations, 40; see Hospitals and Hospital service. 
Duels, artillery, see Artillery duels. 
Dynamite, 157. 

Dynamos, location of, 113, 158. 

Eagle Nest, 25, .56. 63, 64, 81. 82, 8.3, 84, 8.5, 95, 98, 101, 114. 
Earth, layer of. effect on shell bursts, 149, 150; cost of earth con- 
struction in foi'ts, 163. 
East front, at Port Arthur, 15, ,38-40, 06, 84. 

INDEX. 188 

Klhow roRts, soo Small anns. 

Electric bells, see Bells. 

Electi'ic fence, 33, 3(). 

Embrasures, 106: use of, for observation, HS. 

Emplacements, for guns, 95. 

Enceinte, delinition of term, 13 ; necessity of, in modern fortress, 14 : 
role of, 79, 87; of secondary importance. 171; see Central Enceintt> 
and Second line of defense. 

Engineering material, 10r>. 

Engineers, transportation for, 107, 108. 

Entanglements, wire, 33, 3(5, 38, 41, 00, 70, 02. 106; se(> obstacles. 

Entrenchments, see Trenches. 

Exits, to covered passages, shelters, etc., in forts, 137, 13S, Uii. 144. 
145, 160; lack of, caused loss of Redoubt. No. 3, 145. 

Fence, electric, see Electric fence. 

Fenghuangsban, 49, 52, 58, 64, 92. 123; imi)ortance of, 53-54, 138. 

Field of tire, in front of line of forts. 14. 106. 

Fighting line, importance of, 87, 171 : see Line of forts. 

Fire conuiiand, 1(>5. 

Fire commander, 165. 

Fire control, 57, 102, 116, 117, 120. 

Flanking guns, see Guns flanking. 

Fock, General, 54, 66, 67, 68. 

Forces, of the belligex'ents, 43. 

Fort, armament of, 142, 143; details of construction of. 132; guns in. 
65, 134, 136, 140; masking of, 162; parade of. 161; searchlights for. 

Forts, cross fire of, 14, 45, 77, 89, 170, 172; intervals between, see In- 
tervals between forts ; line of, see I^ine of forts. 

Fort D, 19, 20, 26. 

Fort P, 19, 26. 

Fort No. II, condition of at beginning of war. 29; description of, 25: 
39; great losses at, 141; work done on during mobilization, .32; other 
references, 61, 63, 65, 70, 71. 7(5. 77. 146. 152, 154. 1.59, 160, 172. 

Fort No. Ill, condition of at beginning of war, .30; armament and gar- 
rison, 39-10; description of. 25. 135; ditches at, 1.53; effect of capture 
of, 133; searchlights at, 113: work done on, during mobilization, 32: 
other references, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 75, 76, 77, 81, 86, 99, 135, 140, 141. 
142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 154, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 172. 

Fortification, explanation of use of term to designate a class of 
redoubt, 6. 

Fortifications, permanent, in the interval between forts, 13. 

Fortifications Nos. 1 and 2, description of. 25: other references. 17, 29. 
30, 39, 49, 52, 56, 58, 60, 61. 62. 64-69. 72. 73, 77, 80, 81. 82, 84. 99, 
100, 114, 133, 137, 139, 172. 

Fortified region, commanders of, not needed, 177. 

Forti-esses, communications of, see Communication ; definition of, 173 : 
duty of commandant of, 175; garrison for. 122; model fortress, 164: 
modern land, plans of, in Russia and abroad, 11. 12. 

Fortress. Port Arthur, see Port .Vrthur. 

184 INDEX. 

Fougasses, 3G, 41. 

Frederick the Great, quoted, 178. 

Front, see East front, North front, and West front. 

Oalleries, counterscarp, see Counterscarp galleries; countermining. 
155; for infantry, SS, 134, 141, IGO, IGS; for machine guns, 141. 

(Jarrison, of a model fort, 159; of a modern fortress, 127; of Tort 
Arthur, 122, 123. 

Geneva Convention, benefit of, disregai'ded, 03. 

Gorbatovski, Major General, 65-69, 125, 140". 

Gorge, of forts, 139, 161. 

(rreat Mandarin road, danger of enemy breaking through in direction 
of, 19. 

Grenades, hand. 145. 

Ground, nature of, at Port Arthur, see Soil. 

Guns, flanking, 45; large caliber in forts, 65, 134, 136, 140; of various 
caliber in same work, 45; see Naval guns, Reconnoitering guns. 
Counter-assault guns, Machine guns, Howitzers, and Mortars. 

Hamburg, siege of, 54. 

Hand grenades, see Grenades. 

Heliograph, 100, 121. 
X Horse Battery, 19. 

Horses, use of in fortresses, 105, 107, 109, 110. 

Hospitals, 41 ; sick in, at Port Arthur, 123. 

