Full text of "An essay on the origin of evil."

E S M A Y

O N T H E

ORIGIN of E V I L.

By Dr. William King, late Lord
Archbifhop of DUBLIN.

Translated from the Latin, with large Notes; tending
to explain and vindicate fome of the Author's Principles Againft
the Objections of Bayle, Leibnitz, the Author of a Philofophtcal
Enquiry concerning Human Liberty j and others.

^To which is prefix'd

A DISSERTATION

Concerning the
Fundamental Principle and immediate Criterion of Virtue,

AS ALSO,

The Obligation to, and Approbation of it.

With fome account of

The Origin of the TaJJions and Aftettims.

LONDON:

Printed for W. Thurlbourn Bookfeller in Cambridge; and fold by
R. Knaplock, J. and J. Knaptcn, and W. Innis in St. Paul's
Church-Tard London. M.DCC.XXXI. ,

THE

Tranflator's Preface.

mn'^i

i,Have always look'd upon an Enquiry into the Caufe
and Origin of Evil, as one of the noblefl and mod
important Subje&s in Natural Theology : It leads
us into the moft exalted Speculations concerning
the Exiftence and Attributes of God, and the Ori-
ginal of Things. It jBrfl difcovers the true Intent
of the Deity in creating any Beings at all, and then
purfues that Intent thro' the feveral Works of his Creation: it {hews
how this is fully anfwer'd by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how
it might and fhould be, and why, and in what refpedt it is not by
the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Oeconomy in the Govern-
ment of the Univerfe, fearches into the various Schemes of Provi-
dence, and takes in the whole Compafs of Nature. Neither is its
Uf'efufaefs inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends
to act upon any ferious Views here, or to entertain any folid Hopes of

a 2 Futuritv.;

363Y50

iv. PREFACE.

Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in fome degree, is abfolutely ne-
ceflfary in order to the fettling in our Minds right Notions of the
Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him j in order to
the due Apprehenfion of his Defign in creating, preferving, and di-
4 recting us, and to the regular Conduct of our Lives, and Enjoyment
of ourfelves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us.
Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Plea-
fure can we take in knowing any other ? When I enquire how I
got into this World, and came to be what I am j I'm told that an
abfolutely perfect: Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me
here on purpofe to communicate fome Part of his Happinefs to me-,

and to make me, in fome meafure, like himfelf.- This End is not

obtain'd; the direct: contrary appears; )I find myfelf furrounded
with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Milery ; by whofe fault I
know not, How to better myfelf I cannot tell. What No-
tions of God and Goodnefs can this afford me? What Ideas, of

Religion ? What Hopes of a future State ? For,, if

God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown ; if it be neither
his Glory, (as fome will have it) which my prefent State is far from

advancing ; nor mine own Good, which the fame is equally in-

conhttent with - f how know I what I'm to do here, and in what man-
ner I mutt endeavour to pleafe him ? or why (hould I endeavour it
at all ? For, if I mult be miferable in this World, what Secu-
rity have I that I mail not be fo in another too j (if there be one)
fince, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for

ought I fee) have been happy in both? Such Thoughts as

thefe mult needs difturb a Perfon that has any Concern for his Ma-
ker's Honour, or his own Happinefs; that defires to pay him a reafo-
nable Service, and anfwer the End of his Creation : in fhort, that
happens either to think at all upon thefe things, or to think for him-
felf. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mirld of fome of thefe
Perplexities, cannot fure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one
of thefe Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind, which can
never be unfeafonable. But the Ufefulnefs, as well as Antiqui-
ty, of the prefent Debate ; and the Abfurdity of the Manichean
bcheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explain'd, and need

not

PREFACE. v.

not here be infifted on: all that ever feem'd wanting to an entire
Conquefl over thefe Hereticks, and their abfurd Hypothefis, was on-
ly a. tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them
into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear
before I have done.

There . are two general ways of Reafoning, called Arguments
a Prior?, and a Pojieriori ; or, according to what Logicians com-
monly flile the Synthetical and Analytical Method: The former lays
down fome evident Principles, and then deduces the feveral Confe-
quences neceffarily refulting from them : The latter begins with the
Phcene?nena themfelves, and traces 'em up to their Original, and
from the known Properties of thefe Phcenomena arrives at the Na-
ture of their Caufe. Now the former of thefe is evidently prefera-
ble, where it can be had, (and I think it may be had almoft every
where, but in the firft Gaofe) fince the Utter muft depend upon a
large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invali-
dates the whole Argument, and quite fpoils a Demonflration. " It is
' ; very true (fays Dr. J. Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 79.) that this is-
" not a ftrict Demonflration of the general Conclufion, becaufe that
" can be had no other way than by trying all the Experiments
" that can poffibly be made every where, which is infinite and
" endlefs; but it is the beft that the Nature of the thing is capa-
" bk of."

Now, if the Thing before us will admit of the former Method,
then I think it is capable of a much better; and an Attempt to mew
that it is fo, mufl be very defirable : And this our Author feems to
have done, without any precarious Syflem, or ill-grounded Hypo-
thefis whatfoever. His fuperior Excellence (as I apprehend) confifls
in having laid down, and previoufly eftablifh'd fuch folid fubftantiar
Principles as may be drawn out in infinitum, and eafily apply' d to all
the Difficulties that attend the prefent Queftion. He firft of all en-
quires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Defign
in the Creation ; fettles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines
whether any could be perfect j and if not, whether all mould have

been

vi. T R E F A C E.

been made equally imperfect ; or feveral in very different Gaffes and
Degrees. Having proved the laft of thefe Opinions to be the true one,
he proceeds to the lovvelt Clafs of Beings: viz. Material Ones: He
enquires into the Nature and effential Properties of Matter, and the
Laws of its Motion, and thereby eftabliffies fuch Rules as direct us
to the Solution of all the Difficulties attending it, as distributed in-
to various Maffes, Syftems and Animated Bodies. He fhews the una-
voidablenefs, and abfolute neceffity of contrary Motions in Matter, for
the fame Reafons that it had any Motion at all, and confequently
of Attrition, Corruption and Dijjolution, and all the Natural Evils
that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a Self-
moving Principle, and the manner of its Operation, he deduces all
the Irregularities incident to Volition, and the Actions confequent
thereupon. He ffates at large the true Notion of Free-Will, aiid
demonftrates the abfolute Neceffity for it in every Rational Being,
in order to its Happinefs. Then accounts for the feveral Abules of
it, and the Moral Evils arifing from thence, and examines all the
poffible Ways of preventing them ; and upon the whole makes it ap-
pear, that none of thefe could have been originally avoided, or can
novv be removed, without introducing greater; and confequently
that the very PermifTion of thefe Evils, and the Production and Pre-
fervation of thefe Beings, in the pref^nt State, is the higheft In-
ffance of infinite Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs. Now thefe are
not mere Arguments ad ignorantiam : This is not telling us, that
we muft believe fuch and fuch things to be the fure Effects of an
infinitely wife and good God, tho' no Marks of either Wifdom or
Goodnefs appear in them ; which, tho' it may be true, and all that
perhaps can be faid in fome particular Cafes, yet has, I think, but
very little Tendency towards either the Conviction of an Infidel, or
the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Perfon is ieriouily con*
templating any Parts of Nature, and folicitouily enquiring into their
feveral Ends and Ufes, no Pleafure furely can arife to himfelf, nor
Devotion toward the Author of it, merely from the Perplexity and
Unaccountable nefs of thofe Parts. Nay every fuch lnitance, one
would think, in u it caff a damp upon his Spirits, and prove an un-
grateful

PREFACE.

grateful Reflection on his Weaknefs, a mortifying Argument of his
Imperfection. Whereas one fingle Perplexity clear'd up, or Ohiec-
tion anfwer'd, is a piece of real Knowledge gain'd, upon which he

can congratulate himfelf, ard glorify his Maker. Our Author

therefore was not content with mere Negative Arguments, and bare-
ly avoiding Difficulties, by removing all Defecls from external things
to ourfelves, and multiplying Inftances of the Narrovvnefs and Weak-
nefs of Human Underftanding : (which any one that thinks at all
will foon be convinced of, and heartily defirous of having it fome-
what enlarg'd and improved, to which this manner of Argumen-
tation, I fear, contributes very little.) But he attacks his Adverfarics in
their ftrongeft. Holds, and plucks up the Manickean Hcrefy by the
Roots : he fhews by certain pre-eftabliuYd Rules, and neceflary Con-
fequence, that we can eafily reduce all to one fupreme Head, and
clearly comprehend how the prelent ftate of things is the very
belt, in all refpects, and worthy of a mofl wife, powerful, and be-
neficent Author : And why, taking the whole Syilem of Beings to-
gether, and every Clafs of them in its own Order, none could pof-
fibly have been made more perfect, or placed in a better. He
proves, in the firft place (as we obferv'd) that no created Beings
could be abfolutely perfect, and in the next, that no manner of E-
vil, or Imperfection, was tolerated in them, but what was, either
in their Clafs and manner of Exiftence, abfolutely unavoidable, or
elfe productive of fome Good more than equivalent : In both
which Cafes there will be the fame Reafons for the Creation of
fuch Beings in fueh Circumftances, together with their concomi-
tant Evils, as there was for any Creation at all : For which the
fole Reafon will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of com-
municating Happinefs to as many Beings as could be made capa-
ble of it, on the very bell: Terms j or a Refolution not to omit the
lean: Degree of pure Good on account of fuch Evils, as did not
counterbalance it: Or (which is the very fame, (ince 'twill be c-
vident, that the Prevention of all the prefent Evils in any concei-
vable Manner, would have been of worfe Confequence than the
Permiffion of them) an Intention always to choofe the leaft of two

Evils,

vn.

viiL ? R E F A<C E.

Evils, when both cannot be avoided. This mutt, be granted,

to come up to the Point; and when it is once made apparent,
will be a full and fufficient Anfwer to that old triumphant Que-
ftion, u&v to kaW ; 'twill be an ample Vindication of the Di-
vine Providence, a Demonftration of the Power, and Wifdom,
and Goodnefs of God, in the Production, Prefervation, and Go-
vernment of the Univerfe ; and as much as a reafonable Man can
either expect or defire. And I heartily wiih this Method had
been taken by more of thofe Authors that have wrote on the pre~
lent Subject, and the Argument purfued a little farther by Natu-
ral Light, in order to give fome Light and Confirmation even to
Revelation itfelf, in thefe inquifitive Days, wherein a great many
feem unwilling to be determined by its fole Authority; wherein
Men are not a little inclined to call every thing into queftion ;

and a weak Argument is fure to be exploded.- Even the moft

learned and ingenious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scrip-
ture when a Difficulty begins to prefs him : which, in my Opi-
nion, is deferting the Argument, and owning, with Mr. Bay le (in
his Explanation touching the Manichees at the End of his Dictio-
nary) " that the Queftion cannot be defended on any other foot."

Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanfwerable by Reafon,

or a plain Contradulion to our natural Notions of God; if (as
the fore-mentioned Author often urges) " we perceive by our
" clear and diftinct Ideas, that fuch a thing is entirely repugnant

* to his Nature and Attributes," referring us to Scripture, which

declares that an infinitely perfect Being did conftitute it thus, will
be no manner of Satisfaction, fince (upon this Suppofition) we can-
not have greater AfTurance that this Scripture comes from him, than
we have that the Dotirine therein contain'd is abfurd and impof-
fible. And what that ingenious Perfon's Intent might be in repre-
fenting the Matter thus, and then referring us to Scripture for an
Anfwer, I cannot determine. But fure I am, that his Account of
it ferv.es rather to betray the Caufe, and undermine the Authority
of both Reafon and Revelation, and is enough (if no better could
be given) to make a Perfon that argues confequentially reject all
kinds of Religion. Farther, every one muft have obferv'd, that moft
Authors upon this Subject treat of God's Difpenfations toward Man,

TREFACE. i x .

as if they were fpeaking of one Man's Behaviour toward ano-
ther. They think it fufficient to make the Almighty choofe the
moft prudent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happinefs; and
act upon the higheft Probability, tho, upon what account foever
it matters not, he fail of his End. This may indeed be the beft
manner of acting in all finite, imperfect Beings, and fufficient to
acquit theGoodnefs and Juftice of God, but is very far from fatisfy-
ing his Wifdom. To a perfect Being who forefees the Effects of all
poflible Caufes and Means, as the fame Authors allow God to do,
thefe only appear fit and eligible for the effects and Ends which they
will certainly produce. Nor is it any reafon why I mould purfue a
Method which is apt and wont to fucceed in moft Cafes, if I know ir
will fail in this. To a Perfon therefore that takes all the Attributes of
God together, and confiders the whole Scheme of Providence from
end to end, it will not appear a complete and fatisfactory Vindication
of them, to aflert that God either now makes Men, or fuffers them
to make themfelves miferable, for rejecting that Happinefs which he
at firft made them capable of, and endow'd them with fuch Powers,
and placed them in fuch Circumftances as render'd it naturally poflible
and even eafie to be attain'd by them: tho' this may indeed clear his
Juftice and lay the Blame upon ourfelves : And yet thefe Writers ge-
nerally content themfelves with going thus far: They bring all our
Sin and Mifery from the abufe of Free- Will, i. e. a Power whereby
Man might have acted otherwife, and prevented it j without ever ex-
plaining the Nature of this Principle, or (lie wing the Worth and Ex-
cellence of it, and proving that, as far as we can apprehend, more
Good in general arifes from the donation of fuch a Self-moving Po-
wer, together with all thefe forefeen Abufes of it, than could poffibly
have been produced without it. To demonftrate this was an Attempt
worthy of our Author, who has at leaft laid a noble Foundation for
it, and feems to be the firft that has propofed the true Notion of hu-
man Liberty, and explained it confidently: All the Doubts and Diffi-
culties attending which intricate Queftion, will, I hope, be tolerably
cleared up ; or at leaft, fuch Principles eftablifh'd as may he fufficient
for that Purpofe, by this Treatife of his, and the Notes upon it. But
fo much for the Subject and our Author's way of treating it.

As for the Tranjlation, 'tis barely Literal : I endeavour'd to keep
clofe to the Author's Senfe, and generally to his very Words : fo that the

b Reader

x. T R E FA C E.

Reader may be pretty fure of finding Dr. King here at leaft. I once
intended to have cut off every thing that 1 could not defend, efpvrially
about the Beginning (which ufed to difcourage moft Readers from per-
ufing the reft of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have
been omitted;) but coniidering that he h.\d involv'd it fo clofely in
the reft of his Scheme, that the whole would feem confufed without

it that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it and

that fome, probably, would be defirous of feeing even the moft im-
perfect Notions of fo great a Philofopher ; I contented myfelf

with omitting only part of his firft Note, and obviating the reft all a-
long, both from other Authors, and fuch Obfervations of my Ovvn as
occurr'd upon the Subject.

Some perhaps may think the frequent and long Quotations very te-
dious, and introduced only to fluff up. 1 can only anfxver, that I

intended the Notes, and References together, to point out a fort of
Compendium of Metapfjyfics, or Speculative Divinity; by directing the
Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjects which our Au-
thor touch'd upon; and which could not be found in any one particular
Book, nor collected from feveral, without much Trouble and Confufi-
on, and unneceffary Reading. I chofe rather to quote the very Words
of the Authors, than either ufe worfe of my own, or pretend todifcover
what had been often difcovered before; or repeat the fame things over
and over again, which is endlefs. I hope the Reader will find that a
citation of two or more Authors on the fame Point is not always tauto-
logy : and I believe it will appear, that in the multitude of References
more than one is fcarce ever made to the fame Place, except upon a ve-
ry different Occafion, or in fome different Light. A Writer feems to
me to do more good to the Public by (hewing the ufe of fome of thofe
many Volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; tho'
this be of much lefs Advantage to his private Character. I determin'd
therefore not to fay any thing myfelf where I could bring another con-
veniently to fay it for me; and tranferibed only fo much from others as
I judg'd abfolutely neceffary to give the Reader afhort View of the Sub-
ject we were upon, and by that Sketch to induce thofe who have leifure,
opportunity and inclination to go farther, and confult tpe Originals ; and
to afford fome prefent Satisfaction to thofe who have not.

But how judicioufly this is perform'd, the Notes themfelves muft te-
ftify, for all that I can fay by way of Preface will never mend the matter.

iitjofniv,

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.

Concerning the

Fundamental Principle

o F

VIRTUE or MORALITY.

HO' all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what
particular Actions are virtuous and what otherwife ; yet they
have, or at leaft feem to have difTer'd very much, both con-
cerning the Criterion of Virtue, viz. what it is which denomi-
nates any Action virtuous j or, to fpeak more properly, what it is by
which we muit try any Action to know whether it be virtuous or no;
and alfo concerning the Principle or Motive by which Men are indu-
ced to purfue Virtue.

As to the former, fome have placed it in acting agreeably to Na-
ture, or Reafon j others in the Fitnefs of things ; others in a Conformi-
ty with Truth j others in promoting the Common Good ; others in the
Will of God, &c. This Difagreement of Moralifts concerning the
Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the fame time their
almoft perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it,
would be apt to make one fufpect, either that they had a different
Criterion (tho' they did not know or attend to it) from what they

b 2 profefs'd ;

xii. 'Preliminary ^Diffcrtation.

profefs'd; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favoura-
ble Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of
them have die fame Criterion in reality, only they have exprefs'd it in
different Wotds.

And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we
confider the Ideas themfelves about which Morality is chiefly conver-
fant, viz. that they are all mixed Modes, or compound Ideas arbitrarily
put together, hating at nrft no Archetype or Original exifting, and af-
terwards no other than that which exifts in other Mens Minds.
Now fince Men, unlefs they have thefe their compound Ideas, which
are fignify'd by the fame Name, made up precifely of the fame Am-
ple ones, mufl neceffarily talk a different Language j and fince this dif-
ference ic fo difficult, and in fome Cafes impofiible to be avoided, it
follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to
thefe Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to under-
stand them) we mould not always take their Words in the common
Acceptation, but in the Senfe in which we find that particular Au-
thor which we are reading ufed them. And if a Man interpret the
Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe tbeir feeming In-
confiftencies and Difagreements about the Criterion of Virtue,
would in a great meafure vanifh ; and he would find that aBing a-
greeably to Nature^ or Reafon, (when rightly understood) would per-
fectly coincide with the Fitnefs of things j the Fitnefs of things (as far
as thefe Words have any meaning) with Truth', Truth with the Com-
mon Good ; and the Common Good with the Will of God.

But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can fcarce
avoid obferving from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of moil par-
4 ticular Virtues, and alfo a confufed Notion of Virtue in general, be-
fore they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or ever did, neither
perhaps can they, deduce all or any of thofe Virtues from their Idea
of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds fhew how thole
.ions fwhich the World call Moral, and moft, if not all Men evi-
dently have Ideas of) are diftinguifh'd from other Actions, or why
they approve of thofe Actions call'd Moral ones, more than o-

ther

But

Preliminary THjfcrtation.

xiii.

But fince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ
in other refpects) includes either tacitly or exprefly, not only the Idea
of Approbation as the Confequence of it j but alfo that it is to every
one, and in all Circumflances, an Object of Choice ; it is incumbent
on all Writers of Morality, to (hew that that in which they place
Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet with
Approbation, but alfo that it is always an Object of Choice j which
is the other great Difpute among Moralifts, viz. What is the
Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purfue Vir-
tue.

For fome have imagin'd that that is the only Object of Choice
to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more
Happinefs than Mifery to the Choofer ; and that Men are and ought
to be guided wholly by this Principle ; and farther, that Virtue will
produce more Happinefs than Mifery, and therefore is always an
Object of Choice : and whatever is an Object of Choice, that we ap-
prove of.

But this, however true in Theory, is infufficient to account for
Matter of Fact, i. e. that the generality of Mankind do approve of
Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any
Reafon for their Approbation; and alfo, that fome purfue it with-
out knowing that it tends to their own private Happinefs ; nay even
when it appears to be inconfiflent with and deftructive of their Hap-
pinefs.

And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the En- *v
quiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue has fo evidently made
appear by a great Variety of Inftances, that a Man muft be either
very little acquainted with the World, or a mere Hobbifi in his Teiri-
per to deny it.

And therefore to folve thefe two Difficulties, this excellent Au-
thor has fuppofed (without proving^ unlefs by mewing the ineffici-
ency of all other Schemes) a Moral Senfe to account for the for-
mer, and a public or benevolent Aff'eclion for the latter: And thefe,
<uiz. the Moral Senfe and Public Affection, he fuppofes to be im-
planted in us like InfincJs, independent of Rea/on, and previous to

any

xiv. Trclimtnary Dijjcrtation. , iY

any Inftruclion; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can
be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we
pretend to account for the Pleafure or Pain which arifes from
Seniation ; i. e. Why any particular Motion produced in our Bo-
dies mould be accompany'd with Pain rather than Pleafure, and vi-
ce verfa.

But this Account feems ftill infufficient, rather cutting the Knot
than untying it, and if it is not a-kin to the Doctrine of Innate Ideas,
yet I think it relifhes too much of that of Ocult Qualities. This in-
genious Author is certainly right in his Obfervations upon the Inef-
ficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our EkStion
and Approbation of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Neceflity of
fuppofing a Moral Senfe (i. e. a Power or Faculty whereby we may
perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of
Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of
human Life. But then by calling thefe Injlincls, I think he flops too
foon, imagining himfelf at the Fountain-head, when he might have
traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Ac-
tions, our own Happine/s.

And this will appear by mewing, that our Approbation of Mo-
rality, and all Affections whatfoever, are finally refolvable into Rea-
fon y pointing out private Happinejs y and are converfant only about
things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that when-
ever this end is not perceiv'd, they are to be accounted for from
the Ajjbciation of Ideas^ 4nd may properly enough be call'd Habits.

For if this is clearly made out, the Neceflity of fuppofing a Mo-
. ral Senfe, or public Affections to be implanted in us, iince it arifeth
only from the Infuificiency of all other Schemes to account for hu-
man Actions, will immediately vanifh. But whether it be made out
or no, we may obferve in general, that all Arguments ad Ignoran-
tiam y or that proceed a Remotione only (as this, by which the Moral
Senfe and public Affections are eftablifh'd to be Inftincts, evidently
does) are fcarce ever perfectly fatisfactory, being for the moft part
fubject to this Doubt, viz. Whether there is a full Enumeration of
all the Parts j and liable alfo to this Objection, viz. That tho' lean-
not

'Preliminary Qiffertation*

not account for Phenomena otherwife, yet poffibly they may be-o-
therwife accounted for.

But before we can determine this Point, it will be neceflary to
fettle all the Terms : We fhall in the firft place therefore enquire

what is meant by the Criterion of Virtue.

__ .

tO \{3lHa:yl

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Criterion of Virtue

' 1 x H E Criterion of any rhing is a Rule or Meafure by a Con-
L formity with which any thing is known to be of this or that
fort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the Cri-
terion of any thing, we muft firft know the thing whofe Criterion
we are feeking after. For a Meafure prefuppofes the Idea of the
thing to be meafured, otherwife it could not be known (fince what
is the proper Meafure of one thing is not fo of another) whether it
was fit to meafure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Flefh, have all
different Meafures ; Gold and Silver different Touchftones. This is
very intelligible, and the Method of doing it generally clear, when
either the Quantity or Kind of any particular Subftance is thus to be
afcertain'd.

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abftracT:,
mix'd Modes, which have no Exiftence but in our Minds, and are
fo very different in different Men ; we are apt to be confounded,
and fearch after a Meafure for we know not what. For unlefs we

are

XV.

mi. Trcliminary 'Differ tat ion.

are firfl agreed concerning the thing to be meafur'd, we fhall in vain
expect to agree in our Criterion ot it, or even to underftand one a-
nother.

But it may be faid, if we are exactly agreed in any mix'd Mode,
what need of any Criterion, or what can we want farther ? What
we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this j
viz. to know whether any inferior or particular thing do belong to
this mix'd Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For
let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never fo clear-
ly, and if you pleafe let this be the Idea, viz. the Eating or Drink-
ing to that degree as to injure his Understanding or Health ; and let
him alfo be never fo much convine'd of the Obligation to avoid it ;
yet it is a very pertinent Queftion in him to afk you, How fhall I
know when I am guilty of Intemperance ?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we fhall find that every little
difference in the Definition of a mix'd Mode will require a diffe-
rent Criterion, e. g. If Murder is defined the wilful taking away
the Life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criteri-
on of Murder, is to enquire how we fhall know when the Life of
another is taken away wilfully ; i. e. when one who takes away the Life
of another does it with that malicious Defign which is implied by
Wilfulnefs. But if Murder be defined the Guilty taking away the
Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murdet, is to
enquire how it fhall be known when Guilt is contracted in the ta-
king away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Murder,
according to one or other of thefe Definitions, will be different.
For Wilfulnefs perhaps will be made the Criterion of Guilt, but
Wilfulnefs itfelf, if it want any, muff have fome farther Crite-
rion, it being evident that nothing can be the Meafure of it-
felf.

If the Criterion is contained in the Idea itfelf, then it is merely
nominal , e. g. If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the
Will of God : To fay the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue,
is only to fay, what is agreeable to the Will of God is call'd Vir-
tue. But the real Criterion, which is of fome ufe, is this, How fhall
I know what the Will of God is in this refpect ?

From

'Preliminary 7)iJfertation xvii.

From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mix'd Mode is
neither the Definition of it> nor contain'd in it. For, as has been
fhewn, the general Idea is necerTarily to be fix'd ; and if tr.e Par-
ticulars comprehended under it are fix'd or known alfo, there re-
mains nothing to be meafured, becaufe we meafure only things un-
known. The general Idea then being fix'd, the Criterion which is
to meafure or determine Inferiors, mull: be found out and proved
to be a proper Rule or Meafure, by comparing it with the gene-
ral Idea only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to
be apply'd. For the truth of the Meafure muft be proved inde-
pendently of the Particular to be meafured, otherwife we mail prove
in a Circle.

To apply what has been faid in general to the Cafe in hand.
Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of Virtue ; but it is to
be fear'd that few know diftinctly what it is they are enquiring
after ; and therefore this muft be clearly ftated. And in Order to
this, we muft (as has been (hewn) firft fix our Idea of Virtue, and
that exactly; and then our Enquiry will be, how we fhall know
this or that lefs general or particular Action to be comprehended under
Virtue. For unlefs our Idea of Virtue is fix'd, we enquire after the
Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give
any Satisfaction, ought to be fo general as to be conformable to that
which all or moft Men are fuppofed to have. And this general I-
dea, I think, may be thus exprefs'd.

Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the ABions of
all rational Creatures with refpett to each other's Happinefs ; to which
Conformily every one in all Cafes is obliged: and every one that does fo
conform, is or ought to be approved of- ejlee?ned and loved for fo doing.
What is here exprefs'd, I believe every one, or moft, put into their
Idea of Virtue.

For Virtue, among all, or moft, does imply fome relation to others :
where Self is Only concern'd, a Man may be prudent but not virtuous;
and an Action which relates immediately to God, is ftiled Religi-
ous.

I think alfo that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to confift in,
yet always make it to imply Obligation and Approbation.

c The

xviii. Preliminary %)if[ertation.

The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire after the Criterion
of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are obligd
to conform or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct
me in my Behaviour towards others, which ought always to be pur-
fucd, and which, if purfued, will or ought to procure me Appro-
bation, Efteem, and Love.

But before I can anfwer this Enquiry, I muft firft fee what I mean
by Obligation.

S E C T. II.

Concerning Obligation.

ligation is the necefjity of doing or omitting any ABion in order to
'be happy : L e. when there is fuch a relation between an Agent
and any Action that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or o-
mitting that Action, then the Agent is fa id to be obliged to do or o-
mit that Action. So that Obligation is evidently founded upon the
profpect of Happinefs, and arifes from that neceflary Influence which
any Action has upon prefent or future Happinefs or Mifery. And no
greater Obligation can be fuppofed to be laid upon any free Agent
without an exprefs Contradiction. /

This Obligation may be confider'd four ways, according to the four
different manners in^which it is induced : Firft, that Obligation which
arifeth from perceiving the natural Confequences of things, i. e. the
Confequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature,
may be call'd Natural. Secondly, that arifing from Merit or Deme-
rit, as producing the Efteem and Favour of our Fellow-Creatures )
or the contrary, is ufually ftiled virtuous. Thirdly, that arifing from
the Authority of the Civil Magiftrate, Civil. Fourthly, that from the
Authority of God, Religious.

Now

Treliminary Differtation. xix.

Now from the Confederation of thefe four forts of Obligation
(which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obli-
gation which will extend to all Cafes, can only be that arifing from
the Authority of God-, becaufe God only can in all Cafes make a Man
happy or miferable : and therefore, fince we are always obliged to
that conformity call'd Virtue, it is evident that the immediate Rule or
Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the whole Will of God the
Criterion of Virtue ? No. For tho' the whole Will of God is equal-
ly obligatory; yet, fince Virtue was defined to be the conformity to
a Rule directing my Behaviour with refpect to my Fellow-Creatures,
the Will of God can be no farther concern'd about Virtue, than as it
directs me in that Behaviour.

The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of God in this par-
ticular is, or what it directs me to do ?

Now it is evident from the Nature of God, viz. his being infinite-
ly happy in himfelf from all Eternity, and from his Goodnefs mani-
fefted in his Works, that he could have no other Defign in creating
Mankind than their Happinefs; and therefore he wills their Happi-
nefs ; therefore the means of their Happinefs : therefore that my Be-
haviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happinefs of Mankind,
fhould be fuch. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new
Criterion: not to a new Criterion of Virtue immediately, but to a
Criterion of the Will of Gcd. For it is an Anfwer to the Enquiry,
How fhall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus
the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the Hap-
pinefs of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of God ; and therefore
the Happinefs of Mankind may be (aid to be the Criterion of Virtue,
but once removed.

And fince I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promot-
ing the Happinefs of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Cri-
terion of this Happinefs: i.e. how fhall 1 know what in my Power
is, or is not, for the Happinefs of Mankind ?

Now this is to be known only from the Relations of things, (which
Relations, with refpect to our prefent Enquiry, fome have call'd their
Fitnefs and Unfitnefs.) For lome Things and Actions are apt to pro-
duce Pleafure, others Pain; fome are convenient, others inconvenient

c 2 for

xx. Preliminary c Differtation.

for ft Society ; .fome are for the good of Mankind, others tend to the-
detriment of it : therefore thofe are to be chofen which tend to the
good of Mankind ; the others to be avoided.

Thus then we are got one ftep farther, viz. to the Criterion of the
Happinefs of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all parti-
cular Virtues and Vices.

The next Enquiry is, How fhall I know that there is this Fitnefs
and Unfitnefs in things ? or if there be, how fhall I difcover it in par-
ticular Cafes ? And the Anfwer is, Either from Experience or Reafon.
You either perceive the Incnveniencies of fome Things and Actions
when they happen j or you forefee them by contemplating the Nature
of the Things and Actions.

Thus the Criterion of the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of things may in general',
be faid to be Reafon : which Reafon, when exactly conformable to the
things exifting, /'. e. when it judges of things as they are, is called
Right Reafon. And hence alfo we fometimes talk of the Reafon of
things, i. e. properly fpcaking, that Relation which we mould find out
by our Reafon, if our Reafon was right.

The expremng by outward Signs the Relations of things as they
really are, is called Truth; and hence, by the fame kind of Meta-
phor, we are apt to talk of the Truth, as well as Reafon of things.
Both Expreffions mean the fame : which has often made me wonder
why fome Men who cry up Reafon as the Criterion of Virtue,
fhould yet diflike Mr. Wollajion's Notion of Truth being its Crite-
rion.

The Truth is, all thefe juft mention'd, viz. the Happinefs of Man-
kind ; the Relations, or Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of things ; Reafon and
Truth ; may in fome fenfe be faid to be Criterions of Virtue ; but
it mutt always be remember'd that they are only remote Criterions of
it, being gradually fubordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will
of God.

And from hence we may perceive the Reafon of what I fuggefted
in the beginning of this Treatife, viz. That the Difpute betw een
Moralifts about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Mean-
ing ; and that this Difference between them has been occafion'd by
their dropping the immediate, Criterion, and choofing fome a more.

remote,

'Preliminary Differtation. xxi.

remote, fome a lefs remote one. And from hence we may fee alfo
the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For
that in a great meafure has occafion'd all this Confufion, as may ea-
fily he mads appear in all the pretended Criterions of Virtue aboye-
mention'd.

Thus thofe who either exprefly exclude, or don't mention the Will
of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good
of Mankind; mult either allow that Virtue is not in all Cafes obliga-
tory (contrary to the Idea which all or moft Men have of it) or they
mull fay that the Good of Mankind is a fufficient Obligation. But
how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to me, when per-
haps in particular Cafes, fuch as laying down my Life, or the like, it
is contrary to my Happinefs.

Thofe who drop the Happinefs of Mankind, and talk of Relations,
the Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of Things, are flill more remote from the
true Criterion. For Fitnefs without relation to fome Efid, is fcarce
intelligible.

Reafon and Truth comc 1 pretty near the Relations of things, be-
caufe they manifeftly prefuppofe them ; but are ftill one ftep farther,
from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.

What has been faid concerning the Criterion of Virtue as inclu-
ding our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but
ftill it will be Org'd, that 'tis infufficient to account for matter of
Fact, viz. that molt. Perfons, who are either ignorant of, or never
conlider'd thefe Deductions, do however purfue Virtue themfelves,
and approve of it in others. I fliall in the next place therefore give
fome account of our Approbations and Affections.

SECT.

xxii. Preliminary Dijfertation.

aoqu^i

' "

rt ti p rp TTf

O Ca \j 1 111.

Concerning Approbation and Affe&ion.

MAN is not only a fenfible Creature, not only capable of Plea-
fure and Pain, but capable alfo of forefeeing the Pleafure and
Pain in the future confequences of Things and Aclions; and as he
is capable of knowing, fo alfo of governing or directing the Caufes
of them, and thereby in a great meafure enabled to avoid the one
and procure the other: whence the Principle of all Action. And
therefore, as Pleafure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out
of his Power, he purfues the former and avoids the latter ; and there-
fore alfo thofe things which are Caufes of them are not indifferent,
but he purfues or avoids them alfo, according to their different
Tendency. That which he purfues for its own fake, which is on-
ly Pleafure, is called an End ; that which he apprehends to be apt to
produce Pleafure, he calls Good, and approves of, i. e. judges a pro-
per means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Ob-
ject of choice j that which is pregnant with Mifery he difapproves of
and ftiles Evil. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved
of, or the contrary, but whenever view'd in Imagination (fince Mancon-
fiders himfelf as exiffing hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare
then as well as now) they have a prefent Pleafure or Pain annex'd to
ihem, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them in real
Exiflence j which Pleafure or Pain arifing from the profpect of future

Pleaiure

Preliminary Diffcrtation.

Pleafure or Pain is properly call'd Paffon, and the Defire confequen t
thereupon, AffeSlion. *,

And as by reflecting upon Pleafure there arifes in our minds a De-
fire of it ; and on Pain, an Averjion from it (which necefTarily follows
from fuppofing us to be fenfible Creatures, and is no more than fay-
ing, that all things are not indifferent to us) fo alfo by reflecting up-
on Good or Evil, the fame Defires and Averfions are excited, and are
diftinguifh'd into Love and Hatred. And from Love and Hatred va-
rioufly modify 'd, arife all thofe other Defires and Averfions which are
promifcuoufly {tiled Paffions or Affections j and are generally thought
to be implanted in our Nature originally, like the Power of receiving
Pleafure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are thefe
following, Hope, Fear, Defpair and its oppofite, for which we want
a Name.

S E C T. IV.

Approbation and Affeffion confided d with regard
to Merit, or the Law of Efteem.

IF a Man in the purfuit of Pleafure or Happinefs (by which is meant
the Sum total of Pleafure) had to do only with inanimate Crea-
tures, his Approbation and Affections would be as defcribed in the
foregoing Section. But, fince he is dependent with refpect to his
Happinefs, not only on thefc, but alfo on rational Agents, Creatures
like himfelf, which have the Power of governing or directing Good

and

Preliminary 7)ijfertation.

and Evil, and of acting for an End $ there will arife different means
of Happinefs, and confequently different Purfuits, tho' tending to the
fame End, Happinefs; and therefore different Approbations and Af-
fections, and the contrary ; which deferve particularly to be con-
fider'd.

That there w ill arife different means of Happinefs, is evident from
hence, viz. that Rational Agents, in being fubfervient to our Happi-
nefs, are not paffive but voluntary. And therefore fince we are in
purfuic of that to obtain which we apprehend the concurrence of
their Wills neceffary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to
procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleafure or
Pain expected from it by them. And therefore, as I perceive that
my Happinefs is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I
apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my
Happinefs, to be a means of Happinefs: i. e. I cannot but approve it.
And fince the annexing Pleafure to their Endeavours to promote my
Happinefs is the only thing in my power to this end, I cannot but
-approve of the annexing Pleafure to fuch Actions of theirs as are un-
dertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent
as a means of Happinefs, is different from the Approbation of any o-
ther means, becaufe it implies an Approbation alfo of an Endeavour
to promote the Happinefs of that Agent, in order to excite him and
others to the fame concern for my Happinefs for the future.

And becaufe what we approve of we alfo defire (as has been fhewn
above) hence alfo we defire the Happinefs of any Agent that has done
us good. And therefore Love or Hatred, when placed on a rational
Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things,
that it implies a defire of, and confequently a pleafure in the Happi-
nefs of the Object beloved ; or, if hated, the contrary.

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have
feen, confifls in his voluntarily contributing to our Happinefs) is cal-
led the Merit of the Agent fo contributing, i. e. that whereby he is
entitled (upon fuppofition that we act like rational, fociable Crea-
tures, like Creatures whofe Happinefs is dependent on each other's
Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: Demerit the contrary.

And

Preliminary < Differtation. xxv-

And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call Merit is
very coniiftent with a Man's acting ultimately for his own private
Happinefs. For any particular Action that is undertaken for tie fake
of another, is meritorious, i. e. defer ves Efteem, Favour, and Appro-
bation from him for whofe fake it was undertaken, towards the
Doer of it. For the prefumption of fuch Efteem, &c. was the only
Motive to that Action ; and if fuch Efteem, &c. does not follow, or
is prefum'd not to follow it, fuch a Perfon is reckon'd unworthy of
any favour, becaufe he {hews by his Actions that he is incapable of
being obliged by Favours.

The Miftake which fome have run into, viz. that Merit is incon-
fiftent with acting upon private Happinefs, as an ultimate End, feems
to have arifen from hence, viz. that they have not carefully enough
diftinguiih'd between an inferior and ultimate End 3 the end of a par-
ticular Action, and the end of Action in general : which may be ex-
plained thus. Tho' Happinefs, private Happinefs, is the proper or
ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means
of Happinefs which any particular Attion is chiefly adapted to pro-
cure, or the thing chiefly aim'd at by that Action j the thing which,
if poflefs'd, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally
is call'd the End of that Action. As therefore Happinefs is the ge-
neral End of all Actions, fo each particular Action may be faid to
have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to
pleafe by his Drefs; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither
pleafing by Drefs, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they ftill tend
or ought to tend to fomething farther ; as is evident from hence, viz.
that a Man may afk and expect a Reafon why either of them are
purfued : Now to afk the Reafon of any Action or Purfuit, is only
to enquire into the End of it : But to expect a Reafon, i. e. an End
to be alTign'd for an ultimate End, is abfurd. To afk why I purfue
Happinefs, will admit of no other Anfwer than an Explanation of
the Terms.

Why inferior Ends, which in reality are only Means, are too often
look'd upon and acquiefc'd in as ultimate, fliall be accounted for
hereafter.

d Whenever

vi. Preliminary Diffcrtatian.

Whenever therefore the particular End of any Action is the Hap-
pinefs of another (tho' the Agent defign'd thereby to procure to him-
felf Efteem and Favour, ar.d lcok'd upon that Efkem and Favour
as a means of private Happincfs) that Aciion is meritorious. And
the fame may be faid, tho' we defign to pleafe God by endeavouring
to promote the Happinefs of others. But when an Agent has a view
in any particular Aciion diftincl from my Happinefs, and that view
is bis only Motive to that Aciion, tho' that Adtion promote my Hap-
pinefs to never fo great -a Degree yet that Agent acquires no Me-
rit ; /. e. he is not thereby entitled' to any Favour and Efteem: Be-
c.aufe Favour and Eileem are due from me for any Aciion, no far-
ther than that Aciion was undertaken upon my account. If there-
fore my Happinefs is only the pretended End of that Aciion, I am
impofed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myfelf indebted
to the Agent; and amdifcharg'd from any Obligation asfoon as I finch
out the Cheat.

But it is far otherwife when my Happinefs is the fole End of that
particular Aciion, i.e. (as I have explain'd myfelf above) when the
Agent endeavours to promote my Happinefs as a Means to procure
my Favour, i. e. to make me fubfervient to his Happinefs as his ul--
timate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happinefs only, as a means
of his own, yet this lefTens not the Obligation.

There is one thing, I confefs, which makes a great alteration in
this Cafe, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour in general^
ox only for fome particular End. Becaufe, if he aim at my Hap-
pinefs only to ferve himfelf in fome particular thing, the Value of
my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular
thing : And therefore I am under lefs Obligation (ceteris paribus).
the more particular his Expectations from me are; but under Obli-
gation I am.

Now from tiie various Combinations of this which we call Me-
rit, and its contrary, arife. all thofe various Approbations and A-
verfions ; all thofe Likings and Diilikings which we call. Mo-
ral

As therefore, from confidering thofe Beings which are the in-
voluntary means of our Happinefs or Mifery, there were produced

Preliminary Differtation. xxvii

in ns the Pamons or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, De-
fpair, and its contrary: So from confidering thofe Beings which
voluntarily contribute to our Happinefs or Mifery, there arife thefe
following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love
or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary
Beings being only a Defire to poffefs or avoid the thing beloved or
hated ; but this on voluntary Agents being a Defire to give Pleafure
or Pain to the Agent beloved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, (fome-
times call'd by one common Name, Refentment) Generofity, Am-
bition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence : and if there be any o-
ther, they're only, as thefe are, different Modifications of Love and
Hatred.

Love and Hatred, and the Foundation of them, (viz. the Agent
beloved or hated being apprehended to be inftrumental to our Hap-
pinefs) I have explain'd above. Gratitude is that Defire of promot-
ing the Happinefs of another upon account of fome former Kindnefs
receiv'd. Anger, that Defire of thwarting the Happinefs of ano-
ther, on account of fome former Difkindnefs or Injury recei-
ved. And both thefe take place, tho' we hope for, or fear no-
thing farther from the Objects of either of them,, and this is
ft ill confident with acting upon a Principle *rf private Happi-
nefs.

For tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther froth
thefe particular Beings ; yet the Difpofition fhewn upon thefj Oc-
cafions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings
towards us; /. e. other Beings will be moved to promote our Hap-
pinefs or otherwife, as they obferve how we refent Favours or In- :
juries.

Ambition is a Defire of being efteem'd. Hence a Defire of being
thought an Object of Efleem ; hence of being an Object of Efleem,
hence of doing laudable, i. e. ufeful Actions. Generofity and Benevo- ;
lence are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called
Pr'ulc, of which there are feveral Species. The Title to the Efleem
of others, which arifeth from any meritorious Action, is called Hq-
tiour. The Pleafure arifing from Honour being paid to us, /'. e. from
others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Efleem, is with*

d 2 ouc

xxviiL 'Preliminary Differtation.

out a Name. Modcfty is the fear of lofing Efteem. The Uneafinefs
or PatTion which arilcth from a Senfe that we have loft it, is called
Shame. So that Ambition, and all thofe other Paflions and Affec-
tions belonging to it, together with Shame, arife from the Efteem
of others: which is the Reafon why this Tribe of Affections ope-
rate more ftrongly on us than any other, viz. becaufe we perceive
that as onr Happinefs is dependent on the Behaviour of others, fo
we perceive alio that that Behaviour is dependent on- the Efteem
which others have conceiv'd of us; and confequently that our acqui-
ring or lofing Efteem, is in effect acquiring or lofing Happinefs, and
in the higheft Degree. And the fame may be faid concerning all our
other A flections and Paflions, to enumerate which, what for want of
Names to them, and what by the confufion of Language about them,
is almoft impoflible.

Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reafon which will then
be obvious.

Thus having explain'd what I mean by Obligation and Approba-
tion ; and fhewn- that- they are founded on and terminate in Happi-
nefs: having alfo pointed, out the. Difference between our Approba-
tions and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means-
of Happinefs; and- farther, that thefe Approbations and Affections.
are not innate or implanted in us by way of InJiineJ, but are all ac-
quired^ being fairly deducible from fuppofing- only fenfible and ra-
tional Creatures dependent on each other for their Happinefs, as ex-
plain'd above : I fhall in the next place endeavour to anfwer a grand
Objection to what has here been faid concerning Approbations and;
Affections arifing from a profpect of private Happinefs.

The Objection is this.

The Reafon or End of every Action is always known to the A-
gent ; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceiv'd : but the
generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and difapprove, im-
mediately, as foon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or
is propofed to them, without confidering whether their private Hap-
pinefs-

Preliminary Differtation. xxix.

pinefs is affected with it, or no: or if they do confider anv Moral
Character in relation to their own Happinefs, and rind themfelves, as
to their private Happinefs, unconcern'd in it, or even find their pri-
vate Happinefs leifen'd by it in fome particular Inflance, yet they
ftill approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent ; nay they
cannot do otherwife. Whatever Reafon may be affgn'd by fpecu-
lative Men why we mould be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the
Diitrened \ yet if the grateful or companionate Mind never thought
of that Reafon, it is no Reafon to him. The Enquiry is not why
he ought to be grateful, but why he is fo. Thefe after-reafons there -
fore rather mew the Wifdom and Providence of our Maker in im-
planting the immediate Powers of thefe Approbations (i. e. in Mr.
Hiitcbejbn's Language, a Moral Senfe) and thefe Public Affections in
us, than give any fatisfactory account of their Origin. And there-
fore thefe Public Affections, and this Moral Senfe, are quite inde-
pendent on private Happinefs, and in reality act upon us as mere
Inftincts.

Anfwer.

The Matter of Fact contain'd in this Argument, in my Opinion, is
not to be contefted j and therefore it remains either that we make
the matter of Fact confident with what we have before laid down,
or give up the Caufe.

Now, in order to fhew this Confiftency, I beg leave to obferve,
that as in the purfuit of Truth we don't always trace every Propo-
rtion whofe Truth we are examining, to a firft Principle or Axiom,
but acquiefce, as foon as we perceive it deducible from fome known
or prefumed Truth j fo in our Conduct we do not always travel to
the ultimate End of our Actions, Happinefs : but reft contented, as
foon as we perceive any Action fubfervient to a known or prefumed
Means of Happinefs. And thefe prefumed Truths and Means of
Happinefs, whether real or otherwife, always influence us after the
fame manner as if they were real. The undeniable Confequences of
Prejudges are as firmly adhered to as the Confequences of real truths

jgS. Trcliminary Differ I at ion.

or arguments; and what is fubferv'ent to a falfe (but imagin'd)
means of Happinefs, is as induftrioufly purfued as what is fubfervient
to a true one.

Now every Man, both in his Purfuit after Truth, and in his Con-
duit, has fettled and fixed a great many of thefe in his Mind, which
he always acts upon, as upon Principles, without examining. And
this is occaiion'd by the Narrownefs of our Understandings : We can
confider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing
to the Fountain-head would be tedious, thro' a long Series of Con-
fequences. To avoid this we choofe out certain Truths and means
of Happinefs, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which
. we may fafeiy acquiefce in, in the Conduct both of our Underftan-
ding and Practice, in relation to the one, regarding them as Axi-
oms ; in the other, as Ends. And we are more eafily inclined to
this by imagining that we may fafeiy rely upon what we call Ha-
bitual Knowledge, thinking it needlefs to examine what we are al-
ready fatisfy'd in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative
and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, viz. few will examine
them.

And thefe RE ST I NO PLACES are fo often ufed as
Principles, that at laft, letting that flip out of our Minds which
firft inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them,
not as they really are, the Subjlitutes of Principles, but Principles
themfelves.

And from hence, as fome Men have imagin'd Innate Ideas, becaufe
forgetting how they came by them ; fo others have fet up almoft as
many diftintt. InfiinSls as there are acquired Principles of acting. And
I cannot but wonder why the Pecuniary Senfe, a Senfe of Power and
Partv. &c. were not mention'd, as well as the Moral, that of Ho-
ttour, Order, and fome others.

The Cafe is really this. We firft perceive or imagine fome real
Good, if. e. fitnefs to promote our Happinefs in thofe things which
we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex
Pleafure to thofe things. Hence thofe things and Pleafure are fo
ty'd together and allociated in our Minds, that one cannot prefent

itfelf

Treliminary c Dijfcrtation>

itfelf but the other will alio occur, And the AJJociation remains e-
ven afrer that which at firft gave them the Connection is q.:ite for-
got, or perhaps does not exilT, but the contrary. An Initarce or
two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the
World who have as ftrong a tafte for Money as others have for Vir-
tue; who count fo much Money, fo much Happinefs; nay, even
fell their Happinefs for Money ; o r , to fpeak more properly, make
the having Money, without any Deilgn or Thought of uiing it,
their ultimate End ? But was this Propen ty to Money born with
them ? Or rather, did not they at firft perceive a great many Ad-
vantages from being pouefs'd. of Money, and from thence conceive
a Plcafure in having it, thence deiire it, thence endeavour to ob-
tain it, thence receive an actual Pleafure in obtaining it, thence de-
fire to prefer ve the Poffefiion of it ? Hence, by dropping the inter-
mediate Means between Money and Happinefs, they join Money and
Happinefs immediately together, and content themfelves with the
phantafticaL Pleafure of having it, and make that which was at nrft
purfued only as a Means, be to them a real End, and what their real
Happinefs or Mifery confifts in. Thus the Connection between Mo-
ney and Happinefs remains in the Mind; tho' it has long fince ceafed
between the things themfelves.

The fame might be obferv'd concerning the Third after Know-
ledge, Fame, &c. the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and
moil: of the various Exercifes and Entertainments of Life. Thefe
were at nrft. enter'd on with a view to fome farther End, but at
length become habitual Arnufements; the Idea of Pleafure is affo-
ciated with them, and leads us on ftill in the fame eager Purfuit of
them, when the nrft Reafon is quite vanifh'd, or at leaft out of our
Minds. Nay, we find this Power of Ajjbciotion fo great as not only
to tranfport our Paffions and Affections beyond their proper bounds,
both as to Intenfenefs and Duration; as is evident from daily In-
ftances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, &c. but alfo, that it
is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and fuch as are of a
quite different Nature from thofe to which our Reafon had at firft
directed them. Thus being accuftom'd to refent an Injury done to

our

xxxi.

^xxli Preliminary 'Diffcrtqtion*

our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him that offer'd it, we nre
apt to conceive the fame kind of Refentment, and often exprefs it in
the fame manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or Stone, where-
by the hatred which we are ufed to place on voluntary Beings, is
fubftituted in the Room of that Averfion which belongs to involun-
tary ones. The like may be obferv'd in moll of the other Paflions a-
bove-mention'd. ^.

Fromlience alfo, viz. from the continuance of this AJfociation of
Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almoft
diabolical) Paflion called Envy> which we promis'd to confider.

Mr. Locke obferves, and I believe very juftly, that there are fome
Men entirely unacquainted with this Paffion. For moil Men-
that are ufed to Reflection, may remember the very time when
they were firfl: under the dominion of it.

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which arifes in the Mind
from obferving the Profperity of others ; not of all others indefinite-
ly, but only of fome particular Perfons. Now the examining who
thofe particular Perfons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us
to the true Origin of this Paflion. And if a Man will be at the Pains
to confult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that thefe
particular Perfons are always fuch as upon fome account or other he
has had a Rivaljhip with. For when two or more are Competitors
for the fame thing, the Succefs of the one muft neceffarily tend to
the Detriment of the other, or others : hence the Succefs of my Ri- ..
val and Mifery or Pain are joined together in my Mind j and this
connection or afibciation remaining in my Mind, even after the Ri-
vallhip ceafes, makes me always affected with Pain whenever I hear
of his Succefs, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to
the Rivalfhip, much more in thofe that bring that to my Remem-
brance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it
not been for him. This may poifibly caft fome Light upon the
black Defigns and envious Purpofes of the fallen Angels. For why
might not they have formerly had fome Competition with their
Fellows ? and why may not fuch Affociations be as flrong in them
as us ?

Thus

Preliminary Dijfertation.

xxxm.

Thus alfo we are apt to envy thofe Perfons that refufe to be gui-
ded by our Judgments and perfuaded by us. For this is nothing elfe
than a Rivalfhip about the Superiority of Judgment ; and we take a
fecret Pride both to let the World fee, and in imagining ourfelves,
that we were in the right.

There is one thing more to be obferv'd in anfwer to this Objec-
tion, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the
moit part) make this Aflcciation ourfelves, but learn it from others:
i. e. that u e annex Pleafure or Pain to certain Things or Actions be-
caufe we fee others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by insta-
ting thofe whom we admire, or whofe Efteem we would procure :
Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his
Father, as well as his Eftate : Hence National Virtues and Vices,
Difpofitions and Opinions : And from hence we may obferve how
eafy it is to account for what is generally call'd the Prejudice of E-
ducation j how foon we catch the Temper and Affections of thofe
whom we daily converfe with; how almoft infenfibly we are taugltf
to love admire or hate -, to be grateful, generous, companionate or
cruel, &c.

What I fay then in anfwer to the Objection is this : " That it is
" neceflary in order to folve the principal Anions of human Life to
fuppofe a Moral Senfe (or what is fignify'd by that Name) and
alfo 7 public AffeHons; but I deny that this Moral Senfe, or thefe
public Affections are innate, or implanted in us : they are acquired
either from our own Obfervation or the Imitation of others. But
whether I have rightly deny'd it or no muft depend upon the Argu-
ments, and the Reader is to judge impartially for himfelf. I think
this Matter deferves a fair Examination j and if what has been faid
already put others upon thinking of it I have my End.

Contents

l> .. I I.. . . >

(XJ

Hfnn t

]

XXXV.

1 .

Contents of the Book.

CHAP. I.

Containing Jo me Principles necejfary to be known in order to the Under ~
jlanding and Solution of the Difficulty about the Origin of Evil,

SECT. I.

Of the Knowledge of External ObjetJs.
Par.
i np Hat Senfations reprefent external things to us, or at leaft difcover
I the prefcnce of them. Page i

2 That thefe are confufed and complicated, but afterwards feparated and

diftinguifh'd by the Underftanding : an inftance of this in Burning-
Wax, ibid.

3 The firft Diftrnction of our Conceptions into fenfible Qualities and Sub-
ftance. 2

4 How we know that there is any fuch thing as Matter. 3

5 What it is. 4

6 That this Definition does not reach the Idea of Matter, but only ihews

us the Mark to diftinguiih it by. ibid.

7 How we come to the Knowledge of Space. 8

8 What it is- 9

9 Thcfc three Conceptions, viz. of fenfible Qualities (v. g. Motion, &V.) of

Matter and Space fcem to be the chief of thofe that are external. fco

Of the Enquiry after the Firft Caufe.

f.i An Enquiry concerning Motion, Matter, and Space, whether they escift
pf themfelves. *5

e 2 2 We

vi. CONTENTS.

z We are to form our Judgment of things whether they exift of theinfirlves

or require a Caufe, from our fimple Conceptions, when there is no

i nuifi. Ground to fufpect a Fallacy. baa xh in. *5

3 *Tis proved that Motion requires a Caufe, tho' it be fuppoied Eternal,

and that Matter is not the Caufe of it. 22

4 That Matter requires a Caufe of its Exiftence. 25

5 That it is nor neceflarily exiftenr, as appears from the Confeflion of thofe

Perfons who fuppofe Space to be the Image of Body. 26

6 And of thofe who deny Space to be diftinguifhable from Matter any o-

therwife than as Extenfion in general is from a particular Extension.

7 That Space feems at fir ft Sight infeparable from Exiftence. 30

8 'Tis fliewn that this may arife from Prejudice. ibid.

9 Without \ fuppofes Space ; while therefore we conceive fomething to exift

without us, we cannot annihilate Space in Thought. 3 1

10 Things are conceiv'd to be annihilated by fubftituting fomething elfe in

the room of tbem ; but we have nothing to fubftitute for Space. 3 2

1 1 We attempt to annihilate Space while thofe things continue which fup-

pofe Space, and therefore it cannot be annihilated. ^2

12 God cannot be conceiv'd not to exift. 34

13 Becaufc we are confeious that we do not exift of ourfelves. 35

14 Smell, Tafts, Hearing, do not give us any notice of Space. ibid.

15 The Mind reflected upon itfelf has no relation to Space, nor any necef-

fity for it. 36

1 6 We may conceive Space to be annihilated altogether, but not by Parts.

17 Hence arofe the Prejudice for its Self-Exiftence. 41

1 8 We are certain of a firft Caufe in what manner foever the Difpute about

Space be determin'd. ibid.

S E CT, III.

Of the Firft Caufe.

f .1 Gut Reafonings about the Firft Caufe are like thofe of a blind Man about

Light, fince it is not an Object, of Senfe. 43

2 Yet we know a great many things concerning it. 44

3 That all other xhings proceed from it. ibid.

4 That it is One. 45
- 5 Infinite in Nature and Power. 4.6

6 Free. %

7 That

CONTENTS. skvu.

7 That he is a confcious, intelligent Being. 51

8 That he ads for an End. ibid.
9. That the end of Creation was to exercife the Power, and to communi-
cate the Goodnefs of the Deity. 52

10 When the World is faid to be created for God's Glory, 'tis after the man-

ner of Men. 34

1 1 That God made the World as well as it could be made by the higheft

Power, Wifdom and Goodnefs. 55

CHAP. II.

Concerning the Nature and Divifon of Evil, and the Difficulty of

tracing out its Origin.

Cj By Evil we underftand whatever is incomodious, inconvenient, or trou-
blefome. 73

2 Evils are of three kinds, thofe of Imperfection, Natural, and Moraf.

ibid.

3 The Difficulty is, how thefe come into the Works of a God of the high-

eft Goodnefs and Power. ibid.

4 Some that were unable to folve this Difficulty have deny'd the Exiftence

of a God, others have fuppofed a double one. 74

5 There are fome of Opinion that it is unanfwerable, and that the Mani-

chees offer'd a better Solution by fuppofing two Principles, than the Ca-
tholics do by owning only one. 74

6 This Difficulty has exercifed the Philofophers and Fathers of the Church,

and fome deny that it is anfwer'd yet. 78

7 There is more Good than Evil in the World. ibid.

8 'Tis no lefs repugnant to infinite Goodnefs to have created thofe things

which he faw would be corrupted by another, than fuch as would cor-
rupt themfelves. The Suppofition of a double Principle is therefore
of no Service toward the Solution of this Difficulty. ibid!

9 If it can be fhewn that it does. not contradict infinite Power and Good-

nefs to permit Evils, or that thefe neceflarily arife from the Exercife of
them, then may this Difficulty be anfwer'd. 80

1 CHAP.

mviii. CONTENTS.

CHAP. III.

Of the Evil of Defeat.

f .1 Things can be no otherwifc than as God pleafed. 81

2 All created things are necefiarily imperfect fince they do not cxift of

themfelves. " ibid.

3 'Tis to be determin'd by the Divine Pleafure what degree of Perfection

every thing muft have, fince all things are necefifarily at an infinite Di-
ftance trom the higheft Perfection. 83

4 All things could not be equally perfed fince fomc are Parts of others.

5 Things are neceffarily of unequal Perfections with regard to their At-

tributes ; but it is agreeable to the higheft Goodnefs to create thofe which
are leaft perfect, if they be no hindrance to the Number or Convenience
of the more perfect ones. 90

6 This confirmed by an Inftance of Matter, which is no Impediment to pure

Spirits. 9 1

7 'Tis lefs agreeable to the Divine Goodnefs to have omitted, than to have

created thefe more imperfect Beings. 9$

c hap. rw

Concerning Natural Evil.

SEC T. I.

Of Generation and Corruption.

q.i A Creature cannot complain of its Fate tho it be lefs perfect than others.

2 The Origin of things from Matter is the Source of Natural Evils, as

their Rife from nothing is the Caufe of thofe of Imperfection. ibid.

3 Matter is ufelefs except it have Motion. 97

4 Such Motion was to be rais'd in Matter as might feparate it into Parts.

Hence the Generation and Corruption of Bodies naturally arifcs. 98

5 Motion under certain Laws, tends more to the Prefervation of things,
- than if it were left at random ; hence God has diftribu ted Bodies into

various Sy Items. 99

6 It

CON T E NTS. xKxix:-

6 It appears from Light and other Phaenomena, that the Syftem of this

World is the very beft and moft beautiful. ioo

7 *Tis rafh to affirm that Matter might be diftributed into better Syftems,

fince wc do not thoro' y underftand the prefent. ibid.

SECT. II.

Qonceaning Animals and the Variety of them.

%.i Motter does not fcem to be made for its own fake, fince it is notfelf-
confcious ; 'tis therefore defign-'d for the ufe of Animals. 101

2 'Tis probable that Animals vary according to the Variety of thofe Re-

gions which they are deftin'd to inhabit. Therefore the JEther and
Air, in all probability, have their proper Inhabitants as well as the
Earth. 102

3 The Earth, as being the leaft part of the Mundane Syftem, is not to be

chiefly regarded, but yet is not made to no Purpofe, or without Defiga.

104

4 The Earth may be conceiv'd as a Wheel in this great Automaton of the

World, without which its Motion would be defective : in the interim it
affords an habitation and food for Animals. 105

5 The Earth is made not for Man alone but for the Univerfe : to think o-

therwife favours of human Pride. 106

SECT. III.

Of Death.

^f.i 'Tis probable that the So^ity of our Bodies is the Caufe why we caraiot
move them whither we pleafe. 109

2 A Soul united to a Portion of ./Ethereal Matter, &c. can move it whi-
ther it will and preferve its Union ; fuch a Body therefore is immortal.

ibid,

3 The Body of a terreftrial Animal is a kind of Vefifel which may be bro-

ken, the humours may flow out, and the circular Motion ceafe, fuch A7
nimals then are naturally mortal. no

4 This Hypothecs reconcll'd with facred Hiftory concerning the Mortality

of the firft Man. in

SECT

C O NT E NT S.

I;, SECT IV. xibixz

Of the PaJJiom.

C.r Our Souls require Bodies of a peculiar Cra/is, when that is diforder'd the
Operations of the Soul are either hinder*d or deftroy'd,,. > 112

2 The Soul and Body admit of a mutual Sympathy: hence it is the firft care

of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm. ibiJ.

3 The Senfe of Pain is neceflary to preferve Life, as alfo the dread of Death.

4 The reft of } the Pafllons are connected with thefe. 1 1 5

5 The Pafiiohs could not be avoided otherwife than by ordering that the

Soul fhould not be affected with the Motions of the Body. By this
means Animals would be very fhort lived. ibid.

6 It is not contrary to the Divine Goodnefs to permit thefe Inconveniencies,

fince they aould not be avoided without greater. 116

J God therefore compared the Good in things with the Evils which neceffa-

rily attend them, and tolerated thofe Evils which were infeperable from

the Good. ibid.

8 The Axiom about not doing Evil for the fake of Good, does not take

place where the leaft Evil is chofen. ibid.

SECT V

Of Hunger, 'Thirji and Labour.

%.i The Parts of the Body fly off, it ftands in need therefore of Reparation,

viz. by Food. 1 1 7

2 Choice muft be had in Food, fince all things are uot equally proper.

'ibid.
.3 The Materials of Food are foon corrupted, they cannot therefore be pro-
cured without Labour. ibid.

4 Every Animal is placed by God where it may have its proper Nnurifh-

ment, hence almoft every Herb maintains its proper Infect. 118

5 Some Animals are made for Food to others, and would not have exifted

on any other Terms. ibid.

6 All Parts of the Earth cou'd not have afforded Nourifhment and Re-

ception for Men, 1 whatever Situation they had been placed in. 1 20

7 Of EartbqnakeSy Lightnipg and Deluges. 121

8 The

CONTEN*^ fe

8 The number of Animals to be fed, was to be proportioned to die ^obd,
and not the Food to the Animals. 1 23

'9 The hundredth part of Mankind which might live upon the Earth does
not yet inhabit it : vain therefore is the Complaint about Seas and De-
farts. 1 24

10 'Tis abfurd for any one to defire a different Station from that which is al-
lotted him, fince he was made to fill that Place, and would otherwife
have had none at all. ib.

S C T. VI.

- '

Concerning Propagation of the Species, Cbild-hocd, and Qld^Agt.

f[. 1 Animals may be repair'd three Ways : ift. If Death were prevented by
Omnipotence. idly. By Creation. 3 dly. By Propagation. 126

2 This 3d Method is the beft, becaufe it may be effected without doing

Violence to the Laws of Nature. ibid.

3 The Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs admirable in the Contrivance of it.

j 27

4 Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death, while the

Brutes are not at all concem'd about it. ibid.

5 This is a Sign that the prefcnt Life is a Prelude to a better. 128

6 'Tis expedient for Men to be born weak and helplefs, hence the Founda-

tion of focial Life, &c. 1 29

7 The chief Appetites are thofe of Self-prefenration, and Propagation of

the Species. iso

S EC T. vii.

Of DifeafeSy Wild-Beajls, and Venomous Creatures.

'If. 1 Bodies are liable to Diifolution, and Humours to Corruption. Hence
Pains and Difeafes. 1 30

2 The ftrength of Poifons and fuch Juices as are noxious to Animals arifes
from the contrariety of things, which could not be removed without ta-
king away Motion. ibid.

? Of Epidemical Difeafes. 131

4 Rocks and Defans are not given to Man, but other Animals for their
Habitation. 132

% Ancient Hiftories declare, that Wild-Beafts and Venomous Creatures were
made for the Punifhment of Mankind. 133

f 6 'Tis

xlii. CONTENTS.

' 6 *Tis the fault of Mankind that thefe multiply : Countries laid, wafte by
War, &c. to thedifgrace of Man, of right belong to them. 13 j

7 Wc may more eafily avoid Wild-Beafts and Venomous Creatures that\ 0-
ther Inconveniencics of Life about which we never quarrel with Provi-
dence. ; ibid.
8 All Animals are under the Divine Care, to think otherwife favours of
Pride. ' " , 134.
9 Wild-Beafts and Venomous Creatures are of ufe to,]Men.. ibid,
\

s e c t, mi

Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man.

f .j Human Underftanding is neceflarily ignorant of many things. 1^5

2 We are fometimes forced to make ufe of Conjectures, therefore we may

not only.be ignorant* but alfo.miftake, ib.

3 God could not guard us always from Errors, without Violence, done to

Nature. 136

4 Man is not therefore miferable becaufe expofed to Errors. ib,

5 Thofe Errors .which we foil in to without our Fault, are feldom pern iciqus.

137
6". Our Knowledge is adapted to our State., 138

7 We prefer Life with all its Inconveniencies before Eteath. 140

8 Some put themfelves to Death, not on account of Natural but voluntary

Evils.. 14.1

9 Thofe" Errors which we fall into by our own Fault, are to, be reckqn'd a-

mong Moral Evils, ibid.

S E C T. IX.

Containing the Sum of what has been faid on Natural Evils.

<f.i The whole Univerfe one Syftem, of which every thing is a part. 142

2 If the whole and all its Parts.bc taken together,, none could be chang'd

but for the worfe. 1 43

3 Hence the Error of the Epicureans who knew only the leafb and worft

part of it. 144

4. Hence a Reply to the Difficulty, Whence comes Evil ? fince it arifes from

the very Nature of created Beings, and cou'd not be avoided without a

Cojittadiclion. 145

5 This.,,

CONTENTS. xliii.

5 This reconril'd with the Mofaic Hiftory, which does not attribute afl

kinds of Natural Evil to the Fall of the firft Man. 145

6 The Evils which do arife from thence are permitted for the Good of the

Unive rfe, and alio of Man hirhfelf 1 47

7 Mortality, Hunger, Thirft, Difcafes, csV. are for the Good of the World

in this corrupt Eftate. iBid.

n xi a p \r

Of Moral Evil
Introduction containing the Sub/lance of the Chapter.

SEC T. I.

-Concerning the Nature of Elections.

1 II R *? FT T T
A View of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from Compulfion only,

but not from Necefjity.

\\ That it is not eafy to underftand or give a true Representation of the O-
piniohs concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Com-
pul/ion only, others from NeceJJily alio. 150

2 The Authors of the former Opinion fuppofe that there are Appetites im-

planted in us by Nature ; what is agreeable to thefe is called Good, the
contrary Evil. I 5 I

3 Things are agreeable to the Appetite in a threefold refpect , hence three

kinds of Good. ibid,

4 That which is actually agreeable to the Appetite is called Pleafant. ib.

5 That which is connected with fomething which is of itfclf agreeable, is
-called Profitable. ibid.
That which is judg'd by the Under ftanding to be the belt, all things con-

iider'd, is abiblutely good, and called Honejl. ibid.

7 Inftances in Health, Medicines, and fuch things as are agreeable to. the

Rational Appetite. x 5 2

$ He that can act as his own Judgmenrdirecls, is free according. to thefe
I Men. ib.

f 2 9 But

xliv. CONTENTS:

9 But they fuppofe that we arc determin'd to-choofe either from -the Good-
nefs or Difigrecableneft of Obje&s perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senfes,
and that therefore we are not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only
of the inferior Faculties which are fubject to the Determination of the
Will. \ eSifojil ibid.

10 If this be fo, all our Actions are abfolutely necefTary. 154 .

1 1 That human Actions are free, not from Necefjky but Connpulfion. 1 5$

12 According to their Opinion there is no Contingency in things, nor could a-

ny thing be done other wife than it is. .156 .,

13 By Evil they underftand nothing more than hurtful. ib.

14 Villanics arc to be placed to the Account of human Miferies, and not.

look'd upon as Crimes, properly Jo call'd. 157

1 5 A Malefactor is .reproved, not becaufe he deferv'd it,, but becaufe Reproof

may drive him from Evil. luowii ib.

16 Punifhments are apply*d as Medicines to the Sick, neither, are Laws ufe-

lefs fince they prevent Vice. 158

17 We are obliged to be grateful only in profpect of a future Benefit. ibid.
1.8 According to this Opinion human Happinefs is impoflible, fince it depends

upon things which are not in our Power. ibid.

19 Its Confequences are hard, and tho' the Argument from. Confequences be.

generally a bad one, yet thefe bring fome Prejudice againft an Opinion

which feems to be attended with them, efpecially if they be acknowledg'd

l 59
20. All .thole who declare that the Will is ..pqfive. in its Operations, will be e~

fteem'd to be of the fame Opinion with the former, and are prefs'd with

the fame Confequences. ibid.

SUBSECT. IJL

An Opinion is propofed in general, ajferting a Liberty from Ntcefjity as

well as Compulficn.

%.i This agrees with the former in moft Cafes, efpecially in thole relating to ,
the Appetites, to good, pleafant, profitable, and boneft \ but determines
this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, viz. that the one is
determin'd by his Bodily Appetite, the other by himfelf. 161

2 The chief Good is neceffarily defired, but others are not, becaufe they may
be reprefented by the Underftanding in different Lights. 162

j Tho' therefore the Will follows fome Judgment of the Underftanding,
yet it is not neceffarily determin'd by it. 164

4 This

It takes place only in doubtful Matters, and then 'tis of no ufc or impor-
tance. ' 1 68
7 We arc left in douhr concerning the way which leads to Happinefs,
~ I'm can have no Help from Liberty.

:IC N'T E NT S.

i^This Opihion eftabliflies Liberty, but there are feme things in it not Yuf-

t ?.9tr: ficiently cxplain'd. 166

5 Such a Liberty as this feems to be of more Prejudice than Benefit to Man*

srfo'i kind. ib.

and
ibid.
S Since that is Good which is agreeable, and this is to be judg'd of by the
Undcrftanding, if the Will follow this Judgment it is not free, if it does
not, it acls againft Reafon. We had better therefore be without fuch.
Liberty. 169

9 If the Will could fufpend its Act contrary to the Judgment of the Under-
ftanding, it would run directly into Evil ; it feems therefore necefiary for
it CD act at the time, and m the manner which the Underftending directs.

170
io There are Anfwers offer'd to thefe Difficulties, but fuch as are far from be-
ing clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion.

* *

SUB SECT. nr.

.#.

Another Notion of Liberty and Elc&ion is p'opofed.

%i\ The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End by exercife, which is
the greateit Perfection of them, and their beft Eftate. 172

2 There is a certain agrecablenefs fixt by Nature between fome Appetites,

and their Objects, whereby they act upon the prefence of them, and
ceafe from Action upon the Removal of them. ib.

3 Liberty would be of differvice to an Agent endow'd with fuch Appetites,

(s?c. as thefe only. 173

4 We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there

is naturally no other Agreeablcnefs but what may arife from the deter-
mination of the Power itfelf. ib.

5 Such a Power as this cannot be determin'd by any Goodnefs in Objects,

fince the Goodnefs of 'em depends upon the determination. ; 175

6 Nor by any Uneafmefs. 1 ib.

7 Nor by the Under/landing. 176
3 Yet fuch an Agent has need of Underftanding in order to diftinguiihp of-
fice things from impofllble. 177

CONTENTS.

9 If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other -Limitation. 477

10 But an Agent of finite Power muft alfo confult his Abilities. ib.

1 1 Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites. 178

1 2 This Power is fuperior to all the Appstites, and fubdued by none. ib.

13 It leems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have fomething

to delight himfelf in when the natural Appetites muft necefiarily be fru-
ftrated. ib.

14 This Power, by its acceflion, increafes the Pleafure of the other Appe-

tites j by oppofition removes, or at leaft alleviates the Pain. 1 79

15 The reft of the Appetites are not to be baulked unnecefiarily. 180

1 6 Such an Agent as this is Self-active. ib.

17 Is determin'd by himfelf, and things are not chofen becaufe they pleafe

him, but pleafe him becaufe they are chofen. i8r

1 8 Yet he is not determin'd by chance. ib.

1 9 Is the true Caufe of his Actions. 182

20 Is capable of Happinefs. ib.

21 An imperfect Underltanding is fulficient for his Happinefs, if he do but

diftinguiih between PoJTibilities and Impoffibilities, things agreeable and
difagreeable to the Senfes, and confult his Abilities. 183

2*2 Tho' Liberty would be a Prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a fure foun-
dation of Happinefs to -this, whofe convenience depends not on Objects
but Election. * 1 84

23 Thefe things are clear enough, tho' they may appear to be a little too
fubtle. ib.

S U B 5 E C T. IV.

'That there is an Agent who is pleafed with Objects only becaufe he

choofes them.

^f.i God is fuch an Agent as this. 18$

2 Becaufe nothing external is either good or bad -to him before Election.

L 11/.

3 Becaufe his own Will is the Caufe of Goodnefs in the Creatures. ib.
4 They are not to be regarded who declare that thisGoodnels determines the

Will of God. 186

5 If he had not a Power of pleafmg himfelf in Election, he could never

have made any thing. 1 8 7

6 If he were moved by the Goodnefs of things to create the Worl'd, he

.would be *a neceffary Agent. 1 8.8

7 But

CONTENTS. ^vii.

7 .But if. things are good becaufe he has chofen to make them, his whoje

Work will be free. i8"8

88b External things are in themfelves abfolutely indifferent to God, but he

has a Complacency in his Choice. ib.

9 And determine himfelf to Action. 189

10 The Difficulty of conceiving how a Power can determine itfelf to Action

ought not to hinder; our, aflent to the truth of the Propofition. 190

xi 'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by
on itfelf, we are prejudiced by being accuftomed to material, i.e. paflive

Agents. ib.

12 What is faid about indifference, with refpect to the Will of God, takes

place in his primary Elections. 191

13 God may have all things at once in his view which are connected with the

thing chofen, and either will or refufe them by one fimple Act. ib.

j 4 As he is of infinite, Goodnefs, he alfo wills the Good of all things which he

has determin/d to create, as far as poffible. 192

15 When the World therefore is once made, it is impoflible that thofe things

fhould pleafe him which tend to the confufion, fcrV. of his Work. ib.

16 When Man is made of fuch a Nature as requires him to be jult, fober,.

&c. God is not at Liberty not to will thefe things. 1 94

1 7 This is no bar to the Divine Liberty. ib.

18 A Being endow'd with this Power is more perfect than one that wants it :

yejt .this does not imply infinite Perfection, therefore it is communicable

196

SUBSEC.T. V.

'That Man partakes of this Principle of pleafing himfelf by Election.

%><<i Some Reafons are offer'd to fhew this. 197

2 Firft, Experience. 198

3 The Vulgar often judge better of nutters.of Fact than Philofophers. ib.

4 J Tis proved that we partake of this Power, becaufe we difcover the

Marks and Properties of it in ourfelves. 200

5 In the firft place, we impute our Actions to ourfelves, whereby we own

ourfelves to be the true Caufes of them. Hence it i"s that we diftinguiirf
Misfortunes from Crimes. ib.

6 This is a molt certain Sign that we are confeious of our Liberty. 201

7 The fecond Token of this Power, that it can go againft the Appetites,

tc. 202

8 'lis fhewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites, ib.

9 That

xlviii. CONTENTS.

9 That we' can eld it alfo in our Senfes, and in a manner change the Nature

of things by an obftinate Election. 203

16 That we : can conquer not only our Appetites and Senfes, but arfo our

'Reafon by the force, of Election . 204

11 This appears from Inftances. 205

1 2 That the Underftanding admits not only Evil things for Good, but Falii-

ties for Truths, viz. being under Subjection to the Will. ib.

13 'Tis prov'd that we have this Power from a Confideration of thefe Rea-

sons which are fuppofed to determine the Will. 206

14 Thefe are enumerated. ib.

15 Firft, Errors of the Underftanding : thefe are fhewn to depend upon de-

prav'd Election rather, than caufe it. 207

16 Secondly, Obftinacy : which is fhewn to be nothing elfe but perfevering

in a deprav'd Election. ib.

17 Thirdly. The violence of Paflions, viz. efire of Fame and Glory, &c.

all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election. 208

1 8 The fame is ftiewn of Hatred, Love, &V. , 209
.19 Of Envy and Revenge. ib.

20 Fourthly, Madttefs: 'tis prov'd on the contrary, that thefe Men are in

their Senfes who choofe abfurdly. 2 1 o

2 1 All thefe things cannot be explained otherwife than by admitting a Prin-

ciple of this kind inourfelves. ib.

22 As much Good arifes from this Principle, fo it is attended with this Evil,

viz. a Power of finning. 211

23 This miftake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underftanding

arofe from hence, viz. that it would b& imprudent in us to act without
confulting the Underftanding. ib.

24 We can act in order to lhew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the fame

as acting without any reafon at all. 21 2

SECT. II.

Where it is Jhewn that Happinefs confijis in Elections.

f.i The more free any Being is, the lefs he is expos'd to external Motions
from without, and meets with lefs Inconvenience. 215

2 Happinefs arifes from the proper ufe of the Faculties, CsrV. If therefore a

Power of choofing be die meft noble of all, the greateft Happinefs will
confift in the Exercife of it, r. e. in Elections. 3 ib.

3 Election is the Caufe why tilings pleafe us. 216

4 He

CO NT. E NT S. xli*.

4 He therefore that has a free power of choofing, can always pleafe himfelf

v<sfi i'cLOj'H all 2I '

5 We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and fo

can attain Happin efs. 217

6' Care of the Body, and the natural Appetites difturb Elections in this prefenc

ftatc, and hinder ourHappinefs from being perfect ib.

7 We have reafon to admire the Divine Wifdom which created an Appetite

that has wherewith to pleafe itfelf in ks own Nature, howfoever external

"things be difpofe'd. 218

S E C T III

Concerning undue Elections.

f .1 To fall fhort of what we choofe is Mifery ; we choofe amifs therefore 'when
we choofe what cannot be enjoy'd ; This is done ijl- when fuch things are
chofen as are impojjible. 2 19

2 idly. When thofe things are chofen which are 'inconfiftent with each 'Other.

220

3 %dly.' If the things chofen be not in the Power of the Elector. ib.

4 4tbly. If any choofe that which is pre-Occupy'd by the lawful Choice of o-

thers. ib.

5 $tbly. When thofe things which tend to Natural Evils are chofen without

any Neceffity. 221

sect iv.

How it is pojftble for us to fall into undue Elections.

f .1 This is done five ways. 222

2 Firft, by Error or culpable Ignorance. ib.

3 Secondly, By Negligence. 223

4 Thirdly, By giving too great indulgence to the exercife of Election, ib.

5 Fourthly, By Objlinacy, or a Habit. ib,

6 Fifthly, By the importunity of the natural Appetites. J , ib*

7 Why every thing ought not to be chofen, and why Elections are not eafily

chang'd. 224

-g S E v T.

CONTENTS.

SECT. V.

How Evil Elections are confijlent with the Power and Goodnejs of God.

SUB-SEC T. I.

Propofcs the Difficulty , with a Preparative to the Solution of it.

4.1 The Evils of Free- Agents are not necefTary, and therefore feem to be
permitted by God voluntarily. 226

2 Moral Evils have no neceflary Connection with a free Nature, nor are of

any Advantage to it. 227

3 Here then lies the ftrefs of the Difficulty, viz. why did God permit thofe

Evils which are neither necefTary nor ufeful I ib.

4 We don't know fo much of the Nature of thinking Beings, as of, material

ones, and therefore are lefs prepared for an Anfwer to this Difficulty than
to the former. ib.

The abufe of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three
ways, which are confider'd in the three following Subjections. 22& 1

SV BS E C T. B.

Why God has created Free-Agents.

fl God might have prevented Moral Evils if he had refufed to create any free
Beings 229 ,

2 But without thofe the World would have been a mere Machme, and e-

very thing pafTrve. ib.

3 Objection from thefe who declare that the Underftanding is active, tho' it

be necefTary, as alfo God himfelf. 230

4. Anlwer to the former part of the Objection. ib.

5 Anfwer to the latter. ib.

% God has a Complacency in his Works, and. if nothing were free, that woo'd

be wanting in them which is moft agreeable to the Deity. 221

J NecefTary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much lefs

thofe which are only pofliple. ib.

% Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good

than the Natural Appetites. 232

9 The ftafce of Man wou'd be worfe if Free-Will were talcen away. 233

10 Free- .

CONTENTS. fc

10 Free Agents are capable of perfect Happincfs, therefore it is better to en-
joy Liberty. 234
U The Benefits of Free- Will cou'd not be had without a Power of finning.

2 35

12 The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, fince the Good-

nefs of them generally proceeds from Election. 236

13 The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help to-

wards the attainment of an Election, the Will therefore could not be
determin'd to Good by the Under (landing. ib.

14 The Goodnefs and. Wifdom of God being equal to his Power, hinders him

from choofing amifs. 238

15 But Man may choofe amifs, fince His Goodnefs and Wifdom neither are

nor can be adequate to his Power. 239

1 6 'Tis better to be fometimes deceiv'd with Pleafure, than to be always fe-

licitous. 240

17 'Tis better to be in danger of finning than to ceafe from Election. ib.

IS U B S E C T. III.

Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence, and occasionally reftrain the
Will from depravd Elections.

v f . 1 More and greater Evils would arife from thence than from the abufe of
Free- Will. 242

2 It would be as much Violence to prevent the Action of Free- Will, as the

Motion of the Sun. ib.

3 God, by interpofing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite in-

vert the Method of treating Free-Agents. 244

4 He would take away that which is the mod agreeable to us in Elections,

viz. a Confcioufnefs that We might have not chofen. 245

5 Free- Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine Power , the

Government of thefe therefore is the proper Exercife of the Divine
Wifdom, wherein God delights. 248

6 It would therefore be neither agreeable to God, nor ufeful to us, that God

mould always hinder bad Elections. 251

SUBSECT. IV.
Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

4.1 Devout Men hope for a Change in the Courfe of Nature, through their
Prayers. 252

g 2 2 God

lii. CO NT E NT S.

2 God does not hear all Prayers. 253 -

3 God is obliged to the Creatures by his Goodnefs and by Covenant. il\

4 What may be requefted of the Deity relates either to the Mind, the Body

or external things. ib.

5 God does not give afliftance to our Minds at random, but under as cer-

tain Laws as thofe of the natural World. 254

6 The Aid Of the. Holy Spirit is not miraculous. 255

7 Prayers naturally tend to pei feci the Mind, 257

8 And to.fubdue the Affections. 25k

9 The Actions of free Beings will produce a Contingency in material things,

yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature. 26q

10 There is a Syftem of intellectual as well as material Beings, which act as

much upon each other. 26 l

1 1 God makes ufe of the Miniftry of Angels in the Government of Man-

kind, nor is this any Violence to Nature. s 262,

12 God is not obliged to take away the abufe of Free- Will, fince he has e-

ftabliftYd a Method of aflifting his Worfhippers. 263

13 The Efficacy of Prayers cannot be accounted for if all things be left to ne-

ceflary Caufes. 264,

14 An Intimation that ,tbis, is not r.epugnant to .the Divine Prefcience. 267

S-.U BS E C T. V:

Why God- does not tranjlate Man to fome other Place, where nothing
would occur that could temp him to choofe ami/'s,

%.i This is the fame as if it were afk'dj why God did not give the Earth to
be inhabited by the Brutes only. - ' 270 ,

2 This is totally to extirpate Mankind 271

3 God will in due time tranflate good Men to a better State, but the prefent

is as necefiary as Seed-time is to Harveft. ib*

SUB3ECT. VI.

Concerning the Scarcity of. happy Perfons, and t the general Corruption of

'Mankind.

%.i. Some Objections propofed concerning the Rarity of happy Perfons. 273
2 That-the Power of Election is not regarded. &

3. That there is an Univerfal Corruption. 274

4 Thefe

CONTENTS. liii.

4 Thefe are beft anfwer'd by Reveal'd Religion., 27 4

5 Many attain to a moderate Happinefs. " **& b^S {b,

6 Men make ufe of this Elective Power tho' they do not obferve it. 276

7 Elections produce the fame Effect in the Moral World as Motion does in

the Natural. 278

8. Things are connected together, and a defect in one affects many others.' #.
9 Vice and Wickednefs, tho deform'd in themfelves, do not impair the Beau-.
ty of the whole. 279

10 If this -be apply'd to particular Cafes, it accounts for the Univerfal Cor-
ruption. 282

S U B S E C T. VII.

Wlxrein th? Principles before laid down are applfd to the Solution of

feme Objections.

%.i Moral Evils are not necefTary in refpect of Free-will, but they are necef-
fary with regard to God, fo tbat he mult either tolerate thefe or greater.

288

2 Cicero's Objection propofed, which is taken from a Phyfician who gives

his Patient Wine when he knows that he will die of it. Or a Father who
leaves his Eftate to a Prodigal Son. 289

3 'Tis fhewn that the Comparifon is ill put between Reafon and Free-will,

and the giving of Wine y and that God,, if he took away Liberty for fear
we fhou'd fin, wou'd be like a Man that kills his Son for fearhe fhou'd
be fick. 290

4 Reafon is no lefs improperly eompar'd to an Eftate. 291

5 It tends to the Good of the whole, and of ourfelves alfo, that we mould

have the ufe of Free-will : for we had rather be what we -are than in the
Condition of Brutes, or without Reafon. ib.

6 Cicero has neither brought oppoiite Similes,, nor given good Advice to

Providence. 293

7 The Objection of Epicurus propofed, which charged God with Weaknefs

if he was not able ; or. Envy if he was able to remove Evils. 294

' f 'Tis a Contradiction that all Evils be removed from created Beings, God
is not impotent therefore becaufe he does not remove them. ik*

9 God always choofes the lead of Evils, and therefore is not envious. 295
10 God cou'd neither be conceiv'd to be infinitely powerful, if he were not
able to create imperfect Beings, i. e. Creatures ; or things that are con-
trary to each other, /'. e. Evils; nor infinitely good if he had been con-
tented in himfejf, and depy'd Exiftenc to every thing elfe. 296

it Epicurus

liv. CONTENTS.

1 1 Epicurus therefore is deceiv'd, who endeavours to attribute Impotence and
Envy to the Deity i whereas he ought to have infcrr'd the higheft Po-
wer and Goodnefs. 296

APPENDIX

Concerning the Divine Laws.

SECT. I.

Why Xjod made Laws when he knew that they would not be obferv'd.

f .1 The Divine Laws are either natural or pofitive. 298

2 Particular Laws ought to give place to more general ones, fince all kind

of repugnancy couM not be avoided. 299

2 The lame mull be faid of thofe Laws which relate to the Moral World.

ib,

4 Why God is faid to be angry with Sinners fince his Will is always done.

300

5 God may alter or add to the Laws of Nature, and give us aflurance that

he intends to do fo , hence the Origin of pofitive Laws, and a Revela-
tion, ib.

6 Laws are the means of informing free Agents of what is ufeful or pre-

judicial to them. ib.

SECT II

Concerning Divine Rewards and Tunijhments.

<.i Punifhraent is a natural Evil annexed to adeprav'd Choice. 303

2 Evil is Violence done to Nature ; but every natural Action has Re-adlion

correfpondent to it : therefore he that does Violence mult ncceffarily fuf-

fer ir, that no Tranfgrefior may go unpunifh'd^ ib.

3 Pofitive Laws inform us of the Punifhments which attend depraved E-

lections, from the Nature of the thing rather than inflict new ones.

4 That the decreeing and inflicting Punifhments prevents greater Evil.

5 'Tis ask'd in the firft place, how this can be reconciled with eternal Pu-

niihments, which don't feem to be capable either of reforming the pu-
nifh'd, or of being a Warning to others. ib.

6 'Tis

CONTENTS. Iv.

I 5 Tis afk'd in the ad place, how Punifhments can be eternal, fince it 5
agreeable to Goodnefs to have created all things in fuch a manner that
nothing might repent of its being created. 305

7 'Tis ask'd 3dly, how eternal Punifhments can fubfift without a Natural

Caufe. 306

8 To the firft *tis anfwer'd, that eternal Puni foments are made known to us
by Revelation, and that God is not therefore obliged to reveal how or
why they are fo j for perhaps the Reafon is above our Comprehenfion.

307

9 It does not appear but that the Puniihments of the Wicked may be of ufe

to the Good. ib*

10 To the 2d 'tis reply'd, that the Matter is yet in debate whether is prefe-
rable, to be miferable, or not to be at all. The Mifery of the Dam-
ned may be like that of Mad-men. 308
i.-j The Damned choofe their miferable State, . as Lovers, angry, ambitious,
envious Perfons indulge themfelves in thofe things which increafe their
Mifery. 309

1 2 Such Punifhment is very great, and very well anfwers the End of Divine

Punifhments. 3,1 r

13 God ought to prefer the common Salvation to that of Particulars. ib,

14 Anfwer to the 3d Objection. *Tis probable that the Mifery of the Wick-

ed arifes from the very Nature of Sin. 3 1 2

15 The Wicked will 1 , thro' Ignorance and Error, delight in fuch things as

they cannot enjoy, and may not know how to take delight in any thing,
elfe. . 313

1 6 The Wicked are confined to certain Places and Companions by the Laws

of Nature, as we are to the Earth. 314

ij The Difpute about Moral Evil relates to the Mind and its Operations,

and on that account, muft neceflarily be fomewhat fubtlc. 315

SE C T. HI.

Concerning the * QueJtion y why bad Men are happy, and good Men mi-
ferable.

\a This Queftion has been fo well 'treated of by many, that there isfcarce
any room for Scruple. 317

2 The matter of Fact is often doubtful, for it is not good Men that are mi-
ferable, but rather referm'd by Adverfity. Nor are bad Men profpe-
r<?us, but made bad by their Prosperity. ib.

3 We

hi. CONTENTS.

2 We are partial Judges of Merit, from the inftance of Hannibal &nd' Scific.

3 11

4 We are bad Judges of the Happinefs of Men, for thofe are often the moft

miferable whom we efteem happy ; and the contrary. ib.

5 T4*e-d\ief Happinefs here confifts in hope ; which is a fign that perfect

Happinefs is referVd for another Life, and all thefc things which befal

good or bad Men, are means to it. 319

"6 -Conclufion of the whole. ib.

I ''

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

CHAP. I.

Containing fornc Principles ncceffary to be known in order to
the Under/landing and Solution of the difficulty about the
Origin of Evil.

-- ..... . .

SECT. I.

Of the knowledge of External ObjeBs.

I. ^f | SIS allow'd that external Objects are made known to us That fen fa n-
from without by the Senfes; but we have entirely forgot ons re P* efent
JL how Light , Colours, and other external Things at firft af- SngTto m,
fected our Senfes and Minds j nor can we eafily recollect or at leaft
the rife and progrefs of our Knowledge concerning thefe things. defence of

However 'tis agreed that the Conceptions which we have of thefe them.
either reprefent to us the things therrtfelves, or at leaft difcover the
prefence and operations of them: That the fenfation of Light, for in- a re*confufed
fiance, arifes from its being prefented to the Eye j and fo in all other an< l compli-
Objefts of the Senfes. S*S?

II. But it is to be obferv'd that the Reprefentations of things, which panted and
we have from the Senfes, are by no means fimple, but very much con- b ft t he S under-
fufed and complicated j for Example, the Eye reprefents to the Mind Ending ; an
burning Wax, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted '"^ a " cc b of

B injngWax.

- Concerning the Origin of Evil.

in the Fire, red, and when foftened by heat, changeable into any Fi-
gure, fufceptible alfo of various colours, and laflly refolvable inra
Smoke. The Eye exhibits all thefe properties in the burning Wax al-
moft at one glance, but the under/landing feparates thofe things by
Reflection, which the fight had convey'd to the Mind collectively.
For it perceives that the Wax preferves its Effence and Denomination,
tho' from round it be turn'd into fquare, from hard and red, into foft
and black. From whence it appears that all thefe properties are ex-
trinfecal to it, but that which continues under all thefe changes is call'd
its Nature and Subflance.
The firft di- III. By Subflance I here underftand a thing which the Mind can
nm&ion of CO nceive by itfelf as diflintt and feparate from all others : For that

our concep- ,. , J J J . > i i 1 i i

tions into tn i n g> the conception or which does not depend upon another, nor does
ftnfibie Qua- include or fuppofe any other, is to us a Subflance ; (i) and according-
SaMtmce, ty we diftinguifh it by that name: But that which implies dependence

NOTES.

(i) Subftance in general is a tiling or being
TV'hicb can fubfift by itfelf without dependence
on any other thing as a Subject. Our Idea of
the word Subftance, according to Mr. Locke, is
only a fuppofition of we know not what fub-
Jlratum or jupport of fuch Qualities as we have
obferved to exift united together, and are ca-
pable of producing fimple ideas in us, which
qualities are commonly call'd accidents. Now
becaufe we cannot eafily concei-ve how thefe ac-
cidents mould fubfift alone or in one another,
we fuppofe them exifting in, and fupported by,
Ibme unknown common fubjlratum which in-
heres not in any thing elfe, and which we de-
note by the name Subflance. See his Eflay, B. 2.
C. 23. ^. 2. and the Notes annex'd.

This is our ufual manner of conceiving
things as they are diftinguifh'd into Subftance
and Accidejit: But what foundation there is in
nature for fuch a diftinftion I know not : In
particular what this fame Subftance is, or whe
ther it. be really any thing at all different from
Jhefe Accidents, or only a relative Idea found-
ed on the modus of their exiftence, or rather
on the manner of our confidering their ex-
iftence, wc fhall not pretend to determine

*B*2. C. 13. S. 18. 19. 20.)

/ Mr. Locke, who does not not much approve of
(the foregoing diftinftion between fubltance and
accident, * feems generally to take it for an un-
known Caufe of the union of what we call Pro-
perties or Accidents. The Author of the Pro-
cedure, Extent, and Limits of H. U. fuppofes it
to be nothing but the union of thefe very Pro-
perties, or all thefe conftituent Properties col-
lected together. " As far as we directly
" know the Eflential properties of any fub-
" ftance fo far we have a direft knowledge
" of the Subftance itfelf: And if we had a di-
" reft knowledge of all the eflential proper-
" ties of any Subftance, we fhould have an
" adequate knowledge of that Subftance ; for
" furely, if there be any meaning in words,
* the knowing any of the eflential properties
" of a thing, is knowing fo much of its very
" Subftance or Eflence." B. 1. C. 3. p. 80,
81.

Whatever is meant by the word Subftance,
Mr. Locke thinks it ought not to be apply'd to
God, Spirits, and Body, in the fame Senfe f and
the Author of the procedure, &c. would have
us when we talk of Spirits to fubftitute the
word Being inftead of it || and I mult believ*

t Ibid. *. 18:

Pa. 77,78.

that

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

in the conception of it we call a Mode, or Accident. For inftance, we
can conceive a certain portion of matter, fuch as Wax is, fetting afide
all others, and alfo without any particular Figure : But are not in like
manner able to conceive any particular Figure without matter. Wax
therefore is a Subfance, for our conception reprefents it as diftintJ, di-
vided from, and independent of, all other things : Nor is it neceflary
to the knowledge thereof, that we join the conceptions of other
things when we think of it ; for the conceptions of that and thefe,
contribute nothing to, nor ftand in need of, each other in order to their
being underftood. But Colour, Figure, foftnefs and hardnefs are modes
or accidents, fince they cannot be conceiv'd without fomething that is
coloured, figufd, foft, or hard -, but they enter not into the Subfance
r nature of Wax, for that remains, whatever may become of thefe.

IV. But when this is refolv'd into fmoke, or fame it has no longer How we
the name of Wax given to it ; we call the thing Wax, which is appli- know that

o * o ' i i there is any

cable to a certain peculiar ufe ; but when it is once refolved into f uc h tn i n g as
fmoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that ufe to which Wax is fubfer- matter.
v lent j and therefore changes its Efence, and appellation, and is no
longer to be called Wax. What therefore does it carry along with it
under all mutations ? 'Tis always extended, and capable of motion or
refi j and has always parts which are feparable, and exclude one ano-
ther out of the fame place; the Subftance therefore which carries
along with it thofe Qualities and Properties is called Matter. (2).

B 2 V. What

NOTES.

that thefe and the like terms, efpecially Sub-
jlratum, are very apt to miflead us in thefe in-
quiries and confine our Imagination to fomc
grofs Properties which belong to Matter only.
See alfo Watti y % Logic, Pt. I. C. 2. '\. 2 and 3,
and N. 13.

(2) This comes nearer to the Idea of Body,
according to Mr. Locke, than that of Matter.
" Body, fays he * Hands for a folid, extended,*
" figured Subitance, whereof Matter is but a
" partial, and more confufed conception; it
" feeming to me to be ufed for the Subftance
' and folidity of Body, without taking in its
** Extenfion and Figure.'' Tho' it muft be

confefs'd that thefe two words are often ufed
promifcuoufly. It may not be improper to ob-
fcrve here that the various fignifications of thefe
general Terms Body, Matter, EJfence, Sec. in
different Authors, as well as the uncertainty of
what thefe Authors intend to fignify by them,
will ferve to convince us, in the firft place,
that thefe words don't denote the manner Ikw
things really exilt, but only our manner of
conceiving them ; and Secondly, that there are
no real Existences ftriftly conformable to this
our way of conceiving them, /'. e. in generals.
For if either thefe general terms Hood for real
things, or this our way of" conceiving things

k *B. 3. C. 10. ^.15.

in)

What it is.

That this
Definition
decs not
reach the
Idea of Mat-
ter, but only
ihews us the
Mark to di-
iiinguifh it
by.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

V. What is obfervable in Wax, may alfo be obferv'd in every other
Subftance, which we know by the Senfes. For all things that are
perceiv'd by the Senfes admit of the like changes, and the above men-
tion *d properties continue both under, and after all thefe motions and
mutations. Any fenfible Object, howfoever chang'd, is always extend-
ed, moveable, conjifting of Jblid, dijlincJ and divifible parts.

VI. Not that this is a Definition, A. or Idea (4J of Matter, any

NOTES.

(in Generals) was fix'd by nature, neither of
them would be fo various and uncertain as we
find they are. But as thefe terms fland only
for our conceptions, and our fixing them to
this or that conception, is merely arbitrary ;
the lame term may often be apply'd to different
conceptions, or feveral terms to the fame con-
ception. Thefe Conceptions alfo, as they are
not of nature's forming, mull be form'd by the
Mind itfelf, and of confequence are arbitrary
too, and fo may eafily be different from each
other, in different Men, and perhaps different
from the real nature of things in all Men. The
end of making thefe general conceptions is to
range things into forts, for the convenience of
Language. The manner of acquiring them is
as follows.

We are at firft acquainted only with parti-
cular fubftances, but obferving, that as thefe
particular fubftances differ in fome Ideas, fo
they agree in others (/'. e. tho' this particular
excites in the Mind fome Idea or Ideas, which
another doe. not, yet there are fome Ideas ex-
cited equally from both of them) we take no
notice of thofe Ideas in which two or more
particular Subftances differ, but feleft thofe on-
ly in which they agree, and connect them into
one complex Idea, by giving them one name.
Which complex Idea becomes general, /'. e. it
may be affirm' d of, or belongs to, or is found
in, more than one particular fubftance. And
the Subftances of which it is affirmed, tzfe. are
laid to be contain 1 d under that generaT Idea.
General Ideas of Subftances are made therefore
by leaving out thofe Ideas in which two or
more particular Subftances differ, and retain-
ing thofe in which they agree. And from Ge-
neral Ideas thus made we may proceed to more

general ones, in the fame way, viz. by always
leaving out the particulars wherein they differ.
Thus by obferving a certain agreement among
Individuals, and leaving out the reft, we form
an Idea of the feveral Species. In like man-
ner, by leaving out the diftinguilhing marks of
each fpecies we get the Idea of Animal in ge-
neral : And again, by dropping that by which
Animals are diftinguifh'd from all other things
which are the obje&s of our Senfes, we acquire
the Idea of Matter or Body: and fo on.
When any of thefe General Ideas are found in
a particular thing, 'tis call'd the EJJence of that
thing ; EJJ}nce therefore is only that general
abftradl Idea in the Mind by which we deter-
mine any thing to be of this or that fort ; and
which we fignify by fuch a general Name as
Animal or Matter. So that the fame Quality
may be EiTential or not Effential to any thing,
according as that thing is rank'd under a diffe-
rent Sort. This fhews us both the abfurdity of
taking thefe general terms for figns of real
Exiftences, which, we fee, arc figns of our
Ideas only; and alfo the neceffity for diftin-
guilhing between a Collection or Combination
of our own Ideas, and real Qualities, as they
are found in Nature ; between Thoughts and
Things. If this laft Diftinftion were fufficiently
attended to, I believe we fhould not be fo rea-
dy to conclude from any Ideas which we may
have of infinite [pace, Infinite Duration, &c. that
thefe muft needs be real Properties, or Attributes
of fome Being. Of which hereafter: See
N.5.

A. God feems to have endowed us with
fenfes and underftanding in order to diftinguifh
things from one another, and to perceive the
prefence and ufes of them. It is not therefore

neceflary

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

NOTES.

Tieceflary that they fhoukl be made known to
us as they are in themfelves, but only fo far as
they regard and can affect us : For it fignifies
nothing to us what they are in themfelves, but
only what effects they may have upon us : And
the report of the fenfes mull be looked upon as
true, when they reprefent thefe effects to us
uniformly, ;'. e. when the Objeft, Medium and
Organ continuing in the fame ftate, they pro-
duce the fame fenfation in us : For by this
means we may perceive the prefence of fenfi-
ble things, and the diftinction of them from
each other, which feems to be the end for
which we had fenfes given by nature.*

We come then to the Knowledge of things
two ways, by Senfation and Reflection. We
are confcious to ourfelves that we exift, from
thence we have the notion of Exijlence. f Nor
do we feem to mean any thing elfe when we
call a thing a Being or Thing, than that it is like
us in that whereof we are felf-confcious, viz.
Exijlence. For Univerfals are, I think, neither
to be interpreted by words alone", nor by con-
ceptions, nor by the particular things them*
felves, but ly Analogy, For Example, when
one affirms that Peter is a Man, he obferves the
Idea of fome particular Man, perhaps of him-
felf, or the Neighbour he faw laft ; .and when
he affirms Peter to be a Man, he means nothing
elfe but that Peter is like himfelf or his Neigh-
bour, (and he calls thofe things alike which
have the fame- effects as to him) After the fame
manner he that fays Man is an Animal, mud be
fuppofed to have the Idea of fome particular
Man and Brute in his Mind, 2nd to mean no-
thing more when he fays, Man is an Animal,
than that this particular Man and thofe that are
like him, are in fome reipe&s alfo like the par-
ticular Brute, the Idea of which he had in his
Mind. Thus we learn the Analogy of things
by Reflection, but are acquainted with all ex-
ternal things by the fenf3tions or Conceptions
which they produce in us ; and according to
thefe various Conceptions we diltinguifh them
from each other, and divide and define them

into various Species. Now we come to the
Knowledge of fome things by immediate Sen*
fation, Proportion, or Connection with what
we perceive by the Senfes^ ||When we perceive
any thing in the former way, we are faid to
know it by Idea; when in the latter, not by
Idea, but Reafon. The Cafe will be cleat er
perhaps by an Inftance : I know a certain King,
becaufe I have feen and heard him, and his
Countenance and Voice are fixed in my Mind ;
by thefe therefore I can diftinguifh him from
others, and know him again when I fee him;
for he is known to me by immediate fenfation,
that is, by Idea. But I know Cafar only by
his actions, /'. e. by Similitude and Connection
with -the things of which I have a Senfation ;
nor fhould I know him again if I met him ;
for immediate fenfation has not imprefs'd thofe
marks upon me whereby I might diftinguifh
him from other Men. I affirm therefore that I
have no Idea of him. I know him (as far as is
neceffary) by reafon alone, /'. e. from Simili-
tude and Connexion with thofe things which I
perceive by my Senfes.

Thus the Vulgar fhew us fufficiently, that
they diftinguifh between Idea and Reafon, when
they deny that they have any Ideas of God, In-
finite, Spirit, and Subftance. And yet they
don't difown all manner of knowledge of thole
things; for they can't deny "but that they have
certain Marks from the Similitude or Relation
to, Or connection with, fenfible things where-
by they may diftinguifh Finite from Infinite,
Subftance from Accident, and Soul from Body.
When therefore they deny that they have any
Ideas of them, they fhew that they mean no
more than that thefe are not yet made known
to them by immediate fenfation. For they look
upon fuch a perception of a thing as this only,
to be the Idea of it; but reckon what they ac-
quire by fimilitude, proportion or connection,
no more an Idea, than Algebraic fpecies are Ideas
of Quantity, for which they arc ufed, and by
the afliftance of which we know feveral things
of infinite quantities whereof we can have no

* Concerning the reality of our fenfitive Knowledge in general, and how far it reaches, fee
i.ocke, B. 4. ch. 2. S- 4- anc * C. ii. For inftances wherein the Senfes arc not to be depended
on, fee N. 6. f See Locke's Effay, B. 2. C. 7. V 7.

Effay on tie nature and conduct of the Paffions, {$(. p. 3. N. f.

B 3 Ideas ,

|| Sec Mr. Hutchcfon's

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

NOTES.

Ideas ; except we will abufe the word Idea con-
trary to the common Senfe of" Mankind.

Neither are thofe Men excufeable who fpeak
othenvife. They pretend indeed that they may
ufe words in their own Scnfe ; but they have
no right to do it; for we are oblig'd to fpeak
with the Vulgar, fince they are to prefcribe
the Rules of Speech ; nor muft we expect that
Readers fhould change the Notions which have
been joined to Words from their Childhood,
and approved by common ufe, at the pleafure
of every Writer. Tis to be obferv'd farther,
that thefe Men generally put a trick upon us,
for they define Words in their own Senfe, but
in difcourfing ufe them in the common one;
hence proceed quarrels among the learned, and
among the half-learned, moft pernicious Er-
rors: For hearing from celebrated Writers,
that all Knowledge is by Ideas, and taking an /-
dea with the Vulgar, for a Mark imprinted on
the Mind by immediate Senfation, when they
find no fuch Mark imprefled on their Minds by
Cody by Sub/lance, by Infinite, by the Myjleries
of Religion, they deny that we have any
Jknowledge at all of thefe things.

But we are to obferve, that things are as pro-
perly known by Reafon as by Ideas; for the
Marks which things imprint on the Mind by
immediate fenfation are not the things them-
felves, but the effects of them upon the Mind
and Senfes; by thefe then we only know what
Effects a thing has upon us, not what it is in
itfelf. Now the things which are known, by
reafon are alfo difcovered by their Effects,, not
produced in us by immediate fenfation,. but
in other things that are connecled: with what we
perceive by the Senfes. For inftance; that is
Lucid which produces the fenfation of Light in
me; Sweet,, which produces that of Sweetnefs ,
But it is the Sun which emits the Light, and
God that made the Sun, i. e. I know Light by
its effect upon me ; the Sun by its effect upon
the lucid Body; God by his effect upon the Sun.
Thus a Man knows his Father by immediate
fenjationy or by Idea ; the Man that begot hisj
Father, is his Grandfather; and the Perfon J
that begot his Grand-Father is his Great-Grand

Father-. Thefe then are known by ret/on, and 1
as properly as the Father is, tho' never feen by
him.

When therefore one asks the Gcws of any
thing, he defircs the Perfon ask'd to fhew fome
thing or things which the A'Litter enquired af-
ter refembles: When he enquires into the Dif-
ference, he" defires to have that fenfation lh^wn
him, which the thing fought, if prefent, would
produce in him, and which would diitinguifh
it from any thing elfe : And if this cannot be
done, that at leaft a Mc<rk may be produced
which is in fome manner connected with the
fenfation. Definitions therefore regard our-
felves, and the effect which things have upon
our Senfes and Minds. When we have the
Charailtr or Murk of any thing whereby the
fenfation or conception produced in us by it,
may be diflinguifhed from the fenfition or con-
ception of other things, and by which we cer-
tainly know for the prefent that it is here, and
are informed what to do or expect upon the
prefence of it, we know as much of it, as our
imperfect State requires. Nay, fuch Knowledge
is of much more ufe than the Philofophical
difcovery of Genus and Difference. He has a
far more ufeful Knowledge of a Man that
knows hia Countenance, Name, Temper and
Condition, than he that is acquainted with the
Principle of Individuation*. Tho* therefore I
have no Idea of Subftance, nor can afhgn a de-
finition which will explain the Effence of it ;
yet if I can produce a Mark, whereby I may
diftinguifh it for the prefent from every other
thing that I meet, I muft be judged to know it
fufficiently. Now fuch a Mark I think 1 have
already given. (3 )

(3.) I omit the reft of our Author's long
Note, fince it contains only fome Arguments
for innate Ideas ; which Hypothefis is now
almoft univerfally exploded. We may obferve,
that moft of his Reafoning is built on a diffe-
rent Signification of the Word Idea. He will
ufe it in the old Planotic meaning for a Species, *
Phantafm, or Corpsreal Image, as it were painted
on the Brain: The Application of the Mind
to which is properly call'd Imagination, and

comes

* See Locke's Eflay, B. 2. C. 27. V %*

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

N O Hi E S.

comes far fhort of 'Knowledge. Whereas, if we
take the Word Idea in the more enlarged mo-
dern Senfe, as it commonly ftands for a Repre-
fentation of any Thing in the Mind, or whatfo-
cver is the immediate Object of the Unierjland-
ing when a Man perceives or thinks ; we can
have no manner of Knowledge without both the
actual Perception of Ideas, and alfo of their
connexion with, or repugnancy to, each other.

According to Mr. Locke, our Apprehenfion
of the Exiiience of any Being (befide ourfelves)
which we have fee n, felt, or beard, may very
properly be call'd fenjitive Knowledge. But our
Affurance of the Exiftence of any other (except
God) which we do not fo perceive by the Sen-
fes, is no Knowledge at all, but only Faith,
Preemption, or Probability, &c.

Our Author's Method of forming Univerfals,
or (as we commonly term them) abjlracl Ideas,
by making the Idea of one particular Thing
ftand for all of the fame Kind, will appear to
be wrong, I think, from this fingle Argument,
viz. that according to the foremention'd
Scheme Univerfals, fuch as Animal, Genus, &c.
would have a real Exiftence in Nature, where-
as they are evidently the Creatures of our own
Minds, and can exift no where elfe. We have
therefore nothing at all to do with Analogy in
forming general Ideas, we can never come at
them by fubftituting one Particular for another,
but muft rather conceive them to be made by
removing all Particularities of Exiftence, and
leaving only what remains in common; ac-
cording to Lockers Account of Abjlracl ion, B. z.
C n. V9- See alfo fVatts's Logic, Pt. I.
C. 3. V 3. or N. 2.

By a due Attention to the Nature of thefe
abftract Ideas, and our Way of acquiring them,
we fhall find that they are all mere entiaRationis,
or form'd by the Mind alone, and of courfe
will perceive that Duration, Space, Number,
&c. which evidently are fuch, can have no
real Exiftence in Nature, no proper Ideatum or
Objective Reality, nor confequcntly be a Proof
of any Thing befide that Power which the
Mind has to form them, as will be ihewn be-
low.

To return : Our Author, in the fame Place
alfo doubly mifapplies the Word Refleilion, firft,
by making it ftand for that particular Operation
of the Mind call'd Reafoning, wbjereas we now
commonly ufe it for the internal Senfe or Confci-
eufnefs both of the Exiftence of the Mind, and
of all its Operations f: And, fecondly, by
making this Reflection or Reafoning to be with-
out Ideas-, Whereas, according to the prefent
Senfe of the Word Idea, 'tis abfurd to fuppofe
the Mind to reafon, imagine, apprehend, or
think at all, without them.

Tho' the Novel ufe of thefe terms might (ag
he here complains) occaflon fome diforder and
corifufion at their firft introduction, yet fince
the Authority of Mr. Locke has chang'd the cu-
ftom, and happily determin'd their fignification,
we have nothing to do now with the old one ;
but muft take them in his fenfe if we would be
underftood. And fince it is often impoflible
for an Author to find old words exactly corre-
fpondent to the Ideas which he wants to ex-
prefs; and very difficult to invent new ones'.
Every Man is certainly at liberty to fix what
Senfe to his words he pleafes and finds rnoft
convenient for his purpofe, tho' never fo diffe-
rent from the derivation and original Senfe of
them, provided he at firft fufficiently explains
them, and flicks to that Explanation : Which
I think Mr. Locke has generally done.

He has alfo put it paft difpute, in oppofition
to Des-Cartes and others, that thefe Ideas are
not innate and pre-exiftent in the Mind, and (o
only raifed and refreftTd by the prefence of
external Objects; but that they are entirely
form'd and produced de novo by them ; or at
leaft, that thefe Objects give occafion to . the
forming of them ; that there is no manner of
innate, (or as fome will have it,} connate Idea,
no general Truth, or firft Principle inherent
in the Soul and created with it (and the fame I
think may be affirm 'd of Paffion, Appetite, Af-
fection, iffc.) at leaft none that ever appears in
our prefent State ^ no immediate Object of the
Mind before external things offer themfelves
to it, and it perceives, or becomes confeious
of them.

Our

f See Lute, B.z. C.i. 4.4.

See Locke, B. 2. C. 9. $. 4>

Concerning

"How we

the Origin of Evii.

r more than the former was of Sub/lance, but that hereby we are ac-
quainted with its prefence, and diftinguifh it from every other thing j
. as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other Circumftances:
Nor is it necefTary that thefe mould be applicable to all Subjlance y at
all times, and to that alone: For it is enough if for this particular
Time and Occafion we know the peculiar Subjiance we are talking of
by them ; and fufficiently diftinguifh it from other things.

VII. It is to be obferved farther, that when a part of this matter
SowieVe* 1S remove d another fucceeds into its Place, but is not in the fame
of Space. Place confiftent with it. Place therefore feems to be fomething be-
yond, befide and diftinct from, the Matter which it receives. For
as from hence that Wax was fucceflively capable of different forms,
.figures, colours and changes, it appears that fomething is in it befide,
and different from all thefe, which we call the Matter of the Wax :
So in like manner from hence that the fame Place or Space receives
more and different Bodies and Particles of matter fucceffively, but
eannot admit more than one at the fame time, it will appear that Place
.or Space, is as diftinct from Matter or Body, as Wax is from the Co-
ntours fucceffively received j nor is dependent on them any more than
Wax is on any particular Form.

VIIL

NOTES.

' Our Author's chief Objection againft this is,
' that there feems to be no manner of relation,
refemblance or conneclion, between the parts and
motions of external Objects ; and thoie Ideas,
which they are faid to produce in the Mind.
But is there any more connection between the
raifing and recalling an old Idea by thefe moti-
ons, than producing a new one ? Is it harder
to conceive how they may generate frejb Ideas,
than how they can excite the latent ones. [See
N. 7 .]

(4^ By the word Idea the Author feems here
to mean immediate, intimate, perception, or
the fame with intuition, as he explains himfelf
in his Note, B ; but this, as we have obferv'd,
is much better explain'd by Locke, who com-
prehends all our Author's Notes, Marks, Cha-
racters, and Conceptions, as well as his Images

and Ideas, under that general word Idea. This
was much more convenient for Mr. Locke's Sy-
ilem, and the liberty, I apprehend, ought to be
allow'd him till a better Syftem be produced
on fome other Principles. But his, I fancy, will
yet be generally embraced, notwithftandiKg
what the ingenious Author of the EJay on the
Imagination, and fome others, have of late
advane'd to the contrary. As for my part, I
cannot conceive what occafion we have to quar-
rel, as fome do, with the grot Author above -
mention'd for not diftinguifhing between an
Idea and a Notion, Sec. when one and the fame
word if we pleafe may eafily ferve for all.
For an account of the different Opinions of
Philofophers about Ideas and their Origin,
fee the .word Idea in Chambers's Cyclope-
dia*

(v)Tho'

Mfc

Concerning the Origin of Evil. 9

VIII. If therefore we fet afide, or annihilate Matter ', whatfoever what it is.' ~ f
ftill remains will all belong to the nature of Space; as in the former
cafe when we had fet afide the Properties of Wax, that which belong'd
to the Matter or fubftance of it remain'd. If you ask what that is ?
I anfwer, firft Local Mobility is to be fet afide, for that feems peculiar
to Matter. Secondly, an adtual feparation of Parts, for what is im-
moveable cannot be divided. Thirdly, Impenetrability, or Solidity,
for that fuppofes Motion, and is neceflary to the Production of it. It
remains therefore that Space (as we conceive it) be fomething extend-
ed, immoveable, capable of receiving or containing Matter, and pene-
trable by it. Tho' therefore we have not a Definition or Idea * of ;.,. ;},;,
Space, properly fo call'd ; yet we can hereby fumciently diftinguifh own Senfe
it from every other thing, and may reafon about it as much as we h * swjvi
have occafion. (5) or N. 4.