Hospital service, Japanese, 56, 60, 63. 

Howitzers, 44, 57, 58, 59, 96, 102, 108, 151; S-inch, 28; 11-inch. Rus- 
sian, 60; position in model fortress, 165; see also Mortars. 

Idol Redoubt, work on, begun, 36. 

Indirect fire, 44, 57, 71, 96, 140. 

Infantry, fire of, not effective from forts when subject to artillery 
fire, 73, 168, 170; galleries for, see Galleries for the infantry; gar- 
rison of, for fortress, 127 ; garrison of, for forts, redoubts, and bat- 
teries, 100; importance of, in repulsing attack, 78, 105, 106. 

Intermediate rear cari)oniers, see Carponiers. 

Intermediate redoubts, see Redoubts. 

Intervals between forts, 73, 75, 88, 91, 99; defense of, 14; how filled 
at Port Arthur, 45 ; constant observation of, 55 ; temporary forti- 
fications in, 65 ; effect of permanent works in, 133 ; length of, 7(i ; 
in model fortress, 164; method of filling in, 79, 171, 173, 176; prob- 
able point of attack. 132; searchlights for, 112, 113. 

Interval between Forts Nos. II and III, 63, 64, 66, 70, 76, 80, 84. 88, 
99, and 125. 

James, David H., quoted, 55, 81, 114, 118. 

Kaoliang, 59, 65, 72. 

Kerosene, use of, to illuminate ditches, 1.58 ; lamps in casemates, 139. 

Kondratchenko, General, 53, 70, 74, 81, 82, 83, 145; insists upon forti- 
fication of important points, 37. 

Kuangtung Naval P.rigade, see Naval brigade. 

Kuroki. General, 175. 

Kuropatkiu, General, desires Aqueduct position fortified. .'>6, 175. 

INDEX. 185 

liabor, enii,) lUiriiij:; luobilization, -!(!. 

LiKldt^rs, scaliiit;, see Scaiiiif; ladders. 

Lamps, kcroseiu', in casoiiiatcs, l.'t'J. 

Land iniiu's, soo Mines. 

I.atrin<'s, in batteries, MS; in forts. i;!;i, 141. 144. 14.". 14t', ; in iii(,d,.i 
ri'doubt, lOU. 

Leer, General, aphorism of. ITii. 

Liaoyann, 17^, 178. 

Line of defense, main, see Line of forts. 

Lin*' of forts, 3, 78, ST. 171; at I'ort Artliiir. lo, 24. 27; distance of, 
from r<n-t Arthur, 4r>: pirrison of, at Port Arthur. 123; length of, at 
INtrt Arthur, 122; men on. pei- mile, at Port Arthur. 122. 

Looi)h<)les, 32, 30, 73, 89. 

Losses, at Port Arthur, ]2(J; in the siej^e of a modern fortress*, 129, 130. 

Machine guns, 15, 39, 42, 43, 02, 00, 08, 70, 74, 82, 100. 114, 115; as 
counter-assault guns, 143-144; in Central Enceinte, 20; for ditch de- 
fense, 144, 104, 109; galleries for, 141; for defense of intervals, 144; 
limits of range, 144 ; for sentinels, 144, 147 ; turrets for, in model 
redonl)t, 100. 

.ALagazines, 12, 1(>3, 100. 107: for tire commands. 105: in forts. 130; in 
model fortress, 105; roofs of, 151. 

Main line of defense, see Line of forts. 

Masking of defenses, etc., see Concealment. 

Material, engineering, see Engineering material. 

Messages, telephone, 04. 

Metz, siege of. 170. 

Military roads, see 1 toads. 

Miners. 1.71. 

Mines, land, 100, 141. 

Mining, 90, 1.50, 157, 172. 

Mines, naval, use of, in front of trenches, 30. 

Mobilization, necessity for plan in ease of unexpected mobilization, 30. 

Motars, 08, 102; 0-inch field, 43; 11-inch, 28. 44, 74, 89, 97, 98; effect 
of pro.iectiles on concrete, 149-150; ineffective against counterscari> 
galleries. 1.54 ; at Port Arthur, insufficient in number and of obsolete 
type, 45; position in model fortress, 105; see Howitzers. 

^Mountain artillery, 44, 4.5. 

Nanshan. .57: value of light shelters against shniimel demonstrated 
at, 1.38. 

Naval Brigade, Kuangtung. 123, 124, 120. 127. 

Naval guns, 43, 57, 90. 

Naval mines, see Mines. 

Navy, .Jai)anese. cooperation of. in land attack, 01, 04. 

Night wf>rk in a besieged fortress, 112. 

Nogi, (Jeneral, .50-04, 83, 118; decides to assault Port Arthur. ,55; plan 
to capture Port Arthur, 03; sunnnons council of war to reconsider 
plan of attack, 01, 172. 