IX. Thefe

NOTE S.

(5) Tho' fo much noife has been made about
Space, which Leibnitz juftly calls an Idol of
fome modern Englijh Men ; and fo great ufe
has been made of it in demcnftrating the di-
vine Attributes, in a way which fome ftile
a Priori; yet, I'm fore'd to confefs that I can-
not poffibly frame any other Notion of it, than
either,' firft, as the mere negation or a'fence of
Matter, or fecondly, as the extenfion of Body,
conlider'd abfirailly, or feparate from any parti-
cular Body: As zvbitenefs without a white
Body, Sec. or thirdly, as a Subject or Subfita-
tum of that fame extenfion in abjlraclo, for which
laft Notion, See N. 16.

Now according to the firft Suppofition we
may indeed have a pofitive Idea of it, as well as
of Silence, Darknefs, and many other Privati-
ons ; as Mr. Locke has fully proved that we
have, and (hewn the Reafon of it. B. 2. C. 8.
^. 4. But to argue from fuch an Idea of Space,
that Space itfelf is fomething external, and has
a real exiftence, feems altogether as good Senfe
as to fay, that bee? ufe we have a different Idea
of Darknejs from that of Light ; of ft 'fence from
that of found; of the abfence of any thing, from
that of its Prejence ; therefore Darknefs, &c.
muft be fomething pofitive and different from
Light, crV. and have as real an Exiftence a>
Light has. And to deny that we have any

pofitive Idea, or, which is the very fame, any
Idea at all, of the Privations above-mention'd
(For every Idea, as it is a perception of the
Mind, muft neceffarily be pofitive, tho' it arife
from what Locke calls a privative Caufe) To de-
ny, I fsy, that we have thefe Ideas, will be to
deny Experience and contradict common Senfe.
There are therefore Ideas and fimple ones too,
which have nothing ad extra correfpondent to
them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or ob-
jective reality, and I don't fee why that of fpace
may not be reckon' d one of them. To fay that
Space muft have exiftence, becaufe it has fome
properties, for inftance, Pcnetr ability, or a capacity
of receiving Body, feems tome the fame as to
urge that darknefs muft be fomething becaufe it
has the power or property of receiving Light ;
Silence the property of admitting Sound ; and Ab-
fence the property of being fupply'd by Prepuce,
i. e. to afiign abfolure Negations, and fuch as
by the fame way of reafoning, may be apply'd
to nothing, and then call them pofitive proper-
ties ; and fo infer, that the Chimera thus cloath-
cd with them, muft needs be fomething. Set-
ting afide the names of its other pretended pro-
perties (which names alfo are as merely nega-
tive as the fuppofed properties to which they
belong) thofe that attribute extenfion to fpace
feera not to attend to the true notion of that
C Property,

Thefe three
Concepti-
ons, viz. of
fenfible
Qualities
(v. g. Mo-
tion, &c.) of
Matter and

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

IX. Thefe three conceptions, namely, of fenfible Qualities (viz*
Metion, &c.) of Matter and Space, feem to be the chief of thofe

which

NOTES.

Space,

Property, which, as the School-men define it
(and let them who like not this definition try

that are ex
'ernaL

feem

chieT f th f l ^' Ve us a ^ etter ^ ls t0 n * ve P artes extra P artei >
c and as fuch, /'. r. as including farts (which
parts, as they differ in fituation from each other,
nuyi have things predicated of fome of them
different from thofe which can be predicated of
others) it appears plainly inconfxflent with their
own Idea of" fimple, uniform, indivifible fpace,
and applicable to Matter only : And to. attri
bute Extenfion, or parts, to fpace, according n
the firft notion of it hid down by us, will be
the fame as to talk of the extenlion or parts of
Abjence ; of Privation, or of mere 'Nothing. Laft
ly, to ask if Space under the fecond Notion of
that word, i.e. as Extenfion in the Abftract, be
extended, or have parts, is apparently abfurd ;
'tis the fame with that noted Queftion cf the
Man, who being told that to have Riches was
to be rich, ask*d if Riches then themielves were
Rich ? Well, but tho' we can't affign any po-
fitive or confiftent properties to fpace, yet, fay
they, we have a Clear Idea of Dijlance itfelf,
and of different diftances one greater than ano-
ther, which proves that this is fomething real.
Let us examine our Idea of Dijlance a little far-
ther, and I believe, we (hall And it to be only
the Conception . of a mere pojjibility for a line
of fuch a certain length, or a Body of fuch di-
menfiens, to be contain'd between two other Bo-
dies, by mentally applying a material meajure of
fo many inches, feet, isc. to the fuppofed di-
jlance between thefe two bodies ; of which ma-
terial meafure, and of its increafablenefs, we have,
indeed, a clear Idea, as alfo of the poflibility
of its being placed between thefe two bodies,
tho* at prefent it be not fo placed : And this
feeras to me to be all the conception or Idea,
th3t -we can pofiibly frame about it. Well,'
then, according to the firft Suppofition, Space'
will be mere non entity, or nothing, n e. no-|
thing can be affirmed, but every thing deny'd!
of it : According to the fecond, it will be on-'
Jy an abjlratt Idea form'd in the mind from a

property peculiar to matter,, which property
abftrafted in Idea cannot itfelf admit of any
other properties, nor be applicable to the Di-
vine Nature, nor capable of pofitive Infinity in
any refpedl.

" If Space, fays Dr. Cudtoorth, be concluded
" to be nothing elfe but the -Exte njien and Di-
*' Jlance of body, or matter confidered in general
*' (without refpedl: to this or that particular
" body) and abjlraclly in order to the Con-
" ception of Motion, and the menfuration of
" things, then do we fay that there appeareth
" no fuffieient grounds for this pofitive lnjinity
" of Space, we being certain of no more than
" this, that be the World, or any figurate bo-
" dy, never fo great, it is not impoffible but
" that it might ftill be greater and greater
" without end. Which Indefinite increajab/e-
" nejs of body and fpace feems to be miftaken
" for a pofitive infinity thereof. Whereas for
n this very Reafon, becaufe it can never be fo
"great, but that more magnitude may ftill be-
" added to it, therefore it can never be pofi-
" tively Infinite.

*' To conclude therefore, by Space without
" the finite World, is to be underltood nothing
" but the poflibility of body farther and far-
" ther, without end, yet fo as never to reach
" to Infinity. "

Hence appears the Weaknefs of that common
Argument urg'd by GaJJendus, Dr. Clarke, and
Raphjon, for the abjohiie infinity of Space, viz.
From the impoflibility of letting bounds or //
mits to it; fince that, fay they, would be to
fuppofe Space bounded by fomething which it*
felf occupies Space, or elfe by nothing, both
which are-contradictions.

Which Argument, either firft of all fuppofes
that Space is really fome thing, or fome pofitive
Quality ; which wants to be proved : Or elfe
improperly applies bounds and bounders to
mere non-entity, or bare poflibility; which
has nothing to do with the Idea of Bounds.

* True Iff/ell. Syfitm, p. 644 & 766^

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

which we have from without, and fo natural to us that there is no rea-
sonable Man but perceives them in himfelf. There are fome who deny

C 2 . that

N 7 E s.

If therefore we take Space in the firft Notion
laid down, then its unboundednefs, will (as
Dr. Cudwortb fays) fignify nothing but the
poffibility of Body farther and farther with
out end ; according to which Senfe, Let us
itate their ufual Queition in other Words, and
the great fallacy and impropriety of it will ap-
pear. What is there, fay they, beytnd this
Space? You mud either imagine more fuch
Space or nothing. What is there, fay we, be-
yond this pojfibility of Exigence ? You muft ei-
ther imagine mtre fuch pojfibility of Exijlence or
mere nothing, i. e. non Exijlence. What Confe-
quence can poflibly be drawn from fuch an odd
kind of Argumentation ?

But if Space betaken in the fecond Senfe,
i. e. as Extenfion \n abfiraclo, then the meaning
of our not being able to Jet bounds to it will only
be, that we have a power of enlarging our ab-
ftradl Idea in Infinitum, or that we always find
rn our felves the fame ability to a<ld to, or re-
peat it, and if we always find that we can add,
we fhall never find that we cannot add, which
(as a very eminent Writer on the Subject ob
lerves) is all the Myftery of the Matter, and
all that can be underftood by infinite Space.
But it is farther urg'd that there muft be fome
thing more in the prefent Cafe ; for we fine
not only a Power of enlarging the Idea, but find it
impofiible to fet bounds to the thing ; whereas, wc
tan enlarge the Idea of Matter to infinity, but can
alfo jet bounds to the thing it J elf. Jn anfwer to
the firft part of this Objection 'tis ask'd, What
thing, 1 pray you, but the thing in your own
mind, that is, the Idea ? Prove it to be thing;
and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds
or not; but to fay the thing is infinite or
boundlefs, before you have prov'd it to exift,
or to be a thing, is too large a ftep to take.
The abovc-memion'd excellent Writer folves
the Difficulty arifing from the fecond part of
the Objection by another parallel Cafe. " When
" I confider the number of the Stars, I can go
" numbering on in my thoughts ftill more and
" more Stars in Infinitum, But I can alfo fet
" bounds to them, can fuppofe their numbers

finite, but to number itfelf I can fet no
bounds. Yet what is Number ? Nothing
but an Abftraft Idea, nothing ad extra, _and
to fay to that number is infinite, comes only
to this, that we cam fet no bounds to our
Faculty of Numbering, it being always as
eafy to add to a thoufand, or a Million, one
more, CSV. as to One. Well then, to fet
bounds to number in the abftradt, is to fet
bounds to the Faculty itfelf, and to deny that
it is in my Power to add, when I plainly
perceive that I can ; and fo is a direct Con-
tradiction. But as to the Number of Stars,
or Hairs, or Men, or any thing, I can fet
bounds to that, without any contradiction,
becaufe it ftill leaves me in pofTeflion of the
power of numbering, which I find I have ;
and which does not require any fubjeel ad
jextra, but may go -on independent of any,
and indifferent to all. Now to apply this to
other cafes : the Mind finds in itfelf the far
culty of enlarging and extending its Idea of
extenfion. 'It can apply it to Matter, or can
let it alone; can fuppole Matter infinitely ex-
panded, or can fet bounds' to it: But to fet
bounds to all Extenfion, as well imaginary
as real, is cramping the Faculty, is denying
it the power of enlarging, which is always
prefent to the mind, and which fhe can ne-
ver lofe; and, in a word, is a contradiction.
Any, either imaginary, or real> Subject is
fufficient for the mind to exercife its Facul-
ties upon; and fo if you either fuppofe God
or Matter, or Space to be infinitely extend-
ed, it is equally fatisfied with any. All
that fhe requires is that fhe may be able to
enlarge the Idea of Extenfion. But, if you
take from her Extenfion itfelf, that is the
Idea of it, and the Power of adding to it,
you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny
her a power which fhe finds fhe has. In a
word, wc can fet bounds to any thing that
ftill leaves the power of enlarging or ex-
tending infinitely, as we find, we always
fcm: and if we would fpeak ftrictiy, it is
not number that is infinite nor extenfion infi-

" nite.

1 5 Concerning the Origin of Evil.

that Space is any thing diftinct from Matter, nor. is it much to our

purpofe

n o r E S.

nite, which are nothing but nitions abftracTed
from things: But the mind of Man is able
to proceed numbering or extending infi-
nitely, that is, without ever coming to any
Stop or Bounds. For to fet bounds is to
deny and deftroy the Faculty itfelf: if it
could not always do it, it could not do it at
all. He that can add one to one, as often
as he will, can never find an end of num-
bering, nor he that can double an Inch as
often as he will, find an end of enlarging ;
itisall nothing more than repening one of
the eafieft operations or exercifes of the
mind, and it will always be a contradiction

for any rational Mrnd to want it: The

Cafe being plainly thus, I think it fhould
not be ask'd, why a Man cannot fet bounds
to Number or Extenfion, but how he comes
to have the Faculty of Counting and Re
peating, which is really tantamount to the
other, and what it ultimately refolves into.
And then, I fuppofe, the Anfwer is very
eafy, and'we need not go to the utmoft
Limits of the World to enable us to refolve
the Riddle. - '--_ .

" f cannot but (mile to obferve how grofly
we are.impofed upon by Words ftanding for
abftraft Ideas, for want of confidering how,
and upon what Occafions, thefe abftracl:
Ideas were invented for the Help* of weak
and narrow Conceptions, and have been ufed
fo long till they are thought to ftand for real
Things. - ~ I forgot to add, that we find
much the fame Cafe with refpeft to the Di-
vifibility of Extenfion, as in regard to the
other.. For when we h*ve mentally divided
our imaginary Space into 10, 20, or 30
parts, we are not in the leaft hinder' d from
dividing and ; fubdividing every part, as
often and as long as we pleafe< For by this
Artifice of the Mind, Divifibility is brought
under Addition, and there is no End of that.
We can always be adding to the number of
divifible parts one way, as well as to en-
larged parts the other. They are both but
the fame work of the Mind. And hence
come many notable demonftrations of the

w Dfaiflbtlity of Extenjitn (and fometimes,
" Matter) in infinitum : the Englilh of. all
" which is no more than this, that whenever.
" we begin to add, we know not when to
" have done becaufe its nothing elfe but do-
** ing the fame over and over again, and we
u do not lofe, but rather improve, our Facul-
" ties by the Exercife of them
I " To conclude this Point: I hope it fuffi-
" ciently appears that the Power the Mind" ha*-
" of adding and repeating does abundantly
" account fot our not being able to fet bounds
" to Ideal Extenfion, any more than to N;.mler,
" in the abiiract, or to Divifibility, all arifing
*) from one and jhe fame Principle, and owing
" to the fame Caufe:" -

A This, I think, is a folid "and ample confuta-
tion of the Argument drawn from the Idea of
Space and its imaginary infinity. We (hall only
add a Word or two to fhew that Duration, as
well as Space, Number, and all Quantity ; Any
thing which can be confidered only by way of
parts, or in fucceffion ; is abfolutely repugnant.
to, or incapable of, true pofitive infinity in:
any refpect. Now by a pofitive, or Met 'a phy-
fua 1 , Infinite we always mean that which is ab-
folutely Perfeft in its kind, which cannot ad-
mit of Addition, or Increafe. 'Tis an Idea of a
certain Quality in the Abftrael, which has no
mixture of the contrary Quality in it, no fai-
lure or defeel : and which therefore is our Stan-
dard to which we always refer, and by which
we try, all imperfeftions, all mix'd or finite
Qualities, which are for this reafon called im-
perfect., becaufe they fall fhort of our original
Standard, and are properly negations of it:
Confequently our Idea of Perfection muft be a
pofitive one, and prior fo that of Imperfetlion ;
as will appear from Cudworth cited in X e,
where the Reader may find a full account of
this pofitive Infinity, and how we get the Idea
of it, and are able to diftinguilh it from that
negative one explain'd by Mr. Locke, which is
frequently confounded with it.

To return. If then a Metaphyfical Infinite
means per/eel, or that to which nothing can be,
added, 'tis plain that Duration,. Number, and,

all

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

purpofe whether it be or no : yet we cannot without offering Vio-

C 3 lence

NOTES.

sH Quantity, the very Nature and Idea of
which includes perpetual Increafe ablenefs ox Ad-
dibility, muft be efTentially incapable of this
abfolute or pofitive Infinity, in like manner as
Cudzvortb has {hewn of Space and Body in the
PafTage referr'd to above. Farther, if we
attend to the Notion of an Infinite Series, and
take a view of the manifold Abfurdities which
accompany it, in any manner of conception
(from which abfurdities we draw our only
Proof of afirfiCaufe, or God) we mail be ne-
ceflarily led to exclude from Infinity all fuch
things as exift Seriatim, or mull be conceiv'd as
confining in, and compofed of, faccejjive parts,
i. e. fuch as Duration, Number, Space, Motion,
Magnitude, sV. all which, when faid to be
infinite, are nothing but fo many infinite Series,
and therefore liable to the fame abfurdities ;
as the abovemention'd Author has demonftrated
of them altogether. Intell. Syfism, p. 643, &c
and of Motion in particular, p. 843. The fame
is fhewn of Duration or Time, by Dr. Bent ley,
Boyle"*! Left. Serm. 3. p. 104, 105, 5th Edit.
Where fpeaking of Infinite Generations of Men
fuppofed to be already pafi (and the Argument
is the very fame in Years or Ages) " What-
" foever, fays he, is now paft, was once aftu-
" ally prefent ; fo that each of thofe infinite
" Generations, was once in its turn actually
" prefent, therefore all except one Generation
" were once future ; and not in being, which
*' deftroys the very Suppofition : For either that
** one Generation muft itfelf have been infi-
* nite, which is nonfenfe ; or it was the finite
* beginning of infinite Generations, between
" itfelf and us, that is, infinity terminated at
" both ends, which is nonfenfe as before. A-
" gain, Infinite pad Generations of Men have
" been once actually prefent, there may be
" fome one man, fuppofe then, that was at
" infinite diftance from us now, therefore that
" man's fon likewife, 40 years younger, fup-
" pofe, than his father, was either at infinite
'* diftance from us, or at finite : if that Son
" too was at infinite diftance from us, then one
u infinite is longer by 40 years than another;
" which is abfurd : if at finite, then 40 years

u added to finite makes it infinite, which is as
" abfurd as the other. "

Thefc and a great many more Arguments of
the fame kind occur in Sir M. Hale's Primitive
Origination of Mankind, \ I. c. 4. and Stil-
lingfieefs Origines Sacrse, B. 3. C. l prop. 7,
8. See alfo the Confutation of an Infinite Se-
ries offucceffive Beings in the beginning of
N. 18. and Xb. (How this Realbning is
confident with the Eternity of God, and what
the true meaning of that Attribute is, fee N. 1 8.
X. c. or Dr. Bentley's 3d Sermon at Beyle's Lec-
ture, prop. 1. or A. Bp King's Sermon on Pre-
deftination, 3V.) The like is fhewn oi Number
and all Quantity, by the ingenious Author of
the Impartial Enquiry into the exiflence and na-
ture of God, p. 24, f3V. " If any Number
" be abfolutely or infinitely great, it can be
" for no other reafon than becaufe 'tis abfolute-.
** \y or in its very nature incapable of increafe
" without an abfolute contradiction. But the
" very nature of all Quantity infers on the
" contrary a neceffify of the increafe of its
" Greatnefs on the fuppofition of the leaft ad-
" dition : For fince no Quantity is more or.
" lefs fuch, or poflefTes more or lefs of the
" nature of Quantity, than another, it fol-
" lows, that all Quantities being of the
" fame general Nature muft feverally bear a
" proportion to each other. For example,
" that can be no Unit which by the addition
" of an Unit will not become two: and by
" parity of reafon, that is no Million which
" by the addition of a fingle Unit will not
" increafe to the greatnefs of a Million and an
" Unit. For if it bebut a Million after the
" Addition of an Unit, 'tis plain it muft be-
" fore that Addition have been lefs than a

" Million by an Unit The like may be

" faid of all other Quantities, p. 25. "

The Learned Dr. Clarke endeavours to evade
all thefe Arguments about Parts, &c. by
denying that any Number of Years, Days,
and Hours; or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, 6v.
" can be confider'd as any aliquot, or confli-
" tuent parts of infinite Time or Space, or be
' compared at all with it, or bear any kind:

" bi)

ijj. Concerning the Origin of Evil.

lenee to our Underftandings, deny but that the conception of Space
is diftindt from the conception of Matter.

SECT.

AT T E S.

" of proportion to it, or be the foundation of
" any Argument in any Queftion concerning
" it. Demsnfir. of the Divine Attr. p. 37,
38. 5th Edit. But does not this look fome-
thing like avoiding one great difficulty by
admitting a greater f For how do we come
at our confufed Idea of infinite Quantity But by
firft having a clear Idea of fome certain part of
that Quantity, in Space, For inftance, of fuch
a Hated Length, as a Foot ; in Time, of an Hour,
itfc. and then by doubling, trebling, or any
way multiplying, that fame Idea as long as we
pleafe, and ftill findin as much room for, or
poffibility of, multiplying it as we did when
we began: "After the utmoft enlargement of
" that Idea w can poffibly make, we find
" no more reafon to ftop, nor are one Jot
" nearer the End of fuch enlargement, than
" we were when we firft fet out. Locke B. 2.
c. 17. ^3. >Bnt does this Idea of Infinite
(which feems to be the only one the Do&or
ever thought of ) when applied to Time or Space,
alter the very nature, ejfence, and idea of that
Time and Space ? Don't we ftill confider it as
an infinity of the fame Time and Space; or as
confifting in a continual addibility of fuch por-
tions of Time and Space; or as a Whole (if
that word did not imply limitation) made up of
numberlefs fuch parts of time and fpace as are
of the fame kind with thefe hours and feet ?
To fay that infinite Space has no parts, is (as
Leibnitz urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. Clarke
N. 11. p. 99.) " to fay that it does not confift
" of finite Spaces ; and that infin'rte Space
' might fubfift, tho' all finite fpaces mould be
" reduced to nothing. It is as if one mould
" fay, in the Cartefian fuppoikion of a mate-
" rial, extended, Unlimited World, that
" fuch a World might fubfift, tho" all the Bo-
" dies of which it confifts, fhould be reduced
" to nothing." 'Tis therefore impoflible to
conceive, that hours and feet, &c. fhould not
be aliquot parts of infinite Time and fpace, and
that thefe parts fhould not bear fome kind of
Proportion to this Infinity. Thefe parts in-
deed will never reach our pojitive abjulute Lnfi-

nity (i. e. that to which nothing can poffibly
be added) becaufe they include a perpetual ad-
dibility, as we obferv'd, which is call'd their
Infinity, and which is a direct contndi&ion to
what we call a pofitive Infinite : And therefore
pofitive Infinity apply'd to them is very wrong
apply'd, and a pofitive infinity of Matter, num-
ber, time, fpace, any quantity or quality that
confifts of parts, or muft be confider'd in fuc-
ceffion, i. e. to which this negative infinite, and
this only, is and muft be apply'd, are all con-
tradictions. Now inftead of anfwering this
Argument againft the abfolute Infinity of Time
and Space, Dr. Clarke firft of all fuppofes that
time and fpace are abfolutely infinite, and the*
becaufe, according to this our way of conceiv-
ing infinity, (v$iich yet is the only way we
have of conceiving it in thefe things) they
could not poffibly be infinite: He argues that
we muft not confider them in this way, namely
as if their parts had any relation at all to their
Infinity. But fhould not the Argument rather
be revers'd, and the confequence of it ftand
thus ? This is our only way of conceiving any
infinite applicable to thefe Things, but this way
we cannot conceive thefe to be pofitively infi-
nite (or pofitive Infinity cannot be apply'd to
thefe) without a contradiction ; therefore we
cannot at all cone?iv r e thefe to be pofitively
Infinite without a contradiction, or therefore
thefe are not pofitively infinite.

There is indeed a certain ufe of the term in-
finite among Mathematicians, where this rea-
foning of Dr. Clarke** might be admitted, but
that is only where they confider Quantities, re-
latively, and not abfolutely, and therefore that
can have no place where we are confidering
real Exiflences. Thus when Geometricians
fay that one Quantity is infinitely lefs than a-
nother, they mean that their infinitely fmall
Quantity is no aliquot part of, bears no pro-
portion to, or cannot be compared with the
other ; but proportion is (nothing Teal but)
purely relative, and therefore the "term infinite
apply'd-here muft be fo too. Thus for inftance,
the Angle of Contadl made by a Curve and its

Tangent

Concerning the Origin of Evil

SECT. II.

Of the Enquiry after the Firfl Caufe.

I. Suppofing thefe three, viz. Motion , Matter, and Space, we are in An enquiry
the next place to examine whether they be of themielves, or of fome- concerning
thing elfe? If of themfelves, the thing is done, and we are to enquire Matter%nd '
no farther about it. For tiiofe things that exift by Nature are caufes s P ace ; whe *
of Exiftence to themfelves, i. e. do not ftand in need of any external [ft"/ thenk*""
caufe - y if they depend on fomething elfe, there will be a queftion about klves.
that alfo, what it is, and what are its properties.

II. We muft prefume that all our conceptions of fknple Objecls We are to
without us are true, that is, reprefent the things as God would have ^ orm our
them known to us, except we elfewhere difcover fome Fallacy or Pre- thinfTwhe -
judice adhering to them. (6) For we can judge of things no otherwife ^ her the y *-
than from our Conceptions. Nor are we to feek for any other (B.) l ^ s th{

NOTES.

Tangent is infinitely lefs than any rectilinear
Angle, i. e. bears no proportion to it, is no
mcafure of it, or cannot any ways be compared
with it. If this were not the fenfe of Ma-
thematicians here, I cannot fee how there could
be a difference of Infinites amongft them, but
'tis well known that they have infinitely little
quantities, which yet are infinitely great ones,
i. e. with refpeft to other Quantities : And
thus they may have an infinite fuccefhon of in-
creafing quantities, every one of which fhall
be infinitely greater than the other that is low-
r in the feries : * But all this is nothing to ab-
folute Metaphyfical Infinite which cannot be
confider'd in that manner, and therefore what
relates to the former infinites cannot be the
foundation of any Argument concerning this.
The equivocal ufe of the word Infinite in thefe
different fenfes by jumbling Mathematics and
Metaphyfics together, has, I believe, occafion'd
moft of the Confufion attending Subjects of
this kind.

Criterion require a

Caufe, front
our fimple

(6.) Thus in Sight we find the fhapt nn&ftze ^"nTher"*
of a vifible objett are very much varied upon j s no eroun( j

to fufpeft a
Fallacy.

us according to its diftance, and the fituation of
the place from whence the profpeel is taken.
When the Picture of Objefts being prick'd
out by the Pencils of rays upon the Retina of the
Eye do not give the true Figure of thofe Ob-
jects (as they not always do, being diverfely
projected, as the Lines proceeding from the fe-
veral points happen to fall upon that concave
fur/ace) this, tho' it might impofe upon a Being
that has no faculty fuperior to fenfe, does not
impofe upon our Reafon, which knows how the
appearance is alter'd, and why. Reafon may be
apply'd to over-rule and correct fenfe in this
and the like cafes. Wollafion Re/. Nat. delin.
p. 54, ci>V. fee more impofitions of this kind
in Locked EJ'ay, B. 2. C 9. . 8, 9.

(JS) They who look for any other Criterion
of Truth or Certainty lofe their Labour; they
who fay that a Clear, diftintl, or determinate Idea
is the Criterion, are never the nigher, for the

Qijefrw n

* Vid. Ntvittn Princ. Math. L. 1.^.1. Keil Introd. *d ver. Phyf. $ 3. and Hayes's Fluxions ad,
Jrincip,

l4 Concerning the Origin of Evil.

Criterion of Truth than that a Conception of any thing offered to the

Mind

NOTES.

Qucftion returns, viz: by what Criterion are
we certain that this Jdea is clear, dijluiQ or de-
terminate, or that this is to be look'd upon as
the Criterion ; aad fo on in infinitum : we muft
therefore flop fome where, and determine of the
lirtellecl, as of the fenfes, that an Object by its
prefence, according as it is reprefented to the
Mind, whether it be dear, or objcure, diftintl or
eonfufed; whether it be determinate ox indeter-
minate, effectually determines that to exert the
aft it fhould exert, and that there is no need of
any Criterion. For inftance, if any one would
be certain whether the Sun fhines, whether the
Light be clear, or obfeure, he need ufe no o-
ther Criterion befide his Eyes, let him open
them, and whether Tie will or no, he'll per-
ceive whether. it fhines -or not, and alfo what
that Light is, nor can he otherwife avoid per-
ceiving this, and -being certain of it, than by
Slutting or turning away his Eyes. The fame
Method is to be obferved in Intellectuals. Let
him that wants to know whether any Propor-
tion be true or falfe, apply it to his Mind, with
the Reafons which prove or difprove it (if there
need any Reafons) and he'll be fore'd whether
he will or no, to affent or dijfent, or fufpend his
afTent, according as the Condition of the ob-
ject requires; nor can he avoid paffing his
Judgment but by diverting his Intellect. For
fince perception of Objedts is an Ad of the.
Mind itfelf, and clear nefs or obfeurity, determi-
natenefs or undeterminaienefs, are modes or affec-
tions of this Ael of conceiving Objects, not of the
Objecls themfelves, we can judge of the AcTs of
our Minds and their affections no otherwife
than from the Senfe and Indication of the Mind
itfelf. For as by a power of the Mind we are
confeious that we perceive a thing, fo by the
very fame power we are no lefs confeious whe-
ther we perceive the thing obfeurely or clearly,
determinately or indeterminately.

Nor do they come off better who put the
Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas for a Crite-
rion ; nay worfe, for they think to difpatch a
matter of the greateft Confequence by a Meta-
phor, which is unworthy of Philofophers. Nor

yet do they attain their End ; for the Queftion
recurs as before, by what Criterion are they
affur'd of the Agreement or Difagreement of
Ideas, or whence did they learn the Truth of
this proportion, viz. That this is the Criterion of
Truth? If they fay, 'tis evident to the Mind of
itfelf and needs no other Criterion, why are
not other Truths after the fame manner difco-
vered without a Criterion ? Setting afide Cri-
terions therefore, we muft neceffarily attend to
the Conceptions themfelves, and in all things
fellow the Guidance of our Mind. For it will
as certainly embrace Truth duly offer'd to it, as
Fire will confume combuftible Matter : And
there's no more neceffity for a Criterion for the
Under/landing to diftinguifh Truth from Falfe-
hood, than for the Fire to diftinguifh between
combuftible and incombuftible Matter : Apply
an Objeft, and the thing will be done of itfelf.
A Perfon imy reply, that there is fomething in
the combuftible Matter which fits it for the re-
ception of the Flame, namely fulphur, or fome-
thing of that nature; after the fame manner
alfo there is fomething in things whereby they
are naturally fitted to determine the Affent of
Underftanding, and this is the Agrecm:nt or
Conformity of Ideas, which therefore difcovers
the Truth, and is the Criterion by which the
Underftanding is determined. I anfwer, all
Logicians (as far as I remember^ u.ed to found
Affirmation in the Agreement, Negation in the
Difagreement of the Terms between themfelves,
and Illation, in their Agreement in/fJie fame
third. But fince this Conformity or Agree-
ment of the Terms may be either real or appa-
rent, here is the proper place and ufe of a Cri-
terion, namely to diftinguifh the apparent from
the real: For a verbal affirmation of the agree-
ment between the Terms, when the Mind per-
ceives none, is a lye ; when 'tis only apparent,
an Error ; but in both a Falfity.

If any one can produce any other Criterion
to diftinguifh this apparent conformity, or dif-
agreement, from the real, befide the-application
and attention of the Mind, he might be thought
to have difcover'd fomething truly ufeful to

Mankind.;

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

Mind forcibly extorts affentj as there is no other Criterion of Ob-
jects perceived by the Senfes, than that an Object, by its prefence for-
ces us to perceive it even againft our Wills. If therefore the Concep-
tions

NOTES.

Mmkind; but inftead of that to put upon us
the very Agreement or difagreement of Ideas,
is to lay down the thing itielf as done, about
which the Query is how it can be done ? For
that is what we enquire after, i. e. how we may
be certain that we are not deceiv'd in taking
apparent Conformity for real. I know, there
is a certain Art of propofing Truths to the Un-
derfhnding by which it may more eafily per-
ceive and judge whether they really agree or
no ; as there is an art of placing the Fuel fo as
to take Fire more readily, but this is nothing
to the Criterion of Truth; nay it proves that
there is none other befide the Mind duely ap-
ply'd.

'Tis to be obferv'd alfo that the Antients
placed Affirmation in the Agreement of the
Terms, much more properly than the Moderns
do in the Agreement of Ideas'. For as we
have (hewn before, * we know feveral Truths
of things whereof we have properly no Ideas ;
unlefs they will abufe the Word Idea contrary
to common ufe, and the fenfe of Antiquity.
For according to Plato, who feems to have been
the firft that introduced Ideas into Philofophy,
Knowledge by Ideas is peculiar to God, who
alone perceives thing3 immediately by their Ef-
fences : But we (as was fhewn before, f) by
Marks and Characters, which whether they be
imprefs'd on the Mind by immediate fenfation
from the Things themfelves, or colleftcd from
the fimilitude, proportion, or relation to the
Things which are perceived by the Senfes, can-
not more properly be calTd the Ideas of Things,
than the very Words can : For they are often
no more like the Effences of things, nor is it
neceffary that they mould ; fince they fuffici-
ently anfvver the ends for which Knowledge
was given us, if they diftinguifh things from
one another and difcover their Ufes.

And in reality this feems to be the only dif-
ference between Words and thefe Maris, that

we connect Sounds with the things by volun-
tary impofition, but the fen/at ions of the Mind,
which itt the Marks whereby the Underftani-
ing ditlinguifhes things from each other, arc
join'd by Nature to the Prefence of them. 'Tis
from Inftitution, for Inftance, that we call a
Body from which Light is diffufed, the Sun :
But nature imprints the fenfation of Light, and
a Globe of two Foot upon the prefence of it,
which are the marks from whence the Mind
reafons about it, and perhaps refemble its Ef-
fence no more than that very found of the
Word Sun does.

'Tis to be obferv'd farther, that thefe Marks
are produced in us at various times, and by
different Faculties, and fometimes have no
manner of connection with each other. When
this happens, we are in doubt whether they
belong to the fame thing: fometimes alfo they
are equivocal, and belong to more things, and
then we enquire whether the things with
which they are connected be different. That
we be not impofed upon by thefe, there's need
of Enquiry, Attention, Obfcrvation and Re-fear cb;
By application to thefe, the Underltanding
difcovers Truth, and embraces it when dif-
cover'd, without any Criterion, belide the
Power implanted in it by Nature, whereby 'tis
naturally adapted to perceive the Truth duly
propofed (as the Sight does Colours, the Tafte
favours) and to diftinguifh, by Marks, the real
from the apparent Congruity of Things. (7)

(7) Tho' our Author feems to have been ar-
guing flrenuoufly againft Locke in moll of this
Note; yet the whole, I think, is a difpute on-
ly about Words, and will come to the very
fame thing, whether we take his, or Locke's
Account of it. Our Author fays, a Concep-
tion offer'd to the Mind forces its affent, with-
out any other Criterion of its reality or con-
formity to the Thing. Locke tells us, that
Truth, or Certainty, confifts entirely in the

Con-

* Note A:

f Note A.

j 8 Concerning the Origin of Evil.

tions which we have of thefe three before mention'd, reprefent them
to us as exifting necejj'arily, fo that they cannot be feparated from Ex-
igence (C) even in Thought, we muri affirm that thefe exift of them-

f elves,

NOTES.

Connexion, Relation or Agreement of our I-
deas, of which connection, &c. we have no
other evidence than the real perception of it
by the Mind. Our Author affirms, that the
Application or Attention of the Mind is fuffi-
cient to diftinguifh Truth from Falihood. Locke
<ys, a clear perception of the Mind is all that
is required to that -end.; Our Author tells us,
in the tail place, that Truth or Affirmation was
much better placed in an agreement of Terms,
Marks, or Charaelers, than of Ideas. Locke di-
ftinguifhes. Truth into Verbal (which is the
conformity of Ideas to the Terms) and Mental
(which is the conformity of Ideas to each o-
ther) and Metaphyseal, or real, (which is their
conformity to the real exiftence of things) of
which laft kind of Truth we have no Criteri-
on, fo that there feems to be no other diffe-
rence between thefe two Authors, than what
lies in the different ufe of the Word Idea (as
was above mentioned in the Notes 3 and 4.)
which, according to the Latitude 'tis ufually
taken in by Mr. Locke and his Followers, com-
prehends all our Author's Marks, Charaelers,
Senfattons, and Conceptions, Sec. For a more
compleat anfwer to that old Queftion, What is
the General Criterion of Truth ? fee Mr. Wattsh
Logic, P. 2. c.2. V7. P- 1 73, 174- 2d. Edit.
(C.) This way of Reasoning is different
from that of Des Cartes : for he applies this Ar-
gument to Complex Ideas made by the Mind
out of fimple ones, but this proceeds upon
fimple ones only. The ground of the diffe-
rence lies in this, the Mind may erroneoufly
join fuch things together as neither are nor can
be join'd in nature: for* example, the moil
perfect Being is made up of a Collection of all
the Perfections which the Mind has obferv'd
difperfed all over Nature: But whether fuch a
Collection does really exift any where may well
be queftion'dj (8.) nor can it be proved from
that very collection or Idea, which is a Work
of the Mind alone. But the cafe is different
in a fimple Idea produced by the Objett itfelf.

.For fince this comes not from elfewhere, we
cannot attribute any other manner of Exiftence
to it than that which it brings along with it
into the Mind.

When I think of a Man prefent, I cannot
but believe that he exiils, /. c. I attribute aHual
Exiftence to him ; but that he will exift for the
future, I perceive, may either be or not be,
./. e. I affign him poftible Exiftence j but if there
be any thing, which, from the lde\ that I have
of it, I cannot confider otherwife than as ex-
ifting, lam as certain that it does always exift,
as that the Man exifts when I fee him. For,
the reafon why I believe the Man that is pre-
fent to exi It, is, becaufe I cannot even in my
Mind conceive him not to exift, while I per-
ceive that he is prefent. If therefore there be
any thing which I cmnot fo much as conceive
in my Mind not to have exifted, or not to ex-
ift for the future, 'tis manifeft that I believe this
to have exifted always, for the very fame rea-
fon that I believe the Man to exift who, is now .
prefent.

Now it is to be obferved, that fomething
muft exift of itfelf and include neceftary Ex-
iftence in its Nature; in the next place we en-
quire what that is j nor can it be determin'd 0-
therwife, than by the conceptions which we
have of things: If any thing which we know
to exift, implies Exiftence in its very notion,
and cannot mentally be feparated from it, we
muft conclude, that this hath always exifted,
and does not require a Caufe diftinft from it-
felf. .. But if I have any reafon to fufpeft that, I
do not fee the pre fence of a Man, but a Statue,
and fo may be miftaken ; I find this Is poffible,
and in that cafe would not attribute atlual Ex-
iftence to it without Examination. So if there
be any reafon why I cannot conceive a thing
not to have exifted, or not to exift for the fu-
ture, tho' in reality it once did not exift, and
perhaps does not now; in this cafe I may fufpeft
myfelf to be miftaken, and to attribute neceffary
Exiftence to it from an erroneous Conception

It:

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

fehes, and require no Caufe of their Exiftence. But if we can conceive
thefe once not to have been, to have begun to be, or to be capable of
Annihilation, 'tis plain that NeceJJ'ary Exiftence belongs not to them,
nor are they of themfelves, they muft therefore have their Being from

D 2 fome-

NOTES,

It muft be confeft, this Sufpicion is ftronger
in Complex Ideas form'd by the Mind, than in
thofe fimple ones that are produced in it by the
very Objects themfelves, and without its affi-
ftance ; yet it may have place in both, as may
be feen below. Care alio muft be taken, that
we do not rob thiugs of their exiftence rafhly,
and without Examination ; for who doubts but
we may be miftaken in feparating Exiftence
from, ab well as attributing it to, them. But
if, after due Attention, 'we plainly find that
our Conceptions of certain things do not at-
tribute necefTary Exiftence to them, we muft
conclude, that we are either miftaken in every
thing, or not miftaken here. If then we find
that neither the Idea of Motion, nor of Matter,
includes Exiftence in itfelf, nor is connected
with it; nay, if after our grcateft diligence and
enquiry, they appear plainly feparable, it is as
certain that Matter and Motion do not exift of
themfelves, as any thing can be: For nothing
is otherwife certain than from the conceptions
which we have of every thing.

It may be objected, that there are fome who
doubt of, fome who deny, the Being of a God ;
we cannot therefore conclude, becaufe we may.
conceive Something not to exift, that Exiftence
is not included in its nature; For, by thh
Means, not only Space and Matter, but alfo
God himfelf, would not be felf-exijlent, fine;
we fee fome bereaving him of his Exiftence, i.e.
conceiving him not to exift, whereas he ne-
ceflarily muft be felf-exiftent : 'Tis not a right
ConclufiOn therefore, that Space, tftc. do not
exift of themfelves, becaufe we can in our
Minds feparate Exiftence from them.

There are, I own, who -deny the Being of a
God, (for what is there fo'abfurd that fome
may not imagine?) but in the interim, that
thev really believe him not to exift, I very
much doubt. However, fuppofing God to
have exiftence, there are none but do acknow-

ledge that he exifts neceflariJy ; nor do any feek
for a caufe of his Exiftence: all fee that 'tis of
fuch a nature as excludes a Caufe.

But in Space, Matter, and Motion, ''tis quite
another thing ; almoft all Men grant that thefe
do now exift, yet thefe fame Men own that
they may not exift ; which cannot be faid of
God, if He be but granted to exift. Why can
I, mentally at leaft, deprive Space, cirV. which,
are conceiv'd actually to exif, of their Exi-
ftence, and confider them for the future as
non-exiftent, but cannot feparate the Idea of
God from Exiftence even in thought, if I once
grant that he does exift ? There's certainly no
other reafon, but that the Divine Nature iri
eludes Exiftence in itfelf; whereas the nature
of Space, Matter and Mstion does not.

For ' tis to be obferv v d, that we are^'no farther
folicitous about the Caufe of things, than as
the nature of them appears to be fuch as muft
require a Caufe: VVe enquire, for inftance,
from whence the Tide, and Saltnefs of the Sea
proceed, and fearch for the caufes of them :
But why do we fufpect that thefe really have a
Caufe ? Is it becaufe we obferve the Sea
fometimes tofs'd with the Tide, or Salt; and
femetimes ftill, or fweet ? Nothing like it:
For, who ever fa'w the Sea perfectly ftill, or
fweet, fo as from thence to raife a doubt about
the Caufe? Why then don't we reft without
enquiring after Caufes, perfuaded that things
have always been as they are, and that thofe
which are Eternal require no Caufe ? Whence
is it, that the Mind does hot at all acquiefce in
this, nor is any one fo ftupid, as to be moved
by it to lay afide the Search o Caufes ? Is it
not from hence that the Mind rcmonftrates a-
gainft it, and declares to us, even ag.iinft our
Wills, that the Tide, or Saltnefs of the Sea,
is not efTential to it? Nor does it otherwife
diftinguifh whether anJfetlion, Mode, ox S>ua-
/./y, be extrinfical to the thing, or require a

Graft

2 c Concerning the Origin of Evil

fomething elfe. For, fince they may either exift, or not exift, Exi-
gence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature they rnufl
have it from without ; and there wants aCaufe by which the Indiffe-
rence,

NOTES.

Caufe, than as this is not included in the Ef-
fcncc of that thing in which it happens to in-
here. This appears plainly enough from hence,
that it troubles not itfelf about the Sea's being
extended, fince it fees that iseflential to it, but
is in the interim folicitous why it is Salt ; for
no other reafon, but becaufe it can conceive
that it may be either fait, or fweet.

The fame mull be faid of Matter, and its^"-
fcftions or Modes. If any things be contain'd in
the conception cf its Nature, or have a necef-
fary connection with it, our Mind enquires
rot after their Caufe, but acquie r ces as foon as
ever it perceives that neceffity or connection :
but it feeksfolicitoufly after the Caufes of others,
and refts not till it has found them. For Ex-
ample, when it thinks of the Exiflence or Mo-
bility of Matter it looks for no Caufes of them,
for it perceives that thefe are included in the
nature of it, or flow necefTarily from it; But
it demands a Caufe of its Exiftence, Fluidity
and Motion, for it judges thefe to be as foreign
to Matter, as the Tide and Saltnefs are to the
Sea.

And if any fay thefe have been always Co, and
therefore require no Caufe, he'll appear to talk
no lefs abfurdly, than he that mould fay the
lame of the Tide and Saltnefs of the Sea ; nor
will he fatisfy our Thoughts any better: For
whether the Tide and Saltnefs be fuppofed e-
ternal or temporary, fince they proceed not
from the very nature of the Sea, they muft ne-
cefTarily have a Caufe, if we will believe our
own Minds. After the fame Manner, whether
the Exiftence, Motion and Fluidity of Matter
be fuppofed eternal ot temporary, fince they
are net included in its Nature, nor flow necef-
farily from it, any more than the Tide and
Saltnefs of the Sea do from its Nature, 'tis e-
qually neceflary that they have a Caufe. Either
all Eaquiry into the Caufes of things is entirely
to be rejected, orto be admitted in thefe. Either
we muft imagine that nothing has any Caufe,
or grant that thefe require one: For, 'tis un-
jreaforuble to expect a Caufe in fbme particular

things, and to pronounce it unneceflary in o-
thers, which are exactly alike.

I know, fome think that thefe things come
by Nature, and that we mull feek for no other
Caufe befide it, and I think they fay true : All
thefe come by Nature, but by the Nature of
what ? Let them tell us. Not by their own ;
Not by the Nature of Space, or Matter; for
they have no necefTary connection with thefe,
nor are included in them. We muft therefore
fuppofe another Nature from whence they pro-
ceed and derive their Origin.

Hence it appears, that if we will truft our
own Thoughts, and follow their direction, we
are no lefs certain of a Caufe diftinct from
Matter and Space, which gave Exiftence and
particular Qualities to each of them, than that
the Tide and Saltnefs of the Sea muft have a-
nother Caufe befide die Sea itfelf. Nay, we
muft either change our whole Method and
procedure of inveftigating caufes,. or admit a
Caufe of thefe, which Caufe can be no other
than God himfelf, in whofe Nature the caufali-
ty of all things is contain'd. (9.)

(8.) That is, might be queftion'd, if there
were no better proof of its Exiftence than that
Conception only. However, this Notion has
been very much infilled on, both by the Carte-
fian and feveral of our own Philofophers, who
were not willing to part with any one Argu-
ment which feem'd to have the leaft tendency
towards the fupport of fo good a Caufe. The
Sum of their Argumentation feems to be this.
We can have no Idea of any thing, but what
has either an afiual or a poflible Exiftence; but
we have an Idea of God, /'. e. of a Being of
Infinite Perfections, which might poflibly ex-
ift ; therefore he muft have an aclual Exiflence:
For actual Exiftence is a degree of Perfection,
and the foremention'd Idea, according to
ihe Suppofition, includes all poflible Perfecti-
on, therefore it muft include that, otherwife
we ftiould have an Idea of fomething abfo-
lutely perfect without one poflible Degree of
Perfection, which is a contradiction in terms.

But

Concerning the Origin of Evil

fence or PofTibility of Exiftence, or non-exiftence, may be determin'd.
Nor do we judge a Caufe in things to be otherwife neceflary than as
they are in their own Nature indifferent, that is, pajjive, in regard to
Exiftence. For, if our Conceptions reprefent fomething to us as ne-
ceflary in its own nature, we enquire no farther about the Caufe
whereby it exifts.

D 3 III. If

NOTES.

But this is all begging the Queftion. For
it is not the bare poffibility of juppofing it to
have all poffible perfe&ions that infers its
attual exiftence, but the proving it to have
them. Indeed if we fuppofe it to have all pof-
fible perfections, we mull at the fame time ne-
cefTarilv fuppofe it to exift, fince Exiftence is
a poffible perfection ; otherwife we fhould fup-
pofe it to have all poffible perfections, and yet
to want one, which is a Contradiction. But
Hill this is only an Exiftence, ex Hypotbeji, a
true confequence from doubtful prernifes, and
which will as eafily follow from the fuppofal of
its having but any One perfection, fince that
muft neceflarily imply exiftence. The certainty
then of fuch actual exiftence, does by no means
follow from the fuppofed poffibility of it, as
thefe Men would be underftood : This Con-
clufion will never held good ; what cannot be
fuppofed without a Contradiction certainly
does not exift, therefore what can be fuppo-
fed without a Contradiction ceitainly does.

Others endeavour to prove the exiftence of
God from our Idea of him after this manner.
Whatever we have an Idea of, that either is, or
if it be not, it is poffible for it to be ; but we
have an Idea of an Eternal and neceffarily Exi-
gent Being ; therefore fuch a Being either /'/, or
it is poffible for it to be. But if fuch a Being
either now is not, or once was not, or ever will
not actually be, it would not be poffible for it to
be at all (except it could make itfelf, or be
made by Nothing) contrary to the former part
of the Suppofition ; nor would it be either
Eternal or neceffarily Exiftent, contrary to the
latter. Therefore fuch a Being now is, and

always was, and ever will be. Or, fhorter,

thus : Our Idea of God is an Idea of fomething
which implies no contradiction, and therefore

fuch a Being may poffibly be; and therefore he
muft a dually be, or elfe he could not poffibly be,
which is contrary to the Hypothefis. Now to
make this and the like Argument of any force,
it muft be clearly prov'd, that we have fuch an
Idea of a neceffarily Exiftent Being, as will infer
its actual exiftence; (which may perhaps appear
to be fomething doubtful from Note 14.) and
alfo, that this Idea is ftriiily innate ox connate
with us, and confequently capable of being
urged a Priori, for a Proof of the Exiftence of
fome Being correfpondent to fuch an Idea
(which is now generally given up) For if this
Idea be only gathered a pofteriori, viz. by a
deduction of Arguments from our own Exi-
ftence, then it is only a Confequence of thefe
Arguments, and cannot of itfelf be alledg'd as
a diftinct one. For how can any Idea confe-
quent upon fome certain proofs of fomething
a Pofteriori, be an antecedent, independent
proof of the fame thing a Priori ? Befides, ei-
ther thefe arguments are enough to convince a-
ny Man of the Exiftence and Perfections of
God, or they are not; if they are, this is unne-
ceffary ; if they are not, this is infuffcient; nay,
it is none at all, fince 'tis a bare confequence of
thefe, and entirely founded in them, and there-
fore muft ftand or fall with them. But there is
no occafion for this or any fuch Quibble, a
Priori, in order to demonftrate the Being and
Attributes of God, fince numberlefs irrefra-
gable Arguments occur, a pofteriori, and fuch
as are obvious to all capacities. [ For a parti-
cular Deduction of the Divine Attributes, fee
N. 18. Thofe that have a Mind to be farther
acquainted with the proofs of a Deity drawn
from the Idea, may find the Queftion fully dif-
cufsd in Cudtoortb, p. 721, &c. or, in Fiddes't
Tbeol. Spec. B. 1. P. 1. C.9. or, in the impar-

tbl

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

Tisprov'd HI. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the Things in Qucftion-,
ttnJntV xt w ^ appear whether they be felf-exiftent, or require a Caufe. In
Caufe, tho' it the firft place, let us examine Motion, which is really ASiion, but in
be iuppos'd jjj Action it is neceflary, if we may truft our thoughts, that there be
that Matter is an Agent and a Patient, without thefe we have no Notion of Action,
notthe Caufe i n Motion therefore, fince that is Adtion, there is required an Agent
and a Patient. We have indeed thePatient, namely Matter $ we mull

NOTE S.

tial Enquiry into the Exigence, &c. of God,
B. 2. P. I.]

(o/J What our Anchor has been endeavou-
ring to prove in all this Note, is, That we
cannot apprehend either Matter or Motion (and
he will fhew the fame by and by of Space) to
be independent or felf-exiftent, and confequent-
Jy that they require force caufe of their Exi-
gence diftinct from and antecedent to them-
felves: . And tho' he frequently makes ufe of
. that confufed equivocal Term, necejjary Exi-
gence, yet he feems to apply it only in a nega-
tive fenfe for Self-Exifence, or Exiflence with-
out a Caufe, as appears from the latter end of
the fecond andfixth paragraphs of this Section,
and which is as much as his Argument re-
quires. For, where a"ny thing appears to be
an effect, as Matter and Motion do, we muft
. require a Caufe ; where no fuch Caufednefs can
be difcovered, we call the Thing Selfexifcnt,
tho' perhaps it really be not fo, but did pro-
. ceed from fomething elfe ; and where an abfur-
dity would follow from fuppofing any Being
not to have exifted once, or not to exift for
the future, we fay there's a neceffity for fuppo-
fing that it did and will always exift: or we
ftile that Being neceffarily Exift ent: which is
perhaps as far as we can go. But as thefe
Words, Necejjary, Neeefjity, &c. feem to have
been taken to denote fome pofitive, txtrinjic
Principle of Exiftence; and which accordingly
is often ftiled antecedent, abjolute, original Ne-
tefftty, a Necejftty fmple, and uniform, and abfo-
lutely fuch in its own nature, in itfelf, Sec. It
may be of fome ufe to coniider the feveral
Things to which thefe Terms are apply'd, and
what Ideas we fix to them ; which may per-
haps convince us that they are all merely re-
ht'w.

Neceflity is chiefly and perhaps primarily ap-
ply'd to Means: and when it ia thus apply'd, it
evidently has Relation to fome E"d to be attain'd
by thofe Means of which its afiirm'd. Thus,
when we fay fuch a thing is neceflary, we
mean, that fome End cannot be attain'd with-
out the Exiftence of that thing. Thus Reli-
gion is necejfary to a Rational Creature, or
more properly, to the Happinefs of a Rational
Creature, i. e. a Rational Creature cannot at-
tain Happinefs, its ultimate End, without Re-
ligion. Farther, Mean? being a Relative Idea,
whatever is affirm' d of Means as Means, muft
be Relative alfo ; or which is much tta fame,
muft be an Affection of a Relative Idea. v. g.
When we fay, any Action is Good, Fit, Right,
Reafonable, &c. all thefe terms are apply'd
to it, as it is conceiv'd to be a Means to fome
End, and confequently are relative ; therefore
to call any AdYion fit, &c. in itfelf, will be
the fame as to affirm any thing to be relative in
itfelf, which is nonfenfe.

Neceflity is alfo apply'd to Truth, and then it
has relation to fome other Truths, either ante- '
cedent or confequential,- according to the diffe-
rent manner in which that Truth is prov'd to
be neceffarily true, i. e. according as the Proof
is direct or indirect. When the proof is di-
rect, i. e. when the truth of any proportion
is fhewn to follow by unavoidable Co nfequence,
from fome other truth before known ; then;the
Nccefftty of that Truth arifeth from the Rela-
tion which that Truth has to fome antecedent
Truth: When the proof is indirect, /'. e. when
the Truth of any Proportion is fhewn, by
fhewing that the fuppofition df the contrary to
that Truth, i. e. the Denying that Truth, would
imply the Negation of, or beinconfiftent with,

fome

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

in the next place fee what is the Agent: viz. Whether Matter produ-
ces Motion in itfelf ; or (to fpeak properly) Whether Motion be coeval
with it, natural, and neceflarily adhering to its EfTence, as Figure
is to Body. But if we remember what was laid down above -j
and carefully examine the Sentiments and Conceptions of our
Mind, it will appear that the nature of Matter (as far as we know
of it) is indifferent to Motion, or Reft, and moves not except it be mo-
ved.

N O 7 E S.

fome other known Truth ; then the Neceffity of
that Truth arifes from the Relation which that
Truth has to fome confequential Truth. Necef-
fity is alfo apply'd to Axioms ; and then it has
Relation to the terms themfelves, i. e. it ari-
feth from the Relation which is between the
terms themfelves ; and means, that fuppofing or
laying down thofe Terms, that Relation or
Connection between them cannot but be. Far-
ther, the fame may be-faid of Truth, as of Means,
Truth being relative alfo; confequently fuch
Phrafes as thefe, true, or falfe in itfelf, a con-
tradiction in itfelf \ or abfolutely fuch, &c. are
very abfurd ones.

Neceffity is alfo apply'd to Exiftence, and
then it arifeth either from the relation, which
the Exiftence of that thing of which it is af-
firm'd has to the Exiftence of other things ; or
it arifeth from the relation which the Exiftence
of that thing, of which it is affirm'd has to the
Manner of its own Exiftence. In the former
Signification, when Neceffity of Exiftence has
Relation to the Exiftence of other things, it
denotes, that the Suppofition of the Non-exi-
ftence of that thing of which Neceffity is af-
firm'd, implies the non-exiftence of things
which w know to exift. Thus fome Indepen-
dent Being does neceffarily Exifl. Becaufe to
fuppofe no independent Being implies that there
are no Dependent Beings ; the contrary of which
we know to be true, fo that Neceflity of Exi-
ftence, in this Senfe, is nothing clfe but Ne-
ceffity of Truth as related to Confequential
Truth. And this fort of Proof is call'd, De-
pwn/iratio a Pofieriori.
_ When the Neceffity of Exiftence arifes from
the Relation which the Exiftence of any thing
has to the Manner of its own Exiftence ; then

Neceffity means, that that thing of which it is
affirm'd exifts after fuch a Manner that it never
could have not exifted. Thus every Indepen-
dent Being, or every Being exifting without a
Caufe, is neceffarily exifting. Becaufe fuch a
Being, from the very manner of its exifting,
could not begin to exift, therefore muft always
have exifted, i. e. does neceffarily exift. For
to fuppofe a Being to begin to exift, is to fup*
pofe a Mutation, viz. from Non-Entity to En-
tity ; and to fuppofe a Mutation is to fuppofe a
Caufe; For if there's no Caufe, every thing
muft continue as i t was : Therefore every Being
which had no Caufe of Exiftence, i.e. which
is Independent, cannot begin to exift, confe-
quently cannot be fuppofed not to exift, i.e. is
neceffarily exiftent *. Whether this is Demm-
flratio a priori I leave to be determin'd by the
learned. I think it is; becaufe Neceffity of
Exiftence follows from Independency, or Ex-
ifting without a Caufe. No matter whether
Independency is prov'd a Pofieriori, or a Pri-
ori.

N. B. Neceffity, as apply'd to Exiftence in
thefe two ways, muft carefully be diftlnguifhedv
For tho' an Independent Being cannot be ne-
ceffarily exiftent in the former Senfe, without
being fo in the latter alfo: yet it may be ne-
ceffarily exiftent in the latter Senfe, without
being fo in the former. There may be two or
more neceffarily exiftent Beings in the latter
Senfe, though in the former there can be but
one neceffarily exiftent Being : which fhewsthe
inconclufivenefs of Dr. Clarke's feventh projo-
fition. And upon the whole, I think we may be
convine'd, that no Ideas can poffibly be fix'd
to this Propofition, Necejfity abfolutt in Hftlf,
[ See alfo the Notes 14, and 18. J

f In the Author's laft Note.

See Note 14.

2 4- Concerning the Origin of Evil.

ved. Motion therefore does not follow from its nature, nor is it con-
tained in its Effence, nor do we conceive it to arife from thence j
Matter is therefore merely paffive in regard to Motion, and an Agent
muft. be fought elfewhere. If you fay it has been in Motion from E-
ternity, you'll be never the nearer; for Duration alters not the nature
of things. If it has been mov'd from Eternity, it has had an eternal
Caufe, and fince Matter is only paflive with refpect to the Motion
which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was ftill, pajjive, only, and
there wanted an eternal Agent to produce eternal Motion (io.) in it:
for eternal Action cannot be more eafily conceived, without an eternal
Agent, than temporary, without a temporal one. But, you'll fay,
what is eternal, fmce it was never made, requires no Caufe. Does ic
not fo? Suppofe the Sun to have min'd from Eternity, and the
Earth, nourimed by its heat, to have undergone eternal vicilTitudes of
Seafons; had thofe vicimtudes therefore no Caufe? Would they be
ever the lefs dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original ?
Hence it appears that Eternity of Action does not exclude an ac-
tive Caufe ; and it is fo far from truth that fuch Action was never
produced, becaufe it is conceiv'd to have been from Eternity, that
we muft rather fay it has always been produced. For, in the Inftance
given, it appears that the Sun did always, and from eternity, caufe
the change of Seafons : Not that I think the Sun really was, or could
be eternal, but if Motion mould be fuppofed eternal (which is the
only fubterfuge left to them that deny the neceffity of an Agent, in
order to the existence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal
with its light and their effects. And if this be granted, it will plain-
ly appear, that Eternity of Affiion does not exclude an affive Caufe.
If then we follow the guidance of our thoughts, we mufl acknow-
ledge

NOTES.

(10.) Eternal Motion feerrH to be a contra-
diction, [ See Infinite Series in N. 5. and
S. C' 5 Impartial Enquiry, c.j. and x b. ] un-
lefs we could conceive two Eternals, one be-
fore the other; as every mover muft, in the
order of our Ideas, neceffarily operate before
ihey moved : Thefe things therefore which im-

ply Beginning, Change, Succeffion, or In-
creafe, are finite as well as in Duration, as in
any other refpecl, and confequently the Suppo-
fitions here and below are all impoffiblc ones.
Concerning the Equivocation which arifes
from ufmg the Words Motion and A SI ion promif-
cuoufiy, as our Author feems to do, fee N. 62,

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

ledge that there is fomething befide Matter and Motion, which mufl
be the Caufe of Motion.

IV. Secondly, as to Matter itfelf, if we may fuppofe it to have had
a beginning, or to be annihilated; neceffary Exigence will manifeftly
not be imply'd in its Nature, for that may be taken from it, at leaft
in thought ; but a thing, cannot be feparated from its Nature or Ef-
fence even by the Mind : If therefore Exiftence were ejjentlal to Mat-
ter, it could not be divided from it even in thought, that is, we could
not conceive Matter not to exift. . But who doubts whether he can do
this? Is it not as eafy to conceive that Space which the Material
World occupies to be empty, that is, void of Matter ; as full? Can-
not the Understanding affign to the Material World a beginning and
an end? They who admit of Space, or a Vacuum (n.) cannot deny

but

NOTES,

That Matter
requires a
Caufe of its-
exiftence.

11. Thefe two Words, Space and Vacuum,
tho' they ought perhaps to have both the fame
meaning, i.e. neither of them to mean any
real thing or quality exifting in Nature, but
only a Negation of Matter and its Qualities,
yet as the former is more evidently a pofitive
term, it is apt to convey an Idea of fomething
pofitive, and thereby leads us to frame fome
imagination of that fomething, and fo at
length draws into a Notion quite different
from that, which the latter Word more natu-
rally offers, and which comes nearer to the
truth of the Cafe ; and therefore I think it not
quite fo convenient to ufe thefe two Words
promifcuoufly. It may be doubted whether our
fubftituting the former of thefe terms for the
latter, when tho Ideas ufually fixt to them have
in reality nothing to do with one another, may
not have given rife to moft of the Difputes a-
gainft a Vacuum, which have been carried on
by many able Writers. Vacuum, in Natural
Philofophy, is (according to the true import
of the Word) only Emptinefs, or abfence of
Matter, r. e. a Term that implies mere Nega-
tion ; tho', when we come to prove that Mat-
ter exifts not every where, or that there is real-
ly any fuch emptinefs or abfence of Matter, we
are obiig'd, thro' the defect of Language, to

make ufe of pofitive Terms about it, viz. that
there is a Vacuum in this or that place, or that
there is a real foundation in Nature for fuppo-
fing it, &c. Hence, probably, Metaphyficians,
when they come to confider it, being ufed to
contemplate real Effences, are led to under-
ftand it, as fomething ptfitive ; which might
properly be faid to be here mi. there, &c. Their-
nextftep is, to bring it under the Imagination,
and fo finding the Idea of Space, or Extenfion,
in fome meafure connected with this Emptinefs,
they eafily fubilitute one for the other, and of-
ten change the negative Idea into a pofitive
one, and define Vacuum to be Extenfion void of
Solidity, or Space vnthout Body*, Whereas the
Ideas of Vacuity and Extenfion have no real
connection with each other, as was faid before,
tho' they be very apt to go together. Well
then, thefe two diliintt Ideas being both in-
cluded under the Word Vacuum, it becomes e-
quivocal, and confequently that may be affirm'd
or deny'd of it according to the one Idea,
which cannot according to the other, and
here's room forendlefs Juggle. z. . It may-
be faid that there is a real foundation in Na-
ture for fuppofing a Vacuum in the negative
fenfe of the Word, /'. e. as fignifying mere em-
ptinefs ; but th fame thing may be deny'd of it
E i

Locke, B. t\ C.13; fc.

2 6 Concerning the Origin of Evil.

but Matter is at leaft mentally feparable from Exigence. For Space
may be conceived either full or empty j that is, with Matter, or
without it. The Notion therefore of the Creation of Matter, is no
more repugnant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space.

V. But whether there be any fuch thing as Space or no, we are
rily exiftent, certain that we have an Idea of it, tho' whence we had it, Philofo-
fromd!" pkers..are not agreed. Thofe that deny any diftin&ion between it and

Confeflion Body,

of thole Perfons who fuppofc, Space to be the Image of the Body.

That it is
not necelTa

AT O T E S.

in the pofitive, i. e. as (landing for pure exten-
fion, which is an abjlrael Idea, form'd by the
mind itfelf, and, as fuch, has no foundation
any where elfe. Again, Philofophers, who
take a Vacuum for Space or Extenfion In the
abftract, ftifly deny that there is a Vacuum in
Nature, ' which is true indeed of abfolute
Space, which exifts only in the Mind, but is
not fo of Vacuity or abfence of Matter, which
has as real a foundation in nature as Matter it-
felf has : except we'll argue that it cannot be
faid to be cr.to have exifience predicated of it,
becaufe 'tis only a negation ; which is playing
upon, and puzzling one another with words.
To illuftrate what has been faid of the difputes
about a Vacuum, I fhall prefent the Reader
with Tome Arguments brought againfl it by
Mr. Green znd Bay/e; which may be of ufe to
us, fo far as they overthrow the Reality of ab-
folute, fimple Space, which they do effectually,
tho' I take them to be mere quibbles with re-
gard to the End for which thefe Authors feem
to have urged them. They may ferve alfo for
another Inltance of the great confufion caus'd
by a jumble of Mathematics and Metaphyfics
together : an Example of which was given be-
fore in the Word Infinite, N. 5.

" Extenfion into Length, Breadth and
'* Thicknefs, or what is call'd mere Space, or
" Diftance, is a Quantity abftracted by the
" Mind, as all other Mathematical Quantities
" are; as a Line, or Superficies; andean be
" no more imagin'd to exift in nature alone,
" than Length or Breadth can. A Line is
" produced from the flowing of a point ; a
'* Surface from the flowing "of a Line; and a

Space or Mathematical Solid from tie flow-
: ing of a Surface : But 'tis own'd that there
is no fuch real point, and confequently no
fuch Line in being, therefore no fuch Sur-
face. And what reafon can there be affign'd
why we may not go one Step farther, and
from the fame principles conclude there is
no fuch Solid. For how is it poflible for a
Superficies which has not a being, and is i-
maginary and abftn&ed, to produce an ef-
fect which is not equally fo t
" We have faid, that Length, Breadth, and
Thicknefs, is the Definition of Imaginary
Space ; and it is likewife the Notion we
have of a Vacuum, as to the nature and efience
of it: for the foreign properties of Light,
or Heat, or Sound, &c. are not included in
the conceptions our Minds have form'd of
Room to move in, or fimple Space. If
therefore the Definition of Imaginary Space
and a Vacuum, are the fame, and a Vacuum
is real Space, it follows, that real Space and
imaginary are the fame, which is a contra-
diction. Since to abftract any thing in the
Mind from Beings as they really exift, is
not to confider Beings as they really ex-
ift.

" From this Idea of Space, being only an
abftrafted one, it is eafy to give an account
of what Place is, namely, that it is only a
portion of this abftracted Space, we have
mentioned, feparated from the reft, and ap-
ply'd to that body which it confiders as a
meafureof its capacity. Therefore primary
or abfolute Place alfo, as well as Space, is a
creature of the mind, and nothing really

" exifting,

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated ; and
then, if w& remember the things that did exift, without confidering
of what kind they were, but only that they were without the Mind,
we have, what we call Space. If this be true,, then it will be certain

E, 2 that

notes:.

" exffting, as fome Philofophers imagine."
Mr. Green's Principles of Natural Pkilofphy,
B. i. C.4. V8, 18.

" Let us rummage as much as we pleafe into
" all the recefles of our Mind, we fhall never
" find there any Idea of an unmoveable, indi-
" vifible, and penetrable extenfion. And yet
" if there is a Vacuum, there muft exift an
" Extenfion effentially endued with thefe three
" Attributes. It is no fmall difHculty to be
" forced to admit the exiftence of a Nature, of
" which we have no Idea, and is befides re-
" pugnant to the cleared Ideas of our Mind.
" But there are a great many other inconve-
" niencies which attend this. Is this Vacuum,
" or immoveable, indivifible, and penetrable
" Extenfion, a Subftance or a Mode? Itmuft
" be one of the two, for the adequate Divi-
' fion of Being comprehends but thefe two
" Members. If it be a Mode, they mull then
" define its Subftance; but that is what they
"- can never do. If it be a Subftance, I ask
" whether it be created or uncreated ? If crea-
** ted, it may perifh without the Matter, from
" which it is diftinft, ceafing to be. But it is
'* abfurd and contradictory, that a Vacuum,
*' that is, a Space diftin& from Bodies, fhould
" be deftroy'd, and yet that Bodies fhould be
** diftant from each other, as they may be af-
" ter the deftruclion of the Vacuum. But if
" this Space diftinft from Bodies is an uncrea-
** ted Subftance, it will follow either that it
" is God, or that God is not the. only Sub-
4< ftance which neceflarily exifts. Which part
" foever we take of this Alternative, we mail
" find ourfelves confounded. The laft is a
" formal, and the othej, at leaft, a material
" Impiety: for all extenfion is compofed of
" diftindi parts, and confequently feparable
M from each other ; whence it refults, that if
i* God was extended he would not be a fim-

ple, immutable, and properly infinite Be-
ing, bat a Mafs of Beings, Ens per aggrega-
tionem, each of which would be finite, tho'
all of them together would be unlimited;
He would be like the Material World, which
in the Cartefian Hypothefis, is an infinite
Extenfion. And as to thofe who fhould
pretend that God may be extended without
being material or corporeal, and alledge, as
an Argument, his Simplicity, you will find
them folidly refuted in one of-Mr. Arnaulfl's
Books, from which I fball cite only thefe
Words : So far is the Simplicity of God from
allowing us room to think that he may be ex-
tended, that all Divines have acknowledged,
after St. Thomas, that it is a neceffary confe-
quence of the Simplicity ef God, not to be ex-
tended. Will they fay, with the School-
Men, that Space is at moft no more than a
privation of Body ; that it hath no reality,
and that,, properly fpeaking, a Vacuum is
nothing? But this is fuch an unreafonable
Aflertion, that all the modern Philofophers
who declare for a Vacuum, have- laid it afidd,
tho' never fo convenient in other refpefts.
Gaffendus carefully avoided' any reliance on
fuch. an abfurd Hypothefis; but chofe ra-
ther to plunge himfelf. into the moft hideous
abyfs of conjecturing, that all Beings are not
either Subftances or Accidents, and that all
Subftances are- not ^either Spirits or Bodies,
and of placing the extenfion of Space a-
mongft the Beings, which, are neither Cor-
poreal nor Spiritual, neither Subftance nor
Accidents.

" Mr.- Locke, believing that he. could hot
define what a Vacuum is, hath yet given ua
clearly to underftand, that he took it for a
pofitive Being. He had too clear a Head
not to difcern, that nothingnefs cannot be
extended in length, breadth, and depth.

2 8 Concerning the Origin of Evil

that Matter is not Self-exiftent: for we may confider it as annihila-
ted, neither can we attribute any ether nature to it, than fuch as an-
fwers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to
them, be a Phantafm of the Body, that is, an Idea of Body recall'd
to mind, which formerly was, but now is not, or is not fuppos'd to
be, 'tis certain, that Body or Matter, fo far as we know any thing of

its

2v o r E S.

Mr. Hartfoeker hath very clearly apprehended
this Truth. There is no Vacuity in nature,
faith he, this ought to be acknowledged without
difficulty, becaufe it ~is utterly contradictory to
conceive a mere non-entity, with all the proper-
ties which can only agree to a real Being. But
if it is contradictory, thatnothingnefsfhould
be endued with extenfion or any other Qua-
lity, it is no lefs contradictory, that Exten-
fion fhould be a fimple Being, fmce it con-
tains fome things of which we may truly
deny what we may truly affirm of fome o-
thers, which it includes. The Space fill'd
up by the Sun is not the fame Space that is
taken up by the Moon ; for if the Sun and
the Moon fill'd the fame Space, thofe two
Luminaries would be in the fame place, and
penetrated one with another, fince two
things cannot be penetrated with a third,
without being penetrated betwixt them-
felves. It is moll evident, that the Sun and
Moon are not in the fame place. It may
then be faid truly of the Space of the Sun,
that it is penetrated by the Sun ; and it may
as truly be deny'd of the Space penetrated
by the Moon. There are then two portions
of Space, really diftincl: from one another,
by reafon that they receive two contrary de-
nominations of being penetrated and not be-
ing penetratted by the Sun. Which fully

" confutes thdfe who venture to affert tnat
" Space is nothing but the immenfity of God:
" and it is certain that the Divine Immenfity
" could not be the place of Bodies, without
u giving room to conclude that it is compofed
" of as many real diftincl parts as there ate
" Bodies in the World.

** It will be in vain for you to alledge, that
" Infinity hath no parts ; this mufl necefTarily
" be fa He in all infinite Numbers, fince Num-
" ber effentially includes feveral Units. Nor
" will you have any more reafon to tell us
*' that incorporeal extenfion * is wholly con-
** tain'd in its Space, and alfo wholly contain'd
" in each part of its Space : for it is not only
" what we have no Idea of, and befides,
" thwarts all our Ideas of Extenfion ; but alfo
" what will prove that all bodies take up the
" fame place, fince each could not take up its
" own, if the Divine Extenfion was entirely
'^penetrated by each Body numerically the
" fame with the Sun and with the Earth. You
" will find in -f- Mr. Arnauld, a folid refuta-
" tion of thofe who attribute to God the diffu-
" fing himfelf throughout infinite Space. Cril.
Ditl. p. 3083, 3084. See alfo Epi/ccp. p. 294.
If any Perfon wants any more Arguments a-
gainfl the Exiftence of fimple Extenfion, or
the application of it to a Spirit, he may find
enough in Bayle, p. 2790, 3P77, &c

Tota in toto, & lota in fingulis partibus: that is, what the School-Men fay of the prefence of
the Soul in a human Body, and of the prefence of Angels in certain places.

f Arnauld, Letter 8 and 9 to Father Malebranche. See alfo a Book of Peter Petit,^ de Exten-
Jione Animee fcf rerum incorporearum natura. And M. de la Chambre's Anfwer to it, which he pub-'
Jifh'd at Paris, Anno 1666. 4/fl. with this Title, Defence de F Extenfion fcf de partes libres de fame,
all the reafons he alledges to fhew, that extenfion and Spirituality may bc^together, are fo we*k,
tiut-they are only good to fhew the falfity of his Aflertion.

Concerning the Origin of Evil. a-9

its nature is indifferent to exiftence or non-exiftence. It has not
therefore Exiftence of itfelf j for that which exifts by neceffity of
nature, Exiftence enters into its Idea (12.), nor can it be conceiv'd o-
therwife than as exifting.

VI. Others deny that Space is diftinguifhable from Matter, any o- And of thofe
ther way than as a general Quantity is from a particular one j For, j" y be
as when Individuals are changed, the Nature of Man or Animal *v-diftmguifha-
Jnains unchanged: Jb when Body is chang'd ar tranjlated into an other ^^ e u fro r m

E 3 place, otherwife

than as Ex-
tenfion in general is from a particular Extenfion.

NOTES.

(12.) We cannot allow of this or any fuch
Argument drawn from this necejjity of nature,
taken in a pofitive fenfe, for the reafons which
will be given in Note 14. And tho' Matter it-
felf perhaps cannot ftr;rly be prov'd not to be
Eternal, yet 2hy Body, or Syflem of Bodies, for
med out of it, as the ingenious Author of the
Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chrijlian Reli-
gion has fully prov'd * muft necefarily have baa
a beginning ; and that matter, or any material
fubftance, is not eternal, independent, &c. maybe
made probable from feme fuch Argument as
this. We conclude from the faculties of our
mind (viz. thinking, volition, cjfrv all which
are in a perpetual flux, and as it were made up
of Succefiions, and confequently incapable of
Eternity, by Notes 5, and X. c) that it diC
not exift from Eternity, therefore it had its ex-
iftence from fome Caufe, (which Caufe, if itfelf
was not eternal and independent, had its exi-
ftence from another, and that from another,
and fo on till we come at one which was) from
the fame caufe that it had its exiftence, it had alfo
all its faculties; the perception or knowledge
of matter is one of thefe Faculties, therefore it
nad the perception of matter from the above
mention'd caufe. Now it could not have the
perception of Matter from the foremention , d
caufe, unlefs the caufe itfelf had it, therefore
that caufe alfo had the perception of matter.
But if matter was eternal, independent, fcsV.
that caufe, as far as we can apprehend, could

not have any perception of it: for as that cau'e
itfelf was alfo eternal, independent, &c. it
could not poflibly be any ways affedled ab ex-
tra, nor confequently by matter, nor confe-
quently have any notices or perceptions of matter,
unlefs matter proceeded from that caufe itfelf,
and was created by it, which is contrary to the
Suppofition of its Eternity. But that caufe
has the perception of matter, becaufe we have,
therefore matter muft have proceeded from that
caufe, or been created by it, and confequently
was not eternal, independent, &c. Or thus:

If Matter were an eternal, independent prin-
ciple, it feems impoflible for God to have haH
any manner of knowledge of it, becaufe it
could no ways affe6t him ; fince he alfo is in-
dependent: but he has knowledge of it, becaufe
we have ; therefore it is not an eternal inde-
pendent Principle.

'Tis here taken for -granted, that Matter, is
efiehtially incapable of thought, nor can poflibly
have any thinking Quality fuper-added to it, and
confequently that the firft Caufe cannot be Ma-
terial; which will appear by the fame Argu-
ment which is brought to prove a thinking Be-
ing incapable of Extenfion, in Note n. Be-
fides, from all the proofs of a Vacuum, both
external and inter fperfed,\t appears that all Matter
is every way limited or defective, and confe-
quently requires a Limit erovExternal Caufe, and
therefore cannot belong to the firft Caufe. Sec
Xf.

* -Sec the Note X d.

30 Concerning the Origin of Evil.

place, the Ex ten/ion of the place which it occupied remains unchanged,
namely empty ', or filfd with another Body. I would not fpend a Cen-
fure on this reasoning j but granting it to be true, it would follow,
that Body or Matter contains nothing in the Idea of it, which might
induce us to believe, that it is of itfelf, or exifts by the . Neceffity of
its Nature : but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at leaft. in
Conception.

If therefore wc confult our Ideas, we muft confefs that Matter
does not exift necerTarily, but is as indifferent to Exigence, or Non-
existence, as to Motion or Reft, i. e. is in that refpect merely paffive.
It requires a Caufe then which may determine it to Exijlence no lcfs
than to Motion. For that which is not of itfelf muft neceffarily be of
another, nor can we know that any thing is of itfelf, otherwife tharv
. from the Ideas which we have of its nature., ,if thefe reprefent , the
nature of any thing as necejjarily exifting, fo that we cannot conceive
it not to be, we enquire no farther about its caufe y if not, we fly
to a Caufe ; nor is the Underftanding fatisfy'd. till it Jias found one.
Why are we inquifitive about the Original of. Man, oe any thing
elfe? but only becaufe out. Conceptions reprefent thefe "as indifferent
in themfelves to Being, and ; therefore,:, as requiring, fome Caufe of
their being diftincl: from themfelves. From the Nature then of Mat-
ter as well as Motion^ we^are forc'al. to admit of another Principle to
be the Caufe of both;
That Space VII. Thirdly. As to Space, many doubt whether ,its Nature be di-
fecms at firft ftinguifhabk .from Exiftence.- Whether it. can be . annihilated even
Ve from m tnou g$t, conceived not to, have been,_ ; For when the whole ma-
Exiftence. terial World is annihilated . in the Mind, the Idea of Space remains,
as of a thing yet exifting-3 k obtrudes itfelf upon the Underflanding,
and fuffers us not to^aflign any beginning or end of its Exiftence. It
forces us therefore to -confefs," whether we will or no, that it exifts ;
nor does it feem to require a Caufe why it exifts, fince it is of fuch
a Nature as, being felf-fufftcient, muft have exiftence of itfelf. For
what will' be felf-exiftent, if that be not, which cannot even be con-
ceiv'd not to exift ?
'Ti* ffiewn, VIII. This feems to argue ftrongly for the Self -exijlence of Space,
that this may Yet a doubt may arife, whether this Inability of our Underflanding,
Sejiiflcc. to feparate the Nature of Space from Exiftence, proceed from that.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

fame Nature of Space, or rather from the imperfection of our Reafon.
For, tho' all our fimple Conceptions muft for the molt part be
look'd upon as true, as we faid before * yet thefe are to be excepted
from this Rule in which we find any grounds of fallacy or prejudice.
And in this reafoning about Space, it is to be fufpected that we con-
nect Exiftence with its Nature merely out of prejudice.

IX. We may underftand how this comes to pafs, if we confider,
i//. That our Conceptions come for the moft part from without, when
therefore fomething is prefented to our minds, we always conceive it
as without us : this Notion therefore of external and internal adheres
to all our Conceptions, and we continually affign a Place to every
thing which we happen to think of, but that there mould be any
thing external, or which has a Place, and no Space, is inconceivable.
As long then as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at
the fame time believe that Space exifts, in -which Space we con-
ceive that thing to exift. For while we fuppofe any thing exifting
befidc ourfelves, that neceflarily feems to be without us; 'but ima-
gine all externals removed, and turn the Mind upon itfelf, and that
without will be taken away, and, together with it, the neceflity of
Space or Place. For, while we conceive nothing to exift befide our-
felves, /. e. our Minds, we don't think of this without, that is, of
Space, nor fee any neceflity for its Exiftence (13.).

-A., It

N Of E S.

Without, fup-
pofes Space ;
while there-
fore we con-
ceive fome-
thing to exift
without us,
we cannot
annihilate
Space in
Thought.

"(3) From hence, I think, it appears fuffi-
ciently that Space, were it granted to have any
real Exigence at all, I mean, to be any thing
more than an Idea in our Minds, (which fome
perhaps will not be very ready to grant, from
an attentive confideration of the Notes, 5 and
11.) yet it cannot be fuppofed to exift necefla-
rily, in Dr. Clarke'' s fenfe of necrjpiry Exi-
gence. For, according to him, " f Whatever
" is neceflarily exifting, there is need of its
" exiftence, in order to the fuppofal of the
" exiftence of any other thing; Co that nothing
" can poflibly be fuppos'd to exift, without
" prefuppofing and including antecedently,
' the Exiftence of that which is necefiary.

Therefore, the fuppofing any thing pofli My
to exift alone, fo as not neceflarily to in-
clude the prefuppofal of fome other thing,
proves demonfmbly, that that other thing
is not neceflarily exilting : becaufc, whatfoc-
ver has neceflary Exiftence, cannot poflibly,
in any conception whatfoever, be fuppofed
away. There cannot poflibly be any notion
of the exiftence of any thing, there cannot
poflibly be any notion of exiftence at all,
but what fliall neceflarily preinclude the
notion of that which is neceflarily exi-
ftent.

Now, if we can confider our own Souls as
lifting alone, and without this Space, with-
out

fa. II. paragr, II.

f Anfuier to the firji Letter, p. io

That things
are conceived
to be annihi-
lated by
fubfti tuting
Something
elfe in the
Room of
them ; but
we have no-
thing to fub-
fti rute for
Space.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

X. It is to be obferved farther, that when we would annihilate a-,
ny thing in our Mind, we confider it as fomething evanefcent, and'
remov'd out of fight; but yet we look upon fome other thing as
fubflituted in the room of that which difappeared; thus when Acci-
dents are removed, we conceive the Sub/lance remaining ; fetting aiide
Matter, we fubftitute Space, but when Space is removed, we have-,
nothing to fubftitute in its ftead, except material or external things;,
but all thefe fuppofe Space, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no,
wonder then that we cannot annihilate Space, while we conceive
thefe as exifting. If therefore we would come at a right underilan-.
ding of the nature of Space, we muft not apply our Minds to any
tiling material or external, bq& attend to our own thoughts and fenfa-
tions, which have no relation ta external things, or to Quantity:
And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no
more neceflity for the exiftence of Space than of Matter.

XI It,

* NOTES:

out confider! ng it as. a exufa fine qua son, or in
2Dy ; oth%r refpeel; without prejitppojing, or any
wjys iniluijig it : Thi$ (according to the Dr.
himfelf) will prove demonftrably, that Space
is not neceffar.ly exiltent. But let any one
Ihew us whit neceffity there is for the exiftence
oiSpace, in order to the fuppofal of the exi-
ltence of a Spirit. Let him try whether he
cannot conceive jn immaterial, thinking fub-
Ibtnce, without the ldn of Space or Extenfion ;
nay, whether he can poffibly conceive it with
them ; whether thefe Ideas .ire atall appficahle
to an immaterial Being, and not rather repug-
nant and contradictory to the very notion of
it; whether they belong not folely to matter,
and if that were annihilated, might not eafily
be fuppofed away. Few, I believe, befide Dr.
Clarke, can apprehend how Space is (as he calls
it in his 4th Reply to Leibnitz, N c . 29. p. 141.)
the Place of all Ideas. I'm fure, Space and Spi-
rit, and the diftinft properties of each, appear
to me as diftant and incompatible, as the moil
remote and inconfiftent things in nature; and
ari extended Soul feems juft fuch anothpr propo-
rtion, as a green found, an EJl of Confcioufnefs,

or a Cube of Virtue. Dr. Clarke grants *, that
Extenfot dc.es not belong to Thought, (as our Au-
thor has inceid prov'd in many of its Modes,
in paragr. XIV. and. XV.) and at the fame time
endeavours to ftiift-off the confequence by an-
Twering, that Thought is not a Being. But
where's the difference in this refpect? Don't
we frame our Idea of the Being from its effen-
tial Properties ? and if thefe have no manner of
relation to Extenfion, why fhould the Being
to which thefe Properties belong have any? \
Fm apt to think, that our conceiving Subjfancf
by way of fome Subflratum (concerning which,
fee Note 1.) has led us into the Notion, that
all kind of Subftances muft be extended; and
'tis perhaps impoffible for u.s to imagine any
fuch thing as an Unextended Subftance ; but yet
reafon convinces us, that there are many real
things of which we can form no imagination.
And that there are Beings in nature to which
no manner of extenfion can poffibly be apply' d,
we find fufficiently prov'd by Cudworth, from
p. 823 to 832. Among the various arguments
there, produced, this is the Subftance of one.
" If the Soul be an extended Supjiance, then it

muft

* Anfwer to the fecond Letter, p. 1 6:

f SeeX.h. at the end of this Chapter.

Concerning the Origin of Evil. frj

XL It proceeds therefore from Prejudice, and an unwary way of We attempt
thinking, that we couple neceffity of 'Exijience with Space ; neither do L^ethi [e
we obferve, that for this very reafon we cannot conceive Space not thofe things
to exift, becaufe we imagine thofe things ftill exifting, which cannot ^^fSS
exift without Space: which is no greater a Wonder than if any one ia-pofeSmc
tent upon the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, mould complain that and tnerefore
he could not annihilate the Matter of them, while the Motion conti- annihilated!
nued ; for material and external things, have no lefs dependence on,
and connection with, Space, than Mobility has with Matter j if then
we conceive God only to exift, while He contemplates himfelf as ex-
iting alone, he can no more be judg'd to ftand in need of Space, or

NOTES.

muft of neceffity be either a Phyfical point

** (for a Mathematical point has no extenfion) or " Perfons in every Alan. Neither can there be

minimum, the leaft extenfion that can poffibly
be ; or elfe it muft confift of more fuch Phy-
jical pohits join'd together. As for the for-
mer of thefe, it is impoffible that one Jingle
Atom, or fmallejl point of extenfion fliould be
able to perceive diftin&ly all the variety of
things, /'. e. take notice of all the dijlintt and
different parts of an extended Objecl, and have
a description or delineation of the whole of
them at once upon itfelf, (for that would be
to make it divilible and indwifible at the fame
time) As for the latter, if the Soul be an
extended Subftance confifting of more points,
one without another, all concurring in eve-
ry fenfatian, then muft every one of thofe
points either perceive a point and part of the
Object only, or elfe the whole Object : Now
if every point of the extended Soul perceives
only a point of the Objecl, then is there no
one thing in us that perceives the whole; or
which can compare one part with another.
But if every point of the extended Soul,
perceives the whole Objeft at once confifting
of many parts, then will the former abfurd-
ity return : and alfo there would be innume-
rable Percipients of the fame Objecl in every
fenfation, as many as there are points in the
extended Soul : And from both thefe fuppo-|
fitions it would alike follow, that no Man
is one fingle Percipient, or Perfon, but that

there are innumerable diftinct Percipients or

" any other fuppofition made befides thofe
" three foremention'd : As that the whole ex-
" tended Soul fhould perceive both the whole
" f en fible objecl^ and all its feveral parts, no
" part of this Soul in the mean time having a*
" ny perception at all by itfelf ; becaufe the
" whole of an extended Being is nothing but
" all the parts taken together ; and if none of
" thofe parts have any life, Jenje, or perception
" in them, it is impoffible that there mould be
" any in the whole. But in very truth> to fay
" that the whole Soul perceiveth all, and no
" part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it
" not to be extended, but to be indtvijible,
" which is the thing we, contend for."

From hence alfo, that an indivifible Being or
Subftance, is not capable of receiving a Divi-
fible Quality, nor a Divifible Subftance an indi-
vifible Ota, he makes it fully appear, that nei-
ther Matter can poffibly think, nor Spirit be ex-
tended. Ibid. p. 827, 828, 829.

Where S. C. might have found a fufficient
anfwer to his Argument for the Soul's extenj;-
on, from its receiving Ideas oj' extended Things.
Impartial Enquiry, p. 222. And to his Maxim,
that like is known by like, and by cohfequence %
Subject absolutely void of extenfion could have
no Ideas of extended things, p. 223.

M Nay the Soul (fays Cudworth) conceives
" extended things themfelvcs tmextendcdly and
F indi-

3ft

Concerning the Origin of Evik

he confcious of it as, actually cxifting, than we are, while we- con*
template only the rcfiex ads of the Mind. But when he vyill'd exter-
nal things, he madp Place or. Space for them to exift in f.
God cannot XII. It may be objected, that ive can feparate Exijlence frm God

nu: C n criT ! aftCr r . he faI ^ e manner as we endeavour to remove it from Space. For,,
the mind being reflected on itfelf, and folely intent upon contempla-
ting its operations, may deny God to exifl as well as Space.. If there-
fore we deny Space to be felf-exiitent, becaufe we can confider our
mind as exiftipg alone in. nature, and. confe.quently Space as. not exe-
rting; why may not we, by the fame way of reafoning, deny that
God is jelf-exifient. lanfwer, we are confeious that we do not exifl
qf ourfelves, while therefore we contemplate ourfelves, and our in-
tellectual operations, we are neceiTarily carried to fome Caufe -, being
certain that we have Exigence from another, and npt of ourfelves ;

N O T E Si

" indivifibly ; for as the difference of the whole
H Hemiphere is contracted into a narrow com-
" pafs in the pupil of the eye, fo are all difian-
" ces yet more contracted in the Soul itfelf,
*' and there underftood indijlantly : for the
thought of a Mile diftance, or 10,000 Miles,
" or femi-diameters of the Earth, takes up no
" more room in the Soul, nor ftretches it any
*' more than does the thought of a. foot or inch,
K or i ndeed of a Ma thematical point" p. 827,
829, C3V.

The foragoing Arguments, againfl: the fim-
plicity of extenfion, as well as thofe in N. 5
and 11. conclude equally ngainlt S. Cs Ampli-
tude or Expanfov.f Since, if it be. any thing real,
it mud have parts really diftincTb from one ano-
ther; which .diftinet parts can,. never , be the
fubjeft of an -undivided Quality,, nor any addi-
tion of them ever reach. a ppfitive Infinity.
But in -truth, thefe Words Expanfion^, Ampli-
tude, &e. don't feem to imply, any. pofitive
thing or quality, or indeed to have. any deter-
minate meaning at all ; like the Ubi of the
School-men, which was not place but fome-
thing elfe, they did not know what, and muff
belong to. Spirits,, tho' how or why they could
not tell.

The abovemention'd S. C. has a fecond Ar-
gument for the Amplitude cr Expanfion of the
Divine Nature grounded on another Maxim,
viz. Nothing can bejiow what it has net in itfelf:
but God has created material expanfion, there-
fore he muft be expanded himfelf, p. 223.
Which Argument he may fee anfwer'd by our
Author in the 18th Paragn and Note D. who
fliews that fuch Expanfion is a mere imperfecliou-
as well as .materiality^ and confequently is e-
qually inconfiftent with the perfection of the
Divine Being. See alfo X h.

That no Collection or Combination of A-
toms can think, and the fame reafon holds a-
gainft any thing which can be conceiv'd by
.way of parts, fee proved at large \n Bay fas
-Dicl. p. .1924. under the Article Leucippus, .
Remark E. See. alfo Dr. Clarke's Letters to
Dodwell concerning the immortality of the
Soul, cifr. or Religion of Nature, Delhi, p. 1 86,
&c. or H. Dittoes appendix. to his Excellent
JDifcourfe concerning the Refurreclion.

* We conceive Space to have no real Exi-
gence, and therefore think that it cannot pro*
perly be faid either to be made, annihilated*
bounded or meafured, &c.

f Impartial Enquiry, &c, p. 212.

Concerning the Origin of Evil. ?$

we cannot therefore exert even one act of the Understanding but
it muft have a necefTary connection with fome Caufe diftinct from

XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourfelves as the only Beings in Becaufe we
nature, for we rnuft admit, along with us, the Caufe from which we^Te^o^
derive Exiftence, which is a confufed conception of God. But the not cfi of
fame cannot be faid of Space, for the operations of our mind are fo in- ourfelvcs -
timately perceivM by us as to have no necefTary connection with Space,

and we underftand clearly enough that thefe may be, tho' there were
no Space, and do not ftand in need of it for their Exiftence. If we
conceive ourfelves as confifting of both Body and Mind, 'tis certain we
ftand in need of Space for our Exiftence, and during that concep-
tion, 'tis impoflible for us to conceive Space to be annihilated ; viz.
becaufe fuch a Conception has a necefTary connection with Space.
After the fame manner, if we conceive ourfelves to be Mind only, yet
we muft own the Exiftence of God. For a finite Mind requires a
Caufe from which it may exift, no lefs than a Body does a Place in
which it may exift ; and from hence, in reality, it is that we attri-
bute Self-exijlence to Space, becaufe, whenever we think of ourfelves,
we imagine ourfelves to confift of both Body and Mind. While there-
fore we are confeious of our own Exiftence, we form our Belief of
Space alfo as necefTarily exifting, infomuch as it is connected with the
conception of Body, i.e. of ourfelves.

XIV. Secondly. It is remarkable, that the Conceptions which we Smell, Tafte,
have from hearing, fmelling, or tajling, tho' they be produced in us J^""?'^ 3
by external Objects, yet have no connection with the conceptions of any notice of
Space; for, who can imagine the longitude, latitude, or profundity of^. c s c *| nce
Sound, Smell, or Tajle? If then we had only thefe three Senfes, we

mould not fo much as imagine that there was any Space. Our Con-
ceptions therefore abftract from all Exteniion, nor do the notions of
external and internal adhere fo clofely to our thoughts but we may
lay them afide ; and if we fet thefe afide, the Self- exiftence of Space
does not neceflarily obtrude itfelf upon us. Now, as the common
People attribute Smells, T-afes, Colours, and other fenjible Qualities to
the Objects themfelves, and believe that they exift in them ; while-
they who attend better to their thoughts, know that thefe exift only"
in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are ip'rodu-'

F 2 ced,

Concerning the Origin of Evil..

ced; befides the peculiar Motion and Texture of their parts : after the
fame manner, 'tis probable, we are impofed upon in attributing necef-
fary exigence to Space, becaufe we obfervc, that almoft all our
Thoughts are produced in us from without, and thereby- accuftoming
urfelves to join Space with them, while we are confcious that we
think we conceive alfo that Space exifts; whereas, if we remember-
that all our fenfations, even thofe produced by external, things, fucli.
as Smells, &c. do not bring along with them the notion of Space, we
may eafily lay afide this prejudice, and, with drawing our thoughts
from the contemplation of Space, may conceive it not to be.

XV. And this will appear 3dly. if by a reflex act we view the
>nTtfdfhfs Mind itfelf and its operations; for nothing of Extenfion or Space, offers,
no relation itfelf in thefe; nor does the Mind, when employ 'd about them, think
aHy P nec;ffirJ at a ^ ^ Sp ace > nor is it confcious that it occupies Space ; it withdraws,
for it. ' therefore from the conceptions of i?itemal and external, and may con-
ceive nothing to, be in the world. befides itfelf, and its Caufe; i. e. can,
imagine Space to be non-exiftent. Thinking Beings then may exift,
without Space; it proceeds therefore from Prejudice that we joinAfc-.
cejfary Exijlence with k ( 14.).

XVI;

N f B SE

The Mind
reflected up-

(14.) As to that neeejjtty of exijlence which,
the learned Dr. Clarke and others have fo large-
ly infilled on, I muft confe/s that I was never
able to confider it in any pofitive fenfe, nor to
form any clear argument from it, which could
either affett the nature of Space, Matter, &c.
or help to. demonftrate the exijlence and attri-
butes of God a priori. With regard to the 'firft
of thefe perhaps too much has already been
faid, in Notes 5, n and 13. As to the laft,
we gather indeed a Po/lericri that an infinite, i.e.
an abjolutely perfecl Being, muft necejfarily have
exifted always, becaufe it would have been'al
Ways a Contradiction for him not to have exi-
fted; namely, he himfelf, and all the things
that are, muft have arofe. from nothing. But
this is only a Confequential Neeeffity, and from
hence to. infer any thjng concerning the Man--
jBf-r of his exijlence feems to be building a great
4eal more on this argument than it will bear.
TJiis is indeed-a 'Reafon by which we find, and :

for which we believe, that he tnujl have exifted
always, but it is a reafon to us only, and does
not affeft bis nature, or the caufe of it, and
when it is.apply'd to that, I think 'tis ufed ;
equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot pof-
iibly be fappofed not 'to Exift, is;far from con-
ceiving bow ox why he actually does exijl ; we
can, eafily fhew a reafon for the one, but it
feems above human comprehenfion to account
in any refpeft for the other : Nay, the attempt >
to do it feems altogether as abfurd and ufelefs,
as endeavouring to (hew how or why a thing
is whit it is . how or why a Firft Caufe is a
Firft Caufe ; How a Tfi angle i* a Triangle,
or why Truth is Truth.

Farther: This eternal Being, we fay, is In-
dependent ; or, which is the fame thing, Self-
exijlent, i. e. his Exiftence depends upon no-
thing bfjide himfelf ? But does it therefore po*>
fitively depend'*^/? himfelf ? Will it follow,
that becaufe he has no external Caufe, therefore
5 he

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

XVI. Fourthly. It is to-be remark'd that Space, fo far as it appears
to our Conceptions, is of fuch a Nature as cannot be annihilated by
Parts, for they are in fuch a manner united to, and dependent upon
one another, that if we fuppofe one part, it will imply a contradic-
tion for the others not to exift. We can in Thought remove all Mat-
ter out of a Veflel, or Chamber, and the Space interjacent between

the:

NO TE S.

Wc may con-
ceive Space
to be annihi-
lated altoge-
ther, but not.
by parts..

he mud have an interna! one ? Or, becaufe no
ground or reafon of his Exigence can be
drawn from any other Subftance, therefore one
muft be contain'd in his own Sub/tana or felf?
This is ufing the Word Self -exiftence in two
different Sen fes, both as negative and pofttive,
which have no manner of conne&ion witheach
other,and the latter of which will perhaps appear
to be no very good one. It is not then appa-
rent yet that there needs any Phyftcal reafon at
all for the exiftence of the eternal, independent
Being. Nor, 2dly, if there did, would this
NeceJJity of Natt/re ufually affign'd as* fuch,
ferve for that purpofe. For, firft, it is not the
Sr/bftance itfelf, that would be to make the fame
thing the ground of itfelf; which is nonfenfe.
'Tis therefore a perfeclion, property or attribute
of that Subftance ( we know no other di-
ftin&ion ) and as fuch. muft, in the Order of
our Ideas, be Confequent upon the exiftence
of that Subftance in which it inheres. What-
ever it is, it has in fome refpecl: or other a Re-
lation to the Subject, to which it belongs. Let
it then be an- Attribute, fui Generis, cujus cunq\
generis (if we mean any thing at all by this
word) it muft be predicated of, and prefuppofe
itfrSubjeft, and confequentlv cannot, according
to our Ideas, be the antecedent ground 'or foun-
dation of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as
fame do) by mating it not an attribute of the
Subftance, but of the attribute of the Subftance ;
or as they phrafe it, a Property of a Property ; is
onlythrufting it ftill farther back, and making
it pofterior in conception to both the Subftance
and its Attribute or Property.

But idly, fuppofing this Necejftty, this Ground
or Reafon, could be confider'd as antecedent to
the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual ex-
iftence, we are got but one Step farther yet ;
for, will there not be the fame neceffity for

demanding a reafon for that reafon, a grounl
for that ground, and fo on in infinitum ? And
what fhall we get by fuch an endlefs progreffi-
on ? Why fhould we not ftop at a firft BeiOg,
as well as at this Ground, which muft itfelf
want a foundation if the other does, fince there
cannofbe any intuitive knowledge in either; and
the fame teafons which are given for flopping at
this ground will hold equally forftopping be-
fore- we come at it, and convince us, that we
might as well, or perhaps better, acquiefce in
the a&ual Exiftence of the firft Being. We
muft then reft fome where : We muft either ad-
mit one firft caufe of all Things and Qualities,
itfelf exifting without caufe (for that is imply'd
in its being called the firft) or an infinite feries
of Beings exifting without any original Caufe
at all ; i. e. cither fome one thing muft be with-
out a Caufe, or every thing.

Here then are two difficulties- the lefe is to
be chofen ; let us fee which' that is. Now, if
the Manner of exiftence in all thefe Beings were
entirely the fame, I grant it would be as eafy
to fuppofe all of them exifting without a Caufe,
as One: But here I think lies the difference :
There was a time when all of them, except one,
were indifferent either to exiftence or non-exi-
ftence; were nothing. Therefore for them that
were once indifferent to exiftence or non-exi-
ftence, to be actually determin'd into Exiftence,
to be brought from nothing into fomething, or
made what they once were not ; is a real cb.mge,.
an atlion, an effeel, and as fuch, muft require
fome changer, agent, caufe. But on the other
hand, all that wc know of this one Beinfi;, is,
that it now exifts, and' always did fo ; that it-
never had a Beginning of its exiftence, was ne-
ver changed from what it is, never made or pro-
duced; Here is no ejfefl, and therefore no rea^

fo.i

gS Concerning the Origin of Evil.

the Walls remains extended in length, breadth, and depth : But the
Space cannot be removed, fince it is of its own Nature immove-
able,

NOTES.

fen, nor room, fcr a. ground r caufe. Nay, to
jslGgn one in any refpect prior to its exiftence,
as it mult be fuppos'd to be if confider'd as a
Caufe ; (and it mull be confider'd as a Caufe,
or extrinfic Principle, if confider'd at all: J
mean, fo as to be made any ufe of in the pre-
sent Queftion, or to infer anything concer- .
ning actual Exiftence) I fay, to affign any
Ground prior to the exiftence of this Being,
would be to prove this Being not eternal, nor ,
the firjl Cauje : as attempting to prove a felf- ,
evident proportion is endeavouring to fhew
that proportion not to be felf evident by affign-
ing a clearer.

Now to lay down fome necejjity, ground, or
reajon of Exiftence, muft either be to propofe
it by way of Caufality, or to fix no manner of
-Idea at all to thefe Words : and indeed no
-manner of Idea feems poffible to be fix'd to
them (as has been obferv'd by the Ingenious
Author of the Enquiry into the Evidence of the
Cbriftian Religion) which is not utterly incon-
iiftent with exifting without Caufe, as that Be-
ing is prov d to^exift. For, why do we con-
fider that Ground or Reajon in the Order of our
Ideas, as antecedent to the Exiftence of the Be-
' ing, otherwife than as it feems in the Order of
Nature antecedently necejfary to the Exiftence of
that Being ? To which neverthelefs we allow,
that no Thing, Mode, Quality, &c. can be real-
ly antecedent. The Cafe will be no better, if
we imagine this neceflity co-etantous, or co-exi-
Jlent with the Exiftence of the Being which is
Supported by it ; Since this is to fuppofe that
actually exifting already, in order to the Exi-
ftence of which this neceflity is introduced :
and alio feems much the fame as an effect eo-
exiftent with its Caufe. For, as was faid be-
fore, this Necejjity muft either be a Caufe, or
nothing at all to the prefent purpofe. And that
it was piopofed, by the forcmention , d Author,
as fome fort of a Caufe (if he would have fpokc
out) is I think pretty plain.
. The whole Cafe then feems to ftand thus.
Qn the one. hand here is a certain alteration

made, a pofitive effetl produced, without a
Cauje ; which is a clear contradiction. On
the other hand there is a difficulty indeed, but
not an apparent contradiction : There is fome-
what exifting of which we can give no account
(the manner of whofe Exiftence is different from
that of any thing elfe) which will admit of no
Caufe, the Idea of which is entirely repug-
nant to that of Caufality.

This may be hard to conceive, but cannot
be deny'd without affirming fomething worfe,
namely, an exprefs contradiction, as has been
(hewn above. In order to fet this in as clear a
light as is poffible, I fhall take the Liberty to
infert a paffage from the learned Writer cited
in Note 5, fe. " The Idea of aSelf-Exiftent
" Being is the Idea of a Being that always was,
** is, and will be, becaufe he always was, is,
" and will be infinitely able to be. If you a*k
" why he is fo, I know not ; Why I believe
" fo, I think I know ; it is, becaufe he has in
" fail exifted from all Eternity, which he
" could not have done, had he not been in-
" finitely able to exift. If you ask after the
" ground or foundation of this infinite Ability,
u it is the fame that is the ground or founda-
" tion of all his other Perfections, his Infinite
" Nature, Eflence or Subftance, if you ask far-
*' ther for the ground of that, I muft call it
" trifling: if you affign abfeiute necejjity, I
11 muft ask what's next ? Or what that means?
'* or refer you to the Indian Philofopher's Ele-
" phant and Tortoife, as the beft comment upon
M abfolute, antecedent Necejjity."

Neither need we run ourfelvcs into fuch ab-
surdities as thefe : This Independent Being ex-
i/ls becaufe it does exift ; or, it exifts by chance.
Since it is enough for us to fay, Tiiere can be no
Reafon why it does exijl; or, which is the very-
fame thing frill, no Caufe, no Caufal Neceflity,
or antecedent Ground of its Exiftence.

But if we grant the firft Being to be now
exifting, there will be a reafon (contrary to
what Dr. Clarke zttcrts in his Lift Letter) why
he (bould *xy!? to morrow, and to all Eternity,

fince

Concerning the Origin of Evil,

able, (1-5.) nor can it be annihilated \ for diftance would' fHll remain
between the bounds which cannot be without Extension, nor Exten-
sion without a Subject,;, but. Space, as far. as. we can. conceive it, is the

primary

NOTE- s.

fince ceafihg to be is- an alteration from Ex
Htence to Non-exiitence, /'. e. a Poftixre Effefl,
and confequently muft require a Caufe', unlefs
it can be effected and not effected at the fame
time. Now, as the exiftence of this Being de-
pends upon no caufe, no caufe can ever affect or
deftroy it, and for h\m to dejlroy himfelf, will
be the fame abfurdity, as to fuppofe him to
make himfelf: therefore he muft always exift,
and in the fame manner that he does *. The
reft of the learned Dr's Arguments contained
in the fame Letter, will be confidered in the
Notes to the 3d Section of the firfr Chapter of
this Book -h I mall only beg leave to obferve
one thing more in this place, namely-, that all
the above mention'd reafoning about neceffary
exiftenct 'feems to be built upon that falfe Max-
im which Leibnitz, lays down as the foundation
of all Philofophy, (and which Dr. Clarke was
very ready to grant him, fince it was the foun-
dation of his own Book on the Divine Attri-
butes) namely, that Nothing is without a reafon,
why it is rather than not, and why it is fo rather
than otherwife. Tho' the Dr. is foon forced to
deny this very Principle, when (in his way of
confidering Time and Spate) he propofes the
mere Will of God, as the only reafon why the
World was created at fuch a certain period of
time, and in fuch a particular pointof Space |j.
Of which Divine Will, or-of its determination,
according to himfelf, there can pofiibly be. no
manner of reafon,. fince he fuppofes thefe effects
of the Divine Will to be, in every polfible
Manner of Conception, ahfolutely equal and
indifferent, and confequently it would be ab-
l'urd to fuppofe any reafon of fuch fpecial Will,
or fuch particular determination. If then we
may fuppofe two things in nature absolutely,
and in evej-y refpeft, equal, (which Leibnitz, to

be confident with himfelf, and I" believe for
no fufficient reafon elfe, found it neceffary to-
deny) the preference of one of thefe before the-
other muft be abfolutely without a reafon. And
tho' there may be a fufficient reafon fof a per-
Con'safling in general, rather, than not acting ?X
all, yet (as Leibnitz well obferves * m ) except
there be one alfo for- his- acting in a certain
particular manner, which in the prefent cafe
there cannot be (according to- Dr. Clarke's,
conceflion f4-) the above mention'd principle
is entirely overthrown. See more of this in
the latter end of Note 1 8. and Note 62*

The fame Argument will hold againft Locke's
Hypothefis of Anxiety, if i t be confider'd 1 as -the
fole and- abfolute determiner to all Action j| |j,
fince it can never determine the Mind to Will
one AdHon before anothery where both are en-
tirely equal ; of which kind numberlefs occur
in life, as will be ihewn at 'large in. its proper
place.-

(.1 5.) That is, as Ihave often hinted, if we
fuppofe it to have any real Nature, or to Exi/f
at all, it muft, as our Author fays, exift every-
where, and cannot be remov'd by parts. And
in this Senfe fhould the Words of Sir Ifaae
Newton be underftood f -j/f. " The order of the
'* parts of Space is immutable ; remove thefe front
" their places, and you zvtll remove them, as I
" may fay, from them/elves." For to fuppofe it
at all once away, feems fo far from amounting
to that abfurd Suppofition mention'd by Dr
Clarke || || \\\, that it is no more than. what muft
be conceiv'd in every Annihilation of any thing*
which is the total deftruction or taking away of
its Exiftcnce, the removal of it, as -we may-
fay, from it/elf, or from Being: which is a
Suppofition that is generally thought to "carry*
no abfurdity along, with, k.

* See X e. at the end of Chap. I. f See the latter end of Note 1 8. \\ 3d Reyly, N. 5. p. 8 1

\ $th Letter, N. 17. p. 169. f4- N. 1, 2. p. 12. of bis ^b Reply.

J| U See Note 65. -f+f Princ Schol. ad' M. 8. || || || Jnjwr to the bib Lei. p. 39.

Concerning

tbt

Origin

of Evil.

primary Subject (16.) of Extenfion, therefore it necefTarily continues
with Diitance, nor can it be annihilated, unlefs we would have Ex-
tenfion without a Subject, that is into Length, Breadth, and Depth,
without any thing Long, Broad and Deep. Hence it appears that
Space cannot be partially annihilated, and from hence the Opinion
- of its felf-exijlence might arife.

XVII. For

NOTES.

(16.) Dr. Clarke affirms f, that Space is not
a Subftance j and yet declares that it has real
Qualities ||. Is not this either to fuppofe quali-
ties or properties inherent in one another ? or
elfe, with Gajfendus, to imagine fome middle
thing between Subftance and Accident ', which
is neither of them, but partakes of both ?

The learned Writer refer'd to in Note 5. is
of the fame opinion with our Author in this
place, viz. thac we are apt to conceive Space
to be a fort of Subftance, or Subjlratum of Ex-
tenfion, and fo are ufed to attribute that and o-
ther imaginary Qualities to it. M The Idea

* of Space is not the Idea of Extenfion, but
*' of fomething extended, it is the Subjlratum
M of Extenfion, and not Extenfion itfelf. But
*' when I fay it is the Subjlratum, do not ima-
" gine t make it to be any thing without ; it
" is an Ideal Subjlratum, and nothing more.
*' When the Mind his been confidering the I-
" dea of Extenfion abftradted from the ex-
** tended Bodies, from whence it firft receiv'd
** the Idea, (whether as they are caujes or oc-
" cafions of it I coniider not now) it is a very
" eafy Step for the Mind to make farther, to

* frame an imaginary Subjlratum to fupport an
" imaginary Extenfion. And this is the more
* eafy, becaufe the Idea we have of a real Sub-
* l Jlratum or Subftance, the fupport of real
' Qualities is dark and confufed, an Idea of
" fomeiohat, and that's all. Now it is bin
" joining the Idea of fomezvhat with the Idea
'* of one Quality only, namely Extenfion, and
** we have an imaginary Subjlratum prefently
*' formed, that is, an Idea of Space, or an I-
J* deal extended fomething. Whether this be

il not the very Cafe, I muft leave to any Man
*' to judge, by reflecting on his own Ideas.

Again: To this Queftion, Why may not
Space be rather defiri'd Extenfion in the Abjlrael,
or imaginary Extenfion, rather than the imaginary
Subjlratum of imaginary Extenfion? He an-
fwers, " Extenfion in the general, or in the
'* abftracl, is an Idea of pure Iniellecl, i.e. is
" to be underftood, but cannot be imagined a-
" ny more than Whitcnefs in the general : or a
" thoufand other the like abftraft Ideas. But
'* as foon as imagination comes to deal with this
" general abftracl Idea (or Ideas) it fupplies it
'* with an imaginary Subftratum, and fo makes
" the general, which was invifibk, be conceiv'd
" as a particular, for the help of the Underftan-
ding. So if the imagination comes to con-
' ceive any certain degree of Whitenefs, it fup-
w plies the Mind wiih fome imaginary white
'* Sutface, and brings down the general Idea
" to a particular Object. In like manner,
" when it comes to conceive a Length, a
" Breadth, a Thicknefs, it fupplies the Mind
" with'a Subftratum, pro hac vice, fuch as may
'* ferve the purpofe, otherwife the Mind m-rfc
"reft in pure intellect only, as in numbers;
" and there is nothing more tedious or uneafy
t( to the Mind generally than to be wholly ab-
" Jlracled; which is the reafon, by the wav,
" that Arithmetical Demonftrations, tho' as
" clear and certain as any, are lefs delightful
*< than Geometrical, and nothing more irkfome
" than abftracl numbers. Nov/ Space being
" the Object of the Imagination, and not of pure
* Intellect, as are all general, abftracl Ideas, it
*' is properly the imaginary Subftratum of an ima-
ginary

f Anftser to the ^d Letter, p. 22. dndto tie \th. p. 28.
I) Anjtver to the 6th Letter, p. 38.

Concerning the Origin of Evil. aft

XVTI. For fince it is of fuch a Nature as mud be annihilated either Hence arofc
altogether, or not at all, they that attempted to annihilate it only by fo^Tif-"
Paris, faw that it was impomble to be done, the nature of the thing exigence.
remonftrated againft a partial annihilation, and if one part be fuppo-
fed, all others might be demonftrated to exift by neceiTary connection.
But if any one mould fuppofe all extended things to be removed toge-
ther and at once, he would find nothing impomble in that fuppofi-
tion : For one may imagine nothing to exift in Nature befide his own
Soul, and the caufe on which it depends j which, as a thinking Being,
includes nothing of Extenfion in it : every thing that is extended may
therefore be feparated from Exiftence. But they that attempted this
by parts, when they found it impomble, did not fcruple to refolve the
Caufe into the felf-exiftence of Space, tho' in reality it did not arife
from thence, but from this, that they attempted to feparate things na-
naturally infcparable, namely, the parts of Space one from ano-
ther.

XVIII. But whether there be any fuch thing as Space, or no ; whe- We are cer-
ther its Extenfion be diftinguifh'd from the Extenfion of Body, or not : q\*J *^ rit
Be it nothing at all : Be it mere privation of Contract, as fome are what man-
pleas'd to term it ; be it mere Pojjibility or Capacity of exifting, as o- ner j e f ver
thers ; be it, laftly, either fomething created, or of it/elf, and necef- about'space
farily exifting, yet frill, as far as we know any thing of the nature of bedetermin'd
it. 'tis an indolent thing, it neither acJs^ nor is in the leafl acted up-
on %

NOTES.

" ginary Extenfion, or the general Idea of Ex-
" tenfion particulariz'd in an imaginary Subjecl;
" and hence it is that Space is faid to be exten-
" ded, which would be nonfenfe to fay of Ex-
" tenfion itfelf : and Bodies are faid to be in
** Space, which would likewife be nonfenfe to
** fay of Extenfion. And fo it is conceiv'd as
" immoveable, indivifible , infinite, lmmovea-
M ble, iffc. all properties of Subllances ; which
* makes it plain that it is conceiv'd after the
" manner of Subitance, and therefore is, be-
* caufe it can be nothing elfe, an imaginary
* Subjlratum, which the Mind takes to parti -

'* cularize, and thereby render conceivable, its
" general Idea of Extenfion ; which could
' not otherwife fall within the Imagination,
" nor be eftimated any way but by abllracl
" numbers, fo many Yards, or fo many Miles,
" 10, 20, 30 j without attending to any thing
" but the numbers, and the meaning of the
" Words, Yards, Miles, iffc. as it is when we
" reckon Ounces, Pounds, &c. of Weight. ~
" Thus then you fee how we come by the
** notion of Space, and what it is." See alfo
Note 5.

ai Concerning the Origin of Evil

Oft; it cannot therefore, as mere Extenjton, under which notfon onfy-
it appears to us, be the Caufe of Matter > or imprefs Motion on it, (D.)

There

N t E SI

(D.) There are Tome, who confidering Space
a? ff/f-xincnt, imagine it to be the immenfity
f God; And indeed, if we grant it to exiit
of itfelf, it muft neceffarily be refer'd to God.
For wh tever has felf-exijlence, muft at the
f me time be believ'd to have all Perfieclisn.
For what can limit a felf-exiftent Being ? Self-
exiftence is the greateft perfection, and no rea-
fon can be conceiv'd why all perfections
fhould not be afcribed to him who has that.
We muft therefore entirely deny Space to be
felf-exifient, or elfe refer it to God J Thefe
Men urge farther, in defence of their Opinion,
that every Fatuity which is in any degree con-
fcious, is to be refer'd to God, and has him in
fome refpect for its Object. For they think it
abfurd to fuppofe, that the Creatures fhould be
perceiv'd*. and the Author, whofe Workman-
ihip they' are, not perceiv'd in the leaft. AH
Faculties therefore which are in any refpect
perceptive, perceive God fome way or other:
fome in a greater degree and more clearly, o-
thers lefs and more obfcurely, according to
their native Perfection. Now our fenfes being
yery imperfect, can apprehend nothing in God
befide his Immetifity, and that very obfcurely :
But our Under/landing perceives his intellectual
Attributes, namely, Wifdcm, Geodnefs,. C3V. and
an Intel left more perfect than that of Man
may apprehend fome properties as much un-
known to us as Wifdom and Goodnefs are to
the Senfes : Nay, pious Men, and fuch as are
cndow'd with the Holy Spirit, especially the
infpired Prophets, behold fuch Marks of the
Divine Prefence* as neither can be perceiv'd
nor believ'd by the Impious.

When they are ask*d how Space, to which no
Jftion can be attributed (as far as we know any
thing of its nature) may belong to God> who
is entirely and effentially aclivei they reply,
that an Object, when perceiv'd by different
Faculties, leaves Tokens of itfelf, which have
ao more connection with one another, than if

they proceeded from the moft different Objects, .
and hence it comes to pafs, that we often take
a thing which is perceiv'd by many Faculties,
to be more than one. A blind Man that felt
Snow to be cold, and when his eyes were o-
pen'd, perceiv'd the fame under the appearance
of white, would not know it to be the fame,
without a new Experiment. But, after com-
paring and examining it, he would eafily ap-
prehend that the fame thing feemed cold to the
touch, mi white to the Eyes, tho' Cold and'
Whitenefs have no more connection with each
other than the Mind and Space. He therefore
that apprehends God by his Senfes as extended,.
by his Reafon as a Spirit, may not obferve with-
out Examination, that thefe tokens belong to
the fame Being, any more than the Man that
was lately blind, but now fees, can perceive
that the tangible and vifible Qualities inhere
in the fame Subftance j namely, the Snow :
but upon Examination he will find, that this
Space is felf-exifient, and alfo eternal, infinite,
immoz'eable ; and that an infinite Mind, fuch as
God is, has the very fame Attributes. Since
then there cannot be two Infinite and Self-exi-
ftent Beings, they will have it to be plain, that
thefe are partial perceptions of the fame thing, .
and belong to the fame Subftance, no lefs than
Cold and Whitenefs to thcStfw.
But to thefe we reply,

\ft. That the Self-exiftence of Space is not
certain, which being taken away, the whole
Reafoning falls to pieces.

zd/y. 'Tis affirm 'd, without a Reafon, that
every perceptive Faculty has God in fome man-
ner for its Object: for how caa they prove
this in Hearing, Smell, or Tafle, fince Space is
not perceiv'd by them, nor any thing that can.
be refer'd to God?

$dly. Tis true, a thing may be apprehended
by different Faculties, under Tokens that have
no connection with one another, and thereby
we are often deceiv'd, believing that there are

difFerent

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

There mufl then necefTarily be another Caufe of Matter and Motion,
that is, active, felf-exijlent, and the Caiife of all things and Ac-
tions, which, fince they are not of themfelves, require a Caufe.

N ?E S.

different Objedls perceived by our Faculties,
when it is but one and the fame. But tho'
thefe Tokens be difperate, yet they are not con-
trary and inconfiftent: Whereas Space and Spi-
rit feem entirely inconfiftent; fince one appears
by its nature equally incapable of afting or be-
ing acled upon ; the other felf-attive, and infe-
parable from AcYion.

\thlj. Thofe Objects that are perceiv'd by
different Faculties, under Tokens which have
no connection with one another, may alfo be
actually feparated ; for inftance, a thing may
be cold and not white, white and not cold;
and fince Space and Spirit are in the Mind as

independent as Cold and White, they may
be feparated, and have a feparate Exiftence,
which cannot be faid of any Divine Attri-
bute.

ybhf. It feems ufekfs, and to no manner of
purpofe, that God fhould be the Objecl of the
Senfes, for Brutes, that are held thus to per-
ceive him, worlhip him not, nor acknowledge
him as the Author of their Beings, which muft
be efteem'd to be the only End of perceiving
the Creator. From hence, I think, it ap-
pears, that this Opinion is by no means pro-
bable.

SEC T. III.

Of the Firft Caufe.

! \\ THAT this active Principle is we cannot apprehend other- Our Reafo-

V V wife than by Reafon, for it occurs not to the Senfes, un- n h in f ft a c out fe
lefs by its Effects, nor is it perceived by them any more than Light is arc like thofe
by the Ears: our Reafonings therefore about this Principle will be ofa blind
like thofe of a blind ^ Man about Light. A blind Man may be affur'd KghUtoa
that there is a certain thing eall'd Light, which the Eye can perceive, it is not an
as the Nofe can Smells j he may be taught alfo by them who fee, to ; g^ of
under/land many Advantages of Light, namely, that it can direct the
Steps, that it can warm, that it derives its Origin from a large remote

G 2 Body,

ings
cerning it

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

Body, /. e. the Sun (17.), that by the help of it very difiant Bodies
may be perceiv'd, with their Forms and other Qualities unknown to
him ; and that Fire which affords only heat to him, can give light al-
io to them who fee: Laftly, that it arifes from fome Motion in the
minuteft Particles of a Fluid (17.).
Vet we know IL From thefe external Properties he might difcourfe of Light,
a great many and in fome meafure underftand the reafonings of other Men upon.
it : he would believe it to be diftinct from Heat ; he would eagerly
defirc, and willingly undergo many hardships, to enjoy the benefit of
it j yet would he never have any fuch fenfe of it as thofe who fee.
After the fame manner we may know many things about this active
Principle, which we are conudl'd, by the force of Reaibns, to be-
lieve certainly to exift, tho' we are no lefs ignorant of what it is in
itfelf, than the blind Man is of the Senfation which Light produces
in thofe who fee *^

III. For inftance ; In the fir/? place we are certain, that aft 1 other
things come from this adfpve Principle : For nothing elfe, as we have
procee rom f^ewn b e f ore ^ contains in itfelf NeceJJary Exiftence, or active Power,
entirely independent of any other j as therefore itfelf is from none,
fo all others are from it. For from hence we conclude, that this
Principle does Exift ; becaufe, after confidering the reft of the things
which exift, we perceive that they could neither be nor 40 t if that had
not exifted, and excited Motion in them..

That all o-
ther Beings

IV. Se+-

NOTES.

(1 7.) Thefe two particulars feem neither ne-
ceflary to be mentioned here among the advan-
tages that Light affords, nor will the latter of
them be thought to be exactly true, if under-
ftood of the Cartefian Subtle Fluid. Tho' per-
haps in effect the Cartefian and Newtonian doc-
trines of Vifion may in this refpect be confi-
dent. For, Sir Ifaac Newton fuppofes, that
Vifitn is perform'd chiefly by the vibrations of
a fine Midtum, which penetrates all Bodies, ex-

cited in the bottom of the Eye by. the rays of.
Light, and propagated thro' the Capillaments
of the Optic Nerves to the Senforium: and Des
Cartes maintains, that the Sun preffing the
Materia Subti/is, wherewith the World is fill'd
every way, the Vibrations or Pulfes of that
Matter reflected from Objects are communica-
ted to the Eye, and thence to the Senfory. So
that the Action or Vibration of a Medium \%
equally fuppofed in both, Chambers.,

* This Compart fon is farther illujlrated by the Author of the Procedure of Human Underftarv,
ding, in bis Introduction.
f t Vz. (aragr. 3, 4, 5, &c. and Note L4.

Concerning the Origin of Evih k^

IV. Secondly \ we are certain that this Principle is One, Similar and Thatitifi0 ^
Uniform ; For Matter is, as to its Ejjence, every where One and a-
like ; the fame mud be faid of Space, if we grant it to be any thing
diftinct from Matter : much more mult the Caufe, which fills Space
with Matter be One, fimple and uniform (18.).

G 3 , Vr Thirdly .

NOTES.

(18".) This Argument, (as well as fome o-
thers hereafter mention' d) were the foundation
of ir true, can but be call v d a probable,, pre-
emptive one at belt : nay, the contrary will
rather follow from the multiplicity and diver City
of created Subftances. We fhall therefore en-
deavour to give a diftinft proof of the Being
and Attributes of God, fo far, at leaft, as the
knowledge of them may affect our prefent Sub-
let.

Now thefefeem capable of a clear deduction
from this one f elf-evident Principle*, I Exif.
I my felf exif : therefore fome thing exifts. If
fomething exifts now, then fomething has exifted
Always, otherwife, that fomething which now
exifts, muft once either have been made by no-
thing, i. e. been caufed by no Caufe, which is
abfurd; or elfe have made itfelf, u e. have ailed
before it exifted, or been at once both Effeil
and Caufe', which is alfo abfurd ; or, laftly,
(which is the only fuppofition left) it muft
have been produced by fomething, which had
its Exiftence from fomething elfe, which alfo
depended on fome other Caufe, and fo on in an
infinite Series of Caus'd or Succeflive Beings,
without any eternal or firft Caufe, which is al-
fo abfurd. For either fome one part of this in-
finite Series has not been fucceffive to any other,
or elfe all the feveral parts of it have been fuc-
ceflive : if fome one part of it has not, then
there was a firft, which deftroys the Suppofi-
fition ; if all the feveral parts of it have been
fucceffive to each other, then they have all
once been future, and if they have been once
all future, then there was a time when none of
them exifted; and if there was a time when
none of them exifted, then either all the parts
of this Infinite Series, and confequcntly the

See X a; at the end *f Chap. I.

whole, muft have arifen from nothing j which isj
abfurd; or elfe there muft be fomething in the*
whole befide what is contain'd in all the parts ;
which is alfo abfurd. This infinite Series there-
fore is, in the whole, and in every part, an
exprefs contradiction. Or thus-: Since all the
parts of this infinite Series arc fucceffive or fa
tare to one another, they muft once either
have been all future, i. e. non-exifient, (and
then the fecondabfurdity will follow, /'. e. tbit y
this whole Series arofe from nothing) or elfe r.ll "
but fome one, (and then the firft will follow, i.e;
that it had a beginning} lvhich one added to the *
reft, either makes them infinite, which is ab-
furd, or they are infinite without that one, and'
then that one added to them makes one more
than infinite, which is alfo abfurd^.

Hence we gather the Eternity || of fome one
Thing or Being. That every one is not in like
manner -Eternal a parte ante, (as the School-
men improperly fpeak) or, never had a Begin-
ning', particularly, that no Body or material Sy-
ftem can be fo (and the fame reafons hold e-
qually againft any finite immaterial Subftance)
is fufficiently prov'd in the Enquiry into the E~
vidence'of the Chriftian Religion f4-

From Eternity comes Independence or Self-
Exiftence. For thatwhich never had a begin-
ning of Exiftence, could not poffibly have any
Caufe of that exiftence (for then ir would nor
be theory? Caufe, contrary to what we have
prov'd above) or. could depend upon no other
thing for it, i. e. muft be independent of all o-
thers; or, which is the fame thing, muft exiftr
of itfelf, i. e. be felf-exiftent || ||.

Eternity a parte poft, or necejjary Exiftence,
or an iinpoflibility of ever ceafing to be, is a
neceflary confequencc of Independence. For,

wiut

fXb. jfX-c. f-rXd. |l! X*

4 6

Infinite in
Nature and
Power,

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

V. Thirdly, That it is Infinite both in Nature and Power : For fince
ic exifts of itjelf t there is nothing that can bound its Nature o$

Power,

NOTES.

what depends upon no Caufe can never be al-
ter'd or deftroy'd by any, as was (hewn in
Notes 9 and 14, and X e.

From Independence comes alfo Omnipotence.
For a Being thut depends upon no external
Caufe for his Exiftence, and has active Power,
(as was fhewn at the fame time that we prov'd
his Exiftence, and by the fame Medium) can-
not depend upon any for the exertion of that
power, and confequently no limits or defeft can
be apply'd to either his Exiftence or Power.
For Limitation is an effect of fome fuperior caufe,
which in the prefent cafe there cannot be: con-
sequently to fuppofe limits where there can be
no limiter,- is to fuppofe an Effeel without a
Caufe ; which is a. Contradiction f.

To fuppofe this. Being limited in or by its
own Nature, is to fuppofe fome Nature antece-
dent, or limiting Quality fuperior, to that Being,
to the Exiftence of whom, no Thing, no Qua-
lity, is in any refpeft antecedent, or fuperior :
which is another Contradiction. And to fup-
pofe that there is no fuch thing as action or
power in a Being which appears to be the
fountain of all aftion and power, is (if pof-
fible) the worft fuppofition of all.

Liberty is alfo included in the Idea of Om-
nipotence : Active Power implies Freedom . Infi-
nite Power is abftlute Freedom. What therefore
has no bounds fet to its power, what can have
no oppofition made to its Will, nor reftraint
laid on its Actions, muft both will and aft
freely. This Attribute is alfo prov'd from the
beginning of Motion, and the creation and
difpofition of indifferent things ||. But tho'
this Being Is free, and as fuch, the Author of
Change in othej Beings, yet he muft himfelf be
Unchangeable. For all changes have a begin-
ning, and confequently are Effefts of fome
prior Caufes: But there can be nothing prior to
the Exiftence of this Being, as he is Eternal,
neither any Caufe of it, as he is independent ;

nor confequently any change in it: except we
could fuppofe him to change himfelf, which is
the fame abfurdity as to produce himfelf, i, e. to
be at the fame time both Effect and Caufe.

Thus we come to the Knowledge of an E-
ternal, Independent, Omnipotent, Free, and Un~
changeable Being.

'Omnifcience, as well as fome of the foregoing
Attributes, may be more eafily deduced thus*
We find in ourfelves fuch Qualities as Thought
and Intelligence, Potver, Freedom, &c. of which
we have intuitive Knowledge, as much as of our
own Exiftence', and that to have thefe is a per-
fection, or, better than to be without them:
We find alfo, that thefe have not been in us
from Eternity, confequently they muft have had
a Beginning, and confequently fome Caufe, (for
the fame reafon that a Being, beginning to exift
in time, requires a Caufe) which Caufe, as it
muft be fuperior to its Effeel, has them in a fu-
perior Degree f4- ; and if it be the fir (I Caufe, as
itfelf can depend upon no other, muft have them
in perfection, or in an infinite or unlimited 'De-
gree (if thefe Words can properly be here ap-
ply'd || ||.) Since Bounds or Limitation would be
without a Limiter (as has been fhewn) i. e% an
Effeft, without a Caufe.

The Phenomena of Nature alfo lead us up to
one, fuch firft Caufe, which is fufficient for
their produftion, and therefore none elfe are
necefjary ; and tho' feveral more independent Be-
ings might poflibly exift, yet would they be no
Gods to us ; for they would have no manner of
Relation to us, nor we any thing to do witlt
them *, Since therefore the fame reafon holds
for no more than One fuch, to fuppofe more
than one is at leaft unreafonable.

Thefe feem to be all the fimple Attributes
obfervable in the Divine Nature, which, as
they are differently combin'd by us, come un-
der different names. Thus the unlimited ex-
ercife of Gods Knowledge and Power demon-
strates

tXf.
part ofXk.

|J See Note 20. and our Author's Note F. and the rfferences. f | See the latter

ill^Xl. *Xg. . +

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

'Bower. Tis to be obferv'd farther, that the number of pojjible things
is conceiv'd by us to be infinite at leaft in Power, but nothing can be

poffible,

NOTES.

ftrates him Omniprejent, i. e. at all times and in
all places fo prefent with every Creature, as to
have an abfolute Knowledge of, and Power over
it ; always to fupervife and govern it \\

His enjoying all conceivable perfections in
an entire abfolute manner, denotes him infi-
nite, or abfolutely perfeel ||; and, which is the
feme thing, his being capable of no want, de-
fe", or utihappinefs whatsoever, defines him all
uffcient.

And fince we can never fully comprehend
the nature of fuch an infinite or perfect. Being,
nor conceive the manner of his Exiflence, we
ftile him Incomprehenfible. To doubt whether
his Nature, and manner of Exillence may be in
reality thus incomprehenflble to us, is to doubt
whether the lefs may not contain the greater -,
and whether our Ideas of things all exiiling
with a Caufe, may not fhew us the manner of a
thing's exiiling without a Caufe, exifting in a
manner quite different from every other thing.
He that can doubt of this, may doubt alfo,
whether twice two may not be equal to twen-
ty ; and whether he may not know how the
Sun mines by his being always in the Dark.

The Moral Attributes of God, are deducible
after the fame manner from his Natural ones.
All of them (except Goodnefs) are cohfider'd
only as confequences of the former, when ex-
ereifed on fome other Beings, and feem to be
the Perfections of his External Atts, rather
than any new internal perfections of his Nature
or Eflence ; and are very properly term'd, his
feeondary, relative Attributes *.

And tho' the Exiflence of any moral Quali-
ty or Action is not capable of ftrict Demon-
ftration, becaufe every moral Action or Quali-
ty, as fuch, depends upon the Will of the A-
gent, which is abfolutely free. Yet, we have
as great an Affurance that there are Moral Qua-
lities in God, and that he will always Aft ac-
cording to thefe Moral Qualities, as the nature

t X h. || See Wollafton, /. 70, 93,

14- See Ditton on Moral Evidence, /. 1, 2.

of the thing admits, and may be as abfolutely
certain of it, as if we could demonftrate it +4

I fhall begin again, with a Self-Evident
Propofition :

Pleafure indifferent from Pain ; confequent-
ly there's zj^fference in things. Pleafure is
fit for, or agreeable to, the Nature of a fenfible
Being, or is a natural Good ; Pain is unfit, or is
a natural Evil: confequently, there's a natural
fitnefs and unfitnefs of things ; or (which is the
very fame, and what thefe terms fhould always-
mean) Natural Good and Evil.

The voluntary application of this fitnefs and
unfitnefs to any Rational Being, or the Produc-
tion || (I of this Natural Good and Evil by a
Rational Being, is M<ral Fitnefs and Unfitnefs,
or Moral Good and Evil : confequently there
is fuch a thing as Moral Good and Evil* An
Inclination to, and Approbation of, this Moral
Good, is implanted in every rational Creature,
and is perfective of its Nature, and therefore it
muft be communicated by, and confequently
be inherent in, the Creator -f\|.-f\

To Will and Act agreeably to this Affection
and Approbation, is alfo a Perfection; the con-
trary an imperfectionr confequently the for-
mer, as it is a Perfection found in. fome degree
in the Creature, muft belong to, and be, ia
the higheft degree, in the. Creator, who has
been already proved to exift in the beft man-
ner poffible, or to have all natural perfections
in an infinite or perfect Degree || || || ; and there-
fore he muft have all moral ones fo too.

As his Knowledge and Power are perfeel, he
muft always both perceive and be able to pur-
fue this Moral Good, And as his Happinefs is
complete, there can be no poffible reafon why
he fhould ever will the contrary ; nay, there is
a good reafon why he fhould not, namely, o-
therwife a perfect Thing would contradict it-
felf, and will a defecl or imperfeelion, i. e. be
be perfeft and not' perfect at the fame time:

And

* See Impartial Enquiry, /. 29, 68, &t,

UK XL f-rtXk. iimxi.

concerning

the Origin of Evil.

fqflible, to which there is not fome Power correfpondefit, that might
actually. .effect it, fince therefore the things that are poflible, cannot

NOTES.

Arid a Being infinitely happy, and who loves
and approves himfelf, becaufe he is fo, would
Jute and difipprove the very fame thing in o-
thers, /. e. would love his ownd^ature, and
yet hate any thing that refembleffit ; which is
ablurd *. It follows then, tha# he muft al-
ways know, be able, and willing to do, and
therefore aSually do what is abfolutely bejl to
be done, /. e. produce the greateft Sum of
Happinefs, or be abfolutely and completely
'Good. This alfo was included in Benevo-
Jence, and the moral Scnfe above mentio-
ned f.

For if he has implanted Benevolent Affec-
tions in us, and a Senfe which approves them,
he muft himfelf have both the fame Affections,
and the fame Senfe of .them ||.

Again: The Idea of Goodnefs properly im-
-plies an inclination of communicating happi-
nefs to others ;- if then this .Being be Good, he
muft aftually have communicated happinefs-to
others. ; and vice verfa y if he have communica-
ted happinefs to others, he muft be good : But
this Being has communicated diappinefs'to o-
thers, therefore he is Good.

The Idea of Wifdom implies his knowledge
and obfervance of the moft proper methods of
effecting this, and is included in his Omnifci-
ence; it being nothing but that very knowledge
confider'd, with relation to practice. It ap-
pears farther, from confidering the only caufes
of imprudence in Men, which are either Igno-
rance, Partiality, or, Inattention', none of which
can have place in God: He cannot be igno-
rant of any thing, fince both all things, and
their Relations to each other, proceed from him :
he cannot be auPd by any Power, ot fwafd by
any intereft, fince (as has been fhewn^ he is
independent and all-fufficient j and he cannot be
inattentive, fince he always fees everything in-
tuitively and at once; and confequently he

muft always know arid do what is fittefl and wi-
fejl to be done.

From which alfo follows his Jufiice : For
he that fees all the circumjiances of things, and
the qualifications of pcrfons, and' has ability to re-
gulate thefe, and no manner of temptation to do
otherwife, -muft certainly fuit thefe Circum-
ftances to thofe Qualifications, or, provide that
perfons receive the natural and proper confe-
quence of their Actions; or (which is the fame)
do with. every perfon what -is exactly juft and
right.

The fame alfo holds for his Holinefs and Ve-
racity, or rather Faithfulnefs. As to the former,
he muft always diflike and deteft Evil, fince it
can never become in the leaft agreeable to his
Perfections, or ferviceable to his Ufe: As to the
latter, he muft adhere to Truth, as it is a Per-
fection, and co-incident with Good, &c* fince
he can have no pofnble reafon or motive to de-
viate from it. " The reafon why Men break
" -their Words (fays Bp. Wilkins) is either be-
" caufe of their rajhnefs and inconfidcratnefs
"in making Promifes, or their firgetfulnefs
" in not minding them, or their inconflancy in
'* not keeping them, or their impotence to per-
" form them : But now the Divine Nature be-
" ing infinitely wife, and all-fufficient, can have
" no temptation to be otherwife than true and
** faithful, his infinite knowledge and wifdom fe-
" cures him from being deceiv'd himfelf, his
" Omnipotence doth exempt him from ftanding
" in need of deceiving others, and his Goodnefs
" fecures us from the leaft fufpicion of any in-
" cli nation thereto - r -f\' '

Thus may we reafon about the feveral per-
fections of the fupreme Being, but that which
fhould chiefly direct us in thefe our Enquiries,
is the Idea of his Infinite Goodnefs. " This
" (f a y s f b e f ame learned Perfon || j| ) is the firft
" and cleared Notion we have of him, the

ioun-

Set Scot'/ Works, Vol.2. DifcXIV. p. 303. + See Xi.

M Nat. Relig. Ch. 10. p. 142. 6th Edit; " || \\ Ibid. p. 138.

Ibid.

Concerning the Origin of RviL

o o J

be limited, there mufl alfo be a Caufe infinitely powerful. For as one

Poffibility

NOTES.

" dationof all our Worfhipand Religion ; and
" without which all his other Attributes
" would not afford fufficient grounds for our
" Love and Adoration." Power without Good-
nefs is attended only with the Idea of Terror ;
jujlice, of Rigour and Severity ; IVifdom, of Ar-
tifice and Cunning; and Truth will be nothing
but rigid Inflexibility in arbitrary Decrees*.
So that there is no other Attribute, when con-
f;der'd feparately from it, capable of giving the
Heart any kind or amiable impreffions; and all
the other moral Attributes (if they can proper-
ly be call'd Attributes) are fo far from exilting
apart from it, that they may be confider'd only
as fo many different Views of the fame Goodnefs
in the Creator, and various Sources of Happinef
to the Creature. Nay, farther, the reft of the
moral Attributes feem as it were fub-ordinateto,
and regulated by, this one principal Perfection,
and brighteft ray of the Divinity. Thus we
conceive his Jujiice to be exerted on any Being
no farther than his Goodnefs necefTarily re-
quires, in order to the making that Being, or
ethers, fenfble of the heinous nature and perni-
cious effecls of Sin ; and thereby bringing either
it, or fome others, to as great a degree of Hap-
pinefs, as their feveral Natures become capable
off. His Holinefs hates and abhors all Wicked-
vefs, only as the necrffary Confequence of it is ab-
folute and unavoidable Mifery ; and his Veracity
or Faithfulnefs, fecms to be no more concern' d
for Truth, than as it is connected with, and
productive of, the Happinefs of all rational
Beings ; to provide the propereft Means for at-
taining which great end, is the exercife of his
Wifdom. Thus, tho' we are certain, that all
the Divine Attributes proceed equally from one
and the fame principle, and are united in one
TLJfence; yet when we conftder that Eflence as
exhibited to us in different refpe&s; we alfo
conceive it partially under the d^fmct Ideas of
Superior, and Inferior, antecedent and confequent,

&c. In which Senfe, Goodnefs is fuperior
and antecedent to, and as it were, the root and
foundation of, all the Moral Attributes.

I have all along declin'd the Argument a pri-
ori, drawn from the antecedent neceffity of Exi-
gence, as well for the reafons given above in
Note 14. as alfo, becaufe it feem'd not to car-
ry fome Attributes, fo far as they might be de-
duced a Pofleriori, and to be fcarce conliftent
with others. That the Self-exiflcnt Being, for
inftance, is not a blind, unintelligent Neceffity,
but in the mod proper Senfe, an underflanding
and really attive Being, cannot be demonftrated
ftriftly and properly a priori, as Dr. Clarke
fays ||, with a great deal of reafon ; and how
abfolute Neceffity is reconcileable with abfolute
freedom, feems hard to conceive. For why
fhould not this neceffity extend to all the Ope-
rations, the Will, the Decrees, as well as the
Exifience of the firft Caufe : and take away that
Freedom of determination, that entire Liberty
of Indifference, which our Author has fufficient-
ly proved +4-> t0 De a property of God himfelf,
as well as Man ? And, if we cannot admit it
in one cafe, why fhould we in the other ? I
don't fay this Neceffity is inconfiflent with pci*-
feft Freedom, as the former is an Impcrfcclion,
fince we do not conceive it to be fuch, any
farther, than as it proceed.% ab extra, from fome
fuperior Caufe impofing it. But, this I fay,
that, be it what you pleafe, the very Nature and
Idea of it feems repugnant to that of Freedont,
i. e. the power of determining in cafes abfolute-
ly indifferent, without any previous reafon, or
neceffity whatfoever ; and cdnfequently thefe
two can never be co-exifient in the fame Caufe:
He that confiders this attentively, will, I be-
lieve, find it to be more than a mere quibble on
the Words || j|.

Laftly, This Neceffity of Exigence, being
(as Di. Clarke contends * m ) Simple and Uniform^
without any poftiblc difference or variety, fhould

admit

* See TiWotCon^s ()o Serm. vol.2. Fol.
jv|. Chap. 5. $. 1. Subj. 4. and elfewhere.

p. 679. f X m.

II" SeeNttes 14&62.

II Demon fir. p. 52.
Dewj.ifir. Prr.p. -,

jo Concerning the Origin of Evil.

PoQibility requires a Caufe, fo infinite Poflibilicies require a Caufe in-
finitely powerful (19.).
Free. VI. Fourthly, Since Space is conceiv'd as merely idle and indiffe-

rent ', with refpecl: to Repletion or Vacuity; fince the Matter which
fills Space, is in like manner merely patfive and indifferent- with re-
fpect to Motion and Reft-, it follows, that the Caufe which fills Spac?
with Matter, and produces Motion in that Matter, is perfectly free;
fo that the Creation and Motion of Matter ^muft be Works of free
Choice, and not Neceflity,. in the Agent. For, if the Agent effec-
ted thefe by -Neceflity, they would alfo be neceffary Effects, and
could not be conceiv'd to be. in themfelves indifferent to Exi-
stence

no r E S.\

adnfiit of no difference or variety of aay fort,-
or in any refpedt, and confequently muft ex-
clude all diverfity, or different kinds of ' .perfection
(a,s well as different Perfons) from the Divine
Nature, which is fuppos'd to exift thereby. It
muft be utterly inconfiftent with that Variety
of Attributes, fuch as Knowledge and Power, Sec.
which we conceive to be very diflintt Proper-
ties, and which Dr. Clarke, and every one elfe,
concludes to be eflentially in God.

If the Learned Do fiefs Notion of abfolute Ne-
cejfity proves all this, I humbly conceive it
proves too much, and if it does not prove this
I cannot apprehend how it proves any thing at
all. See S. C's Impartial Enquiry, &c. p.
170.

(19 ) I fhall give the Reader this Argument
as it is propos'd after another manner by J)f.
Fiddes, and the Anfwer to it, by S. G v

" To fay a thing is poffible, is to fay, there
" is fome thing, fome power or other capable
"of producing it.. For nothing,, oriwhat-has
"no power, can produce no effeft. The
" power therefore, which is to-bring what is
** poffible into Being, is neceflarily fuppofed al-
" -ready to exift; other wife a Perfeclion might
"arife out of non-entity, or without a Caufe;

u and what we conceive poffible, would' \J6
" really impoffible *." -

Which the Author of thtf Impartial Enquiry,
cjrV. confutes, by a parallel inftance.

" If a perfon having firft proved the exi-
" ftence of a Power tint is perfeft, and made
" it appear*- -that a perfeft power cannot but
" extend to whatever is a capable object, of
" power,- -or includes not, a contradiction *;
" fhould proceed to prove, that the Aft o/Cre-
" ation implies no contradiction, and then at
" -/^fhould conclude, that therefore Creation
" isapoffibility (i.e. effeftible by the exer-
" eife .of that perfect or almighty power, whofe
" Exiftence he- had before demonftrated) I
"conceive there could be no reafonable cx-
" ception againft fuch a method of Arguing.
"But if,, on- the. contrary, he fhould fay, I
" plainly perceive there's no contradiction in
" the Suppofition of the Creation, or produ T
" ftion of a thing that was not, and fhould
" from thence immediately infer, that a poweF
" capable of Creation exifts, this would be a
" very prepofterous way of Demonftrating :
" which yet is the. fame method with. that of
" the prefent Argument ||."

*~Theolog. Spec. p. 15.
|| Impartial Enquiry, p. 178..

Concerning the Origin of Evil. 5 I

{fence or Non-Exiftence, as proceeding from a neceffary Caufe,

(20..)

VII. Fifthly : Tho* by our outward Senfes, and the notices which That it is *
they convey to us, we cannot go beyond Space, Matter, Motion, fen- con fij ous > >-

Jible Qualities, and this Active Principle which we are fpeaking of; [ng! 8 and om
yet, if we infpcct our own Minds, we may contemplate a Self-con- nifcient.
fcious and thinking Principle within us, whofe Actions are, to will,
refufe, doubt, reafon, affirm and deny, which carry nothing of Exten-
fion along with them, nor neceflarily include it in them, nor have
any relation to Place or Space-, but are entirely abftracted from the
Notions of external or internal. That there is fuch a Principle in us
we are certain, not only from our fenfes, or the impulfes of external
objects, but alfo from Reflection and Self-Confcioufnefs. 'Tis to be
obferv'd farther, that we can at our pleafufe -move fome parts of
Matter, and make the Limbs of our Body by thought only, that is,
by Volition *, whence it appears, that Motion may be produc'd in
Matter by thought j and that fomething of this kind is to be attri-
buted to the firft Caufe, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, to
bring it into Being. Cogitation alfo, Will and Confcioufnefs, or Fa-
culties equivalent to thefe, are neceffary to a free Caufe, and on that
account to be attributed to the firft Caufe, being (as mail be fhewn
below) perfectly Free: which Caufe, fince it is infinite (as we have
proved) in its Eflence and Power, it mufl be fo likewife in Intelligence %
viz. Omnipotent and Omnifcient.

VIII. Sixthly : Since this Principle (which we call God) is the That he afis
Caufe of all things, and infinite in Knowledge as well as Power, it for an End '
follows, that he ads, not by blind impulfe but, for an End-, and has
order'd his Works by fuch Wifdom, as to be confident with them-

felves, and not deftructive of each other.

H 2 IX. Sc-

NOTES.

(20.) For an excellent illuflration of this
Argument, fee Dr. Clarke's Demonjirat. p. 24,
25, 26. and 65, 66, 67. cth Edit. Sec alfo
Cudwortb, p. 667, &c. and the Impartial En-
quiry, p. 31, 32, sV.

* That Volition r and Anion are perfectly di*
ftindt, and malt proceed from two different

Powers, Sec Note 61
two-fold, Sec Note 62.

That Aft ion alio is

5* Concerning the Origin of Evil.

IX. Seventhly: Since God is perfect in himfelf, fince all things,
of Creation fubfift by his Providence, and ftand in need of him, but he of none ;
wnstoexer- &n ^ f ince h e can neither be profited nor incommoded by his Works,
er.'and P to W " nor a fi~ e & e d hy their Good or Evil; it follows, that he made thefe
communi- things for no Advantage of his own, and that he neither receives
Goodnefs f nor ex P e< ^ s anv Benefit f r0 m them. For by creating things with-
thc Deity, out himfelf, he mufl neceffariiy have fought either their Benefit or
his own; but what Benefit can God feek for himfelf, who poffeffes
all Good ? That certainly which was wanting to him, and necefTa-
riiy mufl be wanting, to a Being even abfolutely perfect, till he has
created fomething; I mean the Exercife of his Attributes without the
communicating of his Power and Goodnefs: That therefore only
muft he be fuppofed to have fought in the Creation and Difpofal
of his Works (21.), Not that Externals can add any thing to Go J,

for

NOTE &

(21.) Some hive objected': here, that accor-
ding to this Notion, there muft have been a
Time before the exiftence of any created Be-
ings, when God was neither infinitely happy,
nor abfolutely Good *. But the one part of this
objection evidently arifesfrom a miftake of our
Author's Notion, who has often told U3-, that
he does not fuppofe any thing external to the
Deity, to add the leaft to his own- Happinefs,
or EfTential Perfections ; (and indeed, to think
otherwife, would be worfe thin to imagine
the Fountain fed by its own Streams ; or the
Sun enlightened by its own Rays) but only to
manifej} them to us his Creatures, and encreafe
our happinefs and perfection, by our knowledge
and imitation of them- The other part cannot
be of force againft Creation in any particular
time; becaufe it will hold equally againft it
in all times: Againft the very poffibility of
Creation in General, fioce with God there is
no prior and poflerior, no difference of timeap-
plicable to his Exiftence, as we have endea-
vour'd to prove in X c. Befides, is it not
abfurd to talk of time, before the beginning
of things, which time (as we have fliewn in

the fame place) can only be-conceiv'd as co~
exijlent with, or rather cevfequential to, the Be-
ing of thefe things ? 'Tis in vain therefore to
ask, why were not Beings created fooner ?
Since no part of Duration conceivable can e-
ver be affign'd, when fome were not Created,
and every period of time has equal relation to
Eternity. " As to the fecond Senfe of the
" Queftion (fays Cudzvorth) Why the World,
" tho' it could not poffibly be from Eternity,.
" yet was no fooner, . but fo lately made ? We
" fay, that this is an abfurd Queftion, both be-
" caufe Time was made together with the
" World, and there was no fooner or later be-
" fore Time\ and alfo, becaufe whatfoever had
" a beginning, muft of neceffity be once but a
" day old. Wherefore, the World could not
" poffibly have been fo made by God in time,.
" as not to be once butjfoe ox fix thoufand
" Years old and no more, as now it is." p. 887
See the fame more at large in Fiddes's Tbeolog,
Spec. B. 3. Part I. Ch. 2. and in Bentlefs
Boyle's Left. p. 232, 235. 5th Edit, orjenkin's
Reafonablenefs of Ckrifliamty, Vol. 2. C. 9. or
Sir MMale's Prim.Originat. of Mankind, S. I. C.6.

Whew

vSft Bp. Pearftm on the Cre$d, zd Edit. p. 62, 63,

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

for they have no manner of Proportion to his Power or Nature: but
he has in himfelf the^adequate Exercife of his Powers, namely in
the Contemplation and Love of himfelf. Externals therefore can
neither encreafe nor diminifh the Exercife of his Powers, which be-
fore was infinite (22.) God is indifferent therefore as to thefe, nor
does his Exercife without pleafe him, otherwife than as he has chofen
to exercife himfelf thus ; as will be fhewn below *. And hence it
manifeftly follows, that the World is as well as it could be made by
infinite Power and Goodnefs. For fince the Exercife of the Divine
Power, and the Communication of his Goodnefs, are the Ends for
which the World is fram'd, there is no doubt but God has attain'd
thefe Ends*

H 3 X. I

NOTE S.

Where you have all the abfurd Queries of that
kind folidly and acutely anfwer'd.

(22.) The Powers or Attributes th'emfelves
were in fome Senfe Infinite, . but I don't appre-
hend how the Exercife of them can properly be
faid to be fo. It fecms impoffible to fuppofe a-
ny Divine Attribute, either Natural or Moral,
to be exerted infinitely on a finite Subject, fince
that Subject muft neceflarily be incapable of
receiving it. Whence appears the abfurdity of
imagining any Man-to be the objedt of God's
infinite Jujlice, and at the fame time*, of his in-
finite Mercy too, in an infinite manner, as fome
love to fpeak; which with them raifes a migh-
ty difficulty about Hell Torments : Whereas, if
we fhould allow that the Divine Juftice is an
Attribute entirely diftinct from Goodnefs, and
alfo, that a perfon may be at the fame time the
object of both ; concerning which fee X m.
Yet ftill we can eafily fuppofe thefe two Attri-
butes in fuch a Cafe bounded and balanced, as it
were, by each other, without any defecl in ei-
ther; all the limitation here only rifmg from
the limitation or finitenefs of the Subjeil on
which they are fuppos'd to be exerted; which,
as 'tis finite, manifeftly cannot receive an in-
finite Exercife of an infinite Power.

The fame Gbfervationwill help us to folve
the Difficulty which fome bring againft the
very notion of infinite Power in God, which,
fay they, implies this Contradiction, viz. that'
he cannot do all that he can do: He could not
rrake the World ever fo foon, but- that it was
poflible for him to have made it. fooner: he
can never make it fo large, that it will be im-
poflible for- him to make it larger: which is
abfurcL To which we anfwer, If thefe terms,
can and cannot, were applied to the fame thing,
in the fame rejpecl, it would indeed be a plain
contradiction ; but in the prefent cafe 'tis o-
therwifc. The former is apply'd to the Ob'
jecls of power in general, which are included
in this Idea, i.e. 'tis affirm'd, that the Power
of God is perfect, or extends, and is com-
menfurate, to all objecls of Power, or that he
can do whatever is in the nature of things pof-
fible to be done. The latter is affirm'd only of
fome particular Subjeft, which is in its own na-
ture incapable of Perfection, or incommenfu-
rate to this infinite Power, and on which there-
fore we may truly fay, that this infinite Power
cannot be employ'd, or that this Perfection can
never be completely exhibited, or exhaufted ire
it. So that in the prefent Cafe, thefe two.

Words

See Chap. 5. ^ 1. Subj. 4.

When the
World isfaid
to be created
for God's
Glory, 'tis
after the mail'
mrtfbl&i.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

X. I know 'tis commonly faid, that the World was made for the
Glory of God : but this is after the manner of Men. For Defire of Glo-
ry is attributed . to God in the fame maimer as Anger \ Love, Re~
venge, Eyes, and Hands. When therefore the Scripture teaches us,
that the World was created for the Glory of God, 'tis to be under-
ftood, that the Divine Attributes, namely, Power, Goodnefs and JVif-
dom, thine forth as clearly in his Works, as if he had no other in-
tent in making them, belide the Oftentation of thefe Attributes ; nor
could they have -anfwer'd that End more fitly, if they had been de-
fign'd for Glory : but, ftriclly fpeaking, the Power of God is infi-
nite, aad when he adts for the Good of his Creatures according to
that infinite Power, he is infinitely Good. Infinite knows no bounds,
nor has the Goodnefs of Gcd any other bounds belides his Wifdom
and Power, which are alfo infinite. And in reality, this makes moft
for the Glory of God, viz. to have created a World with the greateft
Goodnefs. (23.)

XL By

N O t E S.

Words may be ufed, without any Contradiction;
and infinite, or rather perfect, Power may pro-
perly enough be term'd, not able to do feveral
things without fuppofing a defect in that pow-
er, but only in the Subjects which are incom-
menfurate to it, or eflentially incapable of re
ceiving it. Now, that the Material World,
and every part or property thereof is, in eve-
ry refpect, incapable of this Infinity, has, I
think, been prov'd in Note 5. and that no crea-
ted Being whatfoever can be capable of it, will
be fhewn in Note 28. .

(23.) " The reafon why God made the
" World (fays the learned Per/on fo often cited
11 above) was from his own overflowing and
" communicative Goodnefs ; that there might
" be other Beings alfo happy befide himfelf, and
" enjoy themfelves.'' And afterwards, " God
** did net make the World merely to oflentate his
" Skill and Power, but to communicate bis Good-
" nefs, which is chiefly and properly his Glory,

" as the Light and Splendor of the Sun is the G/o-
" ry of it -f\"

We have a fine Paragraph or two to the fame
purpofe in Mr. Wollafiori'% Delin. of the Religion
of Nature, p. 1 1 5 1 20.

The fame Notion is well ftated in Scott\ Chri-
stian Life: where the Glory of God and the
Happinels of Man are fhewn to be co-incident II.
As this feems to be very often mifunderftood,
it may not be improper to mfert a Paffage or
two from that excellent Author. " *A true Sur-
" vey and Infpection of God's Nature, will
" inttruct us, that being infinitely perfeel, as
" he is, he mult be infinitely happy within him-
" felf ; and fo can defign no felf-end without
" himfelf ; and confequently, that the end for
" which he requires our Service, is not any
" advantage he expects to reap from it, or
" farther addition to his own happinefs, he be-
'" ing from all Eternity pafl, as completely
" happy as he can be to all Eternity to, come ;

" and

f Intell. Spfiem, p. 886.

(I See Vol. 1. p. 4, 5.

* Vol. 2. Chap. 6. p. 434, 435.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.
XI. By Good, here underftand that

which is convenient and That Goi
commodious, that which is correfpondent to the Jppetite of every Crea- w^ d th a " s
Mirf Onrl rhprpfore rrpaffv! the. World with ns prear convenience. w.ll a

ture.

God therefore created the World with as great convenience, well as it
and fitnefs, with as great congruity to the Appetites of things, a3Coa H b bc the
could be effected by infinite Power, Wifdom, and Goodnefs. If then w^d
any thing inconvenient or incommodious be now, or was from the Power,
beginning in it, that. certainly could not be hindered or removed even an awffdom;
by infinite Powerj Wifdom, and Goodnefs (24.).

NO r E s.

** and therefore, what other end can he be fup-
" pos'd to aim at, than our Good and Happi-
** nefs ? It is true indeed, he defigns to Glo-
*' rify himjelf in our Happinefs; but how?
" Not to render himfelf more glorious by it
*' than he is in himfelf, for that is impoffible;
*' but to difplay, and fhew forthhis own eflen-
" tial Glory to all tint are capable of admi-
" ring and imitating \\\m, that thereby he
" might invite them to tranfcribe that Goodnefs
*' of his into their Nature, of which his Glo-
" ry is the Shine and Lufire,- and thereby to
* Glorify themfelves ; and what can more ef-
'* feftually difplay the Glory of a Being- who
** is infinitely wife, and powerful, and good,
** than to contrive and effeel the Happinefs of
** his Creatures, and efpecially of hisrational
** Creatures, who, of all others, havethe moil
" ample capacity of Happinefs?

And again : " f But,, doth not the Scripture
" tell us, that be doth all things for his own
" Glory, and that he obtains this end, as well"
" by punifhing, as by rewarding, his Creatures ?
*' very true; but then it is to be confiderkl,
" that the Glory he aims at, confiftsnot iin
" receiving any Good from u, but in doing
*' and communicating all Good to us. For
** infinite -Goodnefs can no otherwife be glori-
f fed, than by its own overflowings and free
" communications, and it can nootherwife be
44 glorified in the puniflimerrt of its Creatures;
" but only as it doth good by it : For,- fhould
* it punifh without good reafon, it would re-
14 proach and vilify itfelf ; but if it doth it

" for good reafon, it mull be becaufe it is -
" good either for itfelf, ox others: for itfelf it
" cannot be ; for how can an infinitely happy
" Being, reap any Good from another's Mife-
" ry ? And therefore it mull be for the Good
" of others, either to' reduce thofe who are pu-
" rrifn'd, or towarn others, by their: Example,
" from running away from their Duty and
" Happinefs. So that to do Good As the-endof
" God's Punifhment; and becaufe it is fo, he
" is gloriffd by it : and confidering that he is
" fo infinitely happy, that he can no ways ferve
" himfelf by our Miferies, io is impoffible he
"fhould have any other end in ^concerning
" himfelf about us, i but oniy the * Great; God-
" like one of doing us Good, and making us
" happy." Seealfo Difcomrfe *14 in the fame
Vol. p; 302; .

1 To the feme purpofe is Smith's Excellent
Difcourfe of the Exiftence and Nature of God,
Ch. 4 and 7; || : And- D'Oylfs faft'Difertation,
p. 122. mcr Rymer's General Rtprefentation of
Reveal 'd Religion, p. 2 60 267. and p. 511.
and Bp. Burners Expofition of the Articles, p. 27.
4th Edit, and our Author's Sermon on Divings
Predeftmation, Sec. . 33. For a fufficient An-
fwer to the Objection drawn from Prov,. 16. 4.
fee Ttllotfoii'si vol. of Sermons, Fol.-'p. 68 1.

(24.) Oar- Author rightly concludes from the
Nature and Will of God, as difcover'd above,
that .nothing can be made, by him (by whom -
are all things made) really unworthy of, or in-
confiflent with, thefe ; however unaccountable-
and irregular things may at prefent feem to us:

For 3 ;

t -Vol. 2; p. 2*04. Fol.

[I Su Seleft Difcourfts, p._. 13 6,. and 147.

Concerning the Origin of RvtL

NOTES.

For, having demonftrated the Divine Perfec-
tions in one Senfe a Priori, i.e. prior to the
Examination of particular Phenomena, no
feeming difficulties or objections whatfoever
a Pofurior'i, i. e. from thefe Phaenomena, ought
to invalidate the belief of them, but ihould be
all over-ruled by, and give way to, thefe ; ex-

cept they amount to an equal degree of Clea^
nefs and Certainty, with the proofs of thefe
themfelves; and alfo cannot poffibly admit of
any manner of Solution confident with them;
neither of which Cafes can ever be rmdc out,
as will, I hope, appear in the following
Chapters of this Book.

REMARKS, referr'd to in Note 18.

[Xa.] That this Propofition muft be al-
low'd for felf-evident , and as fuch, incapable
of proof, appears from the abfurdities which
all run into who attempt to prove their
own Exiftence from any other medium, viz.
from any of their operations. I think, fay they,
therefore lam, i.e. /, who am, think; there-
fore, /, who think, am. I being fuppofed to
exift, do think, therefore this thinking proves
that Exiftence. Is not this plainly arguing in a
circle, and proving a thing by prefuppofivg it ?
And is it not full as clear to me that I am, as
that / think ? Tho' perhaps I could not be
certain of my Exiftence except I perceived fome-
thing : yet fure the perception of my own Ex-
iftence muft be both as early and as evident as
any other perceptions. The firft Propofition
therefore is felf-evident, and if the fecond be
not fo too, 'tis however neceflarily connected
with one. I begin with our own Exiftence,
becaufe we have Intuitive Knowledge of no o-
ther. \

[ X b. j See the abfurdity of this Infinite
Series, as to Generations, Motion, Number,
Magnitude, lc. in the Notes 5, and X d
All, or any of which Arguments demonftrate
the Abfurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully
Mated by Dr. Green in his late Phikfopby *
Where you fee the true old Atheiftic Series in a
different drefs from that in Dr. Clarke's 2d Pro-
portion.

The fame way of reafoning is made ufe of
i n a Philofophhal Effay tewards an Eziclion of the
Being and Attributes of God, by S. W\. " That
<; the World was not eternal, but created, is
" demonftrable from things that are vifible :
" Our Argument Khali be from Generation.
" Whatfoever is begotten, was begotten of
" fome other ; for nothing can poffibly beget
" or make itfelf, otherwife it will follow,
" that the fame thing i?, and is not, both at
" one inftant, feeing it is both the producer,
" and the thing to be produced. It is to be
" produced, and fo it is not yet, it is lifce-
" wife a producer, and thnt fuppofeth thst it
" is in Being: It is therefore in Being, and
" it is not in Being, that's a manifeft contra-
* l diclion. Wherefore, nothing can generate,
**. make, or produce itfelf: wherefore, every
" thing that is begotten, is begotten of fome
" other, and then the other which begot it,
" either was itfelf in the fame manner begot-
" ten, or it was not ; if it was not, we are al-
y ready come to the firft Principle, which
" was, unbegotten, and fo have difcover'd a
" God-head. If it was begotten, either we
" muft follow up the Courfe of fucceffive Ge-
" neraticn to fome firft Production from a
" Caufe eternal, or elfe we muft neceffarily
" fay, that the Courfe of Generations had no
" beginning, and confequently, that infinite
" Succeffions are already paft, which is as
" much as to acknowledge, that an infinite

Number

* B.6. C.5. *.8. p. 763.

f 2d EJit. Oxford, 1655.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

' Number of Succeflions, are pall, and if paft,
*' then they are at an end; So we have found
*' an infinite Number, which hath had an
** end, that is another Contradiction. Again :
** if any lhall affirm, that the courfe of Gene-
" ration had no beginning, but that the num-
" ber of them hath been Infinite : let us put a
" Cafe, and reafon with him. We will ima-
" gine the Generations of Abraham, for ex-
*' ample, and Jofeph xht Son of Jfaac, the Son
** of Abraham. I demand therefore, whether
** before the birth of Abraham there had paft
" an infinite Series of Generations, or not ?
" If the Series was finite, the Work of Gene-
V ration had beginnings which is the Conclu-
" fion I contend for : if the Series paft was in-
" finite; then, at the birth of Jofeph, 'tis evi-
" dent, that more Generations were paft, fo
" wc have found a Number greater than that
u which was ftfppos'd to be Infinite : and con-
" fequently that was not Infinite; fo it was
" both Infinite and not Infinite, a manifeft
A( contradiclion.

** But if we fay that Abraham's was Infinite,
" and that fo was Jofepb's alfo, then it will
" follow, that the Number of Abraham's was
" equal with the number of Jofeph's, but A-
" braham's was but a part of Jofeph'' s, where-
*' fore the part is equal to the whole. Elfe ad-
" mit that Abraham's was finite, but when it
*' came to Jofeph, that then the number was
*. Infinite, it follows then, that a finite num-
" ber added to a finite, fhall make an Infinite,
'.' which likewife is againft the common light
" of reafon. We fee therefore, that fuppofing
" the Eternity of the World, or the Infinity
" of Generations, doth force the Mind to con-
" tradi&ions, and confequently the Fiction is
" vain and utterly irnpofnble. And, as we
"have argued in the way of Generation, fo
** we may likewife in every thing where there
" is a Motion, or Mutation, that is, in all the
" parts of the vifibJe World. The Creation
" therefore of the World, from the viable
" things thereof, is manifeft. Q^E. D." p. 19.
And again, p. 22. Well, having concluded
" the Creation and Beginning of the World,
" we fee it follows, that thence we conclude

" the Eternal Power and God-head ; that is,
44 the Eternity and Power of the God-head.
" As for Eternity, we have, by undeniable
" confequence, refolv'd all Motions in the
** World into the bofom of a firft Mover, and
" if we fuppofe him a firft Mover, the Suppo-
" fition will evidently conclude, that he is E-
" ternal, *'. e. that he is without Beginning of
" Eflence, or without any term or limit of
" Duration. For if it had any beginning of
" Eflence or Duration, that beginning of Be-
" ing prefuppofeth a priority of not-being,
* c (that is, aftual Being is not of the Eflence of
" it) and fo that we may, without anycontra-
" diclion, fuppofe it not to be yet in Being;
* that is, we may bring our Underftandings,
" without error, to the apprehenfion of it, as
M being yet in the State of Power only, or
** Potential-being, fo as things are in their
M Caufes. So then, let us conceit it in this
<l State, and compare this State with the other
" when it had Being ; and it is evident, that
" this paflage, or tranfition from want of Be-
41 ing to a Being, cannot be without a Mo-
** tion, nor Motion without an adlual Mover :
** but that which moves a thing from not be-
*' ing to a State of Being, is neceflarily a pre-
" cedent Mover to that which from it receives
" its Being : So then that which is fuppofed
* to be the firft original Mover will have a
** Mover, which fhall of necelfity have gone
M before it, and confequently it will be both a
'* firft and not a firft Mover, which is a plain
" Contradiclion. Inftead of multiplying Ar-
** guments without -neceflity, we will only re-
** turn by the Footfteps of our Analyfis, and fo
" from the Being of a firft Mover, conclude
H the Eternity. If it be a firft Mover, then it
'* hid no former Mover ; and if fo, then it ne-
** ver was produced from Nothing into Being;
M and if fo, then it never had any beginning of
" its Being, then it is Eternal. Therefore,
'* whatfoever is the firft Mover, it mull of
" neceflity likewife be eternal: but from the
" common affeftions of things vifible, wc did
** before demonftrate an Original and firft
** Mover: Wherefore, the vifible things of this

World,

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

'* World, they likewife do evict the Eternity
of the God-head *.

u And that God was a God of Power, it
u was demonftrated then, wlien we found him
** to be the firft Caufe, and Original Mover,
" and Creator of the World +."

[ X c. ] The generally receiv'd Notion of
Eternity, as confiding in a continual addibility
of JucceJJive Duration, is, I think, the very fame
thing as an infinite Series, and confequently fia-
ble to the fame objections: We muft therefore
try to rcfcue this Divine Attribute from fuch which is complete without it. Time then, or

an abfurd interpretation

Now, if we attentively examine our Idea of
Eternity, I believe we fhall find that it amounts
to thus much: viz. uniform, invariable Exi-
gence : or, fimple Exijlence join*d with Necef
Jity : by which laft Word we only underftand
an Impojfibility of having ever begun, or of ever
ceajing. This I apprehend to be all that can
confiftently be affirm 'd of the Divine Exiftence
in this refpect, and perhaps we may more eafi-
]y and fafely determine what the manner of it
is not, than what it is* v. g. that it continues
not by time,, or in place : Indeed local Extenfion
and fuccejfwe Duration, are modes of the Exi-
ftence of moft Beings, and therefore we find it
very difficult to confider any exiftence without
them : But as we have endeavour'd to fhew the
poffibility of removing the former from the
Divine Eflence, in Notes 5,. 11, & 13. So
here, I think, it may be ftiewn alfo, that the
latter has no neceflary connection with it, but
rather the contrary. i

In order to do this, it will be neceflary to
explain what we mean by Time, which (accor-
ding to Mr. Locke) is of the very fame kind
with Duration ; and may properly be term'd a
part of it. This is very well defin'd by Leib-
nitz, to be the Order of Succejjion of Created Be-
ings. We manifeftly get the Notion of it, by
reflecting on the Succeffion of Ideas in our
Minds, which we are apt to conceive as a \

without any fuch Succeifion of Ideas in our-
Minds, we could have no fuch notion as this
of Duration, but that of pure Exijlence only.
I Now Ex : Jlence being evidently a fimple Idea,
(tho' perhaps Duration be not)' is confequently
incapable of a Definition, and we need, I
think, only obferve of it here, that if we join
our Idea of Duration to it, we ftfll add nothing
to the Idea ofit as it is in itfelf, but merely a
relation to external things; which Idea of Du-
ration therefore feems purely accidental to it,
and no neceflary Ingredient of the former Idea,

Duration, is an Idea entirely refulting from our
Confideration of the Exiftence of Beings, with
reference to a real or imaginary SucceJJion^
Whence it will follow in the firjl place, that
we cannot poflibly frame any Idea of this kind
of Duration, without taking in Succeffion ; and.
fecondly, that we can't eafily feparate the Exi-
gence of any finite, changeable Beings from this
kind of Duration.

Our next Enquiry muft be, whether this
Idea of Duration be connected with the Exi-
ftence of thofe Beings entirely as they exijl, or
only as they exift in fuch a particular manner ;
Whether it belongs to all Exijlence, as Exi-
jlence, or only to a particular Sort of Exiftence*.
viz. that Exiftence which includes the fore-
mention'd relation to Succeffion. The latter,
I think, will appear more probable, when we
-reflect that it is only from the variablenefs and
contingency of our own Exiftence, that all our
Succeffions fpring : whereas, were we entirely
indt pendent, we muft be abfolutely immutable,
and invariably permanent; and alfo, that we
can contemplate even this Exiftence of ours
without any Succeffion, i. e. we have a power
of confining our thoughts and attending to this
Idea alone for fome fmall time (if that Word be
excufeable here) exclufive of all other Ideas,
and confequently exclufive of Succeffion. This
Mr. Locke allows, being what he calls an In-
fant, which, fays he, " is that which takes up

Chain drawn out in length, of which all the I;" the time only of one Idea in our Minds, without
particular Ideas are confider'd as the Links, I " the Succeflion-of any other, wherein there-
Whereas, hid we but one invariate perception, y " fore we perceive no Succeffion at all ||."

Succeffion

D.25,

t B- 3*

H Effay on Human Vnderjlandingy B. 2. Ch. 14.. $. 10.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

Succefiion therefore does not appear to be
receffarily join'd with the Idea of abfolute exi-
gence, fince we can confider one (for how fmall
a time foever) without, and independent of, the
other. Nay, laftly, there is a certain Exiftence
to which it cannot poffibly be in any fenfe ap-
ply'd, and that is a Perfecl one. Suppofe
this perfeel Eeing alone in nature, as we muft
believe him once to have been, and then what-
change of Nature, or Succefiion of Ideas can be
found ? What fiux of Moments, what altera-
tion or increafe can we imagine in his own uni-
form, invariable Eflence? What Idea have we
of Duration as apply'd to his Exiflence, ante-
cedent to his Willing and Creating External
things? Such Duration then as we are ac-
quainted with, can, I humbly apprehend, have
no manner of relation to this immutable Be-
ing, while fuppos'd to exift alone : But as foon
as he determin'd to exercife his feveral Attri-
butes in the production of fomething without
himfelf, then we have reafon to think, that
Time, Succefiion, and Increafe began. " Tho'
*' the Eternal Being had no neceflary Succef-
" fion in his own Nature, yet being perfedly
* l Selfaclive and free, thence it proceeded,
*' that the exercife of his freedom in decreeing
** and producing the Creatures, in fuch a
" manner and order as was judg'd fit by his
** moft perfeel Wifdom, became the Original
" of whatever real Succefiion has been in Na-
4( ture, and fuch Succefiion as we are apt to
" conceive to liave proceeded, is ho other than
" imaginary. " Impart. Enq. p. 208.

To the feveral Objections againft this No-
tion drawn from God's Eternal Wifdm, Ideas,
Decrees, &c. fee a fufficient Anfwer in the fame
place.

I fliall tranferibe this excellent Author's
reply to the moft common and confidcrable one
about tho Schoolman's punclum flans, which
we alfo efteem as indefenfiblc an Hypothefis as
the other.

" Some will poflibly objeft, that if there
H was once no real Succefiion in Nature, it
'* will follow, that the Divine Exiftence was
** then at leaft (as 'tis ufualJy faid to be) In-

u Jlantaneous. But to this it may be reply 'd,
" that Exiflence is nothing, if difttnguifti'd
" from the Being which exifts. Confequently,
" there can no real quantity belong to it as ib
" diftinguifh'd. Wherefore it cannot properly
" be denominated either finite or infinite, fete-

* cefiive or infiantaneous. For thefe are Attri-
" butes which have a Reference to Quantity,
'* and can no more agree to exiflence, which
** is but a Mode of Beings, than they can to
" Neceflity, or Contingence, which are Modes

* of Exiftence. To define Eternity or Ne-
*' cefiary Exiftence by Infinity or the Negation
** of Limits, feems to be no lefs impertinent,
** than to define Virtue by the Negation of
*' Red or Blew. For Exiftence (which has no
" Quantity or Dimenfions) hath no more Ana-
<{ logy to Extenfion and Limits, than Virtue
' (which hath no Colour) hath to Red or
* Blew. And, for the fame reafon, it is no
** lefs improper to define it to be infiantaneous,
" fince even an Inftant (as likewife an Atom)
14 is conceiv'd as quantity, tho' the minuteft i-
maginable. But if it cannot properly be
* denominated infiantaneous, much lefs can
** it be fuccefiive *."

See alfo Epifcop. Infi. Tbeol. L. 4. C. 9.
To which give me leave to add the Tefli-
mony of Cudworth, Trite bit ell. Sy/t. p. 644.) &e.
Where, having confuted the abfurd Notion of
the World's Eternity, he adds : " Here will
** the Atheift think prefently he has got a great
'* advantage to difprove the Exiflence of a God.
" Do not they who thus defiroy the Eternity of the
" World at the fame time alfo defiroy the Eter-
** nity cf the Creator ? For, if Time itfelf were
" not Eternal, then, how could the Deity or any.
" thing elfe be fo? The Atheift fecurely ta-
** king it for granted, that God himfelf could
u not be othcrwife Eternal than by a fuccefiive
" flux of infinite Time. But we fay, that this
" will on the contrary afford us a plain Dc~
" monfiration of the Exiftence of a Deity. For,
" fince the World and Time itfelf were not in*
" finite in their pafi Duration, but had a Begin-
" ning, therefore were they both certainly
** made together, by fome other Being, who

Impartial Enquiry, p. 2

,0.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

* is, in order of Nature, fenior to Time, and fo
" without Time before Time: He being above
" that fucceffive Flux, and comprehending in
* thcS?abi ; ity and immutablePerfeilisn of his own
*' Being, his Tefierday, and to Day, and/cr ever.
'* Or thus: Something was of neceflity infinite
** in Duration, and without a Beginning; But
* neither the World, nor Motisn, nor Time, i.e.
*' no Succejfsve Being was fuch ; therefore is
* there fomething clfe, who r e Being and Dura-
44 tion is not fuccejjive and jVxoing, but perma-
44 nent, to whom this Infinity belongeth. The
' Atheifls here cm only fmile, or make faces;
*' and fhew their little Wit in quibbling upon
11 nunc Jlam, or a (landing Now of Eternity ; as
44 if this ftanding Eternity of the Deity (which
44 with fo much reafon hath been contended
44 for by the antient genuine Theijls) were no-
44 thing but a pitiful fmall moment of Time ft an-
*' ding Jlill ; and as if the Duration of all Be-
44 ings whatfoever muft needs be like their
'* own: whereas the Duration of every thing
" muft of neceflity be agreeable to its nature:
44 and therefore, as that whofe imperfetT. nature
H is ever flowing like a River, and confifts in
** continual Motion, and changes one after ano-
" ther, muft needs have accordingly a fuccef-
' five and flowing Duration, Aiding perpetually
from prefent into pafi tl and always polling
44 on towards the future, expecting fomething
44 of itfelf which is not yet in Being:, but to
41 come ; fo muft that whofe perfeel Nature is
44 ejentially immutable, and always the fame,
44 and neceffarily exifient, have a permanent Du-
< ration ; never lofing any thing of itfelf once
44 prefent, as Aiding away from it ; nor yet
44 running forwards to meet fomething of it-
44 felf before, which is not yet in Being, and
44 it is as contradictious for it ever to have, be-
44 gun, as ever to ceafe to be."

After all, it muft be again confefs'd, that the
Idea of Succeffion (as S. C. obferves) fo infi-
nuates itfelf into our Idea of Exiftence, and is
/o clofely connected with the exiftence of all
finite Beings, that we find it extremely diffi-
cult to imagine the Eternal Exiftence of God,
any otherwife than as an Eteraal continued
Series or Succeffion.'

Our conftant conversation with material Ob-
'jets, makes it almoft impoflible for us to con-
fider things abftracted from time and placr,
which (as we obferv'd before) are Modes of
the exiftence of moil things, and therefore we
are apt rafhly to apply thefe confiderations to>
the great Author and Prefervcr of all things.
We feem to think, that as the moft exalted I-
dea we can form of God's Eternity and Omni-
Prefence muft be infinite Duratkn, and unboun-
ded Extenfion, fo thefe are to be flriclly and
pofitively attributed to him ; whence muft fol-
low all the abfurdities of paft, and future, Ex-
tenfion in this and that place, as compatible
with the Divine E {fence. Whereas abfolute po~
fitive Infinity (fuch as belongs to God *) does,
in its very notion exclude the confideration of
Parts', finceno addition of any parts whatfo-
ever can amount, or in the leafl degree ap-
proach to it. (Tho'fuch negative Infinity as
belongs to all Quantities, cannot poflibly be
confider'd otherwife f .) So that whofoever ac-
knowledges God's perfections to be ftriftly in-
finite, does, by that confeffion, deny that they
maybe confider'd as made up of parts : that
Immenfity can. be compofed of any finite Extew
fions, or Eternity confift of multiply'd Dura-
tions, and confequently, that there can be
Length or Space,. Diflante or Time, pafi or future,
with the Eternal God ||. When therefore we fay
that God always was, or ever will be, we don't
mean, by thefe and the like Words, that his
Exiftence has flriclly any relation to times paft.
or future, that it is at all increas'd, alter'd, or
afFefted thereby ; but only thus much is inten-
ded', viz. that whenever we fuppofe any other
Beings exifting, or time and Succeffion begun,
then it was, is, or will be proper for thefe
Beings to affirm in any part of this their Time
or Succeffion, that God alfo exifts. In the fame
manner as it may be affirm'd of fome Propofiti-
I ons, that they always were and will be true,
i that they are true in this or that, and every
place: tho' fuch affertions are exceedingly im-
proper, becaufe Propofitions, or neceflary
Truths, have no manner of Relation to either
time or place. All Expreffions therefore-

which

* Se Note 5, and X I t .

i Ibid.

|| See Ucke on H. II. B, 2.C. 15. V

12,

Concerning the Origin of Evil.
REMARKS.

which imply Succeffion, fuch as, was, will be, I
always, when, &o as well as thofe that imply
Locality, fuch as, Ubi, where, &c. *, can only
be apply'd to finite temporary things, which
exift in time and place : with which things
fo exifting, as well as every point of time
and place, the Deity
exiftent, or commenfurate ;

vellers fucceeding one another. Bat this, I
think, is fo evident in itfelf, that neither Ar*
gument nor Simile can make it more fo.

Hence then appears the impropriety of thofe

terms, Divine Preference, Predcflination, cjJV.

which have fo long puzled the World, to no

fuppos'd to be c*> ' manner of perpofe: and the only conclufion at

tho' his own Na- 1 IaTrmuft be, that all things which ever were.

ture and Eflence.be very different from thefe, I or will he, which, with refpect to fome former
and have properly no manner of relation to, or or latter times, and to peribns placed therein,
connection with them. If then we will attri- may be call'd pajl or future, are always equally
bute Duration to him, it muft be permcn'nt, un- \ and at once prefent to the view of God ; that to

fuccejfive Duration, /'. e. Duration of a quite dif-
ferent kind from what we meet with here. But
it is to be remember'd, that we don't pretend
to explain the Nature of Eternity, or to deter-
mine the manner of fuch Exiftence as excludes
all SuccrJJion ; fince it is fufficient for us here to
fhew the poflibility of conceiving the thing in-
general, the certainty of it having been de-
monftrated already, when we prov r d that fome-
thing muft be Eternal, having alfo fhewn, that
Eternity could not confift in fucceflive Dura-
tion.

If then the Divine Exiftence cannot include
focceffion of parts, or our kind of Duration,
(which perhaps by this time may not feem al-
together improbable) neither can his ejfential
Attributes. His Knowledge, v. g. can have no
relation to times pajl or future, to fore or. after;
nor can any object be faid to be at a Diftance
from it, or any imaginary diftance fet bounds to
it.

The chief reafon why we don't perceive and
know any thing that has a real Exiftence, is,
becaufe that Exiftence is remov'd from us by
the diftance of time or place : But this reafon
cannot hold with God, who is (tho' ' in a
manner far different from his Creatures) always
frefent to all times and places, and confequent-
ly muft behold all things exifting therein, as
well as we fee any object at due diftance direct-
ly before us. Thus he that is travelling on a
Road cannot fee thofe who come behind, or
are gone far before him ; but he who from
forac Eminence beholds the whole Road, from
end to end, views at once all the. diftant tra-

him, ftridtly and abfolutely, a thoufand Years
are as one Day, and one Day as a thoufand Tearsi
and that whatever difficulties feem to attend"
this conception of things being fucceflive to
us, and! not' fo to him, can be no Argument
againft the matter itfelf, which is demonftra-
ble ; but only one of the many Inftancesof the*
Weaknefs of Human Underftanding in things
pertaining unto God.

Againft the common Notion of Eternity, fee
the Speclator, N* 590. or Sir M* Hale's Prim
Orig. of Mankind, ^. 1. c. 6. p. 123. or a Phi-'
lofophical Effay, 6fV. by Setb Ward, p' 23. or
Grew's Cofmologia Sacra, B. 1 . c. 1 . par. 9.

Both this Attribute and Omniprefence are
alfo well treated of by J. Smith, in his Dif*
courfe concerning the Exiftence and Nature of
God, C. 2. ^4, 5. SelecJ Difceurfes, p. 125,
1 26, &c.

[Xd. ] " Here we find certain Chains of
" Caufes and Ejfefts, and many parts of this
** Syftem- owing their Exiftence, and the manner
'* of their Exiftence, to a preceeding Caufe,
" confequently we can't, with any poffibility
" of reafon, affert, that the whole Syftem ex-
' ift without a Caufe ; for this is the fame as
11 to affert, that the parts do not belong to
* the whole. Again, a material Syftem com-
M pos'd of parts that are changeable, cannot ex-
' ifts without a Caufe diftincl from, and prior
u to fuch a Syftem. For, wherever there is a
" Change, there muft be a Caufe of that Change,
" otherwife there would be a Beginning without
a Caufe* The Caufe of this Change cannot
.3. b*

'See. Xk

Concerning the Origin of Evil.
REMARKS.

u be in the materials of this Syflem for the ve-
" ry fame reafon : therefore it muft be in fome-
** thing diflintl from, and prior to, the Syflem
' itfelf. The fame will be the Cafe as to
'* Motion in a Material Syflem; there isnoMo-
* tion but what is the effect of a former Mo-
** tion, confequently there is no Motion in
H fuch a Syflem which has been from Eternity,
" or which has not been Caufed, &c. *

* From the Imperfeclion alfo, or Unbappinefs,
u which we fee in this Syflem, in Man parti-
cularly ; from the frame and con/1 itut ion of
4t it, 'tis evident that it did not exifl without
" a Caufe.

" The Queflion then will be, What is the
** Caufe of its Exiflence ? Now that cannot
** be in itfelf for then a thing would be be-
** fore it was, which is a contradiction. It
** follows then, that fome other Being is the
*' Caufe of its Exiflence ; and the next Quc-
" ftion will be, who is this Being? Now as
<* whatever began to exifl, mufl owe its Exi-
*' flence to fome preceeding Caufe ; fo that Caufe
u if it has not cxilled eternally, mull likewife
'* owe its Exiflence to fome other preceeding
** Caufe, and that to another, and fo on till we
" afcend to (the firft Cau'e, or to) a Being that
" is Eternal, and exifls abfolutely without Caufe.
" And- that there is fuch a Being is evident,
" otherwife, as nothing could begin to exifl
" without a Caufe, fo nothing that is not E-
temal could ever have exiiled f .

[X e.] That the Idea of Self Exigence can
imply nothing more than a Negation of Depen-
dence on any External Caufe; and that there
can be neither external nor internal Caufe of
the Exiflence of an Eternal Being, neither
antecedent nor concomitant Neceifity, nor any
pofitive permanent Grsund or Reafon whatfoever,
See Note 1 4.

To what has been faid already on the head
of NeceJ//ty, I fhall add a Paflage from the Philo-
fophical Effay, &t. from which we may perceive

what was formerly und^rftood by that Attri-
bute, and how it was us'd to be prov*d. " I
" fay then that the Godhead is a Necejfan Be-
ing, that is, that it is impoffible it fhould
" fail, and implies a Contradiction, that it
fhould not be. That is it which Divines
mean, when they fay it is Eternal a parte
pojl, as well as a parte ante: for if it be not
" a Neceffary Being, that is, if Neceffity of
" Being be not included in the EfTence of the
God-head, then it is not impoflible that it
fhould lofe its Being, i. e. it is in the power
" of fomething to caufe it to lofe its Being :
But nothing can pafs from Being to not Be-
u ing, without Change, or Motion; fo then,
" the Motion of it is in the power of fome o-
ther, and confequently, this is not the Ori-
ginal of Motion, but that other; but we
fuppos'd that to be the Original of Motion,
confequently, it is not poffible it fhould be
" depriv'd of its Being, that is, it is a necef-
fary Being in refpedt of others: and as im-
" poffible it is that it mould lofe its Being of
" itfelf. Indeed it is a manifefl Contradiction,
H that any thing fhould have a power over its
** own EfTence, and needs no farther convic-
" tion, or oppofition, feeing the active power
" of any thing is founded in the EfTence of it,
and confequently cannot exceed the EfTence,
or bring it not to be ||."

[X f. ] For a Being to be limited, or defi-
cient in any refpedt, is to be dependent on fome
other Being in that refpedt, which gave it juft
fo much and no more * m ; confequently, that
Being which in no refpedt depends upon any.
other, is not limited or deficient at all. For
tho' Figure, Divifibility, &c. and all manner
of Limitation, is in one Senfe (viz. in Beings
efentially Imperfect) as Dr. Clarke obferves -f\}-,
properly a mere Negation or Defeel; yet in ano-
ther, viz. in a Being eflentially and abfolutely
perfeel, Finitenefs muft be conceivd as a pofi-
tive Effccl of fome Caufe, reftraining it to a

certain

* See S. C's Impartial Ejjqu.'ry, p. 31,32, cift-.

f Enquiry, p. 1 1, 1 2, 1 8, &c. See alfo Dr. Bentley'-f BoyleV Ledt. Serm. 6. p. 127, &c. yh
Edit, and the other Authors refer'd to in Note 5.
]j Philofoph. Efijay, p. 26, &e. % See Scott, in Note 32. f-j. Demonft. p. 56,57, $tb Edit.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

certain Degree. InallBeings capable of Quantity,
Increafe,cifr. and confequently uncapable of Per-
fection or abfolute Infinity, Limitation or Defecl, is
there a neceffary confequence of Exiftence, and
clofely connecled with it, and is only a Negation
of that Perfection which is entirely incompatible
with their Effence; and therefore in thefe it
requires no farther Caufe. But in a Being na-
turally capable of Perfection or ftrict Infinity, all
Impcrfeilion or Finitenefi, as it does not neceffi-
ri/y flow from the Nature of it, muft have fome
ground or reafon, which reafon muft therefore
be foreign to it, and confequently is an effect
of fome other external Caufe, and confequently
cannot have place in the Firft Caufe. Tint
this Being is capable of Perfection, or abfolute
Infinity, appears, I think, from hence, that he
is manifeftly the Subject: of one Infinite or per-
fect Attribute, viz. Eternity, or abfolute Exi-
ftence. His Exiftence has been fhcwn to be
perfect in this one refpect, and therefore itmay
be perfect in every other alio. Now that which
is the Subject of one Infinite Attribute or Per-
fection, and may have others fo too, mujl
have all of them Infinitely or in Perfection :
Since, to have any Perfections in a finite li-
mited manner, when the Subject and thefe
Attribures afe both capable of ftrict Infinity,
would be the foremention'd abfurdity of pofi-
tive Limitation without a Caufe. This method
of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in
the Deity infinite modo, when we have once
lhcwn that it belongs to him at all : at leaft,
will (hew that it is unreafonable for us to fup-
pofe it limited, when we can find no manner
of Ground for any Limitation, which is per-
haps as far as we can go.

[Xg.] That the Word God is- relative, fee
Jfewton Princ Scbol. Gen. fub. fin. p. 525, &c.
3d Edit, or Maxwell's Appendix to Cumber-
land, p. 106.

To fhew that there is only one Eternal Self-
Exiftent Being, which bears the Relation of
God to us, fcems to be going as far as either is

neceflary, or natural Light will lead vs. As
Dr. Clarke's Demonftration of this and feveral
other Attributes is entirely founded on his Idea
of Necejfity of Exiftence, of Space, &c. *, they
muft ftand or fall together. They who endea-
vour to deduce it from Independence or 0!/-
#<* evidently prefuppofe it in their definition
of thefe Attributes.

[X h.] We cannot include any fuch Notion
in Omnipre fence, as makes the Deity prefent in
his fimple Effence to (or co-extended with) every
point of the bound fefs Immenfityf; Since this Idea
of Extenfion or Expanfion, feems plainly in-
confiftent with that fimple Effence ||. Not that
we fuppofe thefe Attributes of Knowledge and
Power acting feparate from his Effence, but
we fuppofe his Effence to have no more rela-
tion to the Idea of Space, Place, where, &c. than
either of thefe Attributes has *^.

Dr. Clarke's Query, " How it can be fhewn
" upon any other Principle than that of Ne~
" ceffary exiftence, that his governing Wifdom
" and Power muft be prefent in thofe boundlefs
" Spaces where we know of no Phenomena or
* Effetls to prove its exiftencef-J-?" is well
anfwer'd by Epifcopius: I mall give it in his
own Words. " Hot (nempe Deum effe extra
" mundum) non modo prorfus eft aKAl<tK7r\ov fed
" etiam valde abfurdum, quia tot urn at que omne
" illud fpatium quod extra hunc mundum effe di-
" citur, nihil omnino re ale eft, fed pure pute /-
" maginarium, cif prorfus nihilum; ut nut em
" Deus effe dicatur in pure pute imaginario, cif
" prorfus nihilo, per fe abfurdum eft ; quia effe in
" dicit realem habitudinetn aut denominationem ab
" eo in quo quid exiftit : Realis autem habitudo
" & denominatio a nihilo, five ab eo quod nihil re-
'* ale eft, ace i pi nullo modo pot eft. Die ere Deum
" ibi habere intrinfecam cif abfolutam prefentiam
" qua in feipfo realiter Exiftit,- eft fingcre prar-
" fentiam fine Relatione aut denomination ad id,
" cut quod prafens effe dicit ur, -quod implicat con"
" tradiclionem. Intrinfica enim five abfoluta prat-
" fentia, qua quid in feipfo realiter exiftit, non eft
" pr a fentia in nihilo; fed mera effentia five exi~

ticu

*See Notes 5 & 14. f Dr+ ClarkeV Demcnft, p.47.
II Anfwer to -tb Letter, p.49/;.

(( See Note 1 1 : * n See Note 1 3 i.

Concerning the Origin of EviU

R E M Alt K &

f* flentia extra nihilum. Nihil enim fibi ipft pra-
fens rffe poteft ||."

Now to urge upon us the old Maxim, that
nothing can aft where it is not, is ftill fuppofing
a Spirit exifting fomewhere, or in fome USi, or
to-extended, or co-expanded, with fome part of
Cpace, and ailing in fome other part of fuch i-
maginary Space (which Suppofitions we have
long ago difcarded) 'Tis confining its exi-
stence to one particular Modus ; and, as we
conceive, to a wrong one : concerning the Mo-
dality of whofe exiftence we can only think and
argue negatively : viz. that it is not by way of
Extenfton in any fenfe.

To the trite Objection, that what has no
magnitude, or is no where, is therefore Nothing,
fee a fufficient Anfwer in Cudworth, p 770, to
778, &c. How this agrees with Phild's Para-
dox, that God is every where and yet no where,
{ceiiid. p. 773. But the ftrongeft confirmation
of this Opinion, which Dr. Moore ftiles Nulli-
bifm, may be drawn from the learned Dr's Ar-
guments againft it in his Enehir.Metapb. C. 27.

[ X i. ] By the above mentioned pleafure or
natural Good, I mean that pleafure which every
one feels in himfelf. By the produclion of it
here, I underfland both the producing fuch in
himfelf, and alfo in others: to both which he
is equally determin'd by his Nature, tho' from,
quite different Principles. To the former he
n directed by Self- Love : To the latter by a
certain difinterefted Benevolent InftincT: or Af-
fection, and that which determines him to ap
prove the Affection and the Attions flowing
from it is called his Moral Senfe. The former
of thefe Inftincts, as it implies increafe of
Happinefs, is only applicable to finite, imper-
fect Creatures: the latter feems to be common
to us and the Deity. Who could have been
determin'd to create us only by fuch a difinte
refted Benevolent Affedlion, as this is fuppofed
to be. This is always approv'd b; the Moral
Senfe; tho' it may be doubted whether that be
confined entirely to it.

The Object of both thefe Inftinfts is natural
Good', and, I think, moral Good may be al-

ti InfiV Theol. L.4. c. 13. p. 294.

* See Mr. Jackfon'; Defence of Human Liberty, p.

low'd to confift in the profecution of either, or
both of them together, fo long as the former is
in due fubordinatiop to the latter. As for my
part, I cannot extend the Notion of Virtue fo
far, as totally to exclude all manner of regard
to Self, or private Good, confider'd as fuch,
and therein to overlook the tendency of all
fuch private Affections as the All-wife Author
of our Being has thought fit to implant in us,
as neceffary helps and inducements to Self-
Prefervation. I fee no reafon why a particu-
lar endeavour in any Man to perfect his Facul-
ties both of Body and Mind, to improve and
advance his own Happinefs in the whole,
(which is in fome refpect anfwering the End
of his Creation and co-operating with the Will
of his Maker) may not deferve the Name of
Virtue; at leaft of Duty ; the difcharge of which
will make a Perfon the proper Subject of Re-
ward, even abftractedly from Benevolent or
Publick Affeftions*. Tho' thefe indeed are
intitled to it in a much higher and fublimer
degree, becaufe they are productive of more
universal Good. Nay, the kind Author of
Nature has infeparably annex'd fuch a pleafing
Senfation, or agreeable Confcioufnefs, to the
Performance, or even Remembrance of thefe
Benevolent Actions, as is fcarce diftinguifhable
from the JnftincT: or Affection itfelf, which im-
pels us towards them: and therefore to have
:bme attention to this Self -complacency, this in-
ward Satisfaction, and Delight, which accom-
panies our nobleft Actions ; to be in fome de-
gree directed by it in the performance of them,
docs not appear to detract from their Worth,
and moral Excellency. For a full proof, as
well as a beautiful Explication of this moral
Senfe, fee Mr. Hucbefoffs Enquiry into the Origin
f our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good, together
with his I 11 ujf rat ions.

Th. t all the-Notion we can poffibly frame of
I'cral Good or Evil, of Virtue or Vice, &c. con-
fifis entirely in promoting or procuring this na-
tural Good or Evil, fee fufficiently confirmed
b/ Sherlock-^. " Whereas, fays he, we diftin-
" guifh between Moral and Natural Good and
" Evil; the only difference between them is

" this,

7. f On Judgment, p. 20 to 25.

Concerning the Origin of EviL

RE M AR K S.

* this, that Moral Good ind Evil is \n the Will
* f and Choice, Natural Good and Evil, is in the
'-' Nature of things \ that which is good or hurt -
" ful to ourfelves or others, is naturally Good
** or Evil ; to love, to chufe, to </$ that which is
* <wi or hurtful to ourfe\v;s or *A&m, is morally
** Good or Evil; oris the Good or Evil of our
** Choice or Aclions. If you will but recoiled your
f telves, you will find that you have no other
* notion of Good or Evil but this: when you
** fayfucha Man has done a very Good or very
*' Evil AfXion, what do you mean by it? Do
* you not mean, that he has done fomething
u ver y good or very hurtful -to himfelf or i-
*- thers? When you hear that any Man lias
" done Good or Evil, is not the next QuelUon,
** what good or what hurt has he done ? and
u do you not mean by this, Natural Good or
u Evil? which is a plain Evidence, that you
* judge of the Moral Good or Evil of Actions,
" by the Natural Good orEvil, whichthey do."
See more on this Subject, deliver'd in the fame
place, with an Elegance and Perfpicuity pecu.
liar to that Author.

To the fame purpofe is Turner's excellent
Difcourfe of the Laws of Nature, and the reafon
of their Obligation.

This feems to be the ultimate Criterion of
that Fitnefs, Congruity, Reafonabknefs and Rela-
tion of Things, fo often repeated by fome late
Writers, without or beyond which I can fix no
meaning at all to thefe Words. And this Cri-
terion mould, I think, have been more diftincV
ly fpecify'd. For when you fay any thing is
// ; muft we carry our enquirys no farther I
is it not a very proper Queftion, to ask, for
what is it fit? Fit, Congruous, &c (as well as
the Word Neceffary) are mere relative terms
(as we obferv'd in Note 9 ) and evidently refer
to fome End, and what can the end be here but
Happineft? Thefe Relations, &c. may perhaps
in fome tolerable fenfe be call'd Eternal and
Immutable, becaufe, whenever you fuppofe a
Man in fuch certain Circumftances* fuch Con-

fequences and Obligations, did, or will, al
ways certainly follow *.

What is good for me now rn thefe Circum-
ftances and dRefpects, will always be fo in the
fame Circumftances and Refpecls, and can ne-
ver be alter'd without altering the Nature of
things, or the prefent Syftem : but we cannot
imagine thele Relations therefore to be any rer.l
Entities, or to have exifted from all Eternity,
or to be antecedent to, or independent of the
Will of God himfelf; as fome Writers feenvto
have done, if they had any determinate mean-
ing at all f. We cannot, I fay, imagine them
to be either ftridiiy eternal or independent of the
Will of God, becaufe they muft neceffarily
prefuppofe a determination of that Will, and
are in truth only confequences of the exiftence
of things, which things proceed entirely from
that determination ||. Much lefs can we ap-
prehend how thefe Relations, &c. " Are to be
" chofen for their own Sokes and intrinfic Worth ;
" or have a full obligatory power antecedent to a-
" ny reward or punifhment annexed either by na-
" tural Confequence or poftive Appointment to the
" Obfervance or Negletl of them m *." Since the
Natural Good or Happinefs, confequent upon,
and connected with, the obfervance of them,
or the immediate rational pleafure which they
produce, is to us the grand Criterion of them ;
the Argument and Indication of their Worth, the
Ground of all their Obligation.

This Notion is pretty well handled by Tur-
ner. u The Laws of Nature [or, which is the
" fame, Natural Right and Wrong] are fuch
" Laws and Rules of Life, as to the breach of
" which there is a natural Punilhmenc annexed.
" For to fay a thing is efientially good ok evil,
" to call it by hard Names, and to affirm th.it
" it hath a Natural Turpitude ; or, to pals a
" Compliment upon it, and call it a Moral
" Rectitude, and fuch like fine Scholaftic
" Terms without affigning a particular Rea-
" fon of Intereft, why we mould do the one
" or avoid the other, is as much as to fay, a

thing

* Ste I^ckeV EJ}ay, B. 4. C. II. fr. 14. or Turner m the Laws of Nature, and their Oblii*tnn t

20. or N. 76.

f See Hutchefon'j lllufirat, $. 2. p. 250,251.

|i See our Author, C. 1. $.3. par. 9. and C. 5. $.1. par. 23, &c. and Notes 75, 76.

* # Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion, prop. 1-4-7- P- 2 * 8.

Concerning the Origin of Evil*

REMARKS.

" thing is good--for nothing ; or, it is bad,
" but we know not why 5 or, it is pood or
" bad, for a Woman's Reafon, becauie it is:
*' and this Reafon will ferve as well to prove,
u that Murder or Adultery are good things, as
" that they are bad ones 44*.

44 The Laws of Nature, therefore, have o-
** very one of them their Sanction in them-
'-' felves*, i.e. fome things naturally tend to
44 our Happinefs, and others to our Mifery,
and for that Reafon they become natural Laws
to us, or are Rales to dirett our Actions by;
and we arc cb/ig'd to do the one and avoid the
other, M Upon a Principle of Self-happinefs,
44 and Self prefervation, which is the very root
44 and fpring of all Obligation whatfoever f,

44 From whence we may difcern the Vanity
*' and Folly of thofe learned Men, who are u-
" fed to talk fo loudly of ejfential Reclitudes,
*' and eternal Ntions, and I know not what
44 phantaftical /</?/,. in an abftradted way; where
" as there is indeed nothing which is either
44 good or bad merely by itfelf, but every thing
44 which is good, is* good, that is, ufeful to
fomething; and every thing which is bad,
* is fo with reference to fome Nature or other,
44 to which it is more or lefs pernicious and
** deftruc~live: from whence it follows (the
4 nature of Obligation being a refult arifing
44 from the ufeful nefs or hurtfulnefs of a thing
propofed to be the object of a free Agent's
44 choice, with refpect to that Agent which is
'* converfant about it) that all Obligation muft
* 4 be not of a fimple, but of a compound, or
*' concrete nature, and. muft always have an in-
* l feparable refpect to the Intereft or Happinefs
u c/ thofe to whom that Obligation is bind-
** ing. And it is not only true, that our Inte-
* reft and our Duty are both-of them the fame,
44 but that it is abfolutely impoffible any thing
*' fhouid be our Duty, which is not our Inte-
*' reft into the Bargain; for no Man can pof-
libly be obliged to that which, all things con-
** fidered, will be to hisDifadvantage ||."

Farther, moft Authors who treat of the Pro-
duction of this Natural good or evil in fuch a
manner as to conftkute Right or Wrong, mo-

4-t Laws of Nat. &c. . 1. * Ibid. $.2. +
foundation if Morality, Sec. ||| Serm. 2d and 3d.
V$ 5- Note 4. and $. 8,. Note. i f .

ral good or evil, fcfr. appear either to equivo-
cate in a double meaning of the Words : viz.
as they imply producing Happinefs either in
ourfelves alone, or in others, (which are two
very different things, and fhouid accordingly
be always diftinguifh'd) or elfe to be deficient
in pointing out a Rule, and proving znObliga-
tion to it in the latter Senfe, viz. with regard
to others. This great defect in their Syltems,
feems to arife from not fufficiently attending to
the above mention'd Moral Senfe or Confcience,
(as the meaning of that Word is well fix'd by
Mr. Butler\\\\) which is of itfelf both Rule and
Obligation. As an Injlincl, it directs us to ap-
prove fuch Actions as tend to produce Happi-
nefs in others, and fo is a Rule whereby we de-
termine all fuch Actions to be virtuous ; as it
gives us pain, or makes us uneafy at the neglect
of thefe Actions, or at the Pr < ice of the con-
trary ones; it obliges us *o purfue them, or
makes the practice of them absolutely neceffary
to our Happinefs: whkh is the true meaning
of the Word Oblige, as w.sfhewn in the ftn
liminary DiJJ&rtation ; nd is proved more at
large by Cumberland # *.

that therefore, and that only, mufi be faid
to oblige us, which is neeeJJ'ary to our Hfippineh
Now, as the Sum of our Happinefs depends
upo~ the whole of our Exiftence, that only can
be a complete 2nd indifpenfible Obligation,
which is equal and commenfurate to the Sum
total of our Happinefs. Or, that Being only
can, abfolutely and effectually, oblige us, who
has it in his Power to make our whole Exi-
ftence happy or miferable; and of confeqnence,.
the DJty, who alone has that Power, muft
neceffarily be taken into all Schemes of Mora-
lity, in order to fuper-induce a full, adequate
Obligation, or fuch an one as will hold at all
times, and extend to every action ; and an en-
deavour to exclude the Confederation of his
Will, or to deduce all Obligation from any
Principles independent of it, has, I think, oc-
cafion'd another great defect in moft of our
modern Syftems.

That this Moral Good is a PerfeSlion in any
Being, i. e. agreeable to, or perfective of, its

Nature,

Ibid. $.6. || Bid. V- 1* Seedfo Mr. Clarke**/
C>5- V*M***0&Eafiendorf, B - c - 6 -

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

Nature, appeaTs by the very Terms : alfo, that
this Moral Senfe is the greateft Perfection of
Human Nature, and that there is fomething ana-
logous to it, in the Divine Nature, may be
feen in the above mention'd Enquiry, and
Illuf rations of the Moral Senfe, p. 239, &c.
See alfo Scott's Chriflian Life, Vol/ 2. p. 33,

37 > &

N. B. What has been here faid about In-
jjincl, Sffeclion, Moral Senfe, Sec. may feem to
imply, that thefe are all innate; contrary to
what was proved in the Preliminary DifJ'erta-
tion: and indeed this was drawn up at fir/1 up-
on the fuppoled Validity of that Notion, which
many may, perhaps, efteem valid itill, and
therefore I let the Argument ftand in the old
Terms ; efpecially as it is not at all afte&ed
by the Truth or Falfity of that Notion; fince
it will really come to the fame thing, with re-
gard to the Moral Attributes of God, and the
Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the Deity
has implanted thefe Paffions, Inftincts, and Af-
fections in us, or has framed and difpofed us
in fuch a manner; has given us fuch Powers,
and placed us in fuch Circumftances, that we
fhall neccflari ly acquire them; they'll be alike-
natural in either Senfe, juft as all moral Ax-
ioms, &e. are equally certain upon Locke's
Hypothecs, as upon the old footing of innate
principles.

And tho' I take implanted Senfcs, lnflinfis,
Appetites, Paffions, Affeclions, &c. to be a rem-
nant of the Old Philofophy, which ufed to call
every thing Innate that it could not account
for ; and therefore, I heartily wifh that they
were all eradicated, (which was undoubtedly
the aim of that great Author lart mention'd ; as
it was a natural Confequence of his firlt Book,
tho' he might not then think proper to fpeak
out ; ) vet, as common ufe has fix'd this No-
tion of Innatenefs to them, I am obliged to
follow my Author, and treat of them in the
common Language. Only let it be obferved
here once for all, that every Argument which
is built upon thefe Pillions, Senfes, iffc. will be

or acquired. As to the prefent point in parti-
cular, Mr. Hucbefon has fully proved, that we
are led infenfibly, and by the conflitution and
circumftances of our very Being, to love and
approve certain Actions, which we call Vir-
tuous : which is enough for my purpofe. as
was hinted above. Againft the Notion of im-
planted Inflinfts,- fee Felt buy fon a r e Principiis jujii
& decor i, p. 73, &c. Amflel. 1651.

[XL] That God mnft have the fame
Judgment and Approbation of this Moral
Good, which all Rational Beings naturally
have * ; and that we mud judge of the Nature
and Perfections of the Deity, only by that
Nature and thofe Perfections which we derive
from him, is, I think, very plain : I mean,
that we mull not endeavour to conceive the
feveral Attributes of God by fubflituting fome-
thing in him of a quite different hind, and total-
ly diver fe from that which we find in ourfelves,
(as the learned Author of the Procedure of Hu-
man tJnderftanding, feem s to declare, p. 138,
and elfewhere) tho' that be in fome refpects fi-
milar and analogous to this: But we are to
fuppofe fomewhat of the very fame kind and
fort, the fame Qualities or Properties in gene-
ral to be both in him and us, and then remove
all manner of defeel or imperfecJion which at-
tends the particular Modus only of their Exi-
ftence, as they are in us. Thus we afcribe to
God all kinds and degrees of apparent Perfec-
tion obfervable in his Creatures, except fuch as
argue at the fame time Imperfection (v. g. Mo-
tion, which neceffarily implys Limitation) or
are inconfifient with fome other and greater
Perfection (v. g. thcExcrcife of punitive Juftice
in fuch a degree as would exclude Mercy; or,
Materiality, which excludes Knowledge and
Liberty -j\) We alfo remove from him all
want, dependence, alteration, uneafir.cfi, &c. In
fhort, all that refults either from fimple fi-
nitenefs, or from the mere Union of two finite
imperfect Subltances, fuch as conltifute Man.
And when we have thus apply'd every thing

equally conclufive, whether they be implanted in every manner of exiftence which feems to

K 2 imply

* See ScottV Chrijlian Life, Part 2. C. i. p. 21, 22. ift Edit.
f See A. Bp. Tillotfon, Scrm.jS. 2d Vol. Fol. p. 569, cj'r. Dr.] Clarke on Miral E>v.\

P- 95. fife, and Scott'; Cbrifl. Life, Part 2. C. 6. $. 2. p. 447, ciJV. ill Edit.

Concerning the Origin of EviL

REMARKS.

imply Perfection, snd excluded every, thing in
every manner of Exiftence which implies or
includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of
an abfolutely perfect Being,, which we call
God. 'Tis therefore attributing to God fome
real Qualities of a certain determinate kind,.
(v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodnefs or
Truth) the nature of which Qualities we do
perceive, are directly confcious of, and know,
which gives us an Idea or Conception of him,
and a proper one too, (if any fuch diftinction
of Ideas are allow'd) and not imagining fome
others, we cannot tell of what fort, totally
different in nature and kind from any that we
ever did perceive or know ; which would give
us no Idea or Conception at all of him, either
proper or improper.

In like manner we frame a partial concep-
tion of a Spirit in general (which we confef-
fedly have) not by fubftituting fome properties
different in < kind from thofe which we perceive
in out own Spirit; but by fuppofing the very
fame properties, /'. e. in kind, (viz. Cogitation,
and a power of producing Motion) to be. alio
inherent in fome other immaterial Beings
which we therefore call by the fame Names.
Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real know-
ledge, and may be apply'a and argu'd on intel-
ligibly : but the other would, I fear, take a-
Way all poflibility of arguing from the feveral
Attributes or Properties of the Deity, to thofe
ofourfelves, and vice verfa, all our reafonings
upon them (as the learned Author expreffes it,
p> 1 34 ) would be precarious, and without any.
fclid. foundation in the Nature of things. Such
analogical Knowledge thenas that, is (accor-
ding to my Notions of Knowledge) ftrictlyand
pft>perly none at all j and if the Author nfes
analogy in that Scnfe, 'twill, I believe, be
ttjll taken only for a fort or degree of Metaphor,
after all he has faid in the laft Chapter of hit
n>lt Book, to diitinguijh them.

I would here be underftood to affirm thus
much of the {\nvp\e Nature only, or Kind, or our
abftratl Idea of thefe Qualities themfehes, and
not of the manner of their Exiftence: which
two (tho' this Author is pleas'd to ufe them
Pfomifcuoufly in p. 84, cirV.) feem yet very di-
&ttt Confide rations km we .apprehend Icye-

ral Properties,, or Quali<*>, as exifting in osr
own Nature, independent of any particular
manner; nay, in very different manners : v. g.
Knowledge, either by Senfation or Reflection,
by Deduction or immediate Intuition: Love
attended with a certain degree of Pleafure or
Pain, &c. and therefore we fuppofe that thefe.
Qualities may exift in the Divine Nature, in a
manner entirely different from what they do in
us, and yet be the very fame Qualities itill ;
which Modus of the Divine Being, or of any
of his Attributes, is totally unknown to us,
and we can only guefs at it by fome dir
ftant refemblance or Analogy ; which Analogy
I would therefore apply to this Modus of Exi-
ftence, and to this only ;.- which feems fufflcient
for all the great Purpofes of Religion, and in
which Senfe the Notion may perhaps be jujl
and ufeful, but cannot, I think, be extended to
our Idea of the whole Nature and Genus of the
Attribute itfelf. For, if the Divine Attributes
be, toto genere, diftinct and different from thofe.
Qualities which we elteem perfections in ourr
felves or others, if (as the fame Author urges,,
pi 82.) the greateft perfections of thofe Crea-
tures which fall under our Obfervation, (and
thefe he will grant to be all that we have any
Idea of ) are really " but fo many Imferfeelicns,.
.-' when referred or attributed to the Divine Na-
" tttre, as it is in itfelf, in any meaning wbatfir
'* eviTi even with the mofi exalted meaning we
" can poffibly annex to them,' 1 '' (the Author un-
derstanding, I fuppofe, as ufual, the whole Na-
ture and diflinguijhing kind of thofe Qualities in
themfelves.) Then, how fliall we difcover
which kind of Qualities God prefers before the
contrary? How can we be certain that thefe
in particular are agreeable to him ? 01 how fhall
we hope and endeavour to make ourfelves like
him ? Can we know the nature of one thing by
another, entirely different from it? or can we i-
mitate what we don't at all apprehend. '* It
" is foolifh ffays A: Bp. Tillotfon) for any Man
" to pretend that he cannot know what Jufice, .
" and Goodnefs, and Truth in.God are ; for, if we
" do not know this, ''tis all one to us whether God
'** be good ir not ; nor could we imitate his Good-
" nefs : for,, be that imitate: y endeavourj to b;Jike>
fomething that he knows, and mufl of necefjity

** have

Concerning the Origin of Evil;

REMARKS.

** baz'e fome- Idea-cf that- ts zi'hich be aims to be
** /tie ; fo that if we bad no certain and fettled
*' Notion of the Jujlice and Goodnefs and Truth of
"God, be would be altogether an unintelligible
** Being: and Religion, which cwjifts in the Imi-
" tation of him, would be utterly impojftble V '
Which deftroys the Notion of Analogy (as was
obferv'd long ago by the Free-thinker, p. 50,
C3V.) as it J6 beautifully deliver'd by our Au-
thor in his Sermon on Divine Predeflination
cjfr.ifhe did not intend by thatWord'fomething
in God re.\Dy parallel and equivalent to what we
find in fome of his Works, and fo very like it,
that nothing can be liker, except that which
exifts ia the very, fame manner too, /'. ;. in a
perfect one If this could' be has meaning,
(which may not appear improbable from his
Anfwer to the like Objection, * 22. where he
declares, that thefe Attributes have much more
Reality ard Perfeelion in them, than the things
by which we reprefent them, &c.) then is he
perfectly confident with- the other great Au-
thor cited above. I wifh the molt learned Au-
thor of the Procedure, &c were fhewn to be fo
too, who is fuppofed to havepurfued this No-
tion of Analogy farther than.at'moft any will'be.
able or willing to follow him.

But this is no place for a full Examination
either of that Notion, or this learned Author's
Application of it. I fhall only add an Obfer-
vation, which perhap? raw ferve in fome mea-
fure to fhew direftly (as he is pleas'd to re-
quire, lntrodutl. p. 17.) that the Foundation up-
on which' he has placed his Analogy is falfe and
groundlefs: which Foundation is, as I appre-
hend, the Nature of the Being, inflead of the
Modus of its Exiflence. To carry the face of
an Argument, let it fland thus. The Nature
of the foremen tiorr'd Qualities is either wholly
the fame in God and us, or wholly different :
if the former be maintain'd, then this analogi-
cal Senfe is turn'd into an Identical one ; if the
latter, then can n manner of Refemblance or
Analogy be drawn between them ; fince.one na-
ture (as has been obferv'd) cannot in the leafl
help to -reprefent or explain another quite diffe-
rent from it, I mean, in thofe \cry points

wherein they differ ; for that is to be different
and not different, alike and unlike in the very
fame refpeft, at the fame time : And then this
analogical Senfe is turn'd into a difperate or
quite oppofite one, i. e. into no analogy at all:
Or, laitly, they mull be p/trtly the fame, and
partly different, or alike and unlike in different
refpeels, (which is the thing we contend for)
viz. alike in Perfeelion, unlike in Defeel, or im-
perfection; or the fame in Nature, or Effence,.
and different in Degree, or the manner of ^ Exi-
gence. If therefore the Author founds this.
Analogy on the very Nature of the thing, he
feems to incur the foremention'd abfurdity, of
Tuppofing a nature contradictory to itfelf; if,
;with us, he will'pleafe to diitinguifh between
'the Nature of the thing in general, and the
particular Modus of its Exiflence, he mult with
as al-fo remove this analogy from the former"
foundation, and' fix it upon the latter. Far*
; ther, no Similitude whatsoever, whether dedu-
ced from human Reafon or Holy Scripture,,
can have, force enough to perfuade us, that the
whole nature of thefe things is quite different
from what we apprehend or can conceive them
to be ; fince it is univerfally fllow'd, that no 1,
comparifon can (as we commonly fay)' run upon
all four; or (whichis the very foundation and
defign of this whole analogical Scheme) can
ever conflitute a proper and ' c onclufive Argu-
ment, in order to prove to us fuch a paradox :
andif fo great Strefs is to be laid on any, v. g.
that of a Looking-Glafs, ufed in a ftrict Philofo-
phical manner, (as the Author of the Procedure '
feems to do, p. 112, cifr.) why may not fome
urge it flill farther, and argue, that as the I-
magc of your Face fuppofed to be feen in the
Glafs, is nothing real, folic!, and fubffantial
contain'd in the Glafs itfelf, but barely an ap-
pearance exhibited in the Brain; fo all the-
conceptions which we pretend to have of the*
Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at
all in God himfelf, but mere Phantafms and.
delufive Images, exifling only in our own
Mind. This, will thefe Men fay, mufl appear
abfurd at firfl Sight, and yet may be drawn
from the Similitude with as much Propriety as

the

*&/^5.TillQtfon'/$m. 76. V0I.2. Fol p. 572. and p. 678.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

the reft ; confequcntly the whole Scheme of
this Analogy is to be rejected as entirely falfe,
and at laft the true Medium of all our Know-
ledge in the Nature of thcfe things, will be
what we truly and properly perceive of them,
in fome fmafl degree in ourfielves : If it be ob-
je&ed here, that the Nature and Modus of any
thing muft be the very fame, fince by different
Natures are only meant different Mariners of
Exiftence.

I anfwer : By the Nature of any thing, I un-
derftand its feveral difiinguijbbtg Properties. By
the Nature of any Property, I underftand fome
certain po&tive Mark or Charader which diftin-
guifhes that property from any others. Thus,
by the nature of Body, I mean folid, diviii-
ble, figured and moveable Extcnfion. By the
T*Jature of Solidity, I mean Refiftence, or a
power of excluding other Bodies out of its
place; which Mark fufficiently diftinguifhes it
from Divifibility, or any other property be-
longing to the fame Body, as well as all the
foremention'd properties diftinguilh a Body
from fomething elfe : both which we may
therefore property enough be faid to perceive
or know, tho' perhaps we may never in like
manner, know how thefe feveral Properties are
united together, and come to form one Aggre-
gate or Subftance ; nor whence this Power or
Property of Refiftence proceeds, or how it is
caus'd, wnich is what we underftand by the
Modus of each. So that, knowing or having
a clear determinate Idea of a certain Thing or
Quality, fo as to be able to diftinguilh it from
another Thing or Quality, and always to per-
ceive it to be reaWy thus ; is quite different
from knowing how the faid Thing or Quality
comes to be thus : How or Why it is, are Modes
of Exiftence, and differ plainly from what it
is, or what Idea we have of it, which denotes
its Nature or EJfe nee. But any Man, I think,
hat has a mind, may apprehend what we mean
:,y this diftinction without any more Words,
whether he will approve of it or not, is ano-
ther Queftion.

Againft this Notion of Antilogy, as apply'd
to the whole Nature of the Attributes of God, \

fee Fiddes's Body of Divinity, B. I. Part 2. c.13
and his Practical Dfcourfies, Fol. p. 234, &Y.
or, J. Clarke on Moral Evil, p. 95, &c. or
Chubb' $ Trails, p. 146, &e. or, the present State
of the Republic of Letters for July 1728; or, ti
Vindication of the Divine Attribute's, London
1710.

[X 1. ] By the Words, Infinite Degree, here
and above, we don't mean any indefinite Addi-
tion, or encreafablenefs of thefe feveral Attri-
butes partially confider'd (to which fuch terms
are vulgarly, tho' not fo properly apply'd) but
only an entire abfolute Perfiedion, without any
kind of failure or deficiency in thefe refpects :
which we nave intimated in Note 5, and elfe-
where, to be our Notion of Infinity, as ap-
ply'd to any of the Divine Attributes. " Thus
" Infinite Under/landing and Ktmvledge, is no-
" thing elfe but perfied Knowledge, thatwhich
"*' hath no defect or mixture of Ignorance 'in it, or
" the knowledge of whatfoever is knowable.
" Infinite Power is nothing elfe but perfeel
" Power, that which hath no defect or mix-
r ture of Impotency in it: a Power of produ-
" ring and doing all whatfoever \s pojfib'e, i. e.
" whatfoever is conceivable, and fo of the
' reft *.

** Now, that we have an Idea or Concep-
f* tion of Perfiedion, or a perfeel Being, is evi-
" dent from the Notion that we have of Im-
" perfeilion, fo familiar to us : Perfeilion being
*' the Rule and Mcafure of Imperfeilion, and not
" Imperfeilion of Perfeilion, as a fir -aight Line is
" the Rule and Meafure of a Crocked, and net
** a Crooked Line of a Straight. So that Per-
" fection is firft Conceivable in order of nature,
'' * before Impcrfeelion, as Light before Darknefs,
" a pofitive before the privation or defied. For
<c Perfection is not properly the want of 1m-
' perfection, but Imperfection of Perfec-
" tion.

u Moreover, we perceive feveral Degrees of
" Perfection in the Effences of things, and
*' confequently a Scale or Ladder of Perfections
" in Nature, one above another, as of Iving
" ad animate things above fenfickfis and i /ani-
mate,

Cudwortb, p. 647

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

REMARKS.

** mate, durational things above fen/itive; and
" that by rcafon of that Notion or Idea, which
" we firft have of that which is ebfolutely per-
*' feci, as the Standard, by comparing of things
" with which, and meafuring of them, we
" take notice of their approaching more or lefs
" near thereunto. Nor indeed could thefe
" gradual A/cents be infinite, or without End,
M but they muft come at laft to that which is
** absolutely perfect, as the top of them all.
* Laftly, we could not perceive Imperfection
** in the moft perfect of all thofe things which
" we ever had Senfe or Experience of in our
" Lives, hid we not a Notion, ox Idea of that
** which is abfolutely perfcil, which fecretly
" comparing the fame with, we perceive it to
' come fhort thereof*.

" Wherefore, fince Infinite is the fame with
" abfolutely perfetl, we having a Notion or I-
" dea of the latter, muft needs have of the
** former. From whence we learn alfo, that
" tho' the Word Infinite be in the form there-
" of Negative, yet is the Senfe of it, in thefe
" things which are really capable of the fame,
" pofitive, it being all one with abfolutely per-
** fell: as likewile, the Senfe of the Word
** Finite is negative, it being the feme with
" Imperftl : So that finite is properly the
" Negation of Infinite, as that which in order
** of nature is before it, and not Infinite the
** Negation oi' Finite. However, in thofe things
" which are capable of no true Infinity, be
" caufe they are effentially finite, as Number,
" corporeal Magnitude, and time; Infinity being
" there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-
" entity, it can only be conceiv'd by the Ne-
** gation of Finite, as we alfo conceive Nothing
" by the Negation of Something, that is, we
" can have no pofitive Conception at all there-
" off."

Now, all this, is not attempting to make
the Attributes of God pofitively Infinite, by
fbperadding a Negative Idea of Infinity to them
(as the Author of the Procedure, &c, juftly ur-
ges againft Mr. Locke, in B. I. c. 3. p. 82.
and* the fame might with equal Juftice be ob-
jected co Dr. Clarke, when he applies infinite

*-Cudwortby^, 648,

f. Ibid, 649.

Space and infinite Duration to the Deity, and
calls one his Immenfity, and the other his E-
iernity.) But it is making them pofitively and
abfolurely perfetl, by firft proving them to
have fome real Exiftence in the Divine Nature,-
and then by removing from it all Pofilbility of
Want, or Deficiency, Mixture, or Allay ||.

[X m. ] By the Word Juftice, as it relates
to Punilhment, we mean, the Exercife of a
Right, or doing what a Perfon has a Moral
Pozeer to do. Mercy implies his receding from
that Right, or not exerting that moral power.
When we apply thefe Terms to the Deity, wt
confider his Difpenfations in a partial View,
viz. only with Relation to the Perfon offen-
ding, and himfelf the offended, or as mere
Debtor and Creditor, exclufive of all other
Beings, who may be affefted thereby, and
whom therefore we fhould fuppofe to be re^
garded in thefe Difpenfations. In this Senfe,
thefe two Attributes have a diftindt Meaning,
and may both be always fubordinate to Good-
nefs, but can never be repugnant to each o-
ther. Thus, where a Creature has forfeited
its Right to a Favour, orincurr'd a Penalty, by
the breach of fome Covenant, or the Tranf-
greffion of fome Law, the Creator, confider'd
with refpeft to that Being alone, andin thofe
Circumftances, has always a Right to with-
draw the Favour; or to inflift a Penalty ; and
will profecute that Right, whenever he finds
it neceffary, to fome farther End : But yet his
Goodnefs may incline him often to remit it,
on fome foreign Motive, viz. on account of
the prefent Relation between the Criminal
and other Men, in very different Circumftan-
ces, or in view of a future Alteration in the
Circumftances of the Criminal himfelf. Now
as thefe Motives belong to, and are generally
known by, God alone, tho* they may influ-
ence his Aclions towards us, yet they don't at
all affecl: his Right over us, and therefore,
ought not to diminifh our Love, Gratitude,
3V. to him in any particular Inftance, eithr
of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we fuffer
for our Crimes, we have no Rcafon to com-
plain

Concerning the Origin of Evil
R E M ARK S.

plain of any Injury, nor can he, when, upon
the formention'd Motives, he forgives us, ever
injure himfelf. For Juftice, confider'd barely
as a Right or Moral Power, evidently demands
nothing, nor can properly be faid to oblige one
way or other : and therefore, the Being pof-
fefs'dof it, is at liberty either to fufpend or
exert it ; but he will never ufe this Liberty,
otherwife than as his Goodnefs requires, con-
sequently Juftice and Mercy in . fuch a Being
can never clafli.

Whether this way of conceiving thefe Di-
vine Attributes be not attended with lefs Dif-
ficulty than the common manner of treating
them, under the Notion of two Infinites dia-
metrically oppofite, mull be left to the Judg-
ment of the Reader.

As to the Nature of Diftribut'we Juftice, or
the true Reafon of Rewards and Punijbments,
fee S. C's Impartial. Enquiry, &V. B. i . c. 1 1 .
prop. I2i

CHAP.

CHAP. It

Concerning the Nature and Divifion of Evil,
and the Difficulty of tracing out itt Origin.

I. f*\ OOD and Evil are Oppofites, and arife from the Relation By Evil we
f which things have to each other: For, fince there are fome undcribnd
V^>J things which profit, and others which prejudice one ano- ^commo-' "
therj fince fome things agree, and others difagree ; as wedious.incon-
call the former Good, fo we ftilc the latter Evil. Whatever, there- J^SSSfc
fore, is incommodious or inconvenient to itfclf, or any thing elfe ; what-
ever becomes troublefome, or frustrates any Appetite implanted by
God ; whatever forces any Perfon to do or furTer what he would not,
that is Evil.

II. Now thefe Inconveniencies appear to be of three kinds, thofe of E v 'is are of
Imperfection, Natural and Moral ones. By the Evil of Imperfection, *JJ? j^*
I underftand the Abfence of thofe Perfections or Advantages which perfea ion,
exift elfewhere, or in other Beings : By Natural Evil, Pains, Uneafi- JJ atU j 41 ' anti
nefies, Inconveniencies and Difappointments of Appetites, arifing from
natural Motions : By Moral, vicious Elections, that is, fuch as are
hurtful to ourfelves, or others.

III. Thefe Evils muft be confider'd particularly, and we are to fhew The difficul-
how they may be reconcil'd with the Government of an infinitely^ " how

j j j tnclc come

powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For, fince there is fuch into the
a Being, 'tis ask'd, as we faid before, Whence come Evils ? Whence Work o(
fo many Inconveniencies in the Work of a molt good, moft powerful h h
God ? Whence that perpetual War between the very Elements, be- Goodnefs
tween Animals, between Men t Whence Errors, Miferies and Vices, and Powcr -
the conftant Companions of human Life from its Infancy ? Whence

L GooJ

Some that
were unable
to folve this
difficulty,
have deny'd
theExiitence
of a God,
others have
iuppofed a
double One.