North front, at Port Arthur, limits of and works on. 17, 38-40. 03. 

Observation, in foi-ts. 148; general discussion of. 71, 93; in model 
redoubt, 109; ))ersonnel for, (>9. 

186 INDEX. 

Observation station, 32, 40, 4(>, 72, 'M, U8, lUG ; of chief of artillery. ".7, 
106, 118; for commandant, 10G, 118, 100; telephones for sentinels in, 

Observation tower, 73; at Fort No. Ill, 32, 71. 

Observation Inrret, 141, 148; how constructed at Port Artliur, 4(i; in 
model redoubt, 109; see Schwartz observation turret. 

Obstacles, 38-41, (i4, 100, lOO, 133, 152; see Electric fence and En- 

One hundred and seveuty-four Meter Hill (174-Meter Hill), 27. 28. 43, 
49, 58, 59, 64, 70, 115, 124, 173; fortification of, demanded by (Jen- 
eral Foek, 30; importance of, 48; neglected, 50; taken, o.".. 

Outworks to forts, 134, 

0\erhead cover, 100. 

Overhead telephone lines, see Telephone lines. 

Oyama, Marshal, demands capture of Port Arthur. 55. 

Pachlunshan, 27, 37, 93, 124 ; importance of, 53. 

Paint, use of, for concealing works, 94. 

Parade, of fort, 101 ; of redoubt, 160. 

Parapets in intervals with and without ditches, 85, 133; effect of, in 
allowing decrease of garrison, 129; ditch defense for, 104: in model 
fortress, 104, 170. 

Paris, siege of, 170. 

Park, siege, see Siege park. 

Passages, covered, see Covered passages; in parapets, for troops, 
164, 177. 

Pebbles, use of, in parapets and for revetments, see Stones. 

Pigeon Bay, fortitication of, 30, 43. 

Port Arthur, fortress of, plan and armament, 15, 43; condition of, at 
the beginning of the investment, 37; condition at the beginning of 
the war, 29; garrison of, 122, 123; object of defense of. 170; Col- 
onel Velichko's plan for fortifying, 21. 

Positions, advanced, see Advanced positions. 

Postern, in f<jrt, 35, 130 ; roofs of, 151. 

Pyroxylin, 74, 145. 

Railways, fortress, 40, 103, 105, 109, 110, 131; belt, 110; electric. 110; 
portable, 105; none at Port Arthur, 108; steam, 109. 11(». 

Railway troops, 131. 

Ramparts, at Fort No. Ill, thickness of. 130, 

Ramps, for counter-assault guns, 138; in model redouitts. ic.'.t. 

Rapid-tire guns, 08, 78, 84, 

Rapp, General, uses advanced positions at Danzig. 54. 

Reconnoitering guns, 97, 102; in model fortress, 105; should not be 
mounted in forts, 135, 140. 

Red Cross, 41, 03. 

Redoubt, intermediate, 79; importance of, 1.33; model. 100; search- 
lights foi-, 112. 

Redoubt No. 3, description of, 25; condition at beginning of war. ;>0: 
cause of loss of, 145; effect of capture of, 133; other references, 
143, 144, 140, 150, 101. 

Reenforced concrete, see Concrete. 

INDEX. 187 

lioserves, GO, 07, GS, Gl), SG, 88, 'JO, !)1, 101, IL'.!. TJ.'., IJf,. lL!7-i;;u. itr,, 

KetreiRliments, 101, 107. 

lit'vetuients. ceiiieiit barn'ls tilled with stDiics. :;;;, 140; sec s,iuil l»a.i.'s. 
Kitlo tire, 72, 77, 78, 79; see Sniiill anus. 

lioads, military, 37, oS-4o, 4(5, 108-110; in hkuIcI lortress. Hi.".. 
Salvo fire. 100. 
Sand bags, 80, 89, 138, 1-14. 

Sai)i)ers, G4, 12.j, 130-131 ; streugtli of Itnssian sapjier coinpaiiy, 131. 
Sapping, 98, 172; see Mining. 

Sauer, Bavarian general, plan to assault fortress. ,").".. \u. 
Scaling ladders, 09, 152-153. 
Scarps, 153; concrete, 154, 109. 
Schwartz observation tnri'et, 34. 
Sentinels, 147, 148, 159; covered way for, 105. 
Seacoast batteries, at Port Arthur, number and description. 21, 22. 
Searchlights, 40, 40, 01, 73, 77, 78, 82, 83, 110, 170; installation ..f, in 

forts, 157 ; in model fortress, 16G. 
Sebastopol, siege of, 54, 79, 105, 107. 
Second line of defense, 86, 87 ; in model fortress, 100; searchlights for. 

Semai)hores, 41, 121. 