Concerning the Nature and Divifion of EviL

Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good ? If we behold any thing ir-
regular in the Works of Men, if any Machine anfwers not the End
it was made for ; if we find fomething in it repugnant to itfelf or o-
thers, we attribute that to the Ignorance, Impotence, or Malice of
the Workman : but fince thefe Qualities have no place in God, how
come they to have place in any thing ? Or, Why does God fuffer his
Works to be deform'd by them ?

IV. This Queftion has appeared fo intricate and difficult, that fome
finding themfelves unequal to the Solution of it, have deny'd, either
that there is any God at all, or at leaft, any Author or Governor of the
World. Thus Epicurus, and his Adherents: nor does Lucretius bring
any other Reafon for his denying the Syjlem of the World to be the
Ejj'ecl of a Deity, than that it is fo very faulty *. Others judg'd it,
to be more agreeable to Reafon, to afTign a double Caufe of things,
rather than none at all. Since it is the greateft Abfurdity in Nature,
to admit of Actions and Effects, without any Agent and Caufe. Thefe
then perceiving a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully perfua-
ded, that fo many Confufions and Inconfiftencies could not proceed
from a good Being, fuppofed a malevolent Principle, or God, direct-
ly contrary to the good one; and thence derived Corruption and
Death, Difeafes, Griefs, Miferies, Frauds and Villanies j from the
good Being nothing but Good: nor did they imagine, that Contra-
riety and Mifchief could have any other Origin than an Evil Prin-
ciple. This Opinion was held by many of the Ancients, by the
Manicheans y Paulicians, and almoft all the Tribe of ancient Here-
tics, (25.).

V.And

NOTE S.

(25.) In order to give fome light into the
Opinions of thefe "Men, concerning the Ori-
gin of Evil, I fhall tranferibe a Paragraph
from Bay/e's Dictionary, in the Article Mani-
tbeesy. Remark. D. whers he introduces Zoroa-
fier defending the two oppofite Principles a-
Dovo- niention'd. " Zoroafler, fays he, would
** go back to the time of the Chaos, which is
* a State as to his two Principles, \cry^ like

that which Hobbs calls th State of Nature,
axd which he fuppofes to have preceded the
firft Eflablifhment of Societies. In this
State of Nature, . one Man was a Wolf to &r
nother, and every thing belong'd to the firlt
Pofleffor; none was Matter of any thing,
except he was the ftrongeft. To get out of
this Confufion, every one agreed to quit his.
Right to the whole, that he might have a

** Property

* S, t, *,j8o.

NOTES.

Concerning the Mature and Divipon of Evil. n 5

V. And there are ibme ftill who think this Difficulty unanfwerable. There are
They confefs, indeed, the Suppofition of a double Principle to be ab- fome . whoare

/j ii- 1 n 1 -i a 1 ^or opinion,

iurd, and that it may be demonftrated that there is but one Author of that it is un-
all things, abfolutely perfect and good j yet there is Evil in things, an j V f rab ! e '
and this they fee and feel : but whence, or how it comes, they are Mamchea of-
emirely ignorant; nor can human Reafon (if we believe them, in a- fer ' d * better

|- folution, by

*-* 2 n y fuppofingtvvo

Principles,
than the Ca-
tholics do by
owning only
" afide all thofe Fights and Prifoners which One
'" the Manicbeans fpeak of. The whole might
" be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the
" two Principles, that one could never obtain
' from the other but fuch and fuch Conditi-
" oqs: and thus an Eternal Agreement might
" have been made upon this Foot.

For a farther Explication and Amendment
of their Hypothefis, and Replies to feverai
Arguments urg'd againll it, fee the Words,
Manicbeans, Marcionites, Pau/icians, Origen and
Zoroa/fcr, in the abovemention'd Dictionary.

That there is no Occafton for any Hypothefis
of this kind, will be fliewn in the following
Chapters. Let it fuffice in this place, to point
out the abfurdities of the Hypothefis itfelf.
And firft, it may be obferv'd, that the Suppofi-
tion of an ubfolute and infinitely Evil Principle
(if thefe Words mean fuch a Being as is totally
oppolite to the Good One) is an exprefs con-
tradiction. For as this Principle oppofes and
refills the infinitely Good One, it alfo muft be
independent and infinite : It muft be infinite
or abfolute in Knowledge and Power. But the
notion of a Being infinitely Evi), is of one in-
finitely Imperfedt; its Knowledge and Power
therefore mull be infinitely Imperfedl; i. e. ab-
folute Ignorance and Impotence, or no Know-
ledge and Power at all. The one of thefe Be-
ings then is abfolutely perfect, or enjoys all
manner of pofitive Perfections, confequently
the other, as it is directly the Rcverfe, muft be
purely the negation of it, as Darknefs is of
Light; i. e. it muft be an infinite Defccl, or
mere nothing. Thus, this Evil Being muft have
fome Knowledge and Power, in order to make

any

u Property in fomething, they tranfadted one
* with another, and fo the War ceas'd. Thus
" the two Principles weary of this Chios,
w wherein each confounded and overthrew
11 what the other would do, came at laft to an
xt Agreement; each of them yielded fomething,
* each had a fhare in the Production of Man,
" and the Laws of the Union of the Soul :
** The good Principle obtain'd thofe which
" procure to Man a thoufand Pleafures, and
" confented to thofe which expofe him to a
** thoufand Sorrows : and if it confented that
" Moral Good mould be infinitely lefs in
" Mankind than Moral Evil, he repair'd the
** Damage in fome other kind of Creatures,
* wherein Vice fliould be much lefs thanVir-
*' tue. If many Men in this Life have more
" Mifery than Happinefs, this is recompene'd
" in another State ; what they hae not under
" an human Shape, thcyfhall recover under a-
" nother. By means of this Agreement, the
Chaos was a paffive Principle, which was
M the Field of Battle between thefe two ac-
*' live Principles. The Poets * have reprefen-
*' ted this difentangling under the Image of a
" Quarrel ended. This is what Zoroajler
** might alledge, boafting that he does not at-
*' tribute to the Good Principle the produc-
" tion of a Creature at his own Pleafure,
** which was to be fo wretched and miferable ;
" but only, after he had found by Experience
* that he could do no better, nor better oppofe
" the horrible Defigns of the Evil Principle.
11 To render his Hypothefis the lefs often five,
* he might have deny'd that there was a long
" War between the two Principles, and lay

Hanc Deus i& Melicr Litem Natura diremit. Ovid. Met. 1. 1.

76 Concerning the Nature and Divifion ofEviL

ny meafure difcover. Hence they take Occafion to lament our Un-
happinefs, and complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as often
as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted unfuccefsfully. The Ma-
nicheam folve the Phenomena of things better, a hundred times bet-
ter (as thefe Men think) with their moll: abiurd Hypothefis of two
Principles, than the Catholics do with their mod true Doctrine of

One

NOTES,

:ny opjx fition at all to the Good One ; but as he
is directly opposite to that Good or Perfedt One,
he car, not have the lea it degree of Knowledge*
or Pmter, fince thefe are Perfections : therefore,
the Suppofition of fuch an Exiitence as this,
implies a contradiction.

But fuppofing thefe Men only to mean (what
any undcrftanding Perfon among them muft
mean) by tins Evil Principle, an abfolutcly
Malevolent Being, of equal Power, and other
natural Perfections with thofe of the Go>.d
One, " It would be to no pnrpofe (fays Til-
u lot/on*,) to fuppoftf two fuch oppofite Prin-
ciples. For, admit that a Being infinitely
" Mifchievous, were infinitely cunning, and
** infinitely powerful, yet it could do no Evil,
becaufe the oppofite Principle of infinite
* Goodnefs, being alfo infinitely wife and
" powerful, they would tye up one another's
* Hands : fo that upon this Suppofition, the
<l Notion of a Deity would fignify juft no-
* thing, and by virtue of the Eternal Oppo-
u fition and Equality of thofe Principles, they
would keep one another at a perpetual Bay,
* and being an equal Match for one another,
** inftead of being two Deities, they would
be two Idols, able to do neither Good nor
* Evil.

I fhall only produce one argument more as to
Moral Evil, out of Simplicius^s Comment on E-
fitletus, which,, by the Confeffion of Bayle
Jbimfelf, ftrikes home at the Doftrine of Two
Principles, tho' it be confider'd with the grea-
teft Simplicity.

He fays f, * // entirely definys the Liberty
" tf cur Souls, and neceffitates them to Sin, and

8 confequently implies a ContradiBhn. For, fintt
u the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorrupt i-
" ble, and fo potent that God hhnfeif cannot con-
a quer him, it fellows, that the Soul of Man can-
11 not rejijl the lmpufe, with which he mwes it t*
B Sin. But if a Man be invincibly driven to it y
'* he commits no Murder or Adultery, &c. by his
" own Fault, but by a fuperior eternal Fault, and
*' in that Cafe he is neither guilty nor punifhable..
* Therefore, there is no fuch thing as Sin, and
" confequently this Hypothefis defrays itfelf; fince
** if there be a Principle of Evil, there is no long-
41 er any Evil in the World. But if there be m.
" Evil in the World, it is clear there is no-
" Principle of Evil; whence we nay infer, that
'* thofe who fuppofe fuch a Principle, tiefiroy, by
" a neceffary Confequence, both Evil and the Prin*
" ciple of it."

More of this may be feen in Bayle's Explana-
tion concerning the Manichees, at the End of
his Dictionary, p. 66, &.c See alfo Mr. Gur-
don's Boyle's Leclure, Serm; 5. or Stilling fleet's
Orig. Sacra?, B. 3.. C. 3. V 10, 12. See alfo
Sherlock on Judgment, ift Edit, p; 173.

Neither does Mr. BayWs amendment of this
Hypothefis free it from the Difficulty. He
fuppofes the two Principles to be fenfible of
the above mention'd Confequence arifing from
their Equality of Power, and therefore,,
would compound the Matter, by allowing an
equal Mixture of Good and Evil in the
intended Creation. But if the Quantity of
Good and Evil in the Creation be exactly
equal, neither of the Principles has attain'd, or
could expeft to attain, the End for which it
was fuppos'd. to aft. The Good Principle de-

fign'd

2 Vol:, of Sena. Fol. p. 690,

f p. \$z. Ed. Lend. 1 670*

Concerning the Nature and Divifion of Evil.

One perfect, abfolutely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature.
For the Manicbeans acquit God from all manner of Blame, as he was
compelPd by the contrary Principle to fuffer Sin and Mifery in his
Work, which in the mean while he oppofes with all his Power.
But, according to the Catholics, as their Adverfaries object, he per-
mits thefe voluntarily, nay, is the Caufe and Author of them. For
if, as thefe Men argue, there be but one Author of all Things, Evils
alfo fhould be refer'd to him as their Original ; but it can neither be
explain'd nor conceiv'd, how infinite Goodnefs can become the Ori-
gin of Evil. If God could not hinder it, where is his Power? If
he could, and would not, where is his Goodnefs? If you fay, that
Evil neceffarily adheres to fome particular Natures ; fince God was
the Author of them all, it would have been better to have omitted
thofe with the concomitant Evils, than to have debafed his Work-
manfhip with an Allay of thefe Evils, (26.).

L 3 VI. It

NOTES.

fign'd to produce fome abfolute Good, the E-
vil One fome abfolute Evil ; but to produce
an equal Mixture of both, would be in effect
producing neither: One would juft counter-
balance and dellroy the other; and all fuch
a&ion would be the very fame as doing no-
thing at all : and that fuch an exact Equality
f Good and Evil muft be the Refult of any
agreement between them is plain: For, as
they are by Suppofition perfectly equal in In-
clination, as well as Power, neitlier of them
could poflibly concede, and let its oppofite
prevail: The Creation therefore cannot be
owing to fuch a Compofition.

But the beft Confutation of this Scheme may
be found in the Chapter before us; where our
Author fhews, that it does not at all anfwer the
End for which it was introduced. This com-
pletes the abfurdity of it.

(26.) Since this Objection contains all that
can be faid upon Evil in general ; and it ap-
pears tome abfolutely neccflary for every Man

to do Juftice to Objections, who expects that
others fhould receive any Satisfaction from his
anfwers, I fhall infert it, as it is propofed in
its full force, by Cud-worth*. " The fuppo-
** fed Deity and Maker of the World, was ei-
" ther willing to abolilh all Evils, but not
" able, or he was able and not willing : or,
' thirdly, he was neither willing nor able:
<l or, laftly, he was both able and willing.
* This latter is the only thing that anfwers
lt fully to the Notion of a God. Now, that
M the fuppofed Creator of all things was not
" thus both able and willing to aboliih all E-
" vils, is plain, becaufe then there would have
w been no Evils at all left. Wherefore, fince
li there is fuch a Deluge of Evils overflowing
" all, it muft needs be, that either he was
" willing and not able to remove them, and
** then he was impotent ; or elfe he was able
" and not willing, and then he was envious ; or
laftly, he was neither able nor willing, and
then, he was both impotent and envious."

Almoft

* True IntelLSyJl. p* 78, 79.

Concerning the Nature and Divifwn of Evil.

ThJsdifficul- yi j t i s we n known, that this Difficulty has exercifed both the
cite J thcPhi ancient Philofophers and Fathers of the Church (27.): and there are
loiophcrsandfome who deny that it is yet anfwer'd; nay, who undertake to refute
the Church a ^ tne Solutions hitherto offer'd; nor do I promife a complete one in
and fomede every Refpect, tho' I hope to fhew, in the following Part of theTrea-
m- thu it s t |^ ^ at - t - not w } 10 Uy unanfwerable.

anlwer dyec. **

T,, VII. It is manifeft, that tho' Good be mix'd with Evil in this Life,

I nerc is

more Good yet there is much more Good than Evil in Nature, and every Animal
!"" Ev , !1 . provides for its Prefervation by Inftinct or Reafon, which it would ne-
ver do, if it did not think or feel its Life, with all the Evils annex'd,
to be much preferable to Non-exiftence. This is a Proof of the Wif-
dom, Goodnefs, and Power of God, who could thus temper a World
infefted with fo many Miferies, that nothing fhould continue in it
which was not in fome meafure pleafed with its Exigence, and which
would not endeavour by all poffible Means to preferve it.
repugnant to 3/JIL Neither does the Supposition of an Evil Principle help any
Infinite thing towards the Solution of this Difficulty. For the AlTerters of
Shave eIS two Principles maintain, that the great and good God tolerates E-
created thefc vil, becaufe he is forced to it by the Evil One, and that either from
things which an Agreement between themfelves, or a perpetual Struggle and Con-
would be 'tefl with each other. For, fince the Beneficent Author of Nature

corrupted by was

another,

n j 1 1 S w o u 'd corrupt themfelves. The Suppolkion of a double Principle is therefore of no Service
toward the Solution of this Difficulty.

NOTES.

Almoft the fame occurs in Laelantius *, and
is cited, and fufficiently refuted by our Author
in C. 5. S' ? Sub. the laft : See alfo Prudentius
in Hamurtigcnia, v. 64c.

The Subftance of all Bay/e's Objections may
be feen in a Book call'd Free Thoughts on Re-
ligion, &c. C. 5. p. 104, &*. See alfo the fol-'
lowing Note. The Anfwcrs to them will fol-
low in their proper places.

(27.) Any one thar wants to be acquainted
with the Antiquity of this Difpute, -or the
Tertians engaged in it, or the way of managing

it, made ufe of by the Fathers, may confult the
beginning of Dr. J. Clarke's Enquiry into the
Caufe and Origin of Evil : and Bayle's Dictio-
nary, in the Articles Minicheans, Remark B.
Marcionites, Remarks F, and F A- Paulicians,
Remarks K, and K A. and Zorcajler, Remark
E. Or Cudwtrth, from p. 213, to p. 224. or
Stilling fleet's Orjgines Sacra, B. 3 C. 3. (j. 8,
9, 11, 12, &c. or Fabric ij Biblioth. Grcec. v- 5.
p. 287, &c. or Deleft us ArgumeKtorum, &c.
C. ic.

* De Im Dei, >C. 13. p. 4351 Edit. Cant.

Concerning the Nature and T)ivifion of Evil. 79

was hinder'd by the Evil Principle, from producing all the Good he
was willing to produce, he either made an Agreement with it, to pro-
duce as much as he was allow'd, but with a Mixture of Evil, accor-
ding to the Agreement between them; or elfe there is a Mixture of
Good and Evil proportionable to the Power which prevails in either.
Hence they think the good God excufable, who confer'd as many
BleMlngs on the World as his Adverfary permitted, and would have to-
lerated no manner of Evil, unlefs compell'd to it by the adverfe Po-
wer. So rhat he-muft either create no Good at all, or mffer an Allay
of Evil. All which very great Abfurdities have this farther Inconve-
nience, that they do not anfwer the End for which they were inven-
ted. For he is no lefs. culpable who created any thing which he knew
would be render'd miferable by another, than if he had made that
which he forefaw would bring Mifery upon itfelf. If therefore God
might, confidently with Goodnefs, create Things which he knew the
Evil Principle could and would corrupt, as the Manicheans aflerted ;
then he might, confidently with the fame Goodnefs, have created
Things that would corrupt themfelves, or were to perifh in a Tract
of Time. If then, according to the Defenders of this Hypothefis,
God ought to have omitted, or not created thofe Beings, in whofe Na-
tures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he ought alfo to have omitted,
thofe, whofe Natures he forefaw the Evil Principle would corrupt.
And if there was fo much Good in thefe, as made him think it better
to create them, tho' they were to be corrupted fome time or other by
the oppofite Principle, he might alfo judge it preferable to produce
the fame, tho' they were at length to perifh by their inherent E-
vils. Nor will God tolerate Evil in his Works, as forced to it more,
according to the Manicheans, than the Catholics. For, as he might
have not made thofe Beings which have Evils neceffarily adhering ta
them, fo he might alfo have not made thofe which he foreknew the
contrary Principle would corrupt. After the fame manner in both
Cafes he could have prevented Evil, and fince he could, why did He
not ? The Suppofition of two Principles conduces nothing at all
therefore to the Solution of this Difficulty.

IX. But

So Concerning the Nature and Tiivifion of Evil.

If it can be IX. But if we can point out a Method of reconciling thefe Things
incwn, that w ' lX h t ] le Government of an abfolutely perfect Agent, and make them
contradia not only confiftent with Infinite Wifdom, Goodnefs and Power, but
infinite Po- neceffarily refulting from them (fo that thefe would not be Infinite,
Goodnefs to *f thofe did not or could not porTibly exift) then we may be fuppo-
permit Evils, fed to have at laft difcover'd the true Origin of Evils, and anfwer'd all
ec^LiW^* Difficulties and Objections that are brought on this Head, a-
rife from the gainft the Goodnefs, Wifdom, Power, and Unity of God. Let us try
exercife of therefore what can be done in each kind of Evil ; and firft. concerning:

them, then , ^ ., r T . r <-* *

may the Dif- the Evil of Imperfection.

ficulty be
;nf\arcr'd.

CHAP.

CHAP. IIL

Of the Evil of Defeft.

I. a. S for the Evil of ImperfeBion, it is to be confider'd, that be-
fore the World was created God exifted alone, and nothing
befide him. All things therefore are out of nothing, and
whatfoever exifts, has its Exiftence from God j neither can
that Exiftence be different either in Kind or Degree from what he
gave *.

II. Secondly, God, tho' he be omnipotent, cannot make any crea-
ted Being abjolutely perfe6i i for whatever is abfolutely perfect, muft ne-
ceffarily be Self-exiftent. But it is included in the very Notion of a
Creature, as fuch, not to exift of itfelf, but from God. An abfolute-
ly perfect Creature therefore implies a Contradiction. For it mould
be of itfelf, and not of itfelf, at the fame time (28.). Abfolute Per-
fection is therefore peculiar to God, and if he would communicate his
own peculiar Perfection to another, (E.) that other would be God.

The

N O t E S.

Things can
be no other-
wife than as
God pleafed.

All Created
things are
neceflarily
imperfect,
fince they do
not exift of
themfelves.

(28.) A perfeti Creature is a contradiction in
terms. For if it be per/eft it is independent ;
and if it be independent, it is no Creature. A-
jjain ; to fuppoie a created Being infinite in any
refpect is to fuppofc it equal to its Creator in that
refpecl; and if it be equal in one refpect, it
muft be fo in all, fince an Infinite property
cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for then
the Attribute would be more perfect than its
hibject, all which is abfurd. Granting, there-
lore, this one Principle, which cannot be de-

* See Scott in Note 32.

ny'd, (ziz. that an Effect muft be inferior to
its Caufe) it will appear, that the Evil of Im-
perfection, fuppofing a Creation, is necefTary
and unavoidable; and confequently, all other
Evils which neceflarily arife from that, are un-
avoidable alfo. What our Author has advan-
ced upon the following Head, feems perfectly
conclufive.

(E.) This Pofition feems very agreeable to
the Catholic Faith, which teaches that the Fa-
ther did communicate his Nature, and all his

Pcr-

8 a Of the Evil of <?/,?.

The Evil of Imperfection muft therefore be tolerated in Creatures, not--
whhftanding the Divine Omnipotence and Goodnefs: for Contradic-
tions are Objects of no Power. God might indeed have refrain'd from
creating, and continu'd alone, Self-fufficient, and perfect: to all Eter-
nity, but his Infinite Goodnefs would, by no means allow it 5 this ob-
lig'd him to produce external things ; which things, fince they could

nee

NOTES.

Perfections to the Son, and with him to the
Holy Ghofl: each of them therefore is very God
under a different Subfiflenic. The Divine. Na-
ture which is inherent in them, may be con-
ceiv'd to be of itfelf, but the Modus of Exi-
gence cannot. Now the Church looks upon
the Nature thus iiibnlling, as a Per/on. Not
that it is a Perfon in the fame manner as the
human Nature fubfifting by itfelf, but by Rea-
fbn of a certain Similitude and Analogy which
they have between them. Since Divine Mat-
ters are not obiefts of the Senfes, they cannot,
as we faid before *, be known by Maiks im-
prefs'd upon us by Senfation; they are there-
fore conceiv'd by a Similitude, Relation, Pro-
portion, or Connexion with fenfible things-:
The Paffions, Affections Intellect. and.Will,
are the Principles of our Actions, and therefore
we attribute thefe to God. For if we were to
do thofe things which God performs, thefe
would be the Principles and Caufes of them :
We attribute therefore to God fomething ana-
logous, or equivalent to thefe, but we know
that it is as diftant as finite is from Infinite
Nay, 'tis demonflrable, that neither Will, nor
Love, nor Anger, nor Juftice, nor-Mercy, are
in God, after the. fame manner, as they exift
in, and are conceiv'd by, usf. But we muft
make ufe of thefe Words, becaufe we have, no
better, and they fofficiently anfwer the End
for which God would have us to know him.
Now, after the fame manner we point out the
diftin&ion declaied in Scripture between the
Father, Son, and Holy Ghoji, by the Word Per- 1
Jon, becaufe we have. nothing neater, to compare J

* Note A:

f See Woelafton, p. 1 1 5, 11 6. and Epifcopius
S/rmon on Predeflination, &c.
|= S>ualem autem J)eum, tsfc (C/V. de Nat. Devr.

them by; and the. RepccfenUtion under thi#
Analogy fhews us very-well what we may hope-
for from each of them, and what WorflHp we
ought to pay them. Tho'at the fame tirrje we
are certain, that thefe differ no lefs from hu-
man Perfons, than the Divine Intel left does
from human, or the Principles of Divine Ac-
tions from human Pdffions ; for inftance, An-
ger, Hatred, and the like. 'Tis ftrange there-
fore, that Men who- would bcefteenVd learned,
fhould difpute againft a Plurality of Perfons in
the Deity, after the very fame Way of Re:foning
with which Cotta in Gicera argues againft the
Intelligence, Prudence, and Juftice of God |j,
namely, beciufe they cannot be in God after
the fame manner as we conceive them to be in
Men; forgetting, in the mean time, that rhefe
are attributed to God by a kind of Anahgy and
^Accomodation to our Capacity, and rather from
the refemblance of- things done by God, to
thofe done by us, than of the Principles from
which they proceed. But the Scriptures and
the Church have fuffieiently forewarn'd us to
"beware of this erroneous Way of Reafoning.
For when God is defcrlbed under thefe Fi-
gures, Similitudes, and Analogies, . left we
fhould take Images of things for the things,
themfelves, and fo fall into abfurd Reafonings
about them, the fame things are deny'd of God
in one Senfe, that are. affirm'd of him in ano-
ther. Thus God is often faid to repent, and.
in another place 'tis deny'd- that he repents as a .
Man. Thus Light is afcribed to God, as his
habitation, and elfewhere, Thick Darknefs.
He is often faid to be feen, and yet is call'd In-

vifible.

Inft.Thetl. L. 4. C. 22. p. 310. er^our Authors

V. 1 5 Ed. Lond. See our Author's Strm* ; 37. .

Of the Evil of D'efcS.

not poflibly be perfect, the Divine Goodnefs preferr'd imperfect ones
to none at all. Imperfection then arofe from the Infinity of Divine
Goodnefs. Had not God been infinitely Good, perhaps he might not
have furfer'd imperfect Beings j but have been content in himfelf, and
created nothing at all.

III. Thirdly, There are infinite Degrees of Perfection between a
Being abfolutely perfett and Nothing : of which, if Exiftence be con-
ceiv'd as the Firft, every thing will be fo many degrees diftant from
nothing, as there are Perfections to be found in it joined with Exi-
ftence. In this Scale then God will be the Top, and Nothing the Bot-
tom-, and how much farther any thing is diftant from nothing, it is
fo much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much
any thing can refemble God in Perfection, or how nearly approach to
him (F.) we know not.; but we are certain that there is always an in-

M 2 finite

NOTES.

'Tis to he
determin'd
by the Di-
vine Plea Cure
whatDegrees
of Perfection
every thing t
muft have,
fince all
things are
neceffarily at
an Infinite
diftance from
the higheft
Perfe&ion.

vifible. The Father is God and Lord, and al-
fo the Son and the Holy Ghoft, and yet it is
faid there is but one God and Lord. All which
and more of the fame kind, we muft believe to
be thus exprefs'd, for no other Reafon, but to
hinder us from imagining them to be afcribed
to God in the fame manner as they are in us,
(29). But Smatterers in Learning; rejecl and
ridicule thefe forms of Speech as Enigmas, be-
ing ignorant of both the Sacred and Ecclefiafti-
cal Dialeft, which they refufe to learn, tho'
we muft make ufe of it in Divine Matters, or
elfe ent ; rely refrain from all Reafoning about
them. For fince they are known no otherwife
than by fimilitude and analogy, they cannot
be defcribed otherwife, as any one will find
who tries. But it is no wonder if thefe Men,
while they take fimilies for the things them-
felvcs, mould eafily imagine that they difedver
abfurdities in them. If they do this on pur-
pofe, cunningly, and with an ill Intent, they
are Villains ; but if thro' Ignorance or Error,
they deferve Pity, if they did not fwell with a

proud conceit of Science, and exalt themfelves
above the Vulgar ; who yet are much wifer
than thefe Philofophers. For they fear the
Anger of God, love his Goodnefs, embrace
his Mercy, adore his Jufticc, and give Glory
to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoft, and yet
believe in and worfhip one God, moft perfect,
and free from Paflions. Whereas, the Smatter-
ers in Science have got nothing to pliKre in
the Room of thefe, which they themfelves,
much lefs the Vulgar, can underftand ; or,
which can equally excite the Affections of the
Mind, or promote Piety.

(F) Suppofing the World to be Infinite,
there would be, as far as appears to us, Infi-
nite Orders of Creatures descending gradually
from God to Nothing: but fince neither our
Underftanding can comprehend, nor does the
Nature of Quantity and Motion feem to admit
of Infinity or Eternity ; 'tis better to refer the
Matter to the Dirine Will. For if an Infinity
in Creatures be impoflible, 'tis the fame thing
wherever we ftop. For all Finites are equally

diftant

(29) This is a good Inference from thefe and the like Exprtfftons, but ean hardly be fuppofed to have
'been the principal defign, much lefs the only reafon, f them. For more inflames of this kind, fee the
fsremen/icn'J Sermon, . 23, 27.

84 Of the Evil of VefcB.

finite diftance between them. It muft have been deter mm a therefore
bv the Will of God, where he would ftop, fince there is nothing but
his own Will to bound his Power. Now it is to be believ'd, that the
prefent Syftem of the World was the very beft that could be, with re-
gard to the Mind of God in framing it (30.). It might have been bet-
ter.

NOTE iL

djfbnt from Infinite. If therefore God had
created twice, thrice, or a thoufand thoufand
times as great, and as many Beings, and a thou
land thoufand Ages fooner than he has, the
fame, objections might be made, Why not be-
fore ? Why not more ? The World there-
fore muft either have been created Infinite and
irom Eternity, which the very Nature of the
thing feems not to allow, or it is all one when
and how great it might be, and not determi-
nable by any thing befides the Divine Pleafure.
See Chap. 5. . 1. Subf. 4. and % Clarke on
Nat. Evil, p. 90, 93, 280, ci>V.

(30.) In order to confirm this belief, and
come to a right Knowledge of the whole Que-
ilion before us, it is neceflary to enquire a lit-
tle into the meaning of thefe Words ; to confi-
der (with reverence^ what this Mind of God
might be in framing the World, and what was
the moft proper Method of anfwering it. Now
it appear'd from the Conclufion of the firft
Chapter, and Note 23. that the fole Defign of
Almighty God in creating the Univerfe, was
to impart Felicity to other Beings : and in the
beginning of this Chapter it was proved, that
any Happinefs thus communicated could not be
Infinite. His Defign then is completely an-
swer 'd, if the greateft - Degree of Happinefs be
imparted, of which created Beings are capa-
ble, confident with One another ; or when the
utmoft poffible Good is produced in the Uni-
verfe collectively. This alfo fhew.s us what-
we are to understand by the very beft Syftem, viz.
one that is fitted for, and productive of, the
greateft abfolute general Good: The manner of
effecting which comes next under confidera-
rion. As to this, it is queried in the firft
place, whether all Animals ought to have been
created equally perfect j or fe vera! indifferent

Ranks and Degrees of Perfection ; and fecond-
ly, whether God may be fuppofed to have pla-
ced any Order of Beings infuch a fix'd unal-
terable condition, as not to admit of advance-
ment: to have made any Creatures as perfect
at firitas the Nature of a created Being is ca-
pable of. The former of thefe doubts is fully
difcuG'd in this and the following Chipter,
V 2. The latter feems not fo eafy to be deter-
min'd. They who hold the affirmative argue
from our notion of Infinite or abfolute Goodnefs,
which muft excite the Deity always to commu-
nicate all manner of Happinefs, in- the very high-
eft Degree, for the fame reafon that it prompts
him to communicate it ever in any degree. But
this, fay they, he has. not done, except he at
firft endow'd fome Creatures with all the Per-
fection a Creature could poflibly receive, and
gave to every fubordinate Clafs of Beings *,
the utmoft Happinefs their feveral Natures were
capable of. Neither can this Opinion be con-
futed from Holy Scripture, which declares that
God made innumerable glorious Orders of
Cherubim and Seraphim., all far above our Com
prehenfion, and fome, for any. thing that we
know, in the very next Step to the Top of the
great Scale of Beings, and only Second to the
Almighty. Thofe that hold thecontrary Opi-
nion, diftinguifh between Happinefs and Per-
fection, and think that thefe do not either ne-
ceffarily imply, or infeparably attend each o-
ther. They deny therefore the confequence of
I the former Argument, and affign this Reafon
J for it, viz. becaufe a Being produced in the
! higheft degree of natural Perfection which a
1 Creature is capable of, and ftill continued in
the fame, will not receive as much Happinefs .
in the main, as others that were placed in a
I mucJunieriai State. at- the firft. Tnis, tho' it

' Cmtrntitg thefe Clajes, ft< Note*- 33 and 35; .

Of the Evil of Defctt.

ter perhaps in fome Particulars, but not without fome new, and pro-
bably greater Inconveniencies, which mud: have fpoil'd the Beauty,
either of the whole, or of fome chief Part.

IV. Fourthly ; From hence ic appears alfo, that all Beings cannot
liave equal Perfections* For die World muft necef-ariiy be compos'd

M 3 of

All th ; gs
could not
] ic equally
>erfet,
fincc fome
are Parts of others.

N O 2* E S.

may appear fomething like a Paradox, yet, up-
on farther confederation, will perhaps be judg'd
not improbable. Thus, for a Creature confci-
ous of no deficiency of any thing necefTary to
its well-being, to meet with a perpetual accef-
fion of new, unknown Pleafure, to refieftwith
comfort on its paft Condition, and compare it
with the prefent, to enjoy a continued Series
of freih Satisfaction and Delight, and be al-
ways approaching nearer and nearer to Perfec-
tion, this mull certainly advance the Sum of
its Happinefs, even above that of others, whofe
condition is fuppofed to h?.ve begun and to
continue in that degree of perfection, where
this will end (if there could ba any end in ei-
ther) and which never knew defied, variety, or
incrcafe. A finite Being fix'd in the fame
State, however excellent, muft, according to
all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge
from our prefent Faculties, and we can judge
from nothing elfe) contrail a kind of Indolence
or lnfenfibility (i. e. cannot always be equally
affected by an equal degree of Good in the Ob-
ject) which lnfenfibility, nothing but altera-
tion and variety can cure. It does not there-
fore feem probable, that God'has actually fix'd
any created Beings whatfoever in the very high-
ell degree of Perfection next to himfelf. Nay,
it is impoffible to conceive any fuch higheft
Degree, and the Suppofition is abfurd. That
which admits of a continual addibility, can
admit of no higbeft ; and to ask, why God
created not all Beings with the very higheft
Perfection ? is the fame abfurdity as to ask,
why he did not make as many Creatures, or as
many Worlds as he could ? For whkh fee

Note 22. Since then the Creation cannot be
Infinite; and finites, how much foever ampli-
fied, can never reach Infinity or abfolute Per-
fection*, we can fet no manner of bounds to the
Creating Power of God : but muft refer all to
his Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs: which At-
tributes we know can never be exhaufted, nor
will, we believe, produce any Beings in fuch
a State, as fhall not leave room enough for
them to be ftill growing in Felicity, and fore-
ver acquiring new Happinefs, together with
new Perfection.

This notion of a growing Happinefs is em-
braced by moft Divines, and affords the ftrong-
eft Motive for endeavouring to improve and-
excell in every Chriftian Grace. 'Tis beauti-
fully touch 'd upon by Mr. Addifon, Spectator"
N. 1 1 1 . " There is not, in my Opinion, a more
" p leafing and triumphant Conftderation in Reli-
" gion, than this of the perpetual Progrefs which
" the Soul makes toward the Per/eel ion of its Na-
" tare, without ever arriving at a Period in it.
" To look upon the Soul as going on from Strength
*' to Strength ; to con/ider, that She is to Jhine
" for ever with new Accejftons of Glory, and'
," brighten to all Eternity ; that She will be ftill
" adding Virtue to Virtue, and Knowledge to
" Knowledge, carries in it fomething wonderfully
" agreeable to that Ambition which is natural to
" the Mind of Man'. Nay, H muft be a Pro/fiefF
," pleaftngto God himfelf, to fee his Creation for
f* ever beautifying in his Eyes, and drawing nearer
" to him- by degrees of Refemblance.**

That the Happinefs of Saints and Angels may
be continually increafing, fee TWotfen's 77th
[Sermon, Vol. 2d Fol. p. 578, cjfr.

From

'See Note F; and Dr. BentleyV Boyle 's Le8> Serm. 6; p. 336, 237. cth Edit.

&6 Of the Evil of T>efecl.

of various Parts, and thefe parts of others, and fo on. But a Part
muft needs come lhort, both of the Divine Perfection, and the Per-
fection of the whole. For it is nothing with regard to all the Perfec-
tions which it has not, whether thefe be Divine, or Created -, and
fince one Part is not another, nor the whole, 'tis plain, that every part
wants the Perfections not only of the whole, but of other Parts alfo.
And that the whole is more perfect than a part, is evident from hence,
that it neceffarily includes the multiplied Perfection of every part;

and

NOTE &.

From thefe Confederations, and fome which
fellow in the remainder of this Note, it may
perhaps fcem probable, that in u?, and all Be-
ings of the like nature, changes from worfe to
better, muft be attended even with greater de-
grees of Pleafure lhan a fettled permanence in
any, the higheft State of Glory or Perfection,
andconfequently become neceflary to the com-
pletion of all finite Happinefs. But in oppo-
fition to all this, liayle urges, that encreafe or
alteration is not in the leaft requifite to a la-
fting Felicity even in ourfelves.

4f That 'tis no ways necefTary that our Soul
H fhould feel Evil, to the end it may relifh
w what is Good, and that it fhould pafs fuc-
" ceffively from Pleafure to Pain, and from
" Pain to Pleafure, that it may be able to dif-
" cern that Pain is an Evil, and that Pleafure
*' is a Good thing. We know by Experience,
" that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the
" fame time, both Pleafure and Pain; it muft
H therefore at firft. either have felt Pain before
* Pleafure, or Pleafure before Pain. If its
' firft. Senfation was that of Pain, it found that
41 State to be uneafy, altho' it was ignorant of
tl Pleafure. Suppofe then that its firft Senfa-
** tion lafled many Years, without Interrup-
* tion, you may conceive that it was in an
" eafy Condition, or in one that was uneafy.
'* And do not alledge to me Experience, do
* not tell me that a pleafure which lafls a long
*' time becomes infipid, and that a long pain
** becomes infupportable : For I will anfwer
* you, that this proceeds from a Change in
** the organ which makes that pain, which con-

* c tinues the fame as to kind, to be difFerent as
* to Degrees. If you have had at firft a Sen-
" fation of fix Degrees, it will not continue
** of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the
c< end of a Year, but only either of one De-
" gree, or of one Fourth part of a Degree,
" Thus Cuflom blunts the Edge of our Senfa-
** tions; their Degrees correfpond to the Con-
" cufuons of the parts of the Brain, and this
" Concuffion is weaken'd by frequent Repeti-
" tions: from whence it comes to pafs, that
the Degrees of Senfation are diminifh'd.
" But if Pain or Joy were communicated to
" us in the fame Degree, facceffively, for an
" hundred Years, we fhould be as unhappy, or
'* as happy in the hundredth Year, as in the
' firft Day; which plainly proves, that a
* Creature may be happy with a continued
" Good, or unhappy with a continued Evil,
** and that the Alternative, which Laftantius
M fpeaks of*, is a bad Solution of the Diffi-
" culty. It is not founded upon the nature of
" Good and Evil, nor upon the Nature of
" the Subject which receives them; nor upon
" the nature of the Caufe which produces
* them. Pleafure and Pain are no lefs proper
' to be communicated the fecond Moment than
" the firft, and the third Moment than the fe-
rt fecond, and fo of all the reft. Our Soul is
** alfo as fufceptible of them after it has felt
" them one Moment, as it was before it felt
" them, and God who gave them, is no lefs
" capable of producing them the fecond Mo-
" ment than the firft +.*'

Note 103.

f Critical Difl. p. 2486;

Of the Evit of Defca:

and befides the parts when join'd together, and conne&ed, acquire a
new and peculiar Perfection, whereby they anfwer their proper Ends,
which they could not do afunder, they defend themfelves much bet-
ter, and affift each other. The Perfection of the whole therefore, is
not only more extenjive than that of the parts, by the accumulation
of many parts, perhaps equal to one another j but more intenfe alfo;

N O 1" E &

As this is one of the ftrongeft obje&ions, [Brain by frequent Repetitions ; then- we fay, 'tis

J i*ii 11 l* i r -*->_!. t l __ __1"1 n-i 1 ^ .i* ..i r _ t** _ _ /-i ii

and applicable to all kinds of Evil; I have
quoted it at length (tho' fome partb may not re-
late immediately to our prefent purpofe) and
fhall endeavour to give a full anfwer to it in
the following Notes. It will be confider'd
with refpedl: to Moral Good and Evil, in
Notes 90, 106, and. 10 S. Let us confine our-
felvesat prefent to Natural Good, which may
be divided into fenfiHve and intellectual. As
to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for
the augmentation of its Happinefs, is endow'd
with various Senfes, each of which is enter-
tain'd with a variety of Objefts ; now, any
one of thefe Senfes can convey fo much Plea-
fure for fome time,., as is fufficient to fill' our
prefent narrow Capacity, and engrofs the
whole Soul. She can be entirely-happy in the
Satisfaction arifing from the Sight, Hearing,
&c or from the Memory, or any other Mode
of Perception by itfelfl If therefore any one
of thefe Organs could (as Bayle fuppofes) con-
tinue to communicate the fame Degree of Plea-
fure to us for an hundred Years, all the reft
would be unneceffary: but an All- wife Be-
ing, who cannot ad in vain, has implanted
this Variety of Senfes in us; this then is a
good Argument, that none of thefe particular
Senfes could continue in its prefent State, and
always communicate the fame Degree of Hap-
pinefs. Farther, this Supposition will appear
to be impoffible, from confidering.the Nature
and Properties of that Matter of which the
fenfitive Organs are compofed If there be (as
Bayle maintains) fo clofe a connexion between
the Soul and certain Modifications of Matter,
as that the Degrees of fenfitive Pleafure are di-
minifh'd by a Change in the Organ, by wea-
kening the Concuftion of fome parts of the

plainly impoffible, that the Tame Degrees fbould
be continued by this Organ, which, as it is
material, is perpetually expofed to this Change,
ind liable to Diflblutron, and necelfarily wea-
ken'd by thefe frequent Conct/JJtvns. Every Mo-
tion in it muft in time be ftop'd by contrary
ones, as our Author has fully fhewn in Chap.
4. V 1 .

If he fuppofes that the fame Degree of Plea-
fure may ftill be communicated tho' the Organ
liters, he fuppofes that there is no fuch Con-
nection between any portion or pofition of
Matter, and our Spirit; which is direftly con-
trary to his former Suppofition, and alfo to
Truth, as will perhaps appear from the fol-
lowing Chapter. If then Bayle imagines, thaf
the fame, or different Mater, when moved or
at reft ; or when moved in different Directions,
may ftill affeel the Mind in the very fame
manner, he mult either take it for granted that
the AffecYions of Matter are no Caufes of the
Senfations of the Mind, that is, contradict his
former Suppofition ; or elfe he muft fuppofe
the fame Effeft to proceed from different Cau-
fes ; either of which will tend equally to ad-
vance his Syftem. But in reality, this decreafe
of Pleafure in Familiarity and Cuftom, does
not entirely depend on any Change of the cor-
poreal Organs, but on the original Faculties of
the Soul itfelf, as may be gathered from fome
fuch Obfervations as this which follows. View
a delightful Landskip, a pleafant Garden, or
any of thofe Figures which appear moft beauti-
ful, renew the Profpeft once, or twice, to Day,
to Morrow, and at feveral diftant Periods ; it
fhall afford a great degree of Pleafure for fome
time, while any Novelty may be fuppofed to re^
main ; but that Pleafure perifhes together with

this

88 Of the Evil of VefrB.

by the Addition of certain Degrees, whereby the whole muft of Ne-
ceflity excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved, that an abfo-
lutely perfect Creature is an Impoflibility, fo it may be proved from
hence, that all cannot have an equal Degree of Perfection. For the
World confifts of Parts, and thofe again of others, perhaps divifible
in infinitum : but that every fingle Part mould have the Perfection of

all,

N O f E S.

this Novelty, tho' the external Organs of Vi-
fion itill continue perfect, and your Senfations
are moll evidently the fame the laft Day as the
flrft. You are able to behold the fame Scenes
over again, with the fame eafe and accutcnefs.
but not with the fame Intenfenefs of Delight
To attempt a Mechanical Solution of this by
a fuppofed alteration of fome imaginary Trace.
in the Brain (which yet, if they were allow'd,
cannot mend the matter a jot, as was juft now
(hewn) will only throw us into flill greater
difficulties, as any one that attentively confi-
ders the whole of that Chimerical Hypothecs,
mull conclude, and of which Bayle, who foon
perceiv'd the Defetts and Abfurdities of moil
other Syftems, was undoubtedly convine'd. It
feems to me much more properly refolvable
into a native Property of the Soul itfelf. Is it
not probable, th it the mind of Man is origi-
nally framed with an Appetite or Difpofition
for Variety? that it cannot be always on the
lime Bent, but as it is endow'd with different
Faculties fo thefe relieve one another by
turns, and receive an additional Pieafure from
the Xcvelty of thofe Objects about which it is
converfant; and that by this means it enjoys a
greater Sum of Happinefs than it could other
ways attain to ? See the Speftjtor, N. 600.
N*. 626. or N. 412. or Watti on the Paffions,
S- 4-

I (hall only add an Obfervation on this Head
from the ingenious Author of the Vindication tf
Gofs Mural Character, p 2 1 . which fhews us
the neceffity for this Variety or Increafablenefs
of Perfeftion, in order to our Intellectual Hap-
pinefs, fmce moll of that arifes from our paft
Defects. " By Intellectual Happinefs, / man
" the Difcovery and Contemplation of Truth,
" Kith regard to which I have this to obferve,
" that all the Pieafure s we tajle of this kind art

" owing either to our preceding Ignorance, to the
" care and Pains we take in the Difcovery of
" Truth, or to the Degree of our Knowledge,
** when we attain to a greater merfure than 0-
" ther Men. All Truth, when confuier'd fepa-
" rate from thefe, is alike as Truth {tho not of
" the like Importance to uf) the Ob j eel of the U/t-
" derflandivg, and as filth, it muf} afford the
" fame Delight. If we all could, with equal eafe
'* and clearnefs, fee all the Relations of things,
" they muf} all in the nature of the thing equally
" off eel us. We pould tajle as much Pieafure M
" knozoing or contemplating that tzvo and two makes
" four, as in knowing or contemplating anyP ropofition
" which now appears the nufl difficult,*//*//^ affords
" the mojl Pieafure: or rather,- we fhould not
" have Pieafure from any of them. Now if this
" be the Cafe, then it is evident, that the 'Capa-
" city we have for tafling this kind of Pieafure,
" renders uj capable of its contrary. We could
" not be delighted in the Difcovery or Contempla'
" tion of Truth, if we were not capable of being
u ignorant, and of the Unhappine/s which arifes
"from it:'"

This is the Ccnfequence we would draw
from all that went before : but of this more at
large under the head of Moral Evil.

We reply then to Bayle, that this Alternative
or Variety of either Good or Evil, as far as
concerns the prefent Argument, is founded on
the Nature of the Subjecl which receives them,
and that our Soul in its prefent State, is not
fo fufceptible of them, after it has felt them
two or three times as at firft. What it might
have been made capable of, is nothing to the
Purpofe, fincc (as it was obferv'd before, and
muit often be repeated) we are to confider Man
as we find him at prefent ; and draw all our
Arguments, not frem fuch Faculties as are

per-

Of the Evil of TtefetL

or many, 16 impoflible ; and we are not to arraign the Power or Good-
nefs of ( God for not working Contradictions. There muft then 'be
many, perhaps infinite (31.) Degrees of Perfection in the Divine
Works ; for whatever arifes from Nothing is neceiTarily imperfect ; and
the lefs it is removed from nothing (taking Exiftence for one Degree,
as we faid before) the more imperfect it is. There is no occafion
therefore for an Evil Principle to introduce the Evil of Defect, or an
Inequality of Perfections in the Works of God : for the very nature
of created Beings neceflarily requires it, and we may conceive the
place of this Malicious Principle to be abundantly fupplied from
hence, that they derive their Original from Nothings (32.).

V. Fifthly,

NGTES.

perhaps in other Beings, but, from thefe onl.
which we perceive and experience in him. If
thefe cannot be alter'd and improved confi-
ftently with each other *, nor fubjected to any
general Laws more fuitable to his prefent cir-
cumlta-nce?, and -productive of more good to
the whole Syftem f, then, all. Arguments built
on thts Topic againft the Divine Attributes,
mult fell to the Ground. Thefe and the like
Suppofitions therefore, viz. that the fame De-,
gree of Pieafure might be communicated to us fjc-
cefftveh for a hundred Years; if understood of
one uniform Caufe pi oducing it : That our Plea-
sures, meaning jenj.tive ones, might not depend
upon the Fibres of the Brain, and, That thefe
Fibres fhouid not ur,:r out ,;t all ||, or, if thefe
Fibres did not wear out, that the Pieafure
jkould never decay, are all unreafonable Suppo-
fitions : They offend againft the Rule laid
down above, and always to be remember'd,
of taking the whole of human Nature as it
is; of confidering our prefent Body and Spi-
rit, and the obvious Properties of each, and
the known Laws of their Union together. All
aich Objections therefore are befide the Que-
ltion ; and founded upon the old abfurdity of
reducing us to a different Clafs of Brings,
when (as will appear prefenrly) all conceiva-
ble Clares and Orders are already full.

Thus much for one Qnery about the. manner
of Creating things, viz. Whether any fhouid
have been fix'd immutably in a certain Degree
of Perfection : Our Author proceeds to exa-
mine the other, viz. Whether all things could
and ought to have been at firft created in the
fame Degree of Perfection ?

(31.) That is Indefinite, or greater than any
aflignable Number ; for neither the Univerfe
itfelf, nor any thing that belongs to it, can be
properly and abfolutely Infinite, as our Author
maintains in his Note F, and we have largely
proved from Cudzoerth, &c. in the -former
Chapter.

(32.) It is fcarce neceffary to obferve, that
this muft all along be underitood only Materi-
ally, i. e. that thefe things were not produced
from any matter pra-exiftent, but were made
kE ix, ieT&tf', and brought into Being from
mere Non-Exiflrnre. For the poffibility of
which, and the Opinion of the Antients on
this Subject, fee Cvd~i>tnh, C. 5. V 2. p. 738,
65V. The other Scnfes of the Words, viz.
That any thing can come from nothing, cau-
[ally, or be produced by nothing, or by itfelf %
or without an Efficient Caufe, arc manifeltly. ab-
furd, as is demonitrated at large in. the fanne.
excellent Seition. For an Illuftration of our.
Author's Notion before us, fee Scott's Chilian

. . .: *M

Ste Note 421

f- See Note 37.

See BayicV,'Z).:V?. r. 24.87.

jo Of the Evil of 3)cfe3.

Things ne- V. Fifthly: 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not only unequally im^
ceffarily are pcr f e ft ' m re fpect. f t h c ir Parti and Under-parts t and fo on, which

Ot UnCUQ.ll \ i rT i * /- t.' I

Pcrfeaions by continual Sub-divinon, approach in a manner to nothing; but a
with regard neC efTary inequality arifes among them alfo in refpect of their At-
tributes! but tributes. For a confcious or thinking Subflance is more perfect than
it is agrtea- ne that wants Senfe or Underftanding. If it be ask'd, How is it a-
h!jheft hc greeable to the Divine Goodnefs to have created thefe alfo ? I an-
Goodnefi to fwer, If the Creation of thefe be no impediment to the production
which arc" 6 ^ tne more perfect; if neither the Number nor Happinefa of the
lead perfect, more perfect be diminished by the Creation of thofe that are lefs per-
iftheyarenof e ft j why will it be unfit to create thefe too? Since God does
the number what is beft. to be done, nothing more or greater can be expected
orconveni- from the moft benevolent and powerful Author of Nature. If
Perfect therefore it be better, cater is paribus, that thefe more imperfect: Be-
ings fhould exirt, than not, it is agreeable to the Divine Goodnefs,,
that the bell that could be mould be done. If the Production of
a lefs perfect Being were any hindrance to a more perfect one, it
would appear contrary to the Divine Goodnefs, to have omitted the
more perfect and created the lefs ; but fince they are no manner of
hindrance to each other, the more the better, (33.).

VI, An

NOTE S.

more
ones.

fifty Part 2. Vol. 1. G. 6. V- 2. p. 446, 447.
I ft Edit. God is the Caufe of Perfeclion on-
" ly, but not, of" De fed, which fo far forth as
" it is natural to created Beings hath no Caufe
** at all, but is merely. a Negation or Non-entity.
" For every created thing was a Negation or Non-
" entity before ever it had a poftive Being, and
*' it had only fo much of its primitive Negation
" taken away from it*, as it had poftive Being
" conferr'd upon it; and therefore, fo far forth
" a it is, its Being is to be attributed to the
*' Sovereign Caufe that produced it ; butfo.far
** forth as it is not, its not being is to be at-
** tributed to the Original Non-entity, out of
H which it was produced. For that which
ft was once. Nothing, would fill have been
*' Nothing, had it not been for the Caufe that
H gave Being to it, and therefore, that it is fo
*t far Nothing ftill, i. e. limited and defeclive,
* is. only to. be attributed to its own* primitive

" Nothingnefs.. As for inftance, If I give a
" poor Man a hundred pounds, that he is-
" worth fo much Money is wholly owing to
" me, but that he is not worth a hundred
" more, is owing only to his own Poverty,
** and juft. fo, that I have fuch and fucb Per-
,** fetlions of Being is wholly owing to God
'" who produced me out of Nothing; but
" that I have fuch and fuch Defecls of being,
" is only owing to that Non-entity out of which,
" he produced me."-

The fame Notion is alfo largely difcufs'd^
in Eilhardi Lubini Phofphorus, cjfr. Chap. 6, 7,
and 17. From whom it appears, that moft
of the ancient Philofophers meant no more
than- this by their Evil Principle.

(33-) A good Illuftration of this occurs in
Dr. /. C/arie % s Difcourfe on Nat. Evil, p. 289,
ts"<. Now from the Suppolitioa of a Scale of

Beings

Of the Evil ofDefcB. 9 1

VI. An Inftance will make this more clear, Suppofe that God This con-
made the World finite ; fuppofe that Spirits, or pure immaterial firm ' d ty a *
thinking Beings, are the mojl perfect Species of Subftances : fuppofe, u-^^
in the laft place, that God created as many of this fort as were con- which is no
venient for the Syftem he had made, fo that if there were more, they J^EJ^g^
would incommode one another j yet there would be no lefs Room rits.
for Matter, than if there were none at all. This Suppofition is by no
means abfurdj for fince thefe may be conceiv'd without local Exten-
Jion, and have no relation to Space or Place, as Bodies have * in what-
ever Number they were created, they would contribute nothing at all

N 2 either

NOTES.

Beings gradualy defcending from Perfection to
Non-entity, and compleat in every intermediate
Rank and Degree (for which fee Note 35 ) we
fhall foon perceive the abfurdity of fuch Que-
flions as thefe, Why was not Man made more
perfedr ? Why are not his Faculties equal to
thofe of Angels ? Since this is only asking
why he was not placed in a quite different
Clafs of Being?, when at the fame time all o-
ther Gaffes are fuppofed to be already full.
From the fame Principle alfo, we gather the
Intent of the Creator in producing thofe fe-
vcral inferior Orders under our View. They
who imagine that all things in this World
were made for the immediate ufe of Man a-
lone, run themfejves into inextricable Diffi-
culties. Man indeed is the Head of this low-
er part of the Creation, and perhaps it was de-
fign'd to be abfolutely under his command.
But that all things here tend diredtiy to his
own ufe, is, I think, neither eafy nor ncceffa-
ry to be proved. Some manifeftly ferve for
the food and fupport of other?, whofe Souls
may be neceffary to prepare and preferve their
Bodies for that Purpofe, and may at the fame
time be happy in a Confcioufnefs of their own
Rxiftence. Tis probable, that they are inten-
ded to promote each others Good reciprocal-
ly : Nay, Man himfelf contributes to the Hap-

pinefs, and betters the Condition of the Brutes
in feveral refpedls; by cultivating and impro-
ving the Ground, by watching the Seafons, by
protecting and providing for them, when they
are unable to protect and provide for them-
felves ||. Others of a much lower Clafs, may,
for ought we know, enjoy themfelves too in
fome degree or other; and alfo contribute to
the Happinefs even of fuperior Beings, by a
difplay of the Divine Attributes in different
ways, and affording ample matter of Reflec-
tion on the various Ranks and Degrees of Per-
fection difcoverable in the animal World ;
wherein the higheft order may with pleafure
contemplate numberlefs Species infinitely be-
low them : and the lower Clafs can admire
and adore that Infinity of Divine Wifdom and
Goodnefs and Power which fhines forth in fo
many Beings vaftly above them. They may
conduce to the Beauty, Order, and Benefit of
the whole Syftem, the general Good of which
was the aim of its Creator, and with regard to
which, every part is chiefly to be efteem'd f.
They may have Ten thoufand Ufes befide what
relates to Man, who is but a very fmall part of
it : Several Inftances might be given, which
would make this very probable ; at leaft, the
contrary, I think, cannot ever be proved. Sec
C. 4. ^. 2. Subf. 4^ 5.

* See Note 13.

|| See Chubb' s Supplement, c^r. p. \z\ and Dr. J Clarke, p. 284, 285.

f See Cudworth, p. 875, 876.

9 0r Of the Evil of Defeft.

cither to the filling up of Space, or excluding. Bodies out of ir, yet

they would have a certain Sxjlem or Society among themitlves, which

mieht require a determinate Number, which if it were exceeded^ they

muft become troubleibme to one another, by too- great a. Multitude in.

a- fiiitte World. Nay, if the World Were iiippofed to be infinite,

and- as many fuch Spirits created as were pofiible, yet would they be

no impediment to Matter, nor xMattcr to them, neither would their

Number be leisj nor their Conveniences fewer, becaufe Matter did

or did not exift. Since then material, and immaterial Beings ccnfiit

fo well together, is it not agreeable to* the greateft Goodnefs to have

created both? Let Matter be ftupid and devoid of Senfe, as it is;

let it be the moft imperfect of all Subftances, and next to nothing, .

(f nee not to perceive its Exiftence is. little different from Non-exi-

flence) 'tis better to be even fo, than not at all; for Eyiftence is, as

we faid, the Foundation, or firft Degree of Perfection, and the next,

as it were, to this, the fecond, is perception of Exiftence. But you'll

fay, Why did not God add this fecond Degree to Matter ? I anfwer,

if that could, it is probable it would, have been done: But fince

we fee that Matter is in itfelf a paffive, inert Subftance, we muhV

believe that its Nature would not admit of Senfe, or if it had been

capable of Senfe, that greater Inconveniencies would have flow'd

from thence, than if it had been made infenfible, as it is, (34.).

However

NOTE S.

(34.) Matter, as fuch, is at present incapa-
ble of, or has Properties totally inconfiftent
with thought and felf-motion, (as is at large
demonstrated by the Authors referr'd to in
Note 13.) it is therefore in a Degree below
Animals, or (as our Author fays) next to No-
thing. But yet, fuch as it is, 'tis firft, ab-
solutely neceffary to many Animals, and fe-
<fndly, would not be. fo convenient fo their
ufcs, if it could think. It is the BJis or Sup-
pert of Animals in this our Syftem-; it is, as we
may fay, the cafe and covering of their feveral
Souls; it ferves for the clothing of that Cafe,
fcr their Fwd, thejr Defence, and various ufes,

But were it all Life, or confeious (not to in-
fill on the Absurdities of fuch a Supposition in
itfelf) what Mifery and Confufion would a-
rife? If all were Animals, what muft thefe
Animals fubfift on ? If they were q the fame
Nature with fuch as we are acquainted with,
fhey muft alfo be fuftain'd after the fame man-
ner, /. e. they muft live by Food, and confe-
quently live upon, and continually torment
and confume one another ; and confequently
more Happinefs would be loft than gorby fuch
Life, which is as plentiful at prefent *", as
feems agreeable to the Syftem. If Matter, as
Matter, were.endow'd with the Power of Self-

Mathri+ .

* &*Note 39;.

Of the Evil of fkfefa.

Ti'o'ttzier, without this, there would be a kind oiVotdin t!5e Univerfe,
and fomething wanting which might exiit: bur it was better that
there mould be Matter than, nothing at all,., and fince one Side was to
be chofer>, the Divine Gbodnefs preferr'd Matter, . becaufe that was
the greater Good, For, fince it is no hindrance to the multiplica-
tion or convenience of thinking Beings, nor diminilhes the number of
the more perfect, 'tis plain it adds to the perfection of the Univerie,
and whatever it be, tho' the moffc imperfect thing in Nature, 'tis
gain to the whole. It was therefore agreeable to the greatefl Power
and Goodnefs to have created this alfo ; nor need we the Demiurgus
of the antient Heretics to produce it, as if unworthy of the great and
good God. The Evils of Imperfection then muft be permitted in
the Nature of things ; and inequality of Perfections mult be permit-
ted alfo, fince it is impoffibl'e that all the Wacks of God mould be
endow'd with equal Perfections.

VII. If you fay, God might have, omitted the more imperfect ' TisIefsai
Beings, I grant it, and if that had been beft he would undoubtedly fhTl)ivine
have done it. But it is the part of infinite Goodnefs to choofe the Goodnefs to
very belt j from, thence it proceeds therefore, that the more imperfect ^^^0
Beings have Exiftence; for it was agreeable to that, not to omit the hav'c created,,
very leaft Good which could be produced. Finite Goodnefs might . thefe re
poffibly have been exhaufted in creating the greater Beings, but Inji- \^
nite extends to all. The infinite Power and Goodnefs of God then
were the Caufe why imperfect Beings had Exiftence together with
the more perfect. 'Tis plain therefore that the Syflem of the World,
may be. xhoJFork of a Deity, tho' it has this. Fault. Nay, that it was

N 3 created.

notes:

Motion, what ufe could we put if'to "? Whrt
clothing or Habitations ? What Jnftruments or
Uteiifils could we make of it? But this, I
think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter
then, in its prelent State, as united with, and
fnbfervient to, fuch Spirits as we conceive
ors to be, is in general more conducive to
the Good and Happinefs of the whole, than it
would be in any other conceivable manner of
Exiitence. To ask yet why fome certain Po-
tiona or Syftcms of it might not have been

made more perfect, or why it was not farther
fublimated, refined, and fo unaccountably mo-
dify'd, as to be render'd capable of Thought ;
is the abfurd Queftion above mend on' d, vix.
why was it not made fomething elfe, or remo-.
ved into a higher Clafs? when at the fame time
there appears Co much reafon for the Exiitence
of fuch a thing as this now is; and all the fu*
perior ClafTcs are concluded to be full. What
reafon there it for this laft conclufiofl may be
feen in the following Note.

9 Of the Evil of T>cfaH.

created is evident for this very Reafon, becaufe it is imper/eft-, for if
it were Self-exiftent, it would be abfolutely perfeft. (35.)

NOTES,

(3 v) The chief Argument of the foregoing
Chapter is beautifully illuftrated by Mr. Addi-
/fain the Spectator, N. 519. As frequent ufe
will be made of this Observation concerning
-the Scale of Beings, 1 hope the Reader will ex-
cufe my tranferibing fo much of the above men-
tion'd Paper as is neceiTary to explain it.

* Infinite Goodnefs is of fo communicative
** a Nature, that it feems to delight in the con-
44 ferring of Exiflence upon every Degree of
44 perceptive Being. As 'his is a Speculation
* which I have often purfued with great
'* pleafure to my felf, I fhall enlarge farther
"" upon it, by confidering that part of the
* Scale of Beings which comes within our
44 Knowledge. There are fomc living Crea-
*' tures which are raifed juft above dead Mat-
44 ter. To mention only the Species of Shell-
44 Fim, which are formed in the fafhion of a
" Cone, that grow to the furface of feveral
44 Rocks, and immediately die upon their be-
" ing fever' d from the place where they grow.
** There are many other Creatures, but one re-
44 move from thefe, which have no other Sen-
' fes befides that of feeling and tafte. Others
" have Hill an additional one of Hearing . o-
44 thers of Smell, and others of Sight. It is
** wonderful to obferve, by what a gradual pro-
* 4 grefs the World of Life advances thro' a pro-
** digious variety of Species, before a Creature
** is form'd that is compleat in all its Senfes ;
** and even among thefe is fuch a different De-
n grce of Perfection, in the Senfe which one
44 Animal enjoys beyond what appears in ano-
44 ther, that tho' the Senfe in different Ani-
*' mals be diftinguifh'd by the fame common
44 denomination, it feems almoft of a different
44 Nature- If after this we look into the fe-
4 veral inward Perfections of Cunning and
44 Sagacity.or what we generally call Inftintt |),
41 we find them rifing after the fame manner
** imperceptibly one above another, and re-
44 ceiving additionallmprovements according
M to the Species in which they are implanted.

'* This Progrefs in Nature is fo very gradual,
" that the moll perfeft of an inferior Species
" comes very near to the moftimperfett of that
" which is immediately above it. The exube-
t rant and overflowing Goodnefs of the fu-
" preme Being, whofe Mercy extends to all
*' his Works, is plainly feen, as I have before
*' hinted, from his having made fo little Mat-
A ter, at leaft what falls within our Knowledge,
** that does not fwarm with Life: nor is his
" Goodnefs lefs feen in the Diverfity than in
' the Multitude of living Creatures. Had he
" only made one Species of Animals, none of
'* the reft would have enjoy 'd the Happinefs
" of Exiftence, he has therefore fpecified in
* his Creation every Degree of Life, every
44 Capacity of Being. The whole Chafm in
,4 Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is filled up
44 with diverfe kinds of Creatures, rifing one
' over another, by fuch a gentle and eafy af-
44 cent, that the little tranfitions and devia-
* 4 tions from one Species to another, are al-
41 moft infenfible. This intermediate Space is
44 fo well husbanded and managed, that there
u is fcarce a Degree of Perfection which does
44 not appear in fome one part of the World of
" Life. Is the Goodnefs or Wifdom of the
44 Divine Being more manifefted in this his
44 Proceeding ? There is a Confequence, be-
41 fides thofe 1 have already mentioned, which
44 feems very naturally deducible from the fcre-
' 4 going Confident! ons. If the Scale of Be-
14 ings rifes by fuch a regular Progrefs, fohigh
14 as Man, we may, by a parity of Reafon, fup-
44 pofe that it ftill proceeds gradually thro'
44 thofe Beings which are of a fuperior Nature
44 to him; fince there is an infinitely greater
t4 Space and Room for different Degrees of
44 Perfection between the Supreme Being and
44 Man, than between Man and the moft defpi-
44 cable Infeft. This Confequence of fo great
44 a variety of Beings, which are fuperior to
44 us, from that variety which "is inferior to us,
44 is made by Mr. Locke, in a paffage which I

44 fhall

|| To which we may add, Will and Liberty. See Bayle'^ Did. p. 2609, 2610.

Of the Evil apDefeSt.
NOTES.

" (hall here fet down, after having premifed,
" that notwithftanding there is fuch Infinite
" Room between Man and his Maker, for the
creative Power to exert itfelf in, it is im-
u poffible that it mould ever be filled up, fince
** there will be itill an Infinite gap or diftance
" between the higheft created Being and the
" Power which produced him."

The fine PafTage there cited; from. Mr. Locke,
occurs in the 3d Book of his Effay, Chap. 6.

*. 12.

See alfo Notes 38, 39.
From the foregoing Obfervation, that there
is no manner of Cbafm or Void, no Link defi-
cient in this great Chain of Beings, and the
reafon of it, it will appear extremely proba-
ble alfo, that every diltinft Order, every Clafs
or. Species of them, is as full as the Nature of
it would admit, and God faw proper. There
are (as our Author fays) perhaps {o many in
each Clafs as could exilt together without fome
inconvenience or uneajinefs to each other. This

is eafily conceivable in Mankind, and may be
in fuperior Beings, tho\ for want of an exaft
knowledge of their feveral Natures and Orders,
we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or con-
ceive how they afFecl: one another ; oaly this
we are fure of. that neither the Species nor the
Individuals in each Species, can poflibly be In-
finite ; and that nothing but an ImpoJfibiTity in
the Nature of the thing, or fome greater incon-
venience, can reflxain the exercife of the Power
of God, or hinder him from producing ftill
more and more Beings capable of Felicity.
When we begin to enquire into the Number of
thefe and the Degrees of their Perfection, we
foon lofe ourfelves, and can only refer all to
the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs: from our
previous Notices of which Attributes, we
have the higheft reafon to conclude, that eve-
ry thing is as perfect as poffible in its own
kind, and that every Syftem is in itfelf full;
and complete.

CHAP.

9 6

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Natural Evil.

s E c T. I.

Of Generation and Corruption,

A Creature I, tT appears from the foregoing Obfervations, that created Be-
pSnof ?m" * n S s mu ^ neceffarily be defective, i. e. fome mult want

F?te, tho'it JL the Perfections which others have, and that it was impoffible
beiefsperfaa f or mem to en j y either an abfolute or equal Perfection ; alfo,

that there is no occafion for an Evil Principle oppofite to Infinite
Goodnefs and Power. And from hence we may affirm, that God,
tho' infinitely good and powerful, could not feparate things from the
concomitant Evils of Imperfection, and did not efteem it unbecom-
ing himfelf to create the .Good, tho' that brought fome Evils along
with it, fo long as thefe Evils are lefs than the Good with which
they are connected. Nor can the Creature juftly complain of its
Condition, if it have not all, or equal Perfection, with fome others;
fince 'twas neceffary that it mould fill the Station wherein it was
placed, or none at all. This we have fhewn fufficiently, I think, in
the former kind of Evils, viz. thofe of lmperfeftion.
The Origin II. The fame muft be attempted in the fecond kind, viz. the Afa-
from'Maner/^^- Now, as all created Beings are made out of Nothing, and on

is the Source that

of Natural .

Evils, as their rife from Nothing is the Caufe of thofe of Imperfection,

Concerning Natural Evil. 97

that account are neceffarily imperfect ; fo all natural things have a re-
lation to, or arife from, Matter, and on this account are neceflarily
fubjected to natural Evils : nor is the rife of all created Beings from
Nothing a more fruitful and certain Caufe of the Evils of Imperfec-
tion, than the rife of all natural things from Matter is of natural
Evils, (36.). If therefore we can fhew that thefe Evils are fo necef-
farily connected with this Origin that they cannot be feparated from
it, it follows, that the Structure of the World either ought not to
have been framed at all, or that thefe Evils mud have been tole-
rated without any Imputation on the Divine Power and Goodnefs.
But k is better that they mould be as they are, fince they could
not be more perfect. Let us examine the particular Sorts of natural
Evils, and if there be nothing in them which could be removed
without greater damage to Nature, and introducing a larger train of
Evils, the Divine Goodnefs may fecurely applaud itfelf, lince it has
omitted no manner of Good, nor admitted any Evil which could
poffibly be prevented, /'. e. hath done in every thing what was
beft.

III. God has accomplim'd this in the Creation of Matter, as we Matter is
faid before, nor has he been lefs beneficent in what relates to the ufeiefs except
Motion of Matter. In the firft place, Matter, tho' in itfelf unactive, 'f have M -
is neverthelefs capable of Action, viz. local Motion, for Motion is the
Action that belongs to Matter. But 'tis better that it mould act as
far as it is capable, than be entirely ftill and fluggim: if it were
without Motion, rigid and fix'd in the fame place, we cannot con-
ceive what benefit it could be of either to itfelf or any thing elfe :
But when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of ufe, as is plain from
Experience, tho' not always without a Mixture of Evils : But Action
is, cceterh paribus, preferable to Inactivity; it is therefore agreeable
to the Divine Goodnefs to produce Motion in Matter, if the Good

arifing

NOTE S.

(36.) From hence it may be obferv'd, that
there was fomc Foundation for that old and al-
moin univerfal Notion, that all natural Evils
aroic from Matter) which in effeft they do,

but not from it as an eternal independent
Caufe, or the Evil Principle of the Manithces,
as will be fhewn below. See BayJe's Did.
p. 978.

o8 Concerning Natural Ev':L

from thence do but over-ballance the Evil, fo long as no Evils are
permitted which are feparable from Motion, nor fuch as can affect
Spirits, which are purely immaterial.
Such Motion IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, confidently with his
wisVUnMat- Goodnefs, both create Matter and put it into Motion, it neceffarily
ter, as might follows, that its Motions mull interfere with one another. If you
Jcparate n f fty t h at ]yi atter might move uniformly and altoo-ether, either in a

into Parts. / . . O J . o #

Hence the airecl Ltne or in a Circle, and the contrariety of Motions by that
Generation means be prevented : I anfwerj The whole Mafs of Matter would be no
ofBo- P kfs rigid andufelefs with fuch a Motion as this, than if it were entirely

tion

dies natural- at reft; it would neither be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to
the ufes which it now anfwers. Such a Motion therefore was to be
excited in it, as would feparate it into parts, make it fluid, and ren-
der it an Habitation fit for Animals. But that could not be without
contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks of it at all will perceive :
and if this be once admitted in Matter, there neceffarily follows a Di-
vijion and Difparity of parts, Clajking and Oppojition, Comminution,
Concretion and Repuljion, and all thofe Evils which we behold in Ge-
neration and Corruption. God could indeed have removed all thefe
from Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are either to be
tolerated, or Matter muft remain fix'd and immoveable in the fame
Situation. Some may afk, why God would not produce fuch Motion
in Matter as migh render all its Concretions fo perfect as not to be
liable to Diffolution or Corruption. For, fince the Power of God is
infinite, nothing on his fide hinders this from being done, what hin-
ders therefore on the fide of Matter ? I anfwer ; Its Motion and Di-
vifibility. For, if you fuppofe any fort of Motion in Matter, it
muft neceffarily be either ufelefs, as we faid before, or in oppojite Di-
rections. The mutual clafhing of thefe Concretions could therefore
not be avoided, and as they flrike upon one another, whether we
fuppofe them hard or foft, a concuffion of the parts, and feparation
from each other, would neceffarily be produced : But a Separation or
Diffipation of the parts is Corruption. This therefore could not be
avoided without violence done to the Laws of Motion and the Nature
of Matter, For, to hinder moveable things from interfering, and the

Parts,

Concerning Natural Evil. 99

Parts which are feparable in themfelves, from feparating fey mutual
repul/ions, would require a perpetual Miracle, (37.).

V. Secondly; Since it is proper that Matter mould be put into Mot}onundcr
Motion, 'tis better that this mould be done according to fome cer- certain Laws
tain Laws, and in an orderly Courfe, than at random, and as it were tenc j s mor f
by chance. For by this means, the Syftems compofed of Matter will nation of *'
have both more durable and more regular Periods. The firft Evil a- things, than
rifing from Matter was, we faid, the jarring of Elements; from It randan:
whence comes their Corruption and DifTolution, Inftability and Vicif- hence God
fitude. It may be furprifing, that all thefe mould proceed from a ?e" Bodies 1 "
ftable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have made it appear, that into various
Matter could not move at all without thefe, and it was more eligi- s y ftcn -
ble that the World mould be liable to them, than deftitute of Ani-
mals. And that thefe Evils mould not multiply beyond Neceffity,
the Divine Goodnefs has taken care, by retraining its Motion under
certain Laws, fo as to make it fteady, and as conftant as could be ;
fo that the Machines compofed of it might be as little fhock'd with
contrary Motions as pomble, and endure for a long time ; nay, fome
of them in certain places and circumftances forever. For if no par-
cels of Matter were directed by any certain and determinate Rule,
fuch a confufed Motion would jumble every thing together, nor could
any thing laft for ever fo fhort a time. On this account God efla-
blifh'd certain Laws of Motion, and perpetual Rules ; and framed

O 2 the

NOTES.

(37.) That is, there could be no general pre-
eltablifh'd Laws of Nature but God rauft conti-
nually intcrpofc, and effeft every thing by his
own dirett and immediate Power : The bad
confequenccs of which are very obvious. There
could be no Arts and Sciences, no Skill or Indu-
ftryi no regular Methods of providing for our
Bodies, or improving our Minds in the Know-
ledge of things. All which evidently prefup-
pofc, and are entirely founded on, fome fet-
tled, certain Laws of the Univerfe difcoverable
by us.

" We are fo far acquainted (fays the Author
" of the Religion of Nature Dclin. p. 96.)

" with the Laws of Gravitation and M tion,
" that we are able to calculate their Effects,
f and ferve ourfelves of them, fupplying up-
' on many occafions the defect of Power in
" ourfelves by Mechanical Powers, which ne-
" ver fail to anfwer according to the Efta-
" bliihment, C5V." What the known Laws of
Nature are, fee in Cbeytie's Phil. Prin. Keil'a
Introd. to Phyf. &c. Concerning the neccflity
of the prefent Laws of Motion, and the fit-
nefe of them to attain the intended Ends, fee
Dr. J.Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 92, &c. and'
150,158.

i oo Concerning Natural Evil.

the great Mafs of Beings into certain Machines and Syftems, which 1
have fuch an exact correfpondence, as to contribute their mutual
Affiftance towards preferving die. Motion and Order prefcribed by the
Deity. Neither was it convenient that Matter mould every where-
confift of the fame kind of parts ; but rather that it mould be in one
place very fluid, fimilar and homogeneous, fuch as we believe the
/Ether to be j in another, folid and compact, as the Earth is, and per-
haps the Stars ; in another, mix'd with heterogeneous Particles, fuch
as we find the Air and Water.

VI. We muft confefs, that fuch a Mafs as the Earth is, feemsrnotT
LmLi'ht f beautiful, or fo fit for Motion, as the pure fluid ^Ether, 'tis alfo
and other more liable to Corruption and Changes; yet it is moft certain, that
K*nmen:i, the Earth was not.conftituted in this manner for no reafon at all, or
fcmofthu unneceffarily : perhaps the Mundane.. Syftem could no more confift
World is the without thefe folid Manes, than, the human Body without Bones.

oS b iauri? No fober Man doubts > but God could have dHpofed- this, Material
id. V/orld into other Syftems ; and of what kind foever thefe had been,

our Reafon could never have comprehended the contrivance of them.
For, fince our Planetary Syftem is incomprehensible to us, much more
will the Fabric of the whole Univerfe be fo ; but, as far as we do un-
derftand the difpofition of it, all is well, elegant and beautiful : and
if, among all the Phenomena of Nature, we were only acquainted
with Light, that would mew us ; the juft and admirable Structure o
it. It is reafonable therefore to believe, that this is the very beft, and
attended with the leaft Inconveniencies.

VII. You'll fay that fome particular things might have been bet-
affinnriut *** But, ^ nce y ou do not thoroughly underftand the whole, you
Mattermigbt have no right to affirm thus much. We have much greater Reafon
i'nrt better^ to P reujme > tnat no one part; of it. could be chang'd for the better, ,
Syftems.fince without greater detrimentno the reft, which it would either be in-
wedonot CO nfiftent with, or difligure by its Difproportion *: For we have
derftand the fhewn before, that, all manner of Inconveniencies could not be a-
prefcnt, voided, becaufe of the Imperfection of Matter, and the Nature of

Motion. That State of things was therefore preferable, which was
attended 'with the feweft and leaft Inconveniencies. And who but a
very rafb> indifcreet Perfon will affirm, that God has not actually

made

S& Note, 42..

Concerning Natural Evil. 1^1

made choice of this ? Nay, who can do it with any fhadow of Rea-
fon, unlefs he throughly underftands both this and that other which
he would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon them before this,
gives Sentence before he has look'd into the Caufe, and is at the fame
time both a partial and an incompetent Judge.

It concerned us the more to have this well explain'd, that being con-
vinc'd of the Convenience or Meliority of the whole Material Syftem,
we may more eafily perceive the Origin of thofe Evils which neceflariiy
follow fromthe Contrariety of Motion, and the Corruption of things.

S E C T. n.

Concerning Animals and the Variety of them.

Ti Qlnce Matter is not Self-confcious, nor able to enjoy itfelf, norca- Ma " er doe *
O pable of receiving any benefit from itfelf, it follows, that it be made for
was not made for itfelf, but for fomething elfe, to which it was to its own fake,
be fubfervient in Senfation, Thought, or Fruition. We find by Expe- sdf confcu
rience, that Matter can be thus ferviceable to a thinking Being, tho > ous, , tisthere-
ftupid and infenfibk itfelf: 'Tis probable therefore that God defign'd^^f^ '
and diredted all Matter to this end as far as was poflible. Hence of Animals.
comes the Union of fenfible and thinking Beings with the Particles
of Matter, as we experience in ourfelves. The fame may be faid of
all its parts, as far as the order and constitution of things allow'd.
There is nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any Region with-
out its Animals. For fuppofing, as we faid, fo many pure Spirits, fe*-
parate from Matter, to be made as were convenient ; as thefe occupy'
no. Place.*, there would be no lefs Room for other thinking fenfible:-

O 3. SuManceS'

103

'Tis provable
th.it Animals
vary accor-
ding to the
variety of
thole regions
which they
are deflin'd
to inhibit :
Therefore
the .flither
and Air, in
all probabi-
lity, have
their proper
inhabitants,
as well as the
Earth.

Concerning Natural Evil.

Subftances devoid of Matter to exercife their Faculties, and enjoy
themfelves, which for the future let us call Souls, (38.).

II. Now, fince the Structure of this vifible World confifts of vari-
ous Bodies, viz. pure ./Ether, Air, Earth, &c. 'tis highly probable, as
we faid before, that each of thefe has its proper Inhabitants, viz. by
the Union of Souls with the Particles of Matter. Without fuch an
Union, we cannot apprehend how there fhould be either ^Ethereal or
Aerial Animals. For the moft fluid 3odies, if not united to an im-
material Soul, or compacled'fogether, would be immediately difTolv'd,
and every blaft of Wind would diffipate fuch Animals: either then
thefe vafl Fields of Air or ./Ether muft be entirely deftitute of Inhabi-
tants, which very few will believe, who behold every clod of Earth
ftock'd with Animals, or furninYd after fome fuch Manner as We

con-

N O <T E S.

(38.) " God, if he pleafed, could have made
,c nothing but immortal Spirits: and he could
*' have made as many of thefe as there are indi-
" vidual Creatures of all forts in the World j
* but it feem'd good to the wife Architect, to
" make feveral Ranks and Orders of Beings,
" and to difplay his Power and Goodnefs and
" Wifdom, in all imaginable variety of Crea-
'* tures ; all which fhould be good in their
" kind, tho' far fhort of the perfection of An-
*' gels, a?.d immortal Spirits. He that will
* build a Houfe for all the Ufes and Purpofes
" of which an Houfe is capable, cannot make
** it all Foundation, and great Beams and
* Pillars; muft not fo contrive it, as to make
** it all Rooms of State and Entertainment :
** but there muft of neceflity be in it meaner
* Materials, Rooms, and Offices, for feveral
" ufes and purpofes, which, however inferior
" to the reft in Dignity and Degree, do yet
u contribute to the beauty and advantage of
" the whole : So in this great Frame of the
" World, it was fit there fhould be variety
" and different Degrees of Perfection in the
11 feveral parts of it: and this is fo far from
" being an impeachment of the Wifdom and
M Goodnds of him that made it, that it is an

" evidence of both. For, the meaneft of all
" God's Creatures is good, confidering the
" Nature and Rank of it, and the end to which
' it was defign'd; and we cannot imagine
; * how it could have been order'd and framed
" better, tho' we can eafily tell how it might
" have been worfe : and that if this or that had
* been wanting, or had been otherwife, it had
" not been fo good ; and thofe who have been
" moft conversant in the contemplation of na-
4 ture, and of the Works of God, have been
" moft ready to make this acknowledgment *,
* But then if we confider the Creatures of
'* God with relation to one another, aud with
'* regard to the whole frame of Things, they
** will all appear to be very good ; and not-
** withftandtng this or that kind of Creatures
" be much lefs perfedl than another, and there
" be a very great diftance between the Per-
** feftion of a Worm, and of an Angel, yet
" confidering every thing in the fame Order
" which it hath in the Creation, it is as good
** as could be, confidering its Nature and
" Ufe, and the Place allotted to it among the
"Creatures." lillotfon, Serm. 91. p. 683.
Vol. 2. Fol. See alfo Ray on the Creation,
Part 2. P.4Z3. 4th Edit.

v. g. Boje, Wilkim, Cbeyne, Derbam, Grew, Ray, Newentyt, &c.

Concerning Natural EiiL

o
conjecture. (39.) If you fay 5 here's Room for pure Spirits, I an-
fwer; Since thefe do not fill up Place, nor have any Relation to it,
'tis the fame thing wherever they be, and Material Subftances have
nothing at all to do with them : It is not therefore neceiTary to fup-
pofe fuch large tracts of Air or ^ther void of Animals, in order to
make Room for thefe, for which it would be no lefs commodious,
if repleniuYd with, than if deftitute of Animals. If then this be gran-
ted us, we mufl affirm, that there is as great variety of Souls, as of
Animals, and that it is one Species which exerts its Operations by the
help of ^Ethereal Matter, and another which ftands in need of Ae-
real, and a third of Terreftrial. Neither will every Element be fit
for every Animal, but each will have its proper Inhabitants: Nor can-
there be any jufr. caufe of Complaint that they are uneafy out of their
proper Element, that Men cannot live any while commodioufly in
-/Ether, nor perhaps ./Ethereal Animals upon the Earth : For 'tis furli-

eient

10?

NOTES.

(39.) We have a beautiful Defcription of
what our Author here conjectures, in the Spec-
tator, N. q 1 9. " If we confider thofe parts
" of the Material World which lye the near-
" eft to us and are therefore fubjedl to our
" Obfervations and Enquiries, it is amazing
** to confider the Infinity of Animals with
m which it is ftock'd* Every part of Matter
" is peopled; every green Leaf fwarms with
" Inhabitants. There, is fcarce a {ingle hu-
** mour in the Body of a Man, or of any o-
" ther Animal, in which our GlafTes do not
" difcover myriads of living Creatures. The
" Surface of Animals is alfo covered with o-
*' ther Animals, which are, in the fame man-
" ner, the Bafis of other Animals that live up-
" on it ; nay, we find in the moft folid Bodies,
* as in Marble itfelf, innumerable Cells and
*' Cavities that are crowded with fuch imper-
M ceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the
M naked Eye to difcover. On the other hand,
" if we look into the more bulky parts of
" Nature, we fee the Seas, Lakes and Rivers,
*' teeming with numberlefs kinds of living
" Creatures: we find every Mountain and
u Marfh, WUdernefs aiid Wood, plentifully

" ftocked with Birds and Beafts, and every
" part of Matter affording proper necefiaries
' and conveniences for the Livelihood of Mul-
** titudes which inhabit it. The Author of
" the Plurality of Worlds draws a very good
'** Argument from this Confideration, for the
" peopling of every Planet ; as indeed it feems
** very probable from the analogy of Reafon,
" that if no part of Matter which we are ac-
" quainted with, lies wafte and ufelefs, thofe
" great Bodies which are at fuch a diftancc
" from us, fhould not be defart and unpeopled,
" but rather that they fhould be furnifhed
" with Beings adapted to their refpective Si-
' tuations. Exigence is a Bleffing to thofe Be-
M ings only which are endowed with Percep-
" tion, and is in a manner thrown away upon
" dead Matter, any farther than as it is fubfer-
" vient to Beings which are confeious of their
" E'xiftence. Accordingly we find, from the
" Bodies which lie under our Obfervatidn,
" that Matter is only made as the Bafis and-
" Support of Animals, and there is no more of
" the one than what is necefTary for the Exi*
" ftence of the other." See alfo Dr. Scott's
Works, Vol. 2. Difcourfe 1$, p. 308, ci)V.. Fol.

'io4-

The Earth,

-Concerning Natural Evil.

cient if- every one nourifhes its proper Inhabitants, according to the
Nature and Constitution of each.

III. That is a foolifh Objection therefore of the Epicurean Lucre-
aVbeing 'the tius (40.), that the World owes not its Original to a Divine Power and
]rt part oi Goodnefs, becaufe Mountains, Woods and Rocks, large Fenns, and
Syrtcm, \l the Ocean cover fo great a fhare of it ; that the burning beat, viz. of
not to be tne horrid Zone, and the eternal Froji, viz. of the two Frigid, take up
dedf i^yll' almoft two Parts of it; fince the Sea, the Rocks, Winds, and Moun-
is not made tains, are not entirely ufelefs in their prefent Situation j for this was
l ofeo PUr "h requifite f r tne gd of the Univerfe, and the order of the Mun-
out defign. dane Syftem. Neither was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regard-
ed in the nrfl place. For, fince it is but a fmall Part of the whole,
and almoft a Point, where would have been the Wonder if it had
not been fit for any Inhabitants at all ? if it did but promote the
good of the whole, while itfelf was barren and empty. If this had
been the Cafe, it would not have proved an ufelefs part of the World,
any more than a Nail is of a Man's Body ; and it is as abfurd to de-
lire that all parts of the Univerfe fhould immediately afford Habi-
tation to Animals, as that every Part and Member of an animated Bo-
dy fhould by itfelf conftitute an Animal ; 'tis furricient if every par-
ticular Member confpire with the reft, and exercife its own proper
Function, and confequently that the Earth, which is a member of the
Univerfe, have its -peculiar ufe in promoting the Good of the whole.
If therefore the whole Earth was ferviceable, not to preferve Ani-
mals, but only Motion, nothing could be objected from thence a-
gainft the Goodnefs of its Author. Neither would it appear ft range to
any that confiders the Immenfity of the Works of God, and how mi-
nute a Portion of them the Earth is, if it were entirely deftitute of
Inhabitants: nor would it therefore be in vain. How much more
then may we admire the Goodnefs and Wifdom of God therein, who
has nll'd.the whole and every part of it with Life.

IV. He

NOTES.

(40.) See Dr. Bent ley's Eighth Serm. ^. 10.
p. 329. 5th Edit, or Bates on the Exiftcnce if
GU, Sec. Ch. J, 2, and 3. or Cukburn's Efftys,

ill Part, TfT. 7. par. 5, b'r. and 2d Part, Efr.4.
par. 5, sV. and the Authors mentioned in
Note 42.

CQncerning Natural Evil. j Q c

IV. He knew beft what Creatures every part of It was fit for, and The Earth
has aflign'd to each its proper place, as is evident to every Obferver : m fy ^ e con -
The Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have their proper wLeHn
Inhabitants, which they fupply with Nourifhment. The Syftem ofthisAuto-
of the World required a Globe of folid Matter fuch as the Earth is, ^ d f the
and we have reafon to believe that this is, as it were, a Wheel in the without
great Automaton, without which its Motion would be very imperfect. JJjJjjj* lts
But befides this principal End, the Divine Wifdom faw that it might would be de-
ferve for Nutriment to feveral kinds of Animals, that no manner of ': eai Y e: *. n thc
Good therefore might be omitted which was confident with the pri- a ff JdT a n
mary End, he filled it with all thofe Animals that it was capable of, habitation
nor could the Earth afford Suftenance to any fuperior or more proper A n nim s . t0
Beings. God has given thofe parts to the Brutes which were unfit for
Men ; and that thete might be nothing ufelefs, which yet could not
be alter'd without detriment to the whole, he has adapted Animals to
every Part and Region of it; and fince the Habitations could not
conveniently be converted into any other form, he provided fuch Ani-
mals as wanted, and were agreeable to thefe Habitations. Hence
Mountains, Woods and Rocks give Harbour to wild Beafts, the Sea
to Fifties, the Earth to Infects. Neither ought we to complain that
the whole Earth is not of ufe to Man, fince that was not the princi-
pal End it was made for, but on the contrary, Man was for this rea-
fon placed upon the Earth, becacfe it afforded a convenient Recepta-
cle for him. And what if it had been totally unfit for Man ? Would
it therefore have been in vain ? By no means. On the contrary, we
are certain that God would have given it other Inhabitants, to whofe
Maintenance it might have been fubfervient. (41.)

V. Thofe

NOTES.

(41.) Our Author's Argument here might be
carry 'd much farther, and the Infinite Wifdom
of the Creator demonstrated, not only from his
having made nothing in vain, or ufelefs in it-
ft If, but alfo from the diftindi and various rela-
tions which every thing bears to ethers, and
its contribution to the good of the whole :

from the double, the manifold apparent Vfes of
almoft every thing in Nature.

Thus thc Mountains mention'd in the Ob-
jection of Lucretius, and which many Moderns
alfo have mifreprefented as deformities of Na-
ture, have not only their own peculiar Inha-
bitants *, but alfo aiford to other Animals the

moft
See V 5. par. 7. of this Chap, or DerhamV Phyfcofheof. B. 3. C. 4.

ic6

Concerning Natural Evil.

Man alone,
but for the
Univerfc:
to think o-
therwife fa-
vours of hu-
man pride.

V. Thofe therefore who urge the Unfltnefs of certain Parts of the
made^wfor 5 Earth for the Suftenance of Man, as a Fault and Defect of the Di-
vine Skill in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the Earth was
made for the fake of Mankind only, and not of the Univerfe, and
that every thing in the World is ufelefs which does not immediately
tend to the Ufe of Man. But this is abfurd, and what no one would
object, who is not blinded with Pride and Ignorance -f. We ought
rather to admire the Power and Goodnefs of God, who has fo tem-
per'd his Works, tho' they be immenfe and infinitely various, that
there is nothing in them which exifts not in the very beft manner
with refpecl to the whole^ and which he has not replenifh'd with its
proper Inhabitants. And fince the Variety of the conftituent Parts
and Regions of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of the whole

Machine

N E S.

moft commodious Harbour and Maintenance,
the beft Remedies and Retreats. To them Ave
owe the moft pleafant Profpefts, the moft deli-
cious Wines, the moft curious Vegetables, the
richeft and moft ufeful Metals, Minerals, and
other Foffils ; and, what is more than all, a
wholfome Air, and the convenience of navi-
gable Rivers and Fountains.

The Ocean, befides the fupport of its own
Inhabitants (which are, in all probability, as
numerous and various as thofe of the Earth)
provides alfo vaft Quantities of Vapours, which
refrefh and fructify the Earth itfelf, and nou-
rifh and fupport its Inhabitants, producing
Springs, Lakes and Rivers. The leffer Seas,
Jfenns and Lakes, are fo admirably well diftri-
buted throughout the Globe, as to afford fuffi-
cient Vapours for Clouds and Rains to temper
the Cold of the Northern Air, to cool and mi-
tigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and re-
fresh the whole Earth with fertile Showers:
As is fully proved by the excellent Author a-
bove mention'd*.

As to the variety of Ufes which the fame
thing is render'd capable of, and manifeftly de-
fign'd for, by its All-wife Author, fee the in-
genious S. C's Impartial Enqt.iry into the Exi-
gence, Sec. of God, p. 80. " To obtain a great

f See "Note 33.

* Fbrf# Theel. B. 2. C. 5.

' number of Ends by as few means as may be,
" is the higheft point of Wifdom. But nothing
" can be imagin'd more admirable in this re-
45 fpect, than the prefent frame of things. Thus
** tho' the human Body is compofed of a great
{i variety of Parts, yet how much more nurae-
,'* rous are their Ufes? How many are the U-
** fes of the Hand, which directed by Rea*
** fon is infteadof all other Jnftruments ? How
" many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, the
* Ear, and the Tongue ? And if we take a
** deeper View, and look into the minuter parts
** of which thefe are compounded, what can be
" more admirable than the Variety of Aims
" and Intentions that may be obferv'd in
** each ? The feveral Ufes of the Structure
" and Pofition of each ftngle Mufcle have
,." been computed by Galen in his Book de For-
<* tnatione Foetus, to be no lefs than ten. The
like may be obferv'd with reference to the
f* Bones and other fimilar Parts, but efpecially
" with refpeel to the Members of fuch as are
" heterogeneous or diffimular." p. 81.

The fame is fhewn at large by Dr. Grew,
Cofmologia Sacra, B.i. C 5. par. 13, 14, &c.
or W. Scott on the Wifdom and Goodnefs of God,
Serm. 1. p. 15, cjfr. or Wilkin* Princ, of Nati
R elig. C 6.

Concerning Natural Evil.

Machine required, nor the Species of Animals fewer than the Food
would fupply, we mull conclude that there is nothing deficient or
redundant in it. (42.)

P 2 SECT.

io7

NOTES.

(42.) Hence I think we may fafely conclude
with our Author in general, that there could
have been no partial alteration of this Syftem
but for the worfe, as far as we know, at leaft
not for the better. They who hold that there
might have been a total one, that the whole
Scheme of things might poffibly have been al-
ter'd or revers'd, and that either the direct:
contrary, or a quite different One, would have
been equally, or more worthy of God ; the
Men, I fay, that hold this, are oblig'd to
fhew the poffibility of conceiving it, and to
explain the manner how it may be, before we
are oblig'd to believe them. They muft fhew,
(hat the fame things which are now conducive
to our Happinefs, and confequently the Ob-
jects of out Love, might as eafily have tended
to our Mifery ; and confequently have been as
reafonably the Objects of our Averfion ; that
bitter might have been fweet, and fweet bit-
ter ; that the fame Paffions, Objects, Exercifes,
and Inclinations, csV. which now create Plea-
fure in us, might have produced a different, a
quite contrary effect, or no effect at all. This
they are oblig'd to do, and when they have
done all this, and completed their Syftem, and
made a total alteration of things, as they ima-
gine, for the better, they are at la ft only got
to the above mention'd abfurdity of putting
this Syftem into a higher Clafs, whereas all the
different Claffes in every conceivable Degree
of Perfection, were fuppofed to be entirely fil-
led at the firft. We muft therefore take things
as they are, and argue only from the prefent
Nature of them, collectively. In which View
we (hall find no poffible alteration of any thing
but what would produce greater Inconvenien-
ces, either in itfelf or others, to which it bears
a ftrict Relation. Inftances of this kind are
every where to be met with : particular proofs
of it in the natural World, occur in Dr. Ben-

tley's Boyle's Left, particularly with regard to
the five Senfes of the human Body, p. 95, 96.
fee alfo Locke on Humane Under/landing, B. 2.
C. 23. V 12. with refpect to the figure and
ftature of it, in Grac's Cofmokgia Sacra, B. !
C. 5. .25, fff. and as to the feveral Parts of
it all over Boyle, Cheyne, Derham, Newentyt,
Ray, Cockburn, Edwards, W. Scott, or Petting.

The fame might eafily be fhewn in the im-
material World, and in the moft exceptionable
Part of it; viz.. the Soul of Man, its Know-
ledge, Freedom, Affections *.

On this occafion I fhall take the liberty to
borrow a Section from Mr. Maxwell's general
Remarks on Cumberland, C. 5. " The Nature
" of things in the natural World is fo exactly
" fitted to the natural Faculties and Difpofitions
" of Mankind, that were any thing in it other-
" wife than it is, even in Degree, Mankind
*' would be lefs happy than they now are.
11 Thus the dependence of all natural Effects
" upon a few Jimple Principles, is wonderfully
" advantageous in many refpedts. The De-
" grees of all the fenfible Pleafures are exactly
" fuited to the ufe of each : fo that if we en-
M joy'd any of them in a greater degree, we
" fhould be lefs happy ; for our Appetites of
** thofe Pleafures would by that means be too
" ftrong for our Reafon ; and, as we are fra-
" med, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment
" of them, fo as to prejudice our Bodies. And
M where we enjoy fome of them in fo high a
** degree, as that it is in many cafes very diffi-
" cult for the ftrongeft to regulate and mode-
" rate the Appetites of thofe Pleafures, it is in
*' fuch Inftances where it was neceffary to coun-
" terpoife fome difadvantages, which are the
u confequences of the purfuit of thofe Plea-
,c fures. Thus the pleafing Ideas which ac-
* company the Love of the Sexes, are neceffa-

M Iy

* See Sir M. Hale'; Prim. Orig. ofManh. C. 2. De Homine> p. 52.

io8

Concerning Natural Evil.
NOTES.

ry to bc'poflefs'd in fo high a degree, to bal-
lance the Cares of Matrimony, and alfo the
Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex.
The fame may be faid of our Intellectual
Pleafures. Thus did we receive a greater
Pleafure from Benevolence, Sloth would be
'* encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. And
* were the Pleafures of our Inquiries into the
** Truth greater, we fhould be too fpeculative

* and lefs active. It feems alfo probable, that
** the Degree of our Intellectual Capacity is
** very well fuited to our Objedts of Knowledge,
* and that had we a greater degree thereof, all
" other things remaining as they are, we fhould
** be lefs happy. Moreover, it is probably fo
"adapted to the inward frame of our Bodies,
that it could not be greater, without either

* an alteration in the Laws of Nature, or in
* the Laws of Union between the Soul and
u Body. Farther ; were it much greater than
" it is, our thoughts and purfuits would be fo
** fpiritual and refin'd, that we fhould be taken
* too much off from the fenfible Pleafures.
* We fhould probably be confcious of fome
* Defecls or Wants in our Bodily Organs, and
<* would be fenfible that they were unequal to
fo great a Capacity, which would neceffarily
* be follow'd by uneafinefs of Mind. And

* this feems to hold in the Brute Creation :
1 For, methinks it would be for the difadvan-
4 J tagc of a Horfe to be endued with the Un-

" derftandingof a Man : fuch an unequal U-
a nion muft be attended with continual difquie-
*< tudes and difcontents. As for our Pains,
" they are all either Warnings againll Bodily
" Diforders, or are fuch as, had we wanted
cc them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they
** are, we fhould either have wanted fome Ple:i-
" fures we now enjoy, or have poflefs'd them
" in a lefs degree. Thofe things in Nature
" which we cannot reconcile to the foregoing
" opinion, as being ignorant of their Ufe, .
" we have good reafon from Analogy to be-
" lieve, are really advantageous, and adapted
" to the Happinefs of Intelligent Beings of the
Syftem : tho* we have not fo full and com-
" plete a Knowledge of the entire Syftem, as
" to be able to point out their Particularities.
" From thefe Obfervations we may conclude,
" that all the various Parts of our Syftem are
" fo admirably fuited to one another, and the
" whole contrived with fuch exquifite Wif-
" dom, that were any thing, in any part there-
" of, in the leaft otherwife than it is, without
" an alteration in the whole, there would be a
" lefs Sum of Happinefs in the Syftem than
" there now is.'"

See alfo the Ingenious Author of the Nature
and Conducl of the PaJJions, p. 179, 201, 202.

But this will be more fully confidered in
the 4th Seftion.

SECT.

Concerning Natural Evil. 109,

SECT. IIL

Qf Death..

'Ti . probable

I. T X 7 E know by Experience, that Souls united to Bodies move that the Soii-
VV them fome wav or otKer : viz. by Thought and Volition : i 1 v of . ^

/"ui ''a 1/111 y> r Bodies is the

for thus we move our own. And 'tis probable, that the Gravity, oo- C aufe why
lidity, and Hardnefs of our Bodies, together with the Refiftence of we can " ot
the adjacent ones, are the Caufes why we cannot move them every way whTherwe.
as we pleafe. pieafe.

II. A Soul then united to a portion of ./Ethereal, uniform, and p er ~ ASo , v '
fectly fluid Matter, free from the Impediment of Gravity and Refi- te d to a P or-
ftence, may in all probability move its Body whiiherfoever it pleafes. tio f ^-the-
Such a Body therefore would be perfectly obfequious to the thought 5* ca ^ er '
and will of the Soul that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detrimentjnoye it
from the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its Will alone ; ^"^^
at leaft fo long as the ^ther continued in its Fluidity and Purity. Un-prefeVve its
lefs the Animal therefore will'd the contrary, its Body would be incor- u " n h&
ruptible^ and always fit for Union, /. e. immortal. If any one object, * he e re
that the Bodies of the Bleiled, which we call Cceleftial, need no Mo- immortal.
tion or Change of Condition, fince they enjoy continual Pleafure ; for
no one moves or changes his State, but in order to remove fome prefent
Uneafinefs. I anfwer ; Thefe Bodies are not therefore immortal be-
caufe they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompatible
with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are compofed) but be-
caufe they are put into fuch Places and Circumftances by the Deity, ,
that they can, even with Pleafure, forefee and prevent all fuch things
as might tend to introduce either Corruption or Pain. Neither does
their Pleafure or Happinefs confift in Reft properly fo call'd, but in;
Activity, in fuch Acts and Exercifes of their Faculties as they choofe:
Now, fince they may exercife-themfelves perpetually according to their

awn

re is

I 10

"Concerning Natural Evrl.

own Choice, and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be perpe-
tually happy j as will be declared below. All which are different in
folid Bodies.
, f III. We cannot certainly determine what Life is in thefe Animals
atcrreiir'al which have folid Bodies, but we fufficiently apprehend where it is,
Animal is a from certain Marks and Tokens. For where there is a circular mo-
fe" which x - l0n f tne Fluids, there is Nutrition and Increafe, there is, as I con-
maybe broke, jedture, fome fort of Life. Now, -'tis evident, that this circular mo-
th a h flo W UrS t ^ on ma y ^ e i nt errupted by the force of adjacent Bodies : the folid Bo-
o.;t, and th 2 dy of an Animal is a kind of Veflel in which the humours have a flux
circular mo- an d reflux thro' certain duels and channels framed by Divine Skill, in
Such Ani- the motion of which Life confifts. Now this Veflel may be broke in
mais then are pieces by the impulfe of other Bodies, fince by the native imperfection
niorS! 1 " 7 '** Matter it is capable of Diflblution ; but when the Veflel is broken,
the Fluids therein contain'd mufl: neceflarily flow out, the circular mo-
tion mult ceafe, and together with it animal Life. Such Animals
therefore as have folid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot laft
for ever, without violence done to the Laws of Nature, of Matter,
and Motion. There mufl: then have been either none at all created,
or fuch as are naturally Mortal. The imperfection of Matter could
not fuffer it to be otherwife. For the hard and folid parts belonging
to thefe Bodies are of fuch a frame as mufl: neceflarily be fhaken and
-feparated by others of the fame bulk and hardnefs. Every thing there-
fore that confifts of fuch kind of Parts, may be corrupted and diflbl-
ved. (43.) Therefore the Divine Power and Goodnefs did the very

bell

NOTES.

(43.) This point is very well illuftrated, by
-Dr. J. Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 245, &c.
whole Reafoning is entirely built upon Sir If.
'Newton's Experiments. "Human Bodies, as
*' well as thofe of all other Animals, and of
* Plants, are compounded of very different
" Materials, fix'd and volatile, fluid and folid;
" as appears by the refolution of them into
" their conftituent Parts; and they arc nou-
** rifh'd in the fame manner, viz. by attrac-
41 tion. For, as a Spunge by Sudtion draws in
' Water, fo the Glands in the Bodies of all

c< Animals, draw different Juices out of the
11 Blood, according to the particular Nature
" and conftitution of each of them : So long
H therefore as the nourifhment is proper to af-
" fimilate itfelf to thefeveral parts of the Bo-
H dy, as it approaches them in its feveral chan-
" nels; or, fo long as the folid particles (fup-
<c pofe of Salts, which are abfolutely neceffary
'* to the prefcrvation of all Creatures) retain
" their form and texture; fo long Life is pre-
" ferv'd and maintain'd. And when the nou-
" rifliment becomes unfit to affimilate; or the

"faline

Concerning Natural Evil.

feeft even in creating Beings that were mortal: for an Animal fub-
jedt to Death is better than none at all.

IV. But God, you'll fay, created Men at nrft immortal, as we un-
derftand by facred Hiftory : Mortality is not therefore an infeparable
attendant on folid Bodies. I anfwer j It does not appear to us of what
fort the Bodies of Mankind were before the Fall, and confequently no-
thing can be argued from thence againft the necelTary Mortality of all
terreftrial ones. Farther, we mould remember that our firft Parents
were naturally mortal, but that God covenanted with them for Im-
mortality as matter of Favour, and upon particular Conditions. (44.)

Not

NOTES..

ill

This Hypo-
thefis recon^
ciled with
facred Hifto-
ry, concer-
ning the im
mortality of
the firfl Man*

" faline particles (which towards the Center
" are very denfe, and therefore capable of
" ftrongly attracting the Fluids to them) lofe
** their power of Attraction, either by being
" divided into lefs particles (as they may be
" by their watry parts inlinuating themfelves
" into their Pores with a gentle heat) or elfe
" by having thofe watry Parts violently fepa-
" rated from them : in either of thefe Cafes all
** their Motion will ceafe, and end in Corrup-
*' tion, Confufion and Death. And this is a-
*' bundantly confirm'd by Experience, in that
** every thing which is corrupted or putrify'd
' is of a black Colour; which fliews, that the
' component Particles are broken to Pieces,
* and reduced fo fmall, as to be unable even
" to reflect the Rays of Light, Thus we fee,
" that Death, or the DifTolution of the Body,
*' is the neceflary Confequence of thofe Laws
'by which it is framed and generated: and
f therefore is not in itfelf properly an Evil, a-
" ny more than that Fabric can be ftiled /'//,
" the Materials, or manner of building of
" which, would not permit it to laft a thou-
" fand Years, nor. was originally intended to
u continue half fo long.'* See the latter part
of Note 56.

(44.) See Curcellai Inft. Rel. Chrift. L. 3. C.
8. . 1 2, . 3, 20, &c. p. 1 10. or Limborcb, The-
el Chrift. L. 2. C. 24: *). 10. p. 137, 138.

From hence, I think, it will appear, that all

the Objections drawn from the Hiftory of our
firfl Parents in their State of Innocence, as
often urg'd by Mr. Bayle againft the prefent
Queftion, are inconclufive : Since whatever
State they were creited in, it was extraordina.-
ry, fupernatural, and peculiar to them, as the
firft of human Race: and what, their Creator
knew, would at length turn to the fame which
Mankind is in- at prefent. Nay, it is fcarce
poffible to conceive how they could have been
preferv'd and propagated, govern'd and direc-
ted by any general Laws of Nature (which yet
are neceflary to the whole Syftem *) in any o-
ther Condition than they now are. Not to
fpeak here of their moral Part, if they were
compofed of the fame Materials of which all
their Pofterity confift, they muft have been at
leaft naturally Mortal ; tho' God might, if he
had feen it proper, have interfered in fome
preternatural way, and thereby alter'd the eir*
cumftances of their Mortality f. And accor-
dingly the Sentence pronounced upon Adam,
(Gen. 2. 17.) In the Day that thou eateft thereof
thou palt dying Dye, or fhalt die a Death, might
not imply that he Ihould never have died at all
had he not eaten ; but that he fhould die both a
more fpeedy and a more painful Death that other-
wife he might have done : as that emphatical
Phrafe often fignifies in Scripture. See more of
this in V 8. par. 6. and N. 56, and at the end o
this Chapter.

*- See Note 3 7.

+ See Sherlock on Death,. Ch. 2. fc.1,

1 1 a Concerning Natural Evil.

Not that they fhould have continued upon Earth for ever; but dm 1
God promifed to tranflate them at a proper time by his efpecial Fa-
vour, and preferve them in a place fit for the enjoyment of Eternity :
as we believe he did with Enoch and Eli as. But as foon as this Cove-
nant with God was broken by Sin, Man was reftor'd to his Native
Mortality, and fubjected to thofe other Inconveniencies to which the
order of Nature, and the chain of Natural Caufes, render'd fuch Bo-
dies as thefe of Mankind obnoxious. For tho' God has not fo far
tied himfelf up to the Laws of Nature, but that he may in many Ca-
fes fufpend and fuperfede them, yet this is not done frequently, nor
to be expected for the fake of Sinners. God can indeed preferve
Man from aftual Death y but that a folid Machine confining of hete-
rogeneous Parts, fuch as the human Body is, fhould not be naturally
Mortal is impoflible: 'Tis a Contradiction therefore that Man, in the
prefent State of things, mould be by Nature immortal.

S E C T. IV.

Of the TaJJions.

U ii?eB 3 ** O^ppofing the Union of a thinking or fenfitive Soul with Matter,
dies of ape- O its Thought and Will muft neceffarily be affected by the Motions
cuiiar Crafts, f tna t j as Body mufl be again by thefe. For, fince the Soul is of
difordeVd or mc h a Nature as to require Matter of a peculiar Crajis and Figure, in
removed, the order to difcharge its Functions, it follows, that when this Difpofiti-

thTsouTare f on * s f au l tv > or *l u * te ^ s > r ^ e Operations of the Soul muft be im-
either hin- peded, or entirely ceafe ; nor can it poffibly be otherwife while the
J' r i^ rdc ' Soul and Body are of fuch a Nature as they really are.
T II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the Divine Goodnefs to

and Body have affign'd fuch a Nature to them, as was fhewn before ; we mufl

admit of a alfo admit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, if they mu-
mutuai .,n

Sympathy: tUal ty

Jience it is the firft care of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm.

Concerning: Natural Evil.

113

tually affect each other, the confequence will be, that it is the princi-
pal bufinefs of the Soul to preferve the Body from harm : In order to
this, 'tis necefTary that the Soul mould have a perception of what is
good for, or prejudicial to, the Body; and this could not be more ef-
fectually procured, than by providing that thofe things which tend to
its prefervation mould communicate an agreeable Senfation to the
Soul, and what is pernicious, a difagreeable one. For, otherwife, the
firft thing we met with might deflroy us, while we were not appre-
henfive, or regardlefs of it; nor mould we be folicitous to avoid a Ri-
ver or a Precipice. (45.)

III. Tis necefTary therefore that the Soul and Body mould afFecl: each The fenfe of
othermutually,that the impairing or DifTolution of the Bodymould create Pain is ne-
uneafinefs, which, by its importunity, might recall the Soul that was indif- pr e ferve
pofed or otherwife engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to Life, as alfo
ceafe urging, till what was hurtful be removed : without this Impor- ^ e d ead of
tunity perhaps the ftrongeft Animal would not laft even a Day. The
Senfe then of Pain or Uneafinefs produced in the Soul upon the Muti-
lation or DifTolution of the Body is necefTary for the prefervation of
Life in the prefent State of things. It may be proved from the fame
Principles, that the averfion to, or dread of, Death is not in vain, fince
it cannot even be conceiv'd how a frail and mortal Body, toffed by
continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard Bodies, mould e-

fcape

N O t E S.

(45.) This Subject is very well handled by
Dr. J. Clarke, on Nat. Evil, p. 256, ciff. See
alfo Mr. Hucbefon on the Nature and Conducl of
the Pajftons, p. 5 1 , 5 2. or Watts on the Ufe and
Mufe of them, %. \ 3, ffV.

1 fhall tranferibe a PafTage from the Author
laft mention'd. " The Paflions are defign'd
" for the Service of the Body, becaufe they a-
" waken not only all the animal Powers, but
" the Thoughts and Contrivances of the mind,
" to prevent whatfoever is huitful to the Bo-
" dy, and to procure what is pleafant and ufe-
" ful for its Support and Safety ; that is, in
" more compendious Language, to obtain Good,
" or avoid Evil. While our Body is in fuch a
" feeble State, furrounded with Dangers, and

" liable to fo many troublefome Accidents,
" Diforders, and Death, God has not only
" furnifh'd us with the Senfations of Pleafure
" and Pain, to give us fpeedy Notice of what
" hurts or relieves the Body, but he has alfo
" given us the Paffions of Joy and Sorrow, of
" Defire and Averfion, to aflift in this Work,
" that the Body may be better provided with
" what is necefTary to its Health and Life, and
" may be better guarded againft the Danger of
" Wounds and Br uifes, Diftempers and Death."
Thus much for the ufe of what our Author
calls the Sympathy between Soul and Body, the
Paffions, AffeBions, 8cc. with refpeft to the Body.
Concerning the ufe and neceffity of them in
regard to the Mind, fee Note 47.

11 +

Concerning Matured Evil.
fcape Dillblution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not fore-
warn'd to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (46.)

IV. Now

N ? E S.

(46.) To' this Bayfir ohje&s * " That the
" Co nfequences above nicntion'd might as rea-
M dily and certainly be avoided by the fole
" attraction of Pleafure encreas'd ordiminifh'd
" in certain Proportions. Would not a Fore-
" tafte of more cxquifite Pleafure in removing
*' your Chair from a great Fire, make you
quit the vicinity of this great Fire, without
*- any neceffity foif the feeling inconvenience?
" Another Expedient is, That the Soul, in the
t( very nick of time* mould have a clear Idea of
U the peril which environs her Machine, that
" this Idea be attended with the fame Prompt-
" nefs of the Animal Spirits which now ac-
* companies the Senfation of Pain ; we fiiould
" then be always as far from Danger as was
" neceffary, in the fame manner as we fly from
"" it atprefent."

We reply, that according to the prefent frame
of human Nature in general (which Syftem
<5ught always to be taken together) neither of
thefe Expedients would anfwef the end propo-
fed. A.6 to the former, this Author has often
obferv'd in his Dictionary f, that a little Pain
is able to counterbalance a great deal of Plea-
fure ; that one hour of Sicknefs is more poig-
nant than feveral Days of Health. And, p.
1053. That four Afflictions, mix'd with twenty
Felicities, would befufficient to engage a Man
to wifli an alteration of his condition.

Whence it follows, that fuch an encreafe of
Pleafure could not make us avoid the many
Mifchiefs incident to the Body, fo readily and
certainly, as the Excitements of Pain. A mo-
derate degree of Pleafure often fatisfies the
whole Man, and makes him content to forfeit
a Superior Happinefs, or regardlefs of under^

Soing an infinitely greater Mifery to come :
ut the fmalleft fenfitive-Pain immediately ur-
ges him to defire its removaL Four degrees of
Mifery therefore will, according to Bay/e him-
felf, , move, a Perfon more effectually, than

twenty degrees of Happinefs ; and confequent-
ly, fince all kinds of Mifery cannot be avoided,
the prefent Method of Providence is the beft,
as it avoids the m'ofl and grcateft. As to the
fecond Expedient, tho' it were granted, that
a clear Profpeft of enfuing Mifery would prove,
as effectual an Excitement of our Endeavours
to prevent it as a prefent Uneaiinefs, yet the
Mind, in order to have a clear Idea of thefe
Perils which environ the Body, muftalfo have a
completeKnowledge of the feveral properties and
effects of all the circumambient Bodies, which
-I believe, will be efteem'd fomething too much
for a Soul placed in this inferior Clafs of com-
pound Beings. And, laftly, in.anfwer to what
he frequently urges, that there will be no need
of fuch a Method of preventing Death and
Mifery in the future State of the Blefled, where
we expect pure unmix'd Felicity ; and confe-
quently there was no abfolute Necefiuy for
them here; we need only refer the Reader to.
the Obfervations in Notes 30 and 35. viz. that
there are feveral different Syftems- of rational
Beings, one above another, which we believe
to be gradually growing up, and afcending af
ter each ether, and acquiring new Degrees of
Happinefs and Perfection to all Eternity: and
therefore, when we fpeak of the future State of
the Bleffed, we fuppofe them exalted to a far-
nobler kind of Exigence, or placed in a quite
different Clafs, and confequently endow'd with
different Faculties from thefe which we expe-
rience here below: and therefore, to argue
from one to the other, is only confounding
quite different Orders of created Beings : and
fuppofing that what is poffible and agreeable in
one, may and ought to be fo in another, and,
by the fame way of reafoning, alike in all.
This Argument then drawn from that State
of our Fore-Father in Paradife, or us in Hea-
ven, is always inconclufive. See Dr. J* Clarke.
on Natural Evil, p. 257, &c.

* x Repen/e aux Quejliom a*un Provincial, Fol. p. 650.-
ft Under tb.% Article Xenopbam, particularly at p. 305 U

Concerning Natural Evil. g f 5

IV. Now the reft of the Paffions are Confequences of Pain, Uneafi- The reft of
iiefs, and dread of Death; viz. Anger, Love, Hatred, &c. An Animal the Paffions
in the prefent State of things, muft therefore either be obnoxious to S S^IP* 1
thefe, or quickly perifh. For 'tis impoffible that the Sould mould thefe.
have a difagreeable Senfation, and not be angry at the Caufe which
produces it : and fo of the reft.

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering that the Soul The Paffions
mould not be affected by the Motions of the Body; or at leaft, that ^J^ ^*
every thing done therein ftiould be agreeable : But how dangerous this therwife,
would be to Animals, any one may underftand, who recollects how J an B x or *
very fhort their Lives muft be, if they died with the fame Pleafure t h"soui *
that they eat or drink or propagate their Species. If upon tearing the fhould not be
Body, the Soul had either no Senfation at all, or a pleafant one, we Jhe foLdon?
fhould be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, nor would it be of the Body:
more injurious to kill a Man than to fcratch him. And thus Man- ^ a ^
kind would quickly fail. We muft then either have been arm'd with ma is would
thefe Paffions againft Death, or foon have perifh'd: But the Divine ft veryfhor
Goodnefs chofe that Animals fhould be fubject to thefe, rather than

the Earth be entirely deftitute of Inhabitants. (47.)

Q^2 VI. Behold

NOTES,

(47.) Bcfides the Health and Prefervation of
the Body, the Paffions in genera! are neceflary
to the Happinefs and Well-being of theSWal-
fo : Wherein, befides the immediate Pleafure
which arifes from the very Exercife of them,
and their Power to alter even the Nature of
things-, or at leaft, their Relations to us, and
often mate thatafy and agreeable which would
othcrwife be diftaftful and intolerable : they
are farther neceffary to urge and excite the
Mind to laudable Enterprifes, and fo fupport
it in the execution of .them ; to fix and fortify
it againil all Difficulties and Dangers, and en-
able it to proceed and perfevere in the conftant
purfuit of ftill higher Degrees of Happinefs

' of a remifs and fedentary Nature, flow in its
" Refolves, and languijhing in its Executions.
" The ufe therefore of the Paffions is, te fir up
" and put it upon Aclion, to awaken the Under-
11 fia-nding, to enforce the Will, and to. make the
" whole Man more vigorous and attetijive in the
" profecution of his Defigns." See alfo the Spec-
tator 'N 9 . 408.

For a particular Account of all the Paffions,
and their final Caufes, and the Neceffity of
each, fee Mr. Hucbefon's incomparable Effity,
V 2. p. 48,50.^. and . 6. p. 179. or Watts on
the ufe and ab ufe of them, \ 13. or Cbamb/rs's
Cyclopedia, under the Word Paffion, or Scott's
Chrifian Life, Part 2. C. 1. $.2. par. 3. Qut

and Perfection. " The Soul (fays Mr. Addi- what relates to this Subject will come more
" fon*) cenfidefd abftratlly from its Paffions, i>\ properly unde/ the HwdofMor'alEvi/.

Spea. N p . 255.

1 1 6 Concerning Natural Evil.

it is not con- VI. Behold now how Evils fpring from and multiply tipon each o-
trary to the thcr, while infinite Goodnefs ftill urges the Deity to do the very beft.
nefs toremit This moved him to give Exiftence to Creatures which cannGt exift
thefelncon- without Imperfections and Inequality. This excited him to create Mat-
rather' ter an< ^ t0 P ut lt m Motion, which is neceflarily attended with Separation
could norbe an d Diffolution, Generation and Corruption. This perfuaded him to
avoided with- couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence
proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the reft of the
Paffions, yet all of them, as we have feen, are necerTary.

VII. For, as created Exiftence neeefTarily includes the Evil of Im-

red the Good perfection, fo every Species of it is fubject to its own peculiar Imper-

in . r in S s fections; that is, to Evils. All the Species of Creatures then muft ei-

Kviis which t ^ ler have been omitted, or their concomitant Evils tolerated: theDi-

neceiiariiy vine Goodnefs therefore put the Evils in one Scale and the Good in

anTtolcratea tne omer : an ^ f jnc e the Good preponderated, an infinitely good God

thofe Evils would not omit that becaufe of the concomitant Evils; for that very

hire C arab! re ^ mi ^ lon would have been attended with more and greater Evils,, and

from the fo would have been lefs agreeable to infinite Goodnefs.

Good. VIII. The lean: Evil, you'll fay, ought not to be admitted for the

The Axiom &ke ^ tne greateft Good. (For to affirm that God does Evil that

about not Good may come of it, is Blafphemy.) Neither does the Diftinction

forthefakeofk etween Moral and Natural Evil help any thing toward the Solution

Good, does of this Difficulty : For what we call Moral Evil, as lhall be fhewn

wh take f lace below, is that which is forbidden ; now nothing is forbidden by God

leaft Evil is but generally, at lean:, on account of the Inconveniencies attending the

chofen. forbidden Actions : Thefe Inconveniencies are Natural Evils, therefore

Moral Evils are prohibited on account of the Natural ones, and for

that Reafon only are Evils, becaufe they lead to Natural Evils. But

that which makes any thing to be fuch, is itfelf much more fucb :

therefore the Natural, you'll fay, are greater Evils than the Moral, and

cannot with lefs Blafphemy be attributed to God. Granting all this

to be true, yet tho' Evil is not to be done for the fake of Good, yet

the lefs Evil is to be chofen before the greater : And fince Evils ne-

ceffarily furround you whether you act or not, you ought to prefer

that Side which is attended with the leaft. Since therefore God was

compell'd by the neceftary Imperfections of created Beings, either to

abftain from creating them at all, or to bear with the Evils confequent

una*

Concerning Natural Evil. 1 1 7

upon them ; and fince it is a lefs Evil to permit thofe, than to omit
thefe : 'tis plain that God did not allow of Natural Evils for the fake
of any Good; but chofe the leaft out of feveral Evils; i, e. would ra-
ther have Creatures liable to Natural Evils, than no Creatures at all.
The fame wilL be fhewn hereafter concerning Moral Evils-

SECT. V.

Of Hunger, Thirft, and Labour.

I. A Terreftrial Animal muft, as we have faid, neceffarily confift ofThe parts of
\ mix'd and heterogeneous Parts; its Fluids alfo are in a perpe- th Ji B ? d y ty.
tual Flux, and a kind of Ferment. Now 'tis plain that this cannot j n nee d there-
be without the Expence of thefe Fluids, and Attrition of the Solids ; fore ofRep*-
and hence follows Death and Dijfolution, except thefe be repair'd : a by^oj**'
new Acceffion of Matter is therefore neceffary, to fupply what flies
off and is worn away, and much more fo for the Growth of Ani-
mals.

II. But Animals have particular Conjlitutions, and cannot be nouriffr- Choice muff
ed by any fort of Matter: fome Choice therefore muft be made of it, F e 00 ^ f in * ce ,
to which they are to be urg'd by an Importunity ftrong enough to all things are
excite their Endeavours after it. Hence Hunger and Thirft come to n r ot e ^ uall f
affect the Soul ; Affections that are fometimes indeed troublefome, but

yet neceffary, and which bring more Pleafure than Pain along with,
them.

III. But why, fay you, are we obliged to labour in queft of Food ? The Mate*
Why are not the Elements themfelves fufficient? I anfwer j they are arcfooncor-
fufficient for fome Animals: but Mankind required fuch a difpofitionrupted: thejr
f Matter as- was to be prepared by various Coctions and Changes, an ^fobe th roT

that cured with-
out Labour,

1 1 g Concerning Natural Evil.

daily, becaufe 'tis foon liable to Corruption, and if kept long, would

be unfit for Nutriment. Hence Labour becomes necerTary to provide

Victuals in this prefent ftate of things : neither could Hunger, or

Thirft, or Labour *, (which are reckon'd among Natural Evils) be

prevented without greater Inconveniencies. The Divine Goodnefs

therefore had the higher!: Reafon for affixing thefe to Animals.

IV. Now, as Animals require different forts of Food, as was fhewn,

Ewy Ani- according to their different Conflitutions, fo God has placed every one

<*dbyGod ^ them where it may find what is proper for it: on which account

where it may there is fcarce any thing in the Elements but what may be Food for

i*rNou Pr "f me - Every Herb has its InfecT: which it fupports. The Earth, the

rifhmenr, Water, the very Stones, ferve for Aliment to living Creatures -jr.

hence almoft

every herb maintains its prrper Infeft.

Some Ani- V. But fome ftand in need of more delicate Food : Now God
mais are pro- could have created an inanimate Machine which might have fupplied
Food too- tnem w * tn mcn Food j but one that is animated does it much eafier
thers, and and better. A Being that has Life is (ceteris paribus) preferable to
would not one t h at h as not . q therefore animated that Machine which fur-
on any other nifties out provifion for more perfect Animals ; which was both gra-
terms. cioufly and providently done: for by this means he gain'd fo much

Life to the World as there is in thofe Animals which are Food rjor o-
thers: for by this means they themfelves enjoy fome kind of Life,
and are of Service alfo to the reft. An Ox, for inftance, or a Calf,
is bred, nourimed, and protected for fome time, in order to become
fit Food for Man. This certainly is better and more eligible, than
if the Matter of its Body had been converted into an inanimate Mafs,
fuch as a Pompion, or continued in the ftate of unform'd Clay. Nor
is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for the Food of a more noble
Animal, fince it was on this Condition only that it had Life given,
which it could not otherwife have enjoy'd. Matter which is fit for
the Nourishment of Man, is alfo capable of Life ; if therefore God
had denied it Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which might
have been produced without any Impediment to his principal Defign :
which does not feem very agreeable to infinite Goodnefs. 'Tis bet-
ter

* Set Note 51. f See Notes 35 and 39.

Concerning Natural EviL

ter therefore that it mould be endow'd with Life for a time, tho' 'ti s
to be devoured afterwards, than to continue totally ftupid and ilug-
gifti. The common Objection then is of no force, viz. That inani-
mate matter might have been prepared for this Ufe; for 'tis better
that it fhould be animated 5 efpecially as fuch Animals are ignorant
of Futurity, and are neither confcious nor folicitous about their being
made for this Purpofe. So that fb long as they live, they enjoy
themfelves without anxiety j at leaft they rejoyce in the prefent Good,
and are neither tormented with the Remembrance of what is pari:,
nor the Fear of what is to come 3 and laftly, are kill'd with lefs Pain
than they would be by a Diflemper or old Age. Let us not he fur-
pris'd then at the Univerfal War as it were among Animals ; or that
she Stronger devour the Weaker, for thefe are made oa purpofe to
afford Aliment, to the others. (48.)

VI. As

IT9

NOT E S..

(48.) Whit Is here hid down will, upon
Examination, be found to be perfe&ly confi-
ilent with our Obfervation in Note 34.

As the Point before us is fet in a very good
Light by Dr. J. Clarke*, I fhall not fcruple
to transcribe the whole Paragraph. ** If we
** confiderthc effect of Animal Creatures being
u thus made Food for each other, we fhall find
44 that by this means there is the more Good
14 upon the whole: For under the prefent Cir-
44 cumftances of the Creation, Animals living
44 in this manner one upon another could not
M have been prevented, but a much greater E-
44 vil would have followed. For then there
* could not have been fo great a Number, nor
**- fo great a Variety of Animals as there are at
" prefent, fome of which are fo very minute,
44 and the Quantity of them fuch, that, mixing
*' themfelves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain,
44 on which themfelves feed, and with the Wa-
11 ter and Liquids which they drink, they mult
" neccflarily be devour'd by other larger Ani-
' mals who live upon the fame Food, vvith-
* out fo much as being feen or any way per-
44 ceiv'd by them. It is therefore much better
** upon the whole, that they mould live upon

one another in the manner they now do,
than that they fhould not live at all. For if
fuch Animal Life is to be eftcem'd fuperior
to not exiftingafal'l, or to a vegetable Life;
and the more there is of fuch Animal Life,
the more of Good there is in the World; it
is evident that by this means there is Room
for more whole Species of Creatures, at leaft
for many more individuals of each Species,
than there would otherwife be ; and that
the variety of the Creation is hereby much
enlarged, and the Goodnefs of its Author
difplayed. For the Conllitution of Animal
Bodies is fuch as requires that they fhould
be maintain'd by Food : Now if this Food
can be made capable of Animal Life alfo, it
is a very great Improvement of it. A certain
Quantity of Food is necefTary for the pre-
servation of a determinate Number of Ani-
mals: which Food, were it mere vegetable,
would perhaps ferve for that Purpofe only:
but by being fo form'd as to become Animal,
tho' it be in a lower Degree, and the enjoy-
ment of Life in fuch Creatures lefs, yet is ft
more perfeft than unform'd Clay, or even
than the moft curious PlanU Thus the A-

44 ninul

Difcourfe concerning Nattfial Evil, p. 289.

i %o Concerning Natural Evil

All parts of VI. As for the Difficulty of procuring Food, and the Want of it in
the Earth fome Places, 'tis to be obferv'd that the ftate of the Earth depends
w afforded u P on &* light and heat of the Sun j and tho' we do not perfectly un-
Nnurifhment derftand the Structure of it, yet we have reafon to conjecture, (G.)
and R ec P- that it is carried about its Axis by a Diurnal, and about the Sun by an
whatever fi- ' Annual Motion : that its Figure is a Sphaeroid defcribed by the Revo-
tuationthey lution of a Semi-Ellipfe about a conjugate Axisj and that this pro-
ved in! nP a * ceeds from the Laws of Motion and Gravitation. Now in fuch a Si-
tuation, fome Parts of it muft necefTarily be unfit for fuch Inhabitants
as Men, fince the Parallelifm of its Axis is preferv'd in the annual
Motion, and the Revolution about the fame Axis in the diurnal. If
thefe mould undergo the very leaft Alteration, the whole Fabric of
*he Earth would be diforder'd ; the Ocean and Dry Land would
change Places to the detriment of the Animals. Since therefore nei-
ther the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth could be alter 'd
without harm ; 'tis plain, that fome parts of the Earth muft necefla-
rily be lefs convenient for the habitation of Mankind, namely thofe a-
;bout the Poles j and that others muft require much Labour to make
them convenient, as we find by Experience in our own Climate ; but
it will evidently appear to any considering Perfon, that in what fitu-
ation or motion foever you fuppofe the Earth to be, either thefe or
worfe Evils muft be admitted j 'tis in vain therefore to complain of
thefe Inconveniencies which cannot be avoided without greater. (49.)

VII. Neither

NOTES,

** nimal Part of the Creation has Its feveral De-
** grees of Life, and as much Variety in it as
u is to be fond in the inanimate and vegeta-
* ble Part.; (o that in this refpedt there is fo
** far from being any juft ground of Complaint,
** that the Wifdom and Contrivance of the A-
" nimal World is admirable, and plain-ly fhews
** the excellency of the whole, and the fubfer-
* viency of all the Particulars, in order to ob-
* tai n the greateft Good that they are capable
of."

See alfo the beginning of the Spetlator,
N. 519.

(G.) What is faid about the Motion of the
Earth mould be looked upon as an Hypothefis

only, and not a fundamental Principle ; that
the Argument might have the fame Succefs,
whether the Earth ftood ftill or moved; and
our affurance of the Divine Gocdnefs may not
feem to depend on the Conjectures of Mathe-
maticians.

(49 ) Thus if the Figure of the Earth were
chang'd into a perfett Sphere, the Equatorial
Parts muft all lie under Water. If it were of
a Cubic, Prifmatit, or any other Angular Figure,
it would neither be fo capacious for habitation,
nor fo fit for Motion, nor fo commodious for the
Reception of Light and Heat, for the circula-
tion of the Winds, and the Diftribution of the
Waters ; as is obvious to any one that is ac-
quainted

Concerning Natural Evil. in

VII. Neither are Earth-quakes, Storms, Thunder, Deluges and /-0f Earth-
undations any ftronger Arguments againft the Wifdom and Goodnefs <tf2?jS"
God. Thefe are fometimes fent by a juft and gracious God for the luges.
Punifhment of Mankind j but often depend on other natural Caufes,
which are neceflary, and could not be removed without greater Da-
mage to the whole. Thefe Concuflions of the Elements are indeed

prejudicial,

NOTES.

quainted with the firll Elements of Natural
Philofophy, and is at large demonftrated by
Dr. Cheyne, Mr. Derham, Ray, &c. If its Si-
tuation were removed, its Conftitution mull be
alter'd too, or elfe, if placed confiderably far-
ther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice,
if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If ei-
ther its annual or diurnal Motion were flopped,
retarded, or accelerated, the ufeful and agreeable
Viciffitudes of Summer and Winter, Day and
Night, would ceafe, or at leaft ceafe to be Co
ufeful and agreeable as they now are. The im-
moderate length or fhortnefs of the Seafons
would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the
ftated times of Bufinefs and Repofe would be
as incommodious to its Inhabitants: as difpro-
portionate to the common affairs of Life, and
the various Exigences of Mankind +. If, in
the laft place, we alter the Inclination of the
Earth's Axis, the like Inconveniencies will at-
tend the Polar Parts: if we deftroy the Parallel-
ifm of it, befides deftroying at the fame time
the ufeful Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we
bring upon us much worfe Confequences : A
Defcription of fome few of them from Dr. Ben-
t ley's Sermon above cited may perhaps not be
difagreeable. " We all know, from the very
" Elements of Aftronomy, that this inclin'd
" pofition of the Axis, which keeps always the
" lame Direction, and a conftant Parallelifm
" to itfelf is the fole Caufe of thefe grateful
M and needful Viciffitudes of the four Seafons
" of the Year, and the Variation in length of
' Days. If we take away the Inclination, it
** would abfolutely undo thefe Northern Na-
" tions, the Sun would never come nearer us

" than he doth now on the loth of March, or
" the 1 2th of September. But would we ra-
" ther part with the Parallelifm? Let us fup-
" pofe then that the Axis of the Earth keep*
" always the fame Inclination towards the Bo-
" dy of the Sun : this indeed would caufe a.
" variety of Days, and Nights, and Seafons,
" on the Earth ; but then every particular
" Country would have always the fame diver-
" fity of Day and Night, and the fame Confti-
" tution of Seafon, without any alteration.
" Some would always have long Nights and
' ftiort Days, others again perpetually long
" Days and ftiort Nights : One Climate would
" be fcorch'd and fwelter'd with everlafting
" Dog-Days, while an eternal December blafted.
" another. This furely is not quite fo good
" as the prefent Order of Seafons. But mail
" the Axis rather obferve no conftant Inclina-
" tion to any thing, but vary and waver ac
" uncertain times and places ? This would!
M be a happy Conftitution indeed ! There
u would be no Health, no Life nor Subfiftence
" in fuch an irregular Syftem : By thofe fur-
" prifing Nods of the Pole, we might be tofs'd
14 backward or forward, in a Moment, from
" January to June, nay, poffibly, from the
" January at Greenland, to the June of Abejfi-
" nia. It is better therefore, upon all accounts,
" that the Axis Ihould be continued in its
" prefent Pofture and Direction ; fo that this
" alfo is a fignal Character of Divine Wifdom
" and Ooodnefs.

See alfo CbeyneH Phil. Priitc. C. 3. 24,
25, 26, fcfa

+ See Dr. Bentley'/ laft Sermon, p. 312, &V. 5th Edition.

133

Concerning Natural Evil

prejudicial, but more Prejudice would arife to the Univerfal Syfiem by
the abfence of them. What the genuine and immediate Caufes of
them are I dare not determine: they feem in general to derive their O-
rigin from the unequal heat of the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutabi-
lity, and Contrariety of things *. To thefe we may add the Afperity
and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, without which neverthelefs the
whole Earth, or the greater!: Part of it, would be uninhabitable. For
inftance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbifh, as not only dif-
figuring the Face of the Earth, but alfo as ufelefs and inconvenient;
and yet without thefe, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the Weather
fpr producing and ripening Fruits could regularly be preferv'd -f\ In
Mountainous Countries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of the
Weather, for the frequency of Showers and Storms, which yet proceed
from the very Nature of the Climate, and without which all the Moi-
fture would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits wither away.
The Earth then muft either not be created at all, or thefe things be
permitted. (50.)

VIII. The
NOTE S.

(50.) The feveral Objections mention'd in
this Paragraph are folidly refuted by Dr. J.
Clarke in his Treatife on Natural Evil, part of
which I fhall take the Liberty to infert as ufual,
and refer the Reader to the Book itfelf for the
left.

Having defcribed the Nature and Ufe of the
Air's Elasticity, and the acid, nitrous, and Jul-
plureous Particles with which it is impregnated,
which are the Caufe of Fermentation, he pro-
ceeds to accouat for Earthquakes, C5V. p. 190.
" Thus the internal Parts of the Earth being
" the only proper Place for containing fo large
" a Store of Sulphur and Nitre, and Minerals
*' as is required for fo many thoufand Years as
" the Earth in its prefent State has, and may
*' yet continue: it muft neceflarily be, that
*' when that Fermentation is made in fuch fub-
" terraneous Caverns as are not wide enough
" for the particles to expand themfelves in, or
" have no open Paflage to rum out- at, they
" will, by the forementioa'd Law, {hake the
*' Earth to a confiderable diftance, tear thofe
'* Caverns to pieces; and according to, the

*See Note 50,,

f See Note 5?.

depth of fuch Caverns, or Quantity of Ma-
terials contain'd in them, . remove large pie*
ces of the Surface of the Earth, from one
place to another, in the fame manner, tho' to a .
much higher degree than artificial Explofions
made under Ground; the effett of which is
fenfible to a great diftance. If it happens
that thefe Fermentations are in places under
the Sea, the Water mixing with thefe Mate-
rials, increafes their Force, and is thereby
thrown back with great violence, fo as to
feem to rife up into the Clouds, and fall
down: again fqmetimes in very large drops,
and fometimes in whole Spouts, which are
fufficient to drown all that is near them. If
the Fermentation be not fo violent, but fuch
only as raifes large Vapours or Steams, which
can find their way thro' fmall occult pafla-
gei of the Earth ; thefe near its Surface, by
their continual Expirations, are at firft the
Caufe of gentle Winds ; and thefe afterwards
by their continual Increafe, become perhaps
Storms, and Whirl-winds, and Tempefts,
which rnany times, deftroy the F,ruits, tear

Concerning Natural Evil. **3

VIII. The fame mud be faid of the Lakes and the Ocean. For 'tis The Number
manifeft, that Fruits, Vegetables, &c. which are the Food of Ani- o f ^ m * h
fnals, depend upon Moifture, and that this is exhaled frqm the Sea, r ifivd, was to
and watry places, by the Sun j and fince the Showers and Dews thus ** pr ? por " h
elevated, are not more copious than fuffice for the Vegetation of g ^ a d
Plants, 'tis plain that the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is necef- not the Food
fary, and could not be diminifhed without detriment to the whole. Vain ^[J 1 * Am *
therefore is the Complaint of Lucretius, who arraigns all thefe as faul-
ty. Neither was the Earth too narrow, nor needed it too much La-
bour to fuftain its Animals : For it was fufficient for thofe Animals
which God had given it *. But when they multiply above the pro-
portion of their Food, 'tis impoffible that it fhould be fufficient ; it
would not be enough if it were all converted into Food. For a cer-
tain Proportion is to be obferv'd between the Provision and the Eat-
ers, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they muil at length ne-

R 2 cefTarily

n o r E S.

u up the Trees, and overthrow the Houfes :
" But if they be Hill more gentle, there being
* always fome mlphurcous Exhalations, efpe-
" dally if the Earth be dry, they then afc end
'* along with the lighter Vapours, into the up-
" per Region of the Air, where, when a large
" Quantity of them is gathered together, they
" ferment with the acid Nitre, and taking
*' Fire, caufe Thunder and Lightning, and o-
" thcr Meteors. This, as far as can Be gathe-
" thered from Experience and Obfervation of
" the Works of Nature, is the Origin and
" Caufe of thofe Imperfections and Evils,
* which the prcfent Conflitution of the Air,
" and the Laws of Motion obferved by thofe
" Particles mix'd with it, unavoidably fubjedt
" it to. They are the natural and genuin ef-
fedts of the Regulation it is under, and with-,
" out altering the primary Laws of it (that is,
u making it fomething elie than what it is, or
: changing it into another Form : the Refult
** of which would be only to render it liable
* to Evils of another kind, againft which the
" fame Objections would equally lie) or in a
* c fupcrnatural manner, hindering it from pro-

c * ducing fuch Effects, it is impoffible to pre-
" vent them. And if we add to this, that thefe
c * Evils are the feweft that in the Nature of
u things could be, without hindering a much
" greater Good: that they are in the moft con-
* venient Parts, and the moft guarded againit
il doing Mifchief that could be; and that there
** are alio good Ufes to be made of them ; we
" fhall have no Reafon to complain of, or find
" fault w ith them. Were the Quantity of Sul-
' phur and Nitre much dimininVd, there would
" not be fufficient to fill the Region of Air
" for the purpofes of Vegetation and Life ;
" but the Ground would grow barren, and the
a Animals would wafte and die : And if there
'* were a much greater Quantity, the contrary
M Effect would happen, the Earth would be
16 too fat, the Plants would grow too grofs,
" and the Animals would be fuffbeated and
" choaked. The Temperature is therefore as
" exact as it could be, all Circumilances con-
" fider'd ; and the fmall Inconvcnicncies are
" nothing, compared with the general Good."
See alfo the Word Earthquake in Chambers^
Cyc/ofrdia.

*S*?DerhamV Phyf. TkeoL B. 4. C. 11:

124. Concerning Natural EviL

cefTarily perifh with Hunger. Want of Provifion then ought not to he
made an Objection : for if the Number of Creatures to be provided for
be enlarged above this Proportion, the greateil: Plenty would not fuffice ,
if this Proportion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, the leaft
would be fufficient. 'Tis our own fault therefore, not God's, if Pror-
vifions fail ; for the Number of Men may be confined within the bounds
prefcribed by Nature, as might eafily be fhewn, if it were worth our
while,

IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this Occafion j for by our fault
drcdthprtoftJurjg 8 are come to this Pafs, that even the hundredth part of thole
Mankind Eatables which might be had, don't meet with any to confume them,
which might T ^ e )} v i ne Beneficence has therefore dealt bountifully with Mankind

Jive upon tne . _ . J

Earth, does in refpect of Proviiions.

not yet
abit it:

inhabit it : Vain therefore is the Complaint about Seas and Defarts.

'Tis abfurd x. 'Tis to be obferv'd in the laft place, that Animals are of fuch a
defaeadife- Nature as to delight in Action, or the Exercife of their Faculties, nor
rent place or C an we have any other Notion of Happinefs even in God himfelf *.
dlatwhicM? Since tnen tne Faculties of both Body and Mind are to be exercis'd in
allotted him; order to produce Pleafure, where's the wonder if God deftin'd that Ex-
flD de to fin* erc ^ e * P art f r procuring of Food, and connected this Pleafure with
that place, it, (5 1.). The infinite Power of God was able to produce Animals of

and would 0- filch

therwifehave

had none at & Q- * E SL

(51.) Befide the Neceflity there is for labour,
in order to reftrain Man in his prefent State
from an Excefs of Folly and Wickednefs,
(which our Author confiders in the two laft Pa-
ragraphs of this Chapter) the ufe and advantage
of it appears alfo from the manifeft tendency it
has to preferve and improve the Faculties of
both Body and Mind. If ufed in a moderate
Degree, it preferves our Health, Vigour, and
Activity ; gives us a quick Senfe and Relifh of
Pleafure, and prevents a great manyMiferies
which attend Idlenefs. This is well defcribed
by the Guardian N. 131. and the Speflater,
N. 115. "I confider the Body as a Syftem
*< of Tubes and Glands, or, to ufe a more ru-

" ftic Phrafe, a bundle ofPipes and Strainers,
" fitted to one another after fo wonderful a
" manner, as to make a proper Engine for the
" Soul to work with. This Defcription does
" not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones,
" Tendons, Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but
" every Mufcle, and every Ligature, which is
" a Compofition of Fibres, that are fo many
" imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on
" all fides with invifible Glands or Strainers.
" This general Idea of a human Body, with-
M out considering it in the Niceties of AnatO'
*' my, lets us fee how abfolutely neceflary La-
** hour is for the right Prefervation of it. There
" muft be frequent Motions and Agitations, to

mix*
Sa? Ch. 1. $3. par, a and Ch. 5. ^. 1. Sub. 4.

Concerning Natural Evil.

fuch Capacities ; and fince the Creation of them was no Inconvenience
toother Beings who might exercife themfelves in a more noble Man-
ner, may not the infinite Goodnefs of God be conceiv'd to have almoft
compelled him not to refufe or envy thefe the Benefit of Life? Some
of this kind were to be created, fince there was Room left for them in
the Work of God, after fo many others were made as was convenient.
But you may wifh that fome other Place and Condition had fallen to
your Lot ; perhaps fo : but if you had taken up another's Place, that o-
ther, or fome elfe,. muffc have been put into yours, who, being alike
ungrateful to the Divine Providence, would wifh for the Place which
you now have occupied. Know then that it was neceffary that you
mould either be what you are, or not at all. For fmce every other
Place and State which the Syflem or Nature of Things allow'd, was
occupied hy fome others, you mull of neceffity either fill that which
you now are in, or be banifh'd out of Nature. For, do you expect
that any other mould be turn'd out of his Order, and you placed in his
Room? that is, that God mould exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary
Munificence toward you to the prejudice of others. You ought there-
fore not to cenfure, but adore the Divine Goodnefs for making you
what you are. You could neither have been made othcrwife, nor in:
a better Manner, but to the Difadvantage of fome others, or. of the
whole.

pro ? E

mix, digeft, and feparate the Juices contain'd
in it, as well as to clear and cleanfe the Infi-
nitude of Pipes and Strainers, of which it is
compofed; and to give their folid Parts a
more firm and lafting Tone. Labour or Ex-
ercife ferments the Humours, cafts them in-
to their proper Channels, throws off Redun-
dancies, and helps Nature in thofe fecret Di*
ftributions, without which the Body cannot
fubfift in its Vigour, nor the Soul aft with
Chearfulnefs. I might here mention the
Effects which this has upon all the Faculties
of the Mind, by keeping the Underftanding
clear, the Imagination untroubled, and refi-
ning thofe Spirits that are neceffary for the
proper Exertion of our Intellectual Facul-
ties, during the prefegt Laws of Union be-

" tween Soul and Body. It is to a Neglect*
" in this particular that we muft afcribe, the
" Spleen which is fo frequent in Men of ftu-
" dious and fedentary Tempers, as well as the
" Vapours to which thofe of the other Sex are.
" fo often fubjea."

He proceeds to illuftrate both theWifdom
and Goodnefs of God, from his having fitted-
and obliged us to this Labour and Exercife,
which is To neceffary to our well-being : which
Obfervation will help us to account for the fc-
cond and third Eyil arifing from the Fa//, men--
tioned in $.9. par. 5. The Fitnefs of a State,
of Labour for fallen Man, is fhewnat large by
Sherlock on Jvdgment, C. 1. $.8. p. 179. and.
Mr. DOy/y in his Jirjl Diftrtatien, C9. p. 98,
bV. 2d Edition.

SECT,

1 06 Concerning Natural Evil.

SECT. VI.

Concerning Propagation of tie Species, Child-
hood, and Old-Age.

Animals may * lC!7^ om w ^ lat na s been faid it appears, that Animals which have
be repaired J/ folid Bodies are naturally mortal ; thb' the Earth therefore were
d tff Dth at ^^ ^^ ft c k'd w ^ tn them, yet their Number being continually
were preven- diminifh'd by Death, it would at length be quite destitute of Inhabi-
ted by Om- tants. There might, it feems, have been a threefold Remedy for this
"diy^by"" Evil : Firft, if God by his Omnipotence fhould prevent the Natural
Creation: Effects of the mutual Percuflion of folid Bodies, viz. the Corruption
Propagation. am * DifTolution of themfelves, and the Change or Effufion of their
Fluids. For from thefe the Deftruction of Animals neceffarily arifes,
as thefe do from the Compofition of Bodies, and their acting on each
other. Secondly, by leaving Nature to itfelf, and letting it act by U-
niverfal Mechanic Laws ; and when thefe brought on a diffolution of
Animal Bodies, that others be fubftituted in their Room by Creation.
Thirdly, by ordering that an Animal mould generate its like, and pro-
vide another to fupply its Place when it declined.
This third D. Who does not fee that this laft is the beft Method of preferving
Method isthe a conftant Number of Inhabitants upon the Earth ? For 'tis the fame
it can bTef 6 tnm g> cateris paribus, with regard to the Syftem, whether the Earth
fcfted with- have thefe Inhabitants which it has at prefent, or others equal in Num-
vb)ence 8 to '^ er anc * Perfection: but it is not the fame thing whether the Laws of
the Laws of Nature be obferv'd or violated *. In the former Methods God muft
Nature. have interfered every Moment by his abfolute Power, he muft have

done

f See Note 37.

Concerning Natural Evil. 117

done infinite violence to the Laws of j> T atmre, and confounded all the
Conitirutions and Orders of things, and that without any Benefit; nay
with extraordinary detriment to the whole in the main. For fince
the universal Laws of Motion are the bed that could pofiibly be efta-
felifh'd, they would fel.dom be. i<evers'd without damage to the whole*.
Neither does it become the Wifdom of God to have left his Work fo
imperfect as to- want continual mending ev.eain, the mialleft ParticiL-
lars. 'Twas better therefore for it to-be made in fuch a manner as we
fee it is, viz. that a new Offspring mould be propagated, out of the A-
nimals t.hemfelves,. and by themfelves.

HL And herein we may admire the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs The Divine
which hatji.fo prudently and: effectually contrived this End. For it' G J5^ s m
has implanted in all Creatures (as- we fee) a ftrong and almot irrefifti-!idmirabiem-
ble appetite of propagating their kind,, and' has rejider'd this act of c ' ie contri-
propagation fo ufeful and agreeable to them, who perform it, that Po- vance011
iterity becomes dearer to many than Life irielf, and if it were left, to
their Choice, they would, rather die than lofe tlieir Offspring and the
Rewards of Love : nay there is fcarce one that would not protect its
Young at the hazard of its own, Life. God has therefore, by one Angle
Law, and a fort of Mechanifm, replenifli'd the Earth with living Crea-
tures, and provided that a fufficient Number fhould never be wanting,
without the Intervention of a Power, which would be irregular, and .
an Imputation on the Skill and Wifdom of the Architect. Who would
not prefer fuch a piece of Mecjianifm, where one Machine generates
another, and continually producer a new one in its turn, without a-
ny new and extraordinary Intervention of the Artificer, before one
which would immediately and every Day require his affiftance and a-
mendment ?

IV. This Method, you'll fay, is fit enough for the Brutes, many of why Men are
which muft neceflarily die, not only by the Law of their Nature, but ^[ththcain-
alfo for the fake of others, for whofe ufe they were created to ferve as tinual dread
Food. But Man is hardly dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is ^n^Br'ate*-
troubled with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death ; and who ar e not at ail-
frequently foretaftes, and by ruminating, thoroughly digefls, whate- concern' d *-
ver bitternefs there is in Death itfelf. Neither does the Hope or Care
of Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of thefe Pleafures, compenfate for fa

many

* Sie Note 37.

ia8

Concerning Natural Evil.

manyMiferies and Evils: The Divine Goodnefs might therefore have
either conceal'd from Man his Mortality, or elfe removed that innate
Terror arifing in our Minds from the profpect of Death, which is al-
ways dreadful. (52.)
Thisisafign V 'Tis to be confefs'd indeed, that thefe are indications that Man
that the pre- h as fome relation to Immortality, and that the State in which he is
prelude K) a" P^ ace ^ at prefent is not entirely natural to him, otherwife he would
better. not be fo uneafy in it, nor afpire fo eagerly after another. The pre-
fent Life of Men is therefore either affign'd them for a time, by way
of Punifhment, as fome think, or by way of Prelude to, or Prepara-
tion for a better, as our Religion teaches, and our very Nature per-
fuades us to hope and expect This is prefumed, you'll fay, and not
proved. Be it fo. But if by the Suppofition of a future State this
"Difficulty may be folv'd, and Providence vindicated, when it is ar-
raign'd as dealing hardly with Mankind, who is fo foolifh as to be wil-
ling to call in queftion the Power and Goodnefs of God, rather than
admit of fo probable an Hypothefis ? To which we may add, and be-
lieved by almoft all Mankind. But if it were not fo, God hasbeftow'd
other Benefits of Life upon us, which, in our own Judgments, are not
at all inferior to the prefervation of Life ; and this appears from
hence, that we often prefer thefe Benefits to Life itfelf, which we
ihould never do, if we did not fometimes efteem them dearer to us.

N *T E &

(52.) A fufficient anfwe? to this Objection
trav be found in the laft Chapter of Dr. Sher-
lock's admirable Treatife on Death, I (hall in-
fert a little of it. " There are great and wife
M Reafons why God Ihould imprint this aver-
* fion to Death on human Nature; becaufe it
" obliges us to to take care of ourfelves, and
" to avoid every thing which will deftroy or
" fhorten our Lives : this in many Cafes is a
' great Principle of -Virtue, as it preferves us
" from all fatal and deltru&ive Vices ; it is a
" great inftrument of Government, and makes
" Men afraid of committing fuch Villanies as
*' the Laws of-their Country have made capi-

** tal ; and therefore, fmce the natural Fear of
" Death is of fuch great advantage to us, we
" muft be contented with it, tho' it makes the
" thoughts of Dying a little uneafyj efpecially
" if we confider, that when this natural Fear
" of Death is not encreas'd by other Caufes,
** it may be conquer'd or allay'd by Reafon
" and wife Confideration." p. 329. 4th Edi-
tion.

For a farther Account of both the rational
and irrational Fear of Death, what it is., and
what it ought to be, the Ends and Effefts, and
alfo the Remedies of it, fee Norm's excellent
Difcourfe on Heb. 2. 1 5. *.

* Prafthal Diparfes, vol. 4th.

Concerning Natural Evil. tij

To come to a conclufion : Without an univerfal confufion of Nature,
without violence offer 'd to the Laws and Order of it, the fame Ani-
mals could not prolong their Life for any confiderable time, it re-
mained therefore that fome fupply the Place of others fucceffively,
and that the Species be perpetuated, fince the Individuals could not,
left the whol eAnimal kind mould prove a thing of but one Age's Du-
ration.

VI. From hence it appears, that the Race of Mortals is to be per- "^ISJfSj
petuated by the propagation of their Species; and lince every Animal to be bom
is in a perpetual Flux, and may either increafe or decay, it was pro- JjjJ ^. nd
per to proceed from lefs Beginnings to greater; for by this means the hence the
new Offspring would be lefs burthenfome to the Parents, and the foundation
Young and Old agree better together. I confefs indeed Men are born \^% e%
defencelefs and unable to protect themfelves, and lefs qualified to pro-
vide for themfelves than any other Animals : But God has aflign'dus
Parents, Guardians, and Faithful Guides, fo that we are never more
happy than when under their Protection. Hence Childhood, blefs'd
with the fimple enjoyment of good things, and void of Care, becomes
more pleafant to us than any other Age. Hence alfo comes Reverence
and Relief to the Aged, hence proceeds Comfort to the Mature, and
Support to the Decrepit. Nay the Seeds and Principles of Social Life
are all laid in this appetite of Generation. To this propenfion we
owe almoft all the benefits of Society. Nothing therefore could be
more defirable to Creatures mortal (as we are by the neceffary Condi-
tion of terreftrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miferies, than to be born
after fuch a manner as in the firft Part of Life, while we are tender,
unacquainted with things, and put under the Guardianfhip of others,
to enjoy the Sweets without the Care ; in the middle, to pleafe our-
felves as much in taking care of others j and in the decrepit, feeble
Age, to be aflifted in our turn by others whom we have educated.
This Part of the Divine OEconomy is fo far therefore from needing
an Apology, that it is rather a Demonjlration of his Goodnefs. The
Race of Men was to be repair'd, fince Death could not be prevented
without a greater Evil ; and that Reparation is order'd in fo wife and
beneficent a way, that nothing can be more worthy of the Divine
Power and Goodnef6, nothing defer vc greater Admiration.

S VII. Now

1 30 Concerning Natural Evil.

The chief V11 * ^ ow the ** e two Appetites, viz. of Self-prefervation, and the
Appetites ire Propagation of our Species, are the primary, the original of all o-
thofe of Self- tners> From thefe fprintr Pleafure and an agreeable Eniovment of

prefervation, ,. r , r r & . _ , . P . w x - 11 J^.y" ItilL v '*

and propaga- things ; from thefe come almolt every thing that is advantageous or
tionofthe defirable in Life. But all thefe are mingled with fome Evils, which
FCaes * could not be avoided without greater.

SECT. VII.

Of Difeafes, Wild-Beafls, and Venomous

Creatures.

*awf to'di-: 1 - \ \ 7 E muft obferve (as before *) that our Bodies confift of fo-
foiution, and VV lid and fluid Parts, and that thefe folid Members may be
tumours to either cut or broken to Pieces, disjointed, or otherwife render'd unfit
*ne P Pdns for Motion : whence Weaknefs, Languijhing and Torments-, that the
and Difeafes. Fluids alfo are liable, not only to Confumption, but Corruption too,

to Ebullition, by too intenfe Heat, or Stagnation by Cold : whence

proceed various Maladies and Difeafes.

II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth which we inhabit,
The flrength f rom a m i x ture of which arife Changes and Coagulations. There are
ancffadijui- other Bodies alfo which rlyafunder with greater violence when mix'd.
ces as are Thus Milk, by the infufion of a little Acid, turns to Cheefe and
AnE/a- Whey: thus Spirits of Wine and Gun-powder, when touched by the
rifes from the Fire, run into Flame; and there is nothing to hinder the fame from
^ tr s ar ^ c h f coming to pafs in the Blood and Humours of a human Body. Now

could not be tilOlC

removed, without taking away Motion.

*Scft. 13.

Concerning Natural EviL 1 5 1

thofe things which, by being mix'd with them, refolve, coagulate, or
render them unfit for Circulation, we call Poifonous. And if we
confider thofe contraries by which we are nourifh'd, and in the Sn g-
gle or Oppofition of which Nature confifts, 'tis fcarce conceivable how
thefe mould not often happen. Nor can all contrariety be taken a-
way, except Motion be taken away too, as we have fhewn j nor could
all thefe things that are contrary to our Conftitution be removed, ex-
cept fome Species of Creatures were extinct, or never created ; that
is, our Security muft have been purchafed at too dear a Rate. For
if every thing that is in any refpect repugnant to us were removed,
it would coft either the whole Syftem, or ourfelves, more Evil than
we receive from it at prefent, as will fufficiendy appear to any one
that enumerates the Particulars.

III. 'Tis to be obferv'd, that the Parts of this mundane Syftem Qf . ,
which are contiguous to us, viz. the Air, Waters, and the Earth it- m i ca i Dif-
felf, are liable to Changes ; nor could it pofTibly be other wife, if the ea le
whole Machine, of which thefe are but fmall Parts, be thoro'ly con-
fider'd : nor could thefe Changes, efpecially the fudden ones, always
agree with the Temperature of the Humours of human Body. For
they enter into the very conftitution of the Body, and infect its Fluids
according to the Laws of Nature: whence it is that the due Crafisof
the Blood, and Health of the Body, depend upon the temperature of
the Air and Weather. Hence arife peflilential and epidemical Difeaies;
nor could they be avoided, unlefs the Animals had been made of a
quite different Frame and Conftitution. Nay, whatever State they had
been placed in, they would have been fubjecl: either to thefe, or o-
thers no lefs pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardeft of Bodies,
are diflblv'd by the viciflltude of heat and cold, moift and dry, and the
other Changes which we are infenfible of; how much more the hu-
mours and animal Spirits of Man, on a right temperature of which
Life depends. God might indeed, by a favour peculiar to us, have ex-
pell'd all the contagions anting from thefe alterations, or provided
that they mould not hurt us. But what reafon have fuch Sinners
as we now are, to expect it. 'Tis more agreeable to the Ju-
ftice of God, to leave the Elements to themielves; to be carried

S 2 according

igi

Concerning Natural Evil.

according to the Laws of Motion, for our Punimmenr, (53.). Neither
ought we to wonder that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even
the Innocent have no Right to : nay, we ought to think that he has
inflicted a very light Penalty on rebellious Man: for fince the Natu-
ral Evils we are forc'd to ftruggle with, are for the moll part of fuch
a nature as could not he warded off, but by the particular extraordi-
nary favour of the Deity, God mould feem rather to have refumed a
free Gift, than inflicted a Punifhment, when he is pleas'd to permit
them.

IV. If the Earth had been made for the ufe of Man alone, we
might have expected that there mould be nothing in it that was pre-
Snbut o- judicial or ufelefs to him ; but fince it was made, as we have obfer-
ther Animals ved *, for the Benefit of the Univcrfe, Man is placed therein, not
lor their Hi- becaufe it was created for him only, but becaufe it could afford him
a convenient Habitation ; for God mull be fuppofed in this cafe not
to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but the Inhabitants to
the Place. If therefore Man can dwell commodioufly enough in thefe
Regions of the Earth which are fit for his Purpofe, he muft allow
God in his Goodnefs to give the Earth as many other Inhabitants as
it can fuftain confidently with the Good of Men. Neither is he to
repine, that the Rocks and Defarts, which are of no ufe to Men, fup-
ply the Serpents and Wild-Beafts with Coverts. But thefe, you'll fay,
fometimes invade the Countries which are mofl delightful, and befl
ftored with conveniencies for human Life, deftroy the fruits and culti-
vated

NOTES.

Rocks and
Defarts are

litation.

(^3.) Our Authors Argument here feems to
\k framed rather in compliance with the com-
mon forms of fpeaking, than in Arid confor-
m ty to his own Scheme of the to G'iKtiov, or
abfolute Meliority in things: which Syftem
maintains that God is ftill infinitely benefi-
cent, or as kind as pofiible to all, or difpenfes
every thing for the very beft in the main. Tho'
what is here introduced by way of Punifhment,
may, if rightly underftood, be defended as an
inftance of thegreateft poflible Kindrrefs; fince
the only end of all the Divine Judgments is
cither the Correction and Amendment of the

Offenders themfelves, or admonition to others,
or both r and confequently is a means of the
greateil Good to Mankind in general, and the
very beft difpeniation towards them in this de-
generate corrupt Eftate, and the mofl proper
method of fitting them for, or di reding and
drawing them to a better. And if all this
can be effe&ed by the fame general Laws of
Nature, which alfo bring Plenty, Health and
Happinefs to the World, here is a double de-
monftration of the abfolute Wifdom and Good
nefs of its Author.

Chap. 3. Note 33.

Ht-

Concerning Natural Evil. 122

rated Fields, and kill the Men themfelves by Bites and Poifons. I grant
it; but it may be queftion'd whether it has been always fo.

V. For in the firft Place, this Evil might have had its Origin from A ;'t H
Man himielf; viz. Rage might be given to the Lion, and Venom to c ]" J r s ^
the Serpent, for the Punifhment of Mankind, and this antient Hifto- Wiid-Be*fli
lies both facred and prophane declare. But fince this Queftion was JJ^J?*
firft agitated by fuch as either denied reveal'd Religion, or at leaft were tures were
ignorant of it, I would not call that in to our affirmance, nor make a- madc / or the

1 rr-^1 1 tt An punifhment

ny other ule or it tnan as a bare Hypotheiis. of Mankind.

VI. We may affirm then in the fecond Place, that thefe things hap-

pen thro' the fault of Men, who, by Wars and Difcord, make fruit- JJftnkSd 1
ful and rich Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and leave them that thefe
to the poffeffion of Wild-Beafts and venomous Infects : Since there- ult, P I 7 :
fore they neither cultivate them themfelves, nor allow other Perfons la-d wake by
to do it, what wonder is it, if God, for the reproach of Men, give ^ u iff' m to
them up to be inhabited by Brutes, Wild-Beafts and Infects? TnofcpfMan,"?
Parts which we have deferted belong by right to them, nor do they r 'ght belong
otherwife multiply more than is proper. totm

VII. Thirdly: 'Tis no more repugnant to the Divine Goodnefs to Wemaymoie
have made an Animal, by the bite of which a Man might be deftroy'd, " fi jjj *
than a Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth but what may an d veno-
hurt or kill a Man, if it be not ufed with caution: Meat, Drink, mous Crea -
Water; Fire. Muft thefe then not be created becaufe they may hurt ^J jj^.
a Man ? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poifons and Wild- veniences of
Beafts than of thefe : Nay, fcarce one is killed by Poifon, or torn by Jjhfti 1 about
Wild-Beafts, of a thoufand that die by the Sword j and yet we don't never quarrel
at all blame the Divine Goodnefs for this. It may be faid, that Iron, "' ith provi "
Earth, Water, Meats and Drinks, are neceffary, and on that account

the Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who will undertake
to afTure us that venomous Animals and Wild-Beafts are not necefla-
ry * ? Muft we reckon them entirely ufelefs becaufe we do not know
the ufe of them ? Muft we fay that every Wheel in a Clock is made
for no manner of Purpofe, which a Ruftic underftands not the defign
of? But fuppofe we grant that thefe are of no Service to us, yet do
they not pleafe and enjoy themfelves + ?

VIH You

* See Note 54. j Su Note 33..

154. Concerning Natural Evil.

All Animals VIII. You may urge that thefe arc not worth the Notice of the
arc under the Divine Providence. Thus indeed proud Mortals, admirers of them-
felves alone, defpife the Works of God : But "'tis not fo with the
Divine Goodnefs, which chofe that fome Inconvenience mould be-
fal Mankind, rather than a whole Species be wanting to Na-
ture.

IX. If you infift that a Lion might have been made without Teeth
or Claws, a Viper without Venom: I grant it, as a Knife without an
Edge; but then they would have been of quite another Species, and
have had neither the nature, nor ufe, nor genius, which they now
enjoy. In fhort, I fay, once for all, they are not in vain. The very
Serpents, tho' a Race hateful to us, have their ufesj among the reft,
they gather the Poifon out of the Earth, (54.). Nor is the Country
lefs habitable where they are than where they are not. Now, ceteris
paribus, Animals ought to multiply j for Life is a Perfection, and fince
it is as noble a one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none at
all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of God, wherever he has be-
flow'd it, and does not ftand in need of an Evil Principle for its
Author.

divine Care
to think o-
therwife fa
vours of
Pride.

Wild-Beafts
and veno-
mous Crea-
tures are of
ufe to Men.

NOTES.

(54.) For an account of the various ends and
ufes of thefe noxious Animals, poifonous Plants,
Minerals, effr. fee Derbarn's Anfvver to the a-
bove mention'd Objection, in his Pbyf. Ibeol.

B. 2. Ch. 6. with the References, and Ray on

the Creation, Part 2. p. 432, &c. 4th Edition,
or Chambers's Cytlopcedia, under the Word
Poi/in.

SECT.

Concerning Natural Evil. \ 3 5

SECT. VIII.

Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man.

I. Qlnce Man (nay every created Being) is necefTarily of a limited Human Un-
u Nature * 'tis plain that he cannot know every thins;. The demanding

_' * # j , e . u jiecelianly

molt perfect Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things : Nor ignorant of
can they attain to any other Knowledge than what is agreeable to man y thin^.
their Nature and Condition : innumerable Truths therefore lie hid
from every created Understanding. For perfect and infinite Know-
ledge belongs to God alone ; and it muft be determin'd by his Plea-
fure, what degree every one is to be endow'd with : for he only knows
the nature and necemty of each, and has- given what is agreeable there-
to. Ignorance is therefore an Evil of Defect, and no more to be a-
voided than the other kind of Imperfection ; for an imperfect Nature
(as that of all Creatures is) underftands alfo imperfectly.

II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confefs'd that we acquire it by e at ? fom f"

o * x * times forced

the Senfes, and that certain Characters denote, not fo much the Na- tQ ma k e u fe
tures, as the XJfes and Differences of things *f-. Now, fince things very ofconjec-
difFerent internally, have fometimes the fame external Marks, wemuftf^emay
of neceflity be often doubtful, and fometimes deceiv'd by the Simili- not only be
tude of the Marks. IffoSfite'

Neither is it fumcient to the avoiding of Error, that we fufpend
our aflent in doubtful Cafes, for 'tis often necefiary for us (efpecially
if we have to do with other Perfons) to act upon conjecture, and re-
folve upon action, before we have thoro'ly difcufs'd the Point, or dif-
cover'd the Truth : on which account it is impoflible that we mould

totally

* See Note 28.
f Fcr a right Under fanning of this Seel ion, review our Jlutl.ofs Note A^

I 36 Concerning Natural Evil.

totally avoid Errors. God muft therefore either have made no fuch
Animal as Man is, or one that is liable to Errors. As Contrariety re-
mits from Motion, which is as it were the action of Matter, fo a
poffibility of Error is confequent upon the Action of a finite Under-
ftanding.
God could HI. If any one reply, that God can immediately reveal the Truth
not guard U3 to us in fuch Cafes : I anfwer, he may fo, nor can it be denied that
Errors uTth- ne nas done, and will do it fometimes : but that this mould be done al-
out violence ways, would be a violence repugnant to the Nature and Condition of
done to Man, and could not poffibly be done without more and greater Evils
arifing from an interruption of the courfe of Nature. Now we muft
diftinguifh between thofe Errors which we fall into after our utmoft
diligence and application, and fuch as we are led into by carelefnefs,
negligence, and a depraved Will. Errors of the former kind are to
be reckon'd among Natural Evils, and not imputable to us : for they
arife from the very State and Condition of the Mind of Man, and are
not to be avoided, unlefs God would change the Species of Beings,
and order that different things mould not affect the Senfes in the fame
manner, that is, that there mould be no more Species nor Individu-
als, than there are Senfaiions in us: for if the Number of thefe ex-
ceed the Defcrimination or Combination of our Senfations, variety of
them muft neceflarily produce either the very fame Senfations in us,
'Or none at all, and a great many anfwer to the fame Senfation, fo
that we muft certainly be fometimes impofed upon by the fimilitude
of things. Either then the Diftinctions of our Senfations muft be
multiplied in infinitum , or the infinite variety of fenfible Objects taken
away. But 'tis evident that neither could have been done in this
prefent State. We muft therefore bear the Inconvenience, not only
of being ignorant of innumerable things, but alfo of erring in ma-
ny Cafes.
Idan is not IV. To this it may be replied, that Error is a Defect in that part
f ex ^ r ? m, "-of Man, in the perfection of which his Happinefs chiefly confiftsj if
caufe expo- therefore he may naturally fall into Errors, it follows, that Man may
fed to Errors. |> e naturally miferable without his fault. But I anfwer: Any parti-
cular Evil does not bring Mifery upon us, otherwife every Crea-
ture would be miferable, as of necefiity labouring under the E-
vils of Imperfection* He only therefore is to be denominated mife-
rable,

Concerning Natural Evil. j^-

rMe, who is oppreffed with more and greater Evils than his Good
can requite with Happinefs. So that upon ballancing the Conve-
niences and Inconveniencies of Life, it were better for him not to be
than to be.

V. 'Tisto be obferv'd alfo, that God has in his Wifdom and Good- Thofc E . r '
nefs fo temper'd our prefent State, that we very feldom, if ever, fall ^eVaii into
into grievous and pernicious Errors without our own fault. But if without our
this ever come to pafs, as foon as the Evil preponderates, Life is ta- ^0,^ r .
ken away together with the benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be e- nidous.
fteem'd an Happinefs, and an Argument of the Divine Goodnefs, that
the Natural Benefits of Life cannot be taken from us, but Life is ta-
ken alfo. Life then can be a burden to none; nor is it necelfary that
any one mould withdraw himfelf from natural Evils, by voluntarily
putting an end to his Life. For if thefe Evils be fuch as take away
the Benefits of Life, they alfo bring it to an end. God produced all
things out of nothing, and gave us Being without our Advice, he
feems therefore obliged in Juflice not to fuffer us to be reduced to a
State that is worfe than Non-entity. (55.) When therefore any State
is overwhelmed with Evils which outweigh the Good, 'tis reafbnable
that God mould remit us to our former State, that is, let us return
to nothing. Neither ought we to accufe the Divine Power and Good-
nefs which has beftow'd as many Bleffings and Benefits upon us, as
either the whole Univerfc or our own Nature would admit of; and
fince it was impoflible but that fome time or other, upon the increafe
of Evils, his Gift (viz. Life) muft become burdenfome, when this
happens he breaks off its thread.

VI. But

NOTES.

(55.) It would be fo indeed if this were our
only State : but as it is at prefent, I fear many
have nothing but the hopes and expectations of
another to fupport them under almolt complete
Mifery; to comfort and encourage them to un-
dergo Evils infinitely greater than all the be-
nefits of Life: Evils, which make Life itfelf
an Evil,and (as our Author fays) put them into
a State worfe than nothtng. Witntft the long

and acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the
Pains of Confeftbrs, the Labours of commoH
Galley-Slaves, &c. But the lealt hint of this is
fufheient, and the common anfwers to it very
fatisfaclory : as will perhaps appear from the
References to the laft Chapter of the Appendix
to this Book, where this Queftion comes more
properly under confidcratioru

t38

Our Know-
ledge is adap
ted to our
State.

Concerning Natural Evil.

VI. But Man, you'll fay, is ignorant of thofe things which it was
his greateft Intereft to know, namely, of Truths that are neceffary
to the attainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our prefent
State to underftand thefe j and who will affirm that God has not be-
ftow'd upon us all the Knowledge which is agreeable to our State ?
We ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about fuch Truths as thefe,
while we apply all proper diligence to the Search. I anfwerj If this
be understood of the Happinefs due to us in this Life, 'tis very true ;
nor is our Under/landing ever fo far miftaken, as not to inform us of
the Truths neceffary to this, kind of Happinefs, if proper care be not
wanting. But, fuch Happinefs ought to fuffice us, as may ferve to
make Life a Bleffing, and better than the abfence of it. A greater
indeed was promifed to the firft Man by a gratuitous Covenant, {$6)

but

NOTES.

(t;6) Tho' the firft Man might have been
created more perfedt in all his Faculties than a-
ny of his Pofierity (which, as fome think, can-
not be eafily proved from the account we have
of him in Gemfi. *)Tho' this knowledgemight
have been at firlt much clearer, as coming en-
tire and adult from the immediate hand of his
Creator ; yet it feems highly probable,, that
this could not have been propagated in a natu-
ral way, that is, by any general pre-eftablifh'd
Laws, as our prefent Faculties are, but Man-
kind, as a fucceflive Body, muft neeeffarily
have been left to the known Rules of Propaga-
tion, and the prefent Meth d of improving
their Intellects, and deriving all their Notices
from the common Sources of Senfation and
Refle&ion. And fo our bountiful Creator may
be fuppoed to have deprived Mankind of no
B'effings he could, confident with his other
Attribute^, and the order of the Creation, pof-
fibly hav>: 1 eftow'd. Nay, why may not he be
thought to have converted even this neceffary,
unavoidable Imperfection in us, compared with
the firft Adam, into a greater Perfe&ion arifing
both from our notions of his fall, and the

confequences of it, and of the wonderful Re-
medy prepatcd for it, and prom i led in the fe~
cond AJan ? We feem to be made more high-
ly fenfible of the infinite Wifdom and Good-
nefs of God, and more thankful for our Con-
dition, from our knowledge of his juflperniif-
fion of fo deferv'd a FalJ ; and his gracious
undeferv'd' Ex<i/ttitii/! of us agVin to a fupcrior
State, than if we had conceiv'd the Mifery at-
tending human Nature to be (as perhips mod
of it was) a neceffary confequence of our being
created in this inferior Clafs. But whether thi*
Notion be allow'd or not, the Scheme of Pro-
vidence relating to Paradife , &c. as deliver'd in
Holy Scripture, if taken altogether, can be no
juft Objection againit the moral Attributes of
God. He created Man entirely innocent, and
abfolutely free, which Freedom was abfolutely
neceffary to his Happinefs (as will appear un-
der the head of Moral Evil.) He gave him
the Means and Abilities to complete his Hap-
pinefs, and placed him in a World every way
fuited to his Condition. This Liberty made it
poflifele for him. to lofe that Innocence, tho' he
had but one angle opportunity of doing it f,

and

C.8.

* See Bayle under the Word Adam, Remark D. And Curcellaei Jnjiit. Re/. Chrijl. t 3.
p 108, cifV. And DiJJert.de Pecc. Orig. fc . er Epifcopius Inft. Tkeol. 1. 4. C.6,7. p-35&>359-
f See Nichols' i Conferente with a Tbeiji, p. 220, 221. ift Edition.

Concerning Natural Evil.

but when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Pofterity were re-
manded to thofe imperfect Notices which could be had from an im-
perfect Understanding, and the Information of the Senfes j which yer
are not in the lead to be defpifed, neither had Man a Right, nor could

T 2 he

*39

N O 7* E S.

and it was highly reafbnable and neceffary that
he fhould have that ||. This one Opportunity
he embraced, (which it dees not feem poffible
for God himfelf, tho' he forcfaw it, to have
prevented, confidently with that Freedom he
had for good reafons given him, and determin'd
thus to exercife) and fo alter' d his Nature and
Circumftances, and confequently made it ne-
ceffary for God alfo to change his Place and
Condition, and to withdraw fuch extraordina-
ry favours as his infinite Wifdom and Good-
nefs might otherwife have thought proper to
bellow. Thus, with his Innocence, Man loft
all Title to a Continuance in Paradife, and of
confequence became naturally liable to the
common Evils and Calamities of a tranfitory
Life, and the Pains attending its Conclufion.
Thofe that defcended from him, and partook
of the fame Nature, muft neceffarily partake of
the fame Infirmities; in particular, they muft
inherit Corruption and Mortality. Which Evils,
tho we now lament them as the chief Parts of
our Fore-fithcrs Punifhmcnt, yet could not in
the prefent Circumftances of things be preven-
ted ; nor indeed, were fuch a Prevention pof-
fible, would it be in the main defirable ; as
will appear immediately: nay the fe, by a mod
wonderful Scheme of Providence, are infinite-
ly", out weigh' d, and made the means of bring-
ing us to much greater Happinef - , by Faith in
him who was promifed from the Beginning,
ani hath in thefe latter Days brought Life and
Inatr upttbtlity to Light. " Since the Fall of
Man (fays the incomparable Sherlock on Death,
" p. 101.) Mortality and Death is neceflary to
" the good Government of the World : no-
" thing elfe can give a check to fome Men's
" Wickedncft, but either the Fear of Death or

" the Execution of it : fome Men are fo otif-

" ragioufly wicked, that nothing can put a

" ftop to them, and prevent the Mifchief they

" do in the World, but to cut them off: this

" is the Reafon of Capital Punifhments among

" Men, to remove thofe out of the World

" who will be a Plague to Mankind while

" they live in it. For this reafon God de-

" ftroy'd the whole Race of Mankind by a De-

'* luge of Water, excepting Noah and his Fa-

" mily, becaufe they were incurably wicked :

" For this reafon he fends Plagues and Fa-

" mines, and Sword, to correcf the exorbi-

" tant Growth of Wickednefs, to leflen the

" number of Sinners, and to lay Reftraints on

" them. And if the World be fuch a Bedlam

" as it is under all thefe Reftraints, what would

" it be were it filled with immortal Sinners!

And again, p. 105. " When Man had fin-

" ned, it was neceffary that he fhould die, be-

" caufe he could never be completely and per-

" feflly happy in this World, as you have al-

" ready heard : and the only poffible way to

*' make him happy, was, to tranflate him into

" another World, and to bellow a better Im-

" mortality on him: This God has done, and

" that in a very ftupendous way, by giving his

" own Son to die for us; and now we have

" little reafon te complain that we all die in

" Adam, fince we are made alive in Chrift,

" Ciff."

A great many more Arguments on this Sub-
ject may be feen in the fame Book, Chap. 3.
^ 2. All which muft be obferv'd to relate
chiefly to the Government of Man after hi
Fall : the Fall itfelf will be accounted for in
the next Chapter. Sec Note 106.

|| See Dr. J. Clarke in Moral Evil, p. 211. &c. and Limbqrch fhtsl. Chrjjl. L. 3. C. Zt V~2
and Jcnkin'i Rea/on.of the Chrijf, Re!i* vol. 2. C. 13. p 253, 254. 5th Edition.

j:j.o Concerning Natural Evil.

he naturally attain to greater Perfection. For when the Faculties of
our Souls were injured, and the health and vigour of our Bodies im-
pair'd by our own Vices, as well a? thofe of our Parents; our natural
Perfections muff, necellarily be impaired alio. For fince our Know-
ledge is to be acquired by Care, Induftry and Inltruction, if Mankind
had continued innocent, and with diligent care communicated true
Notions of things to their Pofterity ; and had not infected their OfF-
fpring by Example, Infl ruction, or any Contagion attending Propa-
gation, we fhould have been lefs liable to Errors; nay free from per-
nicious ones ; and have enjoy 'd a more perfect Knowledge of things.
For our native intellectual Faculty would have been ftronger, and
being better furnifh'd both with the Means and Principles of Science
than we now are, we fhould more eafily have prevented the Occa-
fions of Err^r. All pernicious Errors therefore, at leaft in Matters of
Neceffity, are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of our Pa-
rents *

VII. If any be fo ungrateful as to murmur ftill, and affirm, that
We prefer he would not accept of Life on thefe Conditions, if he might but
Life, with all ^ his Choice; and that himfelf is the beft judge of his own Inte-

its mconve- Jo

niencies, be- reft, and he no Benefactor that obtrudes a Gift upon a Man againft his
fore Death. Will : that confequently he owes no thanks to God on accountof Life
which Life he would refufe : We muft reply ; that thus indeed impi-
ous Men and Fools are ufed to prate, but this does not come from
their Hearts and Confciences. For none are more afraid of Death,
none more tenacious of Life, than they that talk thus idly. A great
many of them profefs that they don't believe a future Life, and if fo,
they may reduce themfelves to the wifh'd-for ftate of Annihilation as
foon as tney pleafe, and caft off that Exijtence which is fo difagreeable.
No Perfon therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment, and in-
dulges himfelf in Error, can ferioufly prefer Non-exiftence to the
prefent Life. (57.)

VIII. But
NOTES.

(57.) * Self-murder is fo unnatural a Sin,
" that 'tis now-a-days thought leafon enough
" to prove any Man diitra&ed. We have too

" many fad Examples whit a difhirbed Imagi-
" nation will do, if that muft pafs for natural
" Diflrattion ; but we feldom or never hear,

that

For what retain to tbt Doiirine of Original Sin, &c. fee the latter end of the- next Seflm,
and Note 58;

Concerning Natural E^:!. i\

VIII. But if any one think fo from his Heart, he is not fallen into ^me Dut
this Opinion from any natural Evil, but from others which he brought $ e h tIves J
upon himielf by wrong Elections. We fee many Perfons weary of Life, account of
but 'tis becaufeof their bad Management, left they mould be ridicu- i y ,turaI > but
lous for miffing of Honour, of Riches, or fome empty End which Evils." 17
they have unreafonably propofed to themfelves. But very few have

been excited to Self-murder by any natural and abfolutely unavoidable
Evil or Error. Life therefore, of what kind foever it is, muftbe look'd
upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and we ought to pay
our grateful acknowledgments to God, as the powerful and beneficent
Author of it. Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Goodnefs, if
one or two throw Life away in defpair. For it is to be fuppofed, that
this proceeds not from the greatnefs of any natural Evil, but from
Impatience, from fome depraved Election; of which more hereafter.
For none of the Brutes which are deftitute of Free-will, ever quitted
its Life fpontaneoufly, thro' the uneafinefs of Grief, or a Diftemper.
If any Man therefore has killed himfelf voluntarily, we muft conclude
that he did this, as all other wicked Actions, by a depraved Choice.

IX. As to the fecond fort of Errors, into which we are led, not by Thofe Errors-
nature, but carelefnefs, negligence, curiofity, or a depraved will, the J to \-iir
number of thefc is greater, and their effects more pernicious : nay 'tis own fault,
thefe only which load and infeft Life with intolerable Evils, fo as to J^J^ a .
make us wilh that we had never been. But fince they come upon us mong Moral
thro' our own fault, they are not to be reckon'd among Natural Evils, Evils -

but belong to the third kind, viz. the Moral, to which we haften :
But we muft firft Him up what has been deliver'd in this Chapter.

NOTES.

" that mere external Sufferings, how fevere fo-

" ever, tempt Men to kill themfelves. The

" Stoics themfelves, whofe Principle it was to

" break their Prifon when they found them-

M felves uneafy, very rarely put it into practice:

*' Nature was too ftrong for their Philofophy .

" and tho' their Philofophy allow'd them to

" die when they pleas'd, yet Nature taught
" them to live as long as they could ; and we
" fee that they feldom thought themfelves mi-
" ferable enough to die. Sherlock on Provi-
dence, C. 7. p. 249, 250. 2d Edition. Sec alfo
Note 104, andCh. 2. par. 7.

SECT.

1^.2 Concerning Natural Evil

S E C T. V.

Containing the Sum of what has been /aid on

Natural Evils/

The whole I- "I N order to give the Reader a better view of what has been faid
Univerfe one | already, we muft conceive this whole World as one Syftem,
*^ e j"' J r whereof all particular things are the parts and Members, and every one
thing is a has its place and office, as the Members have in our own Body, or the
p rt - Rafters in a Houfe, the i)oors, Windows, Chambers and Clofets :

Neither is there any thing ufelefs or fuperfluous in the whole : and
in order to unite all more clofely together, nothing is felf-fufficient,
but as it is qualified to help others, fo it ftands in need of the help of
others for its more commodious Subfiftence. And tho' in i^o immenfe
a Machine we do not clearly perceive the connection or mutual de-
pendence of the parts in every refpecl:, yet we are certain that the
thing is fo. In many Cafes 'tis fo evident, that he will be efteem'd a
Mad-man who denies it. Since therefore the World is to be look'd
upon as one Building, we muft recoiled:, how many different parts,
and how various, fo grand, fo magnificent an Edifice lhould confift
of. We may defign a Houfe, divided into Halls, Parlours and Clo-
fets; but unlefs there be a Kitchen too, and places fet apart for more
ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 'twill not be fit for Habitation. The
fame may be affirm'd of the World and the frame of it. God could
have filled it all with Suns : but who will engage that fuch a Syftem
would be capable of living Creatures, or proper to preferve Moti-
on. He cculd have made the Earth of Gold, or Gems: But in the
mean while dejiitute of Inhabitants, He that has lived a Day or two

without

Concerning Natural Evil. 14?

without Food, would prefer a Dunghill to fuch an Earth. God could
have created Man immortal, without Paffions, without a Senfe of Plea-
fure or Pain ; but he mud have been without a Jblid Body alfo, and
an inhabitant of fome other Region, not the Earth. He could have
made the whole human Body any^,but then it would have been unfit
for Motion, Nutrition, and all the other functions of Life. He could
have taken away the contrariety of Appetites, but the contrariety of
Motions (nay Motion itfelf) mull have been taken away with it. He
could have prevented the fruftrating of Appetites, but that muft have
been by making them not oppofite; for 'tis impofiible that contrary
Appetites, or fuch as defire what is at the lame time occupied by
others, mould all at once be fatisfied. He could, in the Ian: place, have
framed Man free from Errors, but then he muft not have made ufe
of Matter for an Organ of Senfation, which the very Nature of our
Soul requires.

II. In fhort, if the mundane Syftem be taken together, if all the If r the whoIe
Parts and Seafons of it be compared with one another, we muft be-yand all its
lieve that it could not poffibly be better; if any part could be f arts be '*"

r orfe ; if one aboundeq none could *

be changed
but for the
worfe.

changed for the better, another would be worfe
with greater Conveniencies, another would be expofed to greater E-
vils ; and that neceflarily from the natural Imperfection of all Crea-
tures. A Creature is defcended from God, a moft perfect Father ; but
from nothing as its Mother, which is Imperfection itfelf. All finite
things therefore partake of nothing, and are nothing beyond their
Bounds. When therefore we are come to the bounds which nature
has fet, whoever perceives any thing, muft neceflarily perceive alfo
that he is deficient, and feek for fomething without himfelf to fup-
port him. Hence come Evils, hence oppofition of things, and, as it
were, a mutilation in the Work of God. Hence, for the moft part,
Men fear and defire, grieve and rejoyce. Hence Errors and Dark-
nels of the Mind. Hence Troops of Miferies marching thro' human
Life : whether thefe grow for the punifhmenx of Mortals, or attend
Life by the neceffity of Nature j that is, whether they proceed from
the conftitution of Nature itfelf, or are external and acquired by our
Choice. Nor need we the bloody Battle of the Ancients, nor the ma-
licious God of the Manichees for Authors of them. Nor is it any Ar-
gument againft the Divine Omnipotence, that he could not free a

Creature

oi -it.

144 Concerning Natural EvH.

'Creature in its own Nature neceflarily imperfect, from that native
Imperfection, and the Evils confequent upon it. He might, as we
have often laid, have not created mortal Inhabitants, and fuch as
were liable to Fears and Griefs: nor, as will be declared below,
fuch as by their depraved Elections might deferve Punifliments: but
with regard to the Syftem of the whole, 'twas neceflary that he fhould
create thefe or none at all : either the Earth muft be replenim'd with
thefe, or left deftitute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the forego-
ing particulars be omitted, but that very Omiflion would bring along
with it much greater Evils.
Hence the W From hence fprang the Error of the 'Epicureans, who preten-
Errorofthe ded that this World was unworthy of a good and powerful God.
who knew They, we may believe, knew only the leaft part, and as it were the
only the Sink of the World viz. our Earth. They never considered the good
!"rft "** anc * b eautu<u l P art f Nature, but only contemplated the Griefs,
Difcafes, Death and Deftruction of Mortals, when they denied that
God was the Author of fo many Evils : In the interim they forgot
that the Earth is in a manner the Filth and OrTscouring of the
Mundane Syftem : and that the Workmanmip of God is no more to
be condemn'd for it, than a Judgment is to be form'd of the beau-
ty of an Houfe from the Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant alfo
that the Earth was made in the manner it now is, not for itfelf
alone, but in order to be fubfervient to the Good of the whole ;
and that it is filled with fuch Animals as it is capable of, with a due
(Subordination to the Good of the Univerfe, and the Felicity of
j Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts of this Fabric, viz.
\ the /Ether and the Heavens. Thefe .are as it were the Gardens, Parks,
j and Palaces of the World j this Earth, the Dunghill, or (as fome will
I have it) the Work-houfe. Nor is it a greater wonder that God
I mould make thefe, than the Inteftines, and lefs comely, but yet ne-
x:eflary Parts of human Body. Laftly, they are unmindful that more
and greater Good is to be found here than Evil, otherwife they
.themfelves would reject Life.: and he that has more good than E-
vil is not miferable except he will. If therefore we would compare
the Good things with the Evil : if we could view the whole Work*
manfliip of God: if we thoro'ly understand the Connections, Subor-
dinations,

Concerning Natural Evil. 14.5

dinations, and mutual Relations of things, the mutual afTiftance which
they afford each other; and laftly, the whole feries and order of them;
it would appear that the World is as well as it could poffibly be ; and
that no Evil in it could be avoided, which would not occafiona grea-
ter by its abfence.

IV. We have endeavour'd to clear up thefe Points, and I hope effec- pi^the"
tually, as to this kind of Evil. For, upon the fuppofition of our Difficulty,
Principles, which, by the way, are commonly acknowledg'd, fome EvuTs\Z[
natural Evils mufr. inevitably be admitted; and if even one could a- it arifes from
rife in the Work of an infinitely wife and good God, there's no occa- jJjji/oZ "*"
fion for the Bad Principle as the Origin of Evil, for Evil might have created Be-
exifted notwithstanding the Divine Omnipotence and Infinite Good- i n 8 s and
nefs. The difficult Queftion then, Whence comes Evil? is not unan- avoided
fwerable. For it arifes from the very nature and conflitution of crea- without *
ted Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. And ^ tra 1C ~
tho' we be not able to apply thefe Principles to all particular cafes and
circumftances, yet we are fure enough that they may be applied. Nor

mould we be concern'd, that we are at a lofs to account for fome par-
ticulars; for this is common in the Solution of almofr. all natural
Phenomena, and yet we acquiefce. For prefuppofing fome Princi-
ples, fuch as Matter, Motion, &c. tho' we are ignorant what Matter
and Motion are in any particular Body, yet^ from the variety of thefe,
we take it for granted that various Compofitions and Qualities pro-
ceed. In like manner alfo we are perfuaded, that from the various
kinds of Imperfection necefiarily inherent in things, various Species of
Evils arife, tho' in fome the manner in which this comes to pafs does
not appear, agreeable to what we experience in Light and Colours ;
we are certain that Colours arife from the different difpofition, refrac-
tion and reflection of Light; but yet none can certainly tell how it is
reflected or refracted when it forms a blew, a green, or any other Co-
lour: So that I dare affirm, that the Origin of natural Evil is more
eafily afiign'd, and more clearly and particularly folv'd, than that of
Colours, Taftes, or any fenfible Quality whatfoever.

V. I confefs, that according to this Hypothefis, Natural Evils pro- Th - s recon
ceed from the original Condition of things, and arc not permitted by riled with

u God; *?/*/**

which docs
not attrilutc .ill kinds ofnatur.il Evil to the fall fcf the" full Man.

i- 4 6 Of Moral Evil.

God, but In order to prevent greater, which fome perhaps may think
repugnant to facred Hiitory, and the Doctrine of MofeS. For they
will have it, that the abufe of Free-will was the Caufe of all natural
Evils, and that when God created every thing good and perfect in its
kind, it was afterwards corrupted by Sin, and fubjected to natural E-
vils : but this is afTerted without Proof. For the Scripture no where
teaches that there would have been no manner of natural Evil, if
Man had not finned. God indeed made all things good and perfect in
their kind, that is, he created and fti'll prefe'rves every thing in a flate
and condition fuitable to the whole Syftem Of Beings, and which it
need have no Reafon to repent of except it will. But neither the
Goodnefs of God, nor the Perfection that belongs to the Nature of
things, required that all natural Evils fhould be removed: for fome
created Beings have Evils inherent in their very Natures, ' which God
mull of neceffity either tolerate cr not create thofe things in which
they do inhere. If therefore the facred Hiftory be carefully exami-
ned, it will appear that fome kinds of Evils are attributed to the Sin
of the firfl Man, but others not. Of the former kind are, frft, the
Mortality of Man, who wOuld otherwife have been immortal by
Grace. Secondly , the Barrennefs of the Earth, and growth of noxious
and unprofitable Plants in the Room of fuch as were fit for Food, for
the punifhment of Mankind. 'Thirdly, that hard Labour neceffary for
providing Food, which is a confequence of the former. Fourthly,
that impotent AffeBion and Neceflity of Obedience whereby Women are
made fubject to Men. Fifthly, the pains of Child-birth. Sixthly, the
Enmity between Man and the Serpentine kind. Seventhly, Banifhment
out of Paradife, /. e. as appears to me, an Expulfion out of the State
of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed Man above what
was due to his Nature. Thefe, and fome others, are exprefly enu-
merated as punifhments of the Fifft Fall. (58.) But befides thefe

there

(58.) For an account of the Scripture Hi-
Apry relating to the Fall of Adam, and the c:>n-
iequences of it, both wpon himfelf and'his Po-
ferity, fee ttfofs Boyle's Le& Serm. 5. 2d Set.
Rymffs general Reprefentation of reveal* d Kelt- !

gun, Parti. C. 4. and Dr. J '.Clarke on Moral 16, and his Dijfert. de Pecu Originu
IW/p,z24, &V. or D'Oylfs fourDiflertatiohs,,]

C. 1. p. 3. Note b, and C 9. p 97, cifV. or
Bp. Tay^lof 's Polentical Difcourfes, p. 614, 615,
6z3 See alfo Limborcb's fbeol. Cbriji. L. 3..
C. 3,4,5. or Epiftopiui de Libero Arbitrio, cjV.
or Curcellai Rel.CbriJl. Inftit. L. 3. C. 14, L5,

a Of Mord Evil, iaj

tjiere are many confecruent upon the neceffity of Matter, and concer-
ning; which the Scripture has nothing to induce us to believe that they
arole from bin.

VI. Tis to be obferv'd farther, that thefe are not permitted by God The Evils
to no purpofe, but* for the good of the Univerfe, and at the fame which do a *

vf ' { r\c i- \ T\T , r. \1" 7 - L" '- n *' rife from

time of Man himfelf. For as to Mortality, it was by no means expe- thence are
dient for the Syftem, that a linful Creature mould enjoy Immortality, permitted for
which was not owing to its nature, butgr suftcdTby an extraormnary ^S2J^
favour of the Deity. Najj God feems to have forbidden our firft Pa- andaifo of '
rents the ufe of the Tree of Life out of mere Companion, left if their ^^nlumfelf.
Life mould by virtue of it be prolonged, they mould live for ever
miferable. Even this Punimment, as all others, contributes to the
reftraint of bad Elections, and the preparation of a new way to Hap-
pinefs. For when Man tranfgreffed, and a perverfe abufe of his Free-
Will was once introduced, there would have been no end of Madhefs
if the Divine Goodnefs had continued to preferve J^ife, underftanding
an eafy Food, and the other Gifts of the Primaeval State, to the abufers
thereof, as well as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbitant bad
Elections are even amongft the Cares and Labours which Mortals un-
dergo in providing the NecefTaries of Life; and how pernicious ftrength
of Parts becomes, when, upon a corruption of the Will, it degenerates
into Cunning : how much more intolerable then would it Be if the
Fear of Death were away ; if the fame facility of procuring Food,
the fame vigour of Intellect, which our Firft Parents enjoy 'd were con-
tinued to their corrupt Pofterity. (59.)

VII. Nay, toconfefs the truth, it could not poffibly continue; for, Mortality,
let there be never fo great Plenty of Pi ovifion, it might be all corrup- TMrtt Dif
ted by the voluntary Act of one Man. When our Firft Parent had e*fw, &fr.
therefore once tranfgrerTed, what hopes could he conceive of his Po- '^J^/ 1 ^
ilerity? Or, by what Right could they claim thefe fupernatural World in
Gifts of God ? certainly by none. All then are made mortal, not only *j c <> rrL1 pt
thro' the Juftice, but the Goodnefs of God. For, while Men are ob-

U 2 lig'd

NOTES.

(59) *e Scerlotk upon Dintb, C 2. V 1. Ifcrr'd to in the beginning of Note 56, parti-
par. 3, 4, and C 3. $. 3. As to the Vigour of Icularlv Mr. D'Oy/y's firit D'flert. C. 9.
>ur firit Parent's Intellect, fee the Authors re- I

zj. 8 Concerning Natural Evil.

lig'd to ftruggle with Hunger, Thirft, Difeafes and Troubles, few of
them are at leifure to run quite mad, and leap over all the bounds of
Nature by their depraved Elections. 'Tis better therefore for us to
undergo all thefe Inconveniencies, than to be left to ourfelves without
reftraint in this corrupt Eftate. For by that means we mould bring
upon ourfelves ftill greater Evils. But thefe belong to reveal'd Reli-
gion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on them at large. (60.)

NOTES.

(60.) Thus our Author has, I think, fuffi-
cicntly accounted for all forts of Natural Evil ;
and demonllrated the to GikTiov y or Melio-
rity of things in the Univerfe, taking the whole
(as we always ought) together : at leait, he has
laid down fuch Principles as may be eafily and
effectually applied to that excellent End. He
has clearly proved, and clofely purfued this one
{ingle Propofition thro' all the above mention' d
Particulars, viz. that not one ofthofe Evils or In-
conveniencies in our Syfttm could poffibly have been
prevented without a greater: which is an ample
Vindication, an evident Proof of all the Di-
vine Attributes, in the original Frame and
Government thereof. And indeed this feems

to be the bed and mod convincing, if not the
only proper Method of handling the Argu-
ment and examining the Works of God, fo as
to attain a due fenfe of, and regard for the Au-
thor of them. Which Maxim therefore, we
conclude from the numberlefs inflanccs of its
apparent Validity, ought to be allow'd, and
may be fafely infilled on, tho' by reafon of our
great ignorance of Nature, it cannot always be
fo clearly applied. However it has been alrea-
dy applied fuccefsfully to the Solution of the
molt material Difficulties in the present Que-
ttion, as may appear more fully from the Au-
thors referr'd to in the foregoing Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Moral Evil.

Introduction, containing the Sub/lance of the Chapter.

HAVING given fome Account of Natural Evils, the Moral
come next under confederation : we are now to trace out the
Origin of thefe, and fee of what kind it is, whether they
flow from the fame Source with the Natural, viz. the necef-
fary ImperjeSlion of created Beings j or we are to feek for fome other
entirely different from it.

By Moral Evils, as we faid before, are understood thofe Inconve-
niencies of Life and Condition which befall ourfelves or others thro'
wrong Elections. For it is plain that fome inconveniencies happen
without our knowledge, or againft our Wills, by the very Order of
natural Caufes ; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a
manner with our Confent (when we choofe either thefe themfelves, or
fuch as are necerTarily connected with them.) The Moral are to be
reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies; and he muft be
efteem'd the Caufe of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord,
brings them either upon himfelf or others by a depraved or foolifl*
Choice.

But,

i c Concerning Natural Evil.

But, in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils
more fully underftood, we muft confider in the

i ft Place, What the Nature of Elections is.

2dly. That our Happinefs chiefly depends upon Elections.

3dly. What kind of Elections may be faid to be made amifs, or

fooliihly.
4thly. How we come to fall into depraved or wicked Elections.
5thly. How fucb Elections can be reconciled with the Power and

Go&dnefs of God.

SECT. L

Concerning the Nature cf Elections.

S U B S E C T. I.

jA. Jfiew of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from
Cpmpulfion only, hut not from NeceJJJty.

That it is not \r\ - ^ . ;< 3

eafy to under- 1. FF there be any thing obfcure and difficult in Philofophy, we
Strife re 8 re- C \ are mre t0 find it in that Part which treats of Elections and
fentation of Liberty. There is no point about which the Learned are lefs confj-
the Opinions n- ent w j tn themfelves, or more divided from each other. Nor is it an

concerning ,- % >r ' i n 1 i n V l - J *** Jl ' i

Liberty. eaiy Matter to underftand them, or to give a certain and true reprt-
Someac- fentation of their Opinions. I think they may be diflinguiih'd into
Libert* Iran tt^ Sorts, both admitting of a Liberty; One of them from external
Compuifion Qompulfion, and not from internal NeceJJity, but the other from

only, othcrs^^

from Neccf- ' tt a

Jfoyalfo. *!. As

Concerning Ntittfral EviL i $ i

II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of the former, it is this : Jf h t ^? c "
Firft, they obferve that there are certain Appetites implanted in us by Opinion
Nature, which are not to be efteerh'd ufefefs, but contributing to- fjj^ ^ that
ward our Prefervation, as was (hewn before; and that fome things Appetites
are naturally agreeable, fome contrary to thefe Appetites: that the '^planted in

former, when prefent, pleafe and imprefs a delightful Senfe of them- #Q is a a turc
felves ; the latter difpleafe and create uneafinefs. Thefe therefore are ereeabie to
called incommodious, troublefome and Evil j and thofe commodious, Jj^giodf "

Convenient artd Cood. 'he contrary, Evil.

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us Reajbn, a Mind or Intel- Things are*.
lecJ, whereby to difUnguiih Conveniences from Inconveniencies, s ree * blc e r .
Good from Evil. And firtce thefe may be confider'd by the Mind in ia threefold
a three-fold Refpeft, hence alfo arife three kinds of Good and Ev'A j refpea.
namely, Plea/ant, Profitable and Honefi. . kindsofgood

IV. For if Good be confider'd only with regard to the Appetite,

which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiefces in $v^aiulj c V
'tis called Plea/ant. agreeable

to the Appetite is died Pleafant.

V. But if it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itfelf, but only That wh ich
co?tne5fed with fomething elfe which is of itfelf agreeable, or produces whhfome
Pleafure, and on that account only be defirable, then 'tis called Pro- thing which

Jitable. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at the immediate Enjoy- p S rc e f a b]e elf is"
ment of it, yet the Mind makes ufe of it in order to procure thole called pr'ofi-
things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is efleem'd convenient , table -
i. e. Good.

VI. But, fince that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be re- That which
pugnant or lefs agreeable to others ; and that which pleafes now, may [ n i under/
have fome things connected with it, which may be difpleafing after- Handing robe
wards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, in order to .procure th ? beft ' al I

1 r 1 ^ '1 1 1 U a * W r ^ - , > things conli-

an ablolute Good, /. e. one which, all Appetites and Times confider d, derd.is abfo-
will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleafure or Delight as ]ut * ] Y g^ d
pomble. For this end therefore was the Mind or Understanding gi- Honeft.
ven us, that we might be able to determine what appears fitted to be
done upon a view of all fuch things as create pleafure or uneafinefs
for the prefent or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Under-
standing to be the beft, if there be no Error in the Cafe, muft be
look'd upon as Honeft, For that is honeft which is agreeable to a ra-
tional

151 Of Moral Evil.

tional Agent ; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reafon itfelf
directs, that, all things confider'd, we mould prefer that which
brings the greater, the more certain and more durable Advan-
tages.
inftanccs in VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon thefe three kinds of
didws'.imd Good to be Moral fo far as they refpect Man, becaufe they fall under
fuch things the Government of Reafon. But fince all things cannot be always had
3 biTto ^luT t0 S etner > a ccmparifon muft be made between them, and that em-
Rational braced which appears to be the beft. Now the kinds may be com-
AppetUe. pared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For inftance,
Health is a thing pleafant in itfelf, and defirable above all things that
relate to the Body, but for the prefervation of it Medicines muft be
fometimes taken, which of themfelves are far from being agreeable to
the Appetite, but as they are means to an End which is in itfelf de-
lightful, they are faid to be profitable, and on that account fit to be
chofen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and
more durable than thofe of the Body ; if therefore they cannot be had
without the Lofs of Health, or even Life, right Reafon dictates, that
Health, or even Life muft be defpifed in regard to thefe. For this
appears to be themoft convenient, all things confider'd, and on that ac-
count is honefi : and as Goods of a different kind may be compared to-
gether, fo may alfo particulars of the fame kind, as any one will find
that confiders it.
He that can VIII. As to Liberty, the Men of this Seel: will have it to confift in
adashisown t hi Sj that among all thofe Goods an Agent can embrace that which
dJre&TYs pl ea f es hi m beft, and exert thofe Actions which his own Reafon ap-
free accor- proves : For, according to thefe Men, he that can follow his own
ding to thefe j uc [g mcn t \ n Matters is free. For example, he that is found in Body,
and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be
removed, is at liberty to walk: for he can if he will, and nothing but
his will is wanting to exert that Action.
But they fup- IX. But as to the Actions of the Will itfelf, namely, to will, or to
e fe dJer- WC f u fP en d r ^ e Act f Volition, they think that it is determin'd to thefe,
min'd to not by itfelf, for that is impoilible, but from without. If you afk
\ hoofe h e J ther from whence? They anfwer, from the Pleafure ovUneafincfs perceiv'd

goodne.s or Dy

difag:cc.;blc-

nefsof objects, perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senfts ; and that therefore we are not free as to the Afis of the

Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are fubject to the det.-rmin.uion of the Will.

Of Moral Evil

by the Underfranding or the Senfes; but rather, as they imagine, from
the prefent or urgent Uneqfinefs : fince therefore thefe are produced in
us ab extra, not from the Will itfelf, and are not in its power, but a-
rife from the very things; 'tis manifeft, according to thefe Men, that
we are not free to will or not to will, at leaft from Necejfity, with re-
gard to the immediate Acts of the Will. Some of them therefore ex-
prefly deny that Liberty belongs to Man with regard to thefe Acts, or
that an Election can be faid to be free, or Man himfelf in that refpect:
They will have it therefore, that Liberty belongs to us properly with
refpect to the inferior Faculties which are fubject to the Government
of the Will, and difcharge their Functions when the Man himfelf has
willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleafes;
but not to will ; for he receives the Will to walk from elfewhere :
neverthelefs, he that can do what he wills, according to them, is free,
tho' he be neceffarily determin'd to will. (61.)

X. If

NOTES.

J 53

(61.) The mod remarkable Defenders of this
Opinion, among the Moderns, feem to be
Hobbs, Locke, (if he be confident with himfelf*)
Leibnitz, Bay/e, the Authors of the Philofophical
Enquiry concerning human Liberty, and of Cato's
Letters. But in order to have a more diftinft
Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all
profefling to treat of Human Liberty, Free-will,
&c. Let us in the firft place recite the feveral
Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and ob
ferve to which of them Liberty is or may be
apply'd. Thefe are commonly diftinguifh'd in-
to Perception, Judgment, Volition and Action.
The two former are generally neceffary, or at
leaft always pajjive: For I cannot help feeing a
Light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judg-
ing that two and two make four, whenever I
think of that Propofition ; tho' I may hinder
that Perception by fhutting my Eyes, as well as
prevent that Judgment by refufing to think of
the Propofition. The Will then may properly
enough be faid to influence or impede thefe -f,
but this does not make them lefs/^winthem-

felves ; nay, the more it does influence them,
the more evidently they are fo. The third
will appear to be the exercife of a Self-moving
Principle, and as fuch, cannot properly be mo-
ved or influenced by any thing elfe. The laft
is the exercife of the inferior Powers, the ac-
tual production of Thought or Motion : this is
generally directed by, and an immediate confe-
quence of Volition, on which account feveral
Authors have confounded them together; but
tho' they be properly both Afts of the Mind,
yet they are certainly diftinft ones : the for-
mer is an ability of chooflng fome particular
Thoughts or Motions, the other is a power of
producing thefe Thoughts or Motions purfu-
ant to the aft of choice, or of putting that
choice in execution. A careful diftinftion be-
tween thefe will help us to judge of all fuch
Authors as have either ufed them promifcuoufly
or been content to treat of the laft only, as
mod of thofe Perfons have that are cited in the
14th and following Pages of the Pbihfophical
Enquiry*

Thefe

Set Note 65.

f Seo Note 82.

154 Of Moral Evil

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there ,S
Slow Ac- no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly necefTary. For as to
the proper Actions of the Will, to will or fufpend the Act of Voli-
tion, the Men whom we are fpeakingof, give up Liberty with refpect
to thefe, while they affert that it does not belong to them. For they
are of Opinion, that when any thing is propofed by the Underftanding

to,

NOTES.

tions are

abfolutely

nccefliry.

Thefe two hit. then being the only active
Powers, or rather the only Poteen at all, are the
only proper fubjects of Liberty: to which a-
gain it is varioufly apply'd. With regard to the
Willy fome content themfelves with afTerting
its Freedom from external Compulfion only, from
being forced contrary to its own bent and in
clination ; and indeed it would be very ftrange
to fuppofe itotherwife : For to fay that it may
fee drawn a contrary way to that which the
Mind prefers and directs, h to fay, that it may
tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man
may will a thing againft his Will, or be ob-
lig'd to will what at the fame time he does not
will : but then fuch a Freedom as this equally
belongs to the two former Powers, which can-
not be forced to perceive or judge otherwife
than they do perceive or judge, otherwife than
as Objects appear, and their own Natures re-
quire ; it may be apply'd to any thing the moft
necefTary, nay the more necefTary the better.
Others therefore have contended for an abfo-
lute exemption of the Will from all impercep-
tible Byafs or Phyfical Inclination, from all
internal neceffity, arifing either from its own
frame and conftitution, the impulfe of fuperior
Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reafons,
Motions, &c. which appear'd to them the very
effence of human Liberty, the fole Foundation
of Morality. And indeed thefe feem to be
the only Perfons that fpeak out, and to the
Point, as fhall be Ihewn in the following
Notes.

Laftly, a great many will confine their Idea
of Liberty \o Aclion only, and define it to be a
power of either actually taking up or laying
down a Thought, of beginning Motion or
flopping it according to the preference of the
Mind or. Will. Rut if this be all the Liberty

we have, 'tis of fmall confequence, fince we
are confeious that in fatl all fuch Actions, fup-
pofing the Organs to be rightly difpofed, fol-
low the determination of the Will ; and alfo,
that in reafon they are no farther moral, nor we
accountable for them than as they do fo; we
muft therefore go up higher than this before we
come at any valuable Liberty, and the main
Queftion will be, Whether Man is free to think
'or refolve upon, to will or choofe any thing
propofed, as well as to exert his other Facul-
ties in confequence of fuch a Refolution, Will,
or Choice. This is the only Point worth dis-
puting, and indeed if Liberty be not here 'tis
no where. For if the Mind be abfolutely de-
termin'd to choofe in a certain manner in any
given Circumftances, its other fubordinate Fa-
culties can fcarce be fuppofed to be undeter-
min'd ; but the feveral Actions which depend
thereon will all follow by necerTary confe-
quence. Nay, upon this Hypothefis there is
properly no fuch thing as choice or aclion in
M.n ; but all arePaffions propagated in a chain
of necefTary Caufes and Effects. And indeed
all who fuppofe any external Determination of
the Will (meaning always a necefTary and irre-
fiftible one) whether they place it in the Dejire
of Goood, Anxiety for the abfence of it, or the
I aft Determination of the Judgment, are involv'd
in the fame confequence, how many Steps foe-
ver they may take to remove the Difficulty. For
it is equal to me, if what Icall my Choice or
Action be neceflary,*wherever that Neceffity
be placed. 'Tis the fame thing whether I be
acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate
Caufe, or drawn on by feveral fucceffively. Sup-
pofe, v. g. that I am neceffitateft* to obey the
laft refult of my own Judgment. From the
Exijlenee <f things follow certain Appearances,

thofe

Of Moral Evil

i5S

to be done, we either will it, or fufpend the Act of Volition concer-
ning it, according to the profpect of Happinefs or importunity of
the Uneafinefs which appears to the Mind, in the prefent State and
Circumftances j by thefe therefore our Election, according to them, is
determin'd.

XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect: what we will, That huma*
then they fay we are free, in refpect of fuch Actions, not from necef- ^ 10 "^ re
fity, but only from Compulfion ; for it is plain that nothing but our from Necef-
will is wanting, and fuppofing us to will them, they neceflarily fol- ^J* bm
low. For inftance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but
his own Will, fuppofing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but
that he muft walk, nor can he reft while this continues. If there-
fore, according to them, all acts of the Will are neceflary (as being
determin'd from without itfelf, viz. by the convenience or inconve-
nience of things or circumftances) the actions of the inferior facul-
ties will be no lefs neceflary, for they will depend on the fame cir-
cumftances and acts of the Will, which, as they are neceflary, thefe
actions will be neceflary alfo. (62.) Tho, according to them, there-

X 2 fore,

NOTES.

thofe Appearances caufe certain Perceptions, i.e.
of pleafure or pain; thefe Perceptions form a
Judgment, this Judgment determines the Will,
this Will produces Aclion. All this is nVd and
inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally
neceflary, and 'tis all one to me on which my
Determinations hang: "Tis as good to take
them from the firft as laft, fince the fuppofed
choice or aclion is as much out of my power,
or as incapable of being alter 'd or prevented by
me, as the exiftence of external things. 'Tis
eafy to obferve how deftructive this and the
like Schemes muft prove, as well of Morality as
Liberty, both which muft ftand and fall toge-
ther, and can, I think, only be fe cured effec-
tually upon the Principles laid down by our
Author ; of which in their proper place.

See alfo Mr. Chubb'% Reflections on Natural
Liberty. Coll eel ion of Trails, p. 379, &c. or
Notes 65, 68, 82.

Remarks on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 6

(62.) To call an Action neceffarj, is proper-
ly fpeaking to affirm, that it is no Action: For
by the Word Aclion we mean ah immediate ef-
fect of what is metaphorically ftiled a Self-mo-
ving Power : or, the exercife of an ability which
a Being has to begin or determine either thought
or Motion. Now, the Idea of this Power in a-
ny Being, and of fuch exereife of it, is directly
repugnant to that of NeceJJity, which fuppofes
the Thought or Motion to be already begun or
determined, and to be obtruded on this Being
by fomething elfe, and confequently implies x
Negation of any fuch Self-moving Power in
this Being, or of its exercife by this Being in.
the Cafes above mentioned. " To be an A-
" g*nt (fays Dr. Clarke,*) fignifies to have a
" Power of beginniug Motion, and Motion can-
" not begin neceffarily, becaufe NeceJJity of Mc-
" tion fuppofes an Efficiency fuperior to, and
" irrcfiftible by the thing moved, and confe-

" quently

156 Of Moral Evil.

fore there be no Compulfron of the Will, yet there is NeceJ/ity, from.
which Neceflity nothing in the World will be free ; nay a great many
of them openly profefs to believe that this is the Cafe.

XII. Now, from this Hypothefis, which they extend to the Di-
vine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries feem deduci-
ble. Firft, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwife than it
is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected toge-
ther by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly fo
call'd : Contingency then is removed out of Nature.

According to

their opinion

there is no

contingency

in things,

nor could

any thing be

done othcrw ife than it is.

By Evil they

XIII. Secondly ; That nothing more can be underftood by wicked
or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elec-
nothing more tor or fome others j which Senfe is very remote from the vulgar one;

than hurtful. q_

NOTES.

** quently the beginning of Motion cannot be in
" that which is moved neceflarily, but in the
'* fuperior Caufe, or in the efficiency of fome
" other Caufe ftill fuperior to that, till at length
** we arrive at fome Free Agent" Where,
tho* the Doctor's Definition of Agency feems
to be imperfect, that Word generally includ-
ing the power of beginning Thought as well as
Motion (which are two diftinft Species of Ac-
tion, and proceed from different Powers, tho'
they be often confounded together, and com-
prehended under the fame general term) yet it
fhews us an evident contradiction in thefe two
Words neceffary Agent, in cither Senfe : Unlefs
lie ufes the Word Agent in both Senfes toge-
ther, and then his Reafoning will be falfe, fince
what is afted on and determin'd by another in
regard to its Thought, Will, &c. and in that
Senfe mov'd by a fuperior Efficiency, may yet
have a power of beginning real corporeal Mo-
tion (which is a quite different fort of Action)
in confequence of fuch prc-determin'd Thought,
Will, &c. and in that fenfe be an Agent, tho'
not a moral one. But what ever the Dr. might
mean by the Word Agent, his Argument will
hold in either of thefe two Senfes feparate, viz.
that nothing can be faid to aS cither in think-
ing or moving, which does does not properly
if gin the Thought or Motion, but is put into

Thought or Motion by fomething eife y and al-
fo, that every thing cannot be fo put either in-
to Thought or Motion ; and therefore, that
there muit be fome firft Caufe of both Thought
and Motion.

And will not the fame Argument hold equal-
ly for fome firft Caufe of Exiftence ? If the
Dr. can fuppofe a firft Caufe of all Thought
ad Motion (as he does here,, and we think ve-
ry reafonably) why may he not alfo fuppofe a
firft Caufe of all Exigence ; and fo entirely ex-
clude that antecedent Neceffity which he has often
Recourfe to as a kind of fupport of the exiftence
of the firft Caufe, but is oblig'd to exclude
from its Will and Actions ? Is it harder to
conceive how an Eternal Independent Being,
or Firft Caufe, may exift without any antece-
dent Neceflity, than how it can will or act
without any ?

But to return to the chief Defign of this
Note. We fee how neceflary it is for us to
fix theprecife meaning of the Word Aclion in a
Controverfy of this kind, and if the Significa-
tion of it as laid down above be allow'd, then
neceflary Action is the fame as paflive Action,
or beginning a thing and not beginning it at
the fame time, and in the fame refpedt ; in
which terms every one perceives it to be a con-
tradiction.

Of Moral Evil.

157

for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for
being hurtful without NecerTity, and becaufe they are made otherwife
than they ought to have been : In this Hypothefis then there is no E-
leftion made amifs. (63.) Nor can any thing be faid to be done other-
wife than it ought to be: for what could not poffibly be done other-
wife, is certainly done as it ought ; fince it is done according to the ex-
igence and neceffary order of things.

XIV. Thirdly; By the fame Principle all Evil wou'd be in the VHTaaiesare
ft.ric.lert. fenfe Natural* for it would derive its Origin from natural and t0 b j-P laccd

o fo the ac-

neceffary Caufes. The diftin rt ion then would be loft between natural count of hu-
and moral Evil, as commonly underftood. There would be no Mo- manMifer > r
ral Evil at all. For that only is reckon'd Moral by the common con- jook'dupon
fent of Mankind, of which the Man himfelf is properly the Caufe ; -<s crimes,
but no body looks upon himfelf as properly the Caufe of a thing ^JfJ" y
which he could not avoid, or to which he was neceffitated by natural
Caufes, and fuch as were antecedent to the Will. For every one
blames himfelf only on this account, becaufe he was of himfelf necef-
farily the Caufe of Evil to himfelf or others. Thofe Inconveniences
which come by Neceffity, he looks upon as Miferies, as Misfortunes,
but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay
the Hatred of God himfelf, and whatever we efteem bafe in Villanies
(as well as the difgrace and punifhment attending them) muft be pla-
ced to the account of human Mifery and Unhappinefs, but by no
means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of
God, to his Juftice, Purity or Goodnefs, than Heat or Cold.

XV. Fourthly; When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Mur- A Ma]efaaor
therer, or perjur'd Perfon, when thefe Crimes are arraign'd asfcanda-isreprov'd,
lous; this is not done becaufe they have deferv'd it, or becaufe thefe P ot , b ^ cau /?
things are in themfelves really fhameful or culpable; but becaufe that it> but be-
Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Perfons or others from caufe reproof

* j\ may drive

the I,- ' r Mm

NOTES.

h'm from
Evil.

(63.) Leibnitz declares it to be his fettled O-
pinion *, '* That whenever we refolve or will
" contrary to an evident Reafon, we are car-
** ricd by fome other Reafon ftronger in appea-

" ranee. 1 ' If this be always the Cafe, we cer-
tainly can never will amifs or unreafonably,
Hnce that Reafon which appears to be the
ftrongeft ought always to determine us.

* Rmerquts fur ULivrtde PQrigine duMal. p. 483.

ijS

Punifliments

Of Moral Evil

the like Elections. And this is the only Reafon why we reproach a
Thief, &c. and not a fick Perfon, with Infamy; becaufe Reproach
may cure a Thief, &c . but can do no Good to a fick Perfon.

XVI. Fifthly; Malefaflors are punifh'd, not becaufe they deferve

areapply'dasPunifhment, but becaufe it is expedient, and Laws are made ufe of

A * sd * ci " es te to reftrain Vices, as Medicines to expel Difeafes ; Men fin therefore

neither are after the fame manner as they die, viz. becaufe an effectual Remedy

Laws ufeiefs, W as not apply'd. And yet Laws are not entirely ufelefs, fince they

prevent vice P revent f me Vices, as Medicines protraft the Deaths of fome difeafed

Perfons : and a Perfon infecled with the Plague may be as juftly cut

off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of a-

voiding the Contagion. (64.)

w are }~ XVII. Sixthly ; We are oblig'd to repay good Offices, fince by be-

gr 8 tefui only m g thankful we may excite the Benefador to continue or increafe his

in profpea Benevolence, and alfo induce others to do us Service. And hence it

Benefit'^ 6 comes to P a ^ s > tnat we are oblig'd to be grateful towards God and

Men, but not to the Sun or a Horfe, namely, becaufe God and Men

may be excited by thanks to fome farther Beneficence, whereas the

Sun or a Horfe cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit

receiv'd, but only to one that may be receiv'd ; nor are we oblig'd to

be grateful towards a mofl generous Benefalor for what is paft, but

only for the profpeft of what is to come. All fenfe of Gratitude

then, as commonly underftood, is deftroy'd, for the Vulgar reckon him

a cunning, not a grateful Perfon, who returns one favour merely out

of hopes of another.

XVIII. Seventhly ; If this Opinion be true, we mult defpair of hu-
man Felicity, for it will not in the leaft be in our own Power, but

entirely

According
to this Opi-
nion, hu-
man Hap-
pinefs is
impoffible.

f nee it depends upon things which are not in our ; Power.

N a<r $ s.

(64. 1 ) All thi.% and a great deal more Co the Jphical Enquiry,, &c. p. 91, $3& and much the

See bis Treatife on human Liberty, or Bp. BKonhaliV Works, p. 678.

Of Moral Evil, i 59

entirely depend on external Objects. Our Happinefs (if there be any)
mull, according to them, be conceiv'd to arife from the perfect frui-
tion of thofe things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the
contrary to thefe are prefent, or the agreeable ablent, we muft necef-
farily be uneafy, and while we ftruggle with Anxieties we cannot be
happy. According to this Hypothecs therefore it follows, that our
Happinefs neceiTarily requires fuch an Enjoyment as we have fpoken
of, and that this is at the fame time fmpoffible. For who can hope
that all external things (with which he has _to do) mould be fb tem-
per'd as in every refpect to anfwer his Wifhes, fo as never to want
what he defires, or be forced to endure any thing contrary to his na-
tural Appetites ? If Happinefs arifes from the Enjoyment of thofe
things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which,
can move Defire by their innate, or at leaft apparent Goodnefs; if al-
fo the Will is necefTarily determin'd to thefe, according to the Judg-
ment of the Underftanding, or Importunity of Appetites, every Man
mud: necefTarily want a great many things which he has chofen, and
bear a great many which he willingly would not, than which nothing
is more inconfiftent with Felicity. For we cannot poflibly conceive
any State of Life wherein all things anfwer to the natural Appetites. 1 " confe-.
In vain then do we hope for Happinefs, if it depend upon external ^rcTand" 5

Objects. thY theArgii*

XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, mutt feem men f t from
hard and repugnant to the common Notions of Men, and cannot be hJ^eSenU^
believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confefs in- a bad ne,yet
deed, that, for the molt, part, one cannot argue well againft an Opi- \ ^l p jjf_
nion from its confequences, fince a great many things are true which dice againti
have confequences hard enough: not to mention how eafily we >3M* whieh'Tem*
ftake in deducing confequences. But yet when thefe are acknowledged to be attcn-
by the Authors themfelves j and, if believ'd, would prove detrimental d , ed wi * .
to Morality, they bring no fmall prejudice againft an Opinion which lij^ifSicy be
is attended with them, and recommend us to fome other as more .acknowledge
probable, tho' it be not fupported by any ftronger Reafons.

XX. 'Tis to be obferved alfo, that among the foregoing Authors I All thofe
reckon thofe who declare that the Will is determin'd by the laft J u dg-^ t t d h e e clarc

ment will ispaC

five in its
Operations will be elleemsd to be of the fame Opinion with the former, and are preficd with the fame coiv-
fequenccs.

160 Of Moral Evil

ment of the Underftanding *, which has taken with a great many
Philofophers ; and, in fhort, all who maintain that the Will is pajjive
in Elections. For thefe muft be efteem'd to have the fame Sentiments
of Liberty with the former, which way foever they explain their O-
pinion ; as may appear from hence, that mofl of 'em exprefly deny
that Indifference belongs to the Nature of the Will ; their Opinion
therefore is attended with the fame confequences as the former. (65.)

S U B S E C T.

NOTES.

(65.) As Mr. Locke has particularly laboured
the point before us, and feems to defend by
turns the feveral Principles which our Author
attacks here and in the following Section, we
fhall examine a little into his Method of treat-
ing the Subject. Having firft of all defin'd
Liberty to be "A power in any Agent to
" do or forbear any particular Action, accor-
" ding to the Determination or Thought of
" the Mind, whereby either of them ispreferr'd
" to the other ||.'' Hetr.kes a great deal of pains
to prove, that fuch Liberty does not belong to
the Will: which is very certain, granting his
fenfe of Liberty to be the right and only one,
fince by his Definition it is evidently fubfe-
quent to the choice or preference of the Mind,
and only relates to the execution of fuch choice
by an inferior faculty \. But then, befide this
Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the pre-
fent Queftion, there is another previous and e-
qually proper one, which regards the very de-
termination, preference or direction of the
Mind itfelf, and which could not poffibly be
overlook'd ; he proceeds therefore to ftate the
Queftion concerning that, which he would not
have to be put, whether the Will be fee ? but
whether the Mind or Man be free to will ?
both which I think amount to much the fame
thing with common Underftandings, fince in
the firft place we only ask, Whether this Will
be properly an active power ? (i.e. as oppofed
to Mr. Loch's paffive Power) and in the fecond,
Whether the Mind be active in exerting this
Power call'd Will ? and both which will be

equally improper Queftions with regard to his
former fenfe of the Word Free, i. e. as only
applicable to the Actions fubfequent on Voli-
tion. However, he goes on in the fecond
place to enquire, whether in general a Man be
free " To Will or not to Will, when any
" Action is once propofed to his Thoughts, as
" presently to be done." In which refpect he
determines that a Man is not at liberty, be-
caufe he cannot forbear Willing ^ ; which, if
taken abfolutely (not to mention its inconfi-
ilency with his notion of fufpenfion -j.f) tho*
it comprehends (as he fays) molt Cafes in Life,
yet is not of the leaft Importance. For, whit
does it fignifie to me that I muft neceffarily take
one fide or the other, right or wrong, fo long
as I can choofe either of them indifferently ? If
I can will or choofe either of the two, here's
full room for the exercife of Liberty ; and
whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr.
Locke's next Queftion. The Anfwer to which
feems pretty eafy, tho' perhaps not fo reconcila-
ble with his Hypothefis. However, infteadof
meddling with it, he flips this abfurd Query
into its Room, viz.. Whether a Man be at Li-
berty to will which of the two he pleafes ? or,
which is the fame, Whether he can Will what
Wills? Sect. 25. HI', and then, inftead of telling
us in which Cafes the Will is free, or the Man
free to Will, or whether he be fo in any Cafe
at all (as might have been expected) he goes
on to give us another Explanation of the word
Liberty, which is ftill confined to Action, and
confequently foreign to the prefent Queftion.

* Againft this Notion fee Sect 5- Subfect. 2. par. 13.

|| Q. Of Power, .8. f See Note 6.. % * (,. 23,24:

JU See Mr. StruttV Remarks on Locke'; Chapter of Power, p. 38, l$c t

4-f *. 56. 1. M ,kV.

Of Moral Evil

161

S U B S E G T. II.

An Opinion is fropofed in general^ afferting Liberty from
Necejfity as "well as Compulfion.

' |"*HIS Opinion determines almoft the fame with the former

concerning the Goodnefs or agreeablenefs of Objects to the This agrees]
Appetites, nor is there much difference in what relates to the diftinc- J^^ * n
tion of Good into Pleafant, Profitable, Honeft : Except that it refers moa cafes,

Honeft? f P e ? a "y

in thoio
relating to
the Appetites, to Good, Pleafant, Profitable and Honeft; but determines this to be the difference between
a Man and Brute, viz. that the one is determin'd by its bodily Appetite, the other by himfelf.

n o r E s.

Tn the next place he defines the Will over a-
gain . " Which (fays he) is nothing but a
" power in the Mind to direct the operative
" Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reft, as far
** as they depend on fuel* direction." By
which Words if he mean, that this Power of
directing the operative Faculties, is properly
a&ive (in the fenfe above mention'd) or Phyfi-
cally indifferent to any particular manner of di-
recting them, /'. e. is an ability to direct them
cither to Motion or Reft, without any natural
Byafs to determine it (or to determine the mind
to determine it) toward one fide always rather
than the other : If, I fiy, he intends to imply
thus much in this definition of Will, then may
Freedom be juftly predicated of that fame Will
(or of the Mind in theexercifeof it) not indeed
his kind of Freedom, i. e. that of ailing, which
belongs to another Faculty ; but Freedom in
our fenfe of the Word, /'. e. a certain phyfical
Indifference, or Indeterminatenefs in its own
exercife ; which is what moll Men undcrftand

$ 29.

by Liberum ArbitriUm ; and whether there be
fuch a Liberty as this in human Nature, would
here have been a very proper Queftion. For if
there be, then we have got an abfolutely felf-
moving Principle which does not want any
thing out of itfelf to determine it, which has
no phyfical connection with, and of confe-
quence, no neceffary Occafion for that grand
Determiner Anxiety, which he has afterward*
taken fo much pains to fettle and explain, and
which fhajl be confider'd by and by. But here
he flies off again, and inftead of determining
this, which is the main point of the controver-
fy, and wherein Liberty muft be found, or no
where, as we obferv' d in Note 61. I fay, in-
ftead of ftating and determining this great Que-
ftion, Whether the Will, or the Mind be abfo-
lutely independent upon, and phyfical ly indif-
ferent to all particular Atts, Objects, Motions,
&c. or neceffarily require fome foreign Mover;
he feems to take the latter for granted, andjm-
mediately proceeds to the following Queftion,

What

1 6a Of Moral Evil.

Honed to the Duty which a Man owes to God, himfelf and v other
Men, as a Member of Intellectual Society, rather than to the na-
tural Appetites} and thinks that we are to judge of the Agreable
nefs of things from that, rather than from thefe. As to the Elec-
tion which the Will makes on account of thefe, it aflerts that
this proceeds from the Will itfelf, and that a free Agent can-
not be determin'd like natural Bodies by external Impulfes, or like
Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt Man and
the Brutes, that'thefe are determin'd according to their bodily Appe-
tites, from whence all their Actions become neceffary, but Man
has a different Principle in him, and determines himfelf to Action.
That the II. This Principle whereby Man excells the Brutes is thus explain'd

Ss h neceffart ^ z ^ c Defenders of the following Opinion, if I take their Meaning

]y defir'd, right I

but others

are not, becaufe they maybe reprefented by the Underftandirg in different refpc&s.