Shell, GO. 08, 71, 84. 140, 141; high explosive, 08. 
Shells, star, see Star shells. 
Shelter, bombproof, 33, 30, 05, 00, 70, 72, SO, 88, 89, 90, 100, 134, 100; 

for counter-assault guns, 45, 134, 130, 138 ; for observation, 134 ; for 

officers, 139, 145; against shrapnel, 138. 
Shields, for counter-assault guns, 32; In forts against shrapnel and 

rifle bullets, 147, 108; for garrison of interAals, 88: for guns, 71; 

for personal protection, 144. 
Shoshin, Col. A. P., 7.3, 168. 

Shrapnel, 00, 08, 71, 78, 140; value of light shelter against, 138. 
Shrubs, use of, for concealment, 94. 
Shutters, iron plate, 32. 
Siege park of Japanese, 44, 
Sleeping shelves, in casemates, 139, 160. 
Small arms, limits of range, 144 ; elbow rests for, 147 ; fire of. see Rifle 

Smirnoff, General, 00. 
Soil, nature of, at l^)rt Arthur, 108, 136. 
Sotnia, strength of, 41. 
Star shells, 82, 83, 114. 

Station, observation, see Observation station and Observation tower. 
Stoessel, General, desires construction of Idol Redoubt begun, 36. 
Stones, use of, in para])ets and for revetments, 33, 35, 36, 89, 140, 156. 
Storerooms in forts, 145, 160. 
Straw, use of, to illuminate ditches, 158. 

Takushan, 27, 55, 92, 124, 125 ; condition of, at beginning of the in- 
vestment and garrison. 38; importance of, 48, 50-52, 137. 142; 

poorly fortified, 45; position at, neglected, 36, 37, 50; reason for oc- 

188 INDEX. 

I'upyiii};, 1!>: sliuuld b;ivi' bei'u iiichulcd in lu.-iiii liiu', 44; slopes of, 

covered by fire of Fort >'o. I, 10, and of r.attery A, liattery I?, and 

Round Battery, 24; taken, 49. 
Telegrajjb, use of, in fortress, 116, 119, 121. 
Telephone luessages, 04. 
Telephones, 41, 04, 93, 101, 110; artillery, 40, 102, TOO, 110, 117, 120, 

160; in forts, 139, 141, 147; .Japanese, .50, .57, 04, 102, 118; metallic 

conuection, 120, 121, 10(»; neirleoted at I'oi't Arthur, 37; overhead, 

37, 46, 07, 119, 148; for sentinels in forts, 147; underground, 14, 

119, 120, 105, 166. 
I'eshima, General, 57. 
Tiuichenko-Ruban, M., quoted, 15, 49. 
Todleben. General, 105, 170. 

Torpedoes, Whitehead, see Whitehead torpedoes. 

Tower, ol)servation, see Observation tower and Obsorvation stations. 
Transportation, employed mobilization. 40. loi; -. for eugiueers, 

107, 108. 
Travei'ses, between guns, 99; at exits, 100, 137, 138, 142; in tuodel 

fort, 101; in model redoubt, 107, 108. 
Trees, planting of. 93, 109, 103, 165. 
Trenches, .3S-13, 75, 91; at Fort No. Ill, 138, 1.5.5, 161 : can not stand 

onrush of energetic attack, 170, 173; two tier.s of. 41. 
I'rous-de-loup, 42. 
Turf, use of, for concealment, 94. 
Turret, observation, see Schwartz observation turret. 
Turrets, for guns in forts, 14; for machine guns, 105, 169; s^^e Ob- 
servation turrets. 
Two hundred and three Meter Hill (20.3-Meter Hill), 27, 77, 03, 103, 

124, 127: fortification of, insisted upon by the comniandatit, 30; 

losses inflicted on enemy, 53; position at, neglected, 50; weakly held 

at beginning of investment, 43. 
\'auban, dictum of, 159. 
Velichko, K.. quoted, 3,. 27, 80, 90, 100, 10,5, 122, 170. 171. 174; i>iaa for 

fortifying Port Arthur. 21 ; views upon difficulties of fortifyiug Port 

Arthur, 21, 50. 
\'isibility 1)etween forts. 45, 77, 78. 
Wall, Chinese, see Chinese wall. 
Walls, concrete, thickness of, 28, 45, 88, 97, 148, 109. 
Water for forts, 145, 140. 
West front, limits of and works on, 17. 
Whitehead torpedoes, stations at Port Arthur for firing, 24 ; presence 

of, in land forts, 145. 
Wire entanglements, see Entanglements. 
Wireless telegraphy, 117, 119, 121; .Japanese system, 57, 118; system 

installed at Port Arthur but not used. 46, 
Work, closed, see Closed work ; night, see Night work, 
AVorks, advanced, see Advanced works and Advanced positions. 




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