NOTES.

t*.

What determines the Will ? The Meaning of
tvhich, fays he *, is this, " What moves the
u Mind in every particular inftance to deter-
" mine its general power of directing to this
" or that particular Motion or Reil ? " This
Mr. Locke calls, for (hortnefs fake, determinating
the Will; and declares, that what thus deter-
mines it either firff to continue in the fame
ftate or action, is only the prefent Satisfaclion in
it : or fecondly to change, is always fome Un~
tajinefs +. By which Words if he only meant,
that thefe Perceptions are the common M.tives,
Inducement:, or Occajions whereupon the Mind
in fact exerts its power of willing in this or
that particular Manner; tho' in reality it al-
ways can, and often does the contrary (as he
feems to mean by fpeaking of a Will contra-
ry to Defirej}, of railing Delires by due Confi-
deration m m , and forming Appetites 4--f ; of a
Power to rufpend any Dcfires, to moderate and
reftrain the Paffions, and hinder either of them
from determining the Will and engaging us in
Action || |t : Then, as we faid of him before,
he is only talking of another Queftion, and
what he has advanced on this head may readily

* (f. 29. j- Ibid. [J ^ 30. ** h. 46

* fc * Concerning which Sufpenjtsn fee Note 68.

be granted, at lend: without any prejudice to
human Liberty. For, in this fenfe to affirm,
that the Will or Mind is determin'd by fome-
thing without it, is only faying, that it gene-
rally has fome Motives horn without, according
to which it determines the above mention'd
Powers, which no Man in his Senfes can dif-
pute.

But if he intended that thefe Motives fhould
be underfiood to rule and direct the Will abfo-
lutely and irrefiltibly in certain Cafes. That
they have fuch a neceffary influence on the
Mind, that it can never be determin'd with-
out or againft them; in fhort, that the Soul of
Man has not a phyfical Power of willing, in-
dependent of, and confequently indifferent to
all Perceptions, Reafons and Motives whatfoe-
ver; which the general drift of his Difcourfe
feems to affert, particularly ^. 47, 48, 49, 50.
where he confounds the Determination of the
Underftanding with the exertion of the felf-
moving Power throughout. Asalfo V 5. where
he afferts, " That all the Liberty we have or
" are capable of lies in this, that we can fuf-
'* fend * m * our Defires, and hold our Wills

" unde-
nt V- 53- ill $> 47>5 C > 53-'

Of Moral Evil.

right: In the firft place, they declare that there is fome Chief Good t
the Enjoyment of which would make a Man completely happy ; this
he naturally and neceffarily defires, and cannot reject it when duly re-
prefented by the Underftanding. That other things which offer
themfelves have a Relation to this Good, or fome Connection with it,
and are to be efteem'd Good or Evil, fo far as they contribute to, or
hinder our obtaining it ; and fince there is nothing in Nature but
what, in fome refpect or other, either promotes this End, or prevents
it ; from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity
of rejecting or embracing any thing. For tho' we can choofe nothing
but under the Appearance of Good, ;. e. unlefs it be in fome man-
ner connected with the Chief Good, as a Medium or Appendant;
yet this does not determine the Choice, becaufe every Object may

Y 2 be

NOTES.

*' undetermin'd, till we have examin'd the
" Good and Evil of what we defire; what
" follows after that, follows in a Chain of
" Confcquenccs link'd one to another, all de-
" pending on the lall Determination of the
" Judgment." And when he fpeafcs of Caufes
not iii our Power, operating for the mod part
forcibly on the Will, . 57, &c.

If from theie and the like Expreffions, I
fay, we may conclude this to have been his O-
pinion, viz. that all the Liberty of the Mind
confiits folcly in directing the Determination of
the Judgment, after which Determination all
our Actions (if they can becall'd fuch *) fol-
low nccefliirily: then I believe it will appear,
that at the farce time that he oppofed the true
Notion of Free- Will, he contradicted common
Scnfe and Experience as well as himfelf. For
in the firft place, is it not felf-evidcnt, that we
often do not follow our own Judgment, but
run counter to the clear convidion of our Un-
derilandings, which Aftions accordingly ap-
pear vicious, and fill us immediately with
regret and the flings of Confcience. This he

allows, *). 35, 38, cjrV. to make Room for hi<
Anxiety. But, upon the foregoing Hypothefis,
How can any Adlion appear to be irregular ?
How can anything that is confequent upon the
final Refuk of Judgment, be againft Confci-
ence, which is nothing elfe but that final
Judgment f ? Nay, upon the fuppofition of
our being inviolably determin'd in willing by
our Judgment (and, according to Mr. Locke,
our Conftitution puts us under a neceffity of
being fo, V 48.) it would be really impoflible
for us to will amifs, or immorally, let our
Judgments be never fo erroneous ; " The
" Caufes of which (as he alfo obferves, f). 64.)'
" proceed from the weak and narrow confti-
" tution of our Minds, and are mod of them
" out of our Power." Farther, there are in-
nummerable indifferent Actions which occur
daily, both with refpccT: to abfolute choofing
or refufing ; or to choofing among things ab-
folutcly equal, equal both in themfelves and to
the Mind, on which we evidently pais no man-
ner of Judgment, and confequently cannot be
faid to follow its Determination in them. To

wiU

* See Note 62.

t See Limborch Theol CbriJI. L. 2. C. 23. V 16. and for an Anfwtr to the latter fart of LockcV
48th Seft. fee the fame Ch^p. S- laft.

164. Of Moral Evil

be varied, and reprefented by the Underflanding under very different
Appearances.

III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is propofed which is not
Tho' there- t j ie chief, the Will can fufpend* the Action, and command the Un-

fore the J Jl * , -

will fol- demanding

lows fome

Judgment of the Ucderftanding, yet it is not neceiTariJy determin'd by it.

NOTES.

will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a
Proof of the former; to choofe one out of two
or more Eggs apparently alike is a proverbial
Inftance of the latter: both which are demon-
ftrations of an aftive or felf moving Power;
either way we determine and aft when the
Motives are entirely equal, which is the fame
afr to aft without any Motive at all. In the
former Cafe I perceive no previous Inclination
to direft my Will in general, in the latter, no
Motive to influence its Determination in par-
ticular; and in the prefent Cafe, not to per-
ceive a Motive is to have none (except we
would be faid to have an Idea without being
confcious of it, to be anxious and yet infen-
fible of that Anxiety, or fway'd by a Reafon
which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither
is it neceffary to a true Equality or IndifFerence
here, that I be fuppofed to have no Will to ufe
any Eggs at all fas the Author of the Philofophi-
tal Enquiry, Sec abfurdly puts the Cafe) for,
granting in the firft place, that I have not a
Will to ufe any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed non-
fenfe to fuppofe afterwards that I fhould choofe
anyone; but, let me have never fo great an
Inclination to eat Eggs in general, yet that ge-
neral Inclination will not in the leaft oblige
me to choofe or prefer one Egg in particular f,
which is the only point in queftion. Numfeer-
lefs Inftances might eafily be given, where we
often approve, prefer, defire and choofe, and
all we know not why : where we either choofe
fuch things as have no manner of Good or E-
vil in them, excepting what arifes purely from
that Choice ; or prefer fome to others, when
both are equal. Means to the lame End : in

which Cafes the Judgment is not in the leaft:
concern 1 d, and he that undertakes to oppofe
the Principle by which our Author accounts
for them, muft either deny all fuch Equality
and IndifFerence, or grant the Queftion. But
one Inftance is as good as a thoufand, and. he
that defires more, may find them defcrib'd in
the cleared manner by Dr. Cheyne ||. Now to
urge, that fuch Eleftions as thefe are made on
purpofe to try my Liberty, which End, fay
fome, becomes the Motive, is in effeft grant-
ing the very thing we contend for, viz. that
the Pleafure attending the exercife of the Will
is often the fole reafon of Volition. Befides,
that Motive (if it can be call'd fuch) is one
of the Mind's own making ; and to be able to
produce the Motive for Aft ion, is the fame
thing with regard to Liberty, as to be able to
aft without one. If by trying our Liberty be
meant, an Experiment to aflure us that we real-
ly have fuch a Power ; we anfwer, that there
can be no reafon for trying it in this fenfe, be-
caufe we are fufficiently confcious of it before
any fuch Trial.

" The Mind (fays the Author of the EJfay on
" Confcioufnefs, p.308.) before ever it exerts its
" Will or Power of choofing, is confcious, and
" knows within itfelf, that it hath a Power of
" Choice or Preference, and this is a necefla-
" ry Condition of willing at all, infomuch
M that the very firft time I had occafion to ex-
" ert my Will, or make ufe of my eleftive
" Power, I could not poflibly exercife it, or
" do any voluntary Aft without knowing and
" being confcious to myfelf [before hand J
" that I. have fuch a Faculty or Power in my-

" felf.

* See Note 68..

> See Leibnitz' s Jtftb Paper to Dr. Clarke, ^17. and 6$.
h.2, $,13.

B Phil. Principles, &t-

Of Moral Evil.

derflanding to propofe Tome other thing, or the fame under fome o-
ther Appearance : which may be always done, fince every thing ex-
cept the chief Good is of fuch a Nature, that the Underftanding may
apprehend fome refpect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Nbt-
withftanding therefore that the Will always does follow fome Judg-
ment of the Underflanding, which is made about the fubfequent Ac-
tions,

NOTES.

" felf. A thing that feems at firft fight very
" ftrange and wonderful ; to know I have a
" power of afting before ever I have afted, or
" had any trial or experience of it : But a
" little Refleftion will quickly fatisfy any one
" that in the nature of the thing it mud be
" fo, and cannot poffibly be otherwife; and
" which is peculiar to this Faculty: For we
" know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving,
" Underftanding, Remembring, sV. but by
" experimenting their Afts, it being neceflary
" firft to perceive or think, before we can
" know that we have a Power of perceiving or
" thinking.'' The Author proceeds to fhew,
that this Fore-confcioujnefs of a power of zoi/ling
or choofing does moft clearly demonftrate that
the Mind in all its Volitions begins the Moti-
on, or afteth from itfe/ff.

To argue ftill that fome minute imperceptible
Caufes, fome particular Circumftances in our
own Bodies, or thofe about us, muft determine
even thefe feemingly indifferent Aftions, is
either running into the former abfurdity of
making us aft upon Motives which we don't
apprehend ; or faying, that we aft mechani-
cally, i.e. do not aft at all : and in the laft
place, to fay that we are determin'd to choofe
any of thefe trifles juft as we happen to fix our
Thoughts upon /'/ in particular, at the very
inftant ofAftion, is either attributing all to
the felf-moving Power of the Mind, which is
granting the Queftion ; or elfc referring us to
the minute and imperceptible Caufes above
mention'd ; or elfe obtruding upon us that idle
unmeaning Word Chance inftead of a Phyfical
Caufe, which is faying nothing at all. How
hard muft Men be prefs'd under an Hypothefis }
when they fly to fuch evafive fhifts as thefe !

How much eafier and better would it be to
give up all fuch blind, unknown, and unac-
countable Impulfes, and own what both com-
mon Senfe arid Experience diftate, an Inde-
pendent, Free, Self moving Principle, the
true, the obvious, and only fource ofAftion?
With regard to Mr. Locke's Inconfiftencies,
I fhall only add one Obfervation more, viz.
that he feems to place the Caufe (Motive, or
whatever he means by it) of his Determination
of the Will after the Effeft. The Caufe of
that Determination is, according to him, An-
xiety ', this he fometlmes makes concomitant,
fometimes confequent upon Defire ; and ^.31.
he fays the one is fcarce diftinguifhable from
the other.

But this fame Defire appears to me to be the
very Determination of the Will" itfelf; what
we abfolutely defire we always will, and vice
verfa, whether it be in our Power to purfue
that Will, and produce it into Aft or no ; and
indeed Defire feems to be no otherwife diftin-
guifhable from Volition, than as the latter i*
generally attended with the Power ofAftion,
which the former is confider'd without. This
I think is all the Diftinftion that. they arc ca-
pable of, which yet is only nominal : Nor do
his Jnftances in $. 30. prove that there is any
real Difference between 'em. Thus when I
am oblig'd to ufe perfuafions with another,
which I wifh may not prevail upon him, or
fuffer one Pain to prevent a greater, here are
two oppofite Wills, or a weak imperfeft Voli-
tion conquer'd by, and giving way <o a ftrong-
er : I will or defire that this Man may not be
prevail'd upon, but yet I will or defire more
powerfully and effeftually to ufe thefe perfua-
fions with him : Or rather, here is but one

aftual

EJJayon Confcioufnefs, p. 209. 2 10.

i66

Of Moral Evil

tions, yet it is not neceffarily determin'd by any, for it can fufpend
its Action, and order fome other Judgment, which it may follow.
Since therefore it can either exert or fufpend its Act, it is not only
free from Compulfion, but alfo indifferent in itfelf, with regard
to its Actions, and determines itfelf without neceflity.

IV. It muft be confefs'd, that this opinion eftablifhes Liberty, and
on that account is more agreeable to reafon, experience, and the com-
mon fenfe of Mankind, yet fome things in it feem to be prefum'd and
not explain'd clearly enough.

fufficiently explain'd in it.

Such a Li- V. For, in the firfl place, 'tis faid that the Will determines itfelf;
fcemstobe S ^ ut we are not m ^ orme d how that is poffible, nor what ufe fuch a
of more pre- Power would be of, were it admitted: nay, it feems rather prejudi-
nn cial than beneficial to Man. For that Goodnefs which it is fuppofed
to purfue, is in the things themfelves, and arifes from their connec-
tion with the chief Good j it is not therefore to be form'd, but dif-

covered

NOTES.

This Opi-
nion efla-
blifhes Li-
berty, but
yet there
are fome
things not

benefit to
Mankind.

attml Defire or Will in the Cafe, and the other
is only Hypothetical. Thus I fhould will to
be cured of the Gout, if the cure would not
throw me into greater Pain ; hut in the pre-
fers circumftances I do not really will it, nor
exert any one acl which may ferve to remove
it: nay, in this Cafe, I will or defire to bear
the Gout rather than a worfe Evil that would
attend the removal of it. His Axiom there-
fore, that wherever there is pais, there is a
defire to be rid of it, is not ablblutely true.

Again, I fhould refufe a painful Remedy or
oiiagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfcdl
Health without them ; but as I manifeftly can-
not, I choofe the lefs Evil of the two. Nor
can I indeed be properly (aid to choofe or de-
fire both in Oie prefent Circumftances, or, to
will one and defire the contrary, fince 1 know
that only one of them is pofiible, which there-
fore I now certainly will or defire, tho 1 1 fhould
as certainly havewill'd the contrary had it been
equally poffible. Thefe then and the like In-
ftances are not fufEcient to prove any oppositi-

on between Will and Defire, except the latter
be only taken for a mere paflive Appetite or
Afteaion of the Mind : in which fenfe the
Words choofe, prefer, &c. muft then be very
improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I
believe Mr. Locke here fets the Word Defire to
fignify what we commonly mean by Will, as
he does in ^.48. where 'ris call'd the Power cf
preferring: and puts Volition into the place of
Action', as feems probable from his defcription
of Willing in the 28th and 30th Sea. as alfo,
C. 23. (f. 18. where he defines the Will to be
a Power cf putting Body into Motion by Thought.
And the fame Notion, I think, runs thro' all
his Letters to Limborch. To conclude, what-
ever he means by Defire, he manifeftly poft-
pones it to Volition in ^. 56. " When a Man
" (fays he) has once chofen a thing, and there -
" by it is become a part of his Happinefs, it
" raifes defire, and that proponionably gives
" him uneafinefs, which determines his Will,
" and fets him at work in purfuit of his choice
il on all occafions that offer." If chofen ftand

here

Of Moral Evil

c overed by the underftanding. If then the under/landing performs
its Duty right, it will difcover what is heft: but it is our Advantage
to be determined to that which is befl -, it had therefore been better
for Man, if Nature had given him up abfolutely to the determina-
tion of his Judgment and Underftanding, and not allow'd that Judg-
ment to be fufpended by the power of the Will. For by that means
he would have obtain'd his End with greater certainty and eafe. I
grant, that if a Man were abfolutely determin'd in his Actions to the
belt, there would be no room for virtue, properly fo call'd ; for vir-
tue, as it is commonly understood, requires a free Act, and this Li-
berty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue ; and with good rea-
fon, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleafes: (For thus it
would be imporlible to attain the end of choofing, i. e. to pleafe our-
felves, without Liberty, fince that very thing which pleafes in Ac-
tions, viz. Liberty, would be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which
the Underftanding can difcover, be the very befl before or independent
of our Choice, it were proper for us to be neceflarily determin'd to
it j for the fruition of it, howfoever obtain'd, would make us happy,
and be fo much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not

dependent

NOTES.

167

here for willed, his ufual Method of explain-
ing the Caufe of Volition is inverted, and the
Effect comes firft ; or, if chofen be made only
to fignify defired, he muft fuppofe defire to
raife itfelf, which is bad again. How can
thefe Words be underftood in any Senfe
confiflent with V31 and 71. and with his
whole Hypothefis ? *

Dr. Clarke's Argument for abfolute Freedom,
becaufe all Motives or Senfations are mere
abilrac~l Notions, and have no phyfical power ||,
feems not conclufive, or at leaft not clear. For
who knows, fay the Fatalifts, how far reafons,
motives, sV. may affect a Spirit ? Why may
not one immaterial Subflance determine ano-
ther by means of thought, as well as a material
ene can move another by means of Impulfe ?

Nay, his adherent Mr. Jack/on grants f, " that
" abftract Notions will, by a forcible and ir-
" refiilible impulfe, compel the Mind to move
" the Body whether it will or no." Which
impulfe, if it were conftant, would fufficiently
acquit the Maintainers of Neceffity. But that
there can be no fuch forcible impulfe, will,
I hope, appear below, where it will be fhewn,
to be both agreeable to reafon to fuppofe that
there are Self-aclive Beings, which, as fuch,
muft have a phyfical power of refilling what
we call the moll cogent Motives : and to be
confirm 'd by Experience, that our own Minds
exert fuch a Power ; which is fufficient for our
purpofe. For an Explanation of the true No-
tion of Liberty, fee the following Subfe&ions
of this Chapter, and Note 82.

* See our Author's Subfecl. 3d. par. 6.

|| Remarki on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. la

"jr Defence of human Liberty, p. 1 98.

It only takes
place in
doubtful mat-
ters, and then
'tis of no ule
or impor-
tance.

We are

left in
doubt con-
cerning
the Way .

which leads

Of Moral Evil

dependent upon Chance, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a man-
ner fuppofed to be: nor need we much regard the Glory arifing from
a well made Choice ; iince the fruition of the greateft Good would
give us Happinefs without it; nay fuch Glory would be vain and
defpicable in competition with the greateft Good. Hence it appears,
that Free-will, according to this Hypothefis, cannot be reckon'd any
Advantage.

VI. Secondly ; If it be faid, that the Underftanding is dubious in
many Cafes, and ignorant of what is the beft, and in thefe Liberty
takes place ; neither does this clear the Matter. For if the things to
be done be Good or Evil in themfelves, but unknown to the Intel-
lect, there's no help in the Will ; nor does its Liberty aflift us in dis-
covering or obtaining the better Side ; if they be indifferent, it is no
matter what we do, fince the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are
equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in thefe Cafes, it
will be of no ufe or importance to Life or Happinefs : Nay, it muft
be efteem'd an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfec-
tion of the Underftanding. For if the Underftanding could certain-
ly determine what were beft to be done, there would be no room for
Liberty. (66.)

VII. Thirdly ; They are not well agreed what this Chief Good is,
from the connection with which the Underftanding muft judge of
the Goodnefs of other things, as may appear from the various and
contradictory Opinions about it. (67.) We muft neceilarily therefore

fluctuate,

to Happinefs, and can have no help from Liberty.

NOTES.

(66) Thefe, with fome of the following
confequences attending fuch a confufed Hypo-
thefis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. Loch
(tho' I think they return upon himlelf ) in his
Chapter of Power, . 48,49, 50. and in the
Pbilofopb. Enquiry, p. 63, {5Y. and feem to be
unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of
our Author ; who fuppofes, that in moft Cafes,
all the Goodnefs of an Aft. or Objedl entirely
depends upon, and is produced merely by our
choofing it ; and of confequence Liberty, or a
power of choofing, is according to his Princi-

ples, (o far from being unneceflnrv, or rn Im-
perfection, that it is our nobleit Perfection ;
and conftitutes the greateft part of our Happi-
nefs: For an Explanation of this, fee . 2. of
this Chapter.

(67.) This uncertainty about the Summum
Bonum is own'd and well accounted for by Mr.
Locke, B. 2. C. 21. V 55- " Hence it was
" that the Phi lofo pliers of old did in vain en-
" quire, whether Summum Bcnut:i confided in
" Riches or Bodily Delights, or Virtue, or
" Contemplation ? And they might have as

" reafonably

Of Moral Evil 169

fluctuate, and be folicitous, and rebel againft Nature itfelf, which has
neither granted us a certain End, nor certain Means thereto, but left
us anxious and uncertain about the way which leads to Happinefs ;
neither is there any help here in our Liberty, fince it is blind, and
can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right path.

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confefs'd by all, that Good in general is what Since that is
agrees with every one, and what all things defire. Every Good then g od wh /J ch
anfwers to fome Appetite, and according to thefe Authors, Objects ,nJSS is^o
are good on account of a natural and neceflary conformity which they b- judg'd of
have to our Appetites. The Understanding therefore does not make f^i jf"
good, but finds it in the things themfelves: and when it judges any the will' fbl-
thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, muft necef- j thls .
farily be in refpect of fome natural Appetite. All the Good then which \ 5 not free,
is in things will be the Object of fome Faculty or Appetite, /. e. of the'. fitdoesr ? ^
Underftanding, Senfe, &c. But all thefe are determin'd by Nature in reafon^We '
regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, /. e. in regard had better
to their Pleafantnefs, or Agreeablenefs ; and as to the relation which ^^^^h
they bear to each other, i. e. as to their Profit ablenefs and Honejly, they Liberty,
are to be judg'd of by the Understanding, and directed when and in
what manner they muft give place to each other, or afford their mu-
tual Afliftance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of ufe;
for if it certainly follow the decree of reafon it is not free, at leaft
from neceffity, fince that very reafon which it follows is not free : if
it does not necefiarily follow that, we had better be without it, for it
perverts every thing, and difturbs the Order of Nature, which is the
very beft and fitteft to be follow'd, fuch a Liberty as this would there-
fore

NOTES.

" rcafonably difputed, whether the beft relifh
" were to be found in Apples, Plumbi, or
" Nutts, and have divided themfelves into
" Seh upon it. For ai pleafant Taftcs de-
" pend not on the things themfelves, but their
'* agreeablenefs to this or that particular Palate,
" wherein there is great variety ; fo the gre.i
" teft happinefs confifts in the having thofe
" things which produce tbe Treateft Pleafure l
" and in the abfencc of ti ofe which caufe any
" difturbance, any pain. Now thefe to diffe-

" rent Men are very different things." To
the fame purpofe are the 3d and 4th obfer-
vations in the Religion of Nature delineated,
p. 33. which may ferve to confirm the Notion
which our Author propofes in the next Subfec-
tion, viz. that molt of the Good or Agreeable-
nefs in things arifes not from their own Na-
tures, but our choice of them, or that Objedte
are not chofen becaufc they are good, but are
generally good only becaufe they are chofen.

I 7

If the Will
couldfufperd
its adt con-
trary to the
Judgment of
the Under-
flanding, it
would run
directly into
Evil,itfeems
therefore ne-
cefl"3ry for it
to aft at the
time and in
the manner
which the
Underftan-
ding dire&s.

Of Moral Evil

fore be prejudicial to Mankind ; it would make them liable to do a-
mifs, and produce no kind of Good to compenfate for fo great an
Evil.

IX. Fifthly, It is fuppofed that the Judgment of the Understanding
concerning the Gocdnefs of any thing, is a condition without which
the Will is not directed to the Object, but yet that it can either exert
or fufpend its act about any Good whatfoever. Let us fuppofe then
that the Underftanding has determin'd it to be good to exert fome
certain Action, and Evil to fufpend it , while this Judgment conti-
nues, if the Will can fufpend its Act, it choofes Evil ; if it cannot,
it is not free. You'll fay, it can command the Underflanding to change
its Judgment ; let it be fo. But it is evident, that the Man fufpends
his Action before he can command the Underflanding to change its
Judgment, i. e. he fufpends the Action while the Judgment deter-
mines that it is Evil to fufpend. He therefore choofes that directly
which his Reafon judges to be Evil, which feems to overthrow their
whole Hypothecs. (68.)

X. I confers

NOTES.

(68.) Farther, if the Mind can fufpend the
Satisfaction of any urgent defire (which Mr.
Locke allows *, and therein places all its Li-
berty) then it can as eafily quite ftop, or run
counter to any natural Appetite, fince no grea-
ter Power feems to be requifite for the one than
for the other. If we can hinder the Will from
being determin'd by any defire of abfent Good
without any appearance of greater Good on the
other Side, which might raife an oppofite de-
fire able to counterbalance it, as our Author
has fhewn that we can ; then we fhall be equal-
ly able to prevent its following even the ulti
mate determination of the Judgment, without
any reafon for fo doing ; and confequently
good, whether abfolute or comparative, is nei-
ther the adequate efficient Caufe, nor a neceffa-
ry Means or Motive to the determination of
the Will. This aft of fufpenfon therefore muft
either be folely founded in the felfmoving
Power of the Mind, and of confequence be na-
turally indepndeat on all Motives, Reafons,

&t. and an inftance of the Mind's abfolute
Freedom from any external Determination ;.
which is, I believe, a contradiction to Mr.
Locke's general Hypothefis; or elfe itfelf muft
be determin'd by fome external Caufe, and then
it will be difficult to make it free in any fenfe.
Let us obferve how Mr. Locke endeavours to re-
concile thefe two Notions together. Our Li-
berty, according to him, is founded in a gene-
ral abfolute Inclination of the Mind to Happi-
ncfs, which obliges us to fufpend the Gratifica-
tion of our Defire in particular cafes, till we
fee whether it be not inconfiftent v/ith the ge-
neral Good. " The ftronger Ties, fays he,
" . 51. we have to an unalterable purfuit of
" Happinefs in general, which is our greateft
" Good, and which, as fuch, our Defires al
" ways follow, the more are we free from any
" neceffary determination of our Will to any
" particular Aftion, and from a neceffary com-
" pliance with our Defire fet upon anyparti-
" cular, and then appearing preferable good,

rill

* Book 2. C.2.1. V, 47, and. 50.

Of Moral Evil. 171

X. I confefs, they offer fome Solutions here, but fuch as are fo fub- There are
tie, fo obfcure, and fo much above the comprehenfions of the Vulgar, fc^"^^
that moft Perfons have taken a diftafte to them, given up the caufe of difficulties,
Liberty as defperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one j?"^ 1 ^" 6
will undertake either to give a more clear and full Explication of theing clear.
common Opinion, or bring Solutions of thofe Difficulties which occur n this ac -
in it, he will find me fo far from being his Adverfary, that he may have gSSe o-
expect my aflent, encouragement and affiftance. This indeed were ve r to the
very much to be wifh'd, but in the mean time I mall try, as far as I a merOpi '"
am able, whether thefe things cannot be explain'd more clearly in a-
nother manner.

NOTES.

** till we have duly examin'd whether it has a
" tendency to, or be inconfiftent with our real
M happinefs." And again, V 52. " Whatever
** Neceffity determines to the purfuit of real
" Blifs, the fame neceffity, with the fame force,
'* eflablifhes Sufpence, Deliberation and Scru-
" tiny, of each fucceffive deflre, whether the
" fatisfaftion of it does not interfere with our
" true Happinefs, and miflead us from it."
If by the Word Neceffity he means abfolute
pbyjical Neceffity (which it muft be, if it be any
at all, or any thing to the prefent purpofe) he
has difcover'd a pretty odd foundation for his
Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us
towards Happinefs in general, be abfolute and
irrefiflible, as his Words import, it will draw
us equally towardi all particular appearances of
it, and confequently prove as bad a ground for

Sufpenfion as for Liberty. But in truth this
Sufpenfion is neither founded in any Neceffity
of purfuing Happinefs in general, nor is itfelf
an original power of the Mind diftinct from
that of Volition, but only one particular exer-
cife or Modification of it. " 'Tis willing (as
" the Author of the Pbilofophical Enquiry right-
" ly obferves) to defer willing about the mat-
" ter propofed," and is no otherwife different
from the common cafes of willing and choofing
except that it is the moft evident demonftration
of the Mind's perfect. Liberty in willing, and
fo obvious that Mr. Locke could not get over it,
and therefore ftiles it the fource of all our Li-
berty, &c. $. 47. tho' he foon explains it away
again, by endeavouring to force it into his
Syftem.

SUBSECT.

ijl Of Moral Evil

S U B S E C T. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election is p'ofofed.

.
I. TN order to make my meaning better underftood, we muft obferve,.
titesand A in the firft place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and

Powers at- Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are directed to certain
proper Erdi Actions: and when thefe exert their proper Actions about Objects,
by exerci e, they produce a grateful and pleafant Senfation in us. The exercife of
AV eateft St r C tnem therefore pleafesus; and from hence probably all our Pleafure
feaion of and Delight arifes ; confequently our Happinefs, if we have any,
t Jj e ! 11 ' and feems to coniift in the proper exercife of thofe Powers and Faculties
lifote. which Nature has beflow'd upon us: for they appear to be implanted
in us for no other end, but that by the ufe and exercife of them thofe
things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at reft,
or enjoy themfelves, other wife than as thofe things are produced by
or in them, for the production or reception of which they are defign'd
by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the profecu-
tion of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exercife,
which muff be efteem'd the greater!: Perfection, and moft happy State
of any Being. For that is a State of Happinefs, if any fuch can be
conceiv'd, wherein every thing is done which pleafes, and every thing
abfent which difpleafes j neither does it fecm poffible to imagine a
more happy one.
There is a IL Secondly, It is to be obferv'd, that among our Appetites, Fa-
certain a- culties and Powers, fome are determin'd to their Operations by Ob-
St C by C Na- j ec ^ s peculiar to them. For upon the prefence of their Objects they
tpre be- neceffarily exert their Actions, if rightly difpos'd, and ceafe from O-
Ap^titcsT P erat i n u P on tne i r abfence, and have no tendency towards any o-
fsfr. and ' ther Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing
]ec? s r , where- ^ m Light, Colours, &c . and, upon the Removal of thefe, its Ac-

by they aft tion

upon the

prefen.ee of them, and ceafa from Aclion upon the RemovaJ of them.

Of Moral Evil. i y j

tlon (69.) ceafes. The Underftanding itfelf diftinguifhes thofe Objects
which are communicated to it by the Senfes, or perceiv'd by reflection
from one another, "difpofes and repofits them in the Memory ; but yet
has certain bounds which it cannot exceed: andfo of the reft. There is
therefore a certain natural Fitnefs, a fixt conformity between thefe
Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions
upon the prefence of the Objects, and pleafe themfelves in Exercife :
but are uneafy at the prefence of thofe things which hinder it. If
then there be any natural force in any Object: to promote or hinder
the exercife of any Power or Faculty, that Object is to be efteem'd
Good or Evil in regard to it.

III. Thofe Objects which thus promote or impede the Action, are;.,,
fufficiently diftinguiili'd from each other by the Power or Faculty it- would be of
felf ; thofe that are abfent or future, are judg'd of by the Underftan- 6il - v ice to
ding, and what the Mind determines to be the belt in them that We dowMwid?"
are oblig'd to purfue. He that does otherwife difobeys the Law of^ c h Appe-
Reafon. If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus deter- ^ ^j * s
min'd to their proper Objects, it would feem an Imperfection for Man

to be free, and he would have been much more happy without fuch
a Liberty : for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of the greateft
Evils, viz. a Power of doing amifs.

IV. It feems not impoffible to conceive a Power of a quite different
Nature from thefe, which may be more indifferent in refpect of the Wbm . a x
Objects about which it exerts itfelf*. To which no- one thing is na-Powcr^be*
turally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fitteft to t^eeo which
which it ihall happen -j- to be apply'd : Between which and the Ob- p"? t jc"[ ar
ject, to which it is determin'd, by itfelf or by fomething elfe, there is Objeft there
naturally no more fuitablenefs or connection than between it and any I s natura J-

1 v no other
Other agreeablenefa
but what
mayarife from the determination of the Power itfelf.

NOTES.

(69.) It may be obferv'd here once for all, I thefe fhould rather be calfd Paflioni) butgene-
that our Author feldom ufes this Word Atlion in I rally takes the vulgar expreffions, when they
a Uriel PhilofophicalScnfc (according to which 1 will ferve to explain his meaning.

* See Set. 5. Subfecl. 2. par. 12 and 15.

f That tbii Ward is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by Chance, fee par. 1 8.

tj Of Moral Evil

; other thing, but all the Suitablenefs there is, arifes from the Application
or Determination itfelf. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature,

. but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right arifes from that
very Occupation ; fo there may pombly be a Power to which no Ob-
ject is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become fuita-
ble to it, if it happen to be apply'd j for its Suitablenefs proceeds from
the Application, as we faid before. Now it does not feem any more
.abfurd for a Power to create an Agreeablenefs between itfelf and an
Objeft, by applying itfelf to that Objet, or that to itfelf, than for a
Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil
Laws, fome things are forbidden becaufe they are inconvenient, others
are inconvenient and Evil becaufe forbidden ; fo it may be in Powers,
.Faculties and Appetites ; viz. fome may be determin'd by the natural
Suitablenefs of the Objects, and in others, the Suitablenefs to the Ob-
jects may arife from the Determination. For this Faculty may be na-
turally inclin'd to Exercife, and one Exercife be more agreeable than
another, not from any natural fitnefs of one rather than the other, but
from the Application -of the Faculty itfelf: for another would often
be no lefs agreeable, if it had happen'd to be determin'd to that. No-
thing hinders then but that there may be fuch a Power or Faculty as
this, at leaft with refpeft to very many Objects. (70.)

V. Fourthly,

NOTE &.

(70.) Our Author's Notion of Indifference
lus been grofly mifunderftood by all his Adver-
faries, who have accordingly rais'd terrible
Outcries againft it, as deftroying the effential,
and immutable diftinttion between Good and
.Evil; fubverting Appetites, making Reafon
and Judgment ufelefs, and confounding every
thing. We lhall juft obferve here, that if it
be apply'd to the wbtle Man, it cannot poffibly
be extended, nor was defign'd by our Author
to include all manner of external Objects, Ac-
tions, and Relations of things, as they feem to
have underftood it. For every Man in his
Wits mull be fufficiently fenfible, that all
things don't affect him in the fame manner, e-
ven before he has will'd any of them. I can-
not be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Reft,
when I am Hungry, Thirfty, or Weary. Some

natural Objects are agreeable, and produce
pleafure in me, and others the contrary, whe-
ther I will or no ; and the fame may be faid
of the moral Senfe. Nay our Author every
where allows their full force to what he calls
the Appetites j and afferts that whatever con-
tradicts them mult be attended with Uneafi-
nefs. 'Tis not an abfolute indifference there-
fore of the Man or Mind in general, nor of the
Senfes, Perception or Judgment, which he con-
tends for; but it relates wholly to that parti-
cular Power of the Mind which we call Willing,
and which will appear to be in its own Nature,
or Pbyjically indifferent to acting or not afting,
notwithftanding all thefe different Affections
or Paffions of the Mind rais'd by the different
Objects. Let a thing feem never fo pleafant
and agreeable, never fo reafonable, fit, and eli-
gible

Of Moral Evil

V. Fourthly, If then we fuppofe fuch a Power as this, 'tis plain,
that the Agent endow'd with it cannot be determin'd in its Operations
by any praeexiftent Goodnefs in the Object; for fince the agreeablenefs
between it and the Objects, at leaft in moft of them, is fuppofed to
arife from the Determination, the agreeablenefs cannot poffibly be
the Caufe of that Determination on which itfelf depends. But the
congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodnefs in it,
therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at leaft in
thefe Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embrac'd it, nor E-
vil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power
to the Object is prior to the Goodnefs and the Caufe of it, this Power
cannot be determin'd by that Goodnefs in its Operations.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exift, cannot
be determin'd by any Uneajinefi ariiing from the things about which it
is converfant. For it is fuppofed to be indifferent, not only in refpect
of external ObjeRs, but alfo of its own Operations, and will pleafe it-
felf,

NOTES.

*75

Such a
Power as this
cannot be
determin'd
by any Good-
nefs in Oh-
jefts,fincethe
Goodnefs of
'em depends
upon the de-
termination.

Nor by any
Uneafoiefs.

gible to us, yet there is flill a natural poffibili-
ty for us to will the contrary, andconfequent-
ly the bare Power of willing is in itfelf indiffe-
rent to either Side ; which is all the indiffe-
rence that our Author contends for. Now fuch
an Indifference as this Mr. Locke allows to be
in the operative Powers of Man, tho' he con-
fines it, I think, improperly, to them alone*.
" I have the ability, fays he, to move my hand,
" or to let it reft, that operative Power is in-
*' different to move or not to move my hand :
" I am then in that refpeft perfectly free. My
" Will determines that operative Power to
" reft, I am yet free, becaufe the Indifferency
*' of that my operative Power to aft or not to
" aft flill remains; the Power of moving my
" hand is not at all impair'd by the determi-
" nation of my Will, which at prefent orders
" reft, the Indifferency of that Power to aft
" is juft as it was before, as will appear, if
*' the Will puts it to the trial, by ordering the
" contrary." The fame, I think, may be ap-
ply'd to the Will itfelf in regard to Motives,

&e. with much more Juftice than to thefe ope-
rative Powers. Nay thefe can fcarce be call'd
indifferent to Aftion after the determination of
the Will ; but follow inftantly (as we obferv'd
in Note 61.) in moft Cafes when they are in
their right State. What I Will or Refolve to
do, that I certainly effeft if I have Power to
do it, and continue in the fame Will or Refo-
lution. However, this Indifference of the ope-
rative Powers is what can never coaftitute Mo-
rality (as was obferv'd in the fame place) fince
their Operations are no farther moral than as
they are confequent upon, and under the direc-
tion of the Will.

There muft then be another Indifference pri-
or to them, in order to make even the exertion
of them indifferent, or free in any fcnfe.

For a more complete View of this Queftion,
fee Epifcop. Inftit. Tbeol. L 4. C 6. and <TraeT.
de Libero Arbitrio. There's alfo a good defence
of our Author's Notion of Indifference in P. a
Limbtrcb, Tbeol. Chrifi. L.z. C.23. $.zo,&c.

* B,z. C. 21. Seft. 71.

1 76 Of Moral Evil.

felf, whether it accepts the thing or rejefls it; whether it exerts this
Ail or another. Thefe Objects then will neither pleafe nor difpleafe
till this Indifference be removed, but it is fuppos'd to be removed by
the Application or Determination of the Power itfelf ; therefor Anxi-
ety does not produce but prefuppofe its Determination. Let us fup-
pofe this Power to be already determin'd (it matters not how) to em-
brace a certain Objeft, or to exert the proper Afrions relating to it,
Defire manifeftly follows this Determination, and Defire is follow'd
by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object purfuant to the Ap-
plication of the Power. But if any thing mould hinder or flop this
Endeavour; and prevent the Power from exerting thofe Operations
which it undertook to difcharge in relation to the Object, then indeed
Uneafinefs would arife from the hindrance of the Power. Anxiety
would therefore be the Effefi of the Determination of this Power, but
by no means the Caufe of it *.
Nor by the VII. Sixthly, Suppofmg fuch an Agent as this to be endow'd alio
Underftandin* w j t h Underftanding, he might make ufe of it to propofe Matters fit
to be done, but not to determine whether he mould do them or not.
For the Underftanding or Reafon, if it fpeak Truth, reprefents what is
in the Objects, and does not counterfeit what it finds not in them:
Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are
fuppos'd to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worfe than ano-
ther ; the Understanding if it performs its Duty right, will reprefent
this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than ano-
ther; For the Underftanding direfts a thing to be done no other wife
than by determining that.it is better; as therefore the Goodnefs of
things, with refpect to this Power, depends upon its Determination,
and they are for the mod part good if it embraces, evil, if it rejects
them, 'tis manifeft that the Judgment of the Underftanding concer-
ning things depends upon the fame, and that it cannot pronounoe up-
on the Goodnefs or Badnefs of them, till it perceives whether the Pow-
er has embraced or rejected them. The Underftanding therefore muft
wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can pafs a judg-
ment, inflead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Under-
ftanding before it can be determin'd.

VIII. Seventhly,

* How far this Argument will affeit Mr. Luke's Hypothefis of Anxiety, may be obferv'd
from the latter pirt of Not.* 65.

Of Moral Evil. jny

VIII. Seventhly, But tho* this Power cannot be determin'd in its Yct ru( * ar *
Operations by any Judgment of the Understanding, yet the Under- 4jfofS5-
ftanding is neceflary, in order to propofe Matters of Action, and to di- demanding
ftineuifh pofTible ones from thofe that are impofiible. For tho' the V 1 # f. rder .

1L1 o i^ r # diftinguifh

Goodnefs of things with reipect to the Agent, proceeds from his De- poffibfc
termination, yet the Poffibility or Impoflibility is in the things them- * hin g* *" rom
felves, and this Agent ftands in need of the Understanding to diftin- impo *
guifh between Objects, left it light upon Abfurdities, and fo create
itfelf Uneafinefs. Not that an Object is therefore Good becaufe 'tis
poffible ; for if it were rejected it would be Evil ; nor will it be im-
mediately difagreeable becaufe impomble, for, attempting an Impof-
fibility may be pleafing to us, (for we may prefer the exercife of this
Power, which is the thing that pleafes us, as we faid before) but he
that makes this Attempt, muft neceffarily be unhappy in the Event ;
for fince the thing which the Power undertakes is impoflible to be
done, Uneafinefs muft neceflarily follow the hindrance of its Exer-
cife, 'and the final Difappointment of its End. J If the A(ycnt

IX. This then muft be aflign'd as the. Jirjl Limitation of fuch a be of infinite
Power, viz. that it confine itfelf to Poflibilities, and there needs no 22*1^;
other if the Agent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of ther Limit*-

its End. t tion -

X. Eighthly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need alfo But an Agent
to confult its Abilities, and not determine itfelf to any thing which of finite pow-
may exceed them, otherwife it will be as much difappointed in its confult his
Endeavour as if it had attempted abfolute Impoftibilities. And this is Abilities.
the fecond Limitation of this Power. It is impofhble, you'll fay, for

an Appetite to purfue fuch things as the Underftanding evidently de-
clares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I anfwer, the Senfes .and
natural Appetites are gratify'd with their Objects, and pleafe thcm-
felves, tho' Reafon remonftrate againft them, and condemn that plea-
fure as pernicious. How much more eafily then may this faStitiom
Appetite) which arifes in the Agent from Application only, be con-
ceiv'd to delight in its Good, tho* the Underftanding oppofe it, and
condemn that Delight as foolifh and of fhort Duration. Why Nature
granted fuch a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the *

Good of the whole, will be fhewn afterwards.

A a XL Hitherto

I78 Of Moral Evil

Such an A- ^* ^ Jtnert0 we have either confider'd this Power alone in the A-
gcnt cannot gent* or as join'd with the Understanding. But the Agent endow'd
Mctermin'd with it, may alfo have other Powers and Appetites which are deter-
Appites. er m in'd to their Objects by a natural Congruity ; yet neither can it be
determin'd in its Operations by thefe Appetites. Thefe, when right-
ly difpos'd, mull necefTarily exert their Operations upon the prefenceof
their Object sj but it is not at all necefTary that they mould delight
and pleafe themfelves in thefe Operations. For inftance, a bitter and
naufeous favour is difagreeable to the Tafle : but tho' this be felt, yet
urgent Hunger makes it pleafant, Importunity of Appetite overcom-
ing the Bifagreeablenefs of the Savour. This Pleafure indeed is not
pure, but mix'd and diluted proportionably to the Excefs of the pre-
vailing Appetite. For, fuppofe that there are three Degrees of Unea-
finefs from the Hunger, and two from the Bitter nefs^ the Agent, to a-
void three, mufi necefTarily bear two, which being deducl ed, there re-
mains only one Degree of folid Pfeafure ; whereas if he had met with
fuitable and fweet Food, there would have been three.

XIL Since therefore the Pleafure which arifes from the Satisfaction

is.fuperioTto ^ d&fe natural Appetites, may be overcome by a stronger Appetite,

ail the Appc- there's noReafon to doubt but this Power which is indifferent to Ob-

fcbdaedb 3 e( ^ s ma y overcome au ^ ne other Powers and Appetites. For all thefe

*Me, are limited by their Objetls, and therefore have certain Bounds and

Meafures in their Operations 5 but this Power has no Bounds *, nor is

there any thing wherein it cannot pleafe itfelf, if it does but happen

to be determin'd to it. Now fince the natural Appetites themfelves

may be contrary to each other (as we have {hewn) and one of them

be overcome by the Excefs of another, how much, more eaiily may

this Power beconcelv'd to go againft thefe Appetites, and fince it is of

a very different and fuperior kind, 'tis probable that it can conquer

all others, and be itfelf fubdued by none.

ft feems to XIII. Nay we may imagine it to be given for this very End, that

be given for the Agent might have wherein to pleafe itfelf, when thofe things

thattheAeent wmc h. are agreeable to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it very

might have OttCIX:

fomething to dplight himfclf. in when the natural Appetites muft neceffarily be frufcrated.

* i. e. K its Objefts, fee Note.7L.

Of Moral Evil.

179

often happens. As the natural Powers and Appetites receive Pleafure
and Pain from Obje3s, they muft necefiarily be deprived of Pleafure,
and undergo Pain, according to the Laws of Motion, and the order
of external things. Since then they are often fruitrated, they muft
render the Agents poflefs'd of them liable to Mifery, as well as make
them capable of Happinefs: But the Agent can have this always to
delight itfelf in -, and 'tis an advantage to it to be able to quit the o-
ther Appetites, and pleafe itfelf in reftraining them, or acting contra-
ry to them. For fince every Faculty is fatisfy'd in its exercife, the
Strength of this cannot be more fignally difplay'd in any thing, than
in running counter fometimes to all the Appetites. For this muft ei-
ther be fometimes done, or the Agent muft be deftitute of all manner
of Good, and remain entirely miferable ; namely when, according to
the Laws of Nature, fuch things muft be endured as are quite contra-
ry to the Appetites *.

XIV. And from hence it is very evident how delirable fuch a Power . * /,

1 111 //-i / 1 1 rower,

as this would be: for if it happen to be determin'd to fuch things as by its accef-
are agreeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multiplies the Enjoy- fion,ecreafes
mentj but if it fhould be determin'd to undergo thofe things which o/tL^ther
are repugnant to the Appetites, and which it muft neceffarily bear Appetites; by
fometimes, it might diminifh, nay quite remove the Uneafmefs, or f^oves n or
convert it into Pleafure. (7 1.) at leaft alle-

A a 2 XV. It viates the

pain.

NOTES.

(71.) This is not much more than what Locke
aflerts f in anfwer to the Enquiry, " Whether
it be in a Man's power to change the Plea-
fantnefs and Uneafinefs that accompanies any
fort ofAftion? And to that, fays he, 'tis
plain in many cafes he can. Men may
and fhould correft their Palates, and give
a relifh to what either has, or they fup-
pofc has none. The relifh of the Mind
u as various as that of the Body; and
]ikc that too may be alter'd ; and 'tis a mi-
ilake to think that Men cannot change the

" difpleafingnefs or indifference that is in Ac-
" tions into Pleafure and Defire, if they will
" but do what is in their Power." But it is
objected by Leibnitz, againft our Authors No-
tion, that if it could create Pleafure by an ar-
bitrary Determination and bare Election, it
might for the fame reafon produce Happinefs
in infinitum ||, and then how could we be ever
miferable except we chofc to be fo ? Which
Argument feems to be founded on a miftake of
our Author's meaning, as if he had intended to
affert, that all the good and agreeablenefs in

every

* viz. in painful Remedies, difngreeable Potitns, &c. fee Subfeft. 5. par.c;.
+ B. 2. C. 21. Sett. 69. || EJfah deTheodicee, p. 466, 467.

I go Of Moral Evil.

The reft of XV. It muft be confefs'd, that fome kind of ftruggle will be hereby

Ire nono'bc* excited m this Agent ; but a ftruggle attended with fome Pleafure, tho'

balked unne- it be qualify'd and not perfectly pure, is better than to be under abfo-

cefHiriiy. j ute Mif e ry. Nay, the confcioufnefs of a Power to pleafe itfelf a-

gainfl the bent and Inclination of the natural Appetites, may excite a

greater* Pleafure than could arife from the fruition of thofe things which

would, if prefenr, gratify thefe Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to

have fome regard to the Appetites, and not to difturb them unnecef-

farily, nor reftrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects.

He that does this will bring upon himfelf uneafinefs, and a needlefs

conteft. Tho' therefore it be not at all proper that fuch a Power

mould be abfolutely determin'd by the natural Appetites yet it is fit

that they fhould perfuade it, and that fome regard be had to them

in its Determinations. And this may be reckon'd its third Limita-

tation.

Such an A- XVI. Ninthly, An Agent poflefs'd of fuch a Principle as this would

gentasthisis fc e Self-active, and capable of being determin'd in its Operations by

itfelf alone. Now there is fometimes an abfolute neceffity for it to

be determined ; for when any thing is propos'd to be done immediate-

NOTES.

Self-active.

eYery thing or aftion, proceeds abfolutely and
entirely from our Will : and alfo, that this will
is as unlimited in its Exercife as in its Ohjecls,
and confequently that we might have any way,
and at any time, as much Happinefs as we plea-
fed, purely by willing it ; all which Propofi
tions are as falfe as they are foreign to the In-
tention of our Author, who infills only upon
this, that the act of willing, like the exercife
of all our other Faculties, is in itfelf delight-
ful to a certain Degree. Thi?, when apply "d
to an Object which is in itfelf agreeable, mull
add to the Pleafure arifing from it ; when de-
termin'd to a contrary one (both which kind of
Objects he always fuppofes) mull deduct from
the Pain ; when to an indifferent one, it muft
make that pofitively agreeable, by conferring fo
much abfolute and folid Happinefs.

But Hill this exercife of the Will, and of
con.'equence the Pleafure attending it, muft in
all. finite Creatures be effcntially and neceffarily

finite, as weir as the exercife of all their other
^Powers: and tho'' it has no bounds as to the
number and kind of its Objects, yet it muft be
limited as to its own Nature and the degree of
its exercife. ^his appears to me eafily concei-
vable, and matter of experience. We find
ourlelves generally able to turn our. thoughts to
any Object indifferently, but doea any Perfon
from hence imagine, that he can fix his thoughts
upon any particular Object, with an unlimited
Intenfenefs, or think infinitely? granting the
Words Intention and.Remifiion to be applica-
ble here in any tolerable fenfe-: which will
perhaps, upon Examination, appear very doubt-
ful. However, it is evidently no good confe-
quence to infer, that becaufe I can will, or
choofe a thing abfolutely and freely, therefore
I can will it in infinitum. May I not as juftiy
be faid to perceive or underftand a thing in in-
finitum, becaufe I perceive or underftand n at
all?

Of Moral Evil. i8*

Iy, it muft necefTarily either ad or fufpend its action, one of them muft
necefTarily be * ; but when either of them is done, the Power is deter-
min'd by that very ad: ; and no lefs force is requifite to fufpend than
to exert the act, as common fenfe and experience may inform any
one -j\ A determination then about a thing once propofed to be done,
is unavoidable; and fince it can neither be determin'd by any Good or
Evil pre-exiftent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appe-
tites, nor by their Objects ; it muft of neceffity either continue unde-
termined, or elfe determine itfelf. But trio' it be naturally free from
any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires, that it fhould
be determin'd on every particular occafion; and fince there is nothing
external to do this, it remains that it determine itfelf. We fhall call
th's Determination an Elediion; for as it is naturally indifferent to ma-
ny things, it will pleafe itfelf in electing one before another.

XVII. Nor is it a proper Queftion to afk, What determines it to an is determin'd
Election ? For if any fuch thing were fuppos'd, it would not be in- b y himfeif,
different, i. e. 'tis contrary to the Nature of this Agent, that there a! e nttcEo-
fhould be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a paffive fen becaufe
Power -J-)-, which has a natural and neceffary connection with the Ob- ^ p jJjJ fe
ject, the prefence of which determines it to act, we may reafonably piea*fe him
enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any parti- bec aufe they
cular action; but it is not fo in an aftivt Power, the very Nature of"
which is to make an Object agreeable to itfelf, /'. e. good, by its own

proper act. For here the Goodnefs of the Object does not precede the
act cf Election, fo as to excite it, but Election makes the Goodnefs in
the Object; that is, the thing is agreeable becaufe chofen, and not
chofen becaufe agreeable : we cannot therefore j'uftly enquire after any.
other caufe of Election than the Power, itfelf.

XVIII. If thefe things be true, you'll fay, t this Agent willbe deter- he
min'd by Chance, and not by Reafon ; but in reality here's no room for determin'd
Chance, if by Chance be underftood that which happens befide the in- b y Chance.
tention of the Agent ; for this very Election is the Intention of the A*

gent, and it is impoffible that a Man fhould intend befide his Inten-
tion. As for Reafon, he that prefers a lefs Good to a greater, muft be
judg'd to act unreafonably ; but he that makes that a greater Good by

choofing

* Sea Locke, B 2. G 21. Se. 23,24. f SeeNott>63.

j.f Sec.Z^v, Ch. 21. Sefl 2.

I go Of Moral Evil

choofwg it, which, before his choice, had either no Good at all iri it,
or a lefs, he certainly choofes with reafon. You may urge that Con-
tingency atleail is to be admitted; if by this you mean, that this Agent
does fome things which are not at all neceflary, I readily own a Con-
tingency, for that is the very Liberty I would eftablifh.

XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that fuch an Agent as this, if it be al-
Caufe of his low'd that there is fuch an one, is the true Canfe of his actions, and
Adloos that whatever he does may juflly be imputed to him. A Power
which is not Matter of itfelf, but determin'd to act by fome other, is
in reality not the efficient Caufe of its actions, but only the injirumen-
tal or occqfional (if we may ufe the term of fome Philofophers) for it
may be faid that the thing is done in it, or by it, rather than that it
does the thing itfelf. No Perfon therefore imputes to himfelf, or e-
fteems himfelf the Caufe of thofe aclions to which he believes him-
felf to be necefTarily determin'd: If then any inconvenience arife from
them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime ; and
whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be an-
gry with himfelf, unlefs he be confcious that it was in his power not
to have done them : but he cannot be confcious of this, (except thro'
ignorance and error) who is determin'd by another. For no others
ought to be look'd upon as true Caufes, but fuch as are free. For thofe
that operate necefTarily, are to be conceiv'd as paffive, and we muft
recur to fome other which impofes that neceffity on them, till we a-
rive atone that is free, where we may flop. Since then the Agent
endowed with this Power, is determin'd by himfelf and no other, and
is free in his Operations, we muit acquiefce in him as a real Caufe,
and he ought to be efteem'd the Author of whatever he does, either
well or ill.
s capable of XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifeft that fuch an Agent as this is capable
H.ppinefs. ot Happinefs. For that Perfon mull: be happy who can always pleafe
himfelf, but this Agent can evidently do fo. For fince things are fup-
pofed to pleafe him, not by any neceffiry of Nature, but by mere E-
le&ion, and there is nothing which can compel him to choofe this ra-
ther than another ; 'tis plain that the Agent endow'd with this Power
may always choofe fuch things as it can enjoy, and refufe, i. e. not de-
iire, or not choofe thofe things which are impoflible to be had. And
from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that

whereby

Of Moral Evil. x g j

whereby things become agreeable to the Appetites, be eftablim'd by
Nature, or effected by the Agent himfelf. For if Good and Evil pro-
ceed from Nature, and be inherent in Objects, fo as to render them a-
greeable or difagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happinefs of
this Agent will alfo depend upon them; and unlefs the whole Series
of things be fo>on!er'd; that nothing can happen contrary to his Ap-
petites, he rnuft fall fhort of Happinefs. For his Appetites will be
difappointed, which is the very thing that we call Unhappinefs. But if
Objects derive their agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs from the Choice,
'tis clear that he who has his Choice may always enjoy the thing cho-
fen, unlefs he choofe impombilkies, &c. and never have his Appetite
fruftrated, /'. e. be always happy. Not that all things are indifferent
with refpect to this Power, for it admits of fome Limitations, as was-
obferv'd, beyond which it mull: necerTarily deviate from Happinefs.

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be obferv'd, that Agents, whofe Felicity / in imperfetf
depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, undcniand-
ftand in need of a perfect and almoft infinite Knowledge, to compre- ^ "JJ 1 *""
hend diflinctly all the relations, habitudes, natures and confequences foppfoefs, if
of things; if they come fhort of it, it is impoffible but that they muft J|5 *J.^ t . di "
*>ften fall into pernicious Errors, and be difappointed of their Defires, t ween poifi-
that is be often miferable: Hence anxiety and difquiet of Mind muft W1W and
necerTarily arife, and they would be agitated with continual doubts and 52*thiM
uncertainty, left what they choofe fhould not prove the beft. Thefe agreeable and
Agents then were either to be created without a profpect of Futuri- J^rfcnfcs
ty, or to be endow'd with a perfect Underftanding ; if neither were and confuit '
done, they muft of neceflity be very miferable; for we can fcarcecon- his Abilities.
ceive a greater Mifery than to be held in fufpence about Happinefs,
and compelled to choofe among Objects not fufficiently known, in
which neverthelefs a miftake would be attended with unavoidable Mi-
fery. There's none but is fufficiently apprehenfive how anxious, how
folicitous. how miferable it muft be to hang in fuch a doubt as this;
but if the agreeablenefs of things be fuppofed to depend upon Ele5lion y
a very imperfect underftanding will ferve to direct this Agent, nor need
he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he
do but diftinguifh poffible things from impoftible, thofe things which
are pleafant to the Senfes from them that are unpleafant, that which
is agreeable ta the Faculties from what is difagreeable, and confuit

his.

i 8+ Of Moral Evil

his own Abilities, viz. how far his power reaches - y (all which areeafi-

ly difcovered) he will know enough to make him completely happy.

Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done

be the very beft; for if the Election be but made within thefebounds,

that will become the beft which is chofen.

Tho' Liberty XXII. He that enjoys this Principle of pleafing himfelf in his Choice

would be a carm0 t reafonably complain of Nature, tho' he have but a very imper-

other Agent*, feet Understanding ; for there will always be Objects enough ready to

vetitisafureoj^gj- themfelves within thefebounds, upon which he may exercife his

Happi'ne " to choice, and pleafe himfelf : that is, he may always enjoy Happinefs.

this, whofc Tho* Free-will then be of no ufe, as was faid before, to an Agent ca-

deKnds no* P aD ^ e f De ^ n g determin'd only by the convenience of external things,

on objefts, nay, tho* it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reafon and pro^

butEiedion duce gin j yet to an Agent whofe convenience does not depend upon

the things, but the choice, it is of the greateft Importance, and as we

have feen, the fure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence

it appears how valuable and how defirable fuch an active Principle as

this would be.

XXIII. All this feems to be coherent enough, clear enough, and eafy

s*re dea^e- 5 * t0 ^ underftood, tho' fome may look upon it as a little too fubtle.

nough, tho' It remains that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothecs, with-

theymayap out any Foundation in fact, or there be really fuch a Principle to be

pear to be a r / - ~ " * J

little too found in Nature. (72.)

fubtle.

NOTES.

(72.) For an Explanation of our Author's
Principle of Indifference, above what has been
faid in Note 70, and will be cnlarg'd on in
Note 82. we ihall only obferve here, thatmoft
of the objections brought by the Author of the
P kilo fopbical Enquiry, p. 69, &V. are built upon
the old blunder of confounding this Indiffe-
rence as apply' d to the Mind, in refpett of its
Self determining Powers of willing or ailing
with another, which is falfly referr'd to the
pailive Powers of Perception 2nd Judgment, with

refpeft to the former Faculties all things are
phyfically indifferent or alike, that is, no one
can properly affeft, incline or move them more
than another ; with regard to the latter, moil
things are not indifferent, but necefTari ly pro-
duce Pleafure or Pain, are agreeable or difa-
greeabJe, whether we choofe them or not :
Our Author is to be underftood only in rela-
tion to the former, in this and the following
Sections, tho* he often ufes general terms.

S U B S E C T.

Of Moral Evil. iS$

S U B S E C T. IV.

That there is an Agent <who is fleas' d "with Ofyeiis only
becaufe he choofes them.

I. T T 7E have feen in the former Subfe&ion, that fome things are G^isfuch
V V adapted to the Appetites by the conftitution of Nature it- an Agent as
felf, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that th,s -
we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodnefs or Agreeable-
nefs in the things, by conforming itfelf to them, or adapting them to
it : hereupon things pleafe this Agent, not becaufe they are good in
themfelves, but become good becaufe they are chofen. We have de-
monftrated before, how great a Perfection, and of what ufe fuch a Po-
wer would be, and that there is fuch a Power in Nature appears from
hence, viz. we mufl necefTarily believe that God is invefted with it.

II. For in the firft place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Becaufe n(V
Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the thing exter-
Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore abfolutely indif- n ^ s ^J*^

f event to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm to him before
from any of them. What then fhould determine his Will to acl:? Ieaion -
Certainly nothing without him ; therefore he determines himfelf, and
creates to himfelf a kind of Appetite by choofing. For when the
Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the ef-
fectual procuring of that which he has chofen, as if he was excited
to this Endeavour by a natural and necenary Appetite. And he will
efteem fuch things as tend to accomplifh thefeEle&ions, Good; fuch
as obftruct them, Evil.

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Caufe of Good in the Crea- B

cures, whereon they depend, as almoft every one acknowledges. Forownwni'is
created Beings have all that they have from the Will of God; nor can the Caufe of
they be any thing elfe than what he will'd. Tis plain then dmfiSS^
all thefe are conformable and confonant to his Will, either efficient or
permiflive, and that their original Goodnefs is founded in this Confo-

B b nancy.

1 86 Of Moral Evil

nancy. And fmce all things proceed from one and the fame Will,
which cannot be contrary to itfelf, as it is reftrain'd within its proper
bounds by infinite Wifdom, 'tis alfo certain that all things are confi-
dent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as poflible
to the prefervation of itfelf and the whole Syftem j which we mud
reckon their J'econdary Goodnefs. All the Goodnefs then of the Crea-
tures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, for we cannot
apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themfelves,
fince they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine
Will : and they were as far from being good with regard to God him-
felf, till upon willing their Exiftence, he, by that act of Election, both
constituted them Good in relation to him ; and, by an unity of Will,
made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine
Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Cafes, by his Goodnefs
and Wifdom, and the immediate confequence of this is, that things
pleafe God, i, e. are Good. For many things are not at all agreeable to
his Goodnefs and Wifdom, becaufe he did not will them,, and while
he does not will any thing, it cannot be good.

From whence it appears undeniably, that his Will could not be de-

termin'd to Election by any Goodnefs in the Creatures. For before

that Election which is declared to be the Caufe of Goodnefs in created

Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad ; but when the Election

is made, that only is Evil which obftructs the execution of it ; and

that Good which promotes it. The Goodnefs of things is therefore to

be determin'd by their agreeablenefs to the Divine Will, and not that

by the agreeablenefs or goodnefs of things.

They are not W- Thirdly, We muft not therefore attend to fuch as declare that

to be minded God choofes things becaufe they are Good, as if Goodnefs and the

T h tfo*** g reater Good, which he perceives in Objects, could determine his

Goodnefs Will. (73.) If the Matterjiad flood thus, it does not feem poffible for

determines tbe

the Will of
God*

NOTES.

(73.) This Notioo t? advanced by Dr. Clarfo j The fame is infiflcd on by Leibnitz., Grotius,
in his Demorfi.ation of the Divine Attributes, } Mr. Chubb, and many others. We have en
Prop. iz. and afterwards explain'd, as far as quired a little into it already in X i. fee more
it feems capable of Explanation, in his iiw'-jia Note 75, d3V.
dentet of Natural and Reveal d Religion , Prop.. 1. 1

Of Moral hvil j j

the World to have been made at all. For they who acknowledge God to *
be the Author of it, confefs alfo, that he is abfolutely and completely
happy in himfelf, and does not Itand in the leaft need of other things.
Now it is inconceivable how external things can be of ufe to God,
who comprehends in himfelf all things which tend to perfect Hap-
pinefs. He muft of neceffity therefore be indifferent to all external
Objects, nor can any reafon be aflign'd, with regard to the things
themfelves, why he lhould prefer one to another. 'Tis plain that
things are made by God with Goodnefs, that is, with a certain con-
gruity to his own Nature j but they are fo far from being made on
account of any agreeablenefs antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on
the contrary, they are neceflarily agreeable and pleafant becaufe they
are made by his free Choice. For fince they are nothing in them-
felves, they muft. of neceflity have both their Exiftence and their a-
greeablenefs from that Will, from which they folely proceed ; and it
is impoffible but that they mould be conformable to the Will which
effected them. For God, by willing, makes thofe things pleafing to
him which were before indifferent.

V. Unlefs therefore we attribute to him fuch a Power as has been ff he had . ndt
defcribed (namely, an ability to pleafe himfelf, by determining himfelf a power of
to action, without any other regard had to the Quality of the Object, fefffnEieo"
than that it is poffible) it feems impoffible that ever he fhould begin tion,he could
to effect any thing without himfelf. For, as far as we can apprehend ncv . er ha V c '
there can be no reafon affign'd why he fhould create any thing at thinl 3 " 7
all *, why a World, why at that particular time when it was created,
why not before or after, why in this and no other Form : he receiv'd
no advantage or difadvantage from thefe, no benefit or harm; in
fhort, nothing that could move him to choofe one before another..
Except therefore we attribute to God an active power of determining
himfelf in indifferent Matters, upon every particular Occafion, and of
pleafing himfelf in that Determination according to his Choice ;,
he would do nothing at all, he would be for ever indolent in re-
gard to all external things, and the World could not poffibly havs
been made, fince no reafon could be imagin'd, why a God abfolute

Bb 2 Iy

* i. c. no renfm drawn from the particular Nature of the thing created. See Note 74.

i88

If he were
moved by
the Goodne'
of things to
cre.ite the
World, he
would be a
necefTary A-
gent.

But if things
are good be-
caufe he has
chofen to
make them,
his whole
Work will
be fiee.

External

things are in
themfelves
abfolutely
indifferent
to God, but
he has a com-
placency in
his Choice.

Of Moral Evil

ly perfect in himfelf, and abfolutely happy, fhould create any thing
without him.

VI. Fourthly, If we fuppofe that there was a reafon, and that God
was moved by it to produce external things, 'tis manifeft, that, ac-
cording to this, all things will proceed from him necefTarily. For he
that is determin'd ab extra to do any thing, acts by neceflity, he is
paffive, and mud: necefTarily both do and fuffer, not what he himfelf,
but what the determining Caufe has effected in him : But this Good-
nefs (which is fuppofed to be in things antecedent to the Divine E-
lection, and to determine it) is fomething External, with regard to
the Will of God; if therefore that be the Caufe which determines
the Election, it follows, that the act of Election, and every thing
which depends upon it is necefTary'

VII. But if things be good and agreeable to God for this only rea-
fon, becaufe he has chofen to make them fo, he himfelf will be at
liberty, his whole Work, will be free. The World will be produced,
not by neceffity, but choice; neither will it be impoffible to be effec-
ted, tho' it be in itfelf unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a
complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it fufficiently ap-
pears of how great importance it is, that all the Goodnefs of the
Creatures fhould depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon
the Goodnefs of them, for we fee that by this means Fate is deftroy'd,
and Liberty eftablifh'd.

VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, you'll fay, from the
Objects of his Choice, why fhould he choofe them ? Is it not more
probable that he mould do nothing at all, than bufy himfelf in things
that are like to be of no benefit ? It may be anfwer'd, That it is no
more trouble to him to will things than not to will them ; and
hence it comes to pafs, that when he wills them, they exifr, ; when he
retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reafon, as it fup-
pofes an indifference of things in refpect of God, fo it afferts his Li-
berty to produce or not produce them, and proves, that that will be
agreeable to him which he fhall choofe. But we have a better yet
at hand, viz. that God chofe to create external things, that there
might be fomething for him to delight in without himfelf. For e-
very one receives Satisfaction from the Exercife of his Powers and

Faculties.

Of Moral Evil. 189

Faculties. (74.) Now God is inverted with infinite Power, which he
can exercife innumerable ways, not all at once indeed (for all are not
confident with each other) but fuch as are confiftent are for the mod
part indifferent, nor is there any reafon why he mould prefer one be-
fore another 4-j*, it muff therefore be his own Choice which makes one
more agreeable than another; nor is it otherwife conceivable how a
thing that is in itfelf indifferent to the Elector, mould prove mere
pleating than any thing elfe.

IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reafon of the Election,
i. e. why he choofes this rather than that; for upon fuppoficion that >; ne himfelf '
there is a reafon, the indifference would be deftroy'd, and the Elec- to Aaion,

tion

NOTES,

(74.) This reafon is very confiftent with
what our Author had deliver'd in C. I. $. 3.
par. 9, 10. where he afferted, that the end and
intent of God in creating the World, was to
exercife his feveral Attributes, or (which is the
fame thing) to communicate his Perfections to
fome other Beings : which Exercife or Com-
munication could proceed from no other Caufe
befide his own free Choice ; and therefore he
muft be abfolutely and phyfically indifferent to
it, in the fame refpect as Man was (hewn to be
indifferent towards any Aftion *, only with
this difparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect
Agent, may eafily be imagin'd to will Abfur-
dities or Contradictions, but God can never be
fuppofed to will or aft either inconfiftently
with his Nature and Perfections, or with any
former Volition (as our Author obferves in the
1 2th and following Paragraphs) and confe-
quently cannot be faid to be indifferent to fuch
things (as fome have mifunderftood our Au-
'thor) any more than he is indifferent towards
being what he is f. Leibnitz urges farther ||,
that it could not be in any fenfe indifferent to
God whether he created external things or
not, fince hkGoodnefs was the Caufe (according
to our Author himfelf in the place above cited)
which detcrmin'd him to the Creation. But

what do we mean by his Goodnefs here? Is it
any thing more than an intent to exercife his
Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate
his Happinefs or Petfection ? And is not this
the very Determination or Election we are
fpeakingof ? To fay then that God is deter-
min'd by his Goodnefs, is faying, that he de-
termines himfelf; that he does a thing becaufe
he is inclined to do it ; 'tis affigning his bare
Will and Inclination for a Caufe of his Action;
which is all that we contend for. Whereas
they that would oppofe us fhould affign a Caufe
for that Will or Inclination itfelf, and fhew a
natural neceflity for the operation of the Divine
Attributes (for a moral one is nothing to the
prefent Queftion) a ftrict phyfical connection
between the Exiftence of certain Perfc&ions in
the Deity, and their determinate Exercife. If
therefore God had no other reafon for the
creation of any thing but his own Goodnefs,
he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent,
to create or not create that thing; and if he
will'd, or was inclin'd to exert his Perfections
thus freely, he muft be as free and indifferent
ftill in the actual Exercife of them. As to the
particular manner of his exerting them, fee the
following Note.

f-f In/lances of this Indifference may be feen in otir Author's Note F, and the th precedent Po
ragraph.
See Note 65, and 70. + 6V* Note 75. || Remcrques, p. 473..

i jo Of Moral Evil.

tion would not be free. For if we fuppofe that there is fuch a thing
as better and worfe in the Objects themfelves, who would affirm that
the Goodnefs and Wifdom of God will not necerTarily determine him
to choofe the better? For who can honeftly poflpone the better, and
prefer the worfe ? As then in indifferent Matters there can be no rea-
fon why one is chofen before another, fo there is no need of any : for
fince the Divine Will is felf-active, and mull necerTarily be determin'd
to one of the indifferent things, it is its own reafon of Action, and
determines itfelf freely. Nay fo great is the Power of God, that what-
ever he mall choofe out of infinite Poffibilities, that will be the befl,
it matters not therefore which he prefers.
The difficu 1 - X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are flill unfatisfy'd how a Power
ty of concei can determine itfelf '; **. you are ignorant of xhz Modus-, but a thing
ying how a mu fl. not b e deny'd becaufe we do not know the manner how it is

power can J . . . . _ ,

determine it done, we are entirely ignorant how the Rays of the Sun produce the

lel ^ aftlon Idea of Light in the Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it

hmde^our better underftood how the Members of the Body can be moved by

aflcnt to the a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction of the Will. Yet no

propoHtion? body denys thefe things, becaufe he knows not the manner in which

they are perform'd. If therefore it be manifeft that the Divine Will

does determine itfelf, we mail not trouble ourfelves much in enquiring

how it can be.

'Tisasdiffi- xi. But to confefs the truth, 'tis no lefs difficult to conceive a

cdvehow^ thing to be moved or determined by another than by itfelf; but as

thing can be we are accuftom'd to material Agents * all which are paffive in their

noTher ^s by Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at all folicitous about

itfelf, we a )e the manner of it: whereas, if we confider the thing thoroughly, we

prejudiced ^\\ fi n( j ourfelves as far from apprehending how Motion is commu-

DV DCin? 3C-

cuftomedto nicated from one Body to another, as how the Will can move itfelf:
material, i. e . but there feems to be nothing wonderful in the one, becaufe it is ob-
5e n e ferv'd to happen at all times, and in every Action, whereas the other
is look'd upon as incredible, fince it is feldom perform'd, viz. by
the Will alone. And tho' both Reafon and Experience prove that it
is done, yet we fufpect ourfelves to be impofed upop, becaufe we
know not the manner of it. The ground of the miftake is this, that

fince

* See N te 62 and 6

Of Moral Evil i 9 i

fince the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted
with, the reft being all paflive, we are not eafily induced to believe
it to be really fuch, but form our Judgment of it from a Compari -
fon with other Agents, which fince they don't move but as they are
moved, we require a Mover alfo in the Will of God : which is very
abfurd, fince it is evident, that if there were no a&ive Power in Na-
ture, there could not be a pa/Jive orte ; and if nothing could move
without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action at
all -j-. For we cannot conceive how it mould begin. Now it is
much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning,
than how an Agent can move itfelf. Since then here are Difficulties
on both Sides, neither ought to be deny'd, becaufe the manner of it
is above human Underftanding.

XII. It is to be obferv'd, that what we have faid concerning thisY 118 ! 1 - 8 Jr*

-r t*A 1 i i !- itt-ii i about mdir-

Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place Terence, with
chiefly in thofe Elections which we apprehend to be the Primary ^f^V^
but not always in the fubfequent ones. For fuppofing God to will takes place in>
any thing while that Election continues, he cannot reject either the h s primary
fame, or any thing neceflarily connected with it, for that would be to Elcaions -
contradict himfelf. In order to apprehend my Meaning the better,
we muft remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable
things equal in Nature and Perfections. For inftance, we may con-
ceive numberlefs Men equal to one another in all refpects : and al-
fo numberlefs Species of rational Beings equilly perfect, nothing but
the Will of God could determine which of thefe he mould create
firft. But when it was determin'd to create Man fuch as he now
is, i. e. with the Faculties, Appetites, and integral Parts which he
confifts of at prefent, it is impoffible that God fhould will or
choofe any thing repugnant to human Nature, while that Election
continues.

XIII. For when we conceive any thing propofed to the Know- have y
ledge of God as fit to be done, he muft alfo neceflarily have under things atonce
his Eye, as it were at the fame Glance, all thofe things that are ne- ,n , l ?" view

' ' . ' o which are

cefTarily connected with it, or confequent thereupon to all Eternity j connected
_ and thth =

thing choien,
and cither will or refufe them by one fimple Acl.

* See Dr Clarke'/ Dminftrat. of the Attrlbutti, p. 82, 87, &fV. or S. FancouxtV EJuj (oncer,
ning Liberty, ^rV. p. z8, 29, and Note 62.

j 92 Of Moral Evil

and mull will or reject, them all by one fimple Act. If therefore he
determin'd to create Man, he muft alfo be fuppofed to will that he
mould confift of a Soul and Body, that he fhould be furnifh'd with
Reafon and Senfes, and that his Body mould be fubject to the general
Laws of Matter: for all thefe things are evidently included in the
Choice to create Man.
As he is of XIV. Nay this primary Act of Volition muft be fuppofed to con-
infinite tain not only thole things which have a neceflary connection with
Goodnefs, w h at is chofen, but fuch things alfo as tend to promote its benefit

he alio wills * o t ,

ti* good of and happinefs, as far as they can be made connltent with the benefit
a1 ' l J "S s of the whole. For fince God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he
determin'd wills that his Creatures mould exift commodioufly as much as that
to create, they mould exiit at all. He therefore will'd fuch things as are
fib!e/ aSp agreeable to the Natures, and tend to preferve the Conftitutions of
his Creatures in the fame Election whereby he determin'd to
create them.
When the XV. We have faid before, that there is a double Goodnefs in
foreis one? things, the firft and principal is that which renders them well- ,
made, it is pleafing to God, as they are conformable to his. Will : the other is
thauhofc t ^ iat wnereD y they agree with one another, whereby they afford each
things fhould other mutual Affiftance, whereby they promote the Convenience,
p !? f h h '"d P re f ervat i n ar, d Perfection of the whole : but both thefe proceed
to the confu- from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once
fion, &c. of determin'd to pleafe himfelf in the Creation and Prefervation of the
World, he muft be fuppofed at the fame time to have willed all
fuch things as contribute to the Benefit and Perfection of his Work,
otherwife he would contradict himfelf, and thereby be the Caufe of
frustrating his own Election. For he is now fuppofed to have cho-
fen that there fhould be a World, that it fhould continue as long
as he himfelf had determin'd, that every Being fhould attain the
End affign'd to it, and all things alt according to the Nature he
had given them, and confpire together to preferve and perfect the
whole. It is impoffible therefore that he fhould will the reverfe
of all this, or that fuch things mould pleafe him as tend to the
.confufion, mutilation, or detriment of his Work. For 'tis impof-
fible

Of Moral Evil

fible to conceive that he mould choofe the Exigence of things, and
yet refufe the means necef&ry thereto. (7$.)

XVI. When

NOTES.

*9?

(75). This is a fufficicnt Anfwer to Leibnitz
who objeft?, that it will follow upon our Au
thor's Principles that there is fuch an abfolute
Indifference in the Deity as muft make him re-
gardlefs whether the World were well or ill
made ; Mankind Happy or Miferable, &c.
Whereas our Author having made it appear that
the Exercife of his Attributes, or Communi-
cation of his own Perfections, is the fole End
of his Aftion *, it follows that whenever he
does aft, he mull aft agreeably to that End; if
he exercife thefe Attributes at all, the Effefts
of them mud: be conformable to the Caufe.
His abfolute Power can effeft nothing which
implies a mere defeft of Power, his Infinite
Goodnefs can produce nothing but Good or
Happinefs in general, and his perfeft Wifdom
muft choofe fit and proper means thereto. All
this is included (as our Author fays) in the very
firft Aft of the Deity, or rather in his Will to
aft at all, and to fuppofe him to will at firft,
or to aft afterwards in any refpeft contrary to
this, is fuppofing him to will and aft againft
his own Nature, and in contradiction to htm-
felf ; or, which is the fame, imagining an Ef-
left to be quite different from, or contrary to
its Caufe. The Mm/ Pcrfeftions of the Deity
are therefore immediate confequences, or rather
the genuin Exercife of his natural ones, and
confequently can never produce any thing in
the main repugnant to them. And thus, I
think, it may be (hewn how all the Aft ions of
the Deity muft certainly be Good, Juft, &c.
without recurring to any fuch Fitn;ts or Re la-
tions of things as are by fome unaccountably
fuppofed to be antecedent and abfoJutely necef
fary to the determination of the Will of God
himfelf.

But don't wc, when we fpeak of God's Wif-
cjin choofing fit and. proper means, evidently
luppofe, that fome things are in themfelves
good and eligible, and via verfa even before

any determination of the Deity about them ?
Where is the room for Wifdom and Preference
in God, if all things be alike and indifferent
to him ? I anfwer, firft, If by things being in
themfelves Evil,c5V. be only meant, that fome
particular ways of afting may be conceiv'd,
which would, if the Deity could be fuppofed
to will them, be neceffarily and effentially
oppofite, and have a tendency direftly contra-
ry to hisprefent method of afting: we grant
that fome fuch things may be imagin'd, but
then it will be an abfurd and impoflible fup-
pofition, that God fhould ever will them, as
he has already will'd the contrary; and there-
fore, in regard to him, they muft ftill be only
imaginary. Nay they would be fo far from
being independent of, or antecedent to the
Will of God in any fenfe, that the very Ef-
fence and Idea of there would proceed entirely
from, and prefuppofe its Determination ; fince
we can only conceive any Relations or Confe-
quences of things to be Good or Evil, fo far
as they are confident with, or contrary to the
prefent Syftem pre eftablifh'd by the Will of
God. I anfwer in the fecond place, that the
primary Intent of the Creator being, as was
fhewn above, to communicate his Perfeftions
to various Creatures (to which communication
he was neverthelefs abfolutaly free and indiffe-
rent, and therefore could be determin'd to it
by no external Caufe) while that Intent conti-
nues, the neceflary confequenco. of it is, that
Creatures be fo made and conftituted as to at-
tain that End, and endow'd with fuch Powers
as will make them refemble him as much as
pofiible in their feveral States and Orders. All
this is only profecuting the fame Volition, or
continuing to communicate himfelf: and what
we mean by choofing fit and proper means for
this, is only, that he is not a blind and unin-
telligent Agent, but confeious of his own Na-
ture and Operations, aad therefore able to aft

* See the Lift Note.

C c

194

When Man
is made of
fuch a nature
as requires
him to be
jutt,fober,ffr
God is not
at Liberty
not to will
thefc things.

This is no
bar to the
Divine Li-
berty.

Of Moral Evil.

XVI. When therefore Man was made what he is, by that very Act
of conlKtuting him of fuch a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, God
alfo willed that he lhould be pious, fober t juft. and chad. Thefe
and the like Laws of Nature then are immutable, viz. conformable
to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very firft Act of Election,
wherein he determin'd to create Man. Nor is God at liberty not to
will thefe during his purpofe to continue Man fuclx as he is: For
by this means the fame thing would pleafe him, as being agreeable
to his firft Choice of creating Man, which is fuppofed to ftand yet,
and difpleafe him, as being repugnant to another, which rejects the
very fame things that are contain'd in the firffc ; that is, he would
at the fame time will and not will the fame thing, which cannot
be attributed to God.

XVII. Yet he is never the lefs free, becaufe he cannot will that a
Man be perjurjd, a Murtherer, &c. for he is no otherwife determin'd
than by his own Choice; nor does a thing pleafe or difpleafe him on
any other account than becaufe it is agreeable or contrary to his
Will. For while that Election of the Deity which conflitutes me a
Man (/. e. an Animal that is oblig'd to be pious, juft and fober) re-
mains,

NOTES.

in a certain determinate manner. Now fuch de-
terminate Aftion mull produce a regular Sy-
ftem, the feveral Parts whereof will be related
to, and connected with, each other, and by a
mutual dependency render'd fubfervient to the
Good and Perfection of the whole. Tho' this
whole Syflem might at firft perhaps be indif-
ferent to the Agent in regard to feveral other
Syftems equally poffible, and which might have
been made equally perfeft in its Head. It is rot
thenasZ,#/?/7zargues-f-,the natural and neceffary
Goodnefs of fome particular things reprefented
by the Divine Ideas which determines God to
prefer them to all others, if underftood of his
firff Aft of producing them ; but 'tis his own
free, arbitrary Choice which, among many e
qual polfibilities, makes fome things aelually
'food, and determines them into Exigence.
When thefe are once fuppofed to exilt, every

thing or aftion becomes good which tends to
their Happinefs and Prefervation. Hence aJfo
in refpeft to us certain confequences and rela-
tions arife, which, by the very frame of our
Nature and Conftitution, or by certain In-
iiinfts, Affeftions, ffV. we are directed to ap-
prove, and obliged to purfue, if we expeft to
be happy. Thus all moral Obligation is ulti-
mately referr'd to the WillofGod^ which feems
to be the only fure and adequate foundation of
it, and from which 1 think it may be deduced
with much more clearnefs and confiftency than
from that Hypothetical NeceJJity of the relations of
things, which evidently prefuppofes, as was
obferv , d before, and is itfelf only founded on
the Will of God. See the Preliminary Dijfer-
tation, and Xi. and Note 76. or PufFendorf of
the Law of Nature and Nation^ B. I. C 1. .43*
Note 7. andJB. 2. C. 3. V20.

\ $ marques, p. 447.

Of Moral Evil

mains, 'tis impoffible that He mould will me to be perjur'd, or a Mur-
therer ; nor can the latter Choice take place in God fo long as the
former ftands, fince it is repugnant to the former. When therefore
we acknowledge that things are good, and affert that fome AtHons
are grateful to Gcd,and others odious; this is not becaufe we believe
the Divine Elections to be determin'd by them, but becaufe we fup-
pofe them to be comprehended in the very firft Act of his Will of
creating things, and to be pleafmg or difpleafing to him, fo far as
they are agreeable or oppofite to that Election. Nor does thij deftroy
the Liberty of Good, that he muft neceffarily will thefe while he does
will them: For every thing, while it is ; neceffarily is; but this Ne-
cefiity is coniequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will.
The Divine Election therefore is not determin'd by the Goodnefs of
things, but the Goodnefs and Fitnefs of them arifes from that Elec-
tion, and that is beft for them which is raoft agreeable to that
Choice of the Deity, whereby he will'd them to be what they are.
From hence, I think, it appears fufficiently, that God is fuch an
Agent as delights in things merely becaufe they are chofen. (76.)

C o 2 XVIII. Yet

*95

NOTES.

(76) To what has been faid on this fubjeel
in the precedent Notes, I fhall only add here,
~ that their Argument fcems to be of very little
y force againft our Author, who urge, that if all
">Good and Evil depended upon the Arbitrary
U'jll of God, then it would not be impoflible
for God to will that Vice be Virtue, that two
and two make five, it. For allowing that
God at firft made all things what they are, and
ilill continues to them the lame Exigence,
(tho' perhaps no reafon a priori can be affign'd
why he made them in this rather than fome o-
ther manner) Vice rauft be Vice, cjfc that js,
while things are as they are, the fame Confe.-
quences and Relations will reiult from them ;
nnd to fuppofe the contrary, is to fuppofe that
things may be different, or have different con-
fcquencej, while they continue the fame; or
that they may be what they are and what they
are not at the fame time. Thus all the pre-
fent Relations are evidently fubfequent to the

prefent Order of Nature, and muft continue
with it; and this confequential Neceffity is all
the Fitnefs that I know of. *

To ftile this Eternal and Immutable can there-
fore only mean thus much, viz. fuppofe things
ro be at any time what they now arc, and at
the fame time the very fame confequences would
flow from them which we now find. Sup-
pofe a Set of Beings conflituted like ourfelves,
and framed with the like Capacities for Happi-
nefs, and the fame relative Duties muft be in-
cumbent on them in order to attain that Hap-
pinefs. If they be imperfect dependent Crea-
tures, and perpetually ftanding in need of each
others affiftance ; if alfo they have fuch Pa f-
fions, Inftincls and Inclinations as tend to u-
nitc them to each other, and oblige them to
aft in concert: if they be thus framed, I fay,
they will of confequence be thus related, and
fubjeft to all the moral Obligations which wc
now are. But ftill this nccelhjy is only Hy-
pothetical,

i9 6

A Being en
dow'd with
this Power is
more perfect
than one that
w*nts it:
yet this does
not imply in-
finite Perfec-
tion, there-
fore it is
communi-
cable.

Of Moral Evil

XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this felf-determining Power
is not of fuch a Nature as to imply infinite Perfection ; for it may-
be confident with an imperfect Underftanding, and other Appetites,
as we have fhewn before : There is no reafon therefore for us to
doubt whether a Creature may partake of it ; if God were pleafed
to communicate it, there feems to be no contradiction in the thing
for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that Being which has this
gift beflow'd upon it, will manifeftly be more noble than the reft, and
a more perfedt refemblance of the Deity: fince therefore God has.
created the lefs perfect Beings, we may, without any abfurdity, be-
lieve that he has not omitted the more perfecl. Let us fee then
whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine
Works *,

SUBSECT

N <T E &

pothetical, and like the neceffity of any cer-
tain Confequcnce refusing from certain Pre-
mifes; which Prcmill-s being alter'd, a dif-
ferent, a quite contrary one will be equally
necefTary. Thus in the former Inftance, if a-
jiy rational Creatures be conftituted focial Be-
ings, they wi41 indeed be obliged to aft as
fuch ; but let fome be made independent of
each other, and unfociable, endowed with, or
fd made as neceflarily to squire Paffions, In-
ftinfts and Inclinations, quite oppofite to the
former, and their Duties will be quite the re-
\cr(e. The great Virtue of Selfjbnefs will then
occupy the place of Univerfal Benevolence, and
that Method of Life perhaps produce the grea-
teft Sum of Hnppinefs to each individual, and
confequently be the moft eligible to every one,
which hrs now the direft contrary Effect. If
iach a fuppofirion be conceivable, 'tis fufficient
to ftiew that thefe Relations are not abfilutely
necfffhry in themfehes, but only conditionally
and consequentially to the prefent Order of
the Creation. See Puffendorf, Ri. C. 2. ^>0.
and the Note 2. p. 20.

If thofe Authors who treat of the neceflary
Relations of things independent of the Will of
God, mean only, that it was always impoffible
for God to prevent or alter them whenever
the things themfelves were fuppofed to exift ;
this is a neceffity which may very fafery be
granted, but will ferve little to their purpofe;
'tis a neceffity which is applicable (as our Au-
thor obferv'd above) with equal propriety to
any thing. 'Tis juit as much as to affirm that
while a thing is,, it neceflarily is; while the
whole is the fame, the parts muft be fo too.
If the Objeftion gees yet farther, and it be
urg'd, that according to us it will not be
impoffible for God to change his primary Will
of creating thefe things, and fo to alter the
whole Syflem together. I anfwer, 'tis fcarce
worth difputing whether fuch a Chimerical
Suppofition be poffible or not, fmce however
things might have been at fir.ft, yet as they are
now conftituted, it does not at all fhake the
foundation of Morality, nor affsft our prefent
Duties to God, ourielves, 0/ one another:
Thefe muft all neceflarily be what they now

arc,

* Far the poffibility cf fuch a Power, and tfits- being communicated, fee Dr. Clarke*/ De-
munjtratisn if the Being and Attributes of God, p. 82 and 85. 7th Edit. Fir the Perfection <f
it, fee Mote 82. and ^ 2. -of ' 4bii Chapter.

Of Moral Evil

197

S U B S E C T. V.

That Man partakes of this V rind pie of jtleafing himfelf

by Eletlion*

T appears, I think, from what has been faid, that there is fuch some reafon*
a Principle as this in Nature, and that it is alfo communica- " e oft j\ r ' d t(>

ihew this.

We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferr'd it upon
us : If we confult our own Minds, we may pombly entertain a doubt
whether we are always pafiive in our voluntary Acts : namely, whe-
ther the Goodnefs of ObjetU determines our Elections, according to
the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them ; or, to
rpeak more plainly, whether we always choofe things becaufe they
pleafe us, or feeui convenient; or whether they fometimes appear
indifferent in themfelves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and ac-
quire their Goodnefs from it, and are for this reafon only agreeable
becaufe they are chofen. We have feen that there is in Nature fuch
a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodnefs in
things by willing them ; but, whether we partake of it or no is the
doubt. Now, that we dp partake of it may I think be evinced from
the following Reafons. Firft, If we be confcious of an inherent Li-
berty.

NOTES.

are, while this Univerfal Syftem continues as
it is ; which is fufficient for our Purpofe. Nay,
I think, we may go a ftep farther, and affert,
that the foremen t ion 'd fuppofition is impof-
fible. For God, fuppofing him to be good and
wife, by once choofing this Syftem (whether
the firft Choice were neceflary or indifFerent N
has demonftrated to us, that it was at leaft e-
qually perfect with any other which might pof-
fib)y have exifted ; otherwife that other would
hive been actually preferred to it: as therefore
itterc can b: no better Syftem placed iu the

room of the prefent one, there can be no rea-
fon in Nature for this Change, and therefore
there will be none, tho' fuch a Phyfical Power
of changing it were allow'd to be inherent in
the Deity : Nor need we be fo much afraid
to allow that Being to be in the ftrifteft fcnfe
Arbitrary, which we have before proved to be
abfolutelj perfett.

' Upon this Subjett fee Puffendorfof the Law
of Nature, &c. B. 2. C. 1. V3- and C. 3*
$. 4, 5. with the Notes.

198

Firfl, Expe
rience.

Of Moral Evil

berty. Secondly, If we experience in ourfelves thofe Signs and Pro-
perties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly,
If the Caufes which are fuppofed to determine the Will be evi-
dently infufficient, or arife from Election, inftead of producing it.

II. As to the firfl: j We experience in ourfelves a Principle of this
kind, l. e. a free one, to fuch a degree of certainty, that if our Minds
be confulted we can hardly doubt >of it ; and from hence it is, that all
Men of all Nations, while they follow'd the Guidance of Nature, and
attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have conftantly af-
ferted their Liberty, at leaft in fome particular Actions: nor has any
one, unlefs he were forc'd to it, and as it were circumvented by Phi-
lofophical Subtilties, ever deny'd, either that he was free, or that he
could pleafe himfetf in choofing one or other out of many Objects
prefented to him, tho' that which was preferr'd were no ways prefe-
rable to others in refpect of any intrinfic worth.

III. In this therefore, as in many other Cafes, the Vulgar feem to
be much wifer, and to reafon more juftly than Philofophers. For the
Vulgar generally follow the natural Senfe of the Mind; and, tho'
they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, yet in fuch things

r as are the immediate Objezls of Senfe and Experience, they are often
more acute than Philofophers themfelves. For thefe being either
puff'd up with the Vanity of appearing wife above the Vulgar, or
impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monfters of their
own, and deny things that are the moft manifeft: while they are
ftriving to purfue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and macceffible to
human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in full
Light. Hence fome have deny'd Motion, and others Reft, others
Spacer -f, others all Senfe in Brutes, and ^others all manner of Truth :
and on the fame account, fome have deny'd Liberty, viz, becaufe
they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they them-
felves,

NOTES.

The vulgar
often judge
better of
matters of
Fad* th-n

1 Uy the denyers of Space our Author mould
only mean fuch as deny that we have an Idea
of it, not them who deny it to have a real.
Fxiftence, orherwife he himfelf will be one of
the Philofophers lately mention'* d, fince he has

often afferted in C. t". . 2. (and I think with
reafon) that we mayeafily conceive it all away:
whereas it mull evidently be neceffarily exi-
ftent, if it have any Exigence at all.
See Notes 5, 11, and 13.

Of Moral Evil

fclves, by their Subtilties, had involv'd it. The ignorant and un-
learned do much better in flighting all fuch Arguments, and judg-
ing of things ingenuoufly according to the dictate of their Senfes and
Experience; and if their Judgments be taken we have clearly gain'd
the Caufe : for all thefe declare that they are confcious of this free
Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have fhewn, be well
explain'd otherwife than we have done : The Senfe of our unpreju-
dic'd Mind agrees with thefe, nor is the common Teftimony of Man-
kind to be efteem'd of little importance in a matter of Fact, (jj)

IV. Secondly,

NOTES.

*99

(77.) The Subftanee of what Leibnitz objefts
againtt this Argument*, amounts to thus much,
viz. That it is no proof of the non-exiftence
of a thing becaufe the Vulgar don't perceive it ;
they are no Judges of any thing but what is
perceiv'd by the Senfes; they believe the Air
to be nothing whea it is not mov'd ; they
know nothing of the fubtle Fluid which caufes
Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter, much lefs
of immaterial Subftances: and therefore the fe-
veral Caufes of Aftion, the fecret Springs, the
Reafons and Inclinations, may be all unknown
to them, and yet we be abfolutely determin'd
(as he believes we always are) either by the
conftitution of our own Bodies, or of thofe a-
bout us, or by a thoufand Httle things which,
upon due attention and reflection, we might be
able to difcover. We reply, that tho' in many
Cafes our not perceiving a thing be no Argu-
ment that it does not really exift, yet in fome
Cafes, in this particularly, it is : To feel no
Pain, to be confcious of no Idea, is to have
none: and in like manner to perceive no mo-
tive or reafon of Aftion, is the fame as not to
aft upon any, or to perceive that we aft with-
out one. If any one (whether Philofopher or
Peafant) be thinking upon a Subjeft, he mull,
at that inftant, know the Subjeft that he is
thinking on, or however, that he does think
on fomething: 'tis likewife felf-evident, that
every reafonable Man, when he refolves upon
fome View, or follows an Inclination, muft be
confcious of that View, ot at leaft be fenfible

that his Refolution was form'd upon fome
View or other. In thefe Cafes therefore, and
in all the modifications of Thought, not to be,
and not to be perceived, is the very fame thing.
But befide the abfurdity of being influene'd
by a Motive which we know nothing of; be-
fide the Impoffibility of reconciling thefe im-
perceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty,
(for which fee Note 65.) we reply, fecondly,
that our Author does not conclude againft the
Exiflence of a thing becaufe the Vulgar do not
perceive and take notice of it, but on the con-
trary argues, that there muft be fuch a thing
as a Liberty of Indiffrence, becaufe they do
continually perceive and acknowledge it; be-
caufe they clearly perceive and experience it in
themfelves, or at leaft imagine that they do fo;
nay, becaufe they have as great Evidence of
fuch a felf-determining Power, as they have of
any thing, even of their own Exiftence : and
confequently they muft either be deceiv'd in e-
very thing, or not deceiv'd in this f. The
prefent Argument is therefore built on matter
of Faft, and wiJl be conclufive here, tho T our
Ignorance be never fo great in other Cafes.
Our aflurance of a Truth which we do clearly
perceive, is not the lefs for there being a great
many other Truths which we do not perceive :
and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no-
Argument that it does not exift, yet our ac-
tual perception of it is a Demonttration that
it does. It is not, therefore, becaufe toe do not
confider the Caufes that communicate Motion to the

Remarques, p. 477.

f See Note 82.

aoo Of Moral Evil.

'Tis proved jy Secondly, If we experience in ourfelves the Signs and Proper-
takc of this" ttcs which belong to this Power, it cannot be queftion'd but we
have the Power itfelf : Now thefe are a Self-confcioufnefs that we
are the true Caufe of our Actions ; an Ability to act and p'eafe our-
felves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senfes and Reafon.
perues of jf j t | evident from Experience that we can do thefe things, it will
* 5 be too certain that we have fuch a Power as is able to pleafe itfelf
barely by Election.

V. In the firft. place then, we have declared that a Being endow'd
with this Principle is the only true efficient Caufe of its Actions, and
that whatever it does can be imputed to it only. Now all Men im-
pute the Actions of their own Will to themfelves, and efteem them
truely and properly theirs, whether they be good or bad ; which is
a certain Sign that they do not perceive themfelves to be determin'd
true Cau- f rom e If e where to the Choice or Exertion of them, otherwife they
Hence it is would not look upon themfelves as the Caufe, but the Determiner,
that we di- It cannot be otherwife than from a confcioufnefs and firm perfuafion
Msfonunes f tm ^ Truth, that wrong Elections give us more trouble than fuch
from Crimes, things as proceed from Ignorance and inevitable Error. 'Tis on this
account only that a light Evil occafion'd by our own Choice grieves
and afflicts us more than a very great one from the Action of ano-
ther. If we expofe ourfelves to Poverty, Difgrace, or an untimely
End, by an Act of Choice, our Confcience remonftrates againft it,
Remembrance flings us, and we cannot forgive ourfelves, tho' we
were fecure both from human Punimment and the Wrath of God.
But when the fame Evils befal us by external Force or the Necef-
fity of Nature, we bewail our Condition indeed, and complain of
Fortune, but have none of that wounding Anxioufnefs, and vindic-
tive Reproach of Confcience, which fcourges thofe that become mi-

ferable

NOTES,

Power, be-
caufe we dil
cover the
Marks and

In the firft
place, wc
impute our
Actions to
ourfelves,
whereby we
own our-
felves to be

Sou!, or are not able to delineate the precife man-
ner of t bet Communication, that we ajfert the Soul
to be jelf-tnotive (as the Author of the late iXif-
fertatjon on Liberty and NeteJJity argues, p. i 5.)
But we afiert that it is felf-motive, 'becaufe we
feel it to be fo, and have as great Evidence of
it as we could expect or conceive ourfelves to

have, were it really Co. And that Author un-
reafonably begs the Queftion, in fuppoliug
that there are fuch Caufes and Communicators
in a Cafe where he has, where he can have,
no Evidence at all of them. But this DiJJ'er-
tation is fully confuted by Mr. Jack/on, to whofe
excellent Anfwer I refer the Reader.

Of Moral Evil

sol

ferable by their own fault. As therefore he that enjoys this Princi-
ple muft neceflarily blame himfelf if he bring any Inconvenience up-
on himfelf by his own Choice ; fo he that does blame himfelf, de-
monitrates that he has this Principle. For as it is impoflible but
that he mould accufe himfelf, who believes that he is the true caufe
of his own Mifery, fo on the other hand, 'tis certain that he who
does accufe himfelf, thinks that he himfelf is the true caufe of his
Mifery : otherwife he would grieve, complain, and be angry with the
Perfon that compell'd him to commit fuch things as he finds make
him uneafy, but would never condemn himfelf as the Caufe and Au-
thor of them, unlefs he were confcious that he could have hinder 'd
them. If the grief arifing from a Crime be diftincl: from that which
is occafion'd by a Misfortune, 'tis plain that this can be on no other
account, than becaufe the Crime proceeds from a free Agent, i. e.
one who determines himfelf to Action, but the Misfortune from a
necelfary one. ) VI

VI. 'Tis plain then from our Confcience of Good and Evil Actions, Tkis 5j
that we have this adive Principle in fome refpect within us. For moft certain
we not only rejoice in fuch things as are done well, and grieve at s ? l gn th f " we
the contrary, but alfo impute them to ourfelves, and either blame. f our liberty
or applaud ourfelves as the Authors and true Caufes of them : which
is the nrft and furefr. Sign that our Minds are fenlible of their Liber-
ty, and that they could have pleas'd themfelves in doing otherwife
than they have done. (78.)

VII. The

NOTES.

(78.) 'Tis pleafan't to obferve how the Au-
thor of the Philofopbical Enquiry endeavours to
unfwer this Argument, by confounding the
two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-accufation ; of
a Misfortune and a Crime, as his great Prede
eefibr Hobbs had done before. " Confcience
" (lays he) being a Man 1 sown Opinion of his
" Adtions, with relation to fome rule, he
" may at the time of doing an Action con-
trary to that rule, know that he creates
" that Rule, and confequently aft with re-
" lu&ance, the' not fufficient to hinder the

Adlion. But after the Aclion is over, he
may not only judge his Adlion to be con-
trary to that rule, but by the abfence of the
pleafurc of the Sin, and by finding himfelf
obnoxious to Shame, or by believing himfelf
liable to Puniflimeut, he may really accufe
himfelf; that is, he may condemn himfelf
for having done it, be forry he has done it,
and wifh it undone, becaufe of the confe-
quences that attend it *." Where, not to
infift upon the perpetual abufe of the words,

Pbihfopbicnl Enquiry concerning human Lib'rty, p. 105, 106.

D d

201 '

The fecond
token of this
Power, th.t
it can go a-
gainll the
AppetitcJ,rY

Tis fliewn
that we can
do this in
regard to our
Appetites.

Of Moral Evil

VII. The fecond Sign or Property of this Power is, that it is able
to oppofe the natural Appetites, Senfes and Reafon, and can pleafe
itfelf in the Oppofition. If we experience this Ability in ourfelves >
we may be certain that we partake of fuch a Power.

VIIL With refpecl to the natural Appetites, we have faid before *,
that this Principle, when it happens to be join'd with natural Appe-
tites in the fame Perfon, often runs counter to them, and pleafes it-
felf in reftraining them ; if We find that we can do this, 'tis a Sign
that we have it. But who has not experiene'd this in himfelf ? who
has not fometimes voluntarily fufFer'd fuch things as are hard, in-
commodious, and painful to the natural Appetites, and taken delight
in fuch Sufferance, as if that were fome kind of Good fuperior to

the

NOTES.

de, *8 t csV. which upon this Hypothec's
mull have a Signification dire&ly oppofite
to that which they now commonly bear ;
what can we mean by a Mans accufing or
condemning himfelf, when he is fenfiblc that
be has done nothing which he could have al-
ter' d or avoided j or rather done nothing at all,
but only fuffer'd all the while from fome o-
ther? He may indeed perceive and judge
himfelf to be miferable, and be forry that he
is fo, and wifh himfelf otherwife ; but what
is all this to a Criminal Shame, Remorfe, and
Self-convilion ? Is this all that we under-
ftand by a Guilty Confcience f Can he blame,
reproach, or be angry with himfelf for being
only what another made him, and what he
knows he could not poffibly help ?

As this is matter of Fadt and Experience,
we appeal to the common Senfe of Mankind,
whether the Ideas of Guilt, Remorfe, c3V. be
not entirely different, and evidently diftingui-
(hable from thefe ? The fame holds with re-
gard to our blame or accufation of another, as
has been fhewn at at large by Bp. Bramball, to
whofe Cafligatiom of T. Holbs I muft refer this

* Subfcft.J. par. ii, 12I

Author. " I aslc'd (fays the Bp. +) why do
*' we blame free Agents ? fince no Man bla-
" meth Fire for burning Cities, nor accufeth
" Poifon for deftroying Men. Firft, he re-
'* turneth an Anfwer, We blame them becaufe
" they dt not pleafe us. Why ? May a Man
" blame every thing that doth not pleafe his
" Humour ? Then I do not wonder that T.
" Hobbs is fo apt to blame others without
" Caufe. So the Scholar may blame hb Ma*
** Iter for correcting him defervedly for his
** Good. So he who hath a vitious Stomach
" may blame healthful Food. So a Lethargi-
" cal Perfon may blame his bell Friend for
" endeavouring to fave his Life. And now,
" having (hot his bolt, he begins to examine
" the Cafe. Whether blaming be any thing mire
" than faying the thing blamed is ill or imper-
" feci. Yes, moral blame is much more, *tis
" an Imputation of a Fault. If a Man be born
" blind, or with one Eye, we do not blame
" him for it : but if a Man has loft his Sight
" by his Intemperance, we blame him juftly.
" He enquireth, May vie not fay a lame Horfe
" is lame ? Yes, but you cannot blame the

Horfe;

t P- 7fe

Of Moral Evil

the Gratification of the Appetites. (79.) Nay the Pain itfelf arifing
from the Violence offer'd to thefe natural Appetites, if we do but
choofe to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, which would o-
therwife be very irkfome. From whence it is moft apparent that
this Pleafure depends upon the Choice for while that continues, it
continues too ; when that is chang'd, 'tis gone. Now fuch Elections
as thefe are made every Day, and none can be fo much a Stranger
to himfelf, as not to be confcious of them. (.80.)

IX. It is to be obferv'd farther, that we do not only embrace with
pleafure fuch things as the Appetites refufe, and rejeft fuch things
as they defire, but alter, as it were, Nature itfelf, by an obftinate E-
lection, and make thefe Appetites purfue what they naturally avoid,
and fly what by Nature they defire. And this takes place not only

D d 2 in

NOTES.

203

That we can
do it alfo in
our Senfes,
and in a man-
ner change
the nature of
things by an
obftinate E-
Ieftion.

" Horfe for it, if he was lam'd by another,
*' without his own Fault. May not a Man fay
*' ont is a Fool or a Knave (faith he) if be bi
fo, tbo" be could not help it ? If he made
" himfelf a Sot, we may blame him; tho', if
" he be a ftark Sot, we lofe our Labour. But
" if he were born a natural Idiot, it were
" both injurious and ridiculous to blame him
" for it. Where did he learn that a Man may
*' bt a Knave and cannot help it ? or, that Kna
" very is impofed inevitably upon aManwith-
" out his own fault ? If a Man put fire to his
" Neighbour's Houfe, it is the fault of the
" Man, not of the Fire. He hath confefs'd
" formerly, that a Man ought not to be punijb'd
" but for Crimes, the reafon is the very fame,
" that he mould not be blamed for doing that
" which he could not poffibly leave undone ;
H no more than a Servant whom his Mafter
f hath chained to a Pillar, ought to be bl.m'd
" for not waiting at his Elbow. No Chain
" is ftronger than the Chain of Fatal Dejliny is
" fuppofed to be."

See the fame Author's Definitions of Liber-
ty, Neceflity, &c. with his Defence of them,
" p. 756, iffc. and his Reply to all T. Hobbs's
Evafions (fince tranferib'd by the Author of
the Phi/ofopbical Enquiry, p. 91, fcfr.) in his
Vindication, p. 679, &fe.

(79 ) To this Leibnitz anfwers, " That it is
" only oppofing or ballancing one Appetite
" with another. We fometimes bear Incon-
" veniencies, and we do it with pleafure, but
" this is only by reafon of fome hope, or
" fome fatisfadion which is join'd to the E-
" vil, and which furpafTes it." We reply, if
by hope be meant an expectation of fome fu-
ture Good, 'tis plain that we can oppofe and
refift any natural Habit without any fuch Ex-
pedition, as may be experiene'd when we
pleafe, in Hunger, Thirft, &c. The profpeft
of the bare pleafure of willing to do (o can-
not be the Good hoped for, fince that is a fure
attendant on every, fuch Volition ; all the fatis-
faftion then which appears to be join'd with the
Evil, and to counterbalance it in any fuchCafes,
can only be the pleafure arifing from the ac-
tual Exertion of the felf-moving Power, which
is the thing our Author contends for. See the
latter part of Note 65.

(80) 'Tis a common and juft Obfcrraticn,
that Men as well as Children be.tr any Labour
or Fatigue which they undertime voluntarily,
with half the Uncifinefs .md Grief which the
very fame thing would give them, if they were
fore'd to undergo it ; which c.-.nnot, I think, he
accounted for, but upon our Author's Principle.

qo4- Of Moral Evil.

in Appetites, but alfo in the Objects of the Senfes. Some things are
naturally unpleafant to them, fome things bitter, naufeous, deform'd,
yet thefe are made tolerable by the force of Election, and by a change
of the natural Propenfity, at length become Delights*. On the
contrary, what was fweet, beautiful, &c. being rejected by the Will,
becomes at length difagreeable. We could not poffibly do this, if
we had not a Power of pleafing ourfelves by other Means, than the
agreement of Objects to the Appetites and Senfes. For, whence comes
it that fitch things as are fweet, comely, excellent, commodious -, nay,
all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senfes mould be rejected ;
and when once rejected, mould become irkfome and offenfive ? On
the contrary, whence is it that Griefs, Pains, Torments, nay Death
kfelf fhould be agreeable when voluntarily undergone, unlefs from
this Principle which pleafes kfelf in its Election? If it be granted
that we have fuch a Principle, it may be eafily fhewn how thefe
things can be effected ; for natural Good may, by the Power of it, be
chang'd into Evil, and Evil into Good : for it has a Good in itfelf
fiiperior to thefe, by the Power of which it can overcome and alter
the Nature of them: but that this cannot admit of any other Expla-
nation will be fhewn below f.
That we can x. Thefe things are generally fuppofed to be done by the Power
cn"you r rAp- an d Prefcription of Reafon -y and 'tis thought, that the Will is there -
petitesand by directed to embrace things difagreeable to the natural Appetites
affo our b Rea- an ci Senfes: I confefs this fometimes is, and always ought to be done
fon by the according to reafon j for we have hinted above, that fome regard
force ofEle-fhould be had to thefe things in Elections ; but very often the Cafe
is far otherwife. We have fhewn before, that a Power which is ca-
pable of pleafing itfelf by Election, cannot be determin'd by reafon;.,
for the Underftanding depends upon it, rather than it upon the Un-
derflanding* 'Tis therefore the third Mark and Property of this Po-
wer, that it can run counter, not only to Appetites and Senfes, but
alfo to Reafon. If we can do this, we muft own to our Sorrow, that
we partake of it. But that we can, by the force of Election, con-
quer not only the Appetites and Senfes, but the Underftanding too,

daily

* See Mr. LockeV Chapter of Power, .69. Tho* all this may be effetted iy the file Ptzver of ,-
Ulion, and without the Reafons which bt there afpgns for it.
f See, the following SeJlitn.

Of Moral Evil. 005

daily Experience teaches, and we have reafon to lament that it can be
prov'd by fo many inftances that we pleafe ourfelves in Elections con-
trary to the natural propeniity of Senfes and Appetites, and at the fame
time againft the dictate of Reafon.

XI. We have feen an Atheift fupported by the Obftinacy of a per- This appears
verfe Mind, enduring Torments, Confinement, and Death itfelf ra- from Inlbn -
ther than abjure his beloved Impiety : We have feen a great many ce
Perfons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, Life and Soul,

left they mould be difappointed in a foolim Choice. We have be-
held not a few difregarding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice
of their Relations, the Dictates of their own Mind, Dangers, Di-
ftrefTes, Death, the wrath of God, and the pains of Hell ; in fhort,
defpiling all that is Good, or could appear to be fo, when fet in com-
petition with fuch things as, exclufive of the Goodnefs which they
receive from Election, are mere Trifles, and worth nothing at all -,
fuch as have no manner of Good, or pretence of Good in them.
There have been Perfons, who knowingly, without any kind of hope,,
any kind of belief, have deftroy'd themfelves and their Relations, and
yet were in their right Mind, and coniiftent with themfelves, if a.
right Mind may be judg'd of by fober Words, and a ferious tenor of
Action. Did thefe Men follow Reafon, or any other Good befide the
fruition of their Choice ? We have fhewn already that this Power
may produce thefe and greater Abfurdities; for fince it is fuppos'd to
be of fuch a Nature as can alfo pleafe itfelf in its Act, wherever it
can exert that Act, it can pleafe itfelf, even in opposition to the
natural Appetites, the Senfes and Reafon. If then fuch a Principle
be granted to be in us, it will not feem ftrange that we mould be
able to do things that are repugnant to thefe; if this be not al-
low'd, it cannot be made appear how fo many Abfurdities, fo many
things difagreeable to Reafon, to Senfe ; fo many things contrary to
the dictate of the Mind, mould every Day be committed by Mankind.

XII. Nay, which may feem more ftrange, the Will appears to T h at the
have fo great a Power over the Understanding, that the latter is fo Uoderftan*
far fubdu'd by its Choice, as to take Evil things for Good, and forcU^^^'^.j.
to. admit Falfities for Truths. Neither will this appear impoffible to things for

one *? r d >. bu r c

Falfities for
Truths,
viz. being under fubjettionto the Will.

2o6 Of Moral Evil

one who recollects that the Senfes are no lels natural Faculties, and
have by Nature as quick a Relifh of their proper Objects, and can
as well diftinguifh thofe that are agreeable from them that are difa-
greeable, as the Underflanding. If therefore we fometimes pleafe
ourfelves in choofing what is repugnant to the Senfes, 'tis alfo pof-
fible for us to take pleafure in embracing what is diffonant to Rea-
fon. The Senfes are forced to admit and tolerate fuch things as are
difguftful to them, which things they take for agreeable by ufe, ha-
ving as complete Enjoyment of them as of thofe that are adapted to
them by Nature *. The fame may happen fometimes to the Under-
standing, viz. to be compell'd by the Will to admit Falilties for
Truths, to believe them thro* cuftom, and at laft make ufe of them
ferioufly as Truths. Hence comes that common Saying, that we ea-
fily believe what we eagerly dejire ; and fome take a pleafure in fubdu-
ing not only Senfe but Reafon too. I confefs, he that does this, ads
foolimly, and is much to blame j but from this very thing, that we
act foolimly, that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only can
but actually do pleafe ourfelves in Elections, which are made con-
trary to Reafon j and that the Judgment of our Underflanding de-
pends upon the Will, rather than that the Will is determin'd by
it. From hence it is evident that all the Signs and Properties of
this Self-pleafing Power agree to us, and therefore we certainly par-
take of it.
*Tispro\'d XIII. The fame will appear thirdly, from confidering the Reafons
that we have which move us to the choice of thefe Abfurdities, according to the
from P aconG Op m i n f thofe Men who think that the Will is pajfhe in Elec-
dcration of tions. For if, while they are labouring to affign Reafons for thefe
th h^h eaf nS an( ^ tne ^ e Determinations, they produce nothing for Reafons, but
fuppofed to the very Elections themfelves, or their Effects, it will be apparent that
determine they are in a Miftake, and offer Effects for Caufes; which will ap-
pear more fully from an Enumeration of thofe Reafons which are
fuppofed to move the Will in fuch Cafes.
, XIV. The Principal of thefe Reafons are Errors of the Underftan-

fctoctatcd. && Obflinacy of the Mind, the force of Pafjiom, and Madnefs-, on

thefe

Nay grnerally more fo : "Tis a common Obfervat'on, that fuch things as were at firft the ml
difagreeable of all to the Pa'ate, become by ufe the mojl delightful: viz. Wines, Tobacco, Oltvis,
fcc.

Of Moral Evil

thefe are charg'd all the unreafonable, abfurd, and impious Actions
of Men ; thefe are efteem'd the Caufes of all fuch Elections as can-
not be allow'd to proceed from the intrinfic Goodnefs of the Objects
which are chofen : but this is all groundlefs.

XV. For in the firft place, as to Errors of the Under/landing, 'tispj rft) Err0
certain that we fometimes choofe hurtful Objects by miftake, which pf the Un-
we often lament, but never impute to ourfelvcs, except we be conici- ^I,^ a "^! ng r
ous that this Error was voluntary, /. e. in fome refpect ow'd its Ori- "hewn to de-
gin to Election. Election then is prior to all culpable Error, for thatP end u PJi
depends upon it. 'Tis not therefore always by miftake that we choofe i e aia ra-~
Abfurdities, but by choofing Abfurdities we miftake the Truth. But thcr than
to confefs the Truth, we are hurried on in an abfurd Election, tho' ,caufclt *
we fee and know all that we are about to do: if then there be any

Error, 'tis only this, that we judge it better to enjoy a free Election,
than to be exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident, that there
arifes lb much Pleafure from Election as is able to impofe upon the
Underftanding, and induce it to prefer that to all kinds of natural
Good, nay to Life itfelf. But whether this be done erroneoufly or
wifely, 'tis the ftrongeft Argument that we have fuch a Self-pleafing
Principle as this within us.

XVI. Secondly, as for Obftinacy, by which they fuppofe that we '5jJ; . ndr ^\
are moved to choofe abfurd things ; 'tis plain that this is nothing efte which!? *
but the perfeverance of a bad Election: neither can Obftinacy and Jftewn to be
Perverfenefs be explain'd otherwife than by Elections. If it be gran- but^fetl?
ted that things pleafe us becaufe they are chofen, we fee clearly e-ringinade-
nough what Obftinacy is, viz. an unneceflary adherence to an Elec- p . rav ' d Elcc "
tion, and a Self-complacency in it contrary to the dictate of Reafon,

and with the lofs of natural Good. (81.) But if the Will be deter-

min'd

NOTES*

(81.) Leibnitz (in his Remarks frequently ci-
ted above) argues *, " That Obftinacy is not
" barely the continuance of a bad Election,
" but a difpofition to perfeverc in it, proceed-
" ing from fome Good that a Man forms to
" himfelf, or from fome Evil which one fup-

" pofes to attend the change. The firft EIcc-
u tion, fays he, was made perhaps thro' mere
" Levity, but the refolution of adhering to it
" comes from fome ftronger Reasons or Im-
" preflions." But if this be all that is meant
by Obftinacy, how come the World, to fix fo

bad

p. 482.

Thirdly.The
violence of
Paffions, z'iz.
Dcfire of
Fame and
Glory, &t,
all which are
prov'd to de-
rive their in
ordinate
force from
Election.

Of Moral Evil.

min'd from without, there will be no fuch thing as Obftinacy. By
an obftinate Perfon we mall only mean one that has continued a long
time in a pernicious Error, without any Motive to change his Judg-
ment. Now he that does this is miferable indeed, but cannot be
call'd in the lean; degree obftinate, according to the common Notion
of Mankind.

XVII. Thirdly, fince neither Errors nor Obftinacy are fufficient to
explain the Nature of thefe Elections, they fly to the Power of the
Paffions ; viz. the Defire of Fame, or Glory; Anger, Hatred, &c.
Thefe are the Caufes, fay they, why we choofe abfurdly, and by
them the Choice is determin'd. But Fame, or Glory have no man-
ner of Good in them, efpecially to thofe who believe that they fhall
not exift after Death: why then are thefe Men content to purchafe
Glory with Life ? Certainly from no other Caufe befide Election ;
'tis by Election that we have form'd thefe Idols to ourfelves, and
from thence they derive whatever Good is in them. To be talk'd of
after Death, to mount upon the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name
to diftant Regions ; thefe things pleafe us on no other account but
becaufe we will them. Obfcurity, Oblivion, Retirement will be as

pleafing

NOTES.

bad a Notion to thatWord ? If it be a difpofition
always proceeding from a pro fped of Good, or
dread of Evil, and founded on fecond thought?
and flronger reafons : "how can it ever be e-
fteem'd a Crime? Again, if theory? Election
can "be made without any external Motive,
(-which he feems to allow by affigning Levity
as the fole Caufe of it) why may not the per -
feverance in it be fo too ? may not the fame
Caufe be fuppos'd to produce the fubfequent
Elections, as well as the firft ? -Inihort, Lcjb-
fiitz, after all his feeining oppofition to dur
Author on the head of Liberty, moll evident-
ly grants the Queftion both here, and p. 480:
where he affirms, that in effect we are able to
change the Natures of things, and make thefe
transformations above mention'd. " But this
" (fays he) is not as among the Fairies, by a
" iirople Adt of that Magic Power, but becaufe
" a Man darkens or fupprefles in his Mind,
" the reprefentations of the good or ill Qua-

" lities naturally join 1 d to certain Objects, and
" becaufe we only regard thofe which are a-
" greeable to our Tafte, or our Prepofleffions ;
" or even becaufe we join by force of thought,
" certain Qualities, which arc only found u-
" nited by accident, or by our cuftomary way
" of confidering them." Now what is it to
darken or fuppreCs the reprefentations of good
or ill Qualities,--to regard fome only and ne-
glect others, and to join Qualities to Objects
by the force of thought,--but to exert this very
Power in debate ? Which often choofes the
fruition, or even the confideration of fome one
out of many equal and indifferent Objects, and
by that fimple Act ma'-es it agreeable to our
Tafte, and joins fuch Qualities to it as could
neither proceed from Chance nor Cuflom, nor
any Affociation of Ideas whatsoever. See the
!ConcluGon of this Subject in the following
Note.

Of Moral Evil. 209

pleafing to the Man that choofes them, and have been*fo. Thofe
Perfons then who imagine that thefe determine Elections, take Ef-
fects for Caufes. For thefe, which are nothing in themfelves, (hew
us that they acquire fo much Goodnefs from Election as makes them
overballance all kind of natural Good.

XVIII. The fame mull be faid of Anger, Hatred, Love and De- The fame is
fpair, whereby many believe they are driven into Abfurdities. But fh *Y mofHa "
in reality all that is abfurd and pernicious in thefe Paflions proceeds &* ve '
from Election. Nature has given us Paflions which are generally
innocent, while folicited only by their proper Objecls, and natural
Opportunity, as we fee in Brutes ; but they are compell'd to change

the natural Objects by the Power of Election : thus Anger and Ha-
tred are excited by the Will, and apply'd not to fuch things as are
naturally hurtful : nor Love and Defire to fuch as are naturally de-
firable, but to others of a quite different kind, with which they have
no natural Congruity, fuch as Fame and Glory after Death. Of this
kind alfo are moft of the Inftruments of Luxury, which are com-
monly faid to pleafe, purely by the ftrength of Fancy, that is in rea-
lity, by Election. Hence it is that Men purfue with fo great Eager-
nefs, and fuch an impetus of Paflion, things which are in themfelves
trifling, pernicious, and abfurd. Nay they barter away Life itfelf for
Trifles, and when they cannot enjoy them, caft off that in defpair.
'Tis the Election itfelf which fubftitutes thefe things as fit to be
profecuted by thefe Paflions inftead of their natural Objects, and
while they are hurry 'd on, not according to the exigence of Nature,
but the command of the Will, they confound every thing, tranfgrefs
the bounds of reafon and utility, and in defpight of thefe, rage with-
out limits or reftraint.

XIX. As for Envy and Revenge, they are not owing to Nature, but Of Envy and
the Will, and fetting afide Election, are mere nothing. For whate- Revenge *
ver is pretended to the contrary, there can be no other account gi-
ven why any one mould undergo Labours, Dangers, Griefs and Diffi-
culties j why he fhould lofe his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his

Life, for the Satisfaction of his Envy or Revenge, but that he refolv'd
within himfelf, but that he ckofc to fatisfy themv 'Tis evident that
the moft unexperienc'd Perfon is fufhciently convinc'd of this. But
thefe, when once embrac'd by Eleclion, become more agreeable than

E e thofe

aio Of Moral Evil

thofe things which Nature has made neceflary. Thofe abfurd Elec-
tions then % are not made by the force of thefe Paflions, but the abfurd
and irregular force of thefe proceeds from the Elections.
Fourth! -^* They who perceive that thefe Caufes are infufficienr, have

M4d*efs'\\ recourfe to Madnefs and Phrenzy, in order to account for abfurd E-
prov'd on the | C) q J, but this is playing upon "Words, and taking Madnefs in a
. thef^ Men* different Senfe from that wherein it is commonly underftood. Pie
are in their fox is fo far diforder'd in his Mind as not to be able to deduce one
choo"ab h Idea from another, nor make Obfervations upon what he fees, is.
Airdiy. look'd upon as a Mad-man, but thefe Men who do fo many abfurd
things enjoy the above mention'd Powers, and have their Underftan-
ding and Setifes ftrong enough by Nature: what is it therefore which
drives them into Abfurdities? The power and prevalence of the fu-
pericr Faculty, viz. the Will, which has a Good peculiar to itfelf,
which it produces by Election. This it purfues regardlefs of all that
Reafon, the Body, the Condition, Appetites and natural Faculties re-
quire. For while it can provide for and pleafe itfelf, it is not at all
felicitous about any thing which may prejudice thefe, but has a cer-
tain Complacency in its own Exercife, and endeavours to augment its
Happinefs by the purfuit of fuch things as are repugnant to them.
For the more Difficulties and Abfurdities it encounters, the more it
applauds itfelf in a confcioufnefs of its own Abilities ; which feems
to be the very thing that we call Vanity and Pride. Hereupon it com-
pels the Senfes, Reafon, natural Appetites, to be fubfervient to its
Elections: nor can he be called a Mad-man who acts againfl: Reafon,
thro' the force of a fuperior Faculty, any more than he that falls
from a Precipice by the violence of a fuperior impulfe. For it is not
every one who acts againfl: reafon, that muft immediately be look'd
upon as Mad, but only he that acts abfurdly from fome injury
done to the underftanding Faculty itfelf, or an Impediment to the
Ufe of Reafon ; he that could have follow'd the dictate of Rea-
fOn, and yet knowingly violated it, muft not.be reckon'd mad, but
wicked, unlefs we will impofe upon ourfelves by changing the cufto-
mary Names of things.
h\\ thefe XXI. If it be granted that we have this fuperior Faculty, 'tis plain

* ! t n g on * enough that all^ thefe things may come to pafs. For he that is en-

p^ioedother- dow'd

tvife than by adaiittinga Principle of this kind in ourfelves.

Of Moral Evil. 31 !

dow *d with It, will be able to pleafe himfelf in the Profeoution of
his Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and Mind; to
the prejudice of Senfes, Appetites and ReafOn j which we often
fee done to our Amazement} but, unlefs we have this Faculty im-
parted to us, it does not feem pomble for us to create Good to
ourfelves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to all na-
tural Good whatfoever. As much

XXII. Thefe things. I confefs, ought not to be done ; but if no- f ood a [i ies

o * J o irom tills

thing could be done which ought not, there would be no fuch Principle, fo
thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good arifes from this Prin- ic . is "ended
ciple, fo there is this Evil alfo, that by it Crimes and Follies are "\\, t /z. S a
committed : And it has this Inconvenience, that it can do what it Power of
ought not. ftnnin S-

XXIII. From thefe and other Arguments which might be brought, I Tiiimifake,
think it is evident that God has given us a Principle of this kind, that the ^11
and that our Will is only determin'd by itfelf. They are miftaken judgment of
therefore who affirm that either the Appecites, Pamons, or Under- the Under-
{landing, determine Elections. What probably gave occafion to the j^J.fiJJ,*"
Miftake was, that other things pleafe or difpleafe us, viz. fuch as hence, viz.
are agreeable to the Appetites or Senfes, befide thofe which-.we t b ha i t n ' t ^ vo d ulci
choofe: Now it being obferv'd that we have regard to thefe in E- i n us'to^cT
lections, and do not choofe any thing repugnant to them, but upon ^ ithout C0l >-
neceffity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of aScffuo-
the Underftanding ought to be made ufe of in choofing, and being ding.
accuftom'd to this kind of Choice, we become at laft perfuaded that

it is abfolutely neceffary, and that our Wills are always determin'd
by fome Judgment of the Underftanding : at leaft, that is is a Con-
dition requifite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing cho-
fen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the con-
trary to all this is generally true, viz. that the Mind judges things
to be good becaufe we have willed them, becaufe we have form'd
an Appetite in ourfelves by fome antecedent Election, and thofe things
which we embrace by this faffitious Appetite, as we may call it, give
us equal Pleafure with that which we defire by the Neceflity of Na-
ture,

Ec2 XXIV. Nay

2ll

We can aft
in order to
(hew our Li
bcrty, which
is prov'd to
be the fame
*s acting
without any
reafon at all-

Of Moral Evil.

XXIV. Nay we choofe Objects which are contrary to all the
Appetites, contrary to Reafon, and deftitute of all Appearance of
Good, perhaps for this only Reafon, that we may aflfert our Liberty
of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and he that
does it, proves by an Experiment that he is free, and has a Power
of pleafing himfelf in Election. Nor can he be faid to be deter-
min'd by the Judgment of the Understanding ; for this reafon is made
by the Mind itfelf, and may ferve equally for every Election, fince
it is drawn from the Indifference of the Will itfelf: and he who
does any thing upon a reafon which is made by himfelf, and is in-
different to either Side, muft be efteem'd to act in the fame manner
as if he had done it without any reafon at all. 'Tis evident there-
fore that we have this Power, and make ufe of the Appetites and
Senfes only as Spies and Informers j of Reafon as a Counfellor ; but
that the Will is Matter of itfelf and creates pleafure for itfelf ia
Objeds bv Eledion. (82.)

SUBSECT.

NOTE &

(2.) Upon the whole it appears that the
true defcription of Free-will mull include thus
much. A Power of choofmg or not choofing,
or of choofing either Side in any given Cafe ;
naturally independent of any mediate or im-
mediate, external or internal force, compul-
fion, or neceffity; phyfically indetermin'd by
either bodily Senfations, Appetites, &t. or
mental Perceptions, Reafon, Judgment. 'Tis
an Ability of determining either among equal
and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the
purfuit of fome before others that are entirely
different from or contrary to them : or laflly,
of preferring the very confideration of fome
unknown Objects to all the reft j of delibe-
rating upon, or attending to fome particular I-
deas, and refolving to overlook others, tho' e-
qually prefented to the Mind, and fuppos'd to
be of equal Importance.

All this is contained in the very Notion of
a Setf-moving Power ; (tho' none perhaps have
given fo full and diftindt an Explication of it
as our Author) for that which in flri&nefs
moves itfelf, is properly and phyfically inde-

pendent of, and indifferent to all external Mo-
vers, as long as it continues to do fo ; what is
determin'd in certain circumftances by parti-
cular Senfations, Motives, &c. and cannot
poffibly be determin'd either without or a-
gainft them, is fo far, and in fuch circum-
fbnees, only moved, afted upon, and purely
paffive. If then there be any fuch thing, pro-
perly fpeaking, as an active Principle, it mult
be endow'd with fuch an abfolute Indifference
as our Author fuppofes : and when we fpeak of
the ftrangeft Motives, we don't mean fuch as ;
have the greateft phyfical Influence or Weight
in turning the ballance of the Will (fince we
fuppofe none of them to have any at all) but
only fuch as the Mind moft commonly deter-
mines itfelf upon in fact ; and to argue from
fuch determinations, that thefe Motives muft
have fuch an Influence both abfolutely and
comparatively, /. e. whether taken by them-
felves, or in oppofition to each other ; is ma-
nifeftly to beg the Queftion, and ftill to fup-
pofe that it cannot move or direct itfelf, not-
withstanding our moft evident perception and

experienoe

Of Moral Evil.

ill

NOTES.

experience of the contrary. And that we have
fuch experience, a little reflection on ourfelves
will convince us. ** I think (fays S. C.) I may
" appeal to any confidering Man, whether he
" be not in all ordinary Cafes fenlible of an
" ability of darting his thoughts upon any
" particular Object, even antecedently to any
" deliberation, and then, whether after deli-
" beration about particular Objects he cannot
** refume his deliberation, and fometimes vary
** his Judgment; and whether, after the clear-
" ell Judgment, and moil deliberate Choice of
" particular things or actions, he be not ilill
" confeious of a power of fufpending his prac-
" tice, of refuming the confideration of the
" Objects whenever he pleafes, or of imme-
u diately choofing or practifing the contrary,
** without being determin'd by impreffions
" from without, or impediments from within.
" But we have no clearer proof of our own Exi-
" ftence than Confcioujnefs . and I conceive we
" need not expect greater Evidence of any
M thing than we have of our Exiftence *.'*

If then our Mind has fuch a power of felec-
ting fome particular Ideas out of many per-
ceiv'd by the Understanding, and attending to
them only without any previous apprehenfion
of their nature and tendency, without any
fpecial Reafon, Motive or Inclination, or any
Inducement whatfoever to fuch particular
Choice; if the Mind, I fay, does in fome
Cafes exert fuch a power as this, then it is in
thefe Cafes abfolutely free. It cannot here be
directed by the Judgment, fince it is fuppos'd
to act independently of it : nay it may be pro-
perly faid fometimes to influence and direct,
er rather to obftruct and fubvert the Judgment
itfelf, for as much as it confines that to fome
particular Objects only, and of confequence
renders it partial, and precipitates it in the
Choice of thefe, and withdraws others from
it, which were abfolutely neceflary to a com-
pleat View of the Subject, and an exact de-
termination about it. Hence the fpring of all
Errors, at lead all criminal ones, hence' viti-
ous, abfurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe.

From the fame Power alfb duely applv'd. pro-
ceeds the hippy confeioufnefs of De'ert. and
in it is entirely founded all the reafc rt of Re-
ward. Its ufefulnefs then, and nccelity. ap-
pears both for the eftabliihment of Mrinlity,
the ground of all rational Happinefs ; and al
fo, that we might always hive wherein to
pleafe ourfelves, which (as our Author has
(hewn in the litter end of Subfect. 4.) other-
wife we very often could not. Hence it ap-
pears I think fufficiently, that this Power is one
of our greateft Perfections, tho' (like all other
Perfections that come fhort of Infinity) it be
liable to the greateft abufc, and Co capable of
being turn'd into the word of Imperfections.

It remains 10 be enquir'd with our Author,
whether ail the Happinefs arifing from it
counterbalances the Mifery, and confequently,
whether we and all other rational Creatures
might not have been as well or better without
it. But for this fee . 2. and <J.

We fhall here only add a Word or two in
vindication of this Principle, agaiftft the three
principal Oppofers of Liberty above mentio-
ned. In the firft place then, we don't aflert
that by this Power the Mind can choofe Evil
as Evil, or refufe Good as Good, i. e. that the
former, as fuch is or can be a Mttire for
Choice, or the latter for Refufal : But we fay
that it can choofe the one and refufe the other
without any particular Motive at ail \ nay, in
oppofition to the ftrongeft Motive (viz. that
Motive which prefents the greateft Happinefs,
and which it ufually does, and always ought
to follow) purely by the force of its active
and felf-moving Power f:

You'll fay it does this to prove its own
Power, and the pleafure attending fuch proof
is the ftrongeft Motive in thefe Cafes. I an-
fvver, that granting this to be fo (which yet is
not very probable, as appears from what was
obferv'd from the EJfay on Confeioufnefs in Note
65.) yet this, as our Author obferves, mull be
a Motive of its own creating, which, withre-
fpect to Volition, is the fame as none at all.
Nay this is the very thing we are endeavour-

ing

" Impartial Enquiry, &c. p. 42, 43. See alfoan Effay on Confeioufnefs, p. 205, &e.
+ See Jackfon'j Vindication of human Liberty, p. 49, 6fr. or the beginning of E. Strutt*/ Defence
tf Dr. Clarke'/ Notion, &c.

a 14.

Of Moral Evil
NOTES.

ing to prove, viz. that the Soul has a power
of determining itfclf to will or to act, and of
pleafing itfclf in fuch determination, without
any other Motive or Reafon but what is pro-
duced by itfelf, and follows that very determi-
nation; without any external Caufe whatfoever;
in which Power all its Liberty confifts, and
the greateft Part of its Happinefs, as will ap-
pear in the next Section.

Nor, fecondly, will fuch a Power as this
only make us liable to miftake the true Good
which is in thing* (as the Author of the Phi-
loj'opb* Enquiry and Leibnitz argue) but on the
contrary, it often makes true Good or Happi-
nefs in thofe things which of themfelvs had
none at all ; and improves thofe things which
have, and alleviates thofe which have the con-
trary Qualities j and of confequence is not a
mere Imperfection, but a very valuable and ne-
ceflary Perfection. Our Author does not fup-
pofe us left to an abfolute, blind indifference
in all Objefts (as Leibnitz often urges) with-
out any Guide or Direction in the Choice of
them; which would indeed be an Imperfec-
tion ; but affirms that the Mind or Man is
fenfibly and neceflarily affe&cd by fome, and
informed by his Underftanding of the Nature
and Effeds of others, and fo is fufficiently di-
rected to the Choice of thefe which are in them-
felves good and agreeable to his Conftitution,
and vice verfa ; yet ftill with the refervation of
a full Power of following or not following
that Guide, of negle&ing or refilling that Di-
rection: Which Power therefore, even in thefe
Cafes, remains ftill unaffected. In other Ob-
jects, he (hews that the Man is totally indiffe-

rent, which yet, by an atbitrary Choice, ho
can make to be no lefs conftituent Parts of his
Happinefs.

Whence, in the third place, a reply may be
form'd to the common Queftion, If bat Benefit
is there in a Power of choofing freely among
things that are really indifferent, and exactly
alike ? We anfwer the Benefit of enjoying any
one of them ; which Enjoyment a Man could
not poffibly have without fuch a Liberty, but
muft neceflarily hang in perpetual Sufpenfe,
without any Choice at all ? This Leibnitz owns
to be an unavoidable confequence of his Opt'
nion*, and to avoid this Abfurdity, is driven
to a greater, viz. to deny that there are any
fuch indifferent and equal things in Nature + j
the contrary to which has been abundantly e-
vine'd already withrefpedto bothGodandMan.

Laftly, to the Argument againft the poJJibUi-
ty of fuch a Liberty, fo frequently repeated by
the two Authors above mention 1 d, viz. that
Aftions done without any Motive, would be
Effects without a Caufe. We reply, in fhort,
that it is a plain Petitio Principij, in fuppofing
Motives to be the real phyfical efficient Caufes
of Volition or Action, which we deny; and
yet are far from fuppofing thefe Ads to be ab-
solutely without a Caufe } nay we affign them
another, and, affirm that their only true and
proper Caufe is this felf-moving Power, and
the only Caufe of this is the Creator who com-
municated it.

On this Subjed fee Dr. Clarke\ Dtmonftrat,
p. 136 &e. zd Edit, or his Remark;, &c p. 38,
&c. or Chubb" i farther Reflections on Natural
liberty. Colleclion of Trails, p. 388, &fV.

* EJfais de Theodice, p. 1 61 , &c.
f See his 4th Letter to Dr. Clarke.

SECT.

Of Moral EviL 2 j a

SECT. II.

Where it is /hewn that Happinefs confiHs in

Elections.

L 1 ""'ROM what has been faid above, it appears that a Being en- The more
dovv'd with a Power of choofing, is more excellent and per- f rec . an y de-
fect than one that is without it: For that which neither acts nor is he^expos'd
acted upon, is the fartheft from Perfection, fince it is of no more ufe |o Motions
in Nature than if it were nothing; at all ; that which is purely paf- J'7ZL tl l oat '

^v * i i- i ii'i i rtiiQ meets

live in its Operations, is one degree more perfect, but that which has with lefs in-
the Principle of its Actions within itfelf, fince it approaches, as- ic convenienc -
were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is alfo more rf itfelf y
i.e. it feems to be made for its own fake, and chiefly to refpect its
future benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect.
Nor does it feem pomble for a greater Perfection to be communi-
cated than the fruition of fuch a Principle. The more free any one
is, and the lefs liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is :
God has therefore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the
Syflem and Order of his Work allow'd, and decreed, that fuch as are
paflive in their Operations lhould be fubfervient to thele.

II. Since therefore Happinefs, according to the common Notion of Happinefs a-
it, is granted to arife from a due ufe of thofe Faculties and Powers prufeof
which every one enjoys; and fince this Power of determining our- the Faculties,
iclves to Actions, and pleafing ourfelves in them, is the moft per- ^ l f p\ here "

tect of choofing
be the mo ft
noWe of all, the greatefl Happinefs, will confift in the Exercife of it, f. e. in Elections.-

n6 Of Moral Evil.

feet of all, whereby we are the moil confcious of our Exiftence, and
our Approach towards God, our chief Happinefs will confift in the
proper ufe of it, nor can any thing be abfolutely agreeable to us
but what is chofen. It is to be confefs'd that many external Ob-
jects, many that are offer'd by the Senfes, pleafe us ; but if we look
"Into the thing more narrowly, this will appear to arife from hence
only, that thcfe are as Motives which induce us to exert an Act of
Election, whereby we embrace them as if they were agreeable to
the natural Appetites : for tho' the Will cannot be dstermin'd to E-
lection by any thing but itfelf, yet it may be perfuaded to determine
itfclf, in order to avoid what is abfurd and difguftful to the Natural
Appetites.
Elcaion is III. For 'tis certain that we make ufe of the Affiftance of the
the caufewhv Underftanding in Elections, and hold it as a Light before us to di-
us, ftinguifh Good from Evil ; but we ufe it as a Judge and a Counfellor,

not as a Sovereign and Dictator : and to fpeak the truth, in order
to avoid foolifh and hurtful things, rather than to acquire what is
good and agreeable. For whatever we choofe will (as was fhewn be-
fore) be ipfo fafto good and agreeable, except it lead us into fome-
thing contrary to the Appetites, or otherwife abfurd. The Under-
ftanding therefore points out and admonifhes us (as we faid before)
to avoid thefe external Evils, or to embrace the Good : but till we
have exerted an Act of Election about them, thefe do neither be-
come abfolutely agreeable, nor the other odious. We have prov'd
before that this is the Cafe, and it will be evident from Experience
to any one that confiders it. If then nothing pleafe us but what is
in fome refpect chofen, 'tis manifeft that our Happinefs muft be
fought for in Election.

I v. We have (hewn above, that an intelligent Creature, which is
th has" free merely paffive in its Operations, cannot be made entirely happy: for
power of as it is liable to external Motions, it muft neeenarily meet with

ahvavTSe hurtful as wel1 as ufeful b J e ^ s J ** a11 thin g s cannot be ufeful.

himiclf: It remains therefore, that a Creature which is to be exempt from
all kind of Grief mould have the Principle of his own Happinefs
within him, and be able to delight himfelf, in what manner foever
external things be difpos'd, i. e. that he have the Government of his
own ASions, and may pleafe himfelf by willing either this or fome-

thing

Of Moral Evil i 1 7

thing elfe : Such an Agent as this is, will be fatisfy'd with any Ob-
ject that occurs ; fince Objects are not chofen by him becaufe they
pleafe him, but on the contrary, pleafe him becaufe they are chofen.
Whoever therefore has free Choice may make himfelf happy : viz.
by choofing every thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice
"to things.

V. And it is by this Means only that Creatures feem capable of T e can

/ j 1 chstnfic our

heing made completely happy: for fince the things themfelves are Elections to
neceflarily fix'd by certain Laws, and cannot be chang'd, it remains make thei "
that the Elections be alter'd, in orde-r to make them conformable to ^Mng^and
things, /'. e. to the Will of God: for thus free Agents will have afocanatt.un
Power in themfelves of attaining Happinefs. Hence it is that we Ha PP inef& -
tire fo frequently admonifh'd in Holy Scripture to be conformable to
God*-> on this Point our Salvation and Happinefs turn : And with
good reafon ; for what is Happinefs if not to be in every thing as
we will or choofe ? But he who choofes to conform himfelf in all
things to the Divine Will, muft certainly be always what he would
he, and will never be difappointed in his Choice: however ex-
ternal things fall out, a Perfon thus difpofed may enjoy Happi-
nefs, nor does any one feem to have been capable of it on other
terms.

VI. But perfect Happinefs, may fome fay, is not to be expected ; Care of the
for thole Beings which are united to terreftrial Matter, muft necef- ^Sturlu
farily be affeited with the Motions of it, as was mewn before, and Appetites dl-
cannot bear the diflblution of the Body, or the impairing of its Or- i | urb . E1 ":
gans (which yet are unavoidable) without fome Pain and uneafy Sen- pr efem due,
fation. I confefs, abfolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for and h ' nde y
in the prefent State : But yet the more our Elections are confor- !!f s frombe-
mable to things, the more happy we are; if then our Elections ingperfeft.
were perfectly free, we mould alfo be at Liberty to enjoy perfect
Happinefs: but fince the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appe-

tites difturb our Elections, and fometimes byafs them to one Side,
we cannot pleafe ourfelves in Eleitions abfolutely, and without a
Mixture of Uneafinefs. For tho' they afford Delight, and even grea-
ter than the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove all manner

* Rm. \z- 2. CJof j. 1, 2,&V.

F f

i 1 8 Of Moral Evil

of Uneafinefs, nor extinguifh the fenfe of Pain. While therefore we
arein this State, we mud acquiefce with a mix'd and imperfect
Happinefs, fuch as the prefent State of things affords ; and it is plain
that this, fuch as it is, arifes only from Elections. For tho' we can-
not by mere Election always extinguish the Pain and Uneafinefs
which arifes from our being forc'd to bear fuch things as are dii-
guflful to the natural Appetites, yet we can choofe to bear thefe
things, and pleafe ourfelves in that Choice ; the Confcioufnefs of our
Powers in bearing thefe furpaffing the Uneafinefs of Pain, nay per-
haps augmenting the Pleafure fo far as that the Excefs of it mail o-
vercome the Pai ; n arifing from the fruftrated Appetites, by fo many
Degrees as could have been obtain'd, if there had been no contra-
riety between them and the Election. For inftance, if one feel two
Degrees of Pain from a Diftemper, and receive fix Degrees of Plea-
sure from an Election to bear it with Patience and Decorum j fub-
flracting two Degrees of Pain from thefe fix of Pleafure, he has four
of folid Pleafure remaining : He will be as happy therefore as one
that has four Degrees- pure and free from ail Pain. If this be gran-
ted to be poflible, we may be as happy with the natural Appetites, as
if we had been without them, nor (hall we have any reafon*to com-
plain of them.

: VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire the Divine Goodnefs
fon to admire and Wifdom, which (fince Objects are generally fix'd and confined
tkeDUine under certain Laws) could create an Appetite that fhould have where*
which ?rea- with to fatisfy it within itielf ; and might render any State agree-
t?d an Appe- able, barely by willing it. Now Free-Will lias this Effect by ac-
v. herewith to commojating itfelf to Obje51s, when the Objefts themfelves cannot
pleafe itfeif be chang'd. For the Man will be no lefs happy who choofes what-
xr ItS T n ^ knows will come to pafs, than he who brings that to pafs which
foeverexrer- he choofes j the one may be always done, the other is often impof-
nai things be ftble: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happinefs.
'Tis hard' to comprehend how he can fail of Happinefs who has it in<
his Power to pleafe himfelf. This feems to have been the Opinion
of the ancient Stoics, who had the fame thoughts of Liberty with
thofe laid down above, but did net explain them diftiactly, nor com-
prehend the whole. Series of the Matter.

However/

Of Moral Evil.

However, ';is very plain that they placed Happinefs in the Ufe
and Election of fuch things a? are in our own Power, which yet
would be impomble, if we were not able to pleafe ourfelves in
Election. (83.)

NOTES,

2l 9

(83.^ Our Author's mentioning the Stoics
fiere, might probably give Leibnitz his reafon
to fufpect him of maintaining all the abfurd
Confequences which that Sect are faid to have
drawn from the above mentioned Principle.
They indeed (if they be not greatly mifrcpre-
fented) urg'd it fo far as to affert, that no-
thing external could hurt or incommcde us
except we pleas'd : That all Good and Evil
was entirely in oar Power, and of our ma-
king, and confequently that all outward things
were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to
our own Choice. Which Notions, being con-
trary to every Day's Experience in Pleafure
and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter
was properly an Evil, or rather that there was
any difference at all between them. This
Doftrinc is indeed liable to Leibnitz's Objec-
tions of confounding all the dillinctions of

things, of contradicting the natural Appe*
tites, making Reafon and Underftanding ufe-
lefs, and fubverting all the other Faculties
of the Mind. Thefe and the like Reflections,
I fay, are jufrly made upon the Doctrine of
the Stoics, as they have generally exprefs'd
themfelves, and overthrow a total, abfolute In-
difference of the Mind to will in all Cafes;
but are nothing at all to our Author, who ne-
ver contended for it; but on the contrary, in-
fifts upon a neceffary, fix'd, and unalterable
difference in the Natures of things, according
to the prefent Syftem ; and has allow'd their
full force, both to Reafon and the natural
Appetites, all over the laft Section, as well as
in the foregoing Chapters of this Book.

But this has been explain'd in the Notes a-
bove. For an application of this Sect, fee ^.5
Subiect. 2. and the Notes to $. 5. Subfect. 3.

SECT. III.

Concerning undue Elections.

1. IP^ROM hence it is fufficiently evident what kind of Elections x r al] mort
1/ are to be called undue ones : For it appears that God has gi- of what we
ven us this Faculty of choofing, that we may pleafe ourfelves in the p r y[ e w s e Ml "
uie of it, and be happy in the fruition of thofe Objects which we choofe amifs
choofe. For it is Happinefs to obtain the things chofen, and Mifery rh refore

F f 2 tO choofe what

ctnnot be
enjoy 'd: This is done ift. when fuch things are chofen as ixsinpoflibte.

aoo Of Moral Evil

to be fruftrated and fall fhort of them. Whenfoever therefore we
make fuch a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things chofen,
'tis plain that we choofe foolifhly and unduely : for we bring upon,
ourfelves unneceffary Mifery, fince we could have chofen otherwife
with equal Pleafure. Whoever then choofes knowingly what he
cannot obtain, or what may produce unneceffary trouble to himfelf
or others, he muft be efteem'd to choofe unduely. And this maybe
done, firft, If any one choofe Impojjibilities. It may feem mange,
that any Perfon mould choofe a thing which is impoffible, knowing,
it to befb; but 'tis very probable that this has happen 'd fometimes,
as was faid before *
,. II. Secondly, If he choofe fuch things as are incanjijient with each

When thofe other : he that does this contradicts himfelf, and evidently cuts off all:
things nre hopes of Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we muff take all its
^ e ^S^neceffary confequences together with it. But all things here are of
ttitheacho- a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitternefs:
ther * we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreea-

ble to the Appetites, and refufe the reft: but this is in. vain, fince
the agreeable Parts cannot be feparated from the difagreeable ones:
we muft therefore either choofe or reject the whole- He that does
otherwife cannot poffibly fatisfy himfelf, fince he muft bear with what
he would; not : He is therefore voluntarily, unhappy by an undue E-
lection.
Thirdly, If III. Thirdly, he muft be efteem'd to choofe unduely, who aims at;
the things fc$\ things as he knows not to be in his Power. For it is a hazard
Shthe powe I whether he enjoys thofe things that are not in his Power; and it is
oftheElec- foolifh to commit our Happinefs to Chance; while therefore it is in
ter ' our Power to choofe only fuch things as we are certain of obtaining,

we rifk our Happinefs, or throw it away when we purfue Uncer-
tainties: Now we owe as much Happinefs to ourfelves as is in our
Power, and ought to ufe our utmoft Endeavours- to attain; it ; but we
lofe this by denting- thofe things which we know to be out of our
Power.
Fourthly,. IV. Fourthly, That alfo is an undue Election, which obliges us to
choofe that ^* ze tno ^ e 48l tnat are lawfully occupfd by the Elections of other
which is Men,,

pjc-occupjr'd by thejawful. Choice of others. .

* l^i. Subfeft. 5. gar*.iov .1, 12. .

Of Moral Evil a2l

Men. To be difappointed of an Election is Mifery, as we faid be-
fore; to enjoy it, Happinefs. Every one therefore that is endow'd
with a Power of chooling, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing
chofen, fo far as is necefiary to the Exercife of his own Faculties, and
is no impediment to the Good of others. But he mufl be efteem'd'
an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to him-
felf what is common, or arTume more and greater Advantages from
the common Stock, than fall to his Share. Thofe things then which-
are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of other Men, belong to theChoofers,.
and cannot juftly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them
would have what is not his due : i. e. endeavours by an undue Elec-
tion to rob others of their Right. This is to be referr'd in an efpe-
cial Manner to fuch things as are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of the
Deity;, br thefe are to be efteem'd by all as facred and prohibited:
nor can any one meet with Succefs that oppofes himfelf to God, and
choofes what God difapproves. For what God wills muft neceffarily
come to pafs, but God wills the Happinefs of all Men as far as it is
poflible ; therefore he that offends unneceffarily againft the Happinefs
of any one, is fuppos'd. to offend againft God, and to choofe what is
not his due.

V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for us to defire thofe F . f ,
things which are hurtful to ourfelves or others. By hurtful things Whe/tWe
I underftand thofe that lead to natural Evils, viz. fuch as are preju- thf *?p which
dicial to the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been faid, ."* ^h
that things* pleafe us becaufe they are chofen, but Reafon perfuade&are chofen*
us- to abftain from fuch Elections as may prove pernicious to our own ^ ho ^ t anjr
Minds, or thofe of others, or fuch as defraud the Appetites unnecef-
farily : for we owe a Gratification to thefe Appetites, when it can be
procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election oppo-
sed to thefe gratis, and without any reafon, muft be judg'd an undue
one, becaufe it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites;

S E CT.

ill Of Moral Evil

SECT. IV.

How it is pojfible for us to jail into undue

Elections # .

This is dene I. ' r l v I S difficult to comprehend, as was faid before, how one
five ways. J^ can fa\\ mor t of Happinefs who has it in his Power to

pleafe himfelf, yet if he choofe in the foregoing Manner, or the
'like, he muft neceffarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be fru-
itrated, i.e. he muft be unhappy. But how is it poffible, you'll fay,
that any one mould make fuch a Choice ? I anfwer, This may pro-
ceed firft, from Error or Ignorance. Secondly, from Inadvertency far
Negligence. Thirdly, from Levity. Fourthly, from a contracted
Habit. Fifthly, from other Appetites implanted in us by Nature.
Not that the Will can be determin'd by thefe or any thing elfe
which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and oc-
cafion of determining itfelf, which it would not have had other-
wife.
Tirft, By Er- H. Firft, As to the firft of thefe, we have prov'd before that we
ror or culpa- are liable to Errors and Ignorance ; and that this is to be reckon'd
b]cIsnonne among the natural Evils. When therefore we are fore'd to choofe
among things not fufficiently known, our Errors are not to be charg'd
upon us, nor is it credible that God will fuffer them to prove fa-
tal to us. But when we are under no manner of Neceffity, an E-
le&ion often prefents itfelf to us in Matters fufficiently undtrftood,

and

* Sit LockeV Chapter of Power, . 57, &c.

Of Moral EviL 223

and then we hurry on without a ftrict and careful Enquiry, and
choofe ImpofTibilities, &c. and therefore are not entirely free from
Fault, ilnce we ought to deliberate and examine things before E-
lection.

III. Secondly, Thefe undue Elections therefore happen thro* In- Secondly, By
advertency, for by due Care we might perceive the Good and Evil hr z li s ence -
which is in Objects; but being negligent and fupine, we are frequent-
ly impofed upon, and fuffer for our Negligence, by falling into the

fore mention'd Inconveniencies.

IV. As to the third, Since the Pleafure of a free Agent confifts Thirdly, Bjr
m Election, 'tis no wonder that he gives himfelf as large a Scope asj^J^Jjj.
he can in the Exercife of it. Neither will it be any thing furpri- gence to the
fing, if in this full Exercife of Election, he fometimes tranfgrefs the gJS?* f
Bounds prefcribed him by God and Nature j and light upon fome things

which are attended with- no very profperous IiTuc (viz. Abfurdities
and ImpofTibilities) fince he will attempt every thing. For he plea^
les- himfelf in the Trial, tho' he be unfortunate in the Event ; but
this is no Excufe; for every one is oblig'd to take care of himfelf,
left he be too fond of indulging new Elections, and from Levity be-
come unduely offenfive to himfelf or others.

V. Fourthly, We fee that frequent Choice creates an Habit; this Foarthfy, By
feems to proceed from hence, that as we delight in an Election of- fjjfcfS* r
ten repeated, we are eafily indue'd to hope that the fame Pleafure

will always follow the fame Act, whereupon we grow lupine and
negligent, and difregard the Alterations of things; and he that does
this may eafily fall ; into fuch Elections as will not be attended with
Succefs. Belide, 'tis difficult for us to change thofe Elections, the
Delight of which is fix 'd and, as it were, riveted in the Mind by
frequent Experiment: Yet we are not excufable for rufhing upon ab-
furd and impoffible things, in order to avoid the Uneafinefs attending
the Change of Electron. And if we fearch into the Cafe more nar-
rowly, we mall rind that mod undue Elections arife from this unfcai-
fonable Perfeverance, all which come juflly under the Cenfure of a
culpable Obflinacy.

VI. Fifthly, It has been often hinted, that we confift of a Soul S^*(.
and Body,, that thefe are mutually affected by each other, and that nity t tic

fr om turaU-

, iclac.

2 *4 Of Moral Evil

from hence various Appetites arife in us, fuch.as the Prefervation of
the Body, Defire of Offspring, and the like; and whatever is an im-
pediment to thefe, that we efteem hurtful. If therefore we be not
upon our Guard, we are hurried on, by the Importunity of them, to
Abfurdities, or when we give a loofe to our Elections, we grifp at
fuch things as offer an unneceffary Violence to them : hence arife an
immenfe train of Uneafmefles to ourfelves and others ; hence comes
Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natural Appetites, to
which we owe at lean; a moderate Indulgence : hereupon we rafhly
and unlawfully feize thofc things that are pre-occupied by the E-
lections or Appetites of other Men ; nay, are not fo cautious as to
refrain from what is determin'd by the Will of God himfelf : from
thefe and the like Occanons it happens that we abufe our Liberty,
and by undue Elections bring natural Evils upon ourfelves or others.
For as we are endow'd with Liberty in thefe and the like Cafes, we
may either ufe it according to the dictate of Reafon, or abufe it :
this Power feems to be included in the very Notion of created Li-
berty.
VII. It appears from hence how cautioufly Elections ought to be
"Why every tna j e . for t b ' nothing pleafes us but what is chofen, yet we do
not to be not only take delight in choojing, but much more in enjoying the things
chofen, and chofen, otherwife it would be the fame thing whatever we chofe :
tionsarenot we mu ^ ta ^ e care tnen tnat our Elections be made of fuch things
*ifiiychang'd as we may always enjoy. For if they be of perifhable Objects, or
fuch as are not in the lealt anfwerable to the end of the Elector,
; he that choofes them muft neceffarily grieve at the Difappointment.
He may avoid this, will fome fay, by changing his Election, when
the thing chofen periihes or fails ; but it is to be obferv'd, that E-
. lections are not chang'd without a Senfe of Grief and Remorfc. For
we never think of altering them till we are convinc'd that we have
chofen amifs. When therefore we are difappointed of the Enjoy-
ment of that which we have chofen, we defpair, become miferable,
penitent, and confcious of an Evil Choice, and then at laft begin to
alter our Choice, which cannot be done without an anxious and un-
.eafy Senfe of Difappointment, and the more and longer we have
been intent upon any Election, fo much the greater Pain it will coft
. . . . us

Of Moral Evil

us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which
we feel in altering Elections ; hence many had rather perfirt in ab-
furd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them: For things
pleafeusbecaufe we will them, but to reject what we have once willed,
is contradicting ourfelves, and cannot be done without a very difa-
greeable ftruggle and convulfion of the Mind: as any one may learn
from Experience. (84.)

225

NOTES.

(84.) Any one that attentively confiders the
Workings of his own Mind, will foon be fa-
tisfy'd of the truth of all that our Author here
advances; he will obferve what difficulty and
reluctance he feels in receding from what he
has once firmly refolv'd upon, tho perhaps he
can perceive no manner of Good in jt except
what arifes purely from that Refolution. To
make a Vifit at a certain time ; to walk to any
particular place ; to recreate ourfelves with
this or that kind of Diverfion ; may be Actions
in themfelves perfectly indifferent and trivial:
but when once propofed, even upon mere
whim and caprice, and refolv'd on with as
little reafon, they become often as much the
Objects of our Hope and Defire ; the thoughts
of profecuting them give us as great pleafure
and fatisfaction, and we are as unwillingly
withdrawn from them, and as much difap-
pointed when we fall fhart of the fancied en-
joyment of them, as we fhould be in Matters
of the laft Importance. Every Man that has
taken the leaft notice of what paffes within
him, is able to give numberlefs Inlhnces of the
truth of the foregoing Obfervation: which

may ferve to convince us how great the force
and power of Volition is, and what excellent
ufe it may be of in Life. How it fupplies us
with courage and conftancy in the moll ar-
duous Undertakings, and enable us to furmount
the greateft Difficulties : how it qualifies and
illeviates ourPain, and augments theSum of our
Happinefs ; and makes us run contentedly the
Round of low and otherwife tedious purfuits,
and bear with pleafure the otherwife infuppor-
table load of human Woes. This fhews the
great ufefulnefs and neceffity of fuch a Princi-
ple, and will lead us to confider with our Au-
thor, in what a cautious manner it ought to
be exerted, left it fall upon wrong and im-
proper Objefts, and thereby, inftead of leffen
ing, increafe our Mifery, and become itfelf
the greateft part of it. That this Principle of
Liberty, tho' frequently attended with thefe
confequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the moft
beneficent Donor, muft appear from a general
computation of its Good and Evil Effects,
with regard to the whole Syftem, which will
be the Subject of the following Sections.

SECT.

$16 Of Moral Evil

SECT. V.

How Evil Elections are confident with the
Tower and Coodnefs of God.

; )

S U B S C T. I.

Propofes the Uiifficulty^ with a 'Preparative to the Solu*

tion of it.

I. T X TE have (hewn that moral Evils arife from undue Election;
Free- Agents V V "hat Elections are free; and that it is not at all neceffary
arenct-necef-for any one knowingly and willingly to purfue the worfe. Moral
therefore 1 *& cannot therefore be excufed by heceffity, as the natural ones,
feem to be %nd chofe of Imperfection are. 'Tis plain that created Nature irn-
God vokn by P^ cs ^P^fe^i 011 >m tnfe ver "y terms Of its bein.g created (fince what
tartly. is abfolutely perfect is very God) either therefore nothing at all mull
be created, or fomeihing imperfect: and that God, agreeably to what
infinite Power and Goodnefs required, permitted no manner of Evil
in Nature, the abfence whereof would not have introduced more or
greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the pre-
fence or abfence of it, God made that which was attended with the
leaft. " There are no Evils then which could pofTibly be avoided, and
therefore they mull: be look'd upon as neceffary, fince the Imperfec-
tion of a Creature did not admit of pure and abfolute Good. But
this Neceflity does not appear in free Agents : For the Evils incident

Of Moral Evil. 2 2j

to them feem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but free
Choice, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, when nei-
ther the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Univerfe require the
permiffion of them, that is, the World would he as well without as
with them.

II. 'Tis to be obferv'd, that God permitted the former kind of E- Moral Evil*
vils becaufe they were infeparable from things; either therefore the ha J. c no ne *
things muft not have been created, or their inherent Evils toleratecj. neawnwUh
But Evil Elections have no necefTary connection with the free Acts fceNature,
of the Will: neither does the Nature of Man require that he mould X'antageTo 7
choofe amifs : nor does any benefit accrue to him from thefe Elec- it.

tions which could not be obtained without them, as it does in Hun-
ger, Thirft, Fear, and the reft of the Pafiions; for without thefe Af-
fections, as was {hewn, the Animal would foon perifh j but no Evil
would befal us (nay what Good would not ? ) if we always attended
to Reafon, and never chofe amifs. Since therefore Man might bring
the greateft pleafure to himfelf, and exercife his faculties by choofing
always well, how comes it to pafs that God fuffers him to hurt him-
felf and others unnecefTarily by Evil Elections ? If it be faid that a
Power of choofing either Side is contain'd in the very Notion of Li-
berty ; this muft be allow'd, but yet there feems to be room enough
for the Exercife of Liberty, tho' the Will were confin'd to the choice
of what is lawful and convenient ; what need is there then of fuch a
Power as may extend to the choice of Evil ?

III. This feems to be the main ftrefs of the Difficulty, here is the Hcrc thea
hardeft point in this Affair, viz* Whence come Moral Evils; /. ^. lies the ftrefs
thofe that are not necefTary ? If they be faid to be necefTary, how are f a ^ e \^~
they free? If they be not neceflary, why does God permit them? why did
The latter feems repugnant to the Goodnefs of God, the former to the 9^ P" 1 1
Nature of a free Agent. wh i c h arc

neither necefTary nor ufeftd ?

IV. It muft be confefs'd, that we are lefs prepared for a Solution of
this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Syftems of the^^ "^
Intellectual World are lefs known to us than thofe of the purely Ma- jnuch of the

Gg 2 tcrial I * ,t ?r cof 1J

& thinking Be-

ings as of
jxu'.erial ones, and therefore are lefs prepared for an Anfwcr to this Difficulty, than to the former.

ai8 Of Moral Evil

terial one : Material Objects furround us, and occupy all the Inlets
to Knowledge, and are the only things that immediately affect our
Senfes. They intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce
many and various Senfations in us. But of intellectual Beings of
their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we
have but very few, and thofe very obfcure Notions, viz. fuch as a-
rife only from the reflection of our Understanding upon itfelf, or are
collected by the ufe of Reafon deducing one thing from another :
For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately
perceiv'd by us j nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions a-
rifing from it, with them that proceed frcm other Sources : all our
Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from
this alone. 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in
our Realbnings about thefe and their Operations : and do not fo clear-
ly perceive the neceflity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contra-
riety in the Motions of Matter ; nor fo eafily apprehend what Incon-
venience would follow from reftraining the exercife of Liberty, as we
fee the confequence of taking away the morion of Matter. We know
that without Motion the whole Mafs of Matter would prove entirely
ufelefs, and that there would be no room for fo many Animals as now
we find receive their Origin and Subfiftence from it ; which is juftly
efteem'd a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all die natural E-
vils arifing from Matter and Motion: and we mould find the fame
thing in the prevention of the ufe of Free -Will, if we underftood
the Syftem of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material
World. But if we can mew that more Evils necefiarily arife from
withdrawing or reftraining the ufe of Free- Will, than from permit-
ting the abufe of it, it muft be evident that God is oblig'd to fuf-
fer either thefe or greater Evils. And fince the leaft of thefe ne-
ceffary Evils is chofen, even infinite Goodnefs could not pofiibly do
better.

V. Let us try then whether the abufe of Free- Will could be pro-
Tbe abufe of hibited with lefs detriment to the whole Syftem, than what arifes
^a^bTcon- ^ rom l ^ e P crmi ^ lon f iZ - There are three Ways whereby God may
ceiv'd be conceiv'd able to have prevented bad Elections} firft, If he had

to have created bo Free Being; at all. Secondly, If his Omnipotence inter-

becn prcven- J x

ted three pole,

A-ays, which are ccnfidei'd in the three following Subventions.

Of Moral EviL 229

po I ccafionally retrain the Will, which is naturally free, from

any wrong Electi >n. Thirdly, If he fhould change the prefent ftate
of things, and tranflate Man into another, where the occafions of Er-
ror and incite ents to Evil being cut off, he fhould meet with no-
thing that could tempt him to choofe amifs.

S U B S E C T. II.

* Why God has created Free Agents.

I. A S to the firft, 'Tis certain that God was not compell'd by any

^"\ neceffity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have j^ m $f
prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being with ted Moral E-
Free Choice ; for fo there would have been nothing that could fin. J" ils *J he
But fuch a monftrous Defect and Hiatus would have been left in Na- to create C any
ture by this means, viz. by taking away all Free Agents, as would free Being,
put the World into a worfe Condition than that which it is in at pre-
fent, with all the Moral Evils that attend it, tho' they were multi-
ply'd to a much greater Number.

II. For in the firft place, if we fet afide Free Agents, i. e. thofe jj ut without
which have the Principle of Action within themfelves, there is pro- thefc the
perly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely paf- ^ve^ecrT^
live : there is indeed fome kind of Action in Matter, viz. Motion ; but mere Ma-
we know that it is paffive even with regard to that; 'tis therefore ch,ne %? n(i
the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itfelf ; for it pa ^v e .
does not move itfelf, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the
whole World would be a mere Machine, capable of being turn'd any
Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of it-
felf. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itfelf exert one
fingle Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and ftupid, as
much as a Wheel or a Stone : it would continue fluggifh and inca-
pable of Action, unlefs actuated by external force. Second Caufes
could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them,
but all would be done entirely by the firft. We need not fay, how

much.

a3o

Objection
from theie^
who declare
th.it the Un-
derilanding
is active, the'
itisneceflary
as al o God
himfelf.

Anfwer to
the former
part of the
Obje&ion.

'Anfwer to
the latter.

Of Moral Evil.

much a World thus constituted would be inferior to the prefent, nor
how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author.

III. Man, you'll fay, neceflarily aflents to this Propofition, twice
two make four ; but tho' his Mind is neceflarily driven to this Affenr,
and confequently is not Jree y yet he is active : for it can fcarce be faid
that a Man is paflive in giving his Aflent *. The fame may be af-
firm'd of God, who, tho' we fuppofe him to be abfolutely free in his
primary Elections, yet when thele are once fix-d, he mull neceflarily
execute what he had decreed : neverthelefs he is properly Self-active
in all Cafes, confequently there may be fomething active in Nature,
tho' there were nothing free.

IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis not very clear what
may be the Caufe of intellectual Affent j if the Object, then the Mind
is merely paflive in the Act of Understanding : nor is Aflent imputa-
ble to it any more than Defcent to a Stone -, but if the Object be e-
iteem'd only a Condition upon which the Undemanding acts, we
(hall want a Caufe to determine the Understanding ; for that cannot
be fuppofed to determine itfelf, any more than the Fire determines
itfelf to burn combustible Matter -f*. For no body judges the com-
buftible Matter to be active when it is fet on Fire, or that the Fire
burns of itfelf without being kindled by fomething elfe. The World
then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechanifm, where nothing
moves itfelf, but every thing is mov'd by an external Caufe, and that
by another, and fo on till we come at the firft, namely God; who
will be the only Self-active Being and mult be efteem'd the real
Caufe of all things: neither can any thing, whether well or ill done,
be afcribed to others.

V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Being mufl: be
denominated Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Elec-
tion : But God is no othcrwife oblig'd to execute his Decrees, there-
fore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely ; and is purely
active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he fuffers
nothing by neccflity, nor from any other befide himfelf, and is deter-
min'd to. act by his own Liberty.

VI. Secondly,

* See Note 61 .

t S&jyir Autb,r\ Note B.

Of Moral Evil. 251

VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the World in order to God has a
exercife the Powers he is poflefs'd of for the Good of the Univerfe ; ? ?F en , CJF

1 t-x* n i r -\ r ii'i 1 1 1 / 1 / >n his Works,

the Divine Goodnels therefore delights and applauds ltfelf in. its and if no-
Works, and the more any thing refembles God, and the more 'tis J> in g were
Self-fufficient, it is to be efteem'd fo much the more agreeable to its VVO uid be
Author. But any one may underftand how much a Work which wanting in,
moves itfelf, pleafes itfelf, and is capable of receiving and returning j^lSjJjfc
a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes able to the
no return, unlefs by the force of fome external Impulfe : any Perfon, Deit y-
I fay, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there
is between a Child careffing his Father, and a Machine turn'd. about
by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between
God, and fuch of his Works as are endow'd with Freedom ; there's
room for a Covenant and mutual Love. For there is fome fort of
Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in fome meafure
return the benefits of the Creator, at leaft make an acknowledgment
for them ; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceiv'd to
be agreeable to God, this muft certainly be fo. One fuch Action as
this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of
Motion ; if then there had been no free Creatures, God muft have
been deprived of this Complacency, which is almoft the only one
worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis there-
fore as much agreeable to God that he mould have made fuch Be-
ings, as it is to the World that they mould be made : for if nothing
of this kind had been created, the very bell thing among the Crea-
tures, and that which is moft agreeable to the Deity, would have
been wanting. 'Tis better therefore to permit the abufe of Liber-
ty in fome than to have omitted fo much Good. For the De-
fed: and Abfence of fuch Agents is to be efteemed a greater Evil
than all the Crimes which are confequent upon the abufe of Li-
berty.

VII. Thirdly From what has been faid, we learn, that fome Evils RTeceffary
which neceUarily adhere to things, viz. Natural ones, and thofe of ^^j^. 9
Imperfection, did not hinder the Divine Goodnefs from creating the hinder the
Good with which they were connected, fince the excefs of Good c / c f ion

J of things,

COm-much Jeis

thofe which
are only poffible.

Of Moral Evil

compenfated for the fewer and lefs Evils which were unavoidable :
Thus God chofe fuch Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with Hunger,
Thirft, and other Paflions, rather than none at all. If then rhofe E-
vils which were neceffary and forefeen did not hinder God from crea-
ting the Good that was annext to them, how much lefs fhould the
J-ojjible Evils arifing from the abufe of Free-Will hinder his Goodncfs
from creating Free-Agents ? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good
than fimple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the
train of Natural Evils, how much more gratefully fhould we em-
brace the Gift of Liberty, attended only with fome Danger of E-
vils, but not with the Evils themfelves, as in the former Cafes,

(5-)

VIII. Fourthly, It mud be obferv'd that EleOions are therefore

^ M -efteem'd Evil, becaufe they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an
ter than Mo- Election contain nothing abfurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one.
Fre^wiiu Hatred of God, Rebellion againfr. his Commands, Murther, Theft,
greater Good Lying, are Sins, becaufe they are hurtful to ourfelves or others, be-
turai Appe*" cau fe tne y deprive us of natural Good, and lead into Evil. Electi-
tites. ons therefore are wrong and undue on account of the natural Evils

which fometimes attend them j Natural Evils then are greater than
Moral * : For that which makes any thing bad muft necefTarily be
worfe itfelf : But Free-Will is better than natural Appetites, and a
Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be deny'd to
the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than
the natural Appetites and Propenfities : both of them indeed fome-
times

Natural E
vils are

NOTES.

(85.) In relation to us, indeed, a Gift which
is attended only with the poffibiliry of fome
lnconveniencies, appears to be of more digni-
ty and value than one that brings fome degree
of unavoidable Mifery along with it, and as
fuch it ought to be receiv'd with proportiona-
ble gratitude by us. But with refpeft to a
Being who forcfees all the Abufes of Free-
will, all the contingent Evils confequcnt

thereupon, are as certain as the natural and ne-
ceffary ones, and therefore ought to be equally
provided againft. This Argument therefore a-
bout the Contingency of Moral Evil, fo fir as
it relates to the Deity, need not be infilled on,
fince our Author allows the Divine Prefci-
ence, and confidently with that, offers reafons
fufHcient for the Vindication of the other At-
tributes of God in the prefent Cafe,

Set Chap. 4. $. 4. par. 8. and X i.

Of Moral Evil. itf

times lead us into the fame Evils, but with this Difference, that the
one, Viz. the natural Appetite, loads us with fevils by neceffity; but
the other, "viz. Ffee-Will, not of neceffity, but only if We pleafe 1 .
Thefe might have been avoided fmce they are contingent, but thofe
could not, fmce they force therftfelves upon us againft our Wills: As
therefore it became God to create an Appetite which was join'd with
neceffary Evils ; how 7 much more agreeable was it to his Goodnefs to
have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which thefe may be avoided, or
at leaft alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than
what thefe Evils which flow from it can overbalance, and therefore
worthy to be implanted in Animals by the Deity; how much more
excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become
capable of Ffappinefs, tho' join'd with the danger of falling into E^
viis by abufe ?

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worfe without Free- The sut of
Will than with it, 'tis plain that Liberty diminishes in/lead of incre'a- bfwoTf^if
fing the Sum of Evils, and is beftow'd upon us for that end. But Free- will
how much more miferable the State of Man would be without Li- weretaken
befty than it is with it, will appear to any one who considers what*
fort of Creatures We mould be Without Election. For if Man were
not free, he would be driven by the Violence of Matter and Motion*,
and fooner or later be quite overwhelmed with thofe natural Evils
which neceffarily arife from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But
it is better to ftruggle with feme of thefe with Liberty, than all of
them with ntc-efTity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter
of Brutes *. If by being deprived of Election we mould be freed
from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but
feeing that whether we be free or bound by the chain of Fate (while
we have Bodies) we muft neceffarily endure thofe Evils which arc
confeqUent Upon the affections of Bodies ; (nay thofe very Evils which
We were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain todefirc
the ribfertce Of Liberty, by relying upon which, and ufing it aright,
we may avoid the mofl bitter part even Of thefe neceffary Evils.

X. For

* Ok!}< ?Afo/n> D^rrr, fei tie O f jJlrvdtlcn frcfii Bayle in Note 35.

H h

Free Agents
only are ca-
pable of per-
left H.ippi-
nefs, there-
fore it is bet
ter to enjoy
Liberty.

Of Moral Evil.

X. For in the Sixth place, it is moft manifeft that the greateft
Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Li-
berty. By the amftance of this we rife above Fate, and when at-
tacked from without by adverfe Fortune, we find our Happinefs
within ourfelves. Other Animals have nothing to oppofc to a Di-
ftemper, Death, or Pain, nothing to delight themfelves in, except
Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species. But a
free Agent, in the midft of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and
Thirft, nay Death itfelf, has wherewithal to pleafe itfelf, and to
blunt the Edge of all thefe Evils. We complain of our Bodies, that
by being tied to them, we are oblig'd to undergo very many and
great Hardfhips ; how much more full of Complaints mould we be
if we were entirely fubjecle^ to them, and hurried into Evils with-
out any Remedy or Relief? Is it not better for us to have our Hap-
pinefs in our own Power, than to be oblig'd to feek it elfewhere, nay
rather to defpair of it ? Which Happinefs is only to be found in a
Free Choice, as was {hewn before. From hence it appears, I hope,
fufficiently, why God created Free Agents notwithstanding the abufe
which they were liable to. For he chofe a Creature which w ould
fometimes do amifs, rather than that every thing mould be drawn on
by Fate, and a Chain of Neceffity, into inevitable Evils. (86.)

XI. But

NOTES.

(86.) Our Author having fhewn in V 2. that
the greateft part of our Happinefs confifts in
this Principle of Election, here points out
fome of the many Inconveniencies that would
attend the lofs of it. Firft, If there was no
fuch thing as a free Agent, all would be mere
Mechanifm and neceflary Effedts of the firft
Caufe, i.e. the belt and nobleft part of Nature
would be cut off", that which of all others is
moft worthy of and agreeable to the Deity.
Theie would be no Creatures capable of ma-
king any kind of return, of paying any reafo-
nable Obedience and Duty to God ; no poffi-
bility for him to difpliy his Wifdom, Good-
nefs and Mercy in the Government of them,
nor any means of bringing them to the fubli-
meft Degree of Intellectual Happinefs, viz.
that which arifes from Morality. Secondly,

Thofe paffive Beings themfelves would be in a
much worfe Condition than they now are.
They would be deprived of all the Happinefs
which they now enjoy from the choice of in-
different Objects; they would be necefiarily ex-
pofed to all the natural Evils arifing from the
general Laws of Matter and Motion, viz. Di-
ftempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Sea-
fons, Hunger and Thirft, fff. which Liberty
enables them frequently to guard againft and a-
void, and frequently to bear with pleafure, and
even to convert to their fuperior Good : nay,
they muft inevitably undergo the greateft part
of thofe very Evils which at prefent, by this
Power, they have at moft only a pofftbility of
incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the
other moft exalted Powers of the Mind would
be entirely ufelefs, and often aggravations of

our

Of Moral Evil 225

XI. But, you'll fay, that you defire the Pleafure and Advantages a- The benefits
rifing from free Elections, but would not have the Power to Sin; of F'eeAViir
i. e. you would have a Liberty reftrain'd by Nature within cmaifch^wMw**
bounds, fo as never to extend to Evil. But it may be juftly doubted Power of
whether this w 7 as poffible in the prefent ftate of things: For Free- Slnnm S-
Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itfelf to Action,
and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they mould give oc-
cafion for the Exercife of Ele3ionsj 'tis therefore aQive in its own
Nature. Now whatfoever is limited by another admits of bounds,
and is therefore pafilve with refpect to the Limiter; it feems equally
abfurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which
is in itfelf and of its own Nature paffive, to determine itfelf to Ac-
tion, and is perhaps no lefs impoffible. (87.)

H h 2 XII. Secondly,

NOTES.

our Mifery. " A Faculty of Undcrflanding
" (fays Dr. Jenkin*) without a Will to de-
V termine it, if left to itfelf, mull always
" think of the fame ObjecT:, or proceed in a
" continued fcries and connection of thoughts
" without any Aim or End ; which would be
" a perpetual Labour in vain, and tedious
." Thoughtfulnefs to no purpofe: but if it
" mould be fometimes determin'd by fome
" thing external to new Objects, yet what ufe
" of Reafon could there be in Contemplations,
" which were merely obtruded and fore'd up-
" on the Mind ? " And to forcfee a train of
Evils, without any power of acting againft
2nd oppofing them, muft be only anticipating
Mifery, and adding the future to the prefent,
and a fenfe of our Inability of ever helping
ourfelves to both. Thefe Confiderations are
fufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in
general would be an irreparable Damage to any
confeious Syftem.

For a fuller Explication? of them fee Mr.
J/idfori'% Defence cf human Liberty, p. 79, &c.
and Scolfr- Ckriflian Life, Part 2. C. 4. V 3.
p. 31?, &c. 8po. or Sherlock on Providence, C. 7. 1
p. 240. 2d Edit, or D'Oy/y's Firjl DiJfertation,\

C 10. or Dr. Jenhn in the Chap, above ci*
ted.

The next Enquiry muft be, what Confe*
quences would attend either the Limitation of
this free Power to fome particular Objecl;,. or
the Infringement and Sufpenfion of it on par-
ticular Occasions.

(87.) If Matter were made aclive, it would
be no longer Matter: in like manner if a felf-
moving or active Being were render'd paffive,
it would be no longer what it is. Hence ap-
pears the abfurdity of fuppofing a Liberty, pro-
pcrly fo call'd, to be determin'd to fome parti-
cular ways of acting, 'tis the fame as the Liberty
of a Stone to fome particular Ways of moving,
i.e. no Liberty at all. The very Eflence of Liber-
ty includes an abfolute Phylical Indifference to
either Side in any given Cafe. Such a Liber-
ty as this has been fhewn to belong to Min in
refpect of Willing. He can will or choofe any
thing in Nature, he can alfo either choofe or
refufe any thing, and therefore to determine
his Will to fome Objects, or incline it to one
Side in any given Ci re um fiances, would be fo
far to defiroy it. The Queftion then is not,
whether a Man might be neceflarily inclin'd to.

fonue.

Reafonablenefs of the Chrjftian Religion, 2d vol. C. 12. p. 238. 5th Edit,

Q36 Of Moral Evil

XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally reftrain'd to choofe
Tnld^not be Good only, it muft have this reftraint either from the Object or the
dctermin' 'd \oUnderJlandwg : But neither could be done. If fome things were in
G ^J^ b "themfelves always Good, and others Evil, it might be poiTible in-
theGoodncfsdeed that the Will mould no more admit of Evil than the Sight does
of them ge- f Savours 1 But Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not abfo-
ceedVfrom lute things, but merely relative : for there is almoft no Action which
Election, proceeds from Choice, but what may be Good or Evil upon a change

of Circumftances *. Even Natural Evils themfelves are fometimes
good and eligible. Free-Will then muft needs be indifferent to all
external Objects, and thofe things which are now agreeable, become
fhortly difagreeable, according to the infinite variety of Circumftances
and the Exigence of Affairs. The Will therefore cannot be deter-
min'd to Good by Objects. Nay, to confefs the Truth, we general-
ly do not choofe Objects becaufe they are Good, but they become
Good becaufe we choofe them. The Goodnefs of them therefore is
for the moil part determin'd by the Election, and not that by the
Goodnefs. For we have fhewn before -j-, that this is the Nature of
an Elective FaGulty, and fuch it ought to be, otherwife we could not
have the leaft pofhbility of attaining Mappinefs in fo great a variety
and uncertainty of outward things, |f.

XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable of being determin'd
Ha often " perpetually to Good by the Vnderfianding^ than by Objects. For the

finds nothing Under-

good in

tilings, except that they help towards the attainment of an E'eftion, the Will therefore could not be de-
termin'd to Good by the Understanding.

N O fe E S.

fome particular thing ikr act, and yet continue
fill ; forV

to have Free-Will ; for'hat, \ think, is a con-
tradiction. But whether he mould have this
prefent power of willing deftrpy'd on fome
particular Occafions, or whether he mould be
iometimes alter'd and made what he now is

not. Whether this Change of Man's Nature M vj ryt~<*~M vrfrrr-v *"* i^w^r*
would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, I quences than the prefent Eltablifhment, this
or beneficial to the World, will be more f ul- 1 mull be a very flrong Argument againit, them.

* See Turner's Difcourfe of the Laws of Nature, and the reaftn of their Obligation, V- 23, 24. or-
Puffendorf of the Laws of Nature, Sff, J3. 1. C. 2. V 6.
i Sect. 1. Subfeft. 3. fj See par. 16 ami 17 of this Sett..

ly examin'd in the following Subfeclion : our
Author now proceeds to enquire how this
determination could polfibly be effected in the
prefent State of things, and if, upon Enquiry
into ail the imaginable Methods of effecting
it, they appear to be either inefficient for the
Endpropofed, or attended with worfe Confe-

Of Moral Evil. if

Underftanding adls neceftarily, and reprefents nothing as Good but
what proceeds from Objedts -, if therefore the Will were determin'd
by it, it would neither be free nor always able to pleafe itfelf. For
the Undemanding Gften reprefents all external things as fad and un-
profperous, and could never make us take natural Evils, fuch as
Death, Labours, Torments, for real Good, tho' it might induce us
to bear them in profpecl of a farther End. But to endure a thing in
view of a farther End, is to undergo prefent Miferyin hopes of future
Happinefs; L e. to weigh a prefent Evil againft a futu r e Good, and
of two Evils to choofe the lefs, which Reafon indeed perfuades us to
do, fince it is neceiTary that it fhould be done: but this helps no-
thing towards a Vindication of the Divine Goodnefs, which has im-
pofed this NecefTuy upon us : nor can he be happy by the Judgment
of his own Underftanding, who muft undergo thefe things. But if
it be granted that things pleafe us, not becaufe the Underftanding
judges them to be eligible, but becaufe we refolve to exercife our
Free-Will in performing them, even thefe will become agreeable by
Election, and the Underftanding will perceive them to be made fo 9
and not make them to be fo. 'Tis not therefore the Office of the
Underftanding to govern the Will, but to difcover means for the at-
tainment of that which is chofen, and to give warning when it choo-
fes fuch things as are abfurd or impoifible : For the Underftanding, as
we faid before, judges that to be good which is agreeable to our
Choice, except this lead us into Abfurdities. In order therefore to a-
void Abfurdities, we make ufe of the Underftanding as a Monitor,
not a Mafter.

And from hence, I think, it appears how inconvenient it would be
for the Choice to depend in all cafes upon the Underftanding. For
iince the Judgment of the Underftanding depends upon the Objeds
themfelves, and the natural congruity which they bear to the Appetites;
if the Choice were to be determin'd by its Judgment, 'tis evident that we
muft neceffarily want a great many things which the Underftanding
fudges to be good, and could never hope for folid Happinefs, (88.)

fince

N O f E S.

(88.) That is, if every thing which the Un- [always unhappy, fince I could never attain to
derftanding reprefented as good in itfelf, made Jail the Good I faw. Whereas by this Power
a necejjary Part of my Happinefs, I fhould be J of willing, I cut off K\ral of thefe apparent

I (.J0(.'J5,

2 ?8

Of Moral Evil

The Good-

fince Objects are fix'd, as we faid before**, and can never anfwer to
our natural Appetites in every Particular. In order therefore to the
attainment of continual Happinefs, it wasneceffary that we mould be
able to pleafe onrfelves in fome refpect, independently of the Under-
ftanding, and by Election to conftitute thofe things good and agree -
.able to us, which the Understanding, if there had been no fuch Elec-
tion, would have pronounced orTenlive, difagreeable and painful : From
hence it appears how fit it is that this Power mould be freed from
the Government of the Understanding ; but if it is freed, it could not
be determin'd by it.

XIV. Fourthly, It is to be obferv'd that the Divine Power is Infi-
; andwif mte > an d that there are innumerable things poilible to ir, which are
dom of God repugnant to one another, and destructive of each other, and cannot
bang equd k v an y means b e confiftent. If therefore God fhould act according;

to his rower. J , J T - . t i 1 *

hinders him to the Infinity of his Power, without any regard to his other Attri-
from . chooflR ? butes, he Would effect nothing at all, or elfe immediately deftroy what
he had effected. His infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs therefore gave
bounds and reftraint to his Power, which would other wife confound
everything j and thefe muft of necefiity be equally Infinite with his
Power, otherwife infinite Evils muft certainly arife from infinite Po-
wer. But a Creature, as his Elective Power neceflarily extends far-
ther than his Wifdom and Goodnefs, is made naturally liable to fall
fometimes into Evils. 'Tis well known that Mathematicians fome-
. times fuppofe a Line to be infinite in which they may take a Point
.wherever they pleafe. Now fince our Election may be made as we

pleafe,

NOTES.

Goods, r.nd only make fach to be conftituent
parrs or" my Happinefs as I choofe, and if I
chofe only fuck as I could obtain, I might
be always Happy. This Propofnion, viz. that
all Good does not make an EJJential Part of our
Happinefs , Lecaufe we do not will it, is after ted
by Mr. Locke f , and well urg'd as a Reafon why
the greater Good does not abfoluiely determine
ihe Mind : and die fame, I think, might as

* Sea. r. Subfecl. $. par. 2.
f Chapter cf Power, \ 43;

juflly be afnrm'd of Pain, viz. That the remo-
val of all Pain does not make a part of our
prefent Happinefs, fince we do not always ab-
foluteiv will or defire to remove it. But on
the contrary choofe to bear it, and by that
Choice, ofcen produce a PleafuTe, which does
more than counterbalance it. See C. 5. S- 2.
par. 6. and Note 65.

Of Moral Evil.

*i9'

pleafe, the Wifdom and Goodncfs whereby it is to be govern 'd, ought
to be infinite : for if the Line be finite, a Point may be pitch'd upon
beyond it: and in like manner, if the Goodnefs and Wifdom be finite,
the Choice may be made without and beyond them, that is, amifs.
But fince all created Wifdom and Goodnefs mutt necefTarily be finite, .
it follows that there wants a fufiicient reftraint upon Elections, and
that every free Creature is neceflarily defeffible. As then all created
Beings are necefTarily imperfect in general fo every one has its own
peculiar Defect. And this kind of Imperfection, viz. the Power of \
oinning, is proper and peculiar to fuch as enjoy Free-Will : nor can -
they be conceiv'd feparate from each other, any more than Contrarie-
ty from Motion. (89.)

XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty ofpleafing itfelf by Election ButManimy
cannot be determin'd to Good by Objefls, in the fame manner as the choofca . mifs
Sight is to Light, or Tafte to Savours, (fince Goodnefs is not always Goodnefs
an abfolute Quality in things, like Light and the Objects of Senfe) and wifdom
nor by the Vnderfianding^ fince many things mutt be chofen in which no' r the a r n a be
the Understanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they adequate to
are capable of being chofen, and when chofen pleafe, becaufe they his p ovvcr.
exercife the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infi-
nite, yet there are infinite refpects in which Good or Evil may be
produced : There's need then of infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs to
dire/t the Choice, left it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature
endow'd with Wifdom is finite, it is not poflible but that it may fome-
times do amifs in choofing.

XVI. Fifthly,

N O <T E S.

(89) As Motion without Contrariety would
be of no ufe, fo Liberty without a Power of
doing amifs, if fuch a thing were poflible,
would be of no value -. it would net have the
good Effedls and Ends for which Liberty was
given: particularly it would not be attended
with the happy confeioufnefs of Defert, or the
Idea of receiving a Benefit, by way of reward,
conferr'd upon us for having done what was
right and good, and what we might as eafily
have not done. From which Idea, as inclu-

ding Self-Approbation, &t. we frequently feel a
far more exquifite Pleafure, than from the in-
trinfic Value of the Benefit itfelf: Nay, with-
out this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would
prove even an Uneafinefs to a generous Mind.
This Notion will be farther explain'd and
vindicated in the following Subfc&ion ; but
for the Truth of it we muft appeal to the con-
stant Experience of the ingenuous part of
Mankind,

240 Of Moral Evil.

XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the Choice of t\ ~

^fomettmes thi^g 3 o^ty which the Understanding declares to be good, or was re-
decciv'dwithftrain'd from cricofing till the Goddnefs Of the Objects were apparent,
than'tobe al we mlt ^ ^ neGe ^ u y hefitate in many things, and be anxious and fo-
w.i>s folici- lieitOus in all. For fiiice things are connected together by a long
tons. chain of CoRfcquenceS, it is impovTible for us to form a right Judg-

ment of the abfolute Goodnefs of them, without a foreknowledge of
thefe Confequefrtces : we muft therefore have been oblig'd to ufe all
podible Difquifition before every Election, and fufpend the Choice
whefe any fufpicion of Error cr ground of Doubt mould appear:
But fueh a Difquifition and continual Solicitude would bs a greater
Bar to Happinefs than many Errcrs and natural Inconveniencies. For
if the Will can produce Good to itfelf by choofing, the Errors and
IrtcOnveniencies to Which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be com-
penfated by the Pleafure which atifes from the Senfe of Liberty. But
if we were oblig'd to all pdffible Enquiry, more inconvenience would
be felt from that Obligation, thaft from feme Errors in Election ; nor
would all of them be by this means avoided ; for after all poffrble Ex-
amination, a finite Undemanding maybe deceiv'd. Evil Elections are
-to be avoided on account of the Uneafiftefs confequent upon them, if
therefore fuch a Difquifition as is necefTary to difcover die Good, and
a Sufpenfftfn ol the kieclive Faculty till that Good be difcover'd,
Would bring greater Uneafmefs than fome Wrong Elections, a Man
will be more happy with a Power of doing amifs, than if he were
oblig'd to wait for the determination of the Undemanding in every
Cafe. For it is better that fome Perfons mould fometimes do amifs,
arid fuffer Uneafinefs from the -Confcicnce of having done fo, than
that all Men mould in every Cafe be always afraid, uncertain, and
folicitous, nay generally ceafe fr'Om all manner of Action.
TUbetterto XVII. Such is the Nature of our Will that it can pleafe itfelf in
be m danger Election, and by its own Power make the things chofen agreeable,
thantTcSic t ^ > m themfefves difagreeable to the Appetites. And tho 1 this can-
from Elec not fee done at all times, and in evefry Object, yet it is better to run
ijn * the hazard, than to be deprived Of fo ufeful a Faculty, or to be re-

ftrain'd from Ele^ion till ati imperfect Understanding, fuch as that
of Man neceffarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impoffibility.

Of Moral Evil.

It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Hap-
pinefs from the Will itfelf j for if it depended on the Understanding,
it would come with Difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could fel -
dom enjoy it pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore for us to be
able to pleafe ourfelves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and
Confequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to ceafe from E-
lection, and be reftrain'd from the Exercife of our Faculties, till a
whole train of thefe were perfectly apparent,- which if it could be at
all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find
that tries. (90.)

S U B S E C T.

$41

NOTES.

quainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and
made fenfible of the Infinite Wifdom, Power,
and Goodnefs of the Deity, fhewn in the Go-
vernment and Suppreflion of the former, and
in the Production and Improvement of the
latter: Tho, I fay, thefe exalted Beings could
be fuppofed to have a thorough Intuition of all
the Attributes of God without any fuch mani-
feftation of them in his Works; (againft which
Notion fee D'OylfsFirJi Differ tat ion, C. 8. and
Comlujion, p. 123.) yet it does not feem pof-
fible for fuch imperfett Creatures as we are, to
attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and en-
joy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms
than the prefent ; we could not fure have had
fo lively an Idea of the Mercy of God, if there
had never been any proper Objects of it. We
could not have been fo thoroughly confeious
of our Dependency or Danger 1 nor had fo
grateful a fenfe of our conftant Support, our
frequent Deliverances, nor confequently have
arrived to fo great a degree of Happinefs, ei-
ther in this Life or the next, by any other Me-
thod, as will be further fhewn in Notes 103,
and 108. Either then thefe Happy Beings are
ftill perfectly free, which Freedom conftitutes
the greateit part of their Happinefs j and let

any

* See bis Anfwer to the Querinofa Provincial, and Crit.Dia.ArttiU Ma/chioni tes,wr F. fcfr.
f See A. Bp. Daws'j $tb Setrn. p. 73, 74.
|| See the beginning of Note 95.

I i

(90.) All that Bayfe objeb to this*, is ta-
ken from the Nature of Good Angels, and
Glorified Souls, who, according to him, are
no lefs happy in themfelves, nor perform a lefs
acceptable Service to the Deity for the want of
it ; and why therefore might not we ? To
what was obferv'd about the Inconclufivenefs
of all fuch Arguments as are drawn from Be-
ings of a different Order in Note 46, we fhall
here add, firit, that it is more than we are ob-
llg'd to grant, that either Angels or Saints in
Heaven are abfolutely devoid of Liberty. They
may have more clear Impreffions of Good and
Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Under-
ftandings, fewer and lefs Temptations, C3V.
without being lefs freef; nay they mull be
more free, the more they are fo qualify'd ||.
This way of reafoning therefore proceeds upon
a falfe, or at leaft uncertain Hypothefis.

Secondly, Tho' it fhould be granted that
thefe glorious Beings, fuppofing them all n-
ceflary, might have as ample Knowledge, as
ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and
confequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of
God and themfelves, as if they were all free;
tho' they might have no occafion to fee or ex-
perience Vice, in order to their being fully ac-

$41

Of Moral Evil

SUBSECT. III.

Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence, and occa*
fionally retrain the Will from dep-aved Elettions,

More and
greater Evilj
would arifc
from thence,
than from
the abufe of
Jrce-Will.

It would
be as much
Violence
to prevent
the Attion
of Free-
Will, as the

I. v I 'I S evident from what has been faid, that it was agreeable
| to the Divine Goodnefs to have created Free Agents, fox
without thefe the Syftem of Nature would have been imperfect : nor
could their Actions have been determin'd to Good by any natural
Propenfity or Limitation, in the fame manner as the Senfes are limi-
ted by Objects : But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for
their Actions, and if he mould fufpend his Influence, they would not
act at all. Since therefore he could fo eafily hinder the abufe of Li-
berty, why does he fuffer it? Why does he not reflrain Elections
when they tend to Vice and Abfurdity ? We grant that this Objec-
tion cannot be fatisfactorily anfwer'd, otherwife than by mewing that
more and greater Evils would befal the Univerfe from fuch an Inter-
pofition, than from the abufe of Free- Will. In order to which it is
to be confider'd,

II. In the nrft place, That this cannot be effected without Vio-
lence done to Nature. 'Tis allow'd that Elections ought to be free,
and that thinking Beings cannot otherwife be happy : God himfelf
in creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Law, that they

mould

Motion of the Sun,

NOTES.

any Man try to prove the contrary ; or at leaft
they once were fo, in order to their greater
Perfection, and are now only alter'd by being
tranflated into another State, and put out of

farther Tryal ; and confequently they belong
to our Author's third Expedient, which will
be examin'd in Subfeft. 5. to which we muft
: refer the Reader.

Of Moral Evil 24.3

fliould be free. For by giving them a Nature endow'd with Choice,
he allow'd them to make ufe of it. They cannot therefore be hin-
der'd without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that
God can difpenfe with the Laws of Nature ; but who will require
or allow this to be done frequently ? The bounds of this World,
and the number of Thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we
believe that the Syltem of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all
things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other Se-
curity of our Happinefs, and of the Duration of the World, than
the Divine Conftancy and Immutability: the Univerfal Laws of Na-
ture are the AfTurances of this Conftancy, and upon them does the
Security and Happinefs of the whole Work depend. It is not there-
fore to be expected that GoJ mould lightly difpenfe with thefe
Laws, much lefs alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment.
Since then it is provided by an Univerfal Law, that Free Agents
ihould procure to themfelves Happinefs by the ufe of Election, and
it is impomble but that thefe, being left to themfelves, mould fome-
times fall into depraved Elections, would it not be an Infringement
and a Violation of this Law, if God mould interpofe and hinder the
ufe of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had eftabli-
fhed ? We dont expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Courfe
of the Sun, mould be alter'd on our account, becaufe thefe feem to
be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreafo-
nable, that, for our private Advantage, the Order and Harmony of
things mould be chang'd, to the detriment of fo many Beings. But
to alter the Will, to ftop Election, is no lefs a Violation of the
Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Courfe of the Sun. For a
Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of it
Nature are to be efteem'd more facred, and not to be chang'd with-
out a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and
Violence done to Nature, if God mould interfere and hinder the
Actions of Free- Will ; and perhaps it would prove no lefs pernicious
to the Intellectual Syftem, than the Sun's {landing ftill would be ta
the Natural. His Gcodnefs therefore docs not fuffer him to inter-
pofe, except when he forefees that the Evils arifing from our de-
praved Elections are greater than thofe which would enfue upon art

I i 2 Interrupt

344

God by in-
terpofing in
the Elections
of his Crea-
tures, would
quite invert
the Method
of treating
Prce Agents.

Of Moral Evil.

Interruption of the Courfe of Nature, which he only can know who
knows all things. (91.)

III. Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would not only do Vio-
lence to Nature, but quite invert the Method of treating Free A-
gents. This Method is to hinder or excite Elections by Rewards and
Punifhments : To divert them from unreafonable or abfurd things,
and draw them to better by the perfuafion of Reafon. But it is
doubtful, whether the Nature of the thing will permit an Election
to be determin'd by Impulfe, or, as it were, by immediate Contact.
For it feems equally abfurd to attempt a change of Election by any
other means than thofe above mention'd, as to defire to flop the
Impetus of Matter by Intreaty, or offering Rewards. May we not
with the fame reafon expect that Matter mould l?e moved by Re-
wards and Punifhments, as the Will influenc'd by Phyfical Impulfe,
as they call it ? For it is by thefe Means that they would have God
to flop or alter the Choice. So prepoflerous an Interpofal would con-
found

NOTES.

(91.) By this laft Conceffion our Author e-
vidently allows that God may fometimes have
fufficient reafon to interpofe in matters rela-
ting to our Elections (tho' perhaps he never
acts upon the Will by Pbyjital Impulfe, or ir-
refiflibly, which will be confider'd in the next
Subfection) his Defign therefore is only to
lhew that this ought not to be done frequent-
ly, or as often as Men choofe amifs. Now
this may be illuftrated in the fame manner as
we treated of the Laws of Motion, &>V. That
there are general Mechanic Laws in the Na-
tural World, the Eftablifhment and Preferva-
tion whereof tends more to the Happinefs of
the Creation, and is every way more worthy
of the Deity, than to aft always by particular
Wilh y was fhewn in Note 37. If thefe Laws
were frequently alter 'd and unfix'd, they would
ceafe to be Laws, and all Action, Labour,
Contrivance which depends upon the Stabili-
ty, and computes the future Effects of them,
mull ceafe, or at leafl prove infignificant. In
like manner Liberty has been proved to be an
Univerfal Law of Intellectual Beings, and the
great Ufe and Excellence of it evinc'd, and

therefore we have equal re.ifon to fuppofe that
it could not be, at leaft not frequently, fufpen-
ded, without as great Inconvenience as would
attend the Violation of thefe Laws of Mecha-
nifm. If this were done in the Rational
World, all Studies, Enterprifes, Arguments ;
in fhort, all kind of Reafoning would be vain
and ufelefs, all rewardable Action, and its
concomitant Happinefs (of which in Note 89,
and more below) muft entirely ceafe. Nay,
perhaps to deprive a rational Being of Free-
will, would be altogether as abfurd and in-
convenient, as to endow a Machine with Re-
flection, or an Edifice with Self-motion. But
our great Ignorance of the Intellectual World
muft render any Argument of this kind very
uncertain. However, thus much we are fure
of, that fo great Violence done to the Will,
would be directly contrary to the general Me-
thod of God's treating reafonable Creatures,
and quite oppofite to the end of all thofe Ma-
nifeftations he has made of his Nature and
Will; the very Reverfe of all thofe Argu-
ments, Exhortations, Promifes and Threats,
which are the Subject of Rcveal'd Religion : a

Man

Of Moral Evil.

found every thing, and leave nothing certain in Nature. How fatal
fuch an Experiment would be, and how it would effect the Minds
of the Obfervers, or what Sufpicions concerning God and their own
Security, it might fuggeit to the whole Syftem of thinking Beings,
God only knows. We fee that human Laws cannot be difpens'd with,
without very many Inconveniencies, which yet, as they are made up-
on an imperfect Forelight, and can provide for few Cafes, feem na-
turally to require fome Interpofal : how much greater Evils may we
apprehend from a Difpenfation with the Divine, the natural Laws;
on the Obfervance of which the Good of the whole depends ? This
feems to be the reafon why God makes ufe of fo much Labour and
Pains, fo great an Apparatus of Means, (92.) fo many Precepts, Per-
fuafions, and even Entreaties for the Amendment of Mankind ; which
neverthelefs he could effect in a Moment, if he were pleas'd to apply
force ; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not forefeen more
Inconveniencies from a Change in the Order of Nature, and Violence
done to Elections.

IV. Thirdly, That which gives us the greateft Pleafure in Elections^
is a Confcioufnefs that we could have not chofen; without this 'tis no
Choice at all : but fuch is the Nature of us rational Beings, that no-
thing pleafes us but what we choofe. In order therefore to make any

thing

oufnefs that we might have not

He would
take away
that which
is the moil
agreeable to
us in E-
leclions, viz,
a Confci*
choien.

NOTES.

Man that believes any thig of thefe (upon the
Belief of which I am now arguing) can never
imagine that they are all nude ufe of to no
purpofe, as they muil be in a great meafure, if
the Will could be over ruled occafionally with-
out any confiderable Inconvenience. This is
what our Author endeavours to prove in the
following Paragraph.

(02.) The Hiftory of the Jnciflt Nation af-
fords good Inftances of this. What an appa-
ratus of outward Means was continually made
ufe of in the Government of that ftiff-necked
People? What frequent Murmurings, Rebel-
lions and Apoftacys were permitted, and then

punifh'd ? What numerous Miracles, both of
the remunerative and vindictive kind were ap-
ply'd, in order to bring them to fome tolera-
ble fenfe of their dependence on God, and a
fuitable praftice of the Duties refulting from
it ? All which would have been unnecefTary
at lead, if one Miracle exerted on their Minds
could have done the bufinefs ; if their Under-
itan dings could as well hive been illumina-<
ted and their Wills refonn'd at once, and if
their Practice produced by this means, and as
it were, extorted from them, would have been
equally agreeable to the Deity.

6 Of Moral Evil.

v thing agreeable to us, 'tis neceflary for us to be confcious that we

choofe it voluntarily, and could have refufed it : But if God de-
termine our Election extrinfically, the moil agreeable Part of all is
taken away. For we muft either be confcious that God determines
our Will or not; if we be confcious, how can that be agreeable
which is obtruded on us by force ? If we be not, we are deceiv'd
in the Operations of our own Minds ; neither can we know whether
the Elections be our own or God's. Nay the force of Laws, toge-
ther with the Efficacy of Rewards and Punifhments, would be quite
deftroy'd. For who would regard Laws or Rewards, when he was
certain that Qod would hinder him from doing any thing which
might occalion the Lofs of Rewards, or make him incur the Punifh-
ments ? But however this be, 'tis very certain that our greateft Plea-
fure, nay our very Reward, confifts in being confcious that we have
ufed our Choice aright, and done thofe things which we might have
not done, and which another under the fame Circumftances would
perhaps not have done. On the other hand, 'tis the greateft Grief
and Affliction to have omitted fuch things as would have tended to
our Happinefs, and were in eur Power; one of thefe could not be
had without the other, and if none were fufFer'd to grieve for a bad
Election, none would rejoice for a good one. But it is better that
fome few mould grieve for their , own folly, than that all mould be
deprived of the Rewards of their good Actions. That Privilege then
of doing well, and pleafing ourfelves in what is well done, could not
be had without the hazard of Sinning; if God mould take away the
one, the other would vanifh of itfelf.

But you would have the Pleafure which arifes from Election with-
out the Danger; that is, the End without the Means: Neither do
you obferve that the greateft Pleafure in this Cafe is, that you could
have done otherwiie : and this arifes from the very Nature of Plea-
fure, which fcems to be nothing elfe but a Senfe of the Exercife of
tkofe Faculties and Powers which we enjoy. The more therefore any
Action is ours, the more it pleafes us; and fince a Free Action (which
we could either exert or omit) is the moft of all ours, it muft necef-
farily pleafe us moil : But if the Will were confined to one Side, or
detain'd from the other, the Action would ceafe to be ours, and the

Pleafure

Of Moral Evil.

Pleafure would perih together with the Senfe of Liberty. A Mind
confcious of Virtue is the Pleafure and Reward of good Actions, but
unlcV. \\ w.re poffible for it to become confcious of Vice, 'tis plain
it cannot be confcious of Virtue. (93.)

You

NOTES.

(93.) In oppofition to what our Author has
here advane'd, Bajle * brings a great many
Arguments drawn from the Tenets of Cahi-
nifts, Spinozifts^ &c. who believe that all their
Actions arc neceffarily determined, and yet are
no le r s pleas'd with them. Nay fome, fays he,
rejoice in this very thing, that they are under
the abfolute Direction of the Deity. Dij me
tuentur f, and to be naturally determin'd to
the belt was always look'd upon as a peculiar
Happincfs, and they that came neareft it were
efleem'd the bell Men, as the known Compli-
ments to Cato and Fabricius declare. Some are
as well pleas'd with what they have by Lot or
Inheritance, as what they get by their own La-
bour : Witnefs the Pride of antient Families,
ciff. Gaudeant bene nati is a common Pro-
verb, and among the Things quce vitam fa-
aunt beatiorcm, Martial reckons Res non part a
Labcre fed relicla. And again : If, fays he, we
did take delight in choofing things, yet it
would be enough for us if God conceal'd his
determination from us, and we only believ'd
that we were free to choofe and a<t

We need not, I think, fpend much time in
anfwering fuch Arguments as thefe. For the
Cahinijls, &c. notwithftanding all their abfurd
Tenets, have evidently this Confcioufnefs of
Choice within them, which is the fecret fource
of the Pleafure that attends their Actions, and
cannot be extinguifh'd by any of their Princi-
ple, but overcomes them all, and conftantly
puts thefe Men upon fuch Endeavours as are
vain and ufelefs upon the Suppofition, and in
confident with the Belief of Fate and abfolute
PredclVi nation : which (hews us that thefe No
tions are neither acted upon in Life, nor pur-
fu'd to their utmoft Confequences ; that they

reft in pure Speculation, and are generally laid
afide in Practice; in fhort, that they are abfo-
lutely inconfiftent with human Nature, as well
as human Reafon.

Secondly, Some Perfons may rejoice in be-
ing under the particular Care, Protection and
Government of the Deity; but then their Joy
proceeds not fo much from a bare Contem-
plation of what the Deity does for them, as
from confidering on what account he does it,
viz. becaufe they are , agreeable to him, and
proper Objects of his Favour, and that on ac-
count of fomething which they themselves have
done. If Horact meant otherwife by his Dij
me tuentur, he had fmall reafon for what he
adds in the next Line, Diis Pittas mea cif Mufa
cordi eft.- But in truth this and moft other of
BayWs Teftimonies are Rhetorical or Poetic
Flourifhes, rather than Philofophic Truths,
and confequently not worth a ferious Exami-
nation. To draw any thing like an Argument
from another's Words, we fhould at leaft be
fure of his determinate Meaning, of the pre-
cife number of his Ideas, as well as the juft-
nefs of their Connection together, which we
muft never expect from fuch kind of random
Quotations. It may not therefore be improper
to obferve here once for all, that Bay/e's ufu.il
Method of reafoning from Authorities muft be
very weak and unphilofophical ; and calculated
rather to blind Mens Eyes, than to inform their
Underftandings.

Thirdly, We are pleas'd indeed with what
we call Good Fortune, when a great Sum of Mo-
ney comes to us by Lot, or a large Eftate, or
.1 Title by Inheritance; and are perhaps the
more delighte 1 ., the gre.uer the Change is in
our Circumftance* ; and the iefs Expectation

* Anfwer to the Queries of a Provincial, p. 665.
f Horace, B. 1 . Ode 1 7.

Fol.

24.8 Of Moral Evil

You may urge, that you had rather want this Pleafure .than un-
dergo the Danger ; that is, you had rather be a Brute than a Man :
neither could you by this means avoid thefe natural Evils which
you dread fo much as foolifhly to wifh yourfelf a Brute, left you
mould fall into them. But fuppofing it were convenient for you
to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature : The
Syftem of the Univerfe required free Agents : without thefe the
Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodnefs chofe
the Benefit of the Univerfe rather than that of yourfelf j efpecially
when this is better for you too, tho' you be fo ungrateful as not
to confefs it.

V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature,
Free Agents for God to hinder bad Elections by his abfolute Power, fo nothing
are placed as j^ conceiv'd to be more difagreeable to himfelf. We have faid

it were out o

of the reach that

of Divine

Pttuer, the Government of thefe therefore is the proper Exercife of the Divine Wifdom, wherein God de-
lights.

NOTES.

we had of it f. But is this Pleafure compara-
ble to that Intellectual or Moral Pleafure, that
fublimeSatisfactionandSelf-complacency, which
we feel upon acquiring a like Sum of Money
by fome laudable Aft, or egregious Underta-
king, that may properly be call'd our own t Is
it equal to that folid Comfort, and Self-appro-
bation which every ingenuous Mind is fenfible
of from his doing what deferves an Eltate or
Title, and receiving thefe as the proper Re-
compence and due Tribute of fuch Deeds ?
The Man that can value himfelf more upon
his Defcent from an antient Family, than up-
on being by thefe means the Founder of a new
one, is a dilgrace to his Defcent, and unwor-
thy of the Arms he bears. But to return:

There is undoubtedly an agreeable and ex-
alted Confcioufnefs attending all the Bleffings
which we ourfelves are inftrumental in procu-
ring, infinitely beyond all the Satisfaction
which they could afford us, if we knew our-
felves to be unconcern'd in the Attainment,
and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them.

This is the great Spur and Incitement to ma-
ny noble Actions here, and will be part of the
Crown and Reward of them hereafter (as is
illuftrated at large by Dr. Scott in the firft Vol.
of his Cbrijlian Life, and by Dr. yenkin, in
his Reafonabhnefs of Cbri/lianity, 2d vol. C. 12.
prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly merit
any thing at the hand of God, yet the Con-
fcioufnefs of having perform'd fuch Actions
as are in themfelves acceptable to, and re-
wardable by him, and of receiving Bleffings
from him in return for fuch Actions, muft ve-
ry much increafe our Happinefs in the Enjoy-
ment of thefe Bleffings, both in this Work 4 ,
and the next (ai is fhewn in the fame places]
Nor, laftly, could we receive this Pleafure
which now refults from our Choice and Ac-
tion, if we were determin'd in every thing by
the Deity, fuppofing that Determination con-
cealed from us, and we only made to believ;
that we were really free to choofe and adl.
For, as our Author obferves, this would be

f See Note 30.

Of Moral Evil.

that God made the World in order to have fomething wherein to ex-
ercife his Attributes externally. His Power therefore exerts itfelf
chiefly in one thing, and his Wifdom and Goodnefs in another. He
exercifed his Power in creating the World, and putting it into Motion ;
his Goodnefs and Wifdom in the Order and Agreement of things :
But the Divine Wifdom feems to have fet apart the Government of
Free Agents as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully exercifes itfelf,
and acts up to its Infinity ; for if it were finite it would not be equal
to fo great a Tafk. It does not feem a very extraordinary thing for
God to be able to govern and abfolutely direct fuch Beings as are
merely pafiive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby
they might make any Refinance. For thofe things obey eafily which
do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of in-
finite Wifdom to govern them, for infinite Power, with a moderate ufe
of Wifdom, would have been fufficient. That there might be a Sub-
ject therefore whereon the infinite Wifdom of God mould difplay it-
felf, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his
Power and left to themfelves, might act in a manner independent of
his Will. 'Tis evident to any Perfon how much more difficult it is,
and how much greater Exercife of Wifdom it requires to direct a
Multitude of thefe to a certain End, and make them confpire to the

common

NOTES.

to arrive at the End without the Means, and to
have the Effect without the Caufe. All our
Ideas of Merit arife from, and are entirely
founded in Free Choice : this (as far as we can
apprehend) is the ncceffary Medium to fuch
Moral Happinefs; and we can no more con-
ceive how one mould come without the other,
than how we mould fee without Eyes: and
for us to have this Pleafure, - tho' another
did the Action, would be the fame as for
ore Man to be confeious. of his doing
what fome other really did, or for him to
fee by fome other's Eyes. Such Suppofui-
ons as thefe would breed endlefs Confufion.
For wc muft either know whether another did
this Adion or not ; if we do know this, then
how can we attribute that to ourfelves, or
pride ourfelves in that which we know belongs

to another? If we do not know this, then
how can we attribute to ourfelves, or pleafe
ourfelves in anything? Since every thing in
and about us may, for what we know, be done
by another, and fo we in reality may never de-
krve either praife or blame. The natural con-
fequence of which is, that we might as well
never aim at Defert, or ftrive to do any thing
it all: and this is the genuin Product of all
fuch Suppofitions as queftion the Veracity of
our Faculties, and would make us fufpeel that
we may be impofed upon even in the regular
Operations of our own Minds. The fame
Arguments with thofe of Bay/e, as well as tho
like method of reafoning, are made ufe of by
the Author of the Pbihfopbical Enquiry, cifr.
p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks,

" It

K k

250

Of Moral Evil.

ccnunon Good, than to order Brute Beafts, and fuch as have no Po-
wer of themfelves, in what manner you pleafe. To them that con-
fider the vaft Multitude of Free Agents, which is almoft infinite, and
their Independence (fince every one is, at leaft in many Cafes, abfo-
lute Mafler of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to acl: ac-
cording to that Liberty) God feems to have given a Specimen of the
Extent of his Wifdom, whicji is able thus certainly and effectually to
bring to the End propofed, fo many Free Spirits, fo many Agents that
were in a manner fet at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed
every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for
Wifdom, wherein (fetting alide, and in a manner fufpending the
Exercife of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere
Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pais, that fo many jarring
Wills depending on themielves alone, and no more inclined to either
Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no fuch thing, mall
yet confpire together to promote the Good of the Univerfe. 'Tis im-
poflible that this Exercife of Wifdom mould not be very agreeable
to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be efteem'd agreeable
to him. But if he were oblig'd to interfere with his Power, that
would feem to argue a Defect of Wifdom j for what occafion is
there for him to interpofe and flop the Liberty of Election before gran-
ted, if his Wifdom could provide fufficiently for the Good of the
whole, without altering his Defign * ?

VI. From

n o r E s.

n It may not be improper to obferve, that
** fome of the Pleafures Man receives from
**. Obje&s are fo far from being the Effeft of
" Choice, that they are not the Effeft of the
" leaft Premeditation, or any Aft of his own,
" as in finding a Treafure on the Road, or in
*' receiving a Legacy from a Perfon unknown
" to him.*' But has a Man the fame Pleafure
ib thefe Cifes as if he had done fomething to
dtferve a Treafure of the Public ? or had the

Legacy conferr'd on him as a Reward for his
good Deeds to the deceafed Perfon, his late
lov'd Beneficiary, or his intimate Friend ? If
this Author can find a difference in thefe two
Cafes, this Obfervation of his muft be impro-
per : if he cannot, I am fure he has a different
enfe of things from the reft of Mankind, and
of confequence is not to be argued with. And
fo I take my leave of him.

* $** Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. Ch. 12. p. 140. &c.

Of Moral Evil. 151

VI. From hence it feems fufficiently evident why God would not it wcuid
interpofe his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, fince that ther f ore be
could neither be advantageous to ourfelves nor to the whole Syftem, "reeabie to
nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that abfolute Goodnefs God ' nor
permits Evil Elections, fince for the moft part they could not be^[ U G d US '
prevented without greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, foouid ai-
there's no doubt but God will take care that the very beft fhall be 3 Eic"-"
done. (94.) tions.

K k 2 5UBSECT.

NOTES.

(94.) What has been urg'd in the foregoing
Subfcction about the Divine Jnterpofition in
human Elections muft be underftood in a li-
mited Senfe, viz. as relating only to an imme-
diate Influence, or an abfolute Determination
of the Will, /*. e. to fuchan in termed ling with
Elections as would make them to be no Elec-
tions at all. For it appears from the follow-
ing Subfection, that our Author did not in-
tend to exclude all kind of Interpofition in the
Government of Free Agents, but only that par-
ticular fort which would fubvert their natu-
ral Powery, or be definitive of their Free-
dom. Tho' God has eftablifh'd general Laws
both in the animate and inanimate World, yet
he has not left thefe entirely to themfelves, but
influences, directs, and governs them in fuch
a manner as is moft conducive to the great
End for which he defign'd them ; which End
could not be attain'd without fuch a particu
lar Influence, as will be fhewn below. In
determining the manner of this Government
we muft beware of the two Extremes of fup-
pofing either firft, that the Deity always in-
fluences fecond Caufes or Acts (as Malclranch
terms it) by particular Wills, in the Natural
or Moral World ; which would diflblve all
Laws of Nature, deftroy the Liberty of the
Creature, and reduce every thing to Fate : or,
fecondly, that he never interpofes in the. Go-
vernment of either World, hut lets the gene-
ral Laws of Mechanifm or p.f Liberty take

their natural Courfe, and operate as it were in-
dependently of himfelf; which would entirely
deftroy a particular Providence, and render the
general one in a great meafure ufelefs. The
bad Confequences which would attend the for-
mer of thefe Schemes have been touch'd upon
above : The latter (which is particularly e-
fpous'd by Leibnitz in his Syftem of Pre-efia-
blijb'd Harmony, and by Mr. Whifion in his
Netv Theory of the Earth) will be obviated in
the following Subjection. I fhall here only
add the Opinion of S. C. on the prefent Sub-
ject: " * 'Twas highly fuitable to the Divine
" Wifdom in the Government of the World,
" both to pre-ordain fome of the principal E-
" vents with relation to the entire human
" Community, or to the more confiderable
" parts of it, and to referve to himfelf a Right
14 of interpofing and influenc'ng particular A-
" gents, as in other Cafes, fo mere efpecially
" in order to the accomplishment of tjiefe E-
" vents. That he has actually done fo is a-
** bundantly clear from Scripture-Prophecys,
" and Hiftories. And that in fo doing he has
" acted in a manner moft worthy his Wifdom,
ft is no lefs manifeft. For hereby it appears
" that the Divine Government is equally op*
" pofed to Chance and Deftiny. Had the.
" Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left
" every Man to the Conduct of his own In-
" clinations, and natural Effects in general ta
" the Influence of their Caufes, without ever

interpofing

Impartial Enquiry, &c p. 115.

352

Of Moral Evil

Devout Men

hope for a
change in the
courfe of
Nature,
thro' their
Prayers.

S U B S E C T. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Trayer.

I. OOME may apprehend that God is not fo averfe from interpo-
O . fi n g immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here affert-
ed j and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of fo great con-
fequence with him, but that he may be ealily and frequently induced
to difpenfe with them contrary to what we have here advane'd. For
this feems to be the common Opinion of Mankind. Every Suppli-
cant that addrefTes himfelf to God, believes that this is effected by
the Deity, on account of his Prayers : for if he perceiv'd it to be
otherwife, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to
the Deity. For if all came to pafs according to the natural Order
of things, and the Series of Caufes, Vho could hope to be delivered
from a Diftemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations,

NOTE S..

interpofing to direct them to the attainment
of his great Defign ; this would have been
almoft in effect: to divert himfelf of the Go-
vernment of Rational Agents,, and to fubjedl
their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard
of the utmoft Diforder and Confufion. Or
had he, on the contrary, abfolutely or fa-
tally determined every Event,, tho' this
would have been far enough from diverting
himfelf of the Government of the World,
yet it would have been a Government un-
worthy of the Deity, a Government entire-
ly exclufive of all proper Sin and Punish-
ment, Virtue and Rewards : wherein him-
felf would in effect have been the only A-
gent, and all the Creatures ftupid and paffive.
Whereas, by pre-ordaining the moft material
Events, and fuffering the Creatures freely
to exert their Faculties in all convenient

" Cafes, he appears moft wi fely to have chofen
" the middle way, and thereby to have equal-
" ly avoided the Mischiefs of both Extremes."
See alfo p. 1 16.

All the Difference between this ingenious
Writer and our Author is, that in the Govern'
ment of the World he fuppofes the general
Law of Liberty to be fometimes fufpended, as
well as the Laws of Motion, cjV. Whereas
our Author, tho' he aliens the fame of the
latter, yet he denys it of the former; at leart
does not grant that fuch an Abridgment of Li-
berty is ncceffary to the aforefaid Government :
How on this Principle he accounts for that,
which we generally mean by a Particular Pro-
vidence, anfwering the Prayers, and thereupon
often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs
of Mankind, will be fhewn in its proper place.

Of Moral Evil. 253

by virtue of a Prayer ? Thefe things are either effected by the imme-
diate Interpohtion of the Divine Power, or are requeued of God in
vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Caufes, which may
not be alter'd, thofe Caufes would produce their Effects, as well up-
on the omiffion as the offering of thefe Supplications. But if God
fometimes voucnfafes to fufpend or change the Order and Laws of
Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the fame be done to
prevent the abufe of Free-Will and Natural Evils ? Either this In-
terpofition muff be admitted in order to oppofe thefe Evils, or it
mufl be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deferves
an Anfwer. We attempt to folve it in the following man-
ner.

II. 'Tis to be obferv'd then, in the firft place, that all Prayers are Goddoesnot
not heard by God, nor do we hope that all things fhall be done heir all
which are requested of him, but only fuch as he has declared to be a- Pra )' crs -
greeable to his Will, and has in fome refpeet promis'd to perform.

Thofe things then which are unneceffary, trifling, inconfiffent, hurt-
ful or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by
the Petitioners, tho' they be requefled never fo frequently.

III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold Obligation to his Crea- God is oh-
ture, firtt from his Goodnefs, whereby he is oblig'd fo to order all Jjjg'd t0 the
external things, that Exiftence fhall be better than Non-exiftence to hifooodneft
all who duely perform their Duty. Secondly, By fome Covenant or aid by c#-
Agreement, whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to be-*'*
flow fome Favours upon Men, notwithstanding they were Sin-
ners : Which Covenant, tho' it may not be efteem'd a natural one,

yet it cannot be judg'd to be againft Nature, or to offer Violence
to it.

IV. Thirdly, The things which are requeued of God either belong what may be
to the Mind, viz. that the Mind be found and vigorous, and able toJJJ ^
govern the Affections, &c, or to the Body, that Life and Strength be lat cither
prolong'd, Gfr. or to external things, that the Weather be ferene and^ 11 ^ 11 ^
ieafonable for the Fruits of the Earth, &c. Now thefe differ from external'
each other, and ought not to be prayed for under the fame Con- things,
ditions.

V. Fourthly*

254. Of Moral Evil.

V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, fince the Elective Power is the chief

God docs p art Q Man, and is felf-motive, 'tis fcarce conceivable how it fhould

AiSHance to be determin'd from without itfelf. For that which determines itfelf

our Minis at \ s entirely different from that which ftands in need of another to move

undcr^s cer- it> an d thefe appear to be no more applicable to the fame thing, than

tain Laws as a Square and a Circular Figure are to the fame Surface, at leaft, their

Natural the Natures muft be chang'd to make them compatible. But yet this

World. Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abufe and a perverfe

manner of acting, and when it is thus vitiated, 'tis probable that

God only can reflore it, for it is fuppos'd to be fubject to him a-

lone.

This Afliftance mull: be afforded to Mankind in fuch a manner that
no blemifh be thereby call: upon the Divine Conftancy, nor any Pre-
judice don to his Wifdom in eftablifhing the Laws and Order of Na-
ture. Now that all kind of Interpofition does not prejudice thefe,
appears from hence, viz. that it is mod worthy of the Divine Ma-
jefty to have referved to himfelf a Power over Nature, efpecially
while the Beings over whom this Power is referv'd enjoy their Li-
berty ; it feems not only proper that God mould be at Liberty to act.
in this manner with them, but alfo neceflary, provided this be not
done at random, but under fome known and certain Conditions. And
here the Divine Wifdom has exerted itfelf in a wonderful manner,
and devifed a Way to reconcile the Conftancy of God, and the San-
ctity of the Laws of Nature, with that Afliftance which is occasion-
ally afforded to Mankind upon their Requeft. Man might prefume
upon fome Method of effecting this, before Revelation : but 'tis to
this alone that we owe the clear and undoubted Manifeftation of it.
From hence we learn that God will give his Holy Spirit, under fome
certain Laws and Conditions, to thole that are fitly difpofed: which
would be as certain and conftant a Principle of Spiritual Actions, to
them that are endow'd with it, as Nature itfelf is of the Natural.
Since therefore this Spirit by its Grace affifts our depraved Will, and
in fome refpect reftores it to its Vigour, it cannot be judg'd to vio-
late the Order of Nature, any more than when its Influence fuftains
natural Caufes. If it be afk'd what thofe Laws are, under which the
Influence of this Spirit is promifed. I anfwer, all fuch things as are

neceffary

Of Moral Evil

neceffary to Salvation are promifed to them who make a right ufe
of their prefent Abilities, that pray to God thro' Chrifi for an In-
creafe of them, and that celebrate the Sacraments as the Law of God
requires. Upon thefe Conditions this Spirit defcends into the Minds
of Men, and by its holy Infpiration forms them to Piety.

VI. The giving of this Spirit, and obtaining it by Chrift, was a
moft miraculous Work of Divine Power, but the Operations of it,
fince they are now produced according to fix'd Laws and a fettled
Order, as regularly and conftantly as the Works of Nature, cannot
be reckon'd a Miracle any more than thefe are : For I call a Mira-
cle a fenfible Operation of God, which is perform'd in a Way con-
trary to Nature ; and as it happens beyond all certain and fix'd Order,
it proves God to be the immediate Caufe and Author : But the Inter-
position of the Divine Power exerted about the Will is not an Inter-
pofition of this kind, for it is done, as we faid, according to a cer-
tain Rule and Order, and therefore cannot be miraculous. I con-
fefs that this is indeed an Exception from the general Law of Free
Agents, (95.) but it is no lefs regular than the Law itfelf, nor any

N O ? E S.

2 55

The Aid of
ihe Holy Spi-
rit is not mi-
raculous.

(95.) He does not mean that this is an Ex-
ception from the Law of their Liberty, as ap
pears from what immediately follows; but from
their being left entirely to themfelves, or to
the cafual Impreffions of thofe external Ob-
jects and Agents which furround them ; from
their afting folely upon Principles of their
own Formation or Difcovery, and following
the Guidance of their natural Underftanding,
without any internal Afliftance : which feems
to be the general Law of this their prefent
State of Probation. The Holy Ghoft then, ac-
cording to our Author, does /jot fubvcrt and
fuperfede, but rather flrengthen, prefcrve and
perfect our natural Freedom ; it repairs the
breaches made therein by the Violence of
Temptations, by the Force of Evil Habits,
&c. counterbalances as it were the Influence
of Evil Spirits, and reftores the Mind to its
native Equilibrium, or Indifference. How
thefe EfFedls may be fuppos'd to be produced
in us, and of what kind the Influence of the

Holy Ghoft, of Good and Evil Angels is, will
be confider'd by and by. We (hall firft give
the Opinion of an Author or two concerning
what the Holy Spirit's Operations are not, or
that they cannot be in any refpett deftruttive of
our natural Powers,

In the firft place, " The manner of the
M Spirit's Operation is not inconfiftent with
" the Nature of Mankind, which (fays Dr.
- Stebbing) is a Truth fo fully and fo liberal-
" ly granted by all Parties, that nothing needs
" to be faid to prove it. Now Man we know
" is an intelligent and rational Being, able to
" difcern between Good and Evil ; he has al-
" fo fuch a Freedim or Liberty of Will as
" makes him accountable to God for his Be-
" haviour in this Life. By confequence th
" Spirit muft not be fuppofed to operate in
" fuch a manner as not to make the leaft ufe
" of the Underftanding, nor muft it be fo far
" inconfiftent with Freedom and Liberty, as

" that

056 Of Moral Evil.

more repugnant to their Nature. From hence it appears how God
may interpofe in Matters relating to the Will, and yet not violate the
Order of Nature, nor injure his Conftancy. Not that God actually
determines the Will by an immediate Influx, for by this means the
Act of Election would change its Nature, and be imputed to God
rather than to the Will of the Creature, but that in fome manner he
reflores the Faculty to its Perfection, and makes it, when thus fitly
difpos'd, exert its proper Actions according to the Rectitude of its
Nature, without any Diminution of its Liberty.

VII. Fifthly,

NOTES,

" that a Man's Ailions may not properly
** be call'd his own *. '' Again, *' fuch
" is the manner of the Spirit's Operati-
" ons, that they do not make our own Care
'* and Diligence after Virtue aud Godlinefs
" unneceflary, but that on the other hand th?
" Operations of the Spirit will do us no
" Good, if our own Endeavours be wanting.
* Thirdly, He does' not produce his EfTecls
" in us all at once, but in fuch Order, and by
" thofe Degrees that fuit with our Capacities
*' and Qualification f. Laftly,vHis Motions
** are not difcernable by us from the natural
"Operations of our Minds. We feel them no
* otherwife than we do our Thoughts and
" Meditations, we cannot diftinguifh them by
" the manner of their affedling us from our
** natural Reafonings, and the Operations of
* Truth upon our Souls, fo that if God had
' only defign'd to give the Holy Spirit to us,
without making any mention of it in his
'* Word, we couid never have known, unlefs
" it had been communicated to us by fome
", private Revelation, that our Souls are mo-
" ved by a Divine Power when we love God
" and keep his Commandments }(.'' '

This is a Confirmation of what our Author
has declared above, particularly that the Holy
Spirit's Operations cannot be call'd miraculous.
A larger Proof and Illwllration of the forego-

ing Propofitions may be feen in the fame Chap-
ter. The Confequence refulting from them,
viz. that the Spirit does not operate irrefiflibly,
is clearly proved and defended againft Turejin
in Chap. 8, 9, Ciff.

To proceed : "It hath been the antient
M Opinion of the Church of God (fays R.
" Batiell**) that the Will is not deltroy'd by
" Grace, but only repair'd. A diflocated
! * Joint, when it is fet again, doth not lofe
" the Nature of a Joint, but rather is reftored
" to its former life and comelinefs, fo the
" Grace of God healing the Will, doth not
{t take away the Nature of the Will, butoniy
" makes it able to obey God's Will. So that
*' when God co-operates with the Will, Man
" is left in the hand of his own Council, to
** turn or not to turn to the Lord : God fets
M Life and Death before him, and bids him
M reach out his hand to whether he will."

And again, p. 77. " Neither Sin nor
Grace take away the natural Power of the
" Will ; but only thus it is, Sin hurts and
" weakens it, efpecially ill Habits ; Grace
" heals and ftrengthens it, and brings it near-
" er to its primitive Goodnef.% 65V." This is
very agreeable to what our Author afierts in
the Conclufion of this Paragraph. See alfo
Serifs Chrijlian Life, Part 2. Ch. 4. par. 5.
p. 237. " God (fays he) in the ordinary

" courfe

* Treatife Concerning the Operations of the Spirit, C. 7. p. 123. %vo.
f- Ibid. p. 124. || Ibid. p. 125, 126.

-** Vulgar Emrs in Divinity removed, p. 74.

Of Moral Evil.

a 57

VII. Fifthly, It may be demonftrated that the Prayers themfelves Pra y cr3 nata
have fome natural Power and Efficacy with regard to the Will : For,.^ " hc to
Prayers are certain Endeavours towards the Exercife of Liberty, andMind.
contain in them Acts of Election, tho' perhaps imperfect ones j and
fuch is the Nature of all Powers, that tney acquire Strength by trial
and exercife, and every Act, tho' imperfect, is a Step to a more per-
fect

NO r E s.

" coerfe of his Government doth as well leave
*' free Agents to the natural Freedom with
" which he firft created them as neecjfary one?
" to thefe Neceflities which he firlt itnprejs''c:
' upon their Natures. For his Providence is
" fuccedaneous to his Creation, and did at firft
" begin where that ended, and doth ftill pro-
** ceed as it began, ordering and governing all
" things according to the feveral Frames and
" Models in which he firft caft and created them.
" Nor can he order and govern them otherwife
**. without unravelling his own Creation, and
'* making things to be otherwife than he firft
" made them. For how can he ordinarily ne-
" cejfttate thofe Agents whom he firft made free
** without changing their Natures from free to
** necejfary, and making them a different kind of
" Being than he made them ? So that tho' in
" the courfe of his Government God doth
" powerfully importune and perfuade us, yet
" he lays no Neeejffity on our Wills; but leaves
" us free to cboofe or refufe; and as the Tempt a-
" tions of Sin incline us one way, fo the Grace
** of God inclines us another, but both leave us
'* to our own Liberty to go which way we
" pleafe."

Laftly, what may be expected from the Spi-
rit is (according to Dr. Rymer *) contain'd in
thefe heads, \Ji. Faith in its feveral Degrees.
2dly. Support againft Temptations. $d/y. The
promotion of Virtue. And, $tbly, The Ad-
vancement of Piety. All which are produced
as he there fhews, in a manner perfectly con-
fident with the free ufe of our Faculties. I
mall cite a Paragraph or two in relation to the
2d and 3d of thefe Heads. " As the Spirit

" never offers Violence to the Soul, it may
" fomctimes happen that the Light it give.--,
" the Importunity it ufes, may be fo far over-
" come by fome glaring Vanity, or fome noify
" Paffion, as not to be obferv'a 1 : But general-
" ly in Minds well prepar'd by its former In-
" fluence, it oppofes the Delufions of Temp-
" tations with good Succefs, by bringing all
" the Arguments of Religion into view.
" And as the Spirit may thus difcountenance
" particular Temptations, it may likewife pre-
" ferve us from all vicious Habits, by familiar
" Reprefentations of the Reafon and Nature
" of things, and by many fecret Influences
" both on our Minds and Bodies ; diverting
" dangerous Thoughts, and moderating fuch
" Appetites and Affections as ufually tend to
" Vice, and often difpofe us for it. On the
" contrary, 'tis eafy to conceive how it may
' forward us in Virtue, by prefenting to our
" Minds fuch Thoughts as leffen our Efteem
" for this World, and excite our Zeal for the
" other. The Apoftle, when he bids us not
" quench the Spirit, reprefents it as a Flame
" that both lights and warms us ; fhews us
" ufeful Truths, and gives us a fuitable Con-
" cern for them; and all this confident with
" the Liberty of our Minds, p. 215, 216."
See alfo Bp. Burnet on the 10th Article of the
Church of England, and A-Bp. Tillotfon's 1 69th
Serm. p. 45;. vol. 3. or 147th Serm. p. 310.
3d Edit.Fol.

If the foregoing Obfervations be true, it
follows that the ordinary Operation of the
Spirit cannot be any Phy fie al Influence, ot im-'
mediate Determination of the Will ; it muft '

therefore

* General Reprefentation of Rcvcafd Religion, C. 9. p. 210, 211.

L 1

258

Of Moral Evil.

Tel one, till they have attain'd to a Habit and Facility of acting.
The conftant Exercife of Prayer may therefore tend, by a natural
Efficacy, to reftore the proper ufe of Free Will, and regain its na-
tive Vigour.

VIII. Sixthly, The fame may be faid concerning the Government
duTtheAffec- of the Paffions and Affections, which conftitutes fo great a Part of

human

And to fub-

tions.

NOTES.

therefore be only a Moral Influence, or mediate,
rational Determination. The manner of ef-
fecting this may be by injecting Ideas, repre-
fenting Arguments, exhibiting Motives, and
aflifting the Understanding in its apprehenfion
of them. This I think is all that Mr. Wolla-
flon could mean by the Words Suggeftion, Im-
pulfe, or filent Communication of fome Spiritual
Being || ; and feems to be the only intelligible
Notion of the Influence of either Good or Evil
Spirits : in which fenfe I believe that we are
very frequently acted upon and over-ruled in
order to promote the Good of the whole, and
compleat the Defigns of a particular Provi-
dence. The Author laft cited has given us a
fine Defcription of the manner in which this
Government of Free Beings may be exercifed
and apply'd to the Ends above mention'd.
" It is not impoffible (fays he *) that many
" things fuitable to feveral Cafes may be
" brought to pafs by means of fecret, and
*' fometimes fudden Influences on our Minds,
" or the Minds of other Men whofe Acts may
" affect us. Forinftance; If the Cafe fhould
*' require that N fhould be deliver'd from
" threatning Ruin, or from fome Misfortune
" which would certainly befall him, if he
" fhould go fuch a way at fuch a time as
" he intended ; upon this occafion fome
" new Reafons may be prefented to his
" Mind why he fhould not go at all, or not
" then, or not by that Road ; or he may for-
** get to go ; or if he is to be deliver'd from
" fome dangerous Enemy, either fome new
'* turn given to his Thoughts, may divert him
" from going where the Enemy will be ; or,
" the Enemy may after the fame manner be

| Relinon of Nature delineated, p. 106;

u diverted from coming where he fhall be,
ts or his (the Enemy's) Refentment may be
** qualify 'd, or fome proper Method of Defence
' may be fuggelled, or Degree of Refolution
" and Vigour excited. After the fame man-
" ner, not only Deliverances from Dangers-
" and Troubles, but Advantages and Succefles
tl may be conferred. Or on the other Side,
" Men may, by way of Punifliment for Crimes
" committed, incur Mifchiefs and Calamities.
" I fay, thefe things and fuch like may be.
" Far fince the Motions and Actions of Men,
" which depend upon their Wills, do alfo
" depend upon their Judgments, as thefe
f again do upon the prefent Appearan-
** ces or Non-appearances of things in their
M Minds; if a new profpect of things can be
" any way produced, the Light by which they
M are feen alter'd, new forces and directions
<c imprefs'd upon the Spirits, Palfions exalted
'* or abated, the Power of judging enliven'd
m or debiliated, or the Attention taken off,
" without any Sufpenfion or Alteration of the
" ftanding Laws of Nature ; then without
" that, new Volitions, Defigns, Meafures, or
" a ceflation of thinking may alfo be produ-
M ced, and thus many things prevented that
* would otherwife be, and many brought a-
" boat that would not." See alfo Sberltck on
Providence, p. 51. 2d Edit. Again f, " That
" there may be poffibly fuch Infpirations of
' new Thoughts and Counfels may perhaps
* appear farther from this, that we fo frequent-
** ly find Thoughts arifing in our Heads, into
u which we are led by no Difcourfe, nothing
* we read, no clue of Reafoning, but they
" furprife and come upon us from we know

" not
* p. 105. f p. 107.

Of Moral Evil

human Felicity : we have fhewn that the Elective Power is fuperior
to all others, and has the Government of them, and that when the
Mind is corrupted with Vice, the Will in a great meafure falls from
that Power which Nature gave it. Yet the inferior Affections of the
Mind have not quite fhaken off the Yoke, they ftill obey, tho' with
fome difficulty, but ufe and exercife are neceffary to implant an Ha-
bit of Obedience in them. Since therefore Prayers contain in them-
felves an exercife of Election, they have a natural Efficacy to ftrength-
en the Elective Acts, and by the fame means accuftom the Affections
to Obey : for a repeated Act augments the Power and overcomes
ReMance. (96.)

L 1 2 IX. Seventhly,

3-59

NOTES.

** not what Quarter. If they proceed from the
" Mobility of Spirits flragling out of Order,
" and fortuitous Affections of the Brain, or
" were of the Nature of Dreams, why are they
" not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as
" they are ? " Is it not much more reafonable
to imagine that they come by the Order and
Direction of an all-feeing and all-gracious God
who continually watches over us, and difpofes e-
very thing in and about us, for theGoodofour-
felves or others ? Not to fpeak of the agrceable-
nefi of this Notion to the Opinions and Belief
of the belt and wifeft Men in all Ages. The
Confequence Mr. Wollafton draws from the
whole is perfectly agreeable to the Scope of
our Author. " If this be the Cafe, as it feems
** to be, that Men's Minds are fufceptive of
" fuch Infinuations and Impreffions as fre-
" quently by ways unknown do affect them
" and give them an Inclination towards this
" or that, how many things may be brought
** to pafs by thefe means, without fixing and
" refixing the Law* of Nature, any more than
" they are unfix'd when one Man alters the
" Opinion of another, by throwing a Book
" proper for that purpofe in his way ?

To the fame purpofe fee Scott's Chrijiian
Life, Part 2. Vol. 2, S- ! P-8i, 82. Concer-

ning the Operations of the Spirit, as diflin
guifh'd into fuch as are previous, concomitant,
and fubfequent to our Converfion and Sandtifi-
cation, fee $. Faneourfs Effay concerning Li-
berty, Grace, and Prefcience, Letter 2. $. 2. p.
43, &c.

I hope the Reader will excufe us for in-
filling fo long on this Point, fince falie No-
tions concerning it have produced the mod
pernicious Confequences to Religion in gena-
ral, as well as the principal Objections againft
our Author's Syflem.

(96.) Prayer puts us upon making good Re-
folutions, and endeavouring to fubdue our vi-
cious Inclinations: it animates our Zeal, and
enflames our Affections ; it exercifes and im-
proves our Faith, our Hope, and Charity j
and therefore is in itfelf a Means of ftrength-
ning our Faculties, and removing all Impedi-
ments to a due Exertion of them. It alfb
makes us fenfible of our ftrict Dependence on
the Deity, of our manifold Wants, and the
great Benefit of his Supplies, and of confe-
quene'e it naturally fits us for them, and in-
clines us to make a right ufe of them when wo
do receive them. " It is not only a Mcans^
" (fiys Dr. Barrtnv *) by Impetration acqui-
" ring for us, but it is an effectual Inflrument

" working

* Firft Vol. Fol. 1 ft Edit. p. 493:

2 6o

The Actions
of Free Br-
ings will "
produce a
contingency
in material
things, yet
this does not
offer any Vio-
lence to Na-
ture.

Of Moral Evil

IX. Seventhly, As to Material Objects, viz. our own Bodies and
the Elements, 'tis plain that the intellectual World is more noble
than the Material, and confequently that this latter was made for the
fake of the former, and is fubfervient to its ufe: But iince the Ac-
tions of Beings endow'd with Underftanding and Will are free, and
on that account contingent, they necelfarily produce a Contingency
alio in material Subflances which depend upon them. For we can
excite certain Motions in our own Bodies, and communicate them
to the adjacent ones, which Motions are not in this Cafe produ-
ced mereiv according to Mechanic Laws, but the direction of
die Will

Nor

N O T E S.

" working in us all true Good. It is the
" Channel by which God conveyeth Spiri-
.' tual Light into our Minds, and Spiritual
u Vigour into our Hearts, It is both the
" Seed and the Food of Spiritual Life, by
41 which all holy Difpenfations of Soul, and
" all honeil Refolutions of Practice are bred
" and nourished, are augmented and ftrength-
" ned in us. It exciteth, it quickneth, it
" rmintaineth all pious Affections. The love
" of God can no otherwife than by it be kin-
" died, fomented or kept in Life (without it
" we certainly fhall have an Ellrangement and
" Averfation from him) it alone can maintain
** a conflant reverence and awe of God, keep-
** ing him in our Thoughts, and making us
" to live as in his Prefence. It chiefly enli-
" veneth and exercifeth our Faith in God ;
*' N k is that which begetteth in us a favoury
* 4 Relilh of Divine things, which fweeteneth
% * and endeareth to ourfelves the Practice of
'* Piety; which only can enable us with de-
" light and alacrity, to obey God's Com-
'.* mandments : It alone can raife our Minds
" from the Cares and Concernments of this
" World to a fenfe and defire of Heavenly
" things. By it God imparteth Strength to
'* fubdue bad Inclinations, to reftrain fenfual
*' Appetite.% to compref* irregular Paffions ;
". to evade the allurements to Evil, and the
* difcouragements from Good which this

World always prefenteth ; to fupport alfo
with Patience and Equanimity, the many
CroiTes we muft furely meet with therein.
It is, in fhort, the only flrong bulwark a-
gaint Temptation and Sin; the only fure
guard of Piety and a good Confcience."
" God's End (fays Mr. CbubF) in requiring;
this Duty of Prayer, is wholly and folely
the Good and Benefit of his Creatures, viz.
that it may be a Means to work in the Pe-
titioner a fui table frame and temper of mind,
and to ditpofe him to a fuitable Practice
and Converfation, and fo render him a fui-
table and proper Object of God's fpecial
Care and Love. For as Prayer is an Ad-
drefs or Application of a dependent Being
to his fupreme Governor and original Be-
nefactor, fo when this Duty is performed
with ferioufnefs and application of Mind,
it naturally tends to work in Men an awful
fenfe of the Being and Attributes of God,
of our dependence upon him, and of the
many Obligations we are under to ferve
him. It tends to awake in us a lively
fenfe of the Sovereignty and Power, of the
Knowledge and Wifdom, of the Holinefs,
Truth and Righteoufnefs, of the Mercy and
Goodnefs, and Loving-Kindnefs of the
Lord. It naturally draws forth our Souls
in filial Fear, in Hope and Truft, in Love,
Delight, and Joy in God, and creates in us

" ajuft.

Of Moral Evil.

Nor would they have happen'd at the time or in the manner they
do, if the Will had not by its own Liberty excited them. Neither
do we fuppofe that any Violence or Diforder happens hereby to the
Laws of Natures for Nature itfelf has provided that the lefs fhould
give way to the more noble, that is, local Motion to the Action of
the Will, as being the more excellent of the two. We mutt believe
the fame concerning Agents of a fuperior Nature, and the more no-
ble Order they are of, the greater Sphere of Action is to be attributed
to them. Such little Creatures as we Men are, can convey Water
in Canals, drain fuch Parts of the Earth as are naturally cover'd
with Water, drown the Dry-Land, and produce a great many other
Changes, both in the Earth, the Water and the Air, who then can
affirm but that there may be other Agents who could change almoft
the whole Elements, if they were not prohibited by certain Laws ?
All who acknowledge the Exiftence of fuch Beings, are agreed that
thefe things are pofliblej now it muft be allow'd, that whatever is
perform'd by thefe Beings is done according to the Laws of Nature,
and that no manner of Violence is hereby offer'd to the Order of it,
any more than by the Actions of our own Will.

X. Eighthly, And as all material Beings are connected together,
and by mutual Influence act upon each other -, viz. the Superior upon
the Inferior, the Sun upon the iEther and the Moon, and that upon
the Air, Water, and Earth} and perhaps, vice verfa, fo 'tis in like

manner

as much upon each

261

There is a
Syltem of
intellectual
as well as
material
Beings,
which al
other.

NOTES.

a jiift Concert! to pleafe him, and to ap-
prove ourfelves in his Sight ; and confe-
ancntly to put on that Purity and Piety,
Humility and Charity, which is the Spirit
and Praclice of true Chriftianity. And as
this is God's End in appointing this Duty,
fe for this End he requires the frequent Re-
turns of it, that the Mind of the Petitioner
may be habitually feafoned with a fenfc of

" himfelf*. See al fo Bp. Patrick's Difcourfe
" concerning Prayer, Ch. 8 and 9.

Thefe Effefts and Ufes of Prayer, molt of
which are difcoverable by natural Reaibn,prove
fufficiently, I think, that Prayer is a natural
Duty. Concerning the Efficacy of it, and the
manner whereby Providence may be fuppofec
to anfwer our particular Requefts, fee the fol-
lowing Notes to this Subfeclion.

Chubb"* trails, p. 1 80, &c.

i6i Of Moral Evil

manner probable that there is a certain Order and Syftem of intel-
lectual Beings conftituted, who are no lefs fubordinate to one another,
and operate upon each other by a mutual Influence, according to the
Laws eftablim'd by Nature.
God makes XI. Ninthly, There feems to be no reafon why God mould not
u!~e of the make ufe of the Miniftry of thofe Beings in the Government of this
Aneci r ' V in World* whenever it may be expedient. This we fee is done in fome
the Govern- meafure upon our Earthly Globe. For he makes ufe of Men to go-
w nt . f i vcrn other Animals, and fome Men are fet as Guardians over others.
nor is this a- And as the Attendants of Princes and Judges perform their Office,
ny violence not as they themfelves pleafe, but according to the Appointment of
their Matters, or the Laws; fo in like manner we are to believe that
Agents more excellent than us (which we ttile miniftring Angels) dif-
charge their Office according to the Laws prefcribed by God. Sup-
pofe therefore this about affifting fuch as regularly apply to God, to
be one of thefe Laws j let them be commanded to relieve thofe who
make their humble Addrefies to him, and let the manner of invok-
ing him be prefcribed by Nature, or fome pofitive Law : Can it be
doubted whether they would not as readily exert their Powers for the
Affiftance of thefe Supplicants, and as diligently difcharge the Duty
of relieving them, as a Judge's Officer, or a Prince's Servant performs
the Commands of his Matter ? And fo long as thefe things are done
according to the general Order, and under fuch Conditions as are a-
greeable to Nature and Reafon, they can be no more deem'd repug-
- nant to the Order of Nature, or the Laws appointed for the Go-
vernment of the World, than civil Government and the Laws among
Men are. Here is nothing contrary to or inconfiftent with the Laws
of univerfal Nature: for it does not teem any more repugnant to
thefe, that Angels mould ufe their Powers for the Relief of fuch as
qpray to God, than that Men lhould help each other according to
their Abilities. If it be granted that thefe things are fo, it will be
very apparent how our Prayers may have their Effect, and the defired
Changes may be produced in our Bodies, and the Elements, without
doing Violence to Nature, or difturbing the Order eftablifhed by
God. Nay it may be provided by a Law, that our Wiffies be thus

fulfilled:

* See the Religion of Nature delineate* \ p. 108, \o~).

Of Moral Evil 2 gj

fulfill'd : and we need not declare how much this Power over exter-
nal things granted by free Agents, may tend to raife our Affections,
and incline the Wills themfelves. 'Tis very well known how great
an Influence the Temperature of the Blood and Motion of the Spi-
rits have over thefe. Since then our Bodies are by a Law of Nature
capable of being moved by free Agents, at leaft when we defire it,
'tis not impoffible but that by the Means of thefe Bodies, they may
have Accefs to the Soul ; and though they cannot act upon the
Will immediately, yet they may indirectly excite it to exert it own
Ads. (97.)

XII. Tenthly, There's neither any occalion nor room to explain 9?. ,? n c
how agreeable this is to Reafon and the Holy Scriptures. Let it fuf- uke S aW ay
fice to obferve how large a Field is hereby open'd for Prayer, and how ths abuf ? of
effectual it may be for obtaining the Affiftance not only of God him- ^"'he 1 has
felf immediately, but alfo of his Minifters. enabled

Method

of affifting his Worfhippers.

It muff be confefs'd that God fometimes relieves the Diftrefs'd,'
and when apply 'd to, interpofes in Matters relating to the Will:
but thefe things are effected according to the Univerfal Law of Na-
ture. And tho' this be fuperior to that which is implanted in the
particular Nature of fome Beings ; yet it is no lefs natural with re-
gard to the Syftem of Univerfal Nature j neither are we to believe
that this is often done, but only in Cafes where a particular Nature
cannot be left to itfelf without Detriment to the whole. Nor is
God, becaufe he fometimes vouchfafes to interpofe and help the
Supplicant, alfo oblig'd entirely to remove the abufe of Free- Will j
that is, in reality, to deftroy the Nature itfelf. By a Law of Nature,
the Exercife of that Faculty belongs to fuch Agents as arc endow'd

with

NOTES.

(97.) That is, as a Man is excited or inclin'd
to any thing by a Profpecl of the Pleafure or
Pain which may attend the Prolecution or O-
miffion of it ; or, as we commonly fay, by
another's working upon his Paffions, his Hope 5 ,
or his Fears : For that fuperior Beings aft up-
on us in no other fenfe that their Influence

confifts only in occafioning pleafant or difa-
grceable Ideas in us in reprefenting Argu-
ments, Motives, fcrV. to u% may perhaps be
gather'd from Note 95. And, I think, it mull
oe allow'd that this is very confluent with that
Phyfical Indifference, or abfolute Freedom of
the Will above defcribed.

264- N

Of Moral Evil.

with it, and tho' that Law admit of an Exception, yet it cannot be
.quite abrogated, without greater Damage done to the whole than
what may happen from the abufe of it. Nor is God obliged, be-
caufe Prayers have their Effect with him, to relieve fuch as don't
pray to him at all.
ThtEMun XIII. Eleventhly, This feems to eftablifh the Efficacy of Prayers
ef Prayers much better than their Opinion who hold that all is fix'd by God in
counted*/ " a ^ ata ^ Concatenation, and that fuch things as are requeued of God,
if all things and feem to be obtain'd, are not in any refpedt owing to the Prayers,
be left to ne- but that God has by his Foreknowledge join'd the Actions of the
arycaues ' Will with corporeal Motions, in fuch a manner that they mould hap-
pen together, but without any other relation to each other than what
arifes from his Pre-ordination, as appears in the Agreement between
the Index of a Watch and the Sun.

For inftance : God has pre-ordain'd a Storm from neceffary Caufes,
and that fome notorious Offenders mail be failing in it j when they
are in danger they fhall repent and pray to God, and at length the
Wind fhall ceafe.

Thus a Calm enfues upon the Prayers of the Petitioners, but with-
out any Connection or Dependence on each other, merely by the force
of pre-difpofed Caufes, which do not require any Interpofition of the
Divine Power. (98.)

The

NOTES.

(98.) The foremention'd Hypothefis of a
pre-determin'd and neceffary Connexion be-
tween Corporeal Motions and the Operation*
of the Will, is advanc'd by Leibnitz in what
is commonly call'd hj Syftem of the Pre-efta'
blips 'd Harmony, which occurs in feveral of his
Works, an account of which may be feen in
Fabricius*. An Explanation of \tby G.Han fcius
may be found in the Prefcnt State of the Republic
of Letters, Vol. 4. for Octob. 1729. There are
fome Objections againfl: it in BayJe's Diet.
Article Rozarius. Rem. L. " -But as the

whole of it is built upon a Suppofition that
the Mind has not a Liberty of Indifference, and
of confequence no proper Liberty at all, we
need not fpend any time in confuting it, ha-
ving, I hope, fufficiently eftablifh'd the con-
trary Principle above, and thereby remov'd
the Foundation of it.

Mr. Whifton in particular has efpous'd the
Opinion which our Author alludes to, and en-
larged upon it in the following Manner f.
" Our Imperfection is fuch, that we can only
" al pro re nata y can never know beforehand

" the

* Dehtlus Argumer.tcrum, &c. p. 387, &:.
f New Theory, B. 4. C. 4. Solution 87.

Of Moral Evil

The Affertors of this Opinion are oblig'd from the common fenfe
of Mankind to allow that God is to be invok'd; and that fuch as
duly offer up their Prayers have their Requefts granted : but as they
are of Opinion that things go by Fate, and that there is no room for
Contingency, or a particular Providence,, they have invented this
Scheme that there might be, or at leaft might feem to be fome room
for Prayers. But all this is to no purpofe : For fince God has made
Agents free, and allow'd them the ufe of Liberty, he mull alfo have
refcrv'd to himfelf a Liberty of treating them according to what
their Nature requires, which cannot be done without a peculiar Pro-
vidence, and immediate Interpofition j without thefe no Efficacy will
be left to Prayer, no Worfhip to God, no Honour to Religion; For
if the Production of thofe things which we requeft depend upon an-
tecedent

NOTES.

*65

' the behaviour or actions of Men, neither
1 can we forefee what Circumftances and Con-
: junctures will happen at any certain time
: hereafter. And fo we cannot provide for
: fatureEvents, nor prcdifpofe things in fuch
a manner chat every one (hall he dealt with,
or every thing done, no otherwife than if
we were then alive and prefent, we fhould
think proper and reasonable, and mould ac-
tually do. But in the Divine Operation it
is quite otherwife. God's Prefcience ena-
bles him to aft after a more fublime man-
ner, and by a conftant Courfe of Nature
and Chain of mechanical Caufes to do every
thing fo as it lhall not be diftinguifhable
from a particular Interpofition of his Power,
nor be otherwife than on fuch a particular
Interpofition would have been brought to
pafs. He who has created all things, and
given them their feveral Powers and Facul-
ties, forefees the Effects of them all j at once
looks thro' the entire Chain of Caufes, Ac-
tions and Events, and fees at what Periods,
and in what manner 'twill be neceffary and
expedient to bring about any Changes, be.
ltow any Mercies, or inflict any Punifh-

" ments on the World. Which being unque-
" flionably true, 'tis evident he can as well
" provide and predifpofe natural Caufes for
" thofe Mutations, Mercies or Judgments: he
" can as eafily put the Machine into fuch Mo-
M tions as fhall, without a Neccffity of his
" mending or correcting it, correfpond to all
" thefe forefeen Events or Actions, as make
" way for fuch Alterations afterwards by gi-
*' .ving a random Force to the whole : and
** when thefe two ways are equally poffible, I
" need not fay which is moft agreeable to the
" Divine Perfections, and moll worthy of
* God.'' And again: " * We pray to God
M for Fruitful Seafons, for Health, for Peace,
" for the Succefs of our Endeavours, for a
'* Bleffing on our Food and Phyfick, and de-
11 precate the contrary Miferies from us. Yet
4C at the fame time we fee the Seafons depend
" on the fettled Courfe of the Sun, or other
" natural and neceffary Caufes ; we find our
" Health or Sicknefs to be the proper Effects
'< of our Dyet and Regimen : we obferve Peace
'* and War fubject to the Intrigues of Princes,
** and the plain Refults of vifible Conjunctures
" inhuman Affairs: we know that worldly

" Prudence

* Ibid. Corollary, p. 562. ill Edit.

M m

1 66 Of Moral Evil.

tecedent, natural, and neceffiry Caufes, our Defires will be anfwer'd
no lefs upon the Omiffion than the offering up of Prayers. Vows
and Prayers therefore are made in vain. If it be faid that the Suppli-
cants could not omit them, fince they were pre-ordainYj. I anfwer :
He that could omit them could not poffibly offer them : his Omiffion
therefore is not culpable : And he that is employ 'd in Prayer to God
undertakes a fuperfluous Office: for thefe Petitions in reality contri-
bute nothing to the Effect, and no reafon can be given why that mould
be required which is of no Benefit. (99.)

XIV. Tis

NOTES.

" Prudence and Cunning has a main ftrolce in
" the Succefs of Mens Labours: we feel the
" advantageous Effects of fome Food and Phy-
" fie, and have reafon to believe that the fame
" does very much refult from the Goodnefs of
" the Drug?, the fitoefs of the Proportion, and
'* the Skill of the Phyfician, aj6d can frequent-
" ly give a plain and mechanical Reafon of
" the different Operation of all thefe things;
* neither do we hope for the Exercile of a
" miraculous Power in thefe or the like Cafes.
" In fhort, " Second Caufes, fays he, will
" work according to their Natures, let Mens
" Supplications be never fo importunate : and
" %o expect a Miracle in anfwer to every Pe-
*' tion, is more than the mod religious dare
" pretend to." See alfo Mr. Wollafton'% excel-
lent Illuilration of this Hypothecs, p. 104. or
Dr. Fiddes's Body ef Divinity, 1 ft vol. p. 154.

We fhall propoie an Anfwer to it in the fol-
lowing Note. Let it fuffice at prefent to ob-
ferve, that this particular Interpofition of Di-
vine Power which our Author contends for, is
very improperly filled miraculous, as may be feen
from Note 95. and the 6th Paragraph of this
Subfection.

(99.) Tho this Anfwer is very folid, and may
by fome perhaps be thought fufficient ; yet, as
the Point before us is of the greateft Impor-
tance; fince wrong Notions concerning it
caufe Perplexities which difturb the Minds of

the Scheme of Providence fo elaborately dif-
play'd by this Author_wi)l not, I fear, help to
clear them as he here promifes, but rather oc-
caflon worfe ; on thefe accounts it will not be
improper to give a fuller Confutation of it from
fuch Authors as endeavour to prove that the
foremen tion'd Scheme of Providence is both
impofhble in itfelf, and attended with Confe-
quences deftructive of the very Notion of
Prayer, and moft other Duties of Religion.
'* The Abettors of the mechanical Hypothefis,f
" fays Dr. Jctikin, argue, that he is the belt
'* Artift who can contrive an Engine that fhall
*' need the leaft meddling with after itis made.
" But it ought to be confider'd what the Na-
" ture of the Engine is, and what the ends and
" ufes of it are ; and if the Nature of it be
M fuch that it cannot anfwer the Ends for
" which it was framed, without fometimes an
" affifting hand, it would be no point of Wif-
" dom in the Artificer, for the Credit of his
" Contrivance, to lofe the moft ufeful Ends
11 defign'd by it. As if, among other ufes, this
" curious Engine were defign'd to reward the
" good, and punifh bad Men ; to remove the
" Punifhment upon Amendment, and to renew
' it upon a relapfe : fince brute Matter is inca-
" pable of varying its Motion, and fuiting it-
" felf to the feveral States and Changes of
4< free Agents, he muft aflift it, unlefs he will
*' lofe the chief End for which it is to ferve,

moft Men, as Mr. Whijlon obferves *; and fince.** It is no defect in the Skill and Wifdom of

' "the

* New Theory, p. j6z.
+ Reafonailenefs of CbriJUanity, 2d vol. p. 218. 5th Edit.

Of Moral Evil. 267

XIV. Tis fcare poffible for one who reads this not to think of that
famous Difficulty, viz. how the Contingency of things can be confi- ^tLTthh
ftent with the Divine Prefcience : Neither is it proper to meddle with isnotrepug-
it in this Place : For it would require a whole Book. Let it fuffice JJvinefy/
to give a hint, that the Solution of it depends upon confidering xhe/dend

M m 2 Manner

NOTES.

** the Almighty, that Matter and Motion have
" not Free Will as Men have; but it would
" be a great defeft in his Wifdom not
u to make them the Inftruments of Rewards
'* and Punifhments, becaufe it is impoflible for
" them of themfelves to apply and fuit them-
" felves to the feveral States and Conditions
" of Free Agents. The Nature of Matter and
" Motion is fuch, that they cannot ferve all
" the Defigns of their Crettor, without his
" Interpofition, and therefore he conftantly
" doth interpofe according to a certain Tenor
" which he hath prefcrib'd to himfelf," And
again, " * We may well fuppofe that God
" has as much Regard to his Wifdom in his
" Government of the Moral as of the Material
" part of the Creation ; and yet he has added
" fupplemental Laws to enforce the Moral
" Laws, and thefe additional Laws have been
" chang'd as the Condition and Circumftanccs
" of Men requir'd. Why then fhould the
" Laws of the Material World be fo much
" more facred, as that he fhould never inter-
*' meddle with them ? He aflifts Mo/al A-
" gents with the continual Supplies of his
" Grace, and Natural Agents with that Help
" which is needful for them to perform his
" Will : God may halten and aflift natural
" Caufes upon our Prayers, he may quicken
" the Motions, and enforce the Powers of Na-
" ture, and remove fecret Impediments, to
** help and make way for natural Operations ;
" or he may fufpend or retard natural Cau-
" fes, &c.

He proceeds to a particular Examination of
the Pri-ejlablijh'd Order in p. 221. which he
oppofcs with much the fame Arguments as thefe
thit follow frcm Dr. Tiddes\. " As to the

" Opinion of thofe who fay, God upon the
" Forefight of the Prayers of Men to him, dif-
44 pofed the Order of things in fuch a manner,
** that what they pray for lhall happen, or
" what they deprecate be averted, this is alto-
44 gether inconceivable; or rather, in the Na-
" ture of things, fuppoling Men free Agents,
44 impoflible. For tho' God does forefee which
" way Men will aft, yet nothing upon the
11 Mechanical Hypothefis can follow from his
** Aftion, but according to the Laws of Me-
" chanifm. In cafe any one, for inflance,
" fhould pray to be deliver'd from the danger

* of fome infeftious or peftilentious Diftem-
" per, the Vapour whereby 'tis propagated,
" will, notwithftanding, purfue its natural
1,4 Courfe, and produce its EfFeft wherever ic
* falls upon a proper Subjeft ; it can make no
** manner of Diflinftion between him that fa-
" crijiath and him that facrificeth not. God
*J may indeed, by fome fecret Impulfe on the
" Mind of Man, which yet he is at Liberty
** to follow, be the ocofion of diverting him
" from the Scope of its Motion ; or perhaps,
w on fome extraordinary Exigence, by an in-
M vifible Power, retard, accelerate, or obftruft
" its Courfe; but ftill, if all things operate
u mechanically, whether Men pray or no, it
" will unavoidably have its proper Effeft.
** There is another Cafe wherein the Motives
w to Prayer, if all things come to pals by the
41 flx'd Laws of Mechanifm, appear ftill more
44 evidently groundlefs. A Man in the Heat
44 of Battle, prays that God would preferve
44 him from the Inftruments of Death, which

44 fly every where about him ; yet a Ball from
44 a Cannon or a Mufquet will neceffarily pur*
44 fuc the line of iu direction; it depends*

" however

p. 220.

f 7beol. Spec. B. 3. Part 2. C. 4. p. 292.

258 Of Moral Evil.

Manner by which we apprehend the things of God. (ioo.) He that
understands that manner rightly will never flick at this Difficulty.

The

NOTES.

{

" however on the choice of Man, whether he
" will give it fucha particular Diredtion as by
M the natural tendency of it will take away the
" Life of the Perfon who deprecates the Dan-
" ger wherewith he finds himfelf furrounded.
" In this Cafe it is impoflible, upon any fore
" fight of his Prayers, that the order of Cau-
" fes, which are in themfelves of arbitrary and
M uncertain Determination, fhouidbe difpos'd
M after fuch a manner as certainly to produce
" the defired Effect of them." Concerning
the Impoffibility of adapting a fix'd and immu-
table Law to the State and Condition of Free
or mutable Agents, fee B. 2. Part 1. p. 154.

Laftly : ** It is of great ufe to us (fays Dr.
" Sherlock -}-) to underftand this which teaches
" us what we may expect from God, and what
" we muft attribute to him in the Government
" of Nature. We muft not expect in ordina-
" ry Cafes that God Ihould reverfe the Laws
** of Nature for us ; that if we leap into the
" Fire it fhall not burn us ; or into the Wa-
" ter it fhall not drown us : and by the fame
" reafon, the Providence of God is not con-
' cern'd to preferve us when we deftroy our-
" felves by Intemperance and Luft : for God
'* does not work Miracles to deliver Men from
u the evil Effects of their own Wickednefs :
" But all the kind Influences of Heaven which
" fupply our Wants, and fill our Hearts with
** Food and Gladnefs, are owing to that good
" Providence which commands Nature to
" yield her Increafe; and thofe Diforders of
" Nature which afflifl the World with Fa-
" mines, Peftilence and Earthquakes, are the
" Effects of God's Anger and Difpleafure, and
" are order'd by him for the Puniftiment of a
*' wicked World. We muft all believe this,
*' or confefs that we mock God, when we blefs
** him for a healthful Air and fruitful Seafons,
" or deprecate his Anger when we fee vifible
" Tokens of his Vengeance in the Diforders
u of Nature. For did not God immediate-
" ly intcrpofe in the Government of Na-

*' ture, there would be no reafon to beg his
" Favour or deprecate his Anger upon thefe
" accounts." And to the fame purpofe he
urges, p. 71. That without this Belief, that
God takes a particular Care of all his Crea-
tures in the Government of all Events that
can happen to them (which Belief appears to
be impofiible upon the Mechanical Hypotbef.s)
there is no reafon or pretence for m oft of the
particular Duties of Religious Worfhip, as is
fully proved in the fame place. See alfo C. 9.
Concerning the true Notion, as well as the Rca-
fmablenefi and NectJJity of Prayer, fee p. 381. ib.
(100.) He means the Scheme of Analogy,
concerning which fee his Note E> We have
given our Notion of the Word Prefcience in
Note 18. X e. fee alfo Mr. Jackfon on Human
Liberty, p. 62. But tho' we cannot perhaps-
determine the precife manner of God's know-
ing the free Acts of Men, yet we are certain
that he does and muft always know them :
fince otherwife he would know many things
now which he did not know once, and confe-
quently his Omnifcience or Infinite Knowledge
would receive addition from Events which (as
we have made appear in Xe.) is contrary to
the true Notion of Infinity. This general Argu-
ment drawn from God's infinite or perfeel
Knowledge, feems to me the only one which
can come near to a Proof that he muft always
have a compleat and equal Knowledge of fuch
actions as are in themfelves abfolutely con-
tingent, as all thofe evidently are which de-
pend upon the Free-Will of the Creature.
Thefe actions (as we formerly obferv'd) may
properly be call'd Future with refpect to us or
other Men, and the Knowledge of them in
the fame refpect be (tiled Fore -Knowledge. But
with regard to the Deity, whofe Exiftence and
Attributes can have no relation to time, i. e. to
which nothing can be at a diftance, I think,
the Expreflion is abfurd ; and we muft necef-
farily either admit the fore-men tion'd abfurdity

f Qn Providence, p. 38. 1 ft Edit.

Of Moral Evil

The Reader may obferve, that in 'this and other Places, I interfperfe
fbme things which belong to Revealed Religion, contrary to what I
intended at firft ; which happen'd becaufe fome Objections feem'd to
arife from reveal'd Religion, in oppofition to the Principles and Ar-
guments here laid down. Since therefore 1 had determin'd to pro-
duce nothing but what was perfectly agreeable to the Articles of
Faith, and the Principles of the Chriftian Religion, I found it necef-
fary to call in the Scripture to my Afiiftance, that the Anfwer might
come from the fame Quarter with the Objections.

One that knows nothing of Reveal'd Religion cannot bring thefe
Objections ; one that does not believe it has no right to urge them.
For if he be fenfible that the Objections are of any force, he muft
of neceffity alfo admit the Solutions, fince both of them depend
upon the fame Authority. (101.)

NOTES.

of fuppofmg his Knowledge limited, or elfe
allow that all things are at all times equally in
his view; and confequently that Knowledge,
as in him, hath nothing to do with fore and
sfter.

If we admit this Notion of things being al-
ways prefent to God, tho' fucceffive to us,
which feems to be the only way of conceiving
how Contingencies can poflibly be Objefts of
any Knowledge ; If this, 1 fay, be allow'd,
then all things, a&ions, cirV. which can pro-
perly be faid to exift, will be equally proper
Qbj(Rs of God's Knowledge, fince he is here-
by fuppofed not to know them in fieri, or in
their Caufe ; but in e/j[e, or in their aftual Exi-
fience. Which at the fame time gives us the
Medium of their being knowable, viz. Their
real Exiflence; and makes it as eafy for us to
imagine how God fhould always know them,
as how we mould ever know a thing when it is
immediately prcfented to us.

*Tis fubmitted to the Reader, whether this

old Notion of the Schoolmen be not ftill the
bell we are able to frame upon the prefent
Subjeft.

(101.) This general Argument lies againtt
all thofe who bring Objections from the Scrip-
ture Account of the Creation, Fall, ci/V. viz.
either thy believe the Truth and Divine Au-
thority of thofe Books, or they do not ; if
they do, then they muft believe them alfo when
they declare that all the Works of God are ho-
ly and juft and good j and confequently that
the foremention'd Difficulties are no real Ar
guments againft the Divine Attributes : if they
do not; then the whole falls to the Ground.
For to admit one part of an account and re-
ject the other, when both depend upon the
fame Authority, is evidently unreasonable.

Objections therefore drawn from the Scrip-
ture account of thefe Matters can but be mere
Arguments ad bominetn at beft: and are of
no force either to make or juftify an Unbe-
liever.

SUBSECT

ljo Of Moral Evil

SUBSECT, V.

Why God does not tranjlate Man to fome other Place,
"where nothing "would occur that could tempt him to
choofe amifs.

I. / M *IS plain, that in the prefent State of things it is impoflible
2me Is If It A ^ or ^an to ** ve w i tn ut natural Evils, or the danger of

were ask'd, erring. 'Tis a common Queftion, why does not God change this

Wh t y ?ve d th e d ^ tate > anc * tran ^ ate Man t0 ^ ome other, where all Occafions of Er-
Earth to be ror, and Incitements to Evil being cut off, he might choofe only
inhabited byG ooc j. i % e% j n reality, Why has he placed Man upon the Earth?
onV^ rUteS ^ky did he not leave it to be inhabited by the Brutes alone? There
are fome perhaps who expect fuch things as thefe from the Divine
Goodnefs, but without any Senfe or Reafon j fince it manifestly ap-
pears to be better that we mould contend with the prefent Evils,
than that the Earth mould be void of all rational Inhabitants. (102.)

fome

NOTES.

... -, -_ ._ j t _ - ~~ -

is, i. e. confifting of a Soul and a Body, this ders as could be conceiv'd to exift between
World was a proper place for him. To the himfelf and nothing: or fo long as Exiftence
Queftion, Why fhould he be made of fuch a in the very loweft Order might be a Benefit
Nature as denominates him Man, or placed in either to the Beings of that Order, or to thofe
this lower Clafs of Beings ? a fufficient An- ' of fome other. The Confequence of which is,
fwer is given in Note 35. where, I think, it' that we muft either have been placed in the
is render'd probable, that the fame Goodnefs Clafs we are in at prefent, or no where, fince
which excited the Deity to create Beings of by the Suppofition every other Clafs is full,
the higheft Order, would induce him both to ; And there will appear fufficient reafon for our
create as many of that Order as could commo- J being created in this Order, and placed where
dioufly exift together, or be confiftent with the I we are, rather than not created at all, provided

that

Of Moral Evil

Some make it a Qtfeftion, why fo great a Part of the Earth is given
a'' ay to the Brutes j but tbefe Men would have it all left to 'em j
and Mankind itfelf extinct

II. We hive often declared that Evils are chiefly to be avoided,
nay that they are prohibited by God, becaufe they are prejudicial to
human Nature, but how much worfe would it be to take that Na-
ture enrirely away? They therefore who require this of the Divine
Goodnefs, defire the greateft Evil of all as a Remedy for E-
vils. The fame Perfons alfo, that with fuch Earneftnefs defire a
Change of their Condition, are afraid of Death, forgetting that
this Change of their Condition is what they dread the moft of all
in Death.

III. Mankind believes indeed from the Light of Nature, that God
will tranflate good Men into a better State, but it is necerTary that they
mould be prepared here, as Plants in a Nurfery, before they be re-
moved into the Garden where they are to bear Fruit. God has
therefore decreed this Life to be as it were the PafTage to a better.
Thus this Earth is replenifti'd with Inhabitants, who being educa-
ted under Difcipline for a while, till they have finim'd their Courfe,
mall depart into another State fuited to their Deferts. They who
find fault with this in God, feem to me to do the fame as if one
who is ignorant of Agriculture and Harveft mould laugh at the

Sower

271

God in due
time will
tranflate
good Men to
a better flate,
but the pre-
fent is as ne-
ceflary as
Seed-time is
to Harveft.

This istotal-
lyextirpating>
Mankind.

NOTES.

th.it Exiftence be a Bleflings to us, or that we
receive in general more Happinefs than Mifery
in this prefent State: which point will be
confider'd in the next Subie&ton.

Tint thefe feveral Clafles may be fuppofed
to advance gradually towards Perfection, and
of confequence that we in time may be remo-
ved into fome better State, fee Note 30.

Thefe Confidentions will fupply us with an
Anfvrer to Bay/e's Objeftion againft what our
Author advances in this Paragraph. " This
" (fays he) is juft like as if a King ihould con-
" fine feveral of his Subjefls in his Dungeons,
*' till they were 60 Years old, becaufe thefe

I" Dungeons would otherwife be empty. But
to make any likenefs at all in thefe two Cafes,
it muft be made appear in .the firlt place, that
we really meet with more Evil of all kinds
than Good in this World ; and confequently,
that it were better for us to be out of it than
in it: contrary to what our Author has proved
in Ch. 2. par. 7. Ch 4. .8. par. 7. and in the
following Subfeftion: and fecondly, it muft
be fhewn alfo, that we might have been placed
in fome better World, without any Inconve-
nience to the re/} of the U/ir. r'e, contrary to
what -may be concluded from the former Part
of this Note, and that other to which it refers.

73 Of Moral Evil

J x
Sower for throwing away his Corn. For there is no doubt but the
prefent State of things is as neceflary, not only to the Earth left it
(hould be void of Inhabitants, and to the Animals, which for the
moft part depend upon the Labours of Men, but alfo to Men them-
felves: and as requifite in the Divine Adminiftration, in order to
fome better Life, as Seed-time is to Harveft. (103.)

SUBSECt

N ? E S.

(103.) Sayle objcfts, that our Author's com-
parifon here is not a juft one, fince God can-
not be ty'd to the ufe of common means, and
a flow Progrefs of fecond Caufes. He is not
obliged to nurfe us up as a Gardener does his
Plants, but might as well have produced us
adult and ripe in Perfection, and have made
us happy at once. But perhaps it may appear
a little doubtful to a Perfon who attentively
confiders Note 30, whether this could be done
even in natural Pleafure. However, I think,
'tis abfolutely inconceivable how it Ihould be
effected in Moral Happinefs. If we confider
the Nature of Virtue and of Man, it will not
be poflible for us to imagine how this could
be implanted in him at firft, or infufed into him
afterwards, or he be in any wife made moral-
ly perfect or good on a fudden. The Idea of
Virtue confifts in a repetition of free Acls, and
therefore it cannot be receiv'd faffively. and
tho' the Difpofition might be thus communi-
.cated, yet to compleat its Nature, and make
it actually productive of true moral Happi-
nefs, there muft necefiarily be rcquir'd due
time for Exercife, Experience and confirmed
Habits, as may be gather' d from the Prelimi-
nary Dijfertation ; and will farther appear from
Notes 1 06 and 108.

From the Nature of Man alfo, or a Being
in his imperfect State, we may fairly infer,
that he could not have fo great an Idea of the
moral Perfections of the Deity, nor fo clear
an apprehenfion of the contrary Qualities, nor

confequently, a fuitable afFettion for the one,
and an abhorrence of the other, if he had not
fome experience of both *.

We know not the real Value of a good
thing, we cannot be duly fenfible of its Ex-
cellence, except we have been in fome meafure
acquainted with its Oppofite, or at leaft have
perceiv'd the want of it on fome occafion.
" Does any one (fays Leibnitz f) fufficiently
" relifh the Happinefs of good Health who
" has never been fick ? Is It not moft times
" neceflary that a little Evil fhould render a
" Good more fenfible, and confequently grea-
" ter?'' See alfo Note 30. The fame holds
I ftronger ftill in Moral Good : which is a con-
. firmation of the Alternative that LaBantius
' fpeaks of |l; and which is well defcrib'd by
\JL Gelliusff. It does not therefore feem pof-
j fible for us to have a due Knowledge of Virtue
if we never had feen Vice. Without this
Knowledge of Virtue, we could not ardently
defire it, without fuch a defire, and a fedulous
profecution of that defire, we could not attain
to the proper exercife of it, and without this
attainment we could not have any confciouf-
nefs of defert, any comfortable felf-approba-
tion, or true Moral Happinefs.

It appears then that Virtue is an Act of our
.own, that a Series of thefe Als is requifite to
conftitute an habit of Virtse, and of confe-
quence that this cannot be infpired into any
Being, or however not produced tn one of our
weak frame on a fudden : and in the laft place,

that

* Zee Note 90. f Memoirs of Literature, v. 3. Art. 2c.

\ De Ira Dei, .13; ftft. fub fin. and 15.. ft B. 6. Ch.

118.

Of Moral Evil.

273

S U B S E C T. VI.

Concerning the Scarcity of Hafpy Terfons, and the Gene*
ral Corruption of Mankind.

I. DUT it may feem ftrange, that of fo great a Multitude of Men, s ob .

3 fo few mould attain to Happinefs. For whether that be fup- tions propo^
pofed to arife from the fruition of fuch things as are agreeable to fe . d conccr-
the natural Appetites, or from free Elections, 'tis manifeft, that not "ityVfHap*
even one of a hundred thoufand is truly happy. In vain then do we py Perfons.
enquire about the Means which lead to Happinefs ; the Power of E-
lection is beftow'd on Man to no purpofe, fince it fo rarely attains
the end for which it was imparted.

II. Secondly, The far greater part of Mankind neglecting this That the
Power of pleafing themfelves in Elections, or rather, to confefs thep w . ero / E -
truth, not in the leaft obferving that they have it, or that Happinefs ^g^"^ not
is to be expected from the ufe of it; give themfelves up entirely to
the Government of their natural Appetites and Senfes, and are plain-
ly hurried on according to the Impetus and Direction of the Animal

Nature^

NOTES.

that this prefent State is neceflary (as our fta-
thor toys) to train us up, and fit us for a bet-
ter. That this Life Is properly a State of
'7oWand Probation, and the Virtues of it ab-
solutely neceffary to the Happinefs of the next,
ice Ryu?)-'* General Reprtjtntati.n of TteVtaTd
Religion, Part 2. Ch. 3. p. 385, c^V. and Sectfs
Clnjiinn Life, Vol. 2. Ch 4. ^.3. p. 3 2 1.3 5$,
L'c 8vo. and Sbnlock on Death, C.I. V3-
P 77, t<- 4th Edit.

To the fame purpofe is that excellent Paper
in the Sprtttifor, N. 447. " The raft ufe I
/hall make of this remarkable Pioperty in
41 human Nature, of being delighted withthofe
" Aclions to which it is accnltonVd, is to fhew
* how abfolutely nccelfary it is for us to gain
" habits of Virtue in thi.-Life.if we would enjoy
the pleafurcsof the next.ThcSraie of Blifs we
4 * call Heaven will not be capable of affecting
11 thoicMinds which .ire no' thu-nualify'd for it ;

bgio

274 Of Moral Evil

Nature as much as Brute?. If therefore we have this Power in us,
it feems to be given us in vain, i. e. to fuch as neither ufe it, nor are
conicious that they have it.

III. Thirdly, Hence all Mankind lie polluted and immers'd in

That there is T7 . , xxr - , , r , , * . , ,

nuniverC] vice and Wickednels ; and tis not one or two, but everyone, that
Corruption, deviates from the right ufe of Election. How can thefe things be re-
concii'd with the Care and Providence of an infinitely good and
powerful God ? .
, IV. I confefs, that this Corruption of Manners, and almoft univer
anfwer'd hy &1 Deviation from the way to Happinefs, is better folv'd from Re-
reveai-d R<t- veal'd than Natural Religion, and that the neceffity of a Revelation
is from hence rightly proved. For fince the true Caufe which gave
rife to this is a matter of Fact, viz. the Fall of the firffc Man, it
cannot be difcover'd merely by the Strength of Reafon ; but we itand
in need of Hijiorical Tradition to tranimit this, as well as other mat-
ters of Fact, down to us. But tho' there had been none fuch, and
we were ignorant of the Fall of the Firft Man, yet we fhould have
been furniih'd with a proper, tho' not fo clear an Anfwer, fince the
Mifery or Corruption of Mankind tho' really lamentable, yet is not fo
great but that it may be reconciled with the good Providence of
God.

V. For as to the firft Objection taken from the fewnefs of them
ormodenue that attain to Happinefs, we may reply that Happinefs is two-fold,
Happinefs. perfeEi and abfolute^ or moderate and partial. I call that perfect which
anfwers in every refpect to our Wifhes, and that moderate which,

tho'

NOTES.

Many attain

** we muft in this World- gain a Relifli of
*' Truth and Virtue, if we would be able to
" tafle that Knowledge and Perfection which
*' are to make us happy in the next. The feeds
" of thofe Spiritual Joys and Raptures which
" ztc to rife up and flourifh in the Soul to all
" Eternity muft be planted in her during this
' her prefent State of Probation. In ftiort,
" Heaven is not to be Jook'd upon only as the
*' Reward, but as the natural EfFeft of a Reli-
" gious Life." See alfo Tillotfoti's Serm. ift
vol. Pol. r>. 51, 82, 85, &c. and the 78thSerm.

2d vol. p. 591. Concerning the true End of
Man, and the Means of obtaining it, and the
Nature both of thofe Virtues which will con-
ftitute the greateft part of Heaven, and of
thofe Infiratnental Duties by which we are to
acquire, improve, and perfeft thefe Heavenly
Virtues, or make our own Heaven, fee Scott's
incomparable Treatife of the Cbriftian Life,
vol. 1. particularly Ch. 3. which Notion is al-
fo well defended by Dr. Rymer in the Chap, a-
bove mention'd. See alfo Dr. Laugbttri's, Serm.
on Ram. 6. 23.

Of Moral Evd.

tho' it does not equal our Defires, yet is not quite deftitute of agree-
able Enjoyments, with which Life being accompanied, and fweeten'd
as it were by the Mitigation of its Evils, and the Alleviation of its
Cares, becomes a Bleffing, and worth a prudent Man's Choice. As
to the former, 'tis certain that it cannot fall to the Lot of any Man
in this prefent State, nor is it a Debt due from God to a Creature>
tho' never fo innocent. Since the Condition of Men is, and muft ne-
cefTarily be fuch (while we inhabit this Earth in its prefent State) as
will by no means admit of this abfolutely perfect Happinefs. For
Pains, Griefs, and the reft of thofe which we call natural Evils, can-
not, as things now ftand, be totally avoided, but by the preternatural
Favour of the Deity. The Earth then muft either be left deftitute
f Inhabitants, or we muft take up with a moderate fliare of Happi-
nefs; this alfo is a Gift worthy of God, and fit to be accepted and
embrae'd by Man, Neither is this a rare Felicity, and which hap-
pens to few Men ; for all may enjoy it, and moft actually do ; efpe-
cially if they will make a prudent ufe of their Elections. For if
there be any bitter thing in Life, it generally flows from depravad
Elections, and by a right ufe of thefe, any thing which creates un-
eaiinefs, or can make us weary of Life, might be mitigated or re-
mov'd. To conclude, tho' we complain of the Miferies of Life, yet
we are unwilling to part with it, which is a certain Indication that
it is not a burden to us, and that not fo few attain this moderate
Happinefs, as the Objection would inlimsate. (104.)

N n 2 VI. As

NOTES.

(ic.f) To calculate whether the Sum of
Happinefs in this World exceed the Sum of
Mifcry, Upon the whole, would be an endlefs
piece of Work, and what no Man perhaps is
nble precifely to determine : I Diall therefore
only produce the Opinion of one or two Au-
thors on the Queftion, which may fcrve at
lead to confront the Teflimony fo often and
. fo hugely repeated by B.i)'e in all his Works.

w I am fure (fays Dr. Sherlock f\ we are rc-
" ry ungrateful to Almighty God jf wedo not
" acknowledge that bountiful Provifion which
he has made for the Happinefs of ManJiml
" in this World. For what is wanting on
" God's part to make Man as happy as he can be
" here ? We want no fenfc which is ufeful to
" Life ? wc want no Objects to gr.uifie thofe
" Senfes, and which is very confiderablc, the

" moft

+ Oft Prcv'uUiia, Ch. 7. p. Z43^ *d Edit.

a^6 Of Moral Evil.

VI. As to the fecond thing objected, viz. that moft: of us are either
ufe of"thU ig norant or regardlefs of this Power of pleafing ourfelves by Elec-
Elcftive tion; upon a thorough Enquiry it will be manifeft, that the ufe of
Power tho' t hj s Power is neither difrcgarded, nor fo rare as might appear at firft
observe it. Sight. I own there are few who take notice of this in themfelves,
or obferve, that the Pleafure which they feel in acting arifes from the
Exercife of it. But neverthelefs they do excrcife it, and tafte the Plea-
fure arifing therefrom. And the fame thing feems to befal us in the
Exercife of this Power which happens in fome Organs of Senfe, tho'
we are entirely ignorant which they are, or of what kind, yet we
ufe them, and by the ufe of them perceive external things. Thus
we pleafe ourfelves in choofing, tho' we are not aware that things
pleafe us becaufe they are chofen. Now that this is fo will be evi-
dent, if we examine thofe things which afford Pleafure to both young
and old, wife as well as foolifh. For if the far greater part of them
have no manner of Connection with the natural Appetites, nor with
the Neceffities of Nature, it will appear that they have pleafed us
no otherwife than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the trifles of
Children, and the ferious Affairs of Men ; the Temerity of Fools, and
the Counfels of the Wife j and it will be evident almoft in all of
them, that they pleafe by Election only * This, among other things,

may

NOTE $,

" moft ufeful, and ncceffary, and delightful tc rich. Thefe indeed at beft are but mean
Obje&s, are moft common, and fuch as ] '* Pleasures, the Pleafures of Senfe, which are

" the loweft a ieafonable Soul is capable of;

** Mankind pretty equally fhare in. There is
" not fuch a mighty Difference as fome Men
* imagine, between the Poor and the Rich :
" in Pomp, and Shew, and Opinion, there is
*' a great deal, but little as to the true Plea-
'* fures and Satisfactions of Life : they enjoy
*'. the fame Earth, and Air, and Heavens;
" Hunger and Thirft makes the poor Man's
** Meat and Drink as pleafant and relifhing as
" all the Varieties which cover a rich Man's
" Table : and the Labour of a poor Man is
* more healthful, and many times more plea-
*' {ant too, than the Eafe and foftnefs of the

" but yet they are fo entertaining, that the ge-
nerality of Mankind think it worth living
w to enjoy them. And yet there are mote no-
*' ble aad divine Pleafures which Men may en-
44 joy in this World ; fuch as gratify the no-
" bier Faculties of the Soul, the Pleafures of
" Wifdom and Knowledge, of Virtue and Re-
" ligion ; to know and worfhip God, to con-
" template the Art and Beauty and Perfection
41 of his Works, and to do Good to Men.
" Thefe indeed are Pleafures that do not make
41 us very fond of. the Body, nor of this World;

" for

Ste mere of this in Sett. I. Subfeft. 5. par. 11, 12, &c.

Of Moral Evil

may appear from the Diverfions of Cards and Dice. Nothing is
more agreeable to all, or pleafes more ; but upon no other accounr,
if we examine ic thoroughly, than becaufe we will be thus em-
ploy *d. ' (

Nay that dire Luft of Rule which bewitches mortal Minds, and
tranfports them beyond themfelves, which cannot be fatisfy'd un-
lefs the whole World be fubdued, and even not then; this nei-
ther receives its Origin nor Approbation from Nature or any innate
Appetite.

But the force of Election is never more apparent than in fome
Men's infatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofita-
ble Riches, for no ufe, no end, but to fatisfy their Choice. Behold
the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curfe to his Relations,
a Jefl to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature ; depriving himfelf
of Food, Sleep, Reft, and other Neceflaries, and yet applauding him-
felf ftill. Why do thefe tilings pleafe which are fo unnatural, fo
abfurd, fo prepofterous ? This is felt, this is purfu'd, tho\ he that
does this be not confcious that he is doing it, neither obferves what
it is which pleafes him. It is not therefore the Direction of the
Senfes, or the Impulfe of Animal Nature only, which tranfports us
into Vices and unlawful Acts; thefe are commonly done againft the

Remonftrance

NOTES.

" for they do not arife from the Body, nor
" are they confin'd to this World. We have
" rafon to hope, that when we get loofe
** from thefe Bodies, our intellectual Facul
" ties will be vaftly improv'd ; that we fhall
*\ know God after another manner than we
** now do ; and difcover new and brighter
" Glories which are conceal'd from Mortal
" Eyes ; but yet the Pleafures of Knowledge,
u and Wifdom, and Religion in this World,
" are very great and ravifhing, and therefore
" we either do or may enjoy at prefent fuch
" Pleafures as make Life very defirable : Were
" there no other nor happier State after this, I

" World, and live as long as we can here, to
* enjoy the Pleafures and Satisfactions which
** may be enjoy'd in this Life."

An Explication of Eccl. Ch. 4. v. 2, 3. may
be found in the fame excellent Chapter, fee al-
fo p. 225.

LeiknitZ) EJfais de Theodicee *. " It will
** be faid, that Evils are very great and nume-
M rous if compar'd with good things ; but it
" is a Miftake; Want of Attention is the on-
'* ly thing that lefTens our Happinefs ; and
" 'tis necefTary that this Attention mould be
" rais'd by a mixture of Evih Let us fupply
" by Reflection what is wanting to our Percep-
yet it were very defirable to come into this J" tion, to be more fenfiblc of our Happinefs.

" Were

Mtmoirs of Literature^ V. 3. p. 118.

$*}% Of Mwcd Evil

Remonflrance of thofe Appetites Which are implanted by Nature,agamil
the Remonftrance of Senfe and Initincl:, no lefs than Reafon, and th.2
lealt Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our
great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the Impetus of A-
nimal Nature^ and that this Power of pleafing ourfelves by Election
does not lie idle ; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate
nfe of it which tranfports us into Wickednefs.
El-aioiis ^ ^ s * ^* "*^ Objedion, viz. that the Corruption of Man-

produce the kind is almoft univerfal\ it is to be obferv'd in the nrft. place, that
fame eftea in Ei ec ^i ons produce the fame eifeft in the Moral, as Motion does in
WoridasMo- r ^ e Natural World ; neither is it any more to be expected, that in
tion does in our prefertt State all Elections iliould.be confident and uniform, than
rthe Natural. j^ a jj ivi Gt ion6 mould be lb. Now as contrariety of Motion is a
necefTary Gaufe of natural Corruption, fo the interfering of EleBions
h of Vice br Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both,
viz. by destroying Motion and free Choice ; but while thefe are per-
mitted-, neither of the Evils tould be prevented in the prefent State
of things.

WW 8ect>Adly-, We may obfervt that things are connected toge-
^ . ther, and have a mutual dependence on each other, oil this account,

Things are ' ^ ' '

conneftedto- *S

gerher, and a Defecl ifi tffife srte&s many others.

AT f S.

" thers, Perjuries, Frauds, Moffiurt;, AJfzjfir.r.'
titms, they have ever either heard of or read

" Were it not for the Knowledge of a future
" Life, I believe moft People would be wil-
ling at the point of Death to begin a new

" Lite, upon condition that they flic u!d en
-* joy as much Good, and undergo as many
" Evils, efpecially if they were of another
** kind. They would be contented with a
" Change, without requiring a more happy
" Condition.' '

The fame Conclnfion is drawn by Mr. Hucbe-
fvi after an accurate Enquiry into the Frame of
.human Nature, aiid a Comparifon of the Plea-

" in Hiftory ; thence concluding all Mankind
" to be very wicked as if a Court of Juftice
tt were the proper Place of making an Eiti-
" mate of the Morals of Mankind, or an Ho*
* fpital of the Healthful nefs of a Climate.
" Ought they not to confkler, that the Num-
" ber of honeft Citizens and Farmers far furpais
" thit of all forts of Criminals in any State ;
" and that the innocent or kind Aclions of e-
" ven Criminals themfelves furpafs their

fare's and Pains attending its fcveral Senfes f . " Crimes in number? That 'tis the Rarity of
" Here Men are apt to let their Imaginations " Crime?, in comparifon of innocent or good

rtm o"ut upon all the Robberies, Piracies, Mur~
f Jay en the Peflions, p. 1 77, &c. and in particular p. 1 84.

" A&iom, which engages 'our attention to

them

Of Moral Evil

as Machines which require the moft Workmanfhip may be flopped
o<- difor iered by the defect of a fingle Nail or Wheel : (o the Error
or Offence of one Man puts the rational Syitem or Society of Man-
kind o-;t of Order. Any Perfon, byaimoftone fingle free Act, may
deftroy a Hqufe or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck.
Any King or Governor can, by an eafy and free Acl, overwhelm
whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Fa-
ther may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are fure of inheriting
his Difeafes and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be
otherwife while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth
are fuch as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liber-
ty and the Connection of things muft be deftroy'd, or thefe Evils
tolerated.

IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not permit any bad E-
lections, but fuch as may be reconciled with the Good of the
whole Syftem, and has digefted and order'd every thing in fuch a

l 19

Vice and
Wicked-

nefs, tho'
deform 'd

manner, in them .

Telvcs , do
not impair the Beauty of the whole.

N O $ E S.

them, and makes them to be recorded in
Hiftory; while incomparably more honeft
generous domeftick Aclions are overlook'd
only becaufe they aie fo common ; as one
great Danger, or one Month's Sicknefs fhall'
become a frequently repeated Story, during
a long Life of Health and Safety. The
Pains of the external Senfes are pretty fre-
quent, but how fhort in comparifon of the
long Tiats of Health, Eafe, and Pleafure ?
How rare is the Inftancc of a Life with one
Tenth fpent in violent Pain ? How few
want abfolute Neceffarics, nay have not
fomething to fpend on Gaiety and Orna-,
tnents ? The Pleijures of Beauty are expos'd
to all in feme Meafure. Thefe kinds of
Beauty which require Property to the full
Enjoyment of them are not ardently defir'd
by many. The Good of every kind in the
Univerfc is plainly fuperior to the Evil.

*' How few would accept of Annihilation ra-
" ther than Continuance in Life in the middle
M State of Age, Health, and Fortune? Or
" what feparated Spirit who had confidex'd
14 human Life, would not, rather than perifli,
u take the hazard of it again, by returning in-
u to a Body in the State of Infancy ? "

" i Who would lofe

' For fear of Pain this intellectual Being,

'* Thofe thoughts which wander thro' Eternity

* l To perijh rather, /wallow 1 d up and M

M In the wide Womb of uncreated Night ;

" Devoid of Senfe and Motion ?< . <<

Milton'/ Par. lojl, B. 2:

See alfo Mr. Chubb** Supplement to the
Vindication of God's Moral Character ff, or
Lucas's Enquiry after Happintfs, V. 1. $. 2>
C. 2. p. 41.

ft Tr*as, p, 281, &V;

-8o Of Moral Evil

manner, that thefe very Faults and Vices (hall tend to the Good of
the whole. For as in Mufick Difcords, if heard feparately, grate
and offend the Ear with harfhnefs, but when mix'd in confort with
other Notes, make a more fweet and agreeable Harmony j in like
manner bad Elections, if confider'd alone, are look'd upon as odious
and deteftable, but compared with the whole Syftem, they promote
and increafe the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are
temper'd they become medicinal to each other by that very Con-
trariety, and thofe which would poifon feparate, when mix'd be-
come a Remedy *. |

For inftance, One by a depraved Choice raifes an immenfe Sum of
Money, and a vaft Eftate, and either the fame Perfon os his Heir, by
his Vanity and Profufenefs, compenfates for what he had acquir'd
by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by fquandering a-
way his ill-gotten Wealth to the moft idle Purpofes, as if he had be-
ftow'd all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Induftry, where-
as he would otherwife afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man
offends in Luxury and Idlenefs : the Poor tranfgrerles no lefs by too
much Labour and Solicitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other
End than to provide Inftruments of Luxury for the Rich : but each
of them pleafes himfelf in his Choice, and 'tis almoft the fame thing
with refpect to the benefit of the Univerfe, as if one had converted
to pious Ufes what he fpent in Luxury, and the other had labour'd
moderately to provide only what was ufeful. The fame almoft may
be faid of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals
themfelves, or thofe that defer ve to fuffer -, nay they are often bene-
ficial to others; and fo long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis
fit to allow every one the ufe of their own Will, and let them fuf-
fer for their Sin. God could indeed cut ofT all Occafion of Sin, by
taking away free Elections : But it is plain that this would be
far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Bufinefs to
prevent bad Elections, and if we 5 will not, we fufTer for our Folly:

But

* See Leibnitz in tbs Mtmirs of Literature refar'd t: alr.-e.

Of Moral Evil

But God will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no fefs
than by our Wifdom. (105.)

X. I

181

NOTES,

(105.) We may add, and by our Sin no lefs
than by our Rightewtfttefs. Thus it may be faid
in a good Senfe that private Vices (as well as
private Misfortunes) often becomes public Be-
nefit.', tho' the Authors be no lefs liable to Pu-
nishment: But it will be objected, that this
makes Vice to be necelTary for the Public
Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all ; nor
coafequently punifhable. For a tendency or
oppofition to the general Happinefs of our
Syflem, is the very Criterion of Virtue and
Vice: If then what is call'd my Wickednefs
tends to the Good of the World, how can I
be punifh'd for it ? And if my Action pro
motes the Glory of God, why doth he yet find
fault ? We anfwer, Vice naturally and in ge
ncral tends to the Mifery of any Syflem ; fo
that if all were vicious, all would be wretch-
ed ; and on the contrary, if every one were
virtuous, all mull be happy; to be vicious and
to be productive of Pain or Mifery, would
then be convertible terms. But in a mix'd ir-
regular State, where fome purfue the Rules of
Virtue and others do not, the Cafe is very much
aiter'd, there Pain or Evil, and fuch Actions
as produce it, may often be the moll proper
means to remedy fome greater Evil, or procure
feme fuperior Good ; to reform a Vice, or im-
prove a Virtue ; in which Cafe, tho' that way
of acting which in general tends to Mifery,
happens to be productive of fome real Hap-
pinefs which could not have been produced
without it, yet this is not fufficient to excufe
or juilify it, nor is it fomuch the confequencc
of its own Nature, and attributable to its im-
mediate Author, as an effect of the fupcrin-
tendency of fome other Agent, who applies it,
and raatas it inflrumental to fome End of his'
. who brings Good out of Evil, or from
Evil takes occafion to do dill more Good than
he could be conceiv'd to have done without
lliat Evil.

All this I think may be fuppofed of God,

and yet the different Natures of Good and E-
vil continue fix'd. Man, who cannot fee all
the Confequences and Connection of things,
mull be obliged to fome general Rules of act-
ing, and whenever he deviates from thefe
Rules he does amifs ; at leall when he intends
to act againll the very End of thefe Rules, /. e.
the general Good, he evidently fins, let the
Confequence of his Acts be what it will.
Thus the Actions of a Man may be often mo-
rally Evil to himfelf, tho' they prove natural-
ly Good to fome 'others : they may proceed
from a bad Intention in him, or he may be a
Tranfgreflbr by acting againll his Rule ; and
tho* God may have, an occafion of Glorifying
himfelf thereby, of difplaying his Wifdom and
Goodnefs, &c. to a higher degree than they
could otherwife have been exhibited; and
therefore may reafonably permit the Actions of
this Man, and convert them, either to the
Punifhment and Correction of himfelf or o-
ther Sinners, or to the Blelfing of fome righ-
teous Perfons ; yet the immediate Author is
neverthelefs accountable both to God and
Man for fuch his Actions. Inttances of this
kind are innumerable, and may be feen in
Sherlock on Providence. See particularly what
is required from God's Goodnefs in a State of
Difcipline. p. 221,224, 230, C5V. 2d Edit, or
in Simplicity on Epiftctt/s, p. 83. 4th Edition,
Lond. 1 670.

What has been faid here only relates to-
God's permitting Moral Evil, fo far as it is a
means of fome prepollent Good.

S. C. in his Impartial Enquiry, cjrV. carries
the Matter farther, and fuppofes that God may
for the general Good decree fome fuch Acts as
fecm to be morally Evil ; which I can fee no
reafon or ncceflity for fuppofing. How lie en-
deavours to make this out and reconcile it with
the Holinefs and Juflice of the Deity, may be
fecn in Part f. Cl. n. prop. 9. p. 94, &c.

O o

Z%7

'oil

qoti
X. If

Of Moral

this be true, it is a

l Evil.

cj yi btagapM

fufncicnt Vindication of the Div

I ( t !\ sbear "Goodnefs, notwithstanding fuch a plentiful Crop of Vices be per-
Scuiar Cafes, mitted ; nor need we infift upon a longer enquiry how this may be
it accounts applied to particular Cafes; for whether this Corruption was oc-
vTrfai Cor-" cafion'd by the Fall of our firft Parents as Truth itfelf declares, or
*uption. by any other Caufe whatever, 'tis certain that God would never have
permitted it, if it could have been prevented without greater Da-
mage to the whole. { 1 06.) We may wonder indeed that almoft all

Mankind

NOTES.

(106.) Perhaps fuch a Scheme as this of the
Fall appears to be from the Reprefentation gi-
ven of it, and its effects in Scripture, was ne-
ceffary to malce ns duly fenfible of the Nature
of Good and Evil, to acquaint us more fully
with the Moral Perfections of the Deity
(which could not have been lb clearly exhibi-
ted to us if there had never been any room for
the Exercife of them) and confequently to
bring us to an Imitation of thefe Perfections,
and thereby to the greateft and molt refined
Happinefs that our better part is capable of.
Man (as we obferv'd in Note ro3.) is a very
imperfect compound Being, who, by the con-
ltitution of his Nature, feems incapable of be-
ing made truly wife and virtuous, or which is
the fame thing, morally happy on fudden, he
muft therefore receive Improvement gradually,
and as he is to compteat his good Habits by a
Series of virtuous Acts, fo it fcems proper for
him to be trailed up by various Difpenfations,
and a Series of Events adapted to the feveral
Faculties of his Body and Mind ; the various
conftituent Parts of his Nature, and different
Sources of his Happinefs: accordingly we find
rrvit the Happineia of Man in his firlt Eftate
was chiefly Animal, to which an Earthly Para-
dife was exquilitely fitted ; a Change in this
was probably requifite to introduce the ratio-
nal or moral kind into the World, and to
make him direct his Thoughts to fomething
higher than mere fenfitive Delights. This we
are told wis the Method of Divine Providence
with the Jeivijb Nation in particular, who had I

a Law of Carnal Ordinances to exercife them
for a while, and Jead them on to the Expec-
tation of better things; to fpiritnalize their
Notions by Degrees, and prepare them for the
Heavenly Doctrines of Mfjftah. And why
might not the like Method be made ufe of in
the Government of Mankind in general, or e-
ven all rational Beings ? What if God, wil-
ling to make known the greater Riches of his
Glory, fuiFer'd our firft Parents tD fall foon
from that Condition wherein he created them
at firft, in order to raife them and their Pofte*
rity to a much higher State of Glory and trire
Happinefs after ? And who can prove that
the former was not conducive to the latter ?
We believe that the Blifs of Heaven will in-
finitely exceed the Pleafures of a TerreftrJal
Eden j why then fhould we not fuppofe that
the lefs might be in tome manner ufeful and
introductory to the greater ? Why might not
a fhort Life in Paradife be as proper a State of
Probation for the Virtues of this prefent
World, as this World is for the Glories of a-
nother ? There is a Paffage concerning Para-
dife in Scoffs Cbriflian Life * which confirms
this Notion : But it is the moft fully explain'd
by Mr. D'Oyly in his firft T>iJ[ertation y C. 3.
p. yi, &c. I fhall tranferibe fo much as may
be neceflary to fhew his general Defign. " If
" we confider our Nature as it came in Inns-
* cence out of the hand of its Creator, God
" forefaw how very foon it would fall from
" its primitive Purity, and therefore defign'd
" it farther for a much happier State, raifed

and.

* VoL 1.. p. 26.

Of Moral Evil.

Mankind are polluted in Wickednefs, and that God puts no flop to
the Progrcfs of thofe Vices which deform his Work j but in reality
this is no more to be wonder'd at, than that this inferior World is
by Motion univerfally fubjected to natural Corruption. For as Con-
trariety of Motions neceflarily works a Change in folid and hetero-
geneous Bodies, and tranfpofes them into another Form and Condi-
tion, whence neceflarily proceed Diflblution and Concretion, Cor-

U o 2 ruption

-. ~,.,

NOTES.

283

and refined by a clearer and more extenfive
Manifeftation of himfelf : But had it flood
the Reward (at leaft as far as we know)
would have been the indefeafable Pofl'eflion
of a Paradife in this World, the enjoying of
an immortal Life here on Earth, chequer' d
as it were with Spiritual and Senfitive, or
Animal Pleafures. And for their Conduct
in that State God feems to have left them
(one or two Inftances excepted) under the
Direction of the Law of Nature, the Spiritual
or Religious Part of which taught them to
look up to him as the Creator of the World;
the Lord and Author of their Being, and to
fear and obey him as their Almighty So-
vereign. The Civil part of it furniflVd them
with right Reafon, dictating what was ne-
cefiary to be done in order to their well-
being in this World. So that had they
flood, their Happinefs would probably have
been what that of Mankind was afterwards
a mixture of rational and fenjitive, or bodily
Enjoyments. And as to any Knowledge of
God, farther than that now mention'd ; it
may, I conceive, be thought reafonable to
preiume that they had the fame awful fenfe
of his Veracity as of any other Attribute :
and yet how very eafily were they wrought
into a Belief by the firft Story they heard,
and from they know not whom, that he had
afted collufively in barring them the Fruit of
the Tree of Knowledge^ defigning by it only
to keep them down under the Veil of Igno-
rance, and that there was no fuch imminent

** Danger of Death confequent to their tafting
" it, as they were at firft made to believe f
" Whatever fuch Knowledge therefore we fup-
" pofe them to have had, it may be doubted,
" its Impreffions were not vivid and forcible
" enough to influence their Wills to fuitable
" Efforts in loz'ing and cleaving fteadily to
" him : fince no one can love whom he docs
" not believe, and without Faith 'tis as im-
" poflible to love as to pleaft God ': So that
" thofe Impreflions could not confequently be
" very inftrumental in making an Addition to
" their Happinefs, as has been fliewn above.
'/ Nay as to Adam himfelf in particular, it
" may perhaps feem reafonable to think he
" had not that profound Reverence and awful
" regard for the Divine Majefty which he
" might juflly have been expected to exprefs,
" (tho' not under the Circumflances of a Cri-
H minal) fince after the Facl committed, he
" feems attempting to fcreen his Guilt, even
" by throwing the blame obliquely upon God
" himfelf, where he anfwers, The Woman whom
" Thou gaveft to be with me, Jbe gave mc oftkt
" Tree and I did eat *. M

The Author proceeds to enquire into the
State of Religion in the Antcdeluvian
World, the Patriarchal Ages, and down to
the Jetvijb Difpcnfation, and fhews that
Mankind could not from the Works of
Creation and Providence only (which yet
were their only means of Knowledge) have
fo extenfive and perfect a Knowledge of God
as was requifitc to advance their Happinefs

properly

Diflcrt. 1. p. 33.

"084. Of Moral Evil

ruption and Generation : In like manner free Choice neceffarily ad-
mmifters occafion of Sin to Agents endow'd with an imperfect Un-
derstanding, and obnoxious to Pafiions and Affections. And as in the
natural World; the Corruptionand Contagion of one thing extends it-
felf to others, and acquires Strength by Spreading ; fo alfoin the mo-
ral, if Election once deviate to Evil, the Poifon is difrufed along
with it, and feizes and infects all about it.-

But

NOTES.

properly {o call'd, as rational Agents, to any
confiderable Degree; nor confequently to be
the foundation of a Worfhip worthy of him.
From whence he concludes, " The Faculties
' of our rational Nature muft have lain dor-
" ment and ufelefs as to the greatell Happinefs
** it was capable of attaining by the Exercife of
" them; and as to the higheft Honour and
" moft exalted Worfhip it was in itfelf qua-
" lify'd to pay to the Divine Majefty, unlefs
" he had pleas'd to make provifion for the
"farther Manifeftation of himfelf: which, in
" what manner he has in his infinite Wifdom
" and Goodnefs determin'd to effect, will ap-
** pear by laying open the moft advantageous
" Changes which has been made as to thefe
" and other refpects, by the appearance of
" Chrift in the Flejb. For if it be fhewn, that
" by that amazing Tranfaction he has {o dif-
" play'd the infinite Excellencies and Perfec-
" tions of his Nature, as to give the utmoft
4 poffible Scope to the whole rational Crea-
" tion, to exert their nobleft Faculties, and
" ilrain them up to the moft exalted aftonifh-
** ing Thoughts of, and feraphical Devotion to
" him : if farther he has thereby apply' d the
" moft proper and forcible means to rectify
' the Moral Errors, reform the Vices, and o-
' vercome the daring Wicktdnefs of Mankind ;
' and laftly, if it be fhewn that he has done
" all this in fuch a manner that it could not
" have been effected to fo great Advantage^ any
" other way, then will it be demonftratively
2 evident, that whereas he forefaw from all

" Eternity, that Man whom he had decreed to
" create would abufe his natural Liberty, and
" fo, being tempted, fall into Sin : There
" was infinite reafon on this account as well
tc as that mention'd before, why he might
" have pleas'd alfo, in his infinite Wifdom
" and Goodnefs, to have decreed to permit it,
r thereby to open a way for the ftupendous
" Manifefiation of himfelf, as above exprefs'd.
" And particularly that by what follow'd
" from it, Mankind might become capable of
" attaining far greater Happinefs than they
f* would have been had our firft Parents con-
" tinued innocent." p. 43.

How this Author makes out the fore-men-
tioned Particulars may be feen in the remainder
of his Differ -tat ion.

See alfo Dr. Jenkin on the fame Subject *.

Now this is not, as Bayle objects f, " To
" compare the Deity to a Father who mould
" fuffer his Children to break their Legs, on
" purpofe to fhew to all the City his great
'* Art in fetting their broken Bones. Or to a
H King who fhould fuffer Seditions and Fac-
" tions to encreafe thro 1 all his Kingdom, that
*' he might purchafe the Glory of quelling
" them." But rather like a King who permits
fome of his Subjects to put their feditious De-
figns in practice, and to promote a Revolt,
in order to illuftrate his Wifdom, Power and
Goodnefs more fully in reducing them to their
Duty, and to convince them more clearly of
the Expedience and abfolute Neceffity of obey-
ing him, and thereby to confirm them, or at

leaft

* Reafonablenefs ofCbriftianity, 2d vol. C. 1 2.
f Crit. Difi. p. 2488.

Of Moral Evil

But yet both natural and moral Corruption have their Bounds, nei-
ther does God permit them to fpread farther than is conducive to
to die Good of the whole*. It may feem ftrange to us that he fuf-
fers both of them to wander over this World of ours without Re-
ftraint; but what is our World to the whole Syftem of the Univerfe ?
How fmall a Part! how next to nothing! (107.) Let this whole Earth

n^ ,

NOTES.

leafl: all the reft of his Subjects, in a well
grounded Obedience to his Government, in
which their Happinefs entirely confifts : Or
like a Father that finding, his Children oblli-
nately difobedient, fuffers them fometimes to
wander aftray, and to fall into fome Dangers
and Inconvenicncies, and lets them fmart un-
der the Mifery which they bring upon them-'
fclves, in order to make them more fenftble of
their need of his Affiftance and Direction, and
thereby more dependent on him for the future,
and more fubject to him, and therefore more,
fare of Happinefs. This Comparifon is well
explain'd by Sherlock on Providence, Chap. 7.
p. 262.

Hence then it will perhaps appear that we
have reafon to fuppofe, that the Fall of Man
from Earthly and Animal Delights, was de-
fign'd to raife him to a Rational and Heaven-
ly State of Happinefs, and to make way for
fuch a wonderful Difplay of all the Divine
Attributes in that Expedient, as could not
have been exhibited at all, or not to fo high a
Degree without it ; and confequently that this
Method was the very beft even for eur own
Syftem. But if this Suppofition feem impro-
bable, or infufficient, yet Hill why may not
all the Mifery in this Syftem of ours promote
and encreafe the Happinefs of fome others f ?
We have good reafon to believe that there is
fome Connection between the different Sy-
ftcms of the Univerfe ; but have fmall ground
to imagine ours the beft, why then may it not
be fubfervient to a better ? This indeed is

only Conjecture ; however, I think it would
be no eafy Matter to, confute it; till which be
done, we may very fafely conclude with our
Author, that the Fall it/elf, as well as all the
Sin and Mifery confequ'em upon it, cou'd not
hive been prevented without greate? detriment
to the whole : and one may iay the me of
Eve as the Poet did of the hand Jttumms
Sccevola : Si nan- errafjet., fecerat ilia minus L

(107.) " It will be objected, that even after

" this Life Mifery will prevail above HappU

c * nefs (fince there are but few EleB) which

" appears inconfiftent with the Goodnefs of

' the fupreme Being. * In anfwer to this

" Difficulty, granting that the Number of

" thofe who are to be tormented in Hell will

" be incomparably greater than that of the

" Blefled, the Evil will Hill appear like no-

" thing if compared with the Good, confidcr-

" ing the true Extent of the City of God. The

" Ancients had a narrow Notion of the Works

*' of the Author of Nature ; and St. Auguftin,

" for want of knowing the modern Difcove-

s * ries, was not a little pcrplex'd when he un-

" dertook to juftify the prevalency of Evil.

*' It was in former times a common Opinion,

' that the Earth was the only part of the World

" furniftted with Inhabitants; nay the Antients

lt were afraid of admitting any Antipodes : they

believ'd that the reft of the World did only

" confift of fome mining Globes and Cryftal-

" line Spheres : But in our Days it will be

" acknowledged that there is an innumerable

* Number of Globes, as large and larger than

' ours.

* See Sherlock on Providence, Ch. 7. p. 261. 2d Edit, and Scott'/ Chriftian Life, V. 2. Ch. 4
par. 3. p. 318, Sec. %vo.

f See the next Note, See Leibnitz EJfais de Tbecdicee, Part 2. $* 239.

a 86 Of. Moral Evil

of ours be ftain'd with Corruption of both kinds ; fuppofe it clouded
and benighted with Darknefs and Vice, yet it will -but be like a
very fmall Spot in a very beautiful Body, which is fo far from lef-
fening, that it encreafes the Comelinefs and Beauty of the whole.
The Earth, notwithstanding its Obfcurity, has its Ufe and Place in
Nature, which it could not commodioufly fill if thofe things which
render it liable to Darknefs and Corruption were removed. The
fame muft be faid of Men, they have their proper Ufe and Station,
and in order to fill it commodioufly, they were to be created of
fuch a Nature and Difpofition- as might eafily be corrupted with
Vice. Neither have we any more reafon to conclude that all free
Agents are involv'd in Evil Elections, becaufe this happens almoft
univerfally to Men, than that all the Regions of the Heavens are
fubjecl to the fame Changes that our Air is liable to. The whole
Work of God may be bright and beautiful, tho' that Point which
conftitutes our World feem by itfelf rude and unadorn'd : and tho'
fome Parts appear to us who have not a View of the whole Contex-
ture, larger or lefs than the juft Proportion requires, yet they may
agree with others in the moft perfect Symetry. Nor need we pre-
fume upon the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs in the Moral, any more

than

no r E s.

'* ours, which may be inhabited by rational
" Creatures, tho' it does not follow that they
* are Men. Our Earth is only a Planet, that
*' is, one of the fix principal Satellites of our
" Sun. And becaufe all hVd Stars are fo
** many Suns, 'tis plain the Earth is a very
** inconsiderable part of the Univerfe, fince
" it is only an appendix of one Sun. Perhaps
" all the Suns are inhabited by happy Crea-
" tures, at le.;fl we -have no reafon to believe
'* that many of their Inhabitants will be dam-
" ned. Befides, confidering that there is no
" reafon to affirm that there are Stars every
-" where, it may very well be, that there is a
-*' vaft Space beyond the? Region of the Stars.
" Whether it be the Empyreal Heaven or not,
** that immenfe Space which furrcunds all that

Region may be filled with Glory and Hap-
pinefs. It may be conceiv'd like an Ocean,
which receives the Rivers of all happy Crea-
tures, when they have attain'd to their Per-
fection in the Syftem of the Stars. What
will then become of the Confideration of
our Globe and its Inhabitants ? Will it
not be a thing incomparably lefs than a
Phyfical Point, fince our E.mh is like a
Point with refpecl to the diltance of fome
fix'd Stars ? And therefore the Proportion
of that part of the Univerfe which we know
being loll in a kind of Nothingnefs, it may
very well be faid that all Evils are almoit
nothing in comparifon with all the good
things that are in the Univerfe -f.

f Leibnitz in Memtirs of Literature, Vol, 3.

Of Moral Evil.

than in xh&hWural World. The Crimes and Vices themielves are
very few in comparifon of the free Agents, and may contribute to
the Good of the whole, no lefs than natural Corruption does to the
PrefervatiOn of the Syflem. Nay one Man's Fault is very often cor-
rected by the Vices of another, and the Deformity ftamp'd upon the
Works of God by the Wickednefs of fome, is obliterated by the fu-
pervening Iniquity of others. By the vitiated Elections of fome, a
Stop is put to the Wickednefs of many ; and the Virtue and Hap-
pinefs of a great many is confirmed and increafed by the Mifery of
a few j nay an Opportunity of doing Good is offer'd to fuch as are
fo difpofed, which never could have been if none had abufed their
Choice. (108.)

S U B S E C T.

587

NOTES.

(108.) Upon the whole, from that little
which we know of the Scheme of Divine Pro-
vidence in the Formation and Government of
the M'<ml World, it feems very reafonable for
us to conclude concerning this, in the fame
manner as we did concerning the Natural
World, viz. That no considerable part of it
can be alter'd for the better ; or that no E-
vil in it could either have been originally a-
voided, or may now be removed, without in-
troducing greater Since the whole Contro-
vcrfy depends upon the truth of this general
Conclufion, 'tis proper that we mould be as
fully fatisfy'd as poffible about the ground of
it.

But to attempt to demonftrate it by an In-
duction of Particulars would be infinite, Ifhall
therefore choofe rather to illustrate it by a re-
view of fome of the Principles before laid
down. In the firlt place then the Deity is fup-
pofed out of pure Benevolence to have created
as many immaterial Beings of the nobleft kinds
as were agreeable to the Order and Conve-
nience of his Syftem ; for his Benevolence be
ing unbounded, feems to require this as much
as it does the Creation of any Beings at all :
The fame Benevolence alfo prompted him to
produce more imperfect, mixt ones, becaufe
even thofe were better than none. He en-

dowed thefe with an abfolutely free Principle
of Volition and A3ion, becaufe fuch Freedom
was abfolutely requifite to that Happinefs for
which he dcfign'd them ; riz. Goodnefs, Vir-
tue, or a refemblancc of hi* own Moral Qua-
lities, which is the only true Happinefs or a
rational Being. He continues this Free-

dom to them, tho' many abufc it to the Cor-
ruption of their Natures, and Introduction of
the greateft Mifery ; becaufe this abule pro-
portionably improves the Nature, and increa-
fes the Felicity of others, and fo Liberty (till
tends to the Good and Perfection of the
whole : and this it may be conceived to do in
the following manner. The miferable Effect
of the abufe of Freedom by fome in this
World, makes all others much more fcnfible
of the Nature and Confequences of Sin, and
thereby renders them confeious of a double
Pleafure in ufing their Powers aright : it ex-
ercifeth fome Virtues in them which could
have no place without it; it improveth and
cxalteth others, and confequently raifes their
whole Nature to an higher degree of Perfection
than it could otherwife acquire. By parity of
Reafon we may believe that in the next World
alfo, the Happinefs of them, as well as of
fome other Syltems, will be infinitely advan-
ced by reflections naturally arifing from their

View

288

Of Moral Evil

SUB-SECT. VII.

Wherein the 'Principles before laid down are apply d to
the Solution of fome Objetlions.

Moral Evils * 1 37ROM the foregoing Principles it feems not impoffible to an-
are not ne- Jl ^* wer mc h Objections as are commonly brought againfl the
ceflary in Goodnefs and Providence of God. For in the firft place, when it is

reipect of !_ n. j

Free-will, objected

but they

are neceffary with regard to God, fo that he mull either tolerate thefe or greater.

NOTES.

View of the Mifery which fome fhall undergo :
(which feems to be the beff, the only folid rea-
fon that can be affignM for the Creation of
thofe Beings who fhall be finally miferable, and
for the continuation of them in their mife-
rable Exiflence *.)

" To have efcaped Hell, and to find our-r
" felves in the unchangeable PcfTeffion of Sal-;
" vation by the free Mercy and Goodnefs of
" God, and by the Death of his own Sor, are
" Thougbts which muft create a new Heaven
" as it were in Heaven itfelf; I mean, they
" will enlarge our Souls to the utmoft Capa-
" city of our Natures, and fill and afluate
" them with fuch Divine Ardors of Love, as
" if we had been kept neceffarily from all
" Sin, feem impoffible to have been raifed in
" us-f.

This then we may with Reverence prefume
to have been the principal Defign f God in

permitting all Mankind to bring themfelves in-
to fuch a dangerous Eftate, and fome of them
to fuffer under it ; and perhaps the fame rea-
fon will hold for his permitting the Fall of
Angeh: For I think it plainly appear'd from
Note 23. that the Good, or rather Goodnefs of
the Creature, is properly the ultimate End of
all the Difpenfations of God, and not his own
Glory, as fome love to fpeak : This Glory
feems to bedifplay'd no otherwife than as It is
fubfervient and neceffary to that End ; and
neceffary it is (as has been partly fhewn a-
bove.) For Goodnefs is of our own making,
and muft require Knowledge, Love, &c. as
Motives and Means to further us in the gra-
dual Formation of a fuitable Temper and pro-
per Habits here, the Enlargement and Im-
provement of which will conftitute our Hea-
ven hereafter, as Scott and Dr. Rymer have
fhewn at large.

Virtue

* See the Appendix, V 2. par. 9.

f Jenki*, 2d vol. Ch. 12. p. 244, &c. 5th Edit.

Of Moral Evil

obje&ed, that Moral Evil is not a necefTary concomitant of human
Nature, and therefore is voluntarily permitted by God, and that no
Benefit arifes from the permiffion of it, as there does from Hunger,
Thirft, and the Paffions : We mutt reply, that Liberty of Choice is
a necefTary Concomitant of our Nature, and that the Exercife of it
cannot be hinder'd, as we have feen, without greater Evils : In re-
fpect then of our own Will, Moral Evil is not necefTary, but in re-
flect of God it is, /. e. he muft either tolerate this Evil or a greater;
from hence alfo proceeds no fmall Advantage to univerfal Nature, as
well as to Mankind.

II. Secondly, Hence we perceive the Anfwer to Cicero's Objection
in his third Book, De Natura Deorum, where Cotta is introduced ar-
guing

Phycian who gives his Patient Wine when he knows that he will dye of it. Or a Father
his Eftate to a Prodigal Son.

189

Ciceif s
Objection
propofed
which is ta-
ken from a
who leaves

NOTES.

Virtue therefore or Moral Good cannot (as
Bayle imagines) be infufed into us miraculoufly;
neither could God, according to the Order of our
Ideas, have acquainted us with fo much of his
adorable Nature, his Mercy, Long-fujfering,
Goodnefs and 'Truth (as he himfelf defcribes it *)
nor confequently have brought us to (o great a
refemblance of it by any other Method. The
fole Idea of a Being infinitely perfeil, Sec. (as
Bayle objects f) would not do the Bufinefs, nor
i'f it were perceiv'd and would have been at-
tended to, could it be of fufficient force to in-
fluence the Minds of Men, and regulate their
Practice, as is evident from daily Experience.
The prefent Scheme of Providence was there-
fore necefTary, in order to produce in the ge-
nerality of Men the greateft degree of 'Goodnefs
in this Life, which is the ground and founda-
tion of their Happinefs in the next.. Even
fhcre alfo may the Memory of their former
Trials (as was hinted above) the Confciouf-

ne.fs of their own happy Choice, when others
did, and they had the fame Power and the
fame Temptations to have done otherwife : the
joyful Reflection on their paft Dangers and
prefent Safety, and the natural Confequence of
all this Love and Gratitude, and Glory to
God in the Higheft, and mutual Congratula-
tions of each other. Thcfe and the like Con-
templations will (as Dr. Jcnkin fays) create a
new Heaven in Heaven itfelf. *

And tho' in one refpect a view of the Mife-
ry which the damned undergo, might feem to
detract from the Happinefs of the Blcfled, thro'
Commiferation, &c. Vet under another, a
nearer, and much more affecting Confidcra-
tion, viz. that all this is the Mifery which
they themfelves often expofed themfclves to,
ana were in imminent Danger of incurring ;
in this View, why may not the fenfe of their
own Efcape fo far overcome the Scnfe of a-
nother's Ruin, as quite to extinguifh the Pain

that

* Exod 34. 6, 7.
-| Crit. Diet. p. 248^,

$90 Of Moral Evil

guing in this manner : " If a Phyfichn knows that his Patient, who

' * is order'd to drink Wine, will drink too much and dye of it im-

,c mediately, he is greatly blameable for allowing him it. Thus is

" this Providence of yours to be blamed, which has given Reafon

" to fuch as it knew would make a perverfe and wicked Ufe of it."

He proceeds alfo to confute thofe Perfons who endeavour to excufe

Providence, by faying, " that it does not follow that we are not ve-

" ry well provided for by the Gods, becaufe a great many ufe their

. v " Gifts perverfely ; fince many make a bad ufe pf their Paternal

" Eftates, and yet thefe cannot be faid to have no Benefit from their

u Fathers." To which he replies in thefe Words : " I wifh the

u Gods had not beftow'd that Cunning upon Men which very few

" make a right ufe of : In fo much that this Divine Gift of Reafon

" and Deliberation may feem to be imparted for a Snare and . not a

,c Benefit to Mankind." He adds, " We leave Eflates to our Chil-

" dren in hopes of leaving them well, wherein we may be deceiv'd j

" but how can God be deceiv'd ? "

Tis fhewn III. To all which we reply, Firft, That it is very unfair to com-

that theCom- <c p are fa Reafon which is granted to Man with Wine given to

panfon is ill r o

put between the

Reafon and

Free -Will, and the giving of Wine; and that Gcd, if he took away Liberty for fear we fliould

Sin, would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he Ihould be fick.

NOTES.

thattfually attends the Idea of it, and even ren- j I fhall conclude with another Paflage from
der it productive of fome real Happinefs? To ! Dr. Jenkin*, which fets them in the flrongeft

this purpofe apply that of Lucretius, B. z.

Suave tnari tnagno turbantibus tequora v$ntis
E terra alter ius magnum f peel are labor em,
Nori quia vexari quenquam ejl jucunda volup-

tas.
$ed, quibus ipfe malis careas, quia eernere [na-
ve eft.

Eat however this be, mod of the foregoing
Reflections feem juft and unexceptionable.

Light.

" It muft advance the Happinefs both of
*' Artgels and Men in Heaven, that upon
" Choice and Trial they have preferr'd God
" before all things, and upon that find them-
" felves confirmed and eftablifh'd in the per-
" petual and unalterable Love and Enjoy-.
" ment of him. This very Coitfideration,
" that they might once have fallen from his
" Love, infpires them with the higheft Ar-
** dors of Love, when they rejoice in the

" infinite

p. 242.

Of Moral EviL

9 l

the Siek. For a fick Perfon may enjoy Life, and even recover, with-
out Wine; but Man cannot be what he is without Reafon. The
Comparifon therefore is very improperly made between things that
are difperate. Neither is there a lefs difference between finning and
dying. 'Tis very true, that no body would let a fick Perfon take
Wine which he knew would kill him : but yet any prudent Phyfi-
cian would allow his Patient to take fome Meat, without which he
knew that he certainly mull die, tho' he underftood, that upon ta-
king it the Fever would encreafe a little. In Like manner God has
given Reafon to Men, without which they would not be Men,
tho' he forefaw that fome Evils would arife from it. Reafon there-
fore ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Diftem-
per. If then God were to take away Reafon left Men mould ufe it
amifs, he would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he mould
be fick.

IV. Secondly, Human Reafon is improperly compared to a Pa- Reafon is no
trimony, fince it is the very Being and Life of Man : and who would ^^y" 1 ^*
rather put his Son to Death than furler him to lead a fort of an ir-par'd to an
regular Life ? Eftatc -

V. Thirdly, We ought to remember that we are not born forr tten dsto
ourfelves alone, but are fubfervient to Nature as Parts of the Uni- the good of
vjerfe, 'tis reafonable therefore that we mould bear fuch things as^^^

P p 2 tendfelves too,

that we
fhould have

the ufe of Free- Will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes^ or without

Reafon.

NOTES.

*' infinite Rewards of fo eafy and fhort a
' Tryal : and the Refle&ion upon the Dan-
" gers efcaped, heightens even the Joys of
" Heaven to them, and makes an addition to
" every Degree of Blifs. The remembrance
" of their pail Sins and Temptations, and
" tftc Senfe of their own Unworthinefs ari-
" fing from that Remembrance, will conti-
" nually excite in the Blefled frefh Ais of
" Love and Adoration of God, who has rai-

" fed them above all Sin and Temptatiop,
" and fix'd them in an everlafting State of
" Blifs and Glory. The Trial thu the Righ-
" teous underwent here, makes up fome put
" of their Happinefs in Heaven; and in
" what Degree foever their Happine s can
" be fuppofed to be, yet it is in fome
" mcafure incrcafed, and as it were en-
M deared to them, by reflecting on their
" former State of Trial, in which they

" were

Of Moral Evil

tend to the Good of the whole, tho' they be a little inconvenient to
us. Now we have fhewn before that the Abufe of Reafon cannot
be prevented without Violence done to the Laws of the Univerfe,
without Detriment to Mankind and to ourfelves. If therefore a
Father could not refufe a Son his Inheritance, without breaking
the Laws of his Country, without injuring his Family, and laftly,
without the Lofs of his Son's Life, he would not deferve to be
blamed for giving him it. tho' he underftood that he would make
a bad ufe of it : Efpecially if he forefaw that the Brothers of this
Prodigal would take warning by his Error and become frugal, and
that the Eftate which he fpenr, would turn to their Benefit. The
fame mull be faid of the Phyfician who gives his Patient a Glafs
at his Requeft; which if he did not give, the Patient would im^-
mediately itab himfelf. Is he culpable if he compound for a lefs
Evil, in order to avoid a greater? More efpecially, if many labour
under the fame Diftemper, and would not be convinc'd of the dan-
ger of ufing Wine but by Experiment : would it not be better to
let one or two make the Experiment than that all fhould perifh ?
God therefore knowingly permits us fick Perfons to ufe Wine ;
for tho' we abufe it, yet our Condition will be better than if he
had not beftow'd it upon us. If any urge, that it is better not to
be at all, than to be miferable, and confequently that 'tis more
proper to deprive us of Life, than to fufFer us to abufe it. I an-
fweras before, That we mutt make a Diftinction in Mifery; for
where there is more Evil than Good, it is indeed preferable not to
be, than to be involv'd in this kind of Mifery, but that which
attends human Reafon is not fuch, by our own Judgment. For
we had rather be what we are than not be at all, or be with-
out Reafon. Elfe why are we unwilling to change our Condition

with

NOTES.

" were fubjeft to Temptation and Sin." I Eternity of Hell-Torments, Argument the 4th.
See the fame handled more diftin&ly in J p. 73, &c. or Scotfs Chrijlian Life, Vol. 5.
the firft of Mr. D'Oylfs four DifTertations, J p. 100.
CL10. or A-Bp. Dawei'i 5th Sermon on the]

Of Moral Evil

with the Brutes, or Mad-men, if we do not think it better than
theirs ?

VI. But to conclude, Cotta in Cicero has neither brought perti-
nent Similitudes, nor given good Advice to Providence. For God,
as a Phyfician, does not give Wine to the fick Perfon to kill him ;
but to one that will die, in order to prevent his dying fooner.
Neither has the Divine Father given an Inheritance to his Sons
that they may wafte it, but has beftow'd it upon mch as will wafte
it, left they fhould want Neceflaries. Whereas, if Cotta had been
Counfellor to Providence, he would have advifed Phyficians to let
their Patients die with Thirft, left fome of them fhould drink too
much ; he would have perfuaded Parents either to kill their Chil-
dren, or never beget them, left they fhould make a bad ufe of their
Eftates when they came to Age. (109.)

VII. From

NOTES.

293

Cicero has
neither
brought ap-
pofite Simi-
les, nor gi-
ven good
Advice to
Providence

(109.) The fame holds good ag.iinft all
B.iy/e's Comparifons, Crit.Dicl. Art. Paulicians,
Rem. E. F. K A A, &c. p. 2488. where he
fays, that to permit Men to fin rather than
over-rule their Wills, is like a Mother that
lets her Daughters go to a Ball, where fhe is
fure they will lofe their Honour, and then
pleads in her own Juftification, " that fhe
" had no mind to reftrain the Liberty of her
" Daughters, nor to fhew a ay Diflruft of
' them." Again f, If a Son fhould fee his
'* Father ready to throw himfelf out of the
" Window, either in a fit of Frenzy, or be-
" caufe he is troubled in Mind, he would
" do well to chain him, if he could not re*
" ftrain him otherwife. If a Queen fhould
" fall into the Water, any Footman that
" fhould get her out of it, either by embra-
" cing her, or taking her by the Hair (|, tho'
" he fnould pluck off above one half of it,
" would do a very good Aftion ; fhe would
" not certainly complain of his want of Re-
** fpett to her. If any one fhould fuffer a

" Lady finely drefs'd to fall into a Precipice,
" would it not be a very foolifh Excufe to
" fay, that it had not been poflible to flop
" her without fpoiling her Ribbons and
" Head-drefs ? " And to name no mere*,

" To have regard to the Free-Will of a
" Man, and carefully to abftain from laying
" any reflraint upon his Inclination, when he
*' is going to lofe his Innocence for ever, to
" be eternally damn'd, can you call that a
" lawful Obfervation of the Laws of Liberty?
" You would be lefs unreafonable if you
" would fay to a Man who gets a Fall near
" you, and breaks his Leg, that which bin-
" der'd us /rem preventing your Fall is, that
" tve to ere afraid t$ undo fome Folds of your
" Gown, we bad fo great a refptcl for its Sy-
" me try, that we would not undertake to fpoil
" it, and we thought it was much better to
" let you run the hazard of breaking your
* Bones," 1 ' &c-

In all which this Author evidently miftakes
the Cafe, by comparing the De/lruilion of Free-

Will

f Crit. Did. p. 2497.

|| Thus S^ Chriflina was taken out of a Lake at Stockholm?.

* P- 2497-

294

The Objec-
tion of Epi-
curus pro-
pofed which
accufes God
of Impotence
if he was not
able ; or of
Envy, if he
was able to
removeEvilf.

'Tis a Con-
tradiction,
that all E-
vils be re-
moved
from crea-
ted Be-
ings : God
is not im-
potent, tier

Of Moral Evil

VII. From the fame Principles we may folve that ftrong Objec-
tion of Epicurus againft. Providence, which Laclantius enforces in his
Book De Ira Dei -j-, and, as fome think, does not fufficiently an-
fwer. It flands thus: *' Either God is willing to remove Evils,
" and not able, or able and not willing, or neither able nor wil-
" ling. If he be willing and not able, he is impotent, which can-
" not be apply'd to the Deity: If he be able and not willing, he
" is envious; which is equally inconiiftent with the Nature of
" God. If he be neither willing nor able, he is both envious and
" impotent, and confequently no God. If he be both willing
" and able, which is the only thing that anfwers to the Notion
M of a God, from whence come Evils ? Or why does he not re-
" move them ?

VIII. We muft take the third of thofe four Branches of his
puzling Argument ; viz. That God neither will nor can remove E-
vils. (no.) Yet we deny the Confequence. He is neither to be e-
fleemed Envious nor Impotent, becaufe he does not work Contra-
dictions :

efore becaufe he does not remove them.

NOTE S,

Will (for that is the only thing, as we have
prov'd, that can prevent the abufe of it)
which Will has been fhewn to be the very
Life and Soul of Man ; to fuch mere trifles as
tearing his Hair, or difcompofing his Habit :
Whereas, from the foregoing account of the
ineftimable Worth of Liberty to each Indivi-
dual, and the many Advantages that arife in
common, even from the abufe of it, it plain-
ly appears, that to abridge, or which is the
very fame, to deprive a Man of Liberty for
fear he fhould abufe it, would, in regard to
him, be juft as good as to knock him on the
Head for fear he mould maim or disfigure

himfelf. And wirh.refpeft to the Publick, he
would be far more unreafonible who fhould
defire the abfence of this Liberty, beciu-fi
of its frequent abufe, than he who fhould
wifli that there were no fuch things as Fire,
Wind, or Water, in the World, becaufe fo
many Men, Houfes, and Ships are deilroy'd by
them. As the reft of Bay/e's elaborate Similes
are founded on the fame Mifreprefentation,
one hint of this kind is, I think, enough to
invalidate them.

(no.) Leibnkz would rather fay, " that
" God could take them away, but he was
" not willing to do it abiblutely ; and for a

very

f ; 12. p.435. Camlr. Edit.

Of Moral Evil.

395

dictions : But it is a Contradiction that all Evils mould be remo-
ved, without removing the whole Univerfe; which would be the
greateft of all Evils. For fome kind of Evils adhere (as we have
often declared) to the very Natures of things, and cannot be remo-
ved while any created Nature continues. For when a Circle is once
made, all the Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference,
mud neceffarily be equal; neither is God impotent becaufe he can-
not make them unequal while it continues to be a Circle: In like
manner, when he has made a Creature, he mull neceffarily tolerate
the Evil of Imperfection in it, which is as efTential to it as an
Equality of the Radij is to the Circle. When therefore Matter,
Motion and Free-Will are conftituted, he muft neceffarily permit
Corruption of things, and the abufe of Liberty, or fomething
worfe. For thefe cannot be feparated (as was fhewn) without a
Contradiction. God therefore is no more impotent becaufe he can-
not remove thefe Evils from things while the things themfelves re-
main, than becaufe he cannot feparate an Equality of the Radij
from a Circle. The Confequence then is falfe which charges God
with Impotence becaufe he cannot remove Evils.

IX. Neither is that AfTertion lefs falfe which attributes it to Envy God always
that he will not. For he that always wills the beft, and the leaft fJXof it'
of many Evils, is abfolutely Good, and the fartheft from Envy: and vils, and
we have fhewn that this is the Cafe with refpect to God. If a l, * ercfor ? is

- not envious.

Perfon

N 7 E S.

41 very good reafon, becaufe he fliould have
" taken away the Good at the fame time, and
" becaufe he fliould have taken away more
" Good than Evil f."

The Anfwer */"La6tantius is as follows. " De-
" us poteft quicquid volet, & imbccillitas vcl
" invidia in Deo nulla eft : poteft igitur nu-
" la tollere, fednonvult, nee ideo tamen in-
" vidus eft, id circo enim non tollit quia fa-
" pientiam (ficut edocui) fimul tribuit, & plus
" eft boni ac jucunditatis in fapientia, quam
" in malis moleftiae ; faplcntia enim fa-

" cit ut etiam Deum cognofcamus & per earn
" cognitionem, immortal itatcm aflequainur,
" quod eft fummnmj&onum. Itaque nifi pri-
" us malum agnoverimuj, ncc poterimus ag
" nofcere Bonum, fed hoc non videt Epicn-
" nu, nee alius qnifquam, ft tollantur mala
" tolli pariter S..pientiam, nee ulla in ha-
" mine remanere virtutis veftigia, cujus ratio
" in fuftinenda & fuperanda malorum a ccrbi-
" tateconfift.it- Itaque propter exiguum com-
" penJium fublatorum malorum, maximo Se
" vero & proprio nobis bono carcftmus.

f Rcmarjues, p. 488.

2 9 6 Of Moral Evil.

Perfon had his Choice either to abolifli or not to abolifh Evil, he
would be malicious if he did not abolifli it. But when the choice
is between this and a greater Evil, he that choofes the lefs is far
from being malicious. The Divine Goodnefs therefore reduces God
to this Difficulty, that he mufl choofe to make either no Creature at
all, or an imperfect one; either no fuch thing as Matter and Mo-
tion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things ; either no
free Agent, or admit a Power of finning. He muft necerTarily have
chofen one of thefe, and 'tis eafy to fay whether of them was more
directly oppofite to Envy.
God could X. To fpeak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, but with Reve-
concdv'd^o rcnce > pronounce, that God would nei her have been infinitely pow-
be infinitely erful nor good, if he could not have made any thing which we call
powerful, if E v il. For there are fome things pofiible which are not confident
able to ere: te with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually deftructive, i.e.
imperfea Be- are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any of
cStures? thefe, how would he be infinitely powerful, fince he could not do
or things that all that is poffible ? Nor would it be lefs injurious to his Goodnefs to
are contrary j^ unw }H} n g f or bv this means his Power muft lie idle and ne-

to each o- . /

ther; i.e. ver effect any thing at all; fince nothing can be fimply Good and
Evils: nor CX empt from all manner of Evil, but God himfelf. If therefore
Good, if he the Divine Goodnefs had deny'd Exiftence to created Beings, on ac-
hadbeen count of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been efteem-
Wmfeif^and 1 e d Envious, fince he had allow'd none to exift befide himfelf, and
deny'd Exi- while he refufed to admit of any kind of Evil, he would have re-
ften " t0 ^ jeded all the Good. Thus vaniihes this Herculean Argument, which

induced the 'Epicureans to difcard the good Deity, and the Manichc-

ans to fubftitute an Evil one.
Epicurus xi. Epicurus then is both a Deceiver and deceived himfelf,

is deceiv'd when from the prefent Evils he concludes againfl: the Omnipotence
who en- and Goodnefs of the Deity, Whereas on the contrary God would
to attri- neither have been powerful nor Good if he had not tolerated E-
bute im- vils. From a competition or (if we may be allow'd the expreffion)
P dEnv a C n flift of two Infinites, i. e. Omnipotence and Goodnefs, Evils ne-
to the Dei- . cefTarily

ty, when

he ought to have inferr'd the higheft Power and Goodnefs.

Of Moral Evil ^ * ~

cefTarily arife. Thefe Attributes amicably confpire together, and yet
reflrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Op-
pofkion between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Sha-
dow and Refemblance. Here then, and no where elfe, may we find
the Primary and moll certain Rife and Origin of Evils j and here
only muft we look for that celebrated Principle of the Antients

The Peftilential Strife and Bloody Fight.

Empedocles.

A P P E N-

Q~q

3*8

APPENDIX:

Concerning the Divine Laws.

Why God made Laws when he knew that they
would not be obferv'd.

r pofitivc

The Divine * /"' * H E Divine Laws are either thofe which God has implan-
Lawsareei- tea 1 in the Nature of every Being, or thofe which he has

ther natunl JL publim'd to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain

Mejj'engers chofen and fent for this Purpofe. For fince a
haw is the Will of a fuperior fujficiently promulg'd to an Inferior ,
and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Punijhment : 'tis,
plain that God may be conceiv'd to nave made this Declaration of
his Will to his Creatures two Ways : Firft, by giving them fuch a
Nature as requires that fome things be done, and others avoided, in
order to its Prefer vation : thofe things which are made known to us
in this manner, are commanded or forbidden, we fay, by the Law
of Nature : and that Lav/ which thus difcovers itfelf to our Under-
Handing

ATTENDIX.

derftanding we look upon as the Will of God promulg'd to his Crea-
tures: For we are very certain that God, according to his Goodnefs,
wills the Good and Prefervaticn of all things which he himfelf has
made, as far as is pofllble : and confequently hates any thing that is
hurtful to the Creature.

II. N